Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35517/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35517-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alaska Forest Association
Amicus Curiae
Alaska Forest Association, Inc.

Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Association
Appellee
Cascadia Wildlands
Appellee
Center for Biological Diversity
Appellee
Defenders of Wildlife
Appellee
Greenpeace, Inc.
Appellee
Natural Resources Defense Council
Appellee
Organized Village of Kake
Appellee
Harris Sherman

Sierra Club
Appellee
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
Appellee
State of Alaska
Appellant
The Boat Company
Appellee
Tom Tidwell

Tongass Conservation Society
Appellee
United States Department of Agriculture

United States Forest Service

Tom Vilsack

Wrangell Resource Council
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE; THE

BOAT COMPANY; ALASKA

WILDERNESS RECREATION AND

TOURISM ASSOCIATION; SOUTHEAST

ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL;

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL; TONGASS CONSERVATION

SOCIETY; GREENPEACE, INC.;

WRANGELL RESOURCE COUNCIL;

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; CASCADIA WILDLANDS;

SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE; UNITED STATES

FOREST SERVICE; TOM VILSACK, in

his official capacity as Secretary of

Agriculture; HARRIS SHERMAN, in

his official capacity as Under

Secretary of Agriculture of Natural

Resources and Environment; TOM

TIDWELL, in his official capacity as

Chief, USDA Forest Service,

Defendants,

No. 11-35517

D.C. No.

1:09-cv-00023-

JWS

OPINION

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 1 of 63
2 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

ALASKA FOREST ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendant,

and

STATE OF ALASKA,

Intervenor-Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

December 16, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 29, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Harry

Pregerson, Alex Kozinski, William A. Fletcher, Richard C.

Tallman, Richard R. Clifton, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan

D. Smith, Jr., Morgan Christen, Jacqueline H. Nguyen,

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz;

Concurrence by Judge Christen;

Dissent by Judge Callahan;

Dissent by Judge M. Smith, Jr.;

Dissent by Judge Kozinski

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 2 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 3

SUMMARY*

Environmental Law

The en banc court affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of the Organized Village of Kake, finding

that the United States Department of Agriculture’s

promulgation of the Tongass National Forest Exemption to

the Department’s “Roadless Rule” (limiting road construction

and timber harvesting in national forests) violated the

Administrative Procedure Act; vacated the Tongass

Exemption; and reinstated application of the Roadless Rule

to the Tongass National Forest in Alaska.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture declined to appeal,

but intervenor-defendant State of Alaska appealed. Under the

National Forest Receipts program, Alaska has a right to

twenty-five percent of gross receipts of timber sales from

national forests in the State.

In 2001, the Department of Agriculture promulgated the

Roadless Rule, and expressly refused to exempt the Tongass

National Forest from the Rule (the “2001 Record of

Decision”). In 2003, relying on the identical factual record

complied in 2001, the Department reversed course and found

that application of the Roadless Rule to Tongass was

unnecessary. The Department’s 2003 Record of Decision

promulgated the Tongass Exemption.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 3 of 63
4 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

The en banc court held that the effect of the Roadless

Rule on Alaska’s statutory entitlement to timber receipts

meant that the State of Alaska had an interest in the judgment

sufficient to establish Article III standing. The en banc court

also held that the 2003 Record of Decision fell short of

Administrative Procedure Act requirements. The en banc

court further held that the Tongass Exemption was invalid

because the Department failed to provide a reasoned

explanation for contradicting the findings in the 2001 Record

of Decision. As a remedy, the en banc court upheld the

district court’s reinstatement of the Roadless Rule which

remained in effect and applied to the Tongass Forest.

Concurring, Judge Christen, joined by Chief Judge

Thomas, wrote separately to voice her view that there was no

indication that the district court judge who first ruled in this

case decided it based on his own view, and this court did not

do so either.

Dissenting, Judge Callahan would hold that Alaska does

not have Article IIIstanding to appeal, and the appeal should

be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Judge

Callahan also joined Judge M. Smith’s dissent on the merits,

and would reverse and remand.

Dissenting,Judge M. Smith, joined byKozinski, Tallman,

Clifton, and Callahan, wrote that the Department of

Agriculture followed President Bush’s policy instructions

when it amended the Roadless Rule in 2003, and the agency’s

explanations for its decisions easily met the requirements of

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–15

(2000) (holding that a court should not substitute its judgment

for that of an agency and should uphold an agency decision

where the agency’s path may be reasonably discerned). 

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 4 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 5

Judge M. Smith would hold that the Department was not

arbitrary and capricious in 2003 when it exempted the

Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Rule, and would

reverse the district court’s decision. He would also remand

to the district court to consider the Village’s National

Environmental Policy Act claims in the first instance.

Dissenting, Judge Kozinski joined Judge M. Smith’s

dissent in full, and wrote separately to note the glacial pace of

administrative litigation.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 5 of 63
6 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

COUNSEL

Dario Borghesan (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Anchorage, Alaska; Thomas E. Lenhart, Assistant Attorney

General, Juneau, Alaska, forIntervenor-Defendant–Appellant

State of Alaska.

Thomas S. Waldo (argued) and Eric P. Jorgensen,

Earthjustice, Juneau, Alaska; Nathaniel S.W. Lawrence,

Natural Resources Defense Council, Olympia, Washington,

for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Julie A. Weis, Haglund Kelley Jones & Wilder LLP,

Portland, Oregon, for Amicus Curiae Alaska Forest

Association, Inc.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 6 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 7

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

In 2001, the United States Department of Agriculture

promulgated the “Roadless Rule,” limiting road construction

and timber harvesting in national forests. The Department

expressly found that exempting the Tongass National Forest

from this Rule “would risk the loss of important roadless area

[ecological] values.” Just two years later, relying on the

identical factual record compiled in 2001, the Department

reversed course, finding “[a]pplication of the roadless rule to

the Tongass . . . unnecessary to maintain the roadless values.”

The issue in this case is whether the Department

sufficiently explained this dramatically changed finding. 

Like the district court, we conclude that the Administrative

Procedure Act requires a reasoned explanation for this change

in course, and affirm the judgment below.

I.

A. The 2001 Roadless Rule

Approximatelyone-third of National Forest Service lands,

some 58.5 million acres, is designated by the Department of

Agriculture as inventoried roadless areas. See Special Areas;

Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3245 (Jan.

12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 294.10–294.14) (the

“2001 ROD”). These “large, relatively undisturbed

landscapes” have a variety of scientific, environmental,

recreational, and aesthetic attributes and characteristics

unique to roadless areas, which the Department refers to as

“roadless values.” Id. at 3245, 3251. As the 2001 ROD

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 7 of 63
8 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

explained, these include healthy watersheds critical for

catching and storing water, protecting downstream

communities from flooding, providing clean water for

domestic and agricultural purposes, and supporting healthy

fish and wildlife populations. Id. at 3245. Roadless area

attributes also include habitats for threatened and endangered

species, space for wilderness recreation, environments for

research, traditional cultural properties and sacred sites, and

defensive zones against invasive species. Id.

Inventoried roadless lands were historically managed

through local- and forest-level plans. Id. at 3246–47. In

2000, citing the “costly and time-consuming appeals and

litigation” that plagued this process, id. at 3244, the

Department considered a national roadless lands policy that

would look at “the ‘whole picture’ regarding the management

of the National Forest System,” id. at 3246–48. The

Department undertook to answer two questions when it

started this process. The first was whether to prohibit timber

harvesting and road construction (or reconstruction) within

inventoried roadless areas of our national forests. Id. at 3262. 

The second question recognized the unique nature of the

Tongass National Forest, which, at 16.8 million acres, is the

nation’s largest national forest.1Id. The issue was whether

to exempt the Tongass from the proposed Roadless Rule in

whole or in part. Id. at 3262–63. Thus, the Department

1 The Tongass is vitally important to the economy of Southeast Alaska;

it supports significant timber and mining activity as well as commercial

and recreational fishing, hunting, recreation, and tourism. The Tongass

is also part of the Pacific coast ecoregion, which encompasses one fourth

ofthe world’s coastal temperate rainforests. Id. at 3254. The Tongass has

a very high degree of ecosystem health, and a higher percentage of

inventoried roadless acreage than any Forest Service region in the

contiguous United States.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 8 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 9

examined four alternatives for treating the Tongass under the

Roadless Rule: applying any new rule to the Tongass with no

exceptions (Tongass Not Exempt), excluding the Tongass

from a new rule altogether (Tongass Exempt), postponing any

decision on the application of a new rule to the Tongass until

2004 (Tongass Deferred), and applying some of the

prohibitions of a new rule only to certain parts of the Tongass

(Tongass Selected Areas). Id. No other national forest

received such special consideration in the Department’s

nationwide assessment of the proposed Roadless Rule.

Given the unique importance of the Tongass and the

many competing interests in its use and management, it was

not surprising that thousands of public comments concerning

the proposed rule were received, or that the Department gave

the Tongass special consideration. Id. at 3248. 

Approximately 16,000 people attended 187 public meetings,

and the Department received more than 517,000 comments

on the proposed rule. Id. The 2001 ROD squarely

recognized that adopting the Roadless Rule risked significant

and negative local economic impact for the Tongass:

With the recent closure of pulp mills and the

ending of long-term timber sale contracts, the

timber economy of Southeast Alaska is

evolving to a competitive bid process. About

two-thirds of the total timber harvest planned

on the Tongass National Forest over the next

5 years is projected to come from inventoried

roadless areas. If road construction were

immediately prohibited in inventoried

roadless areas, approximately 95 percent of

the timber harvest within those areas would be

eliminated.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 9 of 63
10 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

* * *

Based on the analysis contained in the [Final

Environmental Impact Statement], a decision

to implement the rule on the Tongass National

Forest is expected to cause additional adverse

economic effects to some forest dependent

communities ([Final Environmental Impact

Statement] Vol. 1, 3-326 to 3-350). During

the period of transition, an estimated 114

direct timber jobs and 182 total jobs would be

affected. In the longer term, an additional 269

direct timber jobs and 431 total jobs may be

lost in Southeast Alaska.

Id. at 3254–55.

In light of these socio-economic concerns, the proposed

Roadless Rule suggested the Tongass Deferred option. See

Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 65 Fed. Reg.

30,276, 30,277, 30,280–81 (May 10, 2000) (notice of

proposed rulemaking). But the 2001 ROD expressly found

that such an approach “would risk the loss of important

roadless area values” in the Tongass. 66 Fed. Reg. at 3254. 

The 2001 ROD also rejected the Tongass Selected Areas

option, finding that even under that more limited approach,

“[i]mportant roadless area values would be lost or

diminished.” Id. at 3266. Ultimately, the Department

adopted a national Roadless Rule prohibiting road

construction and timber harvesting in inventoried roadless

areas of the National Forest System except for specified

“human and environmental protection measures.” Id. at

3263. The Department decided that the Roadless Rule would

apply to the Tongass, but with several exceptions designed to

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 10 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 11

mitigate the impacts of the Rule in Southeast Alaska. The

exceptions allowed: (1) road construction and reconstruction

in certain mineral-leasing areas, (2) timber harvest in areas

where roadless characteristics had been substantially altered

by road construction or timber harvest since the area was

designated an inventoried roadless area but before

implementation of the Roadless Rule, and (3) planned timber

harvest and road construction in areas where a notice of

availability of a draft environmental impact statement had

been published in the Federal Register prior to publication of

the Roadless Rule. Id. at 3266. The Department estimated

that these exceptions would together allow enough continued

timber harvest from the Tongass “to satisfy about seven years

of estimated market demand.” Id.

B. The Roadless Rule Litigation

Although the Department intended the Roadless Rule to

reduce litigation about forest management, see id. at 3244,

3246, that hope was promptly dashed. Litigation over the

Roadless Rule began immediately after its adoption. In 2001,

an Idaho district judge preliminarilyenjoined implementation

of the Roadless Rule, citing violations of the National

Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347

(“NEPA”). Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, No.

01-10-N-EJL, 2001 WL 1141275, at *2 (D. Idaho May 10,

2001). This court reversed, finding that plaintiffs had not

shown a likelihood of success on their NEPA claim. 

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1126

(9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness

Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1178–80 (9th Cir.

2011) (en banc). The Roadless Rule took effect when the

Kootenai mandate issued in April 2003. See California ex

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 11 of 63
12 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th

Cir. 2009) (describing history of the Roadless Rule).

The State of Alaska also challenged the Roadless Rule

soon after its adoption. The State’s complaint, filed in the

District of Alaska in 2001, claimed that the promulgation of

the Roadless Rule violated NEPA, the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (“APA”), the

Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 3101–3233 (“ANILCA”), the Tongass Timber Reform

Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990) (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (“TTRA”), and

other federal statutes. Complaint, Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., No. 3:01-cv-00039-JKS (D. Alaska Jan. 31, 2001),

ECF No. 1; see also Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 776 F. Supp. 2d 960, 964 (D. Alaska 2011)

(describing this litigation). The case settled, and Alaska’s

complaint was dismissed.2 Organized Vill., 776 F. Supp. 2d

at 964.

Four months after this court decided Kootenai, the

Roadless Rule was permanently enjoined by a Wyoming

district court that found the rule violated both NEPA and the

Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136. Wyoming v. U.S.

Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003),

vacated, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207,

1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2005). While that ruling was on

2 Alaska again challenged the validity of the Roadless Rule in 2011, this

time in the District ofColumbia. The district court found the action barred

by the statute of limitations. Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 932 F. Supp.

2d 30, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2013). The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the

limitations period had reset when the Roadless Rule was reinstated in

2006. Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 772 F.3d 899, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

This litigation remains pending.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 12 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 13

appeal, the Department promulgated the “Special Areas; State

Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management” rule

(the “State Petitions Rule”). 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May 13,

2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 294.10–294.18). The

State Petitions Rule replaced the Roadless Rule with a

process under which the “Governor of any State or territory

that contains National Forest System lands” could “petition

the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations

establishing management requirements for all or any portion

of National Forest System inventoried roadless areas within

that State or territory.” Id. at 25,661. In light of the new rule,

the Tenth Circuit dismissed the Department’s appeal from the

Wyoming district court judgment as moot and vacated the

judgment. Wyoming, 414 F.3d at 1211, 1214.

A year later, however, a California district court set aside

the State Petitions Rule, finding it invalid under NEPA and

the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544; the

district court therefore reinstated the Roadless Rule. 

California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F.

Supp. 2d 874, 909, 912, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2006). This court

affirmed. Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1021. In 2008, a Wyoming

district court again permanently enjoined the Roadless Rule. 

Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1355

(D. Wyo. 2008), rev’d, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

661 F.3d 1209, 1272 (10th Cir. 2011). In 2011, the Tenth

Circuit once again reversed. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1272.

C. The Tongass Exemption

In return for Alaska’s dismissal of its 2001 suit

challenging the Roadless Rule, the Department agreed to

publish (but not necessarily to adopt) a proposed rule, the

“Tongass Exemption,” to “temporarily exempt the Tongass

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 13 of 63
14 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

from the application of the roadless rule” as well as an

advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to permanently

exempt the Tongass and another Alaska national forest from

the Roadless Rule. See Special Areas; Roadless Area

Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass National Forest,

Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,865, 41,866 (Jul. 15, 2003) (notice

of proposed rulemaking). In December of 2003, the

Department issued a record of decision (the “2003 ROD”)

promulgating the final Tongass Exemption, the “Special

Areas; Roadless Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass

National Forest, Alaska” rule. 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136 (Dec. 30,

2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.14). The 2003 ROD

expressly found that “the overall decisionmaking picture”

was not “substantially different” from when the 2001 ROD

was promulgated, id. at 75,141, and that public comments

about the Tongass Exemption “raised no new issues . . . not

already fully explored” in the earlier rulemaking, id. at

75,139. Thus, the Department relied on the 2001 Roadless

Rule Final Environmental Impact Statement (“Roadless Rule

FEIS”), rather than preparing a new one. Id. at 75,136,

75,141.

The 2003 ROD adopted the Tongass Exempt Alternative

identified in the 2001 ROD, thus returning the Tongass to

management through a local forest plan, the Tongass Forest

Plan. Id. at 75,136. Contrary to the 2001 ROD, the 2003

ROD concluded “[a]pplication of the roadless rule to the

Tongass is unnecessary to maintain the roadless values of

these areas,” id. at 75,137, which the Department found were

already “well protected by the Tongass Forest Plan,” id. at

75,144.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 14 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 15

D. The Procedural History of This Case

In 2009, the Organized Village of Kake and others

(collectively, the “Village”) filed this suit in the District of

Alaska, alleging that the Tongass Exemption violated NEPA

and the APA. See Organized Vill., 776 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 

The State of Alaska intervened as a party-defendant. Id. at

961. The district court granted summary judgment to the

Village, finding the promulgation of the Tongass Exemption

violated the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), because “the Forest

Service provided no reasoned explanation as to why the

Tongass Forest Plan protections it found deficient in [2001],

were deemed sufficient in [2003].” Id. at 974, 977. The court

thus vacated the Tongass Exemption and reinstated

application of the Roadless Rule to the Tongass.3Id. at 977.

The Department declined to appeal. See Organized Vill.

of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.

2014). Alaska, however, did appeal, and a divided threejudge panel of this court reversed the district court’s APA

ruling and remanded for consideration of the Village’s NEPA

claim.4Id. at 973, 980. A majority of the nonrecused active

judges on this court then voted to grant the Village’s petition

for rehearing en banc. See Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S.

Dep’t of Agric., 765 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014).

3 Because the court found the Tongass Exemption invalid under the

APA, it did not reach the Village’s NEPA claim. Organized Vill., 776 F.

Supp. 2d at 976.

4 The Alaska Forest Association also intervened below, but did not

appeal, instead filing a brief as amicus curiae. Amicus Brief, Organized

Vill., No. 11-35517 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011), ECF No.19.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 15 of 63
16 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

II.

A. Jurisdiction

We begin, as we did in Kootenai, by examining “whether

the intervenor[] may defend the government’s alleged

violations of . . . the APA when the federal defendants have

decided not to appeal.” 313 F.3d at 1107. Although the

Village does not challenge Alaska’s standing, that silence

does not excuse us from determining whether we have

appellate jurisdiction. United Investors Life Ins. Co. v.

Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2004).5

“[I]ntervenors are considered parties entitled . . . to seek

review,” but “an intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the

absence of the party on whose side intervention was

permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that

he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.” Diamond v. Charles,

476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986). To establish Article III standing, a

party must demonstrate “injury in fact,” causation, and

redressability. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 

When the original defendant does not appeal, “the test is

whether the intervenor’s interests have been adversely

affected by the judgment.” Didrickson v. U.S. Dep’t of

Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).

Under the National Forest Receipts program, Alaska has

a right to twenty-five percent of gross receipts of timber sales

from national forests in the State. See 16 U.S.C. § 500. 

5 The D.C. Circuit did not question Alaska’s standing in the litigation

before that court about the 2001 ROD. Alaska, 772 F.3d at 899–900.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 16 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 17

Accordingly, from 1970 through 2001, Alaska received more

than $93 million in Tongass receipts. The permitted amount

of timber harvesting in the Tongass is directly affected by the

Tongass Exemption. See 2001 ROD, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3270

(finding that under the Roadless Rule, “[h]arvest effects on

the Tongass National Forest will be reduced about 18 percent

in the short-term” and “about 60 percent” in the long-term). 

The effect of the Roadless Rule on Alaska’s statutory

entitlement to timber receipts means that Alaska has an

interest in the judgment, Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338,

sufficient to establish Article IIIstanding, see Watt v. Energy

Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1981).

Our dissenting colleague argues that Article III standing

is absent because “Congress did not intend to legislate

standing” for a state under 16 U.S.C. § 500. This argument

misses the mark. As the Supreme Court has recently made

clear, whether Congress created a private cause of action in

legislation is not a question of Article III standing. See

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.

Ct. 1377, 1386–88 & n.4 (2014). Notwithstanding that courts

sometimes have mistakenly referred to this inquiry as

involving “prudential standing,” the Court has made plain

that it “does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the

court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the

case.” Id. at 1387 & n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(noting that “prudential standing” is a “misnomer”). Here,

Alaska does not pursue a claim under the National Forest

Receipts program. Rather, this is an APA action initiated by

the Village challenging the Tongass Exemption. In such an

action, we apply the familiar “zone of interests” test. Id. at

1388–89. The Supreme Court has emphasized,

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 17 of 63
18 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

in the APA context, that the test is not

especially demanding. In that context we

have often conspicuously included the word

“arguably” in the test to indicate that the

benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff, and

have said that the test forecloses suit only

when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally

related to or inconsistent with the purposes

implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably

be assumed that Congress authorized that

plaintiff to sue. That lenient approach is an

appropriate means of preserving the flexibility

of the APA’s omnibus judicial-review

provision, which permits suit for violations of

numerous statutes of varying character that do

not themselves include causes of action for

judicial review. We have made clear,

however, that the breadth of the zone of

interests varies according to the provisions of

law at issue, so that what comes within the

zone of interests of a statute for purposes of

obtaining judicial review of administrative

action under the generous review provisions

of the APA may not do so for other purposes.

Id. at 1389 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

There can be no doubt that the Village more than amply

met the forgiving “zone of interests” test when it instituted

this APA action. That resolves the issue, because “[a]n

intervenor’s standing to pursue an appeal does not hinge upon

whether the intervenor could have sued the party who

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 18 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 19

prevailed in the district court.” Didrickson, 982 F.2d at

1338.6

Of course, Alaska must also have Article III standing. 

Thus, the only issue really before us is whether the judgment

below threatens Alaska with an injury in fact that gives the

State a “stake in defending . . . enforcement” of the Tongass

Exemption sufficient to satisfy Article III. Hollingsworth v.

Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In this respect, contrary to the dissent, Energy

Action Educational Foundation is on all fours. Under the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978

(“OCS”), the federal government was required to share

revenues from a federal OCS lease with a state owning

adjoining portions of an oil and gas pool. Energy Action

Educ. Found., 454 U.S. at 160–61. When California

challenged the bidding system used for awarding federal

leases, the Secretary of the Interior disputed the State’s

standing. Id. In finding that California alleged a potential

injury sufficient to establish Article III standing, the Court

relied expressly on the State’s right to revenues under the

1978 OCS amendments:

The 1978 Amendments require the Federal

Government to turn over a fair share of the

revenues of an OCS lease to the neighboring

6 Even if we were required to determine whether Alaska satisfied the

zone of interest test in this action, the answer would be the same. The

State’s interests in timber harvesting, road construction, and economic

development are directly impacted by the Tongass Exemption, and are

extensively discussed in the 2003 ROD. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish

Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)

(explaining that APA standing requires only that a party’s interests be

“marginally” related to the challenged action).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 19 of 63
20 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

coastal State whenever the Federal

Government and the State own adjoining

portions of an OCS oil and gas pool. 

California thus has a direct financial stake in

federal OCS leasing off the California coast. 

In alleging that the bidding systems currently

used by the Secretary of the Interior are

incapable of producing a fair market return,

California clearly asserts the kind of distinct

and palpable injury that is required for

standing.

Id. at 160–61 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).7

The royalties due California under the OCS are

indistinguishable for Article III purposes from the fractional

timber receipts due Alaska under the National Forest Receipts

program. It is not disputed that reinstatement of the Roadless

Rule in the Tongass will limit timbering and thereby reduce

Alaska’s statutory entitlement to fractional receipts. Alaska’s

claimed injury is thus precisely the same kind of “injury in

fact” alleged by California with respect to the federal lease

7 Contrary to the dissent, the Court did not rely on California’s

ownership of adjacent oil deposits in finding a sufficient injury to establish

Article III standing. Although the Court properly noted that the OCS

required the Secretary “to use the best bidding systems and thereby assure

California a fair return for its resources,” Energy Action Educ. Found.,

454 U.S. at 161, it did so when analyzing causation and redressability

after it had already found that California’s right to statutory payment

established the requisite injury in fact.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 20 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 21

bidding system—loss of funds promised under federal

law—and satisfies Article III’s standing requirement.8

To be sure, Alaska and its government subdivisions have

elected since 2001 to receive payments under the Secure

Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of

2000, Pub. L. No. 106-393, 114 Stat. 1607, and successor

legislation, in lieu of the fractional payments.9 But,

Congress’s current decision to protect beneficiaries of the

National Forest Receipts program against declines in

timbering revenues does not vitiate Alaska’s Article III

standing to challenge the reinstatement of the Roadless Rule. 

The Rule directly affects the size of Alaska’s statutory

entitlement to receipts from timbering, whether or not

Congress chooses in any year to hold the state harmless

against those losses, just as a plaintiff with an insurance

policy has standing to sue a defendant who has damaged his

home, even though in the end the insurer (or even the

8 The dissent correctly does not contest that the causation and

redressability prongs of Article III standing are satisfied here.

9 The Secure Rural Schools Act was reauthorized numerous times before

it briefly expired in 2014. See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care,

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act § 5401,

Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007); Emergency Economic

Stabilization Act § 601, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008);

Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act § 100101, Pub. L. No.

112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012); Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 § 10(a),

Pub. L. No. 113-40, 127 Stat. 534 (2013). The Secure Rural Schools Act

was reauthorized for two years on April 27, 2015. See Medicare Access

and CHIP Reauthorization Act § 524, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87

(2015).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 21 of 63
22 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

homeowner’s uncle) has agreed to indemnify the homeowner

for all losses.10

B. The APA claim

1. The APA Requirements for a Change of Agency

Policy

The APA requires a court to “hold unlawful and set aside

agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A)

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Agency

action is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has . . .

offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of

agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S.,

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983). “Unexplained inconsistency” between agencyactions

is “a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary

and capricious change.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.

Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005).

The Supreme Court addressed the application of the APA

to agency policy changes in FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). In Fox, the Court held that a

policy change complies with the APA if the agency

(1) displays “awareness that it is changing position,”

(2) shows that “the new policy is permissible under the

10 Because the Roadless Rule’s impact on Alaska’s right to fractional

receipts under the National Forest Receipts program suffices to establish

Article III injury in fact, we need not consider other possible bases for

Article III standing.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 22 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 23

statute,” (3) “believes” the new policy is better, and

(4) provides “good reasons” for the new policy, which, if the

“new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those

which underlay its prior policy,” must include “a reasoned

explanation . . . for disregarding facts and circumstances that

underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.” Id. at

515–16 (emphasis omitted).

Fox involved the FCC’s decision to treat isolated uses of

non-literal profanity in television broadcasts as indecency, a

reversal of agency policy. Id. at 508–10. Because the FCC

had not based its prior policy on factual findings, but rather

on its reading of Supreme Court precedent, the Fox majority

did not explore the kind of “reasoned explanation” necessary

to justify a policy change that rested on changed factual

findings. See id. at 538 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But,

Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence provided the fifth vote

in the Fox 5–4 majority, plumbed this issue in his opinion. 

See id. at 535–39.

As a paradigm of the rule that a policy change violates the

APA “if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier

factual findings without reasoned explanation for doing so,”

Justice Kennedy cited State Farm. Id. at 537. That case

involved congressional direction to an agency to issue

regulations for “motor vehicle safety.” Id. (quoting State

Farm, 463 U.S. at 33). The agency issued a regulation

requiring cars to have airbags or automatic seatbelts, finding

that “these systems save lives.” Id. at 537–38 (citing State

Farm, 463 U.S. at 35, 37). After a change in presidential

administrations, however, the agency rescinded the

regulation, never addressing its previous findings. Id. at 538

(citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 47–48). As Justice Kennedy

noted, the “Court found the agency’s rescission arbitrary and

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 23 of 63
24 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

capricious because the agency did not address its prior factual

findings.” Id. (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49–51).

The central issue in this case is whether the 2003 ROD

rests on factual findings contradicting those in the 2001 ROD,

and thus must contain the “more substantial justification” or

reasoned explanation mandated by Fox. Perez v. Mortg.

Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015). We conclude

that the 2003 ROD falls short of these APA requirements.

2. The Tongass Exemption Violated the APA

After compiling a detailed factual record, the Department

found in the 2001 ROD that “the long-term ecological

benefits to the nation of conserving these inventoried roadless

areas outweigh the potential economic loss to [southeast

Alaska] communities” from application of the Roadless Rule. 

66 Fed. Reg. at 3255. On precisely the same record, the 2003

ROD instead concluded that the “the social and economic

hardships to Southeast Alaska outweigh the potential

long-term ecological benefits” of the Roadless Rule. 68 Fed.

Reg. at 75,141. Alaska contends, and we agree, that the 2003

ROD is a change in policy.

We also agree with Alaska that the 2003 ROD complies

with three of the Fox requirements. First, the Department

displayed “awareness that it is changing position.” Fox,

556 U.S. at 515. The 2003 ROD acknowledges that the

Department rejected the Tongass Exemption in 2001 and

recognizes that it is now “treating the Tongass differently.” 

68 Fed. Reg. at 75,139. Second, the 2003 ROD asserts that

“the new policy is permissible” under the relevant statutes,

ANILCA and TTRA. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515; 68 Fed. Reg. at

75,142. Third, we assume the Department “believes” the new

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 24 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 25

policy is better because it decided to adopt it. Fox, 556 U.S.

at 515 (emphasis omitted).

It is the Department’s compliance with the fourth Fox

requirement, that it give “good reasons” for adopting the new

policy, upon which this case turns. Id. The 2003 ROD

explicitly identifies the Department’s reasons for “Going

Forward With This Rulemaking” as “(1) serious concerns

about the previously disclosed economic and social hardships

that application of the rule’s prohibitions would cause in

communities throughout Southeast Alaska, (2) comments

received on the proposed rule, and (3) litigation over the last

two years.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,137. We examine below

whether these constitute “good reasons” under the APA, and

whether a factual finding contrary to the findings in the 2001

ROD underlays the Department’s reasoning.

i. Socioeconomic Concerns

The 2003 ROD explains the Department’s reversal of

course as arising out of concern about “economic and social

hardships that application of the [roadless]rule’s prohibitions

would cause in communities throughout Southeast Alaska.” 

Id. Those concerns were not new. In both the 2001 and 2003

RODs, the Department acknowledged the “unique”

socioeconomic consequences of the Roadless Rule for the

timber-dependent communities of southeast Alaska. See id.

at 75,139; 2001 ROD, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3266. For this reason,

the Roadless Rule included special mitigation measures—not

added for anyother national forest—allowing certain ongoing

timber and road construction projects in the Tongass to move

forward. 2001 ROD, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3266. Moreover, both

RODs incorporated potential job loss analysis from the

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 25 of 63
26 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

Roadless Rule FEIS. See 2003 ROD, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,137;

2001 ROD, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3255.

We do not question that the Department was entitled in

2003 to give more weight to socioeconomic concerns than it

had in 2001, even on precisely the same record. “Fox makes

clear that this kind of reevaluation is well within an agency’s

discretion.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d

1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2012). There was a change in

presidential administrations just days after the Roadless Rule

was promulgated in 2001. Elections have policy

consequences. But, State Farm teaches that even when

reversing a policy after an election, an agencymay not simply

discard prior factual findings without a reasoned explanation.

That is preciselywhat happened here. The 2003 ROD did

not simply rebalance old facts to arrive at the new policy. 

Rather, it made factual findings directly contrary to the 2001

ROD and expressly relied on those findings to justify the

policy change. The 2001 ROD explicitly found that wholly

exempting the Tongass from the Roadless Rule and returning

it to management under the Tongass Forest Plan “would risk

the loss of important roadless area values,” 66 Fed. Reg. at

3254, and that roadless values would be “lost or diminished”

even by a limited exemption, id. at 3266. The 2003 ROD

found in direct contradiction that the Roadless Rule was

“unnecessary to maintain the roadless values,” 68 Fed. Reg.

at 75,137, and “the roadless values in the Tongass are

sufficiently protected under the Tongass Forest Plan,” id. at

75,138.

There can be no doubt that the 2003 finding was a critical

underpinning of the Tongass Exemption. The 2003 ROD

states that “[t]he Department has concluded that the social

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 26 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 27

and economic hardships to Southeast Alaska outweigh the

potential long-term ecological benefits because the Tongass

Forest Plan adequately provides for the ecological

sustainability of the Tongass.” Id. at 75,141–42 (emphasis

added). The 2003 ROD also makes plain that “[t]his decision

reflects the facts . . . that roadless values are plentiful on the

Tongass and are well protected by the Tongass Forest Plan. 

The minor risk of the loss of such values is outweighed by the

by the more certain socioeconomic costs of applying the

roadless rule’s prohibitions to the Tongass.” Id. at 75,144.

Thus, contrary to the contentions of both Alaska and

dissenting colleagues, this is not a case in which the

Department—or a new Executive—merely decided that it

valued socioeconomic concerns more highly than

environmental protection. Rather, the 2003 ROD rests on the

express finding that the Tongass Forest Plan poses only

“minor” risks to roadless values; this is a direct, and entirely

unexplained, contradiction of the Department’s finding in the

2001 ROD that continued forest management under precisely

the same plan was unacceptable because it posed a high risk

to the “extraordinary ecological values of the Tongass.” 

66 Fed. Reg. at 3254. The Tongass Exemption thus plainly

“rests upon factual findings that contradict those which

underlay its prior policy.” Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. The

Department was required to provide a “reasoned explanation

. . . for disregarding” the “facts and circumstances” that

underlay its previous decision. Id. at 516; Perez, 135 S. Ct.

at 1209. It did not.

Consistent with Fox, we have previously held that

unexplained conflicting findings about the environmental

impacts of a proposed agency action violate the APA. In

Humane Society of the United States v. Locke, we confronted

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 27 of 63
28 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

a determination by the National Marine Fisheries Service that

sea lions posed a “significant negative impact” on fish

populations, and could therefore be “lethally removed.” 

626 F.3d 1040, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2010). The agency had

made four previous findings, however, that comparable or

greater dangers to similar fish populations would not have a

significant adverse impact. Id. at 1048. We found that the

APA required the agency to provide a “rationale to explain

the disparate findings.” Id. at 1049 (citing Fox, 556 U.S.

502).

The same result is mandated here. The 2003 ROD does

not explain why an action that it found posed a prohibitive

risk to the Tongass environment only two years before now

poses merely a “minor” one. The absence of a reasoned

explanation for disregarding previous factual findings

violates the APA. “An agency cannot simply disregard

contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made

in the past, any more than it can ignore inconvenient facts

when it writes on a blank slate.” Fox, 556 U.S. at 537

(Kennedy, J., concurring).

Of course, not every violation of the APA invalidates an

agency action; rather, it is the burden of the opponent of the

action to demonstrate than an error is prejudicial. Jicarilla

Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1121

(D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396,

409 (2009) (“This Court has said that the party that seeks to

have a judgment set aside because of an erroneous ruling

carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

But the required demonstration of prejudice is “not . . . a

particularly onerous requirement.” Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 410. 

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 28 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 29

“If prejudice is obvious to the court, the party challenging

agency action need not demonstrate anything further.” 

Jicarilla, 613 F.3d at 1121. Because the Department’s 2003

finding that the threat to the environment from the Tongass

Exemption had now become “minor” is the centerpiece of its

policy change, the absence of a reasoned explanation for that

new factual finding is not harmless error. See Cal.

Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072,

1091–92 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Shinseki prejudice review

to rulemaking). The Tongass Exemption therefore cannot

stand.

ii. The Department’s Other Rationales

Although we conclude that the Tongass Exemption is

invalid because the Department failed to provide a reasoned

explanation for contradicting the findings in the 2001 ROD,

we also briefly consider the two other rationales offered by

the Department. These rationales do not rest on factual

findings contrary to the 2001 ROD, but neither withstands

even the forgiving general requirement that the proffered

reason for agency action not be “implausible.” State Farm,

463 U.S. at 43.

The second of the three reasons given by the Department

in the 2003 ROD for promulgating the Tongass Exemption

was “comments received on the proposed rule.” 68 Fed. Reg.

at 75,137. But, the 2003 ROD expressly conceded that these

“comments raised no new issues” beyond those “alreadyfully

explored in the [Roadless Rule FEIS].” Id. at 75,139. It is

implausible that comments raising “no new issues” regarding

alternatives “already fully explored” motivated the adoption

of the final Roadless Rule.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 29 of 63
30 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

The third rationale for the Tongass Exemption, “litigation

over the last two years,” id. at 75,137, fares no better. The

2003 ROD states that “[a]dopting this final rule reduces the

potential for conflicts regardless of the disposition of the

various lawsuits” over the Roadless Rule. Id. at 75,138. 

Alaska candidly conceded in its opening brief that the

Tongass Exemption “obviously will not remove all

uncertainty about the validity of the Roadless Rule, as it is the

subject of a nationwide dispute and . . . nationwide

injunctions.” These other lawsuits involved forests other than

the Tongass, so it is impossible to discern how an exemption

for the Alaska forest would affect them. And, the Department

could not have rationally expected that the Tongass

Exemption would even have brought certainty to litigation

about this particular forest. It predictably led to this lawsuit,

and did not even prevent a separate attack by Alaska on the

Roadless Rule itself.11 At most, the Department deliberately

traded one lawsuit for another.

C. Remedy

“‘Ordinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in

compliance with the APA, the regulation is invalid.’” 

Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392,

1405 (9th Cir. 1995)); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The

reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency action . . . found to

be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

11 The settlement of Alaska’s 2001 suit against the Department required

the department to promulgate an advance notice of proposed rulemaking

to permanently exempt several national forests in Alaska from the

Roadless Rule; the State’s concerns with the Roadless Rule thus extend

beyond the Tongass. See 2003 ROD, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,136.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 30 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 31

otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”). “The effect of

invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously

in force.” Paulsen, 413 F.3d at 1008. A district court’s

reinstatement of a prior rule is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1011, 1019–20.

Alaska argues, however, that because the remedy for an

invalid rule is not the reinstatement of another invalid rule,

see Paulsen, 413 F.3d at 1008, the district court abused its

discretion reinstating the Roadless Rule because that Rule had

been enjoined by the Wyoming district court both when the

Tongass Exemption was promulgated and when the judgment

below was entered. But, wholly aside from the obvious

conflict between the first Wyoming district court judgment

and our later opinion in Lockyer, 575 F.3d 999, the argument

is of no avail. The Tenth Circuit vacated both Wyoming

district court injunctions. See Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1272;

Wyoming, 414 F.3d at 1214. The Roadless Rule therefore

remains in effect and applies to the Tongass.

III.

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, with whom THOMAS, Chief

Circuit Judge, joins, concurring:

As the court’s opinion recognizes, the Tongass is vitally

important to Southeast Alaska. The court is equally express

in acknowledging that changes of administration can indeed

have consequences. Neither of these points is in dispute.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 31 of 63
32 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

This case is unique because no new facts were presented

between the time the Department of Agriculture adopted the

Roadless Rule in 2001 and the time it reversed its decision in

2003. The outcome of the case pivots on the undeniable: the

2003 decision was contradicted by the agency’s previous

factual findings. In 2001, the agency found that “[a]llowing

road construction and reconstruction on the Tongass National

Forest to continue unabated would risk the loss of important

roadless area values.” Special Areas; Roadless Area

Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,244, 3,254–55 (Dep’t of Agric.

Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.

§§ 294.10–294.14). In 2003, the agency concluded that “the

social and economic hardships to Southeast Alaska outweigh

the potential long-term ecological benefits because the

Tongass Forest Plan adequately provides for the ecological

sustainability of the Tongass.” Special Areas; Roadless Area

Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass National Forest,

Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136, 75, 141–42 (Dep’t of Agric.

Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.14)

(emphasis added).

The dissent suggests that the 2003 decision was likely the

result of a change in administrations, and argues that the

agency, “following the policy instructions of the new

president,” was free to weigh the same evidence and “simply

conclude[] that the facts mandated different regulations than

the previous administration.” Supreme Court authority

directs otherwise. Under FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

Inc., when a new policy is contradicted by an agency’s

previous factual findings, the law does not allow the agency

to simply ignore the earlier findings. 556 U.S. 502, 516

(2009). Instead, the law requires that the agency provide a

reasoned explanation for changing course and adopting a

position contradicted by its previous findings. Id.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 32 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 33

In this case, the agency was unable to defend its flip-flop

when the case was argued in the district court, and the agency

chose not to participate in the appeal. Despite the efforts of

the intervenor, the record and arguments presented to the

district court support its decision, which we affirm today.

I write separately to voice my view that there is no

indication the conscientious district court judge who first

ruled in this case decided it based on his own views, and our

court does not do so either. Judges do not have the expertise

to manage national forests, but we are often called upon to

decide whether a federal agency followed correct procedures. 

Whether or not they are reflected in the headlines, our rulings

in environmental cases sometimes have the result of

permitting resources to be extracted, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 741 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2013), roads

to be constructed, e.g., Sierra Club v. BLM, 786 F.3d 1219

(9th Cir. 2015), forests to be logged, e.g., Lands Council v.

McNair, 629 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), or forests to be

thinned to manage the risk of fire, e.g., Friends of the Wild

Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2014). Other times,

they do not. See, e.g., League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue

Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, 752 F.3d

755, 767 (9th Cir. 2014) (enjoining logging project while

Forest Service completed supplemental environmentalimpact

statement). Regardless of the outcome, the court’s aim is to

fairly and impartially apply the law when we entertain such

procedural challenges. Because in this case the Department

of Agriculture did not follow the rule articulated by the

Supreme Court in Fox, I join the majority in affirming the

district court’s decision.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 33 of 63
34 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The State of Alaska appeals the District Court for the

District of Alaska’s decision setting aside the Departure of

Agriculture’s exemption of the Tongass National Forest from

the Roadless Rule. The majority holds that Alaska has

standing to appeal based on a statutory entitlement—an

option to collect a share of the revenue the United States

makes from timber harvested from national forests in Alaska. 

See 16 U.S.C. § 500 (creating the National Forest Receipts

Program). But Alaska does not have standing based on this

statutory interest. A statutory provision is insufficient to

establish Article III standing where, as here, the right it

creates has not been invaded, Congress did not intend to

legislate standing, and no factual injury has been suffered. 

The majority strays well beyond Article III’s confines in

holding that Congress legislated standing by creating a

revenue-sharing program. The majority alarmingly opens the

door to governance of the nation’s natural resources by

injunction, but only to those groups powerful enough to

secure a statutory entitlement tied to development of those

resources. Moreover, Alaska has not lost any revenue or even

alleged that it will receive less money from the federal

government if the district court’s decision stands. I

respectfully dissent.

I.

This Court’s jurisdiction is limited by Article III of the

Constitution to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const., Art.

III, § 2. One element of the Constitution’s case-orcontroversy requirement is that a litigant must demonstrate

standing to sue. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.

1138, 1146 (2013). The standing requirement is built on

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 34 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 35

separation-of-powers principles; it “serves to prevent the

judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the

political branches.” Id. The standing requirement “must be

met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be

met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” 

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013)

(citation omitted).

States generallymay seek to bring suit in three capacities: 

(1) “proprietary suits,” in which states sue like private parties

to remedy a concrete, particularized injury; (2) “sovereignty

suits,” in which states, for example, seek adjudication of

boundary or water rights; and (3) “parens patriae suits,” in

which states sue on behalf of their citizens.1 Alfred L. Snapp

& Son v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600

(1982). To establish standing to sue in a proprietary capacity

a State, like other litigants, must meet the following, familiar

requirements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an

“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent,

not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” Second,

there must be a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of—the

injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the

challenged action of the defendant, and not

. . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of

some third party not before the court.” Third,

1 States also may seek to protect their “quasi-sovereign” interests in such

suits, but “evidence of actual injury is still required.” Sturgeon v. Masica,

768 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 35 of 63
36 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely

“speculative,” that the injury will be

“redressed by a favorable decision.”

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)

(footnote and citations omitted).

Alaska’s standing fails at the first step. Alaska has not

demonstrated that reinstatement of the Roadless Rule’s

application to the Tongass has caused, or imminently will

cause, the State an injury in fact. This is the “first and

foremost” requirement of standing, Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997), “a hard floor of

Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.” 

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009).

II.

Alaska advances three interests for purposes of

demonstrating injury in fact: (1) a statutory interest in “the

flow of monies to the State via the National Forest Receipts

Program”; (2) a procedural interest based on the fact that the

Department of Agriculture “initiated the rulemaking [that led

to the Tongass exemption] pursuant to a settlement agreement

with the State”; and (3) a parens patriae interest in Alaskan

jobs that are “tied to timber.” None of these asserted harms

satisfies Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.

A.

The majority finds that Alaska has standing because of

“the effect of the Roadless Rule on Alaska’s statutory

entitlement” under the National Forest Receipts Program to

twenty-five percent of gross receipts of timber sales from

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 36 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 37

national forests in the State. Without the Tongass exemption,

the majority explains, less timber will be harvested from the

Tongass National Forest, thus potentially decreasing the

amount of revenue that Alaska may receive under the

National Forest Receipts Program. This statutory entitlement

argument fails for at least two reasons.

1.

First, by creating a “statutory entitlement” to a share of

federal timber revenue, Congress did not legislate the Article

III standing of state and local governments to challenge

federal natural resource management. The Supreme Court

has strongly suggested that Congress cannot create injury in

fact by legislative fiat—rather, a litigant must have suffered

not only a violation of a legal right, but also a factual harm. 

See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 497; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 

But it still may be that “Congress may enact statutes creating

legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even

though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S.

v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). We, for

example, have held that a statutory provision may provide a

litigant with Article IIIstanding where (1) Congress indicated

that it intended for the provision to create a statutory right by

creating a “private cause of action to enforce” the provision,

(2) the litigant’s statutory right has been infringed, and (3) the

litigant has also suffered a concrete, “de facto injury,” albeit

one that was previously inadequate at law. Robins v. Spokeo,

Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412–13 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No.

13-1339, 2015 WL 1879778 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015).

Even if Congress may legislate standing in some

circumstances, however, it has not done so here. There is no

indication in 16 U.S.C. § 500’s text or history that Congress

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 37 of 63
38 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

intended to legislate state and municipal standing to challenge

the federal government’s management of national forests. 

See Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir.

2010) (“Essentially, the standing question in such cases

[where a litigant asserts standing based on a statutory right]

is whether the . . .statutory provision on which the claim rests

properly can be understood as granting persons in the

plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”) (citation

omitted), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 132 S. Ct.

2536 (2012).2Indeed, in the 107 years since § 500 was

enacted, no court has found that the law gives states standing

to challenge actions or inactions that may reduce federal

timber receipts.

Moreover, even if Congress intended for § 500 to confer

a statutory right to revenue, the invasion of which constitutes

injury in fact, the right does not entitle Alaska to standing

here because it has not been infringed. See Linda R.S.,

410 U.S. at 617 n.3 (“Congress may enact statutes creating

legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even

though no injury would exist without the statute.” (emphasis

added)).3 Section 500 entitles Alaska to a share of revenue

2 Other courts have disagreed that a statutory provision can create

standing in the absence of actual harm. See, e.g., David v. Alphin,

704 F.3d 327, 338–39 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]his theory of Article III

standing is a non-starter as it conflates statutory standing with

constitutional standing.”); see also Joint Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc.,

266 F.3d 164, 176 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.). To the extent that Congress

may legislate Article III standing, however, it follows that a Court must

employ the usual tools ofstatutory interpretation to determine if Congress

intended for a statutory provision to create standing.

3

See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (same); Kootenai

Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To

establish standing [to appeal], the defendant-intervenors must first show

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 38 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 39

generated, not a right to have revenue generated. Alpine

Cnty., Cal. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (there is “no duty to generate revenue” under the

National Forest Receipts Program). Thus, Alaska’s

entitlement to a share of federal timber revenue has not been

“invaded” by reinstatement of the Roadless Rule, even

assuming that Alaska could show that the Roadless Rule will

cause Alaska to receive less money from the federal

government.

The majorityconflates the injury-in-fact requirement with

the zone-of-interest test in discussing Lexmark International,

Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377

(2014). The zone-of-interest test asks whether an injury to a

litigant that meets Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement falls

within the zone of interests protected by the substantive

statute under which that litigant sues. Id. at 1387–89. If not,

the litigant’s claim under that statute may not proceed.4Id. at

that they have suffered an injury in fact, [which involves, among other

things,] an invasion of a legally-protected interest . . . .” (quotation marks

omitted)), abrogated by Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d

1173 (9th Cir. 2011); Consumer Watchdog v. Wisc. Alumni Research

Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (dismissing for lack of

standing because, “[u]nlike the plaintiffs in the [Freedom of Information

Act] and [Federal Election Campaign Act] cases, Consumer Watchdog

was not denied anything to which it was entitled”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.

1401 (2015).

 

4 For example, if Alaska had alleged that reinstatement of the roadless

rule caused a State-owned timber business to suffer a financial loss,

Alaska would have demonstrated an injury in fact for purposes of Article

III standing. However, this “purely economic interest” would fall outside

of the zone of interests protected by the National Environmental Policy

Act under our precedent. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d

934, 940 (9th Cir. 2005).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 39 of 63
40 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

1388–89 (explaining that “the zone-of-interests test is [a] tool

for determining who may invoke [a] cause of action . . . .”). 

I agree with the majority that whether an injury in fact falls

within a statute’s zone of protected interests is not a

jurisdictional question. See id. at 1387–88 & n.4.

This appeal presents a different, critical, and jurisdictional

question that is rooted in Article III’s case-or-controversy

requirement: whether a statutory provision that has not been

invaded and does not include a cause of action endows a

litigant who has not suffered a de facto injury with Article III

standing. The answer to this jurisdictional question is clearly

no. Because Alaska’s statutory right under § 500 has not

been invaded, Alaska lacks both injury in law and injury in

fact. Attempting to sidestep this problem, the majority

suggests that Alaska does not need to demonstrate an injury

in fact to maintain this appeal, it need only demonstrate a

“stake in defending” the Tongass exemption. Maj. Op.

16–17, 19. This suggestion is contrary to controlling

Supreme Court precedent and our circuit precedent. 

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66–69 (1986) (dismissing

for lack of jurisdiction because a defendant intervenor did not

demonstrate an injury in fact necessary to establish his

standing to appeal); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at

1109 (“To establish standing [to appeal], the defendantintervenors must first show that they have suffered an injury

in fact . . . .”).

The prospective effects of the majority’s decision are

alarming. After today, states and many local governments

presumably have standing, at least in the Ninth Circuit, to

challenge federal actions and inactions that may result in,

among other things, fewer trees being felled in federal forests,

less oil, gas, and coal being extracted from federal mineral

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 40 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 41

estates, fewer cattle being turned out on public lands, or even

the devaluation of federal land. States and local communities

get a share of revenue generated from these and many other

federal resources.5 Surely by creating a revenue-sharing

program tied to the development of natural resources

Congress did not legislate state and municipal standing to

challenge the pace and manner of the federal government’s

management of the nation’s natural resources.

 This case is not like Watt v. Energy Action Education

Foundation, 454 U.S. 151(1981), the case on which the

majority relies. In Watt, California had standing based on its

interest in “assur[ing] a fair return for its resources,”

specifically state-owned oil and gas reserves drained by

drilling on adjoining federal leases.6Id. at 161 (emphasis

added); see also id. at 160 (“California . . . claim[ed]standing

as an involuntary ‘partner’ with the Federal Government in

the leasing of [Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)]tracts in which

the underlying pool of gas and oil lies under both the OCS

5

See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 315i, 315m (Grazing Leases Payments); 

7 U.S.C. § 1012 (National Grasslands Payment); 30 U.S.C. §§ 191, 355

(Mineral Leasing Payments); 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (Offshore Mineral

Leasing Payment); 42 U.S.C. § 6506a (National Petroleum Reserve in

Alaska Payment); 16 U.S.C. § 715s (Refuge Revenue Sharing Payment);

31 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907 (Payments in Lieu of Taxes); 16 U.S.C. §§ 577g,

577g-1 (Payments to Minnesota); 43 U.S.C. § 1181f (Oregon and

California Grant Lands Payments); 43 U.S.C. § 1181f-1 (Coos Bay

Wagon Road Grant Fund Payment); P.L. 100-446, § 323 (Arkansas

Smoky Quartz Payment).

6

In Watt, California challenged the federal government’s bidding system

for lease sales allowing for oil and gas development of the Outer

Continental Shelf. California claimed that the bidding system was

incapable of producing a fair market return for California’s oil and gas

drained by drilling on federal leases. Id. at 160–61.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 41 of 63
42 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

and the 3-mile coastal belt controlled by California.”

(emphasis added)). The very language that the majority

excerpts also makes it plain that California’s standing was

based on the State’s “own[ership of] adjoining portions of an

[OCS] oil and gas pool” and interest in securing a “fair

market return” for drainage of those State-owned resources. 

Maj. Op. 19 (quoting Watt, 454 U.S. at 160–61). Alaska has

not alleged injury to its interest in being fairly compensated

for or avoiding damage to its natural resources, which would

implicate an injury in fact. Watt, 454 U.S. at 160–61.7

To be clear, the Supreme Court did not hold in Watt, as

suggested by the majority, that the revenue sharing required

by section 8(g) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43

U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2), provides states with standing to

challenge federal actions and inactions that may result in less

oil and gas being extracted from the federal OCS. Rather,

section 8(g) embodies a state’s interest in being fairly

compensated for development of the federal OCS that

diminishes the state’s resources. Absent harm to a state’s

resources or an invasion of that state’s right to be fairly

compensated for diminishment of those resources, section

8(g) does not support that state’s standing to challenge federal

7

See also, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007)

(“Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state’s

coastal property,” and “rising seas have already begun to swallow

Massachusetts’ coastal land,” it “has alleged a particularized injury in its

capacity as a landowner.” (internal citation, quotation marks, and footnote

omitted)); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1329

(D. Wyo. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 661 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011)

(finding that “Wyoming has presented evidence that the Roadless Rule

will increase the risk of environmental harm to its thousands of acres of

state forest land that are adjacent to, or intermingled with, lands

designated by the Forest Service as inventoried roadless areas”).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 42 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 43

management of the OCS.8 Watt does not support Alaska’s

standing to appeal.

2.

Second, when Alaska appealed in June of 2011, Alaska

had not lost any National Forest Receipts Program money and

did not even allege that it would receive less money from the

federal government as a result of the district court’s decision

setting aside the Tongass exemption. This was no oversight. 

Rather, as Alaska acknowledged in its declaration in support

of its motion to intervene, it has for many years elected to

forego its share of federal timber revenue in order to receive

much larger federal funding under the Secure Rural Schools

Program. See Secure Rural Schools and Community SelfDetermination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-393, 114 Stat.

8 Section 8(g) can thus be viewed as an exercise of Congress’s

uncontroversial power to “expand standing by enacting a law enabling

someone to sue on what was already a de facto injury to that person . . . .” 

Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)

(Becker, C.J., joined by Scirica and Alito, JJ.). Congress may “elevat[e]

to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that

were previously inadequate in law,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578, or that were

deemed incognizable as a prudential matter by the courts, Warth, 422 U.S.

at 500 & n.12. See also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.

Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000). Section 500 is not such a statute; it

does not elevate any de facto harm. But section 8(g) does. Section 8(g)

was intended to provide states with fair and easily administered

compensation for drainage of state oil and gas from common-pool

reservoirs. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 1550 (1977) (explaining

that the statute was intended to resolve “the problem of drainage of state

resources by a lessee operating on the Outer Continental Shelf”); H.R.

Rep. No. 99-300 at 547 (1985) (explaining that an amendment of section

8(g) was necessary because case-by-case determinations of “‘fair and

equitable disposition’ of the common pool revenues” had led to “lengthy

litigation”).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 43 of 63
44 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

1607.9 Thus, for example, in fiscal year 2010—before the

Tongass exemption had been set aside by the district

court—Alaska would have been due only about $517,948

under the National Forest Receipts Program as compared to

the $16,027,564.62 it was paid under the Secure Rural

Schools Act Program.10

Stated simply, Alaska cannot show us the money. Alaska

has neither suffered a financial loss traceable to the district

court’s decision nor shown that such injury is “certainly

impending.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. That Alaska might

elect to receive payments under the National Forest Receipts

Program at some unknown future date in the currently

unforeseeable event that the Secure Rural Schools Program

is discontinued is too “conjectural or hypothetical” and

insufficiently “actual or imminent” of an injury to support

Alaska’s standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also, e.g.,

Sturgeon, 768 F.3d 1at 1075 (“Alaska’s claims regarding its

sovereign and proprietary interests lack grounding in a

demonstrated injury. . . . Any injury to Alaska’s sovereign

9 Congress created the Secure Rural Schools Act and has continued to

reauthorize it, see Maj. Op. 21 n.9, because “precipitously” declining

timber revenue from national forests had decreased “the revenues shared

with the affected counties.” Pub. L. No. 106-393 § 2(a)(9)–(10), 114 Stat.

1607 (Oct. 30, 2000).

10 This data is available on the U.S. Forest Service’s website,

http://www.fs.usda.gov/main/pts/securepayments/projectedpayments(last

visited June 18, 2015), and taken specifically from the “View ASR 10-1

FY2010” spreadsheet and “all counties FY 2010” tab of the “Estimated

25-percent payments, FY 2008–FY2010” spreadsheet.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 44 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 45

and proprietary interest is pure conjecture and thus

insufficient to establish standing.”).11

Alaska’s entitlement under 16 U.S.C. § 500 to a share of

federal timber revenue does not give it standing to maintain

this appeal.

B.

Alaska also alleges injury to what it characterizes as a

procedural interest in the Tongass exemption. Alaska states

that the Department of Agriculture “initiated the rulemaking

[that resulted in the Tongass exemption] pursuant to a

settlement agreement with the State.” This interest is not an

injury in fact. First, Alaska has not alleged that its rights

under the settlement agreement have been violated. As the

settlement agreement required, the Department of Agriculture

initiated the rulemaking and published the resulting rule. 

Second, even assuming that Alaska has alleged a violation of

a relevant procedural right, Alaska cannot establish its

standing to appeal based on a procedural interest alone. It is

well established that “deprivation of a procedural right

without some concrete interest that is affected by the

deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient

. . . .” Summers, 555 U.S. at 496; see also Sturgeon, 768 F.3d

at 1075. Thus, Alaska’s asserted legal interests do not

demonstrate an injury in fact.

11 The majority’s analogy to the loss of one’s home due to a neighbor’s

negligence misses the point. Loss of one’s home is an injury in fact. A

statutory financial entitlement untethered to a violation of that entitlement

and an actual or imminent financial loss traceable to that violation is not.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 45 of 63
46 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

C.

Without an injury of its own, Alaska attempts to invoke

someone else’s injury. Alaska asserts that it has standing

because “Alaska jobs are tied to timber.” This general

interest in the employment of its citizens is a parens patriae

interest.12 However, “[a] State does not have standing as

parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal

Government.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16. That is because

“it is no part of [a State’s] duty or power to enforce [its

citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the Federal

Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the

State, which represents them as parens patriae.” Id. (quoting

Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923)).

Alaska lacks parens patriae standing in this case for

another reason. Alaska has not shown, as it must, that

directly interested private parties—Alaskans and companies

interested in jobs tied to Tongass timber—could not represent

themselves. See, e.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 (“In order to

maintain such an action, the State must articulate an interest

apart from the interests of particular private parties . . . .”);

Sturgeon, 768 F.3d at 1075 n.4; Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp.,

552 F.3d 965, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2009). These groups are

entirely capable of representing themselves. Indeed, the

Alaska Forest Association, a trade association for the timber

industry in Alaska, intervened in the district court but decided

12 See, e.g., City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044–45 (9th

Cir. 1979) (alleged “loss of investment profits and tax revenues” by

citizens if development did not proceed implicates a parens patriae

interest); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1976)

(“[A]lleged injuries to the state’s economy and the health, safety, and

welfare of its people clearly implicate the parens patriae rather than the

proprietary interest of the state.”).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 46 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 47

not to appeal. Alaska’s interest in protecting the jobs of

Alaskans and the bottom line of the timber industry is an

insufficient parens patriae interest to support its standing to

appeal.

Alaska has not satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement. Its

alleged injuries fail to ensure that the decision to appeal has

not been “placed in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders,’ who

will use it simply as a ‘vehicle for the vindication of value

interests’” or party politics, rather than to remedy actual or

imminent harm. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing

Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62). This appeal should be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction.

III.

As the majority finds that this Court has jurisdiction and

thus decides this appeal on the merits, I must reach the merits

too. The same concern with the judiciary’s limited role

compels me to join Judge M. Smith’s dissent on the merits. 

Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act did not

authorize a judge, or even an en banc panel of judges, to set

aside an agency decision because the reasons the agency

proffered for the decision were not, from the viewpoint of the

bench, “good” enough. Rather, an agency’s decision must

stand if it is not “arbitrary or capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706.

The Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox Television

Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–16 (2009), does not hold

otherwise. See, e.g., White Stallion Energy Ctr. LLC v. EPA,

748 F.3d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (judicial review of a

“change in agency policy is no stricter than our review of an

initial agency action” (citing Fox, 556 U.S. at 514–16)). Fox

holds that an agency must “provide reasoned explanation for

its action,” which normallyrequires “that it display awareness

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 47 of 63
48 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

that it is changing position.” Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (emphasis

omitted); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983)

(“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious

if the agency has . . . entirely failed to consider an important

aspect of the problem.”).

Here, the Department of Agriculture met Fox’s

requirement by acknowledging that it was changing its mind. 

The Department also met the APA’s requirements by

explaining that the exemption would allow for a better

balance between environmental preservation,road access, and

timber availability. The balance the Department struck is

reasonable and well within its mandate under the National

Forest Management Act and the Tongass Timber Reform Act

to “provide for multiple use and sustained yield” of forest

resources. 16 U.S.C. §§ 539d(1), 1604(e)(1).

“Litigation over the last two years” was not, as the

majority suggests, an extra-statutory weight that entered into

the Department’s “enormously complicated task of striking

a balance among the many competing uses to which land can

be put.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55,

58 (2004) (addressing the Bureau of Land Management’s

similar statutory charge). Rather, litigation was part of what

prompted the Department to consider striking a different

balance.

The significance of the Tongass exemption’s foreseeable

environmental and socioeconomic impacts did enter into that

balance, and were detailed by the Department in its

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and discussed in its

Record of Decision. The majority latches onto one word in

setting aside the Department’s decision. It faults the

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 48 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 49

Department for calling the risk to roadless values—one of the

many natural resources provided by the Tongass—“minor.” 

See 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136, 75,144 (Dec. 30, 2003). It is clear,

however, that the Department was not tossing aside its

analysis of the significance of environmental impacts set

forth in the EIS. Instead, after further consideration, the

Department found that the loss of some roadless values did

not outweigh “the socioeconomic costs of applying the

roadless rule’s prohibitions to the Tongass.” Id. The

Department’s explanation of its balance was not arbitrary or

capricious.

IV.

Iwould dismiss this case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

Stuck with the majority’s finding that this Court has

jurisdiction, I would reverse and remand.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI,

TALLMAN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges,

join, dissenting:

Elections have legal consequences. When a political

leader from one party becomes president of the United States

after a president from another party has occupied the White

House for the previous term, the policies of the new president

will occasionally clash with, and supplant, those of the

previous president, often leading to changes in rules

promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as

amended at 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). See, e.g., Animal Legal

Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2006)

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 49 of 63
50 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

(withdrawal under President George W. Bush of agricultural

policy announced under President Clinton), vacated en banc,

490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.

v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1146, 1149 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (withdrawal under President Reagan of an emission

standard from President Carter’s administration), vacated,

817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Farmworker Justice Fund,

Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated

sub nom., Farmworkers Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 817 F.2d

890 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (withdrawal by President Reagan’s

Secretary of Labor of sanitation standard proposed under

President Carter); Press Release, Department of the Interior,

Salazar and Locke Restore Scientific Consultations under the

Endangered Species Act To Protect Species and Their

Habitats (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 2009 WL 1143690

(withdrawal by President Obama’s Secretary of Commerce

and Secretary of Interior of rule pertaining to consultation of

federal wildlife experts proposed under President George W.

Bush).

This phenomenon is particularly common in the period

between the last few months of an outgoing administration

and the first few months of an incoming administration, as

was the case here. Recent legal scholarship has shed light on

the concept of “midnight regulations,” whereby, during their

final period in office, outgoing administrations accelerate

rulemaking and agency actions, which incoming

administrations then attempt to stay and reverse. See Jack M.

Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 Mich. J.

Envtl. & Admin. L. 285 (2013); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne

Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and

Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.

1157, 1196 (2009); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency

Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 50 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 51

471 (2011). For example, on President Obama’s first day in

office, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel issued a memo to the

heads of federal agencies mandating that they stop the

publication of regulations unless they obtained approval of

the new administration. See Memorandum from Rahm

Emanuel, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, the

White House, to Heads of Executive Departments and

Agencies (Jan. 20, 2009), in 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26,

2009). On the first day of President George W. Bush’s

presidency, Chief of Staff Andrew Card similarly directed

agencies to stop all regulatory notices. See Memorandum

from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and

Chief of Staff, the White House, to Heads and Acting Heads

of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2001), in

66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).

Inevitably, when the political pendulum swings and a

different party takes control of the executive branch, the cycle

begins anew. There is nothing improper about the political

branches of the government carrying out such changes in

policy. To the contrary, such policy changes are often how

successful presidential candidates implement the very

campaign promises that helped secure their election. That is

simply the way the modern political process works.

On the other hand, when party policy positions clash, it is

improper and unwise for members of the judiciary to decide

which policy view is the better one, for such action inevitably

throws the judiciary into the political maelstrom, diminishes

its moral authority, and conflicts with the judicial role

envisioned by the Founders. As the Supreme Court has

cautioned, “[i]t is hostile to a democratic system to involve

the judiciary in the politics of the people. And it is not less

pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 51 of 63
52 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the

law.” Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946),

overruled on other grounds by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186

(1962).

This case involves a clash between the policies of the

outgoing Clinton administration and those of the incoming

George W. Bush administration. The two presidents viewed

how certain aspects of the laws governing national forests

should be implemented very differently. On October 13,

1999, President Clinton issued a memo to the Secretary of

Agriculture, instructing him “to develop, and propose for

public comment, regulations to provide appropriate long-term

protection for most or all of [the] currently inventoried

‘roadless’ areas.” The United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA) followed those instructions in

promulgating the Roadless Area Conservation Rule, 66 Fed.

Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (the Roadless Rule). In keeping

with President Clinton’s policies, the Roadless Rule

emphasized “prohibit[ing] road construction, reconstruction,

and timber harvest in inventoried roadless areas because they

have the greatest likelihood of altering and fragmenting

landscapes, resulting in immediate, long-term loss of roadless

area values and characteristics.” Id.

In November 2001, after President Bush took office and

sought to implement his own policy preferences respecting

national forests, the USDA began a process of “reevaluating

its Roadless Area Conservation Rule.” The USDA believed

that “the abundance of roadless values on the Tongass, the

protection of roadless values included in the Tongass Forest

Plan, and the socioeconomic costs to local communities of

applying the roadless rule’s prohibitions to the Tongass, all

warrant treating the Tongass differently from the national

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 52 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 53

forests outside of Alaska.” Roadless Area Conservation;

Applicability to the Tongass National Forest, Alaska, 68 Fed.

Reg. 75,136, 75,139 (Dec. 30, 2003) (Tongass Exemption

herein). It also found that “[t]he repercussions of delaying

the project planning process regarding road building and

timber harvest [in the Tongass], even for a relatively short

period, can have a significant effect on the amount of timber

available for sale in the next year.” Slide Ridge Timber Sale

Environmental Impact Statement, 66 Fed. Reg. 58710-01

(Nov. 23, 2001). The USDA ultimatelymodified the Clintonera Roadless Rule due to, among other reasons, “(1) serious

concerns about the previously disclosed economic and social

hardships that application of the rule’s prohibitions would

cause in communities throughout Southeast Alaska,

(2) comments received on the proposed rule, and (3) litigation

over the last two years.” Tongass Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg.

at 75,137.

While the APA requires a reasoned explanation for a

change in policy, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for

that of the agency and should uphold a decision of less than

ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be

discerned.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.

502, 513–15 (2009) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). The USDA followed President Bush’s policy

instructions when it amended the Roadless Rule in 2003,

68 Fed. Reg. 75,136 (Dec. 30, 2003), and the agency’s

explanation for its decision easily meets the requirements of

Fox. Unfortunately, it appears that, contrary to the

requirements of Fox, the majority has selected what it

believes to be the better policy, and substituted its judgment

for that of the agency, which was simply following the

political judgments of the new administration. Accordingly,

I respectfully dissent.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 53 of 63
54 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

I. The USDA’s 2003 Change in Policy

Without acknowledging that the factual findings in the

2003 Record of Decision (ROD) rest on different policy

views than those in the 2001 ROD, the majority argues that

“[t]he Tongass Exemption thus plainly ‘rests upon factual

findings that contradict those which underlay [the agency’s]

prior policy.’” This conclusion is simply incorrect. The

agency, following the policy instructions of the new

president, weighed some of the facts in the existing record

differently than had the previous administration, and

emphasized other facts in the record that the previous

administration had not. Stated differently, the two

administrations looked at some of the same facts, and reached

different conclusions about the meaning of what they saw. 

The second administration simply concluded that the facts

called for different regulations than those proposed by the

previous administration.

There is little dispute that the underlying facts analyzed

by the USDA had not changed meaningfully between

November 2000, when the USDA completed the original

rule’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and

2003. The USDA acknowledged as much when it considered

the environmental impact of the Tongass Exemption in 2003. 

It concluded that “the identified new information and changed

circumstances do not result in significantly different

environmental effects from those described in the roadless

rule FEIS. Such differences as may exist are not of a scale or

intensity to be relevant to the adoption of this final rule or to

support selection of another alternative from the roadless rule

FEIS. Consequently, the overall decisionmaking picture is

not substantially different from what it was in November

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 54 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 55

2000, when the roadless rule FEIS was completed.” 68 Fed.

Reg. at 75,141.

Nor had the facts underlying the USDA’s assessment of

the socioeconomic impact oftheTongass Exemption changed

meaningfully by 2003; the USDA simply prioritized different

aspects of the same socioeconomic data that it had considered

in 2000. In the original Roadless Rule, the USDA had found

that “[c]ommunities with significant economic activities in

these sectors could be adversely impacted. However, the

effects on national social and economic systems are

minor. . . . None of the alternatives are likely to have

measurable impacts compared to the broader social and

economic conditions and trends observable at these scales,

however the effects of the alternatives are not distributed

evenly across the United States.” 66 Fed. Reg. at 3261. In

the 2003 ROD, on the other hand, the USDA assigned greater

importance to the adverse socioeconomic impact of the

Roadless Rule: “This decision reflects the facts, as displayed

in the FEIS for the roadless rule and the FEIS for the 1997

Tongass Forest Plan that roadless values are plentiful in the

Tongass and are well protected by the Tongass Forest Plan. 

The minor risk of the loss ofsuch values is outweighed by the

more certain socioeconomic costs of applying the roadless

rule’s prohibitions to the Tongass. Imposing those costs on

the local communities of Southeast Alaska is unwarranted.” 

68 Fed. Reg. at 75,144. In 2003, then, the USDA concluded

that it was important to give greater weight to some adverse

socioeconomic effects than was done when the original

Roadless Rule was promulgated.

Given the substantial similarity between the facts the

USDA weighed in the 2003 ROD and those it weighed in the

2001 ROD, it is abundantly clear that the differences between

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 55 of 63
56 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

the two are the result of a shift in policy. After analyzing

essentially the same facts, the USDA changed policy course

at the direction of the new president, prioritizing some

outcomes over others. Fox fully envisions such policy

changes. It directs courts to uphold regulations that result

from such changes, even if the agency gives an explanation

that is of “less than ideal clarity,” as long as “the agency’s

path may reasonably be discerned.” Fox, 556 U.S. at 513–14

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That

requirement is clearly met here.

II. The USDA Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious

The APA requires that we set aside agency actions that

are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In 2003,

the USDA carefully reconsidered the facts before it, going

through a full notice-and-comment process before exempting

the Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Rule. The

USDA was not arbitrary and capricious in making this

decision.

The majority contends that the USDA does not meet a key

requirement under Fox—that an “agency must show that

there are good reasons for the new policy.” 556 U.S. at 515. 

Respectfully, the majority misconstrues Fox. Under Fox, an

agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the

reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the

old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under

the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the

agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of

course adequately indicates.” Id. (emphases added).

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 56 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 57

Accordingly, although the USDA only needed one good

reason to change its policy, it had four independent ones, all

of which are supported by the 2003 ROD: (1) resolving

litigation by complying with federal statutes governing the

Tongass, (2) satisfying demand for timber, (3) mitigating

socioeconomic hardships caused by the Roadless Rule, and

(4) promoting road and utility connections in the Tongass.

A. Litigation and Statutory Compliance

The USDA promulgated the exemption to the Roadless

Rule in part to comply with statutes governing the Tongass

and in response to lawsuits challenging the Roadless Rule. 

The Supreme Court has suggested that it is appropriate for an

agency to engage in new rulemaking when litigation reveals

new information. See Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A.,

517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (“Nor does it matter that the

regulation was prompted by litigation, including this very

suit.”). This is precisely what occurred here: A number of

lawsuits filed against the USDA brought to light issues

concerning potential conflicts between the Roadless Rule, the

Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),

Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980), and the Tongass

Timber Reforms Act (TTRA), Pub L. No. 101-626, 104 Stat.

4426 (1990). The majority focuses on the fact that the 2003

ROD engendered new litigation, and concludes that it was

therefore arbitrary and capricious for the USDA to act in

response to the earlier litigation. However, the fact that the

2003 ROD led to additional litigation says very little about

whether the earlier litigation pointed to legitimate issues

regarding the Roadless Rule’s compliance with various

statutes ordering preservation of an adequate supply of timber

to Southeast Alaskan communities whose inhabitants depend

on it for their livelihood. The agency acted well within the

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 57 of 63
58 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

bounds of its authority if it believed that revising the

Roadless Rule would ensure compliance with the statutory

mandates that had generated the original litigation.

We have previously concluded that ANILCA and TTRA

require that the USDA balance multiple goals in the Tongass: 

“recreation, environmental protection, and timber harvest.” 

Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797,

808 & n.22 (9th Cir. 2005). The USDA’s 2003 ROD clearly

finds that the Tongass Exemption was meant to bring the

Roadless Rule in line with the purposes of ANILCA and

TTRA. The USDA noted that, under ANILCA, Congress

placed 5.5 million acres of Tongass in permanent wilderness

status and the designation of disposition of lands in the act

“represent[s] a proper balance between the reservation of

national conservation system units and those public lands

necessary and appropriate for more intensive use and

disposition.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,142. The USDA also stated

that TTRA requires it to ensure that enough timber is

available to “meet[] the annual market demand for timber”

and “meet[] the market demand from the forest for each

planning cycle . . . .” 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,140.

After promulgating the revised Roadless Rule, the USDA

issued a press release stating that the Tongass Exemption

sought to maintain “the balance for roadless area protection

struck in the Tongass Land Management Plan.” The 2003

ROD also concluded that “[t]his final rule reflects the

Department’s assessment of how to best implement the letter

and spirit of congressional direction along with public values,

in light of the abundance of roadless values on the Tongass,

the protection of roadless values already included in the

Tongass forest plan, and the socioeconomic costs to local

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 58 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 59

communities of applying the roadless rule’s prohibitions.”

68 Fed. Reg. at 75,142.

I do not suggest that ANILCA and TTRA explicitly forbid

the USDA from applying the Roadless Rule to the Tongass. 

TTRA, for example, is “[s]ubject to appropriations, other

applicable law, and the requirements of the National Forest

Management Act . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 539d(a). The USDA

therefore had discretion to adopt the Roadless Rule to protect

wildlife, recreation, sustained use, and other values. See

Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at 801. By the same

token, nothing prevented the USDA from striking a different

balance and choosing to exempt the Tongass. Considering

the purposes of ANILCA and TTRA, it is clear that Congress

sought to promote a balance between environmental

preservation, road access, and timber availability. The USDA

recognized this directive in promulgating the revised rule. 

The Supreme Court has “long recognized that considerable

weight should be accorded to an executive department’s

construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to

administer, and the principle of deference to administrative

interpretations. . . .” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). We should

abide by this principle, and defer to the actions of the USDA

in promulgating an exemption to the Roadless Rule.

B. Timber Demand

Likewise, the USDA’s determination that applying the

Roadless Rule to the Tongass would have led to a timber

shortage was not arbitrary and capricious. The majority fails

to even acknowledge the agency’s effort to promote timber

production, a factor which, by itself, suffices to uphold the

agency’s 2003 rulemaking.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 59 of 63
60 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

“A court generally must be ‘at its most deferential’ when

reviewing scientific judgments and technical analyses within

the agency’s expertise.” N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v.

Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted). The USDA calculated that the average

annual timber harvest in the Tongass between 1980 and 2002

was 269 million board feet (MMBF), which was higher than

usual. The USDA estimated that in the years following the

Roadless Rule, demand for timber would fall, but that

demand would still be at least 124 MMBF. The USDA found

that if the Roadless Rule were applied to the Tongass, the

maximum timber harvest would be 50 MMBF, which would

create a shortage of around 75 MMBF. The agency

concluded that exempting the Tongass from the Roadless

Rule would allow infrastructure to be built and boost timber

production to meet national demand. 68 Fed. Reg. at

75,141–42.

C. Socioeconomic Hardships

The USDA also revised the Roadless Rule because it

reconsidered socioeconomic hardships caused byapplying the

rule to the Tongass. The majority fails to address this

justification for the Tongass Exemption, which is yet another

independent basis on which to uphold the agency’s 2003

rulemaking.

The district court held that the Roadless Rule would not

lead to job losses because reductions in timber demand had

already occurred. It suggested that the fall in timber demand

would have led to job losses, even without the Roadless Rule

in place. However, the district court impermissibly

substituted its factual determination for that of the agency. 

Although some jobs would have been lost with the fall in

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 60 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 61

demand, the USDA concluded that the application of the

Roadless Rule to the Tongass would have exacerbated these

losses. The USDA had clear reasons to revise the Roadless

Rule to mitigate job losses caused by the fall in timber

demand. This decision is adequately supported by material

in the record.

D. Road and Utility Connections

Finally, the USDA promulgated the Tongass Exemption

to encourage road and utility construction in the Tongass,

another independent factor ignored by the majority that

justifies the agency’s action. Such infrastructure helps the

timber industry and supports isolated communities in the

national forest. The USDA found, for example, that “[t]he

impacts of the roadless rule on local communities in the

Tongass are particularly serious. Of the 32 communities in

the region, 29 are unconnected to the nation’s highway

system. Most are surrounded by marine waters and

undeveloped National Forest System land.” 68 Fed. Reg. at

75,139.

E. Notice and Comment

Several of the arguments raised by Organized Village of

Kake (the Village), and now affirmed by the majority, are

policy-based. By overturning the Tongass Exemption, the

majority conflates the process of judicial review with the

agency’s review of factual and policy questions. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(c) (“After notice required by this section, the agency

shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in

the rule making through submission of written data, views, or

arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. 

After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 61 of 63
62 ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA

agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise

general statement of their basis and purpose.”).

The Village questions the merits of the USDA’s decision

to exempt the Tongass by raising what are primarily policy

issues that were addressed by the notice and comment

process. The USDA carefully considered comments it

received before promulgating the 2003 exemption. E.g.,

68 Fed. Reg. at 75,138 (“The agency received comments

regarding the effects the proposed exemption from the

roadless rule would have on the natural resources of the

Tongass. Some respondents expressed their view that 70

percent of the highest volume timber stands in Southeast

Alaska have been harvested, and exempting the Tongass from

the roadless rule would lead to the harvest of most or all of

the remainder of such stands.”); 68 Fed. Reg. 41,864, 41,865

(July 15, 2003) (“All interested parties are encouraged to

express their views in response to this request for public

comment on the following question: Should any exemption

from the applicability of the roadless rule to the Tongass

National Forest be made permanent and also apply to the

Chugach National Forest?”). As long as the agency’s

decision has clear factual support in the record, as is the case

here, it is not our place to substitute our policy preferences

for those of the agency. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 513–14.

III. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

Claims

The Village claims that the USDA violated NEPA by

neglecting to prepare a new environmental impact statement

and by failing to consider alternatives to exempting the

Tongass. The district court did not reach this issue because

it reversed the agency on other grounds. Given my

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 62 of 63
ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE V. USDA 63

disagreement with the majority, Iwould remand to the district

court to consider the NEPA claims in the first instance.

I respectfully dissent.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I join Judge M. Smith’s masterful dissent in full. I write

only to note the absurdity that we are in the home stretch of

the Obama administration and still litigating the validity of

policy changes implemented at the start of the George W.

Bush administration. How can a President with a mere four

or eight years in office hope to accomplish any meaningful

policy change—as the voters have a right to expect when they

elect a new President—if he enters the White House tethered

by thousands of Lilliputian ropes of administrative

procedure? The glacial pace of administrative litigation shifts

authority from the political branches to the judiciary and

invites the type of judicial policymaking that Judge Smith

points out. This is just one of the ways we as a nation have

become less a democracy and more an oligarchy governed by

a cadre of black-robed mandarins. I seriously doubt this is

what the Founding Fathers had in mind and worry about the

future of the Republic if the political branches fail to take

back the power the Constitution properly assigns to them.

 Case: 11-35517, 07/29/2015, ID: 9626154, DktEntry: 76-1, Page 63 of 63