Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03395/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03395-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nicholas Cademartori
Respondent
Andre Joseph Lamothe
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE JOSEPH LAMOTHE,

Petitioner,

v.

NICHOLAS CADEMARTORI, Chief Probation

Officer,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-3395 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Andre Joseph LaMothe, on probation in the County of

Santa Clara in the constructive custody of Respondent Nicholas

Cademartori, Chief Probation Officer, has filed this petition for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent was

ordered to show cause why the writ should not be granted and has

filed an answer supported by a memorandum of law, the State trial

record and the unpublished opinion of the California Court of

Appeal. Petitioner filed a traverse. Having considered all of the

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papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES the petition for writ

of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the unpublished opinion of

the Sixth Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal in

People v. LaMothe, H023403 (Mar. 6, 2003), affirming in part and

reversing in part the judgment of conviction. 

 Petitioner met Jennifer Huber in August 1998. They dated

for awhile. Then, Petitioner moved into the same condominium

complex in which Ms. Huber lived. While maintaining her own

condominium, Ms. Huber moved in with Petitioner. 

 

 On October 7, 1999, Petitioner and Ms. Huber had a verbal

altercation, which resulted in Petitioner asking Ms. Huber to

return the keys to his condominium. Petitioner removed the

garage remote control from Ms. Huber's car and they both left

Petitioner's home. Later that day, Ms. Huber contacted

Petitioner at the gym. They immediately began arguing. They

left the gym together and drove to Petitioner's condominium. 

Petitioner parked his car in the middle of the garage so that

Ms. Huber could not park there. Ms. Huber parked her car in

the street and entered the garage on foot. She told

Petitioner that she wanted her clothes and belongings out of

his home. They began to argue. 

 

 Petitioner and Ms. Huber yelled and cursed at each other

and then Petitioner slapped Ms. Huber. According to Ms.

Huber, Petitioner grabbed her arms and shook her back and

forth. He pushed her to the ground and kicked her in the

thighs, stomach, and head. Then, Petitioner grabbed Ms.

Huber's hair and dragged her to the side of his car. While

holding her hair, he opened the car door and retrieved a can

of pepper spray. He sprayed Ms. Huber on the chest and face. 

Petitioner let go of Ms. Huber's hair and she stood up. 

However, Petitioner continued to spray her on the front of the

legs and on her shirt and back as she began to leave. Ms.

Huber went to her car and drove a short distance beyond the

condominium complex where she called "911." An ambulance

arrived and took her to hospital. Her skin was blistered

around her eyes and chest and small clumps of hair were

missing from her scalp. Also, Ms. Huber had two bumps on her 

head. 

Police went to Petitioner's home and found three guns in

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the living quarters and a can of pepper spray in the garage. 

Petitioner was arrested and released on bail. Ms. Huber

sought and was granted a temporary restraining order, which

forced Petitioner to stay at his parents' home for five days. 

Petitioner and Ms. Huber reinitiated their relationship in

November 1999, and broke up again in May 2000.

On April 19, 2000, the court issued a "Protective Order

in Criminal Proceedings." The order enjoined appellant from

annoying, harassing, striking, threatening, sexually

assaulting, battering or otherwise disturbing the peace of Ms.

Huber. Petitioner moved to Danville after he and Ms. Huber

broke up.

In November 2000, Ms. Huber attended a birthday party at

a friend's house. This friend, Marcus Campagna, lived with

his wife in the same area in which Petitioner's new residence

was located. When Ms. Huber left the house she noticed that

Petitioner was sitting in his car across the street. 

According to Ms. Huber, after she got into her car appellant

followed her. He flashed his headlights and "tailgated" her

as she switched lanes. Ms. Huber attempted to get away from

Petitioner by driving at speeds up to 120 miles per hour. At

one point, Petitioner pulled his car alongside Ms. Huber and

swerved his car, forcing her to move into the next lane. Ms.

Huber called "911." She stayed on the phone with the operator

for half an hour until the Highway Patrol pulled over both

cars. When Ms. Huber and Petitioner passed the Highway Patrol

Officers who were parked on the side of the road, appellant

was approximately two car lengths behind Ms. Huber. Both cars

were traveling at 85 miles per hour. 

On December 29, 2000, the District Attorney for the

County of Santa Clara filed information No. C0089886 charging

Petitioner with five counts, two of which related to the

November "freeway incident." On January 9, 2001 the district

attorney filed a motion to consolidate that information with

information No. C9948874. On January 19, 2001, the motion for

consolidation was granted. 

At trial Petitioner testified that during the October 7

incident in his garage he asked Ms. Huber to leave "over and

over again." However, she continued to scream and became

hysterical and pleaded to talk with him. Eventually, he used

the pepper spray. He wanted to "defuse the situation." He

claimed, however, that he shot the spray at the ground and the

wall. Only after he told Ms. Huber that he would spray her if

she did not leave did he fire a shot of spray at her leg, her

hip area and across her shoulder.

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II. Procedural History 

Petitioner was charged by consolidated information with one

count of inflicting corporeal injury on a spouse or cohabitant

(count one); assault by means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury (count two); unauthorized use of tear gas (count

three); threats to commit a crime resulting in death or great

bodily injury (count four); stalking while a court order was in

effect (count five); dissuading a victim or witness from testifying

(counts six and seven); and violation of a protective order (counts

eight and nine).

Based on the October 7, 1999, incident (the garage incident)

and the November 1, 2000, incident (the freeway incident), the

court found Petitioner guilty of inflicting corporeal injury on a

spouse or cohabitant (count one), unauthorized use of tear gas

(count three) and violation of a protective order (count eight). 

Count four was dismissed and the court found Petitioner not guilty

on counts two, five, six, seven and nine. Petitioner was sentenced

to time served and placed on formal probation for five years.

On August 7, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal

with the California Court of Appeal. On February 27, 2002,

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the

court of appeal. On direct appeal, the court reversed the

conviction on count eight and affirmed the convictions on counts

one and three. The court of appeal denied the petition for writ of

habeas corpus and petition for rehearing. On May 21, 2003, the

California Supreme Court denied, without comment, the petition for

rehearing regarding the direct appeal and a petition for a writ of

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habeas corpus. 

On May 17, 2004, Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus attacking his conviction on counts one and three.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a State

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition challenging a

State conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

reviewed on the merits in State court unless the State court’s

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if

it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it

applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). 

An unreasonable application of federal law occurs when the

State court identifies the correct governing legal principle, but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts. Id. An

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unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law. Id. Relief is not proper

where the State court decision is "merely erroneous." Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). The only definitive source of

clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the

holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant State

court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

Circuit law may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining

whether a State court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1070-1071.

To determine whether the State court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest State

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001); LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

An unreasonable determination of the facts occurs where the

State court fails to consider and weigh highly probative, relevant

evidence, central to petitioner’s claim, that was properly

presented and made part of the State court record. Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). A federal court gives

deference to a State court’s factual determinations. Lambert v.

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1) provides that “a determination of a factual issue made

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant

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1 Petitioner cites specific federal law for two of his claims: 

(1) The appellate court improperly denied a request for a new trial

based on the subsequently discovered evidence in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Petitioner was denied a closing argument

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In regards to

the remaining grounds for habeas relief, Petitioner claims

generally that substantive and procedural errors constituted actual

prejudice and violated his federal constitutional rights to due

process, to a fair trial, to present a defense and to the

meaningful assistance of counsel. In the interest of justice, the

Court has identified, where necessary, the federal authority

relevant to Petitioner's claims.

7

shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict." Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises six grounds for habeas relief: (1) The

court of appeal should have ordered a new trial because

subsequently discovered evidence showed that Ms. Huber gave

perjured testimony; (2) The trial court denied Petitioner the

opportunity to make an opening statement and a meaningful closing

argument; (3) The trial court erred in excluding evidence of a

conspiracy between Ms. Huber and a third-party, Marcus Campagna;

(4) The trial court erred by admitting evidence of an alleged hand

gesture made by Petitioner towards Ms. Huber at the preliminary

hearing; (5) The trial court erred by consolidating charges from

two separate informations; and (6) The trial court improperly

placed the burden of proof on Petitioner as to the issue of selfdefense.1

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I. Subsequently Discovered Evidence of Perjured Testimony

Petitioner contends that evidence discovered after trial shows

that Ms. Huber, the main prosecution witness, gave perjured

testimony. Respondent argues, among other things, that

Petitioner's claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus

review and that, even if a constitutional violation occurred, the

error was harmless. Without conceding his claim, Petitioner fails

to answer Respondent's arguments. 

As subsequently discovered evidence, Petitioner is apparently

referring to the declarations of Charlene Gallegos and Guy Mori. 

Ms. Gallegos' declaration states that, in the fall of 2000, she was

involved in a relationship with Marcus Campagna, a friend of Ms.

Huber. Mr. Campagna informed Ms. Gallegos that he and Ms. Huber

were going "Andre Hunting." This meant that they were attempting

to get Petitioner in trouble with the law by forcing him to have

contact with Ms. Huber in violation of a restraining order. 

Mr. Mori's declaration states that he and Ms. Huber had

romantic relationship from May 21, 2000 until September 25, 2001. 

Mr. Mori declares that Ms. Huber gave false testimony about

incidents which occurred on October 23, 2000, after Petitioner saw

her at a TGI Friday's restaurant. Mr. Mori further claims that Ms.

Huber lied when she testified that she moved to Arizona because she

was afraid of Petitioner. Finally, Mr. Mori states that Ms. Huber

admitted to accusing Petitioner falsely. He claims that Ms. Huber

made this admission by way of a threat to Mr. Mori that she would

do the same to him in an effort to manipulate him. 

Petitioner's habeas petition with the California court of

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appeal sought a new trial based on these declarations. The court

denied the petition without comment. Where a State court gives no

reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner's federal

claim, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether

the State court's decision was objectively reasonable. Himes, 336

F.3d at 853; Greene, 288 F.3d at 1088; Newland, 263 F.3d at 1028;

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When

confronted with such a decision, a federal court should conduct “an

independent review of the record." Himes, 336 F.3d at 853;

Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

Petitioner asserts that the newly discovered evidence supports

the defense theory that Ms. Huber was obsessed with Petitioner,

distraught over him leaving her and initiated a conspiracy falsely

to accuse him of various crimes. Essentially, Petitioner claims

that the evidence establishes Ms. Huber's perjury and undermines

her credibility as the chief prosecution witness. Citing Napue v.

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), Petitioner seeks federal habeas

relief and a new trial because he asserts that a conviction

obtained through the use of false testimony constitutes a violation

of a defendant's right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Respondent correctly points out that Napue stands for the

proposition that it is unconstitutional for a prosecutor knowingly

to use false testimony to obtain a conviction. 360 U.S. at 269;

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme

Court has never held that due process is offended by a conviction

resting on perjured testimony where the prosecutor did not know of

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the testimony's falsity at trial. Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067,

619-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Durley v. Mayo, 351

U.S. 277, 290-91 (1956)). Thus, absent a showing that the

prosecutor knew Ms. Huber's testimony was false, Petitioner cannot

successfully claim that the court of appeal's decision to deny a

new trial was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. 

An independent review of the record also fails to demonstrate

that there was an unreasonable determination of the facts. A

federal court may not disturb a State court's factual findings

unless, after review of the State court record, it determines that

the State court was not merely wrong, but actually objectively

unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Even assuming the newly discovered evidence undermines Ms. Huber's

credibility, the State trial court in its opinion on direct appeal

reasonably found sufficient evidence to support Petitioner's

convictions relating to the October 7, 1999 garage incident. In

regards to the conviction for inflicting corporeal injury on a

cohabitant, San Jose Police Officer Thomas Boyle testified that

Petitioner had explained and demonstrated to him how Petitioner

pushed Ms. Huber out of the garage with his foot. (RT 244). At

trial, Petitioner also admitted: "I put my foot up and she charged

into me, and my foot blocked her motion. Simple as that." 

(RT 467). Ms. Huber's injury was also corroborated by San Jose

Police Officer Eric Dragoo who testified that he examined Ms. Huber

immediately after the garage incident and found a bump on the left

side of her head and a bruise on her right forearm. (RT 258-59).

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The State court's factual finding is substantiated by

Petitioner's admission that he shot Ms. Huber with pepper spray. 

Petitioner admitted spraying Ms. Huber's leg, hip, shoulder and

armpit. (RT 407-08). Commenting on the incident Petitioner

stated: "I used the pepper spray because I knew that if I were to

physically take her out of the garage then Jennifer would be able

to get her hands on me again." (RT 406). Officer Boyle testified

that Petitioner admitted spraying Ms. Huber three to four times. 

(RT 244). Moreover, the trial court's conclusion that Petitioner

was not using the pepper spray in self defense was reasonable given

the insufficient evidence of an imminent danger and the fact that

Petitioner gave non-self-defense reasons for spraying Ms. Huber ("I

just wanted to defuse the situation. I didn't want anymore

touching, and I just wanted her to go away. I didn't want to be

around her anymore." (RT 405)). 

Even if the newly discovered evidence casts doubt on Ms.

Huber's testimony, the declarations do not otherwise contradict the

evidence used to convict Petitioner for the garage incident. The

declarants apparently address an alleged conspiracy which arose

several months after October 7, 1999. Consequently, the trial

court's determination of the facts necessary for Petitioner's

convictions was reasonable. Furthermore, even if the discovery of

new evidence impeaching a prosecution witness' credibility were

grounds for habeas relief, the evidence proffered here is

insufficient to cast substantial doubt on the reasonableness of the

State courts' findings. Accordingly, the new evidence would not

have a substantial effect on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 673.

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II. Denial of Opportunity for Opening and Meaningful Closing 

A. Opening Statement

Petitioner claims he was denied the opportunity to make an

opening statement. Respondent argues Petitioner fails to show a 

denial in the record and that Petitioner's claim is not cognizable

in a federal habeas petition.

The Supreme Court has limited the constitutional right to oral

argument to final argument or summation. Herring v. New York, 422

U.S. 853, 863 n.13 (1974). The Court declined to imply the

existence of "a constitutional right to oral argument at any stage

of the trial or appellate process." Id. Although the Constitution

requires that trials be fairly conducted and that "guaranteed

rights of defendants be scrupulously respected," McGautha v.

California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971), the Supreme Court has never

held that an opening statement by the defendant is such a

guaranteed right. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have suggested

that the failure to afford a defendant the opportunity to make an

opening statement can constitute error. United States v.

Breedlove, 576 F.2d 57, 60 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.

Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1455 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 1189 (1985). The Court need not consider such case law here

because Petitioner has failed to establish he was denied the

opportunity to make an opening statement. 

The California Court of Appeal observed: 

On the first day of trial, the court asked the district 

 attorney if he wished to make an opening statement and the 

 district attorney elected to waive it. The court did not 

 invite defense counsel to make an opening statement at the 

 time and defense counsel did not request so to do.

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Penal Code section 1093, subdivision (b) provides that defense

counsel may make an opening statement either immediately after

the district attorney's opening statement or after the

People's case has been presented.

After the People had rested, the court said to defense

counsel, "okay, you may proceed, Mr. Defilippis. What's your

pleasure?" To which defense counsel replied "Actually my

pleasure would be to break until tomorrow morning. 

Shall we call it a day? I needed to break at 4:00." Upon

reconvening the next morning, the court noted, "People have

rested. You may proceed, Mr. Defilippis." Defense counsel

called his first witness.

Appellant presents no facts to support his contention that the

court prohibited defense counsel from making an opening

statement. It appears from the record that defense counsel

either chose not to make an opening statement or simply forgot

to make one. 

People v. LaMothe, H023403, at 5; (RT 285, 292). 

The appellate court correctly determined that the trial court

did not prohibit Petitioner from making an opening statement. 

Furthermore, Petitioner never asked to make an opening statement at

any stage in the trial, or objected that he was not allowed to do

so. Although the trial court did not invite Petitioner to make a

statement at the beginning of the trial, the court did permit

Petitioner the opportunity to open at the conclusion of the

prosecution's case-in-chief. The court called for Petitioner to

proceed and conferred complete discretion on counsel by asking,

"What's your pleasure?" Id. The court of appeal also reasonably

concluded that, by choosing to call his first witness on the

following day, counsel either "chose not to make an opening

statement or simply forgot to make one." Id. 

Petitioner's claim is not saved by his reliance on section

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2 Penal Code section 1093 states in pertinent part:

the trial shall proceed in the following order, unless

otherwise directed by the court . . . (b) The district

attorney, or other counsel for the people, makes an opening

statement in support of the charge. Whether or not the

district attorney, or other counsel for the people, makes an

opening statement, the defendant or his or her counsel may

then make an opening statement, or may reserve the making of

an opening statement until after introduction of the evidence

in support of the charge.

14

1093(b) of California Penal Code,2 which affords defendants the

choice of making an opening statement immediately after the

prosecution does so or reserving the opening until after the

prosecution presents its case. It is not the province of federal

courts to grant habeas relief for errors of State law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1992); Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d

1094, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Nor is the Court convinced that such

an error, if it were committed, was so egregious as to deny

Petitioner fundamental fairness at trial, especially where, as

here, Petitioner never requested an opening but was given the

opportunity to make a statement nevertheless. 

 B. Closing Argument

Petitioner claims the trial court denied him the opportunity

to make a complete, meaningful closing argument. He asserts that

certain court-imposed restrictions on closing arguments were

violative of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Respondent

argues that the trial court's actions were consistent with

established precedent, that Petitioner was not precluded from

making a closing argument on the counts for which he stands

convicted and that any error was harmless. 

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It is well-established that a criminal defendant has a

constitutional right to make a closing argument. Yarborough v.

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (citing Herring, 422 U.S. at 865)). 

However, the Supreme Court has also explained that trial courts

have discretion in controlling closing arguments: 

This is not to say that closing arguments in a criminal case

must be uncontrolled or even unrestrained. The presiding

judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the

duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. He [or

she] may limit counsel to a reasonable time and may terminate

argument when continuation would be repetitive or redundant. 

He [or she] may ensure that argument does not stray unduly 

from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly

conduct of the trial. In all these respects he [or she] 

must have broad discretion. 

Herring, 422 U.S. at 862(alterations in original).

Here, the court of appeal observed the following: 

After the presentation of evidence, the court addressed 

counsel as follows: "Let's proceed to final argument on the

matter. What I would like counsel to do is, and I may direct

you during the course of that argument, is to let's just go

down each count. 

I would like to get the People's position as to the state of

the evidence as to each count, and then I would request that

you respond to it, Mr. Defillippis. 

And then I think that the most efficient way to resolve the

matter is for the Court to simply rule on each count as we go

through it.

 Appellant's counsel was given the opportunity to set forth his

arguments on counts, one, three, five, six and seven. The

court did not ask for statements on counts two, four and nine

because it had already determined there was insufficient

evidence to convict appellant on those counts. 

As to count eight, the court stated, "There is simply nothing

that could be said that's going to dissuade me from thinking

that this defendant did, in fact, follow that woman on the

freeway. 

I believe that the officer that testified - I do not believe

that it was a coincidence that he was driving south and ran

into her, and it was light traffic and that they just happened

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to be in traffic during the sequence of events. 

That is a violation of the protective order, and I think it

has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant on

November 1st, year 2000, violated section 273.6(a)." 

People v. LaMothe, H023403, at 6. 

As for count three, the trial court stated:

And I presume that there is no issue that self-defense -- the

evidence is certainly insufficient to justify a finding that

it was used in any form of self-defense. It was simply used

in my view inappropriately.

Is there some technical defense to that Count that the defense

intends to raise? 

(RT 516).

The court of appeal concluded: 

We cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in

restricting counsel to a non-contiguous summation of the case. 

That being said, once defense counsel was restricted to a

"count by count summation closing argument" he was entitled to

address each count. While appellant was allowed to address

the court regarding counts one, three, five, six and seven, 

the court ruled on count eight without hearing argument 

from counsel.

However, since we have determined that appellant's conviction

on count eight cannot stand for the reasons outlined below, we

need not address this matter further.

Id.

Because Herring confers broad discretion on the trial court to

control the scope, duration, timing and order of closing arguments, 

422 U.S. at 862, the appellate court reasonably found that the

trial court did not err in restricting Petitioner to a count-bycount closing. Moreover, Petitioner made a closing argument on

each count (one and three) for which he now seeks relief. Although

the trial court restricted Petitioner's argument on count three to

whether there was a "technical defense" (RT 516), this judicial

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latitude is permissible under Herring to limit the scope of the

argument when "continuation would be repetitive or redundant" or

otherwise "stray unduly from the mark." Id. 

The trial court's statement that it was "under no obligation

to even allow [Petitioner] to make a closing argument" was

mistaken. (RT 517-18). The trial court did decline to hear

argument on count eight. However, the court of appeal reversed the

conviction as to count eight on other grounds, rendering the issue

moot.

Therefore, the court of appeal reasonably applied clearly

established federal law.

III. Exclusion of Conspiracy Evidence

Petitioner argues that evidence of a conspiracy between Ms.

Huber and Marcus Campagna to harass and falsely accuse him was

improperly excluded. He contends that, if allowed, the evidence

would have impeached Ms. Huber's honesty and created a reasonable

doubt whether Petitioner committed any crime. Respondent asserts

that Petitioner has failed to establish a federal constitutional

right to have such evidence admitted and that the evidence itself

is not relevant to the convictions at issue. 

"The Supreme Court has made clear that the erroneous exclusion

of critical, corroborative defense evidence may violate both the

Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial and the Sixth

Amendment right to present a defense." Depetris v. Kuykendall, 239

F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)). Still, a defendant's right to present

relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to

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3

 Section 352 states:

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability

that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of

time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.

4

 Section 1223 states:

Evidence of a statement made against a party is not made

inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) The statement was made

by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit

a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of

that conspiracy; (b) The statement was made prior to or during

the time that the party was participating in that conspiracy;

and (c) The evidence is offered either after admission of

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reasonable restrictions. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410

(1988). States have broad latitude under the Constitution to

establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. United

States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). The defendant must

comply with these rules of procedure and evidence "designed to

assure fairness and reliability." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302

(citations omitted).

Petitioner sought to have Charlene Gallegos testify regarding

a conspiracy between Ms. Huber and Mr. Campagna. Specifically,

Petitioner claims Ms. Gallegos would have testified that Mr.

Campagna regularly told her he was going "Andre Hunting" at the

behest of Ms. Huber to harass Petitioner and set him up for various

crimes. Petitioner concedes that it was within the trial court's

discretion to exclude this testimony under California Evidence Code

section 352.3 Further, the testimony proffered was hearsay. 

Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that it should have been admitted

as testimony by a co-conspirator under section 1223.4

 Affirming

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evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the facts

specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the court's

discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission

of such evidence.

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the decision of the trial court to exclude this evidence as

hearsay, the appellate court noted that Ms. Huber was not a "party"

but a witness. Furthermore, Ms. Gallegos' statements could not

meet the hearsay exception because section 1223 requires

independent evidence of a conspiracy and, after reviewing the

record, the court of appeal found no such evidence. 

If the State court only considered State law, the federal

court must ask whether State law, as explained by the State court,

is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). It is

not. However, even evidence inadmissible under evidence rules may

have to be admitted if its exclusion would violate due process. To

determine whether the exclusion of this evidence violated

Petitioner's due process rights, the Court considers a five-part

balancing test: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on

the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable

of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole

evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it

constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Miller v.

Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds,

768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985).

As for probative value, at best, the evidence would have

undermined Ms. Huber's credibility. The alleged conspiracy,

however, did not arise until months after the October 7, 1999

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garage incident, the subject of Petitioner's two remaining

convictions. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence for

these convictions without Ms. Huber's testimony. Therefore, there

is little, if any, probative value to the conspiracy evidence

concerning the convictions now at issue. 

The Court must also defer to the court of appeal's factual

finding that the hearsay evidence was not reliable because there

was no independent evidence of the conspiracy. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981)

(presumption of correctness of facts is the same even though the

finding was made by a State court of appeals, rather than a trial

court). Assuming the trier of fact could evaluate the conspiracy

evidence (the third prong of the test), Petitioner still fails to

meet the fourth and fifth prongs of the test.

The excluded evidence was not the sole evidence of a

conspiracy. The trial court permitted Charlene Gallegos and

Petitioner to testify about the claimed conspiracy. (RT 305-16,

423). The court also allowed defense counsel to cross examine Ms.

Huber about the alleged conspiracy. (RT 136-38). Because this

evidence of the conspiracy had been admitted, it was reasonable for

the trial court to find further conspiracy evidence cumulative or

irrelevant with respect to the garage incident.

The excluded evidence was not a major part of the defense. 

Petitioner's major defense with respect to the garage incident was

a claim of self-defense. Petitioner also denied injuring Ms.

Huber, though he admitted to using his foot to push her away from

him. For a criminal defendant, raising doubt about the credibility

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5 The State has a substantial interest in preserving orderly

trials, judicial efficiency and in excluding unreliable or

prejudicial evidence. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984).

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of the prosecution's main witness is often a strategy, yet here Ms.

Huber's testimony was not the only obstacle to Petitioner's major

defense. In fact, the trial court commenting on the defense

stated: "And by the defendant's own testimony, he wasn't using it

to protect himself. He was using it in an effort to get the victim

away from the garage, and that's not self-defense." (RT 516). 

Therefore, the trial court did not rely on Ms. Huber's testimony to

discount the self-defense claim. Accordingly, the conspiracy

evidence would not have constituted a major part of Petitioner's

defense.

Finally, as the test prescribes, Stagner, 757 F.2d at 994,

weighing the importance of the excluded hearsay evidence of a

conspiracy against the State's interest in exclusion,5

 the Court

finds that Petitioner's due process rights were not violated. 

Therefore, the appellate court's decision that the evidence was

properly excluded was not an unreasonable application of federal

law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts.

IV. Admission of Evidence of Alleged Hand Gesture 

In counts six and seven of the consolidated compliant, the

prosecution charged Petitioner with intimidating a witness,

alleging that while Ms. Huber was testifying at the preliminary

hearing, Petitioner positioned his hands as if he were firing a gun

at her. Petitioner argues this count was improperly added to the

case without a preliminary hearing and that the court erred in

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6

 Without the support of case law, Respondent submits that,

because this charge was dismissed, Petitioner is not in custody

because of it, for purposes of § 2254. The Court does not need to

resolve this because the Court denies relief on other grounds. 

7 Section 353 states:

A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the 

judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of

the erroneous admission of evidence unless:

(a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to

exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so

stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection

or motion; and

(b) The court which passes upon the effect of the error or

errors is of the opinion that the admitted evidence should

have been excluded on the ground stated and that the error or

errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

22

considering evidence of the alleged hand gesture at trial. 

Respondent counters that Petitioner may not seek habeas relief on

this charge because he was found not guilty.6 Respondent further

contends that Petitioner forfeited any claim by failing timely to

object to the hand gesture evidence. Moreover, Respondent asserts

that Petitioner fails to show that the admitted evidence prejudiced

the court or denied him a fair trial.

Regarding Petitioner's claim, the California court of appeal 

observed: 

In this case, no timely objection was made to exclude the

evidence that [Petitioner] gestured to Ms. Huber at the

preliminary hearing as if he were shooting a gun at her. 

Nor do we find that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 

[Petitioner] was found not guilty of count seven and there 

is no indication in the record that this evidence impacted 

the court's other rulings. [Petitioner's] convictions on

count one and three were based on the garage incident . . .

People v. LaMothe, H023403, at 10. 

 Referring to California Evidence Code § 353,7 the court of

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appeal noted that California law requires a record of objection to

preserve an issue for appellate review. Because Petitioner did not

object to the admission of evidence regarding the hand gesture, the

court of appeal concluded that Petitioner had waived his right to

challenge this evidence on appeal.

The federal courts have recognized and applied this California

contemporaneous objection rule in affirming denial of a federal

petition on grounds of procedural default. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 799, 806 (1991); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953,

957-58 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120,

1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (“we held more than twenty years ago that the

rule is consistently applied when a party has failed to make any

objection to the admission of evidence”). In cases in which a

petitioner has defaulted his federal claims in State court pursuant

to an independent and adequate State procedural rule, federal

habeas review of the claims is barred unless the petitioner can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result

of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750

(1991). A petitioner must establish factual innocence in order to

show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from

application of procedural default. Gandarela v. Johnson, 275 F.3d

744, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2002); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-

43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner has not met this burden because he has failed to

demonstrate cause for the default, actual prejudice or the factual

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8 Section 954 states, in pertinent part:

An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different

offenses connected together in their commission, or different

statements of the same offense or two or more different

offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under

separate counts, and if two or more accusatory pleadings are

filed in such cases in the same court, the court may order

them to be consolidated . . .

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innocence that is necessary to overcome the State procedural bar. 

Indeed, after an independent review of the record, this Court found

sufficient evidence to sustain Petitioner's convictions. 

Therefore, Petitioner's claim is legitimately barred. 

Finally, the trial court dismissed counts six and seven

relating to the alleged hand gesture. This evidence had no

significant factual or legal bearing on the convictions for counts

one and three. Thus, even if the evidence of the alleged hand

gesture had been admitted erroneously, it did not have a

substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

V. Consolidation of Charges

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in

consolidating charges stemming from two separate events, the garage

and freeway incidents. Citing the California Penal Code section

954,8 Petitioner claims that the charges do not meet the

requirements for consolidation and that the trial court

acknowledged the prejudicial effect of the consolidation. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to

prove actual prejudice that resulted in an unfair trial. 

It is not for this Court to consider the State court's

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application of section 954 because a federal court may not grant a

writ of habeas corpus based on "a perceived error of state law." 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). This Court may only

determine whether the State court's joinder of Petitioner's

offenses violated his federal constitutional rights. Jackson v.

Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Misjoinder violates the Constitution only if it results in

prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right

to a fair trial. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8

(1986). Thus, habeas relief may be granted only if the joinder

rendered Petitioner's trial "fundamentally unfair" and "violative

of due process." Davis v. Woodford, 333 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771-72 (9th Cir.

2001)). 

Regarding Petitioner's allegations of prejudice, the court of

appeal noted: 

 

 [Petitioner contends] that had the cases not been consolidated 

 the court would not have convicted [Petitioner] of counts one 

 and three arising from the garage incident. [Petitioner] 

 fails to realize that he admitted that he pepper sprayed Ms. 

 Huber to get her out of the garage. Thus, even if the two 

 separately charged series of events had not been consolidated 

 for trial [Petitioner] would have been convicted of corporeal 

 injury on a spouse or cohabitant . . . and unauthorized use of 

 tear gas . . . Thus, [Petitioner] has failed to show that he 

 was prejudiced by the consolidation . . . 

People v. LaMothe, H023403, at 12 (citations omitted) (alterations

in original). 

Despite the court of appeal opinion, Petitioner maintains that

the charges relating to the freeway incident contaminated the trial

judge's verdict on the charges relating to the garage incident. 

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Specifically, Petitioner emphasizes what he regards as an admission

of prejudice by the trial court. Responding to Petitioner's denial

of guilt after the verdict had been rendered, the court stated:

The problem that you have, Mr. LaMothe, is that there is so

many. If there were just the single act, single act occurring

in October, you might have had a much more credible position. 

But there is no basis that I could find to the continuing

contact you had.

(RT 527-28).

Even if the consolidated charges had some influence on the

trial court, their effect was insubstantial. In determining whether

an error was harmless, the court does not "examine whether there

was sufficient evidence to support the conviction in the absence of

the constitutional error." Gent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1127

(9th Cir. 2002). Rather, the court determines "whether the error

had a 'substantial and injurious effect or influence'" on the trier

of fact. Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946)). Petitioner's credibility was fairly discounted by

other evidence supporting his guilt, including police testimony and

Petitioner's own admissions relating to the garage incident. 

Moreover, the trial court's ability to disregard irrelevant

evidence was demonstrated by the fact that Petitioner was found not

guilty of five counts. 

Therefore, even if the charges should not have been tried

together, any constitutional error was harmless. 

VI. Burden of Proof on Issue of Self-Defense 

In regard to his claim of self-defense, Petitioner asserts the

trial court erred by improperly placing the burden of proof on him. 

Petitioner explains that under California law the prosecution bears

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the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense

does not apply. Respondent counters that in the absence of clearly

established federal law concerning the burden of proof on selfdefense, Petitioner may not be granted habeas relief. Respondent

also argues that there was no evidence that the trial court placed

the burden on Petitioner, but even if an error was made, it was

harmless. 

It is well-settled that "the Due Process Clause protects the

accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he

is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). However,

"[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never

been constitutionally required." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.

197, 210 (1977). Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that the

burden to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence may

constitutionally be shifted to the defendant. Martin v. Ohio, 480

U.S. 228, 235 (1986). 

Thus, Supreme Court precedent suggests that a defendant is not

denied due process simply because the burden of proving selfdefense by a preponderance of the evidence is placed on him. Thus,

the State court of appeal’s decision is not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (court

refused to decide defendant's Sixth Amendment vicinage clause claim

because Supreme Court had not defined the scope of defendant's

rights). In essence, Petitioner is left with a claim of State law

error, which is not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. 

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Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Therefore, the Court may not grant

Petitioner relief on this claim. 

 CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/15/05

___________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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