Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13107/USCOURTS-ca11-14-13107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Linkan LLC
Appellee
Ashley L. Maner
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13107

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-01088-VEH

ASHLEY L. MANER,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

LINKAN LLC, 

d.b.a. Fugi Japanese Cuisine, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(March 3, 2015)

Before HULL, MARCUS and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiff Ashley L. Maner brought claims of pregnancy discrimination and 

retaliation under Title VII against her former employer, Defendant Lincan, LLC. 

After a jury verdict in her favor, Plaintiff Maner appeals the district court’s order 

awarding her attorneys’ fees and costs in an amount less than she requested. On 

appeal, Maner argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding her 

only $38,558.31 out of the requested $92,449.88 in attorneys’ fees and costs. After 

review, we affirm.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Under Title VII, the district court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing 

party to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee” as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(k). Generally, what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is calculated 

using the “lodestar” method, taking the number of hours reasonably expended on 

the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 

U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (1983); Cullens v. Ga. Dep’t of 

Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying the lodestar method of 

calculating attorney’s fees in a Title VII case).

On appeal, Maner challenges both aspects of the district court’s lodestar 

calculation. Specifically, Maner contends the district court incorrectly: (1) 

excluded certain work from the total number of hours reasonably expended on the 

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litigation; and (2) reduced the hourly rate charged by her lead attorney and his two 

associates. We address each claim in turn.1

A. Hours Reasonably Expended on the Litigation

In ascertaining the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, 

the district court should exclude any “excessive, redundant or otherwise 

unnecessary” hours. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 

1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988). The district court also has the discretion to exclude 

work performed on unrelated actions. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12, 103 S. Ct. at 

1941. The fee applicant bears the burden to establish that the hours for which fees 

are sought were “reasonably expended on the litigation.” ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 

168 F.3d 423, 435 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). To carry that 

burden, fee counsel must submit time records showing “time expenditures . . . with 

sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each 

activity . . . .” Id. at 427 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the number 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. The district court found that 

 

1

We review a district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion, 

examining questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Bivins v. Wrap It Up, 

Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008). What constitutes a reasonable hourly rate is a 

finding of fact subsidiary to the total award, and therefore is reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard. ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 436 (11th Cir. 1999). Because, the 

computation of a fee award necessarily involves the exercise of judgment, however, the district 

court’s factual findings are entitled to deference. Villano v. City of Boynton Beach, 254 F.3d 

1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001).

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Maner’s attorneys reasonably expended 151.80 hours, rather than the claimed 

272.90 hours, in litigating her Title VII claims. In doing so, the district court 

thoroughly reviewed the billing sheets submitted by Maner’s attorneys, identified 

the hours it was excluding and why using extensive notations, and then provided 

further explanation for its actions in its memorandum order.

On appeal, Plaintiff Maner argues the district court should not have excluded

time her attorneys spent litigating matters related to her application for state 

unemployment benefits. We disagree, as those hours concerned a discrete state 

administrative proceeding and not her federal Title VII lawsuit. See id. at 436

(finding an abuse of discretion where the district court failed to exclude hours not 

expended on the litigation). We, like the district court before us, are not persuaded 

by Plaintiff Maner’s argument that those hours were “necessary” or “related” to 

her federal litigation. Maner contends that both her state unemployment 

compensation claim and her federal case involved whether her termination was 

voluntary, and an adverse decision in the state administrative proceeding could 

have resulted in issue preclusion in her federal lawsuit. Unreviewed state 

administrative proceedings, however, do not have preclusive effect on federal Title 

VII claims. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794-96, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 

3224-25 (1986); Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1021-22 (11th Cir. 

2001). Thus, for purposes of her federal discrimination claims, it was not 

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necessary to obtain a favorable decision from the state agency or to appeal the state 

agency’s initial unfavorable decision.

Similarly, the district court did not err in excluding as unnecessary the hours 

billed for her attorneys’ travel to and from the Anniston, Alabama, courthouse 

during her three-day trial. Plaintiff’s attorneys lived in Birmingham, but travelled 

back and forth to Anniston, Alabama. Although this Court has no precise rules for 

compensating travel time, we have indicated that a fee applicant seeking to recover 

expenses incurred for retaining non-local counsel generally “must show a lack of 

attorneys practicing in that place who are willing and able to handle his claims.” 

Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437 (involving issue of reasonable hourly rates for non-local 

counsel). Plaintiff Maner made no attempt to make such a showing with respect to 

Anniston, Alabama. As the district court explained, although it allowed mileage 

for travel, it excluded the attorneys’ time (approximately $4,000) because they 

elected to return to Birmingham each night rather than stay in a hotel in Anniston. 

With a distance of approximately 60 miles between Anniston and Birmingham, the 

attorneys’ trip took about an hour each way. Thus, billing for the attorneys’ travel 

time was akin to billing for travel to work. We agree that, under the particular 

factual circumstances, we cannot say the district court erred in determining that it 

was not required to pass the Plaintiff attorneys’ travel time onto the Defendant.

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For the first time in her appeal brief, Plaintiff Maner contends that her 

attorneys: (1) “used the driving time to confer together to discuss the trial’s 

development and plan for subsequent trial activities,” which they also would have 

done at a hotel; and (2) needed to return to their Birmingham law office each night 

because “the district court requested that Maner’s counsel email by 9:00 p.m. each 

night during the trial various materials including pinpoint citations and other 

information relevant to arguments made at trial.”

The problem for Plaintiff Maner is that she has the burden to establish that 

the travel time was expended on the litigation, but she does not point to any 

evidence in the record to support her claim. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 434-36. Time 

entries submitted by Plaintiff Maner’s counsel do not indicate that the attorneys 

performed any legal work while traveling. Rather, the time entries for each trial 

day consist of lists of all the work performed and include notations such as, 

“Travel to Anniston,” and “Return travel.” See id. at 427 (requiring “sufficient 

particularity” from attorney’s time records to show the hours are compensable). 

Nor does counsel’s affidavit in support of the fee request provide the information

asserted in Plaintiff Maner’s appeal brief. With respect to whether an attorney’s 

time is compensable, “unsupported assertions in a brief cannot substitute for 

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evidence in the record.” Id. at 436. In short, Plaintiff Maner has not shown clear 

error in the district court’s finding as to the number of hours reasonably expended.2

B. Reasonable Hourly Rate

We have defined a “reasonable hourly rate” as “the prevailing market rate in 

the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. “The 

general rule is that the ‘relevant market’ for purposes of determining the 

reasonable hourly rate for an attorney’s services is the place where the case is 

filed.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437 (quotation marks omitted). The party seeking 

attorneys’ fees bears the burden of establishing that the requested hourly rate is in 

line with prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299.

In establishing a reasonable hourly rate, the district court may rely on its 

own expertise and where appropriate may also consider certain factors. Id. at 

1299, 1304. These factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty 

and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service 

properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance 

of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) 

time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount 

 

2

The district court also excluded hours: (1) for work that was clerical in nature; (2) that 

were duplicative of other credited hours; or (3) for which counsel provided insufficient detail to 

discern the nature of the work. Maner has shown no reversible error with regard to these 

exclusions.

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involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the 

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson 

v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).3

Once the lodestar figure has been calculated, there is a strong presumption 

that the lodestar figure is a reasonable sum. Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. In some 

instances, however, the district court may adjust the lodestar amount upwards, in 

the case of exceptional results, or downwards, to account for only partial success.

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302.

Here, Maner sought an hourly rate of $450 per hour for her lead counsel and 

rates of $250 per hour and $225 per hour for the two associates who assisted him. 

The district court determined that the reasonable hourly was $385 rate for lead 

counsel and was $135 and $125 for his two associates. The district court’s finding 

is not clearly erroneous. 

The district court considered the experience of the three attorneys, 

customary fees charged for similar work, and the Johnson factors before relying on 

its own expertise, including its “own review of previous fee awards,” to select 

these hourly rates. See Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) 

 

3

“Although [this] balancing test has since been displaced by the lodestar formula, we 

have expressed our approval of district courts considering the Johnson factors in establishing a 

reasonable hourly rate.” Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994).

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(explaining that the district court “is itself an expert on the question [of reasonable 

hourly rates in the local market] and may consider its own knowledge and 

experience . . . and may form an independent judgment either with or without the 

aid of witnesses as to value” (quotation marks omitted)). In his affidavit, Maner’s 

lead counsel averred that he normally billed his non-contingent clients at a rate of 

$385 per hour, and his fee expert averred in her affidavit that the “prevailing 

market rate in Alabama” for a plaintiff’s attorney handling similar cases was 

between $225 and $550 per hour. The district court did not clearly err in setting 

lead counsel’s rate at his normal billing rate of $385 and in the middle of the 

expert’s range.

Lead counsel was the senior partner at his law firm, with over thirty years of 

litigation experience, much of it in employment law. The two associates “working 

under his direction,” however, were recent law school graduates with considerably 

less experience. The associate who primarily worked on Maner’s federal case and 

attended the July 2013 trial was a 2011 law school graduate.4

 We note that neither 

affidavit Maner submitted addressed the prevailing market rate in the Northern 

District of Alabama (or Anniston) for a junior associate working under the 

supervision of a senior partner. Considering the absence of such evidence, the 

district court was within its discretion to rely upon its own expertise in setting the 

 

4

This associate had 76.8 hours of time on the case; the second associate had only 3.5 

hours of time on the case.

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associates’ reasonable hourly rates. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (explaining that 

fee counsel must provide “specific and detailed evidence from which the court can 

determine the reasonable hourly rate,” and, if there is a lack of such evidence, “the 

court may make the award on its own experience”).

In sum, the district court did not err in calculating the lodestar figure, as its 

determinations of the number of reasonably expended hours and the reasonable 

hourly rates were both supported by the record. There is no merit to Maner’s 

suggestion that the district court’s award of fees in an amount less than she 

requested was an improper downward adjustment of the presumptively reasonable 

lodestar amount. The district court based its fee award solely on its calculation of 

the lodestar amount, expressly stating that no adjustment to the lodestar was 

warranted. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we cannot say the district court 

abused its discretion in awarding Maner $37,600 in attorney’s fees.

C. Costs

The district court may also award costs other than attorney’s fees to a 

prevailing plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); Chapman v. 

AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1038-39 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that 

Rule 54(d) creates a presumption that the prevailing party is awarded full costs). 

In determining the costs to be awarded, the district court may tax as costs all 

reasonable expenses incurred during the course of litigation, with the exception of 

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routine office overhead. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 438-39 (involving civil rights 

litigation under § 1988).5

Maner requested $2,262.38 in costs. The district court awarded $958.31, 

however, because it excluded costs associated with litigating Maner’s state 

unemployment compensation claim. As already noted, those expenses were not 

reasonably incurred during the course of litigating Maner’s federal Title VII 

lawsuit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs.

AFFIRMED.

 

5

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to award costs, which 

“occurs if the trial judge bases an award or denial upon findings of fact that are clearly 

erroneous.” Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007).

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