Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cr-00024/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cr-00024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Anthony Carlisle
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

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v. ) Case No. 5:16-cr-00024-MHH-HGD

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MARK ANTHONY CARLISLE, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Mark Anthony Carlisle is charged in a four-count indictment with

coercion or enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and engaging in 

activities related to material constituting or containing child pornography in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). (Doc. 1, pp. 1–3). On 

March 28, 2016, Mr. Carlisle filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant 

to a search by law enforcement of Mr. Carlisle’s residence that occurred on August 6, 

2013. (Doc. 12). The magistrate judge assigned to the case held a hearing on Mr. 

Carlisle’s motion on April 18, 2016. (Doc. 23). On April 22, 2016, the magistrate 

judge entered a report and recommendation denying Mr. Carlisle’s motion. (Doc. 23). 

Mr. Carlisle timely filed an objection to the magistrate’s report and recommendation. 

FILED

 2017 Mar-13 PM 02:24

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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(Doc. 24). The Court held a hearing to explore Mr. Carlisle’s objections on October 

25, 2016. (Doc. 29). For the reasons discussed below, the Court sustains Mr. 

Carlisle’s objection and adopts only part of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district 

court reviews legal conclusions in a report de novo and reviews for plain error factual 

findings to which no objection is made. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n. 9 

(11th Cir. 1993); see also LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 749 (11th Cir. 1988); 

Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). 

II. BACKGROUND

The facts in this case are undisputed. On July 31, 2013, a judge for the Circuit 

Court of Madison County, Alabama issued a search warrant for Mr. Carlisle’s home, 

located at 426 Walnut Grove Road, New Market, Madison County, Alabama 35761. 

The warrant authorized local law enforcement officers to search for “computers, 

cellular telephones or computer-related storage devices found thereon, as further 

described in Attachment A and Attachment B.” (Doc. 25-1). Attachment A contains 

a photo of the residence located at 426 Walnut Grove Road, New Market, Alabama. 

(Doc. 25-1, p. 9). Attachment B contains a description of property to be seized and 

searched, including, but not limited to:

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Any and all records, documents, journals, and materials pertaining to an 

electronic solicitation of [a] child by computer and any visual depiction 

of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, child pornography, 

child erotica, a sexual interest in children, or sexual activity involving 

children.

Any and all records, documents, and materials that concern any internet 

accounts or any internet-related media.

Any and all software that may be utilized to create, receive, distribute, 

store, modify, conceal, or destroy any of the evidence sought.

(Attachment B - Doc. 25-1, p. 10). Attachment B also states that “[i]n the execution 

of this warrant, the agents may seize all computers and computer-related media to be 

searched later by a qualified examiner in a laboratory or other controlled 

environment.” (Doc. 25-1, p. 10). 

The affidavit in support of the search warrant was submitted by Detective 

Brendan Morgan of the Hoover Police Department. (Doc. 25-1, p. 2). Paragraph 2 of 

Detective Morgan’s affidavit states:

As will be shown, there is probable cause to believe that Mark Anthony 

Carlisle engaged in criminal conduct, ‘Electronic Solicitation of a Child 

by Computer’ as defined in 13A-6-122 and ‘Possession and possession 

with intent to disseminate obscene matter containing visual depiction of 

persons under 17 years age’ as defined in 13A-12-192 of the Code of 

Alabama, 1975, by means of communicating with a computer and a 

cellular telephone that is located at the aforementioned address.

(Doc. 25-1, p. 2). 

In his warrant affidavit, Detective Morgan describes the background of the 

investigation into Mr. Carlisle. (Doc. 25-1, p. 5). Detective Morgan’s affidavit states 

that on May 15, 2013, an undercover police detective made contact with Mr. Carlisle 

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in response to an advertisement that Mr. Carlisle placed on Craigslist. (Doc. 25-1, p. 

5). According to the warrant affidavit, Mr. Carlisle believed that he was 

communicating with a parent who was soliciting her minor female child, under age 

12, and two minor cousins, a female under age 12 and a male under age 10. (Doc. 25-

1, p. 5). The Craigslist advertisement placed by Mr. Carlisle was traced to 426 

Walnut Grove, New Market, Madison County, Alabama 35761—which is Mr. 

Carlisle’s residence and the place where the search was executed. (Doc. 25-1, pp. 5–

6). The warrant affidavit describes the substance of the on-line communications 

between Mr. Carlisle and the undercover agent. In the course of roughly ten separate 

communications between March 23, 2013 and July 6, 2013, Mr. Carlisle describes the 

sexual conduct he wished to engage in with the minor children. (Doc. 25-1, p. 6). 

Mr. Carlisle also forwarded a photo of his face and genitals to the undercover agent. 

(Doc. 25-1, p. 6). 

Detective Morgan’s affidavit explains that based on his training and 

experience, “[t]hose who have demonstrated an interest or preference in sexual 

activity with children or in sexually explicit visual images depicting children are 

likely to keep secreted, but readily at hand, sexually explicit visual images depicting 

children.” (Doc. 25-1, pp. 7–8). The affidavit also explains that “[p]ersons trading in, 

receiving, distributing or possessing images or movies of child pornography often 

have copies of those files on their computer’s hard drive or computer-related media." 

(Doc. 25-1, p. 7).

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On August 6, 2013, law enforcement executed the search warrant and seized 

numerous items from Mr. Carlisle’s home, including a Gateway computer, two cell 

phones, a camera, and several thumb drives, floppy discs and CDs. (Doc. 23, 

Defendant’s Exhibit 2). On August 14, 2013, law enforcement made an image of the 

Gateway computer’s hard drive. (Doc. 23, p. 18). An image is an exact copy of a 

computer hard drive. (Doc. 23, pp. 18–19). On August 16, 2013, the computer was 

placed in a property room at the Hoover Police Department; the computer is still 

there. (Doc. 23, p. 18). 

The Hoover Police Department did not complete its forensic analysis of the 

computer hard drive until October 15, 2014, more than one year after the computer 

was seized. (Doc. 23, p. 31; Doc. 23, Defendant’s Exhibit 3). Testimony reflects that 

the agent who conducted the initial investigation of this case left the Hoover Police 

Department for other employment. (Doc. 23, p. 23). The agent’s replacement, 

Detective Morgan, was the individual who would have been responsible for 

performing forensic analysis of the computer, but he also left his employment with the 

Hoover Police Department. (Doc. 23, p. 26). Another officer involved in the case, 

Sergeant Keith Czeskleba, testified that aside from personnel turnover, he could not 

account for the delay between the time the computer was seized and the forensic 

analysis of the computer was performed. (Doc. 23, pp. 26, 30). 

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III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Carlisle asserts two arguments in support of his motion to suppress. First, 

he contends that the search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment because it is not 

sufficiently particular to establish probable cause that Mr. Carlisle possessed child 

pornography. (Doc. 12, p. 8; Doc. 24, pp. 9–11). Second, Mr. Carlisle argues that 

even if the search warrant was valid at its inception, the 441-day delay between law 

enforcement’s seizure of his computer and the forensic analysis of a copy of the hard 

drive amounts to an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 12, pp. 

2–8; Doc. 24, pp. 4–6). As part of his second argument, Mr. Carlisle argues that the 

search warrant was not timely executed under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.10. (Doc. 12, pp. 1–2; Doc. 24, pp. 3–4, 8).

1. Particularity of the warrant affidavit

Mr. Carlisle contends that “there is no basis to believe from the affidavit that 

any of the items sought and/or seized would contain child pornography.” (Doc. 12, p. 

8). Mr. Carlisle asserts that “this is an exploratory, general warrant, based upon 

speculation without any independent investigation” and that “there is no information

[contained in the warrant affidavit] that any computers at the residence were used to 

actually view or download any illicit material.” (Doc. 12, p. 8). The Court disagrees.

 Detective Morgan’s affidavit states that based on his training and experience, 

“[t]hose who have demonstrated an interest or preference in sexual activity with 

children or in sexually explicit visual images depicting children are likely to keep 

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secreted, but readily at hand, sexually explicit visual images depicting children.” 

(Doc. 25-1, p. 7). The warrant affidavit describes how Mr. Carlisle demonstrated an 

interest or preference in sexual activity with children by posting an internet 

advertisement on Craigslist from his home computer and communicating with an 

individual whom he believed was a parent soliciting her minor child and minor niece 

and nephew for sexual conduct. (Doc. 25-1, p. 5). In addition, Mr. Carlisle indicated 

in his communications with the undercover agent the sexually explicit activities he 

would like to see the children engage in, with an emphasis on watching them, and Mr. 

Carlisle stated that he had previously sought out visual images of sexually explicit 

material containing children. (Doc. 25-1, p. 6). For example, Mr. Carlisle stated that 

“the guy from bham [Birmingham] that used to send me pics of his 6yr old did it 

wrong. He took only pics of her when she was sleeping [b]ut they were hot.” (Doc. 

25-1, p. 6). 

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that direct evidence or first-hand 

observation of a crime is not required to establish probable cause for a search warrant.

United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080–81 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United 

States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir. 1982) (“‘[T]he nexus between the 

objects to be seized and the premises searched can be established from the particular 

circumstances involved and need not rest on direct observation.’”)) (alteration 

provided by Jenkins); see also Schaff v. United States, 2014 WL 3925280, *4 (S.D. 

Ga. 2014) (citing United States v. Davis, 589 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Similar 

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evidence not specified in the warrant can still be seized if it had a sufficient nexus to 

the crime being investigated.”)). The Eleventh Circuit has also permitted warrant 

affidavits to draw limited inferences about criminal conduct based on the specialized 

knowledge and experience of law enforcement. Jenkins, 901 F.2d at 1081. 

In Jenkins, the warrant affidavit included statements by an experienced FBI 

officer that individuals who commit theft are likely to keep the stolen items in their 

homes. Jenkins, 901 F.2d at 1081. In crediting the statements and finding that 

probable cause existed for a search of the suspect’s home, the Court noted that (1) the 

affidavit established probable cause that the suspect committed theft and (2) the 

officer had extensive experience investigating this type of crime. Id. (“The affidavit 

stated that Agent Gerald L. Jones, the veteran FBI agent who advised Agent Todd 

about the likely hiding place of the contraband, had spent ten of his seventeen years 

with the FBI investigating bank robbery/burglary matters.”). “These combined facts 

would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a search of Jenkins’ 

home would uncover evidence of the theft.” Id.

The key question in the probable cause inquiry is whether “there is a fair 

probability that contraband evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Court finds that based on the facts 

and circumstances of this case, the warrant affidavit provided sufficient indication that 

contraband—in the form of child pornography—would be found at Mr. Carlisle’s 

residence. Detective Morgan’s affidavit describes his specialized knowledge and 

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training with respect to child exploitation and crimes against children. (Doc. 25-1, p. 

2). Mr. Carlisle does not dispute that probable cause existed to search his computer 

for evidence that he enticed a minor to engage in illegal sexual conduct. His argument 

that probable cause expired once evidence of the enticement was found is 

unconvincing. Probable cause existed to search Mr. Carlisle’s computer for evidence 

of child pornography.

Assuming for argument’s sake that the search warrant was overbroad or lacking 

in probable cause, the Court finds that the evidence obtained from Mr. Carlisle’s 

home is still admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In 

United States v. Haynes, 160 Fed. Appx. 940 (11th Cir. 2005), a case which is almost 

factually identical to the present case, the defendant was charged with enticement of a 

minor and possession of child pornography. The defendant moved to suppress 

evidence of the child pornography on grounds that the warrant was overly broad. The 

defendant argued that “enticement conduct is different than child pornography, and 

there was no probable cause to support a search for child pornography.” Haynes, 160 

Fed. Appx. at 943. While the Eleventh Circuit declined to rule on whether the warrant 

was overly broad, the Court held that the evidence of child pornography is admissible 

under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 944 (citing United 

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). 

Leon stands for the principle that courts generally should not render 

inadmissible evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable 

reliance upon a search warrant that is ultimately found to be unsupported 

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by probable cause. . . . Thus, suppression is necessary only if the 

officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could 

not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of 

probable cause. 

Haynes, 160 Fed. Appx. at 944 (quoting United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 

(11th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 

The Haynes court concluded that the officers acted in reasonable reliance on 

the warrant and noted that the defendant did “not even argue, much less show, that 

any of the exceptions to the good faith doctrine applie[d].” Haynes, 160 Fed. Appx. at 

944. Mr. Carlisle likewise fails to argue that any exceptions to the good faith doctrine 

apply. Mr. Carlisle has not alleged or produced evidence that Detective Morgan was 

“dishonest or reckless” in preparing the warrant affidavit. Nor has Mr. Carlisle 

demonstrated that the officers conducting the search “could not have harbored an 

objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Id. (quoting Martin, 

297 F.3d at 1308). The magistrate judge correctly concluded that evidence of child 

pornography on Mr. Carlisle’s computer is subject to the good faith exclusionary rule.

2. Execution of the warrant under Alabama Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.10

Mr. Carlisle asserts that law enforcement violated Alabama Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.10 because the search warrant was not executed within ten days. (Doc. 

12, pp. 1–2; Doc. 24, pp. 3–4, 8). Rule 3.10 states:

The search warrant shall be directed to and served by a law enforcement 

officer, as defined by Rule 1.4(p). It shall command such officer to 

search, within a specified time not to exceed ten (10) days, the person or 

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place named for the property specified and to bring an inventory of said 

property before the court issuing the warrant.

Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.10. Mr. Carlisle urges the Court to define “execute” under Rule 

3.10 to mean the date law enforcement performed forensic analysis on the computer. 

Mr. Carlisle argues that law enforcement had no idea whether the items seized 

contained any illicit contraband prior to the expiration of ten days, and nothing in the 

warrant indicated that forensic analysis would require an extended retention of the 

items seized. (Doc. 24, p. 3). 

In Hatfield v. McDaniel, 2012 WL 5187770 (M.D. Ala. 2012), the Court 

interpreted the requirements of Ala. Code § 15-5-12, which is now Alabama Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.10, as it relates to the seizure of computers and the analysis of 

electronically stored information. The Court determined that seizure is the date that 

an item is physically seized and taken into police custody. The Hatfield Court 

explained:

Although the term “execute” is undefined in § 15-5-12, usage of the term 

suggests a search warrant is executed when the described property is 

physically seized and taken into police custody. In the context of 

electronically stored information, that would mean that the warrant is 

executed when the computer is seized, not when the files are accessed. 

Hatfield, 2012 WL 5187770 at *6.

The warrant in the present case was issued on July 31, 2013. (Doc. 25-1, p. 1). 

Law enforcement executed the search warrant and seized the computer and related 

devices on August 6, 2013. (Doc. 12, p. 1; Doc. 23, Defendant’s Exhibit 2). Thus, 

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under Ala. Code § 15-5-12, the warrant was executed within 10 days pursuant to 

Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.10.1 Regarding Mr. Carlisle’s contention that 

the warrant should have indicated that extended retention of the items seized may be 

necessary, the Court finds that no such disclosure requirements exist under the 

Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nonetheless, the warrant affidavit clearly 

indicated that items seized may be retained for analysis at a later date. (Doc. 25-1, p. 

10 – Attachment B) (“In the execution of this warrant, the agents may seize all 

computers and computer-related media to be searched later by a qualified examiner in 

a laboratory or other controlled environment.”). 

3. 441-day delay

Mr. Carlisle finally contends that, even if the seizure of his computer was 

initially valid, the 441-day delay between the seizure of the computer and the forensic 

analysis of the copy of the hard drive unreasonably infringed his possessory interests 

in the information contained on the hard drive and thus rendered the seizure of the 

hard drive unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court agrees.

The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . 

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A seizure of 

property occurs “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s 

possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 

 

1At the suppression hearing, Mr. Carlisle argued that the warrant is also untimely under Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 41(e), which requires execution of warrants within 14 days. (Doc. 23, p. 38). 

The Court need not address this argument because, as discussed above, the police executed the 

warrant within the window provided by both the state and federal rules. 

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(1984). “[A] seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth 

Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory 

interests protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘unreasonable 

seizures.’” United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 613 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124)).

To support his argument that the police unreasonably infringed his possessory 

interests in the hard drive, Mr. Carlisle relies, in part, on United States v. Mitchell, 565 

F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009). (Doc. 12, pp. 2–4). In Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit 

considered the reasonableness of a 21-day delay between law enforcement’s seizure 

of the defendant’s hard drive and the issuance of a search warrant for the hard drive. 

Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1348. The FBI agents involved in the case visited the 

defendant’s home to conduct a “knock and talk.” Id. at 1349. The defendant 

permitted the agents to enter his home, and the agents asked if the defendant’s 

computer contained any child pornography, to which defendant replied, “yes, 

probably.” Id. The agents then removed the computer’s hard drive and left the 

defendant’s residence. Id. Twenty-one days later, the agents obtained a search 

warrant for the computer hard drive. Id. at 1348–49.

In holding that the agents’ delay was unreasonable, the Eleventh Circuit relied 

on United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46 (2nd Cir. 1998) and United States v. Respress, 

9 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 1993). In Martin, the Second Circuit held that “even a seizure 

based on probable cause is unconstitutional if the police act with unreasonable delay 

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in securing a warrant.” Martin, 157 F.3d at 54. In Respress, the Sixth Circuit found 

that “even with the existence of probable cause to effect a seizure, the duration of the 

seizure pending the issuance of a search warrant must still be reasonable.” Respress, 

9 F.3d at 488. Based on these decisions, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the delay 

of 21 days between the seizure of the defendant’s computer hard drive and the 

issuance of a warrant to search the hard drive amounted to an unreasonable 

interference with the defendant’s possessory interest in the seized property. Mitchell, 

565 F.3d at 1354.

In Laist, the Eleventh Circuit again considered the reasonableness of a delay 

between the seizure of a defendant’s computer and the issuance of a search warrant 

for the computer. Guided by Mitchell, the Court in Laist “identified several factors 

highly relevant” to the question of whether a delay renders a temporary warrantless 

seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Laist, 702 F.3d at 613. These 

factors, to be considered among the totality of the circumstances and on a case-bycase basis, are: (1) “the significance of the interference with the person’s possessory 

interest,” (2) the duration of the delay, (3) “whether or not the person consented to the 

seizure,” and (4) the government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as 

evidence[.]” Id. at 613–14 (citing Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351–52).

The Court in Laist stated that, “[w]hen balancing these interests to determine 

the reasonableness of the government’s actions, we are also obliged to ‘take into 

account whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation.’” Laist, 702 F.3d 

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at 614 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)). In doing so a court 

must consider, among other things, “the nature and complexity of the investigation 

and whether ‘overriding circumstances arose, necessitating the diversion of law 

enforcement personnel to another case[.]’” Laist, 702 F.3d 614 (quoting Mitchell, 565 

F.3d at 1353). These factors, according to the Court “are the most relevant when we 

seek to balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns . . . at stake 

in cases of this kind.” Laist, 702 F.3d at 614 (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted). 

The United States argues that Mitchell and Laist do not apply here because the 

police seized Mr. Carlisle’s computer pursuant to a valid search warrant. (See Doc. 

19, p. 8). Thus, the Court is not tasked with analyzing the reasonableness of a delay 

between a warrantless seizure and the subsequent issuance of a warrant. Instead, the 

Court must evaluate a delay between an initially reasonable seizure by warrant and the 

ultimate examination of the seized closed container. For guidance in conducting this 

analysis, the United States suggested in oral argument that the Court should look to

United States v. Conrad, 2013 WL 4028273 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2013), and United 

States v. Ilonzo, 2015 WL 5827598 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2015). 

In Conrad, the Middle District of Florida held that a 5-month delay between the 

seizure of the defendant’s computer pursuant to a valid warrant and the subsequent 

forensic examination of the computer was reasonable. Conrad, 2013 WL 4028273, at 

*11. The district court explained that Mitchell and Laist were “distinguishable and 

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inapposite” because law enforcement seized the computers in Mitchell and Laist 

without a warrant. Id. The district court then considered whether the 5-month delay in 

retaining the computer to conduct a forensic analysis was reasonable under the 

circumstances of the case. Id. Because the record contained evidence that law 

enforcement’s delay in examining the computer could be attributed to “the amount of 

workload facing forensic examiners,” and because the Court found “no evidence that 

the government was not diligent in its efforts to complete the forensic examination,” 

the Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the computer evidence. Id. at *2, 

*11. 

In Ilonzo, the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the analysis in Conrad 

that Mitchell and Laist do not apply to seizures performed pursuant to a valid warrant. 

Ilonzo, 2015 WL 5827598, at *20. Thus, as in Conrad, the Georgia court did not

explicitly apply the Laist factors in assessing the reasonableness of the government’s 

delay in completing the forensic examination of the defendants’ computers. Instead,

the Court considered the “multi-year complex nature of the investigation” and the fact 

that the defendants “ha[d] not requested the return of their computers.” Id. at *21, 

*23.2 Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the government’s delay was 

 

2 The Court in Ilonzo cited United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 236 (3d Cir. 2011), for the 

proposition that “a defendant who does not seek the return of property cannot argue a Fourth 

Amendment violation [when the police retain the property for a prolonged period after seizure.]” 

Ilonzo, 2015 WL 5827598, at *21. As the Court in Ilonzo correctly points out, however, “Stabile’s 

broad statement . . . is not binding.” Id. Furthermore, the case from which Stabile derives its 

reasoning, United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985), does not, as suggested by the district court in 

Ilonzo, establish that a defendant must show that the government’s delay had an “adverse affect [sic] 

on [his] legitimate interests in [the seized property] to assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment.” 

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reasonable and denied the defendants’ motions to suppress the computer evidence. 

See id. at *6, *20–21.

The Court agrees with the United States and with the courts in Conrad and 

Ilonzo that Mitchell and Laist are distinguishable from the present case because the 

Hoover police obtained a valid search warrant before they seized Mr. Carlisle’s 

computer. Nevertheless, the reasonableness factors that the Eleventh Circuit 

identified in Laist may assist the Court in analyzing Mr. Carlisle’s argument that 

Hoover’s unjustified delay of 441 days before examining the copy of the computer 

hard drive for the evidence described in the warrant was unreasonable, requiring 

suppression of any evidence on the hard drive. 

A seizure of property must be reasonable or else it violates the Fourth 

Amendment. Laist, 702 F.3d at 613. The factors that the Eleventh Circuit 

enumerated in Laist—the presence or absence of consent to the seizure, the 

government’s diligence, the circumstances that diverted the government’s attention 

from the seized property, “the significance of the interference with the person’s 

possessory interest,” the duration of the delay, and “the government’s legitimate 

interest in holding the property as evidence”—all inform a court’s analysis of the 

reasonableness of a delay in retaining a closed container pending an examination of 

the container’s contents. Id. Above all, courts must “evaluate the totality of the 

circumstances presented by each case.” Id. (citing Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351). 

 

See Ilonzo, 2015 WL 5827598, at *21. As the United States conceded at oral argument, a defendant 

does not have to prove prejudice to establish a Fourth Amendment violation. 

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When the closed container at issue is a computer, a court must consider the fact 

that “computers are a unique possession, one in which individuals may have a 

particularly powerful possessory interest.” Laist, 702 F.3d at 614. As the Mitchell 

Court held, the hard drive of a computer “‘is the digital equivalent of its owner’s 

home, capable of holding a universe of private information.’” Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 

1352 (quoting Kansas v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 735 (2005)). In addition to holding

potential evidence of a crime, a defendant’s computer hard drive contains, in almost 

every case, a significant amount of data that is outside the scope of the warrant, 

irrelevant to the alleged crime, and non-criminal in nature. A defendant’s possessory 

interest in this innocent information is significant, and the government’s possession of 

a defendant’s hard drive represents a significant interference with the defendant’s 

possessory interest.3 

In Conrad, the district court found that a 5-month delay between seizure and 

forensic analysis was reasonable, in part, because of “the amount of workload facing 

forensic examiners.” Conrad, 2013 WL 4028273, at *11. In Ilonzo, the district court 

took into account the “multi-year complex nature of the investigation” in concluding 

that the government’s delay was reasonable. Ilonzo, 2015 WL 5827598, at *23.4 The 

 

3

Jacobsen instructs that a person does not have a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in 

contraband, and law enforcement may retain evidence of criminal conduct, but law enforcement may 

not retain innocent material without implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See 

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1984). 

4

Similarly, in United States v. Whaley, the Eleventh Circuit considered the forensic analysts’ 

“strained [resources]” in concluding that the government’s 2–3-month delay between seizure and 

examination was reasonable. 415 Fed. Appx. 129, 135 (11th Cir. 2011).

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record in this case contains no evidence that the forensic examiners were inundated 

with work or that Mr. Carlisle’s investigation was particularly complex.5 Instead, the 

441-day delay appears to be the result of oversight on the part of the Hoover Police 

Department. On cross-examination, the government’s witness, a sergeant in the 

Hoover Police Department, testified that the officer to whom the case initially was 

assigned left the department and her cases “just sat idle.” (Doc. 23, p. 26).6 He also 

testified that he “[could not] explain why Detective Morgan didn’t do anything” with 

Mr. Carlisle’s computer once it became Detective Morgan’s responsibility to “do all 

the forensics on it.” (Doc. 23, pp. 25–26). 

In cases where the evidence demonstrates that prolonged retention of seized 

property is unavoidable despite reasonable diligence on the part of the police, such a

delay does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This is not one of those cases. 

Although the United States undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in evidence of 

criminal conduct that may be present on the hard drive, the Court finds that the 

unjustified 441-day delay between the seizure of Mr. Carlisle’s computer and the 

forensic examination of the hard drive constitutes an unreasonable infringement on 

Mr. Carlisle’s possessory interests in the hard drive. The Hoover Police Department 

 

5 The Court assumes that this evidentiary gap is not an oversight. Counsel for the government are

experienced and well-versed in the law. If a reasonable explanation for the delay were available, 

counsel for the government no doubt would have provided it.

6

It is not clear how much longer the police would have retained Mr. Carlisle’s hard drive had Mr. 

Carlisle not filed a motion for specific discovery in state court seeking the results of the 

government’s examination of the hard drive. (Doc. 32-2, pp. 2–3).

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was not diligent, and the department, once it made the effort, was able to perform its 

analysis of the hard drive in a fairly short period of time, suggesting that there was 

nothing particularly complex about the examination. Mr. Carlisle did not consent to 

the seizure. Consequently, under Laist, the delay violated Mr. Carlisle’s rights under 

the Fourth Amendment. See Laist, 702 F.3d at 613.7 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court SUSTAINS Mr. Carlisle’s objection to 

the magistrate judge’s recommendation and GRANTS Mr. Carlisle’s motion to 

suppress the hard drive evidence.8 The Court ACCEPTS the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation in all other respects and finds that the warrant was sufficiently 

particular and validly executed. The Court asks the Clerk to please TERM Docs. 12, 

21, and 32.

DONE and ORDERED this March 13, 2017.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

7 At oral argument, the United States acknowledged that the Court must apply a reasonableness test 

to assess the constitutionality of the seizure of Mr. Carlisle’s computer, but, the United States argued, 

a seizure pursuant to a valid search warrant like the one in this case is presumptively reasonable. 

Even if that is so, on the record in this case, the presumption is rebutted. 

8 Counsel for Mr. Carlisle acknowledged that his motion to suppress does not extend to the cell 

phones that law enforcement seized from his house. (Doc. 23, p. 5).

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