Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01807/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01807-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joyce Whitaker
Appellant
Wisconsin Department of Health Services
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 16-1807 

JOYCE WHITAKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 2:13-cv-00938-LA — Lynn Adelman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 27, 2017 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Joyce Whitaker worked 

for the Wisconsin Department of Health Services. The Department fired Whitaker when she did not return to work after 

exhausting her unpaid statutory and contractual medical 

leave. Whitaker sued, claiming that the Department failed to 

accommodate her disability and terminated her employment 

in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the Department on 

Case: 16-1807 Document: 27 Filed: 02/27/2017 Pages: 10
2 No. 16-1807 

several grounds. We agree with the district court that Whitaker failed to establish that she was an “otherwise qualified” 

employee, as required by the Rehabilitation Act, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Employment History and Disability Accommodation 

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we accept 

as true the evidence offered by the non-moving party, and we 

draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Zerante v. 

DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff Joyce Whitaker first started working for Milwaukee County in 2001. She 

initially worked as a corrections officer, but after suffering a 

back injury in 2005, she transitioned to other positions with 

the County. She ultimately became an economic support specialist in the Income Maintenance Program, which manages 

Milwaukee’s applications for public assistance. Whitaker’s responsibilities included processing applications for benefits, 

answering phone calls, and general case management. 

In 2009, the Wisconsin legislature directed the Wisconsin 

Department of Health Services to assume administration of 

Milwaukee County’s public assistance program. 2009 Wis. 

Act. 15, § 22, codified at Wis. Stat. § 49.825. Whitaker continued in her position, where she worked on behalf of the 

County but was under the supervision of the Department of 

Health Services. The Department had authority to make employment decisions regarding Whitaker, Wis. Stat. 

§ 49.825(3)(b)(1), and it made the termination decision that 

she challenges in this suit. 

The Department was aware of Whitaker’s disability at 

least as early as 2009. On December 8, 2009, Whitaker filed a 

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No. 16-1807 3 

disability form seeking an accommodation for her chronic 

back pain. She requested permission to stand and stretch for 

five minutes once every thirty minutes during the workday. 

The Department approved her request. 

B. Consecutive Leaves of Absence 

In the summer of 2010, Whitaker took the first of several 

consecutive leaves of absence. She never returned to work before she was fired in November 2010. During those months, 

Whitaker requested and received a number of extensions until she had exhausted several types of leave that were available to her. At times she made clear that she was requesting 

leave due to her disability. At other times it was less clear why 

she requested leave. The events unfolded as follows. 

On August 27, 2010, Whitaker requested two weeks of 

continuous leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 

(FMLA) due to her “recurrent back pain.” The Department 

approved her request and set her return date for September 

10, 2010. Then, on September 8, Whitaker requested additional FMLA leave until December 27, 2010 to take care of a 

family member and because of her medical condition. The Department authorized leave through October 18, 2010, but informed Whitaker that her FMLA leave for the year would be 

exhausted at that point. The Department advised Whitaker 

that she could, however, request an unpaid leave of absence 

for up to 30 more days under section 2.24 of her contract: 

“Leaves of absence without pay [not] exceeding 30 calendar 

days may be granted for good reason to any employee with 

the approval of their [sic] department head or designee ... . 

Request for such leaves shall be made by the employee as far 

as possible in advance of the date on which such leave is to 

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4 No. 16-1807 

begin.” The Department also explained the process for requesting that leave.

On October 18, Whitaker submitted a request for contractual leave without pay through December 28, 2010. This time 

her request said that she sought leave to “take care of [her] ill 

father” and due to her “own personal illness.” It did not mention her back condition specifically. The Department approved her contractual leave until November 5, 2010, but 

noted that it “will not be granting any additional extensions 

of this leave” and Whitaker was “expected to return to work on 

Monday, November 8, 2010.” (Emphasis in original.) The Department warned Whitaker that if she failed to return to work, 

it would begin the termination process. 

Whitaker did not return to work on November 8. She did, 

however, submit two additional notes from her doctor. One, 

dated November 3, 2010, said only “medical leave of absence 

until 11/17/10.” The second was dated November 12, 2010 and 

said only “medical leave of absence until 12/17/10.” Neither 

note provided any detail on Whitaker’s condition, her course 

of treatment, or the likelihood of her recovery. 

C. Termination and Lawsuit 

On November 15, 2010, the Department notified Whitaker 

that it was considering terminating her employment due to 

her failure to return to work. It scheduled a meeting with her 

for November 18 to “discuss this pending action and provide 

any documentation you wish to submit for consideration.” 

Whitaker attended the November 18 meeting with a union 

representative. She indicated that she still could not return to 

work. The Department then terminated her employment on 

November 30, and Whitaker sued. 

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No. 16-1807 5 

Whitaker’s legal claims have gone through several iterations. On appeal, she argues that the Department of Health 

Services violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 794, by rejecting what she calls her request for an accommodation of “finite, unpaid leave” and instead terminating her employment.1

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Department. First, the court found that Whitaker failed to 

provide evidence that she could perform the essential functions of her position, either with or without an accommodation. Second, the court found that Whitaker had admitted that 

she was not terminated “solely by reason of her ... disability,” 

as required by the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, the court found 

that Whitaker’s accommodation request “amounted to an 

open-ended leave request,” which was not reasonable and 

would have imposed an undue burden on the Department. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. Magnus v. St. Mark United Methodist Church, 688 

 1 Whitaker filed an earlier lawsuit alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and naming both Milwaukee County and the 

Wisconsin Department of Health Services as defendants. The Department 

was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, and the district court 

granted the County’s motion for summary judgment because the adverse 

employment actions were taken by the Department, not the County. We 

affirmed. Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2014). On 

August 20, 2013, Whitaker filed this new suit against the Department under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the Department’s motion to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds but granted its motion for 

summary judgment, which Whitaker now challenges. 

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6 No. 16-1807 

F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2012). Except for its “solely by reason 

of” standard, the Rehabilitation Act “incorporates the standards applicable to Title I of the [Americans with Disabilities 

Act].” Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 

2013). To prevail on her Rehabilitation Act claim, Whitaker 

must show that: “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the 

statute; (2) that she was otherwise qualified for the job in question; (3) that she was discharged or the subject of other adverse action solely because of her disability; and (4) the employment program of which her job was a part received federal financial assistance.” Felix v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transportation, 828 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2016). 

To avoid a motion for summary judgment challenging 

each element, Whitaker must present evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would establish each of these elements. Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 

2011). It is undisputed that Whitaker is disabled within the 

meaning of the statute and that the Department receives federal funds. However, Whitaker failed to present evidence that 

would allow a trier of fact to find that she was an “otherwise 

qualified” employee. An employee is “otherwise qualified” 

when she is capable of performing the “essential functions” 

of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 

Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 631. Since Whitaker failed to establish 

that she could perform the essential functions of her job, her 

Rehabilitation Act claim fails. We need not address the Department’s argument that Whitaker never made a proper accommodation request in the first place, nor the district court’s 

conclusion that her request was not reasonable. 

 

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No. 16-1807 7 

B. “Otherwise Qualified” Employee 

For purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 

the Rehabilitation Act, regular attendance is an essential function of many jobs. See, e.g., Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) (“An employer is 

generally permitted to treat regular attendance as an essential 

job requirement and need not accommodate erratic or unreliable attendance.”), citing EEOC v. Yellow Freight System, 

Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 948–49 (7th Cir. 2001); Jovanovic v. In-SinkErator Division of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899–900 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (“Common sense dictates that regular attendance is 

usually an essential function in most every employment setting; if one is not present, he is usually unable to perform his 

job.”). 

While there may be exceptions to this general rule, the record shows there was no exception in this case: Whitaker’s economic support specialist position required regular attendance. The position’s responsibilities included answering 

phone calls, attending in-person meetings with clients, using 

the Department’s internal computer system, and other tasks 

that required attendance. Whitaker does not provide any evidence that attendance was not an essential function of the job. 

Whitaker argues instead that even if attendance was an essential function, the district court erred by analyzing her qualification only without accommodation, rather than also with 

a reasonable accommodation. This is simply not the case. The 

district court did consider whether Whitaker was capable of 

performing the essential functions of her job either with or 

without a reasonable accommodation. Whitaker did not meet 

this standard without an accommodation because she failed 

to attend work, and attendance was an essential function of 

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the job. She did not meet this standard with an accommodation because, as the district court discussed, she did not offer 

sufficient evidence to establish this element. 

Whitaker did not offer any evidence regarding the effectiveness of her course of treatment or the medical likelihood 

of her recovery. The only medical documents she supplied 

were two terse doctor notes. One stated “medical leave of absence until 11/17/10” and the other stated “medical leave of 

absence until 12/17/10.” These notes did not explain whether 

Whitaker was even receiving treatment, let alone the likely effectiveness of the treatment. We have found doctor notes were 

insufficient to support a reasonable accommodation even if 

they were more informative than these. See, e.g., Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1997) (affidavit from 

plaintiff’s psychiatrist saying “there was a good chance” that 

she would be able to return to work was “too conclusory and 

uninformative” to support conclusion that accommodation 

would enable plaintiff to attend work regularly). The doctor 

notes here were even less informative. 

Given this shortcoming, Whitaker argues that her declaration provides sufficient evidence that she could perform the 

essential functions of her job if given an accommodation—

that is, that she could attend work on a regular basis if given 

additional leave. In her September 2015 declaration, Whitaker 

stated that she received cortisone injections and physical therapy during her leave in the fall of 2010. She also said: “I provided [the Department] with an anticipated return to work 

date of December 28, 2010 that I would have actually been 

able to return by if Defendant had extended my medical 

leave.” 

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No. 16-1807 9 

It is true that “self-serving affidavits can indeed be a legitimate method of introducing facts on summary judgment.” 

Widmar v. Sun Chemical Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 459–60 (7th Cir. 

2014). Moreover, we have taken pains to reject “the misconception that evidence presented in a ‘self-serving’ affidavit is 

never sufficient to thwart a summary judgment motion.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003); see also 

Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Deposition testimony, affidavits, responses to interrogatories, and 

other written statements by their nature are self-serving. As 

we have repeatedly emphasized over the past decade, the 

term ‘self-serving’ must not be used to denigrate perfectly admissible evidence through which a party tries to present its 

side of the story at summary judgment.”) (citation omitted). 

Nonetheless, Whitaker’s declaration is insufficient to 

avoid summary judgment. Her declaration does not provide 

sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to find that, if the 

Department had given her additional unpaid leave, she likely 

would have been able to return to work on a regular basis. 

While Whitaker said that she was receiving treatment, she did 

not explain the effectiveness of this treatment or the medical 

likelihood that it would enable her to return to work regularly. 

Again, we have found claims with even more medical evidence insufficient. See, e.g., Basden, 714 F.3d at 1038 (plaintiff 

provided “evidence that medication improved her condition; 

that she had hoped for enough improvement to return to 

work regularly after leave; and that she subsequently had 

brief employment that was interrupted by a two-week absence caused by her condition;” that “evidence was insufficient to support a factual finding that [plaintiff] was able to 

come to work regularly at the time of her termination, or that 

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her regular attendance could have been expected following 

the leave she sought or with any other accommodation”). 

The insufficiency of Whitaker’s declaration is compounded by the record, which shows that she had repeatedly 

requested additional medical leave when her leave was about 

to expire. See, e.g., Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 928–

29 (7th Cir. 2001) (in light of employee’s attendance record, 

“the extension of [employee’s] already lengthy leave by one 

more week would have been a futile concession, not a reasonable accommodation”). 

Since Whitaker failed to establish that she was an “otherwise qualified” employee, we need not address whether she 

properly requested an accommodation, or whether her accommodation request was reasonable. The district court’s 

grant of summary judgment for the Wisconsin Department of 

Health Services is 

AFFIRMED. 

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