Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03076/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03076-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Hernandez-Herrera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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FILED 

United States ~rt <#Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Cn'CUtt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 2 0 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 91-3076 

FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ-HERRERA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-20076-01) 

Michael L. Harris (Charles D. Anderson, Federal Public Defender, 

with him on the brief), Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kansas 

City, Kansas, for the Defendant-Appellant. 

Christina L. Morris (Lee Thompson, United States Attorney, 

District of Kansas, with her on the brief), Assistant United 

States Attorney, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-3076 Document: 01019336201 Date Filed: 12/20/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant-Appellant Francisco Hernandez-Herrera appeals from 

a Judgment and Commitment Order following his conviction for 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(c)(l) and 8 u.s.c. § 1326(b)(l). On 

appeal, defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible 

error in admitting Government Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 because 

these exhibits were not properly authenticated. Defendant also 

argues that Exhibit 9 is inadmissible hearsay and does not fall 

within the business record exception of Rule 803(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1291 and affirm. 

When deciding whether evidence was properly admitted or 

excluded, we use an abuse of discretion standard of review, 

"defined in this circuit as an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, 

or manifestly unreasonable judgment." United States~ Cardenas, 

864 F.2d 1528, 1530 (lOth Cir.) (quoting United States~ Wright, 

826 F.2d 938, 943 (lOth Cir. 1987)}, cert. denied, 491 u.s. 909 

(1989). See also C.A. Assocs. ~Dow Chern. Co., 918 F.2d 1485 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

I. EXHIBITS 1-4 

The foundations the government laid for Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 

4 are nearly identical. All four exhibits were documents from an 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) file retrieved from 

the Denver immigration office. The government offered testimony 

from Michael Wheeler, an agent of the INS, that all four exhibits 

were records kept by the INS in the course of its regularly 

conducted business activity. Concerning Exhibits 1, 3, and 4, 

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Wheeler testified that it is the regular practice of the INS to 

make these records at or near the time of the events reflected in 

the records. Wheeler also testified that Exhibit 2 -- the 

decision of the immigration judge was prepared by someone with 

knowledge of the events reflected in the document. 

Agent Wheeler gave testimony concerning how the immigration 

file was identified and obtained. Wheeler testified that he 

interviewed the defendant on May 23, 1990 and placed the 

defendant's name into the Immigration Service's computer to 

determine whether the defendant had an immigration file. Wheeler 

discovered that a file under the name of Francisco HernandezHerrera was located at the Denver, Colorado immigration office. 

Wheeler then "retrieved" that file from the Denver immigration 

office and kept the file in his custody. 

Authentication is a prerequisite to the admission of 

evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The authentication requirement 

is "satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 

matter in question is what its proponent claims." Id. The 

rationale for the authentication requirement is that the evidence 

is viewed as irrelevant unless the proponent of the evidence can 

show that the evidence is what its proponent claims. Cardenas, 

864 F.2d at 1531 (citations omitted). 

Defendant argues that Exhibits 1-4 were not properly 

authenticated. Defendant maintains that, even assuming Exhibits 

1-4 are public records, they were not authenticated as public 

records under Rule 901(b)(7) because the government failed to 

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properly establish a chain of custody. 1 Defendant also argues 

that Exhibits 1-4 could not have been authenticated under Rule 

901(b)(1) because no witness "with knowledge" presented testimony 

that the exhibits were what the government purported them to be. 

Rule 901(b)(1) provides that a witness with knowledge may 

authenticate a piece of evidence by testifying that a matter is 

what it is claimed to be. The trial transcript shows that Agent 

Wheeler had personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding 

the making of the relevant INS forms and that Wheeler was familiar 

with the recording procedures of the INS. Wheeler testified that 

he had worked for the INS for nearly five years. For two of those 

years, Wheeler was an Immigration Detention Officer and was 

involved in moving, detaining and transporting illegal aliens. 

We find that the testimony of Wheeler, an INS agent familiar 

with the record keeping practices of the INS regarding Exhibits 1-

4, establishes the authenticity of these exhibits under Rule 

901(b)(7). United States~ Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th 

Cir. 1985). In finding that Exhibit 2 --the decision of the 

immigration judge -- was sufficiently authenticated, we rely both 

on Agent Wheeler's testimony and on the internal indicia of 

reliability appearing on the face of the exhibit. See United 

States v. Jimenez Lopez, 873 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1989). 

Because these documents are uniquely identifiable and relatively 

1 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(7) provides "by way of 

illustration only" an example of how public records or reports can 

be authenticated: "Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be 

recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public 

office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data 

compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of 

this nature are kept." 

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resistant to change, the establishment of a chain of custody is 

not necessary. Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1531. The trial court 

committed no abuse of discretion in admitting Exhibits 1-4 into 

evidence. 

II. EXHIBIT 9 

Exhibit 9 is a photocopy of a fingerprint card. The 

government claimed that Exhibit 9 was a photocopy of the 

defendant's fingerprint card from the Denver Police Department, 

made November 4, 1977, bearing the Denver Police Department 

identification number of 268336. The defendant argues that the 

photocopy of the fingerprint card is inadmissable hearsay. We 

find, contrary to defendant's assertions, that the objection he 

raised at trial to Exhibit 9 was not "in substance" a hearsay 

objection. Consequently, the defendant cannot raise the hearsay 

issue on appeal. See United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 

1039 (lOth Cir. 1988); United States v. Taylor, BOO F.2d 1012, 

1017 (lOth Cir. 1986) ("specific ground for reversal of an 

evidentiary ruling on appeal must also be the same as that raised 

at trial" (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987). 

The defendant also argues that Exhibit 9 was not properly 

authenticated. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling that Exhibit 9 was admissible. 

The government offered testimony from FBI Special Agent 

Robert Novotny that Exhibit 9 was requested from the Denver, 

Colorado Police Department and was received in the District of 

Kansas. Agent Novotny testified that there is nothing about a 

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photocopy of a fingerprint card that makes it less reliable than 

the original. He also testified that he had never seen the 

original. He stated, "The original I believe is in Denver, 

Colorado." 

We find that there is ample circumstantial evidence to 

establish that Exhibit 9 was what the government purported it to 

be. In discussing the authenticity of a fingerprint card, the 

Eleventh Circuit ruled that the authenticity of the card could be 

inferred from sufficient circumstantial evidence. United States 

~Lopez, 758 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

u.s. 1054 (1986). This Circuit has held that the "identification 

of physical evidence, and its connection to a particular 

defendant, may be shown through either circumstantial or 

testimonial evidence." United States~ Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 802 

(lOth Cir. 1980) (citing United States~ White, 569 F.2d 263 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 848 (1978)). 

Agent Novotny testified that the fingerprints on Exhibit 9 

matched the set of prints on two other exhibits Exhibits 3 and 

8 --that were already admitted into evidence. 2 Rule 90l(b)(3) of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that authentication may be 

established through comparison by an expert "with specimens which 

have been authenticated." Agent Novotny also testified that the 

fingerprint card showed a "DPD" number, a number assigned by the 

Denver Police Department. The DPD number on Exhibit 9 matched the 

DPD number on two other exhibits -- Exhibits 6 and 7 -- that had 

2 These exhibits were Exhibit 3, the warrant of deportation, 

and Exhibit 8, the defendant's fingerprint card taken October 9, 

1990. 

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' . 

already been properly admitted into evidence. Further, in laying 

the foundation for Exhibit 6, the government offered testimony 

concerning the significance of the DPD number. 

Although the government could have laid the foundation for 

Exhibit 9 in a more thorough manner, it presented sufficient 

circumstantial evidence to place the admission of Exhibit 9 within 

the broad discretion of the trial court. Any possible lack of 

proof connecting Exhibit 9 with the defendant was a matter for the 

jury to consider. Brewer, 630 F.2d at 802 (citations omitted). 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court committed no abuse of 

discretion in admitting Exhibit 9. 

AFFIRMED. 

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