Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03100/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03100-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Olathe, Kansas Police Department
Appellee
William Sullivan
Appellee
Bernard Wayne Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 2 G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BERNARD WAYNE WILLIAMS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

OLATHE, .KANSAS POLICE DEPARTMENT,) 

and WILLIAM SULLIVAN, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 91-3100 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-3068) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

On February 26, 1991, plaintiff-appellant, an inmate in the 

Missouri State Penitentiary, filed a prose civil rights action 

under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 alleging that defendants, the Olathe, 

Kansas Police Department and William Sullivan, a detective with 

the department, falsely arrested and imprisoned him and conspired 

to deprive him of due process. On March 8, 1991, the district 

court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to file 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the brief filed by appellant and the record, 

this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This case therefore is 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-3100 Document: 010110090687 Date Filed: 09/26/1991 Page: 1 
within the two-year statute of limitations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b) (6). 

We review de novo the district court's ruling on the 

applicability of the statute of limitations. Wright v. 

Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 1991). 

We will not reverse a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a 

claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) "when it is 'patently 

obvious' that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts 

alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint 

would be futile." McKinney v. Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th 

Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 

F . 2d 1106, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1991). 

"[T]he appropriate statute of limitations for§ 1983 actions 

arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 60-513(a)(4)." Johnson v. Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 

1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991). See also Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 

675, 679 n.7 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Cowrey v. Eastborough, 

730 F.2d 1376, 1378 (10th Cir. 1984); Hamilton v. City of Overland 

Park, 730 F.2d 613, 614 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 

1052 (1985). For purposes of the statute of limitations,§ 1983 

actions accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of 

the injury which is the basis of his action. Johnson, 925 F.2d at 

1301. See also Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 

(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); Bireline v. 

Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 

U.S. 842 (1979). "Claims arising out of police actions toward a 

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criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and 

seizure, are presumed to have accrued when the actions actually 

occur." Johnson, 925 F.2d at 1301. See also Singleton, 632 F.2d 

at 191; McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d at 903, 906 (6th 

Cir. 1988). 

Notwithstanding plaintiff's contention that his "cause of 

action is predicated on numberous [sic) acts occurring over and 

extended period, [and that) the cause of action accrues with each 

new act, 111 all of the alleged acts underlying the cause of action 

occurred on May 26, 1988. Plaintiff alleges that on May 26, 1988, 

he was falsely arrested and imprisoned on charges of possessing a 

stolen vehicle. He was handcuffed and transported to the Olathe 

Police station. Detective Sullivan then allegedly coerced 

plaintiff to return to Missouri, with officers of the Kansas City 

Police Department, by threatening to file criminal charges against 

him in Kansas. Plaintiff returned to Missouri with the Kansas 

2 City Police officers on that same day. Plaintiff makes 

absolutely no allegation of any act by any defendant in this case, 

1 Plaintiff cites Simons v. Neises, 395 P.2d 308 (Kan. 1964), 

and Henderson v. Talbot, 266 P.2d 273 (Kan. 1954), as authority 

for this argument. It is now settled in this circuit that 

"federal law controls questions relating to accrual of federal 

causes of action." Newcomb, 827 F.2d at 678 (footnote omitted). 

Therefore, plaintiff's authority is inapposite. 

2 Plaintiff was subsequently convicted on criminal charges in 

Missouri and received a sixty-five year sentence for which he is 

presently incarcerated. The fact that plaintiff remains 

incarcerated in the Missouri State Penitentiary, does not alter 

our conclusion with respect to his false imprisonment claim as 

Missouri state officials are not named as defendants in this 

action. 

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Appellate Case: 91-3100 Document: 010110090687 Date Filed: 09/26/1991 Page: 3 
subsequent to May 26, 1988, to support his claim. 3 

Plaintiff's attempt to extend the date that his cause of 

action accrued by alleging a conspiracy between the defendants and 

members of the Kansas City Police Department is meritless. While 

we have recognized that "conspiracy is a viable claim under 

§ 1983," Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(citations omitted), the conspiracy alleged was completed once 

plaintiff returned to Missouri on May 26, 1988. Plaintiff does 

not allege that his current incarceration is the basis for his 

§ 1983 claim. On the contrary, plaintiff's conspiracy claim 

relates solely to his arrest and detention by Detective Sullivan, 

and subsequent transportation back to Missouri, all of which 

occurred on May 26, 1988. 

Plaintiff also argues that the statute of limitations is 

tolled by his Missouri conviction. The United States Supreme 

Court has held that state tolling rules apply to§ 1983 actions. 

Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980). The Kansas 

statute, which provides relief from the statute of limitations for 

"[p]ersons under legal disability," reads, in pertinent part, as 

follows: 

If any person entitled to bring an action ... at the 

time the cause of action accrued or at any time during 

the period the statute of limitations is running, 

is ..• imprisoned for a term less than such person's 

3 While Detective Sullivan testified at plaintiff's criminal 

trial in April 1989, plaintiff does not allege that Detective 

Sullivan's testimony is an occurrence underlying his cause of 

action; rather, he merely points to the testimony as evidence of 

Detective Sullivan's alleged unlawful conduct on May 26, 1988. R. 

doc. 7. 

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Appellate Case: 91-3100 Document: 010110090687 Date Filed: 09/26/1991 Page: 4 
natural life, such person shall be entitled to bring such 

action within one year after the person's disability is 

removed •. 

Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 60-515(a) (1983). The complaint indicates 

that plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Missouri State 

Penitentiary. While the record does not indicate when 

plaintiff first became incarcerated, even if we assume that 

plaintiff has been in custody since May 26, 1988, § 60-515(a) 

does not save plaintiff's claim from being barred by the 

statute of limitations. 

Where an inmate "has access to the court for purposes of 

bringing an action," the inmate "shall not be deemed to be 

under legal disability." Id. The complaint states that on 

June 19, 1989, plaintiff filed an action in the Western 

District of Missouri alleging an illegal extradition. Bernard 

Wayne Williams v. Kansas City Bd., No. 89-0575 CV-WSP. Thus, 

plaintiff had access to the court no later than June 19, 1989, 

and Kansas law would deem him not to be under any legal 

disability from at least this point forward. If plaintiff 

seeks to rely on§ 60-515(a), he was required to bring his 

action within one year after he first had access to the court 

which would have been June 19, 1990. See Lewis v. Shuck, 623 

P.2d 520, 523-24 (Kan. App. 1981) (plaintiff who is imprisoned 

during period when statute of limitations is running must 

bring action within one year after "removal of disability"). 

Because plaintiff did not file his action until February 

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Appellate Case: 91-3100 Document: 010110090687 Date Filed: 09/26/1991 Page: 5 
1991, § 60-515(a) does not save plaintiff's claim from being 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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