Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02776/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02776-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mason James Henry
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

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 All document numbers are in the CV case.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Mason James Henry, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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CV 10-2776-PHX-JAT

CR 08-1377-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Movant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 1.1

 On June 14, 2011, Magistrate Judge Aspey

issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the motion be denied. Doc.

15. Movant filed objections to the R&R. Doc. 20. In both the objections and by separate

motion, Movant sought to have the undersigned recuse from this case. Id.; Doc. 18. The

Court will address the recusal issue first.

I. Recusal

Movant argues that the undersigned should recuse from this case. Doc. 18. Movant

claims that because he asserts that he has mental competency issues, this Court cannot be

impartial to him. Doc. 18 at 3 (Affidavit of Movant). Movant bases this claim on his theory

that this Court cannot be impartial to any party who is raising competency as an issue. 

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2

 Presumably, Movant’s arguments would apply not only to the undersigned, but to

all Judges in Arizona.

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Two statutes govern recusal of district judges: 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Section

144 applies when a party to a proceeding believes that the district judge “has a personal bias

or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 144.

“Section 144 expressly conditions relief upon the filing of a timely and legally sufficient

affidavit.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).

Specifically, the statute provides: 

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning

of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be

shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such

affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of

record stating that it is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 144. When a party files a timely and legally sufficient affidavit pursuant to

section 144, the district judge “shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be

assigned to hear such proceeding.” Id.; Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867. However, “if the motion and

affidavit required by section 144 [are] not presented to the judge, no relief under section 144

is available.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868.

In this case, Movant has filed a motion and affidavit. However, neither the motion

nor the affidavit allege a bias or prejudice against Movant or in favor of another party.

Instead, the motion and affidavit claim that the undersigned cannot be fair and impartial in

any case in which any party raises a mental competency issue.2

 Section 144 does not provide

for recusal based on legal or factual claims or defenses. Instead, it provides for recusal when

a judge is biased for one party or against another party. Neither situation is alleged or present

here, and recusal is not warranted under Section 144.

Section 455 sets forth two recusal provisions. The first provision, subsection (a),

provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself

[or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The second provision, subsection (b), provides that any

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justice, judge, or magistrate “shall also disqualify himself [or herself] in the following

circumstances: (1) Where he [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]” 28 U.S.C. §

455(b)(1). “Section 455 modifies section 144 in requiring the judge to go beyond [a] section

144 affidavit and consider the merits of the [recusal] motion pursuant to section 455[].”

Silba, 624 F.2d at 868. 

“The test for personal bias or prejudice in section 144 is identical to that in section

455[], and the decisions interpreting this language in section 144 are controlling in the

interpretation of section 455[].” Id. at 867. “The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§

144 [and] 455 is whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude

the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,

993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th

Cir. 1986)); see Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867 (“The same substantive standard will be applied to

each section.”).

Applying the Section 455 standards in this case, the undersigned does not find recusal

to be required. The undersigned does not personally know any of the parties or victims in

this case. The Court does not find recusal to be called for based on the competency issue

Movant now seeks to raise because the Court has no actual or perceived bias against all

people who raise competency issues. Therefore, the motion to recuse will be denied.

II. Review of Report and Recommendation

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original). Because Movant has filed objections to the

R&R, the Court will review the motion de novo.

As the R&R recounts, Movant pled guilty in August 2009. R&R at 2. After

requesting and receiving new counsel, Movant was sentenced in December 2009. R&R at

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3

 In unpublished decisions, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that

Jeronimo has been overruled or abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jacobo

Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). See United States v. Rojas-Vivar, 2011

WL 109805, *1 (9th Cir. 2011) (overruled); United States v. Gutierrez, 2011 WL 1979594,

n 1 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated). 

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6-7. Movant’s plea agreement contained a waiver of his ability to bring a motion under §

2255. R&R at 9. Movant does not dispute these facts, but argues that he should not be

bound by the plea agreement because his counsel was ineffective for not realizing Movant

was not competent to understand the charges and the sentence. Objections at 6.

As the R&R details, waivers of the right to collaterally attack a sentence in a plea are

enforceable, see Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-509 (1984) (abrogated on other

grounds by Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1430 n. 1 (2009)), unless the plea was

not knowing and voluntary, United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005).3

R&R at 9. “[A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received

from counsel was [ineffective].” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, as stated above, Movant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

recognize that he had mental competency issues. As the R&R quotes, the Court went

through a colloquy with Movant at the time he entered into his plea agreement. Movant’s

counsel at the time of the plea noted that counsel had to put extra effort into explaining the

process to Movant, but that counsel was satisfied that Movant understood everything. R&R

at 3-4. This Court must give substantial weight to counsel’s determination regarding

Movant’s competence. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992) (“defense counsel

will have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense”);

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n. 13 (1975) (“a lawyer’s representations concerning

the competence of his client...is unquestionably a factor which should be considered [by the

Court]”); Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The observations of those

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interacting with petitioner surely are entitled to substantial weight.”). Given Movant’s

counsel’s thorough evaluation of this issue, the Court will give substantial weight to

counsel’s conclusion.

Movant argues that this Court should disregard counsel’s opinion because counsel

failed to investigate and determine that Movant went to a special school. Objections at 5.

During the plea hearing, counsel said, “[Movant] did go at least through the eleventh grade

and he was never in any special education classes.” R&R at 3. Thereafter, the Court asked

Movant if he had been satisfied with his counsel and Movant said yes. Id.

Movant now argues that he went to a special school. Objections at 5. Specifically,

Movant states, “San Carlos Alternative School was specifically opened and existed especially

for Henry’s special education and behavior needs as those school records will reflect.” Id.

Movant has not attached any evidence that this statement is true, but claims he had no ability

to obtain the school’s records. Doc. 19 at 3. Movant claims that the presentence report

writer’s omission of the school records was, “a deliberate attempt to conceal this material

fact.” Objections at 4.

Notably, Movant was at his change of plea hearing and answered several questions.

Movant stated that he understood both the plea agreement and all of the rights he was giving

up. R&R at 4-5. Movant did not “correct” his counsel’s statement that he was not in any

special education classes. Further, Movant has presented no evidence that he was in special

education classes. Finally, even if Movant’s statements regarding his education are true, the

fact that Movant went to a special school would not, standing alone, show that he was unable

to knowingly enter a plea agreement. Thus, giving significant weight to both counsel’s

opinion and Movant’s contemporary statements at the time of the plea, the Court finds that

the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered into by Movant. See United States v. Mims

928 F.2d 310, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding in the habeas context that a movant’s

contemporary statements regarding his understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial

weight in determining whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered).

Accordingly, based on this record, the Court finds Movant knowingly and voluntarily

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entered into the plea agreement. Thus, Movant’s waiver of his ability to collaterally attack

his sentence is valid and enforceable. As a result, the motion will be denied.

III. Motion to Amend

Movant has also filed a motion to amend or supplement his § 2255 motion. In the

motion to amend or supplement, Movant seeks to add his educational records once he

receives them, which Movant asserts will support his claim that he should not be bound by

his plea agreement. As discussed above, even if at some point in the future Movant obtains

his school records, and even if those records show Movant attended a special school, those

records would not prove Movant could not knowingly and voluntarily enter into a plea

agreement. Accordingly, the Court will not delay the resolution of the § 2255 motion

indefinitely while Movant endeavors to obtain his school records. As a result, the motion to

amend or supplement is denied as futile.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to recuse (Doc. 18) and the motion to amend or

supplement (Doc. 19) are denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Report and Recommendation (Doc. 15) is

accepted and adopted, the objections (Doc. 20) are overruled, and the motion (Doc. 1) is

denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing

Section 2255 Proceedings, in the event Movant files an appeal, the Court grants issuance of

a certificate of appealability on Movant’s claim that he did not knowingly and voluntarily

enter his plea agreement because his counsel was ineffective.

DATED this 31st day of August, 2011.

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