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Parties Involved:
J.R. Bell
Appellee
Sedrick L. Reed
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 2, 2020*

Decided April 6, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐1656

SEDRICK L. REED,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

   

v.

J.R. BELL,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:18‐cv‐00319‐WTL‐DLP

William T. Lawrence,

Judge.

O R D E R

Sedrick Reed, a federal prisoner, was found guilty in a prison disciplinary

proceeding of possessing an illegal cell phone and, as a result, lost good‐time credit. He

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the disciplinary proceeding

violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the petition, and we affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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In September 2016, Reed transferred into the federal prison in Terre Haute,

Indiana. In March of the following year, a correctional officer interviewed him as part of

an investigation into another inmate whom they suspected of illegally possessing a cell

phone. During this conversation, Reed admitted to borrowing and using the inmate’s

phone to call two people “when I first got here ... back in September.” Prison officials

served Reed with an incident report charging him with possessing an illegal cell phone.

The report was dated March 20, 2017 (with the notation “Staff became aware of

incident”) and listed the “Date of Incident” as December 2, 2016. The narrative,

however, cited Reed’s admission to using a cell phone “when he arrived,” as well as the

record of calls to Reed’s contacts, as grounds for the violation. The prison’s

investigation into the incident report was briefly delayed by a criminal inquiry into the

presence of the phone in the prison. Prosecutors cleared the prison to continue its

disciplinary proceedings on March 30, 2017, and the prison’s investigation continued

the following day.

At his disciplinary hearing, Reed stated that he had not received copies of forms

he had signed informing him of his rights, so the hearing officer gave him the

documents and continued the hearing. Three weeks later, Reed appeared for his hearing

with a staff representative and denied that he ever used a cell phone while in the prison.

The hearing officer, however, credited Reed’s earlier admission (documented both in

the incident report and in a separate statement taken during the investigation) that he

had used a cell phone when he arrived at the prison. Confidential documents from the

investigation into the inmate who owned the phone corroborated Reed’s admission:

phone records showed calls made in September and October 2016 to some of Reed’s

known contacts. The hearing officer found Reed guilty of possessing a phone and

deducted 41 days of good‐time credit as punishment. Although the officer cited

evidence pertaining to the use of the cell phone in the fall of 2016, in his written

statement the officer said that he found that Reed “committed the prohibited act” on

March 30, 2017.   

Reed petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contending that the

prison’s disciplinary procedures violated his constitutional rights. First, he argued that

the incident report gave him insufficient notice of the charges against him in violation

of his due process rights, because it did not include enough detail about the offense and

omitted “details surrounding the discovery, chain of custody, or analysis conducted on

the cell phone.” The notice was also inadequate, Reed asserted, because it charged him

with using a cell phone in December 2016, not on the date in the hearing officer’s

findings. Additionally, he contended that the questioning that led to his confession

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No. 19‐1656    Page 3

violated the Fifth Amendment because the officer did not give him a warning under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before interrogating him.   

The district court denied Reed’s petition. It first concluded that Reed had waived

all but two claims, which the court understood to be (1) a Miranda challenge and (2) a

claim that he did not receive copies of, or details about, the evidence against him.

Regarding the Miranda challenge, the district court concluded that no warning was

required in disciplinary investigations. As for the denial‐of‐evidence argument, the

court determined, after reviewing the confidential call records and other investigation

documents in camera, that the failure to provide copies to Reed did not violate his due

process rights because the evidence was not exculpatory. We review the denial of

Reed’s petition de novo. Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2018).

Reed first contends that the district court did not address his due process

arguments that the notice of the violation and the hearing officer’s written findings

were defective because they contained inconsistent statements about the date of his

alleged misconduct. The initial report cited December 2, 2016; the findings referenced

March 30, 2017; and the evidence pertained to calls in the fall of 2016.

We agree with Reed that the district court did not address the primary due

process arguments he raised, but those arguments could not have succeeded. First,

notice of disciplinary charges is adequate if it gives “the charged party a chance to

marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify what the charges are.” Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974); see also Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011). Reed

correctly points out that this generally requires notice of the time and place of the

offense. See McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982). Here, however, the

narrative section of the incident report, which describes the alleged offense, clearly

states that the charge was related to calls Reed admitted he made “when he arrived” at

the prison (around September 2016) and lists the telephone numbers he was alleged to

have called. So, Reed was on notice that the hearing officer was reviewing evidence of

illegal phone use during the fall of 2016 and could prepare a defense to that charge—

despite the initial report’s reference to a December 2016 incident date. See Northern

v. Hanks, 326 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (notice of facts underlying charge meets due

process requirements).

Second, Reed’s challenge to the adequacy of the written findings also fails

because the hearing officer’s statement shows that he found Reed guilty of the same

phone use described in the incident report. Due process requires hearing officers to

explain their decisions in writing to protect inmates from “a misunderstanding of the

nature of the original proceeding.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565; see also Scruggs v. Jordan,

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485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007). Here, the basis for the officer’s finding of guilt is clear:

he cited the incident report charging Reed with using a phone “when he arrived” at the

prison, phone records showing calls made to Reed’s contacts in the fall of 2016, and

Reed’s statement during the investigation that he used the phone “when I first got here

... back in September.” The prison has never explained why the hearing officer cited

incident date as March 30, 2017. Nonetheless, it seems clear against this backdrop that

the hearing officer mistakenly referred to the date of the investigation, not the date of

the misconduct. The officer did not find Reed guilty of using a cell phone after he was

charged with the violation (on March 20). Any error did not implicate Reed’s due

process right to an explanation of the decision.   

Reed nonetheless contends, in general terms, that he was unable to properly

defend himself because of the date discrepancies. He does not, however, explain—as he

must to justify reversal—how he was prejudiced. See Jones, 637 F.3d at 846–47

(reviewing due process violations for harmless error). The evidence on which the

hearing officer based his guilty finding (the admission and the call records) leaves no

question that Reed was found guilty of the same offense (on the same timeline)

documented in the incident report. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how the correct

dates could have helped him better prepare his defense, which was that he never used a

cell phone. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2003) (petitioner must

show how new evidence would have helped him).   

Moreover, to the extent that Reed also contends that prison officials should have

disclosed (in the incident report or otherwise) more detail about the evidence against

him, this challenge also fails. The district court correctly concluded that due process

requires only that prison officials disclose exculpatory evidence. See Jones, 637 F.3d

at 847. We agree that there is nothing in the documentary evidence that would have

been useful to Reed’s defense.   

Finally, Reed contends that the district court erred in concluding that his

confession could be used against him in the disciplinary hearing even though he had

not been given Miranda warnings before admitting to the cell phone use. Even so, the

Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination applies only in criminal cases, not

prison disciplinary proceedings. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772–73 (2003)

(absence of a criminal case defeats Miranda claim).

We have considered Reed’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.   

AFFIRMED

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