Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01282/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01282-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Doe
Appellee
Robert Edwin Green
Appellant
David Martinez
Appellee
K. C. Rogers
Appellee
Rosa Lina Salinas
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT EDWIN GREEN, 

PlaintiffAppellant, 

v. 

FI LED 

Uflited Scates Court of Appeals 

Tench Cir'J.lit 

AUG 1 6 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1282 

DAVID MARTINEZ; K.C. ROGERS; ROSA 

LINA SALINAS; JOHN DOES# 1 - 3; 

(D.C. No. CV-85-108JB) 

(Dist. N.M.) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MCWILLIAMS, and BARRETT, Circuit 

Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. · The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Robert Edwin Green appeals from the district court's 

dismissal of defendant Martin Vigil and from the court's grant of 

the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Green's 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 claims. 

The district cou r t dismissed defendant Vigil because it found 

that Green's amended complaint (which named Vigil as a defendant) 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 1 
did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), which 

permits the relation back of an amended complaint to the date of 

the original complaint. Rule 15(c) provides for the relation back 

of an amendment changing a party against whom a claim is asserted 

if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the claim or defense 

asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 

transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth 

in the original pleading; and, within the period provided by law 

for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by 

amendment that party, (2) has received such notice of the 

institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in 

maintaining his defense on the merits, and (3) knew or should have 

known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 

proper party, the action would have been brought against the 

party. 

The district court found that the new claim asserted by Green 

did arise from the same transaction, occurrence or core of 

operative facts involved in the original claim, and it was merely 

a new theory of recovery. The court also found, however, that the 

last two requirements of Rule 15(c) were not satisfied, i.e., 

Vigil had no notice of the action by Green, nor did he know or 

should have known that the action would have been brought against 

him, but for a mistake of identity, within the three years during 

which the action could have been brought. We agree with the 

district court for substantially the same reasons set forth in its 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 2 
Memorandum Opinion and Order of January 27, 1986, a copy of which 

is attached hereto, that the action against Vigil was time barred. 

Green claims that his rights of procedural and substantive 

due process were violated by actions of the defendants Police 

Officers Martinez and Cordova, former Chief of Police, in 

connection with the confiscation, pursuant to valid search 

warrants, of two vehicles on Green's property in which Green 

claimed an interest. 

The district court found, first, that Green's substantive due 

process rights were not violated by Officer Martinez allegedly 

pulling a gun and pointing it at Green when Martinez confiscated 

the first car. Whether the officer pulled a gun is disputed, but 

the court reasoned that, even if the allegation were true "given 

the transient and insubstantial nature of the alleged injury, . 

the actions attributed to the officer failed to deprive the 

plaintiff of any substantial liberty interest." (Memorandum 

Opinion and Order of February 6, 1987, at p. 8). We agree. 

Relative to Green's procedural due process claims, the court 

found that Green failed to show a constitutionally protected 

property interest in the two confiscated cars, but that even if he 

had shown such an interest, there were adequate post-deprivation 

remedies available to him under New Mexico law. The court also 

found that Green's claim of supervisory liability against Cordova 

for inadequate training or supervision so as to protect the 

property rights of people like Green must also fail in light of 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 3 
the court's determination that Green had no property right. We 

agree. 

We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment for substantially the 

same reasons set forth in the district court's Memorandum Opinion 

and Order of February 6, 1987, a copy of which is attached hereto. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

-4-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 4 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OP HEW MEXICO 

F.l .CED 

~t ALBUQUERQUE! 

J~N 2 ·, 1967 

ROBERT EDWIN GREEN, 

Plaintiff, 

JESSI-CASADS: 

~CU!IIC,--

v. Civil No. 85-O1O8-JB 

DAVID MARTINEZ, K. C. ROGERS, 

MARTIN VIGIL, former Chief of Police 

of the New Mexico State Police, MAURICE 

CORDOVA, former Chief of Police of the 

New Mexico State Police, MAURICE PAYNE, 

Chief of Police of the State of New Mexico, 

the STATE POLICE DIVISION OF THE STATE OF 

NEW MEXICO, a/k/a The New Mexico State Police, 

Defendants. 

MEMORARDUH OPIRIOR ABD ORDER 

ENTERED ON DOCKET 

.!AN 21 \986 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' motion 

in support of affirmative defenses treated as a motion to 

dismiss. The Court will also consider herein Defendants' motion 

to strike Plaintiff's rebuttal memorandum filed pursuant to the 

Defendants motion to dismiss. The Court finds that the motions 

to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion to strike will, however, be granted. 

Motion to Strike 

The Court will first address Defendants' motion to strike. 

Defendants filed a motion and memorandum brief in support of 

certain affirmative defenses. Plaintiff then filed a response, 

(\ 

\. \ G\ ' 

/ 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 5 
and Defendants a reply. Plaintiff then addressed a letter to the 

Court on January 25, 1986, stating as follows: 

Dear Judge: 

Defendants' have filed a reply memorandum in the above 

numbered and styled cause. Since local rule 9e does 

not provide for a rebuttal memorandum, presumably none 

is contemplated. Should the Court be of the opinion 

that Plaintiff's submission of a rebuttal memorandum 

would be an aid to the Court, Plaintiff is willing to 

submit a responsive memorandum. Please have your law 

clerk communicate to me the Court's wishes at his 

earliest convenience. 

Sincerely, 

Ray M. Vargas 

Without any authorization from this Court, counsel for Plaintiff 

filed a rebuttal to Defendants' reply on February 4, 1986. This 

rebuttal brought forth no issues that were not previously at 

issue when Plaintiff's counsel filed his brief in response to 

Defendants' motion. Defendants now move to strike this rebuttal 

memorandum and further ask this Court to award Defendants their 

fees and costs in preparing the motion to strike this unauthorized and therefore frivolous pleading. 

Defendants are correct that a "rebuttal" memorandum is not 

an authorized pleading under Local Rule 9(e). Furthermore, a 

letter to the Court was not authorized under either the Federal 

Rules or the Local Rules. Plaintiff's counsel should have filed 

a motion with the Court requesting permission to file a supplemental memorandum, as required under Local Rule 9(a). Plaintiff's rebuttal is therefore not properly before the Court and 

will therefore be stricken. Defendants have additionally 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 6 
requested sanctions in the form of reasonable costs and attorney 

fees accrued in preparing their pleadings relevant to the motion 

to strike. The Court is concerned about the failure of Plaintiff's counsel to abide by the Local Rules in this and other 

instances. However, the Court .will defer ruling at this time on 

the question of whether sanctions should be imposed. 

Motion to Disllliss 

Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 claiming 

that on two occasions he was deprived of property without due 

process of law. Plaintiff states that in January 1982 Defendants 

Martinez and Rogers, state police officers, unlawfully seized a 

vehicle in Plaintiff's custody and on which he had a mechanic's 

lien, in violation of his procedural due process rights. First 

Amended Supplemental Complaint, ~• 13, 14. In May 1983, 

Plaintiff alleges that an agent of the New Mexico State Police, 

not a defendant in this suit, confiscated another vehicle from 

Plaintiff on which Plaintiff had a storage lien, in violation of 

due process. Id., •• 18, 19. Plaintiff further alleges the 

existence of these and other violations as supporting a failure 

or refusal on the parts of Defendants Vigil and Cordova (former 

Chiefs of Police of the New Mexico State Police) to properly 

train or supervise their agents on a continuing basis, said 

failure leading to the violation of Plaintiff's due process 

rights. Id., • 20. 

Eleventh Amendment IDDDunity 

Defendants move for dismissal against all individual 

Defendants [except Defendant Payne] because as state actors 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 7 
acting in their official capacities, they are immune from suit in 

federal court under the eleventh amendment. Defendants argue 

that even though Plaintiff seeks to recover from these Defendants 

in their individual capacities,~ First Amended Supplemental 

Complaint, ~ 8, these Defendants are only actually being sued 

in their official capacities and therefore suit against them is 

barred. 

Defendants misunderstand the nature of personal or 

individual capacity suits against governmental officials. Both 

sides agree that suits against state officials acting in an 

official capacity are barred under the eleventh amendment. See 

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Suits against state 

officers acting in their official capacity "generally represent 

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which 

an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Department of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55(1978). The governmental 

entity is liable under§ 1983 only when the entity's policy or 

custom was the "moving force'' behind the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. Kentucky v. Graham, 53 u.s.L.W. 4966, 105 s. Ct. 

3099 (1985). 

To establish personal or individual liability of a state 

official under§ 1983, "it is enough to show that the official, 

acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a 

federal right." Kentucky v. Graham, 53 u.s.L.W. at 4967-68. 

Plaintiff is correct in arguing that allowing an individual 

capacity suit against a state actor perpetuates the teachings 

of Ex parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1980). When a state 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 8 
officer acts in violation of the Constitution, "[h]e is in that 

case stripped of his official or representative character and is 

subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual 

conduct." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 237 (1974), quoting 

Ex parte Young, 209 u.s. at 159 (emphasis in original). Thus, 

"[t]he Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official 

confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal 

right under the color of state law." Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237. 

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 u.s. 89 

(1984), is not to contrary as it deals with invnunity of state 

officials from suit in federal court based on violations of state 

law. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Defendants in 

their individual capacities will be denied. However, the 

Complaint will be dismissed as to the New Mexico State Police, on 

the grounds that, as a state agency, it is an arm of the state 

and therefore not suable in federal court under the eleventh 

amendment. See Korgich v. Regents of New Mexico School of 

Mines, 582 F.2d 549, 551 (10th Cir. 1978). 

Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Vigil, Cordova & Payne 

These Defendants alternatively move for dismissal on two 

grounds, one of which is procedural, the other substantive. The 

Court will first consider Defendants' motion to dismiss on the 

ground the statute of limitations has run as against any claim 

against these Defendants. 

On November 21, 1985, Plaintiff, by leave of court, filed 

an amended Complaint. In this Complaint, Plaintiff added a 

second claim for relief based on a second alleged unlawful taking 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 9 
of an automobile from his place of business on June 28, 1983. 

Named as defendants for the first time in the First Amended 

Complaint were Defendants Vigil, Cordova and Payne. Payne, the 

current Chief, is sued only for injunctive relief seeking that he 

"institute proper training and/or supervision to assure that such 

violations are not repeated. " First Amended Complaint, ~ 23. 

Defendants Vigil and Cordova were alleged to have been Chiefs of 

Police at times relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint. These 

Defendants are alleged to have "proximately caused the June 1983 

constitutional violation and "other violations" in that they 

"failed and/or refused on a continuing basis to properly train 

their agents and/or supervise them while they had knowledge of 

these types of violations, established no procedures concerning 

training or supervision to protect the rights of persons in like 

position as Plaintiff with possessory, ownership or lien rights 

to chattels. That such violations are/were and have been so 

widespread and continuing as to constitute a pattern, policy or 

pernicious practice •.•. " Id.~ 20. Plaintiff's original 

Complaint of January 21, 1985, and an amended Complaint of May 

16, 1985, were filed prose and did not clearly allege a cause of 

action based on supervisory liability, though he did name as 

Defendants John Does 1, 2 and 3. 

Defendants now move to dismiss the amended Complaint as 

against them on the ground that it does not relate back to the 

January 1983 cause of action asserted in the original Complaint 

is therefore barred by the three-year statute of limitations 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 10 
applicable to§ 1983 actions. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 

(10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 s. Ct. 1938 (1985). 

The "relation back'' doctrine comes into play to permit an 

amended pleading which would otherwise be barred by the statute 

of limitations when the claim "asserted in the amended pleadings 

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading .•.• " Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(c). Clearly, any new claim stemming from the 1983 

incident is not barred by the statute of limitations as it 

occurred less than three years before the amended Complaint of 

November 21, 1985, and there would be no need to rely on the 

relation back doctrine to allow the claim to proceed. A problem 

arises only where Plaintiff seeks to recover against the newly 

added Defendants for conduct occurring before November 1982, over 

three years before the amended Complaint was filed. 

In the amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a new theory 

of recovery (supervisory liability) against previously unnamed 

Defendants. The pre-November 1982 facts remain unchanged. 

Addition of new theories of recovery are not time-barred where 

they relate to the same transaction, occurrence or core of 

operative facts involved in the original claim. See Clipper 

Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 

1240, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 1227 (1982). The 

supervisory liability claim based on the 1982 violation is simply 

a new theory of recovery. However, these particular Defendants 

were not officially noticed of the claims against them until the 

time the Complaint was amended in November 1985. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 11 
Thus, the critical question here is whether these newly 

added parties (1) received such notice of institution of the 

action that they will not be unduly prejudiced in maintaining a 

defense and (2) knew or should have known that but for a mistake 

concerning the identity of the parties, the action would have 

been brought against them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). 

First, liability for actions taken after November 1982, 

would not be barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant 

Vigil, according to representations of Plaintiff, was Chief of 

Police until February 1982. Plaintiff did not personally serve 

Defendant Vigil until November 30, 1985. Of these three 

Defendants only Defendant Vigil could have been involved in the I 

alleged incident of January 1982. Plaintiff has offered no 

reason for this Court to find that Defendant Vigil had prior 

notice of the action against him based on his conduct as Police 

Chief over three years after his leaving that position. 

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend and 

Supplement the Complaint, p. 1. The fact that the Defendant and 

other state police officers had notice does not extend to Vigil 

who is only before the Court in his individual capacity. 

Therefore, any claim against Defendant Vigil is time-barred as it 

does not satisfy the relation-back criteria of Rule lS(c). 

Therefore, he will be dismissed from the lawsuit. 

Lastly, the Court considers whether the Complaint against 

Defendants Cordova and Payne is subject to dismissal for failure 

to state a claim for supervisory liability. As to Defendant 

Payne, the Complaint seeks only prospective injunctive relief 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 12 
against Payne acting in his official capacity. In Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 u.s. 362 (1976), the Supreme Court strictly cautioned 

against the use of 42 u.s.c. § 1983 as the basis for authorizing 

injunctive relief against a local governmental entity, particularly where the officials to be enjoined were charged with a 

failure to act (inadequate discipline of police officers) and 

therefore were not directly responsible for the actions taken by 

a small percentage of the police force. Id. at 375-76. As pled, 

Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Payne for injunctive relief 

based on supervisory liability does not rise to a level justifying a federal court's intervention in local affairs. Therefore, 

the claim against Defendant Payne for injunctive relief will be 

dismissed. 

Because Defendant Cordova is before the Court in his 

individual capacity, he is only responsible for his own acts as 

Chief of Police. To hold him responsible for the past patterns 

and practice of the office would be a suit against a state entity 

and such a claim is precluded in federal court by the eleventh 

amendment. Defendant argues that mere negligent failure to 

supervise or train probably is not a basis for supervisory 

liability under§ 1983. Nor can a supervisor be held vicariously 

liable for an employee's acts under§ 1983. For Defendant 

Cordova to be liable, his failures must constitute the "moving 

force" which provide an affirmative link between the conduct 

complained of and the constitutional violation. Kentucky v. 

Graham, 53 u.s.L.W. at 4966. The Supreme Court has recently 

questioned whether even "gross negligence" in police training 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 13 
practices can establish an affirmative policy or whether a more 

conscious decision on the part of the policymaker is required. 

See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 53 u.s.L.W. 4639, 4645 n. 7 

(plurality opinion) (June 4, 1985). After Tuttle, it is highly 

unlikely that a single act of failure to train or supervise would 

fairly support a finding of policy or custom. However, this Court 

finds it would be premature to decide that a§ 1983 violation for 

inadequate training or supervision could not be stated under any 

circumstance. Official acquiescence, coupled with notice of 

repeated violations, might be so egregious as to constitute an 

official policy sufficient to cause a constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff herein alleges multiple violations without 

enumerating them, other than to describe the alleged deprivations 

of January 1982 and June 1983. However, the Court will have 

occasion to consider whether Plaintiff has been able to come 

forward with sufficient facts to establish whether Defendant 

Cordova's actions caused a constitutional deprivation when it 

decides the cross-motions for summary judgment currently pending 

before the Court. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion to 

dismiss as it applies to Defendant Cordova. 

Wherefore, 

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 

1. Defendants' motion to strike is granted. 

2. The motion to dismiss Defendants on eleventh amendment 

grounds is denied except as to Defendant New Mexico State Police 

who is hereby dismissed from the lawsuit. 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 14 
3. The motion to dismiss by Defendant Martin Vigil is 

granted. 

4. The motion to dismiss by Defendant Maurice Payne is 

granted. 

5. The motion to dismiss by Defendant Maurice Cordova is 

denied. 1'11 

DATED this a 7 day of January, 1987. 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 15 
IR THE mIITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO ,.F.:rcE o· 

~t 'ALBUQUERQUEJ 

ROBERT EDWilll GREElll, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DAVID MARTINEZ, K. C. ROGERS, 

and MAURICE CORDOVA, former Chief 

of Police of the New Mexico State 

Police, 

Defendants. 

F:.·p 6 . ... __ , 1987 

JEssecwus· 

ClSK 

Civil No. 85-0108-JB 

ENTERED ON DOCKET 

FEB - 6 \SC:,7 

MEMORANDUM OPilllIOR ARD ORDER 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on cross-motions for 

summary judgment. Pursuant to the Court's order of January 27, 

1987, Defendants Martin Vigil, Maurice Payne and the New Mexico 

State Police were dismissed from the lawsuit. The remaining 

three Defendants are David Martinez and K.C. Rogers, both 

officers of the New Mexico State Police, and Maurice Cordova, 

former Chief of Police of the New Mexico State Police, these 

Defendants being sued in their individual capacities. The Court, 

having reviewed the pleadings, the evidence of record and the 

relevant law, finds that the Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment is well taken and will be granted. Plaintiff's motion 

for summary judgment is accordingly denied. 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 16 
Background 

Plaintiff brings his action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

alleging multiple violations of due process. The alleged 

violations stern from two separate incidents in which vehicles 

were taken from Plaintiff's business premises pursuant to search 

warrant. The facts, while lengthy, are necessary to put the 

events in context. Plaintiff is in the auto repair business. In 

the summer of 1981, Plaintiff was requested to replace the engine 

of a 1975 Chevrolet Vega by a woman named Connie Kremearer. 

Plaintiff began work on the vehicle, which had Oregon license 

plates, and removed the engine. A few days thereafter, he 

attempted to make contact with Ms. Kremearer but was told she had 

left town. He "checked" and found out the car was stolen. When 

and how he made this determination is unclear. He sent the owner 

word, by registered mail dated December 1981, that he had the car 

and that there was a repair bill outstanding. The owner's 

insurer, a Mr. Jim Craft of Safeco, eventually contacted the 

state police and a search warrant was sworn out by Officer 

Martinez, a defendant to this action. The search warrant was 

duly approved by a magistrate, Rosa Luna Salinas. Officer 

Martinez and Officer Rogers, another defendant to this action, 

were sent to execute the warrant. The warrant authorized seizure 

of the 1975 Vega to include the "Engine, Transmission, Tires & 

Rims and all Mechanical Parts belonging to the above mentioned 

Vehicle." When the officers arrived, there was no engine in the 

vehicle and the wheels had been removed. There was, however, an 

engine on a hoist above the car and wheels nearby in the garage. 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 17 
Plaintiff informed the officers that the engine and tires 

belonged to him, the original engine having already been 

dismantled. At this point, the accounts of the incident diverge. 

The officers claim they asked him to prove they were his, which 

he could not or would not do. Plaintiff claims that Officer 

Martinez pulled a gun and pointed it at him and instructed the 

wrecker operator to take everything, engine, tires and all. 

Defendant Martinez denies pulling a weapon. It is undisputed 

Plaintiff was given an inventory of the vehicle in which it was 

noted, inter alia, "wheels and tires given to us by Bob Green" 

and "Mr. Green says that engine is his." 

Plaintiff states he did not get back either the engine or 

the tires which he claimed were his property. On August 12, 

1983, he filed a replevin action in the District Court of Hidalgo 

County against Jim Craft, the insurance agent and registered 

owner of the vehicle, Officer Martinez, and Magistrate Rosa Luna 

Salinas, seeking recovery of the engine or damages. See Green v. 

Craft, Hidalgo County No. 83-33. Plaintiff appeared prose in 

this action. In a letter opinion, dated October 25, 1983, by 

Ray Hughes, District Judge, Judge Hughes found Magistrate 

Salinas to be entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Defendant 

Craft was found entitled to dismissal for insufficiency of 

process. It was further noted that Officer Martinez would be 

entitled to sovereign immunity unless Plaintiff amended his 

Complaint to allege an act for which immunity for law enforcement 

officers is specifically waived under§ 41-4-12 NMSA 1978, part 

of the Tort Claims Act. An order to this effect was entered on 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 18 
November 14, 1983. 1 Plaintiff submits that he never received 

what he claims was his property. It appears that the vehicle was 

eventually returned to Safeco agent Craft. Where the engine and 

the tires are now located is not clear. On the basis of these 

facts, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for violations of his 

rights to procedural due process. He further alleges he was 

deprived of substantive due process by the officers' use of 

excessive force by threatening him with a gun. 

Plaintiff's second claim for relief involves a second 

seizure of a vehicle on Plaintiff's property pursuant to a search 

warrant. The subject of that seizure was a 1969 Volkswagen 

Karmen Ghia. In May 1983, Plaintiff states he "discovered" the 

vehicle on his property. "It was partially in the roadway, which 

is also my property. Because it had in it valuable equipment in 

it [sic], I built a fence around it and put a dog in there to 

protect it." Affidavit of Robert Edwin Green, ,r 8. The vehicle 

bore Texas plates and Plaintiff wrote to the Texas Department of 

Motor Vehicles, requesting title information. He was informed 

that the vehicle belonged to a Jeffrey Blake, to whom he sent a 

certified letter on June 20, 1983. Plaintiff informed Blake of 

the whereabouts of the car and asserted a claim for storage fees. 

On June 28, 1983, State Police Officer Roxanna McGahey sought to 

recover the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant. Plaintiff 

1 The ultimate disposition of this complaint is unclear, but 

there is an indication in the record that Plaintiff refiled his 

complaint naming only Craft as a defendant. See Letter Jan. 9, 

1985, of Nilda M. Pabon, Assistant Legal Advisor, New Mexico 

State Police. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 19 
indicated to Officer McGahey that he knew the car was stolen but 

that he had written to the owner and that he had a storage lien 

on the vehicle. Plaintiff was charged with receiving stolen 

property and arrested. The charges were eventually dropped. 

Plaintiff alleges that the State Police tried to pressure him to 

drop the civil complaint he filed in relation to the 1975 Vega in 

return for a dismissal of the criminal charges. Plaintiff 

refused unless his engine and tires were returned to him. The 

criminal charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dismissed. 

Plaintiff claims that the confiscation of the Karmen Ghia 

violated his property rights (in the form of a storage lien) 

without due process of law. On the basis of these and other 

events, Plaintiff asserts that the supervisors of Officers 

Martinez, Rogers and McGahey are liable under§ 1983 for failing 

to train their agents to protect the possessory, ownership and 

lien rights of the public. Pursuant to this Court's order of 

January 27, 1987, former police chief Cordova is the only 

supervisory defendant remaining in the lawsuit. He served as 

Chief during March 4, 1983, through August 31, 1985, covering the 

period in which the Karmen Ghia was seized. 

Substantive due process - use of excessive force 

The Court will first consider Plaintiff's§ 1983 claim 

against Defendant Officer Martinez for use of excessive force. A 

motion for summary judgment properly may be granted only in cases 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 20 
of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

54 u.s.L.W. 4775, 4777 (June 25, 1986}; Mustang Fuel Corp. v. 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 36 (10th Cir. 1975). In 

ruling upon a motion for summary judgment the Court must view the 

record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion and must consider factual inferences in the light most 

favorable to the existence of triable issues. Exnicious v. United 

States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977). The burden on a defendant 

moving for summary judgment may be discharged by offering 

evidence that negates an element of the plaintiff's claim or by 

showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 54 u.s.L.W. at 4777-78. Should 

the Plaintiff then fail to make a showing sufficient to establish 

the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and 

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, 

summary judgment in favor of the moving party is mandated. Id. 

at 4777. 

There is clearly a very obvious dispute regarding the 

facts alleged to support the claim of excessive force. Plaintiff 

states, "I made them [Officers Martinez and Rogers] aware of the 

fact that the engine and tires were mine and asked them to wait 

until I talked to the District Attorney, Ellenwood. Martinez 

then pulled his gun and pointed it at me and instructed the 

wrecker operator to take everything, engine, tires and all. It 

scared both me and my brother, Ken Green, who was also there, out 

of our pants, especially since Martinez had a reputation in the 

community of being a hothead and agressive [sic]." Affidavit of 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 21 
Robert Edwin Green, ~ 6(g). Officer Martinez, on the other hand, 

states, "At no time during the course of events on January 23, 

1982, was Mr. Green threatened by words or behavior by either 

officer, nor was any weapon pulled; as a matter of fact, it was a 

very routine seizure of a stolen vehicle without any complications." Affidavit of David Martinez, ~ 34; Affidavit of K.C. 

Rogers, ~ 23. Thus, while there is substantial dispute as to the 

facts, it is the Court's task to decide whether, resolving all 

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the facts are 

material and whether his claim is cognizable as a matter of law. 

Not all force used by police rises to the level of a 

constitutional violation. Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1379 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 s. 

Ct. 131 (1985}; Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 

1981}. Section 1983 provides a remedy only where the alleged 

abuse is so egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a 

deprivation of constitutional dimensions. Wise, 666 F.2d at 

1328. Section 1983 imposes no liability for violations of duties 

of care which are more properly redressed under traditional state 

tort-law principles. "The Civil Rights Act was not enacted to 

discipline local law enforcement officials." Id. However, 

excessive force is actionable under§ 1983 where it deprives the 

victim of a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth 

amendment. Hewitt, 758 F.2d at 1379. Force may be found 

excessive where it is "inspired by unwise, excessive zeal 

amounting to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, or by malice rather than mere carelessness " Id. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 22 
In considering whether force is excessive, it is appropriate to 

consider the relationship between the amount of force used to the 

need presented, the extent of the injury inflicted, and the 

motives of the state officer. Hewitt, 758 F.2d at 1379: Wise, 

666 F.2d at 1333. 

The Tenth Circuit has found it problematic to articulate 

what level of police misconduct is so egregious as to rise to a 

substantive denial of due process. See Hewitt, 758 F.2d at 1379. 

However, this Court concludes that, under the totality of the 

circumstances presented, resolving all factual interests in favor 

of Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to show that he was deprived of any 

constitutionally protected right, thereby entitling him to 

judgment as a matter of law. Cf. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d at 

1335 (display of can of mace by a police officer not so egregious 

as to amount to a constitutional deprivation). While the Court 

does not wish to minimize the conduct alleged herein, given the 

transient and insubstantial nature of the alleged injury, the 

Court concludes that the actions attributed to the officer failed 

to deprive the Plaintiff of any substantial liberty interest. Any 

injury suffered by the Plaintiff is properly redressed under 

state tort law. 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 23 
Procedural due process claims 

Next, the Court considers whether there is a material 

issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff was deprived of a protected 

property interest without due process of law. The fourteenth 

amendment prohibits governmental action that acts to deprive "any 

person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 

u.s. Const. amend. XIV. Such deprivations are redressable under 

42 u.s.c. § 1983. As to the January 1982 seizure of the 

Chevrolet Vega, Plaintiff asserts he was deprived of property, 

specifically chattels (his engine and tires) and further claims 

that the confiscation unconstitutionally interfered with a 

property interest in the Vega to which he was entitled in the 

form of a mechanics lien. As to the Karmen Ghia involved in the 

1983 seizure, Plaintiff claims a storage lien. In evaluating the 

nature and extent of a property interest, the Court looks to 

state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 u.s. 341, 344 (1976): Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

106 S. Ct. 1376 (1986). 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants should be estopped from 

denying that Plaintiff has a mechanics lien on the Vega. 

Plaintiff claims that state court Judge Ray Hughes decided in the 

replevin proceeding brought in state court that Plaintiff had a 

valid mechanics lien on the Vega. As support, Plaintiff cites 

Judge Hughes' letter of October 25, 1983, referred to supra, pp. 

3-4. Plaintiff's assertion is a gross mischaracterization of 

Judge Hughes' ruling. Judge Hughes acknowledged that Plaintiff 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 24 
claimed a mechanics lien. He did in no way decide that such a 

lien was valid under New Mexico law. 

Assuming, however, that Plaintiff had at least a property 

interest in the engine he says was his, it is clear that the 

actions of officers served to deprive him of property, at least 

temporarily. Due process normally requires that, where feasible, 

the person receive notice and a hearing prior to the loss of a 

protected property interest. However, it is recognized that where 

the deprivation is random or unauthorized, a pre-deprivation 

hearing is not always practicable. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

u.s. 517, 532 (1984): Parratt v. Taylor, 451 u.s. 527 (1977). 

Property interests, in particular, may be adequately protected by 

a post-deprivation hearing if it occurs prior to the person's 

ultimately being deprived of his property interest. See Logan v. 

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 u.s. 422, 434 (1982): McKee v. Heggy, 

703 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1983). In that regard, due process of 

law may in some instances be satisfied by the availability of 

state tort remedies that serve to redress property losses. 

Under the facts of this case, the Court finds that a 

pre-deprivation hearing was impracticable, but that a postdeprivation hearing was available and adequate as a matter of 

law. The facts clearly support a finding that under the 

circumstances, an adequate pre-deprivation hearing was not 

feasible. The officers possessed a search warrant authorizing 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 25 
L • 

them to seize the Vega including the engine and tires. 2 Although 

Plaintiff protested that the engine and tires were his, he was 

unable to prove his ownership at the time of the seizure. 

Although Defendants argue that some pre-deprivation process was 

provided to Plaintiff in the form of the officer having to secure 

a search warrant based on probable cause, such process does not 

meet the requirements of due process as it failed to provide 

Plaintiff with notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 

Due process necessarily requires that there be a meaningful 

manner of establishing one's rights before being ultimately 

deprived of property. See McKee v. Reggy, 703 F.2d at 479. In 

this case, Plaintiff's meaningful opportunity to be heard could 

only come in the form of a post-deprivation remedy. 

Indeed, Plaintiff sought to avail himself of a postdeprivation remedy provided by state law. He filed an action in 

replevin, as provided for by§§ 42-8-1 to 42-8-22 NMSA 1978. 

Section 42-8-3 specifically authorizes an action to be brought 

for recovery of property "wrongfully seized by an officer under 

or by virtue of any writ of execution, mesne or other process 

from any court •••• " Furthermore, the New Mexico Tort Claims 

Act, on which Judge Hughes relied, provides that immunity is 

waived, inter alia, for violation of property rights caused by 

law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their 

duties. § 41-4-12 NMSA 1978 (1986 Repl. Pamp.). While Plaintiff 

2 Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of the warrant 

itself or the magistrate's determination that it was supported by 

probable cause. 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 26 
apparently did not recover his property, it is not because the 

post-deprivation remedies available to him were inadequate. Thus, 

the Court finds that as his post-deprivation remedies were 

adequate, Plaintiff was not, pursuant to the January 1982 

seizure, deprived of property without due process of law. Accord 

Allen v. City of Kinloch, 763 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 

106 s. Ct. 313 (1985) (plaintiff whose vehicles had been towed by 

municipality had adequate remedy of replevin available under 

Missouri law); Storey v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. 

Miss. 1986) (truck owner whose truck was seized by state 

officials not denied due process by garage owner who stored truck 

in light of availability of action for replevin). See also Gumz 

v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 

s. Ct. 1644 (1986). As no genuine issue of material fact remains 

on the procedural due process claim surrounding the January 1982 

seizure, summary judgment is granted for Defendants Martinez and 

Rogers on this claim. 

In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff uses the 1983 

seizure of the Karmen Ghia as support for his claim against 

Defendant Cordova for failing to properly train and supervise his 

agents. As the Court concludes that the officer supervised by 

Defendant Cordova did not serve to deprive Plaintiff of property 

without due process of law, Plaintiff's claim of supervisory 

liability under§ 1983 must also fail and Defendant Cordova is 

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Plaintiff asserts that he had a property interest in the 

Karmen Ghia in the form of a storage lien as a result of the 

12 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 27 
.... . 

actions he took in May of 1983 as described supra p. 4. Section 

66-3-203 NMSA 1978, cited by Plaintiff, states: 

An operator of a place of business for garaging, 

repairing, parking or storing vehicles for the public 

in which a vehicle remains unclaimed for a period of 

thirty days, shall, within five days after the 

expiration of that period, report in writing to the New 

Mexico state police at Santa Fe and the sheriff of the 

county in which the unit is stored, setting forth the 

make of car, model-year [and] engine, serial and 

vehicle numbers of the vehicle unclaimed. A person who 

fails to report a vehicle as unclaimed in accord with 

this subsection forfeits all claims and liens for its 

parking or storing and is guilty of a misdemeanor 

punishable by a fine of not more than twenty-five 

dollars ($25.00). 

It is uncontested that Plaintiff did not report the vehicle as 

unclaimed within thirty days after he "discovered" it on his 

property. Plaintiff nevertheless argues that the thirty-day 

period specified by the statute cannot begin to run until the 

owner of the vehicle is known, i.e., without a known owner, there 

cannot be an unclaimed vehicle. Although there is no New Mexico 

case law on point, this Court believes that Plaintiff failed to 

comply with the plain meaning of the statute: to report the 

unclaimed vehicle to the proper authorities within a specified 

time period. While Plaintiff states he discovered the vehicle in 

the latter part of May, 1983,3 he did not take any action until 

June 1983 when he requested the name and address of the owner 

from Texas authorities. He notified the owner on June 21, 1983, 

3 Other available evidence suggests that the Plaintiff, on 

about May 20, 1983, pushed the vehicle onto his property and then 

built a fence around the car. Affidavit of Roxanna Lea McGahey, 

,r,r 14, 15. 

13 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 28 
• & 

that he was in possession of the vehicle and laid claim to 

storage fees. Plaintiff's argument that the thirty-day period did 

not begin to run until he took it upon himself to identify the 

owner is illogical and clearly contrary to the intent of the 

statute. Applying New Mexico law regarding whether Plaintiff had 

any cognizable property interest in this vehicle, the Court finds 

that even if he had a claim for storage fees, it was extinguished 

as a matter of law by his failure to comply with the notification 

provisions of§ 66-3-203. 4 Again, Plaintiff has failed to show 

he was deprived of a constitutionally protectable property 

interest. Even if he had, he had adequate post-deprivation 

remedies as provided by New Mexico law. See discussion supra, 

pp. 10-12. As Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of 

material fact on an issue for which Plaintiff will carry the 

burden at trial, his prima facie case fails. 

Plaintiff's claim of supervisory liability against 

Defendant Cordova for inadequate training or supervision so as to 

protect the property rights of persons like Plaintiff must 

likewise fail. Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing even 

one incident where he was deprived of property without due 

process. Therefore, there can be no supervisory liability on 

this basis. Section 1983 liability is limited to situations in 

which a person acting under color of state law subjects or causes 

another to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation. Vinyard 

4 Furthermore, the Court finds it highly unlikely that state 

law would recognize as valid a claim for a storage lien for the 

benefit of a party possessing property he knows to have been 

stolen. 

. 14 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 29 
~ . .. 

v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 433 (10th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has not 

come forward with evidence to show that anyone "caused" him to 

suffer an injury of constitutional dimensions. Plaintiff claims 

to have knowledge of other persons who were allegedly subject to 

"recurrent governmental abuse of property rights so substantial 

as to raise substantive due process violations." First Amended 

Supplemented Complaint, ~ 20. However, in failing to establish 

that his own rights were violated, he lacks standing to recover 

damages based on an alleged pattern and practice for which 

Defendant Cordova was responsible. 

Malicious prosecution claim 

In his brief in support of his motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiff attempts to raise for the first time a§ 1983 

claim based on a theory of malicious prosecution. He asserts 

that the "State Police" attempted to pressure him into dropping 

his civil complaints in return for dropping the criminal charges 

against him and in return for the engine and tires. Plaintiff 

states that he refused to go along with this. As a result, 

Plaintiff claims that the criminal charges were left pending 

against him for nearly two and one-half years, which he claims is 

contrary to New Mexico law. He says that such coercive techniques constitute a violation of due process. See Memorandum in 

Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16. The 

fact that Defendants failed to move for summary judgment on this 

claim is likely due to the fact that it is not clearly plead on 

the face of Plaintiff's Complaint. Furthermore, the State Police 

is no longer a party to this lawsuit, and Plaintiff has failed to 

15 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 30 
.. •' .. 

plead in what manner any of the Defendants before the Court are 

chargeable with the alleged misconduct. In this regard, the 

Complaint merely states: "That because of Officer McGahey' s 

petulant insistence in violating Plaintiff's rights she caused 

Plaintiff to be criminally prosecuted for receiving stolen 

property knowing that Plaintiff was at all times acting within 

his legal rights." First Amended Supplemented Complaint, ,r 21. 

Officer McGahey is not a defendant in this action. Plaintiff 

will not be permitted to amend his pleadings by way of argument 

to state a new claim of which Defendants have not had notice. 

The Court thus finds that no genuine issues of material fact 

remain to be decided at trial and that therefore summary judgment 

should be granted in favor of Defendants and judgment entered 

accordingly. 

Wherefore, 

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED ARD DECREED that: 

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied; 

2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all 

remaining claims is granted, and judgment shall be entered for 

Defendants. 

DATED this t, 'fhday of February, 1987. 

16 

Appellate Case: 87-1282 Document: 01019975932 Date Filed: 08/16/1989 Page: 31