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Parties Involved:
Edmund Tanios Elias
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Co?rt ~f Appeals T"ntl, ctrcmt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL. G 21991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

EDMUND TANIOS ELIAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 90-2230 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 90-016-01-JC) 

Submitted on the briefs. 

Ron Koch, Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the briefs for the 

Defendant-Appellant. 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Thomas L. English, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the 

brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-2230 Document: 01019293796 Date Filed: 07/02/1991 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

I. Background 

Defendant-appellant Edmund Elias appeals a district court 

denial of his motions to withdraw a guilty plea and the imposition 

of sentence. On appeal, Elias argues the district court erred 

because his plea was not made voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently. He also argues the court erroneously applied the 

incorrect version of the Sentencing Guidelines or, in applying the 

correct version, erroneously increased the offense level by taking 

into account the conduct of his codefendants. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 

affirm. 

Elias was indicted on one count of conspiracy and two counts 

of firearms violations. He entered a plea of guilty to one count 

of knowingly making fictitious statements intended to deceive a 

licensed dealer in connection with the acquisition of firearms in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 2, 922(a)(6), and 924(a)(l)(B). 

At the plea hearing, the court placed Elias under oath and 

asked if he had "received a copy of the indictment, the charges 

pending against you." Elias responded affirmatively. Elias also 

responded affirmatively to the court's question whether he had an 

opportunity to review the charges with his attorney. When the 

court asked about representation Elias had received from his 

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attorney, Elias indicated he was fully satisfied and had no 

complaints. 

The court informed Elias the maximum penalty for the offense 

to which he was pleading guilty is not more than five years' 

imprisonment, a fine of not more than $250,000, and a special 

penalty assessment of $50. The court also told Elias that 

although his sentence would not be determined until after a 

presentence report was completed, Elias would be sentenced under 

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Sentencing Guidelines. 

The court asked Elias if his attorney had discussed the Sentencing 

Guidelines with him. Elias indicated he had understood the judge 

could impose a sentence more or less severe than that called for 

in the Guidelines. 

The court advised Elias he had rights to plead not guilty to 

the charged offenses, to a trial by jury, to assistance of 

counsel, to see and hear all the evidence against him and crossexamine witnesses, to decline testifying unless he chose to do so 

in his own defense, and to use subpoenas or compulsory process to 

compel witnesses to testify for him. The court also stated that 

by entering a plea of guilty Elias would not have a trial and 

would forfeit all the rights explained to him. 

The court informed Elias the charge against him was providing 

a fictitious statement in the acquisition of a firearm. The court 

questioned the prosecutor about the factual basis of the plea. 

The prosecutor stated the government would show: 

[O]n April 23, 1988 this defendant presented a false 

driver's license in the name of one Mr. Clements to a 

licensed firearm dealer, Mr. Howard. In return for 

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those representations, oral representations, Mr. Howard 

produced, amongst others, two .380 caliber pistols. 

The defendant then filled out an ATF [Alcohol, 

Tobacco & Firearms] form entitled 4473 with that false 

information. He then swore to that form and signed it. 

Because of those written and oral representations, the 

defendant was permitted to purchase the two .380 caliber 

pistols . • . . 

The prosecutor also told the court the government could prove 

Elias had written the name "Clements" on the form based on a 

handwriting expert's comparison of handwriting exemplars. 

The court asked Elias how he pleaded to Count V of the 

indictment. Elias responded, "Guilty." When the court asked him 

to explain in his own words what he was pleading guilty to, Elias 

told the court he had filled out false information on the form 

even though he did not understand the law or intend to violate it. 

When the court asked Elias whether he used the other name, he 

answered, "Yeah. It's my friend's name." The court found Elias 

was fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, his 

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and the plea was supported 

by an independent factual basis relating to each element of the 

offense. 

After the plea hearing, the presentence report was prepared. 

The report concludes the Sentencing Guidelines base offense level 

is nine with an increase of two points for the defendant's 

supervisory role in the offense, an increase of two points for 

obstruction of justice, and a decrease of two points for 

acceptance of responsibility. The report also states Elias falls 

into criminal history category one. According to the Guidelines, 

an offense level of eleven and a criminal history category of one 

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results in a sentencing range of eight to fourteen months and a 

mandatory period of supervisory release of two to three years. 

Prior to sentencing, Elias filed a motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea and later a motion to reconsider his motion to 

withdraw, both of which were denied. Elias also made factual 

objections to the presentence report, and an evidentiary hearing 

was conducted. The court rejected Elias' objections and sentenced 

him to fourteen months' imprisonment, a supervised release of 

three years, a $5,000 fine, and a special assessment of $50. 

II. Discussion 

A. Compliance with Rule 11 

A guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. McCarthy ~ 

United States, 394 u.s. 459, 466 (1969). Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes procedures designed to 

ensure a plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States ~ 

Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (lOth Cir. 1990). We 

generally review de novo a district court's compliance with the 

requirements of Rule 11 before accepting a guilty plea. Id. at 

1524; ~ United States ~ Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 1079 (1991). We review a court's 

decision regarding a factual basis for a guilty plea for an abuse 

of discretion. See United States ~ Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992, 996 

(lOth Cir. 1988); United States~ Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 938 (5th 

Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 u.s. 904 (1980). 

Rule 11 requires a district court to address a defendant in 

open court and determine he understands a number of facts before 

accepting a plea of guilty, including: (1) the nature of the 

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charge; (2) the mandatory minimum and maximum possible penalty 

provided by law, including any supervised release term; and (3) 

the fact the court must consider any applicable sentencing 

guidelines but may depart from them under some circumstances. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(l). The court also must advise an 

unrepresented defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel. 

The court must explain that the defendant has the right not to 

plead guilty, to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses, and to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 

Further, the court must inform the defendant he waives the right 

to a jury trial by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(2)-

( 4 ) . 

To further protect a defendant who enters into a plea 

agreement, Rule ll(f) provides "the court should not enter a 

judgment . . . without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it 

that there is a factual basis for the plea." The advisory 

committee's notes explain this duty is meant to protect a 

defendant who may understand a charge but does not realize his 

conduct fails to fall within that charge. Id. advisory 

committee's note (1966 amendment). The court may satisfy this 

requirement by questioning the defendant or the government or by 

examining the presentence report to determine whether the conduct 

to which the defendant admits constitutes an offense charged in 

the indictment. If the court is not satisfied a factual basis for 

that charge is present, the court should set aside the plea and 

enter a plea of not guilty. Id. 

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Elias argues the district court failed to advise him fully of 

the nature of the charge against him. A court may satisfy Rule 11 

and constitutional standards by explaining in plain terms the 

nature of the charge. Stinson~ Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 916 (lOth 

Cir. 1973). The charge to which Elias pleaded guilty was 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(a)(6), which makes it unlawful to 

"knowingly • . . make any false . . . statement or • exhibit 

any false . . • identification . . . likely to deceive [a 

firearms] dealer." Although this provision requires that a 

defendant "knowingly" make a false statement to a dealer, it does 

not require a showing the defendant knowingly violated the law. 

United States~ Beebe, 467 F.2d 222, 226 (lOth Cir. 1972), cert. 

denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974); see United States~ Cornett, 484 

F.2d 1365, 1367 (6th Cir. 1973); Cody~ United States, 460 F.2d 

34, 38 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 u.s. 1010 (1972); 

Here, the court apprised Elias of the nature of the section 

922 charge in discussing the plea agreement at the hearing. The 

court explained Elias was charged with providing a false statement 

in the acquisition of a firearm. Elias indicated to the court he 

understood this basis for his plea and had discussed the charge 

with his attorney. Because providing false information to a 

firearms dealer violates section 922(a)(6), the court's 

explanation of the nature of the charge is sufficient. 

The court also discussed the factual basis for the plea with 

the prosecutor and Elias. The government explained that Elias had 

presented a false driver's license to a firearms dealer, filled 

out a form with false information from that license, and swore and 

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signed the form in order to purchase the two firearms. Elias 

confirmed he had given false information by using his friend's 

name on the form. The record shows the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining the adequacy of the factual 

basis for the plea. 

Elias argues the district court failed to inform him a 

section 922 violation requires proof of specific intent to deceive 

a firearms dealer. This argument is based on a misunderstanding 

of the law. In United States ~Harelson, 705 F.2d 733, 736 

(5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit explained the phrase "likely to 

deceive" in section 922(a)(6) does not establish a specific intent 

element but only requires proof the defendant imparted false 

information with the general intention of deceiving or being 

likely to deceive the dealer. Further, when there is evidence of 

misstatements to a firearms dealer, the statutory requirement of 

"likely to deceive" may be satisfied even when the dealer already 

is alerted those statements may be false. See, ~' United 

States~ Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d 973, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Elias' claim that no factual basis exists for a specific intent 

element is without merit because specific intent to deceive a 

dealer is not required. Elias' assertions the dealer may have 

known Elias was not "Clements" are therefore immaterial. 

Elias contends the court failed to inform him fully of the 

effect of his plea -- specifically, that sentencing would include 

a period of supervised release. Although the government concedes 

the court did not mention supervised release in the plea hearing, 

this technical violation of Rule 11 will be disregarded unless it 

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affects substantial rights. In United States ~ Barry, 895 F.2d 

702, 705 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 3222 (1990), we 

held a district court's failure to advise a defendant of a period 

of supervised release does not affect his substantial rights. 

This holding was based on the defendant's failure to show that 

knowledge of the period of supervised release would have 

materially affected his decision to plead guilty because the total 

sentence imposed -- imprisonment and supervised release -- was 

only a fraction of the total maximum penalty advised by the court. 

Id. at 705 & n.2. 

Here, Elias does not argue he would not have pleaded guilty 

had the court advised him of the mandatory period of supervised 

release. The court informed Elias the maximum penalty for his 

offense is five years' imprisonment, plus other fines and fees. 

He received a sentence of fourteen months' imprisonment and 

supervised release of three years. The period of imprisonment and 

supervised release totals four years and two months, which does 

not exceed the maximum period of five years. Because the total 

period is a fraction of the maximum period of imprisonment stated 

by the court at the plea hearing, Elias' substantial rights are 

not affected. See Barry, 895 F.2d at 705. 

Elias urges us to distinguish Barry based on the fact the 

defendant in that case received a total sentence amounting to only 

a quarter of the maximum imprisonment term. Id. at 703. In 

reaching our decision in Barry, however, we relied on other 

decisions where either the total sentence was a much higher 

fraction of the maximum period of imprisonment, see United States 

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~Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946, 948-49 (lOth Cir. 1979), or the court 

did not consider the size of the fraction significant as long as 

the total sentence was less than the maximum period of 

imprisonment, see United States ~Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63, 66 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 834 (1977). Therefore, we reject 

the distinction Elias attempts to draw from Barry. We also reject 

the suggestion that the possible effect of a violation of a 

condition of supervised release on the original term of 

imprisonment pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3583(e)(2) might affect the 

harmless error analysis under Rule ll(h). See United States~ 

Clay, 925 F.2d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1991); United States~ 

Sanclemente-Bejarano, 861 F.2d 206, 210 (9th Cir. 1988). The 

court's omission here does not affect Elias' substantial rights 

because the total sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum 

stated by the court. 

B. Application of the Sentencing Guidelines 

Elias also contends the district court erroneously applied 

the 1987 version of the Sentencing Guidelines in determining the 

base level offense for violation of section 922. We review de 

novo a district court's legal conclusions regarding the 

application of the Guidelines. United States ~Tisdale, 921 F.2d 

1095, 1100 (lOth Cir. 1990). The government concedes that between 

the 1987 version in effect at the time of the offense and the 1989 

version in effect at the time of sentencing, the applicable 

version is the one least onerous to the defendant. Under the 1987 

version, section 2K2.l(a) provides the base offense level for 

receipt of firearms by prohibited persons is nine. u.s.s.G. 

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§ 2K2.19(a) (1987). There is no provision in this section for an 

increase based on the number of firearms involved. 

Under the 1989 version of the Guidelines, the base offense 

level under section 2K2.l(a) is only six. Id. § 2K2.19(a) (1989). 

However, this version also instructs the court to apply section 

2K2.2 (Unlawful Trafficking and Other Prohibited Transactions 

Involving Firearms) if the offense involved the distribution of a 

firearms or possession with intent to distribute. Id. § 

2K2.l(c)(l). Section 2K2.2 authorizes an increase of three or 

four in the offense level when the number of firearms to be 

distributed is 8 to 12 or 13 to 24 respectively. 

This firearms enhancement in the 1989 version applies to 

Elias through the Guidelines' policy of considering the conduct of 

codefendants for purposes of sentencing. The 1989 version in 

section 1Bl.3(a)(l) allows a sentencing court to consider "conduct 

of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointlyundertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by 

the defendant." Id. § 1Bl.3(a)(l) comment. (n.l). Based on this 

provision, a sentencing court may take into account the conduct of 

codefendants even though the offense to which the defendant 

pleaded guilty does not include conspiracy. See, ~' United 

States~ McFarlane, No. 90-3257, slip op. at 3 (lOth Cir. May 21, 

1991); United States~ Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 548 (lOth Cir. 

1991); United States~ Aguilera-Zapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th 

Cir. 1990). 

Evidence presented at the sentencing hearing shows Elias and 

his codefendant, Frank Guzman, were involved in the distribution 

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of 10 to 20 firearms. By taking into account this conduct, either 

three or four points must be added to the base level offense of 

six under the 1989 version. Because the 1989 version was not 

applied, the district court did not enter a finding regarding the 

foreseeability to Elias of Guzman's conduct. However, we are 

convinced from the evidence about the number of firearms involved 

and the court's finding Elias was responsible for involving two 

other individuals in obtaining guns for Guzman that the court 

would have found that the codefendant's involvement in 

distribution of ten to twenty firearms was reasonably foreseeable 

to Elias. Because the base offense level under the 1989 version 

thus would be increased to either nine or ten, the district court 

did not err in determining a base offense level of nine from the 

1987 version. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Elias further contends he had ineffective assistance of 

counsel during plea bargaining and sentencing because his attorney 

did not advise him of a specific intent requirement for the 

offense, incorrectly estimated his offense level, and did not 

procure plea agreement stipulations to reduce his sentence. We 

review de novo a determination whether an attorney's performance 

is so deficient that it violates a defendant's right to effective 

assistance. Laycock ~New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (lOth Cir. 

1989). A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 

must establish: (1) the attorney's conduct is outside the wide 

range of competence demanded of attorneys and (2) the conduct was 

prejudicial to the defendant. Hill ~ Lockhart, 474 u.s. 52, 56 

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(1985); Strickland~ Washington, 466 u.s. 668, 687-88, 692 

(1984); Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1187. 

Because a section 922 offense does not require specific 

intent, Elias cannot complain his attorney's failure to advise him 

about it constitutes incompetence. Further, Elias has not shown 

his attorney's possible reliance on the 1989 version of the 

Guidelines prejudiced him in any way because both versions result 

in the same base offense level when applied to Elias. 

Furthermore, because the plea agreement with the prosecutor is not 

binding on the district judge, Elias has not shown prejudice from 

his attorney's failure to procure stipulations in the agreement 

that sentencing would not take into account his codefendant's 

conduct. 

D. Withdrawal of the Plea 

Finally, Elias contends the district court should have 

allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. Rule 32 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to withdraw a 

guilty plea prior to sentencing "upon a showing by the defendant 

of any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. In United 

States~ Hickok, 907 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir. 1990), we listed seven 

considerations in determining whether a defendant's reason for 

withdrawal is fair and just: (1) whether the defendant has 

asserted his innocence; (2) prejudice to the government; (3) delay 

in filing defendant's motion and, if so, the reason for the delay; 

(4) inconvenience to the court; (5) defendant's assistance of 

counsel; (6) whether the plea is knowing and voluntary; and (7) 

waste of judicial resources. Id. at 985 n.2 (citing United States 

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~Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 

U.S. 1004 (1985)). A defendant's dissatisfaction with the length 

of his sentence generally is insufficient reason to withdraw a 

plea. See, ~' United States ~ Savage, 891 F.2d 145, 151 

(7th Cir. 1989). We review a district court's denial of a motion 

to withdraw a guilty plea only for an abuse of discretion. 

Rhodes, 913 F.2d at 839; Hickok, 907 F.2d at 984. 

Here, the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Elias had 

the benefit of effective assistance of counsel throughout the plea 

bargaining and sentencing. Further, he does not assert his 

innocence. Withdrawal would prejudice the government, 

inconvenience the court, and waste judicial resources. The only 

reason Elias asserts for withdrawal is dissatisfaction with the 

length of his sentence. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Elias' motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

We AFFIRM. 

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