Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03522/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03522-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 15, 2010

Decided May 7, 2010

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3522

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee

v.

GREGORY DAVIS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 00001‐2

Charles R. Norgle, Sr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

On May 11, 2009, we vacated Gregory Davis’s 210‐month sentence and remanded

the case to the district court for resentencing in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.

85 (2007).  United States v. Davis, No. 03‐2915 (7th Cir. May 11, 2009).  On remand, the

sentencing judge ruled that Davis’s guideline range would remain at 210‐262 months (the

range prescribed by the 2002 guidelines in effect at the time of his initial sentencing)

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(1), and imposed a 200‐month sentence.  Davis appeals.

Davis first argues that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(1) to crack cocaine

offenders who were sentenced prior to the amendment of the guidelines violates the Eighth

Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.  This argument fails.  A sentence

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3522 Page 2

imposed for a non‐capital felony conviction that falls “within the legislatively prescribed

limits will not be considered disproportionate unless the sentencing court abused its

discretion.”  United States v. Vasquez, 966 F.2d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1992).  Davis’s sentence fell

within legislatively prescribed limits — § 3742(g)(1) provides that in conducting a

resentencing hearing, district courts “must apply the guidelines as they existed at the time

of [the defendant’s] first sentencing.”  United States v. Romero, 528 F.3d 980, 981 (7th Cir.

2008).  Section 3742(g)(1)’s charge to apply the guidelines in effect on the date of the

previous sentencing support the district court’s sentence and militate against Davis’s Eighth

Amendment claim.  

Davis challenges the reasonableness of his sentence on similar grounds, arguing that

it was improper for the district court to use the 2002 guideline range given that the

guidelines have been subsequently amended by the Sentencing Commission.  This was also

Davis’s primary argument to the district court at his resentencing — Davis contended that

the Sentencing Commission expressed a policy judgment in 2007 that the crack/cocaine

powder disparity should be lessened, and that the district court should have taken that into

account in reaching a sentence.

We cannot tell from the district court’s explanation for the sentence whether the

court actually considered Davis’s argument.  While Davis’s sentence was 10 months below

the 2002 advisory guidelines range and is thus presumed reasonable, United States v. Poetz,

582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009), the district judge did not provide a sufficient explanation to

allow us to meaningfully review the sentence.  Remand for resentencing is therefore

warranted.  See United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 854‐55 (7th Cir. 2009) (insufficient

explanation for sentencing decision precluded affirmance); United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d

785, 795‐96 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679‐80 (7th Cir.

2005) (same).  

The district court imposed Davis’s sentence without providing a meaningful

explanation as to why that sentence was being given.  The district court stated:

I have . . . determined the guideline range to be 210 to 262 months.

The original sentence imposed by the Court was 210 months.  The

matter is before the Court for reconsideration.  I have heard what the

defendant has had to say and what the witnesses have said and the

arguments of counsel.  The guidelines are not mandatory.  They do

serve as guides.  So in looking at the entire matter, all of the

information before the court today, the sentence imposed by the Court

is 200 months — not 210 months — but 200 months which the Court

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finds to be a fair and appropriate sentence given the totality of the

information before the Court.

This explanation gives no indication how, if at all, the court exercised its discretion in

considering Davis’s argument regarding the 2007 crack/powder disparity guideline

amendments.  While a district court need not discuss every single § 3553(a) factor or

address every single argument from a defendant, it does have to provide reasons for its

sentencing decision and address the defendant’s principal arguments that merit discussion.

Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679.  Davis’s argument was not one that was “so clearly without

merit that it could be passed over without comment.”  Harris, 567 F.3d at 854; see United

States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the Sentencing Commission

changes a guideline, it does so for a reason; and since it is a body expert in criminal

punishments, its reason is entitled to the serious consideration of the sentencing judge.”).

Instead of directly addressing Davis’s argument, the district court noted that the

guidelines were advisory, recited the generic language of the § 3553(a) factors, and then

announced a 200‐month sentence based on “the totality of the information before the

Court.”  As we stated in Cunningham, “a rote statement that the judge considered all

relevant factors will not always suffice.”  429 F.3d at 679.  And we have vacated and

remanded other cases with similarly conclusory sentencing explanations, finding that they

precluded meaningful appellate review.  See, e.g., United States v. Villegas‐Miranda, 579 F.3d

798, 802 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Although the district court listened at length to [defendant’s

argument], we cannot take on faith that it adequately considered the argument where it

passed it over in silence.”) (internal quotes omitted);  Miranda, 505 F.3d at 796 (“We cannot

tell from the district court’s comments whether the court made that individualized analysis

of Miranda’s facutal and legally supported sentencing arguments.”).

Also complicating matters is the fact the court stated that it considered United States

v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2009), which has been overruled by our holding in United

States v. Corner.  598 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  Because the district court did

not explain how the cases it cited were influencing its decision, we cannot know from this

record whether Welton played a role in its reasoning.  The possibility that Welton may have

influenced the court also militates in favor of remand.  

We express no opinion as to the length of the sentence given to Davis; our concern is

solely with the fact that the explanation given for the sentence precludes meaningful

appellate review.  It may well be the case that the district court disagreed with the

crack/powder disparity reflected in the 2002 guidelines, but agreed with the government’s

argument that other aggravating factors, such as Davis’s criminal history, warranted a 200‐

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month sentence.  But there is no way to tell that from the record.  Here, like in Cunningham,

“[t]he inadequate explanation for the sentence precludes our affirmance.”  429 F.3d at 680.

Davis’s sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing.

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