Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01061/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Acoustic Technology, Inc.
Appellant
Itron Networked Solutions, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Appellant

v.

ITRON NETWORKED SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Appellee

______________________

2019-1061

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2017-

01024.

______________________

 

Decided: February 13, 2020

______________________

MICHELLE ARMOND, Armond Wilson LLP, Newport 

Beach, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

DOUGLAS R. WILSON, Austin, TX. 

 ADAM R. BRAUSA, Durie Tangri LLP, San Francisco, 

CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by MARK A.

LEMLEY. 

 ______________________

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 1 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

2

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

On September 8, 2017, the Patent Trial and Appeal 

Board instituted inter partes review based on a petition

filed by Silver Spring Networks, Inc. Nine days after institution, Silver Spring agreed to merge with Itron, Inc., an 

entity undisputedly time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 

Silver Spring and Itron completed the merger during the 

IPR proceeding. The Board later issued a final written decision and found the challenged claim unpatentable. On 

appeal, Acoustic asks that we vacate the Board’s final written decision on grounds that the inter partes review was 

time-barred due to Silver Spring’s and Itron’s merger-related activities. Acoustic also challenges the Board’s unpatentability findings. Because we find that Acoustic 

waived its time-bar argument and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s unpatentability findings, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

I. ’841 Patent

Acoustic Technology, Inc. (“Acoustic”) owns U.S. Patent 

No. 6,509,841 (“the ’841 patent”), which relates to communications systems for utility providers to remotely monitor 

groups of utility meters, e.g., electricity meters.1 According 

to Acoustic, the claimed invention was “an improvement 

upon prior art automated meter reading systems that used 

expensive and problematic radio frequency (RF) 

1 The ’841 patent is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 08/949,440, which issued as U.S. Patent 

No. 5,986,574. Acoustic filed a related appeal involving 

U.S. Patent No. 5,986,574 on the same day it filed this appeal. Acoustic Tech., Inc. v. Itron Networked Solutions, 

Inc., Case No. 2019-1059. We heard oral arguments in this 

case and Case No. 2019-1059 on December 4, 2019. We 

have issued opinions in both cases simultaneously.

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 2 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

3

transmitters, or systems that relied on human meter-readers using handheld or vehicle-mounted short-range wireless devices to obtain meter readings when they were in a 

customer’s vicinity.” Appellant Br. 7. Central to this appeal are the “CDMA” and “relay” claim limitations. 

In one embodiment, shown in Figure 1 below, a plurality of “servicing means 16” (e.g., on-site utility meters) communicate with a “relay means 14,” which in turn 

communicates with a “control means 12” (e.g., a remote 

computer at a utility facility). J.A. 94, Fig. 1; J.A. 98–99

at 2:43–3:19. 

The relay can be “positioned at any desired location 

within the communication system,” including on a distribution pole or at a customer’s location. The relay can communicate with the control station via a Code-Division 

Multiple Access (“CDMA”) link. CDMA is a digital multiple access technique where all users are allowed to transmit simultaneously utilizing the same available frequency 

band. 

Claim 8 of the ’841 patent, reproduced below, is the 

only claim at issue on appeal:

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 3 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

4

8. A system for remote two-way meter reading 

comprising:

a metering device comprising means for 

measuring usage and for transmitting 

data associated with said measured usage in response to receiving a read command;

a control for transmitting said read command to said metering device and for receiving said data associated with said 

measured usage transmitted from said 

metering device; and

a relay for code-division multiple access 

(CDMA) communication between said 

metering device and said control, 

wherein said data associated with said 

measured usage and said read command 

is relayed between said control and metering device by being passed through 

said relay. 

J.A. 100 at 8:24–39.

II. IPR Petition

In March 2010, Acoustic sued Itron Inc. (“Itron”) for infringement of the ’841 patent. Acoustic and Itron later 

agreed to settle the suit. As part of the settlement agreement, Acoustic licensed the ’841 patent to Itron. As a result 

of the lawsuit, Itron was time-barred from seeking inter 

partes review (“IPR”) of the ’841 patent as of March 26, 

2011. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 

Six years after suing Itron, Acoustic sued Silver Spring

Networks, Inc. (“Silver Spring”) for infringement of the ’841

patent. In response, on March 3, 2017, Silver Spring filed 

the IPR petition that gave rise to this appeal: IPR2017-

01024 (“the petition”). 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 4 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

5

Several weeks before Silver Spring filed the petition, 

Silver Spring and Itron began privately discussing “a potential business combination.” J.A. 6556. The first contact 

occurred on February 12, 2017, when a representative of 

Itron phoned a Silver Spring board member to express 

Itron’s interest in a potential merger. The next day, Itron’s 

CEO continued the discussion with a director of Silver 

Spring. One week later, on February 20, 2017, Itron’s CEO 

requested a meeting with Silver Spring to discuss “a potential acquisition.” J.A. 6556. 

Silver Spring and Itron continued to discuss a potential 

merger after Silver Spring filed the petition. Representatives from each company met on March 10, 2017, one week 

after Silver Spring filed the petition, and again on April 12, 

2017. 

The Board instituted inter partes review on September 8, 2017. Nine days later, on September 17, 2017, Silver 

Spring and Itron agreed to merge. Itron publicly announced the agreement the next day. Silver Spring asserts 

that, up until the day the parties reached an agreement, 

Silver Spring was exploring potential business relationships with more than a dozen other companies. 

Silver Spring and Itron completed the merger on January 5, 2018, while the inter partes review proceeding remained underway. Acoustic learned of the merger three 

days later. On January 17, 2018, Silver Spring filed updated mandatory notices that listed Itron as a real-partyin-interest. 

The Board entered a final written decision on August 21, 2018, nearly a year after Silver Spring and Itron 

agreed to merge, and seven months after they completed 

the merger. The Board’s final written decision found claim 

8 unpatentable on all three asserted grounds: anticipated 

by NetComm; anticipated by Gastouniotis; and obvious in 

view of Nelson and Roach. Acoustic never raised a timebar challenge to the Board.

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 5 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

6

Acoustic appeals the Board’s final written decision. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

Acoustic raises two issues on appeal. First, Acoustic 

asserts that the Board’s final written decision should be vacated because the underlying IPR proceeding is timebarred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Second, Acoustic challenges the Board’s unpatentability factual findings as not 

supported by substantial evidence.

I. Time-Bar

Acoustic argues that we must vacate the Board’s final 

written decision because the inter partes review was timebarred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Section 315(b) provides: 

An inter partes review may not be instituted if the 

petition requesting the proceeding is filed more 

than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, 

real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is 

served with a complaint alleging infringement of 

the patent.

35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (emphasis added). Congress included 

the “real parties in interest” provision in § 315(b) to “safeguard patent owners from having to defend their patents 

against belated administrative attacks by related parties.” 

Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 

1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1366

(mem.) (2019). 

The Board evaluates § 315(b) at the time it decides 

whether to institute the proceeding. Power Integrations, 

Inc. v. Semiconductor Components Indus., LLC, 926 F.3d 

1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In Power Intergrations, we 

held that the real-party-in-interest determination must 

consider all relationships that arise before the date of institution, including relationships that arise after the petition filing date. Id. at 1314–1315 (“[Section] 315(b) 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 6 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

7

requires consideration of privity and [real-party-in-interest] relationships arising after filing but before institution.”). We expressly declined to decide whether the Board 

is required to reevaluate § 315(b) in view of a new realparty-in-interest that arises after institution. Id. at 1314

n.8 (“We do not address the impact of a change in 

RPI . . . occurring after institution.”).

Acoustic argues that the underlying IPR is time-barred 

because Itron was a real-party-in-interest “both before and 

after the IPR was instituted.” Appellant Br. 51. Before

institution, Acoustic asserts, Itron was a real-party-in-interest because “the executives met; Itron conducted due diligence; the details of the merger were discussed; and the 

formal ‘merger agreement’ was prepared and negotiated.” 

Reply Br. 15–16. After institution, Acoustic contends, Itron 

was “unquestionably” a real-party-in-interest because Silver Spring became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Itron, and 

Itron “controlled [Silver Spring] and had a significant interest” in the inter partes review proceeding. Id. at 19–22. 

Acoustic contends that Silver Spring’s post-institution 

status as a real-party-in-interest is important because “institution is not a static decision” and the Board has the authority to reevaluate § 315(b) when a real-party-in-interest 

arises after institution. Reply Br. 17–18. The Board’s ability to assess § 315(b) after institution is necessary, Acoustic 

explains, in order to avoid an “end-run around Section 

315(b)” where parties delay their corporate deals until

shortly after institution and avoid the consequences of the 

time-bar. Id. 21–22.

Itron advances several arguments in response to 

Acoustic’s time-bar arguments. First, Itron argues that 

Acoustic waived its time-bar challenge of the IPR because 

Acoustic did not raise those arguments before the Board. 

Second, Itron argues that the time bar of § 315(b) does not 

apply to the underlying IPR proceeding because Itron

merged with Silver Spring after the Board instituted the 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 7 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

8

proceeding. Third, Itron asserts that the Board is not authorized to reevaluate § 315(b) after institution and that 

Acoustic’s proposed reading of the statute “offers no logical 

stopping point” for the Board to assess the time bar. Appellee Br. 39.

We hold that Acoustic has waived its time-bar challenge to the IPR because it failed to present those arguments before the Board. We retain case-by-case discretion 

over whether to apply waiver. Monsanto Tech. LLC v. E.I. 

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 878 F.3d 1336, 1342 n.8 (Fed. 

Cir. 2018). We have “frequently declined to hear arguments that the applicant failed to present to the Board.” In 

re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. 2004). When a party 

raises arguments on appeal that it did not raise to the 

Board, they “deprive[] the court of the benefit of the 

[Board’s] informed judgment.” In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 

F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining the importance of “a comprehensive record that contains the arguments and evidence presented by the parties”). 

There is no dispute that Acoustic failed to raise § 315(b)

time-bar arguments before the Board. Acoustic became

aware of the merger as of January 8, 2018, more than seven 

months before the Board issued its final written decision. 

J.A. 7026. Yet, Acoustic does not provide any reason for its 

failure to challenge the proceeding as time-barred. Because Acoustic failed to present its time-bar arguments to 

the Board and “deprive[d] the court of the benefit of the 

[Board’s] informed judgment,” we exercise our discretion to 

apply waiver. In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1380.

Acoustic attempts to excuse its waiver by asserting, 

without legal authority, that the time-bar is “jurisdictional” and thus “may be raised at any time.” Appellant 

Br. 29. We disagree.

Acoustic is correct that we have previously described 

the time-bar restrictions on the Board’s institution powers 

as “jurisdictional.” Appellant Br. 32–35 (citing Click-toCase: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 8 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

9

Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321, 1325 

(Fed. Cir. 2018); Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878

F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). But our application of 

waiver differs between challenges to an agency’s “jurisdiction” and challenges to a federal court’s jurisdiction. PGS 

Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 

2018). As we explained in PGS:

Even if the Board could be said to have acted “ultra 

vires” in refusing to institute reviews of some 

claims and grounds . . . the Board’s error is waivable, not one we are required to notice and act on 

in the absence of an appropriate request for relief 

on that basis. Several courts of appeals have recognized the same for a challenge to an agency’s “jurisdiction,” after the Supreme Court, in City of 

Arlington v. FCC, rejected a distinction between 

agency “jurisdiction” errors and other errors for 

certain deference purposes . . . .”

Id. (compiling cases) (citations omitted). We hold that 

time-bar challenges under § 315(b) are not immune from 

waiver.

To permit litigants to raise § 315(b) time-bar challenges for the first time on appeal would encourage what 

the Supreme Court has referred to as “sandbagging,” i.e., 

“suggesting or permitting, for strategic reasons, that the 

[tribunal below] pursue a certain course, and later—if the 

outcome is unfavorable—claiming that the course followed 

was reversible error.” Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991). But allowing Acoustic to 

raise a time-bar challenge for the first time on appeal 

would afford it a significant and unfair advantage: Acoustic could wait for the Board’s decision on the merits, which 

if favorable would have estoppel effect, and then challenge 

the Board’s jurisdiction on appeal only if the Board finds 

the claims obvious.

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 9 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

10

Although we do not address the merits of Acoustic’s 

time-bar argument, we note Acoustic’s concerns about the 

concealed involvement of interested, time-barred parties. 

But because Acoustic never raised this issue to the Board, 

we decline to resolve whether Itron’s pre-merger activities 

render it a real-party-in-interest, or whether the Board has 

any authority or obligation to reevaluate § 315(b) post institution. 

II. Unpatentability

Acoustic argues that we should reverse the Board’s unpatentability findings. Acoustic contends that the Board 

erred with respect to each of the three grounds on which it 

found claim 8 unpatentable: (A) anticipation by NetComm; 

(B) anticipation by Gastouniotis; and (C) obviousness in 

view Nelson and Roach. We address each ground in turn.

We review the Board’s factual determinations for substantial evidence and its legal determinations de novo. Liqwd, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 941 F.3d 1133, 1136 

(Fed. Cir. 2019). Anticipation is a question of fact that we 

review for substantial evidence. In re Hodges, 882 

F.3d 1107, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Whether an invention 

would have been obvious is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual findings. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 

U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Determinations about the scope and 

content of prior art, and whether an artisan would be motivated to modify it with a reasonable expectation of success, are questions of fact. Id.

A. Anticipation by NetComm

Acoustic challenges the Board’s determination that 

NetComm anticipates claim 8 of the ’841 patent. Specifically, Acoustic claims the Board erred by finding that NetComm discloses the claimed CDMA communication

limitation. 

Acoustic contends that the Board’s CDMA finding is 

not supported by substantial evidence because the Board 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 10 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

11

relied entirely on the testimony of Silver Spring’s expert,

Dr. Soliman. Appellant Br. 56. Acoustic explains that Dr. 

Soliman’s testimony is not evidence of anticipation because 

Dr. Soliman’s testimony reflects an “incorrect obviousness 

standard” instead of the standard for anticipation. Id. 

Acoustic points to Dr. Soliman’s statement that a skilled 

artisan would “recognize” NetComm as disclosing CDMA. 

Id. Dr. Soliman’s use of the word “recognize,” Acoustic asserts, is akin to testimony about what a prior art reference 

“suggests”—which goes to obviousness, not anticipation. 

Id. We disagree. 

In an anticipation analysis, the dispositive question is 

whether a skilled artisan would “reasonably understand or 

infer” from a prior art reference that every claim limitation 

is disclosed in that single reference. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 

Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). Expert testimony may shed light on what 

a skilled artisan would reasonably understand or infer 

from a prior art reference. Monsanto Tech. LLC v. E.I. 

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 878 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 

2018). Moreover, expert testimony can constitute substantial evidence of anticipation when the expert explains in 

detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art 

reference. Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 

1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Here, Dr. Soliman conducted a detailed analysis and 

explained how a skilled artisan would reasonably understand that NetComm’s disclosure of radio wave communication was the same as CDMA. J.A. 893–896 at ¶¶ 165–

175. For example, Dr. Soliman identified specific passages 

in NetComm that a skilled artisan would recognize as disclosing “spread-spectrum radio communication.” J.A. 894 

at ¶ 169. Dr. Soliman identified other passages that a 

skilled artisan would recognize as disclosing that “multiple 

users share a band and hop between channels in that band 

using a pseudo-random pattern assigned to each device.” 

J.A. 895 at ¶ 171. As a result, Dr. Soliman concluded, a 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 11 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

12

skilled artisan would recognize that NetComm discloses 

the CDMA limitation of claim 8. J.A. 896 at ¶ 176. Acoustic provided no evidence to rebut Dr. Soliman’s testimony. 

J.A. 26. 

We conclude that the Board’s finding that NetComm 

discloses CDMA and anticipates claim 8 is supported by 

substantial evidence. See Koito Mfg., 381 F.3d at 1152.

B. Anticipation by Gastouniotis

Acoustic challenges the Board’s determination that 

Gastouniotis anticipates claim 8 of the ’841 patent. Acoustic asserts that the Board’s finding is erroneous because the 

Board relied on “the same structures to satisfy separate 

claim limitations.” Appellant Br. 60. Specifically, Acoustic 

asserts that the Board relied on the same “remote station 

6” in Gastouniotis to satisfy the “control” and “relay” limitations of claim 8. Id. at 57. We disagree. 

Gastouniotis discloses a two-way utility meter reading 

system that includes a plurality of “remote stations” that 

communicate with a plurality of “instrument links.” 

J.A. 968 at 4:9–46. Gastouniotis discloses that individual 

“remote stations” may have different functions in a given 

embodiment. Id. In finding that Gastouniotis anticipated 

claim 8, the Board relied on separate “remote station” 

structures to meet the “control” and “relay” limitations. 

J.A. 30. 

As to the “control” limitation of claim 8, the Board relied on Gastouniotis’ disclosure of at least one remote station that engages in two-way communication with the 

metering device: transmitting commands to the metering 

device and receiving usage data from the metering device. 

Id. at 4:15–17. Dr. Soliman provided unrebutted testimony

that a skilled artisan would understand that these remote 

stations disclosed in Gastouniotis meet the “control” limitation of claim 8. 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 12 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

13

As to the “relay” limitation of claim 8, the Board relied 

on Gastouniotis’ disclosure of separate remote stations that

function as a “relay”:

[T]he remote stations can be configured to communicate with each other as well as with the instrument links. In this way, data obtained by one 

remote station can be communicated to a central 

location using the other remote stations as a relay.

J.A. 968 at 4:37–42 (emphasis added). Dr. Soliman provided unrebutted testimony that a skilled artisan would 

understand that these remote stations disclosed in 

Gastouniotis meet the “relay” limitation of claim 8. 

As a result, we conclude that the Board did not improperly rely on the same structure in Gastouniotis to meet the 

“control” and “relay” limitations of claim 8. We affirm the

Board’s factual finding that Gastouniotis anticipates 

claim 8.

C. Obviousness in View of Nelson and Roach

Acoustic challenges the Board’s determination that 

claim 8 of the ’841 patent is rendered obvious in view of 

Nelson and Roach. Acoustic asserts two errors in the 

Board’s obviousness analysis: (i) that the Board erroneously mapped Nelson onto the elements of claim 8; and (ii) 

that the Board’s motivation-to-combine finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We reject both arguments.

1.

First, Acoustic asserts that the Board erroneously 

mapped “the same structure in Nelson onto multiple claim 

limitations.” Appellant Br. 64. Specifically, Acoustic asserts that the Board relied on the same “electronic meter 

reader (EMR)” in Nelson to satisfy both the “metering device” and “relay” limitations of claim 8. Appellant Br. 64–

65. We disagree.

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 13 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

14

Nelson discloses a two-way meter reading system that 

includes a plurality of “electronic meter readers (EMRs).” 

J.A. 997 at 8:23–27; J.A. 1005 at 22:25; J.A. 1013 at 13:19. 

Nelson discloses that individual EMRs may have different 

functions in a given embodiment. Id. In finding that Nelson anticipated claim 8, the Board relied on separate EMR

structures to meet the “metering device” and “relay” limitations. 

To satisfy the “metering device” limitation of claim 8, 

the Board relied on Nelson’s disclosure that the “meter apparatus 10,” which houses an EMR, “is substantially the 

same as a conventional meter apparatus designed to indicate the amount of electricity consumed by a consumer’s

electrical system.” J.A. 997 at 8:23–27; J.A. 1005 at 22:25. 

Dr. Soliman provided unrebutted testimony that a skilled 

artisan would recognize the metering apparatus of Nelson 

as meeting the “metering device” limitation of claim 8. 

To satisfy the “relay” limitation of claim 8, the Board 

relied on Nelson’s disclosure of separate, “intermediate

EMR devices” that operate as “communication relays” in a 

technique known as “meterstringing.” J.A. 1013 at 24:13–

19 (emphasis added). Nelson discloses that these “[i]ntermediate EMR devices serve [the] sole purpose of communications link between the EMI device and the target EMR 

at the end of the communication link.” Id. Dr. Soliman 

provided unrebutted testimony that a skilled artisan would 

recognize that the intermediate EMR devices of Nelson 

meet the “relay” limitation of claim 8. 

As a result, we conclude that the Board did not improperly rely on the same electronic meter reader in Nelson to 

satisfy both the “metering device” and “relay” limitations 

of claim 8. 

2.

Second, we reject Acoustic’s argument that the Board 

erred in finding that a skilled artisan would be motivated 

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 14 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

15

to combine Nelson and Roach. Acoustic argues that the 

Board “erred by not making any factual findings that one 

of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the 

prior art.” Appellant Br. 61. Acoustic requests that we reverse the Board’s finding because the Board relied on “attorney argument,” and “generically cited to [Dr. Soliman’s] 

expert testimony.” Id. at 61–62. 

The motivation to combine prior art references can 

come from the knowledge of those skilled in the art, from 

the prior art reference itself, or from the nature of the problem to be solved. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 

F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Acoustic is correct that

conclusory expert testimony and attorney argument cannot 

constitute substantial evidence of a motivation to combine.

E.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 

F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We have found expert 

testimony insufficient where, for example, the testimony 

consisted of conclusory statements that a skilled artisan 

could combine the references, not that they would have 

been motivated to do so. TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., 

Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 

The Board’s final written decision provides a detailed 

discussion of Silver Spring’s arguments that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Nelson and 

Roach. J.A. 35–36. The Board expressly found those arguments “supported by a sufficient rational underpinning” 

and “supported by the testimony of Dr. Soliman.” J.A. 35–

36, 38. The Board cited specific pages of Dr. Soliman’s testimony, including his opinion that “one of the goals of Nelson’s system is to increase communication reliability and 

information access integrity,” and that the CDMA communication described in Roach was “well known” among 

skilled artisans as a way to achieve those goals. J.A. 34–

36 (citing J.A. 914–915). 

Dr. Soliman’s testimony was not conclusory or otherwise defective, and the Board was within its discretion to

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 15 Filed: 02/13/2020
ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. ITRON NETWORKED 

SOLUTIONS

16

give that testimony dispositive weight. In re Am. Acad. of 

Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We

have previously determined that expert testimony constituted substantial evidence of a motivation to combine prior 

art references, e.g., Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 

841 F.3d 995, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and we reach the same 

conclusion here. We affirm the Board’s conclusion that 

claim 8 is rendered obvious by Nelson and Roach. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Acoustic’s other arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. We affirm. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 19-1061 Document: 56 Page: 16 Filed: 02/13/2020