Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01414/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01414-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerrod Patterson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 9, 2016

Decided November 10, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16-1414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JERROD D. PATTERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15-CR-74-4-JPS

J. P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

For several years Jerrod Patterson conspired with other Gangster Disciples to sell 

heroin and other drugs in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Federal authorities broke up the ring in 

early 2015, but Patterson fled and remained a fugitive for almost six months. After he 

was caught, Patterson pleaded guilty to distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 

was sentenced below the guidelines’ imprisonment range to 125 months to be followed 

by three years of supervised release. Patterson filed a notice of appeal, but his 

appointed attorney moves to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous. See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Patterson has not accepted our invitation to

respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that 

explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be 

expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 

776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel tells us that Patterson does not wish to challenge his guilty plea, and 

thus the lawyer appropriately forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea and 

adequacy of the plea colloquy. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 

348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel has not identified any potential procedural error at sentencing, leaving 

only the possible claim that Patterson’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. But as 

counsel correctly recognizes, that claim would be frivolous. The district court, after 

finding that Patterson is a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, calculated a total offense 

level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI. Patterson did not dispute these 

calculations, which yielded an imprisonment range of 151 to 188 months and a 

recommended three-year term of supervised release. Patterson’s below-range prison

sentence is presumed reasonable, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 

(2007); United States v. Womack, 732 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2013), as is his withinguidelines term of supervised release, see United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th 

Cir. 2014); United States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 494, 496–97 (7th Cir. 2008). Counsel has not

identified any reason to rebut those presumptions, nor have we. 

In determining the appropriate sentence, the district court addressed Patterson’s 

arguments in mitigation and evaluated the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The 

court acknowledged Patterson’s addiction to drugs and difficult childhood—his mother 

also was drug dependent and one brother was murdered— but explained that these did 

not excuse his “multiple contacts with the criminal justice system” or his decision to flee 

and remain a fugitive for months after he was indicted. The court emphasized the

seriousness of his drug crime and the devastating effect of drugs on users, their 

families, and the community. Nevertheless, the court observed that incarceration is 

expensive and opined that too many persons are imprisoned for too long. The court 

concluded that, although 125 months is longer than any sentence Patterson had 

received previously, a term of that length was necessary to protect the people of 

Kenosha from drug trafficking. Accordingly, an appellate claim challenging the 

reasonableness of Patterson’s prison sentence would be frivolous.

One final note: Counsel does not mention two standard conditions of supervised 

release that the district court imposed and that we have criticized as problematic. The 

condition prohibiting Patterson from leaving the judicial district without permission

may improperly impose strict liability, see United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 395 

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No. 16-1414 Page 3

(7th Cir. 2016), and the condition requiring him to follow his probation officer’s 

instructions doesn’t even hint at what those instructions might be and lacks a 

reasonableness qualification, United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir. 2016). But 

counsel implies that Patterson does not wish to challenge these conditions, and we have 

no reason to believe otherwise. If Patterson later perceives those conditions to be vague, 

confusing, or otherwise problematic, he may seek modification at that time. See Brown, 

823 F.3d at 395; United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 518–20 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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