Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03030/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Andrew Warren
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2012 Decided November 30, 2012 

No. 11-3030 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

ANDREW WARREN, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cr-00158-1) 

Brian W. Shaughnessy argued the cause for the appellant. 

Peter S. Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., United 

States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth Trosman

and Julieanne Himelstein, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

were on brief. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

USCA Case #11-3030 Document #1407567 Filed: 11/30/2012 Page 1 of 10
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 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant 

Andrew Warren (Warren) appeals his 65-month sentence of 

imprisonment, arguing that it is both procedurally and 

substantively defective. Among other arguments, Warren 

contends that his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 

depression and substance abuse issues made it substantively 

unreasonable to sentence him to more than a brief period of 

incarceration, followed by treatment at a private facility. We 

disagree and affirm the district court. 

I. 

Warren was once a rising star in the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA). In 2007 and 2008, the CIA assigned Warren to 

work as a high-level official for the United States Embassy in 

Algeria, where he lived in government housing. Sometime in 

2007, Warren met Person A, a Muslim woman and Algerian 

national. On February 17, 2008, Warren invited Person A to 

his home where he served her adulterated alcoholic drinks 

that caused her to pass in and out of consciousness. While she 

was semi-conscious, Warren moved her to his bed, removed 

all of her clothing and had sexual contact (but not intercourse) 

with her. Person A later wrote a text message to Warren 

accusing him of abuse, to which Warren replied that he was 

sorry. 

Due to her religion and Algerian culture, Person A did 

not report Warren to law enforcement or mention his conduct 

to her family. Eventually, in September 2008, she reported 

Warren to an official at the United States Embassy in Algeria. 

In investigating the allegations, special agents from the 

United States Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security executed a search warrant on Warren’s Algerian 

residence and found child pornography, Valium, Xanax and a 

handbook on the investigation of sexual assaults. As an expert 

USCA Case #11-3030 Document #1407567 Filed: 11/30/2012 Page 2 of 10
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witness explained, Valium and Xanax mixed with alcohol 

could have caused the symptoms Person A experienced at 

Warren’s residence. The government also discovered that in 

September 2007, before his assault on Person A, Warren had 

allegedly drugged and sexually abused Person B, another 

Algerian Muslim woman. Person B, like Person A, was afraid 

to report Warren’s conduct due to her religion and culture. 

In March 2009, the CIA terminated Warren. In June 

2009, Warren was indicted on one count of sexual abuse 

committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 

of the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2). 

In April 2010, Warren failed to appear for a status 

hearing and the district court issued a bench warrant for his 

arrest. In its search for Warren, the government discovered 

that Warren’s neighbor in Norfolk, Virginia had recently filed 

a complaint against Warren for exposing himself to her. 

Several days later, the police found Warren at a Norfolk 

motel. He appeared to be under the influence of drugs and 

was carrying a “fully loaded 9 millimeter semi-automatic 

Glock pistol in the front pocket of his shorts.” Supplemental 

Appendix (SA), Tab F at 7. Upon being confronted by the 

police, Warren made several motions toward the gun, 

physically resisted arrest and had to be subdued with a taser. 

On June 7, 2010, Warren pleaded guilty to a superseding 

information on two counts: (1) abusive sexual contact (18 

U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1)); and (2) possession of a firearm by an 

unlawful user of a controlled substance (18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(3)). The district court accepted the plea agreement 

and Warren’s guilty plea. In the plea agreement, the parties 

agreed that the proper range under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines, see United States Sentencing 

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Guidelines Manual (Guidelines), was between 27 and 33 

months’ imprisonment. 

Warren filed a sentencing memorandum arguing for a 

below-Guidelines sentence because he suffered from PTSD, 

depression and substance abuse problems. At a January 31, 

2011 pre-sentencing hearing held to hear from Warren’s 

psychiatrist, the psychiatrist testified that the United States 

Bureau of Prisons had only one facility—in Lexington, KY—

that could treat Warren’s so-called “dual diagnos[e]s” of 

substance abuse and mental problems. SA, Tab I at 54-55. 

Because the program had limited space and thus a long 

waiting period, however, he recommended that Warren be 

treated at a private facility called Behavioral Health of the 

Palm Beaches, located in Lake Park, Florida. 

At the March 3, 2011 sentencing, the court rejected 

Warren’s argument that his “dual diagnos[e]s” entitled him to 

a shorter sentence. Instead, while the court agreed that the 

Guidelines range was 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment, it 

imposed an upward variance and sentenced Warren to 65 

months in prison. The court explained its reasons for the 

sentence. On the one hand, it noted, Warren had an excellent 

career, the loss of his job was painful, he suffered from 

mental and substance abuse problems and he had “served this 

country well.” Appendix (A) 8-9, 11. On the other hand, the 

court explained, an above-Guideline variance was appropriate 

because, inter alia, (1) Warren was a high-level United States 

officer with diplomatic immunity; (2) he took a “calculated 

risk” in victimizing Person A, a married Muslim woman, who 

he believed would not complain to authorities (for religious 

reasons) and could not seek legal recourse because of 

Warren’s diplomatic immunity; (3) Person A’s victim impact 

statement was “overwhelming to read” because of the harm 

Warren caused to her life; (4) “there has to be a clear message 

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that people should not abuse others in other cultures who may 

not be in a position to come forward and speak for 

themselves” and (5) if released, Warren would pose a danger 

to himself and the community based on his conduct on arrest. 

See A 13-15. 

The district court also recommended to the Bureau of 

Prisons that Warren be placed in the Lexington program but, 

on the recommendation of Warren’s counsel, changed its 

recommendation to a facility in Butner, NC. Warren timely 

appealed his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

II. 

We review a sentencing challenge under a two-step 

analysis. United States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 356 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). First, we determine whether the district court 

committed significant procedural error. Id. (quoting United 

States v. Akhigbe, 642 F.3d 1078, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 

Second, “we review the overall reasonableness of the 

sentence to ensure that it is objectively reasonable in light of 

the sentencing factors in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)].” Id. at 356 n.3 

(citing United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1033-34 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Olivares, 473 F.3d 

1224, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 

A. 

Warren makes several procedural error arguments 

regarding the district court’s explanation of his sentence. 

Because Warren failed to make the objections at sentencing, 

we review for plain error. See United States v. Mahdi, 598 

F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010). To establish plain error, 

Warren must show “(1) there is in fact an error to correct; (2) 

the error is plain; (3) it affects substantial rights; and (4) it 

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seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Warren first argues that the court failed to adequately 

explain its reasons for imposing an upward variance. We 

disagree. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3551 et seq., requires the district court to explain, at the 

time of sentencing and in open court, its reasons for the 

defendant’s sentence. See Locke, 664 F.3d at 357 (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(c)). Additionally, if a sentence “is not of the 

kind, or is outside the range, described in [the Guidelines],” 

the court must state “the specific reason for the imposition of 

a sentence different from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(c)(2). This requirement has two purposes: to “‘develop 

an adequate record so that appellate courts can perform 

substantive review’” and to “guarantee that sentencing judges 

continue to consider every convicted person as an individual.” 

Locke, 664 F.3d at 357 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the 

district court gave a detailed explanation for its aboveGuidelines sentence, referencing, among other facts, that 

Warren was a high-level representative with diplomatic 

immunity, that he took advantage of Person A’s religion in 

sexually abusing her, that Person A’s victim impact statement 

was “overwhelming to read” and that Warren’s conduct in 

resisting arrest showed that he posed a danger to himself and 

others. See A 13-15. Contrary to Warren’s assertion, his case 

is in no way like our Akhigbe decision, in which we found 

that the district court committed plain error in imposing an 

above-Guidelines sentence when it gave virtually “no 

individualized reasoning as to why [it] believed a sentence 12 

months above the Guidelines range was appropriate for this 

particular defendant.” 642 F.3d at 1086. By contrast, the 

district court’s explanation of its upward variance was 

extensive and individualized. 

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Warren next complains that the court’s written 

explanation of the sentence was insufficient. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(c)(2) provides that, in imposing an upward variance, 

in addition to explaining its reasons for doing so in open 

court, the court must state its reasons “with specificity in a 

statement of reasons form issued under [28 U.S.C. § 

994(w)(1)(B)].” “Written statements offering only vague 

generalities that fail to discuss meaningfully the particular 

defendant and his particular crime do not” satisfy section 

3553(c)(2). Akhigbe, 642 F.3d at 1087. But here, the 

statement of reasons form—attached to an annotated partial 

transcript of Warren’s March 3 sentencing—offered more 

than “vague generalities.” First, the form (which was attached 

to the judgment) explained that the upward variance was 

based on four factors included in section 3553(a).1

 Second, 

the transcript, which was incorporated by reference into the 

statement of reasons form, contained the district court’s entire 

oral explanation of the sentence, including the upward 

variance, along with the court’s annotations. This court has 

previously approved a written statement of reasons in which 

the district court incorporated the sentencing transcript by 

reference. See United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1035 

(finding written statement adequate because the district 

court’s written statement of reasons “referenc[ed] its findings 

at the sentencing hearing”). 

 

1

 The factors are: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the defendant” (18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(1)); (2) “the seriousness of the offense, . . . respect for the 

law, and . . . just punishment for the offense” (18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(2)(A)); (3) “adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” (18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)); (4) “protect[ing] the public from further 

crimes of the defendant” (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7)). A 3. 

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Warren also claims that the district court improperly 

varied upward based in part on Warren’s sexual abuse of 

Person B despite the court’s statement that it “was not in a 

position to determine what had happened” to Person B. SA, 

Tab I at 49. Warren misunderstands the record. While the 

court mentioned Warren’s abuse of Person B during 

sentencing, it did not rely on that incident as a reason for the 

upward variance. Instead, the court’s variance explanation 

plainly relied on the assault of only one woman, Person A. 

See, e.g., A 13-14 (“[t]he victim here is a married Muslim 

woman . . . . [s]he could not seek legal recourse . . . . by 

picking a victim such as this woman . . . . she would not 

complain . . . . [h]er victim impact statement2

”) (emphases 

added). 

Warren’s final procedural error argument is that the 

sentencing court considered only two of the section 3553(a) 

factors. Appellant Reply Br. 1. Although Warren’s briefs are 

difficult to understand on this point, his argument appears to 

be that the court erred by failing to explicitly refer to each

section 3553(a) factor. This argument also fails. “[W]e 

ordinarily presume a district court imposing an alternative 

non-guidelines sentence took into account all the factors listed 

in § 3553(a) and accorded them the appropriate significance.” 

United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 

see also United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (“It is true that the district court did not specifically 

refer to each factor listed in § 3553(a). But we have not 

required courts to do so.”) (emphasis in original). Here, 

Warren “has proffered nothing to rebut that presumption,” 

Locke, 664 F.3d at 358. Warren’s argument is particularly 

 

2

 Only Person A filed a victim impact statement. A 10 (“They could 

not locate [Person B] to file a victim impact statement.”). 

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wanting because the court gave a nine-page oral explanation 

of the sentence on the record, after a 44-page colloquy 

between the parties and the court and after the court had 

reviewed the parties’ sentencing memoranda. 

In sum, Warren fails to show any, much less plain, 

procedural error. 

B. 

Warren also argues that his sentence is substantively 

invalid. His argument, reviewed for abuse of discretion, see 

United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 

2008), fails. 

Specifically, Warren complains “the most reasonable 

sentence would have been to provide Mr. Warren with 

treatment for his PTSD and depression at a facility like 

Behavioral Health of the Palm Beaches in Florida” after a 

short term of imprisonment. Appellant Opening Br. (App. Br.) 

27 (footnote omitted). In support, Warren cites his mental 

health and substance abuse diagnoses and his psychiatrist’s 

opinion that the only Bureau of Prisons facility that could 

adequately treat Warren’s diagnoses had a long waiting list, 

with the result that Warren would have to spend a lengthy 

period in a traditional Bureau of Prisons facility that could not 

adequately treat him. Warren also complains generally about 

his sentence, arguing that the court did not give enough 

weight to the fact that he led an “otherwise impeccable life, 

one characterized by devotion and service to his country,” 

App. Br. 3. Warren’s mental health and substance abuse 

problems are, of course, relevant to sentencing. While a PTSD 

diagnosis may mitigate criminal conduct that occurs 

spontaneously or unexpectedly—for example, Warren’s 

resisting arrest—his conviction resulted from conduct, 

especially drugging his victim, that was planned and 

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deliberate. Granted, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) requires the 

district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed” 

and sets forth as one of the considerations thereunder “to 

provide the defendant with needed . . . medical care.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). But the district court considered that 

factor. Because of Warren’s diagnoses, the court 

recommended that he be placed at the Lexington, KY facility 

recommended by Warren’s psychiatrist and then agreed to 

change the recommendation to a facility in Butner, NC, at the 

request of Warren’s counsel. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. 

So ordered. 

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