Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-03251/USCOURTS-ca3-23-03251-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters
Appellant
Claims Exchange Inc
Appellee
Institutes LLC
Appellant
Sydney Posner
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

______________ 

No. 23-3251 

 ______________ 

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CHARTERED PROPERTY CASUALTY 

UNDERWRITERS, 

d/b/a The Institutes; THE INSTITUTES LLC,

 Appellants 

v. 

SYDNEY POSNER; THE CLAIMS EXCHANGE INC. 

______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05369) 

U.S. District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 

______________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

December 6, 2024 

______________ 

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: January 8, 2025) 

______________ 

OPINION∗

______________ 

∗

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent. 

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2 

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

Defendants American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters and 

the Institutes (collectively, “American Institute”) appeal several pretrial rulings, jury 

instructions, the judgment against them, and the order denying them a permanent 

injunction. For the following reasons, we will affirm. 

I 

A 

 American Institute provides professional development resources and other services 

to insurance industry professionals. In 2018, American Institute acquired Claims and 

Litigation Management Alliance (“CLM”), which among other things, hosted educational 

and networking events for such professionals. Sydney Posner served as CLM’s Chief 

Relationship Officer and sold sponsorships for CLM events, and after CLM was 

acquired, she performed the same role at American Institute. 

Posner’s employment contract with American Institute provided her with a salary 

and sales commissions. She also executed a confidentiality and non-solicitation 

agreement.1

 

About a year and a half into her tenure at American Institute, Posner was 

terminated for allegedly violating company policy,2

 and American Institute asked her to 

1

 American Institute also sought to include a non-compete provision, but Posner 

would not agree to it without additional compensation, which American Institute declined 

to provide. 2

 American Institute claims that she was terminated for accepting a side payment 

in connection with a sponsorship deal. 

Case: 23-3251 Document: 58 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/08/2025
3

return her company equipment, including a laptop. Posner returned the laptop. An 

examination of the laptop revealed that Posner had (1) downloaded “very confidential” 

company information onto external hard drives, App. 7290; (2) erased the web history;

and (3) emailed various files to herself. 

Shortly after her termination, Posner founded The Claims Xchange Inc. (“CXI”), 

an organization that, like CLM, held educational and networking events for insurance 

professionals.

B

American Institute sued Posner for breach of her confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreement, conversion of company information, and unfair competition under 

Pennsylvania common law, among other causes of action. Posner counterclaimed for 

unpaid commissions and relief under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection 

Law (“WPCL”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 260.1-260.13, among other claims. 

Of relevance to this appeal, the District Court dismissed American Institute’s 

unfair competition claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), determining

that Pennsylvania trial courts have recognized a common law tort of unfair competition,

but that American Institute failed to plead that Posner’s conduct “caused harm to 

[American Institute’s] commercial relations.” App. 1. The Court also denied American 

Institute’s motion for summary judgment on Posner’s counterclaim for unpaid 

commissions, concluding that the relevant contracts were unambiguous concerning when 

commissions were due, but that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

any were unpaid. The Court granted in part American Institute’s motion for an adverse 

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4

inference jury instruction, in light of Posner’s failure to produce certain evidence after 

being ordered to do so.3

The jury found, among other things, that: (1) Posner had violated the 

confidentiality provision of her employment agreement and awarded American Institute 

$48,830.45 in damages,

4 and (2) that American Institute was liable to Posner for unpaid 

commissions and awarded her $48,830.45. 

After trial, American Institute filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in 

the alternative to amend the judgment, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict. The Court remitted the judgment to omit sales that were not 

commissionable under its interpretation of the commission agreements.

5

 

Finally, the District Court denied American Institute’s motion for a permanent 

injunction, which requested an order requiring Posner to return confidential information 

belonging to American Institute and barring her from competing with American Institute 

for three years. The Court determined that American Institute failed to show that it had 

no adequate remedy at law because evidence, such as expert testimony concerning value 

3 During discovery, the Court granted American Institute’s motion to compel and 

ordered Posner to produce any computer devices and two personal email accounts she 

used around the time of her termination. Posner did not produce a personal laptop, iPad, 

or email account subject to the Court’s order, explaining that the laptop had been stolen, 

the iPad had been irretrievably lost, and she had deleted her email account after someone

told her that her chosen address did not sound sufficiently professional.

4 The verdict form instructed the jury to award damages on the conversion claim 

only if they were “not duplicative of damages [it had] already awarded for 

misappropriation and/or breach of contract.” App. 16602. The jury found that Posner 

had converted American Institute’s confidential information but did not award any 

additional damages on that claim. 

5 The District Court reduced the original award of $48,830.45 to $38,399.82. 

Case: 23-3251 Document: 58 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/08/2025
5 

of the misappropriated information and the jury’s monetary award, showed the injury to 

American Institute could be compensated via damages. 

American Institute appeals. 

II6

A7

We first review whether the District Court properly dismissed American Institute’s 

unfair competition claim. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not clearly defined the elements of an unfair 

competition claim under Pennsylvania common law, see, e.g., Granite State Ins. Co. v. 

Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 1995),8 and so some Pennsylvania 

trial courts have applied the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, see, e.g., Babiarz 

v. Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc., No. 1863 Aug. Term 2000, 2001 WL 1808554, at *9-10 (Pa. Com. 

Pl. July 10, 2001). We will assume, without deciding, that the Pennsylvania Supreme 

6

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

7

 “We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Pacira BioSciences, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of 

Anesthesiologists, Inc., 63 F.4th 240, 244 n.6 (3d Cir. 2023). We must determine 

whether the complaint, construed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” 

Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 284, 290 

(3d Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted), “contain[s] sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). 

8

 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of a common 

law unfair competition claim without defining its elements. See, e.g., Pottstown Daily 

News Publ’g Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 192 A.2d 657, 662-63 (Pa. 1963). 

Case: 23-3251 Document: 58 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/08/2025
6 

Court would adopt the Restatement’s formulation. See e.g., Acumed LLC v. Advanced 

Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 227 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Under the Restatement, to state an unfair competition claim, a plaintiff must plead 

that (1) the defendant engaged in an act defined in the Restatement as an unfair method of 

competition (e.g., misappropriation of trade secrets); and (2) the defendant’s conduct 

caused harm to the plaintiff’s commercial relations.9

 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair 

Competition § 1 (Am. L. Inst. 1995). American Institute alleged that Posner used its 

“highly confidential trade secret and other proprietary information” to solicit some of its 

“clients, vendors, advertisers and/or sponsors to terminate or limit their involvement with 

[American Institute] and, instead, to associate with CXI,” App. 1917-18, and hence 

pleaded that Posner and CXI engaged in an unfair method of competition under the 

Restatement. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 1 (identifying 

“appropriation of . . . trade secrets” as an example of unfair method of competition). 

However, aside from summarily stating that “[b]y their actions and omissions, Posner and 

CXI have caused damages to [American Institute],” App. 1924, American Institute did 

not allege that Posner’s unfair competition caused it to lose customers, good will, or 

suffer any other harm. American Institute’s conclusory statement does not satisfy the 

9

 American Institute argues that it need not prove damages as part of its unfair 

competition claim, relying on Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Cap. Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 

1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). However, in that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 

upheld an injunction because plaintiff had shown that potential future disclosure would 

have a “negative impact on [plaintiff’s] place in the . . . market” as well as a potential 

“positive impact on [defendant’s] competitive position.” Id. at 1233. American Institute 

failed to make factual allegations of such harms. 

Case: 23-3251 Document: 58 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/08/2025
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pleading standard. See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012)

(“[W]e disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and 

mere conclusory statements.”). As such, the District Court correctly dismissed the 

claim.10

B 

Next, we evaluate American Institute’s challenge to the District Court’s 

instructions that permitted the jury to draw an adverse inference from Posner’s 

destruction of, or failure to preserve, her computer devices, data, and email account, if it 

found Posner engaged in such acts.11, 12 American Institute claims that the District Court 

10 Alternatively, even if American Institute had met the pleading standard, the 

Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act expressly “displaces conflicting tort, 

restitutionary and other law of this Commonwealth providing civil remedies for 

misappropriation of a trade secret.” 12 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat § 5308. A claim is not 

pre-empted if it falls under one of the three following exceptions: “(1) contractual 

remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; (2) other civil 

remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal 

remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.” 12 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. § 5308(a)–(b). Because American Institute’s unfair competition claim rests on the 

allegation that Posner was “[d]ownloading, exporting, copying and/or removing highly 

confidential trade secret and other proprietary information”—i.e., misappropriation of a 

trade secret—their claim is barred. App. 1923; see REVZIP, LLC v. McDonnell, No. 

3:19-CV-191, 2023 WL 3260662, at *26 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 2023). 

11 American Institute did not object to the adverse inference instructions either 

before or after the District Court delivered them, and therefore we review the instructions 

for plain error, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d), and “will reverse only where the error is 

fundamental and highly prejudicial, such that the instructions failed to provide the jury 

with adequate guidance and our refusal to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage 

of justice,” Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 

2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that plain error analysis applies for 

forfeited arguments about jury instructions).

12 Contrary to American Institute’s claim that this issue could be resolved under 

state law, federal law governs. Most significantly, American Institute relied on Federal 

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8 

improperly focused its jury charge on spoliation of devices and equipment, rather than 

information.13 

Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for its request for relief. The advisory committee’s note to the 

2015 amendment provides that Rule 37 gives courts authority to address a party’s failure 

to preserve evidence, “foreclos[ing] reliance on inherent authority or state law to 

determine when certain measures should be used.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory 

committee’s note to 2015 amendment. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 

(1965) (“When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] . . . 

the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule.”); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding “federal law of spoliation applie[d]” in a 

diversity case). 

13 American Institute specifically objects to the Court’s modification of Proposed 

Jury Instructions 5 and 6. Its Proposed Instruction No. 5 read: 

You have heard that Defendant Posner deleted the browser history on her 

Dell laptop before returning the laptop to [American Institute], deleted her 

sydneyposner1@gmail.com account, did not produce her Lenovo laptop for 

an inspection, and did not produce the iPad she used to access her Gmail 

account on the morning of September 23, 2019. If you find that this evidence 

was in Posner’s control, the evidence would be relevant and helpful to 

Posner, and Posner does not satisfactorily explain why it was not produced 

during trial, you may find that the evidence would have been unfavorable to 

Posner. 

App. 5925. The District Court agreed to charge the jury with this instruction, but 

changed it slightly to: 

[American Institute] presented testimony or evidence that Ms. Posner deleted 

the browser history of her dell laptop before returning the laptop to the 

Institutes; deleted her sydneyposner1@gmail.com account; did not produce 

her Lenova [sic] laptop for inspection; and did not produce the iPad that she 

used to access her Gmail accounts . . . . 

If you find that this evidence was within Ms. Posner’s control, the evidence 

would be—and the elements would be relevant and helpful to Ms. Posner, 

and Ms. Posner did not satisfactorily explain why these devices were not 

produced during trial, . . . you may find that the evidence would have been 

unfavorable to Ms. Posner. 

App. 8989. 

 American Institute’s Proposed Instruction No. 6 read: “If a party intentionally 

destroys a relevant document and does not satisfactorily explain why they destroyed the 

document, you may find that this document would have been unfavorable to the party 

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Because the instructions, taken as a whole, must inform the jury of the correct 

legal standard, see Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2011), 

we consider all the relevant instructions to determine whether there was an instruction 

error. A review of the District Court’s complete set of instructions regarding spoliation 

shows there was no error. The instructions permitted the jury to draw an adverse 

inference with respect to both Posner’s alleged spoliation involving devices and her 

failure to produce information after being ordered to do so. See, e.g., App. 8989-90 (jury 

instruction explaining that if the jury agreed that Posner “altered or destroyed” “her 

browser history, her sydneyposner1 Gmail account, the laptop and the iPad,” it was 

“permitted but [] not required to infer[] that the altered or destroyed evidence would have 

been unfavorable to her and favorable to [American Institute]”). Furthermore, American 

Institute’s complaints about the instructions are not well-taken as the instructions 

who destroyed it.” App. 5926. The District Court slightly modified this instruction, 

ultimately charging: 

If the party intentionally destroys a relevant document or object and does not 

satisfactorily explain why they are destroyed, you may find that the 

document and/or object would have been unfavorable to the party who 

destroyed it. You must decide if any of the equipment Ms. Posner was to 

return to [American Institute] was destroyed or not, and if the explanation 

provided Ms. Posner was credible. 

App. 8990. 

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delivered were nearly identical to those it proposed.14 Accordingly, the adverse inference 

instructions were not erroneous.15 

C 

 We next evaluate American Institute’s four arguments seeking to overturn the 

judgment awarding Posner damages on her unpaid commissions claim. 

 First, we review American Institute’s challenge to the District Court’s 

interpretation of the commission structure16 and the jury verdict based on this 

interpretation. “When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its meaning 

must be determined from the four corners of the contract.” In re Diet Drugs 

(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., 706 F.3d 217, 223 (3d 

Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If a contract term is ambiguous, a 

court may examine extrinsic evidence, such as the parties’ course of conduct, to 

determine its meaning. Id. 

Posner’s initial employment contract provided: 

14 Compare App. 5925-27, with App. 8989-91 (District Court making immaterial 

adjustments to American Institute’s proposed jury instructions, such as changing “[i]f a 

party intentionally destroys a relevant document” to “[i]f the party intentionally destroys 

a relevant document or object.”).

15 In its reply brief, American Institute argues that it seeks appellate review not 

only of the jury instructions delivered, but of the District Court’s failure to “impose a 

proper sanction” to remedy Posner’s alleged spoliation. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 13. 

However, because the only sanction it sought from the District Court was a mandatory or 

permissive adverse inference jury instruction, we review only the jury instructions that 

the Court delivered. 

16 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s summary judgment ruling, 

which established as a matter of law the meaning of the contract governing Posner’s 

counterclaim for unpaid commissions. See Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. F & M Equip., Ltd., 

804 F.3d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 2015). 

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You will earn 8% commission on all sales. Commissions will be paid out 

three times per year, after the following periods or events: commissions 

earned from sales during the period of January through June, commissions 

earned from sales during the period of July through December, and 

commissions earned from sales for the CLM Annual Conference. You must 

be an active employee . . . on the date of the commission payout to receive 

the commission pay. 

App. 9132. The language shows that Posner was entitled to a commission once the 

“sale” took place, provided that Posner was an American Institute employee on the next 

commission payout date. A “sale” is defined as “[t]he agreement by which” something is 

transferred in exchange for a price. Sale, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).17 The 

District Court correctly concluded that, with the exception of sales related to the CLM 

Annual Conference, the event need not have occurred before Posner received a 

commission. Put differently, the only condition precedent to earning a commission is the 

occurrence of a “sale,” except for sales for the CLM Annual Conference. Because the 

District Court’s interpretation of the agreement was correct, American Institute’s 

challenge to the jury verdict based on a different interpretation of the commission 

structure fails.18

17 “When interpreting contracts under Pennsylvania law, courts ‘may look to 

dictionary definitions to’ determine the plain meaning of a contract.” Darrington v. 

Milton Hershey Sch., 958 F.3d 188, 195 n.8 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth ex 

rel. Shapiro v. UPMC, 208 A.3d 898, 906 (Pa. 2019)). 

18 American Institute also argues that Posner’s counterclaim should never have 

gone to the jury because there is “no evidence to support [Posner’s] argument that any of 

the commissions she claimed were unpaid.” Appellants’ Br. at 52. Posner, however, 

testified that she was not paid the commissions she claimed at trial, and it was up to the 

jury to determine whether to credit this testimony. See Rodriquez v. Se. Pa. Transp. 

Auth., 119 F.4th 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2024) (“[We] may not . . .determine the credibility of 

witnesses . . . but rather may grant a Rule 50 motion only if upon review of the record, it 

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12 

 Second, we address American Institute’s claim that Posner violated her discovery 

obligations by untimely disclosing documents and damages calculations concerning 

unpaid commissions.19 Because the documents and calculations were based on a 

spreadsheet American Institute itself produced in discovery, the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion by allowing Posner to offer damages testimony based on that 

spreadsheet. 

Third, American Institute argues that it was error to allow Posner to request 

specific damages amount in her closing argument.20 American Institute, however, did not 

contemporaneously object when Posner’s counsel stated the damages figure she sought, 

and so it forfeited any argument that such statement was improper. Murray v. Fairbanks 

Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Counsel’s failure to object precludes him from 

seeking a new trial on the grounds of the impropriety of opposing counsel’s closing 

remarks.”). 

Fourth, American Institute claims that Posner suggested to the jury that the 

District Court “blessed” the damages amount she sought. Appellants’ Br. at 53. 

American Institute timely objected to Posner’s suggestion that the Court approved the 

calculation of her damages figure. The Court sustained the objection and instructed the 

can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient 

evidence.” (quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original)). 

19 We review the District Court’s decisions on whether and how to sanction 

discovery violations for abuse of discretion. See Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., 

Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 134 (3d Cir. 2009).

20 We review a district court’s treatment of an allegedly improper attorney 

statement during closing argument for abuse of discretion. See Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 

424 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). 

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13 

jury that it did not want the jury “to get the impression that [the Court] agreed to that 

number.” App. 8887. Because we presume juries follow their instructions, any prejudice 

from the comment was thus cured. See Robinson, 920 F.3d at 191. 

Accordingly, American Institute’s challenges to the judgment fail. 

D21

 Finally, we address whether the District Court properly denied American 

Institute’s request for a permanent injunction. The purpose of an injunction is to prevent 

future harm. See, e.g., SEC v. Gentile, 939 F.3d 549, 556 (3d Cir. 2019). A court may 

impose a permanent injunction where the movant shows that: “(1) it will suffer 

irreparable injury [absent the injunction], (2) no remedy available at law could adequately 

remedy that injury, (3) the balance of hardships tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction 

would not disserve the public interest.” TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 278 (3d 

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “[T]he availability of adequate monetary damages belies a 

claim of irreparable injury.” Id. at 282 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying American 

Institute’s motion. The record does not show that Posner has used or intends to use 

confidential information belonging to American Institute and thus there is not ongoing or 

future harm that an injunction would prevent.22 See Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B & B 

21 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a permanent injunction for 

abuse of discretion. NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475-76

(3d Cir. 2011). 

22 Moreover, the jury’s $48,830.45 award, which it curiously labelled “nominal 

damages,” App. 16601, shows that monetary relief is available and therefore undermines 

the need for injunctive relief. See TD Bank N.A., 928 F.3d at 282. 

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14 

Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). Accordingly, American Institute’s request for a 

permanent injunction fails. 

III 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 

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