Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01612/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01612-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. K. Scribner
Respondent
Roderick Washington
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODERICK WASHINGTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

A. K. SCRIBNER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

)

)

___________________________________ )

1:05-cv-01612-LJO WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER RE MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 15] 

ORDER DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 18, 2004, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

United States District Court, Central District of California. In addition to other claims,

Petitioner challenges the December 18, 2002, and December 30, 2002, disciplinary reports

that he claims resulted in a thirty day and ninety day credit loss, respectively. After further

briefing, Petitioner filed an amended petition on February 22, 2005. The district court then

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transferred this matter to the Eastern District.

In his amended petition, Petitioner makes the following claims: 1) Respondent placed

false information in his central file; 2) he was retaliated against for complaining about mail

serves; 3) he was improperly transferred from North Kern State Prison; 4) he was improperly

assessed at a higher custody level; 5) he was improperly housed in a security housing unit; 6)

he was denied the right to appeal the disciplinary reports that caused an alleged credit loss;

and 7) Respondent violated his due process rights when finding him guilty and subsequently

assessing credit losses for the two disciplinary reports issued in December 2002.

In addition to filing an amended petition, Petitioner also filed a declaration stating that

on December 30, 2003, he began the state court review process to exhaust his federal claims

by simultaneously filing petitions in the California Supreme Court, the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, and the Kern County Superior Court. In his declaration,

Petitioner also refers to letters referencing five California Supreme Court cases as further

evidence that he has exhausted his state court remedies.

In the first letter from the California Supreme Court, dated May 15, 2003, the clerk

informed Petitioner that he currently had three petitions pending before the court. In the

second letter, dated December 15, 2003, the clerk informed Petitioner that he is returning

copies of the two petitions that are pending before the court. The clerk also notes that

Petitioner had sent exhibits to the court without a petition. In the third letter, dated December

29, 2003, the clerk informed Petitioner that the exhibits she received would be considered

with his two pending habeas actions. In the last letter, dated February 27, 2004, the clerk

informed Petitioner that his unsigned petition would be returned unfiled.

On March 2, 2004, the Kern County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s petition,

which he signed on December 30, 2003, for procedural reasons. The court found that

Petitioner had failed to attach available documentary evidence to support his claims, that he

failed to allege sufficient facts to support any claims, and that those facts he did allege did not

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support his request for relief.

On March 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court, also

challenging the allegedly improper December 18, 2002, and December 30, 2002 disciplinary

reports. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition with a citation to In re

Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993), and In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949). 

On February 7, 2007, this court entered an order requiring Respondent to file a

response to the petition. On April 9, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner

did not file an opposition to the motion. On November 7, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of

appeal, although no decision had yet been rendered on the motion to dismiss. On January 14,

2008, the appeal was processed to the Ninth Circuit. On February 19, 2008, the Court of

Appeal entered an order, stating in part that “because the appeals are so insubstantial as to not

warrant further review, they shall not be permitted to proceed.”

LEGAL STANDARDS

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams

v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of

his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction

challenged arises out of California State Prison - Corcoran, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has

jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) th

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(quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, th

117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is governed by its

provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply

with respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court.

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for

habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173

(2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143

(9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court th

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

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criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the

state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must

accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that Petitioner failed to

exhaust all of his federal claims in state court. He also moves to dismiss the petition on the

ground that the claims are untimely. Finally, Respondent moves to dismiss several of

Petitioner’s claims on the ground that they are outside the scope of federal habeas corpus

relief. Petitioner has not opposed or otherwise responded to the motion to dismiss. 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

Petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that

the Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee

Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust

state remedies may be raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal

answer as to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss as a request for the court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254

Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d

599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. th

1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the court will review

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

EXHAUSTION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that Petitioner failed to

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exhaust his claims in state court. A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to

collaterally challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state

judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the

state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged

constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546,

2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v.

Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state

court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given th

a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court

with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887,

888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992)

(factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he

was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888;

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). th

Here, Respondent correctly states that Petitioner’s petition in the California Supreme

Court was denied on March 15, 2005, with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993) and

In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949). Respondent argues that the exhaustion requirement

is not satisfied by a petition that is denied because it is procedurally defective, such as is the

case with a denial pursuant to Swain. 

 In re Swain is cited by the Supreme Court of California to indicate that claims were

not alleged with sufficient particularity. That deficiency, when it exists, can be cured in a

renewed state petition and state judicial remedies therefore are not considered exhausted. See,

Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9 Cir.1986); see also McQuown v. McCartney, th

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795 F.2d 807, 808 n 1, 809 (9 Cir1986); Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9 th th

Cir.1974). The court must therefore agree with Respondent that Petitioner’s claims regarding

his 2002 disciplinary reports are unexhausted. 

Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by respondent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(C). 

The court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an absence of available State corrective

process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect the rights

of the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, Respondent has not waived

exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for Petitioner to pursue state claims. 

For example, these claims may be presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Cal.

Penal Code §§ 1473 - 14758. 

Finally, there are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the court to ignore the

United States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and find that

California’s corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. 

Accordingly, the court finds that this petition must be dismissed for failure to exhaust

state judicial remedies.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Respondent also moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is untimely and

barred by the statute of limitations.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

Section 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all 1

have original habeas corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner

may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies

relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for

review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations

is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme

Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1

1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d th

557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10 Cir. 1999). The Court th

reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his

petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state

courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the

limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at

1005. 

In this case, Respondent argues that Petitioner claims that his due process rights were

violated on December 18, 2002, and December 30, 2002, but Petitioner did not begin the

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state court review process until December 30, 2003. Respondent argues that a delay of 365 

days before filing his state court petitions was unreasonable. He further argues that Petitioner

is therefore not entitled to AEDPA statutory gap tolling for the seventy nine days from when

he began the state court review process and when he filed his first federal petition

In so arguing, Respondent confuses the application of gap tolling and the related

reasonableness analysis. “Gap tolling” refers to the tolling of the statute of limitations

between the resolution of a state court petition and the filing of the petition in a higher state

courts. See Nino v. Galaza. This concept does not apply to the time period between a state

court petition and a federal court petition, and most particularly does not apply to the time

period between the filing of a state court petition and the filing of a subsequent federal

petition. The court notes that in making this argument, Respondent does not address the

relevant time period between the resolution of Petitioner’s state court proceedings and the

filing of his federal petition.

Accordingly, this court finds this contention lacks merit and provides no basis for the

dismissal of this petition.

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Respondent moves to dismiss Petitioner’s retaliation, improper transfer, improper

classification, housing and improper denial of inmate appeals services claims as outside the

scope of federal habeas corpus relief. 

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A

habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge “the very fact or

duration of his confinement,” and where “the relief he seeks is a determination that he is

entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment.” Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that confinement. 

In the claims at issue here, Petitioner is not challenging his conviction, but rather is

challenging civil rights prison conditions. Accordingly, the proper vehicle for Petitioner to

pursue these claims is through a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore,

the court will also grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss as to these claims on the ground that

they cannot be addressed on federal habeas corpus.

Petitioner may seek to appeal from the judgment of the court in this case. Petitioner

cannot proceed on such an appeal absent a certificate of appealability. The controlling

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district

judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for

the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a

person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity

of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal

may not be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained

of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant

has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific

issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

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In the present case, the court finds no denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a 

certificate of appealability will be denied.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED;

3) This petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED for failure to exhaust state

judicial remedies and for failure to state a claim for federal habeas corpus relief as to

specific claims set forth above; and

4) The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment for

Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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