Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07087/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Howard University Hospital
Appellee
Vijayakumar Moses
Appellant
Janet M. Nesse
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 7, 2010 Decided June 1, 2010

No. 08-7087

VIJAYAKUMAR MOSES AND JANET M. NESSE,

APPELLANTS

v.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:01-cv-02528-PLF)

James C. Strouse argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellants. Janet M. Nesse entered an appearance.

Stephen E. Baskin argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: SENTELLE,Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 2001, Vijayakumar

Moses (“Moses”) filed suit against Howard University Hospital

(“Howard”) claiming retaliation in violation of Title VII of the

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Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., and the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977

(“DCHRA”), D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 et seq. After filing this

lawsuit, Moses twice filed for bankruptcy in the District of

Maryland. However, in his bankruptcy filings, Moses failed to

disclose the existence of this lawsuit as required by 11 U.S.C.

§ 541. Upon discovering these failures to disclose, Howard filed

a renewed motion for summary judgment on the ground that

Moses’s claims should be barred by judicial estoppel. The

District Court granted Howard’s motion, and Moses now

appeals. On appeal, Howard raises two additional grounds to

support the dismissal of this suit. First, Howard argues that

Moses lacks standing to maintain this appeal. Second, Howard

contends that Moses’s notice of appeal was untimely under

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).

We hold that Moses has standing to appeal. In June 2009,

Janet M. Nesse (“Nesse”), the trustee appointed to oversee

Moses’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, abandoned the estate’s

claims in this case. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). “[W]hen property

of the bankrupt is abandoned, the title ‘reverts to the bankrupt,

nunc pro tunc, so that he is treated as having owned it

continuously.’” Morlan v. Univ. Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 298

F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallace v. Lawrence

Warehouse Co., 338 F.2d 392, 394 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964))

(emphasis added). Once the trustee abandoned the estate’s

claims, Moses was free to seek redress as if no bankruptcy

petition had been filed. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

¶ 554.02[3], p. 554-5 (15th ed. rev. 2008). 

We also hold that Moses’s notice of appeal was timely filed.

On July 1, 2008, the District Court entered judgment for Howard

against Moses. On July 9, 2008, Nesse, acting as trustee, filed

a motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) to amend the District

Court’s opinion and judgment to clarify that judicial estoppel

applied only if Moses elected to pursue his retaliation claims in

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his own right. Nesse’s Rule 59(e) motion tolled the 30-day

notice of appeal requirement of Rule 4(a). See FED. R. APP. P.

4(a)(4)(A)(iv). On August 25, 2008, while the time for appeal

was still tolled, Moses filed a notice of appeal in his own right.

The retroactive effect of the trustee’s abandonment ensured that

Moses had standing to file a notice of appeal on August 25,

2008. On February 19, 2009, the District Court resolved

Nesse’s Rule 59(e) motion and Moses’s previously filed notice

of appeal took effect. 

Finally, we uphold the District Court’s application of

judicial estoppel and affirm the summary judgment granted in

favor of Howard. “Courts may invoke judicial estoppel ‘[w]here

a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, . . .

succeeds in maintaining that position, . . . [and then,] simply

because his interests have changed, assume[s] a contrary

position.’” Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir.

2010) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749

(2001)). Even after he had filed for bankruptcy, Moses

continued to hold himself out before the District Court as a valid

plaintiff, a position which was “clearly inconsistent” with his

pursuit of relief in bankruptcy. See Maine, 532 U.S. at 750

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udicial acceptance of an

inconsistent position in a later proceeding . . . create[s] the

perception that either the first or the second court was misled,”

thus posing a threat to judicial integrity. See id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Moses “derive[d] an unfair

advantage” in maintaining and controlling this lawsuit by falsely

holding himself out as a proper party. Id. at 751. Therefore, the

District Court did not err in applying judicial estoppel against

Moses. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 22, 1999, appellant Moses filed the first of two

lawsuits against Howard, his then-employer, alleging race

discrimination, national origin discrimination, and retaliation in

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violation of Title VII; race discrimination and retaliation in

violation of the DCHRA; and age discrimination in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29

U.S.C. § 621 et seq. On January 30, 2001, the District Court

entered summary judgment for Howard on all counts except

those related to Moses’s ADEA claim. See Moses v. Howard

Univ. Hosp., Civ. Action No. 99-0410 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2001)

(“Moses I”). The parties subsequently settled the ADEA claim,

and the case was dismissed with prejudice. See Moses v.

Howard Univ. Hosp., Civ. Action No. 01-2528, slip op. at 2

(D.D.C. July 1, 2008) (“Moses III”) (describing the proceedings

in the initial lawsuit).

 In October 2000, Moses was terminated by Howard.

Moses then filed complaints with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the District of

Columbia Office of Human Rights, contending that he was

dismissed in retaliation for filing the 1999 lawsuit against

Howard. On September 14, 2001, Moses received a “right to

sue” letter from the EEOC. He then filed the instant lawsuit

with the District Court. In his complaint, Moses alleged that

Howard had retaliated against him in violation of Title VII and

the DCHRA. Howard denied the charges and moved for

summary judgment. 

While this lawsuit was pending in District Court, Moses

initiated two separate bankruptcy proceedings. On September

20, 2003, Moses filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. This action was

brought in the District of Maryland, with Nesse assigned to

serve as trustee of Moses’s bankruptcy estate. A Chapter 7

proceeding “authorizes a discharge of prepetition debts

following the liquidation of the debtor’s assets by a bankruptcy

trustee, who then distributes the proceeds to creditors. . . .

Under Chapter 7 the debtor’s nonexempt assets are controlled by

the bankruptcy trustee.” Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.,

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549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). On January 5, 2004, Moses secured

a discharge of approximately $20,000 in debt pursuant to his

Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 

In early 2007, Moses again filed for bankruptcy in the

District of Maryland, this time under Chapter 13 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. “Chapter 13

authorizes an individual with regular income to obtain a

discharge after the successful completion of a payment plan

approved by the bankruptcy court. . . . [U]nder Chapter 13 the

debtor retains possession of his property” during the course of

the bankruptcy proceeding. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. The

bankruptcy court rejected Moses’s proposed payment plan and

his Chapter 13 proceeding was closed on June 25, 2007.

In each of his bankruptcy proceedings, Moses was required

to execute, under penalty of perjury, a “Statement of Financial

Affairs” setting forth “all suits and administrative proceedings

to which the debtor is or was a party within one year

immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case.”

Moses III, slip op. at 5 (citing Defendant’s Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgement (“Def.’s Undisputed Facts”) ¶¶ 13-14,

reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 3). A debtor is required to

disclose all potential claims in a bankruptcy petition. See 11

U.S.C. §§ 521(1), 541(a)(1). This means that a debtor is under

a duty both to disclose the existence of pending lawsuits when

he files a petition in bankruptcy and to amend his petition if

circumstances change during the course of the bankruptcy. See

Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir.

2005); In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 207-08 (5th Cir.

1999). And when an estate is in bankruptcy under Chapter 7,

the trustee is the representative of the estate and retains the sole

authority to sue and be sued on its behalf. See Parker v.

Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004).

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Nesse retained this authority as trustee in the Chapter 7

bankruptcy proceeding. 

Despite these disclosure requirements, Moses failed to

reveal the existence of this lawsuit in either his Chapter 7 or

Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. He did, however, disclose

his involvement in separate civil actions involving the

garnishment of his wages. See Moses III, slip op. at 5 n.3 (citing

Def.’s Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 13, 19, J.A. 3, 4).

Moses’s action in this case remained live in the District

Court during the course of both bankruptcy proceedings. On

February 12, 2007, the District Court “conclude[d] that genuine

issues of material fact remain[ed] with respect to Mr. Moses’s

termination claim[, and thus ruled that Howard was] not entitled

to summary judgment on this claim.” Moses v. Howard Univ.

Hosp., 474 F. Supp. 2d 117, 127 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2007)

(“Moses II”). The court also ruled that, “[w]ith respect to all

other adverse employment actions that Mr. Moses allege[d]

were taken in retaliation for his filing a discrimination complaint

and lawsuit, [it would] enter judgment for [Howard].” Id. The

District Court subsequently set a trial date for Moses’s claim

that his termination from employment constituted unlawful

retaliation.

While preparing for trial in this case, Howard uncovered

Moses’s Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings.

Howard also determined that Moses had neither disclosed this

action to the bankruptcy courts nor disclosed the bankruptcy

proceedings to the District Court. On December 6, 2007, with

this newly discovered information in hand, Howard renewed its

motion for summary judgment, arguing that judicial estoppel

barred Moses from maintaining this suit. In early 2008, after

Howard had revealed Moses’s failures to disclose, Moses moved

to reopen his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in the District of

Maryland to amend his original “Statement of Financial Affairs”

to reflect the existence of this lawsuit. On January 24, 2008, the

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bankruptcy court granted Moses’s motion and reappointed

Nesse as trustee of the estate. While Howard’s renewed motion

for summary judgment was still pending before the District

Court, Nesse and Howard commenced negotiations over a

possible settlement of the pending retaliation claim. 

On July 1, 2008, the District Court granted Howard’s

renewed motion for summary judgment. See Moses III, slip

op. at 1-13. On July 9, 2008, Nesse filed a Rule 17(a) motion to

substitute herself as plaintiff in this action. See FED. R. CIV. P.

17(a). On the same day, Nesse also filed a Rule 59(e) motion to

amend the opinion and judgment in Moses III, to clarify that

judicial estoppel would apply in this case solely against Moses

in the event that he acted in his own right to pursue the

retaliatory termination claim. See FED.R.CIV. P. 59(e). Moses

filed a notice of appeal on August 25, 2008, contesting the

District Court’s dismissal of his suit. 

On February 19, 2009, the District Court approved Nesse’s

Rule 17(a) and Rule 59(e) motions. See Moses v. Howard Univ.

Hosp., Civ. Action No. 01-2528, slip op. at 1-8 (D.D.C. Feb. 19,

2009) (“Moses IV”). The District Court corrected the case

docket to show Nesse as plaintiff, and amended its July 1, 2008

judgment and opinion to clarify that its judicial estoppel holding

only applied to the extent that the retaliation claim was

“prosecuted by Mr. Moses on his own behalf.” Id. at 6.

Subsequently, when settlement negotiations between Nesse and

Howard failed to yield an agreement, Nesse notified the

bankruptcy court that she sought to abandon Moses’s claim in

this case as property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). The

bankruptcy court approved Nesse’s abandonment on June 26,

2009. See Order Authorizing Abandonment of Property of the

Estate 1-2, reprinted in J.A. 494-95. 

In this appeal, appellant Moses argues that the District

Court erred in granting summary judgment to Howard on

judicial estoppel grounds. Howard counters that judicial

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estoppel applies in this case; Howard further contends that (1)

Moses lacks standing to pursue this appeal and (2) this court

lacks jurisdiction to hear the case because Moses failed to timely

file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment below.

See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standing

“The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or

otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party,

even though the court’s judgment may benefit others

collaterally. A federal court’s jurisdiction therefore can be

invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered some

threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal

action. . . . [E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury

sufficient to meet the ‘case or controversy’ requirement, [the

Supreme] Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert

his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to

relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v.

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

In the context of bankruptcy proceedings, it is well

understood that “a trustee, as the representative of the

bankruptcy estate, is the real party in interest, and is the only

party with standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to

the estate once the bankruptcy petition has been filed.” Kane v.

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008)

(per curiam). The commencement of Chapter 7 bankruptcy

extinguishes a debtor’s legal rights and interests in any pending

litigation, and transfers those rights to the trustee, acting on

behalf of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)

(indicating that a bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or

equitable interests of the debtor in property”); id. § 323

(establishing the bankruptcy trustee as the “representative” of

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the estate with the “capacity to sue and be sued” on its behalf).

Thus, “[g]enerally speaking, a pre-petition cause of action is the

property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee

in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it.” Parker, 365 F.3d at

1272; accord Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th

Cir. 2004); Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 535 (4th

Cir. 1997). 

Howard argues that only Nesse, the trustee of the

bankruptcy estate, and not Moses, had standing to pursue the

claims in this case. That was true until June 2009, when Nesse

abandoned the estate’s claims in this case. An outstanding legal

claim that is abandoned by the trustee reverts back to the

original debtor-plaintiff. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (directing that

“[a]fter notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any

property of the estate that is burdensome . . . or that is of

inconsequential value and benefit to the estate”); id. § 554(c)

(directing that “any property scheduled . . . [but] not otherwise

administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to

the debtor and [considered] administered”). “‘[U]pon

abandonment . . . the trustee is . . . divested of control of the

property because it is no longer part of the estate. . . . Property

abandoned under [§] 554 reverts to the debtor, and the debtor’s

rights to the property are treated as if no bankruptcy petition was

filed.’” Kane, 535 F.3d at 385 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON

BANKRUPTCY ¶ 554.02[3], p. 554-5); see also Parker, 365 F.3d

at 1272. 

Whatever interest passed to the trustee when Moses filed for

Chapter 7 bankruptcy was extinguished when Nesse abandoned

the cause of action in this case. Cf. Brown v. O’Keefe, 300 U.S.

598, 602 (1937). In other words, “when property of the

bankrupt is abandoned, the title reverts to the bankrupt, nunc pro

tunc, so that he is treated as having owned it continuously.”

Morlan, 298 F.3d at 617 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted) (emphasis added). The retroactive effect of the

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trustee’s abandonment ensured that Moses had standing to file

a notice of appeal on August 25, 2008, when he did. And, as

explained below, Moses’s notice of appeal was effective on

February 19, 2009, when the District Court disposed of the

trustee’s Rule 59(e) motion.

B. Timeliness 

A court of appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal

that is filed outside of the time limits prescribed by FED.R. APP.

P. 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). See Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205 (2007). These time limits are “mandatory and

jurisdictional,” and failure to file a timely notice of appeal

defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals. Id. at 210 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Howard contends that

Moses’s appeal should be dismissed, because it was not “filed

with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order

appealed from” was entered. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

We disagree.

The District Court entered its original order granting

Howard’s motion for summary judgment on July 1, 2008. As

noted above, Nesse, acting as trustee, filed a Rule 59(e) motion

on July 9, 2008, seeking to amend the District Court’s judgment.

Rule 4(a) provides that “[i]f a party timely files [a motion to

alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59], the time to file an

appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing

of the last such remaining motion.” Id. at 4(a)(4)(A). In other

words, once Nesse filed her Rule 59(e) motion, this tolled the

time for the filing of an appeal.

Moses filed his notice of appeal on August 25, 2008, during

the time when the Rule 59(e) motion was still pending and the

time for filing an appeal was tolled. His notice of appeal was

thus early, not late. The trustee’s Rule 59(e) motion was not

disposed of until February 19, 2009, the date when the time to

file an appeal commenced to run for all parties. Where, as in

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this case, the notice of appeal was filed before the District Court

resolved the pending Rule 59(e) motion, the notice of appeal

became effective when the order disposing of the 59(e) motion

was entered. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i) (“If a party files

a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment

– but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)

– the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, in

whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such

remaining motion is entered.”). In other words, Moses’s early

notice of appeal was “in effect, suspended until the [59(e)]

motion [was] disposed of, whereupon, the previously filed

notice effectively place[d] jurisdiction in the court of appeals.”

See Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED.R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), 28

U.S.C. App. 

 On the record here, we conclude that Moses’s notice of

appeal was timely. The initial time for an appeal commenced

running on July 1, 2008. The 30-day limit was tolled on July 9,

2008, when Nesse filed her 59(e) motion. Moses’s August 25,

2008 notice of appeal was filed within this tolled period. And

as noted above, the retroactive effect of the trustee’s

abandonment ensured that Moses had standing to file a notice of

appeal on August 25, 2008. The time for an appeal began

running again on February 19, 2009, when the District Court

entered its order disposing of Nesse’s motion. Moses’s notice

of appeal, filed almost seven months earlier, thus became

effective on February 19. 

Howard does not dispute these calculations, but instead

argues that Nesse’s Rule 59(e) motion could not have tolled

Moses’s filing time period, because Nesse was not a “party” to

the lawsuit when she filed her motion. This argument fails. At

the time when the trustee filed her Rule 17(a) and Rule 59(e)

motions, she was the only party who had a right to pursue the

cause of action that had been initiated by Moses. As noted

above, “a pre-petition cause of action is the property of the

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Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy

has standing to pursue it.” Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272. Nesse’s

Rule 17(a) motion was a mere formality to confirm on the

court’s docket papers that the trustee, and not Moses, was the

proper plaintiff in this case. If there was a live case in the

District Court in July 2008 – and there was – the only proper

plaintiff was the trustee, not Moses. And the trustee surely had

the right to file a Rule 59(e) motion, because the District Court’s

decision in Moses III – dismissing the case on grounds of

judicial estoppel – directly affected the trustee’s authority to

pursue the cause of action on behalf of the estate.

It is also quite clear that the trustee cannot in any way be

faulted for her actions. Moses secured a discharge of his debt on

January 5, 2004, pursuant to the judgment entered in his Chapter

7 bankruptcy proceeding. It was not until early 2008, after

Howard had uncovered Moses’s failures to disclose, that Moses

moved to reopen his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in the

District of Maryland to amend his original “Statement of

Financial Affairs” to reflect the existence of this lawsuit. Nesse

became aware of the situation when the bankruptcy court

granted Moses’s motion and reappointed Nesse as trustee of the

estate on January 24, 2008. And after her reappointment, Nesse

commenced negotiations with Howard in an effort to settle this

lawsuit on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. Nesse then filed her

Rule 59(e) motion after settlement talks failed and the District

Court granted summary judgment in favor of Howard on

grounds of judicial estoppel. Nesse’s Rule 59(e) motion plainly

was an action taken by the real plaintiff in the case, for her

motion sought to alter the judgment in Moses III to clarify that

judicial estoppel did not apply to the trustee acting on behalf of

the bankruptcy estate. If Nesse had not secured relief under

Rule 59(e), the trustee would have been bound by the judgment

in Moses III holding that judicial estoppel barred further pursuit

of this case. This would have impaired the trustee’s authority to

pursue this cause of action on behalf of the estate. The trustee’s

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Rule 17(a) and Rule 59(e) motions merely served to confirm,

not initiate, the trustee’s party status. Howard’s suggestion that

Nesse was not a party when she filed her Rule 59(e) motion is

thus without merit. 

C. Judicial Estoppel

1. Standard of Review 

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Howard on the ground that Moses’s claim is barred by judicial

estoppel. This court reviews the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo, see, e.g., Haynes v. Williams, 392

F.3d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and “must view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Breen v. Dep’t

of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The D.C.

Circuit, however, has yet to determine the standard governing

the review of District Court applications of judicial estoppel.

The Supreme Court has indicated that judicial estoppel “‘is an

equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion,’” Maine,

532 U.S. at 750 (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037

(9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)),

and “[a] majority of [the] circuits that have addressed the issue

apply the abuse of discretion standard.” Stallings v. Hussmann

Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Alternative

Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30-31 (1st

Cir. 2004) (citing In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 205;

Talavera v. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 1997);

McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-17 (3d Cir.

1996); Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed.

Cir. 1996); United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir.

1994)). But see Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Group, 385 F.3d 894,

897 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying a de novo standard of review);

accord United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1999).

We need not decide the question in this case. We find that,

whether reviewed de novo or pursuant to an abuse of discretion

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standard, the District Court did not err in granting summary

judgment to Howard on grounds of judicial estoppel. 

Furthermore, because “a federal court’s ability to protect

itself from manipulation should not depend upon the law of the

state under which some or all of the claims arise,” see Eastman

v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007),

Moses’s pendent D.C. law claims, as well as his federal claims,

are subject to federal principles of judicial estoppel. See also

Ogden Martin Sys. v. Whiting Corp., 179 F.3d 523, 527 n.1 (7th

Cir. 1999); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94

F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir. 1996); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins.

Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (6th Cir. 1982); Allen v. Zurich Ins.

Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982).

2. The District Court Did Not Err in Applying Judicial

Estoppel in This Case

Until 2001, with the issuance of the Supreme Court’s

decision in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 742, judicial

estoppel was “disfavored” in the D.C. Circuit. So. Pac.

Transp. Co. v. ICC, 69 F.3d 583, 591 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

However, in Maine, the Court spoke approvingly of judicial

estoppel. The Court noted that judicial estoppel “‘prevents a

party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is

inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous

proceeding,’” Maine, 532 U.S. at 749 (quoting 18 MOORE’S

FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.30 (3d ed. 2000)), and explained that

judicial estoppel is “‘an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at

its discretion,’” Maine, 532 U.S. at 750 (quoting Rolfs, 893 F.2d

at 1037). Since Maine, this court has recognized and applied the

doctrine as instructed by the Supreme Court. See Comcast

Corp., 600 F.3d at 647.

While “‘[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel

may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any

general formulation of principle,’” Maine, 532 U.S. at 750

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(quoting Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166), we have explained

that “[c]ourts may invoke judicial estoppel ‘[w]here a party

assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, . . . succeeds in

maintaining that position, . . . [and then,] simply because his

interests have changed, assume[s] a contrary position.’”

Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 647 (quoting Maine, 532 U.S. at

749). There are at least three questions that a court should

answer in deciding whether to apply judicial estoppel: (1) Is a

party’s later position clearly inconsistent with its earlier

position? (2) Has the party succeeded in persuading a court to

accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of

an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the

perception that either the first or the second court was misled?

(3) Will the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position

derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the

opposing party if not estopped? See Maine, 532 U.S. at 750-51.

It appears that every circuit that has addressed the issue has

found that judicial estoppel is justified to bar a debtor from

pursuing a cause of action in district court where that debtor

deliberately fails to disclose the pending suit in a bankruptcy

case. See Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1157-60; Cannon-Stokes

v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 447-48 (7th Cir. 2006); Jethroe, 412

F.3d at 599-601; Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289,

1293-97 (11th Cir. 2003); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782-85 (9th Cir. 2001); United States ex

rel. Gelbert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 917-19 (8th

Cir. 2001); Payless Wholesale Distribs., Inc. v. Alberto Culver

(P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Eubanks, 385

F.3d at 898-99 (declining to apply judicial estoppel where

failure to disclose the claim to the bankruptcy court appeared

inadvertent).

We think it is clear from the Court’s discussion in Maine,

and at least implicit in the holdings of many of our sister

circuits, that a court may not invoke judicial estoppel against a

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party (1) who has engaged in misconduct in a separate judicial

proceeding, (2) but there is no meaningful connection between

that proceeding and the judicial proceeding in which judicial

estoppel is sought. There must be a discernible connection

between the two proceedings. See, e.g., Cannon-Stokes, 453

F.3d at 447 (noting that the debtor “represented that she had no

[legal] claim[s] [before the bankruptcy court]; . . . [and] that

representation had prevailed; she had obtained a valuable benefit

in the discharge of her debts,” but “[n]ow she wants to assert the

opposite in order to win a second time”); Transp. Admin. Servs.,

260 F.3d at 918 (noting that the debtors “represented to the

bankruptcy court that they did not have any contingent claims”

and that they “stood to benefit from the inconsistent positions

put forward” because the new claim “was not theirs for purposes

of bankruptcy, but it was theirs for the purposes of a later . . .

action”); Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 (noting that the debtor

“failed to list his claims . . . as assets on his bankruptcy

schedules, and then later sued . . . on the same claims”)

(emphasis added); Payless Wholesale Distribs., 989 F.2d at 571

(The debtor, “having obtained judicial relief on the

representation that no claims existed, can not now resurrect them

and obtain relief on the opposite basis.”). In short, a court may

not invoke judicial estoppel against a party who has engaged in

misconduct in a separate proceeding if that proceeding is

unrelated to the current proceeding. 

With this caveat, and taking into account the three

considerations addressed in Maine, we are satisfied that the

District Court did not err in applying judicial estoppel in this

case. First, Moses continued to hold himself out before the

District Court as a proper plaintiff, a position which was clearly

inconsistent with his pursuit of bankruptcy. The inconsistency

did not arise simply as a result of the fact that “neither [Moses]

nor [his] attorney ever listed the discrimination claim as an

asset” in his bankruptcy proceedings. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1295.

Rather, the inconsistency stems from the fact that Moses “had

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already filed and was pursuing [his] employment discrimination

claim at the time [he] filed [his] bankruptcy petition[s].” Id. at

1294-95. He continued to pursue his initial discrimination claim

even though he was no longer a proper plaintiff once he sought

Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Second, the bankruptcy court’s decision to initially

discharge Moses from Chapter 7, and the District Court’s

decision to allow this case to continue even during the pendency

of Moses’s bankruptcy proceedings, leaves little doubt that

Moses succeeded in hiding the inconsistency from the courts

and “creat[ing] the perception that either the first or the second

court was misled.” Maine, 532 U.S. at 750. 

Third, Moses’s assertion that he did not derive any unfair

advantage because Howard “was not a creditor nor had any

interest in . . . [his] bankruptcies,” Appellant Br. at 19, is

misguided. In maintaining this suit without disclosing it in his

bankruptcy proceedings, Moses set up a situation in which he

could gain an advantage over his creditors. In other words, had

he prevailed in his lawsuit against Howard, he would have kept

any damages for solely himself, to the detriment of his creditors.

Moses’s inconsistent positions also adversely affected Howard.

Had the trustee known of this lawsuit during the Chapter 7

bankruptcy proceedings, she might have settled this case early

or decided not to pursue it, actions that might have benefitted

Howard. 

Finally, it is clear here that Moses’s actions in the

bankruptcy proceedings and before the District Court were

related. Moses “represented that [he] had no [legal] claim[s]

[before the bankruptcy court] . . . [and] that representation had

prevailed; [he] had obtained a valuable benefit in the discharge

of [his] debts,” but “[n]ow [he] wants to assert the opposite in

order to win a second time.” Cannon-Stokes, 453 F.3d at 447.

Moses offended the integrity of the District Court by presenting

himself as a proper party in that court on the basis of a position

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that was flatly inconsistent with the position taken in the

bankruptcy proceedings. Payless Wholesale Distribs., 989 F.2d

at 571.

Moses cannot avoid judicial estoppel by claiming that his

failure to disclose this lawsuit in the bankruptcy court or his

maintenance of the suit in District Court were the result of

“‘inadvertence or mistake.’” See Maine, 532 U.S. at 753

(quoting John S. Clark Co. v. Faggert & Frieden, P.C., 65 F.3d

26, 29 (4th Cir. 1995)). Moses failed to disclose the existence

of this case in two separate bankruptcy proceedings, yet in both

of those proceedings he listed pending lawsuits that, unlike the

instant case, reduced the overall value of his assets through

wage garnishment. See Moses III, slip. op. at 5 n.3 (citing Def.’s

Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 13, 19, J.A. 3, 4). 

And Moses’s argument that he cured his failure to disclose

by reopening his Chapter 7 case, amending his “Statement of

Financial Affairs,” and inviting Nesse to intervene in the suit, is

wholly unpersuasive. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, allowing

such a debtor to “back-up, re-open the bankruptcy case, and

amend his bankruptcy filings, only after his omission has been

challenged by an adversary, suggests that a debtor should

consider disclosing potential assets only if he is caught

concealing them. This so-called remedy would only diminish

the necessary incentive” for the debtor “to provide the

bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of [his] assets,”

Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir.

2002), and would similarly diminish the doctrine’s ability to

deter the debtor from pursuing claims in the District Court to

which he is not entitled. See also Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1160;

Barger, 348 F.3d at 1297; Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC

Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir.

2003).

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed. 

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