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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Alvin Webb
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 1997 Decided February 3, 1998 

No. 97-3059

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

ALVIN WEBB,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cr00245-01)

Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellant, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. 

Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were 

on the briefs.

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellee, with whom A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs. William G. 

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Spencer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Defendant Alvin Webb pleaded 

guilty to distribution of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. 

When sentencing Webb, the district court departed downward from the sentencing range specified in the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines chiefly due to Webb's addiction 

to drugs but also due in part to the Government's decision not 

to arrest Webb earlier, when he had made small sales to an 

undercover officer and would have received a lesser sentence 

under the Guidelines. Because the district court relied upon 

impermissible factors in reaching its decision to depart from 

the Guidelines, we remand the case for resentencing within 

the proper range.

I. BACKGROUND

By his own admission Alvin Webb sold cocaine base in the 

500 block of Florida Ave., N.W., in Washington, D.C. for 

"about three years" before finally being arrested in March 

1994. An addict himself, he said "the suppliers would just 

give me the stuff to give to the people.... I never received 

any money. All I received was just drugs for that."

Acting upon information from a confidential informant, an 

undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration 

located Webb and bought crack cocaine from him three times 

in February 1994, in quantities of 5.3 grams, 6.3 grams, and 

55.8 grams. Focusing upon the third sale, the Government 

charged Webb with one count of distributing 50 grams or 

more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 

(b)(1)(A)(iii). Webb entered a plea of guilty and agreed that 

he should be held accountable under the "relevant conduct" 

provision of the Sentencing Guidelines for the first and 

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second sales as well. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The additional 

11.3 grams did not affect Webb's sentencing range, however. 

See id. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (table setting base offense level at 32 for 

distribution of 50 to 150 grams of cocaine base).

At Webb's initial sentencing hearing defense counsel suggested "delaying the sentencing to see if Mr. Webb can 

benefit from inpatient drug treatment with the Veterans 

Administration for some period of time and ... maintain 

some type of employment." The court agreed to grant Webb 

a continuance in order "to allow him to take certain steps so 

he can meet the downward departure grounds set forth in 

United States v. Harrington, 808 F. Supp. 883 (D.D.C. 1992) 

based on his drug rehabilitation efforts." The court released 

Webb into the custody of his brother, an investigator with the 

D.C. Department of Corrections, on the condition that Webb 

enroll immediately in the VA drug rehabilitation program, 

which takes four to six months to complete.

After one month, Webb dropped out of the program and 

out of sight. He resumed using drugs and remained a 

fugitive from justice for 18 months.

Although the offense to which Webb pleaded guilty carries 

a statutory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment, 

the Congress has recently provided a "safety valve" that 

enables a district court to impose a sentence in accordance 

with the applicable Guidelines and without regard to the 

statutory minimum sentence when certain conditions obtain.*

__________

* The conditions are that:

(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history 

point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of 

violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or 

induce another participant to do so) in connection with the 

offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury 

to any person;

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or 

supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the 

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The district court determinedand the Government does not 

disputethat Webb may be sentenced without regard to the 

statutory minimum.

The base offense level for the distribution of 50 to 150 

grams of crack cocaine is 32. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3); id.

§ 2D1.1(c)(4) (table). Webb qualifies for an automatic twopoint reduction under the heading of Specific Offense Characteristics, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6), because he meets the 

"safety valve" criteria noted above and his base offense level 

was greater than 25. Webb's probation officer recommended 

a two-point increase for Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, because Webb had 

"absconded from inpatient drug treatment, resumed drug use 

and failed to return to Court for sentencing." In view of 

Webb's obstruction of justice, the probation officer also suggested that Webb was not entitled to any reduction for 

Acceptance of Responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. See id. Application Note 4 ("Conduct resulting in an enhancement under 

§ 3C1.1 ... ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not 

accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct"). With an 

offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, the 

probation officer calculated that Webb should be sentenced in 

the range from 121 to 151 months.

At Webb's final sentencing hearing the prosecutor asked 

for a sentence in the indicated range. Defense counsel 

requested a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsi-

__________

sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing 

criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 

defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense 

or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a 

common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no 

relevant or useful information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a 

determination by the court that the defendant has complied 

with this requirement.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.

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bility (notwithstanding the enhancement for obstruction of 

justice), which would have yielded an offense level of 29 and a 

sentencing range of 87-108 months. The court not only 

granted the requested three-point reduction but also declined 

to give the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice, 

apparently because the court did not regard Webb's 18-

month absence as willful. The court explained:

It's because he doesn't control his own body. That's the 

problem. He doesn't control himself. He's out of control. He didn't do it to defy anybody. He hasn't done it 

in a defiant act. He did it because it's impossible for 

him.

The court thus gave an overall reduction of five pointstwo 

for meeting the "safety valve" criteria and three for acceptance of responsibility, with no enhancement for obstruction 

of justiceyielding an offense level of 27 and a sentencing 

range of 70-87 months.

Although defense counsel had neither asked for a departure from the Guidelines nor proffered any ground for departure, and although the presentence report had identified "no 

known factors that would warrant a departure in this case," 

the district court told Webb that even after reducing his 

offense level to 27 it still had a problem with sentencing him:

Now here is my problem. My problem is that your 

offense level, that these Guidelines grossly overstate the 

offense level here. It's grossly disproportional to the 

crime. And the crime here is addiction. As I said 

before, if you were in a different economic bracket in this 

country, you'd probably be out at the Betty Ford Clinic.... So I've got to reduce it down because of its 

disproportionality.

Thus the district court departed downward sua sponte from 

the Guidelines range by some 30 months: "I'm going to 

reduce it down to an offense level 22, and I'm going to 

sentence you to 41 months in prison. I think 41 months is 

even much too long for you."

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Anticipating that it would do something like this, the court 

had indicated earlier in the hearing that it expected to be 

reversed. Addressing itself to the Government, the court 

said: "I realize that you people hold all the weapons in this 

war on drugs, and I'll give you an easy one to get me 

reversed on.... I'll give you an easy one."

Two months after sentencing Webb the district court issued an opinion defending its sentence upon three grounds. 

First, the court explained, "The principal mitigating circumstance here is Defendant Webb's addiction to drugs, specifically crack cocaine." United States v. Webb, 966 F. Supp. 16, 

17 (D.D.C. 1997). Second, the court stated its belief that "the 

Guidelines range is disproportionate and unduly harsh in this 

case, and would subject Defendant Webb to constitutional and 

legal deprivations." Id. Finally, the court observed that

the government played a key role in the determination of 

Defendant Webb's ultimate sentence.... If the undercover officer had arrested Defendant Webb after making 

lesser purchases from him ... then Defendant Webb 

would be facing a sentence of less severity

and opined that "[t]he sentencing court should have the right 

to take this fact into account." Id.

Not surprisingly, the United States appealed the sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

The Government has expressly declined to challenge the 

district court's calculation of Webb's offense level (27) and 

criminal history (category I). The only issue it raises upon 

appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by 

departing downward from the Guidelines sentencing range of 

70-87 months for the reasons it gave. We conclude that none 

of those reasons justifies a departure and that, therefore, the 

district court abused its discretion.

A. Addiction to Drugs

The Supreme Court has instructed a court considering a 

departure from the Sentencing Guidelines first to ask itself:

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1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside 

the Guidelines' 'heartland' and make it a special, or 

unusual, case?

2) Has the Commission forbidden departures based on 

those features?

3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures 

based on those features?

4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures 

based on those features?

Koon v. United States, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996) 

(quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 

1993)). Here the district court identified Webb's drug addiction as the "principal mitigating circumstance" that, in its 

view, takes this case outside the heartland of the guideline for 

drug distribution. Webb, 966 F. Supp. at 17.

This potentially mitigating circumstance falls at the first 

hurdle, however, because the Sentencing Commission has 

essentially forbidden departure on that basis; the Guidelines 

plainly state that "[d]rug or alcohol dependence or abuse is 

not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines." 

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. Although that directive is in the form of a 

"policy statement" rather than a "guideline," it is still "an 

authoritative guide" for a court contemplating a departure 

from the Guidelines. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 

193, 200 (1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically 

confirmed that certain factors listed in part 5H of the Guidelines, including drug dependence, "never can be bases for 

departure." Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044.

Webb's counsel recognizes as much and so argues that

[t]he district court here did not depart because it believed Mr. Webb's addiction made him less culpable, as is 

forbidden under the Guidelines. Rather, the court departed because it believed that drug usei.e., buying 

drugs to feed his addictionwas Mr. Webb's only criminal conduct.

The departure was appropriate, Webb's counsel suggests, 

because "[s]mall-time purchase, possession and use are not 

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within the heartland of distribution cases for 50 grams or 

more of crack cocaine." The problem with this position is 

that Webb did not plead guilty to small-time purchase, possession, or use; he pleaded guilty to distributing more than 

50 grams of cocaine base in a single transaction. That 

transaction places him squarely in the heartland of distribution cases for 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.

Webb argues in the alternative that the district court 

legitimately departed from the Guidelines because Webb's 

conduct does "not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought 

to be prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue," 

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.11, namely, as Webb sees it, acting as the 

"kingpin" or "mastermind" of a major drug operation. We 

reject that argument not only because the district court did 

not purport to rely upon § 5K2.11 as a basis for its departure 

from the Guidelines but also because that section is manifestly inapplicable. The Congress has in effect defined a "major" 

drug trafficker as one who distributes 50 grams or more of 

crack. Thus, the whole purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(iii) is 

to prevent anyone from doing precisely what Webb pleaded 

guilty to doing: selling more than 50 grams of crack.

To sum up, although the district court may be correct in 

saying that Webb's "criminal conduct in this case, as well as 

his abscondence [sic], can be explained by his addiction," 966 

F. Supp. at 17, in the regime established by the Sentencing 

Reform Act, neither the district court's speculation nor the 

defendant's addiction can justify a departure from the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission "has proscribed, as a 

categorical matter, consideration of the factor." Koon, 116 

S. Ct. at 2051. The district court's reliance upon Webb's 

addiction was mistaken as a matter of law and therefore, "by 

definition," an abuse of its discretion. Id. at 2047.

B. Undue Harshness

The Supreme Court also made clear in Koon that "[a] 

district judge now must impose on a defendant a sentence 

falling within the range of the applicable Guideline, if the case 

is an ordinary one." 116 S. Ct. at 2044. Because, as we have 

seen, Webb's addiction does not remove his case from the 

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heartland of crack distribution cases, the district court must 

impose a sentence falling within the Guideline range notwithstanding its personal opinion that "the Guidelines range is 

disproportionate and unduly harsh in this case." 966 

F. Supp. at 17.

We have already had occasion to explain that

disproportionality does not, in itself, provide an appropriate basis for a downward departure. Unless the disproportionality between crime and punishment is so extreme 

that it violates the Eighth Amendment ... the sentences 

established for various crimes under the Guidelines cannot be set aside based merely on their perceived severity.

United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 

(emphasis deleted). We reaffirm that principle today and 

hold that the district court erred by disregarding it.

Although the district court suggested that imposing a 

sentence within the Guidelines range "would subject Defendant Webb to constitutional and legal deprivations," 966 

F. Supp. at 17, neither the district court nor Webb has 

identified any such deprivation, and we do not see any. The 

district court's disagreement with the policies embodied in the 

Sentencing Guidelines does not authorize it to depart: "To 

permit departures for that reason would be to eviscerate the 

Guidelines, reestablishing the very judicial discretion in sentencing that the Guidelines were designed to confine." Beckham, 968 F.2d at 54 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 

U.S. 361, 396 (1989)).

C. Government Role in Determining Sentence

The district court noted, correctly but trivially, that "[i]f 

the undercover officer had arrested Defendant Webb after 

making [the two] lesser purchases from him ... then Defendant Webb would be facing a sentence of less severity." 966 

F. Supp. at 17. The court then opined that a "sentencing 

court should have the right to take this fact into account," and 

upon that basis departed downward from the range specified 

in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. Perhaps because we had 

already rejected "sentencing entrapment" as a basis for obUSCA Case #97-3059 Document #327951 Filed: 02/03/1998 Page 9 of 12
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taining a lesser sentence, see United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 

1323, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the district court did not 

purport to revive the theory as a ground for departure and 

instead blandly described the police conduct in question as 

"arrang[ing] to make an arrest only after purchasing 55.85 

grams [in the third transaction], thereby ... increasing 

[Webb's] minimum guidelines sentence." 966 F. Supp. at 17. 

Webb likewise purports to disavow any reliance upon "sentencing entrapment" or "sentencing manipulation" but maintains that "police conduct" may nevertheless be a permissible 

factor to consider for a departure from the Guidelines.

Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Koon, we begin 

by asking whether any feature of this case potentially takes it 

outside the Guidelines' heartland. We find none: Webb 

patrolled Florida Avenue offering to sell crack; that it was 

the police who upon three occasions accepted his offer is 

irrelevant to his culpability for those sales.

Similarly, that the police did not arrest Webb after their 

first or second purchase cannot, without more, take this case 

out of the heartland of drug distribution cases. Application 

Note 3 to the relevant conduct Guideline (§ 1B1.3) anticipates 

that law enforcement agents may wait until a defendant has 

made multiple sales before arresting him:

For example, where the defendant engaged in three drug 

sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of cocaine, as part of the 

same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, ... 

the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is to be 

used to determine the offense level even if the defendant 

is convicted of a single count charging only one of the 

sales.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Application Note 3. Repeat purchases 

preceding an arrest are a common and legitimate law enforcement tactic. As the district court acknowledged in this very 

case, "the government may need to engage in a number of 

transactions with low level street drug merchants in order to 

find the source of the drugs." Nor is it apparent how 

aggregation of the quantities of drugs that Webb sold to the 

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police might overstate his offense level, for he crossed the 50-

gram sentencing threshold in a single sale.

The Commission has recognized one situation in which use 

by the police of a legitimate law enforcement tactic might 

warrant a departure from the Guidelines: the Commission 

authorizes departure when the police in a reverse sting sell 

drugs at an artificially low price and thereby lead a defendant 

to purchase "a significantly greater quantity ... than his 

available resources would have allowed" him to buy at the 

market price. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 15. We 

need not speculate about what other kinds of police conduct 

might warrant a departure; it suffices to say that the actions 

of the police in this case do not constitute such a mitigating 

circumstance. There is no claim and no evidence in this case 

that the police overpaid for the drugs or in any other way led 

Webb to commit crimes beyond those that he otherwise would 

have committed. There being nothing in the record to suggest that the conduct of the police makes this case "special, or 

unusual," Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045, we hold that the district 

court abused its discretion by departing from the Guidelines. 

III. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing account clearly shows, Judge Sporkin not 

only abused his discretion in sentencing the defendant in this 

case, he did so knowingly; indeed, he expressly invited the 

court of appeals to reverse his decision. In this way Judge 

Sporkin more than expressed his disagreement with the law 

he is sworn to uphold, which he could have done in obiter 

dicta; he wreaked havoc in the administration of justice in 

this case. And in the end, the only result is grief on all sides: 

The United States Attorney and the Federal Public Defender 

each had to write learned briefs and this court had to hear 

argument and write an opinionall at considerable expense 

to the public; the defendant had his hopes raised, inevitably 

to be dashed; and the decision of the district court had to be 

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reversed. Accordingly, we remand this case for the district 

court to resentence the defendant within the Guideline range 

of 70-87 months.

So ordered.

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