Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02894/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02894-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City and County of San Francisco
Defendant
Louis Smith
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-02894-RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2010, Plaintiff Louis Smith was released from his probationary appointment 

as a Transit Supervisor for the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (“MTA”). On 

September 30, 2015, more than five years later, Smith filed suit against the City and County of 

San Francisco (“the City” or “Defendant”) alleging that the procedures for appealing his release

were unconstitutional. Smith avers the City violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

because he did not have access to the same appeal procedures available to other classes of

employees. Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Smith has failed to 

state a claim and that his claims are untimely. The motion is granted because Smith’s claims are 

barred by the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), this matter is suitable for 

disposition without oral argument and the September 22, 2016, hearing will be vacated. 

Case 3:16-cv-02894-RS Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 1 of 4
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

CASE NO. 16-cv-02894-RS

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Smith began a probationary appointment as a Transit Supervisor for the MTA on 

September 8, 2009. On April 16, 2010, Smith was released from that appointment. On September 

30, 2015, Smith filed a civil action against the City in San Francisco Superior Court. The City 

filed a demurrer, which the court sustained with leave to amend. Smith then filed an amended 

complaint on April 22, 2016, which included new constitutional claims. The City promptly 

removed the amended complaint to federal court. Although Smith’s complaint is hard to decipher 

and states few facts, he appears to alleges that the City violated his First and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by failing to offer him the same appeals procedures available to “Service 

Critical Class” MTA employees. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed–but 

early enough not to delay trial–a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is “functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th 

Cir.1989). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in 

the pleadings as true, [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lyon v. Chase Bank 

USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass’n, L.P., 

419 F.3d 1011, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.

2004) (explaining that all material allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and construed 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party).

 

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The factual background is based on the averments in the complaint, which must be taken 

as true for purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court also considers the 

“Notice of Release” attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Erin Kuka because Smith 

“necessarily relies” on that document for purposes of his complaint and the authenticity of the 

document is not contested. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Even though 

the “Notice of Release” is not explicitly incorporated in Smith’s complaint, consideration is 

appropriate in light of the policy of “[p]reventing plaintiffs from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

by deliberately omitting references to documents upon which their claims are based.” Id. 

Case 3:16-cv-02894-RS Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 2 of 4
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

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IV. DISCUSSION

Smith brings suit, presumably under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. He avers he was denied “equal protection under the law” and the 

“right to petition” because he was not offered the same appeal procedures available to other 

classes of MTA employees when he was released from his probationary appointment. Comp. at 1-

2. He alleges that the San Francisco Civil Service Rules governing the release of employees 

during probationary periods are unconstitutional because they do not include the same appeal 

procedures available to “Service Critical Class” employees. Defendant moves for judgment on the 

pleadings on a two grounds, arguing: (1) the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff's claims and 

(2) the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. Although both of these 

contentions appear to have merit, even a brief examination of Defendant’s first argument suffices 

to show that Smith’s claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

Defendant argues that the statute of limitations has run. The limitations period for actions 

under § 1983 corresponds to that for personal injury claims in the forum state. See Taylor v. 

Regents of Univ. of California, 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 1993). California law requires that a 

plaintiff claiming personal injuries bring suit within two years of the date of injury. See Cal. Code 

Civ. Proc. § 335.1. It follows that a two year statute of limitations applies to Smith’s claims. 

“A statute of limitations under § 1983 ... begins to run when the cause of action accrues, 

which is when the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the injury that is the basis of their 

action.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Scheer 

v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 

535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (the statute of limitations for facial challenges brought under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983—outside the context of property rights—begins to accrue when a plaintiff 

“knows or has reason to know of the actual injury”). Here, Smith’s release from his probationary 

appointment on April 16, 2010 was the operative decision that caused his injury. On that day, 

Smith was put “on notice” of the City’s alleged violations; he then knew or should have known of 

the injury that is the basis of his claim. Smith commenced this action on September 30, 2015, 

more than five years after his release. Accordingly, Smith’s claims are untimely and barred.

Case 3:16-cv-02894-RS Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 3 of 4
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-02894-RS Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 4 of 4