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Parties Involved:
Michael Darnell Holden
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

F LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

NOV 211990 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) .ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 89-3048 

) ( D. C. No. 88-20105-01) 

MICHAEL DARNELL HOLDEN, ) (D. Kansas) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the United States, 

defendant Michall D. Holden, a/k/a Michael D. Holden, pleaded 

guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)(l) and 846. The district court 

sentenced Holden to 78 months' imprisonment, which was the low end 

of the range of 78-97 months indicated by the Sentencing 

Guidelines 1 promulgated under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 

18 u.s.c. §§ 551, et~ 

Defendant appeals his sentence, contending that the district 

court committed two errors which warrant reversal of the court's 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

1 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, (Oct. 

1988) (hereinafter u.s.s.G.). 

Appellate Case: 89-3048 Document: 010110051345 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 1 
Guidelines application and a 

asserted that the trial court 

remand for resentencing. It is 

erred by (1) determining that 

defendant did not qualify for a two level offense level reduction 

for affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his 

crime, pursuant to§ 3El.1 of the Guidelines, and (2) determining 

that it could not find defendant to be a minor or minimal 

participant in the criminal activity, and he therefore did not 

qualify for an offense level reduction under§ 3Bl.2. We affirm. 

I 

Defendant argues that the trial court inappropriately denied 

his request for an offense level reduction for "acceptance of 

responsibility," pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.1. When Holden was 

arrested he falsely identified himself to law enforcement officers 

as Darnell Woods. II R. at 3. Later that day, during an 

interview with a U.S. Pretrial Service Officer, Holden continued 

to make both oral and written assertions that his name was Darnell 

Woods. II R. at 5. The following day a detention hearing was 

held and "an individual identified as the defendant's cousin 

testified that the defendant's name was Darnell Woods." II R. at 

5. 

Holden made no effort to reveal his true identity until after 

Drug Enforcement Agents presented substantial evidence that 

defendant's name was not Darnell Woods. The Agents' evidence 

indicated, first, that defendant had given his name as Michael L. 

Holden when he was stopped at Kansas City International Airport, 

one day prior to the arrest in the instant case for possession of 

a small quantity of marijuana. Second, they said that fingerprint 

analysis of defendant had also indicated that his name was Michael 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-3048 Document: 010110051345 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 2 
Holden. II R. at 3, 5. Defendant finally identified himself as 

Michall Darnell Holden, which is believed to be his true name. 

Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly relied 

upon application note 4 of§ 3El.1 of the Guidelines concerning 

the effect of a defendant's obstruction of justice in the 

determination of the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. He 

also contends that the court erred in its reliance upon note l(g) 

concerning the "timeliness of the defendant's conduct in 

manifesting the acceptance of responsibility." IV R. at 14, 15. 

Defendant's first contention concerning the court's incorrect 

reliance on application note 4 focuses on the contrast between the 

language of application note 4 and the language of§ 3Cl.1, both 

dealing with obstruction of justice. Application note 4 states 

that "[a]n adjustment under this section is not warranted where a 

defendant perjures himself, suborns perjury, or otherwise 

obstructs the trial or the administration of justice (see 

§ 3Cl.1), regardless of other factors." u.s.s.G §3El.1, comment. 

(n.4). On the other hand, Section 3Cl.1 provides for a two level 

increase in the offense level "[i]f the defendant willfully 

impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the 

administration of justice during the investigation or 

prosecution." u.s.s.G. §3Cl.1 (emphasis added). 2 

2 

Defendant received a two level increase for obstruction of 

justice under §3Cl.1 due to the "reasons outlined in the 

presentence, regarding his [Holden's] furnishing false information 

to the United States Pretrial Services officer, [and a] Los 

Angeles officer, and finally lying under oath at the detention 

hearing before the magistrate." IV R. at 15. This increase is 

not being appealed. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-3048 Document: 010110051345 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 3 
Defendant argues that the presence of the attempt language in 

§ 3Cl.1 and its absence from application note 4 of § 3E.1.1, 

supra, clearly indicates an intent to preclude the use of any mere 

attempt to obstruct justice as a basis for refusal of a two level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 3 

Defendant's argument leads to a nonsensical construction of 

§ 3El.1 whereby a defendant is encouraged to attempt obstruction 

of justice through deception or outright falsehood. If 

defendant's argument were accepted, a defendant would have no 

disincentive for lying. If the lie is believed, damaging 

information may remain hidden. Should the defendant's deception 

be discovered, it was only an unsuccessful "attempt" to obstruct 

justice and, as such, is to be ignored when assessing the 

defendant's acceptance of responsibility. 

The court's determination that defendant did not timely 

accept responsibility, under application note l(g) of§ 3El.1, is 

also based upon Holden's presentation of false identification to 

the authorities. IV R. at 14. Questions concerning acceptance of 

responsibility are factual and are to be reviewed under a clearly 

erroneous standard. United States v. Whitehead, 912 F.2d 448, 451 

(10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 

3 

The disposition of this argument will have limited 

precedential effect. Note 4 in the commentary to§ 3El.1 was 

amended, effective November 1, 1989, to read "Conduct resulting in 

an enhancement under §3El.1 (Willfully Obstructing or Impeding 

Proceedings) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not 

accepted responsiblity for his criminal conduct. There may, 

however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both 

§§3Cl.1 and 3El.1 may apply." United States Sentencing Commission 

Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1989) § 3El.1, note 4. The notes 

following the amendment state that one reason for the change is 

"to clarify the reference to obstructive conduct". Id, at C.135, 

n. 258. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-3048 Document: 010110051345 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 4 
(6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th 

Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 

1989). Specifically, "[o]n the issue of timeliness [of acceptance 

of responsibility], the district court has substantial 

discretion." United States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 464 (1st 

Cir. 1989). 

The district court expressed deep concern over Holden's 

presentation of false information at his detention hearing. Such 

concern contributed to the decision to agree with the probation 

office recommendation to deny any level of reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. IV R. at 14, 15. We are satisfied 

that the district court's finding that Holden had not timely 

accepted responsibility was not clearly erroneous. This finding 

was made notwithstanding defendant's plea of guilty, 4 and his 

admission of sorts that he knew at the time of the offense that 

the package contained cocaine. 5 

4 

We have stated that a "guilty plea, standing alone does not 

entitle him [defendant] to a two-level sentence reduction under 

u.s.s.G. § 3El.1." Trujillo, at 1462 (applying u.s.s.G. § 3El.1 

comment. (n.3) which states "A guilty plea may provide some 

evidence of the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. 

However, it does not, by itself, entitle a defendant to a reduced 

sentence under this section." 

5 

"When asked if he [Holden] knew it was Cocaine [in the box] 

he replied, 'common sense would tell you there was something in 

there.'" IV R. at 5. Additionally, in Mr. Holden's "written 

statement he said 'I had no idea that it was two kilos in that 

box. I knew it was something but not that much of something.'" 

II R. at 5. From the record, these appear to be Mr. Holden's most 

specific admissions of knowledge of any nexus of illegality in his 

delivery services prior to arrest. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-3048 Document: 010110051345 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 5 
II 

Defendant's second contention is that the district court 

erred in not finding him to be a minor or minimal participant 

under the § 3Bl.2 mitigating role provision, thus denying him an 

offense level reduction. The Guidelines indicate that a 

mitigating role adjustment can be made when a defendant is 

"plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct 

of a group" or is "any participant who is less culpable than most 

other participants." u.s.s.G. §3Bl.2, comment. (n.1, 3). We 

feel, however, that there is little evidence in the record which 

suggests that defendant was less culpable than other participants 

or in fact, that there were any participants in the operation 

other than defendant. 

Holden claims that he was a mere courier with no direct 

knowledge of what was in the package he was to pick up and deliver 

to another person in exchange for fifteen hundred dollars. IV R. 

at 4, 5. Upon signing for the package, however, Holden proceeded 

to open the package, an act which is patently inconsistent with 

the claimed role of mere courier. II R. at 2. Furthermore, the 

package bore a fictitious return address identical to defendant's 

address with the exception of the last digit of the house number. 

# 

Id. This address serves as additional circumstantial evidence 

that Holden at least had a role in the sending as well as the 

receiving of the drug package. 

The district court's decision regarding any reduction in the 

defendant's offense level for his mitigating role in the offense 

is a factual determination which will not be disturbed on appeal, 

absent a showing that it is clearly erroneous. United States v. 

6 

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• 

Lord, 907 F.2d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 1990); see United States v. 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

U.S. --- (1990); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 

541, 557 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Franco-Torres, 

869 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1989)). The district court stated 

that its decision was greatly influenced by "look[ing] at the 

overall presentence report" in which it appeared "almost as 

consistent that he [Holden] was a big drug operator as it is . 

that arguably he might have been a minor participant." IV R. at 

15. We conclude that the denial of a mitigating offense level 

reduction was not clearly erroneous. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

Chief Judge 

7 

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