Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02162/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02162-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Orlando Escobar-Quintanilla
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2162

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Northern District of Iowa.

*

Orlando Escobar-Quintanilla, also * [PUBLISHED]

known as Chefe, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 14, 2010

Filed: July 26, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Orlando Escobar-Quintanilla pleaded guilty to twelve counts of conspiring to

distribute and distributing methamphetamine and using a communication device to

facilitate methamphetamine distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A) and (B), 843(b), and 846. At sentencing, the district court1

 determined 

that Escobar’s total offense level is 35, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing

range of 168 to 210 months in prison. Explicitly balancing all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

1

The HONORABLE MARK W. BENNETT, United States District Judge for

the Northern District of Iowa.

Appellate Case: 09-2162 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2010 Entry ID: 3686888
sentencing factors, the court denied Escobar’s motion for a downward variance but

took into account his personal mitigating factors in imposing a sentence at the low end

of the range. The court sentenced Escobar to 168 months in prison, finding “that this

sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary [and] meets all of the sentencing

objectives in 3553(a).”2

On appeal, Escobar first argues the district court clearly erred in determining

a base offense level of 35 rather than 34 based on the quantity of drugs attributable to

his offenses. The government correctly argues that this contention is without merit

because, at sentencing, the district court explicitly found a drug quantity level of 34,

rather than level 36 as urged by the government.

Escobar next argues the district court erred in imposing a four-level rather than

a two-level increase for his role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. At sentencing,

Escobar conceded that a three-level increase is warranted, thereby waiving his

contention on appeal that a two-level increase is appropriate. The district court found

that he was an organizer or leader of the conspiracy, and therefore warranted a fourlevel increase under § 3B1.1(a), because he recruited others to join the ten-participant

conspiracy, directed drug deliveries, and dictated where drugs would be stored. The

court noted that a four-level as opposed to a three-level increase “is a close call” that

was “not critical to the ultimate sentence” imposed. After careful review of the

sentencing record, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in imposing a fourlevel role-in-the-offense increase. In addition, any error was harmless because it did

2

The district court also stated that it was imposing a reasonable sentence, but

this is irrelevant to our appellate review. The Supreme Court instructed the lower

courts in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007), that a district court may

not presume that an advisory guidelines sentence is reasonable. We applied that

principle in reversing the sentence in United States v. Greene, 513 F.3d 904, 907-08

(8th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit footnote quoted in a see also citation in Greene

should not be applied more broadly than this context.

-2-

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not affect the court’s “ultimate determination of a reasonable sentence.” United States

v. Shuler, 598 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur but write separately to emphasize that a district court’s responsibility

is not to impose a “reasonable” sentence. See United States v. Greene, 513 F.3d 904,

907 (8th Cir. 2008). Rather a sentencing court must carefully consider the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors and impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than

necessary. Id. at 907-08.

In this case, the district court stated that it imposed a “reasonable sentence.” 

But the court also carefully considered and analyzed the § 3553(a) factors, focusing

on aggravating factors such as the ongoing nature of the offense and that it was a crime

of greed. The court also focused on the mitigating factors, such as the lack of a

criminal history and the difficult life Escobar had endured. Thus, overall, the district

court did not err.

______________________________

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Appellate Case: 09-2162 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/26/2010 Entry ID: 3686888