Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05446/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05446-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christine Amatruda
Plaintiff
KLI, Inc.
Defendant
Old Ladder Co.
Defendant
Old Ladder Co. (PA), Inc.
Defendant
Werner (FID) Co., Inc.
Defendant
Werner Co.
Defendant
Werner Funding Corporation
Defendant
Werner Ladder Inc.
Defendant
Werner Management Co.
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE AMATRUDA,

Plaintiff,

v.

WERNER (FID) CO., INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05446-PJH 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION

TO QUASH FOR INSUFFICIENT 

SERVICE OF PROCESS

Re: Dkt. No. 24, 26

Defendant Werner Co.’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and quash service 

under Rule 12(b)(5) and defendant KLI, Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff 

Christine Amatruda’s (“plaintiff”) first amended complaint (“FAC”) came on for hearing 

before this court on January 22, 2020. Plaintiff appeared through her counsel, Leland 

Belew and Lori Andrus. Defendant Werner Co. appeared through its counsel, Jonathan 

Hembree, and defendant KLI, Inc. appeared through its counsel, Zack Tolson. Having 

read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the 

relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendant 

Werner Co.’s motion to quash for the reasons stated at the hearing, TERMINATES as 

withdrawn defendant Werner Co.’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, and DENIES

defendant KLI, Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2019, plaintiff filed her original complaint (“Original Complaint”) 

against defendant Werner (FID) Co., Inc. and defendant Old Ladder Co. f/k/a Werner Co. 

(collectively, the “Original Defendants”). Dkt. 2 (Compl.). On October 3, 2019, not then a 

named defendant in this action, defendant Werner Co. made a special appearance to file 

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a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss or quash service of the Original Complaint upon the 

Original Defendants. Dkt. 12. On October 15, 2019, plaintiff filed her operative FAC. Dkt. 

20. On October 16, 2019, defendant Werner Co. withdrew its initial motion. Dkt. 23.

In her FAC, plaintiff maintained her claims against the Original Defendants and 

further named the following entities as defendants (“Additional Defendants”) as to such 

claims:

• Werner Co.;

• Werner Ladder Inc.;

• Werner Funding Corporation;

• Old Ladder Co. (PA), Inc. f/k/a Werner Holding Co. (PA), Inc.;

• Werner Management Co.; and 

• KLI, Inc., f/k/a Keller Ladders, Inc., f/k/a KUA Co. f/k/a Keller Industries, Inc.

For purpose of this order, the court will refer to the Original Defendants and 

Additional Defendants collectively as “defendants.” In her FAC, plaintiff alleges the 

following claims against defendants in connection with an injury she suffered when using 

a ladder:

• Negligence, FAC ¶¶ 50-56;

• Strict products liability for design defects, id. ¶¶ 57-77; and

• Strict products liability for manufacturing defect, id. ¶¶ 78-92. 

The parties agree that, aside from naming the Additional Defendants, the

substantive claims alleged in the FAC are materially similar to those alleged in the 

Original Complaint. Dkt. 26 at 9; Dkt. 30 at 19. Except as noted in its analysis, the court 

need not detail the events underlying plaintiff’s claims to resolve the instant motions. 

On November 15, 2019, defendant Werner Co. again made a special appearance 

to file the instant motion to dismiss or quash service under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 

12(b)(5). Dkt. 24. In its service of process challenge, defendant Werner Co. asked this 

court to quash service with respect to all defendants, except itself. In its challenge to this 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction, defendant Werner Co. argued incomplete diversity, 

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citing an allegation in the FAC stating that defendant KLI, Inc. maintained its principal 

place of business in Mission Viejo, California and an allegation in a notice of removal filed 

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Merryfield et al 

v. KLI INC et al, Case No. 1:17-cv-00742-WCG (“Merryfield”) stating that defendant KLI, 

Inc. maintains its principal place of business in Chino Hills, California. Dkt. 24 at 6-7; Dkt. 

32 at 2-3. 

On November 18, 2019, defendant KLI, Inc. filed the instant motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 26. In it, defendant KLI, Inc. argues only that California’s 

statute of limitations bars the claims against it. Significantly, defendant KLI, Inc. did not

join in defendant Werner Co.’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion or otherwise challenge this court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its purported California citizenship. 

At oral argument, plaintiff admitted that, except defendant Werner Co. and 

defendant KLI, Inc., she failed to properly serve defendants. Therefore, the court orally

granted defendant Werner Co.’s motion to quash and dismissed the improperly served 

defendants without prejudice. 

At oral argument, the court also asked counsel for defendant KLI, Inc. where its 

client principally conducts its business operations. Counsel failed to provide a clear or 

direct answer to the court’s question, instead responding with his “understanding” that 

defendant KLI, Inc. “no longer manufactures ladders” and has a California address. The

court then ordered that defendant KLI, Inc. submit to jurisdictional discovery concerning 

its citizenship and that the parties submit further briefing on the jurisdictional challenge.

Shortly after that order, on February 14, 2020, defendant Werner Co. filed a “Notice of 

Withdrawal” of its motion to dismiss, which abandoned that challenge. Dkt. 41. 

To the extent necessary to resolve the outstanding issues presented, the court 

details the relevant allegations, judicially noticed facts, and service of process related 

events in its analysis below. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Rule 12(b)(5) – Insufficient Service of Process

Rule 12(b)(5) provides that a party may assert a defense based upon “insufficient 

service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(5). “Once service is challenged, plaintiffs 

bear the burden of establishing that service was valid under Rule 4. . . . Neither actual 

notice, nor simply naming the person in the caption of the complaint, will subject 

defendants to personal jurisdiction if service was not made in substantial compliance with 

Rule 4.” Sebastian Brown Prods., LLC v. Muzooka, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1033 

(N.D. Cal. 2015). The Ninth Circuit recognizes that “[a] signed return of service 

constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service which can be overcome only by strong 

and convincing evidence.” S.E.C. v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 

(9th Cir. 2007). Lastly, while Rule 4 generally allows 90 days to effect service, a court 

may extend time for such service “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure” to 

timely serve. Fed. R. Civ. Pro 4(m).

2. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim

“A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on 

the face of the complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 

F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Analysis

1. The Court Maintains Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Action

Despite defendant Werner Co.’s “withdrawal” of its jurisdictional challenge, this 

court has an independent obligation to ensure that it maintains such jurisdiction over this 

action. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).

Here, based upon the allegations, representations by counsel, third-party 

testimony, and litigation conduct of the parties, the court is satisfied that it maintains 

diversity subject matter jurisdiction over this action. As noted above, defendant Werner 

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Co. based its jurisdictional challenge upon two allegations—the allegation in the FAC that 

defendant KLI, Inc. maintains its principal place of business in Mission Viejo, California, 

FAC ¶ 16, and an allegation in a notice of removal filed in Merryfield stating that 

defendant KLI, Inc. maintains its principal place of business in Chino Hills, California. 

Dkt. 33-2 ¶ 7. 

With respect to the FAC allegation, plaintiff provided evidence in her opposition of 

a business using the “KLI” acronym in Mission Viejo, California, but that that business, in 

fact, has nothing to do with ladders. Dkt. 33-2 ¶¶ 2-5 (testimony of a Kelly Legere stating 

that he is the owner of “KLI, Inc.,” which stands for “Kelly Legere Inspections, 

Incorporated,” is a business involved in “the performance of school inspections,” “has 

never been involved in the design, manufacture, distribution, or marketing of ladders,” 

and maintains an address in Mission Viejo, California). This testimony supports plaintiff’s 

explanation that her allegation at paragraph 16 was a mistake. Dkt. 30 at 16-17. With 

respect to the Merryfield notice of removal’s allegation, the court is unpersuaded. Such 

allegation is nothing more than an unverified statement signed by counsel in a pleading 

to an out-of-district court in a now terminated case. Dkt. 33-2 at 6.

In any event, the court finds that defendant Werner Co.’s “withdrawal” of its 

jurisdictional challenge shortly after this court ordered discovery on the issue—coupled 

with the fact that defendant KLI, Inc. (the purportedly non-diverse defendant in this 

action) did not challenge the FAC on jurisdictional grounds—compels the adverse 

inference that defendant KLI, Inc.’s principal place of business (assuming one exists) is 

located outside California. As a result, the court concludes that it maintains subject 

matter jurisdiction over this action and will go on to decide the remaining issues below. 

2. Plaintiff Failed to Properly Serve All Defendants Except Defendant 

Werner Co. and Defendant KLI, Inc.

At oral argument, the court granted defendant Werner Co.’s motion to quash in 

part and dismissed the improperly served defendants without prejudice. Such order is 

proper given plaintiff’s admission, both at oral argument and in her briefing, that, except

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for defendant Werner Co. and defendant KLI, Inc., she failed to properly serve the other

defendants. Dkt. 30 at 18. However, plaintiff provided this court with a proof of service 

upon defendant KLI, Inc. Dkt. 28. Neither defendant Werner Co. nor defendant KLI, Inc. 

contested such presumptively sufficient evidence of service in their replies. Dkt. 32 at 2; 

Dkt. 33. The court therefore concludes that plaintiff properly served defendant KLI, Inc. 

3. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claims Against 

Defendant KLI, Inc.

Plaintiff does not dispute that California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1’s twoyear statute of limitations would bar her claims against defendant KLI, Inc. unless such 

claims either relate back to her Original Complaint or are subject to equitable tolling. 

Analyzed below, the court concludes that plaintiff’s claims relate back to the Original 

Complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) and, in the alternative, may be equitably tolled under 

California law. As a result, the statute of limitations does not bar the challenged claims.

a. The Challenged Claims Relate Back to the Original Complaint 

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)

Rule 15(c)(1) provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date 

of the original pleading when:

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations 

allows relation back;

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out 

of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted 

to be set out--in the original pleading; or

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the 

party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is 

satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for 

serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in 

by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced 

in defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been 

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 

party's identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

The Supreme Court in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010) has 

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explained that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation 

back, and the amending party's diligence is not among them,” and “the Rule mandates 

relation back once the Rule's requirements are satisfied; it does not leave the decision 

whether to grant relation back to the district court's equitable discretion.” Id. at 553. 

Here, plaintiff asserts that her claims against defendant KLI, Inc. properly relate 

back to her Original Complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Dkt. 30 at 19-23. Defendant KLI, 

Inc. concedes that “Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is not at issue here,” Dkt. 26 at 9, and does not 

dispute that it would suffer any prejudice within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). 

Instead, defendant KLI, Inc. challenges plaintiff’s assertion on the following two grounds: 

(1) Rule 15(c)(1)(C) applies only to circumstances where a party needs “to correct a 

misnomer or technicality,” as opposed to “add[ing] a completely new party,” Dkt. 26 at 10; 

and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendant KLI, Inc. was on notice that, but for a 

mistake in its identification, it would have been named in the Original Complaint, Dkt. 26 

at 10; Dkt. 34 at 3. The court analyzes each ground in turn.

In support of its first ground, defendant KLI, Inc. relies upon Craig v. United States, 

479 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Craig II”). Contrary to defendant KLI, Inc.’s 

characterization, Craig II did not limit Rule 15(c)(1)’s then-existing 1966 version to 

correcting “misnomers.” Instead, Craig II held that plaintiff could not relitigate a finding in 

its prior related action (“Craig I”) that plaintiff could not add a party (“Litton”) in place of a 

Doe defendant because “in Craig I, we applied the rule [Rule 15(c)] and held (1) that 

within the statutory period, Litton had not received notice, formal or informal, of the 

institution of the action, and (2) that due to its nonreceipt of such notice, Litton would be 

prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits, should the amendment be allowed.” 

Craig II, 479 F.2d at 36-37. In her opposition, plaintiff distinguishes Craig II on a similar 

basis, which defendant KLI, Inc. fails to address in its reply. Given the above, defendant 

KLI, Inc.’s first ground for challenging relation-back lacks merit.

Similarly, for two independent reasons, the court concludes that defendant KLI, 

Inc.’s second ground also lacks merit. First, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires only that the 

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added defendant “know or should have known” that it would have been named in the 

original pleading but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity “within the period 

provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 

15(c)(1)(C). Under that requirement, then, defendant KLI, Inc. need not acquire Rule 

15(c)(1)(C)(ii)’s subject knowledge until November 27, 2019 (i.e., within 90 days after the 

Original Complaint was filed on August 29, 2019). 

On November 18, 2019, nine days before expiration of the Rule 4(m) period, 

defendant KLI, Inc. filed its motion to dismiss. Dkt. 26. In that motion, defendant KLI, 

Inc. cites plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Dkt. 26 at 3 (“Plaintiff’s initial Complaint alleges 

that Plaintiff suffered personal injury falling from a ladder on September 30, 2017”), which 

alleges that “[t]hrough various divisions and under various labels, including the Keller 

brand, Defendants develop, design, test, manufacture, advertise, distribute, supply, and 

sell goods—including Ladders—throughout the United States,” Compl. ¶ 11. Defendant 

KLI, Inc.’s own motion acknowledges that it was formerly named both “Keller Ladders, 

Inc.” and “Keller Industries.” Dkt. 26 at 2. Having relied upon a pleading containing such 

allegation when filing its November 18, 2019 motion, defendant KLI, Inc. (by defendant 

KLI, Inc.’s own admission, formerly known as “Keller Ladders, Inc.” and “Keller Industries, 

Inc.”) cannot contest that it “should have known,” before November 27, 2019, that its 

absence from the Original Complaint as a named defendant entity under the “Keller 

brand” label was a mistake. 

Second, there is reason to infer that defendants are acting under common control 

and, therefore, the knowledge of one may be imputed to the other. As an initial matter, 

defendant KLI, Inc. does not challenge the FAC’s unverified allegation that it is subject to 

common control with the other defendants. FAC ¶ 19. The veracity of that allegation is

supported by plaintiff’s counsel’s undisputed testimony that, prior to filing the FAC, he 

received a telephone call from an attorney (Michael Terhar) for defendant Werner Co., 

Dkt. 30-1 ¶ 2, and Mr. Terhar made representations concerning the corporate existence 

of some of the other defendants, id. ¶¶ 3-4. 

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An inference of common control is also supported by defendant Werner’s grounds 

for making a special appearance to file its instant motion to dismiss—namely “to protect 

its interest in the event that plaintiff moves to default” against the other defendants and 

“erroneously attempts enforcement against Werner Co. on a successor liability basis.” 

Dkt. 24 at 1-2 (emphasis added). Such inference is still further supported by defendant 

Werner Co.’s own request for judicial notice of the Merryfield notice of removal. Similar 

to this action, Merryfield involved claims for injuries suffered in connection with a ladder. 

Dkt. 33-2 ¶ 11 (“In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendants for the 

following: . . . a. for amounts to compensate plaintiff Merryfield for ‘serious injuries and 

damages’ suffered from a fall from a ladder . . .’”). Its notice of removal shows that 

defendant KLI, Inc. and defendant Werner Co. were both named as defendants, were 

represented by common attorneys, and jointly removed it to federal court. Dkt. 33-2 at 2

(“Defendants, KLI, Inc. (‘KLI’) and Werner Co., (‘Werner’) (collectively, ‘Defendants’), by 

their attorneys, O’Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & Laing S.C., hereby submit their

Notice of Removal . . .”) (emphasis added).

Taken together, the above proffered filings, undisputed testimony, and unrefuted 

allegation support imputing the knowledge of the other defendants to defendant KLI, Inc. 

for purpose of the court’s Rule 15(c)(1)(C) analysis. G.F. Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping 

Co., 23 F.3d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Cases from other circuits confirm that Rule 

15(c) notice is satisfied when ‘the parties are so closely related in their business 

operations or other activities that the institution of an action against one serves to provide 

notice of the litigation to the other. . . . Such is the case with Panobulk and Pan Ocean.”). 

As shown by the certificates of service filed with this court, plaintiff served the Original 

Complaint at “93 Werner Road, Greenville, Pennsylvania 16125” on September 12, 2019. 

Dkt. 10-11. Defendant Werner Co. acknowledged that it is located at such address. Dkt. 

24 at 4. At minimum, then, defendant Werner Co., received notice of the Original 

Complaint on September 12, 2019. Because an incidental aspect of “common control” 

includes information sharing, the court may reasonably infer, then, that defendant KLI, 

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Inc. either “knew” or “should have known” (by way of defendant Werner Co.) about the 

Original Complaint and its mistaken omission on or around September 12, 2019. For the 

two independent reasons noted above, defendant KLI, Inc’s second ground for 

challenging relation-back also lacks merit.

1

In short, the record shows that by at least November 18, 2019, defendant KLI, Inc. 

“knew or should have known” that this action would have been brought against it but for a 

mistake in its identity. Defendant KLI, Inc. conceded that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is not at issue 

here and failed to contest that its belated notice of this action (which nonetheless allowed 

it to file the instant pre-discovery dispositive motion) would prejudice its defense on the 

merits. As a result, the court concludes that plaintiff’s claims against defendant KLI, Inc. 

relate back to her Original Complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).

b. Alternatively, the Court May Equitably Toll the Challenged 

Claims under California Law

Under California law, equitable tolling is “appropriate where the record shows the 

following:

(1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; 

(2) lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to 

defend against the second claim; and

(3) good faith and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing 

the second claim.” 

Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 

1137-38 (9th Cir. 2001).

As analyzed above, the court may infer that defendant KLI, Inc. received timely 

1 Lastly, Defendant KLI, Inc. cites the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in RamosSantoya v. Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 379 F.App’x 596 (9th Cir. 2010) for the 

proposition that relation-back is improper when a plaintiff “knew of the identity of the 

[added party] before suit was filed, but for whatever reason, did not name it as a 

defendant.” Id. at 597. Putting aside defendant KLI, Inc.’s failure to explain how such 

authority is applicable here in the first instance, the Ninth Circuit filed Ramos-Santoya on 

May 17, 2010, which was before the Supreme Court’s June 7, 2010 decision in Krupski, 

which expressly ruled that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “sets forth an exclusive list of requirements 

for relation back, and the amending party's diligence is not among them.” Id. at 553. 

To the extent defendant KLI, Inc’s suggests that relation-back here is also improper 

because plaintiff failed to act diligently, such suggestion rests upon overruled authority. 

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notice of the potential claims against it in the Original Complaint by virtue of its 

relationship with defendant Werner Co., which itself received notice of this action on 

September 12, 2019. Moreover, the record does not suggest that defendant KLI, Inc.’s 

post-September 30, 2019 addition to this action inhibited its ability to defend against it or 

that plaintiff acted in bad faith by belatedly adding defendant KLI, Inc. In the alternative, 

then, the court concludes that plaintiff’s claims against defendant KLI, Inc. may be 

equitably tolled under California law.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART defendant Werner Co.’s 

motion to quash WITHOUT PREJUDICE and TERMINATES its motion to dismiss. The 

court DENIES defendant KLI, Inc.’s motion to dismiss. Except the notice of removal in 

Merryfield (Dkt. 33-2), the court DENIES all requests for judicial notice.2 Defendant 

Werner Co. and defendant KLI, Inc. both remain as defendants in this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2020

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

2 The denied requests are unnecessary for the court to resolve the outstanding issues in 

these motions. Plaintiff does not oppose judicial notice of the Dkt. 33-2, which, in any 

event, the court may “properly take judicial notice of [as a] court filing[] and other matter[] 

of public record.” Flores v. Montgomery, 727 F. App'x 273, 275 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 139 S. Ct. 283, 202 L. Ed. 2d 187 (2018).

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