Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01176/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01176-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
H.J. Heinz Company
Appellee
Scott A. White
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SCOTT A. WHITE,

Appellant

v.

H.J. HEINZ COMPANY,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1176

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 95/002,241.

______________________ 

Decided: February 19, 2016

______________________ 

 KEITH JUDE GRADY, Polsinelli PC, St. Louis, MO, 

argued for appellant. Also represented by MARK THOMAS 

DEMING, Chicago, IL.

 PETER BRANKO PEJIC, Greenblum & Bernstein, P.L.C., 

Reston, VA, argued for appellee. Also represented by

ARNOLD TURK, MICHAEL J. FINK, JILL BROWNING. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

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2 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Scott A. White appeals the decision of the 

United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB” or “Board”), on 

inter partes reexamination, finding claims 1–19 of U.S.

Patent No. 8,231,026 (the “’026 patent”) unpatentable as 

anticipated or obvious. See H.J. Heinz Co. v. White, No. 

2014-004561 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2014) (J.A. 2–9). For the 

reasons set forth below, this court affirms. 

BACKGROUND

I. The ’026 Patent 

The ’026 patent is entitled “Condiment Container” 

and relates to “a condiment container configured to be 

carried by a standard drink holder to enable condiments 

to be securely carried in place in a vehicle during travel.” 

’026 patent col. 1 ll. 7–9. 

Independent claim 1 is illustrative and recites:

A condiment container for carrying various 

condiments, the condiment container comprising: 

a container formed with a continuous sidewall with varying heights and forming a 

predetermined shape closed on one end 

forming a bottom floor and open on an opposing end defining an open end forming a 

container portion for receiving a condiment, said container portion formed with a 

form factor that enables said container to 

be received in a standard vehicle drink 

holder by way of a shoulder portion, said 

bottom floor formed to provide a deep end 

of said condiment container and a shallow 

end of said condiment container;

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WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 3

said shoulder portion comprising one or more 

extending shoulders extending outwardly 

from said continuous sidewall adjacent 

said open end configured to vertically support said container portion in said standard vehicle drink holder; and

a cover for covering said open end of said 

container portion, the cover attached to 

the open end of said container by an adhesive, the cover is peelable from the deep 

end of the container, the cover is totally 

removable from the deep end of the container to access the deep end of the container, and the cover is removable from the 

shallow end of the container to squirt the 

condiment from the shallow end of the container.

Id. col. 5 ll. 25–49 (emphases added). Independent claims 

14 and 18 are similar to independent claim 1, but do not 

recite limitations relating to the shape and configuration 

of the container. See id. col. 5 ll. 19–33, 43–59. 

II. The Prior Art: Selker 

U.S. Patent Application No. 2001/0045374 (“Selker”) 

“discloses a single-use sealed package assembly for food 

products and medicines with dual distinct functions of 

containing a substance, and dispensing and applying it 

evenly, neatly, and sanitarily using a handle.” Selker ¶ 9. 

Figure 1 depicts “a view of the filled and hermetically 

sealed package,” id. ¶ 12, and Figure 2 depicts “a top view 

of the unsealed container,” id. ¶ 13. 

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4 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

Id. figs.1, 2. This sealed container is formed “when the 

base 102 is sealed with the lid 104 using a conventional 

adhesive 112 deposited on the flange 110. During assembly, the adhesive 112 is applied to either the exterior 

circumferential flange 110 or the lid 104.” Id. ¶ 18. 

III. Proceedings 

In 2012, Appellee H.J. Heinz Company (“Heinz”) requested an inter partes reexamination of claims 1–19 of 

the ’026 patent.1 In its reexamination request, Heinz 

asserted: (1) claims 14–18 were unpatentable as anticipated by the teachings of Selker; (2) claims 1–5, 8–13, and 

19 were unpatentable as obvious in view of the combined 

teachings of Selker and U.S. Patent Application No. 

2005/0161471 (“Grenda”); and (3) claims 6–7 were unpatentable as obvious in view of the combined teachings of 

either (i) Selker, Grenda, and U.S. Patent No. 5,429,262

(“Sharkey”) or (ii) Selker, Grenda, and U.S. Patent No. 

6,076,700 (“Manges”). 

 

1 Mr. White and Heinz are also involved in an infringement action in the U.S. District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois regarding the ’026 patent. 

White v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 12-cv-06074 (N.D. Ill. filed 

Aug. 1, 2012). That case is currently stayed pending final 

decision in this proceeding. 

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In June 2013, the Examiner issued a Right of Appeal 

Notice following her Action Closing Prosecution, which 

held claims 1–22 of the ’026 patent unpatentable as 

anticipated or obvious.2 See J.A. 687–95 (Action Closing 

Prosecution). Mr. White appealed the Examiner’s findings to the PTAB. J.A. 750. The PTAB affirmed the 

Examiner’s rejection of claims 14–18 under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 102(b) (2006) and claims 1–13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 103(a). Mr. White timely appealed. This court has 

jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s Final Decision under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Anticipation 

A. Standard of Review and Legal Standard for Anticipation 

“[A]nticipation is a question of fact, including whether 

an element is inherent in the prior art,” In re Gleave, 560 

F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), 

and is reviewed for substantial evidence, In re Rambus 

Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might 

accept the evidence to support the finding.” K/S Himpp 

v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted). “If the evidence in [the] record 

will support several reasonable but contradictory conclusions, we will not find the Board’s decision unsupported 

by substantial evidence simply because the Board chose 

one conclusion over another plausible alternative.” In re 

Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

 

2 In January 2013, Mr. White added claims 20–22 

by amendment. During the reexamination, the Examiner 

found these claims unpatentable. In September 2013, Mr. 

White canceled claims 20–22 by amendment. 

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6 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

A reference is anticipatory under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)3

if “the prior art reference . . . disclose[s] each and every 

feature of the claimed invention, either explicitly or 

inherently.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., 

Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “[A]nticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate 

only when the reference discloses prior art that must 

necessarily include the unstated limitation . . . .” 

Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 

1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA v. 

Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268–69 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 

“Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing 

may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Cont’l Can Co., 948 F.2d at 1269 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

B. The PTAB Did Not Err in Its Finding of Anticipation 

for Claims 14–18

Mr. White argues Selker does not anticipate the removable cover limitation of independent claim 14 or 

dependent claims 15–18 because “Selker would have 

necessarily included a stop that would prevent total 

removal of the cover.” Appellant’s Br. 18. Mr. White 

argues: (1) the PTAB erred in finding Selker does not 

disclose an inherent stop limitation preventing complete 

removal of the container cover, id. at 24–32, and (2) the 

PTAB erred in its applying the law of inherent anticipation, id. at 23, 26. We address these arguments below. 

 

3 In passing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 

(“AIA”), Congress amended § 102. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 

§ 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011). However, because 

the application that led to the ’026 patent was filed before 

March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 102(b) applies. See id.

§ 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.

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WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 7

1. Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Determination that Selker Does Not Inherently Disclose a Stop

The PTAB affirmed the Examiner’s finding that “in 

Selker, [t]here is not any structure disclosed that prevents 

the cover from being peeled beyond the handle portion 

and that the user stops the cover at the desired location.” 

J.A. 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The PTAB determined “a preponderance of the evidence 

support[ed] the finding that Selker does not disclose any 

kind of stop. Selker neither depicts in any drawing, nor 

describes in any textual disclosure, structure that might 

prevent the cover from being removed from both ends of 

Selker’s package.” J.A. 5. The PTAB further stated “[i]n 

fact . . . , Selker specifically discloses reliance upon the 

user to refrain from peeling the cover back from either 

end of the package any more than necessary to make the 

condiment available for use as the user desires.” J.A. 5–6 

(emphasis added). 

Mr. White argues the PTAB erred in finding that 

Selker does not inherently disclose a structural stop. 

Appellant’s Br. 28. Mr. White contends “the Selker container necessarily has a stopping point [between the bowl 

and the knife] that prevents the cover from being totally 

removable.” Id. at 13. Mr. White notes that he provided 

“expert testimony [that] conclusively establishe[d] that 

Selker necessarily included a stop, or that it otherwise 

would not function as intended.” Id. at 28. In support of 

this argument, Mr. White relies on analysis from his 

expert, Thomas J. Dunn. Specifically, Mr. White reproduced Mr. Dunn’s annotated versions of Figures 3 and 4 

from Selker, where arrows were added to “demonstrate 

the presence of the [alleged] stopping point.” Id. at 29; see 

also J.A. 253 (Mr. Dunn’s expert declaration). Mr. Dunn 

calculated that “Selker intends that eight-fifteenths (57%) 

of the lid remain[s] attached to the base for either use.” 

J.A. 253 ¶ 27. The image, as presented in Mr. White’s 

appeal brief, is provided below.

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8 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

Appellant’s Br. 29 (reproducing Figures 3 and 4 from 

Selker, with arrows added). 

Mr. White’s amalgamation of these figures and analysis is misplaced. We have consistently found “patent 

drawings do not define the precise proportions of the 

elements and may not be relied on to show particular 

sizes if the specification is completely silent on the issue.” 

Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc., 222 

F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also In re Wright, 569 

F.2d 1124, 1127 (CCPA 1977) (“Absent any written description in the specification of quantitative values, 

arguments based on measurement of a drawing are of 

little value.” (citation omitted)). 

Mr. White further argues that “a physical stop or lockup seal [i.e., adhesive] is necessarily present because 

Selker would otherwise be susceptible to over-peeling that 

would render it inoperable.” Appellant’s Br. 30. Without 

a stop, Mr. White contends, Selker would not work for its 

intended purpose. Id. at 14 (“A stop . . . is fundamental to 

Selker’s operation.”). As such, a person having ordinary 

skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would know a consumer 

would be prone to over peeling the lid from the container 

and would have “turned to well-known adhesives that 

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WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 9

form ‘easy-peel’ sealants at one temperature and ‘lock-up’ 

seals that provide a stop at higher temperatures.” Id. at 

31. Mr. White contends “the absence of extensive discussion about the stop is of no moment given that the implementing technology—such as heat-sealed bumps or ‘lock 

up’ seals—was well-known and regularly used in the art.” 

Id. at 15. Based on this, Mr. White concludes that Selker 

“necessarily discloses a stop that would prevent its lid 

from being totally removable.” Id. at 32. 

Both Mr. White and Heinz submitted declarations detailing their respective positions on why a stop was or was 

not present in Selker. See generally J.A. 249–58 (Mr. 

Dunn’s expert declaration on behalf of Mr. White), 481–87 

(Brian Wagner’s expert declaration on behalf of Heinz). 

These experts opined on what a PHOSITA would infer 

from Selker regarding what a “conventional adhesive” 

was. See Selker ¶ 18 (“lid 104 using a conventional adhesive 112”). Mr. White’s expert, Mr. Dunn, contends such a 

person would infer the use of an adhesive that would 

create a permanent stop in the middle of the packaging. 

See J.A. 253 ¶ 29 (“Packaging material options are known 

for specifying ‘easy-peel’ sealants on lidding that provide 

[sic] can also deliver ‘lock-up’ seals. . . . It necessitates 

that lid material with the uniform sealant layer experience higher sealing temperatures in the one fifteenth of 

the lid length intended to provide a ‘stop peel’ function 

than used in the ‘peel’ areas.”). Heinz’s expert, Mr. Wagner, contends such a person would infer the use of a single 

adhesive, which would not create a permanent stop. See 

J.A. 486 ¶ 25 (“Given that [Selker] discloses the use of 

only one adhesive to the exterior circumferential flange 

110 or the lid 104, one of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand that the adhesive would behave in the same 

way throughout and, thus, the lid 104 could be capable of 

being detached or removed from all sections of the container 102.”). While the Examiner and the PTAB did not 

explicitly cite these expert reports, it is evident the ExamCase: 15-1176 Document: 57-2 Page: 9 Filed: 02/19/2016
10 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

iner and the PTAB weighed these arguments and accorded more weight to Heinz’s expert. 

Substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s determination that Selker does not disclose a structural stop limitation. As described above, Selker’s figures and express 

textual teachings and expert declarations provided the 

Examiner and the PTAB with substantial evidence to 

reach its determination. Based on the record during 

reexamination, the Examiner concluded, and the PTAB 

agreed, that there was “not any structure disclosed that 

prevents the cover from being peeled beyond the handle 

portion. The Selker disclosure states that the user stops 

the cover at a desired location.” J.A. 703 (emphasis added) 

(Examiner’s Action Closing Prosecution); see J.A. 5–6.

Finally, Mr. White agues the PTAB erred in finding 

the cover of Selker to be completely removable based on 

its finding that Selker did not disclose any structural stop 

limitations. Appellant’s Br. 23. He contends “substantial 

evidence does not support finding Selker discloses a 

totally removable cover.” Id. at 26 (capitalization omitted). Mr. White cites Figures 2 and 5 of Selker to argue 

the “figures do not disclose the total removal of a cover 

from a once-sealed container. Rather, they explicitly 

disclose ‘an unsealed container,’ i.e., a container to which 

a cover has not been applied.” Id. at 24 (quoting Selker 

¶¶ 13, 16). Figure 2 discloses “a top view of the unsealed 

container,” Selker ¶ 13, and Figure 5 discloses “a top view 

of the unsealed container showing a serrated edge along 

the handle,” id. ¶ 16. Mr. White argues that Selker knew 

how to describe a cover that had been removed, as in

Figures 3 and 4, because it explicitly said so. 

As demonstrated above, substantial evidence supports 

the PTAB’s finding that Selker anticipates claims 14–18 

of the ’026 patent. The PTAB relied on its determination 

that Selker did not disclose a structural limitation and 

found this “allow[ed] for complete removability of the 

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WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 11

cover from the container.” J.A. 6. While Mr. White 

argues a PHOSITA would understand Selker differently, 

the PTAB’s decision to find anticipation of the ’026 patent 

is supported by substantial evidence. See Jolley, 308 F.3d 

at 1320 (“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence will not render the Board’s 

findings unsupported by substantial evidence.” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the 

PTAB did not err in its determinations. 

2. The PTAB Did Not Err in Its Inherent Anticipation 

Analysis 

Mr. White next argues that, even if the PTAB correctly found that Selker does not inherently disclose a stop, 

the PTAB committed legal error when it asked him “to 

demonstrate Selker inherently disclosed the absence of 

the totally removable limitation.” Appellant’s Br. 26. Mr. 

White contends that in order for Selker to anticipate the 

’026 patent claim limitation of “totally removable,” it 

“must have ‘necessarily’ disclosed a totally removable 

cover.” Id. (quoting In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). He explains “[i]t is not enough 

that Selker likely or probably discloses a totally removable cover . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). Mr. White also 

contends the PTAB “improperly shift[ed] the burden of 

demonstrating inherency” because “it was the Examiner’s 

and the Board’s responsibility to show the limitation was 

necessarily present.” Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 

Mr. White’s argument is contrary to the PTAB’s findings. Here, the PTAB determined that “Selker neither 

depicts in any drawing, nor describes in any textual 

disclosure, structure that might prevent the cover from 

being removed from both ends of Selker’s package.” J.A. 

5. Rather, the PTAB determined that Selker expressly 

“disclose[d] reliance upon the user to refrain from peeling 

the cover back from either end of the package any more 

than necessary.” J.A. 5–6. 

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12 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

The PTAB did not err in its analysis of inherent anticipation. Inherent anticipation requires that the “prior 

art . . . necessarily include the unstated limitation.” 

Transclean Corp., 290 F.3d at 1373 (citing Cont’l Can Co., 

948 F.2d at 1268–69). Here, the PTAB found Selker did 

not disclose a stop, which was supported by express 

disclosures in Selker that cautioned the user to “refrain 

from peeling the cover back . . . any more than necessary.” 

J.A. 6. Under substantial evidence review, there is sufficient evidence to support the PTAB’s factual determination with respect to inherent anticipation. See Rambus, 

694 F.3d at 46 (“Anticipation is a question of fact and we 

uphold the Board’s factual determinations unless they are 

not supported by substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)). 

II. OBVIOUSNESS

A. Standard of Review and Legal Standard for Obviousness

A patent claim is invalid “if the differences between 

the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 

are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 

been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 

[PHOSITA] to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 

U.S.C. § 103(a);4 see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 

U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007) (discussing obviousness). Obviousness is a question of law that is reviewed de novo, 

based on underlying findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000). These underlying factual inquires include: (1) 

 

4 In passing the AIA, Congress amended § 103. See

Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287–88. However, because the application that led to the ’026 patent was 

filed before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 103 applies. 

See id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293. 

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WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 13

“the scope and content of the prior art”; (2) “differences 

between the prior art and the claims at issue”; (3) “the 

level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art”; and the presence of (4) secondary considerations of nonobviousness 

such “as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, 

[and] failure of others.” Graham v. John Deere Co. of 

Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966), cited with approval in 

KSR, 550 U.S. at 399. Evidence of copying is also considered when evaluating secondary considerations of nonobviousness. Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, 

Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

“The objective evidence of nonobviousness . . . may in 

a given case be entitled to more weight or less, depending 

on its nature and its relationship to the merits of the 

invention.” W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 

F.2d 1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Additionally, any 

“commercial success of the product must be due to the 

merits of the claimed invention beyond what was readily 

available in the prior art.” J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste 

& Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citation 

omitted). 

B. PTAB Did Not Err in Its Obviousness Determination 

for Claims 1–13 and 19

Mr. White argues the PTAB’s finding of obviousness is 

based on its erroneous determination that Selker does not 

teach a structural limitation. He contends the PTAB did 

“not rely on Grenda, Sharkey, and Manges to teach a 

‘totally removable cover’ for a dual-function container as 

claimed in the ’026 patent because it erroneously understood Selker to teach that limitation.” Appellant’s Br. 32 

(citation omitted). As such, Mr. White contends the 

PTAB’s “determination that claims 1–13 and 19 are 

obvious based on Selker in view of Grenda, Sharkey, or 

Manges is unsupported and should be reversed.” Id. 

These arguments are raised in one paragraph of Mr. 

White’s appeal brief and they rely on his previous arguCase: 15-1176 Document: 57-2 Page: 13 Filed: 02/19/2016
14 WHITE v. H.J. HEINZ CO. 

ment that the PTAB erred in its determination of what 

Selker teaches. The arguments—underdeveloped in any 

event—need not be addressed because we affirm the 

PTAB’s findings regarding Selker. Mr. White does not 

otherwise develop his nonobviousness argument, instead 

relying entirely on secondary considerations. 

As the PTAB explained, Mr. White relied “on secondary consideration evidence [that] addresses what has 

already been determined to be taught by Selker, so the 

evidence relating to the nonobviousness of those features, 

as opposed to the entirety of what is claimed in claim 1, 

[is] inapt.” J.A. 7. On appeal, Mr. White fails to present 

any developed arguments explaining how the asserted 

secondary considerations address elements of the invention other than those taught by Selker. On this record, 

we cannot say the PTAB erred in its determination that 

Mr. White’s secondary considerations failed to establish 

nonobviousness. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. White’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the 

decision of the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board is 

AFFIRMED

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