Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02243/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02243-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Albert Terrell Ellis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2243

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Albert Terrell Ellis

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

____________

 Submitted: December 18, 2015

 Filed: March 18, 2016

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Albert Terrell Ellis was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm as a felon,

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), 924(e); possessing heroin with intent to distribute,

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a

drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). He argues on appeal that the

government’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts and that

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the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior felony drug1

trafficking conviction. We affirm.

Ellis first argues that the government’s evidence against him was insufficient

to support his convictions. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government and accepting all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in

favor of the verdict. United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2006). 

Our review of the evidence presented at trial is “highly deferential.” United States

v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2008). “If evidence consistent with guilt

exists, we will not reverse simply because the facts and circumstances may also be

consistent with some innocent explanation.” United States v. Griffith, 786 F.3d 1098,

1102 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Even where the evidence ‘rationally supports two conflicting

hypotheses, [we] will not disturb the conviction.’” (citation omitted)). Moreover, “it

is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should

be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011)

(per curiam). Thus, we will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable jury could

have found the defendant guilty. See Maloney, 466 F.3d at 666. 

In October 2012, Ellis drove his mother’s GMC Envoy from his home in

Chicago, Illinois, to Duluth, Minnesota, where he planned to stay for several days

with his sometime girlfriend, Arajay Guinn, who had recently moved into a duplex

apartment rented by Jacqueline Clancey. Clancey’s boyfriend, Mathew Johnson,

would also periodically stay at the apartment. Clancey knew Ellis only as “Medicine

Man,” because he supplied heroin to her, Guinn, and Johnson. According to Clancey,

Ellis kept a “stack of cash” in the apartment, but he would “leave the apartment” to

retrieve the heroin that he supplied to her “every day.” Ellis told Clancey that he had

a firearm “somewhere in the house.” He did not tell her precisely where he kept it,

however, and she never saw him with a firearm. At some point after Ellis’s stay

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

1

District of Minnesota. 

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began, Clancey wasin the duplex’s common basement area searching for heroin when

she discovered a firearm wrapped in a brown plastic grocery bag in a closet. Because

she was concerned and “didn’t know why [the firearm] was there,” she removed it

from the closet and placed it in a small storage space beneath a wooden trapdoor in

the basement floor. 

On October 10, 2012, Clancey and Guinn engaged in a violent physical

altercation at the apartment over heroin and money. Sometime during the altercation,

Ellis, who was not present when the argument began, arrived at the apartment and

separated the two women. Clancey then telephoned her mother, crying and claiming

that she was frightened, that she felt unsafe, that “something bad [was] happening,”

and that her mother should telephone the Duluth police. Clancey’s mother called 911

and asked the dispatcher to send an officer to Clancey’s home to check on her

welfare. Clancey told Ellis and Guinn that the police were on the way, and she

demanded that Guinn move out of the apartment immediately. Ellis warned Clancey

not to “tell anybody or else he’s coming back,” whereupon he and Guinn began to

remove Guinn’s belongings from the residence. 

Duluth Police Officer Daniel Rendulich responded to the 911 call, arriving at

the apartment to find Ellis in the front yard, loading Guinn’s belongings into a Ford

Expedition that Ellis had borrowed from a friend. Ellis told Rendulich that Clancey

and Guinn had been fighting and that he was helping Guinn move out of the

apartment. When Duluth Police Officer Matt McShane arrived, the officers went

inside the apartment to speak with Clancey. McShane soon saw Guinn outside the

apartment, and, having heard that she “had drugs on her person,” went outside and

asked to look inside her bag, in which he found evidence of heroin use, including

syringes and a spoon coated with burned residue. 

In the meantime, Rendulich was inside the apartment speaking with Clancey,

who “appeared nervous and upset,” “leaned in close” to speak with him, and

“look[ed] constantly over [his] shoulder at the door . . . as if she was concerned about

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somebody coming in or interrupting what she was saying.” Clancey told Rendulich

that she had discovered a firearm in her basement that she believed belonged to Ellis,

and she offered to show Rendulich where she had hidden it. Clancey led Rendulich

to the wooden trapdoor in the basement floor, but the firearm was no longer there. 

Rendulich, concerned that there was a firearm on the scene that had not been

accounted for, advised McShane by radio to conduct a pat down of Ellisto ensure that

he was not armed. The pat down revealed that Ellis was not armed but was carrying

a “quantity of cash” in his pocket that was “bundled into a few separate packages or

packets,” which, according to McShane, was typical “of individuals who sell

controlled substances.” McShane returned the cash to Ellis, and Ellis and Guinn

drove away in the Expedition a short time later. 

Meanwhile, after Clancey and Rendulich failed to find the firearm where

Clancey had hidden it beneath the trapdoor, Clancey led Rendulich to the basement

closet where she had originally discovered the firearm. Inside the closet was a plastic

grocery bag that held two boxes of ammunition, but no firearm. Clancey then told the

officers that Ellis had retrieved the heroin he supplied her and the others from his

vehicle, and that she suspected that the firearm, as well as Ellis’s drug stash, would

be in that vehicle. She then pointed the officers to Ellis’s Envoy, which was parked

on the street in front of the duplex, resting on a jack and missing a rear tire. A day

or two earlier, Ellis had asked Johnson to fix a flat tire on the Envoy, but Johnson had

been unable to remove the spare tire from its rack under the vehicle, leading Ellis to

use the Expedition to take the flat tire to a repair shop on the morning of October 10,

from where he planned to pick up the repaired tire later that afternoon. After Clancey

identified Ellis’s Envoy, Rendulich ran its license plates and determined that the

vehicle was registered to Ellis’s mother in Illinois. He then called for a police canine

unit to conduct a drug sniff of the vehicle, and McShane contacted Investigator Scott

Williams to obtain a warrant to search the vehicle. Two canine units eventually

arrived, and both dogs alerted to the vehicle. 

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After Williams arrived with a warrant, the officers searched the Envoy and

recovered from its gas-cap compartment a clear plastic bag, which held several

separate, smaller-quantity packets of crack cocaine and heroin. Subsequent analysis

confirmed that the bag contained a total of .08 grams of heroin and 1.6 grams of crack

cocaine. The officers recovered from under the vehicle’s hood a loaded .45-caliber

handgun wrapped in a brown plastic grocery bag, which Clancey testified resembled

the firearm and grocery bag she had discovered in her basement. After the officers

found the drugs and the firearm, McShane reentered the apartment and, learning that

Clancey had left and Johnson had arrived, obtained permission from Johnson to

retrieve the ammunition from the basement closet. 

The handgun and the ammunition, as well as the plastic grocery bags in which

they were found, were submitted for fingerprint and DNA analysis. Although Ellis’s

fingerprint was found on the ammunition evidence, neither his fingerprints nor his

DNA was found on the firearm or the plastic bag in which it was found. 

In addition to the foregoing evidence, the jury heard testimony from several

government experts. The government’s expert in drug trafficking and drug

organizations explained, among other things, that firearms are an essential tool used

by drug traffickers to protect themselves, their drugs, and their drug proceeds. The

government’s fingerprint expert explained that if the surface of a firearm is “dirty or

textured,” or if an individual has very dry hands or is wearing gloves while handling

the firearm, it may not be possible to recover fingerprint evidence from the firearm. 

The government’s DNA expert explained that if a firearmhad been “cleaned or wiped

down,” there may be no DNA evidence present. The expert also stated that firearms

are often coated in “oils and grease,” which “inhibit DNA from showing up,” and that

firearms “get hot when they’re shot,” which “breaks down DNA.” 

At the close of the government’s case, the district court ruled on the

government’s motion to introduce evidence of Ellis’s 1996 state felony conviction for

heroin delivery, stating:

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I think the heroin, particularly since it is possession with intent and this

case involves heroin and a defense it does not belong to the defendant

but another heroin user—there’s multiple heroin users who are in

question and whose credibility is challenged before the Court—it may

assist the jury in determining who the heroin belonged to and recovery

from the vehicle in light of the defense. So I will allow inquiry into the

1996 Cook County possession of a controlled substance with intent to

deliver, which is an exactsame possession of the exactsame drug in this

case. So I will allow its admissibility under 404(b).

Following the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, Ellistestified in his own

defense, during which his counsel raised the subject of the 1996 conviction. On

cross-examination, the government elicited follow-up testimony from Ellis to clarify

the year of the conviction and to confirm that it involved the delivery of heroin. Ellis

also testified about his time at Clancey’s apartment and the events on October 10,

generally denying all knowledge of the drugs and firearm and suggesting instead that

either Clancey or Johnson had placed the contraband in his vehicle. As recounted

earlier, the jury found Ellis guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon, of possessing

heroin with intent to distribute, and of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a

drug-trafficking crime. It found him not guilty on the possession-of-ammunition

charge. The district court sentenced Ellis to 262 months’ imprisonment. 

Ellisfirst argues that the evidence wasinsufficient to convict himof possessing

a firearm as a felon. To find Ellis guilty of this offense, the government was required

to prove that Ellis was a felon, that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the

firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g);

Maloney, 466 F.3d at 666. Ellis challenges the sufficiency of the government’s

evidence on the second element—that he knowingly possessed the firearm recovered

from his vehicle. “Possession” for these purposes may be either actual or

constructive. Maloney, 466 F.3d at 666. A defendant may be in constructive

possession of a firearm if he has “dominion and control” over the firearm itself or

over the premises in which the firearm was located. Id. at 666-67. “Proof of

constructive possession is sufficient to prove the element of knowing

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possession . . . .” United States v. Johnson, 285 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2002). More

specifically, we have held that a defendant’s dominion and control over a vehicle may

indicate knowledge of the vehicle’s contents. See United States v. Parker, 587 F.3d

871, 881 (8th Cir. 2009).

Ellis does not dispute that the vehicle from which the firearm was recovered

belonged to him. He argues, however, that there was insufficient evidence to prove

that he had dominion and control over the vehicle because he had given the vehicle’s

keys to Johnson when he asked Johnson to change the flat tire. Thus, argues Ellis,

the evidence established that it was Johnson who had dominion and control over the

vehicle and constructively possessed the firearm recovered therefrom. We disagree. 

Clancey testified that Ellis did not give her or Johnson the keys to the vehicle while

they were attempting to change the tire. Although Johnson said nothing about the

keys, he denied driving Ellis’s vehicle, denied putting the heroin or the firearm inside

Ellis’s vehicle, and testified that he “never went in the vehicle or anything like that.” 

Johnson also testified that although he had used “20 gauges and 12 gauges for clay

pigeon[s],” he had “never held a handgun or owned one in [his] life.” Clancey

confirmed that she had never seen Johnson with a handgun. Accordingly, there was

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that it was Ellis and not Johnson,

who had dominion and control over the vehicle.

The crux of Ellis’s argument is that the jury made an erroneous credibility

determination by rejecting his testimony in favor of Clancey’s and Johnson’s. But

weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses are “exclusively for

the jury.” Kirk, 528 F.3d at 1111. The jury heard the conflicting testimony, it

assessed the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and it elected to credit

Clancey and Johnson, despite Ellis’s vigorous challenges to their credibility. Any

doubts about their credibility, “[w]hether well-founded or not,” were for the jury—not

the court—to resolve. United States v. Kelly, 625 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2010). 

Likewise, it wasthe jury’s responsibility to decide what conclusions should be drawn

from the evidence. Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 4; see also United States v. Anderson, 78

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F.3d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The evidence need not exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence, and we may not disturb the conviction if the evidence

rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses.”). 

Ellis also points to the fact that neither his DNA nor his fingerprints were

recovered from the firearm. But the government’s experts explained why DNA and

fingerprint evidence may be difficult to recover from a firearm, and the jury was

entitled to consider these explanations in reaching its conclusion that Ellis possessed

the firearm despite the absence of DNA and fingerprint evidence. 

Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient for a

reasonable jury to conclude that Ellis maintained dominion and control over his

vehicle and thus knowingly possessed the firearm recovered therefrom.

Ellis next argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of

possessing heroin with intent to distribute. To convict Ellis of this offense, the

government was required to prove that Ellis knowingly possessed the heroin

recovered from his vehicle and that he intended to distribute it. See United States v.

Timlick, 481 F.3d 1080, 1082 (8th Cir. 2007). As with possession of a firearm,

constructive possession ofillegal drugs issufficient to satisfy the element of knowing

possession, and such possession is established if a defendant has dominion and

control over the illegal drugs themselves or over the premises in which those drugs

are located. See id. at 1083. Having already concluded that the evidence was

sufficient to establish that Ellis exercised dominion and control over the vehicle and

thus had constructive possession of the firearm recovered from the vehicle, we

likewise conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Ellis

constructively possessed the heroin recovered from the vehicle. 

With respect to Ellis’s intent to distribute that heroin, Clancey testified thatshe

knew Ellis as “Medicine Man” and that he had supplied her, Guinn, and Johnson with

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heroin. The officers found heroin paraphernalia in Guinn’s purse on the day in

question. The heroin recovered from Ellis’s vehicle was packaged in several smaller

quantities, which government witnessestestified was a common practice among drug

dealers. Clancey also testified that Ellis kept a “stack of cash” in the apartment, and

McShane testified that Ellis had a “quantity of cash” in his pocket “bundled into a few

separate packages or packets,” which, in his experience, was typical “of individuals

who sell controlled substances.” Ellis denied possessing the heroin with intent to

distribute and again claimed that either Clancey or Johnson was responsible for

placing the contraband in his vehicle. He also disputed the suggestion that the

manner in which he carried cash in his pocket implied drug trafficking. But the jury

reasonably rejected Ellis’s testimony in favor of the government’s theory. “[T]he

presence of one possible ‘innocent’ explanation for the government’s evidence does

not preclude a reasonable jury from rejecting the exculpatory hypothesis in favor of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maloney, 466 F.3d at 667. Again keeping in mind

our highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient for the jury to find that Ellis possessed the heroin recovered from his

vehicle with intent to distribute. Accordingly, we affirm Ellis’s possession-withintent conviction.

Ellis was charged under § 924(c)(1)(A) with using and carrying a firearm

during and in relation to the underlying heroin-distribution offense. This offense

encompasses two alternative types of conduct with a firearm, “using” or “carrying,”

“either one of which provides a basis for prosecution under the statute.” United

States v. White, 81 F.3d 80, 83 (8th Cir. 1996). As noted earlier, the jury found Ellis

guilty on the carrying charge. We have already concluded that Ellis knowingly

possessed a firearmfor purposes of the felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1),

but “carrying” a firearm for purposes of a § 924(c)(1)(A) charge requires something

more than simple “possession.” See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126,

136 (1998); see also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1995). A

defendant carries a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A) when he bears it on his person. See

Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 130 (“No one doubts that one who bears arms on his person

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‘carries a weapon.’ But to say that is not to deny that one may also “carry a weapon”

. . . in a car.”). A defendant also carries a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A) when he

“knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked

glove compartment or trunk of a car, which [he] accompanies.” Muscarello, 524 U.S.

at 127; see also United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 851 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that

“an individual can carry a firearm merely by knowingly transporting it in a vehicle”). 

A defendant carries a firearm “during and in relation to” an underlying drugtrafficking offense when the firearm “facilitated or had the potential to facilitate” the

drug-trafficking offense. United States v. Winn, 628 F.3d 432, 439 (8th Cir. 2010)

(citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)). 

The government argues that Ellis carried the firearm in his vehicle. We need

not determine whether the government must prove that Ellis actually drove the

vehicle while the firearm was located within it, because the evidence was sufficient

for a jury to conclude that Ellis had carried the firearm on his person. Specifically,

there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ellis “carried” the

firearm for purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A) by retrieving it from the basement of the

duplex, transporting it to his vehicle, and concealing it in his vehicle near his heroin

stash. Clancey testified that Ellis told her that he had a firearm and that she later

discovered a firearm in her basement. She further testified that on the morning in

question, she told Ellis that the police were on the way to the apartment, giving Ellis

ample time to remove the firearm from the basement and conceal it in his vehicle. 

When police arrived at the duplex, the firearm was no longer in the basement but was

eventually recovered from Ellis’s vehicle. Both Clancey and Johnson denied placing

the firearm in Ellis’s vehicle. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that

Ellis, knowing police were on the way to the apartment, retrieved the firearm he had

hidden in the basement and concealed it in his vehicle, along with his heroin stash,

in an effort to protect this contraband from discovery by police. 

Moreover, the evidence wassufficient for the jury to conclude that Ellis carried

the firearm from the apartment to his vehicle “during and in relation” to his heroin-

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distribution activity. The government presented evidence that firearms are essential

tools used by drug traffickers to protect themselves, their drugs, and their drug

proceeds, and “[w]e have long recognized the role of firearms in protecting drugs or

drug proceeds.” United States v. Espinosa, 300 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Clancy testified that Ellis would leave the apartment to retrieve heroin from his

vehicle. The evidence wassufficient for the jury to infer that Ellis carried the firearm

from the basement to his vehicle to conceal it near his heroin stash with the purpose

of facilitating his heroin-distribution activity. 

“If evidence consistent with guilt exists, we will not reverse simply because the

facts and circumstances may also be consistent with some innocent explanation.”

Griffith, 786 F.3d at 1102 (“Even where the evidence ‘rationally supports two

conflicting hypotheses, the reviewing court will not disturb the conviction.’” (citation

omitted)). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict and accept all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in favor of

the verdict. Given this highly deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the

evidence was insufficient to support Ellis’s conviction for carrying a firearm during

and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, and thus we affirm the conviction. 

Finally, Ellis argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence of his 1996 state felony conviction for possessing heroin with intent to

deliver. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to admit

evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United

States v. Cowling, 648 F.3d 690, 699 (8th Cir. 2011). Such evidence is not

admissible under Rule 404(b) “solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit

criminal acts,” id. (citation omitted), but is admissible to show “motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of

accident,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of a prior conviction is admissible if (1)

it is relevant to a material issue, (2) it is similar in kind and not overly remote in time

to the charged offense, (3) it is supported by sufficient evidence, and (4) its potential

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prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Cowling, 648 F.3d at

699. 

Ellis denied possessing or distributing heroin and denied any knowledge of the

heroin recovered from his vehicle, which placed his state of mind at issue and

rendered his prior heroin-delivery conviction probative of his knowledge and intent

to commit the charged heroin-distribution offense. See United States v. Thomas, 58

F.3d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible

when a defendant places his state of mind at issue by means of a general-denial

defense); United States v. Gipson, 446 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of

prior possession of drugs, even in an amount consistent only with personal use, is

admissible to show such things as knowledge and intent of a defendant charged with

a crime in which intent to distribute drugs is an element.” (quotation and alteration

omitted)). Moreover, Ellis’s prior conviction was for delivering heroin—the very

drug he was charged with distributing in this case, which made the prior conviction

particularly relevant to knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake. Furthermore, any

prejudicial effect of admitting the prior-conviction evidence was mitigated by the

district court’s limiting instruction to the jury that it could consider the evidence of

Ellis’s prior conviction only to evaluate his credibility and to determine “knowledge,

motive, absence of mistake, accident or intent.” See United States v. Ironi, 525 F.3d

683, 688 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that prejudicial effect of prior-crimes evidence was

reduced when the district court instructed jury to consider prior-crimes evidence only

to determine intent). We thus reject Ellis’s argument that the evidence was admitted

for an improper purpose and was more prejudicial than probative.

Ellis also argues that his prior conviction was too remote in time to be

admissible under Rule 404(b), noting that his 1996 conviction was nineteen years old

at the time of the instant offense. Although proximity in time is a factor a court must

consider in deciding whether to admit Rule 404(b) evidence, we have held that “there

is no fixed period within which the prior acts must have occurred.” United States v.

Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 276 (8th Cir.1996). Instead, we “appl[y] a standard of

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reasonableness, as opposed to a standard comprising an absolute number of years, in

determining whether a prior offense occurred within a relevant time frame for

purposes of Rule 404(b).” United States v. Green, 151 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.

1998). We have applied this standard of reasonableness in cases in which the prior

convictions were similarly remote in time to the prior conviction in this case. See

United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2002) (twenty years);

United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271,1275 (8th Cir. 2006) (eighteen years); United

States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1573 (8th Cir. 1996), (seventeen years); United

States v. Warren, 788 F.3d 805, 812 (8th Cir. 2015) (fifteen years). A factor relevant

in those casesis also present in this case, namely, that Ellis wasincarcerated for much

of the time between his 1996 offense and the offense charged here. See, e.g., Warren,

788 F.3d at 812 (noting that the admission of “remote convictions [has] been upheld

when a defendant has been in custody for much of the intervening time period”). 

Because the prior-crimes evidence wasrelevant, probative, and not too remote

in time to the instant offense, and because any potentially unfair prejudicial impact

was mitigated by the district court’s limiting instruction, the district court did not

abuse its discretion under Rule 404(b) by admitting the evidence of Ellis’s 1996 state

felony conviction.

The judgment is affirmed.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

This is a close case marked by the lack of direct evidence of appellantdefendant Albert Ellis’s (Ellis) guilt. Instead, the government relies, primarily, on

circumstantial evidence to sustain Ellis’s convictions. Based upon the evidence

submitted at trial, while on somewhat different grounds, I concur in the majority’s

conclusion that the circumstantial evidence issufficient to sustain Ellis’s convictions

for possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2),

924(e), and possessing heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

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§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). I further agree with the majority that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Ellis’s prior felony drug-trafficking

conviction. I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that sufficient evidence

supported Ellis’s conviction for “carr[ying]” a firearm “during and in relation to” a

drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

“We review the denial of a motion for acquittal by viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, giving the government the benefit of all

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” United States v. Davis, 103

F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). We will uphold the conviction

unless “a reasonable factfinder must have entertained a reasonable doubt about the

government’s proof of one of the offense’s essential elements.” Id. (quoting United

States v. French, 88 F.3d 686, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1996)). This “ ‘standard applies even

where the conviction rests entirely on circumstantial evidence.’ ” United States v.

Wilcox, 50 F.3d 600, 602-03 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Durns v. United States, 562

F.2d 542, 546 (8thCir. 1977)). “[W]here the government’s evidence is equally strong

to infer innocence of the crime charged as it is to infer guilt, the verdict must be one

of not guilty and the court has a duty to direct an acquittal.” United States v. Kelton,

446 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).

Under the statute, to sustain Ellis’s conviction, the government must prove

Ellis “carrie[d]” a firearm “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.” 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The Supreme Court held that the word “carr[y]” in section

924(c)(1) means the government must prove the firearm was either on the defendant

or accompanying the defendant. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 130-31,

118 S. Ct. 1911, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1998). Thus, to “carry” a firearm requires some

“conveyance” of the firearm, whether by bearing the firearm or “carrying . . . [the]

firearm in a vehicle.” Id. at 128-30, 139.

The Supreme Court further defined the phrase “in relation to” under

section 924(c)(1) to mean “the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect

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to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of

accident or coincidence.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237-38, 113 S. Ct.

2050, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1993). The words “during and in relation to” are the

“limiting phrase” in section 924(c)(1) that “should prevent misuse of the statute to

penalize those whose conduct does not create the risks of harm at which the statute

aims,”—namely convincing an individual to “ ‘leave his [or her] gun at home’ ” when

“ ‘tempted to commit a Federal felony.’ ” Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132, 139, 118 S.

Ct. 1911, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968) (statement of

Rep. Poff)).

Beginning with the “carrying” prong ofsection 924(c)(1), the record shows no

evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Ellis carried the firearm from the basement of

the duplex to the vehicle. Instead, the evidence presented at trial included: (1)

Jacqueline Clancey’s (Clancey) testimony that, (a) Ellis told Clancey he had a

firearm, (b) Clancey never saw Ellis with a firearm, (c) Clancey found a firearmin the

basement of the duplex, (d) Clancey believed the firearm belonged to Ellis,

(e) Clancey moved the firearm to a secret location—unknown to Ellis, and

(f) Clancey did not move the firearm in Ellis’s inoperable vehicle; and (2) Mathew

Johnson’s testimony that he did not place the firearm in Ellis’s inoperable vehicle. 

None of this evidence proves Ellis “carried” the firearm.

The majority improperly permits the jury to speculate from the absence of

evidence regarding the removal of the firearm from the basement—when the

government bears the burden to prove the elements of the crime. See United States

v. Simms, 18 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The burden to make out the guilt of the

defendant . . . is upon the government”); see also Stanback v. United States, 113 F.3d

651, 657 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Absent any evidence in that vein, only speculation will

permit us to construe the mere presence of the gun on the table as the kind of ‘active

employment’ that Bailey requires as a precondition to conviction for ‘use’ of the

firearm.”); United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough the

government need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to

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sustain the conviction, we are loath to stack inference upon inference in order to

uphold the jury’s verdict” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

Even assuming Ellis carried the firearm from the basement to the vehicle, there

is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing Ellis carried the firearm “during and

in relation to” Ellis’s drug trafficking activities. We have consistently held, in

keeping with Supreme Court precedent, that “ ‘simultaneous possession of drugs and

. . . firearm[s] is not alone sufficient to support a conviction under’ section 924(c).”

United States v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original)

(quoting United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1150 (8th Cir. 2003)). Instead,

some “[e]vidence of a nexus between the defendant’s [carrying] ofthe firearmand the

drug offense is required.” Id. And “temporal proximity between the carrying of a

firearm and drug trafficking activity is important.” United States v. Bailey, 235 F.3d

1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000).

Here, the majority posits a jury could infer “that Ellis, knowing police were on

the way to the apartment, retrieved the firearm . . . and concealed it in his vehicle,

along with his heroin stash, in an effort to protect this contraband from discovery by

police.” (Maj. Op. 10 (emphasis added)). The majority concludes that from this

inference the jury could again infer that “Ellis carried the firearm . . . with the purpose

of facilitating his heroin-distribution activity.” (Id.) While one could speculate that

the drugs and the firearm were connected because they were both located in the

vehicle, “speculation is different from a reasonable legal inference based on specific

evidence.” United States v. Turner, 511 F. App’x 840, 844 (11th Cir. 2013) (Barkett,

J., dissenting) (per curiam) (unpublished). There exists not a single piece of evidence

showing Ellis carried a firearm during a drug transaction, or any other drug

trafficking activity. See id. at 845 (“Here there is no evidence . . . Turner’s coconspirators possessed firearms during any acts that were part of the charged drug

conspiracy, or that they possessed firearms to be used in furtherance of the

conspiracy, or that Turner could have reasonably foreseen that his co-conspirators

would possess firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy.”); United States v. Nichols,

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184 F. App’x 532, 537-39 (6th Cir. 2006) (Chon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part) (unpublished) (concluding insufficient evidence supported a section 924(c)

conviction when the only evidence tying the firearm and drugs was their placement

inside a vehicle); cf. United States v. Leary, 422 F. App’x 502, 513 (6th Cir. 2011)

(unpublished) (holding the evidence did not permit an inference a firearm and drugs

were connected, in part, because there was “no evidence that Leary possessed a gun”

any time he was observed with drugs).

Thus, concluding a nexus existed between Ellis’s alleged carrying of the

firearm from the basement and Ellis’s drug-trafficking activities requires stacking

numerous inferences upon each other, almost all speculative. Spencer, 439 F.3d at

914 (holding some “[e]vidence of a nexus between the defendant’s [carrying] of the

firearm and the drug offense is required”). In my view, this tenuous link between the

facts presented at trial and the conclusion Ellis carried the firearm during drugtrafficking activities falls on the side of speculation and it is impossible for a jury to

find Ellis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Nance, 40 F.

App’x 59, 65-66 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (concluding a potential to facilitate

drug trafficking is not shown simply because a firearm and drugs were found inside

a vehicle). To rule otherwise would undermine the “limiting” effect of the “during

and in relation to” element of the crime, such that the government need not prove a

nexus between the drug trafficking activities and the firearm. See Muscarello, 524

U.S. at 139, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111 (holding the “during and in relation

to” language isthe “limiting phrase” in section 924(c)(1) that “should prevent misuse

of the statute to penalize those whose conduct does not create the risks of harm at

which the statute aims”).

For these reasons, I vigorously dissent. For this non-violent offense, Ellis has

been sentenced quite harshly. Ellis’s conviction under section 924(c)(1)(A) should

be vacated on the merits and Ellis’s sentence should, thereby, be reduced by 60

months. 

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