Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cr-00207/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cr-00207-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Deshawn Torrence
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

KAREN A. ESCOBAR 

Assistant United States Attorney 

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 

Fresno, CA 93721 

Telephone: (559) 497-4000 

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 

KRISTEN CLARKE 

Assistant Attorney General 

Civil Rights Division 

FARA GOLD 

Special Litigation Counsel 

Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division 

United States Department of Justice 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

J. DESHAWN TORRENCE, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 1:22-CR-00207-JLT-SKO 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER 

DATE: November 2, 2022 

TIME: 1:00 p.m. 

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto 

 BACKGROUND

This case is set for a status conference on November 2, 2022. On May 13, 2020, this Court 

issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until 

further notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue 

matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 

issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s 

discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order caseby-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

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will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and 

previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonCase 1:22-cr-00207-TWR-SKO Document 32 Filed 10/25/22 Page 2 of 5
 

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exhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; 

(6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; 

and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id. 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United 

States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on November 2, 2022. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 

4, 2023, and to exclude time between November 2, 2022, and January 4, 2023, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

consists of over 79,000 pages of material and includes investigative reports, recordings, 

photographs, text messages, search warrants, and other items produced in electronic form. All of 

this discovery, including supplemental discovery produced on October 4, 2022, has been either 

produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying by the 

defendant’s former attorneys. Attorney Roger D. Wilson substituted in as counsel for the 

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defendant on October 19, 2022. 

b) The defense desires additional time to review discovery, conduct further 

investigation, and meet with the attorneys for the government to discuss a potential resolution. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence. 

d) The government does not object to the continuance. 

In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and presented by the 

evolving COVID-19 pandemic, and current subvariant strains, an ends-of-justice delay is 

particularly apt in this case because, in this district, the Court has begun to schedule a limited 

number of trials with several precautions designed to protect trial participants from possible 

infection with the coronavirus. For example, the Court plans to hold only one trial per floor at 

one time, thus limiting the number of trials that can be safely scheduled at any given time. 

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 2, 2022 to January 4, 

2023, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’ request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

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Dated: October 21, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ KAREN A. ESCOBAR

 KAREN A. ESCOBAR

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: October 21, 2022 KRISTEN CLARKE 

Assistant Attorney General 

Civil Rights Division 

/s/ FARA GOLD 

 FARA GOLD 

Special Litigation Counsel 

Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division 

Dated: October 21, 2022 /s/ Roger D. Wilson

 ROGER D. WILSON 

Counsel for Defendant J. DeShawn Torrence 

ORDER 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 

 THE HONORABLE SHEILA K. OBERTO 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

10/24/2022

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