Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-07078/USCOURTS-caDC-10-07078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AARP
Amicus Curiae
Mary Kate Breeden
Appellee
Equal Rights Advocates
Amicus Curiae
National Employment Lawyers Association
Amicus Curiae
National Partnership for Women & Families
Amicus Curiae
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation
Appellant
Public Justice Center
Amicus Curiae
Secretary of Labor
Amicus Curiae

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 10, 2011 Decided July 8, 2011

No. 10-7073

MARY KATE BREEDEN,

APPELLANT

v.

NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Consolidated with 10-7078

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-00625)

Adam Augustine Carter argued the cause for the

appellant/cross appellee. R. Scott Oswald was on brief.

Sally Dworak-Fisher was on brief for amici curiae Public

Justice Center, National Partnership for Women & Families and

Equal Rights Advocates in support of the appellant.

Daniel B. Kohrman and Melvin Radowitz were on brief for

amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association and

AARP in support of the cross-appellee. Stephen Z. Chertkof

entered an appearance.

USCA Case #10-7078 Document #1317459 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 1 of 23
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Rachel Goldberg, Attorney, United States Department of

Labor, argued the cause for amicus curiae Secretary of Labor in

support of the appellant.

Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for the appellee/cross

appellant. Jessica L. Ellsworth was on brief. Aaron R. Gelb,

David M. Hernandez and Mark L. Stolzenburg entered

appearances.

Before: HENDERSON, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Mary

Breeden (Breeden) sued her former employer Novartis

Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Novartis) alleging violations of

the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601

et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Novartis on Breeden’s interference claim and entered a

judgment as a matter of law on her retaliation claim. Breeden

appeals both the summary judgment and the judgment as a

matter of law. Novartis conditionally cross-appeals the district

court’s mixed-motive jury instruction, arguing that the FMLA

does not permit a mixed-motive claim. For the following

reasons, we affirm the district court in full and do not reach

Novartis’s conditional cross-appeal.

I.

Novartis hired Breeden in 2000 as an Associate Transplant

Specialist in its Transplant Business Unit (TBU). Her title later

changed to Transplant Account Manager (TAM) but her job

remained the same. The TBU sells products designed to help

prevent an organ transplant recipient’s body from rejecting the

new organ. As a TAM, Breeden’s job was to persuade doctors

and hospitals to use Novartis products.

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TBU management restructured the sales force in 2003 to

focus more closely on the medical centers performing the most

organ transplants and thus having the greatest influence in the

prescription of transplant drugs. As part of the restructuring,

Novartis transferred three of Breeden’s Virginia accounts to

another TAM—Ruth Ann Sneith (Sneith)—and gave Breeden

three new accounts—Johns Hopkins and the University of

Maryland, both in Baltimore, Maryland, and the Alfred I.

duPont Children’s Hospital in Wilmington, Delaware. Breeden

was “thrilled” with the realignment because she viewed Johns

Hopkins and the University of Maryland as “great centers.”

Breeden Dep. 38-39. Despite her excitement with the 2003

realignment, her performance did not improve. She was the

25th-rated TBU sales representative—out of 26—in 2002. Id.

at 59. In 2003, she was the lowest-rated TBU sales

representative—26th out of 26—and received a “below

expectations” rating of her sales performance. Id. at 59-60; Trial

Tr. 104, Breeden v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 2d 33

(D.D.C. 2010) (Breeden II) (No. 08-625 Mar. 1, 2010) (3/1/10

Tr.) (Breeden testimony). In 2004, she was again rated 25th out

of 26. 3/1/10 Tr. 102-03 (Breeden testimony).

In June 2004 Brian O’Callaghan (O’Callaghan), then in

charge of the TBU, accompanied Breeden on a sales call.

Breeden claimed he asked her if she had children, inquired about

her fertility treatments and asked if she planned to return to

Novartis after having children. O’Callaghan denied asking

those questions. According to him, Breeden asked about his

children and he responded, with what he believed to be “a

normal response” to her question, by asking Breeden if she had

any children. O’Callaghan Dep. 18. O’Callaghan claimed

Breeden replied that she did not have kids and “insinuated” she

could not have kids, at which point he “changed the subject and

moved on to a different conversation feeling uncomfortable.” 

Id.

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Shortly thereafter Novartis decided to realign its TBU sales

force again and in September 2004 hired the consulting firm ZS

Associates (ZS) to develop a new sales model. In November

2004 Breeden informed Novartis she was pregnant and would

need FMLA leave beginning in March 2005. ZS presented its

realignment proposal to TBU management the next month.

During its presentation, ZS discussed “contingency plans,”

which were intended “to plan for[] something out of the

ordinary, like a vacancy that hasn’t been filled or a maternity

leave or a disability of some kind, or a promotion, for example,

in the case of M. Stillwell. He was being promoted so we needed

to fill a vacancy.” Villageliu Dep. 80.1 Breeden’s upcoming

maternity leave was one of the contingency plans discussed at

the meeting, as was the upcoming maternity leave of another

employee, Kathy Dilger. Id. at 80-81, 84-85. The PowerPoint

slide that mentioned Breeden’s maternity leave read: “M.K.

Breeden on MAT leave in 2005: Who can work with her now to

learn the accounts and then temporarily cover her key accounts

when she [is] out on maternity leave in May/June?” Id. at 80. 

A ZS consultant who worked on the assignment stated that no

one gave him any reason to believe Breeden would not return

from maternity leave. Id. at 81.

ZS placed each account into a tier from I to IV and assigned

a “full-time equivalent” (FTE) value to each tier. Id. at 96. For

example, a Tier I account typically had a FTE value of .2 to .3,

meaning the TAM assigned to that account should devote 20%

or 30% of his time to that account. ZS tried to divide the

accounts so that each TAM had a FTE as close to 1.0 (100%) as

possible.

Effective January 1, 2005, TBU management assigned

Breeden nine accounts, all located in the Washington, D.C.,

1

 Alejandro Villageliu worked on the TBU’s 2004/2005

realignment as a ZS consultant. Villageliu Dep. 6-8.

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area. Breeden no longer serviced Johns Hopkins or the

University of Maryland, both Tier I accounts, or duPont

Children’s Hospital, a Tier III account. Her new accounts

included one Tier I account, three Tier II accounts, one Tier III

account and four Tier IV accounts. In total, Breeden had a FTE

of 1.01. Breeden claimed that she objected to the realignment

during a conference call in which O’Callaghan participated.

According to Breeden, O’Callaghan responded to her objections

by “jokingly” saying “well, you’re not coming back from

maternity leave anyway, right?”. Breeden Dep. 97-101.

O’Callaghan not only denied having made that statement but

denied having participated in the conversation at all.

O’Callaghan Dep. 42 (Q: “Did you ever say anything like

[‘Well, you’re not coming back from maternity leave

anyway’]?” A: “Never.”); id. at 42-43 (“Me getting into

conversations on a teli-con with individual sales representatives

would never have happened, and that conversation never

happened.”). Breeden further claimed that both O’Callaghan

and her immediate supervisor, Tom Harper (Harper),

acknowledged she had suffered from the realignment and

promised to make her “whole” and to “compensate” her by

giving her some of her old accounts back. Breeden Dep. 126-

27, 134-37. Both O’Callaghan and Harper denied making any

such promise. O’Callaghan Dep. 43; Harper Dep. 19-20.

Sometime in 2005 Harper spoke to Breeden and Sneith about

transferring some of Sneith’s accounts to Breeden. Sneith Dep.

21-24. The record contains a table comparing the number of

transplants performed at Sneith’s accounts to the number of

transplants performed at Breeden’s accounts and describing two

possible scenarios for transferring accounts from Sneith to

Breeden. Despite the discussion, no change took place.

According to Breeden, Harper told her he would not give her

any of Sneith’s accounts because Sneith was “single.” Breeden

Dep. 158-61. Harper denied making that statement.

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Breeden left Novartis on maternity leave in late March

2005. She returned in July 2005, having extended her leave

through the use of vacation time and personal days. On her

return, she held the exact position she had held when she left on

maternity leave in March, with the same title, same salary, same

benefits and, significantly, the same accounts. Harper Decl.

¶ 15; Appellant’s Br. 52. Breeden then began to distinguish

herself in the TBU. Whereas before 2005 she had ranked last or

next-to-last of all TBU sales representatives, in 2005 she ranked

14th out of 25. Breeden Dep. 70-71; 3/1/10 Tr. 103. She ranked

even higher in 2006—7th out of 25. Breeden Dep. 71-73; 3/1/10

Tr. 103. She and her colleagues in her business area received an

award at a national sales meeting in 2006 for working in the top

producing business area—a far cry from the “below

expectations” rating she had received in 2003. Breeden Dep.

156-57; 3/1/10 Tr. 105. Her compensation also

increased—substantially—after the realignment.

O’Callaghan left Novartis in mid-2006 and Novartis hired

Jesus Leal (Leal) to replace him as head of the TBU. Leal hired

Powell & Associates (Powell) in 2007 to recommend further

changes to the TBU sales structure. Among other things, Powell

recommended the TBU create a new sales territory covering

Indiana and Cincinnati, Ohio. Because the TBU believed it

could not afford to hire an additional sales representative,

Powell recommended it combine Breeden’s and Sneith’s

territories into one territory and terminate either Breeden or

Sneith in order to create a sales position for the new territory in

the Midwest. Leal Aff. ¶ 4; Weinberg Decl. ¶ 5. Novartis did

not consider Breeden for the new territory. Instead it hired a

sales representative who had previously worked for a competitor

in that region and who thus had existing relationships with

accounts there. Having recently combined territories in nonTBU sales groups, Novartis had developed written rules “on

how to combine territories and how [to] choose who is the . . .

surviving associate.” 3/2/10 Tr. (afternoon) 8-9 (testimony of

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Michael Barr, Novartis director of human resources). Under its

rules, Novartis retained Sneith, who had more accounts and

prescriptions in the combined territory (formerly Breeden’s and

Sneith’s separate territories). Novartis informed Breeden it was

eliminating her position in January 2008.

Breeden sued Novartis in district court in April 2008,

asserting an interference claim and a retaliation claim under the

FMLA. Her interference claim alleged that Novartis did not

give her a substantially equivalent position when she returned

from FMLA leave in July 2005. Her retaliation claim alleged

that Novartis realigned her accounts in 2005—and failed to keep

its alleged promise to make her “whole”—in retaliation for her

FMLA maternity leave. Novartis moved for summary judgment

on both claims. On February 16, 2010, the district court granted

summary judgment to Novartis on Breeden’s interference claim

but denied summary judgment on her retaliation claim. Breeden

v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60-63 (D.D.C.

2010) (Breeden I). The district court found that Breeden’s post2005 realignment position was substantially equivalent to her

pre-realignment position. Specifically, the court rejected

Breeden’s assertion that her post-realignment position required

less effort or skill than her pre-realignment position because, it

concluded, “more effort and skill should be needed to wring

more sales from a smaller territory.” Id. at 61. The court also

rejected Breeden’s argument that she lost the authority to offer

customers discounts by noting that every TAM lost that

authority after the realignment. Id. The court rejected

Breeden’s claim that her new account portfolio had less “status”

or “prestige” than her previous portfolio, noting that United

States Department of Labor regulations specifically exclude

“intangible[] or unmeasurable aspects of [a] job” when

measuring the equivalence of two positions. Id. (quoting 29

C.F.R. § 825.215(f)). Although the court denied summary

judgment on Breeden’s retaliation claim, it expressed doubt that

she would ultimately prevail on the claim. The court identified

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“proof of damages” as the defect in her retaliation claim,

observing that it “may turn out to be insurmountable.” Id. at 63.

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Breeden’s retaliation claim was tried to a jury over three

days in March 2010. At the end of Breeden’s case-in-chief,

Novartis moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Novartis argued that

Breeden failed to show she suffered damages as a result of the

alleged retaliation, i.e., the 2005 realignment. The district court,

although “inclined to agree with [Novartis] that the proof of

causation of damages is virtually nonexistent,” nonetheless

decided to submit the question to the jury pursuant to Rule

50(b).2 3/2/10 Tr. (afternoon) 33. The court noted “that the

passage of three years, the involvement of a new consultant, the

increase in the plaintiff’s income after 2005, between 2005 and

2008 . . . interrupt, attenuate and may defeat the chain of

causation.” Id.

The jury returned a verdict for Breeden on March 5 and

awarded her $289,669 in damages. Novartis moved for

judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

The district court granted Novartis’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law on May 26. Breeden II, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 35-37.

The court held that the FMLA’s requirement that an employee

suffer damages “by reason of” the FMLA violation requires the

employee to prove that the FMLA violation was the proximate

cause of his damages. Id. at 35-36. The court found that

Breeden’s harm—her 2008 termination—was too far removed

from the alleged retaliation—the 2005 realignment—with too

2

 Under Rule 50(b), within “28 days after the entry of judgment,”

a party whose earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law under

Rule 50(a) was not granted “may file a renewed motion for judgment

as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for

a new trial under Rule 59.” Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b).

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many intervening causes for the alleged retaliation to be the

proximate cause of her termination. Id. at 36-37. On June 1,

2010, Breeden appealed both the judgment as a matter of law

and the district court’s February 16, 2010 grant of summary

judgment to Novartis on her FMLA interference claim.

B. Mixed-Motive Cross-Appeal

In its conditional cross-appeal, Novartis argues the district

court erred by instructing the jury that it could find in favor of

Breeden on a mixed-motive theory of liability.3

 Novartis

3

 The mixed-motive language appears in Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, providing that an employment

discrimination plaintiff must establish that discrimination was only “a

motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other

factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)

(emphasis added); see Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340,

1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 930 (2009). If a

plaintiff alleges that discrimination was one of multiple “motivating

factor[s]” in his employer’s decisionmaking process, the plaintiff is

said to have a “mixed-motive” claim. See Ginger, 527 F.3d at 1345.

In contrast to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., does not permit mixed-motive claims against

a private employer and requires a plaintiff to “prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the

challenged adverse employment action.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009). The Supreme Court has not

addressed the viability of a mixed-motive claim under the FMLA, nor

has this court.

Novartis moved in limine to preclude Breeden from arguing a

mixed-motive theory at trial but the district court held the motion in

abeyance until jury instructions. Mot. in limine on Mixed Motive,

Breeden II, 714 F. Supp. 2d 33 (No. 1:08-CV-00625 Feb. 9, 2010).

Ultimately, the court allowed Breeden’s counsel to argue a mixedmotive theory to the jury and the district court instructed the jury that

Breeden need only establish that her taking FMLA leave was “a

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contends that the FMLA, like the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., does not permit

mixed-motive claims but requires a plaintiff to prove but-for

causation. Because Novartis prevailed in the district court, its

cross-appeal is conditional only, meaning we need not reach it

if we affirm the district court on Breeden’s appeal.

II.

Breeden claims that Novartis interfered with her FMLA

rights by failing to restore her to an equivalent position when

she returned from FMLA leave in 2005 and that Novartis

retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave by giving her

smaller, less prestigious accounts in the 2005 realignment and

by refusing to reassign her to her old accounts. We address her

claims in turn.

A. Interference Claim

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Novartis on Breeden’s interference claim. Sigmund

v. Starwood Urban Retail VI, LLC, 617 F.3d 512, 513 (D.C. Cir.

2010). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to

Breeden and affirm if “ ‘there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’ ” Id. at 513-14 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

The FMLA entitles an eligible employee, upon return from

FMLA leave, “to be restored . . . to the position of employment

held . . . when the leave commenced; or to be restored to an

equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay,

and other terms and conditions of employment,” 29 U.S.C.

§ 2614(a)(1), and prohibits an employer from “interfer[ing]

motivating factor” in Novartis’s decision to realign her accounts in

2005.

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with, restrain[ing], or deny[ing] the exercise of or the attempt to

exercise” FMLA rights, id. § 2615(a)(1). Breeden claims

Novartis interfered with her FMLA rights by not restoring her

to an equivalent position when she returned from FMLA leave

in July 2005. The district court appears to have assumed, as

Breeden argues here, that Breeden was entitled to be restored to

a position equivalent to the one she held in 2004 rather than to

the one she held in March 2005 when she began FMLA leave.

See Breeden I, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 60-61. Although we are not

convinced that is the correct comparison, because the issue has

not been joined before us and because we believe Breeden’s

post-FMLA leave position was equivalent to her 2004 position,

we can affirm the district court assuming without deciding that

it compared the correct positions.

Department of Labor regulations clarify what constitutes an

equivalent position. “An equivalent position is one that is

virtually identical to the employee’s former position in terms of

pay, benefits and working conditions, including privileges,

perquisites and status. It must involve the same or substantially

similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail

substantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and

authority.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). The equivalency analysis

does not, however, encompass “de minimis, intangible, or

unmeasurable aspects of the job.” Id. § 825.215(f). Breeden

acknowledges that she retained the same title and benefits when

she returned from FMLA leave and that her compensation

increased. She argues nonetheless “that her territory was so

drastically cut that her status, her responsibilities, her authority,

her level of effort, her job security, and her chances of

promotion were all severely and measurably diminished.”

Appellant’s Br. 52-53.4

4

 Breeden urges us to define “status” as used in 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.215(a) in conformity with Department of Labor regulations

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Breeden first alleges that her post-realignment territory

contained “many accounts that were closed doors” because the

formularies used by those accounts locked them into using

products made by Novartis’s competitors.5 Id. at 53. Despite

her allegation that “many” accounts were closed doors she

identifies only one—the University of Virginia. If the formulary

in fact “closed doors” on Breeden, it did so only temporarily, as

evidenced by the fact that Breeden eventually convinced the

University of Virginia to add a Novartis product to its

formulary. Breeden Decl. ¶ 14; see also Breeden Dep. 115

(“They were not permanent contracts, . . . they were yearly

contracts, so the goal was to get in there and change that . . . .”);

id. at 115-16 (Breeden “could readdress [account with formulary

using competitor’s products] in a year”). Moreover, Sneith

testified that an account’s use of a formulary did not turn the

account into a closed door. See Sneith Dep. 49 (use of

competitor’s products on formulary does “not necessarily” mean

Novartis products are “not allowed to be on the formulary”).

Sneith explained that one of her accounts had a contract with a

competitor but that a nephrologist at the account preferred

Novartis products. The nephrologist used the competitor’s

products during inpatient treatment but switched the patient to

Novartis products when he discharged the patient for outpatient

treatment. Id. at 50-51. “So long-term, that patient was going

to be on [Novartis] products, but for that four-day window of

interpreting “status” under the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A)-(B),

(a)(3)(A)-(B). See 69 Fed. Reg. 56,266, 56,275 (2004). Section

825.215 defines status precisely enough for us to conclude that

Novartis restored Breeden to an equivalent position without resort to

regulations promulgated under a different statute.

5

 “A formulary is essentially a list of prescription drugs preferred

by a particular health care provider or plan.” Appellee’s Br. 9 n.4.

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time when they were in the hospital, they were on the

competitor’s products. So in that case what the hospital did

inpatient didn’t really reflect what was going to happen moving

forward.” Id. at 51. The record therefore does not support

Breeden’s assertion that the formulary closed doors at many of

her accounts.

Breeden’s next argument, which seems to contradict her

first, claims that her post-realignment accounts required less

skill than her pre-realignment accounts “because there were

fewer decision-makers and fewer bureaucratic hoops to jump

through.” Appellant’s Br. 54. She also argues her new accounts

required less effort “because she spent significantly less time

traveling [in her car] to her new accounts.” Id. at 55. But the

number of “bureaucratic hoops” Breeden had to “jump through”

at each account is precisely the type of “intangible[] or

unmeasurable aspect[]” that we do not consider in assessing the

equivalency of positions. 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(f). Additionally,

that she spent fewer hours in her car after the realignment,

although a measurable aspect of the realignment, does not make

her post-realignment position non-equivalent to her prerealignment position. See Smith v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch.

Bd., 453 F.3d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) (fact that plaintiff no

longer had to travel in new position was de minimis, intangible

difference). Breeden’s job was selling medical products, not

driving cars.

Finally, Breeden argues that she enjoyed fewer

opportunities to advance her career after the realignment

because a TAM needed large accounts like the University of

Maryland and Johns Hopkins to receive a promotion. Breeden,

however, was hardly a rising star before the 2005 realignment.

She had consistently ranked last or next-to-last among sales

representatives in the TBU and had received a “below

expectations” rating in her sales evaluation. After the

realignment, by contrast, Breeden ranked 14th out of 25 sales

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representatives in 2005—despite being on leave from March to

July. In 2006 she rose further to rank 7th out of 25. While

Breeden’s improved ranking may have resulted partly from the

reduced expectations and sales goals that accompanied her

smaller account portfolio, that does not alter the fact that she

achieved substantial success after the 2005

realignment—success she had failed to attain while servicing

larger accounts before the 2005 realignment. Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Breeden’s favor, we do not believe a

reasonable juror could conclude that Breeden’s prospects for

career advancement were greater before the 2005

realignment—when she was among the least productive TAMs

but serviced some of Novartis’s largest accounts—than they

were after the realignment—when she was among the most

productive TAMs while servicing smaller accounts. To the

contrary, common sense tells us that a salesman who fails to sell

to his employer’s largest clients will not long hold his job, much

less receive a promotion. Cf. Csicsmann v. Sallada, 211 F.

App’x 163, 166 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s

argument “that the new position was ultimately slated for layoff

while the pre-leave position was not” because “[t]here [was]

nothing in the record to support his theory that the pre-leave

position would have survived”).

The Fourth Circuit, reviewing similar facts, held that a

plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was properly dismissed for

failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

Montgomery v. Maryland, 266 F.3d 334, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2001),

judgment vacated on other ground, 535 U.S. 1075 (2002); see

Montgomery v. Maryland, 72 F. App’x 17, 19-20 (4th Cir. 2003)

(reaffirming reasoning and holding on FMLA interference

claim). The plaintiff had worked as an administrative aide to the

warden of Maryland’s Eastern Correctional Institute but, upon

returning from FMLA leave, was reassigned to a position as a

secretary in the maintenance department. 266 F.3d at 336. She

retained the same salary and benefits but argued her new

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position was not equivalent to her old position because her

former duties had been “truly administrative” whereas her new

position required her to perform the “most menial of clerical

functions.” Id. at 341. Additionally, she had her own work area

in her old position but shared a room with another employee in

her new position. Id. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument

that the two positions were not equivalent, finding that her

“complaint focuse[d] on precisely the sorts of de minimis,

intangible, and unmeasurable aspects of a job that the

regulations specifically exclude.” Id. The court explained

further that “the alleged reduction in the complexity of her tasks

and the sharing of work space [fell] within the excluded de

minimis category.” Id. at 342. The difference between the

“truly administrative” tasks she used to perform and the more

menial tasks she performed in her new position was “not of

sufficient magnitude, especially given the equivalent pay grade

. . . , to constitute an FMLA violation.” Id.; see also Smith, 453

F.3d at 652 (positions equivalent where plaintiff retained same

salary and similar title and job description); Mitchell v.

Dutchmen Mfg., 389 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (positions

equivalent where plaintiff retained same salary and benefits but

was required to perform additional tasks that “were neither

overly time consuming nor physically demanding”); Csicsmann,

211 F. App’x at 166 (positions equivalent where “salary, title,

bonus eligibility, health care, and retirement benefits remained

unchanged” despite plaintiff’s allegation “that the new position

was less prestigious and less visible”); Lampley v. IMS Mgmt.

Servs., LLC, No. 10-11543, 2011 WL 914311, at *2 (11th Cir.

Mar. 17, 2011) (unpublished) (positions equivalent where

plaintiff retained same title, pay and benefits despite changed

work location). As in Montgomery, Breeden’s allegations

“focus[] on precisely the sorts of de minimis, intangible, and

unmeasurable aspects of a job that the regulations specifically

exclude.” Montgomery, 266 F.3d at 341. And, again as in

Montgomery, Breeden’s salary was not “interfere[d]” with.

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Novartis on Breeden’s interference claim.

B. Retaliation Claim

The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to

Novartis on Breeden’s retaliation claim because it concluded

that Breeden had failed to establish that Novartis’s alleged

retaliation in 2005 proximately caused her termination in 2008.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment as a

matter of law and “may affirm only if we find . . . that no

reasonable jury could [have reached] a verdict in the plaintiff’s

favor.” Conseil Alain Aboudaram, S.A. v. de Groote, 460 F.3d

46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(ellipsis and alteration in original). Although judgment as a

matter of law is “highly disfavored” because it “intrudes upon

the rightful province of the jury,” Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157,

1161 (D.C. Cir. 1994), it is proper if “the court finds that a

reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary

basis to find for” the nonmoving party, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

See Boodoo, 21 F.3d at 1161 (judgment as matter of law proper

if plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence of proximate

causation); see also Guile v. United States, 422 F.3d 221, 228

(5th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of judgment as matter of law

because plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause). The

questions before us, then, are whether the FMLA requires a

plaintiff with a retaliation claim to establish proximate causation

and, if so, whether Breeden presented evidence sufficient to

permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the 2005 realignment

proximately caused her termination three years later, in 2008.

An employer who violates the FMLA is liable “for damages

equal to the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits,

or other compensation denied or lost . . . by reason of the

violation; or . . . any actual monetary losses sustained . . . as a

direct result of the violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I)-

(II). Breeden does not dispute that the district court’s jury

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instructions “properly state[d] the law as set forth in the FMLA”

and “incorporate[d] the concept of proximate cause by requiring

that Breeden prove that she sustained monetary losses as a

direct result of Novartis’[s] retaliation.” Appellant’s Br. 31

(emphasis in original). The parties thus agree that Breeden had

to establish proximate causation. We may therefore assume

without deciding that an FMLA retaliation plaintiff must

establish proximate causation.

We next ask whether Breeden presented sufficient evidence

to establish proximate causation. In determining proximate

causation, we ask: “Was there an unbroken connection between

the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation? Did the

facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked

together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and

independent cause intervening between the wrong and the

injury?” Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 420 (D.C. Cir.

1975) (quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94

U.S. 469, 474-75 (1896)).6 The district court correctly

concluded that there was no continuous succession of events

between the 2005 realignment and Breeden’s termination.

Breeden II, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37. Rather, there were several

“new and independent cause[s] intervening between” 2005 and

6

 The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 433 identifies three

considerations in determining proximate cause: “[1] the number of

other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of

the effect which they have in producing it; [2] whether the actor’s

conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous

and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a

situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the

actor is not responsible; [3] lapse of time.” See also W. Page Keeton

et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, § 41, at 264 (5th ed.

1984) (“[L]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes which

are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that

the law is justified in imposing liability.”).

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2008. Novartis hired Leal to replace O’Callaghan as head of the

TBU in May 2006. Leal hired a new outside consultant, Powell

& Associates, to recommend changes to the TBU. That

consultant recommended creating a new sales area in the

Midwest. Because Novartis believed it could not afford to hire

another TAM, the recommendation was to combine Breeden’s

and Sneith’s sales areas. In combining non-TBU sales territories

in the past, Novartis had developed rules “on how to combine

territories and how [to] choose who is the . . . surviving

associate.” 3/2/10 Tr. (afternoon) 8-9 (Barr testimony).

Pursuant to those rules, Novartis decided to retain Sneith to

service the combined sales area. Only then—after each of the

foregoing intervening events—did Novartis terminate Breeden.

Breeden attempts to downplay the significance of the

intervening events by arguing that her immediate supervisor,

Harper, was a “direct and consistent link” between the alleged

retaliation in 2005 and her 2008 termination. Appellant’s Br.

34. Breeden claims Harper promised to make her “whole” by

reassigning her to the accounts she serviced in 2003-2004 but

ultimately reneged on that promise in retaliation for her FMLA

leave. Id. at 35. She further claims that Harper could have

prevented her termination in 2008 and that he was most

responsible for choosing to let her go rather than Sneith. The

record, however, does not support her assertions. Harper

testified that he lacked the authority to rearrange Breeden’s

accounts in 2005, see 3/2/10 Tr. (morning) 33-34 (testimony of

Harper that he referred Breeden’s request to his boss, who

“wasn’t particularly interested in moving accounts around”);

Harper Decl. ¶ 11 (“[A]fter [the 2005] realignment, I had no

ability or authority to transfer or assign accounts within my sales

area or outside my sales area . . . .”), and Breeden acknowledged

as much in her deposition, see Breeden Dep. 136-37 (Harper

told Breeden that “he would present [her request] to his

management, and they would work as a team to fix it”).

Additionally, Breeden offered no evidence that Harper played a

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role in the decision to terminate her. The evidence instead

indicates that Barr and John Weinberg, the TBU’s executive

director of sales and marketing, not Harper, made the decision.

See 3/2/10 Tr. (afternoon) at 19-20 (testimony of Harper that he

was “just told to get [Breeden] on the phone” and that he called

her for Barr); id. at 8-9 (testimony of Barr that he applied rules

in determining to terminate Breeden); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102-03

(Harper called Breeden to connect her to Barr, who “informed

Breeden that ‘outside consultants’ had decided to eliminate her

territory”); Leal Aff. ¶¶ 5-6 (Weinberg applied rules in deciding

to retain Sneith); Weinberg Decl. ¶¶ 6-7 (same). That Harper

was responsible for filling the open position in the new

Indiana/Cincinnati sales area, moreover, does not relate back to

Novartis’s decision to terminate Breeden nor is there any

evidence that Harper’s decision not to consider Breeden for the

position was in retaliation for Breeden’s taking FMLA leave

almost three years earlier. The sales representative Novartis

hired for the position had existing relationships with accounts in

the new territory—an important qualification that Breeden

lacked irrespective of the 2005 realignment.

Breeden further argues the intervening events were not a

new and independent cause of her termination because the 2005

realignment made her termination inevitable. She claims that a

TBU salesman can attain success and job security only by

servicing large, prestigious accounts and that, because she

serviced smaller, less prestigious accounts after the 2005

realignment, her career was doomed. Breeden attempts to

bolster her argument by claiming that TBU managers reached

their positions “by capitalizing on their performance at large

transplant centers” like the ones she serviced before 2005 and by

noting that Novartis filled the new position created by the 2008

realignment with a salesman who had, in Breeden’s words,

“important relationships with the major transplant centers” in

the newly created area. Appellant’s Br. 41-43. She asserts that

she “would have been able to maintain [connections] at Hopkins

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and [University of Maryland] had it not been for” the 2005

realignment and that her “lack of connections at large

prestigious transplant centers” was the “final straw” that led to

her termination. Id. at 43-44.

Breeden’s argument is flawed because the evidence does

not establish that simply servicing large accounts guarantees

success or job security. Instead it reflects that successfully

servicing large accounts enhances a sales associate’s career

prospects and job security. See 3/1/10 Tr. at 75 (testimony of

Breeden that “people that succeeded had these large accounts”

such as “Harper, who had done great in Ohio” (emphases

added)); id. at 77 (Breeden testimony) (“If you can get into a

large account and have success, it’s noted by everybody, and

from that you’re going to be obviously able to work your way

up.” (emphasis added)). Breeden’s managers did not attain their

positions because they serviced large accounts but because they

successfully serviced large accounts, see, e.g., 3/3/10 Tr. at 27-

28 (testimony of John Blutfield, head of TBU’s commercial

operations from approximately 2005-2006, that Harper and

another TBU manager had “legendary relationships” and “a

track record of success” with large accounts)—something

Breeden was never able to do. That some of the TBU’s best

sales associates, through “legendary” relationships with its

largest accounts, achieved success says nothing about Breeden’s

career prospects before the 2005 realignment.

Simply put, Breeden adduced no evidence to establish that,

had her accounts not been realigned, she would have established

and maintained successful relationships with the accounts she

serviced before 2005. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which

a reasonable jury could conclude that Breeden’s career prospects

or job security diminished after the 2005 realignment. The

evidence, in fact, suggests the contrary. Before the 2005

realignment, she was the last or next-to-last ranked sales

associate and received a “below expectations” rating in her 2003

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performance review despite the fact that she serviced large,

prestigious accounts. She did not achieve success until after the

2005 realignment when she began to service smaller accounts.

Not only did her sales rank improve significantly but she also

received—jointly with her colleagues in her business area—a

sales award at a national conference in 2006 and her

compensation increased. These are hardly the signs of a career

in decline or of an employee whose termination is inevitable. 

To the contrary, Breeden’s career seems to have been on the rise

after 2005.

We agree with the district court that no reasonable jury,

relying on the evidence presented at trial, could conclude that

the 2005 realignment proximately caused Breeden’s termination

in 2008. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of

judgment as a matter of law to Novartis on Breeden’s retaliation

claim.

C. Equitable Relief

An employer who violates the FMLA is liable not only for

money damages but also “for such equitable relief as may be

appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and

promotion.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B). Breeden claims the

jury found that Novartis violated the FMLA by retaliating

against her for taking FMLA leave and that the district court’s

subsequent judgment as a matter of law did not disturb that

finding. She raises this argument for the first time on appeal,

however, and it is accordingly forfeited. See Bennett v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 618 F.3d 19, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In

response to Novartis’s motion for judgment as a matter of law,

Breeden had the opportunity to argue that she was entitled to

equitable relief even if the district court found that she suffered

no monetary damages and granted Novartis’s motion but she

failed to do so.

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Even if the argument were not forfeited, however, we would

reject it. The district court instructed the jury that Breeden had

to prove four elements “to prevail on her claim of intentional

retaliation”—one of which was that she “lost compensation or

benefits by reason of Novartis’[s] alleged adverse action, or

sustained other monetary losses as a direct result of the alleged

adverse action.” 3/3/10 Tr. 84. The district court granted

judgment as a matter of law to Novartis because it found that

Novartis’s “alleged adverse action”—the 2005 realignment—did

not proximately cause Breeden’s 2008 termination. Breeden II,

714 F. Supp. 2d at 35-37. The district court thus held that

Breeden failed to present sufficient evidence to establish an

element necessary to her retaliation claim. In other words, the

court held that no FMLA violation occurred. As explained

supra, we affirm the district court’s holding that Novartis did

not violate the FMLA. Accordingly, Breeden is not entitled to

equitable—or any other—relief.7

7

 The cases on which Breeden relies to argue she is entitled to

appropriate equitable relief are easily distinguished. She relies most

heavily on Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division, 429

F.3d 325 (1st Cir. 2005), but that case says only that a “hypothetical

plaintiff who succeeds in establishing a retaliatory firing claim would

no doubt have been ‘prejudiced by the violation’ and would thus be

theoretically entitled to the full array of remedies provided by the

statute.” Id. at 335 n.6 (emphasis added); see also Traxler v.

Multnomah Cnty., 596 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2010) (employee

demoted to lower-paying position and then fired for taking FMLA

leave entitled to both monetary and equitable remedies); Miller v.

AT&T, 83 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-09 (S.D.W. Va. 2000) (employee fired

in violation of FMLA); Rogers v. AC Humko Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d

972, 974 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (employee fired in retaliation for taking

FMLA leave). Breeden, by contrast, does not clear the first

hurdle—that of “establishing a retaliatory firing.” Colburn, 429 F.3d

at 335 n.6.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to Novartis on Breeden’s

interference claim and its grant of judgment as a matter of law

to Novartis on Breeden’s retaliation claim.8

So ordered.

8

 Because we affirm the district court on Breeden’s appeal, we do

not reach Novartis’s conditional cross-appeal regarding the viability

of a mixed-motive claim under the FMLA.

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