Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00232/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00232-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cardell Hunes
Plaintiff
Wendy Kelley
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

CARDELL HUNES PETITIONER 

ADC #76654 

 

VS. 5:16-CV-00232 BSM/JTR 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent 

to United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to 

all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) 

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be 

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this 

Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of the 

right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Background

 Pending before the Court is a § 2254 habeas Petition filed by Petitioner, 

Cardell Hunes (“Hunes”). Doc. 2. He attacks a prison disciplinary conviction and 

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resulting punishment he received while incarcerated in the East Arkansas Regional 

Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”).1

 Doc. 2. 

 On November 6, 2015, ADC correctional officers received a written statement 

from fellow inmate, Casey Fyke (“Fyke”), who alleged that Hunes had sexually 

propositioned him multiple times. Fyke further alleged that Hunes slapped him the 

last time Fyke rejected Hunes’ advances. Doc. 5-2. The ADC launched an 

investigation into Fyke’s allegations. Doc. 5-3. 

 On November 7, 2015, Hunes made a written statement in which he 

categorically denied making any sexual comments to Fyke or having “any 

knowledge about [his] sexual life.” Doc. 5-4. 

 On December 10, 2015, after the completion of the ADC’s investigation, 

Hunes was charged with three disciplinary violations stemming from his alleged 

contact with Fyke: (1) failure to obey an order of staff; (2) lying to a staff member; 

and (3) making sexual proposals to another person. Doc. 2 at 2-3, 9; Doc. 5-6. 

 On December 18, 2015, Hunes attended a disciplinary hearing on the pending 

charges. When Hunes was given an opportunity to make a statement, he complained 

to Disciplinary Hearing Officer Keith Waddle (“DHO Waddle”) that the 

 1

 In 1981, Hunes was convicted of rape, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping and sentenced 

to a total of 170 years’ imprisonment. Hunes v. State, 274 Ark. 268 (1981). 

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“investigation . . . was not done according to policy” and investigators used a 

CVSA2

 in questioning him in violation of state and federal laws. Doc. 2 at 10-11.

DHO Waddle found Hunes guilty on all three disciplinary charges and imposed the 

following punishment: (1) 30 days in punitive isolation; (2) a reduction in goodtime classification; and (3) forfeiture of 365 days of good-time credit. Id 

 On December 21, 2015, Hunes appealed to the Warden. On December, 28, 

2015, the Warden affirmed the decision. Doc. 2 at 13. Hunes appealed to the 

Disciplinary Hearing Administrator and to Director Wendy Kelley, both of whom 

upheld the disciplinary convictions. Doc. 2 at 15-16. 

 In his habeas Petition, Hunes argues that he was denied due process because: 

(1) prison officials failed to follow internal policy, procedures and regulations in 

conducting their investigation into the misconduct allegations; (2) he was not 

permitted to submit a form entitled “Extension of Investigation Status”3

 into 

evidence at his hearing; and (3) DHO Waddle was biased. Doc. 2 at 6-7. Hunes 

requests the Court to reverse the DHO decision, restore his forfeited good-time 

credit, reassign him back to the general population, and restore his job assignment 

in the general population. Doc. 2 at 7. 

 2

 “CVSA” stands for “Computer Voice Stress Analyzer.” Doc. 5 at 6. It appears that 

investigators used a CVSA in questioning Hunes and determined that his answers were deceptive. 

Doc. 2 at 9. 

3

 The form is hereafter referred to as the “Extension of Investigation form.” 

Case 5:16-cv-00232-BSM Document 15 Filed 02/07/17 Page 3 of 13
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Respondent argues that Hunes’ habeas claims are either: (1) not cognizable in 

a federal habeas action; or (2) fail on the merits. Doc. 5. For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court agrees with Respondent and recommends that Hunes’ Petition for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and the case dismissed, with prejudice. 

II. Discussion

A. Hunes’ Challenge to the Forfeiture of Lost Good-Time 

Credit is His Only Cognizable Claim for Federal Habeas 

Relief 

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974), the Court held that a 

disciplinary conviction which results in a prisoner losing good time credits

implicates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Because the loss 

of good time credits affects the length of a prisoner’s confinement, a habeas action 

is a prisoner’s exclusive remedy to challenge the constitutionality of the final 

disciplinary conviction. See Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 

2002). However, if a prison disciplinary conviction does not result in the elimination 

of good-time credits, it has no effect on the length of the underlying sentence and 

“raise[s] no claim on which habeas relief could have been granted on any recognized 

theory.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004). 

Because Hunes’ disciplinary conviction resulted in the loss of 365 days of 

good-time credit, that portion of his claim can support habeas relief. Hunes’ “other 

claims,” which challenge the 30 days he spent in punitive isolation and the reduction 

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in his good-time classification, are not cognizable in a habeas action.4 Spencer v. 

Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014); Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 

1073–74 (8th Cir. 1996). 

B. The ADC’s Disciplinary Decision to Reduce Hunes’ GoodTime Credits Did Not Violate His Due Process Rights 

In a prison context, procedural due process requires only that a disciplinary 

proceeding afford a prisoner the following rights: (1) written notice of the 

disciplinary charges at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing; (2) an 

opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, for a 

prisoner to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) 

a written statement from an impartial decision maker identifying the evidence relied 

on to support the disciplinary convciction and the reasons for the disciplinary action. 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563-67. 

 4

 As to these “other claims,” the Court has considered whether Hunes might be able to 

assert them as a due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 

469-70 (8th Cir. 2014) (before dismissing habeas petition raising conditions-of-confinement 

claims, district court should consider whether the prisoner has raised a “potentially viable” 

constitutional claim and, if so, whether his case should be recharacterized as a civil rights action). 

Changes to a prisoner’s classification status and placement in punitive isolation for 

relatively short intervals do not constitute the type of “atypical and significant” hardships 

necessary to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 

482–86 (1995) (holding that the due process clause applies only when prison officials impose an 

“atypical and significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”);

Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F .3d 1063, 1065–66 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that thirty days in punitive 

segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin); Sanders v. Norris, 153 

Fed. Appx. 403, 404 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming pre-service dismissal of inmate’s § 1983 claim 

challenging post-disciplinary reduction in class status and thirty days in punitive isolation). Thus, 

there is no legal basis for recharacterizing Hunes’ other claims under § 1983. 

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Additionally, if a prison disciplinary action results in the loss of good time 

credits, there must be “some evidence” in the record to support the decision. 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1985). “Some evidence” has been 

defined as “any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 

the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added). This minimal evidentiary 

standard obligates federal courts to defer to the judgment of prison officials as long 

as the due process requirements of Wolff are satisfied and “there is any evidence in 

the record that could support the conclusion reached.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 

(emphasis added). 

 (1) Hunes’ Alleged Due Process Claims 

 (a) Documentary Evidence 

Hunes complains that, during his disciplinary hearing, DHO Waddle did not 

allow him to introduce into evidence the Extension of Investigation form. Doc. 2 at 

12. He further complains that on the form, none of the boxes next to the five preprinted reasons for extending the investigation were checked.5

 Hunes does not 

explain how the fact someone overlooked checking one of the boxes prejudiced him 

or otherwise effected the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. 

 5

 This form, which Hunes signed, stated that the investigation was being extended for five 

working days, from “November 26, 2015” to “December 3, 2015.” Petitioner’s Exh. C, Doc. 2 at 

12. The explicit written notation that the investigation was being extended seemingly makes it 

clear that, of the five unchecked boxes, the only one that is applicable is the last box: “The case 

requires more extensive investigation.” Id. A fair reading of this form makes it clear that Hunes’ 

“box check argument” is an attempt to make a mountain out of a molehill. 

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Even if one accepts Hune’ argument that it was a technical violation of ADC 

policy for one of the five boxes on the form not to be checked and that he was denied 

the right to introduce the form into evidence during his disciplinary hearing, neither 

of these ADC rule violations rises to the level of violating Hunes’ constitutional 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. A federal court may issue a writ of habeas 

corpus only for a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a). There is no federal constitutional interest in having 

state officers follow state law or prison officials follow prison regulations. Phillips 

v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003); Ebmeier v. Stump, 70 F.3d 1012, 1013 

(8th Cir. 1995). Thus, as to Hunes’ claim that prison officials failed to properly 

check one of the boxes on the Extension of Investigation form, this may have been 

a violation of ADC rules, but it cannot support a due process claim under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 

As to Hunes’ argument that he was somehow harmed by not being allowed to 

introduce the Extension of Investigation form into evidence at his disciplinary 

hearing, there is nothing in that document which would have aided his defense, much 

less altered the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding. See Howard v. United States, 

487 F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying harmless error analysis to due process claim 

that prison officials denied requested witness testimony at hearing); Powell v. 

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Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (constitutional violation in adjudicating 

prison disciplinary proceeding is subject to harmless error analysis). 

Finally, Hunes does not contend that the extension of the investigation for five 

days adversely impacted either his ability to present a defense or the outcome of his 

disciplinary hearing. If anything, the extension of the period for investigating the 

incident gave Hunes more time to prepare for his disciplinary hearing. In requiring 

that inmates must receive at least 24 hours notice, between the filing of disciplinary 

charges and the hearing to resolve those charges, the Court in Wolff was concerned 

with ensuring that prisoners had an adequate opportunity “to marshal the facts and 

prepare a defense.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Here, Hunes had at least 8 days between 

formally being charged on December 10th and the disciplinary hearing on December 

18th. This was more than ample time for Hunes to prepare his defense. Yet, when 

permitted to make a statement at his disciplinary hearing, Hunes only complained 

about the technical error in the Extension of Investigation form and investigators 

using a CVSA to question him, without offering any defense, on the merits, to the 

charges against him. 

In short, Hunes has failed to identify any adverse impact on the disciplinary 

proceeding or its outcome from: (1) prison officials extending their investigation of 

the incident for five days; or (2) him not being allowed to introduce the Extension 

of Investigation form into evidence. Accordingly, these allegations by Hunes do not 

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support any violation of his due process rights before, during, or after the 

disciplinary hearing. 

(b) DHO’s Impartiality 

Hunes argues that DHO Waddle was biased because he: (1) refused to turn 

on the tape recorder so that a record could be made of the hearing; (2) refused to 

permit Hunes to introduce the Extension of Investigation form; and (3) failed to 

follow other prison rules and regulations. Assuming these allegations are true, they 

do not call into question whether the DHO met minimum constitutional standards 

for impartiality. 

“The nature of prison disciplinary proceedings compels the courts to give 

wide latitude to prison officials in the manner in which they conduct these 

proceedings.” Ivy v. Moore, 31 F.3d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1994). Disciplinary hearing 

officers are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the 

constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high.” See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 

F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). For a petitioner to prevail on a claim that a DHO was 

biased, he must show that officer's conduct “gave [the officer] an interest adverse to 

[the inmate’s] ‘so direct, personal, and substantial as to give rise to a due-process 

violation.’” See Ivy v. Moore, 31 F.3d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Hunes’ allegations that DHO Waddle failed to turn on the tape recorder, 

refused to allow him to introduce the form and otherwise failed to follow internal 

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rules are not sufficient to establish an adverse interest “so direct, personal, and 

substantial” as to give rise to a due process violation. There is simply no evidence in 

the record that DHO Waddle had any personal interest in the circumstances giving 

rise to the charges against Hunes or in the resolution of those charges. At most, 

Hunes’ claim is that DHO Waddle failed to follow internal prison rules and 

regulations applicable to disciplinary hearings. As previously discussed, violations 

of prison rules and regulations, even if proven, do not rise to the level of a federal 

constitutional violation of any of Hunes’ due process rights. 

(c) Investigators’ Use of Computer Voice Stress 

Analysis to Question Hunes 

Hunes asserts that prison officials relied, in part, on the results of a CVSA to 

support their decision to charge him with disciplinary violations, and DHO Waddle 

also relied on that evidence to find Hunes guilty of the charges. According to Hunes, 

the use of and reliance on the CVSA violated his due process rights.6

 While evidence 

from voice stress analysis and its predecessor, the polygraph, is not admissible in 

judicial proceedings,7

 the use of such evidence in prison disciplinary proceedings 

 6

 Prison investigators concluded, based on the CVSA results, that Hunes was being 

deceptive in answering their questions. Doc. 2 at 9. Although it is unclear to what extent DHO 

Waddle relied on the CVSA results to find Hunes guilty of the charges, this was not the only 

evidence against Hunes. Fyke’s statement provided additional direct evidence against Hunes. In 

addition, Hunes apparently had a history of engaging in similar misconduct. Within the past six 

months, he had been charged with a second or subsequent offense for making sexual proposals. 

7

 By statute, all Arkansas law enforcement agencies “are authorized to use a psychological 

stress evaluation instrument to test or questions individuals for the purpose of determining and 

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has been repeatedly upheld.8 Hunes cites no legal authority to support his argument 

that the ADC’s use and reliance on CVSA results violated his constitutional rights, 

and this Court’s research has located no such legal authority. Thus, investigators’ 

use of a CVSA in questioning Hunes, and DHO Waddle’s consideration of those 

results to support his verdict that Hunes was guilty of the charges did not constitute 

a violation of any of Hunes’ federal constitutional rights. 

(2) “Some Evidence” Supports Each of Hunes’ 

Disciplinary Convictions 

While it is unclear whether Hunes is arguing that his convictions were not 

supported by “some evidence,” the Court will address that issue out of an abundance 

of caution. In undertaking this limited review, the Court is not required to examine 

the entire record, make an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or 

weigh evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. Prison officials can permissibly rely on 

violation reports and hearsay to find inmates guilty of disciplinary infractions. See 

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008). Finally, the Eighth Circuit 

has held that, as long as the disciplinary proceeding is conducted by an impartial 

 

verifying the truth of statements.” Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-701. The results of such examinations 

“shall be inadmissible” in all Arkansas courts. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-704. Houston v. Lockhart, 

982 F.2d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing application of statute). 

8

 See, e.g., Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1989) (“in prison disciplinary 

hearings, polygraph results are routinely admitted and relied upon”); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 

F.2d 800, 802-803 (9th Cir. 1990) (use of polygraph to help resolve question of whether inmate 

had given up his gang affiliation did not violate due process and also qualified as some evidence 

under Hill). 

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decision maker, a report from a correctional officer constitutes “some evidence” 

upon which to base a disciplinary decision. See Hartsfield, 511 F.3d at 831. The 

“some evidence” standard is satisfied even if the inmate disputes the facts in the 

report and the only support for the DHO’s decision is the report itself. Id. 

 Here, DHO Waddle was faced with a situation in which either Fyke or Hunes 

was lying about the charges. DHO Waddle accepted Fyke’s version of what took 

place. He also credited the internal investigation into the allegations, which found 

that Hunes “lied to staff and made a sexual proposal to another inmate [Fyke].” Doc. 

5-8 at 2. Finally, DHO Waddle relied on the charging officer’s disciplinary report,9

in which he stated that the investigation supported Fyke’s complaint of sexual 

misconduct and also found that Hunes had been deceptive. This clearly constituted 

“some evidence” that Hunes committed each of the three disciplinary charges. 

III. Conclusion 

 The Court concludes that Hunes’ disciplinary hearing satisfied the minimal 

due process requirements of Wolff and that none of Hunes’ due process rights were 

violated. Additionally, “some evidence in the record” supports DHO Waddle’s 

decision on each of the disciplinary charges. Accordingly, Petitioner Hunes’ claims 

related to his disciplinary convictions are either not cognizable claims for federal 

 9

 Major Disciplinary Form F-831-1. Doc. 5-6. 

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habeas relief or he has failed to demonstrate that his constitutional rights were 

violated in connection with his December 18, 2015 disciplinary hearing. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, (doc. 2), be DENIED, and that the case be DISMISSED, WITH 

PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. 

 Dated this 7th day of February, 2017. 

 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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