Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08001/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Wyoming
Appellee
Jerry Lee Jenkins
Appellant
Duane Shillinger
Appellee

Document Text:

LED f l eourt of Appeals 

Uaited s;:tb Citcuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS J\\JG - 3 \990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

~OBERT L.1:-IOECKER 

Clerk 

JERRY LEE JENKINS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

DUANE SHILLINGER and the 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 

OF WYOMING, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 90-8001 

(D.C. No. C88-388-B) 

( D. Wyoming) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8001 Document: 010110039611 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 1 
Jerry Lee Jenkins appeals the district court judgment denying 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following an evidentiary 

hearing, the district court concluded that Mr. Jenkins failed to 

establish the "cause" element of the "cause and prejudice" test 

required under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). We agree 

and affirm the district court's judgment. 

Mr. Jenkins was convicted of murder (Count I), rape (Count 

II), and assault and battery (Count III). He was initially 

sentenced to death on Count I, thirty-five years to life on Count 

II, and not less than thirteen nor more than fourteen years on 

Count III. The sentence imposed on Count III was to be served 

concurrently with his sentence on Count II. 

Following a direct appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court which 

ruled his mandatory death sentence unconstitutional, Kennedy v. 

State, 559 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Wyo. 1977), Mr. Jenkins was 

resentenced to life imprisonment on Count I, to be served 

consecutively to the previously imposed sentences in Counts II and 

III. Mr. Jenkins filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence 

and a Motion to "Reconsider" which were both denied. Mr. Jenkins 

appealed the denial of the Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence 

to the Wyoming Supreme Court which held that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Mr. Jenkins' 

resentence of life imprisonment be consecutive to his other 

sentence. 

Mr. Jenkins filed a Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment 

and Conviction with the state district court. In this motion, 

which was treated as a post-conviction petition, Mr. Jenkins 

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Appellate Case: 90-8001 Document: 010110039611 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 2 
contended for the first time that his trial counsel failed and 

refused to challenge his 1974 convictions on the merits. The 

state court denied the post-conviction motion because it was filed 

over five years after conviction and sentence, and Mr. Jenkins did 

not show the delay was not due to his own neglect. Mr. Jenkins 

did not appeal this denial of post-conviction relief. 

Mr. Jenkins then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the state district court, alleging that his court appointed 

trial counsel failed and refused to "file an appeal [on the 

merits] on all charges, after he had been requested to do so." 

The petition was denied, and Mr. Jenkins filed a subsequent 

petition with the Wyoming Supreme Court which was also denied. 

Mr. Jenkins then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. In 

his federal petition, Mr. Jenkins alleged that 1) the state trial 

court was without jurisdiction to alter, upon resentencing, the 

manner in which the sentences were to be served; 2) he had been 

denied a direct appeal on the merits because his appointed 

attorney "failed and refused" to take a direct appeal; and 3) the 

conviction was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel 

during trial and on appeal. The district court dismissed the 

petition sua sponte, and on appeal this court remanded for 

proceedings to determine the merits of Mr. Jenkins' claims. 

On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing as required by this court. After a lengthy review of the 

testimony at that hearing, the district court concluded Mr. 

Jenkins "waived his right to challenge his 1974 convictions on the 

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merits." The court noted that while Mr. Jenkins knowingly and 

intelligently understood his right to appeal his 1974 convictions 

on the merits to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, he failed to object 

or protest to his attorney in the direct appeal or anyone else 

that the brief filed on his behalf did not challenge his 

convictions on the merits. Further, he failed to protest or 

object to the opinion rendered in Kennedy v. State, after 

receiving a copy and with full understanding of its contents and 

meaning. Thus, the court reasoned Mr. Jenkins did not show 

"cause" for not bringing a direct appeal under the "cause and 

prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes and dismissed the 

petition. 

In Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984), the Supreme Court 

made it clear that the "cause and prejudice" test announced in 

Wainwright v. Sykes, applies to procedural defaults on appeal. As 

the Court explained in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 

(1986), "we hold that counsel's failure to raise a particular 

claim on appeal is to be scrutinized under the cause and prejudice 

standard when that default is treated as a procedural default by 

the state courts." 

After reviewing the record, we conclude the district court's 

findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Because we agree 

that Mr. Jenkins has not shown "cause" for his default, we affirm 

the district court's judgment dismissing this petition. 

Supreme Court noted in Murray v. Carrier: 

As the 

Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of 

counsel does not constitute cause for a procedural 

default even when the default occurs on appeal rather 

than at trial. To the contrary, cause for a procedural 

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Appellate Case: 90-8001 Document: 010110039611 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 4 
... 

default on appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some 

external impediment preventing counsel from constructing 

or raising the claim. 

477 U.S. at 478. In this case, Mr. Jenkins has not shown any such 

barrier that kept his counsel from appealing his conviction on the 

merits. 

In addition, there is no evidence that Mr. Jenkins' appellate 

counsel was ineffective under the test 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): 

of Strickland 

First the defendant must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient. This requires showing that 

counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 

defendant must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that 

counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable. 

v. 

See also United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412 (10th Cir. 

1988). In Hall, this court held the decision not to press other 

issues on appeal did not deny effective assistance of counsel 

where the defendant did not demonstrate that "counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as 'counsel' 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 843 F.2d at 413-14. 

Similarly, in Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1556 (10th 

Cir. 1988), we held that a defendant's due process rights are not 

violated if defense counsel explains the pros and cons of an 

appeal to the defendant and the defendant makes a knowing and 

intelligent choice not to appeal. At the same time, we held that 

if counsel does not adequately advise his or her client or if 

counsel ignores the client's wishes, then the failure to file an 

appeal may well deny a defendant due process of law. Id. After 

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Appellate Case: 90-8001 Document: 010110039611 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 5 
reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that Mr. 

Jenkins was aware of his right to appeal his conviction on the 

merits and that he made a knowing and intelligent decision not to 

object to the briefs and opinions rendered in his earlier appeals. 

Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

The manda t e shall issue f o rthwith . 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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