Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cr-00035/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cr-00035-35/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Zachary Jenson
Defendant
Eric McDavid
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Lauren Weiner
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 2:06-cr-00035-MCE

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ERIC MCDAVID,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter came before the Court on March 6, 2008. Mark

Reichel appeared on behalf of Defendant, Eric McDavid. Robert

Steven Lapham, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared on

behalf of the Government. On September 27, 2007, a jury found

Defendant guilty of conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. section 844

(f) and (i). Defendant now moves the Court for judgment of

acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial.

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BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted on one count of conspiracy to damage

or destroy property by fire and an explosive under 18 U.S.C.

section 844(n). Defendant was indicted with two other coconspirators. The matter was tried by a jury beginning

September 10, 2007. During the course of the trial, the

Government put on evidence regarding the Earth Liberation Front

(“ELF”), the Animal Liberation Front (“ALF”), and various

anarchist groups. The Government also introduced the testimony

of “Anna,” an undercover agent working closely with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. Anna began working with the FBI as a

college student. As part of her work with the FBI, she attended

protests in an undercover capacity. Anna first met Defendant at

the Crimethink Convergence in 2004. She determined at that time

that Defendant was interested in various forms of illegal protest

activity, but otherwise appeared to be of little interest. In

2005, Anna met with Defendant at a BioTech conference in

Philadelphia. At that point, Defendant told her he was planning

something “big” in California. At this meeting, Anna believed

Defendant to be much more radical in his thinking and he began

talking to her about a bombing campaign.

Anna traveled to California, where she met with Defendant

and the other co-conspirators charged in the indictment, Lauren

Weiner and Zachary Jenson. At that point, Defendant and the coconspirators began plotting a bombing campaign at various

locations in Northern California as a part of their anarchist

philosophy. 

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Anna agreed to obtain a cabin for the group to use and the

FBI wired the cabin with surveillance equipment. During their

time in the cabin, the group planned to bomb gas stations, the

Nimbus Dam, the Institute of Forest Genetics (“IFG”), power

stations and cell phone towers. In addition to the testimony

from Anna, the Government also introduced recorded conversations,

e-mails, books, and notes that corroborated her testimony. 

Defendant’s co-conspirators, Weiner and Jensen, also testified

and corroborated Anna’s testimony. 

Defendant put on several character witnesses who testified

that Defendant was a peaceful person. At the close of the

evidence, the Court instructed the jury as to the crime charged

and the defense of entrapment. On September 27, 2007, after

several questions from the jury and several supplemental

instructions, the jury returned a guilty verdict. In a special

verdict, the jury found that Defendant conspired with Weiner and

Jensen. 

STANDARD

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

In deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the Court must decide whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find each essential

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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U.S. v. Mosley, 465 F.3d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); U.S. v. Johnson, 357 F.3d

980, 984 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). A district court’s denial of a

motion for acquittal is reviewed de novo. Id. at 414-15.

B. Motion for New Trial

Rule 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the

court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the

interest of justice so requires.” A trial court’s denial of a

motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. U.S.

v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 2007).

ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Defendant raises five issues in his Motion for Judgment of

Acquittal:

1. Insufficient Evidence

Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence that he

actually conspired with the two co-defendants. The parties

stipulated the IFG, Nimbus Dam, and cell phone towers either

received government funding or were used in interstate commerce. 

Defendant argues the government did not prove any other target of

the conspiracy and the co-defendants, Weiner and Jensen,

testified there was no agreement as to the stipulated targets. 

Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant

under 844 (n) of conspiring to commit 844(f)(1) or (i).

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In response, the Government points to recorded conversations

where the co-defendants and the government informant discussed

gas stations, cell phone towers, and the IFG. The Government

also points to recorded conversations where Weiner states she is

“down for the Forestry Service” and where the parties discuss the

IFG, getting schematics for the building, and determining the

locations of the security cameras. Further, the “Burn Book”

addressed cell phone towers and Nimbus Dam, among other targets. 

The Government also points to evidence that the group took

scouting trips to the Nimbus Dam and to the IFG.

The Government points to more than sufficient evidence upon

which a rational trier of fact could find that the conspirators

agreed on at least one of the federal targets beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jensen testified the group considered the IFG a target

for direct action. There was evidence the group took a trip to

the IFG and drew a map of it to plot their actions. There was

also evidence the group took a trip to the Nimbus Dam to scout

out the locations of the buildings. Jensen testified the group

had discussed cell phone towers, but they had not agreed on any

particular tower or any particular group of towers. Finally, the

evidence Defendant points to does not dissolve the conspiracy. 

Weiner testified in her cross-examination that after visiting the

Nimbus Dam it was no longer a target because the group did not

know what the effect of bombing it would be. This is not the

same as her testifying that the group never agreed on the Nimbus

Dam. The conspiracy was complete, at the latest, when the

conspirators drove to the various targets. 

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In order to withdraw from a conspiracy, the conspirator must

(1) disavow the illegal objective of the conspiracy, (2) take

affirmative steps to defeat the conspiracy, or (3) disassociate

himself from the conspiracy. U.S. v. Fox, 189 F.3d 1115, 1118

(9th Cir. 1999). Defendant and his co-conspirators took none of

these actions.

2. Variance Between Indictment and Evidence

Defendant argues the indictment was specifically for a

conspiracy to destroy the Nimbus Dam, cell phone towers, and the

IFG in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 844(f) and (i). However,

Defendant argues that, at trial, the Government’s witnesses

indicated there was no conspiracy with the co-conspirators as to

these targets and the Government told the jury it need not prove

these were the three targets in order to convict. Defendant

argues this resulted in a conviction based on charges not

contained in the indictment, and Defendant should be acquitted as

a result of this fatal variance. 

The Government argues its evidence was consistent with the

theory set forth in the indictment. The indictment charged

Defendant with conspiring to destroy the particular sites and

that is what the Government proved at trial. Although evidence

of discussions regarding other targets, such as dams or gas

stations, was introduced, the bulk of the evidence was consistent

with the targets listed in the indictment. Therefore, the

Government argues there was no fatal variance.

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An indictment may charge numerous offenses or the commission

of one offense in numerous ways. U.S. v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130,

136 (1985). As long as the defendant is convicted of an offense

listed in the indictment, the Grand Jury Clause is not violated,

despite any surplusage of charges. Id. “A part of the

indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of

the offense proved may normally be treated as “a useless

averment” that “may be ignored.” Id. (citing Ford v. U.S., 273

U.S. 593 (1927)). A conviction for an offense other than that

charged in the indictment must be reversed if the variance

between the indictment and the proof affects the substantial

rights of the parties. U.S. v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 116 (9th

Cir. 1979). A material variance exists if a set of facts

materially different from those alleged in the indictment is

presented at trial, and if that variance affects the defendant's

“substantial rights.” U.S. v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 615-16 (9th

Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Bhagat, 436 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006).

Defendant relies upon United States v. Choy for the

proposition that even a minor variance in the Government’s theory

can constitute a fatal variance in violation of the Grand Jury

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 309 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2002). In

Choy, the defendant was charged with bribing a public official by

giving him two checks for a total of $5000 to be used for

purchasing computer equipment. Id. at 605. At trial, the

government’s theory was that the defendant gave the checks to a

third party to purchase the computer equipment, which indirectly

conferred a benefit on the public official. Id. 

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The Ninth Circuit held this was a fatal variance because the

defendant was indicted for bribing a public official according to

the statutory language of the offense, and the theory at trial

was too attenuated to meet the elements of the statute. Id. at

606. Further, the Ninth Circuit made clear that a conspiracy

conviction may stand even if the evidence for the underlying

charge is insufficient. Id.

The evidence at trial showed Defendant conspired to destroy

the sites listed in the indictment. There were recorded

conversations regarding these sites, and reconnaissance missions

to the sites. In Choy, the government changed its theory to the

extent it failed to meet the elements of the statute. Id. In

the present case, the government put forth evidence consistent

with the indictment, and the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt

Defendant did conspire to destroy those listed sites. There was

no fatal variance between the indictment and the charges or

theory presented at trial.

3. Evidence of “Explosive Device”

Defendant argues the jury was not presented with any

evidence of an “explosive device” or “fire” as defined in

18 U.S.C. section 844. Although the jury was not instructed on

this definition, Defendant contends there was insufficient

evidence in the record to meet this definition.

In response, the Government argues because Defendant was

charged with conspiracy to commit arson, and not with arson

itself, the Government did not need to prove Defendant was in

possession of an incendiary device. 

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The Government points to the conversations between Defendant and

his fellow conspirators regarding explosives and explosions.

The evidence of “Molotov cocktails” and the “Poor Man’s

James Bond” is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to

conclude the Defendant intended to use an “explosive device” as

that term is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 844. 

The term “explosive” means gunpowders, powders used for

blasting, all forms of high explosives, blasting

materials, fuzes (other than electric circuit

breakers), detonators, and other detonating agents,

smokeless powders, other explosive or incendiary

devices within the meaning of paragraph (5) of section

232 of this title, and any chemical compounds,

mechanical mixture, or device that contains any

oxidizing and combustible units, or other ingredients,

in such proportions, quantities, or packing that

ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by

percussion, or by detonation of the compound, mixture,

or device or any part thereof may cause an explosion.

18 U.S.C. § 844(j). It is clear from the recorded conversations

the conspirators intended to cause explosions and they were

concerned regarding the loss of life that might accompany those

explosions. It is also clear they wanted to make a bomb. The

fact they were unsuccessful and had an incorrect recipe is not

dispositive in a conspiracy case. There was sufficient evidence

upon which the jury could find Defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

4. Entrapment as a Matter of Law

Defendant argues he was entrapped as a matter of law, and

therefore, was entitled to a dismissal of the charges against

him. Defendant argues the evidence showed he was not predisposed

to commit the offense and he was induced by the government. 

Defendant argues he lacked the “wherewithal” to commit the

offense and therefore could not have been predisposed.

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The Government argues there was substantial evidence

establishing Defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense and

the lack of inducement on the part of the government. The

government refutes the case Defendant relies upon, U.S. v.

Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2000). The facts of Poehlman

are very similar to those of U.S. v. Jacobson, which was argued

and analyzed in an early hearing before this Court in the present

case. 

“Generally, whether a defendant was entrapped is a question

for the jury.” U.S. v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 516 (9th Cir. 2000). 

To establish entrapment as a matter of law, the defendant must

point to undisputed evidence making it patently clear that an

otherwise innocent person was induced to commit the illegal act

by trickery, persuasion, or fraud of a government agent. U.S. v.

Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 471 U.S. 1139 (1985); see Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369,

373-76 (1958); U.S. v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.

1986). To succeed on an entrapment as a matter of law defense,

the defendant must persuade the court that “viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable jury

could have found in favor of the government as to inducement or

lack of predisposition.” Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 698. 

 At trial, this case presented disputed facts and evidence

about conversations, romantic interests, sources of ideas, and

agreements. This case also involved disputed evidence as to

Defendant’s level of commitment to the conspiracy. The various

factual disputes alone establish Defendant was not entrapped as a

matter of law. 

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Further, the jury found Defendant was not entrapped because the

jury found he was predisposed to commit the act or it found the

government did not induce him. In either event, the jury’s

finding supports the argument Defendant was not entrapped as a

matter of law.

5. Lack of Agreement

Defendant argues there was no agreement for the purposes of

a conspiracy because the co-conspirators testified they were

“acting” when they interacted with McDavid at the times of

importance. Defendant argues since the act of agreeing is a

group act, when one person pretends to agree there is no actual

agreement and therefore no conspiracy. However, the case

Defendant relies on discusses whether a defendant can conspire

solely with a government agent for the purpose of giving a Sears

instruction. U.S. v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F. 2d 1196, 1198-99

(9th Cir. 1984).

In response, the Government contends an agreement may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence and to the extent the coconspirators testified they were “acting” the jury did not find

that testimony credible or it would not have convicted Defendant.

Defendant’s argument does not warrant a judgment of

acquittal. A rational trier of fact could find an agreement

beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence showed recorded

conversations between Defendant and his co-conspirators regarding

their plans to bomb the various targets of the conspiracy. The

parties to the conspiracy took notes in the “Burn Book” and

Jenson and Weiner went so far as to help Defendant purchase the

materials and attempt to make a bomb. 

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Although the Defendant asserts the co-conspirators testified they

were acting, a rational trier of fact could find the

co-conspirators had an agreement.

B. Motion for New Trial

Defendant raises seventeen issues in his Motion for New

Trial:

1. Testimony from Officer Naliboff

Defendant argues the government witness, Officer Naliboff,

was not qualified as an expert, and therefore should not have

been allowed to testify. Naliboff's testimony addressed ELF,

ALF, and anarchist groups, explaining what the groups believe,

and what activities group members have been known to partake in

to support their causes. 

The Government argues this was admissible testimony that was

linked to subsequent evidence regarding Defendants' plans to

follow ELF/ALF guidelines. In addition to denying this was

expert testimony, the Government does not concede this was even

lay opinion testimony. Naliboff was never asked, and never gave,

an opinion as to whether the conspirators were members of any

group. The testimony was used to assist the jury in

understanding Defendant's motive for targeting the particular

locations.

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides for lay opinion

testimony. In U.S. v. VonWillie, an agent testified “as a lay

witness about the nexus between drug trafficking and the

possession of weapons.” 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Specifically, he testified in his experience with the Drug

Enforcement Bureau, (1) it was common for drug traffickers to

possess and use weapons in order to protect their drugs and to

intimidate buyers; (2) the MK-11, one of the guns found in the

defendant’s bedroom, was a particularly intimidating gun and he

knew of drug dealers who used that specific weapon; and (3) drug

traffickers commonly kept a weapon near their drugs. Id. The

court concluded “these observations are common enough and require

such a limited amount of expertise, if any, that they can,

indeed, be deemed lay witness opinion.” Id.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides for scientific,

technical, or other specialized testimony given by a witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education. A district court’s rulings on the admissibility of

expert testimony are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Such

rulings will be reversed only if “manifestly erroneous.” General

Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-142 (1997); U.S. v.

Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000).

In Hankey, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s

decision to allow testimony of a gang expert for the purpose of

explaining the gang’s beliefs and actions, and to give context to

the behavior of the defendant and witnesses. 203 F.3d at 1167. 

The court held the Daubert factors need not all be met, and the

officers’ training, experience, knowledge, education, and skill

were sufficient to qualify him as an expert. Id. 

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The court noted when expertise is based on specialized knowledge,

the requirements for expert qualification should be applied more

liberally. Id.

In the present case, Naliboff had been in law enforcement

for more than 26 years. He had become familiar with ALF, ELF,

and anarchist groups during the course of his career and keeps

himself current on issues relating to those groups. He did not

give opinion testimony about Defendant or his conduct. He did

not testify Defendant was a member of ELF or ALF, but rather

explained ELF, ALF, and anarchist groups’ methods and motives in

order to provide the jury with a context to better understand

other evidence relating to motive. Naliboff had sufficient

experience and did not give any specific opinion testimony. It

was within the Court’s discretion to allow him as a witness. 

Although the Government did not qualify Naliboff as an expert

witness, as in VonWillie, his testimony was such that it was

admissible as a lay opinion. Naliboff’s testimony related to

ALF, ELF, and anarchist groups generally, he did not give an

opinion that McDavid was a member of any of these groups. 

2. 404(b) Evidence

Defendant argues 404(b) evidence was improperly admitted. 

The evidence he points to includes: Defendant’s connection to

Ryan Lewis, Lewis was an ELF fire bomber and a friend of

Defendant’s; Defendant attended CrimeThink in 2004; Defendant

spoke of Molotov cocktails; Defendant spoke of killing police

officers, informants, innocent bystanders and fence sitters; and

Defendant spoke of reading Ted Kaczynski; among other unspecified

errors. 

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Defendant argues this evidence was admissible only under 404(b)

to show Defendant’s propensity and bad character and the

Government specifically stated it would not be putting forth any

404(b) evidence.

The Government first asserts this evidence is not subject to

404(b). In the alternative, the Government argues the evidence

was admissible under 404(b).

The evidence Defendant points to is not character evidence

subject to 404(b). The evidence regarding Defendant speaking of

Molotov cocktails; killing police officers, informants, innocent

bystanders and fence sitters; and reading Kaczynski was all

admissible as a party admission under Federal Rule of Evidence

801.

3. 403 Evidence

Defendant argues that, upon objection under Rule 403, the

Court is required to weigh the factors on the record. Defendant

argues the Court overruled the objection without weighing the

factors “on numerous instances.” The Government asserts the

Court is not required to consider nebulous, unspecified errors.

Defendant does not point to specific instances where the

Court failed to weigh the factors on the record. Further, the

case Defendant cites in support of his position, Doe v. Glanzer,

232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000), only requires a Court do a 403

balancing on the record when the Court is doing so in the context

of Rule 415 evidence of similar acts in civil cases concerning

sexual assault and child molestation. 

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Further, the Ninth Circuit has held a district court need not

state explicitly it is applying a 403 balancing, but the record

need only show a balancing occurred. U.S. v. Milner, 962 F.2d

908, 912 (9th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has held that

failing to make a record of a 403 balancing is not reversible

error and that the district court’s ruling on the objections

established presumptively the court had weighed the evidence

pursuant to Rule 403. Smith v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc., 436

F.3d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 2006).

4. Failure to Provide Discovery on Informant

Defendant argues the Government failed to provide discovery

on “Anna,” specifically referring to agreements between Anna and

the FBI and to the 240-question psychological assessment that

Anna completed regarding Defendant. Defendant argues he

requested all written documents regarding himself numerous times,

and was told no other documents existed. At trial, Anna

testified about these documents and Defendant did not receive

them until after the close of the Government’s case-in-chief. 

The Government argues all of the discovery the Government

was in possession of was properly turned over to Defendant. The

agreements were admonitions regarding attorney general guidelines

and not actual written agreements between Anna and the FBI. The

guidelines were all properly disclosed. The Government was not

aware of the questionnaire until Anna testified about it, and the

Government turned it over as soon as it received it. Defendant

was not prejudiced by this late piece of discovery, which was

demonstrated by Defendant’s failure to request a continuance or

raise an objection.

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A conviction will only be reversed because of a discovery

violation if the district court abused its discretion and the

defendant’s substantial rights were prejudiced. U.S. v.

Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995). The prejudice that

must be shown in order for the court to grant a reversal is that

the verdict would have been different had the violation not

occurred. U.S. v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Defendant has not established that as a result of the

violation, he suffered prejudice to his substantial rights. The

nature of the evidence, especially in light of the rest of the

evidence at trial, suggests the violation was harmless and does

not entitle Defendant to a new trial. The Government was not

privy to the psychological assessment form, and did provide it to

Defendant as soon as it possessed it. Regarding the agreements,

Defendant has not referred to any agreements other than those the

Government asserts were merely guidelines, not agreements, and

these were turned over during the discovery period.

5. Government Reopening to Admit Evidence

Defendant argues the Court improperly allowed the Government

to reopen its case to admit exhibits over Defendant’s objections,

and a new trial should be granted. The Government argues for all

intents and purposes, this evidence was admitted during its casein-chief. One piece had been admitted, and it was only a

clerical error that caused the Government to believe it failed to

admit the exhibit. The other piece of evidence was a CD of

recorded conversations that had been played for the jury and had

been referenced numerous times. 

///

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The CD itself was not actually received as an exhibit, and the

Government did not learn this until after it completed its casein-chief. After all the excerpts were played, defense counsel

asked if all the CDs of recordings were going to be admitted and

the Government responded that all the excerpts were on one disk

and it would be admitted. Defendant did not object when the

excerpts were played.

The reopening of a criminal case after the close of evidence

lies within the sound discretion of the court. U.S. v. Ramirez,

608 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1979). The Government notes

although the Ninth Circuit has not articulated particular factors

for deciding to reopen a criminal case, other circuits have. In

United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 775 (11th Cir. 1989), and

United States v. Dossey, 558 F.2d 1336, 1339 (8th Cir. 1977), the

courts listed the following factors: (1) whether the evidence

surprised the defendant, (2) whether the defendant was given

adequate opportunity to meet the proof, and (3) whether the

evidence was more detrimental to the defendant because of the

order in which it was introduced.

Defendant does not argue he suffered any prejudice,

surprise, or detriment as a result of the Court’s decision to

allow the Government to reopen its case to admit the exhibits. 

Additionally, it appears these exhibits were either already

admitted or heavily used during the trial and inadvertently

omitted. Therefore, Defendant was well aware of them, and the

jury had already heard or seen them. It was not an abuse of

discretion to allow the Government to reopen its case to remedy

these ministerial errors.

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6. Renewed Motion Based on Outrageous Government Conduct

Defendant argues the pretrial motion to dismiss due to

outrageous government conduct should have been granted, and since

it was not, a new trial should be granted. According to

Defendant, the installation and use of video and audio

surveillance constituted outrageous conduct, and the jurors’

post-trial statements to counsel and the press evidence that. 

The Government submits the matter on the prior briefing and

arguments on this issue, and asserts nothing new was developed at

trial on the matter.

The Fifth Amendment requires dismissal of an indictment for

government misconduct “only where the government’s conduct is so

grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal

sense of justice.” U.S. v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.

1988). A motion to dismiss based on outrageous conduct is a

question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. This defense is

similar to entrapment, but is a much higher standard requiring

the government’s conduct to “be malum in se or amount to

engineering and direction of the criminal enterprise from

beginning to end.” Id. at 1153. 

In Citro, the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss the

indictment, even though the government provided counterfeit

credit cards and raised the idea of a counterfeit credit card

scheme. Id. The court held, “[t]he government simply attempted

to ‘attach itself to an on-going...operation for the purpose of

closing it down and prosecuting the operators.’” Id. (quoting

Greene v. U.S., 454 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

///

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In the present case, because this Court has already found

Defendant cannot meet the heightened standard of entrapment as a

matter of law, Defendant cannot meet his burden of proving

outrageous government conduct. This case is analogous to Citro

where the government attached itself to an ongoing plan, and

created an opportunity for the offense to be committed. The use

of surveillance equipment does not make this outrageous conduct

and does not warrant a new trial.

7. Restriction on Character Evidence

Defendant argues the Court’s restricting character evidence

testimony to any time prior to June 2005 was prejudicial error. 

Because the proof of predisposition must be for the time period

prior to government contact, Defendant argues not allowing him to

admit evidence of his character prior to June 2005 is prejudicial

error.

In response, the Government argues that evidence of

Defendant’s character to prove entrapment must be related to and

proximate in time to the government’s inducement. Defendant

called three witnesses - his sister, his best friend, and his

best friend’s wife - to testify as to character trait for nonviolence. The government asserts the time limitation was not

prejudicial error.

Evidence of a defendant’s good character is admissible to

show lack of predisposition so long as it “‘bears meaningfully on

the defendant’s lack of a criminal disposition at the time of the

government’s inducement.’” U.S. v. Thomas, 134 F.3d 975, 979

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. v. Barry, 814 F.2d 1400, 1403 n. 6

(9th Cir. 1987)). 

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Thomas, and the cases discussed therein, dealt with trials where

all of the defendant’s good character evidence was excluded. The

court found because predisposition is an essential element of

entrapment, it was error for the trial court to exclude all

evidence of a defendant’s lack of a criminal record. Id. at 980. 

That is not the situation presented in this case. At Defendant’s

trial, the Court admitted the testimony of his sister, his best

friend, and his best friend’s wife as to his good character. 

However, the Court excluded evidence that was remote in time. 

Therefore, the appropriate analysis is under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Defendant

has not asserted any particularized prejudice and therefore a new

trial is not warranted.

8. Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense

Defendant argues the jury should have been instructed on a

lesser included offense since the lesser offense was identified

within the charged offense and a rational jury could have found

Defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not the greater. 

The Government argues the lesser offense Defendant requested

at trial was 18 U.S.C. section 371, which is conspiracy to commit

an offense against the United States. Defendant was charged with

18 U.S.C. section 844(n), (f), and (i), to wit, conspiring to

destroy, by fire or explosives, property owned or leased by the

United States, and/or property used in interstate commerce. In

order for the jury to find Defendant guilty of section 371, they

would have to find he conspired to commit an offense against the

United States. 

///

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The only offense against the United States alleged in the

indictment was conspiracy to destroy, by fire or explosives,

government property. If the jury did not find Defendant

conspired to destroy government property, it could not find he

conspired to commit an offense against the United States because

there was no other offense alleged. Thus, the Government argues

that, in this instance the charged offense and the proposed

lesser included offense were identical and therefore instructing

on the lesser offense would have been improper.

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesserincluded offense if: (1) a lesser included offense is identified

within the charged offense; and (2) a rational jury could find

the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense but not

guilty of the greater. U.S. v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233-34

(9th Cir. 1980); Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c). In a case where some of

the elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser

crime, the defendant, if the evidence justifies it, is entitled

to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the

lesser offense. Sansome v. U.S., 380 U.S. 343, 350 (1965)

(quotations and citations omitted). It is not proper to instruct

on a lesser-included offense where the factual issues the jury

must resolve are the same as to both the lesser and greater

offenses. Id. The lesser offense cannot be completely

encompassed by the greater offense. Id. There must be a

disputed factual element which is not required for a conviction

of the lesser-included offense. Id. 

///

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In the present case, an instruction on a lesser included

offense would not have been proper because, based on the language

of each section, the jury could have only concluded Defendant

violated both sections 371 and 844, or he violated neither. The

indictment only alleged a conspiracy to destroy federal property

by fire or explosives. If the jury found Defendant did not

conspire to commit this particular offense, then there would have

been no other possible object of the conspiracy upon which the

jury could convict under section 371. The factual issues the

jury needed to resolve were the same for the proposed lesser

offense and the charged greater offense and failure to instruct

on the lesser offense does not warrant a new trial.

9. Failure to Instruct on “Wherewithal”

Defendant argues the Court should have instructed the jury

that “predisposition is the defendant’s willingness to commit the

offense prior to being contacted by government agents, coupled

with the wherewithal to do so.” Defendant argues Poehlman

requires this instruction.

The Government argues in response a defendant is not

entrapped simply because he could not have committed the crime

without government assistance. Further, the Defendant’s reliance

upon Poehlman is misplaced because that case did not address a

situation where the defendant did not have the means to commit

the crime.

Poehlman is the only case this Court finds using the term

“wherewithal” as an element of predisposition. Further, Poehlman

does not suggest a defendant is entitled to an instruction that

predisposition requires the wherewithal to commit the crime. 

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Rather, the case Poehlman relies on for the proposition discussed

predisposition in the following terms: “A public official is in a

position to take bribes; a drug addict to deal drugs; a gun

dealer to engage in illegal gun sales. For these and other

traditional targets of stings all that must be shown to establish

predisposition and thus defeat the defense of entrapment is

willingness to violate the law without extraordinary inducements;

ability can be presumed.” U.S. v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196,

1200 (7th Cir. 1994)(emphasis added). 

There is no case law that supports Defendant’s position. 

The Comment to Ninth Circuit Model Rule 6.2 outlines five factors

relating to predisposition (discussed below). Wherewithal to

commit the crime is not included in these factors. Moreover, the

Government accurately cites case law that the inability to commit

the crime without the government’s assistance is not a defense. 

U.S. v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997). The

Court’s omission of one sentence provided in only one case is not

error sufficient to support a new trial.

10. Mistaken Written Answer to Jury Question

The jury submitted a note asking “Was Anna a government

agent in Aug. 04? If not, when did she become one?” In open

court, the Court instructed that the answer to this question was

“Yes.” The jurors continued deliberating while the Court

prepared a written response. The written response erroneously

indicated that the answer to this question was “No.” 

///

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///

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Because the jurors indicated after the verdict to counsel and the

media their verdict was a product of the Court’s instructions,

Defendant argues this erroneous written response requires a new

trial. The Government argues any error committed was harmless.

Looking at the timing of these facts and the

conscientiousness and frequency with which this jury asked

questions of the Court, it cannot be said the jury mistook the

written answer after the Court had orally advised the jury Anna

was a government agent in August of 2004. Therefore, any error

was harmless.

11. Instruction on “Predisposition”

Defendant requested, prior to closing argument, the jury be

instructed on the definition of “predisposition.” The Court

denied that request. The jury then submitted a note asking “What

does predisposition mean?” In response, the Court gave the

Government’s proposed instruction. Defendant requested a

clarifying instruction indicating the government bore the burden

of proving Defendant was predisposed to commit the crime prior to

first being approached by the government agents. Defendant

argues the failure to give this clarifying instruction requires a

new trial. The Government responds the instruction given fairly

and accurately states the law and a defendant is not entitled to

any particular form of an instruction.

No error exists here and therefore no basis for a new trial. 

The instruction given fairly and accurately states the law. 

Further, as to Defendant’s request regarding the clarifying

instruction, the initial instruction to which this jury question

relates stated: 

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“The government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant was not entrapped. The government must

prove the following: 1. the defendant was predisposed to commit

the crime before being contacted by government agents...” See

Docket #271, Instruction #18 (emphasis added). The Court had

already given the instruction Defendant now claims it omitted. 

The proper instruction was given and therefore no error

occurred.

12. Instruction on “Inducement”

Defendant argues it was error not to instruct the jury on

the meaning of the word inducement. The instruction Defendant

requested stated: “Even very subtle governmental pressure, if

skillfully applied, can amount to inducement. For example, the

inducement may consist of repeated requests, made in an

atmosphere of comradery; as well the inducement may consist of

nothing more than giving the defendant the idea of committing the

crime, coupled with the means to do it.” Defendant argues it was

error not to so instruct.

The Government counters that the jury was properly

instructed on inducement, the jury did not request definition of

the term, and the Court is not required to define common terms. 

Further, the Government argues that, based on the verdict, the

jury did not need to determine whether Defendant was induced

because the jury found he was predisposed.

///

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So long as the instruction given adequately covers the

defense, the defendant is not entitled to any particular form of

instruction he requests. U.S. v. Slaughter, 891 F.2d 691, 699

(9th Cir. 1989) (finding defendant not entitled to instruction

defining inducement where concept was adequately incorporated

into entrapment instruction). The entrapment instruction given

read as follows:

The government has the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped.

The government must prove the following:

1. the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime

before being contacted by government agents, or

2. the defendant was not induced by the government

agents to commit the crime.

Where a person, independent of and before government

contact, is predisposed to commit the crime, it is not

entrapment if government agents merely provide an

opportunity to commit the crime.

This instruction, and particularly the last paragraph, adequately

incorporated the concept of inducement into the instruction. 

Defendant was not entitled to his argumentative proposed

instruction.

13. Definition of “Contact”

Defendant disputes the Court’s instruction on “contact.” 

The jury asked, “What does contact mean?” After oral argument on

the issue, the Court instructed the jury, “Contact as used in the

instruction is the time that you determine was the first time

that there was some communication between the defendant and a

government agent about the crime charged in the indictment.”

///

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Defendant argues that under Poehlman, entrapment is viewed

from the time period before the defendant has any contact with

government agents. The Defendant argues the reference to “the

crime charged in the indictment” is error because the government

contacted Defendant in regards to illegal protest activity in

2004 but did not contact him in regards to the fire-bombing

campaign until 2005.

In response, the Government points to the Comment to Ninth

Circuit Model Rule 6.2. The Comment points to five factors

relating to “contact”: “In determining whether the defendant was

predisposed to commit the crime before being approached by

government agents you may consider the following: 1) the

defendant’s character and reputation; 2) whether the government

initially suggested criminal activity; 3) whether the defendant

engaged in activity for profit; 4) the nature of the government’s

inducement; and 5) any other factors related to predisposition.” 

Because these factors relate to “the crime,” and not to criminal

activity generally, the Government argues the instruction given

was consistent with the principles of the comment and therefore

proper.

This is an issue of first impression. The Court finds no

case law on point with McDavid’s case, namely, where a defendant

had fleeting contact with a government agent and was deemed

inconsequential at that time, but who later became a person of

interest to the government by making statements that he was

indicating a predisposition.

///

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The Court agrees the language of Jacobson is clear, “Where

the Government has induced an individual to break the law and the

defense of entrapment is at issue, as it was in this case, the

prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant

was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being

approached by Government agents.” 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992). 

In Jacobson, the defendant was the target of a mail campaign

seeking to induce him into purchasing child pornography. The

government’s campaign lasted more than two years before the

defendant purchased the pornography. As to predisposition, the

Court said, “although he had become predisposed to break the law

by May 1987, it is our view that the Government did not prove

that this predisposition was independent and not the product of

the attention that the Government had directed at petitioner

since January 1985.” Id. at 550.

The distinction between Defendant’s case and Jacobson is

that Jacobson involved a continuous string of inducement on the

government’s part, whereas Defendant’s case involved an initial

meeting that the government did not act upon, and a later contact

upon which it did. Therefore, in Jacobson the government needed

to prove the defendant was predisposed prior to that entire

string of government conduct. Here, however, the government did

not engage in a continuous string of inducement. Rather, the

government had an isolated, initial contact with Defendant, and

deemed him inconsequential. It was not until sometime later,

when Defendant began talking about his plans, that the government

began focusing its efforts on Defendant and the others affiliated

with him.

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Defendant cites to Ninth Circuit case law: “[T]he relevant

time frame for assessing a defendant's disposition comes before

he has any contact with government agents, which is doubtless why

it's called predisposition.” Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 703 (emphasis

added). Following the plain language of Poehlman would have

required the Court to instruct the jury that contact occurred in

2004. However, the facts of Poehlman, and other cases quoting

the same language, do not gel with the facts presented here. Had

the Ninth Circuit considered the facts of this case, this Court

believes it would have phrased that sentence differently. In

this case, defining contact from the first time Defendant came

into contact with Anna would have resulted in an overzealous

application of the entrapment defense. A literal application of

Poehlman was not logical in this case.

The Court notes the difficulty in applying the entrapment

defense to a case where conspiracy is the only count charged in

the indictment. All the cases reviewed by this Court involved

crimes such as drug sales, child pornography sales, or crossing

state lines for the purpose of engaging in sex acts with a minor

- situations where the crime was complete after the commission of

some physical act. In each of these cases, the government

initiated the contact and the contact related only to the crime

charged in the indictment. In those cases, it makes sense to

evaluate predisposition prior to any contact with the government. 

The facts of this case did not warrant a blanket instruction to

be cut and pasted from distinguishable cases. 

///

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The fact that in this case the Government’s initial contact

related to unlawful protest activity, and the later contact

related to the crime charged in the indictment - conspiracy to

commit arson - required a more sensitive approach to the issue of

predisposition. The instruction given was proper. The

instruction Defendant proposed would turn the use of undercover

officers and informants on its head and would significantly

hinder the Government’s ability to prevent crimes such as the one

Defendant was convicted of in this case.

14. Allowing Government to Reopen after Rule 29 Motion

Defendant argues it was an abuse of discretion for the Court

to allow the Government to reopen its case to admit exhibits

after Defendant made a Rule 29 motion for acquittal. Defendant

argues the prejudice was manifest and the Government should not

have been allowed to reopen its case.

A district court is afforded wide discretion in determining

whether to allow the government to reopen its case in order to

introduce evidence. U.S. v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749, 751 (9th

Cir. 1971). One purpose of Rule 29 motions is to alert the court

to omitted proof so that, if it so chooses, it can allow the

government to submit additional evidence. U.S. v. Tisor, 96 F.3d

370, 380 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 29(a) provides in relevant part

that “[t]he court on motion of a defendant ... shall order the

entry of judgment of acquittal ... after the evidence on either

side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a

conviction” of the offense charged.

///

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Defendant relies upon a Tenth Circuit opinion, U.S. v.

Hinderman, 625 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1980). However, in that

case, the Tenth Circuit held that the standard for allowing the

government to reopen its case to introduce evidence remains the

same even if the defendant makes a Rule 29 motion for acquittal. 

Id. at 996. The court went on to note, “the trial court must be

vested with discretion to permit reopening when mere inadvertence

or some other compelling circumstance ... justifies a reopening

and no substantial prejudice will occur.” Id. 

The analysis above as to Defendant’s other argument

regarding allowing the Government to reopen applies equally to

this argument.

15. Answering Jury Question Without Consulting Attorneys

The jury submitted a question asking “what does contact

mean?” The Court, after consultation with counsel, returned the

answer, “Contact as used in the instructions is the time that you

determine was the first time that there was some communication

between the defendant and a government agent about the crime

charged in the indictment.” After reading this instruction in

open court, Juror Two asked: “The timeframe, when does the

evidence start? June 2005 or prior to that?” Juror Twelve

asked: “In the entrapment portion, do we consider entrapment from

June of ‘05 or back to August of ‘04?” The Court advised the

jurors that the instruction they had just received on “contact”

would answer that question and reread the instruction. Defense

counsel requested a sidebar which the Court denied. 

///

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Defendant now argues the Court’s refusal to allow defense counsel

to be heard on this issue violated Defendant’s constitutional

right to due process because it permitted the jury to draw an

inference from isolated facts. The Government points out that

the Court merely referred the jury back to a prior instruction

and instructed the jury to apply the formula to the facts, rather

than applying it for the jury.

The juror asked a question about “contact.” The Court had

just given the jury an instruction on that very issue. The Court

merely pointed the jury back to that instruction. The juror’s

question essentially asked the Court to instruct it on an

ultimate issue. The Court’s refusal to do so was proper under

the circumstances and the Defendant suffered no harm as a result.

16. Government Shifted Burden in Closing

Defendant argues the Government improperly shifted the

burden of proof during its closing argument by referring to

defense counsel’s failure to produce tape recordings that show

Defendant was entrapped. Defendant argues this was a reference

to Defendant’s failure to testify, and therefore violated his

Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant also argues the Government’s

reference to defense counsel’s failure to produce tapes was

improper because defense counsel only had the tapes the

Government provided.

The Government argues it only pointed out that defense

counsel had all the recordings and if there actually were

conversations establishing entrapment, defense counsel would have

presented them. 

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The Government also argues it properly turned over all of the

recordings, and it did not “cherry pick” conversations that made

it appear Defendant was more committed to the conspiracy than he

actually was.

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), the

Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination clause of the

Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the

accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence

is evidence of guilt.” A comment on the defense’s failure to

present exculpatory evidence is distinct from a comment on the

defendant’s failure to testify. U.S. v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298,

1301 (9th Cir. 1995). “A prosecutor may properly comment upon

the defendant’s failure to present exculpatory evidence, as long

as it is not phrased to call attention to defendant’s own failure

to testify.” U.S. v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 595-96 (9th

Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S. v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 494-95 (9th

Cir. 1985)). 

In the present case, the Government’s comments in its

closing argument did not violate Defendant’s Fifth Amendment

rights. Defense counsel maintained the theory of entrapment

throughout the case, and did fail to produce tape recordings of

conversations that would support that theory, despite intimating

such evidence existed. The Government referred to defense

counsel’s failure to produce evidence, and not to Defendant’s

failure to testify. These statements were permissible and do not

warrant a new trial.

///

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17. Totality of Errors Requires New Trial

Defendant argues that the totality of the above-described

errors warrants a new trial. Because no prejudicial error

occurred, this argument fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for New Trial is

also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cr-00035-MCE Document 306 Filed 03/28/08 Page 35 of 35