Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01209/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01209-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Franco Antonio Alarcon-Gonzalez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FRANCO ANTONIO ALARCON-GONZALEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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JAN 0 4 1996 

PA TRrCK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-1209 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-401-B) 

Charles Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, Denver, 

Colorado, with him on the brief). 

Gregory C. Graf, Assistant u.s. Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Henry 

L. Solano, U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, with him on the 

brief) . 

Before BRISCOE, SETH, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

Franco Antonio Alarcon-Gonzalez entered a plea of guilty to 

reentering the United States after deportation for a felony 

conviction (8 U.S.C. §1326(a) and (b) (1)), but reserved the right 

to appeal the order of the district court denying his motion to 

suppress evidence. He contends the questioning by Immigration and 

Naturalization service (INS) agents that led to his arrest was a 

Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 1 
seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion. We agree, and 

reverse and remand with directions. 

Alarcon~Gonzalez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was 

convicted of sale and transportation of cocaine in California in 

1993, and was deported to El Salvador. INS agents arrested 

Alarcon-Gonzalez on November 28, 1994, while he was working as a 

roofer on a job site in Aurora, Colorado. 

Aurora building code inspectors had informed INS that they 

suspected several roofing companies working in the city had 

employed illegal aliens because the inspectors had encountered 

roofers .who did not speak English or who spoke with an accent. The 

inspectors provided a list of those companies to INS. INS was 

also informed that some vehicles at the job sites had Texas 

license plates. INS agents regarded this as a factor indicating 

the presence of illegal aliens because after a major hail storm in 

1991 1 several local roofing companies had hired illegal aliens 

whose vehicles had Texas plates. 

INS planned 11 0peration Shingle, 11 in which teams of INS agents 

and Aurora police officers would contact roofing companies in the 

area to determine if they were employing illegal aliens. INS did 

not limit the scope of its investigatiOn to the list of roofing 

companies provided by the Aurora building inspectors. The teams 

were instructed to go to job sites and ask foremen for permission 

to speak to workers about their immigration status. Agents were 

instructed to speak to all workers regardless of apparent 

nationality or ethnicity and to make no further inquiry if a 

foreman refused permission or a roofer refused to answer 

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questions. "Operation Shingle" teams contacted approximately 60 

people on November 28, 1994, and arrested 31, all of whom were 

Hispanic in appearance. 

On the morning of November 28, an "Operation Shingle 11 team 

saw Alarcon-Gonzalez and another man, Cesar Carcamo-Perez, 

standing by a truck in the driveway of a home that was being 

reroofed.1 The company named on the side of the truck, 11 CLM 

Roofing, 11 was not a company included in the list of roofing 

companies the Aurora building inspectors had given to INS. The 

team stopped its two INS vehicles and one Aurora police patrol 

car, and four to eight armed and uniformed team members got out 

and approached the two men. 

Carcamo··Perez was reaching into the truck to unload a shingle 

gun. Apparently believing it to be a weapon, one of the team 

members commanded Carcamo-Perez to 11 freeze, 11 and he complied. 

Alarcon-Gonzalez understood the command to be directed at CarcamoPerez, but did not feel free to leave; he was only five feet away 

from Carcamo-Perez. INS agents approached and asked Carcamo-Perez 

to put the equipment down, which he did, slowly. An agent asked 

Carcamo-Perez if it was an item that he would normally use while 

roofing. Agents then identified themselves and asked CarcamoPerez and Alarcon-Gonzalez about their immigration status. 

Carcamo-Perez and Alarcon-Gonzalez replied they were from El 

Salvador and that their documents were at home. The agents called 

1 The record does not establish whether the truck had Texas 

plates. At oral argument, counsel stated photographs of the truck 

were admitted into evidence, which indicated the truck had 

Colorado plates. These photographs were not included in the 

record on appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 3 
in a records check, which revealed that Alarcon-Gonzalez had 

previously been deported and had not sought permission to reenter 

the country. Both men were arrested and taken to the INS office. 

The officers did not draw their weapohs at any time, and there was 

no evidence that they touched either Alarcon-Gonzalez or CarcamoPerez until they were placed under arrest. 

In denying the motion to suppress, the district court 

rejected Alarcon-Gonzalez's argument that the command to 11 freeze" 

converted the encounter into an unconstitutional seizure, holding 

it was a justified response to a perceived threat to safety and a 

mere de minimis intrusion into the personal liberty of AlarconGonzalez and Carcamo-Perez. The court also concluded the police 

encounter with Alarcon-Gonzalez was based on reasonable suspicion 

that he was involved in criminal activity. 

In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and we 

review the district court's findings of fact only for clear error. 

However, the court's conclusions as to when a seizure occurred and 

whether it was supported by reasonable suspicion are reviewed de 

novo, The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the 

Fourth Amendment is also reviewed de novo. United States v. 

Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496-97 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

Alarcon-Gonzalez contends he was subjected to a Fourth 

Amendment seizure when one of the team yelled 11 freeze 11 as the team 

approached and asked Carcamo-Perez and Alarcon-Gonzalez about 

their immigration status. The government argues the encounter was 

consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 4 
'!'he district court did not hold that the encounter was 

consensual. The court ruled the command to 11 freezen was a de 

minimis intrusion on personal liberty that did not convert the 

encounter into an unconstitutional seizure, and concluded there 

was reasonable suspicion for the brief questioning of AlarconGonzalez. 

The government's argument that the questioning that followed 

the command to "freeze" was consensual is without merit. A brief 

police encounter with an individual can be a detention under the 

Fourth Amendment if 11 the circumstances of the encounter are so 

intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have 

believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded." 

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 

(1984). A seizure occurs when consideration of all the 

circumstances surrounding the encounter shows that the police 

conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or 

she was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise 

terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 

439 (1991); United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1067··68 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). Although a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur 

simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks 

a few questions, that was not what occurred here. 

The team may not have intended the questioning to be a 

nonconsensual detention or seizure, but consideration of all the 

circumstances compels the conclusion that a reasonable person in 

Alarcon-Gonzalez's position would not have felt free to leave 

after the approach of four to eight armed and uniformed police 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 5 
officers and INS agents and the command to 11 freeze. n An order to 

freeze communicates that suspects are not free to leave and is 

sufficient to effect a seizure. See Urtited States v. Stanley, 915 

F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1990). A command by a police officer to 

11 freeze 11 is intimidating. It carries with it an implied threat to 

use force if the command is disobeyed. 

Although AlarconMGonzalez knew the command to 11 freeze 11 was 

directed at CarcamoMPerez, he did not feel free to leave. 'rhe two 

roofers were only five feet apart, and were obviously working 

together. Under these circumstances, the command would 

communicate to both persons that they were not free to terminate 

the encounter. See United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1556 

(lOth Cir. 1993). A reasonable person in Alarcon-Gonzalez' 

position would not have believed he was free t.o leave. The 

questioning that followed the command was not the result of a 

consensual encounter, but a seizure. Delgado, supra, is 

distinguishable because in that case the workers questioned were 

given no reason to believe the agents were restricting their 

freedom in any significant way. The agents in Delgado did nothing 

as coercive and intimidating as the command to 11 freeze 11 in this 

case. 

AlarconMGonzalez contends his detention for questioning about 

his immigration status was not supported by reasonable suspicion, 

and he argues he was detained and questioned solely because of his 

Hispanic appearance. The government argues that Alarcon-Gonzalez 

was questioned because he was a roofer, which, with the 

information known by INS, provided reasonable suspicion that 

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Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 6 
Alarcon-Gonzalez was an illegal alien. The district court found 

that the officer who yelled "freeze" reasonably believed CarcamoPerez was reaching for a weapon. Alarcon-Gonzalez argues that in 

the absence of evidence describing the shingle gun, there is no 

basis for determining the reasonableness of the officer's belief 

that the tool was a weapon. 

However, whether or not the conunand to "freeze" was justified 

is immaterial because its effect was to turn the encounter that 

followed into a nonconsensual seizure. It must have been obvious 

that Carcamo-Perez had a roofing tool and not a gun when the 

questioning began. Agent Castillo described it as 11 equipment" and 

11 a large staple gun," and did not question Carcamo··Perez further 

about it after asking him if it was a roofing tool. Following the 

command to "freeze," the agents did not say or do anything to 

communicate to Carcamo-Perez and Alarcon-Gonzalez that they were 

free to go, or otherwise attempt to undo the effect of the command 

to 11 freeze." Instead, they immediately began questioning the two 

men about their immigration status. See Unit§d States y. 

Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1133 (lOth Cir. 1985) {consent to search 

given by detained driver after grounds for detention had 

dissipated held invalid where officer did not inform driver he was 

free to leave before obtaining consent). Cf. United States v. 

Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (lOth Cir. 1990) (continued 

questioning after officer terminated detention by returning 

driver's license and registration was consensual). 

The initial concern that Carcamo-Perez might have a gun could 

not justify an investigatory detention for questioning about 

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Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 7 
immigration status. An investigatory detention must be reasonably 

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the stop in 

the first place. See United States y. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 

(1985); Terry y. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). The concern about 

a gun was completely dispelled before the questioning began. Once 

the reason that justified the initial stop is dispelled, further 

detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth 

Amendment. See United States y. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561-62 

(lOth Cir. 1994}. 

The determinative issue is not whether the command to 

11 fre·eze 11 was justified, but whether there was reasonable suspicion 

to detain Alarcon-Gonzalez and Carcamo-Perez for questioning about 

their immigration status. Facts insufficient to establish 

probable cause may establish reasonable suspicion. A fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 

is therefore unnecessary. However, the police must be able to 

articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch. There must be some minimal level of objective 

justification. Qnited States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989). 

Only in stops at fixed checkpoints is some amount of 

individualized suspicion not required for a brief investigatory 

detention. ~ united States y. Massie, 65 F.3d 843, 847 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). Otherwise, there must be a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity. 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officers 

must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 8 
u.s. 411, 417-18 (1981), cert. denj,ed 455 u.s. 923 (1982); 

Lambert, supra, at 1069. 

Here, the totality of the circumstances gave the INS agents a 

reasonable basis for suspecting that some roofers might be illegal 

aliens, but did not give them a reasonable basis for suspecting 

that Alarcon-Gonzalez in particular might be one of them. See 

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (apparent 

Mexican ancestry of occupants of car did not provide reasonable 

suspicion that they were illegal aliens) . 

The INS agents themselves did not believe the information 

they had about illegal aliens employed as roofers was sufficient 

to justify detaining all roofers of Hispanic appearance for 

questioning on their immigration status. They intended all 

encounters with roofers to be consensual. An unusual combination 

of circumstances simply turned this encounter into a seizure. 

There was nothing whatsoever that could give the INS agents a 

reasonable basis for suspecting that Alarcon-Gonzalez in 

particular might be an illegal alien, There was no visible 

criminal activity. Neither Alarcon-Gonzalez nor Carcamo-Perez did 

anything that could have suggested he was an illegal alien or was 

otherwise engaged in criminal activity. The officer's belief that 

Carcamo-Perez was reaching for a weapon was dispelled before the 

questioning began, and there is nothing at all suspicious about a 

roofer unloading a roofing tool from a truck at a job site. 

Working as a roofer is totally consistent with innocence. 

There was no evidence of any objectively suspicious act by 

Alarcon-Gonzalez. Compare United States v. Ledesma-Dominguez, 53 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 9 
F.3d 1159 {lOth Cir. 1995) ("masking odor" typically used by drug 

smugglers supported stop of vehicle), with United States v. 

Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878-81 {10th Cir. 1994) {no reasonable 

suspicion; no masking odor, evasive action, or other objective 

indication of contraband). There was no evidence that either 

Alarcon-Gonzalez or Carcamo-Perez was visibly nervous or gave a 

false name. Compare Reidy. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 {1980), 

with Sokolow, supra, and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 

{1983). Nor was there evidence that they attempted to hide or 

escape when approached by the "Operation Shingle 11 team, or that 

they displayed anger or disgust when they were detained. Compare 

United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1994), 

and united States v. Martin, 15 F.3d 943, aff'd on reh'g 18 F.3d 

1515 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 187 (1994), with 

Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878-81. Because there was no visible 

criminal activity or any objectively suspicious act or 

circumstance, we conclude the detention of Alarcon-Gonzalez was 

not supported by reasonable suspicion. ~ Reid, supra, at 440; 

Lambert, supra, at 1069-70. 

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to vacate AlarconGonzalez's guilty plea. 

10 

Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 10 
No. 95-1209 - UNITED STATES v. ALARCON-GONZALEZ 

SETH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I concur in the reversal and remand of this case as ordered 

by the majority. I would, however, place the reversal on the 

following: 

This encounter took place in a residential area of Aurora, 

Colorado, in a driveway leading from the street to a house set 

back from the street. Apparently there were no other persons 

present except the officers, the Defendant, and Defendant's fellow 

worker. Defendant was helping to unload a roofing company truck. 

There were four to six officers who had come up the street to the 

driveway in what were obviously two police cars and three 

Immigration and Naturalization Service cars. The police officers 

were in uniform and were obviously armed. The group of officers 

made up what was a 11 team" created to interrogate men working in 

the area as 11 roofers. 11 The team connotes a cohesive group, each 

member with a function, with all to act together. This is the 

11 team11 which walked up the driveway toward the Defendant. It must 

be considered to have been a "Show of authority. 11 It must have 

been a threatening presence. This must be taken together with the 

shout by an officer in the team of 11 freeze" intended to be 

directed to the person (not the Defendant) who had his hand in the 

truck removing a stapling device which looked like a handgun but 

was soon recognized as a harmless tool. 

Taking all the circumstances together there was no consensual 

encounter at the outset but instead was an intimidating challenge 

Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 11 
by the "team" by ~ts appearance, number, movements, arms, uniforms 

and the verbal challenge. When the group arrived a question was 

asked about the tool, directed to Defendant's fellow worker. No 

answer was received. The record states that the team captain 

"introduced" himself, but the record does not reveal how warmly 

this "introduction" was received. The questions then began 

apparently with all the above mentioned present. 

The Supreme Court in the several opinions wherein the 

11 reasonable person 11 ~ doctrine as to seizure has been applied as 

discussed presents an unusual number of separate opinions in each 

case. For example, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), 

there are five opinions. INS v. Delgado, 466 u.s. 210 (1984}, was 

the first majority opinion using the doctrine. However, the 

number of separate opinions do not necessarily conclude that 

different dispositions be made. 

In these opinions there are recurring terms which include the 

consideration of a "show of authority," 11 the threatening presence 

of a number of officers," 11 weapons, 11 11 intimidation", "an order to 

halt, 11 "uniforms," and generalities as to location. "Circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating" and use of language 

or tone of voice indicate that compliance might be compelled. 

In considering the "totality of the circumstances 11 the impact 

of these listed conditions, if present, is examined, together with 

the question whether police conduct itself, w)len communicated to a 

reasonable person, would cause such a person to feel free to 

leave, to feel no need to respond or cooperate, or to feel that he 

could terminate the encounter. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 12 
The location where the encounter took place or continued is 

always a factor. Per se consequences as to certain locations have 

been excluded. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), as to 

bus passengers. Also, our court in an en bane opinion excluded 

what was developing to be a per se rule as to encounters in 

passenger train roomettes or compartments. United States v. 

Little, 18 F. 3d 1499 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

Any per se rule is obviously gone, but the 11 reasonable 

person 11 doctrine is still alive and well although there may have 

been mentioned a new definition of 11 seizure, 11 which may only be 

one of semantics, but indicates a more physical aspect. See 

Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). We apply Little, 

however, because we have no physical seizure here. We consider 

United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526 (lOth Cir. 1992), 

United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (lOth Cir. 1992), and 

United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751 (lOth Cir. 1993), after the 

impact of the Little holding. It is apparent that in those "train 

encounter cases, 11 the fact that the incident took place in a 

roomette or compartment cannot be a determinative factor. As 

mentioned, the train opinions were approaching a per se rule. 

United States v. Dimick, 990 F.2d 1164 (lOth Cir. 1993). The 

Little en bane opinion made it clear that all factors and 

circumstances surrounding an encounter must be considered without 

any single one being a determinative factor, relying on and 

quoting Bostick and citing Bloom. Bloom held that the particular 

place of the encounter is but one factor in the totality of the 

circumstances. In Little the court stated: 

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Appellate Case: 95-1209 Document: 01019279831 Date Filed: 01/04/1996 Page: 13 
"Just as Bostick explicitly rejected any 

categorical distinctions based on the location 

of a police~citizen encounter on a bus (inside 

the bus, outside the bus, or in the bus 

terminal lobby), so, too, we reject the 

argument that the location of an encounter on 

a train (outside the train, in a public coach, 

or in a private roomette) is determinative of 

the seizure question. Any implication to the 

contrary from our previous opinions is 

overruled. n 

18 F.3d at 1504 (footnote omitted). Citing Bloom, 975 F.2d at 

1453, n.6, the Little court noted that again the basic question 

was "whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is 

unable to terminate the encounter." 18 F.3d at 1505. The Little 

court then held that the trial court was in error because it 

"apparently gave determinative weight to both the roomette setting 

and the failure to specifically advise Ms. Little that she need 

not answer questions . . " 18 F,3d at 1506. 

The court in Little did not decide whether a private place 

should be distinguished from a public place, but only rejected the 

train roomette as the reason for a distinction. Little cited 

Bostick on this point, and stated: 

'nBostick explicitly held that the 

particular location of an encounter is but one 

factor in the 'totality of the circumstances' 

test ' [w] here the encounter takes place is one· 

factor, but it is not the only one.' 11 

18 F.3d at 1503. 

Justice Powell, concurring in the result in Delgado, stated 

that "the systematic and public nature of the [factory] survey 

serve[d] to minimize any concern or fright on the part of the 

lawful employees." 466 U. S. at 224. The Supreme Court in 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 u.s. 420 (1984), a Miranda case, 

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considered the importance of an encounter in a public place in the 

"reasonable person" analysis. A 11 public placen is of course a 

place where the individual is in the view of persons other than 

the officers. In Zapata, we stated specifically and as of general 

application: 

"We consider a number of factors in 

determining whether a police-citizen encounter 

becomes a seizure; the location of the 

encounter, particularly whether the defendant 

is 'in an open public place where he [is] 

within the view of persons other than law 

enforcement officers,' Ward, 961 F.2d at 1531; 

" 

997 F.2d at 756. This was not changed by Little. See~ 

Justice Powell concurring in the result in Delgado. The private 

place compared to a public place was held to be a factor in 

United States v. Ray, 973 F.2d 840 (lOth Cir. 1992), and 

United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 15.26 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

In my view, the location where the encounter here took place 

is entirely different from that in Delgado, and so different that 

it must be a factor of importance to be added to the entire 

circumstances. 

In my view, when all the circumstances are considered 

together it appears that there was no consensual encounter at the 

outset. Instead, there was a challenge by the presence of the 

team, its actions and the shouted command in a "private place 11 as 

the term is used in the above opinions. There is nothing to 

demonstrate that the original circumstances changed before or 

dur:i.ng the questioning. Thus there was a "seizure" when the 

reasonable person doctrine is applied. 

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I would order on remand to the trial court that Defendant's 

Motion to Suppress be granted, and that he be allowed to withdraw 

his guilty plea. 

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