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Parties Involved:
Amanda Michelle Feenstra
Appellee
Humble Independent School District
Appellee
Mary King-White
Appellant
Tammy McHale
Appellee
Juan Melendez
Appellee
Alicia Narcisse
Appellee
Charles Ned
Appellee
Guy Sconzo
Appellee
Craig Stowers
Appellee
A. W.
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20484

Summary Calendar

MARY KING-WHITE; A. W., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

HUMBLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; AMANDA MICHELLE 

FEENSTRA; GUY SCONZO; CHARLES NED; JUAN MELENDEZ; TAMMY 

MCHALE; CRAIG STOWERS; ALICIA NARCISSE, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No.4:13-CV-3551

Before DAVIS, JONES, AND GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellants Mary King-White and A.W. (“Appellants”) filed suit against

Appellee Michelle Feenstra (“Feenstra”), Humble Independent School District

(“HISD”), and other school district employees, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983 and 1988, Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, as 

well as various tort claims under Texas law. Appellants alleged, inter alia, 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 6, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-20484

2

that Feenstra, A.W.’s former high school dance teacher, sexually abused A.W. 

from 2009 until A.W. graduated in the Fall 2011. Appellants filed their lawsuit 

on December 4, 2013, more than two years after the abuse had stopped. The 

district court dismissed the claims against HISD and its employees on 

December 2014, and the claims against Feenstra on July 2015. This Court 

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against HISD and its 

employees on October 20, 2015. See King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 

803 F.3d 754 (2015). 

Appellants now challenge the district court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (“§ 1983”) claims against Feenstra. Appellants contend that the district 

court erred in dismissing their § 1983 claims as barred by the two-year statute 

of limitations in Section 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code 

(“§ 16.003”).

Except as provided by Sections 16.010, 16.0031, and 16.0045, a 

person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to the 

property of another, conversion of personal property, taking or 

detaining the personal property of another, personal injury, 

forcible entry and detainer, and forcible detainer not later than two 

years after the day the cause of action accrues. 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.001(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 

Appellants essentially argue that the correct limitations period is five years 

because § 16.003 directs the plaintiff to § 16.0045, which provides a five-year 

statute of limitations for personal injury claims resulting from sexual assault. 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.0045(b) (West 2005). 

§ 1983 claims are subject to state personal injury statutes of limitations. 

See King-White, 803 F.3d at 759. The identical issue whether the two-year 

limitations period in § 16.003 applies to Appellants’ § 1983 claims has been 

foreclosed in this Circuit by King-White, 803 F.3d at 754—a case that 

Appellants conveniently failed to acknowledge in their briefing. In King-White, 

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No. 15-20484

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we held that the two-year limitations period in § 16.003 applied to Appellants’

§ 1983 personal injury claims, “regardless of whether the facts underlying the 

particular claim make an exception potentially applicable.” Id. at 761. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment.1

 

1 In their Reply Brief, Appellants proffer a “tolling” argument. Because Appellants

failed to brief their “tolling” argument until their Reply Brief, they have waived it. See 

Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd v. Occidental Crude Sales, 729 F.2d 1530, 1539 n.14 (5th Cir. 1984). 

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