Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03111/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03111-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Spencer L. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2000 Decided November 14, 2000

No. 98-3111

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Spencer L. Johnson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00062-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Valinda Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Darrell C.

Valdez, Assistant United States Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: A jury convicted Spencer L. Johnson of possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994), and simple possession of marijuana, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. s 844(a) (1994). Judge Harold H.

Greene sentenced Johnson to 121 months in prison and five

years of supervised release on count one, and concurrent

terms of 12 months in prison and one year of supervised

release on count two.

Johnson appeals and requests a new trial. He asserts that

the prosecutor substantially prejudiced the verdict by arguing

to the jurors that their function included protecting the

community from drugs. Defense counsel raised a timely

objection to the prosecutor's comments at trial. Johnson is

correct that the prosecutor's comments were error. However, the error was harmless. The improper comments did not

substantially or injuriously affect the determination of the

jury's verdict. As a result, we affirm the judgment.

In the alternative, Johnson argues that this court should

remand the case for resentencing. Johnson has not been

provided with a transcript of his sentencing proceedings in

violation of the Court Reporter Act, 28 U.S.C. s 753(b)

(1994). The Miller Reporting Company lost the stenomask

tape and any transcript that might have been prepared.

Johnson asserts that without resentencing there can be no

meaningful review. The Government argues that the likelihood of a lower sentence is small, but concedes that it is not

out of the realm of possibility.

This case presents a highly unusual circumstance. Ordinarily, if a sentencing record is lost, the judge who sentenced

the defendant makes definitive findings as to the content of

the sentencing proceedings pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case, however,

the judge who sentenced Johnson became seriously ill before

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the record could be reconstructed. The judge who succeeded

the original trial judge issued an order stating that the record

could not be reconstructed. Given what is known here about

the sentencing proceedings before the original trial judge, it

is possible that Johnson was entitled to a lesser sentence. In

light of these unusual circumstances, and to ensure that all

appropriate possibilities are considered, we remand the case

for resentencing.

I. Background

A. Trial

On February 24, 1998, a federal grand jury indicted Johnson for possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(A)(iii), and simple possession of marijuana, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. s 844(a). Johnson's first trial ended in a mistrial

when certain jurors became unavailable entering the fourth

day of deliberations. During Johnson's second trial, the

Government presented the testimony of five police officers

involved in appellant's arrest: Investigator Tommy Miller,

Sergeant Curt Sloan, and Officers John Branch, Devinci

Wooden, and Andre Wright. The Government also presented

the testimony of a chemist and a police detective with expertise in narcotics. The defense presented the testimony of

Johnson, and Johnson's friend, Larry Holmes, who witnessed

the arrest.

The officers testified to the following. On February 6,

1998, they were patrolling the neighborhood surrounding

Clifton Street, N.W., Washington D.C. Around 5:00 p.m.,

Officer Tommy Miller, sitting with his partner in a police car,

noticed a broken light on Johnson's car. They radioed the

other officers that they were going to make a traffic stop.

See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 6/17/98 at 17. When they

reached Johnson, he had driven around the corner, parked his

car, and started walking towards an alley. See id. at 18-19.

Officer Branch pursued Johnson through the alley. Officer

Branch wore a black police raid jacket with "Police" written

on front. He wore a badge at his waistband and a gun on his

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hip. Officer Branch did not identify himself, but believed

Johnson realized he was a police officer. See id. at 83-84. In

the alley, Sergeant Sloan saw Johnson use a hook-shot twice

to toss objects onto the roof. See Tr. 6/18/98 at 57. Officers

Wooden and Wright saw Johnson throw two objects onto the

roof. See id. at 95-96; Tr. 6/19/98 at 12. Officer Branch saw

one of Johnson's throws. See Tr. 6/17/98 at 49-50. After the

police reached Johnson, Officer Miller heard Johnson say he

ran because he did not have his driver's license. See id. at

27. Officer Branch recovered two plastic bags from the roof

containing 64 grams of cocaine. See id. at 51. A police

detective with expertise in narcotics testified that this was

more than an individual would normally possess for personal

use. See Tr. 6/19/98 at 69. The officers also found a bag in

Johnson's coat containing 26.5 grams of marijuana. See Tr.

6/17/98 at 62-63; Tr. 6/19/98 at 47.

Johnson's story was quite different from the testimony of

the officers. He testified that on February 6, 1998, he parked

near his former home on Chapin Street. See Tr. 6/19/98 at

105, 108-09. As he walked away from his car, a man jumped

out of another car and chased him. Because his brother had

been killed recently in crossfire in a drive-by shooting in the

same area, Johnson feared for his life and ran instinctively.

See id. at 106. He did not know the man chasing him was a

police officer. See id. at 106-07. After he was stopped by

the police in the alley, an officer told him the police were

going to say he threw illegal drugs onto the roof. See id. at

118. Johnson testified that he could not have made a hookshot motion because of an injury to his right shoulder. See

id. at 104. He testified that he did not possess any drugs.

See id. at 112. Larry Holmes testified that he saw Johnson

run down an alley before being stopped by police. He did not

see Johnson throw anything. See id. at 86.

B. Prosecutor's Statement

In his rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor stated:

[Y]ou heard in his closing defense counsel make a lot

about truth and justice and the Pledge of Allegiance.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, justice does not have one

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eye; it's got two eyes. Justice protects not only the

person who is accused, but it also protects persons like

those individuals who--those 400-plus individuals that

the crack cocaine were intended for. That is another

person justice is intended to serve.

Tr. 6/22/98 at 48. Defense counsel requested curative instructions. Initially, Judge Greene did not remember the

statement. After being reminded of the comment by both

defense counsel and the prosecutor, Judge Greene denied the

request explaining:

I don't think that is improper. It is a little of pressure

on the jury, which is probably what Mr. Jones objected

to, but I don't think it is improper enough that I should

now tell the jury to forget about that. That is what you

want me to do, right? That is reserved for a future time,

for the third and fourth and fifth time.

Id. at 71. The jury subsequently returned guilty verdicts on

all charges.

C. Sentencing

Judge Greene sentenced Johnson to 121 months in prison

and five years of supervised release on count one, and concurrent terms of 12 months in prison and one year of supervised

release on count two. Unfortunately, the official court reporter, Miller Reporting Company, lost the stenomask tape of

the sentencing proceedings, so no transcript of the proceedings could be prepared. Subsequently, Johnson, pursuant to

Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,

served a statement of proceedings on the Government in

which Johnson, his trial attorney, and his mother, attempted

to reconstruct the sentencing proceedings. In response, the

Government elected not to contest or supplement Johnson's

statement.

Ordinarily the judge who presides at sentencing makes

definitive findings regarding the content of the sentencing

proceedings. Judge Greene, however, as a result of serious

illness, was not available. In his absence, Chief Judge Norma

Holloway Johnson entered an order finding that complete

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reconstruction and settlement of the sentencing record was

not possible. See United States v. Johnson, Crim. No.

98-062, Order (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1999) ("Order"), reprinted in

Appellant's Appendix ("Appellant's App.") at 40.

II. Analysis

A. Prosecutor's Statement

Johnson raised a timely objection to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument to the jury; therefore, we review the contested

remarks for harmless error. See United States v. Saro, 24

F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In any invocation of the

harmless error standard, the Government carries the burden

of proof; and the measure of "harm" under the standard is

whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict, not merely whether the record evidence is sufficient absent the error to

warrant a verdict of guilt. See United States v. Smart, 98

F.3d 1379, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In assessing claims of prosecutorial misstatements, the

court is required to determine whether the disputed remarks

constituted error and whether they substantially prejudiced

the defendant's trial. See United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d

693, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We typically consider several

factors in this analysis: the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to

mitigate the effects of the error. See Gaither v. United

States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

There is no doubt here that the prosecutor's rebuttal

argument to the jury was impermissible. A prosecutor may

not make comments designed to inflame the passions or

prejudices of the jury. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 715. And a

prosecutor may not ask jurors to find a defendant guilty as a

means of promoting community values, maintaining order, or

discouraging future crime. See United States v. Monaghan,

741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984). On its face, the

prosecutor's argument in this case improperly suggested that

the jury should convict the defendant in order to protect

others from drugs.

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The Government argues that the prosecutor's comments

were a moderate response to defense counsel's allegations

that the police employed Nazi tactics to frame the defendant.

See Appellee's Br. at 15-16. It is undoubtedly correct that, in

assessing the severity of impermissible arguments, a court

must consider whether prosecutorial comments were offered

in response to inflammatory statements by defense counsel.

See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (1989).

In this case, defense counsel did indeed invoke Nazi practices

in discussing police tactics. See Tr. 6/22/98 at 42. However,

read in context, the prosecutor was not responding directly to

allegations of police misconduct. Rather, the prosecutor was

responding to defense counsel's legitimate statement that the

promise of liberty and justice for all in the Pledge of Allegiance applies to Johnson. See id. at 28.

The Government further argues that the prosecutor implied that the police, not the jury, had a duty to protect the

community from drugs. See Appellee's Br. at 16. Despite

this claim, the prosecutor's comments give no explicit indication that their subject is the police. The plain meaning of the

prosecutor's comments is that the jury should give justice not

only to Johnson, but also to the individuals the drugs were

intended to reach. See id. at 48.

There is no claim here that precise measures were taken to

cure the prosecutor's misconduct. However, the absence of

curative instructions is not dispositive of the question of

prejudice. See Monaghan, 741 F.2d at 1443 n.43. Rather, an

appellate court generally defers to the District Court's judgment as to "[w]hether the prosecutor has struck a foul blow

instead of just a hard one." United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d

640, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We also consider the jurors'

common sense in assessing the effect of a prosecutor's statement. See Monaghan, 741 F.2d at 1440. In the judgment of

Judge Greene, the prosecutor's comments would have merited judicial intervention had they been repeated a "third and

fourth and fifth time." Tr. 6/22/98 at 71. Although he did

not issue a curative instruction, Judge Greene urged the

jurors in his general instructions to convict based only on the

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evidence and reminded the jury that the lawyers' arguments

were not evidence. See id. at 53-54.

The final thing that we must consider in assessing a claim

of prosecutorial misstatement is the likely impact of the

improper remarks on the verdict. See United States v.

Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Johnson

argues that his conviction was uncertain. He points out that

the first trial ended in a mistrial after three and one-half days

of jury deliberations. See Appellant's Br. at 16-17. Though

complete certainty is not to be had in this circumstance, we

do not think it plausible, in light of the formidable evidence

arrayed against Johnson, that the prosecutor's remarks are

what account for Johnson's relatively speedy conviction at the

second trial.

Johnson also argues that the Government's evidence was

infected with the aura of collusion. In support of this claim,

Johnson points out that two police officers, along with the

prosecutor, admitted they revisited the crime scene during

the trial. See Tr. 6/18/99 at 61, 71. Furthermore, Johnson

alleges that a photograph the officers used to illustrate their

testimony contained markings that enabled them to coordinate their testimony. See 6/22/98 at 35. Finally, Johnson

argues that the odd consistency of the testimony among the

officers, such as repetition of the term "hook-shot" and references to eye contact with Johnson, indicates collusion. See

Tr. 6/17/98 at 16, 84; Tr. 6/18/98 at 16-17, 92, 125; Tr. 6/19/98

at 9-10, 37; Tr. 6/22/98 at 37.

Despite Johnson's assertions, we find that the great weight

of the evidence strongly supports Johnson's conviction. Five

police officers testified that Johnson possessed drugs. Their

eyewitness accounts were corroborated by physical evidence.

The only challenge to their testimony came from the defendant and the defendant's friend. Furthermore, at issue in

Johnson's collusion argument is the credibility of the Government's witnesses versus the credibility of Johnson and his

witness. If the prosecutor improperly addressed the issue of

witness credibility, Johnson's argument might have more

force. Instead, the prosecutor urged the jury to convict

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Johnson in order to protect the community from drugs.

Given the content of the prosecutor's misstatement, it was not

likely to have affected the outcome of the case. Regardless

of the prosecutor's statement, the evidence clearly supported

the jury's verdict. Having considered these factors, we hold

that, although the prosecutor's comments were impermissible,

the error was harmless. Accordingly, the jury's verdict must

stand.

B. Loss of Sentencing Record

The Court Reporter Act, 28 U.S.C. s 753(b), requires that

court reporters record verbatim all proceedings in criminal

cases held in open court. However, failure to record a

proceeding or make a whole transcript available does not per

se require reversal. See United States v. Carrazana, 70 F.3d

1339, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We evaluate the burdens and

benefits of remand on a case-by-case basis and consider "(1)

the goal of deterring violations of the Court Reporter Act; (2)

the ability (and reasonable efforts of the parties) to correct

for violations of the Act by reconstructing the record; and (3)

the likelihood that reversible error occurred." Id.

In this case, Miller Reporting Company defaulted on its

responsibilities by losing the transcript. There is no mitigating evidence that the transcript was lost as a result of

inadvertent mechanical error. See, e.g., United States v.

Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Appellant

asserts that Miller Reporting Company has engaged in a

pattern of negligence. The Assistant Federal Public Defender in this case attests that this is the fifth case she has

handled in six years in which the Miller Reporting Company

has lost a transcript. See Appellant's Br. at 21. The Government admits that it has "been frustrated from time to time by

lapses in the performance of this reporting company." Appellee's Br. at 25 n.15. In light of this record, our interest in

deterring violations of the Court Reporter Act weighs heavily

in favor of remanding this case for resentencing.

An additional consideration here is the confluence of circumstances which prevented the parties from reconstructing

the record. Appellant made a good faith effort to reconstruct

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the record pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure. However, due to the unavailability of

the transcript, the inability of the parties to recall everything

that occurred at sentencing, and the illness of the presiding

District Court Judge, Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson

determined that complete reconstruction of the sentencing

record was not possible. See Order, reprinted in Appellant's

App. at 40. As a result, there is no reconstructed record in

this case.

Finally, we must consider whether Johnson was prejudiced

by the violation of the Court Reporter Act. In particular, we

must consider

the ability of the defendant to allege specific prejudice

arising out of an event in the missing portions [of the

transcript]; the extent of the missing portions; the significance of the missing portions in a typical trial (e.g.,

final jury instructions are presumptively more significant

than a bench conference); the likely significance of the

missing portions in the context of the specific trial in

question; and the use of new counsel on appeal.

Carrazana, 70 F.3d at 1343. In this context, since the

burden of resentencing is comparatively light, these factors

need not weigh as heavily in favor of remand as when a new

trial is at stake. See Saro, 24 F.3d at 288. We thus consider

the Carrazana factors in light of this lower burden.

First, appellant does not allege specific prejudice arising

out of an event in the sentencing proceedings. This is not

dispositive, however. We have found reversible error where

a crucial stage of trial was missing even though the defendant

could not allege specific prejudice. See United States v.

Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700, 702 (1970) (per curiam).

Second, in this case, the extent of the missing transcript of

the sentencing proceedings is significant, as the entire transcript was lost. In both Carrazana and Winstead, we concluded that the context of the missing transcripts, such as the

absence of select bench conferences, suggested that the missing portions related mainly to housekeeping matters. In

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other words, the subject matter of the missing transcripts in

those cases was not crucial; as a result, it was held that

reversible errors were unlikely. See Carrazana, 70 F.3d at

1344; Winstead, 74 F.3d at 1322. In contrast, in Workcuff,

the court reporter was absent from a crucial stage of the

trial--a jury instruction given after jury deliberations had

begun--and, as a result, the court could not determine that

no substantial right of the appellant had been violated. See

Workcuff, 422 F.2d at 702. Similarly, in this case, although

Johnson cannot point to prejudice arising out of a particular

event, the loss of the transcript of the entire sentencing

proceedings constitutes the absence of a crucial stage and

itself increases the likelihood of error. The Government does

not dispute the significance of this phase of the analysis.

Third, in evaluating the significance of the missing portions

of the transcript in the context of the specific trial in question,

the court considers whether the gaps are suggestive of probable error. See Carrazana, 70 F.3d at 1343. The Government

argues that the gap is not suggestive of probable error,

because we can determine that Judge Greene properly calculated Johnson's sentence based on the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"). The parties agree that the statutory

mandatory minimum for the crime was 120 months. See 21

U.S.C. s 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a base offense level of 32, which triggers

an imprisonment range of 121-151 months. See PSR at 4.

In addition, the Presentence Investigation Report recommended a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, for a

total of 34 points, which triggers an imprisonment range of

151-188 months. See PSR at 4-5. Judge Greene sentenced

Johnson to 121 months. By implication, the Government

asserts, Judge Greene rejected the obstruction of justice

recommendation, but accepted the remainder of the Presentence Investigation Report. The Government further argues

that Johnson did not raise any grounds for downward departure in his objections to the Presentence Investigation Report. See Appellee's Br. at 30-31. Nevertheless, the Government concedes that if there were grounds for downward

departure, Judge Greene could have sentenced appellant to

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120 months, the statutory mandatory minimum, rather than

121 months, the minimum guidelines recommendation. The

Government argues this one-month discrepancy is not an

appreciable difference. See id.

Johnson argues that, contrary to the Government's claims,

the Presentence Investigation Report does not demonstrate

that there was no error in the District Court's sentencing.

Johnson presents the following example. The Presentence

Investigation Report made it clear that Johnson met the first

four criteria for the 2-level safety valve adjustment in U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 5C1.2 (1997), specifically, no

criminal history points, no violence or weapon possession in

the offense, no death or serious bodily injury, and no leadership role. However, only the District Court Judge could

determine whether Johnson met the fifth criteria, i.e., truthfully providing all information and evidence about the offense.

See U.S.S.G. s 5C1.2.

If Judge Greene found that Johnson met the fifth criteria,

and he also rejected the enhancement for obstruction of

justice as the Government suggests, Judge Greene could have

sentenced Johnson to less than 120 months. See U.S.S.G.

s 2D1.1(b)(6). The Presentence Investigation Report provides no assessment of this, and without a sentencing transcript, there is no record of Judge Greene's analysis of this

provision. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 9. In addition,

according to the uncontested account that Johnson submitted

in his attempt to reconstruct the record, during sentencing

Judge Greene spoke about how harsh the sentencing guidelines were, and stated that if he could sentence Johnson below

the guidelines range, he would. See Appellant's Statement of

Proceedings Prepared Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 10(c),

reprinted in Appellant's App. 33-35. This further supports

the possibility that Judge Greene would have granted Johnson a lesser sentence, had the safety valve been brought to

his attention.

This court has not specifically ruled on whether a defendant who testified at trial and was disbelieved by the jury,

but subsequently truthfully provided the Government with all

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information and evidence, is eligible for the safety valve. See

United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999)

(holding that despite previous fabrications and obstruction

defendant was eligible for safety valve). Under the plain

language of U.S.S.G. s 5C1.2, a defendant has until "not

later than the time of the sentencing hearing" to truthfully

provide the Government with all information and evidence

concerning the offense. Johnson bore the burden of persuading the District Court that he was eligible for the safety

valve. See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 29 (D.C.

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2000 WL 1468603 (U.S.

Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-6297). We are not in a position to

weigh these factors and we cannot be certain what the trial

judge's assessment might have been in this case.

Finally, in this case original counsel was available in the

attempted reconstruction. As a result, the use of new counsel

is not a significant factor in the likelihood of reversible error.

See Carrazana, 70 F.3d at 1344-45.

As we discussed in Carrazana, we consider the foregoing

factors in assessing the likelihood that reversible error occurred. We then weigh the likelihood that reversible error

occurred, along with deterrence and the ability and efforts of

the parties to reconstruct the record. See Carrazana, 70

F.3d at 1342-43. On balance, we find that this case presents

a circumstance which qualifies for remand and resentencing.

Johnson and the Government both acknowledge repeated loss

of transcripts by Miller Reporting Company. Despite Johnson's good faith effort to reconstruct the record, the District

Court found that no reconstruction was possible. Both parties recognize that it is possible that Judge Greene could have

sentenced Johnson to a lesser sentence. In addition, the loss

of the entire transcript of the sentencing proceedings further

supports resentencing. Based on these concerns, justice

requires that the case be remanded for resentencing.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons given above, we affirm the judgment, but

remand the case for resentencing.

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