Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-03157/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-03157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barrett Financial Group LLC
Defendant
Jennifer Blair
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jennifer Blair,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Barrett Financial Group LLC,

Defendant.

No. CV-24-03157-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

Defendant Barrett Financial Group LLC (“Defendant”) has filed an Expedited 

Motion to Stay (Doc. 18) this action pending the Court’s decision on its Motion to Compel 

Arbitration (Doc. 12). Plaintiff Jennifer Blair (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Response opposing 

Defendant’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 21) and Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 23). The 

Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Stay for the following reasons. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff, Defendant’s former employee, has brought this action against Defendant 

for Failure to Pay Overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207, on her 

own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated former and current employees who 

were not compensated for their overtime wages. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff brings this action as a 

collective action and asks for the “prompt issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 

to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency 

of this action, and permitting them to timely assert FLSA claims in this action by filing 

individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).” (Id. at 9, ¶ A). Plaintiff 

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has also filed a Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 11) and seeks to issue a Notice of Collective 

Action to potential opt-in plaintiffs (Doc. 11-3). The Court has yet to rule on the Motion 

to Certify Class. 

After Plaintiff filed these two Motions Defendant moved to compel arbitration and 

dismiss this matter due to an Arbitration Agreement between the parties which it argues is 

binding. (Doc. 12). This Arbitration Agreement states that: 

I agree that if I am unable to resolve any dispute through the internal policies 

and procedures of BFG, I will arbitrate (instead of filing a lawsuit or 

discrimination charge with any court or governmental agency) any legal 

claim that I might have against BFG or its employees, in connection with my 

employment or termination of employment, including but not limited to any 

claim of employment discrimination of harassment based on age, sex, marital 

status, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability or status with 

respect to receipt of public assistance, under federal or state law or city 

ordinance, whether arising out of issues or matters occurring before the date 

of this Agreement or after such date. 

Waiver. I agree that there will be no right or authority for any dispute to be 

brought, heard, or arbitrated as a class, collective, representative or private 

attorney general action. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 2–3). 

In its Motion to Compel Arbitration, Defendant also argues that a stay is proper 

under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because the statute mandates a 

stay. (Doc. 12 at 25 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (providing that the Court “shall on application of 

one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 

accordance with the terms of the agreement.”)). After filing this Motion, Defendant also 

filed a separate Expedited Motion to Stay. (Doc. 18).

II. Legal Standard

A pending dispositive motion is not generally “a situation that in and of itself would 

warrant a stay of discovery.” DRK Photo v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2012 WL 

5936681, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2012) (internal citation omitted). However, the case for 

staying discovery is “particularly strong when the underlying dispositive motion on which 

the stay request is premised is a motion to compel arbitration” because without a stay “the 

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advantages of arbitration—speed and economy—are lost forever.” Williams v. Experian 

Info. Sols. Inc., 2024 WL 739676, at *2–4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2024) (citing Coinbase, Inc. 

v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023)). 

The party seeking a stay of discovery “carries the heavy burden of making a strong 

showing why discovery should be denied.” Id. Courts in the Ninth Circuit employ a threeprong test to determine whether a stay is appropriate, including: “1) the pending dispositive 

motion must be potentially dispositive of the entire case; 2) the court must either be 

‘convinced’ that the dispositive motion will be granted, or the court must find that a ‘clear 

possibility’ exists that the dispositive motion will be granted; and 3) the court must be able 

to resolve the dispositive motion without any additional discovery.” Cebrynski v. Wells 

Fargo Bank NA, 2022 WL 2290561, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2022) (citing Baadsgaard v. 

Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 2020 WL 6273405, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 21, 2020).

Application of this test requires the court to take a “preliminary peek” at the merits 

of the pending dispositive motion. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2012 WL 5936681, at 

*2. To be entitled to a discovery stay, the moving party must show there is an “immediate 

and clear possibility of success” on its motion. Mlejnecky v. Olympus Imaging America, 

Inc., 2011 WL 489743, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011).

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that allowing this litigation to proceed before the Court decides 

its Motion to Compel Arbitration will create irreparable harm by eroding its arbitration 

rights, contrary to the FAA’s purpose of promoting streamlined resolution outside the 

judicial process. (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion to Compel 

Arbitration is not dispositive of the entire case due to another opt-in Plaintiff who has filed 

consent to join the action. (Doc. 21 at 5). She also argues that a stay is not appropriate 

here because discovery will have to proceed during arbitration as well and that, because 

Defendant has threatened Plaintiff, there is a high likelihood that other potential plaintiffs 

or witnesses may similarly be threatened to dissuade them from joining or testifying. 

(Id. at 5–6). If the Court issues a stay, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a gag order 

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prohibiting Defendant, its Counsel, or its management from “communicating with any 

other current and/or former employee regarding this lawsuit, who may be a potential class 

member.” (Id. at 6). The Court will first address the Motion to Stay and then move on to 

Plaintiff’s requested communication restriction. 

A. The Motion to Stay

1. Dispositive Motion

The first prong of the three-part test is satisfied. Courts routinely find that motions 

to compel arbitration are dispositive motions. See, e.g., Arik v. Meyers, 2020 WL 515843, 

at *1–2 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2020) (discussing dispositive nature of a motion to compel 

arbitration). Indeed, “granting a motion to compel arbitration does not simply change the 

forum for resolution of a dispute, it changes the nature and process of that resolution. 

Potentially depriving a party of the ability to litigate in a court renders a motion to compel 

arbitration dispositive for purposes of determining whether to stay discovery.” Id. at *2. 

Plaintiff argues that the existence of other opt-in plaintiffs renders this Motion nondispositive. (Doc. 21 at 45). However, Plaintiff ignores that the Motion to Compel 

Arbitration cites to an agreement wherein she waived her right to bring a class or collective 

action. (Doc. 12-1 at 3). Furthermore, other potential opt-in Plaintiffs have also signed 

this same agreement as part of their employment with Defendant. (Doc. 16-2 at 3 

(notifying Plaintiff that “these individuals are also bound by similar ADR Agreements, 

which bar them from participating in a collective action.”). So, Defendant’s Motion to 

Compel Arbitration is potentially dispositive of the entire case. See Cebrynski, 2022 WL 

2290561, at *1. 

2. Clear Possibility of Success

Having taken this “peek” at the merits of the Motion, the Court concludes that 

Defendants have demonstrated a clear and immediate possibility of success on their Motion 

to Compel. Indeed, other courts within this district have stated that they “cannot ignore 

that many courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have granted requests by Defendant to 

compel arbitration under what appears to be [a similar] agreement.” Williams v. Experian 

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Info. Sols. Inc., 2024 WL 739676, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2024) (citing Meeks v. Experian 

Info. Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 17958634 (9th Cir. 2022)). Thus, without deciding how it will 

rule on the Motion to Compel Arbitration, the Court concludes that the second prong is 

satisfied. 

3. Additional Discovery 

The Motion to Compel Arbitration is fully briefed. (See Docs. 12, 16 and 20). 

Plaintiff has not argued the need for further discovery before responding. (Doc. 21 at 6–

7). Thus, because additional discovery is not needed to resolve the potentially dispositive 

motion, this prong is also met. See Ferrell v. AppFolio, Inc., 2024 WL 132223, at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. Jan. 8, 2024) (“[Plaintiff] has already filed her opposition to the underlying motion, 

so it is not clear what purpose limited discovery would serve.”). 

B. Plaintiff’s Requested Communication Restriction 

Plaintiff asks that if the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Stay, it also “impose a 

communication restriction on Defendant’s counsel, Defendant’s owners, and any other 

supervisor and/or manager from communicating with any other current and/or former 

employee regarding this lawsuit, who may be a potential class member.” (Doc. 21 at 6). 

The Court denies this request as it is premature. 

“The Supreme Court recognizes that district courts have the duty and the power to 

oversee communications from both defendants and class counsel with potential class 

members and FLSA collective action participants.” Dominguez v. Better Mortg. Corp., 88 

F.4th 782, 791 (9th Cir. 2023). However, this power “must be exercised cautiously.” Id. 

District courts have “broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter 

appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” Id. (citations omitted). 

A district court “may issue ‘an order limiting communications between parties and 

potential class members . . . based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a 

weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the 

parties’ ” or run the risk of imposing an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 

Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981)). “The FLSA’s antiCase 2:24-cv-03157-DJH Document 26 Filed 01/10/25 Page 5 of 7
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retaliation clause is designed to ensure that employees are not compelled to risk their jobs 

in order to assert their wage and hour rights under the Act.” Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 

997, 1002–04 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The restrictions on a defendant’s communication with class members arises from 

the existence of an attorney-client relationship. See Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc., 

235 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2002). In a class action that has been certified under 

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “absent class members are considered 

represented by class counsel unless they choose to ‘opt out.’ ” Id. (citing Kleiner v. First 

National Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1207 n. 28 (11th Cir.1985)). The situation is 

“different” in a collective action for unpaid wages or overtime under the FLSA. See Parks, 

235 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that “[n]o employee shall 

be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such 

a party.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “Until they ‘opt-in,’ prospective § 216(b) plaintiffs are not 

yet parties to the action, they have no attorney, and no attorney-client relation is yet in 

issue. The Court’s authorization to give notice in a § 216(b) case does not create a class of 

represented plaintiffs as it does in a Rule 23 class action.” Parks, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.

In Rule 23 class actions, “pre-certification communication from the defense to 

prospective plaintiffs is generally permitted” because “no attorney-client relationship yet 

exists.” Id. (emphasis added). The same can be said for opt-in plaintiffs in a Section 216 

collective action because no attorney-client relationship exists until they opt in. See id. 

Accordingly, a defendant employer may communicate with prospective plaintiff 

employees in an FLSA collective action who have not yet opted in to the collective “unless 

the communication undermines or contradicts the Court’s own notice to prospective 

plaintiffs.” Parks, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (emphasis added). 

In this case, after Plaintiff filed her collective action Complaint in this matter, 

Defendant’s counsel sent her a letter informing her that she had signed an arbitration 

agreement. (Doc. 16-2 at 2–4). In this letter, Defendant states that “it has come to our 

attention that your client has contacted current and former Barrett Financial Group 

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employees to solicit their participation in this collective action. This conduct constitutes 

tortious interference with contractual relations . . . We caution you and your client to cease 

any such further conduct immediately.” (Id. at 3–4) (emphasis added). The Court finds 

this communication concerning. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for a 

communication restriction, a prior restraint on speech, is premature. 

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Certify Class, but the Court has yet to rule on it or 

grant authorization to give notice to potential plaintiffs. Without having granted such 

authorization of notice, the Court cannot have its “own notice to prospective plaintiffs” 

undermined. See Parks, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (emphasis added). Moreover, like 

plaintiffs in a pre-certification class action, any potential opt-in plaintiffs to this action are 

not yet represented by counsel; so, communication from the defense to these prospective 

plaintiffs should generally be permitted. See id. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s 

request, but it will do so without prejudice to renew. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 18) is GRANTED. The 

Court will stay discovery in this matter until it decides Defendant’s Motion to Compel 

Arbitration (Doc. 12).

Dated this 9th day of January, 2025.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

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