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Parties Involved:
Louis Wayne Fennell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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FILED 

UniU:d States Court of APiY~ls 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LOUIS WAYNE FENNELL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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oc·r o 1 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1214 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-379-3) 

(District of Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges. 

Mr. Louis Wayne Fennell was charged in a multi-count 

indictment. Count I charged Mr. Fennell, Mr. Lewis Dixon and Mr. 

Whittier Buchanan with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 u.s.c. S 846. Counts II through V and 

Count VI charged Mr. Dixon and/or Mr. Buchanan with possession 

with intent to distribute. Count VI was the only other charge 

against Mr. Fennell. That count charged Mr. Fennell and Mr. Dixon 

with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 

21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. S 2. Mr. Buchanan entered 

into a plea agreement, and Mr. Fennell and Mr. Dixon were tried 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1214 Document: 010110090717 Date Filed: 10/01/1991 Page: 1 
together. Mr. Dixon was convicted on all counts. Mr. Fennell, 

however, was found guilty of Count I, the conspiracy count, but 

acquitted of Count VI, the substantive possession count. 

Mr. Fennell is appealing his conviction on the conspiracy 

count. He argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) there was a fatal variance between the 

indictment alleging a single conspiracy and proof at trial of 

multiple conspiracies, and (3) the trial court erred in denying a 

motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence and wrongful withholding of exculpatory evidence. 

I. FACTS 

The Drug Enforcement Administration received information 

through a confidential informant that one Whittier Buchanan was 

distributing cocaine. The informant took an undercover agent to 

Mr. Buchanan and introduced her as a friend. The undercover agent 

made four separate purchases of cocaine from Mr. Buchanan. 

Each time the agent wished to make a purchase from Mr. 

Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan made a telephone call. Mr. Buchanan said 

he made the call to a pager. A few minutes later, Mr. Buchanan 

got a return call. Mr. Buchanan and the agent then drove to 

another location. Each time, Mr. Dixon appeared at the location. 

Each time, Mr. Buchanan left the agent to talk with Mr. Dixon 

before delivering the cocaine to the agent. 

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• The agent then arranged a direct meeting with Mr. Dixon. At 

that meeting he denied any involvement in the drug business, 

claiming only to be interested in the vending machine business. 

However, just prior to meeting with the agent, Mr. Dixon noticed a 

surveillance car containing two more agents and stared at it. 

Shortly after that meeting, Mr. Buchanan told the informant that 

Mr. Dixon had identified the undercover agent as law enforcement. 

He arrived at this conclusion because of the cars that were following her. 

After hearing that she had been identified, the agent made no 

further purchases through Mr. Buchanan. Instead, the informant 

approached the appellant, Mr. Fennell, whom she had identified to 

the DEA as another cocaine dealer, and asked to make a cocaine 

purchase. This was Mr. Fennell's first involvement in the undercover operation which led to his arrest. 

The informant met Mr. Fennell at his apartment. Utilizing 

the same methods as Mr. Buchanan had used, Mr. Fennell placed a 

telephone call to a pager. In a few minutes, Mr. Fennell received 

a return call. Mr. Dixon's cellular phone record shows a call to 

Fennell's apartment. Mr. Fennell then left the apartment, and 

returned after a period of time with the cocaine. The agents who 

had Mr. Fennell under surveillance testified that he met with a 

man driving a white Corvette. Mr. Dixon was seen leaving the area 

in a white Corvette, one of several cars he possessed. 

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The informant later attempted to make another purchase from 

Mr. Fennell, but he refused. When the informant asked why, Mr. 

Fennell told her it was "because my man says you hang out with too 

many police." Record, vol. 7, at 592. Mr. Fennell then described 

the undercover agent, whom he had never met. Mr. Fennell said 

that he knew she was police. The undercover agent had previously 

dealt only with Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Dixon. Shortly after this, 

all three men were arrested. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 

"Evidence is considered sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, viewing all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 

879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987). Mr. Fennell claims that the jury's 

verdict of acquittal on the substantive count of possession indicates that the evidence was insufficient on the conspiracy count. 

He also argues that the acquittal on the substantive count bars 

conviction for the conspiracy because there was an identity of 

proof necessary for the two counts. 

Verdicts which are inconsistent or logically incompatible are 

not rendered invalid. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57; 

United States v. Beitcher, 467 F.2d 269, 274 (10th Cir. 1972). 

Thus, disregarding the inconsistent verdicts, our inquiry is 

limited to whether sufficient evidence existed that Mr. Fennell 

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was knowingly involved in a conspiracy to possess cocaine with 

intent to distribute. We conclude that there was such evidence. 

Without attempting to explain the jury's conclusions, we note 

that substantial evidence was adduced which tended to undermine 

the credibility of the informant to whom Mr. Fennell allegedly 

sold cocaine. There was, however, testimony from undercover 

agents that Mr. Fennell met with Mr. Dixon. Furthermore, Mr. 

Dixon's cellular phone record showed a call to the apartment where 

Mr. Fennell was staying. Thus, the jury reasonably could have 

concluded that Mr. Fennell conspired with Mr. Dixon to sell 

cocaine. 

Mr. Fennell's argument that an identity of proof is required 

for the two offenses charged is without merit. He cites to United 

States v. Soteras, 770 F.2d 641, 646 (1985). However, Soteras 

also explains that conspiracy, which requires an agreement to 

commit a substantive offense, is different from the substantive 

offense, which requires no agreement. Id. at 647. In this case, 

the substantive offense of possession for which Mr. Fennell was 

acquitted requires no agreement. Therefore, the proof required 

for the conspiracy was not identical to that required for the substantive offense. 

III. VARIANCE 

A variance between indictment and proof may be fatal if it 

"affect[s] the substantial rights of the accused." Kotteakos v. 

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United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757 (1946); United States v. Record, 

873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989). Mr. Fennell argues that while the 

government charged a single conspiracy, the evidence showed two 

conspiracies with one common actor, Mr. Dixon. He argues that his 

rights were prejudiced by the presentation of evidence as to Mr. 

Dixon's dealings with Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Fennell did not raise 

this objection at trial, however. Thus, we must review for plain 

error. If Mr. Fennell had objected to the variance at the close 

of the evidence and had requested a corrective instruction which 

was refused, this would be a different case. While, under these 

facts, Mr. Fennell might be able to make a convincing argument if 

the issue had been properly preserved for appeal, we do not find 

plain error. 

IV. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND BRADY VIOLATION 

Mr. Fennell made a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). At 

trial, the government informant, for the first time, revealed that 

another person, whose name she did not know, was present in the 

apartment when the informant agreed to buy cocaine from Mr. 

Fennell. This person was a Mr. Steve Braden, who, apparently, 

shared the apartment with Mr. Fennell. After trial, Mr. Fennell 

obtained an affidavit from Mr. Braden in which Mr. Braden states 

that at no time did he observe Mr. Fennell and the informant discussing or dealing drugs, and that he had never known Mr. Fennell 

to use drugs. We review the denial of a motion for new trial 

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under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Sutton, 

767 F.2d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 1985). 

To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Mr. 

Fennell must show that his failure to learn of the evidence at the 

time of trial was not due to the defendant's lack of diligence. 

United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 1391 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Because Mr. Braden was Mr. Fennell's housemate and because Mr. 

Fennell was aware of Mr. Braden's presence at the time of the 

alleged transaction, he could easily have pursued this evidence 

prior to trial. He was in a better position than the government 

to know that Mr. Braden's presence might have provided exculpatory 

testimony. Thus, the district court properly denied Mr. Fennell's 

motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We 

also approve the district court's finding that no Brady violation 

occurred. There was no evidence that the government deliberately 

withheld exculpatory information. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Chief Judge 

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