Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01072/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rental Services Corporation
Appellee
Bradley Schulz
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief United States District Court Judge

for the Southern District of Iowa.

2

 Disability claims arising under the ICRA are analyzed the same as ADA

claims. Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 F.3d 538, 542 n.3 (8th Cir. 2005).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1072

___________

Bradley Schulz, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern 

* District of Iowa.

Rental Services Corporation, *

C [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 29, 2006

Filed: October 13, 2006 

___________

Before ARNOLD, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Bradley Schulz appeals the district court's1

 grant of summary judgment

dismissing his claims of employment discrimination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act

(ICRA), Iowa Code §§ 216.1-216.20.2

 We affirm.

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-2-

Schulz worked for Rental Services Corporation (RSC) as an Inside Sales

Coordinator. On November 19, 2003, he fell and fractured his left wrist. Schulz was

granted a leave of absence and on February 10, 2004, his physician advised RSC he

could return to sedentary work with no use of the left upper extremity. RSC told

Schulz not to return until fully recovered and then terminated him. Schulz argues he

was terminated because RSC mistakenly believed his broken wrist posed a safety

hazard and prevented him from performing any of the essential functions of his

position. Schulz contends he was capable of performing all the essential functions.

Schulz brought this action alleging RSC's actions violated the ADA and ICRA.

He conceded his broken wrist was not a qualifying disability but argued RSC

regarded him as disabled. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding

RSC knew Schulz had a broken wrist, which is not a qualifying disability. On appeal,

Schulz argues RSC believed he was unable to perform any of the essential functions

of his position and the district court erred in concluding it did not, therefore, regard

him as disabled. 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Henerey

v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is

proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The ADA affords protection from discrimination to any "qualified individual

with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case, Schulz

must show 1) he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 2) he is qualified

to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable

accommodation, and 3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his

disability. Conant v. City of Hibbing, 271 F.3d 782, 784 (8th Cir. 2001). Disability

is defined as 1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

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major life activity, 2) a record of such impairment, or 3) being regarded as having

such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). An impairment is "substantially limiting"

if it renders an individual unable to perform a major life activity that the average

person in the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the

condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform such an

activity compared to the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). When

determining if a person is substantially limited in a major life activity, we consider

1) the nature and severity of the impairment, 2) its duration or anticipated duration,

and 3) its long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). "Only a permanent or

long-term condition will suffice." Mellon v. Fed. Express Corp., 239 F.3d 954, 957

(8th Cir. 2001).

 

 Persons "regarded as" having a disability must show the employer

"entertain[ed] misperceptions about the individual – it must [have] believe[d] either

that one ha[d] a substantially limiting impairment that one [did] not have or that one

ha[d] a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment [was] not so

limiting." Conant, 271 F.3d at 785 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527

U.S. 471, 489 (1999)).

Viewed in the light most favorable to Schulz, Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124

F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1997), the evidence establishes RSC knew Schulz's injury

was a simple wrist fracture. It considered the injury more limiting than Schulz, but

RSC never regarded it as more than a temporary condition. Accordingly, RSC did not

believe Schulz had a substantially limiting impairment. See Anderson v. ND State

Hosp., 232 F.3d 634, 636 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Statutory disability requires permanent or

long-term limitations.") (quoting Heintzelman v. Runyon, 120 F.3d 143, 145 (8th Cir.

1997) (per curiam)).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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