Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04395/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04395-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Contra Costa County Sheriff
Defendant
Foley
Defendant
Gray
Defendant
Andrew S. Guillory
Plaintiff
Warren E. Rupf
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW SAMUEL GUILLORY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY SHERIFF

WARREN E. RUPF, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________

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No. C 05-4395 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND REFERRING CASE TO PRO SE

PRISONER SETTLEMENT PROGRAM

(Docket no. 28)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Andrew Samuel Guillory, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, brought this 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action against Contra Costa County Sheriff Warren E. Rupf

and two Sheriff's Deputies. Plaintiff alleges that in February,

2005, while he was incarcerated at the Martinez Detention Facility

(MDF) as a post-arraignment pretrial detainee, Defendants Deputies

Foley and Gray used excessive force in violation of his civil

rights. In an Order dated March 22, 2006, the Court found

Plaintiff's allegations stated a cognizable excessive force claim

against Defendants Foley and Gray. All claims against Defendant

Rupf were dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege facts

sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability.

Defendants Foley and Gray move for summary judgment on the

ground that no triable issue of material fact exists and that they

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants also claim

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1

 Plaintiff has attached twelve handwritten pages and various

exhibits after page four of his complaint, but he failed to label

them with page numbers. The Court has numbered his handwritten

pages, beginning with page number "5" and ending with page number

"16". 

2

 Plaintiff claims that he has bi-polar disorder, and that he

has been suffering from mental health problems since he was seven

years old. (Compl. at 6, 11.)

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that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies

and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff

opposes the motion.

For reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendants'

motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Undisputed Facts

The following facts are based on Plaintiff's verified

complaint1

 as well as the affidavits and evidence submitted by

Defendants and Plaintiff in support of and in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment.

On February 9, 2005, Plaintiff was housed in the Q Module at

MDF. (Gray Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Gray was on duty and assigned to

the Q Module. (Id.) 

At approximately 6:00 PM, Plaintiff approached Defendant Gray

and told him he wanted to speak to the jail's mental health staff.2

(Compl. at 7; Gray Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Gray explained to

Plaintiff that in the absence of an emergency, Plaintiff was

required to complete an inmate request form and wait for an

appointment to see mental health staff. (Gray Decl. ¶ 3.) 

Defendant Gray then asked Plaintiff if he intended to hurt himself,

and Plaintiff said, "Yes, if that is the only way I can see mental

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health." (Compl. at 7; Gray Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Gray then

directed Plaintiff to take a seat while he made a phone call. 

(Compl. at 7; Gray Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant Foley arrived to escort

Plaintiff to a safety cell at the intake unit. (Compl. at 7; Foley

Decl. ¶ 3.) He handcuffed Plaintiff before proceeding to the

intake unit. (Compl. at 7; Foley Decl. ¶ 4.)

II. Disputed Facts

A. Defendants' Version

According to Defendants, after Plaintiff was handcuffed,

Defendant Foley escorted Plaintiff to the intake unit while

Defendant Gray stayed behind. (Gray Decl. ¶ 5; Foley Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Defendant Foley used a standard control hold to guide Plaintiff

toward the module door, which "opens out into a hallway area and

must be electronically unlocked by staff at a central location." 

(Foley Decl. ¶ 5.) As Plaintiff and Defendant Foley approached the

door, Plaintiff turned away from Defendant Foley, attempting to

break free from the control hold, and shouted at Defendant Gray. 

(Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Foley forced Plaintiff towards a nearby wall

"to re-establish [his] control" and "pushed [Plaintiff] forward

into the unlocked door to open it, as an alternative to releasing

[his] control of [Plaintiff] and reaching over him or around him to

open the door. . . ." (Id. ¶ 6.) As he did so, Plaintiff kicked

open the door and pushed back against Defendant Foley, causing them

to fall to the floor in the hallway. (Id.) 

According to Defendant Gray, he saw Plaintiff kick the door

open. (Gray Decl. ¶ 5.) Then he saw the door close quickly and

strike both Plaintiff and Defendant Foley. (Id.) Defendant Gray

saw them fall to the floor and "perceived that Defendant Foley

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could be at a dangerous disadvantage when on the floor with an

inmate." (Id.) He decided to assist Defendant Foley regain

control over Plaintiff, who was "resisting." (Id.) 

According to Defendant Foley, he "lost control" of Plaintiff

after they fell to the floor. (Foley Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff

"resisted [his] attempts by rolling from side to side" and by

"bringing his legs under him in an attempt to stand up." (Id.) He

was joined by other deputies, including Defendant Gray and Deputy

Duggins, who assisted him in controlling Plaintiff by holding

Plaintiff on the floor with their body weight. (Foley Decl. ¶ 7;

Ex. A at CC 28.) Defendants brought Plaintiff to his feet and

escorted him to a holding cell at the intake unit without further

incident. (Gray Decl. ¶ 5; Foley Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Defendant Gray states that, once they reached the intake unit,

Plaintiff "spoke with Deputy Murphy and told her he was not going

to harm himself, and just wanted to talk with Mental Health

[Staff]." (Gray Decl. ¶ 5.) Deputy Murphy decided to put

Plaintiff in a holding cell until mental health staff could see

him. (Id.)

B. Plaintiff's Version

According to Plaintiff's version of events, as they approached

the module door, Defendant Foley "put his hand on the back of

[Plaintiff's] head and pushed extremely hard slamming [his] head

into the door." (Id.) Defendant Foley then used Plaintiff's body

to open the door. (Id.) After the door opened, Plaintiff "was

slammed on the ground with nothing to stop the force because [his]

hands were cuffed behind [his] back." (Id.) He was then "punched

very hard in [the] back by one of the deputies (Foley or Gray)." 

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(Id.) A woman from classification saw Defendant Foley "grinding

[Plaintiff's] face in the ground" and inquired about what was going

on. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant Foley told the woman to close the

door, and then jerked Plaintiff back to his feet and resumed

escorting him to the intake unit. (Id. at 8.) 

As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff suffered a

bruise to his back and sharp pains in his neck, as well as

sleeplessness and anxiety. (Id. at 6.)

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

On February 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed an inmate request form,

stating he was "slammed on the ground for no reason" and "the

deputy also used [his] body and head to open the door." (Rubin

Decl., Ex. C.) He added "Im [sic] having a lot of bad thoughts and

memories. I need to see someone A.S.A.P. Something bad is going

to happen." (Id.) 

Pursuant to MDF policy, the same form is used for requests and

grievances. (Rubin Decl. ¶ 4.) Because Plaintiff marked the box

labeled "Request" on the form, MDF staff did not treat Plaintiff's

inmate request form as a grievance and did not call for an

investigation into the alleged incident. (Id. ¶ 6.) Instead, MDF

staff responded to Plaintiff's request by transferring him to the M

module. (Rubin Decl., Ex. C.)

Plaintiff wrote to internal affairs because there was no

investigation into the alleged use of excessive force stated on his

inmate request form. (Compl. at 5.) On March 4, 2005, Plaintiff

received a written response to his letter from the Office of the

Sheriff, County of Contra Costa. (Attach. to Compl., Letter from

Lt. Eric Navarro, Professional Standards Unit, dated Mar. 4, 2005.) 

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According to the letter, Plaintiff's complaint was "vague, lack[ed]

specific information and [did] not warrant an investigation by the

Professional Standards Unit," and his concerns "would be best

addressed through the Inmate Grievance Process." (Id.) He was

further informed that his complaint would be "forwarded to

Commander George Lawrence of the Custody Services Bureau and

Captain Greg Gilbert at MDF for investigation/resolution." (Id.) 

However, the parties agree that no such investigation ever took

place. (Compl. at 10; Rubin Decl. ¶ 6.)

On July 22, 2005, Plaintiff filed a state petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in the Contra Costa County Superior Court. The

petition was denied on September 8, 2005. (Attach. to Compl.,

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus dated Sept. 8,

2005.) In his petition, Plaintiff alleged a "perfect example of

abuse" relating to "his attempt to see mental health staff in

February, 2005" when he was "mistreated by deputies after he was

pressured into saying he wanted to hurt himself so he could see

someone from the mental health staff." (Id. at 2.) Included in

Plaintiff's prayer for relief were requests for proper training of

MDF staff on how to deal with mentally ill inmates, and for

individual and group therapy for inmates. (Id.) In denying his

petition, the court stated that it would not "micro-manage the

mental health unit at MDF," and that "assuming the petition [was]

construed as a request for declaratory relief, the petition

fail[ed] to state facts sufficient to support such relief." (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

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evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

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party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion

A. Legal Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and inmates are not

required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. 

Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921-22. Because there can be no absence of

exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a movant claiming

lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained

available, whether at unexhausted levels or through awaiting the

results of the relief already granted as a result of that process. 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A prisoner's concession of non-exhaustion is a valid ground

for dismissal, so long as no exception to exhaustion applies. 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. Accordingly, a claim may be dismissed

without prejudice if it is clear from the record that the prisoner

has conceded that he did not exhaust administrative remedies. See

id.

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Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion

of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382

(2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

"Prisoners must now exhaust all 'available' remedies, not just

those that meet federal standards." Id. Even when the relief

sought cannot be granted by the administrative process, i.e.,

monetary damages, a prisoner must still exhaust administrative

remedies. Id. at 2382-83 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734). 

The PLRA's exhaustion requirement requires "proper exhaustion"

of available administrative remedies. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at

2387.

 When no other administrative remedy is available, however, the

exhaustion requirement is deemed fulfilled. See Booth, 532 U.S. at

736 n.4. The obligation to exhaust persists as long as some remedy

is available; when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need

not further pursue the grievance. Brown, 422 F.3d at 934-35. For

example, a prisoner need not exhaust further levels of review once

he has either received all the remedies that are available, or been

reliably informed by an administrator that no more remedies are

available. Id. at 935. In Brown, an inmate complaining about

staff misconduct was deemed to have exhausted all available

remedies because, once an investigation had been ordered at the

second formal level under California's staff complaint process, the

authorities lacked any remaining power to act on the subject of the

complaint. Id. at 937-40 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 736 n.4). By

contrast, an inmate was deemed not to have exhausted all available

remedies where he was informed at the second formal level that his

administrative appeal would be treated as a staff complaint, that

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any non-staff claims should be separately appealed, that further

review was available if he was dissatisfied, and that his appeal

was denied. Id. at 940-43. 

B. Analysis

In support of their allegation that Plaintiff's excessive

force claim is unexhausted, Defendants argue that Plaintiff only

filed a "request" and never filed a "grievance." Defendants'

argument is premised on a narrow reading of Plaintiff's inmate

request form, causing them to process it as a request instead of a

grievance. 

The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that pro se prisoner

plaintiffs should not be held to technical pleading requirements. 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Just as their complaints must be

liberally construed, see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988), their prison grievances -- which

under the PLRA are prerequisites to filing civil rights complaints

-- should be liberally construed as well. As long as the

grievances fairly put the defendants on notice of the wrong the

prisoner claims to have suffered and the sort of relief he seeks,

so that the defendants have a fair opportunity to address and

resolve the problem before the prisoner turns to federal court, the

exhaustion requirement should be deemed satisfied. Cf. B.K.B. v.

Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (in the

Title VII context, holding that administrative complaints must be

construed "with the utmost liberality since they are made by those

unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading") (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff's inmate request

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form failed fairly to put them on notice about the alleged use of

excessive force on February 9, 2005. Plaintiff stated on the form

that he was "slammed for no reason" and that "the deputy also used

[his] body and head to open the door." (Rubin Decl., Ex. C.) 

While Plaintiff did not specifically name Defendants Gray and

Foley, he complied with the grievance procedure by alerting MDF

staff to a problem, which is all that is required by the PLRA to

"properly exhaust." Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007)

(exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual

later sued was not named in the grievances). 

Even if his allegations were considered a grievance,

Defendants argue, he did not appeal the disposition. In the inmate

request form, Plaintiff asked to "see some one [sic] A.S.A.P." and

stated "something bad is going to happen." Plaintiff's inmate

request form specified that he wanted to be seen by "mental

health;" however, it was within MDF staff's discretion to determine

a proper remedy. They transferred Plaintiff to the M module. 

Plaintiff could not pursue his grievance because they did not

indicate that this was an appealable decision; therefore, he had no

further obligation to exhaust. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 934-35 (the

obligation to exhaust persists as long as some remedy is available;

when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need not further

pursue the grievance). The Court notes that Plaintiff turned to

different avenues to present his excessive force claim. He wrote a

letter to internal affairs, which was forwarded to MDF staff. He

also filed a state habeas petition relating to MDF staff's

deliberate indifference to his mental health needs, which included

the same excessive force allegations and requested proper training

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 Defendants have incorrectly cited the Fourth Amendment in

their motion for summary judgment as the applicable constitutional

standard for Plaintiff's excessive force claim. Plaintiff is a

post-arraignment pretrial detainee and his excessive force claim is

properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Cf. Pierce v. Multnomah County, Oregon, 76 F.3d 1032,

1043 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Fourth Amendment sets the applicable

constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained

without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or

found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for

arrest."). The result here would be the same under either

standard.

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of MDF staff on how to deal with mentally ill inmates. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff substantially complied with the grievance

procedure at MDF and exhausted his administrative remedies as to

his excessive force claim. See also Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d

876, 878 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that substantial compliance with

prison grievance procedure satisfies PLRA exhaustion requirement).

Having reviewed the parties' pleadings and evidence in support

of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the Court

concludes that Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving

that Plaintiff did not exhaust all available administrative

remedies with respect to his excessive force claim stemming from

the incident on February 9, 2005. Accordingly, Defendants are not

entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

II. Excessive Force Claim

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a

post-arraignment pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force

that amounts to punishment.3 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979));

see Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir.

2002) ("The Due Process clause protects pretrial detainees from the

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use of excessive force that amounts to punishment . . . . Graham

therefore explicates the standards applicable to a pretrial

detention excessive force claim in this circuit.") (citations

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has stated the factors a court should

consider in resolving a due process claim alleging excessive force. 

White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990). These factors

are (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship

between the need and the amount of force that was used, (3) the

extent of the injury inflicted, and (4) whether force was applied

in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. Id.

To determine whether particular restrictions and conditions

accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment, the Court

first looks to whether the disability imposed is for the purpose of

punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other

legitimate governmental purpose. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. 

Absent a showing of an express intent to punish, whether a

restriction amounts to punishment will generally turn on whether

there is an alternative, rational purpose for the restriction, and

whether the restriction then appears excessive in relation to that

purpose. See id. If a restriction or condition is not reasonably

related to a legitimate goal, i.e., if it is arbitrary or

purposeless, the Court may infer that the purpose of the action is

punishment. See id. at 539. 

Defendants contend in their motion for summary judgment that

Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether

Defendants' use of force amounts to punishment. Defendant Foley

asserts that he "used only that level of force that [he] perceived

necessary under the circumstances to maintain control over

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[Plaintiff] during escort." (Foley Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant Gray

claims that he "did not use any force with [Plaintiff] other than

that required to assist him to his feet." (Gray Decl. ¶ 5.) In

support of their claims, Defendants argue that there is no evidence

showing that their use of force was excessive under the

circumstances or that Plaintiff was injured as a result of their

actions. A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit

under Rule 56, as long as it is based on personal knowledge and

sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v.

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995); see also

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996), amended,

135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (treating allegations in prisoner's

amended complaint as opposing affidavit). Here, Plaintiff's

complaint was signed under penalty of perjury. The Court on

summary judgment must assume the truth of Plaintiff's verified

pleadings. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.

1999) (citing T.W. Elec. Svc., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors,

Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff contends

in his complaint that there was no provocation for Defendants' use

of force. (Compl. at 6.) He claims that Defendant Foley slammed

his head into the door, slammed his body to the ground and ground

his face into the floor; and that he was punched in the back by

either Defendant Foley or Defendant Gray. (Id. at 7.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact remain. 

Assuming the truth of Plaintiff's pleadings, evidence produced by

Defendants conflicts with Plaintiff's evidence with respect to at

least two questions of fact. First, a genuine issue of material

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fact exists regarding whether Plaintiff was resistant or combative

during escort such that Defendants' application of force was

necessary. Second, assuming some force was warranted, there is a

material issue of fact regarding whether Defendants' force was

applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. 

See White, 901 F.2d at 1507. A reasonable jury, drawing inferences

from facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could find

that Defendants' use of force amounts to punishment because it was

not reasonably related to a rational alternative purpose, or

because it was excessive in relation to that purpose. See Bell,

441 U.S. at 538. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff

has set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial" and, therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 US at 324. 

In the alternative, Defendants claim that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. 

Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the Court

must undertake a two-step analysis when a defendant asserts

qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment. The Court

first faces "this threshold question: Taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged

show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id.

at 201. If the Court determines that a constitutional right has

been violated, it then moves to the second step and asks "whether

the right was clearly established" such that "it would be clear to

a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted." Id. at 201-02. In the excessive force context,

the Court first makes an inquiry into the objective reasonableness

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of the officer's belief in the necessity of his actions; the Court

next makes an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the

officer's belief in the legality of his actions. Wilkins v. City

of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2003). The qualified

immunity analysis does not take "20/20 vision of hindsight" into

account, but rather gives deference to the judgment of reasonable

officers at the time of the occurrence. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 396 (1989).

The Court cannot decide whether Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity because there is a genuine, material issue

"relating to the historical facts" regarding Defendants' conduct

and Plaintiff's injuries, and "such questions of fact are for the

jury to determine." Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi

Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1995). The jury must decide

the disputed "foundational" or "historical" facts that underlie the

determination of qualified immunity. See Acosta v. City and County

of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1996) (district

court erred in granting defendant qualified immunity based on its

own factual findings contrary to jury's). If Defendants' use of

force on Plaintiff was unnecessary, and they knowingly violated the

law by using force that amounts to punishment, Defendants would not

be entitled to qualified immunity. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. The Court DENIES Defendants' request to dismiss

Plaintiff's excessive force claim for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

2. The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Guillory4395.MSJ.frm 17

(docket no. 28).

3. Unless this case can be settled it will have to be tried.

4. The Northern District of California has established a Pro

Se Prisoner Settlement Program. Certain prisoner civil rights

cases may be referred to a neutral magistrate judge for prisoner

settlement proceedings. The present case will be REFERRED to

Magistrate Judge Vadas for settlement proceedings. The proceedings

will consist of one or more conferences as determined by Magistrate

Judge Vadas. The conferences may be conducted at Mule Creek State

Prison, and Defendants and/or their representative shall attend in

person, or may contact Magistrate Judge Vadas to seek permission to

attend by videoconferencing, if available, or by telephone.

The conference shall take place within one hundred twenty

(120) days after the date of this Order. Magistrate Judge Vadas

shall coordinate a time and date for the conference with all

interested parties and/or their representatives and, within ten

(10) days after the conclusion of the conference, file with the

Court a report regarding the conference.

The Clerk of the Court shall provide a copy of this Order, and

copies of documents from the court file that are not accessible

electronically, to Magistrate Judge Vadas.

5. This Order terminates Docket no. 28.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:9/27/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Guillory4395.MSJ.frm 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLORY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CONTRA COSTA SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-04395 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 27, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Andrew S. Guillory F-03860

Mule Creek State Prison

C-13-140-UP

P.O. Box 409060

Ione, CA 95640

Monika L. Cooper

County of Contra Costa

651 Pine Street

9th Floor

Martinez, CA 94553

Dated: September 27, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-04395-CW Document 45 Filed 09/27/07 Page 18 of 18