Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03415/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03415-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Champaign
Appellee
Andre Davis
Appellee
Kelsey Markou
Appellant
Jacob Saathoff
Appellant
Kathy Saathoff
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐3415

JACOB SAATHOFF, KATHY SAATHOFF,

and KELSEY MARKOU,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

ANDRE DAVIS,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:13‐cv‐02253‐CSB‐EIL— Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 20, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 20, 2016

Before FLAUM and MANION, Circuit Judges, and ALONSO,

District Judge.*

ALONSO, District Judge. After Champaign, Illinois police

officer Andre Davis shot and killed their dog, plaintiffs‐

*

  Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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appellants,Jacob Saathoff, Kathy Saathoff, andKelseyMarkou,

sued Davis and the City of Champaign under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating their Fourth Amendmentrights. The § 1983 claim

against Davis was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for

Davis. The district court entered judgment on the verdict.

Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment, which we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jacob and Kathy Saathoff are husband and wife. Markou is

Kathy’s daughter and Jacob’s stepdaughter. The Saathoffs and

Markou owned a chocolate‐colored labrador retriever named

“Dog.” On the evening of November 17, 2012, Markou, who

was eighteen years old, was walking Dog in the family’s

neighborhood in Champaign. Dog was wearing a fabric collar

underneath a metal “choker” collar that provided better

control. His leash was attached to the choker collar.

By about 5:20 p.m., Markou and Dog were within about a

half‐block of home after having followed their usual route.

Meanwhile, Tyrone Jones, who lived in the neighborhood and

was walking to a friend’s house, had spied a gray and white pit

bullrunning loose in the area. Jones did notrecognize the dog,

so he stopped at several houses on the way to his friend’s to

see if anyone else recognized it. No one did. Jones was sitting

on his friend’s front steps and could see Markou and Dog

when they approached the intersection of John Street and

Crescent Drive. When Markou and Dog began to head south

on Crescent, the pit bull spied them from across the street and

ran toward them. Once the pit bullreached them, the two dogs

sniffed each other briefly, and then, without warning or

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No. 15‐3415 3

provocation, the pit bull lunged at Dog’s neck. Dog began to

defend himself, and the dogs were soon locked in a fight.

Jones ran across the street to help Markou. Jones and

Markou tried to separate the dogs by kicking at them and

using a tree branch, but they were unsuccessful. At Jones’s

suggestion, Markou dropped Dog’s leash so that Dog could

more freely defend himself. Three juveniles arrived on the

scene and were watching the dogfight. Before long, Jones

asked Markou if she wanted someone to call the police to get

help. Markou agreed, and someone called the police and

reported the dog attack.

At the time, Officer Davis was in his squad car on the way

to a call about a residential burglary. The police dispatcher

reported over the radio that a vicious pit bull was attacking

another dog near the corner of John and Crescent. Davis

testified at trial that the dispatcher also said that one dog was

“almost dead.” Davis’s route took him past the corner of John

and Crescent, and someone in the group of people watching

the dogfight flagged him down, so Davis pulled over and

trained his spotlight on the dogs.

When Davis got out of his car, he asked what was going on.

Markou, who was or had been crying, identified herself as the

owner of the dog that was being attacked. The juveniles, who

were standing farther away from the dogs than were Markou

and Jones, were yelling. Markou told Davis that her dog was

the brown lab, had collars and a leash, and was being attacked.

Jones testified that he also told Davis that Markou’s dog was

the brown lab and the stray dog was gray and white.

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Davis testified at trial that his first impression was that the

dogs were both “dark color.” He has a form of colorblindness

that makes it difficult for him to distinguish between certain

colors, including between gray and brown. Although Davis

acknowledged that the colorblindness has had some effect on

his daily life and his abilities to act as a police officer, as of the

time of trial he had not informed his employer of his condition.

Davis walked in a semicircle around the dogs and saw that

one dog was on top of the other, the dog on top seemed larger

and more aggressive, and the dog on the bottom had a white

belly.(Markou, however, testified that although Dog was taller

than the pit bull, one dog was not on top of the other.) No one

saw any wounds or blood on either dog. The dogs were

focused only on each other and did not appear to pose any

immediate threat to the people present. Davis testified that he

went through a “mental checklist” of his options because in his

experience, pit bulls fight to the death. (He had responded to

two calls in the past that involved pit bulls fighting.) Davis

considered that the police department was undergoing a shift

change at the time; in his estimation, animal control officers

would take fifteen minutes to arrive if called; he had a metal

baton, but would risk getting bitten and did not know what to

do with the pit bull if he was able to get the dogs separated; he

did not have a catch pole, which was back at the station; and in

his experience, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray does not work

on fighting dogs. Davis also worried that the pit bull might

turn on the persons present.

After walking partway around the dogs, Davis stood a few

feet away from them, drew his service weapon, made sure no

person was standing behind them, and shot at the dog that in

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No. 15‐3415 5

his view was the aggressive dog, the one “on top.” The dogs

did not separate, so Davis fired a second shot a few seconds

later. The dogs separated. Dog began limping toward Markou,

who cried out that Davis had shot her dog. Davis testified that

he could not believe that he had shot the wrong dog. In Jones’s

opinion, Davis looked “confused.”

Davis then aimed his gun at the pit bull, which had started

to move away from the scene, and fired four more times. The

pit bull trotted across the street. Davis followed and fired a

seventh and final shot at the pit bull when it reached the

intersection of John and Crescent and headed east. He lost

sight of the pit bull and returned to Markou’s side while using

his radio to call a supervisor and animal control. Davis’s

supervisor, Sergeant Matthew Crane, arrived at the scene

within a few minutes. Within ten to fifteen minutes, perhaps

less, an animal control officer arrived. That officer captured the

pit bull and took it to the animal control facility. Dog died as a

result of the gunshot wound.

When Davis left the scene, he returned to the police station

and wrote a report aboutthe incident, which was admittedinto

evidence at trial. From the time Davis had arrived at the scene

to the time he fired the seventh shot, about two minutes

elapsed. Markou testified that thirty to forty seconds elapsed

between the time Davis arrived and the time he began shoot‐

ing.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 8, 2013, plaintiffs filed their complaint

against the City and Davis. Seeking damages under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, they alleged that Davis’s actions in shooting and killing

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Dog constituted an unconstitutional seizure of their property.

Against Davis, they sought damages for conversion of their

property, and Markou sought damages for intentional inflic‐

tion of emotional distress. Plaintiffs also sought damages and

injunctive relief for violation of the Illinois Humane Care for

AnimalsAct, andthey broughtMonell andrespondeat superior

claims against the City.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of plain‐

tiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs cross‐moved for summary judgment as

to liability on all of their claims. In a written opinion issued on

May 18, 2015, the district court granted the City’s motion in

full, granted Davis’s motion as to plaintiffs’ state‐law claims

and denied it as to the § 1983 claim, and denied plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment.

On the § 1983 claim against Davis, the case proceeded to a

three‐day jury trial in July 2015. The parties agreed that the

shooting of Dog constituted a seizure; the only issue at trial

was whether Davis’s conduct was reasonable. On July 9, 2015,

the jury found in favor of Davis and against plaintiffs, and the

district court entered judgment on the verdict the same day.

Plaintiffs then filed a motion for a new trial, which the

district court denied. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

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No. 15‐3415 7

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs raise three issues on appeal.1 First, they contend

that the district court erred in concluding that Davis had not

committed any discovery violations and erred in denying their

motion for a new trial that was based upon those alleged

violations. Second, plaintiffs argue that the court erred in

refusing their proffered jury instruction on the Fourth Amend‐

ment reasonableness analysis. Third, plaintiffs assert that the

jury’s verdict went againstthe manifest weight ofthe evidence.

A. Alleged Discovery Violations

We review a district court’s discovery determinations and

denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.

EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2013). Where

an alleged error of admission of evidence occurred during a

trial, we will grant a new trial only if the error had a substan‐

tial influence overthe jury and the resultreached was inconsis‐

tent with substantial justice. Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of

Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in allowing

Davis to do the following at trial: 1) testify that he heard the

police dispatcher say that one dog was “almost dead”; 2)

expand upon his police report by testifying that he considered

several factors in a “mental checklist” prior to using his gun,

including the fact that a shift change was imminent, and that

1

  Plaintiffs raise an additional issue pertaining to the district court’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of the City, but it is in play only if this court

vacates the judgment against Davis. Because we affirm that judgment, we

need not address plaintiffs’ fourth issue.

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he rejected options like using his baton or OC spray or waiting

for someone to bring a catch pole; and 3) call his report an

incomplete summary and contradict what he said therein

about what he was able to see (the dogs’ colors) when he

pulled up in his vehicle. According to plaintiffs, because Davis

had not previously disclosed this information by supplement‐

ing his discovery responses, it was an abuse of discretion for

the trial court not to bar this evidence.

Plaintiffs cite two of their interrogatories to Davis. In the

first (#7), they asked: “Describe in Your own words the

Incident, starting from the dispatch call that sent You to the

Incident and ending with your last involvement in any way

Related to the Incident (whether that last involvement was

writing a report, discussing the Incident with a supervisor,

etc.), except only for Your communications with Your attor‐

neys concerning This Litigation. Include with the description

Your explanation for each action You took, and state and

describe as precisely and exactly as You can what each person

said.” Davis responded by stating that his recollection of the

incident was contained in his police report, which had been

produced. In the second interrogatory (#10), plaintiffs asked

Davis: “Identify all facts upon which You have based Your

Answer, or have otherwise relied upon, in making the denials

of the allegations of the following paragraphs of the Com‐

plaint: 41, 42, 43, and 44.” Those paragraphs of the complaint

alleged that Davis’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and

intentional or reckless. In his response, Davis stated that all

such facts were contained in his police report. Davis did not

mention in the report that he knew about any statement by the

dispatcher that one dog was “almost dead,” nor did he

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No. 15‐3415 9

mention going through a mental checklist of his options prior

to the shooting. He also did not testify about these matters at

his deposition. At trial, Davis acknowledged it was only

duringdiscussions with counsel whilepreparing fortrial when

he first recalled hearing the dispatcher’s statement. Davis also

testified at trial that his police report was an incomplete

summary of the incident.

In plaintiffs’ view, Davis’s failure to disclose this informa‐

tion was unjustified and prejudicial. They argue that the

information came as a “complete surprise,” the timing pre‐

cluded them from developing or offering countervailing

evidence, and the jury verdict was the result of the “surprise

evidence.” Plaintiffs say that had they received timely notifica‐

tion of the information, they could have obtained and offered

a recording or transcript of the actual dispatch, if available, or

the dispatcher’s or other officers’ testimony about what was

said; presented evidence to contradict Davis’s assertions about

a shift change and the catch pole; challengedDavis’s assertions

about the pitfalls of using OC spray; and asked Sergeant Crane

about these matters had he not already testified.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1)(A) provides that a

party who has made a disclosure orresponded to an interroga‐

tory must supplement or correct his disclosure orresponse “in

a timely manner if the party learns that in some material

respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect,

and if the additional or corrective information has not other‐

wise been made known to the other parties during the discov‐

ery process or in writing.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

37(c)(1), titled “Failure to Disclose or Supplement,” provides:

“If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as

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required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use

that information or witness to supply evidence ... at a trial,

unless the failure was substantially justified oris harmless.” In

addition to or instead of this sanction, the court may order the

payment of expenses caused by the party’s failure, inform the

jury of the failure, and impose other sanctions.

When plaintiffs objected to Davis’s testimony at trial and

requested“appropriate sanctions,” thedistrict courtdeniedthe

motion, finding that there was no surprise and noting that trial

testimony can sometimes involve matters, even important

ones, that were not explored during depositions. The court

furtherremarked that plaintiffs’ counsel had impeached Davis

and would have the opportunity to impeach him again by

pointing out that during his deposition, he had failed to

mention some of the matters about which he was now testify‐

ing. Later, in its ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, the

district court concluded that there was no discovery violation

because the subject matter ofDavis’s challengedtestimonyhad

been disclosed during discovery, and at trial Davis merely

added details to his previously‐disclosed narrative. The court

reiterated its prior observation, both before and during trial,

that plaintiffs’ view of discovery is “unrealistic.”

The interrogatories on whichplaintiffs rely were nottightly

focused. They were better suited for a deposition, so it is

understandable that Davis simply pointed to his police report

to answer them. During discovery, plaintiffs were given the

police dispatcher’s log stating that a pit bull was attacking

another dog and “the dog is almost dead.” Nothing prevented

plaintiffs from seeking a recording or transcript of the dis‐

patcher’s actual statements over the radio. Plaintiffs’ counsel

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No. 15‐3415 11

asked Davis at his deposition about what he had heard the

dispatcher say, but failed to ask him if he had heard that

specific statement. (In fact, counsel asked Crane about it but,

inexplicably, did not ask Davis.) As for Davis’s thought

process, that is not the kind of information one would expect

to find in a police report, and plaintiff’s counsel had the

opportunity to explore that topic at Davis’s deposition but

barely skimmed the surface. Counsel asked Davis about his

shift, but not about shift changes, and did not ask about all of

Davis’s options. Forinstance,plaintiffs’ counsel was aware that

Davis carried OC spray, and could have asked more questions

about that. Plaintiffs were provided in discovery all the

information they needed to ask Davis the right questions

before trial.

In any event, even if Davis had violated Rule 26 by failing

to supplement his discovery responses, the failure was

harmless. Davis’s trial testimony was not materially different

from what he had disclosed in discovery, and to the extent he

contradictedhis previous testimony orhis report,plaintiffshad

the opportunity to, and did, impeach him. Furthermore, there

was no reason why plaintiffs could not have recalled Sergeant

Crane to ask him about the other aspects of Davis’s testimony.

As the district court aptly observed, Davis’s discovery

responses were not a script that he was bound to recite

verbatim at trial. The court did not abuse its discretion in

denying plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions and for a new trial.

B. Jury Instruction on Reasonableness of the Seizure

We review challenges to jury instructions de novo and

afford the district court “‘substantial discretion with respect to

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the precise wording of instructions so long as the final result,

read as a whole, completely and correctly states the law.’”

Lewis v. City of Chi. Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Gibson, 530 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir.

2008)). “When it comes to potentially confusing or misleading

instructions, the reviewing court is to first ask if the correct

message was conveyed to the jury reasonably well.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “This inquiry is done by

examining the instructions as a whole, in a common sense

manner, avoiding nitpicking. If the instructions fail in this

regard, a new trial is appropriate only if the instruction

prejudiced the complaining party.” Id. (citation omitted).

The killing of a companion dog constitutes a “seizure”

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Viilo v. Eyre,

547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Altman v. City of High

Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194, 204‐05 (4th Cir. 2003); Brown v.

Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 210‐11 (3d Cir. 2001); Lesher v.

Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150 (8th Cir. 1994); and Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d

65, 68 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v.

Solano Cty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002)). Therefore,

Officer Davis’s actions were constitutional only if reasonable.

See id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).

The district court gave the following jury instruction

regarding reasonableness:

You must decide whether Defendant’s seizure was

unreasonable from the perspective of a reasonable

officer facing the same circumstances that Defen‐

dant faced. You must make this decision based on

what Defendant knew at the time of the incident,

not based on what you know now. In deciding

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No. 15‐3415 13

whether Defendant’s seizure was unreasonable,

you must not consider whether Defendant’s inten‐

tions were good or bad.

In performing his job, an officer can use force that

is reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

This instruction was based largely on Seventh Circuit

Pattern Jury Instruction 7.09. The jury was also instructed that

the term “seizure” referred to the shooting of the dog.

Plaintiffs argue that the court’s instruction insufficiently

stated the law because it did not guide the jury in assessing

reasonableness in the context of the shooting of a household

pet. They submit that the court erred in rejecting their pro‐

posed addition to the instruction, drawn from Viilo, 547 F.3d at

710: “[U]se of deadly force against a household pet is reason‐

able only if the pet poses an immediate danger and the use of

force is unavoidable.”

The district court rejected plaintiffs’ request to add this

language, and, in its opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for a

new trial, explained that Viilo is distinguishable and the

requested instruction would have confused the jury. We agree.

Viilo involved police officers’ shooting of one dog at the

owner’s house while the owner was present, not a fight

between two dogs, one of which was evidently a stray, off the

premises of any owner. Plaintiffs’ proposed language does not

fit the facts of this case. The pattern instruction was sufficient

to inform the jury correctly of the applicable law.

C. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

We apply the “abuse of discretion” standard of review to

the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on

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the basis thatthe verdict was against the manifest weight ofthe

evidence. EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir.

2016) (citing Lewis, 590 F.3d at 444). We will set aside the

verdict and remand for a new trial only if “‘no rational jury

could have rendered’” it. Id. (quoting Smith v. Wilson, 705 F.3d

674, 677‐78 (7th Cir. 2013)). Under this analysis, we examine

the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, while

“‘leaving issues of credibility and weight of evidence to the

jury.’” See id. (quoting King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th

Cir. 2006)). “Once the district court applies the correct law, its

discretion is wide and our review deferential.” Whitehead v.

Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2012) (brackets omitted)

(quoting Mejia v. Cook Cty., Ill., 650 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir.

2011)). The district court “‘is in the best position to evaluate the

evidence and determine whether the verdict was against the

manifest weight; it heard the witnesses testify, saw the evi‐

dence presented, and gained a better appreciation of the

nuances of the case than could be gleaned from a cold, written

record.’” Id. (quoting Mejia, 650 F.3d at 634).

Plaintiffs cite the following undisputed facts in support of

their assertion that the district court abused its discretion in

denying their motion for a new trial: Davis shot Dog less than

a minute after arriving on the scene; he spoke only briefly with

Markou and Jones; he was informed that Markou’s dog was

brown and the pit bull was gray; he knew about his own

colorblindness, that it had been a problem in the past, and that

it could be a problem in the twilight; no person was in immedi‐

ate danger; Davis knew that a number of alternatives to

shooting the dogs existed but rejected them; and after he used

his gun, he called for a supervisor and animal control, who

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No. 15‐3415 15

arrived within minutes. Plaintiffs further maintain that it was

“simply unreasonable” for Davis to have behaved as he did.

When it ruled on plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, the

district court applied the proper standard, citing Mejia, and

reasoned as follows:

At trial, this court had the opportunity to observe

the manner and demeanor of the witnesses who

testified.During theirtestimony, allthreePlaintiffs,

by their body language and choice of words,

showed that they were angry and believed that

they were entitled to substantial damages for the

loss of their dog. It appeared that Plaintiffs’ presen‐

tation of evidence was more focused on damages

than liability. This court wants to be clear that

Plaintiffs did present evidence from which a jury

could have found in their favor. However, in

contrast to the Plaintiffs, Defendant came across on

the witness stand as a very reasonable person who

came into a chaotic, emergency situation and did

what he thought was best at the time. This court

therefore concludes that the jury was presented

with a legally sufficient amount of evidence from

which the jury could reasonably derive its verdict

in favor of Defendant.

We find no fault with this assessment of the evidence at

trial, which also showed that Davis had prior experience with

pit bulls and knew they could be vicious. And the dog in‐

volved in this fight was indeed described as vicious. Davis

offered plausible reasons for rejecting alternative courses of

action, including the risk of dangerto the bystanders. Plaintiffs

are adamant that this risk was not “immediate,” but they fail

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to acknowledge that a vicious dog was involved and the

situation thus could have changed at any moment.

Plaintiffs merely recite the evidence that would have

supported a verdict in their favor and fail to address the

countervailing evidence andthedistrict court’s analysis.Based

on the record, we cannot say that the district court, having

observedthe witnesses andassessedtheir credibility andheard

the rest of the proof at trial, abused its discretion in holding

that the jury verdict was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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