Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01599/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01599-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julie Ann Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1599

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Julie Ann Miller, also known as *

Julie Johnson, also known as *

Julie DeBruin, also known as *

Julie Kerns, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2004

Filed: August 19, 2005

___________

Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Julie Miller appeals the restitution portion of her sentence1

 in this direct

criminal appeal. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

In January 2001, in Bellevue, Iowa, Miller's paramour killed his roommate,

Greg May. While Miller was not criminally charged in May's death, she did help her

boyfriend remove the body from the house. She later helped her boyfriend clear out

the residence, including May's belongings. The pair sold some of May's belongings,

gave other things to friends and to Goodwill, but loaded the remainder, including an

extensive antique Civil War collection, into a moving van, and the two absconded to

Arizona. Miller contends that she did not know which items in the moving van

belonged to her boyfriend, and which belonged to May. Along the way to Arizona,

Miller helped to either sell off or destroy many of May's belongings.

Once caught, Miller pled guilty to interstate transport of stolen property. In

addition to a 37-month sentence, Miller was ordered to pay $122,165 in restitution

pursuant to the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (MVRA). The

restitution order is the only portion of Miller's sentence being challenged in this direct

appeal. Miller stipulated in her plea agreement that the value of May's personal

belongings was between $120,000 and $200,000. But some of that loss was

recovered by law enforcement. And, the presentence investigation report (PSR)

indicated that restitution was still being investigated and would be set at a later date.

At the sentencing hearing, Officer Rahn testified that law enforcement had not

been able to recover all of May's belongings, and he also acknowledged that there

was no inventory of or insurance records regarding the estate. Rahn noted that Miller

had actually made a list of items to be sold, apparently in an attempt to keep track of

the couple's inventory. Rahn also testified about pictures of both Miller and her

boyfriend taken on the journey to Arizona, which showed some of May's collection

that had not yet been recovered. 

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May's son testified that he knew from personal experience, and from

interviewing friends and other family members, that his father's Civil War collection

was extensive. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the son completed a "declaration of

loss" statement for the probation office, containing a list of items worth $42,165,

which he believed was a partial list of what was stolen from the estate. At sentencing,

the son also produced Exhibit 14, which showed additional losses to his father's estate

in the amount $80,000 for lost property (which included personal property other than

the Civil War collection), and $15,000 in cash that his father usually kept in the

residence. In addition to the aforementioned friends and family, May spoke with an

antique firearms appraiser in coming up with the total valuation for Exhibit 14.

II. DISCUSSION

We review for clear error the district court's determination of the amount of

restitution under the MVRA. United States v. Fogg, 409 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir.

2005). The government has the burden of proving the amount of restitution by a

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Young, 272 F.3d 1052, 1056 (8th

Cir. 2001). Our circuit has determined that the preponderance-of-evidence burden

in restitution cases is unchanged by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision

in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). United States v. May, 413 F.3d

841, 849 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding "persuasive" cases from our sister circuits which

hold that Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker do not affect the manner in which restitution

findings can be made).

Miller contends that the government's evidence regarding the final loss to the

victim's estate, after discounting the items which were ultimately recovered, was not

sufficiently reliable for sentencing purposes. Relying on Young, 272 F.3d 1052,

Miller also argues that allegations in the plea agreement or the PSR do not bind her

to a specific amount of restitution. The defendant in Young challenged the amount

of restitution awarded for the victim's lost profits. The government argued that the

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defendant was bound by unobjected-to admissions regarding lost profits in the PSR.

However, the PSR in Young only recounted the victim's estimate of lost retail sales,

and contained no independent documentation verifying the estimate. Also, the PSR

acknowledged that the amount of restitution owed was uncertain. At sentencing, the

victim elected not to testify, and the government therefore provided no evidence

regarding lost profits. On appeal, the defendant argued that the government's proof

for the restitution amount was lacking. We agreed, and held that "[b]ecause the

district court relied only on the victim's 'uncertain' estimate [in the PSR] in ordering

restitution for lost profits" the district court committed clear error in determining the

amount of restitution. Id. at 1056.

Young is distinguishable. In the instant case, the government did not simply

rely upon the PSR or stipulated facts from the plea agreement, but instead presented

a plethora of restitution evidence at the sentencing hearing. As indicated, Officer

Rahn testified about items from May's estate that were sold and never recovered,

based upon, among other things, photographs of Miller and her boyfriend. May's son

testified that in order to discover the extent of his father's collection, he interviewed

family, friends and fellow collectors. The son also produced an inventory list for the

probation office and another one for the sentencing hearing, assigning the value to the

still-missing items (including cash) at $137,165. These assigned values were based

upon personal recollection, and consultations with family, friends, and a source

knowledgeable about Civil War weaponry.

The government concedes that there is some overlap in the son's two lists,

specifically $6,900 attributed to a train, phonographs, and movie posters. The

government argues, however, that Miller failed to object to any double-counting at

the sentencing hearing, and in any event, other items on both lists were not assigned

any value, nullifying the effect of the double-counting.

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We find that the government met its burden of proving the amount of

restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. As stated above, the government put

on extensive proof at the sentencing hearing, and produced exhibits assigning value

to the estate. Government witnesses provided explanations for items on the list and

how their values were calculated. And, while acknowledging that it was not her

burden to do so, we note that Miller certainly did not put forth any contrary evidence

with regard to valuation.

Finally, we agree with the government's argument about double-counting. We

note that certain items were not accounted for in the final totals–most notably in

Exhibit 14, where May's son estimated that May kept $15,000 in cash at the

residence. Clearly the district court did not take the missing cash into account in

figuring restitution, because the total–$122,165–equals the exact amount attributed

to missing property (minus suspected missing cash) on both inventory lists.

Accordingly, we find the district court did not clearly err in setting restitution in the

amount of $122,165.

Miller also argues that the district court ordered restitution without making

findings about her ability to pay restitution. However, the amount of restitution in

this case was set pursuant to the MVRA, which provides that restitution is mandatory,

and shall be imposed "without consideration of the economic circumstances of the

defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). Instead, "[t]he offender's ability to pay is

relevant only in determining whether restitution should be paid by lump sum, a

schedule of payments, or nominal payments." United States v. Gray, 175 F.3d 617,

617-18 (8th Cir. 1999). Here the district court required Miller to begin paying by

having her prison wages garnished, and made provisions for future payments when

Miller is placed on supervised release. Thus, we find no error on this point.

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III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the restitution order set by the district court. 

______________________________

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