Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02171/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bufford McDonald
Appellant
George Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

BUFFORD 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MCDONALD, } 

} 

Fi L E D ~.l!:iri.:J Star-es Cm:rr of Appeals 

°ff::'IHh ( iro,t' 

JAN ?, ·i 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECY..ER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, } No. 89-2171 

} 

v. } (D.C. No. 89-460-SC} 

} ( D. New Mexico} 

GEORGE SULLIVAN, } 

} 

Defendant-Appellee. } 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed; R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Bufford McDonald appeals from a den i al of his "Motion to 

Vacate" the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 action against the former warden of the New Mexico State 

Penitentiary. McDonald's "Motion to Vacate" was denominated as a 

motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and wholly fails to set 

forth grounds which qualify under that rule. It was also arguably 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing . the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2171 Document: 01019961129 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 1 
filed one day late to qualify as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e), excluding intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), since the district court's order was entered 

on the docket June 26, 1989 and the motion was filed on July 11, 

1989. However, the time limit governing Rule 59(e) motions 

relates to service upon the opposing party, and the record 

indicates that the opposing party had not been located prior to 

the dismissal of the action. And, although the motion referred to 

Rule 60(b), it clearly sought reconsideration of the order of 

dismissal. "[R]egardless of how styled, a motion questioning the 

correctness of a judgment and timely made within ten days thereof 

will be treated under Rule 59(e)." Dalton v. First Interstate 

Bank of Denver, 863 F2d. 702, 703 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing cases). 

Accordingly, we will treat the appeal on the merits as having been 

properly perfected. 

McDonald's complaint alleges, among other things, that the 

defendant intercepted McDonald's letter to an inmate at · the 

penitentiary, and sent 

Before sending the 

it to 

letter to 

the police 

Texas .the 

in Amarillo, Texas. 

defendant allegedly 

"deliberately altered the contents of the letter so as to cause 

great harm to the Plaintiff through the Amarillo, Texas Police 

Dep[artmen]t." R. Vol. I at Tab 1, p. 1. Then "th~ illegally 

altered contents of the letter so inflamed the minds of the 

Amarillo, Texas Police Department that great physical and mental 

pain was suffered by . Plaintiff and a loss of liberty was 

experienced as a result of the illegally intercepted and altered 

letter." Id. at 2 (emphasis added) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2171 Document: 01019961129 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 2 
The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte, prior 

to service. In its order, the court acknowledged the allegations 

that McDonald's letter was intercepted by the defendant and sint 

to the police in Amarillo, but made no mention of the allegations 

of deliberate falsification leading to a loss of liberty. It 

concluded that: 

"Although it is not clear from the complaint what action 

was taken by the Amarillo authorities, it is clear that 

what ever [sic] happened to Plaintiff, under the 

circumstarices, did not rise to a violation of any 

constitutional rights. See Wills v. Ward, 470 F.2d 1185 

(10th Cir. 1972)." 

Order, R. Vol. I at Tab 4, p. 2. 

"(A] complaint filed in forma pauperis is not automatically 

frivolous within the meaning of S 1915(d) because it fails to 

state a claim." Neitzke v. Williams, 109 s. Ct. 1827, 1834 

(1989). Rather, it is frivolous only "where it lacks an arguable 

basis either in law or in fact." Id. at 1831. 

We are unable to conclude that McDonald's complaint, when 

liberally construed, lacks any arguable basis. We have no trouble 

with the proposition that McDonald has no constitutional right to 

mail letters to an inmate, or to prevent prison authorities from 

reading incoming mail. The district court found that McDonald was 

on parole from the penitentiary when he wrote to an inmate. 

Except for certain restrictions regarding treatment of mail from 

attorneys, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974), 

prisons are permitted to read and even to bar such correspondence 

altogether. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1879-80 

(1989): Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91-93 (1987). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2171 Document: 01019961129 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 3 
Nor do we have any difficulty with the proposition that a 

warden who properly intercepted such a letter, which contains 

incriminating information may, without violating the sender's 

constitutional rights, alert the proper authorities. But the allegation of deliberate falsification leading to a claimed loss of 

liberty cannot be dismissed out of hand. See generally, ~-, 

Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1985). 

We agree with the district court that the complaint is too 

vague in its present form to state a claim, but it is not 

inarguable. And, while the district court stated that it was 

familiar with the letter referred to in the complaint and 

therefore discounted the allegations in the complaint, that letter 

and the reasons for the district court's statement are not part of 

this record, leaving us with no basis for review. Accordingly, we 

are obliged to remand this -case for further proceedings. 

By this remand, we do not mean to imply that .2!..2. se litigants 

may abuse the judicial system or party defendants by the -simple 

tactic of marginal or artful pleadings. It is well established in 

this circuit that although .2!..2. se plaintiffs are held to less 

stringent standards, in order to state a cognizable 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (1986) claim, a prose plaintiff must specifically allege 

facts showing that the defendants, whiie acting under the color of 

state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and 

the laws of the United States. ~-, Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 

1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Pike v. City of Mission, 

Kansas, 731 F.2d 655, 661 (10th Cir. 1984) (complaint must plead 

sufficient facts concerning particulars of constitutional 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2171 Document: 01019961129 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 4 
violation); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 1981) 

(the complaint must specifically identify constitutional rights 

that are allegedly violated). 

Furthermore, McDonald's complaint seeks only damages. In 

such instances, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that: 

"Damage actions against government officials are 

subject to a heightened standard of pleading with 

sufficient precision '"to put defendants on notice of 

the nature of the claim and enable them to prepare a 

response and, where appropriate, a summary judgment 

motion on qualified immunity grounds."'" 

Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 170 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting 

Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(quoting 

Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 

Accordingly, in order to test the complaint further, the 

district court may order the plaintiff to file an amended 

complaint which explains in detail the alleged falsificatio'n and 

how it proximately caused a loss of liberty despite all of the 

procedural and other safeguards of due process which attended any 

such deprivation, and which explains exactly what the loss of 

liberty entailed by way of charge, proceedings and punishment. 

Or, the court may allow the action to proceed and, if the 

difficulties of service are at last surmounted, to then have the 

sufficiency of the complaint tested upon a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6). Such a motion will accord the plaintiff notice 

"and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is 

ruled upon." Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. at 1834~ 

Finally, we note that the allegations raised in McDonald's 

complaint are similar to those raised in no. 89-2016 in which we 

issued a decision affirming the district court on the merits 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2171 Document: 01019961129 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 5 
with respect to a defamation claim. A copy of that opinion is 

attached hereto. The district court may wish · to examine 

McDonald's complaints in the two cases to determine if the issue 

involved in the remand is res judicata. 

The order of the district court dismissing plaintiff's 

complaint is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED for further 

proceedings. The mandate shall issue f o rthwith. 

6 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-2171 Document: 01019961129 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 6