Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00568/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00568-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento
Defendant
Hector Rubio
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HECTOR RUBIO,

NO. CIV. S-07-0568 WBS GGH

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO REMAND

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

SACRAMENTO, a corporation (“JOHN

DOE 1”); JOHN DOE 2, JOHN DOE 3,

JOHN DOE 4, DOES 5 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Hector Rubio filed this action against

defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento (“Diocese”)

alleging sexual abuse of plaintiff when he was a minor. 

Defendant removed the matter based on diversity jurisdiction, 28

U.S.C. § 1332, and plaintiff now moves to remand the case to

state court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was born in California on March 18, 1974, and

was a resident of Glenn County, California, at the time of the

events averred in the complaint. (First Amended Complaint

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Plaintiff alleged claims of: 1) childhood sexual abuse 1

(C.C.P. § 340.1); 2) negligent hiring, retention, supervision,

and failure to warn; 3) negligence; 4) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; and 5) procuring or making a child available

to another. (Compl.) On May 11, 2007, plaintiff filed a First

Amended Complaint, which dropped the first and fifth claims in

the original complaint, but contained two new claims of 1) sexual

battery (C.C.P. § 1708.5) and 2) fraud and conspiracy to commit

fraud. (FAC.) 

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(“FAC”) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was raised in a religious family, which

included serving as an altar boy and regularly attending mass. 

(Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Diocese is a religious institution

organized under the laws of the state of California as a

corporation sole, with its principle place of business being in

Sacramento, California. (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendant is responsible for

funding, staffing, and directing parishes, parochial schools,

fraternal organizations, and other facilities and institutions in

Sacramento and Glenn Counties. (Id.)

 Plaintiff came to know a parish priest and spiritual

counselor (“JOHN DOE 2”), while attending a church located in

Glenn County, California (“JOHN DOE 3”). (Id. ¶ 9.) According

to plaintiff’s complaint, beginning in approximately 1983, and

continuing through 1985, defendant JOHN DOE 2 abused plaintiff by

engaging in sexual conduct with him while plaintiff was a minor

under the age of eighteen. (Id. ¶ 10.)

On March 20, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of Sacramento County, alleging five causes of

action stemming from the alleged sexual abuse. (Compl.) On 1

March 23, 2007, defendant Diocese removed the case to this court

based on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On April 24,

2007, plaintiff brought this motion to remand the case to state

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At oral argument, the court pressed defendant Diocese 2

(a citizen of California) about the propriety of removal in light

of the “forum defendant” rule, which prohibits removal by a

defendant who is a citizen of the state in which the original

action was brought (in this case, California). As defendant’s

counsel noted, the Ninth Circuit has unequivocally held that the

“forum defendant” rule is a procedural defect of removal. Lively

v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The removal statute “prohibits a defect in removal procedure from

being raised later than 30 days after the filing of the notice of

removal, regardless of whether a timely remand motion has been

filed.” N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des

Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995); 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c). Plaintiff Rubio filed his motion for remand 32 days

after defendant’s Notice of Removal. Accordingly, while

plaintiff’s current motion to remand challenging diversity is

proper, see Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.

2004) (“federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction cannot be

waived and may be raised at any time”), plaintiff has waived his

right to raise the “forum defendant” rule as an objection to

removal. Id.; see also Kelton Arms Condominium Owners Ass’n,

Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that a district court may not sua sponte raise

procedural defects in removal).

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court, arguing that the parties are not diverse as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1332.

II. Discussion

Removal is appropriate of any case brought in state

court “of which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). A district

court will have original jurisdiction in diversity when a dispute

arises between “citizens of different states” over an amount

greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity cases may

be removed “only if [no defendant] is a citizen of the State in

which the action is brought” when notice of removal is filed. 28

U.S.C. § 1441(b) (emphasis added); Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Court

for N. Dist. of Cal., 393 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2004).2

However, if removal was improper, then “the district court

lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction, and the action should [be]

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remanded to the state court.” Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d

648, 653 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)). The party

asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. 

Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1961).

“To show state citizenship for diversity purposes under

federal common law a party must (1) be a citizen of the United

States, and (2) be domiciled in the state.” Kantor v. Wellesley

Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). A person

is “domiciled” in a location where he or she has established a

“fixed habitation or abode in a particular place, and [intends]

to remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Lew v. Moss, 797

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Owens v. Huntling, 115

F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940) (internal quotations omitted)). 

A person’s old domicile is not lost until a new one is

acquired. Lew, 797 F.2d at 750 (citing Barber v. Varleta, 199

F.2d 419, 423 (9th Cir.1952)). A change in domicile requires

both (a) a physical presence at the new location with (b) an

intention to remain there indefinitely. Lew, 797 F.2d at 750;

Owens, 115 F.2d at 162. In making the determination about an

individual’s domicile, the court will consider factors such as:

“current residence, voting registration and voting practices,

location of personal and real property, location of brokerage and

bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in

unions and other organizations, place of employment or business,

driver’s license and automobile registration, and payment of

taxes.” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750. “Domicile is evaluated in terms

of ‘objective facts,’” and “‘statements of intent are entitled to

little weight when in conflict with facts.’” Id. (quoting

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Defendant objects to the Declaration of Hector Rubio, 3

submitted in support of this Motion to Remand, as being in

violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1746, which details the federal

statutory requirements for unsworn declarations. (Def’s

Objections 2.) Because the court will deny plaintiff’s motion,

and because most of the information contained in plaintiff’s

declaration is also contained in plaintiff’s responses to

interrogatories, attached to the Declaration of defense counsel

Stephen Greene, the court need not rule on defendant’s

objections.

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Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.

1985)).

Defendant Diocese is a corporation formed under the

laws of, and having its principal place of business in, the state

of California. Defendant’s Notice of Removal asserts that at the

time plaintiff filed this action, he was a citizen of Texas for

diversity purposes. (Not. of Removal ¶ 4.) In the present

Motion to Remand plaintiff argues that, while he does currently

reside in Texas, the only reason he moved there was because he

was transferred by his employer. (Rubio Decl. ¶ 3; Greene Decl.

Ex. B (Response to Interrogatory #17).) Plaintiff maintains 3

that he fully intends to return to California, and therefore

California remains his domicile. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert

Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Weible v. United

States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir. 1957) (“A person residing in

a given state is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not

necessarily a citizen of that state.”)). As further evidence of

his intention to return, plaintiff notes that 1) he has

maintained his California driver’s license, 2) he has not changed

his voter registration, and 3) he still owns a home in

California. (Rubio Decl. ¶¶ 5-7; Greene Decl. Ex. B (Response to

Interrogatory #19).)

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Plaintiff’s Reply Brief submitted in support of this 4

motion indicates that plaintiff was transferred to Arizona, while

plaintiff’s declaration indicates New Mexico. (Pl.’s Reply in

Supp. of Mot. to Remand 4; Amended Rubio Decl. ¶ 4.)

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Plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s interrogatories,

however, reveal significant facts supporting the conclusion that

he has changed his domicile to Texas. Importantly, plaintiff

argues that the only reason he and his family moved to Texas was

because he was transferred by his employer. However, having

resigned from his job over two months ago, plaintiff is no longer

employed yet he remains in Texas. (Greene Decl. Ex. B (Response

to Interrogatory #14).) Moreover, a significant indicator of

residency upon which plaintiff relies is his continued ownership

of a home in California. Plaintiff’s California home, however,

is currently up for sale. (Id. (Response to Interrogatory #20).) 

By contrast, plaintiff purchased a home in Texas in December,

2006, which is where he and his family currently reside. (Id.

(Response to Interrogatory #10).) Plaintiff has moved his family

and many of his belongings to Texas. (Id. (Response to

Interrogatory #8, 10, 30).) Plaintiff’s children attend a

private preschool in Texas. (Id. (Response to Interrogatory #31,

32).) While plaintiff does maintain a California drivers

license, both of his cars are currently located in Texas, and he

recently transferred the registration of at least one to Texas. 

(Id. (Response to Interrogatory #24, 25).) 

Plaintiff asserts that his current status as a

temporary resident in Texas is similar to a previous period when

he relocated to New Mexico for two months for employment 4

purposes. (Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Remand 4.) There are

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no indications, however, that any of the attendant circumstances

in the present case existed in that instance, such as plaintiff’s

decision to purchase a home in the new state, to sell the home in

California, to move the family and belongings to the new state,

or to switch the registration of a car to the new state. Indeed,

at oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel indicated that plaintiff’s

primary concern is to avoid “uprooting his family” again--at

present time, plaintiff’s family is located in Texas, and a

subsequent move back to California would once again uproot them.

The factors for determining domicile are “essentially

factual,” Lew, 797 F.2d at 750, and based on all the facts

presented, plaintiff appears to have changed his domicile from

California to Texas. Plaintiff’s mere assertion of an intent to

return is not sufficient to overcome facts to the contrary. Id.

Accordingly, diversity of citizenship exists for the parties in

this action, and plaintiff’s motion to remand will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to

remand be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: May 30, 2007

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