Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05072/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benjamin Brewer
Appellant
Dan Reynolds
Appellee

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, CO 80257 

April 13, 1994 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-5072, Brewer v. Reynolds 

Filed April 5, 1995, By Judge Anderson 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

The corrected citation and related text on pages 24 

and 25 have been corrected. 

Attached are revised pages 24 and 25. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk ~ 

sy: 0ctc~~< L 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-5072 Document: 01019282864 Date Filed: 04/05/1995 Page: 1 
of Mr. Brewer's trial, nor had the State presented evidence 

regarding Mr. Brewer's future dangerousness. Thus, according to 

the court, Ake and Liles did not dictate appointment of a mental 

health expert. SeeR. Vol. I, Doc. 53 at 12-13. While we agree 

with the district court, we arrive at our conclusion via a 

slightly different analysis. 

At the time Mr. Brewer made his motion for the appointment of 

a mental health expert, the State had not dropped the continuing 

threat aggravating circumstance from its bill of particulars. 

Thus, although the trial court had before it a bill of particulars 

alleging the continuing threat aggravator, it nevertheless denied 

the defense motion for the appointment of a mental health expert. 

Under Liles, this was error. See Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; see also 

Clisby, 960 F.2d at 930; Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710 (11th 

Cir.) ("[W]e must assess the reasonableness of the trial judge's 

action at the time he took it."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 

(1987). We therefore must consider whether Mr. Brewer suffered 

any harm resultant from the error. 

The Eighth Circuit recently held that the denial of a 

psychiatric expert in violation of Ake is "trial error," and thus, 

subject to harmless-error analysis. Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 

1280, 2191-92 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Norris v. Starr, 

115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). We agree with the court's conclusion that 

"a right to which a defendant is not entitled absent some 

threshold showing [cannot] fairly be defined as basic to the 

structure of a constitutional trial." Starr, 23 F.3d at 1291. 

Thus, harmless error review is appropriate. See Rose v. Clark, 

-24-

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478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) ("[I]f the defendant had counsel and was 

tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption 

that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to 

harmless-error analysis."); United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 

893, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1993); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 

279, 307-10 (1991) (holding that certain constitutional errors, 

such as the deprivation of the right to counsel, are so 

fundamental that their existence abrogates the basic structure of 

a constitutional trial and are not, therefore, subject to 

harmlessness review) . 

We disagree with the Eighth Circuit, however, as to which 

harmless-error analysis is applicable. While the court in Starr 

applied the standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 

(1967) (appropriate harmless error standard is whether federal 

constitutional error is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"), 

Starr, 23 F.3d at 1292, the Supreme Court, in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993), directed the federal 

courts, on habeas corpus review, to apply the standard set forth 

in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and determine 

whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. at 776. The 

Court in Brecht held that "the Kotteakos harmless-error standard, 

rather than the Chapman standard, applies in determining whether 

habeas relief must be granted because of constitutional error of 

the trial type." Brecht, 113 U.S. at 1722. Accordingly, we apply 

the Kotteakos harmless-error standard in our review of Mr. 

Brewer's Ake claim. 

-25-

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Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, CO 80257 

April 11, 1994 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED DECISION 

RE: 94-5072, Brewer v. Reynolds 

Filed April 5, 1995, By Judge Anderson 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

The last paragraph of page 24 has been changed. 

Attached is a revised page 24. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

By:\&:ulez~~ 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-5072 Document: 01019282864 Date Filed: 04/05/1995 Page: 4 
of Mr. Brewer's trial, nor had the State presented evidence 

regarding Mr. Brewer's future dangerousness. Thus, according to 

the court, Ake and Liles did not dictate appointment of a mental 

health expert. See R. Vol. I, Doc. 53 at 12-13. While we agree 

with the district court, we arrive at our conclusion via a 

slightly different analysis. 

At the time Mr. Brewer made his motion for the appointment of 

a mental health expert, the State had not dropped the continuing 

threat aggravating circumstance from its bill of particulars. 

Thus, although the trial court had before it a bill of particulars 

alleging the continuing threat aggravator, it nevertheless denied 

the defense motion for the appointment of a mental health expert. 

Under Liles, this was error. See Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; see also 

Clisby, 960 F.2d at 930; Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710 (11th 

Cir.) ("[W]e must assess the reasonableness of the trial judge's 

action at the time he took it."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 

(1987). We therefore must consider whether Mr. Brewer suffered 

any harm resultant from the error. 

The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the denial of a 

psychiatric expert in violation of Ake is "trial error," and thus, 

subject to harmless-error analysis. Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 

1280, 2191-92 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Norris v. Starr, 

115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). We agree with the court's conclusion that 

"a right to which a defendant is not entitled absent some 

threshold showing [cannot] fairly be defined as basic to the 

structure of a constitutional trial." Starr, 23 F.3d at 1291. 

Thus, harmless error review is appropriate. See Rose v. Clark, 

-24-

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PUBLISH FILED .. ·~ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALgjnited States Co~ o_f Appeio-' Tenth C1rcu1t 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 0 5 1995 

BENJAMIN BREWER, 

PATR!CK FISH"EU 

Clerli: 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. No. 94-5072 

DAN REYNOLDS, 

Defendant - Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

{D.C. No. 92-C-487-B) 

Benjamin Lee McCullar, Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, Norman, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

A. Diane Blalock, Assistant Attorney General (Susan Brimer Loving, 

former Attorney General and W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, 

with her on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

In 1983, an Oklahoma jury convicted Benjamin Brewer of first 

degree murder and sentenced him to death. After unsuccessfully 

pursuing a direct appeal of his conviction and post-conviction 

relief in the Oklahoma state courts, Mr. Brewer filed this, his 

first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, Mr. Brewer raised thirty-six 

Appellate Case: 94-5072 Document: 01019282864 Date Filed: 04/05/1995 Page: 6 
claims. The district court denied the petition, but issued a 

certificate of probable cause. 

In this appeal, Mr. Brewer's only challenge is to the 

district court's denial of two of his claims. First, he contends 

the district court erred in ruling that he received effective 

assistance from his trial counsel during the penalty phase of his 

trial. Specifically, he claims his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to introduce mitigation evidence relating to his mental 

condition and for failing to call his mother as a mitigation 

witness. Second, Mr. Brewer contends that the district court 

erred in concluding that he did not have a constitutional right to 

the appointment of a mental health expert to assist in the penalty 

phase of his trial. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

On August 17, 1978, the semi-nude body of Karen Joyce 

Stapleton was discovered in her Tulsa apartment. She had been 

stabbed twenty-one times. Mr. Brewer confessed to the crime and 

physical evidence introduced at trial corroborated that 

confession. 

In 1979, Mr. Brewer was tried in the Tulsa County District 

Court on a charge of first degree murder. He raised the defense 

of insanity, relying on the expert testimony of Dr. Anthony C. 

Gagliano, a private osteopath specializing in psychiatry. 

Mr. Brewer was represented at trial by Frank McCarthy of the Tulsa 

County Public Defender's Office. The jury found Mr. Brewer guilty 

of first degree murder and, in the bifurcated penalty phase, 

recommended the death penalty. Finding prosecutorial misconduct 

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during the trial, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed 

the conviction. Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okla. Crim. App. 

19 82) . 

Mr. Brewer was retried in 1983, again raising the defense of 

insanity. In the second trial, he was represented by Mr. McCarthy 

with the assistance of Thomas Burns, another attorney in the Tulsa 

County Public Defender's Office. 

In support of his insanity defense, Mr. Brewer again introduced the expert testimony of Dr. Gagliano. Dr. Gagliano did not 

conduct any psychological testing on Mr. Brewer. Rather, he based 

his findings on his review of Mr. Brewer's mental health records, 

a discussion with one of the mental health experts who previously 

had examined Mr. Brewer, an interview with Mr. Brewer's mother and 

written materials received from her, and interviews with Mr. 

Brewer. 

Dr. Gagliano testified that, although Mr. Brewer was not 

psychotic, he suffered from a personality disorder. R. Supp. Vol. 

III at 921. Dr. Gagliano further testified that he found no 

insanity or thought disorder either prior to or after the 

homicide, but that the "bizarreness and insaneness of the crime" 

represented a thought disorder at the time of the act. R. Supp. 

Vol. III at 920; R. Vol. I, Doc. 52 at 5. 

As to the legal defense of insanity, Dr. Gagliano testified 

that at the time he committed the murder Mr. Brewer was insane; 

that is, he neither knew the difference between right and wrong, 

-3-

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nor could he appreciate the consequences of his actions. R. Supp. 

Vol. III at 925.1 

The jury rejected Mr. Brewer's insanity defense and returned 

a guilty verdict on the first degree murder charge. In the 

penalty phase of the trial,2 the State alleged the following 

aggravating factors: (1) that Mr. Brewer previously had been 

convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 

the person;3 and (2) that the murder was especially heinous, 

atrocious, or cruel.4 The State introduced by motion the guilt/ 

1 Oklahoma follows the M'Naughten test of legal insanity. See 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 152 (West 1983); Manous v. State, 745 

P.2d 742, 744 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). 

2 Under the Oklahoma capital sentencing scheme, a separate 

penalty phase of the trial is held. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 

§ 701.10 (West 1983). Before the jury may recommend the sentence 

of death, it must unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, at 

least one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances, and it must 

determine that the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh the 

mitigating factors. Id. §§ 701.11-.12. 

3 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1) (West 1983). Mr. 

Brewer had been convicted of first degree rape in 1977. 

4 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.12 (4) (West 1983). Following 

our decision in Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1482 (lOth 

Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals restricted the application of this circumstance 

to murders preceded by torture or serious physical abuse. 

Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988). Uniform Jury Instruction 

OUJI-CR 436, which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held in 

Stouffer sufficiently directed and limited the jury's discretion 

to impose the death penalty, was read in Mr. Brewer's case: 

As used in this instruction, the term "Heinous" 

means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; "Atrocious" 

means outrageously wicked or vile; "Cruel" means 

pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, 

with utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the 

sufferings of others. 

The phrase "Especially heinous, atrocious, or 

(continued on next page) 

-4-

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innocence phase prosecution evidence. Additionally, in support of 

the prior violent felony aggravator, the State introduced the 

judgment and sentence of the 1977 rape conviction and Mr. Brewer's 

stipulation that the crime involved the use or threat of violence 

to the person. R. Supp. Vol. III at 1065-67. The State called no 

witnesses during the penalty phase. 

Mr. Brewer instructed his attorneys not to call any witnesses 

during the penalty phase. At the federal habeas corpus hearing, 

Mr. McCarthy testified5 that he and Mr. Burns discussed whether or 

not they should override Mr. Brewer's direction and present 

mitigation witnesses. R. Vol. VIII at 18. Mr. McCarthy further 

testified that, at the time of trial, he did not believe Mr. 

Brewer was competent to make the decision to forego presentation 

of mitigating evidence; that, as far as Mr. McCarthy knew, Mr. 

Brewer had no reason for directing his counsel not to put on 

(continued from previous page) 

cruel" is directed to those crimes where the death of 

the victim was preceded by torture of the victim or 

serious physical abuse. 

Id. In this case, the state district court on collateral review 

found, and Mr. Brewer has not challenged, the following facts in 

support of this aggravating circumstance: the victim was awake and 

aware of what was happening to her as evinced by the presence of 

"defensive wounds"; the victim had been stabbed twenty-one times; 

she bled to death as a result of the severing of the carotid 

artery, as evinced by the great amount of blood around her body; 

she had numerous defensive wounds on her arms, hands, and sides 

indicating that she was attempting to defend herself from the 

petitioner; the petitioner stated that he knew the victim was dead 

or dying because "she was ... drowning in her own blood"; and 

finally, the petitioner stated that after stabbing the victim he 

"sat down on the couch and watched Karen Stapleton thrash in her 

own blood." Brewer v. State, No. CRF-78-2137, at 8-9 (Tulsa 

County Dist. Ct. Sept. 21, 1988). 

5 Mr. Burns, then deceased, did not testify at the federal 

hearing. 

-5-

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mitigating evidence; and that defense counsel's decision to forego 

presentation of mitigating evidence was not a "tactical decision." 

Id. at 18, 22, 31. Thus, although defense counsel believed that 

the testimony of Mr. Brewer's mother, Shirley Brewer Botkin, would 

have been helpful, they nonetheless acceded to the wishes of their 

client and called no mitigation witnesses. Id. at 18, 30-31. 

Defense counsel did, however, introduce by motion the defense 

evidence presented during the guilt/innocence phase. Thus, Dr. 

Gagliano's testimony, presented during the guilt/innocence phase 

of the trial, was again before the jury in the penalty phase. 

The jury found the two statutory aggravating factors beyond a 

reasonable doubt and returned a recommendation that the death 

penalty be imposed. On October 27, 1983, the court sentenced Mr. 

Brewer to death. 

On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed the conviction and sentence, Brewer v. State, 718 P.2d 

354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), and the United States Supreme Court 

denied certiorari, Brewer v. Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 871 (1986). Mr. 

Brewer thereafter sought post-conviction relief in the Oklahoma 

state courts. The district court denied post-conviction relief on 

September 19, 1988. See Brewer v. State, No. CRF-78-2137 (Tulsa 

County Dist. Ct. Sept. 21, 1988). That decision was affirmed in 

an unpublished opinion by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

on September 8, 1989. See Brewer v. State, No. PC-88-868 (Okla. 

Crim. App. Sept. 8, 1989). 

On June 12, 1992, Mr. Brewer filed this federal habeas corpus 

petition. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on 

-6-

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December 23, 1993, and subsequently entered an order denying the 

petition. The court did, however, grant a certificate of probable 

cause and Mr. Brewer filed a timely notice of appeal with this 

court. A stay of execution order, entered by the district court 

on June 12, 1992, remains in effect. See R. Vol. I, Doc. 11. 

As to each of the claims presented in this appeal, Mr. Brewer 

has exhausted the available state-court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b). Mr. Brewer first presented the ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim to the Oklahoma district court in his application 

for post-conviction relief. Brewer v. State, No. CRF-78-2137 

(Tulsa County Dist. Ct. Sept. 19, 1988). The court concluded that 

because ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim which may be 

raised on direct appeal, Mr. Brewer could not raise it for the 

first time on collateral review. Id. at 3-4 (citing Jones v. 

State, 704 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). The Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Brewer v. State, No. 

PC-88-868 (Okla. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 1989). However, in Brecheen 

v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (lOth Cir. 1994), we recently held that 

the failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

on direct review will not preclude federal review of that claim. 

Id. at 1363-64. Thus, Mr. Brewer's ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is not procedurally barred.6 

Mr. Brewer's second claim, that he was denied the appointment 

of a mental health expert in violation of the Fourteenth 

6 Although the briefs in this case were filed prior to our 

decision in Brecheen, at oral argument, the State conceded that, 

under Brecheen, Mr. Brewer's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim was not procedurally barred. 

-7-

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Amendment, was raised on direct appeal and the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals disposed of the claim on the merits. See Brewer 

v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). 

DISCUSSION 

In reviewing the district court's denial of Mr. Brewer's 

habeas corpus petition, we accept the court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and we review the court's conclusions of 

law de novo. Thomas v. Kerby, No. 93-2323, 1995 WL 3405, at *1 

{10th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995); Kell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 26 

F.3d 1016, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1994); Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 

1495 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING· THE PENALTY PHASE 

Mr. Brewer's first claim is that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in not introducing the following evidence during the 

penalty phase of his trial: psychological evidence relating to his 

lifelong mental and emotional disturbance; and the testimony of 

his mother, Shirley Brewer Botkin. Noting that Mr. Brewer had 

instructed his attorneys not to present mitigating evidence, the 

federal district court stated its refusal to "establish a rule 

whereby an attorney must disregard the explicit instructions of 

his client, who has been found competent, or risk being found 

ineffective as counsel," R. Vol. I, Doc. 53 at 14, and denied 

habeas corpus relief on this ground. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed 

question of law and fact which we review de novo. Brecheen v. 

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Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1365-66 (lOth Cir. 1994); United States v. 

Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346, 1347 (lOth Cir. 1992). We accept the 

factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (lOth Cir. 

1993). 

The two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), governs review of an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 

as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 

requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 

whose result is reliable. 

Id. at 687; Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1562 (lOth Cir. 

1994); see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); United 

States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1472 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

"The Supreme Court has observed that often it may be easier 

to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim for lack of prejudice than 

to determine whether the alleged errors were legally deficient." 

Haddock, 12 F.3d at 955; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; United 

States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 728 (lOth Cir. 1993); Coleman v. 

Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 428 

U.S. 909 (1987). This is a case in which we may heed the Supreme 

Court's suggestion and turn immediately to Strickland's prejudice 

component.? 

7 In so doing, we need not, and therefore do not express any 

opinion as to whether Mr. Brewer's trial counsel's performance was 

deficient. 

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In order to establish the prejudice component of the 

Strickland analysis, Mr. Brewer must show there exists "a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's purported 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694; see Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 (lOth 

Cir. 1988); see also Kimmelman, 477 u.s. at 381; Andrews v. 

Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1193 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 

U.S. 1110 (1992); Tapia v. Tansey, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991); Rivera, 900 F.2d at 

1472. In the context of a challenge to counsel's effectiveness at 

the penalty phase of a capital trial, prejudice is established if 

the petitioner demonstrates "a reasonable probability that, absent 

the errors, the sentencer--including an appellate court, to the 

extent that it independently reweighs the evidence--would have 

concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

695; Osborn, 861 F.2d at 626 n.12. In reviewing a claim of 

prejudice, we must "keep in mind the strength of the government's 

case and the aggravating factors the jury found as well as the 

mitigating factors that might have been presented" if the 

petitioner had been provided effective assistance of counsel. 

Stafford, 34 F.3d at 1564; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 

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A. 

Mr. Brewer first claims that the sentencing jury should have 

heard evidence regarding "the severe mental and emotional 

impairments suffered by Benjamin Brewer throughout his life that 

mitigated the degree of his culpability." Petr's Br. at 27. In 

support of this argument, Mr. Brewer introduced the testimony of 

two psychologists at the federal habeas corpus hearing: Dr. 

Patricia Fleming, a clinical psychologist, and Sally Church, a 

licensed professional counselor.8 

Dr. Fleming conducted her evaluation of Mr. Brewer in 1993, 

fifteen years after the crime. She and her associate conducted a 

battery of psychological tests which included the Minnesota 

Multiphastic Personality Inventory ("MMPI"), the Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler Memory Scale, and various other 

tests of sensory and perceptual functioning. Mr. Brewer tested 

within the average or normal range on most of these tests. Dr. 

Fleming noted that Mr. Brewer's I.Q. of 120 was slightly above 

average. Dr. Fleming reviewed Mr. Brewer's previous mental health 

records which included two competency evaluations performed at the 

8 Ms. Church testified regarding Mr. Brewer's competence to 

assist his counsel at trial and on the importance of placing 

mitigating psychological testimony before a sentencing jury. In 

all other respects, her testimony essentially paralleled that of 

Dr. Fleming. See R. Vol. VIII at 92-104. 

In this appeal, Mr. Brewer's claims relate only to the 

sentencing phase of his trial. Furthermore, regarding Mr. 

Brewer's competence during the penalty phase, at oral argument 

counsel for Mr. Brewer conceded, "Mr. Brewer was competent, I 

believe, from a legal standpoint." Thus, Mr. Brewer's competence 

to assist counsel during the penalty phase is not at issue in this 

case, and any question regarding his competence to stand trial for 

the substantive criminal offense is not properly before us. 

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Eastern State Hospital (one in 1976, prior to his trial for rape; 

the second in 1979, prior to his first trial on the first-degree 

murder charge); the report of Dr. Paul Aleksic, a psychologist who 

examined Mr. Brewer when he was sixteen years old; and the 

testimony of Dr. Gagliano. Dr. Fleming also communicated with Mr. 

Brewer's family members and conducted approximately nine hours of 

interviews with Mr. Brewer. 

Dr. Fleming testified that Mr. Brewer suffers from a 

"schizoid personality disorder";9 that he exhibits a "high level 

of paranoia, alienation, social alienation, suspiciousness"; and 

that, in her examination of Mr. Brewer, he "showed some antisocial 

behavior things on [the MMPI and Beck Depression Scale tests] , 

some psychotic thinking." R. Vol. VIII at 59. She noted in her 

evaluation that Mr. Brewer "has a number of traits typical of the 

aggressive man with little regard for others, poor interpersonal 

relationships, and social isolation." R. Vol. III, Doc. 13 at 12. 

Mr. Brewer contends that, had the jury heard this 

psychological evidence, it would have viewed him in a different 

light, and he concludes that there is a reasonable probability the 

jury would not have rendered a recommendation of death. The 

State, on the other hand, contends that a good deal of the 

psychological testimony Mr. Brewer now claims should have been 

introduced during the penalty phase was adequately placed before 

the jury by way of Dr. Gagliano's testimony, given during the 

9 The district court concluded that this diagnosis was 

essentially the same as that of Dr. Gagliano. R. Vol. I, Doc. 53 

at 13. In his trial testimony, Dr. Gagliano characterized Mr. 

Brewer as having a "personality disorder." R. Supp. Vol. III at 

921. 

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guilt/innocence phase and introduced by motion into the penalty 

phase. We disagree. 

The major requirement of the penalty phase of a capital trial 

is that the sentence be individualized by focusing on the 

particularized characteristics of the defendant. See Eddings v. 

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 

U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). 

And, as the Supreme Court has observed, "[e]vidence of ... 

emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in 

mitigation." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115; see Hill v. Lockhart, 28 

F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 778 

(1995); Schlup v. Armantrout, 941 F.2d 631, 643 (11th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1273 (1992); see also Gary Goodpaster, 

The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death 

Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 300-03 (1983). Clearly, 

such mitigating evidence is not limited to evidence of guilt or 

innocence, nor does it necessarily relate solely to the 

circumstances of the offense. See Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 

1554-55 (lOth Cir. 1988, rev'd sub nom. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 

484 (1990). 

In this case, Dr. Gagliano's testimony was given at a point 

in the proceedings when the jury was focused on guilt or innocence 

rather than the sentence to be imposed. Furthermore, the 

testimony centered on Mr. Brewer's sanity at the time he committed 

the offense, and only tangentially touched upon the more chronic 

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mental health problems to which Dr. Fleming testified at the 

federal habeas corpus hearing.10 

Thus, while Dr. Gagliano's guilt/innocence phase testimony 

clearly was relevant to the first of the five mitigating 

instructions given by the court at sentencing,11 its relevance 

10 Dr. Gagliano testified that reviewing material from Mr. 

Brewer's mother and an interview with Mr. Brewer gave him 

a firm hold on Ben as a child, the manner in which he 

related, the multiple school changes, the never having 

had a stable relationship, his never forming good 

interpersonal or friendship relations which immediately 

was the seed for an antisocial personality or dissocial. 

He has never been a social person. 

R. Supp. Vol. III at 924. Dr. Gagliano further testified that 

Ben is not a thought disorder or psychotic individual. 

Ben is a personality disorder. 

I think this report in 1976 [referring to the 

report from Eastern State Hospital] sums it up 

beautifully like what I just said. "Thus, he has many 

attitudes in common with antisocial personalities, such 

as the negative viewing of his environment," and this 

important point, "a propensity to do things on the spur 

of the moment with little reflection and a good deal of 

self-centeredness. . And it was predicted in 1976, 

and it was predicted in 1974 when Dr. Alexis also stated 

almost verbatim that he is not likely to act in a 

violent manner unless provoked and when provoked, even 

Dr. Alexis predicted that it would be in some form of a 

violent fashion, whether it would be homicide or 

stealing cars, but it would be something antisocial. 

Id. at 921-22. 

11 The court five mitigation instructions given by the court 

were as follows: 

(1) Mental disease or defect impaired Mr. Brewer's capacity 

to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his 

conduct to the requirements of the law; 

(2) Mr. Brewer committed the crime while under the influence 

of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 

(3) Mr. Brewer's childhood and environment and the manner in 

(continued on next page) 

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with respect to the remaining instructions would have been less 

obvious to the jury. Unfortunately, counsel did nothing to 

clarify this obfuscation. Counsel waived opening statement and 

directed his closing argument toward his disagreement with the 

jury's verdict of guilt and his generalized opposition to the 

death penalty. See R. Supp. Vol. III at 1070-71, 1080-91. Simply 

stated, defense counsel did nothing more with Dr. Gagliano's 

guilt/innocence phase testimony than to properly move for its 

introduction at sentencing. As a result, although the jury 

instructions provided "standards to guide" the jury in its 

deliberation of the sentence, we harbor serious doubt that "the 

sentencing authority [was] apprised of the information relevant to 

the imposition of the sentence." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. The 

jurors simply were left with no guidance as to how they might 

consider Dr. Gagliano's testimony in light of the mitigating 

instructions given by the court. See Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 

642, 654-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872 (1988); see 

also Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1503 & n.124 (11th Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2282 (1992); Armstrong v. Dugger, 

833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we must 

consider the evidence offered by Mr. Brewer at the federal hearing 

as well as the impact that evidence would have had on the jury had 

it been presented at sentencing. 

(continued from previous page) 

which he was raised had an adverse effect on his personality and 

contributed to the cause of the homicide; 

(4) Mr. Brewer's age at the time of the crime; 

(5) Mr. Brewer's criminal record consisted of only one prior 

conviction. Petr's Br. at 40 n.14. 

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In reviewing Dr. Fleming's testimony, and the thirteen-page 

psychological evaluation of Mr. Brewer that she prepared, we note 

the conclusory nature of her diagnosis of Mr. Brewer as a man "who 

suffers significant mental illness." R. Vol. VIII at 69. We also 

note the absence in Mr. Brewer's mental health history of any 

diagnoses which corroborate Dr. Fleming's conclusion. There is 

nothing in the record which suggests Mr. Brewer suffers from 

significant mental health problems, nothing to suggest an organic 

brain disorder, nothing suggesting brain damage. He is not 

mentally retarded; he has an I.Q. of 120. He has never been 

hospitalized for treatment of any form of mental disease or 

condition, nor has he ever been on medication to control any 

mental disorder. On the standardized psychological tests 

administered by Dr. Fleming, Mr. Brewer tested within the normal 

range. When he was evaluated in 1974 by Dr. Paul Aleksic, he was 

diagnosed as having "pronounced schizoid features," but there was 

no indication at that time of "serious emotional deterioration." 

R. Vol. III, Doc. 10 at 7. Indeed, Dr. Aleksic found only "some 

schizophrenic traits evident in that he is socially and 

emotionally detached but there is no evidence of disorder thought 

or dissociation from reality." Id. 

Mr. Brewer was evaluated at the Eastern State Hospital for 

his competency to stand trial on two occasions, in 1976 and again 

in 1978. While the foci of these evaluations were on Mr. Brewer's 

competency, we cannot overlook the fact that qualified 

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physicians12 at this state institution, on two separate occasions, 

found that Mr. Brewer had "no mental disorder." R. Vol. III, 

Docs. 11, 12. Although Dr. Fleming had some reservations 

regarding the Eastern State Hospital reports, her evaluation 

stated only that, had the examining physician "addressed the issue 

of behavioral stability and the schizoid and depressive 

characteristics the report would have noted dynamics that 

indicated the need for treatment for this young man." Petr's Br., 

App. 1, at 7. Thus, Dr. Fleming did not dispute the hospital's 

conclusion regarding the absence of a mental disorder, it was 

simply her opinion that Mr. Brewer needed some form of unspecified 

"treatment." And finally, Dr. Gagliano testified that Mr. Brewer 

is not psychotic, nor did he suffer from any mental disorder or 

thought disorder prior to, or following, the homicide. R. Supp. 

Vol. III at 921. 

We find nothing in Dr. Fleming's written evaluation of Mr. 

Brewer or her habeas hearing testimony which directly refutes, or 

even calls into question, the diagnoses of the several other 

mental health professionals who found no mental illness or thought 

disorder in Mr. Brewer.13 She simply arrived at a different 

12 Mr. Brewer argues that the competency evaluations performed 

at the Eastern State Hospital are unreliable because the attending 

physician, Dr. R. D. Garcia, suffered from an untreated 

manic-depressive illness during the time he evaluated Mr. Brewer. 

Petr's Br. at 4 n.1. The district court found Mr. Brewer's 

evidence on this issue unpersuasive and we discern no error in 

that finding. 

13 Dr. Fleming also noted that Mr. Brewer's relationships with 

women have been dysfunctional, especially in his sexuality. Yet, 

Dr. Fleming's own evaluation states that Mr. Brewer's wife 

reported their "marriage had been good" until Mr. Brewer began to 

(continued on next page) 

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conclusion, which is not surprising given that psychiatry is not 

"an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and 

frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate 

diagnosis to be attached to a given behavior and symptoms, [and] 

on cure and treatment." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985); 

see Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1517 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 1275 (1992); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 

1013 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991). In 

light of the rather speculative nature of Dr. Fleming's 

conclusions and the conflicting diagnoses regarding Mr. Brewer's 

mental condition, we believe the jury would have viewed Mr. Brewer 

as, at most, a paranoid, antisocial man, suffering from a 

personality disorder evinced by violent and inappropriate 

behavior. Psychological testimony of the sort proffered at the 

federal hearing would not have been afforded considerable weight 

by the jury. Thus, we are doubtful that the jury would have found 

such evidence sufficiently mitigating to change the sentence 

rendered. 

B. 

Mr. Brewer next claims that the jury should have heard 

testimony from his mother, Shirley Brewer Botkin. Ms. Botkin did 

not testify at the federal hearing. The only evidence proffered 

(continued from previous page) 

associate with two other men, whom Ms. Brewer believed were drug 

users, and it was at that time that Mr. Brewer became abusive and 

violent. Petr's Br., App. 1 at 5. We are therefore left to 

speculate whether this dysfunctionality was the product of mental 

illness, as Dr. Fleming suggests, or attributable to some other 

factor such as Mr. Brewer's drug use. 

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as to what her testimony would have been is an eighteen-page 

letter, prepared by Ms. Botkin, wherein she details her son's life 

history. R. Vol. III, Doc. 16.14 The substance of this letter 

suggests that Ms. Botkin would have testified regarding her son's 

difficult childhood; her own inability to spend time with her son 

due to the demands of her employment; his father's disaffection 

and abuse, unspecified as to type, time, manner, degree, or 

duration; the family's instability, frequent moves, and financial 

hardships; Mr. Brewer's inability to make friends or form lasting 

relationships; his failed attempts at suicide; the fact that her 

son had been diagnosed with "schizophrenia brought on by pressures 

from his peers"; and Mr. Brewer's failed marriage. 

Mr. Brewer argues that this evidence would have cast him as 

the unfortunate victim of a violent and turbulent upbringing. In 

considering Mr. Brewer's ineffectiveness claim, however, we "must 

consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury," 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, not merely that part of the testimony 

which may have been helpful to Mr. Brewer's case. Thus, we 

believe it is just as probable that the jury may have concluded, 

not that Mr. Brewer was a victim of his environment, but that his 

crime was the culmination of his own, self-directed, violent, and 

14 We are unable to locate where this letter was made part of 

the record. It is not in the form of an affidavit, it is undated, 

and while it is represented on appeal as being written "for her 

son's federal habeas appeal," Petr's Br. at 27, the text of the 

letter makes clear that it was prepared prior to Mr. Brewer's 

trial. The letter was included in an appendix to Mr. Brewer's 

original petition for habeas corpus. See R. Vol. III, Doc. 16. 

While we retain reservations as to the reliability of this 

document, because it is the only evidence proffered in the 

district court relating to Ms. Botkin's possible testimony, we 

consider it in this appeal. 

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irresponsible life. The jury would have heard testimony regarding 

Mr. Brewer's problems in school and the fact that he eventually 

dropped out of school; his drug and alcohol abuse, and the fact 

that he had left home to take up residence with other drug users; 

his increasing alienation of his family; his inability to hold 

down a job; and his numerous parol violations. The jury 

undoubtedly would have been struck, as we are, by Mr. Brewer's 

escalating criminality: he had run away from home and been 

adjudged an ungovernable youth in 1973; he had been charged with 

third degree burglary for theft and placed on parole in 1975; he 

was convicted of first degree rape in 1977; and finally, he 

committed the instant crime in 1978. See R. Vol. III, Doc. 16. 

In short, while testimony from a family member may generally be 

beneficial to a capital defendant at sentencing, we believe that, 

in this case, the totality of Ms. Botkin's revelations could have 

been devastating. 

We have taken due account of the impact that the errors Mr. 

Brewer claims were committed by his counsel would have had on the 

sentencing jury. This is not a case, however, in which the 

sentence rendered is "only weakly supported by the record." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Given the State's overwhelming case 

against him, the number and gravity of the aggravating 

circumstances found by the jury, and the nature of the crime 

itself, we do not believe that the speculative, conclusory, and 

possibly damaging mitigating evidence offered now, seventeen years 

after the crime, would have resulted in the imposition of a 

sentence other than death. Even assuming deficient performance by 

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counsel, Mr. Brewer has failed to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of his sentencing would have been 

different. Thus, our confidence in the outcome has not been 

undermined, id., and we affirm the district court's denial of 

habeas relief on Mr. Brewer's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. 

II. AKE CLAIM 

Prior to trial, Mr. Brewer filed a motion requesting 

appointment of "a private medical expert" in order to "determine 

whether there exists a probability that the defendant would commit 

criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 

threat to society as is alleged in the bill of particulars filed 

by the state of Oklahoma in this case." R. Vol. III, Doc. 4 at 

1.15 The trial court denied the motion.16 Mr. Brewer contends 

15 The State of Oklahoma's bill of particulars alleged the 

following aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was especially 

heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) there existed of a probability 

that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 

would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3} Mr. 

Brewer previously had been convicted of a felony involving the use 

or threat of violence. R. Vol. III, Doc. 21; see Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 1983). At trial, only the heinous, 

atrocious, or cruel aggravator and the continuing threat 

aggravator were alleged. 

It is unclear at what point in the proceedings the State of 

Oklahoma determined not to pursue the continuing threat 

aggravating circumstance. For purposes of our review, however, we 

assume that on the date Mr. Brewer filed his motion seeking 

appointment of a mental health expert, January 18, 1983, the State 

was continuing to allege the continuing threat aggravator. 

16 On direct review, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

noted that the only psychiatric expert to testify during the trial 

was the defense expert, Dr. Gagliano. The court then went on to 

hold that because the State had not introduced psychiatric 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 94-5072 Document: 01019282864 Date Filed: 04/05/1995 Page: 26 
that the trial court's failure to appoint a mental health expert 

to assist in the penalty phase of his trial was a denial of due 

process.17 

Subsequent to Mr. Brewer's trial, the Supreme Court decided 

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Court held that 

when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity 

at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, 

"the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a 

competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination 

and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 

defense." Id. at 83. 

The Court in Ake observed that "under certain circumstances, 

due process also entitles a criminal defendant to court-appointed 

psychiatric assistance during the sentencing phase of a capital 

proceeding." Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 335 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 

(1992); see Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 928-29 (11th Cir. 

1992); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied sub nom. Thompson v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 1042 

(continued from previous page) 

testimony, it "did not have a strategic advantage over Brewer that 

would create a risk of error in the proceeding absent a defense 

witness to counter-balance the State's expert testimony." Brewer 

v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). 

17 Mr. Brewer's argument on appeal suggests that he is 

challenging the court's denial of appointment of an expert for 

both the guilt/innocence phase and the penalty phase of his trial. 

Provision of psychological assistance during the guilt/innocence 

phase of his trial, however, was not an issue presented to the 

habeas court below and, consequently, it is not properly before 

this court now. See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 

716, 720 (lOth Cir. 1993). We therefore limit our review of Mr. 

Brewer's Ake claim to the penalty phase. 

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(1987) .18 Finding that the state trial court had deprived the 

petitioner of due process during the sentencing phase of his trial 

by denying him court-appointed psychiatric assistance "to rebut 

the State's evidence of his future dangerousness," Ake, 470 U.S. 

at 83 (emphasis added), the Court held that due process entitles a 

defendant to the appointment of a mental health expert "when the 

State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future 

dangerousness." Id. 

We have rejected a narrow construction of Ake. In Liles v. 

Saffle, 945 F.2d 333 (lOth Cir. 1991), we held that due process 

requires the appointment of a mental health expert to assist the 

defendant in the penalty phase when the State presents evidence, 

psychiatric or otherwise, concerning the defendant's future 

dangerousness, and the defendant establishes the likelihood that 

his mental condition could have been a significant mitigating 

factor. Id. at 341. 

In denying Mr. Brewer's habeas corpus petition, the district 

court observed that, in this case, the State had not alleged the 

continuing threat aggravating circumstance in the sentencing phase 

18 The nonretroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 

(1989), is not implicated in this case. Ake was decided on 

February 26, 1985 and Mr. Brewer's direct appeal did not become 

final until October 6, 1986, when the United States Supreme Court 

denied certiorari. Brewer v. Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 871 (1986). 

In cases such as this, in which the trial court denied the 

defendant's motion for appointment of a mental health expert prior 

to the Court's decision in Ake, but to which the holding of Ake is 

applicable, "the question presented is whether, 'upon review of 

the entire record, [petitioner] could have made a threshold 

showing under Ake that "his sanity at the time of the offense is 

to be a significant factor at trial .... "'" Liles, 945 F.2d at 

336 (quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1212 (lOth Cir. 

1986)) (alteration in original). 

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Appellate Case: 94-5072 Document: 01019282864 Date Filed: 04/05/1995 Page: 28 
of Mr. Brewer's trial, nor had the State presented evidence 

regarding Mr. Brewer's future dangerousness. Thus, according to 

the court, Ake and Liles did not dictate appointment of a mental 

health expert. SeeR. Vol. I, Doc. 53 at 12-13. While we agree 

with the district court, we arrive at our conclusion via a 

slightly different analysis. 

At the time Mr. Brewer made his motion for the appointment of 

a mental health expert, the State had not dropped the continuing 

threat aggravating circumstance from its bill of particulars. 

Thus, although the trial court had before it a bill of particulars 

alleging the continuing threat aggravator, it nevertheless denied 

the defense motion for the appointment of a mental health expert. 

Under Liles, this was error. See Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; see also 

Clisby, 960 F.2d at 930; Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710 (11th 

Cir.) ("[W]e must assess the reasonableness of the trial judge's 

action at the time he took it."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 

(1987). We therefore must consider whether Mr. Brewer suffered 

any harm resultant from the error. 

The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the denial of a 

psychiatric expert in violation of Ake is "trial error," and thus, 

subject to harmless-error analysis. Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 

1280, 2191-92 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Norris v. Starr, 

115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). We agree with the court's conclusion that 

"a right to which a defendant is not entitled absent some 

threshold showing can fairly be defined as basic to the structure 

of a constitutional trial," Starr, 23 F.3d at 1291, and is, 

therefore, amenable to harmlessness review. See Rose v. Clark, 

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Appellate Case: 94-5072 Document: 01019282864 Date Filed: 04/05/1995 Page: 29 
478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) ("[I]f the defendant had counsel and was 

tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption 

that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to 

harmless-error analysis."); United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 

893, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1993); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 

279, 307-10 (1991) (holding that certain constitutional errors, 

such as the deprivation of the right to counsel, are so 

fundamental that their existence abrogates the basic structure of 

a constitutional trial and are not, therefore, subject to 

harmlessness review) . 

We disagree with the Eleventh Circuit, however, as to which 

harmless-error analysis is applicable. While the court in Starr 

applied the standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 

(1967) (appropriate harmless error standard is whether federal 

constitutional error is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"), 

Starr, 23 F.3d at 1292, the Supreme Court, in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993), directed the federal 

courts, on habeas corpus review, to apply the standard set forth 

in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 u.s. 750 (1946), and determine 

whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. at 776. The 

Court in Brecht held that "the Kotteakos harmless-error standard, 

rather than the Chapman standard, applies in determining whether 

habeas relief must be granted because of constitutional error of 

the trial type." Brecht, 113 U.S. at 1722. Accordingly, we apply 

the Kotteakos harmless-error standard in our review of Mr. 

Brewer's Ake claim. 

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It is clear that the trial court's denial of Mr. Brewer's 

motion, though erroneous, was nonetheless harmless. Mr. Brewer's 

motion requesting appointment of the mental health expert was 

framed exclusively for the purpose of rebutting the State's 

allegation that he posed a continuing threat to society. 

Therefore, when the State did not pursue the continuing threat 

aggravator at sentencing, the sole basis for Mr. Brewer's request 

disappeared. Simply stated, there was nothing for a defense 

psychiatric expert to rebut.19 The error committed by the court 

in denying Mr. Brewer's motion, therefore, could not have had a 

substantial and injurious effect, nor could it have had any 

influence on the jury's recommendation of death. Brecht, 113 

S. Ct. at 1722. Thus, in this case, we harbor no "grave doubt" 

that the error was harmless. See O'Neal v. McAninch, No. 93-7407, 

1995 WL 66598, at *3 (Feb. 21, 1995). 

Mr. Brewer does not dispute that once the State dropped the 

continuing threat aggravating factor, any right which he may have 

had to the appointment of an expert to rebut that aggravator also 

became a nullity. He contends, however, that he nonetheless was 

entitled to appointment of a psychiatric expert. He argues that 

the mere fact that a capital defendant may offer affirmative 

psychiatric evidence in mitigation sufficiently calls the 

defendant's mental condition into question under Ake as to warrant 

appointment of an expert. We disagree. 

19 We note that although Mr. Brewer has challenged various 

facets of his trial counsel's effectiveness in this appeal, he has 

not raised the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to 

frame the motion seeking appointment of a mental health expert 

more broadly. 

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• 

Under Mr. Brewer's analysis, every capital defendant desiring 

such would be entitled to a court-appointed psychiatric expert at 

sentencing, regardless of whether he makes the requisite threshold 

showing of need. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected such a 

proposition: "A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at 

issue in every criminal proceeding . . . and it is unlikely that 

psychiatric assistance of the kind we have described would be of 

probable value in cases where it is not." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82. 

Ake does not stand for the proposition that every capital 

defendant has a fundamental right to the appointment of a 

psychiatric expert to assist in the sentencing phase of trial. 

Rather, Ake ensures that when the resources of the State are 

brought to bear upon an indigent individual in the sentencing 

stage of the proceeding, he is provided with the "basic tools of 

an adequate defense" necessary to rebut the State's challenge. 

Id. at 77, 80; Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; Kordenbrock v. Scraggy, 919 

F.2d 1091, 1105 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 

(1991); Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) 

(en bane), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); see also Smith v. 

McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1990); Davis v. 

Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401, 1407 (lOth Cir. 1989), vacated sub nom. 

Saffle v. Davis, 494 U.S. 1050, aff'd, 911 F.2d 415 (lOth Cir. 

1991); Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1214 (lOth Cir. 

1986), point aff'd on reh'g, 822 F.2d 1477 (lOth Cir. 1987), 

aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 

1458-59 (11th Cir. 1986); Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 763-64 

(11th Cir. 1985); cf. United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 

-27-

0 

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• 

(lOth Cir. 1985); Gore v. Dugger, 763 F. Supp. 1110, 1120-21 (M.D. 

Fla. 1989), aff'd, 933 F.2d 904 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 

502 U.S. 1066 (1992). See generally Britt v. North Carolina, 404 

U.S. 226, 227 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372, 353 (1963) 

(state must insure meaningful chance to present defense); Griffin 

v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide indigent 

defendant trial transcripts) . In this case, the State did not 

pursue the continuing threat aggravating factor at sentencing and 

there was, therefore, nothing for a defense psychiatrist to rebut. 

Thus, with respect to future dangerousness, Mr. Brewer's mental 

condition was not at issue during the penalty phase. 

Mr. Brewer argues, however, that the State did place his 

mental condition at issue in the penalty phase by alleging that 

the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, and 

cruel manner. We disagree.20 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has narrowed the 

heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating factor to encompass only 

those crimes in which "torture or serious physical abuse" precede 

the death of the victim. See Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988). As 

noted previously, the jury instruction which was read to the jury 

in this case reflected that narrowing construction. See supra 

20 At oral argument, Mr. Brewer's counsel also suggested that 

the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance, Okla. Stat. 

Ann. tit. 21, § 701.12(1) (West 1983), places the defendant's 

mental condition at issue. Again, we disagree. Especially in a 

case such as this, where the defendant stipulated that he had been 

convicted of a prior felony involving the use or threat of 

violence to the person, this aggravating circumstance relates 

simply to the fact of a prior violent felony conviction. 

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note 4. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has construed the 

heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator in such a manner such 

that it does not implicate a defendant's mental condition. 

Compare Stouffer, 742 P.2d at 563, with State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 

1017, 1032-34 (Ariz. 19 89) (construing "Especially heinous, cruel 

or depraved" aggravating circumstance to implicate mental state), 

aff'd, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), it has not done so; 

see also Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1482 (lOth Cir. 

1987) (determination of what narrowing construction of the 

"Especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance 

would satisfy constitutional requirements left to state to decide 

in the first instance), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). Accordingly, 

we reject Mr. Brewer's argument that the State's allegation of the 

heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator sufficiently placed his 

mental condition at issue as to trigger the right to a courtappointed psychiatric expert. 

In sum, the State of Oklahoma alleged two aggravating factors 

in the penalty phase of Mr. Brewer's trial. Neither of these 

factors, however, placed his mental condition at issue. 

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not deprive Mr. 

Brewer of due process by denying his request for a psychiatric 

expert to assist in the penalty phase of trial, and the district 

court did not err in denying habeas corpus relief on Mr. Brewer's 

Ake claim. 

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w 

• 

III. CONCLUSION 

We have exhaustively reviewed the record in this case and 

carefully considered each of Mr. Brewer's claims properly before 

this court. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district 

court's order denying Mr. Brewer's petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. 

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