Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08199/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08199-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Self
Petitioner
Richard Larry Self
Petitioner
USA
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Larry Self,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-13-8199-PCT-DGC (JFM)

CR-10-8036-PCT-DGC

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or 

Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed on July 29, 2013 a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 2). 

On March 19, 2014, Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 15). Movant filed a Reply on 

June 16, 2014 (Doc. 21). On September 29, 2014, Petitioner re-filed (Doc. 24) his 

Memorandum in Support of his Petition because of a defect in the electronically filed 

version.

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases , Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his Motion to Suppress, Movant described the factual background as follows:

This investigation began on November 5, 2008, when the 

Child Exploitation Section of the ICE (Immigration and Customs 

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Enforcement) Cyber Crimes Center received information regarding 

a website containing child pornography, known as DreamZone. ICE 

agents verified that the website contained pornography and that the 

website could be accessed by “members” to the website for a 

monthly fee. ICE agents accessed this site for a monthly fee of 

$99.00 after an agent completed the transaction with an undercover 

identity and credit card. The undercover agent received a user name 

and password, accessed the website, and found child pornography 

within the site. ICE then obtained the web access logs from

November 11, 2008, through November 20, 2008, and matched IP 

addresses with specific image files that were accessed from each IP 

address. Pursuant to this search warrant, ICE identified the e-mail 

address of richardrimrock@AOL.com (“Rimrock IP”) as one of the 

IP addresses that accessed the DreamZone website on November

18, 2008. The logs further showed that on this date the Rimrock IP 

downloaded numerous images of child pornography from the 

website.

Pursuant to further subpoenas to AOL, ICE determined that, 

as of January 30, 2009, the account holder for the Rimrock IP was 

Richard Self at a P.O. Box in Rimrock, Arizona, and that the 

relevant phone number was assigned to Richard Self through a 

Verizon account that had been effective since April 15, 2008, with 

the same P.O. Box in Rimrock. In May of 2009, ICE reviewed the 

motor vehicle database for records of Richard Self and identified a 

residential address on Desert Pine Road in Rimrock, Arizona.

On November 15, 2009, ICE agents conducted surveillance 

at the Desert Pine address and observed a motor vehicle that was 

registered to Mr. Self at the Desert Pine address. In December of 

2009, ICE obtained another subpoena for the AOL account holder 

information, and it was the same as the January 2009 information 

for Mr. Self.

Based on this information alone, the ICE agent avowed that 

he believed Richard Self spent money to purchase a membership to 

a website devoted to child pornography and thus that Mr. Self has a 

sexual interest in children. Further, the application for the search 

warrant states that the agent believes that Mr. Self accessed and 

downloaded child pornography on November 18, 2010, from the 

DreamZone website. Thus, the agent concluded there was probable 

cause to believe that there was child pornography at the residence.

The application for the search warrant also contains a 

boilerplate section regarding “common characteristics” of persons 

who collect child pornography. Among other things, the application 

states that “[t]hese collections [of child pornography] are often 

maintained for several years and are kept close by, usually at the 

collector’s residence, to enable the individual to view the collection, 

which is valued highly.”

The search warrant was executed at the residence on 

February 8, 2010. Defendant was not present at his residence during 

the execution of the warrant. Mr. Self’s step-son, who lived next 

door and allowed the agents into the residence, told the agents that 

Mr. Self had left on February 6, 2010, with his wife on a business 

trip driving his company’s semi-tractor/truck to Florida. At the 

residence, agents found computer generated printouts that contained 

photographs of child pornography. Also, agents found several 

hundred pages of print documents containing narratives describing 

sexual conduct with children. Agents also found documents 

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indicating the purchase of a Verizon wireless mobile broadband 

device, but did not find the broadband device or a laptap computer. 

Agents did find two older-model tower computers that did not 

appear to contain any child pornography but did contain website 

advertising banners related to child pornography sites.

Based on the above information, another search warrant was 

obtained to search the semi-tractor/truck that Mr. Self was driving. 

This warrant was executed on February 18, 2010, pursuant to a 

traffic stop of the vehicle. Mr. Self and his wife were in the vehicle. 

During the search of the vehicle, the agents found two laptops, one 

of which it was later determined contained images of child 

pornography. The agents also found several thumb drives and other 

electronic material containing child pornography. An indictment 

was obtained against Mr. Self for possession of child pornography, 

and he was arrested on March 14, 2009, pursuant to a traffic stop. 

The agents searched the vehicle and found electronic material that 

later was determined to contain documents that contained narratives 

describing sexual activity with children, similar to the documents 

obtained from Mr. Self’s residence.

(CR-10-8036-PCT-DGC Doc. 47 at 3-6 (citations omitted).)1 (Documents filed in the 

criminal case, CR-10-8036-PCT-DGC, are referenced hereinafter as “CR Doc. ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On March 9, 2010, Movant was indicted (CR Doc. 1) in the District of Arizona 

case CR-10-8036-PCT-DGC on four counts of Possession of Child Pornography, with 

forfeiture allegations. Counsel was appointed. (CR Doc. 5, M.E. 3/15/10.) 

On September 21, 2010, a Superseding Indictment was filed (CR Doc. 35), 

charging Movant with 3 counts of Transportation of Child Pornography, 3 counts of 

Possession of Child Pornography, and forfeiture allegations. 

Counsel filed a Motion to Suppress (CR Doc. 47) seeking to suppress evidence 

seized at Movant’s home on January 27, 2010 for lack of probable cause to support the 

warrant, and evidence seized in the ensuing searches of his truck and car, as fruits of the 

poisonous tree. The motion was denied. (CR Doc. 69, Order 11/12/10.) 

Movant proceeded to a jury trial on November 17, 2010. (CR Doc. 78, M.E. 

11/17/10.) He was found guilty as charged. (CR Doc. 90, Verdict.) 

Counsel moved for a downward depart and variances in sentencing. (CR Doc.

 

1 Movant was, in fact, arrested on March 14, 2010. (See CR Doc. 19, Arrest Warrant 

Returned Executed.) 

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93.) The motion was denied, and on March 14, 2011 Movant was sentenced to 

concurrent terms of 135 months on the transportation charges, and concurrent terms of 

120 months on the possession charges, for an effective sentence of 135 months. (CR 

Doc. 95, M.E. 3/14/11; CR Doc. 97, Judgment.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal, appealing the denial of his motion to suppress on the 

basis that the lapse of time between the first lead and the search warrant was so long as 

to render the information stale and prevent a finding of probable cause. Movant also 

challenged his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his arguments, and 

affirmed the convictions and sentences. (CR Doc. 117, Memorandum Decision.)

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion – Movant commenced the current case by filing Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on July 29, 2013 (Doc. 1). 

Movant asserts the following eight grounds for relief:

(1) Movant’s counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the

validity of three search warrants;

(2) Movant’s counsel was ineffective in allowing Movant to be 

indicted, tried, and convicted in violation of Movant’s right to be 

free from double jeopardy;

(3) Movant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge

prosecutorial misconduct;

(4) Movant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

irrelevant evidence of prior bad acts;

(5) Movant’s counsel was ineffective when she failed to introduce

evidence that others lived in Movant’s household, had access to 

Movant’s AOL account and use of the computer, and that of the five 

computers seized, “only one was dirty”;

(6) Movant’s counsel was ineffective because counsel refused to let 

the probation officer interview Movant, members of Movant’s 

family, or any of Movant’s friends;

(7) Movant’s counsel was ineffective by failing to present evidence 

that someone else could have committed the crime; and

(8) The Court abused its discretion by failing to resolve the conflict

between Movant and Movant’s counsel and for not appointing new 

counsel.

(Doc. 4, Service Order.) 

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Response - On March 19, 2014, Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 15). 

Respondent argues that the first seven grounds, asserting ineffective assistance, are 

without merit. Respondent argues that Ground Eight is procedurally defaulted for failing 

to raise it on direct appeal.

Reply - Movant filed a Reply on June 16, 2014 (Doc. 21), addressing the merits 

of his ineffective assistance claims, and arguing that his Ground 8 is not procedurally 

defaulted. 

Supplement – Upon reviewing the filed record, the Court observed that the 

electronically filed version of Movant’s Memorandum in Support (Doc. 2) had become 

partially unreadable, and no paper versions were available. Movant was directed to refile his Memorandum in Support and attached exhibits. (Order 9/15/14, Doc. 23.) On 

September 29, 2014, Movant complied and again filed his Memorandum in Support and 

exhibits (Doc. 24). 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUNDS 1-8: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

1. Ground 1: Ineffective Assistance re Search Warrant

In his Ground 1, Movant asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to 

adequately investigate the validity of the three search warrants. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 5; 

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Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 1-4.) Movant asserts four specific defects in the searches and 

warrants, addressed hereinafter as subparts (a) through (d). Respondent argues that 

defense counsel adequately investigated, and filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

seized during the searches. 

a. Ground 1(a): IAC re No New Probable Cause to Search Home

Movant argues that trial counsel should have challenged the search of the home 

on the basis that there was no new probable cause asserted to support the second warrant 

to search the home which was issued after the first warrant expired unserved. 

Respondent argues that the motion to suppress addressed the staleness and lack of 

probable cause to support the search of the home, and that no new statement of probable 

cause was required to support the warrant. Moreover, Respondent argues this issue was 

addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Movant’s direct appeal. (Response, Doc. 15 at 16-17.) 

Movant replies that the second warrant amounted to an improper reissuance of the first 

warrant based upon a stale statement of probable cause. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 2-3.)

Respondent appears to conflate the staleness of the information in the probable 

cause statement used to support a warrant, with the staleness of the statement or affidavit

itself. The former was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Movant’s direct appeal (and 

may not be revisited in this proceeding). (CR Doc. 117, Mem. Dec. at 4.)2 The latter is 

the argument Movant now makes.

In support of his contention that a new probable cause statement was required, 

Petitioner cites to U.S. v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997), U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 

(2006), and Sgro v. U.S., 287 U.S. 206 (1932). Nothing in these cases suggests that a 

new affidavit must be submitted when an expired warrant is being reissued. These cases

 

2

The Ninth Circuit seems to have been unaware of the issuance of the earlier warrant. It 

was not addressed in the trial court’s ruling on the issue. (CR Doc. 69, Order 11/12/10 

on Motion to Suppress.) The parties have provided no record of the earlier warrant. The 

undersigned presumes for purposes of this Report and Recommendation that there was 

an earlier warrant, and that the same affidavits and statement of probable cause were 

used for both.

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simply stand for the proposition that affidavits in support of warrant requests “must be 

based on facts ‘ ‘so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a 

finding of probable cause at that time.’ ’” U.S. v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745 (9

th Cir. 1997)

(indirectly quoting Sgro, 287 U.S. at 210). At best, Sgro held that an expired warrant 

may not simply be reissued without a new finding of probable cause, based upon timely 

affidavits. 

The issue of a second warrant is essentially a new proceeding which 

must have adequate support...The statute in terms requires him 

before issuing the warrant to take proof of probable cause. This he 

must do by examining on oath the complainant and his witness and 

requiring their affidavits or depositions. The proof supplied must 

have appropriate relation to the application for the new warrant and 

must speak as of the time of the issue of that warrant. The 

commissioner has no authority to rely on affidavits which have sole 

relation to a different time and have not been brought down to date 

or supplemented so that they can be deemed to disclose grounds 

existing when the new warrant is issued. 

287 U.S. at 211. Thus, Sgro did not mandate new affidavits or statements, merely timely 

information.

Moreover, Sgro did not establish any time limit on when the affidavits have come 

to “have sole relation to a different time.” In Lacy, the court observed that such a 

determination is a fact specific inquiry.

However, “[t]he mere lapse of substantial amounts of time is not 

controlling in a question of staleness.” “We evaluate staleness in 

light of the particular facts of the case and the nature of the criminal 

activity and property sought.” The information offered in support of 

the application for a search warrant is not stale if “there is sufficient 

basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good 

reasons, that the items to be seized are still on the premises.” 

Lacy, 119 F.3d at 745-46 (internal citations omitted). Of course, in this case, the 

question whether the information was stale has been decided by the Ninth Circuit on 

Movant’s direct appeal. 

Movant fails to establish new affidavits or statements of probable cause were 

mandatory, despite the freshness of the information contained in the original. The 

undersigned has found no such requirement. 

Thus, the undersigned concludes that an attack based on the reliance on the same 

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affidavits in issuing the second warrant would have been without merit. “The failure to 

raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Accordingly, Ground 1(a) is without merit.

b. Ground 1(b): IAC re Warrant on Home Not Properly Served

Movant argues that trial counsel should have challenged the search of the home 

on the basis that the search warrant for the home was not properly served because the 

attachments and affidavit were not served, and the warrant was not served at the outset of 

the search on his son-in-law, the caretaker of the property. Respondent argues that 

presentation of the warrant is not required at the outset of the search, and that the 

affidavit or other supporting exhibits need not be presented at all. (Response, Doc. 15 at 

17-18.) Respondent further argues that a warrant need not be served on a non-occupant 

caretaker when a residence is unoccupied at the time the warrant is executed, and that in

any event copies were left at the home, and may have been shown to the son-in-law

before entry was gained. (Id. at 18, and n. 7.) Movant replies that it is unclear whether 

service of the warrant is required. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 3-4.) 

In support of his argument that service of the warrant at the outset of the search is 

required, Movant relies upon U.S. v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1999), U.S. v. Hector, 

474 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009), and the separate opinion of Justices Souter, Stevens 

and Ginsburg in U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 99 (2006). (Reply, Doc. 21 at 3-4.)

In Gantt, the Ninth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d) 

(now at Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)) required that a search warrant be served at the outset of a 

search. 194 F.3d at 1001-1002. Seven years later, the majority opinion in Grubbs

appeared to have rejected that holding:

In fact, however, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 41 imposes such a requirement. “The absence 

of a constitutional requirement that the warrant be exhibited at the 

outset of the search, or indeed until the search has ended, is ... 

evidence that the requirement of particular description does not 

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protect an interest in monitoring searches.” The Constitution 

protects property owners not by giving them license to engage the 

police in a debate over the basis for the warrant, but by interposing, 

ex ante, the “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... 

between the citizen and the police,” and by providing, ex post, a 

right to suppress evidence improperly obtained and a cause of action 

for damages.

Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 99.

Movant suggests that the special concurrence in Grubbs leaves the question open. 

And indeed, Justice Souter asserted that prior decisions of the Court left open the 

question whether there was a “right of an owner to demand to see a copy of the warrant 

before making way for the police,” “and it remains undetermined today.” 547 U.S. at 

101. Indeed, in U.S. v. Hector, the Ninth Circuit addressed the decision in Grubbs, and 

concluded: “It is not clear whether [Grubbs] overrules the Ninth Circuit's precedent on 

the requirement to present a copy of the warrant to the owner of the premises at the time 

of the search.” 474 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9

th Cir. 2007). But see U.S. v. Miller, 2013 WL 

4805616, 5 (D.Ariz. 2013) (report and recommendation concluding that Grubbs

overrules Gantt) (issue avoided in Order modifying, 2013 WL 4026851, 3 (D.Ariz. 

2013). At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the Grubbs decision effectively

reduces the “legitimate interest served by the presentation of a warrant” to be “head[ing]

off breaches of the peace by dispelling any suspicion that the search is illegitimate.” 

U.S. v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9

th Cir. 2007). That interest is not affected when a 

search warrant is executed when the premises are vacant.

Movant also complains that the affidavit and other attachments were not included 

with the copy of the warrant eventually left at the premises. However, Rule 41 does not 

mandate the delivery of anything other than the warrant and a receipt for the property 

taken. There is no “constitutional mandate that an executing officer possess or exhibit 

the affidavit or any other document incorporated into the warrant at the time of the 

search in order for the warrant to be valid.” U.S. v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 472 (4th Cir. 

2006). See also Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 444 (6

th Cir. 2006) (no constitutional requirement or 

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requirement under Rule 41 to leave incorporated affidavits, etc.).

Even if there were some basis to assert an obligation to serve the warrant and/or 

the affidavits or attachments, a motion to suppress founded upon such a service 

requirement would have been futile for two reasons. First, even when applying Gantt, 

the Ninth Circuit has held that suppression for violations of Rule 41 are only appropriate 

where:

1) the violation rises to a “constitutional magnitude;” 2) the 

defendant was prejudiced, in the sense that the search would not 

have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if law 

enforcement had followed the Rule; or 3) officers acted in 

“intentional and deliberate disregard” of a provision in the Rule.

U.S. v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9

th Cir. 2006).3

 Grubb establishes that there is 

no violation of a constitutional magnitude. Petitioner has not proffered any prejudice in 

the form of the search resulting from the failure to serve the warrant at the outset. And, 

there is no indication that the officers acted deliberately in disregard of the rule. See e.g. 

Williamson, 439 F.3d at 1133-1134 (failure to serve not deliberate violation, even though 

intentional, when based on misunderstanding of requirement). 

Second, Movant was not present when the warrant was executed, and thus cannot 

complain of the lack of service of the warrant. “Just as a person who is somewhere else 

cannot benefit from the ‘assurance provided by the showing of a warrant, an absent 

person has no present stake in the contemporaneous opportunity to monitor the search 

for compliance with the warrant. Thus the interest in the ‘notice’ that showing a warrant 

provides, likewise, does not run to someone who is not there and who cannot exercise 

that option.” U.S. v. Silva, 247 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9

th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, any attempt to mount challenges to the timing or lack of service of 

the warrant or its attachments, supporting affidavits, etc. would have been futile, and 

failure to do so would not have been ineffective assistance. Baumann, 692 F.2d at 572.

Therefore, Ground 1(b) is without merit.

 

3 Grubbs was decided March 21, 2006. Williamson was decided March 13, 2006, and 

thus was decided without benefit of Grubbs. 

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c. Ground 1(c): IAC re Warrant on Truck Not Properly Served

Movant argues that trial counsel should have challenged the search of the truck on 

the basis that the search warrant for the truck was not properly served because the 

attachments and affidavit were not served, and the serving agent refused to provide a 

copy of the warrant at the outset of the search. 

As discussed hereinabove, with regard to the execution of the warrant on 

Movant’s home (with the exception of the distinction that Movant was present when the 

vehicle was searched), any argument based upon the timing or lack of delivery of the 

warrant to search the truck would be without merit. The fact of Movant’s presence 

would give him standing to mount the objection, but even if Gantt survives Grubbs,

Movant fails to establish a constitutional violation (and cannot under Grubbs), asserts no 

prejudice, and fails to proffer anything to establish a deliberate violation of the Rule. 

Accordingly, this claim would also be without merit, and cannot support a claim of 

ineffective assistance. Baumann, 692 F.2d at 572.

Therefore, Ground 1(c) is without merit.

d. Ground 1(d): IAC re Improper Search and Seizure of Movant and Wife

Movant argues that trial counsel should have challenged the search of his truck on 

the basis that Movant and his wife were searched, his effects were seized, and they were 

locked in a law enforcement vehicle during the search of his vehicle, all without 

Miranda warnings, even though the warrant did not extend to them or their effects. 

Respondent argues that the detention of occupants during a search is permitted, and no 

Miranda warnings are required. Respondent argues there is no evidence that Movant 

was searched, he cannot complain of the search of his wife, and no evidence from such 

searches was presented at trial, precluding a finding of prejudice. (Response, Doc. 15 at 

18-19.) Movant replies that the authorities relied on by Respondent with regard to the 

detention and ensuing search are distinguishable on the basis that the warrants were for 

evidence, not contraband, and that the searches of Petitioner’s effects did not occur until 

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the conclusion of the search of the vehicle. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 4-6.) 

Movant’s Wife - Movant has no standing to complain about the detention and 

search of his wife. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which...may not be 

vicariously asserted...No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at stake when the 

evidence is offered against some other party.” Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 174

(1969). Consequently, any challenges by counsel on this point would have been without 

merit.

Detention - Movant attempts to distinguish cases relied upon by Respondents, 

e.g. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to justify detention during a search. He 

does so on the basis that the cases cited deal with searches for contraband, while the 

search of Movant was simply for evidence.

In a footnote, the Summers Court indicated they did “not decide whether the same 

result would be justified if the search warrant merely authorized a search for evidence.” 

452 U.S. at 705, n. 20. In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), however, the Court 

applied Summers where the search was for “deadly weapons and evidence of gang 

membership.” Id. at 94-95. Moreover, this contraband/evidence distinction was 

explicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054 

(2006). “Thus, the doctrine of Michigan v. Summers, permitting police officers to detain 

individuals during a search, and the principle of Muehler, holding that the authority to 

detain incident to search is categorical, apply to all searches upon probable cause, not 

just to searches for contraband.” Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1066. 

Even assuming that this remained a significant distinction, Movant’s factual 

premise is flawed. Here, the warrant to search the vehicle included not only evidentiary 

types of things (correspondence, records, etc.), but “images of child pornography and 

files containing images of child pornography.” (CR Doc. 47, Mot. to Supp. at Exhibit B, 

Warrant, at Attachment B, at 56.) Such images would be contraband the same as the 

narcotics being searched for in Summers. 

Accordingly, any challenge based upon the detention would have been without 

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merit.

Miranda Warnings - Movant complains that he was not given Miranda

warnings. Respondent properly argues that Miranda only applies to “custodial 

interrogation”, but makes the logical jump that Movant’s Summers detention during the 

search did not require the warnings. (Response, Doc. 15 at 19.) However, in U.S. v. 

Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002) the court explicitly rejected an argument by the 

government that the principles of Summer “support the conclusion that police officers 

executing a search warrant need not give Miranda warnings to an individual detained 

and questioned during a search.” Id. at 976. 

The police did not interrogate Summers during the detention. If they 

had asked questions going beyond a brief Terry-type inquiry, see 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 

(permitting a brief stop and inquiry that are “reasonably related in 

scope to the justification for their initiation”), Summers would, it 

appears, have been entitled to Miranda warnings.

Kim, 292 F.3d at 976. The Kim court went on to conclude that the detention in that case 

had morphed into a custodial interrogation which required Miranda warnings. 

Nonetheless, here Movant makes no assertions that any interrogation ensued. (See 

e.g. Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 3-4.) Nor does Movant suggest that any statements were 

made by him while he was detained, nor that any such statements were entered into 

evidence against him. (Id.)

“Our cases also make clear the related point that a mere failure to give Miranda

warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's constitutional rights or even the Miranda 

rule.” U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004). “Potential violations occur, if at all, 

only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial.” Id.

Consequently, any challenge based upon the lack of Miranda warnings would 

have been without merit.

Search of Personal Effects – Finally, Movant complains that he was searched as 

part of the search of the vehicle. However, “police officers with probable cause to search 

a car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing 

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the object of the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999). Here, the 

categories of objects being searched for, e.g. passwords, encryption keys, etc. (see CR 

Doc. 47, Mot. to Supp. at Exhibit B, Warrant, at Attachment B, at 60), could easily be 

concealed in a pocket, wallet, etc. 

Moreover, even assuming that the searches were prohibited, Movant makes no 

suggestion that any evidence used at trial was obtained during or derived from the search 

of his person, wallet, etc. as opposed to the search of the vehicle. 

Consequently, any challenge based upon the search of Movant and his personal 

effects would have been without merit.

f. Summary re Ground 1 – Movant fails to show that counsel performed 

deficiently in challenging the various searches, warrants, etc. Accordingly, Ground 1 is 

without merit and must be denied.

2. Ground 2: Ineffective Assistance re Double Jeopardy

In his Ground 2, Movant alleges that counsel was ineffective in allowing Movant 

to be indicted, tried, and convicted in violation of Movant’s right to be free from double 

jeopardy. Movant’s theory is that possession is a lesser included offense of 

transportation, and thus he could not properly have been convicted of both types of 

offenses. Respondent argues that the possession charges were not lesser included 

offenses of the transportation offenses because the images in the three possession 

charges were different than the images in the three transportation charges. (Answer, 

Doc. 15 at 20.) Movant replies that simultaneous possession of more than one image 

may only result in one conviction, citing U.S. v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2nd Cir. 2009) 

and U.S. v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 279 (1st Cir. 2012). In support of his contention 

that possession is the lesser included offense of transportation he cites U.S. v. Kennedy, 

643 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2011) and U.S. v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2008). 

(Reply, Doc. 21 at 6-8.) 

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Multiple Possession Charges – Movant argues that the three possession charges 

amounted to a single offense, citing Poluizzi and Chiaradio. 

In Polouizzi, the defendant was convicted of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 

2252(a)(4)(B). That statute proscribes the possession of “1 or more books, magazines, 

periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction” of 

child pornography. (Emphasis added.) The Polouizzi court concluded that this 

construction made the focus on the possession of the matter which contained any number 

of images, and thus a single book or other repository containing multiple images would 

only amount to one violation. Moreover, because it referred to “1 or more,” then “a 

person who simultaneously possesses multiple books, magazines, periodicals, films, 

video tapes, or other matter containing a visual depiction of child pornography [is 

subject] to only one conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).” 564 F.3d at 155. 

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit had concluded many years before that under § 2252(a)(4)(B) 

“the ‘matter’ is the physical medium that contains the visual depiction—in this case, the 

hard drive of Lacy's computer and the disks found in his apartment.” U.S. v. Lacy, 119 

F.3d 742, 748 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

But, here Movant’s convictions for possession were under 18 U.S.C. § 

2252A(a)(5)(B), not § 2252A(a)(4)(B). (CR Doc. 97, Judgment.) This provision 

proscribes possession of “any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer 

disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 

2252A(a)(5)(B) (emphasis added). In U.S. v. Hinkeldey, the Eight Circuit relied upon 

that very distinction (“1 or more” vs. “any”) to distinguish Polouizzi in a plain error 

analysis applying § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 626 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2010). Similarly, in 

U.S. v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2012), upon which Movant relies, the First 

Circuit distinguished Polouizzi on the same basis. 

With respect to possession offenses, section 2252A(a)(5)(B) 

prohibits knowingly possessing “any book, magazine, periodical, 

film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains 

an image of child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) 

(emphasis supplied). The use of the word “any” contrasts sharply 

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with section 2252(a)(4)(B), which criminalizes possessing “one or 

more” matters containing any image. Id. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (emphasis 

supplied).

Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275. Thus, under § 2252A(a)(5)(B), the possession of multiple 

materials establishes multiple violations. 

Thus, in U.S. v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527 (5

th Cir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit addressed

this issue under §2252A(a)(5)(B) (which Movant was convicted of violating), and held 

that each different “material” (containing one or more images) was a separate offense. 

“The allowable unit of prosecution for § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is each ‘material,’ or medium, 

containing an image of child pornography.” Woerner, 709 F.3d at 540. In that case, two 

separate convictions were sustained based upon possession of a computer and a flash 

drive, each containing images.

Woerner was founded upon the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in U.S. v. Planck, 493 F.3d 

501, 504 (5th Cir. 2007) (“where a defendant has images stored in separate materials (as 

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A), such as a computer, a book, and a magazine, the 

Government may charge multiple counts, each for the type of material or media 

possessed”). In U.S. v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit cited 

Planck approvingly.

Here each of Movant’s charges of possession was founded upon a separate media 

storage device. Count 4 was founded upon possession of “a compact disc (referred to as 

CD 1)”; Count 5 on possession of “a compact disc (referred to as CD 2)”; and Count 6 

on possession of “a Verbatim 4GB USB thumb drive.” (CR Doc. 35, Superseding 

Indictment at 2.) Thus, Polouizzi is distinguishable, and Chiaradio supports multiple 

convictions. Therefore, Movant’s conviction was based on three separate violations, 

each based on a different “material.” 

Accordingly, any challenge by counsel on this basis would have been futile.

Lesser Included Offense – Movant argues that his possession convictions were 

lesser included offenses of his transportation convictions. In support of this argument, 

Movant relies upon U.S. v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2011) and U.S. v. 

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Davenport, 519 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2008). Those cases conclude that “possession of child 

pornography, § 2252A(a)(5)(B), is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child 

pornography, § 2252A(a)(2).” Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1258, n. 11 (citing Davenport, 519 

F.3d at 945) (emphasis added).

Here, however, Movant was not convicted of possession and receipt, but of 

possession and transportation. As the Court observed in Kennedy, that issue has not 

been resolved in the 9th Circuit. “Although we have not held that possession of child 

pornography is a lesser-included offense of transportation of child pornography, the 

government has not appealed this determination, and therefore we need not reach the 

issue here; rather, we assume for purposes of this appeal that the district court's analysis 

was correct.” Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1258, n. 11. Cf. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 280 

(possession of child pornography not a lesser include offense of distribution). 

Moreover, an offense is only a lesser included offense if it and the greater offense 

are based on the same underlying conduct. “Stated in reciprocal terms, where separate 

conduct supports each offense, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause is not 

implicated.” U.S. v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 695 (9

th Cir. 2009). Here, the three 

possession charges were founded upon Movant’s possession of three sets of material, 

containing the images “image 943[1].jpg,” “m_p_1.jpg,” and “22_03797....”. In 

contrast, his transportation charges were founded upon Movant’s transportation of three 

separate images, “(pthc) Izzy 02.avi,” “3-10.jpg,” “dogg_78956...”. (CR Doc. 35, 

Superseding Indictment.)4

Accordingly, even if possession is a lesser included offense of transportation of 

the same images, Movant has failed to show that the underlying conduct was the same, 

i.e. the images possessed were the same as the images transported. Consequently, this 

claim is without merit, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it.

 

4 Respondents proffer nothing to show that the transported images were not contained on 

the same “material” (e.g. CD 1, CD2 and the Verbatim drive). But, unlike the possession 

provision (§ 2252A(a)(5)(B)), which is focused upon the possession of “material,” the 

transportation provision (§ 2252A(a)(1)) is focused upon the transportation of “any child 

pornography.”

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3. Ground 3: Ineffective Assistance re Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his Ground 3, Movant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge prosecutorial misconduct based upon: (a) the prosecution of multiplicitous 

offenses; (b) the use of stories found on materials obtained during the vehicle search to 

obtain a detention order, deny a travel order, in opening statements, etc., where there was 

no evidence to link Movant to the authoring or knowing possession of the stories; (c) 

failure to investigate and disclose evidence of others using Movant’s computer; (d) 

presentation of perjured testimony at the detention hearing; (e) failing to investigate 

fingerprint and DNA evidence to exonerate Petitioner; (f) permitting the illegal searches 

and seizures; and (g) failure to “mention” “clean” computers found at Movant’s home 

and in his vehicles.5 (Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 7-11.)

a. Ground 3(a): IAC re Misconduct re Multiplicitous Offenses

Movant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to assert prosecutorial 

misconduct for prosecuting multiplicitous offenses. Ordinarily, charging decisions are 

uniquely within the discretion of the prosecutor and not subject to judicial intervention. 

See U.S. v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1298-99 (9th Cir.1992), overruled on other 

grounds by U.S. v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir.1995). There are circumstances 

that result in an exception. See Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:1, et seq. (2d 

ed.) (identifying selective, vindictive, and bad faith charging as charging decisions 

amounting to judicially cognizable prosecutorial misconduct). However, Movant 

provides nothing to suggest that a simple decision to charge multiplicitous offenses 

would be an exception.

Even assuming such a claim would be cognizable, for the reasons discussed 

 

5

In his Reply, Movant asserts additional grounds for arguing of prosecutorial 

misconduct, e.g. pursuing a superseding indictment with tougher charges, and 

threatening the use of stories regarding incest; misrepresenting Movant’s wife as his exwife. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 8-11.) Movant has not sought to amend his Motion to add these 

additional allegations, and they are factually and legally separate and distinct bases for 

asserting prosecutorial misconduct, and hence ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Consequently, they are not addressed herein.

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hereinabove, Movant has failed to show that the charges were multiplicitous. (See infra

discussion concerning Ground 2 regarding double jeopardy.) 

b. Ground 3(b): IAC re Misconduct re Use of Stories

Movant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by using sexually 

graphic stories involving inter alia sexual conduct with children, where there was no 

evidence to link Movant to the authoring or knowing possession of the stories. 

Respondent argues that the stories were found on CD-1 and a RiData thumb drive found 

in Movant’s vehicle, that trial counsel challenged their introduction, the trial court issued 

limiting instructions, the evidence presented was in accordance with those instructions, 

and the trial court issued a limiting instruction to the jury on their consideration of the 

evidence. (Response, Doc. 15 at 21-23.) Movant replies that Respondent had available 

to it other evidence to show Movant’s knowledge, i.e. testimony from Movant’s wife, 

and thus the use of the stories was simply to show a proclivity to commit the child 

pornography offenses. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 8-9.) 

Indeed, counsel did challenge the introduction of the stories, including the 

absence of evidence on some of the stories that they were authored by Movant, and that 

the introduction of the evidence should be precluded from use as bad act evidence under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as unfairly prejudicial. Counsel argued that while 

courts had found such evidence to prove intent to possess child pornography such use 

was subject to an undue prejudice analysis. Counsel further argued that “the

Government has substantial other forensic evidence taken from the examination of the 

computers and media that would support a finding that the Defendant would have had 

knowledge of what was contained on the thumb drives, computers, and CDs.” (CR Doc.

57, Response to Notice of Intent at 7.) 

In response, the Court concluded that subject to the redactions and other 

limitations, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial, and that it was admissible. (CR 

Doc. 70, Order 11/12/10 at 5-7.)

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The Court also concludes that the stories, as the government has 

proposed to redact and present them (Doc. 67), satisfy the 

requirements of Rule 404(b). (1) They tend to prove a material fact 

– that Defendant is interested in the sexual exploitation of children, 

a fact that tends to show Defendant knew of the child pornography 

on his computer and storage devices; (2) the stories were located on 

the laptop and storage devices found in Defendant’s tractor-trailer 

during the search, and in Defendant’s home during the search, and 

therefore are not too remote in time; (3) the evidence is sufficient to 

support a finding that Defendant authored the stories and stored 

them on the laptop and storage devices that also contained child 

pornography; and (4) Defendant’s authorship of the stories is 

sufficiently similar to the possession of child pornography to be 

relevant on the question of knowledge.

(Id. at 7.)

Under these circumstances, the undersigned cannot find any likelihood that a 

different outcome would have occurred on the objection to the stories, had counsel made 

the additional arguments asserted by Movant (e.g. the lack of evidence of Movant’s 

knowledge of his possession of the stories, and the availability of testimony from 

Movant’s wife to show knowledge). 

Consequently, there is no reason to believe that an assertion of prosecutorial 

misconduct on this basis would have been anything but futile. Consequently, counsel 

was not ineffective for failing to pursue such a claim. 

c. Ground 3(c): IAC re Misconduct re Others on Computer

In his Ground 3(c), Movant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the failure to investigate and disclose 

evidence of others using Movant’s computer. Respondent argues that the claim is 

without merit because there was no evidence of such usage, and the defense was 

provided access to the available evidence (e.g. the seized computer and media). 

(Response, Doc. 15 at 23.) Petitioner replies that the investigating agent testified that 

“they could not say who was using the computer or the media.” (Reply, Doc. 21 at 11.) 

Movant misapprehends the duty of the prosecution with regard to exculpatory 

evidence. “While Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)] requires the Government 

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to tender to the defense all exculpatory evidence in its possession, it establishes no 

obligation on the Government to seek out such evidence.” U. S. v. Walker, 559 F.2d 

365, 373 (5

th Cir. 1977). See U.S. v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1553 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(prosecution under no obligation to disclose material of which it was not aware nor in 

possession of). 

Here, the testimony of the agent referenced by Movant indicates that the 

government had no information of use by others. Movant proffers nothing to show that 

such evidence existed, or that it was in the possession or control of the prosecution. 

Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct would have been without merit, and 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue it.

d. Ground 3(d): IAC re Misconduct re Perjured Testimony

In his Ground 3(d), Movant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the presentation of perjured testimony at 

the detention hearing. Movant argues Agent Shrable misrepresented at the detention 

hearing that he attended the execution of the search warrant at Movant’s home and talked 

with Movant’s wife between that search of the home and the search of the vehicle. 

Movant argues that Shrable later testified he was authorized to be on leave, that Agent 

Koski executed the warrant, and that Movant’s wife was travelling with him at the time 

of the alleged conversations. (Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 9.) Respondent argues that 

Shrable never stated he was present when the search was conducted and clarified on 

redirect that the conversation may have been later, but in any event the statement at the 

pre-trial proceeding would not have prejudiced the outcome of the trial. (Response, Doc. 

15 at 24 and n. 16.) Movant does not reply.

The prosecutor has a constitutional duty to correct testimony he knows to be false. 

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269–70 (1959). “In assessing materiality under Napue, 

we determine whether there is ‘ ‘any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 

have affected the judgment of the jury;’ ’ if so, then ‘the conviction must be set aside.’ ”

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Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9

th Cir. 2005). Here, the alleged misrepresentations 

were not made at trial, but at a pretrial detention hearing. There is no indication that the 

jury was made aware of any uncorrected falsehood. Thus, any such falsehoods could not 

have affected the judgment of the jury in convicting Movant. Accordingly, this claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct would have been without merit, and counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to pursue it.

e. Ground 3(e): IAC re Misconduct re Fingerprint and DNA Evidence

In his Ground 3(e), Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the failure to “follow through on” 

fingerprint and DNA evidence.6 Movant asserts that the fingerprints came from someone 

other than Movant, and that there was DNA material that the prosecution failed to test.

(Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 9-10.) Respondent argues that such evidence would have not 

altered the outcome because it would have, at best, shown that someone other than 

Movant touched the materials. Respondent also argues that trial counsel cross examined 

Agent Shrable on the failure to pursue the DNA, and the jury nonetheless convicted. 

(Response, Doc. 15 at 24-25.) Movant replies that the prosecution made excuses but 

failed to pursue the material because it would have “shown Defendant[‘]s actual 

innocents [sic].” (Reply, Doc. 21 at 10.)

Movant overstates the persuasive effect of any such evidence. As noted by 

Respondent, it would not have shown Movant’s innocence. At best, it would have 

shown that someone else had touched the items. While this may have created some 

inference that a third party may have been responsible for the child pornography, that 

inference would have been limited. Movant does not, for example, suggest that anyone 

touching the items must have been the one placing the child pornography on them. 

 

6

Email correspondence provided by Movant between the prosecution and defense 

counsel reflects that the fingerprint was found “on a plastic case for a camera card.” It 

also reflects that “[t]here was no pornography found on any of the camera cards.” 

(Memoradum, Doc. 2 at Exhibit 1, Email 11/10/10.) Thus, the relevance of the finger 

print evidence would have been further limited.

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Indeed, a third party may have innocently touched the items (e.g. at the time of sale, to 

relocate them in the residence or vehicle, etc.) without ever altering their contents. 

Indeed, many people could have touched them without doing so. There is no substantial 

likelihood that such a slight inference would have overcome the other evidence that 

linked Movant to the child pornography. 

More importantly, as with Ground 3(c), Movant simply misapprehends the 

obligation of the prosecution. Movant does not suggest that the existence of the 

fingerprints or DNA was not disclosed to the defense, nor that the defense was not able 

to conduct the DNA testing. He simply complains that the prosecution failed to 

investigate the information they had. That was not the prosecution’s obligation. See 

Walker, 559 F.2d at 373. 

Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct would have been without 

merit, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue it.

Moreover, ineffective assistance is not shown “where counsel's actions or 

omissions reflected tactical decisions, even if better tactics appear in retrospect to have 

been available.” U.S. v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9

th Cir. 1975). The court need not 

determine the actual reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the 

range of reasonable representation. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-457 (9th 

Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). Here, counsel had a tactical reason for not 

pressing the issue of the DNA evidence by asserting prosecutorial misconduct. Such an 

effort would likely have resulted in the prosecution pursuing the testing. At best, the 

testing might have shown contact with the media by a third party. This would, as 

discussed above, have been of limited effect. At worst, it could have reflected Movant’s 

DNA. By not challenging the issue, counsel was able to argue the question of whose 

DNA it was, and the ability to make the implication that the prosecution was hiding 

something by not pursuing testing. 

Indeed, counsel elicited testimony from Agent Shrable on the point:

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Q And there was some cellular material located on some of the 

storage devices or adapters; is that correct?

A As reflected in the report from the Arizona Department of Public 

Safety, that is correct.

Q And they indicated that if the government desired to do any DNA 

analysis, that it would be necessary to obtain a blood sample from 

the defendant; is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And there was no attempt to do that; is that correct?

A There was not.

(CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 397-398.) Counsel made further use of the lack of 

testing at closing:

You also heard testimony there was some DNA material found on 

some of the cases for some of the media and that the government 

did not bother to do any testing on this material. The excuse given 

was that they did not have enough time to get the DNA testing done. 

I would remind you that the evidence here was seized in February 

18th of 2010 and it's been nine months since that time.

(CR Doc. 113, R.T. 11/19/10 at 441.) 

Accordingly, counsel had a reasonable tactical basis for not pursuing this claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct, and thus was not ineffective for not doing so.

f. Ground 3(f): IAC re Misconduct re Illegal Searches and Seizures

In his Ground 3(f), Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert 

a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the illegal searches and seizures. 

Respondent points to the lack of merit to the attacks on the searches. Movant does not 

reply on this issue.

Even if, assuming arguendo, that a prosecutor engages in misconduct justifying 

relief from a conviction by proceeding with a prosecution involving an illegal search or 

seizure, then for the reasons discussed hereinabove in connection with Ground 1, Movant 

has failed to show that there were illegal searches or seizures conducted in this case, or 

that nay prejudice resulted. 

Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct would have been without 

merit, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue it.

/ /

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g. Ground 3(g): IAC re Misconduct re Clean Computers

In his Ground 3(g), Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the prosecution’s failure “to 

mention” that four of the five computers found in the home and vehicle were “clean” of 

any child pornography. (Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 10-11.) Respondent does not respond 

on this claim, and Movant does not reply.

Just as there is no obligation to investigate for exculpatory evidence, Movant 

points to no obligation of the prosecution to present or argue exculpatory evidence. The 

undersigned knows of none. At most, there is an obligation to disclose the information 

when it is in the prosecution’s possession. Movant does not suggest that the defense was 

not provided that information.

Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct would have been without 

merit, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue it.

h. Summary re Ground 3

Movant’s Ground Three is based on the contention that trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to pursue challenges based on prosecutorial misconduct. For the 

reasons discussed hereinabove, Movant has failed to show a viable claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue such claims, 

and Ground 3 is without merit.

4. Ground 4: Ineffective Assistance re Failure to Object to Prior Bad Acts

In his Ground 4, Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the evidence of the “stories.” Movant argues that there was insufficient 

evidence to link the stories to Movant, pointing to a brother-in-law as potential source, 

and arguing that the indication that the stories were authored by “Richard Self” could 

have been a fraudulent ruse. Further, Movant argues that the evidence was cumulative, 

confusing, and unduly prejudicial, serving only to paint him as a “bad man.” In support 

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of his claim, Movant cites U.S. v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006) and U.S. v. 

Grimes, 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2000). Respondent argues that the claim is meritless, 

pointing to counsel’s objections to admission of the evidence, and objection at trial, and 

for the reasons discussed in connection with Ground 3(b). (Response, Doc. 15 at 25.) 

Movant replies that trial counsel only opposed the stories as cumulative, repetitive, and 

misleading, but failed to oppose them on the basis of a lack of attribution to Movant, and 

to assert the potential of a fraudulent use of Movant’s name as an author. 

Trial counsel did oppose the introduction of the stories, including arguing that 

they were not “intertwined” with the charged offenses and thus not necessary to 

presenting a comprehensible story of the commission, inadmissible under Rule 404(b), 

and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. (CR Doc. 57, Response at 5-8.) At trial, counsel 

renewed the objection as to each story admitted. (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 351, 

352, 354.) 

Movant argues that counsel should have objected on the basis of a lack of 

attribution to Movant. There was, however, a basis for attribution, including the fact that 

the stories had been found on Movant’s media, purported to be authored by Movant, and 

reflected characteristics of Movant (e.g. his name, status as a truck driver, and purported 

status as a veteran of the Vietnam war). (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 350-355.) 

Although not irrebuttable evidence of Movant’s authorship or even ownership of the 

stories, there was evidence which connected the stories to Movant. Thus, an objection 

on that basis would have been futile. 

Although such matters would not have supported an “objection,” trial counsel did 

seek to argue to the jury that the stories could not be attributed to Movant. Trial counsel 

argued at closing that multiple people had access to Movants residence and the computer 

and other media, and Movant was away for extended periods of time. (CR Doc. 113, 

R.T. 11/19/10 at 442-444.) 

Movant complains that counsel did not present evidence of a fraudulent use of 

Movant’s name. Movant proffers nothing to show that counsel was aware of any 

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fraudulent use of Movant’s name, or had reason to investigate. The use Movant points to 

was a fraudulent scheme to obtain a mortgage on a victim’s property, transferring the 

proceeds into an account in the name of “Richard Self.” (CV-08-0838-PHX-MHM, 

Jernigan v. Ryan, Doc. 18, Report & Recommendation at 2-3.) Movant proffers nothing 

to suggest that counsel was aware of this case, had any reason to pursue an investigation 

that would have led to the case, or that it was anything more than a coincidence that 

Movant’s name was used in that case.

Movant suggests challenges under Rule 404(b) based on Johnson and Grimes.

That rule provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 

person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.”

In Johnson, the court observed that, under the rule, prior bad act evidence may be 

admitted for purposes other than to prove criminal disposition. The defendant in 

Johnson was charged with possession of child pornography, did not deny possession, but 

asserted that the pornography had been inadvertently downloaded without his 

knowledge. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant possessed 

paper copies of stories of rape of young girls. The Eighth Circuit observed: 

Offering the stories added nothing to aid the jury in determining 

whether child pornography could be inadvertently downloaded. 

Instead, it encouraged the jury to conclude Johnson intentionally 

and knowingly sought out images of child pornography because he 

had a propensity to possess such materials.

Johnson, 439 F.3d at 888. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence was offered to 

prove criminal disposition, in violation of Rule 404(b). 

Similarly, in Grimes, the Fifth Circuit faced a defendant charged with possession 

of child pornography, who argued that the images had been inadvertently obtained. The 

government sought to introduce evidence that narratives of sexual abuse of minors were 

also found on the computer, which had been downloaded the prior year. There, however, 

the court concluded that the narratives were admissible under Rule 404(b), because they 

were probative of intent to possess the images, an issue other than the defendant’s 

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character. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit went on to find that the portions of the 

narratives introduced were so graphic as to be unfairly prejudicial. Thus, Grimes would 

not have supported an argument under Rule 404(b). 

Here, trial counsel’s argument under 404(b) was not supported by Johnson (or 

Grimes) but was supported by an in depth discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 

U.S. v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). (CR Doc. 57, Response at 6-7.) 

In Curtin, the defendant was charged with crossing state lines to engage in a 

sexual act with a minor, and when arrested had stories of sex with minors on an 

electronic device. The “minor” was actually an undercover agent, posing as a 14 year 

old girl, with whom the defendant had engaged in internet chats to arrange a meeting. 

The defense at trial was that the defendant believed the person he was to meet was an 

adult woman posing as a minor in role-playing and fantasy. The government sought to 

introduce the stories to show that the defendant’s intent was to engage in sex with a 

minor, not sex with an adult. The Ninth Circuit held that the stories “had probative value 

with respect to the intent element of the specific intent crime for which he was 

prosecuted.” U.S. v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 959 (9

th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, like the 

court in Grimes, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had erred in finding an absence 

of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, based in large part on the trial court’s failure to 

actually read the stories before ruling, which also included descriptions of bestiality. 

Trial counsel, who was litigating in the Ninth Circuit, not the Eighth, might have 

preferred to rely upon a case such as Johnson. But the controlling authority in the Ninth 

Circuit was Curtin, not Johnson. So, trial counsel diligently tried to distinguish Curtin 

on the basis that it involved a defense of a denial of the requisite intent, while Movant’s 

defense was founded upon a denial of knowing possession. He also attempted to 

distinguish Curtin on the basis that there was other evidence to establish Movant’s 

knowing possession (e.g. the forensic evidence from the computer files, etc.), while in 

Curtin the stories were “critical” to the government’s case. Still, (perhaps realizing the 

weakness of that argument), trial counsel argued the most beneficial component of 

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Curtin, i.e. its mandate for a careful review of the proffered narratives as part of 

determining unfair prejudice. 

Thus, trial counsel did mount as good a defense under Rule 404(b) as the 

controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit would permit. 

Finally, to the extent that more could have been done, trial counsel could have 

made a reasonable tactical decision to focus his challenges to the story evidence on their 

prejudicial effect. This was in line with the holdings of not only Curtin, but of Grimes as 

well. 

In sum, Movant fails to show that counsel performed deficiently in objecting to 

the introduction of the story evidence. Accordingly, Ground 4 is without merit and must 

be denied.

5. Ground 5: Ineffective Assistance re Omitted Evidence

In his Ground 5, Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

admit various evidence, including: (a) that other people had access to Movant’s 

residence, computers, computer accounts, and media, and the media (CDs and thumb 

drives) containing child pornography also contained files related to such third parties; (b) 

none of his five computers had child pornography in allocated memory; (c) only one of 

the five computers had child pornography in unallocated space; (d) child pornography 

was obtained from locations under shared possession with Movant’s wife (e.g. her 

bathroom cabinets, amongst her belongings, and in the center of the top bunk area of the 

semi truck which she was standing next to when they were stopped; (e) evidence that 

Movant had purchased the thumb drives to download his wife’s pictures; (f) witnesses 

that he rarely took a computer on the road, and never the one found in the truck, and 

never took CDs, and always bought types and brands of CDs different from those found; 

(g) that his thumb drives had disappeared the month before; (h) that illegal activity had 

occurred in his bank account which resulted in refunds; and (i) that Movant’s wife was a

perjurer. (Memorandum, Doc. 24 at 13-16.) 

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a. Ground 5(a): Access by Others

In response to Movant’s argument in Ground 5(a) concerning the access by third 

parties to the computers, accounts, and media, Respondent argues that trial counsel 

elicited a variety of evidence concerning the mutual access. 

Ms. McClellan [trial counsel] elicited evidence that others lived in 

Defendant’s household and could have accessed his AOL account 

when cross-examining the government’s witnesses. In her crossexamination of government witness Dean Sehm, Ms. McClellan

elicited testimony that Defendant’s ex-wife, Sherry Self, lived in his 

house while they were married; that Defendant’s neighbor had 

access to Defendant’s house; that Defendant was previously married 

to Mildred Self and that Mildred Self owned a computer; and that

Sherry Self and his daughter, Robin Self, would often accompany 

Defendant on trucking trips for long periods of time. (RT 

11/17/2010 170-72.) In her cross-examination of government 

witness ICE SA John Koski, Ms. McClellan elicited testimony that 

none of the rooms in Defendant’s residence were locked when the 

search warrant was executed and a fingerprint found on a seized 

item of evidence did not match Defendant’s fingerprints. (RT 

11/17/2010 213-14.) In her cross-examination of government 

witness Sherry Self, Ms. McClellan elicited testimony that a number 

of people had previously lived in Defendant’s residence; that a 

number of people visited Defendant’s residence; that six different 

people had keys to Defendant’s residence; that Defendant was gone 

for extended periods of time because he was a truck driver; that both 

she and Robin Self would sometimes accompany Defendant on 

those trips; and that other persons drove Defendant’s Kenworth 

semi-truck/trailer. (RT 11/17/2010 260-65.) In her cross

examination of government witness Richard Kaplan, Ms. McClellan 

elicited testimony that a person with Defendant’s user name and 

password any person could access his AOL account. (RT 

11/17/2010 308.) In her cross-examination of government witness 

ICE SA David Potosky, Ms. McClellan elicited evidence that SA 

Potosky did not have actual knowledge of who downloaded the 

child pornography; that SA Potosky did not know who inserted the 

thumb drives in the computer; that SA Potosky did not know who

conducted the searches for child pornography on Defendant’s 

computer; and that anyone using Defendant’s account could have 

conducted the searches. (RT 11/17/2010 384-85.)

(Response, Doc. 15 at 25-26.) 

In reply, Movant asserts, in effect, that counsel only addressed these issues in 

cross examination, and did not affirmatively introduce evidence to show the mutual 

access. Movant identifies the following evidence available to counsel: (1) evidence from 

AOL (reflected in Exhibits 3 and 5 to his Memorandum (Doc. 24)); (2) report from the 

defense’s forensic examiner showing someone else’s use; (3) a receipt for the purchase 

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of six thumb drives by Sharon Self one month before the search of the truck; (4) 

unidentified witnesses to the mutual access; and (5) an unidentified witness to the use of 

the computer by his wife. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 13-14.)

AOL Evidence – In support of his contention that counsel had exculpatory 

evidence from AOL, Movant points to Exhibits 3 and 5 to his Memorandum (Doc. 24) in 

support of his Motion. However, Exhibit 3 is the defense’s Forensic Examiner’s report 

and makes no reference to exculpatory information from AOL. Exhibit 5 is 

Administrative Subpoena to AOL, and simply provides what appears to be a printout of 

logins. Movant fails to suggest what exculpatory information is reflected in that exhibit.

Moreover, as noted by Respondent, trial counsel did introduce evidence through 

cross examination of Richard Kaplan, the government’s computer forensic examiner, 

that the use of the AOL account was not an irrefutable connection to Petitioner.

Q Just a few questions, Mr. Kaplan.

Those records indicate who was being billed for this 

account; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q But it does not indicate - - you cannot learn from these 

records who the person was that was at the computer at this specific 

time mentioned here. You don’t know who that person is; is that 

correct, based on these records?

A That’s correct. I’m just reading the records.

Q Anyone that was utilizing this IP address who had the correct 

password and other information needed to access the website on that

account could have done that, correct?

A Well, there’s two different sets of records here. For the AOL 

set of records you would indeed need the user name and password 

of the AOL, that AOL account. For the Verizon record you would 

need the actual piece of hardware or device that would connect you 

to the Internet in order to be logged on at that time.

Q But if you had that hardware, and you had the information 

you could access it - - any person could; is that correct?

A Yes.

(CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 307-308.) Movant fails to suggest what additional 

information could have been adduced from the AOL records. 

Forensic Examiner - The defense’s forensic examiner conducted a review of the 

computer files. Movant does not indicate the basis on which he concludes that the 

examiner would have shown a third party’s use of the computers or media. There is no 

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indication of such a finding in the copy of the examiner’s report provided by Movant. 

(Memorandum, Doc. 24 at Exhibit 3.) 

Moreover, the examiner would have been subject to cross examination on a 

number of potentially damaging points, including: (a) findings on the Acer Aspire 5720 

that reflected 480 hits on the child pornography site DreamZone, including references to 

Movant’s email address, downloads of child pornography, visiting other child 

pornography sites (id. at 12); (b) findings on CD 1 of 1082 child pornography images, 

and videos from 2006 (id. at 18); (c) findings on CD 2 of 36 images of child 

pornography from February, 2008 (id.); (d) findings on one R Data thumb drive of 55 

images of child pornography, created on December 31, 2008, approximately a half hour 

after nude images of Movant and an unknown woman were created (id); (e) findings on 

another R Data thumb drive of 40 WordPerfect files, all containing a header “By Richard 

Self” and containing incest and child pornography stories (id. at 19); (f) findings on one 

SimpleTech thumb drive of 60 files of child pornography (id.); (g) findings on one 

Verbatim thumb drive of 209 images of child pornography from December 2008 (id.);

and (h) findings on another Verbatim thumb drive of approximately 5,900 images of 

child pornography, including banner images for DreamZone and indications that the 

images originated from that site (id.). Thus trial counsel had a reasonable tactical basis 

for declining to call the defense’s forensic examiner.

Receipt for Thumb Drives – Movant argues the thumb drives were purchased 

by his wife. Movant proffers nothing to support this contention.

Moreover, Movant fails to show how this evidence was significant. To be sure, 

Movant attempts to paint the thumb drives as belonging to his wife, e.g. by arguing her 

purchase of them, that they were in her thumbdrive case, and that they were in her 

favorite color. However, none of this precludes Movant’s use of the thumb drives. The 

drives were discovered in Movant’s vehicle, in a case containing thumbdrives Movant 

indicates were his own. (Memorandum, Doc. 24, Exhibit 20.) Moreover, Movant’s exwife described the thumbdrives, as well as the case, as belonging to Movant. (CR Doc. 

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112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 250-251.) 

Witnesses- Movant makes broad references to a laundry list of unidentified 

witnesses, and makes assertions that they would have testified to the mutual access to the 

computers, and the use of his computer by his ex-wife. 

With regard to his wife’s access to his computer, Movant fails to identify who 

would have supplied such testimony, simply stating “Defense has a witness that could 

testify” to her access to the computer. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 14.) With regard to the others 

with access, Movant simply states that “Defense counsel had witnesses.” (Id.) 

A habeas petitioner may not establish ineffective assistance by simply alluding to 

potential evidence. A petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ 

testimony might be, but must adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby 

v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a 

putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the 

witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have 

been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” 

U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991). 

Presumably, Movant could have been called to testify about much of the 

information. However, Movant would have then been subject to cross examination on a 

variety of issues. 

There were witnesses that Movant proposed to the trial court to testify concerning 

others’ access to the computers, and Movant argued that trial counsel wrongly refused to 

call them, i.e. his daughter Robin, his stepdaughter Laura and her husband Jim 

Holdgrafer. (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 237-239.) Counsel explained to the trial 

court:

MS. McCLELLAN: Your Honor, we have interviewed 

Robin Self and James Holdgrafer and it was my conclusion that 

those witnesses would not be beneficial for his case and that’s why 

I’ve decided not to call them. I told Mr. Self that he can testify, and 

be prepared for that. And if he wants to testify, that is his decision. 

But I told him it’s my decision about what other witnesses we’re 

going to call and it was my decision not to call them. If I thought 

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that they had exculpatory testimony, I would certainly put them on 

the stand. But in my opinion, they would not be helpful.

THE COURT: Why do you think they would not be helpful?

MS. McCLELLAN: Well, they do not - - they cannot say 

whether they knew there was any child pornography on those 

computers. We can’t do an alibi, so to speak, for the entire four-year 

period that the child pornography was - - the different time periods 

that there was child pornography downloaded. The testimony 

would not be possible for them to say he never had an opportunity 

to download. They would confirm that they did not put that child 

pornography on the computers. And I think other witnesses have 

verified that Mr. Holdgrafer had access to the home and Mr. Sehm 

knew he had lived in the home.

And I’m also concerned about Robin Self because of the fact 

she’s in those photographs in the truck that are not being - - but if 

she testifies I’m concerned there could be cross-examination 

regarding that issue. And her character. And when they 

interviewed Mr. Holdgrafer, he said he had read some material. He 

said he was a good writer. Would be absolutely harmful to the case.

So none of them have information that someone else put 

child pornography on the computers. So I just - - I do not believe 

they would be helpful and in some sense they could actually be 

harmful to the case.

(CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 240-241.) Thus, at least as to these witnesses, trial 

counsel had strong tactical reasons to not call them. The more people who had access to 

the computer who were called to testify, who would then deny responsibility for the 

child pornography, the more evidence there would be pointing to Movant. And 

Movant’s daughter bore special risks. The trial court ultimately precluded introduction 

of the photographs found on one of the thumb drives “of Defendant and his adult 

daughter naked, in his tractor-trailer, wearing only santa hats,” finding that they were 

“not child pornography and likely would inflame the jury with suspicions of incest,” and 

thus were excludable under Rule 403. (CR Doc. 70, Order 11/12/10 at 9.) 

Even if the Court could conclude it might have taken a different approach, that 

would not justify a finding of ineffective assistance. "Mere criticism of a tactic or 

strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation." 

Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Movant proffers nothing to 

suggest that the decision was outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.

Moreover, there was substantial, undisputed evidence before the jury of such 

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access. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Dean Sehm, Movant’s stepdaughter’s 

husband, that Movant’s stepson, Jim Holdgrafer had access to Movant’s house. (CR 

Doc. 111, R.T. 11/17/10 at 171.) And Sehm testified that Movant’s deceased wife had 

lived in the home and used a computer. (Id.) Defense counsel elicited testimony from 

Agent Koski that Holdgrafer had let them into Movant’s house to execute the search 

warrant. (Id. at 213.) The prosecution elicited testimony from Movant’s ex-wife that 

Movant’s special needs daughter lived with them and had a computer that she used in the 

home, and that the ex-wife’s brother had lived with Movant for some time in 2008-2009. 

(CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 256-257.) Defense counsel elicited testimony from 

Movant’s ex-wife that Movant’s daughter Robin had lived in his home in 2009, and that 

Jim and Laura Holdgrafer, Berneta and Dean Sehm, and Robin all had keys to the home

and that Laura Holdgrafer’s sister, Sandy, and a respite worker also came to the house. 

(Id. at 261-263.) Through this testimony, counsel was able to provide potential other 

sources for the child pornography, without having them dispelled by providing 

opportunities for those sources to disclaim using the computer or other responsibility. 

Movant proffers no reason to believe that further evidence on this point would have 

swayed the jury from concluding that the child pornography found was attributable to 

Movant.

b. 5(b) and 5(c) Child Pornography in Computer Memory – Movant argues 

counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that none of his five computers 

had child pornography in allocated memory. Movant also argues counsel was ineffective 

in failing to present evidence that only one of the five computers (Petitioner’s Acer 

5720) had child pornography in unallocated space. 

There was evidence proffered to show that the child pornography was not in 

allocated space on Petitioner’s computer. On direct examination, the prosecution’s 

computer forensic examiner Potosky testified that he examined the hard drive of 

Petitioner’s Acer laptop (trial exhibit 5A) and although he found child erotica and adult 

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pornography, he reported no child pornography. (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 336-

337.) On the other hand, he also testified that it had been used to access the Dreamzone 

child pornography website and a folder containing child pornography on one of the 

thumb drives. (Id. at 346.) 

Movant proffers nothing to suggest that any of this evidence would have altered 

the outcome of the trial. The prosecution proffered substantial evidence tending to show 

that Movant had accessed the Dreamzone child pornography website, as well as the 

thumbdrives containing child pornography, with his laptop. Moreover, the prosecution 

proffered substantial evidence tending to show that Movant kept child pornography on 

removable devices and CD drives, etc., rather than preserving it on his computers. Not 

only was the presence of child pornography saved on the computers unnecessary to the 

prosecution’s case, its absence was not inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory of the 

case (i.e. that Movant consistently stored his collection of child pornography on other 

devices).

c. 5(d) Shared Access Areas – Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to present evidence that child pornography was located in areas under shared 

possession with Movant’s wife (e.g. her bathroom cabinets, amongst her belongings, and 

in the center of the top bunk area of the semi-truck which she was standing next to when 

they were stopped). 

In support of this argument, Movant cites a series of cases attempting to define 

possession in cases where contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, but in an 

area under shared control with others. For example, Movant cites Delgado v. U.S, 327 

F.2d 641(9th Cir. 1964). In that case, a search of the defendant’s home revealed 

marijuana in the drawer of a night stand next to a bed shared by the defendants. The 

government failed to introduce any evidence to show possession by either defendant or 

even both. “But here it is pure speculation as to whether Rodriguez alone, or Delgado 

alone, or both of them, had possession. No doubt one of them did; perhaps both did.” 

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327 F.2d at 642.

In contrast, here there was substantial evidence to link the child pornography to 

Movant (e.g. the ties to Movant’s computer, his writing on the CDs and thumbdrives, the 

stories showing his authorship and involving his personal details tending to show his 

interest in pedophilia, etc.) 

Moreover, there was evidence before the jury that permitted the inference that 

there was shared access. This was not child pornography, erotica, etc. found in some 

hidden place to which Movant had no access or which jurors might presume were not 

accessible to others. Rather they were found in computers and thumbdrives and 

bathroom cabinets that a reasonable juror would infer was accessible at least to Movant’s 

wife. Movant’ fails to proffer anything to suggest that direct testimony on this point 

would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

d. 5(e) Purchase of Thumbdrives – Movant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to introduce evidence to show that Movant had purchased the thumb drives to 

download his wife’s pictures. Movant fails to suggest who would have proffered such 

testimony. 

Moreover, Movant’s ex-wife testified that various thumbdrives had been used to 

download her pictures. (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 251.) But she also testified that 

she had never personally used the thumbdrives, but relied on Movant to download 

pictures to them. (Id.) Movant fails to suggest what additional exculpatory inference 

would have arisen from evidence that Movant had purchased thumbdrives specifically 

for that purpose, and thus fails to show a reasonable probability that direct testimony on 

this point would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. 

e. 5(f) Traveling Without Computer and CDs, etc. - Movant argues that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence to show that he rarely took a 

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computer on the road, and never the one found in the truck, never took CDs, bought a 

different type and brand of CDs, etc.. Movant fails to identify who would have testified 

on this point. 

Moreover, the testimony at trial was that the computer was even specially 

equipped to be secured to the steering wheel to be used in his truck. (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 

11/18/10 at 248.) 

Movant fails to show a reasonable probability that direct testimony on this point 

would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

f. 5(g) Disappearance of Thumbdrives – Movant argues that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to introduce evidence to show that his thumb drives had 

disappeared the month before. Movant fails to identify who would have provided such 

testimony. Moreover, Movant fails to suggest how this would have altered the outcome 

of the proceeding. Movant does not, for example, suggest a reason why the jury would 

have inferred from such theft that the child pornography found on the thumbdrives in 

Movant’s possession was not his. Given the substantial evidence attributing the child 

pornography to Movant, the undersigned cannot find a reasonable probability that 

evidence on this point would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

g. 5(h) Illegal Access to Bank Account - Movant argues that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to introduce evidence to show that illegal activity had occurred in 

his bank account which resulted in refunds. Movant fails to show how this would have 

been exculpatory.

Perhaps Movant believes that this would have called into question the charges 

from the Dreamzone website on Movant’s bank card. However, those charges were 

attributed to Movant by the evidence on his computers (e.g. emails) showing access to 

and purchasing of access on the Dreamzone site. Movant fails to show a reasonable 

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probability that evidence on this point would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

h. 5(i) Impeachment of Ex-Wife - Movant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to introduce evidence to show that Movant’s wife was a perjurer. 

(Memorandum, Doc. 2 at 16.) In support, Movant references his Exhibits 12 and 17. 

Exhibit 12 is a Petition for Order of Protection filed by Movant’s ex-wife. He 

contends she lied when asserting he had asked her to take his disabled daughter out of 

the state, and that he had been arrested for sexually abusing his other daughter.

Exhibit 17 is his ex-wife’s Petition for Annulment of Marriage, dated March 4, 

2010. She alleged that he was “currently under investigation and is on the run from the 

FBI, Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement for suspected drug 

smuggling” and that he had a “prior arrest for sexual assault against his daughter.” 

(Memorandum, Doc. 24, Exhibit 17, Petition at 2.) 

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that “extrinsic evidence is not 

admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support 

the witness's character for truthfulness.” Thus, trial counsel would not have been able to 

introduce evidence to show that Movant’s ex-wife had lied in these two petitions. 

Moreover, Petitioner proffers no evidence to counter the contentions asserted in 

these documents. He simply provides his own bald assertions that they were false.

To be sure, he provides a letter from his daughter, Robin, denying any molestation

of her disabled sister. (Memorandum, Doc. 24, Exhibit 22.) However, this was based on 

her assertion that she was “told the story how she accused my dad of molesting 

her...[and when confronted] it wasn’t true.” (Id. at 1-2.) Thus, any testimony by Robin 

on this point would have been hearsay, and inadmissible. See Federal Rule of Evidence 

802, et seq. 

Movant also provides a statement from Robin denying that Movant molested her 

or that he “went to jail.” (Memorandum, Doc. 24, Exhibit 13.) However, counsel would 

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have had a tactical reason to not present testimony by her, given the nude photos of her 

and Movant found amongst Movant’s computer files.

Moreover, counsel would have had a tactical reason to not impeach Movant’s exwife on the issue of the molestation allegations, which would have brought the 

allegations to the attention of the jury, potentially inviting assumptions of molestation 

and incest.

Movant fails to support this claim by showing evidence available to and usable by 

trial counsel to impeach Movant’s ex-wife.

Moreover, even had counsel successfully impeached Movant’s ex-wife on some 

or all of these points, the undersigned cannot find a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Her testimony was of little 

consequence in the proceeding, providing little more than affirmation that the laptop and 

cellular wifi belonged to Movant (which Movant does not deny) (CR Doc. 111, R.T. 

11/17/10 at 229; CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 247-249), that the thumbdrives and CD 

discs belonged to Movant and had his handwriting on them (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 

at 250-255), and that there had been fictional stories in the home but they did not belong 

to her (id. at 256) (which Movant does not deny). There was other substantial evidence 

tying Movant to the thumbdrives and CD discs, e.g. the trace evidence on the computers, 

the “stories” and their connections to Movant, and the evidence of Movant’s access to 

the Dreamzone website.

Accordingly, Movant has failed to support this claim of ineffective assistance. 

i. Summary re Ground 5 - Movant’s Ground Five is based on the contention 

that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present various evidence. For the reasons 

discussed hereinabove, Movant has failed to show ineffective assistance, and Ground 5 is 

without merit.

/ /

/ /

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6. Ground 6: Ineffective Assistance re Probation Officer Interview

In his Ground 6, Movant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 

failed to have the presentence report corrected and refused to let the probation officer 

interview Movant, members of Movant’s family, or any of Movant’s friends. 

Respondent argues that Movant fails to show that such interviews would have altered the 

sentence, and that the record indicates that Movant was provided an opportunity to be 

interviewed, but declined. (Response, Doc. 15 at 27-28.) Movant replies that defense 

counsel declined the interview, and that an interview would have permitted him to 

review the presentence report and there were various inaccuracies in the report. (Reply, 

Doc. 21 at 19-23.) 

Errors in Presentence Report – Movant complains that counsel failed to correct 

errors in the presentence report. In particular, Movant asserts issues concerning: (1) 

false allegations of an incestuous affair between Movant and his daughter; (2) false 

allegations that Movant molested his daughter and was arrested for it; (3) an erroneous 

alias; (4) an error in Movant’s date of birth and social security number; (5) multiple 

references to the same grand theft auto offense for which he was released; (6) multiple 

references to the same offense of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle; (7) multiple 

references to the same assault charge; (8) false allegations of forcible rape by a girl he 

dated; (9) a failure to appear arrest resulting from various circumstances.

Here, Petitioner was given a sentence “at the bottom of the guidelines.” (CR Doc. 

114, R.T. 3/14/11 at 11.) Moreover, he was classified by the Court as having a criminal 

history category of I, the result of a finding of 0 criminal history points. (Id. at 6; 

Presentence Report, Doc. 28 at 11.) See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 5A, 

Sentencing Table. In sentencing him, the Court considered “hundreds of photographs 

and videos” depicting child pornography in Movant’s possession, that they were 

purchased perpetuating the market in them, the addictive fixation on sexual abuse of 

children reflected in the stories written by Movant, Movant’s failure to accept 

responsibility, and (to Movant’s advantage) the incidental nature of the interstate 

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transportation. (CR Doc. 114, R.T. 3/14/11 at 10-12.)

Movant sought a variance or departure based upon his age and ill health, which 

the Court rejected. (Id. at 5-6.) 

Movant complains that there were multiple references in the presentence report to 

various convictions or arrests. That is true. (See Presentence Report, Doc. 28 at 11-13, 

19.) However, the Report also concluded that none of those were “scoreable,” and relied 

upon them only to note that they were “concerning” because they involved allegations of 

“crimes of violence,” e.g. false imprisonment, assault, aggravated battery, rape under 

threat of harm, assault to commit rape/robbery, etc. (Id. at 19.) 

To the extent that Movant contends that his participation in the interview would 

have corrected false allegations concerning incest, rape of his girlfriend, etc. Movant 

proffers nothing to suggest that he had anything to provide the probation officer other 

than his denials to counter the allegations, and fails to proffer anything to show that the 

outcome would have been different had he provided those denials.

Moreover, there is no indication that the Court considered any allegations of (1) 

incest, (2) molestation, (3) forcible rape, or any of the (5), (8) arrests not leading to 

convictions, or any of the (6), (7), (9) prior convictions. There is no indication the Court 

considered, nor would there be any reason for the Court to have considered or been 

swayed by the errors in (3) an alias, or (4) Movant’s date of birth or social security 

number. Movant proffers no suggestion how this would have altered the outcome. As 

noted, the sentence given to Movant was at the bottom of the guidelines. The 

undersigned cannot find a reasonable probability that had Movant proffered his denials 

and corrections on these various disputed issues that he would have received something 

less than the bottom of the guidelines. 

Thus, even had counsel objected to these matters and obtained corrections, there 

is not a reasonable probability that Movant’s sentence would have been altered.

Failure to Permit Interviews - Movant’s argument concerning the interview is 

in two disparate veins. The first relates to the interviews themselves. The second relates 

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to the review of the presentence report. 

With regard to the interviews themselves, with one exception, Movant fails to 

proffer any information he, his family, or his friends would have provided the probation 

officer that would have altered his sentence.7 This portion of the argument is conclusory 

and without merit.

Moreover, with respect to Movant, as argued by Respondents, there was a real 

risk that Movant’s lack of acceptance of responsibility and/or remorse could have 

resulted in a worse outcome. See U.S. v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434-1435 

(9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, “[i]n conducting the presentence interview, the probation 

officer is entitled to seek information regarding [allegedly criminal conduct of which the 

defendant has not been convicted], which information, if inculpatory, may provide the 

basis for a significant increase in his sentence.” Id. at 1435. Here the prosecution was 

prepared to present evidence of substantial uncharged conduct. The prosecution made a 

record at trial of the additional conduct that they were prepared to offer on rebuttal if 

Petitioner testified:

MR. DOKKEN: We've subsequently acquired information

from Dreamzone which we would bring in rebuttal, and we do have

a rebuttal witness here.

THE COURT: Right, that was mentioned yesterday morning.

MR. DOKKEN: With all of the matches, and it matches stuff 

that we found on the search warrant with M & I Bank, that that was 

in fact his bank and that was entered with Dreamzone. All of his 

personal information would match, and of course that would open 

the door.

Additionally, we've done -- we had done additional analysis 

and we found 7500 images on the one thumb drive and we found a 

whole lot more sites that he had gone to, and they all have very bad 

names that make them obvious they're child porn sites, and they're 

on his computer. I've shown counsel that.

I've shown the 32 days that he's used that computer to access 

Dreamzone, and that all of course would be fair game for me to ask 

on cross-examination. And I showed her what I was planning on 

asking.

 

7 Movant argues that the alleged misinformation in the PSR was damaging to his family. 

The Strickland standard is not met by any showing of harm, but rather only by a showing 

that the outcome of the proceeding was affected. However unfortunate any such 

collateral harm might be, it does not provide a basis for a finding of ineffective 

assistance.

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(CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 402.) For those reasons, counsel could have made a 

strategic decision to not have Movant meet with the probation officer. 

Movant does contend that had his daughters been interviewed, they would have 

countered assertions that Movant had molested them. Assuming the probation officer 

and/or the Court would have found such denials credible, there is no indication that this 

would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. As noted above, the allegations of 

molestation were not relied upon by the Court in sentencing Movant. 

The second part of Movant’s argument is that if he had been allowed to go to the 

interview, he would have been able to correct various errors in the presentence report. 

However, as discussed hereinabove, Movant has failed to show that those errors affected 

the outcome of the proceeding. Moreover, as discussed hereinabove, the risks of such an 

interview were strong support for strategic decisions to deny the interview. Further, 

there was no reason to encounter those risks, given the fact that the report was available 

to Movant and to counsel, and they were entitled to object to any inaccuracies. See Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(f).

To be sure, Movant asserts in his Reply that he never received the report from the 

probation officer or defense counsel, and never reviewed the report with counsel. 

(Reply, Doc. 21 at 19-20.) However, counsel represented to the Court that she had 

reviewed the presentence report with Movant. (CR Doc. 114, R.T. 3/14/11 at 3.) 

Movant did not counter that representation. When later asked whether he had anything 

he would like to say, Movant responded “No, sir.” (Id. at 8.) Further, Movant made 

explicit references to the “Probation Report” in his pre-sentencing letter to the trial court, 

including referencing the allegations of molestation. (CR Doc. 96 at 2.) The undersigned 

finds the latter convincing evidence that Movant had reviewed the report at the time of 

trial.

Ground 6 is without merit, and should be denied.

/ /

/ /

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7. Ground 7: Ineffective Assistance re Evidence of Third Party

In his Ground 7, Movant argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to (a) 

present evidence from the forensic expert that someone else could have committed the 

crime. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 11.) Movant further argues counsel failed to: (b) pursue 

discovery and disclosures from the prosecution (Memorandum, Doc. 24 at 19); (c) 

investigate whether another person authored the “stories” (id.); (d) object to the “stories” 

(id. at 20); (e) failing to call witnesses for the defense (id.); (f) present a defense (id.); (g) 

investigate information that Movant did not own a computer until May 2008, that the 

other computers were clean, and available for others to use, and that program used to 

write the stories was not on his computer (id. at 20-21); (h) show that the computers 

could not have been placed on the bottom bunk of the truck (id. at 21); (i) impeach the 

government’s witnesses (id.); and (j) object to references to his ex-wife as such at trial 

even though they remained married (id. at 22). 

Respondents argue that Movant is simply disagreeing with counsel’s trial 

strategy, and the strategy was reasonable, and the outcome at trial would not have been 

altered. (Response, Doc. 15 at 28-30.) 

Movant replies by arguing the merits of his claims and by asserting additional 

failures of counsel (e.g. to present bank statements showing illegal activity on account, 

to impeach his ex-wife, to impeach Agent Shrable, to pursue undisclosed handwritten 

stories, to present evidence of the disappearance of his ex-wife’s brother, to have the jury 

instructed on his theory of defense etc.). The undersigned does not reach the purported 

deficiencies of counsel raised for the first time in the reply. “The district court need not 

consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 

990, 997 (9

th Cir. 2007). 

Unsupported Allegations - Movant fails to support most of his allegations. He 

fails to (a) identify what evidence from the forensic examiner would have been 

exculpatory. Moreover, the report of the forensic examiner indicates her testimony 

would have served to substantiate most of the prosecution’s forensic evidence, giving 

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counsel a strategic reason to decline to call her.

He fails to suggest (b) what additional discovery or disclosures from the 

prosecution would have provided to assist in his defense.

He fails to suggest (c) what additional investigation could have been done to 

establish that someone else authored the “stories.” 

He fails to suggest (g) what other information was available to show that Movant 

did not own a computer until May 2008. He does reference the manufacture date, etc. of 

the laptop seized from his truck. That would not however, preclude Movant from having 

owned a different computer in the past. For that matter, Movant was not required to own 

a computer to have downloaded the child pornography. Similarly, the absence of the 

WordPerfect program from the computers seized does not establish that he did not have 

access to a different computer in the past which had the software available, or that he did 

not have access to a computer capable of saving the documents in a WordPerfect format. 

Movant fails to suggest who could have testified (h) that the computers could not 

have been placed on the bottom bunk of the truck. At best, Movant suggests that it was 

not his practice to place them there. That would not have precluded them from having 

been placed there at the time of seizure. To the extent that Movant could have testified 

as to this practice, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, counsel had valid strategic 

reasons to not call Movant to testify. 

Moreover, there is not a reasonable probability that this evidence would have 

altered the outcome. Movant does not suggest that the computers were not his and his 

wife’s, merely that they were found in an unexpected location. Perhaps, if the only place 

evidence of child pornography had been found was on these laptops, there might be 

some persuasive effect to showing the unusual placement. Given all the other 

connections pointing to Movant, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome 

would have been changed. 

Finally, Movant fails to suggest any prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to 

references to his ex-wife as such at trial even though they remained married. Movant’s 

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marital status was not an issue in the case, and his ex-wife testified that she had filed for 

an annulment and the matter was still pending. (CR Doc. 112, R.T. 11/18/10 at 259, 

260.) 

Repetitive Allegations – The balance of the allegations in Ground 7 are 

repetitive. 

His allegations concerning (d) objections to the “stories” is without merit. As 

discussed hereinabove in connection with the related Ground 3(b), arguing counsel was 

ineffective in failing to assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in relation to the 

“stories,” counsel did object to their introduction. Movant fails to show what additional 

arguments could have been raised.

His allegations regarding (e) failing to call witnesses for the defense is without 

merit. As discussed hereinabove in connection with the related Ground 5(a), arguing 

counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that others had access to the 

computers, the witnesses proposed by Movant could provide little assistance beyond 

denying their own culpability, and counsel had valid strategic reasons for not calling 

them.

Movant’s allegation that counsel (f) failed to present a defense is without merit. 

Counsel asserted a variety of procedural defenses, including a motion to suppress, and 

opposing the introduction of various evidence, and cross-examining witnesses in an 

attempt to convince the jury that the government could not prove its case beyond a 

reasonable doubt. While complete failure to defend a criminal case is ineffective 

assistance, the constitution does not require counsel to manufacture a defense where 

none exists. See U.S. v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986). “The sixth amendment 

does not require counsel to invent a defense.” Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 764 (5th 

Cir. 2001), rehr’g granted on other grounds, 284 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2002).

In many cases, the law and facts will be so overwhelmingly in favor 

of the government that defense counsel can do little more than try to 

poke holes in the government's case in cross-examination. The 

hopelessness of some cases may even relegate the most competent 

defense counsel to the role of official hand-holder. The Sixth 

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Amendment does not hold an attorney responsible for the difficulty 

of the case he inherits. The choice to pursue a bad strategy makes no 

comment on an attorney's judgment where no better choice exists.

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995).

Movant’s arguments that (g) counsel failed to show that the other computers were 

clean, and available for others to use is without merit for the reasons discussed 

hereinabove in connection with Grounds 5(a), (b), (c), and (d).

Movant’s allegations that counsel (i) failed to adequately impeach the 

government’s witnesses is without merit for the reasons discussed hereinabove in 

connection with Grounds 3(d) (prosecutorial misconduct re perjured testimony) and 5(i) 

(impeachment of ex-wife).

For the foregoing reasons, Ground 7 is without merit and should be denied.

8. Ground 8: Ineffectiveness Re New Counsel And Sentence

Liberally construed, in his Ground 8, Movant argues that “counsel” was 

ineffective for: (a) failing to object to the abuse of discretion in refusing to provide new 

counsel; (b) failing to object to a conviction for the greater and lesser included offenses 

(Motion, Doc. 1 at 12); and (c) failing to object to the imposition of multiple special 

assessment fees despite the decision to impose concurrent sentences (Memorandum, 

Doc. 24 at 24-25.)

Respondent argues that the claim is really an assertion that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying new counsel and that such claims should have been raised on 

direct appeal and are now procedurally defaulted. Respondent further argues that the 

procedural default is not excused by an ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in failing to 

bring the claim, because the claim is without merit. Finally, Respondent argues that the 

request for new counsel would have been without merit and defense counsel performed 

adequately and Movant fails to show any prejudice. (Response, Doc. 15 at 30-32.)

In his Reply, Movant reiterates that his claim is one of ineffective assistance, and 

argues the merits of his request for new counsel.

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Movant also asserts new claims in his reply regarding: failure to object to the 

admission of the “stories,” and failure to object to his wife testifying against him before 

the termination of their marriage. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 29-30.) The undersigned does not 

reach these purported deficiencies of counsel raised for the first time in the reply. See

Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9

th Cir. 2007). 

Procedural Default – Respondent argues that Ground 8 is procedurally 

defaulted. That argument is based upon a characterization of the claim as a direct attack 

on the denial of new counsel. The Court’s service Order did construe Ground 8 as 

asserting that the trial court “abused its discretion.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) However, upon 

evaluation of the Motion to Vacate in light of the Reply (Doc. 21), it is clear that Movant 

intends to assert a claim of “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for failing to Show Abuse 

of Discretion by the Court.” (Reply, Doc. 21 at 27.) A claim of ineffective assistance is 

properly brought in the first instance in a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

rather than on direct appeal. See United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir.1988); 

Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003) (“failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, 

appropriate proceeding under § 2255”). Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that 

Ground 8 is not procedurally defaulted.

Of course, to the extent that Movant might have intended to assert direct 

challenges on these decisions of the trial court, the claims would be procedurally 

defaulted for failing to raise them on direct appeal. The general rule is “that claims not 

raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows 

cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Thus, a section 2255 

movant raising a claim for the first time in post-conviction proceedings is in procedural 

default, and is precluded from asserting the claim. Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 621 

(1998) (finding default where petitioner challenging his guilty plea did not raise claim in 

direct appeal); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (noting that a motion to 

vacate or modify a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a 

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direct appeal). “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise 

it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first 

demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent’.” 

Bousley, 523 U.S at 622 (citations omitted). Ineffective assistance of counsel may 

constitute cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and excuse 

procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998).

To the extent that Movant intended to assert the ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel as cause to excuse his failure to present the claims on direct appeal, because the 

underlying substantive claims are without merit (for the reasons discussed hereinafter), 

the undersigned could not find that appellate counsel performed deficiently in failing to 

raise the claims, and could not find prejudice, either to support the prejudice component 

of the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or to support the prejudice 

component of the assertion of “cause and prejudice,” to excuse the procedural default. 

a. 8(a): IAC re New Counsel – In part (a), Movant argues that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the denial of new counsel. Movant argues that there 

was a breakdown of communications and trust between Movant and trial counsel. As 

evidence of that breakdown, Movant points to counsel’s failure to investigate and failure 

to call witnesses. To sustain this claim, Movant must show not only the trial counsel was 

obligated to take some action in support of Movant’s request for new trial, but that 

Movant was prejudiced from trial counsel’s failure to do so. 

Movant does not show that trial counsel performed deficiently at the time of the 

request for new counsel. For example, Movant does not suggest what other arguments 

should have been made, or how they would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. 

To be sure, Movant argues that the trial court wrongly rejected the request, but he does 

not assert that the trial court was not armed with the requisite facts or law to address the 

issue. To the contrary, he asserts that the trial court held a hearing and had “knowledge 

that [trial counsel] was no[t] investigating nor was she going to be calling witnesses.” 

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(Memorandum, Doc. 24 at 23.) 

Nor does Movant show prejudice from any purported deficiency.8 Movant’s 

various claims of deficient performance by trial counsel are addressed throughout this 

Report & Recommendation. Movant has failed to show that trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that had counsel been effective 

in having herself replaced, that new counsel would have obtained a better result. 

b. 8(b): IAC re Lesser Included Offenses – In his Ground 8(b), Movant argues 

that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge his conviction for lessor included 

offenses and the greater offense. This is the same argument raised in Ground 2, and for 

the reasons discussed hereinabove, the claim is without merit.

c. 8(c): IAC re Special Assessments – Finally, Movant argues that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s imposition of separate special 

assessments while imposing concurrent sentences. 

Here, the judgment against Movant assessed $600 in special assessments against 

Movant. (CR Doc. 97 at 1.) Under 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(2)(A), the Court was required to 

assess $100 for each felony offense. See U.S. v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 10 (1

st Cir. 1993). 

Still, Movant cites a series of cases where the courts found prejudice because 

(although the defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences) multiple special 

assessments were levied. (Memorandum, Doc. 24 at 24.) 

The first set of cases involve double jeopardy violations, in which the multiple 

special assessments established the multiple punishments despite concurrent prison 

sentences. See e.g. U.S. v. Robertson, 606 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2010) (requirement of 

 

8 A direct challenge to the denial of a request for new counsel would be based upon an 

abuse of discretion standard, considering “ (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the 

adequacy of the district court's inquiry; and (3) whether the asserted conflict was so great 

as to result in a complete breakdown in communication and a consequent inability to 

present a defense.” U.S. v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, 

however, Movant’s claim is presented as one of ineffective assistance, making 

Strickland’s requirement of a different outcome the requisite standard.

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prejudice when applying plain error review of double jeopardy claim met by multiple 

special assessments); U.S. v. Christner , 66 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); U.S. v. 

Grubbs, 829 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1987) (same). See also Rutledge v. U.S., 517 U.S. 292 

(1996) (multiple special assessments amounted to double punishment for double 

jeopardy purposes). Here, however, for the reasons discussed hereinabove in connection 

with Ground 2, Movant fails to make out a double jeopardy violation, not because of the 

lack of multiple punishments, but because the offenses are separate offenses. Thus these 

double jeopardy cases are inapposite.

The second type of case cited by Movant involved the “concurrent sentence 

doctrine.” 

Where the conviction on one count is found to be valid by the 

appellate court, or is not challenged on appeal, the court may 

decline to address issues directed only to the other counts. The court 

could summarily affirm if a ruling in defendant's favor would not

reduce the length of a defendant's entire sentence or the amount of a 

fine or otherwise prevent some prejudice to the defendant. This is 

the so-called "Concurrent Sentence Doctrine."

1 Federal Criminal Appeals § 3:54. See Ray v. U.S., 481 U.S. 736 (1987) (concurrent 

sentence doctrine inapplicable because of multiple special assessments). Here, however, 

Movant has not been denied review of a particular conviction based upon his having 

received concurrent sentences. Accordingly, Ray is inapposite. 

In sum, none of the cases cited by Movant preclude the imposition of multiple 

special assessments where, as here, the defendant has been properly convicted of 

multiple offenses. Accordingly, Movant has failed to show a viable challenge to the 

multiple special assessments which counsel could have asserted.

9, Summary

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Movant has failed to provide any ground 

for relief. Accordingly, the Motion to Vacate must be denied.

/ /

/ /

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.@ Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court@, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2255. The 

recommendations if accepted will result in Movant=s Motion to Vacate being resolved 

adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of Appealability is 

required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, the claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion to Vacate, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed July 29, 2013 (Doc. 1) 

be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 31, 2014

13-8199r RR 14 08 04 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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