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Parties Involved:
Michael Joseph Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 1994 Decided February 7, 1995

No. 93-3149

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL JOSEPH JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

-

No. 93-3150

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DOLORES Y. ELLIOTT,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

93cr00033-01

93cr00033-02

James C. Savage argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant Johnson.

Marian Flynn argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant Elliott.

Timothy J. Heaphy, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on

the brief was Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Thomas C. Black,

Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant Michael Joseph Johnson was convicted on five drug and

firearm related charges; Dolores Yvette Elliott on one count of aiding and abetting Johnson in the

possession of an unregistered firearm. Johnson raises challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

and to the admission of certain evidence at trial. As to one count, that of possessing drugs with the

intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), we conclude that

the evidence was insufficient and reverse asto that charge only. Elliott challenges the district court's

jurisdiction over her District of Columbia violation. As to Elliott's single conviction and the other

convictions of Johnson, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 4, 1993, United States Park Police officers, executing a search warrant, knocked

on the door of the Washington, D.C., home of the Johnson family and announced their presence.

Hearing footsteps running towards the back of the house and seeing a shadow pass by a front

window, they became concerned that suspects might be fleeing or destroying evidence, and forcibly

opened the door. Inside, they found three of Johnson's relatives. One officer at the back of the house

saw Johnson come out the back door and flee almost immediately after the lead officer had knocked

at the front door. Several officers chased Johnson into a wooded area, where he was apprehended.

The police searched the house. In one of the upstairs bedrooms they found a film canister

containing ten bags of crack cocaine and a loaded Glock .45 caliber pistol on top of a stereo speaker.

They also found in a dresser in that room a bag containing 113 smaller bags of crack cocaine, more

ammunition in the room's closet, the box for a Glock pistol under the bed, a speed loader and belt

holster for a .45 caliber pistol, and a police scanner. In the same bedroom, the officers found

numerous documents bearing Johnson's name, including bills, his birth certificate, and his social

security card. In the hallway, officers found two brown bags containing packaging and cutting

materials, including bags like those containing crack cocaine found in the bedroom. The police also

seized a 1987 Acura Legend from in front of the house, which was registered to Johnson.

After the search, Johnson was arrested. During the booking process, he told the police that

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he was employed as a sales clerk at the Sports Factory sporting goods store. Johnson also told the

police that the drugs did not belong to anyone in his family or to his girlfriend, Dolores Elliott.

Thereafter, the federal grand jury indicted Johnson on one count of possession with intent to

distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, one count of possession with intent to distribute

more than five grams of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school, one count of use of a firearm

during a crime of drug trafficking, one count of possession of an unregistered firearm in the District

of Columbia, and one count of possession of ammunition for an unregistered firearm in the District

of Columbia. Elliott was named as a co-defendant in the last two counts, which charged violations

of the D.C. Code. Elliott moved to dismiss the counts against her, arguing that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to hear the non-federal charges. The court denied the motion.

At trial, Johnson's sister testified that the room where the drugs and gun were found was

Johnson's room and that she had seen him in the house shortly before the police arrived. Johnson's

mother testified that Elliott lived with Johnson in his room during the month before the search. Park

Police Officer Schmidt testified that the large quantityof cocaine, along with the packaging materials,

cutting tools, police scanner, and other items found were consistent with the distribution of crack

cocaine. He also testified that drug dealers use guns to protect themselves, as well as their drugs and

money, and that a dealer usually keeps his gun ready and exposed at home for prompt use. Further,

he identified the type of Glock gun found as one commonly used by drug dealers.

The government presented testimony by the owner of the Sports Factory, Cindy Kim, who

stated that while she recognized Johnson from the area around her store, he had never worked there.

The co-owner of a car dealership also testified that Johnson made regular $300 fortnightly payments

on the Acura. Additionally, the owner of Freestate Arms, a gun shop in Maryland, testified for the

government. He stated that Elliott and Johnson came into his store together in January 1992, Elliott

approached him and stated that she wished to buy a Glock gun, and she filled out an application for

approval of the sale by Maryland police. This application included information about the gun's serial

number and other identifying characteristics that matched the gun found in Johnson's bedroom. The

gun store owner further testified that when the application was approved, Elliott returned to the store

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1We do not determine whether proof of the point of possession requires the diagonal

occasioned by his possession on the second floor or whether a measurement to the corresponding

point on the first floor would be sufficient, as the government's evidence in this case does not

establish either measurement. 

to retrieve the gun.

The jury found Johnson guilty on allfive charged counts and found Elliott guilty of aiding and

abetting Johnson's possession of the unregistered gun but acquitted her of the charge of aiding and

abetting Johnson's possession of ammunition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Johnson's Appeal

1. The 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) violation

Johnson asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgments of acquittal

asto two counts ofthe indictment and in admitting evidence that he had committed another wrongful

act by lying when he stated that he worked for the Sports Factory. The only assignment of merit is

his assertion that the government introduced insufficient evidence to prove that he violated Title 21

U.S.C. § 860(a) (Supp. II 1990), which provides an enhanced penalty for drug law violators who

distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or manufacture a controlled substance within 1000 feet

of a school. In support of its charge that Johnson violated this provision, the government inexplicably

offered evidence not of the distance from a school to the point in the house where Johnson possessed

the drugs, but only of a measurement made by Officer Reid from Randle Highlands Elementary

School to a point five feet up the walkway to Johnson's house.1Johnson argues correctly that the

government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense with which the

defendant is charged, see, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977), and that based

upon the improper terminal point of the measurement, the government failed to carry its burden of

proof.

The government notesthat the measurement made byReid was a pedestrian travelroute, and

that a straight line measure, rather than a pedestrian travel route, may be used for purposes of

establishing a violation of this statute. See United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir.

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1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1619 (1993); United States v. Watson, 887 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir.

1989); United States v. Ofarril, 779 F.2d 791, 792 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 475

U.S. 1029 (1986). Thus, under this rule, a person may be convicted of possessing with intent to

distribute crack cocaine within 1000 feet of a school even if the distance by street is over 1000 feet,

aslong asthe straight line distance between the site ofthe possession with intent to distribute and the

school is within 1000 feet.

As the evidence at trial showed that Officer Reid diverted from a straight line path because

of obstaclessuch as buildings, the government's position isthat a straight line distance to the property

would be a good deal shorter than 994 feet. This, the government argues, would easily have

established that the point at which Johnson possessed the drugs was within 1000 feet of the school.

It is entirely possibleperhaps probablethat this is true. If so, we have no idea why the

government did not prove it. For it to be both true and sufficient to make out the violation, Reid's

pedestrian measurement (994 feet) must exceed the straight line distance between the two points

measured by a number of feet greater than the sum of six feet and the distance between the end of

Reid's measurement and the point of Johnson's possession. Since there is no evidence of either the

straight line measurement or the distance between the terminal point of Reid's measurement and the

point of possession, it is impossible to determine whether or not this equation istrue. Therefore, the

government cannot prevail.

The government relies on United States v. Watson, 887 F.2d at 981, where the court upheld

a conviction for violating 21 U.S.C. § 845a(a) (1988), the precursor to section 860(a), on evidence

that "did not establish that the distance from the nearest point of the school property to the exact

location ofthe [violation] waslessthan 1000 feet, but only that the distance between the nearest point

of the two property lines was 922 feet." However, the government's reliance is misplaced. In that

case the government also offered "[e]vidence ... in the form of a map clearly show[ing] that the

distance between the property line closest to the school and the property line farthest fromthe school

was significantly less than 78 feet." Id. Therefore, the evidence before the court in Watson did

establish that any point within the property was less than 1000 feet from the school. While the same

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may be true of the property in the present case, the government, for whatever reason, offered no map

establishing that fact. Nor did it provide any other evidence from which the jury could establish that

the possession occurred within 1000 feet from a school. Accordingly, Johnson's conviction on this

charge cannot stand.

2. The 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violation

Johnson also questions the sufficiency of the evidence of possession of a firearm during and

in relation to a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988). Johnson's arguments are

fully disposed of by United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in banc). Under section

924(c), the government must show: 1) that the defendant used or carried a firearm, and 2) that the

use or carrying of the firearm was during and in relation to a predicate offense. Id. at 114. As to the

first element, in Bailey we determined that Congress intended "use" to have a broad meaning and

that, in the context of the section, one who avails himself of a gun by putting or keeping it in a

particular place from which he can gain access to it if needed to facilitate a drug crime, uses the gun.

Id. at 114-15. We further concluded that because possession with intent to distribute is a continuing

offense, the government need only prove that the defendant put or kept the gun in that particular

place at some point while he illegally possessed the drugs. Id. at 115.

To satisfy the second requirement, the gun must facilitate or have the potential of facilitating

the drug trafficking offense. Id. As using a gun to protect one's drugs, or drug paraphernalia by

positioning it to be available for use during ongoing drug activity is a prohibited use of the gun under

section 924(c), id. at 116, when there is "sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant at

some time during the commission of the predicate drug offense put or kept a firearm in a place where

it would be proximate to and accessible froma place that is clearly connected to his drug trafficking,"

such as a place used to store or distribute drugs, "the jury may also infer that the gun was being used

to protect the drug trafficking operation, and was therefore being used in violation of § 924(c)." Id.

In the instant case, there was ample evidence that Johnson kept the gun in a place accessible

from a place connected with his drug trafficking since the loaded gun was found on top of a speaker

next to some packaged drugs and in the room where other drugs were stored. Accordingly, there

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was sufficient evidence that Johnson possessed a firearm in violation of section 924(c).

3. The admission of evidence of Johnson's false statement

Johnson's final argument is that the admission of evidence of his false statement concerning

his employment was in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which precludes "evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith." However, such evidence "may ... be admissible for other purposes...." Here,

such other purpose is present. Johnson's statement about his employment apparently was an attempt

to explain his ability to acquire an expensive car, a gun, and various items of jewelry found by the

police during the search of his room, and Kim's testimony demonstrating that the statement was

untrue suggested that he was concealing the actual source of his income, drug dealing. Thus, the

district court did not err in admitting this evidence since it reflected an attempt to avoid the charge

against Johnson of possession with intent to distribute drugs. See United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d

83, 89 (2nd Cir. 1994) (evidence ofmisrepresentation admissible to demonstrate knowledge or intent

to conceal ownership of asset and rebut innocent explanation). Accordingly, the evidence of

Johnson's prevarication comes under the inclusionary provision of Rule 404(b) rather than the

exclusionary provision of Rule 404(a), and the court did not err in admitting it.

Johnson further argues that even if the evidence was admissible under Rule 404, the court

erred in not excluding it under Rule 403, as "the probative value" of the evidence was "substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." FED. R. EVID. 403. We review Rule 403

determinationsmost deferentiallyandwillreverse onlyfor "grave abuse" ofthe trial court's discretion.

United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Here there is none. Johnson's

untruthful statement was probative of consciousness of guilt and was not likely in itself to give rise

to any substantial prejudice on the part of the jury. Likewise, Johnson's further argument that the

court erred in not giving a limiting instruction confining the jury's consideration of the "bad acts"

evidence to the purpose for which it was offered is without merit. Federal Rule of Evidence 105

states that when evidence that is admissible for one purpose but not admissible for another purpose

is admitted, "the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the

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jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105 (emphasis added). Johnson requested no such instruction.

Moreover, such instruction might in fact be inconsistent with a defendant's deliberate trial strategy

to minimize the jury's recollection of the unfavorable evidence. Accordingly, the district court did

not err in failing to give a limiting instruction.

B. Elliott's Appeal

Elliott raises an issue that goes to the foundation of the charge against her. She argues that

the United States District Court lacked jurisdiction over her because she was charged solely with

violations of D.C. municipal regulations and no federal crimes. She states that the D.C. code gives

jurisdiction to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for criminal cases under law applicable

exclusively to D.C. and that the charge of failing to register a handgun is such a law. While Elliott

admits that federal court has jurisdiction to hear cases involving local law when the local counts are

joined with federal ones, D.C. Code Ann. § 11-502(3) (1989), she argues that joinder of the counts

was not proper in this case because she was charged solely with D.C. violations. Cf. United States

v. Garnett, 653 F.2d 558, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting section 502(3) enacted solely to eliminate the

proceduraldifficulties oftrying a single defendant for related federal and D.C. offensesin two courts).

While Elliott's argument has a facial logical appeal, we ultimately reject it. The United States

District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction of any offense under any law applicable

exclusively to the District which is joined in the same information or indictment with any federal

offense. D.C. Code Ann. § 11-502(3). In adopting this section, Congress made federal and local

offenses joinable in the same indictment, allowing for a single trial rather than two separate trials in

separate courts. See United States v. Shepard, 515 F.2d 1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Applying this

section, we have upheld the district court's jurisdiction over local offenses so long as an indictment

properly joins federal and local offenses under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8. See United

States v. Kember, 685 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982); United States

v. Kember, 648 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam).

Elliott rejoins that in United States v. Koritko, 870 F.2d 738, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1989), we

concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant was charged solely with

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D.C. offenses that were not joined with any federal offense. She contends that her case is

distinguishable from those in which we have upheld jurisdiction in that she, like the defendant in

Koritko, is charged solely with offenses under the District of Columbia Code not joined with any

federal offense. However, we conclude that Koritko is not controlling, as Elliott, unlike Koritko, was

joined with another defendant charged in the same indictment with federal violations. In short, we

hold that under D.C. Code Ann. § 11-502(3), as applied in United States v. Shepard and other cases,

United States District Court for the District of Columbia does have jurisdiction over a defendant

charged solelywithDistrict ofColumbiaCode violations when she is properlyjoined with a defendant

charged in other counts with violations of federal statutes.

The propriety of joinder of defendants is tested under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

8(b). See United States v. Brown, 16 F.3d 423, 427 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 257 (1994).

Rule 8(b) provides that two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment if they are

alleged to have participated in the same act or series of acts constituting an offense or offenses, that

such defendants may be charged in one or more countstogether, and that all ofthe defendants do not

have to be charged in each count. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). Defendants' acts form a series within the

meaning of the rule if they constitute part of a common scheme or plan, and joinder is proper so long

as the government presents evidence before trial that the defendants' offenses arose out of the same

scheme. United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The indictment in the instant case charged Elliott and Johnson with the same criminalscheme

or plan; namely, the possession of a firearm in D.C. without a valid registration. The prosecution

made a pretrial proffer and introduced trial evidence for the proposition that Johnson and Elliott

traveled together to a Maryland gun store where she bought the gun under her name at a time when

they were both D.C. residents, that Elliott enabled Johnson to possessthe gun, and that Johnson told

the police that Elliott brought the gun into the house. Based on this evidence, joinder was proper.

See United States v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (joinder "strengthened" by fact that

defendants aided and abetted those offenses charged against other defendants).

Since the common scheme was apparent on the face of the indictment, the firearm counts

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against Elliott and Johnson were properly joined with the drugs counts against Johnson alone. See

Halliman, 923 F.2d at 883. The fact that Elliott was not charged with aiding and abetting Johnson's

drug distribution does not render joinder improper. Rule 8(b) specifies that defendants may be

charged in one or more counts together or separately and that all defendants need not be charged in

each count. It is sufficient that all participated in some way in the series of transactions that link the

counts, and not necessarily in each act that makes up the series. Halliman, 923 F.2d at 883.

Adjunct to her questioning of the court's jurisdiction, Elliott contends that the United States

Attorney lacked the authority to prosecute pure violations of District of Columbia municipal

regulations because D.C. Code Ann. § 23-101(a) (1989) providesthat "[p]rosecutionsfor violations

of all police or municipal ordinances or regulations," a class concededly including those which she

is charged with violating, "shall be conducted ... by the Corporation Counsel for the District of

Columbia...." However, the United States correctly responds that section 23-101(d) authorizes the

U.S. Attorney to prosecute regulatory offenses when they are joined in the same indictment with

offenses prosecutable by the United States and "the other prosecuting authority consents." Since the

D.C. regulatoryoffenses were joined with federaloffensesin the indictment and the D.C. Corporation

Counsel consented to Elliott's prosecution in district court, section 23-101(d) was satisfied.

Accordingly, Elliott's claims must fail.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the government did not present sufficient evidence to show that Johnson possessed

with intent to distribute narcotics within 1000 feet of a school, his conviction on this charge is

reversed. Additionally, because the D.C. Code charges against Elliott were properly joined with the

federal charges against Johnson, the district court had jurisdiction over her. Although we have not

discussed other contentions bythe defendants, we have reviewed themall and find that none warrants

reversal. Accordingly, all other convictions are affirmed.

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