Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03994/USCOURTS-ca8-08-03994-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tarone M. Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3994

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Tarone M. Jones, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 22, 2009

Filed: March 3, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Tarone Jones of being a felon in possession of a shotgun and

a semi-automatic pistol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

granted the government's upward departure motion for underrepresented criminal

history and imposed a 240-month sentence. On appeal, Jones argues that the district

court erred in failing to consider the harshness of the advisory Guidelines range before

granting the government's upward departure motion. We disagree and affirm the

judgment of the district court.

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I. Background

The charges against Jones arose from the Storm Lake, Iowa Police Department's

investigation into a quarrel at Jones's apartment involving a sawed-off shotgun and a

semi-automatic pistol. Officers discovered the semi-automatic pistol hidden in Jones's

apartment and the sawed-off shotgun hidden in another apartment in the same

complex. Jones was charged and convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Jones's presentence investigation report assigned Jones 19 criminal history

points. Additionally, he had four convictions or adjudications that did not result in any

criminal history points. Jones's criminal history also included four convictions for

"violent felonies" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Specifically, two armed robbery offenses on June 30, 1999, against two separate

victims; an October 31, 2002 assault and battery of a police officer; and a November

28, 2005 assault and battery of a police officer.

At sentencing, the district court set Jones's Guidelines range between 235 and

293 months' imprisonment based upon an offense level of 33 and a category VI

criminal history. The court also found Jones to be an armed career criminal. After a

brief colloquy, the district court granted the government's upward departure motion

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) for substantial underrepresentation of Jones's

dangerousness and recidivism and departed upward two levels. The court noted

Jones's six additional criminal history points (it takes 13 points to qualify for criminal

history category VI) and observed the remarkable rapidity with which Jones

committed crimes. The court then departed upward two additional levels to account

for the six extra points. This resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of 292 to 365

months' imprisonment. The court then granted Jones's variance motion and reduced

his sentence to 240 months.

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II. Discussion

On appeal, Jones claims that the court abused its discretion by considering the

government's upward departure motion independently from the calculated Guidelines

range. Jones maintains that in his case a § 4A1.3 enhancement was unnecessary

because his status as an armed career criminal established both a higher statutory

punishment and higher Guidelines punishment than otherwise would have been

applicable for the underlying offense. Jones further contends that the district court's

isolation of the narrow underrepresentation inquiry from all other considerations

essentially nullifies the discretion that § 4A1.3(a)(1) grants to the sentencing court.

Finally, Jones argues that the district court's subsequent downward departure does not

render this error harmless simply because it stated that its 240-month sentence was

"sufficient but not greater than necessary."

This court reviews a district court's decision to depart pursuant to § 4A1.3 for

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922, 930 (8th Cir. 2008).

"Section 4A1.3 permits an upward departure if 'reliable information indicates that the

defendant's criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of

the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other

crimes.'" Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1)). 

Our review of Jones's criminal history convinces us that the district court did

not err when it increased his offense level by two levels and sentenced him to 240

months' imprisonment. Jones's criminal history is extensive. Remarkably, he amassed

all 19 of his criminal history points in just ten years. These offenses have not been

petty. They evidence Jones's aggressive and violent tendencies. One encounter

between Jones and his mother illustrates his violent disposition. After returning to his

mother's home intoxicated, Jones found the door locked. He then kicked the door and

demanded that it be opened. He threatened to "bust" his mother's "face in" if she did

not comply. Jones's conviction for this assaultive conduct did not count among Jones's

four convictions for "violent felonies" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 and 18

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U.S.C. § 924(e). On this record, the district court's upward departure, which, after all,

leaves Jones's sentence well below the statutory maximum for the offense of

conviction, was not unreasonable.

Neither are we persuaded by Jones's argument that the district court erred by

independently considering the applicable Guidelines range and the government's

upward departure motion. Jones cites no authority for this proposition, and in fact, our

post-Booker cases appear to reject Jones's sentencing approach. "First, the district

court must determine the appropriate sentencing range under the Guidelines. Next, the

district court must decide if a traditional departure under the Guidelines is appropriate,

thus creating an advisory guidelines sentencing range. Finally, the district court must

consider the § 3553(a) factors to determine a sentence." United States v. Plaza, 471

F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly,

contrary to Jones's contention, we have indicated that the Guidelines and departures

are to be considered sequentially. Furthermore, we have stated:

When contemplating and structuring such a departure, the district court

should consider both the nature and extent of a defendant's criminal

history. In deciding the likelihood that a defendant may commit other

crimes, a court may take into account any evidence of obvious

incorrigibility and conclude that leniency has not been effective.

United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations, alterations, and citations omitted).

Similarly, Jones's contention that the district court ignored the discretionary

nature of § 4A1.3(a)(1) is unsupported by the record. Without such evidence this

argument fails because district courts are presumed to know and apply sentencing law.

See United States v. Battiest, 553 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 2009) ("We presume that

district judges know the law and understand their obligation to consider all of the §

3553(a) factors.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

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We need not address Jones's argument that any error related to the departure

was not harmless, as we find no error in the district court's analysis.

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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