Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03098/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03098-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony J. Fareri
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2013 Decided April 9, 2013

No. 11-3098

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTHONY J. FARERI,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00054-1)

Rosanna M. Taormina, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the 

briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam 

Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Peter S. Smith, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #11-3098 Document #1429680 Filed: 04/09/2013 Page 1 of 5
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Anthony Fareri, a

stockbroker, sold his clients worthless shares of stock in shell 

companies controlled by a co-conspirator. Fareri helped 

inflate the price of shares in the shell companies, 

recommended the companies to his clients, purchased shares

on behalf of his clients without their permission, ignored 

requests by his clients to sell their shares in the companies, 

and falsified documents to conceal his scheme. Fareri

ultimately defrauded his clients out of more than $3 million.

Fareri pled guilty to one count of mail fraud, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. He was sentenced to 8 years and 9 

months of imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution to his 

victims. In this direct appeal, Fareri raises three issues. He 

challenges his sentence, raises an ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim, and requests remand in order for the 

District Court to correct the amount of restitution. 

First, at sentencing, the District Court applied a two-level 

upward adjustment to Fareri’s offense level based on its 

finding that some of Fareri’s victims were vulnerable. See 

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2012). 

Fareri claims that the upward adjustment was improper. 

As an initial matter, the Government responds that the 

plea agreement bars Fareri from challenging his sentence. We 

need not decide whether the text of the plea agreement bars

Fareri from challenging his sentence because, in accepting 

Fareri’s guilty plea, the District Court told Fareri that he 

“probably retain[ed] the right to challenge any illegal 

sentence” and the Government did not object to the District 

Court’s characterization of the plea agreement. Plea Entry Tr. 

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23, Sept. 20, 2010. This Court has held that a defendant may 

rely on the district court’s characterization of a plea 

agreement if the Government does not object. See United 

States v. Godoy, No. 10-3105, slip op. at 2-4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 

5, 2013). On appeal, Fareri therefore may challenge the 

application of the vulnerable victim enhancement.

The vulnerable victim enhancement applies if “the 

defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the 

offense was a vulnerable victim.” U.S. SENTENCING 

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1. The commentary to the 

enhancement explains that a vulnerable victim is someone 

“who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental 

condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the 

criminal conduct.” Id. cmt. n.2. The District Court found that 

three of Fareri’s victims were vulnerable victims. We give 

“due deference” to the District Court’s application of the 

vulnerable victim enhancement to the facts of the case. See 

United States v. Henry, 557 F.3d 642, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). 

Fareri knew that these three victims of his scheme were 

inexperienced investors; he also knew that one of these

victims was suffering from health problems and that another 

was grieving the loss of a spouse. On appeal, the parties 

debate at some length how to define “particularly 

susceptible.” But we need not anticipate specific fact patterns 

not before us. In this case, it was at least reasonable for the 

District Court to conclude that the combination of these

victims’ characteristics – and especially the fact that they

were inexperienced investors – made them “particularly

susceptible” to Fareri’s fraud. See United States v. Anderson, 

440 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming application of 

vulnerable victim enhancement based on similar 

characteristics). Reviewing the matter under the deferential 

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“due deference” standard, we therefore uphold the vulnerable 

victim enhancement.

Second, Fareri raises an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim. Fareri contends that his trial counsel made

errors relating to the amount-of-loss calculation, a key 

component in determining Fareri’s sentence. Fareri argues 

that his trial counsel erroneously told him that, under the plea 

agreement, he would be able to challenge the amount of loss. 

Fareri also says that his trial counsel failed to uncover 

evidence that he repaid some of his victims. Fareri asserts

that, together, those errors led him to believe that he would be 

able to reduce the amount-of-loss calculation underlying his 

sentence and that, if he had known that he would not have 

been able to challenge the amount-of-loss calculation, he 

would not have pled guilty. 

This Court has allowed defendants to bring ineffectiveassistance claims on direct appeal. But because ineffectiveassistance claims typically require factual development, we

generally remand unless the record “conclusively” 

demonstrates that the defendant is or is not entitled to relief. 

United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). Like most ineffective-assistance claims raised on 

direct appeal, the claim in this case requires further factual

development. We therefore remand Fareri’s ineffectiveassistance claim so that the District Court may consider it in 

the first instance.

Third, the Government and Fareri agree that remand is 

required to correct the amount of restitution due. In its oral 

sentence and in its written judgment, the District Court 

imposed restitution in a total amount of $3,646,747.83. 

However, the District Court also produced a written list of 

payments due to each of Fareri’s victims, and the sum of 

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those required payments exceeded the $3,646,747.83 total 

announced in the District Court’s oral sentence and listed in 

its written judgment. The District Court’s oral sentence –

which indicated a total of $3,646,747.83 – is controlling. See 

United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2010). We 

therefore remand for the District Court to correct the specific 

amounts owed to each of Fareri’s victims, so that the amounts

add up to a total of $3,646,747.83.

We affirm Fareri’s sentence. We also remand for the 

District Court to consider Fareri’s ineffective-assistance claim 

in the first instance and for the District Court to correct the 

amount of restitution that Fareri must pay his victims.

So ordered.

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