Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01341/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01341-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Shawn Henderson
Petitioner
Mike Knowles
Respondent

Document Text:

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY SHAWN HENDERSON, No. CIV S-04-1341-GEB-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. AMENDED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on July 13, 2004, respondent’s answer (Doc. 8), filed on

January 4, 2005, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 15), filed on February 24, 2005. On September 7,

2005, petitioner filed a notice of new case law making the court aware of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, as amended on denial of rehearing by 408 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.

2005). Respondent has not responded to this filing.

/ / /

/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

Prosecution Case-in-Chief

On August 13, 2000, at about 2:30 a.m., Sacramento Sheriff’s

Deputy Tyler Neff was dispatched to Raley’s market on Folsom

Boulevard. He contacted Shonda Baker who was crying and appeared to

be in what he termed a “panic mode.” Her eye was swollen halfway shut,

and she had swelling on her cheek and an abrasion on her hand.

Baker told Neff that, at about 2:00 a.m., two men approached her

and took her purse. She then followed the men to the First Value Inn

(Inn), located a short distance away.

Neff drove Baker to the Inn and took a more detailed statement. 

Baker said that two Black men approached her while she was waiting for a

taxi. The man who stole her purse, later identified as defendant, punched

her three times in the face. Baker told Neff that defendant’s companion

looked shocked or surprised when defendant struck her and ran off with

her purse. Baker watched the men go to the Inn where they entered room

116. She had never seen these men before. She was still crying and was

starting to calm down. The right side of her face felt numb.

While speaking to Baker in the patrol car outside the Inn, Deputy

Neff was approached by Mejeed Hunter, the man who was with defendant

at the time of the attack.

Hunter testified that he first met defendant the previous afternoon

at Cesar Chavez Park. The men smoked crack cocaine and made their

way to the Inn. Defendant and Hunter left room 116 of the Inn at

approximately 1:30 a.m. and walked to Wong’s Palace, a Chinese

restaurant and bar. Defendant solicited people coming out of the bar for a

ride. One of those patrons was Baker. She told the two men that she was

stranded as well and was going to take a taxi. After learning that Baker

had taxi fare, defendant, who was standing behind Baker, gestured to

Hunter by putting his fist to his chin. Hunter did not take the gesture

seriously because defendant looked comical. However, moments later,

defendant stepped in front of Baker and grabbed her purse. When she

resisted, he punched her three times in the face. After defendant gained

control of the purse, he and Hunter went back to the motel room. Hunter

returned to the motel room because he was afraid and did not know what

to do.

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Once inside the motel room, defendant went through the purse. He

became upset when he discovered it held no money. Hunter left moments

later and approached Deputy Neff outside the motel. He left the room

because he was very nervous. 

Defense

Defendant challenged the credibility of Hunter’s testimony through

the testimony of two defense investigators who had questioned Hunter

before trial. Defendant also presented evidence that he was wearing green

pants on the morning of the robbery and not black sweat pants as

described by Baker. 

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of second degree robbery and

falsely identifying himself to a police officer. The trial court found true the allegation that

petitioner had one prior serious felony conviction. Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years in state

prison concurrent with six months in county jail. 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in a reasoned

decision issued on September 25, 2002. On December 11, 2002, the California Supreme Court

denied review. Petitioner subsequently filed three state habeas petitions. The Sacramento

County Superior Court denied his first habeas petition in a reasoned decision issued on June 3,

2003. The Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s second and third

petitions without comment or citation. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

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habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to

reach petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

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governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining the rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refused to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot

necessarily be found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

is clearly erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

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283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

In his pro se petition, petitioner makes the following claims: 

1. Petitioner should be granted relief because the trial court committed

reversible error when it ruled that Shonda Baker’s hearsay statement to

Deputy Neff . . . was admissible as an excited utterance;

2. Petitioner should be granted relief because the trial court failed to

adequately [instruct the jury in response] to a juror note submitted during

deliberations;

3. Petitioner should be granted relief because the trial court failed in its sua

sponte duty to deliver accomplice jury instructions following testimony of

Majeed Hunter supporting this theory;

4. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to trial

by jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community;

5. The prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly expressing her

personal opinion concerning petitioner’s guilt in violation of his due

process right;

6. The prosecutor committed misconduct by infringing upon petitioner’s

Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to testify against himself at

trial;

7. The . . . prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly vouching for the

credibility of its witnesses;

/ / /

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8. The trial court violated petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

[right] to compulsory process; and

9. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Respondent concedes these claims are exhausted. 

A. Hearsay

Petitioner claims the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Baker’s hearsay

statements to Deputy Neff. Specifically, petitioner asserts:

Ms. Shonda Baker gave . . . Deputy Neff two statements shortly

after the charged crimes were committed. The first statement came when

the Deputy met Ms. Baker in the Raley’s Shopping Market parking lot

shortly after Baker reported the alleged robbery. At trial. Deputy Neff

characterized this statement as a brief overview of what was alleged to

have taken place. . . . The second statement taken by the Police was much

more detailed and it was made outside of the First Value Inn, minutes after

the first statement was made. Most notably, this second statement . . .

from Ms. Baker included a description of the robbery suspect. At the

outset of the trial, the trial court determined over Petitioner’s objections

that the statements were admissible as “excited utterances” within the

meaning of the California Evidence Code. . . . This trial court ruling led to

the revelation at trial of both statements through the testimony of Deputy

Neff.

Petitioner contends that the admission of this hearsay evidence resulted in a “violation of

substantive rights.” In addressing this claim, the state court first concluded that the evidence was

admissible under California law under the exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous

declarations. As to the constitutional dimension of petitioners claim, the state court concluded

that petitioner’s right to confront witnesses was not violated because “‘[t]he hearsay exception

for spontaneous declarations is among those “firmly rooted” exceptions that carry sufficient

indicia of reliability to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause.’” (citations omitted). 

The state court also addressed prejudice and held:

Alternatively, admission of Baker’s second statement to Neff was

not prejudicial because it was cumulative of other evidence. They jury

heard Baker’s first statement to Neff, in which she stated that two men

approached her and took her purse. The jury also heard Hunter’s

testimony identifying defendant as the perpetrator and describing the

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In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court held that new constitutional rules of 2

criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new

rules are announced unless they fall within two exceptions to the general rule. See 489 U.S. 288

(1989). The two exceptions are if the new constitutional rule of criminal procedure would “place

certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of criminal-law making

authority...” or “require the observance of ‘those procedures that...are ‘implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty.’” Id. at 307; see also, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990). In Bockting,

8

crime’s prelude, commission, and aftermath in far greater detail than

appears in Baker’s second statement. Indeed, Hunter’s testimony

consumes 52 paged of trial transcript, whereas Baker’s statement

consumes just three pages. As we explain in part III . . . Hunter was not

an accomplice and his testimony did not require corroboration. Contrary

to defendant’s argument, it was Hunter’s eyewitness testimony, and not

Baker’s hearsay statement, which provided “the most persuasive element

of the prosecution’s case.” On this record, admission of Baker’s statement

was harmless by any standard. 

The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant from unreliable hearsay evidence

being presented against him during trial. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI. Prior to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the admission of

hearsay evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause where the hearsay fell within a firmly

rooted exception to the hearsay rule or otherwise contained “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,

66 (1980). In Crawford, however, the Supreme Court announced a new rule: Out-of-court

statements by witnesses not appearing at trial that are testimonial are barred under the

Confrontation Clause unless the witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a chance to

cross-examine, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the trial court. See 

541 U.S. at 51. 

The Ninth Circuit held in Bockting v. Bayer, that the Crawford rule should be

applied retroactively on collateral review. See 399 F.3d 1010, as amended on denial of rehearing

by 408 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the court held that retroactive application of

Crawford does not violate the non-retroactivity principle set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288 (1989). However, on February 28, 2007, the United States Supreme Court announced its 2

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the Ninth Circuit held that Crawford applied retroactively because it altered the understanding of

the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. See 399 F.3d at 1019-

20.

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decision in Whorton v. Bockting, ___ U.S. ___ (Feb. 28, 2007), reversing the Ninth Circuit’s

holding in Bockting. The Supreme Court concluded that Crawford does not apply retroactively

to cases on collateral review. In considering this claim, the state court applied Lilly v. Virginia

and Ohio v. Roberts. Because these were the controlling cases at the time, and because

Crawford cannot be applied retroactively, this court must review the state court’s decision under

the more deferential “unreasonable application of” standard. 

In the presence of the jury, Deputy Neff testified, in relevant part, as follows:

Q: Did you take a statement from Ms. Baker while she was at

Raley’s?

A: I took a brief statement.

* * *

Q: And what did [Ms. Baker] tell you at that time?

A: She told me that at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning she was

standing out in front of Wong’s Palace, which is just down from the

Raley’s in the same shopping complex, and while she was standing out

there, two guys came up to her, approached her and basically stole her

purse.

Q: And at that point what did you do next?

A: Well, she told me that she had followed these two guys across the

street to the First Value Inn, which is a motel, so I put her in the back set

of my car and we drove over to that parking lot.

* * *

Q: And while in the parking lot, what did you do?

A: Then I began taking a detailed statement from her.

Q: And what did she tell you at that time; how did this incident start?

A: That she was waiting for a taxi outside of Wong’s Palace when

two black males walked up to her and they had asked her a question about

if they could give her a ride – if she could give them a ride up to North

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Sacramento, and she basically told them she did not have a car, that she

was waiting for a taxi. 

Q: And when she told them she was waiting for a taxi, did she give

you a description of the two males that approached her?

A: Yes, she did.

* * *

A: The first subject she described as a black male about five ten, he

was wearing black sweat pants and a red shirt and he had a ponytail, small

ponytail on the back of his head. The second guy, she didn’t have a

clothing description of him, but I believe she said he was about five eight,

a hundred and fifty pounds. 

Q: Also a black male?

A: Also a black male.

Q: And after they had this conversation that she said she was getting a

taxi, what happened next?

A: Well, there was some discussion about her having money to pay

for a taxi.

Q: Who did she have this discussion with?

A: The first guy, the guy with the ponytail.

Q: Okay. And at that point what did she say happened?

A: She said she had her purse hung over her shoulder and just all of a

sudden, the guy punched her three times in the face and took her purse.

Deputy Neff then testified as to what Baker told him about the actual incident and the injuries

she sustained. Neff further testified as follows:

Q: So when these two guys ran off, what did she do at that point?

A: She wanted to follow them. What she told me she was scared, she

didn’t want them to see where she was running to or she was following

them, but she did watch them go over to the First Value Inn where they

entered the motel room.

Q: Was she able to give you the motel room number?

A: Yes.

/ / /

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Applying the test which controlled at the time of petitioner’s trial and subsequent state

court proceedings, admission of the challenged hearsay would not have violated petitioner’s

Confrontation Clause rights if: (1) it fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule; and

(2) contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 123-24. Under

this standard, the state court concluded that Baker’s out-of-court statements were admissible

under the firmly rooted spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically, the

state court held: 

The California Supreme Court has explained that, “‘[t]o render

[statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is

required that: (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to

produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and

unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time

to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be

supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance;

and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence

preceding it.’” (citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has further explained that, “‘[n]either lapse of

time between the event and the declaration nor the fact that the

declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of

spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress

of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.’”

(citations omitted).

Thus, the court has held that “‘[t]he crucial element in determining

whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible . . . is the

mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterance – how long it was

made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for

example – may be important, but solely as in indicator of the mental state

of the declarant.’” (citations omitted). “Whether a statement satisfies the

requirements of the spontaneous declaration exception is ‘largely a

question of fact’ and is within the discretion of the trial court.” (citations

omitted).

Therefore, the hearsay in question would be reliable and admissible if it fell within the

spontaneous declaration exception. In concluding that Baker’s out-of-court statements satisfied

the requirements of this exception, the state court held:

In this case the robbery, the arrival of police, and the recording of

Baker’s statements all occurred within less than an hour. The traumatic

effect of being robbed and bludgeoned by an attacker would, in all

probability, be profound. Although Baker was “significantly calmer”

when Deputy Neff questioned her during the second interview than she

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had been during the first interview, her hard breathing, rapid speech, and

complaints of numbness support a finding that she was still “under the

stress of excitement” and that her “reflective powers were still in

abeyance,” within the meaning of [California law]. Admission of the

statement was a spontaneous declaration was not an abuse of discretion. 

As to Baker’s out-of-court statements, petitioner concedes that her first statements

to deputy Neff were spontaneous declarations. As to Baker’s second statements to Neff,

petitioner contends that they were no longer excited. Specifically, petitioner asserts that Baker’s

hard breathing, rapid speech, and complaints of numbness were the result of Baker having

smoked crack cocaine “in prior proximity to her giving her overall statements.” The problem

with this argument is that there is no evidence in the record that Baker had smoked crack cocaine

just prior to the incident. Petitioner admits as much when he states that this is “unexplored

evidence.” Given the facts as outlined by the state court, this court cannot say that the state

court’s decision was an unreasonable application of Ohio and Lilly. 

B. Jury Instruction Claims

Petitioner’s second and third claims challenge jury instructions. Specifically, in

petitioner’s second claim concerning the trial court’s response to a note from a juror, petitioner

asserts that the trial court erred by not rereading CALJIC No. 2.90 regarding proof beyond a

reasonable doubt when it responded to the juror’s note. In his third claim, petitioner argues that

the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury under CALJIC Nos. 3.10, 3.11, and 3.18

regarding accomplice testimony. 

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright,

786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Thus, a challenge to jury

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instructions does not generally give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768

F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury

instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

/ / /

/ / /

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It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).

1. Juror Note

As to petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury

under CALJIC No. 2.90 in response to the juror’s note, the state court said:

Background

Juror No. 1 submitted a note stating, “I am having a difficult time

with Shonda Baker’s validity. I feel the defense should be afforded [the

chance] to cross-examine the victim. I understand the People are charging

Henderson with the crime and not Baker. But I am almost certain the

events of that night happened in a different way. Is this just cause to

support my reasonable doubt? Did not know the absence of Baker

would’ve had such an effect on my verdict.”

* * *

In response, the trial court told the jurors, “all the instructions are

important considering what you all find to be the facts.” The court then

reread CALJIC No. 2.11, which provided, “Neither side is required to call

as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any of the . . .

events disclosed by the evidence or who may appears to have some

knowledge of these events. Neither side is required to produce all objects

or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence.” The court also

reread CALJIC No. 1.03, which provided in relevant part, “You must

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decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this

trial and not from any other source. You must not independently

investigate the facts or the law or consider or discuss facts as to which

there is no evidence. This means, for example, that you must not on your

own visit the scene, conduct experiments or consult reference works or

persons for additional information.”

Defense counsel then objected that CALJIC No. 2.11 “should have

been included with the rereading of the presumption and the burden on the

People.”

Analysis

Defendant claims the trial court should have “referred to” CALJIC

No. 2.90 for two reasons, because Juror No. 1 “did not fully understand”

the concept of reasonable doubt and because “CALJIC No. 2.11 alone

advised the juror that any deficiency that she may have found in the

prosecution’s case due to Shonda Baker’s absence was not to be

considered by her as a lack of proof” of his guilt. Neither point has merit. 

Juror No. 1 did not display any misunderstanding of the concept of

reasonable doubt. Rather, she perceptively asked whether her belief that

“the events . . . happened in a different way” was sufficient to raise a

reasonable doubt. While not demonstrating any misunderstanding, the

question raised an issue that was entrusted to the jury’s determination and

could not be answered by the court. Thus, the court properly refrained

from instructing as to how much significance could be attached to Baker’s

absence. 

The trial court’s comment that “all the instructions are important

considering what you all find to be the facts” told the jurors that

instructions such as CALJIC No. 2.90 remained important even though

they were not reread along with CALJIC Nos. 2.11 and 1.03. Thus, the

jury was told not to consider “CALJIC No. 2.11 alone,” as defendant

suggests. The jury had no basis to draw the erroneous conclusion that

“any deficiency” in the prosecution case “due to Baker’s absence was not

to be considered” as a lack of proof of guilt. There was no error. 

Because the state court considered whether the failure to reread CALJIC No. 2.90 affected the

jury’s understanding of its role, this court concludes that it applied the correct law and will,

therefore, review under the “unreasonable application of” standard. 

As the state court observed, there is no evidence to suggest that any member of

the jury did not understand the concept of reasonable doubt. In fact, as Juror No. 1's note

demonstrates, the concept was clear. The juror simply wanted to know whether Baker’s absence

constituted reasonable doubt, a question which the trial court could not answer. Moreover,

because the trial court instructed the jury that all instructions were important, and because it

must be presumed that the jury followed all instructions it was given, there was no danger that

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the failure to reread CALJIC No. 2.90 somehow diminished the prosecution’s burden. 

2. Accomplice Testimony

As to petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct

the jury regarding accomplice testimony, the state court stated:

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to deliver

accomplice instructions on its own motion following the testimony of

Majeed Hunter. We are not persuaded.

“Under section 1111, an accomplice is ‘one who is liable to

prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial

in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.’ To be

chargeable with an identical offense, a witness must be considered a

principal under section 31. [Citation.] An accomplice must have ‘“guilty

knowledge and intent with regard to the commission of the crime.”’

[Citation.] ‘If there is evidence from which the jury could find that a

witness is an accomplice to the crime charged, the court must instruct the

jury on accomplice testimony. [Citation.] But if the evidence is

insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that a witness is an

accomplice, the trial court may make that determination and, in that

situation, need not instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. [Citation.]’

[Citations.]” 

In order for a witness to be deemed an accomplice, “the record

must establish . . . either that the witnesses aided and abetted defendant in

committing the [robbery] [citations] or was involved in a conspiracy in

which that person harbored the intent to commit the offense that was the

object of the conspiracy. [Citation.]” In this case, there was no evidence

that Hunter aided or abetted, or conspired with, defendant. 

Instead, defendant relies on evidence that Hunter was with him

“before, during, and after the robbery” and “did not part company” with

him “until after it was determined the robbery had not resulted in any

financial gain.” However, neither presence at the scene of a crime nor

failure to prevent its commission is sufficient to establish aiding or

abetting. Nor is “general willingness . . . to violate the law” sufficient;

Hunter’s admission “to smoking crack cocaine on the day in question” did

not suggest he was an accomplice to second degree robbery.

Because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support

a finding that Hunter was an accomplice, the trial court was not required

to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony.

 

Here, the state court held that, under California law, there was insufficient

evidence that Hunter was an accomplice. The state court concluded, therefore, that the duty to

give accomplice testimony instructions was never triggered. This court agrees and cannot say

that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was either “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

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application of” federal law. Specifically, the facts reveal that Hunter did not take petitioner’s

gesture of putting his fist to his chin seriously and that Hunter only went with petitioner to the

motel after the incident because he was afraid. There is no evidence that Hunter shared

petitioner’s specific intent. Therefore, Hunter was not an accomplice. 

C. Jury Composition

Petitioner – who is black – contends that he was denied a fair jury of his peers

because the jury consisted of only white people. Petitioner does not argue that the prosecutor

improperly challenged black venirepersons. Rather, his argument is that there simply were no

blacks in the pool of prospective jurors called for his case. This claim was first raised in the

state court in petitioner’s first habeas corpus petition. The state court denied the claim as

procedurally defaulted because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Respondent argues

that this court is, therefore, barred from reviewing the claim. Respondent also argues that the

claim fails on the merits. 

Assuming without deciding that this court can reach the merits, to prevail

petitioner must show: (1) that the group alleged to have been excluded is distinctive; (2) that the

representation of this group in the venire pool is not fair and reasonable in light of the number of

such persons in the community; and (3) that the lack of adequate representation of the group is

due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357

(1979); United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, there is

no evidence of systematic exclusion of blacks on venire panels. Therefore, whether on the

merits or as a result of a procedural bar, this claim should be denied. 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims

Petitioner raises three claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he argues that

the prosecutor improperly expressed her personal opinion concerning petitioner’s guilt. Second,

petitioner contends that the prosecutor improperly sought self-incriminating testimony. Third,

petitioner claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of prosecution

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In his statement of this claim, petitioner also challenges other statements made 3

during closing which he alleges improperly vouched for witness credibility. This will be

discussed below in section III.D.3.

18

witnesses. As with his jury composition claim, these three claims were not raised on direct

appeal and were denied by the state habeas court for this procedural reason. Respondent argues

that this court is procedurally barred from reviewing the claims and also that they fail on the

merits. 

Again, assuming without deciding that this court may reach the merits, success on

a claim of prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the conduct so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. See Greer v. Miller, 483

U.S. 756, 765 (1987). The conduct must be examined to determine “whether, considered in the

context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to have affected the jury's discharge of its

duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Even if an error of constitutional magnitude is determined, such error is considered harmless if

the court, after reviewing the entire trial record, concludes that the alleged error did not have a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Error is deemed harmless unless it “is of such a

character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights.” Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-761 (1946). Depending on the case, a prompt and effective

admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial judge may effectively “neutralize

the damage” from the prosecutor’s error. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th

Cir. 1993) (citing Simtob, 901 F.2d at 806).

1. Opinion

Petitioner challenges two statements made by the prosecutor during her closing

arguments. Specifically, petitioner claims: 3

. . . Petitioner . . . contends that the State prosecutor improperly

interjected her personal opinion with regard to Petitioner’s credibility and

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guilt by calling him a liar by stating: (1) “The first words that come out of

Mr. Henderson’s mouth during this whole incident was a lie.” and 

(2) “And so the person that has truly lied to us so far is the defendant.” 

This claim lacks merit because the prosecution may properly label testimony as lies or

fabrication. See Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sarno, 73

F.3d 1470, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1995); Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). Moreover, the trial court neutralized any possible error by instructing the jury that

comments made by counsel during closing argument are not evidence. 

2. Self-Incrimination

Petitioner challenges the following statement made by the prosecutor during her

closing arguments:

He was within the same time frame that the Raley’s people saw

her. He was within the same time frame that Neff saw her. It was all

within the same time, it all came together where they ran, there the purse

ended up, and everybody who testified all corroborated Mr. Hunter’s

testimony and Shonda Baker’s testimony. You have heard no other

evidence of anything else regarding as to how this happened. 

Specifically, petitioner asserts:

. . . The comment improperly suggests that it is highly unlikely that

anyone else other than Petitioner could contradict, deny, rebut, or dispute

the State prosecution’s evidence. Thus, the State prosecutor’s comments

on Petitioner’s failure to testify violates not only the Fifth Amendment,

but also due process right to a fair trial and therefore requires a reversal of

Petitioner’s conviction.

On the merits of petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor’s comments improperly

brought attention to petitioner’s decision not to testify, the court agrees with respondent that no

error occurred. First, the prosecutor’s statement neither asked the jury to draw an adverse

inference from the lack of testimony from petitioner, nor asked the jury to treat petitioner’s

silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 

Second, the comments were not extensive. See Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir.

1993). Third, the prosecutor never asserted petitioner’s silence as a basis for conviction. See id. 

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The court finds that the prosecutor’s statements were directed to the lack of evidence in support

of the defense, and not directed specifically to petitioner’s decision not to testify. 

3. Vouching

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly

vouching for the credibility of prosecution witnesses. In his fifth claim for relief, petitioner

challenges the following comment made by the prosecutor during her closing arguments:

When I flip through a file in my office and read through the facts of the

case, I have to make a determination can I prove this beyond a reasonable

doubt? And I know what that standard is.

Petitioner argues:

. . . This comment is improper because the State prosecutor is

personally vouching for the strength of the Government’s case and that

she would not have presented the case to the jury had she not known that

the Petitioner was guilty. 

In his seventh claim for relief, petitioner asserts that the prosecutor also improperly vouched for

Hunter’s testimony and Baker’s out-of-court statements. As to Hunter, petitioner challenges the

following statements made by the prosecutor:

Now, Mr. Hunter told you what he saw, and he was honest and he

was pretty forthcoming with you. He had nothing to hide.

* * *

And but what – and so, he had nothing to hide, nothing, didn’t do

anything to make himself sound or look better, so he just came in and told

you the truth. He told you the truth here. 

* * *

Now, Mr. Hunter came in here and told you the truth. Keeping in

mind his reputation is on the line, he had to tell these people what he did

that day. . . . 

And he has been truthful and forthright here. . . .

As to Baker, petitioner challenges the following statements made by the prosecutor:

Shonda Baker’s testimony came through Officer Neff, and that

testimony came in through Officer Neff because it is reliable testimony

and it is a reliable statement . . . 

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* * *

. . . There is absolutely no motive for her to lie in this case. 

In bolstering a witness's credibility, a prosecutor may not overstep the bounds of

propriety and fairness. Vouching is improper when the prosecutor places “the prestige of the

government behind the witness” by providing “personal assurances of [the] witness’s veracity.” 

United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Roberts, 618

F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)). “A prosecutor has no business telling the jury his individual 

impressions of the evidence.” Id. There is no bright-line rule about when improper vouching

has occurred. A number of factors must be weighed including: (1) the form of vouching; 

(2) how much the vouching implies that the prosecutor has knowledge outside the record of the

witness's truthfulness; (3) any inference that the court is monitoring the witness's veracity; (4)

the degree of personal opinion asserted; (5) the timing of the vouching; (6) the extent to which

the witness's credibility was attacked; (7) the specificity and timing of a curative instruction; and 

(8) the importance of the witness's testimony and the vouching to the case overall. See United

States v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1154, 1158, 1278 (9th Cir. 1996). When reviewing for plain error, the

court must then balance the seriousness of the vouching against the strength of any curative

instruction and closeness of the case. Statements bearing on credibility that are plainly advanced

as argument do not constitute vouching. See id.

As to the prosecutor’s comments regarding the burden of proof, the court finds

that there was no vouching. Specifically, the prosecutor did not give any personal assurances as

to the veracity of specific evidence. Rather, the comments were part of the prosecutor’s larger

explanation of the burden of proof in criminal cases. Similarly, as to the prosecutor’s comments

regarding Hunter and Baker, she was simply outlining why she thought the evidence shows they

are credible. Because the prosecutor did not refer to evidence outside the record or make any

personal guarantees as to truthfulness, there was no error. See United States v. Necoechea, 986

F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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Petitioner does not present any evidence of governmental misconduct, such as 4

witness intimidation, which is required for a claim of denial of compulsory process.

22

E. Compulsory Process

Petitioner claims that his constitutional compulsory process right to present

witnesses in his own defense was violated when the trial court excluded “evidence and crossexamination regarding Shonda Baker’s untruthfulness and credibility.” Specifically, petitioner

asserts that the trial court erred: (1) by excluding evidence that, on a prior occasion, Baker had

been arrested by Neff; and (2) by refusing to allow petitioner to cross-examine Neff concerning

false statements made to him by Baker. This claim was not raised on direct appeal and the state

habeas court denied it as procedurally defaulted. Respondent argues that this court is barred

from reviewing the claim and also argues that, in any event, it lacks merit. 

At the outset, the court observes that petitioner’s claim in essence presents a

challenge to the state court’s evidentiary rulings. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 4

U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195,

1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of

state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir.

1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be

utilized to try state issues de novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Because federal habeas

relief does not lie for state law errors, a state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

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process. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d

971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see

also Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994). In order to raise such a claim in

a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage

of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293, 294-

95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In this case, the following exchange occurred between the trial court and

petitioner’s counsel regarding evidence that Baker had been arrested by Neff on a prior occasion:

THE COURT: . . . And simply because a person has been arrested,

what does that mean?

MR. BONHAM: Well, what that means is that this woman has

avoided, has intentionally avoided coming in as a witness because of the

fact that she has a warrant apparently, a warrant out for her arrest. 

THE COURT: I tell you the truth, if that’s what you are going to

do, that doesn’t mean anything to me, and that is speculative, it is

collateral and it would result in an undue consumption of time. And if

that’s what you wish to get into, under Evidence Code section 352, for the

reason I just stated, you shall not get into it. 

Petitioner has not alleged how this evidentiary ruling so infected the trial as to render it

fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. This court agrees with the trial court that

evidence that Baker had been arrested on a previous occasion is collateral and simply not

relevant. 

As to petitioner’s efforts to cross-examine Neff, the following exchange took

place:

THE COURT: All right. We are outside the presence of the jury.

There is an objection. Mr. Bonham.

MR. BONHAM: Yes, your honor. On the evening, August 13th, the

alleged victim identified herself as Shonda Teresa Baker, with a date of

birth of 3-19-1956.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. BONHAM: When this officer arrested Ms. – the alleged victim

on November 12th for being drunk in public, she – 

* * *

MR. BONHAM: She identified herself as Shonda Marie Divengenes

with a date of birth of February 22nd, 1958.

THE COURT: So what’s the point?

MR. BONHAM: The point is that the victim here lied, and I believe

that I have a right to present that to the jury, that the victim has

misidentified herself to this officer subsequently, and this – this officer

doesn’t know who she is.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained for the same reasons that

I have already sustained the objection earlier under 352. It is adequately

in the record. I see no reason to change the ruling.

* * *

MR. BONHAM: I mean, this would take no more than five minutes.

THE COURT: It is not the duration of time. It is the relevance. It

is the undue consumption of time. You tried to get into this area to

indicate that this officer arrested the victim some months after this crime

for drunk in public. You were trying to establish a theory to get it in, and

I see no difference, and the objection is sustained. 

MR. BONHAM: Just for the record, I believe that this goes to the

trustworthiness of – 

THE COURT: Please, the record is adequately covered. . . .

Petitioner argues that he was entitled to introduce evidence that Baker lied in an effort to show

that her out-of-court statements to Neff were not reliable. However, as discussed above, the

reliability of Baker’s out-of-court statements comes from their excited nature. In particular, for

the spontaneous declaration exception to apply in the first place, the court must determine that

the declarant made the statements before there was time to contrive or misrepresent. Because the

state court correctly concluded that the spontaneous declaration exception applied to Baker’s

out-of-court statements, it necessarily follows that Baker did not have time to contrive or

misrepresent her statements. Evidence that she may have given a false name does not change

that. 

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F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his

attorney failed to object during the prosecution’s closing arguments. The Sixth Amendment

guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court set forth the

test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688. To this end,

petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must then determine

whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professional competent assistance. See id. In making this determination, however,

there is a strong presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable

assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions

made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

Applying the Strickland standard to petitioner’s claim, the state court stated:

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

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object to prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. Petitioner alleges that

the prosecutor gave her personal opinion on Petitioner’s guilt, referred to

Petitioner’s failure to testify, and vouched for the credibility of prosecution

witnesses. However, petitioner has produced neither evidence of the

alleged prosecutorial misconduct, nor evidence to show that counsel failed

to object. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that counsel’s conduct

was deficient. Likewise, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the

omissions. 

Because the state court applied the correct federal law, this court reviews under the “unreasonable

application of” standard. As discussed above, there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore,

as the state court reasoned, counsel’s performance could not have been deficient in the way

petitioner argues. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment

and close this file.. 

These amended findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20

days after being served with these amended findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge's Amended Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 5, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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