Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03428/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03428-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Katavich
Respondent
Charles Turner
Petitioner

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHARLES TURNER, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOHN KATAVICH, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 14-cv-3428-TEH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Charles Turner, a state prisoner, has filed this pro se 

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not 

be granted. Respondent has filed an answer. For the reasons set 

forth below, the petition is DENIED. 

I 

On August 21, 2011, a Contra Costa County jury found 

Petitioner guilty of second degree murder of Lathel Douglas Sr. 

and attempted voluntary manslaughter of Lathel Douglas Jr. 

Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 217-19. Petitioner was sentenced to 

47 years to life in state prison. Id. at 540-46. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. 

People v. Turner, No. A132790, 2013 WL 1641280 (Cal. Ct. App. 

April 17, 2013). The California Supreme Court denied review. 

Answer, Exs. 9, 10. 

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II 

The following factual background is taken from the order of 

the California Court of Appeal.1

Prosecution's Case 

The Involved Parties 

Douglas Sr. lived at 1729 First Street in 

North Richmond. Douglas Jr. had lived in the 

house with his father and uncle, but moved 

out when his father got married. After 

moving out, Douglas Jr. continued to keep 

some clothing and personal effects at his 

father's house. 

Douglas Jr. knew Quianna Moore from high 

school. The two were friends, but not 

romantically involved. Moore was a heavy 

drug user, and Douglas Jr. had both sold 

drugs to her and used drugs with her. 

Douglas Jr. did not really know Vanessa 

Perez, but had seen her around the projects. 

Perez had lived in North Richmond for several 

years prior to the shooting. She had been 

living with her mother in an apartment in the 

public housing projects on West Ruby Street, 

until about five months before the shooting, 

when she moved in with a girlfriend on First 

Street. Perez met Turner, whom she knew as 

“Noony,” in late 2008, when he visited a 

cousin who lived in the unit next door to 

Perez's mother. Perez met Moore through 

Turner. In September 2008, Turner and Moore 

had a child together. 

Douglas Jr.'s Testimony 

Douglas Jr. testified that, on November 6, 

2009, he was driving past the West Ruby 

Street projects, where he saw Moore and 

Perez. Moore spotted Douglas Jr. and waved 

him over. Douglas Jr. needed gas money and 

asked Moore if she wanted to buy a $10 bag of 

marijuana. Moore agreed, but said she needed 

a ride to a nearby house to get the money. 

Moore got into the car, while Perez stayed 

behind. 

 

1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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Moore directed Douglas Jr. to a house nearby 

on Warren Street, which was around the corner 

from Douglas Sr.'s home on First Street. She 

went inside to get the money while Douglas 

Jr. waited in the car. After a few minutes, 

Moore hurried out of the house and got into 

the car. She was agitated. She said, “he's 

comin',” and urgently told Douglas Jr. to 

“drive off.” 

As Douglas Jr. made a u-turn, he saw “[s]ome 

dude” he did not know approach. The man 

pointed a handgun at Douglas Jr. and told him 

to stop the car. Two other men were off to 

the side. The man with the gun walked around 

to the passenger side and told Moore to get 

out of the car. Moore refused. Douglas Jr. 

told Moore, “the dude got a gun. Open the 

door.” When Moore still did not open the 

door, Douglas Jr. reached across Moore and 

opened her door. FN3. 

FN3. The passenger door of Douglas 

Jr.'s car was defective and required a 

special maneuver to open it. 

Douglas Jr. asked what was going on. The man 

responded: “‘It has nothing to do with you.’” 

Douglas Jr. tried to explain that he and 

Moore were not involved; as he put it, 

“[Moore was] actually trying to get high.” 

This explanation made the armed man angrier. 

He began swearing at Moore, telling her she 

was not supposed to get high. He also said 

something like, “this is my kid.” Moore 

still refused to get out of the car. After 

five minutes, the man said, “forget it,” shut 

the car door, and walked off. 

Douglas Jr. drove up the street a block, 

pulled over, and asked Moore to get out of 

the car because he did not want trouble. 

Moore responded that she still wanted to buy 

marijuana, and if he waited a few minutes, 

she would run back to the house to get $10. 

Douglas Jr. needed gas money in order to get 

to his son's birthday party and he 

reluctantly agreed. Moore returned a few 

minutes later with the cash, and Douglas Jr. 

gave her a small bag of marijuana. He then 

drove Moore back to the West Ruby Street 

projects. 

There, they again met up with Perez. Perez 

joined them in the car. Douglas Jr. agreed 

to give Moore and Perez a ride to San Pablo 

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since he was heading to Pinole. Along the 

way, the three stopped by a gas station and 

smoked marijuana. FN4. Douglas Jr. then 

dropped the women off at Moore's friend's 

home in San Pablo. Douglas Jr. went to his 

son's birthday party in Pinole. 

FN4. Douglas Jr. was already high on 

methamphetamine at the time. 

Later that evening, Moore called Douglas Jr. 

for a ride home. He picked up the women, and 

they went to another house where they “got 

high some more.” Douglas Jr. commented that 

he needed to get his hair twisted again, and 

Moore offered to twist his braids for him. 

Douglas Jr. drove the women to his father's 

home on First Street where he kept his hair 

products. 

Douglas Jr. arrived at his father's house 

after 1:00 a.m., and backed his car into the 

driveway. He called his father on his cell 

phone to let him in. Douglas Jr. went inside 

the house for several minutes while the women 

waited in the car. Perez was in the back 

seat and Moore was in the front passenger 

seat. Douglas Jr. returned and put his hair 

products in the car. As Douglas Jr. started 

to get in the driver's side of the car, he 

heard the sound of someone coming up behind 

him. He looked up and saw “[s]ome dude in a 

hood” approaching with a gun in his hand. A 

second man was standing nearby, about a car 

length away. 

The armed man went around to the passenger 

side, opened the passenger door, and started 

arguing with Moore, telling her to get out. 

Not wanting a commotion outside his father's 

house late at night, Douglas Jr. told Moore: 

“Get the fuck up off my car with this shit.” 

Immediately thereafter, the man raised the 

gun and shot Douglas Jr. in the neck. FN5. 

Douglas Jr. spun around and fell to the 

ground next to his car, where he played dead. 

Both men came around to the driver's side and 

went through Douglas Jr.'s pockets, taking 

his wallet. Douglas Jr. still had his cell 

phone in his hand. He called his father and 

whispered into the phone that he had been 

shot. 

FN5. On cross-examination, Douglas Jr. 

testified somewhat differently. He said 

that, before the shooting, the armed man 

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asked Douglas Jr., “‘What are you doing 

with this bitch?’” Douglas Jr. 

responded: “‘What are you talking 

about?’” The man repeated his question, 

and before Douglas Jr. could respond, 

the man shot him. 

Douglas Jr. did not see his father come 

outside. However, as Douglas Jr. was laying 

on the ground, he heard the gate open and 

heard Douglas Sr. say, “Hey little nigga.” 

Then, Douglas Jr. saw the man who had shot 

him extend his right arm and heard the man 

fire three shots at Douglas Sr. He did not 

see the gun. Immediately after the three 

shots were fired, the armed man fled the 

scene. 

Douglas Jr. ran across the street to his 

neighbor's house and frantically asked him to 

call an ambulance for his father. The police 

were dispatched to the scene at 1:25 a.m., 

and arrived within a few minutes. Douglas 

Jr. was taken, by ambulance, for treatment. 

Douglas Sr. suffered gunshot wounds to the 

chest and the foot and was pronounced dead at 

the scene. 

At trial, Douglas Jr. denied knowing the 

shooter's identity and denied ever telling 

the police that Turner was the shooter. He 

also testified that the shooter was not the 

same person who confronted him and Moore with 

a gun on Warren Street. The two men had 

different body types and voices. They were 

also wearing different clothes. Douglas Jr. 

testified: “Code on the streets is don't 

tell, snitch. [¶] ... [¶] Could be the end 

of you, could be fatal.” Douglas Jr. admitted 

that he had a criminal history, including 

convictions for possession of a stolen car 

and petty theft. He was on probation at the 

time of the shootings. 

On cross-examination, however, Douglas Jr. 

was asked about his statements to police 

after the shooting. Douglas Jr. initially 

told police that he had been robbed by 

someone he did not know. After being 

released from the hospital, he repeated the 

same story. He was contacted by officers 

again on November 9 and November 10. On 

November 10, the police came to Douglas Jr.'s 

house and said, “you gotta come talk to us.” 

Douglas Jr. explained that he didn't want to 

talk. The officer's asked Douglas Jr. if he 

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was on probation. When he said “yes,” the 

police said: “[T]ough luck. You're going 

with us now.” At that point, Douglas Jr. 

“felt there was no options, really.... [He 

didn't] want to go to jail.” Douglas Jr. was 

taken to the Martinez police station, where 

the officers said nothing further about his 

probation. At the station, Douglas Jr. 

finally mentioned he was with Perez and 

Moore. Thereafter, the police “kept 

bothering” him. Douglas Jr. continued to 

resist talking to police. On November 16, 

Douglas Jr. again spoke with the police. 

Perez's Testimony 

Perez testified that, on November 6, 2009, 

Douglas Jr. drove by the West Ruby Street 

projects, where Moore and Perez were hanging 

out. Moore and Perez walked over to his car. 

Moore got into the car, while Perez stayed 

behind. Moore and Douglas Jr. returned 10 or 

15 minutes later. Douglas Jr. gave Moore and 

Perez a ride to San Pablo. Along the way, 

the three stopped by a gas station and smoked 

methamphetamine. Douglas Jr. then dropped 

the women off at Moore's friend's home, in 

San Pablo, where they watched television. 

Later that evening, Douglas Jr. returned to 

pick up Moore and Perez. According to Perez, 

he drove them straight back to North 

Richmond. Douglas Jr. commented that he 

needed to get his hair twisted again, and 

Moore agreed to twist his braids for him. 

Douglas Jr. drove the women to his father's 

home on First Street where he kept his hair 

products. 

Douglas Jr. arrived at his father's house and 

backed his car into the driveway. Douglas 

Jr. went inside the house for several minutes 

while the women waited in the car. Douglas 

Jr. returned with his hair products. 

However, unlike Douglas Jr., Perez testified 

that once back in the car, Douglas Jr. 

complained that he needed to fix the 

amplifier in his car to improve the sound 

quality. Moore offered that she knew how to 

adjust the amplifier, and the two of them 

opened the trunk and worked for several 

minutes while Perez waited in the back seat. 

When they finished, Moore returned to the 

passenger seat and Douglas Jr. headed for the 

driver's seat. As Douglas Jr. started to get 

in the car, Perez saw Turner approaching. 

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Turner went to the passenger side of the 

vehicle and started arguing with Moore, 

telling her to get out. The passenger door 

was open, and at some point Moore began 

hugging Turner around the waist, saying, 

“[B]aby, it's okay. Stop.” Douglas Jr. was 

standing between the car and the open 

driver's side door. Perez heard a gunshot 

and saw Douglas Jr. fall to the ground. 

Perez testified that she had seen a black 

handgun in Turner's left hand, which was 

pointed at the ground when Turner was arguing 

with Moore. FN6. Perez was asked: “If 

[Turner] was holding the gun, and he was 

pointing the gun over the hood of the car, 

would you have been able to see his hand or 

the gun from your vantage point?” She 

answered: “No.” 

FN6. At the preliminary hearing, Perez 

testified that Turner was holding the 

gun in his right hand. 

After the shot was fired, Moore was already 

out of the car and the passenger door was 

closed. Turner looked at Perez and said, 

“‘Vanessa, get out.’” Perez said she was 

“freaking out.” She could not open the 

passenger door because it was broken, so she 

climbed out through the driver's door. When 

she got out of the car, Turner told her not 

to tell anyone. She promised she would not 

and started to run. She noticed a second man 

standing on the sidewalk, but she did not see 

him holding a gun. When Perez was around the 

corner, running toward the projects, she 

heard approximately four more shots fired. 

Moore ran in the opposite direction. Perez 

did not see anyone go through Douglas Jr.'s 

pockets. 

A few days later Perez was picked up by 

police and spoke with them at the police 

station. From a photographic lineup, she 

identified Turner as the shooter. Since 

December of 2009, Perez had been receiving 

$800 per month for rent and $575 for 

incidentals from the district attorney's 

witness relocation program. She had been 

threatened by a man named “Dante.” FN7. 

FN7. The jury was instructed: “[T]here 

is no evidence linking [Turner] to the 

threat with regard to [Perez] ... and it 

is not evidence against [Turner] in this 

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case.” 

Jeff Moule's Testimony 

Jeff Moule, then a homicide sergeant with the 

Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office, 

responded to the scene. On November 7, Moule 

interviewed Douglas Jr. after he was released 

from the hospital. Douglas Jr. told Moule 

that two unknown men ran up to him, said it 

was a robbery, shot him, and then fled on 

foot. Douglas Jr. did not mention Perez or 

Moore. Later on November 7, Moule received a 

tip about the identity of the shooter. Moule 

prepared a photo lineup including Turner's 

picture and showed it to Douglas Jr. that 

evening. Douglas Jr. claimed that the 

shooter was not in the lineup. However, 

Moule observed that Douglas Jr. avoided 

looking at Turner's photograph. 

On November 9, 2010, Moule again met with 

Douglas Jr., who said that he lied in his 

earlier statement because he feared for his 

safety and that of his family. He told Moule 

that “[the police] were on the right track” 

and to keep doing what they were doing. 

Moule asked Douglas Jr. to come to the 

station to give an interview the next day, 

but agreed to let Douglas Jr. discuss it with 

his family first. 

The following day, Douglas Jr. initially 

balked at going to the station. Moule then 

told Douglas Jr. that he was interfering with 

the investigation and “being on probation, 

that is not really a proper way to interact 

with law enforcement.” Moule told Douglas 

Jr.: “[H]e needed to come down, that [Moule] 

hadn't called his probation officer but ... 

could have done [so].” At this point, 

Douglas Jr. agreed to be interviewed at 

police headquarters. In the interview, 

Douglas Jr. finally mentioned he was with 

Perez and Moore, mentioned the incident on 

Warren Street, and gave a more detailed 

account of the shooting. Douglas Jr. was 

clear that the same man with the gun on 

Warren Street was the shooter. However, he 

still hesitated to identify the shooter, 

saying he was not comfortable doing so and 

needed to talk to his relatives. 

On November 11, Moule interviewed Perez, who 

gave a full account of the evening and 

identified Turner as the shooter. Turner 

turned himself in that same day. On November 

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14, Douglas Jr. called Moule and said that 

the shooter's photo had been in the bottom 

right corner of the photographic lineup. That 

photo was of Turner. On November 16th, 

Douglas Jr. came to the station on his own. 

He picked Turner out of a new photographic 

lineup and gave a taped statement identifying 

Turner as the shooter. The prosecution 

played a video recording of Douglas Jr.'s 

November 16th taped interview. 

Physical Evidence 

Four shell casings were found at the scene. A 

fired projectile was also found in the front 

passenger floorboard area of Douglas Jr.'s 

car. Bullet damage was found in the roof. 

Ballistics testing demonstrated that the four 

shell casings found at the scene were all 

fired by the same .40 caliber semiautomatic 

handgun. 

Defense Case 

Rhashonda Stevenson's Testimony 

Turner's mother, Rhashonda Stevenson, 

testified that Turner is left-handed. On 

November 11, 2009, Stevenson drove Turner to 

the police station, after learning that he 

was a murder suspect. She also confirmed 

that Turner and Moore had a child together. 

The child was born in September 2008. 

Turner's Demonstration 

Turner did not testify. However, he was 

directed by defense counsel to handwrite his 

name and the letters A through F on an easel 

in front of the jury. The record reflects 

that he did so with his left hand. 

Verdict and Sentence 

In his closing argument, Turner's trial 

counsel argued that the prosecution's main 

witnesses, Douglas Jr. and Perez, were not 

credible. He maintained that their testimony 

implicating Turner was not corroborated, as 

Turner was left-handed and there was no 

fingerprint or DNA evidence tying Turner to 

the scene. 

The jury convicted Turner, on count one, of 

the lesser included offense of second degree 

murder and, on count two, the lesser included 

offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 

The jury also found the firearm enhancements 

to be true as to both counts. The jury found 

Turner not guilty of robbery, but hung on the 

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lesser included offenses for that charge, and 

the court declared a mistrial as to the 

lesser charges. Turner was sentenced to a 

term of 47 years to life in state prison and 

the prosecution dismissed the remaining 

charges. Turner filed a timely notice of 

appeal. 

Turner, 2013 WL 1641280, at *1-5. 

III 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal 

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief 

is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of 

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under 

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

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grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether 

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in 

conducting its analysis, the federal court must presume the 

correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the 

Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a 

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ 

and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of 

the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly 

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A 

federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a 

view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

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Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 17 (2003). 

When applying these standards, the federal court should 

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no 

reasoned opinion from the state’s highest court, the court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

804. 

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and 

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses 

Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that: 1) the trial court 

erred in admitting statements to police made by the victim, 

Douglas Jr.; and 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury 

that they could consider other offenses to establish Petitioner’s 

identity. 

IV 

A 

 Petitioner first contends that statements made by victim 

Douglas Jr. between November 10 and November 16 were the result 

of police coercion and therefore improperly admitted at trial. 

Petitioner argues that police sergeant Moule’s reference to 

Douglas Jr.’s probation status rendered his later statements 

involuntary and they should have been excluded. 

 The California Court of Appeal set forth the background for 

this claim: 

In the middle of Moule's testimony, outside 

the presence of the jury, Turner's trial 

counsel moved to exclude any statements 

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Douglas Jr. made to police after November 10, 

2009, on the ground that the statements were 

coerced. Specifically, Turner's trial 

counsel argued: “[I]t is my position those 

statements over the next five-day period—it's 

not a long period, less than a week—were 

coerced statements, not in the sense of a gun 

to the gentleman's head, but in the sense he 

had no choice, given the prospect of 

incarceration, and it would be a violation of 

due process to admit those statements from 

that point forward....” 

A hearing was held pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 402, in which Moule was examined by 

the People and defense counsel. Moule 

testified: “[On November 10,] I [told Douglas 

Jr.] the problem is ... yesterday, you told 

us that you lied to us, you know. This is a 

homicide. It's a serious investigation. 

You're on probation. I think you need to 

come down with us. You know, you admitted to 

interfering with our investigation. We're 

heading in a direction and then you lied to 

us. You told us nope, that's not it. [¶] So 

now we're looking around some more. We're 

using resources, ... but then you admit no, 

that was a lie. You're on the right track. 

We're at a standstill waiting on your 

truthful statement regarding what happened 

here. [¶] Will you please come with us and 

talk with us ... ? [¶] ... [¶] I don't recall 

I ever said ... you're going to be under 

arrest or going to jail or anything like 

that. You know, I made mention of probation, 

calling his probation officer. I said I had 

not yet. Made mention that he was 

interfering, and ... by admitting that he 

lied to us and we're on the right track, he 

was confusing our investigation, and we 

needed to get the truth out so we can move 

forward. That was the extent.” When Douglas 

Jr. did speak to Moule, later that day, he 

discussed the involvement of Moore and Perez, 

the Warren Street incident, and also said 

that the same man later shot him and his 

father. However, Douglas Jr. continued to 

refuse to identify the shooter by name. 

Between November 10 and November 14, Moule 

repeatedly called and left messages for 

Douglas Jr. On November 14, 2009, Douglas 

Jr. called Moule on the phone and said he 

“want[ed] to come clean.” Douglas Jr. 

identified the shooter's location in the 

photographic lineup he had previously been 

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shown. No mention of probation or 

interference with an investigation came up 

during that conversation. On November 16, 

2009, Douglas Jr. showed up at the police 

station on his own. Moule showed Douglas Jr. 

a second photo lineup and recorded a short 

interview. During that interview, Douglas 

Jr. identified Turner as the shooter. 

Douglas Jr.'s car and cell phone were 

returned to him that same day. Douglas Jr. 

was never handcuffed. 

After hearing argument, the trial court 

concluded that the police conduct did not 

rise to the level of coercion. The trial 

court explained: “First of all, naturally 

they were calling him because he was a victim 

and percipient witness, so I don't find that 

coercion. They gave him a lot of opportunity 

to come forward. While ... Moule mentioned 

that the probation, and certainly one could 

say there's an implicit threat in that. I 

don't find that he threatened him in any way 

that caused [Douglas Jr.] to come forward. 

[¶] I think [Douglas Jr.] came forward on his 

own volition, and I think that's particularly 

highlighted by the fact that on November 14, 

[Douglas Jr.] calls ... and comes in [on 

November 16,] voluntarily. He comes in on 

his own. He isn't even picked up and brought 

in by law enforcement then.... And there was 

a lapse of time between the first interview 

on the 10th and when he ultimately called ... 

on the 14th of November. [¶] So I'm not 

finding that he was coerced or threatened, 

and I do agree that if you do mention the 

probation officer, there could be an implicit 

threat there, but he just mentioned ‘I 

haven't called the probation officer.’ He 

hasn't gone on in great detail ... about what 

could happen ... if I called probation 

officer. [¶] And I do find ... Moule very 

credible.” Turner's motion was denied. 

Turner, 2013 WL 1641280, at *6-7. The California Court of Appeal 

then denied this claim: 

Turner contends that Moule's reference to 

Douglas Jr.'s probation officer made the 

statements coerced. A witness's statement is 

coerced if it is the product of police 

conduct which overcomes the individual's free 

will. (People v. Lee (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 

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772, 782 (Lee).) A statement is considered 

involuntary if not “‘“the product of a 

rational intellect and a free will.”’” 

(Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398.) 

Voluntariness is tested by the totality of 

the circumstances, including the details of 

the interrogation and the characteristics of 

the witness. (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal. 

4th 959, 981, disapproved on other grounds by 

Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 

1046, 1069, fn. 13; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 

(1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226.) 

. . . 

Contrary to Turner's suggestion, this case is 

nothing like Lee, supra, 95 Cal. App. 4th 

772. Moule did not lie to Douglas Jr., 

threaten to call his probation officer unless 

he implicated Turner, nor did Moule ever 

suggest any particular statement police 

wanted Douglas Jr. to give. There is no 

evidence that, before Douglas Jr. implicated 

him, Turner's name was even mentioned by 

Moule. To the extent Moule pressured Douglas 

Jr., it was only to tell the truth. Such 

pressure is permissible. (See People v. 

Boyer, supra, 38 Cal. 4th at p. 445; People 

v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal. 4th at p. 1010; 

People v. Hill, supra, 66 Cal. 2d at p. 549.) 

Even immediately after being subject to 

Moule's pressure, on November 10, Douglas Jr. 

continued to refuse to name the shooter. It 

was only days later, after Turner had turned 

himself in, that Douglas Jr. himself 

initiated statements to police that 

implicated Turner. The evidence in fact 

indicates that any “coercion” Douglas Jr. 

felt was not from police conduct, but from 

his concern not to be identified as a 

“snitch” who voluntarily provided information 

to police. We conclude that Turner has not 

met his burden, under the totality of the 

circumstances, to show that Douglas Jr.'s 

statements, made after November 10, 2009, 

were tainted by improper coercion. 

Turner, 2013 WL 1641280, at *7 (footnote omitted). 

Although the United States Supreme Court has clearly 

established both that the admission of a defendant's involuntary 

statements violates the Constitution (Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 

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U.S. 199, 205 (1960)), and that the prosecution's knowing use of 

the false testimony/statements of a witness, including false 

testimony/statements extorted through violence, violates the 

Constitution (Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)), the 

Supreme Court has not established that the admission of a 

witness's involuntary statements which the prosecutor does not 

know to be false constitutes a violation of the Due Process 

Clause. See Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(discussing absence of Supreme Court authority); Spencer v. 

Biter, 2012 WL 8023845, *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012) (noting 

Supreme Court has never held that accused can challenge admission 

of a witness's coerced statement), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2013 WL 1970244 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2013); Horton v. 

McWean, 2012 WL 6110488, *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov.5, 2012) (“The 

Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the admission of 

coerced testimony of a third party at a criminal trial violates 

the Due Process Clause regardless of falsity.”), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 6131200 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 

2012). 

Although the Supreme Court has not done so, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that a criminal defendant is entitled to habeas 

relief if the admission of coerced third party testimony rendered 

his trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. 

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In the absence of clearly established Supreme Court 

authority, the California Court of Appeal's rejection of 

Petitioner's claim cannot be contrary to, or involve an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

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law; therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. See 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (it is not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for 

state court to decline to apply specific legal rule that has not 

been squarely established by Supreme Court). There are no 

allegations and no indication that Douglas Jr.’s testimony was 

false to support a claim under Napue. The state court discussed 

the statements by Douglas Jr. and the circumstances surrounding 

them and did not find them coerced or false. The police sergeant 

did not threaten to contact Douglas Jr.’s probation officer, 

Douglas Jr. was never handcuffed or detained, and he voluntarily 

came to the police station. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority or an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Nor has petitioner shown that the admission of the testimony 

rendered his trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due 

process. There are no allegations that Petitioner was coerced 

into identifying Petitioner, only that he was coerced into 

cooperating. Assuming arguendo that Douglas Jr.’s testimony 

identifying Petitioner was coerced, there was another eyewitness 

who identified Petitioner as the shooter providing evidence of 

his guilt. Therefore, the trial was not rendered fundamentally 

unfair by Douglas Jr.’s testimony. This claim is denied. 

B 

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred by issuing 

a jury instruction that the jury could consider evidence of the 

Warren Street incident as relevant to the identity of the shooter 

pursuant to a modified version of CALCRIM 375. The jury was 

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instructed that: 

The People presented evidence that the 

defendant committed another offense of 

brandishing a weapon in violation of ... 

section 417 that was not charged in this 

case; [¶] AND [¶] The People presented 

evidence that the defendant had an 

altercation with [Moore] and [Douglas Jr.] on 

Warren Street before the shooting. [¶] You 

may consider this evidence only if the People 

have proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant committed the 

uncharged offense and/or had the altercation. 

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a 

different burden of proof than beyond a 

reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence if you conclude 

that it is more likely than not that the fact 

is true. [¶] If the People have not met this 

burden, you must disregard this evidence 

entirely. [¶] If you decide that the 

defendant committed the uncharged offense or 

act you may, but are not required to, 

consider that evidence for the limited 

purpose of deciding whether or not: [¶] The 

defendant was the person who committed the 

offenses alleged in this case; or [¶] The 

defendant acted with the intent to rob 

[Douglas Jr.], kill [Douglas Jr.] or kill 

[Douglas Sr.]; or [¶] The defendant had a 

motive to commit the offenses alleged in this 

case. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for 

any other purpose except for the limited 

purposes of identity, intent and/or motive. 

[¶] Do not conclude from this evidence that 

the defendant has a bad character or is 

disposed to commit crime. [¶] If you conclude 

that the defendant committed the uncharged 

offense and/or act, that conclusion is only 

one factor to consider along with all the 

other evidence. It is not sufficient by 

itself to prove that the defendant is guilty 

of murder, attempted murder, or robbery. The 

People must still prove each charge and 

allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1171-72; CT at 286. 

However, the California Court of Appeal discussed this claim 

in detail and noted that it was Petitioner who requested this 

instruction and it was his modified version of the jury 

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instruction that was issued. Turner, 2013 WL 1641280, at *8-10. 

The state court then denied the claim under the invited error 

doctrine: 

We agree with the People that the doctrine of 

invited error bars Turner from raising his 

current complaint. “The doctrine of invited 

error bars a defendant from challenging an 

instruction when the defendant has made a 

conscious and deliberate tactical choice to 

request it. [Citations.]” (People v. Enraca 

(2012) 53 Cal. 4th 735, 761; People v. Harris 

(2008) 43 Cal. 4th 1269, 1292–1294.) “‘The 

doctrine of invited error is designed to 

prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on 

appeal because of an error made by the trial 

court at his behest. If defense counsel 

intentionally caused the trial court to err, 

the appellant cannot be heard to complain on 

appeal.... [I]t also must be clear that 

counsel acted for tactical reasons and not 

out of ignorance or mistake.’ In cases 

involving an action affirmatively taken by 

defense counsel, we have found a clearly 

implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to 

invoke the invited error rule. [Citations.]” 

(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal. 

4th 1, 49; see also People v. Wader (1993) 5 

Cal. 4th 610, 657–658.) If the record shows 

no tactical decision, the invited error 

doctrine is not applied. (People v. Harris, 

supra, 43 Cal. 4th at p. 1299.) 

Here, as the above excerpts from the record 

make clear, Turner's trial counsel did not 

merely acquiesce. In fact, he affirmatively 

requested CALCRIM No. 375 and affirmatively 

sought the modified language that was 

ultimately presented to the jury. We can 

infer that Turner sought a tactical advantage 

in doing so. Namely, he sought to add to the 

prosecution's burden of proof with respect to 

the Warren Street incident. Thus, Turner 

cannot be heard to challenge the instruction 

on appeal. 

Turner, 2013 WL 1641280, at *10. 

 The invited error doctrine is recognized as a valid 

procedural default that bars federal habeas review. See, e.g., 

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Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing 

that invited error doctrine may be a valid basis for procedural 

default under habeas review where the state court clearly and 

expressly invoked the invited error doctrine). In this case, 

Petitioner not only failed to object to the jury instruction, but 

in fact requested it. Because the trial court issued 

Petitioner’s requested jury instruction, he is not now entitled 

to claim that the issuance of the instruction was an error. 

A petitioner may show cause for a procedural default by 

establishing constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, 

but attorney error short of constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel does not constitute cause and will not 

excuse a procedural default. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 

467, 494 (1991). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his 

counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective and has, 

therefore, not shown cause for the procedural default. 

Regardless, even looking to the merits of the claim, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief. A challenge to a jury 

instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a 

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury 

charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process. See Estelle at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 

U.S. 141, 147 (1973). The instruction may not be judged in 

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of 

the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle at 

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72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in 

the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of 

the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). 

Petitioner argues that the jury instruction permitted the 

jury to consider the Warren Street incident to identify him as 

the shooter, instead of only using the incident to demonstrate 

motive. He argues it lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. 

However, the jury instruction was clear that the evidence was 

only to be used in deciding identity and the prosecution must 

still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was 

also separately properly instructed that Petitioner was entitled 

to an acquittal unless the evidence demonstrated he was guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. CT at 263. 

Petitioner has failed to show that this one instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violated due process. As discussed in the prior claim, Douglas 

Jr. identified Petitioner. Another witness also identified 

Petitioner as the shooter. RT at 180-81, 213-21, 238-39, 297. 

For all these reasons, this claim is denied. 

V 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has 

not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

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assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not 

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court 

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of 

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions 

as moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 11/02/2015 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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