Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01204/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01204-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
Intervenor
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
National Treasury Employees Union
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 1997 Decided March 27, 1998

No. 97-1204

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Federal Labor Relations Authority

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No. 92-5272

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

JOHN CALLAHAN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 888,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 92-5307

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 91cv02404)

In case No. 97-1204, Elaine D. Kaplan argued the cause 

for petitioner National Treasury Employees Union, with 

whom Gregory O'Duden was on the briefs.

David M. Smith, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, argued the cause for respondent FLRA, with whom 

James F. Blandford and Shari Polur, Attorneys, were on the 

brief. William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor, entered an appearance.

Mark D. Roth and Judith Galat were on the brief for 

intervenor American Federation of Government Employees, 

AFL-CIO.

In case Nos. 92-5272 and 92-5307, Judith Galat argued the 

cause for appellant American Federation of Government Employees, Local 888, with whom Mark D. Roth was on the 

briefs.

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R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for the Federal appellants, with whom Mary Lou 

Leary, U.S. Attorney at the time the briefs were filed, was on 

the briefs. John D. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered 

an appearance.

Elaine D. Kaplan argued the cause for appellees National 

Treasury Employees Union, et al., with whom Gregory O'Duden was on the brief. Clinton D. Wolcott entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The Social Security Administration several times denied the National Treasury Employees 

Union a permit to distribute leaflets in front of the SSA 

buildings on the government campus in Woodlawn, Maryland. 

The NTEU filed unfair labor practice charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and sued the Administrator 

of the SSA in district court alleging a violation of the First 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

In No. 97-1204 the NTEU petitions for review of the 

decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority that the 

permit denials neither discriminated against the NTEU nor 

unlawfully assisted the incumbent union, the American Federation of Government Employees. We uphold the FLRA's 

decision that the SSA did not unlawfully assist the AFGE. 

The FLRA's decision that the SSA did not discriminate 

against the NTEU, however, was premised upon an erroneous reading of the case law, and we therefore remand that 

aspect of the case to the FLRA for reconsideration.

In Nos. 92-5272 and 92-5307 the SSA and the AFGE 

appeal the decision of the district court holding that the SSA's 

denials of a permit to the NTEU to distribute literature at 

Woodlawn abridged the NTEU's freedom of speech, in violation of the first amendment. We remand this claim for the 

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district court to determine whether there is still a case or 

controversy between the parties in light of our decision in No. 

97-1204.

I. Background

The controversy among the NTEU, the SSA, and the 

AFGE began in 1991 when the NTEU, which was organizing 

a nationwide campaign to replace the AFGE as the exclusive 

bargaining representative of SSA employees, applied several 

times for a permit to distribute leaflets outside the SSA 

buildings on the Woodlawn campus. The SSA denied each 

request on the ground that the Federal Service LaborManagement Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(3), so required. See, e.g., Letter to Clinton Wolcott, Assistant Counsel, NTEU, from Marilyn G. O'Connell, Acting Associate 

Commissioner for Facilities Management, SSA (Sept. 24, 

1991) (stating that "the agency in 'control' of the premises 

must deny access to the nonincumbent union absent an 

inability to reach the agency's employees through reasonable, 

alternative means of communication"). Section § 7116(a)(3) 

makes it an unfair labor practice for an agency to

sponsor, control, or otherwise assist any labor organization, other than to furnish, upon request, customary and 

routine services and facilities if the services and facilities 

are also furnished on an impartial basis to other labor 

organizations having equivalent status.

The Act also makes it an unfair labor practice to "interfere 

with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the 

employee of any right under this [statute]." Id. § 7116(a)(1).

The NTEU sued the Administrator of the SSA and other 

officials in district court, claiming that the SSA's denials of its 

applications for a permit violated the Union's right to free 

speech under the first amendment. The district court held 

that the SSA had indeed violated the first amendment by 

denying to the NTEU the right to speak in a "public forum,"

see NTEU v. King, 798 F. Supp. 780 (D.D.C. 1992), and the 

SSA appealed to this court.

The NTEU also filed a charge with the FLRA claiming 

that the SSA's denial of its applications for a permit was an 

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unfair labor practice. The FLRA held that the SSA had 

acted correctly under the circumstances for two reasons. 

First, the SSA's refusal to issue a permit did not violate 

§ 7116(a)(1) of the FSLMRA because that subsection protects only the rights of employees; it does not give a nonincumbent union any right of access to the property of the 

employing agency, at least where the complainant is not an 

affected employee. Second, to have issued a permit, according to the FLRA, would have "assisted" the NTEU, in 

violation of § 7116(a)(3) of the Act. See Social Security 

Administration and National Treasury Employees Union 

and American Federation of Government Employees, 45 

FLRA 303 (1992).

Upon the NTEU's petition for review of the decision of the 

FLRA, we held that the Authority had erred in failing to 

consider the first amendment implications of its decision and 

we remanded the matter to the Authority for reconsideration. 

See NTEU v. FLRA, 986 F.2d 537 (D.C. D.C. 1993). We then 

held the SSA's appeal of the district court's decision in 

abeyance pending the outcome of the proceedings upon remand before the FLRA.

Upon remand the FLRA took as its starting point the 

analytical framework set out by the Supreme Court in NLRB 

v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1952), for dealing with 

the union access issue as it arose under the National Labor 

Relations Act. See Social Security Administration and National Treasury Employees Union and American Federation 

of Government Employees, 52 FLRA 1159, at 29-30 (1997). 

The FLRA recognized that the initial organizing campaigns 

generally analyzed in Babcock & Wilcox and "its progeny" did 

not match the facts of the current case; purportedly applying 

the principles of Babcock & Wilcox, however, the FLRA held 

that the SSA's denials of the NTEU's permit requests did not 

violate § 7116(a)(1) of the FSLMRA because the NTEU 

failed to show that such denials discriminated against the 

NTEU. The Authority also held that the SSA had not, by 

denying the permit requests of the NTEU, assisted the 

AFGE in violation of § 7116(a)(3). The NTEU now petitions 

the court to review both aspects of that decision.

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II. No. 97-1204

The NTEU does not challenge the Authority's adoption of 

the Babcock & Wilcox framework. The Union does argue, 

however, that under that framework the SSA should be held 

to have discriminated against the NTEU and to have unlawfully assisted the incumbent AFGE.

A. § 7116(a)(1)

After stating that it was adopting the framework of Babcock & Wilcox and its progeny "as a starting point" for 

analysis, see 52 FLRA 1159, at 27, the FLRA described that 

framework as follows: In Babcock & Wilcox the Supreme 

Court held that an employer subject to the NLRA may 

maintain a general policy of denying non-employee solicitors 

access to its premises; it may not discriminate against union 

solicitors, however, by granting access to solicitors for other 

types of organizations. See 351 U.S. at 112. The excluded 

"union has the burden of showing that ... the employer's 

access rules discriminate against the union's solicitation." 

NLRB v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center, 916 F.2d 932, 

936 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San 

Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 

205 (1978)).

The National Labor Relations Board has created, and this 

court has approved, an exception to the general rule of 

Babcock & Wilcox for "isolated beneficent acts": An employer that has a no-solicitation rule but nonetheless grants access 

to a few charitable organizations does not thereby lose its 

right to exclude unions under its general rule against solicitation. See Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hosp. v. NLRB,

97 F.3d 583, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Hammary Mfg. Corp., 265 

NLRB 57, 57 n.4 (1982). In deciding whether grants of 

access to charitable organizations fall within the "isolated 

beneficent acts" exception, the Board does not employ a per 

se approach but rather looks at the "quantum of ... incidents." Hammary, 265 NLRB at 57 n.4.

Stating that "[t]he NLRB's interpretation and application 

of Babcock's nondiscrimination rule has been reviewed by 

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several United States Courts of Appeals," the FLRA then 

cited without analysis certain conflicting decisions applying 

Babcock & Wilcox. 52 FLRA 1159, at 28. From this descriptive exercise (or at least after it) the FLRA concluded 

that "[t]he principles articulated in the [cited] decisions suggest that '[b]y inviting the public to use an area of its 

property, the employer does not surrender its right to control 

the uses to which that area is put.' " Id. (quoting Baptist 

Medical System v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1989).

Turning to the facts of this case, the Authority said there 

could be "no doubt that SSA has differentiated among the 

organizations that it has allowed to solicit"; specifically, while 

denying the NTEU's requests for permits, the SSA had 

granted permits to several "beneficent organizations" to solicit money or membershipincluding the Disabled American 

Veterans, the American Legion, the Little Sisters of the Poor, 

and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. 52 FLRA 1159, at 30. 

The FLRA found, however:

[T]he record is silent as to whether any other [i.e., nonbeneficent] organizations have sought, been granted, or 

been denied access to SSA's premises.

... Moreover, the parties' arguments do not address 

whether the number of permits granted during the time 

period have been isolated and limited to a small number 

of beneficent organizations.... As a result, we do not 

find that SSA's denial of access to NTEU, which occurred during the same time period that it granted 

occasional access to charitable organizations, violated the 

Babcock non-discrimination rule.

Id.

The NTEU argues that upon the present facts the FLRA 

erred in finding no violation of the general rule of Babcock &

Wilcox. We agree. Under that rule, the SSA's denial of the 

NTEU's permit request while granting permits to other 

organizations would be unlawful discrimination unless the 

exception for isolated beneficent acts (or some other exception) applies. The predicate for the rule is lacking here, 

however: the SSA does not have a general no-solicitation 

policy. To the contrary, the agency administers its permit 

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lations, by authority delegated from its landlord, the General 

Services Administration. The FPMR states that every application for a permit must be granted unless it is faulty in form 

or the proposed use falls into one of five specifically excluded 

categories. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.402(a) ("A permit shall be 

issued ... within 10 working days following [the administering agency's] receipt of the completed applications"); id. 

§ 101- 20.403(a) (the agency "shall disapprove any application 

... if" the proposed use is commercial, obscene, intended to 

influence judicial proceedings, interferes with government 

uses of the property, or violates the prohibition against 

political solicitation in 18 U.S.C. § 607).

Because the SSA does not have a general no-solicitation 

policy, Babcock & Wilcox and its sequelae do not protect the 

SSA's denial of permits to the NTEU. Moreover, even if the 

SSA did have a general no-solicitation policy, we would have 

to fault the Authority for applying the isolated beneficent acts 

exception without examining the "quantum ... of incidents" 

in which the SSA granted permits to beneficent organizations, 

as it should have done before finding that the SSA's prior 

"beneficent acts" were indeed "isolated." To the extent that 

the FLRA relies upon Babcock & Wilcox and "its progeny," 

therefore, the Authority's interpretation of the case law is 

erroneous and we must reverse its decision based thereon.

Our analysis does not end here because the FLRA was not 

required to adopt the rule of Babcock & Wilcox in the first 

place; nor, having done so, was it required to adopt the 

NLRB's exception for isolated beneficent acts. It is possible 

that the Authority intended, by its summary statement of the 

case law secondary to Babcock & Wilcox, to articulate its own 

standard under the FSLMRA, one more deferential to the 

federal agency employer than is the standard of Babcock &

Wilcox to private employers. (Recall that the Authority had 

concluded that the cases "suggest that by inviting the public 

to use an area of its property, the employer does not surrender the right to control the use to which that area is put.") 

Such a standard might, for example, permit an agency employer to exclude union solicitors from its premises while 

allowing all (or almost all) manner of other groups to engage 

in solicitation pursuant to the FPMR. To the extent that the 

FLRA may have intended to create any such new standard, 

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however, that standard raises a serious constitutional question, as we have previously pointed out in this very litigation, 

see NTEU v. FLRA, 986 F.2d 537, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1993); it 

also lacks any grounding in the cases cited, and the Authority 

neither described it clearly enough nor explained its reasoning sufficiently to permit us to affirm its decision upon that 

basis. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) 

(holding that reviewing court may not affirm agency decision 

on basis of rationale agency itself did not adopt).

The FLRA also held, as an alternative basis for its conclusion, that even if the SSA did discriminate against the NTEU 

the Authority would not apply the standard of Babcock &

Wilcox retroactively to the actions of the SSA. Rather, the 

Authority would judge the SSA under the standard in place 

when the SSA denied the NTEU's applications for a permit to 

distribute leaflets. See 52 FLRA 1159, at 31 n.25. The 

NTEU objects that the FLRA's concern with retroactivity is 

misplaced because the Union seeks only forward-looking relief, and in any case retroactive application of the new rule 

would be permissible under the case law of this circuit.

We agree with the NTEU that the Authority's concern with 

retroactivity is unwarranted. If the Authority does conclude 

upon remand that the SSA engaged in an unfair labor practice, then the SSA will not be unfairly imposed upon by the 

relief to which the NTEU would be entitled. A declaration to 

the effect that an employer committed an unfair labor practice, when based upon a newly-adopted standard, is indeed 

retroactive but only in the way familiar to private sector labor 

law and indeed inherent in both administrative and common 

law adjudication. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways v. 

NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("new rules 

announced in agency adjudications may be applied retroactively absent any 'manifest injustice' "); Daily News of Los 

Angeles v. NLRB, 73 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding 

NLRB decision finding newspaper liable for unfair labor 

practice by overruling prior Board decision); 13A WRIGHT,

MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3535 n.20 ("[o]rdinarily the litigants in the case 

producing a new rule of law are controlled by the new rule"). 

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Indeed, the SSA does not even face potential liability for 

backpay or other material relief to which employers in both 

the public and the private sector are routinely exposed upon 

the basis of "retroactive" adjudication. To the extent that the 

FLRA, upon further reconsideration, adheres to the standard 

of Babcock & Wilcox, therefore, it may not decline to find a 

violation merely because it had not yet adopted that standard 

when the SSA denied the NTEU's requests for permits.

In sum, we remand to the FLRA the question whether the 

SSA violated § 7116(a)(1); the Authority may either reaffirm 

its embrace of the Babcock & Wilcox standard and hold that 

the SSA discriminated against the NTEU in violation of that 

section, or it may adopt some other standard by which to 

judge the SSA's denial of permits to the NTEU. If the SSA 

violated the Act under whatever standard the FLRA adopts, 

however, then the Authority may not deny the NTEU a 

remedy on the ground that it must avoid retroactive lawmaking.

B. § 7116(a)(3)

The FLRA also held that the SSA's denial of permits to the 

NTEU did not violate § 7116(a)(3), which makes it an unfair 

labor practice for an employee to assist a labor union. According to the Authority "there are certain advantages that 

go with incumbency," and "denial of access to a rival, in and 

of itself, does not equate to sponsorship, control, or assistance 

to the incumbent"; nor was there any evidence that the SSA 

had "sponsor[ed], control[led], or assist[ed] AFGE" in any 

other way. 52 FLRA 1159, at 23. The NTEU objects that 

the AFGE did benefitin the form of enhanced prospects for 

re-electionfrom the disadvantage the NTEU incurred in 

being denied access to the grounds of the SSA, and because 

the denials of the permits were unlawful, the advantage 

gained by the AFGE was a fortiori unlawful assistance.

The FLRA approached this issue, reasonably we think, by 

asking the functional question whether the employer "interfered with employee freedom of choice by failing to maintain 

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nization involved." 52 FLRA 1159, at 22. Answering the 

question by reference to the totality of the circumstances, the 

Authority concluded that the advantage the SSA indirectly 

conferred upon the incumbent AFGEby excluding the rival 

NTEU from the agency's premisesdid not constitute assistance, sponsorship, or control within the meaning of those 

terms in § 7116(a)(3):

[T]here is no evidence that through this denial of access 

SSA interfered with its employees' freedom of choice or 

failed to maintain the proper arms-length relationship 

with AFGE.... [T]here is no evidence that AFGE is 

... controlled by SSA.... Nor is there evidence that 

the denial was viewed by the employees as indicative of 

the agency favoring AFGE.

52 FLRA 1159, at 23.

In this context "evidence" includes not only empirical data 

but also the Authority's expert judgment on the question 

whether the employer's conduct tends to interfere with the 

employees' freedom of choice. Cf. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 

Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 792-93 (1990) (finding it not 

irrational for NLRB to refuse to apply presumption that 

replacement workers do not support striking union, in light of 

Board's assumptions drawn from its expertise); General 

Electric Company v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 627, 636 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (enforcing Board decision that distribution of postelection benefits while objections to election were still unresolved was impermissible attempt to interfere with employees' freedom of choice about unionization). We therefore 

affirm the Authority's interpretation of the record upon the 

ground that the Authority, in the exercise of its expert 

judgment, found no reason to believe that the employer failed 

to maintain the appropriate arms-length relationship with the 

AFGE. Consequently, we need not determine whether, as 

the FLRA seems to have believed, the AFGE was entitled to 

the advantage of exclusive access to the sidewalks as a benefit 

of incumbency.

III. Nos. 92-5272 and 92-5307

The first amendment claim in the AFGE's appeal from the 

decision of the district court, which we have heretofore held 

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in abeyance, may now be moot by virtue of the FLRA's 

change of position in the unfair labor practice case. The 

FLRA's current position constitutes a retreatwithout objection on the part of the AFGEfrom the position the Authority took in its first decision, namely, that the FSLMRA 

required the SSA to deny the permit request of a nonincumbent union. Assuming the FLRA adheres to the 

framework of Babcock & Wilcox upon remand, therefore, the 

SSA will not be able to deny on that ground any future 

permit application the NTEU may file. Indeed, the SSA may 

well have to grant the NTEU's next request for a permitin 

which case there would seem to be no continuing controversy 

and no need for the court to resolve the constitutional question.

Moreover, even if the SSA does again deny a permit to the 

NTEU, it will presumably do so in a manner consistent with 

the FLRA's new interpretation of the Act. Any such denial 

would therefore have to depend upon a rationale different 

from the SSA's reason for denying the NTEU's permit in 

1991. To decide now whether a hypothetical future permit 

denial by the SSA would violate the first amendment would 

be to risk giving an advisory opinion in an area where the 

court should be particularly keen to avoid any unnecessary 

ruling. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1642 n.11 (1997) 

("It has long been the Court's considered practice not to 

decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions ... or to 

decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity 

for its decision....").

In sum, the constitutional issue arising from the permit 

denials of 1991 may be moot as a practical matter. See 

Belton v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

20 F.3d 1197, 1203 (1994) (decision to require retrial based 

upon one issue makes other issue "moot as a practical matter 

although not in the strict sense"). The issue of mootness was 

not briefed by the parties, however, and the record before us 

is stale inasmuch as the FLRA has redefined, and may yet 

further redefine, the obligations of the SSA under the 

FSLMRA. We therefore remand this case for the district 

court to determine in the first instance, upon the basis of an 

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updated record if that seems advisable, whether there is a 

live constitutional case or controversy between the parties.

IV. Conclusion

In No. 97-1204 the FLRA permissibly concluded that the 

SSA's denial of a permit to the NTEU did not "assist" the 

AFGE in violation of § 7116(a)(3) of the FSLMRA. On the 

other hand, the Authority's conclusion that the SSA did not 

discriminate against the NTEU in violation of § 7116(a)(1) of 

the FSLMRA is based upon an erroneous reading of the 

Babcock & Wilcox line of cases. We therefore affirm the 

decision of the FLRA upon the first issue and remand the 

second issue to the Authority for further consideration. We 

also remand the first amendment cases, Nos. 92-5272 and 

92-5307, to the district court for a determination of whether 

that dispute is (or with the issuance of the opinion in No. 

97-1204 is about to become) moot.

So ordered.

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