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Parties Involved:
Kenneth Barton
Appellee
Clarence Dwight Hines
Appellant
James R. Wallace
Appellee

Document Text:

• f 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS .. IsJ.~r.tiw-a" 

Unil'M Tenth Ci1'.'Cult 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CLARENCE DWIGHT HINES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V. ) 

DEC 10 1992. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No . 92-7032 

) 

JAMES R. WALLACE, Unit Manager) 

of Mack Alford Correctional ) 

Center; KENNETH BARTON, Senior) 

Case Manager of Mack Alford ) 

Correctional Center, ) 

(E.D. Okla., No. 91-369-S) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge . ** 

In this prose appeal, the appellant challenges the district 

court's order dismissing his §1983 complaint against the 

appellees, the Unit Manager and Senior Case Manager of Mack Alford 

Correctional Center, where the appellant is currently 

incarcerated . The appellant filed his complaint in forma 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

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Appellate Case: 92-7032 Document: 010110151619 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
pauperis, alleging that the appellees violated his First and 

Eighth Amendment rights by 1) requiring him to work in the prison 

cafeteria on Sunday in violation of his religious beliefs, 1 

2) requiring him to perform tasks as part of his cafeteria job 

that were inconsistent with his medical condition, 2 and 

3) threatening to retaliate against him when he requested a job 

transfer. The district court found each of the appellant's 

allegations to be frivolous and dismissed the appellant's 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915(d). We affirm in part and reverse 

in part. 

The federal in forma pauperis statute is designed to ensure 

that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal 

courts. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). 

Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §1915(a) permits an indigent litigant to 

commence a civil or criminal suit without prepayment of fees or 

costs. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(d). To prevent abusive litigation, 

however, 28 U.S.C. §1915(d) allows an in forma pauperis suit to be 

dismissed if the suit is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(d). A 

suit is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or 

fact." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Olson v. Hart, 965 F.2d 940, 942 

n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). Since dismissal under §1915(d) is 

discretionary, we review such a dismissal under an abuse of 

1 The appellant claimed that he was an adherent to the Baptist 

religion which required him to treat Sunday as a day of rest. 

2 The appellant was diagnosed by a physician's assistant at the 

Correctional Center as having a bad back which prevented him from 

performing any job requiring prolonged standing, heavy lifting, or 

bending. 

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Appellate Case: 92-7032 Document: 010110151619 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 2 
discretion standard. Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 

(1992); Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The appellant's first claim is that the appellees violated 

his First Amendment rights by requiring him to work in the prison 

cafeteria on Sunday, contrary to his religious beliefs. It is 

well settled that prisoners have a right to pursue legitimately 

held religious beliefs. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 

(1972); McKinney v. Maynard, 952 F.2d 350, 352 (10th Cir. 1991). 

It is equally well settled, however, that prison regulations 

infringing on these rights are judged under a less restrictive 

standard than that ordinarily applied to regulations restricting 

the free exercise of religion. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 

U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1525 (10th 

Cir. 1991). Prison regulations restricting the free exercise of 

religion are proper so long as they are reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests. Shabazz 482 U.S. at 349; 

LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991). The 

factors to be considered in making this reasonableness 

determination include 1) the connection between the challenged 

activity and the asserted penological interest, 2) the 

availability to the prisoner of alternative means of exercising 

his rights, 3) the impact of accommodation on prison resources and 

routine, and 4) the existence of easy alternatives to the 

challenged action. Turner v. Safley. 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). 

In this case, the district court found the appellant's First 

Amendment claim to be frivolous on the grounds that extensive 

alternatives were available to the appellant for exercising his 

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Appellate Case: 92-7032 Document: 010110151619 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 3 
religious beliefs. 3 The district court read the appellant's claim 

as challenging his job assignment because it prevented him from 

attending Sunday worship services. Relying on the Martinez report 

filed by the Department of Corrections, the district court found 

that alternative worship services were available to the appellant 

throughout the week. On this basis, the district court concluded 

that the appellant's claim failed to allege any significant 

infringement of his First Amendment right to the free exercise of 

religion. 

We believe the district court's reading of the appellant's 

complaint was in error. Construing the appellant's prose 

complaint broadly, see Hall v. Belman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th 

Cir. 1991), we read the complaint to allege that the appellant's 

work assignment prevented him from treating Sunday as a day of 

rest, not just that it prevented him from attending Sunday worship 

services. The appellant states several times in his complaint 

that his religious beliefs prevent him from working on Sunday, see 

Appellant's Complaint at 2(a); nowhere does the complaint make any 

mention of worship services. Furthermore, the appellant 

explicitly stated in his letter to the appellees requesting a job 

transfer that his assignment in the cafeteria prevented him from 

3 The district court did not question the sincerity of the 

appellant's religious beliefs, and we find no basis for doing so. 

While the Martinez report suggested that the appellant's beliefs 

were insincere because many Baptists do not believe that work is 

prohibited on Sunday, it is well established that a belief may not 

be considered insincere merely because all members of a given 

faith do not share that belief. See Thomas v. Review Board of 

Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); 

LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d at 1119. 

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Appellate Case: 92-7032 Document: 010110151619 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 4 
treating Sunday as the "Sabbath day." See Appendix to Appellant's 

Brief. 

Given our reading of the appellant's allegations, we find 

that the presence of alternative worship services is not 

sufficient, by itself, to render appellant's claim frivolous. 

Unless the alternatives available to a prisoner for expressing his 

religious beliefs fully substitute for the alleged impingement on 

his freedom of religion, the existence of alternatives is but one 

of the factors to be considered under Turner in determining 

whether a given activity violates a prisoner's First Amendment 

rights. See Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (treating the ability of 

Muslim prisoners to participate in other religious observances as 

but one factor supporting a restriction on the right of prisoners 

to attend Jumu'ah services). In this case, we cannot say that the 

ability to attend worship services during the week fully 

compensates the appellant for his inability to treat Sunday as a 

day of rest. Consequently, we hold that the district court abused 

its discretion by dismissing the appellant's claim under §1915(d) 

solely on the basis of the alternative worship services available 

to the appellant, and remand this claim to permit the district 

court to reassess its finding of frivolousness in light of all 

four Turner factors. Cf. McKinney, 952 F.2d at 353-54 (reversing 

dismissal of prisoner's First Amendment claim under §1915(d) and 

remanding for Turner analysis). We leave it to the district court 

to decide whether the Martinez report permits the court to 

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Appellate Case: 92-7032 Document: 010110151619 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 5 
properly analyze the appellant's complaint under the Turner 

framework or whether further responsive pleadings are in order. 4 

The appellant's second claim is that the appellees violated 

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment by requiring him to perform tasks that were 

inconsistent with his medical condition. The Eighth Amendment 

prohibits the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Hudson 

v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992) (quoting Ingraham v. 

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)). Failure to attend to a 

prisoner's medical needs, whether the result of prison guards 

denying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with 

the treatment once prescribed, may violate this prohibition if it 

amounts to "deliberate indifference." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. 

Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

In this case, the appellant has failed to supply any factual 

allegations indicating that the appellees acted with deliberate 

indifference toward his medical condition. Indeed, the Martinez 

report reveals that the appellees spoke to the Correctional 

Center's Health Administrator before assigning the appellant to 

the cafeteria and that the Health Administrator specifically 

endorsed this assignment as consistent with the appellant's 

4 Although it appears from the Martinez report that the appellant 

has been transferred to a new job, see Affidavit of James R. 

Wallace, we do not believe this fact, even if accurate, moots the 

appellant's First Amendment claim. First, the appellant is 

claiming monetary as well as injunctive relief. Second, the 

report does not indicate whether the appellant's new job still 

requires him to work on Sunday. 

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Appellate Case: 92-7032 Document: 010110151619 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 6 
d . 1 d' . 5 

me 1ca con 1t1on. 

of James R. Wallace . 

See Affidavit of Kenneth J. Barton; Affidavit 

Thus, as the district court concluded, the 

appellant's allegations suggest little more than a disagreement 

with the appellees over his relative degree of fitness. Such a 

disagreement, without more, does not give rise to a cause of 

action for cruel and unusual punishment. Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 

285, 287 (10th Cir. 1990); McCracken v. Jones, 562 F.2d 22, 25 

(10th Cir. 1977), Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th 

Cir. 1968). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the 

appellant's claim as frivolous. 

The appellant's third claim is that the appellees violated 

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment by threatening to retaliate against him for complaining 

about his work assignment in the cafeteria. The district court 

dismissed this claim under Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 

(10th Cir. 1981), which holds that conclusory allegations are 

legally insufficient to sustain a constitutional claim under 

§1983. 

We believe the district court's reliance on Wise constituted 

an abuse of discretion. First, the appellant's complaint in this 

case articulates with great specificity the nature of the 

appellee's retaliatory threats. The appellant charges that the 

appellees threatened to put him in solitary confinement, to place 

5 Although the Martinez report may not be used to resolve bona 

fide factual disputes, a court may rely on the Martinez report in 

dismissing a claim pursuant to §1915(d) when the report's factual 

allegations do not contradict any of the plaintiff's factual 

allegations. Hall v. Belman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 

1991). 

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. ' -

him in a higher security correctional facility, and to charge him 

with a prison infraction and take away his good time credits. See 

Appellant's Complaint at 2-2(a). As a result of these threats, 

the appellant seeks both damages and injunctive relief. Second, 

Wise's requirement of specificity must be tempered in cases where 

the litigant is proceeding prose. A stringent application of 

Wise to prose complaints would violate the requirement that these 

complaints be construed broadly. See Hall v. Belman, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). In light of these two 

considerations, we believe the appellant's complaint clearly 

satisfies Wise's requirement of specificity. 

Even though we believe the district court erred by dismissing 

the appellant's retaliation claim under Wise, we nonetheless find 

that the appellant's claim is frivolous. In this case, the 

appellant does not allege that the appellees actually retaliated 

against him, but only that they threatened to retaliate against 

him. Not every threat by a prison guard amounts to a 

constitutional violation, however. Maintaining order and 

discipline in the prison context is not an antiseptic or 

particularly genteel process and wide latitude is therefore 

allowed to prison personnel in the use of verbal communications 

with prisoners. See Collins v. Cundy. 603 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 

1979); Boston v. Stanton, 450 F. Supp. 1049, 1055-56 (W.D. Mo. 

1978). Here, the retaliatory threats alleged by the appellant, 

though specific, are legally insufficient to state a claim under 

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, . -

the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, we believe the appellant's 

claim of retaliation was properly dismissed under §1915(d) . 6 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED with respect 

to the appellant's Eighth Amendment claims. The judgment of the 

district court is REVERSED with respect to the appellant's First 

Amendment claim and this claim is REMANDED to the district court 

for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgement. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

6 Although the district court did not reach the issue of whether 

retaliatory threats give rise to a cause of action for cruel and 

unusual punishment, we can affirm the district court on any 

grounds that find support in the record, In Re Slack-Horner 

Foundries Co., 971 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1992); Scivally v. 

Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101, 103 (10th Cir. 1983), even where the 

lower court's conclusions were based on an erroneous course of 

reasoning, Bath v. National Ass'n of Intercollegiate Athletics, 

843 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1988) . 

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