Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01024/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bell Atlantic Enterprises International, Inc.
Intervenor
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee
JAJ Cellular
Intervenor
McElroy Electronics Corporation
Appellant
Metro Mobile CTS of Phoenix, Inc.
Intervenor

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 24, 1995 Decided May 19, 1995

No. 94-1021

JAJ CELLULAR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

METRO MOBILE CTS OF PHOENIX, INC., ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

And Consolidated Case No. 94-1024

Appeal from an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Louis Gurman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the joint briefs was William D. Silva for

appellant McElroyElectronicsCorporation. Coleen M. Egan entered anappearance forJAJCellular.

Roberta L. Cook, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for appellee.

With her on the brief were William E. Kennard, General Counsel, Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate

General Counsel, and John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission.

R. Bruce Beckner argued the cause for intervenors Metro Mobile CTS of Phoenix, Inc. and Bell

Atlantic Enterprises International, Inc. With him on the brief were Stuart F. Feldstein and Jill K.

McClelland.

Before WALD, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: JAJ Cellular ("JAJ") and McElroy Electronics Corporation

("McElroy") appeal from an order of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or

"Commission") granting interim operating authority to Bell Atlantic Corporation ("Bell Atlantic"),

as successor to Metro Mobile CTS of Phoenix, Inc. ("Metro Mobile"), to provide cellular telephone

service in a "fill-in" area in the Phoenix metropolitan area where JAJ, McElroy, and Bell Atlantic are

competing for permanent operating authority. We affirm the Commission's order.

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1Licenses were awarded on a competitive basis. The radio spectrum set aside for cellular

service was divided into two frequency blocks, denominated block A and block B, to allow two

cellular providers for each market area. Metro Mobile was awarded permanent authority to serve

block A in most of the Phoenix MSA; US West was awarded permanent authority to serve block

B. 

2The Commission subsequently modified the rule, providing that the five-year exclusive

expansion period would commence on the date of the licensee's own initial authorization, rather

than the date of the first license in the market. See Order on Reconsideration of Second Report

and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 5377, 5379-80 (1989). 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises in the wake of our decision in McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC, 990 F.2d

1351 (D.C. Cir. 1993), where we ordered the FCC to reinstate nunc pro tunc various applications

to provide cellular telephone service which the Commission had erroneously dismissed as

"premature." Among these were applications by JAJ and McElroy to serve the "fill-in" area within

the Phoenix metropolitan statistical area ("MSA") at issue in this case.

When theCommission awarded the first round oflicensesto provide cellular communications

service in the early 1980s, its policy favored applicants who made a commitment to provide service

to the larger part of a metropolitan area.1 Applicants were not required, however, to serve the entire

MSA. As a result, in many MSAsincluding Phoenixthere were gaps in cellular coverage, usually

in less heavily-populated fringe areas or pockets within the MSA. The Commission gave the initial

licensee the exclusive right to expand or "fill in" its service into these unserved areas for a period of

five years after the first license was issued for the MSA.2 After that date, the Commission said, it

would accept competitive applications to serve any remaining unserved "fill-in" areas.

The McElroy litigation arose when the Commission, interpreting its own regulations,said the

competitive application period for "fill-in" service did not commence automatically upon expiration

of the incumbent'sfive year exclusive expansion period, but instead would begin on filing datesto be

announced by the Commission. Under this interpretation, the Commission dismissed as "premature"

applicationsfor various "fill-in" areas that McElroy and JAJ had submitted after the expiration of the

five-year exclusive period, but before the Commission had announced specific filing dates. We

concluded that although the Commission had authority to adopt a policy not to accept applications

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3Metro Mobile principally sought retroactive application of the Commission's revised five-year

"fill-in" rule, see supra n.2, to the Phoenix MSA. Metro Mobile was awarded its first license to

provide service on block A in the Phoenix MSA in October, 1984, nearly two years after block B

service was awarded to US West. If the Commission applied the revised five-year rule

retroactively, Metro Mobile's exclusive five-year fill-in period would commence not in 1982, but

in October, 1984, and would therefore end in October, 1989. Consequently, McElroy's and JAJ's

applications, which were filed in January, 1989 and March, 1989 respectivelywithin Metro

Mobile's "revised" exclusive expansion periodwould have been untimely. 

until an announced filing date, it had failed to provide sufficient notice of that policy to applicants,

and therefore the policy could not serve as the basis for dismissing their applications. McElroy, 990

F.2d at 1363-64.

Among the applications we ordered reinstated were those of McElroy and JAJ seeking

permanent authority to provide cellular service in a "fill-in" area in the Phoenix MSA for which the

Commission had in the meantime granted permanent authority to Metro Mobile, the incumbent

provider of cellular service on frequency block A in the Phoenix market. Acting under this disputed

authority, Metro Mobile constructed three cells and began providing service in the "fill-in" area in

1992. Because JAJ's and McElroy's reinstated applications were inconsistent with Metro Mobile's

permanent authority, Metro Mobile petitioned theCommission forspecialrelief, requesting inter alia

approval to continue to provide service on an interim basis pending an award of permanent authority

to one of the applicants. The bulk of Metro Mobile's petition, however, concerned issues not

germane to this appeal.3

JAJ and McElroy opposed Metro Mobile's petition for special relief, alleging that Metro

Mobile had engaged in misconduct in connection with its application and had made

misrepresentationsin certain required technicalfilings. Like Metro Mobile's petition, however, JAJ's

and McElroy's oppositions were principally concerned with issues other than interimauthority. JAJ's

opposition did argue, albeit briefly, that it would be contrary to FCC policy to award interim

operating authority to Metro Mobile while also allowing Metro Mobile to seek permanent authority.

McElroy's opposition argued additionally that Metro Mobile had been operating illegally and should

not be "rewarded" with interim operating authority, and that McElroy's own application for

permanent authority would be prejudiced if interim authority were granted to Metro Mobile.

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4

In 1992, Bell Atlantic Corporation acquired all the stock of Metro Mobile CTS, Inc., the

parent of Metro Mobile CTS of Phoenix, Inc. In the subsequent reorganization, Metro Mobile

CTS of Phoenix became a subsidiary of Bell Atlantic's subsidiary, Bell Atlantic Enterprises

International, Inc. Bell Atlantic or its subsidiary is thus the successor-in-interest to Metro Mobile

CTS, Inc. 

5As a threshold matter, we reject intervenor Bell Atlantic's contention that JAJ and McElroy

lack standing to bring this appeal. To qualify for Article III standing, appellants must show an

"actual or imminent" injury-in-fact, fairly traceable to the challenged agency action, and likely to

be redressed by the relief they seek. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136

(1992). JAJ and McElroy claim that their applications for permanent authority will be prejudiced

by the Commission's allegedly wrongful award of interim operating authority. Specifically, they

claim the award pre-judges the issue of Metro Mobile's character qualifications, cloaking its

actions in a presumption of validity despite appellants' contentions that Metro Mobile unlawfully

constructed facilities in the disputed area. This alleges a sufficiently concrete injury to appellants,

traceable to the agency's action, and redressable by the relief they seek, i.e., vacating the award of

interim authority.

Our decision on the merits of this case construes the Commission's order to include a

binding commitment not to prejudice JAJ's and McElroy's applications for permanent authority. 

See Part II.A. infra. We also construe the order as not adjudicating character qualifications

issues. See Part II.B. infra. Absent that limiting construction, however, appellants might indeed

have suffered a cognizable injury. 

On December 13, 1993, the Commission rescinded Metro Mobile's permanent authority in

the disputed three-cell "fill-in" area, and returned its application to "pending" status alongside those

of JAJ and McElroy. Metro Mobile CTS, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. 8675, 8676 (1993). In the same order,

the Commission granted Bell Atlantic, assuccessor to Metro Mobile,4interim operating authority to

continue to provide cellular service in the disputed area pending an award of permanent authority.

Id. at 8677. Citing its earlier decision in La Star Cellular Telephone Co., 4 F.C.C.R. 3777 (1989),

aff'd, 899 F.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the Commission reasoned that because Metro Mobile's cells

were already in place and providing service, and because the alternative would be no service on block

A in the disputed area until permanent authority was granted, the public interest would be served by

allowing Bell Atlantic/Metro Mobile to continue to provide uninterrupted service in the area on an

interim basis. Metro Mobile, 8 F.C.C.R. at 8677. The Commission also stated that the award of

interim authority would be "without prejudice" to future action on any of the applications for

permanent authority. Id.

JAJ and McElroy appeal from that order, challenging the Commission's grant of interim

operating authority on various grounds.5

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Application, Notice, and Hearing Requirements

Appellants contend the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting interim operating

authoritywithout submission of a formal application byMetro Mobile, and by failing to submit Metro

Mobile's request for special relief to public notice and comment.

The Commission responds that our decision in La Star Cellular Telephone Co. v. FCC, 899

F.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1990), is controlling and disposes of appellants' objections. In that case, the

Commission had initially rejected as untimely La Star's application to provide cellular service to St.

Tammany Parish, an unserved area within the New Orleans MSA, and granted the incumbent cellular

provider's application for permanent authority to expand itsservice area into the parish. Because the

Commission had not given adequate notice of the filing deadline, however, we ordered La Star's

rejected application reinstated nunc pro tunc, Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551,

1560 (1987), necessitating rescission of the incumbent's permanent authority to serve the parish.

Without a competitive hearing, the Commission then granted the incumbent interim operating

authority to provide uninterrupted cellular service in the disputed area while the Commission

considered the pending applications for permanent authority. We affirmed the Commission's grant

of interim authority, noting that the Commission had made the requisite finding under 47 C.F.R. §

22.32(g) that the public interest demanded an immediate grant of interim authority in order to

continue uninterrupted service to cellular customers. La Star, 899 F.2d at 1234-35. We also said

that the Commission had adequately considered and explained its reasons for rejecting proposed

alternatives, and fairly weighed "the potential harm to the fair consideration of competing

applications" for permanent authority, concluding thatsuchprejudicewas unlikelybecause the interim

licensee had already made the necessary investments. Id.

Here, the Commission says, there was similarly a public interest need for an immediate grant

of interim operating authority to avoid an interruption in service to Metro Mobile's customers.

Furthermore, the Commission contends, here, asin La Star, the grant of interim authority would not

prejudice the Commission'sfuture decision on permanent authority, because the interimoperator had

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already made the necessary investments to provide the service under an improper (and later

rescinded) grant of permanent authority. Cf. La Star, 899 F.2d at 1235; Consolidated Nine, Inc. v.

FCC, 403 F.2d 585, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (greatest prejudice to competitors is if interim incumbent

makes investments that Commission will be inclined to protect).

The facts of La Star are strikingly similar to those of the present case. We note at the outset,

however, that our decision in La Star was made in the context of an agency record and an articulated

agency rationale for its decision in that case. Based on our examination of that record, we concluded

that the Commission had weighed the relevant factors and offered a reasoned explanation for its

action, supported by evidence in the record as a whole. See La Star, 899 F.2d at 1235.

In the case now before us, the agency record and its articulated rationale are exceedingly

sparse. The Commission offers but a single paragraph of explanation, which can be summed up in

a few propositions. The Commission asserts that "service to the public will cease unless we take

further action." 8 F.C.C.R. at 8677. It cites La Star as "a similar situation," and states that "[f]or

similarreasons" to those in La Star "the public interest strongly supports and requires grant ofinterim

operating authority." Id. Finally, it states that "the grant of interim operating authority is without

prejudice" to applications for permanent authority. Id.

Such a threadbare explanation of the bases for the Commission's decision might in different

circumstances be less than illuminating, and even court reversal. Nonetheless, although it is a close

call, we conclude that the facts and circumstances ofthis case so closely parallel those of La Starthat,

in context, the Commission's terse explanation must be adjudged adequate, reasoned, and supported

by the record evidence.

La Starstandsfor the proposition that iftheCommission expresslyfindsthere is an immediate

public interest need for uninterrupted service, adequately considersthe alternatives, fairly weighsthe

prejudice that may result to competing applicants, and adequately explainsitsreasoning, it may grant

interimauthorityto an ousted incumbent under § 22.32(g) pending the award of permanent authority.

The Commission may even proceed to do so without a hearing, because § 22.32(g) authorizes the

grant of interim authority when "the public interest requires prompt establishment of radio service in

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a particular community or area," 47 C.F.R. § 22.32(g). See La Star, 899 F.2d at 1234-35.

Here, theCommissionmade the requisite findings, considered the relevantfactors, and offered

a reasoned explanation for its decision. The Commission in its Metro Mobile order expressly

grounded its action in § 22.32(g), which authorizes the Commission to grant "one or more mutually

exclusive applications" for permanent service on an interim basis where "the public interest requires

prompt establishment of ... service." 47 C.F.R. § 22.32(g). Under § 22.32(g), then, neither a formal

separate application to provide interimservice nor public notice and comment on such an application

were required, given theCommission's determination that there was an immediate public interest need

for the action taken. See La Star, 899 F.2d at 1235.

The Metro Mobile order includes an express finding that the public interest in uninterrupted

service requires an immediate grant of interim authority, see 8 F.C.C.R. at 8677, triggering the

Commission's § 22.32(g) authority. We certainly do not understand La Starto say that whenever an

incumbent's permanent authority is ousted, there will be a public interest need for uninterrupted

service requiring a grant of interim authority; nor that it will always be appropriate to award interim

authority to the incumbent; nor that, even where a pressing public interest is present, it automatically

outweighs potential prejudice to competing applicants. The Commission must make those

determinations on a case-specific basis, as indeed it did in La Star. We do, however, understand the

Commission's Metro Mobile decision, fairly construed, to say that given the facts and circumstances

of this case, there is an immediate and pressing public interest need for uninterrupted service, based

upon "similar reasons" to those in La Star where the facts and circumstances were nearly identical.

We concluded that the facts of La Star were sufficient to support such a determination. La Star, 899

F.2d at 1235. Appellants advance no sound reason to reach any other conclusion here. We conclude

that the Commission made the necessary public interest finding, that there was an adequate basis in

the record to support it, and that, reasoning by analogy to La Star, the Commission provided an

adequate explanation of its reasons for making that determination.

We are more troubled by the next prong of the La Star inquiry: whether the Commission

adequately considered the alternativesto a grant of exclusive interim authority to the incumbent. See

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La Star, 899 F.2d at 1235-36 (concluding that the Commission "reasonabl[y]" rejected alternatives).

There is no mention of alternativesin the Commission's order, much less any explanation of why they

would be undesirable. See 8 F.C.C.R. at 8677. Concededly, appellants did not offer any alternatives

for the Commission to consider, but given that the Commission afforded them neither a

notice-and-comment period nor a formal hearing before proceeding to issue interim authority to the

incumbent, their failure to advance alternatives at that stage is perhaps excusable. It may be, as

intervenor Bell Atlantic suggests, that no practical alternatives were available, although La Star

suggests otherwise. There, we noted the possibility that the Commission might have awarded joint

interim authority or licensed a third party for the interim period, La Star, 899 F.2d at 1235,

alternatives the Commission expressly considered and rejected in that case. See 4 F.C.C.R. at 3780.

But be that as it may, appellants have not argued here that the Commission's decision was fatally

flawed for failure to consider alternatives, and therefore they must be deemed to have waived that

argument. We caution the Commission, however, that although § 22.32(g) may authorize truncated

procedures without a notice-and-comment period or a hearing, such procedures appear to invite a

future situation in which the Commission may be led to overlook reasonable alternatives, because

interested parties are not offered opportunities to call them to the Commission's attention.

Finally, La Starrequiresthe Commission to fairly weigh the potential prejudice to competing

applicants for permanent authority. La Star, 899 F.2d at 1235. We think the Commission did so

here. Certainly the Commission gave some consideration to the possibility of prejudice to

nonincumbent applicants when it concluded that the "grant of interim operating authority is without

prejudice to future action on any of the reinstated applications." Metro Mobile, 8 F.C.C.R. at 8677.

If this were merely a predictive finding of the likely absence of prejudice, we might think the

Commission's statement so conclusory that, without further elaboration or indication of the record

evidence upon which that judgment is based, the agency's explanation would be inadequate. But we

understand the Commission's statement to be more than a prediction concerning its future action.

The statement that the grant of interim authority "is without prejudice" appears instead to be a

binding commitment by the Commission that its award of interim authority to Bell Atlantic does not

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decide, and therefore will have no effect adverse to appellants upon, the issuesrelevant to the award

of permanent operating authority. In addition, in context, it must also be understood to mean that

BellAtlantic's application for permanent authoritywillnotreceive preferentialtreatment as "the status

quo to be preserved." La Star, 4 F.C.C.R. at 3780. Thus understood, the Commission's

determination that there is no prejudice to appellants because the Commission so binds itself is

reasonable and adequately explained.

B. Appellants' Oppositions and Character Qualifications Issues

Appellants next contend that theCommissiondisregarded their oppositionsto Metro Mobile's

petition for special relief. Their complaint is, in part, that they were entitled to a response to all the

issues raised in their oppositions, but they further contend that once Metro Mobile's character

qualifications were put in issue anywhere in the record, the Commission was obligated to consider

thembefore awarding interimoperating authority. Cf. Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 379 F.2d

447, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Congressional policy clearly bars any use of the air waves by those

whose public interest qualifications have not been established," except in "extraordinary

circumstances requiring emergency operations."). Appellants' underlying argument is that Metro

Mobile should have been disqualified from holding even interimoperating authority due to its alleged

misconduct in building facilities while appellants' challenges to its authority were still pending, and

its alleged misrepresentations in informational filings to the FCC.

The Commission, on the other hand, argues that the character qualifications issues raised in

JAJ's and McElroy's oppositions to Metro Mobile's request for special relief are wholly irrelevant to

the award ofinterimauthority. See Government Brief at 21. Under La Star, the Commission argues,

its decision on interim authority is based only on the immediate public interest need and the lack of

prejudice to applicants for permanent authority. Therefore, the Commission reasons, it was not

required to include consideration of Metro Mobile's character qualifications in its explanation of the

basis for its decision, which considered all relevant factors.

We cannot entirely agree with either party's reasoning. Character qualifications are always

a relevant consideration in the award of a license, not because we say so but because Congress has

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definitively said so. See Folkways, 379 F.2d at 449. If the Commission rescinded a permanent license

on the basis ofserious character disqualifications,such asfraud or flagrantlydiscriminatorypractices,

it surely would be appropriate for the Commission to take that factor into account in deciding

whether to award interim authority under § 22.32(g). See Voice of Reason, Inc., 37 F.C.C.2d 686

(1972) (denying extension of temporary operating authority on the basis of character qualifications).

At the very least, we would say that the Commission could consider character qualifications in

deciding whether or not to grant interim authority. Certainly to that extent, character qualifications

are relevant to a § 22.32(g) decision.

That said, however, appellants have not convinced us that the Commission acted arbitrarily,

capriciously, or unlawfully by not taking character qualifications issues raised in appellants'

oppositions into account in this proceeding. Bell Atlantic's interim authority was granted under §

22.32(g), which does not require a separate formal application or a hearing, but instead authorizes

the Commission to award interim authority to one or more of the applicantsfor permanent authority

when the public interest so requires. Although Metro Mobile first broached the subject of interim

authority in its petition for special relief, the Commission apparently did not regard that petition as

a separate "application" for interim authority; indeed, the Commission's order never even mentions

the petition for special relief. Under the circumstances, we do not view the § 22.32(g) proceeding

at issue here as having been a disposition of Metro Mobile's petition for special relief. Since the §

22.32(g) proceeding did not directly concern Metro Mobile's petition forspecialrelief, neither would

it be reasonable to view appellants' oppositions to that petition as appertaining to the § 22.32(g)

proceeding. That being the case, the Commission was not obligated to address JAJ's and McElroy's

oppositionsin the § 22.32(g) proceedingpresumably it remains under an obligation to consider the

issues raised in those oppositions at some point.

Appellants argue, however, that even ifthe Commission was not obligated to respond to their

oppositions in this proceeding, it was required to consider character qualifications issues raised

anywhere in the record. But the principal case relied on by appellants, Folkways, does not forbid the

Commission from ever granting interim operating authority without first considering outstanding

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character qualifications issues raised elsewhere in the record. Indeed, the Folkways court clearly

recognized that there are exceptions, however narrow, under which in "extraordinarycircumstances"

the Commission may find that the public interest necessitates a grant ofinterimauthority, even before

character qualificationsissues are resolved. 379 F.2d at 449. In the Folkways case, the Commission

had not made the necessary "strong public interest finding," and so had failed to justify its award of

interim authority without first addressing character qualifications. Id. Here, in contrast, there was

such a public interest finding. See 8 F.C.C.R. at 8677 (relying in part on reasoning in La Star, 4

F.C.C.R. at 3780, where in analogous circumstances the Commission found uninterrupted service

"immediately and imperatively necessary"). In similar cases where the Commission has granted

interim operating authority on the basis of an urgent public interest in uninterrupted service, it has

deferred consideration of character qualificationsissuesto proceedings on permanent licensing. See

Telephone and Data Systems, Inc., 9 F.C.C.R. 938, 957 (1994). We see no reason why it cannot do

so here given its determinations that, in the circumstances of this case, the public interest urgently

demanded uninterrupted service and the award of temporary authority to Bell Atlantic would not

prejudice applicants for permanent authority.

We do not comment on the merits of the underlying question raised in appellants'

oppositionswhether Metro Mobile engaged inmisconduct and misrepresentation. We do not think

the Commission has in any way resolved or even indirectly addressed that question by awarding

interimoperating authorityto BellAtlantic. The question thus remains before the Commission, which

may or may not decide that appellants have raised a substantial and material question meriting

designation as a separate issue in subsequent proceedings. At this stage, then, the question of Bell

Atlantic/Metro Mobile's character qualificationsisinno wayforeclosed bytheCommission's decision,

or by ours here today.

We conclude that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by granting interim

operating authority without responding to "character qualifications" issues raised in appellants'

oppositions to Metro Mobile's petition for special relief.

C. Simultaneous Applications for Interim and Permanent Authority

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Appellants finally contend that by granting interim authority while Bell Atlantic/Metro

Mobile's application for permanent authority was also pending, the FCC violated its own

well-established policy against granting interim authority to an applicant for permanent authority.

Obviously, no such policy barred an applicant for permanent authority from receiving interim

authority in La Star, 4 F.C.C.R. 3777 (1989), where the Commission granted such authority to one

oftwo competing applicantsfor permanent authority. Moreover, appellants' contention appears flatly

contrary to § 22.32(g), which authorizesthe Commission to award operating authority on an interim

basisto "one or more mutually exclusive applicants" for permanent authoritywhen the public interest

so requires. 47 C.F.R. § 22.32(g). Appellants argue, however, that a new policy has emerged after

the FCC decided La Star in 1989.

The Commission insists in reply that appellants are misreading its post-La Star precedents.

According to the Commission, its present policy is to prohibit simultaneous applications for interim

and permanent authority onlywhen no service is currently being provided. But the circumstances are

different here because Metro Mobile was already providing service, and the whole point of the award

of interim authority was to allow its customers to continue to receive that service uninterrupted. In

similar circumstances where permanent authority has been rescinded, threatening a disruption of

service, the Commission says it has allowed applicants for permanent authority to provide interim

service. The principal post-La Star case cited by appellants, Portland Cellular Partnership, 6

F.C.C.R. 2283 (1991), does not support their broad claimof a new, post-La Star policy. In that case,

the Commission expressly relied on the La Star rationale, and concluded that since Portland

Cellularwhose operating authority had been rescindedwas no longer an applicant for permanent

authority, there was no danger that granting it interim authority would prejudice applicants for

permanent authority. But that outcome surely does not imply that the Commission will award interim

authority only to parties not also applying for permanent authority. In Telephone and Data Systems,

Inc., 9 F.C.C.R. 938 (1994), the Commission rescinded a party's permanent authority but granted it

interim authority; the party nonetheless remained eligible for permanent authority. The Commission

acted similarly inHighlandsBroadcastingCo., Inc., 9 F.C.C.R. 5746 (1994), albeit in a broadcasting

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6Bell Atlantic moved to strike from the record a letter to the Clerk of the Court dated March

20, 1995, from Louis Gurman, counsel for appellant JAJ Cellular. Because we do not rely on this

letter, Bell Atlantic's motion is denied. 

context. Appellants cite no cases to the contrary. The "well-established policy" that appellants say

the Commission violated appears to us nonexistent, and the Commission's action was therefore not

arbitrary and capricious.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,6the order of the Commission is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

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