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Parties Involved:
American Federation of Government Employees, Council of Prison Locals, Council 33, Local 506
Intervenor for Respondent
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Florida
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 25, 2013 Decided December 17, 2013

No. 12-1383

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU 

OF PRISONS FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX COLEMAN,

FLORIDA,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

COUNCIL OF PRISON LOCALS, COUNCIL 33, LOCAL 506,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 13-1067

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Applications for 

Enforcement of an Order of the Federal Labor Relations 

Authority

Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the 

briefs were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, and 

Leonard Schaitman, Attorney.

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Zachary R. Henige, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations 

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were 

Rosa M. Koppel, Solicitor, and Barbara A. Sheehy, Attorney. 

David A. Borer and Judith D. Galat were on the brief 

for intervenor American Federation of Government 

Employees, Council of Prison Locals, Council 33, Local 506 

in support of respondent. 

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Petitioner in this 

case, the United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau 

of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Florida 

(“agency” or “BOP”), challenges a decision and order of the 

Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA” or “Authority”) 

regarding United States Penitentiary I, a high security facility 

in Coleman, Florida. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Council of 

Prison Locals 33 Local 506 (Union), 66 F.L.R.A. 819 (July 

23, 2012) (“FLRA Decision”), reprinted in Joint Appendix 

(“J.A.”) 284-309. The Authority held that BOP was required 

to bargain with the American Federation of Government 

Employees, Council of Prison Locals, Council 33, Local 506

(“Union”) over two proposals relating to BOP’s installation of 

two metal detectors in the compound through which prisoners 

must pass to enter or exit the recreation yard. Id. at 824, 828.

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The Union’s Proposal 1 would require prison 

management to have inmates turn in all watches which do not 

clear the compound metal detector, treat such watches as 

contraband, and assure that watches sold in the prison store 

would not set off the metal detectors. In support of this 

proposal, the Union argued, inter alia, that the bottlenecks of 

inmates at the entrance to the compound/detector area, caused 

by officers having to personally search inmates who had set 

off the metal detectors while other inmates waited, posed a 

safety risk to officers who could be “trapped in the event of a 

disturbance.” Id. at 821. The FLRA determined that Proposal 

1 was negotiable as an “appropriate arrangement” under 5 

U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) because it sought to ameliorate harm 

caused by the installation of the new metal detectors and did 

not excessively interfere with management’s rights under 

§ 7106(a)(1) to determine its internal security practices.

The Union’s Proposal 2 initially consisted of the 

following three sentences:

A block and mortar Compound Officer’s station, or 

comparable building materials, will be constructed on the 

compound. This should be constructed near one of the 

metal detector areas. The Metal Detector Station on the 

opposite side of the compound should have a secure area 

to be used as a control center for controlling inmate 

movement through the metal detector area, enclosed in a 

chain link fence, or something comparable.

Id. at 824 (emphasis added). The Authority found that 

Proposal 2, in its entirety, would excessively interfere with 

management’s right to determine internal security practices 

and, thus, is not an “appropriate arrangement” subject to 

bargaining. Id. at 827. However, the Authority granted the 

Union’s request to sever the third sentence from Proposal 2 

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and held that the severed sentence is within the duty to 

bargain. Id. The Authority did not hold that the Union has a 

right to bargain over the construction of “chain link fence, or 

something comparable.” Rather, it reasoned that the third 

sentence did not offend BOP’s management rights because it

merely proposed that the metal detector on one side of the 

compound “should” (instead of must) have a secure area

enclosed in a chain link fence or something comparable. Id. at 

828. In other words, the Authority found that the third 

sentence of Proposal 2 was negotiable because it required 

nothing of BOP. Id.; Br. for Resp’t at 27.

In March 2013, after BOP had filed its petition for review 

with this court but before arguments had been presented to the 

court, the prison warden changed the metal detector policy so 

that detectors would be used only “as needed.” BOP then filed 

a motion with the court to dismiss the case as moot because 

the bottleneck problem that prompted the Union’s proposals 

was no longer an issue.

BOP now asks that this court find its petition moot and 

vacate the Authority’s decision and order, or, in the 

alternative, that the court reverse the Authority’s decision and 

order on the merits. The Authority has cross-petitioned for 

enforcement of its decision and order, and the Union has

intervened on behalf of the Authority. For the reasons 

indicated below, we deny BOP’s motion to dismiss, deny the 

petition for review with respect to Proposal 1, grant the 

petition with respect to the third sentence of Proposal 2, and 

remand the case to the Authority for further review.

I. MOOTNESS

We first address the threshold jurisdictional issue raised 

by BOP, i.e., whether “this case is moot because of events 

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occurring after the Authority’s decision, namely, a new 

warden’s decision to use the compound detectors to screen 

only those inmates suspected of carrying contraband.” Br. for

the Pet’r at 3. BOP is simply mistaken in its contention that 

the case is moot because the action giving rise to the Union’s 

bargaining demands is no longer an issue. On this point, the 

Supreme Court has spoken unequivocally:

[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not 

deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the 

case, i.e., does not make the case moot. A controversy 

may remain to be settled in such circumstances, e.g., a 

dispute over the legality of the challenged practices. The 

defendant is free to return to his old ways. This, together 

with a public interest in having the legality of the practices 

settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. 

United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) 

(citations omitted); accord County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 

440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). In order for this matter to be 

declared moot, BOP must satisfy a heavy burden of 

demonstrating “that ‘there is no reasonable expectation’ that 

the alleged violation will recur.” County of Los Angeles, 440 

U.S. at 631 (quoting W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633); accord 

Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486, 492 (D.C. 

Cir. 1988). BOP has not satisfied this burden.

The record before the court indicates that BOP has not 

irrevocably reversed its decision to place metal detectors in 

the prison compound. And it is uncontested that BOP retains 

the discretion to decide how to utilize the metal detectors. In a 

February 2013 memorandum issued by the agency concerning 

use of the metal detectors, BOP declared that the metal 

detectors will not be removed from the recreation yard and 

that the metal detectors will be used “to screen inmates as 

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needed for security purposes (randomly, suspicious behavior, 

etc.).” Br. for the Pet’r, Addendum B. It is clear from this 

directive that the agency can increase the number of inmates 

required to pass through the metal detectors at any time, as it 

sees fit, and reintroduce the bottleneck problem that the Union 

seeks to address through its bargaining proposals. Given this 

reality, we cannot conclude that BOP has met its “heavy 

burden” of showing that “there is no reasonable expectation 

that the wrong will be repeated.” Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 

492 (citation omitted).

BOP also contends that we should vacate the FLRA’s 

decision, either because the case is moot or because the 

Union’s claim regarding Proposal 1 is now stale. We disagree. 

Even if the case were moot, we would not vacate the FLRA’s 

order with respect to Proposal 1. The Supreme Court has 

stated that if the party seeking relief from the judgment below 

caused the mootness by voluntary action, vacatur usually will 

not be ordered. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall 

P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24-25, 29 (1994). We can find no 

equitable basis for vacatur in this case. However, we will 

remand the case for further consideration by the Authority to 

allow it to determine whether, in light of the changed 

circumstances cited by BOP, the order to bargain over 

Proposal 1 should be modified.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

As we explained in Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA

(NTEU 2008), 550 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2008):

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations 

Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135, requires federal agencies to 

bargain with public employee unions over employment 

conditions, but renders certain management rights 

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nonnegotiable, including an agency’s right to determine 

its “internal security practices,” 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1). 

When a union submits a proposal that would affect an 

agency’s internal security practices, the agency can 

invoke this provision to relieve it of the obligation to 

negotiate over the proposal. To find that a proposal 

would affect the agency’s right to determine its internal 

security practices, the Federal Labor Relations Authority 

must determine that the agency’s policy is reasonably 

linked to the security of its operations, and that the 

union’s proposal deviates from or modifies the policy. 

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA (NTEU I), 404 

F.3d 454, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 2005). An agency may 

nevertheless be required to negotiate over a proposal 

which would affect its right to determine its internal 

security practices if the union can establish that the 

proposal represents an “appropriate arrangement[ ] for 

employees adversely affected” by the agency’s exercise 

of that right. § 7106(b)(3).

In assessing whether a proposal that would affect an 

agency’s right to determine its internal security practices 

is nonetheless negotiable as an appropriate arrangement, 

the Authority applies the “KANG test.” See Nat’l 

Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA (NTEU II), 437 F.3d 

1248, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of 

Gov’t Employees, Local R14-87 (KANG), 21 F.L.R.A. 24 

(1986)). Under this test, the Authority requires the union 

to establish that the proposal is in fact intended as an 

arrangement to benefit employees. If the union does so, 

then the Authority balances the “‘practical needs of 

employees and managers’” to see if the proposal 

“‘excessively interferes’” with management rights. 

NTEU II, 437 F.3d at 1253 (quoting KANG, 21 F.L.R.A. 

at 31-32).

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Therefore, in order to conclude that an agency has no 

obligation to negotiate over a proposal, the Authority 

must determine, first, that the proposal would affect the 

agency’s right to determine its internal security practices 

and, second, that the proposal does not qualify as an 

appropriate arrangement. While the Authority may make 

the first determination without requiring the agency to 

produce evidence if the connection is obvious, see, e.g.,

U.S. Dep’t of Def. Fort Bragg Dependents Sch., 49 

F.L.R.A. 333, 343 (1994), its second determination must 

be supported by record evidence, e.g., NTEU I, 404 F.3d 

at 458.

Id. at 1150-51.

As noted above, the dispute in this case arose when BOP 

installed outdoor metal detectors at the United States

Penitentiary I in Coleman, FL, and implemented a policy 

requiring that all prisoners move through them on the way in 

and out of the recreation yard. The Union, concerned that the 

large numbers of inmates moving through the detectors could 

cause “bottlenecking,” submitted a number of bargaining 

proposals for changes in prison procedure intended to 

improve working conditions for the correctional officers in 

light of the new detectors. Only Proposal 1 and the third 

sentence of Proposal 2 are at issue in this case.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“It is well established that the court’s role in reviewing 

the FLRA’s negotiability determinations is narrow.” Am. 

Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2761 v. FLRA, 866 F.2d 1443, 

1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989). We “will only reverse a negotiability 

finding of the Authority when the finding is not supported by 

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substantial evidence, is inconsistent with the governing 

statute, represents an unexplained departure from prior agency 

determinations, or is otherwise arbitrary or capricious or not 

in accordance with the law.” Id. 

However, pursuant to arbitrary and capricious review, if 

an agency’s “explanation for its determination . . . lacks any 

coherence,” a court owes “no deference to [the agency’s] 

purported expertise.” Tripoli Rocketry Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 437 F.3d 75, 77 

(D.C. Cir. 2006); accord Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 80 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that because the agency failed to 

offer any coherent explanation for its judgment denying the 

plaintiff’s application for a Certificate of Loss of Nationality, 

the action was arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned 

decisionmaking); Coburn v. McHugh, 679 F.3d 924, 926 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that because the agency decisions 

were “largely incomprehensible,” they were “unworthy of any 

deference”).

IV. PROPOSAL 1

We need not tarry long over Proposal 1, for the 

Authority’s decision is eminently reasonable and supported 

by the record. The Authority found that the Union had 

identified several adverse effects resulting from BOP’s

decision to install new outdoor metal detectors. These adverse 

effects included, inter alia, bottlenecks at the metal detector 

entrances that compromised the safety of officers and the 

efficacy of the clearing process and that increased the amount 

of time officers were “at the mercy of . . . climate conditions.” 

FLRA Decision, 66 F.L.R.A. at 823. Moreover, the Authority 

found that “Proposal 1 is sufficiently tailored because it 

targets a group of employees likely to be harmed by a 

particular exercise of management’s right to determine 

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internal security practices, here, the installation of outdoor 

metal detectors. It is intended to reduce nuisance alarms 

triggered by prohibited watches, thereby moving inmates 

through the compound-detector bottlenecks more quickly.” 

Br. for Resp’t at 17; see FLRA Decision, 66 F.L.R.A. at 823. 

Finally, the Authority found that Proposal 1 is an “appropriate 

arrangement” under KANG because “banning prohibited 

watches would reduce the delays, inefficiencies, and security 

risks caused by nuisance alarms at the compound-detector 

bottlenecks.” FLRA Decision, 66 F.L.R.A. at 823.

During argument before this court, counsel for BOP 

suggested that Proposal 1 should be declared non-negotiable 

because BOP retains sole discretion to determine all matters 

related to internal security at its prisons. This assertion is 

wrong as a matter of law. As noted above in NTEU 2008, 

“[i]n assessing whether a proposal that would affect an 

agency’s right to determine its internal security practices is 

nonetheless negotiable as an appropriate arrangement, the 

Authority applies the ‘KANG test.’” 550 F.3d at 1150. The 

Authority appropriately applied the KANG test here and 

reasonably determined that Proposal 1 would not excessively 

interfere with management rights. BOP argued before the 

FLRA that Proposal 1 excessively interferes with its 

management rights because it would leave the agency without 

discretion to decide “what is and is not contraband as it relates 

to inmate watches.” Agency’s Statement of Position at 15, 

reprinted in J.A. 110. However, as the FLRA properly notes, 

BOP never explained to the Authority just how this purported 

loss of discretion would “excessively interfere” with BOP’s 

management rights. FLRA Decision, 66 F.L.R.A. at 823.

In sum, we can find no grounds upon which to overturn 

the judgment of the Authority with respect to Proposal 1. The 

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Authority’s decision clearly passes muster under the 

applicable standard of review.

V. PROPOSAL 2

The Authority’s decision on Proposal 2 is a different 

matter, however. It is arbitrary and capricious because it is

“largely incomprehensible” and thus not supported by 

reasoned decisionmaking. Coburn, 679 F.3d at 926.

The Authority held that the Proposal 2 taken as a whole

was non-negotiable because “a proposal concerning the 

construction of a shelter for officers on the grounds of a 

correctional facility affects management’s right to determine 

internal security practices.” FLRA Decision, 66 F.L.R.A. at 

826. The Authority found that “management has made a 

decision to keep the compound area free from any 

obstructions that could aid an inmate in escaping, committing 

an assault, or otherwise engaging in illegal or non-allowed 

conduct in that area.” Id. at 825. (citation and alterations

omitted). Thus, the Authority concluded that Proposal 2 

would impermissibly infringe management rights, and it 

further concluded that the proposal was not an appropriate 

arrangement because it “excessively interferes with the 

Agency’s right to determine its internal security practices.” Id.

at 826.

Oddly, however, the Authority concluded that the third 

sentence in Proposal 2 –

The Metal Detector Station on the opposite side of the 

compound should have a secure area to be used as a 

control center for controlling inmate movement through 

the metal detector area, enclosed in a chain link fence, or 

something comparable. 

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– is negotiable because it “has a separate meaning, and can 

operate independently, from the first two sentences.” Id. at 

828. Given the words of the proposal and the Authority’s 

holding with regard to Proposal 2 in its entirely, this 

conclusion makes no sense. 

In an effort to defend its conclusion, the Authority found 

that the first two sentences of Proposal 2 “address the 

construction of the officers’ station, [while] the third sentence 

addresses creating a ‘secure area’ in the compound-detector 

area . . . [and not] necessarily the physical, block-and-mortar 

officers’ station discussed in the first two sentences of the 

proposal.” Id. Most notably, the Authority held that “the 

severed sentence of the proposal uses the word ‘should’ and 

we have adopted the Union’s explanation that the severed 

sentence does not require that the compound detector area 

have a secure area.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the 

Authority’s decision relies heavily on its view that the word 

“should” commands nothing and that, therefore, the third 

sentence has no substantive content.

In its brief to this court, the FLRA amplified its view of 

the third sentence of Proposal 2:

[T]he Authority found that the [third sentence in Proposal 

2] is within the duty to bargain because it “does not

require that the compound-detector area have a secure 

area,” only that it should have such an area. In other 

words, the Authority determined that the proposal’s use 

of the non-obligatory term “should” does not affect any 

management right . . . . The Agency’s claim must fail 

because the Agency did not, and cannot, explain how a 

proposal that does not require it to do anything could be 

outside the duty to bargain.

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Br. for Resp’t at 29 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

When pressed at oral argument on this point, counsel for the 

Authority repeated the claim that the third sentence in 

Proposal 2 requires nothing of BOP. He also asserted that, 

even if it were included in a collective bargaining agreement, 

the Union’s proposal would have no meaning and could not 

be enforced. According to counsel, BOP was thus obliged to 

bargain over the third sentence of Proposal 2. This is a 

specious line of reasoning. 

The Authority rhetorically asks: how can “a proposal that 

does not require [BOP] to do anything” be outside the duty to 

bargain? Id. This is the wrong question. The proper question 

here is: how can a proposal that purports to have no meaning 

whatsoever be within the scope of the statutory duty to 

bargain? The Authority has provided no answer.

The Authority’s claim that the disputed proposal is 

meaningless is sophistry. On its face, the third sentence in 

Proposal 2 plainly would require a secure area for use as a 

control center; that is what the Union was seeking. And the 

Authority concedes that such a proposal would not be 

negotiable. The Authority’s claim that the word “should” in 

the third sentence somehow negates the force of what is being 

proposed does not withstand scrutiny. “Should” is typically 

used to express an obligation or duty. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S 

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2104 (3d ed. 1976). 

Thus, the disputed proposal presented by the Union certainly 

suggests something more than nothing.

Finally, counsel for the Authority acknowledged that if 

BOP was required to bargain over the third sentence in 

Proposal 2 and the parties failed to reach agreement, the 

dispute could be submitted to the Federal Services Impasses 

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Panel for resolution. 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b). The Impasses Panel 

may use any of a number of dispute resolution techniques –

such as informal conferences, additional mediation, fact 

finding, written submissions, recommendations for settlement, 

and mediation-arbitration – to resolve a bargaining impasse. If 

the parties are still unable to reach settlement, the Impasses 

Panel may impose contract terms upon the parties. Id.

§ 7119(c); 5 C.F.R. §§ 2471.1, 2471.6. Both this court and the 

Authority have held that, barring “unusual circumstances,” 

Panel decisions are not reviewable by the Authority or a 

court. See, e.g., Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 

1497, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7119(c)(1) “commits to the [impasses] panel broad authority 

to make swift decisions in order to end disputes,” and that 

such decisions are normally binding and nonreviewable); 

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 63 F.L.R.A. 183 (2009)

(NTEU), (same). In NTEU, the Authority tellingly stated that, 

in matters concerning the resolution by an Impasses Panel of a 

negotiation impasse under the statutory authority of 

§ 7119(c)(1),

[the statute] establishes the Panel as an independent 

entity within the Authority and commits to the Panel the 

broad authority to make decisions to resolve negotiation 

impasses. Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 

at 1499. That broad authority denies direct review of 

Panel orders by either the Authority or the courts. Id. at 

1499-1500.

63 F.L.R.A. at 187. 

Given the wording of the Union’s proposal, an Impasses 

Panel seemingly would be free to impose a contract term that 

requires BOP to construct a secure area for controlling inmate 

movement through the metal detector area, enclosed in a 

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chain link fence, or something comparable. This would be 

quite ironic, because the Authority suggests that BOP has no 

obligation to bargain over such a requirement. 

The point here is that the Authority’s decision that the 

third sentence in Proposal 2 is negotiable could result in its 

imposition on the parties by an Impasses Panel. It is possible, 

of course, that BOP could fail or refuse to cooperate in 

impasse procedures or decline to adhere to a contract 

provision imposed by an Impasses Panel requiring it to 

construct the secure area. This might prompt the Union to file 

an unfair labor practice charge with the Authority pursuant to

5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(6), which would allow the Authority to 

clarify its position on the meaning of the third sentence in 

Proposal 2. Brewer, 735 F.2d at 1500 (noting that it is an 

unfair labor practice for an agency or a labor organization “to 

fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse procedures and impasse 

decisions”). But the Authority has not argued here that if an 

Impasses Panel imposes a contract term that requires BOP to 

construct a secure area to be used as a control center for 

controlling inmate movement through the metal detector area, 

enclosed in a chain link fence, or something comparable, this 

would be subject to review by the Authority. Therefore, we 

decline to address this issue.

In sum, the Authority’s construction of the third sentence 

in Proposal 2 defies reasoned decisionmaking. We therefore 

hold that the Authority’s decision regarding the third sentence 

of Proposal 2 is arbitrary and capricious.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, we deny BOP’s motion to 

dismiss on grounds of mootness and its motion to vacate the 

Authority’s decision and order. We grant the Authority’s 

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cross-petition to enforce its decision and order regarding 

Proposal 1, and we grant BOP’s petition to vacate the 

Authority’s decision and order regarding the third sentence in 

Proposal 2. We hereby remand the case to the Authority to 

allow it to determine whether, in light of the changed 

circumstances occasioned by the changed use of the metal 

detectors, the order to bargain over Proposal 1 should be 

revised.

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SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part. I 

join the panel opinion with one exception. Counsel for the 

FLRA explicitly stated at oral argument that an impasse panel 

would not be able to order the petitioner to actually do 

anything regarding the “should” clause. I think that statement 

would certainly constitute an “unusual circumstance” 

providing grounds for review of a wayward impasse panel 

decision, and we should accept the Authority's assurance. 

That makes the dispute over the “should” clause a tempest in 

a teapot.

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