Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-07350/USCOURTS-ca4-09-07350-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Samuel Bush Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7350

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL BUSH WRIGHT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:03-cr-00146-AW-2; 8:07-cv-01790-AW)

Submitted: June 15, 2010 Decided: July 2, 2010

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Robert K. Hur, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Samuel Bush Wright appeals the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010) 

motion. We granted a certificate of appealability on Wright’s 

claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 

use of a conviction for second-degree burglary in the District 

of Columbia as a predicate conviction for sentencing Wright 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 

(2006). After further consideration, we affirm.

In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a movant must show: (1) that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; 

and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). In 

evaluating counsel’s performance, the court indulges a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. Further, 

the reviewing court must evaluate the reasonableness of 

counsel’s performance within the context of the circumstances at 

the time of the alleged errors, rather than with the benefit of 

hindsight. Id. at 690. To satisfy the second prong of 

Strickland, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.

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Wright was sentenced in 2004, and his conviction 

became final in 2006. At that time, the use of a prior burglary 

conviction as a predicate for sentencing under the ACCA was 

governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Taylor held that burglary as used 

in § 924(e) must include “an unlawful or unprivileged entry.” 

495 U.S. at 598. The district court correctly recognized that 

neither the Washington, D.C. second-degree burglary statute nor 

Wright’s underlying indictment includes this element. 

Importantly, however, Taylor reserved the interpretation of 

§ 924(e)’s residual clause, which states that the ACCA can still 

apply if a felon-in-possession’s prior felony was one that 

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 

risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Taylor Court noted that “[t]he 

Government remains free to argue that any offense -- including 

offenses similar to generic burglary -- should count towards 

enhancement [under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)].” 495 U.S. at 600 n.9.

Wright correctly notes that the Supreme Court, in 

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-47 (2008), narrowed 

the definition of a violent felony under the residual clause of 

the ACCA to include only crimes that involve “purposeful, 

violent, and aggressive conduct” similar to burglary, arson, 

extortion, or use of explosives. However, Wright’s counsel at 

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sentencing in 2004 cannot be held responsible for forecasting 

future interpretations of the statute. Thus, counsel’s 

performance was not deficient when he did not assert an argument 

based on the principles announced in Begay. See United 

States v. McNamara, 74 F.3d 514, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1996) (an 

attorney’s failure to anticipate a new rule of law is not 

constitutionally deficient).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED

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