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Parties Involved:
Shirley S. Chater
Appellee
Jeff Reid
Appellant

Document Text:

JEFF REID, 

v. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 95-2059 

SHIRLEY S. CRATER, Commissioner, Social ) 

Security Administration,* ) 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-551-LH) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gary J. Martone and Francesca J. MacDowell, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

and Joseph B. Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Region VI and 

Christopher Carillo, Lead Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, 

Social Security Administration, Dallas, Texas, for DefendantAppellee. 

* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services in social security cases were 

transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 

103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, 

Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. 

Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant 

in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for 

the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to 

the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of 

the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-2059 Document: 01019280395 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 1 
Before BRISCOE, LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Ralph G. 

District Court for 

designation. 

Thompson, District Judge, United States 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

THOMPSON, District Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Jeff Reid appeals from an order affirming the 

Secretary's decision that he was not disabled before the 

expiration of his insured status on June 30, 1989, and therefore 

was not eligible for disability insurance benefits. We affirm. 

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income benefits in August 1991, claiming he 

became disabled on December 3, 1985, due to severe low back pain. 

The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge 

(ALJ) found that plaintiff worked through October 1989. Because 

plaintiff's insured status lapsed on June 30, 1989, the ALJ found 

he was ineligible for disability insurance benefits. However, he 

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Appellate Case: 95-2059 Document: 01019280395 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 2 
found plaintiff established he was disabled as of July 15, 1991, 

and therefore was eligible for supplemental security income. 

The Appeals Council denied review; consequently, the ALJ's 

decision stands as the final decision of the Secretary in this 

case. The district court affirmed. We review the Secretary's 

decision "to determine whether the findings are supported by 

substantial evidence and whether the Secretary applied correct 

legal standards." Pacheco v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 695, 696 (lOth 

Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ's finding that his 

disability onset date was after June 30, 1989, contending the ALJ 

failed to follow Social Security Ruling 83-20 by not calling a 

medical advisor at the hearing. Ruling 83-20 (West's Soc. Sec. 

Rptg. Serv. Rulings 1983-91, at 49 (1992)), defines the onset date 

as "the first day an individual is disabled as defined in the Act 

and the regulations." Factors relevant to the determination are 

the claimant's allegation of an onset date, his work history, and 

the medical evidence, with medical evidence being the primary 

element in determining onset date. Id. at 49, 50. 

Ruling 83-20 recognizes that it sometimes may be necessary to 

infer the onset date. The ALJ then should call on the services of 

a medical advisor at the hearing. Id. at 51. However, a medical 

advisor need be called only if the medical evidence of onset is 

ambiguous. Bailey v. Chater, 68 F.3d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1995); 

Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1993); Morgan v. 

Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1991); DeLorme v. 

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Appellate Case: 95-2059 Document: 01019280395 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 3 
Dr. Barry Maron's April 18, 1989, report indicates that 

plaintiff complained of aching and stabbing translumbar discomfort 

and numbness anteriorly, transversely, and in the left anterior 

thigh. On examination, plaintiff was comfortable in a seated 

position. The side table test was negative for sciatic tension 

signs, calf circumferences were equal, motor control in the hip, 

knee, and ankle was excellent, extensor function of the large toe 

was strong, and leg lengths were clinically equal. Additionally, 

straight leg raises, hip rolls, flexion abduction, and external 

rotation elicited no discomfort. Sensation and circulation in the 

lower extremities with pinwheel and palpation was normal. Stress 

of the sacroiliac and lumbosacral joint elicited no discomfort. 

Plaintiff had a full range of motion of the spine. Heel and toe 

gait was normal. Lumbar spine x-rays revealed a spondylolysis, 

bilaterally, at LS with a minimal slip anteriorly. Dr. Maron 

recommended Williams flexion exercises and bracing. He advised 

plaintiff to avoid heavy weight lifting, but thought plaintiff 

could perform sedentary, light, or moderate work. Dr. Maron also 

thought plaintiff might be able to return to his job as a painter 

once he got over this episode. Appellant's App. at 140. 

Dr. Maron's report unambiguously establishes that plaintiff 

was able to do sedentary, light, and moderate work during the 

relevant time period, and therefore was not disabled at that time. 

Thus, if Dr. Maron's report is considered, the ALJ was not 

required to call a medical advisor under Ruling 83-20. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that Dr. Maron's report should 

be given little if any weight because Dr. Maron examined him only 

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Appellate Case: 95-2059 Document: 01019280395 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 4 
once and therefore was not a treating physician. A treating 

physician's opinion about the nature and severity of a claimant's 

impairments will be given controlling weight under certain 

circumstances. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human 

Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (lOth Cir. 1994). A treating 

physician's opinion generally is favored over that of a consulting 

physician. Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1463 (lOth Cir. 

1987). However, "[t]he treating physician rule governs the weight 

to be accorded the medical opinion of the physician who treated 

the claimant . . . relative to other medical evidence before the 

fact-finder, including opinions of other physicians." Kemp v. 

Bowen, 816 F.2d 1469, 1476 (lOth Cir. 1987) (quotation 

omitted) (emphasis added). Dr. Maron's report was the only medical 

evidence submitted pertaining to the relevant time period. 

Plaintiff's later treating physicians did not express an opinion 

as to whether he was disabled during this time period. Therefore, 

the treating physician rule does not dictate that Dr. Maron's 

report be given little or no weight. 

There is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's finding 

that plaintiff's onset date was after June 30, 1989. The date an 

impairment forces a claimant to stop working is of great 

significance in determining the onset date. Ruling 83-20 (West's 

Soc. Sec. Rptg. Serv. Rulings 1983-91, at 50). Plaintiff was able 

to work through October 1989. This fact, coupled with Dr. Maron's 

opinion that plaintiff could perform moderate work as of April 

1989, provides substantial evidence for the ALJ's finding. 

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Appellate Case: 95-2059 Document: 01019280395 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 5 
The second issue is whether the ALJ improperly analyzed 

plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling pain. We recently 

held that an analysis of the credibility of subjective complaints 

of disabling pain is inadequate if the ALJ merely states a 

conclusion that pain is not disabling without making express 

findings with reference to relevant evidence. Kepler v. Chater, 

68 F.3d 387, 391 (lOth Cir. 1995). Although it appears the ALJ's 

pain analysis in the present case suffers from the same infirmity 

as in Kepler, we need not resolve the issue because plaintiff 

never testified he was disabled by pain before June 30, 1989.1 

Rather, he testified that he was beset by totally disabling pain 

when he finished his furniture building job. Appellant's App. at 

75. Other evidence of record establishes that the furniture 

building job ended in October 1989. Id. at 172. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

1 Whether he was disabled by pain after June 30, 1989, but 

before the onset date of July 15, 1991, is immaterial; he would 

not be entitled to disability insurance benefits if he became 

disabled after expiration of his insured status, see Flint v. 

Sullivan, 951 F.2d 264, 267 (lOth Cir. 1991), and he would not be 

entitled to supplemental security income prior to the month in 

which he submitted his application (August 1991), Ruling 83-20 

(West's Soc. Sec. Rptg. Serv. Rulings 1983-91, at 49). 

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Appellate Case: 95-2059 Document: 01019280395 Date Filed: 12/05/1995 Page: 6