Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-23-01557/USCOURTS-ca7-23-01557-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Sheffler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-1557 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

TODD SHEFFLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:19-CR-30067 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 8, 2025 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Correctional officers at an Illinois 

state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who died from 

his injuries. For their part in his killing and its cover-up, Todd 

Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal 

crimes. Following a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and a jury 

found him guilty. 

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On appeal, Sheffler argues there was not a reasonable likelihood that an incident report he wrote and an interview he 

gave to the state police would reach federal officials. So, he 

submits, he could not have violated two federal statutes underlying some of his convictions: 18 U.S.C. § 1512, prohibiting 

witness tampering, and 18 U.S.C. § 1519, forbidding falsifying 

records in a federal investigation. 

Sheffler also asserts the district court incorrectly ruled that 

he had breached a proffer agreement, as well as erroneously 

allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. He further maintains 

that in the rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor impermissibly attacked his lawyer, misconstrued evidence, and inappropriately commented on his right to silence. For all these 

reasons, Sheffler challenges the district court’s denial of his 

motion for a new trial.

We affirm because sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s 

convictions, and neither the district court nor the prosecutor 

committed any reversible errors. 

I. Background 

Sheffler appeals his criminal convictions after a jury trial, 

so we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution. United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 

2016). We describe the beatings Earvin suffered that led to his 

death, Sheffler’s actions during the subsequent investigation, 

the charges against him, a proffer agreement into which he 

entered before his first jury trial, and the events and rulings at 

his second jury trial.

The beatings. The events in this case took place at the Western Illinois Correctional Center in Mt. Sterling, Illinois. On 

May 17, 2018, Earvin refused to lock up at a correctional

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officer’s request. In response, officers attempted to handcuff 

Earvin. He resisted and a scuffle ensued in which an officer 

received a minor injury. This occurred in the prison’s R1 

building in the D Wing.

An alert was called out that staff was in distress, and more 

than 20 officers arrived on the scene. Earvin was escorted out 

of D Wing with officers Alex Banta and Willie Hedden holding his arms. They walked into the R1 vestibule, a “blind spot” 

not covered by security cameras. There, Banta began to kick 

and punch Earvin. Hedden bent over and struck Earvin three 

times with a closed fist, while a third officer kicked Earvin 

around the thigh. 

Another inmate saw this beating as he spoke to his girlfriend on the phone. He narrated: “They beatin’ him up; they 

stompin’ this man.” Officers then picked Earvin up and led 

him out of the R1 vestibule and toward the segregation unit. 

At this point the injured Earvin needed assistance to walk.

Sheffler stepped in to relieve another officer and take over 

the escort. At that point five officers were assisting, and a sixth 

officer was following them. They approached the entryway to 

segregation, which like the R1 vestibule had no security cameras. It was known that “beatdowns” happened there. 

In this second blind spot the officers again assaulted 

Earvin. The parties dispute Sheffler’s precise involvement, 

but multiple officers testified to his participation. Hedden 

opened the exterior door to segregation and the interior door 

remained closed. Then Hedden saw Sheffler shove Earvin 

through the exterior door into the interior door. Earvin landed 

headfirst at the base of the interior door. Hedden then saw 

Banta and Sheffler “stomping and kicking” Earvin, as well as 

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Banta repeatedly “dropping himself with both knees” onto 

Earvin. Another officer’s recollection differed somewhat, with 

Banta throwing Earvin into the door, punching him, and 

jumping on his rib cage. In that officer’s version, Sheffler 

played a more passive role, not visibly throwing or kicking 

Earvin. A third officer saw kicks and punches aimed at Earvin 

but could not tell who struck which blows. In contrast, a

fourth officer observed Banta and Sheffler “stomping” Earvin 

with their feet as he lay handcuffed on the floor. 

After these assaults, Earvin could no longer walk, was covered in blood, and appeared unconscious. He was carried

from the segregation entryway to a holding cell. Staff then 

moved Earvin to the prison’s health care unit, and soon after 

transferred him to the hospital. Forty days after the assault 

Earvin died from his injuries. 

False statements. Following the assault, Sheffler immediately prepared an incident report that was false. It recounted 

that “Inmate Earvin dropped to his knees and tried to pull 

away while being escorted.” Sheffler did not mention any incident in the segregation unit, let alone a beating. The next 

day, the state police interviewed numerous correctional officers, including Sheffler. None of them mentioned an assault in 

segregation. Sheffler denied seeing any “physical altercation” 

between Earvin and staff: “[W]e kept pulling him up off the 

ground. That was about it.” Sheffler also denied hearing any 

“rumors” about officers getting “a little aggressive” with 

Earvin. Sheffler named only one other officer from Earvin’s 

escort, Banta, whom he described as “decent” and a “good officer.” 

Federal criminal charges. For their roles in the beatings and 

the investigation, a grand jury indicted Sheffler, Hedden, and 

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No. 23-1557 5

Banta with numerous federal crimes. Sheffler was named in 

five counts: 

1. Conspiracy to Deprive Civil Rights in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; 

2. Deprivation of Civil Rights in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 242;

3. Conspiracy to Engage in Misleading Conduct in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2;

4. Obstruction–Falsification of Document in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519; and 

5. Obstruction–Misleading Conduct in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).1

Proffer agreement. Before his first trial, Sheffler requested 

and signed a proffer agreement with the government. He 

agreed to “be completely truthful about the facts” and not to 

“conceal or minimize his own actions or involvement in any 

offense.” Violation of the agreement carried harsh consequences. If Sheffler knowingly made any false statements or 

omissions, the government would be entitled to use those 

statements to start and support a criminal prosecution. After 

signing the agreement, Sheffler answered questions in several 

FBI interviews. 

The first jury trial for Sheffler and Banta occurred in March 

and April 2022. At that trial the government did not elicit Sheffler’s statements during the interviews. Banta was found 

guilty of several crimes, including Counts 1–3 listed above, 

but the jury hung on the charges against Sheffler. The 

1 Hedden pleaded guilty to Counts 1–3 of the indictment in March 

2021, before the first jury trial of Sheffler and Banta.

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government subsequently moved to revoke the proffer agreement, seeking to admit Sheffler’s interview statements at the 

second trial. The district court granted this motion, pointing

to three ways Sheffler had obfuscated during the FBI interviews. 

First, Sheffler said that “through his peripheral vision,” he 

saw Banta jumping and landing on Earvin. This conflicted 

with a later statement that Sheffler did not see Banta land 

blows on Earvin, but it was “possible” Banta did so. It also

conflicted with Sheffler’s claim that the incident could be an 

“honest mistake.” The court saw these three statements as 

mutually exclusive, demonstrating that Sheffler did not tell 

the truth. Second, Sheffler denied knowledge of any injuries 

to Earvin before other staff took him to the health care unit. 

Given the extent of Earvin’s injuries, the court concluded that 

it was impossible for Sheffler to be completely blind to them. 

Third, Sheffler denied contacting Banta after the beatings. But 

phone records show he called Banta that day and twice more 

in the coming days, with two of the three calls being answered. 

As a consequence of these false denials, the district court 

ruled that Sheffler had violated the proffer agreement and 

that his statements during the FBI interviews could be admitted into evidence at the second jury trial. 

Juror bias allegations. During Sheffler’s second trial in August 2022, his wife claimed she overheard a conversation 

among prospective jurors and one of them say: “Two of them 

have already been convicted.” Sheffler’s wife identified one of 

the prospective jurors as Juror 31. The magistrate judge who 

conducted voir dire had previously questioned Juror 31, who

denied having any discussions about the case. 

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Later during the second trial, the government learned that 

a juror from the first trial was watching the second trial from 

an overflow room. After the first jury hung on the charges 

against Sheffler, that former juror had called the outcome a 

“travesty” and said that Sheffler should have been convicted. 

Of particular concern, the government learned that the former 

juror may have spoken to Juror 31 after the first trial. Such a 

conversation could threaten the second jury’s impartiality. 

The government followed up with the former juror and 

learned that after the first trial was over, she had shared texts 

and phone calls about the first trial with Juror 31’s wife, but 

that she had not spoken with Juror 31 himself. The district 

judge then heard statements from the parties and questioned 

Juror 31 apart from the other jurors:

THE COURT: ... Did you have any prior awareness about anything about this case?

JUROR NUMBER 31: No.

THE COURT: Have you ever had any discussions about this case with anyone?

JUROR NUMBER 31: No.

THE COURT: Including your family, your 

wife?

JUROR NUMBER 31: Correct.

THE COURT: ... Did you have any conversations with any of the other jurors about this 

case, either before being sworn in or after?

JUROR NUMBER 31: No. I have not.2 

2 The magistrate judge questioned Juror 31 on August 2, 2022. The 

government raised with the district judge the former juror’s contact with 

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After this exchange, Sheffler’s counsel expressed concern that 

the former juror’s statements may have influenced Juror 31 

and asked to reserve the juror bias issue for additional research. The district judge rejected this request: “I think the issue has already been blown, quite frankly. You didn't assert it 

for cause at the time. I certainly, hearing this colloquy, got 

nothing that would permit an excuse for cause.” Juror 31 remained on the jury throughout the second jury trial. 

Prosecution’s rebuttal argument. The second jury trial lasted 

15 days. Toward the end, the prosecution began its rebuttal 

closing argument by recounting defense counsel’s opening 

statement:

[A]t the beginning of this trial, right after you 

took an oath, [defense counsel] stood before you 

and asked you to imagine ... having your 

grandmother accused of robbery, and she 

equated that to the presumption of innocence, 

which drew an objection that the Court sustained. 

Defense counsel had asked the jurors to think of Sheffler as 

their “best friend” or “grandma,” drawing another sustained 

objection. Then defense counsel said: “What would it take to 

convince you of someone you love of their guilt?” and again 

drew a sustained objection. 

In the rebuttal the prosecutor recounted each of these sustained objections. Defense counsel objected, asking “Am I on 

trial, or is Mr. Sheffler on trial?” The objection was overruled, 

Juror 31’s wife on August 4, 2022. The district judge questioned Juror 31 

on August 5, 2022.

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and the prosecutor continued: “There is nothing more unsupported or discrediting of an attorney’s statements than when 

the Court instructs a jury to disregard them. But that is how 

the defense of Todd Sheffler began.” 

Later in the rebuttal, the prosecutor again looked back to 

the defense opening statement, in which defense counsel had 

claimed guards beat Earvin while leading him out of D Wing. 

According to the prosecution, this turned out to be false, as 

“[t]here was no beating or assaulting of Mr. Earvin on D 

Wing.” 

Toward the end of the rebuttal, the prosecution spoke to

Sheffler’s FBI interviews. Defense counsel had previously argued that Sheffler could not intervene to stop the beating, as 

his “back was to everything that was happening” and Sheffler 

“consistently said that.” The prosecutor argued the defense’s 

interpretation of events contradicted Sheffler’s past statements:

This business ... about he didn’t have an opportunity to intervene is just not supported by what 

he said when he was interviewed by the State 

Police and by the FBI. Over and over again. He 

had multiple opportunities. He had the ... obligation to be complete and truthful. He had 

months prior to the Indictment to come forward, as he was obligated to do, to provide complete and truthful information.

In response, defense counsel objected to the government undermining the defendant’s right to silence. The court sustained the objection and asked the prosecutor to “wrap it up.” 

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Convictions. At the end of the second trial the jury found 

Sheffler guilty of the five counts with which he was charged. 

He moved for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The 

district court denied both motions, and Sheffler appeals. 

II. Discussion

Sheffler offers several arguments on appeal. First, he contends the government introduced no evidence from which a 

jury could find a reasonable likelihood that his incident report 

or interview with the state police would reach federal officials. Insufficient evidence therefore existed, he says, for his 

convictions under the federal statutes he was charged with 

violating in Counts 3–5 of the indictment. 

His other arguments concern his second trial. He submits 

the district court should not have permitted the government 

to revoke his proffer agreement, allowing his interview statements to be used. Further, Juror 31 should have been 

dismissed, he says, because of suspicions that Juror 31 had 

discussed the case with others, as well as due to contacts a 

juror from the first trial had with Juror 31’s wife. Sheffler also 

alleges the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument by disparaging his attorney, misrepresenting evidence, and commenting on his right to remain 

silent. 

Sheffler believes these errors—either individually or cumulatively—denied him a fair trial and should result in his 

acquittal. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Sheffler first challenges the district court’s rejection of his 

motion for a judgment of acquittal, which we review de novo.

United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724, 741 (7th Cir. 2023). This 

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review is highly deferential. We will overturn the jury verdict 

only if “the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it 

is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rivera, 901 F.3d 896, 900–

01 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 

1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016)). 

In Counts 3 and 5 of the indictment Sheffler was convicted 

of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) and (k), provisions in this

witness tampering statute. Section 1512(b)(3) makes it a federal offense to: “engage[] in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to ... hinder, delay, or prevent the 

communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the 

United States of information relating to the commission or 

possible commission of a Federal offense.” Section 1512(k) 

makes it a federal offense to “conspire[] to commit any offense 

under this section.” 

At issue is what § 1512 requires to implicate a federal 

investigation. Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), is important to this interpretation. There, the Supreme Court evaluated a different part of the same statute—§ 1512(a)(1)(C)—

which criminalizes “kill[ing] another person, with intent to ... 

prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer ... of the United States.” Fowler, 563 U.S. at 670. 

The defendant intended to prevent communication “to law 

enforcement officers in general rather than to some specific 

law enforcement officer or set of officers which the defendant 

has in mind.” Id. at 672 (emphasis omitted). Though the defendant killed to prevent communication to all officials, he 

lacked the particular intent to prevent communication to federal officials. See id. The Court held that such “broad indefinite 

intent” is not enough. Id. at 674. Rather, where the defendant 

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acts without particular officers in mind, “the Government 

must show a reasonable likelihood that, had, e.g., the victim communicated with law enforcement officers, at least one relevant 

communication would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer.” Id. at 677 (emphasis in original). 

This reasonable likelihood requirement elucidates the statute and its application. Given the broad scope of federal 

crimes, a more permissive standard “would transform a federally oriented statute into a statute that would deal with 

crimes, investigations, and witness tampering that, as a practical matter, are purely state in nature.” Id. Despite these 

guardrails, Fowler’s bar is low: “the Government must show 

that the likelihood of communication to a federal officer was 

more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical,” although how much more has been left to the lower courts. Id. at 

678; see United States v. Smith, 723 F.3d 510, 517–18 (4th Cir. 

2013) (reiterating that “reasonable likelihood” in this context 

is “a relatively low bar”); Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 

F.3d 170, 185 (3d Cir. 2017) (same). 

The relevant question for us is whether, when Sheffler 

made false statements in his incident report and during the 

police interviews, there was a reasonable likelihood they 

would reach federal officials. 

Before answering that question, though, a preliminary issue arises. Fowler addressed only § 1512(a)(1)(C), which criminalizes witness tampering by murder. 563 U.S. at 670. Does 

Fowler’s reasonable likelihood standard also guide our interpretation of the statute under which Sheffler was convicted—

§ 1512(b)(3)—which criminalizes misleading conduct? 

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No. 23-1557 13

We first compare the text of each statute. The subsection in 

Fowler, § 1512(a)(1)(C), criminalizes (1) “kill[ing] or attempt[ing] to kill another person” (2) “with intent to” (3) “prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement 

officer or judge of the United States of information relating to 

the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense 

... .” (bolded numbered parentheses supplied). 

The statute here, § 1512(b)(3), similarly criminalizes (1)

us[ing] intimidation, threaten[ing], or corruptly persuad[ing] 

another person, or attempt[ing] to do so, or engag[ing] in misleading conduct toward another person” (2) “with intent to” 

(3) “hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information 

relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense ... .” (bolded numbered parentheses supplied).

These parallel provisions—composed of similar elements 

and situated next to each other in the criminal code—are 

properly evaluated under the same standard. See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2019) (a phrase 

appearing multiple times in a statute is intended to have a 

consistent meaning); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012)

(under the presumption of consistent usage, words and 

phrases are “presumed to bear the same meaning throughout 

a text”). 

This conclusion is consistent with the reasoning of other 

circuits, which have deemed § 1512(a)(1)(C) and § 1512(b)(3) 

“investigation-related provision[s] aimed at protecting the 

communication of information to law enforcement.” United 

States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 

United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2015) (using the 

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same “investigation-related provision” language); United 

States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 

These investigation–related statutory provisions fall within 

the same “line[] of jurisprudence,” so courts should evaluate 

them under the same test. Shavers, 693 F.3d at 379; see also Lobbins v. United States, 900 F.3d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding 

that “reasonable likelihood” standard applies to 

§ 1512(a)(2)(C) just as it applies to § 1512(a)(1)(C), because 

“absent good reason to do otherwise, we give the same words 

the same meaning throughout the same statute”).

Based on the analogous text in the two provisions, the contextual canon of the presumption of consistent usage, and the 

decisions of other circuits, the reasoning in Fowler as to 

§ 1512(a)(1)(C) can be extended to § 1512(b)(3). The reasonable likelihood standard thus applies to Sheffler’s case. We return then to the question of whether sufficient evidence was 

introduced at trial under that standard to support his convictions on Counts 3–5. 

This court has addressed this standard from Fowler only 

once, in United States v. Snyder, 865 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2017).

There, the defendant conspired to murder a potential witness 

to cover up a convenience store robbery. Id. at 493–94. Though 

initially charged in state court, that case was dismissed after 

federal officials pursued federal charges, including Hobbs Act 

robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and conspiring to kill a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1) and (k). Id. at 494.

Snyder pleaded guilty to robbery and other crimes, but he 

took the conspiracy to murder a federal witness charge to jury 

trial and was convicted. Id. at 494–95. 

Snyder “outline[d] two separate paths the government can 

take to show the required federal nexus under § 1512 ... .” Id.

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at 497. “First, if the underlying crime ... would have been 

prosecuted in federal court, then it is reasonably likely that 

the witness would have spoken with a federal officer during 

the course of that prosecution.” Id. “Second, even if the underlying crime would not have been prosecuted in federal 

court, the government can still satisfy § 1512 by showing a 

reasonable likelihood that the victim would have communicated with a federal officer who was assisting the state prosecution of the underlying crime.” Id. The district court in 

Snyder relied on the second path to deny Snyder’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal. Id.

This court reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient on either path. Id. at 497–99. First, though the robbery could be prosecuted in state or federal court, that does 

not satisfy § 1512, because out of hundreds of commercial robberies in that federal district, only six were prosecuted federally. Id. at 498. Second, state police and the FBI shared office 

space and could possibly discuss an armed robbery, and federal officials provided technical investigative assistance. But 

that did not show a reasonable likelihood that the deceased 

would have communicated with a federal employee. Id.

In Snyder, the federal offense of killing a witness happened 

after the underlying felonies, including the robbery, had been 

completed. In contrast, here the crime remained the same—

Sheffler’s participation in the beating and then covering it up. 

This case travels the first of the two paths laid out in Snyder, 

inquiring whether the underlying crime would have been 

prosecuted in federal court, and then asking if it is reasonably 

likely that the witness would have communicated with a federal officer during that federal prosecution. 

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This is where the facts in Snyder fall short of the stronger 

federal nexus the government provided at Sheffler’s second 

trial. Consider that Sheffler’s incident report was written on 

an official Department of Corrections form, which was 

reviewed by supervisors and kept in the regular course of 

business. A false report therefore would be preserved for any 

potential investigation, including a federal one. Further, Illinois corrections officers including Sheffler took an oath to 

obey “all state and federal laws” and to “uphold the Constitution of the United States.” Their code of conduct explicitly 

stated they must comply with “state and federal laws.” This 

placed Sheffler on notice that civil rights violations could be 

investigated. And Sheffler’s federal crime—the beating to 

death of a prisoner while on duty as a corrections officer—

was both severe and intimately tied to his position of authority. This is the type of especially serious prison assault that 

regularly forms the basis for federal civil rights investigations.

Witness testimony also provided this link. At trial, an FBI 

agent explained that deprivation of a person’s civil rights under color of law is a federal offense. It was “not unusual at 

all,” another agent testified, for the Illinois State Police to communicate with the FBI about potential federal-law violations. 

That agent added: the “FBI investigates violations of federal 

law. State Police investigates violations of state law. Sometimes they intersect; sometimes they don’t. But we work with 

state and locals a lot, particularly on areas where there’s an 

overlay between both systems.” 

FBI cooperation with state authorities came quickly here. 

The state police contacted the FBI about a potential federal investigation in early June 2018, within a few weeks of Earvin’s 

assault and before Earvin died. The FBI promptly opened an 

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investigation. Four days before Earvin died, an FBI agent tried 

to interview him. He was on “breathing assistance,” and 

could communicate “very minimally.” When the agent questioned him about the incident, “he would kind of grimace in 

pain and cringe up toward one side.” Although the key question remains the likelihood of federal involvement at the time 

of the misleading conduct, rapid federal investigation provides additional evidence of that likelihood. See Veliz, 800 F.3d 

at 75 (recognizing “the very fact that communication with federal officials” eventually took place may “lend[] some support 

to a finding that the communications were reasonably likely 

at the time of the [misleading conduct]”). And Sheffler’s false 

incident report and untruthful statements during his state police interview reached the FBI in the natural progression of its 

investigation, not in some “remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical” manner, as Fowler prohibits. 563 U.S. at 678. 

From all this evidence, a jury could fairly conclude that an 

inmate’s death at the hands of state correctional officials 

would be investigated by federal authorities.3 Sheffler used

his government authority to kill a person under his supervision. Crimes of great severity committed under state control 

are more likely to yield a federal investigation. So, it was reasonably likely that relevant communications in Sheffler’s case 

would reach federal law enforcement. 

3 This court has promulgated pattern jury instructions for crimes alleged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 and 1519. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL 

JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THE WILLIAM J. BAUER 

PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT (2020 ed.).

The district court gave four of those instructions to the jury. Jury Instrs.

77–81, ECF No. 402. 

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Courts are also inclined to find reasonable likelihood of 

communication reaching federal officials when there is evidence of state-federal cooperation. See United States v. Tyler, 

956 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2020) (murdered witness had 

worked with a state agent who met with the DEA multiple 

times a month and frequently referred cases); United States v. 

Smith, 723 F.3d 510, 518 (4th Cir. 2013) (city police department 

worked closely with DEA and was major source of information, with testimony that even street-level drug cases came 

to DEA attention); United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 

498–99 (4th Cir. 2012) (federal officials were previously focused on the group involved, and local officials investigating 

the underlying crime were actively cooperating with federal 

officials). The FBI agent’s testimony here about “work[ing] 

with state and locals a lot” supports this conclusion. 

Indeed, when courts decline to find reasonable likelihood 

that a relevant communication would make it to a federal officer, the evidence is noticeably weaker than that which the 

government offered here. See United States v. Gatlin, 90 F.4th 

1050, 1064–66 (11th Cir. 2024) (defendant’s misleading statements given to state public defender’s office to influence state 

prosecution; defendant thought he faced a state law charge); 

Lobbins, 900 F.3d at 803 (federal detainee assaulted another 

federal detainee who had relayed information to a state prosecutor; that did not support inference that cooperating detainee was likely to talk to a federal official).

Sheffler points to United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 1078 

(9th Cir. 2017), in which a § 1512(b)(3) conviction was reversed 

because “the Government presented minimal evidence of a 

federal nexus.” Id. at 1083. Both this case and Johnson involved 

a state correctional officer using force against an inmate and 

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No. 23-1557 19

then failing to truthfully document the encounter. Id. at 1079–

80. In Johnson, the government presented evidence of a “use 

of force” policy incorporating federal constitutional law. Id. at 

1083. The officer also received training on the policy, so he 

knew that excessive force violates the Constitution, which he 

swore to uphold. Id. Aside from that, the government provided no evidence of a federal nexus. See id. The Ninth Circuit 

concluded in Johnson that this evidence was insufficient under 

Fowler’s reasonable likelihood standard. Id.

But Johnson differs from this case. In Johnson the jury knew 

that a state employee had committed a federal crime, but the 

likelihood of federal involvement remained nebulous. There 

is no such problem here. The government provided crucial 

evidence of federal involvement, including the testimony 

from the FBI agents as detailed above. 

The reasonable likelihood standard of Fowler is not onerous. It requires “more than [a] remote, outlandish, or simply 

hypothetical” possibility of federal involvement, but declines 

to set the bar higher than that. 563 U.S. at 678. And when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether any

reasonable jury had the evidence to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rivera, 901 F.3d at 900–01. Given these permissive standards, each of which Sheffler must satisfy, we are not 

persuaded that his convictions should be reversed on Counts 

3 and 5 under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) and (k). 

A related topic remains. Sheffler was convicted in Count 4 

of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which provides: 

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, 

conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false 

entry in any record, document, or tangible 

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20 No. 23-1557 

object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any 

department or agency of the United States ... 

shall be fined ... imprisoned ... or both.

(emphasis supplied). We have not previously addressed what 

standard applies when determining whether a matter falls 

“within the jurisdiction of” the federal government. Sheffler 

argues that Fowler’s reasonable likelihood standard applies to 

§ 1519, the same as it does to § 1512. 

“The most natural grammatical reading of the statute is 

that the term ‘knowingly’ in § 1519 modifies only the surrounding verbs: ‘alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 

up, falsifies, or makes a false entry.’” United States v. Yielding, 

657 F.3d 688, 714 (8th Cir. 2011). The term “knowingly” adds 

no requirement to the jurisdictional language later in § 1519. 

It is enough for the defendant to intend to obstruct an investigation, and on an unrelated note, for the investigation to be 

within federal jurisdiction.

This lines up with the usual understanding of jurisdictional elements, which typically lack a mens rea requirement. 

See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 677 n.9 (1975) (“[T]he 

existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not 

be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the 

act made criminal by the federal statute.”); United States v. 

Ringer, 300 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2002) (under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001, “made knowingly and willingly” and “concerned a 

matter within the jurisdiction of a federal department or 

agency” are independent elements). See also United States v. 

Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 664–65 (4th Cir. 2007) (“It is well settled 

that mens rea requirements typically do not extend to the 

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No. 23-1557 21

jurisdictional elements of a crime[.]”); United States v. Campa, 

529 F.3d 980, 1006 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[N]o proof of mens rea is 

necessary for elements that are ‘jurisdictional only.’”(quoting 

Feola, 420 U.S. at 676 n.9)); United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 

835 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he mens rea of a federal criminal statute does not ordinarily extend to the statute’s jurisdictional 

elements.”).

Other circuits considering this issue have unanimously 

reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Hassler, 992 

F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Every circuit to address [§ 1519] 

... has concluded that knowledge of a federal investigation 

under § 1519 is a jurisdictional element and not a separate 

mens rea requirement that the jury must specifically find.”); 

United States v. Gonzalez, 906 F.3d 784, 795 (9th Cir. 2018) (“To 

sustain a conviction under § 1519, it is enough for the government to prove that the defendant intended to obstruct the investigation of any matter as long as that matter falls within 

the jurisdiction of a federal department or agency.”); United 

States v. Gray, 692 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); United 

States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2012) (same); 

Yielding, 657 F.3d at 714 (same). 

We join these other circuits in reading § 1519 as containing 

a pure jurisdictional requirement, with no federal intent component. Fowler’s reasonable likelihood standard therefore 

does not apply to Sheffler’s conviction under § 1519. 

Sheffler conspired to and engaged in misleading conduct 

by knowingly filing a false incident report describing Earvin’s 

escort, as well as by falsely denying he knew about, witnessed, and participated in the assault of Earvin during his 

interview with the Illinois State Police. So, Sheffler’s convictions on Counts 3–5 stand. 

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22 No. 23-1557 

B. Proffer Agreement

Sheffler also disputes the district court’s revocation of his

proffer agreement with the government before the first jury 

trial. He says he provided truthful and complete information

during his FBI interviews, so the court erred when it found 

that Sheffler breached the agreement and permitted the government to introduce the proffered statements at his second 

jury trial. 

A proffer agreement is “considered to be a contract,” and, 

like any other contract, “must be enforced according to its 

terms.” United States v. Reed, 272 F.3d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Breach permits the government to use proffered statements at 

trial. Absent breach, those statements remain excluded. The 

district court concluded that Sheffler was not truthful in three 

ways—about his knowledge and participation in the assault,

that he knew Earvin was injured, and about Sheffler’s contacts 

with Banta after the incident. Sheffler disputes these conclusions. As with any other contract, breach is a factual determination, so we review the district court’s conclusions for clear 

error. See id. at 953. 

Sheffler says he spoke truthfully when he denied he saw 

Banta assault Earvin. Sheffler correctly points out that witnesses recalled the assault with varying details and precision. 

Indeed, Sheffler himself describes the incident in different 

ways. Seeing something through one’s “peripheral vision” is 

not far from being unsure something occurred, especially 

during a heated incident. And when asked for his opinion, 

Sheffler described Banta’s actions as a potentially “honest 

mistake.” That statement about Banta’s state of mind does not 

directly contradict Sheffler’s other statements.

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No. 23-1557 23

But as to Sheffler’s insistence that he did not observe 

Earvin’s injuries, there is little room for honest disagreement. 

After the assault, other officers saw Earvin unconscious with 

blood on his shirt. Many of Earvin’s injuries from the officers 

kicking him and jumping on his chest were internal. Yet, given 

Sheffler’s close proximity to Earvin during the assault, the extent of the injuries, and others’ recollection of bleeding, Sheffler’s wholesale denial of seeing injuries is untenable.

That Sheffler falsely denied contacting Banta post-incident 

is even more clean cut. Sheffler claims on appeal that it makes 

“perfect sense” not to “recall two fleeting calls over a year 

later.” But these phone calls took place the day of the assaults 

and immediately afterward, when Sheffler and Banta had a 

pressing need to coordinate a consistent story. The district 

court’s finding that Sheffler made false statements about the 

phone calls follows naturally from the context of those calls.

The government provided ample evidence that Sheffler 

was not truthful in his FBI interviews, at least about Earvin’s 

injuries and his phone calls with Banta. The district court did 

not clearly err in concluding that Sheffler had breached the 

proffer agreement, and by allowing the government to offer 

Sheffler’s statements at trial. 

C. Juror Bias

Sheffler next argues that the district court erred by not dismissing a juror he contends was biased, depriving him of his 

right to a fair trial. We “review a district court’s decisions concerning jury impartiality for an abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Howard, 692 F.3d 697, 707 (7th Cir. 2012). That review 

is deferential to the district court, which is best equipped to 

assess the credibility and demeanor of jurors. United States v. 

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24 No. 23-1557 

Brodnicki, 516 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States 

v. Granger, 70 F.4th 408, 411 (7th Cir. 2023) (noting that trial 

judges “can hear the prospective juror’s tone of voice” and 

“see the prospective juror’s facial expressions and body language,” credibility indicators unavailable on appellate review). As a remedy Sheffler requests a new trial. 

Twice questions arose as to whether a juror who sat on the 

second trial may be biased. 

The record shows that during jury selection, Juror 31 was 

questioned and denied discussing the case with others. There 

is no basis for us to question the magistrate judge’s handling 

of this topic during voir dire, or for us to conclude that the 

juror was untruthful or harbored any bias against Sheffler. 

Then, early in the second trial, new information was 

brought to the court prompting further investigation. The 

court was informed that a juror from the first trial had communicated with Juror 31’s spouse. The government investigated and told the court that the former juror admitted to texting about and discussing the case with Juror 31’s wife. But 

the former juror denied discussing the case with Juror 31. 

When the district judge questioned Juror 31 on this point, he 

confirmed he had not discussed the case with anyone, including his wife. Sheffler has not provided any basis to assume 

Juror 31’s answers were unreliable. 

The district judge spoke directly with Juror 31 and was in 

the best position with the best information to assess his credibility. The district judge saw “nothing that would permit an 

excuse for cause” and declined to remove Juror 31. None of 

the information gleaned raised concerns about bias. These

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No. 23-1557 25

circumstances were carefully and properly handled, including the questioning of Juror 31. 

Sheffler also contends the district court incorrectly rejected 

his jury bias concerns as untimely. The court stated, “the issue 

has already been blown, quite frankly.” This could be interpreted as a failure to timely move to strike Juror 31 before 

trial. If so, this could raise a problem, as the former juror’s 

concerning statements arose only after the second trial had 

started. But the court investigated those new concerns and 

concluded that there was no evidentiary basis to dismiss Juror 

31. This shows Sheffler’s allegation of juror bias was fairly and 

reasonably considered on the merits. 

The circumstances involving Juror 31 were serious. A 

court faced with a similar situation must be careful about any 

possible intrusion into juror fairness, including a potential juror’s discussions with a spouse exposed to extra-record information. Still, we conclude that the district court here thoroughly vetted this matter and did not abuse its discretion.

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Sheffler next contends the district court erred in refusing 

to grant his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. He criticizes three statements by the prosecutor during the rebuttal closing argument, the final words the jury 

heard from either party. According to Sheffler, the prosecutor 

disparaged defense counsel, misrepresented evidence by 

denying an assault in D Wing, and undermined Sheffler’s 

right to remain silent. These comments deprived him of a fair 

trial, Sheffler submits. To prevail, he must show the district 

court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial. United 

States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 254 (7th Cir. 2017). 

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A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed in two 

steps. Initially, we “determine whether the prosecutor’s remark was improper.” United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 986 

(7th Cir. 2006). Then, if misconduct is found, the court assesses whether the conduct prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 

986; United States v. Washington, 417 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 

2005). 

First, Sheffler takes issue with the prosecutor highlighting

objections that had been sustained during the defense closing 

argument. Defense counsel misstated the presumption of innocence by asking the jury to think of Sheffler as a close friend 

or relative. The prosecutor addressed this topic on rebuttal, 

clarifying that defense counsel’s statements were incorrect, as 

confirmed by the court sustaining objections to those statements.

Though “[a]ttorneys should not attack opposing counsel 

personally ... they may criticize opposing counsel’s tactics 

and the strength of the evidence.” United States v. Gan, 54 F.4th 

467, 480 (7th Cir. 2022). For example, prosecutors may go so 

far as to call opposing counsel’s argument “made up” or “ludicrous.” Id. (quoting Washington, 417 F.3d at 786–87). The 

prosecutor’s reminder to the jury about the sustained objections is problematic, and we do not encourage such a comment. Still, the prosecutor’s critique was limited to defense

counsel’s particular statements; it did not extend to personal 

attacks. For that reason, there was no prosecutorial misconduct.

Even if this statement by the prosecutor was improper, it 

did not prejudice Sheffler. At the trial’s beginning and end, 

the district court instructed the jury that the lawyers’ statements, arguments, and objections are not evidence. And the 

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No. 23-1557 27

rebuttal argument came at the close of a 15-day trial, in which 

multiple witnesses testified to Sheffler’s participation in the 

fatal beating. So, brief comments about defense counsel’s 

credibility are unlikely to have affected the jury’s verdict. 

Sheffler’s second claim—that in the rebuttal argument the 

prosecutor misrepresented the evidence—fares no better. 

Sheffler contends the prosecutor claimed Earvin was not 

beaten or assaulted in D Wing of the prison. But Sheffler overlooks the distinction between D Wing and the R1 entryway. 

The prosecutor never disputed that an assault occurred in the 

R1 entryway. But as to D Wing, where video footage is unclear and witness memories less certain, the assault was disputed. The prosecutor’s denial of an assault precisely in D 

wing is not necessarily inconsistent with the evidence.

Prosecutors “may argue reasonable inferences from the 

evidence that the jury has seen and heard.” United States v. 

Waldemer, 50 F.3d 1379, 1383 (7th Cir. 1995); Evans v. Jones, 996 

F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2021). If the inferences are weak, the 

jury is free to disregard the prosecutor’s claims. As noted, the 

jury was instructed that lawyer’s statements are not evidence, 

and “the evidence is what counts.” So, even if during the 

rebuttal the government misrepresented where the beating 

occurred, there was no prejudice. The jury could recall the evidence, as instructed, and give evidence about a D Wing beating its proper weight. Our review is also for plain error, as 

Sheffler did not object to the prosecutor’s statement. See 

United States v. Echols, 104 F.4th 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 2024). 

Given the amount of inculpatory evidence at trial, Sheffler 

cannot show that this statement made his trial fundamentally 

unfair.

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28 No. 23-1557 

Third, Sheffler claims the prosecutor undermined his right 

to remain silent by arguing he had “multiple opportunities”

to intervene and an “obligation to be complete and truthful.” 

But in context, the prosecutor’s statements did not undermine 

Sheffler’s right to silence. Rather, the prosecutor was pointing 

to the conflict between Sheffler’s arguments at trial and his 

statements before trial. During closing arguments, Sheffler’s 

counsel said that Sheffler’s “back was to everything that was 

happening” and he “consistently said that” to the FBI. By 

making this claim, Sheffler opened the door to questions on

his statements in the FBI interviews. The prosecutor was permitted to set the record straight as to what Sheffler shared—

and failed to share—when speaking with law enforcement. 

The prosecutor was speaking to commentary and statements 

by the defense. That is not commenting on Sheffler’s constitutionally protected silence. 

Even if the prosecutor’s statement was construed as commenting on Sheffler’s silence, any error would be harmless. 

The district court instructed the jury on the defendant’s right 

not to testify, which would address any concerns about this 

statement. Further, we do not consider the rebuttal argument 

in isolation. It is viewed in the context of the entire trial and 

numerous witnesses who testified to Sheffler’s conduct. The 

prosecutor’s brief and somewhat cryptic comment about 

Sheffler’s silence cannot hold up to the overwhelming amount 

of evidence inculpating him.

The prosecutor committed no misconduct during the rebuttal argument. And we cannot see how the prosecutor’s 

comments would have swayed the jury’s verdict. The denial 

of a motion for a new trial on this contention was not an abuse 

of discretion.

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No. 23-1557 29

Finally, Sheffler asserts cumulative error at his second 

trial. To succeed on such a claim, he must show “(1) that multiple errors occurred at trial; and (2) those errors, in the context of the entire trial, were so severe as to have rendered his 

trial fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 

702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011). We reject this assertion, not just because we have found no reversible errors at trial, but in “light 

of the quantity and quality of evidence of [the defendant’s] 

guilt adduced at trial.” Id. at 707. 

III. Conclusion

The evidence at trial was sufficient to show a reasonable 

likelihood that Sheffler’s statements would reach federal officials, and thus that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512, prohibiting 

witness tampering, and 18 U.S.C. § 1519, forbidding falsifying 

records in a federal investigation. 

The district court also did not clearly err in concluding that 

Sheffler had breached the proffer agreement, and by allowing 

the government to offer Sheffler’s statements at trial. Nor did 

the district court abuse its discretion by denying his motion 

for a new trial. For all these reasons, we AFFIRM. 

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