Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03075/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bryan W. Talbott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2013 Decided July 1, 2014

No. 12-3049

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHESTER D. RANSOM, JR.,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 12-3075

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cr-00357)

Matthew G. Kaiser, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the joint briefs for appellant Bryan W. Talbott. 

Richard Seligman, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the joint briefs for appellant Chester D. Ransom, Jr. 

Jay Apperson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and Suzanne Grealy Curt,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, ROGERS, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants Chester

Ransom and Bryan Talbott pled guilty to fraud charges in the

district court in connection with the operation of their property

management company. Although their plea agreements

stipulated the range of prison sentences under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced both Ransom

and Talbott to above-Guidelines sentences. Both appellants

claim that the district court committed procedural and

substantive errors in entering the sentences. For the reasons set

forth below, we conclude that the district court committed no

error, and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

Background

From 2004 until 2011 appellants Chester Ransom and

Bryan Talbott owned and operated a property management

company. In 2012 the government charged Ransom and Talbott,

in connection with their running of the company, with

conspiracy to commit bank fraud; conspiracy to commit mail

fraud; and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Both

Ransom and Talbott signed plea agreements with the

government, acknowledging their guilt of the charges. The plea

agreements contained waiver-of-appeal clauses. Each plea

agreement also contained a stipulated United States Sentencing

Guidelines (“USSG” or “Guidelines”) range of 46-57 months. 

At Ransom’s sentencing hearing, the district court calculated the

Guidelines range at the stipulated 46-57 months, but sentenced

Ransom to an above-Guidelines sentence of 72 months. 

Ransom did not object to his sentence. At Talbott’s sentencing

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hearing, the court calculated the Guidelines range at 63-78

months, but imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 120

months. Talbott also did not object to his sentence. In neither

plea agreement did the Sentencing Guidelines stipulation

purport to bind the sentencing court or promise a specific

sentence. Indeed, each agreement explicitly described the

Guidelines as non-mandatory and specified that the decision on

sentencing would be made by the presiding judge. 

Ransom and Talbott now appeal their above-Guidelines

sentences.

Discussion

A. Waiver of Appeal

Both Ransom and Talbott acknowledge that in their plea

agreements they waived their right to appeal their sentences. 

But Talbott notes that in the plea agreement both he and the

government agreed that neither party would seek a sentencing

departure from what was stated in the agreement. Since the

government subsequently asked to be relieved of this agreement,

seeking an upward departure, Talbott argues then he should be

relieved of his waiver of appeal. The government replies that in

light of its departure request it is not seeking to enforce Talbott’s

waiver.

Ransom, in turn, argues that, notwithstanding the appeal

waiver in his plea agreement, he in fact never waived his rights

because his lawyer was ineffective and the sentencing court did

not follow fair sentencing procedures. The government replies

that Ransom knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to

appeal his sentence, that at his plea hearing under Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Ransom swore that he had

read, understood, and signed the plea agreement, and that

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Ransom was not prejudiced by any alleged failure on the part of

his counsel. The government further replies that it is clear from

the record that the sentencing procedures were fair. We need

not decide whether Ransom’s appeal waiver should stand,

however, since we determine that even if Ransom had not

waived his right to appeal, his arguments made on appeal are

meritless.

B. Arguments Made on Appeal by Ransom

Ransom argues (as does Talbott, see section C below) that

his sentence was both procedurally flawed and substantively

unreasonable. First, he contends that at sentencing the district

court erred procedurally when it imposed a Guidelines sentence

of 72 months—15 months above the 46-57 months Guidelines

range—without proper explanation on the record as to why a

sentence above the Guidelines was being imposed. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (if the court imposes a sentence outside the

Guidelines range then the court must state “the specific reason”

for the variance). Ransom acknowledges that at sentencing he

did not object to his sentence. Consequently, we review the

district court’s sentencing procedures for plain error. See United

States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Because

Locke did not challenge the adequacy of the district court’s

statement of reasons below, we review her claim for plain

error.”). 

Ransom asserts that the only explanations given by the

district court for his above-Guidelines sentence were the number

of victims, abuse of trust, and the commission of the instant

offense while he was on probation. Concerning the number of

victims, Ransom claims that this was already taken into account

by the Guidelines. Concerning an abuse of trust, Ransom claims

that this issue was not addressed by the presentence report and

that it is not at all clear that it would apply in his case. Finally,

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concerning the commission of the instant offense while he was

on probation, Ransom claims that this too was already taken into

account by the Guidelines. Taking all of this into consideration,

Ransom contends that the district court failed to explain

adequately the reason for the sentence it imposed on him and

therefore committed plain error.

To prevail under the plain error standard, an appellant must

“demonstrate that the district court: (1) committed error; (2) that

is plain; and (3) that affects [his] substantial rights,” and “[i]f all

three conditions are met, and if the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, 

an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error.” Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). 

At sentencing, the district court gave a detailed explanation for

its above-Guidelines sentence, including identifying specific

factors that it considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the

court’s explanation was both extensive and individualized. 

In arriving at Ransom’s above-Guidelines sentence, the

district court considered the underlying facts of Ransom’s

criminal past, including having operated with Talbott a property

management company that embezzled from its clients—the

same type of offense that was now before the court. The court

also considered that in the present case Ransom’s clients trusted

him with their money and their property, that he abused that

trust, and that this abuse of trust was not included in Ransom’s

Guidelines calculation. The district court further made clear in

imposing sentence that it considered the number of victims who

submitted victim impact statements, which detailed Ransom’s

wrongdoing and the severe harm that he caused them. Finally,

the district court echoed its detailed explanation for an aboveUSCA Case #12-3075 Document #1500153 Filed: 07/01/2014 Page 5 of 12
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Guidelines sentence in its written Statement of Reasons.*

 See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (if an outside Guidelines sentence is

imposed the “reasons must . . . be stated with specificity in a

statement of reasons form . . . ”). We conclude that procedurally

the district court committed no error, let alone plain error, in

sentencing Ransom.

* * * * *

Second, Ransom argues that his sentence was substantively

unreasonable. In particular, Ransom asserts that the district

court gave no compelling reasons for imposing a sentence 15

months in excess of the Guidelines. See In re Sealed Case, 527

F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“If the court decides to impose

a sentence outside the Guidelines, it ‘must consider the extent of

the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently

compelling to support the degree of the variance.’” (quoting

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007))). In support of

this contention, Ransom relies on what he deems an

inconsistency in the court’s rationale. He points out that the

court accepted the presentence report recommendation that the

defendant receive a 3-point reduction in the Guidelines

calculation based on his acceptance of responsibility. See

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) & (b). He then points out that the court

stated that a justification for the upward variance was Ransom’s

lack of remorse. These two elements of the court’s

consideration are not inherently inconsistent. Without Ransom’s

early admissions of his involvement in the crime and assistance

in the investigation, the court could nonetheless have raised the

sentence but starting from a higher baseline. A defendant who

*

The written Statement of Reasons for both Ransom’s and

Talbott’s sentences remain under seal except to the extent this opinion

refers to information therein, see United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d

985, 1036 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

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admits his guilt and assists in an investigation may be indeed

remorseful, or he may simply be practical enough to know that

he is assisting his cause. 

Furthermore, at the time of sentencing, Ransom, after

repeated requests, had still not submitted a financial statement

as contemplated at the time of the plea agreement. As the court

explicitly stated at sentencing, “How can he get credit for

acceptance of responsibility and for complying with the plea

agreement if he hasn’t done that? That’s like the most basic

thing.” Ransom also states that the district court justified the

variance because Ransom committed the instant offense while

on probation for a similar offense, but that the court failed to

take into account that the Guidelines had already increased his

criminal history by two points based on the same aggravating

circumstance. As one of our sister circuits has noted, it is not

error for a district court to enter sentencing “variances based on

factors already taken into account by the Advisory Guidelines,”

in cases in which “the Guidelines do not fully account for those

factors, or ‘when a district court applies broader § 3553(a)

considerations in granting the variance.’” United States v.

Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1052 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United

States v. Jones, 509 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2007)). In this case,

the district court explicitly set forth its consideration of the

§ 3553 factors. The court’s discussion of the criminal history of

Ransom—that is, that he committed this fraud while on

probation for a substantially similar fraud—while reviewing the

presentence report makes it plain that he did not deem the

Guidelines calculation in the report to have fully accounted for

Ransom’s criminal history.

Ransom further asserts that the district court erred in

holding that an upward variance was justified because of

Ransom’s abuse of trust. He argues that an abuse of trust

“enhancement” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 is “generally reserved

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for professionals with fiduciary duties and it was not intended to

apply to clerks or managers who don’t exercise discretion.” 

Appellants’ Br. at 50. He rightly notes that § 3B1.3 “defines a

‘position of trust’ as one that is ‘characterized by professional or

managerial discretion.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. 3B1.3

Application Note (Nov. 1, 1994)). This is, in fact, very true. 

And as Ransom further notes, the Application Commentary

gives examples for applying the adjustment: 

This adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an

embezzlement of a client’s funds by an attorney serving as

a guardian, a bank executive’s fraudulent loan scheme . . .

This adjustment does not apply in the case of an

embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or a hotel

clerk because such positions are not characterized by the

above-described factors.

Id.

Ransom’s problem is he is not a bank teller or hotel clerk or

anything similar. He was, in fact, the manager of the

fraudulently operating scheme. He was vice president of the

real estate development company with whom the defrauded

apartment owners dealt and whom they trusted. He, according

to the victim testimony and impact statements before the district

court, defrauded, deceived and deluded them daily. The district

court heard and appropriately made reference to the testimony

of the parade of victim witnesses, and read and appropriately

made reference to the written victim impact statements.

“[W]e review claims of substantive unreasonableness for

abuse of discretion, regardless of whether an objection on those

terms was made.” United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 633

(D.C. Cir. 2010). During Ransom’s sentencing hearing, the

district court mentioned that there were a number of victims,

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heard from several of them at that time, and stated that there

were 174 pages of victim impact statements and that he had

reviewed all of them. To reiterate, the court also questioned

Ransom’s acceptance of responsibility since Ransom had not yet

filed a financial disclosure report as required by the plea

agreement. Furthermore, the court noted that in his property

management business, Ransom had a relationship with his

clients in which they trusted him with their money and property,

that Ransom abused that trust repeatedly, and that the Guidelines

calculation had not taken that abuse into account. The court also

mentioned Ransom’s conviction in 2003 for “the same type of

offense that [Ransom] then went on and perpetrated in spades

with Mr. Talbott again.” We conclude that Ransom’s sentence

was not so unreasonably high as to constitute an abuse of

discretion by the district court. See United States v. Gardellini,

545 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In light of the facts and

circumstances of the offense and offender, is the sentence so

unreasonably high or unreasonably low as to constitute an abuse

of discretion by the district court?”).

C. Arguments Made on Appeal by Talbott

Like Ransom, Talbott argues that his sentence was both

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. First, Talbott

asserts that the district court erred procedurally when its

explanation for why it was imposing an above-Guidelines

sentence consisted only of a recitation of the § 3553(a) factors

and a single comment that, given the nature and circumstances

of Talbott’s offense, an above-Guidelines sentence was

appropriate. Talbott argues that reciting the sentencing factors

that influence a court’s decision-making is not enough: the court

must also explain, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), why those

factors justify the defendant’s particular sentence. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall

state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular

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sentence . . . .”). The court’s failure to do so, Talbott contends,

is plain error. See In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 193 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he failure to provide a statement of reasons as

required by § 3553(c) is plain error . . . .”). Talbott also argues

that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the

district court, as one of the reasons for giving Talbott an aboveGuidelines sentence, mistakenly believed that Talbott had

hidden assets.

As noted in our Ransom discussion above, we review the

district court’s sentencing procedures for plain error. It is true,

as Talbott contends, that when sentencing Talbott the district

court recited the § 3553(a) factors that it was to take into

account. But the court then went on, for four pages of transcript,

explaining in detail why it was imposing Talbott’s sentence. In

particular the court stated: that Talbott had been convicted in

2003 of the same kind of crime; that while on pretrial release

Talbott had committed further crimes; that Talbott had no regard

for the law and no remorse; and that the public had to be

protected from him. Contrary to Talbott’s argument, although

the court mentioned the missing assets during the sentencing

hearing, it did not list them as one of the reasons for giving

Talbott an above-Guidelines sentence. Finally, the court, as it

had with Ransom, repeated its detailed explanation for Talbott’s

above-Guidelines sentence in an extensive paragraph in its

written Statement of Reasons. We conclude that at sentencing

the district court committed no, much less plain, procedural

error.

* * * * *

Second, Talbott argues that his 120 months sentence—42

months above the top of the 63-78 months Guidelines range—

was substantively unreasonable. He acknowledges that, as the

district court stated in its reasons for his sentence, he committed

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new offenses while on release. But he claims that these offenses

were already taken into consideration when his Sentencing

Guidelines range was calculated. Furthermore, Talbott argues,

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) directs a court to “avoid unwarranted

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who

have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Talbott claims that

he and Ransom had the same criminal history, engaged in the

same offense conduct, and against the same victims, yet Ransom

was only sentenced to 72 months, or 16 months above the

Guidelines range, while he was sentenced to 120 months, or 42

months above the Guidelines range. Talbott argues that this gulf

between his and Ransom’s sentence is not consistent with §

3553(a)(6)’s requirement that the district court avoid

unwarranted disparities.

At this point, it would be perhaps appropriate to review

some additional conduct on the part of Talbott. During the

pendency of the case, he obtained pretrial release. While on

pretrial release, he engaged in financial dealings, in violation of

the conditions of his pretrial release and filed false vehicle title

documents in Delaware. Perhaps the short answer to Talbott’s

complaint that he received more time than his codefendant is:

you committed more crimes pending trial; he didn’t.

However, more formally, as noted above, we review claims

of substantive unreasonableness for abuse of discretion. Our

discussion above of Talbott’s procedural error claims shows that

the district court explained in detail why it imposed Talbott’s

sentence. With respect to Talbott’s specific arguments here, the

district court judge stated that not only had Talbott committed

crimes while on release, but had committed the same sort of

crimes for which he was now being sentenced. Furthermore, the

court stated that Talbott had repeatedly committed fraud, lied,

created false documents, and threatened people with legal

action, leading the court to determine that the public had to be

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protected from Talbott. We conclude that the district court

judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing Talbott.

Conclusion

In the end, we conclude that the district court did not only

all that it was required to do in entering the upwardly variant

sentences, but more than enough. For the reasons stated above,

the judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed.

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