Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03215/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03215-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Air Force
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Corey Demond Stoglin
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

COREY DEMOND STOGLIN,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3215

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in Nos. SF-3330-13-1464-B-1, SF-3330-13-1464-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 13, 2016

______________________ 

 COREY DEMOND STOGLIN, Minneapolis, MN, pro se.

 KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

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2 STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 

Petitioner Corey Stoglin appeals the final decision of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

See Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, No. SF-3330-13-1464-B1, 2015 WL 4166462 (M.S.P.B. July 9, 2015). For the 

reasons set forth below, this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Stoglin applied for the position of Equal Employment Manager with the Hawaii Air National Guard 

(“HANG”) that was announced under the authority set 

forth in 32 U.S.C. § 709 (2012).1 After the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)2 referred its initial selection

of eligible candidates to the HANG, it reevaluated whether awarding a veteran employment preference was appropriate because 32 U.S.C. § 709(g) precludes awarding

veteran’s preference. Resp’t’s App. 33–34; see 32 U.S.C. 

§ 709(g) (“Sections 2108, 3502, 7511, and 7512 of title 5 do 

not apply to a person employed under this section.”); 5 

U.S.C. § 2108 (veteran’s preference statute). Based on its 

reevaluation, OPM determined the job announcement was 

incorrect. Resp’t’s App. 33. As a result, OPM released 

“[a] new Vacancy Announcement . . . without mention of 

veteran’s preference, and the pool of candidates was rerated without veteran’s preference.” Id. at 34 (citation 

omitted). In January 2011, OPM notified Mr. Stoglin that 

his application was received, but that he was not among 

the best-qualified candidates and his name was not 

referred to the HANG for consideration. 

1 The record does not disclose the date that Mr. 

Stoglin filed his application.

2 Mr. Stoglin stated in his Petition for Appeal that 

“OPM conducted a search on behalf of [the] [HANG].” 

Resp’t’s App. 11 (first alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). 

 

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STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 3

In July 2013, Mr. Stoglin filed an appeal with the 

Board regarding his non-selection, which was construed 

as a claim under the Veterans Employment Opportunities 

Act of 1998 (“VEOA”). See Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, 

No. SF-3330-13-1464-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 6, 2013) (Resp’t’s 

App. 31–42). During an August 2013 telephonic conference call, Mr. Stoglin also suggested his appeal was a 

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act (“USERRA”) claim. Mr. Stoglin alleged “his 

veteran status [as a traditional reservist] should have 

given him a hiring preference, and because it was not 

applied, a nonveteran was hired instead.” Resp’t’s App. 

33. 

Initially, an administrative judge within the Board 

determined that the Board did not have jurisdiction under 

the USERRA or the VEOA and dismissed Mr. Stoglin’s 

appeal. See generally id. at 34–37. However, Mr. Stoglin

sought review of the administrative judge’s dismissal, and 

the Board granted his petition and remanded the case for 

further proceedings on Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claim.3 See 

Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, No. SF-3330-13-1464-I-1 

(M.S.P.B. Sept. 23, 2014) (Resp’t’s App. 21–30). The 

Board determined that, while Mr. Stoglin’s allegations 

were conclusory, they were “sufficient to establish Board

jurisdiction over his USERRA claim.” Resp’t’s App. 29 

(citation omitted).

On remand, the administrative judge granted the 

United States Department of the Air Force’s (“Agency”)

motion to dismiss for lack of Board jurisdiction. See 

Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, No. SF-3330-13-1464-B-1 

(M.S.P.B. Jan. 21, 2015) (Resp’t’s App. 8–20). The administrative judge determined that, “[a]lthough not raised in 

the [i]nitial [a]ppeal, the [A]gency’s motion on [r]emand 

3 Mr. Stoglin’s VEOA claim was ultimately dismissed for being untimely filed. See Resp’t’s App. 23–28. 

 

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4 STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 

raises a fundamental question of whether [Mr. Stoglin’s] 

USERRA claims concerning actions within the authority 

of the [HANG] . . . fall within the Board’s jurisdiction or 

should properly be within the jurisdiction of the state 

court.” Resp’t’s App. 11. In considering this question, the 

administrative judge quoted the applicable provision of 

USERRA, which states in relevant part that

(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and 

(C), the term “employer’’ means any person, 

institution, organization, or other entity that 

pays salary or wages for work performed or 

that has control over employment opportunities, including— . . . (ii) the Federal Government; (iii) a State; . . . (v) a person, 

institution, organization, or other entity that 

has denied initial employment in violation of 

section 4311.

(B) In the case of a National Guard technician 

employed under section 709 of title 32, the

term “employer” means the adjutant general 

of the state in which the technician is employed.

Id. at 11–12 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A), (B)). The 

administrative judge determined “under a plain reading 

of the statute, the USERRA claim by a National Guard 

Technician [] against the employing state agency is 

properly before the appropriate state court where the 

state agency is located.” Id. at 12. Thus, Mr. Stoglin’s 

“USERRA [claim] would properly be before the state 

courts of Hawaii, not the Board.” Id. 

Mr. Stoglin appealed the administrative judge’s remand decision to the Board, which affirmed the administrative judge’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over Mr. 

Stoglin’s USERRA claim. See Stoglin, 2015 WL 4166462 

at *2. The Board noted the position Mr. Stoglin applied 

for with the HANG “was advertised as a nondual status 

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STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 5

position.” Id. (citations omitted). It observed that “[t]he

employment of such nondual status employees is authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 10217(a), and the incumbents are 

civilian employees.” Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 10217(a)). The 

Board further noted that, “[a]lthough they are employees 

of the Department of Defense, and thus considered federal 

employees for most purposes, National Guard civilian 

technicians are considered state employees for USERRA 

purposes.” Id. As a result, the Board held that Mr. 

Stoglin’s “USERRA claim against the [HANG] [was] not 

properly before the Board and [] dismiss[ed] it for lack of 

jurisdiction.” Id. 

The Board found support for its conclusion in the 

United States Department of Labor’s regulations that 

implement USERRA. It observed that “‘[a] National 

Guard civilian technician is considered a State employee 

for USERRA purposes, although he or she is considered a 

Federal employee for most other purposes.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 1002.306). The 

Board stated these regulations explain that “‘[a]n action 

brought against a State Adjutant General, as an employer 

of a civilian National Guard technician, is considered an 

action against a State for purposes of determining which 

court has jurisdiction.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 1002.305(d)). Thus, the Board concluded 

that “an action under USERRA against a state ‘may be 

brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction according to the laws of the State.’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. 

§ 1002.305(b)). 

Mr. Stoglin timely appealed. This court possesses jurisdiction to review the Board’s final decision pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012).

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6 STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

“Whether the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate a 

particular appeal is a question of law, which we review de 

novo.” Herman v. Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1378 

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). However, “we are 

bound by the [administrative judge’s] factual determinations [that form the basis of the jurisdiction determination] unless those findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence.” Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 

F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 

U.S. 197, 217 (1938) (citations omitted). 

II. The Board Did Not Possess Jurisdiction over Mr. 

Stoglin’s USERRA Claim

Mr. Stoglin argues the “USERRA was not applied as 

liberally as Congress intended . . . [and the Board] failed 

to apply the law correctly and never addressed many of 

the issues of [his] case . . . .” Pet’r’s Br. 1. Mr. Stoglin 

also contends the Board’s decision failed to consider “[t]he 

fact that the adverse action taken by the [A]gency was a 

result of retaliation by an [A]gency official who violated 

USERRA.” Id. 

The Board did not err in its determination that it 

lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claims. 

As explained by the Board, the USERRA explicitly states 

“‘[i]n the case of a National Guard technician employed 

under section 709 of [T]itle 32 [of the United States Code], 

the term ‘employer’ means the adjutant general of the 

State in which the technician is employed.’” Stoglin, 2015 

WL 4166462 at *2 (first alteration in original) (quoting 38 

U.S.C. § 4303(4)(B)). In Mr. Stoglin’s case, the position he 

applied for with the HANG was announced “under the 

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STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 7

authority set forth in 32 U.S.C. § 709,” thus, the “employer” was the State Adjutant General of Hawaii. Resp’t’s 

App. 33; see also id. at 11 (discussing the job announcement submitted with Mr. Stoglin’s Petition for Appeal to 

the Board). 

This court has previously stated the procedure for 

“‘[e]nforcement of [USERRA] rights with respect to a 

State or private employer’ is set out in 38 U.S.C. § 4323, 

which provides for district court jurisdiction over actions 

against a state commenced by the United States, and 

state court jurisdiction over actions against a state commenced by a person.” Asatov v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 595 

F. App’x 979, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (alterations in original). This court has also stated “[t]he National Guard federal regulations explain that ‘[a]n action 

brought against a State Adjutant General, as an employer 

of a civilian National Guard technician, is considered an 

action against a State for purposes of determining which 

court has jurisdiction.’” Id. (second alteration in original) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 1002.305(d)). 

Because Mr. Stoglin’s claim is against the State Adjutant General of Hawaii, as the employer of civilian National Guard technicians, he must seek resolution of his 

claim in Hawaii state court. See Asatov, 595 F. App’x at 

982 (“[T]he scheme of the National Guard Technicians Act

is to create the technicians as nominal federal employees 

for a very limited purpose and to recognize the military 

authority of the states through their Governors and 

Adjutants General to employ, command and discharge 

them.” (citation omitted)); 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2). 

CONCLUSION

Because the Board properly determined that it did not 

possess jurisdiction over Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claims, 

we need not address his arguments as to the merits of his 

case. For the reasons set forth above, the final decision of 

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8 STOGLIN v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. 

the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing Mr. 

Stoglin’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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