Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00651/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00651-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc.
Defendant
Maeola Goldthrip
Plaintiff
Vickie Goldthrip
Plaintiff
Johnson and Johnson
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MAEOLA GOLDTHRIP, et al., :

 :

Plaintiffs, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00651-KD-B

 : 

JOHNSON and JOHNSON, :

 :

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the Court on Defendant Johnson and 

Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19). The motion, which has

been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution, has been referred 

to the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and 

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. 

Ala. CivLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration of all matters 

presented, the undersigned RECOMMENDS, for the reasons stated 

herein, that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be granted. 

I. Background Facts

Plaintiffs Maeola Goldthrip and Vickie Goldthrip filed the 

instant action against Defendants DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. 

(hereinafter “DePuy”), and its parent corporation, Johnson and 

Johnson (hereinafter “J&J”) for a product defect in an 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 1 of 22
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implantable total hip prosthesis sold by Defendants. (Doc. 1) 1. 

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the court has 

personal jurisdiction over these Defendants pursuant to the 

Alabama long arm statute in Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 4.2, as the 

Defendants transacted business in the State of Alabama, made a 

contract within the State of Alabama, and/or committed a 

tortuous act in this State. (Id. at 4). They further state that 

each Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the State of 

Alabama to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the 

Court. (Id.). According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants conduct 

substantial business in the State of Alabama, market and sell 

their products in the State of Alabama, and direct their 

business toward the residents of the State of Alabama.” 2 (Id.). 

 1 Summary Judgment was granted in favor of DePuy on May 13, 2016. 

(Doc. 33). 

2 Plaintiff’s statements on J&J include the following detailed 

allegations relevant to jurisdictional analysis: that J&J is a 

New Jersey corporation with its principle place of business in 

New Brunswick, N.J; that J&J does business or directs and 

conducts its business and activities in State of Alabama; that 

J&J “transacted, solicited, and conducted business in the State 

of Alabama...and derived substantial revenue from such business”; 

that J&J was “engaged in the business of designing, developing, 

manufacturing, testing, packaging, advertising, promoting, 

marketing, distributing, labeling, and/or selling the subject 

product”; that J&J expected or should have expected “that their 

acts would have consequences within... the State of Alabama, in 

particular”; and that “...each Defendant was the representative, 

agent, employee, or alter ego of the other defendant and in 

doing the things alleged herein was acting within the scope of 

its authority.” (Doc. 1 at 2-3).

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On April 4, 2016, J&J filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint and Supporting Memorandum on the grounds that J&J is 

not subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Alabama. 

(Docs. 19, 20). J&J argues that it is not incorporated in 

Alabama, does not have its principle place of business in 

Alabama, and is not otherwise “at home” in Alabama. (Id. at 1). 

Attached to its Motion to Dismiss is the affidavit of Lacey P. 

Elberg, an Assistant Secretary of J&J. J&J alleges that the 

statements contained in this affidavit show that there is no 

specific or general jurisdiction over J&J, as J&J has no 

contacts whatsoever with Alabama, and Plaintiffs cannot assert

jurisdiction through an alter ego theory. (Doc. 20 at 5, 11). 

In Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition, they argue that 

Alabama has personal jurisdiction over J&J because J&J is the 

parent company of DePuy and plays a “very active role in 

settling and negotiating product liability cases in most of 

DePuy’s hip implant lawsuits throughout the United States”, and 

that DePuy’s contacts in Alabama should be imputed to J&J. (Id. 

at 1). In support of this claim, they cite multiple news 

articles and cases decided in other circuits where J&J has taken 

an active role in lawsuits with DePuy, note that DePuy 

identifies itself as a “Johnson and Johnson Company” on its 

various logos, and that DePuy is listed on J&J’s website. (Id. 

at 2, 5, 7). 

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In J & J’s Reply (Doc. 31) 3, it argues that Plaintiffs have 

failed to submit any admissible evidence to support the Court’s 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over J&J, and the 

inadmissible documents they have submitted do not support 

Plaintiff’s position on jurisdiction or respond to J & J’s

evidence challenging personal jurisdiction. (Id. at 1, 5). 

The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for 

resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD/BURDEN OF PROOF

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 

party to assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by 

motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff seeking the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 

bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient 

facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” United 

Technologies Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 

2009)(citations omitted); see also Hard Candy, LLC v. Hard Candy 

 3 Also pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike J 

& J’s Reply. (Doc. 32). Plaintiff argues that J & J’s Reply is 

untimely. Pursuant to S.D. AlaLR 7(d), Movant’s Reply must be 

filed within 7 days of service of the non-movant’s response, 

which in this case was May 2, 2016. Defendant filed their reply 

on May 11, 2016. (See Doc. 31). However, pursuant to the order 

entered by the undersigned Magistrate Judge on April 7, 2016, 

the reply deadline was May 11, 2016. (Doc. 23). Defendants filed 

a timely reply under the April 7 order, and therefore 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is due to be DENIED. The Court will 

consider Defendant’s Reply moving forward. 

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Fitness, LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1238, 2015 WL 3377906 at *4 

(S.D. Fla. May 13, 2015)(“Initially, a plaintiff seeking to 

establish a court’s jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 

need only allege sufficient material facts to make out a prima 

facie case of jurisdiction.”). “Where, as here, the defendant 

challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in 

support of its position, the burden traditionally shifts back to 

the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” 

Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff 

presents affidavits or deposition testimony sufficient to defeat 

a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” PVC Windoors, Inc. v. 

Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 598 F. 3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 

2010). 

“Where the evidence presented by the parties’ affidavits 

and deposition testimony conflicts, the court must construe all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant plaintiff. ... If 

such inferences are sufficient to defeat a motion for judgment 

as a matter of law, the court must rule for the plaintiff, 

finding that jurisdiction exists.” PVC Windoors, 598 F. 3d at 

810 (citation, internal marks and footnote omitted); see also

Hard Candy, 2015 WL 3377906, at *4 (“In assessing the evidence, 

the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the plaintiff.”)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 5 of 22
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Notwithstanding the burden-shifting framework identified herein, 

“[i]t goes without saying that, where the defendant challenges 

the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over its person, the 

plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing that 

personal jurisdiction is present.” Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia 

Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). 

When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “the plaintiff has 

the twin burdens of establishing that personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant comports with (1) the forum state’s long arm 

provision4 and (2) the requirements of the due-process clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Continental Motors, Inc. v. Jewell 

Aircraft, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d. 1296, 1306 (S.D. Ala. 

2012)(citation omitted). “In this case, the two inquiries merge, 

because Alabama’s long arm statute permits the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally 

permissible.” Sloss Industries Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F. 3d 922, 

925 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, the operative question is whether the 

 4 Alabama’s long arm statute provides, in part: 

An appropriate basis exists for service of process outside 

of this state upon a person or entity in any action of this 

state when the person or entity has such contacts with this 

state that the prosecution of the action against the person 

or entity in this state is not inconsistent with the 

constitution of this state or the Constitution of the 

United States... 

Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b)(Effective August 1, 2004).

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 6 of 22
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exercise of personal jurisdiction over J&J in Alabama comports 

with the guarantees of due process. 

The particulars of the constitutional analysis depend on 

whether the type of personal jurisdiction asserted in a 

particular case is “general” or “specific”. Facts supporting 

personal jurisdiction “may be general, which arise from the 

party’s contacts with the forum state that are related to the 

claim.” Continental Motors, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (citation 

omitted). General jurisdiction refers “to the power of a court 

in the forum to adjudicate any cause of action involving a 

particular defendant, irrespective of where the cause of action 

arose” because the defendant is “at home” in the forum. Daimler 

AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2014). 

“Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes 

of action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions 

within the forum.” PVC Windoors, 598 F.3d at 808 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “In specific personal 

jurisdiction cases, we apply the three-part due process test, 

which examines: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out of 

or relate to’ at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the 

forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant ‘purposely availed’ 

himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum’s state’s 

laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

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comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F. 3d 

1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013)(citations omitted). The plaintiff 

bears the burden of establishing each of the first two prongs, 

after which the defendant/movant must make a “compelling case” 

that exercising jurisdiction would violate traditional notion of 

fair play and substantial justice. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Under the due process clause, “a State may authorize its 

courts to extend personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 

defendant if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with 

[the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 

offend traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945))(internal quotations omitted). 

“The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration 

of the laws,’ gives a decree of predictability to the legal 

system that allows potential defendants to structure their 

primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 

conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) 

(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish personal 

jurisdiction over J&J in the instant case, because J&J has no 

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contacts with the State of Alabama. (Doc. 20 at 5). As stated 

above, there are two categories of personal jurisdiction: 

general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Daimler, 134 S. 

Ct. at 754. Plaintiff argues that this court has both general 

and specific jurisdiction over J&J in this action, while 

Defendant disagrees on both counts. 

i. General Jurisdiction

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 

(sister-state or foreign country) corporations to hear any and 

all claims against them when their affiliations with the State 

are so ‘continuous and systematic as to render them essentially 

at home in the forum State.’” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). As explained by 

the Eleventh Circuit Court in Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., 

Inc., 789 F. 3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015): 

A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 

(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations," 

without offending due process "when their affiliations 

with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as 

to render them essentially at home in the forum 

State.” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851). "[O]nly a 

limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a 

defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.” 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. --- , 134 S. Ct. 746, 

760, 187 L.Ed. 2d 624 (2014). "A corporation's place 

of incorporation and its principal place of business 

are "paradigm all-purpose forums." Id. And "a 

corporation's operations in a forum other than its 

formal place of incorporation or principal place of 

business" will be "so substantial and of such a nature 

as to render the corporation at home in that State" 

only in "exceptional" cases. Id. at 761 n.19. 

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Carmouche, 789 F. 3d at 1204.

In this case, it is undisputed that J&J is incorporated 

under the laws of the state of New Jersey, and has its principle 

place of business in New Brunswick, New Jersey. (Doc. 20-1). 

Moreover, J&J is not registered or qualified to do business in 

Alabama, does not lease or own any real estate in Alabama, does 

not ship any products to Alabama, and does not engage in local 

advertising in the State of Alabama. (Doc. 20-1 at 2). And, 

there is no indication in the record that J&J, as an independent 

corporation, has ever participated in any business activities in 

Alabama whatsoever, thus it has no activities that are in any 

way analogous to those present in the ‘exceptional’ cases where 

general jurisdiction was found. See Carmouche, 789 F. 3d 1201, 

1205. 5

 5 The Court in Carmouche compared and contrasted a long line of 

precedent indicating the type of activities that justified the 

exercise of federal jurisdiction over a corporation outside of 

its state of incorporation or principle place of business: 

Compare Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. 

Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952)(general jurisdiction existed in 

Ohio, as the court determined that Ohio had become the temporary 

principle place of business when the president of the 

corporation moved to Ohio and oversaw the work of the company 

from his office there) with Carmouche, 789 F. 3d 1201, 1205 (no 

general jurisdiction despite a Florida bank account, two Florida 

addresses, purchasing insurance from a Florida company, filing 

financial statements with the Florida Secretary of State, 

joining a non-profit trade organization based in Florida, and 

consenting to the jurisdiction of the Southern District of 

Florida for all lawsuits arising out of agreements with 

(Continued)

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To the extent that Plaintiff argues that DePuy’s contacts 

are attributable to J&J for general jurisdiction purposes, that 

argument is without merit. “[A]s long as a parent and a 

subsidiary are separate and distinct corporate entities, the 

presence of one in a forum may not be attributed to the other.” 

Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F. 3d. 1286, 1293 (11th

Cir. 2000). Generally, a foreign parent corporation “is not 

subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state merely because a 

subsidiary is doing business there”. Id. Where the “subsidiary’s 

presence in the state is primarily for the purpose of carrying 

on its own business and the subsidiary has preserved some 

semblance of independence from the parent, jurisdiction over the 

parent may not be acquired on the basis of the local activities 

of the subsidiary.” Id. (citing Portera v. Winn Dixie of 

Montgomery, 996 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (M.D. Ala. 1998)). 

 

Carnival); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 

466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1873, 80 L. Ed. 404 (1984) (no 

general jurisdiction found in Texas where New York bank account 

accepted checks drawn on Houston bank, the CEO visited Texas to 

negotiate a contract, 80 percent of the helicopter fleet was 

purchased from Texas, and the company sent personnel to Texas 

for training); and Fraser v. Smith, 594 F. 3d 842 (11th Cir. 

2010) (no general jurisdiction in Florida though tour operator 

maintained a website accessible from Florida, advertised in 

several national publications including the Miami Herald, 

purchased approximately half the company’s boats in Florida, and 

sent employees and representatives to Florida for training and 

to promote the company’s services). Carmouche, 789 F. 3d 1201, 

1205. 

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For a plaintiff to persuade the court that general personal 

jurisdiction exists over a parent company because of the 

subsidiary’s actions, the plaintiff must show that the 

subsidiary’s corporate existence was a simple formality, and 

that it was merely the agent of the parent company. Consol. Dev. 

Corp. 216 F. 3d. at 1293 (general jurisdiction not imputed on 

parent corporation where the only contacts were bonds issued in 

the U.S. several years previously and there was a casual 

presence of a corporate agent for service of process. The parent 

was not registered to do business and had no employees in the 

country in question, and the subsidiary had its own board of 

directors, determined its own pricing and marketing, and had its 

own bank accounts and employees). 

Based upon the affidavit provided by J&J, J&J and DePuy are 

separate legal entities, and “their corporate relationship is 

one of parent-subsidiary.” (Doc. 20-1 at 2). Further, they have 

maintained separate corporate identities, separate boards of 

directors and officers, and separate by-laws. (Id. at 2-3).

DePuy is not a shell or sham corporation of J&J, or vice versa. 

(Id. at 3). Plaintiffs provide no evidence to dispute these 

assertions. Therefore, the Court finds no basis for imputing the 

contacts of DePuy to their separate and distinct parent company, 

J&J, for the purposes of general jurisdiction.

ii. Specific Jurisdiction 

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“[T]he central concern of the [specific jurisdiction] 

inquiry” is the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, 

and the litigation.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Shaffer 

v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)); see also Walden v. Fiore, 

134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). As stated supra, there is a threepronged due process test to determine whether specific personal 

jurisdiction should apply to a Defendant – (1) whether the 

plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of 

the defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the 

nonresident defendant ‘purposely availed’ himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state and 

(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with 

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” See

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A, 736 F. 3d at 1355. 

Courts may not ascribe the contacts of one co-defendant to 

another in determining personal jurisdiction, and this court has 

rejected the idea that contacts that only exist through a 

subsidiary are any more than a ‘mirage’ for personal 

jurisdiction purposes. Cont’l Motors, Inc. v. Jewell Aircraft, 

Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1307 (S.D. Ala. 2012)(citing Fraser 

v. Smith, 594 F. 3d 842, 852 (11th Cir. 2010)). This Court’s 

inquiry must instead focus on the direct causal relationship 

among Defendant J & J, the forum, and the litigation. Id. at 

1308. 

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The first prong indicates that it must be the defendant’s 

“suit-related conduct” that creates a “substantial connection 

with the forum State” in order to confer specific jurisdiction. 

Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 at 1121. J&J claims that it is a holding 

company that did not engage in any such conduct. (Doc. 20 at 10; 

Doc. 20-1 at 2). “...J&J did not design, and does not manufacture, 

inspect, advertise, distribute, and/or sell the Porocoat Prodigy 

Hip Prosthesis or any other component described in the 

Complaint. Any such activities are conducted independently by 

DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.” (Doc. 20-1 at 2). 

At least one other court has determined that J&J is 

considered a mere ‘holding company’, and not subject to personal 

jurisdiction in a suit against a subsidiary. In Androphy v. 

Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (N.D. Ill. 1998), 

the court discussed the relationship between J&J and their 

subsidiary, JJPI, and observed that J&J did not pay any of 

JJPI’s salaries, did not cover any expenses or losses, and 

maintained separate and independent bylaws, minutes, corporate 

records, financial records, and bank accounts from its 

subsidiary. The Court in Androphy held: 

“Johnson [& Johnson] is not subject to personal 

jurisdiction under the Due Process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson has never 

manufactured, used, or sold the knee-resection 

instruments at issue in the instant suit, either in 

Illinois or elsewhere. Further, it is not registered 

to do business in Illinois, and it has no agents 

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here. It is a holding company which neither 

transacts business nor contracts to provide products 

or services in Illinois. Thus, Johnson lacks the 

“minimum contacts” with the forum state that would 

justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. It 

has not “purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege 

of conducting activities” [in the state], and could 

not “reasonably anticipate being hailed into court 

there.” 

Id. The facts in the Androphy case are analogous to those in the 

instant case. Here, Plaintiffs claim that DePuy’s minimum 

contacts should impute to J&J because J&J is “so intermingled 

and joined with DePuy that it is not only foreseeable for 

Johnson to expect to defend itself in Alabama but is also 

legally proper and fair”. (Doc. 27 at 2). It appears that 

Plaintiff is arguing that jurisdiction should attach based on an 

alter ego theory; thus, the Court will analyze this claim upon 

that basis. 

Federal courts have “consistently acknowledged that it is 

compatible with due process for a court to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over [a corporation] that would not ordinarily be 

subject to personal jurisdiction in that court when the. . . 

corporation is an alter ego... of a corporation that would be 

subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.” Cahaba Disaster 

Recovery, LLC. v. DRC Emergency Servs., 2015 WL 9489911 at *3 

(N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 2015)(internal citations omitted). However, 

“[p]iercing the corporate veil is not a power that is exercised 

lightly.” Cont’l Motors, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.

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Mere control and dominion does not suffice to trigger 

alter-ego status. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 882 F. Supp. at 1304. 

Under Alabama law, there are three elements that a plaintiff 

must meet to justify the court piercing the corporate veil under 

an alter ego theory. Cahaba Disaster Recovery, LLC v. DRC 

Emergency Servs., 2015 WL 9489911 at *4. These elements are: 

“1) The dominant party must have complete control and 

dominion of the subservient corporation’s finances, 

policy, and business practices so that at the time of 

the attacked transaction the subservient corporation 

had no separate mind, will or existence of its own;

2) The control must have been misused by the dominant 

party. Although fraud or the violation of a statutory 

or other positive legal duty is misuse of control, 

when it is necessary to prevent injustice or 

inequitable circumstances, misuse of control will be 

presumed; 

3) the misuse of this control proximately cause[d] the 

harm or unjust loss complained of.” 

Id. (citing First Health, Inc. v. Blanton, 585 So. 2d 1331, 

1334-35 (Ala. 1991)). 

Under the first prong of this analysis, courts look at a 

variety of factors, including whether the parent corporation 

owns “all or most” of the subsidiary’s capital stock, whether 

the two entities share directors or officers, whether the parent 

finances the subsidiary or causes the subsidiary’s 

incorporation, whether the subsidiary has grossly inadequate 

capital, whether the parent pays the subsidiary’s expenses or 

losses, whether the subsidiary’s directors or executives take 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 16 of 22
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orders from the parent corporation in the parent’s interests, 

and whether the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are 

adhered to. Cahaba Disaster Recovery, LLC, 2015 WL 9489922 at *3 

(citing Duff v. S. Railway Co., 496 So. 2d 760, 763 (Ala. 

1986)). No one of these factors is dispositive; nor does this 

list exhaust the relevant factors. Duff, 496 So. 2d at 763. 

Plaintiffs attempt to argue that J&J and DePuy are 

“intermingled” based on J&J’s involvement in lawsuits against 

DePuy in Circuits across the country, the presence of the words 

“a Johnson & Johnson Company” on Depuy’s logo, and the presence 

of DePuy on J&J’s website. To prove J&J’s involvement, they cite 

a variety of news stories, a magazine article, J&J’s involvement 

in various DePuy’s lawsuits, pictures of DePuy’s logo, and a 

link to J&J’ website. This showing is not sufficient. 

When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction by 

submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position, the 

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence 

supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the 

defendant “unless the defendant’s affidavits contain only 

conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to 

jurisdiction.” Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort and Crystal 

Palace Casino, 447 F. 3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). J&J 

provided an affidavit from Lacey P. Elberg, a J & J corporate 

official, in support of its assertion that DePuy and J&J are 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 17 of 22
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separate corporate entities. (Doc. 20-1). 

The Elberg affidavit provides that J&J does not do business 

under the name of DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.; that the manufacture 

and sale of the products at issue in the instant case are 

conducted independently by DePuy; that the two corporations

maintain their own boards of directors and officers who are 

primarily responsible for their respective businesses; that the 

two corporations are separate legal entities whose relationship 

is that of parent-subsidiary; that DePuy is not referred to as a 

department or division of J&J; that the two corporations 

maintain their own separate and independent by-laws, minutes, 

and corporate records; and that the two corporations own, 

maintain, and operate their own respective facilities. (Doc. 20-

1). Further, the Elberg affidavit provides that the two 

corporations are financially independent of one another - DePuy 

is fully capitalized; DePuy prepares its own financial 

statements and budgets and is responsible for its own profits 

and losses; that J&J does not pay for any research, salaries, 

raw materials, or any other operating expenses; that both 

corporations maintain their own separate financial records and 

bank accounts, and neither corporation attempts to divest assets 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 18 of 22
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away from the other6. (Id.). 

The evidence presented by J&J clearly shows that J&J and 

DePuy are separate corporations. Based upon the uncontroverted 

Elberg affidavit, none of the required factors outlined by the 

Alabama Supreme Court in Duff, which justify piercing the 

corporate veil, exist in the instant case. See Duff, 496 So. 2d 

at 763. Thus, the burden shifts back to Plaintiffs to 

substantiate their jurisdictional allegations “by affidavits or 

other competent proof.” Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe 

Transp. A/S, 795 F. 2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986)(citations 

omitted). 

The information submitted the Plaintiffs in support of 

their position do not rise to the level of competent proof.7

 6 J&J and its subsidiaries file certain government-mandated 

consolidated financial report, such Annual Reports on Form 10-K 

pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but all other 

records are separate. (Doc. 20-1 at 2). 

7 The Eleventh Circuit has generally considered newspaper articles 

to be inadmissible hearsay when offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted. United States v. Baker, 432 F. 3d 1189, 1211 

(11th Cir. 2005) abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. 

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 

224 (2006). In this case, Plaintiffs are clearly presenting the 

articles provided for the truth of the matter asserted in them –

specifically, that J&J settled claims brought against their 

subsidiary DePuy. (Doc. 27 at 2, 6, 7) Further, the court has no 

foundation to determine the authenticity of the logos provided 

by Plaintiffs in their response. (Doc. 27 at 5). As such, this 

evidence provided by the Plaintiffs in support of this court’s 

jurisdiction over the Defendant will not be considered going 

forward. 

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Plaintiffs cite three cases as proof that J&J is actively 

participating in lawsuits involving DePuy, namely Ljunggren v. 

Johnson and Johnson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27411 (C.D. Ca. March 

2, 2016)(case remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction), Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51843 (N.D. Ill. April 18, 2016)(order 

granting motion by plaintiff’s counsel to enforce attorney’s 

lien for fees and expenses), and Azefor v. DePuy Orthopaedics, 

Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27863 (D. Nev. March 3, 2016)(court 

denied DePuy’s motion to dismiss as there was a material issue 

of fact regarding the statute of limitations). These cases do 

not include any discussion of J & J beyond their existence as a 

co-defendant. Nor do any of the cases discuss the court’s 

personal jurisdiction over J&J. Indeed, there is no information 

about J&J’s relationship with DePuy anywhere in the three 

referenced cases. Plaintiffs’ reliance on these three cases 

(which merely show that J&J has been included as a co-defendant 

in suits against their subsidiary) falls far short of meeting 

the heavy burden to prove specific jurisdiction in this case.

The Plaintiffs also attempt to argue that the presence of 

DePuy on J&J’s corporate website proves a sufficient connection 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 20 of 22
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between the two corporations8, but that argument is also without 

merit. J&J’s website is clearly a passive informational website, 

and as such lacks jurisdictional significance. See Matthews v. 

Brookstone Stores, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1065 (S.D. Ala. 

2007)(“A purely passive informational website . . . lacks 

jurisdictional significance.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the 

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proving specific 

personal jurisdiction over J & J in light of the uncontroverted 

evidence submitted by J & J.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that 

Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of specific 

personal jurisdiction over J & J.

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that 

Defendant J & J’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED because personal 

jurisdiction is lacking.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

 8 Johnson and Johnson’s website can be found at www.jnj.com. (Doc. 

21 at 5). 

Case 2:15-cv-00651-KD-B Document 47 Filed 12/08/16 Page 21 of 22
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written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c). The 

parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] 

party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 8th day of December, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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