Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01284/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01284-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Durham School Services, LP
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2016 Decided May 17, 2016

No. 14-1284

DURHAM SCHOOL SERVICES, LP,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 15-1017

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

Amanda A. Sonneborn argued the cause for petitioner. 

With her on the briefs were Charles P. Roberts III and Brian 

M. Stolzenbach.

Micah P.S. Jost, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. 

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, 

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Julie B. Broido, 

Supervisory Attorney.

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Before: BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 2013, in an election 

conducted by the National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or 

“NLRB”), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 

991 (“Union”) prevailed in its campaign to represent school 

bus drivers and monitors working for Petitioner Durham 

School Services, LP, in Milton, Pace, and Navarre, Florida. 

Petitioner challenged the election, claiming that the Union 

had circulated misleading propaganda during the election 

campaign, and that a Board Agent had engaged in 

inappropriate conduct during the election. After considering 

Petitioner’s proffered evidence and claims, the Board’s 

Regional Director recommended overruling Petitioner’s 

objections without a hearing. The Board adopted the Regional 

Director’s findings and recommendations, and certified the 

Union as the employees’ lawful bargaining agent. Durham 

Sch. Servs., LP, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (May 9, 2014), 

reconsideration denied, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (Oct. 20, 2014).

Petitioner refused to bargain, which caused the Union to 

file unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. The 

Regional Director then issued a complaint alleging that 

Petitioner had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National 

Labor Relations Act (“Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1), by 

refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union following 

Board certification. On December 4, 2014, after the case had 

been transferred to the NLRB, the Board granted a Motion for 

Summary Judgment filed by the Board’s General Counsel. 

The Board held that Petitioner had violated the Act as 

charged, and ordered it “to cease and desist, to recognize and 

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bargain on request with the Union and, if an understanding is 

reached, to embody the understanding in a signed agreement.”

Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 121, at 2 (Dec. 4, 

2014). Petitioner now petitions for review, and the Board has 

filed a cross-application for enforcement of its decision and 

order.

Petitioner raises three principal grounds in support of its 

claim that the Board erred in dismissing its objections to the 

election. First, Petitioner contends that the Union 

impermissibly deceived voters by distributing a campaign 

flyer that contained pictures of eligible voters and statements 

misrepresenting their intent to vote for the Union. Second, 

Petitioner asserts that the Board Agent handling the election 

compromised the integrity of the election in various ways 

when, inter alia, she carried the election booth and the ballot 

box to Petitioner’s parking lot to permit a disabled employee 

to cast a ballot. Finally, for each claim, Petitioner maintains 

that its proffered evidence, even if insufficient in itself to 

overturn the election, was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary 

hearing. We find no merit in these claims.

The Board disposed of the first claim pursuant to 

Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 

(1982). Under Midland, the Board “will not probe into the 

truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements and will 

not set aside an election on the basis of misleading statements 

unless ‘a party has used forged documents which render the 

voters unable to recognize propaganda for what it is.’”

Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 1 (quoting Midland, 263 

N.L.R.B. at 133). The Board dismissed the second claim 

because there was nothing to indicate that “the manner in 

which the election was conducted raise[d] a reasonable doubt 

as to the fairness and validity of the election.” Id. at 3

(quoting Polymers, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 282, 282 (1969), 

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enforced, 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969)). Finally, the Board 

held that Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing on its 

objections because it failed to proffer evidence raising any 

substantial and material factual issues. 

The Board’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence, and its conclusions are consistent with established

precedent. Therefore, because the Board’s Decisions and 

Orders are neither arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, nor otherwise not in accordance with law, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), we deny the petition for review and grant the 

Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner employs full-time and regular part-time school 

bus drivers and monitors at its Milton, Pace, and Navarre, 

Florida facilities. On January 10, 2013, the Union filed an 

election petition with the NLRB to represent these employees. 

Pursuant to a Stipulated Election Agreement, Petitioner and 

the Union waived their rights to a pre-election hearing and 

agreed to a secret-ballot election to be conducted by the 

Board’s Regional Director for Region 15 pursuant to the 

Board’s regulations then in effect. The applicable regulations, 

which were codified in 29 C.F.R. pt. 102, were subsequently 

amended effective April 14, 2015. See Representation—Case 

Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308 (Dec. 15, 2014). All 

regulations referenced below refer to the version of the 

Board’s regulations that were in effect at the time when the 

events at issue took place.

The election took place on February 22, 2013. The Union 

prevailed by a wide margin: 112 to 74. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 

§ 102.69(a), Petitioner timely filed objections with the 

Regional Director challenging the election, and proffered 

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evidence in support of the objections. The first two objections

were, in relevant part, as follows:

First Objection. Prior to the election, . . . [the 

Union] engaged in a deliberate attempt to deceive eligible 

voters by distributing a flyer shortly before the election 

that contained pictures of eligible voters and language 

misrepresenting that the pictured employees . . . intended 

to vote in favor of the Union. . . .

Second Objection. During the election, the [Board 

Agent] . . . at the Pace [location] engaged in . . . conduct 

that destroyed confidence in the Board’s election 

processes and impugned the Board’s election 

standards[.] . . .

Petitioner’s Objections at 1-2, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 16-17. 

Petitioner also challenged the authority of the Regional 

Director to conduct a representation election at a time when

the Board did not have a quorum. Petitioner now concedes

that, in light of the court’s decision in UC Health v. NLRB, 

803 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2015), this third objection has no 

merit.

In support of its first objection, Petitioner submitted the 

Union flyer and two affidavits. The flyer’s first page stated: 

“On February 22, 2013 WE’RE VOTING YES for Teamsters 

Local Union 991! And Here’s Why......” The second page 

listed the date, time, and locations of the election, and some 

pro-union quotations attributed to the “Santa Rosa County 

Durham Teamsters Organizing Committee.” The remaining 

pages of the flyer included the names and photographs of 

various employees alongside a quotation that said “We are 

voting ‘Teamster’s YES!’ for a better future at Durham!”

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The first affidavit was executed by employee April Perez, 

who declared that, a week before the election, a Union 

representative asked her to sign a document and to allow him 

to take her picture. Perez acknowledged that she gave the 

representative permission to take her photograph and signed 

the document without reading it. Perez’s affidavit also says 

that the Union never told her that her picture would be used in 

its propaganda, and that she never authorized any quotations 

to be attributed to her. The second affidavit, executed by 

employee Heidi Gourley, simply stated that various 

employees had seen and discussed the Union flyer.

In support of its second objection, Petitioner submitted 

two affidavits. The first affidavit was executed by employee 

Barbara Nelson, who had served as Petitioner’s election 

observer at the Pace, Florida, location. Nelson declared that, 

during the election, an employee who was not on the voter 

eligibility list was in the parking lot and wanted to vote, but 

was physically unable to get to the voting area. In order to 

accommodate the disabled employee, Nelson and the Board 

Agent carried the unsealed ballot box and voting booth

outside to the parking lot. Nelson believed that if the Board 

Agent had noticed anyone entering the voting area when they 

were in the parking lot, the Agent would have asked the 

prospective voter to wait. Because it was raining, Nelson left

the Board Agent for 30 seconds to get her umbrella; she could 

not see the ballot box when she did this. As it turned out, 

Nelson and the Board Agent were in the parking lot for only 

about 2 to 3 minutes. When they were returning to the polling 

area, the Board Agent realized that she had forgotten to put

the disabled employee’s ballot in an envelope reserved for 

challenged ballots. The Board Agent telephoned her 

supervisor to explain what had happened, and she talked on

the telephone with her supervisor and another Board 

representative for about 20 minutes. During this time, eligible 

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voters continued to cast their ballots. The second affidavit, 

executed by employee Cal Schmidt, simply stated that the 

Board Agent acknowledged that she had failed to put the 

disabled employee’s ballot in an envelope reserved for 

challenged ballots.

In light of the foregoing objections and supporting 

evidence, Petitioner asked that the election be set aside and 

that a second election be directed. Petitioner also requested

that, if necessary, a full hearing on its objections be conducted 

on the record before a Hearing Officer pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 

§ 102.69(e).

A. The Representation Proceeding

In response to Petitioner’s objections, the Regional 

Director initiated an investigation pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 

§ 102.69(c)(1). The Regional Director received a position 

statement and supporting documents from the Union. These 

documents purported to show that April Perez backed the 

Union and that she had given the Union permission to use her 

name and picture in its propaganda. 

On March 25, 2013, the Regional Director issued a 

Report and Recommendation, recommending that Petitioner’s 

objections be dismissed and that a Certification of 

Representative be issued to the Union. With respect to 

Petitioner’s first objection, the Regional Director concluded 

that the Union’s flyer did not violate the standard set forth in 

Midland, 263 N.L.R.B. 127. With respect to the second 

objection, the Regional Director found, inter alia, that

Petitioner had provided no evidence that the security of the 

ballot box or the voting area had been compromised or that 

the Board Agent’s phone call had adversely affected the 

election; that Petitioner had not alleged that any unauthorized 

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ballots were cast; and that Petitioner was estopped from 

relying on Nelson’s voluntary decision to leave her station at 

the ballot box for 30 seconds to get an umbrella. The Regional 

Director also found that, although one ballot had been

inadvertently mishandled, this could not have tainted the 

election process because the Union won by 38 votes.

Petitioner filed timely exceptions with the Board pursuant 

to 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(2), challenging the Regional 

Director’s Report and Recommendation. Petitioner asserted 

that the Regional Director had impermissibly relied on the 

documentation provided by the Union. Petitioner additionally 

claimed that the Regional Director had erred in concluding 

that the Union had not misrepresented Perez’s views, used her 

photograph without permission, or compromised the rights of 

employees to cast a secret ballot. Petitioner also contended

that the Regional Director had impermissibly applied the law 

to the facts. Finally, in a separate motion, Petitioner requested 

that the Board reopen the record for Petitioner to submit a 

supplemental affidavit executed by Perez. In that affidavit, 

Perez declared that she never executed any documents 

indicating that she supported the Union, and that she feared

that her signature may have been forged on the documents 

proffered by the Union. 

On May 9, 2014, the Board dismissed Petitioner’s 

objections, denied the motion to reopen the record, and issued 

the Union a Certification of Representative. Durham, 360 

N.L.R.B. No. 108. In its decision, the Board noted that the 

Union’s documentation appeared to show that Perez was in 

fact a Union supporter. Id. at 2. However, the Board held that, 

“even assuming, as the Employer claims, that Perez did not in 

fact support the Union and did not write [that she supported 

the Union], we would still affirm the Regional Director’s 

decision to overrule Objection 1 without a hearing, under the 

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Midland standard.” Id. The Board further held that no 

employee right to cast a secret ballot had been compromised

because all of the employees’ actual votes had remained 

secret. See id. at 2-3 (citing Somerset Valley Rehab. & 

Nursing Ctr., 357 N.L.R.B. 736, 737 n.5 (2011)). Finally, 

with regard to the second objection, the Board held that, 

contrary to Petitioner’s claim, “the Regional Director actually 

applied th[e] correct standard in her thorough analysis of the 

Employer’s evidence [regarding the Board Agent’s conduct], 

and [agreed] with her conclusion that no hearing was 

necessary.” Id. at 3. The Board therefore dismissed 

Petitioner’s objections without a hearing.

B. The Unfair Labor Practice Proceeding

Following its certification, the Union requested that 

Petitioner schedule a meeting to begin negotiating a collective 

bargaining agreement. Petitioner refused to bargain with the 

Union in order to elicit an unfair labor practice charge and 

thereby obtain judicial review. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 

376 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1964) (explaining that, in the normal 

course, Board certification orders are not directly reviewable 

in the courts). As anticipated, the Union filed unfair labor 

practice charges with the NLRB, and the Regional Director 

issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing. Subsequently, the 

Board’s General Counsel moved to transfer and continue the 

proceeding before the Board and moved for summary 

judgment. The Board transferred the proceeding and ordered 

Petitioner to show cause why summary judgment should not 

be granted. Petitioner acknowledged that it had refused to 

bargain with the Union, but contended that the Union had 

been improperly certified.

On December 4, 2014, the Board issued a Decision and 

Order finding that Petitioner had unlawfully refused to 

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bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) 

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1), and ordering Petitioner 

to bargain upon the Union’s request. Durham, 361 N.L.R.B. 

No. 121. Petitioner filed a timely petition for review, arguing 

that the Board, in certifying the Union, had erred in declining 

to grant Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on its objections and 

in refusing to reopen the record. The Board cross-applied for 

enforcement.

II. ANALYSIS

The Board’s position in this case is quite straightforward 

and compelling: “With regard to both [of Petitioner’s]

objections . . . the Board properly assumed the truth of all 

[of Petitioner’s] relevant evidence, but found it wanting under 

its well-established law. Because the specific evidence 

[Petitioner] proffered falls far short of establishing a prima 

facie case of conduct that would warrant setting aside the 

election, [Petitioner] was not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing and [the] Board acted within its discretion in 

declining to conduct one.” Br. for Respondent at 11-12. We 

agree.

Congress has vested the Board with the “responsibility to 

supervise representation elections.” Serv. Corp. Int’l v. NLRB, 

495 F.3d 681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also 29 U.S.C. 

§ 159(c). For this reason, Board decisions regarding

representation elections are “entitled to ‘a wide degree of 

discretion.’” Serv. Corp., 495 F.3d at 684 (quoting NLRB v. 

A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946)). In reviewing the 

validity of election results, we ask whether the Board “has 

followed appropriate and fair procedures, and has reached a 

rational conclusion” in addressing any objections to the 

election. Id. (citation and ellipsis omitted). “We will uphold 

the Board’s decision unless ‘upon reviewing the record as a 

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whole, we conclude that the Board’s findings are not 

supported by “substantial evidence,” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f),’ 

or that its interpretation of the Act is not ‘reasonable and 

consistent with applicable precedent.’” Id. (citations omitted).

Objecting parties do not have an automatic “right to a 

post-election hearing.” Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 

Am. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Rather, to 

receive a hearing, “[t]he burden is on the objecting party to 

present evidence that raises substantial and material factual 

issues.” Park Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1010 

n.1 (1992); see also 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d). In each case, 

“[w]hether [an objecting party’s] evidence was sufficient 

depends upon the Board’s ‘substantive criteria’” for the 

relevant claim of election misconduct. AOTOP, LLC v. NLRB, 

331 F.3d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Swing Staging, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 994 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Thus, as 

the Board appropriately notes:

When [a] party’s evidence, even if credited, would not 

justify setting aside the election under those criteria as a 

matter of law, there is simply “nothing to hear,” and the 

Regional Director may resolve the objections on the basis 

of an administrative investigation.

Br. for Respondent at 16 (quoting Amalgamated, 424 F.2d at 

829). That is the sum and substance of this case.

A. Petitioner’s First Objection

Before the Board, Petitioner claimed that “the Union 

deceived voters by distributing a campaign flyer that 

contained pictures of eligible voters and statements 

misrepresenting their intent to vote for the Union.” Durham,

360 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 1. The Board agreed with the 

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Regional Director that Petitioner’s evidence did not raise any

substantial and material factual issues under Midland. Id.

As noted above, the Board in Midland set forth the 

standard governing objections to campaign propaganda:

[W]e rule today that we will no longer probe into the 

truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and 

that we will not set elections aside on the basis of 

misleading campaign statements. We will, however, 

intervene in cases where a party has used forged 

documents which render the voters unable to recognize 

propaganda for what it is.

263 N.L.R.B. at 133 (footnote omitted). The Board held that 

Midland controlled here because 

[t]here is no claim (much less evidence) of forgery here. 

Nor is there any dispute that the Union’s flyer was easily 

recognizable as campaign propaganda. At most, then, the 

Employer’s evidence suggests a possible 

misrepresentation of an employee’s sentiments which, 

under Midland, provides no basis for setting aside the 

election. Thus, there was no need for a hearing much less 

grounds to warrant setting aside the election, which we 

note the Union won by a considerable margin.

Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 2. We have no grounds 

upon which to overturn the Board’s decision on this point.

The Midland rule has been accepted by both this court 

and a number of our sister circuits. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of 

Nev. Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.3d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 

Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 1 n.2 (citing cases). And 

the Board has routinely applied Midland in situations similar 

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to the present case: that is, in situations in which unions 

allegedly have engaged in misrepresentation by distributing

campaign flyers designed to suggest that specified employees 

supported the union. See, e.g., U-Haul, 490 F.3d at 962-63;

NLRB v. Media Gen. Operations, Inc., 360 F.3d 434, 444 n.10 

(4th Cir. 2004); Somerset, 357 N.L.R.B. at 736; BFI Waste 

Servs., 343 N.L.R.B. 254, 254 n.2 (2004). In each case, the 

Board found that, under Midland, the contested election

propaganda was not of the type sufficient to set aside the 

election.

Petitioner does not contend that the Union’s flyer was a 

forged document that was unrecognizable as propaganda. 

Rather, it appears that Petitioner simply seeks to avoid the

Midland rule by minimizing the precedent. Petitioner first 

contends that the Regional Director improperly relied on

evidence, uncovered during an ex parte investigation, that 

portrayed April Perez as a Union supporter. Petitioner thus 

argues that that Board erred in adopting the Regional 

Director’s recommendation to dismiss its objections. The 

Board, however, made it clear that, “even assuming . . . that 

Perez did not in fact support the Union” and that the Union 

had misrepresented her views, Petitioner’s objection did not 

meet the Midland standard. Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 

at 2.

Petitioner also asserts that Midland does not establish a 

hard-and-fast rule. In Petitioner’s view, the applicability of 

Midland “all depends upon the circumstances.” Br. of 

Petitioner at 22. In particular, Petitioner points out that 

evidentiary hearings have been granted in many cases 

involving Midland, hearings that, according to Petitioner, 

“would have been wholly unnecessary if the Midland rule 

were to be rigidly applied.” Id. (citing cases). This argument 

claims too much. The Board does not contend that the 

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Midland rule automatically forecloses evidentiary hearings. 

Rather, the Board’s position here is that Petitioner proffered 

no evidence raising substantial and material factual issues

under Midland. The Board accepted all of Petitioner’s factual 

assertions as true and concluded that there was nothing to 

indicate that the Union had used forged documents that 

rendered the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what 

it is. Thus, there was no reason for a hearing.

Petitioner further contends that Midland should not apply 

where a Union publicizes without permission how an 

employee intends to vote. Br. of Petitioner at 23-29. We need 

not address this issue, however, because Petitioner failed to 

raise it in the first instance with the Board. Petitioner did not 

mention this claim in its exceptions to the Board. Rather, in 

its exceptions to the Board, Petitioner focused on its claim

that “the statutory rights of employees to cast a secret ballot 

were compromised” by the Union’s misleading election 

campaign propaganda. Petitioner’s Exceptions at 3, J.A. 88.

And the Board addressed this issue in its response to 

Petitioner’s exceptions:

[O]ur [dissenting] colleague insists that accurately

revealing an employee’s expressed voting intentions, 

absent the employee’s express consent, violates the 

principle of ballot secrecy. That claim is mistaken. If 

ballot secrecy were genuinely implicated, then even an 

employee’s express consent to disclose her voting 

intentions would be insufficient to authorize publication 

of an employee’s intended vote. More significantly, 

whatever an employee may tell a union about how she 

intends to vote, and however a union may publicize that 

disclosure, the fact remains that the employee’s actual 

vote will be secret. See Somerset Valley, [357 N.L.R.B. at 

737 n.5] (citing ballot secrecy in rejecting argument that 

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employees whose names and pictures appeared in flyer 

would feel compelled to support union). The Board has 

consistently focused on protecting ballot secrecy during 

the voting process. When the employee enters the voting 

booth, whether she votes against the union—either 

because she changed her mind or because she misled the 

union originally—or for the union, her vote is known 

only to her. There is no basis, then, for imposing 

precisely the sort of restriction on free campaign speech 

that the Midland Board rejected.

Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). 

It is true that the Board member who dissented on the 

Midland issue argued that he “would hold that a party engages 

in objectionable conduct when it publicizes how specific, 

named employees intend to vote unless the party obtained 

express consent from those employees to disclose how they 

intended to vote.” Id. at 4 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting). 

This, however, was not the issue raised in Petitioner’s 

exceptions to the Board. And, as the opinion for the majority 

points out, the position advanced by the dissenting Board 

member was inconsistent with Board precedent. Id. at 2 

(majority opinion). This may explain why it was not the focus 

of Petitioner’s exceptions. The main point here, however, is 

that because Petitioner failed to raise the issue with the Board 

in the first instance, the claim has been forfeited. See 29 

U.S.C. § 160(e); U-Haul, 490 F.3d at 963; Parsippany Hotel 

Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Int’l 

Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 

418 F.2d 1191, 1195 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Board erred in denying 

its request to reopen the record to consider Perez’s 

supplemental affidavit. According to Petitioner, the proffered 

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affidavit was necessary to respond to the evidence, uncovered 

by the Regional Director during an ex parte investigation,

supporting the Union’s claim that April Perez was a Union 

supporter. Br. of Petitioner at 29-31. As explained above, 

however, the Board’s decision in this case did not rely on this 

evidence. Therefore, there was no need for the Board to 

reopen the record. 

Furthermore, Perez’s supplemental affidavit lends 

nothing of substance to Petitioner’s position. In her affidavit, 

Perez merely asserts that her signature may have been forged 

by the Union. The affidavit does not assert that the Union’s 

campaign flyer was somehow a “forgery” under Midland

rendering voters unable to recognize the flyer as campaign 

propaganda. See U-Haul, 490 F.3d at 963 (affirming the 

Board’s determination that “allegedly forged signatures, 

which suggested more employees supported the Union than 

may have been the case, would not have prevented employees 

from recognizing that the Union was circulating the petition 

to garner support for its cause”).

B. Petitioner’s Second Objection

Petitioner’s second objection borders on frivolous. 

Petitioner contends “that the Board agent handling the 

election compromised the integrity of the election in various 

ways when the agent carried the election booth and the ballot 

box to the Employer’s parking lot in order to permit a 

disabled employee to cast a ballot.” Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. 

No. 108, at 3. Given the record in this case, it is clear that the 

Board did not err in concluding that the manner in which the 

election was conducted raised no reasonable doubts as to the 

fairness and validity of the election, and in holding that no 

hearing was necessary. 

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The Regional Director found that Petitioner did not allege 

that any unauthorized ballots were cast. Nor was there 

evidence that the Board Agent’s conduct in any way affected 

the election’s outcome. Petitioner does not dispute these 

findings. Rather, Petitioner argues that its objection and 

supporting evidence, even if not sufficient to overturn the 

election outright, were enough to warrant an evidentiary 

hearing. Petitioner is mistaken. As noted above, to merit an 

evidentiary hearing, an objecting party must “raise[] 

substantial and material issues of fact sufficient to support a 

prima facie showing of objectionable conduct.” Swing 

Staging, 994 F.2d at 862 (emphasis added). Whether such a 

showing has been made depends on the same “substantive 

criteria” that govern the Board’s ultimate determination.

AOTOP, 331 F.3d at 103 (quoting Swing Staging, 994 F.2d at 

862). When the conduct of a Board Agent is at issue, one 

substantive criterion is that “mere speculative harm [is 

insufficient] to overturn an election.” Fresenius USA Mfg., 

352 N.L.R.B. 679, 680 (2008) (citation omitted).

The case law is clear that Petitioner must rely on its 

proffered evidence to support a request for an evidentiary 

hearing. And only if that evidence raises issues of fact 

sufficient to support Petitioner’s prima facie case is a hearing 

then warranted to address issues concerning the fairness and 

validity of the election. See, e.g., N.Y. Rehab. Care Mgmt., 

LLC v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 

Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. NLRB, 373 F.3d 1345, 1347-50 

(D.C. Cir. 2004); AOTOP, 331 F.3d at 102-05.

Petitioner responds that requiring a party to be precise in 

its objections and evidence would effectively place the burden 

on that party to prove its case without a hearing. This is a 

specious claim that misapprehends the requirements of the 

law. An objecting party is not entitled to a hearing merely by 

USCA Case #14-1284 Document #1613531 Filed: 05/17/2016 Page 17 of 18
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imagining fanciful acts of misconduct that find no support in 

the evidence. Rather, an objecting party must offer concrete 

evidence that is sufficient to give reasonable cause for 

concern and thus justify a hearing. See, e.g., NLRB v. JWood/A Tappan Div., 720 F.2d 309, 311-14 (3d Cir. 1983)

(remanding for a hearing where, although not yet proven, the 

employer’s evidence demonstrated that a “union agent” might

have threatened employees’ jobs prior to an election). In this 

case, Petitioner points to nothing in the record to support a 

claim that the Board Agent engaged in any conduct that might 

have tainted the election proceeding. Because Petitioner’s 

proffered evidence raised no reasonable concerns regarding 

the propriety of the election, the Board did not err in denying 

the request for an evidentiary hearing.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion, we 

deny Petitioner’s petition for review, and we grant the 

Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

So ordered.

 

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