Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02142/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry King
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

TERRY KING and VALERIE JEAN 

BURDEX, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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MAR 2 61993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 92-2142 

92-2173 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 92-247-SC) 

Michael Edmund O'Neill, United States Department of Justice, 

Criminal Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C. (Don J. 

Svet, United States Attorney, and James D. Tierney, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the 

brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Teresa E. Storch, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee Terry King. 

Angela Arellanes, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee 

Valerie Jean Burdex. 

Before LOGAN, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

The government appeals the district court's orders 

suppressing evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure of 

Defendants Terry King and Valerie Jean Burdex. The district court 

found that the police officer who seized Defendants lacked a 

reasonable suspicion that they were involved in criminal activity; 

Appellate Case: 92-2142 Document: 010110198779 Date Filed: 03/26/1993 Page: 1 
therefore, Defendants' detention violated the Fourth Amendment. 

See Terry v . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). The government contends 

that the officer's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances 

and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The 

government also argues that even if the officer's conduct violated 

the Fourth Amendment, the drugs, which were discarded by Burdex, 

were not the fruit of the unlawful detention. Our jurisdiction 

arises under 18 U. S . C. § 3731, and, in reviewing the district 

court's order, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable 

to Defendants . United States v. Horn, 970 F . 2d 728 , 731 (10th 

Cir. 1 992 ). 

I. 

On April 30, 1992, at approximately 1:15 p .m., Officer 

LeMasters o f the Albuquerque Police Department arrived at the 

scene of a traffic accident at a busy intersection. One of the 

vehicles involved in the accident remained disabled in the 

intersection, impeding the flow of traffic such that only one to 

two vehicles per traffic light could proceed, and several 

bystanders had gathere d around the intersection. While 

investigating the accident, Officer LeMasters' attention was 

dive rted by a car with heavily tinted windows. The driver was 

honking his horn incessantly, apparently in an effort to prompt 

the preceding driver to proceed through the congested 

intersection. Officer LeMasters testified that she approached the 

car in o rde r t o i nform the dri ver of the hazardous conditio ns and 

a dvise him t o r e frain from using his h o rn. As she approac hed the 

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car, the driver, King, ceased honking, partially rolled down his 

window, and apologized for the commotion claiming that he was 

merely trying to get through the intersection. Officer LeMasters 

then observed a nine millimeter pistol, with a clip inside the 

weapon, on the driver's seat, partially tucked under King's right 

thigh. State law permits motorists to carry loaded weapons, 

concealed or otherwise, in their vehicles. See N.M. Stat. Ann. 

§ 30-7-2(A) (2) (Michie Supp. 1992). Officer LeMasters also 

observed Burdex in the passenger seat whom she had not seen 

earlier due to the tinted windows. 

Upon observing the pistol on the front seat, Officer 

LeMasters drew her service revolver, pointed it at King, and 

ordered him to place his hands on the steering wheel, threatening 

to shoot him if he did not comply with her order. Officer 

LeMasters testified that, while she did not suspect Defendants of 

being engaged in any criminal activity, she took this action out 

of concern for the safety of herself and the bystanders, despite 

the fact that King had not made any threatening gesture or sudden 

movement. While holding her revolver on King, Officer LeMasters 

radioed for assistance. Within a minute, Officer Palone arrived, 

pulling her patrol car directly in front of King's car. Officer 

Palone ordered King to exit the vehicle while keeping his hands in 

view, and King complied. Defendant Burdex also exited the vehicle 

on the passenger side, despite having been ordered to remain in 

the car. Officer Armijo, who had also responded to the call for 

backup assistance, joined Officer LeMasters at the rear of King's 

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vehicle armed with a shotgun, and ordered Burdex onto a dirt area 

approximately twenty-five feet from the car, and she complied. 

Meanwhile, Officer Palone ordered King to move backwards and get 

down on his knees which he did. Officer LeMasters handcuffed 

King, while Officer Armijo removed the pistol from the front seat. 

As the officers were busy securing King, Burdex, who had 

moved into the dirt area at Officer Armijo's request, removed a 

bag from her pants and dropped it near a utility box. Two 

bystanders who observed the incident informed the officers which 

led Officer Armijo to retrieve a bag containing drugs. The 

officers advised Defendants that they were under arrest for drug 

possession, and a search incident to arrest uncovered $2,700 under 

the driver's side floor mat and $400 in King's boot . 

A federal grand jury indicted Defendants for various drug and 

1 

weapons offenses. Defendants moved to suppress the drugs, gun, 

money and statements as the fruit of an unlawful seizure of their 

persons. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court, 

recognizing that state law permitted motorists to carry loaded 

guns in their vehicles, see N . M . Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2 (A) (2 ) (Michie 

Supp . 1992), found that Officer LeMasters lacked a reasonable 

suspicion that Defendants were engaged in criminal activity 

thereby rendering their detention unlawful under Terry . The 

1 Defendants were charged with possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine base and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1 ) , 

(b ) (1) (B) , (b ) (1 ) (C) , and using and carrying a firearm during the 

commission of a drug trafficking offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1 ) . 

Burdex was also charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Id. § 922 (g) (1). 

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district court also found that the evidence was the fruit o f the 

unlawful detention, and therefore must be suppressed. 

II. 

At the outset, it is important to note the limited scope of 

the government's appeal. The government does not contest the 

district court's finding that Officer LeMasters lacked a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Accordingly, we 

express no opinion on whether a police officer's observation of an 

apparently loaded pistol partially tucked under a motorist's leg 

would support a reasonable suspicion that the motorist was engaged 

in criminal activity other than to note that the state law 

permitting motorists to carry guns in their vehicles, N.M. Stat . 

Ann. § 30-7-2 (A) (2 ) (Michie Supp. 1992), is not dispositive on 

the issue . See Reid v . Geo rgia, 448 U. S. 438, 442 (1980) (per 

curiam) ( "[W]holly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that 

criminal activity was afoot."). Rather, the government argues 

that Officer LeMasters' conduct must be judged under a 

reasonableness standard, and her conduct was reasonable in light 

of the circumstances. Because the government's challenge is 

limited to the proper legal standard and the reasonablene ss of the 

officer's conduct, our review is de novo. See United States v. 

Evans, 937 F . 2d 1534, 1536-37 (10th Cir. 1991) (" [U]ltimate 

determinations of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, and 

other questions of law, are reviewed de novo."). 

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A. 

"[T]he Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable 

. seizures' includes seizure of the person." California v. 

Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991) (citation omitted) . Of 

course, not all police-citizen encounters implicate the Fourth 

Amendment. See,~, Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 

574-76 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-21 (1984). See 

generally United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1450-56 (10th 

Cir. 1992). "[M]ere police questioning does not constitute a 

seizure . " Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). 

Moreover, '"law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 

Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in 

another public place '" Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 

U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plural ity opinion)). Rather, a person is 

seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when, considering all the 

surrounding circumstances, the police conduct "would have 

communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free 

to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the 

encounter." Id. at 2389. Applying this standard to the case 

before us, we have little doubt that both King and Burdex were 

seized when Officer LeMasters ordered King at gunpoint to place 

his hands on the steering wheel or else be shot as such conduct 

would communicate to both persons in the car that they were not 

free to decline Officer LeMasters' request or otherwise terminate 

the encounter. 

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Be that as it may, the protection of the Fourth Amendment 

does "not . .. guarantee against all . seizures, but only 

against unreasonable ... seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 

470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). Prior to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1967), Fourth Amendment seizures of the person were analyzed in 

terms of arrest, and reasonable only if supported by probable 

cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979). Terry 

was the first case to recognize that "the Fourth Amendment governs 

'seizures' of the person ... (other than] arrests," 392 U.S. at 

16, and created a "narrowly drawn 11 exception to the probable cause 

requirement for lesser government intrusions into an individual's 

liberty. Id. at 27. See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 499 ("Terry and 

its progeny ... created only limited exceptions to the general 

rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to 

arrest.") . 

In Terry, a police officer observed three men who appeared to 

be casing a store for an armed robbery . The officer approached 

the men and, believing they were armed, patted down their outer 

clothing, discovering that two of them were carrying guns, which 

led to concealed weapons charges. Narrowly framing the issue as 

"whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a 

person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless 

there is probable cause for an arrest," 392 U.S. at 15, the Court 

held: 

where a police officer observes unusual conduct which 

leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 

experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that 

the persons may be armed and presently dangerous . 

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he is entitled for the protection of himself and others 

in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the 

outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 

weapons which might be used to assault him. 

Id. at 30. Terry has come to stand for two distinct 

propositions--an investigative detention ( "stop") in which a 

police officer, for the purpose of investigation, may briefly 

detain a person on less than probable cause, see United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), and a protective search ( "frisk") 

which permits an officer, in the course of an investigative 

detention, to conduct a limited search for weapons for his or her 

own protection. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S . 143, 147-48 

(1972 ) . 

To determine whether an investigative detention or a 

protective search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 

inquiry is twofold. First, the officer's action must be 

"justified at its inception." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 . For an 

investigative detention, the officer must have an articulable and 

reasonable suspicion that the person detained is engaged in 

criminal activity. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 . For a protective 

search to be "justified at its inception," the officer must not 

only harbor an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the 

person is armed and dangerous, the officer must also be "entitled 

to make a forcible stop." Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-48 (footnote 

omitted). See also Terry, 392 U.S . at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) 

(if "a policeman has a right . .. to disarm a person for his own 

protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be 

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in his presence"); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal 

Procedure§ 3.8(e), at 307 (1984). 

The second prong of the reasonableness inquiry of either an 

investigative detention or a protective search is whether the 

officer's action is "reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place." Terry. 392 U.S. at 20. An investigative detention may be 

unreasonable because it is "a more serious intrusion on [one's] 

personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal 

activity." Royer, 460 U.S. at 502 (seizure of defendant, although 

supported by reasonable suspicion, was unreasonable where 

defendant was "as a practical matter. under arrest"). See 

also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) 

(ninety-minute detention of traveler's luggage unreasonable). But 

see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542-44 

(1985) (sixteen-hour detention of suspected alimentary canal 

smuggler at border not unreasonable); Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 

(twenty-minute detention not unreasonable when police act 

diligently and suspect's action contributed to delay). Similarly, 

a protective search may be unreasonable when it is not limited to 

ensuring that the suspect is not armed. See Sibron v. New York, 

392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (protective search for weapons unreasonable 

when officer reached inside defendant's pocket without first 

conducting initial limited exploration). Regardless of whether 

the inquiry focuses on an investigative detention or a protective 

search, the reasonableness of the officer's action necessarily 

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depends upon the justification for the action. Royer, 460 U.S. at 

500 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 

B. 

The district court analyzed this case as if it were an 

investigative detention. The court determined that Defendants 

were seized when Officer LeMasters ordered King at gunpoint to 

place his hands on the steering wheel , and found this seizure to 

violate the Fourth Amendment because Officer LeMasters lacked any 

reasonable suspicion that Defendants were engaged in criminal 

activity. In essence, the court held that the seizure was not 

"justified at its inception." 

1. 

The government's "reasonableness" argument suggests that 

Officer LeMasters' seizure of Defendants can be justified by her 

concern for the safety of herself and the bystanders due to her 

observation of the pistol within Defendants' immediate reach. As 

authority for its position, the government cites Pennsylvania v. 

Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977 ) (per curiam), wherein the Supreme Court 

held the Fourth Amendment does not preclude the police from 

ordering a legally detained motorist out of his vehicle, absent 

any suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 109-10 . In Mimms, police 

officers stopped the defendant's car due to an expired license 

plate. As part of their standard procedure, one of the officers 

ordered the defendant out of the car. As the defendant stepped 

from the car, the officer noticed a bulge under his jacket and 

immediately frisked the defendant, finding a loaded gun which led 

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to a concealed weapons charge. There was "no question" that the 

initial detention of the defendant due to the expired license 

plate was proper, id. at 109, and the Court had "little doubt" 

that the subsequent frisk of the defendant after the officers 

observed the bulge in his jacket was permissible. Id. at 111-12. 

In holding that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment 

by ordering the defendant out of the car without any 

particularized suspicion, the Supreme Court balanced the 

"important" interest of the officer's safety against the "de 

minimus" "intrusion into the driver's personal liberty 

occasioned ... by the order to get out of the car." Id. at 111. 

As the Court stated, "[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience 

cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the 

officer's safety. 11 Id. (footnote omitted). 

Mimms does support the government's suggestion that Officer 

LeMasters' seizure of Defendants was justified at its inception by 

her concern for the safety of herself and the bystanders due to 

the presence of the gun. In Mimms, the defendant was lawfully 

detained due to an expired license plate, and the de minimus 

intrusion in the interest of the officers' safety was reasonable 

partly because the police already had a basis to detain the 

individual. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. See also New York v . Class, 

475 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1986) (de minimus intrusion reasonable 

partly because probable cause had focused suspicion on the 

affected individual) . The government's argument would extend 

Mimms to allow police officers to seize any citizen whom the 

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officers have any articulable reason to believe presents a threat 

to their safety. In a state such as New Mexico, which permits 

persons to lawfully carry firearms, the government's argument 

would effectively eliminate Fourth Amendment protections for 

lawfully armed persons. Moreover, the government's 

"reasonableness" standard would render toothless the additional 

requirement that the scope and duration of detention be carefully 

tailored to its underlying justification. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; 

Ter:r::y. 392 U.S. at 20 . For example, if a police officer's safety 

could justify the detention of an otherwise lawfully armed person, 

the detention could last indefinitely because a lawfully armed 

person would perpetually present a threat to the safety of the 

officer. In short, while the safety of police officers is no 

doubt an important government interest, it can only justify a 

Fourth Amendment intrusion into a person's liberty "[s]o long as 

the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop . 11 Adams, 

407 U.S. at 146 (footnote omitted). See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 

32 (Harlan, J., concurring); 1 LaFave, supra, § 3.8(e). 

2 • 

While we cannot accept the government's attempt to justify 

the seizure of Defendants based on Officer LeMasters' safety 

concerns due to the presence of the pistol, neither can we accept 

the district court's application of the reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity s tandard to the facts of this case. The 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard presupposes an 

investigative purpose by the detaining offi cer. See, ~, Royer, 

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460 U.S. at 502 (defendant suspected of carrying drugs); United 

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (defendants 

suspected of being illegal aliens); Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23 

(defendants suspected of planning robbery). Officer LeMasters 

approached Defendants' car, not for any investigative purpose, but 

to alleviate what she perceived as a traffic hazard resulting from 

King's incessant honking at the intersection, 2 and she ordered 

King out of the car, again not for any investigative purpose, but 

to alleviate a perceived threat to the safety of herself and the 

bystanders due to the presence of the pistol. 

Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment "depends on a 

balance between the public interest and the individual's right to 

personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 

officers." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878. See also Terry. 392 

2 Relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Brower v. County 

of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), that a Fourth Amendment seizure 

occurs "only when there is a governmental termination of freedom 

of movement through means intentionally applied," id. at 597, King 

argues that Officer LeMasters' lack of subjective intention to 

seize Defendants, prior to her observation of the pistol, 

precludes any finding that Defendants were seized prior to the 

point Officer LeMasters drew her revolver. Brower does not add a 

police officer's subjective intention to the inquiry of whether a 

person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather, Brower 

stands merely for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does 

not address "the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government 

conduct." Id. at 596. Nonetheless, we agree that Defendants were 

not seized until Officer LeMasters drew her revolver because it 

was at this point that Officer LeMasters' conduct would 

communicate to a reasonable person that he or she was unable to 

terminate the encounter. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389. Be that as 

it may, the fact that Defendants were not seized until Officer 

LeMasters drew her revolver does not preclude us from considering 

circumstances prior to the seizure in determining the 

reasonableness of Officer LeMasters' conduct. See Montoya de 

Hernandez, 473 U.S. a t 537 (reasonableness inquiry must consider 

all of the surrounding circumstances). 

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U.S. at 21 (reasonableness determination balances "'need to ... 

[seize] against the invasion which the . [seizure] entails' ") 

(brackets in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 

U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)). Permitting investigative detentions on 

less than probable cause reflects a reasoned judgment by the 

Supreme Court that the governmental interest in effective crime 

prevention and detection outweighs minor intrusions into 

individual liberty occasioned by brief investigatory stops. See 

Terry. 392 U.S. at 22-23. See also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 

at 541 ( "The 'reasonable suspicion' standard ... effects a 

needed balance between private and public interests when law 

enforcement officials must make a limited intrusion on less than 

probable cause . " ) ; Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 ("The predicate 

permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that 

law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the 

personal security of the suspect."). However, when a police 

officer initiates an encounter with a person for a purpose other 

than to investigate criminal activity, the governmental interest 

in effective crime prevention and detection is irrelevant. See 

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (reasonableness inquiry must 

consider the nature of the seizure). 

"Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of 

purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to the desire to 

prosecute for crime." Terry. 392 U.S. at 13 (footnote omitted). 

See also I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 1 -1.l (c) at 18 

(2d ed. 1986) ("those aspects of police function that relate to 

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minimizing the likelihood of disorder ... are equal in their 

importance to the police function in identifying and punishing 

wrongdoers"}. Indeed, police officers are not only permitted, but 

expected, to exercise what the Supreme Court has termed "community 

caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, 

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 

violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 

433, 441 (1973). In the course of exercising this 

noninvestigatory function, a police officer may have occasion to 

seize a person, as the Supreme Court has defined the term for 

Fourth Amendment purposes, in order to ensure the safety of the 

public and/or the individual, regardless of any suspected criminal 

activity. See,~' United States v. Rideau, 949 F.2d 718, 720 

(5th Cir. 1991) (officers stopped defendant for his own safety and 

the safety of others after observing him standing in the middle of 

the road at night, dressed in dark clothes, and apparently 

intoxicated}, vacated on other grounds, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 

1992) (en bane} (agreeing with panel on this point}; United States 

v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 1989) (officers detained 

defendant for his own safety after being informed that he 

possessed gun and had threatened suicide}, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 

1006 (1990). The fact that the officer may not suspect the 

individual of criminal activity does not render such a seizure 

unreasonable per seas Terry only requires "specific and 

articulable facts which ... reasonably warrant [an] intrusion" 

into the individual's liberty. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 . See also 

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Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1574; Wallace, 889 F.2d at 582. Cf. State v. 

Vistuba, 840 P.2d 511, 514 (Kan . 1992 ) (safety reasons based on 

specific, articulable facts may justify vehicle stop) ; State v. 

Marcello, 599 A.2d 357, 358 (Vt. 1991 ) (same); State v. Pinkham, 

565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1989); State v. Oxley. 503 A.2d 756, 759 

( N • H . 19 8 9 ) ( same ) . 

However, a person's Fourth Amendment rights are not 

eviscerated simply because a police officer may be acting in a 

noninvestigatory capacity for "[i]t is surely anomalous to say 

that the individual [is] fully protected by the Fourth 

Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal 

behavior. " Camara, 387 U. S . at 530 (footnote omitted) . Whether 

the seizure of a person by a police officer acting in his or her 

noninvestigatory capacity is reasonable depends on whether it is 

based on specific articulable facts and requires a reviewing court 

to balance the governmental interest in the police officer's 

exercise of his or her "community caretaking function" and the 

individual's interest in being free from arbitrary government 

interference . See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878; Terry, 392 

U.S . at 21. 

In the present case, Officer LeMasters was clearly exercising 

her " c ommunity caretaking function" when she approached 

Defendants' car during the course of her investigation of a 

vehicle accident. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 441 (investigation of 

vehicle accidents is within police officers' community caretaking 

function ). King's honking at the accident site created an 

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specific, articulable basis for Officer LeMasters to believe that 

he might cause a second accident. Accordingly, Officer LeMasters 

was justified in approaching Defendants' car and could have 

briefly detained Defendants in order to inform King of the 

hazardous conditions and to advise him to cease honking, 

3 regardless of whether King's actions violated any traffic laws. 

In balancing the respective Fourth Amendment interests, we note 

that Defendants were already detained at the intersection, not by 

Officer LeMasters, but by the congested traffic conditions due to 

the disabled vehicle in the intersection. Therefore, Defendants' 

Fourth Amendment interest is limited to the "incremental" 

intrusion of being required to listen to Officer LeMasters while 

stuck in traffic. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; Walker, 941 F.2d at 

1089. On the other hand, the governmental interest in 

investigating accidents and ensuring the public safety at accident 

sites, while perhaps not compelling, is one we have come to expect 

from local police officers and is sufficiently important to 

outweigh the relatively minor intrusions on motorists, who are 

already stuck in traffic and whose conduct arguably creates a 

hazard. Under the facts of this case, Officer LeMasters had a 

reasonable and articulable basis to briefly detain King in order 

to advise him to cease honking his horn. 

3 Had King violated a traffic law, Officer LeMasters would 

certainly have had grounds to detain Defendants. See Mimms, 434 

U.S. at 109; United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 731 (10th Cir. 

1992). However, the government does not argue that King's honking 

violated any law. 

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When Officer LeMasters observed a pistol within Defendants' 

immediate reach, she escalated the encounter into a seizure, again 

not for an investigative purpose, but to alleviate a perceived 

threat to the safety of herself and the bystanders. At this 

point, King was in substantially the same position as the 

defendant in Mimms. The officers in Mimms ordered the defendant 

out of his car, prior to observing the bulge in his jacket, as a 

matter of routine procedure in order to ensure their safety during 

the traffic stop. Here, Officer LeMasters saw the pistol before 

ordering King out of the car. Thus, her concern for her safety 

was based on specific articulable facts, making the justification 

for ordering King out of the car even more critical than that 

presented by the officers in Mimms. 

Officer LeMasters' observation of an apparently loaded pistol 

within Defendants' immediate reach would justify her separation of 

Defendants from the pistol in order to ensure her own safety 

during the encounter. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S . 1032, 1049 

(1983 ) (permitting limited search of passenger compartment of 

lawfully detained automobile and seizure of any weapon found based 

on reasonable suspicion that driver is dangerous and may gain 

control of a weapon); Adams, 407 U.S. at 147- 48 (permitting 

limited search of lawfully detained person's outer clothing and 

seizure of any weapon found based on reasonable suspicion that 

person is armed) ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (same ) . The governmental 

interest in the safety of police officers outweighs the 

individual's Fourth Amendment interest when an officer has an 

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objective basis to believe that the person being lawfully detained 

is armed and dangerous. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1 051; Terry. 392 

U.S. at 23-24. Moreover, Defendants' lawful possession of the 

pistol has no bearing on the reasonableness of Officer LeMasters' 

actions because the interest justifying her separation of 

Defendants from the pistol is her safety, and a legally possessed 

weapon presents just as great a danger to her safety as an illegal 

one. Long, 463 U. S. at 1052 n.16; Adams, 407 U.S . at 146 . 

In short, Officer LeMasters had not yet advi sed King of the 

hazardous conditions his honking created, which she was entitled 

to do, when she observed an apparently loaded pistol within the 

immediate reach of both him and his passenger. Officer LeMasters 

was entitled to separate Defendants from the pistol by ordering 

them out of the car for the duration of her advisement. Officer 

LeMasters had an articulable safety reason justifying the initial 

intrusio n, and any additional intrusion in asking Defendants to 

exit the car could "only be described as de minimus." Mimms, 434 

U.S. at 111 . To h old otherwise , would "' unreasonab [ly] [] require 

that p olice officers take unnecessary risks in the performance o f 

their duties.'" Id. at 110 (quoting Terry. 392 U. S. at 2 3) . 

C. 

Having found that Officer LeMasters' detention of Defendants 

was justified at its inception and that Officer LeMasters could, 

in the course o f the detention, separate Defendants from the 

pistol, our inquiry now turns to whether Officer LeMasters' action 

was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 

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justified the interference in the first place. 114 Terry, 392 U.S . 

at 20. See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. On this point, the 

government's reliance on Mimms is misplaced. In Mimms, a critical 

factor was the "de minimus" intrusion on the defendant's liberty 

resulting from the officer's request to step out of the car during 

the course of a traffic stop which the Court considered nothing 

more than a "mere inconvenience." Id. See also Maryland v. Buie, 

494 U.S. 325, 335 n.2 (1990); Class, 475 U.S. at 117. Here, 

Officer LeMasters drew her gun and pointed it at King, threatening 

to shoot him if he did not comply with her order. Her call for 

backup assistance led other officers to encircle Defendants' car 

with weapons drawn. Officer Palone ordered King to his knees, and 

Officer LeMasters handcuffed him after both Defendants were 

separated from the pistol and no longer presented a threat to the 

safety of any of the officers or bystanders. This level of 

governmental intrusion on Defendants' liberty is not remotely 

similar to ordering a motorist to step out of his car and can 

hardly be considered "de minimus" or a "mere inconvenience. " See 

United States v . Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1991) 

4 Although the district court did n o t address this issue 

because it held that the seizure was not justified at its 

inception, we must uphold the district court's ultimate ruling "if 

there is any reasonable vie w of the evidence to support it." 

United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1989). See 

also United States v . Morgan, 936 F .2d 1561, 1565 (10th Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1190 (1992). Given that the 

evidentiary record before us is well developed, and the "ultimate 

determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment" is a 

question of law, United States v. Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1090 

(10th Cir. 1991) , cer t. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1992) , we see no 

purpose in remanding to the district court for resolution of this 

issue . 

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(officer's additional questioning of lawfully detained motorist 

concerning drugs was not "mere inconvenience"), cert. denied, 112 

S. Ct. 1168 (1992). Cf. Class, 475 U.S. at 117 (reaching inside 

car to remove papers obstructing VIN was de minimus intrusion). 

Whether Officer LeMasters' seizure of Defendants was 

reasonably related in scope to its justification must focus on 

whether the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was 

appropriate. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. There are no "bright 

line" rules in assessing whether Officer LeMasters' conduct was 

reasonably related in scope to its justification; rather, our 

evaluation is guided by "conunon sense and ordinary human 

experience." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685. See also Montoya de 

Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544 (no "hard and fast time limits" on 

Terry stop before it becomes an arrest). While police officers 

are not required to use the least intrusive means in the course of 

a detention, we must determine whether Officer LeMasters' failure 

to use less intrusive means was unreasonable. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 

686 - 87. 

Notwithstanding our reluctance to "indulge in 'unrealistic 

second-guessing'" of police officers in determining whether a 

seizure was reasonably related in scope to its justification, 

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S . at 542 (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 

64 6) , we hold that Officer LeMasters' failure to use less 

intrusive means to ensure her safety while advising King to cease 

honking was unreasonable . The traffic hazard King presented, 

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which was the basis for the detention, was alleviated when King 

ceased honking and explained himself prior to Officer LeMasters' 

observation of the pistol; nonetheless, Officer LeMasters had the 

right to explain the situation to King and ensure that he would 

not continue to present a traffic hazard. Once she saw the gun, 

Officer LeMasters could separate Defendants from the gun for her 

own safety by ordering Defendants out of the car. However, 

Officer LeMasters' conduct, as noted above , went far beyond what 

was necessary to ensure her safety while advising Defendants of 

the hazardous traffic conditions . Officer LeMasters initiated 

what was essentially an arrest procedure . 5 See United States v. 

Maez , 872 F.2d 1444, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1989 ) (defendants were 

effectively arrested when police surrounded house and ordered them 

to come out). Under the facts presented here, Officer LeMasters' 

conduct was not "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 

which justified the interference in the first place , " Terry. 392 

U.S . at 20, and went far beyond what was necessary to protect her 

5 In a state, other than New Mexico, where it is illegal to 

transport firearms in the passenger compartment of a car, Office r 

LeMasters, upon observing the pistol, would have had probable 

cause to arrest Defendants, and, therefo re, her actions would have 

been reasonable . 

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safety. 6 Accordingly, the seizure of Defendants was unreasonable 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

III. 

Having determined that Officer LeMasters' detention of 

Defendants was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we turn to 

the question of whether the drugs which were discarded by Burdex 

were the fruit of the unlawful detention. In determining whether 

evidence discovered by the police following a Fourth Amendment 

violation is "fruit of the poisonous tree" and therefore subject 

to the exclusionary rule, the question is "whether, granting 

establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which the 

instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 

illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 

purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 

471, 488 (1963) (quotations omitted). Because the issue is fact 

intensive, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S . 590, 603-04 (1975); United 

States v. Ward, 961 F . 2d 1526, 153 5 (10th Cir. 1992), we review 

the district court's finding under a clearly erroneous standard. 

The government contends that Burdex voluntarily abandoned the 

drugs, and this act was a sufficient intervening circumstance to 

6 In United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1982 ) , 

cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983), we held that the fact that 

officers approached the defendant with guns drawn and pointed at 

him did not render the investigative detention unreasonable. Id. 

at 1273. In Merritt, the officer's actions were reasonable in 

light of the officer's suspicion that the defendant was an armed 

and dangerous murder suspect. Id. at 1274. In contrast, we 

consider similar actions by Officer LeMasters to be unreasonable 

because the j ustification for the detention was merely to ensure 

her safety while advising a lawfully armed motorist to cease 

honking his horn . 

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purge the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation. In determining 

whether "the evidence to which the instant objection is made has 

been come at by exploitation of th[e] illegality or instead by 

means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 

taint," Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, several factors guide our 

inquiry including the "temporal proximity" of the Fourth Amendment 

violation and Burdex's discarding of the evidence, any 

"intervening circumstances," and "the purpose and flagrancy of the 

official misconduct." Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04 (citations and 

footnotes omitted). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 

218 (1979). Moreover, when, as here, the government asserts that 

an act by the defendant purges the taint of the illegality, the 

voluntariness of the defendant's act is a "threshold requirement." 

Brown, 422 U.S. at 604. See also Ward, 961 F.2d at 1535 ("[W]hen 

an alleged abandonment follows a Fourth Amendment violation, the 

issue is whether the abandonment of property was voluntary . " ) . 

Considering these factors, we cannot say that the district 

court's finding that the drugs were the fruit of the unlawful 

detention is clearly erroneous. Given that Burdex discarded the 

drugs during the course of the unlawful seizure, and Officer 

Armijo almost immediately retrieved the drugs after being alerted 

by a bystander, the "temporal proximity" between the Fourth 

Amendment violation and Burdex's discarding of the evidence weighs 

heavily in support of a finding that the drugs were the fruit of 

the unlawful seizure. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 (confession 

which came two hours after illegal arrest held to be fruit); Wong 

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Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 (statement made immediately after unlawful 

arrest held to be fruit). Moreover, Officer LeMasters' conduct 

here came very close to approaching an arrest for which there was 

no probable cause; thus, "the flagrancy of the official 

misconduct" also weighs in favor of a finding that the drugs were 

the fruit of an unlawful seizure. 

Furthermore, we disagree with the government's suggestion 

that Burdex's act of discarding the drugs constituted a voluntary 

abandonment which is a sufficient intervening circumstance to 

purge the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation. A confession 

by a defendant during an illegal detention is not an intervening 

circumstance which purges the taint of a Fourth Amendment 

violation. See Dunaway. 442 U. S. at 219; Brown, 422 U.S. at 6 04. 

Likewise, '" [a]bandonment will not be recognized when it is the 

result of illegal police conduct . 1117 Ward, 961 F.2d at 1535 

(quoting United States v . Brady. 842 F.2d 1313, 1315 n . 7 (D. C. 

Cir. 1988 )) . In United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 

1974 ) , two containers holding marijuana fell out of the back of 

the defendants' truck as they unexpectedly drove off during an 

7 The government's reliance on California v. Hodari D., 111 S. 

Ct. 1547 (1 991) , United States v . Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 

1991) , cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1190 (1992), and United States v. 

Jone s, 7 0 7 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. ) , cert. denied, 4 6 4 U.S. 859 

(1983 ) , i s misplaced because in these cases, the items seized were 

abandoned prior to any unlawful seizure of the defendants. 

Because the defendants were not unlawfully seized prior to 

discovery of the evidence which the defendants sought to suppress, 

none o f these cases considered whether the defendants' acts in 

abandoning the evidence were "sufficiently a product of free will 

t o break ... the causal conne ction between the illegality" and 

t he discovery o f the evidence . Brown, 422 U.S. at 590. 

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unlawful search. We held that the initial illegal intrusion 

"tainted all subsequent events leading to the ultimate seizure of 

the marijuana," and therefore "contraband evidence was 

inadmissible as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" Id. at 995. 

Similarly, in United States v . Borcich, 460 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 

1972), the defendants were unlawfully seized on a remote highway. 

One of the defendants was ordered to drive his truck between the 

two police cars to the nearest city which was over 100 miles away. 

As they approached the city, the defendant driving the truck threw 

a small container from the window, which the officers recovered 

and found to contain marijuana. We held that the marijuana was 

the fruit of the illegal detention, and that the primary taint had 

not been purged by the considerable lapse of time during the 100 

mile journey. Id. at 1394. See also United States v. Beck, 602 

F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant's discarding of marijuana 

cigarette upon being unlawfully seized was not voluntary 

abandonment sufficient to purge taint). In short, it was not 

clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Burdex's 

discarding of the drugs during the course of the unlawful 

detention was not "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 

primary taint of the unlawful invasion. " Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 

486 (suppressing defendant's statement immediately following 

illegal arrest). 

AFFIRMED. 

Judge Anderson concurs in the judgment only. 

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