Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00910/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00910-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Sonja Lynn Vincent
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SONJA LYNN VINCENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0910-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social 

Security Act (“Act”).1 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Commissioner

opposed while simultaneously filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 17, 22, 

23.) No optional reply brief was filed by plaintiff.

For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRMS 

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(15), and both 

parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. 

(ECF Nos. 7, 9.) 

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the Commissioner’s final decision. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on September 9, 1969; she has a high school education; her previous 

occupations include cook, assistant manager of a burger restaurant, caregiver, and cashier; and 

she last worked in December 2010 as a cashier.

2

 (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 44-46.) 

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI benefits on April 18, 2011, alleging that her disability began on 

December 16, 2010, and that she was disabled due to bipolar disorder and chronic back pain.

3

 

(AT 102-03, 217-29, 234.) After plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on 

reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took 

place on April 3, 2013. (AT 147-52, 155-71, 172-76.) In a decision dated June 17, 2013, the ALJ 

found plaintiff not disabled. (AT 20-38.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on November 25, 

2014. (AT 5-9.) The Appeals Council subsequently granted plaintiff an extension of time to seek

judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (AT 1-3.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action 

in federal district court on April 27, 2015, to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final 

decision. (ECF No. 1.)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether the ALJ improperly evaluated the 

opinions of the treating physicians; (2) whether the ALJ erroneously failed to consider plaintiff’s 

assessed mental limitations; and (3) whether the ALJ improperly failed to credit plaintiff’s and 

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

3

Plaintiff filed both DIB and SSI applications, but the ALJ’s decision did not reference the DIB 

application. (AT 23.) Neither party asserts prejudicial error, and the court likewise finds none. 

The standard for disability is essentially the same for purposes of DIB and SSI claims. 

Furthermore, to be eligible for DIB, plaintiff had to prove disability prior to June 30, 2015, the 

date she was last insured. (AT 213.) Because the ALJ considered evidence from the entire period 

from plaintiff’s alleged onset date of December 16, 2010, through June 17, 2013, the date of the 

ALJ’s decision, and found plaintiff not disabled, the omission in itself was harmless and does not 

warrant remand.

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third parties’ testimony regarding the nature and impact of plaintiff’s functional limitations.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to disability benefits pursuant to the 

Commissioner’s standard five-step analytical framework. 4 At the first step, the ALJ concluded 

 

4 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, 

in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

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that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 18, 2011, the SSI 

application date. (AT 25.) At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following 

severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bipolar disorder, and 

posttraumatic stress disorder. (Id.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 26.)

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) 

except she can occasionally lift/carry, push/pull 20 pounds and 10 pounds frequently; she 

could stand/walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, with 

normal breaks. She can perform unskilled, simple repetitive tasks.

(AT 27.) At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work. 

(AT 31.)

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined 

in the Act, since April 18, 2011, the date the SSI application was filed. (AT 32.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

(1) Whether the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of the treating physicians

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 

1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, 

 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s opinion, and an 

examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a non-examining physician’s opinion. 

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202. 

To evaluate whether an ALJ property rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons. Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion 

generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining 

professional’s opinion (supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may 

resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The regulations require the ALJ to weigh the 

contradicted treating physician opinion, Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157,5except that the ALJ in any 

event need not give it any weight if it is conclusory and supported by minimal clinical findings. 

Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, minimally 

supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a nonexamining professional, by itself, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining 

professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

a. Dr. Birtha Balcazar, M.D.

In March 2013, treating physician Dr. Balcazar completed a physical evaluation form 

assessing plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities, which included the following limitations: 

plaintiff could lift/carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and under 10 pounds frequently; could 

stand/walk for 3 hours during an 8-hour day with normal breaks; could sit for 3 hours during an 

8-hour day with normal breaks; could sit for 20 minutes and stand for 10-15 minutes before 

 

5

The factors include: (1) length of the treatment relationship; (2) frequency of examination; (3) 

nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) supportability of diagnosis; (5) consistency; 

and (6) specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. 

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changing position; had to walk around for 5-10 minutes every 60 minutes; needed the opportunity 

to shift at will between sitting and standing/walking; and needed to lie down about twice a day 

during a work shift. (AT 575-76.) Dr. Balcazar opined that plaintiff could occasionally twist and 

climb stairs, but could never stoop, bend, crouch, or climb ladders. (AT 576-77.) Additionally,

plaintiff could push or pull only up to 10 pounds and would have difficulty balancing. (AT 577.) 

Dr. Balcazar then opined that plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and 

cold, wetness, humidity, noise and fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation, and should

avoid moderate exposure to hazards including machinery and heights. (Id.) Overall, Dr. Balcazar 

opined that plaintiff could not work 8 hours per day, 5 days a week with legally allowed rest 

periods and lunch breaks at the normal pace for plaintiff’s type of work, and that plaintiff’s 

impairments would cause her to be absent from work more than three times a month. (AT 578.) 

For the reasons outlined below, the court finds that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. 

Balcazar’s opinion.

First, the ALJ noted inconsistencies between Dr. Balcazar’s assessment and the medical 

evidence. (AT 30.) Indeed, Dr. Balcazar’s severe opinion conflicted with her own relatively 

minimal clinical findings. At plaintiff’s first medical examination with Dr. Balcazar in 

September 2012, the physician observed that plaintiff was alert with no acute distress, had partial 

amputation of the right big toe and full amputation of the right second toe, had calluses on the 

right foot, and was stepping more on the lateral side of the right foot to compensate for missing 

toes. (AT 561.) At her second visit with Dr. Balcazar in November 2012, Dr. Balcazar again 

noted plaintiff to be alert with no acute distress, and added that plaintiff had a somewhat antalgic 

gait due to back pain and was somewhat stiff. (AT 542-43.) Two months later, in January 2013, 

Dr. Balcazar once again noted that plaintiff was alert with no acute distress, and added that she 

appeared ambulatory and had only mild paralumbar tenderness on palpation. (AT 539-40.)

Second, the ALJ also noted that plaintiff’s activities of daily living were inconsistent with 

Dr. Balcazar’s assessment:

She is able to care for her personal needs. She prepares simple 

meals, does household chores, and scrubs the shower, vacuums, 

does laundry, and shops for clothing and food. She goes out every 

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day by walking. She walks 20-40 minutes a day. She also takes 

public transportation. She goes to the park with her friends. She 

went camping and was able to sleep in a sleeping bag. The 

claimant also stated she was traveling to Washington for 

Thanksgiving to see her daughter. 

(AT 29-30, 251-56.) 

Third, Dr. Balcazar’s opinion was inconsistent with plaintiff’s own testimony that she 

would likely still be working were it not for the alleged harassment she had endured from her 

manager at her prior job. (AT 30, 48.)

Finally, Dr. Balcazar’s opinion is inconsistent with the opinion of consultative examining 

physician Dr. John Chang, M.D. Dr. Chang completed an orthopedic consultation on November 

4, 2011, where he noted the following: plaintiff was in no acute or chronic distress; was able to 

move about the office freely without assistance; was able to get on and off the examination table 

as needed; could assume a supine position without any assistance or difficulty and was in 

apparent comfort throughout the evaluation; had normal posture and gait; had no discernable 

limitation in any plane of the cervical spine; had forward flexion of 70 degrees along lower 

lumbar region of the lower back, but otherwise was within normal limits; had tightness in the 

right hamstring and right heel cord; had no evidence of swelling, effusion, or deformity of any 

joint; and had normal muscle strength, sensation, and reflexes. (AT 378-79.) 

Based on his examination, Dr. Chang opined that plaintiff had the following functional 

limitations: she could push, pull, lift, and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds 

frequently; she could stand up to 6 hours per day; she did not require an assistive device for 

ambulation; she could frequently bend, kneel, stoop, crawl, crouch, walk on uneven terrain, climb 

ladders, and work at heights; and she could sit without restriction. (AT 379.) Because Dr. Chang 

personally examined plaintiff and made independent clinical findings, his opinion constitutes 

substantial evidence on which the ALJ was entitled to rely.

In light of the above, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Balcazar’s opinion.

b. Dr. Herbert Monie, M.D.

On May 20, 2011, Dr. Monie completed a medical source assessment of functional 

capacity on plaintiff’s behalf. (AT 339-41.) He opined the following physical limitations: 

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plaintiff could lift/carry less than 10 pounds occasionally and frequently; could stand and/or walk 

for less than 2 hours total during an 8-hour day; could sit for less than 6 hours total in an 8-hour 

day; was restricted on a frequent basis from climbing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, and 

crawling; could push 20 pounds frequently and 30 pounds occasionally, but could only pull 20 

pounds occasionally. (AT 340-41.) He recommended that plaintiff avoid concentrated exposure 

to extreme heat, wetness, and humidity; avoid moderate exposure to extreme cold, dusts, poor 

ventilation, noise, and vibrations; and avoid all exposure to hazards including machinery and 

heights. (AT 341.) He opined that these limitations would persist for many years, likely for

plaintiff’s entire lifetime. (Id.)

For the reasons outlined below, the court finds that the ALJ reasonably discounted treating 

physician Dr. Monie’s opinion as to physical limitations. 

First, much of Dr. Monie’s opinion relied heavily on plaintiff’s subjective reports and was 

not supported by any significant objective findings. (AT 31.) To support his May 2011 physical 

assessment, Dr. Monie referenced plaintiff’s amputated toes, recent hernia surgery, and lower 

back pain. (AT 340.) The ALJ found that those were “too few objective results” to support the 

severity of the limitations, and, given the lack of any further explanation or rationale, correctly 

accorded the opinion little weight. 

Second, Dr. Monie’s severe opinion was inconsistent with his own treatment records 

documenting mostly mild clinical findings. (AT 31.) At the first examination on March 11, 

2011, Dr. Monie noted plaintiff was alert and in no acute distress, was able to walk up and down 

stairs, was sitting up with no discomfort, and had normal gait and balance. (AT 327.) At 

plaintiff’s follow-up appointment on March 25, 2011, Dr. Monie noted plaintiff appeared wellnourished, well-developed and in no apparent distress. (AT 322-23.) Once again, on April 1, 

2011, Dr. Monie noted that plaintiff was alert in no acute distress, had normal gait and balance, 

and a labile mood with a normal affect. (AT 320.) On two more occasions, April 11, 2011, and 

April 22, 2011, Dr. Monie noted that plaintiff was alert, was in no acute distress, had normal gait 

and balance, and had a normal affect. (AT 314, 317.) Curiously, despite these mild findings and 

the fact that Dr. Monie had only treated plaintiff for about two months, he nonetheless opined that 

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plaintiff’s assessed limitations began 31⁄2 years prior and would probably persist for plaintiff’s 

entire lifetime. (AT 341.) 

Third, Dr. Monie’s opinion is inconsistent with the opinion of examining physician Dr. 

Chang, as discussed above, which is well-supported by Dr. Chang’s own clinical findings and 

accompanying medical rationale.

As such, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Monie’s opinion concerning plaintiff’s physical 

limitations. 

On May 20, 2011, Dr. Monie also completed a short-form evaluation for mental disorders 

and diagnosed plaintiff with affective psychosis and PTSD. (AT 342-45.) He assessed the 

following mental status: well-groomed; normal motor activity; normal speech; cooperative; very 

verbal when upset, but directable and not out of control; orientated in all spheres; intact 

concentration; normal memory; below average education because of concentration problems; 

anxious, depressed and angry mood with labile affect; and dislike of riding in cars, sneezing, 

coughing or touching money due to germ phobia. (AT 343-45.) Dr. Monie opined that plaintiff 

had a good ability to perform activities within a schedule and maintain regular attendance; had a

fair ability to understand, remember and carry out simple and complex instructions; and had a

poor ability to maintain concentration, complete a normal workday/workweek without 

interruptions, and respond appropriately to changes in a work setting. (AT 345.)

For the reasons outlined below, the court finds that the ALJ properly gave Dr. Monie’s 

mental opinion little weight. 

First, Dr. Monie’s severe findings are not supported by the limited treatment history. 

Notably, on the same date that Dr. Monie completed the evaluation form assessing disabling 

mental limitations, his treatment notes merely indicate that plaintiff was alert, oriented, and in no 

acute distress, with a normal affect and a stable mood. (AT 402.) Moreover, his treatment notes 

from over the approximately 2 months of treatment likewise document largely mild mental

clinical findings. (AT 314, 317, 322-23, 327.) 

Second, Dr. Monie’s opinion is inconsistent with the opinion of consultative examining 

psychologist Dr. Miles White. Dr. White completed a comprehensive psychological evaluation 

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on November 22, 2011, where he noted the following: plaintiff was coherent and organized; her 

thought content was linear, focused, and non-delusional; her mood was calm, though generally 

dysthymic and anxious, and her affect was stable; her speech was normal; she was fully oriented; 

and her ability to communicate and process in the abstract was unimpaired. (AT 433-34.) 

Overall, Dr. White found that plaintiff’s insight was mildly impaired because she tended to 

exaggerate and overestimate the degree of severity of her psychological symptoms. (AT 435.) 

Dr. White opined that plaintiff had no impairments in her ability to understand, remember, and 

carry out simple one or two-step job instructions; mild impairments in her ability to relate and 

interact with co-workers and the public, accept instructions from supervisors, and perform work 

activities without special or additional supervision; and moderate impairments in her ability to 

perform detailed and complex instructions, maintain concentration/attention/persistence/pace,

associate with day-to-day work activity including attendance and safety, and maintain regular 

attendance in the workplace and perform work activities on a consistent basis. (AT 436.) Dr. 

White, a mental health specialist, personally examined plaintiff and made independent clinical 

findings, and his opinion thus constitutes substantial evidence on which the ALJ was entitled to 

rely. 

In light of the above, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Monie’s opinion concerning 

plaintiff’s mental limitations.

c. Dr. Okechukwu Nwangburuka, M.D.

Plaintiff also submitted to the Appeals Council a mental capacity opinion by a Dr. 

Nwangburuka, dated September 13, 2013, which assessed various serious and disabling mental 

limitations. (AT 39-40.) The Appeals Council ostensibly refused to consider this new evidence 

because it post-dated the ALJ’s June 17, 2013 decision, and did not relate to the relevant period 

under review. (AT 6.) 

Generally speaking, “when the Appeals Council considers new evidence in deciding 

whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record, 

which the district court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision for 

substantial evidence.” Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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Here, the court has considered Dr. Nwangburuka’s opinion along with the record as a whole, but 

ultimately concludes that no prejudicial error occurred.

As an initial matter, the court cannot find that the Appeals Council erred in determining 

that Dr. Nwangburuka’s opinion did not relate to the relevant period under review. To be sure, 

the mere fact that the opinion post-dates the ALJ’s decision is not dispositive. For example, an 

opinion by a physician who treated a claimant over an extended period of time, including during 

the relevant period, may well relate to the relevant period even if the opinion itself post-dates the 

ALJ’s decision. However, in this case, there is no indication in Dr. Nwangburuka’s opinion that 

he treated plaintiff during the relevant period. The opinion itself is merely dated September 13, 

2013, and does not purport to assess plaintiff’s mental health retroactively. (AT 39-40.) 

Moreover, even assuming, without deciding, that Dr. Nwangburuka’s opinion could be 

said to relate to the relevant period, it is entirely conclusory and minimally supported. Dr. 

Nwangburuka does not cite a single objective clinical finding in support of his opinion, and all 

portions of the form that invite explanation were left blank. As such, the court finds it 

implausible that the Appeals Council or the ALJ would have rendered a different decision had 

they considered the substance of Dr. Nwangburuka’s opinion. 

Consequently, the Appeals Council’s failure to consider Dr. Nwangburuka’s opinion does 

not warrant remand.

(2) Whether the ALJ erroneously failed to consider plaintiff’s assessed mental limitations

As noted above, consultative examiner Dr. White opined that plaintiff had no impairments 

in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple one or two-step job instructions; mild 

impairments in her ability to relate and interact with co-workers and the public, accept 

instructions from supervisors, and perform work activities without special or additional 

supervision; and moderate impairments in her ability to perform detailed and complex 

instructions, maintain concentration/attention/persistence/pace, associate with day-to-day work 

activity including attendance and safety, and maintain regular attendance in the workplace and 

perform work activities on a consistent basis. (AT 436.) Non-examining state agency 

psychologist, Dr. Hillary Weiss, likewise assessed certain moderate mental limitations. (AT 138-

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39.) On appeal, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC fails to account for those assessed mental

limitations. That argument lacks merit. 

The Ninth Circuit has observed that an ALJ may synthesize and translate assessed 

limitations into an RFC assessment without repeating each functional limitation verbatim in the 

RFC assessment. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (defining RFC as “the most you can still do despite your limitations”). In 

this case, plaintiff’s assessed RFC appears to adequately capture the assessed moderate mental 

limitations. Notably, a position involving unskilled, simple, repetitive tasks would logically 

require less concentration and implicate less difficulties with persistence and pace, which may in 

turn have impacted attendance and performance of work on a consistent basis, thereby addressing 

plaintiff’s moderate limitations in those areas. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (holding 

that an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, 

persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical 

testimony). 

Moreover, the ALJ’s failure to specifically include the above limitations was harmless, 

because the Ninth Circuit has already held that moderate mental limitations do not even require 

vocational expert testimony. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007). In Hoopai, 

a medical source determined that the claimant was moderately limited in “his ability to maintain 

attention and concentration for extended periods; his ability to perform activities within a 

schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual with customary tolerance; and his ability 

to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruption from psychologically-based 

symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 

periods.” Id. After the ALJ utilized the Grids at step five to determine that the claimant was not 

disabled, plaintiff contended on appeal that the ALJ was required to seek vocational expert 

testimony regarding the limitations assessed. Id. at 1075. The Ninth Circuit rejected this 

argument, holding that those moderate limitations were not sufficiently severe to prohibit the ALJ 

from relying on the Grids without the assistance of a vocational expert. Id. at 1077.

Therefore, plaintiff’s mental limitations were properly considered. 

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(3) Whether the ALJ improperly failed to credit plaintiff’s and third parties’ testimony

regarding the nature and impact of plaintiff’s functional limitations 

In Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged. 

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. . . .

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “At the same time, the 

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would 

be available for the asking....” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959.

////

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To the extent that the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony regarding her symptoms and 

functional limitations, the ALJ provided several specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing 

so.

The ALJ permissibly found that plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the medical 

evidence, as properly weighed. Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for 

discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, it is nevertheless a relevant factor for the 

ALJ to consider. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ also properly noted that plaintiff’s treatment was generally routine and 

conservative, with mostly routine checkups and no evidence of specialized care, such as 

orthopedic care for plaintiff’s amputated toes. (AT 28.) See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence of conservative treatment is 

sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment”). 

Substantial evidence further supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s daily activities 

were inconsistent with her allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (AT 29-30, 251-

56.) “While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the 

ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday 

activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting....Even where those activities 

suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 

testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 

674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly considered claimant’s ability to care for her own needs, 

cook, clean, shop, interact with her nephew and boyfriend, and manage her finances and those of 

her nephew in the credibility analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in 

the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit 

the claimant’s credibility). 

Here, as discussed above, plaintiff was able to care for personal needs, make meals, do 

household chores, scrub the shower, vacuum, do laundry, and grocery shop; she walked 20-40 

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minutes every day, took public transportation, and went to the park with friends; she camped and 

was able to sleep in a sleeping bag; and she made plans to travel to Washington to visit her 

daughter. (AT 29-30, 251-56.) To be sure, the record also contains some contrary evidence

suggesting that plaintiff’s activities are more limited. However, it is the function of the ALJ to 

resolve any ambiguities, and the court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be reasonable and supported 

by substantial evidence. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 

ALJ’s credibility determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal 

about how regularly she was able to keep up with all of the activities and noting that the ALJ’s 

interpretation “may not be the only reasonable one”). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

It may well be that a different judge, evaluating the same evidence, 

would have found [the claimant’s] allegations of disabling pain 

credible. But, as we reiterate in nearly every case where we are 

called upon to review a denial of benefits, we are not triers of fact. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ...Where, as 

here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to 

second-guess that decision.

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, plaintiff’s own testimony was also inconsistent with her allegations of disabling 

symptoms. Plaintiff testified that she quit her last job because of the way she was treated and, 

had it not been for the alleged harassment from her boss, she would likely still be working. (AT 

46-48, 58.)

As such, the ALJ reasonably discounted plaintiff’s credibility. 

Additionally, the ALJ properly discounted third-party statements regarding plaintiff’s 

symptoms and limitations. “[C]ompetent lay witness testimony cannot be disregarded without 

comment” and “in order to discount competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ must give reasons 

that are germane to each witness.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, 

the ALJ specifically discussed the statements by third parties, thereby indicating that he had 

considered them in the disability evaluation process. (AT 28, 30.) Nevertheless, those statements 

essentially echoed plaintiff’s own testimony and, as discussed above, the ALJ already provided 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony, which are equally 

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germane to the third-party testimony. As such, any error in not explicitly re-stating, or 

incorporating by reference, the reasons given for discounting plaintiff’s testimony with respect to 

these third parties was harmless and remand is not warranted. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115-22.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the ALJ’s decision was free from prejudicial error and supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is DENIED. 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 22, 23) is 

GRANTED.

3. The Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and judgment is entered for the 

Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 27, 2016

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