Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01094/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
National Cement Company of California, Inc.
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Petitioner
Tejon Ranchcorp
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 2007 Decided July 20, 2007

No. 06-1094

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL CEMENT COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, INC. AND

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION,

RESPONDENTS

TEJON RANCHCORP,

INTERVENOR FOR RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Robin A. Rosenbluth, Attorney, Mine Safety & Health

Administration, argued the cause for the petitioner. W.

Christian Schumann, Counsel, was with him on brief. 

Margaret S. Lopez argued the cause for the respondent.

Michael T. Heenan was with her on brief. John T. Sullivan and

Thomas A. Stock, Attorneys, entered appearances. 

Thomas C. Means was on brief for intervenor Tejon

Ranchcorp in support of the respondent.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 1 of 25
2

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The Secretary

of Labor (Secretary) petitions for review of a decision of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC

or Commission) which reversed the decision of the

administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ upheld the

jurisdiction of the Mine Safety and Health Administration

(MSHA) to issue a citation to the National Cement Co. of

California, Inc. (National Cement) for failing to install

guardrails or berms along a road National Cement uses to access

its cement processing plant (Access Road) pursuant to a nonexclusive right-of-way grant from National Cement’s lessor,

Tejon Ranchcorp (Tejon). Section 4 of the Mine Safety and

Health Act (Mine Act or Act) provides that “[e]ach coal or other

mine . . . shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.” 30

U.S.C. § 803. Section 3(h)(1) of the Act defines the term “coal

or other mine” to include “(A) an area of land from which

minerals are extracted in nonliquid form or, if in liquid form, are

extracted with workers underground[ or] (B) private ways and

roads appurtenant to such area.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1). The

ALJ concluded that the Access Road is a “mine” under section

3(h)(1)(B)—so as to come within the jurisdiction of

MSHA—because, under the unambiguous language of section

3(h)(1)(A) and the undisputed facts, it is both “private” and

“appurtenant to” National Cement’s Lebec Cement Plant, which

is undisputedly a “mine” under section 3(h)(1)(A). Nat’l

Cement Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 84 (2005) (ALJ

Dec.). The FMSHRC reversed the ALJ, concluding that,

although the road met the two unambiguous statutory criteria,

the Congress did not intend such a road to be classified as a

mine subject to Mine Act jurisdiction because this classification

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 2 of 25
3

will yield “absurd results.” Sec’y of Labor v. Nat’l Cement, 27

F.M.S.H.R.C. 721 (2005) (FMSHRC Dec.); see In re Trans

Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (“This

Court, in interpreting the words of a statute, has ‘some scope for

adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its

words where acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd

results . . . .’ ” (quoting Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571

(1965)) (internal quotation omitted)). Because we conclude that

the language of section 3(h)(1)(B) is ambiguous, we vacate the

Commission’s decision and remand for the Secretary to interpret

the statute’s ambiguous language. 

I.

The material facts are not disputed. See Joint Stipulations

(FMSHRC Docket No. WEST 2004-182-RM filed Nov. 17,

2004) (Joint Appendix (JA) 7) (Stip.). The Access Road runs

across Tejon’s 27,000-acre ranch (Ranch), near the town of

Lebec in southern California. National Cement operates a

cement processing plant on leased property within the Ranch,

extracting minerals such as limestone, shale and silica from

quarries and processing them with other trucked-in materials to

produce Portland cement for sale. National Cement is not the

only commercial entity that conducts business on the Ranch and

uses the Access Road. Tejon and several of its other lessees

also use the Access Road in the course of their respective

business, as set out below.

 The cement processing plant property, which consists of

about 5,000 acres, was initially leased, with easement rights over

the Access Road, to Pacific Western Industries, Inc. (Pacific

Western) in 1966 for three successive 20-year terms and a final

19-year term. Cement Manufacturing Plant Lease (Lease) at 3-4

(JA 41-42). The lease and easement rights were later assigned

to National Cement. Under a “Road Easement Deed” filed

October 13, 1965, National Cement has “a non-exclusive rightof-way and easement for the purpose of constructing,

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 3 of 25
4

reconstructing, altering, maintaining, repairing and using a road

upon, over and across” a sixty foot-wide strip of land “for use

and enjoyment by [National Cement] in connection with the

construction and operation on [Tejon’s] land of a plant or plants

for the processing and manufacture of portland cement and

related by-products pursuant to lease terms between [Tejon] and

[National Cement]” for the duration of the lease. Road

Easement Deed at 1 (JA 29). Under the deed, Tejon “reserves

for itself, its successors and/or assigns, the right to use and cross

over said road and the right to grant to others easements in

proximity to, crossing or overlapping the right of way and

easement [t]herein granted provided such other easements shall

not materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the right

of way and easement [t]herein granted.” Id. Road maintenance

is governed by the 1966 lease which provides:“Lessee [National

Cement] and the other grantees, if any, of joint-use easements

and rights of way, pro rata in accordance with their respective

use thereof, shall maintain all such easements and rights of way

in such condition as necessary for use thereof by Lessee in the

usual conduct of its business.” Lease at 18 (JA 56). 

Pacific Western developed the Access Road in the mid1960s from an existing network of dirt roads on the Ranch. In

the early 1970s, the California Department of Water Resources

(DWR) constructed an aqueduct across the Ranch with a bridge

running over it where it intersects the Access Road. DWR then

realigned the Access Road to traverse the bridge. Today the

Access Road is a paved 4.3-mile, two-lane road running north

from State Route 138 to the cement plant. The Access Road’s

use is restricted to “Tejon’s employees, vendors, contractors,

lessees, licensees and visitors; National Cement’s employees,

vendors, contractors and visitors; and those persons so

authorized by the State of California.” Stip. ¶ 21 (JA 11). Signs

indicating the restricted access are posted at the intersection with

State Route 138 and along the initial segment of the road leading

to the cement plant. Fencing, which encloses ranch land, runs

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 4 of 25
5

1

Adjacent to the the guardhouse is a sign advising:

ANYONE ENTERING THIS FACILITY MUST STOP AT

THE FRONT OFFICE AND CHECK IN BEFORE

PROCEEDING TO ANY OTHER LOCATION WITHIN

THE PLANT. 

EXCEPT NATIONAL CEMENT EMPLOYEES, DELIVERY

WORKERS and OVER THE ROAD TRUCK DRIVERS. 

THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO VENDORS,

SALESMEN, CONTRACTORS, SERVICEMEN, AND

VISITORS. 

 This is a Mine Safety and Health Administration, (MSHA)

regulated site and as such requires all those who enter to

comply with 30 Part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR).

Stip. ¶ 27 (JA 14).

2

That mining activity accounts for a “majority” of road use, as the

parties stipulated, is not to say that it “dwarf[s]” road use, as the

dissent asserts in its fifth “undisputed” fact, drawing on the ALJ’s

characterization. Dissent at 6 n.2. 

along either side of the road, with gates located at various points

opening onto dirt roads, trails and livestock corrals. Tejon

maintains locks on most of the gates. None of the gates is used

by National Cement, which has its own gate and guardhouse at

the north end of the Access Road in front of the cement plant.1

The Access Road provides the only vehicular access to the

cement plant. While “[t]he majority of traffic on the road is for

cement-plant-related purposes,” id. ¶ 38 (JA 16),2 the road is

also used by (1) Tejon’s ranch management staff, which travels

it two to three times per month; (2) the Centennial Livestock

Company, which leases 200,000 acres in the southern part of the

Ranch where it maintains 7,000-9,000 head of cattle that are

rotated among various fields every 6 months—its employees

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 5 of 25
6

make about 300 round trips on the road annually; (3) customers

of Tejon’s “Film Department” which contracts with

entertainment production companies, commercial photographers

and others to provide locations on the Ranch for filming; (4)

patrons of Tejon’s hunting program who use the road to access

hunting areas (sometimes with Tejon guides) during 11 months

of the year; (5) participants in Tejon’s “Explorer Program” who

pay an annual fee to explore and camp on the Ranch from

February through August each year; (6) Tejon security personnel

who make daily rounds; (7) consultants performing work on a

planned 12,000-acre commercial and residential development,

which Tejon hopes to begin constructing in 2009 and which will

use the Access Road both during construction and after

completion; (8) Federal Aviation Administration agents who use

the road for access to a communication tower located on the

Ranch; (9) utility agents who use the road for access to

transmission lines and related facilities; and (10) DWR which

uses the road to access its aqueduct and bridge. Id. ¶¶ 45-66, 33

(JA 17-24, 15).

Since the mine’s inception, National Cement (and its

predecessor cement plant operators) “have always maintained

and kept in usable condition the road,” without seeking

permission of Tejon. Id. ¶¶ 35-37 (JA 16). In November 2003,

for example, National Cement at its own expense resurfaced,

sealed and restriped the road and installed speed bumps and

speed limit signs. Id. ¶ 36 (JA 16). DWR, however, maintains

“the bridge and its approaches” and National Cement “does not

perform any construction or maintenance on this part of the

road.” Id. ¶ 31 (JA 15). DWR has installed “speed bumps and

related warning signs on the road in both directions at the

approaches to the bridge.” Id. ¶ 34 (JA 15). 

 In 1992, a MSHA inspector cited National Cement for

violating 30 C.F.R. § 56.9300(a), which requires: “Berms or

guardrails shall be provided and maintained on the banks of

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 6 of 25
7

3

The Secretary’s regulations define a “berm” as “a pile or mound

of material along an elevated roadway capable of moderating or

limiting the force of a vehicle in order to impede the vehicle's passage

over the bank of the roadway.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.2. The required berms

or guardrails “shall be at least mid-axle height of the largest selfpropelled mobile equipment which usually travels the roadway.” Id.

§ 56.9300(b).

roadways where a drop-off exists of sufficient grade or depth to

cause a vehicle to overturn or endanger persons in equipment.”3

See JA 155. On April 9, 1992, MSHA vacated the citation

through the following notice:

 This action is to “vacate” this citation since it was

issued in error. 

 The main entrance roadway was from a public

highway to the mine site office traveled by the company

and public to reach the mine property. 

 At the mine site near the main office where mine site

activities begin was a posted guard shack indicating the

restrictions and the actual activities of the mining

operation. 

 The main entrance from the main public highway was

leased by the mine operator but used/traveled by various

other personnel and the public—once arriving at mine

property signs were posted that the mine office must be

contacted prior to entering the work sites. 

 The mine operator had no control over personnel using

the entrance roadway until they arrived at the mine site

office—(no security-locked gate at entrance off public

highway).

Id. at 156.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 7 of 25
8

4

This regulation provides:

 (d) Where elevated roadways are infrequently traveled and

used only by service or maintenance vehicles, berms or

guardrails are not required when all of the following are met:

 . . .

 (3) Delineators are installed along the perimeter of

the elevated roadway so that, for both directions of

travel, the reflective surfaces of at least three

delineators along each elevated shoulder are always

visible to the driver and spaced at intervals sufficient

to indicate the edges and attitude of the roadway.

30 C.F.R. § 56.9300(d)(3).

On February 4, 2003, a MSHA inspector issued a citation

(No. 6351224) to National Cement because the Access Road

contained “faded and missing delineators for the entire distance

of the haulway” in violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.9300(d)(3).4 Id.

at 157. During a routine review of the citation, MSHA’s district

office determined that the inspector incorrectly cited National

Cement because 30 C.F.R. § 56.9300(d)(3) applies to “elevated

roadways” that “are infrequently traveled and used only by

service or maintenance vehicles.” See ALJ Dec., 27

F.M.S.H.R.C. at 97. Accordingly, on February 13, 2003,

Citation No. 6351224 was vacated and a new citation (No.

6351230) was issued for failing to install berms or guardrails in

violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.9300(a). The citation stated:

 The primary access road to the plant had no guard rails

or berms to protect vehicles and persons from going over

the edge of the road. There are drop off[s] all along the

highway ranging up to approximately 25 feet where a

vehicle could easily roll over. The road is used

extensively by large over the highway trucks, miner's

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 8 of 25
9

5

No one has suggested that the fencing along both sides of the

road, which appears from photographs in the record to be strung wire,

see, e.g., JA 132, 135, 142, is an adequate substitute for the required

berms or guardrails.

vehicles, and various other vehicles. The two lane road

without berms or guard rails presents a hazard,

especially during inclement weather where the

possibility of sliding and crashing may be prevalent.

JA 160.5

 

On April 14, 2003, after National Cement brought to

MSHA’s attention the vacatur of the 1992 citation, the MSHA

inspector lowered the citation’s negligence level from

“Moderate” to “Low” because “[i]nformation . . . indicated that

a previously issued citation for this condition was vacated,

therefore the company's negligence was less than originally

evaluated.” Id. at 161. The MSHA District Manager concluded

that MSHA had jurisdiction over the road but nonetheless on

November 17, 2003 had the notice “vacated without prejudice

due to inadequate notice that the road in question was subject to

the Agency's jurisdiction.” Id. at 162.

On December 16, 2003, the MSHA District Manager sent

National Cement a letter informing it that MSHA considered the

road subject to MSHA jurisdiction:

This letter is to inform you that MSHA has carefully

reviewed the facts regarding the Wayne Hand Road

which is located between National Cement Company’s

Lebec Plant, and Highway 138. The Mine Safety and

Health Act Section 3(h)(1)(B) specifically includes

“private ways and roads appurtenant to” mines, as

“mines” subject to MSHA jurisdiction. MSHA,

therefore, examines all pertinent facts to determine

whether such roads are to be considered as part of a

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 9 of 25
10

mine. Here, MSHA has determined that it has

jurisdiction over the Wayne Hand Road leading from

Highway 138 to the Lebec Plant. This jurisdiction is

based on our finding that National Cement Company

maintains this road, that it holds an easement on this

road and that this road is the sole means of egress to and

from the mine. It also appears that traffic to and from

the Lebec Plant constitutes the vast majority of traffic

along this road. 

National Cement Company is hereby put on notice that

conditions which violate applicable MSHA regulations

with respect to the road shall be subject to MSHA's

enforcement authority, effective immediately.

Id. at 163. Accordingly, on February 9, 2004, a MSHA

inspector issued National Cement the subject citation (No.

6361036) for violating 30 C.F.R. § 56.9300(a). The citation

reads:

The mine operator failed to provide berms and

guardrails on the banks of the primary access road to the

Lebec Cement Plant. There were drop offs along the

roadway ranging from 6 ft. [t]o approximately 25 ft. and

sufficient to cause a vehicle to overturn or endanger

persons in equipment. The roadway was used

extensively by large over-the-road trucks, delivery

vehicles, and personal vehicles of mine personnel and

vendors. The l[a]ck of berms or guardrails on the two

lane road presented a hazard particularly during

inclement weather when vehicles could be expected to

slide and potentially become involved in accidents.

JA 164. National Cement filed a Notice of Contest of the

citation and Tejon intervened in support of National Cement.

On cross-motions by MSHA and National Cement for

summary decision on the issue of Mine Act jurisdiction, the ALJ

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 10 of 25
11

6

In a letter filed December 12, 2006, the FMSHRC informed the

court it “w[ould] not file a brief” and “w[ould] not participate as an

active litigant.”

ruled in MSHA’s favor in a decision dated January 12, 2005.

Nat’l Cement Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 84 (2005).

The ALJ concluded that the access road is a “mine” under the

plain language of section 3(h)(1) of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C.

§ 802(h)(1), and rejected National Cement’s argument that “the

circumstances of this case create ambiguity.” Id. at 99. The

ALJ then directed the parties to advise him within 30 days

whether they had reached a settlement or wished to proceed to

a hearing on the merits of the citation.

Upon motion filed by National Cement on November 17,

2005, the FMSHRC vacated the ALJ’s decision, concluding that

under the plain meaning of section 3(h)(1), the entire Access

Road cannot be characterized as a “mine” under the Mine Act

because to do so would violate the structure of the Act and

produce “absurd results.” Sec’y of Labor v. Nat’l Cement, 27

F.M.S.H.R.C. 721 (2005). The Commission “h[e]ld instead that

only such portion of the access road over which National

Cement and its customers have exclusive use can be considered

an appurtenant road” and remanded the matter to the ALJ to

establish the parameters of the specified portion. Id. at 735.

The Secretary filed a petition for review of the Commission’s

decision on March 17, 2006.6

II.

On review,“the Secretary’s interpretation of the law must

‘ “be given weight by both the Commission and the courts.” ’ ”

Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867

F.2d 1432, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-181,

at 49 (1977))). “When, as here, ‘the Secretary and the

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 11 of 25
12

Commission divide, it [is] . . . the Secretary rather than the

Commission [who] is entitled to the deference described in

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984).” Id. at 6 (quoting Cannelton Indus., 867

F.2d at 1435 (alterations in original) (parallel citation omitted)).

“Moreover, in the statutory scheme of the Mine Act, ‘ “the

Secretary’s litigating position before [the Commission] is as

much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the

Secretary’s promulgation of a . . . health and safety standard,” ’

and is therefore deserving of deference.” Id. (quoting RAG

Cumberland Res. LP v. FMSHRC, 272 F.3d 590, 596 n.9 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health

Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991))). In this case,

however, we do not accord the Secretary’s litigating position

Chevron deference because she incorrectly treated the statute as

unambiguous and interpreted it accordingly. See Peter Pan Bus

Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350,

1354 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[D]eference to an agency's

interpretation of a statute is not appropriate when the agency

wrongly “believes that interpretation is compelled by

Congress.” ’ ” (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786,

798 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d

248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2002)))). 

Under step one of Chevron, we “ask ‘whether Congress has

directly spoken to the precise question at issue,’ in which case

we ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.’ ” Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 410

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). “If the

‘statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,’

however, we move to the second step and defer to the agency’s

interpretation as long as it is ‘based on a permissible

construction of the statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843). Before the Commission, as here, the Secretary has relied

on the plain meaning of the statute, viewing its language as

unambiguous. See FMSHRC Dec., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 726

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 12 of 25
13

7

In her reply brief the Secretary argues for the first time that her

interpretation is reasonable and is therefore due deference under

Chevron step 2. See Reply Br. at 23-25.

(“The Secretary argues for affirmance of the judge’s decision

because the definition of ‘coal or other mine’ plainly includes a

road such as the one at issue.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at

728 (rejecting “literal interpretation of the specific words used

in section 3(h)(1)(B) offered by the Secretary”); Sec’y’s Br. at

19-33 (asserting road is “mine” under section 3(h)(1)(B)’s “plain

meaning”).7

 The statute has no plain meaning, however,

because section 3(h)(1)(B)’s language is, in our view,

ambiguous. 

As explained earlier, section 3(h)(1)(B) establishes that a

road is a “mine” subject to MSHA’s jurisdiction if it meets two

criteria: it must be (1) “private” and (2) “appurtenant to” an

“area” that constitutes a “coal or other mine” under section

3(h)(1)(A). 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)(B). The FMSHRC,

following the lead of the ALJ and with the approval of the

parties, relied on the dictionary definition of “private” as

“intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or

group or class of persons: not freely available to the public.”

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1804-05 (1993)

(Webster’s). Under this definition, the term may be construed,

as the Secretary argued and the Commission concluded, to mean

restricted to the use of “a particular . . . group or class of

persons”—in this case, all of the grantees to whom Tejon may

grant a right of way—and their invitees—which, as it turns out,

are many and varied, see supra p. [5]. Under the same

definition, however, “private” may be construed more narrowly

to mean restricted to the use of “a particular person” such as

National Cement. See also Webster’s at 1805 (setting out

alternative definition “belonging to or concerning an individual

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 13 of 25
14

person, company, or interest”). Given these alternative

meanings, the word “private” is, in our view, ambiguous.

The term “appurtenant to” is also ambiguous under the

dictionary definition applied by both the ALJ and the

Commission. “Appurtenant” is defined as “ ‘a: annexed or

belonging legally to some more important thing (a

right-of-way—to land or buildings); b: incident to and passing

in possession with real estate—used of certain profits or

easements.’ ” See FMSHRC Dec., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 728

(quoting Webster’s at 107). Under this definition, the phrase

may be construed to encompass a road such as the Access Road

because it is subject to a transferable right of way benefitting the

mine lessee. Or, again, the term might have been used in a

narrower sense, as suggested by the definitional language

“annexed or belonging legally to,” to mean dedicated

exclusively to the use of the mine. See Webster’s at 87

(defining “annex” as “to join in a closely united but subordinate

capacity: take possession or control of : assume rights or

jurisdiction over”); id. at 201 (defining “belong” as “to be the

property of a person or thing”).

In sum, both of the relevant statutory terms are ambiguous

and the Secretary therefore erroneously interpreted them as

bearing a plain meaning. In the event of such ambiguity, “ ‘it is

incumbent upon the agency not to rest simply on its parsing of

the statutory language’—‘[i]t must bring its experience and

expertise to bear in light of competing interests at stake.’ ”

Peter Pan, 471 F.3d at 1354 (quoting PDK Labs., Inc., 362 F.3d

at 797-98 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66) (alteration in

original)). If the agency has not done so, “ ‘at this stage it is not

for the court “to choose between competing meanings.” ’ ” Id.

(quoting PDK Labs., Inc., 362 F.3d at 798 (quoting Alarm Indus.

Commc’ns Comm. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir.

1997))). “Chevron step 2 deference is reserved for those

instances when an agency recognizes that the Congress’s intent

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 14 of 25
15

is not plain from the statute’s face.” Id. Because the Secretary

did not recognize the ambiguities inherent in the statutory terms,

we do not defer to her plain meaning interpretation but instead

remand for her to treat the statutory language as ambiguous. See

id. at 1352. We recognize that we do not ordinarily remand a

case with instructions regarding the decisionmaking process of

a litigant. As we have demonstrated above, however, it is well

established that the Congress intended us to afford Chevron

deference to the Secretary—a litigant below—not the

Commission—the adjudicator below. Coupling that principle

with the principle drawn from Peter Pan and PDK Labs, Inc.,

requiring a Chevron-worthy agency to recognize ambiguity, we

are left with no other rational result. Accordingly, we follow

that course of action. 

Both National Cement and Tejon identified “absurd results”

they claimed would arise from the Secretary’s plain meaning

interpretation of the statute—because of National Cement’s

status as a non-exclusive right-of-way grantee, with only limited

control or authority over the Access Road or its users outside the

cement plant premises. These are not frivolous concerns.

First, it is questionable that National Cement, as a

“nonexclusive” right-of-way grantee, has the authority to alter

the road as the Secretary requires—notwithstanding National

Cement has sua sponte, without interference, previously

performed routine maintenance and made minor alterations (e.g.,

installing speed bumps and speed limit signs). National

Cement’s easement is subject to the right Tejon reserved to itself

to use the road—and to grant others the right to use it—along

with National Cement. Alteration of the Access Road might

interfere with the others’ right to use it and Tejon’s right as

property owner to control it. In addition, it is undisputed that

National Cement lacks authority to make any changes to the

portion of the bridge approaching or crossing the aqueduct as

DWR has the exclusive right to maintain this portion of the road

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 15 of 25
16

8

“[P]erson” is broadly defined in the Mine Act as “any individual,

partnership, association, corporation, firm, subsidiary of a corporation,

or other organization.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(f).

and has in the past installed speed bumps and signs. Stip. ¶ 34

(JA 25).

Second, under the Secretary’s interpretation, National

Cement as the mine “operator” would be required to assume

responsibility for all road users, including those over whom it

has no authority and with whom it has no business connection

whatsoever. For example, as “operator” of the “mine,” National

Cement would be required to (1) comply with a withdrawal

order of the Secretary requiring it to cause “all persons,”

including invitees of Tejon and other right-of-way grantees, to

withdraw from a specified area of the Access Road, 30 U.S.C.

§ 814(b), (d)(1)-(2), (e);8

 (2) “[i]n the event of any accident

occurring [on the road] . . . notify the Secretary thereof and . . .

take appropriate measures to prevent the destruction of any

evidence which would assist in investigating the cause or causes

thereof,” id. § 813(j); and (3) “provide site-specific hazard

awareness training, as appropriate, to any person who is not a

miner . . . but is present [on the road],” 30 C.F.R. § 46.11(b).

National Cement could thus be liable for violating the cited

provisions notwithstanding it lacks authority to comply with

them because it lacks control over all Access Road users. See

FMSHRC Dec., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 732 (“[O]n appeal the

Secretary has reaffirmed her authority to hold National Cement

strictly liable for all violations, including those committed by

unrelated third parties. Thus, as National Cement fears, it

appears that the Secretary would issue a citation for Mine Act

violations committed by a user of the road who had no

connection to National Cement’s operations.”) (internal citation

omitted). 

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 16 of 25
17

9

In fact, the Secretary acknowledges that she would treat Tejon as

an operator subject to Mine Act jurisdiction. See Sec’y’s Br. at 37 n.9;

Reply Br. at 15-16.

Third, because the Act defines a mine “operator”

expansively to include “any owner, lessee, or other person who

operates, controls, or supervises a coal or other mine or any

independent contractor performing services or construction at

such mine,” 30 U.S.C. § 802(d), under the Secretary’s

interpretation Mine Act jurisdiction would extend to Tejon as

the “operator” (owner) of the Access Road and to any other

party with right-of-way control over the Access Road

notwithstanding the party lacks any relation whatsoever to the

mine’s operations. Each of them could be liable as a mine

operator for mine safety infractions occurring on the Access

Road.9

 

The Secretary responds that she will, “as a matter of

prosecutorial discretion,” refrain from citing “Tejon users whose

conduct has no appreciable effect on the safety of National

Cement miners.” Sec’y’s Br. at 39. This vague, open-ended

(and unenforceable) representation offers scant comfort to the

various road users who would be subject to liability under the

Secretary’s expansive construction of Mine Act jurisdiction. In

any event, the Mine Act itself does not authorize such

prosecutorial discretion but mandates that a citation issue when

its provisions or the regulations promulgated thereunder are

violated by a party within Mine Act jurisdiction. See 30 U.S.C.

§ 814(a) (“If, upon inspection or investigation, the Secretary or

his authorized representative believes that an operator of a coal

or other mine subject to this chapter has violated this chapter, or

any mandatory health or safety standard, rule, order, or

regulation promulgated pursuant to this chapter, he shall, with

reasonable promptness, issue a citation to the operator.”

(emphasis added)). 

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 17 of 25
18

These are problems the Secretary must confront on remand

if she continues to interpret section 3(h)(1) to extend Mine Act

jurisdiction over the entire Access Road. Although a statutory

interpretation that is “employed in the course of an adjudication

constitutes an ‘interpretative’ statement and as such is exempt

from the APA notice and comment requirements,” nonetheless,

under Chevron the Secretary must “offer a reasoned analysis” of

her statutory reading. Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186,

195, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Reasoned analysis requires that the

words of the statute “ ‘be read in their context and with a view

to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” Ne. Md. Waste

Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809

(1989)). Here, this means that the Secretary must address the

concerns raised by National Cement and Tejon and harmonize

her interpretation of section 3(h)(1)(B) with the Mine Act’s

overall enforcement of mine safety standards. Given that

National Cement lacks control over the Access Road or those

traveling upon it beyond the well-marked boundaries of the

cement processing plant itself such harmony may be difficult to

achieve. As the Sixth Circuit has observed, the reach of Mine

Act jurisdiction under section 3(h)(1)(B) is not limitless:

Without some limitation on the meaning of “roads

appurtenant to,” MSHA jurisdiction could conceivably

extend to unfathomable lengths since any road

appurtenant to a mine that connects to the outside world

would necessarily run into yet other roads, thus

becoming one contiguous road. Because of the potential

reach of MSHA jurisdiction if the definition in

§ 802(h)(1)(B) is left unfettered, “private ways and

roads” cannot simply mean “any road.” Otherwise, there

could conceivably be no limit to MSHA jurisdiction, a

result Congress clearly did not intend.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 18 of 25
19

Bush & Burchett, Inc. v. Reich, 117 F.3d 932, 937 (6th Cir.

1997). 

Because the terms “private” and “appurtenant to” in section

3(h)(1)(B), 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)(B), are ambiguous and the

Secretary instead interpreted them as having a plain,

unambiguous meaning, we vacate the Commission’s decision

and remand for it to obtain from the Secretary a Chevron step 2

interpretation of section 3(h)(1)(B), which addresses the

problematic issues raised by National Cement and Tejon. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 19 of 25
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: In issuing a citation to

the National Cement Company of California for failing to install

berms or guardrails along its access road, the Secretary of Labor

relied on the jurisdiction of the Mine Safety and Health

Administration under the plain text of the definition of a “mine”

under section 3(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health

Act of 1977 (“Mine Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Today, the

court holds that the definition of “mine” is ambiguous and

remands this case so that the Secretary may exercise discretion

in interpreting her jurisdiction. But there is only one legitimate

interpretation of whether the access road is a “private” road

“appurtenant to” land from which minerals are extracted, and

thus is subject to Mine Act jurisdiction. The Secretary adopted

that plain text interpretation and the Federal Mine Safety and

Health Review Commission (the “Commission”) unanimously

agreed that the literal interpretation of the text was

unambiguous. See Sec’y of Labor v. Nat’l Cement Co. of Cal.,

Inc., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 721, 728 (2005); id. at 737-38 (Jordan,

Comm’r, dissenting). The court improperly relies upon policy

considerations to find ambiguity where there is none.

I.

Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), the court must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.

Under the plain meaning of the terms, the access road is

“private” and it is “appurtenant to” land from which minerals are

extracted. The history and purpose of the Mine Act fully

support the plain text reading and National Cement has offered

no reason to avoid the literal meaning.

The Mine Act defines a “mine” to include “an area of land

from which minerals are extracted,” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)(A),

and “private ways and roads appurtenant to such [an] area,” id.

§ 802(h)(1)(B). The parties agree that the cement plant at the

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 20 of 25
2

end of the access road is “an area of land from which minerals

are extracted,” meaning that it is subject to Mine Act jurisdiction

if it is both “private” and “appurtenant to” the cement plant.

The access road is unambiguously a “private” road. It is

located on private property and it is not open to the general

public. There is, in fact, a sign posted by National Cement

where the access road meets the public state highway that says,

in large red lettering, “PRIVATE ROAD NO TRESPASSING.”

In a statutory provision, words are presumed to have their

ordinary, common sense meanings. See, e.g., United States v.

Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57 (2000). As this court has previously

recognized, “[i]t is beyond cavil that the common usage of

‘private’ refers to that which is not public or governmental.”

Inner City Broad. Corp. v. Sanders, 733 F.2d 154, 158 (D.C.

Cir. 1984). In determining Mine Act jurisdiction, the Sixth

Circuit has taken the natural step of looking to whether a road is

“public” as opposed to “private.” See Bush & Burchett, Inc. v.

Reich, 117 F.3d 932, 936-38 (6th Cir. 1997). The court must

engage in tortured reasoning to conclude that in specifying that

Mine Act jurisdiction extends only to “private” roads, Congress

plausibly may have meant to exclude more than just the natural

antonym, “public” roads. As the Supreme Court has

acknowledged, “[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional

possibilities but of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner, 513

U.S. 115, 118 (1994); see also Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.

v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 372 F.3d 395, 400 (D.C.

Cir. 2004). Nothing in the plain text of the Mine Act supports

the court’s dissection of the statute in search of ambiguity.

Similarly, by the plain text of the Mine Act, the access road

is “appurtenant to” the cement plant. The court suggests that

Congress might have been saying something about an operator’s

exclusive access to the road by requiring appurtenance. But the

common meaning of appurtenance has nothing to do with

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 21 of 25
3

1 See, e.g., Bush & Burchett, 117 F.3d at 937 (noting that

public roads may be appurtenant to extraction facilities); BR Assocs.

v. LaFramboise, No. 06-11870-BC, 2007 WL 1840031, at *1 (E.D.

Mich. June 26, 2007) (referencing a “non-exclusive easement

appurtenant”); Bee Tree Missionary Baptist Church v. McNeil, 570

S.E.2d 781, 783 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (similar); State v. Japage

P’ship, 80 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. App. 2002) (similar).

exclusivity. “An easement is appurtenant to land when the

easement is created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of

the land in his use of the land.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF

PROPERTY § 453 (1944); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.5(1) (2000). It is unsurprising that

the court’s anointing of ambiguity in the word “appurtenant” is

accompanied by no references to authorities in which

appurtenance has been interpreted to require exclusivity.

Counterexamples are plentiful.1

 Again, by the ordinary meaning

of this term, the road is “appurtenant to” the cement plant

because Tejon Ranchcorp has granted National Cement an

easement providing a “right of way for the purpose of ingress

and egress to and from” the cement plant. 

The purpose of the Mine Act fully supports the literal

interpretation of the statute supplied by a plain reading of its

terms. Congress expressly declared that “the first priority and

concern of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the

health and safety of its most precious resource – the miner,” 30

U.S.C. § 801(a), noting, among other things, that “the existence

of unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices in the

Nation’s coal or other mines is a serious impediment to the

future growth of the coal or other mining industry and cannot be

tolerated,” id. § 801(d). As part of this initiative, Congress

defined “mine” in a manner that this court has characterized as

“sweeping,” Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 734 F.2d 1547,

1554 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and that courts have acknowledged

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 22 of 25
4

“makes clear that the concept that was to be conveyed by the

word [‘mine’] is much more encompassing than the usual

meaning attributed to it,” Marshall v. Stoudt’s Ferry

Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1979); accord

Cyprus Indus. Minerals Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health

Review Comm’n, 664 F.2d 1116, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The legislative history of the Mine Act confirms Congress’s

intent. The Conference Committee expressed its intention to

adopt a “broad[]” definition of what constitutes a “mine” that

included “roads . . . related to the mining activity.” S. REP. NO.

95-461, at 38 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in SENATE

SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, COMM. ON HUMAN RES., LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF

1977, at 1316 (1978) (hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY). The

Senate Committee on Human Resources added further emphasis,

clarifying that “all private roads and areas” appurtenant to

mineral extraction operations were covered. S.REP.NO. 95-181,

at 14 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 602.

II.

To avoid the literal meaning of the Mine Act, National

Cement, Tejon Ranchcorp, and the court suggest that “absurd

results” would result therefrom. See Op. at 15-17. A party

seeking to avoid the literal text because of the policy

consequences faces “an exceptionally high burden.” Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 1121 (2007). To succeed, such a claim must

be accompanied by a showing that “as a matter of historical fact,

Congress did not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as

a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could

not have meant it.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075,

1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here, the express purpose and history of

the statute indicate that Congress meant precisely what it said.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 23 of 25
5

The court concludes that National Cement and Tejon Ranchcorp

have “valid” concerns that this interpretation will result in

“absurd results,” but this conclusion is flawed.

The “absurd results” doctrine is narrow in order to avoid

having courts act as super-legislatures that balance the pros and

cons of potential policies. Here, the court adopts the position of

the Commission majority that Congress could not have intended

a mine “operator” to be liable for what happens on a road for

which it lacks complete control. Op. at 15-17. But as the

dissenting Commissioner noted, “[p]ermitting concerns about

future National Cement liability for non-mining related activity

to guide the outcome of this case is letting the tail wag the dog.”

27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 741 (Jordan, Comm’r, dissenting). 

The court’s approach adds a requirement of exclusivity to

the definition of a “mine” when its true concern is who

constitutes an “operator,” which is defined in section 3(d) of the

Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 802(d). Not only has Congress set only

two requirements for roads to be subject to the Mine Act, the

necessary inference of which, in the absence of legislative intent

suggesting otherwise, is that Congress intended no others, cf.

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001), nothing suggests

Congress acted absurdly by determining, in a separate section,

who should be liable for Mine Act violations. If National

Cement does not have sufficient control over the access road,

then it might not be the “operator” of the access road, as the

Secretary acknowledges. See Appellant’s Br. at 36-37. But the

conclusion to be drawn is not that the access road is beyond the

jurisdiction of the Mine Act. The consequences of this reverse

inference leave the possibility that a dangerous road covered by

the plain text of the statute and referenced in the legislative

history will not require berms or guardrails, despite steep drops

(up to 25 feet), on a road traversed by heavy cement trucks more

than 45,000 times a year.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 24 of 25
6

2 It is undisputed in this court that: (1) the access road on the

Tejon Ranch is privately owned; (2) National Cement operates the

quarry to which the road provides the only vehicular access; (3)

National Cement and Tejon Ranchcorp have entered into a long term

lease that gives National Cement an easement, which transfers to

successor lessees of the cement plant, to use the road to access the

quarry from the state highway and allows National Cement to grant

access to others; (4) the lease preserves the right of Tejon Ranchcorp

to use the road and grant easements to others so long as those

easements do not materially interfere with National Cement’s

operations; (5) National Cement’s activities at the cement plant, which

operates 7 days a week, dominate use of the access road in that the

vast majority of traffic is related to the cement plant and other use of

the road, the Administrative Law Judge found, “is dwarfed by

National Cement traffic,” Nat’l Cement Co. of Cal., Inc. v. Sec’y of

Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 84, 101

(2005); and (6) its heavy trucks traverse the access road hundreds of

times a day and accidents have occurred on the road. 

The court’s related concern that National Cement will be

strictly liable for Mine Act violations involving non-mining

activities on the access road is resolved similarly. If National

Cement does not have the requisite control, then it might not be

an operator that can be cited. The facts of this case2

 do not

present an occasion to further speculate on how the Act would

be interpreted, let alone enforced, should the issue arise. Before

the court today is the definition of a “mine,” and the Secretary

was correct to conclude that the definition plainly includes

National Cement’s access road. A speculative concern about a

tiny fraction of access-road users should not be used to uproot

the major purpose of the Mine Act.

Finding no ambiguity in the definition of a “mine,” I would

remand the case to the Commission for adjudication of the

citation on the merits. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

USCA Case #06-1094 Document #1054937 Filed: 07/20/2007 Page 25 of 25