Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-00702/USCOURTS-ca10-16-00702-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Eagle
Petitioner
Freeport-McMoran, Inc.
Respondent

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WILLIAM EAGLE, individually and on 

behalf of all similarly situtated persons, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

FREEPORT-MCMORAN, INC., f/k/a 

Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold, Inc., 

LLC, 

 Respondent. 

No. 16-702 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00577-MV-GJF) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 This matter is before the court to consider the petition filed by the plaintiff for 

permission to appeal the district court’s order denying his “Motion for Conditional Class 

Certification.” 

 The plaintiff sought class certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act 

(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The district court denied the motion without prejudice, 

concluding that plaintiff failed to show that he and the putative class members are 

similarly situated under the appropriate ad hoc test. See Thiessen v. General Electric 

Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1098, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did 

not err in applying the ad hoc test in a case brought under the Age Discrimination in 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

September 13, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 16-702 Document: 01019687388 Date Filed: 09/13/2016 Page: 1 
2 

Employment Act, which adopts the same standards for class actions as FLSA). The court 

found that the plaintiff’s allegations were unsupported and merely conclusory and that the 

plaintiff did not show that he and putative class members were denied overtime pay due 

to an unlawful decision, plan or policy. The court indicated that it would revisit the issue 

should the plaintiff submit “some evidence tying Plaintiff and the putative class together 

under a single decision, policy, or plan on the part of Defendant to deny overtime pay.” 

Order at p. 12. 

 The plaintiff seeks permission to appeal this interlocutory order pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(f). However, Rule 23(f) provides that a “court of appeals may permit an 

appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule ....” 

(Emphasis added.) This is not a Rule 23 case, but rather one falling under FLSA. 

 As argued by the defendant, and not refuted by the plaintiff, FLSA does not 

provide for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of class certification. See McElmurry 

v. U.S. Bank National Association, 495 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is 

no comparable interlocutory review provisions [as in Rule 23(f)] in § 216(b) . . . .”); 

Baldridge v. SBC Communications, Inc., 404 F.3d 930, 932 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]s the 

district court observed, this case involves a garden-variety § 216(b) FLSA action and is 

not a rule 23 class action, so rule 23(f) is inapplicable.”); Id. n.6 (“A critical difference 

between a § 216(b) class action and a rule 23 class action is that the former requires each 

class member to opt in as a party plaintiff, but the latter includes all absent class members 

who do not affirmatively opt out. Consequently, Congress could rationally conclude that 

the default rule allows rule 23 certification orders, on average, to result in larger, more 

Appellate Case: 16-702 Document: 01019687388 Date Filed: 09/13/2016 Page: 2 
3 

financially onerous classes, thereby giving stronger policy justification for a special 

procedural rule allowing interlocutory appeals of those orders and trumping the final 

judgment rule of § 1291.”); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th 

Cir. 1975) (after discussing the difference between FLSA and Rule 23 class actions, the 

court stated that “[i]t is crystal clear that [§ 216(b)] precludes pure Rule 23 class actions 

in FLSA suits.”) 

Accordingly, because there is no statutory authority to the plaintiff's petition, the 

petition for permission to appeal is DENIED. 

Entered for the Court 

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk 

by: Ellen Rich Reiter 

 Jurisdictional Attorney 

Appellate Case: 16-702 Document: 01019687388 Date Filed: 09/13/2016 Page: 3