Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07020/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Allen Russell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

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APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 2 t 1992 

-----------fl.•OBERTL.HOECKEE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS ALLEN RUSSELL, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Clerk 

No. 91-7020 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF 

(D.C. No. CR-90-56-2-S) 

Submitted on the briefs:1 

Joseph F. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, on the brief for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Mark Green, Muskogee, Oklahoma, on the brief for DefendantAppellant. 

Before SEYMOUR and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

1 After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-7020 Document: 010110243020 Date Filed: 04/21/1992 Page: 1
Mr. Russell2 

was convicted of three felonies including 

conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine, use of a 

communication facility to facilitate the distribution of 

methamphetamine, and the distribution of methamphetamine. Mr. 

Russell appeals only his conspiracy conviction asserting 

insufficient evidence exists to support this conviction. We 

affirm. 

I. 

When a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is made, we 

examine the entire record, including both direct and 

circumstantial evidence, drawing therefrom the reasonable 

inferences. After examining such evidence, we must affirm if the 

evidence and the reasonable inferences, examined in the light most 

favorable to the government, are such that a reasonable trier of 

fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Cox, 929 F.2d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991). 

The evidence in a drug conspiracy prosecution must prove two 

or more persons agreed to violate the federal narcotics laws, the 

defendant knew at least the essential objectives of the 

conspiracy, and the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a 

part of the conspiracy. United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 

1294 (10th Cir. 1988). 

2 Mr. Russell was a co-defendant of Mr. Stanberry, whose 

conviction and sentence we affirmed in United States v. Stanberry, __ F.2d __ (No. 91-7021, 10th Cir. ___ , 1992), and Ms. Coyote, 

whose conviction we affirmed in United States v. Coyote, __ F.2d __ (No. 91-7025, 10th Cir. ___ , 1992). 

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Appellate Case: 91-7020 Document: 010110243020 Date Filed: 04/21/1992 Page: 2
A review of the evidence reveals the undercover narcotics 

agent began making regular purchases of methamphetamine from Mr. 

Stanberry in 1988. Mr. Stanberry told the narcotics agent that if 

he (Stanberry) was not available when the illegal drugs were 

required, he should contact his friend and neighbor, Mr. Russell. 

The agent frequently followed this procedure. On occasion, Mr. 

Russell was present when the narcotics agent purchased 

methamphetamine from Mr. Stanberry. On one occasion, Mr. Russell 

was present when Mr. Stanberry pulled the purchased 

methamphetamine from the water jug that Mr. Stanberry had cleverly 

modified to carry concealed methamphetamine. On yet another 

occasion, the narcotics agent called Mr. Russell and asked him to 

relate to Mr. Stanberry that he wished to purchase one ounce of 

pure methamphetamine. Because Mr. Stanberry was absent, the 

narcotics agent went directly to Mr. Russell's home to purchase 

the methamphetamine. Shortly after the agent's arrival, Mr. 

Russell drove up on a three-wheeler having come from Mr. 

Stanberry's home, a short distance away. Mr. Russell had gone to 

Mr. Stanberry's to get the methamphetamine which he then sold to 

the narcotics agent. Mr. Russell told the narcotics agent that on 

most occasions when Mr. Stanberry was unavailable, Mr. Stanberry 

would tell him where the methamphetamine was hidden. 

Additionally, the narcotics agent testified he made numerous 

telephone calls to Mr. Russell asking him to set up a trip to 

California with Mr. Stanberry in order that they could purchase a 

large quantity of methamphetamine. All of these acts occurred in 

1988 and are sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find the 

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Appellate Case: 91-7020 Document: 010110243020 Date Filed: 04/21/1992 Page: 3
existence of the conspiracy and Mr. Russell's participation 

therein beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Mr. Russell tacitly concedes the formation of the conspiracy 

in 1988 and his participation therein. However, he asserts there 

is insufficient evidence to establish his continued participation 

in the conspiracy through August 14, 1990. Mr. Russell's argument 

is based upon a flawed legal assumption . During the existence of 

a conspiracy, each member of the conspiracy is legally responsible 

for the crimes of fellow conspirators. Pinkerton v. United 

States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). Of course, a conspirator is 

only responsible for the crimes of the conspirators that are 

committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. As stated by the 

Supreme Court, conspirators are responsible for crimes committed 

"within the scope of the unlawful project" and thus "reasonably 

foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful 

agreement." Id. at 647-48. Stated somewhat differently, a 

conspiracy, once instituted, continues to exist until it is 

abandoned, succeeds, or is otherwise terminated by some 

affirmative act, such as withdrawal by the de fendant. "The time 

at which a conspiracy ends depends upon the particular facts of 

[each] case." United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 867 

(10th Cir. 1984). 

In the case before us, the evidence is overwhelming that Mr. 

Russell was a part of a conspiracy formed i n 1988 to possess and 

distribute me thamphe tamine. Be caus e of this, Mr. Russell r emains 

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Appellate Case: 91-7020 Document: 010110243020 Date Filed: 04/21/1992 Page: 4
legally responsible for the crimes of his fellow conspirators as 

there exists no evidence in the record even tending to show Mr. 

Russell or his fellow conspirators terminated or otherwise ended 

the conspiracy. Ample evidence exists in the record that would 

enable the jury to find Mr. Russell guilty of conspiracy as 

charged in the indictment, including the allegation that the 

conspiracy existed from March 1988 until August 14, 1990. 

II. 

Mr. Russell also argues insufficient evidence exists to 

establish he was a part of the conspiracy in 1990 for 

purposes. This argument is predicated upon the 

Sentencing Guidelines were amended in 1989 to 

sentence than was possible under the 

provide 

pre-1989 

sentencing 

fact the 

a longer 

Sentencing 

Guidelines. These contentions have been fully discussed in United 

States v. Stanberry, __ F.2d , (No. 91-7021, 10th Cir. ___ , 

1992), which is dispositive. 

While not necessary to our disposition of this case, we 

nevertheless look at the evidence concerning the continuation of 

the conspiracy until 1990. We hold that on numerous occasions in 

1988 Mr. Stanberry told the narcotics agent his source of 

methamphetamine was in California; Mr. Stanberry sometimes 

received as much as two pounds from California; the parcel that 

was addressed to Ms. Coyote at Mr. Stanberry's address, which Mr. 

Stanberry received in August 1990, contained one pound of 

methamphetamine and had been mailed from California; and when the 

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Appellate Case: 91-7020 Document: 010110243020 Date Filed: 04/21/1992 Page: 5
items were seized pursuant to the search warrant in 1990, they 

were the same items utilized by Mr. Stanberry in 1988 in the 

presence of Mr. Russell for the purposes of concealing, packaging, 

carrying, and distributing the methamphetamine. 

The factual determination whether a conspiracy continued 

until August 14, 1990, was a question for the sentencing court. 

See United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 2064 (1991). As we stated in 

Stanberry, the termination date of the conspiracy was a sentencing 

factor that related only to the determinations of the sentence and 

had no bearing upon the guilt or innocence of Mr. Russell. The 

recited evidence clearly would enable the sentencing court to 

conclude a conspiracy existed and continued to exist until August 

1990. A defendant bears the burden of establishing withdrawal 

from a conspiracy. United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 

(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979). The record 

contains no evidence that Mr. Russell ever withdrew from the 

conspiracy nor that the conspiracy was in any way ended. A 

defendant is accountable for drug quantities associated with a 

conspiracy provided those 

and reasonably foreseeable 

quantities were "within the scope of, 

in connection with, the criminal 

activity he jointly agreed to undertake with his coconspirators." 

United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1462 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991). See also Sentencing Guideline 

§1B1.3, comment, n.1. The sentencing court properly based the 

sentencing calculations upon the quantity of methamphetamine 

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involved in the conspiracy including the one pound received by Ms . 

Coyote and Mr. Stanberry in August 1990. 

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

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