Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03150/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03150-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark John Carney
Appellant
Joan Fabian
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3150

___________

Mark John Carney, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Joan Fabian, Minnesota Commissioner *

of Corrections, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2007

Filed: June 5, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Mark Carney appeals from the district court’s1

 denial of his petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. We affirm.

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2

The Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota. 

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I.

In March 2001, Carney was convicted in a Minnesota state district court of firstdegree murder and was sentenced to life in prison for the shooting death of John

Voeller. At the time of the murder, Carney believed that Voeller was having an affair

with his wife, Shelia. At trial, Carney admitted that he shot Voeller, but asserted that

he had acted in the heat of passion and requested that the jury receive an instruction

for the lesser-included offense of first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter. The trial

court denied Carney’s motion and the jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict. 

On direct appeal, Carney asserted, inter alia, that the trial court erred in refusing

to give the heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. The Minnesota Supreme Court

concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction and

affirmed Carney’s conviction. State v. Carney, 649 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. 2002).

Following his direct appeal, Carney filed a petition for state postconviction relief,

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied his petition and the

Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Carney v. State, 692 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 2005).

Carney subsequently sought federal habeas corpus relief, asserting, among other

things, that he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process when the trial

court refused to give the heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. A magistrate

judge2

 issued a report and recommendation that concluded that Carney’s due process

argument was procedurally defaulted because it was not fairly presented to the

Minnesota Supreme Court and, alternatively, that the argument would fail on the

merits. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

and denied Carney’s petition. 

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We reject Carney’s contention that his brief on direct appeal sufficiently

asserted a due process violation when it stated that the trial court’s failure to give the

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II.

Carney contends on appeal that his due process claim was fairly presented to

the state court and therefore not procedurally defaulted. Carney further asserts that

the trial court’s refusal to give the heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction

constituted a denial of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. “In

reviewing a federal district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief, we review findings

of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.” Bell v. Attorney General, 474

F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 2007).

 

To be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner must first

“exhaust his state law remedies and fairly present the facts and substance of his habeas

claim to the state court.” Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 855 (8th Cir. 2006), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 980 (2007). “In order to fairly present a federal claim to the state

courts, the petitioner must have referred to ‘a specific federal constitutional right, a

particular constitutional provision, a federal constitutional case, or a state case raising

a pertinent federal constitutional issue in a claim before the state courts.’” McCall v.

Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Myre v. State of Iowa, 53 F.3d

199, 200 (8th Cir. 1995)). “If a petitioner has not presented his habeas corpus claim

to the state court, the claim is generally defaulted.” Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d

1155, 1161 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

As stated above, on direct appeal Carney challenged the trial court’s refusal to

give the heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. In that proceeding, however,

Carney relied solely on state law grounds – namely, that the trial court misapplied

Minnesota’s state statutes and case law on point. Carney did not specifically assert

a due process violation, refer to the United States Constitution, or cite a relevant

federal constitutional case.3

 In addition, and despite his assertion to the contrary,

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heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction affected his “substantial rights” and his

“significant, fundamental rights.” These rights that Carney was referring to were

those provided under Minnesota state law, and Carney cited only Minnesota state law

to support his argument. Further, while petitioners are not required to “cite book and

verse on the federal constitution” to satisfy the fair presentment requirement, “the

constitutional substance of a claim must be apparent,” and the petitioner “must have

explicitly referred the state courts to the United States Constitution or federal case

law.” Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations

omitted). This standard is not satisfied by the vague references petitioner relies on

here.

4

One of the issues before the court in Auchampach was whether the government

bore the burden of proving the absence of heat-of-passion when the matter is before

the jury. State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 816-18 (Minn. 1995). The sole

federal constitutional issue raised in this context was the principle that due process

requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every

element of the crime charged. Id. at 816. The court did not address the federal

constitutional implications of a trial court’s refusal to give a lesser-included offense

instruction. The constitutional issue presented in Auchampach was therefore not

pertinent to Carney’s case.

-4-

Carney’s citation to State v. Auchampach on direct appeal does not constitute a

reference to a “state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue” because the

constitutional issue raised in Auchampach is not pertinent to the one presented here.4

See State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 814-18 (Minn. 1995).

Despite his failure to refer specifically to a federal constitutional provision or

relevant case, Carney asserts that he is entitled to federal habeas review because the

state law arguments that he presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court are identical

to his due process arguments presented here. This argument lacks merit because, as

we have previously noted, “[m]ere similarity between the state law claims and the

federal habeas claims is insufficient . . . .” McCall, 114 F.3d at 757 (“‘If state courts

are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims

under the United States Constitution.’” (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

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For this reason, we note that even if Carney’s claim were not procedurally

defaulted, it would fail on the merits. To grant federal habeas relief, current law

requires us to conclude that a state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(2006). Because “[t]he Supreme Court has never held that due process requires the

giving of lesser-included-offense instructions in noncapital cases,” Dickerson v.

Dormire, 2 Fed. Appx. 695, 696 (8th Cir. 2001), the trial court’s refusal to give the

heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction here cannot be considered to be contrary to

clearly established federal law.

-5-

66 (1995))). Further, as the magistrate judge pointed out, the constitutional standard

governing lesser-included offense instructions in noncapital cases – if there is one –

is not necessarily synonymous with the standard imposed under Minnesota state law,

since the Supreme Court has never held that there is a constitutional requirement that

lesser-included offense instructions be given in noncapital cases.5

 Dickerson v.

Dormire, 2 Fed. Appx. 695, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam); Tatum

v. Dormire, 183 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1999); Pitts v. Lockhart, 911 F.2d 109, 112

(8th Cir. 1990). 

Also unpersuasive is Carney’s assertion that his federal habeas claim was fairly

presented because Minnesota case law regarding lesser-included offense instructions

relies upon federal constitutional law. None of the cases relied on by Carney

regarding this point were included in his brief on direct appeal and the fact that federal

constitutional law shaped Minnesota’s state law does not satisfy the fair presentment

requirements set forth above. Accordingly, we agree with the district court and

conclude that Carney failed to fairly present his due process claim to the Minnesota

state court.

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

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