Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03051/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03051-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Eugene Mack
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2016 Decided November 15, 2016 

No. 15-3051 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

KEVIN EUGENE MACK, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:13-cr-00150-1) 

John A. Briley, Jr. argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant. 

Karen P. Seifert, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Elizabeth 

Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Lauren R. Bates, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

EDWARDS. 

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 EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: On May 23, 2013, 

appellant Kevin Mack was charged by indictment with two 

counts of distribution of a mixture or substance containing 

phencyclidine (PCP), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B)(iv), (b)(1)(C), for twice selling PCP to an 

undercover police officer. On July 21, 2014, appellant pled 

guilty to one count of the indictment. On July 28, 2015, the 

District Court imposed a 77-month term of incarceration and 

36 months of supervised release. In his appeal to this court, 

appellant contends that the District Court erred by failing to 

consider his arguments for a time-served sentence. In 

particular, appellant claims that the trial judge ignored his 

“sentencing manipulation” argument – i.e., that the 

undercover officer arranged the second PCP sale solely to 

increase his sentence. Appellant also argues that the District 

Court erred in calculating the quantity of PCP attributable to 

him. 

At the time of sentencing, a district court judge is 

required to state in open court the reasons for choosing a 

particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012). This 

requirement has been construed to mean that the trial judge 

must address all “nonfrivolous reasons” for an alternative 

sentence asserted by a defendant and provide a “reasoned 

basis” in open court for any sentencing decision. United 

States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–57 (2007)). 

The trial judge in this case expressly rejected appellant’s 

claim that he had been “induced” by police officers to engage 

in unlawful conduct in an order denying appellant’s motion to 

dismiss the indictment. But the trial judge did not explicitly 

address the issue of “sentencing manipulation” when he 

rendered his sentencing decision. However, after explaining 

the reasons for his sentencing decision, the trial judge asked 

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appellant’s counsel on two occasions whether there was any 

reason why the court should not impose the sentence on the 

terms indicated. Counsel said “no.” In other words, even 

when afforded the opportunity to object, defense counsel 

never complained that the trial judge had failed to address 

appellant’s sentencing manipulation argument. In these 

circumstances, we hold that appellant did not preserve his 

claim that the District Court failed to adequately address his 

sentencing manipulation argument. We therefore review this 

claim for plain error. On the record before us, we find no 

plain error affecting appellant’s substantial rights. 

We also hold that the District Court did not clearly err in 

calculating the quantity of the liquids containing PCP that 

were the subject of the drug transactions. Under the clearly 

erroneous standard, the District Court’s findings of fact are 

presumptively correct. In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841, 844 

(D.C. Cir. 2009). On the record before us, we find no basis to 

overcome this presumption. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Summary of the Facts

 In 2012, the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) 

was investigating the sale of PCP in the District of Columbia. 

That investigation led an undercover MPD officer to contact 

someone named “Rico,” who steered the officer to his “Uncle 

Jimmy,” claiming that Jimmy was Rico’s PCP supplier. After 

failed attempts to contact Jimmy by telephone, appellant 

Kevin Mack texted the undercover officer and arranged to sell 

him PCP. On July 23, 2012, appellant sold six vials of liquid 

PCP to the undercover officer for $1,200. The transaction was 

video-recorded. A sample of the liquid was submitted to the 

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Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) for analysis and 

determined to be PCP with a purity of 4.9%. 

 Appellant and the undercover officer continued to 

exchange text messages after the first sale. They arranged 

another sale about a week after their first exchange, but when 

the MPD officer arrived at the second buy, appellant reported 

that he did not have the PCP prepared for delivery. A month 

later, appellant and the undercover officer arranged another 

meeting. On September 5, 2012, appellant sold six vials of 

liquid PCP to the undercover officer for $1,800. This 

transaction was also video-recorded. DEA later determined 

from a sample of the liquid that it was PCP with a purity of 

6.7%. 

 For several months after the second PCP transaction, 

MPD deliberated over how to proceed with its investigation. 

Because the lead officer involved in appellant’s case became 

involved in a different matter, MPD decided to close the case 

and proceed with prosecution. On May 23, 2013, a grand jury 

charged appellant with one count of unlawful distribution of a 

mixture or substance containing PCP, and one count of 

unlawful distribution of one hundred grams or more of a 

mixture or substance containing PCP, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iv), (b)(1)(C). 

B. The Proceedings Before the District Court 

On April 30, 2014 and May 31, 2014, appellant filed 

motions to dismiss on the grounds of entrapment and selective 

prosecution. The District Court denied these motions. United 

States v. Mack, 53 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D.D.C. 2014). The court 

ruled that no government agents “engaged in persuasive 

overtures” in soliciting appellant, “beyond those ordinarily 

present in drug transactions.” Id. at 188. The court also found 

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that the government “did not solicit the Defendant directly,” 

and noted that the first sale “was initiated by the Defendant . . 

. out of his own volition.” Id. Regarding the second PCP sale, 

the court noted that, although it “resulted from a series of text 

messages between the undercover officers and the 

Defendant,” there was “no evidence” of “persuasive 

overtures” by MPD officers or “any reluctance” on the part of 

appellant. Id. The court additionally found that appellant had 

not provided any “factual predicate or evidentiary foundation” 

for his entrapment argument. Id. 

 

 Finally, the court rejected appellant’s claim of selective 

prosecution. On this claim, the court found that appellant had 

“not put forth a shred of evidence even hinting at the 

existence of a discriminatory purpose behind the decision to 

prosecute him.” Id. 

 On July 21, 2014, appellant entered a guilty plea to Count 

One of the indictment. The plea agreement provided that the 

parties’ dispute over the drug quantity with respect to the 

relevant conduct would be resolved by the court as part of the 

sentencing procedures. 

1. The Drug Quantity Hearing

 Before sentencing, the District Court held a hearing at 

which the prosecution offered evidence to support its 

calculation that the relevant drug quantity was 222 grams. The 

Government’s Brief to this court accurately describes the 

testimony and evidence that was received by the District 

Court: 

Officer Cardinal . . . stated that liquid PCP has 

a “distinct chemical odor,” typically a yellow or 

amber tint, and often contains engine starter fluid. 

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[He] explained [that when] . . . more than one 

ounce is obtained by MPD, it uses a process called 

“remediation” wherein it submits only one ounce 

from the larger sample to DEA. First, each separate 

vial is weighed on a calibrated scale. Next, each 

vial is tested with a field-test kit to determine if it 

has a reaction for PCP. Thereafter, the liquid in all 

the vials is emptied into a beaker and weighed 

together. The weight of the beaker is subtracted 

from that amount to get the weight of the liquid 

substance. Finally, a one-ounce sample is taken 

from the liquid mixture and sent to DEA. The 

remaining substance is sent to MPD’s evidence 

collection division for destruction. MPD officers 

document all of these steps with photographs. 

Officer Cardinal testified that he takes these steps 

because DEA [will] . . . only receive a maximum 

of one ounce of liquid PCP, due to its volatility. 

. . . . 

Regarding the transaction on July 23, 2012, 

Officer Cardinal introduced photographs showing 

the four half-ounce vials and two one ounce vials 

that the undercover officer had purchased from 

appellant, the positive field tests for PCP from 

each vial, and the other steps in the remediation 

process. All six vials contained liquid that was 

consistent in odor and color with liquid PCP. The 

Officer testified that the liquid PCP purchased 

from appellant on July 23 weighed 87.6 grams, 

without any packaging. One ounce (25.4 grams) 

was sampled from this mixture, secured in 

appropriate packaging, and sent to DEA’s MidAtlantic Laboratory. That sample was tested by 

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DEA and shown to contain PCP, with a 4.9% 

purity. 

Regarding the transaction on September 5, 

2012, Officer Cardinal introduced photographs 

showing the six one-ounce vials that the 

undercover officer had purchased from appellant, 

the positive field tests for PCP from each vial, and 

the other steps in the remediation process. All six 

vials contained liquid that was consistent in odor 

and color with liquid PCP. The Officer testified 

that the liquid PCP purchased on September 5 

weighed 133.4 grams, without any packaging. One 

ounce (25.1 grams) was sampled from this 

mixture, secured in appropriate packaging, and 

sent to DEA’s Mid-Atlantic Laboratory. That 

sample was tested by DEA and shown to contain 

PCP, with a 6.7% purity. 

Investigator Derek Starliper testified that he 

was part of the team that secured the liquid PCP 

purchased from appellant. . . . [H]e took physical 

custody of the vials from the undercover officer, 

packaged and labeled them, deposited them into 

the MPD evidence room, retrieved them for 

remediation by Officer Cardinal, and then 

submitted the sample produced from the 

remediation process to DEA. 

Br. for Appellee 6–9 (citations omitted). 

 Appellant offered no evidence at the hearing. Instead, 

appellant submitted a Memorandum in which he questioned 

the reliability of the measurements and field tests conducted 

by MPD; argued that only the amount of drugs actually 

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measured and tested by DEA should be used to calculate the 

relevant drug quantity; and also argued that the alleged weight 

of the liquid PCP from the second transaction should not be 

included in the relevant drug quantity because the DEA 

chemist did not testify at the hearing. 

 On May 14, 2015, the District Court issued an order 

finding that MPD “followed sufficiently reliable procedures 

when they handled and measured the weight of the drug 

evidence” and proved the relevant drug quantity beyond a 

preponderance of the evidence. Memorandum & Order at 10–

11, United States v. Mack, No. 13-cr-0150 (D.D.C. May 14, 

2015), Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) 57–58. The District 

Court found no merit in appellant’s argument that the court 

should consider only the drug quantity sent to DEA. Id. at 8–

9, S.A. 55–56. The court pointed out that drug sampling 

procedures that were followed in this case were approved in 

United States v. Sheffield, 842 F. Supp. 2d 227, 228–29 & n.2 

(D.D.C. 2012), as well as United States v. McCutchen, 992 

F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1993), and United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 

190 (3d Cir. 2012). Id. at 8–9, S.A. 55–56.

2. The Sentencing Hearing

 Prior to sentencing, appellant filed a Memorandum 

requesting a “time-served” sentence. Appellant argued that he 

had been convicted in Maryland and was likely to be 

imprisoned there for five years or more; he was selectively 

prosecuted; he was solicited by police and the September 5, 

2012, transaction was engineered to increase the drug quantity 

amount; and he was inappropriately prosecuted in federal 

court instead of D.C. Superior Court. Appellant also 

submitted separate written objections to the calculation of his 

Sentencing Guidelines range in the Presentence Report, again 

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asserting that the court should consider only the drug quantity 

sent to DEA. 

 During the sentencing hearing, the District Court listened 

to arguments from appellant’s counsel and the prosecutor. 

The prosecutor explained to the court that appellant had not 

been selectively prosecuted, but rather that there was not 

sufficient evidence to proceed against other parties. The 

District Court addressed this point in noting that “many of the 

individuals caught up in the PCP investigation that resulted in 

the instant matter did not face justice.” Tr. of Sentencing 

Hearing at 23, S.A. 159. The District Court also addressed 

appellant’s argument that he was arbitrarily prosecuted in 

federal court. The trial judge asked the prosecutor: “[I]n this 

particular case, what [were] the driving factors that resulted in 

it being brought here rather than in superior court?” Id. at 15, 

S.A. 151. The prosecutor pointed to the amount of drugs and 

appellant’s criminal history. Id. at 15–16, S.A. 151–52. 

 The District Court imposed a 77-month term of 

incarceration and 36 months of supervised release, which 

would run concurrently with any sentence appellant served in 

his Maryland case. The court reviewed the sentencing factors 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting that the offense was “serious, 

PCP is a tremendously dangerous and destructive substance” 

and discussing appellant’s “tremendously long criminal 

history,” which included “repeated criminal convictions,” 

showing “that he is not easily deterred.” Tr. of Sentencing 

Hearing at 23, S.A. 159. The court also stated that appellant 

had been unsuccessful on repeated attempts at supervised 

release. The court rejected appellant’s request for a timeserved sentenced because appellant had appealed his 

Maryland case and the court needed to “ensure[] the public’s 

protection” if appellant was successful in that appeal. Id. at 

24, S.A. 160. 

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 There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that 

the trial judge addressed appellant’s sentencing manipulation 

argument during the sentencing hearing. Appellant raised this 

claim in his written Memorandum before sentencing and 

again during defense counsel’s oral presentation at 

sentencing. But the trial judge never explicitly commented on 

appellant’s request for mitigation on the ground of sentencing 

manipulation. 

 Although the trial judge did not expressly address 

sentencing manipulation during the course of sentencing, 

defense counsel declined two opportunities to object to the 

sentencing judge’s statement of reasons. After reciting his 

statement of reasons for appellant’s sentence, the trial judge 

said: 

I will now indicate the sentence to be imposed, but 

counsel will have one more opportunity to make 

any legal objections on the factors I have considered 

before I impose the sentence. Any further legal 

objections? 

Id. at 25, S.A. 161. Defense counsel replied “[n]o, Your 

Honor.” Id. Then, after announcing appellant’s sentence and 

explaining the terms of his supervised release, the District 

Court again asked “Counsel, any reason that I should not 

impose the sentence other than those previously argued as just 

stated?” and defense counsel replied “[n]o, Your Honor.” Id. 

at 27–28, S.A. 163–64. 

 

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II. ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review

Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), appellate courts review sentences 

under an abuse-of-discretion standard and set aside sentences 

found to be “unreasonable.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 261–63; 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

This review proceeds in two steps. First, the appellate 

court must “ensure that the district court committed no 

significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or 

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—

including an explanation for any deviation from the 

Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “In applying the 

clearly erroneous standard, an appellate court must remain 

mindful that judicial findings of fact are presumptively 

correct.” In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d at 844 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the appellate court 

reviews the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.; see also United States v. 

Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

This case involves only the first step. 

When a party fails to preserve a procedural challenge to 

his sentence, we review for plain error. See Locke, 664 F.3d at 

357 (“The more demanding plain error standard of review 

applies where a defendant fails to raise a claim at his 

sentencing hearing or fails to object to a district court's 

ruling.”); United States v. Akhigbe, 642 F.3d 1078, 1085 

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(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[O]ur review is for plain error because . . . 

[the defendant] failed in the district court to object to the 

adequacy of that court's reasoning.”). 

“To overturn a district court's decision under plain error 

review, we must find that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, 

and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions 

are satisfied, we have discretion to remedy the error only if 

(4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Baldwin, 

563 F.3d 490, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations, brackets, and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To affect substantial rights, 

the defendant must “show a reasonable probability that, but 

for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 

1343 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Appellant’s Procedural Challenges

As noted above, a district court judge must “state in open 

court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012). The sentencing judge “must 

adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for 

meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of 

fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. The judge need not 

recite “a full opinion in every case,” and the length and depth 

of the judge’s explanation “depends upon circumstances.” 

Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. The guiding principle is that “[t]he 

sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the 

appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments 

and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” Id. 

Part of the sentencing judge’s obligation under 3553(c) is 

to respond to a defendant’s “nonfrivolous reasons for 

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imposing a different sentence.” Id. at 357. When a defendant 

advances nonfrivolous arguments, “the judge will normally go 

further and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” Id. 

If the sentencing judge gives such an explanation, “we 

generally presume that he adequately considered the 

arguments and will uphold the sentence if it is otherwise 

reasonable.” Locke, 664 F.3d at 358. By contrast, if the 

sentencing judge fails to respond to a nonfrivolous argument, 

the presumption of adequate consideration is rebutted. See

United States v. Bigley, 786 F.3d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

 Appellant argues that “the record of the sentencing 

procedures includes no explanation by the district judge for 

not agreeing with, or even considering” several of his 

arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. Br. for Appellant 

9. Specifically, appellant claims that the District Court did not 

consider the arguments that he was “selectively prosecuted,” 

that he was arbitrarily prosecuted in federal court (and not 

state court), and that the officers “solicited a second PCP 

transaction, in order to enlarge the guideline sentencing 

range.” Id. at 8. 

 

 The record largely contradicts those assertions. As 

discussed in detail in the Background section, the trial judge 

afforded appellant ample opportunities to air his concerns 

about sentencing; he explicitly addressed appellant’s selective 

and arbitrary prosecution arguments; he sought clarifications 

and explanations from the prosecutor; and he offered a 

carefully reasoned judgment for his sentencing decision. The 

judge’s only omission was his failure to explicitly address 

appellant’s sentencing manipulation claim. 

 Prior to our 2015 decision in Bigley, there was 

uncertainty in our Circuit about whether sentencing 

manipulation was even a plausible argument for a reduced 

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sentence. See United States v. Oliveras, 359 Fed. App’x 257, 

261 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“Our sister Circuits 

have adopted widely different positions on the availability of 

the sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment 

doctrines. . . . [T]he D.C. Circuit has strongly suggested that it 

would not recognize either doctrine.”). However, as we 

explained in United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1123 

(D.C. Cir. 2016), the “law of the circuit is now clear that a 

defendant may raise a mitigation argument resting on 

sentencing entrapment to request a downward variance in his 

sentence.” 

 “Sentencing manipulation occurs when the government 

unfairly exaggerates the defendant's sentencing range by 

engaging in a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, 

increasing the drug quantities for which the defendant is 

responsible.” United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th 

Cir. 2009); see also Bigley, 786 F.3d at 15 (recognizing 

sentencing manipulation where an “officer ma[de] multiple 

drug buys from the defendant before finally arresting him”). 

In slight contrast, sentencing entrapment occurs “if the 

government induces a defendant to commit a more serious 

crime when he was predisposed to commit a less serious 

offense.” United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995). We have recognized both sentencing manipulation 

and sentencing entrapment, and a district court is obligated 

under 3553(c) and Rita to respond to those arguments. Bigley, 

786 F.3d at 14 (“When a district court confronts a 

nonfrivolous argument for a sentence below the relevant 

guideline range, it must consider it.” (citing Locke, 664 F.3d 

at 357)). 

 In this case, defense counsel advanced a sentencing 

manipulation argument, albeit with little clarity. It would have 

helped if counsel had cited Bigley, which was published 

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before appellant’s sentencing proceeding, and before defense 

counsel filed his Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing. 

Nevertheless, counsel did raise a vaguely discernable 

sentencing manipulation argument in writing and orally. 

 In his written Memorandum, defense counsel argued that 

“‘time served’ would be an appropriate sentence” because, 

among other reasons, “the second transaction (on 9/05/12) has 

served no other purpose than to enhance the drug quantity 

amount on which the Court will base its sentence.” 

Defendant’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing 3–4 (June 

26, 2015), Appendix for Appellant 21–22. At the sentencing 

hearing, defense counsel argued further that 

Mr. Mack was, for lack of a better term, lured into a 

second transaction and the net result of that 

transaction, it didn’t further the investigation, it 

didn’t result in any major breakthrough for the law 

enforcement. All it did was put Mr. Mack in a 

position of having a greater sentence than if he had 

been arrested within a short time following his first 

offense . . . . 

Tr. of Sentencing Hearing at 12, S.A. 148. And on appeal, 

defense counsel again alleged that “the MPDC officers had 

solicited a second PCP transaction, in order to enlarge the 

guideline sentencing range.” Br. for Appellant 8. 

Nevertheless, the transcript of the sentencing hearing shows 

that the District Court did not recognize or consider this 

argument at sentencing. 

 Prior to sentencing, the District Court gave careful 

consideration to an argument closely related to appellant’s 

sentencing manipulation argument. In defense counsel’s 

motion to dismiss the indictment, counsel argued that the 

undercover officers “induced the defendant’s participation in 

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the PCP-for-money transaction on September 5, 2012 for the 

sole purpose of exposing the defendant to additional penal 

sanctions.” Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Indictment; to 

Compel Discovery; For a Severance of Counts; and, For a Bill 

of Particulars at 2, United States v. Mack, No. 13-cr-0150 

(D.D.C. May 31, 2014). The District Court rejected this 

argument in a published opinion denying the motion to 

dismiss. Mack, 53 F. Supp. 3d 179. The court found that 

the second drug sale, which resulted from a series of 

text messages between the undercover officers and 

the Defendant, does not amount to inducement as 

there is no evidence that the Government's requests 

were accompanied by persuasive overtures or that 

the Defendant displayed any reluctance in 

consummating the transaction. The Defendant has 

not provided the factual predicate or evidentiary 

foundation necessary to meet his initial burden of 

showing government inducement. 

Id. at 188 (citation omitted). The defendant’s sentencing 

manipulation claim is essentially identical to his inducement 

claim: both allege that MPD officers improperly induced the 

second drug sale. 

 Of course, the District Court’s prior consideration of 

appellant’s sentencing manipulation argument is not a perfect 

substitute for explicit recognition at the sentencing proceeding 

itself. We have previously explained that sentencing judges 

“must adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . not only for 

the defendant but also for the public to learn why the 

defendant received a particular sentence.” In re Sealed Case, 

527 F.3d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Prior consideration of an argument 

in an earlier written opinion does less to adequately explain a 

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particular sentence than an explanation during the sentencing 

proceeding itself. However, the District Court’s prior written 

opinion at least confirms that the court considered all of the 

“nonfrivolous reasons” asserted for a lesser sentence. Rita,

551 U.S. at 357. Indeed, the record reveals that the trial judge 

was consistently attentive to the concerns raised by appellant. 

And there is more to be taken into account with respect to the 

trial judge’s handling of sentencing. 

In Locke, we stressed the importance of affording a 

defendant an “opportunity to object to the district court’s 

sentencing determination at sentencing.” 664 F.3d at 357. 

There is no claim here that appellant was denied an 

opportunity to pursue his sentencing manipulation claim at 

sentencing. It is unclear why defense counsel failed to raise an 

objection when the District Court never mentioned appellant’s 

sentencing manipulation argument. It may be that counsel 

recalled the judge’s opinion denying appellant’s motion to 

dismiss, in which the court rejected appellant’s claim that he 

had been “induced” by police officers to engage in the 

unlawful drug sales. Counsel may have decided that it would 

be fruitless to raise even a variation of the “inducement” 

argument again. In any event, it is clear that defense counsel 

did not object when the trial judge set forth the reasons 

supporting the sentencing decision without explicit reference 

to sentencing manipulation. 

 The alleged error raised by appellant in this appeal is the 

District Court’s failure to address his sentencing manipulation 

argument at sentencing. However, that alleged error was 

muted when the trial judge asked defense counsel near the 

conclusion of sentencing whether he had “[a]ny further legal 

objections[.]” Tr. of Sentencing Hearing at 25, S.A. 161. In 

other words, before rendering his final judgment on 

sentencing, the trial judge essentially asked defense counsel 

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“have I missed anything?” And the judge queried defense 

counsel twice, and each time counsel said “No, Your Honor.” 

Any protest of the alleged error was therefore forfeited. 

 When a defendant fails to raise objections at sentencing, 

we review only for plain error. United States v. Warren, 700 

F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2012). As the Supreme Court has 

explained, there are good reasons for this rule: 

If a litigant believes that an error has occurred 

(to his detriment) during a federal judicial 

proceeding, he must object in order to preserve the 

issue. If he fails to do so in a timely manner, his 

claim for relief from the error is forfeited. No 

procedural principle is more familiar to this Court 

than that a . . . right may be forfeited in criminal as 

well as civil cases by the failure to make timely 

assertion of the right before a tribunal having 

jurisdiction to determine it. 

. . . . 

This limitation on appellate-court authority 

serves to induce the timely raising of claims and 

objections, which gives the district court the 

opportunity to consider and resolve them. That 

court is ordinarily in the best position to determine 

the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute. In the 

case of an actual or invited procedural error, the 

district court can often correct or avoid the mistake 

so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate 

outcome. And of course the contemporaneousobjection rule prevents a litigant from 

“sandbagging” the court—remaining silent about 

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his objection and belatedly raising the error only if 

the case does not conclude in his favor. 

 

In federal criminal cases, Rule 51(b) tells parties 

how to preserve claims of error: “by informing the 

court—when the court ruling or order is made or 

sought—of the action the party wishes the court to 

take, or the party's objection to the court's action 

and the grounds for that objection.” Failure to abide 

by this contemporaneous-objection rule ordinarily 

precludes the raising on appeal of the unpreserved 

claim of trial error. Rule 52(b), however, recognizes 

a limited exception to that preclusion. The Rule 

provides, in full: “A plain error that affects 

substantial rights may be considered even though it 

was not brought to the court's attention.” 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 On the record before us, we can find no basis upon which 

to overturn the judgment of the District Court. The trial judge 

gave appellant’s counsel two opportunities to contest the 

proposed sentencing decision before sentence was 

pronounced. Trial judges often are pressed with a long litany 

of claims during sentencing, so it may happen that a judge 

inadvertently fails to address a claim that a defendant believes 

to be of consequence. In these circumstances, if a trial judge – 

as in this case – asks defense counsel whether there are any 

further objections to sentencing, it is incumbent upon counsel 

to voice any concerns regarding matters that counsel believes 

have not been addressed by the judge. As the Supreme Court 

said in Puckett, this contemporaneous-objection rule prevents 

a litigant from “sandbagging” the trial judge. 

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Because appellant forfeited his objection that the trial 

judge erred in failing to address his sentencing manipulation 

argument, we review the objection pursuant to the plain error 

standard. As the Supreme Court makes clear in Puckett, plain 

error review does not mean that a defendant cannot prevail on 

a challenge to a sentencing decision. See, e.g., United States v. 

Brown, 808 F.3d 865 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating a sentence 

and remanding for resentencing because the appellate court 

was unable to discern the sentencing judge’s rationale for 

imposing an above-Guidelines sentence); United States v. 

Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (vacating a plainly 

erroneous condition of supervised release). Plain error review 

simply means that the standard of review is very stringent and 

the likelihood of prevailing on appeal is greatly diminished. In 

applying Rule 52(b), we will vacate a plain error only if it 

impinges upon the defendant’s “substantial rights,” FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(b), in a way that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (quoting United 

States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). On the record 

before us, we cannot find that appellant’s substantial rights 

have been affected. 

“A sentencing error affects substantial rights when there is 

a reasonable likelihood it impacted the sentence.” Burroughs, 

613 F.3d at 245. In light of the District Court’s decision 

denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, it is 

implausible to think that the error in this case impacted 

appellant’s sentence. The District Court’s decision in Mack

clearly rejected appellant’s “inducement” claim, see Mack, 53 

F. Supp. 3d at 188, and that claim is essentially the same as 

appellant’s sentencing manipulation argument. The decision 

in Mack has not been contested, and for good reason. In our 

view, the District Court’s findings, reasoning, and judgment 

in Mack are eminently sound. 

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C. Drug Weight Calculation

Finally, appellant argues that the District Court erred in 

calculating the drug weight attributable to him. He argues that 

the procedure used by MPD and DEA is not a “legally 

satisfactory proof of drug quantity.” Br. for Appellant 12. We 

review the District Court’s determination of drug quantity 

relevant for sentencing under a clear error standard. United 

States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

There was no error here. 

After defense counsel called for an evidentiary hearing to 

determine the drug quantity for which appellant would be 

accountable, the District Court heard testimony from the 

officers who processed the PCP that appellant sold to the 

undercover officer. As detailed above, the officers testified 

and introduced photographs showing that after they seized 

multiple vials containing clear liquid in Mack’s possession, 

they field tested each vial for PCP. Then, the officer 

calibrated a scale, combined all of the liquid PCP into a 

beaker, and weighed the aggregate PCP. Next, the officer 

removed a one-ounce sample from the aggregated liquid PCP 

in the beaker, packaged it, and sent it to the DEA’s MidAtlantic lab for testing. The officer used this same 

methodology to process the vials from both the first and 

second drug sales. The District Court credited this testimony 

and evidence in upholding MPD procedures. This was not 

clear error. 

Defense counsel claims that appellant should only be 

accountable for the two one-ounce samples (roughly 50 

grams) sent to the DEA’s lab, and not for the aggregate 

quantity of PCP in the vials field tested and weighed by MPD. 

The District Court rejected this argument after the evidentiary 

hearing. Appellant’s sole challenge to this finding is that 

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MPD’s testing procedures were not authorized by 28 CFR § 

50.21, which appellant claims governs only DEA’s drug 

testing procedures. Br. for Appellant 11–12. This argument 

misses the mark. MPD’s drug processing procedures do not 

need to be authorized by any federal regulations to provide 

valid, satisfactory proof of drug quantity. See McCutchen, 992 

F.2d at 25–26 (upholding processing technique to determine 

drug quantity for sentencing where the government 

extrapolated from a test sample). 

“A district court makes findings of drug quantities under 

a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Burnett, 827 F.3d 

at 1120 (citing United States v. Fields, 325 F.3d 286, 289 

(D.C. Cir. 2003)). Appellant has not raised, nor do we 

perceive, any error with the District Court’s calculation of 

PCP attributable to appellant. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of 

the District Court. 

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