Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00696/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00696-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angela McKinney
Plaintiff
R&L Foods, LLC
Defendant

Document Text:

The parties dispute some of the facts. However, for purposes of this 1

memorandum opinion, the court will recite disputed facts in the light most

favorable to McKinney, giving her the benefit of every doubt. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANGELA MCKINNEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

R&L FOODS, LLC, d/b/a WENDY’S

OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

CIVIL ACTION NO.

06-AR-0696-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is the motion of defendant, R&L Foods, LLC,

d/b/a Wendy’s Old-Fashioned Hamburgers (“R&L”), for summary

judgment in the above-entitled action brought by plaintiff, Angela

McKinney, who claims sexual harassment and retaliation in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq. (“Title VII”), and the state-law torts of invasion of privacy,

assault and battery, negligent supervision, and negligent

retention. For the reasons that follow, R&L’s motion will be

granted in part and denied in part.

Pertinent Undisputed Facts1

R&L is a company which, until July 2005, owned and operated a

Wendy’s Old-Fashioned Hamburgers (“Wendy’s”) restaurant in the

Century Plaza located in Birmingham, Alabama. Affidavit of Gary

Real (herein, “Real Aff.”) (Doc. No. 36-2), at ¶ 1. McKinney

FILED

 2007 May-31 PM 02:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 1 of 35
 This portion of McKinney’s deposition transcript indicates that Mackey 2

promoted McKinney to shift leader in 2004, but this appears to represent an

inadvertent misstatement made by McKinney. McKinney does not deny R&L’s

assertion that she was promoted to shift leader in 2001. See Def.’s Summ. J.

Br. (Doc. No. 35), at 3, ¶ 5b.

2

worked as a crew person at the Century Plaza store from the summer

of 1999 until she resigned for personal reasons less than one year

later. Deposition of McKinney (herein, “McKinney Dep.”) (Docs.

Nos. 36-4 — 36-13), at 37:5 — 38:18. She was rehired as a crew

person at the Century Plaza Wendy’s in 2001. Id., at 58:17 —

59:10. She was promoted by then store manager, Deltrika Mackey, to

the position of shift leader later in 2001. Id., at 32:3-22. As 2

shift leader, McKinney was responsible for opening and closing the

store, completing necessary paperwork, and generally overseeing the

shift, but she was not considered to be a part of management. Id.,

at 35:17 — 36:17. In February 2002, Jerry Young took over for

Mackey as store manager. Affidavit of Jerry Young (herein, “Young

Aff.”) (Doc. No. 36-3), at ¶ 2. As shift leader, McKinney was not

authorized to hire or fire people, and she was not authorized

independently to discipline other employees. McKinney Dep., at

35:17 — 36:17. She was authorized to confer with store manager,

Jerry Young, about issuing discipline to other employees. Id.

Approximately five employees worked at the Century Plaza store

at any one time. Id., at 85:12-15. McKinney frequently worked

with crew persons Cedric Morris and Darrius Jackson. According to

McKinney, Morris, and to a much lesser extent, Jackson, often

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 2 of 35
3

engaged in obscene, insulting, and/or offensive behavior at the

workplace. The following is an exhaustive list of all such

behavior in which McKinney says Morris and Jackson engaged:

1. Once in 1999, before her rehire, McKinney saw Morris in

the freezer with his pants unzipped with Misty Woods, a

woman whom McKinney thinks Morris dated. McKinney Dep.,

at 205:22 — 207:9; 208:16 — 209:22; 210:4 — 211:2.

McKinney did not report this incident to anyone at R&L.

Id., at 209:23 — 210:6.

2. Once in 1999, also before her rehire, Morris told

McKinney that he “went down on” Woods and “that he’ll do

it again.” Id., at 281:7 — 283:1. McKinney did not

report this incident. Id., at 281:20-22.

3. Morris touched his penis through his pants in front of

McKinney “several times a day,” beginning in 2001. Id.,

at 183:6-20; 187:12-23. McKinney reported this conduct

to Mackey or to Young at least six times. Id., at

193:14-21; 197:15-22. As a result of McKinney’s

reporting Morris’s penis-grabbing, McKinney thinks that

Mackey cut Morris’s hours for one week in 2001. Id., at

196:3-6.

4. On two occasions, Morris made remarks to customer

Kimberly Harris in front of McKinney, such as that he

“didn’t like fat girls” and/or that Harris was “too fat”

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 3 of 35
4

for him to have sex with her. Declaration of Kimberly

Harris (herein, “Harris Decl.”) (Doc. No. 36-16), at ¶¶

4-5; McKinney Dep., at 295:11 — 305:20. Harris did not

take offense at any of Morris’s remarks because she “knew

[Morris’s] personality,” and because she had “concluded

[Morris] was a playful person who liked to tease.”

Harris Decl., at ¶ 4. McKinney says that Morris’s

speaking to Harris this way “made [McKinney] upset.”

McKinney Dep., at 295:17. McKinney reported both of

these incidents to Young. Id., at 297:17-19; 305:21 —

306:2. When she reported the incident to Young the first

time, Young was a shift leader or an assistant manager,

and Mackey was the store manager. Id., at 299:4 —

302:22. When McKinney reported the second incident,

Young was the store manager. Id., at 305:21 — 306:5.

5. Once in early 2005, Morris stated in McKinney’s presence

that he had attended a bachelor party featuring

strippers, and that he was “up on” the strippers. Id.,

at 234:10 — 241:2. McKinney did not report Morris’s

comment because she believed that Young had overheard the

conversation. Id., at 243:15 — 244:19. Young confirmed

that he did overhear Morris say that “he had gone to a

bachelor party that had strippers at the bachelor party.”

Deposition of Jerry Young (herein, “Young Dep.”) (Doc.

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 4 of 35
5

No. 36-19), at 85:5-10.

6. On several occasions, Morris touched McKinney’s head.

Id., at 211:10 — 218:13. After one such occurrence,

McKinney shoved Morris and told him to stop. Id., at

215:2-6. McKinney told Young to tell Morris to stop

putting his hands on her head. Id., at 216:8 — 218:13.

Young did stop, and McKinney does not recall another

occasion on which Morris touched her head after that.

Id.

7. In early 2005, Morris grabbed McKinney’s breasts. Id.,

at 218:14 — 227:5. Morris kept his hands on McKinney’s

breasts for “a couple seconds,” and then he laughed and

walked off. Id., at 224:14 — 225:7. McKinney reported

this incident to Young. Id., at 225:11-12. McKinney

does not remember how Young responded. Id., at 225:16-

18.

8. In early 2005, Morris “pushed [McKinney] from the chili

well to the second register.” Id., at 227:6 — 233:20.

McKinney was pregnant at the time. Id., at 228:18 —

229:1. McKinney immediately went to Young to tell him

that Morris had pushed her. Id., at 231:8-10.

9. At least once, Jackson “talked nasty, rude” to McKinney.

Id., at 344:15 — 347:22. On one such occasion,

approximately two months before McKinney’s July 2005

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 5 of 35
6

termination, Jackson told McKinney that she needed “to

leave [her] old man for him” and that he would take care

of her. Id., at 346:4-8. McKinney did not report any of

Jackson’s comments to any member of management. Id., at

345:5-7. McKinney does not specifically recall how many

times Jackson “talked nasty” to her. Id., at 346:9-21.

10. Approximately two months before her July 2005 discharge,

Morris said to “the employees in general” that he had

“fucked” his girlfriend “from behind” and in “the chicken

wing” position. Id., at 286:11 — 288:2. McKinney did

not report this incident to management “because Jerry

[Young] was in on the conversation.” Id., at 288:23 —

289:15.

11. On July 4, 2005, McKinney saw Morris rub himself to

erection by the freezer door and come to the store’s

front. Id., at 310:3 — 324:15. Morris said, “I bet you

won’t believe I’ll pull it out.” Id., at 317:3-22.

Morris proceeded to undo his pants and to expose his

penis to McKinney. Id. McKinney reported this incident

to Young. Id., at 324:16-20. When she did, Young

laughed. Id., at 326:22 — 327:2.

12. Morris made “nasty comments,” which were “every day”

occurrences. Id., at 258:15-20. Among those that

McKinney specifically recalls:

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 6 of 35
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a. In early 2005, Morris told McKinney, while he was

standing at the ordering counter and while grabbing

his penis, that “he was too big” for her. Id.,

at 250:4 — 255:11. Fellow employee Gwendolyn

Griffin was present during this incident. Id., at

252:15-18. McKinney did not report it to

management. Id., at 254:8-21.

b. Morris once rubbed his chest while saying “you want

some of this” to McKinney. Id., at 255:4 — 264:4.

McKinney did not report this incident to

management. Id., at 257:10-15. Young was present

when Morris said this to McKinney. Id., at 261:7-

10.

c. Morris once told McKinney “you couldn’t handle me.”

Id., at 264:5 — 273:6. McKinney did not report

this incident to management. Id., at 266:2-10.

According to R&L, there was posted at the Century Plaza

Wendy’s a poster notifying employees of a 1-800 telephone number

that they should call if they believed they were being subjected to

sexual harassment. Young Aff., at ¶ 2b. McKinney never called the

1-800 number to report any of the offensive conduct of Morris or

Jackson, but she denies that a poster informing her of such a

telephone number was ever posted. Pla.’s Resp. to Def.’s First

Req. for Admis. to Pla. (Doc. No. 39-2), Resp. No. 1; McKinney

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 7 of 35
8

Dep., at 327:13-14. It is undisputed that R&L had a written policy

describing the actions employees should take in order to report

sexual harassment in the workplace. That policy provided:

PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS

A. Any employee who believes that they [sic] have been

the subjects of harassment should promptly report

the alleged act to their immediate supervisor

and/or Human Resources. Employees who feel

comfortable doing so should also inform the person

engaging in such harassment that the conduct is

offensive and must stop.

B. Supervisory personnel who become aware of harassing

conduct which is violation of this guideline must

report such conduct immediately to Human Resources

and initiate an investigation of the allegations.

(Failure to do so may result in disciplinary

action.)

C. Human Resources has the responsibility of ensuring

that all complaints of harassment are investigated

and resolved in a timely and effective manner. The

employee who registered the complaint may be

advised of the outcome.

D. All investigations of harassment allegations will

be conducted with all due regard to the need for

confidentiality. Employees have a responsibility

to provide information needed to properly

investigate the allegation(s). All matters will be

considered confidential with disclosure limited to

only those directly affected. Employee’s [sic] who

disclose confidential information to unauthorized

parties will be subjected to disciplinary action.

E. Where investigations confirm, appropriate

disciplinary action will be taken up to and

including discharge. An employee whose allegations

were made in good faith will not be subject to any

retaliation on the part of [R&L]. However, should

[R&L] determine the allegation(s) to be fabricated,

the employee will be subject to disciplinary action

up to and including discharge.

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 8 of 35
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* * *

R&L Crew Employees Handbook (herein, “Employee Handbook”), Real

Aff., Attach. A, at 8-9; McKinney Dep., Ex. 6, at 8-9. Although

Young never reported to Human Resources any of the allegedly

harassing conduct about which McKinney says she complained in

accordance with R&L’s written policy, Young says that he is “aware

of no one who reported unwanted sexual touching, sexual comments or

words, sexually derogatory statements, or other kinds of conduct

during [his] employment at the Century Plaza Wendy’s.” Young Aff.,

at ¶ 2c. 

In addition to the written harassment policy, R&L’s Crew

Employees Handbook contained a written employee-conduct policy

which covered unexcused employee absences. That policy provided:

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT

It is [R&L’s] desire that all of it’s [sic] employees

find the time they spend working to be a rewarding

experience. [R&L] intends to maintain a professional and

pleasant work environment for its employees to enjoy.

All employees are expected to conform to generally

accepted business standards to behavior. Employee

discipline problems or performance problems may require

corrective action by [R&L]. Depending on the seriousness

of the problem the action taken could be any of the

following:

1. Written Warning

2. Suspension of employment

3. Termination of employment

Disciplinary problems are generally broken down into one

of two categories. These are (1) Unacceptable Behavior

or Conduct or (2) Flagrant Violations.

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 9 of 35
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UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR OR CONDUCT

Although not exhaustive, the following are illustrative

of those actions, which can usually be corrected through

progressive discipline procedures. Employees will be

given an opportunity to explain their view of the

situation and given reasonable assistance in resolving

any issues. Employees should be given specific length of

time in which to correct the problem and understand that

continued violation may lead to dismissal.

Frequent unauthorized tardiness or frequent unauthorized

absence from work. The employee must notify the manager

at least 30 minutes prior to the start of the shift if

they are going to be tardy. The employee must notify the

manager at least three hours prior to the start of their

shift if they are going to be absent. Store openers must

notify the manager at least 1⁄2 hour prior to the start of

the shift or the evening before.

A note from the employee’s physician may be required.

Negligence, resulting from inferior work, equipment

breakdown, or intentional waste of products, materials or

supplies.

Using telephones for excessive personal calls is not

allowed. Cellular telephones, walkie-talkies and beepers

are not permitted on line at any time. District Managers

and other supervisory personnel may carry these items on

line; however, they should use care to insure that their

use does not our [sic] guests [sic] dining experience.

Violation of safety or health regulations.

Soliciting, collecting funds, engaging in propaganda or

organizing activities, distributing pamphlets or other

materials, posting notices or articles on [R&L] premises

without proper approvals.

Any other non-crisis behavior which may be correctable

and which does not threaten substantial [R&L] interests.

The following policy IS NOT subject to [R&L] progressive

disciplinary action guidelines. Failure to report to

work without the required notice, as outlined above, is

grounds for immediate termination. A first infraction

can result in immediate termination.

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 10 of 35
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* * *

Employee Handbook, at 9-10.

McKinney missed a shift for which she was scheduled to work on

July 11, 2005. McKinney Dep., at 120:6-8. She says that she

missed her shift because she had to rush her uncle to the emergency

room that day, and she “just didn’t think about calling in.” Id.,

at 119:12-18. Approximately two hours after she was supposed to

report for her shift, McKinney did call in to report her absence.

Id., at 121:7-19. She spoke to fellow shift-leader Gwendolyn

Griffin. Id. Although she did not report her absence directly to

Young or to any other member of management, “at that time, a

manager wasn’t scheduled until . . . later that afternoon.” Id.,

at 126:12-14. McKinney says she had medical documentation which

proved that her uncle had to be taken to the emergency room, but

that she did not show Young the documentation because Young “never

asked for it.” Id., at 121:23 — 122:6.

On July 14, 2005, Young terminated McKinney. Young Aff., at

¶ 9. His only stated reason for the termination was that McKinney

was a “no-call/no-show” on July 11, 2005. Id. McKinney had been

warned on one prior occasion for having been absent for a shift

without calling in. McKinney Dep., at 122:7-12. Young says that

neither Griffin nor any other employee told him that McKinney had

called Griffin to report her July 11, 2005 absence, but that it

would not have mattered if he had been told because “the policy

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 11 of 35
12

required that [McKinney] speak with a manager.” Young Aff., at ¶¶

9c, 9d. McKinney says that she was “devastated” when she was

fired, and that, as a result, she has been “stressed out” and has

experienced hair loss. McKinney Dep., at 366:22 — 369:6.

On September 6, 2005, McKinney filed a charge of

discrimination with the E.E.O.C. against R&L based on Morris’s

alleged sexual harassment of her. She received a right-to-sue

letter on March 30, 2006, and she initiated this action on April 7,

2006. 

Summary Judgment Standard

In considering a Rule 56 motion, the court must construe the

evidence and make factual inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). The

court may enter summary judgment only if it is shown “that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The court does not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of

the matter,” but solely “determine[s] whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

242-43 (1986) (citations omitted). This determination involves

applying substantive law to the substantive facts construed in

favor of the non-movant. 

Analysis

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 12 of 35
13

I. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment

sexual harassment under Title VII, McKinney must demonstrate a

basis for holding the employer, R&L, liable for the harassment.

Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2000);

see Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir.1999)

(en banc), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1068, 120 S.Ct. 1674, 146 L.Ed.2d

483 (2000). Employer liability in a case, like this one, involving

sexual harassment by a co-worker, exists when the employer knew

(had actual notice) or should have known (had constructive notice)

of the harassment, and failed to take remedial action. Breda, 222

F.3d at 889; see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th

Cir. 1982). The other elements of a prima facie case of hostile

work environment sexual harassment require that McKinney establish

that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was the

subject of unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment occurred

because of her sex; and (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment.

Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1245. R&L concedes for purposes of its

summary-judgment motion that McKinney is a member of a protected

group (female), that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual

harassment, and that the harassment occurred because she is a

female. The only elements of the prima facie case that are in

dispute are whether the harassment was sufficiently severe and

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 13 of 35
14

pervasive, and whether the harassment can be attributed to R&L.

This court has no doubt that a reasonable jury could find,

based on McKinney’s testimony, that the harassment to which she was

subjected was sufficiently pervasive and hostile to support a Title

VII claim. In assessing whether harassment is objectively severe

and pervasive, the court must look to (1) the frequency of the

conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct

was physically threatening and humiliating or just a mere

utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with

the employee’s work performance. Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC,

367 F.3d 1238, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In

considering these factors, the court must apply a totality-of-thecircumstances approach. Id. at 1248; Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,

Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). R&L argues that

McKinney can point to only 14 discreet acts of harassment

(allegations 1-11 and 12(a), (b), and (c) above, see supra pp. 3-

7), but many of the harassing acts to which McKinney says she was

subjected happened more than once — with some occurring many times

each day that McKinney and Morris worked together. Although the

court agrees that the totality-of-the-circumstances test is

inherently difficult to apply in a completely objective manner, R&L

completely abandons this principle in favor of a test that would

evaluate each individual instance of alleged harassment in a

vacuum. Despite R&L’s attempt to persuade the court otherwise,

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 14 of 35
15

there is sufficient evidence that McKinney was the target of

constant, daily unwelcome sexual comments — such as Morris saying

with sexual overtones that he was “too big for her,” that “you want

some of this,” and that “you couldn’t handle me” — to prove

pervasiveness. McKinney was also subjected to more than just the

occasional unwelcome touching; Morris touched her head hair “on

several occasions,” and one time he grabbed her breasts with

“enough pressure for them to go up.” Morris also once shoved

McKinney across the store, which might not constitute an act of

sexual harassment if it were viewed as an isolated event, but which

could easily be interpreted by a reasonable jury as a sexually

threatening act, given Morris’s alleged pattern of behavior. In

addition to Morris’s frequent comments directed exclusively at

McKinney, and to his touching, shoving, or grabbing McKinney on

numerous occasions, Morris’s daily touching of his penis through

his pants, and his one-time pulling his penis out of his pants in

front of McKinney, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that,

under the totality of the circumstances, the harassment to which

McKinney was subjected was severe and pervasive enough to alter the

terms and conditions of her employment.

However, in order for her to succeed on her hostile-workenvironment sexual-harassment claim, McKinney must also establish

that the employer itself can be held responsible for the

harassment. McKinney can meet this requirement if R&L knew or

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 15 of 35
16

should have known of the harassing activity, but failed to take

remedial action. Breda, 222 F.3d at 889. Although McKinney does

not contend that R&L had actual knowledge of every episode in which

she was harassed by Morris, the following is a list of incidents

which McKinney says she reported to Young or to Mackey, or during

which Young or Mackey was physically present and could hear or

observe: 

• Morris touched his penis through his pants in front of

McKinney several times per day.

• Two times, Morris told customer Harris that he “didn’t

like fat girls” and/or that Harris was “too fat” for him

to have sex with her.

• Morris said that he had attended a bachelor party where

he was “up on” strippers.

• Morris touched McKinney’s head hair.

• Morris grabbed McKinney’s breasts.

• Morris pushed McKinney from the chili well to the second

register.

• Morris told his fellow employees that he had “fucked” his

girlfriend “from behind” and in “the chicken wing”

position.

• Morris rubbed himself to erection, told McKinney that “I

bet you won’t believe I’ll pull it out,” and proceeded to

expose his penis.

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 16 of 35
17

• Morris rubbed his chest while saying “you want some of

this” to McKinney.

R&L’s knowledge of the harassment is a question of fact, and a

supervisor’s knowledge can constitute the knowledge of the

employer. See Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F.Supp.2d

1254, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2001). (citing Martin v. Norfolk Southern

Railway Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1051-52 (N.D. Ala. 1996)). R&L

contends that some of McKinney’s complaints were too “generalized”

to have put it on notice of Morris’s objectionable behavior. R&L

may be correct in this regard, but that is an issue of fact that

cannot be decided at the summary-judgment stage. Based on the

evidence presented by McKinney, a reasonable jury could find that

managers Mackey and Young — and by extension, R&L — knew or should

have known about Morris’s allegedly harassing behavior.

The fact that McKinney never called the 1-800 telephone number

which R&L says it posted to report any sexual harassment is not

dispositive. Although an employee must comply with the reporting

procedures that her employer has established, see Frederick v.

Sprint/United Mgmt., 246 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001), R&L’s

written policy makes no mention of any 1-800 number. It expressly

states, however, that “[a]ny employee who believes that they have

been the subjects of harassment should promptly report the alleged

act to their immediate supervisor and/or Human Resources” (emphasis

added). There is evidence that McKinney followed this policy after

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 17 of 35
18

many of the incidents in which she says she was harassed by Morris.

Moreover, R&L admits that action was taken against Morris only two

times: once when Mackey cut his hours for one week in 2001, and

again when Young told him not to put his hand on McKinney’s head.

Under the circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that these

actions fail to amount to sufficient “remedial action” to exonerate

R&L. Accordingly, R&L’s motion for summary judgment with respect

to McKinney’s hostile-work-environment sexual-harassment claim will

be denied.

II. Retaliation

McKinney contends that R&L retaliated against her for engaging

in activity protected by Title VII when it fired her on July 14,

2005. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under Title VII, McKinney must prove that (1) she participated in

an activity protected by Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the

participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 586 (11th

Cir. 2000). If she makes out a prima facie case, R&L must then

articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions,

which McKinney must then demonstrate are pretextual if she is to

prevail. Sullivan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056,

1059 (11th Cir. 1999). R&L concedes the first two elements of the

prima facie case for purposes of its summary-judgment motion, but

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 18 of 35
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it says that McKinney’s retaliation claim fails because she cannot

meet the third element. R&L further asserts that, in any event,

there is no evidence that its stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for firing McKinney is a pretext.

A. McKinney’s Prima Facie Case

R&L contends that McKinney has not established her prima facie

case because she cannot demonstrate that her being fired was

causally related to her complaining about the allegedly

discriminatory behavior of Morris. In order to establish a jury

issue of causal connection, McKinney need only show that her

complaints about Morris, and her being fired, were not “wholly

unrelated.” EEOC v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571

(11th Cir. 1993). The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “cases

that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge

of protected activity and an adverse employment action as

sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case

uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close,’”

Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121

S.Ct. 1508, 1511 (2001) (citing O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237

F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001); Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d

205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (3-month period insufficient); Hughes v.

Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-1175 (7th Cir. 1992) (4-month period

insufficient)). McKinney last engaged in what might have been

statutorily protected activity on July 4, 2005, when she reported

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to Young that Morris had rubbed himself to erection and exposed his

penis to her. Young fired her on July 14, 2005. The fact that

only ten days elapsed between the time McKinney last complained

about an act that arguably constituted sexual harassment in

violation of Title VII, and the time she was terminated, can in

itself establish the causal connection necessary to support her

prima facie case. In other words, this court finds that a ten-day

period, unlike a 3- or 4-month period, can be reasonably considered

“very close” for purposes of McKinney’s Title VII retaliation

claim. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether McKinney can establish her prima facie case of

retaliation.

B. R&L’s Proffered Reason for Terminating 

McKinney’s Employment

R&L’s Employee Handbook states:

The employee must notify the manager at least 30 minutes

prior to the start of the shift if they are going to be

tardy. The employee must notify the manager at least

three hours prior to the start of their shift if they are

going to be absent. Store openers must notify the

manager at least 1⁄2 hour prior to the start of the shift

or the evening before.

. . .

The following policy IS NOT subject to Company

progressive disciplinary action guidelines. Failure to

report to work without the required notice, as outlined

above, is grounds for immediate termination. A first

infraction can result in immediate termination.

R&L flatly and unequivocally says that it fired McKinney for one

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21

reason, namely, because she was a “no-call, no-show” on July 11,

2005. There is no dispute that McKinney did not call and report

her absence to Young, and that she did not report her absence to

anyone at the store until at least two hours after her shift was

scheduled to begin. R&L’s termination of McKinney’s employment is

entirely consistent with its written policy. R&L has thus met its

light burden of articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason

for discharging McKinney. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106

F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).

C. Pretext

Although R&L has met its burden of producing a legitimate

reason for firing McKinney, McKinney “has the opportunity to

demonstrate that the defendant’s articulated reason for the adverse

employment action is a mere pretext” for retaliation. Holifield v.

Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir.1997) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825 (1973)).

The court’s task is to “determine whether the plaintiff has cast

sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory

reasons to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the

employer’s proffered ‘legitimate reasons were not what actually

motivated its conduct.’” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. A plaintiff can

establish pretext by showing “that she has been the victim of

intentional discrimination . . . either directly by persuading the

court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the

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employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229

F.3d 1012, 1052 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089,

1095 (1981)). McKinney contends that R&L’s stated reason for

firing her is not credible because (1) R&L was unreasonable in not

accepting her reason for not following the written attendance

policy, (2) R&L has given conflicting explanations for its

decision, and (3) R&L retained other employees who were similarly

situated to her. See Pla.’s Br. in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ

J. (Doc. No. 38), at 21-25.

1. McKinney explained why she did not report to work

on July 11, 2005.

McKinney first argues that R&L’s having followed its written

policy by firing her after she had an unexcused absence on July 11,

2005 is not a credible reason for her termination because she

subsequently explained why she was absent. See id., at 21-22. It

may be true that R&L’s policy allows employees to call in unexcused

absences to a shift leader rather than to a manager, and to offer

an explanation as to why they did not call in the absence in a

timely manner. See Young Dep., at 32:20 — 33:1; Deposition of Gary

Real (herein, “Real Dep.”) (Doc. No. 36-18), at 76:16-18. It may

also be true that R&L management believes that “there is a

difference between someone not calling and not showing up and

someone calling after they are supposed to be there to let

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23

[management] know their situation.” Young Dep., at 43:9-13. Even

assuming that all of these things are true, there is no evidence to

suggest that R&L must abandon, or even that it typically or

occasionally does abandon, its written policy in favor of accepting

a truant employee’s excuse.

McKinney also contends that the specific reason for which she

was absent — she says she was taking a relative to the emergency

room — renders R&L’s articulated reason for the termination

unworthy of credence. R&L testified through its Rule 30(b)(6)

representative that “if you’re in the emergency room . . . that’s

about as good an excuse as you can come up with.” Real Dep., at

77:2-4. Young also individually testified that a medical excuse

“would be an excused absence if documentation was brought to my

attention in that situation,” and that a “medical excuse” would be

accepted if the employee did call in the absence in accordance with

company policy even if the employee could not provide

documentation. Young Dep., at 28:14 — 30:1. In what appears to be

an attempt to lead the court into a misinterpretation of the

testimony, McKinney cites to this evidence despite the fact that

counsel’s questions that prompted the testimony were clearly

intended to apply to an excuse related to an employee’s own medical

condition. Neither McKinney’s counsel’s questions, nor the

witnesses’ responses, can be reasonably understood to have referred

to a third party’s medical condition, as was the case with

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McKinney’s July 11, 2005 absence. McKinney’s ineffectual argument

on this part does not render R&L’s articulated reason for firing

her unworthy of credence.

2. R&L offered “inconsistent reasons” in support of

McKinney’s termination.

McKinney next contends that Young and R&L gave inconsistent

reasons for firing her, and that this establishes that R&L’s reason

for firing her is unworthy of credence. See Pla.’s Br. in Resp. to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ J., at 22-23. McKinney cites to the following

evidence in support of this assertion:

• R&L’s interrogatory answers, signed by Director of Human

Resources, Gary Real, state that McKinney was “terminated

by male general manager Jerry Young on July 14, 2005 for

her failure to report for work or call in as required by

company policy, despite having been previously warned of

such conduct.” (McKinney’s emphasis). Def.’s Resp. to

Pla.’s First Req. for Admis., Interrogs., and Req. for

Produc. of Docs. (Doc No. 39-3). 

• Real testified in his deposition that he personally is

“not aware of any performance issues” with respect to

McKinney. Real Dep., at 80:23-24.

• Real’s only personal knowledge of McKinney’s absence is

related to her last day of work. Id., at 81:5-6.

• Young testified that McKinney’s “being tardy and being

written up for a tardy has no warrant on her being fired

Case 2:06-cv-00696-WMA Document 55 Filed 05/31/07 Page 24 of 35
 Real testified both in his personal capacity and in his capacity as 3

corporate representative of R&L during his deposition. See Real Dep., at 8:5-

8.

25

for this occurrence.” Young Dep., at 44:17-19.

• Young also testified that “I can’t remember any other

write-up for no call-no show other than this one that was

. . . for which she was terminated.” Id., at 39:23 —

40:2.

McKinney’s argument is flawed in two respects. First, Real’s own

statements are not internally inconsistent because R&L’s

interrogatory responses were based on the knowledge of R&L, not on

that of Real individually (regardless of who signed the responses),

while the particular pieces of Real’s testimony to which McKinney

cites were clearly based on Real’s own personal knowledge, not on

that of R&L as a corporate entity.3

Second, Young’s deposition testimony and R&L’s interrogatory

responses are not “inconsistent,” and they in no way evince a shift

in R&L’s reason for terminating McKinney. That Young did not

recall, on the day of his deposition, a specific previous instance

where he warned McKinney for being a no-call, no-show, is

consistent with R&L’s statement that McKinney was terminated

“despite” being warned on at least one previous occasion by someone

at R&L, particularly when McKinney herself admits that she had

received a prior warning. Moreover, there is no inconsistency

whatsoever between R&L’s interrogatory response and Young’s having

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26

stated that previous occurrences of McKinney’s tardiness did not

influence his decision to fire her. No reasonable jury could

conclude otherwise on this evidence.

3. McKinney’s comparators.

Finally, McKinney says that the reason R&L gave for firing

her is unworthy of credence because R&L retained other employees

who were similarly situated to her. See Pla.’s Br. in Resp. to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ J., at 23-25. Specifically, McKinney points

to R&L’s actions with respect to employees Malcolm Russell and

Tamika Stuttlemeyer. 

Russell was an employee who failed to call in to report an

unauthorized absence, but who was not terminated. Young Dep., at

65:1 — 67:4. Russell was incarcerated when he was supposed to

report for a shift, and Young excused his attendance-policy

violation because “[t]here was no way for him to call” while he was

in jail. Id., at 65:11. Russell’s situation is fundamentally

different from that of McKinney. Completely unlike Russell, the

reason McKinney gave for not calling to report her absence was that

she “just didn’t think about calling in.” A reasonable jury could

not find that Young’s handling of the situation with Russell proves

pretext regarding its articulated reason for firing McKinney.

Stuttlemeyer was a “no-call, no-show” on two occasions. Id.,

at 67:10-11. Young excused Stuttlemeyer’s first violation because

Stuttlemeyer had suffered from a stroke and had been hospitalized.

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Id., at 14-21. Young does not recall the reason for Stuttlemeyer’s

second “no-call, no show,” but he believes that she was fired

because of this second occurrence. Id., at 68:11-20. Similar to

that of Russell, Stuttlemeyer’s situation is quite different from

McKinney’s. Stuttlemeyer was in the hospital after she had a

stroke — a condition which rendered her at least temporarily and

partially paralyzed — not because she was taking a family member

who was ill to the emergency room. See id., at 67:17-19. That

Young excused Stuttlemeyer’s absence, and not McKinney’s, serves as

no rebuttal to R&L’s stated reason for discharging McKinney.

These conclusions are reinforced by what the Eleventh Circuit

very recently held in Crawford v. City of Fairburn, 482 F.3d 1305

(11th Cir. 2007), which, like this one, involved an alleged

retaliatory termination. If City of Fairburn did not exist, this

court might be persuaded to recognize an exception or avenue for

pretext recognized by the Eighth Circuit in Erickson v. Farmland

Industries, Inc., 271 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2001). In Farmland

Industries, the Eighth Circuit held:

We have said, “[I]t is possible for strong evidence of a

prima facie case to . . . present a factual issue on

pretext.” Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d

1131 (1135 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Accord Reeves, 530

U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (“[A]lthough the presumption

of discrimination ‘drops out of the picture’ once the

defendant meets its burden of production, the trier of

fact may still consider the evidence establishing the

plaintiff’s prima facie case ‘and inferences properly

drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the

defendant’s explanation is pretextual.”’ (internal

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citations omitted)).

Id. at 726 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the termination followed so closely upon

McKinney’s last protected conduct that a strong suggestion of

retaliatory motive is created, a motive that R&L might be motivated

to cover up by seizing upon an innocuous rule violation. Some

reasonable jurors might deduce from these circumstances that R&L’s

single articulated reason was contrived and therefore was

pretextual. As the court reads it, City of Fairburn has taken away

this possibility. In the instant case, R&L proffers one reason for

terminating McKinney. Instead of putting all of its eggs in one

basket like R&L did, the employer in City of Fairburn articulated

five separate facially legitimate reasons for its decision to

terminate. And yet, the Eleventh Circuit ruled:

If the employer proffers more than one legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each

of the reasons to survive a motion for summary judgment.

Id. at 1308 (emphasis added).

[T]he December 2003 statements of the administrator do

not raise questions about the truthfulness of any of the

proffered reasons. Viewed in the light most favorable to

Crawford, they suggest a retaliatory animus, but they do

not respond to the explanation of the City that

Crawford’s performance was unsatisfactory in four other

areas of his responsibility.

Id. at 1309 (emphasis added). In other words, it now appears that

in the Eleventh Circuit an appearance of retaliatory animus is

insufficient to rebut any other explanation proffered by the

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employer for its termination decision following closely upon an

employee’s protected conduct. City of Fairburn invites employers

to articulate multitudinous facially legitimate reasons for their

adverse employment decisions, each and all of which must be proven

pretextual by evidence beyond that in the prima facie case. The

long-recognized defense approved by Mt. Healthy City School Dist.

Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568 (1977), requiring

an employer who concedes a discriminatory motive but also has a

non-discriminatory motive to affirmatively prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that it would have made the same decision without

regard to the proscribed motive, seems to have lost its

significance as a result of City of Fairburn.

In sum, the court finds, in light of City of Fairburn, that a

reasonable jury could not be allowed to conclude that R&L’s

proffered reason for terminating McKinney’s employment was a

pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, R&L’s summary-judgment

motion will be granted with respect to McKinney’s retaliation

claim.

III. Invasion of Privacy

To succeed on her Alabama claim for invasion of privacy,

McKinney must show (1) that the matters intruded into are of a

private nature and (2) that the intrusion would be so offensive or

objectionable that a reasonable person subjected to it would

experience outrage, mental suffering, shame, or humiliation. Ex

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parte Atmore Community Hosp., 719 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998).

McKinney cites the following three acts of Morris, and

contends that together they constitute the tort of invasion of

privacy:

• Morris grabbed McKinney’s breasts.

• Morris gave unsolicited announcements of sexual positions

and women with whom he would or would not like to have

sex.

• Morris removed his penis from his trousers.

Pla.’s Br. in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ J., at 26-27. The

Alabama Supreme Court has recognized that “Restatement (Second) of

Torts, § 652B, and its Comment, enunciate a clear and concise

definition, and establish the perimeter, of the ‘wrongful

intrusion’ tort, which, when read in light of [its] case law,

affords meaningful guidelines” for the adjudication of the actions

alleged by McKinney. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services,

Inc., 435 So.2d 705, 708-09 (Ala. 1983). The Restatement, and its

Comment, state: 

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,

upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private

affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other

for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be

highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Comment:

a. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this

Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the

person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs. It

consists solely of an intentional interference with his

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interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his

person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a

kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.

b. The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place

in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the

defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in a

hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in

entering his home. It may also be by the use of the

defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to

oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as

by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars or

tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other

form of investigation or examination into his private

concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail,

searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private

bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order

to permit an inspection of his personal documents. The

intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to

liability, even though there is no publication or other

use of any kind of the photograph or information

outlined.

Under Alabama law, the actions of Morris may or may not constitute

invasion of privacy. Morris’s conduct was offensive,

objectionable, and reprehensible, but McKinney does not present any

evidence that would create respondeat superior liability for R&L

unless “invasion of privacy” is just another way of describing

“assault and battery.” McKinney will be allowed to proceed under

her assault and battery theory. No reasonable jury could conclude

that R&L, the only named defendant, vicariously committed the tort

of invasion of privacy. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of

R&L is appropriate with respect to this claim.

IV. Assault and Battery

R&L does not dispute that a question of fact exists as to

whether Morris could be liable to McKinney for assault and battery

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if he were a defendant. Instead, it contends that its motion for

summary judgment must be granted on this claim because it cannot be

held liable for an intentional tort committed not by it, but by its

employee. An employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s

intentional torts if (1) the employee’s acts are committed in the

furtherance of the business of the employer, (2) the employee’s

acts are within the line and scope of his employment, or (3) the

employer participated in, authorized, or ratified tortious acts.

Ex parte Atmore Comm. Hosp., 719 So.2d 1190, 1194-95 (Ala. 1998).

The first two possibilities are inapplicable in this case. R&L was

in the business of selling hamburgers, and as a crew person,

Morris’s job was to facilitate that business. No reasonable jury

could find that Morris’s harassing activity furthered, or was

within the scope of this objective.

Whether R&L authorized or ratified Morris’s activity is a

question that merits closer attention. R&L says that it could not

have ratified Morris’s conduct because it “could not have ratified

conduct of which it was not aware. . . . A harassment policy was in

place and everyone knew it.” To show ratification, a complaining

employee must show that the employer (1) had actual knowledge of

the tortious conduct of the offending employee, (2) that the

tortious conduct visited upon the complaining employee, (3) that

based upon this knowledge, the employer knew, or should have known,

that such conduct constituted ... a tort; and (4) that the employer

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33

failed to take adequate steps to remedy the situation. Mardis v.

Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 669 So.2d 885, 889 (Ala. 1995). As the

court discussed in section I above, there is an issue of fact as to

whether or not R&L was aware of the conduct of Morris which might

have constituted assault and battery, and as to whether or not R&L

nevertheless failed to take adequate remedial steps. See supra pp.

16-17. It is therefore the province of a jury to decide whether

R&L ratified or encouraged Morris’s tortious acts. R&L’s motion

for summary judgment with respect to McKinney’s claim for assault

and battery will be denied. 

V. Negligent Supervision and Negligent Retention

In order to avoid a summary judgment on a negligentsupervision and negligent-retention claims, a plaintiff “must show

or demonstrate that the employer had notice or knowledge (actual or

presumed) of the employee’s alleged incompetency for the employer

to be held responsible; demonstrating liability on the employer’s

part requires affirmative proof that the employee’s alleged

incompetence was actually known to the employer or was discoverable

by the employer if it had exercised care and proper diligence.”

Ledbetter v. United Am. Ins. Co., 624 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Ala. 1993).

As the court has previously explained, there is a question of fact

as to R&L’s knowledge of Morris’s conduct, precluding summary

judgment.

R&L argues that even if it was negligent in supervising and

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retaining Morris, it cannot be liable to McKinney under a theory of

negligence because McKinney did not sustain a cognizable injury

under Alabama law. Specifically, citing American Road Svc. Co. v.

Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala. 1980), R&L argues that Alabama cases

since 1980 have consistently rejected invitations to recognize the

tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Declining to

respond to this argument, McKinney says that she has suffered

“mental anguish” as a result of R&L’s alleged negligence in

supervising and retaining Morris. See Pla.’s Br. in Resp. to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ J., at 29. Under Alabama law, “mental

anguish” is not a separate injury that can support a claim for

negligence. See generally Inmon. Although she does not place a

great deal of emphasis on the fact, McKinney does make a passing

mention in her response to R&L’s summary-judgment motion that she

also experienced hair loss. McKinney testified that she

experienced this “physical injury,” if it can be described as such,

in response to being asked, “[h]ow did your being terminated affect

you besides losing your paycheck?” McKinney Dep., at 366:22 —

367:1. McKinney therefore contends that her hair fell out after

and because she was terminated, not during her employment because

R&L negligently supervised or retained Morris. The court will

therefore grant R&L’s motion for summary judgment on McKinney’s

negligent-supervision and negligent-retention claims.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, R&L’s motion for summary judgment

will be granted with respect to McKinney’s claims for retaliation,

invasion of privacy, negligent supervision, and negligent

retention. With respect to McKinney’s sexual-harassment hostilework-environment claim under Title VII, and with respect to her

claim against R&L for assault and battery, R&L’s motion will be

denied.

DONE this 31st day of May, 2007.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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