Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03006/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Gary S. Schnell
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GARY S. SCHNELL,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3006

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-1221-07-0700-X-2.

______________________ 

Decided: March 25, 2015

______________________ 

 GARY S. SCHNELL, Sparta, WI, pro se.

 ALBERT S. IAROSSI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 SCHNELL v. ARMY

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Gary Schnell appeals the final order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his 

petition for enforcement of the Board’s order requiring the 

Army (“Agency”) to promote Petitioner to an appropriate 

position at the GS-12 level effective October 31, 2006, and 

to pay him back pay with interest from that date to January 15, 2011. Schnell v. Dep’t of the Army, No. CH-1221-

07-0700-X-2 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 21, 2014) (Resp’t’s App. 146–

56) (“Final Order”). Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the Agency complied with 

its directive regarding the appropriateness of Mr. 

Schnell’s job placement and the sufficiency of the interest 

payments, this court affirms. 

BACKGROUND

In March 2003, Mr. Schnell worked as a Supervisory

Quality Assurance Specialist (GS-0301-11) in the Directorate of Support Services (“DSS”) at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. In this position, Mr. Schnell authored a Quality 

Assurance Surveillance Plan (“QASP”) for work performed 

on a $109 million contract and supervised eighteen quality assurance employees. In an effort to allow for more 

subjective government inspections, Mr. Schnell revised 

the QASP seventeen times. However, he acknowledged 

that he was too inexperienced to develop a QASP that 

properly protected the Agency’s interests. 

In December 2004, when Mr. Schnell’s QASP was still 

in use, the Army Audit Agency (“AAA”) began an audit of 

Fort McCoy’s inspection procedures. Mr. Schnell “disclosed problems with the inspection process and other 

matters to AAA auditors.” Final Order at 4 In July 2006, 

the AAA issued its audit report and found “Fort McCoy 

must improve its monitoring of contractor performance.” 

Id. 

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SCHNELL v. ARMY 3 

Mr. Schnell’s superiors informed him that the directorate he worked for would be reorganized, the DSS A-76 

contract, for which he monitored performance of other 

employees was about to expire and that his position would 

be abolished. Mr. Schnell subsequently “applied for 

promotion to Facility Operations Specialist, GS-1640-12, a 

temporary position to become effective October 2006.” Id. 

He was not selected for this position. 

In 2008, the DSS A-76 contract ended, and was replaced by several smaller contracts. The Agency reorganized and divided the DSS into the Directorate of 

Public Works and the Directorate of Logistics. Later that 

year, the Agency realigned Mr. Schnell’s position to the 

Directorate of Public Works, where he supervised off-post 

employees performing quality assurance work until all 

remaining contracts were awarded. Before his realignment to another directorate, Mr. Schnell’s position and 

pay were evaluated under the Total Army Performance 

Evaluation System (“TAPES”). However, post realignment, his pay was set according to the National Security 

Personnel System (“NSPS”),1 which had different evaluation and rating procedures.2

“On February 1, 2009, the Agency abolished Mr. 

Schnell’s position and laterally reassigned him to Environmental Protection Specialist, GS-0028-11.” Resp’t’s 

App. 80. Upon reassignment, Mr. Schnell “expressed

concerns that the Environmental Protection Specialist 

1 The NSPS was a pay for performance system created in 2004 under the authorization of Congress for the 

United States Department of Defense. 2 The Agency later abandoned its use of NSPS and 

transferred affected employees back to the GS system. 

During the period in which Mr. Schnell’s back pay award 

and interest payments were being calculated, the Agency 

reverted to using the GS payment schedule. 

 

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4 SCHNELL v. ARMY

position ‘might be declared illegal in six months or a year’ 

because ‘[t]here needs to be a much sharper delineation 

between what is in the contract and what is not in the 

contract.’” Resp’t’s App. at 79. 

I. Procedural History

On March 20, 2007, Mr. Schnell filed a complaint with 

the Army’s Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) asserting the 

Agency “cut him out of quality assurance for the DSS A76 contract, threatened to eliminate his position, and 

denied him a temporary promotion to Facility Operations 

Specialist in reprisal for protected whistleblowing.” Id. 

On July 23, 2007, the “OSC terminated its inquiry into 

[Mr. Schnell’s] allegations and notified him of his right to 

seek corrective action from the Board.” Id. 

On September 25, 2007, Mr. Schnell filed an Individual Right of Action (“IRA”) appeal under the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) with the Board. This action was 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Administrative 

Judge (“AJ”) on January 25, 2008. The Board adopted the 

AJ’s decision, denying Mr. Schnell’s petition for review in 

a final order. See Schnell v. Dep’t of the Army, No. CH1221-07-0700-W-1 (M.S.P.B. July 3, 2008). Mr. Schnell 

appealed the Board’s decision. This court vacated the 

Board’s July 3, 2008 Final Order and remanded the case 

for further proceedings related to his whistleblower 

allegations. Schnell v. Dep’t of the Army, 345 F. App’x 537 

(Fed. Cir. 2009). 

On June 18, 2009, the AJ issued a remand decision 

finding the Board had jurisdiction of Mr. Schnell’s IRA 

appeal, but denying him corrective action on the merits of 

his claim. The AJ found Mr. Schnell “did not show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a protected disclosure 

was ‘a contributing factor’ in a personnel action.” Id. 

On April 20, 2010, the Board granted Mr. Schnell’s 

petition for review. The Board issued an Opinion and 

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SCHNELL v. ARMY 5 

Order, granting Mr. Schnell’s request for corrective action 

and ordering the Agency to promote him to grade GS-12, 

effective October 31, 2006. See Schnell v. Dep’t of Army, 

114 M.S.P.R. 83, 85 (2010). The Board determined Mr. 

Schnell’s “non-selection for a temporary promotion and 

the threatened elimination of his position are personnel 

actions under the WPA and that the [A]gency has failed to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 

taken those personnel actions in the absence of protected 

whistleblowing disclosures.” Resp’t’s App. 81 (citing 

Schnell, 114 M.S.P.R. at 95). 

Per the Board’s order, “the Agency processed [Mr. 

Schnell’s] temporary promotion to Facility Operations 

Specialist, GS-1640-12, from October 31, 2006, to September 30, 2007.” Id. On May 14, 2010, Mr. Schnell filed 

a petition for enforcement seeking further compliance

with the Board’s order regarding his promotion. The AJ 

found that the Army failed to demonstrate full compliance 

with the Board’s order and recommended that the Board 

grant Mr. Schnell’s petition. 

On June 16, 2011, the Board remanded Mr. Schnell’s 

petition for further evidentiary proceedings concerning 

his job placement and back pay. The Board held that “the 

[A]gency failed to provide sufficient evidence showing the 

appellant received the back pay with interest to which he 

[was] entitled.” Resp’t’s App. 82. With respect to Mr. 

Schnell’s promotion, the Board determined the Agency did 

not provide a sufficient explanation for placing him in the 

Environmental Engineer position and did not address his 

“argument that the position is not substantially equivalent in its status and duties to his former Supervisory 

Quality Surveillance Specialist position.” Id. 

On remand, the AJ conducted a hearing regarding the 

appropriateness of Mr. Schnell’s corrective action placement and the sufficiency of the interest payments on his 

award of back pay. The Agency provided witnesses and 

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6 SCHNELL v. ARMY

both parties provided additional documentary evidence. 

[Id.] On the basis of evidence gathered at the hearing, 

the AJ determined Mr. Schnell’s post-corrective action 

“position was substantially equivalent in scope and status 

to the duties of the appellant’s former position, as well as 

to the temporary Facility Operations Specialist position to 

which he was denied a promotion.” Final Order at 2

(footnote omitted). 

However, the AJ “found that the [A]gency failed to 

demonstrate that the appellant received the correct 

interest on his back pay in light of errors the [A]gency

made that were discussed, but not fully explained, by its 

witnesses at the hearing.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Remand 

Recommendation at 10). Finally, the AJ determined that 

because the Agency conceded Mr. Schnell was working in 

an inappropriate position during the part of the back pay 

period when the NSPS was in effect, Mr. Schnell’s performance ratings should have been increased based on his 

performance evaluations in prior years. 

In response to the AJ’s recommendation, the Agency 

provided additional documents showing Mr. Schnell’s 

back pay and interest payments were calculated properly, 

Final Order at 4, and that retroactively increasing Mr. 

Schnell’s performance ratings under the NSPS pursuant 

to the AJ’s order would have had an adverse effect on his

back pay award.3 Id. 

3 The Board requested the Agency provide an explanation for why it failed to make the recalculations of 

back pay and interest in order to reflect Mr. Schnell’s 

performance rating during the NSPS period. Final Order 

at 4. In response, the Agency asserted “it had not made 

the changes because of evidence that it submitted showing a re-creation of the NSPS rating and pay pool for [Mr. 

 

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SCHNELL v. ARMY 7 

Upon review of the AJ’s evidentiary hearing findings, 

the Board determined the Agency was in compliance with 

the Board’s decision and dismissed Mr. Schnell’s petition 

for enforcement. Final Order at 9. Mr. Schnell appeals, 

this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) 

(2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court’s review of a decision of the Board is limited by statute. The Board’s decision must be affirmed 

unless it is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012); see Briggs v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

This court must set aside a Board decision “unsupported by substantial evidence when it lacks such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” McLaughlin v. Office 

of Pers. Mgmt., 353 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

II. Mr. Schnell Is Not Entitled to a Higher Rating 

Under NSPS

On appeal, Mr. Schnell contends that because he was 

given “exceptional ratings, (‘1’s’) in the TAPES system,”4

Schnell] would significantly reduce his pay below what he 

already received.” Id. 4 Under TAPES, performance evaluations ranged 

from a high of number “1” to a low of number “5.” A 

number “5” rating was considered unsuccessful. The 

number range “3” to “1” were considered “successful” with 

the number “3” being low and number “1” considered 

 

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8 SCHNELL v. ARMY

he should have been provided an equivalent evaluation 

under the new NSPS performance rating system. Pet’r’s 

Br. 10. According to Mr. Schnell, “[s]ix weeks after the 

first [A]gency submission . . . they changed the rating type 

[back] to TAPES and gave me a ‘fully successful’ ‘3’ rating 

in the TAPES System.” Pet’r’s Br. 10–11. Mr. Schnell 

asserts that he “was [previously] rated ‘exceptional’ (‘1’) 

not ‘fully successful’ (‘3’) under the TAPES system.” 

According to Mr. Schnell, the problem was “that [the] 

rating system changed from TAPES to NSPS.” Id. at 11. 

The Board credited the testimony of Mr. Schnell’s 

former supervisor, Darrell Neitzel, who according to the 

Board “persuasively testified that the higher rating under 

the NSPS that [Mr. Schnell] seeks would not have been 

the equivalent of the rating that he received for the 

preceding period under the previous appraisal plan 

[TAPES] because of differences in the two plans.” Final 

Order at 5 n.4. Mr. Neitzel testified that 

[b]ecause according to the NSPS rating criteria, if 

you did everything that you were supposed to do 

as a requirement of your job, that was considered 

a Level 3. As I said, this is where NSPS, the criteria used in evaluations was much different than 

our old TAPES system where pretty much everybody got top-block whether you just did your job or 

not. 

But in the NSPS system, the fully complying, or 

completing all of the requirements of your position 

was considered you were operating at Level 3. In 

order to get to a 4 or a 5, which is a higher rating, 

high. Pet’r’s Br. 9–10. Conversely, under NSPS, this 

order was inverted such that the highest performers were 

ranked as number “5” and lower performers received 

number “1.” Id. 

 

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SCHNELL v. ARMY 9 

you had to have demonstrated that you did, that 

you went above and beyond the normal expectation of the position. 

Resp’t’s App. 74–75 (emphasis added). 

Mr. Schnell argues the Agency should have granted 

him a higher rating because he went “above and beyond” 

and because he “blew the whistle on several areas of 

deficiency and, in all likelihood, effected some positive 

changes.” Pet’r’s Br. 12. 

Mr. Schnell’s contention is unsupported by record evidence. During his testimony, in providing instances that 

would compel a higher performance rating, his supervisor, 

Mr. Neitzel outlined additional actions that an employee 

must take before being granted a higher performance 

rating under NSPS. Specifically, Mr. Neitzel testified 

that such an employee would have to “have taken some 

special initiative to have gone out perhaps and created 

some training program or [would have to have] developed 

some new processes for the organization.” Resp’t’s App. 

76. Thus, unlike the TAPES system, NSPS requires more 

than an employee’s satisfactory performance of a particular task. Mr. Neitzel’s testimony provides evidence that 

NSPS and TAPES performance evaluation systems are 

fundamentally distinct. 

Here, Mr. Schnell does not provide any support for his 

contention that, under NSPS, the only factor required for 

a higher performance rating is for an employee to go 

“above and beyond” the necessary requirements for the 

performance of a job. Because the Agency articulated 

additional factors considered for a higher performance 

rating, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding 

that the higher performance rating sought by Mr. Schnell 

under NSPS would not have been equivalent to his rating 

under TAPES. 

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10 SCHNELL v. ARMY

III. Mr. Schnell’s Back Pay and Interest Payments Were 

Properly Calculated

Mr. Schnell next argues the Agency miscalculated his 

back pay and interest payments. He argues he was 

provided the same amount of back pay and interest irrespective of the AJ’s recommendation that the Agency 

should replace his level 2 performance rating for the time 

he worked as a GS-11 Environmental Protection Specialist during the part of the back pay period when the NSPS 

was in effect, with a level 3 fully successful rating. 

The Board credited the Agency’s determination that it 

expressly made no changes to his back pay and interest 

payments because it submitted evidence “showing a recreation of the NSPS rating and pay pool for [Mr. Schnell] 

would significantly reduce his pay below what he already 

received.” Final Order at 4. 

Mr. Schnell does not direct the court to any evidence 

contradicting the Agency’s contention concerning its 

reason for using the TAPES as opposed to the NSPS 

rating schedule. Instead, Mr. Schnell argues “[t]he 

[A]gency submitted no evidence or documentation to back 

up [its decision to use TAPES instead of NSPS]. I believe 

the Board erroneously accepted this statement without 

any evidence.” Pet’r’s Br. 15. 

In its response to the AJ’s order dated November 5, 

2013, the Agency provided exhibits showing that any 

effort to recreate the NSPS rating and pay pool for Mr. 

Schnell for 2008 and 2009 would be less favorable to him

than the current disposition. For example, with respect to 

2008, the Agency noted: 

By moving [Mr. Schnell] to the TAPES system, he 

in fact had a 2008 year end salary of $78,381. . . . 

This is due to the award of a Within Grade Increase (WGI) on [Nov. 9 2008]. The WGI would 

not have been available to [Mr. Schnell] were he 

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SCHNELL v. ARMY 11

in NSPS. [Mr. Schnell] also received a 1.5% pay 

increase under TAPES that would not have been 

available to him under NSPS. 

Resp’t’s App. 140 (internal citation omitted). 

Here, because the Agency has presented evidence 

supporting its assertion that Mr. Schnell’s back pay and 

interest payments were higher under TAPES and because 

Mr. Schnell has failed to present any evidence refuting 

this claim, this court finds substantial evidence supports 

the Board’s determination that the Agency’s use of NSPS 

would have adversely impacted Mr. Schnell’s back pay 

and interest payments. 

Mr. Schnell next argues the Agency made a “major error” in its calculations of his 2006 base salary. Pet’r’s Br.

16. Specifically, Mr. Schnell asserts “the base salary 

should be $64,585.00 not $63,928.00 as shown in [the 

Agency’s] calculations” because “the [A]gency failed to 

take [his] retroactive promotion to GS-12, Step 6, effective 

[October 31, 2006], into account.” Id. at 16. 

The Agency contends Mr. Schnell “knew that the base 

salary used in [its] calculations for the first year was 

$63,928 because the [Agency] pointed it out in the pages 

that Mr. Schnell admits he received.” Resp’t’s Br 14. The 

Agency also argues “[e]ven if [this court] were to accept 

[Mr. Schnell’s] clams about an incorrect 2006 starting 

salary, [Mr. Schnell] failed to demonstrate that using the 

‘correct’ starting salary would have resulted in higher pay 

under the NSPS than under TAPES.” Id. Furthermore, 

the Agency contends that this salary “was clearly identified as the starting salary in the ‘NSPS Payout Reconstruction’ table that Mr. Schnell also concedes he 

received” and “[r]ather than provide the [B]oard with 

evidence in an effort to show that the [Agency’s] calculations were incorrect, [Mr. Schnell] failed to act for nine 

months and only now alleges errors before this Court.” 

Resp’t’s Br. 14. 

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12 SCHNELL v. ARMY

This court has held that “in situations where a party 

appeared pro se before the lower court, a court of appeals 

may appropriately be less stringent in requiring that the 

issue have been raised explicitly below.” Forshey v. 

Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Specifically, Forshey teaches “a court of appeals may require less 

precision in the presentation of the issue to the lower 

court than it demands of a litigant represented by counsel.” Id. 

Although Forshey allows this court to be less stringent 

in requiring an issue to be presented before the Board,

even under a less stringent approach, Mr. Schnell cannot 

now present his argument. Here, Mr. Schnell never 

presented to the Board or to the AJ his argument that the 

Agency employed the incorrect base salary because it 

failed to account for the Board’s order to promote him to 

the GS-12 grade level effective October 31, 2006. 

Furthermore, as asserted by the Agency, the NSPS 

Payout Reconstruction for the years 2007 and 2008 was 

provided to Mr. Schnell. Mr. Schnell does not assert that 

he did not receive this document, nor does he present any 

extenuating or limiting circumstance that impeded his 

ability to present this information to the Board. Therefore, Mr. Schnell has waived this argument. 

IV. The Board Correctly Determined the Agency’s Placement of Mr. Schnell in the Environment Engineer, GS-12, 

Position Complied With Its Decision 

The Board concluded the Agency’s placement of Mr. 

Schnell in an Environmental Engineer (GS-12) position 

was in accordance with its directive. Final Order at 7. 

The Board affirmed the AJ’s determination that Mr. 

Schnell’s position as a GS-12 Environmental Engineer 

was “substantially equivalent in scope and status to the 

position he would have received absent his whistleblowing.” Id. In response to Mr. Schnell’s contention that he 

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tion, the Board determined Mr. Schnell has “not pointed 

to any specific evidence in the record before the [AJ] that 

shows she erred in finding that he did not occupy a sham 

position.” Id. at 8. Specifically, the Board concluded that 

the duties such as “developing significant environmental 

compliance policies and procedures . . . or serving as a 

contract officer representative[,] . . . are only some of the 

varied higher level responsibilities of his position.” Id. 

On appeal, Mr. Schnell contends that he did not perform the majority of duties set forth for the Environmental Engineer position. Specifically, he asserts that in 

total, he “did about 10% to 20% of what was listed in the 

job description.” Pet’r’s Br. 23. 

The Agency argues that “to the extent [Mr. Schnell] 

did not perform some of the job responsibilities, the 

[B]oard noted statements from [Mr. Schnell’s] supervisors 

indicating that [he] failed to perform various assigned 

duties, not that he had no responsibility for those duties.” 

Resp’t’s Br. 16. For example, the Agency cites a Senior 

System Civilian Evaluation Report where a performance 

appraisal states that Mr. Schnell “works in accordance 

with his own agenda instead of working toward goals 

prescribed by Senior Management.” Id. (citing Resp’t’s 

App. 117). 

In response to the Agency’s contention that he failed 

to perform the tasks assigned to him as opposed to having 

no responsibility for their performance, Mr. Schnell cites a 

report stating: “[m]eeting a suspense date means that the 

product has been reviewed and approved by the supervisor. Some leniency will be given if the supervisor requires 

more than a week to review.” Pet’r’s Br. 27 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). According to Mr. 

Schnell, this meant that

if [I] had a suspense (deadline) to get a report 

done by 10 August and [he] submitted the report 

on 5 August, if the supervisor didn’t have time to 

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14 SCHNELL v. ARMY

review and approve the report by 10 Aug, [I] 

failed, or if the supervisor reviewed the report and 

returned it to me on 11 Aug with perceived punctuation errors, I failed.

Pet’r’s Br. 27.

Mr. Schnell’s assertion does not address the Agency’s 

contention that he had an “apparent lack of desire to 

perform tasks assigned to him [which was] degrading the 

overall performance of [the] Compliance Branch and 

delaying the completion of critical actions that need to be 

taken.” Resp’t’s App. 118. Rather, his argument merely 

addresses the process employed by the Agency in evaluating whether he was successful at completing a particular 

task. 

The issue is whether Mr. Schnell actually carried out 

the duties assigned to him and necessary for his position. 

Here, because Mr. Schnell has failed to refute the Agency’s contention that he did not carry out his assigned 

tasks, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding 

that he was not assigned to a sham position and the 

Agency complied with the Board’s directive in assigning 

him to the GS-12 Environmental Engineer position. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s decision is

AFFIRMED

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