Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02870/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02870-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
MetLife Group
Defendant
Larry Worman
Plaintiff

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The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY WORMAN, 

 NO. CIV. S-06-2870 LKK EFB

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

METLIFE GROUP, INC. and

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

The plaintiff, Larry Worman, has brought suit against his

former employer, MetLife Group, Inc., alleging that he did not

receive the full compensation he was owed at the time of his

termination. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all

claims. The court resolves the motion on the papers and after oral

argument.

I. FACTS1

The plaintiff was hired in November 2003 as Vice President of

Marketing for the Western Region of the Wirehouse Division of

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Travelers Life & Annuity (“Travelers”). His duties centered around

supervising Regional Vice Presidents and increasing “point-of-sale”

business in the western United States. 

As of January 2004, the plaintiff’s direct supervisor was Tom

Tooley, Senior Vice President of Marketing. Mr. Tooley reported

directly to Lou DiGiacomo, Vice President of Life Distributions,

who reported to Ed Cassidy, President of Travelers Life Division.

The plaintiff was given sales targets in 2004 and 2005, which

were calculated from the commissionable portions of the life

insurance premiums for products sold by the Regional Vice

Presidents who reported to him. In 2004 his sales target was $4

million and in 2005 it was $8-9 million. In 2005, the plaintiff

only reached $4.5 million of his sales target. 

The plaintiff’s compensation plan is one of the subjects of

dispute in this action. It is undisputed, however, that the

plaintiff’s total annual compensation in 2004 and 2005 was

comprised of a base salary, a “discretionary bonus,” and “monthly

variable compensation.” The discretionary bonus was given to the

plaintiff out of a pool of funds, whose amount was unknown until

the end of the year and were typically not paid until March of the

following year. Mr. Cassidy had final approval of the amount of

discretionary bonuses to be paid to each employee. No other manager

had authority to promise an employee what the amount of his bonus

would be. The amount of the discretionary bonus was based on the

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The plaintiff disputes this, to the extent that it suggests

that his overall compensation package would be less than $350,000

in 2005. Statement of Genuine Issues In Opposition to Motion for

Summary Judgment, ¶ 33. 

3

The plaintiff disputes whether this bonus should be

characterized as a “year-end bonus.” Statement of Genuine Issues

In Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 54.

3

employee’s overall job performance.2

In 2005, MetLife acquired Travelers. In February 2005, the

plaintiff received a memo from Michael Farrell, the Senior Vice

President of MetLife, which stated that employees who reached 90

percent of their sales targets would receive a “special sales

incentive” of between 10-20 percent of the employee’s “total

monthly variable incentive compensation.” The plaintiff understood

this to be a retention bonus. The memo stated that the bonus was

not available to managers who participated in a monthly variable

incentive program. Plaintiff asserts that Michael Farrell later

modified the terms of this bonus, informing plaintiff and others

that the special sale incentive would be 1 percent of actual

production if the sales targets were met. Statement of Disputed

Facts, ¶ 68.

The plaintiff was terminated on January 31, 2006. At that

time, he received as compensation for 2005 his base salary of

$75,000, monthly variable compensation of $100,000, and a retention

bonus of $10,000. In March 2006, MetLife paid the plaintiff a bonus

of $45,598.25.3

At the time of termination, the plaintiff was also paid for

thirteen unused vacation days. According to the plaintiff, he was

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owed payment for twenty unused vacation days. Statement of Genuine

Issues In Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 56;

Statement of Disputed Facts, ¶¶ 66-67.

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

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renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

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inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff has brought five causes of action, all of which

are premised on the allegations that he was not paid, at the time

of his termination, his full compensation for 2005 nor the value

of the unused vacation days he had accrued. For the reasons

provided herein, the court grants the defendant’s motion in part.

A. Claims Related to Value of Plaintiff’s 2005 Compensation

As described above, the plaintiff’s annual compensation was

comprised of three parts. First, he had a base salary of $75,000.

Second, he had a “monthly variable compensation.” The plaintiff was

guaranteed that the monthly variable compensation would be at least

$100,000 per year, pro rated into monthly payments. Third, the

plaintiff’s annual compensation also included a “discretionary

bonus,” which all parties agree was based at least to some extent

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The plaintiff testified in his deposition that he conceived

of his compensation structure as having two components: his base

salary and his monthly variable compensation, and that the latter

was comprised of a fixed sum of $100,000 divided monthly plus a

year-end bonus (the discretionary bonus). Deposition of Larry

Worman (“Worman Depo.”) 66:1-67:7.

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on the plaintiff’s performance.4 In addition to these three

elements of his compensation, the plaintiff alleges that he was

also owed a “Special Sales Incentive,” which he characterizes as

a retention bonus, pursuant to representations made by Michael

Farrell, the Senior Vice President of MetLife.

The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff was entitled to

and received his $75,000 base salary in 2005. They do not dispute

that he received $100,000 in “monthly variable compensation” that

year, as well. Finally, they do not dispute that he received

$45,598.25 in March 2006, although the parties do dispute whether

this was the discretionary bonus or the Special Sales Incentive /

retention bonus.

The plaintiff’s position is that the defendant, through its

agents, promised that his total compensation was to be at least

$350,000, and his claims are premised on the fact that his

compensation fell short of this. He alleges that he was made to

believe that the three elements of his compensation package (base

salary, monthly variable compensation, and discretionary bonus)

would be at least $350,000 in 2005, and that it could be even more

than that based on the plaintiff’s performance and the amount of

money available for bonuses at the end of the year. For this

reason, the plaintiff explains that he understood that the bonus

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was only “discretionary” in the sense that it would be at least

$175,000 ($350,000 minus the $75,000 base salary minus the $100,000

monthly variable compensation) but that the defendants had

discretion to make the bonus even more than that amount. 

The plaintiff has presented admissible evidence that he was

promised that his compensation would total at least $350,000,

meaning that his discretionary bonus would be at least $175,000.

The plaintiff testified that he was told by Tom Tooley and Lou

DiGaicomo that his total compensation would be a minimum of

$350,000 and that the year-end discretionary bonus would be

calculated to guarantee the plaintiff at least this amount. See,

e.g., Worman Depo. 58:6-15, 67:8-68:2, 72:14-73:3, 167:8-168:1. Tom

Tooley testified that when explaining to the plaintiff what his

compensation would be for 2005, the plaintiff was told “Here is

what we are going to get you this year,” referring to the total of

$350,000. Deposition of Tom Tooley (“Tooley Depo.”) 82:3-83:6. The

discretionary bonus would be used to ensure that the plaintiff’s

total compensation reached $350,000. Id. at 85:20-23. If the

plaintiff exceeded his sales goals, however, he could have received

an even greater compensation. Id. at 86:2-7. 

Additionally, the amount of the bonus is not so vague as to

be unenforceable as a term of the contract. See Rochlis v. Walt

Disney Co., 19 Cal. App. 4th 201 (1993). The plaintiff alleges that

by the terms of his contract, the bonus was to be at least $175,000

and that he therefore is entitled to this amount. This is a legally

viable position. 

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The plaintiff also has shown that a reasonable jury could find

that Travelers’ agent or apparent agent assured him that his

compensation plan would be as he describes it in his complaint. A

plaintiff may recover against a principal for acts performed by the

principal’s apparent agent only when the plaintiff’s belief of that

person’s agency was reasonable, due to some act or omission by the

principal, and when the plaintiff’s belief was not negligent. Cal.

Civil Code § 2317; Hill v. Citizens Nat. Trust & Savings Bank, 9

Cal. 2d 172, 175-76 (1937). Here, the plaintiff does not dispute

that he did not know whether Mr. Tooley or Mr. DiGiacomo had the

authority to guarantee the amount of the discretionary bonus. See

Undisputed Facts ¶ 58. Notwithstanding this, the plaintiff also has

presented deposition testimony that other employees of Travelers

at MetLife, including Ed Cassidy, Mike Farrell, Andrew Aiello, and

Paul LaPiana, informed the plaintiff that they were aware of what

his compensation plan had been under Travelers and that he would

be paid in accordance with it in 2005. Worman Depo. 108:7-110:15,

111:18-112:4, 118:6-119:12, 124:16-125:1, 128:12-129:6, 131:12-

132:1, 143:7-143:17. Based on this, a jury could reasonably infer

that even if Mr. Tooley and Mr. DiGiacomo did not have authority

to make promises on Travelers’ or MetLife’s behalf, that they were

simply describing the details of the compensation plan that Mr.

Cassidy, Mr. Farrell, Mr. Aiello, and Mr. LaPiana had promised to

the plaintiff. A jury could also reasonably conclude that as the

President of Travelers Life Division, Senior Vice President of

MetLife, and MetLife managers, respectively, Mr. Cassidy, Mr.

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Farrell, Mr. Aiello, or Mr. LaPiana had the authority or apparant

authority to take actions that would bind the principal, Travelers

and MetLife. See Cal. Civil Code § 2317; Hill, 9 Cal. 2d at 175-76.

Consequently, the court denies the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment for the plaintiff’s first, third, fourth, and

fifth causes of action insofar as they allege that the plaintiff

was entitled to but not paid the discretionary bonus of at least

$175,000.

B. Claims Related to the 2005 Special Sales Incentive /

Retention Bonus

In his first cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that he

was not paid the retention bonus he was promised. He appears to

incorporate this allegation in his third and fifth causes of action

as well. In his opposition brief, however, the plaintiff concedes

that he was paid the retention bonus, in the amount of $45,598.65.

Therefore, the court grants the defendants’ motion as to the

plaintiff’s first, third, and fifth claims insofar as they allege

that he was not paid the retention bonus.

C. Claims Related to the Payment of Unused Vacation Time

The plaintiff also brings his first, third, fourth, and fifth

causes of action premised on the allegation that he had accrued

twenty vacation days by the date of his termination, had used none,

and was only paid for thirteen. To support this allegation, the

plaintiff offers his deposition testimony that he felt he was

entitled to ten days per year of vacation time, and that he took

no vacation days in 2004 and 2005. Worman Depo. 181:8-182:1. 

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The court grants the defendant’s motion as to the plaintiff’s

fifth cause of action in section V.E, infra.

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This suffice to show that there is a genuine issue of material

fact on this question. The plaintiff has presented admissible

evidence -- his testimony -- that he was not paid fully for the

vacation days he had accrued. Although the defendants offer

contrary evidence in the form of the testimony of James Boylan that

the plaintiff was only due payment for thirteen days, this does not

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact on this issue.

See Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶¶ 55-57.

Put plainly, the plaintiff has presented evidence that would permit

a jury to find in his favor. This is all that is required. See

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290.

Accordingly, the court denies defendant’s motion as to the

plaintiff’s first, third, and fourth claims insofar as they allege

that the plaintiff was not paid the vacation time he was owed.5

D. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit

In his second cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that he

was entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the work

he performed for the defendant on the theory of quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit is a measure of recovery for one who has rendered

services to another, so that he may recover the reasonable value

of his services. Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.

Palmer v. Gregg, 65 Cal. 2d 657, 660 (1967); Day v. Alta Bates

Medical Center, 98 Cal. App. 4th 243, 248 (2002). It is not a means

for recovery when a contract exists between the parties, as it

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cannot be a vehicle for changing or supplying terms of a contract.

Maglica v. Maglica, 66 Cal. App. 4th 442, 451 (1998); Hedging

Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 41 Cal. App. 4th

1410, 1419 (1996).

The plaintiff presents this cause of action in the

alternative, in the event that the factfinder determines that a

contract did not exist between the plaintiff and defendant. The

defendant, however, concedes the existence of a contract but only

disputes its terms. Consequently, this cause of action is not

viable as a matter of law. The court grants the defendant’s motion

as to the plaintiff’s second claim.

E. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action Under California Labor Code

Section 203

Under California Labor Code section 203, a plaintiff is

awarded an amount equal to his daily wages for up to thirty days

after his termination, if his employer had wilfully failed to pay

him his wages at the time of termination. Imposition of this

penalty is not proper if the employer’s failure to pay wages was

not “willful,” but was the consequence of a good faith dispute that

any wages were due. 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 13520. 

Here the plaintiff has adduced no evidence that the defendant

withheld wages from him wilfully, within the meaning of section

203, or for any reason beyond a good faith dispute about the amount

of compensation that was due. For this reason, the defendant’s

motion must be granted as to the plaintiff’s fifth cause of action.

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F. Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages

The plaintiff concedes that punitive damages are not an

available remedy for his causes of action. The defendant’s motion

is granted as to the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

V. CONCLUSION

As described herein, the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 28, 2008.

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