Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03134/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Joaquin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2003 Decided May 2, 2003

No. 01-3134

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WILLIAM JOAQUIN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00216–01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W.

McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Challenging his sentence for distributing crack cocaine, appellant argues, among other things,

that the district court misconstrued the scope of its authority

in denying his motion for a downward departure under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.3. Although we disagree,

we vacate the sentence and remand because, contrary to

section 4A1.3’s plain language, the district court based its

decision in part on appellant’s ‘‘prior arrest record itself.’’

I.

Appellant William Joaquin pleaded guilty to distributing

approximately 250 grams of cocaine base to an undercover

District of Columbia police officer. In return, the government promised not to file an information under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1) that would have triggered a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence because Joaquin had previously been

convicted of a felony drug offense. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)(iii). Based on an offense level of 31 and a criminal

history category of IV, the presentence report calculated

Joaquin’s sentencing range as 151 to 188 months. The report

assigned two criminal history points for a February 1991

sentence for attempted drug possession; two points for a

1993 sentence for possession of cocaine; three points for a

1993 felony sentence for distributing cocaine; and two points

because Joaquin engaged in the 2001 sales while still on

parole for the earlier felony. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 4A1.1(a), (b), (d). Three marijuana and PCP

distribution offenses committed while Joaquin was a juvenile

were not counted.

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Joaquin did not challenge the presentence report’s calculation, but asked the district court to depart downward under

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.3 because his prior

crimes (1) involved drug offenses to support a cocaine addiction for which he never received treatment and (2) were

committed without weapons or violence while under the age

of twenty-one. Under section 4A1.3, district judges have

discretion to depart from otherwise applicable sentencing

ranges ‘‘[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal

history category [as calculated under other provisions of the

Guidelines] does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the

defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit other crimes.’’ Id. § 4A1.3. Insisting

that his criminal history was significantly less serious than

those of most defendants in Category IV, Joaquin argued that

he should be treated as falling in Category III with a

sentencing range of 135 to 168 months. Opposing the motion,

the government argued that Joaquin’s seven convictions and

eighteen arrests in fourteen years demonstrated a significant

risk of recidivism.

The district court began its discussion by stating, ‘‘I think

this is a close case, everybody. [Defense counsel] Grimm, I

hope you take an appeal so we can get some law, but I will

have to say that I honestly don’t think that this case falls

within the case law interpretation of the Guidelines and what

would constitute a real over-representation of one’s criminal

history.’’ Sentencing Tr. at 25. The court added, ‘‘I would

be delighted to get reversed[,]TTTT [b]ut I honestly don’t

think that this is an over-representation of his criminal history.’’ Id. at 26. Responding to defense counsel’s argument

that the court should disregard the eleven arrests that had

not led to convictions because they were ‘‘no papered’’ and

therefore might have involved situations in which the government arrested the wrong person or had too little information

to bring a case, the court stated, ‘‘those arrests can mean

many different things[,]TTTT [but] [t]his number of arrests

TTT for a young man of 29, is still an extraordinary number of

arrests. When I look at what you have posed as the key

issue, whether there is a chance of recidivism, I TTT think this

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record shows TTT that there is a great chance of recidivism.’’

Id. at 27. The court concluded: ‘‘I feel compelled to deny the

motion. Not because I don’t have any legal authority to

grant it, but because I just conclude that this is not a case

that falls within the departure downward case law on this

issue.’’ Id. at 28.

Joaquin appeals, arguing that the district court mistakenly

believed that it lacked authority to depart based on the facts

of the case and that it violated a provision in section 4A1.3

stating that ‘‘a prior arrest record itself shall not be considered under section 4A1.3.’’ U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3. Joaquin also argues that the district court did

not realize that one of the convictions used to calculate his

criminal history category should have been disregarded under

section 4A1.1 because it was imposed more than ten years

prior to the instant offense. Id. § 4A1.1, cmt. n.2.

II.

We will review a district court’s refusal to depart from the

applicable Guideline range where the sentence is ‘‘imposed in

violation of law’’ or ‘‘a result of an incorrect application of the

sentencing guidelines.’’ 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (2); United

States v. Brooke, 308 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A refusal

to depart based on the district court’s mistaken belief that it

lacked authority to do so is reviewable as an incorrect application of the Guidelines, but a determination that the particular circumstances of a case do not warrant an exercise of the

court’s departure authority is a matter of discretion that we

cannot overturn. United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439

(D.C. Cir. 1995).

In support of his primary contention—that the district

court mistakenly thought that it lacked authority to depart—

Joaquin argues that if the court had merely decided that the

facts did not warrant a sentence reduction, it never would

have urged defense counsel to appeal, for it would have

known that Pinnick and other D.C. Circuit case law preclude

review of exercises of departure discretion. Read in isolation,

the district court’s reference to an appeal is certainly ambiguUSCA Case #01-3134 Document #747186 Filed: 05/02/2003 Page 4 of 13
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ous. But read on. ‘‘I feel compelled to deny the motion.

Not because I don’t have any legal authority to grant it, but

because I just conclude that this is not a case that falls within

the departure downward case law on this issue.’’ Sentencing

Tr. at 28 (emphasis added). Given that the district court

made this statement just before pronouncing Joaquin’s actual

sentence, we cannot conclude that the court believed that a

departure lay outside the scope of its discretion.

Contrary to the government’s argument, however, concluding that the district court understood the scope of its authority does not deprive us of jurisdiction because Joaquin argues

that the court, in the course of determining that a departure

was unwarranted, misapplied the Guidelines in other ways.

See, e.g., United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1345

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (misapplication of the Guidelines may occur

as the result of either legal or factual errors). Although

Joaquin concedes that he failed to raise in the district court

his arguments concerning the arrest records and the stale

conviction, criminal defendants may prevail on unpreserved

issues if they can demonstrate that an error is ‘‘plain or

obvious under current law, affects substantial rights, and

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.’’ United States v. Smith, 267 F.3d 1154,

1160 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). An error affects

substantial rights if it is prejudicial. United States v. Venable, 269 F.3d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Under plain error

review, defendants bear the burden of persuasion as to prejudice, but that burden is ‘‘slightly less exacting’’ with regard to

sentencing proceedings as compared to trial errors, since a

defendant need show only a ‘‘reasonable likelihood’’ that the

error affected the court’s sentence. United States v. Saro, 24

F.3d 283, 286–88 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

We begin with Joaquin’s argument that, in declining to

depart downward, the district court erred by relying on his

prior arrests. Although section 4A1.3 authorizes courts to

consider whether a defendant has engaged in ‘‘prior similar

adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction,’’

Joaquin relies on the provision’s statement that ‘‘[h]owever, a

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prior arrest record itself shall not be considered under

§ 4A1.3.’’ U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3.

Claiming that the presentence report provides no description

of the underlying events, that the record contains no evidence

concerning the arrests, and that he never conceded their

validity, Joaquin argues that the district court relied on his

‘‘prior arrest record itself.’’ Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 11

F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (sentencing court did

not commit plain error in relying on a presentence report

containing detailed descriptions of defendant’s conduct leading to his arrest); United States v. Terry, 930 F.2d 542, 545–

46 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).

The government responds first by asserting that Joaquin is

not entitled even to plain error review because he actively

waived the issue when his defense counsel, before arguing

that ‘‘no papered’’ arrests in the District of Columbia system

were too unreliable to consider in assessing Joaquin’s risk of

recidivism, stated, ‘‘[t]he court can obviously consider anything it wants at sentencing.’’ Sentencing Tr. at 18. At oral

argument, however, government counsel candidly conceded

that ‘‘you could look at it either way.’’ Indeed, at most

Joaquin ‘‘may have acquiesced in what he now claims is error,

but he did not invite it.’’ In re Sealed Case, 108 F.3d 372, 374

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Nothing in defense counsel’s passing comment suggests that he made a conscious, strategic decision to

‘‘intentional[ly] relinquish[ ] or abandon[ ] TTT a known right,’’

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), and his argument that

the arrests were unreliable as a matter of fact in no way

conflicts with Joaquin’s argument here that they are also

unreliable as a matter of law. Cf. United States v. Warren,

42 F.3d 647, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (defendant may not raise

argument on appeal that is directly contradictory to his

affirmative argument to the sentencing judge).

On the merits, the government does not challenge Joaquin’s

assertion that the record contains no information about the

events underlying his arrests. Instead, it argues that because the prohibition against considering arrest records appears in a paragraph discussing upward departures, it (1)

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applies to upward departures only, and (2) even if it also

applies to downward departures, it is not so clear as to

amount to plain error. We disagree on both counts.

Section 4A1.3 starts with an umbrella paragraph stating

that courts may ‘‘consider TTT departing from the otherwise

applicable guideline range’’ only where ‘‘reliable information

indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit

other crimes.’’ U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3,

¶ 1. The two subsequent paragraphs then discuss upward

and downward departures, respectively. To be sure, the

prohibition that Joaquin relies on appears at the end of the

upward departure paragraph. But if, as the government and

dissent argue, the Sentencing Commission had intended to

bar consideration of arrest records in upward departures

only, it would have stated that prior arrest records shall not

be considered ‘‘in making upward departure decisions,’’ rather than that they shall not be considered ‘‘under § 4A1.3.’’

Id., ¶ 2 (emphasis added). After all, the Commission knows

exactly how to focus on upward departures when it wants to,

as it did in the provision’s immediately preceding sentence.

Reading the two sentences together makes the point crystal

clear:

The court may, after a review of all the relevant information, conclude that the defendant’s criminal history was

significantly more serious than that of most defendants

in the same criminal history category, and therefore

consider an upward departure from the guidelines.

However, a prior arrest record itself shall not be considered under § 4A1.3.

Id. (emphasis added). Focusing on the word ‘‘[h]owever,’’ the

dissent argues that the arrest record prohibition modifies

only the preceding sentence. But this ignores the fact that

the prohibition expressly applies ‘‘under § 4A1.3’’ and that

section 4A1.3 applies to both upward and downward departures. Moreover, we can see no reason—nor does the government offer one—for considering prior arrest records any

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more ‘‘reliable’’ for downward departures than they are for

upward departures. Given the Commission’s insistence that

district courts act only on reliable information and the applicability of the arrest record prohibition ‘‘under § 4A1.3,’’ the

Guidelines authors had no reason to repeat the prohibition at

the end of section 4A1.3’s third paragraph discussing downward departures, as the government would apparently require. The prohibition thus applies to both types of departures.

This leaves the question whether section 4A1.3 is so clear

that the district court’s reliance on Joaquin’s arrest records

amounted to plain error. The government argues that the

prohibition is ambiguous because, again, it appears in the

paragraph on upward departures. This argument might have

some merit if the prohibition had stated merely ‘‘a prior

arrest record itself shall not be considered,’’ since readers

might then wonder whether it applied only to the upward

departure paragraph. But the sentence is not at all ambiguous, for it states expressly that prior arrest records shall not

be considered ‘‘under § 4A1.3.’’ Because section 4A1.3 governs both upward and downward departures, we think it

‘‘obvious’’ that the arrest record prohibition applies to downward departure motions. Smith, 267 F.3d at 1160.

The government calls our attention to United States v.

Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4–5 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam), which

found the sentence location theory sufficiently plausible to

defeat plain error review. In reaching this conclusion, the

court characterized the arrest record prohibition as occurring

‘‘at the end of the second of two paragraphs that deal solely

with upward departures.’’ Id. at 5. However, the first of the

two paragraphs—the umbrella paragraph that begins section

4A1.3—is not limited to upward departures and instead emphasizes the need for basing all departure decisions on reliable information. That paragraph speaks in general terms—

‘‘the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from

the otherwise applicable guideline range’’—and without reference to direction upward or downward. U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Equally

telling, the first paragraph also states that departures may be

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considered in any case in which reliable information indicates

that the defendant’s criminal history category ‘‘does not

adequately reflect’’ the seriousness of the defendant’s past

conduct or risk of recidivism. Id. By contrast, the next two

paragraphs limit upward departures to situations in which a

defendant’s criminal history category ‘‘significantly underrepresents’’ the past conduct or risk of recidivism and downward departures to cases in which the category ‘‘significantly

over-represents’’ the conduct or risk of recidivism. Id., ¶¶ 2–

3. By using broader language in the first paragraph, the

Commission made clear that the reliable information requirement applies, sensibly, to both types of departures. See

United States v. Webb, 139 F.3d 1390, 1395–96 (11th Cir.

1998) (describing the reliable information requirement as

applying to downward departure decisions); United States v.

Fletcher, 15 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); United

States v. Gayles, 1 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). Any

other reading would permit sentencing courts to depart downward on the basis of unreliable information, which cannot be

what the Commission intended.

The government argues that even if section 4A1.3’s reliable

information requirement does apply when a district court

departs downward, ‘‘there is no error, let alone plain error,

that arises from the trial court’s decision to withhold leniency

from an offender who has an extensive arrest record’’ because

the defendant bears the burden of proof. Appellee’s Br. at

27–28. We disagree. The Supreme Court has held that

regardless of whether a sentencing court departs upward or

downward, ‘‘[w]hen a reviewing court concludes that a district

court based a departure on both valid and invalid factors, a

remand is required unless it determines the district court

would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance on the

invalid factors.’’ Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113

(1996). This rule does not change just because consideration

of valid and invalid factors led the district court to decline to

depart. Otherwise, defendants would have no redress where

a court declines to depart downward on the basis of factors

such as race, religion, and sex that are never relevant to the

determination of a sentence, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

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Manual § 5H1.10, or because it misconstrues the Guidelines

to prohibit consideration of a legitimate mitigating factor.

Because such a refusal to depart rests on a misapplication of

the Guidelines, our case law clearly permits review under

such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 145

F.3d 1375, 1383–84 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding where sentencing court committed legal error by refusing to consider a

permissible factor in denying a downward departure motion

under section 5K2.0); United States v. Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440,

447 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding where sentencing court committed legal error by refusing to consider permissible factors

in denying a downward departure motion under section

4A1.3).

Of course, even if the district court had not relied on

Joaquin’s arrests, it might have properly concluded that

Joaquin failed to carry his burden of proof to justify a

downward departure—indeed, the court may do so upon

remand. But that possibility does not change the fact that

the court erred by placing evidence that it was barred from

considering on the scales against Joaquin and that such a

misapplication of the Guidelines is subject to appellate review.

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2).

Thus, given that ‘‘failure to follow a clear legal norm may

constitute plain error, without regard to whether the applicable statute or rule previously had been the subject of judicial

construction,’’ United States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 50 (D.C.

Cir. 1993), we conclude that the district court committed plain

error in considering Joaquin’s ‘‘prior arrest record itself

under § 4A1.3,’’ without supporting evidence indicating that

he had in fact engaged in prior criminal conduct not resulting

in a conviction. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 4A1.3. The government cannot dispute that there is a

reasonable likelihood that this error prejudiced Joaquin, since

the district court specifically stated that ‘‘[t]his number of

arrests TTT for a young man of 29, is still an extraordinary

number of arrests’’ immediately before concluding that Joaquin presented a significant risk of recidivism. Sentencing

Tr. at 27. Because reliance on information expressly deemed

unreliable by the Sentencing Commission seriously affects the

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fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, we see no

reason for declining to exercise our discretion to correct the

plain error by vacating Joaquin’s sentence and remanding the

case for further consideration. Saro, 24 F.3d at 288, 292.

In view of this disposition, we need not address Joaquin’s

argument that the district court, in calculating his criminal

history category, also committed plain error by counting his

February 1991 conviction, which occurred more than ten

years before the instant offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1, cmt. n.2. The government does not

dispute that this violated the Guidelines, but contends that

Joaquin cannot show prejudice because even without counting

the conviction he still would have been placed in Category IV.

Since the district court will have to reconsider its departure

decision on remand anyway, we see no need to determine

whether it was reasonably likely that the court would have

granted a departure initially had it realized that Joaquin was

at the bottom of Category IV rather than near the top. See,

e.g., United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir.

1992).

We vacate Joaquin’s sentence and remand the case for

resentencing consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring in part

and dissenting in part:

While I otherwise concur in the majority opinion, I dissent

from the remand for resentencing because I perceive no

error, plain or not, by the sentencing judge. The court used

Joaquin’s arrest record in declining to depart downward

based on Joaquin’s assertion that his ‘‘criminal history category significantly over-represents the seriousness of [his] criminal history or the likelihood that [he] will commit further

crimes,’’ pursuant to the third paragraph of Guidelines section 4A1.3, which is devoted to downward departures.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 ¶ 3 (emphasis added). Not only does the

language on which the majority relies for error (‘‘However, a

prior arrest record itself shall not be considered under

§ 4A1.3’’) appear within the second paragraph of section

4A1.3, which the majority itself characterizes as ‘‘the upward

departure paragraph,’’ Maj. Op. at 7, the inclusion of the

adversative ‘‘however’’ directly connects the language to the

preceding sentence which authorizes the court to ‘‘conclude

that the defendant’s criminal history was significantly more

serious than that of most defendants in the same criminal

history category, and therefore consider an upward departure

from the guidelines.’’ U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

The reason for limiting the arrest record proscription to

upward departures paragraph is obvious. The proscription

rests on a determination that an arrest record is not the kind

of ‘‘reliable information’’ that section 4A1.3 requires as the

basis to depart from the Guidelines’ prescriptions. See

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 ¶ 1 (‘‘If reliable information indicates that

the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the

seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the

likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the

court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the

otherwise applicable guideline range.’’); id. commentary

(‘‘This policy statement authorizes the consideration of a

departure from the guidelines in the limited circumstances

where reliable information indicates that the criminal history

category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the

defendant’s criminal history or likelihood of recidivismTTTT’’).

As a record of additional crimes, however, an arrest record

will never be used to support a downward departure. Below,

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the court did not rely on Joaquin’s arrest record as a basis for

making a departure at all but considered it only in declining

to accept Joaquin’s argument that his case lay outside the

Guidelines’ heartland and warranted a downward departure.

The decision to adhere to the Guidelines’ directives and not to

depart is, as the majority recognizes, discretionary to the

point of being unreviewable. See Maj. Op. at 4 (citing United

States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The

information supporting it therefore need not meet the standard of reliability required in making a departure. See

United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4–5 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting

as reason not to apply arrest record prohibition to decision

not to depart downward that ‘‘[c]ourts TTT are generally

subject to greater scrutiny when they choose to depart than

when they opt to remain within the applicable sentencing

range’’); cf. United States v. Chavez–Chavez, 213 F.3d 420,

422 (7th Cir. 2000) (requirement that ‘‘reliable information’’

be used ‘‘when calculating a sentencing range under the

guidelines, or departing upward to impose a higher sentence’’

does not apply ‘‘when a judge imposes a sentence within the

guideline range (or, here, decides to curtail the extent of a

downward departure)’’; ‘‘[w]hen seeking a downward departure the defendant bears the burden, and the judge may

disbelieve the defendant’s position without requiring additional evidence’’).

Finally, even if the arrest record proscription is not unambiguously restricted to upward departures (which I believe it

is), neither does it unambiguously extend to downward departures, given the language and structure of the departure

provision as I have limned it above. Thus, Joaquin has not

met his burden under the applicable plain error standard.

See United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d at 4–5 (2d Cir. 2001)

(concluding ‘‘a district court’s reliance on prior arrest records

as a basis for refusing to depart downward does not constitute ‘plain error’ ’’ because it is not ‘‘implausible that the

Sentencing Commission meant to prohibit the use of prior

arrest records only in the context of upward departures’’).

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