Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03029/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
Defendant
Joseph G. McGill
Plaintiff
The Home Depot, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH G. MCGILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE HOME DEPOT, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-03029-KAW 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 9-11

On January 20, 2015, Plaintiff Joseph G. McGill filed this case against Defendant Home 

Depot, Inc. in Marin County Superior Court. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A.) On June 30, 2015, 

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. removed the case to federal court on the grounds that it was made aware 

on June 1, 2015 that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, such that there is complete 

diversity of citizenship between the parties. On July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand 

the case to state court. 

Upon review of the moving papers, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and finds that Defendant’s removal 

was timely, such that Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff Joseph G. McGill was shopping at Home Depot in San 

Rafael, California, when he reached for an item on the shelf and the shelf collapsed onto his foot. 

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A.) The impact allegedly caused Plaintiff to fall to the ground, and he 

broke his toes and sustained a knee injury. Id.

On January 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Home Depot in Marin 

County Superior Court for negligence and premises liability, in which he sought recovery of wage 

loss, hospital and medical expenses, general damages, and compensatory damages. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-

Case 4:15-cv-03029-KAW Document 20 Filed 09/15/15 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

11, 14.) Plaintiff’s complaint did not specify the amount in controversy. See id. On March 13, 

2015, Defendant filed an answer. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. B.) On June 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a case 

management statement in which he stated that his damages exceeded $100,000. (Case 

Management Conference Statement, Dkt. No. 1, Ex. C.)

On June 30, 2015, Home Depot removed the case to federal court on the grounds that, 

prior to the filing of the case management statement, it was unaware that the amount in 

controversy exceeded $75,000, such that federal jurisdiction exists as there is complete diversity 

of citizenship between the parties. (Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1.)

On July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to Marin County Superior 

Court. (Pls.’ Mot. to Remand, “Pls.’ Mot.,” Dkt. No. 10.) On August 13, 2015, Defendant filed 

an opposition. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 14.) On August 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Pl.’s 

Reply, Dkt. No. 19.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Removal

District courts have jurisdiction in civil actions where there is complete diversity of 

citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest 

and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). There is a “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction.” 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). This principle dictates that the removal 

statute be “strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Id. “The strong presumption against 

removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal 

is proper,” and that the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court. Hunter v. 

Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009).

The procedure for removal of civil actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446. A notice of 

removal must be filed within 30 days after the receipt of the initial pleading or

if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 

removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, 

through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, 

motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained 

that the case is one which is or has become removable.

Case 4:15-cv-03029-KAW Document 20 Filed 09/15/15 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1),(3). Thus, the first thirty-day period for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 

only applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face. Harris v. Bankers 

Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). And “[t]he second thirty-day period for 

removal applies when ‘the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.’” Id. (quoting § 

1446(b)(3)).

B. Request for Judicial Notice

As a general rule, a district court may take notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute 

that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal–Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A] court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’” Lee v. City 

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court need not accept as true allegations that contradict facts 

which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1987). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff asks that the Court take judicial notice of a 

purportedly true and correct copy of the proof of service of summons in the instant case. 

(Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Dkt. No. 11, Ex.1.) The proof of service states that the 

complaint was served on January 29, 2015. Id.

Defendant does not oppose the request for judicial notice.

A district court may take notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are 

“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal–Obeso, 989 F.2d 

331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). True and correct copies of court records are not subject to 

reasonable dispute and are proper subjects of judicial notice. United States v. Wilson, 631 

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Case 4:15-cv-03029-KAW Document 20 Filed 09/15/15 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

B. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff moves to remand the case on the grounds that Defendant’s notice of removal was 

untimely. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the service of the initial complaint 

on January 29, 2015 required Home Depot to file a notice of removal by February 27, 2015.1Id. 

Home Depot claims that removal was timely, because it first ascertained that the amount in 

controversy exceeded $75,000 when it was served with Plaintiff’s case management conference 

statement, which alleged an amount in controversy that exceeds $100,000. (Def.’s Opp’n at 3.)

The Ninth Circuit has construed § 1446(b)(3) to mean that the “thirty day time period for 

removal starts to run from defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading only when that pleading 

affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” Harris v. 

Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91 (9th Cir. 2005). Otherwise, the thirty-day period

begins when it becomes apparent that the case has become removable by “an amended pleading, 

motion, order or other paper.” Id. at 696; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).

Plaintiff argues that removal is untimely because Defendant could have removed the action 

when the complaint was filed, as it was plausible that the amount in controversy requirement was 

met. (Pl.’s Reply at 3-4.) Plaintiff, however, misconstrues the recent United States Supreme 

Court’s decision in Dart Cherokee, which held that “a defendant’s notice of removal need include 

only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. 

Evidence establishing the amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, 

or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. 

Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014). In sum, Dart Cherokee involved whether a defendant’s

assertion that the amount in controversy requirement is met, absent evidence in support of the 

allegation, is sufficient to satisfy the “short and plain statement” requirement for removal. Id. at 

551. It does not stand for the proposition that the thirty-day clock for removal begins to run if it is 

plausible that the amount in controversy requirement is met.

 

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s timing computation is inaccurate, because, pursuant to Rule 6, 

the last day after the complaint was served would have been extended to March 2, 2015, when the 

thirtieth day fell on Saturday, February 28, 2015. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). This error, 

however, is of no consequence, since the notice of removal was not filed until June 30, 2015.

Case 4:15-cv-03029-KAW Document 20 Filed 09/15/15 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the argument that a case becomes 

removable where the initial pleading provides a “clue” regarding removability. Harris, 425 F.3d at 

696; see also Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2012). In 

Harris, the Ninth Circuit held that “jurisdictional and procedural interests [are] served by a brightline approach” restricted to the face of the complaint. Harris, 425 F.3d at 696. Here, the 

complaint does not affirmatively state an amount in controversy. While the complaint’s brief 

statement regarding Plaintiff’s injuries made it possible that the amount in controversy exceeded 

$75,000, it did not become apparent until the June 3, 2015 case management statement, in which

Plaintiff claimed that his damages exceeded $100,000. By filing the notice of removal within 30 

days of the case management statement, Defendant’s removal was timely.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. 

Furthermore, Home Depot’s notice of removal, filed within 30 days of Plaintiff’s case 

management conference statement, was timely. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2015

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:15-cv-03029-KAW Document 20 Filed 09/15/15 Page 5 of 5