Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00514/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00514-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc.
Defendant
Aimee Lambert
Plaintiff
Raze Media, LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AIMEE LAMBERT, an individual, on 

behalf of herself and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE, INC., a 

Delaware corporation; RAZE MEDIA, 

LLC, a Texas limited liability company; 

and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-00514-MCE-KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc.’s Motion to 

Dismiss or Stay this putative class action brought by Aimee Lambert (“Plaintiff”) under 

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. ECF No. 10. 

Defendant Raze Media, LLC joined in the Motion. ECF No. 13. For the following 

reasons, the Motion is GRANTED and this case is STAYED pending further order of the 

Court.1

///

 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc. and Raze 

Media, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) sent her two text messages without her consent 

on October 18, 2013, in violation of the TCPA. Compl., ECF No. 1. In order to prevail 

on her TCPA claim, Plaintiff must prove: (1) Defendants called her cellular telephone 

number; 2 (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”); (3) without her prior 

express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 

707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, or in the 

alternative to stay the instant litigation, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 

Defendants do not dispute that they sent text messages to Plaintiff, but assert that 

petitions currently pending before the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) are 

relevant to whether the text messages were sent using an ATDS and whether Plaintiff 

gave prior express consent to receive text messages from Defendants.3

STANDARD

“The primary jurisdiction doctrine permits courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss 

a complaint without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the special 

competence of an administrative agency.” Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 

1114 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he doctrine is a ‘prudential’ one, under which a court 

determines that an otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy questions 

that should be addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory authority 

 2 For purposes of the TCPA, a text message is a “call.” See In re Rules and Regulations 

Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R.14014, 

14115 ¶ 165 (F.C.C. July 3, 2003).

3 Defendant Buth-Na-Bodaige, Inc.’s Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 12, of the pending 

petitions and public notices issued by the FCC, to which Plaintiff has not objected, is granted. 

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over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial branch.” Id. Invocation of the 

doctrine “is committed to the sound discretion of the court when ‘protection of a 

regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the 

scheme.’” Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th 

Cir.1987)). “Although ‘[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary 

jurisdiction,’” Clark, 523 F.3d at 1115, the Ninth Circuit has held that the doctrine applies 

in cases where there is “(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by 

Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority 

(3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive 

regulatory scheme that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.” Davel 

Commc’ns, Inc. v Qwest Corp., 460 F.3d 1075, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). In considering the four factors, the Court is mindful 

“that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is designed to protect agencies possessing quasilegislative powers and that are actively involved in the administration of regulatory 

statutes.” Clark, 523 F.3d at 1115.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not argue, and thus appears to concede, that factors two through 

four are satisfied here. Indeed, Congress has vested in the FCC considerable authority 

to make rules and regulations to implement the TCPA. See Satterfield v. Simon & 

Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, 

LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 466-67 (6th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the FCC “is familiar with the 

regulations it prescribed and possesses expertise over the statute it implements.” 

Charvat, 630 F.3d at 467 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Rather, 

Plaintiff argues that the issues before the FCC in the pending petitions are irrelevant to 

her TCPA claim, and thus there is no basis for a stay or dismissal. The Court disagrees.

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Under the TCPA, text messages sent using an ATDS are prohibited unless the 

recipient has given prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). The statute itself is 

silent on what form of express consent—oral, written, or some other kind—is required. 

See id. However, as of October 16, 2013, express written consent is required. See In re 

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 

Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1839 ¶ 20, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 

2012). Further, the express written consent must be signed and be sufficient to show 

that the consumer received clear and conspicuous disclosure of the consequences of 

providing consent and unambiguously agreed to receive future calls or text messages. 

See id. at 1844 ¶ 33.

Plaintiff alleges that she never consented to receiving text messages from 

Defendants. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 20. Conversely, Defendants provide a declaration 

asserting that Plaintiff gave prior express consent in September 2013 by providing her 

phone number to Defendants and granting permission to be contacted by phone. 

Motion, ECF No. 10 at 4; Decl. of Molly M. Dufner, ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff contends

that because she received the text messages from Defendants on October 18, 2013, two 

days after the new FCC regulations took effect, any “consent” she may have provided in 

September 2013 is meaningless. Opp’n, ECF No. 14 at 12-13.

However, as demonstrated by the Coalition of Mobile Engagement Providers’

(“CMEP”) petition now pending before the FCC, 4 (ECF No. 12-2, Exh. 5), “express 

consent” provided by a customer prior to October 16, 2013, could obviate the need to 

again obtain consent under the new regulations. Indeed, the FCC understands CMEP’s 

petition as seeking clarification that the new rules (1) do not “nullify those written express 

consents already provided by customers” before October 16, 2013, and (2) “are 

applicable only to new customers and therefore mobile marketers need not take 

additional steps to obtain the revised forms of written consent from existing customers 

 4 The FCC issued a Public Notice in connection with the CMEP petition on November 1, 2013. 

The public comment period has since expired.

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who have already provided express written consent under the previous rules that does 

not meet the standards of the revised rules.” ECF No. 12-2, Exh. 6. If the FCC clarifies 

that a customer’s pre-October 16, 2013, express consent covers post-October 16, 2013, 

communications, Plaintiff’s claim could be materially affected. Accordingly, a stay is 

warranted.5 Moreover, because there is no indication that Plaintiff has received any text 

messages from Defendants since October 18, 2013, she is not suffering continuing harm 

and thus will not be prejudiced by a stay. 

In short, the Court finds that a stay is warranted because: (1) at least one petition 

that may affect Plaintiff’s claim in this case is already before the FCC and the comment 

period has expired; (2) judicial economy weighs against issuing any decisions that may 

be undermined by anticipated rulings by the FCC; (3) the violations alleged by Plaintiff 

are not ongoing—indeed, the only alleged violations occurred over ten months ago—so 

Plaintiff will not suffer further damages during the pendency of a stay; and (4) this case is 

in the earliest stage of litigation, such that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by any delay 

and all parties will be spared the costs of discovery that could be rendered moot by FCC 

rulings. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc.’s Motion to 

Dismiss or Stay, (ECF No. 10), in which Defendant Raze Media, LLC joined, is 

GRANTED and this case is STAYED pending further order of the Court. The parties are 

directed to file a Joint Status Report advising the Court of the status of the FCC petitions 

identified in ECF No. 12 every sixty (60) days; the first such report must be filed not later

than sixty (60) days after this Order is electronically filed. Failure to do so may result in

///

 5 Because the Court finds that a stay is appropriate based on the prior consent issue, 

consideration of the pending FCC petitions regarding the scope of what constitutes an “automatic 

telephone dialing system,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), is unnecessary. 

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monetary sanctions and/or dismissal of this action for noncompliance with this Court’s 

Order and/or the failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 20, 2014

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