Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03493/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03493-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shaun Stafford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3493

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

v. * District of Arkansas.

*

Shaun Stafford, also known as Shawn * [UNPUBLISHED]

Michael Phillip Stafford, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 9, 2005

Filed: May 23, 2005

___________

Before BENTON, LAY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After Shaun Stafford was convicted on several state charges, the Government

moved to revoke his supervised release. Stafford admitted the violations and the

district court sentenced Stafford to the statutory maximum of twenty-four months in

prison without further supervision. 

On appeal, Stafford contends the logic of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.

2531 (2004), should apply to the supervised release provisions of the Sentencing

Reform Act and render his sentence unconstitutional. We disagree. Stafford’s

revocation sentence is not affected by Blakely or the Court’s more recent decision in

Appellate Case: 04-3493 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/23/2005 Entry ID: 1905759
-2-

Booker v. Washington, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). United States v. Edwards, 400 F.3d

591, 592-93 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Even before the Court’s decision in

Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines associated with supervised release violations were

considered advisory. Id. Further, the Supreme Court has not recognized a Sixth

Amendment right to have a jury decide the facts relevant to the revocation of

supervised release, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972), and Stafford

admitted the facts relevant to the revocation in this case. 

Stafford next contends the district court committed error in making a

determination on jail time credit, when that issue should have been reserved for the

Bureau of Prisons. The district court recognized that state jail time credit is a Bureau

of Prisons decision, however, and declined to order credit for time served in the state

county jail. 

Last, Stafford asserts the district court committed error in imposing the

statutory maximum sentence of twenty-four months under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3),

because the sentence exceeds the 5-11 month range recommended by chapter 7 of the

Sentencing Guidelines. The district court has discretion to impose a sentence above

the advisory range suggested by chapter 7 up to the statutory maximum. See United

States v. Hawkins, 375 F.3d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jasper, 338

F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 2003). Under § 3583(e), the court must consider sentencing

factors in § 3553(a), but the court need not mechanically list every factor, or make

explicit, detailed findings when sentencing a defendant. Hawkins, 375 F.3d at 752;

Jasper, 338 F.3d at 867-68. If a sentencing judge mentions some of the factors

contained in § 3553(a), we assume the court knew of the statute’s entire contents.

Hawkins, 375 F.3d at 752. Statutory sentencing factors include, among other things,

the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the

defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the need for the sentence to promote respect for

the law, to deter criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes by the

Appellate Case: 04-3493 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/23/2005 Entry ID: 1905759
-3-

defendant, id. § (a)(2)(A)-(C), and in the case of supervised release violations, the

sentencing range advised under chapter 7 of the guidelines, id. § (a)(4)(B) . 

Before imposing sentence in this case, the district court heard the testimony of

several witnesses about Stafford’s conduct violating his supervised release. During

the hearing, the court specified both the Guidelines range and statutory maximum,

and confirmed that Stafford was aware of them. At the conclusion of the testimony,

the court stated Stafford had been the biggest failure of the supervised release

program that he had seen. The court noted Stafford had completely disregarded the

court’s orders and had not complied with supervised release in countless ways. The

court observed that Stafford had been given every opportunity by several courts, by

several organizations, and supervised release had not worked. Under the

circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding a two-year

sentence was necessary to punish Stafford’s noncompliance with the terms of his

supervised release. The court’s statements make clear that the court considered the

relevant statutory factors and show Stafford’s sentence was a carefully considered

exercise of discretion. Hawkins, 375 F.3d at 753. 

We thus affirm the district court. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3493 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/23/2005 Entry ID: 1905759