Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55906/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55906-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Bratton

Mohammad Afzal Chaudhry
Appellee
Mohammad Umar Chaudhry
Appellee
Rukhsana Chaudhry
Appellee
Usma Chaudhry
Appellee
City of Los Angeles
Appellant
County of Los Angeles

Joseph Cruz

Estate of Mohammad Usman Chaudhry
Appellee
Anthony Hernandez

Interfaith Communities United for Justice and Peace

Islamic Shura Council of Southern California
Appellee
Los Angeles County Coroner Department

Los Angeles Police Department

David Romo

Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RUKHSANA CHAUDHRY;

MOHAMMAD AFZAL CHAUDHRY;

USMA CHAUDHRY; MOHAMMAD

UMAR CHAUDHRY; ESTATE OF

MOHAMMAD USMAN CHAUDHRY;

ISLAMIC SHURA COUNCIL OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

And

INTERFAITH COMMUNITIES UNITED

FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; JOSEPH

CRUZ; DAVID ROMO; COUNTY OF

LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES

COUNTY CORONER DEPARTMENT;

ANTHONY HERNANDEZ;

LAKSHMANAN

SATHYAVAGISWARAN,

Defendants-Appellees,

And

No. 11-55820

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-01592-

RGK-RZ

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2 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT;

WILLIAM BRATTON,

Defendants.

RUKHSANA CHAUDHRY;

MOHAMMAD AFZAL CHAUDHRY;

USMA CHAUDHRY; MOHAMMAD

UMAR CHAUDHRY; ESTATE OF

MOHAMMAD USMAN CHAUDHRY;

ISLAMIC SHURA COUNCIL OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

And

INTERFAITH COMMUNITIES UNITED

FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant-Appellant,

And

JOSEPH CRUZ; DAVID ROMO;

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS

ANGELES COUNTY CORONER

DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY

HERNANDEZ; LAKSHMANAN

SATHYAVAGISWARAN; LOS ANGELES

No. 11-55906

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-01592-

RGK-RZ

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3

POLICE DEPARTMENT; WILLIAM

BRATTON,

Defendants.

RUKHSANA CHAUDHRY;

MOHAMMAD AFZAL CHAUDHRY;

USMA CHAUDHRY; MOHAMMAD

UMAR CHAUDHRY; ESTATE OF

MOHAMMAD USMAN CHAUDHRY;

ISLAMIC SHURA COUNCIL OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

And

INTERFAITH COMMUNITIES UNITED

FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH CRUZ,

Defendant-Appellant,

And

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; DAVID

ROMO; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY CORONER

DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY

HERNANDEZ; LAKSHMANAN

SATHYAVAGISWARAN; LOS ANGELES

No. 11-55907

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-01592-

RGK-RZ

OPINION

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4 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

POLICE DEPARTMENT; WILLIAM

BRATTON,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 6, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 19, 2014

Before: William A. Fletcher, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s decision striking a

damages award, reversed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal of two claims, affirmed in part and

reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment, and

vacated an attorneys’ fee award in an action brought by three

organizational plaintiffs and the family and estate of

Mohammad Usman Chaudhry, who was shot and killed by a

Los Angeles police officer.

In reversing the district court’s decision to strike the

estate’s $1 million damage award, the panel held that

California’s prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering

damages in survival actions limits recovery too severely to be

consistent with the deterrence policy underlying 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The panel therefore held that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 377.34, disallowing pre-death pain and suffering, does not

apply to § 1983 claims where the decedent’s death was

caused by a violation of federal law. The panel held that on

remand, the district court could consider, in the first instance,

whether the $1 million award was excessive.

The panel reversed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal of the estate’s claim under California Civil

Code § 52.1 against the City defendants, noting that a

successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth

Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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6 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

§ 52.1. The panel also reversed the district court’s Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal of the parents’ substantive due process

claim on the grounds that parents have a liberty interest in the

companionship of their adult children and have a cause of

action under the Fourteenth Amendment when the police kill

an adult child without legal justification.

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

on the Chaudhrys’ negligence claim under California law

based on the coroner’s failure to provide timely notice of

Usman’s death. The panel held that the Chaudhrys

introduced enough evidence to create a jury issue on whether

the coroner’s attempts to locate Usman’s family were

reasonable.

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the defendants on the intentional infliction of

emotional distress and § 1983 substantive due process claims

brought by Usman’s siblings, but reversed as to their

negligence claim against the County defendants. Finally, the

panel vacated the district court’s attorneys’ fee award.

COUNSEL

Olu K. Orange (argued), Orange Law Offices, Los Angeles,

California; Donald W. Cook and Robert Mann, Mann &

Cook, Los Angeles, California; Paula Dee Pearlman,

Disability Rights Legal Center, Los Angeles, California;

AmeenaMirzaQazi, Council on American-Islamic Relations,

California, Anaheim, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Blithe Smith Bock (argued), Los Angeles City Attorney’s

Office, Los Angeles, California; Jules Solomon Zeman

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7

(argued), Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP, Los Angeles,

California; Alison McIlvaine Turner (argued) and TimothyT.

Coates, Greines, Martin, Stein &Richland LLP, Los Angeles,

California; Patricia E. Ellyatt, and Kenneth Maranga,

Maranga & Morgenstein, Woodland Hills, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Early in the morning of March 25, 2008, Mohammad

Usman Chaudhry (“Usman”) was shot and killed by Los

Angeles Police Officer Joseph Cruz. Los Angeles County

Department of the Coroner (“the Coroner”) took custody of

Usman’s body, but it did not notify his family of his death for

twenty-one days. This delay prevented Usman’s family from

burying him in accordance with their religion.

These events gave rise to a suit involving many plaintiffs,

many claims, and many defendants. In this opinion, we

address some of the issues, affirming in part and reversing in

part. In a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with

this opinion, we affirm on the remainder of the issues. 

I. Background

Usman was a 21-year-old Muslim man. According to his

family, he was autistic and often wandered from home. On

March 25, 2008, Officer Cruz and his partner, Officer David

Romo, saw Usman sleeping in front of an apartment building

in Los Angeles. Suspecting that Usman might be a drug user,

they stopped their police cruiser and approached him. Cruz

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8 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

asked Usman to show his identification. Usman complied. 

Cruz gave the identification to Romo, who returned to the

cruiser to check for outstanding warrants. Cruz testified at

trial that, while Romo was at the cruiser, Usman lunged at

Cruz with a knife. Cruz drew his gun and fired four shots,

three of which struck Usman in the chest and abdomen. 

When Romo returned from the cruiser, Cruz had a cut on his

hand. Usman died at the scene.

The Coroner received Usman’s remains and began to

search for his next of kin. Usman’s identification listed his

address as the Celebration Theatre in West Hollywood,

California. On March 25, the day of the shooting, someone

at the Coroner ran a search in the records of the Department

of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). The DMV printout contained

three addresses: the address of the Celebration Theatre, an

address in Los Angeles, and an address in Bellflower,

California. Brian Elias, an investigator for the Coroner,

visited the Celebration Theatre, but it was closed. Joyce

Kato, another investigator, then took over the search. On

March 27, Kato ran a “comprehensive” search on Accurint,

a LexisNexis service for searching public records. That

search disclosed several addresses connected with Usman’s

name. She made a note in the Coroner’s file for Usman that

the “only address consistently listed” was that of the

Celebration Theatre.

The Bellflower address belonged to Usman’s parents,

Rukhsana and Mohammad Afzal Chaudhry (“the

Chaudhrys”). Kato “overlooked” that address and focused

her search on the Celebration Theatre. She called and sent an

email to the Theatre. On April 1, 2008, she sent a letter to the

Theatre and began pursuing what turned out to be a false lead. 

On April 3, she requested information from the Los Angeles

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9

Police Department (“LAPD”). She received a response on

April 11 that indicated that Usman had listed the Celebration

Theatre as his address. She received a response to her April

1 letter on April 15, but the response provided no useful

information. On April 15, she double-checked her paperwork

and noticed the Bellflower address in the DMV printout. 

That same day, she ran that address in Accurint, identified the

Chaudhrys, contacted Usman’s mother by telephone, and

notified her of his death.

In the twenty-one days between Usman’s death and the

notification of his family, his body decayed. His mother

testified that when she saw Usman’s body, “His skin was all

over. I couldn’t touch him or kiss him. . . . His ears was all

over, skin was all over, just like a bird face. . . . [H]is skin

was falling off just like a bird face . . . like a small shrink

face. . . . There was no eye in the socket.” She testified

further, “They cut his body without our permission. That is

the worst thing you do with our person. We never allow. If

we are there, we never allow to cut his body.” The delay in

notification and the decay of Usman’s body prevented the

Chaudhrys from burying their son in accordance with the

religious customs of Islam.

Usman’s Estate (“Estate”), Usman’s siblings Usma and

Mohammad Umar Chaudhry (“Usma and Umar”), and the

Chaudhrys sued various City and County defendants, seeking

damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Three

organizational plaintiffs—Interfaith Communities United for

Justice and Peace (“ICUJP”), the Islamic Shura Council of

Southern California (“Shura”), and the Los Angeles

Community Action Network (“LACAN”)—also sought

declaratory and injunctive relief. The City defendants were

the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD (collectively “City”),

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10 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

chief of police William Bratton, and Officers Cruz and Romo. 

The County defendants were the County of Los Angeles

(“County”), the Coroner, and Coroner officials Anthony

Hernandez and Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran.

Plaintiffs brought claims against the City defendants

under (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for

unreasonable seizure and excessive force under the Fourth

Amendment; and (3) state law, for assault, battery, false

imprisonment, and wrongful death. Plaintiffs brought claims

against all the defendants under (1) § 1983, for violations of

substantive due process and equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment and of free exercise under the First

Amendment; (2) § 1983, for implementing unconstitutional

policies or customs, in violation of Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (3) § 1983, for failure

to train and for supervisory liability, in violation of City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); (4) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985

and 1986, for conspiracy to violate the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments; (5) California law, for negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and

conversion and trespass to chattels; and (6) California law, for

violations of civil rights under the California Constitution and

California Civil Code §§ 51.5, 52(b), and 52.1.

The district court rejected most claims before trial. The

court granted the City defendants’ motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6) as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for violations of

equal protection, free exercise, and substantive due process;

plaintiffs’ § 1985 and § 1986 claims for conspiracy; and

plaintiffs’ state-law claims for IIED, negligence,

discrimination, and violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. 

The court dismissed LACAN’s only claim, which alleged

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11

unconstitutional discrimination against homeless and disabled

people, because LACAN did not plead facts plausibly

suggesting intentional discrimination. The court later granted

summary judgment to Officer Romo on all claims; to the

County defendants on all claims; to the City defendants on all

claims except the Estate’s and the Chaudhrys’ claims for

wrongful death and assault and battery; and to Officer Cruz

on plaintiffs’ claim for conversion. The court held that Shura

and ICUJP lacked organizational standing under Hunt v.

Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.

333 (1977), because there was no showing that Usman was a

member of either organization. The court held further that

Usman’s siblings, Usma and Umar, lacked standing. It wrote,

“Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence indicating that

Usma and Umar have a legally protected interest that falls

into the category of an injury in fact.”

The only remaining claims were the Estate’s excessive

force claim against Cruz, the Estate’s assault and battery

claim against the City, and the Chaudhrys’ wrongful death

claim against Cruz and the City. Those claims went to trial. 

At trial, the Estate and the Chaudhrys presented evidence

contradicting Cruz’s version of events. They presented

evidence that Romo did not hear Cruz yell “knife”; that

Usman’s DNA was not on the knife with which he allegedly

attacked Cruz; that the knife was a “boot knife,” a kind of

knife typically carried by police officers; and that the pattern

and trajectory of Cruz’s gunshots showed he shot Usman

while Usman was collapsing to the ground, rather than while

he was advancing toward Cruz. The jury found for the Estate

and the Chaudhrys. It found that Cruz used excessive force,

that the excessive force caused Usman’s death, and that Cruz

acted “reckless[ly], oppressive[ly], or malicious[ly].” The

jury awarded $700,000 to the Chaudhrys for their wrongful

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12 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

death claim under state law, and $1,000,000, based on

Usman’s pain and suffering, to the Estate for its excessive

force claim under § 1983.

The City and Cruz filed renewed motions for judgment as

a matter of law or for a new trial. The district court denied

the motion for a new trial and denied the motion for judgment

as a matter of law as to the $700,000 award. The district

court granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law as

to the $1,000,000 award. It held that California law prohibits

recovery for pain and suffering in survival actions, and that

this prohibition is incorporated into § 1983. See Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 377.34.

The Estate and the Chaudhrys sought attorneys’ fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and California Civil Code

§ 52.1(h), requesting a total of $1,007,849.25. They also

requested a contingency-fee modifier under California law. 

See Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 744–46 (Cal. 2001). The

district court awarded fees of $73,125.

Plaintiffs timely appealed most of the district court’s

orders granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for

summary judgment, its order vacating the Estate’s

$1,000,000 damages verdict, and its reduced attorneys’ fees

award. The City cross-appealed the attorneys’ fees award. 

Cruz and the City initially appealed the Chaudhrys’ $700,000

verdict but later conceded that this part of the verdict should

stand.

II. Discussion

Plaintiffs waived claims against some defendants by not

addressing them in their opening brief. See Kim v. Kang,

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 13

154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1998). For the purposes of this

appeal, the remaining defendants are the City and Cruz

(collectively “the City defendants”), and the County and the

Coroner (collectively “the County defendants”). The

following claims have been preserved for appeal and are

addressed in this opinion: (1) the Estate’s claim for damages

for pre-death pain and suffering under § 1983; (2) the Estate’s

claim under California Civil Code § 52.1; (3) the Chaudhrys’

§ 1983 claim that Cruz violated their substantive due process

rights by killing Usman; (4) the Chaudhrys’ negligence claim

against the County defendants; (5) Usma and Umar’s § 1983

claim for substantive due process violations and their statelaw claims for IIED and negligence; and (6) plaintiffs’

request for attorneys’ fees. In a memorandum disposition

filed concurrentlywith this opinion, we address the remaining

claims that have been preserved for appeal.

A. The Estate’s Pre-Death Pain and Suffering Damages

Under § 1983

Under California’s survival statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 377.20, Usman’s § 1983 claim survived his death. See

Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir.

1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de

la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In survival

actions, however, California does not allow a decedent’s

estate to recover for the decedent’s pre-death pain and

suffering. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.34. Because federal

law is silent on the measure of damages in § 1983 actions,

California’s disallowance of pre-death pain and suffering

damages governs unless it is inconsistent with the policies of

§ 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a); Robertson v. Wegmann,

436 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978). The district court found that

§ 377.34 is not inconsistent with § 1983 and struck the jury’s

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14 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

$1,000,000 verdict in favor of the Estate. We review that

decision de novo, see EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

156 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 1998), and reverse.

One of Congress’s primary goals in enacting § 1983 was

to provide a remedy for killings unconstitutionally caused or

acquiesced in by state governments. See Monroe v. Pape,

365 U.S. 167, 172–76 (1961), overruled in part on other

grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Berry v. City of

Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1501–02 (10th Cir. 1990). “The

policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons

injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of

abuses of power by those acting under color of state law.” 

Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590–91. Whether a state-law

limitation on damages applies in § 1983 actions depends on

whether the limit is inconsistent with § 1983’s goals of

compensation and deterrence. Id. at 591–92; see Bell v. City

of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled

in part on other grounds by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th

Cir. 2005). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has

addressed whether a state law denying pre-death pain and

suffering damages is inconsistent with § 1983 in cases where

an alleged violation of federal law caused the victim’s death. 

The district courts in our circuit are divided. Compare, e.g.,

Venerable v. City of Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128,

1132–33 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (consistent), with Guyton v.

Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166–67 (N.D. Cal. 1981)

(inconsistent).

We begin our analysis with Robertson, in which the

Supreme Court considered a Louisiana law that abated tort

claims when a plaintiff died and was not survived by a

spouse, child, parent, or sibling. 436 U.S. at 587. The

plaintiff in Robertson filed a § 1983 suit for malicious

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 15

prosecution but died before trial. He was not survived by any

close relatives. The tortious acts alleged in the suit had not

caused Robertson’s death. Id. at 586–87. The Fifth Circuit

refused to abate his claim, holding that the Louisiana law was

inconsistent with the policies of § 1983. Id. at 587–88. The

Supreme Court reversed. It held that Louisiana’s abatement

law was not inconsistent with § 1983 for two reasons. First,

the law did not undermine the compensatory goals of § 1983,

which the Court held did not require “compensation of one

who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased’s estate.” 

436 U.S. at 592. Second, the law did not undermine

deterrence because, “at least in situations in which there is no

claim that the illegality caused the plaintiff’s death,” an

official would have no way of knowing in advance whether

or not any particular victim would die without close relatives

“before conclusion of the § 1983 suit.” Id. & n.10. The

Court also found it important that the Louisiana law would

apply in only a small number of cases. Id. at 591–92.

The Court’s statement in Robertson that § 1983 does not

require compensation to the decedent’s estate was made in a

case where the alleged violation of federal law did not cause

the decedent’s death. It is unclear whether the Court intended

its statement to apply when the violation did cause the death. 

We need not decide that question here. Cf. Bell, 746 F.2d at

1240 n.42 (declining to address whether § 1983 requires

compensation for loss of life “where the victim by virtue of

death cannot be made whole”). What is clear is that, with

respect to deterrence, the distinction between those violations

of federal law that cause death and those that do not is

crucial. The Court in Robertson repeatedly distinguished

Louisiana’s abatement law from cases “in which deprivation

of federal rights caused death.” Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594;

see also id. at 592 & n.10.

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16 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

The practical effect of § 377.34 is to reduce, and often to

eliminate, compensatory damage awards for the survivors of

people killed by violations of federal law. Section 377.34

limits damages in survival actions to the victim’s pre-death

economic losses. See People v. Runyan, 279 P.3d 1143, 1151

(Cal. 2012). In cases where the victim dies quickly, there

often will be no damage remedy at all under § 377.34. Even

in cases of slow death where pre-death economic damages

might be available, § 377.34’s limitation will often be

tantamount to a prohibition, for the victims of excessive

police force are often low-paid or unemployed. The same is

likely to be true for prisoners whose death is caused by the

deliberate indifference of jail or prison officials in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Bureau of Justice

Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Profile of Jail Inmates, 2002,

at 9 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/

pdf/pji02.pdf (reporting that, as of 2002, 83.5 percent of

prison inmates had pre-arrest monthly incomes of less than

$2,000). Therefore, a prohibition against pre-death pain and

suffering awards for a decedent’s estate has the perverse

effect of making it more economically advantageous for a

defendant to kill rather than injure his victim.

Three of our sister circuits have addressed state laws

comparable to § 377.34. All three held that those state laws

were inconsistent with § 1983 when the violation of federal

law caused the victim’s death. In Berry v. City of Muskogee,

the decedent, an inmate at Muskogee City-Federal Jail, was

killed by fellow prisoners. 900 F.2d at 1492. His widow

brought a § 1983 suit against the city for violation of the

Eighth Amendment, alleging that jail officials’ deliberate

indifference to the decedent’s safety had led to his death. Id.

The Tenth Circuit rejected an Oklahoma law limiting

damages in survival actions to property loss and “loss of

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 17

decedent’s earnings between the time of injury and death.” 

Id. at 1504. The court wrote, “The [state limitation laws] are

not suitable to carry out the full effects intended for § 1983

cases ending in death of the victim.” Id. at 1506. In Bell v.

City of Milwaukee, aMilwaukee police officer shot and killed

the decedent, planted a knife on his body, and then lied about

the circumstances of the killing. 746 F.2d at 1215–18. The

decedent’s siblings and estate brought suit under § 1983. Id.

at 1224. The Seventh Circuit rejected Wisconsin laws

precluding recovery of damages for loss of life and punitive

damages in survival actions. Id. at 1239–41. The court

wrote, “[I]f Section 1983 did not allow recovery for loss of

life notwithstanding inhospitable state law, deterrence would

be further subverted since it would be more advantageous to

the unlawful actor to kill rather than injure.” Id. at 1239. 

Further, “[t]o disallow punitive damages,” the court said,

“would seriously hamper the deterrence effect of Section

1983.” Id. at 1241. Finally, in McFadden v. Sanchez,

710 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1983), the decedent was killed by

police officers during the course of an arrest, and a jury

awarded punitive damages. Id. at 908–10. The Second

Circuit rejected a New York law barring punitive damages in

survival actions. The court wrote, “[W]e have no doubt that

limitations in a state survival statute have no application to a

section 1983 suit brought to redress a denial of rights that

caused the decedent’s death.” Id. at 911.

We agree with the reasoning in these cases. Consistent

with Berry, Bell, and McFadden, we hold that California’s

prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages

limits recovery too severely to be consistent with § 1983’s

deterrence policy. Section 377.34 therefore does not apply to

§ 1983 claims where the decedent’s death was caused by the

violation of federal law.

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18 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

The City defendants argue that even if pain and suffering

damages are available under § 1983, the jury’s award of

$1,000,000 was excessive in light of the evidence adduced at

trial. Because the district court held that pain and suffering

damages were categorically unavailable, it did not reach the

argument that the $1,000,000 award was excessive. The

district court is in the best position to assess the

reasonableness of the award. We therefore remand to the

district court to consider in the first instance a motion for

remittitur.

B. The Estate’s California Civil Code § 52.1 Claim

The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) the

Estate’s claim against the City defendants under California

Civil Code § 52.1, which provides a cause of action for

violations of a plaintiff’s state or federal civil rights

committed by “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 52.1. The district court held that § 52.1 requires

evidence of discriminatory intent. After trial, the Estate

moved to amend the judgment to reinstate its § 52.1 claim in

light of the jury’s verdict on its § 1983 excessive force claim. 

The district court denied the motion. We review de novo. 

See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc).

The district court erred in dismissing the Estate’s § 52.1

claim and in denying its post-trial motion to amend the

judgment. The California Supreme Court has held that § 52.1

does not require proof of discriminatory intent. Venegas v.

Cnty. of L.A., 87 P.3d 1, 13–14 (Cal. 2004). The Estate won

its excessive force claim under § 1983 at trial. The City

defendants concede in their brief to us that a successful claim

for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 19

basis for a successful claim under § 52.1. See Cameron v.

Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he elements

of the excessive force claim under § 52.1 are the same as

under § 1983.”); Bender v. Cnty. of L.A., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d

204, 212–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).

The City defendants nonetheless argue that the district

court acted properly. They contend that the Estate’s § 52.1

claim is entirely duplicative of its § 1983 claim. We disagree. 

If the Estate had prevailed on its § 52.1 claim, it could have

received a multiplier of its attorneys’ fees to account for the

risk of contingent representation. See infra at 31–32;

Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 744–46. Such a multiplier is not

available under § 1983. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557, 562–66 (1992). We therefore reverse the district

court’s dismissal of the Estate’s § 52.1 claim and remand

with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect the Estate’s

success on that claim.

C. The Chaudhrys’ Substantive Due Process Claim

Against Cruz

The Chaudhrys brought a § 1983 claim against Cruz for

violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive

due process. They alleged that Cruz’s killing of Usman

infringed their liberty interest in the companionship of their

child. The district court dismissed that claim under Rule

12(b)(6), holding that the Chaudhrys had no legal interest in

Usman’s companionship once he reached the age of majority. 

Reviewing de novo, see Lacey, 693 F.3d at 911, we reverse. 

Our decisions recognize that parents have a liberty interest in

the companionship of their adult children and have a cause of

action under the Fourteenth Amendment when the police kill

an adult child without legal justification. See Porter v.

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20 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008); Curnow ex rel.

Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.

1991).

On appeal, Cruz does not dispute that the Chaudhrys

properly stated a substantive due process claim. However, he

argues that we should affirm the district court because, he

contends, the Chaudhrys’ substantive due process claim is

entirely duplicative of the state-law wrongful death claim on

which they prevailed at trial. We disagree. Prevailing on

their substantive due process claim under § 1983 would

entitle the Chaudhrys to attorneys’ fees, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b), while prevailing on their state-law wrongful death

claim does not.

To succeed on their substantive due process claim against

Cruz, the Chaudhrys must prove he shot Usman with the

purpose “to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of

arrest.” Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140 (internal quotation marks

omitted). After trial, the jury found that Cruz’s conduct was

“reckless, oppressive, or malicious.” The verdict thus

establishes that Cruz unreasonably killed Usman, but not that

he acted with the purpose of harming him. On remand, the

district court should reinstate the Chaudhrys’ substantive due

process claim against Cruz and conduct appropriate

proceedings for its resolution.

D. The Chaudhrys’ Negligence Claim Against the County

Defendants

The Chaudhrys sued the County defendants for

negligence based on the Coroner’s failure to provide timely

notice of Usman’s death. The district court granted summary

judgment to the County defendants, finding as a matter of law

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 21

that the Coroner was not negligent. We review de novo a

grant of summary judgment. Heinemann v. Satterberg,

731 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2013). We reverse.

California Government Code § 815.6 specifies when a

public entity is subject to tort liability. There is a rebuttable

presumption of negligence under § 815.6 if the public entity

violates a statute and “(1) the statute which was violated

imposes a mandatory duty, (2) the statute was intended to

protect against the type of harm suffered, and (3) breach of

the statute’s mandatory duty was a proximate cause of the

injury suffered.” Braman v. State, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 610

(Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The Chaudhrys contend that the

Coroner had a mandatory duty under California Government

Code § 27471(a) to “make a reasonable attempt to locate the

family” of a decedent.

In Davila v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 651

(Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the California Court of Appeal held that

§ 27471(a) “[q]uite clearly” imposes on coroners “a

mandatory duty to make a reasonable attempt to locate [a]

decedent’s family,” and that one of the purposes of

§ 27471(a) is to allow family members control over the

disposition of the decedent’s remains. Id. at 653, 655. Under

Davila, the Coroner had a mandatory duty to make a

reasonable attempt to locate and inform Usman’s family of

his death.

The County defendants argue that Davila was impliedly

overruled by the California Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Guzman v. County of Monterey, 209 P.3d 89, 95 (Cal.

2009). We disagree. The Court in Guzman did not mention

Davila, and Davila is easily distinguishable. The statute at

issue in Guzman imposed on the “operator of [a] water

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22 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

system” a “duty to notify consumers of any water

contamination.” Guzman, 209 P.3d at 95, 98. The statute did

not impose an express duty on any other party, but the

plaintiffs in Guzman argued it imposed an “implied

mandatory duty” on the county in which a water system is

located. Id. at 98–99 (emphasis omitted). The Court rejected

that argument, holding that there was no such implied duty. 

By contrast, § 27471(a), the statute at issue here and in

Davila, expressly imposes a duty on the coroner: “‘Whenever

the coroner takes custody of a dead body pursuant to law, he

or she shall make a reasonable attempt to locate the family.’”

Davila, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (emphasis in original)

(quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 27471(a)).

The County defendants also argue that Davila is

inconsistent with the rule cited in Guzman that there is no

mandatory duty when the duty “itself involves the exercise of

discretion.” Guzman, 209 P.3d at 95 (citation omitted). The

County defendants point to two cases. In Ellerbee v. County

of Los Angeles, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010),

the statute required a sheriff to file a writ of execution “in

accordance with [the judgment creditor’s] written

instructions.” The creditor’s instructions, in turn, requested

the sheriff to act “promptly” and “as soon as possible.” Id. at

762 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those instructions

did not impose any mandatory duty on the sheriff, who

“retain[ed] complete discretion to determine how and when

it is feasible to allocate departmental resources to effect

service.” Id. In Department of Corps. v. Superior Court,

63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), the statute

provided that the Commissioner of Corporations “may” act

under certain circumstances, but it did not “require any action

at all.” Id. at 634 (emphasis omitted). As in Ellerbee, the

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 23

statute in Department of Corps. “grant[ed] the Commissioner

‘pervasively discretionary’ authority.” Id. at 633.

The duty in § 27471(a) does not allow the sort of

discretion allowed in Ellerbee and Department of Corps.

Contrary to the County defendants’ argument that § 27471(a)

provides no way “to objectively measure the government’s

action,” reasonableness is a quintessentially objective

measure. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 29 P.3d 197, 207

(Cal. 2001); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d

795, 810 (Cal. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283

cmt. c (1965). We conclude that Davila is an accurate

statement of California law and hold that the Coroner owed

a mandatory duty to the Chaudhrys under § 27471(a). See

Davila, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.

Because the Coroner owed the Chaudhrys a duty under

§ 27471(a), summary judgment for the County defendants

was appropriate only if, “after viewing the evidence and

drawing every inference in the light most favorable to the

[Chaudhrys], . . . no reasonable jury could find” that the

Coroner did not make the required reasonable effort to locate

Usman’s family. Frybarger v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,

812 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1987). We hold that the

Chaudhrys introduced enough evidence to create a jury issue

on whether the Coroner’s attempts to locate Usman’s family

were reasonable.

In response to Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) notice to depose

the Coroner Department, see Mattel, Inc. v. Walking

Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 797 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003), the

Coroner produced Lieutenant Supervising Investigator David

Smith as the “person most knowledgeable” of its policies. 

Smith testified that the DMV report containing the

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24 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Chaudhrys’ address was in the Coroner’s files. He also

testified that when the Coroner runs a DMV report, it does so

within three days of the decedent’s arrival. The record in this

case includes a printout of a DMV report from the Coroner’s

files dated March 25, 2008, the date of Usman’s death. 

Investigator Kato’s notes and declaration indicate that she ran

a “comprehensive Accurint report” on March 27. Her notes

written on March 27 describe the Celebration Theatre as the

“only address consistently listed” in the report, but not as the

only address listed. Kato’s written notes for April 15 state, “I

reviewed the decedent’s paperwork, and I noticed an address

in Bellflower on his DMV.” The Bellflower address was the

Chaudhrys’. Smith testified that when Kato reviewed

Usman’s paperwork on April 15, she apparentlywas “looking

for something that she may have overlooked during her initial

search.” He agreed that when Kato found the Chaudhrys’

address in the DMV report, “she found something she

overlooked.”

Smith also testified that when the Coroner Department

knows of multiple addresses, it “in all likelihood” sends a

letter to any recent but non-current residential address or runs

that address through Accurint. Smith testified that running an

Accurint report takes “five or ten seconds.” The DMV report

listed the Celebration Theatre as Usman’s most recent

address, effective June 15, 2007. It listed the Chaudhrys’

address and a third address as effective January 24, 2007. 

When Kato noticed the Chaudhrys’ address on April 15, she

ran an Accurint report and discovered the Chaudhrys’

identities. That same day, she informed them of Usman’s

death.

Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that

the Coroner had the Chaudhrys’ address in its files on the day

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 25

of Usman’s death or, at the latest, two days later on March

27. The Chaudhrys’ address, while not listed as current, was

recent. Had Kato not “overlooked” the Chaudhrys’ address

in late March, she would have sent a letter or run the address

through Accurint, discovered the Chaudhrys’ identities, and

then informed them of Usman’s death. The only reason the

Chaudhrys were not informed in late March was that Kato

focused on only one of the addresses listed on the DMV

report and did not double-check her paperwork until twentyone days later. Under those circumstances, a jury could

reasonably find that the Coroner did not make a reasonable

effort to locate Usman’s family. See Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC,

520 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (credit reporting agency

negligent for “overlook[ing]” a court document “or fail[ing]

to understand its legal significance”); In re Harbin, 486 F.3d

510, 523 (9th Cir. 2007) (lender bank “indisputably negligent

in overlooking [a] title report showing [debtor’s] status in

bankruptcy proceedings”); Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Heise,

289 P.2d 103, 106–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (insurance agent

negligent for “overlooking” information in a car-purchase

contract).

E. Usma and Umar’s Claims

Usma and Umar sued all defendants for the failure to

timely notify them of Usman’s death. They brought claims

for negligence and IIED under state law and for violations of

substantive due process under § 1983. The district court

granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that

Usma and Umar lacked standing because they did not have a

legal interest in the disposition of Usman’s remains and

therefore had not suffered an “injury in fact.” We review de

novo. See Heinemann, 731 F.3d at 916. We agree in part and

disagree in part.

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26 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

The district court did not refer to Article III of the

Constitution, but its conclusion that Usma and Umar had not

suffered an “injury in fact” necessarily means they lacked

standing under Article III. We disagree with the district court

that Usma and Umar lacked Article III standing. The three

requirements for Article III standing are injury in fact,

causation, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Usma and Umar

satisfy all three requirements. They introduced evidence that

they suffered emotional harm (injury in fact) caused by the

defendants’ failure to timely notify them of Usman’s death

(causation). A damage judgment in their favor would

compensate them for that harm (redressability). We

recognize, of course, that damages are a poor substitute for

timely notice of Usman’s death. Damages are often a poor

substitute for proper performance of a legal duty, but that

does not mean damages do not provide redress within the

meaning of Article III.

In holding that Usma and Umar did not suffer an injury in

fact, the district court confused Article III standing with the

merits of Usma and Umar’s claims. If the defendants did not

owe Usma and Umar any duty, their claims fail on the merits. 

But Article III “standing in no way depends on the merits of

the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.” 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see also Lexmark

Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,

1387 n.4 (2014) (noting that, unlike standing, “the absence of

a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter

jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We

therefore turn to Usma and Umar’s claims on the merits. See

Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.

2009) (“We . . . may affirm on any basis supported by the

record.”).

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 27

We affirm summary judgment for the defendants on the

merits of Usma and Umar’s IIED and substantive due process

claims. Usma and Umar’s IIED claim fails because there is

no evidence showing that, in failing to provide timely notice

of Usman’s death, any defendant acted “with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d

181, 202 (Cal. 1991). Usma and Umar’s substantive due

process claim fails because they had no property interest in

Usman’s remains. As long as a decedent’s parents are alive,

California law does not grant the decedent’s siblings any right

to possess the decedent’s body. Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 7100(a).

Usma and Umar’s negligence claim against the nonCounty defendants also fails, for these defendants owed no

duty to notify family members in a timely fashion. However,

as we discussed above, the Coroner had a duty under state

law “to make a reasonable attempt to locate the family.” Cal.

Gov’t Code § 27471(a). Section 27471(a) is not expressly

limited to any particular family members, and the full scope

of the Coroner’s duty appears to be an open question. It may

be that the scope of § 27471(a) is limited by the order of

priority contained in Health & Safety Code § 7100, even

though such a limitation is not specified in § 27471(a). Cf.

Davila, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (defining the interests

protected by § 27471 in part by reference to § 7100). If

§ 7100 limits the family members to whom a duty is owed,

the Coroner may have had no duty to provide timely notice to

Usma and Umar. The district court did not address the scope

of the Coroner’s duty, and the parties have not briefed that

question to us. The district court may address the question on

remand.

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28 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

F. Attorneys’ Fees

After trial, the Estate and the Chaudhrys requested an

award of attorneys’ fees of $1,007,849.25. The district court

awarded attorneys’ fees of $73,125. We review de novo

decisions determining the legal right to attorneys’ fees; we

review the calculation of fees for abuse of discretion. 

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.

2008). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district

court’s attorneys’ fees award.

1. Fees Under Federal Law

A party who prevails on a claim under § 1983 is entitled

to reasonable attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances

would render such an award unjust. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b);

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). The district

court has discretion in determining what fees are

“reasonable.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437. However, the

court must “provide a concise but clear explanation of its

reasons for the fee award.” Id. at 437. When determining a

reasonable fee award, the court must start by calculating the

lodestar amount, which is the “number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate.” Id. at 433. The court may then adjust the lodestar

amount based on several factors, including the degree of

success achieved by the prevailing party. Id. at 434. 

a. The Lodestar Calculation: Reasonable Rate

Fee applicants have the burden of producing evidence that

their requested fees are “in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Camacho v.

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 29

Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he relevant

community is the forum in which the district court sits.” Id.

at 979. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney[s] and other

attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community . . . are

satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403,

407 (9th Cir. 1990). Once a fee applicant presents such

evidence, the opposing party “has a burden of rebuttal that

requires submission of evidence . . . challenging the accuracy

and reasonableness of the . . . facts asserted by the prevailing

party in its submitted affidavits.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Estate and the Chaudhrys carried their initial burden

by submitting expert affidavits attesting that their requested

fees were within the prevailing market rates for Los Angeles. 

The affidavits described plaintiffs’ counsel’s experience and

skill, provided concrete numbers for billing rates at numerous

Los Angeles law firms, and compared those rates to

plaintiffs’ counsel’s rates. The Estate and the Chaudhrys

requested “hourly rates ranging from $275 to $710 for 12

attorneys and from $165 to $235 for at least 10 law clerks and

paralegals.”

The district court concluded that the expert affidavits

“fail[ed] to prove” that plaintiffs’ counsel were entitled to the

market rates. The district court imposed a “blended rate of

$325 per hour” for all attorneys and non-attorneys. The court

did not explain its choice to impose a “blended rate” rather

than different rates for the different attorneys and nonattorneys, as the Estate and the Chaudhrys requested. In

Camacho, we reversed a fee order that did not “distinguish

between [the plaintiff’s] three attorneys, though they each

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30 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

sought different hourly rates.” 523 F.3d at 980; see also

Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC, 741 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.),

amended, 2014 WL 905767 (9th Cir. 2014). Nor did the

district court explain why, if a blended rate was appropriate,

$325 was the proper hourly charge. It did not explain why

that rate “was in line with those prevailing in the community

for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable

skill, experience and reputation.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980

(internal quotation marks omitted).

b. The Lodestar Calculation: Reasonable Hours

The Estate and the Chaudhrys requested fees based on

2,543.85 hours of work. This was already a 10 percent

reduction of the hours they contend they spent on this case. 

The City defendants sought an approximately 20 percent

reduction of the requested hours (a 496.75-hour reduction). 

The district court went further, reducing the requested hours

by 88 percent (a 2,243.85-hour reduction) and awarding fees

for 300 hours of work.

“By and large, the [district] court should defer to the

winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time

he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at

1112. A district court can reduce a lawyer’s request for

duplicative or unnecessarywork, and it can impose up to a 10

percent reduction without explanation. See id. However,

“where the disparity is larger, a more specific articulation of

the court’s reasoning in expected.” Id. at 1111. In Moreno,

for example, we reversed a district court’s 25 percent

reduction for lacking specific explanation. Id. at 1112; see

also Carter, 741 F.3d at 1074 (reversing a nearly 50 percent

cut for lack of explanation).

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 31

The court explained generally that the Estate and the

Chaudhrys’ fees request included “multiple duplicative

efforts, excessive overstaffing, and unnecessary hours.” It

stated that “multiple attorneys and legal assistants attended

and participated in certain conferences, depositions, court

hearings, and trial, doing much of the same work. Many of

the law clerks billed for duplicative note-taking or for training

at trial or depositions.” We held in Moreno that duplicative

work is not inherently inappropriate, 534 F.3d at 1112, and a

reduction of 88 percent requires a more specific explanation

than that provided by the district court. As in Moreno, the

court “gave no specific explanation as to which fees it

thought were duplicative, or why.” Id.

c. The Lodestar Reduction

After calculating the lodestar, the district court reduced

the fee award by another 25 percent because of the Estate and

the Chaudhrys’ limited success on their claims. Because we

hold that the district court erred in rejecting some of those

claims, see supra at 19–20, that decision requires

reconsideration.

2. Fees Under State Law

Plaintiffs who prevail on a claim under California Civil

Code § 52.1 are entitled to attorneys’ fees. Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52.1(h). Unlike federal law, California law allows for a

multiplier of the lodestar to compensate for the risk of

contingent representation. Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 744–46. We

have held that when a plaintiff succeeds on both federal and

state claims that support a fee award, the state-law multiplier

is available. Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d

1470, 1478–79 (9th Cir. 1995).

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32 CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

The Estate requested a multiplier of the lodestar based on

its claim under § 52.1. The district court rejected that request

because it had earlier dismissed the Estate’s § 52.1 claim. As

we held above, that dismissal was incorrect. See supra at

19–20. The Estate is therefore eligible for a fees multiplier. 

The choice whether to award a multiplier, however, is within

the district court’s discretion. Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 746. On

remand, the district court should consider whether the Estate

should receive a fees multiplier and, if so, how large it should

be.

3. City Defendants’ Cross-Appeal

The City defendants cross-appeal the attorneys’ fees

award on two grounds. First, they argue the Chaudhrys were

not entitled to any attorneys’ fees because they prevailed on

a state-law claim rather than a § 1983 claim. See Mateyko v.

Felix, 924 F.2d 824, 828–29 (9th Cir. 1991). Second, they

argue the Estate was entitled only to minimal fees because the

district court struck all of its damages. Because we hold the

district court should not have dismissed the Chaudhrys’

§ 1983 substantive due process claim against Cruz or struck

the Estate’s damages, see supra at 18, 20, we deny the City

defendants’ cross-appeal.

Conclusion

We reverse the district court’s decision to strike the

Estate’s $1 million damages award under § 1983. On

remand, the district court may consider a motion for

remittitur. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of the

Estate’s claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 against the

City defendants and the Chaudhrys’ substantive due process

claim against Officer Cruz under § 1983. We reverse the

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CHAUDHRY V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 33

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County

defendants on the Chaudhrys’ negligence claim under

California law. We affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the defendants on Usma and Umar’s

IIED and § 1983 substantive due process claims, but we

reverse as to their negligence claim against the County

defendants. Finally, we vacate the district court’s attorneys’

fees award. In a separate memorandum disposition filed

concurrently with this opinion, we affirm all of the district

court’s other rulings from which the plaintiffs appealed.

We remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED.

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