Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00201-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CSG
Defendant
California State Grange
Defendant
Robert McFarland
Defendant
National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

THE NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE 

ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDRY, a District of 

Columbia nonprofit 

corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, a 

California corporation, d/b/a 

“CSG,” and ROBERT McFARLAND, 

a California resident, 

 Defendants. 

Civ. No. 2:16-201 WBS AC 

ORDER 

----oo0oo---- 

On February 1, 2016, plaintiff National Grange of the 

Order of Patrons of Husbandry filed the present action against 

the California State Grange, currently known as the California 

Guild (the “Guild”), and its president, Robert McFarland 

(“McFarland”), asserting six causes of action for violations of 

the Lanham Act, Copyright Act, and related state laws. Plaintiff 

had previously filed a similar action in March 2014 against the 

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Guild, alleging violations of the Lanham Act (“Grange I”). See 

Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. California 

State Grange, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS AC, 2016 WL 1587193, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016). In July 2015 in Grange I, the court 

granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on its Lanham Act 

claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition and 

false designation of origin. Id. In September 2015 in Grange I, 

the court entered final judgment permanently enjoining “[the 

Guild] and its agents, affiliates, and assigns, or any party 

acting in concert with [the Guild] and its agents, affiliates, 

and assigns from using marks containing the word ‘Grange.’” Id. 

The court in Grange I declined plaintiff’s request to enjoin the 

Guild from using the words “Granger,” “CSG,” and “CG” because 

whether those words were protected trademarks was never litigated 

or before the court in Grange I. Id. at *1, *9. 

The Guild has appealed the court’s July and September 

2015 Orders in Grange I, and plaintiff has cross-appealed that 

portion of the September 2015 Order limiting injunctive relief to 

the word “Grange.” Id. at 2. Those appeals are currently 

pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit. See id., appeal filed, No. 15-17179 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 

2015); id., appeal filed, No. 15-17274 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2015). 

Plaintiff’s claims in the present case are allegedly based on 

defendants’ unlawful conduct following the entry of judgment in 

Grange I and issues that were not litigated in Grange I, 

including defendants’ use of the words “Granger,” “CSG,” and 

“CG.” (Compl. ¶ 7 (Docket No. 1).) 

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On March 1, 2016, McFarland filed a motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s federal claims in this action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), (Docket No. 20), and a motion to 

strike plaintiff’s state-law claims pursuant to California’s 

anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“antiSLAPP”) statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, (Docket No. 21). 

On April 5, 2016, the Guild moved to dismiss all of plaintiff’s 

claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for a 

more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). (Docket No. 32.) 

Those motions are currently set for hearing on July 11, 2016. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint in the present action, however, 

does not take into account the events that have transpired after 

it filed its Complaint on February 1, 2016. Specifically, on 

April 20, 2016 in Grange I, this court granted plaintiff’s motion 

for additional injunctive relief based on the issues that were 

litigated in that case. See Grange I, 2016 WL 1587193, at 

*15-16. The April 2016 Order in Grange I consequently granted 

plaintiff much of the relief that plaintiff seeks in the present 

action. The Guild and McFarland submitted reports in Grange I 

setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they, their 

agents and affiliates, and all parties acting in concert with 

them have complied with the court’s April 2016 Order in Grange I. 

See id. (ECF Nos. 140-141, 145, 149). Additionally, on June 24, 

2016 in the present action, plaintiff filed a motion to amend its 

Complaint to add four additional claims and an additional 

plaintiff, (Docket No. 55), and a motion for a preliminary 

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injunction, (Docket No. 54), both of which are set for hearing on 

August 22, 2016. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a) provides that, 

“[i]n any action, the court may order the attorneys . . . to 

appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such purposes as: 

(1) expediting disposition of the action; (2) establishing early 

and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted 

because of lack of management; [and] (3) discouraging wasteful 

pretrial activities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed, administered, 

and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, 

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 

proceeding.”). In light of the court’s April 2016 Order in 

Grange I and plaintiff’s pending motion to amend its Complaint in 

the present action, the court finds that a further status 

conference in this case is warranted. The court will thus vacate 

the hearings set for July 11, 2016 on defendants’ pending motions 

to dismiss and to strike plaintiff’s Complaint, given that the 

motions were filed before the court’s April 2016 Order in Grange 

I and plaintiff’s motion to amend its Complaint in the present 

case, and convert those hearings into a status conference on that 

date. 

Counsel for the parties shall appear at the status 

conference on July 11, 2016 and be prepared to address the 

following issues: (1) whether the present action should be stayed 

pending the resolution of the parties’ cross-appeals in Grange I; 

(2) whether any claims in the present action are moot in light of 

the relief granted in the court’s April 2016 Order in Grange I; 

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(3) whether defendants intend to oppose plaintiff’s pending 

motion to amend its Complaint in the present action; (4) whether 

all or any parts of defendants’ motions to dismiss will be moot 

if plaintiff’s motion to amend its Complaint is granted; and (4) 

whether defendants intend to re-file their pending motions to 

dismiss and to strike plaintiff’s Complaint in the present action 

in light of the relief granted in the court’s April 2016 Order in 

Grange I and plaintiff’s pending motion to amend its Complaint in 

this case. Prior to the July 11, 2016 status conference and to 

the extent they can do so, the parties shall submit a joint or 

separate status reports that succinctly address these four issues 

and any other issues that they think need to be addressed at the 

status conference. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) the hearings set for July 11, 2016 on defendants’ 

pending motions to dismiss and to strike plaintiff’s Complaint, 

(Docket Nos. 20, 21, 32), are hereby VACATED; 

(2) a status conference shall be set for July 11, 2016 

at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 5; and 

(3) the parties shall submit a joint or separate status 

reports prior to the July 11, 2016 status conference addressing 

the four issues outlined in this Order and any other issues that 

they think need to be addressed at the status conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 7, 2016 

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