Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-03-41201/USCOURTS-ca5-03-41201-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ExxonMobil Chemical Company
Appellee
Anita McGowin
Appellant
Mobil Chemical Company
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 5, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

No. 03-41201

Summary Calendar

_______________

ANITA MCGOWIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL, INC.; ET AL.,

Defendants,

EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY,

ALSO KNOWN AS EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL INTERAMERICA, INC.;

MOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

_________________________

 Case: 03-41201 Document: 0051200774 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/05/2004
2

Before SMITH, DEMOSS and

STEWART, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

AnitaMcGowinappealsthe dismissalof her

state law fraud and conspiracy claims for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The district court held her claims to be completelypreempted bytheEmployeeRetirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29

U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and decided, as a result,

that federal jurisdiction was proper and that

McGowin cannot seek relief in federal court

without first pursuing an administrative remedy. Agreeing that McGowin’s claims seek

relief that is at the core of ERISA, we affirm

the dismissal.

I.

McGowin formerly performed services for

defendant ExxonMobil ChemicalCorporation

(“ExxonMobil”) while on the payroll of a

third-partyemployer, ManPower International,

Inc. (“ManPower”). She came to work for

ManPower only after learning of a job opportunity at ExxonMobil that the company required to be filled by one of ManPower’s employees rather than by a direct employee of

ExxonMobil. 

As a condition of obtaining employment

withManPower, McGowin signed a statement

acknowledging that she was an employee only

ofManPower. She received weekly paychecks

and insurance benefits from ManPower. On

her annual tax returns, McGowin reported

ManPower as her employer. Nevertheless, she

represents to the courts that she was, at all

relevant times, an employee of ExxonMobil

entitled to its employee benefits.

After her termination from ManPower and

the end of her duties at ExxonMobil, McGowin sued ExxonMobil and ManPower in

state court, alleging age discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud,

and conspiracy to commit fraud, all in connection with the refusal to pay ERISA benefits.

McGowin’s theory is that ExxonMobil falsely

informed her that she was not an employee of

ExxonMobil and was not entitled to its employee benefits. 

Defendants removed the case to federal

court, citing federal question jurisdiction, then

moved for summary judgment. In response,

McGowin dropped all except her fraud and

conspiracy-to-commit-fraud claims, asserting

that she sought “to enforce ERISA through a

finding that she was an ExxonMobil commonlaw employee and was denied her right assuch

to eligibility for benefits.”

The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that McGowin’s claims are

completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a), 29

U.S.C. § 1132(a), and, consequently, are

barred by her failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Taking no chances, the district

court granted the motion on two alternative

grounds as well: first, that the defendants

validly stated a defense of conflict preemption

under ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144; and

second, that McGowin’s claims are barred by

Texas’s statute of limitations applicable to

fraud actions.1 McGowin appeals, arguing

1 A ruling on these alternative grounds would

require an alternative jurisdictional basis. See

Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 313 (5th

Cir. 2002) (stating that a federal court may assert

supplemental jurisdiction only over claims preempted by ERISA § 514), cert. dism’d, 124 S. Ct.

44, and cert. granted sub nom. Aetna Health Inc.

(continued...)

 Case: 03-41201 Document: 0051200774 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/05/2004
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that her claims are severable from ERISA and

thus are not preempted.

II.

The district court correctly determined that

McGowin’s claims are completely preempted

by ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).2

“[C]omplete preemption exists when a remedy

falls within the scope of or is in direct conflict

with ERISA § 502(a), and therefore is within

the jurisdiction of federal court.” Haynes v.

Prudential Health Care, 313 F.3d 330, 333

(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)). “Section

502, by providing a civil enforcement cause of

action, completely preempts any state cause of

action seeking the same relief, regardless of

how artfully pleaded as a state action.” Giles

v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332,

337 (5th Cir. 1999). If McGowin could have

brought her claim under ERISA, the cause of

action is completely preempted and provides a

basisfor federal jurisdiction. Roark, 307 F.3d

at 303.

McGowin seeks a form of relief provided

by§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B),

which affords a beneficiary a federal cause of

action “to recover benefits due to him under

the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights

under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his

rights to future benefits under the terms of the

plan.” The common-law fraud and conspiracy

count in McGowin’s original complaint represents that “[a]s a proximate result of this conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffof her ERISA benefits . . . Plaintiff has suffered damages that

amount to loss of retirement benefits, profit

sharing benefits, yearly bonuses and medical

health care in addition to other benefits that

regular ExxonMobil . . . employees receive.”

Moreover, a court could not find fraudulent

ExxonMobil’s representations that McGowin

is not eligible for benefits without first determining whether the statement is truthful, i.e.,

without clarifying her right to benefits under

the plan.

McGowinmaycharacterize her cause of action as arising under the common law offraud,

but she seeks a determination of her eligibility

for benefits under an ERISA-governed plan,

and she praysfor reliefspecificallyprovided by

§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

Such a claim is completely preempted by

ERISA and is removable to federal court.

Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.3

The district court also correctly determined

that McGowin’s ERISA claims are barred by

her failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

“[C]laimants seeking benefits from an ERISA

plan must first exhaust available administrative

remedies under the plan before bringing suit to

1

(...continued)

v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (No. 02-1845), and cert.

granted sub nom. CIGNA HealthCare,Inc. v.Calad, 124 S. Ct. 463 (2003) (No. 03-83). Jurisdiction is proper, because McGowin’s complaint, at

the time of removal, included a federal age discrimination claim brought pursuant to an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission right-to-sue

letter. That claim, though abandoned, permits a

district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over remaining state claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d

448, 452 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002).

2 As a result, we do not address the court’s

§ 514 conflict preemption and state law limitations

rulings.

3

See also Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,

11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5thCir. 1994) (finding a state

tort claim for wrongful discharge completely preempted by § 502(a)).

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4

recover benefits.” Bourgeois v. Pension Plan

for Employees of Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 215

F.3d 475, 479 (5thCir. 2000). McGowin does

not dispute that she failed to initiate an administrative claim for benefits with ExxonMobil.

Rather, she argues that her failure to do so

should be excused on the ground that administrative review would be futile and that she was

denied “meaningful access” to the review

process.

A failure to show hostility or bias on the

part of the administrative review committee is

fatal to a claim of futility. Id. at 179-80. McGowin makes no such showing. Instead, she

argues that representations made to her by

ExxonMobil during the course of her employment conclusively establish the company’s position that she is not eligible for benefits. 

In Bourgeois, 215 F.3d at 479, this court

rejected a similar claim, reasoning that statements made bya high-ranking companyofficer

do not conclusively show that an administrative committee would reject a claim for benefits. Similarly, statements made by ExxonMobil employees who are not responsible for

adjudicating benefits claims does notshowthat

McGowin’s claim would be futile if she properly presented it for administrative review.

The futility exception does not apply. 

Moreover, McGowin’s conclusional allegation that she was denied “meaningful access”

to the administrative process is unpersuasive.

She argues that she lacked the requisite information to file a claim, because her status as a

third-party employee left her ineligible to receive a copy of the governing plan documents.

As a result, McGowin argues, she did not

know how, or to whom, her claims should be

presented. 

There is no indication that McGowin requested the plan documents or wastold specifically that she could not obtain them.4 Moreover, it strains credulity to think that

McGowinSSwhether through counsel or

notSSpossesses the sophistication to pursue a

lawsuit in state and federal courts but lacksthe

basic capacity to ask a plan administrator for

information on the filing of a claim. This contention is meritless.

The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

4 And we observe, though it is not necessary to

our decision, that a group of similarly situated

plaintiffs managed first to pursue a similar claim

using ExxonMobil’s administrative procedures.

See MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d

472 (5th Cir. 2003). 

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