Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-02231/USCOURTS-ca10-95-02231-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shirley S. Chater
Appellee
Patricia James
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court or Appeals 

Tatb Circuit 

SEP 1 9 1996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

PATRICK FISHER 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATRICIA JAMES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SHIRLEY S. CRATER, Commissioner 

of Social Security,* 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Clerk 

No. 95-2231 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-920-JP) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gary J. Martone and Francesca J. MacDowell, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, District of New Mexico, and Ronald F. 

Ross, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Joseph B. 

Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of 

Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. 

Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. 

Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, 

in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate 

party at the time of the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 1 
Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Region VI, and Randall Halford, Assistant Regional 

Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Dallas, 

Texas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff appeals from a district court order affirming the decision of the 

Secretary denying her application for disability insurance benefits (DIB). 1 We 

review the record as a whole to determine whether the Secretary's decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and adheres to applicable legal standards. 

Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (lOth Cir. 1994). Questions of 

evidentiary weight and witness credibility are the province of the Secretary, 

whose judgment on such matters is entitled to considerable deference. See Gay 

v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1339 (lOth Cir. 1993); Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 

F .2d 13 71, 13 74 (1Oth Cir. 1992). Upon consideration of the briefs and appellate 

record in light of these standards, we affirm. Further, we announce a prospective 

rule today that should have a significant salutary effect on the administrative 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 2 
prosecution of social security disability claims: As in other agency adjudications, 

issues not presented to the Secretary through the administrative appeal process 

may be deemed waived on subsequent judicial review. 

I 

The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that as of December 1988, 

when plaintiff last satisfied the earnings requirement for entitlement to DIB, she 

retained the physical and mental capacity to perform her past relevant work as a 

counselor. Basically, after inquiring at some length into plaintiff's informal and 

relatively undemanding counseling activities, see App. at 121-23, 13 7-41, which, 

by her own admission, continued into December of 1988 and then ceased due to a 

lack of business, see id. at 298, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the 

functional capacity for such work through the period of her DIB eligibility. 

Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled at step four of the Secretary's 

dispositive sequential analysis. 2 See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F .2d 748, 

750-52 (1Oth Cir. 1988). 

2 The ALJ also stated, in passing, that plaintiff could return to work as a 

secretary as well. However, unlike the counseling job properly considered by the 

ALJ, the nature and demands of plaintiff's past secretarial work were neither 

explored at the evidentiary hearing nor discussed in the ALJ' s decision. Thus, 

reliance on the latter occupation is precluded by established precedent requiring 

an informed comparison between past work requirements and the claimant's 

functional limitations as a condition to any step-four disposition. See. e.g., 

Henrie v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 361 (lOth 

Cir. 1993 ). We have therefore reviewed this case solely for the adequacy of the 

ALJ's determination regarding plaintiff's ability to return to her counseling job. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 3 
Plaintiff's objections to this administrative decision were thoroughly 

discussed and thoughtfully rejected in the extensive recommendation issued by 

the magistrate judge, App. at 41-78, adopted in its entirety by the district court. 

We have but three brief comments to add on the merits. First, plaintiff points out 

that the ALJ did not devote much attention to whether her counseling constituted 

substantial gainful activity, a prerequisite for its status as past relevant work, 

Jozefowicz v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1352, 1355 (lOth Cir. 1987). However, 

plaintiff's own statements consistently reflect an average work week of fifteen to 

twenty hours at fifteen dollars an hour, see App. at 138, 178, 265, 267, which 

gives a monthly income (with evidently minimal overhead expense) nearly four 

times the presumptive level for substantial gainful activity, see 20 C .F .R. 

§§ 404.1574(b)(2)(vi) & 404.1575(a)(3), (b)(l), (c)(l). Second, plaintiff 

complains of noncompliance with Social Security Ruling 83-20, because the ALJ 

did not call a medical advisor to testify regarding onset of disability, specifically 

with respect to psychological impair~ent. This argument is frivolous. The cited 

ruling indicates that such testimony is necessary when the issue is whether "the 

onset of a disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to the date of the first 

recorded medical examination." 1983 WL 31249 at *3. Here, there were 

pertinent examinations both before and after the alleged onset date. Third, we 

emphasize that there is no problematic inconsistency between the denial of DIB in 

this case and the award of supplemental security income (SSI) to plaintiff 

-4-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 4 
commencing March 14, 1989, in a separate proceeding. Quite apart from the time 

disparity involved, the two decisions turn on significantly different step-four 

analyses--i.e., for unexplained reasons, the SSI decision focused on plaintiff's 

past secretarial employment, to which, it was found, she could not return, and did 

not address her ability to perform the counseling work crucial to the proper 

disposition of her DIB application. See App. at 313. 

II 

We turn now to the procedural matter anticipated at the outset of this 

opinion. The record indicates counsel did not raise before the Appeals Council 

any of the particular objections now urged against the Secretary. Counsel 

evidently declined the option of filing a brief, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.975, electing 

instead to rely solely on a summary request for review, which did not address the 

ALJ's decision at all but merely restated in conclusory terms the basic claim 

underlying any disability proceeding: "I am disabled and entitled to benefits." 

App. at 94. Such a statement was plainly inadequate to apprise the Appeals 

Council of the particularized points of error counsel has subsequently argued in 

the courts. Cf. Soliz v. Chater, 82 F.3d 373, 375-76 (lOth Cir. 1996)(holding 

objection that "[t]he Findings of the Secretary ... are not based on substantial 

evidence," too general to preserve specific issues for appellate review under 

waiver rule applicable to proposed findings of magistrate judge). 

-5-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 5 
Ordinarily, issues omitted from an administrative appeal are deemed 

waived for purposes of subsequent judicial review. See. e.g., McConnell v. 

Director. OWCP, 993 F.2d 1454, 1460 n.8 (lOth Cir. 1993); Rivera-Zurita v. INS, 

946 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1991); Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 

F .2d 502, 508 n.1 0 (1Oth Cir. 1987). Many circuits have applied this general rule 

to social security disability adjudications in published opinions, see. e. g., Pope v. 

Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993); Harper v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Servs., 978 F.2d 260, 265 (6th Cir. 1992); Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 

1249, 1254 (8th Cir. 1992); Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1152 (3d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971 ), and/or unpublished dispositions, see. 

~,Clagg v. Chater, No. 94-2302, 1995 WL 679841, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 16, 

1995); Miller v. Shalala, No. 93-56444, 1995 WL 29984 7, at * 1 (9th Cir. May 17, 

1995). This court has not yet done so. 3 Given the due process concerns 

implicated by enforcement of a waiver rule about which the adversely affected 

party did not have adequate notice, through such means as direct admonition for 

prose claimants, see. e.g., Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (lOth Cir. 

1991); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038 

3 We did call attention to a social security claimant's failure to raise a due 

process objection to the Appeals Council in Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 

1426 (1Oth Cir. 1996), but in subsequently holding the issue waived, we appeared 

to rely exclusively on the independent rule barring appellate consideration of 

"[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's 

recommendation." Id. (citing only authorities enforcing latter waiver rule). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 6 
(1992), or published case law guidance for counsel, see. e.g., Wesolek v. 

Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); United Steelworkers of America, 

AFL-CIO v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1006-07, 1008 n.9 (3d Cir. 

1987), we have reviewed this appeal on the merits. We emphasize, however, that 

this kind of request for administrative review, which does not identify the issues 

with any particularity, effectively sandbags the Appeals Council. We are thereby 

deprived of its informed views on those issues. Further, had those issues been 

meritorious, this action could cause a claimant years of delay by requiring her to 

pursue judicial proceedings to obtain relief which would have been available on 

administrative appeal. 

This court has on a number of recent occasions recognized that waiver 

principles developed in other litigation contexts are equally applicable to social 

security cases. Thus, waiver may result from the disability claimant's failure to 

(1) raise issues before the magistrate judge, Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1426, (2) object 

adequately to the magistrate judge's recommendation, Soliz, 83 F.3d at 375-76, 

(3) preserve issues in the district court as a general matter, Crow v. Shalala, 40 

F.3d 323, 324 (lOth Cir. 1994), or (4) present issues properly to this court, 

Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389-90 (lOth Cir. 1994). In light of the 

considerations discussed above, we join our sister circuits and extend this line of 

authority to include the principle of administrative waiver. Henceforth, issues not 

brought to the attention of the Appeals Council on administrative review may, 

-7-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 7 
" 

given sufficient notice to the claimant, be deemed waived on subsequent judicial 

revtew. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New 

Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 95-2231 Document: 01019279752 Date Filed: 09/19/1996 Page: 8