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Parties Involved:
Sequoyah Fuels Corporation
Appellee
Barbara Toliver
Appellant

Document Text:

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FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

BARBARA TOLIVER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SEQUOYAH FUELS CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 2 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-7096 

(D.C. No. 89-61-C) 

(E.D. Okla.) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable John L. 

District Court for 

designation. 

Kane, Senior District Judge, United States 

the District of Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Barbara Toliver appeals from the district court's 

entry of sUDDDary judgment in favor of defendant Sequoyah Fuels 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-7096 Document: 010110105228 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 1 
Corporation (SFC) in this 

Toliver filed suit against SFC 

gender based Title VII action. 

alleging supervisors within 

Ms. 

the 

company sexually harassed her, creating a hostile work environment 

which management was aware of but did not remedy. We affirm the 

district court in all respects. 

I. 

Plaintiff is a chemical operator at the SFC plant in Gore, 

Oklahoma. In her complaint she alleged Jack Jamison, a supervisor 

at the facility, sexually harassed her in September and October of 

1987. Ms. Toliver reported these incidents to her supervisor, Jim 

Hummingbird, on October 13, 1987. On that same date, Jack Jamison 

began a two week vacation. While he was gone, plaintiff spoke 

with a female supervisor about the harassment. That supervisor 

encouraged her to report the incidents to the manager of the 

facility, which she did. Ms. Toliver told the manager about 

specific incidents involving Jamison, and also alleged 

supervisors, including Jim Hummingbird, harassed her. 

give any specifics relating to the alleged harassment 

other two supervisors. 

two other 

She did not 

from the 

Management immediately investigated the matter and suspended 

Jack Jamison on November 19, 1987. After further inquiry, Jamison 

was terminated on November 28. Following the termination, SFC's 

human resources manager met individually with Jim Hummingbird and 

the other supervisor plaintiff implicated in the harassment. She 

also met with other supervisors and employees at the plant to 

discuss SFC's position regarding sexual harassment. SFC's 

employee handbook set out the company's policy prohibiting sexual 

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Appellate Case: 89-7096 Document: 010110105228 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 2 
discrimination and harassment. Ms. Toliver received a copy of the 

handbook in July 1987. 

Ms. Toliver's complaint was originally filed on February 16, 

1989. In it, she alleged there was a "pattern and practice" of 

harassment at SFC which was well known to management. She further 

alleged management took no action to protect her or others. Rec. 

Vol. I doc. 1 at 2. After discovery was completed, SFC filed a 

motion for summary judgment, urging the company could not be held 

liable for failing to remedy a hostile work environment. The 

district court agreed. On appeal, Ms. Toliver asserts factual 

issues preclude summary judgment, and that the district court 

erred in its application of the law to this case.

1 

II. 

As an appellate court, we review a grant of summary judgment 

de novo, in the same manner used by the district court. 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 

1990). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is 

appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of fact and one 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). In this regard, the mere existence of some factual 

dispute will not defeat a summary judgment motion. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-8 (1986). Rather, the 

factual dispute must be genuine and material to the issues 

presented. Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to 

establish factual issues. See Setliff v. Memorial Hosp. of 

1 Ms. Toliver was represented by counsel through the filing of 

a docketing statement in this court. Her brief was filed prose. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-7096 Document: 010110105228 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 3 
. ' Sheridan County* 850 F.2d 1384, 1392 (10th Cir. 1988). Finally, 

once a motion for summary judgment is properly supported and 

submitted, it is the opposing party's burden to come forward and 

show evidence that genuine issues of fact exist which preclude 

summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Plaintiff failed to 

sustain her burden in this regard. 2 

III. 

In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), 

the Supreme Court recognized that sexual harassment which affects 

a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment is actionable 

under Title VII. Id. at 67. In order to maintain this type of 

claim, however, the harassment "must be sufficiently severe or 

pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment 

and create an abusive working environment' Id. (quoting Henson v. 

City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). Plaintiff's 

complaint alleges a single cause of action based on sexual 

harassment which created a hostile work environment. 

When analyzing whether an employer will be held liable for a 

hostile work environment sexual harassment claim asserted as a 

result of employee conduct, courts look to agency principles. See 

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections 

Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990). In particular, courts 

2 SFC asserts plaintiff waived her right to argue the factual 

dispute issue on appeal because she included a statement in her 

response to the summary judgment motion indicating that "the facts 

are not essentially in dispute." Rec. Vol. I doc. 29 at 1. We 

disagree. First, the statement is equivocal. Second, it is clear 

from a review of plaintiff's response that she was asserting the 

existence of factual disputes. For these reasons, we will 

consider this argument. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-7096 Document: 010110105228 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 4 
have looked to section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency 

for guidance in this area. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 

1406, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Section 219(1) offers little assistance here, as it provides 

that any employer may be held liable for employee torts committed 

"while acting in the scope of their employment." Restatement 

(Second) of Agency S 219(1) (1958). In light of SFC's undisputed 

policy prohibiting sexual harassment, this provision has no 

application to this case. See Hicks 833 F.2d at 1418 (confining 

liability to situations where employee was acting within the scope 

of his employment could lead to absurd results because only 

employers promoting or overtly condoning harassment would be 

liable). 

Section 219(2)(b) and (d) are more probative. These sections 

impose employer liability when 1) the employer was negligent or 

reckless or 2) the employee purported to act or speak on behalf of 

the employer and there was reliance on apparent authority, or the 

employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of 

the agency relationship. See Restatement (Second) of Agency 

S 219(2) (1958). We agree with the district court that SFC cannot 

be held liable under either one of these theories, which are 

addressed below. 

A. Employer Negligence or Recklessness 

Negligence or recklessness in failing to respond to hostile 

work environment sexual harassment can result in employer 

liability. See Hirschfeld, 

imposing liability in this 

916 F.2d at 577. The standard for 

context is whether the company 

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Appellate Case: 89-7096 Document: 010110105228 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 5 
"fail[ed] to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work 

environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the 

exercise of reasonable care should have known." Id. (quoting EEOC 

v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, 

the district court held as a matter of law that SFC was not 

negligent or reckless in remedying sexual harassment. We agree. 

SFC began investigating Ms. Toliver's claims immediately 

after the plant manager was informed of the incidents. The 

alleged offender was suspended then terminated. Company 

management spoke individually with all the supervisors Ms. Toliver 

implicated, even though plaintiff was unable to identify any 

specific incidents of harassment involving those employees. 3 

Further, the human resources manager also spoke with other 

supervisors and employees regarding SFC's policy prohibiting 

sexual harassment. Finally, it is significant to note that the 

harassment stopped after SFC took action. See id. at 578; see 

also Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding. Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 

(11th Cir. 1989)("Of special importance, [the employee's] 

harassment ended after the remedial action"). Under these facts, 

we agree with the district court that SFC's conduct was exemplary 

in remedying the situation. The company was entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. 

3 In her prose brief, Ms. Toliver argues that her trial 

counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation, thus resulting 

in the district court's adverse ruling. While this argument may 

entitle plaintiff to a legal malpractice claim, it does not alter 

our consideration of the issues presented. Both parties were 

given ample time for discovery, and had the opportunity to present 

all relevant facts and legal arguments to the district court. 

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. ..., 

. J B. Authority of Agency Relationship 

Plaintiff submitted no evidence to indicate Jack Jamison's 

agency relationship with SFC aided in the sexual harassment or 

contributed to it. Jamison was not Ms. Toliver's direct 

supervisor and the record provides no evidence that he used any 

supervisory authority over plaintiff. See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 

579. The record is devoid of even the slightest implication that 

Jack Jamison ever "took, or threatened to take" disciplinary 

action against Ms. Toliver. Id. at 579-80 n.7. For these 

reasons, the undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that the 

district court's disposition was correct. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Appellee is 

directed to file any request for costs in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 39. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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