Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01701/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01701-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert H. Henry
Appellee
John Makowski
Appellee
Darrell Ray Tucker
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DARRELL RAY TUCKER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

AUG 2 5 1989 

ROBERT L. fJOECI<ER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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No. 87-1701 

JOHN MAKOWSKI; ROBERT H. HENRY, 

Attorney General, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 85-C-1098-E) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Darrell Ray Tucker, prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, Timothy s. Gilpin, Assistant 

Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for RespondentsAppellees. 

Before MCKAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District 

Judge. 

*The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of 

h~beas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. He challenges his 

Oklahoma convictions for robbery and kidnapping. Petitioner 

alleges his convictions arose from the same criminal transaction, 

and that the state violated double jeopardy in prosecuting him at 

successive trials for the two crimes. 1 

Petitioner limits his legal argument to a contention that the 

overlapping evidence presented at his successive trials violated 

his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy, relying principally 

on Supreme Court precedent and the decision by the Oklahoma Court 

of Appeals in Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 281 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025, 101 s. Ct. 1731, 68 L.Ed.2d 

219 (1981). Petitioner's factual allegations, however, actually 

raise three principal legal issues: (1) whether petitioner's 

successive trials for robbery and kidnapping, arising from the 

1 In district court, petitioner listed three grounds in support 

of relief. Petitioner's first ground was his double jeopardy 

argument. Petitioner's second ground was apparently a contention 

that he was denied due process and equal protection when the state 

courts initially considered the issues raised in his first ground. 

The third ground was an argument that he met the "cause and 

prejudice" test to avoid the effect of a state procedural bar. 

See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 

594 (1977). Neither petitioner's second nor his third argument is 

an attack on his original convictions. Petitioner is correct that 

he is not procedurally barred from raising his double jeopardy 

argument in federal court. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 2 
same criminal transaction, violated double jeopardy; (2) whether 

the introduction of ''other crimes" evidence at each of 

petitioner's trials violated his due process right to a fair 

trial; and (3) whether the decision by the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals not to apply remedial state precedent to 

petitioner violated any federal constitutional right. In light of 

petitioner's prose status, we will address each of these three 

issues in turn. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 

S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). 

I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 

Petitioner argues that his successive trials for robbery and 

kidnapping subjected him to double jeopardy. Of course, double 

jeopardy would not bar petitioner's first trial for robbery. 

Thus, petitioner may only challenge his kidnapping conviction on 

double jeopardy grounds. 

"The applicable rule is that where the same act or 

transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 

provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 

two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof 

of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. United 

States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 s. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 

(1932). Since the crime of robbery contains elements distinct 

from the crime of kidnapping, see Tucker v. State, 481 P.2d 167, 

168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), the district court was correct that 

petitioner's argument fails under the traditional Blockburger 

test. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 3 
On appeal, petitioner relies in part on Jordan v. Virginia, 

653 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1980), to argue that the Blockburger 

test does not apply where successive prosecutions are involved. 2 

We disagree with the Fourth Circuit to the extent that the court 

has suggested that the Blockburger test does not ordinarily apply 

to double jeopardy challenges to successive prosecutions. 

Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416, 100 s. Ct. 2260, 2265, 65 

L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); Brown, 432 U.S. at 166, 97 S. Ct. at 2225; see 

also United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 667 n.4 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091, 103 S. Ct. 579, 74 L.Ed.2d 939 (1982) 

and 460 U.S. 1024, 103 S. Ct. 1276, 75 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983). We do 

agree, however, that successive prosecutions implicate "the 

protection against re-trial itself." Jordan, 653 F.2d at 873. 

This component of double jeopardy "insures that having once 'run 

the gauntlet' of criminal trial to judgment either of conviction 

or acquittal, a person shall not be required to run essentially 

the same gauntlet again." Id.; see also United States v. Combs, 

634 F.2d 1295, 1297 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913, 

101 s. ct. 1987, 68 L.Ed.2d 304 (1981); United States v. Huffman, 

595 F.2d 551, 559 (10th Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting). 

Because this important interest is at stake, the Blockburger 

test's examination of the requisite statutory elements must be 

2 In Jordan, the prosecution charged defendant with the 

misdemeanor of obtaining a drug by presenting a forged 

prescription and with the felony offense of possession of a 

controlled substance. The Fourth Circuit concluded that although 

under Blockburger, the prosecution arguably could charge and try 

both offenses in a single trial, it could not bring successive 

charges, because the evidence needed at Jordan's first trial was 

necessary to convict him of the second crime. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 4 
made "from the vantage point of the particular case before the 

court." Lee v. Probate Court of Davidson County, 807 F.2d 512, 

514 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S. Ct. 

2260). Thus in Vitale, in trying to determine whether a 

defendant's conviction for failure to reduce speed barred his 

subsequent conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the Supreme 

Court focused on the proof required to sustain the involuntary 

manslaughter conviction. The Court remanded to the Illinois 

Supreme Court to determine whether, under the facts of the case, 

the only way the prosecutor could prove the elements of 

involuntary manslaughter was through proof of failure to reduce 

speed. If so, double jeopardy barred the subsequent prosecution 

for involuntary manslaughter. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 417, 100 s. Ct. 

at 2265-66. See also Brown, 432 U.S. at 168, 97 S. Ct. at 2226-27 

(defendant convicted of joyriding could not subsequently be tried 

for greater offense of auto theft); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 

682, 682, 97 s. Ct. at 2912, 13 (1977) (defendant convicted of 

felony murder could not subsequently be tried for the underlying 

felony of armed robbery because, although the two statutes might 

pass the Blockburger test, in the particular circumstances of the 

case, proof of armed robbery was indispensable to proof of felony 

murder) . 

Contrary to appellant's contention, substantial overlap in 

the evidence· presented in the two trials does not, by itself, 

create a double jeopardy problem. The Supreme Court in Iannelli 

v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975), clarified this 

point as follows: "[T]he Court's application of the [double 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 5 
jeopardy] test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. 

If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the 

Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial 

overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes." (Emphasis 

added). See also Rubino v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (5th 

Cir. 1988) (issue not whether overlapping evidence used, but 

whether conviction for second crime could have been had without 

the assistance of the proof required to convict for the first 

crime). 

Here, petitioner was accused of robbing a drugstore at 

gunpoint. After being given narcotics and money, petitioner 

forced the clerk to accompany him from the store. He then forced 

the clerk into the back seat of the car. He eventually released 

the clerk. Tucker, 481 P.2d at 168. Petitioner was charged with 

armed robbery and kidnapping. 

Under Oklahoma law, the prosecution could have 

crime without introducing evidence of the other. 

proven each 

In his direct 

criminal appeal of his kidnapping conviction, petitioner argued 

that the state could not "obtain separate punishments under 

separate statutes for a single transaction involving a single 

criminal objective and intent, act, or course of conduct." Id. 

He contended that his previous conviction for armed robbery 

resulted in a double jeopardy bar against his kidnapping trial 

because the state was carving "two crimes out of the same course 

of conduct." Id. 

The 

argument. 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 6 
Id. 

We are of the opinion that the Armed Robbery was 

completed when the defendant left the store. The 

elements of Armed Robbery and those of Kidnapping are 

quite dissimilar. The proof required to prove the Armed 

Robbery and the proof required to prove the Kidnapping 

are completely different. 

In light of the deference accorded state courts in 

determining the elements and required proof under their own 

criminal statutes, we conclude that in the circumstances before 

us, the "proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each 

offense" was different. Cf. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 

467, 78 s. Ct. 829, 832, 2 L.Ed.2d 913 (1958) (due process did not 

prevent state from construing robberies of separate victims 

occurring at same time as separate offenses). 3 

Although the problem of overlapping evidence has been 

addressed, the issue remains whether successive trials arising 

from admittedly separate crimes, but stemming from the same 

criminal transaction, nevertheless violated petitioner's right to 

due process in the form of his right to be free of prosecutorial 

attempt "'to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with 

accumulated trials.'" Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 

319, 328, 58 s. Ct. 149, 153, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937)). In Hoag, New 

Jersey had determined that each of four robberies, though taking 

place on the same occasion, was a separate offense. 4 Deferring to 

3 A prior acquittal would arguably require us to determine 

whether, in delivering a not guilty verdict, the jury had decided 

an issue of fact adversely to the government, and whether that 

fact was a necessary element in the second charge. See Ashe v. 

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 90 s. Ct. 1189, 1193, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 

(1970) (recognizing collateral estoppel as part of guarantee 

against double jeopardy, thereby overruling Hoag in part). 

4 The defendant was accused in three indictments of robbing 

(footnote cont. on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 7 
the state's interpretation of what could define a separate crime 

in New Jersey, the Supreme Court concluded there was no double 

jeopardy problem of double punishment for the same crime. Id. 

But even if it was constitutionally permissible for New 

Jersey to punish petitioner for each of the four 

robberies as separate offenses, it does not necessarily 

follow that the state was free to prosecute him for each 

robbery at a different trial. The question is whether 

this case involved an attempt "to wear the accused out 

by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials." 

Id. (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 328, 58 S. Ct. at 153). 

The Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not always 

forbid "[s]tates to prosecute different offenses at consecutive 

trials even though they arise out of the same occurrence. The 

question in any given case is whether such a course has led to 

fundamental unfairness." Id. The Court went on to consider the 

due process issue in terms of the state's justification for the 

successive trials. ·The second criminal trial in Hoag had been the 

result of a surprising recanting of testimony by witnesses during 

the first trial. 

We cannot say that, after such an unexpected turn of 

events, the State's decision to try petitioner for the 

Yager robbery was so arbitrary or lacking in 

justification that it amounted to a denial of those 

concepts constituting "the very essence of a scheme of 

ordered justice, which is due process." 

Id. at 469-70, 78 S. Ct. at 833 (citation omitted); see also 

Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 S. Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983 

(1958) {analyzing successive prosecutions of separate murders 

(cont. from previous page) 

three victims at gunpoint. Each indictment named a different 

victim. The defendant was acquitted on these first three charges, 

whereupon the prosecutor brought a fourth indictment naming a 

fourth victim, Mr. Yager. The defendant was then convicted. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 8 
forming a single criminal transaction under a 

fairness" test). 

"fundamental 

Although the successive 

strict interpretation of the 

prosecutions at issue here meet a 

Blockburger test, the court must 

nonetheless inquire further under Hoag and Ciucci, and ask whether 

the successive trials violated "fundamental fairness." The 

district court did not review the state court records, including 

the transcripts of petitioner's kidnapping and robbery trials, and 

the records are not part of the record on appeal. In light of the 

circumstances of this case, we conclude that a review of 

"fundamental fairness" is impossible without reviewing the 

transcripts. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district 

court and remand for a consideration of the state court records in 

light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions 

contained in Hoag and Ciucci. 

II. DUE PROCESS AND "OTHER CRIMES" EVIDENCE 

,Petitioner complains that evidence of both crimes was 

introduced at each trial, thereby prejudicing the jury against him 

at each trial. Although petitioner does not label this argument 

as such, he has essentially alleged that even if double jeopardy 

does not bar his subsequent kidnapping trial, substantial "other 

crimes" evidence was used to convict him at both trials. This 

argument in itself raises a due process issue. See Brinlee v. 

Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 

1047, 100 s. ct. 737, 62 L.Ed.2d 733 (1980). On remand, the 

district court should also consider petitioner's allegations that 

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Appellate Case: 87-1701 Document: 01019835927 Date Filed: 08/25/1989 Page: 9 
substantial evidence of other crimes or wrongs was introduced at 

his trials for robbery and kidnapping. 

By remanding, we make no comment on the merits of 

petitioner's allegations. We note that "[s]tate court rulings on 

the admissibility of evidence may not be questioned in· federal 

habeas proceedings unless they render the trial so fundamentally 

unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional 

rights." Brinlee, 608 F.2d at 850 (citing Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 

551 F.2d 1182, 1192-93 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845, 98 

s. Ct. 148, 54 L.Ed.2d 111 (1977)); see also Bond v. Oklahoma, 546 

F.2d 1369, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1976). 

III. APPLICATION OF REMEDIAL STATE PRECEDENT 

Petitioner also argues that he was entitled to relief under 

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Chaney, 612 

P.2d at 281, in which the trial court denied the defendant's 

motion to consolidate trials on two charges of kidnapping and two 

charges of murder, all arising from one course of conduct. In 

opposing the motion, the prosecutor promised that each offense 

could be tried separately without reference to the others. 

Contrary to his word, however, the prosecutor brought out evidence 

of other crimes in the first trial. "The jury was told that it 

was trying the defendant· for one murder, but then it was given 

evidence that there wer~ in fact two murders and two kidnappings." 

Id. at 282. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the 

prosecution was estopped from prosecuting the remaining crimes. 

The court noted that the prosecution could have joined the 

indictments under 22 Okla. Stat. S 436, et seq. These statutes 

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permit joinder of indictments or defendants, but instruct the 

trial court to provide relief to either the state or the defendant 

if joinder would be prejudicial. Id. §§ 436 and 439. By 

implication, apparently, a prejudicial severance should also be 

avoided. These statutes were passed in 1968, the same year 

petitioner was convicted. Petitioner argues that the new statutes 

and Chaney represent intervening law which should be applied to 

him. 

In petitioner's post-conviction 

Court of Criminal Appeals held that 

petitioner's case. In Chaney, 

proceedings, the Oklahoma 

Chaney was "inapposite to 

the defendant's motion to 

consolidate the four charges 

murder and two kidnappings 

was denied, but evidence of the 

was introduced at his first trial." 

Order Affirming Denial of Post-Conviction Relief, Tucker v. State 

of Oklahoma, Unpublished No. PC-85-482 (Sept. 25, 1985). Whether 

the court distinguished Chaney from the case at bar because Chaney 

did not concern a double jeopardy argument, or because here 

petitioner perhaps did not move to consolidate, is not clear. 

In any event, the issue whether Chaney retroactively applies 

to petitioner is a state law issue. Cf. Rubino, 845 F.2d at 1275 

(applicability of Texas rule forbidding "carving" of two crimes 

out of single criminal transaction was "peculiarly a creature of 

state law," dictating certification of issue to Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals). Accordingly, the district court correctly 

denied the petition on this ground. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in 

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part, and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

with this order and judgment. Petitioner's motion for appointment 

of counsel on appeal is DENIED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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