Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00001/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00001-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Regents of the University of California
Defendant
C.H. Mercedes Stubbs
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C.H. MERCEDES STUBBS,

NO. CIV. S-06-1 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff is an African-American male with dyslexia who has

brought various claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) and Title VII against his former employer, the Regents of

the University of California. Specifically, plaintiff alleges (1)

disability discrimination, (2) failure to provide reasonable

accommodation, (3) race discrimination, and (4) retaliation.

Pending before the court is defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. The court resolves the matter upon the parties’ papers

and after oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the

court denies the motion, except with respect to plaintiff’s

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retaliation claim under the ADA.

I. Facts1

A. General Background

In January 2004, defendant hired plaintiff Mercedes Stubbs

for the position of Assistant Animal Technician at the

University of California Davis’ California National Primate

Research Center (the “Center”). Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Fact (“SUF”) ¶ 18. The Center is an organized research unit

that conducts biomedical research on a variety of human healthrelated problems using primates as research subjects. SUF ¶ 1. 

It houses approximately 4,800 monkeys, many of whom are

inflected with infectious diseases, such as HIV/SIV and Herpes

B. SUF ¶¶ 3-4.

There are approximately 100 Assistant Animal Technicians

employed at the Center. SUF ¶ 6. The Assistant Animal

Technicians are divided into crews responsible for various

aspects of animal care in compliance with applicable

regulations, guidelines, and protocols. Id. Plaintiff worked

in the Cage Change Crew, supervised by Ron Walgenbach, which is

responsible for changing and cleaning the cages of all 4,800

primates once every two weeks. SUF ¶ 7. Plaintiff was the only

African-American on his working crew. Pl.’s Statement of

Disputed Facts (“SDF”) ¶ 39. The work on the Cage Change Crew

is physical, fast-paced, and requires several employees to work

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in teams to lift and move heavy cages. SUF ¶ 8. Each team

within the crew cleans approximately three rooms of cages per

day by first boxing up the monkeys and then disinfecting the

cages with toxic chemicals. SUF ¶ 9.

B. Plaintiff’s Employment Application & Interview

Plaintiff had previously applied for the same Assistant

Animal Technician position in August 2003, although he was

rejected because he had failed to disclose information regarding

a felony reduced to a misdemeanor. SUF ¶ 16. In his job

application, plaintiff stated that he had never been “released

or discharged from employment or resigned to avoid such

discharge or release,” although he had, in fact, been discharged

from the military and had been terminated from his job as a food

server at Travis Air Force Base. SUF ¶ 21; Depo. of Mercedes

Stubbs (“Stubbs Depo.”) 20:15-17, Ex. A, Decl. of Cori Sarno

(“Sarno Decl.”); SUF ¶ 24. Furthermore, plaintiff indicated

that he had a high school diploma, when he had only passed the

GED test. SUF ¶ 26. Finally, plaintiff indicated that he had

not previously worked for UC, even though he had worked for

Temporary Employment Services. SUF ¶ 25.

When plaintiff applied for the Assistant Animal Technician

position for a second time, Janis Lenox (plaintiff’s then

girlfriend and now wife) acted on his behalf as the Assistant

Director of Administration for the Center. She wrote a note to

Human Resources on plaintiff’s background check application that

stated: “We are aware of Mr. Stubbs’ 1992 misdemeanor and all

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details involved and still want to hire him.” SUF ¶ 29. 

Plaintiff was ultimately hired for the position by Ron

Walgenbach, the Cage Change Crew supervisor, and Jenny Short,

the Assistant Director of Colony Management. SUF ¶ 33. During

the interview, plaintiff disclosed that he had dyslexia. Decl.

of Ronald Walgenbach (“Walgenbach Decl.”) ¶ 6. Plaintiff claims

that his dyslexia affects daily life activities, such as reading

and verbal communication. SDF ¶ 28. He takes Wellbutrin for

his condition, which has improved his concentration. SUF ¶ 90.

C. Plaintiff’s Training and Course of Employment

During the first two weeks of employment, plaintiff worked

with the department’s training coordinator, Doug Miller. SUF ¶

36. The two went through the procedures, as set forth in

“attention-to-detail” lists, for each of the functions plaintiff

was to perform. SUF ¶ 37. After reviewing these attention-todetail lists, Miller performed the tasks as plaintiff watched. 

SUF ¶ 37. After that, plaintiff would perform the tasks while

Miller looked on. SUF ¶ 38. Plaintiff was allowed to take home

the materials to review, which was not normally permitted. SUF

¶ 122.

After the initial training, plaintiff was assigned to work

with various crew members. In late April, early May 2004,

Walgenbach went on vacation for four days. SUF ¶ 41. During

that time, Brian Scarberry, the team leader, essentially took

over for Walgenbach. SUF ¶ 42. While working in one of the

rooms, Scarberry told plaintiff that he had done something

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incorrectly, at which point plaintiff yelled at Scarberry and

stormed out of the room. SUF ¶ 43. Thereafter, Scarberry

requested a meeting with plaintiff, Doug Miller, and Jenny

Short. SUF ¶ 42. At the meeting, plaintiff complained that

Scarberry was too harsh and was pushing the crew too hard in

Walgenbach’s absence. SUF ¶ 44.

After Walgenbach returned from vacation, a meeting was held

on May 5, 2004 between Walgenbach, Short, and Miller to followup on the problem that had arisen between plaintiff and

Scarberry. SUF ¶ 45. Id. Short wanted to know if the problems

that plaintiff was having were limited to when he worked with

Scarberry or whether he was also having issues with other coworkers. SUF ¶ 46. She was informed by Walgenbach and Miller

that plaintiff was not keeping pace with the rest of the crew,

and that, because of this, other crew members did not want to be

assigned to work with him. SUF ¶ 47. Short was also told that

plaintiff mishandled toxic chemicals, did not retain the process

of counting cages, accidentally let the monkeys loose, was

resistant to criticism, and took very lengthy breaks. Decl. of

Jenny Short (“Short Decl.”) ¶ 12.

Although plaintiff was on probationary status, it was

decided that plaintiff should be given more time, because other

employees who were initially slow to learn the process

ultimately became good employees. SUF ¶ 51. Walgenbach decided

to work alongside plaintiff more often to provide extra

training. SUF ¶ 52. Miller also agreed to provide more one-onCase 2:06-cv-00001-LKK -DAD Document 30 Filed 05/25/07 Page 5 of 32
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one training to help plaintiff master the cage changing process

and safety procedures. Id. 

Plaintiff maintains, however, that he was never properly

trained. SDF ¶¶ 12-14, 36. One of the Center’s Senior Animal

Technicians, Edgardo Vasquez, who has worked at the Center since

1991, questioned “why nobody is training him [plaintiff]

properly.” SDF ¶ 14. He observed that Scarberry did not treat

employees fairly in his training, was impatient, and lacked the

skills to train new employees. SDF ¶ 13. Vasquez did not work

in the same room as the Cage Change Crew but came into contact

with them once or twice a day. Depo. of Edgardo Vasquez

(“Vasquez Depo.”) 39:1-5, Ex. A, Decl. of Randal Barnum (“Barnum

Decl.”). Vasquez also stated that in the past, he heard the

words “nigger” and “wetback” used, as well as derogatory

language referencing women and gays and lesbians, but that

management had addressed it and that he had not heard derogatory

language used in the last three to five years. Id. 31:21-34:12.

On May 18, 2004, an incident arose between plaintiff and

two of his co-workers, one of whom was Scarberry. SUF ¶ 57. 

Apparently, plaintiff sprayed the two with a hose that he was

using to perform his duties. Id. Plaintiff maintains that this

was accidental, Stubbs Depo. 158:15-16, whereas the co-workers

involved claim it was not, Scarberry Decl. ¶ 12. In response,

Scarberry called plaintiff a “fucker” and stated “If you do that

again to me, I’ll shove the hose up your ass.” Scarberry Decl.

¶ 12. 

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After plaintiff complained to Walgenbach about this

incident, Walgenbach organized a meeting so that plaintiff could

explain his perspective. SUF ¶ 58. During the meeting, the two

other co-workers apologized to plaintiff. SUF ¶ 59. Plaintiff

was dissatisfied with the meeting and stated that it was biased

and that he wanted to transfer. SUF ¶ 60. He then stood up, at

which point Walgenbach requested that he sit back down and talk

to them. Id. Instead, plaintiff left the room. Id. 

After leaving the meeting, plaintiff went to Human

Resources at the Center and complained to H.R. manager Kristin

Antona that he was being discriminated against on account of his

race. SUF ¶ 61. In addition to complaining about the incident

with the hose, he alleged that work assignments and treatment

toward him were hostile and based on racial discrimination; that

his co-workers were not friendly; that he was frequently

assigned to work alone or work with Scarberry or Walgenbach (as

opposed to other members of the crew); and that he worked harder

and was assigned more work than others. SUF ¶ 62.

After discussing the various methods for lodging a

complaint, plaintiff decided he wanted the Center to conduct an

informal review. SUF ¶ 63. Antona conducted the review, which

included interviews of employees and plaintiff’s supervisor. 

SUF ¶ 64. Antona completed a report of her informal review on

May 27, 2004. SUF ¶ 65. Her report indicated that “[e]mployees

in the Cage Change area are friendlier to some employees than

others” but that “[t]here is no substantiation that this is

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based on racial bias.” Ex. E, Antona Decl. She concluded that

there was “no corroboration of behavior or management decisions

that would demonstrate racial discrimination or bias.” SUF ¶

67. 

On June 1, 2004, Walgenbach claims that plaintiff glared at

him when Walgenbach was giving plaintiff his work assignment in

the morning. SUF ¶ 68. Later that morning, Walgenbach and

plaintiff, among others, were in the locker room. Walgenbach

Decl. ¶ 29. Walgenbach overheard a conversation with plaintiff

and another co-worker in which profanity was used, and

Walgenbach said that they needed to watch their language. Id. 

Another employee witness said that Walgenbach told plaintiff to

watch his mouth in a yelling and demeaning way. Vasquez Depo.

67:20. Walgenbach also informed plaintiff that a follow-up

meeting regarding his relations with the crew had to be

rescheduled due to a campus-wide sexual harassment class that

all employees had to attend. Id. Plaintiff became visibly

angry at this and stormed out of the locker room. Id.

Walgenbach attempted to catch up with plaintiff, who did

not respond and continued to walk away, even after Walgenbach

called out his name. Id. Walgenbach then placed his hands on

plaintiff’s shoulders and turned him around. Id. Plaintiff

claims that he was violently spun around. During his

deposition, plaintiff stated that Walgenbach “physically turned

me around and shook me and said what was wrong with [him].” SDF

¶ 44. Plaintiff then yelled something to the effect of, “[g]et

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your hands off me man” and “[d]on’t ever touch me like that

again!” and walked away. Walgenbach Decl. ¶ 29. Some employees

who were present felt when Walgenbach placed his hands on

plaintiff, it was a friendly gesture, SUF ¶ 69, whereas another

interpreted it as disrespectful, SDF ¶ 17.

D. Plaintiff’s Termination

At 7:25 a.m. on June 1, 2004, the Animal Care Supervisor

for Husbandry, Jaleh Janatpour, paged Short at home regarding an

encounter that she had just had with plaintiff. SUF ¶ 71. 

Janatpour, a former Animal Control Officer with a background in

law enforcement, informed Short that plaintiff had made a

statement that she construed as a threat against plaintiff’s

supervisor, Walgenbach. SUF ¶ 69. Janatpour reported that

plaintiff said something to the effect that “he was being

bullied because he was black” (referencing the locker room

incident). SUF ¶ 73. He also allegedly stated that a person in

his past had bullied him, that plaintiff put him in the

hospital, and that “that man never walked again.” SUF ¶ 73. 

Plaintiff denies making this statement. Stubbs Depo. 190:4-6.

After Short spoke with Walgenbach about the threats, they

both decided to release plaintiff from probation and terminate

his employment. SUF ¶ 75. The decision to terminate plaintiff

was based both on the alleged threat as well as plaintiff’s

performance, which had not improved in the four weeks since the

May 1, 2004 meeting. SUF ¶ 75. Neither Short nor Walgenbach

discussed the matter with plaintiff, nor confirmed that he had

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 Notably, the complaint did not allege any claim of 2

harassment or hostile work environment, and those claims are not

appropriately before the court now.

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made the statements relayed by Janatpour. SDF ¶ 58. While

ordinarily Walgenbach would be the one to release a crew member,

due to the threats, Short decided to release plaintiff herself

and instructed Walgenbach to go home early. SUF ¶ 78.

Following the termination, Edgardo Vasquez, a Senior Animal

Technician, spoke with Scarberry. When asked why plaintiff was

terminated, Scarberry said plaintiff was “dumb” and “stupid” and

mentioned something about plaintiff being black. SDF ¶¶ 19, 25

(“He mention something about -- you know, something like being

dumb, stupid, and then mentioning something because he’s

black.”). 

Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on June 16, 2006

claiming race and disability discrimination. SUF ¶ 79. He 2

further claimed that he had not been given proper training to

perform his job. Id. On March 3, 2005, plaintiff filed an

amended charge adding that he also believed that he had been

retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. The

instant lawsuit was filed on January 4, 2006. Plaintiff’s

complaint alleges that he was the victim of race discrimination

and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act. He also claims that he was the victim of disability

discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Title I and

Title V, respectively, of the ADA.

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II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

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court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Ass’n of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

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Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g

& Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also Int’l Union of Bricklayers &

Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752

F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56©; see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090,

1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to

be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold,

Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also

Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121,

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1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp.

1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

For the reasons set forth below, the court denies

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the disability

discrimination claim, the failure to provide reasonable

accommodation claim, and the race discrimination claim. The

court grants in part and denies in part the motion for summary

judgment as to the retaliation claim.

A. Disability Discrimination

1. Affirmative Defenses

a. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff seeks money damages under two provisions of the

ADA: employment discrimination pursuant to Title I, 42 U.S.C. §

1211 et seq., and retaliation for protected conduct pursuant to

Title V, section 503, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. At the outset,

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 Defendant argues that it was only admitting liability for 3

injunctive relief -- not damages -- but the pertinent paragraph in

the complaint did not state “defendant is an employer subject to

suit for injunctive relief.” Rather, it simply stated that

“defendant is an employer subject to suit.” Compl. ¶ 4. 

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however, defendant argues that it is entitled to sovereign

immunity from damages under the Eleventh Amendment. See Board

of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,

368 (2001) (finding that Title I of the ADA did not validly

abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity); Demshki v.

Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (extending Garrett

to encompass claims brought under Title V of the ADA).

While defendant would ordinarily be entitled to immunity as

“an arm of the state” because it is a corporation created by the

California constitution, see Armstrong v. Meyers, 964 F.2d 948,

949 (9th Cir. 1992), here, it has waived the defense. “Eleventh

Amendment immunity is an affirmative defense . . . that must be

raised ‘early in the proceedings’ to provide ‘fair warning’ to

the plaintiff.” Demshki, 255 F.3d at 989 (internal citations

omitted). The complaint stated that “[d]efendant is an employer

subject to suit under the aforementioned statutes,” Compl. ¶ 4,

referencing Title I and Title V of the ADA, Compl. ¶ 1. In its

answer, defendant “admit[ted] it is subject to suit as an

employer under . . . Title I of the Americans with Disabilities

Act.” Answer ¶ 4. 

Accordingly, there is no dispute that defendant is liable

for damages related to employment discrimination under Title I.3

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Furthermore, while defendant did not expressly deny liability

for retaliation under Title V, any material allegation in the

complaint not denied in the answer is deemed admitted. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(d) (“Averments in a pleading . . . are admitted when

not denied in the responsive pleading.”). Also, nowhere in the

answer did defendant assert sovereign immunity as an affirmative

defense. Cf. Demshki, 255 F.2d at 989 (noting that the

defendant “raised Eleventh Amendment immunity as an affirmative

defense in its answer”). Defendant is therefore potentially

liable for damages under both provisions of the ADA at issue

here.

b. Injunctive Relief & Front-Pay

Defendant also argues that plaintiff should not be entitled

to relief in the form of restitution or front-pay because of the

alleged fraud on his job application. “If an employer discovers

that the plaintiff committed an act of wrongdoing and can

establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the

employee would have been terminated on those grounds alone if

the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge,” the

employee is barred from obtaining reinstatement or front-pay,

and can only recover back-pay from the date of the discharge to

the date the new information was discovered. O’Day v. McDonnell

Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1996)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Even assuming, arguendo, that the alleged application fraud

rose to such a level, after-acquired evidence is an affirmative

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defense that must be pled in the answer. Otherwise, it is

waived. See Red Deer v. Cherokee County, Iowa, 183 F.R.D. 642,

653 (N.D. Ia. 1999) (“[T]he court concludes that ‘after-acquired

evidence’ is an affirmative defense that must indeed be pleaded

and proved pursuant to Rule 8(c).”); Jones v. Bd. of Trustees of

Community College Dist. No. 508, 75 F. Supp. 2d 885, 887 (N.D.

Ill. 1999) (“The defense is an affirmative one.”). Here,

defendant waived the defense by failing to pled it in its

answer.

2. Prima Facie Case

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a

disabled employer with respect to hiring, advancement,

discharge, compensation, job training, or any other term,

condition, or privilege of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A

prima facie claim for discrimination under the ADA requires that

plaintiff show: (1) that she or he is a disabled person, (2)

that she or he is qualified, with or without reasonable

accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job,

and (3) that she or he has suffered an adverse employment

decision because of the disability. Snead v. Metro Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001). The burden for

proving a prima facie employment discrimination case is not

onerous, and does not even require proof by a preponderance of

the evidence. Id. at 1091.

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under the ADA: being regarded as disabled or having a record of

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) & (C). While plaintiff makes

passing note of this, he does not present evidence or argument as

to why he is disabled under these alternate definitions.

Accordingly, the court passes no judgment on these issues.

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a. Disabled

First, defendant argues that plaintiff is not a disabled

person within the meaning of the ADA. “Disability” is defined

to include “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities” of an

individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). There is no dispute that 4

dyslexia is a “physical or mental impairment,” see EEOC

Compliance Manual § 902.3(b), or that plaintiff suffers from

dyslexia, SDF ¶ 26. Rather, the issue here is whether

plaintiff’s dyslexia substantially limits one or more of his

major life activities.

During his deposition, plaintiff explained how his dyslexia

impacted his daily life:

Q: [D]oes [dyslexia] have any effect on your dayto-day activities?

A: Yes, it does.

Q: How? 

A: In terms of bills. I want to read things

sometimes. I don’t understand what I read. Sometimes

when I’m getting in conversation with people they may say

some things I’m not sure what those words or whatever

they’re talking about, not sure how to understand it.

Stubbs Depo. 24:19-25:2. During his job interview, plaintiff

also explained that because of his dyslexia he “need[ed] more

time studying things when [he’s] not sure what they are” and he

“need[ed] more time to learn things.” Id. 221:21-22. 

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Based on the record, plaintiff appears to contend that some 5

of his dyslexia-related problems existed independent of his reading

deficits. E.g., Stubbs Depo. 24:24-25:2 (“Sometimes when I’m

getting in conversation with people they may say some things I’m

not sure what those words or whatever they’re talking about, not

sure how to understand it.”).

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Nevertheless, he admitted that when he took Wellbutrin, it

increased his ability to pay attention, helped with his selfcontrol, and improved his concentration. Id. 30:19-31:3.

In short, plaintiff appears to argue that his dyslexia

substantially limits two major life activities: (1) reading and

(2) learning (or, more broadly, thinking and concentrating). 

With regard to reading, plaintiff’s dyslexia does not impose a

substantial limitation. Like the dyslexic plaintiff in Wong,

plaintiff admitted that he could read the newspaper, SUF ¶ 90,

and look for jobs in the newspaper, SUF ¶ 91. See Wong v.

Regents of the Univ. of California, 379 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th

2004) (“[Plaintiff] has not established that he was unable to

read newspapers, government forms, street signs, or the like.”). 

He also stated that he played bingo several hours a week, which

requires recognition of numbers/letters. SUF ¶ 91. Plaintiff

has not put forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine

dispute that his reading ability is substantially impaired.

With regard to learning, however, the court finds that

there is a genuine dispute. In Vinson, for example, the court 5

found that where a letter from plaintiff’s college indicated

that he required extra study time due to his dyslexia, a

reasonable fact-finder could conclude that his learning ability

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 The fact that plaintiff learned how to dance, SUF ¶95, took 6

community college classes, SUF ¶ 96, and once took a forklift

safety class, SUF ¶ 98, does not demonstrate that no reasonable

fact-finder could construe substantial learning impairment in other

areas of life.

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was substantially impaired. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145,

1153 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, plaintiff similarly complained that

he “need[ed] more time to learn things.” Stubbs Depo. 221:21- 6

22. Furthermore, as detailed below, plaintiff’s less-than-ideal

work performance in the first few months of his employment also

evidenced his learning impairments. 

While the court in Wong rejected a similar claim that

dyslexia substantially impaired learning, it did so because of

plaintiff’s academic success in medical school. 410 F.3d at

1065. Here, in contrast, plaintiff attained only a GED. 

Furthermore, although plaintiff stated that Wellbutrin helped to

improve his concentration, see Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,

527 U.S. 471 (1999) (requiring consideration of corrective

measures in assessing disability), this does not necessarily

mean that the improvement was sufficient to overcome a

substantial impairment. Although a close issue, it would not be

unreasonable for one to conclude, based on the totality of the

evidence, that plaintiff’s learning ability was substantially

impaired.

b. Qualified

Second, defendant argues that plaintiff is not a “qualified

individual,” which is defined as one who is qualified to perform

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the essential functions of the jobs, with or without reasonable

accommodation. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198

F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). The essential functions of a job are

determined by reference to written job descriptions, the amount

of time spent on the function, and the employer’s judgment. 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Here, defendant argues that plaintiff was unable to perform

the essential functions of the Assistant Animal Technician

position, because he had poor interpersonal skills, was

unwilling to follow orders, and had general performance issues. 

An employee’s ability to work reasonably well with others is an

essential function of any position. See Williams v. Motorola,

Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, neither

party disputes that there were interpersonal disputes between

plaintiff and various members of his team. SUF ¶ 107. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff maintains that the cause of these

disputes were attributable to others.

For example, plaintiff points to the incident with the

hose, in which Scarberry called him a “fucker” and threatened to

“shove the hose up [his] ass.” Scarberry Decl. ¶ 12. In

another instance, plaintiff maintains that Walgenbach spun him

around and shook him. SDF ¶ 44. In addition, Edgardo Vasquez,

a Senior Animal Technician, felt that the work situation for

plaintiff “was not pleasant” and that plaintiff “was isolated

from the crew.” SDF ¶ 10. If the interpersonal problems

experienced by plaintiff were a result of ostracism or shunning,

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 This is not to suggest, however, that mere ostracism is 7

actionable. It is not. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d

917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause an employer cannot force

employees to socialize with one another, ostracism suffered at the

hands of co-workers” does not establish discrimination.”).

Nevertheless, if plaintiff’s co-workers unfairly shunned him, that

fact would be relevant to the narrow issue of whether he was

unqualified based on his inability to get along with others.

In his deposition, plaintiff was asked why he continued to 8

ask questions in spite of his training, to which he responded:

“Because [of] the changes. When you train me one way then all of

a sudden I come back and you complain and say why didn’t you do

that just the way you show me, then whose fault is that? Is that

mine? No.” Stubbs Depo. 301:18-21.

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it would be unfair to deem him unqualified on this basis.7

There is at least a genuine dispute as to whether this was in

fact the case.

Second, defendant maintains that plaintiff had general

performance problems and did not follow orders. With regard to

the alleged insubordination, plaintiff claims that Scarberry

would give him contradictory instructions, which is the subject

of a genuine dispute. SDF ¶ 36. With regard to general 8

performance issues, there is little dispute that plaintiff was

not a model employee. For example, he once left his co-workers

to clean a room because he was afraid of the monkeys, SUF ¶ 110;

he once let a monkey out of his cage, SUF ¶ 111; he attempted to

pick up a rolling cage by himself, risking injury to himself and

others, SUF ¶ 54; and, as noted earlier, he mishandled chemicals

and took lengthy breaks. Scarberry complained that “[i]t was as

if each day was his first day on the job.” Scarberry Decl. ¶ 6.

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backfired, because in his complaint of discrimination to Kristin

Antona, the H.R. manager, plaintiff noted that he was frequently

assigned to work alone or work with Scarberry or Walgenbach, as

opposed to other members of the crew.

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Nevertheless, whether an individual is qualified must be

determined based on the receipt of reasonable accommodation. 

Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1104. Here, plaintiff maintains that he was

not properly trained in light of his dyslexia, SDF ¶ 36, and the

observations of at least one other employee, Edgardo Vasquez,

confirm this, SDF ¶ 14. Admittedly, defendant made some efforts

to accommodate plaintiff. For example, after the May 5, 2004

meeting, Miller, the department’s training coordinator, agreed

to provide more one-on-one training, and Walgenbach decided to

work alongside plaintiff more often. SUF ¶ 51. Plaintiff was 9

also allowed to take home the attention-to-detail lists, which

was not normally allowed. SUF ¶ 122.

In spite of this, there was also evidence that Scarberry,

as one of the senior employees on plaintiff’s crew, was

impatient, had poor personal skills, and was not a good person

to train new employees -- at least by the account of Edgardo

Vasquez. Vasquez Depo. 44:2-5. Furthermore, Scarberry’s

training and feedback to plaintiff might have been undermined by

interpersonal problems that, in turn, were caused by Scarberry’s

alleged racism -- not an unreasonable inference, given his use

of the word “black” as a derogatory term. SDF ¶ 25. In

addition, plaintiff maintains that Scarberry gave contradictory

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instructions, which, if true, had the potential to unravel the

training conducted by others, such as Walgenbach and Miller. 

SDF ¶ 36. 

As with the issue of whether plaintiff is a disabled

individual, the issue of whether plaintiff is a qualified

individual is also a close one. But for Brian Scarberry, there

would be little difficulty in concluding that plaintiff received

reasonable accommodation for his dyslexia and that, based on his

performance, he was not qualified for the position. 

Nevertheless, Scarberry’s interpersonal problems with plaintiff

provide the foundation for the inference that plaintiff’s

training was inadequate. Moreover, because the burden of

proving a prima facie case is “not onerous,” Snead, 237 F.3d at

1081, the court finds that there is a genuine dispute as to

whether plaintiff was a qualified individual with reasonable

accommodation.

c. Adverse Employment Decision Because of Disability

Third, plaintiff must establish that the adverse employment

decision was taken because of his disability. Plaintiff states

that “they just [said], I’m letting you go because they got

tired of you, telling you what to do over and over again.” 

Stubbs Depo. 297:24-298:1. This is sufficient, at this initial

stage of the analysis, to satisfy plaintiff’s burden of

demonstrating a nexus between plaintiff’s disability and his

subsequent termination.

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 Although plaintiff has not technically “proven” the prima 10

facie case in light of the disputed facts noted above, the court

nevertheless proceeds with the McDonnell Douglas analysis to

determine whether defendant’s motion for summary judgment should

alternately be granted on the grounds that its proffered reason for

termination was non-pretextual.

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3. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason

Once plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the

burden then shifts to defendant to demonstrate that the adverse

employment action occurred for a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 10

248, 252-252 (1981). The defendant’s burden with respect to

this stage of the analysis is merely one of production, and

“defendant need not persuade the Court that it was actually

motivated by the proffered reasons.” Id. at 254.

Here, defendant argues that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination was that (1)

he was not qualified for the position, and (2) he had made a

threat against Walgenbach. Plaintiff’s performance was clearly

a concern, as demonstrated at the May 5, 2004 meeting, when

Miller and Walgenbach agreed to provide plaintiff additional

training. Furthermore, the alleged threat was reported to the

Center immediately after it occurred, SUF ¶¶ 71-72; it was

relayed by Jaleh Janatpour, a supervisor with a background in

law enforcement who felt the threat was sufficiently credible to

warrant reporting, SUF ¶¶ 71-74; and defendant took precautions

to suggest it honestly believed the threat, such as having Short

rather than Walgenbach terminate plaintiff, SUF ¶ 135. Taken

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 Although Scarberry was not a decisionmaker, he might have 11

influenced the ultimate decision to terminate plaintiff, given that

he had previously met with Miller, who was a decisionmaker, when

a dispute arose in Walgenbach’s absence. This has also been

referred to as the “cat’s paw” theory of liability. See EEOC v.

BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th

Cir. 2006) (“A biased low-level supervisor with no disciplinary

authority might effectuate the termination of an employee from a

protected class by recommending discharge or by selectively

reporting or even fabricating information in communications with

the formal decisionmaker.”). This does not, however, mean that

Scarberry’s comments constitute direct evidence of discrimination

permitting plaintiff to bypass the McDonnell Douglas framework, as

plaintiff attempts to argue.

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together, this is enough to satisfy defendant’s burden of

production.

4. Pretext

Finally, once defendant establishes the existence of a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the McDonnell Douglas

presumption drops out of the picture, and plaintiff must

demonstrate these proffered reasons were pretextual and not the

true reasons for the employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at

253. He may do this “either directly by persuading the court

that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer

or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. at 256.

Here, there is evidence from which a trier of fact could

conclude that defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual, and

that disability discrimination was at least partially the reason

for the decision. As noted earlier, Scarberry remarked to

Vasquez after plaintiff’s termination that plaintiff was “dumb”

and “stupid.” SDF ¶ 25. Plaintiff also maintains that he was 11

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on the alleged threat as grounds for his termination is a “shifting

reason” from which one can allege pretext. This misstates the law.

See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th

Cir. 2002) (the presence of shifting justifications for an adverse

action is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment when those

justifications are not incompatible). Here, defendant’s

justifications (performance issues and plaintiff’s alleged threat)

are not incompatible.

 Short stated that she “did not provide [plaintiff] with 13

each and every reason for his release because [she] was afraid it

would provoke him.” Short Decl. ¶ 51. Nevertheless, if it was to

form the central grounds for his release, presumably some factchecking would be appropriate. 

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told that “they [presumably, his supervisors] got tired of you,

telling you what to do over and over again.” Stubbs Depo.

297:24-298:1. A reasonable inference -- although certainly not

a necessary one -- is that these comments were directed toward

plaintiff’s dyslexia.

With regard to the alleged threat made by plaintiff, there

is certainly evidence to suggest that defendant honestly

believed it to be true. Nevertheless, when plaintiff asked why

he was being released, Short cited performance-related reasons

and omitted any mention of the alleged threat that he had made

against Walgenbach. The fact that no one ever discussed the 12

allegation with plaintiff is a relevant fact from which a trier

of fact could infer that defendant seized upon an ostensibly

plausible reason to terminate plaintiff. Discriminatory animus 13

need not be the only reason for the decision; it need only be “a

motivating factor.” Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d

1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005).

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The fact that the same actors who hired plaintiff also

terminated him does not prove the absence of pretext. The same

actor doctrine creates a strong but not irrebutable inference

that there was no discriminatory action. See Coghlan v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The

same-actor inference is neither a mandatory presumption (on the

one hand) nor a mere possible conclusion for the jury to draw

(on the other). Rather, it is a ‘strong inference’ that a court

must take into account on a summary judgment motion.”). 

Here, while it is true that both Short and Walgenbach knew

of plaintiff’s dyslexia, and that they hired and fired him

within a relatively short period of time, there are other

reasonable inferences of discrimination that could be drawn. 

For instance, it is possible that, while Short and Walgenbach

recognized that plaintiff had dyslexia, they did not fully

appreciate that they would also have to accommodate the

condition, or what that entailed. 

Furthermore, the same actor inference can be rebutted by

showing that a non-decisionmaking employee was biased and

inappropriately influenced the decisionmaker’s employment

decision under a cat’s paw theory of liability. This would

explain why a seemingly non-discriminatory hiring decision could

come from the same individuals who, perhaps unknowingly, carried

out a discriminatory firing decision. Here, plaintiff maintains

that Scarberry exerted such influence on Short and Walgenbach. 

See supra, n.11. Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute on the

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issue of whether defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual,

rendering summary judgment inappropriate.

B. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

The ADA also prohibits discrimination in the form of

failure to provide reasonable accommodation to a known

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). “Reasonable

accommodation” includes “modifications or adjustment to the work

environment, or the manner or circumstances under which the

position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable

an individual with a disability to perform the essential

functions of that job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). As noted

above, however, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the

training that plaintiff received was sufficient, given that

Scarberry (allegedly) had poor training skills training skills,

gave contradictory instructions, and potentially harbored

discriminatory animus that undermined his relationship with

plaintiff. 

Furthermore, plaintiff contends that he was entitled to

transfer to a different crew as a reasonable accommodation -- a

request to which defendant did not respond. See Buckingham v.

U.S., 998 F.2d 735, 720 (finding no per se rule against

transfers as reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation

Act); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1236-37

(9th Cir. 1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment where there

was no evidence that arranging a transfer would impose undue

hardship under ADA). There is similarly a genuine dispute as to

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whether a transfer could have cured the training deficiencies

noted above.

C. Race Discrimination

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to

“discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

An employee suffers disparate treatment “when he or she is

singled out and treated less favorably than others similarly

situated on account of race.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit

Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations

omitted). A prima facie case of race discrimination requires a

plaintiff to prove (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that

she or he was qualified for the position; (3) that she or he

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that a similarly

situated employee was treated more favorably. Godwin v. Hunt

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, plaintiff is an African-American employee who was

fired, and a fact-finder could conclude that he was qualified

with reasonable accommodation for his dyslexia, as discussed

above. Furthermore, none of the other employees on his crew --

who were not black -- were fired. Defendant has also

articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the

termination: that plaintiff had made a threat and that he was

underperforming. Accordingly, the primary issue is whether

plaintiff has shown a genuine dispute that the proffered reasons

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were pretextual or that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the termination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

As noted earlier, Scarberry reportedly use the word “black”

in a derogatory sense when responding to Vasquez’s question

about why plaintiff was fired. Although Scarberry was not a

decisionmaker, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that he

nevertheless had access to the relevant decisionmakers,

Walgenbach and Short. Furthermore, a reasonable fact-finder

could conclude that he negatively influenced their perception of

plaintiff, and that he did so at least in part because of racial

animus. This is all grist for the jury mill, not summary

judgment.

D. Retaliation

Finally, plaintiff alleges a claim for retaliation under

Title VII and the ADA. To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under either statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and

(3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1034-35. 

Here, plaintiff asserts that he was retaliated against for

making complaints of racial discrimination and for requesting

accommodations for his disability. His first complaint to H.R.

manager Kristin Antona in May 2004 raised complaints of racial

discrimination. He raised a similar claim with Jaleh Janatpour

on June 1, 2004 -- the day before he was fired. Proximity in

time between the protected action and the adverse employment

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action is, by itself, enough to infer the causal connection

required by the third element of the prima facie case. Yartzoff

v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless,

plaintiff has only identified Title VII-protected activity, and

has not identified any ADA-protected activity. Accordingly,

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Title I ADA claim is

appropriate.

Once plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, he may

resort to the McDonnell Douglas framework. Cornwell, 439 F.3d

at 1035. Viewing the record as a whole, one could conclude that

defendant terminated plaintiff in retaliation for his complaints

of racial discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment must be

denied as to plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.

IV. Conclusion

As set forth above, the motion for summary judgment is

DENIED as to the disability discrimination claim, the failure to

accommodate claim, the race discrimination claim, and the Title

VII retaliation claim. The motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to the retaliation claim under Title I of the ADA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 24, 2007.

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