Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00396/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00396-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rachel Barbour
Defendant
CEO of USA
Defendant
Dale A. Drozd
Defendant
Michael McCoy
Defendant
Kim Edward Rogers
Plaintiff
USA
Defendant
James William
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KIM EDWARD ROGERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

USA; CEO of USA; DALE A. DROZD, 

Magistrate; MICHAEL MCCOY, 

Attorney; RACHEL BARBOUR, Attorney; 

SHERIFF JAMES WILLIAMS, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-396-MCE-EFB PS 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915.1 The 

declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF Nos. 2, 3 at 

9. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 Determining that plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required 

inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the 

allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed 

below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed. 

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 This case was referred to the undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). 

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 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it 

fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 

(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of 

his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are 

true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable 

legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations 

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the 

plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must satisfy 

the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) 

requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

 Additionally, a federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only 

those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332, 

confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal question jurisdiction 

requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal law or the U. S. Constitution, (2) allege a 

“case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution, or (3) be 

authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific subject matter and confers federal 

jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). To invoke the court’s diversity 

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must specifically allege the diverse citizenship of all parties, and that the 

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matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Bautista v. Pan American World 

Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987). A case presumably lies outside the jurisdiction 

of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. Lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either party or by the court. Attorneys 

Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 As an initial matter, the original complaint filed in this action was submitted by JayatonKerry Thomas, as “Authorized Rep” for plaintiff Kim Rogers, and was not personally signed by 

plaintiff. ECF No. 1. There is no indication from the record that Mr. Thomas, who is plaintiff’s 

brother, is an attorney at law. Unless he is an attorney he may not represent plaintiff nor may he 

sign pleadings on behalf of plaintiff. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 

that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper . . . be signed by at least one attorney of 

record in the attorney’s name—or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11(a). In addition, Local Rule 183(a) requires that any individual who is representing 

himself without an attorney must appear personally or by courtesy appearance by an attorney and 

may not delegate that duty to any other individual. E.D. Cal. L.R. 183(a). Accordingly, Mr. 

Thomas may not file and sign documents on behalf of plaintiff or otherwise represent plaintiff’s 

interests in this action. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-877 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(a non-lawyer has no authority to appear as an attorney for another, and general power of attorney 

does not give non-lawyer right to assert the personal constitutional claims of another); Robles v. 

Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 1:09-cv-1279-AWI-GSA, 2010 WL 3154122 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 

2010) (denying plaintiff’s motion to allow his daughter, a non-attorney, to represent him in 

lawsuit). 

 Plaintiff did not sign the original complaint (ECF No. 1) and that document will be 

disregarded. However, plaintiff has subsequently filed a declaration, which includes a copy of the 

complaint that he personally signed. ECF No. 3. Accordingly, the court construes plaintiff’s 

declaration and its attached signed complaint as the operative complaint in this action. That 

complaint alleges that on November 16, 2014, plaintiff was pulled over and detained by a 

California Highway Patrol Officer. ECF No 3 at 3. He alleges that after he was arrested he was 

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taken to CHP South Sacramento headquarters, where he was coerced and intimidated into signing 

away his rights and giving “a statement concerning the unlawful search and seizure of my vehicle 

and property.” Id. He alleges that he was never Mirandized and that he was also not permitted to 

contact his family and friends. Id. at 4. He further alleges that after he was detained, CHP had 

his vehicle towed even though he was legally parked in a safe neighborhood. He contends that 

this conduct deprived him of his right to due process. Id. 

 Subsequent to his arrest a Pretrial Services report allegedly containing false and 

misleading information was submitted to then Magistrate Judge Dale Drozd which recommended 

detention.2 Id. at 6. Plaintiff claims that Judge Drozd failed to perform his judicial function by 

not granting plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the report. Id. at 7. He also alleges that he has not 

been “vigorously defended” by his appointed counsel, which have included Michael Aye and 

Matthew Scoble. Id, at 2. 

Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a proper claim for 

relief. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair 

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. 

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. Id. Because 

plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief, the complaint must be dismissed. 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the 

defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between 

the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 2

 Judge Drozd is currently a United States District Judge. 

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Plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable for the unconstitutional 

conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). He must identify 

the particular person or persons who violated his rights. He must also plead facts showing how 

that particular person was involved in the alleged violation. 

A municipal entity or its departments is liable under section 1983 only if plaintiff shows 

that his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to the municipality’s 

policy or custom. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); 

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic 

Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). Local government entities may not be held 

vicariously liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under a theory 

of respondeat superior. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 

The complaint appears to assert a section 1983 claim for violation of plaintiff’s right to 

due process based on his wrongfully arrested. The complaint, however, fails to identify the 

specific individual that violated his constitutional rights. The complaint’s caption page lists 

Sheriff James Williams as a defendant, but plaintiff does not allege that this individual personally 

participated in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to 

state a claim based on the alleged wrongful arrest. 

In addition, plaintiff’s court-appointed attorneys cannot be sued under § 1983. See Polk 

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) (public defenders do not act under color of state 

law for purposes of § 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions). And any potential 

claims for legal malpractice do not come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Franklin v. 

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.1981). 

 Lastly, plaintiff fails to state a claim against former Magistrate Judge Drozd. “Judges 

are absolutely immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their 

courts . . . . A judge loses absolute immunity only when [the judge] acts in the clear absence of all 

jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 

1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that Judge Drozd’s 

actions were judicial in nature, and therefore he is entitled to judicial immunity. 

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For these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint, if he can allege a 

cognizable legal theory against a proper defendant and sufficient facts in support of that 

cognizable legal theory. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(district courts must afford pro se litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in 

their complaints). Should plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint 

shall clearly set forth the claims and allegations against each defendant. Any amended complaint 

must cure the deficiencies identified above and also adhere to the following requirements: 

Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 

It must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself without 

reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967)). 

The court cautions plaintiff that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order may result in this action being dismissed. 

See Local Rule 110. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 3) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as provided herein. 

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 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case, must be 

labeled “Amended Complaint,” and must be signed by plaintiff himself. Failure to timely file an 

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be 

dismissed. 

DATED: May 23, 2016. 

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