Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03602/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03602-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Vernon McKnight
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3602

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

James Vernon McKnight

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: September 23, 2016

 Filed: October 31, 2016

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

A jury found James Vernon McKnight guilty of conspiring to possess with

intent to distribute, possessing with intent to distribute, and distributing controlled

substances and controlled-substance analogues, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 813,

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and 846. The district court sentenced McKnight to time

1

served—the seven months during which McKnight had been in custody prior to

sentencing, three years of supervised release, and a $300 special assessment. 

McKnight appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions. We affirm.

In July 2012, police received information that smokable synthetic

cannabinoids, commonly called “K2,” “potpourri,” or “incense” (K2), were being sold

from McKnight’s Starstruck Video store in Conway, Arkansas. Acting on the tip, an

undercover officer entered the store on July 11 and asked an employee, later

identified as McKnight, for “smoke,” street terminology for K2. McKnight led the

officer to a back office, unlocked a three-drawer toolbox, selected a package of K2

from several options, placed the package in a black DVD case, and accepted $20 for

the sale. McKnight did not enter the sale in the cash register or provide the officer

a sales receipt. McKnight told the officer that if he returned to the store with the

black DVD case, store employees would understand that he had purchased K2 in the

past and that he wished to purchase more. Later testing of the contents of the package

purchased by the officer revealed that it contained 1.3 grams of AM-2201, a schedule

I controlled substance as of July 9, 2012, and a controlled-substance analogue prior

to that date. 

In August 2012, the undercover officer returned to Starstruck Video with the

black DVD case and again asked an employee for “smoke.” The employee sold the

officer a 1.5-gram package of “Snoopy” brand K2 for $10, explaining that the store

had no other K2 brands available for sale because they were illegal. The employee

placed the package in the empty DVD case; he did not enter the sale in the cash

register or provide a sales receipt. Later testing revealed that the package contained

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
1.16 grams of UR-144, a controlled-substance analogue. In September, the officer

returned to the store with the black DVD case and again asked for “smoke.” Keith

Burford, McKnight’s business partner, advised the officer that they were out of K2

but were expecting a shipment later that day. After the officer told Burford that he

was “just trying to get right,” street terminology indicating a desire to get high,

Burford motioned the officer into his office and retrieved a cloth bundle, which he

unfolded to reveal a gallon-sized plastic bag full of smaller packages of a green

substance. Burford told the officer that he manufactured this K2 himself, that he had

watched two people get “messed up” after smoking the substance, and that he could

provide larger quantitiesif the officer wanted to sell it to his friends. The officer paid

$20 for a 3-gram package of the green substance, and Burford gave the officer

another package of what he described as poor quality product free of charge. Burford

placed both packages in the officer’s DVD case. Later testing revealed that the two

packages contained 3.0 grams and 2.4 grams, respectively, of UR-144. The

undercover officer returned to Starstruck Video with the black DVD case a final time

in October and again asked for “smoke.” An employee recommended “Scooby Snax”

brand K2 and retrieved a package from under the counter, commenting that other

purchasers had given the product good reviews. The officer paid $30 for a 4.0-gram

package, which the employee placed in the officer’s DVD case. Later testing

revealed that the package contained 3.8 grams of a non-controlled substance. 

On October 18, 2012, officers executed a search warrant at Starstruck Video,

seizing numerous packages of K2; packaging materials, including plastic baggies of

various sizes; a grinder; and several empty black DVD cases. Officers also seized

supplier invoices, U.S. Postal Service (USPS) PriorityMail packages, and documents

identifying Maxwell Mason as a supplier of K2 products. McKnight, who was

present during the search, informed the officers that he had been selling K2 products

for about five months for $25 to $35 per package, but that he received only a portion

of the sales price because he was selling the products on consignment for Mason. 

Thirteen of the seized K2 packages were tested; eight contained AM-2201, XLR-11,

-3-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
and UR-144, and five contained non-controlled substances. At that time, AM-2201

was a schedule I controlled substance, and XLR-11 and UR-144 were controlledsubstance analogues. A few days after execution of the search warrant, officers 2

intercepted a USPS package addressed to “James” at Starstruck Video. Because they

suspected the package would contain additional K2 products, the officers contacted

McKnight, relayed their suspicions, and sought his consent to open the package. 

McKnight denied having ordered anyK2 products and agreed to allowing the officers

to open the package in his presence. The package contained multiple packets of

various K2 products, some of which later tested positive for XLR-11.

On September 11, 2013, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging

McKnight and others with the offenses set forth above. McKnight proceeded to trial,

while each of his coconspirators pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against

McKnight. In addition to the undercover officer’s and lab analysts’ testimony, the

government offered the testimony of coconspirators Mason, Burford, and Justin

Taylor. Mason testified that when he first bought K2 products from McKnight, the

products were kept in frozen-food boxes in a freezer in the back office. At some

point, Mason began buying K2 products in bulk and arranged with McKnight to sell

those products on consignment at Starstruck Video. McKnight recorded sales of

Mason’s K2 products on a separate ledger page, which was titled “Mason back room

stuff.” Mason often packaged his K2 products for delivery to McKnight in sealed

USPS packages with appropriate postage—even though the packages were never

actuallymailed through the postalsystem—because he understood that a warrant was

required before officers could open such packages. Mason testified that he attempted

to stay informed regarding the legality of the products he wasselling, but he admitted

to knowing that all of his K2 products were illegal. He stated that McKnight

UR-144 and XLR-11 were temporarily placed into schedule I on May 16,

2

2013, and that temporary placement became final on May 11, 2016. See Schedules

of Controlled Substances: Placement of UR-144, XLR11, and AKB48 into Schedule

I, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,142 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
distributed the K2 products in black DVD cases from under the counter because he

was attempting to keep the sales “under the radar.” He testified that McKnight

originally insisted on having lab reports to confirm the legality of each K2 product

sold at Starstruck Video but that they later discussed selling products for which there

were no such reports or for which he would simply falsify old lab reports. Mason

acknowledged that he knew his customers were buying K2 products to smoke to get

high and that he never knew a customer to buy the products for another purpose. He

also stated that his K2 products were not for use as aphrodisiacs nor had he ever seen

themadvertised for such purpose in Starstruck Video. Finally, Mason acknowledged

that he delivered K2 products to the store in a manner that was designed to avoid

detection, that K2 products were sold from under the counter and packaged in black

DVD cases, that he advised Starstruck employees and others to keep the products

secret, and that he engaged in these efforts at subterfuge because he understood that

his conduct was illegal.

Burford testified that when Starstruck Video began selling K2 productslabeled

“potpourri,” McKnight told him that the product was “synthetic marijuana.” Burford

also stated that the K2 “potpourri” commanded far higher prices than did the actual

potpourri sold at the store. Burford testified that he and McKnight discussed placing

some of the K2 “potpourri” in a bowl as if it were actual potpourri in the event that

“anything came up,” i.e., in the event that law enforcement entered the store. Burford

stated that he and McKnight discussed whether the K2 products were legal and that

McKnight had obtained information from suppliers regarding the products’ legality. 

Burford admitted, however, that despite these inquiries, McKnight must have known

that the K2 products were illegal because they “kept it so secret.” Burford admitted

that it was his idea to use the black DVD cases to hide the K2 products for

purchasers, because he believed that it would look suspiciousfor the 30-40 customers

who bought these products each day to leave the store without evidence of having

purchased anything. Burford confirmed that the K2 products were not displayed or

available for sale in the adult section of the store, but were instead kept in

-5-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
McKnight’s office. He stated that even though the packages were labeled “potpourri”

that was “not for human consumption,” he and McKnight both understood that the K2

products were not actually potpourri and that customers were buying the K2 products

to smoke to get high. 

Taylor testified that in 2012 his roommate purchased K2 products from

McKnight at Starstruck Video. Taylor explained that he initially accompanied his

roommate to the store until employees became familiar enough with him to sell him

K2 products directly. When he began to purchase K2 products himself, he was taken

into an office where the K2 products were kept in a locked toolbox. Taylor testified

that purchasers bought K2 products to smoke to get high and that no one who

purchased the products used them asincense. Taylor understood that Mason shipped

K2 products in USPS packages because law enforcement could not search those

packages without a warrant. Finally, Taylor testified that Mason told him that the K2

products were illegal but that he never directly discussed the matter with McKnight. 

At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, McKnight moved for judgment

of acquittal, which the district court denied. McKnight then testified, asserting that

he sold the K2 products as “incense” and “herbal Viagra,” that the K2 products were

not intended for human consumption and were so labeled, that they were not meant

to be smoked to get high, and that he displayed a disclaimer in the store warning that

the K2 products were not for human consumption. McKnight stated that he kept the

K2 products under the counter and in a back room because, as with the adult videos

and novelties he sold, he wanted to keep them away from underage customers. He

instructed his employees to place purchases of K2 products in black DVD cases for

discretion and privacy purposes, just as he did for purchases of adult videos. 

McKnight testified that his suppliers, including Mason, assured him that the K2

products he was selling were legal and that he conducted independent research and

obtained lab reports to determine that the ingredients listed on the K2 packages were

not controlled substances or controlled-substance analogues. McKnight generally

-6-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
denied that he entered into an agreement with the other conspirators to possess or

distribute controlled substances or controlled-substance analogues. After the close

of all the evidence, the district court denied McKnight’s renewed motion for

judgment of acquittal, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. 

McKnight appeals, arguing that because the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction, the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of

acquittal. We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and reversing

“only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ramos, 814 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.) (quoting

United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1081 (8th Cir. 2013)), cert. denied, Nos. 16-

5089 & 16-5090, 2016 WL 3633118 & 2016 WL 3633122 (Oct. 3, 2016). We apply

this exacting standard “even when the conviction rests entirely on circumstantial

evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Tillman, 765 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 2014)). 

McKnight first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he

possessed the requisite knowledge to support his convictions for possessing with

intent to distribute and for distributing a controlled substance or controlled-substance

analogue. Although “[k]nowledge is one element of [a] drug-distribution charge[]

under 18 U.S.C. § 841(a),” id., the government is “not required to prove that the

defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance with which he was

dealing,” id. (quoting United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2000)). 

The government need show only “a general criminal intent, i.e., awareness that the

substance possessed was a controlled substance of some kind.” Id.; see also United

States v. Qattoum, 826 F.3d 1062 1065 (8th Cir. 2016). In cases involving a

controlled-substance analogue,the government mayestablish the requisite knowledge

either by showing that the defendant “knew [he] was dealing with some controlled

substance, regardless of whether [he] knew the identity of the substance,” or by

showing that the defendant “knew the specific features of the substance that make it

-7-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
a controlled substance analogue.” Ramos, 814 F.3d at 916 (citing McFadden v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2302, 2305 (2015)). The “specific features” that make

a substance a controlled-substance analogue include a chemical structure that is

“substantially similar” to that of a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II, or

“a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that

is substantially similar to or greater than [that] of a controlled substance in schedule

I or II . . . or [that] is represented or intended to have that effect.” McFadden, 135 S.

Ct. at 2302, 2305 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)). “A defendant who possesses a

substance with knowledge of [these specific] features knows all of the facts that make

his conduct illegal . . . .” Id. at 2305. Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove

the requisite knowledge because a “factfinder can seldom know with certainty what

someone actually knows.” Ramos, 814 F.3d at 915 (quoting United States v. Noibi,

780 F.2d 1419, 1421 (8th Cir. 1986)). This circumstantial evidence “could include,

for example, a defendant’s concealment of his activities, evasive behavior with

respect to law enforcement, knowledge that a particular substance produces a ‘high’

similar to that produced by controlled substances, and knowledge that a particular

substance is subject to seizure at customs.” McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2304 n.1. 

We first conclude that the government offered sufficient evidence in the form

of testimony by its expert witnessesto establish that AM-2201, XLR-11, and UR-144

were listed as either controlled substances or controlled-substance analogues for

purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) at the time K2 products containing these

substances were sold from McKnight’s store. We also conclude that the government

offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that McKnight was aware that

the K2 products he was selling were in fact controlled substances or controlledsubstance analogues—even if he did not know precisely which such substance he was

selling. Under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in McFadden, the

government’s proof was sufficient to show that McKnight knew the “specific

features” that rendered the K2 products he was selling controlled substances or

controlled-substance analogues. Mason, Burford, and Taylor testified to the “cloak-

-8-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
and-dagger” methods McKnight imposed upon the sale of the K2 products, i.e.,

storing K2 products in a locked toolbox or freezer in the back office, selling K2

products from under the counter without use of the cash register or the provision of

a sales receipt, arranging for the K2 products to be delivered in USPS packages

subject to search only by execution of a warrant, and packaging purchases in black

DVD cases and instructing customers that those DVD cases would signal employees

to conduct future sales. McKnight explained to Burford that the K2 products were

“synthetic marijuana,” which indicated his knowledge that the pharmacological

effects of the K2 products were similar to those of marijuana, a controlled substance. 

The testimony of Mason, Burford, and Taylor also established that McKnight was

aware that customers intended to use the K2 products to achieve those

pharmacological effects, i.e., McKnight was aware that customers bought the K2

products to smoke to get high, not to use as “incense,” “potpourri,” or “herbal

Viagra.” 

McKnight pointsto his own testimony, which, he claims, explainsthe innocent

motivation behind the covert nature of his sales and delivery methods and refutes the

statements made by Mason, Burford, and Taylor regarding his knowledge of the

products’ pharmacological effects and his awareness of his customers’ intended use

of the K2 products. But the jury rejected McKnight’s testimony in favor of the

testimony offered by the government’s witnesses. See United States v. Ways, 832

F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2016). We thus conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

prove McKnight’s knowledge under the standards set forth in McFadden. 

The evidence was also sufficient to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that

there was a conspiracy (an agreement to possess with intent to distribute the drugs);

(2) that [McKnight] knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that [McKnight] intentionally

joined the conspiracy.” See United States v. Shaw, 751 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir.

2014). As recounted above, the evidence established that McKnight participated in

a conspiracy with Mason, Burford, and Taylor to distribute controlled substances and

-9-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235 
controlled-substance analogues from Starstruck Video. Mason, Burford, and Taylor

each testified that all of the conspirators, including McKnight, knew that customers

purchased the K2 products to smoke to get high, that they all engaged in cloak-anddagger methodsto keep their activities “under the radar,” and that they were all aware

that the K2 products were illegal to distribute. Thus, the district court did not err in

denying McKnight’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

-10-

Appellate Case: 15-3602 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/31/2016 Entry ID: 4464235