Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01753/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01753-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karamoke M. Fuse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1753

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Karamoke M. Fuse, * 

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: September 14, 2004

 Filed: December 10, 2004

___________

Before RILEY, LAY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

This case presents us again with a traffic stop resulting in an extended

investigation, detention for a dog sniff, a search, and a seizure of illegal drugs.

Karamoke M. Fuse (Fuse) pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more

of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. Pursuant

to his plea agreement and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), Fuse reserved

the right to appeal the district court’s1

 order denying Fuse’s motion to suppress

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cocaine found in the search of his car following a traffic stop. Fuse now exercises

that right. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper John Rule (Trooper Rule) was patrolling

Interstate 70 in Ellis County, Kansas, when he encountered a car traveling eastbound

bearing a rear California license plate, but no front license plate, in violation of

California law. Trooper Rule pulled the car over and approached the passenger-side

window of the car. Seated inside the car were Fuse, in the driver’s seat, and

Cleveland Burgie, Jr. (Burgie), in the front passenger seat. While Trooper Rule was

standing at the passenger-side window, he noticed a very strong odor of air freshener.

Trooper Rule explained why he stopped the car, and Fuse told Trooper Rule the front

license plate was in the car’s trunk. Trooper Rule asked Fuse for his driver’s license

and vehicle registration, and Fuse complied. The driver’s license identified the driver

as Fuse. Trooper Rule asked Fuse who owned the car. Fuse stated the car belonged

to his girlfriend. Trooper Rule asked Fuse about his travel plans, and Fuse said he

was driving from California to Kansas City for a job interview. Trooper Rule found

Fuse’s story strange, because it was late morning on a Friday and Fuse was not

dressed like he was going to an interview. Trooper Rule observed a mobile telephone

and “NoDoz” in the car. Trooper Rule also believed both Fuse and his passenger,

Burgie, were extremely nervous, describing little eye contact and Fuse’s hands

shaking. After Trooper Rule informed Fuse a warning ticket would be issued,

Trooper Rule returned to his patrol car to write the warning citation and check Fuse’s

criminal history. Trooper Rule learned Fuse had been arrested for a crime in the past,

but the criminal history report was not specific. 

When Trooper Rule returned to Fuse’s car, Fuse and Burgie continued to

appear unusually nervous. Trooper Rule handed Fuse his driver’s license, vehicle

registration, and the warning citation. Trooper Rule told Fuse to put on the license

plate and to have a “safe trip.” When Trooper Rule stepped away from the car, Fuse

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started to put the car in gear. Trooper Rule then stepped back to the car and asked if

he could ask a few more questions. Fuse and Burgie indicated their willingness to

answer further questions, and then Trooper Rule asked Fuse about his job interview

in Kansas City. Fuse told Trooper Rule the interview was with AT&T and scheduled

for Tuesday. Trooper Rule found it unusual an individual traveling to a job interview

would arrive four days before the interview. Trooper Rule also was suspicious of

Fuse’s story because Trooper Rule assumed AT&T would fly a job candidate to a job

interview, rather than require him to drive cross-country. The fact Fuse was

accompanied by another person to attend a job interview also struck Trooper Rule as

somewhat unusual.

Trooper Rule asked Fuse if he was “carrying anything illegal, guns, drugs, or

large amounts of money,” and Fuse stated he was not. Trooper Rule asked for

permission to search the car. Fuse told him no. Trooper Rule then asked Fuse and

Burgie to exit the car at which time Trooper Rule proceeded to pat down both for

weapons and then told them to stand at the side of the road. Trooper Rule ran his

drug-sniffing dog, Butkus, who had been in the back of the patrol car, around Fuse’s

car. Butkus alerted to the trunk of the car. A subsequent search of the trunk

uncovered approximately five kilograms of cocaine in a locked duffle bag.

Fuse moved to suppress the cocaine. After an evidentiary hearing, the

magistrate judge recommended the motion to suppress be granted, concluding

Trooper Rule did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the renewed detention of

Fuse. Rejecting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court denied the

motion to suppress.

On appeal, Fuse concedes the traffic stop was lawful. Fuse argues, however,

that after completion of the traffic stop and issuance of the warning citation, Trooper

Rule lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the subsequent detention. In response, the

government contends: (1) the observations of Trooper Rule during the initial traffic

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Because we determine Trooper Rule had reasonable suspicion to detain Fuse,

we need not address the government’s alternative argument under a de minimis

exception. See United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647,

649 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle in a public

location does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search,” and a delay for a twominute canine sniff is a de minimis intrusion on a person’s liberty); see also United

States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding a “short detention

for a dog sniff after the completion of a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth

Amendment”).

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stop created reasonable suspicion justifying further detention; and (2) the dog sniff

did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because it was a de minimis intrusion.2

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we examine

for clear error the district court’s factual findings, and we review de novo the ultimate

question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. United States v.

Stephens, 350 F.3d 778, 779 (8th Cir. 2003). “We must affirm an order denying a

motion to suppress unless the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is

based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire record, we

are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” United

States v. Rodriguez-Hernandez, 353 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 2003).

The Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV; see United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 447 (8th Cir.

2003) (Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).

“A traffic stop constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”

United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968), govern traffic stops. United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir.

2001). Generally, a traffic “stop must be supported by at least a reasonable,

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articulable suspicion that criminal activity” has occurred or is occurring. Jones, 269

F.3d at 924 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663).

We have observed that “[i]t is well established that a traffic violation–however

minor–creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” United States v. Barry,

98 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412,

416 (8th Cir. 1993)). When an officer makes a routine traffic stop, “the officer is

entitled to conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

that initially” justified the interference. United States v. McCoy, 200 F.3d 582, 584

(8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The officer also may detain a motorist while the officer

completes certain routine tasks, such as writing a citation and completing

computerized checks of a driver’s license, vehicle registration, and criminal history.

$404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 647. 

 “[O]nce the officer decides to let a routine traffic offender depart with a ticket,

a warning or an all clear–a point in time determined, like other Fourth Amendment

inquiries, by objective indicia of the officer’s intent–then the Fourth Amendment

applies to limit any subsequent detention or search.” Id. at 648. The officer cannot

continue to detain a motorist after the initial stop is completed, unless the officer has

“a reasonably articulable suspicion for believing” criminal activity is afoot. United

States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Jones, 269 F.3d at 925

(“[W]ith the purpose of the traffic stop completed, it would be an unreasonable

extension of the scope of the investigation for [the trooper] to further detain [the

suspect] or his vehicle, ‘unless something that occurred during the traffic stop

generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention’”) (quoting

United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995)).

In this case, Fuse concedes the initial traffic stop was valid because Trooper

Rule’s observation that Fuse’s car failed to display a front license plate provided

probable cause to stop Fuse’s car. When Trooper Rule returned Fuse’s driver’s

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It is interesting to note the Williams precedent from the Tenth Circuit would

control this seizure and search in Kansas, if Fuse were prosecuted where the stop

occurred.

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license and the vehicle registration, delivered the warning citation, told Fuse to have

a “safe trip,” and stepped away from Fuse’s car, the traffic stop clearly had ended.

Fuse was free to go.

Fuse’s argument on appeal is that Trooper Rule lacked reasonable suspicion

to detain Fuse further for a dog sniff after the initial traffic stop concluded, because

the “clear break” between the original traffic stop and the subsequent detention for

the dog sniff essentially negated any reasonable suspicions developed by Trooper

Rule during the traffic stop. Thus, Fuse suggests Trooper Rule should have ignored

all the observations he made before the time he permitted Fuse to leave. 

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th

Cir. 2001), squarely addresses the question of whether an officer’s objectively

reasonable suspicions developed during a traffic stop are nullified when the officer

indicates to a driver he is free to leave.3

 In Williams, a Kansas Highway Patrol

Trooper stopped a car for speeding. Id. at 1264. During the traffic stop, the trooper

observed several factors which raised his suspicion the defendant may have been

transporting drugs: (1) the defendant exhibited exceptional or extreme nervousness

throughout the duration of the stop; (2) the defendant had a walkie-talkie type radio

commonly used by people driving in tandem; (3) the name on the car rental agreement

did not match the name on the defendant’s driver’s license; and (4) the defendant’s

unusual travel plans. Id. at 1265. Despite his suspicions of criminal activity, the

trooper returned the driver’s license and car rental agreement to the defendant. Id.

“In addition, the [trooper] said something to the effect of, ‘Thanks a lot. We’ll see

you.’” Id. 

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The trooper then asked the defendant if he would answer a few more questions,

and the defendant agreed. Id. The trooper first asked whether the defendant “was

carrying any contraband or large amounts of cash.” Id. The defendant said no. Id.

Then the trooper asked if he could search the car, which the defendant refused. Id.

At that point, the trooper told the defendant he would detain him until a drug-sniffing

dog could arrive and sniff the outside of the car. Id. Approximately fifteen minutes

from the time of the initial stop, the drug-sniffing dog “arrived and eventually alerted

to the trunk area of the” car. Id. A search of the trunk revealed several large bales

of marijuana. Id.

The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana. Relying on the trooper’s

observations made prior to the trooper returning the defendant’s travel documents and

verbally indicating the defendant was free to leave, the district court held the trooper

had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant further for the purpose of

the drug dog sniff. Id. at 1266. The defendant appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing

the trooper’s return of the defendant’s travel documents and verbal indication the

defendant was free to leave nullified any of the suspicion that had developed during

the initial stop. Id. at 1270-71. In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Tenth

Circuit stated: 

Mr. Williams fails to cite any case, nor can we find any, suggesting that

the return of such documentation negates an officer’s objectively

reasonable suspicions developed during a traffic stop. Although the

record indicates that the [trooper] subjectively intended that Mr.

Williams was free to go, the relevant inquiry in this case is based on the

objective facts known to the [trooper], not upon the [trooper’s]

subjective state of mind . . . . Whether the [trooper] never intended to

release Mr. Williams or whether he simply changed his mind after the

consensual questioning does not alter our analysis if the [trooper]

already had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Williams for

the purpose of the canine drug search. We therefore conclude that the

[trooper’s] indication to Mr. Williams that he was free to leave bears no

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significance in our determination of whether the [trooper] had

reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Williams. 

Id. at 1271. We find the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Williams persuasive and conclude

the termination of a traffic stop does not effectively erase the objectively reasonable

suspicions developed by a police officer during the traffic stop.

We next turn to whether Trooper Rule’s observations made during the initial

traffic stop were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to support the detention of

Fuse for a dog sniff after the initial stop was completed. While “reasonable

suspicion” must be more than an inchoate “hunch,” the Fourth Amendment only

requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an

investigatory stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). In determining

whether Trooper Rule had reasonable suspicion, the court must consider the totality

of the circumstances in light of Trooper Rule’s experience. United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). Although each factor giving rise to reasonable suspicion

may appear innocent when viewed by itself, “a combination of factors may warrant

further investigation when viewed together.” Linkous, 285 F.3d at 720. 

Our review of the record convinces us Trooper Rule had reasonable suspicion

of illegal activity sufficient to extend the stop a few additional minutes to conduct a

dog sniff. Trooper Rule, who is an experienced officer trained in highway drug

interdiction, testified at the suppression hearing about several facts that raised his

suspicion: (1) a strong odor of air freshener, which was significant to Trooper Rule,

because drug smugglers commonly use air freshener to mask the odor of controlled

substances; (2) Fuse’s prior arrest; (3) the car did not belong to Fuse or Burgie; (4)

Fuse and Burgie were traveling from California, a “source state” for illegal narcotics;

(5) Fuse’s unusual explanation for traveling to Kansas City; (6) Fuse’s and Burgie’s

continued, unusual nervousness even after Trooper Rule advised them he was issuing

only a warning citation; and (7) Trooper Rule’s observation of a mobile telephone

and “NoDoz” in the car.

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Fuse argues the facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in Beck, 140

F.3d at 1137-39. In Beck, we concluded the following circumstances were not

sufficient to create reasonable articulable suspicion to support detention after the

initial stop was completed: (1) Beck was driving a car that had been rented by an

absent third party; (2) the car was licensed in California and was stopped in Arkansas;

(3) there was fast food trash on the passenger-side floor; (4) there was no visible

luggage in the car; (5) Beck appeared nervous; (6) Beck was traveling from a source

state to a drug demand state; and (7) the officer disbelieved Beck’s explanation for

his trip. Beck, 140 F.3d at 1137. Unlike the defendant in Beck, however, Fuse had

been arrested previously, the car had a strong odor of air freshener, and both Fuse and

Burgie exhibited extreme or unusual nervousness throughout the duration of the stop,

even after Trooper Rule stated he would be issuing only a warning ticket. The

combination of suspicious factors here was stronger than in Beck. Given the totality

of the circumstances, we conclude the facts of this case are sufficient to demonstrate

reasonable suspicion justifying continued detention of Fuse to conduct a dog sniff.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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