Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cr-00047/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cr-00047-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Melchor
Defendant
Demecio Navarro Sanchez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

DAVID W. SPENCER

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DEMECIO NAVARRO SANCHEZ, and 

DANIEL MELCHOR,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:21-CR-0047-WBS

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: April 5, 2021

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. William B. Shubb

This case is set for a status conference on April 5, 2021. By this stipulation, the parties request a 

continuance of the status conference to May 3, 2021, and to exclude time under Local Code T4, for the 

reasons set forth below.

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California “until further notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s 

declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s 

Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district 

judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2021.

1

 This and previous General Orders, 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health concerns related 

to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). The Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice 

continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also 

United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus 

is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory 

rules. 

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In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).2

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 5, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 3, 

2021 at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between April 5, 2021, and May 3, 2021, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case to 

date includes more than 154 pages of investigative reports and other documents. All of this 

discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and 

copying.

b) The government is processing and will soon produce a second batch of discovery 

consisting of audio and video recordings, cell phone downloads, and photographs, subject to the 

stipulated protective orders filed on March 3, 2021 (ECF No. 20) and March 19, 2021 (ECF No. 

27).

c) Counsel for defendants need additional time to review the discovery in this case, 

to conduct independent factual investigation, to research trial and sentencing issues, to consult 

with their clients, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

d) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The government does not object to the continuance.

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 5, 2021 to May 3, 2021, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 23, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ DAVID W. SPENCER

DAVID W. SPENCER

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: March 23, 2021 /s/ Lexi Negin

Lexi Negin

Counsel for Defendant 

DEMECIO NAVARRO SANCHEZ

Dated: March 23, 2021 /s/ Jennifer Mouzis

Jennifer Mouzis

Counsel for Defendant 

DANIEL MELCHOR

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2021

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