Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00824/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00824-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gonzales
Defendant
Homes
Defendant
Kantua
Defendant
LeAnthony T. Winston
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEANTHONY T. WINSTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

LT. HOMES, OFFICER GONZALES, and 

OFFICER KANTUA,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00824-JLT-HBK (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE1

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 

This matter comes before the Court upon periodic review. As more fully set forth below, 

the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this case without prejudice due to 

Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action. Specifically, Plaintiff did not pay the $405.00 fee, 

move to proceed in forma pauperis, or timely respond to the Court’s order.

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff LeAnthony T. Winston is proceeding pro se in this civil action filed on July 17, 

2024. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”). (See docket). On July 18, 2024, the Court provided Plaintiff with 30 days to 

either move to proceed IFP or pay the $405.00 filing fee. (Doc. No. 3). The Court enclosed an 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2023). 

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application and cautioned Plaintiff that if he did not timely comply with the Court’s order, the 

undersigned would recommend the case be dismissed. (Id.). As of the date of these Findings and 

Recommendations, Plaintiff has not complied with the Court order and the time to do so has 

expired. (See docket).

II. APPLICABLE LAW

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.00. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only 

if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 

493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court may dismiss an action where a party fails to pay the filing fee or otherwise move to 

proceed in forma pauperis. In re Perroton, 958 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming 

dismissal of pro se litigant’s claim for failure to pay required filing fees). 

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits courts to involuntarily 

dismiss an action when a litigant does not prosecute an action or does not comply with a court 

order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 

(9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 

683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he consensus among our sister circuits, with which we agree, is that 

courts may dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain circumstances.”). Local 

Rule 110 similarly permits courts to impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with a court 

order. “District courts have inherent power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that 

power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City 

of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a 

party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., 

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a 

court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 

1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 

1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and to comply with local rules).

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In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 

1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. ANALYSIS

Here, Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for this action or applied to proceed in forma 

pauperis. Thus, the district court may dismiss this action for this reason alone. In re Perroton, 958 

F.2d at 890.

Alternatively, the district court may dismiss the action under Rule 41(b). The expeditious 

resolution of litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. 

California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court’s need to efficiently 

manage its docket cannot be overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the 

nation,” and due to the delay in filling judicial vacancies, which was exacerbated by the COVID19 pandemic, operates under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in 

Light of Ongoing Judicial Emergency in the Eastern District of California. The Court’s time is 

better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant 

litigant. Because the Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 

case the second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 

Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale, or witnesses’

memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 

factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an 

unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action. Thus, the third factor, risk of prejudice to 

defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 

occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 

524 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Finally, the fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors 

disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, 

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“this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward 

disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case 

here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on multiple failures 

by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at

644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of 

habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of 

the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the docket, and those in the best 

position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). 

Finally, a court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 

Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. This Court’s July 18, 2024, Order 

expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a 

recommendation for dismissal of this action. (Doc. No. 3 at 1). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate 

warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a 

dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby 

addressing the fifth factor. 

After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, in the alternative, the 

undersigned recommends dismissal, without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee or 

move to proceed in forma pauperis and/or for failing to comply with a court order and prosecute 

this action.

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

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Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: August 27, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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