Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01106/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01106-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cipriano Alvarado Calderon
Petitioner
A. P. Kane
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIPRIANO ALVARADO CALDERON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

A. P. KANE, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:05-cv-01106-LJO-TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS THE PETITION (Doc. 11) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN ELEVEN DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

August 30, 2005. (Doc. 1). On May 11, 2007, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss. 

(Doc. 11). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

On May 11, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition as being filed

outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears

from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief

in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

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state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-603 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss

for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982)

(same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the

court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)’s one year limitation period. Because Respondent’s motion to dismiss is similar in

procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320. The instant petition was filed on August 30, 2005, and thus, it is subject

to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas

corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the

Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review,

or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, Petitioner’s petition for review was denied by the California

Supreme Court on March 20, 2002. (Lodged Document (“LD”) 2). Thus, direct review would

conclude on June 19, 2002, when the ninety day period for seeking review in the United States

Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983); Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). 

Petitioner would have one year from June 19, 2002, or until June 19, 2003, absent applicable tolling,

within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. As mentioned, Petitioner filed this

petition on August 30, 2005, twenty-six months after the one-year period expired. Thus, unless

Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling sufficient to make his petition timely, the

petition must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitations Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d

557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court 1

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276. 108 S.Ct. 2379 (1988). This “mailbox rule” is premised on the pro se prisoner’s

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Court will employ

the “mailbox rule” here in calculating the tolling dates; thus, the Court will refer to the actual dates Petitioner mailed his

various state and federal petitions for habeas relief, rather than to the dates indicated by the courts’ stamps, which are

presumably the dates on which the documents were actually received by the courts. Respondent has provided a copy of

Petitioner’s prison mail log that adequately establishes the dates on which Petitioner handed his documents to prison

authorities for filing. (LD 11).

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reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file

at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will

prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end

before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, the limitations

period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167, 181-182 , 121 S. Ct. 2120 (2001).

Here, Respondent’s lodged documents establish that Petitioner filed the following state court

habeas petitions: (1) petition filed in the Firth District Court of Appeal (“5th DCA”) on February 5,

2003, and denied on March 7, 2003; (2) petition filed in the Kern County Superior Court on April

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8, 2003, and denied on May 15, 2003; (3) petition filed in the 5th DCA on June 20, 2003 and denied

on April 30, 2004; and (4) petition filed in the California Supreme Court on June 18, 2004 and

denied on May 18, 2005. (LD 3-10). 

Respondent contends that the foregoing chronology establishes that the instant petition was

untimely. (Doc. 11). Respondent concedes that the “round” of state habeas petitions beginning with

the second petition, filed in the Kern County Superior Court on April 8, 2003, through the California

Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s state petition on May 18, 2005, were properly filed and

therefore Petitioner is entitled to tolling during that time period. Respondent, however, contends that

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling during the pendency of his first petition, and is not entitled to

tolling for the interval following that first petition. Respondent’s reasoning is that, because the first

state petition was denied by the 5th DCA on the ground that Petitioner “failed to exhaust his remedy

of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court,” (LD 4), it was not “properly filed”

under AEDPA and therefore not entitled to tolling. (Doc. 11, p. 4). Moreover, because the interval

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Art. VI, § 10 of the California Constitution provides that the “Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and 3

their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.” A Court of Appeal has “discretion to deny without

prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not filed first in a proper lower court” (i.e., in a Superior Court), but the Court

of Appeal need not do so. Steele, 32 Cal.4th at 692. Also, the Court of Appeal “has discretion to refuse to issue...[a writ of

habeas corpus] as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the ground that the application has not been made...in a lower court”

in the first place where there “is no showing in the petition that any extraordinary reason exists for action by...[the Court of

Appeal], rather than by the Superior Court...” Application of Hillery, 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294, 20 Cal.Rptr. 759 (1962).

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between the first and second petition was not the result of Petitioner proceeding from a lower to a

higher court, he is not entitled to tolling for that interval either. When the two periods are excluded

from tolling, the one-year period expired on July 30, 2005, thus making the instant petition untimely

by 29 days. (Id. at p. 7). 

After carefully considering the issue and the facts now in the record, the Court disagrees with

Respondent that the period during which the first state petition was pending was not entitled to

tolling. Because that period of pendency is sufficient to make the instant petition timely, the Court

need not decide whether the interval between the first and second petitions is entitled to tolling, since

it would have no effect on the outcome of the instant motion to dismiss.

Respondent correctly submits that to be “properly filed,” the application must be delivered

and accepted by an appropriate court officer. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 7, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361 (2000). 

(Doc. 11, p. 4). Respondent is also correct that a “state post-conviction petition which has been

denied for failing to comply with ‘a condition to filing, as opposed to a condition to obtaining relief,’

is not ‘properly filed’ application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2).” (Id.). Respondent also correctly

points out that a petition is not “properly filed” under the AEDPA when it is filed in the wrong court. 

(Id.). 

None of these undisputed legal principles, however, are applicable here. The 5th DCA 

denied the first petition without prejudice and indicated that Petitioner should exhaust his remedies

by filing first in the California Superior Court. (LD 4). The 5th DCA’s ruling did not indicate that

the petition was improperly filed in the Court of Appeal. The 5th DCA had original jurisdiction to

hear the petition, even though the petition had not previously been filed in the Superior Court; hence,

the petition was properly before the 5th DCA. Cal. Constitution Art. VI, § 10; In re Steele, 32

Cal.4th 682, 692, 85 P.3d 444 (2004). 

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Petitioner’s state habeas petition was delivered to and accepted by an appropriate court

officer at the 5th DCA. It was not denied for failing to comply with a condition of filing. Nor was it

filed in the “wrong court,” because, as discussed above, all California courts have original

jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. The 5th DCA filed the petition, gave Petitioner a case

number, considered his petition, and, approximately one month later, denied the petition by

exercising its discretion to require Petitioner to first apply to the Superior Court for relief. 

In support of his reasoning, Respondent cites an unpublished decision of this Court, Hill v.

Yates, 2006 WL 224419 (E.D. Cal. 2006), which in turn relied upon Application of Hillery, 202

Cal.App.2d 293, 20 Cal.Rptr. 759 (1962), in reaching the conclusion that Respondent now urges this

Court to adopt, i.e., that an initial state habeas petition filed in the Court of Appeal and dismissed

without prejudice to filing in the Superior Court, is not entitled to tolling. After carefully reviewing

Hill and Hillery, the Court believes that Respondent’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. As

mentioned, Hillery held that a California Court of Appeal has discretion to refuse to issue a writ of

habeas corpus as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the ground that application has not been

made in a lower court in the first instance, where there is no showing in the petition that any

extraordinary reason exists for action by the Court of Appeal rather than by the Superior Court. 

However, Hillery was decided over forty years ago, long before the enactment of the AEDPA and its

one-year statute of limitations; therefore, the holding sheds no light on the possible effect of the 5th

DCA’s denial of the first petition on the running of the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. 

Hill was decided two years ago in this district. In relying on Hillery, the Hill holding, if

followed, essentially requires that, whenever a state court habeas petition is filed in a court other than

the trial court in the first instance, and is thereafter denied through the higher court’s exercise of

discretion to refuse to entertain the petition unless the petitioner has first applied to the lower court,

the petition is not entitled to tolling. A reading of Hill leads to two possible bases for that Court’s

decision to deny tolling, i.e., either the petitioner was deemed to have filed his petition in the “wrong

court,” or else the petition’s “delivery and acceptance” were not “in compliance with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz, 531 U.S. at 9. 

///

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First, it is difficult to conceive how a petitioner could file a state petition in the wrong state

court when the California Constitution confers on all state courts the original jurisdiction over habeas

petitions. It is undisputed here that the 5th DCA had original jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s

first petition. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the California Courts of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court also retain discretion to deny a petition and refer it to the lower state court. 

 Were the state appellate courts’ exercise of such discretion determinative of whether an application

was “properly filed” under the AEDPA, California’s unique system of original habeas jurisdiction,

already confusing for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations, would be even more

unpredictable and chaotic. If, for example, the 5th DCA entertained two habeas petitions

simultaneously, each filed initially in the Court of Appeal, and determined from the allegations

therein that one alleged sufficient extraordinary circumstances to justify retaining it, while the other

petition did not and must be referred to the lower court, then, under the reasoning of Respondent and

Hill, the former would be deemed properly filed under the AEDPA and entitled to tolling, while the

latter would not. Certainly, Congress could not have intended such an arbitrary result in the

application of the AEDPA’s tolling provisions. Nothing in the AEDPA suggests that its tolling

provisions are intended to apply only to state habeas petitions that contain “extraordinary reasons” 

justifying retention by an appellate court, but are inapplicable to those that do not. 

Second, the United States Supreme Court has instructed that a petition is “filed” when it is

“delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record.” 

Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8. There seems to be no question that Petitioner’s first petition was “filed” by the

5th DCA, within the meaning of Artuz. Moreover, an application is “properly” filed when the actual

“delivery and acceptance” of Petitioner’s first petition was in compliance with the “applicable laws

and rules governing filings.” Id. Here, an authorized representative of the 5th DCA accepted the

document, filed it, assigned it a case number, and, in the normal course of events, the appellate court

considered and denied the petition. Id. Here again, the 5th DCA’s exercise of discretion to send a

first petition back to the superior court does not signify that Petitioner had not complied with the

applicable rules and law “governing filings.” Respondent’s argument would essentially have the

Court equate the denial of an application for failure to exhaust remedies with failure to comply with

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applicable rules and laws governing filings. This the Court declines to do.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the existence of a procedural bar is a question

quite distinct from whether or not the state application was “properly filed” for tolling purposes. 

Artuz, 531 U.S. at 11 (distinguishing between “a condition to filing” which is a requisite for an

application to be properly filed and “a condition to obtaining relief,” which is normally implicated by

the assertion of a procedural bar). The Ninth Circuit has held that applications denied by state courts

with a citation to a case recognized as indicating a procedural default are “properly filed” within the

meaning of AEDPA. E.g., Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005), withdrawn,

417 F.3d 1050, modified by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, Gaston v. Palmer, 127 S.Ct.

979 (2007) (The California Supreme Court’s denial with a citation to In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300,

304, 209 P.2d 793 (1949), which articulates the procedural requirements that a California habeas

petitioner allege with particularity the facts supporting his claims and explain and justify the delay in

the presentation of the claims, is a denial based on a fact-related deficiency, either as a matter of

pleading of the facts or of presentation of the record from which the facts could be ascertained, and

absent an indication from the court that the application was “improperly filed,” the application which

results in such a denial and citation is considered properly filed within the meaning of the AEDPA).

Apart from the obvious defects in proper filing--i.e., filing in the wrong court, improper form

of the document, failure to pay the filing fee, failure to deliver to the appropriate personnel at the

court--the other significant area in which a defect in filing may result in a denial of tolling is where

the state court deems the petition untimely. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807

(2005); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)(petition dismissed as untimely by

California court is not “properly filed” and, in turn, not entitled to statutory tolling under the

AEDPA)

In holding that timeliness was more akin to a “filing condition” than to a procedural bar to

relief, the majority opinion in Pace stated as follows:

“For purposes of determining what are ‘filing’ conditions, there is an obvious distinction

between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to

consider that petition, and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars at issue in Artuz,

which go to the ability to obtain relief.” 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. 

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In computing the running of the statute of limitations, the day an order or judgment becomes final is excluded and 4

time begins to run on the day after the judgment becomes final. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.

2001) (Citing Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 

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Here, the Court considers the 5th DCA’s denial on the grounds that Petitioner had not

exhausted his remedies by first filing in the Superior Court to be more closely analogous to a

procedural bar that denies Petitioner relief than to a dismissal for lack of proper form, failure to pay

the filing fee, or untimeliness, all of which go to the proper initiation of the application in the first

instance. There is no published authority directly on point, but there are cases that allow statutory 

tolling under the AEDPA for initial state habeas petitions filed in the Court of Appeal, rather than the

Superior Court. The reasoning in those cases is persuasive here, for the conclusion that Petitioner’s

first petition is entitled to tolling. Chiang v. Iaria, 2007 WL 2127569 *3 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2007)

(petitioner’s first habeas petition, made to the California Court of Appeal with two days remaining

on the one-year limitation period, and denied without prejudice because it had not first been brought

in the superior court, was “properly filed” under AEDPA and thus entitled to tolling); see Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d at 1035-1038, 1047 (petitioner’s six state habeas petitions, the first of which was

filed in the California Court of Appeal, found to be “properly filed” and entitled to statutory tolling

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, although the Court appreciates the reasoning in Hill, it

respectfully disagrees and concludes that in light of the foregoing, Petitioner’s first petition was

“properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and therefore Petitioner is entitled to

statutory tolling during the pendency of his first petition. 

Based on the foregoing, and assuming, without deciding, that the one-year period

re-commenced on March 8, 2003 and continued to run until April 8, 2003, when Petitioner filed his 4

second petition in the Kern County Superior Court, another 30 days of the one-year period had

elapsed. Added to the original 231 days that had run from June 19, 2002 until February 5, 2003, a

total of 261 days had then run on the statute of limitation. Respondent concedes that the limitation

period was tolled from April 8, 2003 until May 18, 2005. However, another 102 days ran between

the California Supreme Court’s denial of the last petition on May 18, 2005 and the date Petitioner

handed his federal petition to prison authorities on August 28, 2005. Thus, a total of 363 days of the

one-year period expired. The Court therefore concludes that the instant federal habeas petition was

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timely by two days, regardless of whether Petitioner is entitled to additional statutory tolling for the

interval between his first and second state petitions. 

Because the Court concludes that the petition was timely filed, it necessarily follows that

Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be denied.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 11), be

DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within eleven (11) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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