Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00791/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00791-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Douglas Beeks
Petitioner
George Giurbino
Respondent

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28 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

—o0o—

DOUGLAS BEEKS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

GEORGE GIURBINO, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-00791 LJO JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action has been referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, imposed on April 10, 2003. 

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of grand theft person (Cal. Penal Code §1

487©); Count 1) and resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, Count 3). In

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 Petitioner sought relief from default for failure to timely file a petition for review of the 2

Fifth DCA’s decision due to a calendaring error.

 Petitioner’s original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in this Court on June 3

16, 2005. The petition was stayed and subsequently amended.

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addition, the jury found “true” the allegations that Petitioner had previously been convicted of

“serious felony” (i.e. “strike”) offenses (§§ 667(b)-(I), 1170.12(a)-(d)), and that he had served a

prior term of imprisonment as a result of his felony convictions (§ 667.5(b)). Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of twenty-five (25) years to life in state prison on Count 1. Petitioner was

also ordered to serve two years, consecutive, for two of the prior prison term enhancements. 

Petitioner was sentenced to serve six months in the county jail on Count 3, to be served

concurrently with the sentence imposed for Count 1. Petitioner was further ordered to pay a

$200 restitution fine.

Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District (“Fifth DCA”) on April 11, 2003. On April 6, 2004, the Fifth DCA

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Answer, Ex. 7).

On May 25, 2004, the California Supreme Court declined Petitioner’s petition for relief

from default.

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On May 28, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California

Supreme Court, case number S125209. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition on April 13, 2005.

On February 9, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Supreme Court, case number S131392. The petition was summarily denied on

January 18, 2006.

On April 13, 2006, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

before this court. The Amended Petition alleges several grounds for relief: (1) ineffective 3

assistance of counsel; (2) cruel and unusual punishment; (3) permitting an incompetent person to

testify at trial; and (4) prosecutorial and/or judicial misconduct.

Respondent filed its Answer to the Amended Petition on July 11, 2007. Petitioner filed a

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Traverse to Respondent’s Answer on August 7, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the facts as summarized by the 5 DCA in its opinion dated April 6, th

2004:

At approximately 10:45 p.m. on December 23, 2002, [Petitioner] approached

developmentally disabled 30-year-old Mark Cantrell at the Bakersfield bus station. [Petitioner]

asked Cantrell for money and told him he was going to kill him. When Cantrell refused,

[Petitioner] reached into Cantrell’s pocket, took his wallet, and ran away. The wallet contained

$60 in cash along with Cantrell’s birth certificate, medical card, bus pass, and a Barnes & Noble

bookstore membership card.

Bakersfield Police Officer Lester Riddle immediately interviewed Cantrell and reported

[Petitioner]’s description to other officers in the area. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer

Matthew Roy observed [Petitioner] walking along the street. Officer Roy illuminated

[Petitioner] with a spotlight and exited his patrol car. When the officer asked if they could speak,

[Petitioner] ran in the opposite direction. Officer Roy pursued Cantrell into a hotel, where he

saw [Petitioner] toss some items into a bathroom. [Petitioner] eventually tripped and Officer Roy

apprehended him. In the bathroom, the officer found three $200 bills, a Barnes & Noble

membership card, and a birth certificate bearing Cantrell’s name.

Officer Riddle met [Petitioner] at the hotel and took him to the central receiving facility

for booking. At the facility, Officer Riddle searched [Petitioner] and found two bus passes in his

jacket pocket. The name “Mark Cantrell” was printed on the back of one of the passes.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 fn. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the

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Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly the Court has jurisdiction over this action.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after its enactment). The

instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its

provisions.

II. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C . § 2254(a).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the AEDPA. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, a petition for habeas corpus will not be

granted unless the adjudication in question “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining “clearly established Federal law,” the Court

looks to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. “In other words, ‘clearly

established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id.

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Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413.

This Court may not issue the writ simply because in its independent judgment the state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly; for a writ to

issue, ‘that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. At 411. A federal habeas court making

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.” Id. At 409.

Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9 Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the th

states, ninth circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-

01 (9 cir. 1999). th

AEDPA requires that this court give considerable deference to state court decisions. The

state court’s factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Moreover, we are

bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9 Cir. th

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

Application of these standards is significantly impeded where, as here, the state court

supplies no reasoned decision on some or all of a petitioner’s claims. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d

976, 981 (9 Cir.2000). Under such circumstances, the Court independently reviews the record to th

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determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Delgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9 Cir.2000) ("Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state th

court does not supply reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is

required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal

law."); see also, e.g., Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9 Cir.2002). That is, although th

the Court independently reviews the record, it still defers to the state court's ultimate decision. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Claim One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first claim, Petitioner alleges that he received constitutionally deficient

representation from his appointed state trial and appellate counsel. Petn. At 5, 14-33. 

Specifically, Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because: (1) trial counsel refused to

vigorously advocate on Petitioner’s behalf after Petitioner refused to accept a plea bargain; (2)

trial counsel declined to present the clothing Petitioner was wearing at the time of his arrest as

evidence; (3) trial counsel failed to obtain surveillance tapes from the Bakersfield Hotel, which

would have shown that Petitioner did not match the description of the suspected thief; (4) trial

counsel failed to obtain and introduce audiotape recordings of the police radio calls pertaining to

the incident; (5) trial counsel failed to file a motion to exclude the identification testimony of Mr.

Cantrell as the product of an allegedly suggestive lineup; and (6) appellate counsel’s failure to

timely file a petition for review of the Fifth DCA’s decision on direct appeal prejudiced

Petitioner’s ability to obtain relief in the California Supreme Court. Id.

2. Legal Standard

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective th

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, th

the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by

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the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment

considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348

(9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

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a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9 Cir. 1994). More precisely, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney’s performance

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was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and, unless prejudice is presumed, that

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would

have been different. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

1058, 1062 (2000). 

3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

As noted above, Petitioner alleges numerous instances of ineffective assistance. We will

address each in turn.

(1) Failure to Vigorously Defend Following Plea Bargain Rejection

Petitioner first asserts his trial counsel was ineffective in that trial counsel failed to

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vigorously advocate on Petitioner’s behalf following Petitioner’s rejection of the prosecutor’s

plea offer of twenty-five years to life in prison. Petn. at 15. Petitioner “asserts that [trial

counsel]’s actions were prejudicial and far below prevailing professional [n]orms.” Id.. In

support of this claim, Petitioner notes that at trial he requested substitute counsel. Petn. at 111-

23.

The decision of the Fifth DCA was not objectively unreasonable. First, as Respondent

correctly notes, trial counsel would possibly have been subject to an allegation of ineffective

assistance had he not related the plea offer to Petitioner. See United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d

1111, 1117 (9 Cir. 2003) (noting an attorney should not “fail to advise a client to enter a plea th

bargain when it is clearly in the client’s best interest”). Petitioner potentially faced a much

longer term of imprisonment had he been convicted of all the charges and enhancements with

which he was accused.

Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that trial counsel did anything other than

vigorously, albeit unsuccessfully, advocate on Petitioner’s behalf at trial. We note by way of

example that trial counsel did secure an acquittal on the charge of making a criminal threat (Cal.

Pen. Code § 422; Count 2). Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (“CT”) at 259. As the record does not

support Petitioner’s assertion that his rejection of the prosecution’s plea bargain resulted in less

than vigorous advocacy by his trial counsel, his ineffective assistance claim should be denied.

(2) Failure to Introduce Petitioner’s Clothing Into Evidence

Petitioner’s second contention is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

present into evidence the clothing Petitioner was wearing at the time of his arrest. Petn. at 16,

20. Petitioner claims that the clothing he was wearing at the time he was arrested would have

affirmatively disproved that he was the person who had stolen Cantrell’s wallet, and that trial

counsel therefore rendered ineffective assistance by not admitting this evidence at trial.

We find the Fifth DCA’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was not unreasonable. Even if trial

counsel’s failure to introduce Petitioner’s clothing into evidence constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel, Petitioner’s claim fails because Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was

prejudiced by this omission. The trial record is replete with evidence implicating Petitioner in

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the theft of Cantrell’s wallet.

Cantrell described the suspect to police as being a black male, approximately 30 years

old, five foot six-to-eight inches tall, of medium build, wearing a blue jacket and dark pants. 

Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (“RT”) at 104-105. Officer Matthew Roy testified that he saw

Petitioner walking down the street and that Petitioner generally matched the description of the

suspected thief. Officer Roy put his spotlight on Petitioner and got out of his patrol car. As he

approached Petitioner, Petitioner ran from him. RT 107-108. Officer Roy pursued Petitioner to

a nearby hotel. RT 108. As Officer Roy chased Petitioner through the hotel’s second floor

hallway, he witnessed Petitioner toss some objects into a communal bathroom RT at 112-13. 

Officer Roy apprehended Petitioner after Petitioner tripped on the stairs trying to go back down

to the first floor of the hotel. RT at 113. A search of the bathroom into which Officer Roy had

seen Petitioner discard some objects revealed three twenty-dollar bills, a Barnes and Noble card,

and a birth certificate. RT at 115.

Police Officer Riddle arrived at the Bakersfield Hotel, and Officer Roy gave Riddle the

items he had found in the hotel bathroom. RT at 98-99. Riddle put Petitioner in his patrol car. 

As Riddle was taking Petitioner to the jail to be booked, Petitioner said “he wasn’t the person

responsible for [the Cantrell] robbery.” RT at 99. Petitioner claimed he “had been at The Mint

bar across the street from the Bakersfield Hotel up until the time that Officer Roy made contact

with him.” Id.

In short, there was substantial evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, most notably Petitioner’s

inability to credibly explain how he came to possess Cantrell’s birth certificate, Barnes & Noble

card, and bus pass a short time after the victim’s wallet was stolen. Given this evidence of his

guilt, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how the admission of his clothing into evidence would

have led to a different result at trial. Accordingly, the claim should be denied.

(3) Failure to Obtain Surveillance Videotapes or Obtain Testimony of Witnesses to the Arrest

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain surveillance

videotapes from the Bakersfield Hotel. Petn. at 17. He claims that had trial counsel obtained the

surveillance camera video from the night of December 23, 2002, it “would have proved beyond

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doubt that [Petitioner] does not match the physical or clothing description of the perpetrator of

the crime.” Id. Petitioner further claims trial counsel was ineffective in that he “failed to

investigate for possible witnesses to corroborate [Petitioner]’s testimony in the event he were to

testify.” Petn. at 17.

With respect to the alleged failure to obtain video surveillance footage from the

Bakersfield Hotel, Petitioner’s claim is purely speculative. In order to demonstrate ineffective

assistance of counsel, Petitioner must identify the acts or omissions “that are alleged not to have

been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Here,

Petitioner fails to demonstrate: (a) the Bakersfield Hotel had a surveillance camera; (b) the

camera was operational; © the camera captured the events in the lobby on the night in question;

and (d) that this evidence had probative value. Absent any such demonstration, Petitioner cannot

establish either that trial counsel’s actions were constitutionally deficient or that he was in any

way prejudiced as a result. The Fifth DCA’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim is not objectively

unreasonable.

Similarly, Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to locate and

present the testimony of persons in the hotel lobby at the time Petitioner was being pursued by

Officer Roy is purely speculative and without merit. Petitioner fails to identify what testimony

he may have given that could have been corroborated by eyewitnesses, assuming eyewitnesses

could even be located. Petitioner merely asserts that the “missing testimony of the hotel

witnesses would have altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case.” Petn. at 18. 

Absent any evidence that this is the case, Petitioner’s assertion alone is insufficient to support a

finding either that trial counsel was ineffective or that the failure to obtain eyewitness testimony

in any way prejudiced his defense.

(4) Failure to Obtain and/or Present Evidence of Police Dispatch Audiotapes

Petitioner next claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain and introduce into

evidence audiotape recordings of the police radio calls pertaining to the theft and to his capture. 

Petn. at 17-18. Petitioner claims the tapes might have revealed “what the victim described to

police that the perpetrator was wearing, what his height was, how much he weighed, his age, his

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ethnicity, et cetera.” Petn. at 17.

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. The record indicates that testifying officers did in fact

describe for the jury what the police dispatcher told them in regard to the description of the

suspect. The dispatcher described the suspect as a black male, approximately 30 years old, five

foot six-to-eight inches tall, medium build, and wearing a blue jacket and dark pants. RT at 104-

05. Officer Roy testified that this description prompted him to put his spotlight on Petitioner and

exit his patrol car. As Officer Roy approached Petitioner, Petitioner ran away from him,

prompting the pursuit into the Bakersfield Hotel which eventually led to Petitioner’s arrest. RT

at 106-07.

Additionally, the record discloses that the failure to present evidence of the police radio

call tapes at trial was a strategic decision on the part of trial counsel. Trial counsel told the court

that he requested but did not receive a copy of the audiotapes. He stated, however, that he had

reviewed a copy of the dispatch log “and based on what the log is, I don’t see there’s anything

here that I would want to introduce into evidence.” RT at 150. Petitioner fails to demonstrate

that trial counsel’s failure to pursue or to present the dispatch audiotapes as evidence was

anything other than sound trial strategy. See Kimmelmann v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384

(1986). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

(5) Failure to Move to Exclude the Victim’s Identification of Petitioner

Petitioner claims trial counsel’s performance was ineffective in that he failed to file a

motion to exclude the identification testimony of the victim as the product of an impermissibly

suggestive lineup. Petn. at 19. In support of this claim, Petitioner points to the police report in

which it is noted that Mr. Cantrell positively identified Petitioner as the perpetrator at an in-field

showup. Petn. at 19, 21.

A pretrial identification violates due process if, under the totality of the circumstances, it

is impermissibly suggestive and gives rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1968); Simmons v. United States,

390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of show-up

identifications at the scene of the arrest. See e.g. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972). 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that show-up identifications are not unconstitutional unless the

“procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification.” United States v. Kessler, 692 F.2d 584, 585 (9 Cir. 1982) th

(citation omitted). The Kessler court further notes that a properly conducted show-up

identification is a “salutary” procedure, as it permits eyewitnesses to identify a perpetrator while

the incident is fresh in their minds. Id.

Petitioner argues that the circumstances of the show-up produced a procedure so

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of mistaken

identification. Petn. at 19. Petitioner was detained, handcuffed, and in the back of a patrol car at

the time of the identification. However, as Respondent notes, several Ninth Circuit decisions

have upheld the constitutionality of an identification under similar circumstances. In Kessler, for

instance, the court held that a show-up identification was not impermissibly suggestive despite

the suspect being handcuffed and surrounded by police officers at the time. The court held that

those indicia of custody were “necessary for the prompt and orderly presentation of the suspect,

consistent with protection of the officers and witnesses.” Kessler, 692 F.2d at 587. Similarly, in

United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482 (9 Cir. 1985), the court found a one-man show-up at a th

bank with the defendant handcuffed and surrounded by law enforcement officers shortly after the

robbery was suggestive, but not impermissibly so. Id., at 491-92.

In light of this authority, Petitioner has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s decision not

to pursue a motion to suppress the victim’s on-scene identification constitutes ineffective

assistance of counsel. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9 Cir. 1996) (trial counsel is not th

ineffective for failing to make motions that he reasonably believes to be futile). Moreover, given

the substantial evidence of Petitioner’s guilt above and beyond the victim’s identification,

Petitioner fails to demonstrate the requisite prejudice to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Accordingly, the claim should be denied.

(6) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Finally, Petitioner alleges that his state-appointed appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance due to her failure to timely file a petition for review of the Fifth DCA’s decision, as

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well as her refusal to raise various claims of trial court error presented to her by Petitioner. Petn.

at 23-25, 29-30, 54.

As with trial counsel, effective assistance of appellate counsel is guaranteed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). 

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland 's

two-pronged test. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9 Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, th

792 F.2d 846, 847 (9 Cir.1986); See, also, Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 353-54 th

(1988) (holding that where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance

of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed;

the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective).

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that appellate

counsel's deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,

2064 (1984). Second, Petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice in that there was a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on

appeal. Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what counsel could have done; rather, it is whether

the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th

Cir.1998).

The presumption of reasonableness is even stronger for appellate counsel because he has

wider discretion than trial counsel in weeding out weaker issues; doing so is widely recognized

as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate assistance. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434

(9 Cir.1989). Appealing every arguable issue would do disservice to the Petitioner because it th

would draw an appellate judge's attention away from stronger issues and reduce appellate

counsel's credibility before the appellate court. Id. Appellate counsel has no constitutional duty

to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by petitioner. Id at 1434 n10 (citing Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745, 751-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983)).

We turn first to Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to relief based on appellate counsel’s

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failure to timely file a petition for review of the Fifth DCA’s decision. Appellate counsel timely

filed opening and reply briefs on Petitioner’s behalf before the Fifth DCA. However, due to a

calendaring error appellate failed to timely file a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. See Petn. at 26-31 (Appellate Counsel’s correspondence with Petitioner and her

application for relief from default to the California Supreme Court). The California Supreme

Court denied review on the grounds that the petition was not timely filed. Petn. at 32 (California

Supreme Court denial of review). Subsequent to this denial, Petitioner’s appellate counsel

continued to act on his behalf, filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Answer, Ex. 9. This state habeas petition presented the identical issue

which would have been raised in the petition for review to the California Supreme Court had

relief from default been granted.

We need not address whether appellate counsel’s failure to timely file a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Petitioner’s claim is without

merit, as Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel's

unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. As discussed above, the

claims Petitioner would have raised in his petition to the California Supreme Court are without

merit. That Petitioner was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s error is demonstrated by the fact

that the California Supreme Court denied identical claims when they were presented in

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition before the same court.

Finally, Petitioner claims prejudicial error in that appellate counsel “would not raise any

of the issues” that he raises in the instant Petition. Petn. at 23. This claim is also without merit. 

It is well-settled that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every

nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983); 

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 n. 10 (9 Cir. 1989). The weeding out of weaker issues is th

widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. Id. at 1434 (footnote

and citations omitted). As a result, appellate counsel will frequently remain above an objective

standard of competence and have caused her client no prejudice for the same reason--because she

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declined to raise a weak issue. Id. In her August 7, 2003 letter to Petitioner, appellate counsel

indicates that she carefully considered claims not ultimately raised in her petition (including

claims requested by Petitioner), but ultimately rejected them. See Petn. at 24-25. And as

discussed elsewhere in this Findings and Recommendation, the issues Petitioner claims should

have been raised are without merit. Appellate counsel’s decision not to raise these issues does

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; nor was Petitioner prejudiced by virtue of their

exclusion. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

B. Claim Two: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In his second claim, Petitioner asserts that his sentence under California’s Three Strikes

law is cruel and unusual and thus violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive

punishment. Petn. at 34-44. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison, plus

two years of enhancements.

1. Governing Legal Standard

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is

convicted may indeed violate the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court recently decided two

cases which discuss the clearly established federal law applicable to California Three Strikes

cases. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 

In Andrade, the Supreme Court discussed the current state of Eighth Amendment

proportionality review and held that the only clearly established governing legal principle is that

a “gross disproportionality” review applies to criminal sentences for a term of years. Id. at 73. 

Citing extensively to its past cases dealing with criminal sentencing and proportionality under the

Eighth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that it has “not established a clear and consistent

path for courts to follow.” Id. 

The Supreme Court held that “the only relevant clearly established law amenable to the

‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ frame work is the gross disproportionality

principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and

‘extreme’ case.” Id. The Court analyzed Andrade’s sentence under Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.

263 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957

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28 As expressed in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 4

(1991)(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).

cd 16

(1991), and held that the state court “did not confron[t] a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrive at a result different from

our precedent.” Id. at 73-74. Using section 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause, the

Court also held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to

conclude that the contours of the gross disproportionality principle permitted an affirmance of

Andrade’s Three Strikes sentence. Id. at 75-77. 

In Ewing, the Supreme Court again reviewed the constitutionality of a Three Strikes

sentence of 25 years to life for stealing three golf clubs. After reviewing the Court’s Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence, the Court chose to adopt Justice Kennedy’s view that: 4

[There are] four principles of proportionality review-- the primacy of the

legislature; the variety of legitimate penological schemes; the nature of our federal

system; and, the requirement that proportionality be guided by objective factors– 

that inform the final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict

proportionality between the crime and the sentence. Rather, it forbids only

extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime. 

Ewing, at 23. 

Recognizing that state legislatures have a right to formulate penological schemes

consistent with the state’s policy goals and free from federal intrusion, the Court validated the

California Three Strikes law, stating “[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy

choice to be made by the state legislatures, not the federal courts.” Id. at 25. The Court deferred

to the California Legislature’s policy judgement to enact a tough recidivism statute and held that

states have “a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals.” Id. (citing Parke v.

Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992)). 

In conducting a proportionality review of Ewing’s sentence, the Court stated, “[i]n

weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony,

but also his long history of felony recidivism.” Id. at 29. The Court noted that “any other

approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in

the legislature’s choice of sanctions.” Id. In imposing a Three Strikes sentence on a recidivist

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criminal, the Court recognized the state’s interest in dealing “in a harsher manner with those who

by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms

of society as established by its criminal law.” Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276

(1980)). Accordingly, proportionality review must take this interest into account. Id. The Court

held that Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life was justified by the State’s public-safety interest in

incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by Ewing’s long, serious

criminal record. Id. 

In reviewing Petitioner’s claim, this Court will begin with a brief overview of the Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence and the proportionality standard. In Rummel, the Court upheld a life

sentence imposed under a Texas recidivist statute for a defendant convicted of obtaining $120.75

by false pretenses, an offense normally punishable by imprisonment for two to ten years. 

Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S.Ct. at 1135. However, because he had two prior felony

convictions (for fraudulent use of a credit card and passing a forged check), and had served two

prior prison terms, the prosecution chose to proceed under the state’s recidivist statute, which

carried a life sentence. Id. The Supreme Court held that Rummel’s sentence of life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 265-

266 (emphasis added). The Court noted that Rummel had suffered two separate convictions and

terms of imprisonment for each prior, that he would be eligible for parole in twelve years, and

that under the Texas recidivist statute, prosecutors retained the discretion not to invoke the

statute for “petty” offenders. Id. at 278-81.

Three years later, the Supreme Court set forth the criteria for finding a sentence to be

cruel and unusual punishment under the federal Constitution and affirmed a decision of the

Eighth Circuit holding unconstitutional a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole for a seven-time nonviolent felony recidivist. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct.

3001 (1983). Defining a three-part proportionality criteria, the Court concluded that Solem’s

sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime of uttering a “no account” check for $100.00,

even in light of his prior six nonviolent felony convictions: three for third degree burglary, one

for obtaining money under false pretenses, one for grand larceny, and one for driving while

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intoxicated. Id. at 279-81. The Court emphasized that Solem’s life sentence was far more severe

than the sentence it had considered in Rummel, because Rummel was likely to be eligible for

parole in twelve years, while Solem was given no possibility of parole at all. Id. 

In Harmelin, the defendant received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the

possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine, his first felony offense. 

501 U.S. 957 (1991)(emphasis added). The Supreme Court upheld the sentence, with five

justices agreeing, for varying reasons, that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Although the Court did not produce a majority opinion, seven justices favored some manner of

proportionality review. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, stated that a

noncapital sentence could violate the Eighth Amendment if it was “grossly disproportionate” to

the crime, but concluded that courts need not examine the second and third factors of

intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional reviews discussed in Solem, unless “a threshold

comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross

disproportionality.” Id. at 1005. 

The majority of the justices in the Harmelin Court agreed that outside capital punishment,

deeming a sentence cruel and unusual punishment is “exceedingly rare” due to the lack of

objective guidelines for terms of imprisonment. 501 U.S. at 964. The threshold for such an

inference of disproportionality is high. See id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Generally, so

long as the sentence imposed by the state court does not exceed statutory maximums, the 

sentence will not be considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 

United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The Harmelin Court concluded that the defendant’s sentence did not meet the threshold

factor of “gross disproportionality.” Justice Kennedy stressed the serious nature of Harmelin’s

offense, stating that the offense “threatened to cause grave harm to society” unlike “the relatively

minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002. Justice Kennedy

further noted that the “possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent ‘one of the

greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.’” and that the quantity of

cocaine possessed by Harmelin had a potential yield of between 32,500, and 65,000 doses. Id. 

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3. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

The state courts’ determination of this issue was not objectively unreasonable.

Petitioner’s sentence of twenty-seven years to life does not raise an inference of gross

disproportionality to his crimes. Petitioner received a sentence of 27 years to life for having been

convicted of grand theft person and for having a number of prior violent or serious felonies. 

Petitioner has an extensive criminal history which includes: (1) a felony conviction in

1978 for possession of a controlled substance (three years probation); (2) a conviction for

burglary and possession of known stolen property in 1979 (sixteen months in state prison); (3) a

conviction for burglary in 1981 (two years in state prison); (4) a conviction for burglary in 1985

(ten years in state prison); (5) a conviction for driving under the influence in 1991 (three years

probation); (6) three separate probation violations; (7) a burglary conviction in 1992 for

residential burglary (twelve years in state prison); and (8) four more violations of the conditions

of his parole following his release. Probation, parole, and imprisonment have all failed to

prevent Petitioner’s criminal conduct. 

A 30-to-life sentence does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality to

Petitioner’s current crimes in light of his criminal history. See, e.g. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501

U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding sentence of life without

possibility of parole for first offense of possession of 672 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454

U.S. 370, 370-71, 375, 102 S.Ct. 703 (1982) (rejecting challenge to a 40 year sentence for

possession with intent to distribute less than nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445

U.S. 263, 265-66, 100 S.Ct. 1133 (1980) (upholding a life sentence imposed under a recidivist

statute where the three felonies were passing a forged $28.36 check, fraudulent use of a credit

card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods and services, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses). 

The Fifth DCA’s denial of Petitioner’s Eight Amendment claim was not objectively

unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See, e.g., Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76

(denying habeas claim that Three Strikes sentence of 50 years to life was unconstitutionally

disproportionate to conviction for two counts of shoplifting videotapes worth total of $153.54,

where defendant had suffered three prior convictions for residential burglary). Accordingly,

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Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his Eighth Amendment claim.

C. Claim Three: Due Process Violations

In his third claim, Petitioner asserts a number of due process violations. Petn. at 45-53. 

Specifically, Petitioner alleges: (1) the arresting officer lied on several occasions when he stated

he saw Petitioner wearing a jacket as he went into the Bakersfield Hotel and when he was taken

into custody; (2) the police “planted” evidence against him; and (3) the trial court abused its

discretion by refusing Petitioner’s requests for substitute counsel.

1. Perjured Testimony

Petitioner accuses Officers Roy and Riddle of repeatedly lying about the clothing

Petitioner was wearing at the time of his arrest. In particular, Petitioner asserts the officers lied

in testifying that: (a) Petitioner tossed something from the pocket of his jacket as he was fleeing

through the Bakersfield Hotel; (b) Petitioner was wearing a jacket at the time he was taken into

custody; and (3) a bus pass bearing Cantrell’s name was taken from one of the pockets of said

jacket.

A prosecutor has a constitutional duty to correct testimony he knows to be false. Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959); N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109 (9

th

Cir.2001). If there is “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the

judgment of the jury,” the conviction must be set aside. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103

(1976).

Petitioner claims that the officers’ testimony must necessarily be false because the

prosecution never produced the jacket. First, Petitioner provides no evidence to contradict the

testimony of the officers. Moreover, Petitioner’s argument fails in light of the substantial

evidence – beyond the missing jacket – connecting Petitioner to the theft. As noted above,

Officer Roy attempted to stop Petitioner as Petitioner was walking near the crime scene and

generally matched the description of the suspect. Petitioner fled from Officer Roy, who followed

him into the Bakersfield Hotel. Officer Roy witnessed Petitioner throw something into a

communal bathroom in the hotel as he ran. After Petitioner tripped and was apprehended, Roy

searched the bathroom into which he had seen Petitioner discard something. The search revealed

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three twenty-dollar bills, a Barnes and Noble card, and a birth certificate, the latter two bearing

the victim’s name. A subsequent search of Petitioner at the county jail revealed a bus pass also

bearing the victim’s name. Given this evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, the officers’ testimony that

Petitioner was wearing a jacket could not have affected the jury’s determination.

2. Planted Evidence

Petitioner further claims the police attempted to plant evidence in the form of clothing

Petitioner was allegedly wearing at the time he was booked into jail. Petn. at 48, citing RT at

145-47. Petitioner appears to claim that a bag of clothing marked “Refused to sign” was booked

as Petitioner’s property when he was processed into jail, but that this clothing was not the

clothing Petitioner was wearing at the time of his arrest.

Petitioner’s conclusory allegation lacks support in the record. There is no record of the

contents of this bag of clothing, and nothing on the record indicates that either the prosecutor or

Petitioner ever offered this evidence at trial. Since this allegedly manufactured evidence was

never used at trial, it could not have impacted the jury’s determination of guilt. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

3. Improper Denial of Requests for Substitute Counsel

Finally, Petitioner alleges a due process violation in that the trial court denied his various

requests for substitute counsel. Petn. at 49-53. This appears to be a claim that his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel was violated because the state trial court denied his Marsden

requests. See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) (a California criminal defendant may

move for substitute counsel if his appointed counsel is rendering ineffective assistance).

The Sixth Amendment requires an inquiry on the record into a defendant’s grounds for a

Marsden motion, and that the matter must be resolved on the merits before the case continues. 

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). If failure to conduct such an th

inquiry results in the constructive denial of counsel, it constitutes error per se. Id. at 1027. 

However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only competent representation, not a meaningful

relationship between counsel and defendant. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).

In denying Petitioner’s Marsden motions, two different state court judges found that

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Petitioner was receiving effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s complaints involved

differences over trial strategy, which are not appropriate grounds for appointing substitute

counsel. See Schnell, 218 F.3d at 1026, n.8 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)

(Harlan, J., dissenting in part)) (“‘[A] lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how

to run a trial even in the face of his client’s incomprehension or even explicit disapproval.’”). 

The court further found that Petitioner was not credible in his descriptions of trial counsel’s

alleged deficiency. See, e.g., Petn. at 122; RT (Feb. 29, 2003) at 13. We must defer to the trial

court’s credibility determination, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

We find that the trial court’s inquiry into and resolution of Petitioner’s Marsden motions

comported with due process. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

D. Claim Four: Improper Admission of Testimony

In his fourth claim, Petitioner asserts that his constitutional due process rights were

violated as a result of the admission of the testimony of the victim, Mr. Cantrell. Petn. at 5, 55-

61. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Cantrell “was not qualified to testify due to his mental

limitations.” Petn. at 56. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that Mr. Cantrell had difficulty

understanding questions posed to him, and that he should have been found incompetent by virtue

of his inability to distinguish truth from falsehood. Id.

1. State Court Review

Petitioner’s claim was rejected by the Fifth DCA in a reasoned opinion. In holding that

the state trial court had not violated Petitioner’s due process rights by admitting the testimony of

Mr. Cantrell, the Fifth DCA wrote:

“In general, every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness. 

(Evid. Code, § 700; [citation].) A witness is disqualified from testifying only if he

or she is incapable of expressing him or herself so as to be understood, or is

incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. (Evid. Code, §

701, subd. (a); [citations].) The party challenging the witness bears the burden of

establishing lack of competence. [Citations.] Whether a witness has the capacity

to communicate and an understanding of the duty to testify truthfully is a

preliminary fact to be determined exclusively by the trial court, whose

determination will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A

witness who is disqualified from testifying is unavailable for purposes of

Evidence Code section 1360. (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(2).)” (People v.

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Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1368.).

[Petitioner] suggests the “real problem” with Cantrell was that he was

unable to understand his duty to tell the truth as required under Evidence Code

section 701, subdivision (a)(2). As evidence of Cantrell’s limited understanding

of veracity, [Petitioner] points to the following dialogue between Cantrell and the

prosecutor on redirect examination:

“Q. Mark, you know the difference between the truth and a lie,

right?

“A. Wrong from right.

“Q. Wrong from right. If I were to tell you that my shirt was blue

--

“A. Not anymore, you changed it, because your shirt is white.

“Q. If I were to tell you it was blue, would that be a lie or would it

be the truth?

“A. The truth.

“Q. This shirt’s blue.

“A. No.

“Q. So would that be wrong or would it be right?

“A. It’s white. [¶] ... ... [¶]

“Q. If I told you that it was blue – 

“A. You changed the colors.

“Q. I would have changed it. So by me telling you that it’s blue, is

that right or wrong?

“A. White.

“Q. It’s right that it’s blue?

“THE COURT: White.

“[PROSECUTOR]: White. Sorry. I got it. Let me try something

else.

“Q. How about a brown suit. If I were to tell you that this brown

suit is green

--

“A. Green

“Q. Yeah. Would that be right or wrong?

“A. Right.

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“Q. It would be correct?

“A. I personally can’t tell. Looks green to me.

“[PROSECUTOR]: I’m sorry.

“THE COURT: Green to me too.

“[PROSECUTOR]: I’m sorry.

“THE COURT: Maybe we ought to ask you that question.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: I ought to ask my wife. Sorry.

“Q. Mark, if I told you that this was black, my suit was black,

would that be truth or a lie? Would it be right or wrong?

“A. Right.

“Q. It would be right? You think my suit’s black?

“A. No.

“Q. So that would be wrong.

“A. That’s true.

“Q. If I told you that my suit was brown or green, would I be

telling the truth?

“A. Yeah, you’re telling the truth.

“Q. If I told you it was black, would I be lying?

“A. No.

“Q. No?

“A. It’s green.”

At the close of the prosecution’s case, [Petitioner] moved for an acquittal

based on Cantrell’s incompetence. (Pen. Code § 1118.1.) [Petitioner] argued

Cantrell was unable to respond to questions in a rational manner, did not

understand the questions, and lacked the capacity to respond. Rejecting

[Petitioner’s] challenge, the trial court ruled:

“Based on the testimony of the witness and sitting next to

him here and observing him for at least 30 to 40 minutes, I’m

going to find that his testimony indicated an ability to differentiate

between truth and falsehood, find that he did understand the duty to

tell the truth at the time he testified.

“Some words it did not appear that he understood, but I

think the gentleman was able to articulate what occurred. He was

asked several different – he was asked about the events in several

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different ways, and then reasked, and I find that when I consider

the totality of the testimony that he was competent to testify

because he could differentiate between truth and falsehood.

“He had a little trouble with the suit example and he could

get the colors right. I’m not sure if he understood the words true or

false or lie, but he did indicate to us that he understood what the

truth and what a lie meant and, therefore, we are going to find that

he is competent.”

Notwithstanding the above puzzling line of testimony in which not only

Cantrell but also the prosecutor and the trial court became confused, Cantrell was

able to relate the salient facts concerning the incident at the bus station. Although

Cantrell occasionally provided unresponsive answers to the questions posed, he

nevertheless consistently provided a description of [Petitioner] as the person who

accosted him and stole his wallet. [Petitioner] failed to demonstrate Cantrell was

an incompetent witness who was incapable of expressing himself or of

understanding the duty to tell the truth. (Evid. Code, §§ 700, 701, subd. (a).)

Even excluding Cantrell’s testimony, however, it was not reasonably

probably [sic] the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to

[Petitioner]. (Chapman v. California, (1967) 387 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) 

Cantrell reported a theft and description of the suspect to the police. The police

shortly thereafter apprehended [Petitioner] and recovered exactly $60 and

Cantrell’s Barnes & Noble membership card, birth certificate, and bus pass either

directly from him or at the immediate scene of the arrest. Absent any explanation

as to why [Petitioner] possessed Cantrell’s personal belongings, the jury could

reasonably infer [Petitioner] personally took them from Cantrell against his will.

Answer, Ex. 7 at 3-6.

2. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that an allegation that the admission of evidence

is incorrect under state law does not form a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991) (“We have stated many times that federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”); see also Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d

1172, 1175 (9 Cir. 1997) (“We do not review the admission for error; ‘we may only consider th

whether [Petitioner’s] conviction violated constitutional norms.’ [citation].”)

Petitioner argues that Cantrell was incompetent to testify, and that admitting his

testimony therefore violated Petitioner’s rights to confrontation of witnesses and due process. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him....” U.S.

Const. Amend. VI. This right, incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to state

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prosecutions, “guarantees the defendant [not only] a face-to-face meeting with witnesses

appearing before the trier of fact,” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988), but also the right to

cross-examine those witnesses. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 406-07 (1965).

However, the Confrontation Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the

defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292 (1985). “The

Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by the prosecution will

refrain from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the

contrary, the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair

opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to

the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony.” 

Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21-22, 106 S.Ct. 292.

We find the determination of the state courts is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of settled Supreme Court precedent. The trial court found that although Cantrell did

not understand some questions asked of him, and at times gave nonresponsive answers, he did

display an ability to grasp the difference between a true statement and a lie, and that he was

therefore competent to testify. In upholding Petitioner’s conviction, the Fifth DCA noted that

Cantrell was able to testify as to the salient facts concerning the incident, and that he consistently

provided a description of Petitioner as the perpetrator of the theft of his wallet. We agree that,

while not an ideal witness, Cantrell was competent to testify. Although Cantrell’s responses to

the questions regarding truth and lies were not entirely clear, We do not find that they indicate an

inability to distinguish truth from lies. Given that Cantrell occasionally provided unresponsive

answers to questions posed, a finder of fact might well look with scepticism on his testimony;

however, that is a question of weight, not admissibility.

Moreover, even if Cantrell’s testimony was improperly admitted, Petitioner would still

not be entitled to relief. The Fifth DCA analyzed Petitioner’s claim under Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and determined that “it was not reasonably probable the jury

would have reached a verdict more favorable to [Petitioner]” had Cantrell’s testimony been

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excluded. We agree. In addition to Cantrell’s testimony, testimony was presented that Officer

Roy approached Petitioner since Petitioner generally matched the description of the suspect in

the theft of Cantrell’s wallet. Petitioner fled from Officer Roy, leading him into the Bakersfield

Hotel where Roy saw Petitioner throw some objects into an upstairs bathroom. Petitioner was

apprehended after tripping on the hotel stairs. A search of the bathroom into which Petitioner

threw objects revealed three twenty-dollar bills, a Barnes and Noble card, and a birth certificate,

the latter two items bearing the victim’s name. Petitioner was subsequently searched at the

county jail and found to have a monthly bus pass also bearing Cantrell’s name. Given this

evidence against Petitioner, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a

different verdict had Cantrell’s testimony been excluded. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should

be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

The Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED and the Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951

F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991) th.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2008 /s/ John M. Dixon 

0c08b7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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