Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50129/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Manuel Raya-Vaca
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VICTOR MANUEL RAYA-VACA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50129

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-05261-IEG-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Irma E. Gonzalez, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 5, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed November 10, 2014

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Murguia

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2 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion

to dismiss an information charging, and the defendant’s

conviction of, illegal reentry after having been removed in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and remanded.

Given the Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncement that

the Due Process Clause applies to all who have entered the

United States – legally or not – and given the clear fact of the

defendant’s entry, the panel held that the defendant was

entitled to expedited removal proceedings that conformed to

the dictates of due process. The panel held that an

immigration officer’s failure, during the defendant’s

expedited removal proceedings, to advise the defendant of the

charge against him and to permit him to review the sworn

statement prepared by the officer violated the defendant’s due

process rights to notice and an opportunity to respond.

The panel held that the defendant suffered prejudice as a

result of the entry of the removal order because he could

plausibly have been granted relief in the form of withdrawal

of his application for admission. The panel concluded that

the removal order was, accordingly, fundamentally unfair and

cannot serve as the predicate for his conviction under § 1326.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 3

COUNSEL

Chloe S. Dillon (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego,

Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Mark R. Rehe (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

Victor Manuel Raya-Vaca appeals from a judgment of

conviction following a conditional plea of guilty to one count

of illegal reentry after having been removed in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326. In 2011, Raya-Vaca was arrested while in

theUnited States, subjected to expedited removal proceedings

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and removed; he was later found in

the United States and again arrested. He collaterally attacks

the removal order entered against him in 2011, upon which

his conviction under § 1326 was predicated. Raya-Vaca

contends that his expedited removal proceedings did not

comport with due process because, among other errors, the

immigration officer who entered the removal order failed to

provide Raya-Vaca with notice of the charge against him and

an opportunity to respond. Raya-Vaca further asserts that he

suffered prejudice as a result. We agree. Accordingly, we

reverse the district court’s denial of Raya-Vaca’s motion to

dismiss the information and the subsequent conviction.

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4 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

Factual and Procedural History

I. Background on Raya-Vaca

Raya-Vaca, a 33-year-old native and citizen of Mexico,

first came to the United States at approximately the age of

six. His mother brought him and his siblings to join his

father, who at the time was living and working in Salinas,

California. While his parents worked in agriculture, RayaVaca attended school and, after turning eighteen, held various

full-time jobs. At age twenty-four, he began a relationship

with Trisha, a natural-born United States citizen. The two

lived together for seven years before Raya-Vaca’s removal,

and they have two children who are United States citizens. 

Raya-Vaca’s brother is also a United States citizen.

While in California, Raya-Vaca was convicted of three

misdemeanors. In 2003, he was convicted of misdemeanor

burglary in violation of California Penal Code section 459

and sentenced to ten days in jail and three years of probation. 

In 2010, he was convicted of obstruction of a police officer in

violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) and false

identification to a police officer in violation of California

Penal Code section 148.9(a), for which he served three days

in jail and three years of probation.

Raya-Vaca has also had prior contact with immigration

authorities. Immigration officials sent him to Mexico in

2009, after which he sought to reenter the United States in

March 2009, May 2009, June 2009, September 2009,

November 2009, and September 2010. On three of those

occasions, some of the individuals traveling with Raya-Vaca

identified him as a smuggler. With the exception of his

attempted reentry in September 2009, Raya-Vaca returned

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 5

voluntarily to Mexico—and therefore suffered no formal

immigration consequences, such as a removal order—after

each attempted entry. After attempting to reenter on

September 19, 2009, however, Raya-Vaca stipulated to

removal and waived his right to a hearing; an immigration

judge (IJ) then considered Raya-Vaca’s written

representations of waiver sufficient to find him removable

and issued an order of removal on September 22, 2009.

II. Raya-Vaca’s July 2011 Reentry and Removal Order

On July 24, 2011, Raya-Vaca entered the United States by

“walking through the mountains,” with the intention of

returning to Salinas to join his family. He was apprehended

the following day near the State Route 94 Border Patrol

checkpoint outside Potrero, California. Immigration officials

initiated expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225.

A. Expedited Removal Proceedings Under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225

An expedited removal proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1225

allows immigration officers to (1) determine whether certain

aliens are inadmissible, and (2) enter removal orders,

generally without hearing or further review.

Two classes of individuals are subject to expedited

removal proceedings. Originally, onlyaliens “arriving” in the

United States were subject to the proceedings. However, the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has expanded the

reach of expedited removal proceedings to aliens who have

entered the United States, as long as they (1) “are physically

present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled,”

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6 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

(2) are discovered “within 100 air miles” of the United States

border, and (3) cannot establish that they have been

“physically present in the U.S.” for the fourteen days prior to

the encounter with immigration authorities. Designating

Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877-01,

48880 (Aug. 11, 2004). All such aliens are deemed

“applicants for admission” into the United States, regardless

of whether they seek to enter at a port of entry or have

already entered the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

During an expedited removal proceeding, an immigration

officer must conduct an inspection and determine whether the

alien is inadmissible because the alien (1) has made a

material misrepresentation to gain admission into the United

States, (2) has “falsely represent[ed]” himself to be a United

States citizen, or (3) does not possess a “valid entry

document.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3), (b)(1)(A)(i); see also

id. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), (a)(6)(c)(ii)(I), (a)(7)(A)(i). When

making a finding of inadmissibility, the examining

immigration officer must “create a record of the facts of the

case and statements made by the alien.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 235.3(b)(2)(i). The officer “shall . . . have the alien read (or

have read to him or her) the statement.” Id. Moreover, the

officer “shall advise the alien of the charges against him or

her on Form I-860, Notice and Order of Expedited Removal,

and the alien shall be given an opportunity to respond to those

charges in the sworn statement.” Id. Then, if the officer

determines the alien to be inadmissible, “the officer shall

order the alien removed from the United States without

further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an

intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 7

Unless an alien professes a fear of persecution or claims

to be a lawful permanent resident (LPR), an expedited

removal order “is not subject to administrative appeal.” Id.

§ 1225(b)(1)(C). However, the Attorney General has the

discretion to provide a type of statutory relief to certain

aliens: withdrawal of application for admission. See id.

§ 1225(a)(4). When an individual is permitted to “withdraw”

his application for admission, he may leave voluntarily and

without a removal order, and thus without facing formal

immigration consequences.1 See 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4.

B. Raya-Vaca’s Expedited Removal Proceedings

Raya-Vaca faced expedited removal proceedings because

he was present in the United States without admission, had

been discovered within 100 miles of the border, and could not

establish that he had been present in the United States for the

prior fourteen days. See Designating Aliens For Expedited

Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48880.

During Raya-Vaca’s expedited removal proceedings,

Border Patrol Agent Alberto Baca interviewed Raya-Vaca in

English and prepared a Record of Sworn Statement. RayaVaca then signed an acknowledgment that he had read the

Record of Sworn Statement (the Jurat). Agent Baca found

Raya-Vaca inadmissible and subject to removal because he

had illegally entered the United States without inspection and

was not in possession of any valid documentation permitting

him to enter. Agent Baca ordered that Raya-Vaca be

removed from the United States.

1 As noted earlier, any individual subjected to expedited removal

proceedings is deemed to have applied for admission, even if he sought to

enter or entered the United States illegally. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

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8 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

III. Proceedings Before the District Court

On November 27, 2012, a Border Patrol agent arrested

Raya-Vaca and several other individuals about seven miles

north of the United States-Mexico border, near Tecate,

California. When Raya-Vaca admitted that he was a Mexican

citizen with no valid entry documents, the agent arrested

Raya-Vaca and transported him to a Border Patrol station.

On December 27, 2012, the Government charged RayaVaca by information with one count of illegal reentry after

having been removed from the United States, in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

Raya-Vaca moved to dismiss the information under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), asserting that no valid removal order

existed upon which the information could be predicated. 

Raya-Vaca contended that neither the 2009 stipulated

removal order nor the 2011 expedited removal order could

serve as a valid predicate for the prosecution under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. The Government disclaimed any intent to rely on the

2009 stipulated removal order as a predicate element for the

§ 1326 charge. Instead, the Government contended that

Raya-Vaca had no plausible relief from his 2011 removal

order and thus that he suffered no prejudice attributable to

any due process violation at his 2011 expedited removal

proceeding. See United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d

1077, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that to show prejudice, an

alien must show that he had plausible grounds for relief). 

Therefore, according to the Government, Raya-Vaca’s

challenge under § 1326(d) to his 2011 removal order could

not succeed.

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 9

The district court denied Raya-Vaca’s motion to dismiss

the information. Given the Government’s failure to argue

that no due process violation occurred, the district court

assumed that Raya-Vaca’s due process rights were violated

in the course of his 2011 expedited removal proceedings and

looked to whether an immigration official would plausibly

have exercised his discretion to grant Raya-Vaca relief in the

form of withdrawal of his application for admission. After

weighing the factors outlined in the Immigration and

Naturalization Service’s (INS) Inspector’s Field Manual,

which discusses when an official should permit an alien to

withdraw his application for admission, the district court

deemed it implausible that Raya-Vaca would have been

granted such relief and thus concluded he could not show

prejudice.2

Raya-Vaca entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving

his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 1326(d)

motion. The district court sentenced him to time served (108

days in prison) and one year of supervised release. The

district court entered judgment on March 15, 2013, and RayaVaca filed a timely notice of appeal.

Standard of Review

We review “a denial of a motion to dismiss an 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326 indictment de novo when the motion is based upon . . .

alleged due process defect[s] in the underlying deportation

proceeding.” United States v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928,

 

2

 The district court rejected the standard for prejudice proffered by the

Government—that laid out in Matter of Gutierrez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 562

(BIA 1988). The Government does not argue on appeal that the prejudice

standard from Matter of Gutierrez should apply.

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10 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

929 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

review for clear error the district court’s findings of fact. Id.

Discussion

For a defendant to be convicted of illegal reentry under

8 U.S.C. § 1326, the Government must establish that the

defendant “left the United States under order of exclusion,

deportation, or removal, and then illegally reentered.”3

United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th

Cir. 2011).

A defendant charged under § 1326 has a due process right

“to collaterally attack his removal order because the removal

order serves as a predicate element of his conviction.” United

States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir.

2004). To sustain a challenge to an indictment (or

information) under § 1326, a defendant must demonstrate that

(1) he exhausted the administrative remedies available for

seeking relief from the predicate removal order; (2) the

deportation proceedings “improperly deprived [him] of the

opportunity for judicial review”; and (3) the removal order

was “fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). To satisfy

the third prong—that the order was fundamentally unfair—

the defendant bears the burden of establishing both that the

“deportation proceeding violate[d] [his] due process rights”

and that the violation caused prejudice. United States v.

Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994).

3 As it did before the district court, the Government relies solely on

Raya-Vaca’s 2011 removal order (not on his 2009 stipulated removal

order) as a predicate removal order for his conviction under § 1326.

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 11

I. Administrative Exhaustion and Deprivation of

Judicial Review

As the district court recognized and as the Government

concedes, the statute governing expedited removal

proceedings afforded Raya-Vaca no opportunity for

administrative or judicial review. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1)(C) (“Except as provided [in the subparagraph on

credible-fear interviews], a removal order . . . is not subject

to administrative appeal . . . .”); id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“If an

immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who is

arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible . . . , the

officer shall order the alien removed from the United States

without further hearing or review . . . .” (emphasis added));

see also Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1082 (“[T]he

[Immigration &NationalityAct (INA)] precludes meaningful

judicial review of the validity of the proceedings that result in

an expedited removal order.”). We therefore conclude that

Raya-Vaca exhausted all available administrative remedies

and was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review.

II. Due Process Violation

Raya-Vaca must next establish that the removal order was

fundamentally unfair—meaning, in part, that the expedited

removal proceedings as conducted failed to comply with the

requirements of due process. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3);

Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d at 1431. To this end, he asserts that he

suffered three distinct due process violations during his 2011

expedited removal proceedings: (1) the immigration officer’s

failure to inform Raya-Vaca (in violation of DHS regulations)

of the charge of inadmissibility he faced and to read to him

(or allow him to read) his sworn statement; (2) the officer’s

failure to advise Raya-Vaca of the possibility of withdrawing

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12 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

his application for admission; and (3) the officer’s failure to

afford Raya-Vaca the opportunity to consult with counsel.

A. Applicability of the Due Process Clause

We first confront the threshold question whether the Due

Process Clause, with its attendant protections, applied to

Raya-Vaca at the time of his expedited removal proceedings.

The Supreme Court has categorically declared that once

an individual has entered the United States, he is entitled to

the protection of the Due Process Clause.4In Zadvydas v.

Davis, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of

indefinitely detaining aliens who were once admitted to the

United States but later ordered removed. 533 U.S. 678, 682

(2001). In holding unconstitutional the indefinite detention

of an alien present within the United States, the Court

distinguished the situation at hand from one involving an

alien seeking entry into the country:

The distinction between an alien who has

effected an entry into the United States and

one who has never entered runs throughout

immigration law. . . . [O]nce an alien enters

the country, [his] legal circumstance changes,

for the Due Process Clause applies to all

“persons” within the United States, including

aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.

4

 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o

person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.”

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 13

Id. at 693 (citations omitted). Similarly, when considering

whether certain conditions could be placed on an alien’s

eligibility for federal medical insurance, the Supreme Court

stated,

There are literallymillions of aliens within the

jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth

Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth

Amendment, protects every one of these

persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. Even

one whose presence in this country is

unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled

to that constitutional protection.

Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69, 77 (1976) (citation

omitted); see also, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.

Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is true that aliens who

have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be

expelled only after proceedings conforming to . . . due

process of law.”). This long line of precedent admits of no

exception: an alien who has entered the United States is

guaranteed due process protections.5

Here, there is no dispute that Raya-Vaca had entered the

United States in July 2011 before he was apprehended near

the State Route 94 Border Patrol checkpoint, outside Potrero,

California, within the borders of the United States. Even an

 

5

 Aliens who have entered the country are thus distinct from aliens at a

port of entry, over whom Congress has plenary power, see Kleindienst v.

Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972), and for whom the process prescribed

by Congress constitutes due process, see United States ex rel. Knauff v.

Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).

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14 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

alien who has run some fifty yards into the United States has

entered the country. See United States v. Martin-Plascencia,

532 F.2d 1316, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming

adjudication of illegal entry for alien who had avoided

inspection at the border and had run into the country before

being apprehended); see also Matter of Z-, 20 I. & N. Dec.

707, 713–14 (BIA 1993) (finding that alien had entered

country when he disembarked from his vessel “onto dry land

within the territorial boundaries of the United States at an

area not designated as a port of entry,” after which he “fled

for some distance into the interior”).

Heeding, as we must, the Supreme Court’s repeated

pronouncement that the Due Process Clause applies to all

who have entered the United States—legally or not—and

given the clear fact of Raya-Vaca’s entry, we hold that RayaVaca was entitled to expedited removal proceedings that

conformed to the dictates of due process.6

B. Due Process Right to Notice and Opportunity to

Respond

Our conclusion that the Due Process Clause applied to

Raya-Vaca, however, does not end the inquiry. Raya-Vaca

contends that the immigration officer conducting the

expedited removal proceedings failed to advise Raya-Vaca of

the charge against him and to read to him (or permit him to

read) the sworn statement the officer prepared, in violation of

DHS regulations and Raya-Vaca’s due process rights. We

6 There is no dispute that Raya-Vaca faced the deprivation of a liberty

interest during his expedited removal proceeding. See Flores-Chavez v.

Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004) (declaring that “[a]n alien

facing deportation confronts the loss of a significant liberty interest”).

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 15

must determine whether Raya-Vaca indeed had such due

process rights and, if so, whether they were violated during

the 2011 expedited removal proceedings.

The regulations governing expedited removal proceedings

codify, in mandatory terms, the immigration officer’s duty to

inform the alien of the charge against him and to allow the

alien to review the sworn statement prepared in his name. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (“The examining immigration

officer shall advise the alien of the charges against him or her

. . . , and the alien shall be given an opportunity to respond to

those charges in the sworn statement.”); see also id.

(requiring the examining officer to take the alien’s sworn

statement and to “have the alien read (or have read to him or

her) the statement”).7

7

 The relevant regulatory provision, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i), reads as

follows:

In every case in which the expedited removal

provisions will be applied and before removing an alien

from the United States pursuant to this section, the

examining immigration officer shall create a record of

the facts of the case and statements made by the alien.

This shall be accomplished by means of a sworn

statement using Form I–867AB . . . . The examining

immigration officer shall read (or have read) to the

alien all information contained on Form I–867A.

Following questioning and recording of the alien's

statement regarding identity, alienage, and

inadmissibility, the examining immigration officershall

record the alien’s response to the questions contained

on Form I–867B, and have the alien read (or have read

to him or her) the statement, and the alien shall sign and

initial each page of the statement and each correction.

The examining immigration officer shall advise the

alien of the charges against him or her on Form I–860,

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16 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

Although not every violation of a regulation rises to the

level of a due process violation, see, e.g., United States v.

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751–52 (1979), certain regulations

may in fact be “mandated by the Constitution or federal law,”

id. at 749; see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152

(1945) (observing that particular rules and regulations for

investigations preceding deportation hearings were “designed

to . . . afford [aliens] due process of law”). That is, some

regulations protect due process and other constitutional

rights. This is the case here. Due process always requires, at

a minimum, notice and an opportunity to respond. Cleveland

Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)

(identifying “notice and [an] opportunity for [a] hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case” as the “essential

principle[s] of due process”). The regulations instructing the

immigration officer to advise an alien of the charge against

him and to permit the alien to read or be read the sworn

statement prepared in his name protect those fundamental due

process rights: notice of the charge the alien faces and the

alien’s opportunity to respond to that charge.8 Accordingly,

because Raya-Vaca was protected by the Due Process Clause

when he faced removal, we conclude that any failure to

inform Raya-Vaca of the charge against him and to provide

him the opportunityto review the sworn statement constituted

a violation of Raya-Vaca’s due process rights. See Yamataya

v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 94, 101 (1903) (concluding that alien

Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, and the alien

shall be given an opportunity to respond to those

charges in the sworn statement.

8

Indeed, in expedited removal proceedings the form on which the

charge against the alien is recorded is entitled “Notice and Order of

Expedited Removal.”

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 17

who had entered the country, allegedly illegally, several days

prior to apprehension had to receive “all opportunity to be

heard upon the questions involving [her] right to be and

remain in the United States” to comport with due process); cf.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 882

(1975) (declining to recognize an exception to the Fourth

Amendment requirement of articulable reasonable suspicion

for stops near the border, even though such an exception

would facilitate immigration enforcement).

We further conclude that Raya-Vaca’s due process rights

to notice and an opportunity to respond were indeed violated

during his expedited removal proceedings. Raya-Vaca

asserted in a signed declaration that no immigration officer

explained to him either the nature of the removal proceedings

or that he could be ordered removed from the United States. 

Raya-Vaca further asserted that the immigration officer

neither read to him nor permitted him to review the

information in the sworn statement. While Raya-Vaca

initialed the Record of Sworn Statement and signed the Jurat,

he did not, according to his declaration, understand what he

was signing. Further, Raya-Vaca acknowledged on the Jurat

that he had “read (or . . . had read to [him]) this statement,

consisting of 1 pages (including this page).” However, the

Record of Sworn Statement and Jurat together totaled four

pages, and the Jurat—the sole page Raya-Vaca acknowledged

having read—including only four questions he was asked and

answered, none of which spoke to his admissibility. Beyond

suggesting that the number of pages listed on the Jurat was

perhaps a typographical error, the Government does not argue

that the immigration officer did indeed comply with the

regulation at issue by advising Raya-Vaca of the charge

against him and reading to him, or allowing him to read, the

sworn statement. Cf. United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672,

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18 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

677–78 (9th Cir. 2010) (immigration officer who conducted

stipulated removal proceedings testified about the processes

she followed). Taking into consideration Raya-Vaca’s

declaration, the error on the Jurat, and the Government’s

failure to contest Raya-Vaca’s allegations, we hold that the

immigration officer failed to advise Raya-Vaca of the charge

against him and to permit him to review the sworn statement,

in contravention of Raya-Vaca’s due process rights.

In so holding, we reject the Government’s argument that

in order to show the due process violation itself—the first

prong of a showing of fundamental unfairness—Raya-Vaca

must establish that he was prejudiced by the failure to comply

with the regulation. As noted earlier, there are, for present

purposes, two types of regulations: (1) those that protect

fundamental due process rights, and (2) and those that do not. 

Cf. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749–53 (1979). 

The second type of regulation only implicates due process

concerns when the failure to comply with the regulation

causes prejudice. See id. at 752–53; United States v.

Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979); see

also Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir.

2012) (explaining that the prejudice requirement in CalderonMedina applies to the “violation of a relatively minor

procedural rule,” not “serious” regulatory violations). A

violation of the first type of regulation, however, implicates

due process concerns even without a prejudice inquiry. See

United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1045–46 (9th

Cir. 2012) (holding, without considering prejudice apart from

the plausibility of relief, that violation of regulation providing

for right to counsel constituted denial of due process); see

also United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012,

1015–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding, without prejudice inquiry,

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 19

that immigration judge’s failure to inform alien of eligibility

for relief, as required by regulation, violated due process).

Because the regulatory violation here constituted a denial

of Raya-Vaca’s right to notice and an opportunity to respond,

no showing of prejudice is necessary to establish a due

process violation. We further reject the Government’s

argument that it should have been obvious to Raya-Vaca that

he was being scrutinized for his presence in the United States

without valid documentation. Even if express notice of the

charge of inadmissibility were not necessary, we do not see

how he could have known the specific charge against him

without being told of it, and Raya-Vaca averred he was

unaware that he was facing a formal removal order based on

his lack of documentation.

Accordingly, we conclude that Raya-Vaca has established

a due process violation and thus satisfied the first requirement

for showing that his 2011 removal order was fundamentally

unfair. We now turn to the final remaining issue: prejudice.9

III. Prejudice

To succeed in demonstrating that the 2011 expedited

removal order was fundamentally unfair, Raya-Vaca must

also establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of the

entry of the order. See United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo,

104 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). 

9 Because we decide that the expedited removal proceedings violated

Raya-Vaca’s due process right to notice and an opportunity to respond, we

do not address Raya-Vaca’s argument that he was constitutionally entitled

to other protections—namely, the right to be advised of potential relief

and/or the right to consult counsel.

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20 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

To do so, Raya-Vaca must show that he had “plausible

grounds for relief” from the removal order.10JimenezMarmolejo, 104 F.3d at 1086.

Even though Raya-Vaca did not formally apply for

admission to the United States, he is considered to have been

an applicant for admission and as such was eligible for

“withdrawal of application for admission.”11See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(4). As mentioned earlier, an individual granted

leave to withdraw his application for admission may exit the

United States voluntarily and without a removal order. See

8 C.F.R. § 1235.4. Raya-Vaca contends that he had plausible

grounds for relief from removal in the form of withdrawal of

his application for admission.

A. Analytical Framework for Plausibility of Relief

To assess whether a defendant has shown that he would

plausibly have been granted a discretionary form of relief

from removal, we follow a two-step process. See United

States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2013). 

“First, we identify the factors relevant to the [agency’s]

exercise of discretion for the relief being sought.” Id.

Second, “we determine whether, in light of the factors

relevant to the form of relief being sought, and based on the

unique circumstances of the [defendant’s] own case,” it was

10 We conclude that Raya-Vaca has satisfied the “plausibility” standard

for relief and therefore do not address his argument that he need only

show eligibility for relief, a lower threshold, to demonstrate prejudice.

11 Although certain classes of aliens, for example stowaways, are

ineligible for withdrawal of application for admission, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(2), there is no dispute as to Raya-Vaca’s eligibility for that form

of relief.

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 21

plausible that the agency official considering the defendant’s

case would have granted relief from removal. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

This court’s leading case discussing the plausibility of

relief in the form of withdrawal of application for admission

is United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.

2011). In Barajas-Alvarado, we looked for guidance to the

Inspector’s Field Manual, an internal agency document that

counsels immigration officers as to when to grant withdrawal

of application for admission. See id. at 1090. As noted in

Barajas-Alvarado, the Inspector’s Field Manual, while not

entitled to the force of law, provides helpful insight as to

when relief is plausible—and as to whether relief was

plausible for Raya-Vaca in 2011. See id. at 1090 n.16.

The Inspector’s Field Manual provides for a highly

individualized determination and instructs officers to

“consider all facts and circumstances related to the case to

determine whether permitting withdrawal would be in the

best interest of justice.” INS Inspector’s Field Manual

§ 17.2(a) (2007), available atWestlaw FIM–INSFMAN17.2,

2007 WL 7710869; see also Matter of Vargas-Molina, 13 I.

& N. Dec. 651, 652–53 (BIA 1971). The Manual also

enumerates six factors relevant to the question of relief:

“(1) the seriousness of the immigration violation; (2) previous

findings of inadmissibility against the alien; (3) intent on the

part of the alien to violate the law; (4) ability to easily

overcome the ground of inadmissibility; (5) age or poor

health of the alien; and (6) other humanitarian or public

interest considerations.” Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1090

(citing INS Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.2(a) (2001)). This

list of considerations is non-exhaustive. See INS Inspector’s

Field Manual § 17.2(a) (2007) (specifying that relevant

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factors “are not limited to” the enumerated considerations);

see also Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1091 (evaluating the

weight due to unenumerated factors, taking into account the

Manual’s failure to identify the factors specifically). Finally,

the Manual identifies germane considerations, noting in

particular that withdrawal should “ordinarily” not be

permitted “in situations where there is obvious, deliberate

fraud on the part of the applicant.” Id. (citing as an example

of obvious fraud the use of counterfeit documents).

In Barajas-Alvarado, we concluded that the defendant

had not demonstrated that he would plausibly have been

granted relief in the form of withdrawal at the time of his

expedited removal proceedings. Id. at 1089. Critically,

Barajas-Alvarado had “conceded that he had deliberately

presented false documents to inspection officers,” thereby

committing “obvious, deliberate fraud.” Id. at 1090. In

addition, he had multiple prior findings of inadmissibility,

and his false documents evinced his intent to violate the law. 

Barajas-Alvarado could not “easily overcome such grounds

of inadmissibility,” and none of the other circumstances we

took into account made relief plausible given these concerns. 

Id. at 1090–91.

Conducting the corresponding, fact-specific analysis here,

we remain cognizant of the threshold Raya-Vaca must satisfy:

he must prove only the plausibility of relief. Raya-Vaca

cannot succeed by merely showing a “theoretical[]”

possibility of relief, see United States v. Reyes-Bonilla,

671 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012), but he need not prove

that relief was probable, cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (emphasizing in the notice-pleading

context that the requirement that a pleading proffer “plausible

grounds” for a claim “does not impose a probability

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 23

requirement”). Certainly, he need not show “that he

definitely would have received immigration relief.” BarajasAlvarado, 655 F.3d at 1089. Instead, Raya-Vaca need only

establish “some evidentiary basis on which relief could have

been granted.” Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1049–50.

B. Plausibility of Relief Given Raya-Vaca’s Unique

Circumstances

Bearing in mind the guidance provided by the Inspector’s

Field Manual and the definition of plausibility, we turn to

Raya-Vaca’s case.

First and foremost, Raya-Vaca committed no fraud, let

alone obvious or deliberate fraud, when entering the United

States. Therefore, a crucial consideration that, according to

the Inspector’s Field Manual, “ordinarily” militates against

withdrawal—and a consideration of singular importance in

Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1090—is absent here.

Several of the factors listed by the Manual cut against

Raya-Vaca’s claim that relief was plausible. Given his

history of illegal reentries—six, according to the

Government—Raya-Vaca’s immigration violation was

relatively serious.12 Further, although the 2009 stipulated

removal order may present due process concerns, see United

States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2010), Raya-Vaca

does not contest on appeal that the order constitutes a prior

finding of inadmissibility. Raya-Vaca also intended to

12

It is unclear whether the immigration officer was aware of all six of

the prior illegal entries asserted by the Government. Raya-Vaca’s Record

of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien from July 2011 only makes reference to

three prior entries.

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24 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

violate the law, as evidenced by his prior unlawful entries and

the fact that he entered the United States by “walking through

the mountains.” However, these considerations are not

dispositive: the Government does not dispute that recidivist

immigration violators are permitted to withdraw their

applications for admission, and the record includes an

example of the granting of withdrawal to a recidivist

immigration violator.

In addition, neither Raya-Vaca’s apparent good health nor

his age supports his assertion that relief was plausible. The

same is true for his ability to easily overcome his ground of

inadmissibility: Raya-Vaca had no petitions for status

pending in 2011, and was not officially married to a United

States citizen, so it is not evident that he could have “easily”

overcome his inadmissibility for lack of valid

documentation.13 However, that both his long-term partner

and his brother were citizens suggests that Raya-Vaca may

have had a relatively straightforward path to legal status, a

relevant consideration given the Manual’s instruction to

“consider all facts and circumstances related to the case.” 

INS Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.2(a); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.2(g).

Under the final factor identified by the Manual, RayaVaca presents significant humanitarian considerations

13 The Government suggests that Raya-Vaca could not overcome his

ground of inadmissibility because he was also inadmissible for reentering

the United States without inspection after having been removed in 2009. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). However, the Inspector’s Manual

focuses on the alien’s “[a]bility to easily overcome the ground of

inadmissibility”—the ground of inadmissibility with which the alien was

charged. INS Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.2(a) (emphasis added). We

thus consider other asserted grounds of inadmissibility less relevant.

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 25

counseling in favor of relief. Raya-Vaca’s partner Trisha and

their children, in addition to his mother, siblings, and much

of his extended family, currently live in the United States. 

There is a “compelling humanitarian interest in keeping

families united,” so the humanitarian and public interest

factors weigh significantly in Raya-Vaca’s favor. United

States v. Haro-Munoz, 552 F. App’x 689, 690 (9th Cir. 2014);

see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982)

(observing that an alien’s “right to rejoin [his] immediate

family . . . ranks high among the interests of the individual”);

Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987)

(noting that “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the

family precisely because it is deeply rooted in the Nation’s

history and tradition” (internal quotation marks omitted));

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) (INA “family unity” provision for the

waiver of inadmissibility recognizing that “assur[ing] family

unity” is in the public interest).

Certain other considerations counsel in Raya-Vaca’s

favor. First, his misdemeanor criminal history is fairly

minimal and does not appear to have much bearing on the

plausibility of relief. Second, Raya-Vaca offers a record from

another case in which withdrawal of application for

admission was granted. While that record of withdrawal does

not explain why relief was granted and thus does not help

Raya-Vaca carry his burden, see Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d

at 1091 n.17, it does make clear that even an individual with

a conviction for false statement to a federal officer, no

pending petitions for legal status, and a prior exclusion order

can be permitted to withdraw his application for

admission—and thus relief under such circumstances was

plausible.

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26 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

Third, Raya-Vaca presents statistics from DHS

demonstrating that a significant proportion of aliens

apprehended were permitted to withdraw their applications

for admission. In fiscal year 2004, approximately 70 percent

of the individuals subject to expedited removal

proceedings were allowed to withdraw their applications.14

See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Annual Report: Immigration

Enforcement Actions 2004, at 6 (2005), available at

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/

AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf. The percentage dropped

thereafter, but even in fiscal year 2008 (after which DHS

stopped publishing the data) fully 44 percent of aliens subject

to expedited removal proceedings were afforded this relief.

See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Annual Report: Immigration

Enforcement Actions 2008, at 1, 4 (2009), available at

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/

enforcement_ar_08.pdf. According to our precedent,

statistics alone cannot establish the plausibility of relief. See

Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1091 (observing that “a

general statistic that ‘discretionary relief applications are

granted fifty percent of the time’ was insufficient to show

plausibility of relief”);15 United States v. Corrales-Beltran,

192 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s

effort to show prejudice by relying solely on statistics on the

granting of relief). However, the Supreme Court has

considered statistics when analyzing immigration claims. See

14 The Government challenges the probative value, but not the accuracy,

of the DHS statistics cited by Raya-Vaca.

 

15 In Barajas-Alvarado, we further noted that the value of the statistics

Barajas-Alvarado proffered was diminished because the record did not

support his claim that “arriving aliens who have used fraudulent

documents are generally granted withdrawal.” 655 F.3d at 1091. RayaVaca does not make any such unsupported claim.

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 27

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518–31 (2003) (considering

statistics on flight risk posed by non-detained aliens when

assessing challenge to immigration statute). And the DHS

statistics suggest that, at least in 2008, a very significant

proportion of aliens in expedited removal proceedings

obtained relief. Although Raya-Vaca’s expedited removal

proceedings took place in 2011, the data provide relevant

context for the frequency with which withdrawal was

permitted and, when considered in conjunction with other

individualized evidence supporting the plausibility of relief,

cuts in Raya-Vaca’s favor.

Given these considerations, we conclude that Raya-Vaca

has shown that in 2011 he had “some evidentiary basis on

which relief could have been granted,” United States v.

Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012), and thus

that he had a plausible basis for relief.

The Government contends that Raya-Vaca was an alien

smuggler and that, because DHS was “ramping up” its

response to his illegal reentries, Raya-Vaca would not have

been permitted to leave in 2011 without a formal removal

order. However, that argument is belied by the fact that

Raya-Vaca appears to have been permitted to leave the

United States voluntarily (without facing formal removal

orders) in November 2009 and September 2010, even though

he had already been flagged as a potential smuggler by mid2009 and had stipulated to a formal removal in September

2009.16 Raya-Vaca was also permitted to voluntarily return

to Mexico in June 2009, even though he had been identified

as a potential smuggler during that unlawful entry.

16 Further, Raya-Vaca vehemently contests the allegations ofsmuggling.

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28 UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA

The Government further cites a number of cases in which

we have concluded that relief in the form of withdrawal was

implausible to suggest the difficulty of establishing plausible

grounds for relief. But a significant majority of those cases

involved deliberate fraud that renders relief implausible. 

Thus, they offer little insight into the case at hand, which

involved no such fraud. See Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at

1090 (noting that defendant could not “easily overcome such

grounds of inadmissibility” as deliberate fraud and two prior

removal orders); see also, e.g., United States v. LunaMagdaleno, 533 F. App’x 792, 793 (9th Cir. 2013); United

States v. Meraz-Olivera, 472 F. App’x 610, 612 (9th Cir.

2012).

Finally, contrary to the government’s argument, the

prejudice Raya-Vaca suffered resulted from the due process

violation. As noted, it is uncontroverted that no immigration

officer explained the nature of the removal proceedings to

Raya-Vaca or that he could be ordered removed from the

United States. His sworn statement further asserts that had he

known he could withdraw his application, he would have

asked to do so in order to preserve his ability to reenter the

United States legally by avoiding the bar resulting from a

removal order.

Although the government cites Raya-Vaca’s prior

departures as evidence that he must have known that his

failure to hold a valid entry document could yield adverse

action, in fact they demonstrate precisely the opposite. 

Because Raya-Vaca’s prior departures include five voluntary

departures, they support the inference that, absent notification

of the nature of the proceedings and the charges against him,

he would have assumed that his removal likewise would not

bar him from reentry. Consequently, although not going to

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UNITED STATES V. RAYA-VACA 29

the plausibility of ultimate relief, Raya-Vaca would have

inquired as to the availability of discretionary relief similar to

that which he had previously received on numerous

occasions, the immigration officer would have answered his

question truthfully, and he then would have applied for relief. 

See INS Inspector’s Field Manual, § 2.4, available at

Westlaw FIM-INSFMAN 2.4 (requiring immigration officers

to be honest and fair in their dealings during the admissions

process)

We therefore hold that Raya-Vaca has shown that he had

some evidentiary basis for relief from his 2011 removal order

and therefore that he has successfully challenged that order

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).

Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that Raya-Vaca had entered the

United States at the time of his 2011 expedited removal

proceedings and was thus entitled to due process in the form

of notice of the charge he faced and an opportunity to

respond. Because the immigration officer who conducted the

proceedings failed to observeRaya-Vaca’s due process rights,

and because Raya-Vaca could plausibly have been granted

relief in the form of withdrawal of his application for

admission, we hold that his 2011 removal order is invalid and

cannot serve as the predicate for his conviction under

8 U.S.C. § 1326. We therefore reverse the denial of RayaVaca’s motion to dismiss the information and his conviction.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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