Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07149/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07149-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Braxton
Terminated Party
Capital Management and Development Corporation
Appellee
Capital Restaurant Concepts, Ltd.
Appellee
Menage Limited Partnership
Appellee
Dominic Novak
Appellant
Power Station Limited Partnership
Appellee
SJG Properties
Appellee
Ricky Waller
Terminated Party
Zei, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 26, 2005 Decided July 7, 2006

No. 04-7149

DOMINIC NOVAK,

APPELLANT

v.

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with

04-7150

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv00039)

(No. 01cv00456)

Patrick M. Regan argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Jonathan E. Halperin and Thanos Basdekis.

William C. Parler, Jr. argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellee.

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Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Twelve to fifteen thugs criminally

attacked and permanently injured appellants Dominic Novak and

George Valdivia as they were leaving a bar and dance club in

the District of Columbia. The attack occurred late at night in an

alley that was immediately outside the only exit from the club

and was the most common path for departing patrons. The club’s

operators allegedly knew that there had been numerous attacks

on their customers in and around the club at that time of night

and yet failed to take steps to protect Novak and Valdivia. This

case presents the question whether the club’s operators had a

duty to use reasonable care to protect Novak and Valdivia from

the danger of an attack. The District Court concluded there was

no such duty because the club did not exercise “exclusive

control” over the alley and granted summary judgment for the

club’s operators. The District Court also held that evidence of

two similar assaults per month witnessed by the club’s security

guards was insufficient to make this attack foreseeable.

Applying District of Columbia case law, we conclude that the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals would not look to

whether the club exercised “exclusive control” over the alley,

but would instead inquire whether the club put the alley to a

“substantial special use.” Because a reasonable jury could find

facts establishing that the club put the alley to a substantial

special use, and because evidence of two fights per month

occurring in the alley could demonstrate foreseeability, we

reverse and remand.

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1

 For ease of reference, we will refer to the owners and

operators of the Zei Club collectively as the “Zei Club” or “club.”

I.

The Zei Club is a bar and dance club owned and operated

by appellees Capital Management and Development

Corporation; Menage Limited Partnership; Zei, Inc.; Capital

Restaurant Concepts, Ltd.; Power Station Limited Partnership;

and SJG Properties.1 The club is not located on any particular

street. Rather, it is abutted by alleys on each side and situated

near the intersection of I and 14th Streets in Northwest

Washington, D.C. It is surrounded by office buildings and only

accessible via alleys. There are two main alleys leading to the

club, one running east-west from 14th to 15th Street, named

“Zei Alley,” and another running from Zei Alley north to I

Street (the “I Street alley”). At around 2:35 a.m. on March 23,

1998, Novak and Valdivia were attacked by a group of twelve

to fifteen men in the I Street alley. At that hour, the front doors

to the club were locked, and thus the rear exit onto the I Street

alley was the only way to leave the club. Upon exiting, Novak

and Valdivia turned south to head toward the entrance in order

to exit through Zei Alley. They immediately encountered the

men, who had been standing next to a wall in the I Street alley

across from the rear exit. The group followed Novak and

Valdivia for a few steps and attacked them within view of the

exit. The assailants struck Valdivia several times with fists.

They tripped Novak, then hit him in the back of the head with a

wooden board.

Upon learning of the assault, two off-duty Metropolitan

Police Department (“MPD”) officers working security at the

club, appellees Michael Braxton and Ricky Waller, ran out of

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2

 The Zei Club’s own incident report from that night described

another “confrontation” taking place inside the club at 2:30 a.m. “All

persons involved in [the inside] incident,” according to the report,

were “ejected from the club.” “Moments later,” appellees Braxton and

Waller were called “back outside to stop another fight that was going

on.”

the club, stopped the attack, and apprehended some of the

assailants.2 Novak and Valdivia had been beaten badly. Valdivia

required emergency treatment and months of physical therapy

and Novak emerged from a three-week long coma with

permanent loss of various brain and motor functions.

The Zei Club employed fifteen security guards to protect

against frequent fights in the club and knew that fights in the

alley near the club’s rear exit were common. Several former Zei

Club security guards testified consistently that they witnessed

between one and two fights a month in the alleys around the exit

from the club and witnessed fights within the club with the same

frequency.

Novak and Valdivia argued to the District Court that the Zei

Club had a duty to protect departing patrons from fights it knew

were likely to occur outside the club’s sole exit. The Zei Club,

on the other hand, argued that its duty to protect patrons was

limited to the interior of the club and ended at the club’s

doorstep. The District Court agreed with the Zei Club and

granted summary judgment in its favor. Looking to Kline v.

1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477

(D.C. Cir. 1970), the District Court held that a business has a

duty to protect its patrons from criminal assaults on adjacent

property only if “the criminal activity takes place ‘in the portion

of the premises exclusively within [its] control’ and the business

has ‘exclusive power to take prevent[]ive action.’” Dist. Ct. Op.

at 5 (quoting Kline, 439 F.2d at 481) (first alteration in original;

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emphasis added). The District Court concluded that the “Zei

Club did not have exclusive control over the I Street alley”

because it noted that the District of Columbia MPD had

“discretion to close off all the alleys surrounding the Zei Club”

to car traffic, its “officers patrolled the alleys,” and “off-duty

MPD officers employed by the Zei Club were not allowed to

patrol the alleys because they were already covered by on-duty

MPD officers.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10 (emphasis added). In the

District Court’s view, this lack of exclusive control over the I

Street alley relieved the Zei Club of any duty of care to patrons

using the alley to leave the club. 

The District Court also held that no reasonable juror could

find that the attack on Novak and Valdivia was foreseeable to

the Zei Club. The Zei Club argued that there was no history of

criminal assaults in the I Street alley and that in the fifteen

months before the attack, police reports showed only three fights

at the Zei Club—two inside and one outside. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6.

Novak and Valdivia proffered contrary evidence demonstrating

that criminal assaults were, in fact, common inside the club and

in the nearby surrounding alleys. The District Court

acknowledged that fights occurred as often as twice a month but

concluded that these fights were not sufficiently “frequent.” Id.

at 7.

Novak and Valdivia also argued that the club failed to

follow its own security policy, which, they alleged, required the

club’s guards to secure and patrol the adjacent alleyways. The

club’s alleged failure to follow this policy on the night of the

attack amounted to, in the appellants’ view, a breach of the

club’s duty to protect departing patrons. The District Court

rejected this theory of negligence and concluded in the

alternative that there was insufficient evidence of such a policy.

Id. at 12, 14.

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Novak and Valdivia filed a timely notice of appeal,

invoking our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

“the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Info.

Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing Servs., 338

F.3d 1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “Summary judgment is

appropriate only if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.’” Id. at 1031-32 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

We “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party,” Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841

(D.C. Cir. 2002), “and draw all reasonable inferences in [that

party’s] favor.” Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d

989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Because we are reviewing a grant of

summary judgment in favor of the club, we have stated the facts

in the light most favorable to Novak and Valdivia. See, e.g.,

Info. Handling Servs., 338 F.3d at 1032.

II.

Novak and Valdivia brought their common law tort claim

in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

alleging diversity jurisdiction. Neither the parties nor the District

Court questioned subject matter jurisdiction. They should have.

When this appeal reached this Court, we requested that the

parties brief jurisdictional problems apparent from the face of

the complaint. Novak and Valdivia failed to allege their

citizenship and the citizenship of two individual defendants,

Michael Braxton and Ricky Waller, and claimed only that both

plaintiffs and these two defendants were “residents” of

Maryland. At the least, alleging that all plaintiffs and some

defendants are “residents” of Maryland raises the concern that

there might not be complete diversity between all plaintiffs and

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3 Section 1332(a) of Title 28, United States Code, provides:

“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different

States . . . .” “When a plaintiff sues more than one defendant in a

diversity action, the plaintiff must meet the requirements of the

diversity statute for each defendant or face dismissal.” NewmanGreen, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) (emphasis

in original). 

all defendants.3 But before that issue can be reached, plaintiffs’

residency allegation raises a threshold problem: “an allegation

of residence alone is insufficient to establish the citizenship

necessary for diversity jurisdiction.” Naartex Consulting Corp.

v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis

added). Citizenship is an essential element of federal diversity

jurisdiction; failing to establish citizenship is not a mere

technicality. “[T]he party seeking the exercise of diversity

jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading the citizenship of each

and every party to the action.” Id. at 792. 

The complaint also contained no allegations regarding the

states of incorporation and principal places of business of the

corporate defendants, instead alleging only that one defendant,

Capital Management and Development Corporation, operated a

business in the District of Columbia. “[A] properly pleaded

diversity action . . . will not only allege that there is diversity of

citizenship, but will also advert to the factors set out by [28

U.S.C.] § 1332(c) that establish corporate citizenship.” District

of Columbia ex rel. Am. Combustion, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins.

Co., 797 F.2d 1041, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Thus, a

complaint must provide “a statement of . . . the corporations’

states of incorporation and their principal places of business.”

Id.

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4

 “Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strictly

apply only in the district courts,” Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 832,

“the weight of authority favor[s] the view that appellate courts

possess[] the authority to grant motions to dismiss dispensable

nondiverse parties.” Id. at 836. “Today [appellate] courts rely on . . .

Federal Rule 21” for the authority to dismiss nondiverse parties. Id. In

Newman-Green, the Supreme Court “decline[d] to disturb that deeply

rooted understanding of appellate power.” Id.

5

 Under the liberal amendment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1653, “a

party who has not proved, or even alleged, that diversity exists [may]

amend his pleadings even as late as on appeal.” Transamerica, 797

F.2d at 1044. 

Following our call for supplemental briefing, Novak and

Valdivia moved to dismiss Braxton and Waller as dispensable,

non-diverse parties pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, which

provides: “Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court

on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the

action and on such terms as are just.”4 We granted the motion

and dismissed Braxton and Waller from the lawsuit. The

remaining appellees conceded that they “are to be deemed

citizens of the District of Columbia.” We also granted a motion

by Novak and Valdivia to amend their complaint to plead

citizenship properly, which they did.5

 With the case properly

before us, we turn to the merits of this appeal.

III.

“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or

by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law

of the state.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

In Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.14 (D.C. Cir.

1979), we concluded that the Erie doctrine also applies to the

District of Columbia. Thus, in “a diversity case, the substantive

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tort law of the District of Columbia controls.” Smith v. Wash.

Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir 1998). Our duty,

then, is to achieve the same outcome we believe would result if

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered this case.

See Workman v. United Methodist Comm. on Relief, 320 F.3d

259, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (this Court “reason[s] by analogy

from D.C. cases” to predict the law the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals would apply if it decided this case).

A. The Zei Club’s Duty Over an Adjacent Egress.

In the District of Columbia, as elsewhere, “[t]o establish

negligence a plaintiff must prove a duty of care owed by the

defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant,

and damage to the interests of the plaintiff, proximately caused

by the breach.” District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.,

847 A.2d 1127, 1135 n.2 (D.C. 2004) (quoting District of

Columbia v. Harris, 770 A.2d 82, 87 (D.C. 2001)) (quotation

marks and alteration omitted). At issue in this case is whether

the Zei Club had a duty to use reasonable care to protect Novak

and Valdivia from criminal conduct in an alley used as the

club’s egress.

It is fundamental and well-settled that a business invitor has

a duty of care to its patrons while they are on its premises. See,

e.g., Seganish v. District of Columbia Safeway Stores, Inc., 406

F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (a business invitor’s “duty is to

exercise reasonable care to keep his place of business safe for

the customer using it”); Smith v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 298 A.2d

214, 216 (D.C. 1972) (discussing Seganish). In the District of

Columbia, under Viands v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 107 A.2d 118

(D.C. 1954), and its progeny, a business’s duty extends to

protecting its customers from foreseeable harm caused by third

parties at its “exit doorway and the approach thereto.” Id. at 121.

In Viands, a customer leaving a grocery store through its only

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exit tripped over a small wagon that had been left on a public

sidewalk by some young boys. Id. at 119. Though not store

employees, the boys customarily gathered outside the store to

offer delivery services for a fee. Id. The trial court instructed the

jury that “there can be no duty imposed on the defendant in this

or any other case of this type with respect to space over which

the defendant has no control and no legal opportunity for

control.” Id. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that

the trial court stated too narrow a view of a business’s duty of

care. Id.

Under Viands, business invitors in the District of Columbia

have a duty of care to monitor the entrances and exits of their

premises. “There is nothing novel or extraordinary surrounding

the duty of an invitor to use care with reference to exits,

entrances, and approaches to his premises.” Id. at 119. This duty,

the Court concluded, is well grounded in the common law and

Supreme Court precedent: 

As long ago as 1881, the United States Supreme Court,

speaking through Justice Harlan, stated the rule,

“founded in justice and necessity and illustrated in

many adjudged cases in the American courts” that an

owner or occupant of land is liable to an invitee “for

injuries occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land

or its approaches, if such condition was known to him

and not to them, and was negligently suffered to exist,

without timely notice to the public or to those who

were likely to act upon such invitation.” 

Id. at 119-20 (quoting Bennett v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.

Co., 102 U.S. 577, 580 (1881)) (emphasis added). Thus, a

business invitor’s duty does not strictly end at the shopkeeper’s

door. “[I]t has been specifically held,” the Court observed, “that

the duty to properly maintain approaches to an invitor’s property

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is not to be determined by the exact boundaries of the premises,

and that such duty does not end at the door through which the

invitee makes his exit.” Viands, 107 A.2d at 120.

Businesses also have a well-settled duty, Viands noted, to

protect invitees from foreseeable harm caused by third parties.

“It has generally been held that the invitor is liable if he has not

taken reasonable and appropriate measures to restrict the

conduct of third parties of which he should have been aware and

should have realized was dangerous.” Id. Viands found

persuasive the Restatement (First) of Torts § 348 (1939), which

Viands summarized as follows: “an invitor is liable to a business

invitee for injury caused by the accidental negligence or

intentionally harmful acts of third persons if the invitor by the

exercise of reasonable care could have (a) discovered that such

acts were being done or were about to be done, and (b) protected

the invitee by controlling the conduct of the third persons or

giving a warning adequate to enable him to avoid the harm.” Id.

at 120-21 (emphasis in original).

Viands turned on the fact that even though the “paved

public sidewalk” where the injury occurred was not on the

business’s premises, it was the sole exit from the store and an

area that the business put to substantial use. There was a parking

lot on either side of the sidewalk leading up to the grocery store.

Id. at 118. To enter or exit the store, “customers [had to] cross

[the] paved public sidewalk which leads up to the front of the

store,” to a door that was “the only entrance or exit for use of

shoppers.” Id. Thus, Viands held that a reasonable jury could

conclude a grocery store was liable for failing to protect exiting

customers from the foreseeable negligent acts of “agile,

scurrying and troublesome boys” regularly located outside the

store’s sole exit. Id. at 121. 

This Court encountered a similar issue shortly thereafter in

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Merriam v. Anacostia National Bank, 247 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir.

1957). In Merriam, a pedestrian was injured on a sidewalk in

front of a bank under construction. Id. at 597-98. The

construction allegedly created a dangerous condition on the

sidewalk. We concluded a reasonable jury could find “that [the]

bank had actual knowledge of the danger in time to afford

protection.” Id. at 598. The bank “could [not] stand by knowing

a dangerous condition was being created on the public sidewalk

in furtherance of [its] . . . private and special interests and be

free from liability if [it] did nothing to protect the public from

such danger.” Id. Thus, “[w]here [a] public way is used by

private parties for their own private and special use,” those

private parties “may be liable.” Id. at 598 (emphasis added). 

In Quigley’s Pharmacy, Inc. v. Beebe, 261 A.2d 242 (D.C.

1970), applying Merriam, the Court of Appeals held that the

“duty to invitees to maintain their safety” when invitees are

traveling “directly and necessarily in the path of the entrance to

adjacent private property” arises from a business “hav[ing]

substantially used public space for a direct and special purpose

in aid of [its] use of private property.” Id. at 244; cf. Brown v.

Consol. Rail Corp., 717 A.2d 309, 316 n.9 (D.C. 1998) (“the

common law duty . . . is ‘not invariably [placed] on the person

in whom the land is titled’”) (quoting Husovsky v. United States,

590 F.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (second alteration in

original). In Quigley’s Pharmacy, a woman walking to a nearby

mailbox caught her heel in a hole on a heavily used public

sidewalk twenty feet from the exit to a pharmacy she had just

left. A jury awarded the woman damages. The Court of Appeals

reversed, holding that the pharmacy had no duty of care because

the plaintiff was not “attracted to the spot [where the injury

occurred] as a calculated means of ingress or egress or for other

business-related purposes.” Quigley’s Pharmacy, 261 A.2d at

244. The pharmacy derived no “substantial special use” from the

path from its exit to the mailbox. Id. That is, the plaintiff was

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“attracted to the spot” not by anything the pharmacy did, but by

her decision to use the mailbox.

The District of Columbia’s substantial special use test for

when a business invitor’s duty extends to an egress is consistent

with the approach other courts have taken in applying the

Restatement (Second) of Torts. Comment l to § 332(3) provides

that an invitor has a duty of care for the “area included within

the invitation.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. l

(1965). According to Dean Prosser, the first reporter for the

Restatement, “[t]his ‘area of invitation’ . . . extends to the

entrance to the property, and to a safe exit.” W. Page Keeton et

al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 61, at 424 (5th ed.

1984) (footnote omitted). As the Fifth Circuit has explained,

“the general law of torts, as reflected in the Restatement and in

Prosser, does not preclude recovery against [a business invitor]

for injury occurring in the entranceway to the defendants’

premises.” Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 222 (5th Cir.

1984). 

The Fifth Circuit in Banks, as well as our sister circuits,

have adopted a “sphere of control” test which also recognizes a

boundary of responsibility for proprietors that extends beyond

their front door. Banks employed such a test in determining

whether a hotel had a duty to protect a guest from a criminal

assault just outside the hotel’s exit and on a public sidewalk. Id.

at 227. Applying the Restatement, the Third Circuit adopted that

test in Fabend v. Rosewood Hotels and Resorts, LLC, 381 F.3d

152, 156 (3d Cir. 2004). “[W]hen an innkeeper possesses or

exercises sufficient control over the property adjacent to his

premises, he has the power to take protective measures to reduce

the risk of injury on that property” and “has a duty to exercise it

to the benefit of his patrons.” Id. The sphere of control test,

Fabend held, “requires that we look at the circumstances of the

case to ascertain whether sufficient control exists over the

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6

 We note that several courts have applied tests similar to

substantial special use or sphere of control. See, e.g., Zepf v. Hilton

Hotel & Casino, 786 A.2d 154, 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)

(“A defense witness testified that defendant provided security to

protect its patrons and property. We fail to perceive how defendant

would assert under these circumstances no duty to provide security on

Providence Avenue when its property borders that street and its

patrons could clearly traverse that street in entering and exiting its

property.”); Southland Corp. v. Spencer, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61-63

(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (in case of assault on adjacent property, where

convenience store made use of that property for parking, duty of care

extends); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So.2d 322, 329 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (in case of assault, bar had a “duty not only to its

patrons who parked on the premises, but also to those who parked on

the adjacent lots in accordance with the instructions of the security

guards”); Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 769 (Ind. Ct. App.

1986) (duty of bar owner may extend to persons beyond boundaries

of a tavern); Ralls v. Noble Roman’s Inc., 491 N.E.2d 205, 207-08

(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (restaurant owner’s duty of care extended to a

yard adjacent to the restaurant); Roe by M.J. v. N.J. Transit Rail

Operations, Inc., 721 A.2d 302, 306-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1998) (business invitor liable for rape that occurred in adjacent public

park).

adjacent premises.” Id.; see Pacheco v. United States, 220 F.3d

1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (where defendants charged permit

fee for beach access, the Court looked to, among other things,

whether “defendants exercised control over what visitors to the

beach did” in determining whether defendants had a duty to

warn of dangers in the water adjacent to the beach).6

The case before us raises this familiar issue of when a

business invitor will be liable for a dangerous condition on

adjacent land used as an entryway and approach. The District

Court did not discuss the substantial special use test of Viands,

Merriam, or Quigley’s Pharmacy. Instead, with limited analysis,

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the District Court turned to Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue

Apartment Corp., a preeminent case addressing a landlord’s

liability for conditions that are dangerous to tenants. 439 F.2d

477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In the District Court’s view, Kline stands

for the following proposition: “A business owner has a duty of

care to take preventative action if it has exclusive power over the

area in which criminal activity occurs.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9 (citing

Kline, 439 F.2d at 481) (emphasis added). Thus, because the

MPD also patrolled the I Street alley at times, in the District

Court’s view, no other business invitor could “exclusively”

control the I Street alley and therefore face liability. Presumably,

then, Viands, Merriam, and Quigley’s Pharmacy incorrectly

suggest that business invitors can be liable for subjecting their

patrons to dangerous conditions in their entryways and

approaches because, under the District Court’s reasoning, the

police can always patrol a public area just beyond the

shopkeeper’s door and off the shopkeeper’s property.

Kline, however, contains no such conflicting rule. The

portion of Kline cited by the District Court addressed a specific

duty of care: the duty of a landlord who “has notice of repeated

criminal assaults and robberies.” Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. Kline

notes the “general rule [that] a private person does not have a

duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person,”

but concludes that “the rationale of this very broad general rule

falters when it is applied to the conditions of modern day urban

apartment living.” Id. Instead, the landlord-tenant context

mandates a special standard of care:

The landlord is no insurer of his tenants’ safety, but he

certainly is no bystander. And where, as here, the

landlord has notice of repeated criminal assaults and

robberies, has notice that these crimes occurred in the

portion of the premises exclusively within his control,

has every reason to expect like crimes to happen again,

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and has the exclusive power to take preventive action,

it does not seem unfair to place upon the landlord a

duty to take those steps which are within his power to

minimize the predictable risk to his tenants.

Id. (emphasis added). Today, the duty discussed in Kline is wellknown in the landlord-tenant world, just as Kline noted, the

“innkeeper-guest relationship” has historically also been known

to require a special duty of care by innkeepers. Id. at 482. The

“exclusive power to take preventive action,” id. at 481, referred

to by Kline, however, addresses a landlord’s duty when “tenants

were being subjected to crimes against their persons and their

property in and from the common hallways,” id. at 483

(emphasis added). Kline concluded that landlords must exercise

a duty of care for common hallways within their exclusive

control, but had no occasion to address a business invitor’s duty

over adjacent property or the extensive case law addressing that

area of tort law. Thus, Kline provides no support for the District

Court’s suggestion that a business invitor’s liability for an

entryway or approach should be governed by an “exclusive

power” standard. To the contrary, extensive District of

Columbia case law provides for a substantial special use

standard, just as case law from other circuits prescribes a similar

standard, and we have no basis for disturbing that precedent.

Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to

appellants, and applying Viands, Merriam, and Quigley’s

Pharmacy, the Zei Club put the I Street alley to a substantial

special use. See Viands, 107 A.2d at 119-21; Merriam, 247 F.2d

at 598; Quigley’s Pharmacy, 261 A.2d at 244. The Zei Club was

set off from any public street and surrounded by alleys. Its

patrons were invited to use the alleys as approaches and exits to

the club. The attack occurred within a few steps of the exit in the

I Street alley, which was the chief path of egress from the club.

At the hour of the attack, the only exit from the club led to the

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17

7

 The District Court pointed to evidence showing that some of

the club’s security guards—those who were off-duty MPD

officers—were not allowed to patrol the alleys. Dist. Ct. Op. at 10

(citing D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6A § 301.2, which restricts off-duty MPD

officers from patrolling areas where the MPD exercises “a special

supervisory, regulatory, or enforcement function”). There is other

record evidence indicating, however, that the club’s security guards,

including some off-duty MPD officers, routinely patrolled the alleys

around the club.

I Street alley. The exact spot of the attack was on a “calculated”

and “necessary” egress. Quigley’s Pharmacy, 261 A.2d at 244.

No other businesses used the alley at that hour, and the Zei Club

routinely used its security guards to clear the alley of loiterers

and maintain order.7

B. The Foreseeability of Intervening Criminal Conduct in

an Egress.

“It is axiomatic that under a negligence regime, one has a

duty to guard against only foreseeable risks.” Doe v. Dominion

Bank of Washington, N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1560 (D.C. Cir.

1992); see Viands, 107 A.2d at 121. “‘As a general rule the

proprietor of a place of public resort is subject to liability to his

business invitees for injuries inflicted by the acts of other

patrons or third persons if the proprietor by the exercise of

reasonable care could have known that such acts were being

done or were about to be done . . . .’” Grasso v. Blue Bell Waffle

Shop, Inc., 164 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C. 1960) (quoting Gregorc v.

Londoff Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 314 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Mo.

1958)). 

The foreseeability required when the harm is caused by the

criminal act of a third party, however, is more exacting.

“Because of the extraordinary nature of criminal conduct,”

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18

liability depends on “a heightened showing of foreseeability in

the context of an intervening criminal act.” Potts v. District of

Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C. 1997) (quotation marks

omitted). In Workman, we recently observed that the Court of

Appeals has provided only limited “specific guidance,” 320 F.3d

at 262, on what a “heightened showing” of foreseeability

requires, id. Workman explained:

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has said a

“heightened showing” is required, the requirement is a

“demanding” one, and the proof must be “precise.”

Potts, 697 A.2d at 1252. Foreseeability cannot be

predicated upon “generic information” such as crime

rates, [Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d 817,

820 (D.C. 1995)], or evidence that the defendant’s

employees worked in a “criminally active

environment,” Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc.,

634 A.2d 425, 429 (D.C. 1993). The plaintiff is not,

however, required to show “previous occurrences of

the particular type of harm”; the requirement “can be

met instead by a combination of factors which give

[the] defendant[ ] an increased awareness of the danger

of a particular criminal act.” District of Columbia v.

Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987).

320 F.3d at 262 (second and third alterations in original). After

reviewing D.C. tort cases involving a third party’s criminal

conduct, we predicted in Workman that heightened

foreseeability is present when there is a “special relationship”

between the person injured by the crime and the defendant, and

prior, similar criminal acts have occurred in the area where the

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19

8

 We noted in Workman that “[o]rdinarily, the relationship

between the parties is the key to determining whether the defendant

had a legally enforceable duty to the plaintiff.” Id. at 265 (emphasis

added). D.C. courts, however, “have in more recent cases tended to

leapfrog directly to the foreseeability issue, with the parties’

relationship [being considered] a factor relevant to determining

whether the requirement of foreseeability has been satisfied.” Id.

(emphasis added).

plaintiff was hurt. Id. at 264.8

“[T]he requirement that the defendant have been able to

foresee that a third party would likely commit a criminal act,”

we explained, “ordinarily has, and perhaps must have, a

relational component.” Id. at 263. Cases in this area “suggest a

sliding scale: If the relationship between the parties strongly

suggests a duty of protection, then specific evidence of

foreseeability is less important, whereas if the relationship is not

of a type that entails a duty of protection, then the evidentiary

hurdle is higher.” Id. at 264. We noted, for example, that in

District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d at 33-34, the Court of

Appeals determined a duty could exist where a criminal

abducted a young girl from her classroom in a public school and

raped her at a park across the street from the school. Workman,

320 F.3d at 263. The Court of Appeals found persuasive the fact

that there was evidence of prior crimes occurring in and around

the school (although there was no evidence that this exact crime

occurred previously in this location) and the fact that the victim

was a young schoolchild over whom the District of Columbia

exercised custodial care. Id.

This Court, as Workman notes, see id., looked to a special

relationship and evidence of prior similar conduct in Doe v.

Dominion Bank. There, a woman who had been raped on a

vacant floor of an office building sued the landlord of the

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20

building. The District Court entered a directed verdict for the

defendant, but we reversed because “[t]here was ample evidence

. . . that the [landlord] had incessant notice of criminal

activity—including theft, burglary, drug use, and possibly

prostitution—ongoing at [the office building] during the two and

a half years preceding Doe’s rape.” 963 F.2d at 1561. Although

there was no evidence of criminal assaults, see id., Workman

noted that in Dominion Bank “the relationship between the

plaintiff and the defendant suggested the defendant should be

held liable . . . because the landlord was in the better position

both to know about security threats and to protect against them.”

Workman, 320 F.3d at 263. The parties’ special relationship and

evidence of repeated intruders and prior nonviolent crimes made

up for the lack of evidence of prior violent crimes. Id.

Looking to the existence of a special relationship is not

novel; it is the basis for, and determines the contours of, the law

of premises liability. The Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 314A(3) (1965), provides: “[a] possessor of land who holds it

open to the public is under a . . . duty to members of the public

who enter in response to his invitation.” The duty “arise[s] out

of special relations between the parties, which create a special

responsibility.” Id. § 314A cmt. b. This “duty to protect the

other against unreasonable risk of harm extends to risks arising

. . . from the acts of third persons, whether they be innocent,

negligent, intentional, or even criminal.” Id. § 314A cmt. d.

Applying Viands and Workman to the facts before us and

looking at those facts in the light most favorable to appellants,

we conclude that a criminal attack on Novak and Valdivia in the

I Street alley met the requirements of heightened foreseeability.

The club, as business invitor, shared a special relationship with

its business invitees, patrons Novak and Valdivia. See Hall v.

Ford Enters., Ltd., 445 A.2d 610, 611 n.4 (D.C. 1982)

(“Traditionally, relationships that were considered to give rise

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21

9

 Indeed, Novak and Valdivia allege that the club hired

security guards precisely because fights occurred frequently in and

around the club. 

10 See Restatement of Torts (Second) § 314A (1965) (requiring

an “innkeeper” to observe “a similar duty to his guests” as a “common

carrier,” which “is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable

action . . . to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical

harm”); Bower v. O’Hara, 759 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1985)

(applying the innkeeper duty of § 314A to a tavern owner).

to a duty of one party to protect the other party from foreseeable

criminal acts of third persons have included the relationships of

landowner to invitee, businessman to patron, employer to

employee, school district to pupil, hospital to patient, and

common carrier to passenger.”). Additionally, there is evidence

that the Zei Club had “an increased awareness of the danger of

a particular criminal act.” District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d

at 33. Novak and Valdivia proffered testimony from the club’s

security guards and other employees indicating that fights

occurred in the club “once every two weeks at least,” “twice a

month,” or “probably 1 a month or 1 a week.” One employee

testified that he saw fights in the alley by the exit “twice a

month;” another said he saw “maybe 1 or 2 fights” each month

in the alley by the exit.9 If believed, this evidence certainly could

put a reasonable club owner on heightened notice that a serious

problem existed outside its door. See Washington Metro. Area

Transit Auth. v. O’Neill, 633 A.2d 834, 840 n.11 (D.C. 1993)

(“Virtually all courts and all commentators who have considered

the issue have concluded that a common carrier’s duty to its

passengers includes a duty to protect them from assault by

fellow passengers.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).10

The Zei Club had notice that prior fights frequently

occurred in and around the club. Indeed, in the words of the Zei

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22

11 The dissent argues that evidence of repeated “fisticuffs”

(i.e., fistfights) in and around the Zei Club was not sufficient to

demonstrate the foreseeability of Novak and Valdivia being beaten on

their way out of the club, and thus there was no need to ensure that the

club’s exit was secure. That is, if assailants routinely beat up on a

club’s patrons and yet fights generally rise only to the level of

fisticuffs, a club has a duty to exercise reasonable care to try to

prevent such fights. But it is entirely unforeseeable if an assailant

really beats up on a club patron in a future fight. We respectfully do

not see a basis for such a distinction and do not believe the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals would endorse the dissent’s suggestion

that a business need only protect against an extremely precise level of

past fighting.

In any event, there is no record basis for the dissent’s labeling

of the attack in this case as criminal “mayhem,” see D.C. Code § 22-

Club’s own incident report from the night of the attack, just

“moments” prior to the assault on Novak and Valdivia, the club

had ejected a group of patrons for fighting inside the club.

Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Novak

and Valdivia, the club cannot now seriously contend that an

assault at its exit was not legally foreseeable. The club’s special

relationship, combined with significant evidence of repeated

fights in and around the establishment, put this club on notice

that its violence problem was not “sudden and unexpected,”

Kline, 439 F.2d at 483, such that it had no duty to foresee any

problem in its alleys for its patrons. With notice of repeated

fights on its premises and in its entryways and approaches,

having made substantial special use of those entryways and

approaches, with every reason to expect that fights would

continue absent the exercise of reasonable care, and with the

power to exercise reasonable care over entryways and

approaches, a reasonable jury could believe Novak and

Valdivia’s evidence on prior similar conduct and conclude that

the Zei Club failed to take reasonable steps to secure its alley.11

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23

406 (criminalizing mayhem), as distinguished from prior violence in

and around the Zei Club that the dissent describes as mere, apparently

noncriminal, “fisticuffs.” For using wooden boards from the alley in

carrying out their attack, the two assailants convicted in this matter

faced judgments of conviction not on mayhem, but assault

charges—one for assault with a dangerous weapon, see D.C. Code

§ 22-402, and the other for aggravated assault while armed, see D.C.

Code §§ 22-404.01 and 22-4502. Moreover, the record indicates that

this attack was yet another of many fights that occurred at the Zei

Club. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, past fighting at the club,

i.e., assaults upon patrons, would also be criminal, see D.C. Code

§ 22-401 to -405 (criminalizing assault), and perhaps even mayhem in

some circumstances, see id. § 22-406. But most importantly, past

fighting such as what occurred at the Zei Club could put a reasonable

establishment on notice of highly similar violent acts being perpetrated

against its patrons.

IV.

Novak and Valdivia assert an alternative theory of

negligence liability, arguing that the Zei Club had a security

policy that mandated patrolling the alleys and that the club failed

to follow that policy the night of the criminal attack. This

alleged policy, in their view, demonstrates a duty, and failure to

follow that policy demonstrates a breach of that duty. The

District Court granted summary judgment to the Zei Club on this

claim, holding that there is no such recognized theory of liability

and that Novak and Valdivia failed to show that the club even

had such a policy. Dist. Ct. Op. at 10-13.

Even assuming arguendo that failure to follow a security

policy could establish negligence, we agree with the District

Court that appellants offered insufficient evidence that such a

policy existed. Appellants only offered testimony that Zei Club

guards patrolled the alleys; they did not present any evidence

showing that it was club policy to do so. Because there was no

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24

such evidence, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment on this claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322-23 (1986) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c)

mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). 

V.

We vacate the District Court’s judgment in favor of the

defendants, reverse the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment on appellants’ negligence claim as indicated, and

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part

and dissenting in part: 

While I concur in Part IV of the majority opinion affirming

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants

on Novak’s and Valdivia’s alternative claim of negligence

arising from the Zei Club’s alleged failure to follow its security

policy, I dissent from its holding reversing and remanding the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants as

set forth in Part III thereof—that is, even assuming the Zei Club

put the public alley outside its exit to “special use,” the Zei Club

is not liable for Novak’s and Valdivia’s injuries because the

attack on them was not foreseeable.

Tort law adheres to a “general rule of nonliability . . . for

harm resulting from the criminal acts of third parties.” Romero

v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (citing Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439

F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hall v. Ford Enters., Ltd., 445

A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1982)). The District of Columbia Court of

Appeals (D.C. Court of Appeals) has created an exception to this

“general rule” if “the criminal act is so foreseeable that a duty

arises to guard against it.” McKethean v. Wash. Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 588 A.2d 708, 717 (D.C. 1991). While its

articulation of the exception is hardly self-defining, our review

of the case law suggested to us that “the requirement that the

defendant have been able to foresee that a third party would

likely commit a criminal act ordinarily has, and perhaps must

have, a relational component.” See Workman v. United

Methodist Comm. on Relief of Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries of

United Methodist Church, 320 F.3d 259, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

We found that the D.C. Court of Appeals in fact tends to follow

a “sliding scale” whereby “[i]f the relationship between the

parties strongly suggests a duty of protection, then specific

evidence of foreseeability is less important, whereas if the

relationship is not of a type that entails a duty of protection, then

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2

1

The sliding scale makes sense if one views foreseeability as an

aspect of the duty prong of the prima facie negligence case as the D.C.

Court of Appeals does. See McKethean, 588 A.2d at 717. But see

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40 cmt. K (“However, consistent with

its treatment throughout this Restatement, this subsection rejects the

requirement of knowledge (or foreseeability) of the danger as an

aspect of the duty.”). 

the evidentiary hurdle is higher.” Id. at 264. The duty imposed,

therefore, is one of degree: the closer the relationship between

the plaintiff and defendant—that is, the more control the

defendant exercises over the plaintiff—the more exacting the

defendant’s duty to provide for the plaintiff’s well-being and,

accordingly, the less necessary becomes “specific evidence of

foreseeability.”1

 Id. At one end of the scale—requiring less

foreseeability—is a custodial relationship such as between a

school and a student, see District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d

30, 33 (D.C. 1987), while, at the other end of the

scale—requiring specific foreseeability—is no relationship

between the parties. 

Here, a relationship existed between the Zei Club and Novak

and Valdivia—that of invitor and invitees. Although the

majority identifies the relationship, see maj. op. at 20, it does not

determine where on the sliding scale it falls. A close reading of

D.C. case law suggests, I believe, that the invitor-invitee

relationship falls somewhere closer to the “no relationship” end

of the scale—requiring fairly specific evidence of foreseeability.

In recent cases involving the invitor-invitee relationship, the

D.C. Court of Appeals held that the criminal acts of third parties

were not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the invitor

to protect the invitee. Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d

817 (D.C. 1995), is instructive. In that case, Bailey was shot

while exiting a cheerleading competition held at a D.C. junior

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3

high school. The defendant District moved for summary

judgment and, in response, Bailey submitted affidavits of

witnesses who testified that the neighborhood in which the

school was located was a “high drug area” and that shootings

and other violent crimes had taken place nearby. Id. at 820. The

trial court granted the District summary judgment, concluding

that 

[t]he question is not whether defendant should have

known that fights, or minor scuffles might erupt at this

gathering of 500-600 people on school property in the

absence of an adequate security presence, including at

the least a police cruiser. Rather, the question is whether

the District had a duty to guard against a reasonably

foreseeable risk that a person attending the competition

would decide to settle a dispute with another individual

over an item of clothing by indiscriminately shooting at

that person while in the midst of a crowd of spectators.

Id. at 819–20 (alteration in original) (quoting trial court order).

The D.C. Court of Appeals expressly agreed with the trial

court’s analysis of the foreseeability issue. It dismissed Bailey’s

evidence as “generic information,” insufficient to establish the

foreseeability of the particular type of violent crime at the

particular location. Critically, the court observed that “there was

no evidence of prior gun-related violence or assaults occurring

at the school or at any of the many cheerleading competitions

that had been held anywhere in the city.” Id. at 821. 

More recently, in Potts v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d

1249 (D.C. 1997), the plaintiffs were shot while leaving the

Washington Convention Center (WCC) after having attended a

boxing match. They sued Spencer Promotions, the event’s

organizer, and the District, the WCC’s owner. The D.C. Court

of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

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4

to the defendants because the “plaintiffs [had] proffered no

evidence of any prior gun-related violence at any other event

held at the WCC or promoted by Spencer Promotions, nor any

other specific evidence bearing directly on the foreseeability of

the shooting incident at issue here.” Id. at 1252. 

I believe that the invitor-invitee relationship is akin to the

employer-employee relationship and falls at about the same

place on the “sliding scale.” The D.C. Court of Appeals requires

fairly specific evidence of foreseeability in the employeremployee context. In Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, 634 A.2d

425 (D.C.1993), an employee’s widow sued the deceased’s

employer after he was fatally shot in the employer’s parking lot.

The plaintiff offered an expert witness who testified about

criminal activity in the surrounding area. The court held that the

plaintiff failed to show that the criminal act was foreseeable

because “[n]o evidence was introduced involv[ing] any gunrelated incidents at the particular shopping mall in which the

shooting occurred.” Potts, 697 A.2d at 1252 (summarizing

Clement’s holding). 

Ignoring cases directly on point—that is, cases involving an

invitor’s duty to protect an invitee from the criminal acts of third

parties—the majority finds that the relationship between the Zei

Club and Novak and Valdivia frees the two plaintiffs from

having to produce “specific evidence” that the criminal act was

“particularly foreseeable.” Workman, 320 F.3d at 262–63; see

maj. op. at 20–22. But the D.C. Court of Appeals has recently

observed that “Potts, Bailey, and Clement . . . demonstrate the

tight boundaries—requiring precise proof of a heightened

showing of foreseeability.” District of Columbia v. Beretta,

U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 643 (D.C. 2005) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The three cases

manifest that, when suing an invitor, the invitee must show that

the particular type of criminal act at the particular location was

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5

foreseeable. See Potts, 697 A.2d at 1252 (“In this case, as in

Bailey and Clement, plaintiffs proffered no evidence of any

prior gun-related violence at any other event held at the WCC

or promoted by Spencer Promotions.” (emphasis added));

Clement, 634 A.2d at 429 (“For example, only one offense, a

robbery at a nearby Giant supermarket, involved a firearm and

no homicides had been reported.” (emphasis added)); Bailey,

668 A.2d at 820 (“Bailey proffered no evidence of any shooting

incidents, assaults, or other gun-related violence at any

Department cheerleading competition or any other Department

event held at Evans Junior High School” (emphasis added)).

Novak and Valdivia have failed to make this showing. Police

reports from the 15 months preceding Novak’s and Valdivia’s

injuries show only three incidents occurring at the Zei Club: two

incidents involving fights between patrons inside the club and a

third incident just outside the doorway involving an employee

of the club. See Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., No, 01-

cv-39, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. July 12, 2004). Similarly, the Zei

Club’s internal records show no fights occurring in either the I

Street alley or the Zei Street alley. Appellants’ Br. 15;

Appellees’ Br. 15. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to them, as we must at the summary judgment stage,

see Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179 F.3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir.

1999), Novak and Valdivia have shown only that altercations

occurred in either of the two alleys as often as twice each month

and that they ranged from “pushing to fist fights.” See maj. op.

at 3 (describing alleys’ location). All they have shown,

however, is that “fights, or minor scuffles might erupt” in the I

Street alley. Bailey, 668 A.2d at 819. Fisticuffs is not what

occurred here. In Novak’s and Valdivia’s own words, they were

the victims of a “vicious and deadly assault by which [the

perpetrators] sought to kill and/or seriously injure [them].”

Compl. ¶ 42. In short, the perpetrators lay in wait for them

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6

2

As the majority notes, see maj. op. at 4, the injuries Novak and

Valdivia sustained manifest that their attackers committed mayhem,

regardless what crime they were charged with. The D.C. Court of

Appeals has held that “essential elements of the crime of mayhem are:

(1) that the defendant caused permanent disabling injury to another;

(2) that he had the general intent to do the injurious act; and (3) that

he did so willfully and maliciously.” Peoples v. United States, 640

A.2d 1047, 1054 (D.C. 1994) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). 

3

The majority claims I imply that pushing/fisticuffs is

“noncriminal.” Maj. op. at 23 n.11. Not so. Certain crimes—e.g.,

attempted murder (which is what Novak and Valdivia allege their

attackers committed, see Compl. ¶ 42)—are simply more egregious

than others—e.g., simple assault (that is, fisticuffs/pushing). The

majority also characterizes my dissent as concluding that fisticuffs

may have been foreseeable but “really beating” someone was not.

Maj. op. at 22 n.11 (emphasis omitted). If the majority equates “really

beating” with attempted murder, then, yes, I believe fisticuffs may

have been foreseeable but attempted murder (“really beating” with the

intent to kill) was not. Just as an occasional pickpocket does not,

under District of Columbia precedent, make foreseeable an armed

robbery, an occasional drunken shoving match does not make

attempted murder foreseeable. 

intending to commit mayhem2—a criminal act that was wholly

unforeseeable.3 Because they have failed to establish an

essential element of their claim, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), that is, “the criminal act is so

foreseeable that a duty arises to guard against it,” McKethean,

588 A.2d at 717 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

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7

the defendants. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the

reversal and remand of the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the defendants as set forth in Part III of the majority

opinion. 

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