Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01023/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry D. Scott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1023

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jerry D. Scott

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: September 25, 2015

 Filed: April 1, 2016

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Jerry Scott appeals his conviction and sentence on several drug and firearms

charges following a jury trial. He argues that five of the six convictions must be

overturned because they were based on evidence obtained by police from two vehicle

searches—one conducted on May 12, 2010, and the other on March 26, 2012—that

he contends were illegal. He also argues there was insufficient evidence presented at

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trial to support three of the six convictions. Finally, he claims that the sentence

imposed by the district court was both substantively unreasonable and

unconstitutional. Exercising jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1

I.

Scott was charged in a seven-count indictment. Counts 4–6 were based on

evidence obtained from a May 12, 2010, search of his vehicle: possession with intent

to distribute PCP in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), being a felon

in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). Counts 1–3 were based on evidence obtained from a March 26,

2012, search of his vehicle: possession with intent to distribute PCP in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation

of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a

drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Finally, Count 7 was based

on an August 20, 2010, search of a house: possession with intent to distribute PCP

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Prior to trial, Scott moved to

suppress the evidence obtained from both the May 12, 2010, and the March 26, 2012,

vehicle searches. Both motions were denied after an evidentiary hearing. 

At the conclusion of trial, Scott was acquitted on Count 6 (possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime) and convicted of the lesser included

offense of simple possession of PCP on Count 4, but was convicted on all the

remaining counts. 

1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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A. May 12, 2010, Search

While on patrol the night of May 12, 2010, Kansas City Police Officer Mark

McKenney saw a red Dodge Shelby Charger parked by the side of the road. In later

testimony about the events of that night, McKenney said that he approached the

Dodge from behind in his patrol car and, when he was about five to ten feet away, saw

that its windows were down and smelled what he believed to be PCP. Nevertheless,

instead of stopping, McKenney circled the block. When he returned, he found that the

Dodge was gone.

Shortly afterwards, McKenney saw the same Shelby Charger again—and this

time he pulled the car over. He approached the driver’s side window and told the two

men inside the car that they had been illegally parked when he had first passed. (In

fact, they hadn’t been: McKenney said he only told them they were to keep them

calm.) He proceeded to ask the men something to the effect of, “Are you smoking that

wet now?” “Wet” refers to PCP, and McKenney testified that he asked them if they

were smoking it because he had smelled the odor of PCP and marijuana as he walked

up to their window.2

 The two men in the car said no, they were just smoking

marijuana. McKenney also reported seeing “green leafy residue” that he thought

looked like marijuana on both their laps when he approached the car.

McKenney obtained identification from the two men in the car and found that

the driver of the vehicle was Jerry Scott and the passenger was a man named Andre

Christian. McKenney ran their names through the police car computer and discovered

that Christian had three outstanding warrants, while Scott was listed as having

engaged in aggressive acts toward law enforcement in the past. By that point, other

officers had arrived, and McKenney asked one of the assisting officers to arrest

2

McKenney’s testimony was somewhat unclear on this point: he later testified

that when he approached the Dodge the second time, the car’s windows were up and

he could not remember whether he smelled PCP.

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Christian and put him in handcuffs. He also decided to have the Dodge towed, since

the car was rented and he believed that having drugs in the car violated the rental

agreement. He asked another officer to shine a flashlight on the door to help him

locate the car’s vehicle identification number. As they checked the door, both officers

saw a gun in the door’s side pocket. At that point, Scott was arrested. Before the car

was towed, the officers searched the car and found two vials of PCP.

After charges were filed against him, Scott moved to suppress the evidence

obtained in the May 2010 search. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and

issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the motion be denied. Scott

objected, arguing that a dashboard camera video showed that Scott’s car window was

rolled up during McKenney’s first approach, not down as McKenney testified, and

thus McKenney could not have detected an odor emanating from the car. On review,

the district court watched the video and noted that “while it is not totally clear, there

appears to be a reflection from street lights and/or lights from the patrol car, on the

area of the passenger window that Officer McKenney testified was down. The

reflection appears to indicate that at the time the image was captured, the window was

at least partially up.” Nevertheless, the district court concluded that “even if the

window was raised as Officer McKenney passed, that does not dictate, by itself,

whether Officer McKenney’s testimony as a whole is truthful or not.” The district

court then adopted all of the magistrate judge’s credibility findings, including

McKenney’s claim that he smelled PCP as he drove past the vehicle. It also adopted

the magistrate judge’s ultimate recommendation that the motion to suppress should

be denied.

Scott’s challenge to the May 12, 2010, search of his car turns on a factual issue: 

did McKenney smell PCP when he first passed Scott’s car, or did he simply stop Scott

based on a hunch that he was involved in illegal activity? If it was the former,

reasonable suspicion existed to stop the car. See United States v. Gipp, 147 F.3d 680,

685 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable suspicion to investigate further when police

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officer smelled odor of marijuana coming from defendant’s car). And after Scott and

his passenger admitted smoking marijuana, police would have had probable cause to

believe that the car contained contraband, see United States v. McCarty, 612 F.3d

1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010), permitting them to make a warrantless search of the car

under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, see Maryland v. Dyson,

527 U.S. 465, 466–67 (1999) (per curiam).3

 If, on the other hand, McKenney had

simply been acting on a “mere hunch,” he would not have been permitted to pull Scott

over, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014), and the evidence resulting

from the stop would have to be suppressed.

The magistrate judge who held the evidentiary hearing believed McKenney

when he testified that he smelled PCP when he first approached Scott’s car, and the

district court adopted all of the magistrate judge’s factual findings. On appeal, we

review those findings of fact for clear error, and so long as a factual finding is “based

upon ‘a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic

evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear

error.’” United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).

Scott argues that there is independent evidence showing that at least part of

McKenney’s testimony was untrue: McKenney was insistent that Scott’s passenger

side window was down when he first drove past, but Scott claims that the dashboard

camera video from McKenney’s carshowsthat the window was up. The district court

was inclined to agree that the window was at least partially up, but nevertheless

credited the magistrate judge’s determination that the rest of McKenney’s

3

The fact that the police officers were actually looking for the car’s VIN rather

than for drugs would not transform the search into an illegal one because, apart from

a few exceptions not relevant here, an officer’s motive does not invalidate objectively

justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996).

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testimony—including his claim that he smelled PCP from Scott’s car—was true. 

Having reviewed the video ourselves, we conclude that the district court’s description

of it is not clearly erroneous.

Insofar as the district court made a factual finding that the window was at least

partly up, that does not prove that its factual finding that McKenney smelled the PCP

in Scott’s car on his first approach was clearly erroneous. True, there are some facts

that cast doubt on histestimony. McKenney testified that he smelled what he believed

to be PCP in Scott’s car while sitting in his own patrol car about five to ten feet behind

Scott. Yet McKenney conceded that when he approached the car the second time, the

windows were up, and he could not remember whether he could smell PCP on that

occasion. When asked on cross-examination whether he could smell the PCP

contained in a sealed can on the government’s table in the courtroom, McKenney said

he could not. But this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the possibility that

McKenney did, in fact, smell the PCP in Scott’s car on his first approach, particularly

if the vials of PCP in Scott’s car were open, unlike the sealed can of PCP on the

government’s table. Whether we would come to the conclusion in the first instance

that McKenney smelled PCP in two vials inside Scott’s car when sitting in his own

car five to ten feet away is not the question before us. We hold only that the district

court’s factual findings cannot be set aside, given the deference we owe them. United

States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court’s

credibility determinations “require a high degree of deference”).

Because McKenney’s initial stop of Scott’s car was lawful, we affirm the

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the

subsequent search.

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B. March 26, 2012, Search

In the spring of 2012, Detective Brian Tomanio of the Kansas City Police

Department received information from a confidential source, who had been detained

as part of a separate drug investigation. The confidential source said that he or she

knew an individual named Jerry Scott who lived in the area of 40th Street and

Woodland Avenue in Kansas City, and who was known to sell PCP and carry a

firearm—though the source had never personally seen Scott selling any drugs. The

confidential source described Scott’s approximate height and weight, and said he

drove a black Lincoln Navigator. At the time he received this information, Tomanio

had never previously worked with the confidential source.

Tomanio ran some computer searches and determined that a Jerry Scott did own

a black Lincoln Navigator and lived at 3937 Woodland Avenue—an address near the

intersection with 40th Street. He also determined that Scott did not have a valid

driver’s license, and had a prior criminal history involving drugs and

weapons—specifically, arrests or convictions for possession of a controlled substance

and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The computer searches also yielded

a photo of Scott.

At this point, Tomanio began surveilling the residence at 3937 Woodland

Avenue, and noted a black Lincoln Navigator parked in front on multiple occasions. 

On March 26, 2012, while watching the house, Tomanio saw Scott and a woman leave

the house and get in the Lincoln—Scott in the driver’s seat, and the woman in the

front passenger seat. When Scott and the woman drove off in the car, Tomanio

contacted Officers Chad Pickens and Jason Cramblit of the Kansas City Police

Department, and asked them to stop the Lincoln Navigator because Scott did not have

a valid driver’s license. He had previously told the two officers that Scott was being

investigated for selling PCP, that he was usually armed, and that he was a convicted

felon.

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Pickens and Cramblit used their police car computer to pull up a photo of Scott

and verify that his driver’s license was invalid, and then they stopped the Lincoln

Navigator. Cramblit walked to the driver’s side door, but the front driver’s side

window would not roll down. He was forced instead to talk to Scott through the rear

driver’s-side window, which itself only went down a little more than halfway. 

Because all the windows were tinted, Cramblit was unable to get a full view of the

interior of the car. Both officers testified that they smelled a strong scent of cologne

or perfume coming from inside the car.

Cramblit asked Scott for his license and testified that after an “abnormal amount

of time,” Scott provided it. When Cramblit saw that it was expired, he asked Scott to

exit the vehicle, patted him down, and had him stand on the curb. The passenger also

exited the car. Meanwhile, Pickens went back to the police car, ran the names of both

Scott and his passenger through the police car computer, and found that the passenger

had at least three outstanding city warrants. Although the officers believed they could

arrest both Scott and his passenger at this point (for driving on an expired license and

for having outstanding warrants, respectively), they decided instead to write tickets

and release them.

Pickens then told Scott that he was going to write some tickets and that he was

going to make sure that there were no weapons in the passenger compartment of the

vehicle, because he planned to have Scott and his passenger sit in the car while the

tickets were written up. Scott did not immediately respond. Cramblit testified,

however, that about five to ten seconds after Pickens opened the passenger front door,

Scott told him something like, “Hey, I don’t know if I like you all going through my

vehicle.” At that point, Cramblit called out, “Hey, Pick,”—referring to his partner,

Pickens—and arrested Scott for not having a valid driver’s license and insurance, as

well as having an improper video screen on his dashboard. Scott’s passenger was also

arrested on the outstanding warrants. Unbeknownst to Cramblit, shortly before he

said, “Hey, Pick,” Pickens had located a firearm and what appeared to be PCP in the

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center console of the Lincoln. After seeing that both Scott and his companion were

being put under arrest, Pickens searched the entire car and found additional drugs and

another gun. The officers then had the Lincoln Navigator towed. After charges were

filed, Scott moved to suppress the evidence gathered in the search. Following an

evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion.

The district court concluded that the March 26, 2012, search could be justified

as a “protective sweep” under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). That case

held that when police officers have reasonable suspicion to conclude that the driver

of a car is armed and dangerous, they are entitled to search not only the driver’s

person but also the driver’s car for any weapons that might endanger the officers. 

Long, 463 U.S. at 1045–52.

Scott first argues that the rule derived from Long was limited by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, which held that police officers can only search

a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest if the arrestee has access to the vehicle’s passenger

compartment or if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest

might be found in the vehicle. 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). But it is undisputed that

Scott was not under arrest at the time Pickens searched his car and found drugs and

a gun, and we have rejected the notion that Gant’s requirements apply when no arrest

has taken place. See United States v. Morgan, 729 F.3d 1086, 1089–90 (8th Cir.

2013); United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998, 1002 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Gant,

556 U.S. at 352 (Scalia, J., concurring)); United States v. Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d

1117, 1120–21 (8th Cir. 2009).

Scott also argues that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conclude

that he was armed and dangerous. The government relies on several factors to say

otherwise. Whether or not each factor present in this case, standing alone, was

sufficient to justify the protective sweep, we agree with the district court that the facts

taken as a whole justify the search of Scott’s car. In evaluating reasonable suspicion,

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we look at whether the facts collectively provide a basis for reasonable suspicion,

rather than whether each fact on its own does so. United States v. Peoples, 925 F.2d

1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1991). Even factors that, when considered individually, are

consistent with innocent travel can, when taken together, amount to reasonable

suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989). When viewed as a

whole, we conclude that the facts known to the police officers did give rise to

reasonable suspicion that Scott might be dangerous if allowed to reenter his car.

At the time of the protective sweep, the officers had information that Scott had

a prior criminal record involving drugs and firearms. Exactly which of Scott’s

convictions the police considered at the time is unclear from the record, but whichever

they were, those convictions occurred several years prior to his March 26, 2012,

arrest. Scott’s most recent convictions involving violence were two 2008 convictions

for domestic assault; and the last firearm conviction was for being a felon in

possession of a firearm in 2000. These were four years and twelve years, respectively,

before the stop at issue. He had been arrested for drug possession and being a felon

in possession of a firearm based on the evidence seized during the May 2010 stop

recounted earlier, but he had not yet been convicted of those offenses. There is no

bright-line test for determining when information used to justify a protective sweep

is too stale to be relevant, and this determination cannot be based simply on counting

the number of days between the present offense and the prior conviction. See United

States v. Stachowiak, 521 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2008). Yet, at some point the

conclusions that can be drawn from a conviction or arrest are too attenuated to play

a role in determining whether a protective sweep is justified. While we recognize that

the age of Scott’s convictions is a factor to consider in determining their relevance,

we conclude that the convictions here were not too remote in time to contribute to the

officers’ reasonable suspicion that Scott was armed and dangerous. 

In addition, Tomanio’s confidential source told him that Scott was known to

sell PCP and carry a firearm, and that information was relayed to the officers. The

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confidential source had never personally seen Scott carry a firearm or sell drugs, but

the officers were entitled to rely on this information, in combination with other facts,

to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to search Scott’s car. Tomanio was able

to corroborate various aspects of the source’s account through surveillance and

computer searches, like the fact that Scott did, in fact, drive a black Lincoln Navigator,

and lived in the area the source claimed. See United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d

1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f an informant is otherwise unknown to police and has

no proven track record of reliability, police may deem an informant credible and make

a finding of probable cause when an informant’s information is at least partly

corroborated.”); United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Even

‘the corroboration of minor, innocent details can suffice to establish probable cause.’”

(citation omitted)). In addition, the confidential source’s identity was known to

police, as he or she had been detained as part of a separate drug investigation. 

“Though less reliable than informants with a proven record, unproven informants are

more reliable than anonymous tipsters because the police can hold them responsible

for false information.” United States v. Kent, 531 F.3d 642, 648–49 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Since the confidential source in this case was not anonymous, less corroboration was

required. Id. at 649.

In addition to Scott’s criminal record and the information from the confidential

source, the officers were faced with a situation where they had limited visibility into

Scott’s car, making it more difficult for them to verify that it would be safe to let him

reenter. The car’s windows were heavily tinted, and none of the windows would roll

down all the way, heavily obstructing the officers’ views into the car. The poor

visibility into the car gave police officers additional reason to suspect that letting

Scott and his passenger back into the car might be dangerous. Cf. United States v.

Newell, 596 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The officers were not required to hope

[the defendant] was not arming himself behind the heavily-tinted windows while they

asked him to roll down the window . . . .”).

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Scott correctly points out that it was the officers’ own decision to have Scott

and his passenger wait in the car while they wrote up the tickets. He contends that

officers should not be allowed to create a risky situation and then use that situation to

justify a protective sweep. But even if the officers had written up the tickets while

Scott and his passenger waited on the curb, they eventually would have had to let

them reenter the car, where firearms might have been hidden. See Long, 463 U.S. at

1051–52 (“[I]f the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter

his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside.”); United States

v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453, 457 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is settled that once reasonable

suspicion is established, a protective search of a vehicle’s interior is permissible

regardless of whether the occupants have been removed from the vehicle.”). We are

mindful of Scott’s concern, but do not believe it carries the day in this case.

When viewed as a whole, the particular combination of circumstances known

to the officers was sufficient to justify the search of Scott’s car as a protective sweep. 

As a result, we need not reach the government’s alternative argument that the search

could be justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Scott also challenges whether there was sufficient evidence to support his

convictions for possession with intent to distribute PCP and possession of a firearm

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime based on the evidence obtained on March

26, 2012. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support those convictions. 

Police found an eye dropper, More brand cigarettes, and a bottle of PCP in Scott’s

Lincoln Navigator. The government presented testimony from Detective Tomanio,

who had investigated ten to twenty drug cases involving PCP, that More brand

cigarettes and eyedroppers are associated with the distribution of PCP: eye droppers

are often used to drop PCP onto More brand cigarettes prior to distribution. The

government also presented testimony from Detective Doug Blodgett of the Jackson

County Drug Task Force, who said that eye droppers are often used to transfer PCP

into smaller vials for distribution. Moreover, police found two firearms close to the

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drugs, and Pickens testified that he often found guns and drugs together when

investigating drug traffickers. We have found similar evidence sufficient to support

convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See

United States v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 490 (8th Cir. 2010). Consequently, we deny

his sufficiency challenges to these counts.

C. August 20, 2010, Search

Scott was also convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute

PCP based on evidence obtained from an August 20, 2010, search of a house at 4332

Bales Avenue in Kansas City. Evidence regarding this search was presented at trial

through the testimony of Detective Blodgett. Blodgett testified that after obtaining a

knock-and-announce warrant the morning of August 20, police made a forced entry

into the house at 4332 Bales Avenue. At the time the warrant was issued, the only

information Blodgett had about the target of the warrant was that he was “a black male

known as Jay,” who Blodgett said was later determined to be Jerry Scott. The

information was apparently obtained from a confidential informant who did not testify

at trial. At the time the police entered the house, no occupants were present.

The search of the house turned up two large bottles of PCP, various vials of

PCP, and More brand cigarettes. Blodgett testified that the amount of PCP found was

consistent with distribution, rather than use, as was the eyedropper police found on the

premises—eyedroppers being often used to transfer PCP into smaller vials, according

to Blodgett. The police also found several pieces of mail, including a utility bill

addressed to Scott, and a lease for the residence that had been signed three months

previously and listed Scott as a lessee along with another individual named Lielah

Hudson. Other pieces of mail found in the house, however, were addressed to Scott

but featured a different (though nearby) address, 4342 Bales Avenue, where Scott

lived. These included a traffic ticket, a vehicle registration, and mail from the

Missouri Department of Corrections Board of Probation and Parole.

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In order to support a conviction for possessing a controlled substance with

intent to distribute based on the drugs discovered during the August 20, 2010, search

of the property at 4332 Bales Avenue, the government had to show that Scott

possessed the controlled substance and intended to distribute it. See United States v.

Thompson, 686 F.3d 575, 583 (8th Cir. 2012). Because Scott did not have the drugs

in his actual possession, the government had to show that he constructively possessed

the distribution-quantity PCP found in the house. United States v. Howard, 427 F.3d

554, 557 (8th Cir. 2005). To prove constructive possession, the government must

show that the defendant had “ownership, dominion or control over the contraband

itself, or dominion over the premises in which the contraband [was] concealed.” 

United States v. Stevens, 439 F.3d 983, 989–90 (8th Cir. 2006).

The government asserts that the jury could legitimately conclude that Scott had

dominion over the premises because he (along with another person) was listed as a

lessee, because there was mail, including a utility bill, addressed to him, and because

police had information from a confidential informant that a man named “Jay” was

selling PCP from 4332 Bales Avenue, who Blodgett testified was later determined to

be Scott. We have previously held that “where there is joint occupancy of a residence,

dominion over the premises by itself is insufficient to establish constructive

possession.” United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1168 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing

United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 762 (8th Cir. 1987), and United States v. Mudd,

685 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2012)). Here, Scott did not even have joint occupancy

over the house—the government conceded that he lived in another house nearby. But

this was not the only evidence potentially relevant to constructive possession that the

jury heard. This count was only one of several drug-related charges that were tried

together. As a result, the jury also heard evidence that three months earlier, in May

2010, Scott had been arrested after PCP was found in his car.4

 The government also

4

We note that the jury found Scott guilty of the lesser-included offense of

possession of PCP on Count 4. 

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presented evidence that Scott had PCP in his car again in March 2012. At trial, Scott

did not ask for the count arising out of the August 2010 search to be severed from

either of the other counts charging him with possession of PCP with intent to

distribute. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). Nor does he contend on appeal that severance

was required. In short, the jury heard without objection that Scott had possessed PCP

before and after August 2010, that Scott was a co-lessee of a house where distributionlevel quantities of PCP were found, and that a confidential informant told police that

‘Jay’ (i.e., Scott) was selling PCP from that house. Together, that evidence was

sufficient for the jury to find that he constructively possessed the PCP found at 4332

Bales Avenue, and to find him guilty of this count.

D. Sentencing

At Scott’s sentencing hearing, the district court, applying a career offender

enhancement, imposed concurrent sentences of 240 months’ imprisonment for the two

convictions involving possession with intent to distribute PCP, concurrent sentences

of 300 months for the two felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm convictions, a concurrent

12-month sentence for possession of PCP, and a consecutive 60-month sentence for

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, resulting in a total

sentence of 360 months.

At the time of sentencing before the district court and during the initial briefing

on appeal, Scott’s only challenge to his 360-month sentence was that it was

substantively unreasonable. Shortly before oral argument, however, he moved to file

a supplemental brief on whether one of the provisions of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines used by the district court in sentencing him was unconstitutionally vague. 

We granted the motion, and supplemental briefs have been filed.

The district court found Scott to be a “career offender” under the Sentencing

Guidelines, meaning he had “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of

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violence or a controlled substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1. A “crime of violence”

in turn is defined as an offense that (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another”; (2) is enumerated in

the Guidelines or accompanying commentary as a crime of violence; or (3) “otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 

USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1)–(2). The district court found that Scott’s two prior convictions

for second-degree domestic assault and his prior conviction for second-degree robbery

qualified as crimes of violence under clause (3), the “residual clause.” The Supreme

Court recently held that the identically-worded residual clause that forms part of the

definition of the term “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was

unconstitutionally vague, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015), and

Scott argues that the residual clause found in the career offender guidelines is too.

The government does not dispute that the residual clause of USSG

§ 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague, but argues that even if the district court

erred by relying on the residual clause, the error was harmless since Scott’s two

domestic assault convictions and his robbery conviction also qualify as crimes of

violence under clause (1), the “use of force” clause. Under binding circuit precedent,

the government is correct.

The Missouri statute that provided the basis for Scott’s two second-degree

domestic assault convictions criminalizes the following conduct:

(1) Attempt[ing] to cause or knowingly caus[ing] physical

injury to [a] family or household member by any means,

including but not limited to, by use of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument, or by choking or strangulation; or

(2) Recklessly caus[ing] serious physical injury to [a]

family or household member; or

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(3) Recklessly caus[ing] physical injury to [a] family or

household member by means of any deadly weapon.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.073.1. The indictment showed that Scott was convicted under

subsection (1) for both convictions, and Scott concedes that he “was charged under

subsection (1) of the second-degree domestic assault statute.”

We recently interpreted the “use of force” clause of USSG § 4B1.2 as covering

any offense that required intentionally or knowingly causing “physical injury,” as

Arkansas defines that term. See United States v. Rice, No. 14-3615, 2016 WL

537589, at *2–3 (8th Cir. Feb. 11, 2016). But see id. at *3–4 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 

Arkansas defined “physical injury” to mean “(A) Impairment of physical condition;

(B) Infliction of substantial pain; or (C) Infliction of bruising, swelling, or visible

marks associated with physical trauma.” Id. at *2 n.2 (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-

102 (2006)). At the relevant time period, Missouri defined “physical injury” to mean

“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §

556.061 (2006). These two definitions are similar enough that Rice is not

meaningfully distinguishable. Since, under Rice, Scott’s two convictions for seconddegree domestic assault constitute “crimes of violence,” he was properly found to be

a “career offender” under USSG § 4B1.1. As a result, we need not reach the

constitutionality of the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2).

We also find that the district court’s sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment was

not substantively unreasonable. We “consider the substantive reasonableness of the

sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Scott’s 360-month sentence, undoubtedly long, was nevertheless

at the bottom of his Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. 

In imposing the sentence, the district court properly considered the factors set forth

at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Scott’s prior history of firearm possession and other

offenses and the ineffectiveness of the prior punishments he had received. As a result,

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we cannot find that the district court’s within-Guidelines sentence was an abuse of

discretion.

II.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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