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Parties Involved:
Ray Martinez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LLD 

Unitad State& C<,urt of Appea\t Tenth Cit"CU\t 

PUBLISH NOV 171992 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Nos. 91-2286, 91-2287, 91-2288, 91-2298 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RAY MARTINEZ; EDGAR BUEZO, a/k/a) 

Edgar Martinez; ELOY CARRANZA; ) 

and RUDY RODRIGUEZ, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

D.C. Nos. CR-91-07-03-JC; 

CR-91-07-04-JC; 

CR-91-07-05-JC; 

CR-91-07-02-JC 

James D. Tierney, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Don J. Svet, United 

States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Richard J. Knowles, Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief for 

Defendant-Appellant Ray Martinez. 

Joseph N. Riggs III, Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief for 

Defendant-Appellant Eloy Carranza. 

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Paul J. Kennedy, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant 

Edgar Buezo. 

Peter Schoenburg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant Rudy Rodriguez. 

Before MOORE, LAY,* and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

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This is a consolidated appeal by defendants Edgar Buezo, Rudy 

Rodriguez, Ray Martinez, and Eloy Carranza from convictions for 

drug trafficking offenses, including conspiracy to distribute more 

than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 u.s.c. § 846, 18 u.s.c. § 2; 

possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of 

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (A); and use of a 

firearm during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) and 

§ 2. Defendants present a number of issues, some jointly and some 

separately, which relate to theories of entrapment, joinder, 

instructions, admissibility of evidence, and sentencing. 1 After 

consideration of all the issues, we affirm the convictions. 

The action arises from a Drug Enforcement Administration 

"sting operation" involving DEA agents in Chicago and Albuquerque 

and a confidential paid informant in New York City, known only by 

the assumed name of "Juan Carlos." The operation culminated with 

the arrests of the defendants in Albuquerque while they were 

attempting to consummate the sale of six kilograms of cocaine. 

Disclosure of the Confidential Informant 

A common issue raised by defendants Buezo, Martinez, and 

Rodriguez is their defense of entrapment. Mr. Buezo claims he was 

directly ensnared by Juan Carlos, and the other two argue they 

were "vicariously" entrapped. Without the disclosure of the 

confidential informant, defendants maintain their defense of 

entrapment was undermined. 

1 Mr. Carranza and Mr. Martinez have submitted their 

the briefs. 

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cases on 

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Defendants contend the district court erred by failing to 

require the government to disclose the true identity of Juan 

Carlos and produce him at trial for cross-examination. We review 

this issue under an abuse bf discretion standard. United States 

v. Moralez, 908 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The Supreme Court has articulated a balancing test for 

revealing confidential informants in Roviaro v. United States, 353 

U.S. 53 (1957): 

Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of 

the contents of his communication, is relevant and 

helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to 

a fair determination of a cause, the privilege [of 

secrecy] must give way. 

We believe that no fixed rule with respect to 

disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that 

calls for balancing the public interest in protecting 

the flow of information against the individual's right 

to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance 

renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the 

particular circumstances of each case, taking into 

consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, 

the possible significance of the informer's testimony, 

and other relevant factors. 

Id. at 60-62 (emphasis added). We have described this balancing 

of interests more recently in Moralez, 908 F.2d 565. 

[C]ases involving confidential informants fall into 

several broad categories. At one extreme are the cases 

where the informant is a mere tipster, and disclosure is 

not required. ·At the other extreme are cases such as 

Roviaro itself where the informant has played a crucial 

role .in the alleged criminal transaction, and disclosure 

and production of the informant are required to ensure a 

fair trial. In addition, there are cases where there is 

a slight possibility a defendant might benefit from 

disclosure, but the government has demonstrated a 

compelling need to protect its informant. 

Id. at 568 (citations omitted). 

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In United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 

1992), we upheld the denial of disclosure even though the 

defendant asserted the testimony of the informant was critical to 

the defense of entrapment ·; holding, "Where the value of the 

informer's testimony remains speculative at best, we cannot say 

the district court erred by denying disclosure of the informer's 

identity." Id. at 1001. To permit the trial court to make the 

required balancing test, we held in Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 

1369 (10th Cir. 1981), an in camera hearing can be used to 

determine whether the informant's testimony would lend aid to the 

defense. A defendant seeking disclosure of the identity of a 

confidential informant has the burden of demonstrating a need for 

disclosure. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59. 

Defendant Buezo, contending the informant was the only person 

who could offer direct testimony about his entrapment defense, 

filed a pretrial motion in which he sought to compel the 

disclosure of Juan Carlos' identity and his presence at trial. 

The district court granted the motion and set an in camera Gaines 

hearing. Mr. Buezo subsequently filed a supplemental memorandum 

prior to the hearing in which these and other less significant 

reasons were advanced as justification for the examination of the 

confidential informant to establish his entrapment defense: 

1) Juan Carlos initiated the first discussion with Mr. 

Buezo about the "cocaine business." Juan Carlos suggested they 

"open a nightclub in Albuquerque and import cocaine from New York 

using the nightclub as a distribution center." 

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2) At a later visit on another subject, Juan Carlos "again 

insistently turned the . conversation to the matter of cocaine and 

the opening of a nightclub in Albuquerque to aid in the 

distribution of cocaine." 

3) Juan Carlos was interested in the wholesale price of 

cocaine in Albuquerque and indicated if the price were right he 

and defendant could transport cocaine from Albuquerque and make a 

profit. "The defendant always replied that he did not know the 

prices of cocaine in Albuquerque nor did he know anything about 

the cocaine business." 

4) Juan Carlos indicated he had a boss in Chicago with whom 

he had done business dealing in heroin. 

5) Juan Carlos called defendant "consistently and 

insistently both in New York and in Albuquerque" to persuade 

defendant to engage in the cocaine business. Nevertheless, 

defendant "consistently" attempted to avoid these contacts and 

refused the overtures to engage in drug trafficking. 

6) "Juan Carlos was particular to the Defendant as to how 

to operate a drug distribution business." Juan Carlos insisted a 

person in defendant's position could successfully distribute 

cocaine through a nightclub. 

7) When defendant returned to New York in the autumn of 

1989 for the funeral of his mother, Juan Carlos again "spoke 

consistently about the Defendant's necessity of entering the 

cocaine business." 

8) Juan Carlos used his common background with defendant as 

a persuasive tool to gain defendant's confidence in an attempt to 

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involve defendant in the drug trade. Phone conversations between 

them continued to the day before the charged transaction took 

place. "The details of the deal were intimately negotiated 

between the Defendant and Juan Carlos." 

9) Juan Carlos is "an able and experienced informant for 

the government." 

10) Juan Carlos is "a very smooth and articulate talker 

capable of engendering trust through conversations .. II 

At the in camera hearing, among other facts, the court's 

questioning of Juan Carlos established: 

1) During the first meeting between Juan Carlos and Mr. 

Buezo, defendant "started asking me for -- for one-eighth of a 

kilogram of cocaine .... He asked me for that, if I can supply 

him. And I said, 'Probably in the future,' That's all." Juan 

Carlos stated at the time of this conversation he was "'a 

government informant'" having engaged in that act following 

conviction of possessing a pound of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. 112 

2) After Juan Carlos stated he was unable to deliver a 

kilogram of cocaine, "He give [sic] me his home number, you know, 

his in New York, I think his father's number. And then also, he 

asked me for my beeper number." 

2 While it is not clear from the affidavit whether defendant's 

assertion of the verbal dexterity of Juan Carlos referred to his 

fluency in Spanish or English, it is painfully clear from the 

transcript of the in camera hearing that Juan Carlos is virtually 

inarticulate in English. Indeed, his entire testimony is very 

difficult to follow because it tends to be rambling and 

disjointed. At least in English Juan Carlos is anything but a 

"smooth and articulate talker." 

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3) After this first meeting, def~ndant started calling Juan 

Carlos on his beeper, and they became friends. They talked about 

opening a "clothing business." He added, "All -- when he used to 

go to New York, he come over·· to our car service . . and he said, 

'If I'm -- you know, If I have somebody who want to buy 

marijuana.' And I said, 'I might have a friend, but no [sic] this 

time.' 11 

4) Juan Carlos had fifteen to twenty telephone 

conversations with the defendant but none between June to 

September. "And then when he told me that he has a friend 

friends who can supply in Albuquerque a lot [sic] amount of 

cocaine. So I decided to start and call him lot [sic]." Those 

calls started in December or January ~ He called defendant at his 

old number, and after defendant changed numbers, at a new number 

given him by Mr. Buezo as well as defendant's beeper number. 

5) Juan Carlos tried to get defendant to "do business" with 

Humberto Flores, an undercover DEA agent in Chicago, but defendant 

replied, "No, we can't do any business with Chicago. If you want 

to do any business, have [sic] to be in Albuquerque." 

6) When asked directly whether he had "at any time 

indicated to him that you wanted him to get into the drug 

business," Juan Carlos said, "No." When later asked, "Did you at 

any time suggest to him that he should get in the cocaine 

business," Juan Carlos replied, "No, never, never." Once again, 

after inquiry into many other facets of the activities between the 

two men, the court asked, "Well, did you at any time approach him 

about getting into the drug business, and did you at any time ever 

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,. 

bring it up and say, 'You and I ought to get in the drug 

business.' or something like that?" The witness answered, "No, I 

didn't. No, I did not." Once again, after intervening testimony, 

the court stated, "But what you're telling me, then, is at no time 

did you ever try to induce him to get into the drug business?" 

Juan Carlos responded, "No, never. We never -- I mean, I never 

brought it up with something, cause I was afraid -- afraid if I do 

something, you know, it was going to involve my business, and you 

know, turn down my business, and I didn't want to do that." 

7) On separate occasions, Juan Carlos told the court that 

his effort consisted of trying to get Mr. Buezo and Mr. Martinez 

to contact Humberto Flores in Chicago. 

Following this testimony, the trial court entered an order 

denying disclosure of the informant. The order stated, in part, 

"none of his/her testimony will offer any assistance to the 

defendant." 

From the in camera testimony, we must conclude not only was 

Juan Carlos unable to corroborate Mr. Buezo's theory of 

entrapment, but he also would have directly contradicted it. 

Moreover, Juan Carlos would have refuted defendants' testimony 

about the extent of Juan Carlos' participation in the illicit 

transaction. Our review of the record, then, leads us to further 

conclude defendants' arguments are without a factual foundation; 

the testimony of the confidential informant would have been of no 

assistance to the defendants and would not have lent any credence 

to their defense; the effect of his testimony on their defenses is 

speculative if not altogether nonexistent; and defendants' factual 

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assumptions regarding the value of Juan Carlos' testimony are 

simply conjecture. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said 

the trial court erred by denying the motions to disclose and 

produce. 

We reach th~ same conclusion regardless of the way each 

defendant addresses the issue of production of the informant or 

the benefit of his testimony. For example, Mr. Buezo believes 

Juan Carlos was more than a "mere tipster" and took an active role 

in the activities leading to Mr . Buezo's arrest. Consequently, 

defendant argues, "Juan Carlos' participation was extensive enough 

to raise the issue of entrapment." Mr. Martinez contends he 

became embroiled in the transaction only because Juan Carlos had 

entrapped Mr. Buezo and afterward vicariously threatened him. 

Mr. Rodriguez also spun an entrapment defense off that of Mr. 

Buezo and took the position that the testimony of the informant 

would be critical to his defense of entrapment. However, in 

neither his pretrial motion for disclosure nor his brief in this 

court was he able to articulate a basis for his contention other 

than speculation that the informant might be able to provide 

relevant testimony. Moreover, on appeal Mr. Rodriguez asserts the 

evidence which he might have been able to elicit from crossexamination of Juan Carlos related to "his activities and 

inducement to Buezo on behalf of the government and [sic] avoid 

prosecution." Mr. Rodriguez also contends, "[t]he testimony of 

'Juan Carlos' would almost certainly have been favorable to the 

defendants' entrapment defense." 

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Unfortunately for the defendants, their postulations are not 

borne out by the in camera testimony. It is of no wonder, then, 

that the trial court denied their motions. 

Defendants now maintain because Juan Carlos was more than a 

tipster, they should have had access to him. We do not view the 

requirement of disclosure so narrowly; that is, disclosure of an 

informant is not required simply because the informant has taken 

an active role in the criminal transaction. 

The scales are tipped toward disclosure only when the 

combination of circumstances, including the charge, the possible 

defenses, the significance of the informant's testimony, and other 

relevant factors, dictates disclosure over secrecy. Roviaro, 353 

U.S. at 62; Moralez, 908 F.2d at 567. When, as here, the district 

court conducts an in camera hearing which discloses the informant 

will directly controvert asserted defenses or, at least will 

provide no exculpatory information, the scale tips toward 

nondisclosure, regardless of the role played by the informant. 

When it is clear the informant cannot aid the defense, the 

government's interest in keeping secret his identity must prevail 

over the defendant's asserted right of disclosure. United States 

v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1232 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 

112 S. Ct. 1238 (1992). 

Defendants argue they should have had the opportunity to 

question the informant to establish his bias and impeach his 

testimony. Defendants' argument again is essentially grounded in 

speculation. Our examination of the in camera evidence discloses 

nothing that would support the defendants' suggestion they could 

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have impeached the informant, particularly when his testimony was 

not used in the first place. See United States v. Curtis, 965 

F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1992). Of equal importance, then, is the 

fact that Juan Carlos was not a declarant within the meaning of 

Fed. R. Evid. 806 3 and not subject to impeachment. 

Mr. Rodriguez also cites testimony of government agents 

concerning statements made to them by Juan Carlos as a basis for 

needing impeaching evidence. The trial court, however, correctly 

held those statements were not hearsay declarations because they 

were not introduced for the purpose of establishing the truth of 

the matters asserted in the statements, but rather, for the 

purpose of explaining the conduct of the government agents. Thus, 

the court properly held the credibility of Juan Carlos could not 

be attacked under Fed. R. Evid. 806. 

Mr. Rodriguez argues alternatively that he was entitled to 

impeach Juan Carlos because he was an "adversarial witness," 

citing United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1990). The 

case provides him no solace, however, because it is easily 

3 Rule 806 states: 

When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in 

Rule 801 (d) (2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in 

evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be 

attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any 

evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if 

declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a 

statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, 

inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is 

not subject to any requirement that the declarant may 

have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. 

If the party against whom a hearsay statement h~s been 

admitted calls the declarant as. a witness, the party is 

entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if 

under cross-examination. 

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distinguished. In contrast to this case, "[i]n its case-in-chief, 

the government relied extensively upon the inculpatory hearsay 

remarks of . . . nontestifying declarants to impute Moody's 

alleged intentional and knowing participation in the fraud." Id. 

at 327. Given the trial court's correct assessment of the nature 

of the testimony in this case, we see no error in its protection 

of the identity of the informant from disclosure by means of an 

irrelevant demand for impeaching material. 

Entrapment as a Matter of Law 

Mr. Buezo contends we should conclude, as a matter of law, 

that he was entrapped, citing United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 

1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986). Entrapment exists as a matter of law 

only if the evidence of entrapment is uncontradicted. United 

States v. Dozal-Bencomo, 952 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1991). 

When a jury has found that no entrapment existed, we can alter 

that finding on legal grounds only "where the holding should be 

made without choosing between conflicting witnesses nor judging 

credibility. . Accordingly, we review only whether sufficient 

evidence exists to support the jury's verdict." Id. at 1250. 

Mr. Buezo asserts the government has failed to provide any 

evidence of his predisposition; therefore, as a matter of law, he 

was entrapped. He predicates this assertion upon the argument 

Juan Carlos was the only person who could testify to Mr. Buezo's 

predisposition, but because he was not present at trial that 

evidence was not introduced. 

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We considered the identical argument in United States v. 

Gurule, 522 F.2d 20, 23-25 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 

U.S. 976 (1976), and held even without the testimony of the 

confidential informant there may be a sufficient conflict in the 

evidence to make predisposition a jury question. We said even 

though the government did not produce direct evidence rebutting 

the defendant's testimony of his lack of predisposition, the jury 

is entitled to disbelieve the defendant and conclude he was not 

entrapped. Id. at 24. See also United States v. Johnson, 495 

F.2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1974). Moreover, even without the testimony of Juan Carlos, the jury was presented evidence which put 

into issue Mr. Buezo's predisposition. 

Viewed in a light most favorable to the government, that 

evidence showed Mr. Buezo was not the innocent neophyte to the 

drug trade that he portrayed himself to be. For example, in a 

surreptitiously recorded conversation with undercover DEA agent 

Humberto Flores, who was posing as a buyer of large quantities of 

cocaine and marijuana, Mr. Buezo recounted an experience he had 

traveling with a large quantity of marijuana. He stated while 

driving a truck load of "grass" to New York, he was stopped by 

police because his license plate was dirty. He told agent Flores 

he was not suspected because "I didn't give them a motive." Mr. 

Buezo also advised agent Flores about the price of marijuana in 

New York City and the price of cocaine in Albuquerque. Later, in 

that same conversation, he discussed the details of the sale of 

twenty-five to fifty kilograms of cocaine. Mr. Buezo then stated, 

"about two weeks ago" he had transported "four hundred, three 

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hundred and seventy five pounds" of marijuana to New York and made 

a profit of "three hundred [dollars] on a pound." In a subsequent 

conversation with agent Flores, Mr. Buezo said, cocaine deals were 

nothing new to him and he had "done it [cocaine transactions] in 

New York many times." He added he had sold cocaine in New York 

for "thirty-three a key." There were other conversations in which 

similar statements were made by Mr. Buezo indicating his knowledge 

and experience in the drug trade. These statements and his 

testimony relating to his lack of predisposition put the issue in 

controversy for the jury. Accordingly, we must conclude 

defendant's legal theory is without foundation, and he is not 

entitled to a holding he was entrapped as a matter of law simply 

because Juan Carlos did not testify. 

Finally, Mr. Buezo claims his case is "strikingly similar" to 

Jacobson v. United States, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992), 

which underscores his entitlement to reversal. Like the defendant 

in Jacobson, Mr. Buezo contends he was subjected to a continuous 

effort to convince him to violate the law; thus, his conviction 

should be set aside as the consequence of a concerted government 

scheme to entrap him. That bald assertion of fact 

notwithstanding, we find a marked contrast between Jacobson and 

this case. 

In Jacobson, the government's case presented no controversy 

over the extent of the governmental activity leading to the arrest 

of the defendant. Indeed, the government rested its case upon the 

lengthy prearrest conduct of its agents, and it was that testimony 

which led the Supreme Court to conclude the government had 

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"overstepped the line." The prosecution's case demonstrated a 

period of two and one-half years of "repeated efforts by two 

Government agencies, through five fictitious organizations and a 

bogus pen pal, to explore petitioner's willingness to break the 

new law by ordering sexually explicit photographs of children 

through the mail." 112 S. Ct. at 1538 . In contrast, the only 

evidence in Jacobson of predisposition offered by the government 

was a single purchase of two magazines at the time the purchase 

was legal. There is simply no parallel here, and Jacobson 

provides defendant with no support for his theory that he was 

entrapped as a matter of law. 

Severance 

Defendants Martinez and Carranza argue the district court 

erred by denying defendants' motions for separate trials. We 

review the district court's decision to deny such motions under an 

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 

844, 857 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). 

Severance may be necessary when codefendants produce mutually 

exclusive defenses. "[T]he conflict between co-defendants 'must 

be so intense that there is a danger the jury will unjustifiably 

infer from the conflict alone that both defendants are guilty.'" 

Id. at 857 (quoting United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 538 (10th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908 (1988)). "A mere conflict 

of theories or one defendant's attempt to cast blame on another 

does not require severance." 881 F.2d at 857 (citing United 

States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1984)). When one 

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defendant admits some or all of the elements of the charge, the 

danger a defendant will be denied a fair trial is exacerbated. 

Peveto, 881 F.2d at 858. 

In this case, three defendants admitted most, if not all, the 

elements of the charges against them, relying upon their 

entrapment defenses. Only Mr. Carranza, who claims to have been 

merely present at the scene of the transaction, has denied any 

role in the conspiracy. Now, defendants Martinez and Carranza 

argue that their defenses placed them in conflict with each other 

and the other defendants. Although defendants asserted different 

defenses, those defenses were not antagonistic. We therefore 

conclude they have not met the test prescribed in Esch. 

Mr. Martinez' defense of entrapment certainly does not 

exclude Mr. Carranza's defense of innocence; therefore, their 

defenses are not antagonistic by definition. In no way does the 

assertion of one defense dictate the guilt of the other 

codefendant. 

Cir. 1986). 

See United States v. Smith, 788 F.2d 663, 668 (10th 

Defendants nonetheless urge the trial posture 

produced an unfair result. 

Mr. Martinez argues codefendants' counsel undermined his 

entrapment defense because they tried to depict him as a dangerous 

drug dealer as part of the entrapment defense of their clients. 

Mr. Martinez argues this tactic put the jury in the position of 

having to disbelieve his defense if it believed that of the other 

defendants. Mr. Martinez, however, does not cite to any portion 

of the record where this phenomenon occurred. 

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He does, however, refer to the consequence of the crossexamination of Ramona Garcia . Ms. Garcia, the girlfriend of 

defendant Rodriguez, had been indicted with the others but pled 

guilty and testified as a government witness. While her testimony 

may have been unfavorable to defendants Martinez and Carranza, it 

certainly was not given as a codefendant asserting an antagonistic 

defense. Thus, even though defendants sought severance following 

Ms. Garcia's appearance, her testimony did not provide grounds 

upon which that motion should have been granted. 

We conclude the defendants did not assert antagonistic 

defenses and that any conflict between them was merely a conflict 

in theories. The district court did not err in denying the 

motions for severance. 

Motion for Mistrial 

Defendant Carranza attacks the issue of severance from an 

additional posture, arguing the district 

granting his motion for mistrial because 

positions taken by the defendants. We review 

court erred by not 

of the antagonistic 

denial of motions 

for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. United States 

v. Novak, 818 F.2d 107, 108 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Mr. Carranza asserts because he made repeated motions for 

severance, the district court erred in not granting his motion for 

a mistrial. The grounds he argued for this motion were . the same 

as those advanced in support of his motion for severance. Given 

our review of that motion, we cannot say the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying a mistrial. See Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1164 

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J 

n.2 (Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court makes a clear 

error of judgment or exceeds the bounds of permissible choice.). 

Tendered Instruction on "Vicarious Entrapment" 

Mr. Rodriguez contends even though he had no direct contact 

with Juan Carlos or the undercover governmental agents, threats 

made by these people compelled him to become involved in the 

cocaine transaction. Thus, he argues, he was the victim of 

vicarious entrapment. 

In support of this characterization, Mr. Rodriguez asserts he 

became involved in the offense when his girlfriend, Ms. Garcia, 

who had been thrust into the role of overseeing the transaction 

and checking the money for the supplier of the cocaine, told him 

she was fearful for herself and her children. However, Mr. 

Rodriguez and Ms. Garcia testified he took her place to assuage 

her fears, although both admitted they had not been directly 

threatened by either Juan Carlos or the government agent. 

The focus of his vicarious entrapment defense is: but for 

the criminal design implanted in the mind of Mr. Buezo and the 

threats arising out of Mr. Buezo's subsequent activities, Mr. 

Rodriguez would never have been involved in the crime. Using this 

theory as a platform, Mr. Rodriguez contends, despite the court's 

instruction on entrapment generally, he was entitled to an 

instruction on vicarious entrapment because it was his theory of 

the case. 

A defendant is entitled to a theory of the case instruction, 

but only if the theory is supported by the law and the facts in 

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evidence. United States v . Lofton, 776 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 

1985). We conclude Mr. Rodriguez' theory is not supported by law. 

We are among the majority of Circuits that have not 

recognized the defense of' vicarious or derivative entrapment. 

Holloway v. United States, 432 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1970) 

(there must be some showing of conduct by government agents which 

has induced the accused to commit the charged offense). See also 

United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 1989); United 

States v. North, 746 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 

470 U.S. 1058 (1985); United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1340 

(11th Ci r.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983); United States v. 

Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Dove, 

629 F.2d 325, 329 (4th Cir~ 1980); United States v. Burkley. 591 

F.2d 903, 911 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 

(1979); United States v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 430 U.S. 958 (1977); Whiting v. United States, 321 

F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963); 

Beard v. United States, 59 F.2d 940, 941 (8th Cir. 1932). These 

Circuits maintain, in essence, the purpose behind the entrapment 

defense is to prohibit the government from directly involving an 

otherwise disinterested and disinclined person from committing a 

criminal offense. 4 When the government has no contact with the 

accused, that purpose has no relevance; therefore, without direct 

government communication with the defendant, there is no basis for 

4 See United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 

1986) (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 

(1963)). 

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1165 (10th Cir. 

U.S. 427, 434-35 

Appellate Case: 91-2286 Document: 010110148703 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 20 
the entrapment defense. We adhere to that position. The district 

court did not err in refusing Mr. Rodriguez' vicarious entrapment 

instruction. 

Admission of Cocaine Found in Mr. Rodriguez' Wallet 

When Mr. Rodriguez was arrested, his possessions were taken 

and inventoried. Found in his wallet was a packet containing .46 

grams of cocaine. The trial court, over the objection of the 

defendant, received evidence of this discovery. The defendant now 

argues the evidence was improperly admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b) because the government failed to demonstrate its relevance, 

citing United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1258 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 238 (1991). He asserts because 

the quantity of cocaine in his possession was so small, it could 

not be probative of his intent to distribute; hence, its only 

value was to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jury. 

As the government notes, however, the value of the evidence 

is its bearing upon Mr. Rodriguez' entrapment defense. To help 

establish his lack of predisposition, Mr. Rodriguez testified he 

never used cocaine. The evidence of his possession of a quantity 

consistent with use belies that testimony and puts his credibility 

in controversy. An entrapment defense opens a defendant to a 

"searching inquiry." United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 

at 1003. Any evidence which reflects upon his veracity is certainly relevant to that inquiry. We believe, therefore, the 

relevancy of the evidence was established. 

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Defendant cites two Ninth Circuit cases in support of his 

argument, United States v. Bramble, 641 F . 2d 681, 682-83 (9th Cir. 

1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982), and Enriquez v. United 

States, 314 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1963). In both cases, the court 

held proof of defendant's possession of marijuana was not relevant 

to the charges of distribution of cocaine and heroin. The 

attenuation in the evidence found by the court in those cases is 

simply not present here. 

Lesser Included Offense Instruction 

Mr. Rodriguez argues the trial court should have submitted an 

instruction on simple possession as a lesser included offense of 

possession with intent to distribute. In United States v. Joe, 

831 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072 

(1988), we established a four-part test for submitting an 

instruction on a lesser included offense: 

(1) [there has been] a proper request; (2) the lesserincluded-offense must consist of some, but not all, of 

the elements of the offense charged; (3) the elements 

differentiating the two offenses must be a matter in 

dispute; and (4) a jury must be able to rationally 

convict the defendant of the lesser offense and acquit 

of the greater offense. 

To be entitled to the instruction, a defendant must establish each 

of the four parts. Id. 

Although the government concedes the defendant has met parts 

one, two, and three, it contends the defendant has failed to 

establish part four of the test. Because of his entrapment 

defense, Mr. Rodriguez essentially admitted the elements of the 

charged offense, seeking only to bar conviction on the grounds of 

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invited conduct. We cannot, therefore, conclude a rational jury 

could have acquitted him on the charged offense and still have 

convicted him on simple possession. 

Because entrapment is·· a complete defense, United States v. 

McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1984), the jury's 

acquittal on the charged offense would not have permitted it to 

consider the lesser offense. Moreover, if the jury did not accept 

the entrapment defense, it was bound to convict on the charged 

offense in light of Mr. Rodriguez' admissions. 

In reality, Mr. Rodriguez is contending he should have been 

granted an instruction that would have permitted jury 

nullification. He asserts that had the jury received a simple 

possession instruction, it could have accepted his entrapment defense and acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute; 

then, because he admitted the possession of the small quantity of 

cocaine, it could still convict him of criminal conduct. 

This form of leniency is not the purpose of a lesser included 

offense instruction. Absent the rationality required by the 

fourth part of the Joe test, a defendant is not entitled to such 

an instruction just because it will have a lenient effect. 

Sentence Enhancement 

Mr. Rodriguez was charged with, but acquitted of, possessing 

a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. He 

contends it was therefore improper for the trial court to have 

enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.l(b) (1) which provides 

a two-level increase for possessing a firearm. We have already 

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decided that issue to the contrary in United States v. Coleman, 

947 F.2d 1424, 1429 (10th Cir. 1991). Defendant admits the issue 

is foreclosed to this panel but asserts Coleman's holding should 

be reviewed by the en bane court. That resolution must be left to 

another day. United States v. Splawn, 963 F.2d 295, 297 (10th 

Cir. 1992) (A three judge panel cannot overrule Circuit 

precedent.). 

We have considered the remaining issues and conclude they are 

rendered meritless by our holdings here. Accordingly, the 

judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. 

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