Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-00810/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-00810-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Florence City Board of Education
Defendant
Abbe J.
Plaintiff
Daniel J.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

DANIEL J., et al., )

)

Plaintiffs )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:15-cv-00810-HGD

)

FLORENCE CITY BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, )

)

Defendant )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge based on the

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Defendant, Florence City

Board of Education (Board), has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) the amended

complaint (Doc. 5) of plaintiffs, Daniel J. and Abbe J., individually and as next

friends of their minor child, M.J. The matter is now ready for disposition.

I. Factual Background

The factsleading up to thislitigation are not in dispute. M.J. isthe minor child

of Daniel J. and Abbe J. and suffers from muscular dystrophy. According to

plaintiffs, muscular dystrophy substantially limits her in several major life activities,

including walking, writing and performing manual tasks. 

FILED

 2016 Sep-14 PM 04:11

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:15-cv-00810-HGD Document 25 Filed 09/14/16 Page 1 of 14
DanielJ. is employed as a teacher by defendant and has been since 2009. Since

at least 2011, the Board has had an admissions policy that generally allows allschoolage children who do not reside within the corporate limits of the City of Florence to

apply for enrollment within the Florence City School District. Applications are

considered on a “first-come, first-served” basis with priority given to a student who

was enrolled in the Florence City Schools the previous year, has a sibling enrolled at

the requested school, or has a parent or legal guardian employed by Florence City

Schools.

The application for enrollment also contains questions designed to elicit

information on whether a potentialstudent has disabilities and/or isin need of special

education services. Daniel and Abbe J. indicated on the application for enrollment

that M.J. did have a disability. They assert thatshe meets the definition of a qualified

handicapped person under both § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 794, et seq.(§ 504), pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(4), and under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, as amended (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., pursuant to 28

C.F.R. § 35.104.

By letter dated June 19, 2012, Dr. Janet Womack, Superintendent of the

Florence City School Board, informed plaintiffs that M.J. was being denied

enrollment due to lack of program space, staff and/or support services, based on the

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fact that they had “designated on the enrollment [request form] that [their] child

receives special education services.” Plaintiffs have another child, J.J., who was

already enrolled in Florence City Schools and who, unlike plaintiff M.J., had been

found eligible for special education and related services under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). His enrollment was also terminated at this time. 

According to the amended complaint, Daniel J. complained to other Board

employees about M.J.’s exclusion from full participation in the Board’s educational

program, including that, as a child with a disability, M.J. was being denied equal

access to the services provided to children without disabilities. It is alleged that

other, non-disabled, out-of-district students with fewer “priority factors” than M.J.

and/or whose applications were submitted after M.J.’s application were allowed to

enroll in the Florence City Schools for the 2012-2013 school year. 

As a result, plaintiffs allege that they were forced to move their residence to a

home within the corporate limits of the City of Florence. In August 2012, the Board

evaluated M.J. and found that she was eligible for a personalized education plan

under § 504/ADA. She was not found eligible under the IDEA. 

On or aboutJune 18, 2014, plaintiffsrequested a due process hearing under the

IDEA, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) which provides:

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Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,

procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.],

title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.], or

other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,

except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking

relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under

subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would

be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.

20 U.S.C. § 1415. The subsections(f) and (g), referenced in the statute above, are the

IDEA’s due process hearing and appeal provisions. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) and (g).

Plaintiffsstate that, although M.J. was not eligible for services under the IDEA

or seeking eligibility under that act, because her claims related to the receipt of

educational services from the Board, they attempted to exhaust administrative

remedies under the IDEA before pursuing her claims in federal court. They believe

this exhaustion of remedies was a prerequisite to bringing their ADA and § 504

Rehabilitation Act claims against the defendant. 

On March 25, 2015, the Hearing Officer issued an order in which he found that

he lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims and that the relief

requested was not available under the IDEA. As a result, he dismissed plaintiffs’

IDEA complaint and found that plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative

remedies, to the extent possible, under the IDEA. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this

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lawsuit on May 15, 2015. (Doc. 1). Their amended complaint was filed May 29,

2015. 

II. Motion to Dismiss

In its Motion to Dismiss, defendant contendsthat the amended complaint is due

to be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because all of plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. It also asserts that the plaintiffslack

standing for declaratory and injunctive relief because there is no threat of future harm

and because a favorable decision would not redress the harmof which they complain. 

This is because plaintiffs have moved within the corporate limits of Florence, and

M.J. attends a Board school. (Doc. 13, Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss). 

III. Discussion

A. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on May 15, 2015. This was approximately one

month shy of three years from the letter dated June 19, 2012, denying their request

for out-of-district enrollment. It is not disputed that a two-year statute of limitations

applies to actions in Alabama under § 504 and the ADA. Plaintiffs, however, assert

that the statutes of limitation for these claims were tolled during the time that they

sought exhaustion under the IDEA, which they state was a prerequisite to bringing

their § 504 and ADA claims on behalf of M.J. Thus, according to plaintiffs, the

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statutes of limitations were tolled when they requested an IDEA due process hearing

on June 18, 2014, which falls within the two-year period applicable.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint astrue and take them in the light most

favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167

L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S.Ct. 2179,

153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). “To survive dismissal, the complaint’s allegations must

plausibly suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility above

a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.”

James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.

2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167

L.Ed.2d 929 (2007));see also Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.

2010). “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate

only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.”

Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Where congressional intent not to require exhaustion is clear, there is no tolling

of the statute of limitations. Black v. Broward Empl. and Training Admin., 846 F.2d

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1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus, the question presented is whether exhaustion

under the IDEA was a prerequisite to plaintiffs’ § 504 and ADA claims. 

Plaintiffs assert in their amended complaint that, although M.J. was not eligible

for services or seeking services under the IDEA, they sought administrative

exhaustion under the IDEA “because her [M.J.’s] claims (and her parents

corresponding claims) related to her receipt of educational services from the Board.”

(Doc. 5, Amended Complaint, at ¶ 33). However, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) requires that

§ 504 and/or ADA claims be exhausted under the IDEA only if they are seeking relief

that is also available under the IDEA. Compare Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748,

756 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[W]hen parents choose to file suit under another law that

protectsthe rights of handicapped children—and the suit could have been filed under

the [IDEA]—they are first required to exhaust the [IDEA]’s remedies to the same

extent as if the suit had been filed originally under the [IDEA]’s provisions.”)

(emphasis added) with J.V. ex rel. Ortiz v. Seminole County Sch. Bd., 2005 WL

1243756, at *2 (M.D.Fla. May 25, 2005) (holding that there is no IDEA exhaustion

requirement in autistic student’s § 1983 suit against school system where student was

not claiming the Board denied him “a free and appropriate public education” but,

rather, violated his due process rights by tacitly approving a teacher’s use of

excessive force). 

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Thus, the issue boils down to whether plaintiffs’ § 504 and ADA claims seek

relief that is also available under the IDEA. Claims asserted under § 504 and/or the

ADA are subject to § 1415(f)’s requirement that litigants exhaust the IDEA’s

administrative procedures to obtain relief that is available under the IDEA before

bringing suit under § 504 and/or the ADA. Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County,

135 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998). The IDEA’s broad complaint provision

affords the “opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to

the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision

of a [free and appropriate public education] to such child.” M.T.V. v. DeKalb County

Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6))

(emphasis in original).

The IDEA seeks to provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to

students qualifying for special education and related services under one of IDEA’s

13 eligibility classifications. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) & (9). The categories covered

include a child:

(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including

deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments

(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this

chapter as “emotional disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism,

traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning

disabilities; and

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(ii) who, by reason thereof, needsspecial education and related services.

20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (emphasis added).

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, on the other hand, is anti-discrimination

legislation aimed at providing federally-financed services to individuals with

disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability

in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). Section 504

applies to all public schools that receive federal financial assistance. Id. at

§ 794(b)(2). 

While IDEA recognizes 13 categories of disability, § 504 defines individuals

with disabilities to include anyone with a condition that substantially limits a major

life activity, as well as those with a history of disability and those perceived to have

a disability. Id. at § 705(20). See Laura A. v. Limestone County Bd. of Educ., 610

Fed. Appx. 835, 836 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished).

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that M.J. was denied enrollment

in Florence City Schools “due to lack of program space, staff and/or support services

since [plaintiffs] designated on the enrollment form that [M.J.] receives special

education services.” (Doc. 5, Amended Complaint, at ¶ 22) (emphasis added). They

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further complain that other non-disabled students with fewer priority factors were

allowed to enroll in Florence City Schools. (Id. at ¶25). Thus, the gist of their

complaint is that M.J. was not allowed to enroll because she had a disability while

others without disabilities were not denied enrollment. Another way of looking at it

is that M.J. was denied enrollment because of the possibility that she might need

IDEA special education or related services. 

Subsequently, M.J. and family moved into the City of Florence, and she was

enrolled in school there. Evaluation by the Board reflected that her muscular

dystrophy made her eligible for a personalized education plan under § 504/ADA, but

M.J. has not been found eligible for services under IDEA. Thus, although M.J. was

subsequently found not to need IDEA services, it cannot be said that the Florence

City Board of Education’s initial exclusion of her based on her disability was

unrelated to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational

placement of [M.J.], or the provision of a [FAPE] to [M.J.]” under the IDEA. 20

U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The fact that the parents now concede that M.J. is not eligible

for IDEA services and that they do notseek relief under IDEA does not mean that her

exclusion from enrollment as an out-of-district student was unrelated to the IDEA.

While this is an incredibly close call, the Court chooses to err on the side of caution

with regard to defendant’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court finds that the

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statute of limitations was tolled while plaintiff sought exhaustion under the IDEA. 

As a result, defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations is

due to be and hereby is DENIED. 

B. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Pursuant to Rule 201, Fed.R.Evid., the Court takes judicial notice of the

complaint in J., et al. v. Florence City Board of Education, Case No. 3:16-cv-01386-

MHH. The complaint in that action alleges that Daniel J. and Abbe J. are now

residents of the State of Texas. (Doc. 1, Case No. 3:16-cv-01386-MHH, at ¶¶ 4, 5). 

Defendant contends that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue any claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief and such claims have been rendered moot by M.J.’s enrollment

in Florence City Schools. Certainly, the same argument can be made based on the

family’s move from Alabama to Texas. 

The amended complaint in this action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,

including an order finding that defendant’s out-of-district transfer policy violates

federal law and “requiring Defendant to make modifications to its admissions policy

and procedures to ensure that the policy fully complies with the nondiscrimination

requirements contained in § 504 and Title II and is enforced in compliance with these

statutes.” (Doc. 5, Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief at ¶¶ 1-2).

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Standing is a requirement for federal court jurisdiction as part of the “case or

controversy” requirement under Article III of the United States Constitution. See

Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1264-65

(11th Cir. 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct.

2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). To establish standing, the party invoking federal

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) injury in fact, i.e. the

invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized or actual or

imminent; (2) the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Defendant contends plaintiffs have not

alleged sufficient factsto satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement and the redressability

elements for standing. 

First, “to have standing to obtain forward-looking relief, a plaintiff must show

a sufficient likelihood that [s]he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct

in the future.” Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1283

(11th Cir. 2001); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct.

1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself

show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied

by any continuing, present adverse effects.”).

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Plaintiffs in this case cannot allege that M.J. is likely to be subjected to an

allegedly discriminatory out-of-district admissions policy again. After the allegedly

discriminatory denial of M.J.’s out-of-district enrollment, plaintiffsmoved within the

corporate limits of the City of Florence so they could attend a Board school. (Doc.

5, ¶ 27). Now, plaintiffs have moved to Texas. 

Second, to have standing a plaintiff must show “a substantial likelihood that

the relief requested will redress the injury claimed.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). 

In Ms. H. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 784 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1257-58

(M.D.Ala. 2011), the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a school board’s

policies for complying with § 504 were in violation of federal law and an injunction

requiring the school board to revise its policies. Id. at 1256-57. The court found that,

because the court could not rule on the plaintiff’s claims before she graduated from

high school and left the school system, the plaintiff lacked standing because a

favorable ruling would not redress the allegedly inadequate § 504 procedures. Id. at

1257-58. 

Plaintiffs have argued that their claims are “capable of repetition yet evading

review” because “similar harm to M.J. could occur upon the J. Family’s return to out

of district housing near the Florence City School District.” (Doc. 22, Plaintiffs’Brief,

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at 19 n.10). However, now that the family has moved to an entirely different state,

rather than just to out-of-district housing, that argument fails. Plaintiffs also ask that

if the court finds they lack standing, they be allowed to amend their complaint to add

allegations regarding their request for prospective relief. This request was made

before the family moved to Texas, and the Court finds that absent an allegation that

the family intends to return to northwest Alabama while M.J. is still in elementary

school, no amendment to the complaint will cure the defect.

Therefore, defendant’smotion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claimsfor injunctive relief

is due to be and hereby is GRANTED, and such claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Defendantshallfile its answer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint within

fourteen (14) days from the date of entry of this order.

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of September, 2016.

 

HARWELL G. DAVIS, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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