Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-01707/USCOURTS-caDC-93-01707-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Intervenor
Leach Corporation
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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1Leach Corp. & Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 312 N.L.R.B. 990 (1993). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 24, 1995 Decided May 12, 1995

No. 93-1707

LEACH CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE

WORKERS, DISTRICT LODGE 94,

LOCAL LODGE 102, AFL-CIO,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

-

William H. Emer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Kelly F. Watson.

Robert J. Englehart, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent.

With him on the brief were Linda R. Sher, Acting Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel and Linda Dreeben, Supervisory Attorney, National Labor

Relations Board.

Allison Beck was on the brief for intervenor. Ira R. Mitzner entered an appearance.

Before WILLIAMS, SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Leach Corporation seeks review of an order of the

NationalLabor Relations Board finding Leach liable for unfair labor practices under §§ 8(a)(5) & (1)

of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & (1), in connection with itsrelocation

of a manufacturing operation.1 Leach contends that the Board erred in ruling that the collective

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2The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 94,

Local Lodge 102, AFL-CIO represented the Los Angeles workers and has intervened in support

of the Board. 

bargaining contract applied to workers at the new facility notwithstanding the company's adoption

of a different manufacturing process, and in rejecting its affirmative defense that the charge filed by

the Union2 was untimely under § 10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). We deny the petition for

review and grant the Board's cross-application for enforcement of its order.

I.

Leach manufacturesrelay devices, a type of electronic switch used primarily in the aerospace

industry. It had a longstanding collective bargaining relationship with the Union covering production

and maintenance employees at a manufacturing facility known as the Los Angeles Relay Division

("LosAngeles"). The outstanding collective bargaining contract extended through October 22, 1991.

Relayproduction at Los Angeles, laid out over 14 buildings, operated according to a relatively

inefficient manufacturing method known as "batch" production. In 1990, Leach decided to change

itsrelaymanufacturing processfromthe batchmethod to the more flexible and efficient "just-in-time"

system. Due to physical limitations at the Los Angeles site, however, the company elected to close

the plant and relocate the relay division to a pre-existing Leach facility in Buena Park, 19 miles away.

Leach notified the Union in February 1991 of the plansto transfer the relay division, advising that the

closure and relocation would commence in July and be completed in September. During the period

leading up to the move, representatives of Leach and the Union met several timesto discussthe new

operation. At a March 20 meeting, Leach informed the Union that it would not extend the collective

bargaining contract to Los Angeles employees who relocated to Buena Park due to the different

nature of relay production there, and Leach denied the Union's request to view the Buena Park

premises. At each of these meetings, the Union also requested that Leach recognize it as the

representative of relocating employees, and Leach refused. On June 26, Leach denied the Union's

request for the names, departments and positions of the employees to be relocated.

The relocation process commenced on July 3, when the first 35 Los Angeles workers began

work at Buena Park, and continued until completion on September 17. In all, approximately 280 of

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3The Union had filed the refusal to provide information charge earlier, on November 21. 

Leach took no exceptions to the ALJ's finding, which the Board then approved, and Leach has

not contested it here. See 312 N.L.R.B. at 990 n.3. 

4Section 10(b) provides that "[N]o complaint shall issue based on any unfair labor practice

occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board." 29 U.S.C. §

160(b). 

the 340 Los Angeles unit employees had been transferred. Except for the 35 employees who

relocated on July 3, the record does not reveal the number of employeestransferred on any particular

date. When the relocation was complete, the new relay production line at Buena Park consisted

entirely of former Los Angeles relay workers, and the old facility was closed.

On January 21, 1992, the Union filed a charge with the Board alleging that Leach had

unlawfully repudiated the contract and withdrawn recognition of the Union in violation of §§ 8(a)(5)

& (1). An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the Buena Park relay operation was

substantially the same as production at Los Angeles, notwithstanding the different manufacturing

methodology at Buena Park and the concomitant need for worker retraining. 312 N.L.R.B. at 995-

96. Because Los Angeles transferees made up significantly more than 40 percent of the relevant relay

unit at Buena Park, the ALJruled that the relocation did not relieve Leach of its collective bargaining

obligation with respect to the transferred Los Angeles employees. Id. at 995-96 & n.3. The ALJ also

found that Leach's refusal to provide information to the Union about the relocation process

constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8(a)(5) & (1). Id. at 996.3 However, the ALJ

ruled that because the unfair practice occurred on July 3, when the first group of Los Angeles

employees actually relocated to Buena Park, the Union had filed its charge more than six monthslater

and it was therefore untimely under § 10(b).4Id. at 996-98. Accordingly, while ordering Leach to

cease and desist from refusing to provide requested information to the Union, the ALJ declined to

enter an order regarding the withdrawal of recognition and contract repudiation charges. Id. at 998.

The Board reversed the ALJ's decision on the § 10(b) time- bar, ruling that the limitations

period began at the earliest on September 17"the date the transfer process was substantially

completed." Id. at 991. Rejecting Leach's argument that § 10(b) was triggered prior to the

relocation, the Board noted that "a statement of intent or threat to commit an unfair labor practice

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does not start the statutory six months running. The running of the limitations period can begin only

when the unfair labor practice occurs." Id. at 991 & n.7 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Board emphasized that the § 10(b) period begins to run "only when a party has clear and

unequivocal notice of a violation of the Act," and that the party asserting the § 10(b) defense bears

the burden of demonstrating such notice. Id. at 991.

Applying this principle to Leach's relocation, the Board determined that Leach had failed to

show that the Union "had knowledge of the facts necessary to support a ripe unfair labor practice

charge on July 3," when the relocation began. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Board looked to

the point at which Leach could be found to have committed an unfair labor practice. When an

employer relocates a business, the Board has held that an existing contract remains in effect if (1)

transferees from the old plant comprise a "substantial percentage" of employees in the relevant

bargaining unit at the new plant, and (2) operations at the new facility are "substantially the same"

as those at the old plant. Rock Bottom Stores, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 400, 402 (1993), enf'd, NLRB v.

Rock Bottom Stores, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7641 (2d Cir. April 5, 1995); Harte & Co., 278

N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1986). For a gradual plant relocation involving new hires or other

non-transferred workers, the Board has adopted a rule that the appropriate time for measuring

whetherthe "substantialpercentage" ismet is when the relocation has been "substantiallycompleted,"

rather than when the new plant becomes operational. Harte, 278 N.L.R.B. at 949. In the Board's

view, this rule represents a workable balance between "the newly hired employees' interest in

choosing whether or not to have union representation" and "the transferees' interest in retaining the

fruits of their collective activity." Id. at 950.

The Board treated the gradual relocation of Leach's Los Angeles employees to the

pre-existing Buena Park facility, where approximately 100 non-union workers were already

employed, as a situation governed by Harte. Thus, it determined that Leach became obligated to

recognize the Union and the contract at Buena Park only when the relocation had been substantially

completed. Consequently, "on this record," § 10(b) could not be triggered until that point, as only

then would "sufficient facts [be] in existence to sustain a finding of an unfair labor practice." 312

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N.L.R.B. at 991. In view of the absence of data about how many employees were transferred on any

particular day after July 3, the Board concluded that "September 17 is the earliest date on which the

Union can be found to have had clear and unequivocal notice that Harte 's

substantial-percentage-of-transferees requirement had been fulfilled." Id. at 992. The Board also

found that the Union's lack of knowledge could not be attributed to its failure to seek information

about the relocation, but rather was due in part to Leach's unlawful refusal to provide the requested

information. Id. at 992 n.8. The Board upheld the ALJ's findings and conclusion that Leach had

violated §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) by repudiating its contract and withdrawing recognition of the Union, and

ordered Leach, among other things, to recognize the Union at Buena Park asthe exclusive collective

bargaining representative forthe transferred employees engaged inmanufacturing relays, and to apply

the terms of the contract with the Union. Id. at 992-93.

II.

Leach contends that the Board erred in determining when the § 10(b) limitation period

commenced to run with respect to the Union's non-recognition and refusal-to-bargain charges. The

Board'sinterpretation of § 10(b), provided it isreasonable, is entitled to judicial deference. See Drug

Plastics &Glass Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1017, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (on petition for rehearing)

(deferring to Board interpretation of § 10(b) and citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)); see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d

652, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1992). With respect to the Board's application of its interpretation to

particular facts, the court "must uphold the Board's determination unless it has acted arbitrarily or

otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts at issue." Pittsburgh Press Co., 977 F.2d at

654 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, the court will affirm a decision of the Board

"if it is reasonably defensible" and supported by substantial evidence on the record. Id. At the same

time, the Board must provide a reasoned justification for any departure from its prior policies or

practices. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983);

Cleveland Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Leach first maintains that the Board erred in ruling that § 10(b) could not be activated by the

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company's unequivocal notice of intent to commit an unfair labor practice in the future. Leach relies

primarilyonUnited StatesPostal Service Marina Mail ProcessingCenter, 271N.L.R.B. 297 (1984),

a discriminatory discharge case in which the Board stated that it would henceforth focus "on the date

of the alleged unlawful act, rather than on the date its consequences become effective." Id. at 399-

400. Leach contends that under Postal Service, the company's statements to the Union that Leach

would not recognize the Los Angeles contract at Buena Park should have triggered § 10(b) in May,

and that the application of a different rule here constitutes an arbitrary departure from prior agency

practice.

The Board rejected this argument, describing Leach's reliance on Postal Service as

"misplaced":

The 10(b) standard that was employed in Postal Service applies to discriminatory

discharge cases, but not to situations like those at issue here, involving contract

repudiation and refusal to bargain.

312 N.L.R.B. at 991 n.7. The Board cited two decisions in which it had limited the Postal Service

standard to cases involving a charge of discriminatory termination. See United States Can Co., 305

N.L.R.B. 1127, 1141 (1992); Howard Electrical & Mechanical, 293 N.L.R.B. 472, 475 (1989).

Thus, while its discussion was terse, the Board explained and defended its departure from the rule

in Postal Service. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 339 (D.C. Cir.

1988).

In addition, the Board's decision not to apply Postal Service in the relocation context was

reasonable. Postal Service itself emphasized that the Board did not "consider or discuss, what, if any

implications" its notice rule might have in other contexts. See Postal Service, 271 N.L.R.B. at 401.

More importantly, the decision in Postal Service assumed that the illegal action in a discriminatory

discharge case is complete at the time that the employer makes the final decision to terminate and

communicatesthat decision to the employee. In the business relocation context, by contrast, whether

an employer must recognize a prior collective bargaining agreement at the new site depends, among

other things, on the number of employees transferred and the continuity of operations. Thus, an

employer's stated intent not to bargain following a plant relocation is insufficient standing alone to

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5

See, e.g., Teamsters Local 42 v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 608, 615-616 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Knowledge

of a party's predisposition to commit an unfair labor practice or suspicion that, when the moment

is opportune, the knife thrust will follow, is not enough to galvanize § 10(b). The statute begins

to run only when the impermissible act or omissionthe unfair labor practiceactually takes

place."); American Distributing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984). 

constitute an unfair labor practice. Rather, additional action must be taken and information obtained

in order to determine the employer's genuine obligation and the employees' future rights.

Despite Leach's contention, neither Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1987), nor

Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 745-47 (7th Cir. 1989), isto the contrary. In Armco, the Sixth

Circuit held that the § 10(b) period did not commence when the employer communicated its intent

to recognize another union, but only when the other union actually signed an agreement with the

employer, thereby consummating the labor practices violation. 832 F.2d at 362. Similarly, in

Esmark, 887 F.2d at 745-47, the SeventhCircuit held that regardless whether Postal Service applied

in the refusal to bargain context, the union did not have adequate notice that the employer's plans

would violate the Act until a date within the § 10(b) period. Thus, neither Esmark nor Armco

adopted the Postal Service "notice ofintended illegal action" rule; at most these cases failed to reject

that standard. Other cases, meanwhile, cast doubt on the scope of Postal Service where the existence

of a final adverse action might be questioned.5 We therefore affirm the Board's decision that the

Union's advance notice of Leach's intent to withdraw recognition of the Union and repudiate the

contract at Buena Park did not trigger the running of § 10(b).

In the alternative, Leach contendsthat the § 10(b) period began to run on July 3, when 35 Los

Angeles workers began work at Buena Park. Leach challenges the Board's application of Harte's

"substantial completion" test in the context of the Buena Park relocation. Leach finds significant the

fact that in Harte the transferees were initially outnumbered by new hires who were not subjects of

the old contract, while the relevant Buena Park bargaining unitworkers on the relay manufacturing

linewas comprised solely of Los Angeles transferees from the outset. In other words, Leach

maintainsthat unlike Harte there was no new workforce to dilute the transferee workers' complement

at Buena Park, and therefore Harte 's substantial completion requirement is inapplicable to Buena

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6Even so, the Board notes in its brief that the Union did not know exactly how many

employees would be transferred, what their jobs would be, or what percentage of the total Buena

Park workforce they would constitute. 

7

Indeed, Leach initially maintained that the Buena Park relay employees did not constitute a

separate and appropriate bargaining unit. See Joint Appendix 7 (Leach Answer and Affirmative

Defenses to the unfair labor practice complaint). 

8The theory relied on by our dissenting colleaguethat the Union had constructive notice by

virtue of what (the dissent assumes) the 35 initial transferees must have knownwas not

presented to the Board or in the briefs submitted to the court. 

Park because it was evident on July 3 that the "substantial percentage" requirement had already been

met.

This argument relies on an implicit but incorrect assumption that the Union had access to

sufficient information about the Buena Park operation to evaluate Leach's bargaining obligations. In

fact, the record is devoid of evidence that the Union knew what lay in store for relay production at

Buena Park, what the appropriate bargaining unit might eventuallylook like, or whence its employees

might ultimately come. At most, the record indicates that Leach told the Union that a majority of Los

Angeles workers would be rehired at Buena Park, and that relays would be manufactured there under

a just-in-time production method.6 Leach did not provide the Union with information about the

relationship between the pre-existing Buena Park employees and the Los Angeles transferees. Nor

has Leach shown how the Union could independently determine the relationship between the new

relay production facility and the existing Buena Park facilities.7In short, the record fails to show that

on July 3 the Union had knowledge of the nature of the appropriate bargaining unit, let alone its

ultimate composition.8 Moreover, as the Board observed, Leach itself was primarily responsible for

the Union's lack of knowledge. See 312 N.L.R.B. at 992 n.8.

Under these circumstances, the Board reasonably treated the existing Buena Park employees

as analogous to the new hires at the new facility in Harte, at least from the Union's perspective of

relative lack of knowledge. In both cases, the fluid nature of a gradual relocation meant that the legal

relationship of the employees, union, and employer on the first day of a transfer did not necessarily

reflect their legal obligations at the conclusion of the process. The Board's application of the

"substantial completion" test for purposes of determining when the § 10(b) period began to run is a

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reasonable response to this information imbalance.

For the same reasons, Leach's contention that the Board's rule is inconsistent with Marine

Optical, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1981), enf'd, NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d 11 (1st Cir.

1982), is unavailing. Marine Optical also involved an employer who gradually relocated operations

and then refused to recognize the union or adhere to the contract at the new facility. The Board

determined that the company had violated the Act and that its liability for the violation dated back

to the commencement of the relocation. Marine Optical, however, did not use the "substantial

completion" analysislater adopted in Harte, even though the decision indicatesthat transfereesfrom

the old facility did not constitute a substantial percentage of the new unit untilseveral weeksinto the

relocation process. Leach maintains that Marine Optical conflicts with the Harte-Leach line of

decisions, and that the Board should have applied Marine Optical 's "commencement of the

relocation" test to determine when the violation occurred for § 10(b) purposes.

Although some tension exists between the cases, Marine Optical and the Board's decision in

the instant case are hardly irreconcilable; nor do we accept Leach's argument that the Board's

decision here was unreasonable. Marine Optical did not involve any issue as to the timeliness of the

unfair labor practice charge under § 10(b); the Board's decision instead focused on the company's

challenge to the union's majority status at the new facility, where transferees were outnumbered by

new hires. 255 N.L.R.B. at 1244-45. In addition, the Board's different treatment of the § 10(b)

trigger date and the date of an employer's remedial liability as measured by Marine Optical can be

justified on the basis of comparative knowledge. When the employer begins the relocation process,

it presumably knows whether its ultimate plans willrequire it to recognize the former site's collective

bargaining agreement and might reasonably be charged with a violation of the Act at the point the

relocation begins. By contrast, as here, it would be unreasonable to impute that knowledge to

employees or their representative where an employer's bargaining obligations do not becomemanifest

or otherwise known until well after the relocation process has commenced. In this context, the

Board's decision to apply the Harte "wait and see" approach was reasonable.

III.

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Leach also contends that the Board erred on the merits in concluding that it violated the Act

by withdrawing recognition from the Union and repudiating the Los Angeles collective bargaining

contract when it moved operationsto Buena Park. The test for continuity of operationsin relocation

cases has been likened to that used in the similar context ofsuccessorship. See Central Soya Co., Inc.

v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988). In both settings, the continuity requirement ensures

that despite changes in management, plant location or production techniques, workplace conditions

remain sufficiently unchanged such that "the union can still fairly be presumed to command majority

support in the unit." United Mine Workers of America Local Union 1329 v. NLRB, 812 F.2d 741,

743 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The analysis focuses in large part on whether the " "employees who have been

retained will understandably view their job situations as essentially unaltered.' " Fall River Dyeing

& Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987) (quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,

414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973)). The Board's application of the continuity test, provided it is supported

by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, must be enforced. See id., 482 U.S. at 42; Beth

Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978); see also Westwood Import Co. Inc. v. NLRB, 681

F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1982).

As noted, an existing contract willfollowa plantrelocationprovided that transferees comprise

a "substantial percentage" of employees in the new plant's bargaining unit and the new plant's

operations are "substantially the same" as those at the predecessor. Rock Bottom Stores, Inc., 312

N.L.R.B. 400, 402 (1993), enf'd, NLRB v. Rock Bottom Stores, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7641 (2d Cir.

April 5, 1995). Leach admits that the appropriate bargaining unit is composed solely of relay workers

at Buena Park who relocated from the Los Angeles facility, and hence, the only question is whether

the Board's finding of continuity between the two operations is supported by substantial evidence.

We find that it is.

Leach maintains that its implementation of just-in-time production at Buena Park

fundamentally altered the nature of its relay production operations. The ALJ, whose findings and

conclusions were adopted by the Board, rejected this position after reviewing testimony on the

"batch" and "just-in-time" processes. While acknowledging that just-in-time differs in several ways

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from the obsolete batch method used at the Los Angeles plant, the ALJ nevertheless concluded that

these differences did not alter the fundamental nature ofthe relay operation. Instead, the judge found

that the employees were readily retrained, that the end products and interim components handled by

employees were identical at both plants, and that taken together, "[j]ust-in-time simply changes the

way in which the product goes through the various assembly steps." 312 N.L.R.B. at 995.

Leach contends that the ALJ erred by not specifically finding that employee perceptions of

their job situation were unchanged by the just-in-time process. As Leach notes, in the successorship

area the court has required the Board to identify an explicit connection between operational changes

and their effect on employee attitudes; simply enumerating changes without comment is insufficient.

See United Mine Workers, 812 F.2d at 744. At the same time, the court implicitly recognized that

such findingsmight be unnecessarywhere the relationship betweenoperationalchanges and employee

attitudes was self-evident. See id. (distinguishing situation where the factual findings are "so

obviously relevant that the Court can avoid remanding this case for the Board to relate them in the

first instance to the necessary effect on employee attitudes"). The ALJ here found that the change

in job classifications and work duties at Buena Park were relatively minor and that the same

employees were doing essentiallythe same work. Although the Board did not explicitly connect these

findings to any impact on the employees' outlook, the missing link is plain.

Leach also maintains that the ALJ's finding of continuity between the two operations is

unsupported by substantial evidence. Leach identifies several changes in the Buena Park workers'

responsibilities and maintains that they significantly altered the overall character of the employees'

work environment. In particular, Leach points to the fact that just-in-time required employees to be

"cross-trained," that the new production method required employees to learn and perform multiple

operations as opposed to repeating a single operation, that job classifications were changed and

expanded at Buena Park, and that some employees learned to operate some new machines.

The record, however, provides ample support for the Board's conclusion that the basic

character of the work environment was not fundamentally changed by the relocation to Buena Park.

See 312 N.L.R.B. at 995-96. Buena Park relay workers performed the same work on the same or

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similar equipment, produced the same products, and worked under the same supervision asthey had

done at Los Angeles. Although the just-in-time method required all workers to be more flexible at

Buena Park and some workers were given new job responsibilities, those changes were not so great

as to outweigh the essential continuity of the workers' job content. See United Food & Comm'l

Workers v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1469-1474 (1985). Unlike General Electric Co., 170 N.L.R.B.

1272 (1968), on which Leach relies, the instant case does not involve "the amalgam of ... two

separate facilities" or "major personnel changes." Id. at 1273. Rather, Leach's plant relocation

involved a relatively straightforward transfer of a single production line, with concomitant changes

in the method of production without hiring more skilled or more educated employees. By analogy

to earlier advances in manufacturing technology, the ALJ noted that when Leach changed from

manual feed to automatic feed machines, reducing the number of employees and retraining others,

the different manufacturing process did not give rise to a different operation. 312 N.L.R.B. at 995.

The ALJ's conclusion that Leach's advance to a "just-in-time" system was a comparably incremental

step is supported by substantial evidence on the record.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the Board's cross-application for

enforcement of its order.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Leach's violation of the National Labor Relations Act

consisted of refusing to concede that its collective bargaining agreement continued to apply to

employees in its Los Angeles Relay Division after it relocated them to its facility in Buena Park. On

July 3, 1991, having unequivocally stated its intention not to recognize the union that had been the

workers' bargaining representative in Los Angeles, the company started the move by relocating 35

workers (of the 280 ultimately moved), who immediately resumed their work making relays in the

new location. Absent certain limiting conditions (discussed below), which never developed, this

refusal to recognize the union violated the Act. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 5. Here the majority and I

diverge. The majority, as I understand it, says that the six-month limitations period under § 10(b) of

the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), did not begin to run on July 3 because on that date (and for some time

thereafter) the union lacked "access to sufficient information about the Buena Park operation to

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evaluate Leach's bargaining obligations." Maj. Op. at 9. The trouble with this, and the nub of my

disagreement, is that by July 3 the union was on notice of facts that made the likelihood of any

conditions that would negate Leach's liability vanishingly remote. As Leach argued persuasively

before us, see Pet. Br. at 27-29, the union was thus on notice of all it needed to know.

The majority observes that Leach failed to inform the union "what lay in store for relay

production at Buena Park, what the appropriate bargaining unit might eventuallylook like, or whence

its employees might ultimately come." Maj. Op. at 9. Concretely, this refers to the possibility that

relay workers from Los Angeles might have constituted less than a "substantial percentage" of the

workers in what might emerge as the appropriate bargaining unit in Buena Park. See Maj. Op. at 5.

This in turn could have occurred only if the relocated workers from L.A. were combined with

employees already at Buena Park, or with new hires, so that the relocated workersfrom L.A. did not

ultimately comprise a substantial percentage of the resulting bargaining unit at Buena Park.

In fact, no such blending appears ever to have been a serious possibility. There is no

indication that the relocated employees ever worked at Buena Park with employees already there in

such a way as to make the whole Buena Park operation the appropriate bargaining unit. Moreover,

neither the union nor the Board has suggested that there was even loose talk of any new hires being

brought into the relay unit, let alone in numbers that would have cast doubt on whether, at

"substantial completion" of the transfer process, the transferees would constitute a substantial

percentage of the unit of relay workers. That alone distinguishes Harte & Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 947

(1986), see Maj. Op. at 5, 6, which involved large numbers of new hires at the outset and thus

genuine doubt about the composition of the new unit until "substantial completion" of the transfer.

The 35 bargaining unit members knew, within hours of arrival at Buena Park, that they had

not been blended into the old Buena Park unit and that no new workers had been hired into their unit.

Of course it is possible that none of the 35 played any formal role in union activities, or even,

conceivably, was a member of the union at all. But at least when the requisite information is held by

a substantial number of bargaining unit members, it makes sense to attribute their knowledge to the

union; after all, it is the unit members' representative. So the Fifth Circuit has held. In National

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Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 798 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986), the

employer told employees of a new "no jeans" policy and thereafter enforced it. In applying 5 U.S.C.

§ 7118(a)(4), a six-month statute of limitations analogous to § 10(b), the court said that the

announcement to employees and enforcement of the policy put the union on constructive notice of

the alleged unfair labor practice. "Union stewards, at least, knew or should have known of the policy.

While such knowledge may not be directly attributable to the Union, it demonstratesthat the Union,

in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been aware of the no jeans policy." 798 F.2d at

116. True, in National Treasury Employees Union the employing agency had invited the union to

the announcement meeting, id., while here the company was stonewalling the union. But there is no

suggestion in the Fifth Circuit decision that it turned on that, rather than on the assumed ready

communicationslinks betweenworkers and their bargaining representatives. Indeed, one might think

that Leach's intractability would have made the union especially quick to tap the information held by

the workers it represented.

Moreover, it is clear that if the union had filed an unfair labor practice charge on July 3, the

Board would not have rejected it as premature. In Marine Optical, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1981),

enf'd, N.L.R.B. v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1982), even though new hires initially

outnumbered the transferees, the Board held that the unfair labor practice dated fromthe day that the

company transferred the first unit members and applied to them terms and conditions different from

those prescribed by the bargaining agreement.

Given the essentially undisputed evidence of what the union could readily have ascertained

on July 3, the Board's application of its "substantial completion" analysis has silently dropped

constructive notice out of § 10(b). Accordingly, I dissent.

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