Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01402/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01402-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexis M. Herman
Respondent
LTV Steel Company, Inc.
Respondent
United Steelworkers of America
Petitioner

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2000 Decided June 23, 2000

No. 99-1402

United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 185, et al.,

Petitioners

v.

Alexis M. Herman,

Secretary of Labor and

LTV Steel Company, Inc.,

Respondents

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Jeremiah A. Collins argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioners.

Mark S. Flynn, Senior Appellate Attorney, United States

Department of Labor, argued the cause for respondent SecreUSCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 1 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tary of Labor. With him on the briefs were Allen H.

Feldman, Associate Solicitor, and Nathaniel I. Spiller, Deputy Associate Solicitor.

Mark D. Katz argued the cause and filed the brief for

respondent LTV Steel Company, Inc. Andrew A. Paisley

entered an appearance.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Randolph and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Three local chapters of the United Steelworkers of America ("Union") bring this petition

for review challenging the Occupational Safety and Health

Review Commission's ("Commission") refusal to review an

administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision approving a settlement between LTV Steel Company, Inc. ("LTV" or

"Company") and the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary"). The

Secretary had inspected LTV's facilities and cited the Company for numerous violations of the Occupational Health

and Safety Act of 1970 ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. ss 651-678

(1994). LTV contested the citations and the case was set

before an ALJ. Before the case ever reached the hearing

stage, however, LTV and the Secretary settled. The Union

challenged the settlement on the ground that one of the

provisions effectively granted LTV a variance from the Occupational Health and Safety Administration's ("OSHA")

regulations. The Union argued that the Secretary is prohibited from granting variances in settlements and urged

the ALJ to reject the settlement. The ALJ approved the

settlement, and the Commission denied the Union's petition

to review that decision.

In the petition for review filed with this court, the Union

contends that the Commission's failure to reject the settlement was arbitrary and capricious. The Union asserts that,

although settlement agreements are rarely subject to challenge, employees should, nonetheless, be allowed to challenge

a settlement agreement when the Secretary has granted a

variance in the settlement. In other words, the Union claims

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 2 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that the Secretary acted in excess of her statutory authority

in granting a variance pursuant to a settlement, and, therefore, the settlement should be vacated.

The Union's argument fails. During oral argument, Union

counsel effectively conceded that the settlement agreement

does not in fact grant LTV a variance from OSHA's regulations; in other words, the principal premise underlying the

Union's argument is missing. We therefore have no occasion

to address the issue posed by the Union, for the claim that it

raises lacks foundation. The law is otherwise clear that

employee challenges to settlement agreements are limited to

whether the agreed time for abatement is reasonable. The

Union makes no objection to the settlement's abatement time,

so it has no right to challenge the settlement. Accordingly,

the Union's petition for review is denied.

I. Background

Following an OSHA inspection of LTV's Cleveland, Ohio

steel mill, the Secretary issued LTV two citations alleging

over 60 violations and proposing $242,000 in penalties. Only

one item is at issue in this case. Item 12b of the first citation

alleged a violation of 29 C.F.R. s 1910.179(n)(4)(i), which

provides that "[a]t the beginning of each operator's shift, the

upper limit switch of each hoist shall be tried out under no

load." 29 C.F.R. s 1910.179(n)(4)(i) (1998). The Secretary

alleged that LTV violated this standard by testing the switch

with lifting devices still attached to the hook. See OSHA

Citation and Notification of Penalty at 13, reprinted in Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") 1, 13 (charging that "[t]he upper limit

switch of each hoist was not tried out under no load, at the

beginning of each operator's shift," because, in one of the

shops, "some operators who were testing the upper limit

switch were doing so with the spreader bar on the hook").

LTV contested the citations, and the case was placed on the

Commission's docket. The Union sought and obtained party

status in the administrative proceeding. The proceeding

never took place, however. Instead, the Secretary and the

Company, after consulting with the Union, resolved the issues

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 3 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and agreed to a settlement; LTV withdrew its contest to the

citation. With respect to Item 12b, the parties agreed that

the required test may be performed with or without removing lifting devices from the cranes so long as LTV Steel's

policy and practice is to require that the crane be moved to

a safe location and, further, employees do not stand directly

below or along the side of the crane during the test.

Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at 2-3, reprinted in

J.A. 65, 66-67.

The Union objected to this part of the settlement on the

ground that the settlement was contrary to the regulation

and, in effect, granted LTV a variance from the standard.

The Union argued that the Secretary is not authorized to

grant variances in settlements. Although the Union conceded

that, normally, it was free to challenge only the reasonableness of abatement dates in settlements, it nonetheless urged

the ALJ to reject the settlement, arguing that the Secretary's

actions were arbitrary and capricious and did not comply with

the Act. The Company countered, simply, that the Union

had no standing to contest the settlement agreement.

The ALJ approved the settlement. See Secretary of Labor

v. LTV Steel Co., OSHRC Docket No. 98-0956, Order Approving Settlement (June 21, 1999), reprinted in J.A. 91. The

Commission denied the Union's petition for discretionary

review of the ALJ's decision, see Secretary of Labor v. LTV

Steel Co., OSHRC Docket No. 98-0956, Notice of Final Order

(Aug. 10, 1999), reprinted in J.A. 104, and this petition for

review followed.

II. Discussion

Although the Union acknowledges that employee challenges to settlements are limited, the Union argues that it

nonetheless should be allowed to challenge the settlement at

issue in this case, because, by granting the Company a

variance in the settlement, the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority. On the record at hand, we find no merit in

this claim.

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 4 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Secretary's prosecutorial power to enforce the Act is

broad. See Cuyahoga Valley R.R. v. United Transp. Union,

474 U.S. 3, 6-7 (1985). In particular, she is charged with

vindicating the public rights embodied in the Act. See Atlas

Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 444-47 (1977). She has

the sole responsibility to enforce the Act and she "is the

exclusive prosecutor of OSHA violations." Oil, Chem. and

Atomic Workers v. OSHRC ("American Cyanamid"), 671

F.2d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1982). If the Secretary issues a

citation and proposed penalty that are not challenged, they

become final and are not reviewable by any court. See 29

U.S.C. s 659(a). If the citation is contested, the Commission

adjudicates the dispute and is empowered to affirm, modify,

or vacate the Secretary's citations and proposed penalties.

See Id. at s 659(c).

Employees and employee representatives play only limited

roles in the prosecutorial and enforcement processes under

the Act, and their rights to challenge the Secretary's prosecutorial and enforcement decisions are narrowly circumscribed.

See Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d 918, 926 (2d Cir. 1983). If

the Secretary issues a citation, but the employer does not

challenge it, employees may only challenge whether the

abatement date in the citation is reasonable. See 29 U.S.C.

s 659(c). If the employer does challenge a citation, employees may then participate as full parties in any proceeding

before the Commission. See American Cyanamid, 671 F.2d

at 648-49. Cases sometimes settle before they reach the

Commission proceedings, however. See id. at 650 ("Necessarily included within the [Secretary's] prosecutorial power is

the discretion to withdraw or settle a citation issued to an

employer, and to compromise, mitigate or settle any penalty

assessed under the Act."). If a case settles, employee rights

of participation are again closely circumscribed.

Every circuit that has examined the issue has held that

when a case settles, and the employer withdraws its contest

to the citation, employees may only challenge-and the Commission may only consider-the reasonableness of the abatement time. See Donovan v. Allied Indus. Workers, 760 F.2d

783, 785 (7th Cir. 1985); Donovan v. Local 962, Int'l Chem.

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 5 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Workers Union, 748 F.2d 1470, 1473 (11th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. International Union, 722 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (8th Cir.

1983); Donovan v. United Steelworkers, 722 F.2d 1158, 1160

(4th Cir. 1983); Donovan v. Oil, Chem., and Atomic Workers,

718 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 1983); Donovan, 713 F.2d at

929-31; Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prod. Co., 622 F.2d 1176,

1186-88 (3d Cir. 1980); see also American Cyanamid, 671

F.2d at 650 n.7 (noting in dicta that when a case settles,

"employees are only empowered to invoke commission jurisdiction to object to the reasonableness of the abatement

period"). As our sister circuits have ably explained, this rule

is grounded in the Secretary's well-recognized prosecutorial

discretion and the statutory limits on employee participation.

We join our sister circuits and hold that when a case settles,

and an employer withdraws its contest to the citation, "the

only ground on which the Union may seek a hearing on a

settlement is the unreasonableness of the abatement period."

Donovan, 722 F.2d at 1160.

The Union attempts to circumvent this rule by arguing

that, even if employees are not allowed to challenge routine

settlements, employees should be allowed to challenge settlements in which the Secretary has exceeded her statutory

authority. The Union argues that the Secretary has exceeded her statutory authority here by effectively granting LTV a

variance in the settlement. Variances, the Union argues, can

only be granted through the rulemaking provisions of section

6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. s 655, and cannot be granted in the

context of an enforcement proceeding. Therefore, the Union

argues, because the Secretary granted LTV a variance in an

enforcement proceeding, she exceeded her statutory authority, and the Union should be able to challenge the settlement.

We need not entertain this argument because, as Union

counsel was forced to concede at oral argument, the disputed

settlement agreement in this case did not in fact grant LTV a

variance. In other words, the principal premise underlying

the Union's argument is missing.

In its briefs to this court, the Union argued that the

settlement granted LTV a variance from 29 C.F.R.

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 6 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

s 1910.179(n)(4)(i), which provides that "[a]t the beginning of

each operator's shift, the upper limit switch of each hoist shall

be tried out under no load." The Union claimed that the

regulation requires the company to test the switch with

nothing-not even lifting devices-attached to the hook. The

settlement, the Union asserted, grants LTV a variance, because it allows LTV to test the switch without removing the

lifting devices from the hook. At oral argument, however,

Union counsel conceded that if, under the settlement agreement, employees will not be exposed to any unsafe condition,

then the Act has not been violated and no variance has been

granted. This is precisely the posture of the instant case.

The settlement agreement at issue in this case insures that

employees will not be exposed to danger while the switch is

being tested. In the settlement, LTV agreed to require that

the "crane be moved to a safe location" to perform the test.

Both the Secretary and LTV interpret this language to mean

that employees cannot be exposed to danger when the test is

performed. The law is clear that the Act is only violated if

employees could be exposed to dangers that the statute is

designed to protect against. See Astra Pharmaceutical

Prod., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2126 (O.S.H.R.C. 1981), aff'd in

part, remanded in part, 681 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1982). Because

the Secretary and LTV are on record as stating that the

settlement is intended to remove employee exposure, a fortiori, the settlement is not a variance.

Furthermore, there is no variance here, because the disputed regulation has never been definitively interpreted to require the employer to remove lifting devices before performing the test. The Union's interpretation of the regulation is

one possible interpretation; but, as the Company argues,

another possible interpretation is that the regulation simply

requires the employer to remove any load from the lifting

device before performing the test. Thus, because the settlement is not at odds with any definitive interpretation of the

regulation, it does not grant LTV a variance. Significantly,

at oral argument, both the Company and the Secretary

conceded that if the regulation is later definitively interpreted

strictly to require more than is required by the parties'

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 7 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

settlement agreement, the subsequent regulatory interpretation will take precedence over the settlement and LTV would

be bound by the more stringent interpretation.

The terms of the settlement agreement were entirely within the Secretary's statutory authority. Accordingly, because

LTV has withdrawn its contest to the Secretary's citation and

because no issue has been raised with regard to the abatement time, the Union has no right to challenge the settlement

agreement.

III. Conclusion

The petition for review is denied.

So ordered.

USCA Case #99-1402 Document #525308 Filed: 06/23/2000 Page 8 of 8