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Parties Involved:
Chaka Toure Hutchinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 7, 2005 Decided May 31, 2005

 Reissued August 25, 2005

No. 03-3147

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHAKA TOURE HUTCHINSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00255-01)

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant. William G. Spencer, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

 

Suzanne C. Nyland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman,

and Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #03-3147 Document #897170 Filed: 05/31/2005 Page 1 of 10
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Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Chaka T. Hutchinson, who was

walking to a friend’s house after work, was stopped and

questioned by two police officers and a detective who were

investigating an assault that had occurred earlier in the evening.

According to the police, Hutchinson very closely fit a lookout

description for the assailant. As part of the investigative stop,

the police asked for and received identification from Hutchinson

and attempted to verify it through a computerized records check.

The issue on appeal is whether the retention of his identification

was related to the purpose of the stop or caused the stop to go on

for too long, thereby making illegal his subsequent arrest and the

search of his bag. United States v. Hutchinson, 268 F.3d 1117,

1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Hutchinson I”). We conclude, in light

of the close match between the lookout description and

Hutchinson’s appearance, and the proximity in time and place

between the assault and the investigative stop, which reasonably

prompted concerns whether Hutchinson was the suspect for

whom the police were looking, that the district court did not err

in ruling that it was reasonable for the police to retain

Hutchinson’s proffered identification on site for two to five

minutes in order to attempt to verify his identification through

a computerized records check and allay the officers’ reasonable

articulable suspicion. Accordingly, because there was no Fourth

Amendment violation, we affirm the judgment of conviction. 

I.

This case was twice remanded to the district court to make

findings of fact regarding the duration of the investigative stop,

specifically “whether retention of Hutchinson’s identification for

the purpose of running the ‘WALES’ [Washington Area Law

Enforcement System] check was related to the purpose of the

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stop or caused the stop to go on for too long, thereby tainting the

evidence and statements obtained by the police after the

attempted ‘WALES’ check.” Hutchinson I, 268 F.3d at 1123. 

In remanding the case a second time, the court stated that the

district court was “free to consider new evidence and to make

factual findings necessary to understand whether the information

available from the ‘WALES’ system could have assisted the

police in determining whether Hutchinson was the suspect

whom they were pursuing.” United States v. Hutchinson, No.

02-3038 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 2002) (unpublished judgment). The

court reviews the district court’s determination of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution de novo, and its findings of historical fact for

clear error. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699

(1996); United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 666 (D.C. Cir.

1999). 

The relevant facts are as follows: Around midnight on July

27, 2000, the police broadcasted a “lookout” for a suspect to a

stabbing that had occurred between 11:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m.

on 13th and Kenyon Streets, Northwest, Washington, D.C. An

eyewitness, who saw the stabbing from an elevated position

approximately fifty yards away, informed the police that the

perpetrator was a Black male in his twenties, 5'6" to 5'9" tall,

wearing dark clothes, with “a bush [hair style] which was pulled

back with a tie in the back.” Approximately an hour after the

stabbing occurred, the police stopped Hutchinson at 13th and

Monroe Streets, Northwest, approximately two to three blocks

from the scene of the stabbing. The officers first saw

Hutchinson walking east on Monroe Street, toward 13th Street,

wearing dark blue pants and a white shirt, and carrying a

shoulder bag; he was a Black male and had a bush hair style,

pulled back and tied. Detective Hilliard was “very surprised that

he . . . fit the lookout so closely,” observing that “the bush

pulled back into a tail was the very striking characteristic,”

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although he appeared to be between 5'11" to 6' tall. See

Hutchinson I, 268 F.3d at 1118. Hutchinson does not claim that

the police lacked articulable suspicion to stop and question him.

Id. at 1120.

Following a pat-down by one of the officers, during which

nothing was found on Hutchinson, Detective Hilliard asked

Hutchinson about his whereabouts, to which Hutchinson

responded he had just left work and was on his way to a friend’s

house nearby, and for identification, which Hutchinson tendered.

Hutchinson does not claim that his rights were infringed when

the police asked for his identification, which he furnished

without protest. See id. 

At this point, Detective Hilliard went to his police cruiser

to make notes on the identification and to run a computerized

records check. On his way, Detective Hilliard asked Hutchinson

if he would have a problem if he and Officer Diggs looked

through his bag. Hutchinson did not respond. While Detective

Hilliard “was comfortable that this wasn’t our suspect,” or

“d[id]n’t appear to be the guy that we’re looking for,” he also

realized that Hutchinson could have taken off a dark shirt and

put the weapon used in the stabbing in his bag. The Detective

remained in his cruiser for two to five minutes, but was unable

to use the “WALES” system. Returning to where Hutchinson

and the two officers were standing, Detective Hilliard asked if

Hutchinson had a problem with an officer looking in his bag.

Again Hutchinson did not reply, but began to remove the bag

from his shoulder. When Detective Hilliard asked Hutchinson

what was wrong, Hutchinson replied, “Well, you [are] going to

lock me up anyway.” Detective Hilliard asked if he had a

weapon in his bag, and Hutchinson said he had a gun. 

On the second remand, the government introduced expert

evidence on the computerized records system, known as

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“WALES.” “WALES” is a database maintained by the

Metropolitan Police Department that allows the police to input

local data and to communicate with other law enforcement

agencies nationwide. It contains criminal history information

regarding arrests, address information, physical description

(race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, any scars or markings),

police and correctional identification numbers, and warrant

information. It also contains motor vehicle information (driver’s

licenses, vehicle registrations, vehicle identification numbers),

social security numbers, aliases, fingerprint classifications,

warnings about particular persons, and attempts to locate both

missing cars and people. In addition, “WALES” interfaces with

several other law enforcement records systems, including the

National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System

(“NLETS”), which allows an exchange of information between

individual State databases and is maintained by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); the Criminal Justice

Information System (“CJIS”), which contains arrest information

from the police district or central cell (jail); and the National

Crime Information Center (“NCIC”), which is maintained by the

FBI. Thus, an officer calling in for a “WALES” check, using a

given name, date of birth, or social security number would have

the benefit of the computer search of multiple files in the system

as a means of verifying information that has been provided. The

officer would also receive information indicating whether the

person is wanted by law enforcement authorities, the driver’s

license status, additional social security numbers or dates of

birth, aliases, and any cautionary information. The search itself,

from initiation of the name check to the dispatcher to a response

from the dispatcher as a result of the “WALES” and NCIC

inquiries, should “[o]rdinarily [take] no more than two to three

minutes.”

The district court concluded that the retention of

Hutchinson’s identification for the purpose of a “WALES”

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check was related to the purpose of the stop and did not

unnecessarily lengthen the investigative stop. Given the

Detective’s “persistent doubt” whether Hutchinson was the

suspect for whom the police were looking, the district court

found that the officer would want to record the identification

information in a notebook for future reference. The district

court further found that because the “WALES” check “would

potentially help Detective Hilliard identify if [Hutchinson] were

the stabbing suspect, by finding out if [he] was being truthful

with the officers . . . the retention of [Hutchinson’s]

identification did not unnecessarily prolong the stop.”

Regarding the search of Hutchinson’s bag, the district court

concluded that “the short focused inquiry” was “reasonable

under the circumstances,” inasmuch as the Detective, although

“comfortable that this guy d[id]n’t appear to be the guy that

we’re looking for,” could not be certain without determining if

Hutchinson had a dark shirt in his bag. 

II.

As the prior remands made clear, the only question is

whether it was reasonable for the police to retain Hutchinson’s

identification on site in order to attempt a “WALES” check and

thereby prolong the Terry stop for an additional two to five

minutes. Hutchinson I, 268 F.3d at 1123. During oral

argument, counsel for the United States repeatedly stated it did

not mean to suggest the police may run a “WALES” check

during every Terry stop. We, too, reject any such suggestion,

for the permissible scope and duration of a Terry stop

necessarily varies with the circumstances in each case. See, e.g.,

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). When,

measured in objective terms, an officer has good reason to doubt

the identity of a pedestrian who is properly detained based on

reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, limited

further investigation related to the stop may be warranted to

verify the pedestrian’s identification.

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In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court

upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge a confrontation

on the street between a citizen and the police. The Court

observed that it “has always recognized”:

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully

guarded, by the common law, than the right of every

individual to the possession and control of his own

person, free from all restraint or interference of others,

unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.

Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,

251 (1891)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Referencing “a

sensitive area of police activity,” id. at 9, involving “the power

of the police to ‘stop and frisk’ . . . suspicious persons,” id. at

10, and its precedent that “a search which is reasonable at its

inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its

intolerable intensity and scope,” id. at 18 (citations omitted), the

Court in Terry observed “[t]he scope of the search must be

‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which

rendered its initiation permissible,” id. at 19 (citations omitted).

Thus, “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no

longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (plurality opinion);

see also id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);

see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); United

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975); cf.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981). More recently,

the Supreme Court in Sharpe advised that:

In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration

to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it

appropriate to examine whether the police diligently

pursued a means of investigation that was likely to

confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during

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which time it was necessary to detain the [suspect].

470 U.S. at 686.

Hutchinson’s principal claim of error on appeal stems from

the district court’s rejection of his argument that information

from “WALES” would have shed no light on whether he was the

stabbing suspect, and thus retention of his identification was

unrelated to the purpose of the stop. As he would have it,

“[n]othing about the WALES evidence introduced at the second

remand hearing has, or could have had, any bearing on whether

[he] was hiding a dark shirt and/or knife in his bag.” Br. for

Appellant at 30. Nor, in his view, does “WALES” evidence

bear on whether he was being truthful with the officers, because

the government introduced no evidence relating to Hutchinson’s

proffered identification that could be tested for truthfulness. For

the following reasons, we conclude Hutchinson’s challenge to

the extension of time for an investigative technique misses the

mark. We hold that, taken together, the following three factors

show that Hutchinson’s Fourth Amendments rights were not

violated.

First, the purpose of the attempted “WALES” check was

closely tied to the Detective’s uncertainty about whether

Hutchinson was the stabbing suspect for whom the police were

looking. As the district court found,“the value of a WALES

check lies, at least in part, in its ability to indicate whether an

individual is providing false information to police. This in turn

could ‘dispel suspicion,’or alternatively, suggest to the officers

that they should investigate further.” See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at

686. By confirming that Hutchinson either was or was not

providing false identification information to the police, a

“WALES” check ultimately could assist Detective Hilliard in

evaluating whether or not Hutchinson was the stabbing suspect.

The district court noted that Hutchinson “did not dispute expert

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testimony that a WALES check could verify that the person is

who they say they are.” Regardless of the type of identification

Hutchinson tendered, then, Hutchinson is in no position to argue

now that a “WALES” check would be unhelpful to the police in

resolving their uncertainty about whether he was the stabbing

suspect. While he is correct that information from “WALES”

would not tell the police whether he had a dark shirt in his bag,

if he was being untruthful about his identification, the police

would have reason not to take at face value his explanation of

his whereabouts and to continue their investigation of him as the

stabbing suspect. On the other hand, if his identity were

confirmed, the police could “concentrate their efforts

elsewhere,” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451,

2458 (2004), and he could be on his way.

Second, the description of the assailant in the lookout

closely matched Hutchinson’s appearance, and he was stopped

only two or three blocks from the scene of the crime, less than

an hour after the stabbing. Notwithstanding the Detective’s

statement that he was pretty much satisfied that Hutchinson was

not the stabbing suspect for whom they were looking, it was not

unreasonable for the Detective to attempt to resolve his lingering

uncertainty quickly through a “WALES” check to verify

Hutchinson’s identification. This uncertainty was reasonably

prompted by the close match between Hutchinson’s appearance

and the lookout report, his proximity to the crime scene both

temporally and geographically, and the Detective’s concern that

Hutchinson might have taken off a dark shirt.

Third, the stop was relatively brief, minimally intrusive, see

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, and was not prolonged for the purpose

of making a generalized inquiry, such as whether there were

outstanding warrants for the suspect, unrelated to the stop. The

district court emphasized that “the entire stop was a very swift

exercise between the time Detective Hilliard took [the tendered]

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identification and the time [Hutchinson] indicated he had a

weapon in his bag.” The time taken to make notes on the

tendered identification and to attempt a “WALES” check took

between two to five minutes; the government’s expert testified

that a “WALES” check ordinarily would take no more than two

to three minutes. The time taken for the “WALES” attempt

occurred in the context of the Detective’s uncertainty in view of

Hutchinson’s close match to the lookout. While it is true that

before returning Hutchinson’s identification, the Detective asked

a second time whether Hutchinson would allow a search of his

bag, Hutchinson began removing the bag from his shoulder, and

after a few follow-up questions acknowledged that he had a gun

in his bag. The Detective’s inquiry at this point was hardly

surprising given that he was unable to confirm the validity of

Hutchinson’s identification through “WALES” and still was

uncertain whether Hutchinson was the lookout suspect and,

more specifically about whether he might have a dark shirt or

the weapon used in the stabbing in his bag; this uncertainty was

heightened when Hutchinson did not respond for a second time

to the request to search his bag. 

Under the circumstances, the police acted diligently to

dispel their reasonable articulable suspicions quickly through a

“WALES” check and brief, focused questioning, see Sharpe,

470 U.S. at 686, and consequently the seizure of Hutchinson’s

identification “last[ed] no longer than [wa]s necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500

(plurality opinion); see also id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J.,

concurring in the judgment). Accordingly, because there was no

Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm the judgment of

conviction.

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