Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-07-02354/USCOURTS-ca6-07-02354-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lord Shawn Russell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0046p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LORD SHAWN RUSSELL,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 07-2354

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 06-00273—George C. Steeh, District Judge.

Argued: November 19, 2009

Decided and Filed: February 19, 2010 

Before: MERRITT, GIBBONS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John T. Schuring, DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC, Grand Rapids, Michigan,

for Appellant. Nils R. Kessler, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Grand

Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John T. Schuring, DICKINSON

WRIGHT PLLC, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Nils R. Kessler, ASSISTANT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. 

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Lord Shawn Russell was convicted

of various drug- and firearm-related offenses and sentenced to 684 months’

imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges his conviction and sentence on several grounds.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1

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I.

On October 20, 2005, the Grand Rapids Police Department conducted a search

of the residence at 912 Nagold Street Northwest (“Nagold”), in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Russell, present at the time of the search, told the officers that “he had no knowledge of

any drug activity inside the home.” However, police found drug paraphernalia in

“[p]retty much every room” of the house. The police also found three cars near the

house: a Cadillac parked next to the house, and a Lincoln and a Chevy Blazer parked in

the street. The Cadillac was positioned against the property’s fence in such a way that

one could only access its trunk from inside the fence via a hole cut in the fence that lined

up with the locking mechanism of the trunk. Three firearms were found in the trunk.

Upon searching Russell’s person, the police discovered the key to the Cadillac and

$4,100 in cash in his shoes. Russell was taken into custody at the scene.

On the night of June 10, 2006, sheriff’s deputies responding to shots fired at 3930

Mayfield Avenue (“Mayfield”) encountered Russell outside the apartment complex and

took him into custody again. Neighbors reported that, upon hearing gunfire, they saw

Russell firing a handgun into the apartments and called the police. The sheriff’s

detectives later uncovered a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol in the area where the

neighbors had seen Russell digging after the shots were fired. Ballistics tests determined

that shell casings found at Mayfield had been fired by the gun dug up in the backyard.

After obtaining a search warrant, the police searched Russell’s Mayfield

apartment. The police discovered much of the same types of drug paraphernalia that had

been discovered at Nagold. They also found a receipt for a rent payment made by

Russell for the Mayfield apartment, although the apartment was leased in the name of

Jodee Griffee. The search also revealed two state vehicle registrations: one for a Chevy

Blazer, registered to Russell and Kenneth Oyler at the Nagold address, and one for the

Cadillac, registered to Russell and Brena Faye Watts. Russell’s neighbors also told

police that Russell appeared to be selling drugs from his apartment and the trunk of his

Lincoln every day and at all hours. A search of the Lincoln revealed two more

handguns, and a canine trained in the detection of narcotics alerted to $11,375 in cash

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found on Russell’s person. Russell claimed that the cash was proceeds from gambling

and selling cars but had no documentation to prove it. Although a gunshot residue test

performed on Russell’s hands was negative, the forensic detective who conducted the

test later testified that the result was not surprising given the length of time that elapsed

between the shooting and the test. Roughly a day and a half after the shooting, a

maintenance worker at Mayfield discovered a small baggy containing cocaine base near

a walkway outside Russell’s apartment. Testing of the baggy provided a virtual 100%

match to a DNA sample from Russell. A total of 3.96 grams of cocaine base and .56

grams of cocaine powder were confiscated from Mayfield.

On May 10, 2007, a grand jury returned an eight-count, second superseding

indictment charging Russell with the crimes of maintaining a drug-involved premises,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), for the Mayfield apartment (count 1) and the

Nagold house (count 6); possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count 2); using, carrying, and discharging a firearm during and

in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (count 3);

possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (counts 4 and 7); and felon in possession of firearms, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (counts 5 and 8).

Toward the end of voir dire, juror number four informed the district court that,

as a paralegal for a tribal prosecutor’s office, she helped to prepare cases, and worked

with tribal law enforcement officers every day. The juror explained that although she

identified with the prosecutor “[p]rofessionally,” she did not “[p]ersonally” lean in one

particular direction with respect to the case. She added that she did not think her

professional capacity would cause her to hesitate to return a verdict of not guilty if the

evidence called for it, nor would it lead her to be unfair to Russell. She indicated that

she understood the reasonable doubt standard, that the burden remained with the

prosecutor to exceed that level of proof, and that it would be her responsibility as a juror

to follow the law provided by the court. The district judge denied defense counsel’s

motion to excuse the juror for cause, and counsel chose not to exercise a peremptory

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challenge. Before the jury was empaneled, the district judge asked the prosecutor

whether, in order to “play it conservatively,” juror number four should be excused, but

the prosecutor declined. Defense counsel asked no further questions of juror number

four, adding only, “I made my motion,” and the jury was empaneled.

During its case-in-chief, the government presented testimony by law enforcement

officers and called four additional witnesses. James Tanner testified that Russell had

sold him crack cocaine at the Mayfield apartment or out of Russell’s car, and that he had

seen Russell sell crack to “[f]ifteen to twenty” other people at various locations. Tanner

further testified that he saw Russell count “thousands” of dollars in cash at his

apartment. Jodee Griffee, Tanner’s girlfriend, testified that she put her name on the lease

for Russell’s Mayfield apartment at Tanner’s request but never lived there or paid rent

of any kind. Russell had paid the security deposit. Kenneth Oyler also testified that

Russell sold him crack cocaine on between twelve and thirty occasions. He recounted

that, in exchange for crack cocaine, he helped Russell to purchase an automobile by

signing the paperwork. He also traded his Smith and Wesson pistol to Russell for crack

cocaine worth $50. Finally, the prosecution called Anna Pahman. Pahman testified that

she began living with Russell at the age of sixteen; they lived together in several

locations, including the Mayfield apartment. During that time, Pahman received crack

cocaine from Russell roughly three times per week, and she saw Russell sell crack

cocaine to about fifty different people. The sales took place at several locations,

including at Mayfield. According to Pahman, drug sales totaled between $300 and $500

daily, and, at night, Pahman often watched Russell count between $15,000 and $20,000

in cash. Pahman testified that Russell was not employed in any capacity other than drug

trafficking.

At no point did Russell move for a directed verdict. At the close of arguments,

the district court recited the jury instructions, which had been decided upon by the court

prior to trial and after submissions by both parties. As to counts 1 and 6—maintaining

drug-involved premises under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)—Russell had requested that the

court instruct the jury that the elements of the offense were:

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(A) First, that the defendant knowingly opened, leased, rented, used,

or maintained a place, whether permanently or temporarily;

(B) Second, that the defendant did so for the purpose of

manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.

Russell further requested the following definitions:

(2) “For the purpose” of manufacturing, distributing, or using a

controlled substance means that drug manufacturing, use, or

distribution was a significant or important reason why the

defendant rented his apartment. It need not have been the only

reason, but it must have been one of the primary or principal

reasons.

(3) Proof that defendant manufactured, used, or distributed drugs at

his apartment, without more, is not sufficient to convict

Defendant under this statute. The government must prove that

Defendant rented or used the apartment for that specific purpose.

The government requested that, with respect to the purpose of Russell’s maintenance of

the property, “[m]anufacturing, distributing, and/or using controlled substances need not

be the only purpose, or the primary purpose, for the use or maintenance of the place.”

The district court used a modified version of Russell’s proposed instructions, essentially

adopting the elements of the crime laid out in paragraphs A and B, but slightly altering

the definitions in paragraphs 2 and 3 as follows:

([2]) “For the purpose” of distributing a controlled substance

means that drug distribution was a significant or

important reason for which the defendant rented or used

his apartment. It need not have been the only reason

[deleting the last clause].

([3]) Proof that defendant distributed drugs at his apartment,

on occasion [added], without more, is not sufficient to

convict Defendant under this statute. The government

must prove that Defendant maintained the apartment for

that purpose [deleting “specific”].

Russell objected to the court’s modifications, but the instruction was read to the jury as

written. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

At sentencing, a central issue in dispute was the amount of cocaine base for

which Russell could be held responsible because, as stated above, only 3.96 grams of the

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drug were found at Mayfield. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)

recommended a base offense level of 34, converting the $11,375 found on Russell into

322.48 grams of cocaine base. The government’s sentencing memorandum largely

tracked the recommendation in the PSR and argued that the court should convert the

entire $11,375 into a quantity of cocaine base. The government recalled evidence at trial

that established Russell’s primary source of income to be cocaine sales, but argued that

even if Russell had income from other sources, meaning not all of the $11,375 could be

converted to cocaine base, there was not enough evidence of alternative sources to

warrant a base offense level below 34. Because the base offense level of 34 covers

conduct involving 150 to 500 grams of cocaine base, the government pointed out that the

district court “would have to find that Russell made less than 37% of his profits from

crack . . . to find a base level of 32 or lower.” This figure was calculated by assuming

that, at $800 per ounce, 150 grams of crack would be worth about $4,285, or roughly

37% of the $11,375 found on Russell at Mayfield.

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor offered evidence that the proper street

price of cocaine base was $800 per ounce—a figure that Russell, again, did not dispute.

Detective Mike Rozema of the Grand Rapids Police Department testified that $11,375

converts to roughly 11 pounds of marijuana, but that there was no evidence indicating

that Russell sold marijuana in quantities that large, thereby ruling out marijuana as a

significant alternative income source.

The government again called Anna Pahman, who testified that when she began

living with Russell, she was not only his girlfriend but also worked for him as a

prostitute. Pahman earned no less than “$50 per trick,” totaling between $100 and $200

per night, which she handed over to Russell in exchange for crack cocaine. Pahman

estimated that at least ten girls worked for Russell as prostitutes, but estimated that only

$300 of the $11,375 was attributable to revenue from their prostitution. Pahman also

helped shed light on Russell’s income from drug dealing. She stated that she sometimes

helped Russell handle drug deals. According to Pahman, Russell dealt methadone and

marijuana “once in a while, . . . but not that often,” and that his primary business was

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dealing crack cocaine. When asked where she thought Russell got the $11,375, Pahman

replied, “The only way to my knowledge would be selling crack cocaine.”

The district judge found that “[t]he government’s formula for conversion is not

in dispute based upon a street value of $800 for an ounce of cocaine.” He further found

that Russell “occasionally sold marijuana, . . . occasionally sold methadone, and he

certainly realized some level of income from managing prostitutes.” On the question of

“ultimately how much of that $11,000 should be treated . . . as the proceeds of the sale

of crack cocaine,” the district judge found that “[t]here may have been several thousands

[sic] dollars attributable to illegal activity other than the sale of crack cocaine, but as

argued in the government’s brief, in order to find a level less than the level that was

adopted by probation in its [PSR], the Court would have to find that [more] than 4,700.”

The judge concluded that a finding that less than 37% of the $11,375 was attributable

to the sale of crack cocaine “would not be a reasonable conclusion I think based upon

the evidence that I heard at trial, as well as the evidence received during the course of

this hearing.” Therefore, the district judge applied a base offense level of 34, in accord

with the PSR, and sentenced Russell to 684 months’ imprisonment. Russell timely

appealed.

II.

On appeal, Russell argues seven claimed errors in the district court proceedings:

(1) he was denied an unbiased jury by the district court’s failure to excuse juror number

four for cause; (2) the jury instructions on the § 856(a)(1) charges for maintaining a

drug-involved premises were improper in their definition of “purpose”; (3) his

conviction for maintaining the Nagold home (count 6) was based on insufficient

evidence; (4) because count 6 was based on insufficient evidence, count 7, possession

of a firearm in furtherance of maintaining the drug house at Nagold must also be

reversed; (5) the jury instructions on the § 856(a)(1) counts constituted a constructive

amendment to the indictment because they included more possible activities than

“maintaining” the property; (6) his conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent

to distribute was based on insufficient evidence; and (7) the district court abused its

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discretion by converting the $11,375 in cash to cocaine base to determine the applicable

base offense level.

A. Implied Juror Bias

“The doctrine of presumed or implied, as opposed to actual, bias provides that,

in certain extreme or exceptional cases, courts should employ a conclusive presumption

that a juror is biased.” Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “A finding of implied bias is appropriate only

‘where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is

such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his

deliberations under the circumstances.’” Id. at 326 (quoting Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d

656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988)). “These extreme cases occur when a juror has ‘a relationship

in which the potential for substantial emotional involvement, adversely affecting

impartiality, is inherent.’” United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 379 (6th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Although the doctrine of implied bias existed prior to Smith v. Phillips, 455

U.S. 209 (1982), Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in that case describes the potential

application of the doctrine by providing examples of extreme or exceptional cases:

“[T]hat the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close

relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror

was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction.” 455 U.S. at 222

(O’Connor, J., concurring). As this court has noted, there is a question as to the

continued viability of the implied-bias doctrine after Smith. See Johnson, 425 F.3d at

326.

In general, we review a district court’s decision to deny a challenge of a juror for

cause for abuse of discretion. Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing

Marks v. Shell Oil Co., 895 F.2d 1128, 1129 (6th Cir. 1990)). However, we have neither

applied an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing for implied bias nor have we

explicitly stated the proper standard of review. See Frost, 125 F.3d at 380 n.15. Our

sister circuits have applied different standards of review, considering it as “a question

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of law,” see Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 318–19 (7th Cir. 1992), “a mixed question

of law and fact” reviewed de novo, see Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir.

2007), or “within the discretion of the trial court . . . [and] accorded deference,” see

United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2002).

We find it unnecessary to decide whether the implied-bias doctrine remains

viable or which standard of review is appropriate in this case. Assuming the viability

of the doctrine, Russell cannot demonstrate implied bias under any standard of review.

The record is devoid of facts that would support such a finding. Although juror number

four was a paralegal at a tribal prosecutor’s office, there is no indication that juror

number four ever had contact with non-tribal federal or state prosecutors of any kind.

There are no facts in the record to suggest that juror number four’s position created the

sort of exceptional circumstance about which Justice O’Connor was concerned.

B. Meaning of “Purpose” in § 856

This Court reviews challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 502

F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2007)). “When jury instructions are claimed to be erroneous,

[this Court] review[s] the instructions as a whole, in order to determine whether they

adequately informed the jury of the relevant considerations and provided a basis in law

for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.” United States v. Frederick, 406 F.3d 754,

761 (6th Cir. 2005). “A judgment may be reversed based upon an improper jury

instruction ‘only if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or

prejudicial.’” Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 659 (quoting United States v. Harrod, 168 F.3d 887,

892 (6th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The offense of maintaining a drug-involved premises under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)

requires proof that the defendant “knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any

place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing,

distributing, or using any controlled substance . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (emphasis

added). The district court instructed the jury that the government could show that

Russell maintained a place “for the purpose of” distributing drugs if the “drug

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distribution was a significant or important reason for which the defendant rented or used

his apartment.” Russell argues now, as he did at trial, that the district court erred by not

following the interpretation of § 856(a)(1) offered by the Tenth Circuit—namely, that

the drug-related purpose for maintaining the premises must be “at least one of the

primary or principal uses to which the house is put.” See United States v. Verners, 53

F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). According to the Tenth Circuit, the

drug-related purpose “must be more than a mere collateral purpose of the residence.”

Id. at 296.

The district court borrowed the “significant or important” language used in the

jury instruction from the Fifth Circuit, which held that the common understanding of

“purpose” was sufficient and that the jury needed no further instruction on a definition.

United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1990). It later noted that “section

856(a)(1) does not require that drug distribution be the primary purpose, but only a

significant purpose.” United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 346 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997);

see also United States v. Church, 970 F.2d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Roberts

approvingly and rejecting the proposition that the government cannot sustain a

conviction under § 856 if drug distribution is “but one of several uses of a residence”).

Each court to have addressed this issue has agreed that the “‘casual’ drug user does not

run afoul of [§ 856] because he does not maintain his house for the purpose of using

drugs but rather for the purpose of residence, the consumption of drugs therein being

merely incidental to that purpose.” United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1253

(D.C. Cir. 1992).

We have never specifically endorsed an instruction defining the “for the purpose

of” language of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). Today we conclude that the district court clearly

did not abuse its discretion in crafting the jury instructions as it did. The instructions

were not misleading or incorrect. They properly conveyed a reasonable interpretation

of § 856 and included a definition of “purpose” that has been adopted by a majority of

circuits to have reached the issue. We therefore affirm Russell’s convictions on the

relevant counts.

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We further hold that the definition of “purpose” adopted by the district

judge—that the government need only prove that the defendant’s drug-related purpose

for maintaining a premises be “significant or important”—is the proper definition of

“purpose” in this circuit in the context of § 856 prosecutions.

C. Constructive Amendment of the Indictment

Because Russell failed to object at trial to the jury instruction as constituting a

constructive amendment to the indictment, we will review only for plain error. Id. Thus,

Russell must show: “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects his fundamental

rights.” United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United

States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 2008)). If he satisfies these conditions, we

have discretion to “correct the error only if the error seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. Plain error does not

require reversal if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The defendant bears the

burden of establishing that a constructive amendment has occurred. United States v.

Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704, 712 (6th Cir. 2002).

This Court explained in Kuehne that:

A constructive amendment “results when the terms of an indictment are

in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions

which modify essential elements of the offense charged such that there

is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of

an offense other than the one charged in the indictment.”

547 F.3d at 683 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 338 (6th Cir. 2005)).

“To determine whether a constructive amendment has occurred, therefore, we review the

language of the indictment, the evidence presented at trial, the jury instructions and the

verdict forms utilized by the jury.” Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 683–84.

In instances in which a jury is “charged regarding two different methods of

committing the same offense rather than a wholly distinct offense, a variance occur[s]

and [the defendant] must demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by the

district court’s erroneous jury instruction.” Id. at 685. Substantial rights are only

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1

Not only did Russell not object to this language in the jury instructions at trial, but Russell’s own

proposed jury instructions included the language he now challenges. This fact alone could be deemed a

waiver of this argument. Nonetheless, we address the merits of the claim.

affected in this context “‘when a defendant shows prejudice to his ability to defend

himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment’s sufficiency to

bar subsequent prosecutions.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 962

(6th Cir. 2006)).

Counts 1 and 6 of the second superseding indictment charged Russell with

“Maintaining a Drug-Related Premises” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). The

district court’s jury instructions, however, tracking the language of the statute itself,

required the jury to find that “the defendant knowingly opened, leased, rented, used, or

maintained” such a premises. According to Russell, the jury instruction constituted a

constructive amendment because it expanded the range of activity for which the jury

could return a verdict of guilty.1 However, because the added verbs—“open,” “lease,”

“rent,” and “use”—tracked the language of the statute, the change constituted a variance

and not a constructive amendment. Thus, Russell must show that the change affected

his substantial rights, which he cannot do. He argues that the added language made

unclear what evidence the jury relied upon in reaching its verdict. However, the

language on the verdict form was limited to “maintaining a drug-involved premises,” and

the jury foreperson similarly recited that language when reading the verdict to the court.

Furthermore, Russell fails to satisfy the plain-error standard of review that any

error that did occur seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the

judicial proceedings. We therefore conclude that the jury instructions did not constitute

a constructive amendment of the indictment.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When deciding whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, we

determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430, 433 (6th Cir.

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2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Because Russell failed

to move for a judgment of acquittal at either the close of the government’s case or at the

close of his own case, we may reverse his conviction only if the record is “‘devoid of

evidence pointing to guilt,’” such that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. See

United States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 956 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.

Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897, 903 (6th Cir. 1998)).

1. Maintaining the Nagold Residence

Russell first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

under § 856(a)(1) for maintaining the property at 912 Nagold for drug-related purposes.

To convict Russell under this provision, the government must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he (1) knowingly, (2) maintained any place, whether permanently or

temporarily, (3) for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance. See Frost, 1999

WL 455434, at *3 (citing United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1990)).

To satisfy the “maintaining” element of the statute, it is not necessary that the defendant

lease or own the home. See United States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 591–92 (7th Cir.

2008) (finding that a jury could infer that the defendant maintained the premises). Acts

that evidence “maintenance” are “such matters as control, duration, acquisition of the

site, renting or furnishing the site, repairing the site, supervising, protecting, supplying

food to those at the site, and continuity . . . .” United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079,

1091 (11th Cir. 1992). “Where the defendant lives in the house, this element is normally

easily proved.” Verners, 53 F.3d at 296.

A review of the evidence presented at trial reveals considerable direct evidence

supporting a finding that Russell maintained the Nagold home. Russell was found at

Nagold when it was searched, at least one automobile was registered to Russell at the

Nagold address, and the key to a Cadillac registered to Russell and parked in a hole in

the Nagold fence was found in Russell’s shoe. Drugs and products used to use, package,

and sell drugs were found in nearly every room, suggesting the home was maintained for

drug-related purposes.

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Substantial circumstantial evidence also supports conviction. Although Russell’s

presence during the search does not conclusively establish maintenance, no other people

were present at the house when the police arrived, and he spoke to the officers as though

he knew what was going on inside. Furthermore, Russell parked the trunk of his

Cadillac, which was loaded with guns, through a hole in the fence so that it could only

be accessed from within the Nagold premises, and he kept the key to the trunk in his

shoe. A jury could reasonably infer that he took these steps in order to defend the house.

As mentioned in Clavis, evidence that Russell protected the house is evidence that he

“maintain[ed]” the premises. 956 F.2d at 1091. There is no evidence in the record to

suggest that Russell was merely a casual visitor.

The evidence is sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to convict Russell on

the charge of maintaining Nagold for drug-related purposes, and his conviction on this

count is affirmed. Because we affirm, we also reject Russell’s claim of insufficient

evidence to convict him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of maintaining Nagold

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A)(i). As Russell concedes, success on this claim

was predicated on us finding insufficient evidence to support his conviction of

maintaining Nagold for drug-related purposes. The jury’s conviction on this count is

therefore also affirmed.

2. Possession with Intent to Distribute

Russell contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

The elements of the offense are that the defendant: “(1) knowingly, (2) possessed a

controlled substance, (3) with intent to distribute it.” United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d

887, 897 (6th Cir. 2006). “Possession” can be proven either by evidence of actual

possession or constructive possession. See United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 150 (6th

Cir. 1996). “To establish constructive possession, the evidence must indicate

‘ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle

in which the contraband is concealed.’ Physical proximity to drugs, or mere presence

in an area where drugs are found, is not sufficient.” United States v. White, 932 F.2d

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No. 07-2354 United States v. Russell Page 15

588, 589 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Gordon, 700 F.2d 215,

217 (5th Cir. 1983)).

Russell claims that because the cocaine base was found in the public area of the

Mayfield apartments, it is “impossible” to prove that he ever had ownership, dominion,

or control over it. He further argues that the delayed discovery of the drugs despite

considerable police searches in the interim renders the circumstances of the discovery

suspicious. Relying on United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546, 551 (9th Cir.

1992), and United States v. Townley, 942 F.2d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1991), Russell also

discounts the DNA evidence found on the baggy, analogizing it to the fingerprint

evidence found insufficient to establish possession in those cases.

The record presents copious evidence supporting the jury’s finding. For

example, several witnesses testified that they had purchased drugs from Russell; police

uncovered physical evidence in the Mayfield apartment indicating Russell was dealing

drugs; and Anna Pahman testified that she witnessed Russell conduct dozens of drug

transactions while she was living with him. The DNA evidence is simply one piece of

the total evidence supporting a finding of guilt and, given the other proof, permits an

inference that Russell had possessed the baggy for the purpose of distributing its

contents. This case is quite different from Vasquez-Chan and Townley, where

fingerprints were determined to be insufficient to convict, in view of the lack of other

evidence supporting guilt and the varying inferences that the fingerprints themselves

permitted.

The voluminous evidence of Russell’s drug-dealing activities, including the DNA

evidence on the cocaine baggy, provides an adequate basis on which a reasonable jury

could have convicted Russell for possession with intent. Therefore, Russell’s conviction

on this count is affirmed.

E. Calculation of Amount of Crack Cocaine for Sentencing

At sentencing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence the quantity of drugs involved in an offense. United States v. Sims, 975

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No. 07-2354 United States v. Russell Page 16

F.2d 1225, 1242 (6th Cir. 1992). The district court’s determination of the quantity of

drugs for which a defendant is held responsible is a factual finding that we review for

clear error. United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1300–01 (6th Cir. 1990). “A factual

finding is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support that finding,

‘the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v. Ware, 282 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir.

2002) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide:

Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the

scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the

controlled substance. In making this determination, the court may

consider, for example, the price generally obtained for the controlled

substance, financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled

substances by the defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory

involved.

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. note 12 (2007). “[T]he evidence supporting the [sentencing

court’s] estimate ‘must have a minimal level of reliability beyond mere allegation, and

the court should err on the side of caution in making its estimate.’” United States v.

Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Owusu, 199

F.3d 329, 338 (6th Cir. 2000)). Seized funds can be converted into an equivalent amount

of drugs. Id. To do so, “the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

both the amount of money attributable to drug activity and the conversion ratio—i.e., the

price per unit of drugs.” Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 990 F.2d 251, 253 (6th Cir.

1993)). Russell never challenged the conversion ratio used by the government ($800 per

ounce). Therefore, the only issue on appeal is the amount of money attributable to the

sale of cocaine base.

Russell claims that the district court clearly erred when it converted the entire

$11,375 found on him at his arrest into cocaine base. Further, he argues that the district

court’s finding that no less than $4,700 of the $11,375 was attributable to the sale of

cocaine base did not involve a proper “weighing of the evidence.” He argues that his

sentence should be vacated under Sandridge, in which we held that the government had

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No. 07-2354 United States v. Russell Page 17

failed to meet its burden of proving at sentencing that money found on the defendant was

linked to the sale or purchase of drugs. Id. at 1037–38.

Russell’s arguments are without merit. First, the district court never found that

the entire quantity of cash derived from the sale of cocaine base. Rather, the district

court found that, because Russell would receive the same base offense level should it

calculate any amount of cocaine base greater than or equal to 150 grams, it only needed

to find that the cash equivalent of the minimum 150 grams—or 37% of the cash found,

roughly $4,700—was attributable to cocaine to reach the same base offense level

applicable to $11,375 worth of cocaine base sales. At sentencing, the government

presented evidence indicating that Russell did not deal in large quantities of marijuana,

and Anna Pahman testified that a large majority of his income originated from selling

cocaine. She further testified that any sales of marijuana or methadone were

“occasional” or “once in a while” and would not have constituted $11,375. Pahman also

testified that Russell’s proceeds from managing prostitutes were minimal. The district

court therefore found that it “would not be a reasonable conclusion” to find that

Russell’s proceeds from selling cocaine base were less than $4,700.

The evidence that the government presented at Russell’s sentencing describing

the proceeds Russell derived from the sale of cocaine base was far more compelling than

anything the government presented in Sandridge, easily distinguishing that case. Thus,

the district court’s factual conclusions were not clearly erroneous and we affirm

Russell’s sentence.

III.

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Russell’s conviction and sentence.

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