Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-18-01118/USCOURTS-ca13-18-01118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
SolarWorld Americas, Inc.
Not party
Sunpreme Inc.
Appellee
United States
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

SUNPREME INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC.,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants

______________________

2018-1116, 2018-1117, 2018-1118

______________________

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:16-cv-00171-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.

______________________

Decided: May 16, 2019

______________________

DIANA DIMITRIUC QUAIA, Arent Fox, LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

JOHN M. GURLEY, NANCY NOONAN. 

 JUSTIN REINHART MILLER, International Trade Field 

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, argued for defendant-cross-appellant United States. Also 

represented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., JEANNE 

DAVIDSON, JOSEPH H. HUNT, Washington, DC; MERCEDES 

MORNO, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC. 

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2 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

 TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-cross-appellant SolarWorld 

Americas, Inc. Also represented by TESSA V. CAPELOTO,

LAURA EL-SABAAWI, USHA NEELAKANTAN, MAUREEN E.

THORSON. 

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and CLEVENGER,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CLEVENGER.

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Chief Judge PROST.

CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge.

Sunpreme Inc. appeals from the final decision of the 

United States Court of International Trade in favor of the 

United States and SolarWorld Americas, Inc., concluding 

that Sunpreme’s solar modules are covered by the scope of 

antidumping and countervailing duty orders on U.S. imports of certain solar cells from the People’s Republic of 

China. The United States and SolarWorld cross-appeal

from the same decision, which also concluded that Commerce could not instruct United States Customs and Border Protection to continue suspending liquidation of 

Sunpreme’s solar modules entered or withdrawn from 

warehouse for consumption before the scope inquiry was 

initiated. Because we agree with the Court of International Trade that Commerce’s final scope ruling is supported by substantial evidence and that Commerce cannot 

continue a suspension of liquidation that Customs lacked 

authority to implement in the first place, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I

Solar modules convert sunlight into electricity. Many

solar modules are composed of crystalline silicon photovoltaic (“CSPV”) cells. Those modules contain crystalline 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 3

silicon wafers that are processed in the presence of other

chemicals so that one portion of the wafer has a negative 

charge (i.e., an n-type layer with excess electrons) and another portion has a positive charge (i.e., a p-type layer with 

excess electron holes). The existence of the positive and 

negative layers in a single wafer creates what is known in 

the industry as a “p/n junction.” J.A. 325, 466, 546, 2719. 

A built-in electric field is created at and around the site of 

the p/n junction due to the electric charge differential. 

When sunlight strikes a CSPV cell, the light energy is absorbed, free electrons in the n-type layer attempt to unite 

with holes in the p-type layer at and around the p/n junction, and the resulting energy generated by the mobilized

electrons is translated into usable electricity.

Other solar modules are composed of thin films. Those 

modules contain very slim layers of semiconductor material, such as amorphous silicon, deposited on a substrate of 

some sort, such as glass, stainless steel, or plastic. Some of 

the layers are doped with chemicals that create an excess 

of electron-donating impurities (i.e., n-type layers), while 

other layers are doped with chemicals that create an excess 

of hole-donating impurities (i.e., p-type layers). When the 

n-type and p-type layers are put in contact, they form a p/n 

junction, and a built-in electric field is created. The imposition of an additional semiconductor substrate (i.e., intrinsic layer) between the doped thin film layers forms what is 

known as a “p/i/n junction.” J.A. 531, 546. With respect to 

p/i/n junctions, the electric field extends across the entire 

intrinsic region.

In 2011, SolarWorld filed a petition with the United 

States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the 

United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) 

seeking the imposition of antidumping and countervailing 

duties on CSPV cells imported from the People’s Republic 

of China, pursuant to §§ 701 and 731 of the Tariff Act of 

1930. In 2012, following an investigation, Commerce issued antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering 

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those imports. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, 

Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s 

Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order (“CVD Order”), 77 Fed. Reg. 73,017 (Dec. 7, 2012); Crystalline Silicon 

Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final 

Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Antidumping Duty Order (“AD Order”), 77 Fed. Reg. 73,018 

(Dec. 7, 2012). Both orders recite the same scope, which 

reads in relevant part as follows:

The merchandise covered by this order is crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, and modules, laminates, and panels, consisting of crystalline silicon 

photovoltaic cells, whether or not partially or fully 

assembled into other products, including, but not 

limited to, modules, laminates, panels and building 

integrated materials.

This order covers crystalline silicon photovoltaic 

cells of thickness equal to or greater than 20 micrometers, having a p/n junction formed by any 

means, whether or not the cell has undergone other 

processing, including, but not limited to, cleaning, 

etching, coating, and/or addition of materials (including, but not limited to, metallization and conductor patterns) to collect and forward the 

electricity that is generated by the cell.

. . . .

Excluded from the scope of this order are thin film 

photovoltaic products produced from amorphous 

silicon (a-Si), cadmium telluride (CdTe), or copper 

indium gallium selenide (CIGS).

CVD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,017; AD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 

at 73,018–19. Commerce notified United States Customs 

and Border Protection (“Customs”) of the AD and CVD Orders (“the Orders”) and required cash deposits or posting of 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 5

a bond equal to the appropriate rate in effect at the time of 

entry for covered imports.

Sunpreme manufactures solar modules in China. 

Those modules contain bifacial solar cells that are composed of thin films, which are several layers of amorphous 

silicon less than one micron thick, deposited on both sides 

of a crystalline silicon wafer. Following publication of the 

Orders on December 2, 2012, Sunpreme entered its merchandise as entry type “01,” meaning not subject to the Orders, and continued to do so without question from 

Customs until early 2015, when, for unknown reasons, 

Customs began to question whether Sunpreme’s entries 

were covered by the Orders. Initially unsure whether the 

Orders covered Sunpreme’s entries, Customs sought advice 

from one of its laboratories. On April 20, 2015, Customs 

notified Sunpreme that it had decided that Sunpreme’s entries are covered by the Orders, thus resulting in the suspension of liquidation of Sunpreme’s entries and the 

requirement that Sunpreme pay cash deposits in order for 

its shipments to be released from the port’s warehouse. 

Although it objected to Customs’ determination, Sunpreme 

complied.

Meanwhile, Customs continued to question whether 

Sunpreme’s solar modules unambiguously fell within the 

scope of the Orders. On June 3, 2015, Customs contacted 

Commerce seeking guidance on whether Sunpreme’s products were covered by the Orders. Commerce answered that

a determination as to whether this product is covered by antidumping duty order A–570–979 and 

countervailing duty order C–570–980 [i.e., the Orders] would need to be made by the Department of 

Commerce in a scope ruling which can be requested 

by the importer or exporter.

Sunpreme Inc. v. United States (“Sunpreme I CIT”), 190 F.

Supp. 3d 1185, 1191–92, 1199 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016).

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In a separate proceeding, Sunpreme filed a complaint 

with the United States Court of International Trade 

(“CIT”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), directly challenging Customs’ determination that Sunpreme’s solar modules are 

subject to the Orders. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States

(“Sunpreme I PI”), 145 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1282 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2016) (opinion granting preliminary injunction). In 

its final decision, the CIT found it undisputed that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain layers of thin film, but that 

Customs’ laboratory tests confirmed those modules also 

contain crystalline silicon. Sunpreme I CIT, 190 F. Supp. 

3d at 1191, 1195–96. The CIT noted that, although the Orders expressly include “crystalline silicon photovoltaic 

cells” within their scope and expressly exclude “thin film 

photovoltaic products” from their scope, the Orders do not 

define the term thin film products. Id. at 1190, 1195, 1200. 

That led the CIT to characterize the scope language in the 

Orders as ambiguous with respect to Sunpreme’s solar 

modules. Id. at 1203. The CIT concluded, based on our 

decisions in AMS Associates, Inc. v. United States, 737 F.3d 

1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 

F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2002), that Customs lacked authority to 

interpret the scope of Commerce’s ambiguous Orders, and 

thus Customs could not determine that Sunpreme’s solar 

modules are subject to those duty orders. Sunpreme I CIT, 

190 F. Supp. 3d at 1202–04; accord Sunpreme I PI, 145 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1283–92. We reversed on appeal because, under the circumstances presented, the CIT lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) to entertain direct 

challenges to Customs’ decision given that an alternative

administrative remedy was available. See Sunpreme, Inc. 

v. United States (“Sunpreme I”), 892 F.3d 1186, 1192–94 

(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Section 1581(i) ‘may not be invoked when 

jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could 

have been available, unless the remedy provided under 

that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.’” 

(quoting Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 7

1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006))). That remedy was a scope 

ruling from Commerce interpreting the scope of the duty 

orders. Id.

II

A

On November 16, 2015, Sunpreme petitioned Commerce for a scope ruling to determine whether its solar 

modules are subject to the Orders. Sunpreme contended 

that the Orders do not cover its solar modules because they

do not contain CSPV cells, they do not have a p/n junction, 

and they otherwise qualify for the Orders’ exclusion because they are thin film products. On December 30, 2015, 

Commerce initiated a formal scope inquiry.

B

After the scope inquiry was initiated, but before a final 

ruling was made, Commerce issued a scope ruling in a separate proceeding deciding that Silveo, Inc.’s Triex photovoltaic cells are subject to the Orders. Like Sunpreme’s solar 

modules, the Triex cells also contain a crystalline silicon 

substrate sandwiched between layers of amorphous silicon 

thin films.

Commerce’s regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k) establish its analytical path for deciding whether certain imports are covered by the scope of an antidumping or 

countervailing duty order. See Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 776 F.3d 1351, 1354 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). Commerce first examines the sources 

listed under § 351.225(k)(1), which include “the scope language contained in the order itself, the descriptions contained in the petition, and how the scope was defined in the 

investigation and in the determinations issued by Commerce and the ITC.” Id. Those are known as the (k)(1) 

sources. If those sources are not sufficient to decide the 

matter, then Commerce turns to examining the sources 

listed under § 351.225(k)(2), which include the product’s 

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physical characteristics, ultimate purchasers’ expectations, the ultimate use of the product, trade channels in 

which the product is sold, and the manner in which the 

product is advertised and displayed. Id. Those are known 

as the (k)(2) sources.

Commerce determined that the (k)(1) sources were not 

dispositive as to whether the Triex cells fell within the 

scope of the Orders. It said the language of the Orders was

ambiguous and the other sources did not resolve whether 

p/i/n junctions qualify as p/n junctions or whether products 

containing both thin films and crystalline silicon components qualify for the thin film exclusion. Commerce correctly concluded that the hybrid Triex cells “are neither 

dispositively covered nor clearly excluded from the scope of 

the Orders.” J.A. 884.

Commerce then concluded that, based on (k)(2) sources, 

the Triex cells are covered by the Orders. It said the Triex 

cells contain a p/n junction formed by any means because 

“a p/i/n junction is simply a type of p/n junction” in which 

the electric field is extended over a wider region of the cell. 

J.A. 870–71 (internal quotation marks omitted). It concluded the presence of an intrinsic layer does not change 

the function of the p/n junction. Moreover, Commerce explained that conventional thin film cells were designed to 

avoid the use of crystalline silicon, and thus allowing products using crystalline silicon as an active, energy-producing component to qualify for the thin film exclusion “would 

result in a physical description that would easily permit 

circumvention of the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 871–72.

Commerce placed the Triex scope ruling on the record 

in the Sunpreme proceeding so that interested parties 

could comment on any relevant distinctions between Sunpreme’s solar modules and the Triex product.

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 9

C

In July 2016, Commerce issued its final scope ruling 

with respect to Sunpreme’s solar modules. Like the Triex 

hybrid cells, Commerce understood that Sunpreme’s solar 

modules were neither covered nor clearly excluded by the 

descriptions contained in the Orders. Based solely on (k)(1) 

sources, it concluded that Sunpreme’s hybrid bifacial thin 

film cells are subject to the Orders. It concluded that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain CSPV cells because they actively rely on crystalline silicon wafers to generate 

electricity and absorb sunlight, just like the crystalline silicon component in the Triex product. It also determined 

that the CSPV cells, which include all the active, energygenerating components such as the thin films and crystalline silicon wafers, are at least twenty micrometers thick. 

Furthermore, Commerce decided that Sunpreme’s solar 

modules contain a p/n junction because, as it said in the 

Triex scope ruling, a p/i/n junction is just a form of p/n junction that does not change the function or nature of the p/n 

junction in the CSPV cell. Finally, it concluded that Sunpreme’s solar modules do not qualify for the thin film exclusion because, as it said in the Triex scope ruling, the 

mere presence of some thin film layers does not override 

the significance of the crystalline silicon wafer and thus 

cannot thereby circumvent the Orders.

Commerce then issued instructions to Customs ordering it to continue suspending liquidation of Sunpreme’s solar modules imported pre-scope inquiry and to begin 

suspending liquidation and collecting cash deposits at the 

applicable rate for any relevant products Sunpreme entered or withdrew from warehouse for consumption on or 

after December 30, 2015. That date is when Commerce initiated the scope proceedings.

D

Sunpreme filed a complaint in the CIT challenging 

Commerce’s final scope ruling and its instructions to 

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Customs. It argued that Commerce’s final scope ruling is 

unsupported by substantial evidence and that its instructions to Customs should not have applied retroactively to 

solar modules entered before the scope inquiry was initiated. The CIT upheld Commerce’s final scope ruling as in 

accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence, but it invalidated as contrary to law that part of 

Commerce’s instructions to Customs ordering continued

suspension of liquidation for entries pre-dating the initiation of the scope inquiry. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 

256 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1278, 1292, 1294 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2017).

With respect to the final scope ruling, the CIT explained that substantial evidence supports each of Commerce’s four main determinations: that Sunpreme’s solar 

modules contain CSPV cells, are at least twenty micrometers thick, have a p/n junction, and do not qualify for the 

thin film exclusion. Id. at 1278–91. It agreed that the Orders, the petition, the initial investigation, and the Triex 

scope ruling provided evidentiary support for Commerce’s 

decision. Id.

With respect to Commerce’s instructions to Customs, 

however, it held that it was unlawful for Commerce to order continued suspension of liquidation and collection of 

cash deposits for entries made before the scope inquiry was 

initiated. Id. at 1291–94. The CIT held that Customs’ suspension of liquidation was ultra vires because Customs 

made its decision before the Sunpreme scope inquiry was 

completed, at which time Customs lacked authority to interpret the Orders to determine whether Sunpreme’s solar 

modules fell within the scope of those Orders. Id. The CIT 

again relied on AMS Associates, 737 F.3d 1338, and Xerox, 

289 F.3d 792, to support its judgment that Customs lacked

authority to interpret the Orders for suspension of liquidation purposes. Id. at 1292. The CIT therefore concluded 

that “Commerce could not extend the suspension of liquidation on entries that were not appropriately

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 11

administratively suspended.” Id. at 1293. It held that 

Commerce only has authority to “continue” a lawful suspension of liquidation. Id.

Sunpreme now appeals the CIT’s decision upholding

Commerce’s scope ruling. The United States and SolarWorld cross-appeal the CIT’s partial invalidation of Commerce’s instruction to Customs to the extent that it 

directed suspension of liquidation pre-dating the initiation 

of the scope inquiry. We have jurisdiction to decide the appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

We review CIT decisions de novo and apply anew the 

same standard it used. Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action 

Comm. v. United States, 802 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 

2015); Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. U.S., 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 

(Fed. Cir. 1984). Under that standard, we “must uphold 

Commerce’s determinations unless they are ‘unsupported 

by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.’” Ad Hoc Shrimp, 802 F.3d at 1348

(quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)). While our review 

repeats much of the work of the CIT, we do not ignore the 

CIT’s informed judgment. Id. Moreover, we give substantial deference to Commerce’s interpretation of its own duty 

orders “because the meaning and scope of [those] orders are 

issues ‘particularly within the expertise’ and ‘special competence’ of Commerce.” King Supply Co. v. United States, 

674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Sandvik Steel 

Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

A decision is supported by substantial evidence if the 

evidence amounts to “more than a mere scintilla” and “a 

‘reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support 

a conclusion.’” Ad Hoc Shrimp, 802 F.3d at 1348 (quoting 

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 217 

(1938)). Commerce’s findings “may still be supported by 

substantial evidence even if two inconsistent conclusions 

can be drawn from the evidence.” Id.

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Two main issues are presented for our review. First, 

Sunpreme argues that Commerce’s determination that its 

solar modules are covered by the scope of the Orders is not 

supported by substantial evidence. Second, the United 

States and SolarWorld contend that Commerce’s instructions to Customs were not unlawful and should have been 

upheld in all respects. We address those issues in turn below.

I

Sunpreme’s only challenge on appeal is that the CIT 

incorrectly concluded that Commerce’s decision that Sunpreme’s solar modules are covered by the Orders is supported by substantial evidence. The United States and 

SolarWorld disagree.

Commerce issues scope rulings to clarify the scope of 

its antidumping and countervailing duty orders. 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(a). As noted above, the analysis for Commerce’s 

scope rulings is governed by its regulations at 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225. “Commerce must first examine the language of 

the final order.” Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 

725 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2013). If the language is 

unclear, then Commerce must turn to available (k)(1) 

sources, including the petition, the initial investigation, 

and any earlier determinations by Commerce and the ITC. 

Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1). If the matter remains unresolved, Commerce must turn to available (k)(2) sources, including the product’s physical characteristics, ultimate 

purchasers’ expectations, the product’s ultimate use, the 

channels of trade in which the product is sold, and the way 

the product is marketed. Mid Continent, 725 F.3d at 1302; 

19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).

While “review of the petition and the investigation may 

provide valuable guidance as to the interpretation of the 

final order,” those sources “cannot substitute for language 

in the order itself.” Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 

F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The scope of an order can 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 13

encompass certain “merchandise only if [the order] contain[s] language that specifically includes the subject merchandise or may be reasonably interpreted to include it.” 

Id. at 1089. Similarly, “merchandise facially covered by an 

order may not be excluded from the scope of the order unless the order can reasonably be interpreted so as to exclude it.” Mid Continent, 725 F.3d at 1301 (emphasis 

omitted). At bottom, while Commerce has “substantial 

freedom to interpret and clarify its antidumping [and countervailing duty] orders,” it may not do so in a way that 

changes them. Id. at 1300 (quoting Novosteel SA v. United 

States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

Sunpreme attacks all four parts of Commerce’s scope 

determination. First, it argues its solar modules are not 

CSPV cells. Second, it contends they are far less than 

twenty micrometers thick. Third, it asserts they do not 

contain a p/n junction. Last, it argues they qualify for the 

Orders’ thin film exclusion. Because none of Sunpreme’s 

arguments is persuasive, we conclude, as the CIT did, that 

Commerce’s final scope ruling is supported by substantial 

evidence.

A

Sunpreme argues that substantial evidence does not 

support Commerce’s conclusion that its solar modules contain CSPV cells. It argues that Commerce’s decision to 

treat any product relying on crystalline silicon to generate 

electricity as a CSPV cell is contrary to law because it introduces criteria into the scope of the Orders that are not 

covered by their plain language or any (k)(1) sources. 

Moreover, it contends that Commerce was wrong when it 

stated that the crystalline silicon wafers in Sunpreme’s solar modules play a primary role in the modules’ generation 

of electricity. Finally, Sunpreme asserts that its crystalline silicon wafers are not doped and thus can produce no 

more electricity than a sliver of river rock.

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The United States and SolarWorld respond that Commerce correctly concluded that Sunpreme’s solar modules 

contain CSPV cells. They identify record evidence they allege shows that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain a doped 

crystalline silicon substrate that serves a primary role in 

absorbing sunlight, which according to the Triex scope ruling is enough to conclude that those modules contain CSPV 

cells. They argue Sunpreme simply wishes for us to reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion.

We agree with the United States and SolarWorld that 

substantial evidence supports Commerce’s conclusion that 

Sunpreme’s solar modules contain CSPV cells. Commerce 

determined that a CSPV cell is a solar product that relies

on crystalline silicon to generate electricity. That is a reasonable interpretation of the Orders based on their plain 

language and (k)(1) sources. The Orders expressly cover 

“crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells” without much relevant further limitation. CVD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 

73,017; AD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,018. The petition 

states that “CSPV cells . . . are made from crystalline silicon” and “convert the energy of sunlight directly into electricity, by the photovoltaic effect.” J.A. 237. And 

Commerce determined in the Triex scope ruling that the 

basic purpose of solar cells as opposed to blank crystalline 

silicon wafers is electricity generation, and thus a crystalline silicon substrate that contributes to energy generation 

when the device is struck by sunlight constitutes a CSPV 

cell.

The record supports Commerce’s decision that Sunpreme’s solar modules rely on crystalline silicon in the electricity generation process. In the Triex scope ruling, 

Commerce explained that traditional CSPV cells contain a 

“semi-conduction and photon collection region . . . between 

the positively and negatively doped layers of the wafer itself,” and that the crystalline silicon wafer in the Triex cells 

serves the same purpose because “the wafer is part of the 

‘circuit’ between the p/n layers of thin film, creating a 

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region of semi-conduction and photon collection between 

the thin film layers.” J.A. 871. In both instances, the wafer 

contributes to “electricity generation between the positively and negatively doped regions of the cell.” J.A. 871. 

It is active because it is slightly doped and plays a critical 

role in the energy-generating function of the cells.

The same is true for Sunpreme’s solar modules. Sunpreme said that “the role of the wafer substrate [in its solar 

modules] is primarily to provide a light absorbing material 

and a stable mechanical/thermal interface for the amorphous silicon cells.” J.A. 4575. It also admitted that its 

crystalline silicon wafers are naturally slightly doped, 

meaning they have a slight inherent p-type or n-type orientation. J.A. 4574, 4773. And Sunpreme has not identified any evidence that, given those characteristics, the 

crystalline silicon wafers in its solar modules do not operate just like the wafers in the Triex cells, which formed part 

of the energy-generating circuit by “creating a region of 

semi-conduction and photon collection between the thin 

film layers.” It was thus reasonable for Commerce to conclude that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain CSPV cells 

because the active crystalline silicon wafers in those products absorb sunlight, are slightly doped, and largely serve 

the same function as the crystalline silicon in traditional 

CSPV cells.

We are not persuaded by Sunpreme’s arguments to the 

contrary. Commerce’s determination that CSPV cells are 

those that rely on crystalline silicon to generate electricity

does not add a new criterion to the scope of the Orders because the scope language can reasonably bear, and the 

(k)(1) sources reasonably support, Commerce’s interpretation. Whether the crystalline silicon wafer is doped or acts 

as a primary solar absorber are not new criteria, but instead serve as exemplary guideposts for identifying the 

purpose and function of the wafer, which is to contribute to 

the generation of energy in the modules. Additionally, 

even if the crystalline silicon wafers in Sunpreme’s solar 

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modules are not the primary solar absorbers in the cells, 

Commerce could have reasonably concluded that it is 

enough that the wafers provide for and are primarily used 

for absorbing sunlight. Finally, while Sunpreme would 

have everyone believe that its crystalline silicon wafers are 

inert, useless slivers of river rock that play no role in the 

energy-production process, the wafers are naturally 

slightly doped and, when used in conjunction with the rest 

of the solar module’s components, play a critical role in the 

generation of energy. J.A. 245–55, 304–06, 325–27, 871. 

We therefore agree with the CIT that substantial evidence 

supports Commerce’s conclusion that Sunpreme’s solar 

modules contain CSPV cells.

B

Sunpreme argues that its solar modules do not contain 

cells that are at least twenty micrometers thick. It argues 

the thin film layers are far less than twenty micrometers 

thick and the much thicker crystalline silicon substrate 

must be excluded from the calculation given that it is not 

an active part of the devices. Because we uphold Commerce’s conclusion that the crystalline silicon wafer in Sunpreme’s solar modules are indeed an active part of those 

devices, Sunpreme’s thickness argument necessarily fails. 

We agree with the CIT that Commerce’s ruling that Sunpreme’s solar modules have cells that are at least twenty

micrometers thick is supported by substantial evidence.

C

Sunpreme also argues that substantial evidence does 

not support Commerce’s conclusion that its solar modules 

have a p/n junction. It contends that the term “p/n junction” as used in the Orders does not require interpretation 

because it unambiguously refers to p-type layers directly 

adjacent to or abutting n-type layers formed within the 

crystalline silicon wafer itself. It asserts that its solar modules do not have a p/n junction because the thin films form 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 17

p/i and i/n junctions outside the wafer substrate and a p/i/n 

junction is not a p/n junction.

The United States and SolarWorld counter that Commerce correctly concluded that Sunpreme’s solar modules 

contain a p/n junction. They argue that the Triex scope 

ruling is a (k)(1) source that supports treating p/i/n junctions as a subset of p/n junctions, and that the form of junction should not be elevated over its function. They also 

contend that neither the plain language of the Orders nor 

any (k)(1) sources limits the location of the p/n junction to 

inside the crystalline silicon component.

We agree with the United States and SolarWorld that 

substantial evidence supports Commerce’s conclusion that 

Sunpreme’s solar modules contain a p/n junction. The language of the Orders, as well as several (k)(1) sources, support Commerce’s determination that a p/i/n junction is a 

type of p/n junction because the function and nature of the 

junction, which is the formation of an electric field, is unchanged by introducing an intrinsic crystalline silicon 

layer between positive and negative thin films. The Orders 

provide that covered merchandise must contain “a p/n junction formed by any means . . . .” CVD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 

at 73,017; AD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,018. Their express 

language in no way limits the location, form, or method of 

production of the p/n junction.

The original petition describes the p/n junction as “an 

interface of a p-type semiconductor and an n-type semiconductor that is usually formed by dopant additions to create 

an intrinsic or extrinsic charge state.” J.A. 237–38. It 

states the junction could be heterogenous with various sections of the substrate responding differently to sunlight, 

homogenous, or patterned. J.A. 238. It also notes that the 

p/n junction could be formed by several means and recites

a non-exhaustive list that includes dopant diffusion, ion 

implanation, epitaxial growth, and bonding of dissimilar 

materials. J.A. 238 n.14. SolarWorld later revised its 

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18 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

petition to state that the duty orders cover cells “having a 

p/n junction formed by any means,” without reference to a 

specific list of possible formation methods. J.A. 816. SolarWorld explained that its change was meant to clarify 

that the p/n junction could be formed in any number of 

ways and at any one of numerous points in the manufacturing process of the cells. Again, like the language of the 

Orders, the petition does not limit the location, form, or 

method of production of the p/n junction.

The Triex scope ruling states that a p/i/n junction 

simply is a type of p/n junction because it is one of many 

possible means of forming the necessary electric field. That 

is, the intrinsic crystalline silicon substrate connects the ptype and n-type thin film layers so that the cell functions 

in the same way as p/n junctions formed by other means. 

The intrinsic layer just “‘extends the electric field over a 

wider region of the cell’ (i.e., the crystalline silicon wafer 

region . . .).” J.A. 871 (citation omitted). Additionally, in 

the Triex scope ruling, Commerce soundly and logically rejected the argument that the crystalline wafer is inert and 

thus plays no role in the electricity generation process because, if that were true, the substrate could be replaced 

with less expensive material than crystalline silicon that 

would clearly fall outside the scope of the Orders. Therefore, the language of the Orders and the (k)(1) sources support Commerce’s interpretation.

Here, Sunpreme’s solar modules contain a p/i/n junction formed by p-type and n-type thin films sandwiched 

atop both sides of an intrinsic crystalline silicon wafer. 

Substantial evidence therefore supports Commerce’s conclusion that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain a p/n junction, which encompasses p/i/n junctions.

Sunpreme’s arguments to the contrary do not convince 

us otherwise. First, the term “p/n junction” is not unambiguously defined in the Orders. The petition’s use of the 

word “interface” to describe the boundary between the pCase: 18-1118 Document: 6 Page: 18 Filed: 05/16/2019
SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 19

type and n-type layers that creates the p/n junction does 

not necessarily mean that the layers must be in direct contact without the presence of an intervening intrinsic layer. 

CVD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,017; AD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 

at 73,018. Additionally, the fact that glossaries define both 

p/n and p/i/n junctions does not mean that the two are mutually exclusive, for the same reason that a dictionary’s 

separate definitions for flower and tulip do not connote absolute distinctiveness.

Second, Sunpreme is incorrect in its insistence that the 

p/n junction must be located within the crystalline silicon 

wafer itself. Neither the language of the Orders nor any 

(k)(1) source limits the location of the p/n junction, and 

Commerce expressly rejected the same argument in its earlier Triex scope ruling. The fact that the petition originally 

included a list of means that was later removed is unhelpful to Sunpreme’s argument because the removal broadens 

the methods of formation that previously were delineated 

in a non-exhaustive list. Furthermore, a SolarWorld representative’s statement during the ITC conference that the 

p/n junction is created within the silicon base material does 

not conflict with a junction formed by p-type thin films, ntype thin films, and an intrinsic substrate relating the two. 

The p/n junction is in all those components, including the 

base material itself, and cannot be seen.

Third, we are not persuaded by Sunpreme’s attempt to 

distinguish the Triex scope ruling based on perceived differences in the cells. Both Sunpreme’s solar modules and 

the Triex cells have p/i/n junctions formed by thin films laid 

atop a crystalline silicon substrate, wherein the crystalline 

silicon substrate facilitates the creation of an electric field 

between the thin film layers. Any other differences between the cells, including the location of the junction or the 

method of formation, do not bear on our analysis for the 

reasons stated above.

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20 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

Finally, Sunpreme’s effort to analogize the facts of this 

case to the facts in Duferco is fruitless. In Duferco, Commerce interpreted a floor plate product with patterns in 

nonrectangular cross-sections achieved from a rolling process to be within the scope of an order covering flat-rolled 

products of nonrectangular cross-section where the crosssection was achieved only after rather than during the rolling process. 296 F.3d at 1095. We held that Commerce’s 

interpretation was unlawful because it was completely untethered from the language of the order. Id. at 1095, 1098. 

We reasoned that merchandise may only be included 

within an order’s scope if that order contains language specifically targeting the subject merchandise or capable of being reasonably interpreted to include such merchandise. 

Id. at 1089. The same facts do not exist here. Unlike the 

duty order in Duferco, which did not include any language 

that could act as a hook for the subject merchandise, the 

Orders expressly contemplate products having a p/n junction formed by any means, which for the reasons stated 

above can be reasonably interpreted to include p/i/n junctions.

We therefore agree with the CIT that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s conclusion that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain a p/n junction.

D

Sunpreme argues that Commerce’s ruling that Sunpreme’s solar modules do not qualify for the thin film exclusion in the Orders is not supported by substantial 

evidence. It argues that Commerce rewrote the scope of 

the exclusion by interpreting it as not covering solar products containing active crystalline silicon wafers because 

the language of the exclusion and (k)(1) sources do not suggest discriminating among products based on the thin film 

substrate. It contends that its solar modules are thin films 

based on their industry certification, their size, and the 

way in which they are produced. Finally, Sunpreme

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 21

asserts that SolarWorld’s statements during the ITC conference demonstrate the scope of the exclusion is broader 

than Commerce’s interpretation because there is no overlap between thin films and crystalline silicon cells, and the 

only competitive injury contemplated by the industry was 

with respect to crystalline silicon products rather than thin 

films.

The United States and SolarWorld respond that Commerce correctly interpreted the thin film exclusion as not 

extending to Sunpreme’s solar modules. They argue that 

the language of the exclusion in the Orders is capable of 

bearing a narrow interpretation and (k)(1) sources support 

that understanding. Additionally, they encourage us to 

discount the value of the industry certifications Sunpreme 

identifies with respect to its solar modules because those 

modules are certified as both crystalline silicon and thin 

film products. Finally, SolarWorld argues that Sunpreme 

misconstrues its representative’s statements at the ITC 

conference.

Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s conclusion 

that Sunpreme’s solar modules do not qualify for the thin 

film exclusion. It was a reasonable interpretation of the 

Orders, based on their plain language and (k)(1) sources, 

for Commerce to determine that the thin film exclusion 

does not protect those products that have both thin films 

and an active crystalline silicon wafer. The Orders provide 

that the covered merchandise “is crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells” and the excluded merchandise includes “thin 

film photovoltaic products produced from amorphous silicon (a-Si), cadmium telluride (CdTe), or copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS).” CVD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,017; 

AD Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,018. The petition clearly 

states that thin film products “do not use crystalline silicon 

. . . .” J.A. 551. And the ITC asserted in its investigation 

that “CSPV products and thin film products have different 

chemical compositions and physical characteristics that affect the inherent properties of each and may limit their 

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22 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

interchangeability,” making particular note that traditional CSPV cells are made from crystalline silicon and are 

more efficient while thin films are typically made of amorphous silicon or non-silicon materials. J.A. 309, 326–27. 

The ITC also determined in its investigation that thin film 

products tend to use glass substrates or a flexible substrate 

such as stainless steel or plastic. Those sources strongly 

suggest that thin films do not incorporate crystalline silicon.

Moreover, in the Triex scope ruling, Commerce distinguished CSPV cells from thin film products for purposes of 

the Orders. Relying on the petition and the ITC’s initial 

investigation, Commerce said conventional thin films were 

designed to avoid the use of crystalline silicon and instead 

use a-Si, CdTe, or CIGS on a non-functional substrate like 

glass. It determined that the Triex cells do not qualify for 

the thin film exclusion because they “contain a crystalline 

silicon component that contributes to their photovoltaic 

function.” J.A. 871.

Because there is no dispute that Sunpreme’s solar modules contain crystalline silicon, and the evidence demonstrates that the crystalline silicon plays an active role in 

the cells energy generation processes as stated above, Sunpreme’s solar modules do not qualify for the thin film exclusion. We agree with the CIT’s decision to uphold 

Commerce’s interpretation of the Orders because allowing 

any product that contains any thin film layer to qualify for 

the thin film exclusion “would result in a physical description that would easily permit circumvention of the scope of 

the Orders.” J.A. 872.

Sunpreme’s arguments trying to chip away at Commerce’s reasonable conclusion are unpersuasive. First, 

Commerce’s interpretation does not rewrite the scope of the 

thin film exclusion by defining it based on the substrate 

used, but instead its interpretation reasonably construes 

the exclusion to prevent it from covering products that are 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 23

drawn to the central focus of the Orders: active crystalline 

silicon. Second, although SolarWorld’s representative 

stated at the ITC conference that it was not concerned with 

certain hybrid solar cell products that used both crystalline 

silicon wafers and amorphous silicon thin film layers, he 

noted that his lack of concern was merely because those 

hybrid products were limited in availability and production. Earlier in the conference, SolarWorld stressed that 

thin film technologies are “completely separate” from crystalline silicon products and the two do not overlap in their 

application. J.A. 370. Last, even if Sunpreme’s solar modules are certified by the International Electrotechnical 

Commission as thin film products, we are not persuaded 

that the scope of the Orders is dictated by or otherwise 

tethered to such industry certifications. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination that Sunpreme’s solar modules are not 

excluded thin films.

In sum, we agree with the CIT that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s final scope ruling. Sunpreme’s 

solar modules are covered by the Orders.

II

We now turn to the cross-appeal filed by the United 

States and SolarWorld. After April 20, 2015, Sunpreme

was required to make cash deposits with Customs to free 

its solar modules for entry into the stream of U.S. commerce. That requirement was triggered by Customs’ interpretation of the Orders to cover Sunpreme’s solar modules, 

resulting in the suspension of liquidation for those imported products. All of Sunpreme’s subject solar modules

imported after April 20, 2015, and until the publication of 

Commerce’s scope decision were subject to suspension of 

liquidation.

Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the relevant regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(3), when Commerce 

issues a final scope ruling “to the effect that the product in 

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24 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

question is included within the scope of the order, any suspension of liquidation under paragraph (l)(1) or (l)(2) will 

continue.” Subsection (l)(1) provides that when Commerce 

conducts a scope inquiry as it did in this case “and the product in question is already subject to suspension of liquidation, that suspension of liquidation will be continued” 

pending the final scope ruling, as it did in this case. If the 

final scope ruling is that the product in question was not 

within the scope of the order, subsection (l)(3) provides that 

Commerce will order any previous suspension of liquidation ended and instruct Customs to refund cash deposits 

already made or release any bonds relating to the product. 

If there has been no previous suspension of liquidation, and 

the final scope ruling is that the product is covered by the 

order, then Commerce is commanded by subsection (l)(3) to 

instruct Customs to suspend liquidation and collect the 

requisite cash deposit “for each unliquidated entry of the 

product entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date of initiation of the scope inquiry.”

If, as the CIT held, the suspensions of liquidation in 

this case beginning in April of 2015 were ultra vires acts by 

Customs, and therefore of no legal effect, then it is clear 

that no suspensions of liquidation existed to be “continued” 

during the scope inquiry in this case under subsection 

(l)(1).1 It is equally clear that with no legally effective ongoing suspensions of liquidation during the scope inquiry, 

at the end of the inquiry, Commerce faced, under subsection (l)(3), the situation “where there has been no 

 

1 As recognized in Sunpreme I, when Customs acts 

within its ministerial powers and suspends liquidation 

without exercising Commerce’s authority to interpret antidumping and countervailing duty orders, its actions are 

lawful and continue during a scope inquiry. 892 F.3d at 

1194 n.1.

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 25

suspension of liquidation.” In that instance, Commerce’s 

command to Customs to begin suspension of liquidation is 

limited to products “entered on or after the date of initiation of the scope inquiry.” In this case, the scope inquiry 

was initiated on December 30, 2015, and Sunpreme seeks 

the refund of the cash deposits it was required to make before that date. So the question before us is whether the 

CIT, relying on our precedent, correctly determined that 

Customs acted beyond its authority when it interpreted the 

Orders to cover Sunpreme’s hybrid solar modules.

A

When Commerce decides, after an initial investigation, 

to issue an antidumping or countervailing duty order, it issues an order to Customs, giving Customs authority to suspend liquidation on entries of the product covered by the 

antidumping or countervailing duty order. Customs is 

thereafter expected to inspect imported products to determine if they are covered by the duty order. As we explained 

in Xerox, “Customs makes factual findings to ascertain 

what the merchandise is, and whether it is described in an 

order.” 289 F.3d at 794. When, based on examination of 

the product in question and the plain meaning of the words 

in an antidumping or countervailing duty order, there is no 

question that the product is either within or not within the 

scope of the order, Customs either suspends liquidation 

and collects cash deposits, or passes the entry without suspending liquidation and collecting cash deposits. In either 

instance, Customs performs what we have described as its 

assigned and lawful ministerial duties. Mitsubishi Elecs.

Am., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 

1994); see also Xerox, 289 F.3d at 794. In either instance, 

Customs lawfully performs its ministerial duties because 

the duty order in question is not ambiguous as to whether 

it applies to the particular imported products. Xerox, 289 

F.3d at 795.

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26 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

In other circumstances, when it is unclear from application of facial language of an antidumping or countervailing duty order to factual inspection of imported product 

that the product is within or without the scope of the relevant order, Commerce provides the mechanism to resolve 

the question. That mechanism is the scope inquiry procedure provided by 19 C.F.R. § 351.225. Our precedent 

makes clear that when it is unclear whether products are 

within the scope of a duty order, “Commerce ‘should in the 

first instance decide whether an antidumping order covers 

particular products,’ because ‘the order’s meaning and 

scope are issues particularly within the expertise of that 

agency.’” Xerox, 289 F.3d at 795 (quoting Sandvik Steel, 

164 F.3d at 600). And to protect Commerce’s administrative authority, Customs cannot make such determinations. 

Id. We also recognized the superior institutional competence of Commerce over Customs for antidumping and 

countervailing duty matters in Mitsubishi Electronics, noting Customs’ merely ministerial duties, and holding that 

“Customs cannot ‘modify . . . [Commerce’s] determinations, 

their underlying facts, or their enforcement.’” 44 F.3d at 

977 (quoting Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. United States, 507 

F. Supp. 1007, 1014 n.8 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1980), aff’d, 669 

F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).

Although Commerce, unlike Customs, can interpret 

the scope of unclear or ambiguous duty orders, our case law 

is clear that even Commerce cannot order suspension of liquidation of merchandise covered by such orders before the 

scope inquiry was initiated. In AMS Associates, Commerce 

instructed Customs to suspend liquidation of an importer’s 

laminated woven sacks from China, regardless of the fabric’s country of origin, that were entered or withdrawn from 

warehouse for consumption starting on a date that preceded Commerce’s initiation of its scope inquiry. 737 F.3d 

at 1340–41. We held that Commerce cannot order suspension of liquidation and collection of cash deposits retroactively (i.e., pre-scope inquiry) in instances where it clarifies 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 27

the unclear or ambiguous scope of an existing duty order. 

Id. at 1344. We reasoned that, under § 351.225(l), Commerce can only act prospectively when the scope of an order 

is unclear or ambiguous, and thus retroactive authorization of suspension of liquidation is prohibited. Id.

Based on our existing case law, we can see no reason 

why Customs, which we have recognized plays a ministerial role in the liquidation process and lacks the authority

in the first instance to interpret the scope of unclear or ambiguous duty orders, should have more power than its 

charging agency—Commerce—to order suspension of liquidation.

Customs cannot clarify or interpret duty orders in the 

first instance. Customs can determine if merchandise is 

covered by a clear or unambiguous duty order and suspend 

liquidation before a scope inquiry because such actions do 

not require clarification or interpretation of the duty order. 

Commerce can continue that suspension of liquidation following its own assessment. But Commerce cannot order 

suspension of liquidation pre-scope inquiry for merchandise possibly subject to an unclear or ambiguous duty order. We now hold that neither can Customs because 

allowing it to do so would permit Customs in the first instance to clarify or interpret the ambiguity in the duty order so as to place merchandise within its scope. Because 

Customs lacks authority to suspend liquidation under 

those narrow circumstances, certainly Commerce cannot 

continue an ultra vires suspension of that kind.

B

Ambiguity is the line that separates lawful ministerial 

acts from unlawful ultra vires acts by Customs. This is not 

a close case. The Orders in this case cover certain solar 

modules and expressly exclude others, without providing a 

definition of the class expressly excluded. Sunpreme’s solar modules are hybrid products, mixing characteristics of 

the included and excluded solar cells. Sunpreme imported 

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28 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

its products for a considerable time as non-dutiable products, without question from SolarWorld, the competing 

company that triggered the anti-dumping investigation in 

the first place, or Customs, which presumably was diligently performing its responsibility to test Sunpreme’s 

products against the plain language of the Orders. Early 

in 2015, Customs had cause to rethink its ministerial decisions that permitted the products to enter duty free. But 

it needed interpretative help to change its mind and begin 

suspension of liquidation. And even after its change of 

mind, it asked Commerce for help in deciding whether Sunpreme’s solar modules fell within the Orders, and Commerce responded that only a scope inquiry could answer 

Customs’ question. Then when Commerce dug into the 

scope inquiry, it agreed that the Orders are ambiguous as 

to whether they reach Sunpreme’s products. Only after 

Commerce clarified the scope of the Orders did Sunpreme 

have a rationale as to why the Orders covered its solar 

modules.

C

As a matter of policy, the United States and SolarWorld severely counsel us that “it is important not to overlook the adverse consequences” that may flow from 

concluding Commerce cannot continue a suspension of liquidation irrespective of Customs’ authority ab initio to institute the suspension. U.S. Cross-Appellant Br. (“U.S. 

Red Br.”) 49–50; accord SolarWorld Cross-Appellant Br. 

(“SW Red Br.”) 21–22. They argue that our decision will 

encourage importers to delay or avoid requesting scope rulings from Commerce to evade antidumping and countervailing duties and to “simply use any perceived ambiguity 

in scope language as a shield against suspension.” SW Red 

Br. 21–22; accord U.S. Red Br. 49–50. SolarWorld adds

that domestic interested parties are not in a good position 

to police such undesirable activity because they rarely 

know whether an importer is entering products with or 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 29

without paying potentially applicable duties. The facts of 

this case do not warrant these fears.

As for a solution to their policy concerns, the United 

States and SolarWorld urge us to bless unlawful action by 

Customs by elevating the roles of Customs from ministerial 

to substantive while collecting duties. The United States 

and SolarWorld have no sound counter to the demands of 

our precedent, which bars Customs from asserting interpretive power over antidumping and countervailing duty 

orders. The scope inquiry in this case, answered by Commerce’s interpretation of the duty order, proves beyond 

cavil that the duty order here is ambiguous. Only at the 

conclusion of the scope inquiry could it be said that Sunpreme’s solar modules fall within the scope of an ambiguous duty order. The law recognizes this fact, but the United 

States and SolarWorld insist that we vest Customs with 

the authority to perform Commerce’s job. This panel cannot change the law to suit the policy concerns noted by the 

United States and SolarWorld.

As Sunpreme points out, the holding in this case applies only in a narrow set of circumstances because, when 

the duty order is clear and unambiguous, Customs can suspend liquidation of subject merchandise pre-scope inquiry 

and Commerce is free to continue that suspension. See 

AMS Assocs., 737 F.3d at 1344 (“Importers cannot circumvent antidumping orders by contending that their products 

are outside the scope of existing orders when such orders 

are clear as to their scope. Our precedent evinces this understanding.”). But even when the order is ambiguous, 

there are other options available to the Government that 

would prevent importers from evading potentially applicable duties. When confronted with a scope question, nothing 

prevents Customs from picking up the phone and calling 

Commerce, or sending Commerce an instant message, encouraging it to self-initiate a scope inquiry. 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(b). Indeed, that is precisely what Customs did in 

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30 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

this case, but Commerce did not timely respond by self-initiating a scope inquiry.

D

In this case, after Commerce issued its final scope ruling concluding that Sunpreme’s solar modules are subject 

to the Orders, it instructed Customs to suspend liquidation 

of the modules entered or withdrawn from warehouse on or 

after the date of initiation of the scope inquiry and to continue suspending liquidation of the modules entered or 

withdrawn from warehouse before that time. We agree 

with the CIT that the latter part of Commerce’s instructions to Customs is invalid.

From the start and throughout this appeal, the parties 

have disputed the scope of the Orders. Furthermore, it

cannot be seriously disputed that, at the time Customs suspended liquidation and the scope inquiry was later initiated, the scope of the Orders was ambiguous with respect 

to Sunpreme’s solar modules. Cf. Sunpreme I, 892 F.3d at 

1192 (stating that the parties dispute the scope and application of the Orders).2

 

2 That we, as legislators or administrators, might 

prefer to make the importer pay up front even where an 

antidumping or countervailing duty order is ambiguous is 

not for us to say. The question is what the law demands. 

We think the law is clear that Customs lacks interpretive 

authority, where, as here, the Orders are ambiguous. The 

rule suggested by the dissent, namely that Customs’ behavior is defined one way when the appealed issue is jurisdiction (in which case Customs lacks interpretative 

authority), but another when the appealed issue is a question of scope (Customs has interpretative authority), is unavailing. Customs takes an action, which we review on the 

merits or in a jurisdictional challenge. The nature of Customs’ action does not change depending on the challenge.

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 31

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the CIT’s conclusion that Commerce’s final scope ruling placing Sunpreme’s solar products within the ambit of the Orders is 

supported by substantial evidence. We also affirm the 

CIT’s determination that Commerce’s instructions to Customs are invalid to the extent that they command continuation of suspension of liquidation and collection of cash 

deposits on Sunpreme’s solar modules entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption before Commerce 

initiated its scope inquiry on December 30, 2015.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 18-1118 Document: 6 Page: 31 Filed: 05/16/2019
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

SUNPREME INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC.,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants

______________________

2018-1116, 2018-1117, 2018-1118

______________________

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:16-cv-00171-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.

______________________

PROST, Chief Judge, dissenting-in-part. 

I agree with the Majority’s well-reasoned analysis of 

the appeal in this case. I respectfully dissent, however, 

from the Majority’s affirmance of the cross-appeal. For the 

reasons explained below, I would reverse and hold that 

Commerce’s instruction to continue suspension of liquidation was proper.

The practical difference between the Majority’s holding 

and my view is this: for the period between April 20, 2015 

(the approximate date Customs began collecting cash deposits from Sunpreme) and December 30, 2015 (the date 

the scope inquiry was initiated), I believe Sunpreme should 

be required to pay antidumping duties because, as the Majority holds today, the products Sunpreme imported during 

Case: 18-1118 Document: 6 Page: 32 Filed: 05/16/2019
2 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

that period were subject to antidumping and countervailing duty orders. But under the Majority’s holding as to the 

cross-appeal, instead of paying the duties owed for that 

time period, Sunpreme will instead receive a refund for the 

cash deposits it paid. Sunpreme is therefore rewarded for 

its delay in filing a request for a scope inquiry. This cannot 

be correct. 

I

Commerce issued the antidumping and countervailing 

duty orders (“AD/CVD orders”) at issue in this case in December 2012. Despite the existence of those orders, Sunpreme had been entering its products as type 01 entries, 

meaning that the entries were not subject to antidumping 

and countervailing duties. In 2015, Customs began to 

question Sunpreme’s identification of its products as type 

01 entries. Customs determined that the products were indeed covered by the AD/CVD orders in this case and directed Sunpreme to enter its products as type 03 entries, 

which require payment of antidumping and countervailing 

duty cash deposits. Only after Customs forced Sunpreme’s 

hand in this way did Sunpreme eventually file a request 

for a scope inquiry to determine whether its products were 

within the scope of the AD/CVD orders.

After Commerce issued its final ruling in the scope inquiry, which confirmed that Sunpreme’s products were 

within the scope of the AD/CVD orders (i.e., that Customs 

was correct), Commerce instructed Customs to (a) continue 

suspension of liquidation and collection of cash deposits as 

to entries that were already suspended; and (b) begin suspension of liquidation (and collection of cash deposits) for 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 3

entries that were not already suspended, beginning on the 

date the scope inquiry was initiated.1 J.A. 4692, 4697. 

These two instructions were in accordance with the relevant Commerce regulation. As relevant here, when Commerce conducts a scope inquiry “and the product in 

question is already subject to suspension of liquidation, 

that suspension of liquidation will be continued, pending a 

preliminary or a final scope ruling, at the cash deposit rate 

that would apply if the product were ruled to be included 

within the scope of the order.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(1). 

Once Commerce issues a final scope ruling, “any suspension of liquidation under paragraph (l)(1) or (l)(2) of this 

section will continue.” Id. § 351.225(l)(3).

The Majority does not hold that Commerce violated 

§ 351.225(l) or any other regulation. Indeed, it could not, 

as Commerce followed those procedures to the letter. Instead, the Majority goes a step further, holding that Commerce could not “continue” suspension of liquidation 

because the original act of suspending liquidation and collecting cash deposits was, in the Majority’s view, an ultra 

vires act by Customs. Majority Op. at 24, 25.

This court has not directly addressed the contours of 

Customs’ authority regarding the application and enforcement of AD/CVD orders. Most of our commentary on Customs’ role has been in the context of analyzing various 

jurisdictional issues. See Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 

892 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Xerox Corp. v. United 

States, 289 F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Sandvik Steel Co. v. 

U.S., 164 F.3d 596 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., 

Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In one 

of those cases, we explained that once Commerce issues an 

 

1 “Liquidation means the final computation or ascertainment of duties on entries for consumption or drawback 

entries.” 19 C.F.R. § 159.1.

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4 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

antidumping or countervailing duty order, “Customs is 

charged with the ministerial function of fixing ‘the amount 

of duty to be paid’ on subject merchandise.” Xerox, 289 F.3d 

at 794 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1500(c)). As the Majority recognizes, see Majority Op. at 25, Customs is expected to examine imported products to determine if they are covered 

by an AD/CVD order. Xerox, 289 F.3d at 794 (“When merchandise may be subject to an antidumping duty order, 

Customs makes factual findings to ascertain what the merchandise is, and whether it is described in an order.”). 

Under the Majority’s reasoning, Customs may perform 

its function—fixing the amount of duty to be paid— only if 

there can be no doubt that a product is either within or not 

within the scope of an AD/CVD order. See Majority Op. at 

25, 26. The Majority cites Xerox for this proposition. But 

Xerox merely addressed an issue related to the Court of International Trade’s jurisdiction—namely, whether the 

unique factual scenario at issue in that case was protestable to Customs, or whether a scope inquiry from Commerce 

was necessary. We explained that if it were “unclear 

whether the goods at issue were within the scope of antidumping duty orders,” a scope inquiry would be necessary, 

rather than a protest. Xerox, 289 F.3d at 795. But, we held 

that a scope inquiry was not necessary in Xerox because 

“the scope of the order [was] not in question” given that the 

products at issue were “facially outside the scope of the antidumping duty order.” Id. Indeed, on appeal, the parties 

in that case agreed that the goods were not subject to the 

AD/CVD order. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1, Xerox Corp. 

v. United States, No. 01-1124 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2001), Dkt. 

No. 8 (“It is uncontested in this appeal that Customs assessed antidumping duties against entries made by Xerox 

of merchandise that is outside the scope of the relevant antidumping order.”). The circumstances in Xerox thus involved a “ministerial, factual error of Customs”—i.e., the 

AD/CVD order required the products to be used for power 

transmission and to contain certain materials, and the 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 5

products at issue were not used for power transmission and 

did not contain such materials. 289 F.3d at 793–95. We 

thus held that such a ministerial error was protestable to 

Customs. Id. at 795.

The Majority’s reasoning appears to create a strict dichotomy between “ministerial” actions by Customs and improper “interpretation” of scope language by Customs. In 

my view, this is a false dichotomy. The cases the Majority 

cites regarding whether an act by Customs was “ministerial” pertained to whether that act was the type that was 

protestable such that the CIT would have jurisdiction under § 1581(a). See Sunpreme I, 892 F.3d at 1192; Xerox, 

289 F.3d at 795; Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977. Certainly, 

Sunpreme I suggests that the alleged error there was more 

than the “undisputed” and “ministerial” issue in Xerox

(otherwise the CIT would have had jurisdiction under 

§ 1581(a)). See See Sunpreme I, 892 F.3d at 1192. But Sunpreme I did not speak to whether a lack of jurisdiction under § 1581(a) necessarily meant that Customs was 

improperly “interpreting” an AD/CVD order.

To be sure, our case law indicates that if it is not clear 

whether products fall within the scope of an AD/CVD order, 

it is Commerce’s role to decide whether those products fall 

within the scope of the order.2 This, however, does not 

mean that Customs’ hands are completely tied. 

 

2 In Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, we stated 

that “[s]ound administration of the antidumping laws 

counsels that Commerce, which administers those laws, 

should in the first instance decide whether an antidumping 

order covers particular products.” 164 F.3d 596, 600 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). But that case did not address 

the issue here. We made that statement—“in the first instance”—as part of our analysis of whether administrative 

remedies had been fully exhausted. See id. In that case, 

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Customs is responsible for fixing the amount of duty 

owed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1500(c). That necessarily requires a 

decision from Customs as to whether the goods fall within 

an AD/CVD order. But the Majority holds today that Customs may apply and enforce AD/CVD orders to set the 

amount of duty owed only if merchandise is clearly and unambiguously covered by an AD/CVD order. See Majority

Op. at 27. Meanwhile, if there is any question as to 

whether merchandise is subject to an AD/CVD order, the 

Majority holds that any action from Customs applying that 

AD/CVD order would be an improper “interpretation” of 

the AD/CVD order. Id. 

To be sure, I agree with the Majority that only Commerce can interpret the scope of an AD/CVD order. I disagree, however, that Customs’ routine application of such 

orders constitutes an improper and ultra vires “interpretation” of those orders. Whether merchandise is subject to 

an AD/CVD order is a yes or no question that Customs 

must answer to fix the amount of duty owed. But under 

the Majority’s reasoning, unless the AD/CVD order is crystal clear, any decision by Customs—whether yes or no—

would be an “interpretation” of the scope of that AD/CVD 

order. In my view, by giving a yes or no answer, Customs 

is merely performing its “ministerial function of fixing ‘the

amount of duty to be paid’ on subject merchandise.” Xerox, 

 

after Customs had suspended liquidation and begun collecting cash deposits, the importer failed to timely file a request for a scope inquiry from Commerce. Then, after 

Customs liquidated the entries, the importer protested 

Customs’ application of the antidumping duty to those entries. We held that the Court of International Trade lacked 

jurisdiction to review the denial of the protest because the 

importer had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 

by failing to request a scope inquiry. 

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289 F.3d at 794 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1500(c)). It is not improperly “interpreting” the scope of an AD/CVD order. 

To support its conclusion regarding Customs’ actions

being ultra vires, the Majority concludes that “even Commerce cannot order suspension of liquidation of merchandise covered by such orders before the scope inquiry was 

initiated.” Majority Op. at 26. Respectfully, this extends 

our holding in AMS Associates, Inc. v. United States, 737 

F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013), too far. First, Commerce’s regulation contemplates continuing the suspension of liquidation upon initiation of a scope inquiry, which demonstrates 

that in at least some circumstances, suspension of liquidation before a scope inquiry is initiated is appropriate. 19 

C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(1). Too broad a reading of AMS would 

nullify that provision. Moreover, to the extent the Majority’s statement is limited to situations in which Commerce 

clarifies an unclear or ambiguous AD/CVD order, this still 

takes AMS too far. In AMS, Customs had not suspended 

liquidation. Despite this, Commerce ordered suspension of 

liquidation retroactive to the period prior to the initiation 

of the scope inquiry. We held that where Commerce seeks

to clarify an unclear AD/CVD order, Commerce cannot order suspension of liquidation where such instructions 

would result in merchandise that had previously entered 

not subject to the AD/CVD order being retroactively 

brought within the scope. Unlike in AMS, Commerce’s instruction in our case is not truly retroactive because Customs had already suspended liquidation for the pre-scope 

inquiry period.

II

The practical import of the Majority’s conclusion that 

Customs acted ultra vires is that importers will have no 

incentive to request a scope inquiry from Commerce. As 

the government and SolarWorld argue, if Customs cannot 

suspend liquidation and collect cash deposits where it is 

unclear if merchandise falls within an AD/CVD order, 

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8 SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES

importers will be incentivized to delay or avoid requesting 

scope rulings from Commerce. As the result in this case 

shows, the longer an importer delays, the less it will ultimately pay in antidumping or countervailing duties. 

The Majority’s proposed solution for this problem is to

have Customs pick up the phone, call Commerce, and suggest to Commerce that Commerce self-initiate a scope inquiry.3 Majority Op. at 30. But there is no statutory or 

regulatory framework to support such a solution. Indeed, 

the presence of such a referral procedure elsewhere in the 

regulatory framework suggests that such a procedure is not

contemplated here. See 19 C.F.R. § 165.16 (in the context 

of investigating claims of evasion of antidumping and countervailing duties, requiring referrals to Commerce in certain circumstances). Without some statutory or regulatory 

basis for these two agencies to coordinate in such circumstances, I am not comfortable assuming this is a workable 

solution.

Finally, I note that there appears to be no harm in Customs’ suspending liquidation and requiring importers to 

pay cash deposits during the period prior to the initiation 

of a scope inquiry, even where it is unclear whether the 

merchandise falls within an AD/CVD order. If as a result 

of the scope inquiry Commerce rules that a product is not 

within the scope of an AD/CVD order, Commerce will instruct Customs to refund the AD/CVD cash deposits to the 

importer. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(3); see also Majority Op. 

at 24. And if instead Commerce rules that the product is 

within the scope of the AD/CVD order—i.e., that Customs 

was correct to suspend liquidation—there is no reason why 

 

3 A scope inquiry may be self-initiated by Commerce, 

see 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(b), or in response to a request filed 

by an interested party, see id. § 351.225(c). Customs cannot initiate a scope inquiry because it is not an “interested 

party.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9). 

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SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES 9

the importer should not have been paying cash deposits for 

the period prior to the initiation of the scope inquiry. 

In sum, the Majority’s holding significantly limits Customs’ ability to perform its role in applying and enforcing

Commerce’s AD/CVD orders as Customs fixes the amount 

of duty owed. This holding also encourages importers to 

delay filing requests for scope inquiries so that they too 

might receive the windfall that Sunpreme is receiving in 

this case. Because I cannot agree with this outcome, I respectfully dissent.

Case: 18-1118 Document: 6 Page: 40 Filed: 05/16/2019