Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07037/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07037-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States
Appellee
Does
Appellee
Russian Federation
Appellee
Russian Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication
Appellee
Russian State Library
Appellee
Russian State Military Archive
Appellee
State Development Corporation VEB.RF
Appellant
Tenex-USA Incorporated
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2024 Decided August 6, 2024 

No. 23-7036 

AGUDAS CHASIDEI CHABAD OF UNITED STATES, A

NON-PROFIT RELIGIOUS CORPORATION, 

APPELLEE

v. 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, A FOREIGN STATE, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

TENEX-USA INCORPORATED, 

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 23-7037 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:05-cv-01548) 

Carolyn B. Lamm and Nicolle Kownacki argued the cause 

for appellant TENEX-USA, Inc. With them on the briefs were 

Jacqueline L. Chung and Ena Cefo. 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 1 of 24
2 

Wesley W. Whitmyer, Jr. and David C. Tobin were on the 

briefs for appellant State Development Corporation VEB.RF. 

Robert P. Parker argued the cause for appellee. With him 

on the brief were Steven M. Lieberman and Paul S. Macri.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WILKINS and CHILDS, 

Circuit Judges. 

 Opinion of the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN. 

 SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: For the third time, we consider 

an appeal in this long-running lawsuit brought by Agudas 

Chasidei Chabad of United States to reclaim religious property 

unlawfully expropriated by the Russian state. Years ago, 

Chabad obtained a default judgment against the Russian 

Federation and several of its agencies along with an order 

directing them to return the expropriated property. The 

defendants ignored that order, so the district court imposed 

monetary sanctions against them, payable to Chabad. The 

sanctions have now accrued to over $175 million and have been 

made enforceable through interim judgments. 

 This appeal arises out of Chabad’s attempt to collect on 

those sanctions judgments by attaching the property of three 

companies it contends the Russian Federation owns and 

controls. We hold that Chabad may not do so. As a foreign 

state, the Russian Federation has sovereign immunity from 

civil suits unless its immunity has been abrogated by the 

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The district court believed 

that it had jurisdiction over the Russian Federation pursuant to 

that Act’s “expropriation exception” to immunity. Our 

precedents, however, establish that the expropriation exception 

is inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. The district 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 2 of 24
3 

court thus does not have—and has never had—jurisdiction over 

Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation. 

Because the district court entered the default judgment and 

sanctions judgments against the Russian Federation in excess 

of its jurisdiction, those judgments are void as against the 

Federation. And without the judgments against the Federation, 

there is no predicate for Chabad to attach the property of 

companies the Federation allegedly owns and controls. We 

vacate the district court’s decision concluding otherwise. 

I. 

A. 

 Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States (Chabad) is a 

religious movement of Russian origin dating back to the 1700s. 

Over its first century and a half, Chabad accumulated a library 

of more than 12,000 volumes containing its history and central 

teachings (the Library). It also compiled an archive of the 

writings of its spiritual leaders, or Rebbes, documents it 

considers sacred (the Archive). Collectively, the Library and 

the Archive are known as “the Collection.” As our first 

decision in this case recognized, “[t]he religious and historical 

importance of the Collection to Chabad . . . can hardly be 

overstated.” Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n 

(Chabad I), 528 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

 During the twentieth century, the Soviet Union took both 

pieces of the Collection from Chabad—the Library in the 

1920s and the Archive after the end of World War II. Since 

their expropriation, the Library and Archive have resided in 

Russia in the custody of government agencies now called the 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 3 of 24
4 

Russian State Library (RSL) and the Russian State Military 

Archive (RSMA). 

B. 

 Chabad filed this lawsuit in 2004, naming as defendants 

the Russian Federation, the RSL, the RSMA, and the Russian 

Ministry of Culture and Mass Communications. Chabad 

sought, among other relief, an order directing the Collection’s 

return. 

As a basis for jurisdiction, Chabad invoked the Foreign 

Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et 

seq. The FSIA affords a blanket grant of immunity to foreign 

states (and their agencies and instrumentalities) from the civil 

jurisdiction of American courts, subject to certain exceptions. 

Id. §§ 1604–1611. Chabad relied on the FSIA’s so-called 

“expropriation exception,” which allows courts to hear certain 

claims against foreign states involving “property taken in 

violation of international law.” Id. § 1605(a)(3). 

 

 The case first reached our court after the district court 

granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district 

court held that, under the FSIA’s expropriation exception, it 

had jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims against the RSMA but 

not over its claims against the RSL. Agudas Chasidei Chabad 

of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 19–20, 31 (D.D.C. 

2006). We affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding 

that the district court had jurisdiction over both. Chabad I, 528 

F.3d at 939, 955. 

But neither the district court nor our court examined 

whether there was jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims against 

the Russian Federation itself or whether the Federation instead 

was immune from suit. Although our opinion remarked that 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 4 of 24
5 

we “reverse [the district court’s] finding of Russia’s

immunity,” just what precisely we meant by that statement visà-vis the Russian Federation is unclear, since we at times in the 

opinion referred to all the defendants collectively as “Russia” 

and conducted no analysis specific to the Russian Federation. 

Id. at 955 (emphasis added); see generally De Csepel v. 

Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1105–06 (D.C. Cir. 

2017). 

The upshot of Chabad I was that all the defendants, 

including the Russian Federation, remained in the case. In the 

wake of our decision, however, the defendants withdrew from 

the litigation. The Russian Federation, speaking on behalf of 

itself and its agencies, asserted its belief that “a Court in the 

United States does not have the authority to adjudicate rights 

in property that in most cases always has been located in the 

Russian Federation.” Statement with Respect to Further 

Participation at 1 (June 26, 2009), J.A. 92. The Federation thus 

concluded that further participation in the case would be 

inconsistent with its “sovereignty.” Id. at 2, J.A. 93. 

Approximately a year later, the district court granted 

Chabad a default judgment against all defendants and ordered 

them to surrender the Collection. After the defendants failed 

to comply, the court imposed contempt sanctions, requiring the 

defendants to pay Chabad $50,000 per day until they returned 

the Collection. The defendants, though, neither paid the 

sanctions nor returned the Collection. In the ensuing years, the 

court entered interim judgments of accrued sanctions, which 

now total more than $175 million. 

C. 

 Unable to execute directly against the assets of the absent 

defendants to satisfy the accumulating sanctions judgments, 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 5 of 24
6 

Chabad looked elsewhere. It sought, in particular, to collect 

from entities in the United States with connections to the 

Russian state. That effort eventually led Chabad to TenexUSA, a third-tier subsidiary of the Russian State Atomic 

Energy Corporation, and State Development Corporation 

VEB.RF (VEB), a Russian state development bank. See 

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n (Chabad II), 

19 F.4th 472, 474–75 (D.C. Cir. 2021). 

 Our second decision in this case, Chabad II, followed 

Chabad’s efforts to subpoena information from Tenex-USA 

and VEB about their assets and ownership. Id. As relevant 

here, Tenex-USA responded to the subpoena by seeking partial 

vacatur of the default judgment and sanctions judgments 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Id. TenexUSA argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over 

Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation under the 

FSIA’s expropriation exception. Id. at 475. And Tenex-USA 

maintained that, absent jurisdiction as to the Russian 

Federation, there was no basis for Chabad to seek attachment 

of Tenex-USA’s assets based on its alleged ties to the 

Federation. Id. 

We disposed of Chabad II without reaching that 

jurisdictional question. We held that, regardless of the district 

court’s jurisdiction over the Russian Federation, Tenex-USA 

could not invoke Rule 60(b) to void the judgments against the 

Russian Federation. Id. at 477. That rule allows only “a party 

or its legal representative” to seek relief from judgment. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b). And Tenex-USA was neither a party to the 

judgments—the parties instead were the Russian Federation 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 6 of 24
7 

and its agencies—nor any party’s legal representative. Chabad 

II, 19 F.4th at 477. 

 The case thus returned to the district court. Chabad then 

moved to attach the U.S. property of Tenex-USA, its parent 

company Tenex Joint-Stock Company (Tenex JSC), and VEB, 

and to execute on that property to satisfy the sanctions 

judgments it held against the Russian Federation. Chabad 

argued that all three companies were alter egos of the Russian 

Federation and that their property should be considered 

Russian Federation property for purposes of enforcing the 

judgments. 

The district court denied Chabad’s motion without 

prejudice. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 

659 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2023). The court first held that 

Chabad had satisfied the FSIA’s expropriation exception as to 

the Russian Federation, so the Federation lacked immunity 

with respect to the judgments entered against it. Id. at 7–10. 

The court next concluded that, for the most part, Chabad had 

satisfied a separate FSIA exception to the immunity from 

attachment that the FSIA otherwise confers on foreign state 

property. Id. at 10–11. 

 While the court ruled in Chabad’s favor in those respects, 

it further determined that Chabad had not fulfilled the FSIA’s 

requirement to provide notice of a default judgment to a 

defendant before attaching its assets to satisfy the judgment. 

Id. at 11–15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c)). Although Chabad 

had served the default judgment on the Russian Federation, it 

had not served the sanctions judgments. Id. at 12–15. The 

court therefore denied Chabad’s motion without prejudice, 

directing Chabad to serve the sanctions judgments on the 

Russian Federation and then file a renewed attachment motion. 

Id. at 15. Because the court rested its decision on lack of notice, 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 7 of 24
8 

it did not resolve whether the property of Tenex JSC, TenexUSA, or VEB is in fact property of the Russian Federation to 

which Chabad has a legitimate claim. Id. 

VEB and Tenex-USA now appeal. They argue, among 

other things, that the district court erred in asserting jurisdiction 

over Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation under the 

FSIA’s expropriation exception. (Because Tenex-USA 

purports to speak only for itself, not Tenex JSC, we refer 

almost entirely to Tenex-USA throughout the remainder of the 

analysis. And because VEB raises no arguments of its own and 

merely incorporates those of Tenex-USA, we generally do not 

refer separately to VEB, although most of what we say about 

Tenex-USA applies to VEB too.)

 

II. 

 We begin by confirming our jurisdiction over this appeal. 

Chabad raises four jurisdictional objections, none of which has 

merit. 

 First, Chabad contends that Tenex-USA lacks standing to 

appeal a decision in its favor—viz., the district court’s denial 

of Chabad’s attachment motion. Chabad is correct that, in 

general, “a party cannot appeal from a favorable judgment.” 

15A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 3902 (3d ed. 2023); see also California v. 

Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (per curiam). The district 

court, though, did not deny Chabad’s attachment motion 

outright; instead, it denied the motion without prejudice. And 

a party is “within its rights to appeal a dismissal without 

prejudice on the grounds that it wants one with prejudice.” El 

Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 885 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 8 of 24
9 

The reason is that an order dismissing a case (or, as here, 

denying an attachment motion) without prejudice “subject[s] 

the defendant to the risk . . . of further litigation.” Disher v. 

Info. Res., Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1989). That is the 

case here. The district court’s order expressly contemplates 

that Chabad will “file its motion again” and “have the 

opportunity and authority to collect upon a renewed motion.” 

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 15. But 

if Tenex-USA had gotten the ruling it wanted—a denial of 

Chabad’s motion with prejudice—further proceedings would 

be foreclosed, and Tenex-USA would be out of the case. 

Tenex-USA may take this appeal in an effort to achieve that 

more favorable outcome. 

 Second and similarly, Chabad argues that Tenex-USA 

seeks to appeal the district court’s reasoning, rather than its 

judgment, contrary to the basic principle that a party may only 

appeal “judgments, not opinions.” United States v. Simpson, 

430 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). But Tenex-USA in fact asks us to 

review a judgment—or, more accurately, an order—not merely 

an opinion. Tenex-USA seeks review of the portion of the 

district court’s order that denies Chabad’s motion without 

prejudice rather than with prejudice. And because we may 

review an order to that effect, we also may review the reasons 

the court denied the order without prejudice rather than with 

prejudice. See El Paso Nat. Gas, 750 F.3d at 885. 

 Third, Chabad maintains that we already determined in 

Chabad II that Tenex-USA lacks standing to raise the issue of 

the Russian Federation’s immunity. Chabad misunderstands 

Chabad II’s holding. Chabad II, as noted, held that TenexUSA could not attack the judgments in this case through a Rule 

60(b) motion because Tenex-USA was not “a party or its legal 

representative” in the litigation resulting in those judgments. 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 9 of 24
10 

19 F.4th at 477 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). But Chabad II

did not foreclose the possibility of Tenex-USA ever raising a 

sovereign-immunity argument. 

In fact, the court specifically recognized that VEB—

identically situated to Tenex-USA—could have raised such an 

argument in an appeal of the denial of its motion to quash 

Chabad’s subpoena. Id. at 476. And rightly so: a nonparty 

may challenge an order on sovereign-immunity grounds if the 

nonparty “has an interest that is affected” by the order—as long 

as it does so through an appropriate procedural vehicle. 

Aurelius Cap. Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 

127–28 (2d Cir. 2009); see Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 7 

(D.C. Cir. 2014); Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, 61 F.4th 

984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The district court’s order plainly 

affects Tenex-USA’s interest in its United States property. So 

even if Tenex-USA could not protect that interest through a 

Rule 60(b) motion, it can do so in this appeal. 

 Finally, Chabad submits that the denial without prejudice 

of its attachment motion cannot be appealed until the district 

court’s proceedings have come to an end. It is true that our 

jurisdiction ordinarily is limited to appeals from “final 

decisions of the district courts” that end the litigation on the 

merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But under the collateral order 

doctrine, there is a “‘small class’ of collateral rulings that, 

although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately 

deemed ‘final’” and immediately appealable. Mohawk Indus., 

Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1949)). 

 The district court’s ruling that it has jurisdiction over the 

Russian Federation under the FSIA’s expropriation exception 

meets the three conditions that render an interlocutory decision 

an immediately appealable collateral order. See Johnson v. 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 10 of 24
11 

Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1995). First, the court 

conclusively decided that it has jurisdiction. See Agudas 

Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 10. Second, the 

issue of a court’s jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state 

is important and separate from the ultimate merits question in 

the ongoing collection proceedings: whether Tenex-USA’s 

property is in fact attachable. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s 

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 

2004). And third, the denial of sovereign immunity is 

“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see EM Ltd. 

v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 2012) 

(explaining that “[i]n post-judgment litigation,” the relevant 

final judgment is the “judgment that concludes the collection 

proceedings”). “[S]overeign immunity,” we have explained, 

“is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of 

litigation, and not just a defense to liability on the merits.” 

Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1126 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

Because our conclusion as to the Russian Federation’s 

immunity suffices to resolve this appeal, and because a 

particular ruling in an order may be immediately appealable 

even if the order in its entirety is not, see Oglala Sioux Tribe v. 

U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 896 F.3d 520, 527–28 (D.C. Cir. 

2018), we need not consider whether we have jurisdiction at 

this time to review other rulings in the district court’s order. 

III. 

 Tenex-USA’s primary submission is that the district court 

lacks—and has always lacked—jurisdiction over Chabad’s 

claims against the Russian Federation. Accordingly, TenexUSA says, the default judgment and sanctions judgments the 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 11 of 24
12 

court entered against the Russian Federation are void. And as 

a result, Chabad is without a legal predicate to attach TenexUSA’s property in satisfaction of those judgments, even 

assuming that property is Russian Federation property in the 

relevant sense (which Tenex-USA vigorously denies). 

We agree with Tenex-USA’s argument: under our 

precedents, the FSIA’s expropriation exception does not 

abrogate the Russian Federation’s sovereign immunity in the 

circumstances of this case. And we reject Chabad’s contention 

that, even if the district court lacks jurisdiction over its claims 

against the Russian Federation, the principle of jurisdictional 

finality precludes us from giving effect to that conclusion at 

this stage of the proceedings. 

A. 

1. 

 The FSIA establishes that “a foreign state shall be immune 

from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of 

the States” unless an exception to immunity applies. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1604. The sole exception in play in this case is the 

“expropriation exception.” That exception divests foreign 

sovereign immunity “in any case” 

[1] in which rights in property taken in 

violation of international law are in issue 

and [2A] that property or any property 

exchanged for such property is present in 

the United States in connection with a 

commercial activity carried on in the 

United States by the foreign state; or [2B] 

that property or any property exchanged 

for such property is owned or operated by 

an agency or instrumentality of the 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 12 of 24
13 

foreign state and that agency or 

instrumentality is engaged in a 

commercial activity in the United 

States . . . . 

Id. § 1605(a)(3) (bracketed labels added). A district court thus 

has jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state or its 

agencies and instrumentalities under the expropriation 

exception if rights in property are at issue, that property has 

been taken in violation of international law, and the appropriate 

“commercial-activity nexus requirement” is satisfied. De 

Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104. 

 In Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 146 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Fed. 

Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169 (2021), we held 

that “[t]he nexus requirement differs somewhat for claims 

against the foreign state . . . as compared with claims against 

an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state.” Simon 

understood clause 2A to be the only path to jurisdiction over 

claims against a foreign state itself: the property that is the 

subject of the claims (or property exchanged for it) must be 

“present in the United States in connection with a commercial 

activity” that the foreign state “carrie[s] on” in the United 

States. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). And Simon

correspondingly read clause 2B to be the only basis for 

jurisdiction over claims against an agency or instrumentality of 

a foreign state: the property need not be present in the United 

States, but it must be “owned or operated by an agency or 

instrumentality of the foreign state” that is “engaged in a 

commercial activity in the United States.” Id.

 Simon was decided years after Chabad I, and Simon did 

not discuss the fact that Chabad I apparently kept the Russian 

Federation in this case. See pp. 4–5, supra. But under Simon’s 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 13 of 24
14 

interpretation of the expropriation exception, the Russian 

Federation ought to have been dismissed: a claim against a 

foreign state must fit within clause 2A, which, as noted, 

requires the expropriated property in issue to be present in the 

United States. Yet it is undisputed that the expropriated 

property giving rise to this suit—the Collection—is not present 

in the United States. Nonetheless, Chabad I said (without 

elaboration) that it was overturning the district court’s “finding 

of Russia’s immunity.” 528 F.3d at 955. 

 Although Simon did not address that seeming tension with 

Chabad I, our court directly confronted it the following year in 

De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary. De Csepel, like this case 

and Simon, was an expropriation-exception suit against a 

foreign sovereign (Hungary) concerning property located 

outside the United States. 859 F.3d at 1104–05. The plaintiffs 

argued that, under Chabad I, jurisdiction existed over Hungary 

even though the expropriated property was not in the United 

States. Id. at 1105. Hungary responded by relying on Simon, 

under which jurisdiction over Hungary could arise only 

pursuant to clause 2A, which is inapplicable when the property 

is outside the United States. Id. at 1104. 

We sided with Hungary, holding that Simon’s 

interpretation of the expropriation exception governed. We 

reasoned that Chabad I had not in fact “held that a foreign state 

loses immunity if the second nexus requirement [clause 2B] is 

met.” Id. at 1105 (first alteration in original). “The issue of the 

Russian state’s immunity,” we explained, “was completely 

unaddressed by the district court and neither raised nor briefed 

on appeal” in Chabad I. Id. What is more, the Chabad I court 

“did not explain why it kept the Russian Federation in the 

case.” Id. It instead “reversed the district court with no 

explanation at all,” id. at 1106, stating in a single conclusory 

sentence that it “reverse[d] [the district court’s] finding of 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 14 of 24
15 

Russia’s immunity,” id. at 1105 (quoting Chabad I, 528 F.3d 

at 955) (second alteration in original). Such a “cursory and 

unexamined statement[] of jurisdiction,” we determined, had 

“no precedential effect.” Id. at 1105–06 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Simon, by contrast, had “expressly 

considered and decided the question of foreign state immunity 

under the expropriation exception.” Id.

We have applied the expropriation exception on more than 

one occasion since De Csepel. In each instance, we considered 

ourselves bound by Simon’s construction of § 1605(a)(3). See 

Schubarth v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 891 F.3d 392, 399–

401 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Philipp v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 894 

F.3d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2018), rev’d in part on other grounds, 

592 U.S. 169 (2021). Accordingly, De Csepel and our 

subsequent decisions have consistently held that “a foreign 

state is immune to claims for the expropriation of property not 

present in the United States.” Schubarth, 891 F.3d at 394–95. 

2. 

 Under Simon and De Csepel, the expropriation exception 

cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims 

against the Russian Federation in this case. The expropriated 

property those claims involve, the Collection, sits in Russia, 

not the United States. And as we have now held several times, 

expropriated property must be located in the United States for 

jurisdiction to lie under the expropriation exception over claims 

against a foreign state. Simon, 812 F.3d at 146. Even if 

Chabad I could be read to have reached a different conclusion, 

our decision in De Csepel resolved that Simon, not Chabad I, 

controls. 

 In nonetheless concluding that it had jurisdiction over 

Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation, the district 

court relied on Chabad I. The court read Chabad I to have 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 15 of 24
16 

allowed for jurisdiction over a foreign state under either clause 

2A or clause 2B of the expropriation exception. Agudas 

Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 8. And it thought 

that our later decisions—including Simon and De Csepel—did 

not mandate a different result, because they departed from 

Chabad I, an earlier and, in the court’s view, binding precedent. 

Id. at 9. As the district court saw things, Chabad I established 

the law of the circuit, and it remains the law of the circuit 

because we have not overruled it en banc. Id. at 9–10. 

 We appreciate that, at one time, there might have been 

uncertainty about whether Chabad I or Simon supplied this 

circuit’s law on the proper interpretation of the expropriation 

exception. But our decision in De Csepel definitively settled 

the matter in favor of Simon. We extensively analyzed the 

issue and squarely held that Chabad I did not create “[b]inding 

circuit law” because it never held “that a foreign state loses 

immunity if the second nexus requirement is met.” De Csepel, 

859 F.3d at 1105 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Chabad I’s passing remark about 

“Russia’s immunity,” De Csepel emphasized, had “no 

precedential effect.” Id. at 1105–06 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

De Csepel’s authoritative reading of Chabad I is now itself 

binding circuit law, which the district court (and our court) 

must follow unless we reconsider the issue en banc. Lest any 

doubt remain about the law in this circuit, we reiterate once 

again: there is no jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign 

state under the FSIA’s expropriation exception unless the 

expropriated property is located in the United States. De 

Csepel forecloses reliance on Chabad I to conclude otherwise. 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 16 of 24
17 

B. 

 Chabad advances two reasons why we nevertheless should 

not apply Simon in this case. The first is readily dismissed: 

Chabad asks us to reconsider Simon’s holding, but we are 

bound by that holding after De Csepel, no less than were the 

panels in Schubarth and Philipp. And in any event, for the 

reasons explained in De Csepel, we would adopt Simon’s 

construction of the expropriation exception even if we were 

free to interpret the FSIA on a blank slate. De Csepel, 859 F.3d 

at 1107–08. 

 Chabad also argues that, even if Simon is the law today, 

the principle of jurisdictional finality precludes us from 

revisiting the district court’s jurisdiction over its claims against 

the Russian Federation at this stage of the proceedings. We 

conclude, however, that jurisdictional finality poses no barrier 

to our applying our governing precedent in this case. 

 Under the doctrine of jurisdictional finality, “principles of 

res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations—both 

subject matter and personal.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. 

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 

(1982). The usual rule is that “[a] party that has had an 

opportunity to litigate the question of . . . jurisdiction” may not 

“reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse 

judgment.” Id. 

 To support application of that principle here, Chabad relies 

on Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 

1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which we described two options 

available to a defendant who questions the jurisdictional basis 

of a lawsuit against it. First, such a defendant “may appear, 

raise the jurisdictional objection, and ultimately pursue it on 

direct appeal. If he so elects, he may not renew the 

jurisdictional objection in a collateral attack.” Id. at 1547. 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 17 of 24
18 

“Alternatively, the defendant may refrain from appearing, 

thereby exposing himself to the risk of a default judgment. 

When enforcement of the default judgment is attempted, 

however, he may assert his jurisdictional objection.” Id. 

According to Chabad, the Russian Federation took option 

one: it initially appeared in the case, contested jurisdiction, 

appealed, and lost (in Chabad I). That result, Chabad reasons, 

cannot now be challenged in enforcement proceedings 

following the default judgment, because a party that appears 

and challenges jurisdiction cannot “renew the jurisdictional 

objection in a collateral attack.” Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d 

at 1547. 

The Practical Concepts framework does not control in this 

case. To begin with, the defendant in Practical Concepts had 

not appeared in the case prior to the entry of a default judgment 

against it, so only the second path we described was relevant to 

our disposition. Id. at 1545. Nor did we purport to establish 

any ironclad rule in Practical Concepts, stating only that 

defendants “generally” face the choice we described. Id. at 

1547. Our use of indefinite language was appropriate, given 

that equitable considerations and exceptions have always 

informed the application of res judicata. See Canonsburg Gen. 

Hosp. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 295, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The 

Practical Concepts passage on which Chabad relies thus 

provides “generally” applicable guidance, but it does not 

delimit the full range of permissible outcomes. And several 

features of the present case persuade us that applying 

jurisdictional finality is unwarranted. 

 First, the party now contesting jurisdiction, Tenex-USA, 

was not a defendant in the case when it was filed or when the 

district court entered the default judgment. See Chabad II, 19 

F.4th at 477. Indeed, Tenex-USA had no reason even to be 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 18 of 24
19 

aware of the litigation until it received a subpoena from Chabad 

in 2019, in the course of post-judgment enforcement 

proceedings. So we see little reason to deny Tenex-USA the 

benefit of FSIA law that was clearly established in our circuit 

by the time Tenex-USA first became involved in the case. 

After all, the reasoning of Practical Concepts by its own terms 

applies in situations in which the party contesting jurisdiction 

post-judgment was “[a] defendant who kn[ew] of” the initial 

action against it. 811 F.2d at 1547. So, while a “party that has 

had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter 

jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question in a collateral 

attack upon an adverse judgment,” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 

U.S. at 702 n.9, Tenex-USA is not such a party. Rather, TenexUSA contested jurisdiction at the first opportunity available to 

it. 

 We recognize that it remains unresolved whether, 

notwithstanding its “separate juridical status,” First Nat’l City 

Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 

611, 621 (1983), Tenex-USA is in fact an alter ego of the 

Russian Federation, as Chabad alleges. But even if Chabad is 

correct on that score, it would not change the jurisdictional 

finality analysis. The Russian Federation is an indirect 

shareholder of Tenex-USA. And in general, a judgment 

against the shareholder of a corporation binds the corporation 

“only if” the corporation has “notice” of the “action resulting 

in the judgment” and a “fair opportunity to defend” in that 

action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 59(5) (Am. L. 

Inst. 1982); 18A Wright & Miller, supra, § 4460. There is no 

suggestion here that Tenex-USA was on notice of this suit or 

had an opportunity to defend itself prior to the default 

judgment. What is more, the Russian Federation’s actions—

with respect to the Collection and in this litigation—are 

entirely disconnected from its status as an indirect Tenex-USA 

owner. So it is immaterial to the jurisdictional-finality inquiry 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 19 of 24
20 

whether Tenex-USA’s corporate separateness from the 

Russian Federation should be disregarded for attachment 

purposes. 

 In addition, the issue of the Russian Federation’s immunity 

was never adjudicated before entry of the default judgment that 

now provides the predicate for attachment proceedings against 

Tenex-USA. As we explained in De Csepel, the Russian 

Federation’s immunity “was completely unaddressed by the 

district court” in the proceedings that led to Chabad I and 

“neither raised nor briefed on appeal.” 859 F.3d at 1105. The 

issue then received at best a “drive-by” ruling in our court that 

did not amount to a precedential holding. Id. at 1106 (quoting 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 

And while the district court’s later opinion accompanying the 

default judgment contained a jurisdictional analysis, that 

analysis was limited to the RSL and RSMA and said nothing 

specifically about the Russian Federation. See Agudas 

Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 729 F. Supp. 2d 

141, 146–48 (D.D.C. 2010). Given that procedural backdrop 

and the other considerations weighing against the application 

of jurisdictional finality, the Russian Federation’s immunity 

need not be forever insulated from examination. 

Settling a jurisdictional question correctly—rather than 

simply settling it—is also particularly important when the 

question concerns foreign sovereign immunity. “Actions 

against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues 

concerning the foreign relations of the United States,” 

Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 

(1983), and can have serious “diplomatic implications,” 

Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1, 19 (2019). This 

case is illustrative: the United States informed the district court 

several times that the imposition of contempt sanctions on the 

Russian Federation “risk[ed] damage to significant foreign 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 20 of 24
21 

policy interests.” Statement of Interest of the United States at 

10 (Aug. 29, 2012), J.A. 145; Statement of Interest of the 

United States at 6–7 (Feb. 21, 2014), J.A. 166–67. 

 Mindful of such concerns, the Supreme Court has 

explained that “the rule of law demands adherence to [the 

FSIA’s] strict requirements.” See Harrison, 587 U.S. at 19. 

And we have likewise cautioned that “[i]ntolerant adherence to 

default judgments against foreign states could adversely affect 

this nation’s relations with other nations and undermine the 

State Department’s continuing efforts to encourage foreign 

sovereigns generally to resolve disputes within the United 

States’ legal framework.” FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. 

Democratic Republic of Congo, 447 F.3d 835, 838–39 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1551 n.19). 

Those considerations do not give foreign states a free pass with 

respect to jurisdictional finality. But they do counsel in favor 

of rectifying an evident jurisdictional problem in the 

circumstances of this case. 

 Finally, there is no indication of gamesmanship on the part 

of the Russian Federation or Tenex-USA. It would be a 

different case if, for instance, the Russian Federation had 

appeared and contested jurisdiction, determined that its 

arguments were unlikely to succeed, withdrawn and defaulted, 

and then strategically reappeared in an attempt to challenge 

jurisdiction a second time. Or one could imagine a scenario in 

which a foreign state relied on its agencies or instrumentalities 

for the specific purpose of raising or re-raising jurisdictional 

arguments that otherwise would be precluded. In such 

situations, applying jurisdictional finality would best promote 

the values preclusion serves—judicial economy and the 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 21 of 24
22 

protection of opposing litigants. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 

Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). 

But there is no hint of anything like that in this case. The 

Russian Federation withdrew from the litigation in 2009. And 

nothing in the record indicates that, 15 years on, it is using 

Tenex-USA to make arguments on its behalf. Rather, TenexUSA was a stranger to the case until years after the default 

judgment, when Chabad served it with legal process in 

enforcement proceedings. At that point, Tenex-USA 

understandably began to challenge the district court’s exercise 

of jurisdiction as inconsistent with our precedents. 

 For those reasons, the doctrine of jurisdictional finality 

does not prevent us from applying in this case the interpretation 

of the FSIA’s expropriation exception that governs in our 

circuit—just as we would do in any other case presenting the 

issue. 

C. 

 Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over 

Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation when it 

entered the default judgment and sanctions judgments, those 

judgments are void as against the Federation. Consequently, 

the judgments may not be enforced through attachment of 

Tenex JSC’s, Tenex-USA’s, or VEB’s assets. See TIG Ins. Co. 

v. Republic of Argentina, 967 F.3d 778, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 

Chabad’s claim on those assets is entirely derivative of its 

claim on the Russian Federation’s assets. And without a valid 

judgment against the Russian Federation, it no longer has any 

such claim. 

 Though Chabad does not raise the point, we note that a 

final judgment entered in excess of a court’s jurisdiction 

typically is not void unless “the court that rendered judgment 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 22 of 24
23 

lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction.” Lee Mem’l 

Hosp. v. Becerra, 10 F.4th 859, 863–64 (D.C. Cir. 2021) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United Student Aid 

Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)). And given 

the abstruseness of Chabad I’s jurisdictional determinations 

and the fact that Simon had yet to be decided, we cannot say 

there was no arguable basis for the district court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction over the Russian Federation when it entered the 

default judgment and most of the sanctions judgments. But as 

Lee Memorial Hospital v. Becerra recognized, we have 

declined to apply the arguable-basis standard in cases involving 

foreign sovereign immunity when the “objecting party”—here, 

Tenex-USA—did not “appear[] in the challenged proceeding.” 

Id. at 864 (quoting Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Since 

that is the present situation, the judgments against the Russian 

Federation are void simply because “the issuing court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether there existed 

an ‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction.” Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d 

at 1181. 

 Our holding also requires the Russian Federation to be 

dismissed from the case: absent an applicable FSIA exception, 

it is immune from Chabad’s claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 

1604. In arriving at that conclusion, we do not intend in any 

way to downplay the wrongs Chabad has suffered or the 

frustrations it has endured in its hundred-year effort to 

reacquire its wrongfully taken sacred objects, of which this 

lawsuit is only the latest chapter. The result we reach is simply 

a consequence of the statute Congress enacted and the limits it 

chose to set on claims against foreign states like the Russian 

Federation. And we do not disturb the district court’s exercise 

of jurisdiction over, or entry of judgment against, the RSL and 

RSMA. Chabad remains free to proceed against those 

entities—and perhaps also against the Russian Ministry of 

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 23 of 24
24 

Culture and Mass Communications, although the Ministry’s 

amenability to suit has not specifically been addressed to 

date—as appropriate. 

* * * * * 

 The district court stated that “unless and until it receives a 

mandate” from this court directing it to dismiss the Russian 

Federation, it “would continue to assert subject-matter 

jurisdiction” over the Federation. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of 

U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 10. This opinion occasions such a 

mandate. We vacate the district court’s order and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #23-7037 Document #2068466 Filed: 08/06/2024 Page 24 of 24