Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02708/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02708-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Albert Becht
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2708

___________

Jason Albert Becht, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2004 

Filed: April 7, 2005

___________

Before COLLOTON, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Jason Albert Becht was convicted of one count of possessing child

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and one count of distribution

of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). His conviction was

affirmed on appeal, United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2001), and it is

final. Becht petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his conviction

must be vacated because, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Speech

Coalition v. Ashcroft, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001), the conviction was based upon a statute

that made criminal certain activities protected by the First Amendment. Becht

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The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

2

The complete jury instruction read as follows:

“Child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any

photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated

image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical,

or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where (1) the production

of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually

explicit conduct, or (2) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a

minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

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supplemented his petition to include a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. The district court1

 denied his petition, and we affirm.

I.

Becht owned and operated a website displaying and disseminating child

pornography, which was discovered by law enforcement authorities. Becht was

prosecuted for possession and distribution of child pornography under the Child

Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”), as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.

In accordance with the CPPA, the jury instruction under which Becht was convicted

defined “child pornography” as a “visual depiction [that] is, or appears to be, of a

minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” (Final Jury Instruction No. 16).2

 

Becht’s trial counsel, citing Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th

Cir. 1999), objected to the instruction on the ground that the “appears to be” language

of the CPPA infringed upon conduct protected by the First Amendment. The district

court, relying on United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), and United

States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999), concluded that the statute was

constitutional, because it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental

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interest. Becht was convicted and sentenced to ninety-seven months’ imprisonment,

two years of supervised release, and a $200 special assessment.

On December 28, 2000, Becht retained appellate counsel. On January 22,

2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision on

the constitutionality of the CPPA, see Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S.

1124 (2001), and Becht asked his counsel to raise the constitutional issue on his

direct appeal to this court. When counsel declined to do so, Becht filed an

unsuccessful pro se motion to dismiss his attorney and to be assisted by new counsel.

In his response to that motion, counsel explained that the appellate strategy was the

result of a review of the transcript, a discussion with Becht’s trial counsel, counsel’s

own legal research, and consultation with other appellate counsel. 

Becht’s counsel eventually filed an appellate brief, which did not raise the

constitutionality of the CPPA or the jury instruction defining “child pornography.”

The brief did argue that the district court’s admission of thirty-nine images of child

pornography unfairly prejudiced Becht’s defense in violation of Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, and that the government offered insufficient evidence to support the

jury’s verdict of guilty. A panel of this court rejected those arguments. Becht, 267

F.3d 767.

On April 16, 2002, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in Ashcroft

v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), holding that the “appears to be”

language of the CPPA was overbroad and unconstitutional under the First

Amendment. Id. at 258. The Court also remanded a number of cases for further

consideration in light of Free Speech Coalition. See United States v. Mento, 535 U.S.

1014 (2002); Fox v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); O’Connor v. United States,

535 U.S. 1014 (2002); Tampico v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); Snow v.

United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); Peebles v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002).

Becht neither argued the constitutionality of the CPPA on direct appeal nor petitioned

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for certiorari on the issue, so his case was not among those remanded for further

consideration.

One month later, on May 17, 2002, Becht moved to vacate, set aside, or correct

his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Becht argued that his conviction should

be vacated because the law under which he was convicted was facially invalid under

the First Amendment. Becht supplemented his petition with a claim that his appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the constitutional challenge to the CPPA

on direct appeal despite Becht’s specific request. 

The district court denied Becht’s § 2255 motion, but granted a certificate of

appealability in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1). The certificate framed the issue for appeal as follows:

“Did Petitioner receive ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because his

attorney did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the grounds that 28 U.S.C.

§ 2256(8)(B) was unconstitutional?”

II.

Becht’s § 2255 motion raised both a claim that his conviction was obtained in

violation of the First Amendment, and an assertion that his appellate counsel’s

ineffective assistance resulted in a violation of the Sixth Amendment. The

government argued that Becht had procedurally defaulted his First Amendment claim

by failing to raise it on direct appeal. The district court’s order denying Becht’s

§ 2255 motion discussed Becht’s allegation of ineffective assistance only in the

course of considering whether Becht had demonstrated “cause” and “prejudice” to

excuse his procedural default of a First Amendment challenge to the CPPA. The

district court’s certificate of appealability, however, frames the issue for appeal as

whether Becht received “ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because

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3

Ordinarily, prior to considering whether Becht’s procedural default was

excused, we would determine whether Becht’s motion is barred by the rule on

retroactivity announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The government,

however, concedes that Free Speech Coalition may fit an exception to the Teague

rule and, “for purposes of this appeal only,” does not argue that Becht’s petition is

barred by Teague. (Gov’t Br. at 11).

-5-

his attorney did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the grounds that 28

U.S.C. § 2256(8))(B) was unconstitutional?” 

The certificate of appealability is confusing for two reasons. First, it refers to

the validity of Becht’s “guilty plea” when Becht pleaded not guilty and was convicted

after a jury trial. Second, the certificate does not specify whether it is limited to an

appeal raising Becht’s Sixth Amendment claim that he was deprived of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal, whether it is limited to an appeal raising

Becht’s First Amendment claim (as to which the ineffective-assistance claim is a

necessary predicate to excuse a procedural default), or whether it is intended to

encompass both claims. We believe that the certificate of appealability is best

construed as authorizing an appeal of both constitutional claims, because a decision

on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is necessary to resolution of both

claims. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1248 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001);

Jackson v. Gammon, 195 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir. 1999). We assume that the

reference to a “guilty plea” was the result of an oversight, and we construe the

certificate to encompass the question whether Becht’s appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to challenge the validity of Becht’s conviction by jury. 

To succeed on his First Amendment claim, Becht must show that the claim was

not procedurally defaulted.3

 “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim

by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the

defendant can first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually

innocent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (internal quotations

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and citations omitted). Becht does not claim actual innocence, and so we consider

only whether he has demonstrated both cause and actual prejudice.

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may constitute cause and prejudice

to overcome a procedural default. Boysiewick v. Schriro, 179 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.

1999). Thus, the condition Becht must meet to proceed on his First Amendment

claim is identical to the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim. To establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, both as an independent claim and as cause and

prejudice to excuse a procedural default, Becht must show that “counsel’s

performance was deficient” and “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive

[him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In other words, Becht must establish first that his “counsel’s

assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in that counsel failed

to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney

would use under like circumstances; and second, that the deficient performance

prejudiced [his] defense.” United States v. Acty, 77 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1996)

(internal quotations omitted).

“Our review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential,” Sherron v. Norris,

69 F.3d 285, 290 (8th Cir. 1995), and “[i]t is the defendant’s burden to overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s actions constituted objectively reasonable strategy

under the circumstances.” Schumacher v. Hopkins, 83 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir.

1996). In this case, however, Becht’s appellate counsel failed to raise the First

Amendment issue despite Becht’s specific requests that he do so, where there was a

conflict in the circuits on the constitutionality of the “appears to be” language of the

CPPA, and after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Free Speech Coalition. For

these reasons, we will assume that Becht received deficient representation on direct

appeal, and proceed to consider whether he has established prejudice. See Owens v.

Dormire, 198 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2000).

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To show that he was prejudiced by deficient performance of counsel, Becht

must establish that counsel’s conduct rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable.

See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). “A necessary condition for

establishing prejudice is to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Schumacher, 83 F.3d at 1037. 

To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different, we consider what this court would have done

had Becht raised the First Amendment issue on appeal. See Duhamel v. Collins, 955

F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1992). Had he done so, this court either would have

anticipated the Supreme Court’s decision and found the CPPA unconstitutional or

would have agreed with the majority view at the time that the statute was

constitutional. In the latter event, it is reasonably probable that Becht would have

filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and this court would have reviewed the case

again on remand from the Supreme Court after the decision in Free Speech Coalition.

In either event, the question would have arisen whether the faulty jury instruction

including the “appears to be” language was subject to review for harmless error.

There are two lines of decisions from the Supreme Court that bear on whether

the faulty jury instruction in Becht’s trial may be considered harmless error. One

series of cases, beginning with Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931),

addresses the situation in which a jury returns a general verdict of guilty after a case

is submitted on alternative theories, and one of the theories is later determined to be

unconstitutional. Because a reviewing court cannot know whether the jury convicted

based on a constitutional theory or an unconstitutional theory, the Supreme Court has

held in several such cases that a general verdict of guilty cannot stand. “It has long

been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the

unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside.”

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979) (quoting Leary v. United States,

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395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969)). Most recently, in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46

(1991), the Court explained that Stromberg does “not necessarily stand for anything

more than the principle that, where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction

on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict

that may have rested on that ground.” Id. at 53. 

Although the Supreme Court has not discussed Stromberg in the specific

context of harmless-error analysis, some appellate decisions have read Stromberg to

circumscribe harmless-error review. The Eleventh Circuit has concluded that in a

Stromberg-type case, the reviewing court may not consider whether the strength of

the evidence on the valid theory submitted to the jury is sufficient to render harmless

the error of instructing the jury on an alternative theory that is unconstitutional:

“Stromberg does not suggest a harmless error standard based on overwhelming

evidence of guilt under the valid portion of the jury charge. Rather, Stromberg states

simply that if it is ‘impossible’ to say on which ground the verdict rests, the

conviction must be reversed.” Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir.

1985). See also Parker v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 778 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“An error with regard to one independent basis for the jury’s verdict cannot be

rendered harmless solely because of the availability of the other independent basis.”).

A second line of Supreme Court decisions, however, has emphasized that most

constitutional errors are subject to review for harmlessness. The Court has

“‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be

set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the

constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Rose v. Clark, 478

U.S. 570, 576 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).

A narrow class of errors – defects “affecting the framework within which the trial

proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself” – are considered

“structural” errors that require automatic reversal. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S.

1, 8 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). In its most

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comprehensive discussion of “structural” errors, the Court identified a list of errors

that defy harmless error review: the complete denial of counsel, a biased judge, racial

discrimination in jury composition, denial of a public trial, and a defective jury

instruction on the reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. By

contrast, harmless-error review may be conducted with respect to a trial court’s

failure to instruct on an essential element of a crime, id. at 13-15, and to an

instructional error on an element of a crime that renders the resulting conviction

unconstitutional. Rose, 478 U.S. at 576-82; Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-02

(1987).

“[A] constitutional error is either structural or it is not,” Neder, 527 U.S. at 14,

and we believe the flawed instruction in Becht’s case is a trial error that belongs in

the category that may be reviewed for harmlessness. The Supreme Court’s decision

in Pope provides particularly useful guidance. There, the defendants were convicted

in separate cases of selling obscene materials. In light of an Illinois obscenity statute

that permitted the admission of evidence concerning “[t]he degree, if any, of public

acceptance of material in this State,” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 11-20 (1983) (emphasis

added), the trial court instructed the juries to determine whether the material was

obscene based on “how it would be viewed by ordinary adults in the whole State of

Illinois.” 481 U.S. at 499. 

This instruction was constitutional error, because the First Amendment

required the jury to measure the value of the allegedly obscene material according to

a national “reasonable person” standard, rather than a narrower community standard.

As a result, “there was necessarily a ‘gap’ between what the jury did find (that the

allegedly obscene material lacked value under ‘community standards’) and what it

was required to find to convict (that the material lacked value under a national

‘reasonable person’ standard).” Neder, 527 U.S. at 13-14. Despite that gap, the

Court remanded the case for harmless-error analysis. Pope, 481 U.S. at 504. The

Court explained that “in the absence of error that renders a trial fundamentally unfair,

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such as a denial of the right to counsel or trial before a financially interested judge,

a conviction should be affirmed ‘[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record

developed at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’” under the correct

legal and constitutional standard. Id. at 502-03 (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 579).

In Becht’s case, there is a similar gap: If the jury convicted Becht under the

“appears to be” language, there is a gap between the findings necessary to support

such a conviction and the findings required to support a conviction for possession of

images depicting actual children. As Pope and Neder explain, however, this gap does

not preclude harmless error review. Even had an objection to the “appears to be”

instruction been raised on direct appeal, Becht’s conviction would have been affirmed

if the trial record established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the alternative

theory that Becht possessed images of actual children – just as the Supreme Court

directed the Illinois courts to consider whether the error in Pope was harmless after

replacing the erroneous “contemporary community” standards with the

constitutionally-acceptable “national ‘reasonable person’ standard.”

In light of Pope, Neder, and Rose, we believe that if Becht’s jury had been

instructed only on the erroneous theory that Becht possessed images of what

“appeared to be” children, then the error would have been subject to harmless-error

review. If the trial record established that any reasonable jury would have found guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt under the correct constitutional standard – that Becht

possessed images of actual minors – then the reviewing court could conclude that the

instructional error was harmless. It would be anomalous to read Stromberg to

preclude harmless-error review in Becht’s case because the jury also was given the

option to convict based on a constitutionally valid theory that Becht possessed images

of actual children. As the First Circuit remarked, this assertion “reduces to the

strange claim that, because the jury here received both a ‘good’ charge and a ‘bad’

charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious than in Rose – where the

only charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one. That assertion cannot possibly

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be right, so it is plainly wrong.” Quigley v. Vose, 834 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1987) (per

curiam).

In view of the Court’s recent decisions concerning harmless-error review, we

think the Stromberg line of cases is best read as an exception to the common law rule

that where a general verdict of guilty rested upon both a “good” charge and a “bad”

charge, it was presumed that the jury’s verdict attached to the “good” one. See

Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49-50. Where a general verdict may have rested on a ground that

is forbidden by the Constitution, Stromberg prevents a reviewing court from

presuming that the jury convicted on an alternative theory permitted by the

Constitution, merely because the evidence was sufficient to support the constitutional

ground. Stromberg thus establishes that there is “error” in such a case; it does not

speak to whether the error may be harmless. The Court in Neder made no mention

of the Stromberg line of cases when it catalogued those “structural errors” that defy

harmless-error review, and for the reasons discussed, we believe that a Strombergtype instructional error is an error in the trial process itself that may be reviewed for

harmlessness. Indeed, we have held that a jury instruction using the erroneous

“appears to be” language from the CPPA was not “plain error” warranting relief,

United States v. Wolk, 337 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2003), and that holding “cuts

against the argument” that the flawed instruction will always render a trial unfair. See

Neder, 527 U.S. at 9. 

We conclude, therefore, that the unconstitutional jury instruction would have

been reviewed for harmless error if Becht had raised the issue on appeal. On direct

appeal, the government would have borne the burden of establishing that the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this § 2255 habeas corpus proceeding,

however, it is Becht’s burden to establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of his

appellate counsel’s deficient performance. United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076

(8th Cir. 1996). Becht “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

The standard for prejudice under Strickland is virtually identical to the showing

required to establish that a defendant’s substantial rights were affected under plain

error analysis. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In both instances, the party

challenging a conviction must show a reasonable probability that absent the alleged

error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See United States

v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2339-40 (2004). Comparison of the plain

error and Strickland prejudice standards is helpful in this case because we and other

courts previously have considered whether a jury instruction that is erroneous under

the decision in Free Speech Coalition amounts to “plain error” warranting relief. See

Wolk, 337 F.3d at 1004; United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002);

United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 2002). In those cases,

where a jury was instructed that it could convict upon finding possession of a visual

depiction that “appears to be” of a minor, the reviewing courts looked to the available

evidence, found that the children depicted were actual minors, and concluded that the

defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by the erroneous jury instruction. Id.

The images that Becht was convicted of possessing were introduced at his trial

and viewed by the jury that convicted him. They remain in the record, and we have

examined them. We have no doubt that the images depict real children. We have

held that a jury may find that images depict real children based only on a review of

the images themselves, United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 449-50 (8th Cir. 1999), and we conclude in this

case that “no rational juror, if properly instructed” could find that the depictions were

not of actual minors. Pope, 481 U.S. at 503; see Wolk, 337 F.3d at 1004; Hall, 312

F.3d at 1260; Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1064 & n.2; cf. United States v. Hilton, 386

F.3d 13, 18-19 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming grant of habeas relief based on

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unconstitutionality of CPPA where “the government failed effectively to preserve the

issue of harmless error review on appeal”); United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522,

531 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that erroneous “appears to be” jury instruction was not

harmless error where government expert testified that he did not know whether

charged images depicted actual children or were virtual creations). 

Becht has offered no evidence to suggest that the depictions did not involve

actual children. He produced no evidence at trial that the depictions were “virtual

images.” In this § 2255 proceeding, where Becht bears the burden of proving

prejudice, he did not request an evidentiary hearing or otherwise proffer that he could

present any evidence that the children depicted were not actual minors. And as the

Supreme Court itself observed in Free Speech Coalition, the hypothesis that virtual

images are indistinguishable from real ones is “somewhat implausible,” because “[i]f

virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would

be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes.” 535 U.S. at 254.

Because we have no doubt that any reasonable jury considering the trial record would

find that the depictions were of actual minors, and Becht has offered no evidence to

the contrary in this habeas corpus proceeding, we conclude that he failed to establish

prejudice arising from his appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the erroneous jury

instruction on direct appeal.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Becht has failed to demonstrate

prejudice resulting from his counsel’s performance on direct appeal. Consequently,

he has not established a deprivation of his right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment or cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default on his First

Amendment claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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