Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00201-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CSG
Defendant
California State Grange
Defendant
Robert McFarland
Defendant
National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

THE NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE 

ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDRY, a District of 

Columbia nonprofit 

corporation, and THE 

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, its 

chartered California chapter,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE d/b/a 

“California Guild,” a 

California corporation, and 

ROBERT McFARLAND, a 

California resident,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-201 WBS DB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs the National Grange and the California State 

Grange (collectively “plaintiffs”) brought this action against 

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defendants the California Guild1 and Robert McFarland 

(collectively “defendants”), alleging that defendants are falsely 

representing themselves to be the same organization as or 

responsible for the history and achievements of the California 

State Grange. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 75).)

Presently before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ first amended Complaint or, in the alternative, for a 

more definite statement of claims. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Defs.’ Mot.”) (Docket No. 77).)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The National Grange is a nonprofit fraternal

organization founded in 1867 to promote the interests of rural 

America and agriculture. (FAC ¶ 15.) It provides goods and 

services to agricultural communities and is involved in some 

2,100 towns across the country. (Id.)

The National Grange created the California State Grange

as its California affiliate in 1873. (Id. ¶ 16.) As a chartered 

affiliate, the California State Grange collects dues from local 

granges across California and turns over a portion of those dues 

to the National Grange. (Id.) In 1946, the California State 

Grange registered as a corporation with the California Secretary 

of State. (Id.) The California State Grange elected McFarland 

as its leader in 2009. (Id. ¶ 17.)

In 2012, disputes arose between the National Grange and 

 

1 A central issue in this and previous proceedings is 

whether defendants may refer to themselves as the “California 

State Grange.” Consistent with the court’s rulings in previous 

orders, all references to the “California State Grange” in this 

Order refer to plaintiffs, not defendants.

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members of the California State Grange. (Id.) As a result, the 

National Grange revoked the California State Grange’s membership

and the two sides disaffiliated in 2013. (See id.; Pls.’ Mot. 

for Prelim. Inj., Mem. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 1 (Docket No. 76-1).) 

Members of the disaffiliated chapter, led by McFarland, continued

to exist as a separate entity under the corporate charter filed 

in 1946. (Pls.’ Mem. at 3-4.) The National Grange chartered a 

new California State Grange in 2014. (Id. at 7.) What resulted 

after the split, then, were two California entities: a newly 

chartered California State Grange (i.e., along with the National 

Grange, plaintiffs to this action) and a disaffiliated entity led 

by McFarland (i.e., defendants).

After the split, defendants continued to use the

registered corporate name “California State Grange” and represent 

themselves publically as the California State Grange. (Id. at 3-

4.) In March 2014, the National Grange filed an action against 

the disaffiliated entity for federal trademark infringement, 

trademark dilution, trademark counterfeiting, and false 

advertisement under the Lanham Act (“Grange I”). (Id. at 4.)

On July 14, 2015, this court granted the National 

Grange summary judgment on its trademark infringement and false 

advertisement claims.

2 Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons of 

Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS DAD, 115 F. 

Supp. 3d 1171, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The court permanently 

 

2 The National Grange voluntarily dismissed its remaining 

Grange I claims with prejudice. Nat’l Grange of the Order of 

Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS 

AC, 2016 WL 1587193, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016).

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enjoined the disaffiliated entity from using the word “Grange,” 

but declined to extend that prohibition to include the words

“Granger,” “CSG,” and “CG” because the National Grange did not 

expressly seek such relief in its Grange I complaint. See Nat’l 

Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, 

Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS DAD, 2015 WL 5813681, at *2-*3 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 30, 2015), modified, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS AC, 2016 WL 

1587193 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016).) The parties have appealed 

Grange I to the Ninth Circuit, where it is currently pending. 

Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State 

Grange, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS AC, 2016 WL 1587193 (“Apr. 20 

Order”), at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016).

After Grange I, the disaffiliated entity changed its 

corporate name to the “California Guild.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 6.) 

Since that time, it has continued to publicly refer to itself as

“CSG” and “[f]ormerly the California State Grange.” (Decl. of Ed 

Komski (“Komski Decl.”) Ex. 2, CSG Website Screenshots (Docket 

No. 54-3).)

Simultaneous to litigation in this court has been

litigation in the California Superior Court over ownership of the

California State Grange’s property. (Pls.’ Mem. at 6.) On 

August 18, 2015, the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of

the National Grange and ordered that the California Guild 

“transfer to the Newly Chartered State Grange all Grange property 

in its possession or control as of the date its Charter was 

revoked.” (FAC Ex. 1, State Ct. Docs. at 33 (Docket No. 75-1).) 

Defendants have appealed that order as well. (FAC ¶ 140.)

On February 1, 2016, plaintiffs brought the present 

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action against defendants. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiffs

allege that since Grange I, defendants have continued to engage 

in activities that damage their reputation and goodwill, such as

taking credit for the California State Grange’s history and 

achievements, misappropriating Grange trademarks and copyrights,

spreading false rumors about Grange membership, and 

misrepresenting themselves to be successors to the California 

State Grange. (See FAC ¶¶ 18, 20, 24, 45.)

Plaintiffs bring the following causes of action against 

defendants: (1) false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); (2) false advertisement under the 

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1)(B); (3) false advertisement

under the California Business and Professional Code, Cal. Bus. 

Prof. Code § 17500; (4) trademark infringement under the Lanham 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (5) infringement of unregistered logo and 

trade dress under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1125(a); (6) 

copyright infringement under federal law, 17 U.S.C. § 106; (7) 

trade libel under California common law; (8) intentional 

interference with contractual relations under California common 

law; (9) trespass under California common law; and (10)

conversion under California common law. (Id. at 38-51.) 

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended Complaint in 

its entirety or, in the alternative, for a more definite 

statement of claims. (Defs.’ Mot., Mem. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 2-3.)

II. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the 

pleadings as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

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the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation 

omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” 

and “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A. False Designation of Origin, False Advertisement, and 

Trademark Infringement Under the Lanham Act

Five of plaintiffs’ ten causes of action--false 

designation of origin, federal false advertisement, state false 

advertisement, infringement of unregistered logo and trade dress, 

and trademark infringement--arise under or require substantially 

the same proof as section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (“section 

43(a)”), 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). False designation of origin arises 

under section 43(a)(1)(A), and federal false advertisement arises 

under section 43(a)(1)(B). Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 

Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014) (“Section 1125(a) 

thus creates two distinct bases of liability: false association, 

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§ 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, § 1125(a)(1)(B).”). 

False advertisement under the California Business and 

Professional Code requires the same proof as federal false 

advertisement. See Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Euro-Pro 

Operating LLC, No. CV 14-03954 DDP MANX, 2015 WL 476287, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (“[F]alse advertising claims under 

California’s Unfair Competition Act . . . are ‘substantially 

congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act. Therefore, the 

Court analyzes the state and federal false advertising claims 

together.”) (internal citation omitted)).

Trademark infringement under section 32(1) of the 

Lanham Act requires the same proof as false designation of 

origin.3 See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 

174 F.3d 1036, 1046 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The same standard 

[embodied in section 32(1) of the Lanham Act] is embodied in 

section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act . . . .”); Grey v. Campbell 

Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (“The tests 

for infringement of a federally registered mark under § 32(1) . . 

. [and] unfair competition under § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) . . 

. are the same”), aff'd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987).

“Infringement of unregistered logo and trade dress” 

appears to be the same claim as false designation of origin. 

 

3 The key distinction between trademark infringement and

false designation of origin is that the former “applies to 

federally registered marks” while the latter applies “to both 

registered and unregistered trademarks.” Brookfield Commc'ns, 

Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999). That distinction is not relevant here because plaintiffs 

have alleged infringement of both registered and unregistered 

trademarks. (See FAC ¶¶ 125, 135.)

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Plaintiffs cite section 43(a) as the statutory basis for 

“infringement of unregistered logo and trade dress,” but the 

court is not aware of any case holding that it is a separate

cause of action from false designation of origin.4 Moreover, 

plaintiffs concede that to the extent “infringement of 

unregistered logo and trade dress” is not alleged with 

specificity, it “is subsumed by the false designation of origin 

claim.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 23.) Accordingly, the court will 

dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for “infringement of unregistered logo 

and trade dress.”

The only section 43(a) claims that the court must 

decide whether plaintiff plausibly alleged, therefore, are false 

designation of origin and false advertisement.

1. False Designation of Origin

The Ninth Circuit has held that a false designation of 

origin claim under section 43(a)(1)(A) requires proof that

defendants “(1) use[d] in commerce (2) any word, false 

designation of origin, false or misleading description, or 

representation of fact, which (3) is likely to cause confusion or 

misrepresents the characteristics of his or another person’s 

goods or services.” Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 

898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Luxul Tech. Inc. v. Nectarlux, 

LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding the 

same). “‘[C]ommerce’ as used in the Lanham Act . . . include[s]

 

4 Plaintiffs’ confusion appears to stem from the fact 

that false designation of origin “protects against infringement 

of unregistered marks and trade dress as well as registered 

marks.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047 n.8.

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‘all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’ It 

is well settled that so defined ‘commerce’ [means] interstate 

commerce.” Thompson Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Thompson, 693 F.2d 991, 

993 (9th Cir. 1982).

The Ninth Circuit has held that interstate commerce for 

these purposes “includes intrastate commerce which ‘affects’ 

interstate commerce.” Id. at 992–93. Additionally, courts in 

this circuit have held that communications made on public 

websites are made in interstate commerce. See United States v. 

Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Internet 

is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.” 

(internal citation omitted).); Homeland Housewares, LLC v. EuroPro Operating LLC, No. CV 14-03954 DDP MANX, 2015 WL 476287, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (“[P]lacing a [product] review on a 

widely-available website is placing a statement into interstate 

commerce . . . .”). Plaintiffs allege that defendants are 

representing, via public websites, that they are the same 

organization as or responsible for the history and achievements 

of the California State Grange. (See FAC ¶¶ 20-26, 69.) Such 

representations are allegedly resulting in “loss of goodwill” to 

the California State Grange and, in turn, the National Grange. 

(Id. ¶¶ 78, 83.) Because defendants’ representations are 

available on public websites and allegedly damaging the National 

Grange’s reputation, they are made in interstate commerce.

Defendants also challenge whether the California State 

Grange and California Guild can be said to engage in “commerce”

to begin with. (See Defs.’ Mem. at 7.) According to defendants, 

the two groups are “non-profit corporations that do not engage in 

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commerce,” which precludes coverage under the Lanham Act. (Id.) 

Contrary to that argument, federal courts in this circuit and 

others have held that “the mere fact that a speaker is a 

nonprofit organization does not preclude its speech from being 

commercial speech, or ‘commercial advertising or promotion’ 

within the meaning of section 43(a).” Nat’l Servs. Grp., Inc. v. 

Painting & Decorating Contractors of Am., Inc., No. SACV06-

563CJC(ANX), 2006 WL 2035465, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2006). 

In keeping with that understanding, federal courts routinely hold 

nonprofit entities liable under section 43(a). See, e.g., Comm. 

for Idaho’s High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 

1996) (applying section 43(a) to “two non-profit advocacy 

groups”); Nat’l Servs. Grp., 2006 WL 2035465, at *4 (holding that

“nonprofit trade organization that represents the interests of 

painters and decorators” may be liable under section 43(a)); 

Gideons Int’l, Inc. v. Gideon 300 Ministries, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 

2d 566, 568, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (applying section 43(a) to 

nonprofit religious groups). Accordingly, defendants’ “commerce” 

argument fails.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants are making 

representations that confuse the public as to the identity of the 

California State Grange and California Guild. According to

plaintiffs, defendants are: (1) taking credit for the California 

State Grange’s history and achievements,

5 (see FAC ¶¶ 20-26, 42, 

 

5 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants are 

making statements along the lines of the following:

The CSG . . . is the oldest agricultural organization in 

California, started in 1870. Cities and townships have 

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76): (2) copying logos, backdrop, and content from the California 

State Grange’s website as to make their website look identical to 

plaintiffs’ website, (see id. ¶¶ 18, 24-25, 30); and (3) 

violating the court’s April 20 Order by continuing to use the 

word “Grange” in public communications, soliciting Grange dues, 

using Grange bank accounts, and performing Grange rituals using 

Grange regalia, (see id. ¶¶ 45-47, 68, 75-76, 112, 125, 128). 

Such activities, according to plaintiffs, have “caused actual 

confusion among at least fifty of Plaintiffs’ members” and

resulted in some members disaffiliating from plaintiffs to join

defendants.6 (Id. ¶¶ 75, 79, 130.)

 

grown up around our rural halls . . . . The CSG has 

lobbyists in Sacramento and boasts a long history of 

successful legislative advocacy. The CSG was the first 

organization to support and promote women as equal voting 

members. . . . In these uncertain times our members find 

comfort and security by returning to our roots and

reaffirming principles and goals set by the founders 140 

years ago.

(FAC ¶ 20 (internal citation omitted).) As explained in the 

court’s September 23, 2016 Order partially granting plaintiffs’ 

motion for preliminary injunction, while defendants are 

technically correct when they refer to themselves as having 

existed since 1946 because they continue to occupy the California 

State Grange’s 1946 corporate charter, at least some of their

other statements--namely, their references to a history prior to 

1946--are undeniably false. (See Sept. 23, 2016 Order at 12 

(Docket No. 93).)

6 Defendants note that they use disclaimers that refer to 

the California State Grange as “Grange of California Order of 

Patrons of Husbandry.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 15.) Plaintiffs allege 

that “the name ‘Grange of the State of California’s Patrons of 

Husbandry Chartered’ is unknown to the California Granges,” 

however. (FAC ¶ 22.) Accordingly, defendants’ disclaimers do 

not defeat plaintiffs’ allegations of confusion among local 

granges.

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Uncredited references to another entity’s history and 

achievements may constitute “false or misleading” representations

as to give rise to liability under section 43(a). See, e.g.,

ITEX Corp. v. Glob. Links Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1171 (D. 

Nev. 2015) (trade exchange’s claim to forty-year history of 

unaffiliated company violates section 43(a)); Riggs Inv. Mgmt. 

Corp. v. Columbia Partners, L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 1250, 1267 

(D.D.C. 1997) (investment company violated section 43(a) when it 

represented itself as responsible for another firm’s investment 

record). Use of substantially similar website logos and 

backgrounds may also give rise to liability under section 43(a). 

See, e.g., GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff is likely to succeed on 

section 43(a) claim where defendant used “glaringly similar” 

logo); CJ Prod. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 

161 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff is likely to succeed 

on section 43(a) claim where defendant‘s website “looks 

substantially similar” to plaintiffs’ website).

The same is true of performance of similar functions, 

see, e.g., Herb Reed Enterprises, Inc. v. Monroe Powell’s 

Platters, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1325 (D. Nev. 2014) (finding 

section 43(a) liability where one music group “market[ed] similar 

live vocal performances” as another), and misappropriation of 

trademarks, see Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1046 n.6 (proving 

trademark infringement proves violation of section 43(a)).

7

 

7 The cases cited here are false advertisement and 

trademark infringement cases. But their ‘false or misleading’ 

analysis is applicable to false designation of origin because all 

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Because plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that 

defendants are making false or misleading representations in 

interstate commerce that confuse the public, they have stated

plausible claims for false designation of origin and, by 

extension, trademark infringement.

2. False Advertisement

The Ninth Circuit has held that a false advertisement 

claim under section 43(a)(1)(B) requires: “(1) a false statement 

of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its 

own or another’s product8; (2) the statement actually deceived or 

has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its 

audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to 

influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its 

false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the 

plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the 

false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself 

 

three types of claims require proof of “false or misleading 

representation of fact” under section 43(a)(1). See Lexmark 

Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1384 (holding that false designation of 

origin and false advertisement each arise under section 

43(a)(1)); Luxul Tech, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (“To establish a 

claim for either trademark infringement or false designation of 

origin under § 43(a)(1)(A) . . . a plaintiff must prove that the 

defendant (1) used in commerce (2) any word, false designation of 

origin, false or misleading description, or representation of 

fact . . . .”).

8 “False” for these purposes means false or misleading. 

See Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“To demonstrate falsity within the meaning of 

the Lanham Act, a plaintiff may show that the statement was 

literally false . . . or that the statement was literally true 

but likely to mislead or confuse consumers.”).

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to defendant or by a lessening of the goodwill associated with 

its products.” Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 

1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997).

As explained in the ‘false designation of origin’ 

section, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that defendants are 

making false or misleading representations in interstate commerce 

that is causing confusion among local granges, some members to 

disaffiliate from plaintiffs, and loss of goodwill. That is 

enough to satisfy each prong of Southland Sod Farms. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have stated plausible claims for false 

advertisement under the Lanham Act and, by extension, section 

17500 of the California Business and Professional Code.

3. Defendants’ Defenses

Defendants raise several defenses to plaintiffs’ Lanham 

Act claims. First, they argue that the representations

plaintiffs attribute to them constitute protected political 

speech under the First Amendment. (Defs.’ Mem. at 7-11.) It is 

well established that the “First Amendment does not protect false 

or misleading commercial speech,” however. Amarin Pharma, Inc. 

v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 

2015); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 

Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976) 

(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been 

protected for its own sake.”). At least some statements and 

representations plaintiffs attribute to defendants are “false or 

misleading” under the authorities cited above. See ITEX Corp., 

90 F. Supp. 3d at 1171; Riggs Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 966 F. Supp. at 

1267; GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d at 1206; CJ Prod. LLC, 809 F. 

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Supp. 2d at 161; Herb Reed Enterprises, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1325; 

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1046 n.6. That speech is not protected. 

Accordingly, the court will not dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on 

First Amendment grounds.

Second, defendants cite to cases holding that mere

“criticism” and “opinion” cannot serve as bases of liability 

under the Lanham Act. (Defs.’ Mem. at 7-11.) Those cases are 

easily distinguishable because defendants’ alleged statements are 

not mere criticism or opinion, but assertions of fact. (See, 

e.g., FAC ¶ 20 (defendants claim that “[t]he CSG . . . is the 

oldest agricultural organization in California, started in 1870. 

. . . [That t]he CSG was the first organization to support and 

promote women as equal voting members. . . . [That their] roots 

and reaffirming principles and goals [were] set by the founders 

140 years ago.” (emphases added)).) If defendants made clear to 

the public that their statements taking credit for plaintiffs’

history and achievements were merely statements of opinion, their

argument may have merit. But under the facts alleged by 

plaintiffs, that is not the case.

Third, defendants argue that their representations are 

protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which holds that 

“those who petition any department of the government for redress 

are generally immune from statutory liability for their 

petitioning conduct.” See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 

929 (9th Cir. 2006). That doctrine extends to “conduct 

incidental to the prosecution of [a] suit.” Columbia Pictures 

Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 

1528 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 508 U.S. 49 (1993). The 

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representations plaintiffs attribute to defendants rise far 

beyond “petitioning conduct,” however. Taking credit for 

another’s history and achievements, designing one’s website to 

look the same as another’s, using another’s trademark publicly, 

and performing the same rituals as another have nothing to do 

with the present litigation. None of that activity is related to 

defending a lawsuit. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss 

plaintiffs’ claims on Noerr-Pennington grounds.

9

Fourth, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ Lanham Act 

claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the 

court already adjudicated those claims in Grange I. (See Defs.’ 

Mem. at 17-18.) Res judicata only bars claims that are identical 

to each other, however. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 

Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing W. Radio Servs. 

Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.1997)). Where a 

subsequent claim does not “arise out of the same transactional 

nucleus of facts” as its predecessor, it is not barred. See id.

at 714. 

Grange I decided ownership of the word “Grange,” and 

enjoined defendants from the use of that term (see Apr. 20 Order 

at 3). The conduct alleged to support plaintiff’s Lanham Act 

 

9 With respect to plaintiffs’ California false 

advertisement claim, defendants argue that a separate litigation 

privilege exists under California Civil Code section 47. (See

Defs.’ Mem. at 21-22 (noting that California Civil Code section 

47(b)(2) protects “communications by a litigant to a judicial 

proceeding that have some connection or logical relation to the 

action”).) That argument fails for the reasons defendants’ 

Noerr-Pennington argument fails.

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claims in this action is different from the conduct enjoined in 

Grange I. It involves more than merely the use of the word 

“Grange.” To the extent that the complaint here alleges that 

defendants are representing they are the same organization as the 

California State Grange, that they are responsible for the

history and achievements of the California State Grange, or 

making other false or misleading representations causing 

confusion among local granges, it goes beyond the complaint in 

Grange I and seeks to enjoin different conduct. Accordingly, the 

court will not dismiss plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims on res 

judicata grounds.

B. Copyright Infringement

To state a claim for copyright infringement, plaintiff 

must plausibly allege: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and 

(2) that the defendant violated the copyright owner’s exclusive 

rights under the Copyright Act.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 

1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)).

Here, plaintiffs have attached, as exhibits to their 

amended Complaint, copyright registrations for content on their 

website, including information about the California State 

Grange’s history, foundation, and membership. (See FAC Ex. B, 

Copyright Registrations (Docket No. 75-2).) They allege that

without permission, defendants copied such materials onto their 

website in violation of section 106 of United States Copyright 

Law, (see FAC ¶¶ 117-120), which confers upon copyright owners 

the exclusive right to “reproduce the copyrighted work” or 

“prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” 17 

U.S.C. § 106. Because plaintiffs have alleged ownership of the 

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website materials and defendants’ unauthorized copying of such 

materials, they have stated a plausible claim for copyright 

infringement.

Defendants argue that their website materials are not 

identical to plaintiffs’. (Defs.’ Mem. at 25.) To succeed on a 

copyright infringement claim, however, plaintiff need not prove 

identity of copied materials; substantial similarity suffices. 

See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] 

plaintiff may establish copying by showing that the infringer 

had access to the work and that the two works are substantially 

similar.”). Plaintiffs have alleged substantial similarity in 

the website materials. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 20 (alleging that 

defendants’ “advertisements and representation about its history 

and goodwill on its new website . . . were copied verbatim from 

the former California State Grange website except for the 

substitution of ‘CSG’ in lieu of ‘California State Grange’”).) 

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs did not rule out 

the possibility that they independently created the website 

materials after splitting from plaintiffs in 2013. (See Defs.’ 

Mem. at 24-25.) That argument misses the fact that plaintiffs

allege defendants copied materials from their website with 

copyright registrations dated 2010. (FAC ¶¶ 117, 119; Copyright 

Registrations.) Accordingly, the court will not dismiss 

plaintiffs’ copyright infringement claim.

C. Trade Libel

Under California law, “[t]rade libel is the publication 

of matter disparaging the quality of another’s property, which 

the publisher should recognize is likely to cause pecuniary loss 

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to the owner.” ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 

4th 993, 1010 (4th Dist. 2001) (citing Leonardini v. Shell Oil 

Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 547, 572 (3d Dist. 1989)). It encompasses 

“all false statements concerning the quality of services or 

product of a business which are intended to cause that business 

financial harm and in fact do so.” Leonardini, 216 Cal. App. 3d 

at 572. 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants disparage their name 

and goodwill by publicly claiming that the newly chartered 

California State Grange “IS NOT the original California State 

Grange” and not heir to the 146-year history that it has accrued 

since being founded in 1870. (FAC ¶¶ 20, 113.) The alleged

statements are false, see supra note 5, and obviously calculated 

to cause loss of goodwill and membership to plaintiffs. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged trade libel.

D. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

Under California law, “[t]he elements which a plaintiff 

must plead to state the cause of action for intentional 

interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract 

between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of 

this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to 

induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; 

(4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; 

and (5) resulting damage.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns 

& Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 (1990).

Plaintiffs’ claim appears to be that defendants are 

causing local granges to breach their contractual duties under 

Grange by-laws by convincing them to leave the California State 

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Grange to join the California Guild.10 (See FAC ¶¶ 112-113.) 

They have not cited any by-laws that require local granges to

remain members of the California State Grange, however. The bylaws plaintiffs cite merely require that local granges “comply 

with the Constitution, By-Laws and Codes of the Grange at all 

levels.” (Id. ¶ 109.) There is no indication that such 

obligations include remaining members of the Grange. Moreover, 

plaintiffs have not alleged that Grange by-laws are contractual 

in nature--that is, that local granges offered and accepted 

consideration in becoming Grange members, that remaining in the 

Grange was part of the contract, and so forth. Accordingly, 

plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for intentional 

interference with contractual relations.

E. Trespass and Conversion

Under California law, “[c]onversion is the wrongful 

exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements 

of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right 

to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by 

a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) 

damages.” Hernandez v. Lopez, 180 Cal. App. 4th 932, 939 (4th 

Dist. 2009) (quoting Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 

 

10 Plaintiffs also appear to be alleging that defendants

are causing local granges to breach Grange by-laws by 

collaborating with them while they remain Grange members. To the 

extent that is what the claim is, plaintiffs have alleged neither 

the specific by-laws being broken nor that the by-laws are 

contractual to begin with. Accordingly, that claim fails under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 for vagueness. See Lee v. City 

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (a complaint 

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”).

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1066 (1st Dist. 1998)), as modified (Dec. 28, 2009). “Dubbed by 

Prosser the ‘little brother of conversion,’ the tort of trespass 

to chattels allows recovery for interferences with possession of 

personal property ‘not sufficiently important to be classed as 

conversion’ . . . .” Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 

1350 (2003).

Plaintiffs allege that defendants convert and trespass 

upon their property by continuing to occupy Grange buildings and 

refusing to return tangible Grange property after the 2013 split. 

(See FAC at 50-51.) In addition to “preventing Plaintiffs[ from] 

access[ing] said property,” defendants’ actions have allegedly

“harmed Plaintiffs by causing confusion among the California 

Granges” as to the identity of the California State Grange and 

the California Guild. (Id.) Because plaintiffs allege ownership 

of the property, defendants’ wrongful occupation of and refusal 

to return the property, and resulting damages, they have stated

plausible claims for trespass and conversion under California 

law.

Plaintiffs’ trespass and conversion claims are not 

barred under the doctrine of res judicata by the underlying state 

court action in this case because that action remains pending on 

appeal. See Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (“Under California law . . . a judgment is not final 

for purposes of res judicata during the pendency of and until the 

resolution of an appeal.”); see also Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 

208 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The preclusive effect of a 

state court judgment in federal court is based on state 

preclusion law.”). Neither does Grange I bar such claims, as 

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Grange I decided ownership of the word “Grange,” (see Apr. 20 

Order at 3), not defendants’ subsequent alleged refusal to vacate 

and return Grange property. See W. Radio Servs., 123 F.3d at 

1192 (“In order for res judicata to apply there must be . . . an 

identity of claims . . . .”). Accordingly, the court will not 

dismiss plaintiffs’ trespass and conversion claims on res 

judicata grounds.

III. Motion for a More Definite Statement

With respect to the claims the court will not dismiss, 

defendant moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) for a 

more definite statement of the claims. (Defs.’ Mot. at 3-4.) “A 

Rule 12(e) motion is proper only where the complaint is so 

indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the 

claim[s] being asserted.” Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. 

Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Famolare, Inc. v. 

Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 

1981)). “Motions for a more definite statement are viewed with 

disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading 

requirements of the Federal Rules. Parties are expected to use 

discovery, not the pleadings, to learn the specifics of the 

claims being asserted.” Id. (citing In re American Int'l 

Airways, Inc., 66 B.R. 642, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1986)).

Plaintiffs’ amended Complaint provides more than enough

information to alert defendants as to the nature of the claims 

asserted against them. Defendants appear to have no trouble 

responding to the claims in their motion to dismiss, in their 

reply, and at oral argument. Accordingly, the court will deny 

defendants’ motion for a more definite statement.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ first amended Complaint or, in the 

alternative, for a more definite statement of claims, be, and the 

same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

(1) plaintiffs’ “infringement of unregistered logo and 

trade dress” and intentional interference with 

contractual relations claims are DISMISSED;

(2) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ other claims 

is DENIED; and

(3) defendants’ motion for a more definite statement of the

non-dismissed claims is DENIED.

Dated: November 15, 2016

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