Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02232/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02232-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Polsky
Appellant
Robert Polsky
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 15-2232

__________

ROBERT POLSKY; LISA POLSKY,

 Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-00655)

District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage

__________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 25, 2016

Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion Filed: December 15, 2016)

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Robert Polsky

Lisa Polsky

9 Jody Drive

Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462

Pro Se

Karen G. Gregory, Esq.

John A. Nolet, Esq.

Joan I. Oppenheimer, Esq.

United States Department of Justice

Tax Division

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

P.O. Box 502

Washington, DC 20044

Beatriz T. Saiz, Esq.

E. Christopher Lambert, Esq.

United States Department of Justice

Tax Division

P.O. Box 227

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Appellee United States of America

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

PER CURIAM. 

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Robert and Lisa Polsky, the parents of a permanently

disabled daughter, claimed a child tax credit on their 2010 

and 2011 income taxes. However, the Internal Revenue 

Service (IRS) disallowed the credit because the Polskys’ 

daughter was too old to qualify for it. 

After a few false starts, the Polskys challenged the 

disallowance of the credit by bringing suit in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

They argued that the tax credit’s definition of “qualifying 

child,” which has an age cap, incorporates by reference a 

different section of the Internal Revenue Code that has no age 

cap at all for a person who is permanently disabled. The 

Polskys contended that this second definition of “qualifying 

child” overrides the age cap in the child tax credit. 

In granting the IRS’s motion to dismiss, the District 

Court held that the plain language of the Code supported the 

IRS’s position: the age cap of the child tax credit section of 

the Code controlled, and the credit was therefore properly 

denied. Having reviewed the interplay between the two 

sections of the Code, we agree with the District Court and, for 

the reasons set forth below, will affirm its judgment. 

I.

After the Polskys attempted to claim the child tax 

credit for the 2010 and 2011 tax years, the IRS issued them a 

notice of a “mathematical or clerical error”1 disallowing the 

credit because their daughter was older than 17. In response, 

the Polskys submitted amended returns, specifically 

requesting that the IRS review whether their daughter 

 1 See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(g)(2). 

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qualified for the tax credit. According to the Polskys, the IRS 

refused to rule on the amended returns because they were 

substantially the same as the original returns. The Polskys 

next filed a petition in the Tax Court. The Tax Court 

dismissed the petition, however, because the IRS had not 

issued a notice of deficiency. See United States v. Mellon 

Bank, N.A., 545 F.2d 869, 873 n.10 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[A]

notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a 

taxpayer’s suit in the Tax Court.”). 

In 2014, the Polskys, who have been pro se

throughout, filed an action in the District Court, alleging that 

the IRS erroneously disallowed the child tax credit and 

violated their due process rights by preventing them from 

challenging the disallowance in Tax Court.2

 The United 

 2 The Polskys labeled their filing as a “class action” 

complaint and named Daniel I. Werfel, the IRS’s Acting 

Commissioner, as the sole defendant. They also moved for 

class certification. Contrary to the Polskys’ argument on 

appeal, the District Court permissibly evaluated the United 

States’ motion to dismiss before ruling on class certification. 

See Greenlee Cty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 880 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (recognizing that courts can grant a motion 

to dismiss without addressing class certification); Searles v. 

Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789, 790 n.1, 794 (3d Cir. 

1993) (affirming order granting motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim, while noting that the “district court did not 

rule on the class certification because it ultimately concluded 

that plaintiff failed to state a claim”); see also 3 William B. 

Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 7:9 (5th ed. 2013) 

(“Given the early nature of most motions to dismiss, courts 

will often handle them prior to deciding a motion for class 

certification.”). We note that courts have questioned whether 

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States filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court 

granted. In particular, the District Court held that the tax 

credit is unavailable when the child has attained age 17 and 

that the Polskys failed to state a constitutional due process 

claim. Polsky v. Werfel, 87 F. Supp. 3d 748, 758-60, 763-66 

(E.D. Pa. 2015). The Polskys appealed.

 

laymen pro se litigants may represent a class. See Fymbo v. 

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 

2000) (holding that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by deciding that an unincarcerated pro se litigant 

was not an adequate class representative). The District Court 

also properly substituted the United States for Acting 

Commissioner Werfel. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f)(1)-(2) 

(providing that a suit seeking a tax refund must be brought 

against only the United States, not its officers or employees, 

while allowing party substitution via court-ordered 

amendment of the pleadings); Polsky v. Werfel, 87 F. Supp. 

3d 748, 756-57 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (treating the action as a 

refund suit “[b]ecause the jurisdictional and procedural 

requirements for filing a refund suit are satisfied”). 

 

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II.3

The child tax credit, 26 U.S.C. § 24, allows certain 

taxpayers to claim a credit against tax liability for each 

qualifying child. A “qualifying child” means “a qualifying 

child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c)) who has 

not attained age 17.” 26 U.S.C. § 24(c)(1) (emphasis added). 

The Polskys did not dispute that their daughter was 

over 17 in 2010 and 2011. Instead, they argued that they are 

entitled to the child tax credit regardless of their daughter’s 

age because she meets the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 

§ 152(c), which § 24(c)(1) incorporates by reference. 

Section 152(c) defines “qualifying child” for purposes of a 

taxpayer’s dependency deductions and provides an exception

to its own age requirements4 for an individual

who is “permanently and totally disabled.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 152(c)(3)(B). 

 3 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

exercise plenary review over the order granting the United 

States’ motion to dismiss. See Cooper v. Comm’r, 718 F.3d 

216, 220 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion to dismiss, 

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

4 Generally, with respect to the dependency deduction, a 

qualifying child must be under the age of 19 or a student 

under the age of 24. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(c)(3)(A). In 

addition, § 152(c)(1) includes requirements pertaining to the 

child’s relationship with the taxpayer, principal place of 

abode, percentage of self-support, and joint filing status. 

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III.

We agree with the District Court that the Polskys are 

not entitled to a child tax credit for their disabled daughter. 

The age-cap exception in § 152(c)(3) does not supplant the 

separate age limitation in § 24(c)(1). See Cushman v. Trans 

Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that, 

as a general rule of statutory construction, “[w]e strive to 

avoid a result that would render statutory language 

superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant”). To the contrary, 

under the plain and unambiguous language of the Internal 

Revenue Code, the age limitation for the child tax credit in 

§ 24(c)(1) effectively overrides the age requirements and 

exception for claiming a child as a dependent that are found 

in § 152(c)(3). As the District Court correctly explained:

Section 24 imports the basic qualifications from 

§ 152(c), and adds an age limitation of 

seventeen years. . . . The age restriction in 

§ 24(c)(1) is intended to end the tax credit when 

the child reaches seventeen years of age. In 

contrast, the special rule applicable to 

permanently and totally disabled dependents in 

§ 152(c)(3)(B) is calculated to extend the tax 

deduction as long as the child is disabled. 

Therefore, the taxpayer can take a dependent 

deduction regardless of the child’s age as long 

as the child is permanently and totally disabled, 

but cannot receive a tax credit for a disabled 

child who, by the close of the taxable year, was 

seventeen years of age. 

Polsky, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 759. In other words, the child tax 

credit is available only when the “qualifying child” meets the 

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non-age-related requirements of § 152(c) and “has not 

attained age 17.” 26 U.S.C. § 24(c)(1). Because the Polskys’ 

daughter was over 17 during the relevant tax years, they are 

not entitled to the child tax credit.

The Polskys also argued that the IRS violated their due 

process rights by failing to issue a notice of deficiency, which 

would have allowed them to seek redress in the Tax Court. 

As a basis for this claim, the Polskys relied on 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. That provision, however, does not apply to federal 

actors, such as IRS employees. Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 

250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001) (“It is well established that 

liability under § 1983 will not attach for actions taken under 

color of federal law.”). In addition, neither the IRS nor the 

United States can be sued under § 1983. See Accardi v. 

United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding 

that “[t]he United States and other governmental entities are 

not ‘persons’ within the meaning of Section 1983”). We have 

also held that an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 

“which is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action 

against state actors,” Brown, 250 F.3d at 800, “should not be 

inferred to permit suits against IRS agents accused of 

violating a taxpayer’s constitutional rights.” Shreiber v. 

Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2000). 

In any event, we agree with the District Court that the 

Polskys’ due process rights were not violated. Although they 

could not bring their claims in the Tax Court, see 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6213(b)(1) (providing that when a return contains a 

mathematical error, the taxpayer has no right to file a petition 

with the Tax Court), the Polskys’ due process rights were 

protected by their ability under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 to sue for a 

refund. See Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 435 (5th 

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Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“The refund claim procedure 

provided in section 7422 adequately protects . . . due process 

rights.”). 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 

the District Court.5

 5 We deny the Polskys’ motions “to consider new evidence” 

and “to consider additional new evidence.” Our review is 

limited to whether the dismissal of the complaint “was correct 

in light of the facts pleaded in the complaint.” Maio v. Aetna, 

Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Harris v. City 

of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that issues 

raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered). 

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