Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01857/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01857-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gene Edward Evans
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GENE EDWARD EVANS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:09-CV-01857 AWI GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #11]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, following his conviction by jury

trial on November 16, 2004, of two counts of forcible oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code

§ 288a(c)(2)), one count of rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2)), one count of kidnap for rape (Cal.

Penal Code § 209), one count of penetration with a foreign object (Cal. Penal Code § 289), and one

count of carjacking (Cal. Penal Code § 215). (LD 1.) On February 3, 2005, Petitioner was 1

sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 301 years to life in state prison. (LD 1.) 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent in support of his motion to dismiss.

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(hereinafter “Fifth DCA”). On September 29, 2006, the Fifth DCA reduced the sentence by fifty

years, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (LD 2.) Petitioner then sought review in the

California Supreme Court. On December 13, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied review.

(LD 3.) 

On February 7, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion to recall the remittitur in light of Cunningham

v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). (LD 4.) On February 15, 2007, the Fifth DCA denied the motion.

(LD 4.) Petitioner then sought review in the California Supreme Court. On May 23, 2007, the

California Supreme Court granted review and recalled the remittitur. (LD 4.) On September 21,

2007, the California Supreme Court dismissed the petition in light of People v. Black, 41 Cal.4th

799 (2007). (LD 5.) 

Petitioner then filed three post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent

judgment in the state courts as follows:

1. Tulare County Superior Court

Filed: March 19, 2008 ; 2

Denied: March 27, 2008;

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: May 21, 2008;

Denied: June 6, 2008;

3. California Supreme Court

Filed: August 20, 2008;

Denied: March 11, 2009.

(LD 7-12.) 

On October 2, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in

this Court. On December 30, 2009, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed

outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner filed an

opposition on February 25, 2010. In his opposition, Petitioner claimed, inter alia, that he is entitled

to equitable tolling due to mental health impairments. On March 4, 2010, Respondent moved for an

extension of time in order to secure Petitioner’s mental health records and provide a meaningful

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the various petitions filed on the dates they were signed and

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presumably handed to prison authorities for mailing. Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001).

th

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response to Petitioner’s claim for tolling. Petitioner objected to the disclosure of his mental records.

On April 8, 2010, Respondent filed a reply to the opposition. Respondent addressed all of

Petitioner’s claims save one, the mental health claim, which Respondent states he could not address

without the relevant records. Therefore, on April 15, 2010, in light of the necessity of the mental

health records for review of Petitioner’s claim, the Court issued an order providing Petitioner with

two options: 1) Withdraw his objection; or 2) Abandon his claim for equitable tolling on the basis of

mental incompetence. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to withdraw his objection and the Court granted

his motion.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

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1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on October 2, 2009, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the final petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on September 12, 2007. Thus, direct review concluded on December 11, 2007, when the

ninety (90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. th

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). The statute of limitations commenced on the following th

day, December 12, 2007, and expired one year later on December 11, 2008. Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9 Cir.2001). Here, Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until October 2, th

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2009, exceeding the due date by 295 days. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is

barred by the statute of limitations. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely, or it was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). If the state court states the petition was

untimely, “that [is] the end of the matter, regardless of whether it also addressed the merits of the

claim, or whether its timeliness ruling was “entangled” with the merits.” Carey, 536 U.S. at 226;

Pace, 544 U.S. at 414.

In this case, the statute of limitations began to run on December 12, 2007. It continued until

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the Tulare County Superior Court on March 19, 2008. 

At that point, 98 days of the limitations period had elapsed. Respondent correctly argues the petition

was not properly filed, because the Tulare County Superior Court explicitly stated that “Petitioner

failed to raise the issues raised in his writ in a timely manner.” (LD 8.) Since the state court ruled the

petition was untimely, the petition could not be deemed “properly filed” and therefore could not

operate to toll the statute of limitations. Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-414. 

The second and third petitions were denied without comment or citation to authority. In such

a situation, it is presumed that the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court denied

the petitions for the same reasons expressed by the Tulare County Superior Court. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991) (“Where... the last reasoned opinion on the claim

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explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did

not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.”). Therefore, the second and third petitions

were also not properly filed and did not operate to toll the limitations period. 

In his opposition, Petitioner argues he should be entitled to interval tolling between the

petitions since he did not unduly delay between those petitions. His arguments are without merit

since none of the petitions were properly filed; thus, he cannot obtain interval tolling between those

petitions. He also argues that the state court’s untimeliness ruling should be ignored because he had

cause for the delay and can demonstrate prejudice. As correctly argued by Respondent, however, 

procedural default analysis has no application in determining whether a state petition is “properly

filed.” In Artuz v. Bennett, the Supreme Court held that “the question of whether an application has

been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the

application are meritorious and free from procedural bar.” 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000) (italics omitted). 

Thus, analysis of the independence or adequacy of a state’s procedural bar is not relevant to whether

the petition was properly filed. See Gorby v. McNeil, 530 F.3d 1363, 1367-68 (11 Cir.2008), cert. th

denied, 2009 WL 578785 (2009) (per curiam). As stated above, the state court’s determination of

untimeliness is “the end of the matter.” Carey, 536 U.S. at 226.

Accordingly, the limitations period continued uninterrupted until it expired on December 11,

2008. The federal petition remains untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

In his opposition, Petitioner argues that during the relevant time period, “he was suffering

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from a severe mental disorder.” (See Petitioner’s Opposition at 14.) He claims that he was

“prescribed strong psych [sic] medication which put the Petitioner down and incapacitated him.”

(Id.)

1. Legal Standard

Mental incompetency can, in certain circumstances, rise to the level of an “extraordinary

circumstance” beyond a petitioner’s control that warrants equitable tolling. Laws v. Lamarque, 351

F.3d 919, 923 (9 Cir.2003). However, the circumstances must be exceptional. See Rhodes v. th

Senkowski, 82 F.Supp.2d 160, 168-70, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); also U.S. v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512

(4 Cir.2004) (“As a general matter, the federal courts will apply equitable tolling because of th

petitioner’s mental condition only in cases of profound mental incapacity”).

In the context of a defendant’s ability to stand trial or plead guilty, the term “competence”

has been defined to meant that the defendant had “a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1993); Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S.

402 (1960). “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is

whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. A

defendant is incompetent only if he “‘lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the

proceedings’ . . . .” Id., quoting, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). In Laws, the Ninth

Circuit signaled approval of the Godinez/Dusky standard of competence in evaluating a petitioner’s

claim of mental incompetence for equitable tolling purposes. 351 F.3d at 923.

In addition, mental incompetency alone is not a per se reason to grant equitable tolling. “Most

mental illnesses are treatable, and with proper treatment many, if not most, sufferers are capable of

managing their own affairs.” Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7 Cir.1996). Petitioner must th

show that the alleged mental incompetence “in fact” caused him to fail to file a timely habeas

petition. Laws, 351 F.3d at 923. 

2. Analysis

In support of his allegations of mental incompetence, Petitioner points to mental health

records dating from December 2005 through December 2007. As correctly noted by Respondent, the

records are incomplete and do not address the relevant time period, which is the limitations period

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commencing on December 12, 2007, and ending on December 11, 2008. Petitioner has not submitted

anything that shows he was incapable of managing his legal affairs in that time. Nevertheless, it is

sufficient for Petitioner to have alleged mental incompetence in a verified pleading along with

evidence of a possible mental infirmity to merit further factual development. Laws, 351 F.3d at 924. 

Accordingly, Respondent has lodged with the Court a copy of Petitioner’s mental health

records for the relevant time period. (LD 13.) Review of these records reveals Petitioner did suffer

from a mental health disorder; however, the records do not support a finding that he was incapable of

conducting his legal affairs. Petitioner was prescribed Abilify, Prozac and Zydis for treatment of

auditory hallucinations and depression. The prescribed medications appeared to help Petitioner

manage his mental health complaints. Petitioner described his own well-being ranging from “doing

well” to “my depression is bad.” Generally, when Petitioner opted to forego the medication, his

symptoms would worsen. When he would take the medication, his well-being would improve.

Petitioner was on medication for approximately 10 of the 12 months. During the relevant time

period, his thought process was observed to be linear. His insight and judgment were generally

“good” or “fair” but occasionally “limited.” He was also observed to be calm, cooperative, alert, and

oriented. His speech and cognitive abilities were within normal limits. In sum, the medical records

do not show Petitioner suffered from a debilitating mental health impairment which made him

incapable of managing his affairs.

Moreover, the record of state habeas filings reflect that Petitioner was in fact able to conduct

his affairs. All three of his state habeas petitions were filed during the relevant time period. As

Respondent correctly notes, the second habeas petition was filed during the time when Petitioner’s

symptoms were apparently at their worst, when Petitioner stated he was suffering from bad

depression and the treating doctor determined his insight was limited. There is no question Petitioner

possessed the mental capability to manage his affairs during the limitations period. Therefore,

Petitioner’s claim for equitable tolling should be denied. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9th

Cir.2005), reh’g granted, opinion modified, 447 F.3d 1165 (9 Cir.2006). th

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

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GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after date of service of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the

Objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The

Finding and Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District

Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 21, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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