Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01966/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01966-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donny Ray Gramling
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1966

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Donny Ray Gramling, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 16, 2004

Filed: August 8, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Donny Gramling appeals the restitution order and sentence that the district

court1

 imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and use of a communications

facility in commission of a felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Gramling

contends that the district court erred in ordering restitution under 21 U.S.C. § 853(q),

enhancing his sentence for illegal storage of anhydrous ammonia, and running his

sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. He also asks us to allow

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supplemental briefing in light of United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) and

Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005). We affirm the district court's

restitution order and sentence, with a slight modification, and deny the motion to

supplement briefing.

In July 2003, Gramling was tried before a jury on charges of conspiracy to

manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and manufacturing

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The jury deadlocked, and

the court declared a mistrial. Gramling later pled guilty to a two-count superseding

information. Count One charged Gramling with conspiracy to attempt to manufacture

fifty grams or more of methamphetamine from about 1998 through January 16, 2002,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charged Gramling with using a

communication facility in the commission of the underlying drug offense on January

16, 2002, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 

 At the sentencing hearing, the government offered testimony from Gramling's

July 2003 trial. At that trial, the government's confidential informant testified that

Gramling sold anhydrous ammonia to people by the quart for either $250 or four

grams of methamphetamine. At his July 2003 trial, Gramling testified that he sold

anhydrous ammonia for $250 per quart and that the largest quantity he ever sold was

thirty-five gallons, for which he charged less than $250 per quart. He also implied

that the volume of anhydrous ammonia purchased made it apparent to him that his

customers were using it to manufacture methamphetamine. 

The government also offered the testimony of Roger Case, the Drug

Enforcement Agency's coordinator for clandestine laboratories in the state of

Arkansas. Case testified that anhydrous ammonia is a serious irritant that can cause

death from inhalation in large quantities. If not kept under sufficient pressure and

stored in stainless steel containers, the ammonia will become gaseous and leak, or

react with other metals. Under Arkansas law, it must be stored and transported in

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stainless steel containers that will maintain pressure. Case testified that he had no

knowledge of any legal containers for a quantity as small as a quart, and none of the

chemical suppliers he has asked sell anhydrous ammonia in that quantity. 

Case also testified that the items found at Gramling's home indicated that there

was an operational methamphetamine laboratory in his home. Case testified that,

except for pseudoephedrine tablets which were intercepted on their way to Gramling,

almost all the materials needed to manufacture methamphetamine were on the

premises. In particular, peeled lithium batteries were found. Case testified that there

is no legitimate use for peeled lithium batteries, and that peeling the batteries and

assembling all the other necessary items constituted a substantial step towards starting

the manufacturing process. Finished methamphetamine was also found on the

premises. 

Case testified that there is gross contamination of the area where the

manufacture of methamphetamine takes place. All of the items used, as well as the

location and surrounding structure, are commonly contaminated above levels

accepted by the EPA and OSHA. Consequently, it is Drug Enforcement Agency

policy to destroy everything that could have been used for the manufacture of the

drug.

Based on this evidence, the district court found that there was an operational

methamphetamine laboratory in Gramling's home, and that Gramling was selling

anhydrous ammonia in illegal quart-sized containers. The district court enhanced his

sentence by two points for unlawful storage of anhydrous ammonia under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(5)(A)(ii), and charged him $10,525.25 in restitution for the cleanup

associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(q).

The Guidelines permitted a sentence between seventy and eighty-seven months. The

statutory maximum sentence was sixty months for the conspiracy conviction and

forty-eight months for the communications facility conviction. The district court

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sentenced Gramling to sixty months on the conspiracy conviction and fifteen months

on the communications facility conviction, to run consecutively for a total of seventyfive months. Gramling appeals the enhancement, the restitution order, and the

decision to run the sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. 

I.

Gramling challenges the restitution order on the ground that the statute under

which it was imposed--21 U.S.C. § 853(q)--was inapplicable. Since this claim was

not raised below, the district court's application of section 853(q) is reviewed for

plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). For us to find plain error "[t]here must be an

'error' that is 'plain' and that 'affects substantial rights.'" United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 732 (1993). We may exercise our discretion to correct the error if it

"seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."

Id. We conclude that the district court did not commit plain error. 

Gramling contends that the language of section 853(q) precludes its application

to his conviction. Section 853(q) provides:

The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under

this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter involving the

manufacture of methamphetamine, shall–

. . .

(2) order the defendant to reimburse the United States . . . for the costs

incurred by the United States . . . for the cleanup associated with the

manufacture of . . . methamphetamine by the defendant . . . .

21 U.S.C. § 853(q) (emphasis added). Gramling argues that section 853(q) does not

apply to him for two reasons: 1) his conspiracy conviction was not "under this

subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter" and 2) his convictions did not "involv[e]

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the manufacture of methamphetamine" because his offense was inchoate--conspiracy

to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. 

 Regarding Gramling's first argument, we do not believe the district court erred

in applying section 853(q) to Gramling's convictions. Gramling pled guilty to Count

I of the Superseding Information, alleging offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18

U.S.C. § 371, and Count II, alleging offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and

843(b). The operative provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853(q) mandate restitution for

cleanup of clandestine laboratory sites for offenses under subchapters I or II of

Chapter 13 of Title 21 of the United States Code. Subchapters I and II of Chapter 13

cover 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971, which include the offenses to which Gramling pleaded.

We can only read the plea agreement to be entering guilty pleas to portions of

subchapter I of Chapter 13, and accordingly Gramling's convictions are subject to the

mandatory provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853(q). 

Second, Gramling argues that section 853(q) does not apply because he was not

convicted of an offense "involving the manufacture of methamphetamine." In a case

decided after we heard oral argument in Gramling's case, this Court addressed the

meaning and proper application of section 853(q) for the first time when it determined

that a conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine clearly

and obviously is not an offense "involving the manufacture of methamphetamine"

within the plain meaning of the statute. United States v. Lachowski, 405 F.3d 696

(8th Cir. 2005). The Court acknowledged that the "term 'involving' appears to expand

the scope of the statute beyond convictions for the manufacture of methamphetamine

into related areas." Id. at 699. However, the Court also noted that the phrase

"involving the manufacture" of methamphetamine puts a limit on what convictions

can fall under the statute, because the phrase would not be included if Congress

meant to authorize restitution for any methamphetamine crime. See id. at 700.

However, the Court did not need to define the exact scope of the statute, and neither

do we, since all that is required on plain error review is a determination of whether

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it is "clear or obvious" that the defendant's conviction was not covered by the statute.

Id. at 699.

 Lachowski was decided on plain error review, and the Court determined the

district court had committed plain error. Id. at 698 & 700. Lachowski held that the

defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute clearly did not

"involv[e] the manufacture of methamphetamine." Id. at 699. The Court interpreted

the phrase "involving the manufacture of methamphetamine" to mean that the offense

includes the manufacture of methamphetamine as a "necessary circumstance,

condition, or consequence." Id. (quoting Random House Webster's Unabridged

Dictionary 1005 (2d ed. 1997)). Neither the fact of possession nor of distribution of

the drug necessarily includes any association or connection with the manufacture of

the drug. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that in a conviction for possession with

intent to distribute the district court could not order restitution under section 853(q).

Lachowski makes clear that because the application of section 853(q) is limited

to situations where the offense the defendant was convicted of involves the

manufacture of methamphetamine, we must look only to Gramling's convictions and

not to whether the district court could reasonably conclude that he had manufactured

methamphetamine. 405 F.3d at 699 n.1. Gramling was convicted of two offenses:

conspiracy to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and use of a communications

facility in an attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. An attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine is both "associated with" and "connected to" the manufacture of

methamphetamine. An attempt to manufacture a drug is inextricably linked to the

completed crime; without the beginning steps to manufacture a drug, the actual

manufacture of the drug would never occur. And while an attempt to manufacture a

drug may not always result in the drug's manufacture, but for intervening factors, the

natural, necessary, and intended consequence of an attempt to manufacture a drug is

the actual and completed manufacture of the drug. Therefore, it was not clear or

obvious error for the district court to conclude that Gramling's convictions

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"involv[ed] the manufacture of methamphetamine." Accordingly, the district court

did not commit plain error in applying 21 U.S.C. § 853(q) to Gramling's convictions.

 

At the sentencing hearing and again on appeal, Gramling objected to the

district court's finding that there was an operational methamphetamine lab on his

property. However, we need not address whether the district court'sfinding was clear

error, because the district court's application of the statute in this case was appropriate

based on the nature of the convictions alone.

II.

Gramling next argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence by

two points for illegal storage of anhydrous ammonia. Gramling objected to the

presentence report's statement and the district court's finding that he sold anhydrous

ammonia in illegal quart-sized jars. Gramling argues on appeal that the district court

had insufficient evidence to support this finding.

Although the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory after United

States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764 (2005), the district court must continue to

determine the appropriate guidelines sentencing range as it did pre-Booker, before

considering the other factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Mathijssen, 406

F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the district court's application of the

guidelines to the facts de novo, and we review the district court's factual findings for

clear error. Id. If a defendant has objected to factual allegations in the presentence

report, the report is not evidence and not a legally sufficient bases for making

findings on the contested issues of fact. United States v. Greene, 41 F.3d 383, 386

(8th Cir. 1994). "[A] district court may not adopt the [presentence report's]

challenged facts until . . . the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence

that the facts stated in the [presentence report] are accurate." United States v. Cole,

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357 F.3d 780, 785 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Logan, 54 F.3d 452, 455

(8th Cir. 1995)).

The district court did not err in finding Gramling sold anhydrous ammonia in

quart-sized quantities. The government presented testimony from Gramling and the

confidential informant that Gramling sold anhydrous ammonia for $250 per quart.

It was not clearly erroneous for the district to infer from this testimony that Gramling

sold quart-sized quantities. 

The government also presented evidence that if Gramling sold in quart-sized

quantities, the containers had to have been illegal. Case, the Drug Enforcement

Agency's clandestine laboratory coordinator in the state of Arkansas, testified that he

knows of no legal quart-sized containers for anhydrous ammonia. At the time of his

testimony, Case had been involved in the seizure of over 500 methamphetamine labs.

He received reports and statistical information on current activities and trends in

manufacturing methamphetamine on a daily basis. The district court did not err in

relying on this testimony to enhance Gramling's sentence. We conclude that the

enhancement for illegal storage of anhydrous ammonia was supported by sufficient

evidence.

III.

 

Gramling also argues that the district court should have run his sentences

concurrently rather than consecutively. Concurrent sentences would have resulted

in a sentence of only sixty months, the statutory maximum for the conspiracy count.

This argument is without merit. Section 5G1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines

addresses sentencing on multiple counts and states, "If the sentence imposed on the

count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then

the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but

only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total

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punishment." § 5G1.2(d) (emphasis added). This Court has held that "'total

punishment' is the precise sentence determined by the sentencing judge from within

the appropriate guidelines range." United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1045-46

(8th Cir. 2000). When the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest

statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, the sentence imposed on one or

more of the other counts should run consecutively to the extent needed to reach the

total punishment. Id. at 1046. The en banc Court reaffirmed this principle in United

States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2002). 

 The district court sentenced Gramling to a total of seventy-five months'

punishment--sixty months on the conspiracy count and fifteen months on the

communications facility count. The district court's decision to run the sentences

consecutively rather than concurrently was proper under section 5G1.2(d) and this

Circuit's case law. However, we must modify Gramling's sentence. Rather than

sentence Gramling to fifteen months on the communications facility charge, the

district court should have sentenced Gramling to the statutory maximum on both

counts, with fifteen months of the communications facility sentence to be served

consecutively to Gramling's conspiracy sentence. United States v. Pierce, 388 F.3d

1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that § 5G1.2 requires that, to the extent possible,

the total punishment is to be imposed on each count). 

IV. 

Gramling finally asks us to grant his motion to supplement briefing in light of

Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005), and United States v. Booker, 125

S.Ct. 738 (2005). Gramling relies on Shepard to argue that the district court

inappropriately relied on information in the presentence report derived from police

reports to enhance his sentence by two points for possession of a firearm while

manufacturing methamphetamine. In Shepard the Supreme Court held that a court

sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act cannot look to police reports or

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complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily

admitted, and supported a conviction for, generic burglary. Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at

1257. We do not believe the holding in Shepard applies to this case. Gramling's

sentence was not enhanced because of a prior conviction, whereas the Court explicitly

states that Shepard was decided to resolve a circuit split over what evidence may

establish the nature of a prior conviction that stems from a guilty plea. See id. at

1257-59. 

Gramling also challenges his sentence under Booker. Gramling was sentenced

on the basis of fact-based sentencing enhancements that were not tried to a jury.

Gramling did not raise this objection in the district court. Therefore, we must

consider whether the district court's application of the enhancements and its

application of the guidelines as mandatory, rather than advisory, constitute plain

error. In order to conclude that the district court's use of the guidelines in sentencing

constituted plain error, we would have to determine that there is a reasonable

probability that Gramling would receive a more favorable sentence but for the error.

United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). We find no

evidence in the record that the district court would have sentenced more leniently but

for the Booker error. The district court's application of the guidelines to Gramling's

case was not plain error. Accordingly, we deny Gramling's motion to supplement

briefing.

We modify the sentence of the district court and, as modified, affirm the

sentence as well as the restitution order.

______________________________

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