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Parties Involved:
Kenneth Conley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1455

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KENNETH CONLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 986 — Gary S. Feinerman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 30, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, KANNE and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. While incarcerated in Chicago’s

Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”) awaiting 

sentencing for a bank robbery, Kenneth Conley escaped by 

scaling down seventeen floors of the building on a “rope”

made of bed sheets. Conley pled guilty to the escape and 

was given a 41-month sentence, to be served consecutively to 

his sentence for bank robbery. 

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On appeal, Conley challenges his escape sentence on two 

grounds. First, he contends that the district court relied on 

the wrong provision of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 in imposing a 

consecutive, as opposed to a concurrent, sentence. Second, 

Conley argues that even if the district court applied the 

proper provision, the 41-month consecutive sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. We disagree and affirm the 

sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

On October 29, 2012, Conley pled guilty to one count of 

bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Conley was 

thereafter held in custody in Chicago’s downtown MCC

while awaiting sentencing.

During the early morning hours of December 18, 2012, 

Conley and his cellmate, Joseph Banks, escaped from the 

MCC. The men sawed through the bars in their narrow cell 

window and removed a section of concrete from the wall 

surrounding it. They fashioned a rope out of bed sheets, 

crawled through the opening, and scaled seventeen floors 

down the side of the building to the ground. 

Conley was at large for seventeen days before he was 

captured. Numerous law enforcement agencies, including

the United States Marshals Service and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, conducted an exhaustive manhunt for Conley. 

Officers of the suburban Palos Hills Police Department 

discovered a disguised Conley hiding out in Palos Hills, 

Illinois. When they approached him, Conley provided a false 

name. He then ran from the officers and attempted to enter a 

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No. 14-1455 3

family-occupied apartment. One of the apartment’s residents 

used physical force to block Conley’s entry. Conley was 

taken into custody, and the United States charged him with a 

single count of escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).

The United States Probation Office (“Probation”) had 

prepared an initial presentence report (PSR) for the bank 

robbery conviction prior to Conley’s escape. The PSR set his 

offense level at 32, based on the application of the career 

offender provision. It recommended a 2-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. That, combined with Conley’s

criminal history category of VI, resulted in a guidelines 

range of 168 to 210 months in prison.

Not surprisingly, Probation prepared a new PSR 

following Conley’s escape, and on May 29, 2013, Judge 

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan held a sentencing hearing on the 

bank robbery conviction. The amended PSR contained a 

recommendation for removing the 2-level acceptance of 

responsibility reduction, and it also recommended adding 2 

levels for obstruction of justice, on account of the escape. 

This resulted in a new guidelines range of 210 to 240 months, 

in part because the sentence for bank robbery is capped at 

240 months.1 The court imposed a sentence of 240 months, 

citing the escape as evidencing a likelihood of recidivism 

and a lack of respect for the law. We upheld that sentence on 

appeal. U.S. v. Conley, 541 F. App’x 699 (7th Cir. 2013). 

1 The sentencing judge indicated that were it not for the 240-month cap, 

he would have been inclined to impose an even lengthier sentence.

 

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Conley pled guilty to the escape on October 21, 2013, 

pursuant to a plea agreement. On February 24, 2014, Judge 

Gary Feinerman conducted Conley’s sentencing hearing. The 

crime of escape carries a base offense level of 13. Conley 

qualified as a career offender, because he had at least two 

prior felony convictions for crimes of violence: three 1996 

armed robbery convictions and the 2012 bank robbery 

conviction. The career offender designation raised his 

offense level to 17. The PSR recommended a 3-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, bringing the 

offense level to 14. The offense level 14 and criminal history 

category VI resulted in a guidelines range of 37 to 41 

months. 

Conley did not dispute the offense level or guidelines 

range calculation. The primary dispute concerned whether 

Conley’s sentence for the escape should be imposed 

consecutively to or concurrently with his bank robbery 

sentence. Because Conley had a prior undischarged term of 

incarceration, the court was required to determine which of 

the three subsections of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 applied to Conley’s 

sentencing. Both parties agreed that subsection (a) did not 

apply.2

Subsection (b), if applied and satisfied by Conley, would 

have recommended that his two sentences run concurrently. 

2 Subsection (a) applies when the instant offense was committed during 

a term of incarceration, or following sentencing (but before commencing 

service of the sentence) for another offense. Because Conley had not yet 

been sentenced at the time of his escape, the parties agreed that this 

subsection did not apply. 

 

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No. 14-1455 5

After considering objections from Conley, the court 

determined that subsection (b) did not apply. The court then 

applied the remaining provision, subsection (c). That 

provision instructs the court to impose a concurrent, 

partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence as required “to 

achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c).

After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and 

discussing its discretion to impose a concurrent or 

consecutive sentence, the court imposed a within-guidelines 

sentence of 41 months, to be served consecutively to the bank 

robbery sentence. 

Conley appeals the district court’s determination that 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) did not apply. In the alternative, he 

challenges the 41-month consecutive sentence as being 

substantively unreasonable.

II. ANALYSIS

A. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) versus § 5G1.3(c)

This court reviews de novo whether a district court 

followed proper sentencing procedures, including whether it 

correctly determined the applicable provision of U.S.S.G. 

§ 5G1.3. United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 

2013). 

Conley was serving a term of imprisonment for the bank 

robbery at the time that he was sentenced for the escape. 

When a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment and is 

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facing sentence on another offense, under certain 

circumstances U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 recommends that the court

should impose a concurrent sentence, as opposed to a 

consecutive one, for the other offense. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) 

provides in pertinent part: 

If subsection (a) does not apply, and a term of 

imprisonment resulted from another offense that 

is relevant conduct to the instant offense of 

conviction under the provisions of subsections 

(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant 

Conduct) and that was the basis for an increase in 

the offense level for the instant offense under 

Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) or Chapter Three 

(Adjustments), the sentence for the instant offense

... shall be imposed to run consecutively to the 

remainder of the undischarged term of 

imprisonment.3

§ 5G1.3(b).

As we recently stated in United States v. Rachuy, in order 

to obtain the benefit of subsection (b), a defendant must 

satisfy both requirements of this provision. 743 F.3d 205, 212 

(7th Cir. 2014). That is, the conduct underlying the prior 

offense for which the defendant is already incarcerated must 

be relevant conduct to the instant offense; and that prior 

offense must have served as the basis for an increase in the 

offense level assigned to the instant offense. Here, for 

3 This provision has since been amended, which we discuss in greater 

detail below.

 

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subsection (b) to apply, the bank robbery must be relevant 

conduct to the escape, and the bank robbery must have 

served as the basis for an increase in the offense level for the 

escape. 

As to the first requirement, Conley argues that the bank 

robbery is relevant conduct to the escape. Conley appears to 

argue that because he escaped from custody while 

incarcerated for the bank robbery, there is some degree of 

factual overlap between the two courses of conduct. We 

disagree. The bank robbery conduct was completed before 

his escape conduct, as evidenced by the fact that Conley had 

already pled guilty to the bank robbery charge at the time of 

his escape. None of the “Relevant Conduct” provisions of 

Section 1B1.3 support Conley’s apparent contention that 

incarceration for a prior offense constitutes relevant conduct 

for a subsequent offense. He therefore cannot establish the 

first requirement of Section 5G1.3(b).

Likewise, Conley cannot establish the second 

requirement of Section 5G1.3(b), that the bank robbery

served as the basis for an increase in the offense level 

assigned to the escape. Conley argues that because the bank 

robbery conviction was one of several offenses that qualified 

him as a career offender, and because that designation raised 

his offense level from 13 to 17, the bank robbery conviction 

increased his offense level for the escape. Once again, we 

disagree.

Conley’s argument ignores subsection (b)’s specific 

language. That provision states that prior relevant offense 

conduct “that was the basis for an increase in the offense 

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level for the instant offense under Chapter Two (Offense 

Conduct) or Chapter Three (Adjustments)” can provide the 

basis for a concurrent sentence. § 5G1.3(b). Conley’s 

increased offense level was due to enhancements imposed 

under Chapter Four (Career Offenders and Criminal 

Livelihood), not Chapters Two and Three. By the plain 

language of the provision, then, his career offender 

enhancement cannot provide the basis for fulfilling 

subsection (b)’s “increase” requirement. 

We conclude by noting that Section 5G1.3(b) was recently 

amended, effecting relatively significant changes for 

defendants who are subject to prior undischarged terms of 

incarceration. Effective November 1, 2014, the “increase 

requirement,” or the requirement that the prior offense 

conduct resulted in an increase in offense level for the 

instant offense, has been stricken from the provision.

U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 787 (Nov. 1, 2014). Therefore, in 

order to meet the requirements for a consecutive (or 

adjusted) sentence under the amended subsection (b), a 

defendant need only show that the prior undischarged term 

of imprisonment resulted from another offense that qualifies 

as “relevant conduct” to the instant offense. 

Because Conley was sentenced prior to November of 

2014, this amendment does not apply to him. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.11(a) (stating that the “court shall use the Guidelines 

Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 

sentenced.”) In addition, because Conley could not fulfill 

subsection (b)’s requirement that the prior offense be 

“relevant conduct” to the instant offense, even with the 

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No. 14-1455 9

benefit of Amendment 787, Conley would still not meet the 

provision’s requirements for a concurrent sentence.

We conclude that Conley did not meet either of the 

requirements of Section 5G1.3(b). Because both parties 

agreed that subsection (a) did not apply, the district court 

correctly determined that Conley should be sentenced 

pursuant to subsection (c). 

B. Substantive reasonableness of the sentence

We review the substantive reasonableness of a 

defendant’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Conley argues that under the 

circumstances he faced, the imposition of a 41-month, 

consecutive sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Conley argues that under subsection (c), the district court 

abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence. 

Subsection (c) provides:

In any other case involving an undischarged term of 

imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense 

may be imposed to run concurrently, partially 

concurrently, or consecutively to the prior 

undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a 

reasonable punishment for the instant offense. 

§ 5G1.3(c).

Conley asserts that without the escape, he would have 

faced a guidelines range of 168 to 210 months for the bank 

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robbery; after the escape, he was sentenced to 240 months. 

Therefore, Conley argues, at least 30 months of his bank 

robbery sentence are “attributable to” the escape. Because of 

this overlap, Conley asserts, imposing the escape sentence to 

run consecutively to the bank robbery sentence constitutes 

greater punishment than is necessary under § 3553. In 

essence, he argues that he is being double-punished in a 

manner that § 3553 forbids.

We disagree. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that a consecutive sentence was 

required to achieve a reasonable punishment, even taking 

into account that Conley’s robbery sentence was lengthened 

by the escape. The court below provided a thorough and 

carefully articulated discussion that weighed the relevant 

3553(a) factors. 

For example, the district court discussed the nature and 

circumstances of Conley’s offense. It underscored the 

seriousness of escape from federal custody, as well as the 

fact that the escape did not arise from a momentary lapse in 

judgment. Conley carefully planned his flight (or more 

precisely, his seventeen-story descent), showed obvious 

disregard for the law in carrying it out, and absorbed the 

substantial attention of state and federal law enforcement 

agencies as they expended great resources to apprehend 

him.

The court also considered the history and characteristics 

of the defendant. It noted that Conley was forty years old at 

the time of sentencing and would be nearly sixty when 

released from prison on the bank robbery sentence. The 

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No. 14-1455 11

court acknowledged that the risk of recidivism often drops 

as a person passes certain age milestones.

The court, however, weighed Conley’s age against the 

fact that he had amassed 27 criminal history points in 

reaching the criminal history category of VI, the highest 

category under the Guidelines. It noted that 27 points is

more than double the threshold required to reach Category 

VI. It also concluded that Conley’s score likely 

underrepresented his actual criminal history, as he had 

many offenses for which no points were assigned. The court 

also evaluated the nature of the offenses making up his 

criminal history—armed robberies, aggravated assault, 

etc.—and that Conley had accumulated fifteen behavioral 

violations while previously incarcerated in federal prison. 

The court determined that, given this history and his 

continuing criminal behavior at age forty, Conley would be 

more likely than the average sixty-year old to reoffend after 

leaving prison.

The court also considered the need for the sentence 

imposed in this case to fulfill the goals of criminal 

punishment. It considered the role of deterrence, which was 

particularly influential here, given the strong need to deter 

others from attempting to escape from federal custody. It 

also identified a need to protect the public from Conley’s 

potential future criminal conduct. While it could not predict 

with certainty whether Conley would reoffend (no judge 

can), the court noted that neither past prison terms nor 

incarceration at the MCC had yet served as adequate 

deterrents. 

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Finally, the court considered all of these factors as they 

applied to the types of sentences available—in this case, both 

the length of incarceration and whether Conley’s sentence

should be served consecutively to or concurrently with the 

bank robbery sentence. It took into account that Conley’s 

sentence in the bank robbery was lengthy and that he might 

have to serve particularly “hard time” at a supermax 

correctional facility. It also acknowledged that Conley’s

escape likely played a role in increasing his sentence for the 

bank robbery. 

It weighed those factors against Conley’s incorrigibly 

violent past; his “demonstrated and consistent disrespect for 

legal authority;” the seriousness of the offense of escape; and 

the need to protect the public. It concluded that a 41-month 

consecutive sentence was necessary to achieve a reasonable 

punishment for the escape.

Indeed, strong policy reasons support the district court’s 

analysis. Conley is in effect arguing for a “freebie.” Because 

the maximum term allowed for escape falls far short of 

Conley’s bank robbery sentence, the imposition of a 

concurrent sentence would negate virtually all punitive force 

of a sentence for escape. With nothing to lose, that result 

would encourage defendants who face lengthy prison 

sentences to attempt escape. This is particularly true if, like 

Conley, they have already maxed out at criminal history 

category VI, or are already classified as career offenders. We 

cannot countenance this result.

In light of the district court’s thorough and careful 

consideration of the 3553(a) factors, we find that the court 

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No. 14-1455 13

did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Conley to a withinguidelines sentence of 41 months. Nor did it abuse its 

discretion in determining that the escape sentence should be 

served consecutively to the bank robbery sentence. 

Conley argues in the alternative that the district court 

was under a heightened duty to provide “compelling 

justifications” for the consecutive sentence. See United States 

v. Johns, 732 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a 

sentencing judge should support an above-guidelines 

sentence with compelling justifications); United States v. 

Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2010) (same).

Conley asserts that the (at least) 30 months of his bank 

robbery sentence that are “attributable to” the escape should 

be added to the 41 months he was given for the escape itself.

He argues that when those two sentences are considered in 

combination, they amount to an above-guidelines 

punishment of 71 months for the escape. At a minimum, 

Conley argues, as a sort of constructive upward departure, 

the district court should have supported its sentence with 

“compelling justifications.”

We disagree. Conley’s escape sentence does not amount 

to an upward departure. The Guidelines contemplate that 

separate criminal conduct may form the basis for sentencing 

enhancements and other increased punishment exposure.

Prior criminal conduct, for example, can provide the basis 

for the assignment of criminal history points, thereby raising 

a defendant’s criminal history category. This may result in a 

higher guidelines range for a subsequent offense, even if the 

defendant has already served a sentence for that prior 

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criminal conduct. The district court was not required to 

provide “compelling justifications” for the within-guidelines 

sentence it imposed.

III. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we find that the court did not abuse 

its discretion in sentencing Conley to a 41-month term of 

imprisonment for the escape, to be served consecutively 

with the bank robbery sentence. 

AFFIRMED

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