Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-00239/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-00239-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amado Haro
Plaintiff
Rochelle Ortega
Plaintiff
Walmart, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMADO HARO and ROCHELLE 

ORTEGA, on behalf of themselves and all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WALMART, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-00239-ADA-SKO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THAT PLAINIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

BE DENIED, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF 

FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION BE 

GRANTED, AND RECOMMENDING 

PLAINIFFS’ PROPOSED COLLECTIVE 

ACTION NOTICE PLAN BE APPROVED 

IN PART

(Docs. 41, 44, 70)

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Amado Haro and Rochelle Ortega (“Plaintiffs”)’s motion for 

conditional certification of collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b) (Doc. 41), proposed collective action notice plan (Doc. 44), and motion to strike 

employee declarations submitted by Defendant Walmart, Inc. (“Walmart”) (Doc. 70). For the 

reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike be 

DENIED, Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification be GRANTED, and that Plaintiffs’ 

proposed notice plan be APPROVED IN PART.

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II. BACKGROUND

On February 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed this class and collective action, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, alleging that Walmart implemented an unlawful policy 

requiring its non-exempt, hourly workers to undergo COVID-19 screenings prior to clocking in 

for their shifts without overtime pay. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1; Doc. 41-1 at 7, 16.) Specifically, Plaintiffs 

contend that pursuant to this policy, regardless of the employees’ specific job titles, job duties, or 

store location, non-exempt Walmart employees were required to wait in line, spend time 

undergoing COVID-19 screenings, and walk from the screening location to the area of the store 

to clock in. (Doc. 41-1 at 21–22.) Plaintiffs assert that these COVID-19 screenings constitute 

physical and medical examinations that are compensable time under both the FLSA and the 

California Labor Code, and that, by failing to pay overtime wages for time spent in the screenings,

Walmart violated California and federal law. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1–3; Doc. 41-1 at 7.) 

Plaintiffs filed their conditional certification of collective action motion on August 15, 2022. 

(Doc. 41.) In support of the motion, Plaintiffs submit evidence including declarations from several 

experts (see Docs. 49-5, 49-6) and 12 current or former Walmart employees from locations across 

the country1(see Doc. 49-7 (“Haro Decl.”); Doc. 49-8 (“Ortega Decl.”); Doc. 49-9 (“Hernandez 

Decl.”); Doc. 49-12 (“Lewis Decl.”); Doc. 49-13 (“Sanchez Decl.”); Doc. 49-14 (“Gibson Decl.”); 

Doc. 49-15 (“Gumataotao Decl.”); Doc. 49-16 (“Elias Decl.”); Doc. 49-17 (“West Decl.”); Doc. 

49-19 (“Riley Decl.”); Doc. 49-20 (“Newman Decl.”); Doc. 49-21 (“McNaught Decl.”)). Plaintiffs 

also submit transcripts of multiple depositions, including depositions of the two named Plaintiffs 

in this case. (See Docs. 49-22; 49-23; 49-24; 49-25; 49-26; 49-28; 49-29.)

Plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify the following California collective:

All current and former hourly-paid employees of Walmart who underwent a 

COVID-19 screening during at least one week in California at any time from April 

10, 2020, through the date when Walmart ended the screening practices in 

California.

Plaintiffs also seek to conditionally certify the following nationwide collective:

1 The undersigned previously granted the parties’ joint stipulation to withdraw three declarations from former or current 

Walmart employees. (See Doc. 57.) Plaintiffs also agree that the Court may disregard citations to the declaration of 

their third expert, Dr. Richard Drogin (Doc. 49-4), for purposes of the FLSA motion. (See Doc. 69 at 3.)

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All current and former hourly-paid employees of Walmart who underwent a 

COVID-19 screening during at least one week outside of California at any time from 

April 10, 2020, through the date when Walmart ended the screening practices in that 

state.

2

Plaintiffs allege that these workers are “similarly situated” within the meaning of the FLSA 

because they all were: (1) non-exempt, hourly paid employees of Walmart; (2) “required to undergo 

the COVID-19 health screenings before clocking in for work;” (3) “subject to Walmart’s uniform 

screening policies and practices;” (4) “subject to the same or substantially similar screening 

procedures established by Walmart;” and (5) “subject to the same Walmart compensation policy to 

pay these workers for only 5 minutes to account for the COVID-19 screening regardless of whether 

the waiting time, screening time, and/or walking time took more than 5 minutes.” (Doc. 41 at 3.) 

Plaintiffs request that the Court conditionally certify the proposed collectives and that direct notice 

be sent to the proposed members. (Id.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs move to strike the declarations provided by Walmart in support of its opposition 

to collective certification. (Doc. 70; see also Doc. 59 at 15; Doc. 58-1.) “At the pre-certification 

stage of an FLSA collective action, ‘[a]s a general matter, employers are free to communicate with 

unrepresented prospective class members about the lawsuit and even to solicit affidavits from them 

concerning the subject matter of the suit.’” Ward v. Sutter Valley Hosp., No. 2:19-cv-00581-KJMAC, 2022 WL 2805965, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2022). Courts have held that, “on a motion for 

class certification, the evidentiary rules are not strictly applied and courts can consider evidence 

that may not be admissible at trial.” Syed v. M-I, L.L.C., No. 1:12–CV–1718 AWI MSJ, 2014 WL

6685966, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, at this early stage in 

the proceedings, the Court may consider the declarations provided by Walmart even if this evidence 

is assigned little weight or later deemed inadmissible at trial.

 Moreover, “‘the question “is not whose evidence regarding commonality is more 

believable, but simply whether [P]laintiffs have made an adequate threshold showing.”’” Droesch 

2 Walmart requested (Doc. 59 at 30–31), and Plaintiffs agreed (Doc. 67 at 20), to modify the relevant time period for 

the collectives to April 10, 2020, to the date when Walmart ended the screening practices in each state.

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v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv-06751-JSC, 2021 WL 1817058, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 

2021). As discussed below, the undersigned finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that collective 

certification is proper. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiffs’ request to 

strike the declarations submitted by Walmart.

B. The FLSA Collectives

1. Personal Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb 

Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), Walmart contends that this Court does 

not have personal jurisdiction over the claims of potential opt-in plaintiffs from outside of 

California. (Doc. 59 at 18–20.) Plaintiffs contend federal courts in California have held that 

Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions and that this challenge, raised in 

Walmart’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification, has been waived because 

Walmart made general appearances and did not timely object to personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 67 at 

19–20.) The undersigned finds that Walmart has waived this jurisdictional challenge due to its 

failure to raise it at the first available opportunity. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 permits a party to request dismissal on the basis that a 

court lacks personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). However, such a defense is waived 

if a party fails to either “(i) make it by motion under this rule; or (ii) include it in a responsive 

pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(h)(1)(B). “This strict waiver rule extends only to defenses then available.” Sloan v. General 

Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 854 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). “To show a defense was not previously available, a defendant must demonstrate 

that it ‘would have been directly contrary to controlling precedent in this Circuit.’” Sloan, 287 F. 

Supp. 3d at 854.

The Supreme Court decided Bristol-Myers on June 19, 2017, several years before Plaintiffs 

commenced this class and collective action on February 23, 2021. (See Doc. 1.) In Bristol-Myers, 

the Supreme Court made clear that its decision neither changed existing law nor created a new 

defense that was previously unavailable. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“Our settled 

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principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this case.”); id. at 1783 (“Our straightforward 

application in this case of settled principles of personal jurisdiction will not result in the parade of 

horribles that respondents conjure up.”); see also Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 854 (“Bristol-Myers did 

not reverse any Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosing Defendant’s [personal jurisdiction] challenge”).

Throughout the pendency of this litigation, Walmart has filed both an answer (Doc. 13) and 

a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31) that was later withdrawn (see Doc. 40). As Plaintiffs 

accurately describe (Doc. 67 at 20), Walmart did not challenge personal jurisdiction over the claims 

of the non-California opt-in plaintiffs at the first opportunity, but rather, as a part of its opposition 

to Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification. Because the personal jurisdiction defense under 

Bristol-Myers was available to Walmart even before the commencement of this action, the 

undersigned finds that the argument has been waived. See Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 854.

Even if Walmart’s challenge had not been waived, the undersigned finds that Bristol-Myers

does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. In Bristol-Myers, the Supreme Court held that a California 

state court did not have personal jurisdiction over claims under California law in a mass tort action 

by plaintiffs who were not injured in or otherwise connected to California. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. 

Ct. at 1775–77. The Bristol-Myers Court did not have occasion to address whether its holding 

applied to FLSA collective actions, the very issue raised by Walmart’s personal jurisdiction 

challenge. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1783–84 (“since our decision concerns the due process 

limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the 

Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal 

court.”) (emphasis added). District Courts have been split on whether the holding articulated in 

Bristol-Myers applies to FLSA collective actions, and the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the issue. 

See, e.g., Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 858–59; Arends v. Select Med. Corp., No. CV 20-11381 TJH 

(AGRx), 2021 WL 4452275, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2021); see also Chavez v. Stellar Mgmt. Grp. 

VII, LLC, No. 19-cv-01353-JCS, 2020 WL 4505482, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (collecting 

cases). Following other federal courts in California, the undersigned finds that Bristol-Myers does 

not apply to FLSA claims brought in federal court. See Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 858–59 (“where 

a federal court presides over litigation involving a federal question, the due process analysis does 

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not incorporate the interstate sovereignty concerns that animated Bristol-Myers and which may be 

‘decisive” in a state court’s analysis.”) (footnote omitted); Arends, 2021 WL 4452275, at *1 (“This 

Court will follow the thirteen other districts that have held that Bristol-Myers does not apply to 

FLSA actions” and accordingly, “has jurisdiction over the out of state putative class members and 

defendants.”); Chavez, 2020 WL 4505482, at *7–8 (holding that Bristol-Myers does not apply to

federal courts applying federal law, and, in following district courts that applied Sloan, finding that 

“the federalism concerns that drove the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers” were absent in the FLSA 

collective action before the court).

The fact that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the claims at issue in this case, 

however, is not determinative as to whether a nationwide collective should be certified. 

Accordingly, the undersigned turns to whether Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the 

members of the proposed collective are “similarly situated” for purposes of the FLSA such that 

conditional certification is warranted.

2. Legal Standard

The FLSA establishes an opt-in collective action procedure for employees allegedly denied 

wages and overtime pay. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under the FLSA, “one or more employees” may file 

a collective action on behalf of himself or herself and “other employees similarly situated.” Id.; 

Millan v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 607 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

“There is no established definition of the FLSA’s ‘similarly situated’ requirement, nor is 

there an established test for enforcing it.” Campbell v. City of L.A., 903 F.3d 1090, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2018). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statutory term in Campbell, determining that “[p]arty 

plaintiffs are similarly situated, and may proceed in a collective, to the extent that they share a 

similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims.” Id. at 1117; see also 

Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2019).

In Campbell, the Ninth Circuit approved a two-step approach for determining whether a 

FLSA collective action may proceed. Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1110 (“[A]s a general rule, the twostep process, culminating in a decertification motion on or after the close of relevant discovery, has 

the advantage of ensuring early notice of plausible collective actions, then eliminating those whose 

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promise is not borne out by the record.”). As for the first step, “at or around the pleading stage, 

plaintiffs will typically move for preliminary certification.” Id. at 1109. “At this early stage of the 

litigation,” the Court’s analysis is often “focused on a review of the pleadings but may sometimes 

be supplemented by declarations or limited other evidence.” Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 

level of consideration at this step, known as the notice stage, is “‘lenient,’” “sometimes articulated 

as requiring ‘substantial allegations’” or “turning on a ‘reasonable basis,’” but, in any event, 

“loosely akin to a plausibility standard” commensurate with the beginning stage of the proceedings. 

Id.; see also Droesch, 2021 WL 1817058, at *3 (“At the first stage, ‘conditional certification is by 

no means automatic, but Plaintiffs’ burden is light.’”). “A grant of preliminary certification results 

in the dissemination of a court-approved notice to the putative collective action members, advising 

them that they must affirmatively opt in to participate in the ligation.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109. 

“Denial of preliminary certification may be without prejudice and may be revisited by the district 

court after further discovery.” Id. “Assuming the collective action has survived its earlier scrutiny, 

the second stage will come at or after the close of relevant discovery.” Id. At the second step, the 

employer may “move for ‘decertification’ of the collective action for failure to satisfy the ‘similarly 

situated’ requirement in light of the evidence produced to that point,” and the Court takes “a more 

exacting look at the plaintiffs’ allegations and the record.” Id.

3. Analysis

a. Conditional Certification

As the parties appear to agree (see Doc. 67 at 8) and because relevant discovery has not yet 

been completed, the case is at the preliminary certification stage. Accordingly, the undersigned 

proceeds with the first step and applies the “‘lenient’” standard described in Campbell.

The undersigned finds that declarations submitted by Plaintiffs, along with the detailed 

factual allegations in the complaint and other evidence provided by Plaintiffs, are sufficient to show 

that the proposed collectives of current and former Walmart employees are “alike with regard to 

some material aspect of their litigation” and “in ways that matter to the disposition of their FLSA 

claims.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis in original). 

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Plaintiffs provide declarations from the Plaintiffs who are either named in this litigation or 

who have opted-in to the action. Each declaration provides that, while serving as an hourly 

employee at Walmart, the Plaintiff was required to complete a COVID-19 screening but was not 

compensated by Walmart for the time spent working off-the-clock as a result of the screening. (See

Haro. Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7, 9–10; Ortega Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7–8, 10–11; Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 3–14; Lewis Decl. 

¶¶ 3–14; Sanchez Decl. ¶¶ 3–14; Gibson Decl. ¶¶ 3–13; Gumataotao Decl. ¶¶ 3–15; Elias Decl. ¶¶ 

3–13; West Decl. ¶¶ 3–13; Riley Decl. ¶¶ 3–13; Newman Decl. ¶¶ 3–13; McNaught Decl. ¶¶ 3–

13.) Even though the members of the proposed collectives worked in different Walmart locations 

across the country and had different job titles and duties, Plaintiffs allege they were all subject to 

“identical and uniform written policies and procedures” in which Walmart unlawfully required its 

non-exempt employees to submit to COVID-19 screening procedures prior to clocking in for their 

shifts. (Doc. 41-1 at 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied their “‘light’” burden of 

demonstrating that conditional certification is appropriate. See, e.g., Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1116 

(if supported by an adequate record, plaintiffs’ allegations that the police department had a tacit 

policy of discouraging reporting of earned overtime would have been sufficient to show that they 

were “similarly situated”); Pittmon v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. CV 21-02044-CJC (JEMx), 2021 WL 

4642022, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021) (finding seven declarations indicating plaintiffs worked 

overtime hours without being paid, were subject to defendants’ pre-approval overtime policy, and 

that approval for overtime was rarely given to be sufficient at the conditional certification stage); 

Knight v. Concentrix Corp., No. 4:18-cv-07101-KAW, 2019 WL 3503052, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

1, 2019) (finding three declarations and allegations contained in the complaint indicating plaintiffs 

were required to arrive at their workstations and perform pre-shift work before clocking in to be 

sufficient at the conditional certification stage).

Despite the “‘lenient’” standard for preliminary certification, Walmart contends Plaintiffs 

have not adequately shown that the members of the proposed collectives are “similarly situated.” 

Walmart highlights several factual inconsistencies presented in the evidence, such as how the time 

employees spent waiting to be screened was sporadic and minimal, how the screening process 

differed across the various store locations and was extremely brief, and how the time between 

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screening and clocking in was not consistent, ranging from a few seconds to several minutes. (Doc. 

59 at 10–13, 21–22, 29.)

As the Ninth Circuit articulated in Campbell, however, the scope of the Court’s review 

during this first stage of conditional certification is loosely akin to a plausibility standard. See

Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109. “Significantly, as long as the proposed collective’s ‘factual or legal 

similarities are material to the resolution of their case, dissimilarities in other respects should not 

defeat collective treatment.’” Senne, 934 F.3d at 948 (citing Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1114). 

“Critical” to the undersigned’s findings is that Plaintiffs—all non-exempt, hourly workers 

employed by Walmart—“allege a single, FLSA-violating policy” and “argue a common theory of 

[Walmart’s] statutory violations”— the failure to compensate for time spent working off-the-clock 

as a result of mandatory COVID-19 screenings. Senne, 934 F.3d at 949. “These are ‘similar 

issue[s] of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims,’ thus making [P]laintiffs 

‘similarly situated.’” Id. (citing Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117).

Walmart submits additional evidence, including numerous declarations from potential 

putative collective members that factually conflict with evidence from the named and opt-in 

plaintiffs, as discussed above. (Doc. 59 at 15; see Doc. 58-1.) This evidence, however, “is 

irrelevant at this juncture, because the Court does not resolve factual disputes at the notice stage.” 

Knight, 2019 WL 3503052, at *3; see, e.g., Droesch, 2021 WL 1817058, at *3 (“To the extent that 

Defendant challenges [Plaintiffs’] declarations as boilerplate and insists that they are contradicted 

by deposition testimony or by other evidence, the Court declines to consider these arguments at this 

early stage.”). “Courts rarely reject conditional certification during this first stage based on 

defendant’s declarations.” Pittmon, 2021 WL 4642022, at *4; see also Kress v. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 263 F.R.D. 623, 628 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (in determining whether 

plaintiffs meet the “similarly situated” standard at the first stage of the certification process, “courts 

need not consider evidence provided by defendants”). While the undersigned may consider this 

evidence, “‘[its] use at this stage is of limited value.’” Droesch, 2021 WL 1817058, at *3. “To 

require otherwise would permit a defendant employer to defeat certification before the plaintiffs 

were afforded an opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery to obtain the ‘concrete evidence’ 

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necessary to support their claims,” Knight, 2019 WL 3503052, at *3, and “‘contravene the lenient 

level of consideration required by Campbell,’” Droesch, 2021 WL 1817058, at *3. Accordingly, 

the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the members of the 

proposed collectives are “similarly situated” within the meaning of the FLSA.

b. Scope of the Collectives

Although Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the former and current Walmart 

employees are “similarly situated,” Walmart contends that the collective should be limited to 

California employees. (See Doc. 59 at 15–17.)

As noted above, Plaintiffs’ burden at this step of the certification process is “‘light’” and 

the Court’s level of consideration is “‘lenient.’” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109; Droesch, 2021 WL 

1817058, at *3. At the notice stage, before the close of relevant discovery, Plaintiffs are not 

required “to submit declarations from plaintiffs in every single state to justify nationwide collective 

certification.” Pittmon, 2021 WL 4642022, at *4. “[C]ourts have routinely certified classes 

encompassing employer locations that are not accounted for in declarations or other evidence 

provided to the Court at the certification stage.” Id. Therefore, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs 

have sufficiently shown that members of the proposed collective across the country are “similarly 

situated” for purposes of preliminary certification.

Walmart contends that conditional certification is not appropriate because a jury would have 

to determine how long each individual Plaintiff spent engaged in compensable time surrounding 

the COVID-19 screenings, and thus, Plaintiffs are not “similarly situated.” (See, e.g., Doc. 59 at 

26–29). This argument is not persuasive. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Senne, “damages will 

inevitably be individualized, at least to some extent. But just as the need for individualized damage 

calculations is insufficient to defeat Rule 23 certification, ‘[i]ndividual damages amounts cannot 

defeat collective treatment under the more forgiving standard’ for FLSA collective certification.” 

Senne, 934 F.3d at 950 (citing Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117). Ultimately, “[d]istrict courts are wellequipped to deal with issues of individualized calculations in the wage-and-hour context, and may 

use ‘any of the practices developed to deal with Rule 23 classes facing similar issues.’” Senne, 934 

F.3d at 950 (citing Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1116).

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Plaintiffs contend nationwide collective treatment is proper, given that the case “involves 

modest, hourly wage earners who do not have the means to individually challenge Walmart’s 

compensation policies.” (Doc. 41-1 at 8.) As the Ninth Circuit provided in Campbell, the FLSA 

merely “requires similarity of the kind that ‘allows . . . plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual 

costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.’” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1114. “As is true in 

all FLSA cases, underlying our decision today is the background principle that ‘because the FLSA 

is a remedial statute, it must be interpreted broadly.’” Senne, 934 F.3d at 950. Accordingly, the 

undersigned finds that nationwide certification of the proposed collective in this matter is 

appropriate under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the term “similarly situated,” and is 

“consistent with ‘the great public policy’ embodied by the FLSA.” Id.

Thus, the undersigned recommends preliminary certification of the California and 

nationwide collectives as proposed by Plaintiffs.

4. Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs

Lastly, Plaintiffs request that the Court approve of their notice plan, consisting of emails, 

text messages, posted notices at Walmart’s retail stores and on a static website, as well as reminder 

emails and texts, and they include draft collective action notices. (Doc. 44 at 2–3.) Plaintiffs also 

ask that, given the large size of the potential collectives, the Court permit the hiring a neutral thirdparty administrator to oversee and handle distribution of the notices. (Id. at 3.) This administrator 

would create, administer, and operate the static website, which would contain the same proposed 

notice as well as other relevant, publicly available documents such as the complaint in this case and 

Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiffs also request that the Court require Walmart to furnish contact information of optin plaintiffs to Plaintiffs’ counsel within 21 days of Court’s order granting conditional certification. 

(Doc. 44 at 7.) This contact information is comprised of (1) names of all potential opt-in plaintiffs; 

(2) their last-known mailing addresses “for purposes of confirming active cell phone numbers and

running public records search[es] for personal email addresses;” (3) personal email addresses; (4) 

telephone numbers; and (5) dates of employment. (Id.) Plaintiffs also request that Walmart provide 

the last four digits of the potential collective members’ social security numbers “so that the thirdCase 1:21-cv-00239-KES-SKO Document 90 Filed 02/27/23 Page 11 of 15
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party administrator may verify the email addresses and phone numbers to which notice would be 

sent.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs request that the opt-in period consist of 120 days following the date 

on which notice is initially transmitted. (Id. at 9.)

Walmart acknowledges that notice should be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs if a collective 

is certified, but raises numerous objections as to the content and procedure of Plaintiffs’ proposed 

notice and plan. Walmart contends the 120-day opt-in period suggested by Plaintiffs is excessive 

and a 90-day period would be sufficient. (Doc. 61 at 8.) Walmart also asserts notice by email 

(including reminder emails) and website are adequate, and the other methods of communication 

requested by Plaintiffs—text messages and posting at Walmart’s retail locations—would be 

redundant and intrusive, implicate privacy concerns, and infringe on the Court’s ability to convey 

judicial neutrality. (Id. at 9–11.)

Walmart also objects to the production of the last four digits of the potential opt-in 

plaintiffs’ social security numbers. (Doc. 61 at 12–13.) Walmart contends such a request is 

premature, given that Plaintiffs have not shown they will encounter difficulties providing notice 

through the other methods of distribution. (Id.) In the event it does not have a personal email 

address for a potential member of the collective, Walmart proposes distribution by first class mail. 

(Id. at 11 n.5.) Walmart does not object to the use of a third-party administrator at Plaintiffs’ 

expense, and requests that the parties meet and confer to select a mutually agreeable administrator. 

(Id. at 11–12.) Finally, Walmart asserts that the notice and consent forms submitted by Plaintiffs 

must be modified because they are misleading and lack information that would properly inform 

potential opt-in plaintiffs regarding the lawsuit. (Id. at 13–17.)

a. Legal Standard

Once a collective action has been conditionally certified, potential FLSA collective 

members are entitled to “accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective 

action, so that they can make informed decisions as to whether to participate.” Hoffman-La Roche 

Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989). “Section 216(b)’s affirmative permission for employees 

to proceed on behalf of those similarly situated must grant the court the requisite procedural 

authority to manage the process of joining multiple parties in a manner that is orderly, sensible, and 

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not otherwise contrary to statutory commands or the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” Id. 

Under section 216(b) of the FLSA, the Court has the authority and discretion at the notice 

stage to monitor the preparation and distribution of the notice to “ensure that it is timely, accurate, 

and informative.” Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 172. For example, the Court has discretion 

“to direct a defendant employer to disclose the names and addresses of potential class members.” 

Cowley v. Prudential Security, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-01472-NONE-JLT, 2021 WL 53084, at *5 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 6, 2021). “In exercising the discretionary authority to oversee the notice-giving process, 

courts must be scrupulous to respect judicial neutrality. To that end, trial courts must take care to 

avoid even the appearance of judicial endorsement of the merits of the action.” Hoffman-La Roche 

Inc., 493 U.S. at 174; see, e.g., Newell v. Ensign U.S. Drilling (Cal.) Inc., No. 1:19-cv-01314-

NONE-JLT, 2020 WL 2060399, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2020) (finding plaintiffs’ draft collective 

action notice “reasonable and adequate” where the proposed form was neutral in tone, apprised

putative collective members of the claims alleged, expressly denied endorsement from the court, 

provided the steps potential plaintiffs must take to be included in the action, and provided contact 

information for plaintiffs’ counsel).

Courts routinely allow the production of employees’ mail, email addresses, and telephone 

numbers to ensure that notice is effectuated. Forsyth v. HP Inc., No. 5:16-cv-04775-EJD, 2021 

WL 1391501, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2021). “Courts have also granted unopposed requests by 

plaintiffs that seek personal information such as birthdates or social security numbers.” Id.; see 

also Droesch, 2021 WL 1817058, at *4 (“requests for personal information such as dates of birth 

are granted only where unopposed.”). “It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the notices reach 

the entire potential class to avoid having to revisit the issue at a later date.” Syed, 2014 WL 

6685966, at *8.

As for the opt-in period, several courts have found that 120 days is excessive, see, e.g., 

Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2009), whereas other courts 

have approved of a 120-day response period. See Syed, 2014 WL 6685966, at *9. “In approving 

longer periods of time, courts have accepted arguments that ‘the potential class is transitory and 

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there is a high turnover rate, meaning that additional investigation may be required in order to 

contact potential opt-in plaintiffs.’” Id. “Where such an explanation is given, granting an extended 

. . . time period is reasonable.” Id. In the absence of such “special circumstances, ‘timeframes of 

sixty to ninety days appear to have become the presumptive standard in [the Eastern] District.’” Id.

b. Analysis

The undersigned recommends granting Walmart’s request to meet and confer regarding the 

selection of an appropriate, mutually agreeable third-party administrator to oversee and handle the 

distribution of collective action notices in this case. See Prentice v. Fund for Pub. Int. Res., Inc., 

No. C–06–7776 SC, 2007 WL 2729187, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (“The Court agrees that 

using a third party is the best way to ensure the neutrality and integrity of the opt-in process.”); see 

e.g., Forsyth, 2021 WL 1391501, at *7. Given that both sides agree on the use a third-party 

administrator, the undersigned finds it equitable for the parties to split the costs.

Moreover, considering the principles described above, the undersigned recommends 

approval of Plaintiffs’ proposed collective action notice plan (Doc. 44) with the following three

exceptions. First, the relevant start date as presented in the notice must be modified to the agreedupon date of April 10, 2020. Second, the undersigned finds that notice by text message and posted 

notices at Walmart’s retail locations, as Plaintiffs propose, is not necessary under these 

circumstances. Given that Walmart does not object to notice by email (including reminder emails) 

and static website (see Doc. 61 at 11), the undersigned recommends that those two methods of 

distribution serve as means to effectuate notice in this case. In the event that the email addresses 

of potential opt-in plaintiffs are unable to be ascertained, the undersigned recommends the use of 

direct mail. Third, the undersigned finds that disclosure of personal information such as the last 

four digits of the opt-in plaintiffs’ social security numbers is not needed in light of the furnishing 

of the other information and Walmart’s opposition to doing so. See Droesch, 2021 WL 1817058, 

at *4; see, e.g., Guilbaud v. Sprint/Mgmt. Co., Inc., No. 13–cv–04357–VC, 2014 WL 10676582, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (“The plaintiffs have not adequately explained why telephone numbers 

or social security numbers would be necessary to provide notice to potential collective members, 

and the Court finds that the names, last known mailing addresses, and email addresses will be 

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sufficient.”). Thus, the undersigned recommends that Walmart furnish the names, mailing 

addresses, and email addresses of putative collective members to the third-party administrator. 

Forsyth, 2021 WL 1391501, at *7.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike declarations submitted by Walmart (Doc. 70) be DENIED;

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of FLSA collective action (Doc. 41) be GRANTED;

and

3. Plaintiffs’ proposed notice plan (Doc. 44) be APPROVED IN PART, as more fully set 

forth in these findings and recommendations.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B). Within twentyone (21) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, any party may file

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 

F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2023 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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