Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00217/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00217-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors
Defendant
Les Weidman
Defendant
John M. Wilson
Plaintiff

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28 The Court, by separate Order, has issued Findings and Recommendations regarding the pending Motion for 1

Temporary Injunction.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN M. WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANISLAUS COUNTY BOARD 

 OF SUPERVISORS, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 06-217 AWI SMS P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

ORDER DISREGARDING MOTIONS FOR

JOINDER AND MISJOINDER (Docs. 36. 37.) 

ORDER VACATING SCHEDULING ORDER

ISSUED MAY 11, 2006. (Doc. 20.) 

 John M. Wilson (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action on

October 14, 2005, in the Sacramento Division of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District

of California. The Sacramento Division ordered service of the Complaint on Defendants

Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Les Weidman on November 15, 2005. 

Defendants moved for a change of venue on January18, 2006, and the Motion was granted. This

Court received the case on February 27, 2006, after the summons was returned executed by the

Board of Supervisors and unexecuted by Sheriff Les Weidman. 

On November 3, 2006, Plaintiff field a Motion for Temporary Injunction. Defendants 1

filed an Opposition to that Motion on January 5, 2007. On January 8, 2007, Plaintiff filed a

pleading titled “Motion for Permissive Joinder” in which he requests that the Court allow him to

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 “‘Sexually violent predator’ means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against 2

two or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety

of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code

§6600(a)(1)

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substitute in the current Sheriff Adam Christenson because Defendant Weidman was now retired. 

In a separate pleading titled “Motion for Misjoinder,” Plaintiff requests that the Court dismiss

Sheriff Weidman from the action. On January 10, 2007, Defendants filed a Statement of NonOpposition what is termed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant Weidman from the action. 

A. SCREENING 

Generally, when a case of this nature is first filed with the Court, the Court conducts an

initial review of the Complaint to determine whether it alleges cognizable claims for relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). It does not appear that such a review of this case was conducted prior to

service of the Complaint. As Plaintiff has now moved the Court to dismiss one Defendant and

include another in his place, the Court finds it necessary to sua sponte conduct a screening of the

case to determine whether it states cognizable claims for relief. 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it determines that the action is

legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A

claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Wiliams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9 Cir. 1984). th

A federal court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 327. If

the court determines that the Complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to

the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

B. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff states that he is a civilly committed detainee in custody pursuant to Welfare and

Institutions Code § 660, the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”). Plaintiff states generally 2

that the Defendants have failed to comply with California’s Welfare and Institutions Code and

the Constitution of the United States to his detriment while confined in the Stanislaus County

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Jail. After providing numerous pages of legal analysis, Plaintiff provides 1.5 pages of facts

which state that he was exposed to feces, spit, blood and hair in the shower area of the jail and

that food was left uncovered and exposed, that food was served by inmates, that he was

threatened by inmates belonging to gangs, his phone calls were not confidential, that his mattress

was too thin and he could not sleep, his personal visits were restricted, he was denied church

services, he has experienced strip searches, was not allowed to send or receive uninspected mail,

was charged for medical care, and was transported along with penal inmates.

In an entirely separate section, Plaintiff lists the ten (10) separate federal constitutional

claims for relief. Each claim will be addressed individually below. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights. 

Here, although Plaintiff names the Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff

Les Weidman as Defendants and also provides a brief list of wrong-doings, Plaintiff fails to link

either Defendant to any act or omission of which he complains violated his rights. Plaintiff’s

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only mention of the Defendants is on page 3 where he informs the Court who the Defendants are

and what their responsibilities are at the Stanislaus County Jail. 

In addition, Plaintiff fails to link any of the alleged wrong-doings to any constitutional

violation and thus, as discussed below, the Complaint fails to allege any cognizable claim for

relief. 

2. First Amendment

Plaintiff states that the Defendants policies, practices, and customs punished plaintiff by

not affording him freedom of the press and thereby denying him access to the outside world. 

Other than this conclusory statement, however, the Complaint fails to allege facts establishing a

causal link between any policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. In fact,

Plaintiff’s facts are so minimal that the Court cannot determine the exact nature of the first

amendment violation. Accordingly, the claim is dismissed. 

3. Fourth Amendment

Here, Plaintiff again provides a conclusory statement that Defendants policies and

practices have subjected him to unreasonable searches as a form of punishment. However, again,

Plaintiff fails to identify the policy or provide facts to support his allegation. As such, this claim

is also dismissed with leave to amend. 

4. Ex Post Facto Clause and Double Jeopardy

In his Third and Fourth claims for relief, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants policies and

procedures have violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the right to be free from

Double Jeopardy. (Compl.at 19-20)

The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes “a second prosecution for the same offense,” and

prevents “the State from ‘punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for

the same offense.’” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (quoting Witte v. United

States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995)). 

The Ex Post Facto Clause “forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime

already consummated,” and “pertain[s] exclusively to penal statutes.” Id. at 370 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Because Plaintiff’s confinement under the SVPA is civil

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in nature, these allegations are legally frivolous as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff may

not proceed in this action with these claims and they are dismissed. 

5. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff next alleges that the Defendants policies and procedures have subjected Plaintiff

to “restrictive and degrading conditions of confinement” which amount to “cruel and unusual

punishment.” (Compl. at 20.) The Eighth Amendment, however, is not the proper vehicle to

challenge the conditions of civil commitment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct.

1861 (1979). Conditions of confinement claims raised by detainees who are not adjudicated

criminals are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment substantive Due Process Clause, rather

than the Eighth Amendment. Id.; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9 Cir. 1998.). th

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation under the Eighth Amendment must also be dismissed. 

6. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants policies and practices have denied him of procedural

due process. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 556 (1974). However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that he

was deprived of a protected interest without procedural due process nor does he identify the

policy or custom that allegedly violated this right. This claim is also dismissed.

7. Substantive Due Process. 

Plaintiff here alleges that the Defendants policies and practices have deprived him of

substantive due process. Plaintiff states that the conditions of confinement at Stanislaus County

Jail are the same or worse than those under which penal prisoners or detainees are held. 

“To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required

to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

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due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d

868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117

S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

Although Plaintiff complains generally that his conditions were “degrading,” he provides

no specific facts to support his allegations nor does he establish a causal link between a policy

and the alleged deprivation. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief and this

allegation is dismissed with leave to amend.

8. Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that the policies of Defendants are more restrictive, punitive and

degrading and deny him equal protection of the law. 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show

that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of

inmates which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)

(equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No.

14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City

of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Other than his conclusory allegation, Plaintiff alleges no facts to support his allegation of

a denial of equal protection. Accordingly, this claim is also dismissed with leave to amend. 

9. Sixth Amendment

Plaintiff states that the policies and practices of the Defendants violated his right under

the Sixth Amendment by interfering with his communications with legal counsel, by requiring

him to use non-confidential telephones and that his mail was inspected. 

The Sixth Amendment, by its express language, protects those in criminal proceedings. 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). As Plaintiff is not subject to a criminal

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proceeding in this action, he may not proceed on the Sixth Amendment claim alleged. 

10. Right to Privacy

Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants policies and practices violate his right to privacy. 

Again, other than a conclusory statement, Plaintiff fails to identify specific policies or provide

sufficient factual support for this allegation. This claim is also dismissed. 

11. Sheriff Les Weidman

Plaintiff names as Defendant, Sheriff Les Weidman and alleges in the Complaint that he

was the individual responsible for plaintiff’s “existence” while housed in the jail. Plaintiff does

not, however, indicate the capacity in which he is suing Defendant Weidman and the fact that

Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against him but also has moved to substitute the current

Sheriff makes the capacity issue more unclear. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim that supervisory Defendants either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts

must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support an allegation against Defendant Weidman

personally participated in any of the conduct or deprivations that Plaintiff alleges violated his

constitutional rights. Absent such allegations, Plaintiff may not sue Defendant Weidman in his

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“Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or 3

injunctive relief where ... the action is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision official adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at

690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. 

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personal capacity for damages. To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue Defendant Weidman in his

personal capacity for damages, he may not move to substitute Defendant Christenson for

Defendant Weidman. 

Plaintiff may sue a local government official in his official capacity under Section 1983. 

Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1979) (addressing a constitutional

challenge to a statute enacted by the city which indisputably was an official policy of the

defendant municipality.) Local government officials sued in their official capacity are “persons”

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in those cases where a local government is suable in its own name. A3

judgment against a public servant in his “official capacity” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes

liability on the entity that person represents, provide the public entity received notice and an

opportunity to respond. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985.) Absent

an allegation or identification of a policy, custom, or procedure so seriously deficient as to

violate a constitutional right and a showing of direct liability through supervisory management,

as discussed above, Sheriff Weidman (or his successor), may not be held liable in their official

capacity. 

In the Complaint, Plaintiff merely identifies Sheriff Weidman but alleges no facts as to

the role he played in the alleged deprivation of his rights and further identifies no policy “so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force

of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). As

Plaintiff will be required to amend his Complaint to provide sufficient facts to support his

constitutional claims for relief, he will be afforded the opportunity to allege the appropriate facts

to allow the Court to know the capacity in which Plaintiff is suing Defendant Weidman. Until

such amendment is made, the Court will disregard the pending Motions for Joinder and

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Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows for joinder of defendants in a single action "if 4

there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of

the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common

to all defendants will arise in the action." Here, Plaintiff seeks to substitute one party for another on the basis that

the first party retired and the second assumed his employment position. This substitution of parties is more

appropriate under Rule 25(d) and not Rule 20. 

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Misjoinder. 

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12. Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors

A local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a

respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978). Rather, to state a claim for municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must allege that

he suffered a constitutional deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local

government unit. City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

In this case, Plaintiff merely alleges that the Defendants policies violated his rights. 

Plaintiff identifies no specific policies nor does he state with sufficient specificity the nature of

the violations. Conclusory allegations and citation to constitutional amendments are insufficient

to state cognizable claims for relief. Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.1977).

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to do

so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9 Cir. th

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each Defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9 Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 th

F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

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be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. th

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN THIRTY (30) days

from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1).

3. The Motions for Permissive Joinder and Misjoinder are DISREGARDED; and 

4. The Scheduling Order issued on May 11, 2006, (Doc. 20) is VACATED. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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