Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06008/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06008-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Battles
Appellant
Kay Bickham
Appellee
City of Edmond
Appellee
Martin Feldman
Appellant
Ron Mercer
Appellee
Wendell Miller
Appellant
Gary Moore
Appellee
Barbara Orza
Appellant
Wayne Robinson
Appellant
Randell Shadid
Appellee

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, co 80257 

October 24, 1995 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-6237, 95-6008, Robinson v. City of Edmond 

Filed October 17, 1995 by Judge Anderson 

Please be advised that the attached Appendix "A" was 

omitted from the opinion as originally filed. 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

B~ Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-6008 Document: 01019280700 Date Filed: 10/17/1995 Page: 1 
~· . 

APPENDIX "A" 

Appellate Case: 95-6008 Document: 01019280700 Date Filed: 10/17/1995 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

FILED 18 UDited States Co~ o_f Appel Tentb Carcuat 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

OCT 111995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

WAYNE ROBINSON; CURTIS BATTLES; 

WENDELL MILLER; MARTIN 

FELDMAN, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

BARBARA ORZA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF EDMOND, a Municipal 

corporation; RANDELL SHADID, 

individually and in his official capacity as 

Mayor of the City of Edmond; RON 

MERCER, individually and in his official 

capacity as a member of the City Council of 

the City of Edmond; KAY BICKHAM, 

individually and in her official capacity as a 

member of the City Council of the City of 

Edmond; and GARY MOORE, in his 

official capacity as a member of the City 

Council of the City of Edmond, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

WAYNE ROBINSON; CURTIS BATTLES; 

WENDELL MILLER; MARTIN 

FELDMAN, and BARBARA ORZA, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

No. 94-6237 

No. 95-6008 

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CITY OF EDMOND, a Municipal 

corporation; RANDELL SHADID, 

individually and in his official capacity as 

Mayor of the City of Edmond; RON 

MERCER, individually and in his official 

capacity as a member of the City Council of 

the City of Edmond; KAY BICKHAM, 

individually and in her official capacity as a 

member of the City Council of the City of 

Edmond; and GARY MOORE, in his official 

capacity as a member of the City Council of 

the City of Edmond, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-153-R) 

Michael C. Salem, Salem Law Offices, Norman, Oklahoma (Joel Carson, Carson & Mueller, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Laura Haag McConnell, Hartzog, Conger & Cason, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and V. Burns 

Hargis, McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (RyanS. Wilson, Hartzog, Conger & Cason, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Stephen T. Murdock, City Attorney, Edmond, Oklahoma, with 

them on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees. 

Michael L. Tinney, Oklahoma City, on the brief for Amicus Curiae Citizens for Keeping the 

Cross. 

Before ANDERSON, HOLLOWAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

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Plaintiffs and appellants, Dr. Wayne Robinson, Curtis Battles, Wendell Miller and Martin 

Feldman, appeal from the grant of judgment in favor of defendants, City of Edmond, Oklahoma, 

the City's mayor, Randell Shadid, and its City Council members, Charles Lamb, Gary Moore, 

Ron Mercer, and Kay Bickham, on plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge to the inclusion of 

a Latin or Christian cross on the City seal. They also appeal the imposition of attorneys fees and 

costs. 1 For the following reasons, we reverse and remand on both the merits of this case (Appeal 

No. 94-6237) and on attorneys fees and costs (Appeal No. 95-6008). 

BACKGROUND 

At issue in this case is the official seal ofthe City of Edmond, Oklahoma. The circular 

seal contains four quadrants, of which one depicts a steam engine and oil derrick, one depicts the 

Old North Tower,2 one depicts a covered wagon with the number 1889,3 and the last quadrant 

depicts a Christian cross. A copy of the seal appears as an appendix to this opinion. 

1

Appeal No. 95-6008 involves attorneys fees and costs. One additional party, Barbara 

Orza, is an appellant in No. 95-6008. Ms. Orza initially participated in the main case as a 

plaintiff, but was unavailable for trial and her claim was dismissed by the district court. She 

therefore did not participate in appeal No. 94-6237, involving the merits of that case. The district 

court did assess costs and attorneys fees against her, however, and she has therefore joined 

appeal No. 95-6008 challenging those fees and costs. 

2

The Old North Tower is a well-known local landmark of what is now the University of 

Central Oklahoma. It is where the first higher education classes were conducted in the 

Oklahoma Territory. 

3

The significance of the covered wagon and the number 1889 is that "wagons were used 

in the Land Run of 1889 the day Edmond was first settled." Mem. Op. at 4; Pis.' Br., Attach 01. 

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. . The seal was first adopted in 1965 following a competition sponsored by the City Council 

and a local newspaper. A local resident, Frances Bryan, designed the seal from her two winning 

entries. Since 1965 the seal has been used extensively by the City, and appears on City limits 

signs, on City flags, on the uniforms of City police officers and firefighters, on official City 

vehicles, on stickers identifying City property, and in the City Council chambers. Additionally, 

the seal appears on each utility bill sent out by the City, as well as on official City stationery and 

the Utility and Sanitation Department's newsletter. The seal has been registered as a trademark 

under Oklahoma law. 

Plaintiffs are non-Christians who live or work in Edmond. Mr. Feldman is a Jew who 

lives in Edmond, Mr. Miller is a member of the Unitarian Congregation who lives and is selfemployed in Edmond, Mr. Battles is a member of the Unitarian Congregation who lives in 

Edmond, and Dr. Robinson is the minister of the Channing Unitarian Church in Edmond. They 

brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the inclusion of the Christian cross in 

the City seal violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause ofthe First 

Amendment, as well as certain provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. They named as 

defendants the City, its mayor, and its City Council members. The mayor and City Council 

members were sued in both their official and individual capacities. Plaintiffs sought declaratory 

and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages. 

The district court initially granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

plaintiffs' claims against them in their individual capacities. It subsequently granted defendants' 

motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' claimed deprivation of their rights under the 

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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and on their state law claim under Article I, § 5 of 

the Oklahoma Constitution. After a two-day trial to the court, in which eight witnesses testified, 

the district court granted judgment for defendants, holding that the seal did not violate the 

Establishment Clause under the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 

(1971 ). It also held, without explanation, that the seal was valid under the Oklahoma 

Constitution. Fallowing judgment, defendants sought costs and attorneys fees, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court awarded costs of $5,586.38, and denied 

all but $2,361.00 of attorneys fees, holding that plaintiffs' claims under the Establishment Clause 

and their claims against defendants in their individual capacities were not frivolous, unreasonable 

or without foundation. It held, however, that plaintiffs' claim under the Free Exercise Clause 

was without foundation, given plaintiffs' admission in their depositions that "they were 

completely free to exercise their respective chosen religions in the City of Edmond," Order at 3, 

Pls.' Br., Attach. F3, and that fees and costs were appropriately awarded to defendants for 

defending such a baseless claim. 

On appeal, plaintiffs argue the district court erred in finding for defendants on their 

Establishment Clause claim. 4 They also claim error in the district court's order requiring 

plaintiffs to disclose in camera to the court a letter sent to plaintiffs by their attorney. Finally, 

they claim the district court erred in awarding to defendants attorneys fees and costs incurred in 

responding to plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim, which the court held was frivolous. They in 

4

Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of their Free Exercise clause claim. 

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tum seek an award of attorneys fees and costs if they prevail in this appeal. Defendants seek 

attorneys' fees incurred in defending their award of fees and costs below. 

DISCUSSION 

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. Canst. amend. I. 

The Supreme Court generally applies the three-part test of Lemon when evaluating claimed 

violations of the Establishment Clause. 5 Thus, we continue to apply it to such cases, while 

recognizing that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has been unwilling to endorse Lemon as the 'beall' and 'end-all' in Establishment Clause cases, it has continued to apply it almost exclusively." 

Friedman v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777,780 (lOth Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. 

denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). 

Government action violates the Establishment Clause under Lemon if it fails to meet any 

of the following conditions: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect 

must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster excessive 

government entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The first and second parts 

of the test have been modified, or at least recast, to ask whether the challenged government 

action was intended to endorse, or has the effect of endorsing, religion. County of Allegheny v. 

5

While the Lemon test has been criticized by many, including some members of the 

Supreme Court, and has been declared dead by Justice Scalia, Lamb's Chapel v. Center 

Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2149-50 (1993), the Supreme Court has 

specifically declined to overrule it. See id. at 2148 n.7; see also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 

2649, 2655 (1992). 

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• • 

American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 

687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 

1491 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990). 

Plaintiffs concede that the main issue in this case is whether the City seal violates the 

second part of the Lemon test: whether its primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, or, in 

endorsement test terms, whether it conveys or attempts to convey the message "that religion or a 

particular religious belief is favored or preferred." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (quoting Wallace 

v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).6 In applying this 

"effects" test, we must consider the '"particular physical setting'" of the challenged action. 

Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1491 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597). Further, we evaluate the 

effect "by an objective standard, which looks only to the reaction of the average receiver of the 

government communication or average observer of the government action." Friedman, 781 F .2d 

at 781; see also, F oremaster, 882 F .2d at 1491 ("We inquire what an average observer would 

perceive when viewing the action ofthe City."). 

Other cases, including two from our own circuit, have considered whether a government 

seal or logo containing an unmistakably religious image violates the Establishment Clause. All 

6

Standing is of course always necessary in an Establishment Clause case, and it is 

sometimes a difficult issue. No one in this case disputes plaintiffs' standing. Under our case 

law, plaintiffs clearly have standing. See Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1490 ("Foremaster's 

allegations of direct, personal contact suffices as non-economic injury."). 

Further, because we hold that the City seal violates the second (effects or endorsement) 

part of the Lemon test, we need not address plaintiffs' arguments that the seal also violates the 

first (purpose) part of the test or the third (entanglement) part ofthe test. Failure to satisfy any of 

the three Lemon test prongs suffices to support an Establishment Clause violation. 

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' . but one of those cases have held that it does. Finding no principled distinction between those 

cases and this one, we likewise hold that the Edmond City seal violates the Establishment 

Clause. 

We first addressed this issue in Friedman, in which the Bernalillo County seal 

containing a Latin cross and the Spanish motto "CON ESTA VENCEMOS" was challenged on 

Establishment Clause grounds. Like the City seal here, the Bernalillo County seal had been used 

for many years, and used pervasively, appearing on "county documents, stationery, motor 

vehicles, and the shoulder patches of sheriffs department officers." Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779. 

The district court found no Establishment Clause violation, concluding that the cross was simply 

an historical depiction of the importance of the Catholic Church in settling the southwest. On 

appeal, we reversed, holding that under either a clearly erroneous or a de novo standard of 

review, 7 the lower court erred. 

7

We acknowledged in Friedman that there is some ambiguity concerning the standard for 

our review of"constitutional facts" like a district court's findings on each part of the Lemon test. 

We observed that conflicting language in the Supreme Court's Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 

( 1984), decision suggested either a clearly erroneous or a de novo standard of review could 

apply, while the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 

United States. Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508, 509 (1984), held that the clearly erroneous standard did 

not apply to appellate review of a finding of malice in a First Amendment case. Because we 

concluded in Friedman that the lower court's findings and conclusions were wrong under either 

standard, we did not decide "which standard applies under the Establishment Clause." Friedman, 

781 F .2d at 779-80 n.2. Because we reach that same conclusion here--that the district court erred 

under either standard--we too decline to decide which standard applies. We do note, however, 

that several other circuits appear to hold that a de novo standard applies. See Harris v. City of 

Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1402 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991), ("It is well-settled that whether a government 

display violates the first amendment is indeed a question of law. Thus, on review we examine 

the issues de novo with 'no deference to the district court's resolution."') (quoting Mather v. 

Village of Mundelein, 864 F .2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989) (other citations omitted)), cert. 

(continued ... ) 

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~ . In reaching that conclusion, we considered "the seal's composition and use." I d. at 782. 

We noted that the cross was prominent, as "the only visual element on the seal that is surrounded 

by rays of light." I d. Further, the impression conveyed by the cross we described as follows: 

A rabbi testified that the seal suggested to him that there was an "officialness '' 

about Christianity in the state and county. In addition, he pointed out that the 

cross had at times symbolized outright oppression and persecution of Jewish 

people. It cannot be denied, as one amicus brief argues, that the cross probably 

would have a similarly threatening connotation for a Lebanese Moslem or 

Northern Irish Protestant. We are compelled to draw the same conclusion with 

regard to the reactions ofNative Americans who reside in Bernalillo County. The 

seal certainly does not memorialize their "Christian heritage" but rather that of 

those who sought to extinguish their culture and religion. 

Id. at 781-82. 

In addition to the particular message conveyed by the actual elements of the seal, we also 

considered its pervasiveness: "the seal ... pervades the daily lives of county residents. It is not 

displayed once a year for a brief period ... [but r ]ather it appears on all county paper work, on all 

\ ... continued) 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992); New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East 

Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir. 1989) ("'First Amendment questions of 

"constitutional fact" compel [the] Court's de novo review.'") (quoting Rosenbloom v. 

Metromedia. Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54 (1971) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 

494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 

691 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We review de novo the question whether the Indian plaintiffs have a 

valid first amendment claim."), rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bender v. 

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 542 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated for lack of standing, 

475 U.S. 534 (1986). 

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' . county vehicles, even on county sheriffs uniforms." Id. at 782. We therefore concluded that the 

seal violated the Establishment Clause. 8 

We faced a similar challenge to a city seal in Foremaster, in which the challenged seal 

contained a depiction of the St. George, Utah, temple of the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Oay 

Saints ("LOS Church"). The district court granted summary judgment to the city, finding that 

the illustration of the St. George temple did not have the primary effect of endorsing the LOS 

Church. We reversed and remanded, finding that there was "a genuine issue of material fact as to 

what an average observer would perceive when viewing the City logo." Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 

In addition to Friedman and Foremaster, several other cases from other circuits address 

Establishment Clause challenges to city seals or logos. In Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 

(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992), and Kuhn v. City ofRolling Meadows, 927 

F .2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991 ), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992), consolidated for decision, the 

Seventh Circuit held that seal of the city of Rolling Meadows and the seal, emblem and logo of 

8

Friedman was cited with apparent approval by Justice O'Connor in her concurring 

opinion in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 629, as well as by Justice Kennedy in his opinion concurring 

in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. ld. at 661. 

9

0efendants argue strenuously that our remand in Foremaster for further factual findings 

on what the average observer would perceive when viewing the logo clearly indicates that such 

an inquiry is always purely factual, and the district court's findings on that matter are only 

reversible if clearly erroneous. Thus, so the argument goes, we could not easily reverse the 

district court's findings about the average observer in this case. We are not convinced 

Foremaster's holding reveals so much. The question of what the average observer would 

perceive when looking at a LDS Church temple, a less familiar religious symbol, would probably 

require more inquiry than the question of what the average observer would perceive when 

looking at a Latin cross, a very familiar religious symbol. 

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the city of Zion both violated the Establishment Clause. The Rolling Meadows seal contained, in 

one of its four quadrants, a depiction of a church that was under construction with a Latin cross 

in front of it. The Zion seal contained a shield on which appeared a Latin cross, a dove carrying 

a branch, a crown and sword, and the name "Zion." A ribbon above the shield contained the 

words "God Reigns." Both city seals were used extensively, on city vehicles, the city letterhead, 

the shoulder patches of city police officers and, in Zion, on firefighters as well, and in the City 

Council chambers. 

Addressing first the Rolling Meadows seal, the court observed that it "is a permanent 

statement that is viewed year-round." Kuhn, 927 F .2d at 1412. Further, the seal "acts as the 

City's imprimatur for official correspondence, property and business." Id. The court rejected the 

city's argument that the presence of other, secular images on the seal "neutralized" any religious 

message conveyed by the seal. "The images on the seal are not just neutral snapshots of the 

community; they are charged with endorsement. ... To any observer, the Rolling Meadows seal 

expresses the City's approval of those four pictures of City life--its flora, its schools, its industry 

and commercial life, and its Christianity." ld. The court therefore concluded that the city seal 

"endorses Christianity in violation of the first amendment." I d. at 1413. 

Turning to the Zion seal, the court found that it violated both the purpose and the effects 

test of Lemon. Finding that its indisputably religious purpose when it was originally adopted in 

1902 was not diminished by a more recent decision to retain the seal for historical purposes, the 

court went on to conclude that the seal constituted an unconstitutional endorsement of 

Christianity. It also rejected Zion's argument that the seal, emblem and logo "merely 

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commemorate the historical origins ofthe City." Harris, 927 F.2d at 1414, stating that "the City 

may not honor its history by retaining the blatantly sectarian seaL emblem, and logo." Id. at 

1415. Finally, the court rejected the city's attempts to distinguish its seal from the one our court 

had already held unconstitutional in Friedman: 

The City of Zion seeks to distinguish its corporate seal from the seal of Bernalillo 

County by noting that the Latin cross in the Zion seal is smaller and shares space 

on the seal with a crown, a scepter and a dove. We find this argument a baseless 

attempt at distinction. 

Id.; but see Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding against 

Establishment Clause challenge a city insignia based upon "the family coat of arms of Stephen F. 

Austin, the 'father of Texas' and the person after whom the City is named," and which included a 

Latin cross), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992). 10 

Because we find no meaningful distinction between the Edmond seal and that of 

Bernalillo County or the cities of Zion and Rolling Meadows, we hold that Edmond's seal 

10The Austin insignia appeared extensively throughout the city. The Fifth Circuit rejected 

the argument that "any time a municipality incorporates a religious symbol within its seal, 

insignia, or logo--regardless of the history, purpose, or context--the Establishment Clause is 

violated." Murray, 947 F.2d at 156. Instead, the court distinguished Friedman by the Friedman 

seal's 

lack of undisputed secular symbols within the seal; the accompanying phrase 

which translates "With This We Conquer"; the county's relatively recent 

expanded use of the seal; and that at least one county commissioner knew at the 

time that the cross represented the role of the Catholic Church in the settlement of 

the Southwest. 

l.d.. at 157. Concluding that the Austin city seal "in its context, ... does not endorse religion in 

any true or meaningful sense of the word 'endorsement,"' the Fifth Circuit upheld its 

constitutionality. ld. at 158. 

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.. 

violates the Establishment Clause. Like Bernalillo County's seal, and the seals of Zion and 

Rolling Meadows, the cross is a prominent feature of the Edmond seal. 11 The religious 

significance and meaning of the Latin or Christian cross are unmistakable. Further, Edmond's 

use of the seal is as pervasive as the county seal in Friedman, and the city seals in Harris and 

Kuhn. 

Defendants argue that the City seal is permissible because it symbolizes "the unique 

history and heritage of Edmond." Appellees' Br. at 6. We agree with the Seventh Circuit's 

rejection of the identical historical argument in Harris: "the City may not honor its history by 

retaining the blatantly sectarian seal .... These symbols transcend mere commemoration, and 

effectively endorse or promote the Christian faith." Harris, 927 F.2d at 1415. Such an appeal to 

history also failed to save the Bernalillo County seal in Friedman, and is indeed an argument 

which could always "trump" the Establishment Clause, because of the undeniable significance of 

religion and religious symbols in the history of many of our communities. We rejected 

arguments in Friedman that the county seal was permissible because it was not intended to 

advance religion, stating "[i]fthe challenged practice is likely to be interpreted as advancing 

religion, it has an impermissible effect and violates the Constitution, regardless of whether it 

actually is intended to do so." Friedman, 781 F .2d at 781. 

Defendants further argue that the evidence in this case supports their claim that the 

''majority of the people in Edmond-- the average, everyday Christian and non-Christian citizens" 

11 We noted in Friedman that the visibility of the cross was significant: "a one-color 

depiction in which the seal and especially the cross are not easily discernible might not pass the 

threshold [of impermissible joint church-state authority.]" Friedman, 781 F .2d at 781. 

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.. 

do not view the seal as endorsing religion. That is not determinative. As we observed in 

Friedman, 

It is not decisive that defendants' heraldic and historical experts, and lay witnesses 

who are members of Christian sects, reacted less emotionally to the seal. It is to 

be expected that members of Christian sects would be more comfortable with a 

seal endorsing their beliefs than would individuals who adhere to different beliefs. 

The comfort ofthe majority is not the main concern of the Bill of Rights. 

ld. at 782. The relevant inquiry is the objective one of what the "average observer" would 

perceive when viewing the seal. Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1491. On that issue, we must conclude 

that the average observer would perceive the same sort of endorsement of Christianity which we 

held such an observer would feel in Friedman, and the Seventh Circuit held such an observer 

would feel in Harris and Kuhn, when evaluating governmental seals with similarly distinctive 

crosses. 

Finally, defendants attempt to distinguish the Edmond seal from the Bernalillo County 

seal at issue in Friedman by arguing that the other secular elements of the seal effectively 

neutralize any religious message conveyed by the cross. While we acknowledge that each case 

must tum on its own facts, and that the particular context and setting of a particular governmental 

seal or logo is relevant to its fate when challenged under the Establishment Clause, we decline 

defendants' invitation to carefully and minutely distinguish the Edmond seal from the Bernalillo 

County seal based upon the particular dimensions of the crosses in the two seals or the secular or 

non-secular nature of other elements of the seal. As the Seventh Circuit stated in rejecting the 

identical argument in Kuhn, 

The images on the seal are not just neutral snapshots ofthe community; they are 

charged with endorsement. ... [R ]egardless of its origins, the [city] seal does 

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.. ' .. promote the selected images it depicts. To any observer, the [city] seal expresses 

the City's approval ofthose four pictures of City life-- its flora, its schools, its 

industry and commercial life, and its Christianity. 

Kuhn, 927 F.2d at 1412. We too decline to hold that some visible and clearly defined religious 

images are permissible while other identically visible religious images are not. "Otherwise, we 

judges will be immersed in the minutiae of graphic design, our rulers and calipers in hand, 

scrutinizing each symbol for acceptable proportion, color and gloss. With no principled basis for 

distinguishing one seal from the next, our opinions will be fastidiously fact-bound and our 

precedent hopelessly abstract." Murray, 947 F.2d at 170 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 

In sum, we hold that under applicable Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court authority, the 

Edmond City seal violates the Establishment Clause. The district court erred in concluding 

otherwise. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 12 

Because we reverse and remand this case, and find in favor of plaintiffs, plaintiffs are 

now the prevailing parties for purposes of the attorneys fees provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

This casts in a new light the determination of any fee awards in this case. We accordingly 

remand the issue of attorneys fees and costs to the district court for a redetermination in light of 

this opinion. 

12Plaintiffs have additionally argued that the district court erred in requiring in camera 

production of a letter from plaintiffs' counsel to plaintiffs, in violation of the attorney/client 

privilege. As defendants point out, plaintiffs identify no prejudice or damage stemming from 

this claimed error, and they fail to address the issue at all in their reply brief. We accordingly 

decline to address the issue. 

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