Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-07115/USCOURTS-ca13-14-07115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Service Women's Action Network
Petitioner
Vietnam Veterans of America
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SERVICE WOMEN’S ACTION NETWORK, 

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA,

Petitioners

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-7115

______________________ 

Petition for review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. Section 502.

______________________ 

Decided: March 3, 2016

______________________ 

 DANIELA NOGUEIRA, RACHEL TUCHMAN, Jerome N. 

Frank Legal Services Organization, New Haven, CT, 

argued for petitioners. Also represented by MICHAEL JOEL 

WISHNIE; MARGARET MOOG MIDDLETON, Connecticut 

Veterans Legal Center, West Haven, CT.

 ALLISON KIDD-MILLER, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR; DAVID 

J. BARRANS, MARTIE ADELMAN, Office of General Counsel, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

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 JOHN MILLIAN, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, for amici curiae Public Health and Mental 

Health Specialists, Madelon Baranoski, Traci Cipriano, 

Shelley Geballe, Gregg Gonsalves, Catherine Lewis, Alice 

Miller, Howard Zonana.

 SANDRA SHIN-YOUNG PARK, American Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation, Inc., New York, NY, for amici curiae 

American Civil Liberties Union, Futures Without Violence, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, National

Center on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Protect Our 

Defenders. Also represented by LENORA M. LAPIDUS. 

 PAUL WHITFIELD HUGHES, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Members of Congress. Also 

represented by CHARLES ALAN ROTHFELD. 

 MARIANNE HOGAN, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, 

Washington, DC, for amicus curiae National Veterans 

Legal Services Program. Also represented by BARTON F.

STICHMAN, National Veterans Legal Services Program, 

Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH. 

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

There has been a growing recognition of the pervasive 

and continuing problem of sexual abuse in the military

and the often severe effects it can have.1 Numerous steps 

 

1 See, e.g., J.A. 217–64, Military Sexual Trauma, 

GAO-14-477 (June 9, 2014). 

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have been taken to confront the problem, including an 

increased focus by the Department of Defense, and increased efforts by the Department of Veterans Affairs to 

improve its adjudication of disability claims related to 

military sexual trauma.2 

In response to what they viewed as the VA’s inadequate response to MST-based disability claims, petitioners here (the Service Women’s Action Network and the 

Vietnam Veterans of America) submitted a petition for 

rulemaking which requested that the VA promulgate a 

new regulation regarding the adjudication of certain 

MST-based disability claims. The Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs denied the rulemaking petition and this appeal 

followed. Our review in these circumstances is limited. 

Because the Secretary’s decision to deny the rulemaking 

petition was not arbitrary or capricious, or in violation of 

the equal protection component of the due process clause 

of the Fifth Amendment, we deny the petition for review. 

I 

In 2012, one in five female veterans and one in onehundred male veterans reported that they experienced 

 

2 See Department of Defense Annual Report on 

Sexual Assault in the Military, at 11–12 (2014) (“From FY 

2012 to FY 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed 41 

initiatives that fundamentally reformed how the military 

prevents, responds to, and adjudicates sexual assault.”); 

Victims Protection Act of 2014, S. 1917, 113th Cong. 

(2014); Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, S. 

1752, 113th Cong. (2013); J.A. 217–64, Military Sexual 

Trauma, GAO-14-477 (“The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), within the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA), has taken several steps to improve decisionmaking on disability claims involving military sexual 

trauma (MST) and to rectify past errors.”). 

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sexual abuse in the military, and an estimated 26,000 

servicemembers “experienced some form of unwanted 

sexual contact.” J.A. 220. The trauma stemming from 

sexual abuse in the military is referred to as military 

sexual trauma (MST) and it can result in severe chronic 

medical conditions, including Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. 3 

Generally, veterans with service-connected disabilities (i.e., injuries or diseases contracted or aggravated in 

military service) are entitled to disability benefits. See

38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131. Veterans are eligible to receive 

disability benefits for the physical and mental health 

disabilities caused or aggravated by MST, such as PTSD, 

depression, or anxiety. 

From 2008–2013, veterans filed over 29,000 claims related to disabilities caused by MST. J.A. 220. And from 

2010–2013, the overwhelming majority of those MSTbased claims (94%) were for PTSD. Id. In at least 2010 

and 2011, there was a significant disparity in the rates at 

which PTSD claims were granted, depending on whether 

the claim was based on MST or some other stressor. For 

instance, in 2010, 56% of non-MST-based PTSD claims 

were granted, while only 32.3% of MST-based PTSD 

claims were granted. J.A. 173. And, in 2011, 74% of nonMST-based PTSD claims were granted, while only 44.6% 

of MST-based PTSD claims were granted. Id. 

 

3 The VA defines MST as “psychological trauma, 

which in the judgment of a mental health professional 

employed by the Department, resulted from a physical 

assault of a sexual nature, battery of a sexual nature, or 

sexual harassment which occurred while the veteran was 

serving on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive 

duty training.” 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(1). 

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To address this significant disparity, the Service 

Women’s Action Network and the Vietnam Veterans of 

America (collectively, petitioners) petitioned the Secretary 

for a rulemaking. Petitioners claim that this disparity, at 

least in part, is due to the higher evidentiary burden 

required to establish service-connection for MST-based 

PTSD. 

To establish service connection for PTSD, there must 

be a medical diagnosis of PTSD, a link between the PTSD 

diagnosis and the in-service stressor, and “credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor 

occurred.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Secretary has the 

“authority to prescribe all rules and regulations which are 

necessary or appropriate . . . with respect to the nature 

and extent of proof and evidence . . . in order to establish 

the right to benefits.” 38 U.S.C. § 501(a). Under this 

authority, the Secretary allows a veteran’s lay testimony 

alone to constitute the credible supporting evidence

required for stressors related to combat in which the 

veteran engaged, a veteran’s fear of hostile military or 

terrorist activity, or a veteran’s experience being a prisoner of war. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2)–(4). Specifically, if the 

evidence establishes that the veteran experienced a 

specific event that caused the claimed stressor (e.g., that 

the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy), and the 

claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, 

conditions, or hardships of the veteran’s service, the VA 

allows the veteran to establish the occurrence of the 

claimed stressor through the veteran’s “lay testimony 

alone” when there is no clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. Id. In contrast, when the stressor is related 

to an in-service personal assault, which includes MST, the 

veteran is required to provide corroborating evidence to 

substantiate the occurrence of the stressor. 

38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5). However, evidence from sources 

other than the veteran’s service records may constitute 

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or, including, but not limited to: “records from law enforcement authorities, rape crisis centers, mental health 

counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians; pregnancy 

tests or tests for sexually transmitted diseases; and 

statements from family members, roommates, fellow 

service members, or clergy.” Id. Moreover, “VA will not 

deny a post-traumatic stress disorder claim that is based 

on in-service personal assault without first advising the 

claimant that evidence from sources other than the veteran’s service records or evidence of behavior changes may 

constitute credible supporting evidence of the stressor and 

allowing him or her the opportunity to furnish this type of 

evidence or advise VA of potential sources of such evidence.” Id. 

The petition requests that the VA promulgate a new 

subsection of 38 CFR § 3.304—§ 3.304(g)—to establish a 

separate evidentiary presumption for PTSD caused by 

MST. Petitioners’ proposed rule reads: 

If a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the 

veteran’s reported experience of military sexual 

trauma and a psychiatrist or psychologist confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to 

support a diagnosis of a mental health condition 

and that the veteran’s symptoms are related to 

the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary, the veteran’s 

lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence 

of the claimed in-service stressor. 

J.A. 302.

The petition contends that this rule is necessary because: (1) systemic underreporting deprives survivors of 

rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment of the documentation necessary to corroborate their claims; (2) VA 

adjudicators often misapply the current evidentiary 

standard; and (3) VA’s current rules for PTSD related to 

MST allow for biased exercises of adjudicators’ discretion. 

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The petition further argues that veterans suffering 

from PTSD caused by other stressors “do not have to 

present any threshold evidence of the specific stressor,” 

but must simply show that they “served in general conditions in which stressors causing PTSD occur.” J.A. 345. 

Therefore, the proposed evidentiary standard only requires veterans “to prove they served in general conditions in which military sexual assault and sexual 

harassment are known to occur.” Id. at 345. However, 

since sexual harassment and sexual assault are “known to 

occur in all conditions of service,” veterans claiming 

benefits for MST-based PTSD would only need to prove 

that they served in the military. Id. 

The Secretary denied the petition. Petitioners appeal

on the grounds that the denial is arbitrary and capricious 

and violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C § 502. 

Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345, 

1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

II

As we have previously held, we review the Secretary’s 

denial of a petition for rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A) to determine whether the agency’s decision 

was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. at 1353 (citing 

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007)). 

When a proposed rulemaking “pertains to a matter of 

policy within the agency’s expertise and discretion, the 

scope of review should perforce be a narrow one, limited to 

ensuring that the agency has adequately explained the 

facts and policy concerns it relied on and to satisfy ourselves that those facts have some basis in the record.” Id. 

at 1353–54 (quoting WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 

817 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“In other words, a court ‘looks to see whether the agency 

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tion.’” Id. at 1354 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 

532 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original 

omitted)). 

To determine if the agency employed reasoned decisionmaking, “we must examine the petition for rulemaking, comments pro and con . . . and the agency’s 

explanation of its decision to reject the petition.” 

Gutierrez, 532 F.3d at 920 (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n 

v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In only the “rarest and most compelling 

of circumstances” is it appropriate to overturn an agency 

judgment not to institute a rulemaking. WWHT, Inc., 656 

F.2d at 818; see also Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders 

Ass’n of Am. Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96–97 

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We will overturn an agency’s decision 

not to initiate a rulemaking only for compelling cause, 

such as plain error of law or a fundamental change in the 

factual premises previously considered by the agency.”). 

Applying this extremely limited and highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the Secretary 

has adequately explained the facts and policy matters 

underlying the decision to deny the petition, and therefore 

employed reasoned decisionmaking.4 

 

4 The Secretary’s denial also concluded that “sexual 

assault is not indisputably associated with particular 

places, types, and circumstances of service,” and, therefore, petitioners’ requested regulation is inconsistent with 

its statutory authority. J.A. 7. Petitioners disagree with 

this conclusion, arguing that MST is, in fact, a “circumstance” of service. We decline to decide whether MST is a 

circumstance of service because the issue presented is not 

whether the Secretary could have promulgated the requested rule, but whether the Secretary adequately 

explained its reasoning for not doing so. See, e.g., McKinCase: 14-7115 Document: 99-2 Page: 8 Filed: 03/03/2016
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First, the Secretary explained that the current regulation specifically addresses petitioners’ stated concern 

regarding “the difficulty of producing evidence to prove 

[the] occurrence of an in-service personal assault.” J.A. 4–

5; see also Preminger, 632 F.3d at 1348, 1354 (finding that 

the Secretary engaged in reasoned decisionmaking when 

denying a petition for rulemaking, where the Secretary 

determined that the current regulation effectively addressed the petitioner’s stated reasons for requesting the 

rulemaking). The Secretary acknowledged the “sensitive 

nature of MST stressors and the reluctance on the part of 

Servicemembers to report such events during military 

service” and concluded that the current regulation accommodates those concerns because it relaxes the general 

rule requiring veterans to solely rely on evidence contained in their service record by allowing veterans to 

provide corroborating evidence from a variety of sources. 

J.A. at 4; see also Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Claims 

Based on Personal Assault, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,132 (Oct. 16, 

2000) (proposed rule) (“Many incidents of in-service 

personal assault are not officially reported, and veterans 

may find it difficult to produce evidence to prove the 

occurrence of this type of stressor. This proposed amendment addresses this difficulty by specifying that evidence 

from sources other than the veteran’s service records may 

constitute credible supporting evidence of the in-service 

stressor, where the alleged stressor is a personal assault.”). 

Second, the denial details the VA’s training programs 

regarding MST-based claims. These programs ensure 

 

ney v. McDonald, 796 F.3d 1377, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(“[T]he issue before us is not whether the VA could have 

assigned a retroactive effective date to the 2011 regulation, but rather, whether the VA acted arbitrarily and 

capriciously in assigning a prospective date.”). 

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that “Department employees develop and adjudicate MST 

claims consistent with VA’s regulation and with sensitivity to the unique circumstances presented by each individual claim.” J.A. 5. And, as a result of these programs, 

grant rates for MST-based PTSD claims increased significantly. Id. at 6. Specifically, in 2011, the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) directed regional offices to 

designate adjudicators with experience in processing 

complex claims to assist in development of MST claims 

and adjudications. The VBA developed guidance and 

training for these adjudicators, including: VBA Training 

Letter 11-05 (Dec. 2, 2011); a 1.5 hour webinar on MST 

claims adjudication; a 4 hour in-person training on MST; 

and a 1.5 hour information session regarding how to 

conduct medical examinations of veterans claiming disability as a result of MST. As a result, the grant rates for 

MST-based PTSD claims rose from 38% in 2011 to 52% in 

March 2013. Moreover, in 2013, the overall grant rate for 

MST-based PTSD claims was 49%—comparable to the 

55% grant rate for all PTSD claims. 

These statistics adequately support the Secretary’s ultimate conclusion that the current regulation and training 

program provide “for the accurate, fair, and sensitive 

adjudication of claims based on MST.” J.A. 7; see also J.A. 

235, Military Sexual Trauma, GAO-14-477 (June 9, 2014) 

(some variation in grant rates is expected due to “actual 

differences among claims and their levels of evidence”). 

Lastly, the denial clarifies that the evidentiary burden for PTSD caused by other stressors does in fact require a veteran to present threshold evidence of the 

specific stressor, contrary to petitioners’ belief. The 

Secretary explained that, for example, under 

38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2), a veteran has the initial burden of 

establishing that he or she “engaged in combat with the 

enemy, i.e., personally participated in events constituting 

an actual fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile 

unit or instrumentality before the Veteran’s testimony, 

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alone,” is sufficient to establish the service-connection. 

J.A. 6 (citing Moran v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1157, 1159 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008); Stone v. Nicholson, 480 F.3d 1111, 1113 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although others may have determined that petitioners’ requested rule is the best way to ensure the accurate, 

fair, and sensitive adjudication of MST-based PTSD

claims, that is not the question before us. Ultimately, we 

are bound by the very limited and highly deferential

standard of review, which only allows us to determine if 

the Secretary’s denial constitutes reasoned decisionmaking. Because the Secretary adequately explained its

reasons for denying the petition and continuing with the 

status quo, we conclude that the denial was not arbitrary

or capricious. 

III

Lastly, petitioners claim that by denying the petition, 

the Secretary violated the equal protection component of 

the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because: 

(1) it intentionally discriminates against women without 

providing an exceedingly persuasive justification; and (2) 

in the alternative, it discriminates against survivors of 

MST-based PTSD without providing a legitimate reason. 

The government violates equal protection when it intentionally discriminates against an individual based on 

race, national origin, or gender. See Berkley v. United 

States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A facially 

neutral law or regulation can violate equal protection “if it 

was motivated by discriminatory animus and its application results in discriminatory effect.” Id. If petitioners 

establish that the government engaged in intentional 

discrimination, then the government “must demonstrate 

an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discrimination. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 

(1996). 

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Petitioners assert that women experience MST at a 

greater rate than men, and therefore the denial intentionally discriminates against women because it subjects 

women to a higher evidentiary burden than men when

claiming disability benefits. See Pet. Br. at 40. When the 

government’s particular course of action disproportionately impacts one gender, an equal protection violation arises 

“only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory 

purpose.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 

272 (1979). A discriminatory purpose implies that the 

decisionmaker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course 

of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite 

of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. at 

279. 

The record here establishes that both men and women 

suffer from MST-based PTSD, and therefore, both men 

and women are subject to a higher evidentiary burden to 

claim disability benefits for MST-based PTSD. See, e.g., 

Pet. Br. at 11 (“disparity” in grant rates for men suffering 

from MST-based PTSD “was especially high”); id. at 30 

(“disparity between the approval rate for MST-related 

PTSD claims and the overall approval rate for all PTSD 

claims nationwide . . . results in disparate impact on both 

men and women.”). “When there is a rational, neutral 

explanation for the adverse impact and the law or custom 

disadvantages both men and women, then an inference of 

discriminatory purpose is not permitted.” Ricketts v. City 

of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis 

added) (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275). 

The Secretary treats MST-based PTSD claims differently from other PTSD claims because MST can occur at 

any place, at any time, and to anyone and, therefore, 

raises challenges not applicable to other PTSD claims. 

See Resp. Br. at 42. The VA has determined that veterans suffering from PTSD involving stressors that occurred 

under specific circumstances (e.g., while engaged in 

combat or being held as a prisoner of war), are relieved of 

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the requirement to provide corroborating evidence that 

the particular stressor occurred, and instead may establish the occurrence of the particular stressor through their 

lay testimony alone. However, to be relieved of this 

evidentiary requirement, the veteran is required to first 

present “threshold” evidence establishing that, for example, he or she engaged in combat with the enemy or is a 

former prisoner of war. See id. at 28; J.A. 45. By requiring the veteran to present this threshold evidence, the VA 

is able to consider if the claimed stressor is consistent 

with the “places, types, and circumstances” of engaging in 

combat with the enemy or being held as a prisoner of war. 

MST, however, is not limited to a specific experience 

or circumstance, and can unfortunately occur at any 

place, at any time, and to anyone. Consequently, there is 

no “specific” context or circumstance in which the inservice stressor occurred. Because MST-based claimants 

generally cannot prove that the stressor (MST) occurred 

under a specific circumstance, the VA does not have an 

opportunity to consider if the MST is consistent with the

places, types, and circumstances of a claimant’s military 

service. Thus, the VA requires veterans seeking benefits 

for MST-based PTSD to provide corroborating evidence

establishing the occurrence of the MST so that it may

properly consider whether the MST is consistent with the 

“places, types, and circumstances” of service. See

Resp. Br. at 30. 

This requirement is rational and gender-neutral; 

therefore, the Secretary did not act with discriminatory 

purpose when denying the petition. Because the denial 

was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose, the VA 

did not engage in intentional gender discrimination. 

Alternatively, petitioners claim that by denying the 

petition, the Secretary discriminates between survivors of 

MST-based PTSD and survivors of PTSD caused by other 

stressors. If discrimination is based on a classification 

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other than race, national origin, or gender, the classification “must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 

that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” 

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted). For the reasons discussed 

above, we find the distinction between MST-based PTSD 

and non-MST-based PTSD rational. 

IV

The court is sympathetic to the many challenges faced 

by victims of MST. However, our review of the Secretary’s decision is extremely limited and highly deferential. 

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for review is 

denied. 

PETITION DENIED

No costs. 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SERVICE WOMEN’S ACTION NETWORK, 

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA,

Petitioners

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-7115

______________________ 

Petition for review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 502.

______________________ 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

Irrespective of whether our military veterans served 

in combat, they “risked both life and liberty in their 

military service to this country.” Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 

F.3d 719, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That is equally true when 

our servicepersons become victims at the hands of their 

compatriots, especially in cases of sexual assault, which 

often results in post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). 

Petitioners in this appeal sought to compel the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“Secretary”) to promulgate rules 

addressing their plight. Their Petition for Rulemaking 

was denied. The majority denies the petition for review of 

the Secretary’s denial because, in the majority’s view, “the 

Secretary adequately explained its reasons for denying 

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the [Petition for Rulemaking].” Maj. Op. at 11. However, 

the majority does not appreciate that the Secretary failed 

to offer a reasoned explanation for treating PTSD claimants differently depending on the context in which the 

claimed stressor arose. Because the majority fails to 

discern that a critical aspect of the Secretary’s denial is 

devoid of reasoned decisionmaking, and is therefore 

“arbitrary” within the meaning of the Administrative 

Procedure Act,1 I respectfully dissent. 

I.

I first must explain why I disagree with the majority’s 

conclusions. It is true the Secretary appears to offer 

reasonable responses to a number of issues raised by the 

Petition for Rulemaking. See J.A. 4–7 (Letter from Tammy L. Kennedy, Acting General Counsel, Department of 

Veterans Affairs (“VA”), to Abigail Graber, The Jerome N. 

Frank Legal Services Organization, July 14, 2014). First, 

the letter acknowledges “the difficulty of producing evidence to prove occurrence of an in-service personal assault” such as military sexual trauma (“MST”), and 

explains that 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5) (2014) addresses this 

difficulty by providing that a broad variety of evidence 

may be used to “‘corroborate the veteran’s account of the 

stressor incident.’” J.A. 4 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5)). 

The Secretary also emphasizes in its letter that the list of 

potential sources of evidence in § 3.304(f)(5) is “not exclusive.” J.A. 5. 

Second, the Secretary’s denial letter addresses Petitioners’ concern that “‘VA adjudicators often misapply the 

current evidentiary standard,’” and explains several 

 

1 Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243–44 

(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

(2012)).

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measures the VA has taken to reduce such errors, including the development of “additional guidance and training.” J.A. 5 (quoting J.A. 330). The letter notes that the 

“VA’s grant rate for PTSD claims based on MST rose from 

a rate of 38 percent prior to this training initiative to a 

rate of 52 percent at the end of February 2013, which was 

roughly comparable to the 59-percent grant rate at that 

time for all PTSD claims.” J.A. 6 (citation omitted). 

Third, and relatedly, the letter explains that the VA 

contacted Veterans whose claims were denied between 

September 2010 and April 2013, notifying them that 

claims could be resubmitted for review. J.A. 6. 

Although the Secretary’s letter responds to some of 

the issues raised by Petitioners, it does not “explain[] the 

facts and policy” matters underlying Petitioners’ chief 

concern, namely, the maintenance of different evidentiary 

standards for PTSD claims resulting from MST, and 

PTSD claims resulting from other stressors. Preminger v. 

Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Secretary’s discussion of the flexible nature of the 

evidentiary requirements of § 3.304(f)(5) is not responsive 

to this critical issue because it addresses the subsection in 

isolation, and does not explain what facts or policy concerns might justify the subsection’s more stringent corroboration requirement as compared to its neighboring 

subsections. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (Agency action 

is arbitrary and capricious when “the agency has . . . 

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 

problem.”). The letter therefore fails to reflect “reasoned 

decisionmaking” sufficient to explain the Secretary’s 

denial of the Petition for Rulemaking. Preminger, 632 

F.3d at 1354 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

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Similarly, while it is commendable that the VA has 

initiated training and outreach efforts to ensure that 

MST-based PTSD claims are processed in a “fair, consistent, and thoughtful manner,” J.A. 5, these efforts are 

unrelated to the underlying issue of whether a justification exists for the different evidentiary requirements in 

38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5),2 and consequently for the Secretary’s decision to deny the Petition for Rulemaking, see 

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of 

Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) (An agency has a “duty to 

explain its departure from prior norms.” (citation omitted)); id. (The grounds for an agency’s departure “must be 

clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge 

the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate.”). Training efforts may address the discriminatory 

effects produced by the different evidentiary standards, 

but they do not provide a rationale for the differing 

standards themselves. For the Secretary’s denial to be 

upheld, it must either offer some rationale that could 

explain the maintenance of different standards for similarly situated claimants, or it must explain why such 

claimants are in fact not similarly situated. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 403 

F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Where an agency applies 

different standards to similarly situated entities and fails 

to support this disparate treatment with a reasoned 

explanation and substantial evidence in the record, its 

 

2 In 2002, the VA added subsection (f)(3) to § 3.304, 

which is now codified in subsection (f)(5). Post-Traumatic 

Stress Disorder Claims Based on Personal Assault, 67 

Fed. Reg. 10,330 (Mar. 7, 2002). At the time the VA 

promulgated this subsection, the VA’s regulations contained evidentiary standards for non-MST stressors. See 

38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2001). 

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action is arbitrary and capricious and cannot be upheld.”

(citation omitted)). 

II.

An examination of the regulation’s text, along with 

well-accepted principles of administrative law, reveals 

that we cannot sustain the Secretary’s denial of the 

Petition for Rulemaking. Section 3.304(f) of Title 38 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations sets forth three requirements for establishing service-connection for PTSD: “[1] 

medical evidence diagnosing [PTSD] . . . ; [2] a link, 

established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and [3] credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor 

occurred.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2014) (emphasis added). 

These requirements apply regardless of the cause of the 

PTSD.

However, in subsections (1) through (4) of § 3.304(f), 

“the veteran’s lay testimony alone” can constitute “credible supporting evidence.” See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1) 

(diagnosis of PTSD during service); id. § 3.304(f)(2) (combat-related PTSD); id. § 3.304(f)(3) (PTSD related to “fear 

of hostile military or terrorist activity”); id. § 3.304(f)(4) 

(PTSD related to prisoner-of-war status). By contrast, 

where PTSD is caused by MST, the veteran’s lay testimony alone does not constitute “credible supporting evidence,” and corroboration of that testimony is required. 

See id. § 3.304(f)(5) (listing numerous non-exclusive 

examples of the types of evidence that “may corroborate 

the veteran’s account of the [MST-related] stressor incident”).3 The Secretary in its denial letter offers no explanation of the different requirements.

 

3 Despite the VA’s use of the permissive term 

“may,” the agency interprets this regulation to require

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Instead, the Secretary explains what a veteran must 

establish under § 3.304(f)(2)–(3). The denial letter notes 

that veterans claiming combat-related PTSD must first 

“establish [under § 3.304(f)(2)] that he or she ‘engaged in 

combat with the enemy,’ i.e. ‘personally participated in 

events constituting an actual fight or encounter with a 

military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality.’” J.A. 6 

(quoting Moran v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1157, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 

2008)). The letter explains that “§ 3.304(f)(3) . . . eliminates the [corroboration] requirement . . . if a stressor 

claimed . . . is related to . . . fear of hostile military or 

terrorist activity.” J.A. 6. In its brief, the Secretary adds 

that “a veteran seeking PTSD benefits as a result of a 

prisoner of war experience must still establish that he or 

she was a prisoner-of-war.” Resp’t’s Br. 29 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

These explanations by the Secretary do not address 

the differential evidentiary requirements imposed by 

regulation. As noted, § 3.304(f) requires all claimants 

who seek to establish service-connection for PTSD to 

provide “credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor occurred.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f).4 Of 

 

corroborating evidence in addition to the veteran’s testimony. See J.A. 4 (“Your proposal would eliminate the 

requirement for corroborating evidence.”), 49 (discussing 

the “requirement for seeking markers” from among the 

§ 3.304(f)(5) evidentiary categories); Respondent’s Br. 2 

(noting the “corroborating evidence requirement for MST 

claims”), 6 (“[A] veteran’s lay testimony alone, without 

any corroboration, is not sufficient [under § 3.304 (f)(5)].”). 

4 Subsections (2) through (4) of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)

eliminate the need not for credible supporting evidence, 

but for corroborating evidence, see, e.g., J.A. 4, 6, 210, that 

is, evidence in addition to the veteran’s own testimony. 

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course, the lay testimony of claimants asserting combatrelated, fear-related, or prisoner-of-war related PTSD 

would not be credible if the claimants were in fact not 

prisoners of war, or were not involved in combat or situations where the Veteran was confronted with the threat of 

enemy activity. Similarly, the lay testimony of claimants 

asserting MST-related PTSD would not be credible if the 

claimant did not in fact serve in the military. Subsection 

(f)(5), however, imposes a corroboration requirement even 

if the evidence establishes the claimant served in the 

military and the claimed in-service stressor is related to 

that service. 

Once it is established that a PTSD claimant was in 

fact a prisoner of war, or was involved in combat or 

threatened by enemy activity, that claimant is similarly 

situated to the claimant seeking service connection for 

MST-related PTSD who has established service in the 

military: both were serving in a context where exposure 

to a specific stressor could—but would not necessarily—

occur, see J.A. 7, 43, and both must provide “credible 

supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor 

occurred.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The difference arises at 

 

tionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Evidence that differs from but 

strengthens or confirms . . . other evidence . . . .”). They

also instruct that the veteran’s lay testimony alone can 

constitute the required “credible supporting evidence,” but 

only in the circumstances described in those subsections. 

See, e.g., No. 09-48 429, 2011 WL 1802066, at *3 (Bd. Vet. 

App. Mar. 15, 2011) (“Provided . . . the Veteran engaged 

in ‘combat with the enemy,’ his lay testimony alone constitutes credible supporting evidence . . . .” (citation 

omitted)); No. 02-18 881, 2005 WL 3921319, at *2 (Bd. 

Vet. App. Nov. 17, 2005) (“[A] noncombat veteran’s testimony alone does not qualify as ‘credible supporting evidence’ . . . .” (emphasis added)).

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this point, when the lay testimony of the claimant for 

MST-related PTSD will alone be insufficient to establish 

the occurrence of a specific stressor, whereas the same 

testimony alone will be sufficient in the case of other 

claimants. The Secretary has offered no rationale for this 

distinction. 

It may be that the Secretary can offer “facts and policy concerns” that support differential treatment, Preminger, 632 F.3d at 1353, but the failure to do so in its denial 

letter provides no basis for this court to conclude that the 

decision was not arbitrary, Williams Gas Processing-Gulf 

Coast Co., L.P. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 475 

F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Arbitrary and capricious 

review ‘demands evidence of reasoned decisionmaking at 

the agency level . . . .’” (quoting Kan. City v. HUD, 923 

F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). It is not the job of this 

court to fill in the gaps in the agency’s analysis. The

agency must explain why a different standard is justified. 

See Point Park Univ. v. NLRB, 457 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (“Nor can our Court fill in critical gaps in [an agency’s] reasoning. We can only look to the [agency’s] stated 

rationale. We cannot sustain its action on some other 

basis the [agency] did not mention.” (citation omitted)); 

see also Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 421 F.3d 

1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is well settled that an 

agency must explain its action with sufficient clarity to 

permit ‘effective judicial review.’” (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 

411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973))); Mortg. Inv’rs Corp. of Ohio

v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

III.

“There was a time not long ago when courts and legal 

scholars viewed allegations of rape [and other forms of 

sexual assault] with automatic suspicion, and judges 

instructed juries accordingly.” Osburn v. Hagel, 46 F. 

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ted). Thankfully, those days are supposed to be behind 

us, but the Secretary’s denial letter provides a reminder 

of the need to be ever vigilant lest such irrational bias 

encroach once again into the legal and regulatory sphere. 

Unfortunately, we are unable to know whether that is the 

case with respect to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5), because no 

explanation whatsoever has been provided. Because the 

Secretary’s denial of the Petition for Rulemaking does not 

describe any facts or policy concerns that might justify the 

disparate evidentiary requirements applied to similarly 

situated veterans claiming service connection for PTSD, it 

does not evince reasoned decisionmaking. I therefore 

respectfully dissent. 

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