Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00349/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00349-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
John Harp
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN HARP,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00349-SAB

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 

PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(ECF Nos. 26, 28)

Petitioner Jacqueline A. Forslund (“Counsel”), attorney for Plaintiff John Harp 

(“Plaintiff”), filed the instant motion for attorney fees on October 17, 2016. Counsel requests 

fees in the net amount of $13,032.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff has not 

objected to the request. On October 31, 2016, Defendant Social Security Commissioner, as a de 

facto trustee for Plaintiff, filed a response to Petitioner’s motion providing an analysis of the fee 

request. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint challenging the denial of social security benefits on 

March 11, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) On April 20, 2015, the magistrate judge’s order issued finding

that the ALJ erred by not providing reasons for finding that Plaintiff’s mental health condition 

had not worsened to overcome the presumption of nondisability. (ECF No. 22.) The Court 

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entered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor and the action was remanded on April 20, 2015. (ECF No. 

23.) 

On remand, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled as of July 2010, and past benefits 

were awarded in the amount of $99,743.00.

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 (ECF No. 47-3 at 1.) The Commissioner withheld 

$24,948.25 from the past-due benefit for attorney fees. This amount equals 25 percent of the 

retroactive benefit award. (Id.) Petitioner has previously received payment of $6,000.00 in 

EAJA fees. (ECF Nos. 24, 25.) In the instant motion, Petitioner seeks an additional $13,032.00

which is a gross award of $19,032.00 for work performed in this action.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a 

judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the 

court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due 

benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such 

award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 

406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the 

claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. 

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful 

attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test 

it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). Agreements 

seeking fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded are not 

enforceable. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148. The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the 

fees requested are reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148.

In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the 

 

1 The award letter does not state the amount of back benefits awarded, but does state that twenty five percent, or 

$24,948.25, was withheld from the past due benefits. (ECF No. 26-1 at 3.) This would make the total award 

$99,743.00 (4 x $24,948.25). 

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character of the representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 800. Ultimately, 

an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under 

Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met 

his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the 

standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney 

exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of 

past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the 

benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586 

F.3d at 1151. 

III.

DISCUSSION

The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the 

requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. Here, the fee agreement 

between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides for a fee “totaling up to 25% of all past due benefits, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), if the CLIENT is awarded benefits” after the action is remanded 

back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. (Fee Agreement & Contract, 

attached to Motion, ECF No. 26-1.) Plaintiff has been awarded benefits from July 2010 through 

September 2016 in the amount of $99,743.00. (ECF No. 26-2 at 1.) In determining the 

reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court is to apply the test mandated by Gisbrecht.

There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance. 

Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff. 

Although this action does involve six years of backpay, there is no indication that Counsel was 

responsible for any substantial delay in the court proceedings. Plaintiff agreed to a 25 percent 

fee at the outset of the representation and Petitioner is seeking payment of $13,032.00. 

Considering the prior award of $6,000.00 the total amount sought by Petitioner is $19,032.00, 

which is 19.08 percent of the backpay award. The $19,032.00 fee is not excessively large in 

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relation to the past-due award of $99,743.00. In making this determination, the Court recognizes 

the contingent nature of this case and Counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. 

Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

In support of the motion, Petitioner submits a log of the time spent in prosecuting this 

action. (Time Log, ECF No. 26-3.) The log demonstrates that Petitioner spent 36.6 hours on this 

action. (Id.) When considering the total amount requested by Petitioner, the fee request 

translates to $520.00 per hour for Petitioner’s services in this action. In Crawford the appellate 

court found that a fee of $875 and $902 per hour, for time of both attorneys and paralegals, was 

not excessive. Crawford, 486 F.3d at 1152 (dissenting opinion). 

The Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the amount of 

work Petitioner performed in representing Plaintiff in court. Petitioner’s representation of the 

claimant resulted in the action being remanded for further proceedings and ultimately benefits 

were awarded. Counsel also submitted a detailed billing statement which supports her request. 

(ECF No. 26-3.) 

The award of Section 406(b) fees is offset by any prior award of attorney fees granted 

under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. In this instance, Petitioner has 

previously been awarded $6,000.00 in EAJA fees and the award of fees under Section 406(b) 

must be offset in that amount.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to 

Section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the 

amount of $19,032.00 is GRANTED; 

2. Pursuant to counsel’s request, this amount shall be paid directly to Jacqueline A. 

Forslund. The Commissioner is to remit to Plaintiff the remainder of his withheld 

benefits; and

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3. Petitioner is ordered to refund $6,000.00 of the Section 406(b) fees awarded to 

Plaintiff as an offset for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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