Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03919/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03919-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Green
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3919

___________

United States of America,

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Johnny Green, *

* 

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 11, 2005

Filed: November 16, 2005 

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Johnny Green appeals his convictions for three counts of social security fraud

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), one count of accessing a computer to steal

information used fraudulently to gain credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4),

and three counts of devising a scheme to defraud a financial institution in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. Green contends the district court1

 erred by admitting

evidence relating to victims not listed in the Superceding Indictment, by admitting

posters into evidence without proper limiting instructions, and by not dismissing a

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juror Green claims was asleep during part of the proceedings. He also challenges his

sentence under United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). We affirm.

I

Green organized an identity-theft scheme during which he paid two SBC

Communication, Inc. employees to steal names, addresses, and social security

numbers of California customers. Green then used this information to purchase flatscreen televisions from Dell Computers (Dell) online, using instant credit provided

by Dell. The televisions were delivered to the houses of Green and his friends and

family in St. Louis, Missouri. 

Green was tried before a twelve-member jury, but no alternates remained

following the exercise of both sides' challenges. During the trial, the government

presented testimony from fifteen victims, only six of whom were specifically named

in the Superceding Indictment. Each of the victims traveled from California to St.

Louis to testify as to their experience, recounting the steps taken to prove they did not

purchase the equipment and to repair their credit. Two witnesses testified in lieu of

elderly or deceased parents.

The government presented evidence connecting the victims to Green, including

voluminous records from Dell and SBC. Over Green's objections, the district court

allowed into evidence four large charts, two of which outlined individual transactions

and two of which summarized the evidence in spreadsheet form. 

During the second day of trial, Green noticed a juror who appeared to be

asleep. After bringing this to the attention of the court, the court ordered a brief

recess and noted the juror at issue "got up slower" than the others. The district court,

however, did not question the juror or make any findings on the record as to whether

the juror was asleep.

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At the conclusion of the trial, the court gave the following instruction regarding

the charts: "You may use those summaries or charts as evidence. It is for you to

decide how much weight if any, you will give to them. In making that decision, you

should consider all of the testimony you heard about the way in which they were

prepared." The jury reached a verdict of guilty on all seven counts. During the

sentencing phase, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt six sentencing

enhancements. However, it did not determine Green obstructed justice beyond a

reasonable doubt. Based on these factors, Green's offense level was twenty-six and

his criminal history was category two, resulting in a Guideline range of seventy to

eighty-seven months of imprisonment. During sentencing, the court stated although

the obstruction enhancement would have been warranted prior to Blakley v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), it was inapplicable under the circumstances.

Green was sentenced to seventy-two months of imprisonment to account for the

"serious nature" of the crimes committed and the "objectives of just punishment,

general deterrence, and incapacitation." 

II

We review the district court's legal interpretation of an evidentiary rule de

novo, United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 991 (8th Cir. 2004), but review the

district court's application of the rule for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

King, 351 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2003). Green contends the district court abused its

discretion in allowing the testimony of nine victims who were not specifically

referenced in the Superceding Indictment because the prejudicial nature of the

evidence outweighed its probative value.

Despite Green's argument to the contrary, the testimony of these victims is

relevant. United States v. Swinton, 75 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding facts

surrounding uncharged transactions can be admitted if the "collected transactions

were all part of a single scheme" or the "uncharged transactions were so blended or

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connected . . . that proof of one incidentally involves" the others) (quoting United

States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986)). "Although relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice . . . or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Even if evidence is

erroneously admitted, we will not overturn the conviction unless the substantial rights

of the defendant were affected. United States v. Buffalo, 358 F.3d 519, 527 (8th Cir.

2004). 

No such error occurred in this case. The evidence presented at trial may have

been emotional, but Green cannot show it "lure[d] the factfinder into declaring guilt

on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged." Old Chief v.

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). Additionally, even if the district court erred

in admitting cumulative evidence, any error was harmless in light of the evidence

submitted regarding the victims named in the Superceding Indictment. 

Green next contends the district court erred in admitting charts without the

proper limiting instructions. The admissibility of summary charts, graphs, and

exhibits "rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose action in allowing

their use may not be disturbed by an appellate court except for an abuse of

discretion." United States v. King, 616 F.2d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1980). "The

contents of voluminous writings, . . . which cannot conveniently be examined in court

may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation." Fed. R. Evid.

1006. Summary evidence is properly admitted when (1) the charts "fairly summarize"

voluminous trial evidence; (2) they assist the jury in "understanding the testimony

already introduced"; and (3) "the witness who prepared the charts is subject to crossexamination with all documents used to prepare the summary." King, 616 F.2d at

1041. Additionally, the charts may "include assumptions and conclusions, but said

assumptions and conclusions must be based upon evidence in the record." United

States v. Wainright, 351 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2003). Charts properly admitted

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under Rule 1006 can be treated as evidence and allowed in the jury room during

deliberations, but the district court should issue proper limiting instructions. See

United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1988). 

The four charts in this case summarized evidence already introduced at trial,

namely records from SBC and Dell. The charts assisted the jury in understanding

how the scheme was perpetrated, and the witness who prepared the charts was

available for cross examination. Thus, the charts were properly admitted.

Additionally, the district court did not err in instructing the jury to consider the charts

as evidence while also taking into account "all of the testimony" heard and the "way

in which [the charts] were prepared." See United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 951

(8th Cir. 2004) (holding reversal warranted only when instructions, when taken as a

whole, do not "fairly and adequately" contain the applicable law). 

The trial court also retains broad discretion in determining whether to dismiss

a juror accused of sleeping. United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1087 (8th Cir.

2001). We will not find an abuse of discretion if the record shows a legitimate reason

for the court’s decision to retain the juror. United States v. Wilcox, 50 F.3d 600, 603

(8th Cir. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion when the district court believed the

juror accused of sleeping actually heard the testimony and was capable of issuing a

fair and impartial decision). In this case, Green alerted the district court of a juror

who may have been asleep during the proceedings. The government responded the

juror had been awake and looking around. The district court granted a short recess

to give the jury a chance to stretch but did not make any findings as to whether the

juror in question was actually asleep. Based on this scant evidence, we cannot say

the district court abused its discretion. 

Finally, Green contends his sentence should be vacated in light of Blakely and

Booker. Although Booker was not decided at the time of Green’s sentencing, his

objections based on Blakely are sufficient to preserve the non-constitutional error

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claimed. United States v. Brooks, 417 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005). We review this

claim for harmless error. United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 2005).

The government, as the beneficiary of the error, bears the burden of proving no

“grave doubt” exists as to whether the “error substantially influenced the outcome of

the proceedings.” Id. As in United States v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th

Cir. 2005), we have no “grave doubt” in this case because the district court “left

unused some of its discretion” when it sentenced Green two months above the

minimum Guideline range. The district court’s statements regarding the severity of

Green’s crime, coupled with its remarks concerning the applicability of an obstruction

enhancement under the pre-Blakely regime, leave us with no such “grave doubt.”

Furthermore, the sentence Green received is not unreasonable in light of the factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, we affirm both Green's conviction and

his sentence.

______________________________

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