Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-05218/USCOURTS-ca10-93-05218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Holt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DAVID HOLT, as Personal Representative 

of the Estates of JAMES W. HOLT and 

JOAN HOLT, deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

FILED 

United States Court of App~ls 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 3 0 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-5218 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 92-C-601-E) 

Michael D. Parks of Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper, McCune & Parks, 

McAlester, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen C. 

Lewis, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BALD02K and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District 

Judge.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff David Holt appeals the district court's dismissal 

of his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 1 
... The instant dispute involves a fatal automobile accident 

which occurred on Oklahoma State Highway 151 where it traverses 

Keystone Dam ("the Dam"), near Tulsa, Oklahoma.1 The Dam is a 

multi-purpose facility forming Keystone Lake and managed by the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") as part of a 

system of eleven reservoirs comprising the Arkansas River Basin. 

In carrying out its management duties, the Corps monitors the 

water level of Keystone Lake to determine how much water to 

release downstream into the Arkansas River. Portals called 

"powerhouse turbines" at the base of the Dam and "tainter gates" 

at the top of the Dam allow the discharge of water through the 

Dam. Releases made through tainter gates create a mist or spray 

as the water falls approximately seventy-five feet to the 

downstream surface of the Arkansas River. 

In order to control the release of water through the Dam, the 

Corps has implemented a water control plan designed to meet flood 

control and specific navigational objectives of the Arkansas River 

Basin. Under the plan, water contained in the Dam's flood control 

pool is released within prescribed limits by taking into account 

the level of reservoirs comprising the Arkansas River Basin. 

Through these releases, the Corps is able to evacuate the flood 

control pool in Keystone Lake and achieve desired water levels in 

the Arkansas River Basin. 

On December 25, 1991, the level of Keystone Lake had risen 

eight feet above the minimum flood control pool level of 723 feet. 

1 On September 1, 1965, the Secretary of the Army granted 

Oklahoma a perpetual easement of right-of-way over the Dam, which 

subsequently became part of Oklahoma State Highway 151. 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 2 
As a result, the Corps began to release water through the 

powerhouse turbines and the tainter gates. Under the existing 

freezing conditions, mist created from water released through the 

tainter gates formed an ice slick on the portion of Highway 151 

which traverses the Darn. While travelling in the northbound lane 

of Highway 151, Plaintiff's parents were killed when an on-corning 

vehicle slid on the ice slick, crossed the median line, and struck 

the decedents' car. 

On July 14, 1992, Plaintiff sued the United States in federal 

district court pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged 

that the Corps was negligent when it failed: (1) to warn the 

public and the Oklahoma Department of Transportation of the icy 

road conditions, and (2) to clear the hazardous road conditions. 

On September 30, 1992, the government filed a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or in the 

alternative for summary judgment. The district court dismissed 

the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1), holding that the government was immune 

from liability under the Flood Control Act of 1928 ("the Act"), 33 

U.S.C. § 702c. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Plaintiff contends the government is not immune 

from liability under § 702c of the Act. Specifically, Plaintiff 

contends the government has failed to establish a nexus between 

the injuries sustained by the decedents and flood control 

activities at the Darn sufficient to invoke the protective immunity 

of the Act. 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 3 
I. 

As an initial matter, we must determine our standard of 

review. Plaintiff contends that the district court's dismissal 

pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) should be treated as one for summary 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 because matters outside the 

pleadings were received and considered. Under the summary 

judgment standard, Plaintiff contends the district court 

erroneously resolved a disputed material fact concerning whether 

the waters which formed the ice slick were released for 

navigational or flood control purposes. We disagree. 

Generally, Rule 12(b) (1) motions to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction take two forms. First, a facial 

attack on the complaint's allegations as to subject matter 

jurisdiction questions the sufficiency of the complaint. Ohio 

Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 

1990). In reviewing a facial attack on the complaint, a district 

court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. 

Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in the 

complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter 

jurisdiction depends. Id. When reviewing a factual attack on 

subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the 

truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations. Id. A court 

has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a 

limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional 

facts under Rule 12(b) (1). Id.; Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 

259 n.S (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987). In such 

instances, a court's reference to evidence outside the pleadings 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 4 
does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion. Wheeler, 825 

F.2d at 259 n.5. 

However, a court is required to convert a Rule 12(b) (1) 

motion to dismiss into a Rule 12(b) (6) motion or a Rule 56 summary 

judgment motion when resolution of the jurisdictional question is 

intertwined with the merits of the case. -Id. at 259; see also 

Redmond v. United States, 934 F.2d 1151, 1155 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

The jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the 

case if subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on the same 

statute which provides the substantive claim in the case. 

Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259. 

In the instant case, Defendant's Rule 12(b) (1) motion did not 

mount a mere facial challenge to the complaint, but instead raised 

a factual challenge to the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendant claimed that waters which 

caused the ice slick to form on Highway 151 were in fact released 

for flood control purposes, rendering the government immune from 

suit under § 702c of the Act. Consequently, unless the 

jurisdictional issue is intertwined with the merits of Plaintiff's 

case, the district court properly considered evidence outside of 

the pleadings and resolved factual disputes without converting the 

motion into a Rule 56 motion. Here, resolution of the 

jurisdictional issue--i.e., whether the government is immune from 

suit under § 702c of the Act--does not depend on the FTCA which 

provides the substantive claims in the case. Thus, the district 

court properly treated the government's motion as one brought 

pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1). See, ~, McCarthy v. United States, 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 5 
850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court properly 

considered the question of governmental immunity under the Flood 

Control Act pursuant to a Rule 12(b) (1) motion), cert. denied, 489 

u.s. 1052 (1989). 

Accordingly, we review the district court's dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) de 

novo. Williams v. United States, 957 F.2d 742, 743 (lOth Cir. 

1992). We review the district court's findings of jurisdictional 

facts for clear error. Ohio Nat'l Life, 922 F.2d at 326 ("Where a 

trial court's ruling on jurisdiction is based in part on the 

resolution of factual disputes, a reviewing court must accept the 

district court's findings unless they are 'clearly erroneous.'"). 

II. 

Having determined our standard of review, we next address 

Plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in 

determining the government was immune from suit under § 702c of 

the Act. Section 702c states in pertinent part, "No liability of 

any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any 

damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place .... " 

Under this provision, the district court determined that immunity 

applied because waters released from the Dam for flood control 

purposes formed the ice slick which resulted in the accident. 

The Supreme Court has broadly construed the immunity offered 

by § 702c in United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986). In 

James, recreational users of a reservoir drowned when the Corps 

released water through a dam for the purpose of controlling 

flooding. The Court held that § 702c immunized the government 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 6 
from suit in an action for personal injuries caused by "waters 

contained in or carried through a federal flood control project 

for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters 

that such projects cannot control." Id. at 605. However, in a 

footnote, the Court cited with approval two circuit court opinions 

suggesting that § 702c immunity would not be available if a 

plaintiff could show the harm suffered was "wholly unrelated" to 

flood control. Id. at 605 n.7. 

Following the Supreme CouFt's decision in James, we decided 

Boyd v. United States ex rel. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 

881 F.2d 895 (lOth Cir. 1989). In Boyd, the plaintiff's decedent 

was struck by a boat while snorkeling in a lake under the 

jurisdiction and control of the Corps. Id. at 896. We rejected 

the government's claim of immunity under § 702c, holding that the 

government had failed to show a sufficient nexus between flood 

control activities and the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. 

Id. at 900. Without setting forth "every conceivable situation" 

in which a proper nexus could be established, we simply noted the 

requisite nexus had not been established under the particular 

facts of the case. Id. Rather, the injuries suffered as a result 

of being struck by a boat while snorkeling in a lake were more 

properly "associated with operating a recreational facility" than 

with flood control operations. Id. 

In adopting the nexus approach, we expressly rejected the 

rationale espoused by the Ninth Circuit in McCarthy v. United 

States, 850 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 

1052 (1989). Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900. In McCarthy, the Ninth 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 7 
Circuit relied on James and held that § 702c immunity 

presumptively applies unless the plaintiff establishes that the 

damage or injury was "wholly unrelated" to a congressionally 

authorized flood control project. See McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 563. 

In Boyd, we criticized the "wholly unrelated" approach because it 

created a "but for" connection between flood control activity and 

the injury occurring at a flood control project--i.e., "if the 

injury would not have occurred but for the creation of a flood 

control lake, the government is immune." Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900. 

Under these circumstances, we determined that "[s]uch a connection 

is too attenuated to warrant the invocation of§ 702c." 

We condensed the reasoning of James and Boyd into a 

two-pronged test for establishing governmental immunity under 

§ 702c in Williams v. United States, 957 F.2d 742 (lOth Cir. 

1992). In Williams, we held that a court must examine whether (1) 

there is "'a flood control project' that triggers the Act," and 

(2) a nexus exists between flood control activities and the 

2 Other circuits have rejected Boyd's disapproval of the wholly 

unrelated standard and its determination that government operation 

of a dam as a recreational facility does not provide sovereign 

immunity. See Bailey v. United States Dept. of Army COkPS of 

Eng'rs, 35 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 1994) (Boyd's "rationale 

would appear directly contrary to James."); Zavadil v. United · 

States, 908 F.2d 334, 336 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (indicating Boyd's 

view has been repeatedly rejected by other circuits) (citing 

cases), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991); Dawson v. United 

States, 894 F.2d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 1990) ("To the extent Boyd 

reexamines the meaning of section 702c and its legislative 

history, it is contrary to the binding pronouncement by the 

Supreme Court in James and thus we decline to follow it."). 

Nevertheless, we are bound to apply ~ and its progeny in the 

instant case. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 178 

n.l (lOth Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) ("[A] three judge panel 

cannot disregard or overrule circuit precedent."). 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 8 
injuries sustained. Id. at 743 (citing Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900). 

The inquiry under the nexus prong is primarily a factual one 

whereby a court must determine "the nature of the activity 

creating the nexus with the injury." Id. at 744. Once this 

two-pronged test has been met, the government is immune from suit 

under § 702c. Id. at 743. 

Applying the Williams test to the instant case, the parties 

agree that the Dam is a flood control project "within the ambit of 

the statute." James, 478 U.S. at 605. However, the parties 

disagree that the requisite nexus between flood control activities 

and the injuries sustained at the Dam has been shown. Plaintiff 

contends that the government failed to show the required nexus 

between flood control activities and the injury to decedents. 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the release of water which 

caused the ice slick to form on Highway 151 was made for 

navigational rather than flood control purposes. In support of 

this contention, Plaintiff relies on the Corps' water control plan 

which requires that water contained in the Dam's flood control 

pool be used for purposes of regulating navigation in the Arkansas 

River Basin. Aplt. App. at 77-82, 151-54. The government 

disagrees and contends that the release which caused the ice slick 

was made as part of flood control activity. 

We conclude the government has shown a sufficient nexus 

between flood control activities at the Dam and the injuries 

suffered by the decedents so that § 702c immunity bars Plaintiff's 

lawsuit. The record indicates the Dam was created in part, for 

flood control purposes. As the resident engineer for Reservoir 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 9 
Control at the Dam testified, flood control operations do not 

occur only when a major flood is imminent. Rather, flood control 

operations include redistributing inflows in the Dam's flood 

control pool downstream into the Arkansas River Basin thereby 

meeting navigational needs. In making these discharges, the Corps 

examines the conditions and water levels of the Arkansas River 

reservoir system and "determine[s] how much discharge should be 

made . . . to achieve . . . target flows called for by the System 

Operating Plan." Aplee. App. at 303. These discharges allow the 

Corps to evacuate the Dam's flood control storage in preparation 

for future, subsequent flooding while at the same time meeting the 

specific navigational needs of the Arkansas River Basin system. 

Aplee. App. at 16, 311. 

In the instant case, the releases which caused the ice slick 

to form on Highway 151 were made in order to evacuate the Dam's 

"flood control storage." Aplee. App. at 316. Despite Plaintiff's 

contentions to the contrary, merely because the released waters 

were also used for navigational purposes downstream does not 

negate the underlying flood control purpose of the release. We 

therefore hold that the government has established the requisite 

nexus between flood control activities and the injuries sustained 

by the decedents. Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900. As a result, the 

government is immune from suit under § 702c. Accord Zavadil, 908 

F.2d at 336 (finding § 702c immunity where the dam's water level 

was being monitored for both flood control and navigational 

purposes). Thus, the district court correctly dismissed this 

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Appellate Case: 93-5218 Document: 01019290326 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 10 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) .3 

AFFIRMED. 

3 Having determined the government is immune from suit under 

§ 702c of the Act, we need not address the government's 

alternative argument that the discretionary function exception to 

the FTCA bars Plaintiff's lawsuit. 

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