Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01509/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01509-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Sean Michael Emmons
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SEAN MICHAEL EMMONS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-1509-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For 

the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion is granted; the Commissioner’s motion is denied; 

and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging that he had been disabled since January 1, 

2009. Administrative Record (“AR”) 154-163. His application was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. Id. at 92-96, 100-104. On July 25, 2014, a hearing was held before 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. Id. at 28-69. Plaintiff represented himself at 

the hearing, at which he testified. Id. 

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 On January 9, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 11-23. The ALJ made the following specific 

findings: 

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 31, 2011, the 

application date (20 CFR 416.920 et seq.). 

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: status post open reduction internal 

fixation (ORIF) of the left wrist, left shoulder pain, hepatitis C, mood disorder, 

schizoaffective disorder, and antisocial personality disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

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 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 

* * * 

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) 

except the claimant is unable to perform fine manipulation with the left hand and limited 

to simple unskilled work. 

* * * 

5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965). 

6. The claimant was born on September 27, 1968 and was 42 years old, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963). 

7. The claimant has at least a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 

CFR 416.964). 

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past 

relevant work (20 CFR 416.968). 

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

10. The claimant has not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, since 

May 31, 2011, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)) 

Id. at 13-22. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on May 18, 2015, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

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Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues that erred by (1) failing to explain what weight he gave the opinions of 

plaintiff’s treating physicians; (2) failing to fully develop the record; (3) finding that plaintiff was 

not credible without providing clear and convincing reasons; (4) finding that plaintiff had the 

RFC to perform medium work; and (5) relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines to find that 

plaintiff was not disabled. ECF No. 13-1 at 14-23. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Records From Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians 

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to adequately explain what weight he gave his 

treating physicians, Dr. Payvandi and Dr. Morales. Id. at 14-16. 

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. Ordinarily, more 

weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know 

and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 

1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

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and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional 

may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 

Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

However, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating 

physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician 

are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to given any explanation for why he disregarded the 

treating physician’s opinion that plaintiff “has significant loss of function of the left hand” with 

no grip strength. ECF No. 13-1 at 15. While the treating doctor’s report includes that statement, 

plaintiff’s argument overstates its context. Dr. Payvandi performed surgery on plaintiff’s left 

wrist on February 12, 2011. AR 335-336. Ten days later, at his first follow-up evaluation, 

plaintiff reported that his hand felt fine and expressed optimism about “how it already looks.” Id. 

at 334. Dr. Payvandi placed plaintiff in a short arm cast and instructed him to elevate his arm to 

decrease swelling. Id. He further noted that plaintiff “will return to my clinic in four weeks at 

which time we will remove the cast, obtain new x-rays, and arrange for him to see a therapist and 

begin gentle range of motion exercises.” 

At plaintiff’s next appointment, Dr. Payvandi removed plaintiff’s cast and provided 

plaintiff with a removable splint. Id. at 332-333. Objective findings on physical examination 

included no grip strength and “a significant loss of function of the left hand.” Id. at 332. 

However, Dr. Payvandi explained that plaintiff presented “with loss of range of motion, strength 

and function about his left hand secondary to his fracture and surgical fixation along with 

casting,” and that plaintiff “is ready to go into a splint [and] in a month he’ll be ready for formal 

rehabilitation.” He identified plaintiff’s goals as restoring his range of motion, strength, and 

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function to plaintiff’s left hand. Id. Subsequent treatment notes reflect that plaintiff’s range of 

motion and grip strength improved. Id. at 328-330. 

Thus, Dr. Payvandi did not opine that plaintiff has significant functional limitations to his 

left hand that would interfere with his ability to work. Rather, he observed, unsurprisingly, that 

plaintiff had reduced function and grip strength after having his arm in a cast subsequent to 

surgery. Dr. Payvandi did not provide any opinion regarding plaintiff’s functional limitations, 

and plaintiff’s attempt to use his comment out of context is unavailing. 

Plaintiff also appears to suggest that the ALJ failed to adequately consider an opinion 

from examining physician Dr. Roger Wagner, who found that plaintiff “might have some slight 

limitations with the left arm.” ECF No. 13-1 at 15 (“Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should be 

found to have erred by failing to resolve the conflict between the opinion of Dr. Payvandi that he 

had ‘ . . . significant loss of function of the left hand,’ and the opinion of Dr. Wagner who found 

that plaintiff ‘ . . . might have some slight limitations with the left arm.’”) (citations omitted). 

This argument also appears to be based on a misreading of the record. 

Dr. Wagner performed a comprehensive internal medicine evaluation. Id. at 341-345. Of 

significance here, Dr. Wagner found that plaintiff’s left wrist had a limited range of motion, but 

plaintiff did not have any significant pain over his wrist and exhibited good grip strength. Id. at 

341. He opined that plaintiff could carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. Id. at 

345. He also opined that plaintiff had no manipulative limitations with his right extremities, but 

stated that plaintiff “might have some slight limitations with the left arm.” Id. The ALJ, 

however, accorded great weight to Dr. Wagner’s opinion and determined that plaintiff “is unable 

to perform fine manipulation with the left hand.” Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, the 

ALJ did not reject Dr. Wagner’s opinion. 

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to provide any basis for rejecting an opinion from 

plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Eduardo Morales. ECF No. 13-1. However, the May 30, 

2013 treatment note cited by plaintiff contains only Dr. Morales’s clinical findings from his 

examination on that date, and does not contain an opinion regarding plaintiff’s functional 

limitations or mental restrictions. AR 357-258. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2) (“Medical 

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opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources 

that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your 

symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your 

physical or mental restrictions.”). As noted by plaintiff, Dr. Morales did indicate that on the date 

of examination plaintiff was not able to perform full time work. AR 358. The ALJ, however, 

was not bound by that opinion because it concerns the ultimate determination of disability, which 

is an issue reserved for the Commissioner. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight in 

disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an impairment or the 

ultimate determination of disability.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d), (d)(1) (“A statement by a 

medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine 

that you are disabled.” Such statements “are not medical opinions . . ., but are, instead, opinions 

on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are 

dispositive of a case; i.e. that would direct the determination of disability). Thus, Dr. Morales did 

not provide a medical opinion for the ALJ to consider. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ erred in evaluating the 

medical opinion evidence of record. 

B. The ALJ Failed to Fully Develop the Record 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to fully and fairly develop the record. 

ECF No. 13-1 at 16-18. 

A claimant bears the burden of providing medical and other evidence to support his or her 

claim of disability. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 (“At all times, the burden is on the claimant to 

establish her entitlement to disability insurance benefits.”). However, the ALJ also has “an 

independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests 

are considered.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. Although this duty is present regardless of 

whether claimant is represented, the ALJ must be especially diligent in exploring for all the 

relevant facts when the claimant is unrepresented. Id. “Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own 

finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the 

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ALJ’s duty to conduct an appropriate inquiry.” Id. However, “[a] specific finding of ambiguity 

or inadequacy of the record is not necessary to trigger this duty to inquire, where the record 

establishes ambiguity or inadequacy.” McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). 

When the duty is triggered, the ALJ may discharge it “in several ways, including: subpoenaing 

the claimant’s physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the 

hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” 

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to ensure that all of plaintiff’s medical records were 

obtained. ECF No. 13-1. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to obtain all records 

reflecting mental health treatment he received after his release from prison.2 ECF No. 13-1 at 16. 

Plaintiff appeared at the administrative hearing without counsel and testified that since his release 

from prison in November 2010, he has received mental health treatment from Dr. Morales 

through the “SAC Metro Parole Division.” AR 35-36. He also stated that he was enrolled in 

monthly mental health outpatient classes through the same agency. Id. at 38. 

The ALJ informed plaintiff that he did not have these records, but would try to obtain 

them. Id. at 36-37. However, it does not appear that he ever did. The record contains a single 

progress note from Dr. Morales, dated May 30, 2013. Id. at 357-358. This progress note 

indicates that May 30, 2013, was not the only date plaintiff received treating from this physician. 

The document reflects plaintiff’s report that he felt more stable on his current medication, but still 

believed he was unable to function. Id. at 357. In addition to detailing the findings from 

plaintiff’s mental status examination, the document specifically states that no medications were 

discontinued and no new medications were prescribed, and that plaintiff was scheduled to return 

for a follow-up visit in 4 weeks. 

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 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to obtain a prison chronos stating that he could 

not lift more than five or ten pounds nor engage in repetitive movement. ECF No. 13-1 at 16. 

Plaintiff is mistaken. The record contains a Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono stating that 

plaintiff should avoid repetitively using his left arm and should not engage in lifting more than 5 

pounds. AR 359-361. 

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Thus, the single treatment note from Dr. Morales indicates that plaintiff had previously 

been seen by Dr. Morales and been prescribed medication, and that he was scheduled for a 

follow-up appointment. Furthermore, plaintiff informed the ALJ that he was receiving mental 

health treatment from Dr. Morales. See id. 35-36. But despite the ALJ’s statement that he would 

obtain mental health treatment records, there is no indication from the record or the ALJ’s 

decision that he attempted to obtain additional records from Dr. Morales. This is especially 

problematic given that the ALJ discredited plaintiff’s allegations regarding his mental 

impairments because “[t]here are no mental health treatment records consisting of any mental 

health treatments, therapy sessions, mental status examination and prescriptions for psychotropic 

medications since the claimant’s application filing date.” AR 20. 

As the ALJ failed to fully develop the record, the case must be remanded for further 

proceedings.3

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: September 29, 2016. 

 3

 Because the case must be remanded for further consideration, the court declines to 

address plaintiff’s additional argument. 

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