Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-13742/USCOURTS-ca11-23-13742-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donda, LLC
Appellee
FI Real Estate Fund Two LP
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13742

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

FI REAL ESTATE FUND TWO LP, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DONDA, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cv-80684-AMC

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13742

Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

FI Real Estate Fund Two LP (“FI Real Estate”) appeals the 

district court’s order dismissing its suit against Donda, LLC

(“Donda”), for failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After 

careful review, we affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2023, FI Real Estate sought to buy a property 

Donda owned located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. After some initial 

negotiations, the parties entered into a letter of intent (“LOI”) on 

March 3, 2023, regarding a potential sale. 

By its terms, the LOI “outline[d] the major terms and conditions in which [FI Real Estate] would enter in to a Purchase and 

Sale Agreement” for the property. The LOI identified the property, 

listed a proposed price ($4,200,000.00), and explained that a deposit 

was to be made “upon execution of a Purchase and Sale Agreement.” The LOI also highlighted some terms which were contingent or upon which the parties had not yet agreed. For instance, 

the LOI stated that title and escrow services would be provided by

a “Title Insurance Company to be agreed upon between buyer and 

seller,” and that FI Real Estate would have 30 days to investigate 

the property after receiving “due diligence items from the Seller.” 

At the end of the document, the LOI stated: 

If [Donda is] willing to proceed in good faith to attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable Purchase 

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23-13742 Opinion of the Court 3

Contract, please so indicate by signing the acceptance 

block set forth below and return it to the undersigned. 

Execution of this otherwise non-binding letter of intent shall obligate us only to attempt to negotiate 

terms for a Purchase Contract mutually satisfactory 

to both parties and their respective counsel. It is 

hereby agreed that if both parties have not agreed 

upon the form and content of a mutually satisfactory 

Purchase Contract within fifteen (15) days, neither 

party shall be under any further obligation to negotiate with the other. During this period, however, 

[Donda] shall negotiate exclusively with [FI Real Estate] and not with any other potential purchasers and 

shall treat this letter of intent and all subsequent negotiations and the transactions anticipated thereby in 

a strictly confidential manner.

After FI Real Estate prepared the LOI, it sent the document to 

Donda, whose agent signed it. On March 16, however, Donda’s 

agent informed FI Real Estate that the seller had “got wishy washy 

again, and w[ould] not be selling.” The next day, FI Real Estate 

informed Donda that it viewed its behavior as a breach of the LOI, 

and this suit followed. 

In its first amended complaint, FI Real Estate brought five

counts against Donda. First, it alleged that the LOI constituted a 

valid, enforceable, and binding contract, and sought a court order 

requiring Donda “to honor and perform its obligations” under the 

LOI (“Count I”). Second, it requested a declaratory judgment that 

Donda was “obliged to negotiate and execute” a purchase and sale 

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agreement with it under the LOI (“Count II”). Third, it sued 

Donda for breach of the parties’ contract (“Count III”). Fourth, it 

alleged that Donda had breached an implied duty of good faith and 

fair dealing (“Count IV”). Fifth, FI Real Estate sued Donda for unjust enrichment (“Count V”), alleging that Donda had wrongfully 

received and retained the benefit of its “ownership and increased 

revenue, profits, business value and equity value in the Property 

that rightfully belong[ed] to” FI Real Estate.1

Donda moved to dismiss. It argued—as it argues on appeal—that there was no enforceable contract between the parties 

because the LOI was “a non-binding letter of intent.” Donda also 

contended that FI Real Estate’s unjust enrichment claim failed because FI Real Estate had not conferred any benefit on Donda, an 

element of the claim. 

After full briefing, a magistrate judge prepared a report and 

recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the district court grant 

Donda’s motion. The magistrate judge agreed with Donda that 

the LOI did not constitute an enforceable contract because Florida 

law requires “agreement on the essential terms of the transaction” 

for a contract to be enforceable. The magistrate judge explained 

that this Court’s unpublished decision in Aldora Aluminum & Glass 

1 The magistrate judge and district court concluded that Florida law applied to 

this dispute. On appeal, FI Real Estate does not argue that this conclusion was 

erroneous and, in addition, conceded below that there were not any relevant 

differences between Florida and Tennessee law. We agree with the magistrate 

judge and district court and apply Florida law in this decision.

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Products, Inc. v. Poma Glass & Specialty Windows, Inc., 683 F. App’x 

764 (11th Cir. 2017) (unpublished), was “instructive” on this point 

because there the parties executed an agreement to reach “acceptable agreements” about important terms which never were reached. 

The R&R highlighted that the LOI, similarly, “only” bound the parties “to attempt to negotiate terms for a Purchase Contract” that 

would be “mutually satisfactory.” Accordingly, it recommended 

that FI Real Estate’s breach of contract claim (Count III) be dismissed because there was no enforceable contract between the parties. 

The magistrate judge also rejected FI Real Estate’s other 

claims—reasoning that Counts I, II, and IV were each premised on 

the existence of a valid contract. The R&R then concluded that the

unjust enrichment claim, Count V, failed because FI Real Estate 

had not conferred any benefit on Donda. 

FI Real Estate objected to the R&R’s conclusions, raising 

many of the same arguments it now presses on appeal. Specifically, 

it argued that the LOI was an enforceable agreement that created 

a contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith, which Donda 

breached. It asserted that the magistrate judge had erred in relying 

on Aldora Aluminum which, in its view, was inapposite and inapplicable. Based on its contentions that the LOI constituted a valid 

contract, FI Real Estate argued that Counts I, II, III, and IV should 

be allowed to proceed. FI Real Estate also asserted that Count V, 

its unjust enrichment claim, should not be dismissed because its 

complaint had sufficiently “alleged [that] Donda knowingly and 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13742

wrongfully obtained, accepted, received and retained, and has 

used, and will continue to use, to its economic benefit, the ownership and increased revenue, profits, business value and equity value 

in the Property that rightfully belong to” FI Real Estate. It thus 

urged the district court to reject the R&R in its entirety and deny 

Donda’s motion to dismiss. 

In October 2023, the district court overruled FI Real Estate’s 

objections, accepted the R&R, and granted Donda’s motion to dismiss. It agreed with the R&R that, while the LOI was an agreement to exclusively negotiate in good faith for 15 days, it “did not 

by itself give rise to any enforceable rights or duties.” It concluded 

that letters of intent are not “categorically unenforceable in Florida” but are unenforceable where, as here, “the essential terms are 

so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken . . . .” The court therefore agreed

with the R&R that the LOI was an unenforceable “agreement to 

agree” with indefinite terms that did not represent a “meeting of 

the minds” on many essential terms. It explained that the terms 

were so uncertain that there was no basis for deciding whether the 

agreement was kept or broken. On this basis, it dismissed 

Count III. 

The district court also agreed with the R&R that the remaining counts were due to be dismissed. First, it explained that a 

breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim—

Count IV—“presumes the existence of an enforceable contract” 

which was not present here. Second, it agreed that Counts I and II

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23-13742 Opinion of the Court 7 

were due to be dismissed for the reasons the R&R had explained 

and that FI Real Estate’s “conclusory objections” did not “change 

th[at] analysis.” Finally, it found that FI Real Estate’s claim for unjust enrichment “presumes that [FI Real Estate] eventually would 

have purchased the property from” Donda, which was “far from 

certain” based on the complaint. Moreover, because the allegations of the complaint showed that there was no “concrete benefit 

conferred” by FI Real Estate on Donda, the court found that 

Count V failed as well. 

FI Real Estate timely appealed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a 

claim de novo, “accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as 

true, and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Plowright v. Miami Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 

2024) (alterations adopted) (quoting Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 

2019) (en banc)). “Plaintiffs must plead all facts establishing an entitlement to relief with more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ramirez v. 

Paradies Shops, LLC, 69 F.4th 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting 

Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012)). In 

other words, a “complaint must contain enough facts to make a 

claim for relief plausible on its face; a party must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13742

Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1324-25). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. at 1217-18 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009)). In undertaking this review, we need not accept legal conclusions in a complaint, “even when they are ‘couched as factual 

allegations.’” Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 

2024) (alterations adopted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, FI Real Estate argues that the district court erred 

in determining that the LOI was not a binding contract.2 It contends that the LOI was a contract that obliged Donda to negotiate 

in good faith and that “many jurisdictions” recognize a breach of 

contract even when the only duty broken is a duty to negotiate in 

good faith. FI Real Estate urges this court to apply the principles in 

these jurisdictions and to find that the parties entered into an express agreement to negotiate in good faith and Donda failed to follow through on that agreement. It concedes that the LOI “may not 

have bound the parties to the ultimate contractual goal” but asserts 

that it did bind Donda to negotiate in good faith. It also reiterates 

2 FI Real Estate alternatively asks us to certify the question of the enforceability 

of the LOI to the Florida Supreme Court. We deny that request. Of course, 

that court is “the final arbiter[] of state law” applicable to this case and nothing 

we say controls what they might say if presented with this case. See Lefrere v. 

Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2009). We need not certify any question here because we find the Florida caselaw sufficiently clear to resolve this 

dispute. 

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its argument that the district court and magistrate judge erred in 

applying Aldora Aluminum because the agreement in that case did 

not obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith, as was the case 

here. 

FI Real Estate also argues the district court erred in dismissing the remainder of its claims. First, it asserts that the district court 

erroneously dismissed its breach of implied duty of good faith and 

fair dealing, specific performance, and declaratory judgment claims 

based on the determination that there is no enforceable contract. 

Because, it alleges, the complaint alleged an enforceable contract, 

these rulings were erroneous. Finally, FI Real Estate argues that 

the district court erred in dismissing its claim for unjust enrichment 

because it had “confer[red] benefits on Donda” including “the ownership and increased expectancy revenue, profits, business value 

and equity value in the Property that rightfully belong[ed] to 

[FI Real Estate], but which Donda ha[d] wrongfully retained by virtue of its conduct.” It argues that, if not for Donda’s bad faith, the 

parties would have finalized a contract to proceed with the sale, 

and it contends that the district court erred in reaching a contrary 

conclusion. It contends that the allegations in its complaint—accepted as true—show that the parties would have reached a final 

purchase and sale contract. 

Donda, on the other hand, argues the district court correctly 

dismissed FI Real Estate’s suit. First, it maintains that a mere 

“agreement to agree” is unenforceable under Florida law and that 

is all the LOI here constituted. It argues the LOI did not give rise 

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to any enforceable rights and duties because it was non-binding and 

did not represent a meeting of the minds as to all essential terms. 

It also contends that FI Real Estate’s arguments rely heavily on inapposite law from other jurisdictions rather than relevant Florida 

and Eleventh Circuit law. It also argues that FI Real Estate’s other 

claims were properly dismissed. It argues that the claimsfor breach 

of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance, 

and declaratory judgment all failed because there was no valid enforceable contract. It also contends that FI Real Estate’s claim for 

unjust enrichment was properly dismissed because FI Real Estate 

did not confer a benefit on Donda. It asserts that the complaint 

only established that Donda “retain[ed] the benefits of ownership 

of its own property—that is, the status quo” which is not plausibly 

a benefit for the purposes of an unjust enrichment claim. It argues 

that the district court correctly disregarded FI Real Estate’s “speculative and conclusory allegations” that it would have purchased the 

property from Donda at the price proposed in the LOI. 

Under Florida law, an enforceable contract requires that all 

essential terms are sufficiently defined. See Vega v. T-Mobile USA, 

Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (“To prove the existence 

of a contract [under Florida law], a plaintiff must plead: (1) offer; 

(2) acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) sufficient specification of the 

essential terms.” (emphasis added) (citing St. Joe Corp v. McIver, 875 

So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004)). “Even though all the details are not 

definitely fixed, an agreement may be binding if the parties agree 

on the essential terms and seriously understand and intend the 

agreement to be binding on them.” Dozier v. Scruggs, 380 So. 3d 

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505, 509 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (quoting De Cespedes v. Bolanos, 

711 So. 2d 216, 217-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)). “What constitutes an 

‘essential term’ in an agreement may vary depending upon the nature of the contemplated transaction or agreement and is evaluated 

on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

Based on these principles, Florida courts have rejected 

agreements to keep negotiating in the future as unenforceable. See, 

e.g., Dep’t of Corr. v. C & W Food Serv. Inc., 765 So. 2d 728, 729-30

(Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“The obligation to negotiate renewal in good 

faith is, at most, an agreement to agree on something in the future. 

Because the parties have not yet agreed on the essential terms for 

the period in which the contract could be renewed, they do not 

have an enforceable contract for that period. . . . The court could 

not afford a remedy for the breach of a promise to negotiate a contract, because there would be no way to determine whether the 

parties would have reached an agreement had they negotiated.”); 

Suggs v. Defranco’s Inc., 626 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) 

(“Where essential terms of an agreement remain open, subject to 

future negotiation, there can be no enforceable contract.”); Allen v. 

Berry, 765 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“Where it appears 

that the parties are continuing to negotiate as to essential terms of 

an agreement, there can be no meeting of the minds.”). 

Upon review of the record and the LOI, we agree with the 

district court and magistrate judge that the LOI is not an enforceable contract under Florida law. The LOI represents only proposed 

“major terms and conditions” of a future contract, and, on its 

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terms, only required the parties to proceed with good-faith negotiations for 15 days going forward. The LOI states that “[e]xecution 

of this otherwise non-binding letter of intent [would] obligate [the 

parties] only to attempt to negotiate terms” that would be part of a 

final contract. (emphasis added). Accordingly, none of the proposed terms were binding on either party, and the only agreement 

in the LOI was to reach an acceptable agreement in the future. 

Thus, the “essential terms” of the agreement were not “sufficient[ly] specifi[ed]” in the LOI, Dozier, 380 So. 3d at 509, and the 

LOI is unenforceable under Florida law, see Vega, 564 F.3d at 1272; 

C&W Food Serv., 765 So. 2d at 729-30; Suggs, 626 So. 2d at 1101; Allen, 765 So. 2d at 122.

While FI Real Estate points to cases from several other jurisdictions, we need not discuss or distinguish those cases because, as 

we noted above, Florida law applies to this dispute and the caselaw 

of other jurisdictions does not show what Florida courts would do 

when faced with this circumstance. On the contrary, to prevail 

here, FI Real Estate would have had to: (i) provide Florida caselaw 

showing the LOI is enforceable; or(ii) argue that the law of another 

jurisdiction applies. FI Real Estate has not made either of these 

showings. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 

(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a party abandons an issue by not 

raising it on appeal); Murphy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 

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23-13742 Opinion of the Court 13

314 F.2d 30, 31 (5th Cir. 1963) (“It is elementary that the burden is 

on the appellants to show error.”).3

While FI Real Estate argues the district court and Magistrate 

Judge erred in relying on our unpublished decision in Aldora Aluminum, this was not error. Although our unpublished decisions are 

not binding authority, see 11th Cir. R. 36-2, the district court and 

magistrate judge found the case persuasive based on its factual similarities, see Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 

n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Unpublished opinions . . . are persuasive only 

insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”). Aldora Aluminum, like this 

case, involved a dispute over an agreement that provided that the 

parties would come to “acceptable agreements” on some essential 

items before the transaction would be finalized. See 683 F. App’x 

at 768-69. Given the factual similarities between that agreement 

and this one, the district court and magistrate judge did not reversibly err by looking to Aldora Aluminum—which cites and applies 

Florida law—rather than the cases FI Real Estate cites from other 

jurisdictions, which provide little insight on whether Florida law 

would hold the LOI enforceable. In any event, Florida law is clear 

notwithstanding our unpublished caselaw. Thus, we agree that the 

LOI is not an enforceable contract and affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Count III. 

3 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued by the close of business on September 30, 

1981, are binding precedent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 

1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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FI Real Estate’s remaining claims fare no better. FI Real Estate’s claims for breach of the implied warranty of good faith and 

fair dealing, for specific performance, and for a declaratory judgment—Counts I, II, and IV—all hinge on its contention that there 

was an enforceable agreement. Given that there was not, these 

claims were properly dismissed as well. 

FI Real Estate’s claim for unjust enrichment, Count V, was 

also properly dismissed because the complaint did not plausibly allege that FI Real Estate conferred a benefit on Donda. “Florida recognizes that claims for unjust enrichment may be appropriate 

when no contract exists, but the defendant nonetheless received 

something of value from the plaintiff.” Dixon v. Univ. of Mia., 

75 F.4th 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2023). There are three elements to 

an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law: “(1) plaintiff has 

conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge thereof; 

(2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred; 

and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for 

the defendant to retain the benefit without first paying the value 

thereof to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Doral Collision Ctr., Inc. v. 

Daimler Tr., 341 So. 3d 424, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)); see also Hillman 

Constr. Corp. v. Wainer, 636 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) 

(same). “Additionally, ‘to prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, 

the plaintiff must directly confer a benefit to the defendant.’” Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1101 (11th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812, 818 (Fla. 2017)). Here, the 

only benefit that FI Real Estate has alleged that it conferred on

Donda is Donda’s own continued possession of Donda’s own 

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property. However, FI Real Estate has not conferred a benefit, let 

alone “directly confer[red] a benefit,” on Donda by not buying the

property. Id. (emphasis added). Instead, the parties remain in their 

same respective positions as before the failed negotiations. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim as well.4 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. 

AFFIRMED.

4 FI Real Estate also argues that the district court erred in failing to credit its 

allegations, in its complaint, that the parties would have reached a contract if 

they had continued negotiating. This was not erroneous, however. The district court was required to take the complaint’s factual allegations as true but

was not required to accept the complaint’s legal conclusions and factual speculations. See Wainberg, 93 F.4th at 1224; C & W Food Serv. Inc., 765 So. 2d at

729-30; Auto. Alignment & Body Serv. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 

707, 729 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e are not permitted to engage in speculation, 

even at the pleading stage.”); cf. also Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675, 693-94 

(11th Cir. 2022) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“[P]lausibility means something more 

than possibility or speculation[,] but something less than probability . . . .”). 

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