Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-60039/USCOURTS-ca9-14-60039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eden Place, LLC
Appellant
Sholem Perl

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE SHOLEM PERL,

Debtor.

EDEN PLACE, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

SHOLEM PERL,

Appellee.

No. 14-60039

BAP No.

13-1328

OPINION

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Kirscher, Taylor, and Dunn, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 31, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed January 8, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson;

Dissent by Judge Watford

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2 IN RE PERL

SUMMARY*

Bankruptcy

On appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the

panel reversed the bankruptcy court’s determination that

Eden Place, LLC, violated the automatic stay by evicting a

chapter 13 debtor from a residential property.

The panel held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. 

Because the case did not involve a remand, the panel applied

the two-part finality test articulated in SS Farms, LLC v.

Sharp (In re SK Foods, L.P.), 676 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The panel concluded that the bankruptcy court’s decision (1)

resolved and seriously affected substantive rights and (2)

finally determined the discrete issue to which it was

addressed.

On the merits, the panel concluded that the debtor had no

legal or equitable interest remaining in the property at the

time of his eviction. An unlawful detainer judgment and writ

of possession entered pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure § 415.46 bestowed legal title and all rights of

possession upon Eden Place. Accordingly, Eden Place did

not violate the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(a).

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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IN RE PERL 3

Dissenting, Judge Watford wrote that he would dismiss

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the bankruptcy

court’s order, finding a stay violation but postponing until

later a ruling on damages, could not be deemed final.

COUNSEL

Ronald N. Richards (argued), Law Offices of Ronald

Richards & Associates, APC, Beverly Hills, California;

Howard N. Madris, Law Office of Howard N. Madris, APC,

Beverly Hills, California, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Eden Place, LLC (Eden Place), appeals the

decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirming

the bankruptcycourt’s determination that Eden Place violated

the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by

evicting Debtor Sholem Perl (Perl) from a residential

property. Because we conclude that Perl had no legal or

equitable interest remaining in the property at the time of his

eviction, we reverse the bankruptcy court’s ruling that Eden

Place violated the automatic stay.

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4 IN RE PERL

I. BACKGROUND1

A. State Court Proceedings

Perl and a joint tenant owned a single-family duplex in

Los Angeles, California. After refinancing, Perl defaulted on

his mortgage payments, and Bank of America instituted

foreclosure proceedings. The property was sold to Eden

Place through a non-judicial foreclosure sale on March 20,

2013. Eden Place timely recorded the trustee’s deed nine

days later.

Despite the legal transfer of title, Perl refused to vacate

the premises. Eden Place served Perl with a three-day notice

to quit, and later served Perl with two unlawful detainer

complaints, one for each side of the duplex. In response, Perl

filed a complaint against Eden Place to set aside the trustee’s

sale (Complaint to Set Aside Sale), and Eden Place filed a

cross-complaint for damages, trespass, and interference with

prospective economic advantage (Cross-Complaint), and a

motion to expunge Perl’s lis pendens.

On June 11, 2013, the state court entered judgment in

favor of Eden Place on the unlawful detainer actions,

resulting in a judgment for possession and restitution. Three

days later, the state court entered a Writ of Possession in

favor of Eden Place. Sometime between June 14 and June

24, the Los Angeles County Sheriff posted the lockout notice. 

On June 19, the state court heard Perl’s motion to stay the

unlawful detainer proceedings and set various conditions for

a stay. Once Perl failed to meet the conditions, the unlawful

1 The background facts are taken from the BAP’s opinion. See Eden

Place, LLC v. Perl (In re Perl), 513 B.R. 566, 568 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014).

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IN RE PERL 5

detainer judgment for possession remained in effect,

culminating in eviction by the Sheriff.

B. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings

Rather than complying with the state court requirements

to stay the unlawful detainer proceedings, Perl filed a

“skeletal” chapter 13 bankruptcy petition pro se. He failed to

file any schedules, financial affairs statement, or proposed

plan of reorganization. Although not listed as a creditor,

Eden Place learned of the bankruptcy filing from Perl’s

counsel, who informed Eden Place that no exceptions to the

automatic stay applied and that any eviction would violate the

automatic stay.

Perl also filed a notice of removal in the three state court

actions (Complaint to Set Aside Sale, Cross-Complaint, and

Unlawful Detainer Actions). Because there was a previously

scheduled state court hearing to expunge the lis pendens on

the property, Eden Place sought to remand the three state

court actions and also sought relief from the automatic stay

(Stay Relief Motion). Eden Place argued, in the alternative,

that the automatic stay did not apply because the propertywas

not property of the estate. Specifically, Eden Place argued

that, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition by Perl,

Eden Place purchased the property at a trustee’s sale,

recorded the trustee’s deed, and obtained a judgment and writ

of possession.

Before the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Stay

Relief Motion, the Sheriff proceeded with the lockout and

evicted Perl. As a result, Perl was unable to remove some of

his personal belongings. Perl then filed an emergencymotion

to enforce the automatic stay, arguing that the eviction

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6 IN RE PERL

interfered with protectable equitable interests based on his

continued possessory interest in the premises.

Over Eden Place’s objection, the bankruptcy judge

determined that Perl’s “bare possessoryinterest, coupled with

the possibility of some sort of relief [from the pending

litigation]” gave “the bankruptcy estate a protected interest

that is subject to the automatic stay.” Accordingly, the

bankruptcy court determined that Eden Place had violated the

automatic stay when it evicted Perl, and that the eviction was

void. The bankruptcy court stayed its determination

regarding contempt sanctions because Perl had not yet offered

evidence of damages. Although Eden Place later filed a

status report pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s order, Perl

never filed anything further in his bankruptcy case. 

Eventually, the bankruptcy case was dismissed for Perl’s

failure to appear at the creditor’s meeting. Eden Place timely

appealed the bankruptcy court’s order to the BAP.

C. BAP Proceedings

The BAP determined that it had jurisdiction over the

appeal because Eden Place remained subject to a claim for

damages based on the bankruptcy court’s finding that Eden

Place violated the automatic stay.

After examining its jurisdiction, the BAP turned to the

“sole issue” before it: whether “at the time Perl filed his

bankruptcy petition, he had any remaining interest in the

Residence protected by the automatic stay.” Applying

California law, the BAP held that Perl’s ownership interest

was terminated prepetition when Eden Place purchased the

property at the trustee’s sale. Nevertheless, the BAP held that

Perl had a recognizable equitable interest in the property by

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IN RE PERL 7

virtue of his physical occupancy, notwithstanding the

illegality of his continued occupancy.

The BAP noted that “changing the locks on the

Residence, locking inside Perl’s personal property, which was

also property of the estate, was an act to exercise control over

property of the estate in violation of” the automatic stay. 

Thus, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, and

Eden Place filed a timely appeal to this court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(a) have been violated is a question of law reviewed de

novo.” Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mwangi),

764 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “We

review a bankruptcy court decision independently and

without deference to the [BAP]’s decision. . . .” Decker v.

Tramiel (In re JTS Corp.), 617 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir.

2010) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction - Finality

Before considering the merits of Eden Place’s appeal, we

first consider whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal. 

See Sahagun v. Landmark Fence Co. (In re Landmark Fence

Co.), 801 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Stanley v.

Crossland, Crossland, Chambers, MacArthur & Lastreto (In

re Lakeshore Vill. Resort, Ltd.), 81 F.3d 103, 105 (9th Cir.

1996). The bankruptcy court determined as a matter of law

that Eden Place violated the automatic stay when it evicted

Perl, but deferred its ruling on the contempt sanctions. 

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8 IN RE PERL

Subsequently, the bankruptcy case was dismissed because

Perl failed to appear at the creditor’s meeting. However, the

bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction over “all issues arising

under Bankruptcy Code” §§ 110 (penalties), 329 (attorney’s

fees), and 362 (automatic stay).

The BAP determined that it had jurisdiction because there

was a final order from the bankruptcy court, and Eden Place

remained subject to a claim for damages based on the

bankruptcycourt’s determination that Eden Place violated the

automatic stay. See Eden Place, LLC v. Perl (In re Perl), 513

B.R. 566, 571 n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014). We agree.

We also have jurisdiction over appeals from final

judgments and orders of the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d). In determining what constitutes an appealable order

in bankruptcy proceedings, we have adopted a “pragmatic

approach.” Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d

764, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

In Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692

(2015), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that, for

jurisdictional purposes, “[t]he rules are different in

bankruptcy. . . .” In an ordinary civil case, a party may

appeal the district court’s judgment only under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and only if the decision “ends the litigation on the

merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment.” Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.

368, 373–74 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In bankruptcy cases, though, which typically are

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IN RE PERL 9

appealed (as this one is) under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d),2a

pragmatic approach is warranted; the court uses a more

flexible standard. Orders in bankruptcy cases may be

appealed immediately “if they finally dispose of discrete

disputes within the larger case. . . .” Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at

1692 (citation omitted).3 The Court went on to hold that an

order declining to confirm a proposed repayment plan was

not “final” because the debtor remained free to propose an

alternative plan; the process of attempting to arrive at an

approved plan that would allow the bankruptcy to move

forward was fluid. Id. at 1690, 1693.

Our precedent has not been entirelypellucid regarding the

flexible concept of finality in the bankruptcy context. In

some instances, we have applied the following four-part test:

2 An appellate court hearing an interlocutory appeal from a district court

that is sitting in bankruptcy can apply 28 U.S.C. § 1292, Connecticut Nat’l

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992), but that exception does not

apply here. This appeal comes from the BAP, not the district court.

 

3

 Before Bullard, we had made the same point.

We have adopted a pragmatic approach to finality

in bankruptcy because certain proceedings in a

bankruptcy case are so distinctive and conclusive either

to the rights of individual parties or the ultimate

outcome of the case that final decisions as to them

should be appealable as of right. Our approach

emphasizes the need for immediate review, rather than

whether the order is technically interlocutory.

Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 761 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).

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10 IN RE PERL

(1) the need to avoid piecemeal litigation;

(2) judicial efficiency; (3) the systemic

interest in preserving the bankruptcy court’s

role as the finder of fact; and (4) whether

delaying review would cause either party

irreparable harm.

In re Landmark Fence, 801 F.3d at 1102 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Meyer v. U.S. Trustee (In

re Scholz), 699 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012).

In other instances, we look to whether the bankruptcy

court’s decision: “1) resolves and seriously affects

substantive rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue

to which it is addressed.” SS Farms, LLC v. Sharp (In re SK

Foods, L.P.), 676 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation

omitted); see also Law Offices of Nicholas A. Franke v.

Tiffany (In re Lewis), 113 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1997).

A survey of our precedent reveals that the four-part

finality test articulated in In re Landmark Fence is utilized

almost exclusively when determining the finality of a case

involving a remand to the bankruptcy court. See In re

Landmark Fence, 801 F.3d at 1101–02; see also In re Scholz,

699 F.3d at 1170; In re Lakeshore Vill., 81 F.3d at 104, 106;

Congrejo Invs., LLC v. Mann (In re Bender), 586 F.3d 1159,

1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009); Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.

Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003);

Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1182, 1187

(9th Cir. 2003); Scovis v. Henrichsen (In re Scovis), 249 F.3d

975, 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2001); Lundell v. Anchor Constr.

Specialists, Inc. (In re Lundell), 223 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.

2000); Walthall v. United States, 131 F.3d 1289, 1292–93

(9th Cir. 1997); Bonner Mall P’ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortg.

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IN RE PERL 11

Co. (In re Bonner Mall P’ship), 2 F.3d 899, 902, 904 (9th Cir.

1993).

On the other hand, when the decision of the bankruptcy

court is affirmed or reversed, rather than remanded, we have

applied the two-part finality test articulated in In re SK

Foods, 676 F.3d at 802. See In re Rosson, 545 F.3d at 769;

see also In re Lewis, 113 F.3d at 1043; Dye v. Brown (In re

AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2008);

Schulman v. California (In re Lazar), 237 F.3d 967, 974, 985

(9th Cir. 2001); Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust

(In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1999);

New Life Health Ctr. Co. v. I.R.S. (In re New Life Health Ctr.

Co.), 102 F.3d 428, 429 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United

States v. Stone (In re Stone), 6 F.3d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1993);

Elliott v. Four Seasons Props. (In re Frontier Props., Inc.),

979 F.2d 1358, 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992); Turgeon v.

Victoria Station Inc. (In re Victoria Station Inc.), 840 F.2d

682, 683–84 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Technical

Knockout Graphics, Inc. (In re TechnicalKnockout Graphics,

Inc.), 833 F.2d 797, 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1987); Farber v. 405

N. Bedford Dr. Corp. (In re 405 N. Bedford Dr. Corp.),

778 F.2d 1374, 1376–77 (9th Cir. 1985).

Because this case did not involve a remand, application of

the two-part finality test is appropriate. See In re SK Foods,

676 F.3d at 802. Notwithstanding the fact that no financial

penalty or sanction has yet been assessed against Eden Place,

the bankruptcycourt’s determination that Eden Place violated

the automatic stay is a substantive ruling with real effects,

including money damages that could be sought by Perl

indefinitely. See Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 831–32

(7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a cause of action for violation of

the automatic stay survives the termination of the bankruptcy

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12 IN RE PERL

proceeding). The bankruptcy court’s order determined the

discrete issue of whether there was a stay violation, which

was the only issue litigated in the bankruptcyproceedings and

before the BAP. See In re SK Foods, 676 F.3d at 802

(discussing finality in the bankruptcy context). As a practical

matter, resolution of this issue resolved the entire case and

thereby qualifies as a final decision under our pragmatic

approach to finality in the bankruptcy context. See id.

We respectfully part company with our dissenting

colleague’s view of the finality of the bankruptcy court’s

order, largely because the cases relied on by the dissent were

decided in the context of general civil litigation rather than in

the bankruptcy context, where “[t]he rules are different . . .” 

Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692. Neither are we persuaded by the

out-of-circuit authority cited in the dissent. Rather, we look

to our precedent specifically addressing finality in the

bankruptcy context. That precedent persuades us that the

ruling by the bankruptcy court that Eden Place violated the

automatic stay resolved the only issue in the case, and

seriously affected substantive rights related to damages. 

There is no question that the discrete issue addressed by the

bankruptcy court—violation of the automatic stay—has been

definitively and finally resolved. Resolution of that issue is

as final as it will ever be in this case.

We also look to the clear language of the bankruptcy

appeals statute, which as the Supreme Court noted,

“authorizes appeals as of right not only from final judgments

in cases but from final judgments, orders, and decrees in

cases and proceedings.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(a))

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). After

considering our applicable precedent and the clear language

of the statute, we hold that the bankruptcy court’s order that

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IN RE PERL 13

Eden Place violated the automatic stay was final and

appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).

B. Merits - Violation of Automatic Stay

Having resolved the issue of finality, we now turn to the

merits of this case—whether Eden Place violated the

automatic stay. We start from the premise that the filing of

a bankruptcy petition creates the bankruptcy estate, which

includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in

property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.

541(a)(1). The bankruptcy filing acts as an automatic stay of

“any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of

property from the estate or to exercise control over property

of the estate. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The violation of

the automatic stay inquiry determines whether the debtor, in

isolation, has any protectable legal, equitable, or possessory

interest. See Ramirez v. Fuselier (In re Ramirez), 183 B.R.

583, 587 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); see also 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(a)(3). Thus, the question in this case is whether Perl

had any remaining legal or equitable possessory interest in

the property after Eden Place properly recorded the trustee’s

deed from the non-judicial foreclosure sale, and after the state

court fully adjudicated in the unlawful detainer proceedings

Perl’s remaining possessory interest in the premises. See id.

We look to state law to determine property interests in

bankruptcy proceedings. See Butner v. United States,

440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979). We conclude that under

California law, entry of judgment and a writ of possession

following unlawful detainer proceedings extinguishes all

other legal and equitable possessory interests in the real

property at issue. See Vella v. Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28, 30 (Cal.

1977).

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The BAP correctly determined that Perl had no remaining

legal interest in the property because, when Eden Place

purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and recorded its

deed within fifteen days of the sale, any legal interest Perl

retained in the property was extinguished. See Wells Fargo

Bank v. Neilsen, 178 Cal. App. 4th 602, 613–14 (2009), as

modified; see also Cal. Civ. Code. § 2924h(c). But, the BAP

went further, reasoning that Perl’s unlawful possession

bestowed equitable possessory rights upon him, which he

retained until the Sheriff actually dispossessed him of the

property by executing the writ of possession. See In re Perl,

513 B.R. at 574–76. However, whether Perl had actual

possession of the property when he filed for bankruptcy has

no bearing on whether he had a cognizable possessory

interest in the property. In resolving this issue, the unlawful

detainer statutory provisions are the point of departure for our

analysis.

California’s unlawful detainer statutory scheme was

designed to adjudicate the right to possession of realty

between a landlord and tenant when the tenant is in violation

of the lease. See Knowles v. Robinson, 387 P.2d 833, 836–37

(Cal. 1963). The unlawful detainer provisions authorize a

summary proceeding that adjudicates the right to immediate

possession of the property. See Vella, 572 P.2d at 30. For

this reason, claims regarding title to the property are not

generallylitigated in an unlawful detainer proceeding. See id. 

One exception to the rule that title is not generally determined

in an unlawful detainer proceeding is found in California

Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a, governing the right of

possession by a party initiating an unlawful detainer

proceeding after obtaining title at a nonjudicial foreclosure

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IN RE PERL 15

sale.

4

See id. The exception allows for “a narrow and

4 California Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a provides in relevant part:

(b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds

over and continues in possession of a manufactured

home, mobilehome, floating home, or real property

after a three-day written notice to quit the property has

been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant

in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such

subtenant, as prescribed in Section 1162, may be

removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter:

(1) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a

writ of execution against such person, or a person

under whom such person claims, and the title

under the sale has been duly perfected.

(2) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a

writ of sale, upon the foreclosure by proceedings

taken as prescribed in this code of a mortgage, or

under an express power of sale contained therein,

executed by such person, or a person under whom

such person claims, and the title under the

foreclosure has been duly perfected.

(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance

with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under a

power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed

by such person, or a person under whom such

person claims, and the title under the sale has been

duly perfected.

(4) Where the property has been sold by such

person, or a person under whom such person

claims, and the title under the sale has been duly

perfected.

(5) Where the property has been sold in accordance

with Section 18037.5 of the Health and Safety

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16 IN RE PERL

sharply focused examination of title.” Id.; see also Mortg.

Guarantee Co. v. Smith, 50 P.2d 835, 836 (Cal. Ct. App.

1935) (noting that in actions brought under § 1161a, title is

determined “as a necessary element of the remedy of

unlawful detainer”).

In California, an unlawful detainer proceeding is quasi in

rem and, accordingly, a judgment rendered in an unlawful

detainer proceeding is “not binding upon the world, but

conclusive only between the parties and their privies.” Park

v. Powers, 42 P.2d 75, 79 (Cal. 1935). Pursuant to Code of

Civil Procedure § 415.46,5no occupant of the premises

retains any possessory interest of any kind following service

of the writ of possession. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 715.020(d) (explaining that “if the summons, complaint,

and prejudgment claim of right to possession were served

Code under the default provisions of a conditional

sale contract or security agreement executed by

such person, or a person under whom such person

claims, and the title under the sale has been duly

perfected.

5 California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.46 provides in relevant part:

(a) In addition to the service of a summons and

complaint in an action for unlawful detainer upon a

tenant and subtenant, if any, as prescribed by this

article, a prejudgment claim of right to possession may

also be served on any person who appears to be or who

may claim to have occupied the premises at the time of

the filing of the action. Service upon occupants shall be

made pursuant to subdivision (c) by serving a copy of

a prejudgment claim of right to possession, as specified

in subdivision (f), attached to a copy of the summons

and complaint at the same time service is made upon

the tenant and subtenant, if any.

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IN RE PERL 17

upon the occupants in accordance with Section 415.46, no

occupant of the premises, whether or not the occupant is

named in the judgment for possession, may object to the

enforcement of the judgment . . .”)

We recognize that the BAP may have considered itself

bound to follow its prior decision in Williams v. Levi (In re

Williams), 323 B.R. 691 (9th Cir. BAP 2005), and the cases

upon which In re Williams relied. See id. at 699 (citing Di

Giorgio v. Lee (In re Di Giorgio), 200 B.R 664 (C.D. Cal.

1996), and Westside Apartments, LLC v. Butler (In re Butler),

271 B.R. 867, 876–77 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002)). However,

we are not persuaded that those cases engaged in the proper

analysis.

The earliest case espousing the reasoning adopted by the

BAP is In re DiGiorgio. The DiGiorgios were the defendants

in an unlawful detainer action. They subsequently entered

into a Stipulation for Judgment, forfeiting the lease and

providing for the issuance of a writ of possession. See 200

B.R. at 667. After the writ of possession was issued by the

court, but before it was executed, the DiGiorgios filed a

voluntary petition for bankruptcy. See id. Relying on

California Code of Civil Procedure § 715.050, the Sheriff’s

Department indicated its intent to enforce the writ of

possession without seeking relief from the automatic stay.

6

6 California Code ofCivil Procedure § 715.050 provides in relevant part:

Except with respect to enforcement of a judgment for

money, a writ of possession issued pursuant to a

judgment for possession in an unlawful detainer action

shall be enforced pursuant to this chapter without delay,

notwithstanding receipt of notice of the filing by the

defendant of a bankruptcy proceeding.

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In addition to ruling that § 715.050 was preempted by the

Bankruptcy Code, the district court held that, although the

DiGiorgios had no legal possessory interest in the tenancy at

the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, they retained

an equitable possessory interest by virtue of their continued

physical presence. See id. at 670–71.

This holding was repeated in In re Butler, and adopted by

the BAP in In re Williams, see 323 B.R. at 699. In In re

Butler, the court relied upon California Civil Code § 1006. 

See 271 B.R. at 870–71. That statute provides:

Title by Occupancy; extent

Occupancy for any period confers a title

sufficient against all except the state and those

who have title by prescription, accession,

transfer, will, or succession; but the title

conferred by occupancy is not a sufficient

interest in real property to enable the occupant

or the occupant's privies to commence or

maintain an action to quiet title, unless the

occupancy has ripened into title by

prescription.

The bankruptcy court concluded that, under California

case law, “the mere possession of real estate is constantly

treated as property, which may be purchased and sold, and for

the recovery of which an action may be maintained against

Because we resolve this case without relying upon the provisions of

§ 715.050, we express no view on whether the state statute is preempted

by the Bankruptcy Code.

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IN RE PERL 19

one having no better title.” In re Butler, 271 B.R. at 871

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The flaw in the bankruptcy court’s analysis is that the

unlawful detainer proceedings under § 1161a are expressly

designed to determine who has superior title to the property,

including the right to immediate possession. See Vella,

572 P.2d at 30. As a result, the prevailing party in the

unlawful detainer proceeding under § 1161a has “better title”

than the evicted resident. In re Butler, 271 B.R. at 871. The

conclusion that the occupying resident retains an equitable

possessory interest is inconsistent with § 1161a, which

contemplates a final and binding adjudication of legal title

and rights of immediate possession. See Mortg. Guarantee

Co., 50 P.2d at 836; see also Vella, 572 P.2d at 30. We

therefore conclude that because Perl had no remaining

interest in the property, legal or equitable, when the

bankruptcy petition was filed, the bankruptcy court erred in

concluding that Eden Place violated the automatic stay by

executing the writ of possession.

The unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession

entered pursuant to California Code Civil Procedure § 415.46

bestowed legal title and all rights of possession upon Eden

Place. See Vella, 572 P.2d at 30. Thus, at the time of the

filing of the bankruptcy petition, Perl had been completely

divested of all legal and equitable possessory rights that

would otherwise be protected by the automatic stay. See id. 

Consequently, the Sheriff’s lockout did not violate the

automatic stay because no legal or equitable interests in the

property remained to become part of the bankruptcy estate. 

See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (describing the

bankruptcy estate as consisting of “all legal or equitable

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20 IN RE PERL

interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of

the case”).

IV. CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court erred when it ruled that Eden Place

violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy

Code. Perl had no legal or equitable interest remaining in the

property after issuance of the unlawful detainer judgment and

writ of possession in state court. We therefore reverse the

bankruptcy court order. We need not and do not reach any

other issues presented on appeal.

REVERSED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I would dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The

appeal is taken from a bankruptcy court order that cannot by

any stretch be deemed final, even under the more relaxed

standard for finality that we apply in bankruptcy appeals. See

Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692 (2015).

The bankruptcy court’s June 28, 2013, order found that

Eden Place had violated the automatic stay by evicting Perl

and his wife from their home. The court postponed deciding

whether damages or sanctions should be awarded as a remedy

for that violation until a subsequent hearing scheduled for the

following month. Rather than wait to see whether the

bankruptcy court would actuallyaward damages or sanctions,

Eden Place immediately filed a notice of appeal. As it turned

out, the bankruptcy court never held the subsequent hearing

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because Perl failed to appear at a scheduled creditors’

meeting, and the bankruptcy court therefore dismissed his

Chapter 13 case altogether.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) correctly held

that dismissal of Perl’s underlying bankruptcy case did not

render his request for damages or sanctions moot. See Price

v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 831–32 (7th Cir. 1991). But the

BAP did not make clear why it thought jurisdiction existed to

hear the appeal. The BAP might have assumed that it had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which grants district

courts (and by extension the BAP) jurisdiction over appeals

“from final judgments, orders, and decrees.” Or the BAP

might have exercised jurisdiction under § 158(a)(3), which

allows the BAP to hear appeals, “with leave of the court,

from other interlocutory orders and decrees.” Either way, we

have jurisdiction to review the BAP’s decision only if the

underlying bankruptcy court order was in fact final.

28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). Since the BAP never addressed this

issue, we have to do so in the first instance. See In re

Lievsay, 118 F.3d 661, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

Bankruptcy court orders are final and appealable “if they

finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.” 

Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692 (internal quotation marks

omitted). So the question for us is whether the bankruptcy

court’s order finally disposed of the discrete dispute over

Eden Place’s alleged violation of the automatic stay. The

answer to that question turns on which of two general rules

applies. On the one hand, an order is not final if it determines

liability but does not resolve the plaintiff’s request for

damages or other relief. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976). On the other hand, an

order resolving the merits of a dispute is final, even if it

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leaves a request for attorney’s fees unresolved. Budinich v.

Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200–02 (1988).

The first rule applies here. This is not a case in which the

bankruptcy court resolved the merits of the dispute and left

unresolved only a request for attorney’s fees. The bankruptcy

court’s order merely determined liability; it left entirely

unresolved the relief to be awarded, which included a

potential award of compensatory and punitive damages as

well as an award of attorney’s fees. (Eden Place incorrectly

asserts that Perl requested attorney’s fees alone as relief; in

fact, his motion requested all appropriate relief, including but

not limited to attorney’s fees.) Because the bankruptcy

court’s order determined liability but left the issue of

damages unresolved, this case is governed by Wetzel. Under

the finality rule established there, the bankruptcy court’s

order did not finally determine even “the discrete issue of

whether there was a stay violation,” Maj. op. at 12, because

the order resolved only liability and nothing else.

Eden Place contends the bankruptcy court’s order should

be deemed final under In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.

2003). Our decision in that case construed 11 U.S.C.

§ 105(a), a catch-all provision granting bankruptcy courts the

authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is

necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this

title.” See 322 F.3d at 1184 n.3. We held that an order

finding a violation of the automatic stay but postponing

assessment of appropriate sanctions under § 105(a) is final

and therefore immediately appealable. Id. at 1185–87. That

ruling is probably wrong; a well-developed body of law holds

that “[a] determination that contempt has occurred is not final

if the question of sanctions is postponed.” 15B Charles A.

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Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3917, at

377–78 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2015) (collecting cases).

But we can put that matter to one side. The only portion

of Dyer that has any bearing on this case is the court’s

observation, in dicta, that the finality analysis might be

different if the court were confronted with an order finding a

stay violation but postponing assessment of damages under

11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (now § 362(k)). 322 F.3d at 1186–87

n.10. Because § 362(k) authorizes an award of “damages,”

the finality of orders under that statute is controlled by

Wetzel. We held that § 105(a), by contrast, is “a sanction

authority only and, as such, controlled by the principles of

Budinich.” Id. at 1187 n.10. In support of that holding, we

cited an Eleventh Circuit case, In re Atlas, 210 F.3d 1305,

1307–08 (11th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that the

distinction between attorney’s fees and damages is “crucial to

[the] analysis” of whether an order finding a stay violation

but not addressing remedies is final. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d

at 1187 n.10.

What we said in dicta in Dyer about the finality of orders

under § 362(k) is entirely correct. Our sister circuits have

uniformly held that an order finding a stay violation but

postponing assessment of damages under § 362(k) is not

final. See In re Atlas, 210 F.3d at 1307–08; In re Fugazy

Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 774–76 (2d Cir. 1992); Matter of

Morrell, 880 F.2d 855, 856–57 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Brown,

803 F.2d 120, 121–23 (3d Cir. 1986). Although there is some

uncertainty as to whether an order finding a stay violation but

leaving unresolved only the determination of attorney’s fees

is final, see In re Porto, 645 F.3d 1294, 1300–01 (11th Cir.

2011); In re Johnson, 501 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (10th Cir.

2007), it is perfectly clear that an order finding a violation of

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the automatic stay and postponing a determination of

damages under § 362(k) is not final. Under that rule, which

governs here, the bankruptcy court’s order cannot be deemed

final.

Whatever the merits of the rule established by Dyer for

orders under § 105(a), it doesn’t apply here. It’s true that Perl

cited § 105(a) in his moving papers when requesting

sanctions for Eden Place’s stay violation, but in fact no relief

was available to him under that statutory provision. 

Individual debtors like Perl have a specific remedy available

to them under § 362(k), so it would not be “necessary or

appropriate” for the bankruptcy court to enforce the stay by

imposing contempt sanctions under the catch-all authority

granted by § 105(a). See In re Snowden, 769 F.3d 651, 661

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing In re Roman, 283 B.R. 1, 14–15 (9th

Cir. BAP 2002)). The bankruptcy court recognized as much. 

At the hearing on Perl’s motion, the court noted that it was

considering the imposition of punitive damages, which are

available under § 362(k) in some circumstances but not

available under § 105(a) to remedy a past stay violation. See

In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1192–93. And when the court later

dismissed Perl’s case, it retained jurisdiction over “all issues

arising under Bankruptcy Code §[§] 110, 329 and 362.” It

did not retain jurisdiction to award any relief under § 105,

presumably because it recognized that no such relief would

be available.

What we are left with, then, is an order finding a stay

violation but postponing until later a ruling on damages under

§ 362(k). Because that order addressed liability but deferred

a determination of damages, it was not final under Wetzel, our

dicta in Dyer, or the uniform holdings of our sister circuits. 

I would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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