Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-73153/USCOURTS-ca9-17-73153-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Immigration Lawyers Association
Amicus Curiae
William P. Barr
Respondent
Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project
Amicus Curiae
Innovation Law Lab
Amicus Curiae
Ludwin Israel Lopez-Aguilar
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUDWIN ISRAEL LOPEZ-AGUILAR,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General 

of the United States,

Respondent.

No. 17-73153

Agency No.

A074-394-680

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 5, 2019

Portland, Oregon

Filed January 28, 2020

Before: Susan P. Graber and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit 

Judges, and John R. Tunheim,

* Chief District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Berzon;

Concurrence by Judge Graber

* The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District 

Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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2 LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Ludwin Israel Lopez-Aguilar’s 

petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals, which found him removable based on his robbery 

conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395, 

and held that section 164.395 is not a categorical theft 

offense and therefore not an aggravated felony under section 

101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Comparing section 164.935 to the generic definition of 

theft, the panel held that section 164.935 is facially 

overbroad because a generic theft offense is defined as the 

taking of property or an exercise of control over property 

without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner 

of rights and benefits of ownership, whereas section 164.935 

includes consensual takings via theft by deception. The 

panel concluded that because it is possible to commit theft 

by deception with the consent of the owner, Oregon’s theft 

statute expressly includes conduct outside of the generic 

definition.

The panel further held that the additional robbery 

elements of section 164.395—namely, the use or threat of 

force to obtain the property—do not limit the reach of the 

statute to match the generic definition of theft. Noting that 

a force element generally implies a lack of consent, the panel 

pointed out that section 164.395 expressly contemplates that 

such force may be used to compel another person, rather than 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR 3

the property owner, to deliver the property or to engage in 

other conduct which might aid the commission of the theft. 

For example, a defendant could be convicted if she 

threatened force against a third party to compel that third 

party to convince a property owner, by deception, to give the 

property to the defendant consensually. Similarly, a 

defendant could be convicted if the taking was consensual 

(although deceptive), but force was used against a third party 

to prevent that person from retrieving the property right after 

it was received by the thief. Consequently, the panel 

concluded that, even with the additional robbery elements, 

the text of the statute expressly includes situations involving 

consensual taking, and therefore is facially overbroad. 

Because the government did not argue that section 

164.935 was divisible, the panel deemed the issue waived,

and ended its inquiry without proceeding to the modified 

approach. 

 

Concurring, Judge Graber, joined by District Judge 

Tunheim, agreed with the opinion in full, but wrote 

separately to add her voice to the substantial chorus of 

federal judges pleading for the Supreme Court or Congress 

to “rescue us from the morass of the categorical approach,” 

which requires the performance of absurd legal gymnastics, 

and produces absurd results.

COUNSEL

Jennifer K. Lesmez (argued), Law Offices of Jennifer 

Lesmez, Selah, Washington; Jerome Mayer-Cantú, Oakland, 

California; for Petitioner.

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Imran R. Zaidi (argued) and Matthew A. Spurlock, Trial 

Attorneys; John S. Hogan and John W. Blakeley, Assistant 

Directors; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; 

Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for 

Respondent.

Kari Hong, Ninth Circuit Appellate Program, Boston 

College Law School, Newton, Massachusetts, for Amici 

Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association, 

Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, and 

Innovation Law Lab.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Ludwin Israel Lopez-Aguilar, a native and 

citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a final order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him 

removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), because of his 

conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395, 

and denying his application for relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). We grant Lopez-Aguilar’s 

petition because we conclude that section 164.395 is not a 

categorical theft offense and, therefore, not an aggravated 

felony under § 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA. Because we 

conclude that Lopez-Aguilar is not removable, we do not 

reach the question whether the record supports the BIA’s 

denial of CAT relief.

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LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR 5

I

Lopez-Aguilar is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He 

entered the United States in 1989, when he was three years 

old, and became a legal permanent resident in March 2001, 

when his application for suspension of deportation was 

granted.

In 2014, Lopez-Aguilar was convicted of third-degree 

robbery in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes section 

164.395 and sentenced to 13 months in prison. The 

government initiated removal proceedings against LopezAguilar based on the robbery conviction.

An immigration judge (“IJ”) found Lopez-Aguilar 

removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as 

defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA, which defines 

theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment is at least 

one year. The BIA agreed that the conviction was for a theft 

offense under section 101(a)(43)(G).1

The BIA rejected Lopez-Aguilar’s argument that section 

164.395 is overbroad because it incorporates theft by 

deception and thus covers consensual takings. The BIA 

concluded that the statute requires taking property by force,

which negates the consensual nature of theft by deception. 

The BIA also rejected Lopez-Aguilar’s argument that 

section 164.395 is overbroad because it covers mere 

unauthorized use of a vehicle, affirmed the denial of LopezAguilar’s petition for relief under CAT, and affirmed the 

order that Lopez-Aguilar be removed to Guatemala.

1 The BIA disagreed with the IJ’s alternative conclusion that LopezAguilar’s conviction under section 164.395 was for a crime of violence 

under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA.

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6 LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR

II

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal 

based on a petitioner’s commission of an aggravated felony 

to the extent that the petition “raises . . . questions of law.”

Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (quoting Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 

872 (9th Cir. 2008)). Whether a particular offense is an 

“aggravated felony” under the INA is a question of law that 

we review de novo. Id.

Lopez-Aguilar argues that section 164.395 exceeds the 

generic definition of a theft offense because it incorporates 

consensual takings via theft by deception, and the force 

elements do not impose a requirement that the defendant 

engage in a nonconsensual taking. We agree.

To determine whether a particular conviction is for a 

generic offense, we use the categorical and modified 

categorical approaches of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 

575 (1990), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 

(2005). Under the categorical approach, we “compare the 

elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s 

conviction”—here, Or. Rev. Stat. section 164.395—”with 

the elements of the ‘generic’ crime.” Descamps v. United 

States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). There is a categorical 

match “only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or 

narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Id. If the statute 

of conviction is broader than the generic offense, we next 

determine whether the statute is divisible or indivisible. 

Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2014). Only when an overbroad statute is divisible do we 

turn to the “modified categorical approach.” Descamps, 

570 U.S. at 263–64. An overbroad and indivisible statute 

does not constitute a generic crime. Id. at 264–65; MedinaLara, 771 F.3d at 1112.

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LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR 7

A

“A state offense qualifies as a generic offense—and 

therefore, in this case, as an aggravated felony—only if the 

full range of conduct covered by [the state statute] falls 

within the meaning of the generic offense.” United States v. 

Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Gonzales v. 

Duenas-Alvarez held that a state conviction is not a 

categorical match for its generic counterpart if there is “a 

realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the 

State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the 

generic definition of a crime.” 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).

There are two ways to show “a realistic probability” that 

a state statute exceeds the generic definition. First, there is 

not a categorical match if a state statute expressly defines a 

crime more broadly than the generic offense. United States 

v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), 

abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt, 139 

S. Ct. 399 (2018). As long as the application of the statute’s 

express text in the nongeneric manner is not a logical 

impossibility, the relative likelihood of application to 

nongeneric conduct is immaterial. See United States v. 

Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

Second, a petitioner can show that a state statute exceeds the 

generic definition if the petitioner can “point to at least one 

case in which the state courts applied the statute” in a 

situation that does not fit under the generic definition. United 

States v. Ruiz-Apolonio, 657 F.3d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193).

Here, the Oregon robbery statute is facially overbroad 

because its “greater breadth is evident from its text.” Grisel, 

488 F.3d at 850.

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Under the INA, a conviction for a generic theft offense 

that results in a prison term of at least one year is an 

aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). A generic 

“theft” is defined as the “taking of property or an exercise of 

control over property without consent with the criminal 

intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of 

ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or 

permanent.” Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 189 (emphasis 

added) (quoting Penuliar v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 961, 969 

(9th Cir. 2006)).

The Oregon robbery statute of conviction here provides:

A person commits the crime of robbery in 

the third degree if in the course of 

committing or attempting to commit theft 

or unauthorized use of a vehicle as 

defined in ORS 164.135 the person uses 

or threatens the immediate use of 

physical force upon another person with 

the intent of:

(a) Preventing or overcoming 

resistance to the taking of the 

property or to retention thereof 

immediately after the taking; or

(b) Compelling the owner of such 

property or another person to 

deliver the property or to engage 

in other conduct which might aid 

in the commission of the theft or 

unauthorized use of a vehicle.

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LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR 9

Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395. Section 164.395 incorporates 

Oregon’s definition of theft, which includes “theft by 

deception.” Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.015(4), 164.085.

The first requirement of section 164.395 is a theft or 

attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle. A theft by 

deception satisfies this element. See Or. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 164.015(4), 164.085. The generic definition of theft 

requires that the taking be without consent. AlvaradoPineda, 774 F.3d at 1202. We have explained elsewhere that 

theft statutes which include theft by deception fall outside 

the generic definition for theft. See, e.g., Lopez-Valencia v. 

Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that 

California’s theft statute is overbroad because it includes 

conduct such as theft by false pretenses, which could be 

consensual); United States v. Rivera, 658 F.3d 1073, 1077 

(9th Cir. 2011) (same), abrogated on other grounds by 

Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Because it is possible to commit theft by deception with the 

consent of the owner, Oregon’s theft statute expressly 

includes conduct outside of the generic definition.

The additional robbery elements of section 164.395—

namely, the use or threat of force to obtain the property—do 

not limit the reach of the statute to match the generic 

definition of theft. A force element generally implies a lack 

of consent—the force can be used, for example, to overcome 

resistance or otherwise compel behaviors. But the statute 

here expressly contemplates that such force may be used to 

“compel[]” “another person,” rather than the property 

owner, “to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct 

which might aid the commission of the theft.” Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 164.395(1)(b).

Consequently, even with the additional robbery 

elements, the text of the statute expressly includes situations 

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involving consensual takings. Under subsection (b), a 

defendant could be convicted if she threatened force against 

a third party to compel that third party to convince a property 

owner, by deception, to give the property to the defendant 

consensually. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395(1)(b) (covering 

threatened force used to “compel[] . . . another person to . . .

engage in [] conduct which might aid in the commission of 

the theft”). In that scenario, the property would have been 

taken with the consent of the owner, and the force used 

would not negate the owner’s consent because the force was 

used against a third party without the owner’s knowledge.

Similarly, under subsection (a), a defendant could be 

convicted if the taking was consensual (although deceptive), 

but force was used against a third party to prevent that person 

from retrieving the property right after it was received by the 

thief. In that case, the thief would use “physical force upon 

another person with the intent of . . . [p]reventing or 

overcoming resistance . . . to retention [of the property] 

immediately after the taking.” See id. § 164.395(1)(a).

Although correctly recognizing that the plain text of 

section 164.395 does not require that the defendant engage 

in a nonconsensual taking, the BIA reasoned that the force 

requirement would necessarily nullify consent, because 

“[t]here is no meaningful difference between a taking of 

property accomplished against the victim’s will and one 

where his ‘consent’ to parting with his property is coerced 

through force, fear, or threats,” citing Matter of Ibarra, 26 

I. & N. Dec. 809, 811 (B.I.A. 2016). But, as we have noted, 

under the plain text of the statute, it is possible to apply the 

force needed for a third-degree robbery against a third 

person while engaging in a taking that is consensual with 

regard to the victim of the robbery. The state statute at issue 

in Matter of Ibarra, by contrast, explicitly required “the 

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LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR 11

felonious taking of personal property in the possession of 

another . . . against his will.” 26 I. & N. Dec. at 810 n.2 

(emphasis added) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 211); see also

id. at 812 (“[T]he jury instructions for section 211 of the 

California Penal Code require as an element that the 

defendant take property from another ‘against that person’s 

will.’” (citation omitted)).

In short, unlike the generic theft offense, section 164.395 

does not require that the defendant engage in a 

nonconsensual taking. As the Oregon statute expressly 

includes consensual takings, it is facially overbroad. See 

Grisel, 488 F.3d at 850.

B

Because we hold that the statute is overbroad, we move 

to the next step in the analysis: determining whether the 

statute is divisible, such that application of the modified 

categorical approach is appropriate. See Lopez-Valencia, 

798 F.3d at 867–68.

Oregon’s third-degree robbery statute is indivisible. In 

this case, the government did not argue otherwise. “On the 

merits of the divisibility inquiry, the government did not 

argue to us that section 164.395 is divisible. We therefore 

deem the issue waived.” Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 

1059 (9th Cir. 2019). Because the statute of conviction is 

both overbroad and indivisible, the modified approach “has 

no role to play in this case” and the inquiry ends. Descamps, 

570 U.S. at 264.

III

Accordingly, we hold that section 164.395 is facially 

overbroad and indivisible. As it therefore does not qualify as 

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12 LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR

a categorical theft offense, it does not count as an aggravated 

felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA.

Because Lopez-Aguilar’s conviction was not for an 

aggravated felony, he is not removable under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). We therefore grant the petition.

Petition GRANTED.

GRABER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge Tunheim joins, 

concurring:

I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to 

add my voice to the substantial chorus of federal judges 

pleading for the Supreme Court or Congress to rescue us 

from the morass of the categorical approach. See, e.g., 

United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1043, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 

2018) (Owens, J., concurring) (noting that “countless 

judges” have “urg[ed] an end” to the categorical approach); 

United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (collecting 

cases). The categorical approach requires us to perform 

absurd legal gymnastics, and it produces absurd results.

As the majority opinion explains, Oregon Revised 

Statutes section 164.395 is not a categorical match for the 

generic theft offense because it incorporates consensual 

takings. But I can conceive of very few scenarios in which 

a defendant could use, or threaten the immediate use of, 

physical force against a third party while carrying out a 

taking that was consensual from the property owner’s 

perspective. And in my view those scenarios are unlikely to 

occur and to be prosecuted under this statute. Regardless of 

the existence of possible examples of consensual takings 

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LOPEZ-AGUILAR V. BARR 13

under section 164.395, the fundamental problem is that, to 

escape the consequences of his actions under our 

immigration laws, Petitioner need not show that he carried 

out a consensual taking. Without a doubt, there are better 

ways to decide these cases. See, e.g., Brown, 879 F.3d at 

1051 (advocating for “[a] regime based on the length of 

previous sentences, rather than on the vagaries of state law”).

The categorical approach allows individuals who have 

been convicted of serious crimes to avoid removal, so long 

as they are “clever enough to find some space in the state 

statutory scheme that lies outside the federal analogue.” 

Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d at 1211. As my colleagues have 

noted, we have no discretion in removal cases such as this 

one to correct absurd results—indeed, we must turn a blind 

eye even when the defendant’s actions underlying his state 

conviction unquestionably meet the definition of the generic 

federal offense. Id.

It is past time for someone with the power to fix this mess 

to do so.

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