Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03980/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03980-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abdel Elnashar
Appellant
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appellee
Myron Umbel
Appellee
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3980

___________

Abdel Elnashar, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

United States Department of Justice; *

Federal Bureau of Investigation, *

Minneapolis Office; Myron Umbel, *

and Other Unknown FBI Agents, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 12, 2005

Filed: May 3, 2006 

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Abdel Elnashar filed suit against the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), seeking expungement of his record, access to

his record, and damages relating to the release of his record. He advanced claims

under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §

552, and Amendments I, IV, and V of the United States Constitution. The district

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The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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court1

 granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the DOJ and FBI. Elnashar

appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the FBI and

DOJ; therefore we accept all facts pled by Elnashar as true and draw all reasonable

inferences from the facts in his favor. Waldron v. Boeing Co., 388 F.3d 591, 593 (8th

Cir. 2004). On September 14, 2001, the FBI and DOJ announced an investigation into

the September 11, 2001, terrorist highjackings, which was named PENTBOMB. In

November 2001, an unnamed individual contacted the Minneapolis Office of the FBI

regarding Elnashar. In April 2002, two FBI agents interviewed Elnashar at his home.

Shortly thereafter, Elnashar filed an employment discrimination complaint with

the Saint Paul Human Rights Department (HR Department), against his former

employer. As part of the investigation, the HR Department sought the identity of the

unnamed individual who had contacted the FBI. Elnashar believed that a former

coworker or supervisor had made the contact. Elnashar signed a release, authorizing

the HR Department to obtain and examine copies of all documents and records

contained by the FBI pertaining to Elnashar. The HR Department requested those

documents from the FBI. The FBI responded with a letter stating that there were

records that were responsive to the request, but that the records were part of the

ongoing PENTBOMB investigation and could not be released. The HR Department

subsequently dismissed Elnashar's employment discrimination claim. Elnashar

requested the name of the reporting individual from the FBI on February 26, 2003,

and his request was denied.

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After the denial, Elnashar brought this action. The FBI provided records to

Elnashar, with the name of the individual who contacted the FBI, and any identifying

information, redacted. The records include the dates on which the individual

contacted the FBI, as well as information from Elnashar's interview with the two FBI

agents, describing his immigration to the United States, his foreign travel, and his

work history.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings,

which should only be granted if the moving party has clearly established that no

material issue of fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Waldron, 388 F.3d at 593.

B. The Privacy Act Claim

The Privacy Act prevents federal agencies from releasing records "except

pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to

whom the record pertains" or unless other specified conditions are met. 5 U.S.C. §

552a(b). It also requires that agencies ensure that records "are accurate, complete,

timely, and relevant for agency purposes" prior to dissemination. Id. § 552a(e)(6).

The Privacy Act further provides that governmental agencies shall "maintain no

record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First

Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom

the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized

law enforcement activity." Id. § 552a(e)(7).

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Elnashar argues that the district court made three errors with respect to his

Privacy Act claims concerning the maintenance of records and the release of

information about these records to the HR Department. First, he claims that the FBI

maintained records outside the scope of any law enforcement prosecution or

investigation, about how he exercised his First Amendment rights. To claim a

violation of section 552a(e)(7) of the Privacy Act, Elnashar must allege that the FBI

maintained records of how he exercised his First Amendment rights and that these

records were not within the scope of a law enforcement activity. As the district court

correctly noted, the FBI contacted Elnashar to determine whether he had expertise

with chemical weapons. Elnashar has failed to identify how his First Amendment

rights were implicated.

Second, Elnashar argues that the district court erroneously read an intent

standard into the Privacy Act and thus erred by evaluating whether the FBI's response

to the HR Department portrayed him as a suspected terrorist, since this is the province

of the jury. Third, he argues that the district court wrongly held that his release,

authorizing the HR Department to obtain and examine copies of all FBI documents

and records pertaining to Elnashar, barred his claim because he had consented to

disclosure. Because we agree that the release bars Elnashar's claim, we need not reach

his intent argument.

Specifically, Elnashar claims the FBI violated the Privacy Act by unreasonably

and unnecessarily informing the HR Department that the records were part of the

PENTBOMB investigation. We disagree. Elnashar signed a release "authoriz[ing]

representatives of the SAINT PAUL HUMAN RIGHTS DEPARTMENT to obtain

and examine copies of all documents and records contained by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) pertaining to Abdel Elnashar." In the FBI's response to the HR

Department, the FBI disclosed that it had records which were responsive to the request

for records and that the records were contained in the "PENTBOMB" investigation,

"relating to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which is considered a pending

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investigation and which involves an ongoing prosecution." This disclosure was made

in accordance with Elnashar's release. The FBI did not disclose whether Elnashar was

an informant, victim, witness, or suspect. It simply stated the location of the

documents that contained mention of Elnashar, revealed by an automated search, and

why the records could not be released. In a response to a request accompanied by

written consent, the FBI complied with its duties under the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. §§

552a(b) and (e)(6). 

C. The Request for Judicial Expungement

Elnashar has also asked that the district court order expungement of any FBI

records about him. He argues that the district court erred in determining that Elnashar

must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial amendment of those

records. Elnashar has not requested that the FBI amend his records; therefore the

district court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. §

552a(g)(1)(A). Whittle v. Moschella, 756 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.D.C.1991) (holding

that administrative request for amendment and subsequent denial "is a necessary

prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction [which] is explicit in the Privacy Act").

Elnashar, however, asserts that since expungement is not a specific remedy available

under the Privacy Act, the exhaustion requirement should be waived because

exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile in this instance. This argument

has no merit, because Elnashar can still request amendment, including expungement,

under the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2). If his request is denied, then he can

pursue his claim in the district court.

D. Review of the Unredacted Record

Finally, Elnashar sought access to a full, unredacted record, based on the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.

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Because the issue was not squarely presented or briefed, we do not decide

whether Elnashar actually failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, nor whether

exhaustion would have been futile for his access claim.

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§§ 552a(d)(1) and (g)(1)(B). Elnashar requested the name of the reporting individual

from the FBI, and his request was denied. This denial was not appealed.

Elnashar argues that the district court erred by failing to make a de novo review

of an agency decision. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor

of the FBI and DOJ for the access claim, because Elnashar had failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies.2

 Elnashar argues that since he was entitled to a judicial

review of the unredacted FBI record, the district court necessarily could not grant

judgment on the pleadings, because the unredacted records were not part of the

pleadings. The district court relied on a magistrate judge's order to determine that

Elnashar did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not

administratively appeal his request for records. Because the district court may look

to public records not contradictory to the complaint, in a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999), the

district court used a correct methodology to determine that Elnashar did not exhaust

his administrative remedies in seeking access to his records, which is a prerequisite

to bringing suit. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(4); Brumley v. United

States Dep't of Labor, 767 F.2d 444, 445 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); 28 C.F.R. §

16.45(c).

III. CONCLUSION

We have carefully reviewed all of Elnashar's allegations of error, and find they

are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

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