Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01261/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01261-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Ashley
Defendant
Fisher
Defendant
Leo Lerma
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEO LERMA,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. ASHLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-CV-1261-LJO-DLB-P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Amended Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on September 14, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

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506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)(“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at Lerdo Jail, where plaintiff was

incarcerated at the time. Plaintiff names Sergeant Ashley and Officer Fisher as defendants. Plaintiff

is seeking money damages. The basis of plaintiff’s claims in this action is his placement in

administrative segregation on August 30. Plaintiff states that upon arrival at Lerdo, he was placed

in administrative segregation for no reason and without a fair hearing. Plaintiff believes the

placement was retaliatory. He also alleges that defendants’ actions in placing him in administrative

segregation were malicious and sadistic. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause

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itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The state does not create

protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Rather, the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing

on the nature of the deprivation. Id. Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to

freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

The provision for certain procedural protections under state law does not work to enlarge the

protections plaintiff is due under federal law, which as discussed below are fairly minimal. See

Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, allegations concerning

the failure of staff to follow certain state regulations concerning procedure do not give rise to a claim

for relief unless plaintiff has a protected liberty interest at stake and plaintiff is deprived of the

procedural protections he is also due under federal law.

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined

in the general prison population instead of segregation, see Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68, and plaintiff

has not alleged any facts which support a finding that plaintiff had a liberty interest in remaining free

from administrative segregation created by state law. The complaint is devoid of any facts

supporting a finding that plaintiff was subjected to a situation which constituted atypical and

significant hardship. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s

due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within

sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally

expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no

protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted).

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief for violation of the due process

clause.

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for violation ofthe Eighth Amendment. To constitute cruel

and unusual punishment in violation ofthe Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the

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wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801

F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a

prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be

held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has alleged no facts which support a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated. Plaintiff’s allegations would not support a claim that the conditions were “sufficiently

grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation,” id., or that any of the named defendants

“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section

1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Finally, an allegation of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir.2003). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

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correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must "

'afford appropriate deference and flexibility' to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered

legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory." Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802,

807 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)). The

burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate "that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating

the actions he complains of." Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to

state a claim for retaliation. He has not described what, if any, protected conduct he engaged in for

which he believes he was retaliated. He has also not described the timing of the alleged retaliatory

action in relation to the protected conduct.

 C. Conclusion

By this order, plaintiff’s complaint shall be dismissed for failure to state facts sufficient to

state any claim upon which may be granted. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity

to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

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2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey

a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 19, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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