Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03362/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03362-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy A. Berryhill
Defendant
Brenda Gerridee Butler
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA GERRIDEE BUTLER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-CV-3362-KAW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dkt. Nos. 15, 18

Plaintiff Brenda Gerridee Butler seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of 

the Commissioner’s final decision, and the remand of this case for further proceedings.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers filed by the parties, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and 

GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for Title II benefits on September 9, 2014. (Administrative Record 

(“AR”) 231.) Plaintiff asserted disability beginning April 1, 2011. (AR 259.) The Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application initially and on reconsideration. (AR 125, 

137.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 155.)

On January 27, 2017, the ALJ held a hearing on Plaintiff’s claim. (AR 71-114.) 

Following the hearing, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s application on June 30, 2017. (AR 44-56.) 

Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council on July 17, 

2017. (AR 229.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 20, 2018. 

(AR 1-5.)

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On June 7, 2018, Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On October 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed her motion for summary 

judgment. (Plf.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 15.) On December 13, 2018, Defendant filed her opposition and 

cross-motion for summary judgment. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 18.) Plaintiff did not file a reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may reverse the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits only when the 

Commissioner’s findings are 1) based on legal error or 2) are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance”; it 

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Id. at 1098; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether the 

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the 

evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 

the Commissioner’s conclusion. Id. “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under SSA regulations, disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step sequential 

evaluation. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). At step one, the Commissioner 

determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At step two, the Commissioner determines 

whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment or combination of impairments,” as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. If the answer is no, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If the answer is yes, the Commissioner proceeds to step three, and 

determines whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. § 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is met, the claimant is 

disabled. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721.

If a claimant does not have a condition which meets or equals a listed impairment, the 

fourth step in the sequential evaluation process is to determine the claimant’s residual functional 

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capacity (“RFC”) or what work, if any, the claimant is capable of performing on a sustained basis, 

despite the claimant’s impairment or impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can 

perform such work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). RFC is the application of a legal 

standard to the medical facts concerning the claimant’s physical capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to perform prior work, 

the Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The claimant bears the 

burden of proof in steps one through four. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five. Id. at 954.

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

On June 30, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (AR 44-56.) At step one, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between the alleged 

onset date of April 1, 2011 through her date last insured of December 31, 2016. (AR 46.)

At step two, the ALJ identified the following severe impairments: degenerative disc 

disease, osteoarthritis and meniscus tears of bilateral knees, and status-post total left knee 

arthroplasty. (AR 46.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had other impairments, including medical 

impairments of affective disorders and anxiety-related disorders, but found that they did not affect 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental work activities. (AR 47.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (AR 49.)

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, except 

that Plaintiff could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and occasionally climb 

ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (AR 50.) 

In so finding, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff had alleged she was disabled because of 

physical problems arising from her cervical and lumbar spine and knees. (AR 50.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff asserted that her neck and upper back problems caused her to have headaches, tingling in 

her arms, and difficulty with looking down. (AR 50.) Plaintiff also stated that she had problems 

with her knees, and could only walk up to two blocks at a time before needing a break. (AR 50.) 

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of her symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence. (AR 50-51.) The 

ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had significant degenerative changes in her cervical spine that 

had required surgical intervention, as well as surgical intervention to her knees. (AR 51.) The 

ALJ pointed to a July 2015 MRI showing a lateral meniscal tear in Plaintiff’s right knee, as well as 

a planned right knee arthroscopy in February 2017. (AR 51.) The ALJ ultimately found, 

however, that while this surgical history lent support to her allegations, “they were undermined by 

her longitudinal examination findings and pain management.” (AR 51.) Specifically, between 

April 2011 and December 2016, Plaintiff’s neck, upper back, and knees were “largely 

unremarkable.” (AR 51.) Plaintiff had inconsistent and sporadic signs of painful or decreased 

range of motion in her neck, tenderness and muscle spasms in her upper back, and decreased range 

of motion in her knees, “but she consistently retained full motor strength and sensation in her arms 

and legs.” (AR 51.) Likewise, Plaintiff’s gait was generally normal or unremarkable, and even in 

the run up to her right knee surgery, Plaintiff only demonstrated a “‘mildly’ antalgic gait.” (AR 

51.)

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s longitudinal pain management undermined her 

allegations of disability, explaining that Plaintiff’s pain management was generally conservative 

and usually consisted of a basic nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory, as well as periodic injections for 

her knees. (AR 52.) The ALJ explained that if Plaintiff’s “physical symptoms were as severe as 

alleged, they would have likely been more evident and limiting on examination or required more 

significant pain management.” (AR 52.)

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s allegations were undermined by her reported 

activities. (AR 52.) Plaintiff was able to perform many activities of daily living, including 

preparing meals and driving herself. (AR 52.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had claimed she 

could only pay attention for fifteen minutes, but had followed the hearing for forty-five minutes. 

(AR 53.) Plaintiff had claimed she was too afraid to drive, but had driven to the field office. (AR 

53.) Further, although Plaintiff claimed social anxiety, agoraphobia, and physical limitations, 

Plaintiff was regularly going to the gym in 2014, completed an MA program and internship 

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involving patient interactions, and was still going to the gym and using her anxiety medicines 

sparingly in 2015. (AR 53.) Plaintiff also took complex classes for her degree and a tennis class. 

(AR 53.)

The ALJ then evaluated the various opinions. The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions 

of medical consultants D. Rose, M.D. and B. Sheehy, M.D., who prepared functional capacity 

assessments in December 2014 and April 2015. (AR 53.) Both opined that Plaintiff could 

perform light work and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (AR 53.) The ALJ found those opinions were supported by the 

review of the medical record and their experience with assessing functionality. (AR 53.)

Next, the ALJ gave little weight to the March 2016 Cervical Spine Residual Functional 

Capacity Questionnaire prepared by Emily Ramsey, nurse practitioner, and Rhonda Berney, M.D. 

(AR 53.) Dr. Berney and Ms. Ramsey opined that Plaintiff should be restricted to less than 

sedentary exertion work with significant limitations for cervical spine range of motion and 

postural activities, that Plaintiff would need two unscheduled breaks, and that her symptoms 

would frequently interfere with her concentration. (AR 53.) The ALJ noted that it was unclear 

Dr. Berney had examined Plaintiff, that the opinion was unexplained, inconsistent with 

examination findings indicating Plaintiff had a normal gait, inconsistent with Plaintiff’s limited 

pain management, and contradicted by Plaintiff going to the gym and her general activities. (AR 

53.)

The ALJ also gave little weight to the June 2015 opinion of Lynne C. Hinkle, a physician’s 

assistant. (AR 53.) Ms. Hinkle’s opinion was similar to that of Dr. Berney’s and Ms. Ramsey’s 

opinion, except that Ms. Hinkle also found that Plaintiff had significant manipulative limitations 

and that her mental condition would interfere with regular schedules and routines. (AR 53.) The 

ALJ again found that this opinion was unexplained and inconsistent with Ms. Hinkle’s normal 

findings regarding Plaintiff’s arms and hands, as well as Plaintiff’s daily activities. (AR 53.)

Finally, the ALJ gave little weight to the third-party function report by Plaintiff’s daughter, 

which “largely echoed [Plaintiff’s] allegations.” (AR 53-54.)

At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

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(AR 54.) The ALJ concluded that based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 

in conjunction with vocational expert testimony, that Plaintiff could perform occupations 

including a cashier, ticket seller, and photocopying-machine operator. (AR 55.) Accordingly, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 56.)

IV. DISCUSSION

In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ should not 

have relied solely on Dr. Sheehy and Dr. Rose because they did not consider evidence after 2014. 

(Plf.’s Mot. at 6.) For example, Plaintiff points to various evidence from 2015 through 2017 that 

Dr. Sheehy and Dr. Rose would not have considered, as they occurred after Dr. Sheehy’s and Dr. 

Rose’s evaluations. (Id. at 6-7.) This evidence included the July 2015 MRI of Plaintiff’s right 

knee, various injections in Plaintiff’s right knee, and the scheduled February 2017 right knee 

surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ thus impermissibly assessed Plaintiff’s limitations 

‘based on her own analysis of the subsequent raw medical data in functional terms,” an analysis 

that the ALJ “[wa]s not qualified to make.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff does not contend that the ALJ 

erred in her assessments of the various medical opinions.

In general, an ALJ may not act as her own medical expert, as she is “not qualified to 

interpret raw medical data in functional terms.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 55 (1st Cir. 

1999); Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that the ALJ was 

not qualified to extrapolate functional limitations from raw medical data). The Court, however, 

finds that the ALJ did not err in this case.

In Karen E. v. Berryhill, the plaintiff made the same argument that “the ALJ’s reliance on 

State Agency physicians’ opinions from August 2013 and January 2014 failed to account for 

medical evidence from the following two years for treatment plaintiff received for lower back pain 

and carpal tunnel syndrome,” and that the ALJ therefore impermissibly interpreted the medical 

records. Case No. ED CV 17-918-SP, 2019 WL 1405835, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2019). The 

district court disagreed as to the lower back pain, explaining:

[The State Agency physicians] considered the evidence then 

available to them concerning plaintiff’s back problems, among other 

impairments, and opined limitations accordingly. The ALJ gave 

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significant weight to these opinions, but also reviewed in detail the 

subsequent medical evidence in the record of plaintiff’s treatment 

for low back pain, including MRI findings, epidural steroid 

injections, pain medication, and the results of these treatments. The 

ALJ particularly noted that plaintiff reported receiving good pain 

relief from the injections and medication, with her symptoms 

improving as a result of this treatment. Thus, although there was 

additional evidence not considered by the State Agency physicians, 

the ALJ concluded it did not demonstrate a more severe lower back 

impairment than what [the State Agency physicians] already 

considered in formulating their opinions.

Certainly it may have been helpful for the ALJ to retain a medical 

expert to review these records, but it was not necessary where, as 

here, the ALJ reviewed the substantial medical evidence that 

supported his RFC determination with respect to plaintiff’s lower 

back pain.

Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted). The district court did agree with the plaintiff as to the carpal 

tunnel syndrome, as the State Agency physicians had not reviewed any records concerning his 

carpal tunnel.

Here, Dr. Sheehy and Dr. Rose both reviewed the available medical evidence, which 

included records concerning Plaintiff’s spine and her knee impairments. (See AR 119-120, 131-

32.) The ALJ then reviewed the subsequent medical evidence, specifically discussing much of the 

evidence that Plaintiff now points to, including the injections to Plaintiff’s right knee, the July 17, 

2015 MRI, and the then-upcoming February 2017 knee surgery. (AR 51-52.) Other evidence 

included that Plaintiff’s gait was generally normal or unremarkable, and that she had few instances 

of antalgic gait or limping even preceding her knee surgery. (AR 51.) The ALJ also explained 

that Plaintiff’s pain management was generally conservative, other than periodic injections for her 

knees. (AR 52.) This showed that Plaintiff’s back and knee conditions “were generally 

unremarkable between April 2011 and December 2016.” (AR 52.) Further, any claims of more 

severe symptoms was undermined by Plaintiff’s reported activities, which included preparing 

meals, driving, regularly going to the gym, completing an MA program that included an internship 

with patient interactions, and taking a tennis class. (AR 52-53.) Thus, as in Karen E., the ALJ 

could reasonably conclude that the evidence post-dating the opinions of Dr. Sheehy and Dr. Rose 

did not demonstrate more severe impairments or limitations than that already found by Dr. Sheehy 

and Dr. Rose, but was consistent with their conclusions. Notably, Plaintiff does not argue how the 

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subsequent medical evidence would require greater limitations than those opined by Dr. Sheehy 

and Dr. Rose, or that they are even inconsistent with the evidence reviewed by Dr. Sheehy and Dr. 

Rose.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2019

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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