Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05021/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05021-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Frederick Leonard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

! .- . , . . 

- ., .· i... . . . • .. . . :. .. . ' 

AUG 2 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOEC!CS:S 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

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) 

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No. 91-5021 

CHARLES FREDERICK LEONARD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(N.D. Okla. No. 90-CR-74-C) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and VAN SICKLE, Senior 

District Judge.** 

This is an appeal from a plea of guilty to continuing 

criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S . C. § 848. The 

Defendant-Appellant argues that he pled guilty to this charge in 

reliance upon erroneous advice of counsel . Because the facts 

necessary to evaluate this contention do not appear in the record 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be ci.ted, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable Bruce M. Van Sickle, Senior District Judge of 

the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, 

sitting by designation. 

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before us, we remand for factual findings regarding the nature of 

the advice given to the Defendant-Appellant and his reliance upon 

that advice in his decision to plead guilty. 1 

FACTS 

The Defendant-Appellant, Charles F. Leonard, was involved in 

a methamphetamine laboratory. After Sam Canup, who was also 

involved in the laboratory, was murdered, Leonard was arrested by 

Oklahoma authorities and charged with manufacture of 

methamphetamine. Pursuant to an agreement with Oklahoma 

authorities, the exact parameters of which are in dispute, Leonard 

gave a taped statement about the murder and the methamphetamine 

manufacturing operation. 

The Government asserts that the Oklahoma authorities agreed 

only to drop the pending methamphetamine manufacturing charge in 

exchange for Leonard's statement. Leonard asserts that the 

Oklahoma authorities essentially promised him full immunity from 

prosecution for any crime, state or federal, stemming from the 

methamphetamine operation or the murder. Had he thought that he 

remained open to federal prosecution for methamphetamine 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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production, he asserts, he would not have given the statement. 2 

After Leonard gave his statement, he was indicted in federal 

court for (1) conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to 

distribute, and distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 

u.s.c. S 846, and (2) continuing criminal enterprise, in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. S 848. The indictment was based on substantially the 

same conduct as the Oklahoma manufacturing charge that was 

dismissed pursuant to the confession agreement. Leonard moved to 

suppress his statement to the Oklahoma authorities. The district 

court denied Leonard's motion to suppress the statement, finding 

that the confession agreement contained no grant of immunity from 

federal prosecution and that, notwithstanding this fact, Leonard 

gave his statement voluntarily. 3 

When the district court denied his motion to suppress, 

Leonard pled guilty to the continuing criminal enterprise charge. 

His guilty plea was made pursuant to a plea agreement in which the 

2 On the tape, the parties note, "this statement is predicated 

upon the District Attorney's Office grant of immunity, which would 

have to be judicially done ••• at some point in time or in 

· exchange for ••• a dismissal of .•• the one count 

manufacturing charge that's pending." Defendant/Appellant's 

Opening Br., App. B, at 1. This is not necessarily inconsistent 

with Leonard's purported understanding of the agreement. Leonard 

asserts that the Oklahoma authorities led him to believe that the 

one manufacturing charge was the only charge that the state 

intended to bring against him and that the federal government did 

not intend to bring charges against him. 

3 The record before us is inadequate to assess the validity of 

the district court's findings. Moreover, as discussed below, 

Leonard's guilty plea precludes us from reviewing the denial of 

his motion to suppress. 

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Government agreed to (1) drop the conspiracy charge, (2) prosecute 

no other federal charges against Leonard for any acts occurring in 

connection with the federal investigation, (3) arrange for 

Oklahoma to drop a first degree murder charge brought against 

Leonard for the Canup murder, (4) request a two-level decrease in 

offense level for acceptance of responsibility, (5) stipulate that 

the methamphetamine received by Leonard was less than pure, and 

(6) stipulate that Leonard's participation in the manufacturing of 

methamphetamine was minimal. 

Leonard asserts that he entered the plea agreement, and the 

unconditional guilty plea, upon the advice of counsel that he 

could subsequently appeal the district court's denial of his 

suppression motion. This advice, to the extent that it was given, 

was erroneous. United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1526 (10th 

Cir.) ("Because the effect of the guilty plea was to waive all 

nonjurisdictional defenses, we need not and do not review the 

trial court's denial of [the defendant's] suppression motions.") 

cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 155 _(1990). On appeal, Leonard argues 

that this advice constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

~-- ~- DISCUSSION 

To show ineffect~ve assistance of counsel in connection with 

a guilty plea, a defendant must prove two elements. First, he 

"'must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 

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standard of reasonableness.'" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 

(1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 

(1984)). Second, he "must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 

474 U.S. at 59. 

Giving plainly erroneous legal information regarding 

important consequences of a guilty plea may fall below the 

objective standard of reasonableness. Although there is a "strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 

the Supreme Court has explained that this presumption is 

essentially "that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

[by counsel] 'might be considered sound trial strategy,'" id. 

(citation omitted). We fail to see how erroneous advice regarding 

important consequences of a guilty plea can be considered sound 

trial strategy. 

This is not to say that any error by counsel in advising a 

defendant about a guilty plea renders counsel constitutionally 

deficient. Where counsel errs in predicting the future course of 

the law or how a court will apply present law whose application 

allows discretion, counsel acts within the range of competence 

mandated by the Constitution. See, e.g., Parker v. North 

Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970) (counsel's allegedly 

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mistaken conclusion that confession was admissible "was well 

within the range of competence required of attorneys representing 

defendants in criminal cases"); United States v. Zweber, 913 F.2d 

705, 712 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[The defendants'] lawyers failed to 

anticipate the court's interpretation of [the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines], but their approach was not clearly wrong under the 

existing cases •••• Defense counsel's assistance was not 

outside of the acceptable range of competence."). As noted by the 

Fourth Circuit, "'[A]lthough counsel need not be a fortune teller, 

he must be a reasonably competent legal historian. Though he need 

not see into the future, he must reasonably recall (or at least 

research) the past .•. '" Kennedy v. Maggio, 725 F.2d 269, 272 

(4th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). 

In a nearly identical case to this, the Seventh Circuit held 

that an attorney who mistakenly informed a defendant that he could 

appeal evidentiary rulings after pleading guilty was 

constitutionally deficient. United States ex rel. Healey v. 

Cannon. 553 F.2d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 

(1977). Every circuit that we are aware of that has addressed the 

issue has held that counsel who offers patently erroneous advice 

material to a guilty plea may be constitutionally deficient. See 

Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[G]ross 

misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective 

assistance of counsel."); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th 

Cir. 1986) ("[G]ross mischaracterization of the likely 

[sentencing] outcome presented in this case, combined with 

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erroneous advice on the possible effects [of sentencing statute if 

defendant went] to trial, falls below the level of competence 

required of defense attorneys."); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 

765 F . 2d 1534, 1539-41 (11th Cir. 1985) ("patently erroneous 

advice" regarding possibility of deportation as result of guilty 

plea may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Kennedy v. 

Maggio, 725 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1984) ('"Where counsel has 

induced defendant to plead guilty on the patently erroneous advice 

that if he does not do so he may be subject to' (a significantly 

harsher penalty]," counsel is constitutionally deficient.) 

(citation omitted); O'Tuel v. Osborne, 706 F.2d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 

1983) ("'[W]hen (a defendant] is grossly misinformed about (parole 

eligibility dates and the possibility of receiving the death 

sentence] by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation, he 

is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.'") (citation 

omitted); see also Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 

1983) ("[M]isinformation (regarding parole eligibility] may be 

more vulnerable to constitutional challenge than mere lack of 

information • . . . II ) . 

Leonard also alleges that he relied on the erroneous advice 

of counsel -- that but for this advice, he would have pleaded not 

guilty and insisted on going to trial. Thus, the facts alleged by 

Leonard are sufficient to state a claim for ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 

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The Government does not dispute that the facts alleged by 

Leonard, if true, would entitle him to relief. Rather, the 

Government argues that Leonard has not offered sufficient proof of 

these facts. Additionally, the Government argues, the facts 

available in the record suggest that Leonard would have pled 

guilty even if his attorney gave him accurate advice regarding his 

ability to appeal the district court's suppression ruling. Thus, 

the Government argues, we should affirm Leonard's conviction. We 

disagree. 

We agree with the Government that the record before us is 

inadequate to address Leonard's argument. There is no evidence as 

to what advice Leonard's counsel gave him and no evidence of the 

extent to which Leonard relied upon this advice in deciding 

whether to plead guilty. However, we disagree that this 

inadequacy mandates affirmance. In those rare cases such as this 

where ineffectiveness of counsel is first raised on direct appeal, 

the record is unlikely to contain enough evidence to address the 

issue. "If the record is insufficient, the appellate court may 

either remand for an evidentiary hearing or simply decline to 

consider the claim on direct appeal." Beaulieu v. United States, 

930 F.2d 805, 807 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 

However, the latter course effectively relegates the defendant to 

habeas review. We see no reason to take that course here. 

Accordingly, we remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine 

what advice counsel gave to Leonard and the extent to which 

Leonard relied upon that advice in his decision to plead guilty. 

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Generally, where an appeals court is presented with an 

ineffective assistance of counsel argument in a guilty plea 

context and the record is insufficient to address the argument, 

the court remands for an evidentiary hearing. See Moore v. United 

States, 950 F.2d 656, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1991); Sparks, 852 F.2d at 

885; Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865-66; Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1541; ~ 

also United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1502 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(in non-guilty-plea case, remanding to determine whether conflict 

rendered counsel's performance constitutionally inadequate). 

Admittedly, some courts have declined to grant relief where a 

defendant has failed to offer adequate proof to support his 

allegations that he was inadequately advised or that he relied on 

such advice. See United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1318 

(7th Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989); United States v. 

Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988). However, in each of 

these cases the defendant apparently had the opportunity to 

develop a factual record. See Jordan, 870 F.2d 1312 (defendant 

moved in district court to suppress evidence of prior plea on 

ineffective assistance grounds); Signori, 844 F.2d at 639 

(affidavits filed in district court at plea withdrawal motion). 

We can imagine a situation where evidence in the record 

effectively precludes a defendant from proving an ineffective 

assistance claim. See, e.g., Cepulonis, 699 F.2d at 577 

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(defendant claimed that he was erroneously advised regarding 

parole eligibility date, but lower court found that he "was 

'expressly advised when he pleaded that maximum possible sentences 

of up to life for each offense could be imposed'; that 'counsel 

diligently explained to him that the sentencing judge was not 

bound to follow the prosecutor's recommendations'; and [the 

defendant], as a parole violator serving out a prior sentence, 

could reasonably be expected to know that parole eligibility 

depended on the length of sentence.") (citation omitted). In such 

a case, a remand for a factual hearing would be futile. However, 

this is not such a case. 

The Government argues that the fact that Leonard admitted 

during the plea colloquy that he pled guilty because he was 

guilty, R., Supp. Vol. III, at 20, precludes a finding of 

prejudice. That is, the Government argues, Leonard "admitted" 

that he pled guilty because he was guilty -- not because he had 

been given certain advice by counsel. However, this is not 

dispositive. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, "A defendant's 

statement at the time of his Rule 11 hearing that his guilty plea 

is intelligent and voluntary is not dispositive, although it gives 

rise to a presumption that the plea is constitutionally adequate • 

• • • Any presumptions arising from these statements •.. are 

overcome because [the defendant] had no way of knowing at the time 

of the hearing that his lawyer had incorrectly informed him 

•..• " Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1541 n.14. The same reasoning 

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applies to a defendant's statement at a Rule 11 hearing that he is 

pleading guilty because he is guilty. 

Moreover, many considerations, including actual guilt, may go 

into a defendant's decision to plead guilty. Yet the fact that 

only some of those reasons involve erroneous advice of counsel 

does not preclude a finding that the defendant relied upon that 

advice and would have pled differently had he been given correct 

advice. See O'Tuel, 706 F.2d at 501 ("[T]he fact that other 

considerations [besides the erroneous advice] significantly 

affected the plea decision is not determinative."] Thus, the 

Government's argument that the terms of the plea agreement were 

sufficiently attractive to influence Leonard's decision to plead 

guilty even if he had been given accurate advice is similarly 

insufficient to preclude a factual hearing. 4 

In summary, Leonard has alleged facts that, if proven, could 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 

his guilty plea. Because he has not had an opportunity to develop 

these facts, we remand for a factual hearing to determine whether 

4 We note, additionally, that Leonard rebuts the Government's 

arguments about the attractiveness of the plea agreement. For 

example, he argues that the plea agreement, at most, reduced his 

offense level by two points (reducing his sentence range from 262-

327 months to 210-262 months), and his special assessments by $50. 

He argues that Oklahoma's murder charge is barred by his 

confession agreement and that therefore dropping that charge is 

meaningless. We do not address any of these arguments, as the 

attractiveness of the plea agreement relative to the p~ssibility 

of appealing the suppression ruling is a factual matter best 

determined at a factual hearing. 

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Leonard was erroneously informed that he would be able to appeal 

the district court's suppression ruling and, if so, the extent to 

which he relied upon such advice in deciding to plead guilty. 

Accordingly, we REMAND. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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