Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15902/USCOURTS-ca9-23-15902-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manley Barton
Appellant
Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANLEY BARTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI 

INDIAN RELOCATION, an 

administrative agency of the United 

States, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-15902 

D.C. No. 3:22-cv08022-SPL 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 14, 2024

Phoenix, Arizona

Filed January 8, 2025

Before: Roopali H. Desai and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges, 

and Edward M. Chen,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Desai

* The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 1 of 12
2 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION

SUMMARY**

Tribal Relocation Benefits

The panel reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian 

Relocation, which affirmed a decision of the Independent 

Hearing Officer (“IHO”) denying Manley Barton’s 

application for relocation benefits under the Navajo-Hopi 

Settlement Act.

Manley applied for relocation benefits based on his 

residence at his grandparents’ Hopi Partitioned Lands 

(“HPL”) homesite. To be eligible for benefits, an applicant 

must show that he (1) was a resident of the land partitioned 

to the tribe of which he was not a member on December 22, 

1974; and (2) was head of household as of the date he moved 

away from the land partitioned to the tribe of which he was 

not a member.

The panel held that because Manley was away from the 

HPL homesite after 1984 for his education and then his 

employment, he qualified for the “temporarily away” 

exception. Therefore, to determine Manley’s legal 

residence, the IHO needed to examine Manley’s intent to 

reside on the HPL homesite and manifestations of his intent 

in accordance with the proper standard. But instead, the IHO 

found one fact dispositive of Manley’s residence: his 

grandparents’ relocation from the HPL homesite. This 

reasoning failed to comport with the residency 

standard. The panel concluded that the IHO’s decision was 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 2 of 12
 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION 3 

arbitrary and capricious, and reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings. 

COUNSEL

Lee Phillips (argued), Law Office of Lee Phillips PC, 

Flagstaff, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Ezekiel Peterson (argued), John E. Arbab, and William B. 

Lazarus, Attorneys; Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General; 

United States Department of Justice Environment & Natural 

Resources Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.; 

Katherine R. Branch and William C. Staes, Assistant United 

States Attorneys; United States Department of Justice, 

Office of the United States Attorney, Phoenix, Arizona; 

Larry Ruzow, Attorney, Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian 

Relocation, Flagstaff, Arizona; for Defendant-Appellee.

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 3 of 12
4 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION

OPINION

DESAI, Circuit Judge:

Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, 

applied for benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi 

Indian Relocation (“ONHIR”). His application was based on 

his relocation within the Joint Use Area (“JUA”), a portion 

of reservation land in northeastern Arizona, following its 

partition between the Navajo and Hopi tribes. ONHIR 

denied Manley’s initial application, and on appeal, the 

Independent Hearing Officer (“IHO”) concluded that 

Manley was ineligible for benefits. On appeal, Manley 

argues that (1) substantial evidence does not support the 

IHO’s findings, (2) the IHO’s decision is arbitrary and 

capricious because it misapplied two ONHIR policies, and 

(3) the IHO’s denial violated its federal trust responsibility. 

We reverse and remand because the IHO improperly applied

the OHNIR policy regarding the “temporarily away” 

exception and thus the IHO’s decision is arbitrary and 

capricious.

BACKGROUND

I. The Settlement Act 

After years of conflict between the Navajo and Hopi 

tribes about ownership of the JUA, Congress enacted the 

Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act (“Settlement Act”) to partition 

the land between the two tribes. Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi 

Indian Relocation Comm’n, 878 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 

1989). The JUA was split into the Hopi Partitioned Lands 

(“HPL”) and Navajo Partitioned Lands (“NPL”), and we

approved the partition in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 

F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1980).

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 4 of 12
BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION 5

Pursuant to the Settlement Act, individuals residing on 

land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member 

were required to relocate from their homes. See 25 U.S.C. 

§ 640d-13(a). Congress also created ONHIR, a federal 

agency, to administer the Act, and funds were allocated to 

provide eligible tribe members with relocation benefits. See 

25 C.F.R. § 700.1 (1988). To be eligible for benefits, an 

applicant had to show that he (1) was a resident of the land 

partitioned to the tribe of which he was not a member on 

December 22, 1974, and (2) was head of household as of the 

date he moved away from the land partitioned to the tribe of 

which he was not a member. 25 C.F.R. §§ 700.147(a)–(b), 

700.69(c). 

II. Manley’s Residential History

In 1966, Manley was born on his grandparents’ homesite 

in Beshbito and lived there with his family. When his parents 

found jobs in Holbrook, Arizona, Manley moved with them. 

He attended school in Holbrook from elementary school to

the time of his high school graduation in 1985. 

When the JUA was partitioned in 1974, Manley’s 

grandparents’ homesite in Beshbito became part of the HPL.

They also had a second homesite that became part of the 

NPL. Even though he lived in Holbrook, Manley returned to 

the HPL homesite during summers, weekends, and holidays 

with his mother and sister throughout the early 1980s. In 

1984, his grandparents were certified for relocation benefits, 

and they relocated from the HPL homesite to their NPL 

homesite. After Manley’s grandparents moved, several of 

Manley’s family members testified that they used the HPL 

homesite for religious ceremonies a couple times a year. 

They also testified that the family’s livestock remained at the 

HPL homesite for several years. Manley’s aunt, Ruth Begay, 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 5 of 12
6 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION

testified that she did not “recall anyone living [at the HPL 

homesite] like 24/7.” Manley testified that he was at the HPL 

homesite “all the time” and spent his time doing various 

household chores. He further testified that he lived at the 

HPL homesite until 1986. Around 1984, Manley’s father 

became sick with cancer and received medical treatment in 

Albuquerque, Shiprock, and Flagstaff. Manley visited his 

father at the hospital while he was receiving treatment, and 

his father passed away in 1986.

After graduating high school, Manley worked as a 

construction worker and gas station attendant. Most of his 

construction work was throughout northern Arizona, and the 

gas station was in Holbrook. He earned $4,105 from the two 

jobs in 1985. Manley’s mother, Marie Barton, was certified 

for relocation benefits based on her residence at the HPL 

homesite and moved to the NPL in 1986. There is unrebutted 

testimony that Manley’s aunts Ruth Ann Begay and Mildred 

Begay and possibly other members of the family were also 

similarly certified for benefits. 

III. Manley’s Application for Benefits and Subsequent 

Appeals

Manley applied for relocation benefits based on his 

residence at his grandparents’ HPL homesite. ONHIR 

denied his application for failure to satisfy the head of 

household requirement, and he appealed the decision. In 

support of his appeal, Manley testified and also presented his 

uncle Richard Begay, aunt Mildred Begay, aunt Ruth Ann 

Begay, and sister Marcella Barton as witnesses. And 

following his hearing before the IHO, Manley submitted a 

memorandum arguing that his continued contacts with the 

HPL homesite through 1986 established that he was the head 

of household at the time he moved away from the HPL. The 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 6 of 12
BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION 7

IHO denied Manley’s appeal. He found that all the witnesses 

were credible but noted that Ruth’s credibility was limited 

due to her inability to recall certain dates. The IHO 

concluded that Manley was a legal resident of the HPL on 

December 22, 1974, but his residence at the HPL homesite 

ended in 1984. The IHO explained that Manley’s “claim to 

legal residence” at the HPL homesite “ended in 1984 when 

[his] grandparents relocated to the NPL . . .” Regardless of 

the family’s use of the structures at their former HPL 

homesite after relocation, the HPL homesite was no longer 

any family members’ homesite or legal residence for 

relocation purposes.” Without considering any other 

evidence, the IHO relied on this finding to conclude that 

Manley could not be considered “temporarily away” from 

the HPL homesite. And because Manley was a dependent 

minor in 1984, the IHO ultimately found that he could not 

satisfy the head of household requirement. 

Manley filed an appeal in the district court, and each 

party moved for summary judgment. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding that 

the IHO’s conclusion that Manley’s legal residence on the 

HPL ended in 1984 was supported by substantial evidence 

and was not arbitrary or capricious. It also rejected Manley’s 

claim that ONHIR violated its federal trust responsibility by 

denying his application for benefits. Manley timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

reverse and remand. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed 

de novo. Brunozzi v. Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 851 F.3d 990, 

995 (9th Cir. 2017). When summary judgment involves 

review of an administrative proceeding, we need only 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 7 of 12
8 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION

“determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in 

the administrative record permitted the agency to make the 

decision it did.” Occidental Eng’g Co. v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 

766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”), we review ONHIR’s decision to 

determine whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, not in accordance with law, or unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” Bedoni, 878 F.2d at 1122. 

Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, we “simply 

ensure[] that the agency has acted within a zone of 

reasonableness and, in particular, has reasonably considered 

the relevant issues and reasonably explained [its] decision.” 

Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 

U.S. 414, 423 (2021). For instance, a decision is arbitrary 

and capricious when it “relie[s] on factors which Congress 

has not intended it to consider, entirely fail[s] to consider an 

important aspect of the problem, offer[s] an explanation for 

its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 

agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

ANALYSIS

To satisfy the head of household requirement under the 

Settlement Act, an applicant must show that he was head of 

household as of the time he moved from the land partitioned 

to the other tribe. 25 C.F.R. §§ 700.147(a)–(b), 700.69(c). 

This element requires establishing when an applicant’s 

residence at a homesite ended. Generally, determining an 

applicant’s residence “requires an examination of the 

person’s intent to reside combined with manifestations of 

that intent.” 49 Fed. Reg. 22,277–78 (May 29, 1984)

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 8 of 12
BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION 9

(eliminating “substantial and recurring contacts” standard 

and adopting “intent and manifestations of intent” standard 

for assessing residency). According to the regulations, 

several factors can be considered, including:

Ownership of livestock, Ownership of 

improvements, Grazing Permits, Livestock 

sales receipts, Homesite leases, Public health 

records, Medical and Hospital records, 

including those of Medicinemen, Trading 

Post records, School records, Military 

records, Employment records, Mailing 

Address records, Banking records, Drivers 

license records, Voting records—tribal and 

county, Home ownership or rental off the 

disputed area, BIA Census Data, Information 

obtained by Certification Field Investigation, 

Social Security Administration records, 

Marital records, Court records, Records of 

Birth, Joint Use Area Roster, any other 

relevant data.

Id.

Furthermore, an applicant can establish eligibility for 

benefits under the “temporarily away” exception. Under this 

exception, an applicant who is physically away from their

homesite for education or employment can still establish 

residency for relocation benefits eligibility. Initially, the 

regulations required an applicant who was “temporarily 

away” from their homesite to show “substantial recurring 

contacts” with their homesite to establish residency. See 

Bedoni, 878 F.3d at 1122 (applying the version of 25 C.F.R. 

§ 700.97 in effect in 1977). But since then, the regulations 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 9 of 12
10 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION

have been updated to adopt a general “intent and 

manifestations of intent” standard instead. See 49 Fed. 

Reg. 22,277–78 (May 29, 1984). It follows that, consistent 

with the current regulation, this new standard should also be 

used to assess the residency of applicants who are 

“temporarily away” from their homesite. And at oral 

argument, both parties conceded that the “intent and 

manifestations of intent” standard applies to the 

“temporarily away” exception. Therefore, an applicant who 

is away from his homesite for education or employment 

purposes can nevertheless establish residency through 

evidence of his intent to reside at the homesite or 

manifestations of that intent.

Here, Manley was away from the HPL homesite until he 

graduated from high school in 1985. Following his 

graduation, he was away from the HPL homesite for 

employment purposes. And before the IHO, Manley and his 

family members provided credible testimony demonstrating 

his intent to reside at the HPL homesite post-1984. Manley 

testified that he used the HPL homesite until 1986, when he 

moved to his mother’s relocation house on the NPL. He 

testified that he was at the HPL homesite “all the time,” lived 

in the hogans, used the hogans for ceremonies, and kept 

clothes and belongings there. Manley also testified that he 

did chores, hauled wood, and fed the animals at the HPL 

homesite. Similarly, Manley’s family members testified that 

they held religious ceremonies at the HPL homesite “several 

times a year” until 1987. They also testified that the family 

kept livestock, maintained the structures, stored firewood, 

and kept furnishings and dishes at the HPL after 1984. 

However, the IHO found that “[b]y operation of law,” 

the HPL homesite could not be Manley’s legal residence 

after his grandparents’ 1984 relocation from the HPL 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 10 of 12
BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION 11

homesite, and concluded that “[r]egardless of the family’s 

use” of the HPL homesite, it was “no longer any family 

member[‘s] homesite or legal residence.” Manley argues that 

the IHO’s failure to properly apply the “temporarily away” 

exception to determine his residence after 1984 renders the 

IHO’s decision arbitrary and capricious.

Because Manley was away from the HPL homesite after 

1984 for his education and then his employment, he qualifies 

for the “temporarily away” exception. Therefore, to 

determine Manley’s legal residence, the IHO needed to 

examine Manley’s intent to reside on the HPL homesite and 

manifestations of his intent in accordance with the proper 

standard. But instead, the IHO found one fact dispositive of 

Manley’s legal residence: his grandparents’ relocation from 

the HPL homesite. This reasoning fails to comport with the 

residency standard. Indeed, it is unclear how Manley’s

grandparents’ relocation demonstrates Manley’s intent to 

reside at the HPL homesite or is otherwise a manifestation 

of his intent. And there is no authority to suggest that this 

fact automatically establishes that Manley is not a legal 

resident. Affording dispositive weight to the grandparents’ 

relocation in denying Manley’s claim of residence is 

inconsistent with the certifications of relocation benefits for 

his mother and other relatives. Instead of relying on a single 

fact, the residency standard allows the IHO to consider all 

relevant data in the record. See 49 Fed. Reg. 22,277–78. And 

here, the record contains credible testimony from Manley 

and his family members related to Manley’s continued 

connection to the HPL homesite.

By casting aside the proper standard and relying solely

on Manley’s grandparents’ relocation to determine Manley’s 

legal residency, the IHO “entirely failed to consider an 

important aspect of the problem”: evidence of Manley’s 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 11 of 12
12 BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION

intent to reside at the HPL homesite and manifestations of 

his intent. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. 

at 43; see also Innova Sols., Inc. v. Baran, 983 F.3d 428, 

434–35 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services’ “failure to consider evidence so 

central to the inquiry is yet another (and independent) reason 

why its decision was arbitrary and capricious”); Montana 

Wilderness Ass’n v. McAllister, 666 F.3d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 

2011) (finding that the National Park Service’s failure to

explain how its travel plan maintained “wilderness 

character” under the correct standard rendered the plan

arbitrary and capricious). Thus, we cannot conclude that the 

IHO “reasonably considered the relevant issues and 

reasonably explained [his] decision” to find Manley 

ineligible for benefits, and we find that the IHO’s decision 

was arbitrary and capricious. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 

U.S. at 423. We reverse and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.1

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1 Because we conclude that the IHO’s decision was arbitrary and 

capricious based on its failure to properly consider whether the

“temporarily away” exception applies, we decline to reach whether the 

decision was arbitrary and capricious based on its failure to apply the 

“customary use policy” or whether the decision was supported by 

substantial evidence. And because we make no ruling on the merits of 

Manley’s application, we cannot determine whether the IHO violated its 

federal trust responsibility by finding Manley was ineligible for benefits. 

Case: 23-15902, 01/08/2025, ID: 12918624, DktEntry: 40-1, Page 12 of 12