Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03101/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dana Anspach
Appellant
Retiree, Inc.
Appellee
Sensible Money, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RETIREE, INC., 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

DANA ANSPACH; SENSIBLE MONEY, 

LLC, 

 Defendants - Appellants. 

 

No. 15-3101 

(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-02079-JAR) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, LUCERO and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Retiree, Inc., filed suit against Dana Anspach and Sensible Money, LLC, 

alleging breach of a confidentiality agreement. Following a bench trial, the district 

court ruled in favor of Retiree, entered a permanent injunction, and awarded Retiree 

$500,000 in liquidated damages. Defendants now appeal. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I

 Retiree is a retirement-planning firm specializing in decumulation—the 

process of efficiently drawing down retirement assets. As described by Retiree 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 17, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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principal William Meyer, the company attempts to extend asset longevity by 

coordinating five elements: (1) asset allocation, which refers to the mix of stocks and 

bonds in a portfolio; (2) tax efficiency, which looks to increase the after-tax amount 

of assets; (3) asset location, which concerns the placement of investments in 

particular accounts; (4) withdrawal sequencing, which refers to the order of account 

withdrawals; and (5) Social Security claiming strategies. Retiree spent more than 

three years developing its “big model”—an Excel spreadsheet coordinating the five 

elements, which includes more than 800 rows of tax calculations. The company has 

also developed a simplified “QuickStart” model which generates free client reports 

showing side-by-side comparisons of various decumulation strategies. 

 Anspach is a Certified Financial Planner and has earned a Retirement 

Management Analyst designation from the Retirement Income Industry Association 

(“RIIA”). Since 2008, she has authored a popular retirement-planning blog. In early 

2011, she was a principal of Wealth Management Solutions (“WMS”), a financial 

planning and investment advisory firm. According to Meyer, decumulation was not 

Anspach’s niche practice at WMS, although she was familiar with the decumulation 

concepts identified above. 

 In February 2011, Meyer contacted Anspach and the two began considering 

merging Anspach’s portion of WMS’ practice into Retiree. In March 2011, Anspach 

left WMS. She signed a Confidentiality, Non-Compete and Invention Ownership 

Agreement (the “Confidentiality Agreement”) with Retiree. In the Confidentiality 

Agreement, Anspach acknowledged that she would receive “Confidential 

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Information,” which was defined as “certain confidential and proprietary information 

concerning, without limitation, trade secrets, software products, software designs, 

specifications, processes, plans, or other ideas or inventions relating to the financial 

services industry.” Anspach agreed that she would “not use the Confidential 

Information other than for the purposes of [her] business with [Retiree]” and would 

“not disclose, publish or otherwise reveal any of the Confidential Information 

received from [Retiree] to any other party whatsoever except with the specific prior 

written authorization of [Retiree].” The Confidentiality Agreement also contained a 

liquidated damages provision requiring Anspach to pay Retiree $250,000 for each 

violation. During her affiliation with the company, she received access to documents 

Retiree considered confidential and proprietary, including the QuickStart 

spreadsheet. She was not provided access to the “big model,” although Meyer 

showed her portions of it. 

Shortly after leaving WMS, however, Anspach decided against joining Retiree. 

She instead formed a new company called Sensible Money. In February 2012, 

Retiree filed suit alleging Anspach and Sensible Money had breached the 

Confidentiality Agreement by using Retiree’s Confidential Information and by 

disclosing that Confidential Information to third parties. Retiree sought both 

injunctive relief and damages. The district court held a preliminary injunction 

hearing followed by a bench trial. 

At those proceedings, Meyer testified that as of 2011 very few retirement 

advisors focused on decumulation, and that none efficiently coordinated Retiree’s 

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five elements. Meyer repeatedly stressed that the true value of the Retiree model was 

the ability to coordinate these five components. He conceded that each individual 

element is simple to understand, but testified only Retiree (and perhaps one other 

competitor) was able to comprehensively coordinate all five factors. Meyer also 

testified that interactions between the components made Retiree’s process 

exponentially more complex. For example, withdrawal sequencing strategies 

appearing optimal when viewed in isolation might result in more Social Security 

income being subject to taxation, and maximizing tax efficiency in turn requires 

proper asset location. However, Meyer acknowledged that many aspects of Retiree’s 

complex methodology were in the public sphere because, for example, Retiree 

principals authored publications explaining portions of the model. But Meyer 

suggested that the publications were generally limited to case studies, and disclosed 

only limited information on the underlying methods. 

To support Retiree’s use claim, Meyer compared Anspach’s spreadsheets from 

before and after her association with Retiree. He noted that the “pre-Retiree” 

spreadsheet contained several of Anspach’s annotations identifying gaps in her 

model—in particular that “a tax calculation needs to be developed,” and that the 

document should show “ideal allocation based on an algorithm that needs to be 

defined/developed.” Further, Meyer observed that the pre-Retiree spreadsheet lacked 

Social Security strategies. Meyer then offered Anspach’s more sophisticated “postRetiree” spreadsheet, which allowed Anspach to coordinate Social Security benefits 

and withdrawal sequencing to minimize taxes. The post-Retiree spreadsheet also 

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included information regarding the proper amounts to draw from taxable and taxdeferred accounts. 

Anspach further developed her post-Retiree spreadsheet by the time of trial. In 

June 2013, she authored a document describing her new “Spreadsheet 2.0” and 

identifying “key differentiators” that “make it different from current planning 

projection models.” Anspach stated that Spreadsheet 2.0: (1) allows users “to see 

which years you have tax opportunities in a way that no other tool does”; (2) 

“[a]ccurately incorporate[s] the taxation of Social Security”; and (3) has “[t]he ability 

to tie withdrawal strategy to a specific investment allocation by account type.” 

Meyer testified that the spreadsheet disclosed to Anspach does each of these things. 

Anspach’s testimony differed sharply from Meyer’s. She stated that although 

planners use different terms and methods, the industry standard is for every financial 

planner to advise clients in coordinating the five elements Meyer identified. She 

denied that her spreadsheets use Retiree’s Confidential Information, claiming she 

obtained her information from commercially available software. And she 

distinguished her spreadsheets from Retiree’s by averring that hers could not 

automatically coordinate tax and Social Security information. 

As to Retiree’s disclosure claim, Meyer testified that Anspach presented her 

post-Retiree spreadsheets at RIIA events. Anspach denied promoting her spreadsheet 

at the events, arguing that she only presented client reports which resulted from the 

model. Retiree also argued that a book Anspach published included case studies 

which constituted disclosure. 

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The district court found that Anspach violated the Confidentiality Agreement 

“by appropriating the processes and methodology that underlay Retiree’s software 

and practices.” It rejected Anspach’s position that Retiree’s methods were 

commonplace, noting that after Anspach began calling “notably similar 

methodologies and processes her own,” she herself described them as “novel, unique 

and cutting-edge in the industry.” The differences between Anspach’s pre- and postRetiree spreadsheets, the court found, was “compelling” circumstantial evidence that 

Anspach used Retiree’s Confidential Information. It noted that Anspach was able to 

develop a spreadsheet similar to Retiree’s in just six months, while Retiree’s process 

took several years. The court also held that Anspach disclosed Confidential 

Information to Retiree’s competitors. It awarded $500,000 in liquidated damages 

($250,000 each for the use and disclosure breaches), and entered a permanent 

injunction. 

Anspach and Sensible Money moved to alter or amend the judgment. The 

district court granted the motion in part. It clarified that the damages award was 

entered only against Anspach, not Sensible Money. The court also set forth the terms 

of its permanent injunction: 

Defendants shall be permanently enjoined from using their Post-Retiree 

Spreadsheets/Excel Models and shall remove all material on their 

website that was created using these spreadsheets/models, in particular 

their case studies page and The Free Report. Defendants are further 

enjoined from utilizing their Post-Retiree Spreadsheets/Excel Models in 

presentations, speaking engagements, books, and articles. 

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The court defined “Post-Retiree Spreadsheets/Excel Models” as any “spreadsheet or 

Excel model that utilizes this methodology that was shown to Anspach during her 

affiliation with Retiree.” The court described Retiree’s appropriated methodology as 

“integrat[ing] all of the[ five] factors and allow[ing] a client to see, in real-time, how 

changing variables would affect their financial picture.” The court otherwise denied 

defendants’ motion, and they timely appealed. 

II 

 “In an appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s factual findings 

for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 

F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The parties agree that 

substantive Kansas state law governs this diversity case. See Erie R.R. Co. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 

A

Anspach first contends that the Confidentiality Agreement is unenforceable. 

Whether a contractual provision is enforceable is a question of law we review de 

novo. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956 (10th 

Cir. 1992). “In Kansas, it is well recognized that a restrictive covenant in an 

employment contract will only be applied to the extent it is reasonably necessary 

under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. 

Richter, 679 P.2d 206, 210 (Kan. 1984). “[O]nly a legitimate business interest may 

be protected by a noncompetition covenant. If the sole purpose is to avoid ordinary 

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competition, it is unreasonable and unenforceable.” Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 

89 (Kan. 1996). 

As the Kansas Supreme Court has noted, many jurisdictions hold that 

businesses possess a legitimate interest in protecting “the special training of 

employees, trade secrets, confidential business information, loss of clients, good will, 

reputation, seeing that contracts with clients continue, and referral sources.” Id. at 

91. Kansas Courts have held that businesses may validly protect not only trade 

secrets, but other confidential information through contract. In Kansas, the “law is 

clear that an ex-employee may be enjoined from disclosing confidential material and 

trade secrets gained in the course of his or her employment.” Farmers Grp. v. Lee, 

28 P.3d 413, 419 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001); see also E. Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 567 P.2d 

1371, 1378 (Kan. 1977) (“The existence of trade secrets as evidence of enticing 

customers from a former employer is sometimes relevant, but not essential, to 

injunctive relief in a suit brought for breach of covenant not to compete.”); Heatron, 

Inc. v. Shackelford, 898 F. Supp. 1491, 1500 (D. Kan. 1995) (“Kansas courts have 

long recognized the employer’s right to maintain confidentiality of trade secrets or 

other commercially sensitive information pertaining to the employer’s business 

practices as an interest entitled to protection.”).1

 The policy behind enforcing such 

 1

 In Puritan-Bennett, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that agreements that 

restrict more than “purely trade secrets, have been held unreasonable.” 679 P.2d at 

211. But in the same decision, the court held that “[t]he question of trade secret 

disclosure is not determinative of appellees’ right to have the noncompetition 

covenant in force.” Id. at 212. We thus do not read Puritan-Bennett as establishing a 

rule that only trade secrets are protectable by contract. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. 

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confidentiality clauses is to bar an employee from “obtain[ing] an unfair competitive 

advantage.” Weber, 913 P.2d at 92. But contractual provisions that “restrict 

communication of ideas in general” are impermissible. Puritan-Bennett, 679 P.2d at 

211. 

Anspach argues the Confidentiality Agreement is overbroad, relying on 

Puritan-Bennett. There, the court held that a clause prohibiting a former employee 

from using “any information connected with any aspect of the Company’s business” 

was unenforceable. Id. Similarly, the Confidentiality Agreement in this case barred 

use or disclosure of “other ideas or inventions relating to the financial services 

industry.” 

Although this clause is overbroad, it does not render the entire Confidentiality 

Agreement unenforceable. In Puritan-Bennett, the Kansas Supreme Court held that 

“[s]trict enforcement” of the confidentiality clause at issue “would unreasonably 

infringe upon appellant’s right to earn a living.” Id. But the court nevertheless 

enforced the provision to the extent reasonable, enjoining the former employee “from 

disclosing information relating to Puritan-Bennett’s research, development, 

production or sales techniques of gaseous and chemical aircraft emergency oxygen 

equipment.” Id. 

 

Malinowski, 787 P.2d 742, 1990 Kan. App. LEXIS 66, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) 

(unpublished) (in Puritan-Bennett, the Kansas “Supreme Court also held that valid 

purposes of covenants not to compete are not only to protect trade secrets, but also to 

prevent an employee from using the expertise learned from his or her former 

employer to a competitor’s benefit”). 

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The district court below effectively did the same. It determined that Retiree 

had developed a “unique methodology . . . which is embodied and expressed through 

[its] spreadsheet” and that Anspach “appropriate[d] the processes and methodology 

that underlay Retiree’s software and practices.” The court made clear that it was not 

barring Anspach from using spreadsheets, tax and Social Security planning software, 

or other ideas or inventions related to the financial services industry in general. 

Instead, the court enjoined the use of Retiree’s process and methodology by limiting 

its injunction to the use of a coordinated spreadsheet that provided live updates based 

on changing variables, such that a client could compare various strategies’ outcomes 

in real time. 

As to this limited universe of information, we agree with the district court that 

the Confidentiality Agreement is enforceable.2

 As the district court found, “the 

processes and methodology that underlay Retiree’s software and practices” fall 

within the definition of “Confidential Information” in the Confidentiality Agreement. 

This is true even omitting the overbroad “other ideas or inventions” clause. Meyer 

testified that Retiree restricted access to those methods and processes and required 

confidentiality agreements from anyone given access. He also testified that Retiree 

was in negotiations with other companies to license Retiree’s services or invest in 

Retiree’s intellectual property for millions of dollars. The steps taken by Retiree to 

 2

 We acknowledge that Meyer made overbroad claims about the Confidential 

Information in his testimony, stating for example that free reports issued to clients 

without a confidentiality agreement were confidential. But we review the district 

court’s orders, not the claims of Retiree’s witnesses. 

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protect its spreadsheet model, combined with Anspach’s own words describing the 

model’s novelty, convince us that the information used by Anspach was within the 

enforceable ambit of the Confidentiality Agreement. 

Similarly, that portions of Retiree’s methodology use public information does 

not render the Confidentiality Agreement unenforceable. Even a “trade secret can 

exist in a combination of components, each of which, by itself, might be in the public 

domain. A knowledge of the best combination of processes or systems of 

combination of elements may amount to a trade secret.” Mann v. Tatge Chem. Co., 

440 P.2d 640, 647 (Kan. 1968). While affiliated with Retiree, Anspach learned 

valuable confidential information regarding coordination of decumulation strategies. 

And her spreadsheets changed quickly and dramatically after her relationship with 

Retiree terminated. In making her new spreadsheets, Anspach used information that 

she had contractually agreed not to use. 

Of course, the line between “ordinary competition” and “unfair competitive 

advantage,” Weber, 913 P.2d at 92, is difficult to draw. So too is the line between 

“confidential business information,” id. at 91, and “ideas in general,” PuritanBennett, 679 P.2d at 211. Nevertheless, granting due deference to the district court’s 

factual findings, see Weyerhaeuser, 510 F.3d at 1260, we conclude that the 

restrictions of the Confidentiality Agreement enforced by the district court were 

“reasonably necessary under the facts and circumstances of the particular case” and 

thus permissible, Puritan-Bennett, 679 P.2d at 210. 

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B

 Anspach also argues that the district court erred in finding that she breached 

the Confidentiality Agreement by using and disclosing Retiree’s Confidential 

Information. We review these factual findings for clear error. Weyerhaeuser, 510 

F.3d at 1260. “We will reverse for clear error only if the district court’s finding was 

without factual support in the record or we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 464 

F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

1

 As to Retiree’s use claim, Anspach contends Retiree failed to present 

necessary evidence indicating she misappropriated Retiree’s formulas or algorithms. 

She further argues that the differences between her post-Retiree models and Retiree’s 

spreadsheets demonstrate that she did not use proprietary information. We disagree. 

 Anspach’s argument that her spreadsheets lacked the specific formulas 

contained in Retiree’s spreadsheets is unavailing. The district court expressly found 

that Anspach did not adopt the specific formulas from Retiree’s spreadsheets, but that 

she nevertheless appropriated “the processes and methodology that underlay 

Retiree’s software.” As described supra, Retiree’s methods are within the scope of 

an enforceable agreement regardless of whether Anspach copied particular 

spreadsheet cells. And after her affiliation with Retiree, Anspach described several 

features that her “Spreadsheet 2.0” shared with Retiree’s spreadsheets as “different 

from current planning projection models.” Thus, Anspach herself stated that the 

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methods she adopted—which were nearly identical to Retiree’s methods—were 

novel. 

The court further found that Anspach was able to develop a spreadsheet far 

more sophisticated that the one she used prior to her affiliation with Retiree in only 

six months, and concluded this was strong circumstantial evidence that she used 

Retiree’s methods. Anspach counters that her spreadsheet was not as sophisticated as 

Retiree’s. Specifically, she notes that her post-Retiree spreadsheet was not fully 

integrated. The district court acknowledged that Anspach’s models were not as 

detailed, but concluded that her ability to “replicate parts of Retiree’s spreadsheet” in 

“an abbreviated time” led to the conclusion that Anspach used Retiree’s Confidential 

Information. We are not left with a firm conviction that these findings are mistaken. 

2

 We reach the opposite conclusion as to Retiree’s disclosure claim. The district 

court found that Anspach disclosed “confidential information to Retiree’s 

competitors, including software providers Finance Logix and Social Security 

Timing.” But Retiree states in its briefing that reference to these companies is 

“misplaced,” and that Retiree introduced evidence about the Finance Logix-Social 

Security Timing transaction merely “to show the reasonableness of the $250,000 

liquidated damages number.” Retiree instead argues that Anspach disclosed 

Confidential Information at conferences and in her book. 

 Meyer testified that Anspach “presented her Excel model” at several RIIA 

conferences. He did not claim to have attended these conferences, instead stating 

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that “it was written up in the RIIA newsletter.” But the newsletter was not 

introduced. Nor are we directed to any witness testimony contradicting Anspach’s 

account of her presentation. Anspach testified that she showed “client reports, stuff 

you would show to a client, just as an example of one way to lay out the information” 

at the conferences. She stated that she “wasn’t promoting [her] Excel model.” 

Meyer’s bare-bones testimony that he learned from a newsletter that Anspach 

presented her model is insufficient to support a finding that Anspach disclosed 

Retiree’s Confidential Information. A factfinder cannot “engage in a degree of 

speculation and conjecture that renders its finding a guess or mere possibility.” 

Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(quotation omitted). Merely displaying client reports would not constitute disclosure 

of Retiree’s Confidential Information. As Meyer conceded, client reports are “in the 

public domain” and thus “not confidential.” Retiree itself provides free client reports 

to the public, and Retiree’s principals have published papers containing client case 

studies. Simply, client reports demonstrating that Retiree can coordinate various 

elements are not protectable; rather “how to do it, how these things are coordinated” 

is. See Puritan-Bennett, 679 P.2d at 211 (covenants that “restrict communication of 

ideas in general” are unenforceable). Without any substantive evidence that Anspach 

disclosed to conference attendees how Retiree’s methodology operates, the record 

contains insufficient evidence that she disclosed protectable information at the 

conferences. 

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 Retiree contends that Anspach disclosed Confidential Information in a book 

she authored. But the portions of Anspach’s book Retiree cites merely offer a case 

study discussing various decumulation scenarios for a hypothetical couple. The case 

study shows the results of implementing various methods Anspach appropriated from 

Retiree, but does not disclose how to coordinate the various elements. Again, such 

case studies are not protectable—and Retiree itself similarly makes case studies 

publicly available. Meyer also claimed that Anspach disclosed Confidential 

Information by recommending that her readers use commercially available Social 

Security calculators. The idea of incorporating Social Security strategies, however, 

is a general idea, and does not comprise Confidential Information about Retiree’s 

methods. See id. Moreover, referring readers to a commercially available calculator 

that does not use Retiree’s Confidential Information does not disclose any protectable 

information. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s finding that Anspach 

disclosed Retiree’s protectable information was without factual support in the 

record.3

 

 3

 We also note that regardless of Retiree’s concession, Anspach’s involvement 

in the Finance Logix and Social Security Timing transaction would not support a 

finding that Anspach disclosed Confidential Information. Retiree cited Anspach’s 

statement that Finance Logix would be rolling out a feature to incorporate Social 

Security taxation thanks to her. Anspach testified that she recommended a 

commercially available social security calculator offered by Social Security Timing 

to a Finance Logix principal. Again merely referring a company to commercially 

available software does not constitute disclosure of Retiree’s Confidential 

Information. 

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C

 Lastly, defendants argue that the district court’s permanent injunction fails to 

“state its terms specifically . . . and . . . describe in reasonable detail—and not by 

referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). Whether an injunction is sufficiently specific is a legal 

question we review de novo. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 159 F.3d 1311, 

1316 (10th Cir. 1998). 

“[A]n injunction cannot be so general as to leave the party open to the hazard 

of conducting business in the mistaken belief that it is not prohibited by the 

injunction and thus make him vulnerable to prosecution for contempt.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). “Rule 65(d) requires only that the enjoined conduct be described in 

reasonable, not excessive, detail—particularly in cases . . . when overly precise terms 

would permit the very conduct sought to be enjoined.” Id. In assessing whether an 

order complies with Rule 65(d), we construe the district court’s language “in light of 

the injunctive order as a whole.” Id. 

The district court enjoined defendants from “using their Post-Retiree 

Spreadsheets/Excel Models” and “utilizing their Post-Retiree Spreadsheets/Excel 

Models in presentations, speaking engagements, books, and articles.” It defined 

“Post-Retiree Spreadsheets/Excel Models” to include any “spreadsheet or Excel 

model that utilizes this methodology that was shown to Anspach during her 

affiliation with Retiree.” And it explained that Retiree’s methodology was a “model 

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that coordinated the five factors set out in” a prior order4

 in a manner that 

“integrate[s] all of these factors and allow[s] a client to see, in real-time, how 

changing variables would affect their financial picture.” We hold that this 

explanation adequately puts defendants on notice of the conduct that is prohibited, 

and that which is permissible. 

 Defendants relatedly challenge the injunction’s lack of a temporal limitation. 

Retiree observes that in assessing the reasonableness of a non-competition covenant, 

Kansas courts consider whether “the time and territorial limitations contained in the 

covenant reasonable.” Id. However, Kansas courts have enforced non-disclosure 

agreements without any temporal limitation. See Puritan-Bennett, 679 P.2d at 211-12 

(enforcing non-disclosure agreement prohibiting disclosure of contractually protected 

information “during my employment or at any time thereafter”). Because this case 

concerns a non-disclosure agreement rather than a non-compete covenant baring all 

competition, the indefinite term is permissible. 

III

 For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s award of 

$250,000 in damages on Retiree’s disclosure claim. We AFFIRM the district court’s 

 4

 The “prior order” identifies the five factors discussed supra. Defendants do 

not argue that the injunction violates Rule 65(d) by “referring to the complaint or 

other document,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), and any such challenge is waived, see 

Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments 

inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.”). 

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judgment in all other respects and REMAND for modification of the damages award 

consistent with this order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

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