Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01473/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01473-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Miguel Molina
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL A. MOLINA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:08-cv-01473-AWI-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE:

PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL SECURITY

COMPLAINT (DOC. 1)

Plaintiff, born in June 1984, is proceeding in forma

pauperis and with counsel with an action seeking judicial review

of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(Commissioner) denying Plaintiff’s application of September 21,

2005, for Supplemental Security Income benefits, in connection

with which Plaintiff claimed to have been disabled since October

1, 2003, due to mental problems, schizophrenia, hearing voices, 1

inability to be around people, paranoia, and too much medication

With respect to SSI, because SSI payments are made for a period

1

beginning at the date of application, the onset date in an SSI case is

ordinarily established as of the date of filing, provided that the claimant

was disabled on that date. Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-20. Exceptions are where the

evidence shows that the onset date was subsequent to the date of filing, or

where there is a problem requiring ascertainment of duration. Id.

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to work. (A.R. 45-55, 86-91.) The matter has been referred to the

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b) and

Local Rule 72-302(c)(15).

The decision under review is that of Social Security

Administration (SSA) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Bert C.

Hoffman, Jr., dated March 20, 2008 (A.R. 12-22), rendered after a

hearing held on October 24, 2007, at which Plaintiff appeared and

testified with the assistance of counsel (A.R. 12, 983-1034). The 2

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on July 18,

2008 (A.R. 5-7), and thereafter Plaintiff filed his complaint in

this Court on August 18, 2008. Briefing commenced on May 28,

2009, with the filing of Plaintiff’s opening brief, and was

completed with the filing of Respondent’s cross-motion for

summary judgment on June 29, 2009. The matter has been submitted

to the Court without oral argument.

I. Standard and Scope of Review

This Court has jurisdiction of the underlying controversy

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3) and 405(g). 

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of

the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits under the Act. In

reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Although the hearing is labeled as one occurring on October 24, 2005

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(Court Transcript Index, A.R. 983, 985, 1034), the Court notes that in his

decision, the ALJ referred to the date of the hearing as October 24, 2007

(A.R. 12). Further, Plaintiff’s testimony to his date of birth in June 1984

and his age at the time of the hearing as twenty-three years (A.R. 986, 988),

as well as testimonial references to medical records of treatment occurring in

2007 (A.R. 1029) render the 2005 date extremely unlikely. No other transcript

of another hearing is reflected in the administrative record.

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Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla,"

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a

preponderance, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10

(9th Cir. 1975). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion; it may

not simply isolate a portion of evidence that supports the

decision. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9 Cir. th

2006); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

It is immaterial that the evidence would support a finding

contrary to that reached by the Commissioner; the determination

of the Commissioner as to a factual matter will stand if

supported by substantial evidence because it is the

Commissioner’s job, and not the Court’s, to resolve conflicts in

the evidence. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 (9th

Cir. 1975).

In weighing the evidence and making findings, the

Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. Burkhart v.

Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must

review the whole record and uphold the Commissioner's

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

See, Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d at 995. If

the Court concludes that the ALJ did not use the proper legal

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standard, the matter will be remanded to permit application of

the appropriate standard. Cooper v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

II. Disability

A. Legal Standards

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish

that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due

to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A

claimant must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment of such

severity that the claimant is not only unable to do the

claimant’s previous work, but cannot, considering age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

1382c(a)(3)(B); Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1989). The burden of establishing a disability is initially

on the claimant, who must prove that the claimant is unable to

return to his or her former type of work; the burden then shifts

to the Commissioner to identify other jobs that the claimant is

capable of performing considering the claimant's residual

functional capacity, as well as her age, education and last

fifteen years of work experience. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1273, 1275 (9 Cir. 1990). th

The regulations provide that the ALJ must make specific

sequential determinations in the process of evaluating a

disability: 1) whether the applicant engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged date of the onset of the

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impairment, 2) whether solely on the basis of the medical

evidence the claimed impairment is severe, that is, of a

magnitude sufficient to limit significantly the individual’s

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities; 3)

whether solely on the basis of medical evidence the impairment

equals or exceeds in severity certain impairments described in

Appendix I of the regulations; 4) whether the applicant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, defined as what an

individual can still do despite limitations, to perform the

applicant’s past work; and 5) whether on the basis of the

applicant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, the applicant can perform any other gainful

and substantial work within the economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.

B. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of

psychotic disorder and history of substance abuse which did not

meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (A.R. 14.) Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity to perform a full range

of work at all exertional levels but with non-exertional

limitations of being capable of simple, repetitive tasks with

limited public contact. (A.R. 15.) Having worked at various jobs

for very short periods of time, Plaintiff had no past relevant

work. However, as a younger person (aged twenty-one years at the

time of the application) with a limited education and ability to

communicate in English, and considering his education, age, work

experience, and residual functional capacity (RFC), there were

jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy

that Plaintiff could perform. (A.R. 21.) Plaintiff’s ability to

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perform work at all exertional levels had been compromised by

non-exertional limitations, but those limitations had little or

no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all

exertional levels. Thus, under the framework of § 204.00 in the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines, Plaintiff had not been under a

disability since September 21, 2005, the date the application was

filed. (A.R. 21.)

III. Medical Record

For several weeks in September and October 2003, Plaintiff

was hospitalized in Los Angeles for abnormal behavior and

symptoms of psychosis and movement disorder secondary to

substance abuse. It appeared that Plaintiff had used drugs while

in a rehabilitation program and had wandered away. (A.R. 782,

790.) Upon Plaintiff’s admission to the hospital, an attending

physician diagnosed substance-induced movement disorder and

stimulant-induced hallucinations. (A.R. 613-933, 619-20.)

Plaintiff’s history of stimulant and marijuana use was reported,

and his symptoms improved when he was no longer using illicit

stimulants. (A.R. 619.)

With respect to a longitudinal history of substance abuse,

Plaintiff admitted that he was using drugs when his strange

behavior and disorganization began. (A.R. 837.) In August 2004,

Plaintiff admitted that he had been using drugs, including

smoking methamphetamine, a year before, which was the time of his

lengthy hospitalization in 2003. (A.R. 207-08.) Plaintiff had

smoked marijuana. (A.R. 581-82.) In July 2005, he admitted that

he had not been taking his medications and was on cocaine at the

time of an armed robbery. (A.R. 236.) He reported in 2007 that he

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had used methamphetamine beginning at age fifteen, using heavily

after two years, and being addicted with daily use until

arrested, at a rate of one/sixteenth ounce to an “eight ball” a

day; he sold drugs to support his own habit. (A.R. 581-82.) In

2007 he stated that at the time of his most recent offense (grand

theft), he had been under the influence for ten days straight

without sleep. (A.R. 582.)

Plaintiff claimed in both October 2006 and February 2007

that he had been clean of drug use, including methamphetamine

use, for three years. (A.R. 582, 949.) He also stated in 2007

that he had been off methamphetamine for four to five years.

(A.R. 1007.) Further, various drug tests administered to

Plaintiff had negative results. (See, e.g., A.R. 360 [3/27/07],

215 [8/5/04].) However, Plaintiff admitted in March 2007 that he

last used “ice” four months before (which would be approximately

November or December 2006), and his last drink was a month

before, or in February 2007. (A.R. 590.) Further, at hearing he

admitted that at a time about seven or eight months before the

hearing of October 2007, he had inhaled marijuana smoke; he had

subsequently reported it to his probation officer, but it did not

precipitate a violation. (A.R. 1006-09.) 

Plaintiff was briefly hospitalized at Tuolumne General

Hospital from July 29, 2004, through July 30, 2004, at the behest

of his mother, to whom he had declared an intention to kill

himself. The physician who assessed Plaintiff’s condition

diagnosed schizophrenia, chronic, undifferentiated; personality

disorder with anti-social features; and a GAF of 40 upon

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admission and 55 upon discharge. (A.R. 608-611, 596-611.) 3

Plaintiff was again hospitalized from August 5 through 13,

2004. From August 5, 2004, through August 7, 2004, Plaintiff was

at Fresno County Mental Health, and was thereafter discharged to

Kaweah Delta Behavioral Health Center. Plaintiff suffered

hallucinations during which he saw shadows and heard voices; he

complained that his medications (Risperdal and Depakote), were

not working and were making him fat and hungry, so he wanted new

medications. (A.R. 189-217, 211, 572-73, 191, 199, 208.) A

physician evaluated Plaintiff and diagnosed schizophrenia,

paranoid type, with a GAF of 50. Plaintiff did not appear

intoxicated. (A.R. 191, 572, 217.) At Kaweah Delta Hospital,

after evaluation at the outside hospital and PACT unit,

Plaintiff’s symptoms included fear, auditory and visual

hallucinations, and misbehavior, including inappropriate touching

of his brother and an attempt to choke his mother. It was

reported that the Paxil and Depakote that Plaintiff had been

taking for about a month did not help; however, Plaintiff’s

auditory symptoms decreased after Risperdal was started, although

A GAF, or global assessment of functioning, is a report of a

3

clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning that is

used to plan treatment and to measure the impact of treatment as well as to

predict its outcome. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at 32 (4 ed., text revision) (DSM-IVth

TR). A GAF in the range of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal

ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious

impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends,

unable to keep a job). DSM-IV-TR at 34. A GAF of 55 (i.e., within the range of

51 through 60), indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and

circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in

social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with

peers or co-workers). Id. Neither SSA regulations or governing case law

requires an ALJ to take a GAF score into consideration in determining the

extent of disability. See, Howard v. Commissioner of Social Security, 276 F.3d

235, 241 (6 Cir. 2002).

th

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it affected his movement. The diagnosis was schizophrenia,

undifferented type, neuroleptic-induced acute dystonia secondary

to Risperdal; medications (Haldahl, Ativan, and Benedryl) were

modified, and Plaintiff was given new medications upon discharge

(Abilify, Cogentin, and Clonazepam). At discharge Plaintiff was

calm and had coherent thoughts, fair concentration, and no

hallucinations. (A.R. 185, 550-53, 538, 408-10, 418.) Plaintiff

was released to the police and was ultimately returned to the

California Medical Facility. (A.R. 407, 418, 581.)

In mid-August 2004 Plaintiff reported to medical staff at

the California Department of Corrections that he suffered

auditory and visual hallucinations and paranoia. A physician

diagnosed schizophrenia, paranoid, and assessed a GAF of 55.

(A.R. 407-09, 265-67, 273.) In December 2004 at a different CDC

facility, Plaintiff was assessed as having amphetamine

dependence, in remission; substance-related disorder, not

otherwise specified, in remission; and a GAF of 45. (A.R. 255,

261.) 

By December 30, 2004, Plaintiff stated that he used to hear

voices, but the medications he was receiving in custody worked

for him; he was fine and had no symptoms. A mental status exam

reflected fair concentration, good memory, and organized and

rational thoughts. He was very stable on his medication

(Aripiprazole, Isoniazid, and Pyridoxine) and was not in crisis.

(A.R. 254-56, 261.) 

In June 2005, a review showed that Plaintiff was doing fine,

was compliant with his medications, and had no symptoms. The

diagnosis was psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, in

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remission, poly-substance dependence, and a GAF of 50. (A.R. 244-

47, 255.) In August 2005, a psychologist’s progress notes

reflected that Plaintiff’s mental disorder had stabilized, and

Plaintiff had not experienced any symptoms for numerous months.

Plaintiff was compliant with his medications and stated that the

medication was helpful. Plaintiff did not present a substantial

danger to himself or to others (A.R. 244-47, 256, 259-61.) 

Plaintiff was released from CMF Vacaville on August 13,

2005, and thereafter was evaluated by Ken Katz, L.C.S.W., at the

parole outpatient clinic on September 9, 2005. The assessment was

psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, methamphetamine

dependence, early full remission, with a GAF of 50. (A.R. 228-

30.)

Katz reported that Plaintiff had been evaluated by Dr. Green

on September 2, 2005, who diagnosed schizophrenia, continued

Plaintiff’s Seroquel, added Risperdal and Cogentin twice a day,

and scheduled follow-up in approximately seven weeks. (A.R. 229.)

No notes of this evaluation are in the record.4

On November 27, 2005, consulting examiner Frank Wilson, Jr.,

M.D., performed a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff at a time

when Plaintiff was living in a halfway house where he had to take

his medications. (A.R. 274-77.) Plaintiff reported that he took

his medications (Seroquel, Benzatropine, and Risperdal), and they

kept the voices from “coming alive.” (A.R. 274.) Plaintiff

exhibited normal affect and thought process; he was oriented and

articulate. He did not appear to be reacting to internal stimuli

At the hearing, the ALJ offered to issue a subpoena to obtain Dr. Green’s treating notes. (A.R. 1028-33.) It

4

does not appear that such notes have been put in the record.

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during the examination. Dr. Wilson assessed substance-induced

psychotic disorder in remission, secondary to methamphetamine

abuse; anti-social personality traits; and a GAF of 68. (A.R. 5

276.) Dr. Wilson opined that there was a clear causal

relationship between Plaintiff’s abuse of methamphetamine and his

delusions. (A.R. 276.) Further, Plaintiff was able to maintain

attention and concentration and carry out one-step or two-step,

simple job instructions; could carry out an extensive variety of

technical and/or complex instructions; and could relate and

interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public as

long as he was taking his medication. (A.R. 276.) 

In February 2006, state agency medical consultant G. K.

Ikawa, M.D., completed an RFC assessment relating to Plaintiff’s

psychotic disorder, NOS, and methamphetamine dependence in early

full remission. He found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations

with respect to restrictions of activities of daily living and

maintaining social functioning, mild limitations in

concentration, persistence, and pace, and no episodes of

decompensation of extended duration. Plaintiff had moderate

limitations in the capacity to understand, remember, and carry

out detailed instructions, interact appropriately with the

general public, and get along with coworkers or peers without

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; otherwise, he

 A GAF of 68 indicates a person with some mild symptoms 5

(e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in

social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional

truancy, or theft within the household), but who is generally

functioning pretty well and has some meaningful interpersonal

relationships. DSM-IV-TR at 34. 

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was not significantly limited and was able to sustain simple,

repetitive tasks, to relate as long as contact with coworkers and

the public were limited , and to adapt. (A.R. 286-88, 278-88.)

In October 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Wasco facility of

the CDC; he reported on intake that he was taking no medications,

and he denied hearing voices or having hallucinations. (A.R. 947,

951.) 

In January 2007, Plaintiff was released from Wasco after a

six-month term relating to a parole violation; his parole

discharge date was November 2008. (A.R. 581.) On February 4,

2007, when Plaintiff had been out of custody for about a week, he

was hospitalized briefly for one day at Fresno County Mental

Health for exhibiting hyperactive, nonsensical behavior, and

dissociation. Plaintiff admitted that he was not compliant with

his medication and that he had used alcohol. Plaintiff was

discharged with medication (Seroquel, Hydroxyzine, Benztropine

MES, and Risperdal) and was assigned a GAF of 60; he had no

delusions at discharge. (A.R. 399, 388-405, 587, 393, 388.) In

February 2007 Plaintiff was also evaluated by L.C.S.W. Katz in

the parole system; he admitted that his medications improved his

symptoms, although he still heard voices. His thinking was found

to be adequately organized and goal-directed. The diagnosis was

schizo-affective disorder, methamphetamine dependence in

remission, history of cannabis use, and a GAF of 55. (A.R. 230,

583, 581-84.) Katz again evaluated Plaintiff in February 2007,

when Plaintiff reported that his medication helped him be stable,

although his symptoms remained. Katz assessed psychotic disorder,

not otherwise specified, versus schizo-affective disorder;

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methamphetamine dependence, in remission; history of cannabis

abuse; and a GAF of 55. (A.R. 581-83, 230.)

Plaintiff was hospitalized for a week beginning March 18,

2007, at the Community Behavioral Health Center after it was

reported that he was hearing voices, seeing things, feeling

paranoid, and being aggressive. (A.R. 587-95, 354, 349-52, 593.)

Plaintiff admitted that he had not been taking his medications

for the past two to three months because they made him sad, and

they made him fat. (A.R. 589-90.) He reported that he needed to

be on SSI and that voices were telling him to hurt people,

especially if his SSI were not approved. (A.R. 367.) He was

discharged due to the absence of grounds for hospitalization, and

the recommendation was not to use drugs or alcohol. (A.R. 352.)

The diagnosis on admission was schizophrenia, chronic, paranoid

type; on discharge, the diagnosis was psychotic disorder NOS,

antisocial personality traits, and a GAF of 60. (A.R. 594, 587,

589.)

On March 27, 2007, Dr. Green of the CDC parole outpatient

clinic wrote on a sheet from a prescription pad:

I believe pt is unable to work at this time.

(A.R. 586.) On April 11, 2007, he wrote on another prescription

sheet: 

[PATIENT’S NAME Miguel Molina] Is disabled because

of mental illness--psychosis.

(A.R. 585.)

On May 1, 2007, Plaintiff was admitted for observation at

Fresno County Mental Health because he was delusional and

paranoid, and was discharged from Fresno County Behavioral Health 

on May 2; Plaintiff appeared intoxicated; there appeared to be a

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problem of alcohol withdrawal. Plaintiff was admitted to Fresno

County Mental Health on May 3, 2007, and on May 4 was assessed by

Dr. Mayur Amin, who diagnosed bipolar disorder, manic type,

severe with psychotic features, rule out schizophrenia, paranoid

type, with a GAF of 25. Plaintiff was discharged to home with 6

medications on May 7, 2007. (A.R. 343-46, 330-39, 323, 310-15.) 

On June 5, 2007, Plaintiff reported to Henry Green, M.D.,

that he was doing much better; he wanted to go to school and be

productive. There was no evidence of psychosis or hallucinations.

Medications were to continue. (A.R. 580.) Consistently, Mr. Katz

noted on June 21, 2007, that Plaintiff’s illness waxed and waned

but that Plaintiff appeared better than Katz had ever seen him.

Plaintiff admitted that he perceived voices and shadows but that

they were not so bad; Katz reported that Plaintiff was

controlling his symptoms, and there was no evidence of psychosis.

(A.R. 579.) In July 2007, Plaintiff stated that he was compliant

with his medications, and he was reported to be developing

insight into his symptoms. (A.R. 579.) In August he tried to

detach himself from his symptoms and reported compliance with

medications. (A.R. 578, 580.)

On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff was briefly held at Fresno

County Mental Health pursuant to a self-referral based on wanting

to hurt himself and seeing and hearing demons; he was discharged

on August 21, 2007, to the hospital, from which he was ultimately

A GAF of 21 through 30 indicates that behavior is considerably

6

influenced by delusions or hallucinations or serious impairment in

communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly

inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation), or that there is an inability to

function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or

friends). DSM-IV-TR at 34.

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discharged on August 23, 2007, with a diagnosis of schizophrenia,

paranoid type. (A.R. 308-09, 296-98, 292.) His mental status at

discharge was alert and oriented, calm, cooperative, with linear

thought process, no hallucinations, full affect, and fair insight

and judgment. He was released with Risperdal, Klonopin, and

Cogentin, and with advice not to use alcohol or illicit drugs.

(A.R. 294.) 

On September 5, 2007, Plaintiff expressed no specific

complaints to Dr. Green; his affect was appropriate, and there

was no evidence of psychosis. (A.R. 581.) On September 26, 2007,

parole outpatient clinic psychologist Wasserman noted that

Plaintiff reported that he was stable with his symptoms of

paranoia and auditory and visual hallucinations; Plaintiff said

that he was taking his medications; he had too much time on his

hands, which exacerbated his problems. (A.R. 577.)

IV. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he completed ninth

grade in special education classes; he did not obtain a graduate

equivalence diploma because of an inability to concentrate. 

(A.R. 988-89.) He had worked once for a few months as a produce

clerk in connection with a vocational program, and he had learned

to weld in high school. (A.R. 996.) He saw shadows, but his

medications caused him to calm down and not react to them,

although three times a month the medication would not work. He

did not like to be around people and thought they were talking

about him; however, if that angered him, he could control it by

counting to ten. (A.R. 1010-11, 1014, 1018.) His daily activities

included doing the dishes, mowing the lawn, cleaning his room,

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doing laundry, working on and carrying on correspondence on the

computer, and going out with his mother and brother. (A.R. 1020-

21, 1023.) Dr. Green had told him that he could not work but

probably could go to school, and Plaintiff felt that he could not

work because of his illness; however, if a potential employer

wanted him to work, he would. (A.R. 1012-1014.) 

V. Expert Opinions

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the “treating

physician medical records” from Fresno County Mental Health (A.R.

291-405 [records of treatment from February through August

2007]), the parole outpatient clinic (A.R. 575-86 [records of

treatment from 2007]), and Community Behavioral Health Center

(A.R. 587-95 [records of treatment from March 18 through 26,

2007]). (Pltf.’s Op. Brief at 3-4.) More specifically, Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ’s giving significant weight to the 2005 

opinion of consulting, examining physician Dr. Wilson was not

supported by clear and convincing reasons or substantial

evidence. Plaintiff contends that the report of the doctor who

examined Plaintiff once in 2005, at a time between fifteen and

twenty-one months before Plaintiff’s later psychotic episodes,

was necessarily outweighed by the 2007 opinions of treating

physician Dr. Green and the medical evidence consistent with

those opinions. Plaintiff asserts that his impairment was

progressive in nature, and thus the earlier report was

meaningless and useless.

The standards for evaluating treating source’s medical

opinions are as follows: 

By rule, the Social Security Administration favors

the opinion of a treating physician over

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non-treating physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

If a treating physician's opinion is

“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence

in [the] case record, [it will be given]

controlling weight.” Id. § 404.1527(d)(2). If a

treating physician's opinion is not given

“controlling weight” because it is not

“well-supported” or because it is inconsistent

with other substantial evidence in the record, the

Administration considers specified factors in

determining the weight it will be given. Those

factors include the “[l]ength of the treatment

relationship and the frequency of examination” by

the treating physician; and the “nature and extent

of the treatment relationship” between the patient

and the treating physician. Id. § 

404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii). Generally, the opinions of

examining physicians are afforded more weight than

those of non-examining physicians, and the

opinions of examining non-treating physicians are

afforded less weight than those of treating

physicians. Id. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2). Additional

factors relevant to evaluating any medical

opinion, not limited to the opinion of the

treating physician, include the amount of relevant

evidence that supports the opinion and the quality

of the explanation provided; the consistency of

the medical opinion with the record as a whole;

the specialty of the physician providing the

opinion; and “[o]ther factors” such as the degree

of understanding a physician has of the

Administration's “disability programs and their

evidentiary requirements” and the degree of his or

her familiarity with other information in the case

record. Id. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6).

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9 Cir. 2007). th

With respect to proceedings under Title XVI, the Court notes

that an identical regulation has been promulgated. See, 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.927.

As to the legal sufficiency of the ALJ’s reasoning, the 

governing principles have been recently restated:

The opinions of treating doctors should be given more

weight than the opinions of doctors who do not treat

the claimant. Lester [v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th

Cir.1995) (as amended).] Where the treating doctor's

opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may

be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons

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supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the

treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without

providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported

by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 830,

quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th

Cir.1983). This can be done by setting out a detailed

and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof,

and making findings. Magallanes [v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 751 (9th Cir.1989).] The ALJ must do more than

offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the

doctors', are correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418,

421-22 (9th Cir.1988).

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.1998);

accord Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Lester, 81 F.3d at

830-31.

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9 Cir. 2007). th

Further, a “medical opinion” is a statement from an

acceptable medical source that reflects a judgment about the

nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments, including the

severity of the impairment, its symptoms, a diagnosis and

prognosis, a statement of what the claimant can still do despite

his or her impairments, and any physical or mental restrictions.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). A determination of

whether or not a claimant meets the statutory definition of

disability is a legal conclusion reserved to the Commissioner;

the opinion of a medical source on the ultimate issue of

disability is not conclusive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1),

416.927(e)(1); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9 Cir. th

1989). A treating physicians’s controverted opinion on the

ultimate issue of disability may be rejected by an ALJ if the ALJ

provides specific and legitimate reasons. Holohan v. Massanari,

246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9 Cir. 2001). th

In the decision before the Court, the ALJ reviewed

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Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of inability to focus, work,

and tolerate others, and he listed Plaintiff’s activities of

daily living. (A.R. 15-16.) The ALJ then presented a detailed

review of the longitudinal medical record for the period

September 2003 through August 2007 (A.R. 16-19), and he adverted

to the paucity of information for the year 2006 (A.R. 19). The 7

ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s credibility, finding expressly that

although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairment could

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, his

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of these symptoms were not credible to the extent that

they were inconsistent with the RFC because 1) Plaintiff’s

substance abuse initiated and/or exacerbated his mental disease,

and Plaintiff had engaged in substance abuse during some of the

times in which he had the psychotic episodes attended by

hallucinations, paranoia, confusion, and disorganization; 2)

Plaintiff’s serious symptoms coincided with, and were generally

tied to, Plaintiff’s repeated failure to take his medications,

but his symptom-free periods occurred during compliance with

medication, during which Plaintiff had and would function quite

well; 3) Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were only mildly

limited, and they and Plaintiff’s reported interaction with

others (reading as a hobby, spending time on the computer, going

to dinner and movies with family, playing basketball) indicated

only moderately limited ability to maintain concentration,

persistence, or pace and moderate difficulties in social

Medical records from the California Department of Corrections and USC Medical Center in Los Angeles

7

County were submitted after the hearing and thus were before the Appeals Council. (A.R. 4, 616-982.) Records

relating to the later period of treatment consist mainly of medication summaries.

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functioning; and Plaintiff’s episodes of decompensation were not

of extended duration according to Social Security standards.

(A.R. 19-20.) 

Further, in the course of this analysis of Plaintiff’s level

of functioning and Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ expressly weighed

reports from Plaintiff’s mother, which showed that Plaintiff was

functional but did not address the impact of Plaintiff’s

substance abuse and medication noncompliance on Plaintiff’s

symptoms. (A.R. 20.) Likewise, he considered and weighed

statements from other third parties, including two of Plaintiff’s

friends. (A.R. 20-21.)

It was within this context of the ALJ’s detailed review of

the record that the ALJ considered the opinion evidence. In the

course of reviewing the findings and opinion of Dr. Wilson, the

ALJ expressly gave the assessment significant weight because it

was consistent with the entirety of the record. (A.R. 19.) The

ALJ further stated the following concerning the expert opinions:

As for the opinion evidence, Dr. Green provided a one

line assessment on March 27, 2007. He stated he did not

believe the claimant was able to work at this time. On

April 11, 2007, the one line statement stated the 

claimant was disabled because of mental illness–

psychosis (Exhibit 9F, pp. 1,2). I have not given 

significant weight to these brief, conclusory

statements because they do not specifically delineate

the claimant’s limitations or indicate what factor

prevents him from working. Additionally, they give

no time frame for the alleged disability.

The state agency found the claimant was limited to

simple repetitive tasks with limited public contact

due to a psychotic disorder (Exhibits 4F, 5F). I

concur with this assessment as it is consistent 

with the entirety of the record. 

(A.R. 20.)

With respect to declining to give significant weight to Dr.

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Green’s opinions, the ALJ stated several specific reasons that

accurately reflect some of the weaknesses of Dr. Green’s

opinions, including the brevity of the opinions, the lack of

specificity as to functional limitations and as to time, and the

absence of an explanation of what specific factor rendered

Plaintiff disabled. These reasons have been held to be

legitimate. It is established that even with respect to a medical

opinion, a conclusional opinion that is unsubstantiated by

relevant medical documentation may be rejected. See Johnson v.

Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432-33 (9 Cir. 1995). It is permissible th

for an ALJ to prefer an opinion supported by specific clinical

findings and an explanation thereof over a check-off type of form

lacking an explanation of the basis for the conclusions. Crane v.

Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9 Cir. 1996) (citing Murray v. th

Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501 (9 Cir. 1983)); see Batson v. th

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d

1190, 1195 (9 Cir. 2004). Further, even where an expert’s report th

identifies characteristics that might limit a claimant’s ability

to perform work on a sustained basis, if the report fails to

explain how such characteristics preclude work activity in the

claimant’s case, it is appropriate and adequate for an ALJ to 1)

determine that the level of impairment stated is unreasonable in

light of the symptoms and other evidence in the record, and 2)

set forth that analysis. See Morgan v. Commissioner of Social

Security 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Thus, the Court concludes that focusing narrowly on the

treatment of Dr. Green’s opinions, the ALJ’s weighing of Dr.

Green’s opinions was supported by legally sufficient reasons that

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were in turn supported by substantial evidence in the record.

The Court next turns to the ALJ’s treatment of the other

opinions. In February 2006, non-examining state agency physician

Ikawa opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in

understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed

instructions, and in the ability to interact appropriately with

the general public and coworkers, with no other significant

limitations; Plaintiff was able to sustain simple, repetitive

tasks and relate if contacts with coworkers and the public were

limited. (A.R. 286-88.) A generally consistent assessment by

state agency evaluator A. Middleton, Ph.D, dated December 26,

2006, followed; it stated without explanation a limitation with

respect to only public contact, but it did not refer to Dr.

Ikawa’s recommendation of limited contact with coworkers. (A.R.

289-90.)

The opinion of a nontreating, nonexamining physician can

amount to substantial evidence as long as it is supported by

other evidence in the record, such as where it is consistent with

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record,

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9 Cir. 2002). The opinion th

of a non-examining doctor that conflicts with a treating doctor’s

opinion may constitute substantial evidence warranting rejection

of the treating doctor’s opinion where the non-examining doctor’s

opinion is based on opinions of other examining and consulting

physicians, which are in turn based on independent clinical

findings. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Independent clinical findings can be either 1) diagnoses that

differ from those offered by another physician and that are

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supported by substantial evidence, or 2) findings based on

objective medical tests that the other physician has not himself

or herself considered. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d at 632.

Here, the opinions of the state agency physicians find

support in the opinion and independent findings of Dr. Wilson,

who in 2005 conducted a mental status exam, assessed intellectual

functioning and sensorium, and considered various histories. 

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the 2005 report

of Dr. Wilson was necessarily stale and useless or irrelevant.

Plaintiff cites Wier on Behalf of Wier v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955,

963-64 (3d Cir. 1984) (non-examining sources’ opinions concerning

adolescent claimant’s condition, rendered during childhood at a

time before the development of a new impairment and a change in

the rate of development, were considered to be so stale as to be

virtually worthless); Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1080-81

(9 Cir. 1991) (in connection with a determination of the date of th

onset of a mental impairment that had been characterized as

“progressive,” it was noted that a mental impairment may manifest

itself over a period of time); Armstrong v. Commissioner of

Social Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, (9 Cir. 1998) (where there was th

an absence of medical evidence as to date of onset, it was

necessary to obtain the opinion of a medical expert as to the

date symptoms became disabling); and Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d

1462, 1465 (9 Cir. 1996) (noting in connection with discussing th

the source of an expert opinion and its consistency with the

record, that it is common knowledge that depression is one of the

most under-reported illnesses in the country because those

afflicted often do not recognize that their condition reflects a

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potentially serious mental illness; thus, the fact that a

claimant may be one of millions of people who did not timely seek

treatment for a mental disorder was not a substantial basis on

which to conclude that an expert’s assessment of a claimant's

condition is inaccurate).

The cases cited are factually distinct from the present

case. It is true that a more recent opinion may in some

circumstances be entitled to greater weight. Hunter v. Sullivan,

993 F.2d 31, 35 (4 Cir. 1993). However, in view of all pertinent th

factors, including but not limited to the nature of Plaintiff’s

impairment and symptoms, the absence of medical or other evidence

of a consistently deteriorating or progressively worsening

condition, and the nature of the treatment relationships

involved, the Court concludes that on review the record does not

compel a conclusion that the mere passage of two years rendered

Dr. Wilson’s report irrelevant or insubstantial.

However, the Court finds more troubling Plaintiff’s argument

that the process requires correction with respect to the ALJ’s

reliance on Plaintiff’s failure to seek or comply with his

medical treatment. Plaintiff cites Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d

1462, 1465 (9 Cir. 1996) for the proposition that an ALJ cannot th

dismiss an applicant’s mental disorder simply because the person

has not sought extensive psychiatric treatment or has failed to

adhere to that treatment. (Brief. p. 10.) In Nguyen, as

previously noted, the court found insubstantial and erroneous the

ALJ’s reasoning for adopting the opinion of a non-examining

psychologist and rejecting the opinion of an examining

psychologist concerning whether the claimant met a listing for

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affective disorders. One factor relied upon by the ALJ was the

fact that the examining psychologist examined the claimant at the

request of the claimant’s attorney. The court concluded that the

attorney’s request was not a legitimate basis on which to

discount the doctor’s opinion that the claimant had a severe

depression because the circumstances presented no basis for

questioning the source of the referral, such as an absence of an

objective basis for the opinion or any evidence of actual

improprieties. 100 F.3d at 1464-1465. The court continued its

analysis by citing a second basis for its conclusion that the

attorney’s request for an examination was not a legitimate basis

to discount a doctor’s opinion that a claimant had severe

depression:

Second, it is common knowledge that depression is

one of the most underreported illnesses in the country

because those afflicted often do not recognize that

their condition reflects a potentially serious mental

illness. See, e.g., Warren E. Leavy, Hidden Depression,

Chi. Trib., Feb. 1, 1996 at 7 (noting that nearly 17

million adult Americans suffer from depression in a

given year and that two-thirds of them do not get

treatment). Thus, the fact that claimant may be one

of millions of people who did not seek treatment for

a mental disorder until late in the day is not a

substantial basis on which to conclude that

Dr. Brown's assessment of claimant's condition is

inaccurate. As the Sixth Circuit has noted in finding

invalid an ALJ's reasons for rejecting claimant's

assertions about his depression, ‘[a]ppellant may have

failed to seek psychiatric treatment for his mental

condition, but it is a questionable practice to chastise

one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor

judgment in seeking rehabilitation.’ Blankenship v. Bowen,

874 F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th Cir.1989). (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff further relies on Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d

627, 630 (7 Cir. 2006), in which the claimant suffered from th

manic depression (bipolar disorder) but also had a history of

alcohol and drug (cocaine) abuse. The ALJ found that the abuse

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was the cause of the disability; when the claimant stopped

abusing alcohol and drugs and took prescribed medication, her

condition improved, and she was able to work. There was evidence

in the record that the claimant tended indiscriminately to use

drugs and alcohol during her manic phases, which occurred as

frequently as monthly, and thus that her mental disorder could

precipitate substance abuse. The court also noted medical

literature that established that mental illness in general, and

bipolar disorder in particular, might prevent a sufferer

from taking her prescribed medicines or otherwise submitting to

treatment. Id. at 630-631. The ALJ’s failure to consider this

possibility prevented the ALJ’s reasoning from being a rational

basis for denying disability benefits to the claimant, and the

matter was returned to the SSA for further proceedings.

Here, as the foregoing summary of the medical evidence

reflects, the record contains a great deal of evidence that shows

that Plaintiff repeatedly failed to maintain full compliance with

his treating doctors’ prescriptions concerning his medications.

Periods of noncompliance appear to have roughly coincided with

periods during which Plaintiff was out of custody or was not

subject to rigorous, external or official supervision or

monitoring of his compliance. Evidence from Plaintiff’s mother to

the effect that Plaintiff needed to be reminded to take his

medication was expressly credited by the ALJ. (A.R. 20.) At least

one expert report noted that despite temporary improvement,

Plaintiff’s symptoms waxed and waned. There was also ample

medical evidence in the form of repeated, historical reports that

even with medication, Plaintiff continued to suffer some

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hallucinations and paranoia. Further, Plaintiff testified that

even though his medication helped, about three times a month the

medication would not work.

This evidence, along with the other medical evidence of

record, reveals that Plaintiff suffered a severe mental

impairment with symptoms so extreme that Plaintiff required

repeated in-patient treatment. In determining Plaintiff’s RFC,

the ALJ relied on reports of functionality that were necessarily,

logically based on an assumption that despite Plaintiff’s

impairment, Plaintiff was capable of complying with his

prescribed treatment, or that his impairment did not present or

contribute to any justification for noncompliance. However, the 8

circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s failure to take his

prescribed medications were not examined or evaluated by the ALJ,

who found that Plaintiff was functional when medicated and simply

concluded on the basis of such evidence that Plaintiff was not

disabled.

Impairments that can be controlled effectively with

medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining

eligibility for SSI benefits. Warre v. Commissioner of Social

Security Administration,439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9 Cir. 2006). Title th

In reviewing the medical evidence and determining the RFC, the ALJ expressly gave significant weight to

8

Dr. Wilson’s opinion concerning Plaintiff’s RFC and stated that it was consistent with the entirety of the record. The

ALJ expressly mentioned Dr. Wilson’s findings that Plaintiff could relate and interact with coworkers and

supervisors as long as he was on his medication. (A.R. 19.) Further, in determining that Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints were not credible to the extent inconsistent with the RFC, the ALJ expressly relied on the fact that

Plaintiff’s bizarre behavior and hospitalizations appeared to be tied to periods of noncompliance with medications;

Plaintiff did quite well on several medications when he was compliant; Plaintiff’s difficulties focusing and

concentrating were generally tied to noncompliance with medication; and if Plaintiff were compliant with

medication, then it appeared he would function quite well. (A.R 19-20.) Plaintiff does not expressly raise any issue

concerning the ALJ’s reasoning regarding Plaintiff’s credibility. The Court notes the ALJ’s reasoning on this issue

because it demonstrates how important and indeed, pivotal, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with treatment was

throughout the ALJ’s decision and how it affected the ALJ’s evaluation of all the evidence, including the medical

evidence of record, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and third party reports, and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living.

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20 C.F.R. § 416.930 (2008) provides:

(a) What treatment you must follow. In order to

get benefits, you must follow treatment prescribed by

your physician if this treatment can restore your

ability to work, or, if you are a child, if the

treatment can reduce your functional limitations so

that they are no longer marked and severe.

 (b) When you do not follow prescribed treatment. If you do

not follow the prescribed treatment without a good reason, we

will not find you disabled or blind or, if you are already

receiving benefits, we will stop paying you benefits.

c) Acceptable reasons for failure to follow

prescribed treatment. We will consider your physical

mental, educational, and linguistic limitations

(including any lack of facility with the English

language) when determining if you have an acceptable

reason for failure to follow prescribed treatment. The

following are examples of a good reason for not

following treatment:

 (1) The specific medical treatment is contrary to

the established teaching and tenets of your religion.

 (2) The prescribed treatment would be cataract

surgery for one eye when there is an impairment of the

other eye resulting in a severe loss of vision and is

not subject to improvement through treatment.

 (3) Surgery was previously performed with

unsuccessful results and the same surgery is again

being recommended for the same impairment.

 (4) The treatment because of its enormity (e.g.

open heart surgery), unusual nature (e.g., organ

transplant), or other reason is very risky for you; or

 (5) The treatment involves amputation of an

extremity, or a major part of an extremity.

In Soc. Sec. Ruling 82-59, the SSA states its policy, which

is that an individual who would otherwise be found to be disabled

but who fails without justifiable cause to follow treatment

prescribed by a treating source which the SSA determines can be

expected to restore the individual’s ability to work cannot by

virtue of such failure be found to be under a disability. Id. p.

1. The SSA may make a determination that an individual has failed

to follow prescribed treatment only where all of the following

conditions exist: 1) The evidence establishes that the impairment

precludes engaging in any substantial gainful activity; 2) the

impairment has lasted or is expected to last for twelve

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continuous months from onset or is expected to result in death;

3) treatment which is clearly expected to restore capacity to

engage in any substantial gainful activity or gainful activity

has been prescribed by a treating source, and 4) the evidence of

record discloses that there has been refusal to follow prescribed

treatment. Id. p. 1. Where a failure is found, a determination

must also be made as to whether or not failure to follow

prescribed treatment was justifiable. Id. The SSA will determine

whether the medical evidence demonstrates that the prescribed

treatment will restore ability to work. Id. p. 2. The claimant or

beneficiary should be given an opportunity to express fully the

specific reasons for not following the prescribed treatment, and

the record should reflect the reason or reasons; it may be

necessary to re-contact the treating source for substantiation or

clarification. Failure to follow a prescription is justifiable if

an individual is unable to afford prescribed treatment which he

or she is willing to accept but for which free community

resources are unavailable, or if any duly licensed treating

medical source who has treated the claimant advises against the

treatment. Id. p. 4. The stated reasons are not exhaustive. Id.

p. 4.

With respect to determining whether a claimant had good

reason for failing to follow prescribed medical treatment, an ALJ

cannot assume that a claimant’s condition is remediable; an ALJ

must examine the medical conditions and personal factors that

bear on whether the claimant can reasonably remedy the condition.

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9 Cir. 1993) (discussing a th

claimant’s obesity).

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The ALJ’s reasoning here reflects implied conclusions that

absent medication, Plaintiff would have suffered much greater,

and arguably disabling, functional limitations, and that

treatment by medication rendered Plaintiff able to engage in

work. The reasoning set forth by the ALJ is devoid of any

consideration of how and/or whether Plaintiff’s demonstrated

mental impairment affected Plaintiff’s ability to comply with

prescribed treatment or otherwise contributed to a justification

for noncompliance. 

Defendant argues that Nguyen v. Chater does not apply

because it related only to seeking treatment, not complying with

treatment, and that Kangail v. Barnhart does not apply because

Plaintiff cites to no facts indicating that his mental impairment

prevented him from adhering to treatment. Defendant also points

to evidence that might warrant a finding that Plaintiff’s recent

refusal to take medications might have been precipitated by his

stated desire to receive SSI benefits. However, these matters

were not considered or addressed by the ALJ, and this Court is

limited to reviewing evidence in the record and the findings and

reasoning set forth by the ALJ. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d

871, 874 (9 Cir. 2003). The medical evidence relied on by the th

ALJ does not address whether or how Plaintiff’s impairment, which

involved repeated instances of delusions and hallucinations, or

his medications, affected his ability to comply with treatment or

otherwise presented any justification for noncompliance. No

treating source or other source has opined on the matter. The ALJ

repeatedly referred to and relied upon the connection between

noncompliance with medication and symptoms, hospitalization, and

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functionality not only in the course of evaluating Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints, but also in assessing Plaintiff’s ability

to function and in evaluating the overall medical evidence of

record. (A.R. 19-20.) However, these findings were not

accompanied by any consideration of whether any failure to comply

with treatment was justified in light of the circumstances

surrounding the repeated failures of the seriously disturbed

claimant to take his medication. 

In view of the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s impairment,

and in the absence of any consideration of the issues relating to

any justification for Plaintiff’s noncompliance, the ALJ’s

reasoning concerning the medical evidence of record and

Plaintiff’s RFC lacks legitimate rational force, and the matter

must be returned for further proceedings.

VI. Recommendation 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s

decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record

as a whole and was not based on proper legal standards.

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1. Plaintiff’s social security complaint BE GRANTED, and

2. The matter BE REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration, consistent with this

decision, of Plaintiff’s status as disabled, including whether or 

not Plaintiff a) suffered from a severe impairment or

impairments, b) could perform any past relevant work, and c) if

appropriate, whether on the basis of the Plaintiff’s age,

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, he

could perform any other gainful and substantial work within the

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economy; and

3. Judgment BE ENTERED for Plaintiff Miguel A. Molina and

against Defendant Michael J. Astrue.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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