Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-09-02101/USCOURTS-ca10-09-02101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benjamin Raymond
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BENJAMIN RAYMOND, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 09-2101

(D.C. No. 1:07-CR-00748-MCA-2)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HENRY, EBEL and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. 

 

 The United States appeals the district court’s decision to dismiss an indictment 

charging Defendant-Appellee Benjamin Raymond with several violent crimes allegedly 

undertaken as part of his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The district court 

dismissed the indictment after finding that an earlier plea agreement between Raymond 

and the United States precluded the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of 

New Mexico from pursuing these charges. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3731, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND this case to the district 

court. 

 

*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of 

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive 

value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 24, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 This appeal involves two federal criminal prosecutions. 

A. Raymond’s 2003 federal prosecution for being a previously convicted felon in 

possession of a firearm 

 In October 2003, a federal grand jury in New Mexico indicted Raymond on one 

count of being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). This charge stemmed from an incident occurring on 

June 29, 2002, when Albuquerque police officers arrested Raymond and another 

individual, Josie Robinson, for trying to buy a car using fraudulent checks. Raymond and 

Robinson were an unlikely pair to find together because, one week earlier, Robinson had 

reported to officers from the nearby Rio Rancho, New Mexico, police department that her 

boyfriend, Henry George, was missing and that she suspected Raymond and his 

associates, Travis Dally and Bradley Wasson, of foul play. At the time of his June 29 

arrest by Albuquerque police, Raymond, a previously convicted felon, was found in 

possession of two firearms. This led to Raymond’s 2003 federal prosecution for being a 

felon in possession of a firearm. 

To resolve that case, Raymond entered into a plea agreement with the United 

States on October 14, 2004. Pursuant to the agreement, Raymond pled guilty to the 

single charged offense, in exchange for the Government’s promise that: 

10. Provided that the defendant fulfills his obligations as set out above, . . . 

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a. The United States will not bring additional charges against the defendant 

arising out of the defendant’s conduct now known to the United States 

Attorney’s Office for the District of New Mexico. 

11. This agreement is limited to the United States Attorney’s Office for the 

District of New Mexico [“USAO”] and does not bind any other federal, 

state, or local agencies or prosecuting authorities. 

(Aplt. App. at 44.) The district court sentenced Raymond to fifteen years in prison. 

B. Raymond’s 2007 federal prosecution for a weapons offense and violent crimes 

committed in aid of racketeering 

 In 2007, a federal grand jury in New Mexico charged Raymond and three others, 

Bradley Wasson, Travis Dally and Jeremiah Looney, with weapons offenses and violent 

crimes committed in aid of racketeering. The controlling superseding indictment 

specifically alleged the following: Bradley Wasson was the head of one faction of the 

Aryan Brotherhood in New Mexico. Raymond, Dally and Looney were members or 

prospective members of Wasson’s Aryan Brotherhood faction. A prospective member is 

one who is serving a probationary period, but who is nevertheless “considered part of the 

Aryan Brotherhood family.” (Id. at 18.) The Aryan Brotherhood engages in racketeering 

activity, such as “acts of violence, and other criminal activities, including murder, 

kidnapping, attempted murder, conspiracy to manufacture/distribute narcotics and 

firearms trafficking,” as well as identity theft and check fraud, which “are the most 

prevalent non-violent crimes committed by the Aryan Brotherhood.” (Id. at 15, 17.) 

 The superseding indictment further alleged that, in order “to advance the status of 

the Aryan Brotherhood” (id. at 23), as well as their own positions within that 

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organization, Wasson, Raymond and Dally conspired to kidnap and murder Henry 

George, another Aryan Brotherhood prospect, because he had contacted police. And one 

of the rules of the Aryan Brotherhood is “that any member assisting law enforcement 

authorities must be killed.” (Id. at 21.) Therefore, according to the indictment, Wasson, 

Dally and Raymond went to George’s apartment in Rio Rancho, New Mexico, on June 

20, 2002, and assaulted George until he confessed to contacting police. Wasson then 

ordered that George be killed. Members of the Aryan Brotherhood “are required, when 

ordered, to kill without hesitation. Members who do not fulfill their obligations to the 

Aryan Brotherhood are themselves subject to violent acts, to include murder.” (Id. at 18.) 

Pursuant to Wasson’s order, Dally and Raymond took George to a remote area of Rio 

Rancho, New Mexico, killed him and buried his body in the desert. 

The indictment also alleged that, in order to prevent John Mudersbach, another 

Aryan Brotherhood prospect, from talking to police about George’s murder, Dally and 

Raymond later ordered Brotherhood member Jeremiah Looney to murder Mudersbach. 

Looney tried to kill Mudersbach, but failed to do so. 

Based upon these allegations, the federal grand jury charged Wasson, Dally and 

Raymond with four counts of committing violent crimes in furtherance of racketeering 

activity in connection with George’s murder: Count 1, conspiring to murder George, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); Count 2, murdering George, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; Count 4, conspiring to kidnap George, in 

violation of § 1959(a)(5); and Count 5, kidnapping George, in violation of § 1959(a)(1) 

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and 18 U.S.C. § 2.1 The grand jury also charged several weapons offenses: Count 3

charged Wasson, Dally and Raymond with carrying and using a firearm in relation to a 

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and (j)(1).2

 And Count 6 

 

1

 18 U.S.C. § 1959 provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a 

promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an 

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining 

entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged 

in racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a 

dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, 

or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any individual in 

violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or 

conspires so to do, shall be punished -- 

(1) for murder, by death or life imprisonment, or a fine under 

this title, or both; and for kidnapping, by imprisonment for 

any term of years or for life, or a fine under this title, or both; 

 . . . . 

(5) for attempting or conspiring to commit murder or 

kidnapping, by imprisonment for not more than ten years or a 

fine under this title, or both . . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 2 further provides: “(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United 

States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 

punishable as a principal,” and “(b) [w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if 

directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is 

punishable as a principal.” 

2

 Section 924 provides, in pertinent part, that 

any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . for 

which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 

carries a firearm, . . . shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 

crime of violence . . . if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 

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charged only Wasson with being a felon found in possession of a firearm on the day 

following George’s murder. Finally, Counts 7 and 8 charged Raymond, Dally and 

Looney with committing two additional violent crimes in furtherance of racketeering 

activity: conspiring and attempting to murder Mudersbach, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 

1959(a)(5). The superseding indictment also alleged that there existed “SPECIAL 

FINDINGS,” see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-92, that would make Wasson, Dally or Raymond 

eligible for a death sentence if a jury convicted them, under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), of 

murdering George in furtherance of racketeering activity, or of carrying a firearm in 

furtherance of a violent crime causing death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) 

and (j)(1). 

 Raymond moved for the dismissal of all of the counts the superseding indictment 

charged against him, asserting that the USAO knew about his conduct underlying these 

offenses at the time the USAO previously entered into the plea agreement with him to 

resolve the 2003 felon-in-possession charge, which plea agreement promised that the 

USAO would not bring additional charges against him “arising out of the defendant’s 

conduct now known to the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New 

Mexico” (Aplt. App. at 44). After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court 

 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). But “[a] person who, in the course of a violation of 

subsection (c), causes the death of a person through use of a firearm, shall—(1) if the 

killing is a murder . . . , be punished by death or imprisonment for any terms of years or 

for life.” Id. § 924(j)(1). 

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agreed with Raymond. The court, therefore, dismissed the superseding indictment 

against him, but without prejudice “[b]ecause the plea agreement in [Raymond’s 2003 

federal felon-in-possession case] does not bind state or federal agencies other than the 

USAO for the District of New Mexico [and so] the dismissal of these charges does not 

necessarily preclude similar charges brought by another agency.” (Id. at 173.) The 

United States appeals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 This court generally “review[s] the district court’s dismissal of an indictment for 

an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Todd, 446 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006); see 

also United States v. La Cock, 366 F.3d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 2004). “Abuse of discretion 

is established if the district court’s [dismissal] is based upon an error of law or a clearly 

erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1116-

17 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation, alteration omitted). 

 This court will “review de novo a claim that the government has breached a plea 

agreement.” United States v. Villa-Vazquez, 536 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir. 2008); see 

also Allen v. Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Whether government 

conduct has violated a plea agreement presents a question of law we review de novo.”). 

This court will review for clear error, however, any underlying factual findings. See

United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 501 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 57, 

61, 363 (2009). In doing so, we “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

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district court’s ruling.” United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 129 S. Ct. 2881 (2009). 

“[R]eview under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly deferential.” 

Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Calif., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Calif., 

508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). Importantly, 

[i]t is not the role of an appellate court to retry the facts, because the 

[district] court . . . has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, 

determining the weight to be given testimony, drawing inferences from the 

facts established, and resolving conflicts in the evidence. That the record 

supports a view of the evidence that is permissible but contrary to the trial 

court’s findings is not sufficient to warrant upsetting the lower court’s 

findings. Instead, findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they are 

unsupported in the record, or if after our review of the record we have the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 

Holdeman v. Devine, 572 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations, citations, 

alterations omitted). 

Raymond bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, “the 

underlying facts establishing” that the Government breached the plea agreement. 

Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). 

III. DISCUSSION 

“Where the Government obtains a guilty plea which is predicated in any 

significant degree on a promise or agreement with the U.S. Attorney, such promise or 

agreement must be fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea.” United States v. 

Bullcoming, 579 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). While courts rely on general 

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contract law when interpreting a plea agreement, see Bullcoming, 579 F.3d at 1205; see 

also Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009), such an agreement, 

nevertheless, “is not simply a contract between two parties. It necessarily implicates the 

integrity of the criminal justice system.” Villa-Vazquez, 536 F.3d at 1199 (quotation 

omitted). As such, a plea agreement is also “a matter of constitutional due process,” and 

“an amalgam of constitutional, supervisory, and private contract law concerns.” Id.

(quotations omitted). Thus, “the government has a heightened responsibility that extends 

beyond the plea negotiation to all matters relating to the plea agreement.” Id. (quotation, 

alteration omitted). 

A defendant waives numerous constitutional rights when he enters into a 

plea agreement with the government. As part of this bargain, the 

government must stay faithful to its promises to the defendant. Where . . . 

the government falls short of its promise, a correction is required to 

preserve the integrity of the criminal justice process, and the public’s faith 

in this integrity. 

United States v. Cudjoe, 534 F.3d 1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation, citations, 

alterations omitted). 

A. Whether the United States breached the 2004 plea agreement by charging 

Raymond in the 2007 indictment with the five offenses stemming from 

George’s murder 

 We address first the five charges against Raymond stemming from the 

disappearance and murder of George: Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5, charging that Raymond 

conspired to, and did, kidnap and murder George in furtherance of racketeering activity, 

and Count 3, alleging that Raymond used and carried a firearm in relation to these 

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crimes. The district court found that the USAO knew, on or before October 14, 

2004---the date on which Raymond entered into a plea agreement with the USAO 

resolving the 2003 felon-in-possession charge---of Raymond’s conduct linking him to the 

disappearance of Henry George. 3 The district court based that finding on several 

different categories of evidence. 

1. Defense Attorney Gonzales’ testimony 

 The district court found that “the most direct evidence” on this issue was Public 

Defender Benjamin Gonzales’ testimony. (Aplt. App. at 166-67.) Gonzales represented 

Raymond in the 2003 felon-in-possession prosecution. In that case, the grand jury 

charged Raymond in October 2003; plea negotiations occurred beginning in April 2004; 

and Raymond pled guilty to that offense on October 14, 2004. There is no dispute that, 

several weeks after Raymond’s guilty plea, the assistant United States attorney 

(“AUSA”) handling the case, Louis Valencia, acquired information indicating that 

Raymond was a suspect in George’s disappearance. In fact, Valencia used that 

information at sentencing to argue, unsuccessfully, that Raymond, who had been free on 

bond, should not be allowed to surrender voluntarily, but instead should be taken into 

 

3

 In interpreting the relevant provision of the plea agreement, the district court correctly 

rejected the Government’s argument that “known” meant that the Government, on 

October 14, 2004, knew that Raymond had committed a particular crime, and rejected as 

unreasonable the Government’s understanding that this provision in the plea agreement 

was limited to the USAO’s knowledge of Raymond’s conduct underlying only the 2003-

04 felon-in-possession charge. The plea agreement’s language does not support this 

interpretation urged by the Government. 

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custody immediately after the sentencing hearing because “Mr. Raymond was suspected 

of a murder in Rio Rancho, New Mexico.” (Id. at 543.) The question for the district 

court was whether the USAO knew, before Raymond’s October 14, 2004 guilty plea, that 

he was a suspect in Henry’s disappearance. 

Gonzales testified, in support of Raymond’s motion to dismiss the 2007 

indictment, to the following: 

Q Mr. Gonzales, did there come a time in this matter when you had 

a conversation with Mr. Raymond in your office about what he was likely 

to be looking at on his plea of guilty to felon in possession charges? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you recall approximately when that conversation occurred? 

Do you know if it was before or after his plea? 

A. Oh, it was certainly before his plea. 

Q. Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Raymond about 

how he could help himself by cooperating with the federal authorities? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Will you relate to the Court essentially what that conversation 

involved? 

A. I had learned from Mr. Valencia, the prosecutor, that there was an 

investigation concerning a disappearance and possibly a murder in Rio 

Rancho. And I don’t remember. I couldn’t quote Mr. Valencia. It’s been 

too long ago. 

Q. Okay. 

A. But my impression was that the government was interested in my 

client, Benjamin Raymond, and Mr. Valencia inquired whether Mr. 

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Raymond would be interested in cooperating, at least talking to federal 

authorities. 

Q. And did you relay that interest to Mr. Raymond? 

A. I did. 

(Id. at 251-52.) 

 Based on this testimony, the district court found that the USAO knew Raymond 

was suspected of being implicated in George’s disappearance and murder before 

Raymond pled guilty to the felon-in-possession charge in October 2004: 

The most direct evidence on this point is Mr. Gonzales’ credible testimony 

that Mr. Valencia spoke to him about seeking Defendant Raymond’s 

cooperation in the Rio Rancho murder investigation at some time before

Defendant Raymond entered his guilty plea. Although Mr. Gonzales could 

not recall the exact date or time at which Mr. Valencia first communicated 

this request for cooperation regarding the Rio Rancho murder investigation, 

I find Mr. Gonzales’ testimony to be credible, and I further conclude that 

someone from the USAO (e.g., Mr. Valencia) communicated to Mr. 

Gonzales a request for Defendant Raymond’s cooperation in the Rio 

Rancho murder investigation before Defendant Raymond entered his guilty 

plea . . . on October 14, 2004. 

(Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added, citations omitted).) 

 The Government challenges, on three bases, the district court’s finding that the 

USAO knew, prior to October 14, 2004, that Raymond was a suspect in George’s 

disappearance. 

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 a. The district court misinterpreted Gonzales’ testimony 

First, the Government argues that the district court misinterpreted Gonzales’ direct 

examination testimony to indicate that Gonzales had one conversation with Raymond, 

prior to his guilty plea, during which they discussed both the sentence Raymond was 

“likely . . . looking at” if he pled guilty to being a felon in possession and how Raymond 

might help himself by cooperating with authorities investigating George’s disappearance. 

The Government argues that Gonzales’ testimony was “equivocal” and interprets it, 

instead, to indicate that Gonzales spoke with Raymond about these matters during two 

separate conversations: 1) The conversation Gonzales had with Raymond, before his 

guilty plea, regarding “what he was likely to be looking at on his plea of guilty to felon in 

possession charges”; and 2) a separate conversation with Raymond, occurring at some 

unspecified time, “about how he could help himself by cooperating with the federal 

authorities” investigating George’s disappearance. (Id.) Thus, the Government asserts 

that the district court clearly erred in finding, based upon Gonzales’ direct examination 

testimony, that AUSA Valencia had inquired whether Raymond might be interested in 

talking to authorities investigating George’s disappearance , prior to his guilty plea. 

Gonzales’ testimony is ambiguous. It can be read both as the district court 

interpreted it and also as the Government now reads it. However, 

[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 

record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even 

though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have 

weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views 

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of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous. 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). Although Gonzales’ 

testimony is ambiguous, we cannot conclude that the district court’s interpretation of that 

testimony is implausible. See id. at 578 (upholding trial court’s factual finding, 

notwithstanding that the testimony on which the court relied to make that finding was 

ambiguous). Furthermore, the district court was in the best position to weigh the 

credibility and demeanor of the witness. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 

(2008). 

b. Other witnesses contradicted Gonzales’ testimony 

 The United States further argues that the district court erred in relying on 

Gonzales’ direct examination testimony because the testimony of several other witnesses 

contradicted it. Even so, we cannot say that the district court’s decision to credit 

Gonzales’ testimony over the other witnesses was clearly erroneous. 4 See La Resolana 

 

4

 The United States points to two categories of evidence that contradicted Gonzales’ 

testimony. First, AUSA Valencia testified that he talked to Gonzales about Raymond’s 

possible cooperation with authorities investigating George’ disappearance after Raymond 

had pled guilty, but before his sentencing. The district court, however, appears to have 

credited instead Valencia’s later testimony that he could not “recall” any conversations he 

had with Gonzales prior to Raymond’s guilty plea. Based on that testimony, the district 

court found that “Mr. Valencia made a good-faith effort to recall the events concerning 

his prosecution of Defendant Raymond several years ago,” but that “his recollection was 

not clear enough to rebut the contrary evidence and corroborating circumstances 

presented by the defense in this case.” (Aplt. App. at 174.) 

The second category of evidence that may be considered to conflict with 

Gonzales’ direct examination testimony—that Valencia talked to him about Raymond’s 

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Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting district “court 

did not commit clear error simply because it chose to credit” one witness’s testimony 

over another); see also United States v. DeShazer, 554 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(noting district court was entitled to credit witness’s testimony). “[W]hen a trial judge’s 

finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, 

each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by 

extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear 

error.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575 (noting that “only the trial judge can be aware of the 

variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s 

understanding of and belief in what is said”). 

 

possible cooperation with authorities investigating George’s disappearance before 

October 14, 2004—was the testimony of Rio Rancho Detective Hubbard, FBI Agent 

Griego and ATF Agent Jessen, from whom AUSA Valencia said he learned that 

Raymond had been implicated in George’s disappearance. These three law enforcement 

officers testified that they did not exchange information about George’s disappearance 

and murder until at least November 2004, a few weeks after Raymond pled guilty. While 

the district court found “that Special Agent Griego and Agent Jessen credibly testified 

that it was not until November 2004 that they learned of Defendant Raymond’s status as 

a suspect in Detective Hubbard’s investigation into Mr. George’s disappearance,” the 

court further noted that “their testimony in this regard does not preclude a reasonable 

inference that such knowledge reached the USAO through other, alternative channels of 

communication with state and local law-enforcement officials before that date.” (Id.) 

And the record supports this suggestion. It was ATF Agent Foutz, and not Jessen, who 

was the ATF case agent working with Valencia to prosecute Raymond. And, although 

Detective Hubbard was the Rio Rancho detective investigating George’s disappearance, 

Lt. Noel Snow appears to have assisted Hubbard a great deal, at least initially. So there 

were a number of officers investigating the murder who did not testify, and so did not 

deny giving the USAO information, before October 14, 2004, that authorities suspected 

that Raymond was involved in Henry’s disappearance. 

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c. Whether Gonzales later contradicted his direct examination 

testimony 

 Lastly, the United States argues that the district court clearly erred in relying on 

Gonzales’ direct examination testimony because it was “internally inconsistent”; that is, 

Gonzales’ later testimony contradicted his direct examination testimony on which the 

district court relied. On cross-examination, Gonzales testified: 

Q. Do you have any notes in your file indicating when Mr. Valencia 

discussed this issue with you? 

 A. No. 

 Q. So you have basically a vague recollection that you had some 

sort of discussion with him? 

 A. I know I had that discussion with him. 

(Aplt. App. at 256-57.) The Government asserts that, by this cross-examination 

testimony, Gonzales indicated, contrary to the district court’s interpretation of his direct 

examination testimony, that Gonzales actually had no idea when this conversation with 

Valencia occurred. While this cross-examination testimony could be interpreted that 

way, the district court instead interpreted it in light of Gonzales’ direct examination 

testimony to indicate that the conversation Gonzales had with AUSA Valencia occurred 

prior to the guilty plea, but that Gonzales was unsure of the exact date on which that 

conversation occurred. 

Finally, during redirect, Gonzales testified: 

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Q. And was it your understanding at the time of sentencing that the 

government knew about this murder in Rio Rancho and Ben Raymond’s 

involvement? 

A. The reports I got from Mr. Valencia told me, of course, the 

federal government knew about the murder in Rio Rancho and felt that Ben 

Raymond was involved. I don’t know when the government knew that. I 

didn’t have discussions with Louis Valencia --- well, I don’t know when I 

had those discussions. 

(Id. at 260.) 

As the Government argues, Gonzales’ testimony could be understood to mean that 

he did not know when---pre- or post-guilty plea---that Valencia knew Raymond was 

suspected of being involved in George’s murder. Or, read in light of the district court’s 

interpretation of Gonzales’ direct testimony that the prosecutor raised this issue with 

Gonzales prior to Raymond’s guilty plea, Gonzales’ testimony on redirect might mean 

instead that he did not know the exact date on which the government discovered this 

information, but that Valencia had raised the issue with Gonzales prior to the plea 

agreement. This is the interpretation the district court gave Gonzales’ testimony as a 

whole, finding “that someone from the USAO (e.g., Mr. Valencia) communicated to Mr. 

Gonzales a request for Defendant Raymond’s cooperation in the Rio Rancho murder 

investigation before Defendant Raymond entered his guilty plea” in the 2003 felon-inpossession case. (Id. at 167 (emphasis added).). Although Gonzales’ testimony is 

ambiguous, the district court’s interpretation is plausible. Therefore, we cannot conclude 

it was clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S at 574, 578-79. 

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2. Evidence linking Raymond’s 2003 federal felon-in-possession 

prosecution to the Rio Rancho Police Department’s investigation of 

George’s disappearance 

 There is additional evidence that not only supports the district court’s 

interpretation of Gonzales’ testimony, but also supports the court’s finding that the 

USAO knew that Raymond was suspected in George’s disappearance before October 14, 

2004. For example, based on evidence of the interconnected nature of the 2003-04 felonin-possession prosecution and local officials’ investigation into George’s disappearance, 

the district court determined that the USAO must have been aware, prior to October 14, 

2004, that Raymond had been implicated in George’s disappearance. 

Thus, at the time the USAO brought the indictment against Defendant 

Raymond in [the federal felon-in-possession case] on October 17, 2003, 

there was a pending investigation into Mr. George’s disappearance that 

necessarily involved some degree of overlap and coordination among 

several state and local law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and 

correctional authorities. All of the Defendants in the present case, as well 

as [Mudersbach] and Ms. Robinson, had been detained in connection with 

criminal charges in state court before that date, and thus it was necessary 

for some if not all of the above agencies to coordinate with one another in 

order to make decisions about where and under what conditions to detain 

the above individuals, arrange for interviews while they were in custody, 

identify the offenses with which to charge them and identify the proper 

jurisdiction in which to charge them. Under these circumstances, it is 

highly unlikely and not plausible that a federal prosecutor or law 

enforcement agency could have obtained police reports regarding 

Defendant Raymond’s arrest by APD officers on June 29, 2002, and related 

criminal-history information necessary to bringing the charge of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm on that date, without also coming across 

some link to, or background information concerning, the [Rio Rancho 

Police Department’s] pending investigation into Mr. George’s 

disappearance and related racketeering activity attributed to the Aryan 

Brotherhood. 

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19 

(Aplt. App. at 129; see also id. at 168 (“The evidence of record supports a reasonable 

inference that the information concerning the nature and existence of the [Rio Rancho 

Police Department’s] investigation into Mr. George’s disappearance, as well as 

Defendant Raymond’s alleged involvement in that disappearance and related racketeering 

activity, was readily available to Mr. Valencia, others in the USAO, the ATF case agent 

in [Raymond’s felon-in-possession case], and the District Attorney’s Office before the 

date of Defendant Raymond’s plea agreement in that case.”).) Thus, the district court 

held that, 

[w]hile there is no “smoking gun” confirming beyond doubt that the USAO 

received copies of the written reports of these investigations before October 

14, 2004, there is an abundance of indirect, circumstantial evidence to 

support a reasonable inference that the USAO knew of the information in 

such reports before that date; such indirect, circumstantial evidence is 

sufficient to meet Defendant Raymond’s burden of proof on this issue. 

(Id. at 169-70.)5

 

 

5

 The district court bolstered its finding by noting that 

[t]he cross-examination of [Rio Rancho] Detective Hubbard also revealed 

that there may have been some delay in the preparation of his written 

reports. For example, Detective Hubbard’s report concerning the follow-up 

interview with Ms. Robinson that occurred on July 10, 2002, was not 

prepared until November 12, 2004. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that 

Detective Hubbard relied, at least in part, on informal oral communications 

to conduct his investigation of Mr. George’s disappearance prior to the 

federal involvement in November 2004, when more thorough 

documentation was requested. 

(Aplt. App. at 138.) This, then, might help explain why there is no written document 

establishing that local authorities shared information about Raymond’s suspected 

involvement in George’s disappearance before Raymond’s October 14, 2004, guilty plea. 

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20 

“[D]rawing reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence [is] within 

the province of the district court.” United States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1145 

(10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Here, the inferences the district court drew were 

not clearly erroneous. 

The district court premised its inference that the USAO must have known, before 

October 14, 2004, that Raymond was a suspect in George’s disappearance on at least two 

additional facts: 1) federal officials were working with the APD to prosecute Raymond in 

2003 for being a felon in possession of a firearm; and 2) APD officers were in contact 

with Rio Rancho officials, who suspected Raymond’s involvement in George’s 

disappearance. 

a. Evidence that federal authorities were working with APD to 

prosecute Raymond, in 2003 and 2004, for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm 

Although the evidence before the district court did not specifically identify the 

APD’s exact connection with the USAO’s prosecution of Raymond for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, it cannot be doubted that there was a definite link between the 

two agencies. The federal felon-in-possession charge against Raymond originated from 

the APD officers who arrested Raymond on June 29, 2002, for trying to buy a car using 

fraudulent checks. After discovering that Raymond was armed at the time of his arrest, 

and that he had prior felony convictions, APD officers contacted 

Detective Garcia of APD Intelligence Unit . . . in regards to “Project Exile.” 

As a result of this conversation, it was decided that [Defendant] Raymond 

would be booked into [the Bernalillo County Detention Center] on 

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21 

[outstanding] felony warrants and on charges that would be forthcoming 

from the U.S. Attorneys [sic] Office regarding felon in possession of a 

handgun. 

(Aplt. App. at 124-25.) 

“Project Exile” . . . involved a series of monthly meetings between the 

USAO and the District Attorney’s Office in Bernalillo County. At such 

meetings, those in attendance would go over reports for the purpose of 

identifying cases which warranted federal prosecution by the USAO or 

further follow up by the ATF. According to Mr. Valencia, “Project Exile” 

also involved instances where the local police department would call ATF 

and ask them to present the case to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In addition, 

there was a Violent Crime Impact Task Force, where the ATF was 

embedded into a task force that APD had. Mr. Valencia [testified] that he 

was not sure whether he discussed any charges or criminal history relating 

to Defendant Raymond’s arrest on June 29, 2002, with the District 

Attorney’s Office, but he acknowledged that reports relating to that arrest 

might have been brought to his attention during one of the “Project Exile” 

meetings. 

(Id. at 144-45 (quotations, citations omitted).) Valencia further testified that, although he 

did not know exactly how Raymond’s felon-in-possession case came to the USAO for 

prosecution, it is likely that APD officers contacted the ATF, which would have 

presented the case to the USAO, where Valencia was the “firearms unit supervisor” 

through whom most weapons cases were channeled. This evidence, then, clearly 

established a pathway by which the USAO received from the APD the information 

underlying the USAO’s felon-in-possession prosecution against Raymond. 

b. Evidence that APD was in contact with Rio Rancho officials who 

had identified Raymond as a suspect in George’s disappearance 

 The evidence before the district court also clearly established that APD knew Rio 

Rancho authorities were investigating George’s disappearance; in fact, APD notified Rio 

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22 

Rancho police at the time they arrested Raymond and Robinson, on June 29, 2002. APD 

officers did so after Josie Robinson, having been arrested with Raymond, told APD 

officers that she was working with Rio Rancho authorities “on a case.” (Id. at 84.) In 

fact, it appears that APD Officer Power, who arrested Raymond, had a fairly detailed 

conversation with Rio Rancho Lt. Noel Snow about each department’s respective 

investigations involving Raymond and Robinson.6

 And it is undisputed that by this time 

Rio Rancho authorities had already identified Raymond as a suspect in George’s 

disappearance. 

Further, after discovering that APD officers had taken Raymond into custody, Rio 

Rancho Detective Hubbard, who was investigating George’s disappearance, interviewed 

Raymond. The district court noted that this “would have entailed some communications 

with corrections officials or the agency responsible for detaining Defendant Raymond at 

this time.” (Id. at 138.) 

 

6

 APD Officer Power notified Snow that APD had arrested Robinson and “her boyfriend” 

Raymond “for attempting to purchase a vehicle with a fraudulent check,” and that 

Robinson had told APD that she was “working with [Snow] on a case,” so Power might 

want to contact Snow. (Aplt. App. at 84.) Power also told Snow that both Raymond and 

Robinson were armed at the time of their arrest. Snow, in turn, told Power that 

Raymond’s possession of firearms was a probation violation and a crime in light of his 

prior convictions; Power was already aware of this. Snow suggested that Power “might 

want to check out the validity of the temporary tag displayed on the vehicle” that 

Robinson and Raymond were driving, because when Rio Rancho authorities searched 

both Robinson’s and Raymond’s apartments, they “discovered and seized evidence that 

would lead us to that conclusion.” (Id. at 85.) Power asked if Snow wanted to interview 

either Raymond or Robinson, Snow indicated that they probably would later. When 

Snow reported this to Rio Rancho Detective Hubbard, the detective wanted to interview 

Robinson as soon as possible. 

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23 

 c. Inferences the district court drew from these facts 

 Relying on these facts---that the USAO was working with APD officers to 

prosecute Raymond for being a felon in possession of a firearm, that APD was in contact 

with Rio Rancho authorities investigating George’s disappearance, and Rio Rancho 

authorities identified Raymond as a suspect within days of George’s disappearance---the 

district court inferred that federal authorities, prior to Raymond’s October 14, 2004, 

guilty plea, must have known that he had been implicated in George’s disappearance. 

Drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination, see

United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2009) (reviewing application of 

a sentencing enhancement under the guidelines), we cannot say that the district court’s 

inference was unreasonable or clearly erroneous. See Holdeman, 572 F.3d at 1192 

(noting it is the province of the district court to draw inferences from the evidence). 

3. USAO’s common practices 

 Providing some additional support for the district court’s interpretation of 

Gonzales’ direct examination testimony and the court’s finding that the USAO knew, 

before October 14, 2004, that Raymond was a suspect in George’s disappearance, the 

district court took judicial notice of “Section 9-27.420 of the United States Attorney’s 

Manual (rev. 1997).” (Aplt. App. at 167.) That manual section provides that, “‘[i]n 

determining whether it would be appropriate to enter into a plea agreement, the attorney 

for the government should weigh all relevant considerations, including . . . [t]he 

defendant’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others.’” (Id.) 

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24 

Furthermore, the district court found that “[t]here is evidence suggesting that it is a 

common practice of the USAO in the District of New Mexico to charge defendants who 

were similarly situated with Raymond initially with gun crimes and then solicit their 

cooperation before bringing additional charges or negotiating a plea agreement,” citing 

the USAO’s prosecution of Wasson, Mudersbach and Robinson. (Id. at 167-68.) Based 

upon this evidence, the district court noted that it would have been unusual, and contrary 

to its policy, for the USAO to enter into a plea agreement with Raymond without 

investigating his possible involvement in other criminal activity. While the Government 

argues that the district court could just as easily have drawn contrary inferences from the 

evidence, that does not warrant us finding that the inferences the district court did draw 

were unreasonable or clearly erroneous. “Where there are two permissible views of the 

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 

470 U.S. at 574. 

4. District court’s disbelief of the Government’s explanation for how the 

USAO finally discovered that Raymond was a suspect in George’s 

disappearance 

 Lastly, the district court based its finding that the USAO knew of Raymond’s 

involvement in George’s disappearance before October 14, 2004, in part on the court’s 

disbelief of the Government’s explanation of how AUSA Valencia discovered that 

Raymond was a suspect in George’s disappearance, just a few weeks after Raymond’s 

guilty plea. Valencia’s explanation was this: Within just a few weeks of Raymond’s 

October 14, 2004, guilty plea, FBI Agent Griego was “cold calling” local law 

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25 

enforcement agencies in New Mexico, asking if they had any cases involving the Aryan 

Brotherhood. When he happened to call Rio Rancho Detective Hubbard, Hubbard told 

Griego about the investigation into George’s disappearance. At Agent Griego’s urging, 

Detective Hubbard then faxed information about the George investigation to ATF Agent 

Jessen. It was ATF Agent Jessen who then forwarded this information on to AUSA 

Valencia (even though ATF Agent Foutz, and not Jessen, was the case agent with whom 

Valencia was working to prosecute Raymond). According to Valencia, it was only after 

he received this information, following Raymond’s guilty plea, that he asked defense 

attorney Gonzales if Raymond might be interested in cooperating with authorities 

investigating George’s disappearance. 

 The district court found this story of how the USAO discovered that Raymond was 

a suspect in George’s disappearance, by happenstance and within just a few weeks of 

Raymond’s guilty plea, to be too coincidental: 

 To draw the . . . inference that the USAO did not know anything 

about the various pending investigations by state and local officials with 

regard to Ms. Robinson, Defendant Raymond, their alleged involvement in 

Mr. George’s disappearance, and Defendant Raymond’s association with 

the racketeering activities of the Aryan Brotherhood at the time he entered 

his guilty plea in [the 2003 federal felon-in-possession prosecution], one 

would have to rely on a remarkably improbable series of coincidences: 

(a) the USAO managed to learn the details of Defendant Raymond’s 

involvement in the incident of June 29, 2002, without simultaneously 

learning of Ms. Robinson’s involvement in that incident or the 

communications between APD and [Rio Rancho police] that she prompted 

at that time; (b) despite the efforts by law enforcement agencies to “sell” 

the case for federal prosecution through “Project Exile” and the like, and 

despite the pressing need to develop evidence in support of the effort to 

have Defendant Raymond’s conditions of pretrial release revoked, the 

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26 

USAO entered into the plea agreement in [the 2003 felon-in-possession 

prosecution] without first inquiring about Defendant Raymond’s reported 

association with the “Aryan Brotherhood” or any additional crimes that he 

may have committed; (c) despite the USAO’s usual practice of soliciting 

and assessing a defendant’s cooperation before entering into a plea 

agreement, the USAO did not do so in that case, and (d) instead the USAO 

learned for the first time of the reports of Defendant Raymond’s 

involvement in the disappearance of Mr. George through a “general 

canvassing” or “cold call” initiated by Special Agent Griego less than a 

month after the plea hearing but in ample time to alert the Court of these 

reports for purposes of the sentencing hearing. 

 I do not accept the theory that the Government’s knowledge arose through 

such a series of coincidences. Rather, I find that Mr. Gonzales’ testimony 

provides a more logical explanation that is corroborated by the surrounding 

circumstances. 

(Aplt. App. at 172-73.) 

 We must defer to the district court’s determination that the United States’ 

explanation for when and how the USAO discovered that Raymond was a suspect in 

George’s disappearance was unbelievable. “[D]eterminations of credibility and 

demeanor lie peculiarly within a trial judge’s province, and . . . in the absence of 

exceptional circumstances, we . . . defer to the trial court.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 

(quotations, citations, alterations omitted). 

 Having disbelieved the United States’ explanation, the district court was left with 

the evidence indicating that the USAO knew that Raymond had been implicated in 

George’s disappearance before October 14, 2004. Cf. Allen, 57 F.3d at 1540 (noting, in 

dicta, that the petitioner had shown that the “government potentially breached the plea 

agreement” by offering an “obvious explanation” of his prison classification---the 

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27 

Government used evidence of counts against petitioner that it had dismissed, contrary to 

the terms of petitioner’s plea agreement---and the Government “offered no alternative 

justification”). 

5. Conclusion 

 Because the evidence presented to the district court was ambiguous and disputed, 

this court, based on the cold record before us, might have made different factual findings 

than those the district court made. However, in this case our standard of review is 

determinative. Under “significantly deferential” clear error review, Concrete Pipe, 508 

U.S. at 623, we cannot disturb the district court’s factual finding that the USAO knew, 

prior to October 14, 2004, of Raymond’s conduct implicating him in the disappearance 

and murder of George. We, therefore, AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss 

the five charges alleged in the 2007 indictment against Raymond stemming from 

George’s disappearance and murder.7

 

B. Whether the United States breached the 2003 plea agreement by charging 

Raymond in the 2007 indictment with two offenses stemming from the 

attempted murder of Mudersbach 

The 2007 indictment also charged Raymond with conspiring and attempting to 

murder John Mudersbach in furtherance of racketeering activity, contrary to 18 U.S.C. 

 

7

 In light of this conclusion, we need not address here whether the USAO’s knowledge, 

prior to October 14, 2004, of Raymond’s involvement in the Aryan Brotherhood and with 

suspected check fraud, sufficed to preclude charging Raymond, in the 2007 indictment, 

with the offenses stemming from George’s disappearance and murder. We address that 

evidence next, however, as it pertained to the charges against Raymond stemming from 

the attempted murder of Mudersbach. 

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28 

§§ 2, 1959(a)(5). These charges present a different issue. We conclude that the district 

court legally erred at the outset of its analysis of these charged offenses when the court 

interpreted the relevant language from the 2004 plea agreement---that “the United States 

will not bring additional charges against [Raymond] arising out of the defendant’s 

conduct now known” to the New Mexico USAO (Aplt. App. at 44)---to require “an 

inquiry as to whether any of the essential elements of the ‘additional charges’ the USAO 

brought against [Raymond] in [the 2007 case] originate from conduct known to the 

USAO” on October 14, 2004. (Id. at 164.) See Villa-Vazquez, 536 F.3d at 1196 

(reviewing de novo whether government breached its plea agreement). 

While the United States could have written the plea agreement in that manner, it 

did not do so in this case. Instead, the plea agreement at issue here indicated that the 

USAO would not “bring additional charges against [Raymond] arising out of the 

defendant’s conduct now known.” (Id. at 44.) Although, as the district court noted, the 

USAO knew, at the time of Raymond’s guilty plea, that he was affiliated with the Aryan 

Brotherhood and that he was suspected of check fraud, those facts do not involve 

affirmative conduct on his part linking him to Mudersbach’s attempted murder. 

Moreover, we agree with the Government that the parties could not have understood the 

plea agreement’s language to mean that, just because the Government knew that 

Raymond had been affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood, that fact would immunize him 

from liability for any crimes committed as part of his involvement with that group. 

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29 

There is no evidence in the record to indicate that, at the time Raymond pled guilty 

to the felon-in-possession offense on October 14, 2004, the USAO knew of any conduct 

Raymond had undertaken that would have connected him to the attempted murder of 

Mudersbach. Because there is no such evidence, we need not remand this case to the 

district court to permit that court to consider, in the first instance, the record evidence 

under the correct interpretation of the plea agreement’s relevant language. We conclude, 

instead, that the district court legally erred in dismissing the 2007 indictment charging 

Raymond with the two offenses stemming from that attack on Mudersbach. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss the 

2007 charges against Raymond that stem from George’s disappearance and murder, 

Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. But we REVERSE the dismissal of the indictment as to the two 

charges against Raymond stemming from the attempted murder of Mudersbach, Counts 7 

and 8. In light of that, we REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

 

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09-2101, United States v. Raymond

GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

 The majority’s analysis proceeds in two movements. The first movement affirms 

the district court’s dismissal of the charges associated with the George murder. But the 

second movement sounds a different note, reversing the district court and reinstating the 

charges associated with the Mudersbach attempted murder. I agree with the second half 

of the majority’s opinion and join its decision to reinstate the Mudersbach attempted 

murder charges. Respectfully, however, I submit that the same logic that compels this 

conclusion also compels the reinstatement of the George murder charges. 

I 

 Mr. Raymond has a long and violent criminal history. It is a history that includes 

battery, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, violations of drug and gun laws — and now 

murder. Many of these crimes appear linked to his membership and involvement in the 

Aryan Brotherhood. The current case against Mr. Raymond started in 2007 when the 

New Mexico United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) charged him, and a grand jury 

indicted him, for various crimes in furtherance of Aryan Brotherhood racketeering 

activity, including the successful murder of Henry George and the attempted murder of 

John Mudersbach. 

 According to the USAO’s charging documents, when Mr. Raymond and his 

associates heard in 2002 that Mr. George had recently spoken to law enforcement 

officials, they went to Mr. George’s apartment and beat him until he admitted to 

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2 

“ratting.” After extracting his confession, the group took Mr. George into the desert near 

Rio Rancho, New Mexico, where they forced him to dig a large hole. Mr. Raymond then 

tried to choke Mr. George to death; when that didn’t work, he or one of his coconspirators shot and killed Mr. George. Before leaving the scene, the group buried Mr. 

George in the hole he had dug. A few months later, Mr. Raymond caught wind that Mr. 

Mudersbach, a then-incarcerated member of the Aryan Brotherhood, had “snitched” to 

local authorities about the George murder. As retaliation, Mr. Raymond ordered 

Jeremiah Looney, another of his incarcerated cohorts in the Brotherhood, to murder Mr. 

Mudersbach. Mr. Looney responded by attacking Mr. Mudersbach with a barbell, 

“beating him within an inch of his life.” App. at 54-55. 

 Mr. Raymond sought dismissal of the USAO’s racketeering charges against him. 

He argued that the charges were barred by a plea agreement he reached with the 

government on an unrelated and relatively modest firearms charge in 2004. In the 2004 

plea agreement, the USAO promised that it would “not bring additional charges against 

the defendant arising out of the defendant’s conduct now known to the [USAO].” App. 

at 44. The district court agreed with Mr. Raymond’s motion and dismissed the 2007 

racketeering indictment in its entirety. 

II 

 My colleagues hold that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in 

dismissing the charges associated with the Mudersbach attempted murder. I agree. The 

district court asked “whether any of the essential elements of the” government’s 

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3 

attempted murder charges “originate from conduct known” to the USAO as of the date of 

the plea agreement in 2004. Maj. Op. at 28. This standard, the majority explains, does 

not reflect the terms of the parties’ plea agreement, which instead barred the government 

from bringing new charges “arising out of the defendant’s conduct now known” to the 

USAO, as of the date of the 2004 plea agreement. Id. 

 While the difference between these two standards might not seem significant at 

first blush, as the case played out in the district court the difference proved dispositive. 

The district court dismissed the Mudersbach attempted murder charges because an 

essential element of those charges required the government to prove Mr. Raymond’s 

participation in a racketeering enterprise — here, as alleged in the indictment, the Aryan 

Brotherhood. Because the USAO knew Mr. Raymond was a member of the Aryan 

Brotherhood in 2004, the district court reasoned, dismissal of the Mudersbach attempted 

murder charges was required. Simply put, the USAO’s knowledge of Mr. Raymond’s 

status within the Brotherhood, as of 2004, precluded the current prosecution against him. 

As the majority correctly explains, however, the terms of the plea agreement bar the 

government from bringing charges that arise from conduct, not mere status, known to the 

USAO at the time of the 2004 plea. 

 Having identified this error in the legal standard employed by the district court, 

my colleagues do not remand the matter back to the district court for application of the 

correct legal standard in the first instance. They do not because, as they explain, the 

record before us is clearly devoid of evidence that the USAO knew of any of Mr. 

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4 

Raymond’s conduct in connection with the Mudersbach attempted murder at the time of 

the 2004 plea. Accordingly, the majority reverses the district court’s decision and orders 

the reinstatement of the Mudersbach charges against Mr. Raymond. 

III 

 The same analysis that leads to the reinstatement of the Mudersbach charges 

should also lead to the reinstatement of the George charges. The district court analyzed 

the George charges under the same erroneous legal standard it used when assessing the 

Mudersbach charges. And, under the correct legal standard, the record contains no more 

evidence that the USAO, at the time of the 2004 plea agreement, knew of Mr. Raymond’s 

conduct in connection with the George murder than it did his conduct in connection with 

the Mudersbach attempted murder. 

First, the district court applied its erroneous legal standard to both the George 

charges and the Mudersbach charges. Indeed, the district court’s opinion analyzed the 

George and Mudersbach charges together, in one section, introducing its incorrect legal 

standard at the outset of its common discussion. Under the district court’s standard, the 

USAO’s knowledge in 2004 of Mr. Raymond’s status as a participant in the Aryan 

Brotherhood was enough to require dismissal of all the charges against him. Thus, if 

reversible legal error infects the district court’s analysis of the Mudersbach charges (as it 

does), it no less infects the district court’s treatment of the George charges. The two 

halves of this whole cannot be peeled apart, and so reversal of the whole case, not just 

half of it, should follow. 

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5 

Second, reviewing this case under the correct legal standard, there is no more 

evidence in the record that the USAO knew, at the time of the 2004 plea, of Mr. 

Raymond’s conduct in connection with the George murder than it did his conduct in 

connection with the Mudersbach attempted murder. Indeed, it knew nothing about his 

role in either attack. Any contrary conclusion is thus clearly erroneous, and reinstatement 

of the George charges should follow. 

 The record in this case reveals that the Assistant U.S. Attorney who struck the 

2004 plea agreement with Mr. Raymond testified that he had no knowledge of Mr. 

Raymond’s involvement in the George murder until after the agreement. App. at 674. 

Two federal agents involved in the investigation said the same thing. App. at 303, 308. 

Their testimony was corroborated by a fax date stamp reflecting that state authorities first 

passed along information linking Mr. Raymond to the George murder only after the 2004 

plea deal. App. at 75. And all of this testimony was corroborated by the local 

investigating officer who explained that he hadn’t consulted with federal authorities 

about the George murder until well after the plea deal was consummated. App. at 280. 

 In the face of this proof, Mr. Raymond points to the testimony of his defense 

attorney, Benjamin Gonzales, who indicated that the USAO, at some point, asked him 

whether Mr. Raymond might assist with a possible investigation into Mr. George’s 

“disappearance.” App. at 251. From this, Mr. Raymond asks us to infer that the USAO 

must’ve known, before the plea agreement, of his involvement in the George murder. 

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6 

 At least two problems confront this argument. In the first place, there is no 

evidence in the record suggesting that the conversation occurred before, rather than after, 

the 2004 plea — and thus no evidence that the USAO knew anything of Mr. Raymond’s 

conduct in connection with the George murder before agreeing to the firearms plea deal. 

To be sure, Mr. Raymond urges us to defer to the district court’s estimation that the 

conversation took place before the plea. But for us to uphold the district court’s 

inference, it “must be [based on] more than speculation and conjecture.” United States v. 

Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1288 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this 

case, speculation and conjecture about the timing of Mr. Gonzales’s conversation with 

the USAO is all we have. 

 Even if we could overlook this problem, another remains. If the government’s 

request for help in connection with an investigation into George’s disappearance suggests 

anything, it suggests that the USAO did not know Mr. Raymond kidnapped and killed 

Mr. George. If the USAO did know those things, after all, it would hardly have needed to 

solicit Mr. Raymond’s assistance with its investigation into Mr. George’s 

“disappearance.” At most, the government’s request for assistance suggests only that the 

USAO suspected Mr. Raymond of possessing helpful information about George’s 

disappearance. And under the plea agreement that is not enough. It isn’t enough that the 

government, Casablanca-style, might have considered Mr. Raymond one of the “usual 

suspects” to be rounded up and questioned about a disappearance linked to the Aryan 

Brotherhood. To be barred from proceeding with its indictment, the USAO had to know

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7 

that Mr. Raymond engaged in the conduct of kidnapping and killing George. There is 

simply no evidence that it did. 

 To uphold the district court and dismiss the George murder charges, then, we 

would have to accept Mr. Raymond’s piling of one speculative inference (that the 

Gonzales conversation took place before the plea) on another (that the prosecutor’s 

comments somehow signaled knowledge of Mr. Raymond’s conduct, rather than 

suspicion of his usefulness as an informant). None of this we can do. See United States 

v. Hilliard, 31 F.3d 1509, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[w]e are unwilling to 

stack inference upon inference” to uphold a district court’s factual findings); cf. United 

States v. Rakes, 510 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will not uphold a 

conviction obtained by piling inference upon inference.”). Mr. Raymond asks us to 

believe that the USAO decided to give Mr. Raymond a free pass on a murder charge, 

despite knowing he kidnapped and killed Mr. George, in exchange for a guilty plea to an 

unrelated and relatively modest gun charge. While maybe not an entirely unfathomable 

scenario, Mr. Raymond fails to provide more than speculation that anything so unlikely 

actually occurred. 

 In response to all this, Mr. Raymond stresses that state and local authorities had 

information linking Mr. Raymond to the George murder before the date of the 2004 plea 

agreement. But that is not enough either. Under the terms of the plea, the USAO was 

barred only from pursuing conduct known to it, not conduct known to state and local 

authorities. 

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8 

 Mr. Raymond replies that law enforcement officials frequently coordinate their 

investigative work and so the USAO likely knew what state and local authorities knew. 

But this, too, is just speculation — and speculation contradicted by all of the competent 

record evidence. Every investigator called as a witness, from every law enforcement 

agency involved, testified that the USAO received no information on the George murder 

until after the 2004 plea agreement. To be sure, Mr. Raymond argues that other federal 

officials, who did not testify, might have learned what state and local authorities knew 

before the plea agreement. But, yet again, he supplies no evidence to support that 

speculation. And protesting that the right officials didn’t testify does Mr. Raymond no 

good anyway. He had the chance to call the witnesses he wished and, as the movant 

seeking dismissal of the indictment, he bore the burden of proving that the USAO’s 

charges arise out of conduct it knew of at the time of the plea. Allen v. Hadden, 57 F.3d 

1529, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995). That he simply did not do. 

 Moreover, if we could fairly impute the knowledge of state and local officials to 

the USAO, as Mr. Raymond suggests and the majority seems to agree, we would have to 

affirm the dismissal not just of the George charges. We would also likely have to affirm 

the dismissal of the Mudersbach charges. The majority indicates that the only 

information the USAO knew about Mr. Raymond’s conduct in connection with the 

Mudersbach attack was Mr. Raymond’s status as an affiliate of the Aryan Brotherhood. 

But there are loads of other things that state and local investigators knew about Mr. 

Raymond’s involvement in the attack on Mr. Mudersbach. They knew that Mr. 

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9 

Mudersbach was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. They knew that Mr. Mudersbach 

had implicated Mr. Raymond in the George murder. And they knew that Mr. 

Mudersbach had been attacked in jail by another Aryan Brotherhood member, 

presumably for “snitching” on Raymond. If the knowledge of state and local officials 

about the George murder could be fairly imputed to the USAO, presumably the same 

should hold true for the Mudersbach attempted murder, thus precluding prosecution of 

either crime. The reason why we can’t impute the knowledge of local and state officials 

to the USAO in either case, of course, is that any such imputation would be based on 

speculation. There is simply no evidence in this record that the USAO, as opposed to 

state and local officials, knew of Mr. Raymond’s involvement in either crime. 

* * * 

 The district court applied the wrong legal standard to both the George and 

Mudersbach charges. Applying the correct standard, the record is clearly devoid of 

evidence that the Mudersbach charges arise from conduct known to the USAO at the time 

of the 2004 plea agreement. Exactly the same must also be said of the George charges. 

Accordingly, I would reinstate not just half but all of the indictment against Mr. 

Raymond. 

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