Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03880/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03880-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eagle Vista Equities LLC
Appellee
Eve Sutton
Appellant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUTTON,

Appellant,

v.

EAGLE VISTA EQUITIES LLC,

Appellee.

Case No. 19-cv-03880-EMC 

ORDER AFFIRMING U.S. 

BANKRUPTCY COURT’S ORDER 

GRANTING APPELLEES’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGAINST APPELLANT

Docket No. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Eve Sutton filed suit against Appellees Eagle Vista Equities LLC (“Eagle 

Vista”) and Wedgewood, Inc. (“Wedgewood”) (collectively, the “Appellees”) alleging, inter alia, 

wrongful foreclosure and seeking a judgment quieting title to the property in her name. The 

United States Bankruptcy Court, Judge Blumenstiel, granted summary judgment in favor of 

Appellees against Ms. Sutton’s two claims for relief seeking: (1) determination of wrongful 

trustee sale; and (2) cancellation of instruments and quiet title. Ms. Sutton appeals. See Docket 

No. 1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s order. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Bankruptcy Court found the following facts undisputed. See Docket No. 20-2 

(Appellant’s Excerpts of the Record [“ER”]) at 492; Docket No. 16 (Appendix re Appellees’ Brief 

[“App.”]) at 416. 

Ms. Sutton acquired the at-issue property in 2002. ER at 457. In August 2006, she 

refinanced her loan (hereinafter the “Loan”) with the following details in the Deed of Trust 

(“DOT”): (1) the new debt amount was $450,000 with an interest rate of 6.75%; (2) the 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

beneficiary was Wells Fargo, N.A., a National Association (“Wells Fargo”); and (3) the trustee 

was Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (“Fidelity”). Id. at 457–58. Pursuant to this new 

DOT, Ms. Sutton was responsible for monthly payments of $2,531.25. Id. at 458.

In 2009, Ms. Sutton sought a modification of the Loan. Modification was denied. Later 

that year, she defaulted when she failed to make payments. Id. Ms. Sutton contends that she 

never received an explanation as to why her modification request was denied; she further contends

that Wells Fargo advised that she needed to cease payments in order to be considered for the 

modification and that she complied. Id. Ultimately, her failure to make the monthly payments led 

to the recording of the Notice of Default on December 4, 2009 (“2009 NOD”). Id. First American 

Title Insurance Company (“First America”) recorded the 2009 NOD as an agent for Wells Fargo. 

Id. 

On January 6, 2010, First America substituted as the trustee under the DOT. Id. First 

America noticed a foreclosure sale on behalf of Wells Fargo for April 1, 2010. Id. In response, 

Ms. Sutton filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on March 31, 2010. Id. at 459. In that

petition, she listed the property’s fair-market value as $214,335, and her current debt to Wells 

Fargo was $473,812.21. Id. As part of her petition, she filed a plan for reorganizing her finances, 

which proposed that she would make monthly payments of $1,031 to Wells Fargo upon 

modification of her Loan. Id. At this time, Ms. Sutton represented that a loan-modification 

application was pending. Id. 

On April 26, 2010, Wells Fargo assigned its interest under the DOT to HSBC Bank USA, 

N.A. (“HSBC”). Id. at 460. HSBC thereafter filed a proof of claim to confirm that the amount 

owed on the Loan as of the date of petition (March 31, 2010) was $475,987.21, and the amount of 

pre-petition arrears of 23,774.28 (“pre-petition arrears”). Id. at 461. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 

(“WFHM”) acted as HSBC’s servicing agent. Id.

On June 21, 2010, WFHM moved to lift the First Bankruptcy’s automatic stay because Ms. 

Sutton failed to make payments on the Loan after filing her bankruptcy petition, which had 

accrued in the amount of $6,613.15 (“post-petition arrears”). Ms. Sutton opposed the motion on 

the grounds that—notwithstanding her admission that she made zero payments on the Loan after 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the petition date—the partial payments proposed in her plan ($1,031 monthly, which she did not 

pay) was sufficient to protect HSBC’s interest in the property as she continued to seek 

modification of her Loan. Id. at 461. Ms. Sutton admitted that her previously-filed April 2010 

request for modification was denied, but in a declaration she attested that she filed another

modification application on June 24, 2010. Id. The Bankruptcy Court granted WFHM’s motion 

and permitted HSBC to issue a notice of acceleration of the Loan and to record a second notice of 

default. Id. But it also stated that HSBC could not file for foreclosure, and the stay would not be 

lifted, until HSBC filed a written notification of the denial of Ms. Sutton’s June 24, 2010 loanmodification application. Id.

On August 13, 2010, Ms. Sutton represented to the Bankruptcy Court that HSBC offered to 

modify the Loan as follows: (1) payments on the Loan would be temporarily reduced to 

$1,031.25 for a period of ten months (i.e., from September 2010 to June 2011), after which it 

would revert back to the original contractual amount of $2,531.25; (2) the pre-petition arrears 

would be merged to the principal balance of the Loan; and (3) the interest on the Loan would 

temporarily reduce to 2.75% from 6.25% for this ten-month period. Id. On December 31, 2010, 

HSBC amended its proof of claim to indicate that the outstanding balance of the Loan was 

$475,987.12 and the pre-petition arrears were “0.00,” because it merged into the principal balance. 

Id. 

Nearly a year later, on November 1, 2011, HSBC filed its second motion to lift the

automatic-bankruptcy stay because once the ten-month period lapsed and the payment obligation

reverted to the original contractual amount, Ms. Sutton failed to make the full monthly payments, 

which resulted in new arrears of $4,581.25 (“post-modification arrears”). Id. at 463. In

opposition, Ms. Sutton conceded that the payment amount reverted to the original amount 

($2,531.25), but she argued that she began pursuing another loan modification in October 2011,

and WFHM agreed that she could continue making the lowered payment ($1,031.25). Id. at 463–

64.

Ms. Sutton and HSBC resolved this second motion with a stipulation, filed on March 23, 

2012, which required Ms. Sutton to make payments of $1,031.25 beginning January 1, 2012, 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

while HSBC considered her October 2011 modification application. Id. Pursuant to this

stipulation, if HSBC denied Ms. Sutton’s application, the parties could (1) further stipulate or (2) 

HSBC could renew its motion to lift the stay with fifteen days’ notice. Id. The Bankruptcy Court 

approved the stipulation. Id.

There is no evidence of any modifications to the Loan, nor is there evidence that the postmodification arrears ($4,581.25) were relieved, excused, or otherwise merged into the principal 

balance of the Loan. Moreover, there is no evidence of HSBC affirmatively denying Ms. Sutton’s 

October 2011 modification application. 

On January 2, 2014, First America recorded a Notice of Trustee’s sale, which scheduled a 

foreclosure sale on January 22, 2014. Id. First America subsequently recorded a second Notice of 

Trustee’s Sale on March 20, 2015, which scheduled a foreclosure sale on April 14, 2015. Id. On 

July 2, 2015, HSBC, First American, and Wells Fargo proceeded with foreclosure and sold the 

property to Eagle Vista for $381,791.01. See id.; see also Docket No. 15 (“Appellees’ Brief”) at 

11. According to a Trustee’s Deed of Sale, Eagle Vista obtained title to the property on July 16, 

2015. ER at 465. 

B. Procedural Background

Ms. Sutton filed an adversary complaint on September 27, 2018 in Bankruptcy Court, 

alleging (1) wrongful trustee sale; (2) cancellation and quiet title; (3) fraudulent transfer violation 

under 11 U.S.C. section 548(a)(1)(A); (4) fraudulent transfer violation under 11 U.S.C. Section 

544; and (5) violation of Uniform Voidable Transaction Act under California Civil Code section 

3439 et seq. ER at 1–15. Appellees moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 28. The 

Bankruptcy Court converted the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion and

dismissed Ms. Sutton’s third through fifth claims for relief, but it requested additional briefing 

regarding claims one and two. Id. at 454. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately ruled for Eagle Vista 

and Wedgewood on the remaining two claims. Id. at 505. Ms. Sutton appeals the summary 

judgment order. Docket No. 1 (“Notice of Appeal”).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See In 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996). “The reviewing court will affirm a grant of 

summary judgment only if it appears from the record, after viewing all evidence and factual 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In re Yarbrow, 

150 B.R. 233, 236 (9th Cir. BAP 1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

Ms. Sutton’s opening brief presents numerous issues on appeal—some previously raised, 

and some new1—but the dispositive issue here is whether Appellees were bona fide purchasers

(“BFP”) as a matter of law. The Bankruptcy Court concluded Appellees were. This Court agrees.

The Bankruptcy Court recognized that a buyer receives BFP status if it (1) purchases the 

property in good faith for value, and (2) has no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of 

another. ER at 476. Bankruptcy Court Judge Blumenstiel only addressed the second prong 

because Ms. Sutton did not oppose the first. Id. at 477. During the Bankruptcy Court’s hearing on 

Appellees’ motion to dismiss, Ms. Sutton “conceded that, if Eagle Vista is a bona fide purchaser 

for value [], all the defects from which Ms. Sutton alleges the foreclosure process suffered are 

irrelevant, for a BFP takes good title notwithstanding such defects.” Id. at 493. Bankruptcy Court 

then rejected each of Ms. Sutton’s BFP challenges, finding the following:

• Appellees did not have to fully review the public record pertaining to the Loan and 

foreclosure process because “California law imposes upon purchasers a duty of 

reasonable inquiry, not a duty of exhaustive inquiry.” ER at 478 (citing First Fid. 

Thrift & Loan Ass’n v. Alliance Bank, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 1445 (1998)).

• Even if Appellees conducted an exhaustive review, discovering the six-year gap 

between the 2009 NOD and the 2015 foreclosure sale did not divest them of BFP 

1 Ms. Sutton presents the following issues on appeal: (1) Is the 2015 trustee sale void since it was 

based on a 2009 Notice of Default which substantially overstated the sum required by the

borrower to reinstate her loan? (2) Was the Trustee equitably estopped or barred by laches from 

proceeding to a trustee sale in 2015 based on the 2009 Notice of Default? (3) Is the 2015 Trustee 

Sale void since Sutton was not provided any reason why her HAMP loan modification was 

denied? (4) Did Eagle Vista acquire title to the subject property despite the fact that the First 

American lacked the power to sell at the non-judicial trustee sale? (5) What is the proper remedy 

in this case? Docket No. 13 (“Opening Br.”) at 16.

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

status because notices of default do not expire. Id.

• Appellees would have never discovered the agreement for the temporary 

modification of the Loan because it was a private agreement between Ms. Sutton 

and Appellees, and the agreement never recorded in the property’s chain of title. 

The temporary-modification agreement appeared publicly for the first (and only) 

time as an exhibit to one of Ms. Sutton’s three bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 481. 

• Appellees did not have notice of the defects of which Ms. Sutton complains, 

because none existed. Id. at 483–84. Ms. Sutton argued that the NOD was 

defective because First America had no authority to record it, since First America

had not yet substituted as the official Trustee of Record. But California Civil Code 

section 2924(a)(1) specifically addresses who has authority to record notices of 

default: “[t]he trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents

. . . .” (emphasis added). First America had such authorization. Moreover, Ms. 

Sutton contended that the foreclosure sale had to occur within 365 days from the

NOD—but the only statute that imposes any 365-day deadline is California Civil 

Code section 2924g(c)(1), which requires the sale within 365 days of the notice of 

sale—not notice of default. Here, the notice of sale recorded on April 14, 2015, 

and the foreclosure sale occurred on July 2, 2015, which was well within the 

timeframe prescribed by Section 2924(g)(c)(1). Id. at 485. 

• Appellees had no duty to review records (e.g., Securities and Exchange 

Commission filings or other unrecorded documents) outside of the property’s chain 

of title. Id. 

This Court agrees with each of the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions regarding BFP status. 

On appeal, Ms. Sutton still does not dispute that Appellees paid something of value for the 

property, nor does she allege that Appellees acted in bad faith. Moreover, she also does not allege 

that Appellees played a role in the foreclosure process that would disqualify them as bona fide 

purchasers. Instead, Ms. Sutton challenges Eagle Vista’s status as a BFP because she alleges it 

had “a mandatory duty to review the Trustee Sale Guaranty in order to become a BFP.” Opening 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Br. at 22. According to Ms. Sutton, “there is no evidence that Eagle Vista reviewed the Trustee 

Sale Guaranty[,]” which would have revealed that the 2009 DOT was defective because (1) it 

overstated the amount of default; (2) no second notice of default was recorded; and (3) the

permanent modification plan failed. Id. at 23. Because of this, Ms. Sutton maintains that triable 

issues of material fact exist as to whether Appellees conducted sufficient due diligence to be 

considered bona fide purchasers. In other words, she alleges that a “sophisticated buyer such as 

Eagle Vista” had a duty to review the Trustee Sale Guaranty. Id. at 22. 

In response, Appellees argue it is undisputed that Ms. Sutton did not file a lis pendens to 

put potential buyers on constructive notice that there may be an irregularity that could affect the 

title of the property. Answering Br. at 25 (citing App. at 336). Without any notice of defects, 

Appellees contend they are entitled to a conclusive presumption that they are BFPs because of 

California Civil Code section 2924(c). Id. Under Section 2924(c), there is a presumption in favor 

of a BFP who received a trustee's deed that contains a recital indicating the trustee fulfilled its 

statutory notice requirements. Melendrez v. D & I Inv., Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1238, 1250 (2005). 

Section 2924(c) reads, 

A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of 

compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of 

copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default 

or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the 

posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy 

thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with 

these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona 

fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.” 

Here, Appellees point to the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, which contains the following provision: 

“All requirements of law and the applicable Deed of Trust including, but not limited to those 

enumerated by Civil Code 2924, et seq., requiring the mailing, publication, personal delivery and 

posting of the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale, as respectively appropriate, have been met.” 

App. at 114. Ms. Sutton cannot overcome the Section 2924(c) presumption on this record because 

she was in post-modification default once her monthly obligations reverted to the original 

contractual amount of $2,531.25—which led to missed payments of $4,581.25. Ms. Sutton does 

not dispute this post-modification default. Nor does she dispute that the temporary modification 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

expressly reserved “all rights of recourse to which [HSBC] is presently entitled against any 

property.” ER at 497. So even if Appellees conducted an exhaustive search of the property’s title 

history, including a review of the 2009 NOD, they would not have had knowledge (actual or 

constructive) of any defects that would disqualify their status as bona fide purchasers. Instead, 

they would have discovered the post-modification default and HSBC’s reserved right to act under 

the 2009 NOD. 

Accordingly, Ms. Sutton has not rebutted the conclusive presumption afforded by Section 

2924(c), nor has she raised any disputed facts material to Appellees’ BFP status. After the parties

fully briefed this appeal, Ms. Sutton filed two supplemental notices of new authority, identifying 

recent California court of appeal opinions. Neither decision strips Appellees of BFP status, nor 

could they do so retroactively. 

First, Ms. Sutton cites Taniguchi v. Restoration Homes LLC, No. A152827, 2019 WL 

6837966 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2019) for her argument that Appellees deprived her of her 

reinstatement right. This decision has nothing to do with BFP status. In Taniguchi, the borrowers 

sued their lender for depriving them of their right to reinstatement. Id. at *1. The Taniguchis 

obtained a loan in 2006 and, after having difficulty making payments, entered into a loan 

modification with their lender in 2008. Id. The modification stated that, “failure to make 

modified payments as scheduled would be an event of default, and that in the event of a default the 

Modification would be null and void at the lender’s option, and the lender would have the right to 

enforce the loan and associated agreements according to the original terms.” Id. The Taniguchis 

defaulted on the modified loan by missing four payments. Id. at *2. The lender subsequently 

recorded a second notice of default and informed the Taniguchis that in order to reinstate their 

loan, they had to pay the four missed payments and the sums that had been previously deferred by 

the modification. Id. 

The Court of Appeal analyzed California Civil Code section 2924c, which provides that 

when a mortgage loan is accelerated due to default, the borrower can reinstate the loan by paying 

all amounts due, “other than the portion of principal as would not then be due had no default 

occurred.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 2924c(a)(1). Section 2953 limits the ability of a borrower to waive 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

his or her right of reinstatement, “Any express agreement made or entered into by a borrower at 

the time of or in connection with the making of or renewing of any loan secured by a deed of 

trust, mortgage or other instrument creating a lien on real property, whereby the borrower agrees 

to waive the rights, or privileges . . . shall be void and of no effect.” Id. § 2953 (emphasis added). 

The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment in favor of the lender and remanded for further 

proceedings. It held that

for purposes of section 2953, the Taniguchis’ Modification is 

appropriately viewed as the making or renewal of a loan secured by 

a deed of trust. It is thus subject to the anti-waiver provisions of 

section 2953. Section 2924c gives the Taniguchis the opportunity to 

cure their precipitating default (that is, the missed modified monthly 

payments) by making up those missed payments and paying the 

associated late charges and fees, and in that way to avoid the 

consequences of default on the modified loan.

Taniguchi, 2019 WL 6837966 at *7. In so concluding, the Taniguchi court reasoned that after the 

renewal (i.e., the modification), “the debtor is not in breach or default so long as the amended or 

renewed terms of the indebtedness are performed . . . . And upon signing the Modifications, the 

Taniguchis were no longer in default.” Id. at 5. The Taniguchi court held that defaults arising

from modifications are also covered by Section 2953—i.e., a borrower is entitled to reinstatement 

of the loan after payment of the post-modification default. But requiring the borrower to also pay 

the arrears that gave rise to the modification in the first place may deprive the borrower of 

reinstatement rights.2 

Here, the similarities are that Ms. Sutton defaulted, entered into a modification that 

deferred her arrears, and defaulted again post-modification. But the similarities end there. Ms. 

Sutton does not allege that she attempted to reinstate her Loan before or after the temporary 

modification. As such, Taniguchi is factually distinguishable and, most importantly, does not 

concern BFP status, which is dispositive here. The decision only concerns reinstatement rights—a 

right which Ms. Sutton indisputably never sought.

2 At the outset of the Taniguchi opinion, the court acknowledges that “[t]his appears to be a case 

of first impression. The Legislature did not define the phrase ‘at the time of or in connection with 

the making of or renewing of any loan secured by a deed of trust’ for purposes of section 2953, 

and there is no clear definition in the case law.” Id. at *4. 

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The second new authority on which Ms. Sutton relies is Williams v. 21st Mortgage. 

Corporation., No. A153307, 2020 WL 359027, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2020). The Williams 

court followed the holding in Taniguchis, which declared that a lender cannot require a borrower 

to cure default by paying pre- and post-modification arrears, if the modification plan was 

confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Williams, 2020 WL 359027, at *4. In other words, Williams 

held that the default that gave rise to the modification were “not currently in default.” Like 

Taniguchis, the decision in Williams does not divest Appellees of BFP status—the opinion has 

nothing to do with a purchaser being a BFP. Further, as stated above, Taniguchis and Williams are 

inapplicable here because Ms. Sutton never attempted to reinstate her loan by paying the default 

balance (pre- or post-modification). 

Given Appellees’ status as BFPs—and Ms. Sutton’s concession that BFP status would 

obviate the alleged defects with the 2009 NOD—this Court need not definitively decide Ms. 

Sutton’s remaining arguments on appeal, some of which were newly raised and not addressed by 

the Bankruptcy Court. The Court notes, however, that none appear to have merit.3

///

///

///

///

///

///

3

(1) Whether Ms. Sutton was entitled to a permanent loan modification. No, because the express 

terms of the temporary modification indicated that the reduced monthly payments were only for a 

ten-month period.

(2) Whether First America had authority to conduct the 2015 trustee sale. Yes, because there were 

no defects related to the 2009 NOD. 

(3) Whether dual tracking existed. Need not address because it is a newly raised argument. 

(4) Whether laches and estoppel apply to bar the foreclosure. Laches and estoppel do not apply to 

Appellees because Ms. Sutton concedes that they were not participants of the foreclosure process, 

except for being the buyers.

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

V. CONCLUSION

Because of the foregoing, the Court AFFIRMS the summary judgment order against Ms. 

Sutton’s first and second claims for relief because she has not raised a genuine dispute of material 

fact regarding Appellees’ status as bona fide purchasers for value. 

This order disposes of Docket No. 1. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-03880-EMC Document 28 Filed 02/05/20 Page 11 of 11