Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01080/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01080-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karnail Chand
Defendant
Rodger Robinson
Plaintiff
Tejtal Singh
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RODGER ROBINSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

KARNAIL CHAND and TEJTAL SINGH,

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-05-1080 DFL DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

In this American with Disabilities (“ADA”) action, 

plaintiff Rodger Robinson seeks attorney’s fees and costs in the 

amount $10,826.66 following entry of a default judgment against 

defendants Karnail Chand and Tejtal Singh. Defendants have not 

opposed plaintiff’s motion. The court reduces the award to 

$8,466.66. 

I. 

On March 31, 2005, plaintiff, a disabled wheelchair user, 

attempted to gain access to the Victor Market, owned by 

defendants. During plaintiff’s visit, he encountered three 

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barriers: (1) absence of a disabled parking space made it 

difficult for plaintiff to park, (2) absence of an accessible 

route made it difficult for him to exit his vehicle, and (3) 

absence of a curb cut-out forced him to pull himself over a curb 

to gain access to the Market. On May 31, 2005, plaintiff filed 

the complaint in this case, alleging violations of the ADA and 

related state statutes. 

On June 27, 2005, Paul Singh (“Singh”), on behalf of his 

father, Tejtal Singh, called Thomas Stewart, Robinson’s 

attorney, to report that the barriers had been corrected. 

Stewart traveled to the market to verify the repairs on June 29 

and discovered that no changes had been made. On September 5, 

Singh again stated that the barriers had been corrected. 

Robinson checked the alleged changes for Stewart and reported 

that a disabled parking spot had been installed, but that the 

required access aisle by the space was blocked by a ramp. Based 

upon defendants’ attempt at compliance, plaintiff offered to 

settle the case if the parties could agree on additional 

financial compensation. Defendants refused the offer and 

requested a trial date. Defendants ceased communication with 

plaintiff and the court shortly thereafter, eventually resulting 

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in the clerk’s entry of default as to Singh on January 12, 2006.1 

The court granted plaintiff’s February 19, 2006 motion for 

default on December 1, 2006, awarding him $4,000 and injunctive 

relief. Plaintiff now seeks attorney’s fees. 

II. 

The ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act provide that a 

prevailing party should recover reasonable attorney’s fees. See

Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No. Civ. S. 03-1843, 2005 

WL 3287233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005). Calculating an 

appropriate fee award involves a two-step process. Fisher v. 

SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). “First, the 

court must calculate the ‘lodestar figure’ by taking the number 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and multiplying 

it by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. “Second, a court may 

adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a ‘multiplier’ 

based on factors not subsumed in the initial calculation.” Van 

Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

Robinson requests $10,425 in fees, based upon 41.7 hours 

billed at $250 per hour, and $401.66 in costs.2 Despite the 

 

1

 Robinson obtained an entry of default against Chand on 

October 14, 2005. 

 

2

 The $250 per hour rate is consistent with the rate awarded 

to experienced counsel in other ADA cases before the Eastern 

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absence of an opposition, the court finds some of the requested 

fees, as discussed below, to be unreasonable. 

A. Paralegal Tasks 

In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989), the 

Supreme Court held that attorney’s fees could include 

compensation for paralegals. The Ninth Circuit has extended 

compensation to all those “whose labor contributes to work 

product for which an attorney bills her client.” Trustees of 

the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland 

Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2006). Such work is 

only compensable, however, “if it is customary to bill such work 

separately.” Id. at 1257. The party seeking fees carries the 

burden on establishing the rates for such work. See Martinez, 

2005 WL 3287233, at *7. 

For fees to be reasonable, paralegal work should be billed 

at an appropriate rate, regardless of the status of the person 

actually undertaking the work. Stewart seeks to bill at 

attorney rates work more appropriately handled by paralegals or 

secretaries.3 This work includes: preparing cover sheets, 

 

District. See Sanford v. GMRI, Inc., No. Civ. S. 04-1535, 2005 

WL 4782697, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2005). 

3

 Plaintiff’s fee invoice repeatedly lists secretarial and 

paralegal tasks under a single time entry. Although the court 

will not award paralegal rates for secretarial work, see

Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, at *7, it finds that the secretarial 

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converting files to PDFs, e-filing documents, mailing documents, 

arranging for service of documents, scheduling matters, 

researching nonlegal issues such as business ownership, 

preparing boilerplate documents, and organizing case files.4 

Although Stewart may undertake these tasks himself, he should be 

compensated at a work-appropriate rate. Plaintiff has not met 

his burden of demonstrating that, for this work, “the requested 

rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and 

reputation.” Jordan v. Multnomah Co., 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th 

Cir. 1987). The court, therefore, compensates Stewart for 6.2 

hours of work at the $75 per hour paralegal rate favored in this 

district. See Sanford, 2005 WL 4782697, at *5 n.6 (discussing 

reasonable rates in the Eastern District for work on ADA 

actions). The court reduces plaintiff’s requested fees by 

$1,085. 

B. Site Inspections 

Stewart lives in Clayton, roughly 60 miles from defendants’ 

store in Victor. Stewart made four separate trips to the store: 

 

work likely accounted for a de minimis amount of time given the 

other paralegal tasks listed. 

 

4

 The court classifies work on the following dates as 

primarily paralegal in nature: 5/31/05 (1.7 hours); 7/28/05 (0.3 

hours); 8/02/05 (0.2 hours); 8/18/05 (0.2 hours); 8/25/05 (0.2 

hours); 8/31/05 (0.3 hours); 9/05/05 (0.4 hours); 10/14/05 (0.7 

hours); 10/19/05 (0.2 hours); 10/21/05 (0.4 hours); 12/06/05 

(0.7 hours); 1/10/06 (0.4 hours); and 4/18/06 (0.5 hours).

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(1) on April 4, 2005 to confirm plaintiff’s statements; (2) on 

May 30, immediately before filing to confirm the existence of 

violations; (3) on June 29, to inspect the changes allegedly 

made to the parking lot; and (4) on February 17, 2006, to take a 

picture for the default judgment motion. The trips took 14.5 

hours, resulting in $3,625.00 in fees. The court finds 

Stewart’s billing of the February 17, 2006 trip to be 

unreasonable, given that he made the trip only to take a picture 

for his default motion. Stewart could have sent a 

representative to take the photo, as he did on September 5, 2005 

when he sent plaintiff to verify repairs at the site. The court 

reduces plaintiff’s fees by 3.1 hours ($775) for the February 17 

trip. 

C. Legal Work 

Excluding the work discussed above, Stewart spent 16.5 

hours on legal work before the entry of default judgment. 

Stewart spent 8.5 hours preparing the motion for default 

judgment. The motion specifically and thoroughly addressed the 

alleged barriers. Plaintiff provided declarations to detail 

both the barriers encountered and the action’s history leading 

to default. Stewart spent 4.0 hours preparing for and attending 

the motion hearing, including travel time from Clayton to 

Sacramento. The remaining 4.0 hours of work before default 

judgment were spent primarily on conversations with plaintiff 

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and defendants, covering such matters as the parties’ 

disagreement over defendants’ remedial efforts and settlement 

arrangements. The court finds the time expended to be 

reasonable and grants plaintiff’s request for 16.5 hours 

($4,125) for legal work prior to obtaining default judgment. 

D. Preparation of Motion for Fees 

Plaintiff seeks 4.5 hours ($1,125) for work on the motion 

for fees, following defendants’ default. Although a bit on the 

high side, the court finds the request within the zone of the 

reasonable. 

E. Costs 

Plaintiff seeks costs for the filing fee ($250) and service 

of process on both defendants ($75.83 each). He provides 

invoices for service of both defendants. The court finds the 

costs to be reasonable and awards the full $401.66 requested. 

III. Conclusion 

For the above reasons, the court awards the plaintiff 

$8,565 in attorneys’ fees, calculated as follows: 

 Hours Rate Total 

Attorney 

Work 32.4 $250 $8,100 

Paralegal 

Work 6.2 $75 $465 

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Additionally, the court awards plaintiff $401.66 in costs and 

expenses. In total, the court awards plaintiff $8,966.66. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 1, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

 

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