Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02610/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02610-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lesean D. Hardy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2610

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Lesean D. Hardy, also known as *

Leasean Smith, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 13, 2010

Filed: May 13, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Lesean D. Hardy conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appeals the district court’s1

 order

denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the

Honorable Jon S. Scoles, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of

Iowa. 

Appellate Case: 09-2610 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/13/2010 Entry ID: 3664255
I.

On the afternoon of November 12, 2008, two Cedar Rapids Police Department

patrol officers responded to a radio call regarding a silver minivan that had just been

involved in a narcotics transaction. The officers initiated a traffic stop and approached

the minivan, observing that there were two occupants in the front seat and another

individual in the back seat, later identified as Hardy. When questioned by the officers,

the front passenger could not produce identification and he gave inconsistent

information about his age. The officers then asked the front passenger to accompany

them to their patrol car, while Hardy and the driver remained in the minivan. As the

officers continued talking with the front passenger, they observed Hardy moving from

the back seat to the front seat.

Several minutes later, an officer in the canine unit arrived to perform a dog sniff

on the minivan. The canine officer asked the driver and Hardy to step out of the

automobile, and he attempted to perform pat-down searches on both occupants after

they exited. Before Hardy could be patted down, however, he took off running with

the officers in close pursuit. When the officers caught up to Hardy several blocks

away, he was holding a gun in his right hand. 

II.

Hardy’s motion to suppress argued that the attempted pat-down search was not

justified. On an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States

v. Lopez-Vargas, 457 F.3d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 2006). “A police officer may search an

individual’s outer clothing to discover weapons when the officer reasonably believes

that the individual may be armed and dangerous.” United States v. Ward, 23 F.3d

1303, 1306 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). We view the

facts supporting a protective frisk under an objective standard, looking at the totality

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of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search. United States v.

Ellis, 501 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Several facts objectively justified the initial safety-related search in this case. 

First, the officers suspected that at least one of the minivan’s occupants had just

committed a narcotics crime. Based on their experience, the officers reasonably could

have concluded that those who commit narcotics crimes might also be carrying

weapons. See Ward, 23 F.3d at 1306 (stating that the analysis must give due weight

to reasonable inferences that law enforcement officers may draw based on their

experience); see also United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997) (“It

is reasonable for an officer to believe that an individual may be armed and dangerous

when that individual is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction because

‘weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions.’”) (citing

United States v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1990)). Second, the presence of

three individuals in the minivan likely made it more difficult for the officers to

maintain control of the situation, thus heightening the risk to officer safety. See

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (“[D]anger to an officer from a traffic

stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the

stopped car.”). Third, Hardy was observed moving around inside the vehicle, which

one of the officers testified was very unusual. In these circumstances, the officers had

an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Hardy may have been armed and

dangerous, and thus the pat-down was warranted. 

 

Moreover, even if the pat-down search had been improper, suppression of the

evidence would not be required because the gun was not obtained as a result of the

attempted search. The officers located the weapon only after Hardy fled from the

officers, pulled the gun from his pocket, and held it within view. Although Hardy

argues that his flight was a predictable result of the search, he has failed to explain

how the officers’ conduct could have possibly caused him to display a weapon he was

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trying to hide. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying

Hardy’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm.

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

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