Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01198/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01198-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Don Riding
Defendant
Satinderpal Singh
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SATINDERPAL SINGH, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

DON RIDING, Field Office )

Director, U.S. Citizenship )

and Immigration Services, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-1198 OWW/SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS (Doc. 16) AND

DISMISSING ACTION AS MOOT 

On August 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for

Declaratory Judgment and Injunction against Don Riding, Field

Office Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen and national of

India; that Plaintiff was granted asylum on July 21, 1999 by an

Immigration Judge; that, on “September 18, 2000, 1998", Plaintiff

filed an application to adjust status under INA § 209(b), 8

U.S.C. § 1159(b), with USCIS’s predecessor, the INS, at Lincoln,

Nebraska; that, on October 20, 2005, Defendant exercised

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jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s application to adjust status and

conducted an administrative interview at the Fresno Office; and

that Defendant has filed and continues to fail to adjudicate

Plaintiff’s application. The Complaint prays for declaratory and

injunctive relief:

1. Declaring that defendant has unlawfully

withheld and delayed adjudication of

Plaintiff’s application to adjust status;

2. Enjoining Defendant to complete his

review and adjudication of Plaintiff’s

application to adjust status forthwith;

3. Awarding plaintiff costs and reasonable

attorney fees incurred in this action.

4. Granting such other and further relief as

may be appropriate. 

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint as moot. Attached

to Defendant’s motion is a copy of the December 11, 2007 decision

denying Plaintiff’s application to adjust status:

On September 22, 2000, the applicant,

Satinderpal Singh, filed the Form I-485,

Application to Register Permanent Residence

or Adjust Status, under Section 209(b) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended

(‘The Act’). The applicant is a 31-year-old

native and citizen of India. The applicant

last entered the United States in August of

2007.

The applicant is seeking adjustment of status

to legal permanent residence pursuant to

Section 209(b) of the Act. Section 209(b) of

the Act provides in pertinent part:

The Secretary of Homeland Security

or the Attorney General in the

Secretary’s or the Attorney

General’s discretion and under such

regulations as the Secretary or the

Attorney General may prescribe, may

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adjust to the status of an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent

residence the status of any alien

granted asylum ....

Furthermore, Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the

Act provides in pertinent part:

In General - Any alien who, by

fraud or wilfully misrepresenting a

material fact seeks to procure (or

has sought to procure or has

procured) a visa, other

documentation, or admission into

the United States or other benefits

provided under this Act is

inadmissible.

Review of the record reveals the applicant

filed for asylum on December 11, 1998. The

applicant orally testified at his asylum

interview and submitted written statements in

his asylum application that he was not a

member of Barba Khalsa International, but

that he had supported them. It should be

noted that Barba Khalsa International appears

on the Department of State’s Terrorist

Exclusion List. Therefore, this claim for

asylum was not granted as the applicant is

barred by statute from a grant of asylum due

to evidence the applicant engaged in

terrorist activities. The applicant was

referred to the Immigration Judge on January

30, 1999 on the grounds on having engaged in

support of terrorist activity.

The applicant further testified that in March

of 1992 the applicant allowed militants of

Barba Khalsa to stay in his fields where he

provided them with food and water. He stated

that he was not forced to provide them with

such support, that he did so freely and

willingly because he supported their cause to

establish an independent Khalistan. As a

result of such actions, the applicant was

allegedly persecuted by local government

authorities.

The applicant was interviewed on October 20,

2005 and again on November 18, 2007 in

regards the filed adjustment of status

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application. The applicant was placed under

oath at both of these proceedings. During

the interview of November 14, 2007, the

applicant was asked about his involvement

with Barba Khalsa and his testimony given

during his asylum interview on January 6,

1999. The applicant stated he had never been

a member of, or has never been affiliated in

any way with Barba Khalsa such as

volunteering, recruiting members for,

fundraising, providing services free of

charge, providing food or shelter, or

transportation. However, this statement

under oath on November 14, 2007 directly

contradicts the applicant’s statement during

the asylum interview on January 6, 1999. We

find the applicant has therefore given false

statements under oath in an attempt to

procure a benefit under the Immigration and

Nationality Act.

In addition, Title 8 Code of Federal

Regulations 209.2 does not contemplate that

all aliens who meet the required legal

standards will be granted adjustment of

status to that of a lawful permanent

resident, since the grant of an application

for adjustment is a matter of discretion and

of administrative grace, not mere

ineligibility. An applicant has the burden

of showing that discretion should be

exercised in his favor.

Where adverse facts are present in any given

application for adjustment of status, it may

be necessary for the applicant to offset

these by showing unusual or even outstanding

equities. Generally, favorable factors such

as family ties, hardship, and length of

residence in the United States can be

considered as countervailing factors meriting

the favorable exercise of administrative

discretion. In the absence of adverse

factors, adjustment will ordinarily be

granted, still as a matter of discretion. 

However, an absence of major adverse factors

alone does not warrant the grant of

adjustment of status.

Additionally, the Attorney General in Matter

of Jean, 23 I&N Dec 373 (A.G. 2002), stated:

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‘From its inception, the United States has

always been a nation of immigrants; it is one

of our greatest strengths. But aliens

arriving at our shores must understand that

residency in the United States is a

privilege, not a right.’

The applicant has little positive equities in

the United States. The applicant is single

and has no children. Any positive equities

the applicant may have, are not sufficiently

meritorious to outweigh the negative factors

listed above. Thus, the applicant has not

overcome the burden of demonstrating to USCIS

that he warrants a favorable exercise of

discretion.

For this reason, your application for

adjustment of status is denied as a matter of

discretion.

Plaintiff argues that the Complaint is not moot because

Defendant’s responsibility to adjudicate the application to

adjust status implies that he is required to do so lawfully. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant has not done so. Plaintiff

asserts that, if appropriate, he will amend the Complaint to

allege that Defendant has not lawfully adjudicated the

application and amend the prayer to seek lawful adjudication of

the application. 

The issue is whether Defendant’s decision denying

Plaintiff’s application to adjust status is judicially

reviewable. Defendant argues that it is not and Plaintiff argues

that it is. 

Defendant argues that judicial review is barred by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Section 1252(a)(2)(B) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law

(statutory or nonstatutory), including

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section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas

corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651

of such title, and except as provided in

subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether

the judgment, decision, or action is made in

removal proceedings, no court shall have

jurisdiction to review -

(i) any judgment regarding the 

granting of relief under section 1182(h),

1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title,

or

(ii) any other decision or action

of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security, other than the granting of

relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1255 pertains to the adjustment of status of a

nonimmigrant to that of a person admitted for permanent

residence.

Here, Plaintiff did not apply for adjustment of status under

Section 1255. Rather, Plaintiff, who has been granted asylum

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158, applied for adjustment of status

under 8 U.S.C. § 1159. 

Section Section 1159(a) sets forth the criteria and

procedures applicable for admission as an immigrant for an alien

who has been admitted to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1157. 

Section 1159(b), upon which Plaintiff relies, provides in

pertinent part:

The Secretary of Homeland Security or the

Attorney General, in the Secretary’s or the

Attorney General’s discretion and under such

regulations as the Secretary or the Attorney

General may prescribe, may adjust to the

status of an alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence the status of any alien

granted asylum who -

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(1) applies for such adjustment,

(2) has been physically present in the United

States for at least one year after being

granted asylum,

(3) continues to be a refugee within the

meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this

title ...,

(4) is not firmly resettled in any foreign

country, and

(5) is admissible (except as otherwise

provided under subsection (c) of this

section) as an immigrant under this chapter

at the time of examination for adjustment of

such alien.

8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) provides:

The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and

(7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title shall

not be applicable to any alien seeking

adjustment of status under this section, and

the Secretary of Homeland Security or the

Attorney General may waive any other

provision of such section (other than

paragraph (2)(C) or subparagraph (A), (B),

(C), or (E) of paragraph (3)) with respect to

such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to

assure family unity, or when it is otherwise

in the public interest.

8 C.F.R. § 209.2 pertains to the adjustment of status of aliens

granted asylum. Section 209.2(a) sets forth the requirements

for eligibility for adjustment of status. Section 209.2(f)

provides in pertinent part:

No appeal shall lie from the denial of an

application by the director but such denial

will be without prejudice to the alien’s

right to renew the application in proceedings

under part 240 of this chapter. 

8 C.F.R. Part 240 pertains to proceedings to determine

removability of aliens in the United States. 

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Plaintiff argues that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not bar

judicial review of the denial of his application to adjust

status. Plaintiff contends that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) grants

discretionary authority to adjust the status of an alien who is,

inter alia, admissible as an immigrant at the time of examination

for adjustment of status. Plaintiff asserts:

Defendant found that plaintiff was

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 212(a)(6)(C)(i). 

Thus, the Complaint herein does not challenge

a discretionary decision by defendant [sic]. 

Defendant does not have the authority to

exercise discretion because he determined

that plaintiff was inadmissible and therefore

ineligible for the discretionary relief of

adjustment of status. Rather, the complaint

seeks review [sic] of whether defendant

committed legal error in the determination

that, according to defendant, rendered him

ineligible for adjustment of status, an issue

reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 702. 

Plaintiff contends that the issue of whether Defendant lawfully

adjudicated his application to adjust status from that of an

asylee to that of a lawful permanent resident is a final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy

“notwithstanding 8 C.F.R. 209(f) because Plaintiff is not

removable.”

At the hearing, Defendant conceded that Plaintiff’s

application for adjustment of status under Section 1159 is not

statutorily prohibited from judicial review by Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 

There is no question that a district court does not have

jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of adjustment of

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status under Section 1255. See Onikoyi v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1,

3 (1 Cir.2006); Hadwani v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 798, 800 (5 Cir. st th

2006) and cases cited therein.

In Singh v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 156 (1 Cir.2005), Singh, st

citizen of India, entered the United States without being

admitted or paroled on October 31, 1997. In January 1998, Singh

filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his

application, he claimed persecution on account of his Sikh

religion and his involvement with the Akali Dal Mann Party, a

Sikh political organization. At hearings before the INS in San

Francisco, Singh provided evidence that he was twice beaten and

arrested by the Indian police because of his involvement with the

Akali Dal Mann Party and alleged that Indian authorities

continued to seek him after he left India and that he would be

harmed or killed if he returned. 413 F.3d at 157-158. The IJ

determined that Singh’s testimony was not credible and that the

documentary evidence did not sustain Singh’s burden. Id. at 158. 

The IJ denied all applications and ordered Singh removed to

India. Singh appealed to the BIA. During the pendency of the

appeal, Singh moved to Massachusetts and received an approved I140 form filed on his behalf by the owner of a restaurant at

which Singh was allegedly a cook. In 2002, Singh filed a motion

with BIA seeking remand of his case to the IJ in Boston so that

he could file an application for adjustment of status under 8

U.S.C. § 1255(i). Id. The BIA granted the motion. An

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immigration hearing was held in Boston in 2003 to consider

Singh’s application for adjustment of status. The Boston IJ

found that Singh had provided false testimony and information

both in connection with his application for asylum before the San

Francisco IJ and adjustment of status before the Boston IJ and

that, therefore, he was inadmissible to the United States

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Based on this finding

of inadmissibility, the IJ denied Singh’s application for

adjustment of status. On appeal, the First Circuit ruled in

pertinent part that federal courts have jurisdiction to review

the denial of an application for adjustment of status under a

limited circumstance:

The United States correctly does not

challenge our jurisdiction to review the

denial of the application for adjustment

status under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 

This provision limits judicial review of

discretionary denials of adjustment of status

applications. In this case, the IJ denied

Singh’s application based on a finding that

he did not meet the statutory prerequisite of

admissibility. This is not a discretionary

denial; it is mandated by statute. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252 does not limit our review over these

types of denials.

413 F.3d at 160 n.4.

In Onikoyi v. Gonzales, supra, 454 F.3d 1, Onikoyi, a

citizen of Nigeria, first entered the United States with his wife

in 1981 and overstayed his visa. Onikoyi was deported under an

alias in 1986 and later illegally reentered the United States. 

Onikoyi then applied for adjustment of status under the

government’s amnesty program. Onikoyi did not inform the INS

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that he had been previously deported, which would have signaled

that he was ineligible for adjustment of status. In 1990, the

INS adjusted Onikoyi’s status to that of permanent lawful

resident. In 1993, Onikoyi was arrested for theft, which arrest

alerted the INS that Onikoyi had previously been deported under

an alias. Onikoyi was charged and convicted of illegal reentry. 

In 1994, the INS issued an Order to Show Cause charging him with

deportability based on the conviction and his illegal status. 

While the deportation proceedings were pending, Onikoyi’s wife

became a citizen. She filed an I-230 spousal petition on his

behalf so that he could seek adjustment of status. During his

deportation hearing, Onikoyi applied for adjustment of status and

discretionary waiver of inadmissibility. In 2004, the

Immigration Judge and later the BIA denied his application for

adjustment of status and waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of

discretion, emphasizing that Onikoyi had deceived government

officials on several occasions and that the equities were not in

his favor. 454 F.3d at 2. The First Circuit held that it did

not have jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of

adjustment of status, noting that it did have jurisdiction

pursuant to Singh v. Gonzales, supra, to review whether an

applicant is statutorily ineligible for discretionary relief. 

454 F.3d at 3. The First Circuit held:

Onikoyi attempts to cast the arguments in his

petition for review as questions of law,

rather than challenges to the IJ’s

discretionary determinations in his case. He

argues that the IJ found him statutorily

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ineligible for discretionary relief and that

she ‘erred as a matter of law’ by denying him

a waiver of inadmissibility, determining that

he had not demonstrated extreme hardship to

his citizen spouse and children and finding

no other favorable equities in his case.

Onikoyi mischaracterizes the IJ’s opinion. 

The IJ made clear, for each form of

discretionary relief she was denying, that

her decision was based on her exercise of

discretion. The IJ did not conclude that

Onikoyi was statutorily ineligible for a

waiver of inadmissibility or adjustment of

status. Instead, the IJ weighed the equities

and explained that ‘[w]hen a person has the

type of criminal history that [Onikoyi] has

and the tendency to lie to authorities

whenever possible, [relief] should not be

granted to him in the proper exercise of this

[c]ourt’s discretion.’ Although the IJ

considered Onikoyi’s arguments regarding the

family hardship, the IJ concluded that

Onikoyi ‘continued to defraud the United

States, and I haven’t heard any excuse ...

[A]ccordingly, respondent’s application for

adjustment of status, the [] waiver, and

permission to return to the United States

after being previously deported are all

hereby denied.’ The BIA adopted and affirmed

the IJ’s decision to deny his applications

for relief ‘as a matter of discretion.’ 

Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to review

the BIA’s affirmance of the discretionary

decision of the IJ in this case.

454 F.3d at 3-4. 

Plaintiff argues that Onikoyi has no application to the

resolution of this motion because Onikoyi did not involve denial

of an application for adjustment of status under Section 1255.

Plaintiff cites no authority that the denial of his

application is judicially reviewable. Although judicial review

is not precluded by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the question arises

whether judicial review is precluded by Section

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1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 

“[I]t is well established in [the Ninth Circuit] that §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ‘applies only to acts over which a statute

gives the Attorney General pure discretion unguided by legal

standards or statutory guidelines,’ ....” Oropeza-Wong v.

Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9 Cir.2005). “For a statutory th

provision to strip [the Ninth Circuit] of jurisdiction under §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the provision must specify that ‘the right or

power to act is entirely within [the Attorney General’s] judgment

or conscience.’” Id., citing Spencer Enterprises., Inc. v. United

States, 345 F.3d 683, 690 (9 Cir.2003). See also San Pedro v. th

Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1156 (9 Cir.2005): th

In Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United

States, 345 F.3d 683 (9 Cir.2003), we held th

that § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) refers to ‘acts the

authority for which is specified under the

INA to be discretionary.’ Id. at 689. The

specified discretion must be pure and

unguided by legal standards. Id. at 689-90. 

Section 237(a)(1)(H)(removal ‘may, in the

discretion of the Attorney General, be waived

for any alien ... who [meets certain

eligibility requirements]’). Although there

are nondiscretionary eligibility elements

that must be met under § 237(a)(1)(H), ‘the

ultimate authority whether to grant [the

waiver] rests entirely in the discretion of

the Attorney General.’ Spencer, 345 F.3d at

690; see also Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999,

1002 (9 Cir.2001). Accordingly, we have th

jurisdiction only to review the statutory

eligibility elements under § 237(a)(1)(H) and

lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary

denial of the waiver. 

Because the discretion accorded by Section 1159(b) is

circumscribed by statutory guidelines, judicial review is not

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precluded by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 

Consequently, a limited judicial review of the denial of

Plaintiff’s application is not precluded by statute or case law.

At the hearing, however, Plaintiff advised that he has moved

to reopen his application to adjust status on the ground that his

misprepresentation was not material and to have the ground for

his inadmissibility waived. Because of the pending motion to

reopen, any judicial review is premature. The most efficient way

in which to proceed is to dismiss as moot this action as moot

without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing a subsequent action for

judicial review, if appropriate, after Plaintiff’s motion to

reopen is resolved. Requiring Plaintiff to amend the Complaint

to seek judicial review and then hold the action in abeyance

pending resolution of the motion to reopen is inefficient and

unjustified.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. Counsel for Defendant shall prepare and lodge a form of

order setting forth the ruling in this Memorandum Decision within

five (5) court days following the date of service of this

decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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