Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06096/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Erdal Aslan
Appellant
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ERDAL ASLAN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-6096 

(D.C. No. 5:13-CV01319-M) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Erdal Aslan applied for disability benefits, claiming that a car accident had left 

him disabled. An administrative law judge disagreed. At step three of the sequential 

process for evaluating disability claims, the ALJ found that Mr. Aslan’s impairments did 

not meet or equal any of the listings for presumptive disability. See Wall v. Astrue, 

561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining the five-step process). At step four, the 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

February 19, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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ALJ found that, given his residual functional capacity, Mr. Aslan was unable to perform 

his past relevant work. But at the fifth and final step, the ALJ employed the MedicalVocational Guidelines (the “grids”) to find that Mr. Aslan was not disabled. See

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, §§ 201.28, 201.29. Mr. Aslan appealed, but the Social 

Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied review, and a district court later 

affirmed. Now before us, Mr. Aslan says there are three reasons why we must reverse. 

First, he argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find him disabled at step three 

based on his spinal arachnoiditis and abnormal spinal curvature. At step three, the 

ALJ must consider and explain whether the claimant’s condition meets or equals any 

of the listed impairments deemed presumptively disabling. See Clifton v. Chater, 

79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). In support of his position, Mr. Aslan directs us 

to Listing 1.04, which concerns certain disorders of the spine. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.04. The problem is that Mr. Aslan fails to direct our attention to 

any medical records confirming he suffers from spinal arachnoiditis. See id. 

§ 1.00(K)(2)(b) (“[C]are must be taken to ensure that the diagnosis is documented as 

described in 1.04B.”); id. § 1.04(B) (providing that spinal arachnoiditis must be 

“confirmed by an operative note or pathology report of tissue biopsy, or by 

appropriate medically acceptable imaging”). Mr. Aslan also fails to cite any medical 

records showing that any curvature in his spine causes “impaired ambulation” or 

“adversely affect[s] functioning in body systems other than [his] musculoskeletal 

system.” Id. § 1.00(L). Because Mr. Aslan fails to satisfy all of the criteria in these 

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two listings, he cannot prevail at step three as a matter of law. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 

493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). 

 Second, Mr. Aslan argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity 

determination is unsupported by substantial evidence. In particular, he complains that the 

consultative examiner, Dr. Robin Hall, did not have his previous medical records when 

conducting his exam and that the ALJ accepted Dr. Hall’s findings over those of other 

experts, including his treating physician, Dr. Jeri Ellis. But Mr. Aslan does not indicate 

how any missing medical records would have affected Dr. Hall’s analysis. Neither does 

he identify any conflict between Dr. Hall’s findings and those of any other physician, 

including Dr. Ellis. For instance, Dr. Hall noted reduced ranges of motion in Mr. Aslan’s 

back and right hip. But Dr. Ellis also noted similar reduced ranges of motion. Moreover, 

as the district court observed, Dr. Ellis’s suggested work restrictions aligned “almost 

exactly” with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination. See R. vol. I, at 69. 

After examining the record, we conclude the ALJ’s determination is neither 

“overwhelmed by other evidence in the record” nor a “mere conclusion.” Grogan v. 

Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted). 

 Finally, Mr. Aslan argues the ALJ erred at step five in relying on the grids — a set 

of rules that identify whether a claimant is disabled by comparing his personal 

characteristics to the criteria of specific rules — without consulting a vocational expert. 

The problem Mr. Aslan faces is that an ALJ may rely exclusively on the grids if the 

claimant “possesses [the] physical capacities equal to the strength requirements for most

of the jobs” within a range of work, e.g., sedentary work. Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 

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577, 580 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Nonexertional impairments, moreover, 

“preclude[] reliance on the grids only to the extent that such impairments limit the range 

of jobs available to the claimant.” Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 807-08 (10th Cir. 

1988). Here, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Aslan could perform “a very wide range of 

semi-skilled, sedentary work.” R. vol. II, at 26 (emphasis added). And after finding that 

Mr. Aslan’s daily activities were inconsistent with his allegations of pain, migraines, and 

depression, id. at 28-29, the ALJ also concluded that Mr. Aslan’s nonexertional 

impairments would “have little or no effect on” his ability to do sedentary work, id. at 31. 

We thus conclude that the ALJ did not err in relying on the grids at step five to find that 

Mr. Aslan was not disabled. 

 Affirmed. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Neil M. Gorsuch 

Circuit Judge 

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