Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01492/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01492-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jake Kelly
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 15-1492

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

JAKE KELLY, 

 Appellant

_____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 2-04-cr-00605-001)

District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 16, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: October 5, 2016)

____________

OPINION*

____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Jake Kelly appeals from the District Court’s order entered on November 24, 2014, 

denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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On appeal, Kelly raises three issues: (1) whether the District Court applied the correct 

standard for demonstrating prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984); (2) whether the District Court previously found that Kelly had met a more 

stringent “probability-of-acquittal” standard, and thus, under the law of the case doctrine, 

he necessarily met the lower prejudice standard under Strickland; and (3) whether the 

District Court should make certain credibility findings and decide in the first instance 

whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland. For the reasons that 

follow, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

I.

We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 

disposition. Kelly is currently serving a mandatory minimum 180-month sentence of 

incarceration for one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was 

arrested during an “open inspection” of Café Breezes, a bar in Philadelphia, around 1:00 

a.m. on May 1, 2004. During the inspection, a group of approximately nineteen police 

officers entered Café Breezes with the purpose of checking whether the bar maintained 

the proper licenses and to determine whether underage drinking, narcotics sales, or other 

criminal activity was taking place. Kelly, one of the bar’s patrons, was sitting on a bar 

stool near the front door. At some point during the inspection, a gun fell to the floor next 

to Kelly. He was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 

At trial, the Government’s only evidence as to Kelly’s possession of the gun was 

the testimony of police officer Donna Stewart. Officer Stewart testified that, during that 

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inspection, she saw a gun fall from Kelly’s lap when he stood up from his bar stool.

Officer Stewart, who was standing behind Kelly, noticed him “sweating,” “fidgeting,” 

and “leaned over, crunched over in his seat with his hands below the bar where [she] 

couldn’t see them.” Appendix (“App.”) 136, 149-50. She then walked to the other side 

of the bar to speak to another officer. When Officer Stewart returned to her spot behind 

Kelly, she saw him reach “very quickly towards his waist.” Id. at 139. At that point, 

Officer Stewart “stepped forward, . . . put [her] hand on [Kelly’s] shoulder and grabbed 

his right wrist.” Id. at 139. She told him, “Nobody was speaking to you, nobody asked 

you for your ID, place your other hand on the bar.” Id. It was then, she testified, that 

Kelly stood up and “the gun fell from his lap and down along his left leg and hit the metal 

chair rail.” Id.

Kelly’s defense counsel did not call any witnesses. On July 21, 2005, the jury 

found Kelly guilty of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. 

In October 2005, Kelly, represented by different counsel, filed a motion for a new 

trial based on newly discovered evidence.1 That new evidence consisted of statements 

allegedly made by Victor Jones, who had been sitting directly next to Kelly at Café 

Breezes on the night of his arrest. Jones was not interviewed by either the Government 

or the defense prior to Kelly’s trial. But on or about July 28, 2005, after hearing that 

 1 Kelly also sought a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 

to interview and present witnesses. The District Court appropriately denied that claim 

without prejudice, indicating that such claims were more appropriately brought through a 

§ 2255 motion. See App. 563-64; United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 512 n.5 (3d 

Cir. 1997) (“We have emphasized our preference that claims of ineffectiveness of 

counsel be raised in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”). 

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Kelly had been convicted, Jones allegedly told his friend Kemahsiah Gant that he, and 

not Kelly, actually “had the gun” that night and that “[w]hen the police came in he got 

nervous and threw it down on the floor.” App. 394.2 Gant, who is friends with Kelly’s 

girlfriend Jacqueline Cephas, waited three weeks before telling Cephas about Jones’s 

comments. Cephas then informed Kelly’s defense attorney. 

At a post-trial evidentiary hearing based on this new evidence, the District Court 

heard testimony from four witnesses: Jones, Gant, Cephas, and police officer Clarence 

Clark. Jones testified as to both his recollection of the night of Kelly’s arrest and his later 

conversation with Gant. Jones testified that his barstool was at the end of the long end of 

the bar, and that Kelly was seated directly to his left at the short end of the bar. Jones 

stated that, during the inspection, someone behind him “brushed into [him]” and put a 

gun in his lap. Jones testified that he pushed the gun off his lap, and it fell onto the floor. 

He believed that the gun he pushed off his lap was the gun for which Kelly was convicted 

of possessing. He did not initially tell the police that he believed that Jones was wrongly 

arrested because he “didn’t want to have anything to do with that.”3

 App. 500. 

 2 Gant later testified at Kelly’s post-trial evidentiary hearing on the new evidence. At that 

hearing, Gant recounted her initial conversation with Jones. Gant testified that Jones told 

her that “it wasn’t [Kelly’s] gun” and that “[Jones] had the gun and threw it on the floor.” 

App. 423. 

3 Jones also testified that, because he saw Kelly after his arrest, he “assumed [the case 

against him] was over.” App. 519. After learning about Kelly’s conviction and sentence, 

and after being contacted by Kelly’s counsel, Jones decided that testifying at the post-trial 

hearing “probably was the right thing to do.” Id. at 520.

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Based on the post-trial testimony and the parties’ submissions, the District Court 

granted Kelly’s motion for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence.4 But a 

panel of our Court reversed. See United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(“Kelly I”). In Kelly I, we held that Kelly failed to demonstrate due diligence — a 

necessary requirement to be granted a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 

evidence.5

 We held that the diligence inquiry requires a district court to consider

“whether the evidence at issue could have been discovered before or at the time of trial 

with the exercise of reasonable diligence on behalf of the defendant and/or his counsel.” 

Kelly I, 539 F.3d at 182. Based on the pre-trial record for Kelly’s case, our Court found 

“absolutely no evidence — nor allegation — of pretrial diligence on Kelly’s behalf.” Id.

at 183. “The record could not be more clear that Kelly made no effort to speak with 

 4 Generally, a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence 

must meet five requirements: 

(a) the evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since the 

trial; (b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on 

the part of the movant; (c) the evidence relied on, must not be merely 

cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to the issues involved; 

and (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly 

discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.

United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976). 

5 In Kelly I, we did not reach the merits of whether Kelly had met the probability-ofacquittal requirement for a new trial because our determination that Kelly failed to meet 

the diligence requirement was dispositive. 

We also emphasize that our holding in Kelly I that Kelly was not reasonably diligent does 

not defeat a later ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Indeed, a lack of due diligence 

by defendant’s counsel would support, and not hinder, a defendant’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim.

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Jones — despite seeing him anywhere from one to twenty times after the arrest . . . . 

[S]uch inaction simply does not qualify as reasonable diligence.” Id. 

Following remand, the District Court sentenced Kelly to 180 months of 

imprisonment, and our Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. United States v. 

Kelly, 406 F. App’x 676 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential) (“Kelly II”). Kelly 

subsequently filed his § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Kelly 

claims that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial 

counsel’s failure to (1) interview prospective defense witnesses; (2) offer evidence of 

defendant’s post-arrest statement;6 (3) otherwise conduct a reasonable investigation; and 

(4) request a “mere presence” jury instruction. The District Court denied the motion, and 

Kelly timely appealed. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction over Kelly’s collateral petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 2255, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).7

 

 6 At some point after the gun fell to the floor, Kelly told the officers that “someone threw 

the gun at [him.]” App. 551. The District Court granted the Government’s motion in

limine to exclude that statement. The District Court’s order, however, was a preliminary 

ruling that provided an opportunity for the defense to develop evidence concerning the 

duration of time between when the statement was made and when the gun was allegedly 

thrown, which could have supported admission of the statement as an excited utterance or 

a statement of present sense impression. Kelly’s trial counsel never revisited this issue to 

seek admission of that statement. See id. 

7 On November 10, 2015, a panel of our Court granted Kelly’s request for a certificate of 

appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) on the questions whether trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to interview prospective defense witnesses and for failing to 

conduct a reasonable investigation (claims 1 and 3 in his § 2255 motion). The panel 

determined that “reasonable jurists would debate whether the District Court was correct 

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“In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we exercise plenary review [over] the district 

court’s legal conclusions and apply the clearly erroneous standard to the court’s factual 

findings.” United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Lambert v. 

Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997)).

III.

Kelly argues that the District Court erred when it denied his ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to conduct a reasonable investigation.8

 

First, Kelly argues that the District Court applied a higher standard of “prejudice” than a 

defendant is required to show for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 

Strickland. Second, Kelly argues that the District Court previously found that he had met 

a higher standard than Strickland prejudice, and thus, under the law of the case doctrine, 

the District Court should have determined that he was prejudiced under Strickland. In 

addition to those two arguments, Kelly requests that we instruct the District Court, on 

remand, to make additional credibility findings and address the Strickland performance 

prong. We will address each argument in turn.

 

in its prejudice analysis. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984).”

8 The District Court also denied Kelly’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on 

the failure of trial counsel to offer evidence of Kelly’s post-arrest statement and the 

failure of trial counsel to request a “mere presence” jury instruction. Kelly does not

discuss either of these denials in his appellate brief. Thus, he has forfeited any challenge 

to the District Court’s denial of those claims. See Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 

1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain 

statements of all issues presented for appeal, together with supporting arguments and 

citations.”).

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A.

Kelly argues that the District Court did not employ the correct standard for 

determining “prejudice” for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland. 

He argues that the District Court used the more stringent “probability-of-acquittal”

standard that defendants must meet to be granted a new trial based on newly discovered 

evidence. 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

that (1) counsel’s conduct was deficient, and (2) the deficiency resulted in prejudice to 

defendant. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; McNeil v. Cuyler, 782 F.2d 443, 447-49 (3d 

Cir. 1986). When assessing prejudice, a court is to determine whether there is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 

“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id.

This reasonable probability standard is less stringent than the probability-ofacquittal standard governing motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 

To be granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show 

that the “newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.” United States 

v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).

9 In Strickland, the 

Supreme Court explicitly recognized the difference between the two standards: 

 9 “Probably” is typically treated as the equivalent of “more likely than not.” See, e.g., 

CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 

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[W]e believe that a defendant need not show that counsel’s 

deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in 

the case. [That] outcome-determinative standard has several 

strengths. It defines the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to 

courts, though the inquiry, as is inevitable, is anything but 

precise. The standard also reflects the profound importance 

of finality in criminal proceedings. Moreover, it comports 

with the widely used standard for assessing motions for new 

trial based on newly discovered evidence. Nevertheless, the 

standard is not quite appropriate.

Even when the specified attorney error results in the omission 

of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence standard 

is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice standard 

for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for newly 

discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential 

elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding

were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. 

An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of 

the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is 

reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the 

appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower. 

The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and 

hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of 

counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 

to have determined the outcome.

466 U.S. at 693-94 (citations omitted). Thus, to establish an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, unlike with a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,

a “defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered 

the outcome in the case.” Id. at 693. A defendant need only show “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

 

333, 366 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 

(3d Cir. 1997). 

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Kelly points to numerous instances where the District Court appears to have used

the stricter standard for a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence

rather than the Strickland prejudice standard. For example, the District Court’s opinion

indicated:

In determining whether counsel’s failure to identify Jones and 

secure his testimony at trial was prejudicial to Kelly, the 

Court must examine Jones’s testimony in light of the “totality 

of evidence at trial.” In doing so, the Court concludes that 

Jones’s testimony was not sufficiently credible that it likely 

would have produced an acquittal, in particular because of the 

numerous inconsistencies between Jones’s testimony and the 

evidence of the record.

App. 26 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the 

District Court again referenced the likelihood of an acquittal based on Jones’s testimony: 

“A jury could not credit both Jones’s testimony and Officer Stewart’s testimony 

regarding the gun and, given the inconsistencies in Jones’s version of events, it is 

unlikely that Jones’s testimony would have resulted in an acquittal.” App. 27 (emphasis 

added). 

The Government argues that, despite the District Court’s multiple references to the 

probability of acquittal, the District Court actually applied the correct legal standard. The 

Government points to the District Court’s conclusion that “there is not a reasonable 

probability that if Jones’s testimony had been introduced at trial, the jury would have 

credited this testimony and acquitted Kelly.” Gov’t Br. 33 (quoting App. 28); see also

App. 25. But an incantation of the correct Strickland standard by the trial court will not 

automatically alleviate our concern that the District Court actually applied the incorrect 

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standard. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Soberal v. United States, 244 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 2001) 

(remanding when the district court may have applied improperly stringent standard when 

it cited the incorrect standard once and the correct standard multiple times). Nor do we 

accept the Government’s argument that because the Supreme Court used the word 

“likely” in Strickland, the District Court did not err in stating the prejudice standard. See

Gov’t Br. 33. In Strickland, the Supreme Court’s precise words were: “[A] court making 

the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the

decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” 466 

U.S. at 696 (emphasis added).

In the case before us, the District Court repeatedly omitted Strickland’s key word: 

“reasonably.” Instead, the District Court’s entire discussion of the inconsistencies 

between Jones’s testimony and Officer Stewart’s trial testimony was framed using the 

incorrect standard. Thus, we cannot be certain as to whether the District Court applied

the “reasonable probability” standard, or another more stringent standard — such as the 

“probability of acquittal” or “more likely than not” standard. 

We note that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that, despite the difference 

between the “reasonable probability” and “more likely than not” standards, this 

difference “should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness claim only in the rarest case.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) 

(“[T]he difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not 

standard is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.’ [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 693, 697. 

The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”). 

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This, however, is the rare case. In the case before us, the District Court previously 

ruled in favor of Kelly on his motion for a new trial, in the context of the “probability-ofacquittal” standard.10 Because of the similar language used in the District Court’s denial 

of Kelly’s collateral petition to that in the order granting Kelly’s motion for a new trial, 

we cannot be certain that the District Court in fact applied the Strickland prejudice

standard. 

This is also the rare case where, based on the record, there might be a “reasonable 

probability” — even if not “more likely than not” — that the jury would have found 

reasonable doubt as to Kelly’s guilt had Jones testified at trial. The District Court found 

inconsistencies between Jones’s testimony and his earlier statement, as well as 

inconsistencies with the testimony of Officers Stewart and Clark. But perhaps those 

inconsistencies would not foreclose a “reasonable probability” that a jury would have 

 10 However, as discussed infra, the District Court’s probability-of-acquittal inquiry when 

ruling on Kelly’s motion for a new trial was flawed. 

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acquitted Kelly.

11 This is a question that we will leave for the District Court to answer in 

the first instance.12 

Therefore, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Kelly’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim based on the failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, and 

we will remand for the District Court to determine, based on the totality of the evidence, 

whether Kelly has demonstrated a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland

466 U.S. at 694.

B.

Kelly next argues that the District Court had previously found that he had met the 

more stringent “probability of acquittal” standard when ruling on his motion for a new 

 11 For example, as the District Court indicated when ruling on Kelly’s motion for a new 

trial: “Jones had a strong motive not to come forward” until after Kelly had been 

convicted, Jones did not stand to benefit from falsely helping Kelly, and Kelly’s excluded 

post-arrest statement is corroborative of Jones’s prospective testimony. App. 574. The

District Court later held that — viewing Jones’s testimony in totality — “it is unlikely

that Jones’s testimony would have resulted in an acquittal.” App. 18 (emphasis added). 

But given the District Court’s earlier findings, we think it is possible that the District 

Court might find a “reasonable probability” that a jury would not have convicted Kelly if 

Jones had testified that he (Jones) threw the gun to the floor. 

12 The Government argues that “Kelly does not challenge the correctness of the district 

court’s decision that he was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.” See

Gov’t Br. 34. Kelly disagrees with the Government’s assertion that he does not challenge 

the finding of prejudice itself. See Reply Br. 2-3. We agree with Kelly and read his 

briefs to be challenging the District Court’s finding of prejudice. 

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trial, and thus, under the law of the case doctrine,

13 the District Court should have found 

that he met the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland inquiry. To support his argument, 

Kelly points to the District Court’s finding, in ruling on his motion for a new trial, that a

“jury is likely to find Jones’s prospective testimony credible,” and that Jones’s testimony 

is “likely to produce an acquittal.” App. 574. The District Court, however, explicitly 

“decline[d] to make . . . a credibility determination [as to Jones’s testimony],” id. at 571, 

but concluded that a jury was likely to find Jones’s prospective testimony credible:

[A] jury is likely to find Jones’s prospective testimony 

credible for, inter alia, the following reasons: First, it is not 

logical for Jones to perjure himself for the boyfriend (Kelly) 

of one of his friends (Cephas). Second, Jones had a strong 

motive not to come forward and to avoid discussing the 

incident until Gant reported that Kelly had been convicted. 

Third, Jones cannot benefit by falsely helping Kelly. Fourth, 

some time after the arrest but while still at the bar, Kelly 

stated ‘someone threw the gun at [him]’ which corroborates 

Jones’s prospective testimony. 

Id. at 574 (alterations in original).

When we previously considered (and reversed) the District Court’s order granting 

Kelly’s motion for a new trial, we indicated that the District Court’s probability-ofacquittal determination was problematic. We noted that if we were to reach the merits of 

the probability-of-acquittal determination, we would remand for the District Court to 

make its own credibility assessment as to Jones’s testimony, as viewed in the context of 

the other evidence in the record. A district court “serve[s] as a gatekeeper to a new trial,” 

 13 “Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, when a court decides upon a rule of law, that 

decision should continue to govern the same issue in subsequent stages of the same case.” 

ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).

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and thus it is for the court to “decid[e] in the first instance whether the defendant’s 

proffered ‘new evidence’ is credible.” Kelly I, 539 F.3d at 189 (quoting United States v. 

McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1167 (10th Cir. 2006)). In making that credibility 

determination, “the district court cannot view the proffered testimony in a vacuum; it 

must weigh the testimony against all of the other evidence in the record, including the 

evidence already weighed and considered by the jury in the defendant’s first trial.” Id.

We noted that, based on the record before us then, we could not “be certain” that the 

District Court made the credibility assessment itself or whether the District Court 

“weighed Jones’s testimony against the testimony presented at Kelly’s first trial.” Id. at 

190. 

Kelly I makes clear that the District Court did not necessarily find that Kelly met 

the probability-of-acquittal standard. And even assuming, arguendo, that the District 

Court found Jones’s testimony to be credible, it is not enough to consider the “proffered 

evidence in a vacuum.” Id. at 189. For both newly discovered evidence claims and 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, courts are to consider the totality of the evidence 

before a judge or jury. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“[A] court hearing an 

ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or 

jury.”); Kelly I, 539 F.3d at 189 (noting that for newly discovered evidence claims, a 

court “must weigh the testimony against all of the other evidence in the record, including 

the evidence already weighed and considered by the jury in the defendant’s first trial”). 

As we indicated in Kelly I, the District Court had not clearly demonstrated that it 

weighed Jones’s testimony with the other evidence offered at trial, and as a result, its 

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probability-of-acquittal determination was flawed. Therefore, we reject Kelly’s argument 

that, under the law of the case doctrine, the District Court previously found him to meet

the higher probability-of-acquittal standard. 

C.

Finally, Kelly argues that the District Court should be instructed on remand to (1) 

make credibility findings as to the testimony of Kelly and his trial counsel, and then (2) 

decide in the first instance whether Kelly has shown trial counsel’s performance to be 

deficient under Strickland. Although we are remanding to the District Court to reexamine whether Kelly was prejudiced under Strickland, we will not instruct the District 

Court to make credibility findings as to counsel and Kelly, or necessarily reach the 

performance prong on Strickland. The Supreme Court has instructed: 

[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 

assistance claim to . . . address both components of the 

inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 

one. In particular, a court need not determine whether 

counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 

deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 

grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 

should be followed.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. If the District Court on remand determines that Kelly has not 

demonstrated a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694, then the District Court 

need not reach the performance prong of Strickland. Of course, if the District Court were 

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17

to find that Kelly has demonstrated prejudice, then it should make all necessary 

credibility findings and evaluate trial counsel’s performance.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying 

Kelly’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and 

we will remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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