Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04418/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04418-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent
Marekegn Asfaw Tamenut
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

Michael B. Mukasey has been appointed Attorney General, and is substituted

as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4418

___________

Marekegn Asfaw Tamenut, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an Order

v. * of the Board of Immigration

* Appeals. 

Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney *

General of the United States of * [PUBLISHED]

America,1 *

*

Respondent. * 

___________

Submitted: July 19, 2007

Filed: March 11, 2008

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, BEAM, MURPHY, BYE, RILEY,

MELLOY, SMITH, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD,

Circuit Judges, en banc.

___________

PER CURIAM.

The question before the en banc court is whether this court has jurisdiction over

a petition for review filed by Marekegn Asfaw Tamenut challenging the decision of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) not to reopen sua sponte proceedings

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relating to Tamenut’s removal from the United States. We conclude that the decision

whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is committed to the BIA’s

discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), and that we lack jurisdiction to review the

agency’s discretionary decision. We therefore dismiss the petition for review. 

I.

Section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that “[a]n

immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the . . . deportability of an

alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1); see 8 C.F.R. pt. 1240. The decision of an immigration

judge (IJ) that an alien is removable may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.1(b)(2), 1240.15. The BIA “function[s] as an appellate body charged with

the review of . . . administrative adjudications.” Id. § 1003.1(d). 

In a removal proceeding, an alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings.

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion to reopen must be

filed within ninety days of the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion must “state the new facts

that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). 

The governing regulations also provide that the BIA may reopen proceedings

on its own motion. The relevant provision states in full:

(a) General. The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its

own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. A request to

reopen or reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the

Board, which request is made by the Service, or by the party affected by

the decision, must be in the form of a written motion to the Board. The

decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the

discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The

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The provision authorizing the BIA to reopen proceedings at any time on its

own motion originally was promulgated by the Attorney General in 1958, 23 Fed.

Reg. 9,118 (Nov. 26, 1958), pursuant to a statute declaring that “[t]he Attorney

General shall establish such regulations, . . . and perform such other acts as he deems

necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of [the INA].”

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 163, 173

(1952).

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Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving

has made out a prima facie case for relief. 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (first emphasis added). The present version of this regulation

was promulgated in 1996, pursuant to statutory authority providing that the Attorney

General “shall establish such regulations, . . . review such administrative

determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such

other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this

section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2).2

On March 30, 1998, Tamenut filed an application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. On October 22, 1999, an

IJ denied the application. On March 28, 2003, the BIA affirmed without opinion.

Tamenut filed a petition for review, which a panel of this court denied. Tamenut v.

Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 

The BIA received Tamenut’s first motion to reopen on June 7, 2004, and denied

it as untimely on August 20, 2004. On October 4, 2005, the BIA received Tamenut’s

second motion to reconsider and reopen. This motion also requested that the BIA

reopen the proceedings on its own motion. On November 21, 2005, the BIA denied

Tamenut’s motion as untimely. The BIA acknowledged it retained “limited

discretionary powers” under § 1003.2(a) to reopen proceedings on its own motion, but

stated that this power is confined to “exceptional situations,” and concluded that

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Tamenut’s situation did not merit this relief. (R. 2) (citing Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N

Dec. 976 (BIA 1997)).

Tamenut filed a petition for review, arguing that the BIA abused its discretion

by declining to reopen sua sponte, and that the BIA’s decision violated the Due

Process Clause. A panel of this court concluded that if it “were writing on a clean

slate,” then it “probably would conclude that we lack jurisdiction,” Tamenut v.

Gonzales, 477 F.3d 580, 581 (8th Cir. 2007), but determined that it was bound by

Recio-Prado v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 819, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2006), and Ghasemimehr

v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1160, 1162 (8th Cir. 2005), to hold that the BIA’s refusal to

reopen sua sponte is subject to judicial review. The panel then concluded that the BIA

did not abuse its discretion or violate Tamenut’s constitutional rights, and thus denied

the petition for review. Tamenut, 477 F.3d at 582. A dissenting judge would have

dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 582-83 (Riley, J., dissenting).

We granted rehearing en banc to consider the jurisdictional question.

II.

This court has jurisdiction to review all final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1), (b). Although the statute does not mention orders denying motions to

reopen or reconsider, we have held that the grant of jurisdiction extends to review of

these decisions. See Esenwah v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 2004); De

Jimenez v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 783, 788-89 (8th Cir. 2004). We adopted the view of

the Seventh Circuit that “Congress has not clearly expressed an intent to depart from

the long line of Supreme Court and appellate court decisions interpreting ‘order of

deportation’ to include orders denying motions to reconsider and reopen.” See id. at

789 (quoting Chow v. INS, 113 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1997)). In considering the

scope of § 1252(a)(1), we do not perceive a material difference between the BIA’s

decision to deny a party’s motion to reopen and the BIA’s decision to refuse a party’s

request that the agency reopen proceedings on its own motion. Thus, to the extent the

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BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte is not committed to agency discretion,

we would have jurisdiction to review the decision pursuant to § 1252.

There is a “basic presumption of judicial review” of final agency action,

Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993), but this presumption may be overridden

in certain circumstances. The Administrative Procedure Act declares that its

provisions for judicial review do not apply when (1) a statute precludes judicial

review, or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C.

§ 701(a). The INA does include a statutory provision that precludes judicial review

of decisions by the Attorney General (other than the granting of relief under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)), which are specified under subchapter II of the INA to be in the discretion

of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Because the INA does not

specifically address the Attorney General’s authority to reopen proceedings on his

own motion, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude judicial review of the BIA’s refusal

to reopen sua sponte. Even where a jurisdiction-stripping statute does not preclude

review of a particular agency action, however, we must still consider whether that

agency action is “committed to agency discretion by law” under § 701(a)(2) of the

APA. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); see, e.g., Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367

F.3d 975, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2004); Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir.

2006).

The “committed to agency discretion” exception is a “very narrow exception”

that “is applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad

terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’” Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 26

(1945)), abrogated on other grounds byCalifano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).

The Supreme Court has explained that “review is not to be had if the statute is drawn

so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the

agency’s exercise of discretion.” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. The application of the

“committed to agency discretion” exception to judicial review “requires careful

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examination of the statute on which the claim of agency illegality is based.” Webster

v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988). In conducting this examination, we consider “both

the nature of the administrative action at issue and the language and structure of the

statute that supplies the applicable legal standards for reviewing that action.”

Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation omitted). The absence of any statutory factors to guide the

agency’s decision-making process, in combination with the open-ended nature of the

inquiry, generally supports the conclusion that the “agency action is committed to

agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard

Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 455 (1979); State of North Dakota v. Yeutter, 914

F.2d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 1990).

Ten courts of appeals, finding no meaningful standard against which to judge

the agency’s exercise of discretion, have held that the BIA’s decision whether to

reopen proceedings on its own motion is committed to agency discretion by law. Luis

v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1999); Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.

2006); Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2003); Doh v.

Gonzales, 193 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Enriquez-Alvarado v.

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 246, 248-50 (5th Cir. 2004); Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410-

11 (6th Cir. 2004); Pilch v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 585, 586 (7th Cir. 2003); Ekimian v.

INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002); Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000-01

(10th Cir. 2003); Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). We now reach

the same conclusion. 

The statute governing motions to reopen speaks only to motions filed by a

party; it does not establish any standard to guide the agency’s discretion whether to

reopen on its own motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). The regulation establishing the

BIA’s authority to reopen sua sponte was promulgated pursuant to a general grant of

regulatory authority that sets no standards for this decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g).

The regulation itself, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), provides no guidance as to the BIA’s

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appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors for the BIA to consider in deciding

whether to reopen sua sponte, places no constraints on the BIA’s discretion, and

specifies no standards for a court to use to cabin the BIA’s discretion. See Interstate

Commerce Comm’n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987);

South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that the

“committed to agency discretion” exception applies only where statutes do not

“provide even minimal guidance to limit agency discretion”). The use of permissive

and discretionary language in the first sentence of § 1003.2(a) further supports the

inference that the agency action is unreviewable. See Southern Ry., 442 U.S. at 456;

Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

We are mindful that the BIA has said it may reopen proceedings on its own

motion in “exceptional situations,” In re J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 984, and that agency

decisions about the presence of “exceptional circumstances,” a similar phrase, are

reviewable for abuse of discretion in some contexts, such as where the phrase is

further defined by statute or regulation. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (“The term

‘exceptional circumstances’ refers to exceptional circumstances (such as battery or

extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the

alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not

including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.”). We agree

with other circuits, however, that there is no statutory, regulatory, or case-law

definition of “exceptional situation” applicable to the BIA’s sua sponte power under

§ 1003.2(a), e.g., Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1159, and that the use of the permissive term

“may” in the regulation further implies that the BIA is under no obligation to reopen

any particular case. Enriquez-Alvarado, 371 F.3d at 249-50. Assuming that a settled

course of adjudication could establish a meaningful standard by which to measure the

agency’s future exercise of discretion, the mere fact that the BIA has acknowledged

the existence of its authority to reopen sua sponte in what it deems to be “exceptional

situations” is not sufficient to establish a meaningful standard for judging whether the

BIA is required to reopen proceedings on its own motion. See Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d

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at 474-75. Therefore, we hold that the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings

on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion

by law.

Although this court lacks jurisdiction over Tamenut’s challenge to the BIA’s

decision not to reopen sua sponte, we generally do have jurisdiction over any

colorable constitutional claim. See Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 411 (8th Cir.

2007); Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001). See generally

Webster, 486 U.S. at 603; Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109. To be colorable, a constitutional

claim must have “some possible validity.” Torres-Aguilar, 246 F.3d at 1271.

Tamenut argues that the BIA violated the Due Process Clause by

misinterpreting BIA precedent and failing to consider all of the relevant circumstances

of Tamenut’s case. We think these contentions are simply “cloaking an abuse of

discretion argument in constitutional garb,” Onyinkwa v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 797, 799

n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Torres-Aguilar, 246 F.3d at 1271), and are thus

insufficient to justify judicial review. The Due Process Clause guarantees that

removal proceedings will be “fundamentally fair.” Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d

461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004). Tamenut quarrels with the BIA’s fact-specific discretionary

decision whether to reopen his case, but he points to nothing that calls into doubt the

fundamental fairness of the procedures employed.

For these reasons, we join ten other circuits in concluding that the BIA’s

decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)

is committed to agency discretion by law. We also conclude that Tamenut has not

advanced a colorable claim that the BIA violated his constitutional rights.

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review.

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Or, perhaps, Sophie Tucker's verse in the 1927 song "Fifty Million Frenchmen

Can't Be Wrong," an observation proven grossly inaccurate when France constructed

the Maginot Line to defend itself from invasion by Germany at the outset of World

War II. Sophie Tucker-Free Music Downloads, etc.,

http://www.artistdirect.com/nad/window/media/page/0,,253277-812683-

WMLO,00.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). This defensive line was generally

considered one of the great failures of military history. 7 The New Encyclopedia

Britannica 672-73 (16th ed. 1998).

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BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Based upon an analysis under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, I believe we have jurisdiction

over a petition for review challenging the BIA's decision not to reopen the record sua

sponte in a removal proceeding. Therefore, I write separately in dissent. 

The old adage "don't think you're on the right road just because it's a wellbeaten path," is applicable here.3

 In this case, I choose a different path from that taken

by the en banc court and many circuits–one that is not new, but just a little less

traveled. While the parties did not raise the question of whether 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) affects our jurisdiction, we must examine all the bases of our

subject matter jurisdiction, on our own motion if necessary. 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), "implements restrictions on

federal court jurisdiction over several categories of BIA decisions." Zhao v.

Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 302 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005). These restrictions are codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1252, representing Congress's clear intent in immigration proceedings.

Accordingly, the jurisdiction proscription in the IIRIRA itself should be the first and

only place we look to determine our jurisdiction in this case. 

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) proscribes judicial review of "any . . . decision or

action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this

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subchapter [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1381] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General"

(emphasis added). Because § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only strips our jurisdiction to review

the use of discretionary authority "specified under this subchapter," its proscription

would not apply to motions to reopen where the quantum of discretion is established

by the agency in its implementing regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See, e.g.,

Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying Zhao and

determining that it had authority to review motions to continue because the quantum

of discretion exercised by the Attorney General in those instances is furnished by the

federal regulation and is not specified in the subchapter as § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)

contemplates); Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303 (same, in motion to reopen context); MedinaMorales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 529 (9th Cir. 2004) (same, in motion to reopen

context). It is here where I part ways with the court majority even though we all agree

that we have jurisdiction to entertain Tamenut's petition for review under section

1252. Ante at 4.

It matters not, in my view, whether we are reviewing decisions on motions to

reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) or § 1003.2(c). Or, for that matter, whether we are

reviewing motions for continuances under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Regardless, the

discretion established for reviewing any of these motions is established in the

regulations, not the statutes.

Further, I do not view Heckler as a road block. Cf. Zhao, 404 F.3d at 302-04

(finding jurisdiction to review motions to reopen without conducting a Heckler

analysis); Medina-Morales, 371 F.3d at 528-29 (same). I recognize that there are

times when the standards against which we judge a BIA's decision are nonexistent, but

reviewing decisions under § 1003.2(a) is not one of those times. The BIA has ruled

that it will reopen cases in exceptional circumstances. Matter of J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec.

976, 984 (BIA 1997) (holding that the Board's power to reopen or reconsider cases sua

sponte is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to cure filing defects

or circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship). This

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body of agency law combined with case law pertaining to when exceptional

circumstances have been found ought to be sufficient for us to unearth a meaningful

standard of review in the § 1003.2(a) context, especially given the alternative. See

Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2002) (Bright, J. dissenting); see also

Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing

that a history of case law may sufficiently establish standards upon which to review

a BIA's decision). Given this highly deferential and strict standard of review, it may

very well be that most BIA decisions that provide some reasons for not reopening will

be summarily upheld. The critical factor, however, is that review is proper.

Denying jurisdiction in these cases has clear policy consequences. Giving

unfettered authority to administrative agencies to strip our jurisdiction is a slippery

slope and one I am not willing to travel downward needlessly. Recognizing the

"strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action," INS v. St.

Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001), I dissent.

______________________________

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