Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03373/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03373-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
W. Beegle
Defendant
Richard Kirkland
Defendant
M. McDonald
Defendant
B. J. O'Neill
Defendant
Toy Terrell Smith
Plaintiff
Jeanne Woodford
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOY TERRELL SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD (Director of

Corrections; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-3373 SI (pr)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Toy Terrell Smith, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the Americans With Disabilities Act

("ADA")), and 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (the Rehabilitation Act). The court dismissed the complaint

with leave to amend. Smith's amended complaint alleged only § 1983 claims and is now before

the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. 

BACKGROUND

Smith's complaint alleges the following: 

Smith received mental health care in the CDCR prison system at the Correctional Clinical

Case Management Services ("CCCMS") level of care. He was transferred to Pelican Bay in

October 1999 "for the specific purpose" of receiving CCCMS level of mental health care.

Amended Complaint, p. 6. He had mental health care needs and required single cell housing due

to his “extensive history of violence toward cellmates and others over a fourteen year period of

incarceration." Id. at 6-7.

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Smith was told he would have to double-cell or would lose privileges, including the use

of his television, and would receive a disciplinary report. He apparently filed an inmate appeal

trying to avoid being double-celled because of his mental health problems. Defendants associate

warden B.J. O'Neill and facility captain M. McDonald denied his inmate appeal and told him that

he had to comply with orders to double-cell.

Smith also talked with psychologist R. Beegle after he received the order to double-cell.

Smith told him of his mental health care needs and single cell housing needs. Dr. Beegle

informed Smith that, about two months after his arrival at Pelican Bay, "the prison

administration elected to take [Smith] out of the mental health delivery system and that at that

point, [Smith] became non-qualified to officially receive help from mental health service

representatives nor receive any associated assistance from mental health services." Id. at p. 7.

The psychologist also told Smith that if he had not been taken out of the mental health delivery

system, all disciplinary assessments and determinations would have been made by mental health

services representatives and Smith would have received a different response (e.g., medication

or placement in the psychiatric services unit) instead of placement in the security housing unit

when he misbehaved. This apparently would have affected the discipline on a charge that he

fought with a correctional officer en route to Pelican Bay on October 15, 1999. Dr. Beegle told

Smith that the situation was out of his control. 

As mentioned earlier, Smith was ordered to double-cell with another prisoner. He did

not want to share a cell and felt pressured to do so because otherwise he would lose privileges,

including access to his personal television, which had already been confiscated as the first step

of the punishment for refusing to double-cell.

Smith tried to move into a cell with another inmate on April 11, 2001. While Smith was

moving in, the other inmate hit him. A fight ensued. Smith "bit off a large piece of the other

inmate's ear during the fight and would not stop fighting once the fight began." Id. at 8. Pepper

spray and batons were used to stop the fight. Smith states that correctional staff understood that

the fight was not Smith's fault but he had to be charged with a serious offense because he bit off

part of the other inmate's ear. Id. 

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The discipline originally imposed for the ear-biting incident was a determinate term of

two years in the security housing unit. At about the time the two-year term was ending, a

committee hearing was held on December 4, 2002 to decide whether and when to release Smith

back to the general population. Defendant Kirkland was the head of the committee that held the

hearing. Defendant Kirkland finalized a committee agreement to continuously confine Smith

to punitive segregation at Pelican Bay for an indeterminate sentence. Smith filed an inmate

appeal to defendant Kirkland and requested a reasonable modification or accommodation for his

mental health needs. In his administrative appeal to defendant Kirkland, Smith complained

about his unmet need for mental health care that included single cell housing and explained that

he had documented mental health problems. Defendant Kirkland rejected his inmate appeal and

determined that punitive segregation was appropriate based on Smith's dysfunctional prison

history of violence. 

Smith the filed an appeal on August 30, 2003, to the CDCR Director, defendant Jeanne

Woodford, for a director's level decision. He requested that he be put back into the general

population and into a program to help inmates deal with mental health needs. The director's

level response was a denial of his inmate appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,

31 (1993). To establish a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner claiming that

prison officials failed to attend to medical needs must establish both (1) a serious medical need

and (2) deliberate indifference to that need by prison officials. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). Inmates' mental health needs are among the medical needs

covered by the Eighth Amendment. See Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir.

1994); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care

requirements analyzed as part of general health care requirements). 

Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim for deliberate

indifference to Smith's mental health care needs and/or his safety. Smith's complaint adequately

links defendants O'Neill, McDonald, Beegle, Woodford, and Kirkland to his claims. Although

several defendants did unrelated things, each allegedly engaged in an action that prevented Smith

from receiving mental health care needs and/or put him in a situation where there was a serious

risk of harm to him because of his unmet mental health care needs. 

Defendants O'Neill and McDonald allegedly ignored Smith's need for mental health care

and a single cell and, instead, forced him to double-cell, which quickly prompted a cell fight.

Dr. Beegle allegedly knew of but did not do anything to help solve the problem of Smith being

removed from the mental health care program and being forced to double-cell. It is not clear

whether the claims against these three defendants should be viewed as deliberate indifference

to mental health care needs or to safety or both. However, whether viewed as deliberate

indifference to Smith's need for mental health care or to be single-celled so that violence would

not ensue, an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard would apply. 

The liability of Woodford and Kirkland turns on different facts: they allegedly decided

in response to inmate appeals that Smith belonged in punitive segregation and not in the mental

health care system, despite his requests to be provided with mental health care. This states a

cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to Smith's mental health care needs. Defendants

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Woodford and Kirkland do not, however, have liability for the cell fight problem that occurred

two years before their alleged wrongful conduct. That is, their liability would exist because they

denied his requests pertaining to an ongoing need for mental health care.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Plaintiff's complaint states claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as discussed

above. 

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without

prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the complaint, a copy of this order, and a copy of

all the other documents in the case file upon the following persons: 

- Jeanne Woodford (director of Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation)

- Richard Kirkland (associate warden)

- Dr. W. Beegle (psychologist)

- B. J. O'Neill (associate warden)

- M. McDonald (correctional captain)

These individuals apparently are employed at Pelican Bay State Prison, except for Jeanne

Woodford, who apparently is employed at the CDCR headquarters in Sacramento, California.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for

dispositive motions is set:

a. No later than November 2, 2006, defendants must file and serve a motion

for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion that this case

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they must so inform the court prior to the date the

motion is due.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion

must be filed with the court and served upon defendants no later than December 7, 2006.

Plaintiff must bear in mind the following notice and warning regarding summary judgment as

he prepares his opposition to any summary judgment motion:

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The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which they

seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. [¶] 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary

judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no

genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact

that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case.

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is

properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply

rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents,

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants'

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact

for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary

judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. (See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

c. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, they must file and serve the reply

brief no later than December 21, 2006.

4. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on a defendant's

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant's counsel. The court may disregard

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant's

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to

defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to

counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of

address in every pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

/ / /

/ / /

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 7. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this

case on any document he submits to this court for consideration in this case. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2006 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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