Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01541/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01541-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alejandro Camacho
Petitioner
Tom Carey
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO CAMACHO,

Petitioner,

v.

TOM CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-1541 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Alejandro Camacho is a prisoner of the State of

California who is incarcerated at California State Prison-Solano at

Vacaville, California. He brings this petition pro se seeking a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent was

ordered to show cause why the writ should not be granted; he filed

an answer, supported by a memorandum of law, and lodged the State

court record. Petitioner filed a traverse. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties and

the State court trial record, the Court DENIES the petition for

writ of habeas corpus.

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BACKGROUND

According to Petitioner's probation report, the Drug

Enforcement Administration learned that a storage locker in San

Jose, California, was being used to facilitate narcotic

trafficking. On June 6, 1999, DEA agents began video surveillance

of the storage locker.

Two days later, Petitioner arrived at the storage facility. 

He backed his 1988 Ford Explorer up to the storage locker, unlocked

the door and looked around nervously as he entered the locker. He

picked up a large plastic-wrapped object and concealed it under his

shirt. He exited the storage locker, placed the object in the rear

of his vehicle and drove away. 

The next day, agents obtained a search warrant for the locker.

On June 11, 1999, Fernando Ambris and Juan Ambris, arrived at

the storage locker. They got out of their 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier

and looked around nervously. Juan opened the car's trunk and

handed the locker key to his brother Fernando. Fernando partially

opened the storage locker door, returned to the car to get a triple

lined plastic bag and crawled underneath the partially opened

locker door. Juan continued to look around nervously.

Agents approached and detained the brothers. Fernando waived

his Miranda rights and stated, "Yes, Yes, I am guilty." He denied

manufacturing methamphetamine, but admitted that he and his brother

were using the storage locker to store methamphetamine and

equipment; he stated the methamphetamine found in the locker was

his. Fernando further stated that he paid Petitioner $3,000 a year

to rent and guard the storage locker. Juan declined to make a

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statement without an attorney.

Pursuant to the search warrant, agents entered the locker and

located a cardboard box. In the box were eighteen packages of

brown powder wrapped in plastic and an open package containing

231.7 grams of a white powder substance. The agents analyzed the

brown powder with a NIK test kit; it tested presumptively positive

for methamphetamine. Agents also found in the locker: heating

mantles; flasks bearing reaction by-products; buckets containing a

white granular substance; a plastic bag containing red phosphorus;

a five-gallon gasoline container containing ephedrine; an

electronic heat sealer; and a plastic container holding one gallon

of amphetamine in liquid form.

That same day, DEA agents detained Petitioner and his wife as

they drove away from their home in San Jose. Petitioner had a key

to the storage locker. Agents searched his vehicle and found a

cell phone and a pager. The San Jose Police Department's Narcotics

Covert Investigations Unit entered Petitioner's home pursuant to a

warrant obtained by the agents. The officers seized from

Petitioner's home: two notebooks containing various names,

telephone numbers and numeric computations; a bill for the storage

locker; one-thousand dollars in United States currency; plastic

wrap; a coffee grinder with white powder residue; and a five-gallon

plastic gasoline can. The San Jose Police Department also

discovered that, three years before, Petitioner had filed a

fraudulent driver's license application in the name of Alejandro

Cendejas Loya. 

After being read his Miranda rights, Petitioner stated that he

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had visited the storage locker a few days before because the Ambris

brothers told him to get one pound of methamphetamine from the

locker and bring it to them. He stated that the brothers cooked

and sold methamphetamine and that the brothers paid him to watch

the locker, to pay the rent and to take things to, and to remove

things from, the locker.

Petitioner was charged with manufacturing more than ten pounds

of methamphetamine, possession of more than four kilograms of

methamphetamine for sale and transportation of methamphetamine. 

The information alleged that Petitioner had previously been

convicted of possession for sale of a controlled substance and that

he served a prior prison term. In a separate information,

Petitioner was charged with false application for a driver's

license; that information also alleged that Petitioner had served a

prior prison term.

Petitioner moved to quash three search warrants and to

suppress seized evidence. On December 21, 1999, the trial court

denied the suppression motion.

On January 5, 2000, the day his trial was to begin, Petitioner

plead nolo contendere to all charges against him. He admitted to

the enhancements, prior convictions and prison terms. Before

Petitioner changed his plea, the trial court informed Petitioner

and his co-defendants of their rights. The court asked Petitioner

if he understood that "the maximum possible penalty for these

offenses is twenty-two years eight months in the State prison and a

total fine of $40,000." Petitioner responded, "Yes." When asked

by the court if anyone had promised him "anything other than what's

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been said here in open court to get you to plead guilty or no

contest," Petitioner replied, "No." Petitioner also replied, "No,"

when the court asked him if "anyone threatened you or anyone close

to you in order to get you to plead guilty or no contest." And

when the court asked if he was pleading "no contest freely and

voluntarily," Petitioner answered, "Yes."

A probation officer interviewed Petitioner on February 9,

2000. During the interview, Petitioner "adamantly denied any

involvement in the illicit production, transport, or sale of

methamphetamine." He recanted the previous statements he made and

claimed that he was coerced into making those statement because the

agents told him that they would arrest his wife and place their

child in protective custody if he did not admit culpability. He

stated that he did not pursue a jury trial because he believed his

criminal history would be used against him. The probation officer

recommended that Petitioner be committed to the California

Department of Corrections for sixteen years.

On May 24, 2000, the court sentenced Petitioner to a total

prison term of sixteen years.

Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that the court

erroneously denied his suppression motion and that the prosecutor

failed to provide information about the proficiency of the search

dog, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and the California Supreme

Court denied Petitioner's petition for review.

On January 23, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, alleging

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that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his

counsel induced him to plead guilty, even though he did not want to

do so. Petitioner alleged that his counsel told him that his

counsel paid $5,000 to the trial judge and that in return the judge

promised to sentence Petitioner to only three years if Petitioner

plead guilty to all counts. Allegedly, Petitioner's counsel

threatened Petitioner that if he went to trial, the jury would find

him guilty and that he would be sentenced to twenty-two years in

prison. The superior court denied the petition, finding that

Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for relief

because his allegations were conclusory, unsupported and without

any explanation. For example, the court wondered where "the $5,000

in question came from." 

After his petition was denied, Petitioner filed a similar

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District. The Court of Appeal

summarily denied that petition on May 22, 2003.

 On July 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, asserting that his

plea was not voluntary, that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel, that there was a breach of the plea bargain and that he

was actually innocent of the charges and there was insufficient

evidence to sustain his conviction: the same claims he brings

before this Court. The Supreme Court summarily denied his petition

on March 30, 2004.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a State

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prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition challenging a

State conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

reviewed on the merits in State court unless the State court’s

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A

decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it fails

to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the

controlling authority to a case involving facts materially

indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless

reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067

(9th. Cir. 2003). 

An unreasonable application of federal law occurs when the

State court identifies the correct governing legal principle, but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts. Id. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law. Id. Relief is not proper

where the State court decision is "merely erroneous." Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002).

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law

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under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant State court decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Circuit law may be persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether a State court

decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Clark, 331 F.3d at 1070-71.

To determine whether the State court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest State

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). If the State court only considered State law, the

federal court must ask whether State law, as explained by the State

court, is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 

See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). In

the present case, only one of Petitioner's claims, ineffective

assistance of counsel, was addressed in State court in a reasoned

decision, and that decision considered only State law. His other

claims were denied summarily by the California Supreme Court. 

Where the State court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision

on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned lower

court decision on the claim, a review of the record is the only

means of deciding whether the State court's decision was

objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003). When confronted with such a decision, a federal

court should conduct "an independent review of the record" to

determine whether the State court's decision was an unreasonable

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application of clearly established federal law. Id. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court gives deference to a

State court’s factual determinations. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393

F.3d 943, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have

the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.”

Even if the State court's ruling is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, that error

justifies habeas relief only if the error resulted in "actual

prejudice." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

DISCUSSION

I. Guilty Plea

Due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and

voluntary because it constitutes the waiver of three constitutional

rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's

accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). The long-standing test

for determining the validity of a guilty plea is "'whether the plea

represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative

courses of action open to the defendant.'" Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,

31 (1970)). This requires a review of the circumstances

surrounding the plea. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,

749 (1970). Of particular importance is that the defendant enter a

guilty plea with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances

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and likely consequences, id. at 748, and that he understand the law

in relation to the facts. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,

466 (1969).

A plea is not voluntary unless it is "entered by one fully

aware of the direct consequences" of the plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at

755; see Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing that his

guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. See Parke, 506 U.S.

at 31-34. If a defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having

been informed of the crime’s elements, the standard set out in

Brady is not met and the plea is invalid. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 125

S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2005) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637

(1976)). But the Supreme Court has never held that the judge must

himself or herself explain the elements of each charge to the

defendant on the record. Id. Rather, the constitutional

prerequisite of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record

accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements

of the crime were explained to the defendant by the defendant's

own, competent counsel. Id.

As explained by the Supreme Court, 

the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and

the prosecutor at such a hearing, as well as any

findings made by the judge accepting the plea,

constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent

collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open

court carry a strong presumption of validity. The

subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations

unsupported by specifics is subject to summary

dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the

record are wholly incredible.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).

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Petitioner lists "Invalid Plea on Due Process" as one of his

grounds for relief, stating that the plea was invalid because it

was made unintelligently and unknowingly. He alleges that the

nature of the plea, the elements of the offense and the

consequences of the plea were not explained and a that factual

basis was not established. The record, however, shows otherwise. 

The court asked Petitioner if he had an opportunity to discuss his

case fully with his attorney; Petitioner answered yes. The court

asked Petitioner if he had fully discussed the nature of elements

of the charges; Petitioner answered yes. When asked if he had

fully discussed the possible defense to these charges, Petitioner

again answered yes. Petitioner answered yes when the court asked

if he understood that the maximum possible penalty was twenty-two

years and eight months in State prison and a total fine of $40,000.

Furthermore, a defendant who enters a plea of guilty, or no

contest, on the advice of counsel may generally attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea only by showing

that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.

258, 267 (1973). In his traverse, Petitioner states that his plea

was involuntary as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney gave him erroneous information about his

possible sentence. But, as discussed in the following section,

Petitioner is unable to show that he was prejudiced by his

counsel's alleged substandard performance or that the California

court's decision rejecting his ineffective assistance claim was

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contrary to clearly established governing federal law.

Based on an independent review of the record and the

circumstances surrounding the plea, the Court finds that the State

court decision denying Petitioner's first claim for relief is not

objectively unreasonable.

II. Ineffective Assistance

As stated above, a defendant who enters a plea of guilty, or

no contest, on the advice of counsel may generally attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea only by showing

that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Hill,

474 U.S. at 56; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. A defendant must satisfy

the two-part standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984), i.e., show that counsel's performance was deficient and

that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense by showing

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

errors, he would not have plead guilty and would have insisted on

going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59. 

A mere inaccurate prediction regarding the potential sentence

is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; the petitioner

must establish a “‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome’

of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . . erroneous advice on the

probable effects of going to trial.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer,

378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Keller,

902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A defendant generally cannot establish prejudice under Hill if

he received significant benefits from his plea agreement. Counsel

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1

In the earlier declaration that was included with

Petitioner's habeas petition to the Santa Clara County Superior

Court, Petitioner declared that his attorney told Petitioner that

the judge had been paid $5,000 and in return that judge agreed to

give Petitioner a three-year deal. 

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may commit serious errors, but as long as counsel succeeds in

substantially reducing the sentence defendant would have likely

received had he gone to trial, there is no prejudice. See United

States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 845-47 (9th Cir. 1996) (counsel's

failure to assert viable defense to charge that results in

probation does not prejudice defendant when conviction on another,

more serious charge is valid and other, valid charges are

dismissed). 

Petitioner argues that his plea was involuntary and

unintelligent based on his counsel's ineffective assistance. 

Petitioner states in his traverse filed with this Court that his

counsel promised that he would only be sentenced to three years if

he plead guilty and paid an additional sum of money to the judge.1

Instead, Petitioner was sentenced to sixteen years. Petitioner

asserts that his counsel's failure to assess his potential sentence

accurately and to warn Petitioner that he risked a sixteen year

sentence was unreasonable and fell below professional norms of

conduct. But, in his habeas petition before this Court, Plaintiff

types, as supporting facts for his breach of contract claim, "Prior

to taking the 16-year deal, counselor informed petitioner the state

was offering a 3-year deal. However, when petitioner arrived in

court, his lawyer then told him that the 3-year deal is now a 16-

year deal or go to trial." Thus, Petitioner was warned as to a

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possible sixteen year sentence. 

In denying Petitioner's habeas petition based on ineffective

assistance of counsel, the State court did not cite federal law.

But the court did cite In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal.4th 924 (1992), a

California Supreme Court case that sets forth the same requirements

as Strickland for demonstrating an ineffective assistance claim in

the context of plea bargaining. See Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d

1045, 1053 (2003). Although it cited Alvernaz, the State court

focused on whether Petitioner established a prima facie case. 

Finding that the petition was supported only by Petitioner's selfserving and conclusory allegations, the court denied the petition

for failure to establish a prima facie case, without determining

whether Petitioner was entitled to relief under Alvernaz and

Strickland. 

Although the State court did not consider Strickland, or its

progeny, the Court finds that the State law the court did apply is

not contrary to clearly established governing federal law. 

As noted above, the Supreme Court has found that the "subsequent

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is

subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face

of the record are wholly incredible." Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-

74. Furthermore, the Court finds that the State court's denial of

the habeas petition is not unreasonable. Even if the Court applies

Strickland and assumes his counsel's performance was deficient,

Petitioner is unable to prove prejudice. Although Petitioner

states in his traverse that the maximum sentence was sixteen years,

the actual maximum sentence, as the judge informed Petitioner, was

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twenty-two years and eight months. After Petitioner plead guilty

he received a sentence over six and a half years lower than the

maximum. See Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 845-47. And Plaintiff does not

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

errors, he would not have plead no contest and would have insisted

on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59. Petitioner states

in his traverse that he "knew from the outset that he had no

serious defense to this crime" and that his "case was hopeless from

the start, and his only course was to seek the best plea bargain

possible." 

III. Breach of Contract

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to

contract law standards of interpretation. Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d

1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380,

1387 (9th Cir. 1986). In determining whether a plea agreement has

been breached, courts look to what was reasonably understood by the

parties to be the terms of the agreement. See Brown, 337 F.3d at

1160; United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979).

A party breaches a plea bargain if it fails to live up to the

promises it made under the agreement. See Brown, 337 F.3d at 1159-

61. 

Petitioner contends that his attorney informed him the State

offered him a three-year sentence if he plead guilty, and that the

State breached that contract when it reneged on the three-year

sentence. Petitioner moves for specific performance of his alleged

contract, i.e., the three-year sentence. 

But, here, there was no contract. As Respondent notes, there

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is no "contract" until all the parties agree to be bound by the

agreement and the court accepts the plea. Brown, 337 F.3d at 1159. 

The court never accepted the alleged plea bargain that included a

three-year sentence. Instead, the court informed Petitioner that

the maximum sentence was twenty-two years and eight months and that

Petitioner would be referred to the probation department for a

report and recommendation. Furthermore, Petitioner cannot

reasonably have understood that the three-year sentence was part of

any agreement when he agreed to plead. As noted above, he states

in his traverse that when he arrived in court his lawyer told him

"the 3-year deal is now a 16-year deal or go to trial."

Based on an independent review of the record and the

circumstances surrounding the plea, the Court finds that the State

court decision denying Petitioner's third claim for relief

demanding specific performance of a contract that did not exist, is

not objectively unreasonable.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Sufficient 

Evidence of Petitioner's Guilt

In his habeas petition, Petitioner claimed that there was

insufficient evidence of his guilt and that he was actually

innocent of the drug offenses. In its order to show cause, the

Court noted that because Petitioner did not go to trial and instead

entered a plea, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not at

issue. Instead, the Court read this claim "as part and parcel of

Petitioner's cognizable due process and Sixth Amendment claims. 

That is, his plea was not voluntary and knowing because counsel did

not advise him that the evidence against him was not sufficient to

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find him guilty, and if he had known this he would not have plead

guilty." Respondent contends that if the petition is so read, then

the claim is unexhausted. But this is the same claim that

Petitioner brought before the California Supreme Court that was

summarily denied; thus Respondent's contention is unavailing.

Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel had a duty to inform

him that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction,

however, is also unavailing. As Respondent notes, the record

established that there was sufficient evidence against Petitioner

to support his conviction on the charged offenses. For example, a

videotape shows Petitioner driving up to the storage locker,

opening it, going inside toward the back (where the officers found

the methamphetamine and manufacturing equipment), hiding a package

in his shirt that looked similar to the one-pound methamphetamine

bags later found, going back to his car and putting the package in

his car. Furthermore, Petitioner does not show that he was

prejudiced by his counsel's alleged failure to inform him that

there was insufficient evidence against him and that had he known

this he would not have plead guilty. As noted above, Petitioner

acknowledges that "he had no serious defense to this crime" and

that his "case was hopeless from the start."

Based on an independent review of the record, the Court finds

that the State court decision denying Petitioner's fourth claim for

relief is also not unreasonable.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas

corpus (Docket No. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment 

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and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/26/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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