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Parties Involved:
Florida Commission on Offender Review
Appellee
Rodney McCutcheon
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12335

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

RODNEY MCCUTCHEON, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-14327-RNS

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12335

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rodney McCutcheon, a Florida state prisoner proceeding 

pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We granted a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the sole issue of:

[w]hether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 

F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), in denying 

McCutcheon’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition without 

addressing his claim that the Commission violated his 

due process rights by relying on false information 

about his criminal history in determining whether to 

grant him parole?

After review, we affirm.

I. Background

In 1972, McCutcheon was convicted of rape and sentenced 

to life imprisonment. McCutcheon received parole in 1980, subject 

to parole supervision for life.1 He was charged with violating the 

terms of his parole in 1987 and 1989, but both times Florida’s Parole 

Commission (“the Commission”) restored supervision. However, 

1 “In 1983, Florida abolished parole for most new crimes. But offenders who, 

like [McCutcheon], committed crimes before that time remain eligible for 

parole.” Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(internal citation omitted).

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23-12335 Opinion of the Court 3

in 1990, he again violated the terms of his parole by being charged 

with dealing in stolen property and grand theft. He was convicted 

of dealing in stolen property and sentenced to two and a half years. 

As a result, the Commission revoked McCutcheon’s parole and set 

his presumptive parole release date (“PPRD”) for 1996.2 After a 

series of unfavorable biennial reviews, the Commission extended 

McCutcheon’s PPRD to 2006.3 

2 Under Florida law, a parole eligible inmate is entitled to the establishment of

a PPRD, which is “the tentative parole release date.” See Fla. Stat. § 947.172; 

Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-21.002(31). The objective parole guidelines guide the 

Commission in the task of establishing an inmate’s PPRD. See generally Fla. 

Admin. Code R. 23-21.007 to 23-21.011. 

3 After the PPRD is established, the inmate receives regular subsequent 

reviews to assess whether the PPRD should be extended or should become 

the inmate’s effective parole release date (“EPRD”), which “means the actual 

parole release date.” See generally Fla. Stat. § 947.174 (providing for regular 

review of an inmate’s PPRD either every two years or every seven years 

depending on certain factors); id. § 947.1745 (providing that “[i]f the inmate’s 

institutional conduct has been satisfactory, the [PPRD] shall become the 

[EPRD]”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-21.002(15) (defining EPRD as the inmate’s 

“actual parole release date”). “If it is determined that the inmate’s institutional 

conduct has been unsatisfactory,” the Commission may extend the PPRD. See 

Fla. Stat. § 947.1745(1), (2). Even where an inmate has a satisfactory 

institutional record to be placed on parole, the Commission must also find 

“that there is reasonable probability that, if the person is placed on parole, he 

or she will live and conduct himself or herself as a respectable and law-abiding 

person and that the person’s release will be compatible with his or her own 

welfare and the welfare of society.” Id. § 947.18. The Commission must also 

find that the person “will be suitably employed” upon release and “will not 

become a public charge.” Id. “This determination is to be based upon a review 

of the entire official record in the inmate’s case.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-

21.015(10). If the Commission determines that the inmate does not meet the 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12335

In 2006, the Commission determined that McCutcheon did 

not meet the criteria for parole because there was not a “reasonable 

probability that, if [he was] released on parole, [he would] live and 

conduct [himself] as a respectable and law-abiding person and that 

[his] release [would] be compatible with [his] own welfare and the 

welfare of society” as required by Fla. Stat. § 947.18. Accordingly, 

the Commission suspended McCutcheon’s PPRD and set his case 

for extraordinary review in 2010. The Commission again made a 

negative parole finding in 2010, continued the suspension of 

McCutcheon’s PPRD, and set his case for another extraordinary 

review in 2017. 

As part of the 2017 extraordinary review, Commission 

Investigator John O’Donnell provided a memorandum to the 

Commission with a recommendation that “McCutcheon’s PPRD 

remain suspended based on his inability to maintain appropriate 

institutional behavior . . . .” The memorandum listed

McCutcheon’s criminal history as a 1972 conviction for rape and a 

1990 conviction for: dealing in stolen property (Count I), and 

assault with intent to commit robbery (Count II). The 

Commission again made a negative parole finding, continued the 

suspension of McCutcheon’s PPRD, and set his case for another 

extraordinary review at a later date. In making the negative parole 

finding, the Commission mentioned that McCutcheon had a new 

criteria for parole release, the Commission must “enter an order declining to 

authorize the [EPRD] and referring the case to the Commission for 

extraordinary review.” Id. 

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23-12335 Opinion of the Court 5

disciplinary report since his last review, and that the Commission 

was still concerned by the following factors: (A) “the serious nature 

of the offense”; (B) McCutcheon’s “[e]xtensive criminal history. 

Per the Post Sentence Investigation”; and (C) that he was a 

“[p]arole violator.”4 

Thereafter, McCutcheon filed a federal habeas petition, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting multiple claims based on 

several alleged constitutional errors in the Commission’s 2017 

review decision. As relevant to the issue on which we granted a 

COA, McCutcheon argued in Claim 3 that the Commission 

violated his due process and equal protection rights by relying on 

the post sentence investigation report which contained unspecified 

false information. Additionally, in Claim 4 he asserted, in relevant 

part, that the Commission relied on false information because the 

Commission Investigator’s memorandum indicated that 

McCutcheon had a prior conviction for assault with intent to 

commit robbery when he did not.5 

4 McCutcheon filed objections to the Commission’s decision on multiple 

grounds. The Commission construed the objections as a request for review 

of McCutcheon’s PPRD, and denied the request because review was not 

available from extraordinary interviews. McCutcheon then filed a state habeas 

petition challenging the Commission’s decision, asserting multiple due 

process violations, including that the Commission relied on “false 

information,” and requested that the state court “command[] the Commission 

to conduct a proper extraordinary review. . . .” The state court construed his 

“habeas petition” as a petition for a writ of mandamus and denied relief. 

5 We note that McCutcheon’s post sentence investigation report did not list a 

prior conviction for assault with intent to commit robbery, so we know that 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-12335

The district court denied McCutcheon’s § 2241 petition and 

denied a COA. McCutcheon sought a COA in this Court, which 

we granted in part as to the following issue only: 

[w]hether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 

F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), in denying 

McCutcheon’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition without 

addressing his claim that the Commission violated his 

due process rights by relying on false information 

about his criminal history in determining whether to 

grant him parole?6

McCutcheon’s assertion in Claim 3 that the post sentence investigation report 

contained “false” information was not based on this same criminal history 

discrepancy. 

6 Because the COA did not specify whether it related to the “false information” 

allegations in Claim 3 or Claim 4, we construe it as encompassing both claims. 

However, in his initial brief on appeal, McCutcheon focuses on Claim 3 and 

does not address the allegations in Claim 4 concerning the allegedly false 

information provided by the Commission Investigator concerning 

McCutcheon’s criminal history—that McCutcheon had a prior conviction for 

assault with intent to commit a robbery. McCutcheon attempts to resurrect 

Claim 4 in his reply brief, arguing for the first time that the district court also 

failed to address Claim 4. McCutcheon’s argument comes too late. Issues not 

briefed on appeal or raised for the first time in a reply brief by a pro se litigant 

are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008); 

see also Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (“As 

we have repeatedly admonished, arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief are not properly before a reviewing court.” (alteration adopted) 

(quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that he abandoned this claim, 

and we do not address it. 

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23-12335 Opinion of the Court 7

We denied his request for a COA as to his other claims.7 

II. Discussion

On appeal, McCutcheon argues that the district court failed 

to address and resolve Claim 3 concerning alleged unspecified false 

information in the post sentence investigation report. He then 

reiterates the merits of his underlying due process claim.8 

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2241 

petition, but review its factfindings for clear error.” Santiago-Lugo 

v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471 (11th Cir. 2015). “[W]e review de novo 

the legal question of whether the district court violated the rule 

announced in Clisby.” Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299–1300. 

In Clisby, we instructed district courts to resolve all claims 

for relief raised in petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 960 F.2d at 

936. We expressed “deep concern over the piecemeal litigation of 

federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners,” and emphasized 

7 In his brief on appeal, McCutcheon also raises arguments related to the 

claims on which we denied a COA. Because these claims are beyond the scope 

of the COA, we do not consider them. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 

1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “appellate review is limited to the 

issues specified in the COA”).

8 We do not reach the merits of McCutcheon’s underlying claim because 

under Clisby, our only role is to determine whether the district court failed to 

address a claim, not whether the underlying claim is meritorious. Dupree v. 

Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013). If we conclude that the district 

court violated Clisby, then we “vacate the judgment without prejudice and 

remand the case to the district court for consideration of the unaddressed 

claim.” Id.

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12335

the importance of litigating all of a petitioner’s claims in one habeas 

proceeding. Id. at 935. 

Here, there was no Clisby violation because the district court 

clearly addressed Claim 3. First, the district court explained that 

there is no constitutional right to parole or a liberty interest in 

parole in Florida. See McCutcheon v. Fla. Comm’n on Offender Review, 

No. 22-14327, 2023 WL 3750718, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2023). Even 

though McCutcheon had no liberty interest in parole, the district 

court explained that a parole board violates due process if it

“engage[s] in ‘flagrant or unauthorized action’” such as relying on 

information it knows to be false. Id. (quoting Monroe v. Thigpen, 

932 F.2d 1437, 1442 (11th Cir. 1991)). Nevertheless, the district 

court explained that “prisoners cannot make a conclusory 

allegation regarding the use of such information as the basis of a 

due process claim. Without evidence of the [parole board’s] 

reliance on false information, a prisoner cannot succeed.” Id.

(quoting Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2001)). The 

district court then concluded that McCutcheon failed to explain 

why his criminal history in the post sentence investigation report 

was inaccurate and his “conclusory allegation [that the report 

contained false information was] insufficient.” Id., at *4 (citing 

Jones, 279 F.3d at 946). The district court then denied Claim 3. 

Accordingly, because the district court addressed McCutcheon’s 

claim that the post sentence investigation report contained false 

information, there was no Clisby error. Consequently, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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