Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-06206/USCOURTS-ca4-09-06206-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael T. W. Bell
Appellant
Montoyae Dontae Sharpe
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MONTOYAE DONTAE SHARPE, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.  No. 09-6206

MICHAEL T. W. BELL,

Respondent-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.

(5:04-hc-00886-BO)

Argued: December 4, 2009

Decided: January 29, 2010

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and

Henry E. HUDSON, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Hudson joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellant. William Gregory Duke, Greenville, North CaroAppeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 1 of 19
lina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Montoyae Dontae Sharpe was convicted of first degree

murder in North Carolina Superior Court and sentenced to life

in prison. After exhausting state post-conviction remedies,

Sharpe petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming

that his conviction was unconstitutional because it resulted

from ineffective assistance of counsel. Although he had procedurally defaulted on this claim, the district court held that

Sharpe had come forward with new evidence of "actual innocence" sufficient to excuse his default. The district court then

ruled in Sharpe’s favor on the merits of his constitutional

claim. Yet in reaching its conclusions, the district court

ignored the several state post-conviction proceedings which

had determined that the evidence Sharpe presented was not

credible and that his constitutional claim was without merit.

Such a de novo do-over was impermissible under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA"). Sharpe would have us substitute our own judgment for the state court’s credibility determinations, disregard

the fact that the state courts soundly assessed each of his contentions, and unfairly hindsight the performance of his own

trial counsel. Such an approach undermines the principles of

comity and federalism that the Supreme Court and Congress

have set forth in the context of federal habeas review. We

therefore reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the

petition.

I.

Dontae Sharpe was charged with killing a man named

George Radcliffe, who was shot to death on the night of Feb2 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 2 of 19
ruary 11, 1994, in downtown Greenville, North Carolina.

Radcliffe’s body was found inside his pickup truck on a

grassy lot, just off a downtown street. Inside the truck, police

officers found Radcliffe’s wallet, which contained fifty-three

dollars, and a coat later identified as belonging to one Wilbur

Mercer.

At trial, the state offered the testimony of two purported

eyewitnesses to the killing. Beatrice Stokes, twenty-seven

years old, and Charlene Johnson, fifteen years old, both testified that Sharpe sold drugs with a man named Mark Joyner

and was a leading drug dealer in the neighborhood where

Radcliffe’s body was found. Both testified that on the night

of the murder, they saw Sharpe, Joyner, and Radcliffe standing in the street next to Radcliffe’s pickup truck, that an argument broke out, and that Sharpe shot Radcliffe. Both stated

that Wilbur Mercer was also at the scene, and Stokes noted

the presence of several others.

Stokes testified that she immediately fled and called the

police when the shot went off. Johnson testified that she

watched Sharpe and Joyner load Radcliffe’s body into the

truck and drive it into the lot where it was found. Johnson

admitted that she had received a reward for coming forward.

Stokes testified that she had not received a reward but admitted that she was probably using drugs at the time.

A third eyewitness, Alonzo Vines, lived in a house adjacent

to the lot where Radcliffe’s truck was found. He testified that

he was in his house on the night of the murder when he heard

a loud noise, looked out his window, and saw that a pickup

truck had been driven into the lot. He stated that he saw the

truck’s door was open and that two or three people were

standing next to it. He could not identify them, however,

because his view was blocked by dust on his windows. Seven

other witnesses testified for the state. The state’s medical

examiner testified as to the trajectory of the bullet and opined

that Radcliffe could have remained conscious after the shootSHARPE v. BELL 3

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 3 of 19
ing for no more than 10 seconds. Police officers investigating

the murder testified that local residents appeared to be afraid

to get involved.

In his defense, Sharpe offered the testimony of his aunt and

her neighbor, who offered partial alibis, and of two witnesses

who testified that Stokes was untrustworthy. Sharpe also

attempted to introduce further testimony from one of these

witnesses, a woman named Tracy Highsmith. On voir dire,

Highsmith stated that her boyfriend, Damien Smith, had come

home on the night of the murder and confessed to shooting a

man, presumed to be Radcliffe, whom he had attempted to

rob. According to Highsmith, Smith repeated comments to

this effect several times over the next three weeks. Smith

committed suicide twenty-seven days after the murder, and

while Highsmith asserted that he had become increasingly

agitated after Radcliffe was killed, she also admitted that he

had repeatedly threatened suicide before Radcliffe’s death.

Although Sharpe’s attorney argued that Highsmith’s testimony should be admitted under the dying declaration and

state of mind exceptions to the bar on hearsay evidence, the

court held that the testimony was inadmissible. A jury found

Sharpe guilty on July 24, 1995, and the North Carolina

Supreme Court sustained his conviction on appeal. State v.

Sharpe, 473 S.E.2d 3 (N.C. 1996).

On the day Sharpe was first arrested for the murder, Charlene Johnson had been beaten and stabbed by a group of

women for being a "snitch." Sharpe’s mother and aunt had

followed behind the women as they set out for Johnson’s

home and rescued Johnson from the attack. In the course of

taking her to the emergency room, they told her, in Johnson’s

words, that the "word on the street" was that Johnson was "the

one that said something about Dontae murdering Mr. Radcliffe." For safety reasons, Johnson went to live outside of

Greenville, but her mother could not come with her, and she

returned after a few weeks. Johnson came to form a relationship with Sharpe’s family, and eventually with Sharpe him4 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 4 of 19
self, visiting him in prison at least twice. Not long after his

conviction, Johnson recanted her testimony.

In February 1997, Sharpe filed a motion for appropriate

relief ("MAR") in North Carolina Superior Court, alleging

that the recantation entitled him to a new trial and raising, for

the first time, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The

MAR court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that

Johnson’s recantation was not credible. It also held that the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim had been defaulted.

Sharpe then filed for habeas corpus in federal court, and the

district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on his claims.

Just prior to the hearing, a man named Dearl Powell came forward, claiming to have witnessed the shooting and indentifying Smith as Radcliffe’s killer. In Powell’s account, Radcliffe

was in the driver seat of the truck and Wilbur Mercer was in

the passenger seat when Smith shot Radcliffe through the

driver side window. According to Powell, after being shot,

Radcliffe drove the truck off. Powell began to testify at the

habeas hearing, but the district court cut him off before he

could be cross-examined and ordered that his evidence be

presented first in North Carolina court.

Sharpe filed another MAR in November 2001, seeking a

new trial under North Carolina law on the basis of newly discovered evidence of actual innocence and renewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A second evidentiary

hearing was held before the same judge who had considered

Sharpe’s earlier MAR. After listening to Powell and considering the entire evidentiary record, the court concluded that his

testimony was not credible and denied Sharpe’s actual innocence claim. In addition, the court held that Sharpe’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not only defaulted, as it

had done previously, but also that it would fail on the merits.

Sharpe then returned to federal court. Without holding an

evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Sharpe

SHARPE v. BELL 5

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 5 of 19
had sufficiently made out a claim of "actual innocence" under

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to justify setting aside

his procedural default under North Carolina law. Sharpe v.

Bell, 571 F.Supp.2d 675, 681 (E.D.N.C. 2009). It also rejected

the state’s statute-of-limitations defense. Id. at 680. The district court then concluded that the failure of Sharpe’s counsel

to argue for the admission of Highsmith’s testimony under the

hearsay exceptions identified in Sharpe’s habeas petition violated the Sixth Amendment. Sharpe v. Bell, 595 F.Supp.2d

636, 644-45 (E.D.N.C. 2009). This appeal followed.

II.

A.

We begin with the district court’s conclusion that Sharpe’s

procedural default in raising his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be excused.1

 In general, "a federal

habeas court may not review constitutional claims when a

state court has declined to consider their merits on the basis

of an adequate and independent state procedural rule." Burket

v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2000); see also

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977). The MAR

court held that Sharpe had procedurally defaulted under

N.C.G.S. § 15A–1419(a)(3), a statute we have repeatedly held

to be both adequate and independent. Lawrence v. Branker,

517 F.3d 700, 714 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A federal habeas court "does not have license to question a state

court’s finding of procedural default" or to question "whether

the state court properly applied its own law." Barnes v.

Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 974 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). Nor is a procedural default waived when a state

court reaches the merits of a federal claim as an alternative

1

In light of the district court’s conclusion that the timeliness of Sharpe’s

federal habeas petition has been established as law of the case, we decline

the state’s invitation to consider anew whether Sharpe’s second petition

was time-barred under AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

6 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 6 of 19
basis for dismissal. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10

(1989); Ashe v. Styles, 39 F.3d 80, 86 (4th Cir. 1994).

Although the doctrine of procedural default limits federal

habeas review of state convictions, it does not provide an

absolute bar. In order to "balance the societal interests in

finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources

with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case," the Supreme Court has recognized an exception

for situations in which a petitioner’s incarceration represents

a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Schlup, 513 U.S. at

324. This exception excuses a procedural default where "a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 496 (1986). If a petitioner presents "new reliable

evidence" supporting a claim of actual innocence, the habeas

court must determine whether "it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327-28.

This assessment is based on a review of "all the evidence, old

and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to

whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of

admissibility that would govern at trial." House v. Bell, 547

U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28).

B.

Whether and to what extent AEDPA applies to Schlup

claims is the threshold question. One of the most significant

changes wrought by AEDPA was to provide that, with certain

limited exceptions, a petition for federal habeas must be

denied if it is founded on a "claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). With

respect to a Schlup claim of actual innocence, however, we do

not believe that this provision applies. State courts have no

occasion to adjudicate a Schlup claim as such and "the MAR

court’s primary holding—that the [ineffective assistance of

SHARPE v. BELL 7

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 7 of 19
counsel] claim was procedurally barred—was not an ‘adjudication on the merits’ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Stephens v.

Branker, 570 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2009); but see Cooper

v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (Rymer, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

But while a state court does not adjudicate a Schlup claim,

it may well decide matters relevant to one, quite possibly in

the course of deciding highly similar issues of state or federal

law. In addition to Section 2254(d), AEDPA also provides

that in a habeas proceeding challenging a state conviction, "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The habeas

petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Id. While Section 2254(d) thus has no application in the context of a Schlup

claim because it pertains only to a "claim that was adjudicated" in state court, Section 2254(e)(1) does come into play

because it refers to the "determination of a factual issue"—

that is, to a state court’s findings of fact, rather than its conclusions of federal law. See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210

(3d Cir. 2001); see also Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204,

212, 221 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying presumption of correctness under Section 2254(e)(1) in resolving Schlup claim).

This conclusion is generally consistent with the pre-AEDPA

standard of review for factual matters, which recognized the

need to defer to state court fact-finding as a matter of comity

and federalism. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432

(1983); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, (1981).

AEDPA does not make deference to state court fact-finding

dependent on the adequacy of the procedures followed by the

state court. Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2007);

Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d, 941, 951 & n. 17 (5th Cir.

2001); Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir.

2000). Nonetheless, the character of the process upon which

the state court based its conclusion may have some bearing on

whether a petitioner’s showing amounts to "clear and con8 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 8 of 19
vincing" evidence that the state court erred. Mendiola, 224

F.3d at 592. Where the state court conducted an evidentiary

hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should

be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state court’s part. This is especially so

when the court resolved issues like witness credibility, which

are "factual determinations" for purposes of Section

2254(e)(1). Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 858 (4th Cir.

2003). "[F]or a federal habeas court to overturn a state court’s

credibility judgments, the state court’s error must be stark and

clear." Cagle v. Branker, 520 F.3d 320, 324-25 (4th Cir.

2008) (citing Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 434); see also Miller v.

Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).

This all makes sense in the general scheme of things.

AEDPA in general and Section 2254(e) in particular were

designed "to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). Section 2254(e)(1) plainly seeks to conserve judicial resources

and reflects Congress’s view that there is no reason for a doover in federal court when it comes to facts already resolved

by state tribunals. That section also reflects Congress’s

respect for principles of federalism, recognizing that a decision to set aside state court factual findings intrudes on the

state’s interest in administering its criminal law. See Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The deference Section

2254(e)(1) requires has particular salience when a state

court’s determinations closely track the legal issues before the

federal habeas court. Where a state court looks at the same

body of relevant evidence and applies essentially the same

legal standard to that evidence that the federal court does

under Schlup, Section 2254(e)(1) requires that the state

court’s findings of fact not be casually cast aside. See Miller,

474 U.S. at 113 (citation omitted). Indeed, the cavalier treatment of such findings in federal Schlup proceedings would

contravene the course of federal-state relations set by the

Congress and the Supreme Court with great consistency over

a very considerable period of time.

SHARPE v. BELL 9

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 9 of 19
C.

In considering Sharpe’s petition, the district court found

that the combination of Sharpe’s two alibi witnesses, Johnson’s recantation, an absence of physical evidence linking

Sharpe to the crime, and the testimony of Highsmith and

Powell amounted to "a strong showing" under Schlup, and

that Sharpe’s procedural default on his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim should therefore be excused. Sharpe, 571

F.Supp.2d at 681. Yet the MAR court considered all this evidence and more, and specifically found that Powell’s testimony, Highsmith’s hearsay testimony, and Johnson’s

recantation were not credible and that Johnson’s original testimony at trial was. Unless Sharpe could present clear and convincing evidence that those findings were unwarranted, see 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the district court was obliged to respect

them in ruling on Sharpe’s Schlup claim. The district court,

however, did not so much as acknowledge the MAR court’s

efforts, other than to note in passing that the motion based on

Powell’s testimony had been rejected. Sharpe, 571 F.Supp.2d

at 678. Nowhere in its discussion of Sharpe’s actual innocence claim did it so much as mention the MAR court’s having probed and assessed the evidence that was the basis for

the claim. See id. at 680-81.

The court’s failure to do so was error. At the outset, we

note that the MAR court provided a much more substantial

fact-finding process than the district court and was far better

positioned to decide the sorts of factual matters that the district court opted to decide for itself. The MAR court heard

from nineteen witnesses altogether. The transcripts of the

MAR evidentiary hearings total more than three hundred

pages. Lest there be any doubt, the MAR court repeatedly

alluded to its impressions of the demeanor and comportment

of various witnesses and made it clear that its judgments were

informed by those observations. The district court, by contrast, held only a truncated evidentiary hearing and made no

findings of fact or assessments of credibility. Where, for

10 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 10 of 19
example, the MAR court concluded that Johnson’s recantation

was untrustworthy after hearing from a dozen different witnesses on the matter, the district court credited Johnson’s

recantation without hearing even from Johnson, let alone anyone else who could speak to the veracity of her statements.

We also note that the MAR court was tasked with an

inquiry similar to that required of the district court. It considered Sharpe’s claim for a new trial under North Carolina law

based on new evidence of actual innocence. The claim was

rejected after considering Powell’s testimony in light of a

holistic examination of the entire record, including both Johnson’s recantation and Highsmith’s story of Smith’s confession. The court’s decision was based on a preponderance of

the evidence standard. See State v. Beaver, 229 S.E.2d 179,

183 (N.C. 1976). The only appreciable respect in which the

state court’s legal analysis differed from Schlup was that the

court itself evaluated the evidence, rather than attempting to

predict the reaction of hypothetical jurors to that evidence.

See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 (actual innocence is based upon

"a probabilistic determination" that "no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find [petitioner] guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt."). Given the similarity of the state proceedings to petitioner’s habeas claims under Schlup, the state

court’s factual determinations should have exerted a heavy

pull on the habeas court’s adjudication.

D.

Turning to the reasoning of the MAR court’s opinion, we

note that the explanations it provided were commendably

thorough. The district court’s explanation of its Schlup ruling

consisted of five sentences. See Sharpe, 571 F.Supp.2d at 681.

By contrast, the MAR court’s analysis on the single issue of

Powell’s credibility took up eleven pages. And in terms of

substance, we find the MAR court’s conclusions to be plainly

reasonable and certainly uncontradicted by clear and convincing evidence.

SHARPE v. BELL 11

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 11 of 19
In determining that Dearl Powell’s testimony "entirely

lacks credibility," the MAR court exhaustively catalogued the

problems with it. We touch only a few of those problems

here. Powell’s account did not square with the medical examiner’s testimony as to the bullet’s trajectory. It was also inconsistent with the fact that Wilbur Mercer and Damien Smith

were like father and son and Mercer had been at Smith’s bedside when life support was turned off, yet in Powell’s account,

Mercer was sitting next to Radcliffe in the truck when Smith

fired the fatal shot. No explanation was provided for why

Smith would "endanger someone so close to him."

Powell’s claim that Radcliffe drove the car into Vines’s lot

was inconsistent with the medical examiner’s opinion that

Radcliffe would have lost all consciousness within seconds of

being shot. Powell’s claim that Smith had robbed Radcliffe

was inconsistent with the fact that money was found in Radcliffe’s wallet. Powell’s account, in which Joyner "plays no

part," was inconsistent with the fact that Joyner pled guilty as

an accessory. Powell denied that the shooting had taken place

in Sharpe drug-selling territory, contradicting the testimony of

multiple witnesses.

The MAR court also noted reasons to doubt Powell’s

motive in testifying and his general trustworthiness. Powell

claimed that he was moved to come forward because he did

not want to see an innocent man go to jail, yet somehow Powell did not come forward for six years and thereby "allowed

not just one, but two men, the Defendant and Mark Joyner, to

serve prison sentences for a crime they did not commit." The

court noted that Powell adopted a "belligerent[ ]" attitude on

the stand inconsistent with his claim that it was his conscience

that prompted him to come forward. The court expressed

skepticism at Powell’s suggestion that it was simply a "‘coincidence’" he came forward just in time for Sharpe’s federal

habeas hearing, and it noted that Powell sat with Sharpe’s

family and supporters throughout the MAR proceedings. It

12 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 12 of 19
also took account of Powell’s own criminal record and the

fact that he too was a drug dealer.

In contrast, the MAR court found that Johnson’s and

Stokes’s original trial testimony was believable. That testimony was consistent with the rest of the evidentiary record in

every way that Powell’s testimony was not. Furthermore,

Johnson and Stokes "independently and separately" came forward soon after Radcliffe’s shooting and gave accounts that

were consistent with one another. Both Stokes and Johnson

were subjected to rigorous cross-examination, but neither

wavered in her testimony. The truthfulness of Johnson’s original testimony was also corroborated by numerous witnesses

who testified that Johnson consistently gave the same account

before trial, even though she had been "severely" beaten for

having identified Sharpe to the police. Both Stokes and Johnson "had to have known that it was very dangerous to spread

a lie, if it was one, about Dontae Sharpe."

The MAR court also found reasons to question the credibility of Johnson’s recantation and Highsmith’s hearsay testimony. Johnson was "young and lonely" and only recanted

after having befriended Sharpe and his family. Highsmith’s

story was particularly dubious in light of the fact that,

although the police had originally suspected her of murdering

Smith, she somehow never told them what would have been

an exculpatory story of Smith’s confession and his subsequent

emotional turmoil and suicide. And despite the reward that

was being offered for information about the killing, Highsmith did not tell anyone her story until the eve of trial. The

court also took account of Highsmith’s criminal record. Furthermore, even if Highsmith was telling the truth, the court

noted reasons to doubt the veracity of Smith’s supposed confession. Smith was a drug user and was emotionally disturbed,

as evidenced by his suicide. Any confession would also need

to be discounted as hearsay, uttered entirely in private, rather

than offered under oath in court.

SHARPE v. BELL 13

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 13 of 19
Finally, the MAR court noted that investigators could not

find witnesses and that "[p]eople behaved as though they were

afraid to speak." That finding was consistent with the killer

being a live drug dealer, capable of striking fear into the heart

of the community, rather than a dead man, who could strike

fear into no one. And the MAR court recognized that Highsmith’s story may well have formed a "nucleus" around which

to build a story implicating Smith, who by then was "conveniently dead."

Based on all of these considerations, the state court concluded that Sharpe had not established by a preponderance of

the evidence that Johnson’s and Stokes’s trial testimony had

been called into any real doubt. That conclusion and the subsidiary determinations on which it rested should have been

taken into account in the district court’s analysis of the

requirements set out in Schlup. Even without the deference

that AEDPA mandates, there is little basis for concluding that

Sharpe had successfully made out his Schlup claim. But when

the requirements of Section 2254(e)(1) are factored in, the

appropriate course for the district court was apparent.

III.

A.

Sharpe’s flawed Schlup claim is not the only problem with

his habeas petition. Even if the procedural default could

somehow be excused, Sharpe’s ineffective assistance argument has its own deficiencies. Sharpe’s ineffectiveness claim

centers on the proposed testimony of Tracy Highsmith, who,

as noted, was prepared to tell the jury that her boyfriend

Damien Smith had confessed to the murder prior to his suicide three weeks later. Sharpe argues that his attorney’s failure to argue for the admission of Highsmith’s testimony at

trial either as a statement against penal interest under North

Carolina evidentiary law or under the due process principle

14 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 14 of 19
established in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973),

denied him the right to effective assistance of counsel.

To make out such a claim, Sharpe must show (1) "that

counsel’s performance was deficient," and (2) "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). With respect to the

first prong of the Strickland test, Sharpe "must show that

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance "must be highly deferential," and a reviewing court

must avoid the biases of hindsight. Id. at 689. Under the second prong of the test, Sharpe must establish that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

It should be obvious that the failure of Sharpe’s gateway

actual innocence claim under Schlup makes it less likely that

Sharpe’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim would succeed on the merits. First, unlike the Schlup claim, Sharpe’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected in the

state court proceedings, and the state courts’ disposition of

that claim is entitled to the full measure of AEDPA deference.

Second, the range of materials favorable to Sharpe’s case that

are relevant to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

more restricted than those relevant to his actual innocence

claim. Newly discovered post-trial evidence -– Powell’s testimony and Charlene Johnson’s recantation—would have no

bearing on Sharpe’s particular Sixth Amendment claim.

As discussed, Section 2254(d) ordinarily bars federal

habeas relief for "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings," and the MAR court rejected

Sharpe’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on substantive, as well as procedural, grounds. Despite Sharpe’s contention to the contrary, a state court’s alternative holding on the

merits of a constitutional claim qualifies for deference under

SHARPE v. BELL 15

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 15 of 19
Section 2254(d).2

Stephens, 570 F.3d at 208; accord Brooks

v. Bagley, 513 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Harris,

489 U.S. at 264 n.10. In order to win relief, Sharpe would

therefore need to show that the MAR court’s adjudication on

the merits either "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), or was "based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Furthermore,

under Section 2254(e)(1), factual findings must be taken as

correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).

B.

In this case, the MAR court found that Sharpe failed both

prongs of Strickland because Highsmith’s testimony would

not have been admissible under the hearsay exceptions Sharpe

claims his attorney should have invoked. The court reasoned

that since the testimony would not have been admissible,

Sharpe’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue for its

introduction. 

Certainly, the MAR court did not reach a result "contrary

to" Strickland, since it relied on the case and correctly articulated its holding. Nor did it unreasonably apply Strickland in

concluding that, since Highsmith’s testimony was inadmissible, it was neither objectively unreasonable nor prejudicial to

Sharpe’s case to refrain from seeking its admission. "Counsel

2Sharpe also asserts that the MAR court rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim "without any substantive analysis," but that allegation is plainly untrue. The MAR court’s discussion of Sharpe’s claim was

extensive, and Sharpe himself takes issue with various points in the court’s

reasoning. At any rate, § 2254(d) applies to a state court’s rejection of a

constitutional claim even where the court "did not articulate the rationale

underlying its rejection" of the claim. Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158

(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

16 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 16 of 19
is not required to engage in the filing of futile motions."

Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). Therefore, the only question is whether the MAR

court’s conclusion that the testimony would not have been

admissible was unreasonable.

The North Carolina Rules of Evidence allow a person’s

statement that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay to be

admitted in a criminal trial if, inter alia, the statement "so far

tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability . . . that a

reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true" and if "corroborating

circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(3). The MAR court concluded that a confession by Smith made at home and only to

his live-in girlfriend was not one that would tend to subject

Smith to criminal liability. It also held that the circumstances

surrounding the making of the statement indicated that the

statement was not trustworthy.

The district court cast aside this conclusion, arguing that

there was no North Carolina authority for the proposition that

a statement made only to a live-in girlfriend could not constitute a statement against penal interest. See Sharpe, 595

F.Supp.2d at 643. It is beyond the mandate of federal habeas

courts, however, to correct the interpretation by state courts of

a state’s own laws. Cagle, 520 F.3d at 324 (citing Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). To do so only on the

basis of an absence of authority to support the state court’s

conclusion, rather than the presence of contrary authority, is

particularly misguided.

Thus, Sharpe’s entire Sixth Amendment claim, and the correctness of the result reached by the district court, hinges on

establishing that it was unreasonable for the MAR court to

conclude that the due process interpretation given in Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, would not have supported the introduction

of Highsmith’s testimony. Chambers required that a defenSHARPE v. BELL 17

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 17 of 19
dant be allowed to introduce evidence that a third party had

confessed to the crime of which the defendant stood accused.

Id. at 302. In Chambers, however, the third party confessed

in writing, orally confessed to three different people, and was

available to testify at trial. Id. at 297. The MAR court noted

that the deceased Smith’s alleged oral confession only to his

girlfriend differed in every respect from the situation in

Chambers, and that, according to the Supreme Court, Chambers "specifically confined its holding to the ‘facts and circumstances’ presented in that case." U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.

303, 316 (1998) (plurality) (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at

303). 

In addition, the result in Chambers was predicated on the

existence of "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness,"

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, and the MAR court provided

numerous reasons to consider the Highsmith hearsay untrustworthy. These included Highsmith’s criminal record, the fact

that she never came forward with her testimony until the eve

of trial, the fact that Smith was obviously emotionally disturbed, the fact that Smith allegedly claimed to have robbed

the victim when Radcliffe’s wallet was found in the truck

with fifty three dollars in it, and the fact that no evidence in

the record at the time of trial corroborated Highsmith’s testimony.

As it had done with the MAR court’s North Carolina Rules

of Evidence ruling, the district court rejected the MAR court’s

conclusion on Chambers. It never once considered the differences noted by the MAR court between the Highsmith hearsay and the facts of Chambers. Instead, it offered a smattering

of reasons to credit Highsmith’s testimony, including Johnson’s post-trial recantation. Sharpe, 595 F.Supp.2d at 644.

And it took issue with the MAR court’s reasoning that the

money in Radcliffe’s wallet undermined Highsmith’s story,

since Radcliffe might have been robbed without losing all of

his cash. Id. at 644-45. The court ignored all the other indications of untrustworthiness cited by the MAR court.

18 SHARPE v. BELL

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 18 of 19
Furthermore, in assessing Sharpe’s Strickland claim, the

district court also erred in taking into account Johnson’s

recantation. Johnson’s recantation occurred after Sharpe’s

conviction, and it cannot be used to suggest that it was more

likely that the Highsmith hearsay would have been admitted,

since neither Sharpe’s counsel nor the trial judge could possibly have been aware of it. Nor can Johnson’s recantation be

used to suggest that Sharpe might not have been convicted if

Highsmith’s testimony had been introduced, since the jury

would not have known of it either. "[A] court deciding an

actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of

counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular

case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). The North Carolina courts

were certainly reasonable in determining that the difficulties

in Sharpe’s case lay not in any deficiency of counsel but in

the understandable reluctance of the state system to buy a

belated and contrived attempt to pin Radcliffe’s murder on

someone who was all-too-conveniently deceased.

IV.

There is little left to say as to Sharpe’s petition except that

it overlooks the state courts’ efforts at every turn and in every

way. Quite aside from the damage inflicted on AEDPA and

dual sovereignty, a ruling in Sharpe’s favor would fail to recognize the dedicated manner in which the state court system

went about its work. The encouragement of capable and conscientious judging on the part of states is what comity is all

about. The state courts did their job well here and this case is

accordingly remanded with directions that the federal habeas

petition be dismissed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

SHARPE v. BELL 19

Appeal: 09-6206 Doc: 34 Filed: 01/29/2010 Pg: 19 of 19