Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02391/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02391-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Pamela Lee Lane
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAMELA LEE LANE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-02391-AC 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits (“DIB”) under Title II and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment are pending. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on January 12, 2011. Administrative Record 

(“AR”) 18. On the same day, plaintiff filed a separate application for SSI. Id. Plaintiff’s 

application was denied initially on September 1, 2011, and upon reconsideration on February 11, 

2012. Id. Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Peter F. Belli (ALJ) to 

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contest the denials on February 4, 2013. Id. The claimant and an impartial vocational expert 

(VE), Susan L. Creighton-Clavel, testified at the hearing. Id. Plaintiff was represented at the 

hearing by Donald E. Bartholomew, an attorney. Id. In a decision dated March 19, 2013, the 

ALJ found plaintiff not disabled. AR 30. 

The ALJ made the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through September 30, 2012. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 1, 2007, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease and multilevel facet arthritis of the 

cervical spine; cervical radiculitis; peripheral neuropathy; bilateral 

carpal tunnel syndrome, status post carpal tunnel release in the past; 

osteopenia in the hips and lumbar spine; and a history of migraine 

headaches. 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift, 

carry, push and/or pull twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds 

frequently and sit eight hours in an eight-hour workday with normal 

breaks. She can stand and walk six hours in an eight-hour workday 

with normal breaks. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. 

She can occasionally scoop, crouch, crawl and kneel. She is limited 

to frequent, but not constant, fingering and is limited to frequent, 

but not constant flexing or extending of the hands. She is limited to 

frequent gross manipulation. She has no limits on the ability to 

receive, understand, remember and carry out simple job 

instructions. She can frequently perform detailed job instructions. 

She is able to interact appropriately with coworkers, supervisors 

and the general public. She is able to make simple workplace 

changes and is able to make simple workplace judgments. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on November 29, 1959 and was 47 years 

old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced 

age, on the alleged disability onset date. 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English. 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

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whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform. 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from January 1, 2007, through the date of this 

decision. 

AR 20–30 (citations to the Code of Federal Regulations omitted).1

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council, but it denied 

review on August 14, 2014, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security. AR 1. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Born on November 29, 1959, plaintiff was 47 years old, which is defined as a younger 

person, on the disability onset date and 53 years old at the time of her administrative hearing. AR 

28. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. AR 20–

21. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

 

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 The ALJ’s decision erroneously categorizes plaintiff as a person closely approaching advanced 

age under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 as of January 1, 2007, her alleged disability onset date. AR 18, 

28. Plaintiff was, in fact, a younger person under the Federal Regulations until November 29, 

2009, when she turned 50. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (defining a “younger person” as an 

individual under the age of 50). Because plaintiff’s 50th birthday was before her date last 

insured, however, this mistake does not materially affect plaintiff’s disability determination at this 

stage of the proceedings. And in any case, plaintiff’s motion does not make this argument. 

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more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “While inferences from the record can constitute 

substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. 

Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Although this court cannot 

substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court nonetheless must review the 

record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 

the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 

576 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, 

one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons 

stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not 

rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 

871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, “[t]he ALJ in a social security case has an independent 

‘‘duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are 

considered.’’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 

which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 

ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the ALJ erred in giving no 

weight to the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Karen Ramsahai, MD; and (2) the ALJ 

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erred in refusing to credit plaintiff’s testimony as well as third party reports. The Commissioner, 

in turn, argues that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from 

legal error. For the reasons discussed below the court finds that the ALJ did not err in rejecting 

Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion or refusing to credit plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony and the lay 

witness reports. Accordingly, the court will grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment. 

A. Medical Expert Testimony 

1. Legal Standards 

Three types of physicians may offer opinions in social security cases: “(1) those who 

treat[ed] the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine [d] but d[id] not treat the 

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine[d] nor treat[ed] the claimant 

(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In general, the 

opinion of a treating doctor is accorded more weight than the opinion of a doctor who did not 

treat the claimant, and the opinion of an examining doctor is, in turn, entitled to greater weight 

than the opinion of a nonexamining doctor. Id. (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(1)(2). 

An ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted 

opinion of a treating or examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 

908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)). If contradicted by another doctor, the opinion of a treating or 

examining physician can be rejected only for “specific and legitimate reasons” that are supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 830–31 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating 

physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. An ALJ, however, “need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

supported by clinical findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 

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2. Medical History 

On May 27, 2010, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Kurt Moehring, DO, at Lassen Medical Group 

Red Bluff. AR 323–24. At that appointment, plaintiff complained of hand pain and diminished 

grip strength, along with pain in her elbows and shoulders, and migraines that were exacerbated 

by stress and neck problems. AR 323. Plaintiff stated at that time that she had modest pain relief 

with Excedrin. Id. Dr. Moehring indicated that plaintiff was living with her parents at the time 

and claimed to be in too much pain to work. Id. Dr. Moehring assessed plaintiff as suffering 

from: (1) chronic pain issues; (2) headaches; (3) carpal tunnel syndrome; (4) neck pain; (5) 

anxiety disorder; and (6) psychiatric disorder. Id. Dr. Moehring also noted that plaintiff appeared 

“thin, anxious, and tearful.” Id. Based on his assessment, Dr. Moehring ordered lab and x-ray 

work done, and prescribed plaintiff Cymbalta for her carpal tunnel syndrome. AR 323–24. The 

medical report generated by plaintiff’s radiologist, Dr. D L Casey, MD, states that plaintiff 

suffered from severe C5/C6 and C6/C7 degenerative disc disease, moderate C4/C5 degenerative 

disc disease, mild C7/T1 degenerative disc disease, multilevel face arthritis, and muscle spasm. 

AR 347. 

During plaintiff’s follow up visit with Dr. Moehring on June 10, 2010, he noted she was 

more comfortable, relaxed, and pleasant. AR 325. Nevertheless, plaintiff still complained of pain 

and weakness in her arms and hands. Id. Dr. Moehring assessed plaintiff as suffering from 

cervical radiculitis at that time, and instructed her to begin taking baclofen and ibuprofen for her 

chronic pain, along with an increase in Cymbalta. Id. Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Moehring for 

regular follow up appointments. After an appointment on July 20, 2010, Dr. Moehring opined 

that plaintiff would likely have difficulty performing certain job duties, “namely those that would 

require heavy lifting, lifting above the head, prolonged sitting/standing or tasks that require fine 

manipulation of the hands or activity that may be deemed too stressful.” AR 327. Nevertheless, 

Dr. Moehring recommended that plaintiff find some form of accommodating work. Id. 

During plaintiff’s next follow up visit on September 20, 2010, Dr. Moehring noted that 

plaintiff’s nerve conduction results were “not particularly impressive, some possible median 

nerve compression.” AR 329. Plaintiff was still reporting pain in her neck and, now, her feet but 

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Dr. Moehring noted that she was less tearful and the Cymbalta seemed to be helping. Id. Dr. 

Moehring also warned plaintiff that she would soon be released to work, and opined that 

psychological issues may contribute to her symptoms. Id. Dr. Moehring also prescribed plaintiff 

gabapentin for her peripheral neuropathy. Id. On November 16, 2010, plaintiff was examined by 

Dr. Julian P. Alexander, MD, who noted that 15 years ago she had a cataract surgical procedure. 

AR 353. Dr. Alexander’s examination revealed that plaintiff had a posterior subcapsular cataract 

and as a result, she underwent a YAG laser capsulotomy. Id. Dr. Alexander opined that the 

capsulotomy would likely allow for significant visual improvement. Id. 

On June 13, 2011, plaintiff had her first appointment with Mr. Mark Lamberson, a 

physical therapist at Red Bluff Physical Therapy. AR 431. Plaintiff told Mr. Lamberson that she 

had undergone carpal tunnel surgery seventeen years ago with good results until the last few 

years. Id. Plaintiff also complained of debilitating neck pain. Id. At that time, Mr. Lamberson 

scheduled plaintiff for three physical therapy sessions a week for the next six weeks. Id. Plaintiff 

consistently attended physical therapy sessions with Mr. Lamberson with generally positive 

results until August 23, 2011. AR 397–431. Nevertheless, plaintiff’s symptoms never subsided 

entirely. Id. 

Plaintiff continued seeing Dr. Moehring with similar results until September 2011. AR 

484–91. Dr. Moehring made various small changes to plaintiff’s medication regimen during that 

time, but his observations remained essentially the same. Id. Plaintiff next saw Dr. Moehring on 

January 31, 2012, for exacerbation of her migraines and back pain. AR 572–73. At that time Dr. 

Moehring instructed plaintiff to continue her current medication regimen, plus take Vicodin as 

needed. Id. Dr. Moehring also again commented that he did not “believe [plaintiff] [was] fully 

disabled and it would be in her best interest to find some form of accommodating work as [they 

had] discussed numerous times at previous [appointments].” AR 573. Plaintiff then had two 

more follow up visits with Dr. Moehring on February 21 and May 25, 2012. AR 571–66. 

On July 26, 2012, Dr. Jack Kure, MD, performed a CT scan on plaintiff ordered by Dr. 

Moehring. AR 587. Dr. Kure noted that plaintiff had chronic multilevel degenerative disc 

changes most pronounced at C5–6 ad C6–7. Id. In addition, Dr. Kure found “reversal of the 

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normal cervical lordotic curvature and minor hypertrophic encroachment on the C5–6 

neuroforamina bilaterally and the left C6–7 neuroforamina.” Id. Dr. Kure also noted there was 

no evidence of cervical disc herniation but that an MRI might indicate otherwise. Id. 

Shortly before plaintiff’s CT scan, on July 12, 2012, she saw a new primary care 

physician at Rolling Hills Clinic, Dr. Gary Kiefer, MD. AR 599. According to Dr. Kiefer’s 

medical report, plaintiff was seeking a second opinion regarding her chronic pain syndrome 

diagnosis. Id. During plaintiff’s visit she complained of neck, hand, and wrist pain, as well as 

migraines. Id. Dr. Kiefer referred her to the Red Bluff Wellness Center (“Wellness Center”) for 

pain management and ordered a round of x-rays and diagnostic imaging. Id. Plaintiff visited the 

Wellness Center twice, on July 27, 2012, and August 21, 2012. AR 589–90. After plaintiff’s 

second visit, notes from the Wellness Center indicate that plaintiff continued to have arm pain but 

otherwise had “marked improvement in her mobility and activity tolerance.” AR 590. Plaintiff 

continued to return to Dr. Kiefer for follow-up visits until her last visit on September 13, 2012. 

AR 592–99. 

On December 13, 2012, plaintiff saw Dr. Karen Ramsahai, MD, at Rolling Hills Clinic. 

AR 642–44. Plaintiff reported that she was compliant with pain medication, receiving adequate 

pain relief, and experiencing improved functioning in her activities of daily living. AR 642. Dr. 

Ramsahai refilled plaintiff’s Vicodin prescription, performed a medical check up, and discussed 

her migraines. AR 642–44. A musculoskeletal exam revealed normal grip strength despite 

thenar atrophy, and “5/5 upper and lower extremity strength.” AR 643. Dr. Ramsahai ordered a 

number of lab tests, referred plaintiff to the Chico Pain Clinic to evaluate her chronic neck and 

joint pain, and referred her to Dr. McCarty in rheumatology at Greenville Rancheria. Id. On 

January 15, 2013, plaintiff had a follow up visit with Dr. Ramsahai. AR 639-40. No physical 

examination was conducted on this date. AR 639. On this occasion plaintiff reported that she 

was not getting adequate pain relief. Id. Dr. Ramsahai ordered a routine gynecological 

examination including a mammogram, screening, and bone density/DEXA. AR 639–40. 

Plaintiff’s DEXA bone mineral study revealed that she suffered from osteopenia in the hips and 

the spine. AR 647. 

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3. Analysis 

The court finds that the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion, because he 

articulated specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. Finding that Dr. Ramsahai’s medical 

opinion was not entitled to any weight, the ALJ stated the following: 

In this regard, no weight is given to the extreme findings assessed 

by Dr. Ramsahai in the medical source statement she completed in 

February 2013, after two visits with the claimant. She limited the 

claimant to lifting less than ten pounds, standing/walking two hours 

total, and sitting two hours total in an eight-hour workday. She also 

stated that the claimant would be absent from work more than three 

times a month, in addition to the other limitations. (Exhibit 38F). 

The undersigned finds that her conclusions as to disability or 

functional capacity are not supported by detailed, clinical diagnostic 

evidence. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527 and 416.927; SSR 96-2p. She did 

not cite objective findings that relate to functional limitations and 

restrictions assessed; and her findings appear to be based solely 

upon the claimant’s recitations of her subjective complaints. Her 

minimal findings noted at the time of her evaluations are not 

consistent with the extreme limitations she assessed, nor are they 

consistent with the findings in the other evidence of record, as 

described above. As noted above, in December 2012, Dr. Ramsahai 

noted the claimant reported improved ability to function and 

perform activities of daily living more tolerably. It also appears that 

she did not examine the claimant at the time of her statements, 

which suggests that her conclusions were an accommodation in part 

by the physician in an attempt to assist the claimant in her disability 

claim, rather than for treatment. 

AR 26. 

Plaintiff argues first that Dr. Ramsahai did not base her opinion solely on plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints, as the ALJ stated. ECF No. 16 at 16–17. Plaintiff notes that Dr. Ramsahai 

also relied on her own observations and clinical studies such as the DEXA bone mineral study. 

Id. Second, plaintiff argues that Dr. Kinnison’s opinion cannot constitute a specific and 

legitimate reason to discount Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion because his clinical findings were 

essentially the same as Dr. Ramsahai’s, only his conclusions differed. Id. at 18–19. As an 

examining physician, Dr. Kinnison’s conclusions cannot constitute a specific and legitimate 

reason to discount Dr. Ramsahai’s conclusions if they are both based on the same clinical 

findings. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. 

As plaintiff notes, Dr. Ramsahai assessed plaintiff on two occasions prior to completing 

the Medical Opinion form, and made observations regarding her appearance, demeanor, 

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medication regimen, and medical history. AR 639–42.2 While plaintiff is thus correct that Dr. 

Ramsahai had access to information other than plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s 

concern was with the basis for Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion regarding the degree of functional 

limitation. Given the absence of objective medical evidence to support those findings, it is 

reasonable to infer that Dr. Ramsahai relied on the subjective complaints plaintiff made at her 

second visit. Any error in this regard is harmless in any event, because Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion 

was not rejected simply for its inferred reliance on subjective complaints. Rather, the ALJ 

mentioned that issue in the context of his larger point: that Dr. Ramsahai failed to provide an 

adequate basis for her opinion. AR 26. 

The ALJ is correct that Dr. Ramsahai’s report did not identify or discuss any specific 

clinical evidence to support her findings regarding the degree of plaintiff’s functional limitations. 

Instead, Dr. Ramsahai simply identified the relevant diagnoses. AR 656 (identifying medical 

findings that support limitations as “cervialgia, CTS, osteoarthritis, migraines”). The ALJ 

correctly found that these references do not constitute “detailed, clinical diagnostic evidence” of 

functional capacity. An ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor, even a treating physician, if 

the opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Thomas, 278 

F.3d at 957. Dr. Ramsahai’s single page check-off form, containing no narrative justification for 

its conclusions, is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. There is 

therefore no legal error. 

Regarding Dr. Kinnison’s opinion, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously relied on the 

opinion of an examining physician to discount the opinion of a treating physician. Standing 

alone, Dr. Kinnison’s opinion would not constitute a specific and legitimate reason to discount 

Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion. Dr. Kinnison, an examining physician, found that plaintiff suffered from 

(1) chronic headaches; (2) neck and shoulder pain; (3) bilateral hand pain with questionable 

thenar eminence atrophy; and (4) fibromyalgia. AR 372. Dr. Ramsahai’s assessments were 

substantially similar and included (1) migraines; (2) cervicalgia (neck pain); (3) myalgia and 

 

2

 Only the first of the two visits, however, included objective clinical findings based on 

examination. Compare AR 643 with AR 693. 

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myositis (muscle pain); and (4) osteoarthritis. AR 643. When an examining physician relies on 

the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the 

conclusions of the examining physician are not “substantial evidence” sufficient to discount the 

treating physician’s opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. 

The ALJ, however, did not rely on Dr. Kinnison’s opinion as grounds to reject Dr. 

Ramsahai’s opinion. Rather, the ALJ accepted Dr. Kinnison’s assessment of plaintiff’s functional 

limitations after rejecting Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion not only as unsupported but also as inconsistent 

with the other medical evidence and with Dr. Ramsahai’s own evaluation of plaintiff on 

December 13, 2012. The ALJ found that Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion was inconsistent “with the 

findings in the other evidence of record, as described above.” AR 26. The medical evidence of 

record described by the ALJ immediately preceding his discussion of Dr. Ramsahai included 

plaintiff’s course of treatment with Dr. Moehring. The ALJ detailed Dr. Moehring’s two-year 

history of clinical findings, course of treatment, and repeated conclusions that plaintiff’s 

functional limitations did not preclude work. AR 24-25. There is no error in the ALJ’s finding 

that Dr. Ramsahai’s opinion is inconsistent with the record as a whole. 

Moreover, the ALJ permissibly relied on the inconsistency between Dr. Ramsahai’s 

opinion and her own assessment of December 13, 2012. AR 26. The ALJ noted that during this 

visit plaintiff “reported improved ability to function and perform activities of daily living more 

tolerably.” Id. The same report notes plaintiff claimed to be “receiving adequate pain relief with 

current meds.” AR 642. Despite these observations, Dr. Ramsahai’s Medical Opinion opines 

that plaintiff can only stand and walk for two hours during an 8-hour day, and sit for two hours in 

an 8-hour day. AR 656. This inconsistency constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s 

decision to disregard Dr. Ramsahai’s Medical Opinion. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

For these reasons, the ALJ did not err. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

1. Legal Standards 

“In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); see 

also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). “First, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112; Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner 

may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are 

unsupported by objective evidence.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “Second, if 

the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112; Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must 

identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” 

Berry, 622 F.3d at 1234 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 834; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918. 

2. Analysis 

The court finds that the ALJ did not err in finding plaintiff’s pain testimony not to be 

credible, because he offered specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. In discussing 

plaintiff’s testimony the ALJ states the following: 

Evaluating the claimant’s subjective complaints pursuant to 20 CFR 

404.1529, 416.929 and the guidelines of Social Security Ruling 96-

7p, the undersigned concludes that the claimant is not limited by 

incapacitating pain or mental limitation from performing sustained 

work activity at the established residual functional capacity. This 

conclusion is reached after reviewing the claimant’s statements 

concerning her abilities, which include a fairly wide range of 

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activities that are incompatible with the degree of pain or mental 

limitation the claimant alleges. The record shows that the claimant 

lives alone. She feeds her cat, chickens and fish. She drives, goes 

out independently, and does light housekeeping, cooking, laundry 

and shopping. Her social life revolves around her church. (Exhibits 

5E, 11E, 2F, 3F). These activities do not support the degree of pain 

or mental limitation alleged by the complaint. 

There is a lack of medical documentation of an impairment which 

would cause extreme pain or pain which would compromise the 

claimant’s ability to perform work-related activities. The record as 

a whole does not reveal that the claimant is precluded from 

performing all regular, sustained work activity. The level of 

medication the claimant takes and her level of daily activity 

suggests that her pain is controlled sufficiently to enable her to 

perform work activity. There is no evidence of disuse muscle 

atrophy or wasting commonly associated with severe pain. In 

addition, there is no evidence of attention, concentration, or 

cognitive deficits from pain. There is no statement by a physician 

that the claimant experienced severe and unremitting pain. 

Moreover, as noted previously, physical therapy records in July 

2012 indicate that the claimant had marked improvement in her 

mobility and activity tolerance. (Exhibits 29F, 35F). Further, in 

December 2012, the claimant reported improved ability to function 

and perform activities of daily living more tolerably. She denied 

intolerable side effects from medications. (Exhibits 36F). 

Although the claimant alleged at the hearing that she is significantly 

limited in her daily activities due to severe pain, the recent medical 

evidence provided by the claimant’s representative does not support 

a significant change or worsening of her condition. 

AR 27–28. In making an adverse credibility determination, the ALJ failed to present any 

affirmative evidence that plaintiff was malingering, and was thus required to present “clear and 

convincing” reasons for rejecting plaintiff's testimony.3

 Lester, 81 F.2d at 834. 

First, plaintiff argues the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s testimony was contradicted by 

the medical evidence is not supported by the record. Specifically, plaintiff points to lab results 

supporting plaintiff’s claim that she suffers from significant back pain, degenerative disc disease, 

and osteopenia. ECF No. 16 at 21. These results include a 2010 nerve conduction test, 2010 xray impressions, a 2012 CT scan, and a 2013 bone study. Id. Plaintiff is not tasked, however, 

 

3

 The Commissioner argues that, contrary to Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 n.18 (9th 

Cir. 2014) and Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014), the clear and convincing 

standard is not the proper standard because it is contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 21 at 13 

n.9. The court, however, is bound to Ninth Circuit precedent and accordingly will apply the clear 

and convincing standard to the ALJ’s credibility determination. 

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with explaining what evidence in the record supports her contention that she suffers from a severe 

physical impairment. Instead, plaintiff must show that the ALJ did not give a specific, clear, and 

convincing reason for determining she lacked credibility. The court finds that plaintiff has not 

done so in light of the reasons stated in the ALJ’s decision. 

The ALJ specifically cites the following evidence that plaintiff’s pain testimony was not 

credible: (1) medical records from plaintiff’s physical therapist in July 2012 stating she had 

markedly improved in her mobility and activity tolerance; and (2) a medical report drafted by Dr. 

Ramsahai on December 13, 2012, stating that plaintiff “reports receiving adequate pain relief” 

and “improved ability to function and perform ADLs more tolerably” with her medication. AR 

27, 589–90, 642. The ALJ also notes that despite plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain, “the 

medical records show no indication of muscle wasting, deformity, gross muscle atrophy, or 

neurological defects.” AR 24. The ALJ’s decision also points out the fact that plaintiff’s 

longtime treating physician, Dr. Moehring, “[o]n multiple occasions . . . opined that the objective 

clinical findings did not warrant disability.” Id. In sum, the ALJ’s decision does more than 

simply assert the medical evidence in support of plaintiff’s testimony is insufficient, it points 

specifically to reports that cast doubt upon her claims. Plaintiff does not explain why these 

records do not constitute a specific, clear, and convincing reason to find plaintiff’s testimony 

lacks credibility. Indeed, the court finds that the cited medical evidence adequately supports the 

ALJ’s credibility determination. 

Second, plaintiff argues that her treatment history is consistent with her pain testimony. 

Plaintiff notes that she was prescribed Baclofen, Vicodin, Gabapentin, and Ibuprofen for pain 

relief. ECF No. 16 at 21. Nevertheless, she claims that she has continued to experience pain 

daily. Id. “Conservative treatment” may be sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of an impairment. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In finding that plaintiff had been “treated conservatively,” AR 24, the ALJ drew attention to a 

number of facts in the record. The ALJ pointed out that there is no indication in the record that 

surgery was ever suggested to plaintiff, as might be expected for intractable pain. Id. In addition, 

the ALJ found that “the level of medication [plaintiff] takes . . . suggests that her pain is 

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controlled sufficiently to enable her to perform work activity.” AR 27. In light of the deference 

afforded ALJs’ credibility determinations, Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522, the court finds the ALJ’s 

determination that plaintiff’s treatment regimen was conservative is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Third, plaintiff argues that her daily activities were consistent with her pain testimony. 

This is plaintiff’s strongest argument under the governing law. “[I]f a claimant engages in 

numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to the workplace, the ALJ may 

discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings relating to those activities.” 

Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. In addition, an ALJ may find a claimant’s pain testimony lacks 

credibility if that testimony is inconsistent with her claimed limitations. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, “disability claimants should not be penalized for 

attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

722 (9th Cir. 1998); see also id.; Om v. Colvin, 545 F. App’x 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Plaintiff’s evidence documents daily activities that are limited and could be consistent 

with her claimed limitations. In her function report plaintiff describes her daily activities as 

including (1) feeding her pet cat, chickens, and fish; (2) preparing simple meals such as 

sandwiches, cereal, and pasta; (3) going grocery shopping; (4) doing laundry and cleaning dishes; 

and (5) socializing with people at church. AR 226, 230. Plaintiff explicitly states that she could 

not prepare complex meals because of the pain she experienced in her hands. AR 228. Plaintiff 

also states that sometimes she requires assistance from her parents in opening jars, and 

performing other tasks such as feeding her pets and going grocery shopping. AR 227–29. In her 

testimony before the ALJ plaintiff went into further detail, explaining that she sometimes 

experiences pain gripping the steering wheel of her car, buttoning her clothes, and braiding her 

hair. AR 86, 90–91.4 These activities are consistent with plaintiff’s pain testimony, which 

revolves around migraines and chronic pain. AR 204. 

 

4

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accurate; plaintiff lives in a trailer by herself, but that trailer is located on her parent’s property. 

AR 73. 

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On the other hand, as previously noted, plaintiff’s function report and hearing testimony 

are inconsistent with statements she made to medical providers about her functioning. AR 27, 

589–90, 642. Less than two months before the hearing, plaintiff reported that pain medication 

was providing adequate relief, and that she was able to perform activities of daily living. AR 642. 

The inconsistency of plaintiff’s own statements about her activities of daily living was properly 

considered by the ALJ in evaluating her credibility. Moreover, even if the ALJ erred in 

concluding that the specific daily activities reported in plaintiff’s function report and hearing 

testimony are inconsistent with her claimed limitations, that error is harmless in light of the other 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons stated for rejection of plaintiff’s pain testimony. 

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds that the ALJ did not commit legal error 

in deciding that plaintiff’s pain testimony was not credible. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156 (the 

ALJ is responsible for determining credibility); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (where the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld). 

C. Third Party Statements 

1. Legal Standards 

Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must take 

into account, unless he expressly determines to disregard such testimony. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 

F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ must consider this testimony in determining whether a 

claimant can work. Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); 

see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(4); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, in doing so the ALJ is free to evaluate that testimony and determine the appropriate 

weight it should be given in the light of the other evidence. To discount the testimony of a lay 

witness, the ALJ must “give reasons that are germane to each witness.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053; 

see also Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). An ALJ 

who gives sufficient reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony may, in turn, rely on those 

reasons to discount substantially similar third party testimony as long as he does so explicitly. 

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Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694; Stephens v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-05156-RS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

170423, at *21–22 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (D.J. Seeborg). 

2. Analysis 

The court finds that the ALJ did not err by discounting the third party statements of 

plaintiff’s friends and family, because he gave reasons germane to their statements for doing so. 

In discounting the submitted third party reports, the ALJ stated the following: 

More recently, multiple third-party statements indicate that the 

claimant’s activities are quite limited. The undersigned has 

reviewed statements submitted by the claimant’s mother, Roberta 

DeGraw, and father, Richard DeGraw; sister, La Deanne Stubbs; 

Shuree Lee Boling; Dian Lynn Frydenger; Karey Giguere; and 

Susanna Crooks. (Exhibits 6E, 12E, 18E, 19E, 20E, 32F, 33F, 34F). 

However, the record does not provide evidence of an ongoing or 

worsening condition that would significantly reduce claimant’s 

functioning at this time. The undersigned finds that these 

statements are inconsistent with the medical record described 

above. 

AR 28. Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s blanket assertion that the third party testimony is inconsistent 

with the medical evidence is too vague to constitute a specific reason germane to each witness. 

ECF No. 16 at 26. The Commissioner, on the other hand, claims that the ALJ’s reasons were 

sufficient. ECF No. 21 at 15. In particular, the Commissioner points to “[p]laintiff’s own 

admissions that medication adequately controlled her pain and enabled her to better perform her 

activities of daily living (AR 24; 26–27; 401; 488; 642), and the conclusions of [p]laintiff’s longtime treating physician that she was not disabled and could work (AR 482; 484; 486–87).” Id. 

As the court has already discussed in detail, the ALJ’s decision found plaintiff’s pain 

testimony not to be credible in part because it was contradicted by her medical records. The ALJ, 

in turn, explicitly relies upon this same reason to discount the third party reports of plaintiff’s 

friends and family. After reviewing the relevant third party reports the court finds them to be 

substantially similar to plaintiff’s testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err because he 

discounted the lay witness testimony in this matter by giving reasons germane to each witness. 

See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694. 

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CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 16, is DENIED; 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 21, is 

GRANTED; and 

3. This Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case. 

DATED: March 17, 2016 

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