Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06125/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06125-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cube Corporation
Defendant
Vickie Lindsey
Plaintiff

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

VICKIE LINDSEY PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 04-6125

CUBE CORPORATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e, et seq., of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In her Complaint

(Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleges claims for sexual harassment and

retaliation. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 22), and for the reasons that follow,

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

A. Background

The following facts of this case are undisputed:

1. Defendant is a government contractor headquartered

in Sterling, Virginia, and is currently performing

a project for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on

Lake Ouachita in Royal, Arkansas. (Doc. 24 ¶ 1.) 

2. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant on October 26,

2000 as a “Grounds Maintenance Laborer I.” (Doc.

24 ¶ 3.)

3. On September 3, 2003, Plaintiff reported an

incident of sexual harassment to Defendant. (Doc.

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There is no indication in the available facts when 1

Simpson’s investigation concluded.

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24 ¶ 5.) In her report, Plaintiff alleged that on

July 12, 2003, Site Superintendent Garey Breshears

leaned into a truck cab occupied by Plaintiff and

her work partner, Charles Frazier, and placed an

empty beer can between her legs and asked her why

she was drinking on the job. (Doc. 23 Ex. A;

Simpson Aff. ¶ 4 and Ex. 5.) 

4. Defendant’s Lake Ouachita Project Area Manager,

Michael Simpson, investigated Plaintiff’s

allegations. In his written statement, Breshears

confirmed the incident, but contended the beer can

fell onto Plaintiff by accident and that he was

joking when he said “there was no drinking allowed

on the job.” (Doc. 23 Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 4 and

Ex. 7.) Following his investigation, Simpson

concluded no sexual harassment had occurred, but

determined Garey Breshears should be counseled for

behavior “un-becoming of a supervisor.” (Doc. 23 1

¶ 7 and Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 5 and Ex. 9.)

Breshears received a two-day suspension without pay

on September 9, 2003. (Doc. 24 ¶ 7.)

5. On December 12, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Charge of

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Discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Doc. 1. p. 4.) On

July 30, 2004, the EEOC issued a notice of right to

sue on July 30, 2004. (Doc. 7.)

6. On November 7, 2003, Breshears reported to Simpson

that he witnessed an argument between Plaintiff and

her male co-worker, Jackie C. Mahan. (Doc. 23 ¶ 8

and Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 6.) Breshears intervened

and removed both Plaintiff and Mahan to a different

location where the argument continued. (Doc. 23 ¶¶

8-9 and Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 16.)

Plaintiff alleged Mahan used his arm to nearly hit

her face and that he was “always hitting and

kicking us girls in the butt.” (Doc. 23 ¶ 9 and

Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 9 and Ex. 16.) During

Simpson’s investigation of the incident involving

Plaintiff and Mahan, Plaintiff made no allegation

of sexual harassment directed at any employee of

Defendant. (Doc. 24 ¶ 9.)

7. On November 17, 2003 Plaintiff and Mahan both

received two-day suspensions as a result of the

incident in which Mahan nearly hit Plaintiff in the

face with his arm. (Doc. 24 ¶ 10.) Defendant

alleges Plaintiff engaged in “abusive, aggressive,

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and insubordinate behavior” when she was told about

the two-day suspension. (Doc. 23 Ex. A; Simpson

Aff. ¶ 9.) As a result of this incident, Simpson

recommended to Defendant’s Human Resources

Director, Edie Widener, that Plaintiff’s employment

be terminated. (Id.)

8. Upon her return to work on November 20, 2003,

Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. (Doc. 23

Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 12.) Defendant’s stated

reason for Plaintiff’s termination was her behavior

exhibited on November 17, 2003, which Defendant

characterized as “inconsistent with appropriate

employee behavior.” (Doc. 23 ¶ 12 and Ex. A;

Simpson Aff. ¶ 10.)

B. Discussion

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges claims for sexual harassment and

retaliation. (Doc. 1.) Defendant moves for summary judgment

contending Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of

hostile work environment sex discrimination. Defendant also

contends Plaintiff has failed to prove her termination came as a

result of the complaint of sexual harassment lodged against Garey

Breshears. 

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

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The final element applies to allegations of non-supervisory 2

harassment, but not to allegations of supervisory harassment. See

Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999).

Page 5 of 11

favorable to the non-moving party. Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d

559, 562 (8th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden of

establishing the absence of issues of material fact in the record

and of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316

(1986).

1. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment

An employee is subject to hostile work environment sexual

harassment when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and

create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotations and citation

omitted). To establish a prima facie case of hostile work

environment sexual harassment by non-supervisory co-workers, a

plaintiff “must establish all of the following: 1) membership in a

protected group, 2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment, 3) a

causal nexus between the harassment and her membership in the

protected group, 4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or

privilege of employment, and 5) the employer knew or should have

known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial

action.” Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 2002). 2

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Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff claims harassment by her

supervisors, she need not prove her employer knew or should have

known of the harassment. See Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on Human

Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000).

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In the present case, Plaintiff is a member of a protected

class of individuals under Title VII and has alleged an instance of

unwelcome sexual harassment because of her gender. To succeed on

a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must also show that the

alleged harassment was “sufficiently severe and pervasive to create

a work environment that was both objectively and subjectively

hostile.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-87

(1998). The alleged conduct must have been “so extreme that it

amount[ed] to a change in the terms and conditions of her

employment.” Id. Whether the harassment created a hostile work

environment is a function of both the severity and pervasiveness of

the offensive conduct, with a high level of severity compensating

for a low level of pervasiveness and vice versa. Jackson v. Flint

Ink North Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2004). Courts

look “at all the circumstances,” including the “frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23

(1993).

In her pleadings submitted in this case, Plaintiff has related

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several instances of conduct in support of her claim of a hostile

work environment. The first occurred in July 2003, when Site

Superintendent Garey Breshears “took a beer can and put [it]

between [her] legs.” (Doc. 1; Compl. p. 2.) Plaintiff alleges

Breshears simultaneously stated, “there was no drinking on the

job.” (Doc. 23 Ex. A; Simpson Aff. and Ex. 7.)

The second incident involves Plaintiff’s allegation that coworker Jackie Mahan “was always hitting and kicking us girls in the

butt.” (Doc. 23 ¶ 9 and Ex. A; Simpson Aff. ¶ 9 and Ex. 16.) In

her deposition, Plaintiff added that she interpreted this behavior

as sexual in nature. (Doc. 23; Lindsey Dep. p. 73.) Third,

Plaintiff indicated in her deposition that Mahan had previously

either propositioned her for sex or asked her out on a date. (Doc.

23; Lindsey Dep. p. 73.)

Viewing all facts more favorably to Plaintiff, we find these

incidents are neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive to be

actionable under Title VII, as simple teasing, offhand comments and

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) do not constitute a

hostile work environment. Burkett v. Glickman, 327 F.3d 658, 661

(8th Cir 2003); Ford v. Colson Caster Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 991,

999 (E.D. Ark. 2005); see also Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d

958, 967 (8th Cir. 1999) (experiencing unpleasant conduct and rude

comments does not equate to severe or pervasive harassment that

altered conditions of employment). In addition, these instances do

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not reflect a pattern of discrimination marked by ongoing and

repeated conduct that would make a reasonable person conclude the

working environment was “permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).

While the incidents above were inappropriate, we conclude

Defendant’s motion should be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s

sexual harassment claim.

2. Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis “governs the

order and allocation of proof for retaliation claims.” Logan v.

Liberty Healthcare Corp., 416 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins. Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1048

(8th Cir. 2005)). Under this analysis, a plaintiff must first

establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) she engaged in

activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment

action occurred; and (3) that a causal connection linked the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. Krough v.

Cessford Const. Co., 336 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir., 2003); see also

Turner v. Gonzales, No. 04-3426, slip op. at 9 (8th Cir. August 30,

2005). If the prima facie case is met, the burden shifts to the

defendant to produce “a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the

action it took against the plaintiff.” Id. If the defendant

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satisfies its burden, the plaintiff is “then obliged to present

evidence that (1) creates a question of fact as to whether

[defendant’s] reason was pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable

inference that [defendant] acted in retaliation.” Smith v. Allen

Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002).

In viewing the facts more favorably to the Plaintiff, we find

Plaintiff met the first two requirements of the prima facie case

for retaliatory discharge as she engaged in protected activity by

lodging a complaint of sexual harassment on September 3, 2003, and

was later terminated. See Turner v. Gonzales, No. 04-3426, slip

op. at 9 (8th Cir. August 30, 2005). Whether Plaintiff has

presented sufficient evidence as to the third element, however, is

a closer case. 

In order to satisfy the causation element of the prima facie

case, a plaintiff must prove her employer’s retaliatory motive

played a part in the decision to terminate her. Gilooly v. Mo.

Dep’t of Health and Senior Servs., No. 04-2460, slip op. at 8 (8th

Cir. August 31, 2005) (citing Kipp v. Mo. Highway and Transp.

Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2002)). A plaintiff may

also satisfy the causation element by demonstrating a close

temporal proximity between a sexual harassment complaint and

discharge. See, e.g., Turner v. Gonzales, No. 04-3426 (8th Cir.

August 30, 2005) (finding five days between filing of a sexual

harassment complaint and discharge sufficient to meet the causation

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element of plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation); Sherman v.

Runyon, 235 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding two days is

sufficient to prove causation). 

Despite the two-month lapse between Plaintiff’s September 3,

2003, sexual harassment complaint and her termination on November

20, 2003, there is evidence sufficient to suggest a causal link

between these two events. Garey Breshears was the subject of

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaint and also the individual who

reported Plaintiff’s argument with co-worker Jackie Mahan, which

precipitated Plaintiff’s discharge. While this fact may only be

coincidental, it may bear on any motive Defendant had in

terminating Plaintiff. In addition, there is a factual dispute as

to the manner in which Plaintiff was terminated and the reasons

provided. Although Defendant’s stated reason for terminating

Plaintiff was her use of “loud, abusive, aggressive and

insubordinate behavior” on November 17, 2003, in response to a twoday suspension of her employment (Doc. 24 ¶ 11), there is evidence

to suggest that this conduct was widespread at the work site.

(Doc. 30 Ex. F; Simpson Dep. p. 41.) These issues raise a factual

question concerning the reason for Plaintiff’s termination and an

issue of material fact to be determined as to whether Plaintiff’s

behavior on November 17, 2003, was the true reason for Plaintiff’s

termination or a mere pretext for retaliatory discharge. 

We determine Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation should proceed

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to a determination on the issue of pretext, and summary judgment is

DENIED as to this claim.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we determine Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim of

sexual harassment and DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claim of

retaliation. Accordingly, this matter shall proceed to a jury

trial scheduled for the week beginning Monday, October 3, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of September, 2005.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson

______________________________

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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