Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05207/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05207-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Saiyez Ahmed
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 California's Three Strikes law appears in California Penal Code § 667(b)-(i). The heart of

the Three Strikes law is § 667(e), which prescribes increased terms of imprisonment for defendants

who have previously been convicted of certain "violent" or "serious" felonies. Under this

subdivision, a third strike defendant (with two or more prior felony convictions) receives an

indeterminate term of life imprisonment, which includes a minimum term. The minimum term for a

third strike defendant is the greatest of (i) "[t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment

for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions," (ii)

twenty-five years imprisonment in the state prison, or (iii) "[t]he term determined by the court

pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction," including any applicable enhancements. 

Cal. Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(A). These provisions apply in addition to any other enhancements or

punishment provisions which may apply. Cal. Penal Code § 667(e).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAIYEZ AHMED,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent. __________________________________________

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No. C 02-5207 SBA (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 concerning his 1998 conviction in Contra Costa 

County Superior Court. Warden James A. Yates (hereinafter "Respondent") opposes the

petition. Petitioner filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be

DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. Case History

On June 3, 1998, by amended information, Petitioner was charged with three felonies:

(1) forcible kidnap (Cal. Penal Code § 207(a)); (2) attempted murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187,

664); and (3) robbery (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 212.5(c)). It was further alleged that, under

California's Three Strikes law,1

 Petitioner suffered three prior strikes (Cal. Penal Code §§

667(a), 1170.12(c)(2)).

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On December 4, 1998, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser included offense of false

imprisonment (Cal. Penal Code § 236), acquitted of the attempted murder charge, and found

guilty as charged of one count of second-degree robbery. Petitioner's priors were bifurcated for

trial and submitted to the court for determination. (Answer at 2.) The trial court found

Petitioner's three prior strike allegations (three 1992 convictions for assault with a deadly

weapon with personal use of a firearm) to be true. (Id.) On January 22, 1999, Petitioner was

sentenced to state prison for twenty-five years to life pursuant to California's Three Strikes law. 

(Id.)

Petitioner's direct appeal was rejected by the California Court of Appeal on July 31,

2001. See Resp't Ex. C. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court

on August 16, 2001 raising his three unexhausted claims. See Resp't Ex. D. The California

Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's petition for review on October 24, 2001. See Resp't Ex. E. 

On October 28, 2002, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus

raising three claims. First, Petitioner claims the prosecutor in his state case (hereinafter

"Prosecutor") unlawfully used a peremptory challenge to remove an African-American

prospective juror. Second, Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by giving a jury

instruction allowing a permissive inference of guilt, thereby lessening the prosecution's burden

and denying Petitioner due process of law. Third, Petitioner claims that his sentence under

California's Three Strikes law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.

Respondent filed his Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter "Answer") on January 3, 2003

(docket nos. 7, 8). Petitioner filed his Traverse and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Traverse (hereinafter "Traverse") on March 19, 2003 (docket no. 11). The matter

has been fully briefed and is now ready for review on the merits.

II. Statement of Facts

The parties do not dispute the following facts, drawn from the appellate opinion. 

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 Johnson testified that she was forced into the car by Vaughn putting his hand on her neck

and forcing her into the front passenger seat. When Vaughn testified, he offered a different version

of events. He explained that Johnson willingly went with them after they first agreed to take her to

an area where she could locate some drugs. She indicated they could then take her home and

McElmore might be there. The jury found Vaughn and Ahmed not guilty of kidnapping and instead,

convicted them of the lesser offense of false imprisonment in connection with these events.

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Sherry Johnson, one of the victims in this case, testified about a series of

events that occurred on Saturday, February 21, 1998, which led to the brutal

beating of Shawn McElmore, who she described as her "boyfriend" for 15 years

and the father of her three children. Around midnight Johnson and McElmore

walked from their residence on 11th Street in San Pablo to the 7-Eleven store at

San Pablo Avenue and Broadway to purchase some beer. Johnson testified that

McElmore was already drunk, and they "argued the whole way there."

Appellants Vaughn and Ahmed were standing in front of the 7-Eleven

eating. At one point during their argument, Johnson ripped McElmore's shirt and

then pulled it off him. At this point, Johnson heard someone say something to

McElmore like, "It looks like you got your ass whooped." Johnson entered the

7-Eleven store while McElmore remained outside. Johnson stated that she exited

the store when she saw people running and it "clicked . . . that something was

going on" involving McElmore. She saw McElmore engaged in a fistfight in the

7-Eleven parking lot. At trial, Johnson identified appellants Ahmed and Vaughn,

whom she had never met before that evening, as two of the people McElmore was

fighting. The fight quickly ended after Johnson came out of the store because a

San Pablo police car drove by and McElmore ran away. Ahmed and Vaughn then

left the area in a green car.

McElmore then rejoined Johnson, and they began to walk home. As they

walked, they saw the green car Vaughn and Ahmed were driving waiting at the

corner. McElmore ran off and Johnson continued to walk. Vaughn got out of the

car and confronted Johnson, asking her, "[W]here's that nigger at? When we see

him, we're going to do him." Johnson explained at trial that to "do" someone

means to "[f]ight, beat up, kill, whatever." Johnson eventually entered the car and

drove around with Ahmed and Vaughn for approximately 20 minutes while they

looked for McElmore.2

 Johnson intentionally directed them to places that she

knew McElmore would not be "to give him time to get back to the house."

Eventually, they pulled up in front of the residence Johnson and

McElmore shared with their three children. Both appellants said, "There he is." 

Johnson testified that by the time the car stopped, it was clear McElmore was

holding a sawed-off shotgun as it was in plain view. Johnson testified Vaughn

and Ahmed "jumped out the car and ran towards [McElmore]." After stealing a

CD player from appellants' car, Johnson testified she ran into the house, called

911, and "grabbed [her] kids." Johnson came out of the house and found

McElmore lying face down in a pool of blood in the street. He had been severely

beaten.

McElmore was taken to John Muir Hospital in such serious condition that

he was not expected to live. He, however, survived. At the time of trial, it was

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clear he had suffered severe, permanent brain damage, and was unable to talk,

understand what is said to him, walk, or feed himself. He receives sustenance

through a tube inserted into his stomach, sleeps in a protective bed, and no further

improvement in his cognitive or motor functioning is anticipated. He will require

24-hour institutional care for the rest of his life. McElmore was 32 years old at

the time of the crime.

The defense consisted primarily of appellant Vaughn's testimony. Ahmed

did not testify at trial. Vaughn indicated that the altercation with McElmore

began at the 7-Eleven when McElmore walked up to him and asked "what the

fuck was I looking at." Vaughn testified he responded, "[W]hat the hell is your

problem, you know, mad at me because you're getting your ass kicked by

[Johnson]." His testimony about the events that occurred thereafter did not differ

significantly from Johnson's testimony other than to say that she went willingly

with them. Vaughn also contradicted Johnson's testimony by indicating that

McElmore moved behind the car as they pulled up in front of the residence and

that by the time McElmore pulled out the sawed-off shotgun, Vaughn was already

out of the car and had "nowhere to go" to escape. Vaughn also testified that as

McElmore pulled out the weapon, he said, "I'm about to kill y'all."

Vaughn testified that he never intended to kill McElmore, at most he

intended to have a fistfight with him, but that when McElmore pulled out the

shotgun, he believed his choices were "[e]ither stand there and get shot or run and

try and get the gun." He decided to charge McElmore with all his strength and

take the gun, and do his best to keep McElmore from getting the gun back and

shooting him with it. Vaughn testified his assault upon McElmore consisted of:

1) his elbow hitting McElmore in the face, 2) one swing of the side of the shotgun

against his McElmore's face, and 3) Vaughn falling down upon McElmore with

the shotgun hitting McElmore on the head as they hit the ground. He testified that

he had no idea how seriously injured McElmore was and that he took the gun

after the altercation out of concern that McElmore not have it.

Vaughn's testimony was rebutted by the medical evidence. Dr. Henry

Turkel, Jr., one of the first doctors to treat McElmore upon his arrival to John

Muir Hospital, testified that McElmore's injuries were "completely inconsistent"

with the account given by Vaughn as to the manner in which McElmore's injuries

were inflicted. Dr. Turkel testified that in his medical opinion, probably between

eight and ten blows were inflicted upon McElmore's head and face in order to

cause such extensive injuries. He described McElmore's face when he arrived at

the emergency room as "just completely massively swollen . . . . It was soft like a

rotten melon. . . . [I]t was unusually swollen and just mushy wherever you

touched it."

After approximately two days of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict

finding Vaughn and Ahmed guilty of false imprisonment of Johnson, a lesser

offense of the charged crime of kidnapping. Both Vaughn and Ahmed were

found not guilty of the attempted murder charge, but Vaughn was convicted of the

lesser offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, with great bodily injury and

deadly weapon use enhancements. Both Vaughn and Ahmed were found guilty of

second degree robbery for taking the shotgun from the scene.

People v. Ahmed, Nos. A086081/A086579, slip op. at 2-5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2001) (Resp't

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Ex. C) (footnote renumbered).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter

"AEDPA"), a district court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court only if the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

"Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States" refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of

the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69

(9th Cir. 2001). Section 2254(d)(1) "restricts the source of clearly established law to [the

Supreme] Court's jurisprudence." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413. "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a

federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 412-13. 

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.

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at 411. The objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear error standard. See Andrade, 538

U.S. at 63 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's use of clear error standard in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212

F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)). After Andrade, "[t]he writ may not issue simply because . . . a state

court's application of federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise." Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003). "While the 'objectively unreasonable' standard is not

self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of deference to the state courts than

[the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] previously afforded them." Id.

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's

adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue

made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption is not altered by the fact that

the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state trial court. See Sumner

v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); see also Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.

2001), amended by 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where, as here, the California Supreme Court denies review of Petitioner's claim

without explanation, the Court looks to the last reasoned state court decision in conducting

habeas review. See Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001) (the district court "looks through" the

unexplained California Supreme Court decision to the last reasoned state court decision). In the

instant case, the California Court of Appeal rendered the last reasoned state court decision. 

Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is structural error or

had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). 

Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims,

but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it

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 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

4

 In California, a party who believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges to

strike jurors on grounds of group bias alone may raise the point by way of a timely Wheeler motion. 

See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280 (1978).

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resulted in "actual" prejudice. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

II. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S.

129, 133-34 (1987). It is undisputed that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to the

claims raised in this proceeding.

III. Legal Claims

A. The Batson3 Standard

1. Background

Petitioner claims that his Equal Protection rights were violated by the Prosecutor's use of

a peremptory strike to excuse prospective juror Reginald H. (hereinafter "Juror No. 10"), an

African-American man. (Pet'r App. A at 3.) The appellate opinion summarized the facts as

follows:

Here, appellant Ahmed made a Wheeler motion4 after the prosecutor

exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 10, an African-American. 

Appellant Vaughn joined in the motion. The record reflects that at the time the

prospective African-American juror was peremptorily challenged by the

prosecution, there was an African-American in the jury box, an AfricanAmerican in the courtroom awaiting voir dire, and several other AfricanAmericans remaining outside the courtroom and waiting to enter if a jury was

not impaneled. Defense counsel indicated that race was the only apparent reason

for the challenge because the prospective juror did not "give any answers that

were out of the ordinary, unusual, or in any way would indicate that he could not

sit and be a fair and impartial juror in this matter."

Resp't Ex. C at 7 (footnote added).

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The trial court made a finding that Petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case. 

The court stated:

All right, I'm reviewing the questionnaire filled out by [Juror No. 10]. 

Give me just a moment.

All right, I have reviewed the entire questionnaire, and I also don't recall

exactly how many members of our second group, if you will, who are waiting

outside to be brought in, are African American. I noted that we had several in

the initial group, one is seated on the jury now, and we have gone through a

number of challenges, and that juror has not been challenged. Although the case

that has been cited allows that one challenge of one person of color, or other

protected class being challenged, is sufficient to make a Wheeler motion, I think

that there has to be that prima facie showing that, in fact, the questioned

challenge was race based. There may be a variety of reasons why that juror was

challenged. I don't know whether his having sat on an attempted murder jury

before, or any of the other responses, was the basis for the challenge. But in

order to grant a Wheeler, or to actually make the initial finding and request an

explanation from the People, requires a finding by the Court that there's a prima

facie showing that the challenge was race based. The fact that [Juror No. 10] is

African American, that alone, I don't think is sufficient to show that the

challenge is race based. There has to be some other indication. And I think the

fact that we have one other African American on the -- seated on the jury now

and who has not been challenged through several passes by the People, I think

there have been three passes since that juror was seated, does not support the

allegation that this was race based. So I don't find at that juncture that there's

sufficient basis for the prima facie showing, and I'll deny the Wheeler motion.

RT 160-161.

The appellate court reviewed Petitioner's Batson claim in an unpublished opinion. 

According to the appellate court:

Ahmed and Vaughn each contend "the prosecutor systematically

exercised [a] peremptory challenge to remove an African-American man from

sitting on appellant's jury in violation of appellant's state and federal

constitutional rights." The People counter that, "[w]hile it is theoretically

possible that a single challenge to a prospective juror might be racially

motivated, a defendant is hard-pressed to establish the prosecutor 'systematically

exercised his peremptory challenge' . . . to exclude members of a group where

only one challenge is made, other members of the group serve on the jury, and

the victims are members of the same group."

"Under Wheeler and Batson [i]f a party believes his opponent is using his

peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of group bias alone, he must

raise the point in timely fashion and make a prima facie case of such

discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. First, . . . he should make as

complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish

that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group. . . . Third, from

all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such

persons are being challenged because of their group association. [Citations.] [¶] 

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If the trial court finds that [he] has established a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to [his opponent] to provide a race-neutral explanation related to the

particular case to be tried for the peremptory challenge. [Citation.]" (People v.

Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 745 [internal quotations omitted].) In this case, the

burden never shifted to the prosecutor to explain her use of the peremptory

challenge because the trial court found appellants failed to set forth a prima facie

case of purposeful discrimination. This ruling is challenged on appeal. 

In order to set forth a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the

objecting party must show, from all the circumstances of the case, a "strong

likelihood" that persons are being challenged because of their group association

rather than because of any specific bias. (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) 

The appropriate standard of prima facie proof is described in Batson, supra, 476

U.S. at p. 96, as "raising an inference" of improper use of challenges. While

appellants argue these formulations for setting forth a prima facie case constitute

different standards, and that the "strong likelihood" standard should yield to the

"raising an inference" standard, our high court has recently clarified that the

standards set forth in Wheeler and Batson are equivalent. (People v. Box (2000)

23 Cal.4th 1153, 1188, fn. 7 ["in California, a 'strong likelihood' means a

'reasonable inference'"].) 

Appellate courts review trial court's rulings on Wheeler motions for

substantial evidence. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196-197.) 

Because such motions call upon trial judges' personal observations, an appellate

court will review their rulings with considerable deference. (People v.

Rodriguez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1112-1113.) "When a trial court denies

a Wheeler motion because it finds no prima facie case of group bias was

established, the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire." 

(People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1200.) "If the record 'suggests

grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged' the jurors

in question, we affirm." (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155; People

v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 171-172.) 

Here, appellant Ahmed made a Wheeler motion after the prosecutor

exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 10, an African-American. 

Appellant Vaughn joined in the motion. The record reflects that at the time the

prospective African-American juror was peremptorily challenged by the

prosecution, there was an African-American in the jury box, an

African-American in the courtroom awaiting voir dire, and several other

African-Americans remaining outside the courtroom and waiting to enter if a

jury was not impaneled. Defense counsel indicated that race was the only

apparent reason for the challenge because the prospective juror did not "give any

answers that were out of the ordinary, unusual, or in any way would indicate that

he could not sit and be a fair and impartial juror in this matter."

The trial court made a finding that appellants had failed to establish a

prima facie case. The court noted that the prosecutor passed the jury repeatedly

with an African-American on the panel who was now seated on the jury. The

trial court also found there were reasons that the challenged juror could be

eliminated based on his responses. Specifically, the prospective juror had

previously served as a juror in an attempted murder case. The prosecutor then

noted for the record that she had made six challenges, five of which were to

prospective Caucasian jurors, and that this was her first challenge to an

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African-American. 

We find no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for lack

of an adequate prima facie showing of group bias. To satisfy the burden of

proving a "prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the

court," the moving party must "make as complete a record of the circumstances

as is feasible," and "show a strong likelihood" that excluded persons in a

cognizable group "are being challenged because of their group association rather

than because of any specific bias." (People v. Trevino (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th

396, 403, citations, quotation marks, and fn. omitted; see also People v. Fuentes

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 714.) "Although there is no exhaustive list of

circumstances which a court should consider when determining whether a party

has made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, there are several

factors which the courts have said can be considered: [¶] 1) Whether most or all

of the members of the identified group from the venire are challenged, or use of a

disproportionate number of peremptories against the group. [Citation.] [¶] 2)

Whether the jurors in question share only one characteristic -- their membership

in the group; otherwise they are heterogeneous 'as the community as a whole.' 

[Citation.] [¶] 3) Whether the challenging party fails to engage in more than

desultory voir dire of the challenged jurors or asks them no questions at all. 

[Citation.] [¶] 4) Whether the defendant is a member of the group allegedly

discriminated against and the victim is a member of the group to which the

majority of remaining jurors belong. [Citation.] [¶] 5) Whether members of the

group allegedly discriminated against were challenged by the moving party. 

[Citation.] [¶] 6) The extent to which the jury included members of the group

allegedly discriminated against. [Citations.]" (People v. Trevino, supra, at pp.

403-404.)

A consideration of these factors persuades us that appellants have not

established an inference of group bias. While appellant Vaughn belonged to the

same racial group as the challenged prospective juror, so did both of the victims. 

Moreover, the fact that the prosecutor did not challenge an African-American

juror who remained on the jury is evidence that the prospective juror was

challenged for reasons other than his race. "While the fact that the jury included

members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an

indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for

the trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection. [Citations.]" 

(People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168.) Further, a race-neutral reason for

the challenge to the African-American prospective juror was noted by the trial

court, specifically, that he had previously served as a juror in a similar case. 

Furthermore, his mother had lived in San Pablo, where the crime took place, for

approximately 25 years. The prospective juror testified he visited his mother

regularly. Finally, appellants did not make any effort to set out other pertinent

"circumstances, such as the prospective jurors' individual characteristics, the

nature of the prosecutor's voir dire, or the prospective jurors' answers to

questions" in attempting to establish a prima facie case. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1154.) For all of the above reasons we conclude that

substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that appellants did not

make a prima facie showing that the prosecution's challenges were the result of

group bias.

Resp't Ex. C at 5-8.

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To support his Batson claim, Petitioner argues that the trial court's use of Wheeler's

"strong likelihood" test was erroneous for purposes of determining whether Petitioner had

established a prima facie case under Batson. Petitioner also argues that the appellate court's

decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law because the appellate

court relied on the trial court's use of an erroneous standard in its determination that Petitioner

had failed to establish a prima facie case. (Traverse at 7.) 

2. Applicable Federal Law

The use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a cognizable racial group from

a jury is prohibited under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. The

prima facie showing is the first step of Batson's "three-step process for evaluating a claim that a

prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges in a racially-discriminatory manner." Paulino

v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case, Petitioner must

show that (1) the prospective juror who was removed is a member of a cognizable group, (2) the

prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror, and (3) "the facts and any

other relevant circumstances raise an inference" that the challenge was motivated by race or

gender. Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001); see Batson, 476 U.S. at

96. Although a pattern of strikes against a cognizable group may support an inference of

discrimination, a court must consider all the relevant circumstances surrounding a peremptory

challenge. See Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1999). If the defendant establishes

a prima facie case, "'the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion'

with race-neutral reasons" for the peremptory challenge. Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1089 (quoting

Batson, 476 U.S. at 94). Only then does the trial court "determine whether the defendant has

established purposeful discrimination." Id. If the defendant fails to establish a prima facie case,

then the motion was properly denied and the prosecutor need not provide a race-neutral

explanation for the strike. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1046.

The prima facie showing is the first step of Batson's three-step process. See Paulino,

371 F.3d at 1089. A "prima facie inquiry involves a mixed question of law and fact, because

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the court must determine whether the facts are sufficient to meet the requirements of the legal

rule and, therefore, to proceed to the ensuing steps of the Batson analysis." Tolbert, 182 F.3d at

681. Although a petitioner "can make a prima facie showing based on statistical disparities

alone," Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1091; see also Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 682 (9th Cir.

2002), there is no magic number of challenged jurors which automatically establishes a prima

facie case of discrimination. See United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989).

 It is well established that when deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie

showing, "the trial court must consider the totality of [the] relevant circumstances." Tolbert v.

Gomez, 182 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1999). Whether or not all the relevant circumstances raise

a reasonable inference of discrimination will depend on factors such as the attitude and behavior

of the challenging attorney and the prospective jurors manifested during voir dire as well as the

trial judge's observation of critical events. See id. As a practical matter, the trial judge is in a

unique position to personally witness the totality of circumstances that comprises the factual

inquiry, including the jurors' demeanor and tone of voice as they answer questions, and

counsels' demeanor and tone of voice in posing the questions. See id. The trial judge is able to

observe a juror's attention span, alertness, and interest in the proceedings and thus will have a

sense of whether the prosecutor's challenge can be readily explained by a legitimate reason. See

id. The trial court also has access to other information about the venire pool that often does not

show up in the record on appeal -- such as juror age, residence, and employment. See id.

To succeed on his Batson claim, Petitioner must establish a reasonable inference of

racial motivation in the Prosecutor's challenge of Juror No. 10. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 

The Court finds that the first and second steps of the Batson prima facie case have been met: (1)

Juror No. 10 was an African-American and, therefore, from a cognizable group; and (2) the

Prosecutor used a peremptory strike against Juror No. 10. See Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1047-

48; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Because the Court has determined that Petitioner has met the first

two steps, the Court will limit its inquiry to the third step of the prima facie case, that is,

whether the relevant circumstances raise a reasonable inference that Juror No. 10 was stricken

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5

 The Court finds that only the initial step of the Batson claim, which involves establishing a

prima facie case, is under review. The trial court had already determined that Petitioner had not

established a prima facie case, therefore, the burden never shifted to the Prosecutor to articulate a

race-neutral explanation for using a peremptory strike against Juror No. 10. Nor was the trial court

required to assess the Prosecutor's explanations for why she challenged the stricken juror. 

Therefore, the Court will address only the preliminary issue of whether Petitioner made a prima

facie showing that the relevant circumstances gave rise to a reasonable inference that the Prosecutor

exercised her peremptory challenge on the basis of race.

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on the basis of race.5

3. Analysis

a. Trial Court's Erroneous Use of Wheeler's Strong Likelihood

Standard

A review of the record indicates that the state courts failed to recognize that the strong

likelihood standard in Wheeler was not synonymous with Batson's reasonable inference

standard at the time Petitioner's conviction became final. See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1090

("California courts in following the 'strong likelihood' language of Wheeler are not applying the

correct legal standard for a prima facie case under Batson." (quoting Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d

1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000))). Because the Court finds that the appellate court employed the

incorrect legal standard in reviewing Petitioner's claim, the Court will examine his claim de

novo.

The Court would normally be required to defer to the appellate court's factual finding

that there was no prima facie showing of bias. See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1090 (citing Tolbert,

182 F.3d at 682). De novo review applies to a Batson claim where the state appellate court

employed the incorrect legal standard in determining whether the defendant had established a

prima facie case. Id. The application of de novo review is based on the Ninth Circuit's holding

that California's Wheeler standard for establishing a prima facie case is more stringent than the

Batson standard because it requires a defendant to show a strong likelihood rather than a

reasonable inference that the jurors were stricken on the basis of race. See id. (citing Wade, 202

F.3d at 1197).

The Ninth Circuit held in Cooperwood, that de novo review applied where the state

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6

 In Box, the California Supreme Court held that Wheeler and Batson applied the same

standards to peremptory challenges and were interchangeable. Box, 23 Cal. 4th at 1188. The

California Supreme Court has since concluded in People v. Johnson, 30 Cal. 4th 1302, 1313 (2003),

that Wheeler's "strong likelihood" standard is and always has been the same as the reasonable

inference standard found in Batson. The Ninth Circuit has nonetheless held in Cooperwood that de

novo review applies to cases tried prior to 2000, when Box was decided, in which trial courts were

following Wheeler's "strong likelihood" standard. Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1047.

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court employed Wheeler's strong likelihood standard in cases prior to People v. Box, 23 Cal. 4th

1153 (2000).6

 See Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1046. The Ninth Circuit so held because it found

that during the period between the California state courts' decisions in People v. Bernard, 27

Cal. App. 4th 458 (Ct. App. 1994), and Box, 23 Cal. 4th 1153, California state courts were

applying the Wheeler strong likelihood standard in a more stringent manner than the Batson

reasonable inference standard. Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1046-47 ("California state courts have

applied a lower standard of scrutiny to peremptory strikes than the Federal Constitution

permits." (quoting Wade, 202 F.3d at 1196-97)). 

Here, Petitioner’s state trial occurred in 1998 -- before Box was issued. The trial court

found that Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case that the Prosecutor's use of a

peremptory challenge amounted to a equal protection violation. In concluding that Petitioner

failed to establish a prima facie case, the trial court determined that the fact that Juror No. 10

belonged to a cognizable group alone was not sufficient to show that the challenge was racebased and implicitly required Petitioner needed to show "some other indication" that Juror No.

10 was being challenged under Wheeler. RT 161.

The appellate court denied Petitioner's direct appeal in 2001 -- after Box was issued. In

affirming the trial court's denial of Petitioner's prima facie claim, however, the appellate court

did not clearly indicate that it was applying a reasonable inference test consonant with Batson.

The appellate court implied that it used the proper standard for demonstrating bias:

The appropriate standard of prima facie proof is described in Batson, supra, 476

U.S. at 96, as "raising an inference" of improper use of challenges. While

appellants argue these formulations for setting forth a prima facie case constitute

different standards, and that the "strong likelihood" standard should yield to the

"raising an inference" standard, our high court has recently clarified that the

standards set forth in Wheeler and Batson are equivalent.

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Resp't Ex. C at 6 (citing Box, 23 Cal. 4th at 1188 n.12 ["in California, a 'strong likelihood'

means a 'reasonable inference'"]).

Even if the appellate court correctly identified the Batson standard as the "appropriate

standard of prima facie proof," the appellate court clearly applied the Wheeler "strong

likelihood" standard in their analysis: 

To satisfy the burden of proving a "prima facie case of such discrimination to the

satisfaction of the court," the moving party must "make as complete a record of

the circumstances as is feasible," and "show a strong likelihood" that excluded

persons in a cognizable group "are being challenged because of their group

association rather than because of any specific bias." [Citation.]

Resp't Ex. C at 7-8 (emphasis added). Thus, the process employed by the appellate court to

evaluate Petitioner's claim contravened the required procedure to establish a prima facie case

outlined in Batson. See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1090. Because the appellate court's factual finding

-- that there was no prima facie showing of bias -- is not entitled to a presumption of

correctness due to the erroneous application of Wheeler's strong likelihood standard, the Court

will conduct a de novo review of the record using Batson's reasonable inference standard. See

Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men's Colony, 365 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to apply

presumption where state court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on the defendant rather

than the government). The burden still lies with Petitioner to show that there was a reasonable

inference that Juror No. 10 was stricken on the basis of race, in order to establish a prima facie

case under Batson. See Wade, 202 F.3d at 1192.

b. De Novo Review

Upon careful review of the record, the Court finds that the relevant circumstances did

not raise a reasonable inference that the Prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude

Juror No. 10 on account of his race.

Petitioner asserts that Juror No. 10 was a "venire person attractive to the prosecution." 

(Pet'r App. A at 8.) Petitioner supports this assertion with Juror No. 10's answers during voir

dire including: his past history as a robbery victim (and his satisfaction with the investigation of

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7

 Because the record does not include Juror No. 10's answers to the juror questionnaire, the

Court makes its determination based on the voir dire transcript and the trial court's findings.

8

 The Prosecutor expressed her concern that Juror No. 10 might be inclined to visit the scene

of the crime because his mother lived in the area. ART 202-203. This concern was not specific to

Juror No. 10 and not a pretext for a race-based challenge, as another juror, Juror No. 3, was

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that robbery); his prior service as a juror in an attempted murder trial; and his willingness to be

a fair and impartial juror. (Id.) Petitioner argues that these facts raise a reasonable inference

that Juror No. 10 was challenged by the Prosecutor because of his race. (Id.)

Respondent argues that Juror No. 10's experience as a robbery victim and his prior jury

service were valid reasons supporting a non-racial challenge by the Prosecutor. (Answer at 11.) 

Respondent also claims that Juror No. 10's familiarity with the streets of San Pablo was another

possible non-racial reason for the Prosecutor's challenge. 

Here, considering the totality of the relevant circumstances surrounding the Prosecutor's

strike of Juror No. 10, the Court finds that the record does not indicate that the peremptory

challenge at issue in this case raises a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.7

 A review

of the entire voir dire record indicates that Juror No. 10 was posed questions similar in nature to

those posed to other potential jurors, including questions relating to past experiences as a victim

of a crime, past interactions with law enforcement, previous jury service, and familiarity with

the San Pablo area. As such, the trial judge was in the unique position of personally evaluating

Juror No. 10's answers along with the answers of all other prospective jurors and all the relevant

circumstances surrounding those answers.

First, the trial judge acknowledged the presence of one other African-American seated

on the jury who was not challenged by the prosecution. RT 160-161. Turning to Juror No. 10's

questionnaire and his answers at voir dire, the trial judge determined that Juror No. 10's

responses could have formed the basis for the Prosecutor's challenge. RT 161. Juror No. 10

served as a juror on an attempted murder case. RT 161. Furthermore, Juror No. 10's mother

lived in San Pablo for over twenty-five years, and he visited with her "once every couple of

weeks or so."8

 ART 202-203. 

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challenged for cause primarily due to his familiarity with the streets of San Pablo. ART 217-218,

246.

9

 Petitioner's contention that the challenged juror was "attractive" to the prosecution does not

compel a different conclusion because the record indicates that there were indeed race-neutral

reasons for the Prosecutor's decision to remove Juror No. 10. See Tolbert, 190 F.3d at 989; see also

Wade, 202 F.3d at 1198 (noting that "entirely plausible reasons, independent of race," for striking a

juror support a finding that the prosecutor did not act based on racial bias).

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The Court is well-aware that it is not in the same unique position as the trial judge to

evaluate the totality of the relevant circumstances, including counsels' demeanor and tone of

voice, as well as Juror No. 10's demeanor, tone of voice, attention span, alertness, and interest in

the proceedings. However, the Court is convinced that Juror No. 10's answers to his

questionnaire and voir dire responses formed the basis for a reasonable prosecutorial challenge

that was not race-based. The trial judge's evaluation of the totality of the relevant

circumstances, including the presence of one other African-American seated on the jury and the

potential non-racial reasons that could reasonably be gleaned from Juror No. 10's answers, do

not support Petitioner's claim that the Prosecutor systematically exercised a race-based

peremptory challenge.9

In sum, upon conducting a de novo review of the record, the Court finds that Petitioner

failed to establish that the Prosecutor's peremptory challenge raises a reasonable inference of

bias.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not stated a valid Batson claim on which habeas relief can

be granted.

B. Erroneous Jury Instruction

1. Background

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC

No. 2.15, California's pattern jury instruction concerning possession of stolen property. (Pet. at

5.) He claims this instruction "impermissibly lessened the prosecution's burden of proof,"

thereby denying Petitioner due process of law. (Pet'r. App. A at 10.) 

//

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2. Applicable Federal Law

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show

that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). 

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words,

the court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988). Finally, the defined category of infractions that violate

fundamental fairness is very narrow: "Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of

Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 73.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute

the crime with which he or she is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This

constitutional principle prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge

that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt

of every essential element of a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 400-03 (1991); Carella

v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1989); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985);

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-24 (1979). Failure to properly instruct the jury on

the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "can never be harmless error." Gibson v.

Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 825 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14

(1979)). "When a court gives the jury instructions that allow it to convict on an impermissible

legal theory, as well as a theory that meets constitutional requirements, 'the unconstitutionality

of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside.'" Id. (citing Boyde v. California,

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494 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1990)).

The State, however, is not precluded from adopting a rule that makes it easier for the

State to meet the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt unless the rule itself shifts or

reduces the burden of proof or otherwise violates a fundamental principle of fairness and

therefore violates the Due Process Clause. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 54-55

(1996).

The first step in analyzing whether an instruction that creates an evidentiary inference

violates due process by relieving the State of its burden of proving each element of a crime

beyond a reasonable doubt is to determine whether the instruction creates a mandatory

presumption or a permissive inference. See United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir.

1994). "A mandatory presumption instruction tells the jury that it must presume that an element

of a crime has been proven if the government proves certain predicate facts." Id. By contrast,

"a permissive inference instruction allows, but does not require, a jury to infer a specified

conclusion if the government proves certain predicate facts." Id.

Courts "determine the constitutionality of a permissive inference instruction on a caseby-case basis" by reviewing the record evidence to see if the court can say with substantial

assurance that the inferred fact flows more probably than not from the facts proven in the

particular case. See Warren, 25 F.3d at 898; see, e.g., County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,

442 U.S. 140, 162-67 (1979) (finding instruction constitutional only after concluding that

inference more probably than not flowed from specific facts proven to jury at trial).

Permissive inference instructions generally are disfavored because they tend to take the

focus away from the elements that must be proved. See Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1037

(9th Cir. 1996). Such instructions are less objectionable if other instructions condition, qualify

or explain them. See id. at 1038. However, a passing reference in the instructions to "consider

all evidence" will not cure a defect where a jury is entitled to convict by focusing on a few

isolated facts. See id.

If the inference instruction violated the petitioner's right to due process, the petitioner

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10 At trial, the defense argued that Petitioner "did not participate in the robbery, either as a

principal or as aider and abettor, thus his possession of the weapon was not evidence on which a

robbery conviction could be based." (Pet'r App. A at 14.)

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can only obtain relief if the unconstitutional inference instruction resulted in actual prejudice

under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. See Patterson v. Gomez, 223 F.3d. 959, 967-68 (9th Cir.

2000); Hanna, 87 F.3d at 1039. Actual prejudice exists if the unconstitutional instruction had a

"substantial influence on the conviction." Id.

3. Analysis

The trial court read CALJIC No. 2.15 to the jury as follows:

If you find that a defendant was in conscious possession of recently

stolen property[,] the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient to permit an

inference that a defendant is guilty of the crime of robbery. Before guilt may be

inferred there must be corroborating evidence tending to prove a defendant's

guilt. However, this corroborating evidence need only be slight, and need not by

itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.

As corroboration[,] you may consider the attributes of possession, time,

place and manner, that a defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime

charged, a defendant's conduct, his false or contradictory statements, if any,

and/or any other statements he may have made with reference to the property,

and any other evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the crime

charged.

RT 1355-1356.

Petitioner argues that CALJIC No. 2.15 denied him due process of law because the jury

would understand the instruction to mean the following: if the Prosecutor proved he was in

constructive possession of stolen property, then only "slight" corroborative evidence was

necessary to convict him of robbery.10 (Pet'r App. A at 10-11.) Petitioner thus claims that this

jury instruction undermined "the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]" (Id. at 11.)

The appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim that this instruction constituted a denial of

due process of law as follows:

Appellant Ahmed, joined by appellant Vaughn, next claims the court

committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury that "conscious possession of

recently stolen property," together with "slight" corroborating evidence, can

justify an inference of guilt for the crime of robbery. Appellants make the

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following argument: "By coupling an ultimate inference of guilt with a

requirement of proof by only 'slight evidence,' CALJIC No. 2.15 impermissibly

lessened the prosecution's burden of proof." 

This contention was specifically rejected in People v. Holt (1997) 15

Cal.4th 619. In that case CALJIC No. 2.15 was given with reference to burglary

and robbery. The defendant argued that the jury would understand the

instruction to mean it could convict him of burglary and robbery, based upon a

finding that he possessed stolen property and slight corroborating evidence,

without finding the other "foundational facts" necessary to prove robbery and

burglary. (Id. at p. 677.) The court stated: "The jury was advised that the

instructions were to be considered as a whole and each in the light of all the

others. It was also instructed on all the required elements of burglary and

robbery and was expressly told that in order to prove those crimes, each of the

elements must be proved. We see no possibility that giving the jury the

additional admonition that it could not rely solely on evidence that defendant

possessed recently stolen property would be understood by the jury as suggesting

that it need not find all of the statutory elements of burglary and robbery had

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (Ibid.; see also People v. Johnson

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 37-38.) In this case, as in Holt, the jury was instructed on all

the elements of the offenses referenced in the instructions, and given the standard

instructions on the necessity of finding each element. 

With respect to appellants' specific contention that CALJIC No. 2.15

lessens the prosecution's burden of proof, several courts have upheld CALJIC

No. 2.15 in response to similar arguments. In People v. Gamble (1994) 22

Cal.App.4th 446, 454-455, the court rejected the contention, "that CALJIC No.

2.15 violated due process by lessening the prosecutor's burden of proving every

element of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt," and the instruction is misleading

as to the burden of proof and conflicts with the reasonable doubt instructions. 

The court held: "[t]he instruction creates only a permissive inference, one the

jury could either credit or reject 'based on its evaluation of the evidence, and

therefore does not relieve the People of any burden of establishing guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. [Citation.]' [Citation.] A permissive inference does not shift

the prosecution's burden of proof, and violates due process 'only if the suggested

conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven

facts before the jury.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.; accord, People v. Esquivel (1994) 28

Cal.App.4th 1386, 1400-1401.) In People v. Hernandez (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th

73, 81, the defendant argued that CALJIC No. 2.15 "undercut the presumption of

innocence because it permitted the jury to convict him on the basis of slight

evidence." (Italics added.) The court rejected the argument, reasoning that

CALJIC No. 2.15 only describes an inference that may be drawn from the

evidence, and does not purport to modify or lessen the ultimate burden of proof. 

(Ibid.) Based on the foregoing authority, we conclude the trial court did not err

in giving CALJIC No. 2.15.

Resp't Ex. C at 14-15.

Petitioner claims that the case against him was "primarily based on circumstantial

evidence regarding [his] possession of McElmore's sawed-off shotgun." (Pet'r App. A at 13-

14.) Petitioner asserts that the trial court lessened the prosecution's burden of proving its case

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11 In Barnes, the trial court instructed the jury that possession of recently stolen property, if

not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which the jury could infer that the

person possessed the property with knowledge that it was stolen. The Supreme Court rejected the

challenge to the instruction, stating that "[i]n the present case the challenged instruction only

permitted the inference of guilt from unexplained possession of recently stolen property." Barnes,

412 U.S. at 843.

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against him beyond a reasonable doubt by reading CALJIC No. 2.15 to the jury. (Id. at 13.) 

The appellate court rejected this argument.

The Court finds the appellate court's decision was not an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law under Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973). In Barnes, the United

States Supreme Court stated that "[f]or centuries courts have instructed juries that an inference

of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods." 

Id. at 843. The Court in Barnes found that such an inference comported with due process if "the

evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred

fact beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ."11 Id. Therefore, the appellate court's conclusion that

"CALJIC No. 2.15 only describes an inference that may be drawn from the evidence, and does

not purport to modify or lessen the ultimate burden of proof," Resp't Ex. C at 15, was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

CALJIC No. 2.15 does not permit the jury to infer guilt from possession of stolen

property alone. Instead, it also requires corroborating evidence. The instruction lists various

corroborating circumstances, including other evidence tending to connect Petitioner with the

crime charged. These corroborating circumstances were present here, as evidenced by the

testimony of Petitioner's co-defendant, Sam Vaughn. Vaughn testified that Petitioner yelled at

him to "get the gun" away from McElmore and that he pulled the shotgun out of McElmore's

hands. RT 1094. Vaughn also testified that he was "not going to let [McElmore] get this

weapon," and that after a struggle he "yanked [the shotgun] out of [McElmore's] hand[s]." RT

1094-1095. Vaughn later testified that he took the shotgun and put it in the back seat of the car

and Petitioner drove away from the scene. RT 1097. Vaughn finally testified that after

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12 The first sentence of CALJIC No. 2.15 states that "conscious possession of . . . stolen

property is not itself sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of

robbery or burglary." CALJIC No. 2.15. This sentence makes it clear that the requisite

corroborating evidence creates a permissive inference rather than a mandatory presumption. 

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dropping Petitioner off at his home, he hurled the shotgun into the water near Emeryville. RT

1099. The record clearly indicates that Petitioner had knowledge of Vaughn's actions,

encouraged him to take the shotgun away from McElmore, and drove away from the scene in

possession of the stolen shotgun. 

The Court finds that CALJIC No. 2.15 is constitutionally sound because it creates a

permissive inference that allows, but does not require, the jury to infer an essential fact.12 See

Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052

(1993). Habeas relief is not warranted because CALJIC No. 2.15 did not so infect the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.

In reviewing the record, the Court finds that the jury was also instructed: (1) to "decide

all questions of fact . . . from the evidence," RT 1334 (CALJIC No. 1.00); (2) to "[c]onsider the

instructions as a whole and each in light of all the others," RT 1333 (CALJIC No. 1.01); (3)

"before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt," RT 1337 (CALJIC No. 2.01); and (4) that "[a] defendant in

a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved" placing "upon the

People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," RT 1348 (CALJIC No.

2.90). Moreover, CALJIC No. 2.15 was immediately followed by CALJIC No. 17.10: "If you

are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants are guilty of the crimes charged,

you may nevertheless convict him of any lesser crime, if you are convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a lesser crime." RT 1356 (emphasis added). 

Reading CALJIC No. 2.15 together with the other instructions, the Court agrees with the

appellate court's conclusion that CALJIC No. 2.15 did not shift the burden of proof to Petitioner

or allow the jury to infer an improper fact. See Schwendeman, 971 F.2d at 316.

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13 In analyzing this claim, the Court must turn to clearly established federal law during the

time of the relevant state court decision, which is the California Supreme Court's summary denial of

Petitioner's petition for review on October 24, 2001. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Court

"looks through" the unexplained California Supreme Court decision to the last reasoned state court

decision -- the appellate court's decision -- which was also issued in 2001. See Shackleford, 234

F.3d at 1079. This Court notes that since 2001, the Supreme Court has clarified its decision in

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In sum, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied CALJIC No. 2.15 in an

unconstitutional manner, thus Petitioner's conviction did not violate due process. See Estelle,

502 U.S. at 72. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to make the requisite showing for habeas relief,

i.e., that the instruction, when considered in the context of the instructions as a whole, so

infected the trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on his claim that the trial

court used an erroneous jury instruction.

C. Current Sentence Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. Background

Petitioner was sentenced, under California's Three Strikes law, to an unstayed sentence

of twenty-five years to life in prison. Petitioner claims that his sentence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Pet'r App. A at 15.) 

2. Applicable Federal Law

A criminal sentence that is significantly disproportionate to the crime for which the

defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

303 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent

felony violates the Eighth Amendment). "[O]utside the context of capital punishment,

successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be exceedingly rare." 

Id. at 289-90 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The Eighth

Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment "does not require strict

proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are

'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)

(quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303) (Kennedy, J., concurring).13 Under this proportionality

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Harmelin and confirmed that Justice Kennedy's proportionality principle is clearly established law. 

See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (applying the Harmelin standard); United States v.

Carr, 56 F.3d 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146-47 (9th

Cir. 1998) (after Harmelin, the Eighth Amendment forbids "at most" only sentences that are "grossly

disproportionate").

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principle, the threshold determination for the court is whether a petitioner's sentence is one of

the rare cases in which a comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to

an inference of gross disproportionality. United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 858 (1992) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). Only if such an

inference arises does the court proceed to compare a petitioner's sentence with sentences in the

same and other jurisdictions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05; Bland, 961 F.2d at 129.

The threshold for an "inference of gross disproportionality" is quite high. See, e.g.,

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole for first

offense of possession of 672 grams of cocaine did not raise inference of gross

disproportionality). In addition, a court may take into account the State's interest not only in

punishing the offense of conviction, but also its interest "'in dealing in a harsher manner with

those who [are] repeat[] criminal[s].'" Bland, 961 F.2d at 129 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445

U.S. 263, 276 (1980)).

3. Analysis

The appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim that his sentence of twenty-five years to

life constituted cruel and unusual punishment, stating:

In California a sentence may be unconstitutional "if, although not cruel or

unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted

that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." 

(In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted.) A defendant is provided no

greater protection under the United States Constitution's prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment than under the law in California. (People v. Martinez

(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1510.) 

To support his claim that the sentence imposed violates the federal and

state proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment, Ahmed focuses upon

what he characterizes as the "draconian" provisions of the Three Strikes law. 

However, other courts have already determined that, as a general matter,

California's Three Strikes law is not so disproportionate with respect to the

punishment this state imposes for other offenses or with respect to the

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punishments other jurisdictions impose for similar recidivist conduct, that it

violates the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. (See, e.g., People v.

Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1509-1517; People v. Barrera (1999) 70

Cal.App.4th 541, 555-556; People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327,

1337-1338; People v. Kinsey (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1630-1631.) 

The legal principles we apply to Ahmed's constitutional claim are well

settled. When analyzing whether a sentence is cruel or unusual within the

meaning of the state's constitution, a court may: (1) examine the nature of the

offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both

present to society; (2) compare the challenged punishment with that prescribed

for more serious offenses in the same jurisdiction; and (3) compare the challenged

punishment with that prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. (In re

Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425-427.) The court's inquiry into the nature of the

offender must ask whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the

defendant's individual culpability, as shown by factors such as his age, prior

criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind. (People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479.)

The crimes committed by Ahmed and his co-appellant Vaughn were

extremely serious. While Ahmed was found not guilty of the near-fatal assault on

McElmore, he did participate in the commission of the crime by assisting Vaughn

to locate the victim with the intention of carrying out an act of revenge. In doing

so, Ahmed participated in the false imprisonment of McElmore's girlfriend,

Cherry Johnson, in enlisting her help to assist them in locating victim McElmore. 

Further, Ahmed was charged and convicted of aiding and abetting by

taking the shotgun away from McElmore, thereby constituting a robbery, a

serious felony offense. While Ahmed did not inflict actual physical injury to

victim McElmore, he did nothing to stop or prevent co-defendant Vaughn's

criminal actions. The victim, who was 32 years old at the time of sentencing,

remains so severely brain damaged that he will require 24-hour care in an

institution for the rest of his life. 

Another part of the inquiry "focuses on the particular person before the

court, and asks whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the

defendant's individual culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior

criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind. [Citation.]" (People v.

Thompson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 299, 305.) Ahmed, who was 26 years old at the

time of sentencing, began committing crimes as a juvenile at the age of 16. When

he became an adult, the seriousness of his crimes escalated, resulting in a state

prison commitment. His most notable adult convictions include possession of a

sawed-off shotgun (§ 12020), grand theft with use of a firearm (§ 487.1), and

shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246). Ahmed's prior performance on parole

has been unsuccessful. He has continued to reoffend with drugs and weapons

offenses and was returned to custody at least twice before his discharge. Ahmed

was subsequently discharged from parole on January 10, 1998. He was only off

parole for a little over a month when he committed the crimes for which he now

stands convicted. It could fairly be said that Ahmed's unrelenting violent

criminality and the current offenses validates application of the Three Strikes law.

(People v. Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512.)

Appellant argues that his punishment is disproportionately harsh when

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compared with sentences imposed in California for other serious or violent

felonies such as rape, voluntary manslaughter, or kidnapping. The comparison

fails because it ignores his recidivism. (People v. Martinez, supra, 71

Cal.App.4th at p. 1512; People v. Cooper (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 825-826.)

Ahmed also complains that his cohort, appellant Vaughn, was punished

less harshly, even though he was the "primary actor in the criminal episode." But

appellant Vaughn did not escape strong punishment. Vaughn was sentenced to 11

years 6 months for his participation in this crime. However, unlike Ahmed,

Vaughn was not a three-strike offender. The sentences imposed upon the two

defendants here are in marked contrast to Dillon, where one defendant was

sentenced to life imprisonment while the others suffered only "petty

chastisements." (People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 487-488.) 

Appellant also argues that his punishment is harsher than that which

would have been imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. A similar

argument was made in People v. Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, in which

a defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law after

entering a plea of no contest to possessing methamphetamine, attempting to deter

an officer from carrying out his duty, and three alcohol or drug-related

misdemeanors. On appeal, the court rejected the claim that the life sentence

constituted an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. In methodically

comparing recidivist statutes throughout the country, the court acknowledged that

California is among the few states to impose a life sentence for a third felony

conviction that is neither violent nor serious, where at least one prior crime

involved violence. It concluded, however, that although California's punishment

scheme is among the most extreme, that fact does not compel the conclusion that

it is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. The court reiterated that the needs and

concerns of a particular state may induce it to treat certain crimes or treat

particular repeat offenders more severely than in any other state. The judiciary

will not interfere with the Legislature's choice of a fitting and proper penalty

unless that penalty is all out of proportion to the offense. (Id. at pp. 1512-1516.) 

We conclude, as have other courts when presented with the same issue, that

appellant has failed to establish his sentence is disproportionate when compared

to recidivist statutes in other jurisdictions. (People v. Cline, supra, 60

Cal.App.4th at p. 1338; People v. Cooper, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 826-828.) 

In conclusion, given Ahmed's extensive criminal history and the nature of

the current offense, his 25-year-to-life sentence neither shocks the conscience nor

violates notions of human dignity. Thus, it does not constitute cruel or unusual

punishment under the state or federal constitutions.

Resp't Ex. C at 22-24. 

Petitioner argues that he received a life sentence "for false imprisonment and a single

prior incident which happen [sic] to involve multiple counts."14 (Traverse at 13.) While

Petitioner admits that "robbery and false imprisonment are necessarily serious crimes," he

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15 Vaughn was sentenced to prison for eleven years and six months for robbery, false

imprisonment, and attempted voluntary manslaughter. See Resp't Ex. C at 24.

16 The appellate court also stated, "[w]hen [Petitioner] became an adult, the seriousness of

his crimes escalated, resulting in a state prison commitment. His most notable adult convictions

include possession of a sawed-off shotgun (§ 12020), grand theft with use of a firearm (§ 487.1), and

shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246)." Resp't Ex. C at 24.

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argues that his "involvement was determined by the jury to be rather minimal and did not

directly result in injury to the victims." (Pet'r App. A at 18.) Petitioner also compared his

sentence to that of his co-defendant, Vaughn,15 who he argues was "the primary actor in the

criminal episode," to support his claim that his sentence was disproportionate. (Id.)

In rejecting Petitioner's claims, the appellate court rationalized that Petitioner's sentence

of twenty-five years to life under California's Three Strikes law punishes not only his current

offenses, but also his recidivism. See Resp't Ex. C at 24 (citing People v. Martinez, 71

Cal.App.4th 1502, 1512 (Ct. App. 1999) ("It could fairly be said that Ahmed's unrelenting

violent criminality and the current offenses validates application of the Three Strikes law."). 

Furthermore, the appellate court found that Vaughn's sentence was not disproportionate to

Petitioner's because Vaughn was not a three-strike offender. See id.

When viewed in light of his criminal history and current felony convictions, the Court

finds that Petitioner's case is not that "rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime

committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. Furthermore, the appellate court reasonably applied the gross

disproportionality standard in rejecting Petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim. The appellate

court considered the current offenses of false imprisonment and robbery as well as Petitioner's

three prior strikes for assault with a deadly weapon and reasonably concluded that his sentence

was not unconstitutionally disproportionate in light of his current offense and criminal history.16

 See Resp't Ex. C at 25. Therefore, the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by

the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding

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17 See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29-30 (upholding sentence of twenty-five years to life for

recidivist convicted most recently of grand theft); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1996)

(sentence of life without parole for fifteen-year-old murderer does not raise inference of gross

disproportionality); Carr, 56 F.3d at 39 (sentence of twenty-two years upon conviction for sale of

66.92 grams of cocaine base with enhancement under Federal Sentencing Guidelines' career

offender provision for two previous convictions for minor drug sales was not grossly

disproportionate).

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life sentence of recidivist convicted of fraudulent use of credit card of $80, passing forged

check for $28.36 and obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996

(upholding sentence of life without possibility of parole for first offense of possession of 672

grams of cocaine).17

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his Eighth Amendment claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 28, 2006 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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