Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02217/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02217-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Ray Elliott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. PUBLISH 

FILED 

United Scates Court of Appeak 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 1 0 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.ROBERT L. HOECKEll 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

No. 89-2217 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

No. 89-2217 

(D.C. No. CR 88-465 SC) 

(District of New Mexico) 

DONALD RAY ELLIOTT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR 88-465 SC) 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Joe M. Romero, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque 9 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 1 
In a one-count indictment, Donald Ray Elliott was charq~ 

with willfully taking by force, violence, and intimidation $3,901 

in currency from one Tamatha White, a teller in the Carlsbad 

National Bank, Carlsbad, New Mexico, a bank which was insured bf 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of 11 

u.s.c. § 2113(a). A jury found Elliott guilty of the charge 

contained in the indictment, and he was sentenced to 210 months of 

imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release~ 

Elliott appeals his judgment of conviction and the sentence 

imposed thereon. We affirm his conviction but vacate the sentence 

and remand for resentencing. 

On appeal, Elliott advances two reasons why his convictiaa 

should be reversed. First, improper remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument and, second, the bank teller's incourt identification of Elliott as the one who robbed the bank. 

We are not persuaded by either of these reasons and therefore affirm his conviction. 

Someone robbed the Northgate branch of the Carlsbad National 

Bank, Carlsbad, New Mexico on October 26, 1988, by force ani 

intimidation, and escaped with $3,900 in currency. The persoa 

handed a note to the teller which indicated that he was armed and 

instructed the teller to give him currency. The teller testified 

that when the robber raised his shirt she saw what appeared to be 

a gun. In any event, the teller complied with the robber's demand 

and gave him $3,900 in one-, five-, ten-, and twenty-dollar bills. 

The robber took the money and walked out of the bank. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 2 
At trial, the teller identified Elliott as the robber. Other 

government witnesses, including two 

that Elliott admitted robbing the bank. 

police officers, testified 

Other evidence tended to 

show that shortly prior to the robbery Elliott was short on funds, 

and that immediately after the robbery he had newly acquired 

resources. 

Although Elliott did not testify, his defense was that he 

didn't rob the bank, and that somebody else committed the crime. 

The first ground urged for reversal is that the prosecutor 

made improper closing argument. Elliott's girl friend testified 

in Elliott's behalf and stated that at about the time of the robbery Elliott had gone to a filling station to have a flat tire 

repaired and was then going to a Western Union office to pick up 

$3,000 to $5,000 which was being wired by an out-of-state bank. 

In his final closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor 

pointed out to the jury that no witness from Western Union or the 

out-of-state bank had corroborated the testimony of Elliott's girl 

friend, nor had any employee of the filling station corroborated 

the girl friend's testimony that at the time of the robbery 

Elliott was having a flat tire repaired. The prosecutor wound up 

with a flourish: "Where's the beef?" 

Defense counsel objected to this argument on the ground that 

it was improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. We 

disagree. "As long as evidence can be solicited other than from 

the mouth of the accused, it is proper to comment upon the failure 

of the defense to produce it." See United States v. Gomez-Olivas, 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 3 
897 F.2d 500, 503 (lOth Cir. 1990) and the cases cited therein. 

The present case is well within the rule of Gomez-Olivas. 

So far as we can tell from the record before us, the other 

comments of the prosecutor relied on by the defendant on appeal 

for reversal were not objected to in the district court. In any 

event, none constitutes such plain error as would dictate a 

reversal. Any mistatement of the evidence by the prosecutor was 

not of such proportion as to dictate reversal. We have read the 

entire closing argument of counsel, and although the argument on 

both sides was forceful, it was also, in our view, fair comment. 

Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress any incourt identification of Elliott by Tamatha White, the teller, on 

the ground that White's in-court identification, if permitted, 

would be impermissibly influenced by the fact that she had seen a 

photograph in a local newspaper of Elliott which identified him as 

the robber. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied, 

and, at trial, White identified Elliott as the robber. 

As indicated, the robbery occurred on October 26, 1988. 

Although White's observation of the robber was of relatively short 

duration, it was at close range. Ms. White thereafter assisted 

the Carlsbad police in creating a composite picture of the robber. 

On November 3, 1988, after an F.B.I. agent secured a recent photo 

of Elliott, Ms. White was shown a photo spread containing seven 

photographs, including an up-to-date photo of Elliott. At that 

showing, Ms. White immediately selected Elliott's photograph as 

being a photo of the person who had robbed the bank. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 4 
At the time Ms. White identified an up-to-date photo of 

Elliott as being a photo of the robber, she also advised the agent 

that on October 31, 1988, she had seen the composite drawing of 

the robber, which she had assisted in making, and a 15-year old 

picture of Elliott in the local newspaper, and that Elliott was 

described in the article as being the person who had robbed the 

bank. However, in this connection, Ms. White stated to the agent 

that viewing the 15-year old photo of Elliott had not influenced 

her judgment since the 15-year old photo of Elliott did not, in 

many ways, really resemble the person who had robbed the bank. 

And she so testified at the suppression hearing. 

In view of the fact Ms. White indicated that the 15-year old 

photo of Elliott did not resemble the robber, it is difficult to 

see how such event could be so impermissibly suggestive that she 

later identified a very recent picture of Elliott as being a 

picture of the robber, and then subsequently made an in-court 

identification of Elliott as the robber. In any event, we find no 

error in the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. 

Ms. White's viewing of the 15-year old photo of Elliott in the 

local newspaper was not, under the circumstances, "impermissibly 

suggestive," and most certainly "under the totality of the 

circumstances" did not violate any of Elliott's due process 

rights. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Simmons v. 

United States, 390 u.s. 377, 384 (1968); Johnston v. Makowski, 823 

F.2d 387, 391 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 u.s. 1026 

(1988); Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1481-82 (lOth Cir. 1987); 

and United States v. Thurston, 771 F.2d 449, 453 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 5 
As indicated, Elliott also challenges the lawfulness of the 

sentence imposed on him, namely imprisonment for 210 months 

(seventeen and one-half years). Elliott was convicted under 18 

u.s.c. § 2113(a), which authorizes a maximum term of imprisonment 

of twenty years. By statute, Congress directed the Sentencing 

Commission to promulgate guidelines which will "specify a sentence 

to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized 

for categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen 

years old or older" and is a so-called "career offender." 28 

u.s.c. § 994(h). The Sentencing Commission implemented that 

Congressional mandate by promulgating§ 4B 1.1 of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. 

At sentencing, Elliott did not dispute his offense level of 

thirty or his criminal history category of VI. Nor did he dispute 

that under the sentencing table, his sentencing range was from 168 

months to 210 months. 1 As stated at the outset, the district 

court sentenced Elliott to 210 months imprisonment, and, on appeal, counsel asserts that the district court did not give a 

proper "reason" for imposing the maximum term permitted by the 

guidelines, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). Counsel 

concedes that in imposing a sentence within the guidelines range, 

the district court could consider the specific crimes previously 

committed by Elliott, but argues that 28 u.s.c. § 994(h) did not 

require the district court to impose the maximum sentence of 210 

months. 

1 Such took into account the fact that by that time, if not at 

trial, Elliott accepted responsibility for the robbery. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 6 
It is agreed that where, as here, the guideline range exceeds 

24 months, a district court must state its reason for imposing a 

sentence at a particular point within the range. Although the 

record is not entirely clear on this matter, it would appear that 

the district judge in imposing the maximum term within the 

guidelines was of the view that 28 u.s.c. § 994(h) strongly suggested, if indeed it did not require, that he impose the maximum 

term permitted by the guidelines. In this regard, the government 

in its brief at page 40 states that the district court imposed the 

maximum sentence within the applicable range due to "Elliott's 

status as a career offender and the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 

994(h)." We do not agree with that statement. 

28 u.s.c. § 994(h) is a mandate to the Sentencing Commission 

to promulgate guidelines which will result in a guideline range 

"at or near the maximum term" authorized by statute (in our case 

20 years) for so-called "career offenders." This the Commission 

presumably did by promulgating§ 4B 1.1. 2 And Elliott was given a 

guideline offense level of thirty, which, with a criminal history 

category of VI, resulted in the guideline range for sentencing of 

168 months to 210 months. However, we do not regard 28 u.s.c. § 

2 A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant 

was at least eighteen years old at the time of the 

instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction 

is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 

controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has 

at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime 

of violence or a controlled substance offense. If the 

offense level for a career criminal from the table below 

is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, 

the offense level from the table below shall apply. A 

career offender's criminal history category in every 

case shall be Category VI. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 7 
994(h) as mandating, or even suggesting, that the district court 

in the instant case should set Elliott's sentence at the maximum 

permitted by the guideline range. It is conceded that Elliott 

qualified as a "career offender," but that does not mean that 

under 28 u.s.c. § 994(h) the district court was required to 

sentence him to 210 months. Rather, under the guidelines, 

Elliott, as a career offender, is subject to a sentence of 

somewhere between 168 and 210 months, and under 18 u.s.c. § 

3553(c)(1) the district court must state its reason for imposing a 

particular sentence within the range. 28 u.s.c. § 994(h) is not a 

permissible "reason." 

The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The sentence is 

vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2217 Document: 01019297855 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 8