Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99008/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99008-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Martel
Appellee
John Louis Visciotti
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN LOUIS VISCIOTTI,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MARTEL,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-99008

D.C. No.

2:97-cv-04591-R

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 12, 2013

Pasadena, California

Filed October 17, 2016

Before: Harry Pregerson, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon;

Concurrence by Judge Berzon

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2 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas

relief in a case in which California state prisoner John

Visciotti raised (1) a penalty-phase ineffective assistance

claim, focused on the allegation that key aggravating

evidence was introduced only as a result of counsel’s errors

during the penalty proceedings; (2) a new claim that the

cumulative effect of counsel’s ineffectiveness during both

the guilt and penalty phases of trial ultimately prejudiced the

penalty proceedings; and (3) a claim that the trial judge’s

closure of the death-qualification voir dire proceedings

violated Visciotti’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

The panel held that, whether or not the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims have merit, they are foreclosed

by the Supreme Court’s prior decision in this case, Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curiam).

Regarding the trial judge’s closure of death-qualification

voir dire, to which counsel did not object, the panel held that

de novo review continues to apply, post-AEDPA, to a

contention that ineffective assistance of trial counsel

constitutes cause to excuse a procedural default. The panel

concluded that counsel’s failure to object to the closure of

death-qualification voir dire did not constitute deficient

performance, and that Visciotti therefore cannot demonstrate

cause to excuse his default of the public trial right claim.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 3

Concurring, Judge Berzon, joined by Judge Pregerson,

wrote separately to emphasize that this case illustrates that

Supreme Court summary reversals cannot, and do not, reflect

the same complete understanding of a case as decisions after

plenary review.

COUNSEL

Mark R. Drozdowski (argued), Deputy Federal Public

Defender; K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, Research & Writing

Specialist; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Meagan J. Beale (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Holly

Wilkens, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Julie L.

Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D.

Harris, AttorneyGeneral; Office of the AttorneyGeneral, San

Diego, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

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4 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

In 1983, an Orange County jury convicted John Visciotti

of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and robbery. The

same jury then sentenced Visciotti to death.

On direct, automatic appeal, the California Supreme

Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety. People v.

Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1 (1992) (“Visciotti I”). Visciotti filed a

state petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective

assistance of his counsel (IAC) during the guilt and penalty

phases of his trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The

California Supreme Court assumed that counsel afforded

Visciotti “inadequate representation in some respects” during

the penalty phase, but determined that Visciotti was not

prejudiced and so denied his petition. In re Visciotti, 14 Cal.

4th 325, 330 (1996) (“Visciotti II”).

Visciotti next brought a federal habeas petition, alleging,

among many other claims, ineffective assistance of counsel

during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district

court granted Visciotti’s habeas petition as to the penalty

phase and denied it as to his conviction. We affirmed. See

Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Visciotti III”). The United States Supreme Court

summarilyreversed our decision, holding that we “exceed[ed]

the limits imposed on federal habeas review by” the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified

at 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 20

(2002) (per curiam) (“Visciotti IV”).

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 5

Following remand and further proceedings, the district

court denied Visciotti’s remaining claims. Visciotti appeals

that denial. He asserts two species of claims. First, he

contends that his counsel’s ineffective assistance during the

guilt and penalty phases of trial requires habeas relief as to

his death sentence. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court

expressly denied relief on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, he argues that the Court did not decide the

particular claims he now appeals. Second, he claims that the

trial judge’s closure of the death qualification voir dire

proceedings violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public

trial.

I. BACKGROUND

Visciotti I extensively details the facts of this case. 2 Cal.

4th at 28–33. We thus recite only a brief summary of the

events here, as described by the Supreme Court in Visciotti

IV.

[Visciotti] and a co-worker, Brian Hefner,

devised a plan to rob two fellow employees,

Timothy Dykstra and Michael Wolbert, on

November 8, 1982, their payday. They

invited the pair to join them at a party. As the

four were driving to that supposed destination

in Wolbert’s car, [Visciotti] asked Wolbert to

stop in a remote area so that he could relieve

himself. When all four men had left the car,

[Visciotti] pulled a gun, demanded the

victims’ wallets (which turned out to be

almost empty), and got Wolbert to tell him

where in the car the cash was hidden. After

Hefner had retrieved the cash, [Visciotti]

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6 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

walked over to the seated Dykstra and killed

him with a shot in the chest from a distance of

three or four feet. [Visciotti] then raised the

gun in both hands and shot Wolbert three

times, in the torso and left shoulder, and

finally, from a distance of about two feet, in

the left eye. [Visciotti] and Hefner fled the

scene in Wolbert’s car. Wolbert miraculously

survived to testify against them.

Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at 20.1

A. Trial

Visciotti’s parents retained Roger Agajanian for

representation in the pretrial proceedings, at the trial, and on

appeal. Agajanian was admitted to the bar in July 1973, had

never before the Visciotti case tried a capital case that went

to a jury, and had never conducted a penalty phase trial. See

Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 336.

At the outset of Visciotti’s 1983 trial, the court mentioned

that it would conduct “sequestered voir dire.” The court

explained to the pool of prospective jurors that, because the

state could seek the death penalty, “we must . . . inquire of

each prospective juror individually to determine in private

with just the court, the two attorneys, possibly the defendant

and the court personnel present, your attitudes and . . .

attempt to determine if there exists any prejudice or bias that

1 Hefner, Visciotti’s co-defendant, was tried separately, convicted of

the same offenses, and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility

of parole. 2 Cal. 4th at 20 n.2. The State did not seek Hefner’s execution. 

Id.

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 7

may affect your attitude toward the imposition of the capital

punishment.” On July 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, and 14, the court

conducted the death qualification voir dire. The clerk’s

transcript for each day reveals that the examinations were

conducted “in chambers,” in the presence of only the court,

counsel, court reporters, and, some of the time, Visciotti.2

Agajanian never objected to this practice on the record. Nor

did the judge make findings on the record justifying the

private voir dire sessions.

The prosecution’s case was “based in major part on the

testimony of Michael Wolbert, and on [Visciotti’s]

confessions.” Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 28. Of particular

relevance to this appeal, the parties agreed at the start of trial

that the prosecution would not in its guilt phase case-in-chief

present evidence of Visciotti’s previous conviction for

assaulting William Scofield with a deadly weapon. Visciotti

had pleaded guilty to that offense in 1978 and served time in

state prison. The prosecution abided by this agreement.

Agajanian nevertheless had Visciotti testify about his

criminal history, including his 1978 conviction:

In his guilt phase testimony, [Visciotti]

claimed that the 1978 incident occurred when

two men who had a problem with his

roommate, Doug Favello, kicked in the door

of the apartment he shared with Favello, ran

in, and cut Favello’s throat. A third person

2 The clerk’s transcript indicates that Visciotti “personally and

through counsel waived his appearance for the remainder ofthe individual

voir dire conferences” on the afternoon of July 12. He was absent as well

for voir dire conducted in chambers on July 13 and 14.

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8 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

with a gun remained at the door. [Visciotti]

testified that he picked up the knife dropped

by the person who had stabbed Favello, ran

after the fleeing intruders, and stabbed the one

who had slashed Favello’s throat just as that

person (Scofield) was trying to enter his own

room. On cross examination [Visciotti]

conceded that he and several friends went to

Scofield’s room later that night, denied that

they had kicked in the door to that room or

that anyone had been in bed in the room, and

denied seeing, let alone stabbing, a woman

who had been in the room.

Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 30 n.5.

On rebuttal, the prosecution called Robert D. McKay, a

Crime Scene Investigator for the Anaheim Police

Department, to contradict Visciotti’s testimony concerning

the 1978 incident. McKay had investigated the scene of the

1978 incident, including Scofield’s room. He testified with

respect to the door to the apartment that it “appeared it had

been forced open,” as the door molding and latching had been

partially destroyed and there was a hole in the adjoining wall

from “where the doorknob would have struck the wall.” He

authenticated several photographs he had taken of the crime

scene, including images of two knives, blood-stained

bedding, and the damaged door to the apartment.

That same night, at a hospital, McKay observed and

photographed two injured parties: Scofield and Kathy

Cusack. He authenticated at trial a photograph he had taken

of several of Cusack’s stab wounds while she lay half naked

on a table in the hospital emergency room. McKay testified

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 9

that Cusack suffered from seven wounds, including “a deep

laceration to the lower right breast area, a deep long cut to the

inside of the right thigh, a cut to the right side, and four cuts

to the back of the right arm.” McKay later returned to the

police department, where he observed Favello. He testified

that Favello “did not have blood on his clothing or on his

body,” nor any evidence of an injury to his neck.

On July 29, 1983, the jury found Visciotti guilty of first

degree murder of Dykstra, attempted murder of Wolbert, and

robbery. Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 27–28. The jury “also

found that the murder was committed under the special

circumstance of murder in the commission of robbery, and

that [Visciotti] had personally used a firearm in the

commission of the offenses.” Id. at 28 (internal citation

omitted).

B. Penalty Phase

Visciotti’s penalty trial began several days later. As the

California Supreme Court recounted, “[t]he only evidence

presented by the [prosecution] in the initial phase of the

penalty trial was the testimony of William Scofield, the

victim of the June 15, 1978, assault with a deadly weapon

offense to which [Visciotti] had pleaded guilty and for which

he had served a prison term.” Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 33.

Scofield testified as follows: At the time of the incident,

he lived with Kathy Cusack in the same complex as Doug

Favello. The dispute between him and Favello had arisen out

of Favello’s “loss” of Cusack’s cat. At Cusack’s request,

Scofield spoke with Favello about the loss of the cat. Their

conversation degenerated into a fist fight. Later that evening,

Scofield went to Favello’s room armed with a knife and

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10 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

continued the argument. He did not strike Favello with the

knife he brandished.

The following night, “five or six guys kicked the door [to

Scofield’s room] down,” dragged him out of the room, and

assaulted him with some combination of baseball bats, sticks,

knives, and an ice pick. Scofield testified that Visciotti, part

of this group, stabbed him in his back. During the altercation,

Cusack remained in the room. When Scofield returned to the

room, he saw her “covered with blood.” Scofield’s back

required surgery.

The prosecution next called Cusack to testify. Agajanian

objected on the ground that Visciotti had pleaded guilty only

to stabbing Scofield and was not charged in the criminal

information with assaulting Cusack. The court initially

overruled the objection.

Just after Cusack was sworn in but before the prosecution

began to examine her, the court again called counsel to the

bench. The court asked the prosecutor whether the Notice of

Evidence of Aggravation informed Visciotti that the

prosecution would rely on Cusack’s testimony during the

penalty phase. The prosecutor replied that Cusack’s

testimony related to facts “that are an integral part of the

transaction concerning [Visciotti’s] prior felony conviction,”

which was included in the Notice.3 As the initial 1978

3 The Notice stated that “the prosecution intends to introduce, in

addition to the circumstances of the charged offenses and the

circumstances surrounding the alleged special circumstances the following

evidence in aggravation of the penalty and wherever else admissible: . . .

. Proof ofDefendant’s prior conviction for violation ofPenal Code Section

245(a), a felony, on or about August 11, 1978, in the Superior Court of the

State of California, in and for the County of Orange.”

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 11

criminal complaint had expressly referred to an assault on

Cusack, the prosecutor argued, even “a preliminary,

absolutelyminimal threshold type of investigation on the part

of the defense which I’m sure a competent attorney like Mr.

Agajanian . . . would do . . . would alert them to the fact there

was more than one victim alleged.”

The court noted that the Notice “refers strictly to a

conviction for which the defendant stands accused . . . that is,

the assault with a deadly weapon upon William Scofield. . . .

[It] talks about what appears to be a single violation . . . and

it talks about a conviction.” In the end, the court precluded

Cusack from testifying at all. The prosecution offered no

further evidence in its aggravation case-in-chief.

Agajanian’s “theory was to invoke jury sympathy for

[Visciotti’s] family.” In particular, Agajanian presented

evidence from various family members and friends that

Visciotti “had never been violent toward anyone in [his]

family,” and that “he was violent only when under the

influence of drugs.” Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 34.

Midway through Visciotti’s mitigation presentation, the

prosecution moved for permission to introduce Cusack as a

rebuttal witness at the close of Visciotti’s case. The court

granted the motion, holding “that the evidence introduced by

the defense is opinion evidence by every defense witness

offered [during the penalty phase] . . . that the defendant is in

fact a non-violent person. The people are entitled as a matter

of law to rebut that by competent evidence. Specific acts of

violence and rebuttal are relevant and are appropriate to rebut

an opinion that the defendant is in fact a non-violent person,

so the court shall allow the witness to testify as requested.”

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Agajanian, in turn, moved for a continuance “to find out

all of this information that this lady is apparently going to be

testifying to . . . .” After the court denied this motion,

Agajanian moved for production of “certain reports . . . to

help us prepare for this witness and determine the truthfulness

of the statements.” The court granted the second motion.

The California Supreme Court summarized Cusack’s

testimony as follows:

She first met [Visciotti] on June 12, 1978,

at a party in [Visciotti’s] apartment. She had

not seen him again until the early morning

hours of June 15 when he and several other

men broke into the apartment she shared with

Scofield. [Visciotti] had a knife. When the

other men, who were beating Scofield with

bats and sticks, dragged Scofield out of the

room, [Visciotti] remained in the room where

Cusack was standing on the bed. He stabbed

her through the right forearm, which she had

raised to protect herself, stabbed her farther

up that arm, and when she fell down onto the

bed, slashed her leg. He then stabbed her in

the ankle. When [Visciotti] attempted to stab

Cusack in the abdomen she told him she was

pregnant. He nonetheless tried again to stab

her in the abdomen, but she rolled over and he

stabbed her in the side. He then stabbed her

in the chest, slashed her shoulder, stabbed her

in the area of her breast. After stabbing

Cusack eight or more times, [Visciotti] began

to carve up the walls of the apartment, and to

cut up the posters and pictures. When Cusack

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 13

hit him over the head with a stick, [Visciotti]

ran out of the apartment. She . . . had to be

hospitalized for treatment of her wounds.

Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 33–34 (footnote omitted). Cusack

added that she was four months pregnant at the time of the

attack. Id. at 33 n.7. Cusack was the last witness to testify in

the penalty phase of Visciotti’s trial.

During his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized

Visciotti’s attack on Cusack as the primary example of

Visciotti’s history of violence. While the prosecutor noted

that Visciotti’s conviction for assaulting Scofield qualified as

an aggravating prior conviction, he emphasized Cusack’s

perspective on the incident.

For his part, Agajanian delivered a closing argument that

the California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, described as

“a rambling discourse, not tied to particular evidence.” 

Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th at 82 n.45. Agajanian “did not argue

that any statutory mitigating factor was present.” Rather than

arguing against the aggravating factors or for any mitigating

factors, Agajanian’s “approach was to note the tragedy and

the impact of the murder victim’s death on other people, and

to ask the jury not to add to the tragedy or cause others to

suffer the same impact by condemning [Visciotti] to death.” 

Id. at 66 n.35. And, as Justice Brown noted in her California

Supreme Court habeas dissent “Agajanian systematically

conceded nine of the eleven aggravating and mitigating

factors set forth in Penal Code section 190.3 . . . to the

prosecution.” Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 365 (Brown, J.,

dissenting). To the extent Agajanian asserted any theory, it

was to “ask[] the jury to spare [Visciotti’s] life because he

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14 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

was the only bad child of a loving family who would suffer

if petitioner were to be executed.” Id. at 331.

The jury began deliberating on the afternoon of August 3. 

After nearly two days of deliberations, the jury condemned

Visciotti to death.

C. Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction

Proceedings

Visciotti automatically appealed to the California

Supreme Court. Agajanian continued to represent him for

about seven years following his conviction. During that time,

Agajanian filed but a single, thirty-page brief on Visciotti’s

behalf. Also during that period, Agajanian was convicted in

an unrelated matter, in the District of Vermont, of two counts

of criminal contempt. His representation of Visciotti ended

in 1990, when the State Bar suspended his license to practice

law.4

4 Additional discipline followed. As the California Supreme Court

explained:

The bases for the disciplinary proceedingsthat followed

the proceeding related to the contempt conviction were

complaints that Agajanian had abandoned clients, failed

to respond to client communications, made false

representations and misrepresentations, lost files, and

failed to perform promised services. Evidence was

admitted at the evidentiary hearing that during the time

he represented [Visciotti], Agajanian did not respond to

client communications, failed to make court

appearances, did not visit clients in jail or show up in

court or other places as promised, and was distracted by

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 15

Replacement counsel filed a supplemental brief following

Agajanian’s suspension. That brief asserted that the closure

of penalty phase voir dire violated the Sixth Amendment right

to a public trial, citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of

Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Waller v.

Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).

The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on

direct appeal. See Visciotti I, 2 Cal. 4th 1. Justice Mosk

dissented, writing that he would have sua sponte decided that

Agajanian’s “pervasive and serious” deficiencies as trial

counsel “resulted in a breakdown of the adversarial process

at trial” to such an extent that Visciotti’s conviction should

not stand. Id. at 84 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

Visciotti next filed a habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court. That court appointed a referee to take

evidence and make factual findings on certain discrete

questions, most of which concerned Agajanian’s failure to

investigate, discover, and use mitigating evidence in

Visciotti’s penalty phase hearing.

At the hearing, Agajanian testified that he “did not

conduct formal interviews with any members of [Visciotti’s]

family in preparation for the penalty phase,” and that he “did

no investigation and did not have a social worker or

investigator do any investigation to seek potentially

mitigating evidence.” Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 337. He

further testified that, although he decided “to elicit sympathy

a civil suit against a nonlawyer who shared his office

and was accused of fraudulent sales of trust deeds.

Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 350 n.6.

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for [Visciotti’s] family as his penalty phase strategy,” id. at

336, “he had no information about [Visciotti’s] family when

he made his decision on penalty phase tactics,” id. at 337. 

Visciotti also offered evidence that Agajanian failed to

provide mental health experts appointed by the trial court

with the necessary information to provide a competent and

informed evaluation. See id. at 337–40.

Particularly relevant here is Visciotti’s evidence that

“Agajanian did not review the prosecutor’s file.” Id. at 340. 

As Visciotti II described,

[a]lthough it was the practice of the district

attorney at the time of the Visciotti trial to

make the case files of prosecutors available to

defense counsel, Agajanian was not aware

that during petitioner’s 1978 assault with a

deadly weapon on William Scofield,

petitioner had also repeatedly stabbed Kathy

Cusack who was pregnant. Agajanian did not

send for the police report or go through the

prosecutor’s file to read it in advance of trial

and thus was surprised and unprepared to face

that evidence.

Id. Finally, Visciotti presented at the habeas hearing

considerable evidence concerning facts relevant to mitigation

that Agajanian failed to discover and present during the

penalty phase proceedings. The California Supreme Court

summarized that evidence at length in its habeas decision. 

See id. at 341–45.

After considering the referee’s report, a divided court

denied relief for want of prejudice. Assuming that

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 17

Agajanian’s performance was constitutionally inadequate,

and “[n]otwithstanding Agajanian’s multiple failings,”5the

majority reasoned, it was not reasonably probable that the

jurywould have recommended a lesser sentence had Visciotti

received competent representation. Id. at 352–57. The

dissent concluded otherwise, maintaining that “Agajanian’s

abysmal across-the-board performance rendered the penalty

phase of the trial a complete and utter farce.” Id. at 366

(Brown, J., dissenting).

D. Federal Habeas Proceedings

In 1998, Visciotti filed the habeas petition at issue here. 

The district court granted relief on the basis of Agajanian’s

ineffectiveness during the penalty phase of Visciotti’s trial

but expressly rejected most of Visciotti’s remaining

challenges to his conviction, including his guilt phase IAC

claim. Additionally, because of its ruling on the penalty

phase IAC claim, the court held moot several of Visciotti’s

remaining claims, including his objection to the closure of the

death qualification portion of voir dire. We affirmed the

5 The majority assumed Agajanian “failed to afford constitutionally

adequate representation because he allegedly: (1) failed to investigate and

discover mitigating evidence as a result of his ignorance of the types of

evidence a jury might consider mitigating; (2) failed to present readily

available evidence that would have revealed to the jury the extent to which

petitioner was subjected to psychological and physical abuse as a child,

the impact the dysfunctional and peripatetic family life had on petitioner’s

development, and the correlation between these events and petitioner's

resort to drugs; (3) failed to prepare, which left him unaware of the scope

of the aggravating evidence to be introduced; and (4) delivered an

[unfocused] closing argument, during which he undercut his client’s own

case by telling the jury that the evidence of petitioner's mental and

emotional problems was not mitigating, prejudiced petitioner at the

penalty phase of the trial.” Id. at 353.

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district court’s judgment in its entirety. See Visciotti III,

288 F.3d at 1101.

The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed in a per

curiam opinion, without merits briefing. The Court reasoned

that the California Supreme Court’s denial of Visciotti’s state

habeas petition for want of prejudice was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal

law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at

22–27. As relevant here, Visciotti IV rejected our conclusion

that the California Supreme Court failed to take into account

available mitigating evidence, noting that “[a]ll of the

mitigating evidence” that we “referred to as having been left

out of account or consideration [was] in fact described” in

Visciotti II. Id. at 25. Furthermore, Visciotti IV held that the

California Supreme Court’s conclusion that the “aggravating

factors [were] so severe that . . . [Visciotti] suffered no

prejudice from trial counsel’s (assumed) inadequacy” was not

unreasonable. Id. at 26–27. “Habeas relief,” the Court

concluded, “is therefore not permissible under § 2254(d).” 

Id. at 27.

On remand to this court, Visciotti asked us to consider

whether the California Supreme Court’s denial of his state

habeas petition rested on an unreasonable determination of

the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). We remanded to the

district court “to review and rule on the argument[] in the first

instance.” Visciotti v. Brown, 406 F.3d 1131, 1131 (9th Cir.

2005).

The district court denied Visciotti’s remaining claims for

relief. It issued a certificate of appealability on claim 1.C

(contesting trial counsel’s penalty phase effectiveness) and

claim 12 (contesting closure of the death qualification voir

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 19

dire). This appeal followed. After oral argument, we granted

Visciotti’s request to expand the certificate of appealability to

cover claim 58 of his proposed second amended petition,

limited to the question whether “the cumulative effect of

constitutionally ineffective representation throughout the

criminal process, including both the guilt and penalty phases,

prejudice[d] Visciotti in the penalty phase of his trial?”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s denial of a petition for writ of

habeas corpus de novo. Deck v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015, 1021

(9th Cir. 2014). As Visciotti’s petition is governed by

AEDPA, Visciotti can prevail on a claim “that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court” only if he can show

that the adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under AEDPA, “[w]e review the last

reasoned state court opinion.” Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 830, 834–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). However, “when it

is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a

properly raised issue, we must review it de novo.” Pirtle v.

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20 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Cone

v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffectiveness of Counsel (IAC)

Ordinarily, “[a] convicted defendant’s claim that

counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of

a conviction or death sentence has two components.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “First,

the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient.” Id. “Second, the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. To

establish Strickland prejudice, Visciotti must show that but

for Agajanian’s deficient performance, “there is a reasonable

probability that [the jury] would have returned with a

different sentence.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536

(2003). Further, “[t]o assess that probability, we consider

‘the totality of the available mitigation evidence — both that

adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas

proceeding’ — and ‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in

aggravation.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009)

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397–98 (2000)).

Visciotti presents two IAC claims in this appeal. First, he

raises a penalty phase IAC claim, focused on the allegation

that key aggravating evidence, Cusack’s testimony, was

introduced only as a result of Agajanian’s errors during the

penalty proceedings. Second, as a new IAC claim, Visciotti

contends that the cumulative effect of Agajanian’s

ineffectiveness during both the guilt and penalty phases of

trial ultimately prejudiced the penalty proceedings. We

conclude that, whether or not these claims have merit, they

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 21

are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Visciotti

IV, so we may not grant habeas relief.

1. Claim 1C — penalty phase IAC

The California Supreme Court denied Visciotti’s penalty

phase IAC claim, concluding that, assuming that Agajanian’s

performance was constitutionally deficient, “it is not probable

that the jury would have found” the mitigation evidence

Agajanian failed to present was “mitigating or sufficiently so

that the evidence would have affected the jury determination

that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating in this

case.” Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 356. The Supreme Court

held the California Supreme Court’s prejudice determination 

reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as the decision was

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at

27.

Visciotti now argues that the California Supreme Court’s

decision deserves no deference for a different reason —

because it “was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The thrust of Visciotti’s

refashioned penalty phase argument is as follows: The

California Supreme Court specifically assumed that

Agajanian performed deficiently by “fail[ing] to prepare,

which left him unaware of the scope of the aggravating

evidence to be introduced.” Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 353. 

Indeed, the state high court found that, prior to the penalty

phase of trial, Agajanian “was not aware that during

[Visciotti’s] 1978 assault with a deadly weapon on William

Scofield, [he] had also repeatedly stabbed Kathy Cusack”;

“did not send for the police report or go through the

prosecutor’s file to read it in advance of trial”; and “did not

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know evidence of the Cusack stabbing was to be presented.” 

Id. at 340, 346. The California Supreme Court’s ensuing

prejudice determination, Visciotti contends, relied on that

court’s preceding determination that Visciotti “has not shown

that Agajanian’s failure to prepare to meet or counter the

evidence about his assault on Kathy Cusack was prejudicial. 

He does not suggest that this evidence could have been

rebutted.” Id. at 355.

Visciotti’s central § 2254(d)(2) contention is that in its

prejudice analysis, the California Supreme Court

unreasonably assumed that Cusack’s testimony was

admissible without regard to Agajanian’s IAC, yet the trial

court had initially excluded her testimony. Cusack’s

testimony was eventually admitted only as rebuttal to

Agajanian’s deficient mitigation presentation. The trial

court’s initial decision entirely to exclude Cusack’s testimony

from the penalty phase, Visciotti maintains, would have

remained in force had Agajanian not “opened the door” by

incompetently eliciting evidence as to Visciotti’s character

for nonviolence.

Visciotti called attention to these circumstances in his

state habeas petition, arguing that Agajanian performed

deficientlyby choosing a mitigation case that opened the door

to Cusack’s previously precluded penalty phase testimony.

6

6 That the California Supreme Court weighed the Cusack testimony

as part of its Strickland prejudice analysis without acknowledging that it

came into evidence only as a result of Agajanian’s deficient performance

(which the Court otherwise assumed) is the crux of Visciotti’s

§ 2254(d)(2) argument. That is, his challenge is not “based on the claim

that the finding is unsupported by sufficient evidence,” but that “the

process employed by the state court [was] defective.” Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). As in Taylor, Visciotti claims that the

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The assault on Cusack was one of the three components of

the State’s death-penalty argument at the penalty phase, along

with Visciotti’s prior conviction for assaulting Scofield and

the heinousness of the crimes for which Visciotti was being

tried. The prosecution dramatically emphasized the attack on

Cusack during its penalty phase case. Most notably, in

closing argument the prosecutor referred to Cusack as the

“prime example” of Visciotti’s history for violence, noting

that Scofield fell in a “different category.” The prosecutor

continued:

Going in and taking a woman alone in her

bedroom after you’ve kicked in the door in the

middle of the night for no apparent reason. 

She couldn’t offer any motivation why he

would have done this and none was presented

to you. There is no reason. It’s a totally

senseless, vicious, brutal attack on this woman

who again is isolated by herself, totally

defenseless in her bedroom that night.

The statements about her saying I’m

pregnant, don’t stab me, don’t hurt the baby,

then [Visciotti] immediately thereafter

stabbing her right in the stomach. It’s almost

too cold and brutal to comment on. . . .

court “fail[ed] to consider and weigh relevant evidence that was properly

presented” to the state habeas court, id. at 1001 — here, that Cusack’s

testimony would not have been admitted absent Agajanian’s deficient

performance. See also id. at 1008 (“[F]ailure to take into account and

reconcile key parts of the record casts doubt on the process by which the

finding was reached, and hence on the correctness of the finding.”).

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[Visciotti] reenters the room where she’s

all by herself; she doesn’t know what’s going

on; she’s totally defenseless. And [Visciotti]

stabs her seven or eight times for no apparent

reason.

The only conversation is she tells him,

“My god. I’m pregnant. Don’t hurt the

baby.”

That’s what really happened. That’s the

basis for his prior felony conviction. That’s

why he went to state prison. Now, to possibly

think that’s not aggravating, it’s hard to

believe.

Moreover, the California Supreme Court in its prejudice

analysis lingered over the image of a “pregnant KathyCusack

as she lay in bed trying to protect her fetus.” Visciotti II,

14 Cal. 4th at 355.

Cusack’s testimony would not have been admitted had

Visciotti been properlyrepresented, Visciotti argues. And, he

goes on, had Cusack’s testimony been precluded, that

omission would have significantly affected the California

Supreme Court’s determination on state habeas as to whether

Agajanian’s deficiencies prejudiced Visciotti. In reviewing

Agajanian’s asserted ineffectiveness, the California Supreme

Court recognized that the state courts were obliged, in

assessing the prejudice worked by Agajanian’s penalty phase

IAC, to consider the mitigating evidence which Agajanian

failed to present. Id. at 333–34. Consequently, in Visciotti’s

view, a proper reweighing of mitigating and aggravating

evidence, excluding Cusack’s testimony as the product of

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 25

Agajanian’s incompetence and including the mitigating

evidence proffered on habeas for the same reason, would

have resulted in an entirely different prejudice determination,

one which could have entitled him to a different penalty

phase result.

Visciotti’s § 2254(d)(2) arguments are not without

substance. Were we writing on a blank slate, we would likely

find them meritorious. But we are not writing on a blank

slate.

“According to the law of the case doctrine, on remand a

lower court is bound to follow the appellate court’s decision

as to issues decided explicitly or by necessary implication.” 

United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 443 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th

Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“When a case has been once decided by [the Supreme Court]

on appeal, and remanded to the circuit court, whatever was

before [the Court], and disposed of by its decree, is

considered as finally settled. The circuit court is bound by the

decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution

according to the mandate.” In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co.,

160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895).

In deciding Visciotti’s prior appeal, the U.S. Supreme

Court broadly concluded that “[h]abeas relief is . . . not

permissible under § 2254(d).” Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at 27.7

7 We note that the district court declined to address whether the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decision precluded review of Visciotti’s IAC claim. 

Instead, it denied the claim on the merits. Explaining that, if the Cusack

evidence had been the primary basis for the jury’s sentencing decision, it

“might be persuaded that Agajanian’s decision to present a case in

mitigation was both wrong and prejudicial,” the district court found that

“there was much more to the jury’s penalty decision than the

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Yet the Court’s actual analysis was narrow; it focused

exclusively on the applicability of § 2254(d)(1), reversing our

prior conclusion that the California SupremeCourt’s previous

adjudication of Visciotti’s claim was both contrary to, and an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 537 U.S. at 27.

Moreover, and critically, the Cusack-centered IAC issues

were not presented to the United States Supreme Court at all,

not for lack of diligence but because of the procedural posture

in which the case was decided by the Court. Visciotti IV was

issued summarily, on the basis of the petition for certiorari

alone. There were no merits briefs, and there was no oral

argument. The State’s petition for certiorari focused on the

reasoning of our prior decision, without independently

addressing the merits of any of Visciotti’s contentions not

directly implicated by that decision. The petition asked the

Court to clarify the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). Neither the

petition nor Visciotti’s brief in opposition mentioned

§ 2254(d)(2) at all, and neither discussed the circumstances

surrounding the admission of Cusack’s testimony or the

connection between those circumstances and the IAC

prejudice determination. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (No. 02-137), 2002

WL 32134887; Brief in Opposition, id., 2002 U.S. S. Ct.

Briefs LEXIS 1091. The question whether the California

Supreme Court’s implicit assumptions as to the inevitable

unadjudicated Cusack stabbing.” The district court did rely on Visciotti

IV when it concluded that the presence of other aggravating factors was

not “such scant justification for the imposition of a death sentence as to

indicate either an unreasonable application of the law or an unreasonable

determination of the facts.”

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admission of Cusack’s testimony was factually correct was

thus never litigated in the Supreme Court.

Nevertheless, Visciotti IV entirely precludes any review

at this juncture of Visciotti’s IAC claims. Williams v.

Johnson, 720 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2013), judgment vacated,

134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), requires this conclusion.

Williams had previouslyconcluded that the state court had

not adjudicated petitioner’s claims on the merits. After

conducting de novo review, this court granted habeas relief. 

Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 653 (9th Cir. 2011), 

rev’d sub nom. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013). 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Before the Supreme

Court, the parties did not brief — and the Supreme Court did

not expressly analyze — the merits of the petitioner’s claim

under more restrictive standards of § 2254(d). Williams v.

Johnson, 720 F.3d at 1213 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 

Rather, the Supreme Court explained that we had erred in

determining that the state court had not adjudicated the case

on the merits, and therefore in holding that § 2254 did not

apply. See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1091–92. The

Supreme Court’s Williams opinion nonetheless stated,

broadly, “that under [§ 2254(d)] respondent is not entitled to

habeas relief.” Id. at 1092. That sentence, the Williams panel

concluded on remand, precluded further consideration by this

Court of the claim under § 2254(d), even though the Supreme

Court’s reasoning in its opinion did not support the breadth of

its conclusion. 720 F.3d at 1213–14 (Reinhardt, J.,

concurring). As Judge Kozinski put it, “[d]eference to the

judicial hierarchy leaves room for no other course of action

on our part.” 720 F.3d. at 1214 (Kozinski, J., concurring).

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The same is true here. As in Williams, the parties here

“did not brief the merits of [Visciotti’s § 2254(d)(2) claim

regarding ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to

Cusack’s testimony] before the Court,” either by mentioning

that section or by discussing the difficulties with the

California Supreme Court’s assumption concerning the

inevitable admission of Cusack’s testimony. Cf. 720 F.3d at

1213 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Nonetheless, just as in

Williams, the Supreme Court concluded generically that

“[h]abeas relief is . . . not permissible under § 2254(d).” 

Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at 27. Accordingly, we could not grant

such relief under § 2254(d)(2), a subsection of § 2254(d). As

in Williams, “[w]e are . . . required to assume that the Court

meant what it said in . . . its opinion, in which it appears to

have . . . deliberately precluded us from considering the

merits of [Visciotti’s] habeas petition under AEDPA.” 

720 F.3d at 1213–14 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

Following our second decision in Williams, the Supreme

Court, without explanation, granted the petitioner’s new

petition for certiorari, vacated our judgment, and “remanded

for consideration of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim

under the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” 134 S.

Ct. 2659 (2014). This development does not change the fact

that we are bound by the express language in Visciotti IV

barring relief on Visciotti’s penalty phase IAC claim. But, as

in Williams, we “take comfort in knowing that, if we are

wrong, we can be summarily reversed.” 720 F.3d at 1214

(Kozinski, J., concurring).

“[W]e are an intermediate court within the federal system,

and as such, we must take our cue from the Supreme Court.” 

United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 2011). 

As the express language of Visciotti IV bars any

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 29

reconsideration of Visciotti’s penalty phase IAC claims, even

one not presented to the Supreme Court in the submissions

before it at the time it ruled, we deny his claim for habeas

relief.

2. Claim 58 — cumulative error IAC claim

In addition to his penalty phase IAC claim, Visciotti

raises a new IAC claim in this appeal, contending that the

cumulative effect ofAgajanian’s ineffective assistance during

both the guilt and penalty phases of trial prejudiced him with

respect to the ultimate penalty imposed by the jury. The

California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits,

and, alternatively, on procedural grounds.

The procedural history of Visciotti’s cumulative error

claim deserves further mention. When Visciotti first filed his

federal habeas petition, he also filed both a notice of

unexhausted claims and a motion to equitably toll the

AEDPA statute of limitations. The district court denied the

tolling motion. Visciotti then filed an exhaustion petition in

the California Supreme Court in October 1998, about four

months after filing the federal petition in district court. That

petition included the cumulative error claim, as Claim 19. 

Visciotti’s filing of the additional petition appeared

compelled at that time by Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522

(1982), which was generally understood to require dismissal

of petitions containing unexhausted claims. The California

Supreme Court denied the claim on both the merits and

procedural grounds.

Visciotti then requested leave to amend his federal

petition to include a cumulative error claim, now styled as

Claim 58; the district court summarily denied leave. When

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the case was remanded to the district court following Visciotti

IV, Visciotti renewed his motion for leave to amend his

petition. The district court this time granted the motion and

ordered an evidentiary hearing. After this Court issued a writ

of mandamus, at the state’s request, vacating the order for an

evidentiary hearing, the district court reconsidered its

decision to allow amendment of Visciotti’s petition and, this

time, struck the amended petition as an improperly filed

second or successive petition. The district court thus never

decided the cumulative error claim. After oral argument, we

expanded the certificate of appealabilityto include Visciotti’s

cumulative error claim.8

We now turn to the substance of Visciotti’s cumulative

error claim. The State does not dispute that Agajanian

rendered deficient performance throughout the trial. Rather,

it contends that, in Visciotti IV, the Supreme Court decided

whether the cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced

Visciotti at the penalty phase. We are constrained to agree. 

Even assuming that Visciotti could overcome the substantial

procedural obstacles he faces, Visciotti IV squarely forecloses

Visciotti’s cumulative error claim as well.

As we have already explained, the Court’s conclusion in

Visciotti IV — that “[h]abeas relief is . . . not permissible

under § 2254(d)” — precludes our review of Visciotti’s IAC

cumulative error claim. Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at 27. Visciotti

8

In light of this procedural history, the State argues that Claim 58 is

not properly before us because (1) it was presented in a “second” or

“successive” petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); and (2) the California

Supreme Court denied the claim on the alternative basis that it was

procedurally defaulted. As we conclude that the Supreme Court’s ruling

precludes our review of Visciotti’s claim in any case, we decline to

address these procedural questions.

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presents that issue as one specifically raised before, and

decided by, the state courts, and therefore as one covered by

§ 2254(d). That Visciotti did not present this particular,

cumulative error, IAC claim to the United States Supreme

Court in 2002 does not, for the reasons discussed above,

allow us to overlook Visciotti IV’s clear, mandatorylanguage. 

The Court’s broad language in Visciotti IV therefore covers

the issue, and we may not reach it.9

* * *

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s previous adjudication

precludes relief on Visciotti’s present penalty phase and

cumulative error IAC claims. We therefore do not reach the

question whether the California Supreme Court’s analysis

violated § 2254(d)(2), or whether there was cumulative

prejudice at the penalty phase due to ineffective assistance of

counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Instead,

as required by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Visciotti IV, we

affirm the district court’s denial of Visciotti’s IAC claims.

9 Visciotti accurately argues that “a cumulative error claim is a

separate, stand-alone claim . . . [not] merely a method of conducting

prejudice review for separately alleged claims,” and emphasizes that his

cumulative error claim includes non-IAC errors such as “claims of

prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error.” But, in granting

Visciotti’s request for a certificate of appealability, we limited our review

to a single sub-question: whether “the cumulative effect of constitutionally

ineffective representation throughout the criminal process, including both

the guilt and penalty phases, prejudice[d] Visciotti in the penalty phase of

his trial[.]” Thus, while claims of cumulative error may generally be

distinct from the underlying errors on which they rely, the particular

cumulative error on which we granted a certificate of appealability is not.

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B. Public Trial Right

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants

“the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend

VI. Visciotti contends that the trial judge’s closure of the

courtroom for six-and-a-half days during the death

qualification portion of voir dire violated this Sixth

Amendment right.

1. Legal Principles

The public trial right, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

held, encompasses pre-trial proceedings, including voir dire.

Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 511–13, held a trial judge’s

closure of almost six weeks of death qualification voir dire

unconstitutional. “[S]ince the development of trial by jury,”

the Court explained, “the process of selection of jurors has

presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for

good cause shown.” Id. at 505. “The value of openness lies

in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have

confidence that standards of fairness are being observed . . .

Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the

criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to

the public confidence in the system.” Id. at 508. 

Consequently, Press-Enterprise cautioned, “[c]losed

proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare

and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of

openness.” Id. at 509. That is, “[t]he presumption of

openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest

based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher

values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. at

510.

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Press-Enterprise was decided on First Amendment

grounds, not Sixth Amendment grounds. See id. at 516

(Stevens, J., concurring). Soon thereafter, however, Waller

v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1984), concluded that a trial

judge’s closure of a pre-trial suppression hearing violated the

defendant’s Sixth Amendment public trial right. In so

concluding, it relied on Press-Enterprise and prior First

Amendment precedent, noting that “there can be little doubt

that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no

less protective of a public trial than the implicit First

Amendment right of the press and public.” Id. at 46. Waller

went on to hold that “under the Sixth Amendment any closure

of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused

must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its

predecessors” — that is, “the trial court must consider

reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must

make findings adequate to support the closure.” Id. at 47–48. 

“The requirement of a public trial,” Waller further explained,

“is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he

is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the

presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly

alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance

of their functions . . . .” Id. at 46 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

More recently, Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209,

212–213 (2010), emphasized that the Sixth Amendment

“right to a public trial in criminal cases extends to . . . the voir

dire of prospective jurors . . . is well settled under PressEnterprise [] and Waller.” In a per curiam disposition, the

Court concluded that “there is no legitimate reason, at least in

the context of juror selection proceedings, to give one who

asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on

public proceedings than the accused has.” Id. at 213.

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Denial of the public trial right is a “defect affecting the

framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply

an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante,

499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). Violation of the public trial right

is therefore structural error. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49–50;

see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69

(1997) (listing the right to a public trial as one of the “very

limited class of cases” in which the Court has found structural

error). As in other classes of structural error, “a requirement

that prejudice be shown would in most cases deprive [the

defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be

difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence

available of specific injury.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9

(alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).

2. Procedural Default

The State contends that the California Supreme Court

denied Visciotti’s public trial claim in part on procedural

grounds — namely, on the ground that Agajanian failed to

object to the trial judge’s closure decision. Consequently,

before turning to Visciotti’s public trial claim we address

whether the claim was procedurally defaulted. If in fact the

state “discuss[ed] the merits of the claim” but “separately

relied on [a] procedural bar, the claim is defaulted.” Zapata

v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015). If the claim

is defaulted, we are barred from reviewing the merits of the

public trial right claim unless Visciotti can sufficiently

establish “cause” and “prejudice” to excuse the default. 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1977).

In denying Visciotti’s public trial claim, Visciotti I stated

that “[Visciotti] concedes that the issue was not raised in the

trial court.” 2 Cal. 4th at 50. It is evident that the California

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Supreme Court determined that, as Agajanian did not object

to the trial judge’s closure of voir dire, Visciotti defaulted his

public trial right claim by failing to comply with California

contemporaneous-objection rule. That the Court’s denial was

premised on a procedural ground is all the more clear from its

repeated citations to People v. Thompson, which held that a

defendant’s public trial right “may be waived by the failure

to assert it in timely fashion.” 50 Cal. 3d 134, 157 (1990).

Visciotti acknowledges that Agajanian did not object to

the trial judge’s closure of death qualification voir dire. But,

he contends, Agajanian’s ineffective assistance in failing to

raise the objection constitutes cause for purposes of excusing

the default.10See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

10 The State argues in its brief that the California Supreme Court “has

already found that Visciotti had no cause for his failure to object.” That

cannot be so.

In the direct appeal opinion, the California Supreme Court stated that

the possible benefits ofsequestered voir dire to defendants, in combination

with the active litigation at the time of Visciotti’s trial on the question of

the right of the public to attend jury voir dire, made it “doubtful that any

competent defense counsel would have objected to it.” Visciotti I, 2 Cal.

4th at 51. But, on direct review, Visciotti did not seek to excuse his

default by claiming Agajanian’s ineffectiveness as cause. Nor did the

California Supreme Court perform a Strickland analysis — properly so,

as in California, IAC claims, “except in . . . rare instances,” are to be

“raised on habeas corpus, not on direct appeal.” People v. Lopez, 42 Cal.

4th 960, 972 (2008). In any event, the question whether a petitioner’s

procedural default is excused by cause and prejudice for purposes of

federal habeas review is a federal, not state, question. Johnson v.

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.

Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (“The rules for when a prisoner may establish cause

to excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise of the [U.S.

Supreme] Court’s discretion.”); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 517

(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the cause-and-prejudice rule

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753–54 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986).11 To demonstrate such ineffectiveness, Visciotti must

satisfy Strickland’s familiar standard: he must establish that

Agajanian’s performance was deficient and that he was

prejudiced by the deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687–88.

Before proceeding to the Strickland analysis, we consider

a preliminary question: should we “give AEDPA deference

to the state court determination on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim when deciding whether that claim constitutes

cause for procedural default[?]” Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d

1093, 1101 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).12 There is disagreement

among federal courts of appeal on this question. See Janosky

v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2010).13

constitutes an exercise of “federal power to entertain a habeas petition in

the face of a procedural default” (emphasis added)).

11 Visciotti alleged in his initial state habeas petition that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to closing the courtroom. The

California Supreme Court rejected the claim without analysis. See

Visciotti II, 14 Cal. 4th at 329, 333. The IAC claim was therefore properly

“presented” to the state courts for exhaustion purposes. Edwards v.

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000).

12 Jones expressly declined to answer this question, as it held the

petitioner’s IAC claim there failed whether it was reviewed de novo or

applying AEDPA deference. See id.

13 Compare Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“Although [petitioner] must satisfy the AEDPA standard with respect to

his independent IAC claim, he need not do so to claim ineffective

assistance for the purpose of establishing cause”), and Fischetti v.

Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2004) (same), with Richardson

v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 273 (7th Cir. 2014) (when reviewing a state

court’s resolution of an ineffective assistance claim in the cause-andprejudice context, it applies the “same deferential standard as [it] would

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We agree with our sister circuits that have reviewed IAC

claims in the cause-and-prejudice context de novo, thereby

applying a “differing standard for evaluating constitutional

error as a substantive basis of relief and as a cause to avoid

default of other claims.” Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 154. As the

cases so proceeding have recognized, the Coleman cause and

prejudice standard was in no way affected by AEDPA. 

“AEDPA does not establish a statutory high hurdle for the

issue of cause,” and Coleman “made its determination of

cause, or lack of cause, based on a straightforward analysis

whether the denial of counsel was ‘an independent

constitutional violation.’” Id. at 154–55 (quoting Coleman,

501 U.S. at 755). Absent any indication to the contrary in

AEDPA, the Coleman independent constitutional analysis

continues to apply, post-AEDPA, to a contention that trial

counsel IAC constitutes cause to excuse a procedural default.

Accordingly, the question whether we can review the

merits of Visciotti’s public trial right claim turns entirely on

whether Visciotti has established that trial counsel was

ineffective, under the Strickland standard, for not objecting to

the trial judge’s closure of death qualification voir dire. To

that question we now turn.

3. Deficient Performance

To prevail on a Strickland ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, “the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Counsel is deficient when he or she “made errors so serious

when reviewing the claim on its own merits,” declining to follow the

approach taken by other courts that review so-called “nested ineffective

assistance issues” de novo).

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that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”; that is, when

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. Our review of counsel’s

performance is deferential, for “the defendant must overcome

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Carrera v.

Ayers, 670 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Recognizing that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees “do[]

not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every

conceivable constitutional claim,” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.

107, 134 (1982), we cannot conclude that Agajanian’s failure

to object to the closure of death qualification voir dire

constituted deficient performance under Strickland.

We reiterate that, since Visciotti’s 1983 trial, the Supreme

Court has unequivocally established that the Sixth

Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right to public voir

dire. Presley, 558 U.S. at 212–13; see also United States v.

Cazares, 788 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,

136 S. Ct. 2484 (2016). We have also suggested previously

that counsel’s failure to object to the closure of voir dire may,

at least in some circumstances, “[fall] below an objective

standard of reasonableness . . . particularly because the right

to a public trial is critical to ensuring a fair trial,” United

States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010). At

least two of our sister circuits have found that a failure to

object to partial closure of trial proceedings, including voir

dire, can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See

Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2009); Owens

v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007).

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Those decisions, however, do not foreclose the possibility

that in specific instances, counsel’s choice not to object to

closure of trial proceedings might be sound trial strategy. For

example, the First Circuit has held in two cases decided after

Owens that counsel may make a reasonable strategic choice

not to oppose partial closure of voir dire, Wilder v. United

States, 806 F.3d 653, 660 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.

Ct. 2031 (2016), or to forgo an objection to devote limited

resources to more important trial issues, Bucci v. United

States, 662 F.3d 18, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court

has long held that a defendant may waive his right to a public

trial. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619–20 (1960). 

As Justice Brennan observed in Levine, the power to waive

the right “must be . . . based on a defendant’s conclusion that

‘in his particular situation his interests will be better served

by foregoing the privilege than by exercising it.’” Id. at 626

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sorrentino,

175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1949)).

As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland, our

“highly deferential” review of counsel’s performance

“requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 466 U.S. at 689. At

the time of Visciotti’s trial in 1983, neither Press-Enterprise

nor Waller had yet been decided; in fact, “the question of

press access to voir dire was a matter of active litigation.” 

Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 157; see also United States v.

Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The

standard for determining whether a criminal proceeding may

be closed to the public and the proper allocation of the burden

of making the required showing are not yet clearly settled.”). 

While a prudent attorney in Agajanian’s position may have

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objected to closure to preserve the issue while it was being

resolved in the appellate courts, we cannot say that any

competent attorney would have done so, given that some

measure of sequestration of jurors during voir dire was at the

time required by California law in capital cases.

Three years earlier, in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.

3d 1, 80 (1980), superseded by statute, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv.

Prop. 115 (West) (1990) (codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 223), the California Supreme Court had required California

state courts to conduct “individualized sequestered voir dire”

when evaluating potential jurors’ qualifications to hear a

capital case. As the State explains, the Hovey requirement

was based on evidence that showed that sequestration of the

jury panel during voir dire about penalty “minimize[d] the

tendencyof a death-qualified jury to presume guilt and expect

conviction,” id., and therefore resulted in more favorable

juries for capital defendants.

As Visciotti points out, Hovey required only the

insulation of prospective jurors from the death qualification

questioning of their peers, emphasizing that the rule it

prescribed would “not in any way affect the open nature of a

trial.” Id. at 80–81. Hovey thus did not in express terms

require closure of voir dire proceedings to the public. But

California courts appear often to have understood Hovey to

support the principle that a general closure of voir dire

proceedings would be similarly beneficial to the defendant. 

For example, in Thompson, “[t]o comply with Hovey’s

mandate,” the trial court “conducted the death-qualification

voir dire in chambers” where “[n]either the public nor the

press was present.” 50 Cal. 3d at 156. The California

Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the public

trial right in part because “the sequestered voir dire was

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 41

ordered by the judge primarily for the benefit of the

defendant.” Id. at 157. In Visciotti I, the California Supreme

Court similarly cited Hovey in the course of explaining that

“because the sequestered voir dire is for the benefit of the

defendant ‘it is doubtful that any competent defense counsel

would have objected to it.’” 2 Cal. 4th at 51 (quoting

Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d at 156–57). Against this background,

competent counsel in 1983 may similarly have reasonably

believed that closure of voir dire was in the best interests of

his client.

We recognize the importance of a defendant’s interest in

preserving his right to a public trial. “Public scrutiny of a

criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the

integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the

defendant and to society as a whole.” Globe Newspaper Co.

v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). And we

recognize that the cases since Visciotti’s trial suggest that

counsel’s failure to safeguard this right during voir dire may

in some contexts fall below objective standards of reasonable

representation. Nevertheless, in “tak[ing] account of the

variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel,” we must

not “restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making

tactical decisions,” and must accord considerable deference

to trial counsel’s representation decisions when reviewing

counsel’s performance on a cold record. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688–89. “When counsel focuses on some issues to the

exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did

so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect. . . .

That presumption has particular force where a petitioner

bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the trial

record, creating a situation in which a court ‘may have no

way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided

action by counsel had a sound strategic motive.’” 

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Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (quoting Massaro

v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003)). Failing to object

to the closure of voir dire in Visciotti’s trial cannot overcome

our “presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,

350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).14

In sum, we cannot conclude that counsel’s failure to

object to the closure of the death qualification voir dire

constituted deficient performance.15 Visciotti therefore

cannot demonstrate cause to excuse his default of the public

trial right claim.

14 The parties dispute the extent to which closure of voir dire was the

normduring this period. The State’s counsel represented at oral argument

that “in California from 1980 to 1990 it was the prevailing norm of

defense counsel to seek closure of the voir dire as to the death penalty

phase, the Hovey voir dire. That was the prevailing norm of counsel.” 

The panel then inquired whether the State’s reference to the prevailing

norm meant that “the practice was just to exclude prospective jurors or to

exclude everybody?” “Based on personal knowledge,” the State’s counsel

continued, “it was as a practice, it was always done in chambers.”

Visciotti contested this representation, and submitted certified transcripts

ofseveral California capital trials conducted around the time of Visciotti’s

trial to demonstrate that it was not “prevailing” practice to close the

courtroom to the public and press. These transcripts reveal that, at least

in these California capital cases, the trial courts implementing Hovey

sequestered voir dire conducted such proceedings in open court, not in

chambers. But, again, Thompson and Brooklier point in the opposite

direction. From this mixed record we cannot conclude that counsel’s

failure to object ran counter to “prevailing professional norms.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

15 Because we conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient,

we do not consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 43

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s denial of habeas relief with respect to each of

Visciotti’s claims.

AFFIRMED.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, joined by PREGERSON, Circuit

Judge, concurring:

Not surprisingly, I join the principal opinion in full. I

write separately to emphasize one point: This case illustrates

that Supreme Court summary reversals cannot, and do not,

reflect the same complete understanding of a case as

decisions after plenary review. Relying on broad language in

such decisions, as we do in Section III.A, supra, is an

obligation of intermediate courts of appeals. But fulfilling

that obligation does not require that we blinker reality by

pretending that the summary reversal entailed full

consideration of the issues covered by the language of the

Supreme Court opinion issued.

At the certiorari stage, the parties’ submissions are —

quite properly— not designed comprehensivelyto inform the

Court about the merits of a case. The Supreme Court’s Rules

explain that petitions for certiorari “will be granted only for

compelling reasons,” including when (1) the decision below

conflicts with the decisions of federal courts of appeals or

state courts of last resort on an “important matter” or “an

important federal question”; (2) the decision conflicts with a

Supreme Court decision on an “important question of federal

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law”; and (3) when the lower court “decide[s] an important

question of federal law that has not been, but should be,

settled by th[e] Court.” S. Ct. R. 10.

Both scholarlyarticles and Supreme Court practice guides

suggest that petitioners will encounter greater success at the

petition for certiorari stage when they emphasize

“certworthy” aspects of the decision below, such as the

presence of a circuit conflict or the national importance of an

issue, rather than their legal and factual arguments on the

merits. See Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court

Practice, ch. 4.17, at 278 (10th ed. 2013). Whether the

decision below conflicts with decisions of other courts

appears to be the paramount factor at the certiorari stage. 

Scholars have estimated that “seventy percent of Court’s

plenary docket is devoted to addressing legal issues on which

lower courts have differed, and law clerks and Justices alike

have acknowledged that ensuring uniformity is a driving

force in case selection.” Amanda Frost, Overvaluing

Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1569 (2008); David R.

Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law

Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 947, 982

(2007) (collecting data from 2003 to 2005 terms).1“Most of

1

See also Supreme Court Practice, ch. 4.3, at 241 (providing data

about the 1993 term); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court

Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 Okla. L. Rev. 727, 747 (2001)

(“[S]tatistical analysis suggests that the Supreme Court is more likely to

grant certiorari if the petition for a writ of certiorari contains an allegation

of a conflict with Supreme Court precedent or contains an allegation of a

conflict between two or more federal circuit courts of appeals than if such

a claim of conflict is absent.”) (footnotes omitted); Robert M. Lawless &

Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari,

62 Mo. L. Rev. 101, 133 (1997) (concluding that “the existence and depth

of a circuit conflict is important when the Court decides whether to grant

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 45

the rest are cases that involve no conflict among lower courts

but present contentious legal issues of great national

significance.” Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the

Supreme Court’s Certiorari Process, 123 Yale L.J. Forum

551, 561 (2014).

Practice guides and other secondary sources recommend

that petitioners specifically avoid describing the merits of a

case in too great detail, so as not to dissuade the Court from

perceiving the certiorari petition merely as a request for

“error correction.” Quoting Justice Vinson, the authoritative

guide to Supreme Court practice explains: “Lawyers might be

well-advised, in preparing [certiorari petitions] to spend a

little less time discussing the merits of their cases and a little

more time demonstrating why it is important that the Court

should hear them.” Supreme Court Practice, ch. 6.31(a), at

479.2 Similarly, as successful briefs in opposition to

certiorari are in many respects “the mirror image of an

effective [certiorari] petition,” demonstrating that “the

[certiorari] in a bankruptcy case”); Kevin Russell, Commentary: Writing

a Convincing Cert. Petition When There is No Direct Circuit Split,

SCOTUSblog (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/

2007/05/commentary-writing-a-convincing-cert-petition-when-there-is-nodirect-circuit-split/.

2 Accord Timothy S. Bishop, Jeffrey W. Sarles & Stephen J. Kane,

Tips on Petitioning for and Opposing Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme

Court, Litigation, Winter 2008 (“It is crucial to temper the natural instinct

to focus on defending or attacking the lower court’s decision on the

merits.”); Scott L. Nelson, Getting Your Foot in the Door: The Petition for

Certiorari, Public Citizen Litigation Group, available at

https://www.citizen.org/documents/GettingYourFootintheDoor.pdf

(“[Y]ou don’t want your merits argument to suggest that your principal

goal is error correction as opposed to the presentation of an important

issue requiring the Court’s review.”).

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decision below was right . . . is definitely a secondary

argument” at best. Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to

Certiorari, 33 Cath. U. L. Rev. 611, 627, 629 (1984); see also

Supreme Court Practice, ch. 512(c), at 355 (“The merits of

the decision below are not among the ceritorari considerations

of Rule 10 . . . [n]either the petition nor the brief in opposition

is designed to be a brief on the merits.”). As Justice Stevens

explained:

The most helpful and persuasive petitions for

certiorari to this Court usually present only

one or two issues, and spend a considerable

amount of time explaining why those

questions of law have sweeping importance

and have divided or confused other courts.

Given the page limitations that we impose, a

litigant cannot write such a petition if he

decides, or is required, to raise every claim

that might possibly warrant reversal in his

particular case.

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 858 (1999) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).

It comes as no surprise, then, that parties do not —

indeed, should not — fully develop their merits arguments in

certiorari-stage briefing. See Supreme Court Practice, ch.

6.31(c), at 484 (“The attempt to show error below . . . should

not be a long, full-dress argument such as would be proper in

the brief on the merits.”). Normally, of course, this omission

raises no concerns; if the Court grants certiorari, the parties

will be afforded substantial opportunity to explain their

positions in their merits-stage briefing and at oral argument. 

But when the Court issues a summary reversal, without the

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VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL 47

benefit of merits-stage briefing or oral argument, it

necessarily decides the case based on the limited presentation

and arguments raised in the certiorari-stage briefing.

Such was the case here. As the principal opinion

explains, in their certiorari-stage briefing in Visciotti IV,

neither the State nor Visciotti raised the particular IAC claims

now at issue in this appeal, nor did either explain that further

issues could be litigated on remand. Instead, the State’s

petition for certiorari contested, and Visciotti’s brief in

opposition defended, our previous conclusion that the

California Supreme Court’s Strickland prejudice

determination was contrary to or an unreasonable application

of established federal law for particular reasons, in violation

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Thus, the Supreme Court never

had before it the questions whether (1) the California

Supreme Court’s assumption that Cusack’s testimony would

have been before the jury regardless of any ineffective

assistance of counsel constitutes an “unreasonable

determination of the facts” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); and

(2) the cumulative effect of Agajanian’s IAC during both the

guilt and penalty phases of trial prejudiced Visciotti at the

penalty phase.

That Visciotti did not raise these claims was not an

oversight or poor lawyering. His “opposition to the [State’s]

petition for certiorari understandably focuse[d] on arguments

for denying certiorari.” United States v. Hollywood Motor

Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 271 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Nevertheless, at the end of its summary reversal, the

Court held broadly that “[h]abeas relief is . . . not permissible

under § 2254(d).” Visciotti IV, 537 U.S. at 27. Today, we

conclude that this language precludes our review of

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48 VISCIOTTI V. MARTEL

Visciotti’s present IAC claims. In so concluding, our opinion

simply reflects, as in Williams v. Johnson, 720 F.3d 1212 (9th

Cir. 2013), judgment vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), what

the Court actually encompassed in its broad language. And,

as appears to have been the case in Williams, that breadth

may have been inadvertent.

My concern is that “[t]he Court’s decisionmaking process

at the certiorari stage is fundamentally different from

traditional judicial decisionmaking.” Margaret Meriwether

Cordray& Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case

Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the

Merits, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 3 (2008). Summary reversals,

which are the product of such a decisionmaking process, are

also fundamentally different from traditional judicial

opinions, as they issue without the benefit of fully developed,

adversarial legal argument. As a result, what these decisions

say about the broader merits of a case may not reflect the

interwoven legal issues and arguments omitted from the

parties’ certiorari-stage briefing. And so, Justice Blackmun

observed, bydeciding unraised claims and questions “without

briefing or argument, . . . the Court’s summary disposition

[can] deprive[] respondents of their ‘day in court.’”

Hollywood Motor, 458 U.S. at 271–72 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).

As the principal opinion recognizes, the Court’s summary

per curiam reversals are no less binding upon us than the

authored opinions issued after full briefing and argument. 

Visciotti IV therefore requires that we deny habeas relief on

Visciotti’s present IAC claims, even though the substance of

such claims were never presented to the Court and were

almost surely not actually considered.

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In Williams, the Supreme Court corrected the apparently

inadvertent overreach of its original opinion by reversing our

second opinion without comment. Williams v. Johnson,

134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014). Notably, Williams was neither a

capital case nor one in which the Supreme Court’s first

decision was a summary reversal. Here, a person’s life is at

stake, and the Court proceeded without following its plenary

processes. If a second certiorari petition is filed, as I expect

it will be, I fully anticipate that, as in Williams, the Court will

look closely at whether it meant to reject the quite colorable

issues raised before us on remand, never alluded to in our

prior opinion or in the papers filed in the Supreme Court, with

regard to whether certiorari should be granted.

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