Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05091/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05091-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States Postal Service
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Luc J. Van Rampelberg
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

LUC J. VAN RAMPELBERG, 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth <:iro..1it 

SEP 21 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-5091 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. 89-C-357-B) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Defendants/Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

On May 5, 1989, plaintiff-appellant Luc J. Van Rampelberg 

filed in the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Oklahoma a complaint in which he alleged that the 

United States Postal Service (hereinafter "Postal Service" or 

"USPS") had breached a contract to employ him. Seven days later, 

the district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5091 Document: 01019973977 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 1 
§ 1915(d), on the grounds that the action was legally frivolous. 

We affirm the judgment of dismissal. 

In September of 1986, Van Rampelberg took and passed an examination given by the Postal Service to qualify for the position of 

electronics technician. His name was placed on a register and he 

was i nformed that there were eight people ahead of him. However, 

in accordance with a new contract between the Postal Service and 

the American Postal Workers Union, qualified USPS employees were 

promoted to the position sought by Van Rampelberg before anyone on 

the register was hired. 

Van Rampelberg contends that an implied contract for future 

employment was created when the Postal Service listed the 

qualified applicants on the register, and that this contract was 

breached when people who were not on that register were employed 

as electronics technicians. We disagree. Because federal employment is governed by statute and regulation, rather than by 

contract law principles, the Postal Service cannot be bound to an 

implied employment contract. Even if a contract theory were 

available to Van Rampelberg, the facts here would not support it. 

I 

"[F]ederal employees serve by appointment, not by 

contract." Riplinger v. United States, 695 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th 

Cir. 1983). An employment relationship cannot be created by an 

implied contract, but only by official appointment to a federal 

job. Curran v. Office of Pers. Management Bureau of Retirement, 

Ins., and Occupational Health, 566 F. Supp. 1511, 1514 (D.D.C. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-5091 Document: 01019973977 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 2 
1983), affirmed without opinion, 735 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 

cf. Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984). Administering a qualifying examination does not constitute such an appointment. Fernandez v. United 

States, 12 Cl. Ct. 764 (1987) (plaintiff's claim that taking 

typing tests established an employment relationship denied). 

Because Van Rampelberg does not allege that he was ever 

appointed, he cannot claim a federal job. In short, "one is not 

entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly 

appointed to it." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402 

(1976). 

II 

Even if the USPS could be bound to implied employment 

contracts, this would not be such a case. 

"A contract implied in fact is a contract 'founded upon 

a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an 

express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct 

of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding 

circumstances, their tacit understanding. 111 

Silverman v. United States, 679 F.2d 865, 871 (Ct. Cl. 1982) 

(quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 

(1923)). "The requirements of mutuality of intent and the lack of 

ambiguity in offer and acceptance are the same for an implied-infact contract as for an express contract." Russell Corp. v. 

United States, 537 F.2d 474, 482 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 

U.S. 1073 (1977); see Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 4 

comment a (1981). Merely passing an examination and being placed 

on a list of eligible candidates does not create a contract. See, 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-5091 Document: 01019973977 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 3 
~, Rowe v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Alaska 1979), 

affirmed, 633 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 

(1981). 

"[A]n appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where '[none] of 

the legal points [are] arguable on their merits."' Neitzke v. 

Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989) (quoting Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)). A "claim[] of infringement 

of a legal interest which clearly does not exist,'' is "an 

indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. 

Ct. at 1833. Because Van Rampelberg's legal interest in the 

position of Postal Service electronics technician clearly does not 

exist, the district correctly dismissed his complaint as legally 

frivolous. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-5091 Document: 01019973977 Date Filed: 09/21/1989 Page: 4