Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01798/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01798-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GrafTech International Holdings, Inc.
Appellant
Laird Technologies Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GRAFTECH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC.,

Appellant

v.

LAIRD TECHNOLOGIES INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1796

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00023.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

GRAFTECH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC.,

Appellant

v.

LAIRD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1797, 2015-1798

______________________ 

Case: 15-1798 Document: 3-2 Page: 1 Filed: 06/17/2016
2 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

IPR2014-00024 and IPR2014-00025.

______________________ 

Decided: June 17, 2016

______________________ 

ERIN M. DUNSTON, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, 

Alexandria, VA, argued for appellant. Also represented 

by TRAVIS WILLIAM BLISS, Wilmington, DE. 

MATTHEW L. CUTLER, Harness, Dickey & Pierce, PLC, 

St. Louis, MO, argued for appellee. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, CLEVENGER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellee Laird Technologies, Inc. (“Laird”) sought inter parties review of various claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 

6,482,520 (“the ’520 patent”), 6,982,874 (“the ’874 patent”), and 7,292,441 (“the ’441 patent”) (collectively, “the 

patents-in-suit”) before the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“PTAB”). In separate Final Written Decisions, the PTAB 

found the disputed claims of the patents-in-suit invalid as 

obvious. See Laird Techs., Inc. v. GrafTech Int’l Holdings, 

Inc. (GrafTech I), No. IPR2014-00023, 2015 WL 1385390 

(P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2015) (addressing the ’520 patent); 

Laird Techs., Inc. v. GrafTech Int’l Holdings, Inc. 

(GrafTech II), No. IPR2014-00024, 2015 WL 1385391 

(P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2015) (addressing the ’874 patent); 

Laird Techs., Inc. v. GrafTech Int’l Holdings, Inc. 

(GrafTech III), No. IPR2014-00025, 2015 WL 1385392 

(P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2015) (addressing the ’441 patent). 

Appellant GrafTech International Holdings, Inc. 

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GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 3

(“GrafTech”) appeals the PTAB’s decisions. For the 

reasons provided below, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We possess subject matter jurisdiction over 

GrafTech’s appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) 

(2012). We review the PTAB’s legal conclusions de novo, 

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and its 

factual findings for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 

203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence” constitutes the evidence that a reasonable mind 

would accept to support a finding. See Consol. Edison Co. 

v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

II. The PTAB Properly Found the Disputed Claims of the 

’520 Patent Obvious

A patent claim would have been obvious and therefore 

invalid “if the differences between the subject matter 

sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 

subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the 

time the invention was made to a person having ordinary 

skill in the art [(‘PHOSITA’)] to which said subject matter 

pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).1 Obviousness is a 

question of law based on underlying findings of fact. 

Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316. The underlying factual findings include (1) “the scope and content of the prior art,” 

(2) “differences between the prior art and the claims at 

issue,” (3) “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,” 

 

1 In passing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 

(“AIA”), Congress amended § 103. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 

§ 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011). However, because 

the application that led to the ’520 patent was filed before 

March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 103 applies. Id., § 3(n)(1), 

125 Stat. at 293.

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4 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

and the presence of (4) secondary considerations of nonobviousness such “as commercial success, long-felt but 

unsolved needs, [and] the failure of others.” Graham v. 

John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).

The PTAB found claims 1, 2, and 21–23 of the ’520 patent obvious over various prior art references. GrafTech I, 

2015 WL 1385390, at *8–15. It also found evidence as to 

secondary considerations did not warrant the opposite 

result. Id. at *15–19. GrafTech challenges these findings 

and alleges that the PTAB afforded undue weight to 

testimony from Laird’s expert witness, William Bagot, in 

reaching its conclusions. We address each argument in 

turn.

A. The ’520 Patent

The ’520 patent “relates to a system effective for dissipating the heat generated by an electronic component 

using a thermal management system that includes a 

thermal interface formed from a flexible graphite sheet 

and/or a heat sink formed from a graphite article.” ’520 

patent, Abstract.2 The invention seeks to dissipate heat 

generated from increasingly “sophisticated electronic 

components . . . having smaller size and more complicated 

power requirements . . . ,” such as microprocessors. Id.

col. 1. ll. 12–20. Independent claim 1 is representative 

and recites:

A thermal management system comprising a heat 

source having an external surface and an anisotropic flexible graphite sheet formed of compressed particles of exfoliated natural graphite 

and having a planar area greater than the area of 

 

2 After the ’520 patent issued in 2002, its claims 

were amended in 2007 and 2009, respectively, as a result 

of separate ex parte reexaminations. Where appropriate, 

we cite the ’520 patent’s claims as amended.

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the external surface of the heat source, the flexible graphite sheet having first and second major 

planar surfaces and having axes of higher thermal 

conductivity parallel to said major planar surfaces 

such that the ratio of thermal conductivity of the 

flexible graphite sheet parallel to said major planar surfaces to the thermal conductivity of the 

flexible graphite sheet transverse to said major 

surfaces is at least about 20, one of said major 

planar surfaces being in direct operative contact 

with the heat source.

J.A.-1796, at 144 (’520 patent First Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate), col. 1 ll. 26–40.3 Dependent claim 2 

limits the “heat source” recited in claim 1 to “an electronic 

component.” ’520 patent col. 13 l. 67. Claims 21–23 

depend from claim 1 and provide additional limitations to 

the graphite sheet used in the invention. J.A.-1796, at 

144 (’520 patent First Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate), col. 2 ll. 30–39. The central issues in this appeal 

concern the graphite sheet claimed in the ’520 patent.

B. The PTAB Properly Found that the Prior Art Renders 

Obvious the Disputed Claims of the ’520 Patent

The PTAB concluded that claims 1, 2, 22, and 23 of 

the ’520 patent would have been obvious over Japanese 

Laid-Open Patent Application No. H10-56114 (“Inoue”), 

J.A.-1796, at 1384–97, in view of the Grafoil Engineering 

Design Manual (“Grafoil Manual”), J.A.-1796, at 1192–

1280. GrafTech I, 2015 WL 1385390, at *8–14. The 

PTAB also found claim 21 obvious over Inoue in view of 

 

3 The suffix -1796 denotes the materials in Appeal 

No. 2015-1796, while the suffix -1797 denotes those in 

Appeal Nos. 2015-1797 and -1798. In July 2015, the court 

consolidated Appeal Nos. 2015-1797 and -1798 and designated Appeal No. 2015-1796 as a companion case.

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6 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

the Grafoil Manual and an entry from the Thermagon, 

Inc. website (“Thermagon Paper”), J.A.-1796, at 1374–75. 

GrafTech I, 2015 WL 1385390, at *14–15. GrafTech 

challenges the PTAB’s findings.

GrafTech first alleges that a PHOSITA “would not 

have been motivated to combine Inoue with the Grafoil 

Manual,” such that the PTAB erred in finding claims 1, 2, 

22, and 23 of the ’520 patent obvious. Appellant’s Br.-

1796, at 4, 32 (capitalization omitted). This is so, 

GrafTech argues, because Inoue requires the use of a 

carbonaceous sheet with a thermal conductivity higher 

than that of copper or aluminum, id. at 29–31, and the 

Grafoil Manual does not disclose a sheet with such properties, id. at 31–32.4 GrafTech argues that this discrepancy demonstrates that a PHOSITA would not expect 

success in combining the references. Id. at 34–35.

As part of the obviousness inquiry, we consider 

“whether a [PHOSITA] would have been motivated to 

combine the prior art to achieve the claimed invention 

and whether there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & 

Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 

1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The answers to 

these questions require producing factual findings that we 

review for substantial evidence. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 

1316.

Substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s finding 

that a motivation existed to combine Inoue with the 

 

4 According to GrafTech, the “in-plane thermal conductivity of copper is 400 [watts per meter kelvin 

(‘W/m∙K’)] and that of aluminum is 200 W/m∙K,” whereas 

the thermal conductivity of the graphite sheets in the 

Grafoil Manual “is but 140 W/m∙K.” Appellant’s Br.-1796, 

at 3.

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GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 7

Grafoil Manual and that a PHOSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references. GrafTech’s argument rests on the premise that a 

PHOSITA would not have been motivated to combine 

Inoue with the Grafoil Manual because doing so would not 

yield an invention that meets the thermal conductivity 

requirement allegedly found in Inoue, which does not 

appear in the disputed claims of the ’520 patent. ’520 

patent col. 13 ll. 66–67 (claim 2); J.A.-1796, at 144 (’520 

patent First Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate), col. 1 ll. 

26–40 (claim 1), col. 2 ll. 30–39 (claims 21–23). The PTAB 

held that Inoue does not require the use of a carbonaceous 

sheet with a thermal conductivity higher than that of 

copper or aluminum, but instead found that “a person of 

skill in the relevant technology . . . would have the requisite skill and creativity to select the appropriate graphite 

material for the task at hand.” GrafTech I, 2015 WL 

1385390, at *12. The record supports this conclusion 

because Inoue discloses a carbonaceous sheet with a 

thermal conductivity higher than that of copper or aluminum in its description of one preferred embodiment and 

does not make it a requirement. J.A.-1796, at 1386–87

¶¶ 6, 8 (Inoue), 4848 (GrafTech acknowledging that “[t]he 

word[] ‘must’ [is] not in either [of the relevant paragraphs 

of Inoue].” (emphasis added)). An obviousness inquiry is 

not limited to the prior art’s preferred embodiment. See, 

e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1370 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007).

GrafTech next avers that substituting the carbonaceous sheet disclosed in Inoue with the graphite sheet in 

the Grafoil Manual would yield an inoperable product, 

such that the PTAB erred in finding that a PHOSITA 

would be motivated to combine them. Appellant’s Br.-

1796, at 34–37. GrafTech did not raise this argument 

before the PTAB, see J.A.-1796, at 1760–1843 (GrafTech’s 

Response), and accordingly GrafTech has waived it, see, 

e.g., Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 

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8 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

F.3d 435, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that the court 

does not consider arguments not raised before the PTAB).

GrafTech further argues that the PTAB “fell into the 

hindsight trap” in reaching its obviousness conclusion 

because it allegedly relied upon “modern evidence” in 

reaching its conclusion that the prior art does not teach 

away from the disputed claims of the ’520 patent. Appellant’s Br.-1796, at 38 (capitalization altered). According 

to GrafTech, the PTAB “impermissibly used knowledge of 

GrafTech’s actual invention in its obviousness inquiry.” 

Id. at 39 (citation omitted); see also id. at 39–43 (raising 

related arguments). 

“A reference may be said to teach away when a person 

of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be 

discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the 

path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Labs., 

L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(citation omitted). In assessing whether prior art teaches 

away from the claimed invention, the PTAB may consider 

“only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary 

skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was 

made,” but may not consider the claimed invention itself. 

In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). 

Whether a reference teaches away presents a factual 

question reviewed for substantial evidence. Gartside, 203 

F.3d at 1316.

GrafTech argued that the graphite sheets disclosed in 

the disputed claims of the ’520 patent would not meet the 

thermal conductivity requirement allegedly required by 

Inoue, such that Inoue teaches away from the claims of 

the ’520 patent. See GrafTech I, 2015 WL 1385390, at 

*11. However, the PTAB observed that a skilled artisan 

would be able to select the appropriate graphite for the 

particular application, including the products in the 

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GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 9

fy the relevant claim elements. Id. at *12. As a result, we 

disagree with GrafTech that the PTAB’s analysis rested 

on impermissible hindsight.

Finally, as to claim 21 of the ’520 patent, GrafTech 

argues that the “Thermagon Paper does not remedy the 

inoperative result of combining Inoue with the Grafoil 

Manual.” Appellant’s Br.-1796, at 4, 43 (capitalization 

omitted). As discussed above, GrafTech did not present 

this argument before the PTAB and, thus, has waived any 

argument that combining Inoue with the Grafoil Manual 

would yield an inoperable result. In any event, the PTAB 

did not cite the Thermagon Paper to remedy a problem 

that would arise in combining Inoue with the Grafoil 

Manual. Instead, the PTAB observed that the Thermagon 

Paper teaches the limitation of claim 21 of the ’520 patent, GrafTech I, 2015 WL 1385390, at *14–15, which 

requires that “the contact pressure between the flexible 

graphite sheet and the heat source is less than 50 [pounds 

per square inch].” J.A.-1796, at 144 (’520 patent First Ex 

Parte Reexamination Certificate), col. 2 ll. 30–32 (claim 

21). 

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Findings 

With Respect to Secondary Considerations

A party may counter an obviousness challenge by 

demonstrating that, inter alia, “the commercial success of 

[a] product results from the claimed invention.” J.T. 

Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). The PTAB considered 

the evidence as to commercial success, among other 

objective indicia of non-obviousness,5 and determined that 

 

5 Notably, GrafTech does not challenge the PTAB’s 

findings as to the other objective indicia of nonobviousness—i.e., industry praise, failure of others, and 

copying. See generally Appellant’s Br.-1796. Thus, even if 

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none of the evidence established a nexus with the subject 

matter claimed in the ’520 patent. GrafTech I, 2015 WL 

1385390, at *15–19. GrafTech challenges the PTAB’s 

conclusions as to commercial success. Appellant’s Br.-

1796, at 46–56. 

GrafTech alleges that, in finding no nexus existed between the evidence of commercial success and the disputed claims of the ’520 patent, the PTAB confused 

“GrafTech’s arguments about the teachings of the cited 

[prior] art, specifically the Grafoil® Manual, with 

GrafTech’s evidence of the commercial-successfully 

[graphite sheet] being employed today.” Appellant’s Br.-

1796, at 47–48. GrafTech also asserts that it “established 

the required nexus between the claimed invention and the 

evidence of commercial success,” id. at 51 (capitalization 

omitted), citing revenues for products such as the Apple 

iPhone and the Amazon Kindle Fire HD, id. at 52–54. 

We agree with GrafTech that the PTAB applied an incorrect analysis in assessing commercial success. 

GrafTech properly notes that the PTAB compared the 

teachings of the prior art to evidence of commercial success, instead of comparing the requirements of the disputed claims of the ’520 patent to evidence of commercial 

success. See GrafTech I, 2015 WL 1385390, at *16–18. 

The appropriate standard teaches that “[e]vidence of 

commercial success . . . is only significant if there is a 

nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial 

success.” Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 

1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). “When a 

 

GrafTech demonstrated reversible error as to commercial 

success, that error would not disturb the substantial 

evidence supporting the PTAB’s conclusion that the other 

objective indicia of non-obviousness “do[] not tip the 

balance in favor of [GrafTech].” GrafTech I, 2015 WL 

1385390, at *19.

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patentee can demonstrate commercial success, usually 

shown by significant sales in a relevant market, and that 

the successful product is the invention disclosed and 

claimed in the patent, it is presumed that the commercial 

success is due to the patented invention.” J.T. Eaton, 106 

F.3d at 1571 (citation omitted). The patentee bears the 

initial burden of demonstrating that the requisite nexus 

exists. See id. Whether the requisite nexus exists raises 

a factual question that we review for substantial evidence. 

See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316. 

GrafTech failed to meet its burden of demonstrating

the requisite nexus. First, GrafTech submitted the same 

evidence in each of the inter partes reviews to establish 

the commercial success of the patents-in-suit. Compare 

Appellant’s Br.-1796, at 45–65, with Appellant’s Br.-1797, 

at 62–80. That strategy undermines its commercial 

success arguments because GrafTech argues that the 

patents-in-suit are directed to different inventions. See 

infra Section III.A; Ormco Corp., 463 F.3d at 1311–12 

(explaining that a nexus must exist “between the claimed 

invention and the commercial success” (emphasis added)). 

Second, GrafTech does not assert that the commercial 

success of products like the Apple iPhone and the Amazon 

Kindle Fire HD resulted from the products covered by the 

’520 patent or that the products covered by the ’520 

patent are coextensive with the Apple iPhone and Amazon Kindle Fire HD; instead, GrafTech asserts that the 

Apple iPhone and Amazon Kindle Fire HD used products 

covered by the ’520 patent and enjoyed commercial success. Appellant’s Br.-1796, at 52–54. Evidence of the 

latter is insufficient to demonstrate the requisite nexus. 

See, e.g., Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing 

Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“When the 

thing that is commercially successful is not coextensive 

with the patented invention . . . [,] the patentee must 

show prima facie a legally sufficient relationship between 

that which is patented and that which is sold.” (emphasis 

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12 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

added)); see also Ormco Corp., 463 F.3d at 1311–12 (explaining that a nexus must exist “between the claimed 

invention and the commercial success” (emphasis added)).

D. Substantial Evidence Supports the PTAB’s Decision to 

Rely upon Mr. Bagot’s Testimony

The PTAB relied upon the testimony of Mr. Bagot 

throughout its obviousness analysis. See GrafTech I, 2015 

WL 1385390, at *10–15. GrafTech contends that the 

PTAB “erred in relying upon the testimony of Mr. Bagot 

and failed to act as an impartial adjudicator.” Appellant’s 

Br.-1796, at 59 (capitalization omitted).6 “Because Mr. 

Bagot is not an expert in the pertinent art,” GrafTech 

continues, the PTAB “failed to uphold its ‘gatekeeping’ 

role.” Id. GrafTech clarifies in its reply that it contests 

“the weight to be afforded Mr. Bagot’s opinions, not their 

admissibility.” Appellant’s Reply-1796, at 29 (citation 

omitted). 

GrafTech’s argument suffers from two flaws. First, 

GrafTech’s argument asks us to reweigh the evidence, 

which we may not do under the substantial evidence 

standard of review. See In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 

1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that, under the substantial evidence standard of review, “[t]his court does not 

reweigh evidence on appeal, but rather determines 

whether substantial evidence supports the [PTAB’s] fact 

findings”); Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingre-

 

6 Laird alleges that GrafTech has waived this argument by failing to raise it below. Appellee’s Br.-1796, 

at 43. However, Laird’s argument confuses the admissibility of the testimony with the weight afforded to such 

testimony. The record indicates that GrafTech argued 

that the PTAB should afford no weight to Mr. Bagot’s 

testimony, just as it does on appeal. See J.A.-1796, at 

1907. 

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dients GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 224 F.3d 1356, 1359 

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Even if we might have found some of 

the facts differently, or even if we might have drawn some 

inferences from the facts differently, . . . that is not the 

role of an appellate court.”). Second, the record does not 

support GrafTech’s argument. During cross-examination, 

Mr. Bagot testified that he worked extensively with 

graphite and that his education in Britain is equivalent to 

a bachelor’s degree in science engineering in the United 

States. J.A.-1796, at 2579–80. Mr. Bagot also testified 

that he possesses over five years of experience in thermal 

management and electronics and that he has worked with 

flexible graphite sheets for over five years. J.A.-1796, at 

2581–82. These are the qualifications that GrafTech 

alleged an individual should possess to qualify as an 

expert. See GrafTech I, 2015 WL 1385390, at *5. Thus, 

substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s decision to rely 

upon Mr. Bagot’s testimony.

III. GrafTech Does Not Demonstrate PTAB Error as to 

the ’874 and ’441 Patents

The PTAB gives “[a] claim . . . its broadest reasonable 

construction in light of the specification of the patent in 

which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2015).7 A speci-

 

7 In In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, the Supreme 

Court is considering whether the PTAB “may construe 

claims in an issued patent according to their broadest 

reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and 

ordinary meaning.” Brief for Petitioner at *II, In re 

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 737452

(Feb. 22, 2016). Even if the Supreme Court finds that the 

PTAB should construe terms consistent with their plain 

and ordinary meaning, that holding would not change our 

conclusion in this case because GrafTech’s proffered

construction improperly would impose an extraneous 

limitation on the disputed claims, as discussed below.

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fication “includes both the written description and the 

claims” of the patent in question. In re Packard, 751 F.3d 

1307, 1320 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 2014). If a specification does 

not assign or suggest a particular definition to a claim 

term, and the PTAB relies upon evidence extrinsic to the 

specification to construe a claim, “[w]e review [the] underlying factual determinations concerning extrinsic evidence 

for substantial evidence and the ultimate construction of 

the claim de novo.” In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 

F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), cert. 

granted sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. 

Ct. 890 (2016).

In separate decisions, the PTAB found claims 1–20 of 

the ’874 patent and claims 1–16 of the ’441 patent would 

have been obvious over various prior art references. 

GrafTech II, 2015 WL 1385391, at *2 (addressing the ’874 

patent); GrafTech III, 2015 WL 1385392, at *2 (addressing the ’441 patent). Before making its obviousness 

determinations, the PTAB construed “thermal shielding” 

in independent claims 1 and 11 of the ’874 patent and 

independent claim 1 of the ’441 patent to mean “a structure that protects against heat.” GrafTech II, 2015 WL 

1385391, at *10 (addressing the ’874 patent); GrafTech 

III, 2015 WL 1385392, at *10 (addressing the ’441 patent) 

(explaining that “thermal shielding” means “protection 

against heat”). Because the specification does not define

“shield,” the PTAB relied upon a dictionary definition to 

construe “thermal shielding.” GrafTech II, 2015 WL 

1385391, at *10 (addressing the ’874 patent); GrafTech 

III, 2015 WL 1385392, at *10 (addressing the ’441 patent).

GrafTech challenges the PTAB’s construction of 

“thermal shielding” in the ’874 and ’441 patents. Appellant’s Br.-1797, at 39–48. Because of that allegedly 

erroneous construction, GrafTech avers, the PTAB’s 

obviousness determinations are necessarily defective. Id.

at 49 (The “erroneous construction of ‘thermal shield’ 

caused the [PTAB] to conclude that the challenged claims 

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[would have been] obvious.” (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted)). We address each argument in turn.

A. The ’874 and ’441 Patents

The ’874 and ’441 patents relate generally to a “thermal solution for an electronic device, which is positioned 

between a heat source and an external surface of the 

electronic device and/or another component of the electronic device.”8 ’874 patent, Abstract; ’441 patent, Abstract (explaining that the invention relates to a “thermal 

solution for a portable electronic device [(i.e., a cell 

phone)], which is positioned between a heat source and 

another component of the electronic device” (emphasis 

added)). The inventions covered by the ’874 and ’441 

patents “facilitate[] heat dissipation from the heat source 

while shielding the external surface and/or second component from the heat generated by the heat source.” ’874 

patent, Abstract; ’441 patent, Abstract (explaining that 

the invention “facilitates heat dissipation from the heat 

source while shielding the second component from the 

heat generated by the heat source”).

Independent claims 1 and 11 are representative of the 

’874 patent. Independent claim 1 recites: 

A thermal dissipation and shielding system for an 

electronic device, comprising:

 

8 The patent application that matured into the ’441 

patent was originally filed as a continuation-in-part of the 

application that resulted in the ’874 patent. “[A] continuation-in-part application contain[s] a portion or all of the 

disclosure of an earlier application together with added 

matter not present in that earlier application.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 n.3 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

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16 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

an electronic device comprising a first component which comprises a heat source, wherein 

the first component transmits heat to an external surface of the electronic device;

a thermal solution comprising two major surfaces, the thermal solution positioned such 

that one of its major surfaces is in operative 

contact with the first component such that it 

is interposed between the first component and 

the external surface of the electronic device,

wherein the thermal solution comprises at least 

one sheet of compressed particles of exfoliated 

graphite which thermally shields the external surface of the electronic device from heat generated 

by the first component.

’874 patent col. 16 ll. 32–46 (emphases added). Independent claim 11 is similar to claim 1, but also requires a 

“second component,” and further requires the graphite 

sheet disclosed in claim 1 to be interposed between the 

first and second components. Id. col. 17 ll. 9–21; see also 

J.A.-1797, at 189 (Certificate of Correction addressing 

Claim 11). Independent claim 1 is representative of the 

’441 patent and recites: 

A thermal dissipation and shielding system for a 

cell phone, comprising:

a cell phone comprising a first component 

which comprises a heat source and a second 

component to which the first component 

transmits heat;

a thermal solution interposed between the 

first component and the second component,

wherein the thermal solution comprises at least 

one sheet of compressed particles of exfoliated 

graphite which thermally shields the second comCase: 15-1798 Document: 3-2 Page: 16 Filed: 06/17/2016
GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 17

ponent from heat generated by the first component.

’441 patent col. 16 l. 63–col. 17 l. 6 (emphases added).

B. The PTAB Properly Construed “Thermal Shielding” in 

the ’874 and ’441 Patents

GrafTech contests the PTAB construction of “thermal 

shielding.” As an initial matter, GrafTech raises several 

arguments in its opening brief that it did not present to 

the PTAB. See Appellant’s Br.-1797, at 39–48. “[W]e 

have often barred parties from changing the scope of their 

claim construction position on appeal” because, when an 

appellant fails to make an argument to the PTAB, “we do 

not have the benefit of the [PTAB’s] informed judgment 

on this issue for our review.” In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 

1368 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Before the 

PTAB, GrafTech limited its argument on the construction 

of “thermal shielding” as follows:

The [PTAB] utilizes a general dictionary definition to define “shield” as “to cover and protect,” 

and to, in turn, define “thermally shields” or 

“thermal shielding” as “any structure that protects against heat.” Though this definition is not 

entirely inaccurate, GrafTech submits that this 

definition is somewhat incomplete as it fails to 

take into account the description of thermal 

shielding from the specification and the accepted 

definition of a thermal shield within the art. The 

disclosure of the ’874 [p]atent demonstrates that 

thermal shielding is protection of a portion of the 

device other than the heat source itself from the 

heat generated by a heat source.

Thus, GrafTech submits that the broadest reasonable interpretation of [“]thermally shields” or 

“thermal shielding” as used in the ’874 [p]atent is 

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18 GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 

protection of a region other than the heat source 

itself from heat generated by the heat source.

J.A.-1797, at 1160–61 (citations omitted); see also J.A.-

1797, at 5314–15 (where GrafTech presents nearly identical arguments as to the construction of “thermal shielding” in the ’441 patent). As a result, our analysis focuses 

on the limited question of whether the PTAB erred by not 

including the clause “other than the heat source itself” 

when it construed “thermal shielding” to mean “a structure that protects against heat.” See Appellant’s Br.-

1797, at 40, 48 (where GrafTech presents the argument 

that was raised before the PTAB).

The PTAB’s construction of “thermal shielding” in 

claims 1 and 11 of the ’874 patent and claim 1 of the ’441 

patent does not suffer from error because adopting 

GrafTech’s proffered construction would introduce an 

extraneous limitation into the claims’ terms. “If we need 

not rely on a [proffered] limitation to interpret what the 

patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim, 

that limitation is ‘extraneous’ and cannot constrain the 

claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 

F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). The 

challenged claims already explicitly require a graphite 

sheet to shield a component other than the heat source 

itself from the heat generated by that source. Specifically, 

claim 1 of the ’874 patent requires a graphite sheet to 

“shield[] the external surface of the electronic device from 

the heat generated by the first component,” thus protecting a portion of the device (external surface) that is not 

the heat source (first component). ’874 patent col. 16 ll. 

45–46. Claim 11 of the ’874 patent similarly requires a 

graphite sheet to “shield[] [a second component] of the 

electronic device from heat generated by the first 

com[p]onent,” thus protecting a portion of the device 

(second component) that is not the heat source (first 

component). Id. col. 17 ll. 20–21. And claim 1 of the ’441 

patent requires a graphite sheet to “shield[] the second 

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GRAFTECH INT’L HOLDINGS, INC. v. LAIRD TECHS. INC. 19

component from heat generated by the first component.” 

’441 patent col. 17 ll. 5–6. Thus, we find no error in the 

PTAB’s construction of the challenged claims.

C. The Court Need Not Address the PTAB’s Obviousness 

Determinations as to the ’874 and ’441 Patents

GrafTech alleges that the “erroneous construction of 

‘thermal shield’ [in the ’874 and ’441 patents] caused the 

[PTAB] to conclude that the challenged claims [would 

have been] obvious.” Appellant’s Br.-1797, at 49 (capitalization omitted) (emphasis added). Because we conclude 

that the PTAB did not err in its construction of “thermal 

shield,” we need not address GrafTech’s conditional 

arguments as to the PTAB’s obviousness determinations.9

CONCLUSION

We have considered GrafTech’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Final 

Written Decisions of the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board are

AFFIRMED

 

9 GrafTech challenges the PTAB’s analysis of commercial success and the weight that the PTAB afforded to 

Mr. Bagot’s testimony in finding the disputed claims of 

the ’874 and ’441 patents invalid as obvious. It raises 

arguments nearly identical to those that it raised in its 

challenge to the PTAB’s obviousness determination as to 

the ’520 patent. Compare Appellant’s Br.-1796, at 45–65, 

with Appellant’s Br.-1797, at 62–80. We reject them for 

the same reasons that we reject GrafTech’s appeal as to 

the ’520 patent.

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