Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-03-01524/USCOURTS-ca10-03-01524-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Bennett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

June 8, 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

V. No. 03-1524 

PAUL BENNETT, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.Ct. No. 00-CR-53-N) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.l(G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of 

law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the 

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under 

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

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Paul Bennett pied guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams 

or more ofmethamphetamine in violation of21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) and 

(b )( 1 )(B)(viii) and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l). He was sentenced to 248 months 

imprisonment. He appeals both his sentence 1 and the district court's ruling on his 

motion to suppress. 2 Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM. 

I. Factual Background 

On February 3, 2000, a state judge issued a search warrant for a residence 

owned by Paul Bennett at 5565 Yuba Way in the City and County of Denver, 

Colorado. The warrant, based on an affidavit filed by Deti~ctive James D. Caffrey 

of the Lakewood Police Department, authorized a search for evidence of 

methamphetamine manufacture. The affidavit, ten pages in length and singlespaced, recounted the investigation into Bennett's activitie:s in great detail. 

Highlights included the following: 

On January 20, 2000, Amy Castle told an undercover agent of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) that she was a supplier of precursor 

1 After initial briefing, Bennett moved for leave to file a supplemental brief on the 

grounds his sentence was invalid under United States v. Booker, -- U.S.--, 125 S.Ct. 738 

(2005). We granted the motion. 

2 Bennett entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to challenge on 

appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(a)(2). 

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chemicals to methamphetamine manufacturers or "cooks," one of whom had been 

manufacturing methamphetamine for thirty years. Later the same day, she was 

observed transporting precursor chemicals to the residence of Chadwick New, 

then nineteen years of age. Shortly thereafter, New left his residence and was 

tailed to a pharmacy. Before entering the pharmacy, he was observed discarding 

several bags into a trash bin. In these bags, recovered by law enforcement, were 

186 empty blister packs that once contained 6,288 cold tablets of pseudoephedrine 

(used in the production of methamphetamine). Based on the foregoing, Detective 

Caffrey obtained a search warrant for New's residence to search for evidence of 

methamphetamine possession and manufacture. 

On January 27, 2000, Castle was arrested after she purchased a pound of 

ephedrine from a chemical supplier. She informed Detective Caffrey she was 

awaiting New's return from a trip to Vermont before delivering the ephedrine to 

him; she purchased precursor chemicals for New and others; she always delivered 

the chemicals to New at his residence; New was involved with others in the 

manufacture of methamphetamine; and she was paid in methamphetamine and 

cash for her services. 

When New's residence was searched pursuant to the search warrant, agents 

discovered in his bedroom extensive evidence of methamphetamine manfacture 

and sale, including precursor chemicals. Confronted with this discovery, and with 

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a warrant issued for his arrest for methamphetamine manufacture, New agreed to 

cooperate with law enforcement. 

On February 1, 2000, New informed agents he purchased precursor 

chemicals for methamphetamine manufacture and delivered them to Paul Bennett. 

The chemicals New provided to Bennett included those provided to New by Amy 

Castle. New was paid for his services in cash or methamphetamine. According to 

New, Bennett was forty to fifty years old, claimed to be a chemist by trade and 

was the main "cook" in the organization. New informed Detective Caffrey that 

Bennett operated a fully-equipped methamphetamine laboratory in the basement 

of a home Bennett owned. New described the various components of the 

laboratory in great detail. New stated Bennett's house had security cameras 

installed on the exterior to monitor people in the vicinity. Other "cooks" also 

used Bennett's methamphetamine laboratory. They compensated Bennett by 

giving him a percentage of their product. New indicated he had been in Bennett's 

house and had assisted in manufacturing methamphetamine. He had also 

observed Bennett manufacture methamphetamine in the basement laboratory. 

New stated he delivered two to three hundred boxes of pseudoephedrine to 

Bennett each week. 

On February 2, 2000, New took agents, including Detective Caffrey, to the 

house containing the methamphetamine laboratory. Its address was 5565 Yuba 

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Way in the City and County of Denver, Colorado. The front door had an iron bar 

across it and security cameras scanned the entrance. There were high intensity 

lights in the back yard. The next morning, New made a controlled delivery of 

precursor chemicals (including 500 milliliters of hypophosphorous acid and 500 

grams of iodine) to Bennett at the Yuba Way address while Agents surveilled the 

delivery from outside Bennett's residence. New was in the residence for 

approximately half an hour. 

After leaving Bennett's residence, New informed Detective Caffrey he had 

delivered the precursor chemicals to Bennett, who paid New $240.00 as partial 

payment. During the visit to Bennett's house, New observed the operational 

methamphetamine laboratory in the basement. He also saw a woman named Tina, 

to whom he had previously delivered pseudoephedrine for use in the manufacture 

of methamphetamine in the basement laboratory, removing pseudoephedrine from 

blister packs. Tina and Bennett informed New they were awaiting delivery of 

additional pseudoephedrine in order to begin a "cook." Tina asked New if he 

would be able to supply additional pseudoephedrine, and New responded he 

would do so. 

New advised that while he was at Bennett's residence he also observed a 

taxicab driver arrive and remove bags of chemical waste resulting from the 

methamphetamine manufacturing process. According to New, Bennett adopted 

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this method of waste management to avoid detection of his illegal operation by 

law enforcement. The officers who surveilled New's controiled delivery of 

precursor chemicals to Bennett in the early morning hours of February 3, 2000, 

simultaneously observed this taxicab driver collect several bags from the 

residence and depart. 

Based on the foregoing, together with abundant additional information 

contained in the affidavit, on February 3, 2000, the state court judge issued a 

search warrant for Bennett's house at 5565 Yuba Way. Executed the same day, 

the search uncovered numerous items evidencing the manufacture and sale of 

methamphetamine, including 5 .9 grams of actual methamphetamine, 601. 8 grams 

of pseudoephedrine, 1,058 grams of iodine and several weapons. Bennett was 

arrested. 

II. Procedural Background 

On September 21, 2000, Bennett entered his conditional guilty plea. The 

court set sentencing for December 8, 2000. Pending sentencing, while on bond, 

Bennett absconded. He was re-arrested in Arizona on February 13, 2003, and 

finally sentenced on December 4, 2003. 

The Presentence Investigation Report (PIR) prepared by the U.S. Probation 

Office set a base offense level of 34 based, initially, on a quantity of 4 72.3 grams 

of actual methamphetamine (5.9 grams of actual methamphetamine seized and 

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466.4 grams of actual methamphetamine based on the productive capability of the 

precursor chemicals seized). 3 See United States Sentencing Commission, 

Guidelines Manual, §2D 1.1 ( c )(3) (2003) (base offense level of 34 applies where 

quantity of actual methamphetamine is at least 150 grams but less than 500 

grams). See also USSG §2Dl.1, comment. (n.12) ("Where ... the amount seized 

does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity 

of the controlled substance. In making this determination, the court may consider 

... the size or capability of any laboratory involved."). In addition, the PIR 

adjusted the base offense level upward two levels for obstruction of justice under 

USSG §3Cl.l. See id., comment. (n.4(e)) (adjustment applies to "escaping or 

attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing; or wilfully failing to 

appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding"). The guideline sentence for a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is the statutory minimum term of imprisonment, 

five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(I) and (c)(l)(D)(ii) (term of 

imprisonment shall be consecutive to other terms of imprisonment imposed). See 

also USSG §2K2.4 (accord). With a total offense level of 36 and a Criminal 

History Category of I, the guideline range was 188 to 235 months imprisonment 

3 The productive capabilities of the precursor chemicals were estimated in DEA 

Summary Laboratory Reports. After a sentencing hearing conducted on November 14, 

2003, and as a result of a misunderstanding by the DEA chemist as to the amount of 

iodine seized from Bennett's house, the PIR was amended prior to final sentencing to 

reflect a productive capability of 275.1 grams. 

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on the drug trafficking offense. Bennett objected to the PIR drug quantity 

calculation under USSG §2D 1.1 ( c) insofar as it depended on the productive 

capability of the precursor chemicals seized. 

At a sentencing hearing conducted on November 14, 2003, experts testified 

to the productive capability of Bennett's methamphetamine ]laboratory based on 

the precursor chemicals seized, in particular the iodine. At the continued 

sentencing hearing on December 4, 2003, the court, relying on the Government's 

expert witness, found the productive capability of Bennett's lab was 275 .1 grams 

of actual methamphetamine. Added to the 5.9 grams of actual methamphetamine 

seized at Bennett's house, this resulted in 281 grams of actual methamphetamine. 

The quantity calculation again resulted in a base offense level of 34. 

The court also found Bennett obstructed justice by absconding before 

sentencing, and, as a result, enhanced the base offense level an additional two 

levels under USSG §3C 1.1. Bennett did not contest the obstruction of justice 

finding or enhancement. The court declined to downward depart for acceptance 

of responsibility, see USSG §3El.1, or for any other reason. See USSG §5K2.0; 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (allowing departures under specified conditions but since 

excised by United States v. Booker, -- U.S. -- , 125 S.Ct. 738, 756 (2005)). With 

a total offense level of 36 and a Criminal History Category of I, the court 

sentenced Bennett to 188 months on the drug trafficking violation (the low end of 

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the guideline range) and imposed a consecutive 60 months for the firearms 

violation, for a total of 248 months. In rendering its sentence, the court stated: 

I find no reason to depart from the sentence called for by application of 

the guidelines in this case. Because of the guideline range of 24 

months, I am required to state a reason for imposing a sentence at a 

particular point and range. In determining each component, I 

determined the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and 

characteristics of the Defendant. 

With respect to imprisonment, I find that the term of imprisonment is 

required. I will impose the minimum term in this case, because I find 

that the minimum term is sufficient to achieve the statutory purposes of 

the sentence of incarceration, including the need for the sentence 

imposed to reflect the seriousness with respect to the law and provide 

just punishment for the offense, for deterrence, and to protect the public 

from further crimes of the Defendant. 

(R. Vol. II at 17-18.) 

III. Discussion 

A. The Search 

Bennett contends the search warrant issued on February 3, 2000, was not 

supported by probable cause and, as a consequence, the district court should have 

suppressed the fruits of the search. In particular, he contends the affidavit in 

support of the search warrant contained little to bolster New's reliability. The 

district court rejected this argument. So do we. 

In upholding the reasonableness of the search, the district court stated: 

The affidavit is extraordinarily detailed, but the central question really 

is the credibility of the informant and whether in light of that question, 

there is probable cause in the affidavit. 

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I find that there is sufficient corroboration and sufficient information 

for ... the judge, the state judge, to conclude that the informant was 

telling the truth when he related this information. 

The affidavit sets forth corroboration of information the informant had 

given about the operation generally. There is some cross corroboration 

of information with other individuals. There is independent 

corroboration of a good deal of the information, and there is 

corroboration of what happened specifically on the evening in question. 

(R. Vol. III at 70.) 

We review de novo the district court's determination of reasonableness 

under the Fourth Amendment, but defer to its factual findings if they are not 

clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government. United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001). We 

accord great deference to the probable cause finding of a magistrate who issues a 

search warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,236 (1983). In doing so, we 

apply a totality of the circumstances test: 

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 

in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of 

knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure 

that the magistrate had a substantial basis for ... conclud[ing] that 

probable cause existed. 

Id. at 238-39 (quotation marks omitted). 

"[P]robable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of 

probabilities in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced 

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to a neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and 

sizes from many different types of persons." Id. at 232. Probable cause does not 

denote a prim a facie case of criminal activity, but only the probability of it. Id. at 

235 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,419 (1969)). To be sure, an 

"informant's statement [must be] reasonably corroborated by other matters within 

the [affiant's] knowledge[,]" id. at 242 (quotation marks omitted), but "even ifwe 

entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed 

description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was 

observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the 

case." Id. at 234. 4 

With these principles in mind, and after a careful review of the record, we 

harbor no doubt the search warrant, based on the totality of the circumstances 

recited in the affidavit, soundly rests on probable cause. We agree with the 

district court's analysis. We have gone to great lengths to recount the highlights 

of Detective Caffrey's affidavit because, even un-amplified by the balance of the 

affidavit, they plainly support issuance of the warrant. Amplified by the balance 

of the affidavit, which we see no need to recount in detail, the case for probable 

4 In Gates, the Court considered probable cause based on an anonymous 

informant's statement. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 225. However, we construe its 

observations on the weight to be accorded an informant's statement as generically 

applicable to all informants, including one whose identity, as in this case, is revealed in an 

affidavit for a search warrant. 

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cause is clear cut and strong. New's statements to law enforcement were 

sufficiently corroborated by the context of the entire investigation and, in 

particular, by the controlled transaction in which he delivered precursor chemicals 

to Bennett on February 3, 2000. We therefore decline relief to Bennett in his 

challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of the 

search. 

B. The Sentence 

The statutory sentence of imprisonment for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841 (a)(l) and (b )(1 )(B)(viii) (possession with intent to distribute five grams or 

more of methamphetamine) is not less than five nor more than forty years. For a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime), the statutory sentence of imprisonment is not less than 

five years, mandated to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment. 

Bennett's sentence of 288 months (24 years) imprisonment is, therefore, within 

the statutorily authorized punishment. Bennett claims, however, that judicial factfinding of drug quantity to enhance his sentence for drug trafficking, see USSG 

§2D 1.1 ( c )(3 ), violates Booker and requires remand for resentencing. 5 

5 In his Supplemental Brief, Bennett suggests Booker is also implicated by the 

failure of the district court to downward depart for acceptance of responsibility. See 

USSG §3El.l. We do not agree. Booker only applies to instances where a sentence 

exceeds that which is authorized by the jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions. 

Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756. 

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In Booker, the United States Supreme Court extended its ruling in Blakely 

v. Washington, -- U.S.--, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), to invalidate the federal 

sentencing guidelines under the Sixth Amendment insofar as they were 

mandatory. 6 125 S.Ct. at 745. It held that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior 

conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum 

authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be 

admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 

756. The Court concluded the guidelines would not offend the Constitution if 

advisory only. Id. at 749-50. To this end, in the remedial portion of its opinion, 

the Court excised those provisions mandating their application. Id. at 7 56-57. 

The Court indicated its decision was applicable to all cases, like this one, on 

direct review. Id. at 769. 

Applying Booker, we have stated: 

6 In Blakely, the Court applied its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466, 490 (2000) ('"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") to invalidate, under the Sixth Amendment, 

application of Washington's sentencing guidelines. In Blakely, the sentencing court 

enhanced a standard sentence under these guidelines. The facts necessary to support the 

enhancement were neither admitted by the defendant nor proven to a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Even though the enhanced sentence did not exceed the statutory ceiling 

of imprisonment for the offense, the Court invalidated it. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538. In 

doing so, the Court clarified that "the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the 

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the 

jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id. at 2537 (quotation marks and emphasis 

omitted). 

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there are two distinct types of error that a court sentencing prior to 

Booker could make. First, a court could err by relying upon 

judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions, to enhance a 

defendant's sentence mandatorily. As Booker makes clear, the Sixth 

Amendment prohibits this practice. As a matter of convenience, we will 

refer to such an error as a constitutional Booker error. Second, a 

sentencing court could err by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory 

fashion, as opposed to a discretionary fashion, even though the resulting 

sentence was calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the 

defendant, found by the jury, or based upon the fact of a prior 

conviction. While this type of sentence does not violate the Sixth 

Amendment, such a sentence is nonetheless impermissible because the 

Court severed the portion of the Sentencing Reform Act that required 

the mandatory application of the Guidelines. We will refer to this 

second type of error as a non-constitutional Booker error. 

United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F .3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2005) 

( quotation marks and citations omitted). Irrespective of the type of error 

involved, Booker does not necessitate a remand for resentencing in all instances. 

Instead, "reviewing courts [are] to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, 

determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails 

the plain-error test." Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (quotation marks omitted). 

Bennett concedes, and the Government agrees, that the alleged error was 

unpreserved in the trial court and review is for plain error. We enjoy discretion to 

notice plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b ). "Plain error occurs when there is 

(1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which ( 4) 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings." Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732 (internal quotation marks 

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omitted). "We conduct this analysis less rigidly when reviewing a potential 

constitutional error." United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir. 

2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Government concedes judicial fact-finding in the quantity calculation 

and also concedes the error was plain. See United States v. Clifton, 406 F .3d 

1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Non-constitutional and constitutional Booker errors 

satisfy the first two prongs of the plain-error test."). We therefore conclude 

Bennett's claim is one of constitutional Booker error, and we limit our review to 

the third and, if necessary, the fourth prong of the plain error test. 

"Satisfying the third prong of plain-error review--that the error affects 

substantial rights--usually means that the error must have affected the outcome of 

the district court proceedings.'' Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F .3d at 732 (quotation 

marks omitted). It is the defendant's burden to make this showing, even in a case 

of alleged constitutional error. Id. at 733. "To meet this burden, the appellant 

must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

In a case of constitutional Booker error, there are at least two ways a 

defendant can make this showing. First, if the defendant shows a 

reasonable probability that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard 

would not have found the same material facts that a judge found by a 

preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant successfully 

demonstrates that the error below affected his substantial rights. This 

inquiry requires the appellate court to review the evidence submitted at 

the sentencing hearing and the factual basis for any objection the 

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defendant may have made to the facts on which the sentence was 

predicated. Second, a defendant may show that the district court's error 

affected his substantial rights by demonstrating a reasonable probability 

that, under the specific facts of his case as analyzed under the 

sentencing factors of 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a), the district court judge would 

reasonably impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range. 

Dazey, 403 F .3d at 1175 (footnotes omitted). 

Applying these principles, we review the facts related to the drug quantity 

calculation. 7 We first inquire whether there is a reasonable probability that a jury, 

applying a reasonable doubt standard, would not have found, as did the judge 

applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, that the productive capability 

of Bennett's lab exceeded 150 grams of actual methamphetamine. Although the 

judge found the productive capability was 275 .1 grams of actual 

methamphetamine, an amount in excess of 150 grams of actual methamphetamine 

is all that is needed under the guidelines for a base offense level of 34. See 

USSG §2D 1.1 ( c )(3). Therefore, the "material fact[} that [the] judge found by a 

preponderance of the evidence," Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis added), was 

7 Bennett admitted in his plea agreement and in the plea proceeding that "[j]ust 

over 6 grams of actual manufactured methamphetamine were found in the basement." (R. 

Vol. I, Docket Entry 136 at 5.) To be more exact, the DEA Summary Laboratory Report 

indicated the actual methamphetamine content of the methamphetamine seized in the 

basement was 5.9 grams. With Bennett's admission, this amount is beyond Booker 

challenge. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756. A quantity of 5.9 grams of actual 

methamphetamine, standing alone, results in a base offense level of 26. See USSG 

§2Dl.l(c)(7). The addition of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, see 

USSG §3C 1.1, results in a total offense level of 28. With a Criminal History Category of 

I, this, without more, would have resulted in a guideline range of 78-97 months. 

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that the productive capability of the laboratory was at least 150 grams of actual 

methamphetamine. 

In conducting our inquiry, we consider the evidence adduced at the 

sentencing hearing on November 14, 2003, and objections made by Bennett at the 

sentencing hearing on December 4, 2003. Our inquiry requires a rudimentary 

understanding of the pseudoephedrine reduction method of manufacturing 

methamphetamine emp_loyed in this case, which we have divined from the record. 

First, pseudoephedrine is extracted from cold medications. It is then mixed with 

iodine, a re-agent. While there are other stages to the manufacturing process, it is 

important to understand this: assuming sufficient quantities of pseudoephedrine 

(not contested here), the amount of iodine available to the process limits the 

amount of actual methamphetamine that can be produced. 

At the sentencing hearing on November 14, forensic chemists testified for 

the Government and Bennett. On behalf of the Government, Keith Chan of the 

DEA testified that he was provided with samples of the iodine seized from 

Bennett's basement. Prior to his testimony, DEA Agent Todd Wheeler, who was 

involved in the iodine's seizure, testified to the protocol for handling and 

disposing of chemicals seized at a methamphetamine laboratory: 8 

8 The protocol did not apply to pseudoephedrine because it is a controlled 

substance and not considered a hazardous material. 

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The chemicals used in the production of these controlkd substances, in 

this case methamphetamine, are sampled, and the samples are sent to 

our laboratory for analysis. And the remaining quantities are then 

provided to a contract company for destruction under hazardous waste 

due to the possibility of contamination, exposure, spills, things that 

could happen to the full quantity of chemicals if they were maintained. 

(R. Supp. Vol. III at 7-8.) In the case of the iodine seizure, he testified agents 

seized and photographed three one-pound containers of iodine. At the time, he 

estimated two containers to be full and one container to be one-third full. 9 This 

information was conveyed to Chan, who converted the estimates to a total of 

1,058 grams. In addition, a sample from each container was provided to Chan for 

chemical analysis. The balance of each container was destroyed pursuant to 

protocol. 

Chan testified that in his professional opinion the productive capability of 

1,058 grams of iodine was 275 .1 grams of actual methamphetamine. He 

explained: 

This type of method of making amphetamine with red phosphorous and 

iodine is one of the more simplest [sic] ways of producing 

methamphetamine. It is what we call one-pot process. That is 

everything, the precursor, re-agent are dumped into a pot or reaction 

vessel, a little heat is applied, end [sic] the result is methamphetamine. 

The whole process can probably be done within two days from initial 

precursor to final product. In my experience we have had - we run 

across high school student[s] performing the same reaction. 

9 Bennett's counsel rigorously cross-examined Agent Wheeler on his estimates of 

the volume of iodine contained in the three one-pound containers. 

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(R. Suppl. Vol. III at 53 .) He added his estimate of productive capability of the 

iodine seized from Bennett's laboratory was a conservative one. Furthermore, 

unless the methamphetamine produced was adulterated, Chan testified it could 

achieve a purity close to 100 percent. Io 

On Bennett's behalf, Dr. Robert Lanz, a chemist employed by Rocky 

Mountain Metallurgic Laboratories in Fort Collins, Colorado, testified that while 

a skilled chemist could produce near-pure methamphetamine using 

uncontaminated raw materials, as Chan had suggested, these conditions are not 

always present and can result in the production of methamphetamine of reduced 

purity. He was unable to state the volume of precursor chemicals that would have 

been necessary to produce the 5. 9 grams of actual methamphetamine seized from 

Bennett's laboratory. He indicated he would not be able to estimate, to a 

reasonable degree of scientific certainty, the weight of the iodine in the containers 

seized from the laboratory. Finally, he testified it is not possible to theorize to a 

reasonable degree of scientific certainty, as Chan did, the productive capability of 

a precursor chemical such as iodine. While Dr. Lanz suggested it might be 

possible to arrive at what he described as a "theoretical yield," based on the 

volume of precursor chemicals, when pressed on cross-examination for an 

Io Chan testified the purity of the methamphetamine seized from Bennett's 

laboratory was ninety-seven percent for one portion weighing .95 grams and ninety-four 

percent for a portion weighing 5.4 grams. 

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estimate of "reasonably expected yield,'' based on the evidence in the case, he 

maintained there were too many unknown variables and declined to offer an 

opinion. (R., Supp. Vol. III at 71-72.) At the sentencing hearing on December 4, 

2003, Bennett's counsel built on Dr. Lanz's testimony and argued Chan's 

methodology for calculating the productive capability of the laboratory was 

simply too imprecise in light of the multiple variables involved - in particular the 

possibility of contaminated precursor chemicals and adulteration of the product. 

Bennett certainly challenged the estimate Agent Wheeler provided to Chan 

of the volume of each of the one-pound containers of iodine seized from 

Bennett's laboratory, the methodology Chan employed in calculating productive 

capability of the iodine and the certainty of the variables Chan employed in his 

calculations insofar as contamination and adulteration were concerned. But, these 

challenges were not so potent, individually or collectively, to merit a conclusion 

on our part that there is a reasonable probability a jury, applying a reasonable 

doubt standard, would conclude the productive capability of the laboratory was 

less than 150 grams. 11 

Nor has Bennett met his burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability 

11 It would require a diminution in excess of forty-five percent off of the 

Government's projected productive capability of 275 .1 grams of actual methamphetamine 

to reduce the productive capability of Bennett's laboratory beneath the 150 grams of 

actual methamphetamine necessary to engage a base offense level of 34. The sum of the 

evidence does not merit such a diminution. 

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that, under the specific facts of his case as analyzed under the sentencing factors 

of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 12 the district court would have reasonably imposed a 

12 Factors to be considered in imposing sentence. The court 

shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph 

(2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular 

sentence to be imposed, shall consider -

( 1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed-

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 

promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment for the offense; 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 

treatment in the most effective manner; 

(3) the kinds of sentences available; 

( 4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for 

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 

applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 

guidelines .... 

(5) any pertinent policy statement -

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission .... 

( 6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 

of similar conduct; and 

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sentence outside the guideline range under a post-Booker advisory regime. The 

court's comments in declaring sentence clearly evidence it determined Bennett's 

sentence in at least partial reliance on§ 3553(a)'s standards. After Booker's 

excision of the mandatory application of the guidelines, see 1.25 S.Ct. at 756-57, 

these standards hold even greater sway. Even so, we can identify nothing in the 

record or in any argument by Bennett to suggest the court would have sentenced 

differently in the absence of the provision mandating application of the 

guidelines. 13 In fact, the court specifically stated the 188 month term of 

imprisonment was appropriate, and it declined to depart downward for any reason. 

We acknowledge the authority to downward depart, pre-Booker, was limited under 

§ 3553(b), but still, there is absolutely no indication in the record the court was 

open to any departure at all, whether legitimate grounds could be advanced or not. 

Therefore, we conclude judicial fact-finding of the productive capability of 

the laboratory did not affect Bennett's substantial rights under the third prong of 

the plain error test. This being so, we need not consider whether he satisfies the 

fourth prong of the test. We determine Bennett has failed to satisfy the plain 

(7) 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 

13 Bennett does not claim Booker error based on the district court's enhancement 

for obstruction of justice. See USSG §3C I. I. Bennett did not challenge the enhancement 

in either his sentencing or his initial appellate briefs. This is not surprising, inasmuch as 

the facts of Bennett's flight and non-appearance for sentencing were patent and without 

valid excuse. 

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error standard. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

Entered by the Court: 

Terrence L. O'Brien 

United States Circuit Judge 

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