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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Ronny Vazquez
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 24, 2010

Decided March 25, 2010

Before

      FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

      ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

      JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge     

   

No. 09‐3346

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RONNY VAZQUEZ,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:08‐CR‐30255‐002‐MJR

Michael J. Reagan,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ronny Vazquez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1343, 1349; credit‐card fraud, id. § 1029(a)(5); and aggravated identity theft, id.

§ 1028A(a)(1).  Four other counts were dismissed as part of a plea agreement in which

Vazquez waived the right to appeal “any aspect” of his convictions or sentence so long as

the prison term did not exceed his guidelines range.  That range was 54 to 61 months, but in

light of Vazquez’s young age and supportive family, the district court imposed a below‐

range sentence of 48 months.  Vazquez filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel

has concluded that the case is frivolous and seeks leave to withdraw.  See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  Vazquez opposes counsel’s motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).

We confine our review to the potential issues outlined in counsel’s facially adequate brief

and Vazquez’s response.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-3346 Document: 15 Filed: 03/25/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09‐3346 Page 2

Vazquez does not want his guilty pleas set aside, so counsel correctly refrains from

discussing the voluntariness of the pleas or the adequacy of the plea colloquy.  See United

States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).  It follows that the plea agreement and

waiver of appeal are binding, see United States v. Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 483 (7th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860‐61 (7th Cir. 2001), and thus the appeal must be

dismissed.

In his Rule 51(b) response, Vazquez asserts that a defendant cannot waive the right

to appeal.  But appeal waivers are permissible and enforceable, e.g. United States v. Cole, 569

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 381 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 519 (7th Cir. 2004), and although Vazquez includes a number of

other potential issues in his response, all of them are precluded by the waiver.

Counselʹs motion is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

Case: 09-3346 Document: 15 Filed: 03/25/2010 Pages: 2