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Parties Involved:
James E. Lockhart
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

. ' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 8. lS91 

ROBERT t. I-!OECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

JAMES E. LOCKHART, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

No. 89-6372 

(D.C. No. CR-89-73-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** District 

Judge. 

Mr. James E. Lockhart was convicted by a jury on a one count 

charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 84l(a)(l) and 846. At trial, three couriers involved in the 

conspiracy implicated Mr. Lockhart in arranging for the 

transportation of cocaine to Oklahoma from California and for 

occasionally paying for shipments of cocaine. Mr. Lockhart was 

subsequently sentenced to 262 months, which included an 

enhancement for acting as a "supervisor" of the conspiracy. He 

now argues that: (1) evidence of other conspirators' drug 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-6372 Document: 010110031041 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 1 
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activity after February 9, 1989, was improperly admitted because 

he had withdrawn from the conspiracy as of that date, (2) the 

trial judge erred in allowing demonstrative evidence of exactly 

how the cocaine was transported, and (3) the trial judge erred in 

finding that Mr. Lockhart was a "supervisor" of the conspiracy 

under the Sentencing Guidelines§ 3Bl.1. We affirm the district 

court on all grounds. 

I. Introduction of Post-February 9, 1989 Evidence of Drug 

Trafficking 

Mr. Lockhart argues that "substantial evidence was introduced 

during the trial that indicated the defendant left the scene of 

any alleged criminal conduct by February 9, 1989," and that the 

trial judge recognized this by excluding consideration of drug 

transactions occurring after February 9, 1989, during the 

sentencing hearing. 

Assuming for the moment that Mr. Lockhart is correct in 

asserting that he left "the scene of any alleged criminal conduct" 

by February 9, 1989 (an assertion that was controverted by two 

government witnesses), he has still not met his burden of 

demonstrating withdrawal from the conspiracy. Under United 

States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. 

denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979), "[t]he burden of establishing 

withdrawal is on the defendant," who must show that he or she took 

"affirmative action, either making a clean breast to the 

authorities or communicating his withdrawal in a manner reasonably 

calculated to reach co-conspirators .... " (citations omitted). 

Citing Parnell, we noted in United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 

1363, 1369 (10th Cir. 1989), that "mere cessation of activities 

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Appellate Case: 89-6372 Document: 010110031041 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 2 
alone is not enough" to show withdrawal from a conspiracy. See 

also United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir. 1980). 

Therefore, even leaving aside evidence of his presence in 

Oklahoma after February 9, 1989, Mr. Lockhart has failed to meet 

his burden of showing affirmative withdrawal and has argued 

nothing more than "mere cessation of activity." The trial judge, 

therefore, did not err in allowing the jury to consider the 

withdrawal question. 

The trial judge's decision to exclude post-February 9, 1989 

evidence for sentencing purposes does not amount to a finding of 

withdrawal from the conspiracy as of February 9. The judge could 

have made this decision for a number of reasons that fall within 

his discretion in the sentencing process. 

II. Use of Demonstrative Evidence 

Mr. Lockhart argues that the trial judge clearly abused his 

discretion in allowing the government witness to demonstrate 

exactly how she transported the cocaine on her body. He cites no 

authority, but claims that the probative value of this evidence 

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 

under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The government argues that the evidence 

technique was both relevant and probative 

witnesses had previously testified how 

of the couriers' 

because government 

the cocaine was 

transported. Regardless, the government claims, introduction of 

this evidence was far less prejudicial than other kinds of 

evidence routinely admitted by courts. 

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While this evidence, like most admitted against defendants in 

criminal cases, might have prejudiced Mr. Lockhart, it was not 

improper. Indeed, it was probative of several issues in dispute, 

such as how much cocaine could be carried in this fashion and 

whether a conspiracy existed at all, as shown by the established 

regimen or technique of transportation. Even if we were to find 

that the introduction of this evidence violated Rule 403, which we 

do not, the error was certainly harmless because the manner in 

which the couriers carried the drugs is insignificant compared to 

the fact that they had been carrying drugs at all in a transaction 

involving Mr. Lockhart. 

III. Upward Adjustment in Sentence for Being a Supervisor 

Mr. Lockhart argues that it was clear error for the district 

court to have found that he was a supervisor of the conspiracy for 

the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines§ 3Bl.l. He further 

claims that even the testimony of the government witnesses shows 

that he was a minor player in the conspiracy and that two of the 

other co-conspirators were the real leaders. 

A reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual 

finding of the defendant's role in the offense unless clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1040 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

The Sentencing Guidelines S 3Bl.1 defines the role of 

defendants and provides for adjustments in sentencing based on 

participation. Section 3Bl.l(b) states: 

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Appellate Case: 89-6372 Document: 010110031041 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 4 
If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an 

organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved 

five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, 

increase by 3 levels. 

Note 3 of the commentary to§ 3Bl.1 states that a sentencing court 

should consider factors, among others, such as the exercise of 

decision-making authority, the amount of participation in planning 

and execution of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, and 

the degree of control exercised over others, in determining 

whether a defendant is a supervisor. This court has recently held 

that a defendant can be found to be a supervisor if he or she 

exercised some degree of control over a subordinate. United 

States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 190 (1990). Here, the trial judge specifically found 

that Mr. Lockhart had sent several couriers to California, that he 

accepted and paid for the drugs brought back by the couriers, and 

was described by one witness as being a partner of the same coconspirators that Mr. Lockhart himself describes as the leaders of 

the conspiracy. Considering this evidence, the trial judge did 

not err in finding that Mr. Lockhart was a supervisor under 

§ 3Bl.1. 

Accordingly, the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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