Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cr-01210/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cr-01210-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Plaintiff
Stanley Weaver Yazzie
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Stanley Weaver Yazzie, 

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CR-04-1210-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant’s motions to dismiss. Dkt. ##43, 51, 62. The

Government has filed responses to the motions and Defendant has filed replies. Dkt. ##49,

51, 55-56, 65. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motions.

I. Background.

On November 17, 2004, the Government filed an indictment charging Defendant with

four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and four counts of abusive sexual contact.

Dkt. #1. Defendant was arrested on December 17, 2004, and made his initial appearance

before United States Magistrate Judge Stephen Verkamp on December 20, 2004. Dkt. #3.

Judge Verkamp held a detention hearing on December 21, 2004, and ordered

Defendant detained pending trial on the ground that he was a danger to the community.

Dkt. #4-6. Defendant was arraigned on December 29, 2004. Dkt. #8. Defendant entered a

plea of not guilty on all counts. Id.

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

On May 16, 2005, Defendant submitted a sealed motion asking the Court to determine

whether he was mentally competent to stand trial. Dkt. #29. The Government submitted a

response on June 3, 2005. Dkt. # 30. On June 17, 2005, the Court granted Defendant’s

motion and entered an order that he be transported to the Federal Medical Center in

Springfield, Missouri (“FMC-Springfield”) for a competency evaluation pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Dkt. #31. The courtroom deputy clerk endorsed the order to be sent

to counsel, but inadvertently failed to endorse the order for transmission to the Marshal’s

Office. See Dkt. #37. The deputy clerk might have walked the order down to the Marshal’s

Office, but is not certain. The Marshal’s Office has no record of having received the order.

 Defendant was not transported to FMC-Springfield as ordered. On September 26,

2005, defense counsel sent an e-mail to the Marshal’s Office inquiring about the status of

Defendant’s competency evaluation and when he would be returned to Phoenix. Upon

receiving this e-mail, the Marshal’s Office learned for the first time of the Court’s order and

promptly took steps to transport Defendant to FMC-Springfield. See id. Defendant arrived

at the medical facility on October 6, 2005, some 111 days after the Court had ordered that

he be transported to the facility.

Doctors at FMC-Springfield determined over the next several months that Defendant

is not competent to stand trial and is unlikely to attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.

This determination was made by February 6, 2006. In order to avoid the need to re-transport

Defendant to FMC-Springfield for a risk assessment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), doctors

at the facility proceeded to undertake a risk assessment, completing that evaluation on

February 16, 2006. The Marshal’s Office sought an extension of time to arrange Defendant’s

return to Phoenix, which was granted by the Court, and Defendant ultimately was returned

to the State of Arizona on March 7, 2006.

At a hearing on May 25, 2006, Defendant and the Government stipulated that

Defendant is not competent to stand trial. Upon receiving this oral stipulation, and having

reviewed the report from FMC-Springfield, the Court found from the bench that Defendant

is not competent to stand trial. In light of this determination, the Court concluded that trial

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

could not proceed as scheduled on June 13, 2006, and vacated the trial. Dkt. #58. The Court

held that the time between then and Defendant’s restoration to competency would be

excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4). Dkt. #61.

II. Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss.

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss based on the 111-day delay in transporting

him from Arizona to FMC-Springfield. Doc. #43. Defendant also moves to dismiss on the

ground that his nearly five months of incarceration at FMC-Springfield exceeded the time

allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) and violated this Court’s order of June 17, 2005.

Dkt. #51. Defendant argues that these delays violated his right to due process of law and

warrant dismissal of all charges. Dkt. ##43, 51 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715

(1972); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003)). In addition, Defendant

argues for dismissal because the 111-day delay violated his rights under the Speedy Trial

Act. See Dkt. ##51 at 4, 62 at 2-7. 

An evidentiary hearing was held on May 25, 2006. Dkt. #58. The Government

provided a proffer of evidence with respect to these motions, and Defendant accepted the

proffer. The Background section of this order is based on the proffered evidence.

A. Due Process and Supervisory Power.

Ninth Circuit law identifies two sources of authority for dismissing criminal charges

on the basis of Government misconduct. The first arises from the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment and is warranted when the Government engages in outrageous conduct.

“‘The defense of outrageous government conduct is limited to extreme cases[.]’” United

States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1099, 1238 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Gurolla,

333 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Government’s misconduct must be “so grossly

shocking and outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.” United States v.

Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1993); see United State v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 712

(9th Cir. 1991); Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1238.

Counsel for Defendant conceded during the May 25 hearing that the deputy clerk’s

inadvertent failure to transmit the Court’s order to the Marshal’s Office does not constitute

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

outrageous conduct on the part of the Government. Dkt. #58. The Court agrees with this

conclusion and will not dismiss the charges against Defendant on due process grounds. See

United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.

Wiley, 794 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1986).

The second source of authority for dismissing criminal charges is the Court’s

supervisory power. “A court may exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment

in response to outrageous government conduct that falls short of a due process violation.”

United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2004); see Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1239.

Dismissal on this basis requires “flagrant misbehavior” and “substantial prejudice” to a

defendant. Kearns, 5 F.3d at 1254; see Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1239; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a);

Bank of Novia Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1988) (“[A] district court

exceeds its powers in dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial

to the defendant.”). Government negligence or incompetence do not suffice. See Fernandez,

388 F.3d at 1239 (negligence); Kearns, 5 F.3d at 1254 (incompetence).

Counsel for Defendant argued in his reply brief and at the May 25 hearing that the

Court should dismiss the charges against Defendant under the Court’s supervisory power.

Dkt. ##51, 59. The Court disagrees.

The circumstances of this case do not show flagrant misbehavior on the part of the

Government. The facts do not demonstrate any systematic delay in transporting defendants

to federal medical facilities or an attitude among court staff that transportation can be

delayed. This is a case of human error, not intentional or systematic misconduct that requires

the sanction of dismissal.

Nor does Defendant’s five-months of incarceration at FMC-Springfield require

dismissal under the Court’s supervisory powers. Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and

the Court’s June 17, 2005 order, the doctors at FMC-Springfield made a competency

determination within four months of his arrival at the facility. Defendant remained at FMCSpringfield for an additional month so the doctors could complete a risk assessment under

§ 4246(a). These facts do not demonstrate flagrant misbehavior by the Government.

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendant’s reliance on Jackson and Mink is misplaced. Jackson dealt with a

defendant’s indefinite commitment on the ground of incompetency alone. 406 U.S. at

732-33. Mink was a civil suit for injunctive relief that did not address the standards for

dismissing indictments in criminal cases. 322 F.3d at 1107-08.

- 5 -

The Court will deny Defendant’s request that the charges be dismissed on supervisory

grounds. See Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d at 1093 (“[W]e conclude that the conduct of the

government was not so outrageous as to constitute a due process violation; nor was

invocation of the court’s supervisory powers proper.”); United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d

652, 655 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing

an indictment under its supervisory powers based on the government’s failure to promptly

correct a witness’ mistaken testimony that a document was incomplete).1

B. The Speedy Trial Act.

The Speedy Trial Act (the “Act”) requires that a defendant be brought to trial within

seventy days of his indictment or initial court appearance, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1); see Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326 (1986). If a defendant is

not brought to trial within seventy days, a court must dismiss the indictment on motion of the

defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 487 U.S. 326 (1988). 

The Act identifies several categories of delay that are excluded when calculating the

seventy-day period. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). Two categories are relevant here. The first

excludes “delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examination, to determine the

mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A). The

second excludes “delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district,

or to and from places of examination or hospitalization,” but includes the important caveat

that “any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date of an order of removal or an

order directing such transportation, and the defendant’s arrival at the destination shall be

presumed to be unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H). Unreasonable delay under

§ 3161(h)(1)(H) is counted toward the seventy-day limit. See Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1384.

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Section 3161(h)(1)(H) states that any transportation period in excess of ten days is

“presumed” to be unreasonable. The Government makes no attempt to rebut the presumption

in this case.

3

 Defendant also claims that the five months he spent at FMC-Springfield exceeded

the time allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). Dkt. #51. Defendant cites no authority for

the proposition that a violation of § 4241(d)(1) provides an independent grounds for

dismissal. To the extent that Defendant argues that the five months he spent at FMCSpringfield violated the Speedy Trial Act, he is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit has held that

any time consumed by a competency examination is excludable time under § 3161(h)(1)(A),

regardless of whether the examination exceeded the statutory timeframe for competency

evaluations. United States v. Miranda, 986 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1993).

- 6 -

Whether Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be granted depends on which

provision of the Act applies to the 111-day delay in this case. If § 3161(h)(1)(H) controls,

ten days for transportation would be excluded, but the remaining 101 days would be

counted.2

 Because the remaining 101-days exceed the seventy-day speedy trial limit, the Act

would be violated and Defendant’s motion would be granted. If § 3161(h)(1)(A) controls,

however, the Court would exclude the entire 111 days on the basis of the cases discussed

below, the Act would not be violated, and Defendant’s motion would be denied.

Defendant argues that this is a delay in transport governed by § 3161(h)(1)(H), and

cites Ninth Circuit cases that have applied the transport provision. See United States v.

Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990); Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1384.3

 In Antoine, the

defendant’s transport from a mental competency examination to the district in which the case

was pending took more than ten days, and the court excluded only the ten days presumed

reasonable under the statute. 906 F.2d at 1381. In Taylor, the Marshal’s Office took

fourteen days to transport a fugitive defendant because it wanted to take a large group of

prisoners at once. The court found four days unreasonable and not excludable from the

seventy-day limit. 821 F.2d at 1384. In both cases, the delays occurred during the actual

transportation of prisoners by the Marshal’s Office. 

The Government argues that § 3161(h)(1)(A) governs this case because the delay

occurred not in the actual transportation of Defendant, but in the period between entry of the

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Although not entirely clear, Defendant appears to argue that the error in this case

occurred after the Court had found him incompetent and had ordered him restored to

competency, and therefore did not occur during a “proceeding . . . to determine . . . mental

- 7 -

Court’s order and receipt of the order by the Marshal’s Office. The Government cites United

States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1990), a case similar to this one. In Vasquez, the

district court ordered transport of the defendant for a psychiatric examination. There was no

record that the Marshal’s Office received the order, and four months passed before the

Government learned that the defendant had not been transported. The district court then

signed a second order directing the mental exam, but another four months elapsed before the

defendant finally arrived at the examination facility. Id. at 331. 

The Second Circuit acknowledged the ten-day limit for reasonable transport found in

§ 3161(h)(1)(H), but held that § 3161(h)(1)(A) controlled because the delays “arose from

proceedings to determine [the defendant’s] competency and were prior to the conclusion of

the hearing thereon.” Id. Because § 3161(h)(1)(A) contains no language limiting excludable

delays to “reasonable” periods, the Second Circuit held that the entire delay was excludable,

even if unreasonable. Id. In reaching this conclusion the Second Circuit relied on the

Supreme Court’s decision in Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. at 330, which held that

the exclusion of time under § 3161(h)(1)(F) was automatic and not subject to a

reasonableness exception.

The Court holds that this case is governed by § 3161(h)(1)(A), not § 3161(h)(1)(H).

The relevant Ninth Circuit decisions, Antoine and Taylor, both involved delays in the actual

transport of defendants and therefore clearly came within § 3161(h)(1)(H). This case

involved Defendant’s detention in Arizona for 101 days before the Marshal’s Office received

the order to transport him to FMC-Springfield. The delay did not occur during transport.

Thus, although the delay was a most serious clerical error and plainly regrettable, it was not

a delay “resulting from transportation” as required by § 3161(h)(1)(H). Rather, it was a

“delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examination, to determine the mental

competency or physical capacity of the defendant” as required by § 3161(h)(1)(A).4

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

competency” under § 3161(h)(1)(A). Dkt. #62. If this is Defendant’s argument, it is

incorrect. Defendant moved for a determination of incompetency on May 16, 2005. Dkt.

#29. The Court did not make a final determination of incompetency until May 25, 2006.

Thus, the clerical error in June of 2005 occurred during the proceeding to determine

competency, not after it was completed.

- 8 -

The legislative history behind § 3161(h)(1)(H) supports this conclusion. The ten-day

transportation rule grew out of a Congressional desire that marshals not delay the transport

of prisoners for economic reasons, such as waiting for more prisoners to be assembled before

incurring the cost of moving them. See Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1384, n.10. The provision was

aimed at marshals and the actual process of transportation, not clerical errors that occur

during competency proceedings. 

Because the delay in this case is governed by § 3161(h)(1)(A), the entire period is

excluded from the seventy-day trial limit. Vasquez, 918 F.2d at 333. The Court will

therefore deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

C. Civil Commitment Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.

Defendant contends that this case must be dismissed because he was returned to the

jurisdiction of this Court without the initiation of any proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4246

and this Court lacks the legal authority to order him into the custody of the Attorney General

for proceedings under that provision. Dkt. #62 at 7-14. In support, Defendant cites Weber

v. United States District Court, 9 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court concludes, however,

that Weber is distinguishable and that the Court has the authority to return Defendant to the

custody of the Attorney General for further proceedings under § 4246.

A jury convicted Weber of three counts of making threats against the President of the

United States. The district court subsequently determined that Weber suffered from a mental

disease or defect and imposed a provisional sentence, during which Weber was to receive

treatment at FMC-Springfield pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244. Following one year of

treatment, the director of FMC-Springfield certified that Weber had recovered from his

mental disease or defect and recommended that the district court proceed to final sentencing.

At the sentencing hearing, the district found that the director had not made an evaluation

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

under § 4246 to determine whether Weber was a danger to the community. Noting that

Weber was due to be released for time served, the district court stayed the entry of Weber’s

sentence and ordered that he be returned to FMC-Springfield for a § 4246 evaluation. 9 F.3d

at 77-78. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked the authority to

initiate a § 4246 hearing because that section requires that the person in question suffer from

a mental disease or defect and the director of FMC-Springfield had certified that Weber no

longer suffered from such infirmities. Id. at 79.

In this case, the Court has found, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), that Defendant is

incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to attain the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable

future. The parties agree with this finding. Thus, unlike the defendant in Weber, who was

competent to proceed with sentencing, Defendant Yazzie is subject to the provisions of

§ 4246. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d); United States v. Ohnick, 803 F.2d 1485, 1486 (9th Cir.

1986) (“Ohnick appeared in the [district] court for a final determination on his competency

to stand trial. The court found that neither was Ohnick presently competent nor was there

a substantial probability that he would obtain competency in the foreseeable future. As a

result, Ohnick was then subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246.”); United States v.

Rivera-Moreles, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that the Ninth Circuit

in Weber concluded that “§ 4246 was not applicable because § 4246 only applies where the

defendant is determined to be incompetent, and Weber was deemed competent by the district

court”); United States v. Trillo-Cerda, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2002)

(distinguishing Weber and stating: “Here, all agree that defendant in his current unmedicated

state is incompetent, and the court has so held. Thus, § 4246 is otherwise applicable.”)

(emphasis in original). Moreover, unlike the situation in Weber, the doctors in this case

initiated § 4246 proceedings by completing a risk assessment to determine whether

Defendant was a danger to the community.

In enacting §§ 4241-48, Congress intended to provide protection for society as well

as the rights of criminal defendants. See Trillo-Cerda, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. Defendant

has cited no case law, and the Court has found none, “holding that where a federal pretrial

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

detainee is determined to be incompetent under § 4241, a dangerousness certification under

§ 4246 is precluded simply because the defendant happens not to be in the physical custody

of the treatment facility where he was originally committed.” Id. The Court concludes that

it has the authority under § 4241(d) to return Defendant to the custody of the Attorney

General for the limited purpose of allowing the doctors at FMC-Springfield to certify

Defendant as dangerous pursuant to § 4246, should they find that such a certification is

warranted. See id.; Rivera-Moreles, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. The Court will deny

Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to this issue.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motions to dismiss (Dkt. ##43, 51, 62) are denied.

2. Defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General for the purpose

of providing FMC-Springfield an opportunity to determine whether a dangerousness

certification is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 4246.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2006.

Case 3:04-cr-01210-DGC Document 67 Filed 09/26/06 Page 10 of 10