Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01104/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01104-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John M. Black
Plaintiff
Reyes McGuine
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN M. BLACK,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOCTOR REYES MCGUINE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01104-OWW-SMS PC

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

AMEND AS UNNECESSARY, AND

DIRECTING CLERK’S OFFICE TO FILE IN

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 12) 

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

I. Order

A. Motion to Amend

Plaintiff John M. Black (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on August

22, 2006. On November 22, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend and submitted a

proposed amended complaint. It is unnecessary for plaintiff to seek leave of court to amend because

he has not previously amended and a responsive pleading has not been served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion shall be denied on the ground that it is unnecessary and the Clerk’s

Office will be directed to file plaintiff’s amended complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is the

subject of the screening set forth below.

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B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State

Prison in Corcoran. The defendants named in this action are John Doe, who is the Chief Medical

Officer, and Nurse Reyes. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and injunctive relief. The claim in

this action arises from the medical treatment plaintiff is being provided for his back pain.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff’s claim involves his medical care and therefore falls within the purview of the

Eighth Amendment. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”

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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does

not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted

with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official

does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health orsafety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate

indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with

medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in

receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to

make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff alleges he suffers from severe back pain and Nurse Reyes is “being deliberately

indifferent because medical professionals know only 93% of the back pain [patients] are diagnosed

with specific pain location.” (Amend. Comp., § IV.) Plaintiff alleges that he is not being provided

with real pain medication, a walking cane, or anything “up to standard per recent ‘Plata’ rulings.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s disagreement with the course of treatment being prescribed for his back pain does

not support a claim for relief under section 1983. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981). In order to proceed under section 1983 against prison officials for acting with deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff’s factual allegations must be sufficient

to support a claim that the named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts linking the

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 Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel such as the Chief Medical 1

Officer for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441

(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory

liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving

force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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Chief Medical Officer to any acts or omissions relating to plaintiff’s medical care, and plaintiff has

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not alleged any facts that would support a claim that Nurse Reyes acted or failed to act in a manner

that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. The court will provide plaintiff with the

opportunity to file a second amended complaint. 

 D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief

may be granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file a

second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

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Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, filed November 22, 2006,

is DENIED as unnecessary;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall file plaintiff’s amended complaint, which was lodged on

November 22, 2006;

3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

4. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

5. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint; and

6. If plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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