Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05338/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05338-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andrew Cuomo
Appellee
Norma Guerra
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided May 25, 1999

No. 97-5338

Norma Guerra,

Appellant

v.

Andrew Cuomo, Secretary,

Department of the Housing and Urban Development,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00213)

Alan Banov was on the brief for appellant.

Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Lena Robins, Special Assistant U.S.

Attorney, and Anthony J. De Marco, Counsel, Department of

Housing and Urban Development, were on the brief for

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appellee. Fred E. Haynes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: Ginsburg and Rogers, Circuit Judges and

Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Appellant Norma Guerra, a former employee

of the Department of Housing and Urban Development

("HUD"), complained for many years that painting in her

office building exacerbated her respiratory condition.1 She

sought accommodation from HUD, including prior notification

of painting times and relocation to another office or her home

to work, but she was never accommodated to her satisfaction.

In 1991, Guerra filed a union grievance, claiming that HUD

had failed reasonably to accommodate her disability. Despite

HUD's alleged recalcitrance, neither Guerra nor the union

took her claim to the next step of the negotiated grievance

procedure. Over the next three years, Guerra continually

requested but failed to obtain the full accommodation she

sought.

In 1995, Guerra filed a formal EEO complaint, alleging that

HUD had violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. s 701 et seq., by failing to accommodate her

disability. In January 1997, she filed suit in the district court

based upon the allegations in her EEO complaint. HUD

moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Guerra's

earlier decision to file a union grievance constituted an irrevocable election of remedies. The district court agreed, ruling

that Guerra's EEO complaint involved the same "matter" as

her union grievance, and was therefore barred. The district

court also ruled that HUD's failure to raise the election of

remedies issue prior to moving to dismiss did not constitute a

waiver of that defense. Guerra filed a motion for reconsideration, and while that motion was pending, HUD issued a final

__________

1 In 1991, a doctor diagnosed Guerra with Reactive Airway

Disease and advised HUD that "she has sensitivity to multiple

chemicals, including dust, fumes, and inhalant chemicals." Compl.

p 64.

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agency decision dismissing her EEO complaint. See 29

C.F.R. s 1614.301(a) ("Any ... complaint filed after a grievance on the same matter shall be dismissed without prejudice

to the complainant's right to proceed through the negotiated

grievance procedure including the right to appeal to the

Commission from a final decision."); see id. s 1614.107(c) &

(d). In 1998 the district court denied Guerra's motion for

reconsideration, again ruling that her grievance and her EEO

complaint concerned the same matter and that HUD had not

waived the election of remedies defense.

On appeal, Guerra raises several contentions, only one of

which requires discussion, namely that her 1991 union grievance and her 1995 EEO complaint raised different "matters."

Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, "[a]n aggrieved

employee affected by a prohibited personnel practice under

section 2302(b)(1) of this title which also falls under the

coverage of the negotiated grievance procedure may raise the

matter under a statutory procedure or the negotiated procedure, but not both."2 5 U.S.C. s 7121(d)(1994); see Johnson

v. Peterson, 996 F.2d 397, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A prohibited

personnel practice includes disability discrimination under

section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. s 791.

See 5 U.S.C. s 2302(b)(1)(D). The Civil Service Reform Act

further provides that:

[a]n employee shall be deemed to have exercised his

option under this subsection to raise the matter under

either a statutory procedure or the negotiated procedure

at such time as the employee timely initiates an action

under the applicable statutory procedure or timely files a

grievance in writing, in accordance with the provisions of

the parties' negotiated procedure, whichever event occurs

first.

See id. s 7121(d). It is undisputed that Guerra filed her

grievance, in writing, in 1991. Notwithstanding HUD's fail-

__________

2 Thus, if the grievance and the complaint raise the same

"matter," an employee who has elected to pursue a grievance would

be prohibited from filing an EEO complaint on the same "matter."

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ure to accommodate her to her satisfaction, Guerra failed to

exhaust her remedies under the grievance procedures, never

taking her grievance to Step 2 or Step 3 or to arbitration.3

The dispositive question, therefore, is whether Guerra's grievance and her later filed EEO complaint involve the same

"matter" thereby precluding a lawsuit based upon the EEO

complaint.

Guerra maintains that the district court erred in ruling that

her union grievance and her EEO complaint involve the same

"matter," and attempts to distinguish her filings. She points

to differences in the remedies sought, or capable of being

sought, in the grievance and the EEO complaint. Specifically, she notes that she did not seek money damages or

reassignment in her grievance but did in her EEO complaint.

Similarly, she states that her EEO complaint, unlike her

union grievance, alleged that chemicals in addition to paint

caused her injury. However, she does not contend that

something other than a failure to accommodate her respiratory condition was the underlying employment action at issue in

both the grievance and the complaint. Instead, raising a type

of continuing violations theory, Guerra contends that denials

by different officials of separate requests for accommodation

constitute distinct legal claims, and that HUD recognized that

her separate requests raised distinct legal claims by requiring

__________

3 Under the agreement between the American Federation of

Government Employees and HUD, at Step 1, an employee unable to

resolve a grievance through informal attempts may advise the

immediate supervisor within 30 working days from the date the

employee became, or should have become, aware of the matter

being grieved. The immediate supervisor is to issue a written

response within five working days. If that response is unsatisfactory, the employee may advance to Step 2 by forwarding the grievance to a management representative who, after meeting with the

employee and the employee's representative, is to issue a written

reply. If still unsatisfied, the employee may proceed to Step 3 by

forwarding the grievance to the Director of a Headquarters office,

Regional Administrator, or Area Manager. From Step 3 the employee may proceed to arbitration.

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medical documentation for every request and evaluating each

claim anew.

The contours of the term "matter" are not readily apparent

from the face of the statute. Looking to congressional intent,

some courts have suggested an approach that focuses on the

underlying employment action. In Facha v. Cisneros, 914

F. Supp. 1142, 1148-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 106 F.3d 384 (3d

Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision), one of the cases on

which the district court relied, the Pennsylvania court noted

that interpreting "matter" too narrowly would undercut Congress' reliance upon collective bargaining agreements in the

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, while interpreting "matter"

too broadly would create a trap for the unwary in view of the

election of remedies provision in s 1721(d). Facha, a senior

trial attorney at HUD, filed an EEO complaint alleging sex

discrimination and retaliation for prior EEO activity. One

month earlier, she had filed a grievance pursuant to her

collective bargaining agreement, alleging reprisal for union

activity. The government moved to dismiss her complaint on

the ground that although her union grievance and EEO

complaint presented different legal theories, they covered the

same "matter." Drawing on the analysis in Bonner v. Merit

Systems Protection Board, 781 F.2d 202, 204-05 (Fed. Cir.

1986), the district court formulated a test for determining

whether a grievance and a complaint cover the same "matter": "If [the employee] raised a topic in both documents, or

if the arbitrators assigned to handle the grievance would

necessarily have needed to inquire into a topic in discharging

their duties, then s 7121(d) bars her from raising that same

topic in her subsequent EEO complaint." Facha, 914

F. Supp. at 1149.4 The district court concluded that whether

__________

4 In Bonner, 781 F.2d at 204-05, the Federal Circuit concluded

that "matter" refers to the underlying employment action. The

issue was whether under the Civil Service Reform Act an appeal

from an underlying reduction in force is within the jurisdiction of

the Merit Systems Protection Board when the reduction force itself

is not. Although the legislative history was not entirely clear, it

was sufficiently clear to satisfy the Federal circuit that, for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the Board, Congress intendUSCA Case #97-5338 Document #437866 Filed: 05/25/1999 Page 5 of 9
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a union grievance and an EEO complaint concern the same

"matter" under s 7121(d) does not depend upon "the legal

status of the act complained of" or upon "legal jargon." Id.

at 1148. Applying that test, the court held that Facha

prevailed on three discrete claims; two were not mentioned in

the grievance and an arbitrator assigned to resolve Facha's

grievance would not have needed to inquire about the third.

The scope of the term "matter" has been discussed in a few

other cases as well, most adopting the Facha/Bonner analysis

or its equivalent. See Van Houten v. Gober, No. Civ. A.

98-270, 1998 WL 966021, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1998)

(citing Bonner and Facha); Bobeck v. Department of Health

& Human Servs., No. 95 C 4778, 1996 WL 89111, at *7 (N.D.

Ill. Feb. 27, 1996) (citing Bonner); Timus v. Whitfield, Civ.

A. No. 87-2699, 1988 WL 25509, at *1 (D.D.C. March 10,

1988). The term "matter" becomes somewhat amorphous

when the personnel action involves the denial of accommodation or other relief due to a disability over an extended period

of time, rather than a promotion or other discrete act. As

noted, courts have tended to construe the term "matter" to

encompass more than a legal claim and instead to encompass

the "underlying action," Bonner, 781 F.2d at 204-05, or the

"topics" raised, Facha, 914 F. Supp. at 1149. The term

"matter" may also have a temporal component, as some

courts have noted, where the matter concerns an employer's

action with "effects" over an extended period of time, Bobeck,

1996 WL 89111, at *7, or separate actions, "on a different

day," by "a different decisionmaker," Van Houten, 1998 WL

966021, at *6.

Even if these authorities do not provide a definitive interpretation of the term "matter," a question we need not decide,

Guerra proposes so narrow a construction of "matter" that it

would render the election requirement meaningless. While

contending that her EEO complaint raised a different "mat-

__________

ed the term "matter" to include not just the appeal from an

underlying employment action, but also the underlying action itself.

See id.

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ter" than her grievance, she admits in her brief that her EEO

complaint "principally attacked action or inaction by different

agency officials during the period of August 1994-December

1994." For this to suffice to distinguish the "matter" covered

in her grievance from that in her EEO complaint would mean

that an employee could simply formulate an EEO complaint

on the basis of dissatisfaction with the results of the grievance process. This is precisely the result that the election of

remedies provision in s 7121(d) was meant to avoid. See

Facha, 914 F. Supp. at 1148-49. The same is true of Guerra's contention that her EEO complaint sought "alternative

accommodations"--"to take work home, to be paid administrative leave with pay whenever the Agency did not so

accommodate her, ... to be reassigned permanently to a

different building," and to be awarded compensatory damages. If this contention, which comes on the heels of her

concession that her EEO complaint, "[l]ike the 1991 grievance

... claimed that the Agency wrongly denied [her] the accommodation allowing her to take work home," were sufficient to

create separate matters, then any employee could file an

EEO complaint that was otherwise identical to her previously

filed grievance except that it requested one form of accommodation not included in the grievance. Unlike Van Houten,

where the issues underlying the grievance did not necessarily

require resolution of a separate issue underlying the EEO

complaint, 1998 WL 966021, at *6, or Facha, where some

claims in the EEO complaint had not been raised in the

grievance, 914 F. Supp. at 1149, Guerra does not contend that

the accommodations she sought in her EEO complaint would

not have been considered in the process of resolving her

grievance.

It is true that Guerra's case is different from Facha insofar

as she alleges continuing violations by HUD, not simply a

discrete action like denial of a promotion. Her initial grievance also long preceded her attempt to pursue relief by filing

an EEO complaint. Cf. Smith v. Kaldor, 869 F.2d 999, 1003-

04 (6th Cir. 1989). But her admissions on appeal underscore

the reality that the topics in her EEO complaint are the same

as those she presented in her union grievance. The continuUSCA Case #97-5338 Document #437866 Filed: 05/25/1999 Page 7 of 9
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ing violations doctrine applies in the civil rights context in

order to avoid statute of limitations problems when an employer commits repeated, but distinct, discriminatory acts,

some inside and some outside of the limitations period. See

Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1986). Arguably,

a similar theory could be advanced by analogy where an

employer takes a number of actions against an employee

(including failing to respond appropriately to requests for

working accommodations) and the employee wishes to avoid

being bound by a single election made years before. Certainly, an election under s 7121(d) cannot reasonably be transmogrified into an election for one's working life no matter what

changes are made to the complaint. Insofar as Guerra could

have filed a new grievance on a different "matter," she had

the option to file an EEO complaint instead. In any event,

Guerra falls short of successfully presenting this legal question. Rather than continuing violations with separate illegal

acts by HUD, if anything Guerra has suffered what amounts

to "continuing effects of past discriminatory acts." Dixon v.

Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1990). As the Seventh

Circuit has observed, "[a] lingering effect of an unlawful act is

not itself an unlawful act." Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997).

Put otherwise, a request, a second request, or even repeated requests, embracing the same basic accommodation

for the same basic condition cannot be viewed as a different

"matter". Attempting to distinguish between filings based on

the relief sought, such as the request for compensatory

damages in the EEO complaint misses the mark: whatever

the scope of the definition of the term "matter," minimally it

must have some bearing to the underlying employment action

and the rights at issue, as distinct from being governed solely

by the remedy sought. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs

Law of Remedies s 1.1, at 1-2 (1993). Hence, Guerra has

presented no factual basis upon which to apply a continuing

violations theory under s 7121(d).

Guerra's other contentions need not detain us. Her contention that her union grievance was not "timely file[d]," and

therefore not an election of remedies, is raised for the first

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time on appeal and we decline to address it. See Boehner v.

Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Her contention

that HUD waived its election of remedies defense is based on

an overly expansive reading of Bowden v. United States, 106

F.3d 433 (1997), inasmuch as HUD had not reached a final

decision on Guerra's EEO complaint when it asserted the

election of remedies defense. See id. at 438.

Accordingly, because Guerra cannot demonstrate that her

EEO complaint involves a "matter" different from that raised

in her union grievance, HUD did not waive the election of

remedies defense, and her other contentions are meritless, we

affirm the judgment of the district court.

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