Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00071/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Conrad M Graber
Respondent
Robert Meeks
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Meeks,

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Conrad M Graber, 

Respondent.

No. cv-10-071-TUC-RCC (CRP) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Robert Meeks (“Petitioner”), currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Safford, Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Habeas Petition”). (Docs. 10, 12). In the Habeas Petition, 

Petitioner seeks a sentence reduction. He argues that based on a recent Supreme Court 

case, he is actually innocent of violating one of the crimes for which he was convicted. 

See Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010). Respondent contests the Habeas 

Petition arguing Petitioner inappropriately filed his claim as a § 2241 habeas petition 

when he should have filed it as a § 2255 habeas petition. (Doc. 17). In his Habeas Petition 

and reply, Petitioner contends his Habeas Petition is properly filed under § 2241 per the 

savings clause of § 2255(e). (Docs. 10, 12, 21). 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Petitioner was convicted in the Northern District of Illinois for 

Conspiracy/Attempt to Commit Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, Distribution of 

Heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), Conspiracy to Deprive the Civil Rights of 

Others in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, and two counts of Use of a Firearm in Relation to 

a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Doc. 17-1, Attachment 2, pp. 8-

10).1

 The first three counts were ordered to run concurrently. The trial judge ordered the 

two § 924(c) counts to run consecutive to the other counts and each other. (Doc. 17-1, 

Attachment 2, pp. 8-10). The § 924(c) counts increased Petitioner’s sentence for 

conspiracy/attempt to commit robbery and conspiracy to deprive civil rights as the trial 

judge predetermined that these two crimes could be defined as “crimes of violence” 

under § 924(c). United States v. Meachum, 1999 WL 511431, *1 (7th Cir. July 15, 1999). 

 The first § 924(c) count was ordered to carry a 60-month sentence to run 

consecutive to the first count. (Doc. 17-1, Attachment 2, p. 9). The second § 924(c) count 

was ordered to carry a 240-month sentence to run consecutive to the fourth count. (Doc. 

17-1, Attachment 2, p. 10). This second count is the one Petitioner disputes in the 

pending Habeas Petition. In sum, Petitioner was sentenced to a 435-month period of 

incarceration. (Doc. 17-1, Attachment 2, p. 10). As of May 2010, Petitioner had 230 

months remaining on his sentence. (Doc. 17-1, Attachment 2, p. 8). He is projected to 

complete his sentence on December 14, 2028, assuming he earns all available Good 

Conduct Time. (Doc. 17-1, Attachment 2, p. 8). 

 Petitioner, a civilian, was convicted for crimes he committed with three Chicago 

police officers. United States v. Meachum, 182 F.3d 923, * 1 (7th Cir. July 15, 1999) 

(unpublished). Petitioner and his three co-defendants set-up and executed drug rip-offs. 

 

1

 The Magistrate Judge cites to the pagination of the Court’s case management and electronic case filing system (“CM/ECF”). 

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Petitioner would call drug dealers to set up the drug transactions. Id. Petitioner’s three codefendants would then meet the drug dealers and rob them of cash and drugs. Id. After 

Petitioner was found guilty, he appealed his convictions and sentences. 

 As part of his direct appeal, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in determining 

his violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 conspiracy/attempt to commit robbery and 18 U.S.C. § 

241 conspiracy to deprive civil rights constituted “crimes of violence” under § 924(c).2

Petitioner argued the jury, not the judge, should have determined whether these two 

crimes were “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The Seventh Circuit disagreed with 

Petitioner. It reasoned that whether an offense is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) is a 

question of law that can be suitably decided by the trial judge. 

 Petitioner next filed his first writ for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Meeks v. United States, 2003 WL 1989653, *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2003). In the § 2255 

Habeas Petition, Petitioner recapitulated many of his arguments raised on direct appeal. 

The District Court denied Petitioner relief. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Seventh 

Circuit, which affirmed the denial of relief. Meeks v. United States, 105 F. App’x. 834, 

836 (7th Cir.2004). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Meeks v. United States, 

546 U.S. 878 (2005). 

 On February 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a second writ for habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner filed this Habeas Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and he filed it in this district 

as Petitioner is currently incarcerated in Safford, Arizona. Prior to the Government 

responding to the Habeas Petition, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. (Docs. 10, 12). 

The Court accepted the Amended Petition and required the Government to answer it.3

 

2

 In a jury instruction, the trial judge told the jury “if they found that defendants violated §§ 241 or 1951, and if they found that firearms were used during and in relation to these crimes, then they should understand that §§ 241 and 1951 are ‘crimes of 

violence.’” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). 

3

 The Magistrate Judge notes that on the same day he issued the order requiring 

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(Doc. 15). The Government answered the Amended Petition and Petitioner filed two 

Traverses.4

 (Docs. 17, 20, 21). Subsequent to the two traverses, Petitioner filed five 

motions to supplement new case law, one motion for an emergency bond hearing and one 

motion to expedite ruling. (Docs. 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31). The Magistrate Judge will 

address these motions in a separate order. The Magistrate Judge will now address 

whether Petitioner properly filed his claim with this Court as a § 2241 habeas petition and 

therefore, whether this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Petitioner’s 

claim. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 A federal prisoner is generally required to exhaust his federal administrative 

remedies before filing a habeas petition. See e.g. Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 

(9th Cir.1991). This rule, however, is intended to apply when a § 2241 petition is 

challenging the execution of a prison sentence. The exhaustion requirement is also 

judicially created and not a statutory requirement. See Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 

(9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds, Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995). While 

Respondent argues Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on this 

habeas claim, Respondent also concedes that the Bureau of Prisons could not remedy 

Petitioner’s claim. Thus, requiring Petitioner to exhaust any administrative remedies 

would be futile. The Court will not dismiss the Habeas Petition for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. 

 the Government to respond to the Amended Petition, the Government filed its response to the original habeas petition. As Petitioner filed his Amended Petition before the 

Government responded to the original one and the Court accepted the Amended Petition, 

the original habeas petition and the Government’s response to it are superseded by the subsequent Amended Petition and Answer to the Amended Petition. 

4

 The Magistrate Judge notes Petitioner filed two traverses that make the same 

arguments, organized differently. The Court has reviewed both documents in reaching a decision. 

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B. Jurisdiction 

 In its Answer, Respondent asserts this Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits 

of Petitioner’s § 2241 claim as Petitioner should have filed this claim pursuant to § 2255 

in the Northern District of Illinois, where he was convicted. Petitioner argues he properly 

filed his claim pursuant to § 2241 in this District as the remedy provided by § 2255 is 

“inadequate or ineffective” to test his claim of “actual innocence” based on Johnson v. 

United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010). 

 A federal prisoner challenging the legality of a sentence must generally do so by 

motion raised in the sentencing court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Harrison v. 

Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.2008). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution must bring a petition pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 

(9th Cir. 2000). An exception to these general rules is created by § 2255(e), also known 

as the “savings clause” or “escape hatch.” The savings clause permits a federal prisoner 

to file a habeas petition under § 2241 to challenge the legality of a sentence when the 

prisoner’s remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 

detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 

i. The Savings Clause 

 The savings clause is a narrow doctrine to be used in extremely limited 

circumstances. United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997); Holland v. 

Pontesso, 234 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir.2000) (A violation of the § 2255 statute of limitations 

does not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective); Aronson v. May, 85 S. Ct. 3 (1964) (a 

prior denial of a § 2255 motion is insufficient to qualify for savings clause); Tripati v. 

Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162-1163 (9th Cir.1988) (a § 2255 petition is not inadequate or 

ineffective because of alleged judicial bias). Petitioner has the burden of persuading the 

Court that a § 2255 petition is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 

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F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir.1963). 

 The savings clause applies “where a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual 

innocence and (2) has not had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting that claim.” 

Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.2006). To establish actual innocence, “a 

petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that 

no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 

U.S. 614 (1998)). When determining whether a petitioner has not had an “unobstructed 

procedural shot,” courts consider “(1) whether the legal basis for the petitioner’s claim 

‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and 

(2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that first 

§2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. 

 Further, a petitioner also must not be able to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 

2255(h) that would allow the petitioner to bring a second and successive § 2255 motion. 

28 U.S.C. 2255(h); see Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. The gatekeeping provision does not 

allow a petitioner to bring a second § 2255 motion unless there is newly discovered 

evidence that is clear and convincing evidence to a reasonable factfinder that the 

petitioner is not guilty or there is a new rule of constitutional law. 28 U.S.C. 2255(h). 

ii. Analysis

 The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court deny the Habeas Petition for 

lack of jurisdiction as Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing of actual innocence 

and Petitioner has not shown he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting this 

claim as the law has not changed in any relevant way to Petitioner’s claim. 

 Petitioner is challenging one of his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

Subsection 924(c) imposes an additional penalty on a person who is convicted of using or 

carrying a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence or possessing a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence. In Petitioner’s case, prior to jury deliberation, the trial 

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judge determined two of Petitioner’s charges including conspiracy/attempt to commit 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and conspiracy to deprive civil rights of others 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 241 were crimes of violence under § 924(c). Thus, the trial 

judge instructed the jury that if they found Petitioner committed these crimes and if they 

found Petitioner used or carried a firearm, they must find Petitioner guilty of twice 

violating § 924(c). 

 The jury did find Petitioner committed the crimes identified by the trial judge as 

crimes of violence and they did find he used or carried a firearm. Thus, they found 

Petitioner was also guilty of the two § 924(c) counts. Petitioner received an additional 

300 months of incarceration for the two 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violations. 

 In the pending Habeas Petition, Petitioner argues he is actually innocent of 

violating § 924(c) for his conviction of conspiracy to deprive civil rights of others in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 241. Petitioner argues the recent Supreme Court case of United 

States v. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010), is a new substantive rule that invalidates his § 

924(c) conviction for his § 241 crime. He contends his violation of § 241 cannot be a 

“crime of violence” under § 924(c) because the Government did not prove he used or 

attempted to use violent physical force to commit this crime. This Court disagrees.5

Violent physical force, used or attempted, is not a required element to violate § 924(c). 

 As a threshold matter, Petitioner previously brought claims in a direct appeal and a 

§ 2255 appeal that were denied by the trial court, the Seventh Circuit and, with regard to 

his § 2255 habeas petition, the United States Supreme Court. Neither party in this current 

Habeas Petition argues Petitioner satisfies the gatekeeping provisions in § 2255(h). 

 

5

 The Magistrate Judge notes if Johnson was applicable to this Habeas Petition, the 

Court would have to determine whether Johnson was retroactive. Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288 (1989), United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.2003). As the Court 

finds Petitioner’s reliance on Johnson is misplaced, the Magistrate Judge will not address retroactivity. 

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Petitioner does not assert any newly discovered evidence in this case nor does Petitioner 

argue Johnson is a new constitutional rule. Thus, it appears Petitioner could not file a 

successive § 2255 habeas petition to pursue this claim. 

 Petitioner, however, also cannot show he is entitled to have this Court rule on the 

merits of his § 2241 Habeas Petition. Petitioner fails to show that he is actually innocent 

of violating § 924(c), nor can he show that he has been denied an unobstructed procedural 

shot to bring his claim. Petitioner’s reliance on Johnson is misplaced; Johnson did not 

address whether violating § 241 is a crime of violence under § 924(c). In fact, Johnson 

does not address §§ 241 or 924(c). 

Johnson interpreted § 924(e), not § 924(c). Johnson held a defendant’s prior 

battery conviction under Florida law was not a “violent felony” under § 924(e)(1) as the 

Florida offense did not require the use of physical force that was “violent force.” 

Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1270-1271. The Johnson court noted that the Florida battery law 

could be satisfied by any physical contact regardless of whether it had physical or violent 

force. It held the term “violent felony” under § 924(e) requires the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of a “violent force” capable of causing physical pain or injury to another 

person. Id. at 1271. The elements of the Florida battery statute could conceivably punish 

behavior that did not involve the violent force necessary to satisfy § 924(e). Thus, the 

Florida battery statute could not be categorically characterized as a violation of § 924(e). 

 In reaching its conclusion, the Johnson court referenced another Supreme Court 

case in which it interpreted the term “crime of violence.” Id. at 1270-1271. In Leocal v. 

Ashcroft, the Supreme Court found “crime of violence” within 18 U.S.C. § 16 “suggests a 

category of violent, active crimes...” 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). As discussed in Leocal, the 

definition of “crime of violence” in § 16 is “a general definition of the term ‘crime of 

violence’ to be used throughout [the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984].” Id. at 

6-7. Subsection 924(c), under which Petitioner was convicted, uses the same definition of 

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“crime of violence” as used in subsection 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) Finding the 

provision of § 924(e) as “very similar” to the provision of § 16, the Johnson court relied 

on its analysis in Leocal to find violent force was needed to satisfy § 924(e). 

 This analysis in Johnson is inapposite as to whether Petitioner’s crime of 

conspiracy to deprive the civil rights of others in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 was a 

“crime of violence” within the meaning of § 924(c). Petitioner contends § 924(c) requires 

an element of violent physical force – similar to § 924(e). He argues the trial judge did 

not require physical force or attempted physical force to be proven for his conviction and 

he is, therefore, innocent of the § 924(c) conviction for his violation of § 241. Petitioner 

is incorrect. 

 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) a crime of violence means “an offense that is a felony 

and – (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial 

risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the 

course of committing the offense.” (emphasis added). Subsection 924(e), which is 

interpreted in Johnson, does not have part B of the definition. See 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B). In contrast to “violent felony” per § 924(e), the term “crime of violence” 

under § 924(c) can be satisfied either by threatened physical force or by activity that “by 

its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 

another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). 

A violent felony under § 924(e) is only satisfied by actual or threatened physical force. 

 The Johnson court concluded the Florida statute did not categorically violate § 

924(e) because the Florida statute did not require violent physical force be used in 

committing the battery. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1270-1271. There is no such requirement 

for a violation of § 924(c). Further, the Johnson court explicitly limited its holding. It 

stated that it was interpreting the term “physical force” in the context of the statutory 

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definition of “violent felony” pursuant to § 924(e). Id. at 1273. 

 Johnson’s holding does not affect the present case and is not a relevant substantive 

rule. Petitioner was found guilty of participating in a conspiracy to rob drug dealers of 

drugs and money. The conspiracy had a substantial risk that physical force would be used 

against the drug dealers or their property. The elements of § 241 categorically describe 

behavior that is a crime of violence under § 924(c). Johnson, interpreting the type of 

physical force required to violate § 924(e), is not a change of law that affects Petitioner’s 

conviction under § 924(c). Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that he is actually 

innocent of violating § 924(c) for his conviction of conspiracy to deprive civil rights of 

others in violation of § 241, nor has Petitioner shown he has been denied an unobstructed 

procedural shot to bring this claim as Petitioner has failed to show a relevant change of 

law. 

 Supportive of this Court’s conclusion, other jurisdictions have explicitly held that 

a § 241 violation is categorically a violation of § 924(c). See United States v. Acosta, 470 

F.3d 132, 137 (2nd Cir.2006) (holding that the Second Circuit joins the Fifth Circuit in 

concluding § 241 is a crime of violence for the purposes of § 924(c)). In Acosta, police 

officers were found guilty of violating § 241 and convicted of § 924(c). Id. The 

defendants in Acosta had participated in a conspiracy to use armed force to steal drugs 

from suspected drug dealers. Id. at 134. The fact pattern is very similar to the present 

case. The Acosta court found that “[a]t a minimum, the conspiracy created a substantial 

risk that violence would be used to achieve its purposes.” Id. at 137. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, DENY Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for lack of 

jurisdiction. (Docs. 10, 12). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

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within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If 

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that 

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: cv-10-071-

TUC-RCC. 

 The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to 

Petitioner. 

 Dated this 30th day of August, 2011. 

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