Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03221/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03221-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J.W.T.
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3221

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

J.W.T., *

*

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: March 9, 2004

Filed: May 21, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit

Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. 

J.W.T., a juvenile, appeals from the sentence imposed after revocation of his

probation. He argues that the district court erred by relying on an amendment to 18

U.S.C. § 5037, which was enacted after his original act of juvenile delinquency, as

authority to impose a period of "juvenile delinquent supervision" following the

revocation of probation. We reverse.

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I.

On February 18, 2002, J.W.T. struggled with and fled from a Bureau of Indian

Affairs police officer who was attempting to arrest him. J.W.T. eventually was

apprehended, and he pleaded guilty to assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 111(b) and 5032. On December 12, 2002, the district court adjudicated

J.W.T. a delinquent, and placed him on probation until age 19. The government

placed J.W.T. in a drug treatment program in South Dakota, but he absconded briefly

from the facility on May 13, 2003. When the treatment staff discharged J.W.T. for

this violation of program rules, he was placed in a different facility. On June 1, 2003,

J.W.T. ran away yet again, and he was arrested in Utah in July 2003.

The district court held a probation revocation hearing on July 29, 2003. J.W.T.

admitted that he failed to notify his probation officer prior to a change of residence,

and that he failed to reside in a community corrections center as required. The district

court revoked J.W.T.'s probation, ordered a supplemental presentence report, and set

a dispositional hearing.

The supplemental presentence report noted that 18 U.S.C. § 5037 authorized

the court to order a period of juvenile delinquent supervision to follow official

detention. The pertinent provision of § 5037 was enacted on November 2, 2002, as

§ 12301 of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act.

See Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758. Thus, the amendment authorizing juvenile

delinquent supervision was enacted after J.W.T.'s underlying act of delinquency, but

before he violated the conditions of probation.

J.W.T. objected to a term of supervision. He argued that because the statutory

amendment was passed after the date of his underlying act of delinquency, the court

could not order a term of supervision as part of the sanction imposed after the

revocation of probation. Rejecting this contention, the district court committed

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J.W.T. to official detention for 14 months, and imposed a term of judicial delinquent

supervision, which the judgment referred to as "supervised release," until J.W.T.'s

21st birthday.

II.

It is uncontested that at the time of J.W.T.'s act of juvenile delinquency in

February 2002, the district court could not order a term of supervised release after a

period of official detention. It is also clear that the November 2002 amendment to 18

U.S.C. § 5037 authorized district courts to impose supervised release, and that the

amendment was enacted after J.W.T. committed the violation of probation that led to

his resentencing. There is disagreement, however, as to whether the imposition of

supervised release should be considered a sanction for the original act of delinquency

(in which case the amendment would be applied retrospectively), or for the violation

of probation (in which case the amendment need be applied only prospectively). The

district court concluded that it was sentencing J.W.T. for a probation violation that

occurred after the effective date of the amendment, such that imposition of supervised

release was authorized by statute and consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause of the

Constitution.

The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694

(2000), however, makes clear that the term of supervised release must be considered

part of the penalty for J.W.T.'s original act of delinquency. In Johnson, the Sixth

Circuit had disposed of an ex post facto challenge by holding that revocation of

supervised release merely imposed punishment for violating the conditions of

supervised release, rather than for the original offense. Id. at 699-700. On this

theory, "if the violation of the conditions of supervised release occurred after the

[statutory change], . . . the new law could be given effect without applying it to events

before its enactment." Id. at 700. The Supreme Court rejected that logic, noting the

"serious constitutional questions that would be raised by construing revocation and

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reimprisonment as punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised

release." Id. Accordingly, Johnson holds that post-revocation penalties should be

attributed to the "original offense." Id. at 701. Johnson involved penalties imposed

after revocation of supervised release, as opposed to revocation of probation, but we

see no basis to treat these situations differently.

The government does not adopt the district court's view, but argues that section

5037 was not applied retrospectively for a different reason. The government asserts

that because the amendment was enacted before the disposition of J.W.T.'s original

act of delinquency in December 2002, even though the change became effective after

the act of delinquency in February 2002, the district court's application of the

amendment concerning supervised release was not retrospective. The relevant date

for determining whether the amendment is retrospective, however, is the date of the

original offense or act of delinquency. The Supreme Court made this point

abundantly clear in Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 427, 430-31 (1987), where it

invalidated state sentencing guidelines that went into effect between the date of the

defendant's offense and the date of his sentencing. We thus reject the government's

position. 

Because the term of supervised release is a sanction for J.W.T.'s original act of

delinquency committed in February 2002, we must address whether Congress

intended the November 2002 amendment to apply retroactively. If so, we must then

consider whether retroactive application of the statute to J.W.T. violates the Ex Post

Facto Clause. We review these legal questions de novo.

The Supreme Court in Johnson reaffirmed that "one of the most basic

presumptions of our law" is that "legislation, especially of the criminal sort, is not to

be applied retroactively." 529 U.S. at 701. Among other things, this presumption

reduces the potential for conflict between legislation and the Ex Post Facto Clause.

In light of this presumption, the Court explained that a statute burdening private

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interests will be deemed prospective in application absent a "clear statement" that

Congress intended retroactive effect. Id.

In Johnson, the Court was confronted with a statute that authorized the district

court to impose a term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of an

offender who had violated the conditions of an initial term of supervised release. Id.

at 698-99. The Court found nothing in the statute to suggest that Congress intended

the amendment to apply retroactively. Thus, the Court applied the "general rule" that

a statute takes effect on the date of its enactment, and declined to give the sentencing

change retroactive effect. Id. at 702.

In this case, we likewise see nothing to indicate that Congress intended the

November 2002 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 5037 to be retroactive. The subtitle

concerning juvenile disposition hearings, which added the authorization for

supervised release, specifies no effective date. The general rule is that when a statute

has no effective date, "absent a clear direction by Congress to the contrary, [it] takes

effect on the date of its enactment." Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395,

404 (1991). Therefore, we find no clear statement that Congress intended the

amendment to apply retroactively, and we hold that the amendment authorizing

juvenile delinquent supervision does not apply to acts of delinquency committed prior

to November 2, 2002.

Because 18 U.S.C. § 5037 did not provide for a term of juvenile delinquent

supervision at the time of J.W.T.'s original act of delinquency, a sentence of

supervised release may not be imposed. Accordingly, we vacate the term of

supervised release, and remand to the district court for entry of an amended judgment

consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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