Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03318/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03318-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allen L. Nicklasson
Appellant
Don Roper
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3318

___________

Allen L. Nicklasson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Don Roper, Warden, *

Potosi Correctional Center, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2007

Filed: June 21, 2007 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Allen Nicklasson was found guilty by a jury in a Missouri state court of firstdegree murder and was sentenced to death. He appeals from the district court’s1

judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

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2

For an account of Skillicorn’s prosecution for this crime, see Skillicorn v.

Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2007).

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For a complete recitation of the facts giving rise to this case, see State v.

Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1998). The facts relevant to this appeal are as

follows. On August 23, 1994, Allen Nicklasson, Dennis Skillicorn, and Tim

DeGaffenreid decided to return to Kansas City after a trip east to obtain drugs. Their

vehicle broke down a number of times along I-70. After one such breakdown, they

burglarized a home and stole four guns, ammunition, a skinning knife, money, a

pillow case, some change, and a cracker box. They stashed the stolen property in the

bushes, called a tow truck, and used the change-filled cracker box to pay a mechanic

to restart the car. Once the car was restarted, they returned to recover the stolen

property, at which point the car broke down once again. 

Richard Drummond saw the three stranded men and offered to take them to a

telephone. Accepting the offer, they transferred the stolen property from their car to

the trunk of Drummond’s vehicle, keeping a .22 caliber handgun and a shotgun with

them when they entered Drummond’s vehicle. Nicklasson then sat behind

Drummond, pressed the pistol against the back of Drummond’s head, and said,

“[y]ou’re going to take us to where we want to go.” As they proceeded towards

Kansas City, the three decided to kill Drummond and they had him drive to a secluded

area off a county road. After ordering Drummond to stop and exit the car, Nicklasson

walked him into the woods, ordered him to kneel, told him to say his prayers, and shot

him in the head twice. Drummond’s body was found eight days later. Nicklasson and

Skillicorn were later arrested while hitchhiking in California.2

 

Following the imposition of his sentence, Nicklasson appealed his conviction

to the Supreme Court of Missouri, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had erred by

(1) conducting a confusing and inadequate death qualification voir dire without

defense participation, (2) prohibiting the defense from conducting follow-up voir dire

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after asking the jury about their ability to follow Missouri’s diminished capacity

instruction, (3) barring any voir dire of jurors concerning their potential reaction to the

introduction of evidence of Nicklasson’s involvement in two other Good Samaritan

murders, and (4) finding that the prosecution did not commit a racially-motivated

Batson violation for striking two black jurors. A divided court held that the voir dire

was constitutionally sufficient and found no error in the trial court’s determination that

the jury strikes were for legitimate reasons. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 609-14.

Nicklasson’s motion for post-conviction relief was also denied. Nicklasson v. State,

105 S.W.3d 482 (Mo. 2003). He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal

district court. Following the district court’s denial of the petition, we granted a

certificate of appealability on the above-mentioned issues. 

II. The AEDPA Standard

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), we

may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any issue decided by the

Missouri state courts unless the decision “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

AEDPA limits the scope of federal review “in order to effect the intent of Congress

to expedite habeas proceedings with appropriate deference to state court

determinations.” Whitmore v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000)). AEDPA “places a new constraint

on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ

of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it

reaches a conclusion opposite to one reached by the Supreme Court on a question of

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law or decides the case differently than the Supreme Court has decided a case with a

materially indistinguishable set of facts. Id. at 405. A state court decision involves

an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if, in the federal

court’s independent judgment “the relevant state-court decision [not only] applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly[, but also did so] . . .

unreasonabl[y].” Id. at 410-11. AEDPA requires federal courts to presume that state

court factual findings are correct, and it places the burden on Nicklasson to rebut that

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. Death Qualification Voir Dire

1. Trial Court’s Procedure

At the beginning of voir dire, the trial court made introductory remarks. It

recounted, inter alia, a jury instruction concerning the elements of first-degree

murder; it described the general decision-making process necessary to determine

whether, if guilty, Nicklasson would receive a death or life imprisonment sentence;

it discussed the role of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the process; and

it concluded by explaining the state’s burden of proof. 

Following this introduction, the trial court asked potential jurors whether they

could both follow the court’s instructions and (1) decide if the defendant was guilty

or not guilty of murder in the first degree or of a lesser degree of homicide, (2)

consider evidence of aggravating circumstances, (3) consider evidence of mitigating

circumstances, (4) decide if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating

circumstances, (5) unanimously decide with the other jurors that the aggravating

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, (6) consider the imposition of

the death penalty, and (7) consider the imposition of life without probation or parole.

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With respect to death qualification, the court asked three additional questions

of the venire panel: (1) whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty,

(2) whether they would automatically vote for life without probation or parole, and

(3) whether they would be able to follow the court’s instructions and consider both the

imposition of the death penalty or the imposition of life without probation or parole.

Sixteen venirepersons responded that they would both automatically impose the

death penalty and would automatically impose life imprisonment if they convicted the

defendant of first-degree murder. Despite this contradiction, the court refused to ask

additional death qualification questions or allow counsel to do so. 

2. Analysis

A. The Sufficiency of the Death Penalty Voir Dire

Nicklasson’s case is not materially indistinguishable from any decided by the

Supreme Court. Nicklasson therefore argues that the issues presented represent an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law set forth in Morgan v.

Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981)

(plurality opinion), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Nicklasson, 967

S.W.2d at 610. 

i. The Clearly Established Federal Law

The Supreme Court has indicated that the Constitution demands that the

defendant be afforded an impartial jury. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-30. “[P]art of the

guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify

unqualified jurors.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (citing Dennis v. United States, 339

U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950)). Without an adequate voir dire, a trial judge’s responsibility

to “remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s

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3

The party wishing to exclude a juror must “demonstrate, through questioning,

that the potential juror lacks impartiality.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 423. 

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instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled . . . [and] the defendant’s

right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute or rule [is impaired]

. . . .” Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188 (citations omitted). 

The conduct of voir dire is generally left to the trial court’s sound discretion,

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. Indeed, “the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and

number of questions on the subject. . . .” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986)

(plurality opinion) (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973)).

Whether a trial court is constitutionally compelled to ask certain questions or has

unduly restricted questioning by counsel is dictated by the essential demands of

fairness. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 730 (citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308,

310 (1931)). Indeed, “[t]o be constitutionally compelled . . . it is not enough that such

questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court’s failure to ask these questions must

render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 730 n.5 (second alteration

in original) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1991)). 

For this reason, “we have not hesitated, particularly in capital cases, to find that

certain inquiries must be made to effectuate constitutional protections.”3

 Morgan, 504

U.S. at 730. To otherwise allow a death qualification voir dire in the absence of such

inquiries leads to doubt as to whether the “petitioner was sentenced to death by a jury

empaneled in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Morgan, 504 U.S.

at 739 (citing Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37). The Supreme Court has, therefore,

mandated questions that probe into whether potential jurors maintain views that

“‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as . . . juror[s] in

accordance with [their] instructions and . . . oath.’” Witt, 469 U.S. at 433 (quoting

Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1985)). In particular, the state must be allowed

inquiries probing the extent to which potential jurors’ opposition to the death penalty

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impacts their impartiality. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7 (1986); see

also Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 n.5. Conversely, the defendant must be allowed inquiries

into whether potential jurors so strongly favor the death penalty that it affects their

ability to follow the dictates of the law. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735 (citing Turner, 476

U.S. at 34-35); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968) (requiring

questions meant to assure the defendant that the jury is not “organized to return a

verdict of death”).

ii. The Reasonableness of Missouri’s Application of Clearly 

Established Federal Law

The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court mandated

the Witherspoon and Witt death qualification voir dire questions and noted that such

questions had been asked. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 611. It further recognized that

[t]he test of the adequacy of voir dire is whether the process permits the

parties to discover bias, prejudice or some other form of impartiality on

the part of potential jurors. The trial court abuses its discretion and

reversal is required only if the voir dire permitted does not allow the

discovery of bias, prejudice or impartiality in potential jurors.

Id. at 609. We take no issue with this enunciation of the federal principle. In

applying the principle, however, the Missouri Supreme Court effectively concluded

that because Nicklasson’s voir dire included questions that were mandated by the

Supreme Court and deemed relevant to the discovery of impermissible juror bias, the

trial court’s questioning was constitutionally sufficient per se. Id. at 611.

By failing to recognize the need for additional death qualification voir dire

questioning in the face of contradictory responses by sixteen potential jurors, the

Missouri Supreme Court may have overlooked essential demands of fairness, thereby

misapplying clearly established federal law. Were we reviewing this case on direct

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We have noted that a trial judge’s discretion in conducting voir dire is “not

without limits.” Harold v. Corwin, 846 F.2d 1148, 1150 (8th Cir. 1988). Further, we

observed that 

[t]he court, in the realization that the purpose of the voir dire is to afford

the parties a trial by a qualified, unbiased, and impartial jury, should at

all times be on guard in its questioning in order to assist counsel in the

exercise of his or her preemptory [sic] challenges and challenges for

cause to eliminate those persons with an interest or bias.

Id. at 1150; see also United States v. Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1253 (8th Cir. 1984) (“the

central inquiry is whether the judge’s overall examination, coupled with his charge to

the jury, adequately protects the defendant from prejudice”).

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appeal, we might have come to a different conclusion.4

 As previously stated,

however, “even if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that

application is also objectively unreasonable.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793

(2001). 

We are unable to say that the Missouri Supreme Court’s application of clearly

established federal law, even if erroneous, is objectively unreasonable for the

following reasons:

First, the Supreme Court observed in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652

(2004), that the more general the rule of decision, the more leeway courts have under

the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1) to reach outcomes in case-bycase determinations. Id. at 664. Because determinations of whether specific voir dire

questions are mandated hinge on the “essential demands of fairness,” Morgan, 504

U.S. at 730, itself an indeterminate rule of decision, we extend to the Missouri courts

a wide range of latitude in determining where to draw the relevant lines associated

with that principle.

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5

Particularly relevant to our analysis is the Supreme Court’s reminder that,

when reviewing habeas petitions raising claims of Witherspoon-Witt error, we “owe

deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor

and qualifications of a potential juror.” Uttecht v. Brown, 2007 WL 1582998, at *14

(June 4, 2007).

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Second, the Missouri Supreme Court repeatedly justified its position by citing

deference to the trial court’s judgment because the trial court observed the jurors

directly. See Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 612. This is not an unreasonable position

in light of Supreme Court precedent regarding the detection of juror bias. See Uttecht

v. Brown, 2007 WL 1582998, at *6 (June 4, 2007). Reflective of the need for, and

appropriate extent of deference, the Supreme Court has notably held that “when there

is ambiguity in the prospective juror’s statements, ‘the trial court, aided as it

undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman’s] demeanor, [is] entitled to

resolve it in favor of [a party].’” Brown, 2007 WL 1582998, at *4 (last alteration

added) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 434).5

 This is because the deeply rooted nature of

juror bias often precludes discovering it through general fairness and “follow the law”

type questions. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 734-36; Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (“determinations

of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results

in the manner of a catechism”). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that voir dire

transcripts reviewed on appeal may not reveal subtle indications of bias otherwise

detectable, even on a subconscious level, by the trial judge: 

[M]any veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the

point where their bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; these

veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing

the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide

their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record,

however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the

definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully

and impartially apply the law . . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid

to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.

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6

We note that despite the arguably erroneous statements made in introductory

remarks preceding the death qualification questions, nothing about the death

qualification questions themselves appears confusing or unusual. Accordingly, the

trial judge’s observations may well have led him to interpret the conflicting responses

to be, in context, indicative of moral uncertainty and not of confusion. 

7

Nicklasson contends that the questions suffered from infirmities because they

consisted of “follow the law” questions and outmoded “automatic” penalty questions.

Contrary to Nicklasson’s contention, the trial court did not rely exclusively on “follow

the law” questions. The questions relating to the automatic sentencing of life and

death did not mention adherence to the law at all. Additionally, although the Supreme

Court has dispensed with references to “automatic” decision making for purposes of

articulating the standard against which potential jurors are to be considered for causebased exclusion, Witt, 469 U.S. 424-26 (replacing the prior standard), it is not

impermissible to phrase the question itself in “automatic”sentencing terms. See

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (noting that a juror who would automatically impose the

death penalty would fail to qualify as impartial even under the new standard).

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Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26; see also Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976);

Brown, 2007 WL 1582998, at *6 (June 4, 2007) (“Deference to the trial court is

appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the

individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude

and qualifications of potential jurors.”). Accordingly, the Missouri Supreme Court

acted reasonably and consistently with respect to Supreme Court doctrine by deferring

to the judgment of the trial court judge that no further death qualification questioning

was necessary.6

Third, the Missouri Supreme Court’s extension of deference conformed to a

principled and reasonable analytical framework. Though its decision accords a broad

degree of deference to the trial judge’s judgment, the court accorded that deference

only after satisfying itself that the mandatory Witherspoon and Witt questions had

been asked.7

 In fact, Nicklasson does not dispute that the judge asked questions

specifically aimed at exposing death penalty bias. By recognizing the need that these

questions be asked, the Missouri Supreme Court guaranteed that at least some

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8

For this reason, we find Nicklasson’s citation of Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.

28, 32 (1986), of limited relevance. In Turner, the Supreme Court reversed a ruling

that a defendant was not entitled to have potential jurors questioned on issues of racial

prejudice. Id. at 33. The issue before us here, however, is not whether Nicklasson was

entitled to have jurors asked their views on the death penalty, but whether the

questions asked on the subject were constitutionally sufficient in light of an arguable

showing of juror confusion. 

9

The Supreme Court was addressing whether exclusions for death qualification

reasons generate imbalanced juries, not voir dire adequacy. Lockhart v. McCree, 476

U.S. 162, 166-68 (1986).

10Nicklasson seems to suggest that because determinations of “juror bias cannot

be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a

catechism,” Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, the Supreme Court demands some amount of

responsive exchange between the questioner and the venire panel. Contrary to this

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information could be elicited from every potential juror – through verbal and

nonverbal responses – from which the trial judge could form impressions.8

Furthermore, as indicated above, outside of constitutionally mandated question topics,

“the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the

subject . . . .” Turner, 476 U.S. at 37. 

Fourth, the Missouri Supreme Court supported its position by noting that the

Supreme Court has held that “removal for cause of ‘Witherspoon -excludables’ serves

the State’s entirely proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially

decide all of the issues in . . . [the] case.” McCree, 476 U.S. at 180. Although the

citation to McCree may have been taken out of context and read in an unintended

way,9

 we cannot say that the Missouri Supreme Court’s interpretation of the quotation

was unreasonably strained. The quotation could indeed be read to support the

contention that sufficient information may be gleaned from answers to a Witherspoontype question to warrant excluding biased jurors. We have not been made aware of

any Supreme Court case holding that a trial judge in a case such as this may not rely

on proven questions but must ask follow-up questions.10

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contention, the quotation when read in its full context was meant to convey the

Supreme Court’s opinion that the stated responses to questioning, taken alone, will not

always expose all impermissible bias. Id. at 424-26; Brown, 2007 WL 1582998, at

*4.

11 [These] claims are without merit. First, the [trial court’s

comments] refute most of [Nicklasson’s] assertions of error based

on omission. Second, Nicklasson’s brief fails to favor the Court

with legal argument or authority tying his generalized assertions of

error to specific prejudice. Absent such argument, there is nothing

for the Court to review . . . . Finally, assuming arguendo, that the

trial court misspoke in some way during its introductory

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Accordingly, even had the Missouri courts misapplied clearly established

federal law pertaining to death penalty qualification voir dire, we are unable to grant

habeas relief because Nicklasson has not shown that the misapplication was

objectively unreasonable. The Missouri Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the

questions asked were sufficiently specific to adequately probe the possibility of

prejudice by the trial judge in whom much discretion is vested. 

B. The Jury Instructions Given to Venire Panels

Nicklasson asserts that the trial court, in its instructions preceding voir dire

questioning, erred by omitting the “knowledge” element of first-degree murder, by

offering a very general definition of “mitigating circumstances,” by later asking jurors

if they could follow the law after telling the jurors that the law they must follow would

be described in full in final jury instructions, and by erroneously describing evidence

in mitigation of punishment as evidence that would make “this homicide . . . not as

serious as other homicides or that [would make] the character of the defendant . . . not

as bad as others who have committed murder in the First Degree . . . .” We need not

address these points, however, because the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that

these claims were procedurally barred.11 

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presentation to the venire, the jury received proper instructions

during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial correcting the trial

court’s earlier error before deliberations began . . . . The points are

denied.

Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 608 (emphasis added).

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“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case

clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (quotation omitted). Here, the Missouri Supreme

Court clearly and expressly stated that these claims lacked merit because Nicklasson

offered “nothing for the Court to review.” Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 608. That the

Missouri Supreme Court also addressed the merits in the alternative is of no relevance.

Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (noting that a state court may address the merits in an

alternative holding without fear of federal habeas review when the state court

explicitly invokes a state procedural bar as a separate basis for decision).

Accordingly, we review a federal habeas petitioner’s constitutional claims that were

defaulted in state court under the cause and prejudice standard. Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 485-86 (1986). As Nicklasson does not now present any argument relating

to cause and prejudice, he is precluded from obtaining habeas relief on these grounds.

C. Diminished Capacity Voir Dire

Nicklasson was allowed to recite Missouri’s diminished capacity instruction

and ask the venire panel whether they could follow it, but he was not allowed to ask

whether any jurors had preconceived notions about mental health or psychology that

amounted to a disqualifying bias against the acceptance of related testimony.

Nicklasson contends that because a diminished capacity defense necessarily requires

reliance on such testimony, this restriction violated his respective rights to due

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process, a fair trial by an impartial jury, effective assistance of counsel, and freedom

from cruel and unusual punishment.

Although clearly established federal law does in some instances require

inquiries into certain biases such as race, Ham, 409 U.S. at 527, a bias against

psychological testimony is not among them. Cf. Ross, 424 U.S. at 594-95 (observing

that “the State’s obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury generally can

be satisfied by less than an inquiry into a specific prejudice feared by the defendant”).

Because the conduct of voir dire is generally left to the trial court’s sound discretion,

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, Nicklasson had no entitlement to the questions.

Furthermore, we see no reason to conclude that the Missouri courts misapplied clearly

established federal law and disregarded essential demands of fairness, because

Nicklasson was allowed to (1) read to the venire the Missouri Approved Instruction

on diminished capacity, (2) answer any questions potential jurors asked relating to the

instruction, and (3) ask members of the venire if they could follow the instruction.

This voir dire process produced no indication that any venireperson would be unable

to adequately consider the diminished capacity defense. The Missouri Supreme

Court’s deference to the trial judge’s conclusion that this process produced no

indication that any venireperson would be unable to fully consider and follow the

diminished capacity defense was reasonable and is entitled to deference. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d).

D. Unadjudicated Crimes Voir Dire

Finally, Nicklasson contends that the Missouri courts violated clearly

established federal law by barring defense counsel from questioning the jury as to

whether information pertaining to additional homicides in Arizona would substantially

impair their ability to follow the law in the penalty phase. Nicklasson reasons that in

light of evidence supporting his involvement in additional murders, some jurors might

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12In the pre-trial transcript, there is a mention by Nicklasson’s counsel of a

previous off-the-record chambers discussion between himself and the judge

concerning the judge’s not wanting further questioning relating to punishment. This

represents the only reference to any prohibition against questions in the penalty stage.

A trial court’s decision will not be found to be constitutionally erroneous in the

absence of a record that clearly reflects that decision. 

13The defense began by saying that 

[t]here will be evidence in this case that two or more people were killed

in Arizona . . . . This evidence wouldn’t be admitted in its entirety until

the second half of the trial if we get that far, but there will be indirect

reference to these Arizona murders throughout the first part of the trial.

I need to ask you a question about the effect of knowing that Mr.

Nicklasson will be responsible for two other deaths in Arizona . . . .

How many of you are concerned about your ability to put aside evidence

of two additional murders when in this first part of the trial you are being

asked only to return Allen’s mental state at the time of the shooting?

Although not a model of clarity, the wording of the question itself and the discussion

between defense counsel and the trial judge before and after the above-quoted

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be incapable of fully considering all of the mitigating sentencing factors and might be

so blinded by their biases that they could not consider life imprisonment. 

This claim is lacking in merit because it mischaracterizes the trial court record.

Nowhere in the record does Nicklasson’s counsel request the questions Nicklasson

now claims were disallowed; nor have we been able to identify an instance in which

the trial judge had stated that he would not allow such questions even were they

desired.12 Instead, read in context, the cited portion of the transcript only describes

defense counsel’s request of leave to ask potential jurors whether, given the indirect

evidence of additional murders likely to be presented in the guilt phase of the trial,

they would be able to put aside that evidence when considering Nicklasson’s guilt for

Drummond’s murder.13 The trial judge disallowed questioning on that guilt-phase

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language leaves us with no doubt that the desired question pertained only to the guilt

phase of the trial. 

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topic. The Missouri Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. As the requested

question was not crafted or intended to detect impermissible juror sentencing bias, we

cannot grant habeas relief on this basis.

IV. Alleged Batson Violations

Finally, Nicklasson argues that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges of Katy

Yokley and Karen McNeil, both African-Americans, were racially motivated and

violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). The trial court found that the

prosecutor was not improperly motivated. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.

Alleged Batson violations are considered in a three-step process. First, the

opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial

discrimination. Second, the proponent of the strike must tender a race-neutral

explanation. Finally, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has

proved purposeful racial discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)

(per curiam) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991) (plurality

opinion)). In federal habeas review, the factual findings of state courts – which

include findings relating to the genuineness of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge

motive – “are presumed to be correct, and may be set aside, absent procedural error,

. . . only if they are not fairly supported by the record.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).

Nicklasson has failed to meet his burden, and the record supports the trial

court’s finding of a race-neutral motivation. Nicklasson contends that the prosecutor’s

proffered reasons for striking two black panelists “applies just as well to . . .

otherwise-similar nonblack[s] who [are] permitted to serve.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 241 (2005). The state argues that there were relevant differences between

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the white and black potential jurors. In response, Nicklasson points out that the

differences are minor and that to impose a per se rule requiring identically situated

prospective jurors as a prerequisite to a finding of a Batson violation would leave

Batson inoperable. Id. at 247 n.6. Nevertheless, although Miller-El does bar such a

per se rule, it also provides that the credibility of the reasons given by the prosecution

may be measured by “‘how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and

by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.’” Id. at

247 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003)). This approach

accounts for the nature and extent of the differences. 

Yokley was purportedly excused because, in response to a death qualification

voir dire question asking whether she would automatically impose a life sentence if

the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, she responded “probably.” A

Caucasian venireperson, Janice Floyd, responded to the same question with “I believe

so” and was not excused. Although Floyd provided a similar response to the death

qualification voir dire question, the particular responses were central to the

prosecution’s determination of whether, and to what extent, prospective jurors might

be committed to imposing life imprisonment over the death penalty. We agree with

the Missouri Supreme Court’s observation that “[t]he state is entitled to make

judgments about the strength of a particular venireperson’s commitment to the lifewithout-parole option, vis-a-vis, that of another venireperson whose words do not

convey the same conviction.” Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 613-14. It is an entirely

reasonable trial strategy for a prosecutor to excuse a juror whose responses suggest

that they may be more committed to the imposition of life in prison than others. 

It is reasonable to contend that a potential juror answering “probably” would

be more committed to a position than one answering “I believe so.” “Probably”

presents a predictive assessment cloaked in the objective garb of statistical language,

whereas “I believe so” reflects a naked, subjective impression. Generally, objective

or quantifiable evidence is more persuasive and comprehensible than subjective or

qualitative evidence. The responses differ in their emphasis. This is a subtle

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14The Court noted that the prosecutor excluded 91% of eligible black venire

panelists, mischaracterized a black venireperson’s testimony in such a way as to make

that testimony appear objectionable and different from that of a white venireperson

when, in fact, the black venireperson’s responses should have made the individual an

ideal jurist for the prosecution, failed to ask follow-up voir dire questions to clarify

claimed distinctions of import, and exhibited a pattern and practice of manipulating

Texas voir dire panelist dismissal rules to effectuate the automatic dismissal of black

venirepersons. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240-66. 

15Unlike the situation in Miller-El, the parties here were not permitted to ask

follow-up death qualification questions, thereby increasing the significance of even

minor differences in responses. Additionally, the state’s proffered rationale as

applied to the potential juror’s testimony in Miller-El was clearly a

mischaracterization, Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 244, but not so here. The prosecution in

Miller-El struck an otherwise ideal juror for the prosecution, id. at 247; here, the

prosecution struck a juror whose statements, no matter how characterized, would be

considered strategically unfavorable to a prosecutor seeking the death penalty.

Finally, there is no evidence here of a pattern and practice of rule manipulation to

avoid empaneling black jurors.

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distinction perhaps, but it has a direct bearing on a legitimate, reasonable, non-racebased trial strategy. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the trial court judge

restricted death-qualification voir dire and asked those questions himself. In light of

these restrictions, even minor differences between each potential juror’s response take

on added significance; such differences are all the parties have to inform their

peremptory challenge decisions. 

Nicklasson’s reliance on Miller-El does not bolster his argument because the

Supreme Court’s finding of a Batson violation did not hinge entirely on the closeness

of the excluded black juror’s testimony to that of the white, but on the “totality of the

relevant facts” pertaining to the prosecutor’s conduct during the defendant’s trial.14

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239. Nicklasson does not offer similarly compelling “totality

of the record” evidence and instead relies entirely upon allegedly inconsistent

treatment of jurors who gave similar responses.15 Although the inconsistent

application of a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge rationale between similarly

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situated white and black jurors constitutes evidence of purposeful discrimination, see

id. at 241, there is not, nor should there be, a per se rule stating that the presence of

such evidence alone must always constitute “clear and convincing” evidence sufficient

to satisfy Nicklasson’s burden no matter its strength. Accordingly, Nicklasson has

failed to demonstrate that the Missouri Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law when it concluded that Yokley’s exclusion was not motivated

by race.

The prosecution also struck Karen McNeil, a child protection investigator for

the Illinois Division of Family Services, who is black. The prosecution claimed it

struck her to avoid her relating her work-related experiences in the jury room.

Nicklasson argues that the proffered reason was pretextual because venireperson

Stark, a white clinical nurse specialist in child psychology, was not struck and might

similarly share stories of child abuse. The trial court was persuaded that there “are

quantum differences between the two jobs” and did not believe the strike was racially

motivated. The Missouri Supreme Court elaborated on these differences, noting that

family services investigators deal with “physical and familial aspects of a child’s life

and attempts to stop or prevent abuse” while a clinical nurse specialist in child

psychology “attempts rehabilitation of the mind and spirit after abuse has occurred.”

Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 614. These findings are entitled to deference under §§

2254(d) and (e), and we agree with the Missouri courts that the experiences associated

with the two jobs are sufficiently different as to justify the prosecutor’s use of a

peremptory challenge on McNeil but not on Stark. See United States v. Pherigo, 327

F.3d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that employment is a valid race-neutral reason

for exercising a peremptory challenge); United States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222, 222

(8th Cir. 1990).

The judgment is affirmed.

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