Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01603/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01603-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne Barnhart
Defendant
Dale Speratos
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dale Speratos, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne Barnhart, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-1603-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #7) and

Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #14). The Court now rules on the

motions.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiff Dale Speratos applied for Title II disability insurance benefits on May 28,

2004, alleging a disability onset date of June 1, 2002. (Tr. 46-48). The claim was denied

initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 29-38). On November 28, 2005, upon Plaintiff’s

request, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing at which Plaintiff testified. (Tr.

178-200). Sandra Richter, a vocational expert, also testified. On February, 23, 2006, the

ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. (Tr. 13-22). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as

of September 30, 2003, the date he was last insured for Title II disability benefits. (Tr. 22).

The Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 6-8).

Plaintiff, born on March 21, 1949, was 54 years old as of September 30, 2003, the date

he was last insured for Title II benefits. (Tr. 21, 46). Plaintiff has a general equivalency

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Plaintiff’s subsequent tests showed that his diabetes was in poor control and that

adjustment to medication was needed. (Tr. 133). 

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degree and past work experience as a drywall finisher and trash hauler. (Tr. 53, 58, 194-

195). 

Plaintiff has Type 2 diabetes for which he takes medication. (Tr. 112, 125, 127). In

October 2002, Plaintiff sought treatment at the Scripps Clinic. (Tr. 128, 130). Plaintiff

reported sharp foot pain and mild tingling and numbness that began in June or July 2002.

(Tr. 123). He had been taking Neurontin, which stopped the shooting pain although the pain

tended to return when the medicine wore off. Id. At the Scripps Clinic, neurologist John

Romine, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff’s condition. Dr. Romine noted that Plaintiff’s gait,

strength and coordination were normal and his muscle strength and reflexes were intact. Id.

Plaintiff’s ankle jerks were sluggish and there was a sensory impairment in the feet. Id. Dr.

Romine diagnosed sensory polyneuropathy with neuralgic pains, probably diabetic. Id. Dr.

Romine advised Plaintiff to return to his primary physician concerning control of his

diabetes. (Tr. 124).1

 Dr. Romine also recommended that Plaintiff continue taking Neurontin,

as Plaintiff was having significant benefit from it. Id. 

On July 21, 2003, Plaintiff sought treatment at the Sharp Rees-Stealy Medical Group

for pain in his feet. (Tr. 112). Plaintiff saw John Colson, D.P.M. Dr. Colson gave Plaintiff

information on preventive foot care instructions, advised Plaintiff to stop smoking, and

instructed Plaintiff on the importance of blood sugar control to prevent complications from

diabetes. (Tr. 112-113). 

In September 2003, Plaintiff visited the Sharp Rees-Stealy Medical Group to discuss

disability. (Tr. 117). The chart note states that Plaintiff “decided he was disabled.” Id.

Plaintiff further reported that he worked doing drywall taper, standing and using his arms all

day, but that he had not worked for 7 to 8 months in a permanent job. Id. Plaintiff

complained of shoulder pain, neuropathy, and that he was unable to lift his arms above his

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head. Id. 

On December 17, 2003, Plaintiff saw rheumatologist Cheryl Wright, M.D., who

recommended shoulder x-rays. (Tr. 118). The x-rays showed evidence of rotator cuff

tendinitis in both shoulders. Id. (Tr. 111). Also on December 17, 2003, Plaintiff saw

neurologist Scott Riedler, M.D. (Tr. 119-122). Plaintiff reported to Dr. Reidler symptoms

of numbness, pain, and weakness in his lower extremities, and that he felt fatigued if he stood

for more than two hours. (Tr. 119). Examination showed that Plaintiff had full strength in

his upper and lower extremities, and his reflexes were 2+ in biceps and triceps, absent biceps,

knees or ankles. (Tr. 120.). Plaintiff experienced some difficulty walking in a straight line

while touching the heel of one foot to the toes of the other foot with each step, and had

decreased sensation at and below his knees. (Tr. 120). According to Dr. Rielder, Plaintiff’s

system of two Neurontin and “Juice Plus” worked “fairly well” for him. Dr. Riedler

suggested another medication to reduce the pain, but Plaintiff was not interested at that time.

(Tr. 120). 

In July 2004, Stuart Brodksy, D.O., a medical consultant for the California State

agency, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. (Tr. 141-149). Brodksy determined that, as

of September 30, 2003, in an eight hour day, Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry 20

pounds, frequently lift and carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk about six hours, and sit about

six hours. (Tr. 142). Plaintiff was restricted in his activities: he was limited to occasional

stooping, kneeling, crouching, balancing and climbing; he could not perform frequent

overhead reaching; and he should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold or heat,

wetness, humidity, vibration and hazards. (Tr. 145). 

In September 2004, Jeffrey Levison, M.D., a medical consultant for the Arizona State

agency, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record. (Tr. 28, 150-157). Dr. Levison determined that

Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and carry 10 pounds,

stand and/or walk about six hours, and sit about six hours. (Tr. 151). Plaintiff could often

stoop, and occasionally balance, kneel, crouch and crawl. He could climb stairs and ramps

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occasionally, but could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. (Tr. 152). Plaintiff was able

to frequently lift at and below shoulder level, and should avoid concentrated exposure to

extreme cold or heat, wetness, humidity, vibration and hazards. (Tr. 153-154). 

In October 2004, after Plaintiff relocated to Arizona, he sought treatment for his

diabetes at the Chino Valley Medical Center. (Tr. 176). Plaintiff reported that he had not

had laboratory tests for a year, had not been monitoring his glucose, and was taking

Neurontin. (Tr. 176). Plaintiff’s gait, balance and motor strength were normal on

examination, and there were no focal signs. (Tr. 177). Plaintiff continued his treatment at

Chino Valley in 2005. (Tr. 162-173).

In October 2005, Plaintiff’s physician at Chino Valley, Daniel Earl, D.O., stated that

Plaintiff was “completely unable to do” his occupation as a drywall finisher due to

polyneuropathy in his arms and legs. (Tr. 158). Dr. Earl further stated that while Plaintiff

remained mobile, his ability to carry out work-related functions such as lifting or standing

was impaired by nerve damage and limited by pain. (Tr. 158, 161).

 Plaintiff testified at his November 28, 2005 hearing that he had diabetes and

neuropathy (nerve damages in his legs from diabetes) and that his shoulders were like

“mush.” (Tr. 183). Plaintiff claimed sensory loss in his legs, sharp pains in his legs and

shoulders, lack of energy due to diabetes, pain in his fingers, and dizziness and fogginess

from his medication. (Tr. 183-184, 187). Plaintiff laid down 30 to 45 minutes three to four

times daily because of his pain and at times vomitted after taking Neurontin. (Tr. 187).

Plaintiff was able to perform limited housework, including washing dishes while leaning

against a counter, and separated his activities “time-wise” because Plaintiff could stand about

10 minutes maximum before having to sit down. (Tr. 188, 190, 193). Plaintiff was able to

walk 75 to 100 yards. (Tr. 190). When Plaintiff and his wife traveled by car to Southern

California, Plaintiff pulled over and walked around “to get the pain level down” every 75

miles. (Tr. 189). Plaintiff stated that he could lift 25 to 30 pounds if he merely lifted a

weight and set it back down. He could lift that weight throughout the day at different times,

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but only if he separated the weight lifting. (Tr. 191). Plaintiff experienced pain in his

shoulder when he reached. (Tr. 191). 

After Plaintiff no longer worked as a drywall finisher, he and his sons worked as

residential trash haulers. (Tr. 191-192). Plaintiff said that after June 1, 2002, he engaged in

trash hauling with his sons two to four times a week, on and off, until a couple of months into

2004, but was not doing so currently. (Tr. 192). Plaintiff moved from California to Arizona

in July 2004. (Tr. 193). 

At the November 28, 2005, hearing, vocational expert Sandra Richter was asked to

assume that Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, sit, stand,

and/or walk six hours in an eight-hour day, occasionally bend, crouch, crawl, kneel, never

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, occasionally climb stairs and ramps, and avoid overhead

reaching, extreme temperatures, hazards, and vibrations. (Tr. 195-196). Ms. Richter stated

that, based on the provided information, Plaintiff could work as a cashier, production worker

and packer, all light level jobs. Ms. Richter indicated that the numbers of available cashier

and production worker positions would be reduced by half because of Plaintiff’s restrictions

on overhead lifting. (Tr. 196-197). Ms. Richter also stated that the severe pain indicated by

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Earl, would prevent a person from working if the pain were

so severe that he could not complete a task. (Tr. 198-199). 

 II. Legal Standard and Analysis

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is disabled. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d

1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995). He must prove that he was permanently disabled or subject to

a condition that was severe enough to disable him prior to the date upon which his disability

insurance expired. Id. Where the claimant establishes his inability to perform his previous

work, the burden shifts to the social-security commission to show that the claimant can

perform other substantial gainful work existing in the national economy. Reddick v. Chater,

157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Court will overturn the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits “only if it is not

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supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind

“might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1457

(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, quotation omitted). In determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support a decision, this Court considers the record as a whole,

weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and the evidence that

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Id. If evidence can support either affirming or

reversing the ALJ’s decision, the court must uphold the decision. Moncada v. Chater, 60

F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). Reviewing courts cannot accept post-hoc rationalizations for

agency action. See, eg., NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441, 85 S.Ct. 1061,

1063 (1965); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the decision must

be upheld, if at all, on the grounds articulated in the order by the hearing officer. Pinto, 249

F.3d at 847. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony and

ambiguities and for determining credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th

Cir. 1995). 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show:

(1) he suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can either

be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months; and (2) the impairment prevents him from engaging

in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). The social security regulations set forth a five-step sequential

process for evaluating disability claims. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520. A claimant is not disabled if, at any point in the sequential process, a finding of

not disabled can be made. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

At step one of the sequential process, the hearing officer determines whether the

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). So

long as the claimant is not gainfully employed, the hearing officer proceeds to step two of

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the analysis. At step two, the hearing officer determines, based on the medical evidence,

whether the claimant has a “severe impairment.” C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant’s

impairment is “severe,” the hearing officer proceeds to step three and determines whether the

impairment meets or equals any of the listed impairments in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(d). If a claimant’s combined impairments meet or equal a listed impairment, then

the claimant will be found disabled at step three without further inquiry. Tackett, 180 F.3d

at 1099. If not, the hearing officer will make a finding about the claimant’s residual

functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in record. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e). At step four, the hearing officer uses the residual-functional-capacity

assessment to determine whether the claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform past-relevant work, then the claim is

denied. However, if the claimant is unable to do past relevant work, then the hearing officer

proceeds to the fifth step and determines, based on the claimant’s age, education, work

experience and residual functional capacity, whether the claimant can perform other work

which exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant cannot, then

he is entitled to a finding of disability. 

In this case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled at step five of the

sequential-evaluation process after finding that, through the date he was last insured for

disability and disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or

medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404. The ALJ also

concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of

light work activity. (Tr. 19). On appeal, Plaintiff argues that in reaching this conclusion the

hearing officer: (1) improperly rejected the evidence from his treating physicians; and (2)

improperly discredited Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony. As a result, Plaintiff argues that

the ALJ’s findings are insufficient to support his conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled

as of the date he was last insured. 

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A. Treating Physicians

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of his treating

physicians, Daniel Earl, M.D., and Julius Conner, M.D., even though their opinions were not

directly controverted by another examining physician. 

The opinion of a treating physician is not always dispositive. A hearing officer may

rely upon the medical opinion of a non-treating doctor if he provides “specific” and

“legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Holohan v. Massanari,

246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001); Fife v. Heckler, 767 F2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985).

While Dr. Conner’s examination was not thoroughly discussed by the ALJ in making

his determination, this Court finds that this is a non-issue because Dr. Conner’s opinion is

not inconsistent with the other non-treating physicians. Moreover, Dr. Conner does not

provide his medical opinion, but instead relies on Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony, which

the ALJ determined to be of limited credibility. (Tr. 19). Specifically, in his Doctor’s

Certificate for Plaintiff’s Claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, Dr. Conner wrote that

Plaintiff “states that he had to stop [drywalling] June 2002 due to severe shoulder pain. . .He

states that he cannot stand for very long due to severe pain in legs.” (Tr. 106). The ALJ

agreed with Dr. Conner’s assessment that Plaintiff could no longer perform his former

occupation and did not reject his assessment, but focused on the objective medical

evaluations of other physicians rather than rely on Dr. Conner transcribing Plaintiff’s opinion

regarding his ability to work. Dr. Conner’s statements did not indicate that Plaintiff was

incapable of performing any work, only that he could no longer work as a drywaller, which

is supported by the objective medical record and acknowledged in the ALJ’s decision. 

The ALJ offered numerous reasons for rejecting Dr. Earl’s opinion. Primarily, Dr.

Earl’s October 2005 examination did not address Plaintiff’s condition during the relevant

time period, prior to September 2003, when Plaintiff was last insured. Further, the ALJ

found that Dr. Earl’s opinion was not supported by the weight of the objective medical

evidence in the record. The majority of medical evidence in the record suggests that

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Plaintiff’s symptoms were managed by his medication, and none of the physicians besides

Dr. Earl (who discussed Plaintiff’s condition three years after the relevant time period) stated

that, in their medical opinion, Plaintiff physically was unable to perform all work-related

tasks. 

For example, in October 2002, Dr. Romine’s examination found that though Plaintiff

experienced shooting pains in his feet, his gait, station and coordination were normal and he

had “significant benefit” from his current medication. (Tr. 123-124). In July 2003, Dr.

Colson described Plaintiff as “a well-developed, well-nourished. . .Caucasian male in no

acute distress.” (Tr. 112). In December 2003, Dr. Riedler examined Plaintiff and found him

to be “doing fairly well” on his medications and Plaintiff refused additional medication that

might have further reduced his pain. (Tr. 120). On July 1, 2004, Dr. Brodsky’s examination

noted that Plaintiff “appeared partially credible. The findings did not fully support the

allegations to a complete level of disability.” (Tr. 149). Further, Dr. Brodsky opined that

Plaintiff “should have been able to do light work with no reaching overhead on a frequent

basis” prior to his date last insured. Id. 

Not only did the vast majority of examining physicians consider Plaintiff’s condition

well-controlled by his medication, but the ALJ noted that Plaintiff worked as a trash hauler

periodically between 2000 and 2004, which led the ALJ to infer that Plaintiff could have

performed a light level of work after the alleged disability onset date. Also, Plaintiff sought

medical treatment relatively infrequently, evidenced by Plaintiff’s medical records, which

led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s pain was under control using his current medication.

All of these factors provided by the ALJ constitute legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Earl’s

opinion and support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving

he suffered from a severe impairment rendering him incapable of all gainful employment. 

B. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. An ALJ

may not reject a claimant’s testimony without specifically identifying the portions of the

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testimony found not credible and explaining what evidence contradicts or undermines the

testimony. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1036 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001); Rollins v.

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. An ALJ’s

credibility determination must be supported by specific cogent reasons and the evidence

relied upon to reject the testimony must be “substantial.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1036 n. 1;

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. 

Under the threshold test for a plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, as announced

in Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the claimant must: (1) “produce objective

medical evidence of an impairment or impairments;” and (2) “show that the impairment or

combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to (and that it did it fact) produce

some degree of symptom.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis

in original). The latter prong of the test does not require evidence of a causal relationship

between the medically determinable impairment and the alleged symptom or that the

impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the severity of symptom alleged. Id.

If the claimant meets the Cotton test, and no evidence shows malingering, in order to

reject testimony regarding the severity of symptoms, the ALJ must specifically state clear and

convincing reasons and specify which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts

support that conclusion. Id. at 1284. In doing so, the ALJ may consider the claimant’s

reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness; any prior inconsistent or less than candid

statements; unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek or follow a course of

treatment; and claimant’s daily activities. Id. The ALJ must also consider the claimant’s work

record; observations regarding the nature, onset, duration and frequency of symptoms by

treating and examining physicians; triggering and aggravating factors; and functional

restrictions and symptoms. Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity, duration and limiting

effects of his symptoms was not fully credible. (Tr. 19). Plaintiff’s April 2004 disability

report, in which he states that he worked as a residential trash hauler from February 2000 to

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June 2002, was inconsistent with his testimony that after June 2002, he continued to work

a trash hauler two to four times a week until early 2004. Due to this inconsistency, the ALJ

inferred Plaintiff was capable of at least light work activity prior to and as of September,

2003. The ALJ further questioned Plaintiff’s credibility because he failed to report his

income between 2000 and 2002, though Plaintiff testified that he worked as a trash hauler

during that time period. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff unlawfully neglected to report his

income and now seeks government benefits that are provided by federal deductions from

reported earnings. (Tr. 20). 

The ALJ found that the objective medical evidence relevant to the time period

Plaintiff was last insured suggests that Plaintiff’s medical condition would not have

prevented him from performing the requirements of sedentary or light work with restrictions.

In fact, the record shows Plaintiff worked as a trash hauler, a physically demanding

occupation, during this time period. Not only was Plaintiff able to work during the relevant

time period, but there is also substantial evidence in his medical records that he responded

well to his medication and his pain was reduced by 70%. Further, Plaintiff did not seek

treatment after his December 2003 neurological consultation until October 2004. The ALJ

inferred from this gap in treatment that Plaintiff’s condition was relatively well controlled

by medication, because he could function for nearly a year without seeking additional

medical treatment. 

The ALJ in this case made specific findings, based on evidence in the record, that

support his credibility determination. Therefore the Court finds that the ALJ was justified

in inferring from the objective medical evidence and Plaintiff’s own testimony concerning

his trash hauling occupation that Plaintiff’s complaints about the extent of his limitations

were not entirely credible.

III. Conclusion

The ALJ properly considered the evidence of whether Plaintiff was disabled as of his

last date insured. The ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion of

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Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Earl, which were supported by substantial evidence on the

record. While the ALJ did not discuss in detail Dr. Conner’s opinion, this is a non-issue

because Dr. Conner’s opinion was consistent with other non-treating physicians. Further,

Dr. Conner’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony, which the ALJ

determined to be of limited credibility due to Plaintiff’s inconsistent description of his

employment. Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving he suffered from a severe

impairment as of his last date insured. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment will be denied and the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment will

be granted.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #14)

is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

#7) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall issue judgment

accordingly and that the judgment shall be the mandate of the Court. 

DATED this 26th day of July, 2007.

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