Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03022/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Gerald F. Whitmore
Appellant

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2003 Decided March 5, 2004

No. 03-3022

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GERALD F. WHITMORE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00269–01)

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

for the appellant. Erica J. Hashimoto, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Jessie K. Liu, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish,

Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.*

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Gerald F.

Whitmore was convicted by a jury on firearm and drug

charges. He appeals the firearm conviction on the ground

that the district court committed reversible error in preventing him at trial from attacking the credibility of the arresting

officer. Whitmore also claims that the court erred at sentencing in concluding that his prior conviction constituted a

‘‘crime of violence’’ within the meaning of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). We conclude that the district court erred in prohibiting Whitmore from crossexamining the officer about certain instances of past conduct

under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). In doing so, the court deprived

Whitmore of any realistic opportunity to challenge the credibility of the only witness who testified that Whitmore committed the firearm offense. That error was not harmless. We

therefore reverse Whitmore’s firearm conviction and remand

for a new trial on that charge. Because of this holding, we do

not reach Whitmore’s sentencing claim.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2002, Whitmore was charged with one count of

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and simple possession of

a controlled substance (cocaine base), in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 844(a). On November 5, 2002, a jury convicted him on both

counts. On January 31, 2003, the district court sentenced

Whitmore to concurrent prison terms of 83 months on the

firearm count and 12 months on the drug possession count,

followed by a three-year term of supervised release.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see

United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

the evidence at trial established that on the evening of

* Judge Silberman was a member of the panel at the time of oral

argument but did not participate in the decision.

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November 1, 2001, Officer Bladden Russell of the District of

Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), while patrolling the Fort Davis neighborhood in Southeast Washington, directed a crowd gathered at a bus stop to disperse. The

crowd, with the exception of Whitmore, complied. Russell

exited his car to approach Whitmore and Whitmore fled.

Russell pursued him on foot and noticed that Whitmore, while

running, held his right hand close to his body at his waist and

the right side pocket of his jacket.

Whitmore successfully eluded Russell but MPD Officer

Efrain Soto, Jr., who was also patrolling the neighborhood in

his police cruiser, spotted Whitmore and gave chase, first in

his car and then on foot. Soto also noticed Whitmore’s right

hand holding the right side of his jacket. While still in the

cruiser, Soto saw Whitmore throw a gun towards an apartment building next to an alley Whitmore ran into. Shortly

thereafter, Soto apprehended Whitmore. Once Russell

caught up to assist, Soto found a gun in a window well of the

apartment building. The weapon (with four rounds of ammunition, one of which was chambered) showed signs that it had

been recently thrown against the building: a piece of brick

was stuck in its sight, there were scuff marks on it and it was

covered with masonry dust. The police found nothing in the

right pocket of Whitmore’s jacket but did discover a small

bag of cocaine base in his left pocket.

At trial Whitmore defended on the ground that Soto had

fabricated the story about the gun and had planted the gun in

the window well. Soto provided, almost exclusively,1

 the

evidence connecting Whitmore to the gun and Whitmore

therefore sought to attack Soto’s credibility in several ways.

He first attempted to call three defense witnesses – Jason

Cherkis, Bruce Cooper and Kennith Edmonds – to testify

regarding Soto’s ‘‘character for truthfulness’’ under Fed. R.

Evid. 608(a). Cherkis, a reporter with the City Paper, wrote

an article in January 2000 reporting that Soto and three other

1 Although Officer Russell testified that Whitmore held his right

hand close to his right side as he fled, Russell did not see him throw

anything.

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MPD officers were the target of multiple complaints from

residents of the MPD’s Sixth District, the district in which

Whitmore was arrested. According to Whitmore, Cherkis

would testify, based on conversations he had with his sources

for the article, that Soto had a reputation as a liar. Cherkis

moved to quash Whitmore’s subpoena on grounds of the First

Amendment and the District’s reporter shield law. D.C.

Code Ann. §§ 16–4701 et seq. Before trial, the court excluded

Cherkis’s testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) because

Cherkis was not personally acquainted with Soto and because

the foundation of Cherkis’s testimony – interviews that he

conducted for the 2000 article – was too remote in time to be

relevant. Appellee’s App. at 26–28.

Bruce Cooper was a local criminal defense counsel who,

Whitmore claimed, would testify regarding both Soto’s reputation for untruthfulness within what he called the ‘‘court

community’’ and Cooper’s own opinion that Soto was untruthful. Whitmore proffered that Cooper would testify that

several defense counsel thought Soto was a liar and that

Cooper had the same opinion based on having tried many

cases in which Soto was a government witness. The district

court excluded Cooper’s reputation testimony because, even

assuming the ‘‘court community’’ constituted a recognized

community, Cooper did not know Soto’s reputation within the

entire ‘‘court community’’ and did not live in Soto’s neighborhood. The court also rejected Cooper’s opinion testimony

under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because it was ‘‘inherently biased,’’

Appellee’s App. at 359, and unduly prejudicial in that Cooper’s contacts with Soto arose from his representation of

criminal defendants against whom Soto testified and because

Cooper’s testimony would lead to additional delay – that is,

the court would have to allow the government to explore the

circumstances underlying Soto’s testimony in the other cases

about which Cooper intended to testify.

Kennith Edmonds, whom Whitmore also sought to call as

both a reputation and opinion witness, was an acquaintance of

Soto who used to live in the neighborhood where Soto worked

and who saw Soto regularly until roughly five years before

the trial, when Edmonds moved away. Whitmore proffered

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that Edmonds would say that he still saw Soto a few times

each week when Edmonds returned to his old neighborhood

to visit his mother and still maintained contacts with others in

the neighborhood who knew Soto. Edmonds’s proffered

opinion evidence was based on two incidents: (1) Soto had

participated in the arrest of a friend of his and, when Edmonds attempted to collect his friend’s property from the

police, Edmonds was told that there was no property to

collect; and (2) Soto and other officers wrongly arrested

Edmonds for drug possession in 1995. The court excluded

Edmonds’s reputation testimony because he had not lived in

the neighborhood where Soto worked for some time; it

excluded his opinion testimony because it questioned whether

Soto was involved in the events on which Edmonds based his

opinion. It also excluded Edmonds’s testimony in its entirety

under Fed. R. Evid. 403, concluding that the minimal probative value of Edmonds’s evidence was outweighed by unfair

prejudice, including the government’s resulting need to examine the events underlying Edmonds’s testimony.

In addition to these three character witnesses, Whitmore

also sought to impeach Soto by cross-examining him on three

subjects: (1) a D.C. Superior Court judge’s finding that Soto

had lied when Soto testified before him in a 1999 criminal

trial; (2) the suspension of Soto’s driver’s license and Soto’s

failure to report the suspension to his supervisors; and (3)

Soto’s failure to pay child support. Regarding the first, the

Superior Court judge had rejected Soto’s testimony that he

had seen a bag of drugs with a blue line in the defendant’s

hand. The judge found that testimony ‘‘palpably incredible,’’

Appellant’s App. at 73, and concluded that ‘‘Officer Soto lied.’’

Id. at 79. The judge therefore granted the defendant’s

motion for acquittal. The U.S. Attorney’s Office subsequently investigated Soto for perjury but declined to prosecute

him. It did, however, put Soto on a ‘‘Lewis list,’’ a watch list

for officers under investigation. See United States v. Bowie,

198 F.3d 905, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing Lewis list

established after Lewis v. United States, 408 A.2d 303, 306

(D.C. 1979)).

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The government moved in limine to exclude crossexamination on the subject under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) as well

as Fed. R. Evid. 403, contending that the judge’s finding was

only an allegation of misconduct and therefore not probative

of Soto’s truthfulness and, in any event, was unfairly prejudicial. Whitmore argued for its admissibility as a specific

instance of misconduct under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) and as

‘‘motive’’ evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). According to

Whitmore, Soto had reason to lie in Whitmore’s case in order

to curry favor with the government and rehabilitate himself

following the local judge’s finding. The district court disagreed and barred cross-examination under Fed. R. Evid. 403,

noting that the finding was not a perjury conviction, that the

present jury might rely too heavily on the finding in making

its own credibility determination regarding Soto and, finally,

that any cross-examination would delay the trial and could

confuse the jury because the government would have to be

given the opportunity to explore the finding before the jury.

Whitmore’s other attempted impeachment matters involved

the alleged suspension of Soto’s driver’s license and his

alleged failure to pay child support. Whitmore sought to

cross-examine Soto from a state document manifesting that

Soto’s Maryland driver’s license had been suspended from

1998 to 2000 for failure to pay child support. Appellant’s

App. at 107. MPD regulations require all officers to maintain

a valid driver’s license and to notify their supervisor of any

change in status. Id. at 110. Whitmore invoked both Fed. R.

Evid. 608(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in support of crossexamination on these subjects: (1) under Fed. R. Evid.

608(b), Soto’s alleged failure to report his suspended license

and to make child support payments would reveal his inclination to dissemble and evade the law; and (2) under Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b), Soto’s conduct gave him a motive to lie about

Whitmore and the gun in order to secure a conviction in case

his supervisor discovered his suspended license. The district

court prohibited cross-examination on both subjects, concluding the document Whitmore intended to cross-examine from

was hearsay and observing that it ‘‘d[id]n’t understand’’ WhitUSCA Case #03-3022 Document #807726 Filed: 03/05/2004 Page 6 of 21
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more’s ‘‘bias argument.’’ Oct. 31, 2002 Trial Tr. (Tr.) at 232–

234.

In light of the trial court’s rulings, Whitmore presented no

evidence in his defense and was limited to cross-examining

the government witnesses about inconsistencies in their trial

testimony. The jury convicted Whitmore on both counts. At

sentencing the court concluded that Whitmore’s prior Maryland conviction for aggravated assault constituted a ‘‘crime of

violence’’ as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and therefore

calculated Whitmore’s base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(a)(2). It sentenced Whitmore to concurrent prison

terms of 83 months on the firearm count and 12 months on

the drug possession count, followed by a three-year term of

supervised release.

II. DISCUSSION

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to

present a defense by calling witnesses on his own behalf and

by cross-examining the witnesses against him. See Taylor v.

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 675, 678–79 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410

U.S. 284, 294–95 (1973); United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d

732, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Graham, 83 F.3d at 1474. The

district court nonetheless has considerable discretion to place

reasonable limits on a criminal defendant’s presentation of

evidence and cross-examination of government witnesses.

Wilson, 160 F.3d at 742; Graham, 83 F.3d at 1474. It must

‘‘be cautious,’’ however, ‘‘[p]articularly where a party is seeking to impeach a witness whose credibility could have an

important influence on the outcome of the trial.’’ Harbor Ins.

Co. v. Schnabel Found. Co., 946 F.2d 930, 935 (D.C. Cir.

1991).

Whitmore makes two challenges: one related to the exclusion of his proposed character witnesses under Fed. R. Evid.

608(a) and the other to the exclusion of his proposed crossexamination of Soto under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). We review

the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,

see Wilson, 160 F.3d at 742 (‘‘review[ing] the district court’s

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decision to deny admission of evidence for abuse of discretion’’); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 919 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (‘‘[r]eviewing the district court’s limits on crossexamination for abuse of discretion’’), and address his claims

separately.

1. Character Witnesses

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) allows a party to attack the credibility

of a witness through reputation and opinion evidence of his

character for truthfulness.2

 Whitmore complains that the

district court erroneously excluded the testimony of three

character witnesses he sought to call to attack Soto’s credibility. As noted earlier, they included: (1) Cherkis, a reporter

who had written a newspaper article involving Soto in 2000;

(2) Cooper, a local defense counsel who had represented

defendants against whom Soto had testified; and (3) Edmonds, an acquaintance who had lived in the neighborhood

where Soto worked. Whitmore wanted Cherkis to provide

reputation evidence and Cooper and Edmonds both reputation and opinion evidence.

In order to offer reputation evidence under Fed. R. Evid.

608(a), a party must establish that the character witness is

qualified by having an ‘‘acquaintance with [the witness],’’ his

‘‘community,’’ and ‘‘the circles in which he has moved, as to

speak with authority of the terms in which generally [the

witness] is regarded.’’ Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.

469, 478 (1948); compare United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d

782, 802 (10th Cir. 1990) (high school principal qualified to

give reputation testimony because he lived in community,

regularly used local facilities and personally knew and had

frequent contact with witnesses), with United States v. Ruiz–

2 Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) provides:

The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by

evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to

these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character

for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful

character is admissible only after the character of the witness

for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation

evidence or otherwise.

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Castro, 92 F.3d 1519, 1530 (10th Cir. 1996) (‘‘[d]efendants did

not establish requisite TTT foundation in order to offer reputation evidence’’ because sole connection was that character

witnesses and principal witness were all from Mexico). With

regard to Cherkis, Whitmore relied on the interviews that

Cherkis had conducted for the 2000 article and on the holding

in Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir.

1993), in which the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s

exclusion of a reporter’s reputation testimony. The reporter

in Wilson, however, had personally interviewed the principal

witness while Cherkis had never met Soto. Id., see Ruiz–

Castro, 92 F.3d at 1530 (character witnesses not qualified

because not ‘‘personally familiar with [the principal witness]

or his alleged reputation’’). Furthermore, neither Cherkis

nor Edmonds had had direct contact with Soto or his community for some time. The district court found the proposed

testimony of both Cherkis and Edmonds as to Soto’s alleged

reputation for truthfulness ‘‘too remote’’ in time from the time

of trial. Appellee’s App. at 27, 351; see United States v.

Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) (reputation

witness not qualified where he knew witness only ‘‘for a short

period of time’’ and his ‘‘testimony was to a reputation that

existed at a time remote from both the time of [the events in

controversy] and the time of trial’’); United States v. Lewis,

482 F.2d 632, 640 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (witness’s ‘‘reputation

for testimonial honesty TTT is to be established by evidence of

his community reputation at the time of trial and during a

period not remote thereto’’). Finally, with regard to Cooper’s

testimony – and leaving aside the troublesome issue whether

the ‘‘court community’’ represents a cognizable community for

the purpose of a law enforcement officer’s reputation – the

district court found the foundation for his testimony weak

because it relied on Cooper’s conversations with only a few

other criminal defense counsel, a subset of the proposed

‘‘community.’’ See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382,

397 (1897) (reputation evidence inadmissible because foundation was few individuals in one building and Court noted

community cannot be so narrowly drawn as to ignore ‘‘general reputation in the community’’); United States v. Nedza,

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880 F.2d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting reputation testimony because only foundation was two former high school

classmates’ conversations); see also 28 Charles Alan Wright

& Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6114,

at 63 (1993) (‘‘The community must not be so parochial that

there is a risk that each member of that community forms

opinions as to character based on the same set of biases.’’).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the reputation evidence of these witnesses.3

While recognizing that the foundational requirement for

opinion evidence regarding a witness’s character for truthfulness is less stringent than that for reputation evidence, see

Watson, 669 F.2d at 1382, the district court nonetheless

rejected both Cooper’s and Edmonds’s proposed opinion evidence. It concluded that both opinions lacked sufficiently

supportive factual information to be credible and thus would

be unfairly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Appellee’s

App. at 359–361. Compare United States v. McMurray, 20

F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding adequate foundation for

opinion testimony because witness convinced character witness to open credit card account ostensibly to buy Christmas

presents but instead incurred sizable travel expenses character witness had to pay), with United States v. Cortez, 935

F.2d 135, 139–40 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting opinion testimony

by police officers because officers had only minimal, post3 The district court also excluded Cherkis’s and Cooper’s testimony because neither lived in Soto’s community. Courts have rejected

the notion, however, that reputation testimony is confined to the

witness’s residential community or that the character witness must

physically reside in that community. See, e.g., Wilson, 6 F.3d at

1239 (admitting reporter’s testimony about witness’s reputation

among people with whom he had worked and among his family

because ‘‘a community doesn’t have to be stable in order to qualify

under the rule’’); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1370 (4th

Cir. 1979) (noting that expansion of community to include witness’s

professional environment reflects ‘‘the realities of our modern,

mobile, impersonal society’’); United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d

1132, 1140 (7th Cir. 1972) (rejecting notion that ‘‘an identity of

residence is essential’’ for reputation testimony).

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arrest contacts with witness and their testimony ‘‘merely

expresses their belief in the story he told them’’). The

foundation for Cooper’s opinion that Soto was untruthful was

limited to his observation that Soto had testified falsely

against his clients; the facts underlying Edmonds’s opinion

did not provide a reasonable basis from which the jury could

conclude that Soto was even directly involved in the events,

much less indicate that he was untruthful about them. United States v. Dotson, 799 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 1986) (‘‘An

opinion TTT without the underlying facts, may be excluded if

it amounts to no more than a conclusory observationTTTT

Unless that basis or source demonstrates that the opinion is

rationally based on the perception of the witness and would

be helpful to the jury in determining the fact of credibility, it

should not become a part of the proof in the case.’’ (emphasis

added)).

Whitmore contends that the foundational defects could

have been highlighted by the government in cross-examining

his character witnesses but were not severe enough to exclude the evidence altogether. See Watson, 669 F.2d at 1382.

The foundation required by Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), however, is

designed to keep unreliable evidence from being heard by the

jury at all. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 701 (opinion must be

‘‘rationally based on the perception of the witness’’ and ‘‘helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the

determination of a fact in issue’’); United States v. Williams,

212 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Giant Food

Stores, Inc. v. Fine, 269 F.2d 542, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per

curiam). The district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding this evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 608 – the foundational defects were serious – and Fed. R. Evid. 403, on the

ground that its value would have been substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the government and by

needlessly occupying the time of the jury and the court.

2. Cross–Examination of Soto

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) allows a party to attack the credibility

of a witness by cross-examining him on specific instances of

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past conduct.4

 Cross-examination pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.

608(b) is not confined to prior criminal convictions – they are

governed by Fed. R. Evid. 609 – but the conduct must be

probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness. See

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). It may not, however, be proven by

extrinsic evidence. Id.; United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d

619, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Bynum, 3

F.3d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that under Fed. R. Evid.

608(b) ‘‘cross-examiner may inquire into specific incidents of

conduct, but does so at the peril of not being able to rebut the

witness’[s] denials’’ and that ‘‘[t]he purpose of this rule is to

prohibit things from getting too far afield – to prevent the

proverbial trial within a trial’’).

Whitmore contends that the district court erroneously prevented him from cross-examining Soto under Fed. R. Evid.

608(b) regarding three instances of past misconduct: (1) his

testimony before the Superior Court judge in 1999; (2) the

1998 suspension of Soto’s Maryland driver’s license and his

failure to report the suspension to his supervisors; and (3)

Soto’s failure to make child-support payments.5

 The district

court prohibited cross-examination as to the first instance

under Fed. R. Evid. 403; with regard to Soto’s failure to

4 Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) provides:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose

of attacking or supporting the witness’[s]character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609,

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,

in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or

untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the

witness (1) concerning the witness’[s] character for truthfulness

or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character

the witness being cross-examined has testified.

5 Whitmore also asserts that cross-examination on these subjects

was permissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to show that Soto had a

motive to lie in Whitmore’s trial to curry favor with (or avoid future

investigation by) his MPD supervisors. Because we conclude that

reversal is required for the reasons discussed in the text, we need

not address this assertion.

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report his suspended license and his failure to make child

support payments, the court concluded that the document on

which Whitmore relied to pursue the questioning was itself

unreliable hearsay. We disagree.6

Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, a court may exclude relevant

evidence ‘‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’’ ‘‘Rule 403 tilts,’’ however, ‘‘as do the rules as a

whole, toward the admission of evidence in close cases;’’

when ‘‘performing the balancing test required under Rule

403, TTT the balance should be generally struck in favor of

admission.’’ United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 795 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We

nonetheless recognize that the district court is in the best

position to conduct the balancing test and therefore review a

Fed. R. Evid. 403 ruling ‘‘only for grave abuse.’’ Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Here the district court first determined that the probative

value of any cross-examination regarding Soto’s testimony

before the Superior Court judge would be slight because it

involved an unrelated and dated matter and fell short of a

perjury conviction. It then concluded, relying in part on

United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 1991) (no

abuse of discretion in prohibiting cross-examination about

prior judicial finding), that cross-examination on the subject

presented a ‘‘grave risk that the jury might abdicate’’ its role

in weighing Soto’s testimony and that both the crossexamination and the government’s inevitable rehabilitation of

Soto’s testimony would ‘‘divert the jury from the facts in this

case and from the assessment that they need to make in this

case.’’ Appellee’s App. at 185–86.

6 The district court did not conclude, and the government does

not argue, that the proposed cross-examination would be impermissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608. Rather, the government argues only

that it was within the district court’s discretion to exclude this line

of cross-examination.

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For his part, Whitmore contends that the proposed crossexamination was strongly probative of Soto’s character for

untruthfulness and that, given the critical nature of Soto’s

evidence against Whitmore, the district court should have

allowed it. We agree. Nothing could be more probative of a

witness’s character for untruthfulness than evidence that the

witness has previously lied under oath. Indeed, as the Second Circuit observed – in a remarkably similar case (before

the enactment of Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)) in which a party

sought to cross-examine a ‘‘key witness’’ regarding a finding

by another court that the witness had ‘‘ ‘intentionally g[iven]

false testimony’ ’’: ‘‘the rule seems to be well settled that

although the opponent is not permitted to adduce extrinsic

evidence that a witness lied on a previous occasion, he may

nonetheless ask questions to that end.’’ Walker v. Firestone

Tire & Rubber Co., 412 F.2d 60, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1969); see id.

(‘‘While a witness’ testimony regarding collateral matters –

here an unrelated trial – may not be refuted by calling other

witnesses or by production of extrinsic evidence, there is

nothing improper in asking questions relating to extrinsic

matters in the hope of undermining the witness’[s] credibility.’’); see also United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 316 (2d

Cir. 1983) (‘‘Proof that a judge TTT before whom [the witness]

had testified as an expert had found that [the witness] had

‘guessed under oath’ was probative of the weight to be

accorded to his testimony.’’); United States v. Whitehead, 618

F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 1980) (approving cross-examination of

lawyer-defendant under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) regarding both

conduct underlying suspension of his law license and suspension itself). But see United States v. Cruz, 894 F.2d 41, 43

(2d Cir. 1990) (excluding cross-examination regarding earlier

judicial finding in unrelated case that witness lacked credibility because of limited probative value). Furthermore, as both

parties note, we have previously observed – in the context of

assessing the government’s Brady violation – that crossexamination of a witness about past false statements he made

under oath would be proper under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) as an

instance of the witness’s conduct probative of untruthfulness.

United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

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Relying on our holdings in United States v. Morrison, 98

F.3d 619, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Bowie, 198 F.3d at 911,

the government nevertheless contends that the probative

value of the proposed cross-examination was limited because

the judge’s finding ‘‘more closely resembles a mere complaint

TTT or a ruling that the testimony of opposing witnesses [was]

more credible, whose probative value is hard to know.’’ Appellee’s Br. at 37 (internal quotations omitted). Hardly. The

government’s attempt to analogize the judge’s simple and

direct statement – ‘‘I think [Officer Soto] lied’’ – to an

unsubstantiated civil complaint, see Morrison, 98 F.3d at 628,

or to a judge’s suppression of evidence because he found

‘‘defense witnesses more credible than’’ the government’s

witness, see Bowie, 198 F.3d at 907, is strained at best.

Furthermore, the government’s suggestion that inquiry under

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) should be limited to a prior perjury

conviction would make Fed. R. Evid. 609 superfluous. Fed.

R. Evid. 608(b) allows a witness’s credibility to be attacked

based on misconduct that, while not constituting a criminal

conviction, nevertheless tends to show that the witness is

untruthful. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 65 (2d

Cir. 1983) (allowing cross-examination of witness regarding

negative credibility determination by another judge under

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) because ‘‘it is clear that the prior

misconduct need not have created criminal liability or resulted in a conviction’’).

Moreover, neither Morrison nor Bowie supports the district court’s total rejection of Whitmore’s proposed crossexamination regarding Soto’s prior testimony, the judge’s

finding and the United States’s Attorney’s Office’s subsequent

investigation of Soto. In Morrison we rejected the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to cross-examine a government witness regarding the fact that the latter had been sued

in state court, noting that ‘‘the mere filing of a complaint’’ –

‘‘regardless of whether the allegations in the complaint [were]

true’’ – did not meet Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)’s requirement that

cross-examination be confined to conduct that is ‘‘ ‘probative

of truthfulness or untruthfulness.’ ’’ 98 F.3d at 628 (quoting

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (emphasis in original)). We did not

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address what difference it might have made had the defendant sought to cross-examine the witness about the substance

of the complaint. And in Bowie we reaffirmed – again in the

Brady context – our statement in Cuffie that Fed. R. Evid.

608(b) authorized defense counsel to cross-examine an officer

testifying for the government regarding a prior negative

credibility determination by another judge in another matter.

198 F.3d at 909 (noting ‘‘at a minimum’’ cross-examination of

officer about United States Attorney’s ensuing investigation

permissible).

We also believe the district court erred in excluding the

entire line of cross-examination on the ground that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk that the

jury might blindly follow the prior judge’s lead or be otherwise distracted from the substance of Whitmore’s trial. The

government relies on the First Circuit’s holding in Lopez and

dicta in Bowie7

 to argue the exclusion of any crossexamination about the judge’s finding. Yet Lopez and the

Bowie dicta stand only for the general proposition that extensive cross-examination regarding the judge’s finding would be

overly prejudicial and neither case involved the crossexamination of the government’s key witness. Lopez, 944

F.2d at 38; Bowie, 198 F.3d at 910. Furthermore, the Lopez

court substantially qualified its own holding, noting that its

review was ‘‘severely hampered by the absence of an offer of

proof as to the nature of the intended’’ cross-examination and

that its decision was confined to the circumstances before it.

944 F.2d at 38. The district court here could have adequately

guarded against any risk of unfair prejudice or undue delay

7 The Bowie court, again in the context of assessing a Brady

violation involving a prior negative credibility determination by

another judge in another matter, included a hypothetical dialogue

among the court, the prosecutor and defense counsel about the

scope of cross-examination regarding that determination. 198 F.3d

910–11. During the course of that dialogue, the court – relying on

Lopez and Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) – sustained the prosecutor’s objection to defense counsel’s inquiry into the reasoning behind the

judge’s determination, id. at 910, a far different scenario from

Whitmore’s proposed cross-examination.

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by limiting cross-examination, Bowie, 198 F.3d at 910, by

giving limiting instructions to the jury and by setting reasonable parameters on the government’s rehabilitation of Soto.

See United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(approving use of limiting instructions instead of exclusion of

evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 in light of ‘‘probative

strength’’ of evidence); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d

1315, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (approving use of ‘‘careful limiting

instruction’’ to prevent jury from drawing improper conclusion from evidence). Instead, by prohibiting crossexamination of the only witness who testified to Whitmore’s

unlawful possession of the gun, we believe the district court

abused its discretion.

Turning to the district court’s denial of cross-examination

regarding Soto’s suspended driver’s license and failure to pay

child support, we also find error. The trial court precluded

cross-examination on those matters on the ground that there

was ‘‘no basis’’ for the cross-examination because Whitmore’s

only support for them – the record from the Maryland Motor

Vehicle Administration – was inadmissible hearsay. Tr. 234.

Counsel, however, need only have ‘‘ ‘a reasonable basis for

asking questions on cross-examination which tend to incriminate or degrade the witness,’ ’’ and ‘‘the general rule in such

situations is that ‘the questioner must be in possession of

some facts which support a genuine belief that the witness

committed the offense or the degrading act to which the

question relates.’ ’’ United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 768

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d

621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and United States v. Fowler, 465

F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). The copy of Soto’s Maryland

driving record provided sufficient basis for such crossexamination and defense counsel readily acknowledged that

he did not seek to admit the record itself and would be bound

by Soto’s answers. Tr. 234. The court apparently assumed,

however, that Soto would simply deny that his license had

been suspended, leaving the jury with a bare denial of a

damaging accusation. Id.; see United States v. Brooke, 4

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) prohibits

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examiner is ‘‘stuck with whatever response’’ witness gives).

We pass over the fact that this assumption implied that Soto

would intentionally lie under oath. The court lacked a basis

for such an assumption, however, because it failed to conduct

any voir dire. See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401,

417–18 (2d Cir. 2003) (no abuse of direction in prohibiting

relevant cross-examination under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) because district court knew from brief voir dire of witness that

witness would deny allegations). The knowledge that he

could be charged with perjury would encourage Soto to

respond truthfully, even if he thought that Whtimore’s counsel could not impeach him further. Accordingly, in excluding

cross-examination on these matters as well, the district court

abused its discretion.

3. Error Not Harmless

Having determined that the district court erred in denying

Whitmore the opportunity to cross-examine Soto about past

misconduct pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) and Fed. R.

Evid. 403, we must determine whether the evidentiary rulings

constituted harmless error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (‘‘Any

error TTT that does not affect substantial rights must be

disregarded.’’). There are two different standards of review

for harmlessness, ‘‘one for non-constitutional errors and one

for errors of constitutional dimension.’’ United States v.

Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under both standards, the burden is on the government to demonstrate that

the error was harmless. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 734 (1993). Whitmore maintains that the standard of

review for constitutional errors – ‘‘harmless if it appears

‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did

not contribute to the verdict obtained’ ’’ – applies because he

was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront a

witness against him. Powell, 334 F.3d at 45 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). But we need not

decide whether the Sixth Amendment was violated here.

Even evaluating the evidentiary rulings under the less rigorous standard of review for non-constitutional misapplications

of the Federal Rules of Evidence – whether the error ‘‘had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

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the jury’s verdict,’’ Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946) – the government has not met its burden of

showing harmless error.

Soto provided the sole and critical eye-witness evidence to

support Whitmore’s firearm conviction. We are hard-pressed

to understand the government’s claim that the proposed

cross-examination would have ‘‘had only marginal evidentiary

value,’’ Appellee’s Br. at 50, and we cannot ignore the potential impact of such a highly probative attack on Soto’s character for truthfulness. Walker, 412 F.2d at 64 (‘‘Since virtually

the whole of plaintiff’s case was based on White’s testimony,’’

court’s decision to ‘‘prohibit[ ] proper impeachment of plaintiff’s key witness’’ ‘‘can only be regarded as material and

significant’’ and ‘‘required’’ ‘‘a new trial.’’); see also Cuffie, 80

F.3d at 518 (noting in Brady context ‘‘undisclosed impeachment evidence can be immaterial because of its cumulative

nature only if the witness was already impeached at trial by

the same kind of evidence’’).

But the government argues that the court’s rulings, if

erroneous, were harmless because Soto’s testimony was ‘‘amply corroborated by the other officers involved in the arrest’’

and Whitmore’s ‘‘defense theory was incredible.’’ Appellee’s

Br. at 48–50. The government finds no safe harbor in either

argument. First, the fact that Officer Russell testified that

Whitmore ran when confronted by Russell is of little importance in light of the cocaine base he was carrying. That

another officer testified the gun showed signs it had been

recently thrown against the wall of a nearby building does not

say anything about who threw it. There were no fingerprints

on the weapon.8

 In fact, the only independent piece of

evidence corroborating Soto’s testimony connecting Whitmore

to the gun was Russell’s testimony that Whitmore was holding the right side of his jacket as he fled. Standing alone,

this evidence would hardly sustain Whitmore’s conviction.

Under these circumstances, the government has not shown

that a reasonable jury would have put aside relevant, im8 It had apparently been wrapped in rubber bands to prevent

identification.

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peaching evidence about the government’s key witness and

reached a similar verdict had it heard the excluded crossexamination. See United States v. Foster, 982 F.2d 551, 556

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (restricted cross-examination of key government witness who identified defendant not harmless where

little corroborating testimony).

Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Powell,

334 F.3d at 46, the government argues that no reasonable

juror could have accepted Whitmore’s theory that Soto ‘‘carried a spare fingerprint-free firearm, which he used to frame

[Whitmore], whom he had no idea why he was chasing, and

claimed to have seen appellant throw the gun rather than

simply to have found it in [Whitmore]’s pocket.’’ Appellee’s

Br. at 49. This case is a far cry from Powell, however, in

which the plausibility of the defendant’s theory was only one

of several factors all weighing in favor of harmless error,

including that the alleged error (admissibility of a witness’s

prior consistent statement) did not cause the defendant ‘‘perceptible prejudice.’’ 334 F.3d at 46. Moreover, in Powell we

noted that to accept the defense theory that the police

planted evidence, the jury would also have had to believe that

the officer brought along ‘‘an extra jacket and gun’’ and was

‘‘waiting for the appearance of a coatless subject upon whom

they might be foisted.’’ 334 F.3d at 46. Here, competing

theories about the case are matters for a jury’s consideration.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court

committed reversible error in prohibiting the crossexamination of Officer Soto as set forth above. The cumulative effect of prohibiting all three proposed lines of crossexamination was to deprive Whitmore of any genuine opportunity to challenge the credibility of the only witness who

testified that he possessed the gun in question. We cannot

conclude that the error was harmless. We therefore vacate

the judgment of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon

in possession of a firearm) and remand for a new trial on that

charge. Whitmore’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)

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(simple possession of a controlled substance) remains unaffected. Because Whitmore’s sentencing challenge is predicated on his firearm conviction, we need not address it.

So ordered.

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