Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-17878/USCOURTS-ca9-10-17878-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Big Lagoon Rancheria
Appellant
California Association of Tribal Governments
Amicus Curiae
California Indian Legal Services
Amicus Curiae
National Congress of American Indians
Amicus Curiae
State of California
Appellee
The Navajo Nation
Amicus Curiae
United South and Eastern Tribes
Amicus Curiae
United States of America
Amicus Curiae

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA, a

federally recognized Indian tribe,

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 10-17803

10-17878

D.C. No.

4:09-cv-01471-

CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Claudia Wilken, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

September 17, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed June 4, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt, Alex

Kozinski, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber,

William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez, Jay S. Bybee, Milan

D. Smith, Jr., Morgan Christen and Jacqueline H. Nguyen,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

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2 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SUMMARY*

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

The en banc court affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of a tribe that alleged that the State of

California had failed to negotiate in good faith for a gaming

compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act for Class

III gaming on a parcel of land taken into trust for the tribe by

the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Rejecting California’s argument that the tribe lacked

standing to compel it to negotiate in good faith under the

IGRA, the en banc court held that the State’s argument

amounted to an improper collateral attack on the BIA’s

decisions to take the parcel of land into trust and to designate

the tribe as a federally recognized Indian tribe.

The en banc court held that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in failing to grant a continuance for additional

discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).

The en banc court dismissed the tribe’s cross-appeal as

moot.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3

COUNSEL

Michael A. Pollard, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Illinois,

argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.

Bruce H. Jackson, Baker & McKenzie, San Francisco,

California filed the briefs for the plaintiff-appellee/crossappellant Big Lagoon Rancheria. With him on the briefs

were Peter J. Engstrom and Irene V. Gutierrez, San

Francisco, California.

Peter H. Kaufman, Deputy Attorney General for the State of

California, San Diego, California, argued the cause for

defendant-appellant/cross-appellee the State of California. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, filed the

briefs for the defendant-appellant/cross-appellee. With her on

the briefs were Sara J. Drake, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, and Randall A. Pinal, Deputy Attorney General, San

Diego, California.

Samuel Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Washington, D.C., argued the cause for amicus curiae the

United States of America. Robert G. Dreher, ActingAssistant

Attorney General filed the brief on behalf of amicus curiae

the United States of America in support of the plaintiffappellee/cross-appellant. With him on the brief were Jennifer

Turner and Rebecca Ross, Office of the Solicitor, U.S.

Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C., and Amber B.

Blaha, Elizabeth A. Peterson, and Kate R. Bowers, United

States Department of Justice, Environmental & Natural

Resources Division, Washington, D.C.

Kenneth J. Pfaehler, Dentons US LLP, Washington, D.C.,

filed the brief on behalf of amici curiae National Congress of

American Indians, United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc., and

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4 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

The Navajo Nation in support of plaintiff-appellee/crossappellant. With him on the brief were V. Heather Sibbison

and Samuel F. Daughety, Dentons US LLP, Washington,

D.C., and Riyaz A. Kanji, Kanji & Katzen PLLC, Ann Arbor,

Michigan.

Dorothy Ann Alther, California Indian Legal Services,

Escondido, California, filed the brief on behalf of amici

curiae California Indian Legal Services and California

Association of Tribal Governments in support of plaintiffappellee/cross-appellant.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether, in the course of negotiations

under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a state can

challenge a Bureau of Indian Affairs decision to hold a parcel

of land in trust for an Indian tribe and whether it can

challenge the tribe’s federally recognized status.

I

A

This litigation is between a small federally recognized

Indian tribe which wishes to build and to operate a class III

gaming casino and hotel on tribal trust land and the State of

California, which seeks to regulate or to oppose such activity.

To regulate gaming on Indian lands, Congress enacted the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 5

(the “IGRA”), which created a “cooperative federalis[t]”

framework that “balance[d]the competing sovereign interests

of the federal government, state governments, and Indian

tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme.” In re

Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d

1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2002)). The IGRA assigns authority to

regulate gaming to tribal and state governments depending on

the class of gaming involved.

Class I gaming includes “‘social games solely for prizes

of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming

engaged in by individuals as part of, or in connection with,

tribal ceremonies or celebrations,’ 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6), and

its regulation is left exclusively within the jurisdiction of the

Indian tribes, id. § 2710(a)(1).” Id. at 1096–97. “Class II

gaming includes bingo . . . and certain card games . . . but

excludes any banked card games, electronic games of chance,

and slot machines.” Id. at 1097. Class III gaming includes “all

forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II

gaming.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). Class III gaming, which is

contemplated by the tribe here, often involves “the types of

high-stakes games usually associated with Nevada-style

gambling.” In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at

1097.

B

The IGRA sets out detailed procedures for Indian tribes

seeking to conduct class III gaming, which is allowed on

Indian lands only if “conducted in conformance with a TribalState compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.”

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). Negotiations for a gaming

compact begin at the request of an “Indian tribe having

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6 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III

gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted.” Id.

§ 2710(d)(3)(A). The Indian tribe’s request triggers the state’s

obligation to negotiate in good faith. Id.

If negotiations are successful, the tribe and the state will

enter into a compact to allow class III gaming subject to the

approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B).

If negotiations are unsuccessful, the tribe can sue the state in

district court. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(I). If, in turn, the district

court finds that the state has failed to negotiate in good faith,

it must order the parties to reach an agreement. Id.

§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). If no agreement is reached after 60 days,

the court must order each party to submit a proposal to a

court-appointed mediator, who selects the proposal that best

comports with the IGRA and other federal laws. Id.

§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).

Of course, gaming is confined to “Indian lands” and

negotiations are begun by a tribe with jurisdiction over such

lands. The IGRA defines “Indian lands” as “all lands within

the limits of any Indian reservation” and “any lands title to

which is . . . held in trust by the United States for the benefit

of any Indian tribe or individual . . . and over which an Indian

tribe exercises governmental power.” Id. § 2703(4).

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (the “BIA”) obtains

authority to hold land in trust for Indian tribes from the Indian

Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq. (the “IRA”),

under which the Secretary of the Interior is authorized “to

acquire . . . any interest in lands . . . for the purpose of

providing land for Indians” and to hold those lands “in trust

for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is

acquired.” Id. § 465. Indians include “all persons of Indian

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7

descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now

under Federal jurisdiction.” Id. § 479.

C

Big Lagoon Rancheria is a federally recognized Indian

tribe located on the shoreline of Big Lagoon near Trinidad in

Humboldt County, California. It claims jurisdiction over two

parcels of land adjacent to one another. One consists of nine

acres purchased by the United States in 1918. The other

consists of eleven acres taken into trust for Big Lagoon

Rancheria by the BIA in 1994. Big Lagoon Rancheria seeks

to operate a class III gaming casino and hotel on the elevenacre parcel held in trust for the tribe.

1

In 1918, the BIA purchased the nine-acre parcel for James

Charley and his family. Charley, an Indian whose family

lived on the parcel, died soon thereafter, and his wife moved

the rest of the family away. One of Charley’s sons, Robert

Charley, may have lived at Big Lagoon between 1942 and

1946, but the nine-acre parcel otherwise appears to have

remained vacant. Later, in the late 1940s or early 1950s,

Robert’s nephew by marriage, Thomas Williams, and his

family obtained the BIA’s permission to camp on the land.

Though they did not have a claim of ownership, they

apparently constructed a home there.

The Williamses came to view the land as a “rancheria”

eligible for termination under the California Rancheria

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8 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958).1

They applied for dissolution of the rancheria—a step that

would have distributed the land to individual tribe

members—in 1967. Although approved, the dissolution never

took place.

Big Lagoon Rancheria first appeared on a list of “Indian

Tribal Entities that Have a Government-to-Government

Relationship with the United States” in 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.

7235 (Feb. 6, 1979), and has appeared on many subsequent

lists. The BIA has held the nine-acre parcel in trust for the

tribe under 25 U.S.C. § 465 since at least 1979.

2

In 1994, the BIA took the eleven-acre parcel that is the

focus of this appeal in trust for Big Lagoon Rancheria. It is

unclear exactly when the State of California became aware of

the entrustment decision. But the State’s interests were

plainly affected, and the State was plainly aware in 1997,

when it petitioned to intervene and subsequently filed two

amicus briefs before the Department of the Interior Board of

Indian Appeals in a challenge to the BIA’s decision. Big

Lagoon Park Co., Inc. v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir.,

Bureau of Indian Affairs, 32 IBIA 309, 312 (1998).

Moreover, California has by its own admission been aware of

1

“Rancherias are numerous small Indian reservations or communities

in California, the lands for which were purchased by the Government

(with Congressional authorization) for Indian use from time to time in the

early years of [the twentieth] century—a program triggered by an inquiry

(in 1905–06) into the landless, homeless or penurious state of many

California Indians.” Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2007)

(alteration in original) (quoting Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 38

(1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9

the entrustment and the potential for casino gambling on the

eleven-acre parcel since 1998, when the State began

negotiating with Big Lagoon Rancheria directly with respect

to the eleven-acre parcel.

II

When negotiations to build the hotel and casino broke

down in 1999, Big Lagoon Rancheria sued the state of

California under the IGRA, alleging that California had failed

to negotiate in good faith. In 2000, as part of the litigation,

the state questioned whether “the lands on which Big Lagoon

proposed to build its casino were Indian lands over which Big

Lagoon properly had jurisdiction to conduct gaming

activities.”

The 1999 lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice as part

of a settlement in 2005 when Big Lagoon Rancheria and the

state reached an agreement allowing the tribe to build a hotel

and casino. That agreement, known as the Barstow Compact,

lapsed in 2007 because the California legislature failed to

ratify it. Negotiations then began anew, but again failed,

foundering principally because the state insisted on

environmental mitigation measures related to the casino’s

construction as well as a share of Big Lagoon Rancheria’s

revenue from gaming. Throughout the course of the

negotiations, the state proceeded on the assumption that it

was obligated to negotiate in good faith under the IGRA.

Big Lagoon Rancheria filed the instant suit in district

court in 2009, once again alleging under 25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) that California had failed to negotiate in

good faith. The tribe substantially prevailed when the district

court declared that California had failed to negotiate in good

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10 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

faith and that the tribe was entitled to conduct gaming subject

only to the Secretary of the Interior’s approval of a gaming

compact. Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 759 F. Supp.

2d 1149, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The State of California

appeals from the district court’s adverse grant of summary

judgment, and also appeals the district court’s order refusing

to grant a continuance to conduct additional discovery under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f),2now Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).3 Big Lagoon

Rancheria cross-appeals, challenging the district court’s

ruling that negotiation over environmental measures did not

necessarily constitute bad faith by California.4

2 The 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure moved

the language contained at Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). As

the notes ofthe AdvisoryCommittee explain, new “subdivision (d) carries

forward without substantial change the provisions of former subdivision

(f).”

3 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 620 F.3d 936, 945 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citing Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2008)). “[W]e

determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact for trial,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd., 531 F.3d 767, 772

(9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We review the district court’s decision

to deny a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) for abuse of discretion.

Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort

Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003).

4 A divided three-judge panel of this court reversed the judgment of the

district court, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 741 F.3d 1032, 1045

(9th Cir. 2014), holding that California was not obligated to negotiate in

good faith under the IGRA because the eleven-acre parcel was not

properly taken into trust by the BIA. We subsequently granted rehearing

en banc, vacating the three-judge panel decision. Big Lagoon Rancheria

v. California, 758 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2014).

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11

III

A

California first argues that Big Lagoon Rancheria lacks

standing to compel it to negotiate in good faith under the

IGRA because the BIA’s 1994 entrustment decision was

improper and because it is not properly recognized as an

Indian tribe. Although the State frames these issues in terms

of challenges to standing and asserts them as affirmative

defenses, the State’s arguments amount to collateral attacks

on the BIA’s 1994 decision to take the eleven-acre parcel into

trust and its pre-1979 designation of Big Lagoon Rancheria

as an Indian tribe.

1

The State’s principal argument is that Big Lagoon

Rancheria is not entitled to enter into good faith negotiations

under the IGRA because the BIA lacked the authority to take

the eleven-acre parcel into trust, relying on Carcieri v.

Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).

Carcieri involved a challenge by the State of Rhode

Island, the State’s governor, and the town of Charleston,

Rhode Island to the Secretaryof the Interior’s decision to take

thirty-one acres of land into trust on behalf of the

Narragansett Tribe. As in Big Lagoon Rancheria’s case, the

Secretary had taken the land into trust “for the purpose of

providing land for Indians” based on his authority under

Section 465 of the IRA. See id. at 381–82; 25 U.S.C. § 465.

The tribe had wished “to free itself from compliance with

local regulations” governing construction of housing.

Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385. In response, the state, the governor,

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12 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

and the town of Charleston timely “sought review of the . . .

decision [to take the land into trust] pursuant to the

Administrative Procedure Act [“APA”].” Id. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the Narragansett

tribe, and the First Circuit affirmed, first in a panel decision

and then sitting en banc. Id. at 385–86.

The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the term “‘now

under Federal jurisdiction’ in § 479 unambiguously refers to

those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the

United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934.” Id. at 395.

The Narragansett tribe was not recognized by the United

States until 1983, meaning that the Secretary of the Interior’s

decision to take land into trust for the Narraganset was

invalid. Id. at 385. Therefore, under Carcieri, if a tribe was

not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the BIA lacks the

authority to take land into trust on its behalf.

The present case is distinguishable from Carcieri, which

involved a timely administrative challenge brought against

the Secretary of the Interior. The instant case is a belated

collateral attack. Carcieri does not address whether the BIA’s

entrustment decisions can be challenged outside an action

brought under the APA or outside the statute of limitations

for APA actions.

2

The Supreme Court has explained that a challenge to the

BIA’s “decision to take land into trust” is “a garden-variety

APA claim.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of

Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2208

(2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)). Such claims

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13

“assert[] merely that the Secretary [] [of the Interior’s]

decision to take land into trust violates a federal statute.” Id.

We have recently observed that parties cannot “use a

collateral proceeding to end-run the procedural requirements

governing appeals of administrative decisions.” United States

v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012). For

example, in United States v. Lowry, 512 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir.

2008), we held that a criminal defendant who “declined to

exercise her right to seek direct judicial review of the agency

decision [in question] within the time allowed” could not

“collaterally attack it in a subsequent criminal proceeding.”

Backlund, 689 F.3d at 1000 (citing Lowry, 512 F.3d at 1203).

“[A]llowing [the defendant] to collaterally attack the

administrative proceedings would effectively circumvent the

six-year statute of limitations we have held governs review of

such actions.” Lowry, 512 F.3d at 1203.

While California asserts that Big Lagoon Rancheria lacks

standing to invoke the IGRA, it necessarily argues that the

BIA exceeded its authority when it took the eleven-acre

parcel into trust. The proper vehicle to make such a challenge

is a petition for review pursuant to the APA, and that is the

typical method employed in prior litigation challenging

entrustment decisions. See, e.g., Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at

2210–11 (allowing an APA challenge to the government’s

decision to take land into trust for the benefit of an Indian

tribe under 25 U.S.C. § 465); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385

(“Petitioners sought review of the IBIA decision [upholding

the government’s decision to take land into trust] pursuant to

the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).

Allowing California to attack collaterally the BIA’s

decision to take the eleven-acre parcel into trust outside the

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14 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APA would constitute just the sort of end-run that we have

previously refused to allow, and would cast a cloud of doubt

over countless acres of land that have been taken into trust for

tribes recognized by the federal government.

3

And, of course, California has not brought an APA action

in this case, nor has it joined the United States, the Secretary

of the Interior, or any other federal government official. See,

e.g., Carcieri, 555 U.S. 385–86 (“Petitioners sought review

of the IBIA decision pursuant to the” APA and named “the

Secretary [of the Interior] and other Department of Interior

officials” as defendants.); 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (waiving the

United States’s sovereign immunity where persons have

“suffer[ed] legal wrong because of agency action” or have

been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action” and

allowing an “action for judicial review” against “the United

States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate

officer” where “no special statutory review proceeding is

applicable”).

Moreover, even if California had brought an APA claim,

such an action would be time barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)

creates a general six-year statute of limitations for actions

brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)

(“Except as provided by chapter 71 of title 41, every civil

action commenced against the United States shall be barred

unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of

action first accrues.”). We have held that this rule “applies to

actions brought under the APA.” Wind River Mining Corp. v.

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 15

United States, 946 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1991).5 Therefore,

California’s arguments that the BIA does not properly hold

the eleven-acre parcel in trust for Big Lagoon Rancheria fail,

both because the state has failed to file the appropriate APA

action and because such an APA challenge would be timebarred.

B

The State also challenges the BIA’s recognition of Big

Lagoon Rancheria as an Indian tribe. The thrust of the State’s

argument is that it is unclear how the tribe came to appear on

the list of “Indian Tribal Entities” in 1979 and that such

uncertainty gives rise to an issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment.

California has not brought an APA challenge to the BIA’s

determination, and, like the challenge to the BIA’s

entrustment decision with respect to the eleven-acre parcel,

such a challenge would be time-barred for the reasons stated

in Part III(A)(3), supra.

5

In Wind River, we recognized an exception to the six-year statute of

limitations when “a challenger contests the substance of an agency

decision . . . by filing a complaint for review of the adverse application of

the decision to a particular challenger.” Wind River, 946 F.2d at 715. We

reasoned that a cause of action should be understood to “accrue” six years

following the application of the decision to a particular challenger under

those circumstances because “[t]he government should not be permitted

to avoid all challenges to its actions, even if ultra vires, simply because

the agency took the action long before anyone discovered the true state of

affairs.” Id. That exception is inapplicable here because California

understood the “true state of affairs” concerning the BIA’s decision to take

the eleven-acre parcel into trust by, at the very latest, 1997, when it filed

amicus briefs in a proceeding challenging the BIA’s authority to take the

eleven-acre parcel into trust.

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16 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IV

California also appeals the district court’s decision not to

grant a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). When a

district court refuses to grant a motion for a continuance, we

have found abuse of discretion only “‘if the movant diligently

pursued its previous discovery opportunities, and if the

movant can show how allowing additional discovery would

have precluded summary judgment.’” U.S. Cellular Inv. Co.

v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 844

(9th Cir. 1994)).

The district court ruled that the State was not entitled to

a continuance because “the status of the Tribe and its elevenacre parcel has no bearing on whether the State negotiated in

good faith.” Big Lagoon, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.

Effectively, the district court concluded that whether Big

Lagoon Rancheria is properly recognized as a tribe and

whether the eleven-acre parcel is properly held in trust are

irrelevant to whether the State was obligated to negotiate in

good faith. While the State’s claims fail in this case, such

considerations might not be irrelevant in a case involving a

timely APA claim.

Nonetheless, the district court also observed that the State

“was [not] reasonably diligent in seeking discovery” on an

earlier motion to stay all proceedings except discovery in the

district court. The record provides ample support for that

conclusion. The parties agreed to one extension of the

discovery deadline, and the court granted another. The

deadline for filing dispositive motions was likewise extended

twice in the district court, once by agreement of the parties

and once by the court. In addition, the State waited until mid-

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BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 17

December 2009—very near the end of the discovery period—

to serve the BIA with a document subpoena. Because the

State failed to demonstrate that it “diligently pursued its

previous discovery opportunities,” the district court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied the State’s motion for a

continuance. U.S. Cellular, 281 F.3d at 934.

V

On cross-appeal, Big Lagoon Rancheria challenges the

district court’s ruling that the State’s negotiation over

environmental measures did not necessarily constitute bad

faith. The district court concluded that “environmental

mitigation measures are a permissible subject for negotiation

under [the] IGRA” under certain circumstances so long as the

State offered “as a meaningful concession gaming rights that

are more expansive than allowed to otherwise similarly

situated tribes.” Big Lagoon, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. It

found that the State had not offered meaningful concessions,

but stopped short of holding that a request for environmental

mitigation necessarily constitutes bad faith. Id.

“A case is moot on appeal if no live controversy remains

at the time the court of appeals hears the case.” NASD

Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal., 488 F.3d

1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007). We have held that “[t]he test for

whether such a controversy exists is ‘whether the appellate

court can give the appellant any effective relief in the event

that it decides the matter on the merits in his favor.’” Id.

(quoting In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)).

The district court ordered the State to reach a gaming

compact with Big Lagoon Rancheria to govern class III

gaming. Big Lagoon, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1163. Subsequently,

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18 BIG LAGOON RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

a mediator selected by the district court chose Big Lagoon

Rancheria’s proposal as the one that would govern gaming at

Big Lagoon. All that remains is for the mediator to notify the

Secretary of the Interior of his selection, and, if the Secretary

of the Interior approves the compact, Big Lagoon Rancheria

will be authorized to build the casino and engage in the

gaming that it seeks. Big Lagoon Rancheria can receive no

further relief on its cross-appeal which is therefore moot.

VI

For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED. Big Lagoon Rancheria’s crossappeal is DISMISSED as moot.6

6 Big Lagoon Rancheria’s Request to Take Judicial Notice in Support of

Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc filed March 6, 2014

is DENIED as moot.

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