Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-03052/USCOURTS-caDC-22-03052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terrell Armstead
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2023 Decided September 3, 2024

No. 22-3052

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

TERRELL ARMSTEAD, ALSO KNOWN AS RELL, ALSO KNOWN AS 

SUPREME 16,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cr-00369-1)

Jonathan Zucker, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Mark Hobel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for 

appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb, John 

P. Mannarino, and Amy Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: KATSAS, PAN, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #22-3052 Document #2072742 Filed: 09/03/2024 Page 1 of 16
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.

KATSAS, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Terrell 

Armstead of sex trafficking through coercion but failed to 

reach a verdict on various other charges. During jury 

deliberations, the district court dismissed a juror who had failed 

to disclose during voir dire that her father had been convicted 

of prostitution and drug offenses. Deliberations remained 

ongoing as the country was shutting down over COVID, so the 

court then instructed the jury to return any partial verdict it had 

reached. Armstead contends that the court impermissibly 

dismissed the juror and demanded the partial verdict.

We reject both contentions. The district court permissibly 

dismissed the juror for her lack of candor during voir dire—

misconduct that was apparent from the record and unrelated to

how the juror may have viewed the evidence. Moreover,

although the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from coercing 

juries to reach criminal verdicts, a judge retains discretion to 

require the return of a partial verdict that the jury has reached

voluntarily. Here, with COVID making future deliberations 

impossible, the district court did not abuse that discretion.

I

Armstead enticed vulnerable women to become 

prostitutes, including one known here as “O.S.” Armstead put 

O.S. to work propositioning customers in a strip club. He 

branded her with a tattoo of his street name, forced her to give 

him any money that she received, and held her car keys and 

social-security card to prevent her from leaving him. Armstead 

hit O.S., choked her, and threatened her with firearms.

A grand jury indicted Armstead on seven counts relating 

to sex trafficking and one count of obstruction. Count Two of 

the indictment charged him with trafficking O.S. through force, 

fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) & (b)(1).

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The district court asked prospective jurors whether any of 

them—or their close relatives or friends—had been a victim of 

a crime, a witness to a crime, or “arrested for, convicted of, or 

charged with a crime.” S.A. 8. Juror 10 answered no, but this

raised eyebrows. Defense counsel pressed her on whether she 

really did not know anyone charged with a crime, or the victim 

of a crime, despite having lived in Washington, D.C. for 53 

years. She remained firm in her answer and was eventually 

seated on the jury.

During the second day of jury deliberations, Juror 10 asked 

the courtroom deputy what she could do if she did not “want to 

be on this jury” anymore. S.A. 24. The district court then 

probed whether she could continue to deliberate in good faith. 

In response, Juror 10 revealed that her father had been 

convicted on federal “prostitution and drug[]” charges, in what 

she described as a “very high-profile case.” Id. at 30. She 

explained that she had “thought this would be a good case” for 

her to sit on, because she could “look outside the box.” Id. But

after deliberations started, she was “not comfortable” doing so

any longer. Id. at 31.

The government filed a motion to remove Juror 10 under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b). That rule sets the 

default number of jurors at twelve but allows the parties to 

consent to a smaller jury. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(1) & (2). If 

a jury of twelve begins deliberating, the rule also permits the 

court to remove one juror for “good cause” and to take a verdict 

from the remaining eleven jurors. Id. 23(b)(3). Armstead 

opposed removal of Juror 10. He argued that, because her 

revelations were bound up in her view of the evidence, 

removing her would compromise his Sixth Amendment right 

to a unanimous verdict.

The district court found good cause to dismiss Juror 10

based on her lack of candor during voir dire. The court noted 

“five instances at least” where she had been asked about 

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relatives with criminal records and not disclosed her father’s 

convictions. S.A. 66–67. The court noted that this “suggests a 

lack of candor, and there’s evidence to point towards 

something more.” Id. at 67. But the court declined to 

determine whether the juror had intentionally concealed

information to mislead the court, how the juror might view the 

case, or whether she was a holdout during the ongoing 

deliberations. Instead of forcing deliberations to start anew by 

recalling the alternate juror, the court instructed the remaining 

eleven jurors to continue deliberating.

The COVID pandemic rapidly spread as they did. On the 

fifth day of deliberations, Friday, March 13, 2020, our 

courthouse closed to the public. Also, the foreman informed

the district court that her child’s school had cancelled classes

for the upcoming week, which required her to find childcare.

During this conversation, the court asked her whether the jury 

had reached “a unanimous verdict as to any of the counts.” 

S.A. 127. She answered yes but did not give any more details.

Armstead and the government agreed to remind the jury that it 

could return a verdict on any count, even if it had not reached

a verdict on all of them. The court gave the instruction in the 

late afternoon, then the jury deliberated for some twenty more 

minutes before calling it a day.

Things worsened over the weekend. The foreman’s 

babysitter for Monday cancelled, leaving her without childcare

and afraid to expose her son to the pandemic. Armstead sought 

a mistrial on the ground the jury could neither deliberate nor 

render a verdict with one of eleven members participating 

remotely. The district court agreed that the jury could not 

deliberate remotely for practical reasons, but concluded that it 

could remotely render a verdict. And it decided to ask the jury 

to render any partial verdict it had reached. The court 

instructed the jury:

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[L]et us know if you have received – reached a verdict 

of guilty or not guilty with respect to any count. If 

you have, what I am going to ask you to do is to 

complete your verdict form and tell us what that 

verdict is. Now, again, that is an “if.” If you have not

reached a verdict as to any particular count, I’m going 

to ask you to simply say “no verdict” on the verdict 

form, okay? So you’ll have your verdict form. As to 

any particular count, if you have reached a verdict, 

simply indicate what that verdict is. If you have not 

reached a verdict as to a particular count, simply 

indicate on the verdict form “no verdict,” okay?

...

Now, as I said, if and only if you have reached a 

verdict as to any particular count, should you so 

indicate. I’m not asking you to come to a conclusion 

if you have not.

S.A. 163–64 (cleaned up). The jury then returned a guilty 

verdict on Count Two—sex trafficking O.S. through force, 

fraud, or coercion—and no verdict on the remaining seven 

counts. Armstead requested a poll, which confirmed that the 

jury was unanimous on the count of conviction.

After the government dropped the outstanding charges, the 

court sentenced Armstead to 276 months in prison, followed 

by 240 months of supervised release.

II

On appeal, Armstead challenges both the removal of Juror 

10 during deliberations and the instruction asking the jury to 

return any partial verdict it had reached. This Court reviews 

both decisions for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam); 

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United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam). Under this standard, we consider only whether the 

district court acted unreasonably or made a legal error. See 

United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2022); 

United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., 758 F.3d 330, 345 

(D.C. Cir. 2014).

A

Armstead’s challenge to the removal of Juror 10 

implicates both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3) 

and the Sixth Amendment.

1

Rule 23(b)(3) provides: “After the jury has retired to 

deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return 

a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, if the court 

finds good cause to excuse a juror.” A “variety of issues” can 

support a finding of good cause under this rule, “including 

illness, family emergency, or ... jury misconduct.” McGill, 

815 F.3d at 866. Misconduct “consists of actions by jurors that 

[are] contrary to their responsibilities,” including “giving false 

testimony during voir dire.” Id. at 866–67 (cleaned up). Other 

courts have confirmed the latter point. For example, in United 

States v. Ozomaro, 44 F.4th 538 (6th Cir. 2022), the Sixth 

Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a deliberating juror for “lack 

of candor” during voir dire. Id. at 544. And in United States 

v. Delva, 858 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit 

affirmed the dismissal of a deliberating juror for “lying on voir 

dire.” Id. at 157–59.

The district court had ample basis for concluding that Juror 

10 did not candidly respond to questions in voir dire. As the 

court explained, there were “five instances at least” where she

answered no to the question whether she had any relatives with 

criminal convictions. S.A. 66–67. The relative in question was 

her father, and the convictions in question were for 

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“prostitution and drugs,” in a federal case that she described as 

“very high-profile.” Id. at 30. Moreover, she did not answer 

no merely once or twice, without time to recollect. And after 

her change of heart about participating on the jury, she all but 

admitted to withholding information in order to be seated. 

Specifically, she told the district court that she had thought this 

would be a “good case” for her to sit on, because her personal 

experience would enable her to “look outside the box.” Id.

Armstead objects that the district court did not make a 

specific factual finding on whether Juror 10’s repeated false 

denials were willful or inadvertent. To be sure, the court 

generously distinguished between the juror’s “lack of candor” 

and her “possibly intentionally misleading the Court and the 

parties,” in part to avoid what it recognized as “Fifth 

Amendment concerns at this point.” S.A. at 62–63. But the 

court did find “certainly, at a minimum” that Juror 10 had 

shown “a lack of candor.” Id. at 67. In ordinary usage, that 

phrase denotes some degree of dishonesty. See, e.g., United 

States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“lack of 

candor” evinces “malicious purposes”). Moreover, the record 

summarized above, and the court’s extensive recounting of its 

concerns, make clear that the dismissal was not based on a

merely innocent failure of recollection.

2

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the 

right to a “trial, by an impartial jury.” Construing this text 

against “the common law, state practices in the founding era, 

[and] opinions and treatises written soon afterward,” the 

Supreme Court has held that a jury “must reach a unanimous 

verdict in order to convict.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 

1390, 1395 (2020). This unanimity requirement “constrains” 

a good-cause determination under Rule 23(b)(3). United States 

v. Wilkerson, 966 F.3d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2020). In particular, 

a district court may not dismiss a deliberating juror “if the 

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request for discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about 

the sufficiency of the government’s evidence.” United States 

v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

After Brown, this Court repeatedly has held that a district 

court may dismiss a deliberating juror for reasons

“independent” of the juror’s possible views of the evidence. 

See McGill, 815 F.3d at 868. In United States v. Ginyard, 444 

F.3d 648 (D.C. Cir. 2006), we reasoned that a deliberating juror 

could be dismissed for an “employment-related need,” despite 

reasons for believing that the juror was skeptical of the 

government’s evidence. Id. at 652. In McGill, we held that a 

deliberating juror could be dismissed for sneaking notes 

outside the jury room, 815 F.3d at 869–70, even if the juror was 

apparently a holdout for the defense, see id. at 862–66. And in 

Wilkerson, we upheld a dismissal where the juror had indicated 

strong disagreement not with the sufficiency of the 

government’s proof, but with the law governing the case. 966 

F.3d at 835–36.

The dismissal of Juror 10 was permissible under these 

precedents. The district court reserved the question whether

Juror 10 wished to be removed based on her assessment of the 

evidence or her possible status as a holdout. S.A. 57–58. And 

it found good cause based entirely on her untrue statements

during voir dire. This case is like McGill insofar as the good 

cause exists “independent of” the juror’s possible views of the 

case. See 815 F.3d at 867–68. But in one respect, this case is 

even easier—here, the misconduct occurred before the juror 

heard any evidence. By the end of voir dire, there was good 

cause to justify excusing the juror, even though it was not 

discovered until after deliberations had begun.

Armstead reads our precedent differently. According to 

him, a juror cannot be dismissed if her misconduct is related in 

any way to her reluctance to convict—even if the misconduct 

is by itself enough to constitute good cause. Armstead’s theory 

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would make it all but impossible to remove jurors for lying 

during voir dire, where questions are asked precisely to 

discover possible biases or leanings that may color jurors’ view 

of the case. But the misconduct justifying removal is a juror’s 

withholding of information during voir dire, not the juror’s 

possible biases or leanings in the case. And this lack of 

candor—which occurs before the juror has heard any 

evidence—is distinct from any possible “evidence-based 

inclination to acquit,” McGill, 815 F.3d at 869, even if the 

underlying subject of the voir dire testimony may affect the 

juror’s good-faith view of guilt or innocence. For these 

reasons, we agree with our sister circuits that a deliberating 

juror may be removed for lack of candor during voir dire. See 

Ozomaro, 44 F.4th at 544; Delva, 858 F.3d at 157–59.

3

Alternatively, Armstead complains that the district court 

did not adequately probe Juror 10’s motivation during voir 

dire. As Armstead himself recognizes, probing too much about 

why a juror wants to be dismissed risks improperly intruding 

on the confidentiality of deliberations. See Wilkerson, 966 

F.3d at 835–36. And Armstead did not ask the district court to 

probe further when it proposed to dismiss the juror for lack of 

candor. In any event, as explained above, the misconduct here 

turned not on why Juror 10 might have wanted to be excused 

during deliberations, but on whether her answers during voir 

dire lacked candor. On that point, the record speaks for itself, 

and the district court explained in detail the compelling

evidence that the juror did not answer questions candidly.

B

Armstead further contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in asking the jury to return whatever partial verdict 

it had reached when further deliberations became impossible. 

He contends that the instruction impermissibly interfered with 

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the jury’s deliberative process. Armstead does not identify any 

source of positive law for this claim, but we think it must be 

the Sixth Amendment.1

1

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a “trial, by an impartial 

jury,” and history shows that this requires a “unanimous verdict 

in order to convict.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395. So, the judge 

may not coerce or pressure the jury—or any individual juror—

into voting to convict. We have developed this point in cases 

addressing how judges may respond to announced jury 

deadlocks. “When efforts to secure a verdict from the jury 

reach the point that a single juror may be coerced into 

surrendering views conscientiously entertained, the jury’s

province is invaded and the requirement of unanimity is 

diluted.” United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C. 

Cir. 1971) (en banc). And an instruction is impermissibly 

coercive if it “shows a substantial propensity for prying 

individual jurors from beliefs they honestly have.” United 

States v. Driscoll, 984 F.3d 103, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned 

up). The same principles govern whether judges may ask for 

partial verdicts, which likewise may coerce juries into 

surrendering conscientiously held views for the sake of 

reaching a verdict. But in both contexts, “neutral” comments—

ones that do not pressure jurors “to yield a conscientious 

1

 As explained above, Rule 23(b)(3) addresses the size of a jury 

and when a deliberating juror may be dismissed. It says nothing 

about how a jury may or must deliberate. Rule 31(b)(2) states that, 

“[i]f the jury cannot agree on all counts as to any defendant, the jury 

may return a verdict on those counts on which it has agreed.” This 

rule entitles a jury to return a partial verdict, but does not speak to 

when the court may prod it to do so.

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conviction”—are generally permissible. United States v. 

McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 1987).

Nothing in the instruction here pressured the jury to reach 

a verdict, much less to find Armstead guilty. Indeed, it is hard 

to imagine a less coercive instruction. The district court 

required the jury to report any “verdict of guilty or not guilty” 

on any individual count—without suggesting a preference for 

one outcome over the other. S.A. 163. Repeating the word if

nine times, the court further instructed the jury to report any 

partial verdict “if” it had reached one and to report the absence 

of a verdict “if” not. Id. at 163–64. Here is one example: 

“Now, again, that is an ‘if.’ If you have not reached a verdict 

as to any particular count, I’m going to ask you to simply say 

‘no verdict’ on the verdict form.” Id. at 163. Here is another: 

“If you have not reached a verdict as to a particular count, 

simply indicate on the verdict form ‘no verdict.’” Id. at 164. 

Here is a third: “[I]f and only if you have reached a verdict as 

to any particular count, should you so indicate. I’m not asking 

you to come to a conclusion if you have not.” Id. Given the

clear and easy choice between returning a verdict or simply 

reporting “no verdict,” even Armstead acknowledges that the 

instruction “did not use coercive language” to pressure a 

verdict. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 12.

This case looks nothing like a typical case of jury coercion.

In deadlock cases, for instance, an aggressive instruction to 

continue deliberating may suggest that holdout jurors should 

abandon their honestly held positions. See, e.g., Driscoll, 984 

F.3d at 110–11; United States v. Black, 843 F.2d 1456, 1463–

64 (D.C. Cir. 1988). But the instruction here did not seek to 

direct future deliberations at all. Instead, it simply asked the 

jury to report any partial verdict it had already reached, while 

simultaneously prohibiting them from reporting a verdict 

unless they had already reached one. Nothing in the instruction 

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pressured any juror to abandon conscientiously held views 

about the case.

2

With no colorable argument of coercion, Armstead must 

instead urge a bright-line rule: Forcing the jury to return a 

verdict that it has already reached impermissibly intrudes on 

the jury’s deliberative process. But the Sixth Amendment, in 

guaranteeing trial by an impartial jury, says nothing about the 

timing or structure of deliberations through which jurors reach 

their honestly held positions. And the ostensible right of a jury 

to structure its deliberations has no deep historical pedigree. 

To the contrary, legislatures and judges have long played a role 

in structuring how juries deliberate.

Start with the judge’s authority to require more

deliberations after the jury announces a deadlock. Even when 

a jury declares itself to be “hopelessly deadlocked,” the court 

may order it to continue, so long as the order does not coerce 

jurors into surrendering their beliefs. See, e.g., Black, 843 F.2d 

at 1463; Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 961–63 (D.C. 

Cir. 1966). Such an order surely impacts the deliberative 

process; the jury wishes to stop deliberating, but the court 

makes it continue to avoid a mistrial if possible. Yet we have 

repeatedly held that such instructions do not violate the Sixth 

Amendment as long as they are noncoercive. See, e.g.,

Driscoll, 984 F.3d at 113; United States v. Lloyd, 515 F.3d 

1297, 1302–03 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Courts structure jury deliberations in other ways as well. 

For example, when a defendant is charged with greater and 

lesser-included offenses, some states require the jury to resolve 

the charges in descending order of severity, acquitting on the 

greater offense before considering the lesser. See, e.g., People 

v. Richardson, 184 P.3d 755, 764 n.7 (Colo. 2008) (en banc);

Hughes v. State, 66 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Ark. 2022). This 

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practice has deep roots, and it clearly involves structuring of 

the jury’s deliberations. More precisely, it “‘requires the jury 

to reach a partial verdict’ on the greater offenses first.” 

Richardson, 184 P.3d at 764 n.7 (quoting State v. Tate, 773 

A.2d 308, 321 (Conn. 2001)). Yet as Judge Friendly concluded

nearly a half-century ago, such an “acquittal-first” system is 

not “wrong as a matter of law.” United States v. Tsansas, 572 

F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1978). Indeed, we are aware of no 

authority holding that this longstanding and widespread 

practice violates the Sixth Amendment.

Armstead’s argument also finds no support in foundingera common law, state practices, judicial opinions, or treatises. 

If it did violate the Sixth Amendment for judges to structure 

jury deliberations even without coercion, one might expect to 

see some discussion of this point in these historical sources. 

See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395. Yet Armstead fails to cite a 

single historical source for his position, and we have not found

one either. To the contrary, founding-era common law cuts 

against Armstead’s position. William Blackstone, “the 

preeminent authority on English law for the founding 

generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999),

observed that judges could deny the jury “meat, drink, fire, or 

candle” in order to “accelerat[e] unanimity” and thus avoid 

“causeless delay.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the 

Laws of England 375 (1769). We do not suggest that coercing 

verdicts in this way would be permissible under modern 

standards barring the coercion of a verdict. See Jenkins v. 

United States, 380 U.S. 445, 445–46 (1965) (per curiam). 

Nonetheless, it is striking just how dramatically Armstead’s 

proposed rule diverges from founding-era practices and 

understandings.

3

With text and history cutting against him, 

Armstead invokes caselaw from other jurisdictions. But far 

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from establishing that courts may never ask juries to return 

partial verdicts voluntarily reached, it supports the opposite

point: Courts retain discretion to consider doing so. For 

example, in United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 

2007), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision to require the jury 

to return partial verdicts it had already reached. See id. at 606–

08. The court stressed the “delicacy” of the decision to do so, 

which it reviewed only “for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 608. It 

acknowledged a risk that accepting a partial verdict sometimes 

might improperly force the jury to truncate deliberations 

prematurely, but it found no reason to think this had actually 

occurred in the case at bar. See id. Likewise, in McKinney, the 

Tenth Circuit affirmed a decision to require the jury to return 

any partial verdicts it had reached by a time certain. See 822 

F.2d at 950. In doing so, the court stressed that the instruction 

was “neutral” as to whether the jury should reach any verdict, 

by confirming “that no individual juror was ever required to 

yield a conscientious conviction” to return a verdict. See id.

Armstead counters with United States v. Moore, 763 F.3d 

900 (7th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Benedict, 95 F.3d 17

(8th Cir. 1996), which reversed decisions to require the return 

of partial verdicts. But both cases recognized the 

“discretionary and fact-dependent” nature of that question. 

Moore, 763 F.3d at 910; see Benedict, 95 F.3d at 19 (“partial 

verdicts may be appropriate in certain circumstances”). In 

Moore, the district court ordered the partial verdict on the first 

day of deliberations, over the objection of both parties; and the 

jury, forced to decide the case piecemeal, ended up rendering 

an inconsistent verdict. See 763 F.3d at 904–08. Likewise, in 

Benedict, the district court ordered the partial verdict less than 

a full day into deliberations, over the objection of the jury itself, 

which was grappling with two closely interrelated counts. See 

95 F.3d at 18 (jury had “indicated that they were making 

progress and asked to continue deliberating”). At bottom, both 

cases rest on concerns about “the premature conversion of a 

tentative jury vote into an irrevocable one,” before the jury has 

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had an “opportunity to fully consider the evidence.” Id. at 19; 

see Moore, 763 F.3d at 912–13 (same).

This case involves nothing like those two. Here, the jury 

had deliberated for five days; it expressed no wish to continue 

deliberating; and the emerging pandemic made any further 

deliberations impossible. In short, there were no more 

deliberations that the district court could have “cut short.” See

Moore, 763 F.3d at 913 (cleaned up). So the court sensibly 

asked the jury to turn in whatever verdict it had already 

reached, if any, while making it perfectly clear that the jury had 

no duty at all to reach such a verdict in the first place.

Armstead’s reliance on United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 

166 (5th Cir. 1975), is even more misplaced. There, a juror 

died after the jury had voted among themselves but before any

verdict was announced in open court. Id. at 167. The 

remaining eleven jurors announced in open court their votes to 

convict, and they revealed that the deceased juror had also 

voted the same way in the jury room. Id. The Fifth Circuit 

held that no “verdict was returned” from the vote in the jury 

room, because a “jury has not reached a valid verdict” until the 

decision is announced “in open court.” Id. at 168–69. And the 

remaining eleven jurors could not render such a verdict

because, at the time, Rule 23 required a twelve-member jury. 

Id. at 169. But a valid resolution of Count Two exists here, 

where the requisite number of jurors unanimously returned a 

guilty verdict in open court and then confirmed it in a jury poll. 

Taylor, which turned on the obvious point that votes taken in 

the jury room do not finally resolve anything, has nothing to 

say about the partial verdict announced in this case in open 

court.2

2

 Armstead further contends that once the foreman could no 

longer deliberate, the district court had no choice but to declare a 

mistrial. This argument rests entirely on the premise that the court 

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III

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

could not request the partial verdict, which fails for the reasons we 

have given.

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