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Parties Involved:
Ray Garza
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, CO 80257 

September 6, 1995 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-6153, USA v. Garza 

Filed June 13, 1995 by Judge Ebel 

Please be advised that the court has granted the 

parties' joint motion and agreement to dismiss this appeal. 

Therefore, the opinion issued on June 13, 1995 is withdrawn 

and the judgment of that date is vacated. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-6153 Document: 01019279297 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

. FILED 

Umted States Court of Appeab 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 13 i99S 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

RAY GARZA, 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) No. 94-6153 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-92-22-A) 

Vickie Zemp Behenna, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma (Rozia M. McKinney-Foster, United States Attorney, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Leslie M. Maye, Assistant United 

States Attorney, with her on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON,* District 

Judge. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior District Judge of the 

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-6153 Document: 01019279297 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 2 
This case is before us for the second time to review the 

sentence imposed on Defendant-Appellee Ray Garza ("Garza"). Garza 

pled guilty to one count of travel in interstate commerce to 

facilitate unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (3). At Garza's 

first sentencing, the district court departed below the applicable 

sentencing range of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 

("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines") to lessen the disparity between 

Garza's sentence and that of a codefendant. The government 

appealed the departure and this court reversed in United States v. 

Garza, 1 F.3d 1098 (lOth Cir.) ("Garza I"), cert. denied, 114 S. 

Ct. 617 (1993). On remand, the district court again departed 

below the applicable Guideline range, this time based on Garza's 

"super acceptance of responsibility." The government appealed the 

departure for a second time. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, once again, we reverse and remand for 

resentencing within the applicable Guideline range. 

BACKGROUND 

The factual underpinnings of Garza's offense are set forth 

fully in our opinion in Garza I, 1 F.3d at 1098-99, and are not at 

issue on this appeal. Based on Garza's participation in the drug 

enterprise described therein, Garza pled guilty to one count of 

travel in interstate commerce to facilitate unlawful activity. 18 

u.s.c. § 1952 (a) (3). 

At the first sentencing hearing on November lOth, 1992, the 

court correctly applied the November 1, 1992 version of the 

Guidelines to calculate a base offense level of 28. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2Dl.l(c) (8). The court then decreased the base offense by the 

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maximum three levels permitted under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) (1) for 

Garza's timely acceptance of responsibility. The resulting base 

offense level of 25, with Garza's criminal history category of I, 

resulted in a sentencing range of 57 to 71 months. Because the 

offense of conviction carries a statutory maximum sentence of five 

years, see 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a), this range was capped at 60 

months. 

Over the government's objection, the district court then 

departed downward from this range to impose a sentence of 41 

months in prison. The district court justified departure as an 

effort to reduce the disparity between Garza's sentence and that 

of a codefendant, reasoning that the equalization of sentences in 

companion cases was not a factor adequately taken into account by 

the Guidelines. See Garza I, 1 F.3d at 1100. The government 

appealed this first downward departure in Garza I. This court 

determined that the disparity in sentences was clearly explicable 

by factual differences between the defendants' conduct and 

therefore, because "the only disparities which are to be avoided 

are unwarranted disparities," was an inappropriate ground for 

departure. Id. at 1101 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we 

remanded for resentencing within the applicable Guideline range. 

Id. 

On remand, the district court held a resentencing hearing on 

April 11, 1994. Without objection, the district court again began 

by calculating a base offense level of 28 with a criminal history 

category of I. The court reduced Garza's base offense by the 

maximum three levels permitted by U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) (1) for 

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acceptance of responsibility, arriving at a base offense level of 

25. Thus, the court correctly arrived at a sentencing range of 57 

to 71 months, capped at 60 months by the governing statutory 

maximum. 

Again, however, the district court departed downward from 

this range over the government's objection. The court reasoned 

that Garza had demonstrated "super acceptance of responsibility" 

beyond that contemplated by U.S.S.G. § 3El.l. See R.O.A. Vol. I, 

Findings of April 15, 1994, at 3 (hereinafter "Findings"). 

Concluding that the maximum three-level offense reduction 

authorized in § 3El.l was "inadequate" to account for Garza's 

degree of acceptance of responsibility, the district court 

departed from the Guidelines by doubling the reduction permitted 

under § 3El.l and reducing Garza's base offense by an additional 

three levels. Id. Arriving at a base offense level of 22, which 

carries a sentencing range of 41 to 51 months, the court again 

imposed a 41-month term of imprisonment. Id. at 3-4. 

The court listed four facts to support its finding of "super 

acceptance of responsibility." First, Garza had demonstrated a 

"willingness to cooperate in the prosecution of others" by 

assisting in the conviction of his codefendants and agreeing to 

testify against a defendant in an unrelated prosecution. Id. at 

2-3. Second, as a result of this cooperation, Garza had been 

placed in solitary confinement for three months in less favorable 

conditions than the general prison population in order to protect 

him from other inmates while he was assisting the government. Id. 

at 2; Sentencing Memorandum, R.O.A. Vol. II, at 4. Third, Garza 

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had demonstrated an unusual degree of post-offense rehabilitative 

efforts while in prison, including tutoring other inmates in 

English and otherwise "attempting to make the best of his 

situation." Findings, at 3. And fourth, Garza had used money 

from his prison income to support his daughter. Id. 

The government brought this appeal to challenge the district 

court's second downward departure from the Guideline range. The 

government does not object to the district court's initial 

calculation of a 57 to 60 month sentencing range. The government 

challenges only the court's additional three-level downward 

departure and the resulting 41-month sentence. While raising no 

objections to the four factual findings listed above, the 

government argues that these facts do not, either independently or 

in combination, justify a downward departure for "super acceptance 

of responsibility" because the Sentencing Commission has already 

adequately taken these factors into account in the Guidelines. 

ANALYSIS 

A sentencing court may depart downward from the applicable 

guideline range if the court finds a "'mitigating circumstance of 

a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 

the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 

should result in a sentence different from that described.'" 

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (1992) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). In 

reviewing a downward departure, this court applies a three-step 

analysis: 

First, we determine de novo whether the circumstances 

cited by the district court admit of a factor not 

adequately taken into account by the Sentencing 

Commission which would justify departure. Second, we 

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review the district court's factual findings supporting 

departure and determine whether they were clearly 

erroneous. Third, if the departure was justified, we 

review the degree of departure to determine whether it 

was reasonable. 

United States v. Ziegler, 39 F.3d 1058, 1061 (lOth Cir. 1994) 

("Ziegler II"). Because we conclude that the facts cited by the 

district court at resentencing fail to "admit of a factor not 

adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission which 

would justify departure," our inquiry proceeds no further than 

step one. 

As a preliminary matter, we note that when the district court 

resentenced Garza on April 11, 1994, the court should not have 

considered any events that arose after its first sentencing 

hearing of November 10, 1992. See United States v. Warner, 43 

F.3d 1335, 1340 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("While ... resentencing is to 

be conducted as a fresh procedure, the latitude permitted is 

circumscribed by those factors the court could have considered 'at 

the first sentencing hearing.' Thus, events arising after that 

time are not within resentencing reach."). Consequently, to the 

extent that Garza's cooperation with the government, time spent in 

solitary confinement, rehabilitation efforts, and continued child 

support occurred after November 10, 1992 (the date of his initial 

sentencing), the district court's reliance on these facts to 

support departure on resentencing was in error. 

However, it is unclear what, if any, portion of this conduct 

occurred while Garza was in prison before his initial sentencing 

hearing and was thus appropriate to consider at resentencing. 

Because we hold that these factors, even when considered in their 

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entirety, do not justify downward departure under the Guidelines, 

it is unnecess-ary for purposes of this appeal to disentangle what 

portion of these events the court should have disregarded 

altogether. While we have left open the possibility that a 

defendant's acceptance of responsibility may be a basis for 

departure if it is so exceptional as to constitute a degree not 

considered by U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, see United States v. Gaither, 1 

F.3d 1040, 1043 (lOth Cir. 1993), all the factors relied on by the 

district court to arrive at such a conclusion have already been 

adequately accounted for by the Guidelines. 

The first fact that the district court used to support its 

finding of 11 super acceptance of responsibility11 was that Garza had 

assisted the government in the prosecution of his codefendants and 

had agreed to testify against another defendant in an unrelated 

prosecution. However, this type of assistance to authorities is 

specifically accounted for elsewhere in the Guidelines. Policy 

statement§ 5Kl.l states that, 11 [u]pon motion of the government 

stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in 

the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 

conunitted an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 11 

Because the government did not make a § 5Kl.l motion in this case, 

however, the district court lacked authority for downward 

departure under that provision. See United States v. Lee, 989 

F.2d 377, 379 (lOth Cir. 1993); United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 

655, 657 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Instead, the district court used Garza's assistance to the 

government as a factor demonstrating Garza's acceptance of 

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responsibility. "The Court does not regard guidelines §§ 5K1.1 

and 3E1.1 as being mutually exclusive," the district court 

reasoned. Findings, at 3. "Conduct that might lead to a 

prosecution motion under § 5K1.1 is relevant in this case to 

§ 3El.l, along with all other § 3E1.1 factors." Id. 

This reasoning is at odds with the Commission's application 

note to § 5K1.1, which clarifies that 

[t]he sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities 

shall be considered independently of any reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. Substantial assistance is 

directed to the investigation and prosecution of 

criminal activities by persons other than the defendant, 

while acceptance of responsibility is directed to the 

defendant's affirmative recognition of responsibility 

for his own conduct. 

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, application note 2. Relying on Garza's 

assistance to the government as grounds for departure under 

§ 3E1.1 was therefore improper, because the Commission has 

adequately taken into account a defendant's substantial assistance 

to the government in § 5K1.1. Because Garza's assistance to the 

government fits squarely within the boundaries contemplated by 

§ 5K1.1, that conduct does not "admit of a factor not adequately 

taken into account by the Sentencing Commission, " and therefore 

cannot support the court's departure under its § 3E1.1 analysis.1 

1 The district court's findings indicate that it may have 

relied on Garza's cooperation in its § 3E1.1 analysis because of 

its dissatisfaction with the prosecution for not filing a § 5K1.1 

motion that would have specifically authorized the court to 

depart. See Findings, at 4 ("This case is one of several that has 

caused the Court to question the fairness of the United States 

Attorney in applying§ 5K1.1."). However, this court has held 

that a district court may second-guess the government's refusal to 

make a § 5K1.1 motion only if: (1) the refusal violated an 

agreement with the government; (2) the refusal was based on an 

unconstitutional motive; or (3) it was an "egregious" case where 

(continued on next page) 

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See Ziegler II, 39 F.3d at 1061. 

The second fact that the court used to support its finding of 

11 Super acceptance of responsibility .. was that Garza had been 

placed in solitary confinement for three months to protect him 

from other inmates who might retaliate against him for his ongoing 

cooperation with.the government. The court felt that this fact 

demonstrated exceptional acceptance of responsibility because, by 

cooperating with the government, Garza had voluntarily subjected 

himself to harsher prison conditions than he otherwise would have 

endured. 

To the extent that the court's reference to Garza's time in 

solitary confinement was intended as further evidence of Garza's 

cooperation with the government, our analysis regarding the 

adequacy of U.S.S.G § SK1.1 to account for cooperation applies to 

this fact as well. To the extent that the court inferred 

acceptance of responsibility based on the quality of the 

confinement itself, that inference is undercut by this court's 

suggestion that conditions of confinement are not relevant to 

(continued from prior page) 

the prosecution refused to file a motion despite overwhelming 

evidence that the defendant's assistance was so substantial 11 as to 

cry out for meaningful relief. 11 Lee, 989 F.2d at 379-80 (internal 

quotation omitted) . In this case, there is no indication that the 

district court's downward departure was based on a determination 

that the prosecution's failure to file a § SK1.1 motion fell into 

one of these three categories. See Findings, at 4 ( 11 This Court 

has no desire to intrude into the proper exercise of prosecutorial 

discretion ... 11 ). Because there is no evidence that any of 

Lee's exceptions to § SK1.1 apply, nor has Garza argued that the 

district court's departure was warranted under one of Lee's 

exceptions, see Appellee's Br. at 16-18, we cannot uphold the 

downward departure on that ground. 

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sentencing departure. See. e.g., United States v. Rivas, 922 F.2d 

1501, 1505-06 (lOth Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's refusal 

to consider fact that defendant had been beaten by prison guards 

as a mitigating factor at sentencing because it was "not a 

circumstance that lessens the severity of his crime nor does it 

affect the determination of a proper sentence for his offense"); 

see also Ziegler II, 39 F.3d at 1063 (holding that it is improper 

to consider prison capacity as grounds for sentencing departure) ; 

United States v. Menoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

(adopting Second Circuit's position in United States v. Restrepo, 

999 F.2d 640, 642-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 405 

(1993), that the fact that deportable aliens face more severe 

conditions of confinement is not grounds for sentencing 

departure), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1552 (1994). 

The third fact that the court used to support its finding of 

"super acceptance of responsibility" was Garza's significant 

efforts at post-offense rehabilitation while in prison. These 

efforts were exemplified by Garza's tutoring of other inmates in 

English.2 The district court also erred by invoking this fact to 

justify departure. This Circuit has repeatedly held that postoffense rehabilitation is an improper ground for downward 

departure below that authorized by the acceptance of 

2 Although the district court's findings did not list other 

specific examples of Garza's rehabilitation efforts, the court 

referred to the "circumstances" listed in Garza's Sentencing 

Memorandum. Findings, at 3. That memorandum noted that Garza had 

completed a required 40-hour course on drug and alcohol abuse and 

had received excellent to outstanding work evaluations during 

incarceration. R.O.A. Vol. II, at 2 ~6. 

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responsibility provision, even in extraordinary circumstances. 

~, Ziegler II, 39 F.3d at 1061-62; Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d at 

1486-87; Gaither, 1 F.3d at 1042; United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.3d 

1044, 1048-50 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("Ziegler I"). These holdings 

stemmed from our conclusion that the Sentencing Commission has 

already fully and adequately accounted for post-offense 

rehabilitation by allowing sentencing courts to consider such 

efforts in determining a defendant's eligibility for the base 

offense reductions authorized in § 3E1.1. See Ziegler II, 39 F.3d 

at 1061; Ziegler I, 1 F.3d at 1047. While these cases dealt 

specifically with post-offense drug rehabilitation, their 

reasoning is applicable here. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, application 

note l(g) (listing drug treatment as only one example of the 

"post-offense.rehabilitative efforts" that are taken into 

consideration when applying § 3El.l). 

Thus, while the district court appropriately could have 

considered Garza's commendable rehabilitation efforts in granting 

the three-level reduction in Garza's base offense permitted by 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and in selecting the particular sentence within 

the 57 to 60 month sentencing range, these efforts "may play no 

further role in [the] court's sentencing analysis." See Ziegler 

II, 39 F.3d at 1061. 

The final fact that the district court relied on to support 

its finding of "super acceptance of responsibility" was that Garza 

has used his prison income for the support of his minor daughter. 

Reliance on this factor was similarly misplaced. This court has 

held that, pursuant to the Commission's policy statement in 

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U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, a defendant's family ties and responsibilities 

are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence 

should be outside the applicable guideline range.3 See, e.g., 

Ziegler II, 39 F.3d at 1062 (rejecting the view that defendant's 

marriage and support of three minor children could be used to 

support a downward departure for extraordinary acceptance of 

responsibility) . 

This court has acknowledged 11 that there may be extraordinary 

circumstances where family ties and responsibilities may be 

relevant to the sentencing decision. 11 United States v. Pena, 930 

F.2d 1486, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1991) (upholding departure· where 

defendant was sole provider of her infant child, was responsible 

for her teenage daughter and that daughter's own infant, and her 

offense was a single act of aberrant behavior). However, the fact 

that Garza uses portions of his prison income to help support his 

daughter, who lives with and is cared for by her mother, is not 

the type of extraordinary circumstance contemplated by Pena. See 

United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 121 (3d Cir.) (holding that 

the fact that defendant paid regular child support to his minor 

son who resided with defendant's former wife did 11 not show such 

extraordinary family ties and responsibilities as to justify a 

departure 11 ), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943 (1991). 

3 To the extent that the district court relied on Garza's 

financial support of his daughter not as an indication of family 

responsibilities, but as further evidence of Garza's post-offense 

rehabilitation, such reliance is precluded under our above 

analysis of rehabilitative efforts. 

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Garza also argues that even if none of the factors listed by 

the district court could justify downward departure independently, 

they justify departure when 11 evaluated in their totality. 11 

Appellee's Br. at 14. This court has acknowledged the possibility 

that some unique combination of factors could constitute the 

11mitigating circumstance 11 warranting downward departure under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(b). See Ziegler II, 39 F.3d at 1063. However, the 

combination of factors in this case--each of which is either 

adequately taken into account by the Guidelines or is an 

inappropriate factor for a sentencing court to consider--does not 

present such a unique scenario. 

We agree with the district court that Garza's post-offense 

conduct has been commendable. And there is no dispute that the 

district court appropriately could have considered these 

characteristics when granting the three-level base offense 

reduction authorized by § 3E1.1 and when selecting a sentence 

within the applicable sentencing range. These facts do not, 

however, 11 admit of a factor not adequately taken into account by 

the Sentencing Commission which would justify departure, 11 and 

therefore do not support the court's additional downward departure 

of three offense levels. See Ziegler II, 39 F.3d at 1061. 

CONCLUSION 

Because there is no legitimate basis for the district court's 

downward departure, we again REVERSE and REMAND with instructions 

that the district court vacate the sentence and resentence Garza 

without departing from the applicable guideline range. 

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