Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_07-cv-01807/USCOURTS-alnd-2_07-cv-01807-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denise Jones
Plaintiff
LaFarge North America, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DENISE JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant.

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}

}

}

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

07-AR-1807-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before this court is the motion of defendant, Lafarge North

America, Inc. (“Lafarge”), for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Denise

Jones (“Jones”) is suing Lafarge, her employer, seeking declaratory

judgment, equitable relief, and money damages. Jones claims that

Lafarge discriminated against her based on her race and gender in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Jones also claims race discrimination

against Lafarge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1981. For the reasons that

follow, Lafarge’s motion for summary judgment will be partially

granted and partially denied.

I. Summary Judgment Facts

1

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates

1

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing whether the movant has

met his burden, the court must view the evidence, and all inferences drawn

therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Hairston v.

Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993). At this

juncture, the court does not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of

the matter,” but solely “determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for

1

FILED

 2008 Oct-21 PM 02:11

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 1 of 34
In 2000, Jones, a black female, was hired by Blue

Circle, Inc., as a hourly worker at its packing/shipping plant in

Calera, Alabama. In 2001, Lafarge bought the plant. When she filed

her complaint, Jones was still in the employment of Lafarge. The

alleged adverse employment action, failure to promote Jones to

packhouse supervisor, occurred on or about August 28, 2006. The

2

following discussion provides the undisputed material facts and

sufficient background information that led up to the decision.

Lafarge is a multinational corporation whose primary business

3

is the extraction and creation of usable materials, including the

extraction of limestone from quarries and the manufacture of

cement. The plant in Calera, Alabama, is known as the “Roberta

4

Plant.” Once the limestone is removed from the quarry, it is

crushed and heated into cement and then packaged and shipped by the

trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)

(citations omitted). This determination involves applying substantive law

to the substantive facts that have been developed. A dispute about a

material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, based on the applicable law in relation to the evidence

developed. See id. at 248; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th

Cir. 1989).

The pleadings create some confusion as to the actual title of the

2

sought after position. The complaint refers to the job as “packhouse

coordinator” and several of the deponents refer to the job as “packhouse

supervisor” and the job opportunity form, discussed infra, refers to the

job’s official title as “shipping supervisor.” For clarity, the court will

refer to the job as “packhouse supervisor.” Also of note, the parties appear

to use the terms “shipping department” and “packhouse” interchangeably.

Lafarge calls itself is an Equal Opportunity Employer. It has a anti3

harassment and sexual harassment policy which Jones acknowledges receiving.

Cement is the main component of concrete. The Roberta plant also does

4

some degree of work with lime and mortar.

2

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 2 of 34
shipping department. Generally, the shipping department’s day-today purpose is first to “bag” the cement and load the cement in

railroad cars and/or heavy trucks. To accomplish this, the hourly

employees at the Roberta Plant perform five central tasks.

Employees work as packers, a palletizers, forklift operators, bulk

truck loaders, and/or bulk rail loaders. On or about July 12,

5

2000, Jones began working for Blue Circle as a packer. Blue Circle

hired employees to perform one or two of the above five tasks. When

Lafarge purchased the Roberta Plant in 2001 it made a few

operational changes. Lafarge reclassified all floor-level employees

as “Operator I.” An Operator I employee was then tasked with crosstraining on all five tasks, even though the employee might, in

fact, spend most of his or her shift on one particular task.

6

Lafarge also kept many of Blue Circle’s personnel, including

Jones and several managers. In 2006, the pertinent

managers/decision-makers in the promotion process were (1) the

packhouse coordinator/supervisor, Richard Buffkin (“Buffkin”),

white male, (2) the packhouse manager, Lynn Wehrmeier,

Generally, a “packer” is responsible for the bagging of cement, which

5

includes the monitoring and troubleshooting of the industrial packing

machine and other equipment on the packhouse floor. A palletizer is the

operator of the machine that places the bags of cement/lime onto a pallet. A

forklift operator takes the pallets and other bagged cement to storage or to

the trucks and rail cars. Bulk truck and rail loaders utilize a loading

machine which loads the trucks and rail cars.

Of note, packer and palletizer positions are referred to as the

“packhouse jobs.”

The central purpose of the cross-training was for flexibility,

6

particularly in overtime scheduling.

3

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 3 of 34
(“Wehrmeier”), white male, (3) the operations manager, Terry

Bennett (“Bennett”), white male, (4) the special projects manager,

Simon Ward (“Ward”), white male, (5) the human resources manager,

Danielle Stokes (“Stokes”) black female, and the plant manager, (6)

Alain Schooner (“Schooner”), white male. Buffkin was the packhouse

supervisor. Buffkin directly supervised Jones and the three other

interviewees for the packhouse supervisor position. Buffkin

7

reported to Wehrmeier, who reported to Bennett, who reported to

Schooner. Stokes and Ward (who reported to various management

personnel) were also part of the interview process. Notably,

according to Stokes’s testimony, of the approximately twenty-six

supervisors employed at the Robert Plant in August 2006, there were

two black male supervisors and two female supervisors. Neither of

the two female supervisors is black. In addition, of the

approximately twenty Operator I’s working in the packhouse, Jones

is the only female.

The four candidates for the packhouse supervisor position

were all Operator I’s in the shipping department. The candidates

were (1) Stephen Clements (“Clements”), white male, (2) Forrest

Walker (“Walker”), white male, (3) Ward Connor (“Connor”), black

The four candidates are discussed infra. Lafarge decided to add

7

another packhouse supervisor position because Buffkin and Wehrmeier were

becoming overtasked with the current workload.

4

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 4 of 34
male, and (4) Denise Jones, black female. Lafarge ultimately hired

8

Forrest Walker on or about August 28, 2006.

Lafarge conducted annual reviews of each Operator I employee,

9

wherein the supervisor, usually Buffkin, sat down with each

employee to review the employee’s performance over the previous

year. Lafarge also filled out a corresponding form styled “employee

evaluation,” wherein it rated the employee’s performance. If

Buffkin did the evaluation, and there was some notable disciplinary

trouble during the previous year, it would be reflected in the

scores. Lafarge rated each employee based on eight categories. They

are:

1. Safety & Environmental Awareness

10

Of note, Connor filed a Title VII race discrimination suit against

8

Lafarge. Connor’s case is currently pending before the Honorable Karon

Bowdre in this court. Connor v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 07-1095 (N.D. Ala.

2008).

Starting in 2006, there is some dispute by Buffkin as to whether

9

Lafarge started employee evaluations on a semi-annual or quarterly basis.

Buffkin testified he was uncertain. However, the court has no record of any

such mid-year 2006 evaluations, which may or may not be relevant anyway, and

thus focuses solely on the documentation in the record.

3-4. Exceptional safety and environmental consciousness.

10

Participates in safety initiatives, may serve on a safety committee,

encourages fellow workers to work safely and in an environmentally conscious

manner.

2-3. Works safely and has a high level of concern for the safety of

those with whom he works. Takes initiative and personal action to eliminate

safety and environmental hazards.

1-2. Works safely and has concern for the safety of those with whom he

works. Has a good awareness and a general concern for environmental issues.

0-1. Works safely but keeps his opinions about the safe work habits of

others to himself. Rarely considers the environmental impact of his actions.

5

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 5 of 34
2. Job Knowledge

11

3. Quality of Work

12

4. Teamwork

13

5. Quantity of Work

14

6. Initiative & Adaptability

15

3-4. Superior knowledge of own and related jobs. Ability and

11

willingness to apply knowledge in all job responsibilities.

2-3. Extensive knowledge of own and related jobs. Ability and

willingness to apply knowledge in all job responsibilities.

1-2. Complete knowledge of own and related jobs. Ability and

willingness to apply knowledge in all job responsibilities.

0-1. Less than complete knowledge of own job and related jobs.

3-4. Exceptionally highly accurate producer.

12

2-3. Exceeds standards of accuracy.

1-2. Meets normal standards of accuracy; seldom makes mistakes.

0-1. Meets minimum requirements but sometimes necessary to redo work.

3-4. Always perceived as a team player. Consistently willing to go

13

above and beyond the call of duty. Interaction with co-workers and

supervisors is always positive and effective.

2-3. Understands his responsibilities as well as those of his team and

supervisor. Uses that knowledge to support and encourage the efforts of the

team members and supervisor.

1-2. Meets expectations of interaction with co-workers and

supervisors. Constructive; contributes to sound work relationships.

0-1. Sometimes indifferent to supervisor’s instructions or insensitive

to co-workers. Does not sufficiently contribute to team efforts.

3-4. Always exceeds expected amount of work at accelerated speed. A

14

very high producer.

2-3. Consistently produces beyond expectations while working at high

speed.

1-2. Produces expected amount of work at normal speed.

0-1. Output at or below minimum standards; often requires help

completing job assignments.

3-4. Exceptional ability to adapt to the changing environment of the

15

plant. Develops new ideas or methods and leads others in implementing.

Learns rapidly and is extremely responsive to change.

2-3. Implements change initiatives consistently by developing new

ideas or methods and convincing others of their value. Quickly adapts to

changing situations and organizes work in an orderly manner.

1-2. Resourceful; makes original contributions. Absorbs new material;

reacts well to change.

0-1. Often relies on others; seldom suggests new ideas. Has difficulty

in adjusting to change. Rejects change and may even work to undermine change

efforts.

6

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 6 of 34
7. Dependability

16

8. Judgment & Logic in Decision Making

17

The evaluations are scored in descending order: 3-4/2-3/1-2/0-1.

Four is the highest score an employee can receive, and zero is the

lowest. A certain meaning attaches to each score. For example, “Job

Knowledge” (3-4) is defined as “superior knowledge of own and

related jobs. Ability and willingness to apply knowledge in all job

responsibilities.” The following provides the relevant work

18

history and employee evaluations, if available, for each candidate.

A. Candidates Biographies and Evaluations

Clements started working at Lafarge on or about January 3,

2006. From 2003 to 2005, he was a quality control supervisor for

Ready Mix, Inc. (“Ready Mix”), a concrete pouring company. Notably,

Ready Mix provided Clements with similar experience in loading and

3-4. Totally dependable in all areas. Goes out of his way to help

16

others and stays busy at all times.

2-3. Requires minimum supervision always on the job. Goes over and

above, looks for ways to be helpful and stay busy. Works his share of

overtime.

1-2. Requires normal supervision regularly on the job follows

instructions. Works required amount of overtime.

0-1. Requires more than normal supervision sometime needs to be

redirected back to job assignment. General unavailable and unwilling to work

overtime.

3-4. Superior judgment ability; always reaches logical and sound

17

conclusions.

2-3. Demonstrates ability to think quickly and soundly; almost always

reached logical conclusions.

1-2. Normal judgmental ability; usually reaches sound conclusions.

0-1. Has difficulty in reasoning; does not make decisions when

necessary.

For a complete list of all employee evaluation criteria, see supra

18

notes 10-17.

7

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 7 of 34
inspecting concrete, but not the terminal operating (packing and

shipping) aspects of a cement factory. From 2002 to 2004, Clements

19

was an engineer at Volkert, Inc., responsible for daily inspection

of building/road projects. He had a high school education and some

college education. Since Clements began working for Lafarge in

20

2006, the record contains no annual evaluations for him.

21

Walker started working at Lafarge on or about October 17,

2005. From June to September 2005, he was a machinist trainee at

Alabama Dynamics. From April to June 2005 and from January 2001 to

February 2005, he was a cashier at J&M Citgo gas station. From

22

The court only has the information filed by the parties, and,

19

apparently, according to his resume, Clements worked for two companies at

once in 2004, Ready Mix and Volkert.

The record is less clear with respect to Clement’s education.

20

Clement’s resume states: “1998-2001: George Wallace Community College.” This

does not by itself demonstrate, nor does the record show, Clements has an

B.S. in engineering. Given the procedural posture, the court is required to

view the facts in light most favorable to Jones, and thus, Clements does not

have an engineering degree.

Clements first opportunity to receive a semi-annual evaluation would

21

have occurred in mid-2006. Clements arguably may have received a semi-annual

employee evaluation after the hiring process began (approximately June/July

2006), but the record contains no such documentation. See supra note 9.

In listing his experience at Citgo, Walker listed his job title as

22

“Cashier/Managerial Duties.” In his deposition, Walker responded to his

managerial responsibilities as follows:

Ms. Leonard (attorney for Jones): Did you supervise anyone [at J&M

Citgo]?

Walker: Not really, just vendors and stuff when they came in.

Ms. Leonard: And those would be the people who might be bringing

the milk in or the soft drinks or the potato chips?

Walker: Yes, ma’am.

Ms. Leonard: And supervising them, was it mainly instructing them

where they needed to put inventory or stock?

Walker: Inventory – or describing what our needs were and what

items we needed them to bring in.

8

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 8 of 34
February to March 2005, he was a shipping clerk at Unique

Industries, which threads steel. From January 2000 to January 2001,

Walker worked as an assistant safety coordinator at Johnson

Controls, Inc., responsible for safety checking equipment and

conducting monthly safety meetings. Walker also earned a B.A. in

political science from the University of Montevallo. On December 9,

2005, Walker received his first evaluation from Buffkin. Walker

earned a score of “2" in Safety & Environmental Awareness, Job

Knowledge, Dependability, and Judgment & Logic in Decision Making.

He received “3s” in the other four categories. Of note, Wehrmeier

wrote “get qualified on one of the two packhouse jobs” at the

bottom of Walker’s evaluation. Walker completed these

qualifications prior the hiring process.

Connor started working at Blue Circle/Lafarge on or about

January 2, 1989. Other than Jones’s testimony that Connor had no

supervisory experience, there is nothing in the record to

demonstrate any other biographical work information concerning

Connor. Additionally, like Clements, the record contains no annual

employee evaluations for him.

Jones started working at Blue Circle/Lafarge on or about July

12, 2000. After graduation from high school, she enlisted in the

Walker Depo. at 12-13. Given the procedural posture, the court is required

to view the facts in light most favorable to Jones, and thus, Walker does

not have any supervisory experience, in terms of managing other personnel.

9

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 9 of 34
U.S. Army, serving as an accounting specialist from 1978 to 1981,

receiving an honorable discharge. From 1982 to 1991, she held

several jobs, including some basic accounting jobs. From

approximately 1991 to 1996, Jones worked in the molding department

of Alabaster Industries, both as an operator on a molding machine,

making various plastic items, and also as needed in the shipping

and receiving department. From approximately 1996 to 1998, she

worked at ABC-NACO, Inc., (also known as “ABC Rail”), as a molding

operator manufacturing train wheels. In 1998, Jones was promoted by

ABC Rail to process control supervisor, wherein she was directly

responsible for one person, compliance with OSHA regulations, and

quality assurance of the wheels ABC Rail produced. After a year in

this position, she was moved by ABC Rail to a “Heat Treat”

supervisor position where she supervised ten employees monitoring

the process of heating and treating the steel. As a supervisor, not

only was she responsible for the ten employees’ daily productivity,

but also general supervisory duties including, discipline,

overtime, and scheduling. From 1999 until July of 2000, she

remained in this position. In 2000, Jones grew concerned about the

ABC Rail plant closing, and thus sought employment from, and was

later hired by, Blue Circle. During the interview with several Blue

Circle supervisors/managers, including Buffkin, Jones was asked

about her role at ABC Rail. She informed them of her supervisor

positions. Jones states that she informed the hiring panel that she

10

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 10 of 34
wanted to continue in a supervisory role, but they informed her

none were available at the time.

On December 8, 2005, Buffkin gave Jones her annual evaluation.

Jones received “3s” in all categories except Initiative &

Adaptability, in which she received a “2." In the comments under

Safety & Environmental Awareness, Buffkin noted Jones was “on an

ESAT Team and very active on it.” ESAT is a Lafarge safety team

that encourages, promotes, and trains personnel concerning safety.

23

Jones questioned Buffkin about her annual evaluation scores “quite

a few times.” Jones wanted to know why she was not receiving any

“4s.” The exact dates of the questioning are not in the record, but

it is likely that they occurred prior to the 2006 interview

process. The record is unclear whether Jones specifically

questioned Buffkin about the December 8, 2005, evaluation. Buffkin

testified Jones had “an aggressive attitude” and was

“confrontational” when she asked Buffkin to “go over her scores.”

Jones admits she did inquire as to her scores, but avers that she

was neither aggressive nor confrontational. Buffkin testified that

he told Jones that her scores “[were] good score[s] not [] bad

score[s]” and the scores were not meant to be competitive.

B. The Job Opportunity Form

The job opportunity form (“the form”) posted in the packhouse

originated as a quarry job opportunity form. Prior to its posting,

The record does not reflect a definition for the acronym “ESAT.”

23

11

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 11 of 34
Wehrmeier altered the quarry form to tailor it to the packhouse

position. On or about April 25, 2006, the form was posted in the

packhouse and online on Lafarge’s website. The deadline for

applying was May 4, 2006. Stokes was to receive all applications.

Although Lafarge received applications from external candidates,

Stokes and Schooner made the decision that Lafarge would only

interview the four above candidates, based on a preference for

internal promotion. The form states in pertinent part:

JOB OPPORTUNITY FORM

Position Title: Shipping Supervisor

. . . .

Grade: 12

For open positions grade 12 and below, open consideration

will be given to applicants who live within close proximity to the

job location. Lafarge may not be able to provide financial

assistance to relocate an employee. However, employees who feel

their profile closely matches the job requirements are encouraged

to apply so that geographical issues may be taken into

consideration.

. . . .

QUALIFICATIONS

Educational Background: High school graduate required,

post-secondary education desirable.

Experience:

Minimum of 2 year cement plant or terminal operating

experience.

- Familiar with current MS office applications, and

aptitude to learn additional computer systems

- Supervisory experience and ability to interact as

a team member

- Ability to communicate effectively and understand

customer issues in shipping

- Able to take initiative based on sound problem

solving skills

- Commitment to the highest standards of safe work

12

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 12 of 34
habits

- Knowledge of ERP or People Soft is a plus

24

- Ability to multi-task and make timely critical

decisions

. . . .

(emphasis supplied). Lafarge has no written policy stating that

qualification requirements are relaxed for internal candidates.

Lafarge avers, however, that there is an unwritten company policy

relaxing qualification requirements for internal candidates.

In its reply brief, Lafarge relies heavily on the language

“employees who feel their profile closely matches the job

requirements are encouraged to apply . . .,” omitting reference to

the “so that geographical issues may be taken into consideration”

language, for the proposition that Lafarge expressly refers to its

unwritten company policy in the form itself. In interpreting this

language, Stokes testified:

It means that if they feel like they closely match [the

form], if they feel like they could do the job, we

encourage them to apply because we may be looking at

geographical preference to not go and move somewhere from

a different location or bring someone in and teach them

all about Lafarge all over again. We give you credit for

at least having been employed by Lafarge.

Also of note, it is uncertain whether the form was even

distributed to the interview panel prior to or during the

interview. For example, Griffin testified that he had not seen the

form until questioned about at his deposition.

People Soft is a software program the packhouse uses for bills of

24

lading. The record does not demonstrate what “ERP” stands for.

13

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 13 of 34
C. The Interview Process

The four applicants went through two rounds of interviews.

25

In June 2006, Buffkin, Wehrmeier, Stokes, Griffin, and Ward

conducted the first round of interviews. Although the intention was

to have all five members of the panel interview each applicant at

the same time, of the four candidates, only Jones had two sets of

first round interviews. She interviewed first with Buffkin,

Wehrmeier, and Ward, and then sometime later with Stokes and

Griffin. The top two candidates from round one, Clements and

Walker, were then sent to a second and final round interview with

Bennett and Schooner. The panel questioned each candidate on the

following interview topics:

1. Computer skills,

2. Troubleshooting skills,

3. Handling conflict,

4. Safety,

5. Maximizing production,

6. Flexibility, and

7. Poor performance of subordinates.

Also, the panel posed hypotheticals to see what candidates would do

given a particular situation.

Then, sometime between the June 2006 interviews and the August

2006 hiring decision, the panel sat down to “rank” the candidates.

Stokes provided the panelists a ranking/score sheet (hereinafter

Of note, Jones failed to timely apply for the position. Jones avers

25

that she met with Wehrmeier to discuss the position in early April 2006.

Wehrmeier stated he was going to “choose the most qualified” applicant, and

Jones believed this conversation was intended to discourage her from

applying. Stokes later approached Jones and encouraged her to apply. Jones

then applied.

14

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 14 of 34
“score sheet”). This was the first time any of the panelists, other

than possibly Stokes, had seen or were aware of this score sheet.

During this meeting, the numerical scores were weighted by the

interview panel, with an “X factor.” Lafarge’s purported intent was

to give bonus points for doing better in certain categories. The

panelists assigned raw scores based on their subjective impressions

of the candidates. Candidates were ranked on the following ten

categories:

Category X factor

Attitude/safety 10

Leadership 9

Communication 8

Decision-Making 7

Computer Work 6

Teamwork 5

Experience 4

Job Knowledge 3

Dependability/Initiative/

Adaptability

2

Equipment Skills 1

The panel assigned a raw score for each candidate in each category,

then Stokes divided the raw score by the X factor. For example,

when Wehrmeier gave Jones a “3" in computer work, it was then

15

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 15 of 34
divided by “6,” resulting in a weighted score of “0.5". The effect

26

was to give equipment skills the most weight and attitude/safety

the least weight. This formula yielded the following scores:

1. Clements, weighted/averaged score: 2.25

2. Walker, weighted/averaged score: 2.17

3. Connor, weighted/averaged score: 2.08

4. Jones, weighted/averaged score: 2.07

In assigning the raw scores, panelists used their subjective

impressions. For example, Buffkin testified he assigned the raw

scores based approximately 90% on the interview and 10% from other

factors, including employee evaluations. Buffkin also testified

that he correlated, or attempted to correlate, the interview topics

with these ten categories. For instance, he correlated interview

topic “maximize production” with experience, job knowledge,

decision-making, and equipment skills and “poor performance of

subordinates” with job knowledge and “maybe” equipment skills. In

Buffkin’s notes on the interview for interview topic “computer

skills,” he wrote the following next to Clements, Walker, and

Jones: “experience on all [meaning software] - explained

Stokes’s declaration states she errantly divided the raw scores by

26

the X factor, when she was supposed to multiply them. Using the above

example, Jones should have received an 18 instead of a “0.5" in equipment

skills. Keeping the rest of the formula the same, the effect would be to

reverse the alleged importance of the categories, such that equipment skills

should be the least important, and attitude/safety would be the most

important. If Stokes had multiplied the X factor instead of dividing it, it

would have yielded the following rankings:

1. Clements, Weighted/Averaged Score: 43.82

2. Walker, Weighted/Averaged Score: 41.22

3. Jones, Weighted/Averaged Score: 36.98

4. Connor, Weighted/Averaged Score: 33.90

Note that Jones would have placed higher than Connor using this formula. In

any event, Clements and Walker would have advanced to the second round.

16

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 16 of 34
experiences good.” When ranking them later, he gave Clements and

Walker “9s” and Jones a “7.” The other interviewers had similar

problems identifying why Jones received lower scores in certain

categories than her male counterparts.

Lafarge avers that Jones received low scores because her

interview performance was not as good as her male counterparts.

Lafarge stated Jones has or had a “casual attitude” toward safety

throughout her time at Lafarge and that during the interview she

27

admitted she sometimes did not wear her safety belt and did not

drive the forklifts safely. Buffkin and Ward testified to these

admissions. Jones admits safety was an issue in the interviews, but

denies any admissions. Buffkin and Ward also testified that Jones

28

failed to “satisfactorily answer” questions concerning

troubleshooting equipment and that she lacked familiarity with

equipment, including rail cars. Jones likewise denies these

allegations.

Of note, Griffin was “a little bit surprised” when Walker got

the promotion. He was surprised because of Walker’s “limited

Lafarge is likely alleging this occurred solely during her first

27

round one interview with Buffkin, Wehrmeier, and Ward. Griffin testified

that Jones did not have a bad interview on safety. He testified that when

all five of the decision-makers got together, Wehrmeier and he discussed

differing views on Jones’s safety portion of the interview. In fact, Jones

received raw scores of 9 from Griffin and Stokes on attitude/safety, and

received “4, 2, and 0" from Buffkin, Wehrmeier, and Ward respectively,

indicating a different performance on each interview.

Jones admits she was counseled by Buffkin for two safety violations

28

in 2001.

17

Case 2:07-cv-01807-WMA Document 24 Filed 10/21/08 Page 17 of 34
experience.” In addition, following the interview, Jones avers that

she met with Buffkin to ask why Walker received the promotion over

her. She alleges that Buffkin told her he got the job because

Walker “could discipline the men better . . . they felt the men

would respect [Walker] better.”

II. Analysis

A. Which theory is Jones relying on?

This case is a classic example of the problem that inheres in

a complaint based upon one alleged adverse employment decision that

has alternative proscribed motivations and ambiguous pleadings.

Jones brings two claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964. She styles one claim “Count II: Race Discrimination Title VII

Promotion” and the other “Count III: Sex Discrimination Title VII

Promotion.” In these two sections, Jones alleges Lafarge’s alleged

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adverse decision, failure to promote, is (1) based on “pretext” and

(2) that Lafarge engages in a “pattern and practice of

discriminat[ion],” without pointing to a specific theory for each.

This lack of precision in pleading always leads to trouble. The

court cannot tell which theory or theories apply to the claim of

race and which to gender discrimination. Additionally, Jones

neither discusses her status as a member of two distinct protected

classes, namely black and female, nor suggests how the court should

proceed given this situation. It could be that Jones is claiming

Count I is Jones’s 28 U.S.C. § 1981 race discrimination claim.

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intersectional discrimination against black females as a protected

group.

There are three theories of intentional discrimination that

are actionable under Title VII: (1) disparate treatment

discrimination; (2) disparate impact discrimination; and (3) a

pattern or practice of discrimination. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab,

Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000). Under theory (1), there

are arguably two distinct theories, (a) individual disparate

treatment and (b) systemic disparate treatment based on either a

formal policy of discrimination or a pattern and practice of

discrimination. “Pattern or practice” statistical data is relevant

not only to a “pattern and practice” cause of action, but also the

disparate treatment theories. See, e.g., Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546,

553 (7th Cir. 2000)(“Within the McDonnell Douglas individual

disparate treatment model . . . statistical evidence is only one

small part of a substantial web of evidence indicating pretext”;

referencing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

discussed infra). The data is of course essential to a disparate

impact cause of action. Thus, when Jones states in her complaint

that “the defendant engages in a pattern and practice of

discrimination in promotions on the basis of race,” she fails

expressly to direct the court to any specific theory of intentional

discrimination.

Although Jones fails to address her dual status as a black

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female in any of her court filings, in Jefferies v. Harris County

Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980), in a decision

binding on this court, the Fifth Circuit held that black women are

a “distinct protected subgroup for purposes of the [McDonnell

Douglas] prima facie case and proof of pretext . . . .” Id. at

1034. As is arguably common in such “sex-plus” or “race-plus”

claims, certain material facts may support one claim, such as sex

discrimination, or another, race discrimination, or both, or may

perhaps inversely cut against each other. Clearly this is not a

square peg, square hole scenario for the court. However, in this

case, Jones makes only one viable claim, namely individual

disparate treatment. The gravamen of her claim is that, as a black

female, she failed to receive the promotion to packhouse

supervisor, and Lafarge instead promoted her white male

counterpart, Walker, even though she was substantially more

qualified. Since Lafarge concedes that Jones has presented a prima

facie case, discussed infra, all the evidence presented will go

toward her burden at the pretext stage. And as the court will

discuss, even if she has somehow “hinted” her way into a systemic

disparate treatment, disparate impact, or pattern and practice

claim, only her individual disparate treatment claim has sufficient

merit to survive Rule 56 analysis.

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B. Title VII Race/Sex and § 1981 Race Discrimination Claims

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1. Individual Disparate Treatment

The parties and the court agree that Jones’s Title VII race

and gender claims against Lafarge are based solely upon

circumstantial evidence. In order to prevail on a Title VII

disparate treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence, the

court applies the familiar burden shifting framework established by

the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)

and Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

Jones’s § 1981 race discrimination claim also follows this

framework. Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 843

n.11 (11th Cir. 2000). Jones must demonstrate race discrimination.

Lafarge concedes that Jones has met her prima facie burden.

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Lafarge then has a burden of production to rebut Jones’s claim.

“The burden then shifts to the defendant . . . to rebut the

presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the

plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a

Title VII states in pertinent part: “It shall be an unlawful

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employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title

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VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class;

(2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her employer

treated similarly situated employees outside her protected class more

favorably; and (4) she was qualified for the job. See Burke-Fowler v. Orange

County, Florida, 447 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Crawford

v. W. Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980)(setting this Circuit’s

standard).

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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not

persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered

reasons.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (citation omitted); see also

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993).

If the defendant-employer meets this intermediate burden, the

presumption is eliminated, and the plaintiff “must establish that

each of the defendant’s proffered reasons for hiring someone of a

different race is pretextual.” Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256

F.3d 1095, 1104 (11th Cir. 2001)(citation omitted). “The ultimate

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all

times with the plaintiff.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.

Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007)(citations

omitted). Here, Jones claims that Lafarge has failed to meet its

intermediate burden. Alternatively, Jones claims that Lafarge’s

proffered reasons are pretextual. Lafarge, of course, denies both

assertions. Each issue is discussed in turn.

2. Jones argues Lafarge failed to meet its burden of production.

The employer’s burden of production here is neither “onerous,

[nor] is it a mere formality. The [employer] may not satisfy its

burden by presenting a hypothetical reason for the employment

decision in question; instead it must raise a genuine issue of fact

as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff by making that

decision.” Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1184 (11th Cir.

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1998)(internal quotations and citations omitted). The defendant’s

burden is “exceedingly light.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and

Rubber Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2005)(citation

omitted), aff’d, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).

Lafarge’s central argument is that Jones’s poor interview

performance (and thus her interview scores) were the reason Jones

failed to receive the promotion. Lafarge cites to Bass, 256 F.3d at

1105, for the proposition that “poor interview performance - can be

as legitimate as any other reason.” Id. Bass is relevant not only

for present purposes, but also for the pretext discussion infra.

a. Lafarge argues Bass is instructive

In Bass, plaintiff Bass sued his employer Orange County,

Florida, alleging, inter alia, Title VII race discrimination and

retaliation. Bass, a white male, was laid off when the county

reorganized its fire department, and he later applied for one of

three open training instructor positions. Id. at 1098-99. Every

qualified, laid-off person was allowed to do so. Id. The job

requirements included two years as a training instructor or closely

related work experience. Id. Bass exceeded this and all other

qualifications. Id. The interview panel consisted of three persons,

all of whom were of not of Bass’s race or gender. Bass, 256 F.3d at

1099. The panel asked pre-selected questions to “test their

responses to hypothetical questions [candidates] may face on the

job.” Id. at 1098-99. The panel members lacked experience as

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training instructors, lacked training on interviewing skills, did

not receive the questions until right before the interview, and did

not receive a job description. Id. at 1099-1100. They were not

instructed to take notes on the interviews, and did not do so. Id.

After the interviews were complete, the panel ranked the candidates

based on their subjective impressions, and Bass finished ninth out

of thirteen. Id. at 1099-1100. Of the three candidates that were

hired, one was a black male who did not meet the basic

qualification of two years experience. Id. at 1100. Importantly,

Bass admitted he did not do very well in the interview. Bass, 256

F.3d at 1107. The interview was the only factor the panel utilized

in their rankings, despite county policy to the contrary. Id. at

1099. Bass later successfully filed a union grievance and was given

a training instructor position created especially for him. Id. at

1101-02. After some years of working under the title “training

instructor,” and being treated differently from the other three

instructors, and deleteriously so, he filed his case. Id. The

district court granted summary judgment to the county, but the

Eleventh Circuit reversed. Id. The county had conceded that Bass

met his prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, and then stated

its nondiscriminatory reason was Bass’s poor interview performance.

Id. at 1102. The Eleventh Circuit cautioned that “in order for a

subjective reason to constitute a legally sufficient, legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, the defendant must articulate a clear and

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reasonably specific factual basis upon which it based its

subjective opinion.” Id. at 1106 (internal quotations and citations

omitted). The court held (1) the interviewers had “explained the

grounds for their subjective evaluations with reasonable clarity

and specificity,” concluded (2) that on this factual basis the

county met its burden, and (3) moved to the pretext analysis. In

the pretext analysis, the court found for Bass, in part, because

the county promoted a less qualified candidate.

b. Jones argues Blackledge is instructive

Jones attempts to distinguish Lafarge’s interpretation of Bass

and also argues that Blackledge v. Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health

and Mental Retardation, No. 06-321, 2007 WL 3124452 (M.D. Ala. Oct.

25, 2007) applies here. Jones argues Blackledge stands for the

proposition that an employer, when it subjectively scores

candidates for promotion (using score sheets), who fails to

identify the “process” the panel members used in their decision,

cannot meet its burden of production. In Blackledge, the plaintiff

Blackledge, a black female, was not promoted and sued her employer,

the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation

(“DMH/MR”) and her boss, John Houston. The court examined the

DMH/MR’s alleged non-discriminatory reasons, including the

defendant’s assertion that Blackledge’s combined score by the

interview panel was lower than the white female who received the

position. Id. at *18. The court found the three exhibits DMH/MR

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used to support this argument to be unpersuasive, because, inter

alia, DMH/MR failed to provide the court with all of the scoring

sheets and the DMH/MR’s decision-maker “merely says that the scores

were assigned based upon the interviewees’ experience, education,

and the interview.” Id. at *18. However, the court assumed arguendo

that defendant had met its burden, and found the ambiguity in

DMH/MR’s explanation, coupled with other evidence, was enough to

create a jury issue on pretext.

Neither Bass nor Blackledge fits the instant case like a

glove. Here, there are multiple decision makers who have tied

Jones’s interview scores to subjective criteria and all of the

scoring sheets are in the record, unlike Blackledge. Also, unlike

Blackledge, the mere conclusory testimony of one decision maker and

meager documentation are not present here. Lafarge has tied its

justification to Jones’s purported poor interview answers on

safety, troubleshooting, and equipment knowledge based mainly on

Buffkin and Wards’ testimony. Jones disputes that she ever admitted

to not wearing her seat belt or driving the forklift unsafely.

Further, she disputes that she failed to successfully answer

questions concerning troubleshooting, whereas in Bass, Bass

admitted he performed poorly in the interview. Lafarge’s burden

here is exceedingly light, yet the court need not decide whether

Lafarge met its burden.

The court finds that although Lafarge’s argument that its

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subjective evaluation of interview scores had “reasonably clarity

and specificity” is arguably better supported than was DMH/MR’s

position in Blackledge, Lafarge’s method in ranking the score

sheets, coupled with the other reasons discussed below, creates a

jury issue as to Lafarge’s true motivations. Furthermore, because

Jones disputes Buffkin and Ward’s testimony about the interview,

the court will assume arguendo that Lafarge has met its burden of

production at this stage.

3. Jones argues that Lafarge’s reasons are pretextual.

Jones has several arguments to suggest that Lafarge’s reasons

are pretextual. First, is Jones’s satisfaction of the experience

requirement compared to the lack of qualifications of her white,

male counterparts establishes pretext. Second, is the fact that

Lafarge relied on an unpublished practice to avoid applying

qualifications for the packhouse supervisor position to white, male

applicants which suggests pretext. Third, the reasons given by

Lafarge for Ms. Jones’s scores are not true, mainly Lafarge’s

justifications concerning disputes over Jones’s interview answers.

The court finds Jones’s first two arguments are intertwined and

persuasive, and thus discusses them together. The court adds a

fourth, namely the method in ranking, noted above. Jones impliedly

touches on this argument but fails to raise it expressly.

a. Qualifications and Experience

Jones’s says she has superior qualifications. In such a

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situation the Eleventh Circuit instructs:

In a failure to promote case, a plaintiff cannot prove

pretext by simply showing that she was better qualified

than the individual who received the position that she

wanted. A plaintiff must show not merely that the

defendant’s employment decisions were mistaken but that

they were in fact motivated by sex . . . . Nevertheless,

evidence showing an employer hired a less qualified

applicant over the plaintiff may be probative of whether

the employer’s proffered reason for not promoting the

plaintiff was pretextual.

Lee v. GTE Florida Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). And

the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that plaintiffs “must

adduce evidence that the disparity in qualifications was so

apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the

face.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1090 (11th

Cir. 2004)(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also

Bass, 256 F.3d at 1107 (“Hiring a less qualified person can support

an inference of discriminat[ion].”). For instance, in Wilson, the

court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

plaintiff’s failure to promote claim. In Wilson, the plaintiff

Wilson sued her employer, alleging, inter alia, failure to promote

based on superior qualifications in comparison with the promoted

candidate, Baker. The court held that because (1) several managers,

including the decision-maker, stated that Wilson was “more

qualified” than Baker and (2) that there was some circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory animus by a manager, based on the

alleged statement “women aren’t typically in that type of

position,” that Wilson could survive summary judgment. Id. at 1091-

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92.

Here, pursuant to the terms of the job opportunity form, Jones

was qualified for the job, and Walker was not. A qualification is

“[t]he possession of qualities or properties . . . inherently

necessary to make one eligible for a position . . . .” Black’s Law

Dictionary 1275 (8th ed. 1999). Jones has necessary “minimum 2 year

cement plant experience or terminal operating experience.” Walker

had been working at Lafarge since approximately October 17, 2005.

When the applications were due in May 2006, he had six months and

seventeen days worth of experience in a cement plant. Nothing in

the record indicates any of his previous experience, mainly at J&M

Citgo, provided him with any “terminal operating experience”

either. Even if the court looks to the August 28, 2006, approximate

promotion date, Walker still had less than one year of experience.

Furthermore, Clements, who started in January, and who made it to

the final round of interviews, had even less experience that Walker

or Jones.

Additionally, Lafarge listed “supervisory experience and

ability to interact as a team member.” Jones was the only one of

the other three candidates who had any supervisory experience.

Thus, on the face of the form, Walker is less qualified than Jones.

Notably, Lafarge contends that there was an unwritten policy to

relax the qualifications for internal employees and points to the

form which states: “employees who feel their profile closely

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matches the job requirements are encouraged to apply so that

geographical issues may be taken into consideration.” Stokes’s

interpretation of the form, explaining that it relates to moving

and training costs, thwarts Lafarge’s reply brief argument that

“the [unwritten] practice is expressly referenced in the job

posting.” Even assuming Lafarge is correct inasmuch as the form’s

language is ambiguous, it likely relates to an external candidate

compared with an internal candidate, not four internal candidates

compared with each other who all work at same plant where the job

opening exists. In addition, Lafarge had the opportunity to make

the language “expressly reference” the unwritten policy when

Wehrmeier’s altered the form. He chose not to adjust the “minimum

two year requirement” nor the “supervisory experience” language.

Also, Griffin testified he was surprised when the job went to

Walker and was unaware the form itself ever existed.

Moreover, Buffkin was allegedly concerned that Walker could

“discipline the men better” than Jones. The potential inference

from Buffkin’s alleged statement is that Jones could not discipline

the men as well because she is a woman. Also, Buffkin’s interview

notes contain the same notes for Walker, Clements, and Jones, but

yield “9s” for the white males and a “7" for Jones. Like in Wilson,

the clear language of the form and Jones’s superior qualifications,

coupled with the admissions of Griffin and the alleged

discriminatory animus by Buffkin, creates a jury question on the

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issue of pretext.

b. Jones argues Lafarge’s reasons for her scores are not true

Even if Jones’s interview is the paradigm case of “what not to

do” in an interview, Jones’s December 8, 2005, employee evaluation

by Wehrmeier and Buffkin suggest that they found she excelled in

almost every category, including safety, job knowledge, and quality

of work, expressly rebutting the claim that Jones was poor on

safety and troubleshooting. Buffkin testified he based his scores

90% on the interview and that the “employee evaluations” were not

supposed to be competitive nor did he consider them in the

interview process. A possible inference may be drawn that the

interview process acted as or was a possible ruse where managers

randomly pick and choose subjective criteria without objective

guideposts, ignoring their own prior assessments of candidates. Of

some consequence, although Walker had only been at Lafarge less

than two months in December 2005, Buffkin chose to give him an

evaluation anyway and ranked him below Jones.

c. Method in Ranking/Scoring Candidates

The court adds another reason that Jones’s alluded to but

never fully articulated. Although federal courts are “not in the

business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or

fair,” Bass, 256 F.3d at 1108, interviewers must explain their

“subjective evaluation with reasonable clarity and specificity . .

. .” Id. at 1106. The fact that the panel interviewed Jones based

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on eight topics and then had to correlate those interview topics

with ten criteria, emphasizes that the entire process was fraught

with lack of reasonable specificity. Like the score sheets in

Blackledge, the score sheets here only listed the category titles

and numerical scores without explanation. Indeed, no member of the

panel, with the exception of maybe Stokes, had ever even seen the

ten score sheet categories prior to the interviews. Matching one

criteria with another proved a difficult exercise. For example,

Buffkin tried to correlate interview topic (5) “maximize

production” with four separate ranking categories, namely

experience, job knowledge, decision making, and equipment skills,

with no discernable guidelines. This demonstrates lack of

reasonable specificity. The court ponders, does each of the four

ranking categories receive a potential 1/4 of the points for

maximize production? How does each correlate? Did each panel member

use the same correlation criteria?

While perhaps no single reason, by itself, is sufficient to

demonstrate pretext, four reasons, when viewed together in the

light most favorable to Jones, satisfy the court that a reasonable

juror could find for Jones on the issue of pretext.

C. Disparate Impact, Systemic Disparate Treatment, Pattern &

Practice

The record demonstrates that of approximately twenty-six

supervisors at Lafarge, none of them are black females. It is wellsettled that such unsupported assertions, while demonstrating

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possible discrepancies between black and white workers, cannot

without more add to the pretext analysis. See Brown v. Am. Honda

Co., Inc., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir. 1991)(reasoning that the

court must know how many blacks applied and failed versus how many

equally qualified white applicants applied and failed; noting

without such data the figures are “virtually meaningless”). For the

same inadequacies, Jones has not made out a disparate impact case,

lacking any reference to the relevant labor pool, an employment

practice of Lafarge, or any nexus between the two. See, e.g., Joe’s

Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1274. Neither is there any identifiable

policy pointing to systemic disparate treatment. Nor is this strong

statistical evidence supporting a portion of a “pattern and

practice claim.” Id. at 1286-87. Generously assuming there is a

pattern and practice claim here, the record fails to support

discrimination is Lafarge’s standard operation procedure, as

opposed to an unusual practice. Id. at 1286-87.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Lafarge’s motion for summary judgment

will be partially denied and partially granted.

DONE this 21th day of October, 2008.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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