Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07064/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07064-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro
Appellee
Republic of Argentina
Appellee
TIG Insurance Company
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 5, 2024 Decided July 30, 2024

No. 23-7064

TIG INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO 

INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND INTERNATIONAL 

SURPLUS LINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

APPELLANT

v.

REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, AS SUCCESSOR TO CAJA NACIONAL 

DE AHORRO Y SEGURO AND CAJA NACIONAL DE AHORRO Y 

SEGURO,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-mc-00129)

Mark N. Bravin argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Theresa B. Bowman.

Rathna J. Ramamurthi argued the cause for appellee

Republic of Argentina. With her on the brief were Carmine D. 

Boccuzzi Jr. and Charles M. Asmar. Thomas R. Lynch entered 

an appearance.

USCA Case #23-7064 Document #2067342 Filed: 07/30/2024 Page 1 of 29
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Before: RAO, WALKER, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

GARCIA, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves an insurance 

company’s efforts to enforce two judgments against the 

Republic of Argentina. It implicates several questions 

concerning the scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 

of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., which grants foreign states 

immunity from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts in the 

United States, subject to certain express exceptions. We 

conclude that two of those exceptions—the arbitration and 

waiver exceptions—may apply in this case, and remand to the 

district court for further analysis and factfinding.

I

The following facts and procedural history are drawn from 

undisputed facts and prior decisions involving the parties. See 

TIG Ins. v. Republic of Argentina (“TIG I”), 2019 WL 3017618 

(D.D.C. July 10, 2019), vacated and remanded, TIG Ins. v. 

Republic of Argentina (“TIG II”), 967 F.3d 778 (D.C. Cir. 

2020); Int’l Ins. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 

392 (7th Cir. 2002). 

A

TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”) is a private insurance 

company resulting from a series of mergers of other insurance 

companies. For simplicity, we refer to TIG and its 

predecessors as “TIG.” In 1979, TIG entered into two

reinsurance contracts with Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguros 

(“Caja”), a state-owned Argentine company. Reinsurance, put 

simply, is insurance for insurers. TIG agreed to pay Caja a 

share of the premiums TIG received on underlying insurance 

policies in exchange for Caja’s payment of a share of certain 

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losses TIG became obligated to pay under those policies. TIG 

alleges that Caja repeatedly failed to pay TIG as promised. 

Beginning in the 1990s, the Republic of Argentina

(“Argentina”) issued a series of resolutions addressing Caja’s

corporate status and operations. In 1994, Argentina declared 

Caja dissolved and placed it in the process of liquidation. In 

1998, Argentina declared “transferred to the National Treasury

the liquidated liabilities and the contingent liabilities and 

assets” of Caja “derived from the reinsurance businesses active 

in the international private market.” J.A. 237. 

In 2000, TIG initiated arbitral proceedings against Caja for 

failing to pay under the reinsurance contracts. TIG won by 

default. In 2001, TIG confirmed that arbitral award against 

Caja in the Northern District of Illinois (the “2001 judgment”)

in default proceedings. The Seventh Circuit upheld the 

judgment. See Int’l Ins., 293 F.3d at 401. 

After the 2001 judgment, Argentina issued additional

resolutions about Caja’s status. In 2003, Argentina transferred 

to its Legal Undersecretary responsibility for handling Caja’s 

international docket of foreign court litigation and international 

arbitrations “through . . . final conclusion” of each matter. J.A.

887. In 2005, Argentina transferred to itself Caja’s 

“liquidated” and “contingent assets and liabilities.” J.A. 252. 

In 2016, TIG initiated a second arbitral proceeding, again 

alleging breach of the reinsurance contracts, but this time 

against Argentina. TIG won by default, with the arbitral panel 

accepting TIG’s position that Argentina was Caja’s successorin-interest and therefore subject to the arbitration provision in 

the contracts. In 2018, TIG confirmed the second arbitral 

award against Argentina, again in the Northern District of 

Illinois, and again by default (the “2018 judgment”).

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Later in 2018, TIG learned that Argentina had listed real 

estate for sale in the District of Columbia. Prompted by this 

discovery, TIG registered the 2001 and 2018 judgments in the 

District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1963. TIG 

simultaneously filed an omnibus motion for emergency relief, 

attachment-related relief, and a writ of execution on the 

property. Soon after, Argentina pulled the real estate listing 

from the market, despite pending offers to buy the property. In 

the district court, Argentina opposed TIG’s omnibus motion,

relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976

(“FSIA”).

B

The FSIA “confers on foreign states two kinds of 

immunity.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. 

134, 142 (2014). The first is jurisdictional immunity, pursuant

to which “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction 

of the courts of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1604, subject 

to several enumerated exceptions, see id. §§ 1605–1607. The 

second is execution immunity, which further protects foreign 

sovereigns by ensuring that in the event of an adverse 

judgment, the sovereign’s property in the United States “shall 

be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution,” id. § 

1609, again subject to several enumerated exceptions, see id.

§§ 1610–1611. 

Because of the FSIA’s dual immunities, parties seeking 

judicial enforcement of an award against a foreign state face 

two hurdles: They must “establish both that the foreign state is 

not immune from suit and that the property to be attached or 

executed against is not immune” from execution. TIG II, 967 

F.3d at 781. 

In 2018, facing TIG’s omnibus motion, Argentina raised

execution immunity and prevailed. According to the district 

court, Argentina’s property was immune from execution

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because Argentina had taken the property off the market. This 

meant that the property was not “used for a commercial 

activity”—a prerequisite for certain of the FSIA’s execution 

immunity exceptions—at the time the court’s writ would issue.

TIG I, 2019 WL 3017618, at *3–4; see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).

TIG appealed, and we vacated and remanded. We held 

that whether a property is “used for a commercial activity” 

depends on the “totality of the circumstances” at the time when 

the motion for a writ of attachment is filed, not when the writ 

would issue. TIG II, 967 F.3d at 785; see also Bainbridge Fund 

Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 102 F.4th 464, 468–70 (D.C. Cir.

2024) (applying the “totality of circumstances” test to the same

Argentina-owned property in a suit involving a different 

judgment creditor).

On remand, Argentina again moved to dismiss. It 

continued to argue that the property was not used for 

“commercial activity” and therefore immune from execution.

But Argentina also raised jurisdictional immunity under the 

FSIA. In response, as relevant to this appeal, TIG argued that 

two of the FSIA’s exceptions to jurisdictional immunity 

applied: the arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6), and 

the waiver exception, id. § 1605(a)(1). 

TIG argued that two provisions in Caja’s reinsurance 

contracts triggered those exceptions, and that Argentina now 

stood in Caja’s shoes. First, Caja had agreed to submit disputes 

under the contracts to arbitration in Chicago, Illinois (the 

“arbitration provision”). J.A. 305, 325. Second, Caja had

agreed that “all matters arising hereunder shall be determined 

in accordance with the law and practice” “of any court of 

competent jurisdiction within the United States” (the “choiceof-law provision”). J.A. 304, 324.

TIG argued that Argentina was bound by these contract 

provisions just like Caja because of Argentina’s relationship to 

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Caja. Relevant to this appeal, TIG offered two theories. The 

first was that Argentina became Caja’s “successor-in-interest” 

by issuing the official resolutions, under which Argentina 

“expressly assumed all of Caja’s legal obligations, assets, and 

liabilities” under the reinsurance contracts. Appellant’s Brief 

50. TIG’s second theory was that Argentina used Caja as an

“alter ego.” Under the alter ego principle, a court can find that 

an entity like Caja lacks a separate identity from another 

controlling entity. See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco 

Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611, 

623–30 (1983). 

The district court construed Argentina’s motion to dismiss 

as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and issued two decisions, 

requesting supplemental briefing in between. The court sided 

with Argentina on all issues. For the 2018 judgment, the 

district court held that the Illinois district court lacked 

jurisdiction over Argentina because none of TIG’s asserted 

exceptions applied. The district court also rejected TIG’s 

request for jurisdictional discovery. For the 2001 judgment,

the court held that TIG needed to amend the judgment back in 

Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in 

federal court here. Based on these rulings, the district court 

concluded that it need not revisit the execution immunity

dispute. 

TIG sought reconsideration on several issues, which the 

district court denied. TIG then appealed.

II

We review a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction de novo with 

respect to legal conclusions. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 77 

F.4th 1077, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2023). We review a denial of 

jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. UrquhartBradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2020). We 

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likewise review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for 

abuse of discretion. Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 23 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015). 

III

TIG argues that two FSIA exceptions independently 

provided the Illinois district court jurisdiction over Argentina 

to enter the 2018 judgment. We start with the arbitration

exception. Contrary to the district court, we conclude that the 

exception may apply subject to further analysis and factfinding 

on remand. 

A

The arbitration exception provides, in relevant part, that a 

foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of a 

United States court for an action 

brought, either to enforce an agreement made by 

the foreign state with or for the benefit of a 

private party to submit to arbitration all or any 

differences which have arisen or which may 

arise between the parties with respect to a 

defined legal relationship . . . or to confirm an 

award made pursuant to such an agreement to 

arbitrate. 

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). 

As the district court recognized, the parties’ dispute is 

limited. See TIG Ins. v. Republic of Argentina (“TIG III, Part 

One”), 2022 WL 1154749, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022). The 

parties agree that the reinsurance contracts are agreements that 

call for the arbitration of “any differences.” And they agree 

that the arbitral award confirmed in the 2018 judgment arises 

from the reinsurance contracts. Their only disagreement is 

whether the reinsurance contracts’ arbitration provision was

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“made by” Argentina because Caja, not Argentina, signed the 

contracts with TIG. See Appellant’s Brief 42–50; Appellee’s 

Brief 21–27.

In TIG’s view, a court should determine whether the 

arbitration agreements were “made by” Argentina by deciding

whether Argentina, as a nonsignatory to the contract, is 

nonetheless bound by the agreement under ordinary contract 

law principles. See Appellant’s Brief 42–48. And here, TIG 

says, Argentina is so bound. Id. at 48–50.

According to TIG, Argentina is Caja’s successor-ininterest. Under successorship principles, when a nonsignatory 

takes certain steps in relation to a contract (such as, in many 

jurisdictions, assuming another entity’s liabilities under that 

contract), the nonsignatory can be treated as bound to the 

contract’s obligations, no different than the original party. See 

BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe, 93 F.4th 595, 598

n.1 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Successors in interest stand in the shoes of 

their predecessors . . . as if they were parties to the original 

agreements and actions of their predecessors.” (cleaned up));

Aguas Lenders Recovery Grp. v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 700–

01 (2d Cir. 2009). TIG submits that Argentina’s official 

resolutions expressly “assumed” Caja’s assets and liabilities 

flowing from the reinsurance contracts, as well as future legal 

obligations related to those contracts. After those resolutions, 

in TIG’s view, Argentina cannot pick and choose which 

provisions of the contracts it wishes to be bound by; it is bound 

by all, including the arbitration provision. TIG points to cases

where courts have held that arbitration provisions specifically

may be enforced against the successors-in-interest of the 

original signatories. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief 26–27 

(collecting cases); see also 21 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts 

§ 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2017) (“Under an assumption theory, a 

party may be bound by an arbitration clause if its subsequent 

conduct indicates that [it] is assuming the obligation to 

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arbitrate, despite being a nonsignatory.”). According to TIG, 

because Argentina is Caja’s successor-in-interest to the 

reinsurance contracts, it is bound by the arbitration provision, 

and the reinsurance contracts are “made by” Argentina for the 

purposes of the arbitration exception.

Argentina offers a different approach. Rather than 

assessing whether the sovereign is bound by the arbitration 

provision, Argentina argues that a court should simply ask 

whether the sovereign (or its alter ego) originally signed the 

contract containing the provision. Under Argentina’s proposed 

inquiry, it is irrelevant whether Argentina assumed Caja’s 

assets and liabilities under the reinsurance contracts (which 

Argentina disputes). Because only Caja signed the reinsurance 

contracts, Argentina says, the reinsurance contracts were not 

“made by” Argentina. See Appellee’s Brief 42–49. 

The district court agreed with Argentina. It held that an 

arbitration agreement is only “made by” the parties who signed 

the contract “at the time of formation.” TIG III, Part One, 2022 

WL 1154749, at *7. So “even if Argentina is Caja’s successorin-interest” and “assumed Caja’s contractual liabilities,” “the 

arbitration agreements were nonetheless not ‘made by’ 

Argentina so as to waive sovereign immunity.” Id. at *8. The 

district court therefore did not analyze whether Argentina is

successor-in-interest to Caja under the reinsurance contracts. 

See id.

B

On appeal, TIG again urges that if Argentina adopted the 

arbitration agreement under successorship principles, then the 

agreement qualifies as one “made by the foreign state . . . to

submit to arbitration” under the FSIA’s arbitration exception. 

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). We agree with TIG and conclude that 

an agreement is “made by” a sovereign if it legally binds that

sovereign to arbitrate with the party opposing the sovereign’s 

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sovereign immunity. That question is answered by resort to 

ordinary principles of contract law, which may include 

successorship and assumption if the governing law recognizes 

them. We reject the contrary view, under which an arbitration 

agreement can only be “made by” a sovereign that was an 

original party to it.

Our analysis begins with the statute’s text. We must read 

the statutory text as a whole and assess the words in the context 

in which they are used. See, e.g., Textron Lycoming 

Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S. 

653, 657 (1998) (“It is not the meaning of ‘for’ we are seeking 

here, but the meaning of ‘suits for violation of contracts.’”

(alteration omitted)); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 

341 (1997). The key phrase here is “an agreement made by the 

foreign state . . . to submit to arbitration.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(6). That phrase supports TIG’s position that an 

arbitration agreement is “made by” a sovereign that later adopts

the agreement just as much as a sovereign who was a party to 

the agreement when it was initially made.

To “make” in the context of making a contract or 

agreement is commonly understood to include later adoption of 

that agreement. For example, both TIG and the district court 

cite the then-current version of Black’s Law Dictionary, which

defined to “make a contract” as “[t]o agree upon, and conclude 

or adopt, a contract.” Make a Contract, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). This 

understanding of to “make”—as TIG urges—encompasses a 

nonoriginal signatory who later adopts an agreement to

arbitrate. 

Moreover, the word “agreement” as it appears in the 

statutory phrase is best understood as an act that has the legal 

consequence of requiring the sovereign to arbitrate. See 

Agreement, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“In law, a 

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concord of understanding and intention between two or more 

parties with respect to the effect upon their relative rights and 

duties, of certain past or future facts or performances.”); see 

also Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“An 

agreement between two or more persons which creates an 

obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.”). If the 

sovereign is not an original signatory but takes actions that 

cause it to adopt and become subject to the agreement, nothing 

in the ordinary meaning of the statutory text suggests the

sovereign does not qualify as having “made” the “agreement.” 

Argentina’s original-parties-only argument would perhaps 

gain some force if we instead looked at the words “made by” 

in isolation. After all, “make”—the word stem of “made”—

can mean “[t]o cause to exist”; “[t]o form, fashion or produce”; 

or “[t]o do, perform, or execute.” Make, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Zooming in on just those words, as 

Argentina would have us do, one could conclude that Argentina 

could only “make” an agreement that it participated in drafting. 

But, as already explained, that is not how we interpret statutes. 

We must read the statutory text as a whole and in context; doing 

so here supports TIG’s view, not Argentina’s. 

In adopting Argentina’s reading, the district court found it 

important that “made by” is a “past participial phrase.” TIG 

III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *7. The court then 

concluded that “made by” refers only to the parties present at 

“the time of formation.” Id. The use of a verb tense can be 

significant in construing statutes. See, e.g., United States v. 

Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. 

v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 63 n.4 (1987). 

But here it is not obvious that any tense applies to the phrase 

“made by.” Cf. TIG II, 967 F.3d at 782–83 (declining to 

associate any tense with “used” in the phrase “used for a 

commercial activity”). Moreover, even accepting the view that 

the phrase is past tense would do nothing to support 

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Argentina’s position. Relative to the time when an “action is 

brought” to “enforce” an arbitration agreement, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(6), both the moment an agreement is first created and 

the moment a nonsignatory adopts the agreement would be in 

the past. The facts of this case illustrate the point: If 

Argentina’s actions in the 1990s and 2000s caused it to adopt 

the arbitration agreement, then it can be said to have “made” 

the agreement at that past time. 

The district court also stated—and Argentina repeats on 

appeal—that “if Congress had intended the arbitration

exception to” apply here, it could have said the exception 

applies to “agreements that ‘bound’ or ‘governed’ foreign 

states, as opposed to agreements that those states ‘made.’” TIG 

III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *7; see Appellee’s Brief 

41. True enough. But Congress also could have specified that 

an agreement be “signed by” or “originated by” the foreign 

state if it intended the contrary reading. That the statute could 

have been more specific in either direction “does not aid our 

inquiry.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.

The district court also found its original-signatories-only

reading supported by the fact that the arbitration exception 

exists at least in part to implement the Inter-American 

Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, a 

multilateral treaty commonly known as the Panama 

Convention. TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *7

(citing An Act to Implement the Inter–American Convention 

on International Commercial Arbitration, Pub. L. No. 100-669, 

102 Stat. 3969 (1988)). That convention applies to “parties” 

who have “undertake[n] to submit to arbitral decision any 

differences that may arise or have arisen between them” in an

“agreement.” Inter-American Convention on International 

Commercial Arbitration art. 1, Jan. 30, 1975, T.I.A.S. 90-1027,

1438 U.N.T.S. 245. Neither that language nor any other aspect 

of the convention that we can identify, however, speaks to 

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whether a sovereign that takes steps to assume or adopt a 

contract is covered. The convention therefore does not assist

our analysis.

1

Our understanding of the exception is reinforced by the 

FSIA’s broader context. Congress enacted the FSIA with the 

“express goal of codifying the restrictive theory of sovereign 

immunity.” Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 

169, 182 (2021). Under the restrictive theory, in contrast to 

“the absolute or classical theory of sovereign immunity,” 

“immunity extends to a sovereign’s public but not its private 

acts.” Id. “Most of the FSIA’s exceptions” give effect to “the 

overarching framework of the restrictive theory” by targeting 

situations where a sovereign has engaged in private acts. Id. at 

182–83. And here, Argentina is alleged to have entered the 

private insurance industry through its assumption of Caja’s 

business, including its assets and liabilities. A rule under which 

a sovereign is free to take over another entity’s obligations 

under a contract with an arbitration provision yet escape the 

immunity-waiving effect of the arbitration agreement would 

seem to frustrate the FSIA’s basic aim. Cf. Aguas Lenders, 585 

F.3d at 701 (“Successorship doctrine prevents parties to 

contracts from using evasive, formalistic means lacking 

economic substance to escape contractual obligations.”). 

1 The district court’s brief discussion of the exception’s purpose 

cited a Second Circuit decision that expressed skepticism in dicta 

towards the “applicability” of an “equitable doctrine” like “benefits 

estoppel” as a basis to “abrogate a state’s immunity under” the

arbitration exception. Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz, 2 F.4th 

42, 67 (2d Cir. 2021). In support, the Second Circuit noted that the 

exception’s purpose was to “implement” the Panama Convention. 

Id. at 68 n.28 (quotation omitted). Gater Assets does not explain how 

the Panama Convention supports an original-signatories-only 

reading of the exception, nor does the decision engage in the broader 

statutory interpretation we must here. 

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Finally, Argentina contends that an interpretation focusing 

on whether the agreement binds the sovereign is improper 

because the FSIA “replac[ed] the old executive-driven, factorintensive, loosely common-law-based immunity regime.” 

NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. at 141. It is true that the FSIA 

embodies Congress’s effort to replace a body of common law 

addressing sovereign immunity that lent itself to “inconsistent 

application” by the Department of State, which then enjoyed 

“primary responsibility” for deciding immunity claims. 

Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010). The question 

posed here, though, is not whether the FSIA displaced the 

common law of sovereign immunity—which it surely does—

but rather whether Congress intended the FSIA to displace the 

substance of common law on other subjects, such as contract 

law, that would inform the meaning of the FSIA’s immunity 

exceptions. Cf. id. at 320 (asking “whether Congress intended 

the FSIA to supersede the common law” on the specific subject 

at issue).

There is no indication that Congress intended the FSIA to 

displace common-law contract principles that inform our 

understanding of what constitutes the “making” of an 

“agreement.” As we have noted, many sources of law “allow 

a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract 

through assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, 

incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, 

waiver[,] and estoppel.” Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 

U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (cleaned up). For example, when 

Congress added the FSIA arbitration exception in 1988, the 

common law in at least some jurisdictions had already 

developed to recognize that “[o]rdinary contract principles 

determine who is bound” to an agreement, and “the mere fact 

that a party did not sign an arbitration agreement does not mean 

that it cannot be held bound by it.” Interocean Shipping Co. v. 

Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 

1975); see Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 

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F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1982); Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. 

Supp. 1529, 1534–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

We see nothing in the FSIA’s arbitration exception that 

“purports to alter” otherwise applicable “background 

principles” concerning who is bound by arbitration agreements. 

Arthur Andersen LLP, 556 U.S. at 630. Instead, the FSIA 

provides no guidance on how covered agreements can be made, 

and thus necessarily requires courts to look to other sources of 

law to make those determinations. The Supreme Court reached 

a similar conclusion in construing the Federal Arbitration Act, 

explaining that the Act does not “alter background principles 

of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements 

(including the question of who is bound by them).” Id. Instead, 

that Act requires looking to an “external body of law” to 

resolve those questions. Id. So too here.

Indeed, both the district court and Argentina accept that at 

least one external, common-law principle already bears on 

what qualifies as an arbitration “agreement made by a foreign 

state.” See TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *8–10; 

Appellee’s Brief 15. This is the “alter ego” principle. Under 

that principle, a court can find that one entity lacks a separate 

identity from another controlling entity. The actions of the first

entity can then be imputed to the sovereign for the purposes of 

waiving sovereign immunity. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629–30. 

And specific to the arbitration exception, in line with 

Argentina’s and the district court’s view, we have assumed that 

when a sovereign’s “alter ego” enters into an agreement, that 

agreement is “made by” the sovereign. See GSS Grp. Ltd. v. 

Nat’l Port Auth. of Liberia, 822 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

In this case, TIG argues that Caja was Argentina’s alter ego, 

which we address in Section V. But the key point for present 

purposes is that Argentina does not dispute that if Caja were 

Argentina’s “alter ego,” then the reinsurance contracts’ 

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arbitration agreements are properly said to be “made by” 

Argentina. 

Reconciling Argentina’s position with our precedent 

would therefore require us to declare that the FSIA recognizes 

the alter ego principle as the one and only external, commonlaw method of binding a nonparty to an arbitration agreement. 

We can identify no basis in the FSIA or logic for that 

conclusion. See 21 Williston § 57:19, p. 183 (listing both “alter 

ego” and “assumption” as examples of several grounds on 

which “a party, despite being a nonsignatory to an arbitration 

agreement, may be equitably bound to arbitrate under 

traditional principles of contract and agency law”). 

C

In sum, we hold that under the FSIA’s arbitration 

exception, an agreement can be “made by” sovereigns other 

than original signatories. We further hold that because the 

FSIA provides no law to guide the determination whether an 

enforceable arbitration agreement exists, that question must be 

answered based on external sources of law. 

On remand, the district court must first consider what 

source of law governs the question of enforcement of the 

arbitration provision. That is because the precise legal test for 

whether (and how) a successorship theory can compel 

arbitration against a nonsignatory can be different from one 

jurisdiction to another. This is generally a question of state 

law. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 

944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to 

arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply 

ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 

contracts.”). But there may be arguments that federal common 

law or another source of law governs. Cf. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 

623 (declining to decide whether international law or federal 

common law governs the question of a state instrumentality’s 

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separate juridical status). The parties have not briefed this 

choice-of-law issue; the district court must consider it on 

remand. 

The district court must then determine whether, under that 

law, Argentina is subject to the arbitration provision. This will 

likely involve factfinding on the existence of a successorship

relationship, if any, between Argentina and Caja. Indeed, there 

appears to be at minimum a dispute of fact over whether 

Argentina assumed liabilities under the reinsurance contracts. 

Compare J.A. 220 (TIG affidavit stating that annex to one 

Argentine resolution specifies liabilities to TIG), with

Appellee’s Brief 6 (citing declarations and claiming that the 

liabilities were not active when Argentina began issuing its 

resolutions). The district court must resolve this dispute and 

any others that may bear on the analysis required by the source 

of law governing the question of enforcement of the arbitration 

provision against Argentina.

IV

We turn now to the second exception TIG contends

provided the Illinois district court jurisdiction over Argentina 

to enter the 2018 judgment: the waiver exception. Again, 

contrary to the district court here, we conclude that the 

exception may apply subject to further analysis and factfinding 

on remand. 

A

The FSIA’s waiver exception “recognizes two species of 

waiver”: explicit and implicit. Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic 

of Iraq, 24 F.4th 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2022). This case concerns 

the latter, which provides that a United States court has 

jurisdiction for an action “in which the foreign state has waived 

its immunity . . . by implication.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). We 

“constru[e] the implied waiver provision narrowly.” Creighton 

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Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir. 

1999).

The FSIA does not define what constitutes waiver by 

implication. Our court has identified “only three 

circumstances” in which a sovereign will be treated as having 

impliedly waived its immunity. Khochinsky v. Republic of 

Poland, 1 F.4th 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). They 

are the sovereign’s: (1) “executing a contract containing a 

choice-of-law clause designating the laws of the United States 

as applicable”; (2) “filing a responsive pleading without 

asserting sovereign immunity”; or (3) “agreeing to submit a 

dispute to arbitration in the United States.” Id. at 8–9 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The legislative history of the FSIA 

provides only” these “three examples of implicit waivers by a 

foreign state, and courts” including ours “have been reluctant 

to recognize an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity in other 

circumstances.” Wye Oak Tech., Inc., 24 F.4th at 691 (citation 

omitted); see H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976); S. Rep. No. 

94-1310, at 17–18 (1976). 

TIG argues all three scenarios here. The district court 

found none of them applicable. TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 

1154749, at *10–11; TIG Ins. v. Republic of Argentina (“TIG 

III, Part Two”), 2022 WL 3594601, at *5–7 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 

2022). We address the arbitration and choice-of-law scenarios 

together before addressing the responsive-pleading scenario. 

B

For the arbitration and choice-of-law scenarios, TIG relies 

on the same basic theory it raised for the arbitration exception:

Because Argentina took affirmative steps that render it Caja’s 

successor-in-interest, Argentina has agreed to the contracts’ 

arbitration and choice-of-law provisions, and it has therefore

impliedly waived immunity. Appellant’s Brief 23–41. 

Argentina responds that what matters for implied waiver is not 

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whether Argentina is bound by the provisions, but rather 

whether there is evidence that it subjectively intended to 

withdraw its sovereign immunity. Appellee’s Brief 27–38. 

Here, it says, TIG points to none. Id. 

We do not read the implied waiver provision to require 

evidence of subjective intent to waive sovereign immunity. As 

explained, this court has already endorsed three scenarios, 

drawn from the statute’s legislative history, in which an 

implied waiver will be found. See supra pp. 18 (collecting 

cases). Those examples depend on the sovereign taking 

specific steps which “the courts” have held indicate a 

willingness to submit to litigation in this country. H.R. Rep. 

No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1310, at 17–18 

(1976). The nature of the examples necessarily entails an 

objective, rather than subjective, assessment of intent. As the 

Second Circuit has put it, these “three examples are persuasive 

evidence that Congress primarily expected courts to hold a 

foreign state to an implied waiver of sovereign immunity by 

the state’s actions in relation to the conduct of litigation.”

Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 

239, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1996).

When a sovereign takes the specified acts, nothing in our 

cases nor the FSIA’s legislative history they draw on indicates

that there must be a further inquiry into whether the sovereign 

affirmatively believed it was waiving immunity. There is, for 

example, no suggestion in the statute or our precedent that if a 

sovereign “fil[ed] a responsive pleading without asserting 

sovereign immunity” or “agree[d] to submit a dispute to 

arbitration in the United States,” Khochinsky, 1 F.4th at 9

(quotation omitted), there would nevertheless be a further 

inquiry into whether the sovereign subjectively intended to 

waive its sovereign immunity by doing so. The FSIA instead 

deems the sovereign to have the requisite intent when it takes 

the specified steps because they “indicate[] its amenability to 

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suit” in this country. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 

F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit has 

similarly concluded that if a sovereign is the successor-ininterest to a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate in the 

United States, it may be found to have impliedly waived its 

sovereign immunity under Section 1605(a)(1). Gen. Star Nat’l

Ins. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 440 

(6th Cir. 2002). 

We emphasize again, however, that beyond the three 

examples we have endorsed where it is appropriate to find 

implied waiver, the provision must be applied “narrowly.” 

Creighton Ltd., 181 F.3d at 122. 

The district court correctly framed the analysis at the 

outset as whether Argentina “agreed to” the provisions at issue. 

TIG III, Part Two, 2022 WL 3594601, at *5–6. It then 

embarked on a different inquiry into Argentina’s subjective 

intent, rather than analyzing whether Argentina is properly

treated as agreeing to the provisions and therefore as having 

implicitly waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at *7. Implied 

waiver thus requires the same conceptual inquiry described 

above for the arbitration exception: If Argentina’s conduct 

renders it subject to those provisions as a matter of law, it has 

impliedly waived its sovereign immunity. 

On remand, because TIG contends here that Argentina’s 

succession to both the choice-of-law and arbitration provisions 

are bases for implied waiver, the district court must analyze 

enforcement of the arbitration provision, per the inquiry we set 

out for the arbitration exception, but it must also analyze 

whether, under the applicable source of law, TIG can enforce 

the choice-of-law provision against Argentina on a 

successorship theory.

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C

As mentioned, the other scenario for implied waiver is

when a sovereign files “a responsive pleading without asserting 

sovereign immunity.” Ivanenko v. Yanukovich, 995 F.3d 232, 

239 (D.C. Cir. 2021). We will not find a waiver on this ground 

“absent a conscious decision to take part in the litigation and a 

failure to raise sovereign immunity despite the opportunity to 

do so.” Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

905 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). 

Here, TIG emphasizes that when Argentina opposed TIG’s 

motion for emergency relief in 2018 and 2019, it argued only 

execution immunity defenses, not jurisdictional immunity 

defenses. Argentina’s decision to wait, TIG says, is akin to 

filing a responsive motion without asserting sovereign 

immunity. 

As the district court explained, TIG’s argument fails for 

the simple reason that Argentina has not filed a responsive 

pleading in this case. Argentina entered a special appearance 

in the case to contest jurisdiction and subsequently filed 

motions seeking dismissal by asserting the court’s lack of 

jurisdiction on various grounds. See TIG III, Part One, 2022 

WL 1154749 at *3–4, *10. “[A] motion to dismiss . . . is not 

considered a responsive pleading.” Bowden v. United States, 

176 F.3d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Adkins v. Safeway, 

Inc., 985 F.2d 1101, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Only complaints, 

answers, replies to counterclaims, and third-party complaints 

and third-party answers are ‘pleadings.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 7(a))). Because Argentina has not filed a responsive 

pleading, the third scenario of implied waiver is not present 

here.

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V

TIG also argues, as a separate theory relevant to multiple 

FSIA exceptions, that Argentina used Caja as its alter ego. The 

district court rejected TIG’s argument, and we agree. 

A

Under the FSIA, the “instrumentality” of a sovereign is 

afforded both sovereign immunity and a presumption of 

separateness from the sovereign. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627. 

That presumption “applies to jurisdictional issues.” ForemostMcKesson, Inc., 905 F.2d at 446. This means that actions taken 

by the instrumentality that waive its own immunity will not 

necessarily be imputed to the sovereign to waive its immunity. 

See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 

200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2000). TIG has not disputed, 

either in the district court or on appeal, that Caja is an 

instrumentality of Argentina for the purposes of alter ego 

analysis, and therefore that a presumption of separateness 

applies for purposes of that analysis. See TIG III, Part One, 

2022 WL 1154749, at *9. 

“That presumption can be overcome,” however, if the 

instrumentality is the sovereign’s alter ego. Transamerica 

Leasing, Inc., 200 F.3d at 847. An alter ego relationship exists

in either of two situations: (1) the “corporate entity is so 

extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of 

principal and agent is created” or (2) “recognition of the 

instrumentality as an entity apart from the state ‘would work 

fraud or injustice.’” Id. at 848 (quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at 

629). Under either scenario, the actions of the alter ego 

corporation can be imputed to a sovereign to work a waiver of 

sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 905 

F.2d at 446.

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As the parties agree, see Appellant’s Brief 54; Appellee’s 

Brief 47, TIG bore “the burden of asserting facts sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss regarding the . . . relationship,” 

Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 905 F.2d at 447; see GSS Grp. Ltd.,

822 F.3d at 605 n.9.

2

 TIG’s lackluster effort to present its alter 

ego theory below fails under that standard. 

TIG’s procedural opportunity to assert facts supporting its 

alter ego theory came in its opposition to Argentina’s motion 

to dismiss after our remand. Yet in that submission TIG 

sketched its alter ego theory in only the most skeletal way and 

failed to allege any relevant facts or put forward any relevant 

evidence. See J.A. 634–35. TIG does not dispute that Caja was 

initially established in 1915 as an independent entity. See 

Appellant’s Brief 59. The only facts TIG identified as showing 

that Caja was Argentina’s alter ego at the time Caja entered the 

reinsurance contracts in 1979 were Argentina’s liquidation 

resolutions in the 1990s and 2000s. See J.A. 634–35. TIG

claimed without elaboration that the resolutions “confirm that 

Caja existed under Argentina’s complete control” and “was in 

some stage of significant undercapitalization,” which are

2 The district court stated that TIG bore the burden of proof on 

this issue. TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *8. TIG 

challenges that conclusion, pointing to our cases applying the FSIA 

exceptions generally, which instead set out a burden-shifting 

approach under which the plaintiff bears a burden of production, but 

then the sovereign must prove that the immunity exception at issue 

does not apply. Appellant’s Brief 54–58. At the same time, we have 

suggested that a plaintiff does in fact bear the burden of proof on the 

specific question of whether a nominally independent entity was a 

sovereign’s alter ego. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 905 F.2d at

447. As explained, however, the parties in this case agree that at the 

motion-to-dismiss stage a plaintiff bears the burden of asserting 

plausible facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. We 

therefore need not resolve the parties’ dispute over who bears the 

burden of proof later in the suit.

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“‘critical’ factors in determining whether an entity is an ‘alter 

ego’ of the sovereign.” J.A. 634 (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. 

Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 2006)).

The key questions, however, are whether Argentina 

exerted “complete domination” over Caja, Transamerica 

Leasing, Inc., 200 F.3d at 848, or whether Caja was effectively 

Argentina’s “agent,” id. at 849, when Caja entered the 

reinsurance contracts with TIG in 1979. On their face, the farlater-in-time resolutions do not speak to those questions at all. 

And aside from citing the resolutions, TIG made no argument

about why the resolutions supported its alter ego claim. Again, 

TIG stated only that the resolutions “confirm” a controlling 

relationship and vaguely asserted—without specific 

connection even to the resolutions—that Caja was 

undercapitalized. J.A. 634–35. This is plainly insufficient to 

survive Argentina’s motion to dismiss.

For similar reasons, TIG also failed to meet its burden on 

the alternative alter ego theory that treating Argentina and Caja 

as separate would work “fraud or injustice.” Bancec, 462 U.S. 

at 629 (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 

307, 322 (1939)). TIG’s opposition memorandum was devoid 

of any argument directed to this theory. The district court thus 

correctly concluded, on the record before it, that TIG had 

“proffered no evidence that Argentina manipulated Caja when 

the insurance contracts were signed so that Argentina could 

benefit from them without risk.” TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 

1154749, at *10. Nor had it put forth “evidence that Argentina 

used Caja ‘to defeat any statutory policy of either [Argentina] 

or the United States.’” Id. (quoting Transamerica Leasing Inc., 

200 F.3d at 854) (alteration in original). Nor did it offer 

“evidence that Argentina is trying to reap the benefits of 

American courts while avoiding potential downside.” Id. 

TIG’s evidence suggested “simply a run of the mill alleged 

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contractual breach,” not fraud or injustice. Id. (quoting GSS

Grp. Ltd., 822 F.3d at 608).

Finally, TIG argues in its reply brief that the district court 

should have considered whether Argentina and Caja were alter 

egos at some later time, such as after Argentina issued the 

official resolutions. See Reply Brief 27. But because TIG did 

not raise this argument in its opening brief, it is forfeited. See 

Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 

In sum, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that 

TIG failed to meet its burden of asserting facts to demonstrate 

that Caja and Argentina were alter egos as a basis to impute 

Caja’s actions to Argentina and to thus form a basis for 

Argentina’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

B

TIG also argues that the district court abused its discretion 

by denying its request for jurisdictional discovery and a later 

motion for reconsideration on the alter ego issue. Both 

arguments fail.

TIG first contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying TIG jurisdictional discovery. 

Appellant’s Brief 57–60. We have said that “in order to get 

jurisdictional discovery,” the party seeking discovery “must 

have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable 

it to show that the court has . . . jurisdiction over the 

defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless 

PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We have also 

explained that jurisdictional discovery in a case like this one 

involving a claim of sovereign immunity “should be carefully 

controlled and limited.” Phx. Consulting Inc. v. Republic of

Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “A district court has 

broad discretion in its resolution of discovery problems that 

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arise in cases pending before it.” In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods.

Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Here, TIG did not offer the district court any explanation 

of what relevant facts it believed jurisdictional discovery would 

uncover. TIG’s opposition to Argentina’s motion to dismiss 

included two sentences on the subject that effectively 

attempted to reserve its right to conduct discovery on the alter 

ego issue if the district court ruled against it on its other 

theories. See J.A. 635. We have rejected similar efforts. See 

GSS Grp. Ltd., 680 F.3d at 812. TIG needed to, at a minimum, 

explain in its opposition “what facts additional discovery could 

produce that would affect [the court’s] jurisdictional analysis.”

Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1147 

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Because TIG failed to develop and support

its request, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying jurisdictional discovery. 

TIG’s challenge to the district court’s denial of its motion 

for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b) also lacks merit. See Appellant’s Brief 61–67. With its 

motion for reconsideration, TIG submitted to the court a 

supplemental record that included a new declaration from its 

legal expert and translated versions of Argentinian laws and 

records which TIG contended bore on Argentina and Caja’s 

relationship. The district court denied TIG’s motion on the 

ground that TIG’s “new” evidence was “previously available.” 

J.A. 1113 (quoting Parker v. John Moriarty & Assocs., 221 F. 

Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2016)). TIG fails to show the district 

court abused its discretion. A “district court should not grant a 

motion for reconsideration unless the moving party shows new 

facts or clear errors of law which compel the court to change 

its prior position.” Nat’l Ctr. for Mfg. Scis. v. Dep’t of Def., 

199 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On appeal, TIG argues

that much of its evidence in the supplemental record was 

“decades old and difficult to find,” Appellant’s Brief 62, but 

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makes no claim that the evidence was unavailable before the 

district court ruled on its alter ego theory. We therefore reject 

TIG’s efforts to rely on its supplemental evidence, and the 

district court thus did not abuse its discretion when it denied

TIG’s motion for reconsideration on its alter ego theory. 

VI

We turn last to the 2001 judgment. Unlike the 2018 

judgment naming Argentina, the 2001 judgment names Caja. 

But TIG also seeks to enforce the 2001 judgment against 

Argentina. Before the district court, Argentina raised two 

defenses. First, it argued that TIG needed to seek amendment 

of the 2001 judgment to substitute Argentina as the judgment 

debtor before TIG could rely on that judgment to attach 

Argentina’s property. Second and independently, Argentina 

invoked its sovereign immunity and denied applicability of any

of the FSIA exceptions for many of the same reasons already 

discussed. 

The district court agreed with Argentina on the first

argument and did not address the immunity defenses. See TIG 

III, Part Two, 2022 WL 3594601, at *7. The district court 

concluded that TIG was required to “go before the Northern 

District of Illinois to amend or alter the judgment before it can 

serve as a basis for an enforcement action against Argentina.” 

Id. The court also stated that this was true even “to the extent 

that Argentina is the successor-in-interest to Caja and this 

successorship is sufficient to enforce the 2001 judgment 

against Argentina.” Id. 

That conclusion was incorrect. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, a 

registered judgment “shall have the same effect as a judgment 

of the district court of the district where registered and may be 

enforced in like manner.” This means that once, as here, a 

judgment is registered in another federal district court, “the 

judgment may be enforced there in accordance with the law of 

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that state as though originally rendered by that court.” 12

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3012 (3d ed. 2014). Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) is to the same effect and 

provides that the procedure on execution—and in proceedings 

supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—

generally follows the procedure of the state where the federal 

court is located. Based on Section 1963 and Rule 69(a)(1), we 

see no basis for a conclusion that the Northern District of 

Illinois must first determine whether a judgment it issued can 

be amended or otherwise enforced in the District of Columbia 

against an entity not named in the judgment. Cf. RMA Ventures 

Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins., 576 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 

2009).

The district court here thus erred by requiring TIG to first 

return to the Northern District of Illinois before seeking 

enforcement against Argentina here. On remand, the district 

court must determine whether the 2001 judgment, having now

been registered in D.C., may under D.C. law be enforced 

against Argentina on a successorship theory. Argentina 

remains free to raise its sovereign immunity defenses apart 

from this question.

VII

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of TIG’s 

request for jurisdictional discovery and vacate the district 

court’s decisions granting Argentina relief from the judgment.

3

 

Because we find that the arbitration exception and the 

implied waiver exception may permit TIG’s claims, we vacate 

the dismissal of TIG’s claims relating to the 2018 judgment. 

3 Because we vacate the orders granting relief from the 2018 

judgment, we need not separately resolve the appeal from the denial 

of TIG’s motion to reconsider those orders.

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We also vacate the district court’s decision that TIG cannot 

enforce against Argentina the 2001 judgment until TIG seeks 

amendment in Illinois. We remand to the district court for 

further analysis and to conduct any necessary factfinding on 

these issues, consistent with the instructions we have provided 

in this decision.

However, because the district court’s decisions properly 

resolved several issues, on remand, TIG is precluded from 

advancing an alter ego theory to establish jurisdiction over 

Argentina under the FSIA. It is also precluded from arguing 

that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive 

pleading as a basis to apply the implied waiver exception. 

So ordered.

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