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Parties Involved:
Judicial Watch, Inc.
Appellant
United States Department of Defense
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2016 Decided February 7, 2017 

No. 16-5054 

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC., 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:14-cv-01935) 

Jason B. Aldrich argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Paul J. Orfanedes. 

August E. Flentje, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Matthew Collette, Attorney. 

Before: HENDERSON and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

USCA Case #16-5054 Document #1659790 Filed: 02/07/2017 Page 1 of 9
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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Judicial Watch, Inc. (Judicial 

Watch) brought this action against the United States 

Department of Defense (DOD or the Department), alleging that 

the Department violated its obligations under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, when it failed to 

release copies of documents embodying the Secretary of 

Defense’s 2014 determination that five Guantanamo Bay 

detainees could be transferred to Qatar. The Department 

moved for summary judgment. Judicial Watch acknowledged 

that the Department had produced one document, but opposed 

summary judgment on the ground that it continued to withhold 

a second document to which Judicial Watch believed it was 

entitled: a memo from Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael 

Lumpkin to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. The 

Department claimed that it had no obligation to produce that 

memo because it was a privileged deliberative document. The 

district court agreed and entered judgment in DOD’s favor. 

Judicial Watch appealed. Because the district court correctly 

determined that the memo was privileged, we affirm. 

I. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2014 (NDAA) provides that the Secretary of Defense may 

transfer a prisoner held at Guantanamo Bay to the individual’s 

country of origin, or any other foreign country, if so directed

by a competent tribunal or if the Secretary “determines” that 

the prisoner is “no longer a threat to the national security of the 

United States.” NDAA, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1035(a), 127 

Stat. 672, 851 (2013). Otherwise, the Secretary may transfer a

Guantanamo Bay prisoner only if he or she “determines” that: 

(1) “actions that have been or are planned to be taken will 

substantially mitigate the risk of such individual engaging or 

reengaging in any terrorist or other hostile activity that 

threatens the United States or United States persons or 

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interests;” and (2) “the transfer is in the national security 

interest of the United States.” Id. at § 1035(b). In making those 

determinations, the Secretary must “evaluate and take into 

consideration” eight separate factors. Id. at § 1035(c). 

 On May 31, 2014, the Secretary of Defense exercised his 

statutory authority to transfer five Guantanamo Bay prisoners 

to Qatar in exchange for the release of Bowe Bergdahl, an 

American soldier who was captured and held in Afghanistan. 

That same day, the Secretary sent eight identical classified 

letters to eight members of Congress statutorily entitled to 

notice, explaining that he had authorized the transfer under 

NDAA section 1035(b) because he “determined” that: (1) the 

government of Qatar would “substantially mitigate” the threats 

posed by the prisoners; and (2) the transfer was “in the national 

security interest of the United States.” J.A. 17. Three days 

later, Judicial Watch submitted the FOIA request at issue here,

asking the government to produce “any and all records 

concerning, regarding, or relating to” the Secretary of 

Defense’s “determinations” regarding the five Guantanamo 

Bay prisoners who were transferred to Qatar. Id. at 28. In 

response to DOD’s objection that the request was overbroad, 

Judicial Watch pared it down to “any and all Secretary of 

Defense memos signed on or before May 31, 2014, that 

approved the release of the five Guantanamo Bay detainees 

exchanged for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl,” as well as “copies of any 

‘determinations’ made by the Secretary of Defense” pursuant 

to section 1305(a) of the NDAA “if such determinations [were] 

. . . separate and apart from the ‘memos’ that the Secretary of

Defense may have signed.” Id. at 39.

Judicial Watch did not receive a timely response to its 

request. On November 18, 2014, Judicial Watch filed a 

complaint in district court against the Department of Defense 

alleging that the Department had failed to comply with its 

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obligations under FOIA. DOD answered that it was “in the 

process of responding to [Judicial Watch’s] FOIA request.” 

J.A. 11. The Department provided its final response on April 

27, 2015, stating that “[t]he only documents responsive to [the] 

request [were the] eight identical classified letters addressed to 

members of Congress.” J.A. 13. DOD gave Judicial Watch a 

copy of one of the eight letters with all classified information 

redacted. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1) (explaining that FOIA’s 

disclosure requirements are inapplicable to “properly 

classified” information). 

The Department then moved for summary judgment. In 

support of its motion, DOD submitted a declaration from Mark 

H. Herrington, an attorney in the Department’s Office of 

General Counsel, describing the processes that DOD had used 

to identify records responsive to Judicial Watch’s FOIA 

request. Department staff had thoroughly searched DOD 

records and concluded that the only “potentially responsive” 

material was a packet prepared by Assistant Secretary of 

Defense Michael Lumpkin. Id. at 23. The packet included a 

“cover memo[]” from Mr. Lumpkin to the Secretary of Defense 

(the Lumpkin Memo) setting forth Mr. Lumpkin’s 

recommendation regarding the Guantanamo Bay detainees, 

and the eight letters to members of Congress, which Mr. 

Lumpkin had prepared for the Secretary’s signature. Id. Mr. 

Herrington attested that the Secretary did not sign or endorse 

the Lumpkin Memo, nor send the memo to Congress. Rather, 

the Secretary only signed and sent the accompanying letters. 

Id. 

Mr. Herrington averred that DOD staff did not produce the 

Lumpkin cover memo because it “did not constitute a signed 

memo or other determination by the Secretary of Defense 

relating to the detainees” and so was not responsive to Judicial 

Watch’s request. J.A. 24. Even if the memo were responsive, 

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Mr. Herrington asserted, it would be exempt from disclosure as 

a privileged deliberative document. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. 

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(explaining that FOIA does not require agencies to disclose 

privileged information). 

The district court granted DOD’s summary judgment 

motion. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 14 

Civ. 1935 (ABJ), 2016 WL 410993 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016) 

(Judicial Watch I). The court described the Lumpkin Memo as 

“responsive to [Judicial Watch’s] request,” id. at *1, but held 

that it was protected by the “deliberative process privilege,” id. 

at *2. Judicial Watch appealed. 

II. 

Congress enacted FOIA to give the public “access to 

official information long shielded unnecessarily from public 

view.” Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 829 F.3d 741, 744 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 

562, 565 (2011)). The Act requires government agencies to 

make information available upon request, unless the 

information is protected by one of nine statutory “exemptions.” 

NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975); see 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b). In this case, the government has invoked 

Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which allows agencies to 

withhold information that would in the context of litigation be

protected from discovery by a “recognized evidentiary or 

discovery privilege[].” Pub. Citizen, 598 F.3d at 874. “Among 

th[e] privileges protected by Exemption 5 is the . . . deliberative 

process privilege,” Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 F.2d 

254, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

which protects government documents that are both 

“predecisional” and “deliberative,” Pub. Citizen, 598 F.3d at 

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874. Documents are “predecisional” if they are “generated 

before the adoption of an agency policy,” and “deliberative” if

they “reflect[] the give-and-take of the consultative process.” 

Id. (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 151 

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 

The deliberative process privilege reflects the commonsense notion that agencies craft better rules when their 

employees can spell out in writing the pitfalls as well as 

strengths of policy options, coupled with the understanding that 

employees would be chilled from such rigorous deliberation if 

they feared it might become public. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 150 

(“[H]uman experience teaches that those who expect public 

dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a 

concern for appearances . . . .” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 

418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)). The privilege also avoids confusion

from premature disclosure of ideas that are not—or not yet—

final policy, and misimpressions from “dissemination of 

documents suggesting reasons and rationales” not ultimately 

relied on. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 

F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

The question in this case is whether the Lumpkin Memo is 

covered by the deliberative process privilege and therefore 

exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Judicial Watch does not 

dispute that, when the Lumpkin Memo was drafted, it was both 

predecisional and deliberative. Nevertheless, Judicial Watch 

notes, a document can lose its predecisional character—and the 

protections of the privilege—if an agency adopts the document 

as its own. Sears, 421 U.S. at 161; Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 

866; Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 276 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). To adopt a deliberative document, it is not enough for 

an agency to make vague or equivocal statements implying that 

a position presented in a deliberative document has merit; 

instead, the agency must make an “express[]” choice to use a 

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deliberative document as a source of agency guidance. Sears, 

421 U.S. at 161 (emphasis in original); see also Afshar v. Dep’t 

of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

Judicial Watch contends that the Secretary of Defense 

“expressly adopted” the Lumpkin Memo when he signed the 

attached letters to Congress, Reply Br. 2, but that contention is 

unsupported by the record. Mr. Herrington stated that the 

Secretary never “endorse[d]” the Lumpkin Memo. The only 

reasoning that the Secretary of Defense held out as his own was

the reasoning in the congressional letters. 

Judicial Watch characterizes the Secretary’s signing and 

sending the letters as a ratification of the cover memo’s 

reasoning. That does not necessarily follow. The Secretary 

might have relied on the memo’s reasoning in deciding to take 

the action it recommended, but it is also possible that he did 

not. We therefore cannot treat the memo as a decisional 

document subject to disclosure. Sears, 421 U.S. at 161; see 

also Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1143 n.22 (suggesting that an agency 

employee cannot strip a memo of its predecisional character by 

silently “carr[ying] out” the memo’s recommended course of 

action). 

Judicial Watch pushes back on this conclusion in three 

ways, each of which is unconvincing. First, because the district 

court found that the Lumpkin Memo was “responsive” to 

Judicial Watch’s request for signed “Secretary of Defense 

memos” and official secretarial “determination[s],” Judicial 

Watch concludes that the Lumpkin Memo must have been an 

official secretarial document. We are sensitive to the fact that 

plaintiffs in FOIA litigation must of necessity rely on 

inferences from the limited information available to them about

documents asserted to be privileged. In this case, that means 

Judicial Watch is reading a great deal into the district court’s 

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description of the Lumpkin Memo. But after reviewing the 

memo in camera, we conclude that the memo is neither a signed 

memo nor a secretarial determination regarding the detainees. 

Thus, while we are perplexed by the district court’s statement 

that the Lumpkin Memo was responsive to Judicial Watch’s 

FOIA request—at least as the request was pared down to seek 

only the Secretary’s signed memos or decisional documents—

we agree with that court’s holding that the memo was 

privileged. 

Second, Judicial Watch points to Mr. Herrington’s 

statement that it is “common for the Secretary of Defense not 

to endorse a cover memo[], if he proceeds to sign the 

correspondence submitted beneath the cover memo[].” But, 

taking into account the Secretary’s common practices, Mr. 

Herrington concluded that signing the correspondence 

submitted beneath the Lumpkin Memo was not an 

“endorse[ment]” of the memo’s analysis. Herrington Decl. 

at 5. 

 Finally, Judicial Watch insists that the Secretary must have 

adopted the Lumpkin Memo to satisfy his recordkeeping 

obligations under 44 U.S.C. § 3101. See 44 U.S.C. § 3101 

(requiring the “head of each [f]ederal agency” to “make and 

preserve records containing adequate and proper 

documentation of the organization, functions, policies, 

decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the 

agency”). But, to satisfy his obligations under that statute, the 

Secretary need only preserve the memo and signed letters to 

Congress. He need not also produce them or any other 

nondecisional records of the agency’s internal workings and 

“essential transactions.” Id. 

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*** 

Seeing no reason to disturb the district court’s judgment 

that the Lumpkin Memo was a privileged deliberative 

document, we affirm. 

So ordered. 

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