Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06339/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06339-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mitchell Andrew Caravayo
Petitioner
David L. Runnels
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MITCHELL ANDREW CARAVAYO,

Petitioner,

 v.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-06339 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND 

VACATING HEARING 

INTRODUCTION

In this habeas corpus proceeding, respondent moves to dismiss the petition as untimely. 

For the following reasons, respondent’s motion is GRANTED. Petitioner’s habeas petition is

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

STATEMENT

The basic procedural history of this case is not in dispute. Petitioner Mitchell Andrew

Caravayo is currently serving a sentence of nineteen years and eight months in state prison for

burglary and threatening to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury. Petitioner

was convicted and sentenced on September 9, 2000. He appealed his conviction to the

California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment on August 28, 2001. The California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on November 19, 2001 (Exhs. 1, 2). 

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Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Santa Clara Superior Court on

March 4, 2002. The superior court denied the petition on March 15, 2002. Petitioner filed a

second habeas corpus petition in the same superior court on November 13, 2002. The superior

court denied that petition on January 16, 2003. Petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition

with the California Court of Appeal on December 29, 2003. That petition was denied by the

court of appeal on March 18, 2004. A petition for writ of habeas corpus was then filed in the

California Supreme Court on October 6, 2004. That court denied the petition on October 12,

2005. The instant petition was filed with this Court on October 10, 2006 (Exhs. 3–10).

On October 25, 2006, this Court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted. Respondent subsequently filed this motion to dismiss the petition as

untimely. 

ANALYSIS

AEDPA places a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas corpus

petitions. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). Relevant to this analysis, that period begins “the date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit has held that under

AEDPA, “a judgment becomes ‘final’ in one of two ways — either by the conclusion of direct

review by the highest court, including the United States Supreme Court, to review the judgment,

or by the expiration of the time to seek such review, again from the highest court from which

such direct review could be sought.” Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.” In other words, any

“pending” request for post-conviction relief in state court “tolls the [one-year] statute of

limitations” period. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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The California Supreme Court denied review of petitioner’s direct appeal on November

19, 2001. Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court. Accordingly, petitioner’s judgment became “final” on February 17, 2001, the end of the

90-day deadline for petitioner to file a petition for writ of certiorari. See Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period started to run

the next day, on February 18, 2002, and ended on February 18, 2003. See Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1245–47 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner did not file the instant petition until October

10, 2006 — 1330 days after the statute had run. The petition is therefore time-barred unless

petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.

1. STATUTORY TOLLING.

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period may be tolled for “[t]he time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). An application is “pending”

until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). Courts have also held: “A petitioner is normally entitled to

‘one full round’ of collateral review in state court free of federal interference. While that full

round is properly in progress, AEDPA’s one-year statute is tolled.” Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d

1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). But the Supreme Court has also explained that under Section

2244(d)(2), the “time that an application for state postconviction review is ‘pending’ includes

the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.”

Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846, 848–49 (2006) (citing Saffold, 536 U.S. 214). 

Petitioner waited 14 days from the date his state court judgment became final to file his

first state habeas petition on March 4, 2002. Following denial of that petition on March 15,

2002, petitioner waited 243 days to file a second petition in the superior court on November 13,

2002. This second petition is not entitled to tolling because it was filed in the same court as the

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1

 Even if petitioner was entitled to tolling during the 64-day period while the second superior court

petition was pending, there would be a total of 1169 days during which petitioner was not entitled to statutory

tolling. 

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March 2002 petition. For purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), state collateral proceedings are

“pending” only during “the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a new

petition in a higher court.” Saffold, 536 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added); Delhomme v. Ramirez,

340 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ach time a petitioner files a new habeas petition at the

same or a lower level, . . . the subsequent petition has no effect on the already pending

application, but triggers an entirely separate round of review.”). Petitioner cites no authority for

the proposition that the 243 days between two petitions at the same level of the state court can

be statutorily tolled. Because the second petition was not at a higher court, there is no tolling

for the November 2002 petition.

Petitioner did not file a petition with the California Court of Appeal until December 29,

2003, which was 654 days after the denial of the first petition in superior court. After the

petition was denied in the California Court of Appeal on March 18, 2004, petitioner waited

another 202 days to file a petition in the California Supreme Court. Then, following the denial

of his state supreme court petition on October 12, 2005, he waited 363 days to file the instant

federal habeas petition. None of these delays were “reasonable.” Chavis, 126 S. Ct. at 849,

854. In all, there were 1233 days during which no statutory tolling could be granted. Unless

petitioner proves his eligibility for equitable tolling to account for this delay, his petition is

barred as a matter of law.1

2. EQUITABLE TOLLING.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Section 2244(d) limitations period may be

equitably tolled under certain “extraordinary circumstances.” Calderon v. United States

District Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds

by Calderon v. United States District Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth

Circuit has “made clear, that equitable tolling is ‘unavailable in most cases.’” Miranda v.

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Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). “Indeed, the

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under the AEDPA] is very high, lest the

exceptions swallow the rule.” Ibid. Equitable tolling is only appropriate when “extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. The petitioner asserting entitlement to equitable-tolling relief “bears

the burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply.” Miranda, 292 F.3d at

1065. As such, the petitioner must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

(2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way,” and (3) that these “‘extraordinary

circumstances’ were the cause of his untimeliness.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).

In petitioner’s opposition to respondent’s motion, he alleges that four circumstances

entitle him to at least some equitable tolling. First, he contends that the trial court refused to

provide him with transcripts of his Faretta hearing. Second, he contends that prison officials

confiscated his legal materials for two years. Third, he alleges that appellate counsel was

grossly ineffective. Fourth, he contends that his habeas attorney’s death in 2003 was an

extraordinary circumstance accounting for some delay. This order holds that even if these

reasons warranted equitable tolling, the instant federal petition would still be untimely.

Petitioner’s most compelling allegation of an “extraordinary circumstance” is that his

habeas attorney, Daniel Hernandez, died in June 2003. Petitioner did not find out about Mr.

Hernandez’s death until September 2003. Counsel’s death, however, does not justify the delay

in filing the instant petition. Apparently, after learning of Mr. Hernandez’s death, petitioner

filed his petition in the California Court of Appeal in December 2003. After that petition was

denied, he waited almost seven months to file his petition before the California Supreme Court

and 363 days before filing the instant federal petition. Petitioner was self-represented for a

portion of that time, but “a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

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1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Even if this circumstance warranted equitable tolling for part of 2003, it

is not sufficient to account for the remaining delays.

Petitioner also contends that he was denied access to his Faretta hearing transcripts on

direct appeal and that the state court’s failure to produce the transcripts violated his right to

pursue a meaningful appeal (Opp. 2–4). This argument has no bearing on the instant issues. 

Whatever delay may have occurred in seeking the transcripts during petitioner’s direct appeal

did not affect the statute of limitations period for the state or federal habeas petitions. The

AEDPA statute of limitations only began to run after the direct appeal in the state court

concluded. The allegation regarding the transcripts appears to relate only to petitioner’s direct

appeal and petitioner does not explain why this occurrence — before the judgment in the direct

appeal became final — caused him such delay in filing his numerous state court petitions once

the federal-petition clock began to run. 

Petitioner next contends that prison officials unjustly confiscated his legal property

between November 17, 2000, and February 7, 2002. He contends that he should be entitled to

equitable tolling for the 447 days while his legal papers were confiscated “without cause or

justification” (Opp. 5). This order holds that even assuming this occurrence would warrant

tolling, it does not help. Petitioner’s legal materials were returned in February 7, 2002. He then

filed his first habeas corpus petition before the superior court on March 4, 2002. Petitioner does

not contend, however, that the alleged confiscation of legal materials justified the nine months it

took him to file the second habeas petition with the superior court. Nor does it explain the

seven months it took for him to file a petition with the California Supreme Court after his

habeas petition was denied by the court of appeal. Nor does it explain the almost full year —

following the denial by the state supreme court — that it took petitioner to file the federal

petition in this Court. Under these circumstances, the seizure of the legal materials did not

contribute to several of the longest periods of delay in this case. 

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Petitioner also contends that his appellate counsel committed errors during the direct

appeal that constitute extraordinary circumstances. Specifically, petitioner contends that

counsel “failed to raise the most viable claims available to Petitioner [during the direct appeal],

including his Farretta claims” (Opp. 6). The Ninth Circuit has held that “ordinary attorney

negligence will not justify equitable tolling,” but “where an attorney’s misconduct is

sufficiently egregious,” it may constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable

tolling. Spitysin v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). In Spitsyn, the attorney was hired

to file a federal habeas petition but failed to do so, which the Ninth Circuit held to be “so

deficient as to distinguish it from the merely negligent performance of counsel.” Id. at 798–01. 

Here, petitioner does not explain how any deficient performance by counsel on direct appeal

caused him to suffer such great delays between each of his state petitions and finally, between

the denial of his last state petition and the instant federal petition. Moreover, the United States

Supreme Court has explained that appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise

every non-frivolous issue requested by the client. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751–54

(1983). The decision not to raise the Faretta issue on direct appeal does not justify the lengthy

delays that occurred later in the habeas process. 

***

Petitioner has put forth some facts that might warrant equitable tolling during a portion

of the 1233 days for which he is not entitled to statutory tolling. The reasons given, however,

mostly relate to the period between his direct appeal and September 2003, when he learned that

his habeas attorney, Mr. Hernandez, died. There remain, however, lengthy unaccounted-for

periods that render the instant federal petition overdue. This order finds that the sum of two of

these completely unexplained periods exceeds the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations. 

First, petitioner waited 202 days after the court of appeal denied his petition on March 18,

2004, to file a petition in the California Supreme Court. Second, after the supreme court denied

the petition on October 12, 2005, he waited 363 days to file his federal habeas petition. These

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2

 Respondent’s motion for leave to file a late reply brief is GRANTED.

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565 days are wholly unexplained and clearly establish the untimeliness of the petition before

this Court. See Evans, 126 S. Ct. at 854 (finding “totally unexplained, hence unjustified, delay

of at least six months” was unreasonable and thus did not warrant tolling). After a full

opportunity to explain these delays, petitioner has not established that the federal petition is

timely.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s habeas petition is

GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Finding no further

argument necessary, the hearing on this motion is hereby VACATED.

2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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