Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01225/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01225-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Environmental Protection Division, Department of Natural Resources, State of Georgia
Intervenor for Respondent
Georgia Coalition for Sound Environmental Policy, Inc.
Intervenor for Respondent
State of North Carolina
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 16, 2009 Decided November 24, 2009

No. 08-1225

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION,

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF GEORGIA

AND GEORGIA COALITION FOR

SOUND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, INC.,

INTERVENORS

On Petition for Review of a Final Action

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Marc D. Bernstein, Special Deputy Attorney General, North

Carolina Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs were Roy Cooper, Attorney General, and

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James C. Gulick, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Allen

Jernigan, Special Deputy Attorney General. 

Perry M. Rosen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Sonja

Rodman, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

David S. Gualtieri, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

entered an appearance.

Margaret Claiborne Campbell argued the cause for

intervenor Georgia Coalition for Sound Environmental Policy,

Inc. in support of respondent. With her on the brief was Byron

W. Kirkpatrick.

Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, and John E. Hennelly

and Diane L. DeShazo, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,

were on the brief for intervenor Georgia Environmental

Protection Division, Department of Natural Resources, State of

Georgia.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The State of North Carolina

petitions for review of the final rule of the Environmental

Protection Agency removing the northern part of the State of

Georgia from EPA’s regulations under its national ambient air

quality standard (“NAAQS”) for ozone measured during a onehour period. See Petition for Reconsideration and Withdrawal of

Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for

Georgia for Purposes of Reducing Ozone Interstate Transport,

73 Fed. Reg. 21,528 (Apr. 22, 2008) (“Withdrawal Rule”). In

1998 EPA called upon several states to revise their state

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implementation plans (“SIPs”) for attaining the NAAQS for

ozone by reducing emissions of oxides of nitrogen (“NOx”), a

precursor of ozone. See Finding of Significant Contribution and

Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport

Assessment Group Region for the Purposes of Reducing

Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27,

1998) (“NOx SIP Call”). Following the remand in Michigan v.

EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904

(2001), EPA promulgated a rule that included only the northern

portion of Geogia in the NOx SIP Call under the one-hour ozone

standard. See Interstate Ozone Transport: Response to Court

Decisions on the NOx SIP Call, NOx SIP Call Technical

Amendments, and Section 126 Rules, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,604 (Apr.

21, 2004) (“Remand Rule”). Georgia’s inclusion was based on

EPA’s findings in the NOx SIP Call that emissions from Georgia

were significantly contributing to non-attainment of the onehour ozone NAAQS in Birmingham, Alabama and Memphis,

Tennessee. See Withdrawal Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 21,530.

Upon the petition of an industry coalition, an intervenor

here, EPA reconsidered its inclusion of Georgia in light of its

determinations that recently Birmingham, and earlier Memphis,

had attained the one-hour ozone standard. See id. North

Carolina now challenges the Withdrawal Rule as contrary to

EPA policy requiring states’ adherence to NOx emissions

budgets based on the one-hour ozone standard after the repeal of

the one-hour standard, as nonconformance with the mandate in

Michigan v. EPA, and as disparate treatment of Georgia without

lawful justification. We do not reach the merits of these

contentions because we conclude that North Carolina lacks

standing, specifically that North Carolina failed to show

redressability.

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1

 In 2005, EPA also began regulating NOx emissions using

the eight-hour ozone standard under the Clean Air Interstate Rule

(“CAIR”). See Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine

Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions

to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg.

25,162 (May 12, 2005); see also North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896

(D.C. Cir. 2008), remanded without vacatur, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir.

2008). 

I.

Nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted into the air react to form

ozone (O3), a pollutant with harmful health and environmental

effects. Ozone is an interstate issue because NOx emissions and

ozone cross into downwind states. See NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed.

Reg. at 57,359. In 1979, EPA established the NAAQS for ozone

at 0.120 ppm (parts per million) measured over a one-hour

period (“the one-hour standard”). Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at

670. In 1997, EPA lowered the ozone NAAQS to 0.08 ppm

measured over an eight-hour period (“the eight-hour standard”),

id., but this standard was stayed in 2000 and was not before the

court in Michigan v. EPA, id. at 671. In 2004, EPA transitioned

from the one-hour standard to the eight-hour standard.1 In 2008,

EPA lowered the eight-hour ozone NAAQS to 0.075 ppm.

Meanwhile, in 1998, EPA called for revisions to the SIPs of

several upwind states (the “NOx SIP Call”). EPA found that

NOx emissions in Georgia significantly contributed (1) to

nonattainment of the one-hour ozone standard in Birmingham

and Memphis, and (2) to nonattainment of the eight-hour ozone

standard in North Carolina. EPA’s 2000 stay of the eight-hour

standard “remove[d] the 8-hour findings as a basis for the SIP

call.” Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 671.

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On petition for review of the NOx SIP Call, the court held

in Michigan v. EPA that “the record does not support . . .

creating NOx [emissions] budgets based on the entire emissions

of Missouri or Georgia,” because only the “fine grid” modeling

used for northern Georgia and eastern Missouri, and not the

“coarse grid” modeling used for other parts of those states,

showed emissions contributing to downwind pollution.

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 669, 683. On remand, EPA

revised the NOx SIP Call by calculating NOx emissions budgets

based only on areas of Georgia and Missouri whose emissions

had been modeled for the NOx SIP Call with the fine-grid

technique. See Remand Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 21,624. The

Remand Rule was published April 21, 2004, with an effective

date of June 21, 2004. However, EPA had found, effective April

12, 2004, that Birmingham (and earlier, Memphis) had attained

the one-hour ozone standard. In response to a petition from

intervenor Georgia Coalition for Sound Environmental Policy (a

group of businesses and companies, hereinafter “industry”),

EPA stayed the Remand Rule with respect to Georgia during the

notice and comment proceedings for industry’s petition to

reconsider Georgia’s inclusion in the NOx SIP Call, in light of

EPA’s Birmingham and Memphis findings. In 2008, EPA

finalized the Withdrawal Rule, removing Georgia from the onehour NOx SIP Call. 

In petitioning for review, North Carolina claims that NOx

emissions from electric generating units (“EGUs”) in northern

Georgia are significantly contributing to North Carolina’s

inability to attain the NAAQS under the eight-hour standard due

to Georgia’s non-inclusion in the one-hour NOx SIP Call, and

that North Carolina’s injury can be remedied by vacating the

Withdrawal Rule in part. Specifically, North Carolina seeks

partial vacatur of the Withdrawal Rule, reinstatement of the

prior 40 C.F.R. § 51.121 regulations and removal of the stay of

the regulations with respect to Georgia under subparagraph (s)

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of section 51.121, and instructions on Georgia’s deadline for

submitting a compliant SIP. On the merits, North Carolina

challenges the Withdrawal Rule on three grounds: EPA’s

noncompliance with a policy requiring states to adhere to

emission budgets set under the one-hour standard after that

standard was abolished; EPA’s noncompliance with the mandate

in Michigan v. EPA, specifically by relying on new data in

promulgating the Withdrawal Rule; and EPA’s disparate

treatment of Georgia as compared to Missouri and other states

in the original NOx SIP Call. Industry, however, challenges

North Carolina’s standing under Article III of the United States

Constitution, maintaining that EPA correctly stated during the

rulemaking that Georgia may already be meeting the

requirements of the one-hour NOx SIP Call, see Withdrawal

Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 21,534, and that consequently North

Carolina cannot show redressability. We turn to that threshold

question.

II.

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the

Supreme Court described the Article III injury, causation, and

redressability requirements for standing:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in

fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which

is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or

imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”

Second, there must be a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has

to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of

the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the

independent action of some third party not before the

court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to

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merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed

by a favorable decision.”

Id. at 560-61 (alterations in Lujan; citations and footnote

omitted). “When the suit is one challenging the legality of

government action or inaction,” and “a plaintiff’s asserted injury

arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or

lack of regulation) of someone else” and “the plaintiff is not

himself the object of the government action or inaction he

challenges,” then “standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily

substantially more difficult to establish.” Id. at 562 (emphasis

and quotation marks omitted).

North Carolina’s situation is similar in many respects to that

of Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2000).

There the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had standing

to challenge EPA’s failure to regulate certain air pollutants,

because Massachusetts has “quasi-sovereign interests” in

reducing air pollution and a procedural right to challenge EPA

under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.

at 519-21. Like Massachusetts, North Carolina is a state

challenging EPA’s rule pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) in

order to reduce its air pollution, which entitles North Carolina to

“special solicitude in our standing analysis.” Massachusetts v.

EPA, 549 U.S. at 520. In addition, “[w]hen a litigant is vested

with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some

possibility that the requested relief will prompt the

injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly

harmed the litigant.” Id. at 518. 

North Carolina contends that because EPA has recognized

ozone as a harmful pollutant (injury), and because EPA

recognized in 1998 that ozone from Georgia contributed to

North Carolina’s non-attainment of the 1997 eight-hour ozone

standard (causation), and because re-including northern Georgia

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in the NOx SIP Call would likely reduce Georgia’s emissions

(redressability), it has established standing. Nonetheless North

Carolina acknowledged during oral argument that

notwithstanding any “special solicitude” to which it may be

entitled as a sovereign state, it must demonstrate Article III

standing. We conclude the redressability requirement is not

satisfied. 

North Carolina contends that it has standing because it is

having difficulty meeting federal eight-hour ozone standards due

to emissions from Georgia. With its opening brief, see Sierra

Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900-01 (D.C. Cir. 2002), North

Carolina submitted an affidavit in support of its standing from

the Deputy Director of the Division of Air Quality of the North

Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

Sheila Holman. The Holman Affidavit states that North

Carolina has areas located close to Georgia that are not attaining

the 1997 eight-hour ozone standard, and concludes that NOx

emissions from northern Georgia impact ozone levels in North

Carolina, based in part on an attached report by Dr. Saravanan

Arunachalam that concluded Georgia’s emissions likely

contributed significantly to North Carolina’s non-attainment in

2005. North Carolina also points out that EPA has recognized

that an area’s proximity to an emissions source contributes to the

effects from that source. See Remand Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at

21,625. North Carolina contends that the Holman Affidavit and

the Arunachalam Report establish North Carolina’s injury and

show that Georgia partially causes this injury. Re-including

northern Georgia in the NOx SIP Call, North Carolina concludes,

would reduce Georgia’s contributions to North Carolina’s

ozone, and thus redress North Carolina’s injury by helping it

meet its federal 1997 and 2008 eight-hour ozone standard

obligations, as well as improve its overall air quality.

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2

 In response to industry’s assertion that the reference in the

Holman Affidavit to “a cap” is not specific enough to allege injury,

North Carolina provided a rebuttal affidavit clarifying that the cap in

the affidavit was the cap from the NOx SIP Call.

In challenging North Carolina’s standing, industry’s

objections regarding injury and causation are not well taken.

Industry’s preliminary contention that North Carolina lacks

standing because it discussed its injury2 in terms of the stayed

1997 and new 2008 eight-hour ozone standards, rather than the

NOx SIP Call’s one-hour ozone standard, is unpersuasive. As

North Carolina responds, ozone is ozone no matter how it is

measured, and if re-including Georgia in the NOx SIP Call

reduces ozone under the one-hour standard, it would presumably

reduce ozone under the eight-hour standard as well. 

Likewise, industry’s position that the Withdrawal Rule

could not cause North Carolina injury is unpersuasive. Industry

suggests that North Carolina has alleged injuries only from

Georgia, rather than from EPA’s Withdrawal Rule, and that

under Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the

Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009), North Carolina has

failed to show that its injury results from actions of EPA, rather

than the discretionary actions of a third party. But North

Carolina, like the state in Massachusetts v. EPA, has standing to

challenge EPA’s failure to regulate a third party because that

failure assertedly causes injury, see also South Coast Air Quality

Management District v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 895-96 (D.C. Cir.

2006), and Georgia is not an absent third party because it would

not have discretion not to meet the NOx SIP Call if it were

subject to the NOx SIP Call.

To the extent industry emphasizes that North Carolina’s

standing burden is heavier both because it is not the object of

EPA’s Withdrawal Rule, and because no interstate NOx

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emissions are keeping North Carolina from meeting the onehour ozone standard that was the basis of the NOx SIP Call,

North Carolina persuasively maintains it should not be more

difficult for it to establish standing, because its injury, causation,

and redressability are more clear than in Center for Biological

Diversity, in which this court stated a party could not establish

standing where causation was based on “speculation” about the

discretionary future acts of various entities, 563 F.3d at 479.

Rather, what is ultimately dispositive is the showing in

submissions by intervenor Georgia Environmental Protection

Division (“the Division”) that reinstating the NOx SIP Call for

Georgia is not likely to redress North Carolina’s injuries. 

Preliminarily we note that certain of intervenors’

contentions miss the mark. Industry contends that because

North Carolina has attained the one-hour ozone standard in the

NOx SIP Call, re-including Georgia in the NOx SIP Call will not

redress North Carolina’s injury, but industry and North Carolina

appear to be defining “injury” differently: industry contends that

the NOx SIP Call involves injuries only from not meeting the

one-hour ozone standard, whereas North Carolina contends that

any reduction in NOx emissions due to the NOx SIP Call would

also help North Carolina meet the eight-hour ozone standards.

Industry and the Division next contend that re-including Georgia

in the NOx SIP Call would actually increase emissions by

creating excess emission allowances that others could buy to

increase their emissions. However, North Carolina responds

that Georgia need not opt into the allowance program. 

North Carolina’s ability to show redressability hinges on

showing that including northern Georgia in the NOx SIP Call

would result in reducing emissions from Georgia that

significantly contribute to North Carolina’s inability to reach

attainment under the 1997 NAAQS standard. If lower emissions

would result from Georgia’s inclusion, then the Withdrawal

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Rule is the cause of North Carolina’s injury and its injury is

redressable by vacating the rule in part with instructions. In

reply to intervenors’ statements that Georgia’s recent NOx

emissions have been below the NOx emissions cap that would

have applied to Georgia under the Remand Rule, North Carolina

provides a rebuttal affidavit from Sheila Holman listing

Georgia’s EGU NOx emission levels in 2007 and 2008, which

North Carolina concludes exceeded the Remand Rule’s NOx

emissions cap. Based on the emissions data in North Carolina’s

reply brief, it reasonably concludes that Georgia’s emissions

have exceeded the limits of the NOx SIP Call, and perhaps as

well that Georgia’s own rules limiting emissions would have a

lesser effect on emissions than the NOx SIP Call would.

However, intervenors challenge North Carolina’s showing of

emission levels. To assist the court in determining whether it

has jurisdiction, it permitted the Division to file a supplemental

reply on standing, most particularly as it concerns redressability.

See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C.

Cir. 2005).

The Division’s sur-reply provides an analysis suggesting

that North Carolina’s Holman Rebuttal Affidavit reports

emissions from the entire state of Georgia rather than only from

the northern two-thirds of Georgia that would have been subject

to the NOx SIP Call after the remand in Michigan v. EPA. The

Division attaches to its sur-reply an affidavit from the Chief of

the Georgia Air Protection Branch of the Georgia Environmental

Protection Division, James A. Capp, stating that Georgia’s

EGUs, in the portion of Georgia that would have been subject to

the Remand Rule of the NOx SIP Call, emitted 31,804 tons of

NOx in 2007 and 31,057 tons in 2008. The Capp Affidavit also

states that Georgia’s NOx emissions budget under the Remand

Rule would have been 29,416 tons. Thus, as industry conceded

at oral argument, Georgia’s 2007 and 2008 NOx emissions

would have exceeded the Remand Rule’s cap if Georgia would

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not have been able to use allowances or credits to increase its

cap.

However, the Division’s sur-reply also provides an analysis

indicating that Georgia would have met the Remand Rule’s NOx

emissions cap through the use of EPA’s compliance supplement

pool (“CSP”) allowances. EPA has stated in the Federal

Register that the CSP is a voluntary provision of the NOx SIP

Call that provides emissions credits to states to allocate in order

to cover excess emissions under certain circumstances. See NOx

SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,428, 57,493. Under the Remand

Rule, EPA would authorize CSP credits to Georgia of up to

10,728 tons of NOx, if Georgia meets the CSP requirements. See

Remand Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 21,629–30, 21,643–44. In its

reply brief, North Carolina suggests in a footnote that Georgia’s

emissions may not qualify for any available CSP credits.

However, counsel for EPA advised the court during oral

argument that EPA generally has approved a CSP allowance in

states subject to the NOx SIP Call. Oral Arg. Tape at

29:12–29:43. In addition, the Capp Affidavit states that Georgia

would have used its CSP allowance to meet the Remand Rule’s

NOx emissions cap. During oral argument North Carolina’s only

response was to question Georgia’s ability to qualify for any

authorized CSP credits. North Carolina offered no data and

cited no statute, regulation, or EPA policy that would bar

Georgia from accessing any CSP credits. It appears likely, then,

that if Georgia had been subject to the NOx SIP Call under the

Remand Rule, Georgia would have used CSP credits to comply

with the NOx emissions cap and would not have needed to lower

its emissions to meet the requirements of the NOx SIP Call. 

The Division’s showing in its sur-reply that Georgia intends

to use CSP credits to cover its excess emissions thus resolves the

question of redressability, for North Carolina can no longer

show that vacating the Withdrawal Rule and re-including

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northern Georgia in the NOx SIP Call is likely to redress North

Carolina’s difficulty in meeting the 1997 NAAQS eight-hour

ozone standard. As counsel for North Carolina stated at oral

argument, if reinstating Georgia in the NOx SIP Call would not

lower Georgia’s emissions, then North Carolina has a standing

problem. Accordingly, we dismiss North Carolina’s petition for

lack of standing.

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