Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02701/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02701-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Patrick Flannigan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-2701

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

William Patrick Flannigan,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of Minnesota.

[UNPUBLISHED]

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 Submitted: February 8, 2010

 Filed: February 19, 2010

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Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

William Patrick Flannigan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the district court1

 sentenced him under the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), to 180 months of imprisonment.

Flannigan appeals, arguing that two of the three predicate offenses relied upon by the

district court are not violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. He argues that his

convictions for third-degree burglary of a commercial building under Minn. Stat.

Appellate Case: 09-2701 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 Entry ID: 3635950
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§ 609.582, subd. 3, and terroristic threats under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 are not

violent felonies.

Flannigan concedes that our court has previously determined that both of these

offenses are violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. See United States v.

Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir.) (third-degree burglary conviction under Minn.

Stat. § 609.582 is a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)), cert. denied,130 S. Ct.

238 (2009), petition for cert. filed, _ U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Jul. 27, 2009) (No. 09-5491);

United States v. Clinkscale, 559 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (terroristic threat under

Minn. Stat. § 609.713 is a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). This panel is bound

by those decisions. See United States v. Nelson, 589 F.3d 924, 925 (8th Cir. 2009).

We reject Flannigan's attempt to lump his prior felonies with the list of

previously classified violent felonies that have been reclassified after the Supreme

Court decided Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008). See, e.g., United States

v. Gordon, 557 F.3d 623, 626 (8th Cir. 2009) (child endangerment); United States v.

Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 972-73 (8th Cir. 2008) (auto theft). Begay redefined how

courts are to classify felonies within the "otherwise" clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii),

holding that felonies must be "roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk

posed" to the enumerated crimes to fit within the "otherwise" clause. Begay, 128 S.

Ct. at 1585. However, neither of Flannigan's predicate felonies depend on the

"otherwise" clause for inclusion within the statute's definition of a violent felony.

Burglary is a specifically enumerated crime, see § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining a violent

felony as a felony that "is burglary, arson, or extortion"), and a terroristic threat fits

the first clause of the definition, see § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining violent felony as a

felony that "has as an element the . . . threatened use of physical force"). Begay

therefore has no impact on our precedent, by which we are bound.

Flannigan's 180-month sentence is affirmed.

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Appellate Case: 09-2701 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 Entry ID: 3635950