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Parties Involved:
Darin D. Bowie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 13, 2010

Decided July 15, 2010

Before

                     ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DARIN D. BOWIE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the

United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 07‐CR‐123

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

A jury in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, found Darin Bowie guilty on multiple counts of

trafficking cocaine.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.  Bowie was sentenced to a total of

235 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.  He filed a notice of appeal, but

his appointed lawyer has concluded that the case is frivolous and moves to withdraw.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  We review only the potential issues

identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief, see United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74

(7th Cir. 2002), and in Bowie’s response, see CIR. R. 51(b).

In his Anders submission, counsel first evaluates whether Bowie could argue that the

delay in bringing him to trial violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161‐74.  But by

failing to seek dismissal on this ground in the district court, Bowie waived his right to

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3035 Page 2

enforce the Act’s time limit.  See id. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Gearhart, 576 F.3d 459, 462

(7th Cir. 2009).  His waiver precludes us from applying even plain‐error review, see United

States v. Broadnax, 536 F.3d 695, 699 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 665 (2008), so any

argument under the Speedy Trial Act would be frivolous.

Counsel next questions whether Bowie could challenge the jury’s verdict on the one

conspiracy count as lacking evidentiary support.  (Bowie received fully concurrent

sentences on all counts, but after Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987), a court of appeals

cannot use the concurrent‐sentence doctrine to bypass this question, see United States v.

Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 2008).)  The government charged that Bowie conspired

with five others to distribute cocaine.  One of the five, Calvin Coleman, testified that he sold

Bowie four‐and‐a‐half ounces of cocaine on a weekly basis for about a year.  Coleman said

he occasionally “fronted” the drugs, which he defined as making delivery without

demanding immediate payment.  Coleman acknowledged, however, that he did not advise

or supervise Bowie, nor did he impose quotas on the amounts of cocaine that Bowie could

or must move.  Coleman emphasized that he viewed Bowie as a mid‐level customer and

“his own man.”  Several other witnesses testified that Bowie had sold them cocaine using

coded language and knew that they resold the drugs.  All of them conceded, though, that

Bowie demanded payment up front and was not their only source of supply.    

We would view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and

uphold the verdict if any rational jury could have found the essential elements beyond a

reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Mitten,

592 F.3d 767, 776 (7th Cir. 2010).  To convict Bowie on the § 846 count, the government was

required to establish that he knowingly agreed with at least one other person to possess

cocaine for distribution.  See United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2010); United

States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 2009).  Hallmarks of a conspiracy include, among

other things, sales on consignment or credit.  E.g., United States v. Dean, 574 F.3d 836, 843

(7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bender,

539 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2415 (2009); Moon, 512 F.3d at 364.

Here, the “fronting” described by Coleman was a sale on credit.  (Consignment sales permit

the middleman to return unused drugs and are quintessential evidence of a conspiracy, see

United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010), but there is no evidence that

Bowie could return the drugs.)  Not all credit sales will support an inference that seller and

buyer have reached an agreement to distribute drugs.  Johnson, 592 F.3d at 756 n.5.  But

evidence of credit sales “coupled with certain characteristics inherent in an ongoing

wholesale buyer‐seller relationship,” e.g., large quantities of drugs or repetitive

transactions, is sufficient to distinguish a conspiracy from a nonconspiratorial buyer‐seller

relationship.  Id.  Coleman testified that he sold a specific amount of cocaine to Bowie on

credit every week for almost a year, and thus we agree with appellate counsel that it would

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be frivolous to argue that no rational jury could have found that the two men were

conspirators.  See United States v. Fouse, 578 F.3d 643, 649‐50 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding jury’s

verdict that he engaged in conspiracy where defendant bought on credit, worked with

others to sell drugs, and coordinated prices); United States v. Fuller, 532 F.3d 656, 662‐63 (7th

Cir. 2008) (upholding conspiracy conviction where defendant bought from dealer on steady

basis every week or two over five‐month relationship, used code words to discuss types and

amounts of drugs, and bought on credit).  

As far as sentencing, counsel and Bowie (in his Rule 51(b) response) consider

arguing that it was clear error to assign a drug quantity of 15 to 50 kilograms of cocaine.

See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 585 F.3d 1024, 1031 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W.

3714 (U.S. June 07, 2010) (No. 09‐8988).  But any argument about the quantity finding would

be frivolous because after he was arrested, Bowie confessed to selling half a kilogram per

week for 18 months.  See United States v. Johnson, 342 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining

that drug dealer’s post‐arrest statements are especially reliable in establishing the extent of

trafficking).    

In his Rule 51(b) response, Bowie proposes to argue that Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), required the jury to decide the amounts of cocaine involved.  But this

argument would be frivolous because Bowie was sentenced below the 20‐year default

maximum that applies for any amount of cocaine.  See United States v. Clark, 538 F.3d 803,

811‐12 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1613 (2009); United States v. Gilmer, 534 F.3d 696,

704 (7th Cir. 2008).

Counsel also considers whether Bowie could challenge the increase in offense level

for possessing a gun, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), or the upward adjustment for obstructing

justice, see id. § 3C1.1.  Bowie’s counsel did not object to either adjustment at sentencing, so

our review would be for plain error.  See, e.g., United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th

Cir. 2010).  Bowie asserts in his Rule 51(b) response that he didn’t own or even know about

the gun police found in his living‐room closet.  He points to the trial testimony of Melvin

Barnes, a defense witness who said he put the gun in the closet while temporarily living

with Bowie.  Ownership is irrelevant, though, and Barnes conceded that he never saw the

gun again after placing it in the closet.  On the other hand, two police officers who searched

Bowie’s house with his consent testified at trial that he alerted them he had a gun in the

living‐room closet.  The officers found the gun (with an obliterated serial number) in that

closet along with 148 grams of cocaine, $20,000 in currency, and a scale.  Thus, an appellate

challenge to the upward adjustment for the gun would be frivolous.  See United States v. Are,

590 F.3d 499, 526 (7th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3590 (Mar. 30, 2010)

(No. 09‐1191); United States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539, 546‐47 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.

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Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 837‐38 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3688 (U.S. May 24, 2010)

(No. 09‐10339).  

Further, among the nonexhaustive list of conduct constituting obstruction of justice

is “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co‐defendant.”  U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(a).  The district court applied the upward adjustment because Bowie sent a

letter to a codefendant warning him not to cooperate.  (Bowie insists in his Rule 51(b)

response that he was simply “telling or asking” his codefendant to exercise his

constitutional right to trial by jury.)  We agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to

argue that the district court’s conclusion that Bowie unlawfully attempted to influence his

codefendant was clearly erroneous.  See United States v. Richards, 198 F.3d 1029, 1032‐33 (7th

Cir. 2000) (upholding application of § 3C1.1 adjustment where defendant warned

codefendant to keep quiet).  

Last, in his Rule 51(b) response, Bowie argues that under Melendez‐Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), he was entitled to cross‐examine the chemists who

analyzed the cocaine recovered from his home.  But this argument is frivolous because

Bowie stipulated at trial to the drug type and quantity.  See id. at 2534 n.3, 2541; see also

United States v. Wingate, 128 F.3d 1157, 1160‐61 (7th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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