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Parties Involved:
American Chemistry Council
Petitioner
American Petroleum Institute
Amicus Curiae
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 24, 2003 Decided August 8, 2003

No. 01-1216

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of a Final Rule of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Michael W. Steinberg argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs were David F. Zoll and Leslie A.

Hulse.

Thomas Sayre Llewellyn argued the cause for amicus

curiae American Petroleum Institute in support of petitioner.

With him on the brief were G. William Frick and Ralph J.

Colleli, Jr.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-1216 Document #765281 Filed: 08/08/2003 Page 1 of 9
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Jon M. Lipshultz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was

Steven E. Silverman, Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: The American Chemistry Council

(ACC) petitions for review of a rule promulgated by the

Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–

6992(k), treating as a ‘‘hazardous waste’’ any substance that is

either mixed with or derived from a listed hazardous waste.

The effect is to render such mixtures and derivatives subject

to the stringent standards for the management of hazardous

waste. We reject the ACC’s argument that the EPA lacked

authority for the rule under the RCRA and hence we deny

the petition for review.

I. Background

The RCRA ‘‘is a comprehensive environmental statute that

empowers EPA to regulate hazardous wastes from cradle to

grave, in accordance with TTT rigorous safeguards and waste

management procedures.’’ Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994); see Environmental

Defense Fund v. EPA, 210 F.3d 396, 397–98 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C.

Cir. 1987). The Act requires the EPA to regulate the identification, disposal, and treatment of ‘‘hazardous waste,’’ which

is defined as:

a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which

because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may –

(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in

mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or

incapacitating reversible, illness; or

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(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to

human health or the environment when improperly

treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.

42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). ‘‘Solid waste’’ is in turn defined (in part)

as any ‘‘discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid,

or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial [or]

commercial TTT operations.’’ Id. § 6903(27).

The Act requires the Administrator to:

develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous

waste TTT taking into account toxicity, persistence, and

degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in

tissue, and other related factors such as flammability,

corrosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics.TTT

42 U.S.C. § 6921(a). The Administrator must ‘‘promulgate

regulations identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste,

and listing particular hazardous wastes (within the meaning

of section 6903(5) of this title), which shall be subject to the

provisions of this subchapter.’’ Id. § 6921(b)(1). Pursuant to

§ 6921, the EPA may deem wastes hazardous

in one of two ways: They possess one of the four

hazardous characteristics identified by the EPA in 40

C.F.R. Part 261, Subpart C (‘‘characteristic wastes’’), see

id. § 261.3(a)(2)(i) (1991), or have been found to be

hazardous as a result of an EPA rulemaking. See id.

Part 261, Subpart D (‘‘listed wastes’’).

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 7–8

(D.C. Cir. 1992).

Both characteristic hazardous wastes and listed hazardous

wastes are subject to regulation under Subtitle C of the

RCRA, which applies stringent management standards to the

generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of

hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6925. Under the

‘‘delisting process’’ provided in the Act, a listed hazardous

waste will be deemed non-hazardous at a particular facility if

a petitioner demonstrates that the waste no longer meets any

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of the criteria for which it was listed, and that it is not

hazardous because of any other factor reasonably identified

by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(f), 40 C.F.R. § 260.22.

In the proceeding here under review, the EPA modified the

regulatory definition of ‘‘hazardous waste’’ to include, subject

to certain exceptions, ‘‘a mixture of solid waste and one or

more hazardous wastes,’’ 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv), and ‘‘any

solid waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a hazardous waste, including any sludge, spill residue,

ash emission control dust, or leachate.’’ 40 C.F.R.

§ 261.3(c)(2)(i). The EPA’s new definition went into effect on

an interim basis in 1992.* 57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Mar. 3). In

1999 the EPA proposed in substance to make permanent the

1992 rule, with some minor alterations not relevant to this

case. 64 Fed. Reg. 63,382 (Nov. 19). The EPA issued the

Final Rule so doing on May 16, 2001. 66 Fed. Reg. 27,266.

II. Analysis

We review the Agency’s interpretation of a statute it is

charged with administering under the two-step analysis of

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). First we must determine ‘‘whether

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at

issue,’’ id. at 842 – here, whether, as the ACC argues, the

statutory definition of ‘‘hazardous waste’’ excludes substances

mixed with or derived from such waste. If the Congress has

so spoken, then ‘‘the court, as well as the agency, must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’’

Id. at 842–43. If, however, ‘‘the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,’’ then we must go on to

* The ACC also challenges the 1992 interim rule. The EPA

suggests this challenge is untimely and moot, and the ACC lacks

standing. We conclude that we have jurisdiction, see Columbia

Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(‘‘Once an agency reopens an issue TTT a new review period is

triggered’’), and we deny the petition for review of the 1992 rule for

the same reasons we deny the challenge to the Final Rule.

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determine ‘‘whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’’ Id. at 843.

A. Chevron step one

The ACC argues first that the EPA’s interpretation is

inconsistent with the statutory definition of hazardous waste,

42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), because the rule brings within that

definition substances that do not exhibit a harmful ‘‘characteristic.’’ The ACC points to the ‘‘EPA[’s] acknowledge[ment]

that not all mixtures and derivatives pose hazards to human

health and the environment.’’ Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at

27,276. According to the ACC, the Congress could not

possibly have meant to include in the definition of hazardous

waste solid wastes that do not pose a threat to human health

or the environment. See Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. v. United States EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1159 (D.C. Cir.

1990) (‘‘A hazardous waste TTT is such only if various factors,

including the concentration of hazardous constituents, actually make it hazardous to human health or the environment’’)

(internal citation omitted).

In our view, however, the Congress did not speak directly,

let alone clearly, to this issue. As the EPA points out, the

definition of ‘‘hazardous waste’’ in the statute has a broad

sweep. See Environmental Defense Fund, 210 F.3d at 397.

It includes not only those solid wastes that do pose hazards to

human health or the environment, but also those that ‘‘may’’

do so. In addition, the definition includes those wastes in

which the ‘‘potential hazard’’ becomes an actual hazard only if

the waste is ‘‘improperly treated, stored, transported, or

disposed of, or otherwise managed.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(B).

This provision does not make mixtures and derivatives clearly

hazardous wastes or clearly non-hazardous wastes. The element of judgment imported into the definition of hazardous

waste by the use of ‘‘may’’ and the inclusion of waste that

may be hazardous only if mismanaged necessarily makes the

statute ambiguous on this score.

The ACC argues nonetheless that the Final Rule simply

cannot be squared with the Act because it allows the EPA to

classify a substance as hazardous without ‘‘taking into account

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toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for

accumulation in tissue, and other related factors,’’ as required

by § 6921(a). Amicus American Petroleum Institute adds

that the legislative history of § 6921 indicates the EPA must

follow a two-step process in order to regulate a solid waste as

hazardous: it must first determine the characteristics of a

hazardous waste and then show that a particular solid waste

has at least one such characteristic. See H.R. Rep. No. 1491,

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,

6263 (‘‘Only after the criteria for determining what is hazardous has [sic] been developed can the Administrator determine

which specific wastes are hazardous’’).

According to the EPA, however, when it lists a waste as

hazardous it could, in principle, automatically list its mixtures

and derivatives as well. That is, the mixture rule and the

derived-from rule are consistent with § 6921 because mixtures and derivatives are ‘‘a second generation of the listed

hazardous wastes from which they originate, [and] it is reasonable to presume, until demonstrated otherwise, that these

wastes are also hazardous.’’

We think the EPA’s response is sufficient, at the least, to

demonstrate that the statute does not directly answer the

issue before us. For the reason just quoted, § 6921 cannot

be understood to preclude the EPA from regulating mixtures

and derivatives until such time as they may be shown to be

non-hazardous. Some – perhaps most – mixtures and derivatives maintain the characteristics of their parent hazardous

waste. See Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 27,274–75 (citing

Mark Eads, Office of Solid Waste, EPA, Analysis of RCRA

‘‘Mixtures and Derived-From’’ Hazardous Waste Constituent

Data, which analyzed the EPA’s National Hazardous Waste

Constituent Survey Database); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (‘‘a

hazardous waste does not lose its hazardous character simply

because it changes form or is combined with other substances’’). Any mixture or derivative that does not remain

hazardous may be exonerated either by an explicit exclusion

in the initial listing or through the delisting process of

§ 6921(f).

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In sum, neither the definition of ‘‘hazardous waste’’ nor

§ 6921 answers the question whether that definition or any

other provision of the RCRA authorizes the EPA to regulate

a mixture or derivative that may be, but has not yet been

shown to be, a hazardous waste. We must go on to determine, therefore, whether the EPA’s interpretation of 42

U.S.C. § 6903(5) is reasonable.

B. Chevron step two

The EPA persuasively argues that it reasonably interpreted the term ‘‘hazardous waste’’ presumptively to include

mixtures and derivatives: ‘‘[The Final Rule] assure[s] that

hazardous mixtures and derivatives do not imprudently escape Subtitle C requirements.’’ We agree. The Final Rule

fulfills the purpose for which the Congress passed the RCRA,

namely to subject hazardous waste to ‘‘cradle-to-grave’’ regulation in order to protect public health and the environment.

United Technologies, 821 F.2d at 716. To that end, too, the

Congress ‘‘requir[ed] that hazardous waste be properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the need for

corrective action at a future date.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5).

We also agree that, because many mixtures of and derivatives

from hazardous wastes are themselves hazardous, it is reasonable for the EPA to assume that all such mixtures and

derivatives are hazardous until shown otherwise. For that

reason we have already endorsed a similar action by the EPA

with respect to hazardous wastes that mix with soil and

groundwater. See Chemical Waste Management, 869 F.2d at

1540. Placing the burden upon the regulated entity to show

the lack of a hazardous characteristic in a mixture or derivative it manages avoids placing upon the EPA what the agency

persuasively describes as ‘‘the nearly impossible affirmative

burden of anticipating and analyzing, in a listing decision, the

hazardousness or non-hazardousness [of] every conceivable

mixture or derivative that a generator might create.’’ In

addition, the dozen or more exceptions already contained in

the rule – such as those for used oil, 40 C.F.R.

§ 261.3(a)(2)(v), certain laboratory wastewaters, id.

§ 261.3(a)(2)(iv)(E), and certain carbamate wastewaters, id.

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§ 261.3(a)(2)(iv)(F)-(G) – prevent it from casting too wide a

net over nonhazardous mixtures and derivatives.

The ACC objects that the delisting mechanism does not

provide any realistic relief to the potential over-inclusiveness

of the rule because it is ‘‘slow, onerous, ineffective, and at

times controversial.’’ OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY

RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE NATION’S

HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: THE

RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 39 (1990). The cumbersome

nature of the delisting process, however, says nothing about

the reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of the statute.

And in any event, even if the delisting process were impossibly cumbersome, a party could still head off the initial listing

of the mixture or derivative by proposing that the initial

listing of a particular waste as hazardous include the qualification that certain specified mixtures and derivatives are not

included in the listing.

The ACC claims the EPA has available to it other ‘‘lawful

and adequate alternatives to the mixture rule and the derived-from rule,’’ such as adopting broader listings or modifying the current prohibition on dilution of hazardous waste.

See 40 C.F.R. § 268.3. We disagree because the EPA has

shown not only that the Final Rule prevents hazardous

mixtures and derivatives from evading proper treatment under the RCRA but also that the alternatives proposed by the

ACC would not be as effective. For example, using broader

listings would place upon the EPA the very administrative

burden we deemed above to be impractical; the Agency

would have to identify not only the hazardous waste but also

to determine whether all second-generation wastes are hazardous. The anti-dilution rule makes unlawful the expedient

of simply diluting hazardous waste in order to lower the

concentration of hazardous constituents and thereby circumvent regulation under the RCRA. The ACC does not explain

how modifying the anti-dilution rule would make it an effective substitute for the Final Rule.

Finally, the ACC argues that the Final Rule imposes a

significant cost upon industry without any showing of a

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concomitant public benefit. The ACC, however, does not

identify any provision of the RCRA requiring the benefits of a

regulation to equal or exceed its costs. And the EPA has

submitted evidence that some mixtures and derivatives display the hazardous characteristics of their parent waste, see

Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 22,274–75, which suggests the

rule will provide at least some added protection of the environment and public health.

We think the Congress wanted the EPA, in deciding which

substances to regulate as ‘‘hazardous’’ under the RCRA, to

err on the side of caution, see 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(6); the

Final Rule is a reasonable exercise of such caution. Therefore, we cannot say the rule is an unreasonable interpretation

of the agency’s statutory mandate comprehensively to regulate hazardous waste.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

Denied.

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