Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02170/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02170-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Kelly H. Crowell
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY H. CROWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-2170 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Kelly H. Crowell moves for summary judgment. 

(Docket No. 12.) Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart in her capacity as

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. (Docket

No. 17) Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties,

the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS

Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

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BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff first applied for disability insurance benefits

(DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSI) under Titles

II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act) on March 31, 1994,

claiming a disability onset date of on December 31, 1986. 

(Administrative Record (AR) at 314.) He claimed an inability to

work due to injury and degenerative processes in his back, neck,

shoulder and lumbar spine and severe pain in his upper and lower

extremities. (AR 314; 85-88; 109.) The Social Security

Administration (SSA) denied his benefit application initially in an

undated decision and upon reconsideration on October 24, 1994. (AR

89-92; 95-97.) 

Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ). (AR 98-99.) Plaintiff and a family friend and

employer, Delores Martin, testified at the hearing before an ALJ on

December 3, 1996. (AR 34-35.) Plaintiff was represented by

counsel. (Id.) In a decision issued on March 4, 1997, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff does not have any impairments that meet

the Listing of Impairments. (AR 11; 21.) The ALJ further found

that Plaintiff was not credible in his allegations of symptoms in

excess of those shown in the medical record and that Plaintiff has

the residual functional capacity for light work. (AR 22.) 

Plaintiff appealed this decision on April 21, 1997. (AR 5-

10.) Plaintiff claimed that the ALJ improperly evaluated his

testimony regarding pain and other symptoms and improperly applied

the medical vocational guidelines. (Id.) On April 1, 1998, the

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Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision and the

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 3-4.) 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an action for judicial review of

the Commissioner's final decision. (AR 439.) On January 4, 1999,

the United States District Court, Northern District of California,

granted summary judgment for Plaintiff and remanded the case for

further administrative proceedings. (Crowell v. Apfel, No. C-98-

1621 BZ; AR 439-44.) The Honorable Bernard Zimmerman found that

the ALJ had committed legal error by failing to give reasons for

rejecting the testimony of Plaintiff's family friend Delores

Martin. (AR 441.) Additionally, Magistrate Judge Zimmerman found

that the ALJ, in using the Medical Vocational Guidelines, should

have either found that any 

non-exertional limitations did not significantly affect Plaintiff's

work or used a vocational expert. (AR 442.) 

Pursuant to this remand, a different ALJ held hearings on

January 9, 2003, and on August 12, 2003. (AR 686-727; 728-762.) 

On November 26, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's

claims for DIB and SSI disability benefits. (AR 311-321.) On

March 23, 2005, the Appeals Council declined to review this

decision and it became the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR

294-298.) The Appeals Council found no reason under its rules to

assume jurisdiction and issued an explanation of its decision. 

(Id.) Plaintiff filed the current action for judicial review of

the Commissioner's final decision on May 26, 2005. 

II. Factual History

Plaintiff was fifty-two years old at the time of the second

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hearing decision and has a high school education. (AR 68.) 

Plaintiff has work experience as a shipping and receiving clerk,

construction laborer, and process server. (AR 315.) Plaintiff's

longest-held job, as of his 1996 administrative hearing, was as a

quality control inspector for an RV accessory manufacturer. (AR

68.) Plaintiff subsequently worked for a year and two months as a

shipping and receiving clerk in 2001 and 2002, a period during

which he claims to have been disabled. (AR 690-91.) 

Plaintiff has had multiple arrests and convictions. (AR 61-

64.) Plaintiff served seventeen months in prison for a drugrelated offense beginning in 1989. (AR 61-62.) He subsequently

served two prison terms for parole violation for positive drug test

results. (Id.) He was imprisoned for a year in 1992 as a result

of his involvement in a fight. (AR 63-64.) He went to jail "every

once in a while" in the 1980's for fighting and public

intoxication. (AR 67-68.) He reported to an examining

psychiatrist that he had been arrested over 100 times. (AR 287.)

Plaintiff has a history of alcohol and drug abuse. (AR 61;

65-67.) Before the accident that he alleges caused his disability,

Plaintiff had a problem with excessive drinking and resulting

blackouts. (AR 65-66.) He lost his license as a result of drunk

driving in 1987. (AR 67.) In 1994, Dr. Whitten, an examining

psychiatrist, reported that Plaintiff was addicted to

methamphetamine. (AR 284.) Plaintiff told Dr. Whitten that he was

using $250.00 worth of methamphetamine every two days. (AR 286.) 

Plaintiff had been a smoker but quit in 1996. (AR 69.)

As of the January, 2003, hearing, Plaintiff was living with

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his wife, son, mother, sister and niece. (AR 700.) Plaintiff has

an adult daughter who lives in Idaho and a grandchild. (AR 60-61.) 

Plaintiff's daily activities include doing a few things around the

house, playing with his dog, going to the store and walking around

the block with his wife and son. (AR 698-99.) His sister does the

shopping, cooking and cleaning. (Id.) Plaintiff visits with

friends once in a while. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims disability based on injuries sustained in

automobile and motorcycle accidents in the 1980's. (AR 38-39.) In

the automobile accident, he broke his collarbone and shoulder. (AR

39.) He had reconstructive surgery to repair his shoulder. (Id.) 

The motorcycle accident caused Plaintiff's back injuries. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims to have constant pain in his shoulder and

back as a result of his injuries. (AR 41; 43.) He claims that his

back pain radiates to his head, legs, arms and hands and causes

numbness in his legs and hands. (AR 42; 694.) He claims that he

can only work for an hour before his legs and arms become numb. 

(AR 47.) For his pain, Plaintiff takes Tylenol, codeine, and

Motrin. (AR 734.) Additionally, Plaintiff has chronic bronchitis. 

(AR 736.) For his respiratory problems, Plaintiff takes Albuterol

twice a day on average. (AR 733-34.) 

Plaintiff is not under the care of a physician. (AR 49.) 

Therefore, the record does not contain an evaluation of Plaintiff's

condition by a treating physician. Plaintiff was treated by a

chiropractor five times in 1992 and again by a different

chiropractor eight times in 1996. (AR 182; 290.)

Dr. Kelly H. Otani, M.D., performed an orthopedic evaluation

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of Plaintiff on July 7, 1994. (AR 284-85.) Dr. Otani reported

that Plaintiff demonstrated multiple inconsistencies in his

physical examination which were not physiological. (AR 285.) 

Based on his examination and objective findings, Dr. Otani believes

that Plaintiff's tolerance for standing is four hours in an eight

hour day and his tolerance for sitting is six hours in an eight

hour day. (Id.) Dr. Otani believes that Plaintiff has a tolerance

for lifting forty pounds. (Id.)

Dr. Keith Whitten, M.D., performed a psychiatric evaluation of

Plaintiff on June 4, 1994. (AR 286-90.) Dr. Whitten noted that

Plaintiff tends to minimize his drug use and has a very poor work

record. (AR 286-87; 289.) Dr. Whitten concluded that Plaintiff is

able to understand simple instructions, perform within a schedule,

maintain attendance, work with others without being sidetracked,

and maintain concentration for extended periods of time. (AR 288.)

A. Plaintiff's first ALJ hearing

At his first administrative hearing, on December 3, 1996,

Plaintiff and Ms. Martin testified. (AR 35.) Plaintiff testified

that he was currently working as a courier delivering court papers. 

(AR 43-44.) Regarding this work he testified, "I try to get an

hour or two in when I do the work, you know, and then sometimes

that lays me up for two or three days." (AR 44.) Regarding the

same work, Ms. Martin testified, "If I have one in Hayward and one

in, in Martinez, that's a long day for him and usually it ends up

laying him up, you know, for three or four days before I can use

him again." (AR 79.) 

In his March 4, 1997, decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

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had not performed "substantial gainful activity" (SGA) since

December, 1986. (AR 21.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Otani had found

multiple inconsistencies in Plaintiff's allegations of pain. (AR

19.) The ALJ found Plaintiff not credible in his allegations of

pain in excess of that supported by the objective medical findings. 

(AR 22.) The ALJ's decision omitted any mention of Ms. Martin's

testimony. (AR 20.) 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable severe

impairments are low back pain, right acromioclavicular joint

separation, and a right shoulder coronoid process abnormality. (AR

21.) According to the ALJ's findings, Plaintiff's impairments do

not meet or equal any listed impairments. (AR 17-19; 21.) The ALJ

found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work and therefore could

not perform past relevant work. (AR 22.) The ALJ's finding

regarding Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) was that

Plaintiff has an RFC for light work. (AR 22.) Based on this

finding, the ALJ, without testimony from a vocational expert,

applied the Medical Vocational Guidelines to conclude that

Plaintiff is "not disabled" within the meaning of the Act. (AR

21.)

B. Plaintiff's second ALJ hearing

After the District Court's remand, a second administrative

hearing was held on January 9, 2003. (AR 686-727.) Plaintiff, a

medical expert, and a vocational expert testified. (AR 686.) 

Plaintiff testified that he last worked as a shipping and receiving

clerk for a year and two months, ending in May, 2002. (AR 690-91.) 

He testified as to his daily activities as described above. 

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Plaintiff submitted four declarations from relatives and

family friends to support his claims of disabling pain and

respiratory problems. (AR 617-21.) Ms. Martin submitted one of

these declarations as an update of her testimony at the first

hearing. (AR 620.) However, Plaintiff provided no witnesses to

testify at the hearing regarding how his symptoms affect his

ability to function. (AR 687.)

Mr. Velton, the vocational expert, testified that Plaintiff's

last job was semi-skilled sedentary work. (AR 722.) Dr. Malley,

the medical expert, testified that he needed to see a report from

an internist and from an orthopedist in order to make a proper

evaluation. (AR 709.) As a result of Dr. Malley's request, the

ALJ arranged for Plaintiff to be examined by an internist and an

orthopedist following the hearing. (AR 723-26.) The ALJ informed

Plaintiff that there would be a supplemental hearing once the

examinations had been conducted. (AR 723.) 

Dr. Burton Brody, M.D., performed an internal medical

evaluation of Plaintiff on February 13, 2003. (AR 642-44.) In his

report, Dr. Brody noted that Plaintiff "tends to dramatize his

history and dramatize his distress during the examination,

specifically when certain areas are being examined and manipulated,

although similar motions without examination are performed without

difficulties." (AR 643.) Dr. Brody questioned Plaintiff's full

compliance with grip and fist formation tests administered during

the examination. (AR 644.) Plaintiff reported that he only takes

non-prescription medication for his pain. (AR 643.) In a

pulmonary function test report appended to Dr. Brody's report, he

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indicated that the results are likely invalid and that Plaintiff's

effort and cooperation were poor despite repeated instructions. 

(AR 645.) Dr. Brody concluded that Plaintiff can sit, stand and

walk a total of six hours in an eight hour day. (AR 644.) 

Dr. Lara Salamacha, M.D., performed an orthopedic medical

evaluation of Plaintiff on February 18, 2003. (AR 651-58.) She

noted that Plaintiff's pain behaviors are mildly out of proportion

to findings and that his straight leg raise was equivocal. (AR

654.) Plaintiff reported to Dr. Salamacha that he does not have

pain radiating to his lower extremities. (AR 652.) Dr.

Salamacha's report indicates that Plaintiff takes only nonprescription medications for his symptoms. (Id.) She concluded

that Plaintiff can stand or walk for six hours in an eight hour

day, with ten minute breaks each hour, and that he has no

restrictions on sitting with routine breaks. (AR 654.)

C. Plaintiff's third ALJ hearing

After the examinations ordered by the ALJ were conducted, a

third administrative hearing was held on August 12, 2003. (AR 728-

62.) Dr. Malley did not appear at the third hearing but Mr. Velton

and Dr. Choslovsky, a different medical expert, did appear and

testified. (AR 729-30.) Dr. Choslovsky testified that Plaintiff

has chronic bronchitis but that he should have no restriction in

his functioning due to his respiratory condition. (AR 735-37.) 

Dr. Choslovsky opined that, other than his respiratory condition,

there is no evidence that Plaintiff has any medical impairments. 

(AR 735-36.) 

The ALJ issued his decision on November 26, 2003. He found

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that Plaintiff has not engaged in SGA since his December 31, 1986,

alleged onset date of disability. (AR 320.) The ALJ found that

the medical evidence establishes that Plaintiff has severe asthma,

low back pain and right shoulder pain but that he does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments shown in the Listing of

Impairments. (AR 320.) The ALJ's finding regarding Plaintiff's

past relevant work was that Plaintiff is unable to perform such

work. (Id.) 

The ALJ relied on the medical reports of Drs. Salamacha,

Otani, Brody, and Whitten in determining Plaintiff's RFC. (AR 316-

20.) The ALJ cited instances from the reports of each of these

doctors that indicate that Plaintiff is not fully credible. (AR

316-19.) The ALJ credited the conclusions of Drs. Salamacha and

Brody that Plaintiff can stand or walk for six hours in an eighthour workday. (AR 316-17.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff can

stand, walk or sit for six hours in an eight hour day, lift twenty

pounds, and do simple grasping and fine manipulation. (AR 320.) 

Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the residual

functional capacity for a wide range of light work. (Id.) Based

on the testimony of Mr. Velton, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can

perform the jobs of investigator of dealer accounts, counter clerk,

and children's attendant, all of which exist in substantial numbers

in the national economy. (AR 321.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits 

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ's

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

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substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v.

Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir.

1995). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 

Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just

the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the

Commissioner's conclusions and that which does not. Martinez, 807

F.2d at 772. 

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld even

when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Secretary, 602

F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by

substantial evidence, the findings of the ALJ as to any fact will

be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

Under the Social Security Act, "disability" is defined as the 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so

severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous

work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the

impairment must result "from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(3). 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Regulations set out

a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(f);

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991); Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). The burden of proof is

on the claimant in steps one through four. Sanchez v. Secretary of

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). In

step one, the claimant must show that she or he is not currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

In step two, the claimant must show that he or she has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limits his or her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)); Bowen

v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

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1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the claimant does not, he or she is

not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues to step three for a

determination of whether the impairment meets or equals a "listed"

impairment which the regulations acknowledge to be so severe as to

preclude substantial gainful activity. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141;

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If

this requirement is met, the claimant is conclusively presumed

disabled; if not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. At step

four, it must be determined whether the claimant can still perform

"past relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform such work, he or she is

not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20

C.F.R. § 1520(f).

DISCUSSION

I. Presumptive disability 

Plaintiff argues that there is not substantial evidence in the

record to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's chronic

bronchitis does not meet the requirements of a listed impairment. 

However, Dr. Choslovsky, the medical expert who testified at the

third hearing, concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the listed

impairments for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (AR 736.) 

Plaintiff did not present evidence to refute Dr. Choslovsky's

conclusion. Therefore, by relying on the only expert medical

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testimony provided on the issue, the ALJ's conclusion that

Plaintiff does not meet the listed impairment for chronic

obstructive pulmonary disease is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff also argues there is not substantial evidence in the

record to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff does not have

spinal stenosis, an impairment listed in § 1.04. However, Dr.

Choslovsky testified that, other than his chronic bronchitis,

Plaintiff did not have any medical impairments. (AR 736.) 

Plaintiff did not present evidence to refute this testimony. 

Therefore, because he relied on the only expert medical testimony

provided, the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff has no other listed

impairments is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff argues that his impairments meet the requirements of

the impairment listed in § 1.05C of the Listing of Impairments:

amputation of one hand and one lower extremity at or above the

tarsal region, with inability to ambulate effectively. There is no

evidence in the record that Plaintiff has experienced an

amputation. Therefore, there was substantial evidence to support

the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's impairments do not meet the

impairment listed in § 1.05C of the Listing of Impairments.

II. The ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's pain testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff's

testimony regarding his pain without giving specific reasons for

finding Plaintiff not credible. In deciding whether to accept a

claimant's subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ is required to

engage in a two-part analysis. First, the ALJ must determine

whether there is a medically determinable impairment that could

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reasonably be expected to cause the claimant's symptoms. Cotton v.

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)

and (b). Second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and

persistence of the claimant's symptoms, considering evidence beyond

the claimant's own testimony. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)). 

 Under the Cotton test, a claimant "must produce objective

medical evidence of an underlying impairment 'which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

alleged.'" Bunnel v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc) (quoting Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-08). "[I]t is improper

as a matter of law for an ALJ to discredit excess pain testimony

solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective

medical findings." Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407; Fair v. Bowen, 885

F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Once a claimant meets the Cotton test, the ALJ may not

discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms merely

because they are unsupportable by objective evidence. Unless there

is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering,

the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be

"clear and convincing." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th

Cir. 1989)); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281.

Plaintiff testified as to his pain and other symptoms that he

argues prevent him from working regularly. (AR 38-43; 692-98.) 

Plaintiff also produced medical evidence that could logically

support his claimed symptoms. (AR 284-85; 642-44; 551-54.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff meets the first step of the Cotton test. 

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However, the ALJ provided several reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff's testimony, each of which is supported by the record. 

Primarily, the ALJ noted that the medical record contradicts

Plaintiff's claim that he cannot walk or stand for more than an

hour without needing to rest. Three examining physicians concluded

that Plaintiff can stand or walk for at least four hours in an

eight hour day. (AR 284-85; 642-44; 651-54.) Plaintiff's treating

chiropractor, after treating Plaintiff for back strain on five

occasions, concluded that Plaintiff could return to work. (AR

182.) 

A testifying medical expert, after reviewing the record,

opined that plaintiff's residual functional capacity for work is

unrestricted. (AR 738.) Plaintiff produced no medical records

from a treating physician to support his claims of disabling levels

of pain. Therefore, Plaintiff's testimony that his pain and other

symptoms prevent him from working is contradicted by strong

objective medical evidence. 

Another reason the ALJ provided for rejecting Plaintiff's pain

testimony was that three examining physicians noted inconsistencies

and lack of effort on Plaintiff's part during examinations. (AR

285; 318-19; 643; 645; 653; 654.) For instance, Dr. Brody, an

examining physician, noted that Plaintiff expressed distress while

being examined but could perform similar motions without difficulty

when not being examined. (AR 643.) Statements such as these from

examining physicians are probative for evaluating a claimant's

credibility. Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.

2004). Therefore, the ALJ provided another valid reason for

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rejecting Plaintiff's pain testimony.

An additional reason the ALJ provided for rejecting

Plaintiff's pain testimony was that Plaintiff has not been taking

strong pain medication. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's use of

only non-prescription pain medication is not consistent with the

disabling level of pain Plaintiff claimed to experience and thereby

undermines that claim. That a claimant is not using medication

commensurate with the level of pain alleged is a valid reason for

discrediting the claimant's pain testimony. Flatten v. Secretary

of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Therefore, the ALJ provided an additional valid reason for

rejecting Plaintiff's pain testimony. 

Another reason the ALJ provided for rejecting Plaintiff's

subjective pain testimony is that Plaintiff had worked a full-time

job for over a year during the period in which he claims to have

been disabled. Plaintiff testified as to this work. (AR 690-91.) 

The ALJ concluded that this is not consistent with the disabling

pain and other symptoms he alleges. Therefore, the ALJ provided

another legitimate reason for discrediting Plaintiff's pain

testimony.

In his reply, Plaintiff argues that he was entitled to a trial

work period before the fact that he has worked can be used to

establish that he is not disabled. However, such trial period is

be considered successful, and thereby may be used to establish that

the claimant can work, if it lasts more than six months, regardless

of the reason for termination. SSR 84-25. The full-time job that

the ALJ took into consideration lasted for over a year. Therefore,

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it was proper for the ALJ to consider evidence of this work

experience to conclude that Plaintiff was not experiencing the

disabling level of pain he alleged.

III. Proper evaluation of the lay testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not considering the lay

testimony regarding Plaintiff's pain and other symptoms. In a

claim for disability benefits, the Commissioner will consider

"observations by non-medical sources" as evidence of the claimant's

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e)(2). Lay witness testimony by

friends, neighbors and family members in a position to observe the

claimant's symptoms is competent evidence. Sprague v. Bowen, 812

F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987); Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716,

719 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985). "Disregard of this evidence violates the

Secretary's regulation that he will consider observations by

non-medical sources as to how an impairment affects a claimant's

ability to work." Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232 (citing 20 C.F.R

§ 404.1513(e)(2)). 

 An ALJ cannot discount lay witness testimony simply because he

finds the claimant to be not credible. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d

915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ must give reasons that are

"germane to each witness whose testimony he rejects." Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1288; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. 

Family members and friends, including Ms. Martin, submitted

declarations describing how Plaintiff's impairments affect his

ability to function. (AR 617-21.) These accounts allege that

after moving about for even a short time Plaintiff must rest due to

his back pain and that he needs to take asthma medication several

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times a day. Id. The medical evidence, however, indicates that

Plaintiff can stand for up to six hours in an eight hour day and

lift at least twenty-five pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently. (AR 285; 644; 654.) Furthermore, the medical evidence

indicates that Plaintiff should have no restriction in his

functioning as a result of his respiratory condition. (AR 737.)

The ALJ discounted the testimony of Plaintiff's family and

friends because their accounts were contradicted by the medical

evidence of record. (AR 320.) That a lay witness's testimony is

contradicted by medical evidence is an acceptable reason for

rejecting lay testimony regarding a claimant's pain and other

symptoms. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Therefore, the ALJ permissibly rejected the lay testimony.

IV. The ALJ's interpretation of the vocational expert's testimony

Plaintiff argues that the testimony of the vocational expert

supports his contention that he cannot perform light work. The

vocational expert did testify that, if Plaintiff could not walk or

stand for more than an hour, he would be restricted in performing

light work. (AR 754-55.) However, the vocational expert made this

assessment in response to a hypothetical question posed by

Plaintiff's counsel regarding a hypothetical person who cannot walk

or stand for more than an hour. Id. 

An ALJ is not bound to accept as true the restrictions

presented in a hypothetical question propounded by a claimant's

counsel. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756-57. Based on his evaluation

of the evidence, an ALJ can reject those restrictions. Martinez,

807 F.2d at 774. The ALJ rejected the hypothetical restrictions

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posed by Plaintiff's counsel and found that Plaintiff can stand or

walk for six hours in an eight hour day. (AR 320.) Therefore, the

ALJ permissibly rejected the vocational expert's testimony in

response to Plaintiff's counsel's hypothetical.

V. The medical expert's testimony supports the ALJ's finding that

Plaintiff could do light work.

Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Choslovsky's testimony supports

his contention that he cannot perform light work. The medical

expert testified that if Plaintiff's respiratory testing had been

done before Plaintiff had taken any medication, the tests might

have shown him to be more severely impaired. (AR 744.) However,

the medical expert clarified that Plaintiff's respiratory condition

is not severe when he is medicated and that he should have no

restriction in his functioning with respect to his respiratory

condition. (AR 737; 744.) Therefore, when viewed in its entirety,

the testimony of the medical expert supports the ALJ's findings

that Plaintiff's impairments do not keep him from working. 

VI. Full and fair inquiry.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ abused his discretion

by failing to develop the record fully. When presiding over an

administrative hearing, "the ALJ is not a mere umpire at such a

proceeding, but has an independent duty to fully develop the

record, especially where the claimant is not represented." Higbee

v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Cox v.

Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Thompson v.

Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1982) (ALJ is required to

pursue relevant avenues of inquiry). 

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However, Plaintiff does not specify what relevant facts or

lines of inquiry the ALJ failed to pursue. Plaintiff was given

three administrative hearings, all of which he attended accompanied

by counsel. Plaintiff did not have any additional medical records

that the ALJ could have reviewed, because he was not under the care

of a physician. When the medical expert testifying at the second

administrative hearing advised the ALJ that the record needed

internal medical and orthopedic evaluations to be complete, the ALJ

had an internist and an orthopedist examine Plaintiff and provide

reports. The ALJ reviewed the reports of the four doctors that had

examined Plaintiff and discussed the reports in his decision. 

Additionally, it is a claimant's rather than an ALJ's duty to

furnish medical evidence of the claimant's impairments. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1512(a). Therefore, the ALJ was not obliged to provide

Plaintiff with a treating physician to furnish a report. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by failing to

develop the record fully. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary

judgement is denied and Defendant's cross-motion for summary

judgement is granted. Judgment shall enter accordingly. Each

party shall bear his or her own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/20/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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