Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05003/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05003-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Chertoff
Respondent
Gottlieb Duwan
Respondent
Alberto Gonzalez
Respondent
Lisa Ulrika Norgren
Petitioner
Condoleeza Rice
Respondent
Ake Peter Gerhard Svensborn
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Although styled as a request for a temporary restraining order, Petitioners essentially

requested that the Court grant the petition for writ of mandamus. Petitioners did not, for

example, request that any action be enjoined pending a motion for preliminary injunction. 

See Civ. L.R. 65-1(c) (discussing form of appropriate temporary restraining orders).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AKE PETER GERHARD

SVENSBORN and LISA ULRIKA

NORGREN,

Petitioners,

v.

PETER D. KEISLER, et al.,

Respondents.

NO. C07-5003 TEH

ORDER VACATING

SEPTEMBER 28, 2007 ORDER

AND DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

This matter came before the Court on Monday, November 5, 2007, for a further

hearing on Petitioners’ request for a writ of mandamus. On September 28, 2007, the Court

granted mandamus relief following a hearing on Petitioners’ oral request for a temporary

restraining order.1

 In its order, the Court also “recognize[d] that its decision [was] based on

papers and oral arguments that [had] been quickly assembled by both Petitioners and

Respondents,” and the Court therefore invited further briefing should the government

continue to oppose the granting of the writ. Sept. 28, 2007 Order Granting Pet’n for Writ of

Mandamus at 2.

The government filed a timely supplemental opposition brief on October 15, 2007,

and Petitioners filed a late reply brief on October 23, 2007, which the Court nonetheless

reviewed. After carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the record in

this case, and relevant law, the Court concludes that its September 28, 2007 order was in

error and now VACATES that order and DENIES Petitioners’ request for a writ of

mandamus.

Case 3:07-cv-05003-TEH Document 11 Filed 11/07/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Diversity immigrants are provided for by 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). The diversity

immigration visa lottery program is governed by 22 C.F.R. § 42.33.

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Section 221(g) provides in relevant part that “[n]o visa or other documentation shall

be issued to an alien if (1) it appears to the consular officer, from statements in the

application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa

or such other documentation under section 1182 of this title, or any other provision of law,

(2) the application fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter, or the regulations

issued thereunder, or (3) the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien is

ineligible to receive a visa or such other documentation under section 1182 of this title, or

any other provision of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g).

2

BACKGROUND

In May 2006, Petitioner Ake Peter Gerhard Svensborn was notified that his

application in the diversity immigration visa lottery program for fiscal year 2007 was

selected.2

 In September 2006, he married Petitioner Lisa Ulrika Norgren. As Svensborn’s

spouse, Norgren was permitted to submit a derivative application for a diversity visa under

8 U.S.C. § 1153(d). Applicants who are selected in the diversity immigration visa lottery

program remain eligible to receive a visa only through the end of the fiscal year in which

they are selected – in this case, September 30, 2007. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II).

Following his marriage to Norgren, Svensborn remained in the United States on a

student visa and applied to have his status adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident. The

government granted Svensborn’s application to adjust his status on May 10, 2007.

Norgren was in the United States only as a visitor, and she returned to Sweden in

December 2006. She attended an immigrant visa interview at the United States embassy in

Stockholm on August 16, 2007. It is undisputed that she was given a Form OF-194 on that

date denying her request for a visa under section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act (“INA”),3

 but also explaining that the deficiencies in her application might be overcome

if she provided additional documentation.

The parties dispute whether Norgren diligently gathered such additional

documentation and provided it to the embassy. However, it is not disputed that Norgren’s

application remains open, and that consular officials remain unsatisfied that Norgren has

presented sufficient evidence to establish her eligibility to receive an immigrant visa.

Case 3:07-cv-05003-TEH Document 11 Filed 11/07/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioners actually named Alberto Gonzalez as a Respondent. As Gonzalez’s

successor, Keisler is substituted as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

25(d)(1).

3

Petitioners filed this case, seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus to

compel adjudication of Norgren’s visa application, on September 27, 2007. Petitioners

named the following individuals as Respondents: Peter Keisler, Acting Attorney General of

the United States4

; Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the United States Department of

Homeland Security; Condoleeza Rice, United States Secretary of State; and Gottlieb Duwan,

Vice Consul of the United States embassy in Stockholm.

The parties first appeared before this Court on September 28, 2007, for argument on

Petitioners’ oral request for a temporary restraining order. At that time, the Court was not

convinced by Respondents’ argument that the August 16, 2007 decision on Norgren’s visa

application constituted an unreviewable consular decision, or that it constituted a final

adjudication of Norgren’s application. Consequently, the Court granted the petition because

Norgren would have lacked any means to obtain a diversity visa for the 2007 fiscal year

unless the Court ordered that adjudication be completed prior to September 30, 2007. 

Recognizing that the parties may not have had an opportunity to develop their arguments

fully, the Court established a supplemental briefing schedule and set a further hearing on the

petition for November 5, 2007, indicating that the Court may vacate its order granting the

writ if Respondents ultimately demonstrated the superior position.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court has jurisdiction over mandamus actions “to compel an officer or employee

of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28

U.S.C. § 1361. However, mandamus is “an extraordinary remedy,” and a writ of mandamus

is proper “only when (1) the plaintiff’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the defendant official’s

duty to act is ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other

adequate remedy is available.” Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Case 3:07-cv-05003-TEH Document 11 Filed 11/07/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The government mistakenly argues that orders in both cases were issued with four

business days remaining in the fiscal year.

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DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Petitioners agree that Respondents Keisler and Chertoff have no

jurisdiction over Norgren’s visa application. Accordingly, Respondents Keisler and Chertoff

are hereby DISMISSED from this case.

Turning to the remaining Respondents’ disputed arguments, the Court first rejects the

contention that the September 28, 2007 order impermissibly tolled the statutory deadline. It

is undisputed that the Court cannot, regardless of the equities involved, extend the statutory

September 30, 2007 deadline by which applicants for diversity immigration visas must

receive their visas. Carrillo-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 353 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Respondents contend that the September 28, 2007 order granting the writ of mandamus

violated this rule because the Court knew that compliance prior to September 30 was

unlikely, given that the order was issued on a Friday at 4:00 PM Pacific time, at which time

the embassy in Stockholm was already closed until Monday, October 1. Respondents argue

that the cases relied on by the Court in which similar orders were issued are distinguishable

because, in those cases, the orders were issued with several business days remaining in the

fiscal year. See Przhebelskaya v. U.S. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 338 F.

Supp. 2d 399, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (four business days); Paunescu v. I.N.S., 76 F. Supp. 2d

896, 898 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (three business days5

).

The number of business days remaining in the fiscal year is, however, inapposite. The

statute provides that aliens who qualify for diversity immigrant visas through the lottery

remain eligible “through the end of the specific fiscal year for which they were selected,” not

through the end of the close of business, local time, on the last business day remaining in the

fiscal year. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II). Contrary to Respondents’ argument, the Court’s

September 28, 2007 order was not the equivalent of tolling the statutory deadline because

Respondents still had two calendar days in which to comply. Although compliance may

have been inconvenient, it was not impossible.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioners here do not argue that the refusal of Norgren’s visa application failed to

comply with these technical regulations. Petitioners’ only assertion is that the refusal was

not a final adjudication of Norgren’s application.

5

Nonetheless, the Court finds that its September 28, 2007 order improperly granted a

writ of mandamus for the reasons set forth below. First, this case is distinct from the other

cases in which district courts have ordered that a visa application be adjudicated. Unlike this

case, where there is no dispute that Norgren’s application was refused under section 221(g),

there was no indication in those cases that the consular officials had made any decision at all. 

Przhebelskaya, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (noting that “the Agency still had not adjudicated the

applications because the FBI had failed to complete [a] background check”); Paunescu v.

I.N.S., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (indicating that no decision had been made on petitioner’s

application because of the failure of the FBI to process a fingerprint check); Kobzev v. I.N.S.,

Case No. 00 C 4576, 2001 WL 12011, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2001) (noting that a writ of

mandamus was granted because “the INS had still not adjudicated Kobzev’s application”).

The only case that has addressed whether a court can review a decision by a consular

official to refuse a visa application under section 221(g) appears to be Patel v. Reno, 134

F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, an alien wife applied for a visa based on her marriage

to a naturalized citizen. While her application was pending, denaturalization proceedings

were begun against the husband, and a consular official subsequently issued a letter

explaining that the wife’s “‘application is refused’ until the denaturalization proceedings had

been completed and [the applicant’s] eligibility to petition had been firmly established.” Id.

at 931. The letter stated that the application was denied under section 221(g) but did not

comply with regulations requiring the denial to be “on a form prescribed by the Department”

and to state statutory provisions under which administrative relief is available.6

 Id. at 932. 

The Ninth Circuit further explained that the denial was “not a final decision. As

respondents’ counsel admitted during oral argument, the consulate is holding the visa

applications in abeyance.” Id. The court held that, based on these deficiencies, the

consulate’s letter was “not a refusal within the meaning of 22 C.F.R. § 42.81.” Id. The court

distinguished the Patels’ situation from the scenario, contemplated by the regulations, in

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which an applicant indicated an intent to submit additional evidence where such evidence

may overcome the stated grounds of ineligibility. Id. at n.2 (discussing provisions for

reconsideration under 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.81(b) and (e)).

Petitioners argue that Patel requires this Court to find that all refusals under section

221(g) are impermissible temporary refusals, but the Court does not find Petitioners’

argument persuasive. Unlike in the present case, the government in Patel admitted that it

was holding the visa application in abeyance – i.e., that it refused to make a decision – until

after the denaturalization proceedings had concluded. Here, by contrast, the government

asserts that it did make a decision by refusing Norgren’s visa application for lack of adequate

documentation under section 221(g); in fact, it is undisputed that Norgren received a form

OF-194 refusing her visa application because she was found to be ineligible. Thus, this case

and Patel arise under very different facts, and this Court does not interpret Patel as a binding

decision that all refusals under section 221(g), regardless of the factual circumstances, are not

final for purposes of determining whether a writ of mandamus should issue.

Moreover, since Patel was decided, the governing regulations have been modified. 

They now explicitly provide that a consular official may fulfill his duty to issue or refuse to

issue a visa by refusing the visa under section 221(g): “When a visa application has been

properly completed and executed before a consular officer in accordance with the provisions

of INA and the implementing regulations, the consular officer must either issue or refuse the

visa under INA 212(a) or INA 221(g) or other applicable law.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a)

(emphasis added); see 66 Fed. Reg. 10363-64 (Feb. 15, 2001) (noting amendment). This is

precisely what the consular officials did in Norgren’s case.

Although Norgren’s visa application remains under review, the regulations provide for

such reconsideration where, as here, the applicant provides “further evidence tending to

overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based” within one year from

the date of refusal. 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e); see also 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(b). Petitioners have

failed to convince the Court that the ongoing review of Norgren’s application is not properly

construed as part of this reconsideration process, rather than as an indication that no decision

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United States District Court

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This Court wholeheartedly agrees with other courts that have noted the inequities that

may result from the September 30 cut-off date for the diversity immigration visa program. 

E.g., Coraggioso v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 730, 734-35 (3d Cir. 2004); Gebre v. Rice, 462 F.

Supp. 2d 186, 191-92 (D. Mass. 2006). However, such inequities do not provide this Court

with the authority to grant Petitioners the relief they seek.

7

has yet been reached on the application. Indeed, it is undisputed that Norgren received a

Form OF-194 stating that she was found ineligible to receive a visa.

In short, the Court concludes that the refusal of Norgren’s visa application under

section 221(g) complied with the consular officer’s duty under 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) to issue

or refuse the visa. Petitioners have failed to cite any authority for the proposition that any

other duty was owed by Respondents to Norgren, and there is thus no basis on which this

Court could grant relief to Petitioners.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that no writ of mandamus or any

other relief should issue in this case. It is undisputed that Norgren’s visa application was

refused under section 221(g). This refusal satisfied the duty owed to Norgren under 22

C.F.R. § 42.81(a) – namely, to “issue or refuse the visa under INA 212(a) or INA 221(g) or

other applicable law” – and Petitioners have pointed to no authority imposing on

Respondents any other duty, such as a duty that reconsideration also be completed before the

end of the fiscal year or that Norgren’s application be approved. Consequently, there is no

outstanding duty that a writ of mandamus could compel Respondents to perform. The

Court’s September 28, 2007 Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandamus is therefore

VACATED, and the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED in its entirety.7

 The Clerk

shall enter judgment against Petitioners in favor of Respondents and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/07/07 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:07-cv-05003-TEH Document 11 Filed 11/07/07 Page 7 of 7