Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-72122/USCOURTS-ca9-09-72122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Francisca Morales de Soto
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCA MORALES DE SOTO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 09-72122

Agency No.

A086-968-871

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Department of Homeland Security

Argued and Submitted March 9, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed May 31, 2016

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit

Judges and Frederic Block,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

* The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior U.S. District Judge for the

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Francisca Morales de Soto’s petition for

review of the reinstatement by the Immigration and Customs

Enforcement agencyof the Department of Homeland Security

of a prior expedited removal order issued against her. 

The panel held that nothing in the facts of Morales’s case

justified remand for reconsideration of the reinstated

removal order. The panel held that an agency’s intervening

memoranda pertaining to the exercise of prosecutorial

discretion that do not change the law to be applied by an

appellate court do not require remand to the agency. 

The panel also held that Immigration and Customs

Enforcement did not abuse its discretion in reinstating

removal before allowing Morales to exhaust her

administrative appeals from the denial of her separate petition

for consent to reapply for admission. The panel held that

there is no legal requirement for the government to wait until

all other administrative appeals have been exhausted before

reinstating removal.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Stacy Tolchin (argued), Law Offices of Stacy Tolchin, Los

Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Lindsay M. Murphy (argued), Julia J. Tyler, Trial Attorneys;

Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Stuart F. Delery,

Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of

Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,

Washington D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Francisca Morales de Soto, a Mexican native and citizen,

petitions for review of the government’s reinstatement of a

removal order issued in 2000. The Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) agency of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) first notified Morales of its intention to

reinstate removal in 2009. Since that time, the government

has revised its policies regarding the exercise of prosecutorial

discretion in immigration proceedings. Morales asks this

court to remand her case so that the agency can reconsider the

exercise of its discretion in light of those changed policies. 

We conclude that remand of a decision to reinstate removal

is not warranted in these circumstances. We also reject

Morales’s claim that ICE abused its discretion in reinstating

removal before Morales could exhaust her appeals from a

separate petition to reapply for admission to the United

States. We deny the petition for review.

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4 MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH

I. Background

Francisca Morales de Soto attempted to enter the United

States on January 21, 2000, at the border crossing in

Calexico, California. Because she lacked a legal visa, she was

issued a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal and was

removed back to Mexico. Later that same month, Morales

reentered the United States without inspection and has resided

here ever since. She now lives with her husband and three

minor children, all four of whom are U.S. citizens.

In July 2007, Morales filed an application to adjust her

status to that of a lawful permanent resident based on

petitions filed by her husband and her brother, who is also a

U.S. citizen. She also filed a Form I-212, Application for

Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States

after Deportation or Removal, and a Form I-601, Application

for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility. All three

applications were denied because she had previously been

removed and had failed to meet the requirements to obtain

consent to reapply to the United States.1 Her case was

referred to ICE, which notified her on July 9, 2009, of its

intention to reinstate her prior order of removal. Morales filed

1 Unlawful reentry into the United States following an expedited

removal order renders an alien permanently inadmissible and therefore

ineligible for adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). An

alien in these circumstances is only eligible to seek a waiver of

inadmissiblity if she has been absent from the United States for more than

ten years and has received the consent of the Secretary of Homeland

Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii); see also Gonzales v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1242 (9th Cir. 2007). Morales applied for

consent to reapply for admission into the United States while she was

unlawfully present within the country and was therefore ineligible for

either consent to reapply or a waiver of inadmissiblity.

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MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH 5

a petition for review by this court that same day and received

a stay of removal. We now address that petition.

II. Jurisdiction

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) substantially

limits this court’s review of a prior order of removal that has

been reinstated by the government. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).

However, we retain jurisdiction to review the reinstatement

order itself under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Castro-Cortez v.

I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on

other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30

(2006). In her petition, Morales does not challenge the

legitimacy of her January 2000 expedited order of removal.

Instead, she limits her appeal to the manner in which ICE

decided to issue the reinstatement order against her. We

therefore have jurisdiction over the petition.

III. Discussion

When an alien has unlawfully reentered the United States

after being subject to a prior order of removal, the INA allows

the government to reinstate the prior order of removal rather

than undertake removal proceedings a second time. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(5). The only factual predicates for reinstatement

are that “(1) petitioner is an alien, (2) who was subject to a

prior removal order, and (3) who illegally reentered the

United States.” Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484,

495 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In most cases, immigration

officers make such reinstatement decisions without a hearing

before an immigration judge. See id. at 487–88.

There is, however, no requirement that ICE reinstate

removal in all cases, even when these factual predicates are

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met. Reinstatement of removal is neither “automatic” nor

“obligatory.” Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878

(9th Cir. 2013). As an alternative to reinstatement, ICE has

the prosecutorial discretion to initiate a new removal

proceeding before an immigration judge. In this case, ICE

chose not to exercise that discretion and instead reinstated

Morales’s prior removal order without providing for a

hearing.

Morales, acknowledging that we cannot review the merits

of ICE’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, does not

contest the validity of ICE’s decision in 2009 to reinstate

removal. She instead contends that changed circumstances

since ICE initially made its decision in 2009 require us to

remand her case so that ICE can reconsider the exercise of its

discretion.

Morales makes two arguments. First, she contends that

remand is necessary because of changes in ICE’s internal

policies surrounding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Second, she argues that the reinstatement of removal was

premature and that remand is required as a remedy for that

error. Neither argument has merit.

A. Changes in ICE prosecutorial discretion policies

Since July 2009, when ICE first notified Morales of its

intention to reinstate removal, ICE has released a number of

memoranda pertaining to its exercise of prosecutorial

discretion. Morales’s petition focuses on two of these

memoranda. The first memorandum was issued by John

Morton, then the Director of ICE, in 2011. Memorandum

from John Morton, Director of ICE, on Exercising

Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil

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MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH 7

Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the

Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17,

2011), (hereinafter “Morton Memo”).

2 The second

memorandum was issued by John Sandweg, then the Acting

Director of ICE, in 2013. Memorandum from John Sandweg,

Acting Director of ICE, on Facilitating Parental Interests in

the Course of Civil Immigration Enforcement Activities

(August 23, 2013), (hereinafter “Sandweg Memo”).3 The

Morton Memo listed factors that ICE agents should consider

when weighing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,

including factors relevant to Morales, such as the alien’s

length of presence in the United States and her family ties to

the country. Morton Memo at 4–5. The Sandweg Memo

focused on the treatment of alien parents of minor children,

stressing the need for ICE agents to consider “whether the

alien is a parent or legal guardian of a [U.S.-citizen] or [legal

permanent resident] minor” when exercising prosecutorial

discretion. Sandweg Memo at 3.

Morales argues that these memos constitute an

intervening change in ICE policies since her removal was

reinstated, necessitating a remand under ordinary principles

of administrative law. Reviewing this question of law de

novo, Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008), we disagree.

2 The Morton Memo is currently available at

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretion-memo.pdf (last checked May 17, 2016).

3 The Sandweg Memo is currently available at

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental_interest

_directive_signed.pdf (last checked May 17, 2016).

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8 MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH

To begin with, we know from experience that ICE may

reconsider the exercise of its discretion regardless of whether

we remand Morales’s petition. Indeed, the government may

reconsider its position while a petition is pending before us. 

In recent years our court has remanded dozens of pending

petitions at the government’s request. Moreover, the

government represents that Morales made a specific request

to DHS that discretion be exercised in her favor after the

Morton Memo was issued and that the request was explicitly

declined. Remand is obviously not necessary to permit the

agency to exercise discretion of this kind.

There are circumstances where remand is appropriate

after there has been a change in applicable agency policy. An

appellate court “reviewing an agency decision following an

intervening change of policy by the agency should remand to

permit the agency to decide in the first instance whether

giving the change retrospective effect will best effectuate the

policies underlying the agency’s governing act.” NLRB v.

Food Store Emps. Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10

(1974). This requirement arises from “the intersection of two

well-established doctrines.” Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v.

FERC, 890 F.2d 435, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The first is that a

reviewing court must apply “the law in effect at the time it

renders its decisions, even when a change in governing law is

made by an administrative agency.” Id. at 438–39 (citing

Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281–82 (1969)). The

second is that “a reviewing court may ‘not supply a reasoned

basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not

given.’” Id. at 439 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v.

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

But the Food Store doctrine does not apply to a case, like

this one, involving review of a purely discretionary decision

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MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH 9

by an agency. The Morton and Sandweg Memos speak only

to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and do not create or

modify the law to be applied by this or any other court. Aside

from constitutional claims or questions of law reviewable

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we have no authority to review the

merits of ICE’s discretionary decision to reinstate a prior

removal order in situations where the factual predicates for

reinstatement are met. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). This reflects

the understanding that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute

or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a

decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute

discretion” and is not amenable to judicial review. Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).4 As such, changes in

departmental policies surrounding the factors to be

considered or emphasized when exercising that discretion do

not in any sense change the law to be applied by courts. There

is consequently no reason nor need to remand a case to the

agency following intervening changes in policy regarding the

exercise of agency discretion.

Moreover, it is unclear that the memos at issue in this

case can even be properly characterized as changes in agency

policy. Both memoranda specifically state that they “are not

intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any

right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law

4 We recognize that Heckler involved the decision not to enforce agency

regulations, while this case involves the contrary decision to enforce.

Heckler, 470 U.S. at 851. Nonetheless, the same need for “a complicated

balancing of a number of factors . . . peculiarly within [an agency’s]

expertise” that caution against reviewing an agency decision not to

enforce, id. at 831, similarly counsel against involving courts in purely

discretionary agency decisions where there is “no law to apply,” id. at 830

(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

410 (1971)).

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by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.”

Sandweg Memo at 9; see also Morton Memo at 6. By

contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in Food Store

involved a change in policy announced by the National Labor

Relations Board in a formal and binding adjudication.

Morales has pointed to no case holding that remand is

required in response to the issuing of a memo with as little

legal force as the memos at issue here.5

Morales cites to our opinion in Villa-Anguiano as a case

where we did vacate and remand a reinstatement order for

reconsideration because of intervening circumstances. That

case presented a rare situation where a federal district court

had an independent reason to examine the validity of a

previous removal proceeding. The government had initiated

a criminal prosecution for illegal reentry based on that

previous removal. In the course of that prosecution, the

district court concluded that Villa-Anguiano had been

deprived of his right to counsel at the removal proceeding and

had been prejudiced by the resulting due process violation,

and so held that the removal order was invalid as the

predicate for a criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

Villa-Anguiano, 727 F.3d at 876. We held that when “the

government itself invites judicial scrutiny of the underlying

removal order by instigating a criminal prosecution under

§ 1326” and “as a result of such scrutiny, a district court finds

constitutional infirmities in the prior removal proceedings

5 The decision by the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d

134 (5th Cir. 2015), currently before the Supreme Court, which upheld a

preliminary injunction forbidding implementation of the Deferred Action

for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program

(DAPA), does not affect the resolution of this case. Neither party raised

any argument regarding the DAPA Memo and the DAPA Memo does not

concern the decision to reinstate removal.

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that invalidate the prior removal for purposes of criminal

prosecution,” the agency must “(1) provide the alien with an

opportunity after the criminal prosecution is dismissed to

make a written or oral statement addressing the expedited

reinstatement determination in light of the facts found and the

legal conclusions reached in the course of the criminal case;

and (2) independently reassess whether to rely on the order

issued in the prior proceedings as the basis for deportation or

instead to instigate full removal proceedings.” Id. at 880. That

situation is entirely distinct from the circumstances of this

case. Indeed, we recognized in Villa-Anguiano that “the

pendency of reinstatement proceedings does not provide an

alien with a new avenue to challenge the underlying removal

order.” Id.

Morales has not pointed to any change at all in her

circumstances since removal was reinstated in 2009, let alone

a change as significant as the district court decision in VillaAnguiano. Further, we emphasized in Villa-Anguiano that

there was evidence within the administrative record that ICE

had either failed to consider or had misunderstood the district

court’s conclusion that the prior removal order violated due

process, id. at 877, and the government acknowledged that

“had it known of the district court’s findings, it quite possibly

would have exercised its discretion not to pursue

reinstatement” of the removal order, id. at 882. By contrast,

there is no evidence here that ICE failed to consider any

factors relevant to its discretionary decision to reinstate

Morales’s removal order.

Morales argues that there is no requirement that she

highlight any particular fact that ICE failed to properly

consider. In her view, the reinstatement order against her

violated due process because it did not specifically set forth

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ICE’s reasons for exercising its prosecutorial discretion to

reinstate removal.

This argument fundamentally misunderstands the role

played by courts in reviewing discretionary decisions. It is

true that when reviewing ordinary agency action we have

held that an agency “abuses its discretion when it fails to

provide a reasoned explanation for its actions.” Movsisian v.

Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing cases

in the immigration context). Effective judicial review is

impossible in such circumstances if the agency does not show

its work. But, as we have already explained, the exercise of

prosecutorial discretion is a type of government action

uniquely shielded from and unsuited to judicial intervention.

In the context of criminal prosecutions we have repeatedly

held that we have little authority to review prosecutors’

charging decisions. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez,

215 F.3d 969, 976–77 (9th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). We

see no reason to act differently when the consequence of that

discretion is removal rather than jail time. Indeed, the costs to

judicial intervention in prosecutorial decisionmaking are

arguably“greatlymagnified in the deportation context.” Reno

v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490

(1999) (listing the dangers associated with allowing for

selective prosecution claims in the context of immigration).

There are, of course, limited situations that might call for

courts to consider the government’s reasons for exercising

prosecutorial discretion. In the context of challenging a

criminal indictment, for example, where a criminal defendant

can show sufficient facts to create a reasonable likelihood that

the prosecution was vindictive, the burden shifts to the

government to provide “objective evidence justifying the

prosecutor’s action.” United States v. Jenkins, 504 F.3d 694,

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MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH 13

701 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457

U.S. 368, 376 n.8 (1982)). In the removal context, in VillaAnguiano, we vacated and remanded the reinstated removal

order to allow ICE to reassess its decision to reinstate

removal in circumstances where it was clear that the agency

had not considered or been presented with the district court’s

decision invalidating the underlying removal order and might

have exercised its discretion differently had it known. We

acknowledged that “[o]nce ICE complies with these

constitutional requirements, it may exercise its lawful

discretion however it sees fit,” and “need not ‘reach a

different result’ on remand.” Villa-Anguiano, 727 F.3d at 880

n.7. Outside of those and similar “unusual instance[s],” due

process does not require that courts interrogate an agency’s

decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion. We decline to

remand Morales’s case for reconsideration.

B. The timing of the reinstatement of removal

Morales’s second argument in favor of remand is that ICE

erred in deciding to reinstate removal before allowing her to

exhaust her appeal of DHS’s denial of her I-212 application

for consent to reapply for admission.

The government denied Morales’s I-212 application on

June 24, 2009 before reinstating removal soon afterwards on

July 9. Morales then filed her administrative appeal of the

denial of the I-212 waiver on July 23. Morales now concedes

that as a matter of law she is not eligible for an I-212 waiver,

but she nonetheless contends that the government abused its

discretion in not waiting to reinstate removal until the

expiration of the period for her to appeal the I-212 denial and

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14 MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH

the exhaustion of the eventual appeal.6 We disagree. There is

no legal requirement for the government to wait until all other

administrative appeals have been exhausted before reinstating

removal.

Under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2), an alien whose application

for I-212 consent to reapply for admission has been denied

may appeal that denial within 30 days (with an additional

three days allowed for service by mail under 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.8(b)). If the alien were to be successful in her appeal,

the receipt of an I-212 waiver would allow her to avoid

application of the reinstatement provision. Gonzales v. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1242 (9th Cir. 2007). But

those regulations do not require the government to postpone

all other agency action while waiting for the appeal, nor do

they require that removal be postponed once the appeal has

been filed.

Our decision in Ahmed v. Holder, where we held that an

Immigration Judge abused her discretion in denying an

alien’s request for continuance of his removal proceedings

pending his appeal of the denial of a visa application, is not

to the contrary. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2009). Unlike the petitioner in that case, Morales did not

request a continuance from the agency. That case involved

formal removal proceeding, not reinstatement of removal as

here. And, the petitioner in Ahmed at least had a possibility

of succeeding in his appeal. See id. at 1013. In this case,

however, Morales concedes her ineligibility for an I-212

6 We note that the government has never officially denied Morales’s

appeal, although, as Morales acknowledges, it has ample legal grounds to

do so.

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MORALES DE SOTO V. LYNCH 15

waiver. The government did not err in reinstating removal

before Morales had filed her I-212 appeal.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that there is nothing in the facts of

Morales’s case justifying remand to ICE for it to reconsider

its decision to reinstate her prior expedited removal order.

Intervening agency memoranda that do not change the law to

be applied by an appellate court do not require remand to the

agency. Nor was ICE required to explain its reasoning when

exercising its prosecutorial discretion to reinstate Morales’s

removal order. Finally, ICE was not required to wait until all

of Morales’s administrative appeals had concluded before

reinstating removal. We deny the petition for review.7

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

7 We grant Petitioner’s unopposed motion to accept the stipulated

supplemental record.

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