Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02252/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02252-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandra Marie Bowen
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

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 Documents and entries from case No. CV 11-2252-PHX-SRB (ECV) are cited as

“CV Doc.” followed by the docket number. Documents and entries from case No. CR 09-

679-PHX-SRB are cited as “CR Doc.” followed by the docket number.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Sandra Marie Bowen, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 11-2252-PHX-SRB (ECV)

No. CR 09-679-PHX-SRB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Movant has filed a pro se Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence

by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (CV Doc. 4).1

 Respondent

has filed a Response (CV Doc. 15) and Movant has filed a Reply (CV Doc. 19). Also

pending before the court is Movant’s Motion for Return of Seized Personal Property. (Doc.

20). 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 9, 2009, Movant was charged in an indictment with conspiracy to possess

marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vii). The

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 The Court cited the following facts in support of its probable cause finding:

Defendants were traveling in a rented minivan, and when asked for the rental paperwork,

they provided paperwork for multiple rental minivans; Defendants placed a magnetic sign

(and bible) on the dashboard to create the appearance it was engaged in the funeral business;

there was an overwhelmingly strong odor of a masking substance like cleaning material;

Defendants gave conflicting stories about where they were going and why; Williams was

unable to remember the address on his drivers’ license and was anxious and gave conflicting

answers; and less significantly that the car was traveling at a cautious rate of speed. (CV Doc.

15, Ex. E at 232-34).

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indictment included forfeiture allegations pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. (CR Doc. 16). On

June 30, 2009, Movant was charged in a First Superseding Indictment with additional codefendants. (CR Doc. 29). 

On July 10, 2009, Movant through counsel joined co-defendant Christopher Williams’

Motion to Suppress evidence retrieved from an automobile stop in which they were arrested.

(CR Doc. 29; Doc. 62 of No. CR 09-679-SRB, United States v. Williams). Movant argued

the search was illegal as it was not supported by probable cause or consent. (Doc. 44 of No.

CR 09-679-SRB, United States v. Williams; CV Doc. 15, Ex. A at 1.) The District Court

denied the Motion to Suppress by finding Movant gave consent to the search; but even if

Movant had not consented, Respondent had sufficient probable cause to search. (Doc. 91

No. CR 09-679-SRB, United States v. Williams; CV Doc. 15, Ex. E at 66-70, 230-34).2

After the denial of the Motion to Suppress, Respondent filed a Second Superseding

Indictment charging Movant with Conspiracy to Possess 1,000 or more kilograms of

Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(vii), Conspiracy to Launder Monetary

Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), Laundering of Monetary Instruments in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i)-(ii), Conspiracy to Destroy or Remove

Property to Prevent Seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Destruction or Removal of

Property to Prevent Seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) and forfeiture allegations

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pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1),(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853; and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). (CR

Doc. 109). 

Approximately two weeks before trial on May 26, 2010, Movant, represented by

counsel, pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Possess 1,000 kilograms or More of Marijuana with

Intent to Distribute, a Class A felony offense (Count 1 - 21 U.S.C. § 846), Conspiracy to

Launder Monetary Instruments, a Class C felony offense (Count 3 - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)),

and admitted to the forfeiture allegations in the Second Superseding Indictment. (CR Doc.

194, 195).

On November 17, 2010, Movant was sentenced to serve 216 months of imprisonment

on Count 1 and 216 months on Count 3 to run concurrently, to be followed by five years of

supervised release on Count 1 and three years of supervised release on Count 3 to run

concurrently. (CR Doc. 322). Movant did not appeal.

Movant’s § 2255 Motion was filed on the docket on November 16, 2011. (CV Doc.

1). On November 21, 2011, the Court ordered Movant to file an amended motion (CV Doc.

3), which Movant did on January 3, 2012 (CV Doc. 4). In her motion, Movant alleges

ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant contends counsel failed to properly raise a Fourth

Amendment issue under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) which caused undue prejudice

(CV Doc. 4 at 5, 11-14), and failed to warn against the deportation consequences at the

conclusion of her sentence and failed to secure a plea that would avoid this collateral

consequence (id. at 6, 14-15). Respondent contends that the record of the criminal

proceedings do not support Movant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (CV Doc.

15 at 7-15).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Change of Plea Proceedings

The transcript of the change-of-plea hearing before the District Court shows that

Movant answered “Yes, your Honor” when the Court asked if she wished to plead guilty to

the written plea agreement. (CR Doc. 353, Plea Hearing Transcript (“Plea Tr.”) at 2-3).

Movant took an oath to tell the truth. (Id. at 3-4). When questioned by the Court, Movant

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answered that her name was Sandra Marie Bowen, she was born on December 6, 1969, and

she had attended school for 12 years. (Id. at 4). Movant told the Court she could read and

understand English. Movant had not had any drugs, alcohol or medicine within the previous

24 hours and had never been judged incompetent. (Id.). Movant’s counsel stated he had

lengthy discussions with her and felt she was fully competent. (Id. at 5). 

During the proceedings, Movant testified she had reviewed the charges in the Second

Superseding Indictment, had discussed them fully with counsel, and was satisfied with her

representation. (Plea Tr. at 5). Movant told the court she understood she was waiving her

right to trial and the constitutional rights she was giving up. (Id. at 6). Movant also

acknowledged she had agreed to give up certain rights to appeal. (Id. at 7). 

The Court then went over specific items in the Plea Agreement with Movant. (Id. at

8). Movant told the Court no one had forced or threatened her or made promises to him to

make her plead guilty. (Id. at 10-11). Movant stated she was signing the plea agreement and

pleading guilty voluntarily and of her own free will with the advice of counsel. She testified

she was pleading guilty to Count 1 and Count 3 and that she admitted to the forfeiture

allegations in the Second Superseding Indictment. (Id. at 11-12). The Court explained to

Movant the maximum statutory term of imprisonment and application of the Sentencing

Guidelines which Movant indicated she understood. (Plea Tr. at 12-16). Movant understood

that the Court could consider the sentencing table and that under no circumstances could the

Court impose a sentence of less than 10 years. (Id. at 19). Movant understood that she

agreed to forfeit any interest she had in the property listed on pages 5 and 6 of the Plea

Agreement. (Id. at 20; CR Doc. 195). 

When advised by counsel that Movant was not a citizen of the United States, the Court

stated:

In addition to the penalties I have already mentioned, Ms. Bowen, do you

understand that you will likely suffer an adverse immigration consequence as

a result of your conviction for these crimes? Specifically, upon your release

from prison, you will be turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement

for deportation proceedings.

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(Plea. Tr. at 20). Movant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” (Id.) The Court then proceeded to

explain the elements of the crimes for which Plaintiff was pleading guilty. (Id. at 21-22).

The Court ascertained there was a factual basis for the plea and found Movant’s plea

knowing, intelligent and voluntary. (Id. at 22-26). After finding the plea was supported by

a factual basis, the Court accepted Movant’s plea. (Id.). On November 16 and 17, 2010,

Movant entered a plea of guilty which the Court accepted. (CR Doc. 322 at 1; CR Doc. 326).

B. Timeliness of the § 2255 Motion

Respondent has acknowledged that Movant’s § 2255 Motion was timely filed. (CV

Doc. 15 at 6-7). 

C. Waiver

Respondent has raised an argument for dismissal because Movant waived any right

to file any collateral attack, including a § 2255 motion, in her Plea Agreement. (CV Doc. 15

at 7-8). Movant appears to contend her guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made

based on erroneous assistance of counsel, who failed to raise a suppression argument under

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), and failed to warn against the deportation

consequences under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). (CV Doc 4 at 12-15).

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883 (2005). A defendant may

waive the statutory right to challenge his sentence under § 2255. United States v. Pruitt, 32

F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). An express waiver of the right to file a §

2255 motion may not preclude a collateral attack “challenging the knowing and voluntary

nature of the plea agreement” or an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that implicates the

voluntariness of the waiver. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4. See also Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433

(doubting whether “a plea agreement could waive a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

based on counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant to plead guilty

or accept a particular plea bargain”). 

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Movant’s written plea agreement included as terms that she waived “any right to file

an appeal, any collateral attack and any other writ or motion that challenges the conviction

. . . including but not limited to any appeal[] under [§] 2255.” (CR Doc. 195 at 4). At the

change-of-plea hearing, Movant told the court she understood she was waiving her right to

trial and the constitutional rights she was giving up, including her right to appeal. (Plea Tr.

at 6-7). The Court ascertained that Movant understood the constitutional rights she was

waiving by pleading guilty and that no promises or threats had occurred to induce her to plea

guilty. See United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Statements made

by a defendant during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity in

subsequent proceedings attacking the plea”). The record does not support Movant’s

contention that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered as a result of

defense counsel’s deficient representation. Therefore, Movant has expressly waived her

rights to any collateral attack and her Amended Motion under § 2255 should be dismissed.

But even if waiver did not apply, as it does here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second

prong to establish prejudice under Strickland as to both raised grounds.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88, 694. The two-part Strickland test “applies to challenges to guilty

pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).

With respect to the first component, it is strongly presumed that counsel’s performance fell

within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Regarding the second component, a movant must establish prejudice. In the guilty-plea

context, the movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, [movant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

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Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

686. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails if either prong of the analysis is not

met and the movant bears the burden of establishing both prongs. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this case, the transcript of Movant’s change-of-plea hearing shows that Movant did

not complain about defense counsel’s representation to the District Court. Movant never

indicated to the Court she did not understand the proceedings. Counsel attested that Movant

was fully competent and the District Court found Movant’s plea knowing, intelligent and

voluntary.

In regards to her first ground, Movant cannot show counsel’s performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness as counsel joined in co-defendant’s Motion to

Suppress. (CR Doc. 29; Doc. 62 of No. CR 09-679-SRB, United States v. Williams). At the

September 23, 2009 suppression hearing, the District Court provided numerous reasons for

finding Defendants consented to the search and, even if they had not, probable cause existed

for the search. (CV Doc. 15, Ex. E at 232-34). At the change-of-plea hearing, Movant

stated, “You know, I just want to get this over with.” (Plea Tr. at 23). Movant cannot show

that but for counsel’s error, she would not have pleaded guilty and would have went to trial.

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Regarding Movant’s second ground, Movant can not show prejudice. The Court

specifically asked if Movant was a citizen of the United States and was told she was not.

(Plea Tr. At 20). The Court then informed Movant there would be immigration

consequences resulting from her guilty plea, including that she would be turned over to

Immigration and Customs Enforcement for deportation proceedings. Movant responded that

she understood. (Id.). Movant voluntarily agreed to plead guilty under the terms of the plea

agreement and thus failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. A court

is not required to determine if counsel’s performance was deficient before considering the

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prejudice issue. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that

course should be followed.” Id.

E. Movant’s Motion for Return of Seized Personal Property (CV Doc. 20) 

Movant has also filed a Motion for Return of Seized Personal Property. (CV Doc.

20). Respondents have not filed a Response. Movant argues that the property seized from

her vehicle should be returned because she was illegally stopped. This property includes

electronics, clothes, luggage and Movant’s birth certificate, passport, business lease and

social security cards. Movant contends co-defendants received some of their legal

documents and social security cards, so she should receive her property or compensation in

the amount of $23,770.00 for their taking.

Movant has admitted to the forfeiture allegations in the Second Superseding

Indictment and has signed the Plea Agreement. (CR Doc. 194, 195). In the plea agreement,

Movant agreed to forfeit “without limitation . . . any other property seized in the course of

the government’s investigation.” (CR Doc. 195 at 5-6). At the change-of-plea hearing, the

District Court asked if Movant understood she had agreed to admit to the forfeiture

allegations. Movant responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” (Plea Tr. At 11-12). The District Court

then asked Movant if she understood that she agreed to forfeit any interest in the property

described in pages 5 and 6 of the Plea Agreement. Movant responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”

(Id. at 20). As discussed above, the District Court found Movant’s guilty plea knowing,

intelligent and voluntary; therefore Movant’s Motion for Return of Seized Property should

be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Movant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in his § 2255 Motion

should be denied and dismissed based on the files and record in this case. Movant’s Motion

for Return of Seized Personal Property should also be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

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That Movant’s Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a

Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CV Doc. 4) be DENIED AND

DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That Movant’s Motion for Return of Seized Personal Property (CV Doc. 20) be

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

regarding Movant’s § 2255 Motion be DENIED because Movant has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This report and recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2013

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