Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03039/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brad K. Edmonds
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2001 Decided February 27, 2001

No. 00-3039

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Brad K. Edmonds,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00207-01)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Teresa Alva, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 1 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr.

and Adam L. Rosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Williams, Ginsburg and Sentelle, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Based on evidence that police

officers discovered during a Terry stop and subsequent

searches, appellant Brad K. Edmonds was convicted of possessing cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school in violation

of 21 U.S.C. s 860(a). Edmonds appeals that conviction,

arguing that the evidence introduced against him was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee

against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because we

conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances,

the police officer reasonably suspected that appellant was

engaged in criminal activity, we hold that he obtained the

evidence lawfully. However, the United States introduced no

evidence that the school near which appellant was arrested

was one of the specific types of schools enumerated in the

statute, and we therefore vacate his conviction and remand

with instructions that his conviction for a lesser included

offense be reinstated.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

In the early evening of May 24, 1999, a group of Washington Metropolitan Police Department officers was patrolling

the 4600 block of Livingston Road, SE in Washington, DC.

The officers included Sergeant Bruce Feirson, a 21-year

veteran who had worked in that neighborhood intermittently

for some 14 years. Livingston Road is notorious as one of

the many "open air drug markets" infesting the nation's

capital and is additionally, in Feirson's words, home to "a

series of murders" and the site of "hundreds of arrests and

hundreds of incidents, violent incidents." Transcript of Motions Hearing at 6 ("Motion Tr.").

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 2 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

On that particular day, Feirson and his companions were

dressed in plainclothes and driving an unmarked car. But

according to his testimony, their vehicle--a black Crown

Victoria--is regularly used to patrol the neighborhood and is

easily identifiable by residents as a police cruiser. As the

officers made their way down Livingston Road, Feirson observed a man (later identified as Antonio McFadden) standing

on the curb. When McFadden noticed the Crown Victoria,

"his eyes got pretty big, and he immediately pivoted, turned

away and he began to walk"--rapidly--towards a van located

in the parking lot of the nearby Patricia Harris school. Id. at

9. McFadden entered the van and seated himself in the front

passenger's seat. Appellant Edmonds occupied the driver's

seat.

McFadden had left the curb, Feirson believed, because he

had recognized him and his companions as police officers.

The sergeant's suspicions were further aroused because, he

testified, "it is not proper for--it would be illegal for cars to

be on school property after hours unless they have some

business at the school." Id. at 48. Moreover, the parking lot

to which McFadden retreated is well-known to officers as the

location of numerous drug transactions.

Sergeant Feirson decided to investigate. Exiting the

Crown Victoria, he approached Edmonds's van through the

parking lot with his police badge prominently hanging from

his neck. Id. at 21. Feirson could see both Edmonds and

McFadden through the van's windshield. As he drew nearer,

Edmonds began to make furtive movements: He "lean[ed]

forward in the vehicle, move[d] about in the car, and then

s[a]t upright, straight back upright in the vehicle." Id. at 11.

Feirson believed that Edmonds was attempting to hide something--he particularly suspected a weapon or drugs--under

the driver's seat.

After reaching the driver's-side door of the van, Feirson

asked Edmonds to show him his driver's license and vehicle

registration. Edmonds appeared to Feirson to be "extremely

nervous," as he was fidgeting in his seat and rapidly blinking

his eyes. Id. at 11-12. When he failed to produce his

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 3 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

registration, Feirson asked him to step out of the van.

Edmonds did so--and promptly began sprinting away. As he

fled, one of Sergeant Feirson's fellow officers spotted a pistol

lying in plain view on the van's floorboard, and shouted out

"gun" or "he has got a gun." Id. at 13.

Feirson, who after catching Edmonds by the waistband of

his pants was dragged several feet, finally tackled him with

the assistance of another officer. Because he noticed "a

bulge in Mr. Edmonds' left-front-pants pocket" and consequently believed that he was armed, id., Feirson conducted a

pat-down search that yielded 40 ziploc bags of crack cocaine

and a fully loaded 9mm clip. Officers also recovered a fully

loaded 9mm pistol "sticking out" from underneath the van's

driver's seat. Id. at 16.

B. Procedural background

Edmonds stood trial on a five-count indictment, charging

him with: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g); (2) unlawful possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18

U.S.C. s 922(g); (3) unlawful possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21

U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii); (4) unlawful possession

with intent to distribute cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a

school in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 860(a); and (5) carrying and

possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1).

Before trial, Edmonds moved to suppress the evidence on

the grounds that it had been seized during an unconstitutional

search. The United States District Court for the District of

Columbia heard Edmonds's motion on September 2, 1999, and

several days later denied it, concluding that the officers' stop

of Edmonds was supported by a reasonable suspicion and

hence was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

The court found, as a general matter, that the testimony of

Sergeant Feirson, who was the United States' principal witness, was credible. It also found that neighborhood residents

could easily identify the officers' unmarked Crown Victoria as

a police cruiser. See Transcript of Pretrial and Voir Dire,

9/13/99, at 15 ("9/13/99 Tr.").

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 4 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The court concluded that Edmonds was "seized" within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the moment Feirson

asked him for his license and registration. See id. at 17. It

further held that the seizure was a reasonable one. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for

an experienced police officer to have suspected that criminal

activity was afoot when (1) he was patrolling a neighborhood

known for drug trafficking; (2) a man observed him and then

fled to a parked van; (3) the van was parked in a school

parking lot after school hours; and (4) another person in the

van made "furtive gestures" while the officer approached him.

See id. at 15-17. Because the initial seizure was lawful, the

court held, Feirson was entitled to order Edmonds to exit the

van after he failed to produce his vehicle registration. And

the officers had probable cause to arrest Edmonds, and to

conduct a search incident to arrest, because they discovered a

gun lying in plain view of the floor of the van. See id. at 20-

21. All evidence therefore was deemed admissible.

Edmonds's trial commenced on September 13, 1999. On

September 20, the jury returned a guilty verdict on counts

three and four (possessing and intending to distribute cocaine

base, and possessing and intending to distribute within 1,000

feet of a school, respectively). Because the jury was unable

to reach a verdict on counts one, two, and five, the court

declared a mistrial as to those counts. At the close of the

evidence, Edmonds had moved for judgment of acquittal on

count four, arguing that the government had not proved that

the school near which he was arrested was one of the types

enumerated in 21 U.S.C. s 860(a). See Transcript of Testimony, 9/15/99, at 170, 196. His motion was denied but, on

March 7, 2000, the court vacated his conviction under count

three, finding that it was a lesser, included offense of count

four. The court then sentenced Edmonds to a 60-month jail

term, from which he now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Edmonds's appeal presents two issues, but only one of

them is contested: whether a police officer has a reasonable

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 5 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

suspicion sufficient to support a Terry stop when (1) he is

patrolling a neighborhood known for narcotics trafficking; (2)

a man observes him, flees, and enters a van in which the

suspect is seated; (3) the van is parked in a school parking

lot--where drugs often are sold--after school hours; and (4)

the suspect makes "furtive gestures," apparently attempting

to conceal an item under the driver's seat, while the officer

approaches the van. As to the second issue, whether a

defendant can be convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. s 860(a),

which criminalizes the distribution of drugs within 1,000 feet

of, among others, "a public or private elementary, vocational,

or secondary school," when the government fails to introduce

any evidence that the school near which he was arrested was

one of the specific types of schools enumerated in the statute,

the parties are in accord. Edmonds's conviction on count

four must be vacated and his case remanded with instructions

that his conviction on count three--a lesser included offense--be reinstated.

A. Constitutionality of the search

We define the scope of our inquiry. Edmonds does not

challenge the district court's determination that he was not

seized until Sergeant Feirson asked to see his license and

registration. Nor does he contend that the seizure of the

pistol lying in plain view on the van's floorboard and of the

cocaine and 9mm clip found during a pat-down was unlawful

on any other ground than the asserted unconstitutionality of

the initial Terry stop. Edmonds's entire appeal hangs on the

proposition that, in light of the circumstances on the evening

of May 24, 1999, it was unreasonable for Sergeant Feirson to

suspect that criminal activity was afoot. It was not.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court

carved out an exception to the warrant requirement of the

Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition

on unreasonable searches and seizures ordinarily requires all

such encounters to be conducted pursuant to a judicially

issued warrant--that is, the criterion by which the reasonableness of a given search or seizure typically is measured is

whether it was authorized by a warrant. See California v.

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 6 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgment) ("Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it is of course

possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of

reasonableness."). But the Terry Court made an exception

for "brief encounter[s] between a citizen and a police officer

on a public street," Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675

(2000), which involve "necessarily swift action predicated upon

the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.

In the same way that such encounters--"Terry stops," as

they have come to be known--need not proceed pursuant to a

warrant, neither must they be supported by probable cause.

Instead, an officer may briefly detain a citizen if he has a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that "criminal activity may

be afoot." Id. at 30. "The officer need not be absolutely

certain that the individual" is engaged in an unlawful enterprise; "the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the

circumstances would be warranted in his belief" that the

suspect is breaking, or is about to break, the law. Id. at 27.

As the Supreme Court recently explained, reasonable suspicion "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and

requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of

the evidence." Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675-76. Hence a

Terry stop requires only a "minimal level of objective justification," INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984), and an

officer may initiate one "based not on certainty, but on the

need to 'check out' a reasonable suspicion." United States v.

Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

When determining whether a Terry stop was supported by

reasonable suspicion, this Court does not separately scrutinize each factor relied upon by the officer conducting the

search. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989).

An officer on the beat does not encounter discrete, hermetically sealed facts. Rather, as we repeatedly have cautioned,

the question of whether reasonable suspicion existed can only

be answered by considering the totality of the circumstances

as the officer on the scene experienced them. See Clark, 24

F.3d at 301-02 ("The evidence giving rise to suspicion must

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 7 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

not be 'dissected and viewed singly,' but taken as a whole;

and it must be 'viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and

cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience

and training.' " (quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857,

859 (D.C. Cir. 1976))). An officer's training and experiences

enable him to "draw[ ] inferences and make[ ] deductions"

from seemingly innocuous facts--"inferences and deductions

that might well elude an untrained person." United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Hence even though a single

factor might not itself be sufficiently probative of wrongdoing

to give rise to a reasonable suspicion, the combination of

several factors--especially when viewed through the eyes of

an experienced officer--may.

In this case, the district court identified four factors that,

when considered in their totality, established the reasonableness of Sergeant Feirson's suspicion that Edmonds was engaging in criminal activity: (1) Livingston Road's notoriety as

an "open air drug market"; (2) Edmonds's presence in a van

parked after hours in a school lot known to be the site of

numerous drug transactions; (3) the "furtive gestures" made

by Edmonds as Feirson approached the van; and (4) the

perception that McFadden, Edmonds's companion, began to

flee when he noticed the officers' unmarked car. We find

that the first three factors are sufficient to amount to reasonable suspicion, especially in light of McFadden's apparent

attempt to evade the officers.

As for the first factor, the probative value of a neighborhood's reputation as a high-crime area is firmly established.

Of course, the fact that a given locale is well known for

criminal activity will not by itself justify a Terry stop; but it

is among the various factors that officers may take into

account. See, e.g., Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (emphasizing

that an "individual's presence in an area of expected criminal

activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a

crime," but stressing that "officers are not required to ignore

the relevant characteristics of a location in determining

whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation"); United States v. Johnson, 212

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 8 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

F.3d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("While obviously insufficient

by itself to amount to reasonable suspicion, this is among the

relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." (citation omitted)). Edmonds simply misstates the law when he

asserts that Livingston Road's disproportionately high crime

rate "adds little" to the reasonable-suspicion calculus. Brief

for Appellant at 21.

In this case, the United States submitted evidence to the

district court that the 4600 block of Livingston Road suffers

from a high incidence of crime. Sergeant Feirson testified

that, in the last five years, he has been involved in "15 or 20

arrests" in the neighborhood, and described it as "an extremely high crime area." Motion Tr. at 6. The government

introduced evidence that the neighborhood is particularly

known for its prevalence of narcotics trafficking and violent

crime. Feirson more than once described Livingston Road as

an "open air drug market[ ]," and elaborated that "[p]rimarily

cocaine, but marijuana is also sold up there." He also

testified that "there has been a series of murders that I am

familiar with up in that area and shootings. There have been

hundreds of arrests and hundreds of incidents, violent incidents up there." Id. In other words, the government established not just that Livingston Road suffers from general,

undifferentiated "crime," but that it is home to the precise

type of infractions--drug and firearm offenses--that Feirson

suspected Edmonds of committing.

The second factor is equally probative of criminal activity

as courts recognize that a car parked in the lot of a closed

establishment can contribute to an officer's reasonable suspicions. For example, in an Eighth Circuit case closely paralleling this one, United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427 (8th Cir.

1995), an officer "observed Dawdy and his passenger parked

after 10:00 pm on a Sunday night at the back of the otherwise

deserted pharmacy parking lot," a pharmacy that was known

to have been burglarized several times in the recent past. Id.

at 1430. That court held that "the presence of two men

sitting in a parked automobile at night," when coupled with

the possibility that the suspect may have attempted to drive

away, "was sufficient to lead a trained law enforcement officer

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 9 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

to suspect that a crime was being committed and to justify

the initial stop." Id.

We need not--and do not today--adopt the Dawdy court's

apparent suggestion that the parked car scenario is by itself

sufficient to justify a Terry stop. See id. at 1432 (Lay, J.,

dissenting) ("This Court has now, for the first time in this or

any other circuit, determined that police can seize, detain, and

question an individual (or individuals) knowing nothing more

than the fact that the person's car is parked legally in a

mixed commercial/residential area at night."). But we do

recognize that a car parked in the lot of a then-closed

establishment that is the site of occasional criminal activity is

a factor that may strongly support an officer's reasonable

suspicions.

In this case, Sergeant Feirson observed Edmonds and

McFadden parked in the school's lot at around 7:00 PM, a

time when the school was known to be closed, as was the

pharmacy in Dawdy. And, again as in Dawdy, Sergeant

Feirson knew that crimes--in this case, drug transactions--

often were committed in the school's parking lot. It is

unclear whether vehicles in addition to Edmonds's van were

parked at the school. As Edmonds points out, Feirson

initially testified that it is "unusual" for cars to park in the

school lot after hours, but admitted on cross-examination that

"I am sure that there are [other] cars that park on that

parking lot after hours, yes." Motion Tr. at 10, 49. But it is

difficult to see why this matters. What triggered Feirson's

suspicion was not simply the after-hours presence of a parked

van, but of a parked van with two men sitting in it--one of

whom had already drawn the officer's notice by his suspicious

behavior. There is no evidence that any of the other cars

parked at the school--if indeed other cars were parked at the

school--also contained passengers. The presence of other

cars would not inherently have led Feirson to be any less

suspicious of Edmonds's van, especially given the approach by

its passenger from the street rather than from the direction

of the school, which could reasonably heighten the suspicion

that the occupants had no legitimate after-hours business

with the educational institution.

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 10 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Third, this Court recognizes that "furtive" gestures in

response to the presence of the police can serve as the basis

of an officer's reasonable suspicion. In United States v.

Green, 465 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1972), we held that officers

were justified in conducting a Terry stop when they halted a

car for a traffic infraction and "observed the driver making

furtive movements as though pulling something out of his belt

and placing it under his seat." Id. at 623. Here, Sergeant

Feirson testified that he could see Edmonds through the

van's windshield as he approached the vehicle, and that he

noticed Edmonds reaching under the driver's seat as though

he were attempting to conceal something. "I saw the Defendant lean all of the way forward," he recalled, "almost ducking out of my sight. I could see his head above the dashboard, and then I saw him lean back, up, seated upright in

the vehicle." Motion Tr. at 11.

Of course, a suspect's movements are not by themselves

enough to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing; furtive gestures "are significant only if they were

undertaken in response to police presence." Johnson, 212

F.3d at 1316. And a suspect can respond to the presence of a

police officer only if he has recognized him as an officer. In

this case, there can be no serious doubt that Edmonds

recognized Sergeant Feirson as an officer. Feirson testified

that he was prominently wearing his police badge on his

chest. Motion Tr. at 21. Since Feirson further testified that

he could observe Edmonds through the van's windshield, it is

a fair inference that Edmonds in turn saw Feirson, perceived

his badge, recognized him as a police officer, and reacted by

making furtive gestures. Indeed, during cross-examination,

in an attempt to establish that Edmonds was "seized" before

Feirson demanded his license and registration, Edmonds's

attorney asked the officer "And it was a police badge, anyone

could tell that you were a police officer with a badge; right?"

To which Feirson replied "Right." Id. at 22.

This case thus is easily distinguishable from Johnson, in

which we doubted that the suspect's initial attempt to conceal

an object under his car seat gave rise to a reasonable

suspicion of wrongdoing (although we held that his later

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 11 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

movements did). See Johnson, 212 F.3d at 1316 ("If the

seizure had taken place at that point, we doubt very much

whether it would have been valid."). The reason why Johnson's first round of furtive gestures did not justify a Terry

stop was because "[i]t is not clear that Johnson was aware

that [the observing officer] was a police officer; [the officer]

was after all in an unmarked car." Id. In this case, by way

of crucial contrast, Feirson had his police badge prominently

displayed on his chest as he approached the van.

These three factors, when considered in their totality and

through the eyes of an experienced police officer on the

street, are sufficient to have led Sergeant Feirson reasonably

to suspect that Edmonds was engaged in unlawful activity.

Moreover, it was reasonable for Feirson's suspicions to be

aroused in the first instance by McFadden's apparent flight

and retreat to Edmonds's van. As we noted above, the

district court found that Feirson was aware that his Crown

Victoria was readily recognizable as a police vehicle. That

McFadden, immediately upon observing that vehicle, hastened to the van to join its driver, could at least raise a

suspicion that whatever was going on in the van had nothing

to do with legitimate presence in the parking lot, raising the

strong possibility, given the other facts discussed above, that

it was criminal activity.

The Supreme Court recently held that "[h]eadlong flight

... is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it certainly is suggestive of such." Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676; see

also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991)

(" 'The wicked flee when no man pursueth.' " (quoting Proverbs 28:1)). This case is not like United States v. Johnson,

496 A.2d 592 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985), in which the Court of

Appeals of the District of Columbia stated that "one person's

flight is imputable to another only if other circumstances

indicate that the flight from authority implies another person's consciousness of guilt as well," before holding that three

suspects' joint presence in a vehicle enabled officers to "conclude that all three were associated in a venture of some

sort." Id. at 597. Rather, in this case the flight of McFadden to the van contributed to a reasonable suspicion that

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 12 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

criminal activity might be afoot in the vehicle. This case

involves direct, not transferred, suspicion. Acting upon that

reasonable suspicion, the investigating officer approached the

van and observed the other factors which we have enumerated above, further contributing to his reasonable suspicion and

supporting his Terry stop of Edmonds.

In sum, it was reasonable for Sergeant Feirson to suspect

that Edmonds was engaged in illegal activity. Because Feirson had a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may

[have] be[en] afoot," Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, the initial stop was

justified, and the evidence the officers subsequently obtained

was lawfully introduced. The district court did not err in

refusing to suppress the evidence.

B. Sufficiency of the evidence

Besides challenging the Terry stop, Edmonds argues alternatively that the United States introduced no evidence at trial

that the school near which he committed a drug offense was

one of the specific types of schools enumerated in 21 U.S.C.

s 860(a). Both parties agree that the government failed to

lay a factual foundation that would have enabled the jury to

conclude that "the Patricia Harris school," Opening Statements and Testimony, 9/14/99, at 36, was one of the statutorily specified schools. They further agree that Edmonds's

conviction on count four--possessing and intending to distribute cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school--must be

vacated, and that the case should be remanded with instructions to reinstate his conviction on count three--possessing

and intending to distribute cocaine base--a lesser included

offense.

21 U.S.C. s 860(a) makes it unlawful for a person to

participate in a drug transaction within 1,000 feet of an

"elementary, vocational, or secondary school or a ... college,

junior college, or university." Section 860(a) does not apply

to all types of schools, but only to the ones that are specifically enumerated in the statute's text. Hence to prove a violation of s 860(a), the United States must establish beyond

reasonable doubt that the school near which the defendant

committed a drug crime is one of the statutorily specified

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 13 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

types. Cf. United States v. Hawkins, 104 F.3d 437, 440 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (holding that s 860(a) is not violated where a drug

offense is committed within 1,000 feet of a "school building

that is no longer (or not yet) in use as a school").

In other words, the character of the school is an element of

the offense that, like all elements, must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.

506, 510 (1993) (stressing that the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to "a

jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the

crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt");

see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2368 (2000)

(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that "every fact that is by

law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment" is an

element of the offense).

Here, the only evidence the United States submitted at

trial was that Edmonds had committed a drug offense in the

vicinity of "the Patricia Harris school." 9/13/99 Tr. at 36.

During the pretrial hearing on Edmonds's motion to suppress, a government witness had described the school alternately as "a local high school" and a "junior high school,"

Motion Tr. at 9--either of which seemingly would meet

s 860(a)'s definition of a "secondary school." But during the

trial itself, the government made no effort to show that "the

Patricia Harris school" is indeed one of the types of schools

specified in 21 U.S.C. s 860(a). Because the United States

failed to introduce any evidence that Edmonds committed

that element of the offense, no jury properly could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated s 860(a).

A similar issue was presented in United States v. Smith, 13

F.3d 380 (10th Cir. 1993), where the Tenth Circuit applied a

statute making it unlawful to sell drugs within 1,000 feet of a

"playground." The statute further defined "playground" as

"any outdoor facility ... intended for recreation, open to the

public, and with any portion thereof containing three or more

separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children...." 21 U.S.C. s 860(d). At trial, the only evidence

introduced by the government was that Crawford Park, the

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 14 of 15
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

location of defendant's drug sale, had "playgrounds, walking

paths, [and] gazebos." Smith, 13 F.3d at 382. It produced

no evidence that Crawford Park had three or more recreation

apparatus. "Because the testimony does not meet the requirements of the definition of a playground set forth in 21

U.S.C. s 860(d), a reasonable jury could not convict Mr.

Smith beyond a reasonable doubt of an offense which requires

activity 'within 1,000 feet of a ... playground' as an element."

Id. Just so here.

We therefore vacate Edmonds's conviction for violating 21

U.S.C. s 860(a), and remand with instructions that the district court reinstate his conviction for violating 21 U.S.C.

s 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), a lesser included offense. The

prosecution might well have avoided this additional stage of

litigation by doing before the jury what it did at the suppression hearing: simply asking its witness to fully describe "the

Patricia Harris school."

III. CONCLUSION

The district court properly concluded that the police officers had a reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of

Edmonds, since they were patrolling in a high-crime area,

observed Edmonds sitting in a van parked after hours in a

school lot, and saw him conceal an object under his seat.

Because the initial stop was lawful, the evidence obtained in

subsequent searches need not be suppressed. However, the

district court erred in refusing to grant Edmonds's motion for

judgment of acquittal, as the United States introduced no

evidence that the school near which he was arrested was one

of the specific types of schools enumerated in 21 U.S.C.

s 860(a). Edmonds's conviction on count four therefore is

vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions that his

conviction on count three be reinstated.

USCA Case #00-3039 Document #578396 Filed: 02/27/2001 Page 15 of 15