Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00801/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00801-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
B.O.L.T.
Plaintiff
Stephen Carrozzo
Defendant
John Dalke
Plaintiff
Robert Di Miceli
Defendant
Robert Dimiceli
Defendant
Joseph A. Farrow
Defendant
Michael Goold
Defendant
Kamala Harris
Defendant
Scott R. Jones
Defendant
Brett Peterson
Plaintiff
Mark Temple
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRETT PETERSON, D.D.S.; 

B.O.L.T., an unincorporated 

association of motorcycle 

riders and enthusiasts; JOHN 

DALKE, an individual; MARK 

TEMPLE, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH A. FARROW, 

Commissioner California 

Highway Patrol; MICHAEL 

GOOLD, in his official 

capacity as Chief of Police 

of the City of Rancho 

Cordova; SCOTT R. JONES, in 

his official capacity as the 

Sheriff of County of 

Sacramento; ROBERT DIMICELI 

a.k.a. ROBERT DI MICELI, 

Officer of the California 

Highway Patrol; STEPHEN 

CARROZZO, Rancho Cordova 

police officer and Deputy 

Sheriff; KAMALA HARRIS, in 

her official capacity as 

California Attorney General,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS

MICHAEL GOOLD, SCOTT R. JONES, 

AND STEPHEN CARROZZO’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE PORTIONS 

OF PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Brett Peterson, B.O.L.T. (short for, “Bikers of 

Lesser Tolerance”), John Dalke, and Mark Temple sued the 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 72 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 16
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following Defendants—Sheriff of the County of Sacramento Scott R. 

Jones in his official capacity, Chief of Police of the City of 

Rancho Cordova Michael Goold in his official capacity, and Rancho 

Cordova Police Officer Stephen Carrozzo in his individual 

capacity (collectively, “Municipal Defendants”); California 

Highway Patrol Officer Robert Dimiceli in his individual 

capacity, and California Highway Patrol Commissioner Joseph A. 

Farrow in his official capacity (collectively, “State 

Defendants”); and California Attorney General Kamala Harris in 

her official capacity—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 

violations of the First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Municipal Defendants move to dismiss and/or strike claims in 

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Doc. #44) under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 12(b)(6), 12(f), and 

21, (Doc. #50). For the reasons stated below, Municipal 

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

“Plaintiffs Peterson, Dalke, and Temple . . . are 

individuals with a class M1 motorcycle license who, at all times 

relevant herein, resided in the State of California.” SAC ¶ 10. 

“Plaintiff B.O.L.T. is an unincorporated association of 

motorcycle riders and enthusiasts[,]” “focusing on the 

unconstitutional enforcement [and constitutionality] of helmet 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 17, 2016.

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laws . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants have an unwritten policy, 

custom[,] and practice of allowing officers to stop motorcyclists 

and issue citations for substandard helmets based on visual 

criteria, and the officer’s subjective opinion of whether the 

helmet would, if tested, conform to federal safety standards[,]” 

id. ¶ 44, “regardless of whether the officer has tangible and 

documentary evidence to believe that (i.) there has been a 

determination of non-compliance with [Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standard (FMVSS)] 218[, 49 C.F.R. § 571.218 (2011), the 

federal standard establishing minimum performance requirements 

for motorcycle helmets], or (ii.) that the motorcyclist has 

knowledge that the helmet has been determined not to comply with 

FMVSS 218[,]” id. ¶ 46. Plaintiffs allege they “have been cited 

for wearing helmets that [D]efendants’ officers considered to be 

in violation of the helmet law,” as a result of this unwritten 

policy, custom, and practice. Id. ¶ 47.

Plaintiffs also allege that because Temple received a 

motorcycle helmet citation, Jones revoked Temple’s concealed 

carry weapons (CCW) permit. Id. ¶ 191. As a result, Plaintiffs 

assert “a constitutional challenge to the complex statutory 

scheme set forth in Cal[ifornia] Penal Code [sections] 25450-

25475, 26150-26225, 26300-26325, 32000-32030 as honorably retired 

California peace officers are granted mandatory rights, 

privileges and immunities which are not bestowed to Temple.” Id. 

¶ 6.

On April 10, 2015, Plaintiffs brought this action against 

Defendants (Doc. #1) and on July 1, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their 

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First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” Doc. #5). In response, 

Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Doc. ##13, 18) and the Court 

granted the motions under Rule 8, giving Plaintiffs leave to 

amend (Doc. #42). On March 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their SAC 

(Doc. #44). The SAC states nine causes of action brought under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 including the following specific claims against 

one or more of the Municipal Defendants: the second claim for 

damages against Carrozzo for Fourth Amendment violations; the 

third claim for damages against Carrozzo for First Amendment 

violations; the fourth claim for damages against Municipal 

Defendants Goold and Jones in their official capacities for 

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations; the fifth 

claim for damages and injunctive relief by Temple against Jones

in his official capacity for Second Amendment violations; the 

sixth claim for damages and injunctive relief by Temple against 

Jones in his official capacity for Fourteenth Amendment Due 

Process violations; and the seventh claim for damages and 

injunctive relief by Temple against Jones in his official 

capacity for Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violations. 

The Court now addresses the merits of Municipal Defendants’

motion to dismiss or strike all of the above causes of action 

except the second claim for relief against Carrozzo (Doc. #50).

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

Municipal Defendants request that the Court take judicial 

notice (Doc. #50-2) of the following documents: Exhibit 1-the 

complaint in related case, B.O.L.T. et al. v. City of Rancho 

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Cordova, et al., E.D. Case No. 2:14-cv-01588 (the “related 

case”); Exhibit 2-the operative pleading in the related case; and 

Exhibit 3-the Court’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 

an earlier dismissal motion in the related case. Plaintiffs do 

not oppose Municipal Defendants’ request. Because these 

documents are a part of the public record the Court may consider 

these documents, and Municipal Defendants’ request for judicial 

notice is GRANTED. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens 

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining 

district courts “may take notice of [other] proceedings[,] . . . 

both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”); Peviani 

v. Hostess Brands, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 

2010) (taking judicial notice of two district court decisions).

B. Analysis

1. Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) provides that “[t]he court may strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

“‘[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the 

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating 

spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to 

trial . . . .’” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 

(9th Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) (quoting Sidney–

Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983)), 

rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

///

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Municipal Defendants contend:

Several of the Plaintiffs in the instant case have 

already made claims against the same Defendants in the 

[the related case] requesting injunctive and 

declaratory relief for violations of their Fourth 

Amendment rights. Specifically, the Monell claim in 

[the related case] (¶[¶] 146-168, SAC, Docket Entry 

No. 31 in Case No. 14-1588) is essentially the same as 

the fourth claim in this case (¶[¶] 164-184, SAC) 

asserting Monell-type liability for the same 

allegations. In other words, the claims by these 

Plaintiffs in the instant action requesting injunctive 

relief for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights 

based on allegations that they were improperly stopped 

pursuant to an unconstitutional policy, should be 

stricken because those claims are redundant to those 

raised in [the related case]. On that basis, 

Defendants respectfully request those claims, 

specifically the fourth claim for relief[], be 

stricken from the instant SAC.

Municipal Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 3:15-25, ECF No. 50. 

Municipal Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ class 

allegations should be stricken as identical to the class 

allegations in the related case. Id. at 4:3-13.

Plaintiffs counter that the allegations in their fourth 

claim should not be stricken because they now seek monetary 

damages in addition to injunctive relief, and allegations in this 

action include new Fourth Amendment violations in the form of

targeted enforcement actions and failed investigations. Opp’n to 

Mot. (“Opp’n”) 2:12-19, ECF No. 60. Plaintiffs also contend that 

the class allegations should not be stricken because the class 

claims seek both monetary damages and injunctive relief whereas 

the plaintiffs in the related case seek only injunctive relief.

While some of Plaintiffs’ class allegations duplicate the 

class allegations in the related case, Plaintiffs seek different 

relief and have added allegations concerning encounters with 

defendant officers which occurred after filing their complaint in 

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the related case. Plaintiffs’ municipal liability allegations in 

their fourth claim also differ from the allegations set forth in 

the related case both in timeline and the type of relief 

requested. Due to these key differences, Municipal Defendants’ 

Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim and class 

claims is DENIED.

2. Fourth Amendment Violations

As noted above, Municipal Defendants have not challenged 

Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief which alleges that Carrozzo 

violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unlawful seizure; the second claim for relief remains.

3. First Amendment Retaliation

Municipal Defendants contend that Dalke and Temple’s third 

claim for relief—alleging Carrozzo committed First Amendment 

violations by retaliating against Plaintiffs for engaging in 

protected First Amendment activity—should be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In order to state a First Amendment retaliation claim under 

§ 1983, Plaintiffs “must establish that (1) [they] engaged in 

[First Amendment activity]; (2) the government officials took an 

adverse action against [them]; and (3) [their protected conduct] 

was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action.” 

Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 

2004) (citing Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2004)). The above test has traditionally been applied in 

the context of public employment, but a similar analysis is 

appropriate in situations such as here where the parties do not 

share an employment relationship. See Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 

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1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. 

Mendocino Cty., 14 F.3d 457, 459–60 (9th Cir. 1994); Cain v. 

Tigard-Tualatin School Dist. 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 n.1 

(D. Or. 2003) (applying test found in context of public 

employment to non-employment First Amendment retaliation claim).

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs allege that Dimiceli and 

Carrozzo “have been in communication with each other, sharing 

filed notes and research on members of B.O.L.T., or purported 

members.” SAC ¶ 160. Further, “Dimiceli and Carrozzo have 

conspired to violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment associational 

rights by using the helmet law as a vehicle to punish 

[P]laintiffs . . . .” Id. ¶ 161. The above allegations are 

conclusory and not accepted as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (A court is not required to accept as true 

a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”) The Court

thus considers the plausibility of Dalke and Temple’s First 

Amendment claims against Carrozzo separately.

a. Dalke’s Claim Against Carrozzo

Municipal Defendants argue that Dalke’s “submission of a 

citizen’s complaint for which no action was taken in 2011 . . . 

appears wholly disconnected to a citation in 2014.” Mot. 5:3-5. 

“[Municipal] Defendant[s] also submit the prior suit by Plaintiff 

Dalke in [the related case] against [Defendant] Carrozzo cannot 

serve as the basis for retaliation, as that suit had no merit 

because it was barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 

5:6-8.

///

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In response, Plaintiffs argue:

The SAC clearly layouts[sic] the intent of two peace 

officers to selectively target the three plaintiffs, 

and to disregard clearly established law regarding the 

enforcement of the state helmet law. Deliberate 

retaliation against an individual for filing a civil 

rights complaint and making internal affairs 

complaints is a factual issue of intent which cannot 

be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Opp’n 6:1-6.

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Dalke engaged in 

protected speech and association. “[T]he right of access to the 

courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the 

Government for redress of grievances.” Bill Johnson’s Rests., 

Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (citing Cal. Motor 

Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)). “The 

First Amendment also protects the right to freedom of expressive 

association.” Plevin v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. C-11-02359 MEJ, 

2012 WL 6025765, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (citing Villegas 

v. City of Gilroy, 484 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Plaintiffs point to their allegations regarding the filing of the 

related case, multiple Internal Affairs Complaints, and 

membership in B.O.L.T. and argue that each of these activities 

warrants First Amendment Protection.

However, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that any 

of the above First Amendment activity was the substantial or 

motivating factor behind Carrozzo’s conduct. Such alleged facts 

are required to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation. 

Dalke’s submission of a citizen’s complaint in 2011 is too 

attenuated from a citation issued in 2014 to demonstrate 

causation without further specific supporting allegations. Also, 

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the prior suit by Dalke, which was legally barred, has a causal 

disconnect to any further speech and could not have chilled such 

speech, as evidenced by the suit alone. In their opposition, 

Plaintiffs fail to substantively address these causal 

disconnections, both temporally or legally. Nor do Plaintiffs 

request further leave to amend. The Court finds that any further 

amendment would be futile. Dalke’s claim for First Amendment 

retaliation against Carrozzo is therefore dismissed with 

prejudice.

b. Temple’s Claim Against Carrozzo

Municipal Defendants contend that Temple’s retaliation claim 

based on the filing of the related action fails for the same 

reasons as Dalke’s claim, and “Temple does not allege any rights 

were chilled.” Mot. 5:14-17.

As with Dalke’s claim, Temple’s conclusory allegation that 

Temple was arrested based on the filing of the related lawsuit 

alone is not sufficient to support a claim for First Amendment 

retaliation. The Court finds that any further amendment of 

Temple’s claim would also be futile. Accordingly Temple’s claim 

for First Amendment retaliation against Carrozzo is dismissed 

with prejudice.

4. Municipal Liability Claim

Municipal Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of 

Plaintiffs’ allegations contained within Plaintiffs’ fourth cause 

of action—a municipal liability claim—but instead bring the Rule 

12(f) challenge denied above. Accordingly, the fourth cause of 

action remains.

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5. Claims Based on Revocation of Temple’s CCW Permit

a. Second Amendment Violation

Municipal Defendants contend that “the claim for a violation 

of Temple’s Second Amendment rights [Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for 

relief] should be dismissed because there is no constitutionally 

recognized right that a person may carry a concealed weapon 

without limitation.” Mot. 5:24-26.

The Ninth Circuit recently held that “there is no Second 

Amendment right for members of the general public to carry 

concealed firearms in public.” Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, ---

F.3d ----, 2016 WL 3194315, at *5 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should decline to follow 

Peruta, arguing that the facts and issues are distinguishable, 

and that Peruta “ignores the facts, legal reasoning and 

historical analysis as set forth in” various Supreme Court cases. 

Pls.’ Supplemental Brief Re: Municipal Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 

2:2-13, ECF No. 69. The Court disagrees and will follow this

binding Ninth Circuit precedent.

Since Temple does not have a constitutional right to carry a 

concealed weapon, Temple cannot state a claim for relief against 

Jones for violation of his Second Amendment rights and Municipal 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for relief 

is granted with prejudice.

b. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation

Municipal Defendants next seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 

sixth claim for relief against Defendant Jones which alleges 

violations of Temple’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. 

Municipal Defendants contend that “the limited nature of a 

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license to carry a concealed firearm which has been issued under 

California Penal Code [section] 12050 prevents characterizing it 

as a property right for purposes of constitutional due process or 

a liberty interest.” Mot. 7:2-6 (citing Erdelyi v. O’Brien, 680 

F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1982)). Municipal Defendants argue “Temple 

does not have a property or liberty interest in his CCW permit, 

and on that basis, any claim for a violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment procedural due process rights should be dismissed.” 

Id. at 7:6-8.

To sustain a procedural due process claim a plaintiff must 

show a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. 

Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phx., Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 

62 (9th Cir. 1994). “Property interests protected by the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever 

a person has only ‘an abstract need or desire for,’ or 

‘unilateral expectation of,’ a benefit.” Erdelyi, 680 F.2d at 63

(quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 

577 (1972)).

In Erdelyi, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff did 

not “have a property or liberty interest in a concealed weapons 

license.” 680 F.2d at 64. The Ninth Circuit explained that 

concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of 

California, and such regulations “explicitly grant[] discretion 

to the issuing officer to issue or not issue a license to 

applicants meeting the minimum statutory requirements.” Id. at 

63 (citing Cal. Penal Code §§ 12000-12094, 12050). The Ninth 

Circuit further explained that “[w]here state law gives the 

issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny license 

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applications in a closely regulated field . . . applicants do not 

have a property right in such licenses protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 

F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980)).

Further, in Peruta, the Ninth Circuit held that because of 

its finding that plaintiffs possessed no Second Amendment right 

to concealed carry weapons permits the plaintiffs in that case

necessarily failed on their due process claims. 2016 WL 3194315, 

at *17.

Based on these binding precedents, Municipal Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ sixth claim for procedural due 

process violations is granted with prejudice.

c. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

While Municipal Defendants do not specifically include a 

separate section in their motion to dismiss concerning

Plaintiffs’ seventh claim, in which Temple alleges violations of 

the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by Jones, 

they do contend that all of the CCW permit claims should be 

dismissed because there is no right to concealed carry under the

Second Amendment. Mot. 6:9-12.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

guarantees that the government treat similar individuals in a 

similar manner. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “When social or economic legislation 

is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the states wide 

latitude.” Id. at 440. By contrast, “when a statute classifies 

by race, alienage, or national origin ... [the statute is] 

subject to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if [it is] 

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suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. 

“Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge 

on personal rights protected by the Constitution.” Id.

Due to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Peruta, Temple cannot 

base his Equal Protection claim on any alleged impingement of his

Second Amendment rights. 2016 WL 3194315, at *17. Further, 

there is no constitutionally recognized suspect classification 

for people who are not “honorably retired peace officers.” 

Accordingly the rational basis standard applies.

A statute challenged under the rational basis standard is 

“generally presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 

classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to 

legitimate state interest.” Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 

F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “A 

legislative classification subject to rational basis scrutiny 

‘must be wholly irrational to violate equal protection.’” Id.

(quoting De Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 

2004)). In “applying rational basis review . . ., any 

hypothetical rationale for the law [will] do.” Witt v. Dep’t of 

Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008). Additionally 

legislative action can pass rational basis review “even when 

there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller v. 

Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).

Here California has a legitimate reason for distinguishing 

between honorably retired peace officers and others in the CCW 

permitting scheme. Specifically California’s “important 

interest[s] in reducing the number of concealed weapons in public 

in order to reduce the risks to other members of the public who 

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use the streets” and “because of their disproportionate 

involvement in life-threatening crimes of violence.” Peruta v. 

Cty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 

rev’d and remanded, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir 2014), vacated by 781 

F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (granting en banc hearing). It would 

be reasonable for the legislature to conclude that the above 

security concerns are implicated much less when experienced 

former police officers carry concealed weapons and it would also

be reasonable for the legislature to conclude that former police 

officers face heightened personal security risks. “It is 

entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the 

conceived reason[s] for the challenged distinction actually 

motivated the legislature.” See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 

U.S. 307, 315 (1993). Accordingly, the CCW permitting scheme 

passes rational basis review and Municipal Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ seventh claim is granted with 

prejudice. See Peruta, 2016 WL 3194315, at *17 (holding that the 

Ninth Circuit’s holding that the Second Amendment “does not 

protect, in any degree, the carrying of concealed firearms by 

members of the general public . . . necessarily resolves, 

adversely to Plaintiffs, their derivative claim[] of . . . equal 

protection . . . .”).

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Municipal 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike; and the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE

Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ third, fifth, 

sixth, and seventh causes of action. Municipal Defendants shall 

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file their answer to the second and fourth causes of action in 

the SAC within twenty days of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2016

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