Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02452/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02452-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alexander Louis Perez
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2452

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District of

* Minnesota.

Alexander Louis Perez, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2008

Filed: May 22, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Alexander Louis Perez pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and possession

of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

The district court1

 sentenced him to 157 months’ imprisonment. Perez appeals,

arguing that the district court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing

on substantial assistance, and that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), 18

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564
-2-

U.S.C. § 3553(e), and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 are unconstitutional. Having jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

As part of the plea agreement, Perez agreed to cooperate with law enforcement

in the investigation and prosecution of other suspects. If the government, in its “sole

discretion,” concluded he provided substantial assistance, it agreed to move for a

downward departure under § 3553(e) and/or § 5K.1.1. The agreement stated: “No

motion will be made unless the defendant is completely and fully truthful and has

provided substantial assistance to the government.” 

Perez subsequently participated in the investigation of B.H., by engaging in

several controlled buys of crack cocaine, which led to B.H.’s arrest and conviction.

Perez then attempted to assist in the investigation of M.H. However, he failed to

follow law enforcement’s instructions. Although officers arrested M.H. for

possession of drugs and guns, they did not pursue charges because they believed Perez

had entrapped M.H. by giving him the drugs in exchange for transporting the guns.

When Perez violated a condition of his pretrial release, he was placed in jail.

There, another inmate informed federal agents that Perez had threatened the life of the

prosecutor assigned to his case. When federal agents first interviewed Perez, he

denied making any threats or anything that could be a threat. To prove he was telling

the truth, he agreed to take a polygraph test. During the polygrapher’s preliminary

interview, Perez said that he had asked another inmate what would happen if the

prosecutor disappeared, which the federal agent interpreted as a threat. Because Perez

admitted making a threatening statement, officers determined there was no reason to

conduct the polygraph.

Based on these events, the government requested that Perez’s sentence be

increased for obstruction of justice, and no credit be given for acceptance of

responsibility. The government also decided not to make a motion for downward

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564
-3-

departure for substantial assistance. Perez requested a hearing on each of these issues.

Although the district court conducted a hearing regarding obstruction of justice and

acceptance of responsibility, it denied Perez’s motion for an evidentiary hearing as to

substantial assistance, finding that he had failed to make a substantial threshold

showing of improper motive. The district court stated, “there is nothing in the record

that I see that would create an irrational and unconstitutional or other unethical or

improper or illegal reason for the government to decline to file the motion. So, I

believe the threshold hasn’t been met.” During the hearing on obstruction of justice,

Perez testified, “We were playing spades and the guy said he was going to go home

because his prosecutor didn’t show up. And I asked, would the same thing happen to

us if our prosecutor didn’t show up? It was just a joke, but I see everybody took it

serious.” The district court sentenced him to 157 months’ imprisonment.

“Upon motion of the Government,” a district court has authority to impose a

sentence below a statutory minimum sentence, “so as to reflect a defendant’s

substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has

committed an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). “Without a government motion, the

district court is without authority to impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory

minimum sentence.” United States v. Holbdy, 489 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 2007).

Under § 5K1.1, a district court may depart from the guidelines “[u]pon motion of the

government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the

investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense . . . .”

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Both § 3553(e) and § 5K.1.1 give “the Government a power, not

a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted.” Wade v. United

States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992). “The government has no duty to make a substantial

assistance motion unless it has entered into a plea agreement with the defendant that

creates such a duty.” United States v. Mullins, 399 F.3d 888, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2005)

(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). 

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564
-4-

“A district court may review the government’s refusal to make a substantial

assistance motion under section 3553(e) or section 5K1.1, if such refusal (1) was

prompted by an unconstitutional motive, such as the defendant’s race or religion; or

(2) was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Id. at 890, citing

Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-87. There is an intra-circuit split whether bad faith is an

additional basis for compelling a motion for downward departure based on substantial

assistance. See Holbdy, 489 F.3d at 913 n.2, comparing United States v. Moeller, 383

F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 2004), with United States v. Wolf, 270 F.3d 1188, 1191 (8th

Cir. 2001) and United States v. Kelly, 18 F.3d 612, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1994). This court

reviews the denial of a motion to compel for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

McClure, 338 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2003).

“[A] claim that a defendant merely provided substantial assistance will not

entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor

would additional but generalized allegations of improper motive.” Wade, 504 U.S.

at 186. Instead, to obtain an evidentiary hearing, “a defendant must make a

‘substantial threshold showing’ that the government’s refusal to make a substantial

assistance motion was premised on an improper motive.” Mullins, 399 F.3d at 890,

quoting Wade, 504 U.S. at 186. “This threshold showing requires more than the

presentation of evidence of substantial assistance and general allegations of improper

motive because we presume a prosecutor has properly discharged her duties absent

clear evidence to the contrary.” United States v. Pamperin, 456 F.3d 822, 825 (8th

Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Perez argues that the district court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary

hearing on substantial assistance because he satisfied his substantial threshold

showing of improper motive. He maintains that the government’s refusal to make a

motion was driven by its “policy” of refusing downward departure for a defendant

who provides substantial assistance but is later accused of obstruction of justice, and

that this reason is unconstitutional, illegitimate, or in bad faith. Perez asserts that the

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564
2

At oral argument, Perez asserted that United States v. Anzalone, 148 F.3d 940

(8th Cir. 1998), reinstated by 161 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1998), controls this case. There,

this court held that “the government cannot base its § 5K1.1 motion decision on

factors other than the substantial assistance provided by the defendant.” Anzalone,

148 F.3d at 941 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the

government conceded that the defendant could make a substantial threshold showing

of substantial assistance, and that its refusal to file was based on an unrelated factor.

See id. at 941-42. Here, Perez’s disruption of the investigation of M.H. and his

untruthfulness do relate to the quality of his assistance. See Pamperin, 456 F.3d at

825; United States v. Ziesman, 409 F.3d 941, 957 (8th Cir. 2005); Moeller, 383 F.3d

at 712-13; McClure, 338 F.3d at 850; United States v. Johnston, 220 F.3d 857, 863-

64 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wilkerson, 179 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 1999).

-5-

existence of this “policy” is evidenced by the fact that the government first

conditioned the motion on successful completion of a polygraph test, but then revoked

the offer when he tried to comply. He stresses his substantial assistance in the arrest

and conviction of B.H.

The government decided not to move for a downward departure based on

Perez’s disruption of the investigation of M.H., his threats, and his false statements

to federal agents.2

 Perez has proffered no evidence that the government’s decision

was prompted by an unconstitutional motive. Furthermore, the refusal was rationally

related to a legitimate governmental end, providing an incentive for defendants to

cooperate fully with authorities. See Wolf, 270 F.3d at 1191 (government’s refusal

to file motion for downward departure because the defendant was untruthful with

authorities was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in providing

an incentive for defendants to fully cooperate); United States v. Licona-Lopez, 163

F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1998) (same). Perez’s mere assertions of assistance are also

not sufficient. See Mullins, 399 F.3d at 890.

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564
-6-

Even if bad faith is a basis to compel a motion for downward departure, Perez

did not show bad faith. See United States v. Hodge, 469 F.3d 749, 754-55 (8th Cir.

2006). The government provided a rational reason for not administering the

polygraph test – immediately before it was to begin, Perez admitted making the

statement in question. Perez did not support his allegation that the government’s

“policy” is actually aimed at punishing him. See Holbdy, 489 F.3d at 914

(“unsupported claims of retaliation are insufficient to meet the threshold showing

under Wade”), citing Wolf, 270 F.3d at 1191 (defendant’s assertion that government’s

refusal to file motion for downward departure was punishment for him lying to

officers, without any evidence of punitive intent, was insufficient to meet substantial

threshold burden). 

Perez does not satisfy his substantial threshold burden. Instead, he only

reiterates the extent of his assistance and makes “generalized allegations of improper

motive.” See Wade, 504 U.S. at 186. The district court did not err in refusing to hold

an evidentiary hearing. 

Perez also argues the district court violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause by granting the government’s motion for hearings on obstruction of justice and

acceptance of responsibility without any showing, while denying his motion for a

hearing on substantial assistance for failure to make a substantial threshold showing.

He alleges that the regime created by § 3553(e), § 5K1.1, Rule 35(b), and mandatory

minimum sentences violates due process and the separation of powers doctrine. This

argument has been rejected by this court. See, e.g., Holbdy, 489 F.3d at 914 (the

government motion requirement under § 3553(e) and Rule 35(b) does not violate the

separation of powers doctrine); United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th

Cir. 2007) (statutory minimum sentences are constitutional); United States v. Kelley,

956 F.2d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (the government motion requirement does

not violate due process or separation of powers doctrine); United States v. Grant, 886

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564
-7-

F.2d 1513, 1514 (8th Cir. 1989) (the government motion requirement under § 5K1.1

does not violate due process). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 07-2452 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/22/2008 Entry ID: 3436564