Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00332/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00332-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Luckey
Plaintiff
Visalia Unified School District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

This case was filed by Plaintiff Timothy Luckey on March 8, 2013. There is federal 

question jurisdiction based on alleged violations of Title VII. 

On April 9, 2013, as part of the screening process, the Magistrate Judge dismissed the 

Complaint for failure to state a claim. 

On May 16, 2013, the Magistrate Judge dismissed the First Amended Complaint for failure 

to state a claim, again as part of the screening process. 

On June 14, 2013, Luckey filed two documents. One document was the Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”). The other document was a motion to remand. The motion to remand 

appears to be a pre-printed form, but does state that there is no federal question within Luckey’s 

complaint.1 

On June 20, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendation (“F&R”) 

as to the SAC. The F&R concludes that the SAC fails to allege any cognizable federal claims, 

 

1 Contrary to Plaintiff’s motion, there is clearly a federal question present in the SAC. The SAC expressly states that 

jurisdiction is conferred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

TIMOTHY LUCKEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

VISALIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-332 AWI SAB 

ORDER ON FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATION AND MOTION 

TO REMAND

(Doc. Nos. 8, 9)

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 11 Filed 09/05/13 Page 1 of 5
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supplemental jurisdiction over two state law claims (defamation and breach of contract) should be 

declined, and remand is improper because the case was not removed and there is federal question 

jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 9.

On July 22, 2013, Luckey filed objections to the F&R. 

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the case. 

Having reviewed the objections and the F&R, the Court must respectfully decline to adopt part of

the F&R. 

In pertinent part, the SAC and the objections contend that Luckey was terminated shortly 

after he informed Defendant that he had met with the EEOC and intended to file an EEOC charge, 

and after he actually filed an EEOC charge. That is, Luckey contends that his termination was in 

retaliation for either complaining, or attempting to complain, to the EEOC. The F&R concluded 

that no claim for retaliation was stated because the SAC did not adequately allege the 

reasonableness of Luckey’s belief that Defendant had engaged in conduct that is prohibited by 

Title VII. The F&R analyzed Luckey’s retaliation claim as “opposition” to an employment 

practice.

An employer can violate Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions in one of two ways: “(1) if 

the adverse employment action occurs because of the employee’s opposition to conduct made 

[unlawful by Title VII]; or (2) if [the adverse employment action] is in retaliation for the 

employee’s participation in the machinery set up by Title VII to enforce its provisions.” 

Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3;2Sias v. City 

Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1980). In other words, an employer can 

unlawfully retaliate under either Title VII’s “opposition clause” or “participation clause.” See

Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988). The “opposition clause” requires 

at least a reasonable belief by the employee that the employer has violated Title VII. See Trent v. 

Valley Elec. Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1994); Sias, 588 F.2d at 695-96. The 

 

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In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 reads: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 

discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by this title, or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

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“participation” clause of Title VII is broadly construed. See Learned, 860 F.2d at 932; Sias, 588 

F.2d at 694. Filing a complaint with the EEOC and meeting with the EEOC are protected under 

the participation clause. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports 

Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1996); Hashimoto, 118 F.3d at 680; see also McGinest v. GTE 

Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

there is no legal distinction between filing an EEOC charge and threatening to file an EEOC

charge. Gifford v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); see 

also Croushorn v. Board of Trustees, 518 F.Supp. 9, 21-22 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). The 

“participation” clause “shields an employee from retaliation regardless of the merit of his EEOC 

charge.” Sias, 588 F.2d at 695. However, to fit within the protections of the “participation 

clause,” the underlying discrimination must be reasonably perceived as discrimination that is 

prohibited by Title VII. Learned, 860 F.2d at 932. Relying in part on Learned, the Third Circuit 

has held that, if an employee’s EEOC charge alleges discrimination against his employer on the 

basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, i.e. the EEOC complaint is “facially valid”

under Title VII, then the “participation clause” applies. Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 

262, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2006); Kendall v. Donahoe, 913 F.Supp.2d 186, 191-192 (W.D. Pa. 2012); 

cf. Motoyama v. Hawai’I Dept. of Transp., 864 F.Supp.2d 965, 980-81 (D. Haw. 2011) (holding 

that plaintiff did not fall within protection of Title VII’s “participation” clause where EEOC 

complaint complained of disability discrimination).

Here, given conduct identified, the Court believes that Luckey’s complaint should be 

analyzed under the “participation clause.” See McGinest, 360 F.3d at1124 n.19; Hashimoto, 118 

F.3d at 680; Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1155-56 & n.2. Under the “participation clause,” the Court still 

agrees with the F&R that the SAC does not adequately describe the underlying discrimination of 

Luckey’s EEOC charge. That is, the SAC does not adequately show that the discrimination that 

underlies the EEOC charge is reasonably perceived as violating Title VII. The SAC merely 

alleges that Luckey’s EEOC charge dealt with some form of “discrimination” and “retaliation” in 

general, which is insufficient. See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267-68; Learned, 860 F.2d at 932. Luckey 

needed to submit a copy of his EEOC charge or allege that his EEOC complaint contained 

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allegations that he suffered some form of discrimination because of his race, gender, or national 

origin. As the F&R has indicated, alleging that a supervisor dislikes Luckey personally or was 

jealous of Luckey’s rapport with students, does not allege discriminatory conduct because of race, 

gender, or national origin. Discrimination can occur for numerous reasons. It is only the 

discriminatory reasons enumerated in and prohibited by Title VII that are actionable under Title 

VII. Without allegations that show the underlying discrimination of Luckey’s EEOC was at least 

facially valid under Title VII, then Luckey’s EEOC charge is not protected under Title VII’s 

retaliation provision. See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267-68; Learned, 860 F.2d at 932. 

It is true that Luckey is on his second amended complaint. Although the Court would 

normally agree to dismiss the Title VII cause of action without leave to amend, Luckey’s 

objections lead the Court to conclude that amendment may not be futile at this time. First, the 

objections indicate that Luckey informed Defendant that he had contacted the EEOC, which is 

another form of protected activity under the “participation clause.” See Hashimoto, 118 F.3d at 

680. Second, Luckey’s objections describe some of the discrimination or harassment he 

experienced. In pertinent part, Luckey states that he was denied a rotation after complaining that 

he was isolated, that he is the only African American employee, and that he was subject to 

negative comments and remarks about students of his nationality while he was in the break room. 

See Doc. No. 10. This portion of the objections suggest that Luckey may have made race based 

claims as part of his EEOC claim. In other words, Luckey’s objections suggest that he may have 

submitted a “facially valid” Title VII EEOC complaint. See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267-68. If 

Luckey made race based claims of discrimination as part of his EEOC claim, then he would 

receive the protection of Title VII’s “participation clause.” See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267-68; 

Kendall, 913 F.Supp.2d at 191-92; cf. Motoyama, 864 F.Supp.2d at 980-81. 

Because Luckey is proceeding pro se, and it is not necessarily clear that amendment would 

be futile, the Court will give Luckey one more chance to file an amended complaint that states a 

Title VII cause of action. As part of his third amended complaint, Luckey shall include the 

additional relevant allegations discussed in this order and found in his objections. Luckey shall 

also attach a copy of his EEOC charge. If Luckey cannot submit a copy of his EEOC charge, he 

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must explain why he cannot submit a copy and include allegations in his amended complaint that 

describes his EEOC charge and the specific bases therefor. If the EEOC charge and/or the new 

allegations again prove to be insufficient, it is highly unlikely that Luckey will be permitted 

another opportunity to amend his federal causes of action.

3

 

With the exception of the above analysis, the Court agrees with the F&R. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court ADOPTS in part and DECLINES TO ADOPT in part the June 20, 2013, 

Findings and Recommendation;

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint that is consistent with this order on or by 

September 27, 2013;

3. Failure to file an amended complaint on or by September 27, 2013, will result in leave to 

amend being withdrawn and the closure of this case without further notice;4

4. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED;5and

4. This case is referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings, including the 

screening of any amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2013 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

0m8i788

 

3

If Luckey again fails to adequately state a federal cause of action, the Court will dismiss the federal cause of action 

without leave to amend and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

4

Plaintiff is advised that the Court must actually receive the amended complaint by September 27, 2013. A document 

that is merely post-marked on or by September 27, 2013, is insufficient.

5 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s remand motion incorrectly stated that no federal question jurisdiction appears in the 

SAC. If Plaintiff is attempting to state that he no longer wishes to allege a federal cause of action, then he may file an 

amended complaint that contains only state law causes of action. If Plaintiff files a complaint that contains only state 

law causes of action, then Plaintiff need not attach his EEOC complaint. Further, if the amended complaint contains 

only state law claims, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss the case without 

prejudice to Plaintiff re-filing his case in state court. 

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