Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00529/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00529-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Stockton
Defendant
Jessica Glynn
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JESSICA GLYNN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF STOCKTON, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-00529-KJM-DB 

ORDER 

This case is confirmed for trial beginning now on February 1, 2017. 

Defendant City of Stockton moves in limine to exclude testimony from Matt Lam, 

a former Peacekeeper terminated by Program Manager Ralph Womack in January 2009. Def.’s 

Mot. in Limine (“MIL”) 16–22, ECF No. 48. The court held a motion hearing on October 7, 

2016, in which Nancy McCoy appeared for plaintiff and Kimberly Horiuchi appeared for 

defendant. ECF No. 75. This order addresses the one motion the court did not decide at hearing. 

Defendant argues Lam’s testimony “should be excluded because it does not 

demonstrate any pattern of retaliation or demonstrate that [defendant’s] reasons for terminating 

plaintiff [are pretexts].” Def.’s MIL at 18. One reason for this, defendant says, is because there is 

no overlap in decision-makers: Womack terminated Lam, whereas Assistant City Manager 

Christian Clegg and City Manager Kurt Wilson terminated plaintiff. Id. Defendant also alleges 

Case 2:15-cv-00529-KJM-DB Document 87 Filed 12/13/16 Page 1 of 3
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Lam’s testimony would be irrelevant to plaintiff’s claim that she was terminated because of 

pregnancy, her gender, or alleged complaints of wrongdoing. Def.’s MIL at 19. Plaintiff 

opposes, arguing she and Lam are similarly situated because there is an overlap in the decisionmakers deciding their fates. She also says Lam’s testimony helps prove defendant was motivated 

to fire plaintiff for “mak[ing] legally protected complaints[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n 3–4, ECF No. 72. 

The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as “[having] any tendency 

to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. 

Generally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove motive or intent. See

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence, however, must be more probative than prejudicial in order 

to be admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

“It is clear that an employer’s conduct tending to demonstrate hostility towards a 

certain group is both relevant and admissible where the employer’s general hostility towards that 

group is the true reason behind firing an employee who is a member of that group.” Heyne v. 

Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Groups can be defined in a 

number of ways, including by race, sex, and national origin. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). In Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, the Supreme 

Court stated: 

The question whether evidence of discrimination by other 

supervisors is relevant in an individual [employment 

discrimination] case is fact based and depends on many factors, 

including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s 

circumstances and theory of the case. Applying Rule 403 to 

determine if evidence is prejudicial also requires a fact-intensive, 

context-specific inquiry. 

552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008). Notably, the testimony in Sprint that the court determined may be 

admissible involved supervisors “who played no role in the adverse employment decision 

challenged by the plaintiff.” Id. at 383. “Recognizing that ‘there will seldom be eyewitness 

testimony as to the employer’s mental processes,’ . . . evidence of the employer’s discriminatory 

attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove . . . discrimination.” Heyne, 69 F.3d at 

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1480 (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)) 

(emphasis in original); see also Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 937 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 

“that bigoted remarks by a member of senior management may tend to show discrimination, even 

if directed at someone other than the plaintiff,” and “even if several years old”).

Plaintiff specifically contends that Lam’s testimony will show Lam was fired 

because he “made legally protected complaints about improper sharing practices between the 

police/Gang Unit and the Peacekeepers.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Plaintiff argues defendant’s treatment 

of Lam parallels the treatment she experienced of being retaliated against for making similar 

complaints about improper sharing practices between the police and the Peacekeepers. Id. at 3–4. 

Plaintiff also contends there is an overlap in decision-makers, or at least in the decision-making 

chain: Supervisor Jose Gomez allegedly reprimanded Lam and also complained to plaintiff’s 

supervisor when Lam and plaintiff engaged in essentially the same protected conduct. Id. That 

these alleged events occurred approximately six years apart does not weigh strongly against the 

testimony’s relevance given plaintiff’s contention, espoused during the motion hearing, that 

defendant’s actions towards Lam and plaintiff are a part of pattern of unlawful conduct that 

spanned at least as many years. See ECF No. 75; see also Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 951 

(8th Cir. 2010) (admitting “me too” testimony in a housing discrimination case even though 

witness had last rented from the defendant twelve years before the plaintiff filed her lawsuit); 

Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 2015 WL 11181335, at *8 (S.D. Iowa July 17, 2015) (finding “me 

too” evidence admissible even though parties’ claims were separated by seven years). Because of 

the similarity of the allegations, the relevance of Lam’s testimony outweighs any prejudice. 

Therefore, defendant’s motion to exclude Matt Lam’s testimony is DENIED without 

prejudice, as governed by the court’s Final Pretrial Order. See ECF No. 60. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 12, 2016. 

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