Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04301/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04301-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tyrone Judon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 05-4301/06-1049

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United States of America,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

Tyrone Judon, also known as

Antwon,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

___________

Nos. 05-4302/06-1050

___________ 

United States of America,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

Gladger Ross, Jr., also known as

Big,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

 

 

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Appeals from the United States

District Court for the 

Northern District of Iowa.

________________

 Submitted: September 28, 2006 

 Filed: January 5, 2007

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, SMITH and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Gladger Ross, Jr. and Tyrone Judon each on several criminal

counts including conspiring to distribute crack and powder cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district court sentenced Ross to 210 months in

prison and Judon to 50 months in prison. Ross and Judon appeal their convictions and

sentences. The Government cross-appeals both sentences. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the convictions as to both defendants but vacate their sentences and

remand for resentencing. 

I. BACKGROUND

In late 2004, officers of the North Central Iowa Narcotics Task Force used two

confidential informants, Brian Davis, Sr. and his son Brian Davis, Jr., to negotiate

several purchases of crack and powder cocaine from Ross and Judon in the Mason

City, Iowa area. Beginning in August and continuing through early November of that

year, the Davises bought several grams of cocaine, in both crack and powder forms,

from Ross and Judon. The Davises bought the cocaine primarily from Ross and

occasionally from Judon at Ross’s direction, often when Ross could not supply the full

quantity requested. Davis Jr. typically bought ten to twelve “rocks” of crack cocaine

at a time from Ross and Judon for $200. Davis Sr. typically bought in larger

quantities, paying $300 to $400 for an eighth of an ounce (about 3.5 grams) of either

powder or crack cocaine. 

On January 19, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Ross and Judon along with

a third co-defendant, Holli Price, on multiple drug distribution charges, including one

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count for conspiring to distribute both crack and powder cocaine. Within weeks, Ross

was arrested on unrelated state charges. While in custody, Ross made inculpatory

statements to law enforcement with respect to the federal drug charges. Ross later

sought to suppress the statements, arguing that they were involuntary, but the district

court denied his suppression motion.

At trial, the Government called both Davis Sr. and Davis Jr. as witnesses. In

addition to being a known drug user, Davis Jr. had been convicted in 2004 for assault

with intent to commit sexual abuse, for which he was sentenced to two years in prison.

Prior to trial, the Government moved in limine to exclude evidence of the sexual

nature of Davis Jr.’s conviction. The district court granted the Government’s motion

over resistance by Judon.

At the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, Ross and Judon each orally

moved for judgment of acquittal, asserting that the Government’s evidence was

insufficient to prove the conspiracy charge. They also challenged the sufficiency of

the Government’s evidence that the conspiracy involved 50 grams or more of crack

cocaine, as charged in the indictment. The district court found that the evidence

presented was insufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the

conspiracy involved 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. The district court otherwise

denied their motions. Ross and Judon renewed their motions for judgments of

acquittal at the close of all evidence. The district court denied these motions and

instructed the jury consistent with its ruling that the evidence presented was sufficient

only for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved less

than 50 grams of crack cocaine. 

The jury convicted Ross for conspiring to distribute both crack and powder

cocaine, specifically finding Ross responsible for five or more but less than 50 grams

of crack cocaine. The jury also convicted Ross on six distribution counts, four

involving crack cocaine and two involving powder cocaine. The jury convicted Judon

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for conspiring to distribute both crack and powder cocaine, finding Judon responsible

for less than five grams of crack cocaine. The jury also convicted Judon on two crack

cocaine distribution charges and acquitted him on one charge of distributing powder

cocaine.

After trial, Ross and Judon filed written motions for judgments of acquittal,

alternatively moving for new trials. Ross filed his motion pro se in conjunction with

a request for a new attorney. He chiefly argued that the Davises lacked credibility.

Judon also argued that the Davises were not credible, and he asserted that the district

court erred by limiting cross-examination into the circumstances surrounding Davis

Jr.’s prior conviction. In separate written orders, the district court denied both

motions.

At sentencing, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that

Ross was responsible for 396.48 grams of crack cocaine and 396.48 grams of powder

cocaine, suggesting a guidelines base offense level of 34. Relying upon United States

v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005), the district court eschewed the 100:1

drug equivalency ratio between crack cocaine and powder cocaine under the

guidelines and instead applied a 20:1 ratio. Describing its action as a Booker variance

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court recalculated Ross’s base offense level as

32 using the 20:1 ratio. Coupled with Ross’s criminal history category of VI, the

district court used the advisory guidelines sentencing range of 210 to 262 months and

sentenced Ross to 210 months’ imprisonment.

The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Judon was

responsible for 19.53 grams of crack cocaine, placing him at a base offense level of

26. The district court likewise varied downward by rejecting the 100:1 crack to

powder cocaine ratio from the guidelines, instead employing a 20:1 ratio to recalculate

a new base offense level of 22. Judon also sought a two-level reduction for a

mitigating role in the offense under § 3B1.2 of the guidelines, which the district court

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denied. At level 22, Judon’s criminal history category of I yielded an advisory

guidelines sentencing range of 41 to 51 months, and the district court sentenced him

to 50 months’ imprisonment.

Ross appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion to suppress and

denying his motion for a new trial. Ross also challenges the district court’s drug

quantity findings. Judon appeals the district court’s order denying his alternative

motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. He also appeals the district

court’s drug quantity findings and denial of a two-level reduction for a mitigating role

in the offense. The Government cross-appeals both sentences, challenging the district

court’s variances based solely on its rejection of the 100:1 ratio.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ross’s Motion to Suppress

Ross contends that the inculpatory statements that he made to law enforcement

should be suppressed as involuntary. On suppression issues, we review a district

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States

v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2005). “A statement is involuntary when

it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to

overbear the defendant’s will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination.”

United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied,

543 U.S. 1145 (2005). In determining the voluntariness of a confession, we examine

the totality of the circumstances. Id. We will affirm the denial of a motion to

suppress “unless the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is based on an

erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire record, we are left with

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. VegaRico, 417 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. HernandezAppellate Case: 05-4301 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/05/2007 Entry ID: 3265021
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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Ross’s evidence consisted solely of an undated prescription for anti-depressant

medication. He did not testify.

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Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir. 2004)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 126 S. Ct.

1770 (2006). 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Logan Wernet testified that Ross initiated

the interview with the police by requesting to speak with them. After the officers gave

him oral Miranda1 warnings, Ross continued to agree to speak with them. Officer

Wernet testified that Ross wanted to cooperate, apparently in an effort to help himself.

Officer Wernet conceded that it was “entirely possible” that they told Ross that they

would forward his request to cooperate to federal prosecutors. Nevertheless, Officer

Wernet testified that he did not observe any signs that Ross’s statements were not

provided voluntarily and that Ross appeared neither upset nor agitated. Ross argues

that he was depressed and under the influence of anti-depressant medication, though

he failed to present any competent evidence establishing these facts.2

 He also argues

that the officers’ agreement to involve federal prosecutors led him to believe that he

would receive leniency for his cooperation.

Even assuming that the officers in fact promised to forward Ross’s information

to federal prosecutors, there is no evidence that such a promise overbore his will and

critically impaired his capacity for self-determination. A promise of this kind, without

more, is not enough by itself to render Ross’s statements involuntary. See United

States v. Otters, 197 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases); see also LeBrun,

363 F.3d at 725-26 (ruling that even if a defendant’s confession was induced by a

promise, there must still be evidence that the authorities overbore defendant’s will and

capacity for self-determination). Without any evidence establishing that the officers

overbore his will and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination, Ross’s

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arguments fail. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Ross’s motion to

suppress his statements.

B. Judon’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Judon contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy

conviction. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal

de novo. United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2006). “When

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conspiracy conviction, we will

affirm if the record, viewed most favorably to the government, contains substantial

evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, which means evidence sufficient to prove the

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d

1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 214 (2006).

To prove a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the Government must show that the

defendant “(1) had an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose, (2) knew of the

agreement, and (3) knowingly became part of the agreement.” United States v.

Winston, 456 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2006). “Direct evidence of an explicit agreement

is not necessary to prove a conspiracy; instead, a tacit understanding among coconspirators may be, and often will be, inferred from circumstantial evidence.” Id.

(internal quotation omitted). Indeed, “conspiracies seldom lend themselves to proof

by direct evidence.” United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1533 (8th Cir. 1990).

Judon asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that an agreement

to achieve an illegal purpose existed. 

The Government presented sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to

establish the existence of an agreement between Judon and Ross. Davis Jr. testified

that on one occasion when he contacted Ross by telephone to buy cocaine, Ross

directed him to purchase it from Judon. On another occasion, Davis Jr. sought to

purchase $200 worth of crack cocaine from Ross. Ross sold Davis Jr. nine rocks of

crack cocaine for $180 and instructed Davis Jr. to purchase a tenth rock from Judon

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for $20, which he did. Davis Sr. testified that both Ross and Judon were present at

three of the four controlled purchases that he made. At one of those buys, Davis Sr.

purchased five rocks of crack cocaine from Ross for $100, two of which Judon

provided. When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the Davises’

testimony shows that Judon and Ross had, at a minimum, a tacit agreement to

distribute crack cocaine. This evidence is therefore sufficient for a reasonable jury to

have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement existed between Ross

and Judon to distribute cocaine. 

C. Ross’s and Judon’s Motions for New Trials

We review a district court’s disposition of a motion for a new trial for an abuse

of discretion. Peters, 462 F.3d at 957. Where, as here, the motions assert that the

verdicts are contrary to the weight of the evidence, “the [district] court need not view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, but may instead weigh the

evidence and evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v.

Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 2001). The district court should grant the

motion if the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that the district court

believes that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Id. “Absent a clear and

manifest abuse of discretion, we uphold the district court’s ruling on a motion for a

new trial.” Peters, 462 F.3d at 957 (internal quotation omitted). 

In seeking new trials, both Ross and Judon argue that but for the testimony of

the Davises, no evidence supports their convictions, and they invite us to assess the

credibility of the Davises. Judon also argues that he should receive a new trial

because the district court erred in limiting cross-examination into the circumstances

surrounding Davis Jr.’s prior conviction, primarily focusing on the district court’s

decision to exclude evidence of the sexual nature of that conviction.

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While Ross and Judon present reasonable arguments challenging the credibility

of the Davises, the Davises’ testimony was corroborated by testimony from three

Mason City police investigators and an F.B.I. agent. The Government also presented

audio recordings of some of the controlled purchases, further corroborating the

Davises’ testimony. The district court was well-positioned to assess the Davises’

credibility in making its rulings on both new trial motions. See United States v. Gabe,

237 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 2001) (declining to second-guess the district court’s

evaluation of witness credibility on a motion for a new trial). We see no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s determination that sufficient evidence supported the

jury verdicts against Ross and Judon.

Judon also argues that the district court erred by limiting cross-examination of

Davis Jr. We review a district court’s decision to limit cross-examination for a clear

and prejudicial abuse of discretion. United States v. Haskell, 468 F.3d 1064, 1072

(8th Cir. 2006). Judon asserts that the district court erred by excluding evidence of

the sexual nature of Davis Jr.’s conviction. In United States v. Ford, 17 F.3d 1100,

1103 (8th Cir. 1994), we upheld an identical limitation in nearly identical

circumstances, holding that it was not a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion for

the district court to exclude evidence regarding the sexual nature of the Government’s

primary witness’s conviction. Id. at 1103-04. Judon also argues that the district court

erred by limiting inquiry into the timing of Davis Jr.’s custody on the sexual assault

charge relative to his cooperation and into the circumstances surrounding his

subsequent plea. However, Judon does not identify in his briefs, nor does the record

reflect, how the district court’s limitation of cross-examination into these matters

prejudiced him. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not clearly and

prejudicially abuse its discretion when it limited Judon’s cross-examination of Davis

Jr.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that sufficient evidence

supported the jury verdicts, and it did not abuse its discretion in limiting crossAppellate Case: 05-4301 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/05/2007 Entry ID: 3265021
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examination into the circumstances surrounding Davis Jr.’s prior conviction. We

therefore affirm the district court’s denials of Ross’s and Judon’s motions for new

trials. 

D. Sentencing

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the guidelines de

novo, its factual findings for clear error, and any decision to depart from the

appropriate guidelines range for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mashek, 406

F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005). We review a district court’s decision to grant a

§ 3553(a) variance for reasonableness, id., a review that is akin to abuse of discretion

review. United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 2006). Ross and Judon

both challenge the district court’s drug quantity findings. Judon also asserts that the

district court erred by failing to find that he was a minor participant in the criminal

activity. The Government appeals the district court’s decision to vary from the

guidelines by using a 20:1 ratio of crack to powder cocaine instead of the 100:1 ratio

provided for in the guidelines. 

1. Drug Quantity Findings

We review a district court’s drug quantity findings for clear error. United States

v. Allen, 440 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 458

(2006). “[W]e will reverse a determination of drug quantity only if the entire record

definitely and firmly convinces us that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Coleman, 148 F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1998)). At sentencing, a district court

may base factual findings on a defendant’s admissions in a proffer interview. See

United States v. Ingles, 408 F.3d 405, 409 (8th Cir. 2005). Further, 

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As noted in the presentence investigation report, a quarter ounce (7.08 grams)

multiplied by 56 weeks (approximately 14 months) equals 396.48 grams. 

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[t]he trial court is entitled to estimate drug quantities where the amount

actually seized fails to represent the scale of the offense if the

preponderance of the evidence supports the quantities. The court may

make a specific numeric determination of quantity based upon imprecise

evidence, so long as the record reflects a basis for the court’s decision.

United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). At

sentencing, it is the Government’s burden to prove drug quantities attributable to a

defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Marshall, 411 F.3d

891, 894 (8th Cir. 2005). 

a. Ross

Ross challenges the district court’s drug quantity findings and asserts that the

Government failed to prove the amount of crack and powder cocaine attributable to

him. The district court found Ross responsible for 396.48 grams of crack cocaine and

396.48 grams of powder cocaine. The district court based its findings on evidence

presented at the sentencing hearing of Ross’s admissions during a proffer interview

with the Government in April 2005 . The notes recorded from that interview state,

“Ross estimated that he bought and sold approximately a quarter ounce of cocaine

(both powder and rocked) once a week for approximately 14 continuous months

(September of 2003 - November of 2004.)” The district court read these admissions

conjunctively, attributing to Ross the purchase and sale of a quarter ounce of crack

cocaine and a quarter ounce of powder cocaine per week.3

 Ross objects to this

reading, emphasizing that the report states that “he bought and sold approximately a

quarter ounce of cocaine . . . once a week” (emphasis added). 

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Officer David Tyler was one of two officers present at Ross’s proffer interview.

During Ross’s sentencing hearing, Officer Tyler testified:

Q. Did [Ross] summarize approximately the time period that he was

involved in selling cocaine, both powder and rock cocaine?

A. Yes. He said basically from August of ‘03 to November of ‘04.

Q. And did he say how often he sold – what kind of quantities he

sold over the course of a week for those continuous 14, 15

months?

A. He said he purchased about a quarter gram – a quarter ounce per

week on the average over that time period.

Q. When you say purchased, you mean bought and sold or just

purchased and used?

A. Bought and sold.

Q. And was that powder and – was that powder cocaine, crack

cocaine, or both?

A. Both.

Transcript of Sentencing at 5. 

Officer Tyler’s testimony and the notes from Ross’s proffer are ambiguous

because they both support two different but reasonable readings. Ross reads this

evidence to state that he admitted to trafficking only in one quarter ounce of cocaine

per week during the relevant time period. The district court interpreted the evidence

to mean that Ross trafficked in both a quarter ounce of crack cocaine and a quarter

ounce of powder cocaine each week during the relevant time period. “Where there are

two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot

be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

Although we recognize the ambiguity and may well have agreed with Ross if we were

reviewing this issue de novo, the entire record here does not “definitely and firmly”

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convince us that the district court made a mistake in interpreting the testimony and

calculating the quantity of drugs attributable to Ross. The district court’s findings are

therefore not clearly erroneous. 

b. Judon

Judon also challenges the district court’s drug quantity findings. The court

attributed a total of 19.53 grams of crack cocaine to him. In reaching this amount, the

district court found Judon responsible for two sales of crack cocaine to Davis Jr.: 2.28

grams on October 22, 2004 and 2.25 grams on October 26, 2004. The district court

next attributed an additional five grams of crack cocaine to Judon on the conspiracy

charge, even though the jury specifically found Judon responsible for less than five

grams of crack cocaine in the conspiracy. Because a district court makes drug

quantity findings using a preponderance of the evidence standard when applying the

sentencing guidelines, it is not bound by the jury’s quantity findings. See United

States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 126

S. Ct. 2345 (2006), and --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 46 (2006). The district court then

found Judon responsible for an additional ten grams of crack cocaine. Davis Jr.

testified that before he began making controlled purchases in cooperation with the task

force, he purchased crack cocaine from Judon on approximately ten occasions. On

each occasion, he purchased anywhere from one gram up to an eighth of an ounce

(3.54 grams) of cocaine. Judon argues that the district court’s finding of the ten

additional grams of crack cocaine was based on Davis Sr.’s testimony. The

sentencing transcript is ambiguous about whose testimony the district court was

actually crediting in attributing the additional ten grams of crack cocaine to Judon, but

it is clear that Davis Jr.’s testimony in fact supports this finding. The finding itself

therefore was not clearly erroneous. See Roach, 164 F.3d at 413-14. 

Judon also argues that the district court double-counted by attributing to him

the 2.28 and 2.25 grams from the October transactions as well as the five grams on the

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conspiracy count. Even if we agreed, such an error would be harmless because

removing the additional five grams from the total of 19.53 grams of crack cocaine

attributed to Judon would not change Judon’s ultimate advisory guidelines range. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7) (correlating a base offense level of 26 to at least five grams

but less than 20 grams of cocaine base). On this issue, there is no prejudicial error in

the district court’s drug quantity findings for Judon.

2. Judon’s Role in the Offense

The district court also denied Judon’s request for a two-level reduction for

being a minor participant in the offense under § 3B1.2 of the guidelines. We review

a district court’s decision on a request for a mitigating role reduction for clear error.

United States v. Salazar, 454 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2006). A minor participant is

one “who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be

described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) cmt. n.5. It is the defendant’s burden to

show that he was a minor participant. See Salazar, 454 F.3d at 848. “The propriety

of a downward adjustment is determined by comparing the acts of each participant in

relation to the relevant conduct for which the participant is held accountable and by

measuring each participant’s individual acts and relative culpability against the

elements of the offense.” Id. 

In ruling on Judon’s request, the district court noted its familiarity with the trial

of the case and stated, “The role [of Judon] was less than Mr. Ross but not

substantially less in order to warrant a reduction for role in the offense.” Transcript

of Sentencing at 30. The testimony presented by the Government demonstrated that

the Davises occasionally obtained drugs from Judon after being referred to him by

Ross. On several occasions, Judon supplied drugs to the Davises when Ross had

insufficient quantities. Though Ross may have been directly responsible for supplying

more drugs, a fact accounted for by the district court’s calculation of their base offense

levels, Judon points to no evidence showing that he was less culpable than Ross in

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The First Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006),

abrogated Perry on this issue. Spears, 469 F.3d at 1173 n.5. 

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distributing the amounts of cocaine actually attributed to him. See Salazar, 454 F.3d

at 848. The district court therefore did not clearly err in denying Judon’s request for

a mitigating role reduction.

3. Crack and Powder Cocaine Disparity

Finally, in the course of sentencing both Ross and Judon, the district court

expressly relied on United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005), to reject

the guidelines 100:1 ratio and apply a 20:1 ratio in treating crack cocaine relative to

powder cocaine. In both cases, the district court applied what it described as a

“Booker variance” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to recalculate each defendant’s base

offense level based solely upon a 20:1 ratio.

We recently addressed this issue in United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166 (8th

Cir. 2006) (en banc). There, as here, the district court categorically rejected the 100:1

crack-to-powder cocaine ratio in favor of a 20:1 ratio, also expressly relying upon the

logic of Perry.

4

 Id. at 1174. The holding of Spears is straightforward: “neither

Booker nor § 3553(a) authorizes district courts to reject the 100:1 quantity ratio and

use a different ratio in sentencing defendants for crack cocaine offenses.” Id. at 1176.

We hold that the district court here abused its discretion and committed reversible

error when it varied under § 3553(a) based solely on its rejection of the 100:1 drug

quantity ratio between crack and powder cocaine. Accordingly, we vacate the

sentences of both Ross and Judon. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s orders denying Ross’s

suppression motion, Judon’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and Ross’s and Judon’s

motions for new trials. Because the district court improperly varied based solely on

its rejection of the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio prescribed by the guidelines, we vacate

the sentence of each defendant and remand to the district court for resentencing in a

manner consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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