Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02002/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02002-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Enrique Carreon
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

POBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ENRIQUE CARREON, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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FIL 

United States Cou~ of~peals · Tenth Circuit 

APR 181989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER · Clerk 

No. 88-2002 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

{D.C. No. CR-88-155) 

David Williams, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney and Joe M. Romero, Jr., Assistant United 

States Attorney, on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, attorney 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

R. Morgan Lyman, Las Cruces, New Mexico, attorney for DefendantAppellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge . 

Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 1 
The United States seeks reversal of the district court's 

order granting defendant-appellee Enrique Carreon's (Carreon) 

Motion to Suppress evidence (approximately 50 kilograms or some 

101 pounds of marijuana) found in his pickup truck by United 

States Customs Inspector John Gordon (Gordon) during a search 

conducted at the Antelope Wells, New Mexico, Customs Station 

located at the border between the United States of America and the 

Republic of Mexico. 

The search conducted by Gordon on February 27, 1988, resulted 

in discovery of the marijuana secreted inside a compartment 

located in the camper wall of Carreon's pickup truck. Thereafter, 

Carreon was indicted, charged with importing into the United 

States less than fifty kilograms of marijuana in violations of 21 

u.s.c. § 952(a), 21 u.s.c. § 960(a)(l) and 21 u.s.c. § 960(b)(4), 

and with possessing less than fifty kilograms of marijuana with 

intent to d i stribute, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(D). 

Prior to trial, Carreon filed his Motion to Suppress the 

evidence. In his motion, Carreon recognized that the government 

has the right to conduct routine bo~der searches to control the 

movement of people and goods across our national boundaries, but 

he contended that "[a] 3t hour detention and a drilli ng into the 

truck violates the standard of reasonableness under the Fourth 

Amendment.. and "[t]hat reasonableness is determined by weigh i ng 

the warranted suspicion of the border official. against the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 2 
offensiveness· of the intrusion.~ (R., Vol. I, Tab 11, p. 2). 

The Evidentiary Hearing and Decision 

An evidentiary hearing was held on Carreon's motion on May 9, 

1988, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (3). , Fed. R. Crim. P. The government, 

in apparent recognition that it was obliged to carry the burden of 

proof on the reasonableness of Gordon's search and seizure 

actions, offered the testimony of Mr. Gordon. Counsel for the 

defendant did not cross-examine Gordon and he did not call the 

defendant or other witnesses. The defendant offered no evidence . 

The undisputed facts based upon Customs Inspector Gordon's 

testimony follow. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on February 27, 

1988, Carreon drove his 1973 Chevrolet pickup truck, with attached 

camper, into the United States Customs Service station located at 

Antelope Wells, New Mexico, on the border between the United 

States of America and the Republic of Mexico. Customs Inspector 

Gordon, the sole officer at the station, met the vehicle. 

Accompanying Carreon were two other passengers, a lady and a 

child. In accordance with normal procedures, Gordon, who had 

served sixteen and one-half years as a customs inspector, asked 

Carreon to declare any property he was bringing into the United 

States. Mr. Carreon declared some clothing contained in a bag, 

and upon inquiry he declared United States citizenship and 

residence in the State of California. 

Officer Gordon, again in keeping with normal procedure, then 

asked Mr. Carreon to step out of the vehicle so that he (Gordon) 

could inspect the vehicle. Gordon had determined to conduct a 

good inspection of the vehicle because he noticed that Mr. Carreon 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 3 
was nervous. Gordon stated that when he addressed Carreon, he 

looked away and that Carreon was shaking when he handed Gordon his 

documents. 

Gordon stated that during the course of his service as a 

customs inspector at various border "ports" he had made 

approximately five hundred narcotics seizures similar to that 

effected in this case. 

Gordon next requested that the lady and child remove from the 

pickup so that he could conduct the inspection. Gordon 

accompanied the lady and child to the nearby customs station after 

calling his wife over from their house trailer located about forty 

feet from the station. Gordon asked his wife to give the lady a 

pat down search to determine if she possessed any weapons and then 

to keep an eye on them while he (Gordon) conducted the vehicle 

inspection. 

Gordon observed that the nuts on each of the six bolts, 

which held the camper shell on the truck, were shiny, indicating 

the nuts had been recently removed. He next observed that the 

front part of the camper shell was very thick, containing a wide 

space. Gordon, with the use of a coathanger, determined that the 

top part of the camper shell was hollow. He then thumped around 

the bottom portion of the camper shell while on his 

the camper and determined that it was solid. 

stated that he then knew that there was something 

portion of the compartment. This colloquy followed: 

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knees inside 

Officer Gordon 

in the lower 

Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 4 
(R.' 

the 

Q. MR. ROMERO (Assistant U.S. Attorney) 

discovered in previous searches of other 

similar compartments? 

A. Well, I . . • 

MR. LYMAN (Counsel for Mr. Carreon): 

Your Honor • • . 

THE COURT: Pardon me? 

I 

Had you 

vehicles 

object, 

MR. LYMAN: Relevance as to previous searches. 

THE COURT: Sustained. 

Vol. II, p. 8) • 

Officer Gordon, after detecting that the bottom portion 

camper compartment was solid, escorted Mr. Carreon to 

of 

the 

nearby station and placed him in a lock-up detention room for 

safety reasons and to prevent Carreon's escape to the nearby 

border. Gordon then obtained his small electric drill, plugged it 

in on the outside of the station and proceeded to drill a hole in 

the lower portion of the compartment. Gordon testified that he 

then detected a substance, which he believed looked and smelled 

like marijuana residue, come out of the compartment . Again, the 

following colloquy occurred: 

MR. LYMAN: We would object to that and request 

that it be stricken from the 

THE COURT: Sustained. It will be stricken. 

Id at p. 12. 

Further inspection revealed that the secret compartment 

contained 101 pounds of marijuana. Carreon was placed under 

arrest at approximately 10:55 a.m. on February 27, 1988. 

· ·· Immediately following Officer Gordon's undisputed testimony, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 5 
the court ruled, stating: 

Well, the Court is going to grant the Motion to 

Suppress. It occurs to me that the mere suspicion on 

Mr. Gordon, here, is totally unwarranted. I -- I really 

don't care what experience he's had . His recitation of 

the events surely would not have warranted a magistrate 

to issue a search warrant and I find it rather offensive 

that he stopped these people and asks his wife to pat 

down the -- the wife of· the defendant and that he then 

incarcerates the defendant and somehow or other he makes 

the distinction that he was not under arrest but he was 

merely detained in a cell. I find that incredulous. 

But merely to -- that -- he states that he found 

this man and that he was a classic case of nervousness 

and on that he starts looking over the vehicle with a -- with a clothes hanger. 

And then on top of that to drill a portion of the - to take an electric drill and to drill into what he 

considers to be a compartment. The end doesn't justify 

the the means. 

I understand the US Attorney has to proceed on 

whatever they're provided, but this is a classic case of 

intrusion. An unconstitutional intrusion and I'm 

appalled at what apparently what this man is doing at 

the border. 

The Court is going to sustain the -- I'm going to 

grant the motion to suppress. 

MR. ROMERO: Your Honor, just for the record, if I 

could state, there -- is it my understanding that there 

was no requirement of probable cause at the border? 

.THE COURT: Absolutely. Now, he's permitted to 

inspect, but he had nothing to warrant the extreme 

inspection that he made. And .the fact that he claims 

that he found something that sounded solid, rather than 

hollow, that doesn't give him the right eo go and start 

drilling to find -- to establish probable cause. 

ae•s permitted to make a reasonable inspection, but 

to the limits that this man went to, I -- I suggest that 

he was that he went to great length to establish 

probable cause. He did not have it, initially. 

That will be the ruling of the Court. 

Id. at pp . 12-14. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 6 
The district court entered its order granting Carreon's 

Motion to Suppress on May 17, 1988. The government's Motion to 

Reconsider the Order Suppressing Evidence was denied on June 14, 

1988, as not well taken. 

Discussion-Disposition 

The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is subject 

only to a few specifically . established and well-delineated 

exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); 

Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 357 {1967). The exceptions 

to the warrant-based-on-probable cause requirement are anchored to 

a tripartite weighing of public necessity, efficacy of the search 

and the degree of the intrusion. See California v. Greenwood, 

U.S. , 43 Crim L. Rep. (BNA) 3029 (1988} (a warrantless search 

and seizure of garbage placed outside of the residential 

curtilage for collection does not violate the Fourth Amendment 

because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in such 

garbage}; Colorado v. Bertine, 107 s. Ct. 738, U~S. 

(1987) {police may open closed containers while conducting a 

routine inventory search of an impounded vehicle); New Jersey v. 

T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (administrative searches of school 

children by school officials conducted on school property approved 

based on reasonable grounds for suspicion of violation of law or 

school rules}; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (random 

searches without probable cause are permissible in prison since 

there ·is no legitimate··expectation of privacy in a prison cell); 

Schneckloth v. Bustamante , 412 u.s. 218 (1973) (consensual 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 7 
search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk for 

weapons); Calonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 

(1967) (regulatory-administrative inspection of premises); Beck v. 

Ohio, 379 u.s. 89 (1964) (search incident to a lawful arrest). 

And the exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement we 

are concerned with in the instant case deals with border searches. 

In United States v. Mayer, 818 F.2d 725, 727 (lOth Cir. 1987), we 

observed: 

The border search has long been recognized as an 

exception to the Fourth Amendment's (probable cause) 

warrant requirement. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 

132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543. At the 

border, "the Fourth Amendment balance between the 

interests of the Government and the privacy right of the 

individual is struck more favorably to the Government," 

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540, 

105 S. Ct. 3304, 3310, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, because of the 

"longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by 

stopping and examining persons and property." United 

States v. Ramsey, 431 u.s. 606, 616, 97 s. Ct. 1972, 

1978, 52 L. Ed. 2d 617, and the ~longstanding concern for 

the protection of the integrity of the border." Montoya 

de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538, 105 S. Ct. at 3309. 

Border searches are reasonable within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment because of "the single fact that the 

person or item in question had entered into our country 

from outside." Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619, 97 S. Ct. at 

1980. 

In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-

38 (1985), the Supreme Court pertinently observed: 

Here the seizure of the respondent (detained by 

customs officials for sixteen hours and subjected to 

rectal examination which resulted in obtaining 88 

cocaine-filled balloons smuggled in her alimentary 

canal) took place at the international border. Since 

the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the 

Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches 

and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a 

_warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties 

and to prevent the introduction of contraband into thi-s 

country. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 

616-17 (1977), citing Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 

Stat. 29. This Court has long recognized Congress' 

power to police entrants at the border. See Boyd v. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 8 
United States, 116 u.s. 616, 623 (1886). As we stated 

recently: 

"'Import restrictions and searches of 

persons or packages at the national border 

rest on different considerations and different 

rules of constitutional law from domestic 

regulations. The Constitution gives Congress 

broad comprehensive powers '[t]o regulate 

Commerce with foreign Nations,' Art. I, § 8 

cl. 3. Historically, such broad powers have 

been necessary to prevent smuggling and to 

prevent prohibited articles from entry.'" 

Ramsey, supra, at 618-19, quoting United 

States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 

123, 125 (1973). 

Consistently, therefore, with Congress' power to 

protect the Nation by stopping and examining persons 

entering this country, the Fourth Amendment's balance of 

reasonableness is qualitatively different at the 

international border than in the interior. Routine 

searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not 

subject to any requirement of reasonable susp1c1on, 

probable cause - or warrant; and first-class mail may be 

opened without a warrant on less than probable cause, 

Ramsey, supra. Automobile travelers may be stopped at 

fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized 

suspicion even if the stop is based largely on 

ethnicity, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. 

543, 562-63 (1976), and boats on inland waters with 

ready access to the sea may be hailed and boarded with 

no suspicion whatever. United States v. VillamonteMarquez, supra. 

These cases reflect longstanding concern for the 

protection of the integrity of the border. This concern 

is, if anything, heightened by the veritable national 

crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit 

narcotics, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 

544, 561 -yl980) (POWELL, J., concurring), and in 

particular by the increasing utilization of alimentary 

canal smuggling. (Footnote omitted). 

The Montoya de Hernandez Court observed that one presenting 

herself at the border for admission into the United States is 

entitled to be free from unreasonable search and seizure but that 

the Fourth · Amendment balance between the interests -of -- the 

government and the privacy right of the individual is "[a]lso 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 9 
struck much more favorably to the government·at the border." The 

Court held that detention and search beyond the scope of a routine 

customs inspection may be undertaken based on a 11 reasonable 

suspicion" standard justified by a particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting the particular person of smuggling 

contraband. 473 u.s. at 541. The Court placed great emphasis 

upon the fact that "[T]he trained customs inspectors had 

encountered many alimentary canal smugglers and certainly had more 

than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' 

Terry, supra, at 27, that respondent was smuggling narcotics in 

her alimentary canal." Id. at 542. 

19 u.s.c. § 1582 provides: 

The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe 

regulations for the search of persons and baggage 

and he is authorized to employ female inspectors for 

the examination and search of persons of their own 

sex,' and all persons coming into the United States 

from foreign countries shall be liable to detention 

and search by authorized officers or agents of the 

Government under such regulations. 

19 u.s.c. § 482 provides, in pertinent part: 

Any of the officers or persons authorized to .•• 

search • • • may stop, search, and examine 

within their respective districts, any vehicle, 

beast or person, on which or whom he or they shall 

suspect there is merchandise which is subject to 

duty, or shall have been introduced into the United 

States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the 

person in possession or charge, or by, in , or upon 

such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search 

any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he 

may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is 

merchandize which was imported contrary to law: and 

if such officer or other person so authorized shall 

find any merchandize . which he shall have 

reasonable -cause to ·believe -~-~ • to have been 

unlawfully introduced into the United States • 

he shall seize and secure the same for trial. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 10 
The district court did 

undisputed facts to determine 

not conduct an 

whether, based 

analysis of the 

on all of the 

circumstances, Inspector Gordon held a "reasonable suspicionH to 

justify extension of his routine border search of Mr. Carreon's 

pickup truck by drilling the small hole in the camper wall. Thus, 

the court did not make findings based on the credibility of 

witness Inspector Gordon. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 

470 u.s. 564, 573-575 (1985). The court concluded, however, 

"[t]he fact that he (Gordon) claims that he found something that 

sounded solid rather than hollow, that doesn't give the right to 

go and start drilling to find .•. to establish probable cause." 

(R., Vol. II, p. 14). The court also concluded that Inspector 

Gordon "[h]ad nothing to warrant the extreme inspection that he 

made." Id. Insofar as the district court's reasoning, supra, 

constitute findings of fact as distinguished from conclusion of 

law or vice versa, we must hold that they are clearly erroneous. 

When a search and seizure is challenged as violative of the 

Fourth Amendment, the burden is on the government to prove its 

validity. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 u.s. 544 (1980), reh'g 

denied, 448 u.s. 908 {1980); United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368 

(lOth Cir. 1985) (the appellate court must accept the trial 

court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; must 

consider the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party); United States v. 

Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (lOth Cir. 1985) (we there placed emphasis 

on - t ·he importance o·f the testimony -given at the··suppression 

hearing by the defendant Recalde, concluding that, based on the 

undisputed facts, the government had failed to carry its burden 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 11 
of proof); United States v. Diaz-Albertine, 772 F.2d 654 (lOth 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1987)~ 

In united States v. Pappas, 735 F~2d 1232, 1233 (lOth Cir. 

1984), we pointed to the need for adequate trial court findings 

following a suppression hearing: 

At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 

given the evidence together with the inferences, 

deductions and conclusions to be drawn from the 

evidence, are to be determined by the trial judge . 

• • • The appellate court is bound by the trial 

court's determinations unless they are clearly 

erroneous ... where, as here, there are only 

conclusory findings, we may look to the judge's 

statements and ruling from the bench to ascertain 

the trial court's factual findings and credibility 

determinations. 

Nothing in the record before us discloses any factual 

findings or credibility determinations by the trial court. The 

facts, all garnered from the testimony of Inspector Gordon, are 

undisputed. In our view, those facts and all reasonable 

inferences, deductions and conclusions to be drawn therefrom lead 

to the inescapable conclusion that the search and seizure of the 

marijuana secreted in the camper wall by Inspector Gordon was 

justified on the "reasonable suspicion" standard articulated in 

Montoya de Hernandez, supra. 

Before setting forth our reasoning-analysis, we must observe 

that we cannot ascertain the trial court's basis for sustaining 

defense counsel's objection (on general relevancy grounds) to 

Inspector Gordon's response to the question "[H]ad you discovered 

in previous searches of other vehicles similar compartments. 11 (R., 

Vol. II, p. 8}. This line of inquiry, we suggest, goes to the 

heart of the applicable "reasonable suspicion" standard. In light 

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of Inspector Gordon's prior testimony that, in the course of his 

sixteen and one-half years of service as a customs inspector, he 

had effected more than five hundred narcotics seizures of the size 

of the marijuana seized from the Carreon vehicle, Gordon's personal 

knowledge of secreting of narcotics in "similar compartments" was 

extremely relevant. See generally, Rule 602, 28 Appendix, Fed. R. 

Evid.i United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 429 u.s. 1100 (1976) (witness may testify upon concrete 

facts within his own observation and recollection ~ facts perceived 

from his own senses). Rule 104(a), 28 Appendix, Fed. R. Evid. 

provides that with respect to preliminary questions concerning the 

qualification of a person to be a witness or the admissibility of 

evidence the court is "(n]ot bound by the rules of evidence except 

those with respect to privileges." Again, for some inexplicable 

reason, the court granted defense counsel's motion to strike that 

portion of the government's closing argument relative to Inspector 

Gordon's suspicions concerning the bottom, solid portion of the 

camper wall and his determination to search further by means of the 

electric drill. That argument, too, was directed specifically at 

the "reasonable suspicion" standard. 

In our view, the facts of this case did establish a 

"reasonable suspicion" justifying Inspector Gordon's search of the 

bottom portion of Carreon's camper wall by use of the electric 

drill. 

(1) Inspector Gordon's inspection of the Carreon vehicle, 

documents and belongings, the subsequent "pat down'' of the female 

passenger and the detention of Carreon while Gordon went for his 

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electric drill were all reasonable, routine border search 

procedures. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra (16 

hour detention); United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir., 

En Bane, 1981) (mere suspicion is sufficient to j~stify a pat down 

at the border, as part of a routine border inspection); United 

States v. Wilmot, 563 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1977) (pat down search is 

part of routine border search); United States v. Nieves, 609 F.2d 

642 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980) (search of 

a defendant's shoes for narcotics was an acceptable routine border 

inspection procedure). See also United States v. Ramsey, 431 u.s. 

606, 616 (1977) (searches of persons or vehicles and contents 

crossing international boundaries "[a]re reasonable simply by 

virtue of the fact that they occurred at the border."); United 

States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 u.s. 1088 (1984) ("Both a _luggage search and a pat 

down or frisk fall within this category [routine border searches]. 

• • • A person's decision to cross our national boundary is 

justification enough for such a search."); United States v. Carter, 

592 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979) 

(inspections and searches of individuals, their belonging and 

effects as they seek to cross border or their functional 

equivalents are routine searches not subject to the warrant 

requirements of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 

576 F.2d 279 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); United 

States v. Chase, 503 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 

u.s. 948 (1975). 

(2) Inspector Gordon testified that Mr. Carreon was nervous 

(he looked away when he spoke and was evasive in his responses to 

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questions) and when he (Carreon) handed certain documents to him 

(Gordon), he was shaking. It has been held that a more intrusive 

search (beyond a routine border search), including a strip search, 

is justifiable if a person behaves in an articulably suspicious 

manner. United States v. Carter, 590 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied 441 u.s. 908 (1979} (extreme nervousness and anxiety during 

questioning}; United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973 (2nd Cir. 1978) 

(excessive nervousness, evasive answers factors justifying strip 

search); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (defendant gave evasive and 

contradictory answers to custom inspector's questions justifying 

decision to search her exterior body surface); United States v. 

Maggard, 451 F.2d 502 {5th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 cr.s. 1045 

(1971) (reasonable suspicion for vehicle search based upon 

defendant's nervousness and suspicious behavior}; United States v. 

Faulkner, 547 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1977) (driver of vehicle acted in 

nervous and agitated manner); united States v. Nichols, 560 F.2d 

1227 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's nervousness significant factor); 

United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d 1206, cert. denied 434 u.s. 1073 

(1977) (defendant acted "very, very nervous," was pale and appeared 

to be sick, fitting a smuggling profile); United States v. Glaziou, 

402 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1968) (when 

defendants were stopped they appeared to be extremely nervous and 

this heightened the customs officers' suspicions). 

(3) During the course of his routine inspection of the 

··pickup truck and camper, Inspector Gordon observed that the camper 

shell had been recently removed because the six nuts on the bolts, 

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three on each side, with two in the front, which hold the camper 

shell onto the'truck "[h]ad a little shiny part of each nut -- the 

bottom nut. This tells you that them nuts had been off recently." 

(R., Vol. II, p. 2). Gordon also then observed that the front part 

of the camper shell was very thick and wide, covered with plywood. 

Entering the camper with a coathanger, Gordon determined that the 

top part of the thick compartment was hollow. He then thumped the 

bottom part of the compartment with the coathanger and determined 

that "[i]t was solid as a rock. 11 Id. Gordon then decided to 

search inside the enclosed compartment by means of his electric 

drill. It was in relation to this testimony that the trial court 

sustained an objection, on relevancy grounds, to this question 

posed to Gordon by the prosecutor: "Q. Had you discovered in 

previous searches of other vehicles similar compartments?" rd. at 

8. 

Inspector Gordon was well aware that the Republic of Mexico, 

from which the Carreon vehicle had arrived, is a source country for 

drugs. The thickness of the front portion of the camper wall, the 

shiny nuts, the hollowness of the upper portion of the camper wall 

compartment as compared to the "solid as a rock" aspect of the 

lower portion of the compartment coupled with Mr. Carreon' s 

nervousness and shaking did create the "reasonable suspicion" 

justified on a particularized and objective basis required by 

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. The 

Supreme Court, in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 

{1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982), said that in assessing 

the concept of ••cause" justifying border patrol officers to effect 

an investigative stop of a vehicle away from the border, the 

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totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken 

into account: 

It implicates all of the principles just discussed 

- especially the imperative of recognizing that, when 

used by trained law enforcement officers, objective 

facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined 

with permissible deductions from such facts to form a 

legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person 

and for action on that suspicion. We see here the kind 

of police work often suggested by judges and scholars as 

examples of appropriate and reasonable means of law 

enforcement. Here, fact on fact and clue on clue 

afforded a basis for the deductions and inferences that 

brought the officers to focus on 'Chevron.• 

In United States v. Puig, 810 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1987), a 

customs officer seized approximately 317 kilograms of cocaine 

hidden in a secret compartment in the bulkhead of a boat, 

discovered only after the officer drilled holes in it. The court 

held that the intrusion was reasonable: 

Here, Officer LeGasse initially boarded and 

conducted an unintrusive visual inspection of the boat. 

This visual inspection revealed a number of factors 

which were inconsistent with the 'fishing trip' story 

given by the defendants and which raised a reasonable 

suspicion based on Officer LeGasse•s experience that 

illegal contraband was hidden in the unaccounted for 

section beyond the forward bulkhead. It was thus 

reasonable for the agent to undertake a more thorough 

search . . . . 

* * * 

Appellants emphasize the intrusiveness of LeGasse's 

drilling into the plywood section of the hull, decrying 

"the permanent physical destruction of an integral part 

of the vessel" . . • yet this surely overstates the 

damage wrought by a small hole that could easily be 

plugged and repaired. The government must be permitted 

to take such limited steps when it has established a 

reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. (Footnote 

omitted). 

In United States v. Moreno, 778 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1985), 

customs officials boarded a vessel which was on the customs' 

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Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 17 
"lookout list" of vessels suspected of being involved in narcotics 

smuggling. Upon boarding the vessel, the officers learned that 

the ship had entered the United States (Miami River) from foreign 

waters. Customs Officer Herm arrived at the scene and advised the 

other agents that from a previous boarding of this vessel, he knew 

that the ship contained concealed compartments. Agents then 

drilled a secorid hole into another portion of the fuel tanks. A 

probe inserted into this hole indicated that some solid objects 

rather than fuel - occupied this portion of the tank. The agents 

then used an electric saw to gain access to the concealed 

compartment and thereupon discovered numerous bales of marijuana. 

The court held that this search and seizure was particularly 

justified since one of the customs agents recalled from a previous 

boarding that the ship contained the secret compartments. 

In the instant case, we have previously observed that Officer 

Gordon discovered the secret compartment during a routine border 

inspection. 

Finally, in United States v. Faulkner, 547 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 

1977), the border patrol•s search and seizure of 450 pounds of 

marijuana concealed in a pickup truck with an attached camper was 

challenged as violative of the Fourth Amendment. In that case, 

contact was not made at the border but instead at a permanent 

checkpoint within the United States so that a heightened standard 

of probable cause was applied, rather than the reasonable 

suspicion standard, which applies here. 

observed/held: 

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Even so, the court 

Appellate Case: 88-2002 Document: 01019593156 Date Filed: 04/18/1989 Page: 18 
[A] search at a permanent checkpoint is valid if, 

after stopping the vehicle, the Border Patrol agent 

finds probable cause to make the search. United States 

v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 46 L. Ed. 2d 623 

(1975). The incongruity in the camper's structure (the 

inside ceiling was approximately one foot lower than the 

outside ceiling) and the Border Patrol agent's knowledge 

that this was a common means of transporting contraband, 

coupled with the initial attempt of defendant to drive 

through the checkpoint and his nervous and agitated 

behavior, furnished reasonable justification for 

referring defendant's vehicle to a secondary inspection 

point for further investigation (emphasis supplied) . 

We hold that the order of the district court granting the 

Motion to Suppress was clearly erroneous. That Order is REVERSED 

and the case is REMANDED for trial. 

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