Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03001/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frederick Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 4, 2013 Decided December 27, 2013

Nos. 07-3131 & 11-3001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GERALD W. EILAND,

FREDERICK MILLER,

APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00379-01)

(No. 04cr00379-02)

Eric H. Kirchman argued the cause for appellant Gerald 

W. Eiland. With him on the briefs was Kenneth M. Robinson.

Dennis M. Hart argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant Frederick Miller.

Frederick A. Miller, pro se, filed the briefs for appellant 

Frederick Miller. 

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne 

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Grealy Curt, and John K. Han, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Appellants, Gerald Eiland and 

Frederick Miller, were convicted of various narcotics-related 

offenses. The government’s evidence at trial showed that 

Eiland and Miller organized an extensive drug ring in the 

Washington, D.C. area that had ties across the country. After 

almost a year and a half of investigation including numerous 

wiretaps, the government indicted twenty-one defendants. 

Many of the defendants pled guilty. The government brought 

the remaining defendants to trial in two groups. This appeal 

results from the second of these trials. We also heard an 

appeal from the first trial, United States v. Miller, Nos. 07-

3135 & 07-3139, and we have disposed of those issues in 

another opinion released today.

Eiland and Miller allege numerous errors affecting the 

second trial. Although we reject most of appellants’ 

arguments, we vacate Miller’s insufficiently supported 

conviction for his participation in a continuing criminal 

enterprise and remand for resentencing. We also vacate the 

fine imposed on Eiland by the district court and remand for 

reconsideration of that portion of Eiland’s sentence.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Our opinion in the companion case sets out the factual 

and procedural background of this case in some detail. We 

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need not retell that story here, and we limit our discussion to 

facts relevant to the second trial and this appeal.

Sometime in 2003, the Safe Streets Task Force of the FBI 

began investigating a drug trafficking ring in Southeast 

Washington, D.C. The evidence revealed a wide-ranging 

drug operation headed by Eiland and Miller. The operation 

dealt in heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and phencyclidine 

(PCP) and had ties around the country and to foreign 

travelers. On February 13, 2004, the task force applied for 

and was granted court authorization to wiretap Miller’s cell 

phone. The court approved two extensions and the wiretap 

lasted three months. In April, the district court permitted the 

task force to tap Eiland’s three phones and approved an 

extension for one of those phones. FBI Agent Daniel Sparks 

provided supporting affidavits for each of the initial wiretap 

and extension applications. Although the conspirators often 

used untapped payphones to discuss their illicit activities and 

spoke in guarded language while on the wiretapped phones, 

the FBI obtained substantial evidence from the wiretaps. 

Following a “reverse sting” operation, the FBI arrested Eiland 

and Miller in August 2004. The government charged twentyone defendants in a 100-count superseding indictment. The 

defendants were charged with conspiring to distribute heroin, 

cocaine, cocaine base, and PCP between 1999 and 2004 in 

Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland.

The defendants who did not plead guilty were separated 

into two groups for trial. Prior to the first trial, many of the 

defendants, including Eiland and Miller, moved to suppress

the wiretap evidence because, they argued, the authorization 

violated the wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. The 

district court denied defendants’ motions. United States v. 

Eiland, 398 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D.D.C. 2005). The government 

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relied heavily on the more than 14,000 recorded telephone 

conversations at both trials.

The first trial group, consisting of Frederick Miller, 

Timothy Thomas, and Corey Moore, went to trial in March 

2006. The trial lasted two months, and the jury deliberations 

lasted a month. Thomas was convicted of most charges, 

including conspiring to commit a narcotics offense (cocaine) 

and RICO conspiracy. Moore was acquitted of all charges. 

Miller was found guilty of twenty-one counts of using a 

communication device to facilitate a drug-trafficking offense. 

The jury acquitted Miller of a count of PCP distribution and 

several counts of communication offenses. The jury was 

hung on the remaining counts against Miller, and the judge 

declared a mistrial on those.

Following the mistrial, the government moved to join 

Miller to the second group of defendants, scheduled to go to 

trial in October 2006. Miller opposed the motion because his 

court-appointed counsel from the first trial, Brian McDaniel, 

was unavailable. Rather than delay the trial of the entire 

second group or hold a separate trial for Miller, the court 

appointed Thomas Saunders to represent Miller.

On October 3, 2006, the second group of defendants—

Robert Bryant, Alvin Gaskins, Gerald Eiland, and Frederick 

Miller—proceeded to trial. On November 15, 2006, the jury 

acquitted Bryant, the alleged PCP supplier for the conspiracy, 

of all charges. The jury found Gaskins guilty of narcotics 

conspiracy with regard to heroin only and acquitted Gaskins 

of all other charges. This court later reversed Gaskins’s 

conviction as resting upon insufficient evidence. United 

States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The jury 

found Eiland guilty of narcotics conspiracy (Count 1) with the 

object of distributing heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base, but 

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not PCP; RICO conspiracy (Count 2); continuing criminal 

enterprise (CCE) (Count 3); attempt to possess with intent to 

distribute heroin (Count 4); and three counts of unlawful use 

of a communication facility. The jury found Eiland not guilty 

of six other communications counts and an accessory to 

murder charge. Miller was convicted of narcotics conspiracy 

(Count 1) with regard to heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base, 

but not with regard to PCP; RICO conspiracy (Count 2); CCE

(Count 3); attempt to possess with intent to distribute heroin 

(Count 5); and three counts of unlawful use of a 

communication facility. The jury found Miller not guilty of 

attempt to possess with intent to distribute PCP and five 

additional communications counts.

Thus, the jury found the government had proved Miller 

and Eiland conspired to traffic heroin, cocaine, and cocaine 

base and committed the racketeering acts and CCE predicate 

offenses involving those same narcotics. But the jury found 

the government had not proved the charged offenses and acts 

involving the trafficking of PCP.

At appellants’ sentencing hearings, the district court 

dismissed the narcotics conspiracy charges against Miller and 

Eiland as lesser-included offenses of the CCE counts. The 

court sentenced each to concurrent sentences of life 

imprisonment for RICO conspiracy and CCE, and lesser 

terms of imprisonment on the other counts. The court 

imposed a $7,000 fine on Miller for Counts 2 and 3. 

Sentencing (Miller) Tr. at 7, Nov. 28, 2007.1 It imposed a 

 1 The written judgment form for Miller states that the fine is 

imposed on Counts 1 and 2. This appears to be a mistake because 

the district court vacated Count 1 (narcotics conspiracy). 

Furthermore, “the pronouncement of the sentence constitutes the 

judgment of the court” and “the written judgment form is a nullity 

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$7,000 fine on Eiland for Count 1. Sentencing (Eiland) Tr. at 

11, Nov. 28, 2007. Eiland and Miller filed timely notices of 

appeal. This court decided to hear the appeal arising out of 

the second trial separately from the appeal of the first trial.2

II. Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence

Eiland and Miller cite several reasons the wiretap 

evidence should have been suppressed. We address these 

arguments in turn.

An application for an order authorizing a wiretap must 

contain certain information, including “a full and complete 

statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the 

applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued.” 

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). A district court may authorize a wiretap

after assessing both probable cause and necessity and finding:

(1) probable cause exists to believe that an individual has 

committed or is about to commit one of certain 

enumerated offenses; (2) probable cause exists to believe 

that particular communications concerning that offense 

will be obtained through an interception; (3) normal 

investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 

or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried; 

and (4) probable cause exists to believe that the 

communication facility sought to be wiretapped is being 

used, or is about to be used, in connection with the 

commission of the offense.

United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)). An initial wiretap may be 

 

to the extent it conflicts with the previously pronounced sentence.” 

United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 2 Miller is also a party in the related appeal from the first trial.

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approved for a maximum of thirty days and may be extended 

for additional thirty-day periods upon a finding of continued 

probable cause and necessity. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (5).

The probable cause standard for the wiretap statute is the 

same as the standard for a search warrant. See United States 

v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1999); United States 

v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 110 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. 

Armendariz, 922 F.2d 602, 608 (10th Cir. 1990); United 

States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 900 (11th Cir. 1990). The 

determination requires the authorizing court “to make a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [it], including 

the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying 

hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 

or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

The necessity requirement is satisfied if “traditional 

investigative techniques have proved inadequate to reveal the 

operation’s full nature and scope.” United States v. Becton, 

601 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The necessity 

requirement prevents law enforcement from resorting to 

wiretapping where traditional investigative techniques would 

suffice. Carter, 449 F.3d at 1293. “[A] court will give close 

scrutiny to a contested wiretap application and will reject 

generalized and conclusory statements that other investigative 

procedures would prove unsuccessful.” Id. But because the 

necessity requirement was not intended “to foreclose 

electronic surveillance until every other imaginable method of 

investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted,” the 

government need only show “that other techniques are 

impractical under the circumstances and that it would be 

unreasonable to require pursuit of those avenues of 

investigation.” Id.

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In evaluating appellants’ objections to the district court’s 

denial of their motions to suppress, we review the district 

court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for 

clear error. United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 69, 71 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). A reviewing court gives deference to the 

authorizing court’s determinations of probable cause and 

necessity. United States v. Glover, 681 F.3d 411, 419–20 

(D.C. Cir. 2012); Johnson, 437 F.3d at 71. We review the 

court’s necessity determination for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

We “do[] not typically give a second layer of deference to a 

district court’s assessment” of the authorizing court’s 

determinations. Glover, 681 F.3d at 420.

A.

Appellants first argue the initial application for a wiretap 

on Miller’s phone was inadequate because Agent Sparks’s

supporting affidavit contained “boilerplate” language 

incompatible with the particularized facts required to establish 

probable cause. Appellants’ argument is unavailing. Even if 

the affidavit does contain some general language, 

“[a]pplications are not to be read in a piecemeal fashion.” 

United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 578, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 

Sparks’s affidavit contains specific facts regarding the 

locations where drug transactions took place, see, e.g., Sparks 

Aff. 15–16, Feb. 13, 2004, Appellants’ App’x 272–73, and 

the quantities of drugs and money observed by confidential 

informants, see, e.g., id. at 16–18, Appellants’ App’x 273–75. 

The affidavit also contains particularized facts regarding the 

phone to be tapped. These facts are sufficient to establish 

probable cause despite the fact that the phone’s subscription

was not in Miller’s name. See, e.g., id. at 21–23, Appellants’ 

App’x 278–80 (explaining that confidential informants had 

described phone calls with Miller regarding drug activity and 

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that toll record and pen register analyses confirmed those 

phone calls were made on the subject phone); id. at 5–6, 

Appellants’ App’x 262–63 (stating that although the phone 

subscription was not in Miller’s name, the investigation had 

shown the phone was regularly used by Miller). The initial 

wiretap application contained particularized facts sufficient to 

establish each of the three probable cause requirements under 

the wiretap statute. See Williams, 580 F.2d at 589 

(“[S]ections of the affidavits are framed in conclusory 

terminology, but they cannot rationally be separated from the 

preceding detailed descriptions of the investigative events.”).

B.

Appellants also argue agents lacked probable cause to 

support an extension of the Miller wiretap. Agent Sparks’s 

affidavit states FBI agents had discovered Miller sometimes 

used payphones to discuss drug activity in order to avoid 

being picked up by any wiretaps. Sparks Aff. 19–20, Mar. 17, 

2004, Appellants’ App’x 338–39. According to appellants, 

this finding vitiates any determination that there was probable 

cause to believe continued wiretaps would lead to the 

discovery of relevant communications. But Sparks’s affidavit 

also contained plenty of examples of relevant calls picked up 

during the initial wiretap period. See id. at 16–17, 

Appellants’ App’x 335–36 (describing conversations in which 

Miller agreed to send a courier to California and discussions 

regarding how to escape fraud detection at airports); id. at 21, 

Appellants’ App’x 340 (describing a call in which one 

participant accidently referred to heroin without using coded 

language). Although the wiretaps were less successful 

because the defendants used payphones to escape detection, 

Sparks’s extension affidavits demonstrated that the wiretaps 

did have some value to the investigation. See United States v. 

Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 532–33 (1974) (where a wiretap 

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extension application shows that the wiretap produced results 

during the initial period, there is probable cause to believe the 

wiretap will continue to pick up communications concerning 

the offenses being investigated). The extension authorizations 

were supported by probable cause.

C.

Eiland and Miller next argue the initial wiretap 

application for Miller’s phone did not satisfy the necessity 

requirement. They note the government had numerous 

cooperating witnesses and informants who were able to 

provide the government with adequate high-level inside 

information, and they complain the wiretap applications also 

did not explain why physical surveillance, pen registers, or 

toll-record analyses were inadequate to achieve the 

government’s investigatory goals.

Agent Sparks’s initial Miller affidavit provides detailed 

information about aspects of the conspiracy learned from 

cooperating witnesses. Sparks noted the FBI had attempted to 

obtain additional high-level informants but had not succeeded. 

See Sparks Aff. 28, Feb. 13, 2004, Appellants’ App’x 285 

(noting the government offered Cinquan Blakney an 

opportunity to cooperate but he declined). The affidavit also 

states that no informants could safely provide other detailed 

information including: (a) the means by which the drugs were 

obtained; (b) the manner and timetable of shipments; (c) the 

locations where drugs and illegally obtained assets were 

hidden; or (d) the manner in which the defendants concealed 

their activities. Id. at 53, Appellants’ App’x 310. The

affidavit is sufficiently detailed with regard to both the 

information obtained, and the type of information not 

obtainable, from informants.

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Appellants say Victoria Owens (CW5) was a high-level 

informant who could give the government any necessary 

information about the conspiracy. But the affidavit 

demonstrates that even Owens did not have access to the most 

closely held secrets. Owens was not one of the few trusted 

people to whom Miller gave his phone number. Id. at 22–23, 

Appellants’ App’x 279–80; see Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294 

(wiretap affidavit adequately demonstrated necessity where it 

stated reasons why use of undercover informants would be 

inadequate to reveal the full nature and scope of the drug 

conspiracy). Furthermore, Owens would have been a

problematic witness at trial—she was a known drug-user who 

was cooperating with the government as part of a plea 

agreement. It was reasonable for the government to seek 

wiretap evidence that would corroborate Owens’s information

and convince a jury at trial. See Sparks Aff. 52, Feb. 13, 

2004, Appellants’ App’x 309 (stating that wiretaps were 

needed to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt).

Sparks’s affidavit also explained that the conspirators 

were adept at detecting physical surveillance and had moved 

away from the area previously captured by a pole camera. Id.

at 49–51, Appellants’ App’x 306–08. While the use of a pen 

register had provided some information to the FBI, it could 

not convey to the government the substance of Miller’s calls. 

Id. at 58–59, Appellants’ App’x 315–16.

In sum, the wiretap applications described the relevant 

evidence that had been gathered through the use of traditional 

investigative techniques. The government was not obligated 

to include in the applications every detail known to it 

concerning the conspiracy. See United States v. Maynard, 

615 F.3d 544, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“At best, the appellants 

suggest investigative techniques that might have provided 

some of the evidence needed, but they give us no reason to 

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doubt the district court’s conclusion that having engaged in an 

adequate range of investigative endeavors, the government 

properly sought wiretap permission and was not required to 

enumerate every technique or opportunity missed or 

overlooked.”); Becton, 601 F.3d at 597 (holding that various 

omissions from the wiretap affidavits did not undermine the 

government’s necessity showing because the omissions were 

not material and the government had “adequately 

demonstrated the failure of normal investigative techniques to 

reveal the full nature and scope of the conspiracy”). It

adequately demonstrated that traditional investigative 

techniques had been employed and holes remained in the 

evidence that could only reasonably be filled by a wiretap. 

The authorizing court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that a wiretap was necessary for the government’s 

investigation.

D.

Appellants contend information discovered after the 

district court denied their motions to suppress demonstrates 

the wiretap applications contained critical misstatements that 

made an accurate determination of probable cause and 

necessity impossible. Specifically, appellants discovered that 

the cooperating witness referred to in the wiretap applications 

as CW5 was Victoria Owens, who shared a house with Miller. 

Appellants say if they had known CW5’s identity, they could 

have successfully argued before the district court that the 

government had failed to provide the authorizing court with 

salient information undermining CW5’s credibility. The 

government purposely concealed Owens’s identity, according 

to appellants, so as not to undermine the evidence establishing 

probable cause. Appellants also make a contradictory 

argument. Because Owens was a trusted confidant of the 

drug conspiracy’s leaders and could obtain valuable inside 

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information, the government was not able to show that a 

wiretap was necessary. Both arguments fail.

Appellants did not raise these arguments before the 

district court in their motion to suppress, nor did they renew 

that motion after they learned of CW5’s identity. Thus, the 

arguments were forfeited and our review is only for plain 

error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 

(1993). Owens’s identity was not hidden from the authorizing 

judge. See Notice 1, Feb. 13, 2004, D.D.C. Misc. No. 04-64, 

Gov’t Supplemental App’x 1. The authorizing court had the 

information necessary to evaluate Owens’s credibility, 

including information concerning her drug use, her past 

untruthful testimony, and her cooperation agreement with the 

government. Appellants offer no reason for the court to 

conclude that further information about Owens would have 

altered the court’s determination of her credibility or 

otherwise undermined its finding of probable cause. 

Additionally, there was enough evidence aside from that 

supplied by Owens to establish probable cause. With regard 

to the necessity determination, the government described 

information to which Owens did not have access and showed 

that a wiretap was necessary despite her cooperation. Thus, 

the omissions affected neither the determination of probable 

cause nor the determination of necessity. See Becton, 601 

F.3d at 597.

Moreover, the defendants did not request disclosure of 

CW5’s identity in support of their request for a Franks 

hearing.3 Because appellants failed to seek that disclosure 

 3 When the defendants filed their motions to suppress, they also 

requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 

155–56 (1978), to inquire whether Agent Sparks had intentionally 

or recklessly included a material false statement in the wiretap 

affidavit. However, the statements defendants alleged were false 

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and did not argue before the district court that the government 

improperly masked CW5’s identity, that argument is also 

forfeited on appeal. See Flynn v. Comm’r, 269 F.3d 1064, 

1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Generally, an argument not made 

in the lower tribunal is deemed forfeited and will not be 

entertained absent exceptional circumstances.”).4 Appellants 

have not demonstrated that either the masking of Owens to 

protect her from retaliation or the district court’s failure to 

hold a Franks hearing on the basis of that masking affected 

their substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

E.

Appellants’ final argument with regard to the wiretap 

evidence is that the authorizing court should not have 

authorized extensions where, appellants contend, the

government did not describe the investigation’s progress in its 

extension applications. An application for an extension must 

include “a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained 

from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the 

failure to obtain such results.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f). The 

purpose of this provision is to “permit the court realistically to 

 

were unrelated to CW5’s identity or credibility. Appellants do not 

allege the district court erred by denying the motion for a Franks 

hearing based on the arguments actually presented to it.

4 Appellants also argue that by not listing CW12, who Miller asserts 

is Rashawn Briggs, in the initial wiretap application affidavit, the 

government omitted the critical fact that a knowledgeable and 

trusted insider was cooperating, thus preventing the authorizing 

court from making a reliable finding of necessity. But the record 

shows that Briggs was in a halfway house from January 16, 2004 to 

March 5, 2004. Oct. 19, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 11. Briggs was not 

mentioned in the initial February 13, 2004 affidavit because he was 

not able to provide assistance to the investigation until he left the 

halfway house. See id. at 106.

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appraise the probability that relevant conversations will be 

overheard in the future.” Giordano, 416 U.S. at 532. Each of 

the government’s extension applications includes a lengthy 

“summary of pertinent calls.” See, e.g., Sparks Aff. 13–33, 

Mar. 17, 2004, Appellants’ App’x 332–52. Sparks’s 

affidavits detail the results of the wiretaps and the 

shortcomings of continued traditional investigative 

techniques. The extension applications demonstrated that the 

wiretaps were producing results and thus established

continuing probable cause. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 532–

33. The authorizing court did not err in granting the 

government’s applications for extensions.

III. Overview Witness Testimony

The district court erred, appellants say, by permitting 

government witnesses to give improper overview testimony. 

The government’s first witness at trial was FBI Agent John 

Bevington. Agent Bevington testified as an expert on 

investigations of illegal conspiracy cases. Oct. 4, 2006 AM 

Trial Tr. at 11–12. Specifically, Agent Bevington began his 

testimony with a definition of conspiracy5 and explained 

conspiracies are conducted secretly, often using coded 

language. Id. at 14–17. Agent Bevington also testified about 

investigative techniques, like controlled drug buys, search 

warrants, surveillance, and interviews. Id. at 19–26. He

described the procedure for obtaining a search warrant and 

authorization for a wiretap and explained how the FBI 

monitors a wiretap. Id. at 25–33. Appellants complain this 

background testimony was erroneously admitted because it 

was unrelated to matters beyond a lay jury’s understanding 

and would not help the jury “to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702.

 5 Agent Bevington testified that a conspiracy is “an agreement 

between two or more people to commit criminal acts.” Id. at 14.

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Agent Bevington’s background testimony was properly 

admitted. “The operations of narcotics dealers repeatedly 

have been found to be a suitable topic for expert testimony 

because they are not within the common knowledge of the 

average juror.” United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 628 

(D.C. Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 

318, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2002) (permitting expert testimony 

regarding drug traffickers’ use of cell phones and pagers to 

frustrate police investigations); United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 

1414, 1421–22 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting modus operandi

testimony about drug traffickers’ counter-surveillance 

techniques because “[s]uch evidence helps the jury 

understand complex criminal activities, and alerts it to the 

possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events 

may indicate criminal behavior”); United States v. TapiaOrtiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Government 

was justified in introducing expert testimony explaining that 

drug traffickers employ certain techniques, such as using 

beepers, cash, and nicknames, in order to avoid detection.”). 

Courts have also permitted law enforcement agents to testify 

as experts on investigative techniques. Cf. United States v. 

Miller, Nos. 07-3135 & 07-3139, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. 

Dec. 27, 2013) (FBI Agent Sparks’s lay testimony about 

investigative techniques would not have been error had 

Sparks testified as an expert).

Agent Bevington’s testimony fits within the type of 

modus operandi expert testimony permitted by this and other 

courts, and his description of investigative techniques 

provided useful background information. The district court’s 

admission of this testimony—which aided the jury in 

assessing the quality of the evidence—was not error.6

 6 Even if Agent Bevington’s testimony had introduced error, 

appellants have not alleged any prejudice as a result.

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Appellants also argue Agent Bevington improperly 

vouched for the cooperating witnesses. Agent Bevington 

explained information given by a cooperating witness was 

usually corroborated by the FBI: “[E]ven if we don’t know it 

at that particular time, we have the ability to investigate 

anything they tell us and determine whether or not they are 

being truthful and accurate.” Oct. 4, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 34;

see also id. at 37 (“Before the government will agree to the 

plea agreement . . . we’re going to know the information 

they’re providing is correct or we’re going to go out and 

conduct further investigation to determine what they have 

been telling us is correct.”). Agent Bevington described the 

various corroborative techniques. Id. at 37–38. However, 

testifying as an expert witness, he disclaimed any specific 

knowledge regarding the cooperating witnesses in this case;

he spoke only about the process of obtaining cooperating 

witnesses generally. Id. at 44–45.

Defendants’ motion in limine to limit the testimony of the 

government’s expert witnesses did not address the errors 

claimed on appeal. See Eiland Mot. in Limine, July 15, 2006, 

D.D.C. 04-379, ECF No. 697. Defendants’ motion asked the 

court to order the government to comply with Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) by giving the defendants a 

written summary of the proposed witness testimony.7 Id. 

Eiland also requested limitations on the breadth and scope of 

expert testimony, asking that the experts not be allowed to act 

as “super-narrators who guide the jury through the evidence 

in a manner that combines hearsay, frustrates crossexamination, and usurps the jury’s function.” Id. at 3. At no 

point did any of the defendants object to Agent Bevington’s 

 7 Defendants’ objection at trial similarly only concerned the 

government’s compliance with Rule 16(a)(1)(G). Oct. 4, 2006 AM 

Trial Tr. at 13–14.

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18

testimony regarding the development or credibility of 

cooperating witnesses. Therefore, we review this portion of

Agent Bevington’s testimony for plain error. See United 

States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

To establish plain error, appellants must show there was 

“(1) a legal error that was (2) ‘plain’ (a term that is 

synonymous with ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’), and that (3) affected 

[their] substantial rights.” United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 

985, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Even when plain error is 

demonstrated, “we . . . reverse only if (4) the error seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. Appellants “bear[] the burden of proving 

each element under this standard.” Id.

Agent Bevington’s cooperating witness testimony

constitutes plain error in light of this court’s holding in United 

States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 59–61 (D.C. Cir. 2011), decided 

after appellants’ trial.8 In Moore, an FBI agent similarly 

testified that cooperating witnesses had inside information the 

FBI would try to verify before striking a deal with them. 651 

F.3d at 59. This court found the “clear implication was that 

the government had selected only truthful co-conspirator 

witnesses for the pre-indictment investigation, from whom the 

jury would hear during the trial.” Id. at 59–60. Such 

testimony infringes on the jury’s role as the sole judge of a 

witness’s credibility. Id. at 59. Agent Bevington’s testimony 

was improper insofar as he vouched for the reliability of the 

investigation and the cooperating witnesses the government 

planned to have testify at trial. See id. at 60.

 8 The “plainness” of an error is evaluated as of the time of appellate 

review, not the time of the district court’s decision. Henderson v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1127–29 (2013).

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19

Nevertheless, we think any error introduced is harmless. 

Bevington’s testimony did not affect appellants’ substantial 

rights or affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

the proceedings. Prior to Agent Bevington’s testimony, the 

court instructed the jury it was “not bound by an expert’s 

opinion,” Oct. 4, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 12, and the court in its 

preliminary and final instructions told the jury it was the sole 

judge of witness credibility, Oct. 3, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 97–

98; Nov. 7, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 101. The court’s final jury 

instructions included a warning to the jury that “[a] witness 

who realizes that he may be able to obtain his or her own 

freedom or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony 

may have a motive to lie. The testimony of a witness who has 

entered into a plea agreement should be received with caution 

and scrutinized with care.” Nov. 7, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 106.

The court’s instructions thus minimized any harm caused by 

Bevington’s vouching. See Moore, 651 F.3d at 62 (certain 

errors “had no prejudicial effect in view of limiting 

instructions”).

Furthermore, the impact of Agent Bevington’s testimony 

was mitigated by other factors. Unlike in Moore—where this 

court also found the error harmless—Agent Bevington 

acknowledged he had no knowledge of the particular 

cooperating witnesses who would testify in appellants’ trial. 

On cross-examination, Eiland’s attorney got Bevington to 

agree that sometimes cooperating witnesses lie and that 

ultimately law enforcement officers have to make a 

“subjective” judgment as to whether the witness is credible. 

Oct. 4, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 52–53. Here, even without the 

cooperating witnesses, there was significant evidence of 

appellants’ guilt, including corroborating wiretaps. See 

Brown, 508 F.3d at 1074 (prosecutor’s error in vouching for a 

government witness did not require reversal because the other 

evidence weighed heavily against defendant and because the 

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judge had instructed the jury that it was the sole judge of 

witness credibility); see also United States v. Rawlings, 522 

F.3d 403, 410–13 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Appellants have not met 

their burden of demonstrating that the error affected their 

substantial rights.9

IV. Lay Opinion Testimony Interpreting Wiretap Evidence

We have held that a lay witness may not give opinion 

testimony interpreting cryptic evidence when the testimony 

violates Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See United States v. 

Hampton, 718 F.3d 978, 981–83 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see id. at 

985–86 (Brown, J., concurring). Appellants contend the 

district court violated this rule in allowing FBI Agent Hall, a 

government witness, to give lay opinion testimony 

interpreting the calls intercepted by the government’s 

wiretaps. Agent Hall, who participated in the investigation of 

appellants’ drug operation, testified numerous times 

throughout the trial. At times, Agent Hall’s testimony was 

intended to put in context the recorded calls played at trial. 

However, even if Agent Hall’s testimony constituted plain 

 9 To the extent appellants object to Agent Bevington’s testimony 

regarding the mechanics of a plea deal, there was no plain error. 

Agent Bevington merely stated that after a cooperating witness’s 

compliance is complete, the government files a motion giving the 

court discretion to depart from a mandatory minimum in sentencing 

the witness. Oct. 4, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 39. “This court has held 

that plea agreements can be introduced by the prosecution and 

referred to in their entirety, because so doing does not improperly 

bolster the witness who signed the plea agreement.” Brown, 508 

F.3d at 1074. The court has only suggested that “use of the 

‘truthfulness’ portions of plea agreements becomes impermissible 

vouching when the prosecutors explicitly or implicitly indicate that 

they can monitor and accurately verify the truthfulness of the 

witness’ testimony.” Id. Moreover, any error would not be 

reversible for the reasons discussed above.

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error under Hampton, appellants have not demonstrated error 

warranting reversal. Appellants’ briefs fail to specifically 

describe the allegedly erroneous testimony or how it may 

have affected the convictions. Appellants have failed to 

demonstrate any error was substantially prejudicial.

V. Replacement of Miller’s Appointed Counsel Prior to the

Second Trial

Miller argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right 

to counsel when the district court, over his objection, replaced 

his appointed counsel from the first trial with new counsel 

prior to the second trial.10 Miller says the Sixth Amendment 

 10 In addition, Miller claims he was denied his constitutional right 

to be present at all stages of his trial because the district court 

decided to replace Miller’s counsel outside Miller’s presence. We 

need not decide now whether a defendant has a right to be present 

at a hearing on replacing counsel. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 

U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (“[The] privilege of presence is not 

guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a 

shadow, [but] due process clearly requires that a defendant be 

allowed to be present to the extent that a fair and just hearing would 

be thwarted by his absence.”). Miller was present at the June 26, 

2006 hearing at which the court heard the government’s motion to 

join Miller to the trial of the second group of conspirators. Hr’g Tr. 

at 3, June 26, 2006. At that hearing the court also considered 

Miller’s opposition to that motion and Miller’s request for a 

severance or postponement. Id. at 4–5. Miller had an opportunity 

to tell the court, through counsel, he wished to have McDaniel 

continue to represent him. Id. Although Miller filed a written 

motion for severance later, on July 2, the court heard and 

considered argument at the June 26 hearing. Miller did not attend 

the brief status conference on July 18 at which the court ordered

Miller joined to the second trial and appointed Saunders to 

represent him. But the court did not hear argument on July 18. 

Thus, Miller was present at the only hearing where his presence 

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compels a different rule: once an indigent defendant and his

appointed counsel develop an attorney–client relationship, the 

defendant has a constitutional right to continued 

representation by that attorney.

Even assuming arguendo Miller had a Sixth Amendment 

right to continued representation, such a right is not absolute 

where a continuance is sought to retain or replace counsel of 

choice. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 

1978). Rather, the defendant’s right “must be carefully 

balanced against the public’s interest in the orderly 

administration of justice.” Id. The district court considers 

such a motion for a continuance in its sound discretion and “is 

not subject to review absent a clear abuse.” Id. at 489–90. 

“Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in 

scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of 

assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same 

place at the same time, and this burden counsels against 

continuances except for compelling reasons.” Morris v. 

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). Among the factors to be 

weighed by the trial judge in considering a motion for a 

continuance are

the length of the requested delay; whether other 

continuances have been requested and granted; the 

balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, 

witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested 

delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, 

purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant 

contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the 

request for a continuance; whether the defendant has 

 

might have been useful—the June 26 hearing. Miller fails to offer 

any reason to suggest his attendance at the July 18 conference 

would have served any purpose, particularly as he had previously 

fully conveyed his views to the district court.

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other competent counsel prepared to try the case, 

including the consideration of whether the other counsel 

was retained as lead or associate counsel; whether 

denying the continuance will result in identifiable 

prejudice to defendant’s case, and if so, whether this 

prejudice is of a material or substantial nature; [and] the 

complexity of the case.

Burton, 584 F.2d at 490–91. “In weighing these factors, we 

presume that the trial judge’s decision was reasonable, and 

find a violation of the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel only if the denial of a continuance was unreasoning 

and arbitrary.” United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 97 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990).

Applying the relevant Burton factors to this case, we 

conclude that, even if Miller had a Sixth Amendment right to 

continued representation by his appointed counsel, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s motion 

for a continuance and replacing Miller’s counsel. Because of 

McDaniel’s busy trial calendar, Miller was requesting a 

seven-month continuance. The district court reasonably 

concluded this was too long for Miller’s co-defendants, who 

were being held without bail, to wait for their joint trial. See

Hr’g Tr. at 12, June 26, 2006. On the other hand, severing 

Miller’s trial would have imposed an enormous 

inconvenience on the government, witnesses, and the court, 

which would have had to repeat a three-month trial for the 

third time.11 Thomas Saunders had a clear calendar to 

 11 Miller moved for a continuance for the second trial group or, in 

the alternative, a severance so Miller could be tried separately at a 

later time when McDaniel was available to continue his 

representation. Miller’s motion for a severance here is nothing 

more than a motion for an individual continuance. Thus, we review 

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prepare for Miller’s trial with the second group of defendants 

in October 2006, see Hr’g Tr. at 2, July 18, 2006, and the 

judge required McDaniel to continue his representation 

through the beginning of voir dire to help Saunders prepare 

for trial. See id. at 2–3; Order, July 18, 2006, D.D.C. 04-379, 

ECF No. 701. The judge offered to assist Saunders by 

holding prompt status conferences any time that would aid 

Saunders’s preparation. Hr’g Tr. at 3, July 18, 2006. In these 

circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude 

that two months would provide Saunders with enough time to 

prepare for trial, particularly because he had the advantage of 

being able to review the proceedings of the first trial in which 

Miller was tried on the same charges.

Miller also has not shown any harm from the district 

court’s decision. “In order to obtain reversal, an appellant 

must show that actual prejudice resulted from denial of the 

continuance.” United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 839 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). There is no indication Saunders was not fully 

prepared by the time trial started. To the contrary, when just 

prior to trial the government moved for a continuance to 

accommodate an ill witness, Saunders opposed that motion. 

Resp. to Gov’t Mot. to Continue, September 5, 2006, D.D.C. 

No. 04-379, ECF No. 766. Miller is unable to point to any 

way in which he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

12

The district court did not err in deciding to retry Miller 

with the second group of defendants, to hold the second trial 

 

the district court’s denial of the alternate motions under the same 

standard.

12 At oral argument Miller’s counsel stated that the short time 

Saunders had to prepare created an “appearance of unfairness.” But 

without actual prejudice, a district court’s denial of a continuance is 

not reversible error. See Celis, 608 F.3d at 839.

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as originally scheduled in October 2006, and to replace 

Miller’s appointed counsel to adhere to that trial date.

VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Miller

Miller contends there was insufficient evidence presented 

at trial to sustain three of his convictions. The court reviews 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence “de novo, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, and affirming a guilty verdict where any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The court 

“give[s] full play to the right of the jury to determine 

credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences 

of fact.” Id.

A. Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Miller argues, through counsel, there was insufficient 

evidence for the jury to convict him of engaging in a 

continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. 

To convict a defendant of CCE, the government must prove 

the defendant committed: “1) a felony violation of the federal 

narcotics law; 2) as part of a continuing series of violations; 

3) in concert with five or more persons; 4) for whom the 

defendant is an organizer or supervisor; 5) from which he 

derives substantial income or resources.” Moore, 651 F.3d at 

80. Miller contends the government failed to prove he 

“occupie[d] a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or 

any other position of management” with regard to five or 

more people. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). To satisfy this 

element, the government must show the defendant “specifie[d 

the supervisees’] activities in adequate detail.” United States 

v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The 

defendant must have “exercise[d] some sort of managerial 

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responsibility.” Id. “Delegation of management to an 

intermediate supervisor does not prevent lower-level 

subordinates from being counted in the continuing criminal 

enterprise statute.” United States v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780, 785 

(9th Cir. 1993). The government identifies five individuals 

whom it claims were Miller’s supervisees: Timothy Thomas, 

Tyrone Thomas, Charles Brown, Darius Ames, and Jay 

Ingram.

There was sufficient evidence for a jury rationally to find

Miller exercised a supervisory role over Tyrone Thomas and 

Timothy Thomas. Miller exercised a supervisory role over 

both of these individuals in arranging for Tyrone to transport 

money to Arizona and to transport cocaine back to 

Washington, D.C. “Drug runners can be considered 

managees for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 848.” United States v.

Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In March 2004, 

Miller called Tyrone and arranged for him to drive to 

Washington. Oct. 10, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 71–73. Miller 

then told Tyrone that Timothy Thomas would introduce

Tyrone to Eiland, with whom Tyrone would be exchanging 

the money for drugs in Arizona. Id. at 73–74. As Tyrone was 

transporting the cocaine back to Washington, Miller kept in 

contact with Timothy Thomas, who was checking on 

Tyrone’s progress. Oct. 12, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 82–83; 

Calls 5589, 5659, Gov’t Supplemental App’x 51–53. When 

Tyrone told Timothy Thomas the cocaine had been lost, 

Miller organized the response, at one point instructing 

Timothy to get the baggage claim number for Tyrone’s bag. 

Oct. 11, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 24–26; Call 6154, Gov’t 

Supplemental App’x 55–56. This evidence establishes Miller 

exercised the requisite supervisory control over both Tyrone 

Thomas and Timothy Thomas, organizing the transportation 

of money and drugs.

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The government also presented sufficient evidence to 

establish Miller was a manager of Charles Brown. When 

Tyrone claimed that the cocaine he shipped by bus was lost, 

Miller recruited Brown to help find the cocaine. Oct. 12, 

2006 PM Trial Tr. at 13–14; Call 6133, Gov’t Supplemental 

App’x 54. At another time Miller arranged for Brown to 

accept a package of heroin for Miller. Oct. 18, 2006 AM 

Trial Tr. at 31–32.

The government’s evidence with regard to Darius Ames 

is weaker but still sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion 

that Ames was a supervisee of Miller. Darius Ames bagged 

heroin for Eiland. Oct. 4, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 26–27. On a 

few occasions Miller came into the stash apartment where 

Ames was bagging and took heroin. Id. at 43–44; Oct. 5,

2006 AM Trial Tr. at 8–14. Miller would measure out 25 

grams of heroin, stretch it to 50 grams, bag it, and leave 

$1,000 with Ames, directing him to give the money to Eiland. 

Oct. 5, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 8–14. In another instance,

Eiland, who was out of town at the time, directed Ames to 

pick up a shoe box from Miller. Id. at 15–16. Miller was to 

call Ames when Miller was ready for Ames to pick it up. Id. 

When Miller called Ames, Ames drove to meet Miller and, 

following Miller’s instruction, went through the alleyway to 

the back door and into the basement of Miller’s aunt’s house. 

Id. at 16; Oct. 4, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 57. Miller proceeded to 

give Ames a shoebox of money that Ames took and stored for 

Eiland. Oct. 4, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 57–58. Together, this 

evidence, although not strong, supports the inference that 

Ames was Miller’s subordinate. Both Miller and Eiland 

viewed Ames as a lower-level conspirator—a gofer whom 

they were free to direct. Under the deferential standard we 

apply on reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we conclude a 

jury rationally could have found Ames to be a supervisee of 

Miller.

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Nevertheless, the government failed to produce sufficient 

evidence to demonstrate that Jay Ingram was supervised by 

Miller. FBI Agent Hall testified that Ingram was a lieutenant 

in the organization and was Miller’s cousin. Oct. 17, 2006 

AM Trial Tr. at 56. But Ingram’s familial relation to Miller is 

irrelevant, and Agent Hall’s description of Ingram as a 

lieutenant is conclusory. The agent’s opinion regarding 

Miller’s role has no more weight than the facts upon which it 

is based, and those were insufficient. There was evidence that 

Ingram obtained PCP from Miller. Oct. 19, 2006 PM Trial 

Tr. at 52–53. But a buyer–seller relationship, without more, 

does not suggest a managerial relationship. See United States 

v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also 

United States v. Witek, 61 F.3d 819, 822–23 (11th Cir. 1995) 

(“Buyers and sellers often need to accommodate one another 

when meeting and arranging for delivery. Such conduct is 

simply incidental to the buyer-seller relationship.”). A dealer 

who simply sells drugs to other dealers and is paid from the 

proceeds of their sales, but who has no other involvement in 

their sales, does not exercise the managerial control required 

for a CCE conviction. Id. There was no evidence presented 

at trial that Miller played any ongoing role in Ingram’s sales 

after supplying Ingram with PCP. Furthermore, the jury’s 

verdict demonstrates that it did not deem the PCP evidence 

credible. The jury found Miller not guilty of all PCP-related 

charges.

The government points to an intercepted phone call in 

which Eiland, who was looking for drugs, called Miller and 

asked where Ingram was. Oct. 17, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 56–

57, 65; Call 1172, Gov’t Supplemental App’x at 37. Miller 

responded that Ingram was with him. Id. Rashawn Briggs, a 

cooperating witness, also testified he once saw Eiland, Miller, 

and Ingram meeting outside a carry-out restaurant. Oct. 19, 

2006 AM Trial Tr. at 34–36. None of this evidence suggests 

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Miller acted in a supervisory capacity with regard to 

Ingram.13 This evidence of association is not enough to prove

that Miller managed Ingram.

The government’s evidence at trial was insufficient to 

convince a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller 

acted as an organizer, supervisor, or manager for five or more 

individuals. Because the government failed to establish one 

of the elements of CCE, we vacate Miller’s conviction on this 

count.

B. Narcotics Conspiracy

In a supplemental pro se brief, Miller challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of narcotics 

conspiracy. In particular, Miller argues the evidence 

introduced at trial varied from the indictment because it 

established multiple conspiracies rather than the single 

overarching drug conspiracy charged and that he was 

prejudiced by this variance. Even though the narcotics 

conspiracy conviction was vacated by the district court as a 

lesser included offense of CCE, we address Miller’s argument 

because the CCE conviction must be vacated and the 

narcotics conspiracy conviction can now be reinstated.

To establish the existence of a narcotics conspiracy in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must show an 

agreement between at least two people to violate narcotics 

 13 There was substantial evidence presented at trial showing that 

Ingram was a supervisee of Eiland. See Oct. 4, 2006 PM Trial Tr. 

at 58–71 (Ames testifying that Eiland twice took Ames and Ingram 

to Phoenix to purchase heroin); Oct. 19, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 15 

(Briggs testifying that Ingram distributed cocaine base and heroin 

for Eiland). There was not the same evidence with regard to 

Miller’s relationship with Ingram.

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law. United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). “In determining whether the evidence supports a 

finding of a single conspiracy or instead only demonstrates 

multiple conspiracies, we look at whether the defendants 

shared a common goal, any interdependence between the 

alleged participants, and any overlap among alleged 

participants, such as the presence of core participants linked 

to all the defendants.” United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 

1520 (D.C. Cir. 1996). To warrant reversal, the defendant 

bears the burden of showing “(1) that the evidence established 

the existence of multiple conspiracies, rather than the one 

conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and (2) that because of 

the multiplicity of defendants and conspiracies, the jury was 

substantially likely to transfer evidence from one conspiracy 

to a defendant involved in another.” United States v.

Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court 

will uphold the verdict if the evidence adequately supports the

jury’s finding that a single conspiracy existed. Id.

Miller demonstrates neither variance nor prejudice. The 

goal of the conspiracy, as demonstrated at trial, was to 

distribute mass quantities of drugs for profit. The evidence 

demonstrated the substantial profit the defendants reaped 

from their participation in the conspiracy. Additionally, there 

was substantial interdependence among the defendants. The 

evidence at trial exposed a large section of the conspiracy’s 

procurement and distribution chain. For instance, Miller and 

Eiland arranged for Tyrone Thomas to travel to Arizona to 

purchase wholesale amounts of cocaine. At one time Miller 

also arranged for Brown to accept a package of heroin on his 

behalf. Oct. 18, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 31–32. The conspiracy 

employed Darius Ames and Eric Butcher to process and bag 

heroin for street-level distribution. Oct. 4, 2006 PM Trial Tr. 

at 29–31; Oct. 19, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 48–50. Eiland and 

Miller also occasionally stretched heroin at the stash house. 

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Oct. 4, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 43. Ricky Gore and Chester 

Craig Simon would then obtain the heroin from Ames or 

Eiland and distribute it to street-level sellers. Id. at 52–57; 

Oct. 19, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 30–35. Gore also obtained 

crack from Eiland. Oct. 19, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 44–46. The 

government’s evidence clearly demonstrates the conspirators’ 

interdependence in obtaining, processing, and distributing the 

narcotics. Each conspirator depended on the others to play 

their roles in the scheme. Finally, this evidence also 

establishes the overlap element—Miller and Eiland were key 

participants in all of the acts, arranging for the purchase and 

distribution of cocaine, heroin, and crack.

Even assuming there was a variance, Miller failed to 

show he was substantially prejudiced by it. “The risk of 

‘spillover prejudice,’ which may occur when a jury imputes 

evidence from one conspiracy to a defendant involved in 

another conspiracy, is less likely the fewer the defendants.” 

United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). Only four defendants were tried together in Miller’s 

second trial. See id. (little risk of spillover prejudice where 

only four defendants were tried). There is also less risk of 

spillover prejudice where, as here, the government presents 

wiretap evidence so that the jury can examine each individual 

defendant’s words separately in order to convict. See id. The 

jury’s not-guilty verdicts for Bryant on all charges and the 

remaining defendants on the PCP-related charges suggest the 

jury was able to consider the evidence against each defendant 

and for each charge individually. See United States v.

Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1017 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (where 

defendants were convicted on some counts and acquitted on 

others, “the jury's verdict reflects that it carefully considered 

the evidence supporting each charge against each defendant”).

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The government presented sufficient evidence to sustain 

Miller’s narcotics conspiracy conviction. The district court 

vacated the conviction on this count as a lesser-included 

offense of the continuing criminal enterprise conviction. 

Because we vacate the CCE conviction, we will reinstate the 

narcotics conspiracy count. See Rutledge v. United States, 

517 U.S. 292, 306 (1996) (courts of appeal “may direct the 

entry of judgment for a lesser included offense when a 

conviction for a greater offense is reversed on grounds that 

affect only the greater offense”); United States v. Baylor, 97 

F.3d 542, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

C. RICO Conspiracy

In his pro se brief, Miller also challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting his RICO conspiracy conviction. 

The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), makes it unlawful to 

conspire to violate § 1962(c), which, in turn, provides that it is

unlawful for anyone “employed by or associated with any 

enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 

interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, 

directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s 

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 

of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Miller contends the 

government failed to prove at trial the existence of either an 

“enterprise” or “a pattern of racketeering activity.”

The RICO statute defines “enterprise” to include “any 

union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a 

legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). An association-in-fact 

enterprise must have three structural features: “a purpose, 

relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and 

longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the 

enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 

946 (2009). An association-in-fact enterprise “need not have 

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33

a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command’; decisions

may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of 

methods—by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, 

etc. Members of the group need not have fixed roles; 

different members may perform different roles at different 

times.” Id. at 948. “[P]roof of a pattern of racketeering 

activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury 

to infer the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise.” Id.

at 951.

A pattern of racketeering activity requires “two or more 

related predicate acts of racketeering within a 10–year 

period.” United States v. Crosby, 20 F.3d 480, 481 (D.C. Cir. 

1994). The government must show that “the racketeering 

predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat 

of continued criminal activity.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 

492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).

The same evidence that supports the narcotics conspiracy 

conviction supports the jury’s finding of an enterprise. The 

enterprise’s purpose was to distribute drugs for profit. The 

defendants organized themselves so each would carry out a 

separate role in the distribution chain, with Eiland and Miller 

overseeing the operation. Rashawn Briggs testified he was 

dealing drugs with Eiland and Miller between 2000 and 2002. 

Oct. 19, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 56. Thus, the enterprise 

continued for a period “sufficient to permit the[] associates to 

pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946.

The government also presented evidence establishing the 

existence of an agreement to engage in a pattern of 

racketeering activity. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 

52, 65 (1997) (“A conspirator must intend to further an 

endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the 

elements of a substantive criminal offense . . . .”). The jury 

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found the government proved agreement to commit three 

racketeering acts—Act 1 (conspiracy to distribute heroin, 

cocaine, and cocaine base), Act 4 (attempt to possess with 

intent to distribute cocaine and unlawful use of a 

communication facility), and Act 6 (attempt to possess with 

intent to distribute heroin). Miller argues the proven acts 

were not related. In fact, the predicate acts were related by 

the nature of the acts (all narcotics offenses), temporal 

proximity (the acts all occurred between 1999 and 2004), 

purpose (to distribute drugs for profit), and participants. The 

government established the existence of both an enterprise 

and an agreement to engage in a pattern of racketeering 

activity. Miller’s challenge to the RICO conspiracy 

conviction will be denied.

VII. Fine Imposed on Eiland

Before sentencing Eiland, the district court vacated 

Count 1, the narcotics conspiracy conviction, as a lesser 

included offense of Count 3, the continuing criminal 

enterprise conviction. Sentencing (Eiland) Tr. at 4, Nov. 28, 

2007; Judgment as to Eiland 1, Feb. 7, 2008, D.D.C. 04-379, 

ECF No. 1029. Nevertheless, the court ordered Eiland to pay

a fine of $7,000 on Count 1. Sentencing (Eiland) Tr. at 11, 

Nov. 28, 2007; Judgment as to Eiland 7, Feb. 7, 2008, D.D.C. 

04-379, ECF No. 1029. The government concedes it was 

error for the court to impose that fine. We vacate the fine and 

remand to the district court to consider whether it intended to 

impose the fine on one of the remaining counts of conviction.

* * * * *

We affirm Gerald Eiland’s convictions but vacate his fine 

on Count 1. We remand for consideration of whether a fine 

should be imposed on one of the remaining counts of 

conviction. We vacate Frederick Miller’s conviction on 

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Count 3, continuing criminal enterprise, but affirm and 

reinstate his conviction on Count 1, narcotics conspiracy. 

Accordingly, we vacate Miller’s sentence and remand for 

resentencing.

So ordered.

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