Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07481/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07481-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrell D. Foley
Plaintiff
Thomas Moore
Defendant
United States
Defendant
United States District Court
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL D. FOLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES; THOMAS MOORE; DISTRICT

COURT; DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-7481 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

On March 8, 2007, Defendants United States and Thomas Moore,

an Assistant United States Attorney, moved to dismiss the complaint

in this case. Pro se Plaintiff Darrell D. Foley filed an

opposition, consisting largely of his objections to the judge to

whom this case was previously assigned. The case was then

reassigned to this Court. Moving Defendants filed a Re-Notice of

Motion. Although moving Defendants' motion stated that an

opposition must be filed not less than twenty-one days before the

re-noticed hearing date, Plaintiff did not file another opposition. 

In light of his pro se status, the Court granted Plaintiff an

additional two weeks to file an opposition. He did not. 

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United States District Court

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Therefore, the Court decides the motion based on the record before

it and, having considered the parties' papers, grants moving

Defendants' motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On December 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed this action, asserting 

six causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional

distress; (2) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) abuse of process;

(4) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) violations of the

Fifth Amendment; and (6) violations of the Fourth Amendment. 

Plaintiff complains about Defendant Moore's actions in two other

civil cases concerning Plaintiff's dispute with the Internal

Revenue Service. For example, Plaintiff contends that Defendant

Moore "substituted a case management statement for a motion to

dismiss" and, therefore, "initiated legal proceedings which

'inhibit the free action of another person' and deprive the

Plaintiff of his Constitutional due process rights." Complaint,

p. 20. He seeks special damages, "actual and general compensatory

damages," and punitive and exemplary damages; he does not seek

injunctive relief.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist

at the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). A Rule 12(b)(1)

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motion may either attack the sufficiency of the pleadings to

establish federal jurisdiction, or allege an actual lack of

jurisdiction which exists despite the formal sufficiency of the

complaint. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594

F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987).

Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes to

the power of the court to hear the case. Therefore, a Rule

12(b)(1) challenge should be decided before other grounds for

dismissal, because they will become moot if dismissal is granted. 

Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir. 1975), disapproved

on other grounds in Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay,

508 U.S. 581 (1993).

A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter

jurisdiction until the contrary affirmatively appears. Stock West,

Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 

An action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend

unless it is clear that the jurisdictional deficiency cannot be

cured by amendment. May Dep’t Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637

F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980). 

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). A plaintiff need not set out in detail the facts

upon which he or she bases her claim; however, the plaintiff must

"give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

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and the grounds on which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964

(2007). 

Although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, they

must allege facts sufficient to enable a reviewing court to

conclude that a claim exists; vague and conclusory allegations of

official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Ivey v. Board of

Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). As

the Supreme Court recently explained, "While a complaint attacked

by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of

his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65

(inner citations and alteration omitted). Rather, the allegations

in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level." Id. at 1965. All material allegations in

the complaint, "even if doubtful in fact," are assumed to be true,

id., and are construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986). 

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

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would be futile, a court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants United States and Moore argue that this case should

be dismissed with prejudice because this Court lacks jurisdiction

over Plaintiff's claims against the United States and because

Defendant Moore is absolutely immune from suit for actions taken in

his prosecutorial role. Before addressing the merits, however, the

Court addresses, sua sponte, whether it must recuse itself from

this case.

I. Recusal 

Plaintiff named the District Court as a Defendant. A federal

judge is required to disqualify him or herself when "a party to the

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(i). Thus, in a "typical

situation" the Court would be disqualified from hearing this case.

Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Ct. of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 453

F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2006). But, as in Ignacio, this is not a

typical situation. Nor are these highly exceptional circumstances

requiring the disqualification of the undersigned and all other

judges in this District. Clemens v. United States Dist. Ct., 428

F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting "that disqualification of

an entire district is not justified except under highly exceptional

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circumstances"). 

The rule of necessity is an exception to disqualification. It

allows a judge, normally disqualified, to hear a case when the case

cannot be heard otherwise. Ignacio, 453 F.3d at 1163-64. The

Ninth Circuit has held that the rule of necessity applies in

situations such as this one; thus, even when it is "'possible to

convene a disinterested panel in another circuit,'" a court is not

required to do so where recusal is necessitated by a meritless

action brought indiscriminately against all the judges of that

court. Id. at 1164 (quoting Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 10

(2d Cir. 1999)). See also Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1257-58

(10th Cir. 2000) (holding that, under the duty to sit and the rule

of necessity, "a lawsuit brought indiscriminately against all the

active and senior judges on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does

not operate automatically to render the court unable to hear and

decide an appeal brought by the plaintiff/petitioner"); Bolin v.

Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the rule

of necessity allows at least those judges on this Court who have

not been involved in plaintiff's prior appeals to hear this

appeal”). As the Ninth Circuit explains, "To hold otherwise would

allow and possibly encourage plaintiffs to impede the

administration of justice by suing wholesale all the judges in a

district or circuit until their case is transferred." Ignacio, 453

F.3d at 1165. 

Plaintiff has indiscriminately sued the entire District Court

for the Northern District of California. As noted below, his

complaint contains no specific allegations against the District

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Court. Nor does it contain any allegations concerning the

undersigned. Therefore, the Court concludes that it is not

disqualified from hearing this case and resolving this motion.

II. Federal Tort Claims Act

A suit against the United States or its agencies is barred by

the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless the United States gives

prior consent to such a suit. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495,

500-01 (1940). The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a limited

waiver of sovereign immunity for certain torts, including negligent

or wrongful acts or omissions committed by government employees

while acting in the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679. The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, does not provide a

waiver for claims arising out of abuse of process or malicious

prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 2680. 

The Federal Tort Claims Act requires that Plaintiff first file

an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency; then

the claim must be denied, or six months must pass, before this

Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action against the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly

held that this 'claim requirement of section 2675 is jurisdictional

in nature and may not be waived.'" Jerves v. United States, 966

F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Burns v. United States, 764

F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also William W Schwarzer, et

al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 1:203.1 ("The

administrative claim requirement is jurisdictional and must be

followed.").

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Plaintiff has not plead that he presented any claim to the

appropriate federal agency and that the agency denied his claim, 

nor does he state in his opposition that he did so. Therefore, the

Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims for intentional infliction

of emotional distress and violations of the Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments and they are dismissed with leave to amend. 

The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's abuse of process claim because

there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity and dismisses his

section 1983 claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing for a cause of

action against a "person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory," violates a citizen's constitutional rights). The

dismissal of these two claims is with prejudice.

III. Prosecutorial & Judicial Immunity

 The Supreme Court has held that absolute immunity bars claims

for damages against "judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and officials

performing 'quasi-judicial' functions." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 520 (1985). Absolute immunity also protects government

attorneys in administrative and civil proceedings. See Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516-17 (1978). The Ninth Circuit explains,

"Prosecutors are absolutely immune for quasi-judicial activities

taken within the scope of their authority." Ashelman v. Pope, 793

F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (holding that a

conspiracy between a judge and the prosecutor to predetermine the

outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, did not

pierce the absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 

Prosecutors act within their authority when they perform a kind of

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act "having more or less connection with the general matters"

committed to their control or supervision. Ybarra v. Reno

Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1984).

Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from damages even if

it leaves “the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress

against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives

him of liberty.” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. There is no bad

faith exception to the absolute immunity of a prosecutor working

within the scope of his or her authority. Id. (citing Campbell v.

Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir. 1986)).

 The allegations set out in Plaintiff's complaint against

Defendant Moore concern quasi-judicial activities taken within the

scope of his authority as an Assistant United States Attorney. For

example, Defendant Moore allegedly failed to file either an answer

to Plaintiff's complaint or a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and

then filed a case management statement before he filed formal

consent to have the case heard by a Magistrate Judge. Even

assuming that Defendant Moore acted in bad faith, as Plaintiff

alleges, such an allegation is not sufficient to overcome absolute

prosecutorial immunity. Even if Defendant Moore's actions were

improper, he is still entitled to immunity against any claims for

damages. Therefore, the Court dismisses all claims against

Defendant Moore. This dismissal is with leave to amend.

IV. Claims against Defendant District Court

In their motion to dismiss, moving Defendants note that

Plaintiff's complaint contains no specific allegations against the

District Court. Moving Defendants state that, even if the

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complaint could be construed to contain allegations against the

District Court, it is well established, as noted above, that both

judges and clerks enjoy absolute immunity from suit for their

official acts. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991).

Although moving Defendants argue that the entire complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice, they do not expressly move to

dismiss the causes of action against the District Court. 

Nonetheless, the Court may sua sponte dismiss causes of action for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986 (9th Cir.

1987). Ninth Circuit law provides that the Court may do so

"without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief." 

Id. at 991. Here, moving Defendants' motion put Plaintiff on

notice that he failed to allege any facts concerning the District

Court. But Plaintiff did not address that issue, or the issue of

absolute immunity, in his opposition. Given the lack of any

allegation against the District Court, Plaintiff cannot possibly

win relief as his complaint is currently plead. Therefore, the

Court also dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the District Court

with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, moving Defendants' motion to

dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (Docket No. 17) is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff's causes of action against the United States for abuse of

process and for violation of section 1983 are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE; his causes of action against the United States for

intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the

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Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. The remainder of Plaintiff's complaint is likewise

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff is granted leave to file

an amended complaint alleging, if he can truthfully do so, facts

showing that he has exhausted his claims and facts establishing a

claim against Defendants Moore and District Court that is not

subject to absolute immunity. Plaintiff's amended complaint is due

two weeks from the date of this order. If Plaintiff does not file

an amended complaint, the Court will dismiss this action with

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/23/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FOLEY et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-07481 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on August 23, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Darrell D. Foley

2240 Ninth Street

Berkeley, CA 94710

Sara Winslow

United States Attorney's Office

450 Golden Gate Avenue

9th Floor, Box 36055

San Francisco, CA 94102

Dated: August 23, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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