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Parties Involved:
Otis R. Bowen
Appellee
Helen Gatson
Appellant

Document Text:

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

,niteb jtates (!fourt of J\ppeafs 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

February 9, 1988 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 86-1078; Gatson v. Bowen 

Filed February 2, 1988 by Judge Stephen H. Anderson 

Attached is a new page 9 to be substitute<i for na.ge 9 

in the original opinion which was sent to vou on Februarv 2, 

1988. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT·L. HOECKER, Clerk 

'. ' Bv \_ )"' ·· .. l, . 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844-3157 

(FTS) 564·31!;i7 

-----=---,.--=----==-e--=------ P a trick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 1 
filed Feb. 2, 1988); Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1105 (10th 

Cir. 1985); Turner v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326,331 (l0th_Cir. 1~85). 

Because the record on appeal provides no statement of the reasons 

for the Appeals' Council's denial of the claimant's request for 

review of the ALJ decision, we accept that decision as the Social 

Security Administration's interpretation of the pain standards in 

effect in February 1985. 

· The ALJ stated that ''based on the medical evidence of record" 

the claimant's subjective complaints of pain prior to December 31, 

1982 were not as credible or limiting as alleged. No additional 

explanation for this conclusion is offered, suggesting that the 

ALJ believed the medical evidence did not confirm, was inconsistent with, or in some way overcame the claimant's testimony. 

Although it is true that subjective pain testimony alone is not 

sufficient to produce a determination of disability, a careful 

reading of the 1984 Congressional pain provision makes clear that 

medical evidence need not confirm or prove the degree of pain 

alleged. 1 See Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-65 (10th Cir. 

1 In pertinent part, the provision reads: "An individual's 

statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be 

conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; 

there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically 

acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which 

show the existence of a medical impairment that results from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged and which, when considered with all evidence required to 

be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the 

individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of 

such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as 

consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a 

conclusion that the individual is under a disability. Objective 

medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by 

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques ..• must 

(cont'd on next page} 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH 'CIRCUIT 

HELEN GATSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v ., 

OTIS R. BOWEN, M.D., 

Secretary of the Department 

of Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Ap1)ellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Fi,LED United s-.d~urt of Appeals tJ)entMCircuit 

FEB Q;2 1988 

ROBER'£ L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-1078 

APPEAL FROM,,TUE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR rHE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(U.C. No. 85-2208-S) 

Martha Ridgway Schmid (Luis Mata with he~on the brief), 

Wyandotte-Leavenworth Legal Services, Kansas City, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert A. Olsen, Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin L. 

Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 3 
Helen Gatson applied for social security disability insurance 

benefits in June 1983, having met the earnings requirements 

through December 31, 1982. Her application was denied at all 

stages of the Social Security Administration's review process. 

The denial was upheld by the district court. we reverse for 

failure to apply the correct standards to the evaluation of 

subjective pain. 

BACKGROUND 

The claimant alleges that she became disabled perhaps as 

early as September 1978 but in no event later than December 31, 

1982 due to a heart condition, arthritis, right-hand impairment, 

hiatal hernia, and kidney problems, all accompanied by severe pain 

in her left leg and hip, right hand, chest, shoulders, and neck. 

During the five years prior to September 1978 she performed 

medium-heavy work in a chair factory, preceded by ten years as a 

sewing machine operator in a garment factory. In 1978, because of 

an injury to the nerves in her right hand, she left her job in the 

chair factory. She received worker's compensation benefits for a 

brief period and has not worked for pay since the injury. 

In July 1982, the claimant was hospitalized for severe 

bronchitis and hemoptysis (expectoration of blood from the 

respiratory tract). At the time of her hospitalization, x-rays 

were taken, indicating marked cardiomegaly (enlarged heart). 

Other diagnostic findings indicated some congestive heart failure, 

atherosclerotic heart disease, and angina pectoris (chest pain}. 

~R. Vol. I at 128. At the time of her hospital admission, her 

treating physician, Dr. Reginald W. Hall, noted the claimant's 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 4 
previous medical history of both "carpal tunnel release" (referring to the prior surgery on the nerves of her right hand) and 

"some rheumatoid arthritis." Id. at 129. There are medical findings in the record supporting the claimant's right hand impairment 

but no such evidence as to the rheumatoid arthritis. In the same 

hospital report, Dr. Hall stated that the claimant "complains of 

chronic arthralgias and weakness of the arms and legs and [has 

been] unable to work as a result .• II Id. at 129. She was 

released early from the hospital "because of some financial matters" after marked improvement in her bronchitis. Id. at 128. 

On June 30, 1983, Dr. Hall, who had treated the claimant 

since 1980, wrote a letter to the Social Security Administration 

describing the claimant's medical condition over the past several 

years. He noted 1980 objective test results substantiating the 

claimant's right hand impairment, and reported stiffness, weakness, inflammation, and muscular atrophy in the hand subsequent to 

her carpal release surgeries. Id. at 150. Dr. Hall observed that 

financial constraints prevented "definitive therapy" on her wrist. 

The letter also reported the claimant's recurring angina and the 

results of a treadmill electrocardiogram (ECG). Dr. Hall stated 

that the treadmill results were 

"somewhat compromised by the fact that [the claimant] 

has been taking lanoxin for the control of congestive 

heart failure which she has developed in the past two 

years. Her official report therefore only reveals a 

boarderline [sic] abnormal tracing with S-T segment 

changes which possibly where [sic] releated (sic] to the 

digoxin but which in fact are true abnormal findings. 

Mrs. Gatson, dispite [sic] her determination has very 

little exercise tolerance and has had marked orthopnea 

which is now improving somewhat although her angina is 

still very active. This lady also needs further care 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 5 
toward her cardiovascular system in terms of evaluation 

but is also unable to afford this because of the situation which has resulted from the disability of her 

hand." 

The treadmill results are in the record and were available for 

review by the Social Security Administration's consulting 

physicians. 

According to the record, the claimant began taking Nitrostat 

for her enlarged heart in 1980, Bufferin #3 in 1982 for arthritis 

and body pain, potassium in 1982 for energy, and LaSix in 1982 to 

drain fluid from her heart. In 1983 she began using nitroglycerin 

ointment and Lanoxin for her heart, and Motrin for her arthritis. 

In 1984 valium was prescribed. R. Vol. I at 170. 

The claimant testified that the pain in her side and right 

hand became bad in 1977, shortness of breath developed in 1980, 

pain in her left leg and hip became pronounced in 1981 and in her 

shoulders and neck in 1982. Id. at 40-41. The testimony of the 

claimant and two other witnesses then focused on the nature of her 

pain and her limited daily activity. Neither the claimant's 

attorney nor the ALJ made an effort to clarify the extent of the 

claimant's pain and limitations prior to December 31, 1982, the 

date by which her disability had to be established in order to 

receive disability benefits. The claimant indicated that, in 

general, the pain had intensified since 1977 and that her chest 

pain had been getting worse since 1980. Although this would 

suggest that her overall pain in 1982 was greater than in 1977, it 

is not clear whether the pain levels in late 1982 and at the time 

of the 1984 hearing were different in any significant degree. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 6 
Certainly, the basic complaints had not changed from the initial 

claim for disability in June 1983, and except for a few statements 

referring to a current time frame, the testimony seemed to refer 

to the claimant's condition both before and after December 31, 

1982. Furthermore,·there is no indication that the testimony was 

not accepted by the ALJ as referring to the pre-1983 period. 

The claimant and her friends described her continuing 

inability to reach, lift, bend, carry groceries, hold her coffee 

cup, garden, reel in her fish when she went fishing with her 

husband, curl her hair, sing, or even sit through church because 

of the pain and discomfort. The testimony also revealed the 

adaptations made by the claimant in order to dress, wash dishes, 

cook, and do the laundry. The claimant testified that she could 

not sit or stand for any length of time, nor walk around the 

block, without exhaustion and pain. She described severe pain 

even upon resting and sleeping. She also testified that currently 

she could not lift a ten pound bag of potatoes but could lift five 

pounds of sugar if she used both hands, although not without chest 

pain. The claimant also described kidney problems and a hiatal 

hernia that accentuated her distress, neither of which is 

addresssed by the medical evidence, although the claimant referred 

to interaction with physicians with respect to those conditions. 

In the case of the hernia, it appears that the pain testimony 

described current pain and did not address the level of pre-1983 

pain. According to her, ''[e]verything that I lift, sometime I 

bend over, it-just seem like everything in my chest is going to 

come out through my mouth. And everything I pick up now, it just 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 7 
seem like it go right straight to my chest. It just hurt and make 

a pain in my chest." Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 

The ALJ also considered medical evidence from a consulting 

physician and an occupational therapist, both of whom examined the 

claimant for the Social Security Administration in August 1983. 

The consulting physician, Dr. George Varghese, reported the 

claimant's multiple pain symptoms, found them "rather vague," and 

noted that the claimant appeared "emotionally very upset." Id. at 

153. He noted some limitation in the joints of the claimant's 

right hand, along with decreased grip strength, although he did 

not detect continuing inflammation and muscle atrophy. He also 

acknowledged a pre-existing report of "ischemic heart disease'' and 

opined that "her major disability should be on the basis of 

cardiovascular system than [sic] musculoskeletal involvement." 

Id. at 153. The occupational therapist, Janice Vollmer, evaluated 

the strength, range of motion, coordination, and sensation in the 

claimant's two upper extremities. She found restricted range of 

motion and strength in the right upper extremity, along with minor 

sensory loss and impaired coordination in the right hand. She 

reported that the left upper extremity was within grossly normal 

limits on the four measures. Id. at 153-54. 

In addition to these examinations, the ALJ considered the 

residual functional capacity (RFC) assessments of two consulting 

physicians who filled out RFC forms based on their evaluation of 

the records but without examination of the claimant. Without 

. ,,:rexpl.a-nation,. they both opined t-hat the claimant had the RFC for 

light work, with limitations as to fine work with the right hand. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 8 
Based on the medical evidence of record the ALJ found that 

the claimant had an impairment that precluded her return to past 

relevant work. He nonetheless found that she retained the RFC to 

engage in light work that did not require fine motor skills with 

the right hand. He.determined that her capacity for light work 

"was not significantly compromised by her exertional limitations," 

which he equated with her allegations of pain, shortness of 

breath, and right hand limitations. Id. at 12. Elaborating, he 

stated that "[t]he claimant's subjective complaints of pain in her 

left leg and hip, right hand pain, chronic shortness of breath, 

hiatal hernia, coughing, and pain in her neck and shoulders are 

not as credible or limiting as alleged prior to December 31, 1982, 

based on the medical evidence of record." Id. at 12 (emphasis 

added). He also stated that "While the claimant doubtless 

experienced some discomfort, there is no evidence that her pain 

was of such character or dimension as to interfere significantly 

with all work-related activities prior to December 31, 1982." Id. 

at 11 (emphasis added). Finally, he found that "(t]here were no 

nonexertional limitations." Id. The ALJ therefore applied the 

Secretary's medical-vocational guidelines, which dictated a 

determination that the claimant was not disabled. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

When a claimant establishes a severe impairment precluding 

the ability to return to past relevant work, the burden shifts to 

the Secretary to establish that there is work in the national 

economy tha~ the claimant can perform. Channel v. Heckler, 747 

F.2d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984). See 32 u.s.c.A. § 423(d)(2)(A) 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 9 
(1987). If the claimant's RFC and other relevant characteristics 

(age, education, work experience) exactly fit one of the "grids'' 

in the Secretary's medical-vocational guidelines then the guidelines may be used to meet that burden of proof. Channel, 747 F.2d 

at 579. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00 (1987). 

See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983). Where, 

however, exertional limitations do not match any of the RFC levels 

of work activity (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy), 

or where significant nonexertional limitations exist, the ALJ may 

not automatically apply the closest "grid-fit.'' Instead, the 

grids may be used only as a framework for assessing whether the 

claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, App. 2, 

§ 200.00(e)(2). 

Here, the ALJ found that the claimant's allegations of pain 

and weakness did not significantly compromise her ability to 

perform light work and that she had no nonexertional limitations 

and thus determined that the grids could dictate the outcome. 

Both these assertions fly in the face of the pain testimony and 

the evidence submitted by the treating physician. They were not 

questioned by the Secretary's Appeals Council when, on February 1, 

1985, it declined to review the ALJ's decision. By this date, the 

new (1984) Congressional pain statute was in effect, codifying how 

the Social Security Administration was to evaluate subjective 

complaints of disabling pain. Also by this date this court had 

declared that pain can be a nonexertional limitation. Channel, 

74~ F.2d-at 580. Later cases-have continued to adopt this position. See Huston v. Bowen, No. 86-1741, slip op. at 12 (10th Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 10 
filed Jan. , 1988); Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1105 (10th 

Cir. 1985); Turner v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326,331 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Because the record on appeal provides no statement of the reasons 

for the Appeals' Council's denial of the claimant's request for 

review of the ALJ decision, we accept that decision as the Social 

Security Administration's interpretation of the pain standards in 

effect in February 1985. 

The ALJ stated that "based on the medical evidence of record" 

the claimant's subjective complaints of pain prior to December 31, 

1982 were not as credible or limiting as alleged. No additional 

explanation for this conclusion is offered, suggesting that the 

ALJ believed the medical evidence did not qonfirm, was inconsistent with, or in some way overcame the claimant's testimony. 

Although it is true that subjective pain testimony alone is not 

sufficient to produce a determination of disability, a careful 

reading cif the 1984 Congressional pain provision makes clear that 

medical evidence need not confirm or prove the degree of pain 

alleged. 1 See Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-65 (10th Cir. 

1 In pertinent part, the provision reads: "An individual's 

statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be 

conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; 

there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically 

acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which 

show the existence of a medical impairment that results from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged and which, when considered with all evidence required to 

be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the 

individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of 

such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as 

consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a . < 0-.concJ.usion that ,the individual is ·Under a disability. Objective 

medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by 

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques ..• must 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 11 
1987). Under the statute, the medical evidenc.e must establish an 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the 

alleged pain, and statements regarding the intensity and 

persistence of the pain must be reasonably consistent with the 

medical findings and signs. Id.; see Huston, slip op. at 7. 

The ALJ's conclusion "based on the medical evidence" is 

unsupportable because the medical signs and findings, in fact, do 

establish serious heart and hand impairments and active angina. 

Moreover, the medical test results submitted by the treating 

physician are consistent with the claimant's subjective allegations. Dr. Hall reported the claimant's congestive heart failure, 

atheroschlerosis, and active chest pain extending back to the time 

period in question. He explained the seriousness of the borderline abnormal findings on her treadmill ECG, which although taken 

four months after December 31, 1982 and not alone sufficient to 

establish a disabling medical impairment before then, certainly 

does nothing to contradict the conclusion that the patient had a 

heart condition, accompanied by pain, prior to that date. 

Furthermore, objective medical evidence of disabling pain 

need not consist of concrete physiological data alone but can 

consist of a medical doctor's clinical assessment as well, where 

based on "any evidence that an examining doctor can discover and 

substantiate." Luna, 834 F.2d at 162. As we stated in Nieto v. 

Heckler, 750 F.2d 59, 61-62 (10th Cir. 1984), 

(cont'd from previous page) 

be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the 

individual is under a disability." 42 u.s.c.A. § 423(d)(5)(A) 

(1987) (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 12 
"[A] medical finding of disability is not based solely 

on objective test results. It includes an evaluation of 

the patient's medical history and the physician's observations of the patient, and necessarily involves an 

evaluation of the credibility of the patient's subjective complaints of pain. A medical opinion based on all 

of these factors is medical evidence supporting a claim 

of disabling pain, even if the objective test results, 

taken alone, do not fully substantiate the claim." 

Dr. Hall's opinion from having treated and observed the claimant 

since 1980 was that she had "continued to suffer •.•. and has 

attempted, dispite [sic] all odds, to try to do things physically, 

but has been totally unable to do them because of her hands and 

the pain and disability that has resulted from this." R. Vol. I 

at 150. He then noted the "true abnormal findings" of her 

treadmill ECG, and additional limitations from her active angina, 

minimal exercise tolerance, and marked shortness of breath. He 

concluded: 

"this lady is a quite proud individual and has taken and 

still takes, pride in the fact that she has been quite 

independent and a provider and contributor to her 

family's financial and emotional well being. Since the 

problem with her hands and heart she has become increasingly depressed and frustrated because she is disabled 

and has been unable to get any help regarding this. I 

think this is one individual who is sincerely deserving 

of serious consideration for disability." 

Id. at 151. A follow-up letter in 1984 indicated that he had seen 

the claimant again and that she had "not improved one bit'' and 

continued to have arthralgias, weakness, hand pain, indigestion, 

heart burn, "esophageal reflex", and "both extertional (sic] chest 

pain and chest pain with stress consistent with angina pectoris. 11 

Id. at 164. 

Dr •. Hall's. clinical impressions of the ·claimant I s credibility, and the diagnostic and laboratory findings of serious heart 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 13 
disease and right hand impairment are all compatible with the 

existence of severe pain and consistent with the claimant's 

subjective testimony. While Dr. Hall's testimony alone might not 

establish that the claimant could not perform any work, such is 

not its burden. rt·does not erode or contradict the pain 

testimony. Moreover, the claimant does not bear the burden to 

prove that her pain and right hand weakness substantially diminish 

her capacity for a full range of light work on a sustained basis; 

instead the Secretary shoulders the burden of showing that the 

pain and weakness do not substantially diminish it. See Channel, 

747 F.2d at 579; Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 

1987). 

The medical evidence is not sufficient to meet the 

Secretary's burden. Neither the findings of the treating 

physician nor the reports of the Social Security Administration's 

consulting physicians and occupational therapist establish the 

claimant's full capacity for light work. The comments of Dr. 

Varghese regarding the claimant's vagueness do not substitute for 

Dr. Hall's personal knowledge of the claimant .over time. See 

Talbot, 814 F.2d at 1463. Nor do his speculations regarding the 

emotional component of her pain. Moreover, Dr. Varghese did not 

discount or discredit the patient's heart disease but merely 

opined that her musculoskeletal involvement was less of a basis 

for finding a disability than was her heart disease. As for the 

views of the consulting physicians who filled out the RFC forms, 

-.. ,.we.,have previously noted the,·."suspect- •reliability" of such forms 

when filled out, as here, without explanation of the basis for the 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 14 
conclusions and without evidence of any examination of the 

claimant. Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987). The 

report of the occupational therapist also does nothing to prove 

the claimant's ability to perform a full range of light work. It 

speaks only to the question of impairment of the claimant's arms 

and hands and not to her heart disease. Therefore, it in no way 

negates the testimony of other impairments that combine with her 

hand impairment. In short, none of the evidence by the Social 

Security Administration's consultants outweighs the medical signs 

and findings provided by the treating physician that the claimant 

is experiencing significant pain and weakness; none of it 

constitutes substantial evidence that the claimant has the RFC to 

engage in a full range of light work on a sustained basis. 

Even assuming the medical evidence, taken by itself, suggests 

that the claimant had the RFC for light work, the claimant's 

subjective pain testimony must be evaluated in determining her 

RFC. In this case, there is evidence from the claimant herself 

that her pain is continual, severe, and both exertional and 

nonexertional in nature. Much of the pain is experienced upon 

lifting, bending, reaching, walking, and otherwise exerting 

herself in the kind of activities that could be directly related 

to jobs in the light work category. 2 On the other hand, much of 

2 Light work is defined in the Social Security regulations as 

work that "involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. 

Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this 

category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or 

when it.involves sitting most of.the.time- with some pushing and 

pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of 

performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 15 
the pain appears primarily nonexertional in character and is 

experienced while resting, sitting or standing for short periods, 

or merely performing such minimal activity as attempting to lift a 

coffee cup. See Huston v. Bowen, No. 86-1741, slip. op. at 12. 

Without explanation"the ALJ stated that there was "no evidence'' 

that claimant's pain interfered significantly with all workrelated activities prior to December 31, 1982. R. Vol. I at 11. 

He also found "no nonexertional limitations.'' Id. In both these 

respects the ALJ erred. The testimony at the hearing certainly 

provided evidence that the claimant's pain would interfere 

significantly with her RFC for light work. And unless the 

testimony was properly found not to be credible, it precluded 

application of the grids without an individualized determination 

that despite the claimant's credible exertional and nonexertional 

pain she retained the RFC for a full range of light work on a 

sustained basis. Here, invoking the medical evidence was not a 

proper basis for a determination of noncredibility because it did 

not constitute substantial evidence refuting or otherwise 

undermining the claimant's allegations of disabling pain. 

SUMMARY 

Where medical signs and findings establish the existence of a 

medical impairment that reasonably could be expected to produce 

disabling pain in some individuals, and where statements of the 

claimant or treating physician regarding the intensity and 

persistence of pain are reasonably consistent with the medical 

(cont'd from previous page) 

ability to do substantially all of these activities. 11 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1567(b) (1987). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 16 
signs and findings, a conclusion that pain is disabling can be 

justifiable. See Huston, slip op. at 7; Luna, 834 F.2d at 164; 42 

u.s.c.A. § 423(d)(5)(A). Here, such an impairment has been 

established, and the statements of both the claimant and the 

treating physician are reasonably consistent with the medical 

evidence. The Social Security Administration did not apply the 

correct standard for evaluation of subjective pain. Instead, it 

seemed to assume that the medical signs and findings must 

establish the disabling pain rather than merely establish an 

impairment that could be reasonably capable of producing the 

alleged pain. The ALJ's conclusion that there was no evidence 

that the claimant's pain significantly interfered with all workrelated activities prior to December 31, 1982 can only be arrived 

at by misreading the medical evidence and then disregarding the 

testimony at the hearing. Discounting relevant testimony and 

reducing its credibility cannot be based on a belief that medical 

evidence which does not establish disabling pain thereby overrides 

all nonmedical evidence. See Huston, No. 86-1741, slip op. at 10 

(claimant entitled to have nonmedical testimony of pain evaluated 

and weighed by ALJ alongside medical evidence}. We can only 

conclude that in this case the Social Security Administration misapplied the law. 

"Failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide 

this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate 

legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal." 

Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, .1235-(l0th Cir. 1984) (quoting 

Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 1983)). Because 

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Appellate Case: 86-1078 Document: 010110017108 Date Filed: 02/02/1988 Page: 17 
the ALJ did not apply the correct standards for evaluating subjec~ 

tive pain and was not justified in applying the grids to 

demonstrate that the claimant could perform a full range of light 

work, given her pain and weakness, we reverse. No purpose would 

be served by a remand for further findings because we note that if 

the ALJ had determined that the claimant retained the functional 

capacity for sedentary work, the grids would dictate a finding of 

disability. 

The district court is instructed to remand the case to the 

Social Security Administration for the award of benefits from July 

26, 1982, by which time the medical records are sufficiently 

compatible with claimant's allegations of pain to determine that 

the pain was disabling. 

While there is no motion before us, the claimant is entitled 

to an award of attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. § 406(b)(l). 

Determination of the amount, including resolution of any factual 

dispute as to a reasonable amount, for representation before the 

federal courts is to be determined by the district court after 

proper petition thereto. See Harris v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Servs., No. 85-2898, slip op. (10th Cir. filed Dec. 31, 

1987). 

REVERSED. 

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