Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03524/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03524-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Esteban Chavez-Cruz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3524

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Esteban Chavez-Cruz

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls

____________

 Submitted: June 8, 2015

 Filed: August 28, 2015 

[Unpublished]

___________

Before LOKEN, BYE, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Esteban Chavez-Cruz of conspiring to distribute 500 grams

or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The

district court1

 sentenced him to 262 months in prison, the bottom of his advisory

1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

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guidelines range. On appeal, Chavez-Cruz raises two evidentiary issues he forfeited

in the district court, and argues that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

I. Evidentiary Issues

A. Prior to trial, during voir dire, defense counsel advised the prospective

jurors that Chavez-Cruz was a lawful, permanent non-citizen of Mexican descent. At

trial, government witness Michael Roemeling testified that he purchased up to three

ounces of methamphetamine from Chavez-Cruz once or twice per week in the summer

of 2013. On cross-examination, attacking Roemeling’s credibility, defense counsel

asked about his continued drug dealing after his release from jail. Roemeling

explained that he continued selling drugs to determine who was responsible for a

beating that had left him with a broken leg. Defense counsel asked if investigating the

beating justified criminal drug dealing. Roemeling replied, without objection: 

I’m not saying it justified it . . . . I just was very scared to call the police

because if anyone knows anything about Spanish people it’s don’t call

the cops on them. And I didn’t -- if they were responsible for my leg

being broke, I didn’t want it to be worse next time. . . . I was beaten from

head to toe. My leg was broken and they stole my cell phones.

On appeal, Chavez-Cruz argues that Roemeling’s response denied him a fair

trial because it invited the jury to convict him on the basis of a prejudicial racial

stereotype -- that “Mexican aliens [are] drug distributors and violent.” This contention

is without merit. Chavez-Cruz primarily relies on our decision in United States v.

Vue, 13 F.3d 1206 (8th Cir. 1994). But witness Roemeling’s spontaneous response

to defense counsel’s question bears no resemblance to the government’s extensive

evidence in Vue, which “clearly invited the jury to put [defendants’] racial and

cultural background into the balance in determining their guilt.” Id. at 1213. The

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district court’s instructions told the jury to ignore “the defendant’s race, color, [and]

national origin” in reaching its verdict. Had there been a timely objection to

Roemeling’s unexpected response, the court doubtless would have stricken it or told

the jury to ignore it. There clearly was no plain error in not taking action sua sponte,

that is, error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).

B. The government’s first witness, Sergeant Shawn Haken of the Jackson

County, Minnesota, Sheriff’s Department, described a warrant search of ChavezCruz’s home in January 2014 during which a large amount of cash, firearms, and

evidence of drug activity were found in an upstairs bedroom. On cross examination,

defense counsel brought out that Chavez-Cruz’s wife and six minor children lived in

the home and were forced to use the oven and stove for heat during cold winter

weather because the furnace was not working. Other witnesses were briefly

questioned about the lack of heat, including Chavez-Cruz when he testified in his own

defense. There was no objection to this testimony.

On appeal, Chavez-Cruz argues this testimony deprived him of a fair trial

because it was irrelevant to the drug conspiracy charge and was elicited to convince

the jury to convict him on the impermissible basis that he was an “evil man.” Again,

this forfeited contention is without merit. It would not have been proper for the

district court to conclude, sua sponte, that the lack of heat in Chavez-Cruz’s home was

irrelevant because defense counsel initially brought out that fact and reinforced it

when Chavez-Cruz testified in his own defense. As this testimony was developed, it

was more likely part of a defense strategy to portray Chavez-Cruz as a poor, hardworking family man than a government strategy to portray him as evil. The brief

testimony elicited by the government about the lack of a working furnace made no

inflammatory mention of his wife or children; rather, it focused on the incongruity

between his apparent poverty and the discovery of $47,000 hidden in the upstairs

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bedroom and his ownership of a Cadillac Escalade SUV. The testimony was not

unfairly prejudicial. There was no plain error.

II. Sentencing Issues

The district court determined that Chavez-Cruz’s advisory sentencing range was

262 to 327 months in prison and sentenced him to 262 months. On appeal, ChavezCruz argues his sentence “is unreasonable.” He first asserts that the district court “did

not specify any aggravating factors [and] did not consider any of the 3553(a) factors

on the record.” If this is intended to be a claim of procedural sentencing error, “[w]e

will not sustain a procedural challenge to the district court’s discussion of the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors by a defendant who did not object to the adequacy

of the court’s explanation at sentencing.” United States v. Williamson, 782 F.3d 397,

399 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Moreover, no claim of procedural error was

encompassed by his statement of the sentencing issue presented for our review, as

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(5) requires. See United States v. MejiaPerez, 635 F.3d 351, 353-54 (8th Cir. 2011).

Chavez-Cruz further argues the district court abused its discretion and imposed

a substantively unreasonable sentence because “a mandatory minimum sentence of

120 months would be more than sufficient in regard to the [sentencing] factors of

punishment, deterrence and protection of the public.” We review the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of the court’s substantial sentencing discretion. 

Williamson, 782 F.3d at 400. After considering the Presentence Investigation Report

and hearing counsel debate the appropriate sentence, the district court explained that

the methamphetamine Chavez-Cruz possessed was “a huge amount . . . for what we

see in this area.” The court noted that Chavez-Cruz had placed his wife and children

in grave danger from drug traffickers and observed that he had taken no responsibility

for his involvement in “the steady, constant drug trade of methamphetamine.” As we

have repeatedly held, “[a] within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable on

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appeal.” United States v. Glassgow, 682 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 133

S. Ct. 631 (2012). There was no abuse of discretion.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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