Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01347/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01347-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Desert Trading Post Market and Bar
Defendant
J & J Sports Productions, Inc.
Plaintiff
Thomas C. Johns
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS C. JOHNS, individually 

and d/b/a DESERT TRADING POST 

MARKET AND BAR,

Defendant.

NO. CIV. 1:14-1347 WBS JLT

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc., brought this 

action against defendant Thomas C. Johns, individually and doing 

business as Desert Trading Post Market and Bar, arising from 

defendant’s allegedly unauthorized public exhibition of a 

televised sporting event. Defendant now moves for summary 

judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56.

///

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a closed-circuit distributor of sports and 

entertainment programming and owned the exclusive nationwide 

commercial distribution rights to the broadcast of “‘The One’ 

Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v. Saul Alvarez WBC Light Middleweight 

Championship Fight Program,” including all undercard bouts and 

fight commentary (the “Event”). (Gagliardi Aff. ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 1

(Docket No. 19-5).) The Event was televised on September 14, 

2013 via closed-circuit television. (Id.) Plaintiff marketed 

and sublicensed the right to broadcast the Event to commercial

establishments, including bars and restaurants, in California. 

(See id. ¶ 3; Compl. ¶¶ 15-16 (Docket No. 1).) The commercial 

establishments were required to pay a sublicense fee to plaintiff 

to broadcast the Event. (Gagliardi Aff. ¶¶ 3, 8, Ex. 2.) The

fee was calculated based on each establishment’s fire code 

occupant capacity. (Id.)

The satellite signal containing the Event was encrypted

to prevent its unauthorized interception or receipt; the Event 

was not available to, or intended for, the general public. (Id.

¶ 11.) Plaintiff authorized its sublicensees to receive the 

decrypted signal by notifying their satellite providers, 

including DirecTV and DISH Network, to transmit the signal to 

them upon their payment of the sublicense fee. (Id. Ex. 2.) 

Plaintiff also hired investigators to visit non-sublicensee 

commercial establishments on the night of the Event to identify 

any businesses that exhibited the Event without a sublicense. 

(Id. ¶ 6.)

Defendant was the owner of Desert Trading Post Market 

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and Bar, a commercial establishment located at 915 North Wheeler 

Ridge Road, Arvin, California 93203 (the “Bar”). (Forney Aff. at 

2 (Docket No. 19-4); Johns Decl. ¶¶ 1-3 (Docket No. 17-1).) 

Defendant did not contract with plaintiff or pay plaintiff a

sublicense fee, which would have cost defendant at least $2,200. 

(Gagliardi Aff. ¶¶ 3, 7, Ex. 2.) Rodney Forney, one of 

plaintiff’s investigators, indicates that he visited the Bar on 

September 14, 2013 at around 6:42 p.m. and observed the Event 

being shown in Spanish on two big-screen televisions. (Forney 

Aff. at 1, 4.) Mr. Forney paid a $15.00 cover charge to enter 

the Bar and observed twelve other patrons inside. (Id. at 2-4.)

Defendant does not dispute that the Event was exhibited

in the Bar on September 14, 2013. (Johns Decl. ¶ 2.) Instead, 

he contends that the Bar lawfully exhibited the Event because he 

purchased it on pay-per-view from DISH Network, the Bar’s 

satellite service provider. (Id.; Reply at 2-6 (Docket No. 23).) 

Defendant states that DISH Network technicians had installed a 

“Dish Network Latino” system in the Bar and that he “reasonably 

relied upon Dish Network to provide a lawful signal” for the payper-view Event. (Johns Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendant has not provided

any further evidence regarding the specific nature of the Bar’s 

“Dish Network Latino” account, such as what type of account it 

was or its terms and conditions.

Plaintiff brought this action asserting claims under

(1) 47 U.S.C. § 553 (unauthorized receipt of a cable 

transmission); (2) 47 U.S.C. § 605 (unauthorized receipt of a 

radio transmission); (3) California common law conversion; and 

(4) California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & 

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Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Presently before the court is 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s 

claims. (Def.’s Mot. (Docket No. 17).) In the alternative, 

defendant moves for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

requests for enhanced statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 

and 605, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees under California 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Id.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict in the non-moving 

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court 

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. 

Id. at 255.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

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Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 

324 (citation omitted). To carry this burden, the non-moving 

party must “do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The 

mere existence of a “scintilla of evidence” is insufficient; 

there must be evidence on which the trier of fact could 

reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

252.

III. Analysis

A. 47 U.S.C. § 553 and § 605

Section 553(a)(1) provides that “[n]o person shall 

intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any 

communications service offered over a cable system, unless 

specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may 

otherwise be specifically authorized by law.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 553(a)(1). “In other words, section (a)(1) prohibits both 

illegally receiving cable programming and helping others to 

illegally receive cable programming by manufacturing or 

distributing equipment that allows a person to receive cable 

programming without authorization.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Manzano, Civ. No. C-08-1872, 2008 WL 4542962, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 29, 2008).

Section 605 “prohibits the unauthorized receipt and use 

of radio communications for one’s own benefit or for the benefit 

of another not entitled thereto.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 

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F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Although 

§ 605 did not originally address television signal piracy, 

amendments made to the statute in the 1980s “extended [its] reach 

to the unauthorized reception or interception of television 

programming,” including satellite television signals. Id. at 

843-44. Section 605 thus “prohibits commercial establishments 

from intercepting and broadcasting to its patrons satellite cable 

programming.” Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Guzman, Civ. No. C-09-

217, 2009 WL 1475722 CRB, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2009). 

Both § 553 and § 605 provide aggrieved parties a 

private civil cause of action against violators. 47 U.S.C. §§ 

553(c)(1), 605(e)(3)(A). Both are strict liability statutes, and 

as such, a plaintiff is not required to prove “willfulness” to 

establish a defendant’s liability. 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(C), 

605(e)(3)(C)(iii); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Albright, Civ. 

No. 2:11-2260 WBS, 2013 WL 2449500, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 

2013). Rather, willfulness is relevant only to the issue of 

damages. Doherty v. Wireless Broad. Sys. of Sacramento, Inc., 

151 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The remedial provisions in 

both Sections 553 and 605 take into consideration the degree of 

the violator’s culpability and provide for reduced damages in 

those instances where the violator was unaware of the 

violation.”).

1. 47 U.S.C § 553

“A signal pirate violates section 553 if he intercepts 

a cable signal, [and] he violates section 605 if he intercepts a 

satellite broadcast.” Manzano, 2008 WL 4542962, at *2. It is 

undisputed that the Bar received the broadcast signal containing 

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the Event over a satellite signal, and not a cable signal. (See

Johns Decl. ¶ 2.) Since defendant did not receive the Event via

a cable signal, § 553 does not apply here. Plaintiff concedes

this point and thus does not oppose summary judgment on its § 553 

claim. (Opp’n at 3 n.1 (Docket No. 19).) Accordingly, the court 

must grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

§ 553 claim.

2. 47 U.S.C § 605

Since defendant received the Event via a satellite 

signal, § 605 applies. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 291 Bar 

& Lounge, LLC, 648 F. Supp. 2d 469, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Because 

§ 605 is a strict liability statute, plaintiff must only prove

that defendant exhibited the Event in the Bar without plaintiff’s 

authorization. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(iii) (imposing 

liability upon violators even when “the violator was not aware 

and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted a 

violation of [§ 605]”); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Bath, Civ. 

No. F-11–1564 LJO SAB, 2013 WL 5954892, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 

2013). It is undisputed that defendant exhibited the Event in

the Bar on September 14, 2013 without paying a sublicense fee or 

obtaining authorization from plaintiff. (Gagliardi Aff. ¶ 7; 

Johns Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.) Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence 

to establish defendant’s liability under § 605. See Albright, 

2013 WL 2449500, at *5-6.

Furthermore, defendant’s argument that DISH Network 

authorized the Bar’s broadcast of the Event is unavailing. 

Courts have found § 605 violations “where defendants purchased 

the program through their satellite or cable provider, but 

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thereafter exhibited the program in their commercial 

establishments without authorization from the exclusive 

licensee.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Nguyen, Civ. No. 13-2008 

LHK, 2014 WL 60014, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014); see Joe Hand 

Promotions, Inc. v. Jorkay, LLC, Civ. No. 5:10–536–D, 2013 WL 

2447867, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 5, 2013) (“Although defendants 

purchased the event from DirecTV, they do not avoid liability for 

broadcasting the event at their establishment without the 

authorization of the exclusive licensee.”); J & J Sports Prods., 

Inc. v. Rivas, Civ. No. 10-760 GKF TLW, 2012 WL 3544834, at *1 & 

n.2 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2012) (finding a § 605 violation where 

defendants “placed an order for the Fight on a DISH Network 

residential account number, paying a fee of $54.95, but broadcast 

the Fight at the restaurant, without paying the commercial 

licensing fee of $2,200.00”); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Phelan, Civ. No. 08-486 OWW DLB, 2009 WL 3748107, at *10 (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“The mere fact that Comcast did, in fact, 

transmit the Boxing Program to [the bar] on the night of the 

fight does not show that Comcast, in fact, possessed the 

requisite authority to do so.”); Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. 

Vinson, 2003 WL 22077958, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2003) (“The 

fact that [the owner of the bar] may have purchased and lawfully 

received the Lewis–Tyson fight from DirecTV does not immunize her 

from liability [under § 605] for then broadcasting the event to 

patrons at her bar without obtaining authorization from 

plaintiff, the exclusive licensee.”).

Defendant also argues that plaintiff is not entitled to 

relief under § 605 because there is no evidence that defendant 

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intercepted the satellite signal containing the Event. This

argument fails because § 605 may be violated either by the 

interception or the receipt of a satellite signal. See Webb, 545 

F.3d at 848. Section 605 also prohibits divulging or publishing

information from an unauthorized signal reception or using that 

information for one’s “own benefit or for the benefit of another 

not entitled thereto.” Id. Moreover, “direct evidence of signal 

piracy is not required to prove unlawful interception” and 

circumstantial evidence may suffice. Id. at 844 (“Signal piracy 

is by its nature a surreptitious venture and direct evidence of 

actual interception may understandably be hard to come by.”).

Relying on Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alvarado, Civ. 

No. CV F-10-907 LJO JLT, 2011 WL 1740536, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 

2011), defendant also argues that to establish liability under 

§ 605, plaintiff is required to prove that defendant authorized 

the exhibition of the Event, benefited from the exhibition, and 

had control over the Bar’s televisions during the exhibition. 

These elements are not found in § 605. Rather, courts have 

applied them to determine “individual liability” in § 605 actions 

that are brought against “both a corporation and an individual.”

Albright, 2013 WL 2449500, at *3; see J & J Sports Prods. v. 

Flores, 913 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (Ishii, J.).

1 

This action, however, has no corporate defendant. 

Defendant was “doing business as” the Bar during the alleged 

 

1 Although there was no corporate defendant in Alvarado, 

the district court based the legal standard in that case on 291 

Bar & Lounge, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 473, which involved an action 

against both a corporate defendant and its alleged owner in his 

individual capacity.

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violation and plaintiff has sued defendant in his capacity as the 

Bar’s owner. (Compl. ¶ 7; Johns Decl. ¶¶ 1-3; Pare Decl. Ex. A 

at 29-30 (Docket No. 17-3).) Plaintiff is thus not required to 

prove the above elements to hold defendant liable under § 605. 

See Albright, 2013 WL 2449500, at *4 (“It was defendant’s 

commercial establishment that broadcast the Program without 

authorization and, having chosen not to organize his business as 

a corporation or other form that would create a legal identity 

separate from its owners, he may be held liable for its 

wrongdoing.”) (citation and alterations omitted).

Accordingly, because defendant exhibited the Event in 

the Bar without paying a sublicense fee or obtaining plaintiff’s 

authorization, the court must deny defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment as to plaintiff’s § 605 claim.

3. Enhanced Statutory Damages under § 605

Defendant requests summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

request for enhanced statutory damages under § 605. (Def.’s Mot. 

at 10-14.) In the event of a § 605 violation, a plaintiff must 

elect to recover either (1) actual damages and any profits that 

the defendant made as a result of the violation, or (2) statutory 

damages between $1,000 and $10,000, “as the court considers 

just.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(II). If the court finds 

that defendant committed the § 605 violation “willfully and for 

purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or financial 

gain,” the court in its discretion may enhance the actual or 

statutory damage award by up to $100,000. Id. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). 

Alternatively, if the court finds that the defendant “was not 

aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted a 

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violation of [§ 605], the court in its discretion may reduce the 

award of damages to a sum of not less than $250.” Id.

§ 605(e)(3)(C)(iii).

“Courts in this circuit have granted widely varying 

awards ranging from near the minimum statutory award of $1,000 

[without any reduction] to near the maximum of $110,000, 

depending on such factors as the capacity of the establishment, 

the number of patrons in attendance, and whether a cover charge 

was required for entrance.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Marcaida, 10-5125 SC, 2011 WL 2149923, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 

2011). Plaintiff here has elected to pursue maximum statutory 

damages of $10,000 under § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) and the maximum 

statutory enhancement of $100,000 under § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). 

(Compl. ¶ 22.)

Defendant argues against plaintiff’s request for

enhanced damages because the Bar only had twelve patrons present 

during the Event’s exhibition, had charged its normal price for 

beer, did not advertise that it was going to broadcast the Event, 

and has since gone out of business. (Johns Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) 

Plaintiff, however, has submitted uncontroverted evidence that

signal pirates do not generally advertise unlawful broadcasts in 

order to avoid detection, but promote them by word of mouth

instead. (Gagliardi Aff. ¶ 16.) Further undisputed evidence 

shows that businesses generally do not increase the costs of food 

or drink on the night of a broadcasted program. (Id. ¶ 17.) The 

record thus indicates that defendant’s failure to advertise the 

Event’s exhibition or raise the price for beer does not 

necessarily establish that his actions were not willful or 

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committed “for purposes of direct or indirect commercial 

advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 605(e)(3)(C)(ii).

Defendant also does not dispute that he required 

patrons to pay a $15.00 cover charge to gain admission into the 

Bar on the night of the Event. (Forney Aff. at 2-3; Johns Decl. 

¶ 2.) “An award of enhanced damages is appropriate where the 

defendant imposes a cover charge or admission fee.” J & J Sports 

Prods., Inc. v. Mendoza, Civ. No. 1:14-1361 JAM BAM, 2015 WL 

5009000, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015); J & J Sports Prods., 

Inc. v. Cano, Civ. No. 1:11-674 LJO, 2013 WL 1964829, at *7 (E.D. 

Cal. May 10, 2013) (awarding enhanced statutory damages under 

§ 605 where patrons paid a cover charge). Accordingly, the court 

must deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

request for enhanced statutory damages under § 605.

B. Conversion

Under California law, conversion requires a showing of 

(1) plaintiff’s ownership of a right to possession of property; 

(2) defendant’s wrongful disposition of plaintiff’s property 

right; and (3) damages. See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta 

Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992). The 

exclusive right to distribute a broadcast signal to commercial 

establishments constitutes a “right to possession of property” 

that satisfies the first element of a conversion claim under 

California law. DirecTV, Inc. v. Pahnke, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 

1189–90 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Wanger, J.).

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s conversion claim 

fails because “there is no evidence that defendant intentionally 

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interfered with plaintiff’s property, or that the plaintiff was 

harmed, or that the defendant’s conduct caused the alleged harm.” 

(Def.’s Mot. at 7.) Conversion is a strict liability tort and 

questions of good faith, lack of knowledge, and motive are 

ordinarily immaterial. In re Emery, 317 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence in the 

record to establish defendant’s liability for conversion here. 

Plaintiff owned the exclusive commercial distribution

rights to broadcast the Event. (Gagliardi Aff. ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 1.) 

Defendant did not obtain a sublicense from plaintiff, yet 

exhibited the Event in the Bar on September 14, 2013. (Id. ¶ 3, 

7; Johns Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.) Defendant’s unauthorized exhibition 

constituted conversion by a wrongful disposition of plaintiff’s 

exclusive property right to broadcast the Event. See Mendoza, 

2015 WL 5009000, at *6. The evidence submitted by plaintiff also 

indicates that it charged a minimum of $2,200 for a commercial 

sublicense to exhibit the Event. (Gagliardi Aff. Ex. 2.) 

Consequently, plaintiff has established damages of at least

$2,200 and states a claim for conversion against defendant. See

Mendoza, 2015 WL 5009000, at *6.

Accordingly, the court must deny defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for conversion.

1. Compensatory Damages for Conversion

Plaintiff requests “compensatory damages in an amount 

according to proof” for its conversion claim. (Compl. at 10, 

¶ 31). Damages for conversion are measured by the value of the 

property at the time of the conversion. Cal. Civ. Code § 3336. 

“In the context of broadcast piracy, damages for conversion have 

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often been calculated based upon the amount that the defendant 

would have been required to pay for a proper sublicensing 

agreement.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., v. Dhillon, Civ. No. 

2:15-1108 MCE KJN, 2015 WL 7572076, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 

2015). At the hearing on this matter, plaintiff’s counsel 

confirmed that plaintiff requests conversion damages for the 

value of the sublicensing fee that defendant was required to pay 

to broadcast the Event.2 Defendant argues that permitting 

plaintiff to recover conversion damages in addition to statutory 

damages under § 605 would result in impermissible double 

recovery. (Def.’s Mot. at 8.)3

 

2 Although plaintiff charged a minimum fee of $2,200, it 

charged a higher fee to commercial establishments with seating 

capacities of over one hundred. (Gagliardi Aff. ¶ 8, Ex. 2). 

Plaintiff has not provided evidence of the Bar’s actual capacity

here. Although plaintiff’s investigator described the Bar as a

“one room establishment,” he did not indicate the Bar’s overall 

capacity. (See Forney Aff. at 4.) The investigator’s pictures 

of the Bar’s exterior, however, suggest that the Bar had a 

capacity of less than one hundred, which reflects a $2,200 fee. 

(Id. at 4-9; Gagliardi Aff. Ex. 2.)

3 Defendant also argues that because plaintiff must elect 

either actual or statutory damages under § 605, to allow it to 

recover for conversion damages on top of statutory damages would 

disregard § 605’s requirement that plaintiff make an election. 

(Def.’s Mot. at 8-9.) The Ninth Circuit has rejected this

argument in a similar context and allowed damages under both the 

Copyright Act and Lanham Act, even though the Copyright Act 

requires that a plaintiff elect actual or statutory damages, and 

a plaintiff’s recovery of lost profits and disgorgement of a

defendant’s profits is considered double recovery under the 

Lanham Act. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 

1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Brown, 

Civ. No. S-10-3233 KJM, 2011 WL 6153355, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 

12, 2011) (observing that the remedial structures of the 

Copyright Act and the Federal Communications Act “are closely 

parallel”); see also Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. 

FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding an award of 

compensatory damages for federal antitrust violations and 

California tort law).

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Several courts in this circuit generally award 

conversion damages in addition to statutory and enhanced damages

under § 605, although courts in other districts have taken the 

opposite approach. Compare J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Paolilli, Civ. No. 1:11-680 LJO, 2012 WL 87183, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 9, 2012) (awarding $6,200 in conversion damages in addition 

to $10,000 in statutory damages and $30,000 in enhanced damages

under § 605), and Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Dang, Civ. No. 

5:11-508 EJD, 2011 WL 6294289, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2011)

(awarding $1,100 in conversion damages in addition to $7,000 in 

statutory damages and $1,000 in enhanced damages under § 605), 

with Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. DeClemente, Civ. No. 5:11-621-

D, 2013 WL 5460189, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (declining to 

award conversion damages in addition to statutory damages under 

§ 605 because it would result in double recovery). This court

has sometimes declined to award conversion damages where

statutory damages under § 605 have sufficiently compensated the

plaintiff. E.g., J & J Sports Prods. Inc. v. Meza, Civ. No. 

1:14-1427 WBS, 2015 WL 1787479, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2015).

It would be premature to determine at this stage of the 

proceedings whether statutory damages under § 605 would 

sufficiently compensate plaintiff in this case such that 

conversion damages would be duplicative. California Civil Code 

section 3336 provides for the recovery of conversion damages only 

after a defendant is found liable for the “wrongful conversion of 

personal property.” Section 605 likewise provides for the 

recovery of statutory damages only after a defendant is found 

liable for a § 605 violation. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3). 

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Ruling on defendant’s request to limit conversion 

damages at this time would be premature because defendant has not 

been found liable for either conversion or a § 605 violation. 

Cf. Siegel v. Edmark Auto Inc., Civ. No. 1:09-443 CWD, 2011 WL 

3439937, at *21 (D. Idaho Aug. 8, 2011) (finding that a motion

for partial summary judgment on the issue of liquidated damages

was premature because liability had not been determined under the 

governing statute); see also AIG Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Altus Fin. 

S.A., 365 F. App’x 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing grant of 

summary judgment where triable issues of fact remained as to the 

plaintiff’s ability to prove its damages to a reasonable 

certainty).

Limiting conversion damages at this time is also 

inappropriate because a question of fact exists regarding whether 

defendant had acted in good faith allowing him to avoid liability 

for conversion under California law. California recognizes a 

good faith purchaser defense if a party can show that he (1) paid 

value for the property, (2) purchased it in good faith, and (3) 

did so without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights 

to the property. Oakdale Vill. Grp. v. Fong, 43 Cal. App. 4th 

539, 547 (3d Dist. 1996); see J & J Sports Prods. v. Coyne, 857 

F. Supp. 2d 909, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (although defendants

“purchased the Program in good faith,” they were liable for 

conversion because they “had constructive notice of J & J’s 

property right”).

Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s request to 

limit plaintiff’s actual conversion damages without prejudice and 

will defer its ruling to such time as the court renders a verdict 

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if this matter proceeds to trial.4

2. Punitive Damages for Conversion

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

request for punitive damages. (Def.’s Mot. at 14-15.) Plaintiff 

does not oppose this motion as to its conversion claim, which is 

the only claim for which plaintiff has requested punitive 

damages. (Compl. at 9-10, ¶¶ 30-31; Opp’n at 13, 19.) 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s request for punitive damages under the

conversion claim.

C. UCL Claim

The California UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or 

fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17200. “An unlawful business practice under [the UCL] is an act 

or practice, committed pursuant to business activity, that is at 

the same time forbidden by law.” Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Yolo 

Cty. Sup. Ct., 135 Cal. App. 4th 263, 287 (3d Dist. 2005)

(citation omitted). The UCL thus “borrows violations of other 

laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the [UCL] makes 

independently actionable.” Cel–Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. 

Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) (citations 

omitted). “Virtually any law--federal, state or local--can serve 

as a predicate for an action under” the UCL. Ticconi v. Blue 

Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 4th 528, 539 

(2d Dist. 2008). To prevail on a UCL claim, a plaintiff must 

“make a twofold showing: he or she must demonstrate injury in 

 

4 Plaintiff seeks a bench trial in this action. (Joint 

Status Report at 5 (Docket No. 13).) 

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fact and a loss of money or property caused by unfair 

competition.” Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 

1590 (4th Dist. 2008). 

As discussed above, plaintiff has provided sufficient 

evidence to maintain that defendant’s exhibition of the Event 

without plaintiff’s authorization was in violation of law. 

Defendant’s actions also occurred pursuant to the business 

activity of operating the Bar. The evidence further indicates 

that plaintiff suffered an injury in fact and a loss of money in 

the amount of the sublicense fee that defendant would have been 

required to pay to broadcast the Event lawfully. (Gagliardi Aff. 

¶¶ 3, 7, Ex. 2.) There is thus sufficient evidence to establish 

defendant’s liability under the UCL. See Joe Hand Promotions, 

Inc. v. Bragg, Civ. No. 13-2725 BAS JLB, 2014 WL 2589242, at *8 

(S.D. Cal. June 10, 2014); Nguyen, 2014 WL 60014, at *6. 

Accordingly, the court must deny defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on plaintiff’s UCL claim.

1. Restitution under the UCL

Defendant argues in the alternative that plaintiff is 

not entitled to restitution under the UCL because there is no 

evidence that defendant acquired any money as a result of his

exhibition of the Event. (Def.’s Mot. at 9-10.)5 An individual 

may be required to pay restitution if he or she is unjustly 

enriched at the expense of another. Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 

 

5 Defendant suggests that this alone is enough to grant 

summary judgment in his favor as to the UCL claim. (Id.) This 

argument fails because plaintiff also requests injunctive relief 

under the UCL, (Compl. ¶ 40). See Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 51 

Cal. 4th 310, 337 (2011) (parties may seek an injunction under 

the UCL whether or not restitution is also available).

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Cal. 4th 39, 51 (1996). “A person is enriched if he receives a 

benefit at another’s expense,” and a “benefit” denotes any form 

of advantage. Id. A benefit is thus conferred “not only when 

one adds to the property of another, but also when one saves the 

other from expense or loss.” Id. 

The evidence in the record establishes that defendant’s 

exhibition of the Event without plaintiff’s authorization 

provided defendant with a benefit by saving him from the expense 

of paying at least $2,200 for a sublicense fee. (Gagliardi Aff. 

¶¶ 3, 7, Ex. 2.) There are thus genuine issues of material fact 

with respect to whether plaintiff may recover restitution under 

the UCL. Accordingly, the court must deny defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on plaintiff’s request for restitutionary relief 

under the UCL claim.

2. Attorney’s Fees under California Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1021.5

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees under California Code 

of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 for enforcing the UCL as a 

private attorney general. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Defendant seeks

summary judgment on plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees under

section 1021.5. (Def.’s Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff does not oppose 

defendant’s request on this issue. (Opp’n at 17 n.6.) 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to California 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 will be granted.6

 

6 This does not impact plaintiff’s right to attorney’s 

fees under § 605. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) (providing 

full costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing 

plaintiff).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is:

(1) GRANTED IN PART as to plaintiff’s claim under 47 

U.S.C. § 553 (Count II), request for punitive damages for 

conversion, and request for attorney’s fees under California Code 

of Civil Procedure section 1021.5; and 

(2) DENIED IN PART as to plaintiff’s claim under 47 

U.S.C. § 605 (Count I), request for enhanced statutory damages 

under § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), claim for conversion (Count III), 

request for compensatory damages for conversion, claim under 

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17200 et seq. (Count IV), and request for restitution 

under the UCL.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2015

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