Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01007/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Manuel Celorio Garrido
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: VICTOR MANUEL CELORIO GARRIDO,

Appellant

______________________ 

2016-1007

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 90/012,726.

______________________ 

Decided: April 26, 2016

______________________ 

VICTOR MANUEL CELORIO GARRIDO, Gainesville, FL, 

pro se.

SARAH E. CRAVEN, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for 

appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by THOMAS W.

KRAUSE, SCOTT C. WEIDENFELLER, BENJAMIN T. HICKMAN. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Victor Manuel Celorio Garrido (“Mr. Celorio”) appeals 

from the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“Board”) in the ex parte reexamination of U.S. Patent 

No. 6,012,890 (“the ’890 patent”). The Board affirmed the 

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2 IN RE: GARRIDO

Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9–11, 13–24, 26, 27, 29–31, 33–36, 

38–40, 48, 50–53, 61–67, 75, 76, 78–82, 84–86, 88–90, 100, 

102–05, 107, 108, 115, 117–50, 152, 158, 163–86, and 

188–223 as anticipated or obvious over the prior art or 

invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of 

35 U.S.C. § 112. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Celorio owns the ’890 patent, which is directed to 

an “Electronic Bookstore Vending Machine” for printing 

and binding books on demand. A third party requested ex 

parte reexamination of the ’890 patent before the PTO. 

The examiner initiated reexamination of claims 1–4, 6–

24, 26–31, 33–36, 38–41, 48, 50–53, 61–67, 75, 76, 78–90, 

100, 102–08, and 115–20 and issued a non-final office 

action, rejecting various claims as anticipated under 

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 

During the course of reexamination, Mr. Celorio added over one hundred new claims. The examiner issued a 

final rejection, maintaining the original § 102(b) and 

§ 103(a) rejections and entering new rejections for many 

of the new claims for deficiencies under § 112. Mr. Celorio

timely appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed the 

examiner’s rejections. Ex Parte Garrido (Board Decision), 

No. 15-4695, 2015 WL 4090081 (PTAB June 30, 2015). 

Mr. Celorio timely appeals to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 

35 U.S.C. § 141. 

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial 

evidence and its legal conclusions without deference. 

Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

“Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of 

the evidence but more than a mere scintilla of evidence.” 

In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

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IN RE: GARRIDO 3

Obviousness under § 103(a) is a “legal conclusion based on 

underlying factual determinations. The factual determinations include (1) the scope and content of the prior art; 

(2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; 

(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective 

evidence of nonobviousness.” Rambus, 731 F.3d at 1251–

52 (internal citation omitted). 

On appeal, Mr. Celorio first argues that the examiner 

failed to consider secondary considerations of nonobviousness before arriving at his ultimate determination regarding obviousness. Specifically, Mr. Celorio asserts that the 

examiner improperly presented analysis of the evidence of 

secondary considerations for the first time in the examiner’s brief to the Board. Mr. Celorio complains that this is 

error because, under this Court’s precedent, the examiner 

must consider objective evidence before making his ultimate conclusion on obviousness. While this general 

proposition is correct, Mr. Celorio did not properly submit 

evidence of secondary considerations until after the 

examiner issued a final office action. The examiner then 

issued an advisory action, explaining why that evidence of 

commercial success, long-felt need, failure of others, and 

copying was insufficient to demonstrate nonobviousness of 

the rejected claims. See Advisory Action, Ex Parte Garrido, Reexam. Control No. 90/012,726 (PTO April 15, 

2014). The examiner later elaborated on the reasons for 

his conclusion in his brief to the Board.

Specifically, the examiner explained that Mr. Celorio

failed to present evidence establishing a nexus between 

the claims and the evidence of commercial success. Commercial success of a product “is relevant in the obviousness context only if there is proof that the sales were a 

direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed 

invention—as opposed to other economic and commercial 

factors unrelated to the quality of the patented subject 

matter.” In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(emphasis added). With respect to long-felt need and 

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4 IN RE: GARRIDO

failure of others, the examiner explained that Mr. Celorio

failed to present requisite evidence to establish these 

factors. Specifically, the examiner explained that 

Mr. Celorio did not demonstrate that those of skill in the 

art recognized the problem and were working on a solution for a long period of time, and yet failed to solve the 

problem. “Absent a showing of a long-felt need or the 

failure of others, the mere passage of time without the 

claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 

Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 

1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And with respect to copying, 

the examiner explained that Mr. Celorio’s submitted

evidence did not demonstrate the alleged copying fell 

within the scope of the claims. As we have explained, 

while copying may be a relevant secondary consideration, 

“as with the commercial success analysis, a nexus between the copying and the novel aspects of the claimed 

invention must exist for evidence of copying to be given 

significant weight in an obviousness analysis.” Wm. 

Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 

1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation mark

omitted). Although the examiner elaborated on the basis 

for rejecting the evidence of secondary considerations in 

his brief to the Board, the examiner did consider 

Mr. Celorio’s evidence prior to the appeal and Mr. Celorio

had adequate notice prior to appeal of the examiner’s 

rationale for rejecting this evidence. The Board adopted 

the examiner’s findings regarding secondary considerations, and in view of the evidence of record, we find substantial evidence supports those findings. 

Mr. Celorio next argues that the Board erred in affirming the rejection of certain claims as indefinite under 

§ 112, asserting that rejections during reexamination may 

be based on only prior-art grounds. Mr. Celorio is correct 

that rejections of original patent claims are limited to 

prior art grounds during reexamination. When new 

claims are added during reexamination, however, the new 

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IN RE: GARRIDO 5

claims may be rejected for failing to comply with § 112. 

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.552(a) (“Claims in an ex parte reexamination proceeding will be examined on the basis of patents or printed publications and, with respect to subject 

matter added or deleted in the reexamination proceeding, 

on the basis of the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112”). 

Because the only claims rejected for failure to comply with 

§ 112 were new claims added by Mr. Celorio during the 

course of reexamination, the Board did not err in affirming the examiner’s § 112 rejections. 

The finding that certain claims of the ’890 patent 

were not indefinite during district court litigation, Celorio 

v. Google, No. 11-0079, 2013 WL 5745675 (N.D. Fla. 

Oct. 22, 2013), has no impact on the Board’s decision. The

district court decision involved different claims than those 

subject to the indefiniteness rejections during reexamination. In any event, the PTO is not bound here by the 

district court’s decision. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 

1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] prior holding of validity 

is not necessarily inconsistent with a subsequent holding 

of invalidity, and is not binding on subsequent litigation 

or PTO reexaminations.” (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted)).

Mr. Celorio also challenges the grounds of rejection 

involving a prior art reference, JIM WALLACE, Exploring 

IBM Print on Demand Technology (Maximum Press) 

(1996) (“Wallace”). Mr. Celorio asserts that Wallace is not 

prior art, disputing the publication date of Wallace. But 

the Board explained that “the prior art status of Wallace 

is not determinative as to the patentability of the rejected 

claims.” Board Decision, 2015 WL 4090081, at *5. As the 

Board explained, all rejections that relied on Wallace

alternatively relied on U.S. Patent No. 5,028,192 (“Lindsay”) or HOWARD M. FENTON, et al., On Demand Printing: 

The Revolution in Digital and Customized Printing

(Graphic Arts Technical Foundation (1995) (“Fenton”). 

Id. Thus, because none of the rejections affirmed by the 

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6 IN RE: GARRIDO

Board depend upon Wallace, we need not resolve the prior 

art status of Wallace.

Mr. Celorio further argues that Wallace, Lindsay, and 

Fenton, individually or collectively, do not disclose all 

elements of the rejected claims. Mr. Celorio mistakenly 

asserts that “clear and convincing” evidence is required to 

establish obviousness. In a reexamination before the 

PTO, a lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard 

applies. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377. Furthermore, while we understand Mr. Celorio to be making a 

general argument that the rejected claims are not obvious 

in view of the cited prior art, Mr. Celorio fails to explain 

which specific elements of the claims are not taught by

the prior art. Nor did he present any such argument 

before the Board. Thus, we find no error in the Board’s 

affirmance of the rejections premised on Wallace, Lindsay, and Fenton. We advise Mr. Celorio that, in any 

future proceedings he has before the PTO, he should 

specifically identify the particular language in the claim 

that he contends is missing in the prior art references 

relied on by the examiner.

Next, Mr. Celorio argues that the Board applied improper hindsight bias by adopting a construction for the 

claim term “formatting” previously adopted in the reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,213,703 (“the ’703 patent”), a child of the ’890 patent. He asserts that the 

reexamination file of the ’703 patent is not prior art

because it occurred after the priority date of the ’890 

patent. Mr. Celorio does not suggest an alternate construction for the term “formatting,” but instead objects 

only to the Board’s reliance on the construction adopted in 

the reexamination of the ’703 patent. The Board did not 

err by construing this claim term consistently across both 

the ’890 and ’703 patents. As we have explained, “[w]here 

multiple patents ‘derive from the same parent application 

and share many common terms, we must interpret the 

claims consistently across all asserted patents.’” 

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IN RE: GARRIDO 7

SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 

1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research In 

Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed Cir. 2005)). Moreover, we find Mr. Celorio’s assertion that the Board erred 

by relying on the ’703 patent reexamination file because it 

is not prior art unpersuasive because the Board relied on 

the file merely for claim construction, not for determining 

the scope and content of the prior art.

Finally, Mr. Celorio asserts that the Board’s and examiner’s decisions evidence bias against Mr. Celorio as a 

Hispanic pro se appellant. Specifically, Mr. Celorio asserts that the examiner expressed prejudice and bias 

against Mr. Celorio and “made extra efforts to try to trip” 

him. Appellant Br. 27. We disagree. We see no evidence 

suggesting that the examiner treated Mr. Celorio differently than other pro se applicants. Likewise, the Board’s 

decision does not reflect any bias and Mr. Celorio’s allegations of bias on the part of the Board and the examiner 

are unsupported by evidence. We have considered 

Mr. Celorio’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. We therefore affirm the Board’s decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs. 

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