Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02349/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02349-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elias Mohamed
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2349

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri.

*

Elias Mohamed, *

*

Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: January 15, 2010

 Filed: April 13, 2010

_____________

Before GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and LANGE1

, District Judge.

_____________

LANGE, District Judge.

Elias Mohamed (“Mohamed”) was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail

fraud in connection with a scheme to obtain fraudulently Missouri commercial

driver’s licenses. Mohamed appeals the denial of his motion to suppress materials

found in his possession during a traffic stop and challenges a verdict director

instruction that included overt acts not specifically alleged in the indictment. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

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I. Factual Background

On May 25, 2005, at 3:04 a.m., Minnesota State Patrol Corporal Robert Frisby

(“Trooper Frisby”) stopped a car driven by Mohamed for not having an operating light

illuminating his rear license plate. During the initial interaction, Trooper Frisby asked

Mohamed "what he was up to" and "where he was headed." In response, Mohamed

explained that he was driving a borrowed car and returning to Kansas City after

attending a funeral in Minneapolis. Mohamed told Trooper Frisby that the funeral had

occurred earlier in the day, and after taking a nap, he had decided to return to Kansas

City that night. During the conversation, Trooper Frisby noticed that some of the door

panels on the inside of the car were loose, that Mohamed seemed more nervous than

would be considered normal, that his breathing was heavier and deeper, and that his

nervousness “remained elevated or slightly increased the longer the stop went.” 

At 3:11 a.m., roughly seven minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Frisby

completed the warning ticket and told Mohamed he was “good to go.” Trooper Frisby

acknowledged in his testimony that the reason for the stop had been completed.

However, as Mohamed got out of the patrol car, Trooper Frisby asked whether

Mohamed had any drugs, weapons, or money in the car. Mohamed told him “no,” but

was unable to make eye contact and instead looked toward his car. Trooper Frisby

then asked Mohamed for consent to search the car. Mohamed said that he would

prefer not to allow Trooper Frisby to search the car. Trooper Frisby told Mohamed

that he had reasonable suspicion to run a drug dog around the car. Trooper Frisby

testified that his reasonable suspicion arose from the loose panels in the car,

Mohamed’s explanation of his travel purpose, his level of nervousness, and his

inability to sit still or maintain eye contact. 

At 3:16 a.m., approximately five minutes after the stop had been completed,

Trooper Frisby began walking the dog around the car. The canine search was

completed within thirty-five seconds. The dog alerted to the car. About twelve

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The HONORABLE JAMES C. ENGLAND, Chief United States Magistrate

Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

3

The HONORABLE GARY A. FENNER, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri. 

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minutes elapsed between the time Trooper Frisby initially stopped Mohammed’s car

at 3:04 a.m. and the time the dog made the positive identification. Following the

dog’s alert, Trooper Frisby concluded that he now had probable cause to search the

car for controlled substances. Trooper Frisby found marijuana seeds inside the car

and documents pertaining to Missouri commercial driver’s licenses inside the trunk.

On September 20, 2006, Mohamed was charged with conspiracy to commit

mail fraud. In the Overt Acts portion of Count 1 charging conspiracy to commit mail

fraud, paragraph 35 alleged that Mohamed directed students to Ernest White

(“White”), another alleged co-conspirator, knowing White would provide students

with fraudulently obtained Missouri commercial driver’s licenses by and through the

use of the mail. 

After he was indicted, Mohamed moved to suppress any evidence obtained

from the May 25, 2005 search of his car, claiming that the search violated his rights

under the Fourth Amendment. The Magistrate Judge2

 held a suppression hearing and,

on October 23, 2007, entered a report and recommendation to deny the motion to

suppress, concluding that the continued detention following the completion of the

purpose of the stop was de minimis. On November 9, 2007, the district court3

 adopted

the report and recommendation.

At trial, co-conspirator White testified that he helped individuals pass the

Missouri commercial driver's license examination by providing students at South

Central Career Center (“SCCC”), a third-party tester under contract with the State of

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Missouri to administer the skills test, with answers to the written portion under the

guise of translation services. White testified that in 2003 he met Osman Abdullahi

(“Abdullahi”). Abdullahi operated a business named “Translation Station,” where he

provided translation services to students taking the written test. He informed White

that he provided answers to the students together with translation services. White

helped students pass the skills portion of the test by bribing one of SCCC’s third-party

testers, Orbin May (“May”), to assure the students passed the driving portion of the

test. 

White identified Mohamed as one of Abdullahi’s business associates. White

testified that Mohamed knew about the arrangement between White and May and that

Mohamed continued to send students to White to help them pass the commercial

driver's license skills test. White testified that Mohamed and Abdullahi referred

between 80 and 120 students to White.

The government also provided testimony of Abdu Mohamed Osman

("Osman"). Osman testified that Mohamed sold him a Missouri commercial driver's

license form D3R for $900. Osman identified the D3R found in the trunk of

Mohamed's vehicle by Trooper Frisby as a document that he purchased from

Mohamed to obtain a commercial driver's license. The D3R form which Osman

purchased from Mohamed indicated that he had taken the skills test at SCCC and that

the test was administered by May.

Ahmed Muhidin Sharif (“Sharif”), who received assistance in obtaining his

Missouri commercial driver's license from Abdullahi, testified that he directed a

student to Mohamed to obtain a commercial driver's license. Sharif stated that the

student left with Mohamed and then returned two hours later with a completed

commercial driver's license skills document showing that he had passed the skills test.

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The government introduced records of Mohamed's cell phone use as evidence

of the mail fraud conspiracy. The records showed that the cell phone number that

Mohamed had provided to Trooper Frisby had been used in numerous telephone

contacts with May, White, and Abdullahi during the time of the conspiracy. FBI

Agent Clayton Bye interviewed Mohamed after his arrest and testified that Mohamed

told him that he knew Abdullahi and White. Mohamed denied having translated for

them or possessing any papers that would help a person fraudulently to obtain a

commercial driver's license.

At trial, the district court gave a verdict director instruction, instruction 21.

Paragraph 4 of jury instruction 21 stated that one element that the government must

prove in order for the defendant to be found guilty is that:

“[W]hile the agreement or understanding was in effect, a person or

persons who had joined in the agreement knowingly did one or more of

the following acts for the purpose of carrying out or carrying forward the

agreement or understanding: 

a. assisted in providing translation services which actually

fraudulently provided the correct answers to the Missouri CDL written

test in order to allow the student to then take the CDL driving test to

obtain a Missouri CDL;

b. directed persons seeking to obtain CDL licenses to co-defendant

Ernest White, knowing that White would obtain these CDL licenses in

an illegal manner by fraudulent means through his relationship with codefendant Orbin May;

c. with other persons sold outdated versions of the Missouri CDL

driving exam forms without the person purchasing the form actually

having taken the Missouri CDL driving test.”

On January 7, 2009, a jury found Mohamed guilty of conspiracy to commit mail

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fraud. He was sentenced on May 28, 2009, and filed a notice of appeal on June 7,

2009. 

II. Standard of Review

With regard to a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the

findings of fact for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v.

Pena-Ponce, 588 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2009). We review the district court's jury

instructions for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lewis, 593 F.3d 765, 771 (8th

Cir. 2010). In this review, we must analyze whether the instructions, taken as a

whole, and viewed in light of the evidence and applicable law, fairly and accurately

submitted the issues in the case to the jury. United States v. Rehak, 589 F.3d 965, 972

(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

A. Fourth Amendment Issues

Mohamed concedes that Trooper Frisby lawfully stopped his car based on

probable cause. Failing to have his license plate illuminated is a traffic violation,

albeit minor, and therefore establishes probable cause for initially stopping Mohamed.

See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 1998); Minn. Stat. § 168.12

(2009). A positive identification by a dog during a canine search following a lawful

stop of a vehicle provides probable cause that drugs are present in the vehicle, thereby

justifying a search of the vehicle. See United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 919

(8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Therefore, because the initial stop by Trooper Frisby and

the ultimate search of the vehicle were both lawful, the evidence obtained from the

search will be suppressed only if the continued detention of Mohamed, from the time

the purpose of the stop was completed to the time of the canine search, was

unreasonably extended. See United States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir.

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2009) (where truck was stopped for speeding and following too closely, a dog’s alert

provided probable cause to search truck for drugs, and evidence was suppressed only

if the defendant was unlawfully detained when the dog sniff of the car occurred). 

Mohamed’s motion to suppress sought to exclude evidence of Missouri

commercial driver’s license forms found in the trunk of his vehicle, arguing that the

search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Mohamed asserts that Trooper Frisby’s

continued detention and walking the dog around the vehicle after the purpose of the

stop had been completed was primarily for interdicting illegal drugs or to advance the

general interest in crime control. The Fourth Amendment requires individualized

suspicion in order for a seizure to be considered reasonable. Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). Absent individualized suspicion, a seizure is unreasonable

unless it serves a “special need.” Id. 

Although a suspicionless seizure of a motorist whose primary purpose was to

detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing is not permissible under a “special

needs” analysis, the seizure of Mohamed was not suspicionless. Because the seizure

was not at a random checkpoint, but instead arose out of a lawful traffic stop, the

general rule of balancing for reasonableness should be applied. Under United States

v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d

998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005); and United States v. $404,905.00, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th

Cir. 1999), when a dog sniff occurs after a very short lapse of time from when the

purpose of the traffic stop has been completed, there is a de minimis intrusion, and

therefore, under the general rule of reasonableness, the stop does not violate the

Fourth Amendment.

In order to protect an individual’s interest in liberty, the Fourth Amendment

limits a detention or search conducted subsequent to a lawful traffic stop.

$404,905.00, 182 F.3d at 648. A lawful traffic stop that is extended in order to

execute a canine sniff does not become an unconstitutional seizure where the stop is

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reasonably prolonged and constitutes only de minimis intrusions on a defendant’s

liberty. Alexander, 448 F.3d at 1016; $404,905.00, 182 F.3d at 649. For example,

in Alexander, 448 F.3d at 1017, the canine sniff was a de minimis intrusion when it

occurred four minutes after the completion of a lawful traffic stop. In Martin, 411

F.3d at 1002, a canine sniff that occurred two minutes after the conclusion of the

traffic stop was considered a de minimis intrusion. See also $404,905.00, 182 F.3d

at 649 (canine sniff completed two minutes subsequent to completion of traffic stop

was a de minimis intrusion). 

Trooper Frisby completed the canine search within five minutes of concluding

a lawful stop. Trooper Frisby did not unreasonably extend the seizure of Mohamed

by prolonging the seizure by five minutes to conduct a canine search. Although

reasonable suspicion is not required for a canine search to be considered a de minimis

intrusion on a driver’s personal liberty, see Alexander, 448 F.3d at 1016; Martin, 411

F.3d at 1002; $404,905.00, 182 F.3d at 649, it is worth noting that such reasonable

suspicion existed in this case. Trooper Frisby stopped Mohamed for a traffic violation

and then noticed loose door panels inside the vehicle. Mohamed's explanation of why

he was on the road and his demeanor aroused Trooper Frisby's suspicions. Trooper

Frisby noted that Mohamed’s breathing was heavier and deeper than is typical, that

his level of nervousness remained elevated, and that he was unable to maintain eye

contact during certain questions or stay in one position. Thus, the canine sniff did not

unreasonably prolong the stop, and was based on reasonable suspicion anyway to

believe that there might be drugs in Mohamed’s car.

B. Jury Instruction Issue

Mohamed argues that because the verdict director instruction included overt

acts which were not specifically alleged in the indictment, the district court erred and

Mohamed’s conviction should be remanded for a new trial. Mohamed also argues that

jury instruction 21, the verdict director, which was derived from Eighth Circuit Model

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Criminal Jury Instructions § 5.06A, violated due process of law because it did not

require the jury to find that Mohamed personally committed the overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy in order to convict him of conspiracy to commit mail

fraud.

Count 1 of the indictment charged that Mohamed and fourteen other individuals

conspired with one another to commit mail fraud. The indictment alleged that

Mohamed committed the overt act of directing students to another co-conspirator,

Ernest White, knowing that he would provide students with fraudulently obtained

commercial driver’s licenses. Although Mohamed argues that the jury instruction

refers to overt acts not pled in the indictment, specifically that he was in possession

and sold D3R documents found in his vehicle, a defendant may be found guilty of

overt acts not charged in the indictment. See United States v. Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981,

992 (8th Cir. 2005). A variance between the indictment and proof occurs “when the

essential elements of the offense set forth in the indictment are left unaltered but the

evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the

indictment.” See United States v. Begnaud, 783 F.2d, 144, 147 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986).

In Sdoulam, this Court stated that “the inclusion of some overt acts in an indictment

does not bar proof of other acts, and proof of other acts in furtherance of the same

conspiracy does not constitute a variance.” 398 F.3d at 992. The elements of the

offense for which Mohamed was charged did not change when other overt acts were

proven at trial, and the additional acts contained in the verdict director were not

materially different from the charge in the indictment. Mohamed recognizes that

Sdoulam is on point, but urges the court to overrule Sdoulam on the principle that “a

person ought not to be convicted of an overt act not charged in the Indictment.” This

Court refuses to overrule Sdoulam.

Even if the overt acts were a variance, Mohamed’s conviction still was proper

under the circumstances. The indictment fully and fairly apprised him of the charges

against him, despite the alleged variance, and therefore there was no actual prejudice

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to Mohamed. See Begnaud, 783 F.2d at 148 (defendant suffers no actual prejudice so

long as an indictment fully and fairly apprises the defendant of the charges he must

meet). The indictment charged Mohamed with conspiracy to commit mail fraud by

assisting students to the conspiracy with obtaining licenses fraudulently. Mohamed

was fully and fairly apprised of the charges that were brought against him and was

able to prepare a defense to the conspiracy charge.

The district court instructed the jury that in order to prove mail or wire fraud

conspiracy, the government needed to prove that “while the agreement or

understanding was in effect, a person or persons who had joined the conspiracy did

one or more of the following acts.” Under the federal conspiracy statute, a conspiracy

is committed when two or more persons conspire to commit any offense against the

laws of the United States, and only requires that one or more of the co-conspirators

commit an overt act to further the purposes of the conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 371

(2009). The requisite overt act is satisfied by a single overt act committed by one coconspirator. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940). Although Mohamed

argues that such a jury instruction allows for him to be found guilty without him ever

committing an overt act, the government is not required to prove that he committed

an overt act. The government need show that “only one of the conspirators engaged

in one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy” and that Mohamed was part of the

conspiracy. United States v. Hermes, 847 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1988); see also

United States v. Hobson, 686 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bass, 472

F.2d 207, 213 (8th Cir. 1973). Because the government proved that Mohamed

knowingly joined the conspiracy, the overt act need not be shown to have been

committed by him.

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

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