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Parties Involved:
Regulo Antonio Zambrano
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided January 10, 2006

No. 05-3106

IN RE: REGULO ANTONIO ZAMBRANO

On Application for Leave to File Second or Successive

Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(93cr00418-03)

Regulo Antonio Zambrano, pro se, filed the application for

leave to file a second or successive motion.

Roy W. McCleese III., Assistant U.S. Attorney, filed the

opposition to the application. On the papers were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney at the time the application was filed.

Before: RANDOLPH, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Regulo Zambrano applies for

leave to file a second motion to vacate his criminal sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that the sentence is

unconstitutional under United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005). We cannot authorize the filing, however, because the

Supreme Court has not made Booker retroactive to cases on

collateral review. We therefore deny Zambrano’s application.

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I

In April 1995, a jury convicted Zambrano on charges

relating to a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. § 853. He was

sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. In 1997, we affirmed the convictions

and sentence. United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). 

After his convictions became final, Zambrano mounted a

collateral attack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He contended

that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, and he

further argued that the district court’s enhancement of his

sentence -- based on findings not made by the jury -- violated

the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held that “[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The district court denied relief.

Almost six months later, Zambrano moved to vacate the district

court’s order, stating that he had not received notice of the

court’s denial of his § 2255 motion until after the time for appeal

had expired. The district court denied the motion, and this court

denied a certificate of appealability. See United States v.

Zambrano, No. 04-3056, 2005 WL 361496 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15,

2005).

Zambrano now seeks leave to file a second § 2255 motion.

In that motion, Zambrano contends that the district court’s

enhancement of his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines

was unconstitutional in light of United States v. Booker, which

held that the “Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of

an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing

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Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a

fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the

jury or admitted by the defendant.” 125 S. Ct. at 756 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

II

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody under a

federal sentence, “claiming the right to be released upon the

ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . may move the

court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct

the sentence.” A second or successive motion under § 2255,

however, “must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a

panel of the appropriate court of appeals” to contain:

(1) newly discovered evidence . . . ; or 

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,

that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (as amended by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.

104-132, 100 Stat. 1214). Section 2244 provides (inter alia) that

“[t]he court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or

successive application only if it determines that the application

makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies” the

above requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); see In re

Olopade, 403 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). 

As Zambrano does not rely on newly discovered evidence,

the only question before us is whether Booker is a new rule of

constitutional law “made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That

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1

In Tyler, the Court addressed 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), rather

than the above-quoted language from 28 U.S.C. § 2255, because the

petitioner was a state prisoner seeking collateral relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659. The relevant portion of §

2244(b)(2)(A) is identical to that portion of § 2255 implicated in this

case, and we have previously applied Tyler to a federal prisoner’s

application for permission to file a successive § 2255 motion. See In

re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also In re Elwood, 408

F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The standards for a successive § 2254

petition and a successive § 2255 motion based on a new constitutional

rule are identical.”).

question is governed by Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001),

which held: “[T]he Supreme Court is the only entity that can

‘make’ a new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes

retroactive, not by the decisions of the lower court or by the

combined action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but

simply by the action of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 663. In

addition, the Tyler Court concluded “that ‘made’ means ‘held’

and, thus, the requirement is satisfied only if this Court has held

that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review.” Id. at 662 (emphasis added); see id. at 663 (“[A] new

rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless

the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.”).1

The Supreme Court has never expressly held Booker

retroactive. Booker itself did not state that its rule was

retroactive to cases on collateral review. See 125 S. Ct. at 769

(stating only that the holding was applicable “to all cases on

direct review”). Nor has the Court held Booker retroactive in

any subsequent case.

In Tyler, the Court acknowledged that, “with the right

combination of holdings,” it could “make a rule retroactive over

the course of two cases.” 533 U.S. at 666. But “[m]ultiple cases

can render a new rule retroactive only if the holdings in those

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cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule.” Id.

(emphasis added); see id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(stating that “[t]he Court . . . can be said to have ‘made’ a rule

retroactive . . . only where the Court’s holdings logically permit

no other conclusion”). That might be so, for example, if the

court were to hold in one case that a rule is of a particular type,

and in another “that all [such] rules apply retroactively.” 533

U.S. at 666; see id. at 668-69 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The

“Supreme Court does not ‘ma[k]e’ a rule retroactive,” however,

“when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves

the application of those principles to lower courts.” 533 U.S. at

663.

The possibility of a Tyler two-step does not assist

Zambrano. Booker was an application of the Apprendi rule to

the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and of the Court’s

previous application of Apprendi to find unconstitutional a

state’s determinate sentencing regime in Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004). See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749. But the

Supreme Court has never expressly held either of those cases

retroactive on collateral review, and we have concluded that the

Court has not “made” either case retroactive within the meaning

of § 2255. See In re Hinton, 125 Fed. Appx. 317 (D.C. Cir.

2005); In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that not every

application of Apprendi has retroactive effect. In Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Court held that, “because

Arizona law authorized the death penalty only if an aggravating

factor was present, Apprendi required the existence of such a

factor to be proved to a jury rather than to a judge.” Schriro v.

Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (describing the holding of

Ring). Nonetheless, in Summerlin, the Court held that Ring

“does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct

review.” 542 U.S. at 358.

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2 Ivan V., itself, was a case on direct review. There, the Supreme

Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals’ decision that Winship

was not to be applied “retroactively” to a direct appeal in which the

initial adjudication had taken place before Winship was decided. 407

U.S. 203, 203-04 (1972). In subsequent cases, the Court suggested

that Winship also applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); United States v. Johnson,

457 U.S. 537, 562-63 n.21 (1982). 

Zambrano argues that Booker is ultimately an extension of

In re Winship, which held that the Constitution “protects the

accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

with which he is charged,” 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970), and he

notes that the Supreme Court has held that Winship is to be

given “complete retroactive effect,” Ivan V. v. City of New

York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972) (internal quotation marks

omitted).2 But there are too many logical steps between Winship

and Booker to conclude that it “necessarily” follows that if

Winship is retroactive, Booker must be as well. Tyler, 533 U.S.

at 666. Although the Court did rely on Winship to decide

Booker, see 125 S. Ct. at 748, the road that begins with Winship

and ends with Booker runs through Apprendi and Blakely. Both

of those cases were also dependent upon Winship, see id. at 748-

49 (stating that Winship “provided the basis” for Apprendi and

Blakely), but as noted above, neither has been made retroactive

for purposes of § 2255. 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that not even

a more direct application of Winship is necessarily retroactive.

In Tyler itself, the Court concluded that it had not made Cage v.

Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), retroactive. Cage held that “a

jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable

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likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow

conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tyler,

533 U.S. at 658 (describing Cage). Notwithstanding that Cage

was based on the finding “that the instruction at issue was

contrary to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ requirement

articulated in Winship,” Cage, 498 U.S. at 41, Tyler determined

that the Court had not made the Cage rule retroactive to cases on

collateral review. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 664.

For these reasons, we conclude that Booker is not a new rule

of constitutional law “made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. In so holding, we join all of the circuits that have

considered the question. See Green v. United States, 397 F.3d

101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Olopade, 403 F.3d 159, 164 (3d

Cir. 2005); United States v. Fowler, 133 Fed. Appx. 922, 922-23

(4th Cir. 2005); In re Elwood, 408 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Shipp, 137 Fed. Appx. 904, 904 (7th Cir. 2005);

Bey v. United States, 399 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005); In

re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2005). The

application for leave to file a second § 2255 motion is

denied.

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