Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00284/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00284-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stephen Garcia
Petitioner
Rosenda Pena
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN GARCIA, ) 1:10-cv-00284-JLT HC

) 

Petitioner, ) ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR

) FOR LACK OF EXHAUSTION

) 

v. ) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

) ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ROSENDA PENA, Judge, )

) ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE 

Respondent. ) CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

____________________________________)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The instant petition was filed on February 19, 2010. (Doc. 1). On March 1, 2010, Petitioner

filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. 

(Doc. 3). 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition

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for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s

motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039

(9 Cir.2001). th

B. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.

1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state

remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order

to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners'

federal rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.

If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not

only in federal court, but in state court. 

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Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims

were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000).

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must

make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of

federal courts, even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control

resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that

the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal

standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

 Here, Petitioner alleges that he was convicted in the Fresno County Superior Court on March

18, 2009, and re-sentenced on August 29, 2009. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner indicates that he did not

file a direct appeal from his conviction. Petitioner has left blank the spaces provided on the form

petition for information related to a direct appeal. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Petitioner answered in the negative

the question whether he has filed any other petitions, applications or motions with respect to the

conviction. (Id.). 

From the foregoing, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not presented any of his claims to

the California Supreme Court as required by the exhaustion doctrine. Because Petitioner has not

presented his claims for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the

petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition

that is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982); Calderon, 107 F.3d at

760. Therefore, the petition must be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition,

and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

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(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge,

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not

be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists

could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a

different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further’.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. 

Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED for lack of

exhaustion;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file; and, 

///

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3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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