Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-12-02606/USCOURTS-ca7-12-02606-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Salvador Guadalupe Navarro
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 12-2606

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SALVADOR GUADALUPE NAVARRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois

No. 11-CR-30046 — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 27, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS,

District Judge.

*

ELLIS, District Judge. Defendant-Appellant Salvador Guadalupe Navarro (“Navarro”) pleaded guilty to and was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

 * The Honorable Sara L. Ellis, of the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. In the plea 

agreement, the government and Navarro both agreed to refrain from seeking a departure from the sentencing guidelines and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines 

range as determined by the district court. At sentencing, the 

district court rejected an aggravated role enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 and determined that the applicable guidelines range was 188 to 235 months in prison. At that point, 

the government argued in favor of an upward departure 

from the guidelines suggested in Application Note 2 to 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) and additionally recommended an aboveguidelines sentence of 320 months. Navarro voiced no objection, however, to this breach of the plea agreement by the 

government. Indeed, the district court departed upward and 

imposed a sentence of 262 months. Navarro now appeals his 

sentence, arguing that the government’s breach of the plea 

agreement constitutes plain error warranting resentencing. 

We agree with Navarro and reverse and remand for resentencing. 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2011, the government indicted Navarro and 

22 others for their participation in a cocaine conspiracy. Navarro and the government entered into a written plea 

agreement in which Navarro pleaded guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five 

kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. 

In the plea agreement, the government submitted that Navarro’s offense level was 37 and that based on Navarro’s 

criminal history category of III, the resulting guidelines 

range was 262 to 327 months in prison. Navarro did not concur with the government’s offense level calculation but 

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agreed that the district court would determine the offense 

level, the resulting guidelines range, and the applicability of 

any enhancements at sentencing. 

Despite the dispute over Navarro’s offense level, the government agreed “to recommend sentencing within the range 

ultimately found by the Court.” Plea Agreement ¶ 3. Likewise, Navarro “agree[d] not to seek any sentence below the 

lowest range of the advisory sentence recommended by the 

guidelines after all guideline factors have been considered 

by the Court.” Id. The plea agreement reiterates, in bold, 

“[t]he United States and the Defendant agree not to seek a 

sentence outside the applicable Guideline range.” Id. ¶ 12.

In exchange for the government’s concessions, Navarro 

also waived certain appellate rights. But Navarro retained 

the right to challenge the reasonableness of the sentence if 

the court imposed a sentence in excess of the applicable 

guidelines range. 

At sentencing, the government called several witnesses to 

testify to Navarro’s role in the conspiracy. The witnesses described Navarro loading and delivering cocaine, counting 

proceeds from cocaine sales, and using soap and perfumes 

to mask the smell of the drugs. A federal agent stated that 

Navarro primarily served as a drug courier, but that Navarro 

took on more responsibility when the leader of the conspiracy, Ivan Vazquez-Gonzalez, travelled to Mexico for an extended period of time. 

Based on the witnesses’ testimony, the government argued that Navarro qualified for a three-level enhancement 

pursuant to § 3B1.1(b) for managing or supervising other 

members of the conspiracy. Alternately, the government 

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proposed that even if the court declined to apply the 

§ 3B1.1(b) enhancement, it could depart upward pursuant to 

that section’s application note 2. Specifically, the government 

stated: 

I would also draw the Court’s attention to application note 2 of that guideline, which says, 

. . . “An upward departure may be warranted, 

however, in the case of a defendant who did 

not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who, nevertheless, exercised management responsibility over the 

property, assets or activities of a criminal organization.” Now there can be no doubt, based 

upon the evidence that was presented today, 

that the description applies to Mr. Navarro. 

Sent. Tr. 110:5–18. While Navarro opposed the imposition of 

an enhancement or an upward departure based on his role 

in the offense, he did not object on the basis that the government breached the plea agreement by advocating for an 

upward departure. 

The district court determined that Navarro did not manage or supervise others, and thus refused to enhance Navarro’s offense level pursuant to § 3B1.1(b). The court found that 

Navarro’s adjusted offense level was 34, resulting in a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months in prison based on his criminal history. But the court adopted the government’s alternative theory, applying an upward departure pursuant to application note 2 of § 3B1.1 based on Navarro’s management 

of the conspiracy’s property. 

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After announcing these conclusions, the court allowed 

the government and Navarro to recommend a specific sentence. The government began by stating, “[m]y understanding of the guideline range found by the Court then is 262 to 

327 months. In the plea agreement, Your Honor, the United 

States reserved the right to make a recommendation within 

that range and we’re making a recommendation today of 320 

months.” Id. at 131. Navarro did not object to this recommendation as a breach of the plea agreement, and the district 

court did not correct the government’s misapprehension of 

the applicable guidelines range. Navarro argued for a sentence “at the lower end of the guidelines,” without specifying a particular number of months. Id. at 133. 

The court ultimately sentenced Navarro to 262 months in 

prison, stating: 

In considering the specific characteristics of 

this offense and this wide range conspiracy, the 

very large quantity of drugs involved, the 

breadth of it, the scope of it in terms of geographics, individuals involved and the 

amount of drugs, this defendant’s personal involvement is such that I believe this would be 

the sentence that I would impose in this case 

had I not found a three level upward departure 

was appropriate under comment 2, section 3B. 

Id. at 138.

Navarro appealed his sentence, but his counsel moved to 

withdraw, believing that the appeal was frivolous. We denied counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw, pointing out that 

Navarro had a non-frivolous argument that the government 

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breached its agreement and that the breach may have affected Navarro’s sentence. United States v. Navarro, 561 F. App’x 

507 (7th Cir. 2014). The parties then briefed the substance of 

Navarro’s appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

Navarro contends that the government breached the plea 

agreement in two ways: by advocating for an upward departure and by recommending a sentence above the applicable 

guidelines range. Navarro argues that these breaches warrant vacating his sentence and remanding the case to the district court for resentencing. We agree. 

Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Williams, 102 

F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1996). But because Navarro failed to 

object both when the government argued in favor of an upward departure and subsequently recommended a sentence 

of 320 months, we review for plain error. United States v. Artley, 489 F.3d 813, 824 (7th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, 

Navarro will prevail if he can demonstrate that: (1) there was 

an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject 

to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected Navarro’s substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Puckett 

v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 173 L. Ed. 

2d 266 (2009); Artley, 489 F.3d at 824; United States v. Salazar, 

453 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The plea agreement contains at least two relevant provisions. In paragraph three, “[t]he Government agree[d] to 

recommend a sentence within the range ultimately found by 

the Court.” Plea Agreement ¶ 3. The government explicitly 

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acknowledges on appeal that it breached this provision by 

recommending a sentence of 320 months and that the breach 

constitutes an error for purposes of the first prong of the 

plain error standard. 

Additionally, in paragraph twelve, both the government 

and Navarro “agree[d] not to seek a sentence outside the 

applicable Guideline range.” Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis omitted). 

The government does not respond to Navarro’s argument 

that it also violated this provision at sentencing. We find that 

the government breached paragraph twelve of the plea 

agreement by suggesting that the court depart upward from 

the guidelines based on Navarro’s management over the 

conspiracy’s property. The plea agreement contemplated that 

the government would pursue an enhancement based on 

§ 3B1.1(b). But the agreement barred the government from 

seeking an upward departure, as doing so constitutes 

“seek[ing] a sentence outside the applicable Guideline 

range.” Id. ¶ 12; United States v. O’Neill, 437 F.3d 654, 662 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (“[A]djustments and departures are distinctly different concepts under the Guidelines. Adjustments are 

changes to an offense level within the Guidelines. Departures, on the other hand, are sentences imposed outside the 

Guidelines.” (quoting United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 

1097 (9th Cir. 1991))). 

The government argues that the difference between an 

enhancement and a departure is “very subtle,” and thus, any 

error fails to satisfy the “clear or obvious” requirement of the 

plain error standard. The government notes that this subtlety 

was manifest by the confusion among the parties and the 

court during sentencing as to the applicable guidelines 

range. The government is not saved by the subtlety of the 

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distinction or confusion at Navarro’s sentencing hearing. 

There is no “reasonable dispute” as to whether the government’s advocacy for an upward departure breached the plea 

agreement. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 139; see, e.g., Salazar, 453 F.3d 

at 914 (noting that other circuits “have concluded that undercutting a sentencing recommendation may rise to the level of a breach of an agreement” (citing United States v. Vaval,

404 F.3d 144, 152–54 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that the government breached its plea agreement when it set forth an argument justifying an upward departure despite provisions 

prohibiting it from doing so))). 

The guidelines themselves and the governing case law 

clearly distinguish between enhancements to the guidelines 

and departures from them. Specifically, § 1B1.1 of the guidelines requires sentencing courts to first determine the applicable guidelines range, and then consider “any other policy 

statements or commentary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. The Supreme Court 

echoed this in Gall, instructing that, “a district court should 

begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the 

applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). Likewise, appellate courts must first determine whether the sentencing 

court committed a procedural error by improperly calculating the guidelines range, and then, only if a “district court’s 

sentencing decision is procedurally sound,” should the appellate court “consider the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence imposed,” including any departures from the 

guidelines. Id.

The very text of the sentencing guidelines also makes this 

distinction clear. The introductory commentary to Chapter 3, 

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Part B explains that the section pertains to enhancements to 

the guidelines calculation, by providing “adjustments to the 

offense level.” U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. B, intro. cmt. Application 

note 2, in contrast, describes “upward departure[s]” for 

those who do not qualify for an enhancement. Id. § 3B1.1 

cmt. n.2. 

We have recognized a clear distinction between adjustments to the guidelines range and departures from them. 

O’Neill, 437 F.3d at 662. Thus, we find that the government 

clearly and obviously breached the plea agreement by advocating for an upward departure and by recommending a 

sentence above the guidelines range. 

The third element of the plain error standard—where the 

government focuses its argument—deals with prejudice. To 

satisfy this prong, Navarro must demonstrate that he probably would have received a more favorable sentence if not for 

the government’s breach. United States v. James, 464 F.3d 699, 

709 (7th Cir. 2006); Salazar, 453 F.3d at 913. A “defendant 

whose plea agreement has been broken by the Government 

will not always be able to show prejudice, either because he 

obtained benefits contemplated by the deal anyway (e.g., the 

sentence that the prosecutor promised to request) or because 

he likely would not have obtained those benefits in any 

event.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141–42. The government contends 

that Navarro cannot meet this threshold primarily because 

the district court explicitly stated at sentencing, “I believe 

this would be the sentence that I would impose in this case 

had I not found a three level upward departure was appropriate under comment 2, section 3B.” Sent. Tr. 138:9–12. The 

government also seeks to downplay the importance of its 

recommendation on the court’s sentence, urging that a recCase: 12-2606 Document: 109 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 14
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ommendation within the guidelines on resentencing “is extremely unlikely to result in the sentencing court imposing a 

different sentence.” Gov’t Br. at 10.

However, the Supreme Court long ago recognized the 

importance of the government’s recommendation on the sentence imposed. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262,

92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). In Santobello, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s sentence because the 

prosecutor breached a promise to refrain from recommending a specific term of imprisonment. Id. Although defense 

counsel in Santobello immediately objected to the prosecutor’s breach and thus properly preserved the issue for appeal, we find the case instructive here. 

The sentencing judge in Santobello attempted to cure the 

prosecutor’s breach by assuring defense counsel, “I am not 

at all influenced by what the District Attorney says, so that 

there is no need to adjourn the sentence, and there is no need 

to have any testimony. It doesn’t make a particle of difference what the District Attorney says he will do, or what he 

doesn’t do.” Id. at 259. Despite this assurance, the Supreme 

Court reversed in “the interests of justice” and based on 

“appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in 

relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of 

guilty.” Id. at 262. 

Here, we are tasked with determining from the record 

before us whether Navarro probably would have received a 

more favorable sentence, even if only slightly more favorable, had the government complied with its obligations in the 

plea agreement. Unlike the unusual circumstances present in 

Puckett which led the Court to conclude that Puckett was not 

likely to receive the benefit contemplated in his plea agreeCase: 12-2606 Document: 109 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 14
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ment, i.e., the district court judge made abundantly clear on 

the record that he had not heard of a defendant receiving a 

departure for acceptance of responsibility when the defendant had committed a new crime after pleading guilty but before sentencing, 556 U.S. at 132, here, the record reflects only 

the district court’s statement that it would impose the sentence regardless of finding the three-level upward departure 

appropriate. Likewise, cases where we have found that the 

defendant failed to prove the prejudice prong are ones in 

which the record compellingly reflects the sentencing court 

was not influenced by the government’s recommendation. 

See United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 

2010) (district court judge consciously sentenced the defendant to the statutory maximum sentence in light of defendant’s recalcitrance); United States v. D’Iguillont, 979 F.2d 612, 

614 (7th Cir. 1992) (district court judge declined to impose 

upward departure advocated by the government in violation 

of the plea agreement and sentenced the defendant to a 

within-guidelines sentence). In contrast, the district court’s 

statement here, standing alone, does not compellingly 

demonstrate that the government’s advocacy had no influence on the ultimate sentence imposed. 

Of course, requests for departures and sentencing recommendations are not binding on courts, and courts are free 

to impose sentences longer than those the government requests. But it appears that in this case the court was influenced by the parties’ recommendations, as the sentence imposed was just above the midpoint between what the government and Navarro requested. The government’s breach of 

the plea agreement focused the district court’s attention on 

application note 2, with the weight of the government’s recommendation behind it. This recommendation had extra 

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force because it included a specific number that was far 

above the applicable guidelines range. As we suggested in 

United States v. Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2010), 

a case determining whether an objected-to breach merited 

reversal of a sentence, the effects of a breach are particularly 

hard to eliminate when the prosecutor demonstrates a 

“strong commitment to a sentence” and does nothing to retract the recommendation that breaches the plea agreement. 

And while, of course, the judge would have been free on his 

own to refer to application note 2, this remains an adversarial system in which parties and their counsel play essential 

roles in framing the choices for the judge. The improper upper guidelines number offered by the government may well 

have anchored the district judge to an inflated sentencing 

range. We conclude that, had the government’s initial recommendation started at a lower point, Navarro likely would 

have received a lower sentence. See United States v. Ingram, 

721 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (discussing how “anchoring effects” influence judgments and 

noting that the court “cannot be confident that judges who 

begin” at a higher guidelines range “would end up reaching 

the same ‘appropriate’ sentence they would have reached” if 

they started from a lower guidelines range); see also Hon. 

Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” 

and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution 

for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 489, 492 (2014) (discussing the “potential robust and 

powerful anchoring effect” of the sentencing guidelines and 

“the effect of the ‘bias blind spot’ in determining just sentences”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1124

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No. 12-2606 13

(1974) (classic theoretical work on how framing and expectations influence judgment).

The government could have avoided a breach by seeking 

an enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1(b), and stopping there 

once the court determined that the enhancement did not apply. Then, the government could have recommended a maximum sentence of 235 months in prison, the high end of the 

applicable sentencing guidelines range. Had the government 

done so, the district court would have received recommendations of 188 and 235 months. We conclude that if the district court were faced with these recommendations, it is likely that Navarro would have received a more lenient sentence 

than 262 months in prison. 

After finding that the first three elements of the plain error standard are met, we have “the discretion to remedy the 

error.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. The Supreme Court cautions 

that we should exercise that discretion “only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the government’s breach, even if inadvertent, seriously undermines 

the fairness and integrity of Navarro’s sentence. 

In addition to the waivers of rights inherent in all guilty 

pleas, Navarro waived his right to seek a downward departure at sentencing. Navarro’s counsel followed through on 

this promise, requesting a sentence “at the lower end of the 

guidelines.” Sent. Tr. 133. In exchange for his plea, Navarro 

received a two-level reduction in his guidelines range for acceptance of responsibility, as well as the government’s promises to refrain from seeking an upward departure and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range. We have 

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previously recognized the importance of such promises in 

enticing a defendant to plead guilty. Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d at

694 (“The government’s recommendation for lenity is an important part of the consideration for a defendant’s entering a 

plea of guilty[.]”). 

But the government failed to honor its promises when it 

advocated for an upward departure and then recommended 

a sentence more than seven years longer than the high end of 

the guidelines range. “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant 

degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that 

it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 

such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. 

We find that reversal is appropriate because the government’s breach seriously undermined the fairness and integrity of Navarro’s sentence. On resentencing, the government is 

required to strictly abide by the terms of the plea agreement. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of 

the district court and remand for resentencing.1

 

1 Where the government has breached a plea agreement based on its 

sentencing recommendation, our usual course is to remand for resentencing before a different judge. See Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d at 694 (“[A] 

minimum remedy [for breach of a plea agreement] is specific performance and resentencing by a different judge.”). However, Navarro requests that the case be remanded back to Chief Judge Reagan given his 

familiarity with the conspiracy. Because Navarro does not oppose resentencing by the same judge, and in fact specifically requests it, we will 

abide by that request.

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