Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01917/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01917-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Venkataramana Adapa
Defendant
First Advantage Corporation
Defendant
Albert Lacondeguy
Plaintiff
Jagdish Ambalal Patel
Defendant
Ian Thomas Pulliam
Defendant
Tracy Occupational Medical Center
Defendant
John Burleson Womack
Defendant
YRC, Inc.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT LACONDEGUY,

Plaintiff,

v.

VENKATARAMANA ADAPA, M.D.; 

JAGDISH AMBALAL PATEL, M.D.; 

individually and dba TRACY 

OCCUPATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; IAN 

THOMAS PULLIAM, D.O.; FIRST 

ADVANTAGE CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; JOHN 

BURLESON WOMACK, M.D., YRC, 

INC., a Delaware Corporation; 

and DOES 1 through 51, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

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Case No. 2:10-CV-1917-JAM-KJM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT FIRST 

ADVANTAGE CORPORATIONS‟S 

MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant First 

Advantage Corporation‟s (“Defendant‟s”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9), 

Plaintiff Albert Lacondeguy‟s (“Plaintiff‟s”) Complaint (Doc. 1), 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 10). This 

motion was set for hearing on September 15, 2010 and ordered 

Case 2:10-cv-01917-JAM -EFB Document 16 Filed 01/03/11 Page 1 of 9
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submitted on the briefs.1 For the reasons set forth below, 

Defendant‟s motion is granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter was originally filed in the Superior Court of San 

Joaquin County, and was removed (Doc. 1) to this Court by defendant 

YRC Inc. (not a party to this motion), based on federal question 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff‟s Complaint is based on alleged violations 

of federal drug testing regulations, and Plaintiff was a union 

member whose suit against employer YRC, Inc. falls under the Labor 

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-195. Though YRC, Inc. 

has since been dismissed from the lawsuit (Doc. 10, ex. 1), this 

Court continues to have jurisdiction due to the alleged violation 

of federal drug testing regulations.

Plaintiff‟s Complaint alleges that he was a truck driver and 

member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The 

Complaint alleges that on or about August 14, 2009, Plaintiff was 

required to submit to a random drug test pursuant to federal 

regulations, which required him to produce a urine sample. The 

drug test was performed at Tracy Occupational Medical Center (not a 

party to this motion). Plaintiff alleges he was unable to produce 

a urine sample, and was thus referred for a physical evaluation by 

a doctor. Plaintiff alleges that the examining doctors (not 

parties to this motion) failed to diagnose a pre-existing condition 

that prevented him from producing a urine sample. The evaluation 

was then sent for review to a medical review officer (“MRO”), Dr. 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L. R. 230(g). 

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Womack. The Complaint further alleges that Dr. Womack erroneously 

verified the results as “positive” the same day as he received the 

results, and failed to contact Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that 

these actions violated the Code of Federal Regulations and its 

provisions governing drug testing and medical review. Plaintiff 

was terminated from his employment in August 2009 following the 

drug test. Defendant employed Dr. Womack and provided YRC, Inc. 

with the medical review services that are required for federally 

mandated drug testing. 

The Complaint brings state law claims for relief for 

negligence of the examining doctors, negligence of the medical 

review officer, and fraud and interference with contract. The two 

claims brought against Defendant are the claim for negligence of 

the medical review officer, and the claim for fraud and 

interference with contract. Defendant argues that both claims 

should be dismissed.2

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure section 12(b)(6). 

Defendant‟s motion to dismiss states in a footnote that it 

already filed an Answer to the Complaint, therefore its motion to 

 

2 Defendant argues for dismissal on its own behalf, and states that 

while Dr. Womack has not yet been served, the same arguments would 

apply to his dismissal from the suit. As Dr. Womack is not a party 

to the present motion, the Court will not opine on the sufficiency

of the allegations against him, nor does the Court‟s order on this 

matter apply to Dr. Womack. 

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dismiss should be considered a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Aldabe v. 

Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1115 (9th Cir. 1980). The Answer was 

presumably filed in the Superior Court, as it is not before the 

Court. However, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 

equivalent to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the standard of 

review is the same. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, the Court‟s analysis is the 

same for a 12(b)(6) motion and 12(c) motion, irrespective of the 

previously filed Answer. 

In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court 

must accept all the allegations in the complaint as true and 

construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Id. However, conclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences are 

insufficient to defeat a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In 

re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

It must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 

relief. Sun Savings and Loan Ass‟n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 

(9th Cir. 1987). 

In addition to considering the allegations of the 

complaint, like a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court may also take into account materials to which it 

can take judicial notice. A Rule 12(c) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings may consequently be granted 

if, after assessing both the complaint, plus matters 

for which judicial notice is proper, it appears beyond 

doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove any facts 

that would support his claim for relief.

Morgan v. County of Yolo, 436 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 

2006) (internal citations omitted).

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B. Claims for Relief

1. Negligence

Plaintiff‟s claim for negligence alleges that Dr. Womack, the 

doctor who reviewed Plaintiff‟s medical evaluation, acted 

negligently in his review and in reporting the evaluation results 

to Plaintiff‟s employer. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Womack was 

required under federal drug laws to contact Plaintiff before 

verifying the evaluation results, and if unable to contact 

Plaintiff, wait ten days before verifying the evaluation results as 

a positive drug test. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Womack 

verified the results as positive on the same day he received the 

evaluation, and failed to contact Plaintiff. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Dr. Womack refused to consider evidence that Plaintiff 

sent him, which Plaintiff alleges showed Plaintiff suffered from a 

long term inability to urinate. Plaintiff alleges violation of 

both statutory duties and common law duties of care, and alleges 

that Dr. Womack‟s negligence was the legal and proximate cause of 

Plaintiff‟s termination from his employment. 

Though the claim does not mention Defendant, Defendant was Dr. 

Womack‟s employer. Defendant argues that it and Dr. Womack 

followed federal drug test procedure that an MRO is required to 

follow, and Plaintiff is attempting to add additional duties that 

are not contained in the drug testing regulations.

When an employee is unable to produce an adequate sample, the 

“shy bladder” regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 40.193 applies. See 49 

C.F.R. § 40.193; Melman v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 

2010 WL 3063805, *7 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2010). Upon notice of an 

employee‟s inability to produce an adequate sample, an employer 

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must direct its employee to obtain an evaluation from a licensed 

physician with expertise in the medical issues raised by the 

employee‟s failure to provide a sufficient specimen. 49 C.F.R. 

§ 40.193(c). The physician evaluating the employee must recommend 

the MRO determine either that a medical condition has, or with a 

high degree of probability could have, precluded the employee from 

providing a sufficient amount of urine, or that there is no 

adequate basis for determining that a medical condition has, or 

with a high degree of probability could have, precluded the 

employee from providing a sufficient amount of urine. 49 C.F.R. 

§ 40.193(d). The MRO must seriously consider and assess the 

physician‟s recommendation before determining whether the medical 

condition satisfies section 40.193(e). If the MRO accepts the 

medical condition as valid, the test is cancelled. If the MRO 

rejects the physician‟s recommendation that a medical condition 

exists, or if the physician finds no medical condition, the MRO 

reports the result as a refusal to test. 49 C.F.R. 

§ 40.193(d)(2)(i). 

When the employee has provided a sufficient sample to test, 

and a laboratory confirmed test result indicates a substituted or 

adulterated test, the MRO is required to interview the employee 

prior to verifying the test as positive or cancelling it as 

invalid, except in specific situations where the employee refuses 

the opportunity to interview or is unreachable despite documented 

efforts to contact the employee over a period of time. 49 C.F.R. 

§ 40.133. 

Here, Plaintiff was unable to produce a urine sample, thus 

there was no laboratory confirmed test result for Defendant to 

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review and interview Plaintiff about, pursuant to sections 40.129 

and 40.133. Instead, Plaintiff was given a physical examination 

that was reviewed pursuant to section 40.193.

Without citation to any authority, Plaintiff‟s opposition 

brief argues that the Court should interpret section 40.193 as 

including the same employee interview requirement as sections

40.129 and 40.133. Plaintiff argues that failure to interview him 

constituted negligence on the part of Defendant. Plaintiff also 

raises a new argument in his opposition brief that due process

requires he receive the same procedural rights as other employees. 

The Court will not consider this new argument, as it was not raised 

in the Complaint. Moreover, as Defendant argues, the allegations 

of the Complaint confirm that Defendant and Dr. Womack followed the 

procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 40.193 for dealing with an 

insufficient sample in a “shy bladder” situation. Plaintiff is 

urging an interpretation that goes beyond the plain language of the 

C.F.R. and adds a new interview requirement and requirement to take 

into account extra materials sent in by an employee, when reviewing 

“shy bladder” physical evaluation. Neither the C.F.R. provision 

governing shy bladders, nor the C.F.R. provision requiring an 

interview when a laboratory test result is positive, adulterated or 

substituted, is ambiguous. Accordingly, the Court does not find 

that section 40.193 requires the MRO to interview Plaintiff or to 

consider extra materials sent in by Plaintiff. 

However, Plaintiff has alleged the Dr. Womack certified the 

test results as “positive.” Plaintiff reiterates this allegation 

in his opposition. Defendant in its motion to dismiss admits that 

“under federal drug testing regulation, however, a failure to 

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provide a urine specimen that is not due to a medical condition is 

a „refusal to test,‟ not a „positive.‟” Motion to Dismiss, FN 4 

(citing 49 C.F.R. § 40.193(d)(2)(i). The Court must take the 

allegations of the Complaint as true. Thus, if Dr. Womack did 

certify the test results as “positive,” rather than, “refusal to 

test,” this may constitute a violation of the C.F.R. and serve as

grounds to maintain the negligence claim against Defendant.

Plaintiff‟s Opposition to Defendant‟s motion appears to be based 

primarily on Dr. Womack not interviewing Plaintiff and not 

considering the additional materials sent in by Plaintiff. Neither 

of these allegations supports a finding that Defendant negligently 

violated federal regulations, and the Court will not allow 

amendment to further pursue these theories against Defendant. 

However, the Court will allow leave to amend the Complaint to the 

extent that Plaintiff wishes to pursue a negligence claim based on 

the certification of test results as “positive” rather than 

“refusal to test.” 

Additionally, to the extent that the Complaint attempted to 

hold Defendant responsible for common law negligence, this claim 

fails. The Complaint includes only one conclusory allegation that 

Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, unsupported by factual 

allegations. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not address or oppose 

Defendant‟s arguments for dismissal of the common law negligence 

allegations. Accordingly, the Court grants judgment on the 

pleadings in Defendant‟s favor with respect to the common law 

negligence claim and the statutory negligence claim. Plaintiff is 

granted leave to amend the statutory negligence claim. 

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2. Fraud/Conspiracy/Interference with Contract

Plaintiff‟s second claim against Defendant alleged civil 

conspiracy to cause wrongful termination through fraud and/or 

interference with contract. Defendant moved for dismissal on the 

grounds that Plaintiff failed to raise sufficient allegations to 

state a claim. Plaintiff‟s Opposition brief did not address 

Defendant‟s motion to dismiss this claim, and did not oppose its 

dismissal. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed, with prejudice. 

III. ORDER

Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss (converted to a Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings) is GRANTED. 

1. The claim captioned “Negligence of Medical Review 

Officer” is dismissed, with leave to amend the statutory negligence 

component consistent with the Court‟s order as discussed above. 

2. The common law negligence component of the above claim is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

3. The claim captioned “Fraud & Interference With Contract” 

is dismissed with prejudice.

If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint against 

Defendant, he must do so within twenty (20) days of the date of 

this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 31, 2010

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