Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02778/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02778-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Clayton Neu
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff/Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES CLAYTON NEU, 

Defendant/Appellant. 

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ROBERT L. HO.EC.KER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2778 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. 88-CR-106) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

Michael J. Norton, Acting United States Attorney, and F. aoseph 

Mackey, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Harvey A. Steinberg, Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

James Clayton N~u appeals from a judgment of the United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado. Neu had 

tendered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

ll(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal from the judgment, 

specifically to review the adverse determination made on his 

pretrial Motion to Suppress. R. Vol. II at 56-59. On this 

Appellate Case: 88-2778 Document: 01019569280 Date Filed: 07/17/1989 Page: 1 
appeal, Neu renews the argument made in connection with that 

motion, i.e., whether the stop and detention of Neu was pretextual, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 

On July 22, 1987 in the mid morning, Trooper Ralph Martinez 

of the Colorado State Patrol first observed Neu driving a HarleyDavidson motorcycle South on Main Street in Lamar, a small town in 

Colorado. R. Vol. II at 10-11. Martinez testified that his 

attention was attracted to the motorcycle because it had an open 

exhaust system, and such systems often produce excessive noise, a 

violation of state law. Id. at 11. Martinez further testified 

that other law enforcement agencies had warned that members of the 

Hell's Angels organization might possibly be passing through 

Lamar. Id. at 13. In this connection, Martinez had been 

requested to keep a record of any sightings of motorcycles passing 

through the town. Martinez had already complied with this request 

by reporting a number of sightings. Id. at 14. 

Martinez spotted the motorcycle again some two hours later. 

At this time, he requested a check on the license plate number, 

but mistakenly reported the plates as Missouri plates. 2 Because 

of the error, the dispatcher informed Martinez that no record was 

found. Id. at 12. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the cause is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 The plate was actually an Arizona plate. Martinez testified 

that his error was due to the similar coloration of the two 

plates. Id. at 14. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2778 Document: 01019569280 Date Filed: 07/17/1989 Page: 2 
.' .'., \ ' _._~-- _.,.,· .• •· -c',"-.• • .:-... _ .. , .• 

The third and final sighting occurred at around 12:45 p.m. 

Martinez, who was driving a marked patrol cruiser, noticed Neu 

driving the motorcycle northbound on Main Street out of Lamar. 

Martinez made a U-turn on Main Street in an effort to follow Neu 

in order to verify his license plate number and state. He was 

also looking for any insignia, symbols, or markings that would 

identify Neu as belonging to the Hell's Angels or some other such 

organization in accordance with the request that had been made of 

him. Id. at 16. In order to read the small motorcycle plate, 

about half the size of an automobile plate, Martinez had to follow 

Neu at a close distance -- within a car's length. Id. at 16, 38. 

Martinez called in the plate number, this time identifying the 

plate as an Arizona plate. 

Martinez estimates that he and Neu were traveling at between 

55 and 60 miles per hour on the highway north of town. The posted 

limit was 50 miles per hour. Suddenly, Neu decelerated abruptly 

to somewhere between 10 and 15 miles per hour. Id. at 17. 

Martinez was compelled to apply his brakes immediately to avoid a 

collision. More specifically, Martinez testified, "If I wouldn't 

have hit my brakes and hit them pretty hard, I would have run over 

the defendant, James c. Neu." Id .. at 43 • 

. Martinez testified that he believed Neu's deceleration 

violated Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1003 by impeding traffic. 3 R. 

3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1003 provides: 

"Minimum speed regulation. (1) No person shall drive a 

motor vehicle on any highway at such a slow speed as to impede or 

block the normal and reasonable forward movement of traffic, 

except when a reduced speed is necessary for safe operation of 

such vehicle or in compliance with law." 

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Appellate Case: 88-2778 Document: 01019569280 Date Filed: 07/17/1989 Page: 3 
Vol. II at 20-21. He promptly pulled Neu over. Martinez asked 

Neu whether or not he had moved into Lamar. When Neu advised he 

was just passing through, Martinez asked him if he had a driver's 

license. Id. at 21. Neu responded that he had left it in a motel 

in Dallas, Texas. Instead, he presented a business card with the 

name ''James New" on it. Neu also presented a valid Arizona title 

to the motorcycle he was driving. During this time, Martinez 

noticed that Neu had a "large sum" of money in his wallet. Id. at 

22. 

Because Neu did not have a valid driver's license on his 

person, Martinez placed Neu under arrest. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 42-2-lOl(l)(a)(I). Martinez conducted a pat-down search of Neu, 

discovering a loaded .38 revolver in the left boot holster. 

Subsequent searches of the motorcycle revealed a loaded .9 mm 

handgun in a bag, several hundred rounds o_f ammunition, a recipe 

for the production of amphetamines, and a grenade. 4 Subsequent 

searches of Neu revealed quantities of marijuana and amphetamines. 

The sole issue on this appeal is whether or not Trooper 

Martinez acted within the strictures of the Fourth Amendment when 

he initially stopped Neu for impeding traffic. Neu concedes that 

after he revealed that he did not have a driver's license on his 

person, Martinez had probable cause to arrest. Neu also concedes 

4 It was possession of the grenade that formed the basis for 

Count Two of the indictment against Neu, and under agreement 

between the defense and the prosecution this was the only count 

remaining by the time of the pretrial hearing and the one to which 

Neu pled guilty. See 26 u.s.c. §§ 5845(a)(8) and (f), 586l(d) and 

5871. -

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Appellate Case: 88-2778 Document: 01019569280 Date Filed: 07/17/1989 Page: 4 
that all subsequent searches and seizures of evidence then would 

have been proper. 

The standard of review for denial of a motion to suppress is 

settled. We must accept findings of fact by the court below 

unless clearly erroneous. If or where findings are not made, this 

court must uphold the ruling if there is any reasonable view of 

the evidence to support it. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 

1110, 1111 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 733 

F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Threat v. United 

States, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984)). 

A traffic stop, such as the one involved here, is ordinarily 

a limited seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

Thus, it is subject to the less rigorous requirements of Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), rather than the more stringent 

constitutional strictures of a custodial arrest. Since Trooper 

Martinez testified that arrest would not have been the accepted 

practice for the traffic violation of impeding traffic, we analyze 

this case under Terry. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 

1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Terry provides a two-step inquiry for constitutional 

"unreasonableness":. "whether the officer's action was justified 

at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope 

to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. See also Guzman, 864 F.2d at 

1518. The constitutionally required level of suspicion typically 

required for a Terry stop falls short of the probable cause 

standard (i.e., probable cause to believe that the person being 

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Appellate Case: 88-2778 Document: 01019569280 Date Filed: 07/17/1989 Page: 5 
stopped has violated, is violating, or is about to violate the 

law). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27. To stop a motor vehicle, one 

must have "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that 

.•• either the vehicle or an occupant is ••• subject to 

seizure for violation of law." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 

663 (1979). Thus, a traffic detention will certainly be justified 

if probable cause for the seizure does in fact exist, whether or 

not a traffic court does or would find the person guilty of the 

alleged infraction. Cf. United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 

1454 (10th Cir. 1985). 

As to the scope of investigative action permitted in a 

routine traffic stop, an officer may request to see the driver's 

license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue 

a citation. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. Cf. Recalde, 761 F •. 2d at 

1455. To assure that the traffic stop is not a pretext for an 

officer to investigate unrelated criminal activity for which the 

officer does not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to 

support a detention, this court in Guzman imposed an objective 

test: "a court should ask 'not whether the officer could validly 

have made the stop, but whether under the same circumstances a 

reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the 

invalid purpose."' Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th 

Cir. 1986). The subjective intent of the officer is not material. 

See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518. 

We believe the facts as found by the district court support 

its conclusion that the stop was constitutionally reasonable, and 

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thus that all evidence obtained as a consequence was lawfully 

obtained. Although it is true, as the district court recognized, 

that Trooper Martinez concededly made a "couple [of] very bad 

errors of judgment" in his pursuit of Neu, specifically in making 

the U-turn, speeding through town, and following Neu so closely, 

the actions of Martinez cannot excuse the response of Neu. R. 

Vol. II at 54-55. The court clearly found that Neu's deceleration 

was unreasonably abrupt, so abrupt that it nearly caused an 

accident. "[E]ven though tail-gating is very dangerous, so is 

slamming on your brakes when someone is close behind you." Id. at 

55. We see no reason to disturb this factual finding, and thus we 

accept the court's conclusion that Martinez had probable cause to 

believe Neu had violated the traffic laws. Id. at 56. It does 

not matter whether Neu might eventually have been vindicated in 

traffic cou~t. 

It also does not matter what lingering suspicions Martinez in 

fact might have harbored against the "biker.'' We only ask whether 

a reasonable officer would have stopped a motorist under the same 

traffic circumstances as involved here. We find it wholly 

credible to believe that a reasonable law officer would have 

reacted similarly in stopping and citing Neu. Martinez did stop 

Neu and requested his driver's license, a request completely in 

keeping with the scope of a traffic detention. Accordingly, we 

accept the court's conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation 

occurred. The court properly denied the motion to suppress. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

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