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Parties Involved:
John William Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JOHN WILLIAM THOMAS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant~ ) 

FILED 

United State8 Court of Appeals 

·tenth Circuit 

SEP S ... 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2418 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 88-14-CR) 

Michael w. Lilley, of Lilley & Macias, P.A., Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for the Defendant-Appellant-. 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Larry Gomez, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the 

.Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from a sentence imposed by the United 

States District Court for the District of New Mexico, applying the 

Sentencing Guidelines, 18 u.s.c. app. §§ 1Bl.l-7Al.4 (guidelines). 

The issue on appeal is whether the guidelines violate the due 

process clause of the fifth amendment. With respect to the 

arguments raised in this appeal we hold that they do not and 

affirm. 1 

John William Thomas was found guilty by jury verdict of 

possession with intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of 

marijuana in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l), (b)(l)(C). After 

the jury verdict but prior to sentencing, Thomas filed a motion to 

declare the guidelines unconstitutional. The trial judge 

implicitly denied this motion by sentencing Thomas under the 

guidelines, but nevertheless assigned an alternative sentence in 

the event the guidelines were ultimately adjudged 

unconstitutional. 

Thomas offers three arguments on appeal, all of which are 

premised upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 

First, he argues that the sentencing procedures established by the 

guidelines unlawfully limit a sentencing court's ability to 

evaluate the particular circumstances of the defendant's case and 

to impose an appropriate sentence. Second, he argues that the 

sentencing process unlawfully prohibits a defendant from 

"meaningful participation" in sentencing by limiting his ability 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unan_imously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 2 
to present evidence r~levant to sentencing. Finally, he argues 

that the guidelines unlawfully allow the prosecutor and the United 

States Sentencing Commission rather than the sentencing judge to 

determine a defendant's sentence. 

I. 

The United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) "is a 

body created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended 

(Act), 18 u.s.c. § 3551 et.~ (1982 ed., Supp. IV), and 28 

u.s.c. §§ 991-998 (1982 ed., Supp. IV)." Mistretta v. United 

States, 109 s. Ct. 647, 649 (1989). The Commission is comprised 

of the Attorney General or his designee, who is a nonvoting ex 

officio member, and seven voting members appointed by the 

President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 u.s.c. 

§ 99l(a). At least three of the voting member.s must be federal 

judges selected from a list recommended by the Judicial Conference 

of the United States. Id. The Act empowers the Commission to 

"promulgate and distribute to all courts of the Uni~ed 

States ••• guidelines ••. for use of a sentencing court in 

determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case." Id . • 

§ 994(a)(l). The Commission must ensure that these guidelines 

"provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of 

sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 

similar criminal conduct, while maintaining sufficient flexibility 

to permit individualized sentences when warranted." Id. 

§ 99l(b)(l)(B). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 3 
The Act ~rovides detailed instructions to the Commission 

regarding the development of the guidelines. The guidelines must 

establish a recommended range of determinate sentences based in 

part on categories of offenses and the history and characteristics 

of the defendant. 2 In general, a sentencing court must select a 

sentence within a guideline's range but may depart from the 

guidelines if it "finds that there exists an aggravating or 

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the guidelines." 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b). If a sentencing 

court departs from the guidelines, it must state the "specific 

2 A range is determined according to a sentencing table which 

categorizes the characteristics of an offense and of the offender. 

The Act instructs the Commission to establish the categories of 

offenses after considering seven facto~s: (1) the grade of the 

offense; (2) the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the 

offense; (3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the 

offense; (4) the community view of the gravity of the crime; (5) 

the public concern generated by the crime; (6) the deterrent 

effect that a particular sentence may have on others; and (7) the 

current incidence of the offense. 28 u.s.c. § 994(c)(l)-(7). The 

Act instructs the Commission to establish the categories of 

defendants after considering 11 factors, including the offender's 

age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, 

physical condition (including drug or alcohol dependence), 

previous employment record, family ties and ~esponsibilities, 

community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree 

of dependence upon crime for a livelihood. Id. at§ 994(d)(l)-

(ll). Both the offense and the criminal history categories work 

in point systems: after a district court finds the base offense 

level and criminal history category of ~ach defendant, it can 

adjust by accounting for a variety of factors listed in the 

guidelines. See 18 u.s.c. app. §§ 2Al.l-4B1.3. These are 

categorized according to the nature of the offense, the offender's 

role in the offence, whether the offender obstructed the 

proceeding in any wayu whether the offender accepted 

responsibility for his actions, and the offender's criminal 

history. See id. at§§ 3Al.l-3El.l. The court then refers to the 

sentencing table, which integrates the offense and defendant 

categories to provide the appropriate sentencing range. See id. 

at ch. 5, part A. The defendant can dispute any of the factual 

findings used to determine the sentencing range. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 4 
reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that 

described." Id.§ 3553(c). 

In January 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the 

constitutionality of the guidelines and the Act against challenges 

that the Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of 

legislative authority and that, together with the guidelines, the 

Act violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 

Mistretta, 109 s.ct. 647 (1989). Although the Supreme Court did 

not review a due process challenge to the guidelines, every 

circuit court addressing such challenges has refused to find a due 

process violation. See United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21 (4th 

Cir. 1989); United States Y.!.. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989); 

United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1989); United 

States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1989); United States~ 

Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1989); United States Y.!_ White, 

869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert·. denied, 109 S. Ct. 

3172 (1989); United States Y.!.. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 

1989); United States Y.!.. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989). 

We have carefully considered the Thomas' due process 

arguments in light of his other circuit decisions, and we conclude 

that his arguments are without merit. We join the other circuits 

and hold that the Act and the guidelines promulgated thereunder do 

not violate Thomas' due process rights. 

II. 

Thomas' first claim is essentially that the sentencing 

guidelines are violative of his due process right to have a judge 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 5 
make a discretionary individualized determination of an 

appropriate sentence. To support his argument, Thomas relies on 

several district court opinions holding that there is a due 

process right to individualized sentencing. See,~, United 

States Y.!. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v. 

Elliott, 684 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Colo. 1988); United States v. 

Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd in part, 864 F.2d 992 

(3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit reviewed and rejected one of 

these district court opinions, holding that there is no federal 

substantive liberty interest in an individualized determination of 

an appropriate sentence. See Frank, 864 F.2d at 1008-10. We 

agree with the Third Circuit. 

Although there are certain recognized substantive limits upon 

congressional power to determine sentences for federal offenses, 

see id. at 1008-09, none of these substantive limits have been 

transgressed in this case. The sta~utory scheme here permits 

departure from the guidelines in a proper case, and has not 

withdrawn all discretion from the sentencing court. 

Under the Guidelines, sentencing judges retain 

discretion to accept or reject a plea bargain, to 

resolve factual disputes about the appropriate base 

offense level, to consider adjusting that base level for 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to choose from 

a range of sentences, to set probation conditions, and 

to determine when to depart from the Guidelines. 

Brittman, 872 F.2d at 828. Under historically accepted criteria, 

a sentence remains highly individualized, since the guidelines 

consider traditional factors such as the defendant's criminal 

history, the degree of seriousness of the crime, and a 

categorization of criminal offenses. Seluk, 873 F.2d at 17. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 6 
As the Third Circuit noted, although "[w]e can conceive of 

sentencing guidelines imposing sentences short of the death 

sentence which are so disproportionate that they might be held to 

be cruel and unusual punishment[,] ••• [t)he [challenged] 

guideline sentences are, if anything, a move forward, rather than 

away from, proportionality in sentencing." Frank, 864 F.2d at 

1009. 

Further, we agree that the recognition of individualized 

treatment in sentencing as a right inherent in the human condition 

would "be inconsistent with the generally accepted notion that 

both retribution, which focuses on the interests of the victim 

rather than the status of the defendant, and general deterrence, 

which focuses on the interests of society at large rather than the 

status of the defendant, are appropriate societal versions for 

imposing sanctions." Id. at 1009-10. The Second Circuit 

addressed the question of a due process right to individualized 

sentencing by simply noting that if such a substantive right· -

existed, it most likely would have been recognized by this time, 

"in light of the variety of mandatory minimum sentencing practices 

that have been implemented in this country." Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 

at 56. Other circuits are in accord. See Bolding, 876 F.2d at 

22-23 ("It is undisputed that Congress may enact mandatory and 

determinate sentencing laws, and it follows that Congress may 

effect the same circumscription of sentencing discretion through 

the delegation of such power to the Guidelines Commission."); 

Seluk, 873 F.2d at 16 ("We find the contention that Congress can 

constitutionally mandate a sentence for a particular crime, but 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 7 
cannot, consistent with due process, legislate a comprehensive but 

flexible sentencing scheme, to be counterintuitive at best."); 

White, 869 F.2d at 825 ("If Congress can remove the sentencing 

discretion of the district courts, it certainly may guide that 

discretion through the guidelines."); Allen, 873 F.2d at 965 

(quoting White). 

The Supreme Court, moreover, has rejected several times in 

dicta the argument that there is a constitutional right to 

individualized sentencing in noncapital cases. Most recently, the 

Court stated in Mistretta that "the scope of judicial discretion 

with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control." 

Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 650 (citing ex parte United States, 242 

U.S. 27 (1916)). In another decision, Chief Justice Burger stated 

that, "in noncapital cases, the established practice of 

individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but 

on public policy enacted into statutes." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 

U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality). 

We agree that because Congress has the power to completely 

divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and to establish 

exact, mandatory sentences for all offenses, Congress may 

circumscribe the court's sentencing discretion through the 

guidelines •. Thomas refers us to no Supreme Court or appellate 

court opinion that identifies a constitutional guarantee to the 

discretionary, individualized determination of a criminal 

sentence. Accordingly, we hold that no substantive due process 

violation exists. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 8 
III. 

Thomas next contends that the sentencing guidelines violate 

his procedural due process rights because they deprive him of 

"meaningful participation'' in the sentencing process by limiting 

the factors relevant to sentencing. Thomas identifies the liberty 

interest at stake as the deprivation of personal liberty that is 

almost invariably the result of sentencing. Again, we disagree. 

Procedurally, the only difference between the sentencing 

process under the guidelines and the prior indeterminate 

sentencing system is the reduction of the sentencing court's 

discretion. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d at 57. Thomas' argument that he 

was not allowed "meaningful participation" in the sentencing 

process is basically another version of the individualized 

sentencing argument we have already rejected. The guidelines 

provid~ "satisfactory procedural safeguards to satisfy the demands 

of the due process clause." Id. at 56. The guidelines define 

explicitly the means by which a court should determine a sentence, 

and require a sentencing court to justify any departure. See 18 

u.s.c. § 3553(c). A defendant "has the right to appear, to offer 

evidence, and to challenge the Government's evidence." Vizcaino, 

870 F.2d at 56. Finally, the primary purpose of the guidelines is 

to promote certainty and fairness in sentencing, not to diminish 

these factors. We hold that the guidelines are procedurally 

adequate for due process purposes. 

IV. 

Thomas argues, finally, that the guidelines 

unconstitutionally allow the prosecutor and the United States 

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Appellate Case: 88-2418 Document: 01019896198 Date Filed: 09/05/1989 Page: 9 
Sentencing Commission to determine a defendant's sentence. Thomas 

argues that, in effect, the Sentencing Commission sets a 

defendant's sentence because the guidelines it has established 

reduce a court's sentencing discretion in order to make all 

sentences basically determinate. This argument merely restates 

the claim of a right to a discretionary assessment of an 

appropriate sentence, which we have already rejected. 

Thomas contends further that, under the guidelines, the 

prosecutor can control the length of a defendant's sentence by 

management of the charging of offenses and plea bargaining 

practices. Thomas does not show, however~ how his rights were 

violated in this way. Thomas was convicted as charged following a 

one-count indictment; he offers no evidence of bad faith or 

discrimination on the part of the prosecutor at any time during 

the criminal proceedings. Further, the Supreme Court has -

recognized that the prosecutor has broad discretion to determine 

what charges to bring. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 

124 (1979). When the evidence against a defendant will support 

conviction under more than one statute, moreover, the Supreme 

Court has stated that "[t]he prosecutor may be influenced by the 

penalties available upon conviction, but this fact, standing 

alone, does not give rise to a violation of the equal protection 

or due process clause.ir Id. at 125. Accordingly, we· reject 

Thomas' final argument. 

We hold that the Act and the guidelines promulgated 

thereunder do not violate Thomas's due process rights. 

AFFIRMED. 

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