Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03271/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03271-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mariano A. Meza-Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3271 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MARIANO A. MEZA-RODRIGUEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 13-CR-192 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JUNE 5, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges. 

WOOD, Chief Judge. When Mariano Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in August 2013, he was carrying 

a .22 caliber cartridge. But it was what he did not have—

documentation showing that he is lawfully in the United 

States—that concerns us now. His immigration status made 

his possession of the cartridge a crime under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(5), which prohibits foreigners who are not entitled 

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to be in the United States (whom we will call “unauthorized 

aliens”) from possessing firearms. Meza-Rodriguez moved 

to dismiss the indictment that followed, arguing that 

§ 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringed on his rights under the 

Second Amendment to the Constitution. The district court 

denied his motion on the broad ground that the Second 

Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. That rationale swept too far, and we do not endorse it. The court’s 

judgment, however, was correct for a different reason: the 

Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on 

the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by 

§ 922(g)(5). 

I 

Meza-Rodriguez was brought to this country by his family when he was four or five years old. Without ever regularizing his status, he has remained here since that time. His 

current troubles began just before midnight on August 24, 

2013, when City of Milwaukee police officers responded to a 

report that an armed man was at a local bar. The officers obtained a surveillance video showing a man pointing an object that resembled a firearm. Witnesses later identified that 

man as Meza-Rodriguez. A few hours later, the same officers 

responded to a different report of a fight at a neighboring 

bar. The officers broke up the fight and recognized MezaRodriguez as the man from the surveillance video. After a 

foot chase, they apprehended him and patted him down. 

This brief search turned up a .22 caliber cartridge in his 

shorts pocket. 

The government later filed an indictment alleging that 

Meza-Rodriguez had violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). That 

statute states, in pertinent part, that: 

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No. 14-3271 3

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... 

(5) who, being an alienȭ

(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United 

States; 

or 

(B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has 

been admitted to the United States under a 

nonimmigrant visa ... 

to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any 

firearm or ammunition ... . 

Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment on the 

ground that § 922(g)(5) imposes an unconstitutional restraint 

on his Second Amendment right to bear arms. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the 

motion, relying in part on the conclusion that the Second 

Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. The district court concurred and denied Meza-Rodriguez’s motion. 

Meza-Rodriguez then pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement with the government and preserved this issue for appeal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). The district court sentenced Meza-Rodriguez to time served with no supervised 

release, and he was later removed to Mexico. MezaRodriguez filed a timely notice of appeal from his conviction. 

II 

Before addressing the merits, we must ensure that MezaRodriguez’s removal to Mexico has not rendered his appeal 

moot. We may not entertain this appeal unless it represents a 

live case or controversy. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. To satisCase: 14-3271 Document: 34 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 19
4 No. 14-3271 

fy this requirement, Meza-Rodriguez “must have suffered, 

or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis 

v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). A person cannot continue to litigate “unless he can show a reasonable 

probability of obtaining a tangible benefit from winning.” 

Diaz v. Duckworth, 143 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998). A convicted person who already has served his sentence must 

point to “some concrete and continuing injury,” i.e., “some 

‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction.” Spencer, 523 U.S. 

at 7. 

With the benefit of supplemental briefing from the parties, for which we thank them, we are satisfied that MezaRodriguez meets this standard. The immigration laws declare that any person who has been removed from the United States and who has committed an aggravated felony is 

permanently inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 

As matters presently stand, Meza-Rodriguez meets both requirements for this permanent bar: he has been removed, 

and his violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) is an aggravated 

felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). 

Indeed, it is possible, though not certain, that a § 

922(g)(5) violation might also qualify as a crime involving 

moral turpitude (CIMT). The latter term is not defined by 

statute, see Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734, 737 (7th 

Cir. 2013), but the Board of Immigration Appeals and the 

courts have offered definitions. The Board has said that 

moral turpitude is “conduct that is inherently base, vile, or 

depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the 

duties owed other persons ... .” See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 

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F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing the definition used by 

the Board in its case and deferring to it). This court has suggested that such crimes are both “deliberately committed 

and ‘serious,’ either in terms of the magnitude of the loss 

that it causes or the indignation that it arouses in the lawabiding public.” Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th 

Cir. 2005); see also Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 

2004) (discussing difficulty of creating a clear definition of 

the term). Persons who have been convicted of a CIMT are 

also inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 

Thus, if Meza-Rodriguez loses this appeal, he cannot return to the United States. If he wins, he does not face a permanent bar to admission. The possibility of returning to this 

country is a “tangible benefit” to Meza-Rodriguez; likewise, 

his current inability to reenter is a “concrete and continuing 

injury.” The appeal is therefore not moot. 

The decision in Diaz might appear at first glance to be in 

some tension with that conclusion, but a closer look shows 

that it is not. Diaz also involved an unauthorized alien who 

had completed his sentence and had been removed from the 

country before we heard his appeal. See Diaz, 143 F.3d at 

346. But that is the extent of the similarity between that case 

and ours. Diaz did not contest the validity of his conviction. 

Instead, he argued—in a habeas corpus proceeding, rather 

than in a direct appeal—that he had been denied due process when the prison revoked some of his good-time credit, 

causing him to serve a longer sentence. See id. Our mootness 

finding did not depend on Diaz’s deportation; we concluded 

that there was no relief we could order because he already 

had completed his sentence. The only consequence of the extended prison time about which he was complaining was the 

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possibility that he might be subject to enhanced punishment 

for a future criminal violation. This possibility, we found, 

was too speculative to avoid mootness, particularly given 

the fact that Diaz already had been removed and thus was 

unlikely to commit future crimes within the country. See id. 

at 346–47. 

The consequences of Meza-Rodriguez’s conviction are 

not theoretical; his right ever to reenter the United States 

hangs in the balance. Diaz recognized that “statutory disabilities such as loss of the right to vote or the right to own a 

gun” are sufficient to save an appeal from mootness. Id. at 

346. Meza-Rodriguez faces a comparable statutory disability. 

Diaz thus actually supports our conclusion that this appeal 

presents a live controversy. See also United States v. Ashraf, 

628 F.3d 813, 822 (6th Cir. 2011) (defendant’s removal did 

not render appeal of his conviction moot because reversal 

“might affect the Attorney General’s discretionary decision 

to allow him back in the country”); United States v. QuezadaEnriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2009) (same, because 

reversal of the conviction “could provide Quezada–Enriquez 

with relief from the collateral consequences of conviction”); 

United States v. Jurado-Lara, 287 F. App’x 704, 707 (10th Cir. 

2008) (same with respect to appeal of a sentence, because a 

reduction in the sentence could affect the applicability of the 

aggravated felon bar); United States v. Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 

118–21 (2d Cir. 2005) (same for appeal of a sentence, because 

of the “substantial impact” a reduction in that sentence 

would have on defendant’s ability to obtain discretionary 

relief to be admitted into the country); Perez v. Greiner, 296 

F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting in dicta that a permanent 

bar on reentry was enough to prevent a habeas petition from 

becoming moot). We therefore find that this appeal is not 

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moot, and we move on to address Meza-Rodriguez’s substantive arguments. 

III

Meza-Rodriguez argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringes on his rights under the Second 

Amendment to the Constitution. We review the constitutionality of federal statutes de novo. See United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2006). 

A 

We first tackle the question whether the Second 

Amendment protects unauthorized non-U.S. citizens within 

our borders. The Amendment provides that “the right of the 

people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. 

CONST. amend. II. The Supreme Court has confirmed that 

this language confers an “individual right to possess and 

carry weapons.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 

592 (2008). But neither Heller nor any other Supreme Court 

decision has addressed the issue whether unauthorized 

noncitizens (or noncitizens at all) are among “the people” on 

whom the Amendment bestows this individual right. A few 

other courts of appeals have reached this issue, however, 

and have concluded, based on language in Heller, that the 

Amendment does not protect the unauthorized. See United 

States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012); United 

States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th 

Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 

1164, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to reach the issue 

because § 922(g)(5) passes intermediate scrutiny in any case). 

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This issue was not, however, before the Court in Heller. 

While some of Heller’s language does link Second Amendment rights with the notions of “law-abiding citizens” and 

“members of the political community,” see Heller, 554 U.S. at 

580, 625, those passages did not reflect an attempt to define 

the term “people.” We are reluctant to place more weight on 

these passing references than the Court itself did. See 

Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1168 (declining to infer such a 

rule both “because the question in Heller was the amendment’s raison d'être—does it protect an individual or collective right?—and aliens were not part of the calculus” and 

because nothing indicates that the Heller Court used the 

word ‘citizen’ deliberately to settle the question); see also 

Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 

2015) (“Heller does not purport to define the full scope of the 

Second Amendment.”). 

Other language in Heller supports the opposite result: 

that all people, including non-U.S. citizens, whether or not 

they are authorized to be in the country, enjoy at least some 

rights under the Second Amendment. (Although it is hard to 

find good data about the percentage of noncitizens in the 

United States before 1820, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.

DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 

STATES 1789-1945: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATISTICAL 

ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1949), available at 

http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/

HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945.pdf, immigration in the late 18th century was a common phenomenon. 

And such provisions as Article I, section 2, paragraph 2, 

which limits membership in the House of Representatives to 

persons who have been “seven Years a Citizen,” and Article 

II, section 1, paragraph 4, which requires the President to be 

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No. 14-3271 9

“a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at 

the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,” show that the 

drafters of the Constitution used the word “citizen” when 

they wanted to do so.) 

Heller noted the similarities between the Second 

Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, implying that the phrase “the people” (which occurs in all three) 

has the same meaning in all three provisions. See Heller, 554 

U.S. at 592 (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the 

Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, 

codified a pre-existing right.”); id. at 580 (noting that “the 

people” is “a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution,” including the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and 

Tenth Amendments) (quoting United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). An interpretation of the 

Second Amendment as consistent with the other amendments passed as part of the Bill of Rights has the advantage 

of treating identical phrasing in the same way and respecting the fact that the first ten amendments were adopted as a 

package. (We recognize that other uses of “the people” in the 

Constitution, including in section 2 of Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment, likely do not reflect this meaning. But 

the word appears in a different context in those provisions, 

which deal expressly with elections, not affirmative individual rights.) 

The conclusion that the term “the people” in the Second 

Amendment has the same meaning as it carries in other 

parts of the Bill of Rights is just the first step in our analysis. 

We still must decide what it means. The Supreme Court has 

spoken on this issue, albeit obliquely. In Verdugo-Urquidez, 

the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not 

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protect a noncitizen brought involuntarily to the United 

States against a warrantless search of his foreign residence. 

See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75. In rejecting Verdugo-Urquidez’s position, the Court stated that “‘the people’ 

protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and 

Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are 

reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a 

class of persons who are part of a national community or 

who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with 

this country to be considered part of that community.” Id. at 

265. Of interest here, the Court also said that “aliens receive 

constitutional protections when they have come within the 

territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” Id. at 271. It then contrasted 

Verdugo-Urquidez with the unauthorized immigrants with 

whom it had dealt in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 

(1984). Unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, the latter “were in the 

United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted 

some societal obligations.” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273. 

At a minimum, Verdugo-Urquidez governs the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to noncitizens. For Fourth 

Amendment rights to attach, the alien must show “substantial connections” with the United States. See, e.g., United 

States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2008) 

(noncitizen who was in the country involuntarily and lacked 

significant previous voluntary connection with the United 

States could not rely on the Fourth Amendment); MartinezAguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (whether 

a noncitizen can invoke the Fourth Amendment depends on 

whether she has substantial connections with the United 

States, i.e., whether she is in the country of her own accord 

and has accepted some societal obligations). 

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Given our earlier conclusion that the Second and Fourth 

Amendments should be read consistently, we find it reasonable to look to Verdugo-Urquidez to determine whether MezaRodriguez is entitled to invoke the protections of the Second 

Amendment. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. Doing so, 

we see first that Meza-Rodriguez was in the United States 

voluntarily; there is no debate on this point. He still has extensive ties with this country, having resided here from the 

time he arrived over 20 years ago at the age of four or five 

until his removal. He attended public schools in Milwaukee, 

developed close relationships with family members and other acquaintances, and worked (though sporadically) at various locations. This is much more than the connections our 

sister circuits have found to be adequate. See, e.g., MartinezAguero, 459 F.3d at 625 (noncitizen’s “regular and lawful entry of the United States pursuant to a valid border-crossing 

card and her acquiescence in the U.S. system of immigration” was sufficient, even though she had not spent long periods of time in the country); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland 

Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying test from 

Verdugo-Urquidez and finding that noncitizen pursuing Ph.D. 

in the United States for four years had established significant 

voluntary connection with the United States such that she 

could invoke the First and Fifth Amendments). 

The government counters with two arguments. First, it 

contends that unauthorized noncitizens categorically have 

not accepted the basic obligations of membership in U.S. society and thus cannot be considered as part of “the people.” 

Second, it argues that Meza-Rodriguez’s unsavory traits, including his multiple brushes with the law, failure to file tax 

returns, and lack of a steady job, demonstrate that he has not 

sufficiently accepted the obligations of living in American 

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12 No. 14-3271 

society. We take the latter point first. We do not dispute that 

Meza-Rodriguez has fallen down on the job of performing as 

a responsible member of the community. But that is not the 

point. Many people, citizens and noncitizens alike, raising 

Fourth Amendment claims are likely to have a criminal record, but we see no hint in Verdugo-Urquidez that this is a relevant consideration. Such a test would require a case-by-case 

examination of the criminal history of every noncitizen (including a lawful permanent resident) who seeks to rely on 

her constitutional rights under the First, Second, or Fourth 

Amendment. Not only would this test be difficult to implement; it would also create the potential for a noncitizen to 

lose constitutional rights she previously possessed simply 

because she began to behave in a criminal or immoral way. 

The Second Amendment is not limited to such on-again, offagain protection. Instead, the only question is whether the 

alien has developed substantial connections as a resident in 

this country; Meza-Rodriguez has. 

The government’s argument might have some force if 

Verdugo-Urquidez represented the Supreme Court’s only relevant holding, but it does not. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 

(1982), which Verdugo-Urquidez left undisturbed, the Court 

addressed the status of unauthorized aliens as “persons” for 

constitutional purposes: 

Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens, because of their immigration 

status, are not “persons within the jurisdiction” 

of the State of Texas, and that they therefore 

have no right to the equal protection of Texas 

law. We reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is 

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No. 14-3271 13

surely a “person” in any ordinary sense of that 

term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in 

this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as “persons” guaranteed due process 

of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 

(1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 

238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 

(1886). Indeed, we have clearly held that the 

Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious 

discrimination by the Federal Government. 

457 U.S. at 210. Verdugo-Urquidez summarized Plyler’s holding (along with a number of others in which the Court had 

recognized that aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights) as 

follows: “These cases ... establish only that aliens receive 

constitutional protections when they have come within the 

territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” 494 U.S. at 271. 

Meza-Rodriguez satisfies both those criteria. He has lived 

continuously in the United States for nearly all his life. During that time, his behavior left much to be desired, but as we 

have said, that does not mean that he lacks substantial connections with this country. Plyler shows that even unauthorized aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights, and so unauthorized status (reflected in the lack of documentation) cannot support a per se exclusion from “the people” protected 

by the Bill of Rights. In the post-Heller world, where it is now 

clear that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is no 

second-class entitlement, we see no principled way to carve 

out the Second Amendment and say that the unauthorized 

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(or maybe all noncitizens) are excluded. No language in the 

Amendment supports such a conclusion, nor, as we have 

said, does a broader consideration of the Bill of Rights.1 

B 

Meza-Rodriguez’s ability to invoke the Second Amendment does not resolve this case, however, because the right 

to bear arms is not unlimited. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 

Congress may circumscribe this right in some instances 

without running afoul of the Constitution, and so we must 

now decide whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) is such a permissible restriction. 

The Supreme Court has steered away from prescribing a 

particular level of scrutiny that courts should apply to categorical bans on the possession of firearms by specified 

groups of people, though it has said that rational-basis review would be too lenient. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 

F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 

n.27). In addressing § 922(g), we have concluded that “some 

form of strong showing,” akin to intermediate scrutiny, is 

the right approach. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 

641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (avoiding the “‘levels of 

scrutiny’ quagmire” but noting that § 922(g)(9) serves an 

important governmental objective and that this provision 

has a substantial relation with this objective); United States v. 

Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 

 1 Because this holding creates a split between our circuit and the 

Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, ante at 7, this opinion has been circulated to all active judges pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted 

to hear the case en banc. 

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681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) (requiring “a strong showing that the 

challenged subsection of § 922(g) [i]s substantially related to 

an important governmental objective”). Other circuits have 

applied at least intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. 

Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 

792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010) (same for § 922(g)(8)). But see Tyler 

v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 322–30 (6th Cir. 

2014), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir. 

Apr. 21, 2015) (applying strict scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)). 

Congress’s objective in passing § 922(g) was “to keep 

guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people” and to 

“suppress[] armed violence.” Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683–84 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)); see also Huitron-Guizar, 

678 F.3d at 1169–70 (§ 922(g)’s purposes are to assist law enforcement in combating crime and to keep weapons away 

from those deemed dangerous or irresponsible). One such 

group includes aliens “who ... [are] illegally or unlawfully in 

the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). The government 

argues that the ban on the possession of firearms by this 

group of people is substantially related to the statute’s general objectives because such persons are able purposefully to 

evade detection by law enforcement. We agree with this position: unauthorized noncitizens often live “largely outside 

the formal system of registration, employment, and identification, [and] are harder to trace and more likely to assume a 

false identity.” Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1170. Persons with 

a strong incentive to use false identification papers will be 

more difficult to keep tabs on than the general population. 

(Section 922(g)(5)(B)’s prohibition on firearms possession by 

most aliens who are lawfully present but who hold only 

nonimmigrant visas reflects a similar concern. Holders of 

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16 No. 14-3271 

nonimmigrant visas sometimes have no address associated 

with them, making them equally difficult to track.) 

The government also argues that § 922(g)(5) reflects the 

likelihood that unauthorized immigrants are more likely to 

commit future gun-related crimes than persons in the general population. It offers no data to support that assertion, 

however, and we have our doubts about its accuracy. The 

government extrapolates from the fact that persons who are 

here illegally have “show[n] a willingness to defy our law” 

to the conclusion that they are likely to abuse guns. This may 

go too far: the link to firearms is unclear, and unlawful presence in the country is not, without more, a crime. See Arizona 

v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (“As a general 

rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present 

in the United States.”). While it is a misdemeanor to enter 

the country improperly, see 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), many unauthorized immigrants—such as Meza-Rodriguez himself—

were too young to form the requisite intent to violate this 

statute when they were originally brought to the United 

States. Even if this future-oriented rationale lacks support, 

however, the government has an strong interest in preventing people who already have disrespected the law (including, in addition to aliens unlawfully in the country, felons, 

§ 922(g)(1), fugitives, § 922(g)(2), and those convicted of 

misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, § 922(g)(9)) from 

possessing guns. 

Congress’s interest in prohibiting persons who are difficult to track and who have an interest in eluding law enforcement is strong enough to support the conclusion that 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) does not impermissibly restrict MezaCase: 14-3271 Document: 34 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 19
No. 14-3271 17

Rodriguez’s Second Amendment right to bear arms. We thus 

AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. 

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18 No. 14-3271 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 

I concur in the judgment. Unlike the majority, I have 

doubts that the Second Amendment grants undocumented 

immigrants the right to bear arms, as my read of District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), does not suggest such 

an expansive interpretation. But because we need not make 

that determination in reaching our result in this matter, I 

would follow the Tenth Circuit’s prudential approach and 

reserve resolution of this challenging constitutional question 

for a case that compels addressing it. See United States v. 

Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 2012). 

In choosing to confront the issue, the majority roots its 

constitutional analysis in the common use of the phrase “the 

people” by the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, and 

the Supreme Court’s suggestion in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), that all persons, regardless 

of citizenship, who are part of our “national community” or 

who manifest a “sufficient connection with this country” are 

entitled to the rights that those amendments bestow. That 

view is not without appeal. Indeed, Heller describes the Second Amendment’s guarantee as an “ancient right,” codified 

in the constitution “to prevent the elimination of the militia,” 

but also “valued ... for self-defense and hunting.” 554 U.S. at 

599. Hence, it might be argued that all adult persons in this 

country share the same basic need to defend themselves. 

Further, Heller tells us that “the conception of the militia at 

the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the 

body of all citizens capable of military service.” Id. at 627. 

Today, that includes certain undocumented immigrants. See

Andrew Tilghman, Military to Allow Undocumented Immigrants to Serve, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2014, 5:22 PM), 

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No. 14-3271 19

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/25/pol

icy-to-allow-undocumented-immigrants-inmilitary/16225135/. 

Conversely, who is part of our “national community” and 

whether (and how) an undocumented immigrant can establish a “sufficient connection” under Verdugo-Urquidez remains unsettled. And Heller provides considerable reason to 

doubt that an undocumented immigrant can enjoy Second 

Amendment rights at all. The Court’s analysis professes to 

“start ... with a strong presumption that the Second 

Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to 

all Americans.” Id. at 581 (emphasis added). It also characterizes “the people” as referring “to all members of the political 

community,” id. at 580, and describes the Second Amendment as “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens,” id. at 

635 (emphasis added). 

However, as the majority recognizes, Heller only addressed the question whether the right protected by the Second Amendment is an individual or a collective one, not 

which individuals possess the right. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 

635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth 

examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field ... .”). In any event, the question of who possesses the right need not be answered to 

reach our outcome here, because regardless of the answer 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) satisfies intermediate scrutiny and thus 

passes constitutional muster. 

Accordingly, I would refrain from addressing the scope 

of the Second Amendment and, further, creating a conflict 

with the law of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. 

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