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Parties Involved:
Rollie M. Mitchell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14‐3759

ROLLIE M. MITCHELL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12‐cv‐01002‐SEB‐TAB — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 25, 2017

Before BAUER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. After his conviction for cocaine

distribution, Petitioner Rollie Mitchell appealed his sentence;

this Court affirmed. Petitioner then filed a motion for post‐

conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that he

receivedineffective assistance of counsel. He arguedthat,prior

to trial, his attorney failed to inform him adequately of the

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details of the government’s plea offer and failed to advise him

ofthe potentialramifications ofrejecting the offer andproceed‐

ing to trial. The district court denied the motion, finding that

counsel’s performance was adequate and that Petitioner could

not demonstrate that, absent any deficient performance, he

would have accepted the plea offer. We affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

In June 2006, Petitioner sold 144 grams of cocaine base to a

police informant named Tony Hurd. Hurd also purchased

cocaine base from two of Petitioner’s associates, Billy Hicks

and Tyree Smith. All three were charged in Indiana state court

with controlled substance offenses. As part of the state court

proceedings, the county clerk’s office made the error of

including Hurd’s name on a public filing. Hurd soon began

receiving threats, and in August 2006, he was shot and killed

at a gas station in Ohio.

After Hurd’s murder, Petitioner was indicted on federal

drug charges. The government also had reason to believe that

Petitioner was involved in Hurd’s murder. In June 2009, the

district court appointed public defender Bruce Brattain to

represent Petitioner. As the trial date approached, Brattain had

discussions withtheAssistantUnitedStatesAttorneyhandling

the case about apotentialplea agreement. TheAUSAinformed

Brattain that the government was willing to recommend a 20‐

year sentence in exchange forPetitioner’s full cooperation with

the government’s investigation into Hurd’s murder. The

government never put this offer in writing.

Brattain communicated to Petitioner the terms of the offer

both orally and in writing. According to Brattain’s affidavit

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No. 14‐3759 3

submitted to the district court, he met with Petitioner and

discussedthe proposal onOctober 19, October 23, and Novem‐

ber 5, 2009, and Petitioner repeatedly rejected the potential

agreement.OnOctober 29, 2009,Brattain sentPetitioner a letter

in which he outlined the principal terms of the government’s

offer and advised Petitioner that it was in his best interest to

consider it before trial.

Brattain sent another letter on November 3, 2009, in which

he informed Petitioner that the government’s evidence made

it “almost absolutely certain” that he would be convicted at

trial on the drug charge. This letter also referenced a new

witness who would corroborate the government’s theory that

Petitioner was involved in Hurd’s murder. The letterinformed

Petitioner that if the court found the witness to be credible by

a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner was likely to face

a life sentence upon his conviction. Finally, this letter advised

Petitionerthatif he wished to negotiate a lesser sentence, “now

is the time to do it.”

Petitioner again rejected the government’s offer and his

case went to trial on November 9 and 10, 2009. The jury found

him guilty of distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court held a

sentencing hearing on April 1, 2010, during which the govern‐

ment presentedevidence ofPetitioner’s involvementin Hurd’s

murder. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that Petitioner participated in the murder, and applied the

murder cross‐reference under the United States Sentencing

Commission Guidelines, § 2D1.1(d)(1). The court sentenced

Petitioner to life imprisonment, which was the resultant

Guidelines range after the application of the murder cross‐

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reference. Petitioner appealed the sentence, and we affirmed.

United States v. Mitchell, 635 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner then filed a motion for post‐conviction relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that Brattain provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by not producing the govern‐

ment’s plea offer in writing and by not advising him ade‐

quately on its substance and effects. The district court rejected

these arguments. The court found that the government never

submitted its proposal in writing and that, even if it had done

so, Petitioner could not demonstrate that he would have

accepted the offer. The court held that Brattain’s communica‐

tion and advice regarding the proposed plea deal did not

constitute ineffective assistance. The court also rejected Peti‐

tioner’s requestfor an evidentiary hearing on the issue,finding

that the record and filings conclusively showed that Petitioner

was not entitled to relief. The denial of his motion and his

request for an evidentiary hearing form the basis for this

appeal.

II.  DISCUSSION

When reviewing the denial of a petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo

and its factual findings for clear error. Martin v. United States,

789 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel extends to the plea bargaining process.” Id. at 706

(citing Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012)). To establish

his claim for ineffective assistance, Petitioner must demon‐

strate both prongs of the test established by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (2012). First, he “must show that

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counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Once he has

demonstrated deficient performance, Petitioner must then

show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694. Petitioner is unable to

meet his burden on either prong.

Petitioner argues that Brattain’s representation was

deficient in that he did not provide sufficient detail of the

government’s offer, that he failed to explain fully the ramifica‐

tions of rejecting the offer, and that he did not make Petitioner

aware of the offer in a timely manner. “[D]efense counsel has

the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to

accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to

the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); see

also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (“If a plea bargain has been

offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of

counsel in considering whether to accept it.”). “Frye does not

consider whether counsel furnish ineffective assistance by

failing to convey a plea offer ‘effectively’; we assume without

deciding that counsel must do so.” Overstreet v. Wilson, 686

F.3d 404, 406–07 (7th Cir. 2012).

Petitioner first argues that Brattain failed to communicate

the offer effectively because he did not provide details outside

of the principal terms of a 20‐year sentence in exchange for

Petitioner’s cooperation in the murder investigation. There is

no indication, however, that there were any such details for

him to convey. The district court found that the government

never put the proposal in writing and Petitioner has not

produced any evidence to contradict that finding. Nor does

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Petitioner offer evidence that Brattain and the government had

any discussions beyond what Brattain communicated to him.

Petitioner cannot identify any details that Brattain knew, yet

failed to communicate to him. Brattain effectively communi‐

cated all of the information that was available to him at the

time of the offer and thus, this argument fails.

Petitionerthen contends that Brattain’s representation was

ineffective because he failed to adequately advise Petitioner of

the potential outcomes of rejecting the offer and going to trial.

He argues that Brattain should have done more to explain the

applicable Sentencing Guidelines and the sentence he would

face if convicted. Brattain’s letters, however, clearly defeat this

contention. In his October 29, 2009, letter, Brattain advised

Petitionerthat it was in his best interest to considerthe govern‐

ment’s offer because a guilty verdict at trial could result in a

“sentence greaterthan twenty years.” In the November 3, 2009,

letter, Brattain informed Petitioner of a new government

witness and advised Petitioner that if the court found the

witness credible, “I now believe that you will be looking at life

in prison upon your conviction.” It is difficult to imagine what

more effective advice Brattain could have provided regarding

the effects of rejecting the plea offer. Therefore, Petitioner’s

argument that Brattain’s performance was deficient on this

point also fails.

Lastly, Petitioner claims that Brattain was ineffective

because he did not inform Petitioner of the offer until the day

his trial began. Again, however, Brattain’s letters show that

Petitioner’s claim is incorrect. Brattain sent Petitioner a letter

on October 29, 2009, ten days before trial, outlining the terms

of the plea offer. That letter also indicates that Brattain and

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Petitioner had already “spoken of [the offer] several times.”

Brattain sent Petitioner another letter on November 3, 2009,

advising Petitioner that if he wished to negotiate a sentence of

less than life in prison, “now is the time to do it.” Additionally,

Brattain’s affidavit states that he and Petitioner discussed the

proposed agreement as early as October 19, 2009. Thus, it is

clear that Brattain effectively communicated the offer to

Petitioner with ample time for him to consider it.

For the reasons just explained, Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate thatBrattain’sperformance fell below anobjective

standard ofreasonableness. Therefore, Brattain’s communica‐

tion and advice regarding the plea offer did not constitute

deficient performance.

However, even if we were to determine that Brattain’s

representation was deficient, Petitioner’s claim still fails

because he cannot establish Strickland’s prejudice requirement.

To show prejudice in the context of the handling of plea offers,

“defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they

would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been

afforded effective assistance of counsel.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at

1409. Petitioner is unable do so here.

Petitioner has admitted, both in the district court and in his

brief before this Court,that he cannot say with certainty that he

wouldhave acceptedthe government’s offer. He argues that he

cannot do so because he did not receive “the full terms” of the

offer due to Brattain’s deficient performance. However,

because Petitioner rejected the general framework of the

government’s offer, the negotiation of further details never

began. Petitioner cannot point to any conditions of the govern‐

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ment’s offer that Brattain failed to communicate to him. As a

result, he cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for

some failure on Brattain’s part, he would have accepted the

government’s offer. Therefore, Petitioner cannot establish the

prejudice prong of his Strickland claim.

Finally, we briefly address Petitioner’s argument that the

district court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary

hearing. We review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary

hearing on a § 2255 motion  for abuse of discretion. Martin, 789

F.3d at 705. An evidentiary hearing is not required if “the

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show

that the prisoneris entitled to no relief ... .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b);

Martin, 789 F.3d at 706. That is the case here.

The district court was able to determine, from the record

alone, that the government had not reduced its plea offer to

writing and had not set forth any details or conditions other

than its offerto recommend a 20‐year sentence in exchange for

Petitioner’s cooperation in the murderinvestigation. Brattain’s

letters demonstrated that Petitionerlearned of the offer at least

ten days before his trial, despite his contention that he first

heard the offer on the day of trial. Finally, Petitioner admitted

in his motion that he could not say definitively that he would

have accepted the government’s offer but for Brattain’s

supposed ineffective assistance. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for a

hearing.

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III.  CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons,the judgment ofthe district court

is AFFIRMED.

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