Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01154/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01154-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randy Ashford
Defendant
Nathan C. Oeser
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHAN C. OESER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RANDY ASHFORD,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-01154 WHA

ORDER DISMISSING

COMPLAINT WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

INTRODUCTION

In this tort action, defendant United States, acting on behalf of Randy Ashford, moves to

dismiss pro se plaintiff Nathan Oeser’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to

plaintiff’s sole claim. For the following reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s entire complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may

timely refile in accordance with the requirements outlined below.

STATEMENT

On January 18, 2007, plaintiff filed a standard “Claim and Order to Go to Small Claims

Court” form in Contra Costa County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s

postal truck had crashed into his truck on September 25, 2006. Plaintiff originally named

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*

 Although it was not indicated on the removal papers, plaintiff also named the “U.S. Post Office” as a

defendant (Compl. 2). For the reasons explained below, however, this addition is of no consequence for the

purposes of resolving this motion because both defendants will be treated as a single defendant, the

United States.

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Randy Ashford, postmaster, as the defendant.* On February 27, 2007, defendant removed

the action to federal court on the ground that the claim was against a federal defendant. 

Upon removal, defendant certified that Randy Ashford was acting in the scope of his federal

duties and that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2679(d) the United States was therefore “automatically

substituted [as the defendant] for Randy Ashford” (Notice of Removal 2).

Defendant filed this motion to dismiss arguing that this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claim because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies by first filing a claim with the appropriate governmental agency. As such, defendant

seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s entire complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff did not file an

opposition to defendant’s motion. On April 13, the Court ordered plaintiff to appear at the

April 26 hearing to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. Plaintiff failed to appear

at the hearing.

ANALYSIS

“Without jurisdiction [a district court] cannot proceed at all in any cause . . . . 

The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature

and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible without exception.’”

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (internal citations omitted).

The United States, as a sovereign, cannot be sued without its consent. The terms of its

consent define the “court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood,

312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The Federal Torts Claim Act provides for a claim against the

United States for injuries caused by the tortious activity of a federal employee when the

employee is “acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. 1346. Under the

FTCA, however, a plaintiff suing the United States must first satisfy a jurisdictional

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For the Northern District of California

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prerequisite. 28 U.S.C. 2675. The Ninth Circuit has been consistently strict in its adherence to

this requirement:

A tort claimant may not commence proceedings in court against

the United States without first filing [a] claim with an appropriate

federal agency and either receiving a conclusive denial of the

claim from the agency or waiting for six months to elapse without

a final disposition of the claim being made. We have repeatedly

held that this “claim requirement of Section 2675 is jurisdictional

in nature and may not be waived.”

Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). 

“[S]ection 2675(a) requires the claimant or his legal representative to file (1) a written statement

sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and

(2) a sum certain damages claim.” Warren v. United States Dep’t of Interior Bureau of Land

Mgmt., 724 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984). Since this requirement is a prerequisite to filing the

complaint, the plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with this exhaustion requirement

in the complaint. Absent the plaintiff’s affirmative allegations of such, the district court must

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Gillespie v. Civiletti,

629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding exhaustion requirement must be “affirmatively

alleged in the complaint” to give court subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claim). The district

court, however, should make every effort to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings in his

or her favor. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

This order finds that plaintiff did not satisfy the pleading requirements in this case. 

Nowhere in the complaint did plaintiff affirmatively allege the requisite Section 2675

administrative exhaustion. In one question on the standard-pleading form, plaintiff was asked

whether he was “suing a public entity.” The question’s subsection informed plaintiff of the

importance of this distinction: if he was suing a public entity he was required to first file a

written claim with that entity and wait until the claim was denied or no answer was received

within the requisite time period. The question provided a space for plaintiff to put the date he

filed an agency claim, if applicable. Despite listing the “U.S. Post Office” as a defendant,

plaintiff marked the box indicating that he was not suing a public entity and did not address

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whether he had filed a written claim with an agency (Compl. 2–3). Given the opportunity to

affirmatively allege compliance with Section 2675, plaintiff failed to do so.

While his response to another of the form’s inquiries is also worth noting, it too fails

to rise to the level of Section 2675 compliance under the relevant Ninth Circuit authority. 

See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 640; Warren, 724 F.2d at 780. Plaintiff was asked whether he had

asked “the Defendant (in person, in writing, or by phone) to pay before [he] sue[d].” 

Plaintiff indicated that he had made this request — by checking the box marked “yes” — but

did not provide any further details as to the nature of the request (Compl. 3). Simply alleging

that he made this request is insufficient. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 640. The nature of the

question leaves open the possibility that plaintiff made this request “in person . . . or by phone.” 

Under the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Warren, plaintiff must have made this request in writing. 

724 F.2d at 780. Nowhere on the complaint did plaintiff so allege. Additionally, when

presented with an opportunity to rebut defendant’s claims in this motion, plaintiff failed to file

an opposition addressing the exhaustion requirement or appear at the hearing. 

Without plaintiff’s opposition or appearance, this order has no further evidence that plaintiff

actually complied with the exhaustion requirements. As such, this order finds that plaintiff did

not affirmatively allege compliance with the Section 2675 exhaustion requirements in the

complaint as required by the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 640.

CONCLUSION

In all, because the complaint does not properly allege that plaintiff exhausted his

administrative remedies as to his only claim and because plaintiff failed to respond to the

government’s exhaustion argument, this order DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 1, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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