Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-01023/USCOURTS-ca10-96-01023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Osmay Perez-Herrera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

OSMA Y PEREZ-HERRERA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 96-1023 

FILED 

lhlfted StaCM Coura of Appcall Tadl Circuit 

JUN 1 0 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Cerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-248) 

John Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney (Henry L. Solano, United States 

Attorney, and Joseph T. Urbaniak, Jr., OCDETF Coordinator, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jeralyn E. Merritt, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Osmay Perez-Herrera appeals the district court's order deferring ruling 

on his Motion to Bar Prosecution on Double Jeopardy grounds. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the collateral order exception to the fmal-judgment rule, 

Appellate Case: 96-1023 Document: 01019301477 Date Filed: 06/10/1996 Page: 1 
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

I. 

In August 1990, the government initiated judicial forfeiture proceedings pursuant 

to 21 U.S.C. § 881 on a 1983 Peterbilt Semi-Tractor-Trailer. The government did not 

notify Defendant of the forfeiture proceedings, but did notify Crossroads Transport, 

which the government asserts was the registered owner of the Tractor-Trailer. Defendant 

did not file a claim or answer or contest the judicial forfeiture proceedings. The district 

court forfeited the Tractor-Trailer to the United States in a December 9, 1991 order. 

In July 1992, a grand jury indicted Defendant and co-defendant Jorge Carlos 

Rodriquez for federal cocaine offenses. In January 1993, the Drug Enforcement 

Administration ("DEA") initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings against a 1983 

Jeep Grand Cherokee, which it believed Defendant purchased with drug funds. It is not 

clear from the record whether the government notified Defendant of the forfeiture 

proceedings. Defendant did not file a claim of ownership in the forfeiture proceeding. 

The DEA administratively forfeited the jeep on January 4, 1993. 

In July 1994, the grand jury returned a nine-count superseding indictment charging 

Defendant with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine, 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l), (b)(l)(A), 846, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l), (b)(l)(A), and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 

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' 

U.S.C. § 848. 

In June 1995, Defendant filed a Motion to Bar Prosecution on Double Jeopardy 

grounds. He argued that the government was impermissibly subjecting him to multiple 

punishment for the same offenses, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy 

Clause. Defendant maintained that the government first punished him for the underlying 

drug offenses by forfeiting the two vehicles, and sought to punish him a second time for 

the same offenses through criminal prosecution. Defendant requested the court bar 

prosecution and dismiss the indictment. 

On January 2, 1996, the district court entered an order deferring ruling on 

Defendant's Motion to Bar Prosecution until after the criminal trial. The court 

determined the motion was premature, stating: 

that because the only aspect of the double jeopardy clause involved in this 

case is double punishment and because the trial of the case does not involve 

punishment and the issue of punishment only arises after there are verdicts 

or findings of guilty on counts which may relate to the bases for civil 

forfeiture, the motions are premature and should be reserved for 

determination prior to sentencing. 

This appeal followed. 

II. 

The parties dispute our jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal. We review 

jurisdictional questions de novo as a question of law. United States v. Maher, 919 F.2d 

1482, 1485 (lOth Cir. 1990). Defendant asserts 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order 

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• 

exception to the final-judgment rule, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), 

empower this court to review the district court's deferral order. The government responds 

that the collateral order exception is inapplicable, and maintains that this court lacks 

jurisdiction. We agree with Defendant. 

A. 

We recently exercised jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a district 

court's pretrial order in a double jeopardy case involving facts nearly identical to the 

instant case. United States v. German, 76 F.3d 315 (lOth Cir. 1996). In German, as in 

this case, the government forfeited assets owned by the defendant, and then sought to 

prosecute defendant for the underlying drug offense. The defendant moved to dismiss the 

indictment on double jeopardy grounds, and the district court denied the motion. 

On appeal, the government argued that we lacked jurisdiction to review the district 

court's order. We rejected the government's argument, concluding that "[o]ur authority 

to hear the appeal stems from Abney." German, 76 F.3d at 316; see Abney, 431 U.S. at 

659-62 (holding that a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double 

jeopardy grounds falls within the collateral order exception to the final-judgment rule and 

is therefore immediately appealable). 

Abney and German control the jurisdictional question in this appeal. The fact that 

the district court deferred ruling on Defendant's Motion to Bar Prosecution, rather than 

denying the motion, is, as the government put it, "one of those true distinctions without a 

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difference, as far as either a deferral or a denial would cause a defendant to go through 

another trial." Aplee Br. at 7. Whether the court denied the motion, or deferred ruling 

on the motion, the effect is the same--Defendant must "endure the personal strain, public 

embarassment, and expense of a criminal trial" which he asserts violates the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Abney, 431 U.S. at 661. As in Abney, "[t]here 

are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the 

defendant maintains is barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee." Abney, 431 U.S. at 

659. Accordingly, the district court's deferral order on the double jeopardy issue is 

tantamount to a denial order, and meets the collateral order exception to the final 

judgment rule. See id. at 659-62. We therefore have jurisdiction over the instant appeal. 

See kl; German, 76 F.3d at 316. 

B. 

The district court concluded Defendant's Motion to Bar Prosecution was 

premature because a jury had not found Defendant guilty ofthe underlying drug offenses. 

Under Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995), however, Defendant's Motion to 

Bar Prosecution was ripe for ruling by the district court before trial, notwithstanding the 

fact that Defendant had not been convicted of the drug offenses. l.d... at 2205 ("This claim 

is ripe at this stage of the prosecution ... if Petitioner is correct that the present case 

constitutes a second attempt to punish him criminally for the same cocaine offenses, ... 

then the prosecution may not proceed."). We therefore agree with Defendant that the 

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district court should have ruled on his Motion to Bar Prosecution. Because the district 

court did not rule on the Motion, the record is insufficiently developed on the Double 

Jeopardy issue. We therefore REMAND to the district court with instructions to conduct 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion and rule on Defendant's Motion to Bar 

Prosecution. 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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