Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05237/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05237-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul A. Bilzerian
Appellee
Ernest B. Haire
Appellant
Deborah R. Meshulam
Appellee
Securities and Exchange Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 19, 2004 Decided August 13, 2004

No. 03-5237

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND

DEBORAH R. MESHULAM,

APPELLEES

v.

PAUL A. BILZERIAN

APPELLEE

ERNEST B. HAIRE, III,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01221)

S. Scott Morrison argued the cause for appellant. On the

briefs was G. Michael Nelson.

Charles B. Wayne argued the cause for appellee Deborah

R. Meshulam. On the brief was Deborah J. Israel.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This case is ancillary to a longstanding Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement proceeding against Paul A. Bilzerian for violation

of federal securities laws. The United States District Court

for the District of Columbia created a receivership estate and

appointed a receiver to satisfy the SEC’s judgment against

Bilzerian’s assets. In the instant action, the receiver filed a

complaint against defendant Ernest B. Haire, III to collect on

the principal, interest, and fees due and owing to the receivership estate on a $1 million loan. Haire moved to dismiss the

complaint, alleging that the court lacked personal jurisdiction

over him, that venue in the District of Columbia was improper, that the forum was not convenient, and that the receiver

had failed to join a necessary party. The district court

rejected those challenges, and entered summary judgment in

the receiver’s favor. We affirm.

I

In 1993, the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia ordered Bilzerian to disgorge over $33 million in

profits and $29 million in prejudgment interest obtained from

his unlawful transactions in several common stocks. SEC v.

Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 689

(D.C. Cir. 1994). On December 22, 2000, after finding Bilzerian in contempt for failing to pay the 1993 disgorgement

judgment, the district court appointed the appellee, Deborah

Meshulam, as receiver ‘‘for the purpose of identifying, marshaling, receiving and liquidating [Bilzerian’s] assets.’’ SEC

v. Bilzerian, 127 F. Supp. 2d 232, 232 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d,

2003 WL 22176183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (hereinafter Receivership

Order). The Receivership Order authorized the receiver to

‘‘take and maintain complete and exclusive control, possession

and custody of Bilzerian’s assets wherever situated’’ and to

‘‘liquidate any interest in any asset held by anyone on behalf

of Bilzerian, including but not limited to the initiation and

prosecution of litigation against others to recover such asset

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and/or interests in asset on behalf of the Receivership Estate.’’ Id. at 233. The receiver filed copies of the Receivership Order in various federal district courts, including the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida where Haire resides.

The assets of the receivership estate included, inter alia,

the assets of Overseas Holdings Limited Partnership

(OHLP), a partnership owned by the Bilzerian family to

which Bilzerian transferred substantial assets during the

course of the SEC litigation. On July 12, 2000, during the

pendency of the contempt proceeding against Bilzerian,

OHLP loaned Haire $1 million. The loan was reflected in a

promissory note (the ‘‘Note’’), which accrued interest at an

annual rate of 12% and made the principal payable on demand. The Note was secured by Haire’s pledge of his stock

shares in Cimetrix, Inc. OHLP demanded payment on August 23, 2000, and Haire’s failure to pay within 15 days of that

demand triggered the Note’s terms governing default and

penalties. Haire and OHLP subsequently executed a Forbearance and Extension Agreement on March 1, 2001, under

which Haire agreed to pay accrued interest immediately, and

OHLP agreed to extend the due date for payment of principal

until March 1, 2003.

In December 2001, OHLP agreed to ‘‘transfer to the Receiver all right, title and interest in that certain note and

stock pledge agreement and related documents by Ernest

Haire III in the principal amount of $1 million, as extended.’’

Consent and Undertakings Agreement at 5 (J.A. 87); see also

Assignment Without Recourse (J.A. 100). Haire, in his capacity as trustee of another Bilzerian-related entity, signed

the agreement. On January 16, 2002, the court entered the

agreement as a consent judgment. On April 19, 2002, the

receiver sent a letter to Haire demanding that he immediately pay all accrued and unpaid interest due on the Note, and

warning that failure to pay within fifteen days would result in

a default under the Note’s express terms. Haire failed to

pay, and the receiver notified him that the entire $1 million

principal (and accumulated interest and penalty fees) was

immediately due.

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On June 19, 2002, the receiver filed the present complaint

against Haire, demanding judgment for the full amount of

principal and accrued interest under the Note. Haire filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of

personal jurisdiction, improper venue, forum non conveniens,

and failure to name an indispensable party. At the same

time, the receiver moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Haire’s motion to dismiss, Mem. & Order

(D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2003) (hereinafter Jan. 2003 Mem. Op.), and

granted the receiver’s motion for summary judgment, Mem.

& Order (D.D.C. July 17, 2003) (hereinafter July 2003 Mem.

Op.).

Haire now appeals.1

 We review both of the district court’s

orders de novo. See Gormon v. Ameritrade Holding Corp.,

293 F.3d 506, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d

749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In Part II, we consider Haire’s

challenge to the court’s conclusion that it had personal jurisdiction. In Part III, we consider Haire’s remaining objections to the court’s order denying dismissal, as well as his

objections to the court’s grant of summary judgment to the

receiver.

II

We begin with the threshold question of whether the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia has

personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a Tampa, Florida

resident who claims not to have any contacts with the District

of Columbia. In SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., a case

1 Haire also appeals the district judge’s 2002 denial of his motion

to recuse the judge from participation in Haire’s case. See Mem. &

Order (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2002). Haire previously sought to overturn

that denial by petitioning for a writ of mandamus. In denying the

writ, a panel of this court readily held that the ‘‘district court did

not abuse its discretion in deciding not to recuse.’’ In re: Ernest

Haire, 2003 WL 1873948, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2003). That holding,

premised not on the elevated standard of review for mandamus, but

rather on the same standard that we would apply to the recusal

question on appeal, is the law of the case.

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also involving a receiver in a proceeding ancillary to an SEC

enforcement action, we explained how such personal jurisdiction could be obtained. 74 F.3d 287, 290–91 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Step one involves Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(D),

which provides that ‘‘[s]ervice of a summons or filing a waiver

of service is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person

of a defendant TTT when authorized by a statute of the United

States.’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D). Step two requires a

statute that provides the ‘‘needed ‘authorization’ to have [the

defendant] served’’ in a district ‘‘outside the territorial boundaries of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.’’

74 F.3d at 290. Section 1692 of Title 28, we said, could

provide such authorization. Id. That section states:

In proceedings in a district court where a receiver is

appointed for property, real, personal, or mixed, situated

in different districts, process may issue and be executed

in any such district as if the property lay wholly within

one district but orders affecting the property shall be

entered of record in each of such districts.

28 U.S.C. § 1692. Finally, ‘‘to invoke § 1692, a receiver first

must comply with 28 U.S.C. § 754.’’ 74 F.3d at 290. Under

that section, ‘‘a receiver appointed in one district may obtain

jurisdiction over property located in another district by filing

in the district court of that district, within ten days after the

entry of his order of appointment, a copy of the complaint and

his order of appointment.’’ Id.

2

 Thus, we said, § 754 is ‘‘a

2 Section 754 provides, in pertinent part:

A receiver appointed in any civil action or proceeding involving

property, real, personal or mixed, situated in different districts

shall, upon giving bond as required by the court, be vested with

complete jurisdiction and control of all such property with the

right to take possession thereofTTTT Such receiver shall, within ten days after the entry of his order of appointment, file

copies of the complaint and such order of appointment in the

district court for each district in which property is located.

The failure to provide such copies in any district shall divest

the receiver of jurisdiction and control over all such property in

that district.

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stepping stone on [the court’s] way to exercising in personam

jurisdiction over’’ one who holds receivership assets in a

remote district. Id. at 290.3

As precedent, Vision Communications relied on the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in Haile v. Henderson National Bank, 657

F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), which is on all fours with the case

presently before us. In Haile, a receiver was appointed in

the Middle District of Tennessee for a bankrupt church and

its assets. Id. at 818. The receiver then brought suit against

an individual in the Northern District of Alabama who had

defaulted on a note held by the church. Id. at 820. The

Alabama defendant resisted on the ground that the district

court in Tennessee lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and

that court agreed, concluding that while they may provide the

court with control of the property of the debtor, ‘‘neither 28

U.S.C. § 754 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1692 TTT grants this court

personal jurisdiction of the defendants.’’ Id. at 820.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that, pursuant to

§ 754, ‘‘the territorial jurisdiction of the appointing court is

extended to any district of the United States where property

believed to be that of the receivership estate is found, provided that the proper documents have been filed in each such

district as required by § 754.’’ Id. at 823. It noted that

‘‘Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates

the use of statutes of the United States which provide for

service of process upon a party not TTT found within the state

in which the district court is held.’’ Id. at 824. And it

concluded that the ‘‘statute of the United States which provides for service of process beyond the territorial limits of the

state in which the district court sits in the case at bar is 28

U.S.C. § 1692.’’ Id. ‘‘The process authorized by § 1692,’’

the court said, ‘‘is not ‘extra-territorial’ but rather nation28 U.S.C. § 754.

3 Further support for the proposition that § 754 is a ‘‘stepping

stone’’ is the fact that, prior to 1948, the provisions of both sections

were contained in a single predecessor statute, 28 U.S.C. § 117

(1940). See Reviser’s Notes, H.R. REP. NO. 80–308, at 1807, 1869

(1947) (noting that § 117 was the basis for §§ 754 and 1692).

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wide.’’ Id. at 826. Under that section, ‘‘[t]he appointment

court’s process extends to any judicial district where receivership property is found.’’ Id.

In American Freedom Train Foundation v. Spurney, the

First Circuit pronounced itself in ‘‘agreement with the Sixth

Circuit’s holding that pursuant to sections 754 and 1692, ‘[t]he

appointment court’s process extends to any judicial district

where receivership property is found.’ ’’ 747 F.2d 1069, 1073

(1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Haile, 657 F.2d at 826). And both

circuits’ discussions paralleled, and Haile expressly relied

upon, the views of Professor Moore, who concluded: ‘‘[I]n

cases under these two sections, the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe as a limitation on extraterritorial

power, does not apply, since service of process under § 1692

[is] nationwide.’’ 7 (Pt. 2) JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL

PRACTICE ¶ 66.08[1] (2d ed. 1996).

In the present case, the district court followed the analysis

outlined in Vision Communications and Haile. The court

found that the receiver had complied with § 754 by filing the

appropriate documents in the Middle District of Florida, and

that this compliance meant that § 1692 authorized service of

process. The court further found that Haire had been properly served. Citing Rule 4(k)(1)(D), the court concluded that

it therefore had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Jan. 2003 Mem. Op. at 5.

Haire does not dispute that the receiver filed the appropriate documents in Florida, or that he received service of

process there. What he disputes is the district court’s authority to issue process to obtain in personam jurisdiction

over an out-of-state defendant. Section § 1692, Haire contends, authorizes extraterritorial service of process only to

obtain in rem jurisdiction — jurisdiction over property — in

another district, and not in personam jurisdiction over a

defendant in such a district. When a court exercises only in

rem jurisdiction,‘‘the resulting judgment can affect only the

property’’ and ‘‘cannot personally bind absentees simply on

the basis of their interests in the property.’’ 4A CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,

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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070, at 281 (3d ed. 2002)

(hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER).

Haire’s contention is, of course, inconsistent with the explanation of the role of § 1692 that we enunciated in Vision

Communications. Haire contends that explanation was dicta

because, in Vision Communications, the receiver had failed

to make the necessary filings within the ten days required by

§ 754, which ‘‘precluded the district court from using § 754

as a stepping stone on its way to exercising in personam

jurisdiction.’’ 74 F.3d at 290. Thus, he says, the court’s

discussion of § 1692 was unnecessary. Haire may be technically correct, but it is apparent that the Vision Communications court did not think so. The court made clear that, but

for the failure to comply with § 754, the ‘‘interplay between

Rule 4(k)(1)(D) TTT and 28 U.S.C. § 1692 could have provided

th[e] authorization’’ for service of process sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Id. at 290.

And it ended its opinion with a direction to the parties that it

would not have issued had it not thought § 1692 authorized

the service necessary to bind the defendant:

On remand, the court may reappoint the receiver and

start the ten-day clock of § 754 ticking once again.

Presumably, the receiver will take advantage of his second chanceTTTT Once he does so, the receiver will have

jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania property and may

seek to have Vista Vision served in Pennsylvania under

28 U.S.C. § 1692.

Id. at 291.

The defendant asks us to cast aside our statements in

Visions Communications, as well as the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Haile, and accept instead the analysis found in an

unpublished opinion from the Northern District of Illinois.

That court held that § 1692 ‘‘merely authorizes extraterritorial service of process in aid of in rem actions and does not do

so in cases like this one in which the receiver seeks an in

personam judgment.’’ Stenger v. World Harvest Church,

Inc., 2003 WL 22048047, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The basis for

the Stenger court’s conclusion was that § 1692 ‘‘does not

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mention service of process; rather it speaks only of issuance

and execution of process.’’ Stenger, 2003 WL 22048047, at

*2. In the Stenger court’s view, ‘‘service of process’’ and

‘‘issuance of process’’ are not the same thing: only ‘‘service’’

achieves in personam jurisdiction; ‘‘issuance’’ is merely the

‘‘Clerk’s ministerial act of issuing a summons to a plaintiff so

that he or she can serve it on the defendant.’’ Id. Moreover,

Stenger continued, ‘‘service’’ and ‘‘execution’’ are also different: while ‘‘service’’ achieves in personam jurisdiction, ‘‘execution of process involves the act, in an in rem action, of

attaching property.’’ Id.

Section 1692 states that ‘‘in a district court where a receiver is appointed for property’’ — which is the case of the

district court here — ‘‘process may issue and be executed.’’

28 U.S.C. § 1692. As Stenger concedes, ‘‘process’’ generally

refers to ‘‘a summons or writ, [especially] to appear or

respond in court.’’ Stenger, at *2 (quoting BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 1222 (7th ed. 1999)). The remaining question,

therefore, is the meaning of ‘‘may issue’’ and ‘‘be executed.’’

And neither Congress nor the courts have restricted those

terms to the meanings insisted upon by Stenger.

Even if Stenger were correct that ‘‘issuance’’ is merely the

‘‘Clerk’s ministerial act of issuing a summons,’’ federal rules,

statutes, and court opinions have used ‘‘execution’’ as more

than merely a synonym for ‘‘attaching property.’’ Indeed,

Rule 79 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure uses ‘‘execution of process’’ as roughly synonymous with ‘‘service of

process.’’ See FED. R. CIV. P. 79 (requiring that the civil

docket contain entries showing ‘‘the substance of each order

or judgment of the court and of the returns showing execution of process’’). In that sense, providing that a summons

‘‘may issue and be executed’’ means that the summons may

issue and be served. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, at 589,

meaning 1 (defining execution as the ‘‘act of carrying out or

putting into effect (as a court order)’’).

‘‘Execution’’ is also often used to mean the method by

which a judgment, including a judgment in personam, is

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enforced.4

 This is as distinct from ‘‘attachment,’’ which is

often used to denote the method by which in-rem (or quasiin-rem) jurisdiction is obtained.5

 In this sense, then, ‘‘may

issue and be executed’’ describes the entire process from

initial issuance, through service, through judgment, to final

enforcement of judgment.

There is also no support for Stenger’s insistence that

‘‘issuance’’ is limited to a clerk’s ministerial act. Congress

has used ‘‘issue’’ as shorthand to comprehend the phase of the

process that extends from issuance of an order through and

including its service.6

 Similarly, courts frequently use ‘‘issu4 Indeed Rule 69, entitled ‘‘Execution,’’ provides that ‘‘[p]rocess to

enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of

execution.’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62

(providing that ‘‘no execution shall issue upon a judgment’’ until 10

days after its entry); 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (declaring that ‘‘[i]nterest

shall be allowed on any money judgment,’’ and that ‘‘execution

therefor may be levied by the marshal’’).

5 See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1070, at 291–92; see also Pennoyer

v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (finding no jurisdiction because,

since the property at issue ‘‘was not attached’’ and its ‘‘first

connection with the case was caused by a levy of the execution,’’ it

was therefore not ‘‘disposed of pursuant to any adjudication, but

only in enforcement of a personal judgment, having no relation to

the property, rendered against a non-resident without service of

process upon him’’); 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (providing for the collection

of fees for different writs, including a writ of ‘‘execution,’’ and a writ

of ‘‘attachment in rem’’).

6 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (providing that in ‘‘case of contumacy or

refusal to obey [an SEC] subpoena issued to any person,’’ federal

courts ‘‘may issue to such person an order requiring such person to

appear before the Commission’’); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (providing that

in ‘‘any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader

TTT a district court may issue its process for all claimants’’); Credit

Mobilier Act, ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509 (March 3, 1873)

(providing that the ‘‘court where said cause is pending may make

such orders and decrees, and issue such process as it shall deem

necessary to bring in new parties’’); see also Robertson v. Railroad

Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 624 (1925) (noting that the Credit Mobilier

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ance’’ and ‘‘service’’ interchangeably.7

In sum, common legal usage of the words employed in

§ 1692 support the views expressed by this court in Vision

Communications, by the First and Sixth Circuits in American Freedom Train and Haile, and by scholarly commentary.

Accordingly, we decline to part company with those views,

and we conclude that the ‘‘interplay’’ between Rule 4(k) and

29 U.S.C. §§ 754 and 1692 properly provided the district

court with jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Haire.8

Act provided jurisdiction in personam over defendants living in

different states).

7 See, e.g., Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484

U.S. 97, 108 (1987) (‘‘[I]t is unclear at this time whether it is open to

us to fashion a rule authorizing service of process. At common law,

a court lacked authority to issue process outside its district, and

Congress made this same restriction the general rule when it

enacted the Judiciary Act.’’) (emphasis added); Robertson, 268 U.S.

at 622–23 (‘‘In a civil suit in personam, jurisdiction over the defendant TTT implies TTT either voluntary appearance by him or service

of process upon himTTTT Under the general provisions of law, a

United States District Court cannot issue process beyond the limits

of the district.’’) (emphasis added); In re: Bridgestone/Firestone,

Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2003)

(‘‘The proposition that the federal court lacks the power to issue

nationwide process must be qualified by the proviso ‘unless a

federal statute authorizes this step’; and one of the claims in the

master complaint rested on RICO, which does authorize nationwide

service of process.’’) (emphasis added).

8 We also reject Haire’s contention that, even if § 1692 authorizes

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, to do so would violate

the Due Process Clause because he lacks ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with

the District of Columbia. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This circuit has held that the requirement

of ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with a forum state is inapplicable where the

court exercises personal jurisdiction by virtue of a federal statute

authorizing nationwide service of process. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569

F.2d 1, 8–10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds,

Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). In such circumstances,

minimum contacts with the United States suffice. See generally 4

WRIGHT & MILLER § 1068.1, at 605–06.

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III

The defendant’s remaining challenges to the district court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss, and to its grant of the

receiver’s motion for summary judgment, require only brief

discussion.9

A

Haire sought dismissal of the complaint on three grounds

in addition to personal jurisdiction. First, he contended that

venue was improper in the District of Columbia to enforce a

contract signed in Florida between two Florida residents.

But the district court correctly concluded that, because the

receiver’s complaint was brought to accomplish the objectives

of the Receivership Order and was thus ancillary to the

court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the receivership estate,

venue was properly established. Jan. 2003 Mem. Op. at 5;

see Haile, 657 F.2d at 922 n.6 (‘‘[W]here jurisdiction is

ancillary, the post-jurisdictional consideration of venue is

ancillary as well.’’); 20 WRIGHT & MILLER § 10, at 52–53

(noting with approval that, ‘‘where ancillary jurisdiction sufficed to allow a claim or a party without jurisdictional

grounds, it was also unnecessary to satisfy the venue statutes

with regard to that claim or party’’); see also Scholes v.

Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995) (‘‘The laying of

venue TTT is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 754, which allows a

receiver to sue in the district in which he was appointed to

enforce claims anywhere in the country.’’).

Second, Haire sought dismissal on the ground that the

Note provides that all related actions must be brought in local

Florida courts. Although Haire styled this as a forum non

conveniens argument, his challenge centered not on the inconvenience or burden of litigating in the District of Columbia,

but rather on the Note’s forum selection clause. That clause

states:

9 In addition to the core arguments set forth below, we have

considered all of Haire’s myriad variations and sub-arguments as

well. We have concluded that they are without merit, and that they

do not merit further discussion.

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Venue for any legal proceeding arising under this Note

or the Stock Pledge Agreement shall be in the courts

located in Hillsborough County, Florida and Maker and

Holder waive any right to sue or be sued in any other

venue unless it shall be lawfully required that venue for

any legal proceeding lie elsewhere.

Promissory Note at 2 (J.A. 29) (emphasis added). In arguing

that the forum selection clause requires suit in Florida, Haire

ignores the clause’s exception for cases in which ‘‘it shall be

lawfully required that venue TTT lie elsewhere.’’ Id. As the

district court correctly concluded, the Receivership Order

satisfies that exception. That Order, which was affirmed by

this circuit in an earlier proceeding, provides that the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia ‘‘shall have

exclusive jurisdiction over the Receivership Estate,’’ and that

‘‘no person or entity shall bring any claim against TTT the

Receivership Estate in any forum other than this Court.’’

Bilzerian, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (emphasis added), aff’d,

2003 WL 22176183 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Finally, Haire contended that dismissal was required because the receiver failed to join OHLP, the original holder of

the Note, as mandated by Rule 19(a)(1). See FED. R. CIV. P.

19(a)(1) (‘‘Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication’’);

see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7). Haire asserted that OHLP

had fraudulently induced him to sign the Note, and that

OHLP had to be joined in order for him to effectively raise

that defense. But as Haire himself maintains, the receiver’s

only rights with respect to the Note were ‘‘derived from the

assignment by OHLP,’’ and ‘‘[a]s an assignee, [the receiver]

merely step[ped] in the shoes of the assignor.’’ Appellant’s

Br. at 30 (citing Ned Chartering & Trading, Inc. v. Republic

of Pakistan, 294 F.3d 148, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Accordingly,

as both parties agree, the receiver was ‘‘subject to all defenses and rights of setoff that Haire ha[d] against OHLP.’’

Appellant’s Br. at 31; see Appellee’s Br. at 31–32. Because

OHLP’s presence was not needed for Haire to raise those

defenses, ‘‘complete relief’’ could ‘‘be accorded among those

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already parties’’ and OHLP was not a necessary party. FED.

R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1).10

B

Haire also appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the receiver, which held, inter alia, that

Haire had to pay the receivership estate the principal amount

of $1 million plus unpaid and accrued interest. See July 2003

Mem. Op. at 26. The purported issues of material fact that

Haire asserted in opposing the receiver’s motion for summary

judgment did not contest anything in the receiver’s statement

of facts, but instead contested entry of judgment on the

grounds of personal jurisdiction, venue, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and duress. The first two grounds

raised issues identical to those raised in Haire’s motion to

dismiss, grounds that we rejected in Parts II and III.A. The

remaining three are without merit.

Haire’s first contention was that he was fraudulently induced into signing the Note. Haire’s affidavit asserted that

Bilzerian’s wife (who controlled OHLP) had assured him that

Bilzerian possessed no interest in OHLP’s assets, and claimed

that Haire did not learn the assurance was untrue (and that

the assets were subject to claims by Bilzerian’s creditors)

until December 2001, more than a year after he signed the

Note. But the district court found on the undisputed facts

that the receiver had served Haire with copies of the December 2000 Receivership Order on ‘‘at least two occasions, the

first being on December 22, 2000.’’ July 2003 Mem. Op. at

17–18.11 That Order decreed that the receivership estate

10 Haire was also free, as the district court noted, to pursue

claims for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and fraud that he

had filed against OHLP in state court. Jan. 2003 Mem. Op. at 8.

At the same time, there was no risk of double recovery against

Haire because the consent judgment gave the receiver the sole

right to enforce the Note. See Consent and Undertakings Agreement at 5 (J.A. 87).

11 Haire’s opposition to summary judgement did not dispute the

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‘‘shall be comprised of’’ Bilzerian’s assets, ‘‘including but not

limited to TTT Overseas Holdings Limited Partnership,’’ and

was transmitted with a cover letter notifying recipients that

those assets were to be ‘‘immediately surrendered to the

Receiver.’’ Id. (quoting Receivership Order and cover letter).

Then, on March 21, 2001 — three months after he received

this notice that OHLP’s assets were subject to the claims of

the receivership estate — Haire signed an extension agreement (the Forbearance and Extension Agreement) with

OHLP that reaffirmed his obligations under the Note. That

reaffirmation, the court held, waived any fraud defense he

might have under Florida law. We agree. See Harpold v.

Stock, 65 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 1953); Price v. Airlift International, Inc., 181 So. 2d 549, 550–51 (Fla. App. Ct. 1966).

Second, Haire contended that OHLP had breached its

obligation under the Note by failing to permit him to sell the

stock he had pledged as security. But the Note does not

mention any such obligation, and the district court correctly

found that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral

agreement is inadmissable under Florida’s parol evidence rule

when — as here — the contract is unambiguous. See Ungerleider v. Gordon, 214 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2000).

Finally, Haire alleged that OHLP had assigned the Note to

the receiver under duress. Even if that were true, it would

not offer Haire a defense to payment on the Note. Moreover, this court has previously held that Haire lacks standing

to collaterally attack the consent judgment in which OHLP

agreed to assign the Note to the receiver. See SEC v.

Bilzerian, 2002 WL 1998001, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the court’s grant of summary judgment for the receiver

was appropriate.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Haire’s motion for dismissal of the receiver’s comship Order upon him in December 2000. See Ernest B. Haire’s

Opp’n to Receiver’s Mot. for Summ. J.

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plaint, as well as the court’s grant of the receiver’s motion for

summary judgment.

Affirmed.

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