Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00101/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pamela Cook
Defendant
Deverick Scott
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

 PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

DEVERICK SCOTT, PLAINTIFF 

ADC #131042 

v. 5:19CV00101-DPM-JTK 

PAMELA COOK DEFENDANT 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Chief 

Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. 

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If 

the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports 

your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the 

United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings 

and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or 

additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at 

the same time that you file your written objections, include the following: 

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate. 

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District Judge (if such 

a hearing is granted) was not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge. 

 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the hearing before the 

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District Judge in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any 

documentary or other non-testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the hearing 

before the District Judge. 

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional 

evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge. 

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to: 

Clerk, United States District Court 

Eastern District of Arkansas 

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff Deverick Scott, a state inmate incarcerated at the Varner Super Max Unit of the 

Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC), filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging retaliation by Defendant Cook. (Doc. No. 2) 

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 

Nos. 17-9, 20-22) They each filed responses (Doc. Nos. 23-24, 25-27). 

II. Complaint 

 Plaintiff alleged he destroyed his blanket by setting it on fire on June 6, 2018, and 

subsequently was charged with a disciplinary and placed on behavioral control. (Doc. No. 2, p. 2) 

When he was released, he was issued used laundry. (Id.) After Defendant Cook denied his request 

for new laundry, he filed a grievance stating that he set his laundry on fire, that the replacement 

laundry he received was mildewed, and that Defendant refused to issue him new laundry. (Id.) 

Defendant responded to the grievance by stating that she would replace his items but would take 

disciplinary action against him. (Id., p. 3) Plaintiff further alleged Defendant Cook then wrote 

Case 5:19-cv-00101-DPM Document 28 Filed 01/09/20 Page 2 of 7
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Plaintiff a disciplinary on September 24, 2018, in retaliation for the grievance he filed, noting that 

she saw during her investigation that Plaintiff already received a written disciplinary on June 6, 

2018 for setting fire to his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff also claimed Cook falsified her disciplinary report 

when she stated Plaintiff burned up other laundry, even though he only destroyed his blanket. (Id.) 

Plaintiff's second disciplinary was dismissed because of the previous disciplinary charge, and 

Plaintiff claimed Defendant's actions violated his First Amendment right to use the inmate 

grievance procedure and caused him emotional and mental distress and physical injuries. (Id., p. 

4) 

III. Summary Judgment 

Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. See Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997). “The moving party bears 

the initial burden of identifying ‘those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Webb v. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 

1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (other 

citations omitted)). “Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot 

simply rest on mere denials or allegations in the pleadings; rather, the non-movant ‘must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 1135. Although the facts are 

viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, “in order to defeat a motion for summary 

judgment, the non-movant cannot simply create a factual dispute; rather, there must be a genuine 

dispute over those facts that could actually affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Id. 

A. Official Capacity 

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The Court initially agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's monetary claims against her in 

her official capacity should be dismissed, based on sovereign immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep't 

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989), and Brown v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 353 F.3d 

1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004) 

B. Individual Capacity 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, stating that Defendant clearly wrote the September 

24, 2018 disciplinary charge against him in retaliation for the grievance he filed about his laundry, 

knowing he previously was charged for the June 6, 2018 incident. In response, Defendant asks the 

Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against her in her individual capacity, based on qualified 

immunity, which protects officials who act in an objectively reasonable manner. 

Qualified immunity It may shield a government official from liability when his or her 

conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Qualified immunity is a question of law, not a question of fact. McClendon v. Story County 

Sheriff's Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, issues concerning qualified immunity 

are appropriately resolved on summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 

(1985) (the privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an 

absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”). 

To determine whether defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the courts generally 

consider two questions: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown, construed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether 

that right was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his or her 

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actions were unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).1 Defendants are entitled 

to qualified immunity only if no reasonable fact finder could answer both questions in the 

affirmative. Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009). 

According to the mostly undisputed facts, Plaintiff set fire to his cell on June 6, 2018. (Doc. 

No. 18, p. 6) Officer Marquis Taylor charged Plaintiff with destruction of property, unauthorized 

use of state property, and setting a fire. (Id.) Plaintiff stated he served time in behavioral control 

and when he was released, he received replacement property which was mildewed, because the 

inmates working in the laundry area did not allow the laundry to properly dry. When Defendant 

Cook denied his request for “new” items, he filed a grievance on September 18, 2018. (Doc. No. 

8) Cook then responded that she would replace the items but that disciplinary action would be 

taken for the destroyed property. (Id.) Cook filed a disciplinary against Plaintiff on September 24, 

2018 and charged him with unauthorized use of state property, destruction of property, and setting 

a fire, and noted the monetary charges for the destroyed property. (Id., p. 9) Plaintiff grieved that 

disciplinary, which he considered retaliatory, and the Warden responded that Cook's disciplinary 

charge was dismissed because of the previous disciplinary. (Id., pp. 10-12, 15-17) 

In her Declaration, Defendant Cook stated that she is Laundry Supervisor at the Varner 

Unit and is authorized to issue disciplinary charges against inmates. (Doc. No. 21-4) She wrote the 

disciplinary against Plaintiff because he admitted in his September 24, 2018 grievance that he set 

fire to his cell and burned his property. (Id., p. 2) In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted 

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Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the 

two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 

circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson, 583 F.3d at 528 (quoting Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236). 

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that he set fire to his cell on at least three occasions, that his grievance statement that “sheets, 

blankets, everything was on fire,” was not true, and that he wrote that because he wanted new 

items. (Doc. No. 21, pp. 10-11) 

To support a retaliation claim against Defendant, Plaintiff must allege and prove “that he 

engaged in protected activity and that defendants, to retaliate for the protected activity, took 

adverse action against [him] that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that 

activity.@ Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007). However, a retaliation claim is 

precluded if the alleged retaliatory conduct violation was issued for the actual violation of a prison 

rule, by the showing of Asome evidence@ that the inmate actually committed a rule violation. 

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2008). And, Aa report from a correctional 

officer, even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, legally suffices as 

>some evidence= upon which to base a prison disciplinary violation, if the violation is found by an 

impartial decisionmaker.@ Id. at 831. See also Sanders v. Hobbs, 773 F.3d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 

2014). 

In this case, Plaintiff admitted burning his blanket in his cell on several occasions and 

admitted that he falsified his grievance when he stated that “my sheets blankets everything was on 

fire 3 times.” (Doc. No. 18, p. 13) He also admitted that he received replacement items, albeit 

used and mildewed, and that he probably received the used items because he had set fire to property 

on several occasions. (Doc. No. 21-5, pp. 10-11) Cook wrote the disciplinary charge based on 

“some evidence," which was Plaintiff's admission in his grievance that he destroyed the property. 

While it is somewhat curious why Cook filed the disciplinary, having discovered through her 

investigation that Plaintiff was previously charged for his actions, Plaintiff provides no proof of 

retaliation. Cook's actions were not such that would “chill” an ordinary person from engaging in 

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future grievances, and in fact, Defendant provides proof that Plaintiff filed 127 grievances since 

September 18, 2018. (Doc. No. 21-6) Finally, the Court notes that Cook's disciplinary charges 

were dismissed as duplicative. (Doc. No. 18, pp. 15-17) 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff=s retaliation claim against Defendant is precluded 

by the evidence which existed to support the charges, that Defendant acted reasonably under the 

circumstances, and that no reasonable fact finder could find that the facts alleged or shown, 

construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or 

statutory right. 

IV. Conclusion

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. No. 17) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20) be 

GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 9th day of January, 2020. 

_________________________________ 

JEROME T. KEARNEY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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