Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-08080/USCOURTS-ca10-16-08080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Allen Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 2, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 16-8080

PAUL ALLEN MILLER, 

Defendant - Appellant.

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00137-SWS)

(D. Wyo.)

ORDER*

Before BRISCOE, GORSUCH and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Paul Miller filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence,

arguing that § 4B1.2(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines has been rendered

invalid by the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551

(2015). The district court, aware that the Supreme Court will soon consider the same

question in Beckles v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016), stayed the proceedings

pending a final decision in Beckles. Miller immediately filed a notice of appeal and now

asks us to either treat the district court’s stay order as a final order and review it on the

merits or, alternatively, treat his notice of appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus under

* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,

res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

Appellate Case: 16-8080 Document: 01019714850 Date Filed: 11/02/2016 Page: 1 
the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and direct the district court to rule upon his §

2255 motion. Because we conclude the district court’s stay order is not a final appealable

order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we construe Miller’s notice of appeal as a petition for writ

of mandamus. Further, because we conclude that Miller’s right to issuance of the writ is

clear and indisputable, we direct the district court to vacate its stay order and rule on the

merits of Miller’s § 2255 motion.

I.

On January 14, 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Miller on a single count of

being a felon and unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of firearms, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (g)(3) and 924(a)(2). On March 13, 2015, Miller

entered into a written Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement with the government. The district

court accepted the plea agreement and, on June 4, 2015, sentenced Miller to a 30-month

term of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

On May 26, 2016, Miller filed a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate his sentence. 

The gist of Miller’s § 2255 motion is that he is entitled to a significantly lower sentence

(somewhere in the range of 12 to 18 months according to Miller) because his 30-month

sentence was based upon the application of § 4B1.2(a) of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines and § 4B1.2(a) has now been rendered invalid by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Johnson. 

The government moved to stay the proceedings. In its motion, the government

noted that “[o]n June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles v. United

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States (S.Ct. No. 15-8544), to decide . . . whether Johnson’s constitutional holding applies

to the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(2), and if so, whether Johnson applies

retroactively to cases on collateral review.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 56. The government asked

the district court to “stay all proceedings in [Miller’s case] until the . . . Supreme Court

issues an opinion in Beckles.” Id. at 55. 

The district court granted the government’s motion on July 21, 2016, and ordered

all proceedings in the case stayed until the Supreme Court issues an opinion in Beckles. 

Miller moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order, arguing that “a stay in th[e]

case effectively operates as a dismissal of his claim” because his “current release date is

March 22, 2017” and “[i]t is unlikely that the Supreme Court will issue an opinion in

Beckles with enough time remaining for [the district court] to then rule on the merits of

[his] claim before he is released.” Id. at 62. Before the district court ruled on the motion

for reconsideration, however, Miller filed a notice of appeal.

II.

A.

Miller argues on appeal that we should treat the district court’s stay order as

“final” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it “amounts to an outright dismissal of

his claim.” Aplt. Br. at 6. In support, Miller cites to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). At issue in

Moses H. Cone was a district court’s order staying a federal “diversity action pending

resolution of a concurrent state-court suit” that involved the precise same issue of the

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arbitrability of the respondent’s claims against petitioner. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court

concluded that “a stay of a federal suit pending resolution of [a related] state suit meant

that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum” and “the state court’s

judgment on the issue would be res judicata.” Id. at 10. “Hence,” the Court noted, “this

stay order amounts to a dismissal of the [federal] suit” and thus constitutes a final

appealable order. Id. Importantly, however, the Court emphasized that “the usual rule

[is] that a stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of § 1291,” and its reasoning

“[wa]s limited to cases where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar

doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be

litigated in a state forum.” Id. at 10 n.11. 

We have little trouble distinguishing the district court’s stay order in this case from

the one at issue in Moses H. Cone. To begin with, the district court’s stay order in this

case was not premised on any abstention doctrine, and there is no risk that Miller’s claims

will be resolved in any other forum. Further, the district court’s stay order does not place

Miller at risk that his claim will never be decided in federal court. Indeed, the district

court’s stay order quite clearly anticipates that the district court will resolve Miller’s

claims on the merits following the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles. Notably, Miller

does not argue otherwise. Instead, Miller’s argument is that the district court’s stay order,

if it lasts long enough, will render moot Miller’s challenge to his 30-month sentence. But

that argument is quite different than the one at issue in Moses H. Cone. As a result, we

conclude that the doctrine outlined in Moses H. Cone is inapplicable to this case.

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B.

Miller argues, in the alternative, that we should treat his notice of appeal as a

petition for mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), directing the district

court to rule on his § 2255 motion. “‘The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate

jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior

court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its

authority when it is its duty to do so.’” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490

U.S. 296, 308 (1989) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)). 

“[T]o be entitled to issuance of the writ,” petitioners must “demonstrate a ‘clear abuse of

discretion,’” id. (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953),

“or conduct amounting to ‘usurpation of [the judicial] power,’” id. (quoting De Beers

Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)). And, “[t]o ensure that

mandamus remains an extraordinary remedy, petitioners must show that they lack

adequate alternative means to obtain the relief they seek, and carry the burden of showing

that [their] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

This court considers “five nonconclusive guidelines” in determining whether to

grant mandamus relief. Clyma v. Sunoco, Inc., 594 F.3d 777, 782 (10th Cir. 2010). 

These include whether: 

(1) the petitioner has alternative means to secure relief; (2) the petitioner

will be damaged in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the district court’s

order constitutes an abuse of discretion; (4) the district court’s order

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represents an oft-repeated error and manifest, persistent disregard of

applicable law; and (5) the district court’s order raises new and important

problems of law or issues of first impression.

Id.

In this case, we conclude that Miller can satisfy four of these five guidelines. To

begin with, Miller has no alternative means to secure relief because, as we have noted, the

district court’s stay order is not a final order and thus is not appealable. Further, if Miller

is in fact entitled to the relief he seeks in his § 2255 motion, staying resolution of his

motion until the Supreme Court resolves Beckles will irreparably damage Miller by

resulting in his unnecessary confinement. And such a stay, we conclude, amounts to an

abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. See King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505

F.3d 1160, 1172 (11th Cir. 2007) (vacating as abuse of discretion a stay that “seem[ed]

indefinite” and that “apparently w[ould] expire only after the conclusion of litigation in

Italy”); Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th

Cir. 2007) (holding that district court’s indefinite stay pending resolution of related

arbitration proceedings in England was an abuse of discretion). Lastly, although the

district court’s stay order does not represent an oft-repeated error or manifest, persistent

disregard of applicable law (and thus does not satisfy Clyma’s fourth guideline), it does

raise a new and important procedural issue of first impression, i.e., whether to resolve on

the merits a § 2255 motion that hinges on an issue that will be resolved in the near future

by the Supreme Court, but in all likelihood not soon enough to benefit the defendant

seeking relief. 

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Ultimately, we conclude that Miller’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and

indisputable because, without it, he will effectively be denied his right to timely

resolution of his § 2255 motion. Accordingly, we shall grant Miller’s petition and issue a

writ of mandamus to the district court.

III

Miller’s notice of appeal, which we construe as a petition for writ of mandamus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), is GRANTED. The district court is directed to vacate its

prior order staying the case and consider Miller’s § 2255 motion on the merits. Miller’s

motion to expedite is DENIED as moot.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge 

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