Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03070/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Matthew West
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 12, 2006 Decided August 15, 2006

No. 05-3070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MATTHEW WEST, A/K/A TITUS SHACKLEFORD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00093-01)

James W. Beane, Jr., appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Bernard J. Delia, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III and Elizabeth Trosman,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: A jury found defendant Matthew

West guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition

by a convicted felon. West raises two issues on appeal. First,

he argues that the district court’s use of compound questions

during voir dire denied him sufficient information to challenge

prospective jurors for cause and impaired his ability to exercise

his peremptory challenges intelligently. Second, he contends

that the district court erred in failing to suppress evidence of the

gun found in his bag. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm

the judgment of conviction.

I

West was a passenger on a Greyhound bus traveling from

New Jersey to North Carolina on February 2, 2004. During a

brief stopover at the Greyhound terminal in Washington, D.C.,

officers from the Drug Interdiction Unit of the Metropolitan

Police Department (MPD) boarded the bus and began

questioning passengers. West was seated in the last row of the

bus. Detective James McNamara -- who was wearing street

clothes and did not display a weapon -- approached West,

showed him his badge, and identified himself as an officer with

the Drug Interdiction Unit. In a conversational tone, McNamara

asked to see West’s bus ticket. West handed over his ticket,

which McNamara examined and returned. Next, McNamara

inquired as to whether the bag at West’s feet belonged to him

and whether he had packed it himself. West answered “yes” to

both questions. McNamara then asked to search the bag. West

opened it and began moving items around so that the detective

could see what was inside. McNamara then asked West for

permission to search the bag himself to ensure his safety. 

At this point, the recollections of Detective McNamara and

defendant West diverge. At a pretrial hearing held to consider

West’s motion to suppress evidence, McNamara testified that

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1

Other one-part questions included whether any panel members:

knew any of the trial lawyers or defendant West; were familiar with

the facts of the case; were familiar with the immediate area where the

offense took place; had opinions regarding defense attorneys or

prosecutors that would cause them to favor one side or the other; or

had any reason at all that would cause them to be unable to sit fairly

West told him he could search the bag, and that West then held

the bag’s flap back to allow the search. As the detective moved

some clothing, he discovered a loaded revolver and placed West

under arrest. By contrast, West testified that, although he

opened the bag for the detective and “didn’t mind going through

it” for him, he “never told [McNamara] he [could] go through

it.” Suppression Hr’g Tr. 56 (May 5, 2004). After hearing the

conflicting testimony, the district court concluded that West had

consented to the search, that his consent was voluntary, and that

evidence regarding the gun was therefore admissible at trial.

Jury selection commenced on September 29, 2004. Before

voir dire began, the lawyers were given a list of the occupations

that potential jurors had reported on their juror questionnaires.

All but six potential jurors on the panel had listed their

occupations.

The court conducted voir dire by asking the panel a series

of twenty-nine questions. The questions had either one or two

parts. In a one-part inquiry, the court simply asked the venire

members an open-ended fact question, such as: Do you know

any of the prospective trial witnesses (whom counsel had earlier

listed)? The court instructed the panel members to raise their

hands if the answer was “yes,” and anyone who answered in the

affirmative was called to the bench individually for further

questioning to determine whether he or she could be fair and

impartial despite that fact. Twenty-two of the court’s twentynine questions were one-part inquiries.1

 

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and impartially. The court also asked whether any panel members, or

their close friends or family, had: had an experience that would cause

them to give greater or lesser weight to a police officer’s testimony;

been a victim of, a witness to, or charged with, an offense like that at

issue in the case; or, as a result of having been a victim of, a witness

to, or charged with a crime, could not be fair and impartial to both

sides.

2

The court also asked two-part questions about whether the panel

members: were acquainted with other panel members; were currently

studying or had previously studied law; had previously served as

jurors; had previously served as grand jurors; or were currently or

previously involved in crime prevention groups.

The court asked the remaining seven questions in two-part,

compound form. The first part of the question was again a fact

question, for example: Are or were you, or your close personal

friends or family members, employed by a law enforcement

agency? The second part of each question was: Would that fact

make you unable to be fair and impartial to both sides? The

judge told the prospective jurors that, regardless of their answer

to the first part (the fact question), they were not to raise their

hands or say anything unless their answer to the second part (the

unable to be fair and impartial question) was “yes.” Only then

would they be called to the bench for individual voir dire. There

were six other two-part questions, including a similar compound

inquiry regarding current or previous employment in criminal

defense.2

West’s counsel objected to the court’s use of compound

questions, arguing that it deprived him of “the opportunity to

ferret out possible bias.” Trial Tr. 57 (Sept. 29, 2004). The

prosecutor joined defense counsel’s objection, stating that she

“agree[d] that jurors should not be responsible for drawing their

own conclusions about what makes them fair and impartial.” Id.

at 58. The court rejected the lawyers’ objections, explaining that

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the court “place[d] a very high premium on these jurors abiding

by their oath,” that “[j]ury selection in this district as it is takes

hours,” and that “[i]f we attenuate this further, what now takes

. . . three hours to pick a jury will be six to seven hours.” Id. at

61-62. Selection of the jury concluded after approximately three

hours and the jurors, including two alternates, were sworn.

Before trial began the next day, defense counsel noted a

further objection for the record, stating that he had been forced

to use peremptory challenges on five potential jurors because he

“knew nothing about their level of potential bias.” Trial Tr. 9

(Sept. 30, 2004). Those five included an attorney with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an attorney with the

Department of Justice, a security officer, and two individuals

who did not list any employment on their juror questionnaires.

The government called Detective McNamara as its first

witness. Almost immediately after the detective began

testifying, a juror raised his hand and informed the court that he

knew the witness. The court excused the rest of the jury and

called the juror to the bench, where the juror informed the court

that he was an Amtrak conductor and had helped McNamara and

his drug interdiction team take passengers who were being

arrested off of trains. In response to questioning from the court,

the juror stated that, as a result of this experience, he did not

believe he could remain fair and impartial. The court excused

the juror and seated an alternate in his place. Detective

McNamara then continued his testimony. 

McNamara’s trial testimony largely repeated his testimony

at the suppression hearing. During its course, McNamara

mentioned that a sergeant in the Drug Interdiction Unit -- Brian

Murphy -- was with him on the bus on the day of West’s arrest.

Sergeant Murphy (who was not otherwise involved in the case)

was not a trial witness; hence, his name, unlike McNamara’s,

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had not been read to the jury pool. Before the second day of

trial began, a juror approached the court to say that she thought

she knew Sergeant Murphy. The juror said that Murphy had

once dated a friend of hers, but that she had not seen the

sergeant in three years. The juror stated that she had asked

another friend -- an MPD detective who had worked on

undercover narcotics cases with Murphy -- for confirmation that

the Sergeant Brian Murphy mentioned at trial was the same

Sergeant Brian Murphy she knew. In response to questioning by

the court about her relationship with the MPD detective, the

juror said that they were “[p]latonic friend[s],” that they had

been “tight for four or five years,” but that they had “grown

apart in the last year.” Trial Tr. 8 (Oct. 1, 2004). The court

asked the juror whether there was anything about her prior

interactions with Sergeant Murphy or with her detective friend

that would render her unable to be fair and impartial to both

sides in the case. The juror attested to her ability to remain fair

and impartial.

The defense moved to excuse this second juror for cause.

The court denied the motion, finding that the juror had said

nothing to indicate any bias, and that her relationships with

Sergeant Murphy and the detective were insufficient to warrant

a for-cause strike. Defense counsel again moved to excuse the

juror, arguing that the voir dire process had been flawed and that

seating the alternate would remedy the problem. Defense

counsel maintained that, had the court not used a compound

question, he would have known about the juror’s friendship with

an MPD detective and would have exercised a peremptory

challenge against her. The court rejected this argument, finding

it speculative that the juror would have regarded the detective,

from whom she had grown apart, as a “close personal friend” (as

called for by the first part of the compound question). Id. at 15-

16.

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The trial concluded on the second day. West did not testify,

nor did he present any witnesses or evidence on his behalf. His

sole defense, offered during counsel’s closing argument, was

that he did not have constructive possession of the gun because

he did not intend to possess it at the time he was arrested. After

deliberating less than an hour, the jury returned a guilty verdict.

On this appeal, West challenges both the district court’s

method of conducting the voir dire and its denial of his motion

to suppress the gun. We consider the former in Part II and the

latter in Part III.

II

West’s objections to the voir dire are aimed at the district

court’s practice of asking certain questions using the two-part,

compound format described above. Although at oral argument

West contended that his objection extended to “the entire voir

dire process,” Oral Arg. Tape at 2:21, he conceded that his briefs

focused only on the possible law enforcement bias of potential

jurors arising from employment by a law enforcement agency or

close association with law enforcement officers, see id. at 5:49.

The only question he objected to on this score was the

compound question that asked the prospective jurors whether

they, or their close personal friends or family members, were

currently or previously employed by a law enforcement agency

-- but that precluded an affirmative response unless a

prospective juror believed that he or she “would be unable to be

fair and impartial to both sides . . . as a result of that

experience.” Trial Tr. 49 (Sept. 29, 2004). None of the panel

members raised their hands at the end of this two-part question.

West charges that, due to the way in which the court

structured this question, he never learned whether any of the

potential jurors, or their close friends or family, were currently

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or previously employed by law enforcement. He contends that

this was error for two reasons: the court’s method denied him

sufficient information to challenge prospective jurors for cause,

and it impaired his ability to exercise his peremptory challenges

intelligently. 

West’s critique parallels the Supreme Court’s explanation

that “[v]oir dire examination serves the dual purposes of

enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting

counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.” Mu’Min v.

Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (italics omitted); see

Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). As

this court has recognized, “[w]ithout knowledge bearing on the

qualifications of the veniremen, neither function can be

performed intelligently.” United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d

1222, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973). We consider West’s two

arguments below.

A

“Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in

the first instance with the trial judge, . . . . federal judges have

been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to

conduct the voir dire.” Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189 (italics

omitted). That discretion extends to the “mode and manner of

proceeding,” as well as “to the range of questions put to the

prospective jurors.” United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376,

380 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see United States v. Orenuga, 430 F.3d

1158, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The voir dire process is governed

by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a), which leaves its

conduct largely up to the trial judge:

(1) In General. The court may examine prospective

jurors or may permit the attorneys for the parties to do

so.

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(2) Court Examination. If the court examines the

jurors, it must permit the attorneys for the parties to:

(A) ask further questions that the court considers

proper; or (B) submit further questions that the court

may ask if it considers them proper.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). As the Rule makes

clear, “federal trial judges are not required to ask every question

that counsel -- even all counsel -- believes is appropriate.”

United States v. Lawes, 292 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002). 

Although the district court has broad discretion, “[t]he

exercise of this discretion, and the restriction upon inquiries at

the request of counsel, [remain] subject to the essential demands

of fairness.” Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310

(1931); see Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1227; Robinson, 475 F.2d at

380. Defense counsel “always ‘must be given a full and fair

opportunity to expose bias or prejudice on the part of the

veniremen.’” Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Robinson,

475 F.2d at 380-81). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]ithout an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility

to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to

follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot

be fulfilled.” Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188 (italics omitted);

see United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1094 (D.C. Cir.

1995).

We have described the appropriate standard of appellate

review for challenges to a trial court’s voir dire many times.

Under that standard, “absent abuse of [the court’s] broad

discretion, and a showing that the rights of the accused have

been substantially prejudiced thereby, the trial judge’s rulings as

to the scope and content of voir dire will not be disturbed on

appeal.” Robinson, 475 F.2d at 380 (emphasis added); accord

Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1095; United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d

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489, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d

1333, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d

428, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For the following reasons, we

find that there was neither an abuse of discretion nor a showing

that the defendant’s rights were substantially prejudiced in this

case.

1. On the question of whether the district court abused its

discretion, we conclude that the voir dire did not leave the

defendant with insufficient information to enable him to

challenge for cause any juror who was biased against him.

First, West’s claim that he could not ascertain the panel

members’ own current ties to law enforcement is not entirely

accurate. The parties were given a list of the venire that

included the occupations of all but six of the potential jurors. Of

those six, four were over sixty-seven years old -- justifying the

district court’s inference that they likely were retired -- and the

remaining two were struck during the voir dire. See Trial Tr. 11,

20 (Sept. 30, 2004). West therefore had current employment

information for almost all of the potential jurors. And while it

is true that neither the list nor the employment question (because

of its compound structure) ensured that West would learn of

panel members’ (or their close friends’ or families’) previous

employment in law enforcement, West never requested the kind

of narrower question (for example, a question specifically about

employment with the MPD) that the court might have been

required to ask. See infra Part II.C.

Second, the voir dire provided West with additional

opportunities to learn of law enforcement experience, or law

enforcement bias, on the part of the panel. As noted in Part I,

the court asked a total of twenty-nine questions, twenty-two of

which were one-part questions that did not have the defect West

has identified. See supra note 1. Among those was the

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3

Cf. Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 2003)

(noting that the Third Circuit has “found error and reversed in cases

where the district court barred all inquiry into a relevant subject matter

designed to elicit a disqualifying prejudice”). 

question: “As a result of an experience that you either had

personally or a close family member . . . or a close personal

friend had[,] . . . would [you] be likely to give greater or lesser

weight to a police officer’s testimony just because they are a

police officer?” Trial Tr. 34 (Sept. 29, 2004). The court also

asked whether any member of the panel, or any panel member’s

close family or friend, had ever been “a victim of, a witness to,

charged with, [or] arrested for a similar type of offense as the

one charged in this case.” Id. at 69. Other open-ended, one-part

questions included whether any panel member knew the

prosecutor, the defense attorney, the defendant, or any of the

potential trial witnesses. And the court closed its questioning by

asking what it called the “kitchen sink” question, inviting

individual panel members to come forward if there was “any

reason that you can think of, even though we haven’t covered it

in a question, that you believe is a basis for your inability to sit

fairly, attentively, and impartially if selected as a juror.” Id. at

80. As we have previously said, this kind of general inquiry

about potential bias is important because it “call[s] upon each

prospective juror, on his oath, to respond if he [feels] that any

aspect of the case . . . might affect his impartiality.” Peterson,

483 F.2d at 1228. Thus, West was not denied an inquiry into the

subject of potential law enforcement bias.3

Third, and perhaps most important, the scope required of

appropriate voir dire necessarily depends on the facts and

circumstances of the particular case. Questions that probe a

potential juror’s views of the credibility of certain kinds of

witnesses, for example, are more important in some cases than

others. Here, as West’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the

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credibility of the police witnesses was not at issue at trial. See

Oral Arg. Tape at 8:27-:50. The defense did not dispute

Detective McNamara’s trial testimony that the bag at West’s

feet contained a loaded revolver, or that West said that the bag

was his and that he had packed it himself. West’s sole defense

was that he did not have constructive possession of the gun

because he did not intend to possess it. See Trial Tr. 83-87 (Oct.

1, 2004) (defense counsel’s closing argument). Compare United

States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1165 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding no

reversible error in the court’s failure to ask about potential law

enforcement bias when “the credibility of most of the official

witnesses was not subject to extensive challenge”), with Brown

v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (vacating

a conviction where the prosecution’s case depended on the

credibility of its law enforcement witnesses and the court

refused to ask whether potential jurors would give greater

credence to the testimony of law enforcement officers).

Considering all of these factors together, we conclude that

the voir dire in this case met the “the essential demands of

fairness.” Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 310. The court’s questioning,

considered as a whole, provided the defendant with sufficient

information to enable him to challenge for cause any juror who

might be biased against him.

2. On the question of whether -- even if the district court

had abused its discretion -- West suffered substantial prejudice,

we note the following circumstances in addition to those

considered above.

First, the court asked numerous questions, of both the oneand two-part variety, that required the potential jurors to swear

that they could be fair and impartial. Particularly important in

this regard was the one-part, “kitchen sink” question noted

above. In addition, at the conclusion of the case, the court

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expressly instructed the jurors that “[i]n no event” were they to

give “either greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a

witness merely because he is . . . a police officer.” Trial Tr. 101

(Oct. 1, 2004). Given that West did not challenge the credibility

of the law enforcement witnesses, those questions and that

instruction served to mitigate any potential prejudice. Cf.

Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1228 (“perceiv[ing] no prejudice resultant

from the denial” of the defendant’s specific voir dire request

because, inter alia, the court instructed the jury against improper

inferences and “posed a general question that should have

elicited instances of bias, if any at all existed”).

Second, the government’s case against West can aptly be

described as overwhelming. As just noted, West did not dispute

any part of Detective McNamara’s testimony. His only defense

was that he did not intend to possess the gun. Since West did

not testify -- about his intent or any other topic -- there was little

if anything to this defense. See United States v. VictoriaPeguero, 920 F.2d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1990) (refusing to reverse a

defendant’s conviction, despite the district court’s error in not

inquiring about law enforcement bias, in part because “the

government’s case was very strong”). 

Finally, and critically, West does not allege that any juror

who sat on his case was actually biased against him. See United

States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Nor

can we presume that a juror’s “connections to law enforcement

. . . , standing alone,” are “suffic[ient] to establish implied bias.”

United States v. Morales, 185 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 1999).

Indeed, we have held that, “absent a specific showing of bias,

[even] a defendant accused of murdering a police officer is not

entitled to a jury free of policemen’s relatives.” Caldwell, 543

F.2d at 1347. The court removed the juror (the Amtrak

conductor) who said he knew Detective McNamara and could

not be impartial, and it individually questioned the juror who

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4

See Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d at 84-85 (holding that whether

error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law

enforcement testimony requires reversal “hinges on such factors as the

importance of the government agent’s testimony to the case as a

whole; the extent to which the question concerning the venire person’s

attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions . . . ;

the extent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness is

put into issue; and the extent to which the testimony of the

government agent is corroborated by non-agent witnesses” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

came forward to say she knew Sergeant Murphy. As to this

second juror, the court concluded, after careful questioning, that

she could remain fair and impartial -- a finding that West does

not challenge on appeal.

In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances, we

conclude that, even if the court had erred in posing the law

enforcement employment question in compound form, there is

no “showing that the right[] of the accused” to an impartial jury

has “been substantially prejudiced thereby.” Robinson, 475 F.2d

at 380.4

B

West also argues that the district court’s voir dire impaired

his ability to exercise his peremptory challenges intelligently.

While “[t]he peremptory challenge is part of our common-law

heritage[,]” it is “not of federal constitutional dimension.”

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000);

see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). Rather, in state

cases it is a “creature of statute,” Ross, 487 U.S. at 89, and in

federal cases a creature of Rule 24(b), which specifies the

number of peremptories to which each side is entitled, see FED.

R. CRIM. P. 24(b). Without defining the exact contours of the

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5

In the interim between Swain and Martinez-Salazar, other

circuits held that the denial or impairment of a litigant’s right to

peremptory challenges required automatic reversal. In no case,

however, did a court hold that a litigant’s rights were substantially

impaired because of an inadequate voir dire. Cf., e.g., Carr v. Watts,

597 F.2d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding reversible impairment

where a judge’s practice of refusing to allow counsel to carry over

unused peremptory challenges prevented the litigant “from using his

remaining peremptory challenge which was his as a matter of statutory

right”); United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1985)

(finding reversible impairment where confusion about the order in

which jurors would be selected rendered the defendant’s peremptory

right, we have held that there “‘must be sufficient information

elicited on voir dire to permit a defendant to intelligently

exercise . . . his peremptory challenges.’” Edmond, 52 F.3d at

1090 (quoting United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 142 (2d

Cir. 1979)). 

Although West points us to the Supreme Court’s suggestion

in Swain v. Alabama that “[t]he denial or impairment of the right

[to peremptory challenges] is reversible error without a showing

of prejudice,” 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), he fails to mention the

Court’s subsequent retreat from that suggestion. In United

States v. Martinez-Salazar, while finding it unnecessary to

decide “what the appropriate remedy for a substantial

impairment would be,” the Court sharply observed that this “oftquoted language in Swain was not only unnecessary to the

decision in that case[,] . . . but was founded on a series of our

early cases decided long before the adoption of harmless-error

review.” 528 U.S. at 317 n.4. We need not decide whether the

substantial impairment of a defendant’s right to peremptory

challenges requires automatic reversal, because we conclude that

West’s right was not substantially impaired. As we have

discussed above, West had adequate -- albeit imperfect --

information with which to exercise his peremptory challenges.5

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strikes “worthless because they were all exercised with respect to

veniremen who were not considered for selection as jurors”).

6

In light of his subsequent statement that he could not be fair and

impartial, the conductor also should have answered “yes” to the

court’s one-part “kitchen sink” question. Trial Tr. 80 (Sept. 29, 2004).

The examples that West cites in support of his impairment

argument do not establish impairment at all. The failure of the

first juror, the Amtrak conductor, to disclose his acquaintance

with Detective McNamara was not the consequence of the

district court’s mode of questioning. On the one hand, it is

unlikely that the conductor would have answered “yes” even if

the employment question had been asked in one part, since the

conductor was not employed by a law enforcement agency. On

the other hand, the conductor should have answered “yes” to a

one-part question that the district court did ask: whether any

member of the panel knew any of the prospective witnesses,

specifically including Detective McNamara.6

Nor has West shown that breaking the employment inquiry

into two separate questions would have elicited an affirmative

response from the second juror (the one with the friend who was

a detective). The first part of that question asked whether any of

the prospective jurors, or their close personal friends or family

members, were employed by a law enforcement agency. But

this juror testified that she had “grown apart” from her detective

friend, suggesting -- as the district court said -- that she did not

regard their current relationship as “close.” Trial Tr. 8, 15-16

(Oct. 1, 2004). Because West objected only to the compound

structure of the question, and not to its restriction to “close”

friends, there is little support for his claim that a different mode

of questioning would have given him more timely information

about that juror. 

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7

As Chief Justice Marshall said at the trial of Aaron Burr: “[A]

man . . . may declare that he feels no prejudice in the case; and yet the

Finally, West notes in the introductory portion of his brief --

but not in the argument section -- that he “was forced to use

peremptory challenges on five jurors” who might otherwise have

been struck for cause, “because he did not have sufficient

knowledge to appropriately judge the level of their potential

bias.” Appellant’s Br. 12. According to their juror

questionnaires, one of the five was an FBI attorney, one was a

Department of Justice attorney, one was a security officer, and

two listed no employment at all. See Trial Tr. 9-20 (Sept. 30,

2004). No doubt the reason West does not argue this point is

that the Supreme Court has foreclosed it. See Martinez-Salazar,

528 U.S. at 307 (holding that “a defendant’s exercise of

peremptory challenges . . . is not denied or impaired when the

defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a

juror who should have been excused for cause”).

C 

Although we affirm West’s conviction, our decision should

not be taken as endorsing the use of compound questions with

respect to subjects of substantial import in a particular case. The

district court’s discretion regarding voir dire is broad, but it is

not boundless. The problem with using compound questions, as

West correctly notes, is that it prevents the parties from learning

the factual premise of the first part of the question, relying

instead upon the juror’s self-assessment of his or her

impartiality. Yet, as we have cautioned in the past, “‘whether a

juror can render a verdict based solely on evidence adduced in

the courtroom should not be adjudged on that juror’s own

assessment of self-righteousness without something more.’”

Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Silverthorne v. United States,

400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968) (alteration omitted)).7

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18

law cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the jury because it

suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a similar situation

would feel prejudice.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (No.

14,692) (C.C. Va. 1807). 

This is not just a problem for the defense. Here, for

example, the district court treated both sides even-handedly.

Another compound question that it put to the venire was whether

they, or their close friends or family, were “involved in any way

in the defense of criminal cases.” Trial Tr. 49 (Sept. 29, 2004).

As with the law enforcement employment question, the court

told the potential jurors not to answer unless they could not be

“fair and impartial to both sides.” Id. It is thus unsurprising that

the prosecutor joined defense counsel in objecting to the use of

compound questions, stating that the government “agree[d] that

jurors should not be responsible for drawing their own

conclusions about what makes them fair and impartial,” id. at

58, and that this was “not a sufficient voir dire process to allow

the attorneys to exercise their peremptories with any information

about who we have in the pool,” Trial Tr. 24 (Sept. 30, 2004).

We do not suggest that the trial court must use one-part

questions on every subject, in every case. Whether and which

one-part questions are required depends upon the context.

Nonetheless, “[u]ndoubtedly there are occasions upon which

further questioning is needed to permit the trial court to make its

own judgment of a juror’s impartiality based on objective facts,

rather than relying exclusively on the jurors’ subjective

determinations of whether they [are] prejudiced.” Caldwell, 543

F.2d at 1345. As we have said several times, “‘[t]he possibility

of prejudice is real, and there is consequent need for a searching

voir dire examination, in situations where, for example, the case

carries racial overtones, or involves other matters concerning

which either the local community or the population at large is

commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short

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8

In the instant case, the district court followed this precedent,

asking the potential jurors, in one-part form, whether they “would be

inclined to give greater or lesser weight to a police officer’s testimony

just because they are a police officer.” Trial Tr. 34 (Sept. 29, 2004).

of presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations

in fact.’” Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Robinson, 475

F.2d at 381 (footnotes omitted)); see also Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at

424; Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189. In addition, “voir dire

must be allowed on subjects with respect to which ‘bias and

distorting influence have become evident, through experience

with juries, and have come to be recognized as a proper subject

for the voir dire.’” Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1163 (quoting

Robinson, 475 F.2d at 381 (italics omitted)). This circuit has

held that “[t]he potential for jurors to attach undue weight to the

testimony of law enforcement officials during trial is one such

example.” Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1163 (citing Robinson, 475

F.2d at 381 (citing Brown, 338 F.2d at 544)).8

Another example is the problem of pretrial publicity, as to

which this circuit has expressly disapproved the kind of

compound questions asked in this case. In United States v.

Edmond, the district court did not ask prospective jurors whether

they had been exposed to pretrial publicity, but only whether

those who had been exposed could “render a fair and impartial

verdict.” 52 F.3d at 1096, 1097. We identified the defect in this

approach as follows:

This style of questioning hardly commends itself. The

trial judge’s inquiry failed to ask directly whether

prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial

publicity; instead, the judge conflated that question

with the broader inquiry whether, notwithstanding their

presumed exposure to such publicity, they could render

a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial.

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9

See United States v. Beckner, 69 F.3d 1290, 1293-95 (5th Cir.

1995) (reversing a defendant’s conviction and remanding for a new

trial where the district court “did not ask jurors what information they

had read” about the case, but only whether “anyone had been so

affected by pretrial publicity that he or she could not be completely

fair and impartial”); Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 638-39 (requiring a new

trial in a case of pervasive pretrial publicity because the “trial court

made no effort to ascertain what information the jurors had

accumulated,” but merely went “through the form of obtaining jurors

assurances of impartiality” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

Not only does such questioning confuse the two lines

of inquiry, but it allows jurors to assess their own

impartiality before the court even has determined the

extent of their exposure to the media. Indeed, this

latter flaw alone can rise to the level of reversible error

in cases where extreme pretrial publicity has inflamed

the local community against the defendants.

Id. at 1097. In the end, we did not reverse the defendants’

convictions, but only because we found that, “in the totality of

the circumstances,” the voir dire “was adequate to assure the

impaneling of a jury that could render a judgment based solely

on the evidence adduced at trial.” Id. at 1098-99. Those

circumstances included the fact that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt began

voir dire in th[e] case by asking prospective jurors to fill out

20-page questionnaires . . . [that] asked about [their] exposure to

various media, inquiring as to the newspapers and television

programs most regularly read and viewed by each juror.” Id. at

1096.9

Finally, and directly relevant here, in certain circumstances

a more searching voir dire may be required with respect to a

prospective juror’s employment. In United States v. Segal, for

example, the court vacated the defendants’ convictions for

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10Cf. Lawes, 292 F.3d at 131 (finding no error because, although

the court refused to ask whether prospective jurors had relationships

or friendships with law enforcement officers, the questions that were

“asked would reveal whether the potential juror or a member of the

juror’s household was in law enforcement, the most compelling

circumstances with regard to the need for further inquiry”). 

bribing an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent, because the

district court had refused to ask whether any prospective jurors

or their immediate families worked for the IRS. See Segal, 534

F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1976), cited with approval in Butler v.

City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811, 816-17 (3d Cir. 2003). The

Third Circuit held:

[T]he defendants would reasonably need to know

whether any member of the panel or any person in his

family had ever been employed by the Internal

Revenue Service. The possibility of lingering loyalty

to the service, friendship of persons still employed

there, or knowledge of agency procedures are all

factors which counsel would weigh in deciding

whether to challenge. . . . [P]ast employment by the

specific agency prosecuting the case is a matter which

should be explored upon a party’s request. The refusal

to do so requires that a new trial be granted.

Segal, 534 F.2d at 581.10 The analogous one-part question here

would have been whether prospective jurors or their families

had ever been employed by the MPD, or worked in drug

interdiction. By contrast, the compound question that the court

did ask required even an MPD narcotics officer to remain silent

if he thought he could be fair and impartial. Had the defendant

requested, and the district court refused to ask, such a one-part

question, this would have been a much closer case. We need not

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11This also appears to be the case in other circuits. See, e.g.,

Lawes, 292 F.3d at 131 (noting that the district court’s questions

“reveal[ed] whether the potential juror or a member of the juror’s

household was in law enforcement”); United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d

749, 754 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the district court “asked the

veniremen whether they, their friends, or their family were employed

in law enforcement”). 

reach that issue, however, because West never sought such a

narrowed inquiry.

We are not unsympathetic to the desire of district courts to

control their crowded dockets. But, as the government

confirmed at oral argument, in this jurisdiction questions

regarding a prospective juror’s employment by law enforcement

agencies or criminal defense attorneys are typically asked as

one-part questions. See Oral Arg. Tape at 31:10.11 Such

questions do not unduly extend the duration of voir dire.

Certainly nothing prevents the court from requiring the parties

to prioritize their requests, narrowing the number and scope of

questions that they wish to have asked on a one-part basis. 

We repeat that we find no error, reversible or otherwise, in

the district court’s conduct of voir dire. Nonetheless, we

reiterate the caution of Edmond that “our approval of the trial

court’s actions is inextricably linked to the particular

circumstances of this case.” 52 F.3d at 1099. “We caution trial

judges not to test the outer limits of their discretion” and, “[i]n

particular, . . . to avoid asking compound questions of

prospective jurors.” Id. As we said in Edmond, “[w]here a

defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial is at stake, the

better practice is to err on the side of a voir dire that is simple,

direct, and thorough.” Id.

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III

West’s second challenge is to the district court’s denial of

his motion to suppress the gun found in his bag. “In reviewing

the denial of a motion to suppress, we examine the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo, but apply a clearly erroneous

standard to its underlying findings of fact.” United States v.

Pindell, 336 F.3d 1049, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted). West’s suppression argument is twopronged: First, he argues that he was unlawfully seized when

Detective McNamara “began interrogating him,” which in turn

tainted the subsequent search of his bag. Appellant’s Br. 29.

Second, he argues that he did not voluntarily consent -- or

consent at all -- to that search. 

The premise of West’s seizure claim is that, in the close

confines of the bus, he did not believe he could simply ignore

the detective’s questioning. As the Supreme Court has said,

however, the “fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does

not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens

into an illegal seizure.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,

204 (2002). Rather, the “proper inquiry ‘is whether a reasonable

person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or

otherwise terminate the encounter.’” Id. at 202 (quoting Florida

v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). The facts of this case are

virtually indistinguishable from those of Drayton, and

completely indistinguishable from those of United States v.

Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In the latter, we held

that the questioning of a defendant on a bus did not constitute a

seizure where the officer wore plain clothes, spoke in a

conversational tone, did not display a weapon, and returned the

defendant’s ticket after examining it. See id. at 1296-99.

Indeed, it is a mark of the futility of West’s argument that a

principal case on which he relies, United States v. Cothran, 729

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F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1990), was overturned on appeal in Lewis,

921 F.2d at 1300.

We turn next “from the question whether [the defendant

was] seized to whether [he was] subjected to an unreasonable

search, i.e., whether [his] consent to the suspicionless search

was involuntary.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206. West testified that

he never gave McNamara permission to personally search the

bag at all. But McNamara testified that West did give him such

permission, and the district court’s “finding that this permission

was given, based on demeanor and credibility evidence, cannot

be said to be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Brady, 842

F.2d 1313, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988). With respect to the

voluntariness of that consent, in “circumstances such as these,

where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search

and seizure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very

similar facts.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206. And just as the

Supreme Court said in Drayton: “[T]he facts above suggest

[that defendant’s] consent to the search of [his] luggage . . . .

was voluntary. Nothing [the detective] said indicated a

command to consent to the search.” Id. Rather, when West told

McNamara that the bag was his, the detective “asked for [his]

permission to check it[,] . . . indicating to a reasonable person

that he or she was free to refuse.” Id. 

We therefore conclude that there was no Fourth

Amendment violation and that the evidence regarding the gun

was properly admitted at trial.

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IV

Finding no error in the district court’s conduct of voir dire

or in its refusal to suppress evidence, we affirm the judgment of

conviction.

Affirmed.

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