Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-05-02154/USCOURTS-ca10-05-02154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felipe Romero-Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel

*

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 16, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

FELIPE ROMERO-HERNANDEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 05-2154

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NEW MEXICO

(D. Ct. No. CR-04-2490 WPJ)

Submitted on the briefs:*

Jerry A. Walz and Alfred D. Creecy, Walz and Associates, Cedar Crest, New

Mexico, for the Defendant-Appellant.

David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, and Norman Cairns, Assistant United

States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney for the District of New

Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, and GORSUCH, Circuit

Judges.

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TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Felipe Romero-Hernandez, a citizen of Mexico,

pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following removal for commission of an

aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). At sentencing,

the District Court applied a sixteen-level upward adjustment to Mr. RomeroHernandez’s sentence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) after concluding that he had previously

been deported following a felony conviction for a crime of violence. On appeal,

Mr. Romero-Hernandez argues that the District Court erroneously applied the

adjustment because his prior state conviction is not a crime of violence. We

exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and

AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 10, 2004, in Denver County Court, Mr. Romero-Hernandez

pleaded guilty to and was convicted of misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact in

violation of Colorado law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-404(1). Mr. RomeroHernandez was sentenced to 720 days’ imprisonment with 60 days’ credit for time

served and 660 days suspended and was thereafter removed from the United

States. On August 14, 2004, Mr. Romero-Hernandez was apprehended in

southern New Mexico and was subsequently charged with illegal reentry

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The PSR describes the offense conduct as follows: 1

Offense documentation reflects the victim[,] who was [15] years old

at the time, told her father of the defendant’s inappropriate sexual

behavior. . . . The victim advised the defendant went into her room

while she was sleeping and he attempted to grab her breasts as he

reached under her shirt. The victim stated she pushed the

defendant’s hands away while telling him to stop and leave her alone. 

The victim related the defendant was telling her to touch him and

rubbed her outer thigh with his hand. The victim reported the

defendant tried to get into bed with the victim and again put his hand

in the victim’s shirt, grabbing her breast while stating “those mine.” 

The victim advised she then told the defendant “no they’re mine!”

(continued...)

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following removal for commission of an aggravated felony, a violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).

Mr. Romero-Hernandez pleaded guilty to the federal charge. The

presentence report (“PSR”) calculated his base offense level as eight pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). In addition, the PSR recommended a sixteen-level upward

adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), which provides for an increase to

the base offense level when the defendant has a prior felony conviction for a

crime of violence. According to the PSR, Mr. Romero-Hernandez’s conviction is

a felony for federal sentencing purposes (despite its characterization as a

misdemeanor under Colorado law) because it is punishable by a term of

imprisonment exceeding one year, see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2, and is a “crime

of violence” because Mr. Romero-Hernandez had non-consensual sexual contact

with a minor and “sexual abuse of a minor” is an enumerated crime of violence

under the Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). The PSR also 1

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(...continued) 1

and pushed him away again.

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recommended a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Applying these adjustments, the PSR reported an

adjusted offense level of 21. With a criminal history category of III, the

recommended Guidelines sentence was 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. See

U.S.S.G. ch. 5 pt. A. 

Mr. Romero-Hernandez objected to the PSR, arguing that his prior state

conviction was neither a felony nor a crime of violence. The District Court

rejected these objections, concluding that the offense was a felony and that a

“plain reading” of the Colorado statute reveals that a violation of the statute

constitutes a “forcible sex offense,” an offense specifically enumerated as a

“crime of violence” under the Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). 

The District Court sentenced Mr. Romero-Hernandez to 46 months’ imprisonment

to be followed by two years’ supervised release. On appeal, Mr.

Romero-Hernandez does not contest that the state conviction is a felony offense

for purposes of the Guidelines. He maintains, however, that the offense of

unlawful sexual contact is not a “crime of violence.”

II. DISCUSSION

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s determination that a prior

offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). 

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See United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2004). “In

interpreting a guideline, we look at the language in the guideline itself, as well as

the interpretative and explanatory commentary to the guideline provided by the

Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 1181 (quotation omitted). 

The 2004 Guidelines, under which the District Court sentenced Mr.

Romero-Hernandez, provide a sixteen-level upward adjustment to the base

offense level if the “defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained

in the United States, after . . . a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of

violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The application notes to § 2L1.2

define “crime of violence” as:

any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated

assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor,

robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary

of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state or local law that has

as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (emphasis added). 

When a defendant contests whether a prior conviction is a crime of

violence, the sentencing court is generally required to follow the “categorical

approach” as adopted in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 

United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005). The

categorical approach requires the sentencing court to look “only to the statutory

definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those

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convictions.” Id. (quotation omitted). But when an examination of the statute

reveals that the statute “reaches a broad range of conduct, some of which merits

an enhancement and some of which does not, courts resolve the resulting

ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial records.” United States v. MartinezHernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005). At this stage, the analysis is

referred to as the “modified categorical approach.” See Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, – U.S. –, 127 S.Ct. 815, 819 (2007); Batrez Gradiz v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d

1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007). In applying the modified categorical approach, the

court is limited to examining “the terms of the charging document, the terms of a

plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which

the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some

comparable judicial record of this information.” Shepard v. United States, 544

U.S. 13, 26 (2005). The court may also rely on any admissions the defendant has

made regarding the facts of the prior conviction. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d at 1285.

Ultimately, the purpose of this analysis is to avoid “collateral trials.” Shepard,

544 U.S. at 23.

Following the categorical approach here, we look first to the language of

the statute to determine whether Mr. Romero-Hernandez was convicted of a crime

of violence. Because we conclude that the particular section of the Colorado

statute at issue prohibits conduct that is categorically a crime of violence under

§ 2L1.2, our analysis ends with the language of the statute and we do not proceed

Appellate Case: 05-2154 Document: 010151632 Date Filed: 10/16/2007 Page: 6
 We may look to the criminal complaint at this stage only to narrow the 2

state offense we examine under the categorical approach. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at

602 (requiring courts, under the categorical approach, “to look only to the fact of

conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense”); see also United

States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[e]ven under

the categorical approach, we have been willing to consider charging documents in

refining the state offense [that] we examine”). 

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to apply the modified categorical approach.

Mr. Romero-Hernandez was convicted under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-

404(1), which provides: 2

Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact

commits unlawful sexual contact if:

(a) The actor knows that the victim does not consent; or

(b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the

nature of the victim’s conduct; or

(c) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows that the

victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented; or

(d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim’s power to

appraise or control the victim’s conduct by employing, without the

victim’s consent, any drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose

of causing submission; or

[(e) Repealed by Laws 1990, H.B.90-1133, § 25, eff. July 1, 1990.]

(f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other

institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority

over the victim and uses this position of authority, unless incident to

a lawful search, to coerce the victim to submit; or

(g) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for

other than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially

inconsistent with reasonable medical practices. 

The District Court concluded that a conviction under the Colorado statute is

categorically a “forcible sex offense” and thus a crime of violence. The statute

prohibits nonconsensual sexual contact that is not necessarily achieved by

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A conviction under § 18-3-404(1) does not require the use of physical 3

force against the victim apart from the force inherent in the unlawful contact

itself. Section 18-3-404 provides two separate penalty provisions. Generally,

unlawful sexual contact is a “class 1 misdemeanor,” Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 18-3-404(2)(a), punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment, id. § 18-1.3-

501(1), (3)(a), (3)(b)(II)(a), unless the accused “compels the victim to submit by

use of . . . [physical] force, intimidation, or threat,” in which case the crime is a

“class 4 felony,” id. §§ 18-3-404(2)(b), 18-3-402(a)–(c), punishable by two to

eight years’ imprisonment, id. §§ 18-1.3-406, 18-1.3-401(10), 18-1.3-

401(a)(V)(A). Because the penalty depends on whether physical force, threats, or

intimidation were used to accomplish the sexual contact, it is clear that a person

can be convicted under the statute without a showing of physical force, threats, or

intimidation. 

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physical force. We must therefore determine whether nonconsensual sexual 3

contact constitutes a forcible sex offense and therefore a crime of violence. As

we explain below, we conclude that it does.

The Guidelines do not define the phrase “forcible sex offenses.” Mr.

Romero-Hernandez argues that to qualify as a forcible sex offense the offense

must involve the use of physical force apart from the force inherent in the sexual

contact itself, while the Government contends that a sex offense can be “forcible”

even though no physical force is involved. According to the Government, a sex

offense is “forcible” if it is nonconsensual, including those situations in which the

victim is legally or medically unable to consent. This is an issue of first

impression for this Circuit, and other circuits appear to be split on the issue. 

Compare United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007)

(noting that, “[n]ot surprisingly, given its language, we have interpreted the

phrase ‘forcible sex offenses’ as requiring the use of force,” and force “must

Appellate Case: 05-2154 Document: 010151632 Date Filed: 10/16/2007 Page: 8
Colorado law defines “sexual contact” as: 4

(continued...)

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actually be violent in nature”), and United States v. Gomez-Gomez, — F.3d —,

2007 WL 2070276, at *3 (5th Cir. 2007) (collecting Fifth Circuit cases discussing

§ 2L1.2’s “forcible sex offenses” enhancement and explaining that, for those

cases to which the enhancement did not apply, “the act may well be against the

will of the victim . . . but [if] there is no force or threat of force, . . . it is not a

‘forcible sex offense’ under the Guidelines”), with United States v. Remoi, 404

F.3d 789, 794–95 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting an interpretation of § 2L1.2 limiting

“forcible sex offenses” to those offenses involving physical force and concluding

that a sex offense against a victim who is “physically helpless, mentally defective

or mentally incapacitated” is categorically a “forcible sex offense”). 

Because the Guidelines do not define the term “forcible sex offense,” we

look to the “ordinary, contemporary, and common” meanings of the words used. 

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); see also United States v.

Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Mungia-Portillo, 484 F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 2007). A “sex offense” is

commonly understood as “[a]n offense involving unlawful sexual conduct.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1112 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “sexual offense”); see also

Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d at 1144 (applying dictionary definition of “sexual

offense”). Section 18-3-404(1) proscribes “unlawful sexual contact.” The full 4

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(...continued) 4

[T]he knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor, or

of the actor’s intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching

of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s

intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual

arousal, gratification, or abuse. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-401(4). 

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range of conduct prohibited by § 18-3-404(1) is thus a “sex offense” as that term

is commonly understood. 

The more difficult question is whether the full range of conduct prohibited

by § 18-3-404(1) is a forcible sex offense. Black’s generally defines “forcible” as

“[e]ffected by force or threat of force against opposition or resistance.” Black’s

Law Dictionary 674 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). This rather circular

definition could be read to imply that the word “forcible” requires physical

compulsion sufficient to overcome “opposition or resistance.” Such a reading

would be incorrect for two reasons. First, as Black’s explains in the context of a

personal trespass, unlawful contact with another person is a forcible injury: “To

lay one’s finger on another person without lawful justification is as much a

forcible injury in the eye of the law . . . as to beat him with a stick.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 674 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, the inclusion of “opposition or resistance”

should not be read to require active opposition or resistance. A legal right to be

free from interference will suffice to satisfy this definition. 

Second, the word “force” does not necessarily connote the use of physical

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compulsion. Black’s defines force as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed

against a person or thing.” Black’s Law Dictionary 673 (8th ed. 2004). “Power”

is in turn defined as “[d]ominance, control, or influence.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 1207 (8th ed. 2004). These definitions omit any reference to physical

power, pressure, dominance, or control. This omission is consistent with how we

have defined “force” in similar contexts. For example, we have stated that “force

may be inferred by such facts as disparity in size between victim and assailant, or

disparity in coercive power.” United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1302

(quotation and citation omitted) (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that in the context of

aggravated sexual assault, force does not mean “the brute force [commonly]

associated with rape”). These facts do not get at the issue of physical

compulsion, but rather go to the disparity of influence. Thus, where one party has

sufficient control of a situation to overcome the another’s free will, force is

present. 

The language of the crime-of-violence definition, § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii),

also indicates that use of physical compulsion is not required for a sex offense to

be “forcible.” The application note specifically uses the word “physical” to

modify force in denoting an offense committed by means of physical compulsion. 

See § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (defining crime of violence to include any offense

that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person of another” (emphasis added)). The Sentencing Commission’s

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omission of the “physical” modifier from the term “forcible sex offense” indicates

that the word “forcible” must mean more than physical compulsion. This

conclusion is bolstered by the fact that there are other enumerated offenses that

do not necessarily involve physical compulsion, permitting an inference that

physical compulsion is not necessary for a crime to be a crime of violence

generally. For example, the list of specifically enumerated crimes of violence

include statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor, neither of which requires

physical compulsion. See Remoi, 404 F.3d at 795 (noting that sexual abuse of a

minor is a crime that involves exploitation, but not necessarily physical

compulsion). Thus, a sex offense may be committed by means that do not involve

“physical” force, yet the offense may still be “forcible.” 

Though we have determined that a “forcible” sex offense need not be

accomplished by means of physical compulsion, the question remains whether

nonconsensual sexual contact, such as that prohibited by the Colorado statute, is

necessarily “forcible.” When an offense involves sexual contact with another

person, it is necessarily forcible when that person does not consent. See Remoi,

404 F.3d at 796 (“If a ‘forcible’ sexual offense is not associated with physical

compulsion, it must therefore mean a sexual act that is committed against the

victim’s will or consent.”). In the instant case, this conclusion is reinforced by

reference to the specifically enumerated situations that are covered by the statute

in question: victims unable to comprehend the nature of their conduct; physically

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helpless victims; victims whose self-control is impaired through the perpetrator’s

actions; or victims who are in the power of the perpetrator for medical purposes

or pursuant to some legal or disciplinary authority. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-

404(1)(b)–(d), (f)–(g). These examples are all ones in which the victims’

situational lack of power, influence, or control renders them unable to give

consent. Read with these examples in mind, subsection (a), which requires

merely that the perpetrator know that the victim did not consent, id., should be

read to cover an analogous situation: where, due to disparities in power or

influence, the victim’s lack of consent and the perpetrator’s knowledge of this

lack of consent is insufficient to protect the victim. Like the more specific

examples discussed in the later subsections, such situations clearly fall under the

definition of “force” discussed in Holly, 488 F.3d at 1302.

Because, as noted supra, the use of such disparities in situational power or

influence meet the definition of force, the offense in question is categorically a

crime of violence, and the District Court did not err by applying the § 2L1.2

enhancement to Mr. Romero-Hernandez’s sentence. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the

District Court. 

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