Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05254/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05254-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan A. Novak
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-5254

JONATHAN A. NOVAK,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge.

(3:08-cr-00173-REP-1)

Argued: May 14, 2010

Decided: June 15, 2010

Before DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge, and Arthur L. ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit

Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Hamilton wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge

Alarcón joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Robert James Wagner, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for

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Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.

Boente, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for

Appellee.

OPINION

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(3), any person that "willfully

fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who

resides in another State, if such obligation has remained

unpaid for a period longer than 2 years, or is greater than

$10,000," may be fined or imprisoned up to two years, or

both. 18 U.S.C. §§ 228(a)(3) and (c)(2). Section 228 contains

a specific venue provision, providing that a prosecution under

§ 228(a) may be brought in, among other places, "the district

in which the obliger resided" during the time the person

described in § 228(a) (i.e., the person who willfully failed to

pay the support obligation) "failed to meet th[e] support obligation." Id. §§ 228(e)(1) and (e)(2).

On appeal, Jonathan Novak challenges his § 228(a)(3) conviction, raising two challenges to the district court’s jury

instructions on venue. First, he contends the district court

erred when it failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that

he intended to remain in Virginia in order to find that he

resided in Virginia. Second, he contends the district court

erred when it failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that

he resided in the Eastern District of Virginia during a time

when he willfully failed to pay child support. Finding no

reversible error, we affirm.

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I

In early 1989, Novak began a relationship with Tina Miller

in California. After moving in together, Novak left for a job

in New York in May 1989. Miller then discovered she was

pregnant, and the couple married in August 1989. Novak continued to live in New York, while Miller remained in California. Shortly after the birth of the child in February 1990,

Miller sought to have her marriage to Novak annulled, and an

annulment was granted on July 3, 1990 by a California state

court. As part of the annulment, Novak was ordered to pay

child support in the amount of $658.00 per month. Some time

in 1993, Miller stopped receiving child support payments

from Novak. Through September 16, 2008, Novak had failed

to pay $120,479.77 in back child support and $110,499.38 in

interest, for a total balance due of $230,979.15.

Novak owned a house in Staten Island, New York with his

fourth wife, Linda, whom he married in 1995. Their four-year

old daughter developed a serious tumor in November 2003.

Linda filed for divorce after the diagnosis. In August 2004,

Novak took employment in Virginia on a consulting contract

with a company called GFS. The contract was guaranteed

through the end of 2004. Novak moved into a furnished apartment provided by GFS in Richmond, Virginia. After he left

New York, Linda moved to evict Novak from the marital

home in the ongoing divorce proceeding. As a consequence,

he was ordered removed from the marital home on August 11,

2004. Novak’s company, the Novak Advisory Group, took

over the apartment lease from GFS in October 2004. Novak

signed the lease and was listed as the sole occupant. The lease

ran through December 2004. Novak traveled back to New

York at least once a week during this time period in order to

visit his daughter. His belongings and documents stayed in the

marital home, and Novak claims he never intended to move

to Virginia.1

1Apparently, during the time frame alleged in the indictment, Novak

continued to make mortgage payments on the home in Staten Island, New

York. 

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Novak’s consulting contract was extended in December

2004. Novak’s company then signed a lease for a fully furnished, corporate apartment at The Gables apartment complex

in Richmond, Virginia. The lease was signed by Novak as the

sole occupant and ran from December 30, 2004 until April 29,

2005. A second lease agreement extended the lease until April

29, 2006. The property manager observed golf clubs at The

Gables apartment. Novak’s "driv[ing] history record," (J.A.

111), lists a Richmond, Virginia address as his address of

record from August 25, 2004, to October 31, 2005. A "certified vehicle record," (J.A. 112), shows that Novak purchased

a car on November 26, 2004 and subsequently registered it in

Glen Allen, Virginia.

Novak was arrested in New York on February 22, 2005, on

an indictment from the Eastern District of California for failure to pay child support. The charging period on the indictment was from January 2002 through May 2004. Novak

requested to report to pretrial services in Virginia. According

to Novak, counsel advised him not to pay child support until

after he was found guilty. On October 27, 2005, Novak pled

guilty to one misdemeanor count of willfully failing to pay

child support, id. § 228(a)(1). He was sentenced to a period of

probation and ordered to pay child support starting January

12, 2006. Novak started paying $658.00 in monthly payments

in December 2005, and continued making monthly payments

until his arrest in connection with the case currently before the

court. Novak served his sentence of probation on the California conviction in Virginia. His probation officer testified that

he visited Novak at his apartment in Virginia and that Novak

would travel on the weekends to New York to see his daughter.

In August 2007, Novak was arrested in connection with the

case currently before the court. On April 2, 2008, Novak was

indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for failure to pay

a past due child support obligation in an amount greater than

$5,000.00, id. § 228(a)(1). A superseding indictment, issued

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on July 8, 2008, increased the past due child support to

greater than $10,000.00, id. § 228(a)(3). A second superseding indictment, issued on August 13, 2008, specified the

charging period as on or about August 8, 2004 and continuing

to on or about July 20, 2005.

A two-day jury trial began on September 17, 2008.

Novak’s defense centered on challenging the government’s

contentions that (1) he willfully failed to pay child support

and (2) he resided in the Eastern District of Virginia at the

time he failed to pay. With regard to his willful failure, Novak

contended that he did not willfully fail to pay the child support during the time charged in the indictment because he lost

contact with Miller around the same time he stopped making

child support payments and could not locate her. He also contended that, from February 2005 through July 20, 2005, he did

not willfully fail to make payments because he was advised

by counsel not to make such payments. With regard to

whether he resided in Virginia, Novak contended that he

resided in New York and simply worked in Virginia. In support of this contention, Novak stressed that he traveled to

New York every weekend to visit his daughter, he did not

bring any furniture or household items to Virginia, he left all

of his important papers in New York, he was arrested in February 2005 in New York, and lived in New York full-time

after his work in Virginia concluded.

In its instructions to the jury, the district court gave specific

instructions on venue. After explaining that venue was not an

element of the offense and needed to be established by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court described the

requisite showing needed to establish that Novak resided in

the Eastern District of Virginia:

[The government must show] that during a time

charged in the indictment when the defendant failed

to meet the support obligation he resided in the Eastern District of Virginia. Specifically, I think there

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isn’t any evidence, but that he was in the Richmond

area. I don’t think they contend he was anywhere

other than that area. The term "reside" . . . used in

this case to describe the location of the defendant

simply means the act or fact of living in a given

place permanently or for an extended period of time.

(J.A. 287-88).

Before the jury retired, the district court gave the jury two

verdict forms. The first dealt with the substantive offense and

required the jury to find, "We, the jury, unanimously find the

defendant, Jonathan A. Novak, guilty or not guilty as charged

in Count One of the indictment." (J.A. 290). The second form

required the jury to find, "We, the jury, unanimously find by

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Jonathan

A. Novak, resided in the Eastern District of Virginia . . . during the time charged in the indictment when he failed to meet

the child support obligation." (J.A. 291).

The jury convicted Novak on September 18, 2008. When

the jury returned its verdict, the first verdict form provided

that "We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant, Jonathan

A. Novak, guilty as charged in Count One of the indictment."

(J.A. 297). The second verdict form was described slightly

differently than it was before the jury retired for deliberations.

The second form was described as finding, "[W]e, the jury,

unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant, Jonathan A. Novak, resided in the Eastern District

of Virginia for an extended period of time during the time

charged in the indictment, and he failed to meet the child support obligation." (J.A. 297-98).2

At sentencing, the district court sentenced Novak to

twenty-four months’ imprisonment. The district court also

2The actual verdict forms were lost at some point in time between the

trial and sentencing. 

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ordered Novak to pay $230,058.70 in back child support and

interest. Novak timely appealed on December 17, 2008. On

appeal, Novak raises two challenges to the district court’s

instructions on venue: (1) he contends the district court erred

when it failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that he

intended to remain in Virginia to find that he resided there;

and (2) he contends the district court erred when it failed to

instruct the jury that it had to find that he resided in the Eastern District of Virginia during a time when he willfully failed

to pay child support.

II

In United States v. Johnson, we recognized that two provisions in the Constitution govern venue in criminal cases. 510

F.3d 521, 523-24 (4th Cir. 2007). First, Article III provides

that criminal trials "shall be held in the State where the said

Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,

cl. 3. Second, the Sixth Amendment requires that, "[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and

district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S.

Const. amend. VI. These constitutional provisions are

designed to protect a criminal defendant from "‘bias, disadvantage, and inconvenience in the adjudication of the charges

against him.’" Johnson, 510 F.3d at 524 (quoting United

States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2005)).

In accordance with these provisions of the Constitution,

Congress may, in its discretion, prescribe specific venue

requirements for a particular crime. Johnson, 510 F.3d at 524.

If Congress does so, "‘that provision must be honored (assuming, of course, that it satisfies the constitutional minima).’" Id.

(quoting United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir.

2004)). In this case, Congress has enacted a specific venue

provision in § 228 (§ 228(e)), and there is no suggestion that

§ 228(e) fails to meet the minimum requirements required by

the Constitution. Accordingly, the issues raised by Novak

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concern the adequacy of the district court’s jury instructions

on venue. Our review of the district court’s jury instructions

is for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d

557, 566 (4th Cir. 2009). In reviewing jury instructions, we

will not reverse a conviction so long as the instructions, taken

as a whole, adequately state the controlling legal principles.

Id. at 566-67. Finally, the government must establish venue

by a preponderance of the evidence. Ebersole, 411 F.3d at

524.

A

Novak first contends that the district court erred when it

failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that he intended

to remain in Virginia to find that he "resided" there. The parties agree that venue in this case is proper in "the district in

which the obliger resided." 18 U.S.C. § 228(e). The district

court defined "resided" as "the act or fact of living in a given

place permanently or for an extended period of time." (J.A.

288). The term "resided" is undefined in § 228 and the parties

dispute its meaning. Novak argues that the term "resided"

includes an intent to remain in the Eastern District of Virginia. The government argues that Novak’s definition is more

appropriate for the term "domicile," that the term "resided" is

distinct from the term "domicile," and that § 228 was

designed to account for this difference by eliminating any

intent requirement.3

Two circuits have published decisions defining the term

"resided" in the § 228 context, and both of these decisions

agree that the government is not required to prove an intent

to remain in a state to establish that a person resided in such

state. See United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.

3Of note, Novak concedes that, if the government was not required to

prove that he intended to remain in Virginia to establish venue, there is

sufficient evidence in the record to establish that he resided in the Eastern

District of Virginia during the time period alleged in the indictment. 

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2004); United States v. Namey, 364 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2004).

Both opinions rest on the commonly understood difference in

meaning between residence and domicile, the intent of § 228,

and the absurd results that arise from requiring an intent to

remain requirement. Venturella, 391 F.3d at 125-28; Namey,

364 F.3d 845-46.

With regard to the commonly accepted meaning of the term

"reside," the court in Namey noted:

The term "reside" has a commonly accepted meaning. Dictionaries define "reside" as "[t]o live in a

place for a permanent or extended time," Webster’s

II New College Dictionary 943 (2001), or to "[l]ive,

dwell . . . to have a settled abode for a time. . . ."

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). An ordinary

person would understand that a person resides where

the person regularly lives or has a home as opposed

to where the person might visit or vacation.

Namey, 364 F.3d 845; see also Venturella, 391 F.3d at 125

("Residence is the act or fact of living in a given place for

some time, while domicile is a person’s true, fixed, principal,

and permanent home, to which that person intends to return

and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.") (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

With regard to § 228’s legislative history, the court in Venturella noted that the legislative history confirmed that § 228

was designed to target a parent who simply resides in another

state and is not concerned with the parent’s state of domicile:

The legislative history of the [Child Support Recovery Act] clearly shows that Congress understood

that: (1) § 228 would apply to those "interstate"

cases where a parent "lived" out-of-state, and (2) one

of the major problems in interstate enforcement was

an inability to garnish out-of-state wages effectively.

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The [Child Support Recovery Act] would reinforce

State garnishment laws by creating a strong incentive for parents to work in-state (or, of course, not to

default willfully on their child support obligations).

These concerns suggest that Congress expected the

CSRA to cover out-of-state residents. No one ever

mentioned domicile, any unique element of domicile, or any concern particular to domicile.

391 F.3d at 130-31. Similarly, the Namey court recognized

that the

concerns expressed in the legislative record have little to do with the parent’s intent to make the new

state his or her domicile or permanent home—rather,

it is the prolonged absence from the child’s home

state that concerned Congress. A parent who dwells,

but is not domiciled, in a different state from his

children is nonetheless absent from the child’s state,

and enforcement presents difficulties. 

364 F.3d at 846.

With regard to absurdity, Venturella describes a number of

scenarios which made patent that requiring an intent to reside

would lead to absurd results. Consider this example set forth

in Venturella:

Consider Annabelle and Barry, both of whom have

child support obligations regarding their respective

children in New York and are in default on those

obligations in excess of $10,000. Annabelle lives

only in New York. Barry lives only in Florida. If we

assume that "resides" does not require an intent to

remain, then, quite logically, only Barry has criminal

exposure under § 228.

However, if we assume that "resides" requires an

intent to remain, we must query the intents of Anna10 UNITED STATES v. NOVAK

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belle and Barry. Assume now, additionally, that

Annabelle is from Richmond, Virginia, intends to

return there, owns a home there, and has never had

any intention of remaining permanently in New

York. In fact, she hates New York and is quite vocal

about it. Assume also that Barry is living in Florida

only because he could not find work in New York,

but that Barry is from New York City, thinks that

life outside "the City" is boring, and intends to return

there when the year is out. If "resides" denotes domicile, then Annabelle may fall within the proscriptions

of § 228, simply because she loves Richmond and

has ties to her old home. Barry, on the other hand,

may escape the reach of § 228, because he desperately hopes to return to New York at the end of the

year. That Annabelle may be prosecuted over Barry

on the basis of her longing for Richmond is preposterous. It is also at odds with the focus of the statute—to offer federal criminal penalties against

parents who willfully fail to honor their child support

obligation and live in another State. Regional affections may be many things, but rarely are they criminal.

391 F.3d at 127.

Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in Namey explained:

A parent who dwells, but is not domiciled, in a different state from his children is nonetheless absent

from the child’s state, and enforcement presents difficulties. . . . [I]t would make no sense to read the

statute as imposing the strict domicile test, which

excludes parents who merely reside in another state

but present the same enforcement difficulties as if

they were domiciled there.

364 F.3d at 846.

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Given the commonly understood difference in meaning

between "resided" and "domicile," the purposes behind § 228,

and the absurd results that arise when one requires an intent

to remain to establish that the defendant resided in the state,

we agree with the analysis of the courts in both Venturella

and Namey and adopt the reasoning of these cases as our own.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err

when it defined "resided" as "the act or fact of living in a

given place permanently or for an extended period of time,"

(J.A. 288), and that the evidence was sufficient, for purposes

of venue, to establish that Novak resided in the Eastern District of Virginia during the time period alleged in the indictment.

B

The district court instructed the jury that it "must determine

whether the United States has proved by a preponderance of

the evidence, . . . that during a time charged in the indictment

when [Novak] failed to meet the support obligation he resided

in the Eastern District of Virginia." (J.A. 287-88).4 Novak

argues that the venue instruction should have required the jury

to find that he "willfully fail[ed]," 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(3), to

meet the support obligation while he resided in the Eastern

District of Virginia.5 Novak posits that the instruction was

4As noted earlier, the government must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Ebersole, 411 F.3d at 524. 

5Although the term "willful" does not appear in § 228(e), Novak makes

his argument through § 228(e)(1)’s reference to § 228(a), which does contain a willful component. Section 228(e)(2) allows for venue in "the district in which the obliger resided during a period described in paragraph

(1)." 18 U.S.C. § 228(e)(2). An "obliger" is defined in § 228(e)(1) as "a

person described in subsection (a)." Id. § 228(e)(1). The "period described

in paragraph (1)," id. § 228(e)(2), is "a period during which [an obliger]

failed to meet that support obligation," id. § 228(e)(1). Taken together,

§ 228(e)(2) allows for venue in the district in which a person described in

subsection (a) resided during a period during which a person described in

subsection (a) failed to meet that support obligation. The "person

described in subsection (a)," id. § 228(e)(1), is any person who "willfully

fails to pay a support obligation," id. § 228(a)(3). 

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erroneous because it "allowed the jury to find venue based on

a period in which Mr. Novak did not make payments on

advice of counsel (after February 2005), not upon a period in

which he willfully failed to make payments." Appellant’s Br.

at 20.

For purposes of Novak’s argument, we will assume, without deciding, that the district court was required in its venue

instruction to instruct the jury that it had to find that Novak

resided in the Eastern District of Virginia during a time when

he willfully failed to pay child support. Such an assumption

is of no help to Novak, however, because any error here is

harmless for two reasons. First, the jury found Novak "guilty

as charged in Count One of the indictment." (J.A. 297). The

indictment alleged a willful failure to pay a child support obligation from August 8, 2004 to July 20, 2005, and further

alleged that Novak was a resident of the Eastern District of

Virginia during that time frame. Therefore, Novak’s theory

that the jury could have found that he did not willfully fail to

pay child support because of advice of counsel is foreclosed

by the jury’s verdict. Second, Novak was not harmed by the

instruction if he resided in Virginia prior to February 22,

2005, the date in which he suggests counsel advised him not

to pay child support. If he resided in Virginia prior to February 22, 2005, then venue was proper. His argument, then,

hinges on his prevailing on his Part IIA argument, that he did

not "reside" in Virginia from August 8, 2004 to February 22,

2005, because during that time period he did not have the

intent to make Virginia his permanent residence. For the reasons explained in Part IIA, Novak cannot prevail on this argument. Therefore, he cannot show any harm even if we assume

the district court’s instruction was erroneous.

III

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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