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Parties Involved:
Michael Duane Benjamin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI L L D 

Uniu.rl States Court of Appeal£ 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 2 C 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL DUANE BENJAMIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92-8037 

(D.C. No. 92CR012-01B) 

(Dist. Wyo. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Michael Duane Benjamin pled guilty to one count of use of an 

unauthorized access device with intent to defraud in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2) . The District Court for the District of 

Wyoming departed upward from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 

sentencing the defendant to sixty months' imprisonment and three 

years of supervised release. The defendant appeals this sentence. 

Because we conclude the trial court did not give adequate reasons 

for departing from the Guidelines or for the degree of departure, 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of e stablishing the doctrines of the law of the case , res judicata , or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

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we remand for resentencing. 

I. 

In January, 1992, the grand jury returned a three count 

indictment against the defendant and a codefendant, charging 

conspiracy, fraudulent possession, and fraudulent use of credit 

cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b) (2) and§ 1029(a) (3 ) and 

(a) (2). The defendant entered a guilty plea to one count under an 

agreement providing for the dismissal of the remaining two counts. 

In the Presentence Report, the Probation Officer set the 

defendant's base offense level at 11 , including a two point 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Considering the 

defendant's lengthy criminal record and the fact that he committed 

the instant offense while on probation and less than two years 

after his release from imprisonment, the Probation Officer 

computed 19 criminal history points. See U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l. This 

point total placed the defendant in criminal history category VI, 

the highest criminal history category. 

defendant with an offense level of 11 

The Guidelines recommend a 

and a criminal history 

category VI receive a twenty-seven to thirty- three month sentence 

of imprisonment . 

Because the defendant's criminal history score was 

substantially higher than the thirteen point minimum required for 

criminal history category VI, the Probation Officer noted 11 [a]n 

upward departure pursuant to [U.S.S.G. §] 4Al.3 may be warranted 

in that defendant's criminal history record does 

reflect the seriousness of his criminal record." 

Officer also set out an alternative sentencing 

2 

not adequately 

The Probation 

table for the 

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district court to use in determining the amount of an upward 

departure: 

Offense 

Level: 11 

VI 

(13, 14, 15) 

27-33 

VII 

(16, 17, 18) 

30-37 

VIII 

(19, 20, 21) 

33-41 

During the sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the 

Probation Officer's recommendations of offense level and criminal 

history category. The court then decided to depart upward in 

sentencing, stating: 

I find that there exists aggravating circumstances of a 

kind and to a degree not adequately taken into 

consideration by the sentencing commission in 

formulating the guidelines, and that these aggravating 

circumstances should result in a sentence different than 

that prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. 

I find that the aggravating circumstances are 

these: First, that your criminal history is not 

adequately represented by a criminal history category of 

6. I think that it would be mo re realistically 

represented by a criminal category of 8. 

Not only that, but I find that you have shown, 

indeed when you addressed the court you have shown a 

marked lack of concern for others, you don't have any 

remorse of any kind for your crimes. You have even 

boasted about your crimes, and you have offered to 

demonstrate to the United States Attorney's office how 

these crimes are committed because you are proud of 

them. 

You have made statements as to how good you are at 

credit card crime, and you have made a statement about 

being the second best in the country at credit card 

crime . And I also note that you have a great tendency, 

and you did it this morning, to blame others for your 

situation instead of yourself. 

All this makes me believe that society is entitled 

to protection from you and, therefore, I am going to 

depart upward so as to protect society. 

I t is the sentence and judgment of this court that 

you be committed to the custody of the Attorney General 

of the United States ... for a period of 60 months .. 

3 

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.. 

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Transcript, Volume 3 at 23-24. 

II. 

We have adopted a three-step analysis for reviewing a 

district court's upward departure from the Guidelines. See United 

States v. Freitekh, 912 F.2d 421, 423 (10th Cir. 1990); United 

States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 277-78 (10th Cir. 199 0) . "First, 

we determine de novo whether the circumstances cited by the 

district court justify departure from the Guidelines. 

Second, we determine whether the factual f indings underlying the 

sentencing court's decision were clearly erroneous. Finally, we 

determine whether the degree of departure was reasonable." United 

States v. Rivas, 922 F.2d 1501, 1504 (10th Cir. 1991) 

omitted). 

(citations 

On appeal, the defendant challenges both the decision to 

1 depart and the degree of departure. First, the defendant argues 

the circumstances relied upon by the district court do not warrant 

an upward departure from the Guidelines. Generally, the 

sentencing court may depart from the Guidelines only if it "finds 

that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 

kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 

the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 

should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(b); United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 567 

1 The defendant also argues the district court failed to give 

him adequate notice of the method or facts it would rely on in 

determining the degree of departure. Because we hold the district 

court did not provide an adequate explanation of the reasons for 

d e parture or the degree of departure, we do not reach the notice 

issue. 

4 

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(10th Cir. 1990). Because uniformity and proportionality are the 

goals of the Guidelines, a sentencing judge should rarely depart 

from the Guidelines range. United States v. Jackson, 921 F . 2d 

985 , 989 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane). 

Here, the district court based its decision to depart upon 

the defendant ' s criminal history and his lack of remorse for his 

crimes or concern for others. The Sentencing Commission 

contemplated a defendant ' s criminal history might warrant an 

upward departure and expressly provided a sentencing court may 

depart upward when it determines "the criminal history category 

significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's 

criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit 

further crimes." 2 U.S.S.G. § 4Al . 3 , p.s. In Jackson, however, we 

concluded the Guidelines discourage departures beyond category VI 

except in extraordinary circumstances. 921 F .2d at 992. 

Specifically, the Guidelines reserve departures beyond the highest 

criminal history category "for the unusual 'case of an egregious, 

serious criminal record in which even the guideline range for a 

2 The Commission' s policy statement 

criminal history category also states: 

on the adequacy of 

If reliable information indicates that the criminal 

history category does not adequately reflect the 

seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit other 

crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence 

departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range . 

. . The court may, after a review of all the relevant 

information, conclude that the defendant's criminal 

history was significantly more serious than that of most 

defendants in the same criminal history category, and 

therefore consider an upward departure from the 

guidelines. 

U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3, p.s. 

5 

the 

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category VI criminal history is not adequate to 

seriousness of the defendant's criminal history.'" 

U.S.S.G. § 4Al.3 , p.s.). Moreover, the open-ended 

reflect the 

Id. (quoting 

structure of 

the criminal history axis of the sentencing table -- placing a 

defendant with thirteen or more criminal history points in 

category VI demonstrates "the Commission intended that a 

sentencing court reaching the uppermost criminal history category 

generally should stay within its confines." Id. These aspects of 

the Guidelines indicate departures beyond category VI should be 

highly unusual . 

Although 

appraising the 

the sentencing court has considerable discretion in 

defendant's criminal history and determining 

whether to depart, the court must explicitly state the reasons for 

departing and "make a particularized finding of what factors were 

not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission." 

Fre itekh, 912 F.2d at 423; White, 893 F. 2d at 278; see 18 U.S.C. § 

3553 (c) (2); United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 

1989) , cert . denied, 494 U.S . 1068 (1990). Stated another way, 

the district court must explain 

adequately reflect the seriousness of 

history. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 993. 

why category VI 

the defendant's 

fails t o 

criminal 

Given this requirement, the district court's explanation in 

t his case is not sufficient to support the departure. As the 

first aggravating factor, 

adequately represent the 

the court stated category VI does not 

defendant's criminal history. 

Unfortunately, b ecause the court gave no explicit reason f or that 

con c lusion, we can only spe culate the court was relying on the 

6 

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fact the defendant had six points more than the minimum required 

for category VI. While a high number of criminal history points 

may frequently evidence a criminal background more serious than 

the category reflects, the open-ended structure of category VI 

provides no grounds for departure based onl y on the accumulation 

of criminal history points. Instead, the sentencing court should 

make explicit findings of factors within the defendant's criminal 

record which indicate why the seriousness of his criminal history 

is not reflected in the Guideline range for category VI. See 

Rivas, 922 F.2d at 1504 (three points allotted to three separate, 

violent crimes resulted in a criminal history category which 

underrepresented serious nature of previous crimes); United States 

v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1434-35 (10th Cir.) (the existence of 

two previous convictions for similar conduct which were not 

considered in calculating defendant's criminal history warranted 

departure), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 875 (1990); United States v. 

Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant 's twentyfive criminal history points were substantially higher than number 

required for category VI, several convictions were not counted in 

reaching twenty-five points, and nearly all defendant's crimes 

involved defrauding people). Upholding a departure based simply 

on the high number of criminal history points would frustrate 

Jackson's holding that the sentencing court should articulate 

reasons for the category VI sentence's inadequacy. 

The district court also identified several other aggravating 

factors, such as the de fendant's lack of remorse or concern for 

others and his tendency to blame others, which s e em directed 

7 

- - - --- ---- - ---

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toward the defendant's propensity to commit future crimes. This 

propensity and the need to protect the public are valid concerns 

when deciding whether to depart. Whitehead, 912 F.2d at 452. 

However, the district court failed to explain how the Guidelines 

inadequately considered these circumstances. See Smith, 888 F.2d 

at 724; United States v. Thomas, 906 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1990) 

(sentencing court should tie reasons for departure to a 

circumstance inadequately considered by a specific section of 

Guidelines); United States v. Kennedy. 893 F.2d 825, 828 (6th Cir. 

1990) ("district court's references to [defendant's] extensive 

criminal record and failures of rehabilitation fail to explain how 

the guideline range was inadequate"). Because we will not 

rationalize the district court's departure or substitute our 

assessment of the case, we must remand for resentencing. 

The defendant's second argument is based on the district 

court's failure to explain the degree of departure imposed on the 

defendant. 3 Because this problem may arise again, we need to 

address this argument. 

To determine whether the degree of departure is 

reasonable, we must consider the district court's 

proffered justifications as well as such factors as: the 

seriousness of the offense, the need for just 

punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, 

correctional treatment, the sentencing pattern of the 

Guidelines, the policy statements contained in the 

Guidelines, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 

White, 893 F.2d at 278 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (e) (3); 18 u.s.c. 

3 The parties do not dispute the material facts underlying the 

district court's departure. Thus, we need not address whether the 

district court's factual basis for departure was clearly 

erroneous. 

8 

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§ 3553(a)). Jackson clarified these factors and held "the 

district court's enunciation of an adequate explanation for a 

departure sentence is a threshold requirement." 921 F.2d at 990. 

The sentencing "court may use any reasonable methodology hitched 

to the Sentencing Guidelines to justify the reasonableness of the 

departure," but the chosen methodology must be explicit. Id. at 

991 (quoting United States v. Harris, 907 F.2d 121, 124 (10th Cir. 

1990)); see Rivas, 922 F.2d at 1505. Without an explicit 

explanation of the district court's method of determining the 

degree of departure, we cannot engage in a meaningful review of 

the reasonableness of the departure. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 989-90; 

Smith, 888 F.2d at 724. Here, the court exceeded even the 

recommendation of the probation officer and determined to impose a 

sentence of sixty months with no explanation of the reason for 

doing so. On remand, if the district court renews its decision to 

depart, it must articulate the method used to arrive at the 

sentence it imposes. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing in accordance with 

this opinion. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

9 

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