Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02107/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Bonin Funeral Parlor
Appellee
Donna George
Appellee
Lawrence Higgins
Appellant

Document Text:

ALD-050 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 15-2107

____________

LAWRENCE HIGGINS,

Appellant

v.

FRANK BONIN FUNERAL PARLOR; DONNA GEORGE

__________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-00581)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 13, 2015

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 17, 2015)

____________

OPINION*

____________

PER CURIAM

Lawrence Higgins appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 

amended complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 

Higgins is incarcerated in the State of Texas. His adult son, Jared Higgins, died in

____________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
2

Pennsylvania on December 28, 2012, and upon his death, the Frank J. Bonin Funeral 

Home of Hazelton, Pennsylvania undertook to make arrangements for disposing of 

Jared’s remains. His surviving spouse, Brandy Prast of Tennessee, was contacted by the 

Funeral Home and she waived her statutory right to dispose of her husband’s remains in 

favor of his biological mother and Higgins’ ex-wife, Donna George, apparently also of 

Hazelton, Pennsylvania, who then arranged for cremation on January 3, 2013.

Higgins filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania against the Funeral Home and Ms. George, alleging that the cremation was 

in violation of his rights as next of kin and not undertaken in accordance with the 

governing Pennsylvania statute, 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 305. Higgins alleged that Jared 

and Brandy were “enduringly estranged,” and that Brandy’s waiver was fraudulently 

obtained by the conspiring defendants. Higgins appeared to invoke jurisdiction in the 

federal courts on the ground that the written waiver executed by Jared’s surviving spouse 

had crossed state lines. Higgins demanded money damages. 

The defendants moved separately to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 

Recommendation, in which he recommended that the motions be granted. The 

Magistrate Judge noted the following deficiencies in the complaint: that the suit could not 

proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants are private parties and not state 

actors; that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for fraud and conspiracy under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 9(b); that § 305 prescribes procedures for the disposition of human 

remains but nothing in the statute authorizes a cause of action for damages against funeral 

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
3

directors or family members of the deceased; and that the facts alleged by Higgins did not 

describe a violation of § 305(b) and (c) by either of the defendants in any event. The 

District Court adopted the recommendation, but allowed Higgins to amend his complaint 

upon the completion of a similar lawsuit he had filed in Pennsylvania state court.1 

When that state lawsuit was dismissed, Higgins filed an amended complaint, 

which restated and repeated his contention that the cremation of his son’s remains was in 

violation of his rights and wishes, not undertaken in accordance with § 305, and based on 

a fraudulent waiver by the surviving spouse. He asserted jurisdiction based on diversity 

of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Higgins specifically alleged that the Funeral 

Home and Ms. George knew how to contact him in Texas but instead conspired to obtain 

a waiver from Jared’s estranged wife in favor of Ms. George. He observed that he too is 

a next of kin, and he stated that he “was excluded because of his ex[-]wife[’]s pure hate 

and for no other reason.” In an apparent attempt to state his fraud claim with 

particularity, Higgins asserted that the written waiver executed by the surviving spouse 

was fraudulent because it was undated and not notarized. Higgins attached a copy of the 

Waiver of Rights obtained by the Funeral Home from the surviving spouse to his 

amended complaint. 

The Magistrate Judge recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed 

with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6), noting that it did not cure the previously-noted deficiencies. In an order 

entered on April 20, 2015, the District Court approved and adopted the Magistrate 

 

1 Higgins filed a similar lawsuit in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas in April, 

2013.

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
4

Judge’s Report and Recommendation and dismissed the amended complaint with 

prejudice. 

Higgins appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk 

granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was 

subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary action under 

Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He was invited to submit argument in writing, and 

he has done so. He argues, as he did in the proceedings below, that the Waiver of Rights 

is fraudulent because it is undated.

We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 

question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We 

exercise plenary review over Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 

F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the 

amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, such as where 

the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility 

standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Conclusory allegations are insufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 

2009). 

Although we agree with the Magistrate Judge and the District Court that there is 

no private right of action for damages under 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 305 itself, 

Pennsylvania recognizes that one who wantonly mistreats or, acting without privilege, 

intentionally withholds the body of a decedent, is liable in tort to the member of the 

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
5

decedent’s family who is entitled to dispose of the body. Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 

A.2d 118, 120 (Pa. 1970). This cause of action includes the right to recover money 

damages for physical harm resulting from mental suffering. Id. As a threshold matter, 

we note that Higgins did not allege physical harm. In addition to that pleading 

deficiency, we agree with the Magistrate Judge and the District Court that he also cannot 

state a plausible tort claim based on his allegation that § 305 was violated because that 

statute was not violated. Instead, Higgins forfeited his rights because he failed to comply 

with the statute’s procedure for challenging the surviving spouse’s rights. 

Section 305(b) of the Pennsylvania Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code provides 

that the surviving spouse shall have the sole authority to dispose of a deceased spouse’s 

remains, unless there is proof by clear and convincing evidence that the couple are 

“enduringly estranged” as follows:

(b) Disposition of the remains of a deceased spouse. -- Absent an allegation 

of enduring estrangement, incompetence, contrary intent or waiver and 

agreement which is proven by clear and convincing evidence, a surviving 

spouse shall have the sole authority in all matters pertaining to the 

disposition of the remains of the decedent.

20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 305(b). Enduring estrangement means “[a] physical and 

emotional separation from the deceased at the time of death of the person authorized by 

this section to determine the final disposition of the decedent’s remains, which has 

existed for a period of time that clearly demonstrates an absence of due affection, trust 

and regard for the deceased.” Id. at § 305(e).

To challenge the surviving spouse’s right, a timely petition must be filed in state 

court. The statute provides that “[w]here a petition alleging enduring estrangement ... is 

made within 48 hours of the death or discovery of the body of the decedent ... a court 

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
6

may order that no final disposition of the decedent's remains take place until a final 

determination is made on the petition.” Id. at § 305(d).2 Higgins does not allege that he 

filed this required petition.

We note that the statute further provides that “[i]f there is not a surviving spouse 

[and] absent an allegation of enduring estrangement .... which is proven by clear and 

convincing evidence, the next of kin shall have sole authority in all matters pertaining to 

the disposition of the remains of the decedent,” id. at 305(c). Under the governing 

statute, that would be the deceased’s parents, including Higgins and Ms. George, see 20 

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2103. The statute further provides that “[i]f two or more persons 

with equal standing as next of kin disagree on disposition of the decedent’s remains, the 

authority to dispose shall be determined by the court, with preference given to the person 

who had the closest relationship with the deceased,” id. at § 305(d)(2). Unfortunately for 

Higgins, these provisions, which might have given him room for argument, only apply if 

there is no surviving spouse. We agree with him that Pennsylvania law respects the 

rights of the next of kin equally. See Kulp v. Kulp, 920 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2006) (“[T]he rights and feelings of the next of kin are paramount, where there is no 

surviving spouse[. Mother and Father] ... stand on equal footing as Son’s next of kin.”). 

But the rights of the next of kin are only at issue if (a) there is no surviving spouse, or (b) 

a petition alleging enduring estrangement has been filed and proven. In short, Higgins 

failed to involve the state courts in a timely fashion in the first instance by filing the 

 

2 The person filing the petition must then give “[n]otice to each person with equal or 

higher precedence than the petitioner to the right to dispose of the decedent’s remains and 

to his attorney if known and to the funeral home or other institution where the body is 

being held....” Id.

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
7

required petition under § 305(d) alleging enduring estrangement, and thus he cannot state 

a plausible tort claim based on a violation of § 305(c).

In order to overcome his failure to timely involve the state courts in the matter of 

his wishes for a burial, Higgins alleged in his amended complaint that the defendants 

engaged in a fraud and conspiracy to deprive him of his rights as next of kin by 

negotiating a waiver of rights from the surviving spouse in favor of Ms. George. “In 

alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A plaintiff may satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 

particularity requirement by alleging who made a misrepresentation to whom and the 

general content of the misrepresentation, or otherwise by “injecting precision and some 

measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud.” Lum v. Bank of America, 361 

F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). See also Frederico v. Home Depot, 

507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).

Higgins’ allegations of fraud do not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. 

Something more must be alleged to state a plausible claim for fraud than that the written 

waiver obtained by the Funeral Home from Jared’s surviving spouse was undated. 

Higgins’ claim that Ms. George unlawfully conspired with the Funeral Home to achieve 

the right to dispose of their son’s remains is speculative and conclusory. We have 

examined the written waiver and nothing on the face of this exhibit to the amended 

complaint suggests that the Funeral Home fraudulently obtained the surviving spouse’s 

waiver. Moreover, the circumstances do not suggest fraud, given that Ms. George stands 

on equal footing with Higgins as Jared’s next of kin, see Kulp, 920 A.2d at 873, and lives 

in the area, whereas Higgins is domiciled in a faraway state and his liberty is restricted. 

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/17/2015
8

The allegations of fraud simply are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 

dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.

Case: 15-2107 Document: 003112131785 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/17/2015