Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02143/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02143-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Water Service Co
Defendant
Yvonne Pile-Cox
Defendant
Rosetta Surrell
Plaintiff

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1 Defendants Cal Water and Cox filed separate motions for

summary judgment. Due to the overlapping facts and issues

presented by these motions, the court addresses both defendants’

motions together.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ROSETTA SURRELL,

NO. CIV. S-04-2143 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE

COMPANY, a corporation; YVONNE

PILE-COX; DOE 1; DOE 2; DOE 3;

DOE 4; DOES 5 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’ California

Water Service Company (“Cal Water”) and Yvonne Pile-Cox’s (“Cox”)

motion for summary judgment.1 On January 27, 2006, the court

heard oral argument on the matter. For the reasons set forth

below, defendants’ motions are GRANTED. 

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2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Separate Stmt. of Undisp. Facts in Opp’n

to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“UF”), filed Jan. 12, 2006). 

Defendants Cal Water and Cox each submitted identical Statements

of Undisputed Facts, and plaintiff responded to each submission

separately. The submissions by plaintiff are also identical. 

Plaintiff objects to virtually all of the evidence

submitted by defendants on various grounds. All of plaintiff’s

objections are without merit. To the extent that plaintiff’s

sole dispute with facts is based upon the inadmissability of

defendants’ evidence, and is not challenged by any admissible

evidence submitted by plaintiff, the court will view these facts

as undisputed. 

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Rosetta Surrell is an African American woman over

40 years of age. (Decl. of Rosetta Surrell in Opp’n to Def.s’

Mot. for Summ. J. (“Surrell Decl.”), executed Jan. 11, 2006, ¶

11). Defendant Cal Water is a wholly owned subsidiary of

California Water Service Group, a privately owned and publicly

traded company, that provides water service to businesses and

consumers in communities throughout California. (UF ¶ 48). 

Defendant Cox was plaintiff’s supervisor at Cal Water from 1997

until August 2002. (UF ¶ 5; Def. Cox’s Mot for Summ. J., filed

Dec. 19, 2005, at 1). 

Plaintiff began employment with Cal Water as a Customer

Service Representative 5 in the Company’s Stockton District in

January 1997. (UF ¶ 1). At all times during her employment with

Cal Water, plaintiff was a member of the Utility Workers Union of

America AFL-CIO (the “Union”). (UF ¶ 2). At all times during

plaintiff’s employment at Cal Water, there was a collective

bargaining agreement between defendant Cal Water and the Union. 

(UF ¶ 3).

In 1998, plaintiff assumed the position of Customer Service

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3

Representative 4, a position she bid on and received, based on

her seniority at Cal Water. (Surrell Decl. ¶ 5). In 1999,

plaintiff bid on and received the job of meter reader, but

returned to the customer service position after three months. 

From April 7, 2001 to April 3, 2002, plaintiff was granted an

unpaid leave of absence. (UF ¶ 12). Plaintiff was involved in

an automobile accident and claims she was completely unable to

work until April 3, 2002. (UF ¶ 13). Plaintiff returned to work

on April 4, 2002 with no medical restrictions. (UF ¶ 14). On

January 29, 2003, plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. 

(Declaration of Christine L. McFarlane in Supp. of Def.s’ Mot.

for Summ. J. (“McFarlane Decl.”), executed December 19, 2005, ¶

22). On December 9, 2003, plaintiff informed Cal Water that she

was unable to return to work due to her medical condition. 

(McFarlane Decl. ¶ 25). As of December 19, 2005, plaintiff

remained on an unpaid leave of absence and was still employed by

defendant Cal Water, receiving health benefits through the

medical insurance plan provided to employees. (McFarlane Decl. ¶

27). At no time during her employment with Cal Water was

plaintiff ever discharged, suspended without pay, demoted, laid

off, or given a reduction in pay. (UF ¶ 7). 

On July 6, 2004, plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court

for the State of California in and for the County of San Joaquin,

alleging numerous employment related claims against defendants. 

Plaintiff’s claims are based upon facts relating to (1) the

promotion of Regina Coe to the position of Office Manager in

2002; (2) defendants’ failure to cross-train plaintiff for the

Head Cashier position; (3) drug testing of the plaintiff; and (4)

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3 Plaintiff raises the argument that she was denied the

promotion to Office Manager because of age, race, or disability

discrimination for the first time in her opposition. In her

deposition testimony, plaintiff stated that defendants’ failure

to cross-train her for the Head Cashier position was the only

claim she had for being denied another position or promotion. 

(Deposition of Rosetta Surrell (“Surrell Dep.”), attached as Exh.

A to Declaration of Raymond F. Lynch, executed Dec. 19, 2005,

409:17-19). However, for the sake of completeness, the court

will consider this claim as well.

4

comments made by defendant Cox to plaintiff between 1998 and

2002. Plaintiff argues that she was denied opportunities and

subjected to harassment because of her age, race, and

disabilities. 

1. Officer Manager Position3

In or about January 2002, defendant Cox announced she was

going to take an early retirement, thereby creating an opening

for the Office Manager position in the Stockton District. (Decl.

of Paul Risso in Supp. of Def.s’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Risso

Decl.”), filed Jan. 20, 2006, ¶ 6). The position was posted

within the company in February 2002 and several Cal Water

employees applied. (Id. ¶ 7). After the two top candidates were

offered the position and declined to accept, Cal Water began

advertising for the position outside the company. (Id.) At this

time, plaintiff requested and was allowed to be included in the

process. (Id.) In July 2002, Regina Coe, a Caucasian female

younger than plaintiff was hired as Office Manager. (Id. ¶¶ 8,

10; Surrell Decl. ¶ 11).

2. Failure to Cross-Train

In April 2002, on several occasions, plaintiff requested to

be cross-trained for the Head Cashier position. (Surrell Decl. ¶

13). Defendant Cox denied plaintiff’s requests. (Id.) In June

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4 Plaintiff disputes these facts (1) on the grounds that

defendants’ evidence is inadmissible and (2) because of the

account of plaintiff offered in her declaration. Defendants’

evidence is admissible, and plaintiff’s account is not

inconsistent or contradictory to these facts. 

5

2002, plaintiff was approached by Denise Holt, a younger

Caucasian co-worker with less seniority. (Id.) Holt informed

plaintiff that she was being cross-trained for the Head Cashier

position. (Id.) When the Head Cashier took vacation time

between June 24-29, 2002, Holt filled in at her position. (UF ¶

19). During the work week of June 24-29, 2002, plaintiff called

in sick four out of the five days. (UF ¶ 20). 

At the time, Cal Water had no cross-training program in

place. (Id.) Under the terms of the collective bargaining

agreement, placement in positions open for less than 120 days are

not open for bid based upon seniority, but are filled at the

management’s discretion. (UF ¶ 10). Plaintiff filed a grievance

through the Union in July 2002, complaining that she should have

been cross-trained instead of Holt. (UF ¶ 27). The complaint

was ultimately denied at the first stage of the grievance

procedure and was not taken to arbitration. (UF ¶ 28).

3. Drug-Testing

On August 22, 2002, supervisors Regina Coe, Scott Bailey,

and defendant Cox observed plaintiff and concurred that she

appeared to be impaired and her speech was slurred.4 (UF ¶ 30).

Plaintiff was ordered to submit to a drug screen. (Id.) 

Defendant Cox called the Union representative over the common

radio line. (Surrell Decl. ¶ 14). A union representative is

always brought when a situation arises with an employee which

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5 Plaintiff disputes this fact, yet offers no evidence

that the drug screen did not show the presence of cannabinoids. 

Rather, plaintiff merely asserts in her declaration that she did

not use marijuana. Plaintiff’s bald assertion that the test

results must be flawed does not create a triable issue of fact in

the face of properly authenticated test results.

6 Plaintiff disputes that her deposition testimony states

this fact. The court has reviewed the deposition and finds that

it does.

6

might involve discipline. (Surrell Dep. 430:25-431:9). 

Plaintiff was taken to the drug screening by Coe. (Surrell

Decl. ¶ 15). Plaintiff asserts that Coe told the facility to

conduct an observed test, which was in contravention to Cal

Water’s policy. (Id.) The results of plaintiff’s August 22 drug

screen showed the presence of plaintiff’s prescribed medication

for her back injuries as well as the presence of cannabinoids.5

(UF ¶ 32). 

Pursuant to the agreement between the Union and Cal Water,

after the plaintiff tested positive for illegal substances, she

was offered a choice of discharge or enrollment in a drug

rehabilitation program. (UF ¶ 33). Plaintiff chose to enter the

rehabilitation program. (UF ¶ 34). Plaintiff completed the

program and returned to work in early October 2002.6 (UF ¶ 35).

On January 29, 2003, several supervisors observed plaintiff

in what appeared to them to be an impaired state. (UF ¶ 36). 

Plaintiff again submitted to a drug test, which returned positive

for several substances. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that these

substances were associated with the medication prescribed by her

doctors. (Surrell Decl. ¶ 18). 

4. Comments by Defendant Cox

Plaintiff asserts that, beginning in 1998, defendant Cox

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7

harassed her in the performance of her duties. (Surrell Decl. ¶

9). On at least one occasion, defendant Cox confronted plaintiff

about failing to perform an aspect of her job in front of a

Customer. (Surrell Dep. 394:11-395:4). Defendant Cox also made

statements in front of a co-worker and in front of a customer

accusing plaintiff of causing the company to lose money by

failing to pay attention to her job. (Surrell Dep. 395:17-23). 

Plaintiff asserts that this accusation was based on paperwork

that did not belong to her. (Id.) On more than one occasion,

defendant Cox told plaintiff that she was too slow with her work. 

(Surrell Dep. 399:19-23). All of plaintiff’s claims are based

upon (1) defendant Cox’s criticism of her job performance; and

(2) the fact that Christine McFarlane, the Vice-President of

Human Resources, should have stepped in and had a meeting with

both plaintiff and defendant Cox after plaintiff complained about

Cox’s criticisms. (Surrell Dep. 450:1-14).

On December 19, 2005, defendants Cal Water and Cox each

filed motions as to all of plaintiff’s claims. The court will

address each of plaintiff’s claims in turn. 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

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that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

/////

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Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Evidence

In opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment,

plaintiff presents only a single declaration of plaintiff as

rebuttal evidence. Plaintiff’s declaration poses numerous

evidentiary problems. 

Many of plaintiffs statements constitute unfounded,

unsupported conclusions. Conclusory statements without factual

support are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 

National Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagles Ins. Corp., 121 F.3d 496,

502 (9th Cir. 1997). Further, 

[a] plaintiff’s belief that a defendant acted from an

unlawful motive, without evidence to support that

belief, is no more than speculation or unfounded

accusation about whether the defendant really did act

from an unlawful motive. To be cognizable on summary

judgment, evidence must be competent. . . . It is not

enough for a witness to tell all she knows; she must

know all she tells. 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026,

1028 (9th Cir. 2001). The type of conclusory allegations

employed by plaintiff in her declaration merely frame the

ultimate issues to be determined, but do not create a genuine

issue of triable fact to defeat summary judgment. Radobenko v.

Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1975). 

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Some of plaintiff’s statements also contradict prior sworn

testimony given in her deposition. “The general rule in the

Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue of fact by

an affidavit contradicting [her] prior deposition testimony.” 

Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir.

1991). This rule does not automatically dispose of every case in

which a contradictory affidavit is introduced to explain portions

of earlier deposition testimony, but is applied to disallow a

party to “create” an issue of fact by presenting “sham”

testimony. Id. at 266-67. “The district court must make a

factual determination that the contradiction was actually a

‘sham.’” Id. at 267.

Plaintiff also references miscellaneous documents attached

to her deposition testimony, which defendants attached to the

Declaration of Raymond F. Lynch. These documents were not

written by plaintiff, contain improper opinion testimony, and are

not properly authenticated. The court cannot consider such

inadmissible evidence on a motion for summary judgment.

Defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s declaration are, in

the majority, sustained. The court will address each evidentiary

issue that is material to plaintiff’s claim and defendants’

motions in the context of its analysis. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings claims against both defendants Cal Water

and Cox pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move for

summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s claims fail

because defendants were not acting under color of law.

To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts

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demonstrating that (1) defendant acted under color of state law,

and (2) defendant deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the

Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334,

1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Violations of constitutional rights are

actionable under federal law only “when committed by one who is

clothed with the authority of the state and purporting to act

thereunder. Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 441

F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1971) (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff does not allege facts that defendants were acting

under color of law. To the contrary, defendants present evidence

that Cal Water is a wholly owned subsidiary of California Water

Service Group, a privately-owned, publicly traded corporation

listed on the New York Stock Exchange. (Declaration of Christine

L. McFarlane in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“McFarlane

Decl.”), signed Dec. 19, 2005, ¶ 3). As such, plaintiffs’ § 1983

claims fail. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment in regard

to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are GRANTED.

C. Title VII Claims

Plaintiff brings claims against defendants Cal Water and Cox

pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Defendants

move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that she has

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 

Title VII requires a person seeking relief to first file a

charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful

employment practice, or, if the aggrieved person initially

instituted proceedings with the state or local administrative

agency (such as the DFEH), within 300 days of the alleged

unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 

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Once the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the claimant has

ninety days from the date of issuance of the letter to file a

civil action. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). “When a plaintiff fails to

raise a Title VII claim before the EEOC, the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.” Lowe v. City of

Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Shah v. Mt.

Zion Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 642 F.2d 268, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1981). 

At the January 27, 2006 hearing, plaintiff admitted that she

had never filed a claim with the EEOC. As such, plaintiff has

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her Title VII

claim, and this court lacks jurisdiction to hear these claims. 

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’

Title VII claims are GRANTED.

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims

Plaintiff brings claims under § 1981 for discrimination,

retaliation, and harassment on the basis of race. Defendants

move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff has not

produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact

for violations of § 1981.

1. Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff asserts that defendants discriminated against

plaintiff on account of her race (1) when they failed to promote

her to the position of Office Manager in the Stockton Cal Water

office; and (2) when they failed to cross-train her to fill in as

Head Cashier. 

In analyzing a § 1981 action, the court employs the same

legal principles as those guiding a Title VII dispute. Gen.

Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391

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(1082); EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1233 n.7

(9th Cir. 1984) (“A plaintiff must meet the same standards in

proving a § 1981 claim that he must meet in establishing a . . .

claim under Title VII . . . .”). As such, the court applies the

burden shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

Plaintiff must first allege a prima facie case of

discrimination. Plaintiff may produce indirect evidence that

gives rise to an inference of discriminatory motive. See

Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)

(“[A] plaintiff must offer evidence that gives rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination.”). Under the latter,

indirect method, plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) she applied for a job for which

he was qualified; (3) she was rejected; and (4) thereafter, the

position remained open and the employer sought other

similarly-qualified applicants. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411

U.S. at 802. 

Once plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse

action. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th

Cir. 1989). The ultimate burden of persuasion, however, remains

with the plaintiff. Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 

If the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for

discrimination. The plaintiff may demonstrate pretext in one of

two ways: “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s

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proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it is

internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2)

directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely

motivated the employer.” Chuang v. Univ. of Calif. Davis, Board

of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The factual

inquiry regarding pretext requires a new level of specificity. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. Plaintiff must produce specific and

substantial evidence that defendants reasons are really a pretext

for discrimination. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal,

Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2002).

a. Failure to Promote

Plaintiff contends that both defendants Cal Water and Cox

discriminated against her on the basis of her race when they

failed to promote her to the position of Office Manager. 

Defendants present evidence that defendant Cox did not

participate in the panel interviews and did not participate in

the selection of Regina Coe for the position. (Risso Decl. ¶¶ 8,

12). Defendant Cox had no role in plaintiff’s application for

promotion. Plaintiff presents no evidence to the contrary. As

such, defendant Cox’s motion for summary judgments regarding

plaintiff’s § 1981 claims based upon failure to promote is

GRANTED. 

In her declaration, plaintiff states that she is African

American, that she applied for the position of Office Manager,

that she was rejected for the position, and that defendants hired

Regina Coe instead of her. Plaintiff’s evidence does not clearly

demonstrate that she was qualified for the position. Rather,

plaintiff makes the bald, unfounded, and inadmissible assertion

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7 This statement is inadmissible for failure to establish

foundation or personal knowledge. Federal Rule of Evidence

(“FRE”) 602. Further, this statement is sham evidence because it

directly contradicts plaintiff’s deposition testimony that she

had no knowledge of Coe’s qualifications and is declared only to

create a triable issue of fact where there is none. See Kennedy,

952 F.2d at 267. 

16

that she was more qualified for the position than Coe.7 (Surrell

Decl ¶ 11). Plaintiff states the that Stockton District Manager,

Paul Risso, told her that she did well in the interview, but

should do more research about water issues and policies. 

(Surrell Decl. ¶ 11). Further, plaintiff’s evidence does not

clearly demonstrate that Cal Water sought out or employed

similarly situated applicants. Rather, plaintiff stated in her

deposition that she knew nothing about Regina Coe’s experience or

qualifications. (Surrell Dep., attached as Exh. A to Supp. Decl.

of Raymond F. Lynch, executed Jan. 20, 2006, 106:25-107:9). 

In contrast to plaintiff’s sparse showing in support of a

prima facie case, defendant Cal Water presents evidence that

Regina Coe was the most qualified applicant for the position and

had performed best in the interviews. (Risso Decl. ¶ 8). Coe

was a trained accountant with a B.S. in Business Administration. 

(Risso Decl. ¶ 9). She had five years of management and

accounting experience, and worked for approximately one year as a

City Administrator. (Risso Decl. ¶ 9). Coe also had experience

with labor relations and demonstrated strong communication

skills. (Risso Decl. ¶ 10). This evidence demonstrates that Coe

was not a similarly situated applicant as compared to plaintiff. 

While plaintiff asserts that she understood the policies and

procedures of Cal Water and knew the responsibilities of each

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job, plaintiff does not present any evidence that she and Coe had

similar experience, knowledge, or qualifications. As such,

plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create a

triable issue for a prima facie case of discrimination.

Assuming that plaintiff was similarly situated to Coe,

defendant Cal Water has proffered evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring Coe and not promoting

plaintiff. Coe had experience in management, administration,

accounting, and labor relations. (Risso Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10;

Declaration of Michael Stevens in Supp. of Def.s’ Mot. for Summ.

J. (“Steven Decl.”), filed Jan. 20, 2006, ¶ 5; Declaration of

Edward Sliger in Supp. of Def.s’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Sliger

Decl.”), filed Jan. 20, 2006, ¶ 4). Cal Water presents evidence

that Coe was considered the most qualified applicant and hired

based upon her experience and her performance during the

interview. As such, defendant Cal Water has demonstrated that it

failed to promote plaintiff not because of her race, but because

she was not the most qualified applicant for the position.

Plaintiff has not presented any specific much less

substantial evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that

defendant Cal Water’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for

discrimination. While plaintiff’s burden at the summary judgment

stage is not great, she cannot simply rely on generalizations. 

Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1995). In

her declaration, plaintiff’s asserts that she was more qualified

for the position than Coe and that there were others who

interviewed for the position who were more qualified. Plaintiff

sets forth no factual basis for such assertions, nor does

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plaintiff provide any basis for her personal knowledge of such

facts. Therefore, these statements are inadmissible. FRE 602. 

Plaintiff also cites to articles and statistics attached to her

deposition testimony, which was included as an exhibit to

defendants’ declaration. These articles and statistics are not

properly authenticated. See Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285

F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, these documents are

inadmissible. Finally, plaintiff states that other minority

individuals who were qualified for jobs and should have been

selected were overlooked. Again, plaintiff sets forth no factual

basis for such assertions and does not provide any basis for her

personal knowledge or opinion. FRE 602. Therefore, this

statement is also inadmissible. 

Excluding consideration of all plaintiff’s inadmissible

statements, plaintiff’s evidence amounts to statements that Cal

Water hired a younger, Caucasian female for the position of

Office Manager and that she believes she was discriminated on the

basis of race. This is insufficient to create a triable issue of

fact for discrimination. See Warren, 58 F.3d at 443; Carmen 237

F.3d at 1028. Thus, defendant Cal Water’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 1981 claims based upon a failure

to promote plaintiff to the Office Manager position is GRANTED. 

b. Failure to Cross-Train

Plaintiff contends that defendants discriminated against her

on the basis of her race when they failed to cross-train her for

the Head Cashier position.

In her declaration, plaintiff states that she is African

American, that she asked defendant Cox to cross-train her for the

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8 The collective bargaining agreement did not contain any

provisions or programs relating to cross-training. The purpose

of cross-training of Holt was to have an employee that could fill

in for the current Head Cashier when she was on vacation for a

week in June 2002. The collective bargaining agreement provided

that placement in positions open for less than 120 days are not

open for bid based upon seniority, but are filled at the

management’s discretion. 

19

Head Cashier position, that Cox refused to train her, and that

defendants cross-trained Denise Holt, a younger Caucasian woman

with less seniority than plaintiff.8 Based upon these

statements, plaintiff has set forth evidence of a prima facia

case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 

Defendants, however, have produced evidence of a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for cross-training Holt instead of

plaintiff. Defendants present evidence that Holt was chosen to

train for the Head Cashier position because she had already done

a portion of that job that she had learned on her own. 

(Deposition of Yvonne Cox (“Cox Dep.”), attached as Exh. C to

Declaration of Raymond F. Lynch, executed Dec. 19, 2005, 49:24-

50:4). Cal Water was in the process of converting to a new

computer system, and Holt would require less training because she

had already learned a portion of the job. (Id. 52:2-7). 

Defendants present evidence that they did not have time to train

her for the position of Head Cashier and that defendant Cox

explained this to plaintiff. (Id. 52:12-18). Based upon this

evidence, defendants have demonstrated that they failed to crosstrain plaintiff for the position of Head Cashier because they did

not have time to fully train plaintiff on all aspects of the

position while in the middle of the conversion and because Holt

had prior training for the position. 

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In response to the reasons proffered by defendants,

plaintiff states that Holt was trained for the position during

the two and a half weeks when plaintiff was available and had

requested it. Plaintiff also states that she was paid during the

training period. Plaintiff’s statements lack foundation and she

fails to demonstrate the requisite personal knowledge to testify

to these facts. FRE 602. Therefore, they are inadmissible. 

Further, even if admissible, these statements do not present

sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of pretext. 

Plaintiff’s account that Holt was trained for short periods is

not inconsistent with defendants’ account that Holt needed more

training on new aspects of the job. Defendants’ evidence

demonstrates that Holt had prior training on the majority of

duties of the Head Cashier and that she would need less training

than someone without prior experience. (See UF ¶ 18). 

Defendants do not assert that Holt did not need any further

training; rather, they admit that Holt spent additional time

training on aspects of the position that involved the new

computer system after she completed her regular job duties. (UF

¶¶ 16, 18).

Because plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence

supporting an allegation of pretext, defendants’ motions for

summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 1981 claims based upon a

failure to cross-train are GRANTED. 

2. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff asserts that defendants retaliated against

plaintiff for complaining about her discriminatory treatment when

they subjected her to drug tests. 

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Section 1981, like Title VII, makes it unlawful “for an

employer to discriminate against any of [its] employees or

applicants for employment . . . because [she] has opposed any

practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a case of

retaliation, plaintiff must prove (1) she engaged in a protected

activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)

there was a causal connection between the two. Hacienda Hotel,

881 F.2d 1504, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1989); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809

F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). Under McDonnell Douglass, once

plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden

shifts to the defendant to set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Stegall v. Citadel

Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). If

defendant can make this showing, the burden shifts back to the

plaintiff to set forth specific and substantial evidence that

this reason is merely a pretext for retaliation. See id.

Plaintiff’s claim is based upon action allegedly taken as a

result of filing a grievance against defendants for failure to

cross-train. In her declaration, plaintiff states that she filed

a grievance and a meeting was held on August 20, 2002. (Surrell

Decl. ¶ 13). Plaintiff also states that on August 22, 2002, she

was subjected to a drug test, and on January 29, 2003, she was

subjected to another test. (Surrell Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15 18). 

Plaintiff declares that it is her belief that defendants insisted

upon an observed drug test in retaliation for plaintiff’s filing

a grievance over the failure to cross-train. (Surrell Decl. ¶

14).

///// 

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Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence, beyond her own

personal belief of discriminatory motive, that defendants’

insistence on a drug screen was retaliation for filing a

grievance. This is insufficient evidence to overcome a motion

for summary judgment. See Carmen, 237 F.3d at 1028 (affirming

grant of summary judgment to the employer on retaliation claim

where plaintiff did not testify to any admission by a

representative of defendants or any other direct or

circumstantial evidence to support her general assertion of

retaliation). 

However, assuming that plaintiff has presented a prima facie

case of discrimination, defendants have presented evidence of a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the drug screens. 

Defendants present evidence that on August 22, 2002, three

supervisors observed plaintiff and concurred that she appeared to

be impaired and that her speech was slurred. (UF ¶ 30). 

Defendants then called the Union representative and took

plaintiff for a drug screen. The result of the drug test showed

the presence of both prescription medications and cannabinoids,

an illegal substance, in plaintiff’s system. Defendants’ expert

states that in order to obtain the level of cannabinoids present

in plaintiff’s system, “the person would have to had been

actively smoking marijuana or ingesting something containing

cannabinoids.” (Export Report of Thomas C. Sneath, attached as

Exh. E to Lynch Decl). Following plaintiff’s return to work

after completion of a drug rehabilitation program, on January 29,

2003, plaintiff was again observed by several supervisors. (UF ¶

36). Plaintiff appeared to them to be in an impaired state. 

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Once again, plaintiff was drug tested and the results were

positive for a variety of substances. (UF ¶ 36). Defendants’

evidence demonstrates that (1) plaintiff was drug tested in the

first instance because she was slurring her words and appeared to

be in an impaired state; and (2) plaintiff was drug tested in the

second instance because several supervisors again observed

plaintiff in an impaired state.

Plaintiff does not dispute that she was slurring her words

on August 22, 2002. (Surrell Decl. ¶ 14). Rather, plaintiff

argues that because the slurring only lasted for a few minutes on

that day, she should not have been drug tested. (Id.) Plaintiff

contends that there would only be question about a person’s

ability to perform if a person was slurring their speech for a

long time. (Id.) Plaintiff does not provide a basis for this

opinion or demonstrate the requisite personal knowledge. FRE

602. Therefore, this statement is inadmissible. Further,

plaintiff does not present evidence that she did not appear

impaired on either date. Plaintiff states that the drug test

must be flawed because she never smoked marijuana. (Surrell

Decl. 17). However, plaintiff does not present any evidence in

opposition to the results of the drug test, the expert reports,

and the declarations of the defendants, except for the

unsubstantiated allegation that the tests “were flawed.” As

such, plaintiff’s declaration does not create a triable issue of

fact regarding pretext. Therefore, defendants’ motions for

summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s § 1981 claims based upon

retaliatory drug testing as a result of filing a grievance are

GRANTED.

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3. Hostile Work Environment Claims

Plaintiff contends that she was subject to a hostile work

environment based upon comments made to her by her supervisors,

defendant Cox and Regina Coe. 

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment

under either Title VII or § 1981, plaintiff must raise a triable

issue of fact as to whether

(1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct

because of her race, (2) the conduct was unwelcome, and

(3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment and

create an abusive working environment.

Li Li Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th

Cir. 2002). Like Title VII, § 1981 is not a general civility

code. Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,

788 (1998)). “Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated

incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to

discriminatory changes in the terms of conditions of employment.” 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 

Plaintiff’s harassment claims are based upon oral criticisms

by defendant Cox from 1998-2002. Plaintiff does not present

evidence that defendant’s remarks were ever directed at her race. 

Nor has plaintiff provided any evidence that she was singled out

for job-related criticisms on the basis of her race. 

However, assuming arguendo that plaintiff had proffered such

evidence, the conduct complained about was neither sufficiently

severe nor pervasive enough to alter the condition of plaintiff’s

employment. See Li Li Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798 (holding that

racial jokes, ridicule of plaintiff’s accent, and act of pulling

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9 Under FEHA, supervisors may not be held individually

liable for discriminatory acts. Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640,

644-45 (1998). Therefore, defendant Cox’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under

FEHA against Cox in her individual capacity is GRANTED.

25

eyes back to imitate or mock the appearance of Asians were

insufficient to create a hostile working environment); Vasquez v.

County of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

no hostile work environment where employee was told that he had

“a typical Hispanic macho attitude,” that he should work in the

field because “Hispanics do good in the field” and where he was

yelled at in front of others); Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217

F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no hostile work

environment where the supervisor referred to females as

“castrating bitches,” “Madonnas,” or Regina, and referred to

plaintiff as “Medea”). Plaintiff references only a handful of

incidents where defendant Cox criticized her job performance over

a series of four years. 

Therefore, defendants’ motions for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s § 1981 claims based upon harassment by

defendant Cox are GRANTED. 

E. Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims

Plaintiff also brings claims against defendants Cal Water

and Cox under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”). Plaintiff asserts that defendants discriminated

against plaintiff,9 retaliated against plaintiff, and subjected

plaintiff to a hostile working environment on the basis of her

race, age, and disability. Defendants move for summary judgment

on the ground that plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative

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10 Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claim based upon

defendants’ failure to cross-train is untimely because plaintiff

did not submit her claim to the Department of Fair Housing and

Employment (“DFEH”) within one year of the claim. As such,

plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and is

barred from bringing suit on this claim. Romano v. Rockwell

Int’l Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996). Plaintiffs argue that

the continuing violation doctrine applies. The court does not

reach the issue of whether this equitable tolling doctrine

applies to plaintiffs failure to cross train claim because, for

the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff has failed to raise a

triable issue of discrimination on the merits. 

26

remedies and has not produced sufficient evidence to create a

triable issue of fact for violations of FEHA.10

Because the antidiscrimination objective and relevant

wording of Title VII and § 1981 are similar to those of FEHA,

“California courts often look to federal decisions interpreting

these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA.” 

Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 812 (2001). 

California courts apply the McDonnell Douglass burden shifting

approach to claims brought pursuant to FEHA and apply the same

guiding legal principles. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229

F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000).

1. Disability Claims

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim of disability

discrimination under FEHA is also barred for failure to exhaust

her administrative remedies. In her complaint filed with the

DFEH, plaintiff did not include mental or physical disability as

a basis for her claim of discrimination. (Exh. A to Pl.’s Compl.

(“Compl.”), filed July 6, 2004). The Ninth Circuit has held that

where a plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of race or

national origin in the claim filed with the DFEH, but fails to

allege discrimination on the basis of disability, the disability

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discrimination claim is barred. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express,

265 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). In Rodriguez, the court found

that the “two claims involve totally different kinds of allegedly

improper conduct, and investigation into one claim would not

likely lead to investigation of the other.” Id. Therefore, the

plaintiff had not exhausted FEHA’s administrative remedies

relating to his claims for disability discrimination. In this

case, because plaintiff likewise failed to file a claim for any

type of disability discrimination, mental or physical, with the

DFEH, her claim is barred for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies.

Plaintiff argues that the court’s holding in Rodriguez does

not bar her claim for disability discrimination under FEHA. In

Rodriguez, the plaintiff failed to comply with the exhaustion

requirements because he was misled by the DFEH. Therefore, the

court held that summary judgment was precluded because the

plaintiff has presented evidence that a triable issue of fact

existed as to whether an equitable tolling doctrine applied. Id.

at 902. In this case, plaintiff has not alleged or presented

evidence that any equitable tolling doctrine applies. As such,

this court, unlike the Rodriguez court, is not precluded from

granting summary judgment because plaintiff has not raise a

triable issue of fact regarding her failure to comply with FEHA’s

exhaustion requirements. 

Defendants motions for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs

claims for violations of FEHA based upon disability

discrimination, retaliation, and harassment are GRANTED. 

/////

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2. Other FEHA Claims

Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and

harassment on the basis of age and race are based upon the same

assertions and evidence discussed in the context of plaintiff’s §

1981 claims. Plaintiff proffers no additional evidence to

support her race or age claims under FEHA. As discussed above,

plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response

to defendants’ evidence in support of summary judgment. 

Therefore, defendants’ motions for summary judgment regarding

plaintiffs’ claims for violations of FEHA on the grounds of age

and race discrimination, retaliation, and harassment are GRANTED.

F. Violation of Article I, Section 8 of the California

Constitution

Plaintiff brings claims against defendants Cal Water and Cox

for violation of Article I, Section 8 of the California

Constitution. Defendants argue that plaintiffs claims fail as a

matter of law.

Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution

(“Section 8") provides that

A person may not be disqualified from entering or

pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or

employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or

national or ethnic origin.

Section 8 has consistently been held to apply only to situations

where the plaintiff has been terminated, constructively

discharged, or threatened with termination. Strother v. S. Cal.

Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 872 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Although Section 8 “sets forth a fundamental principle of equal

employment opportunity, it does not . . . create a cause of

action to redress private employment discrimination not resulting

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in termination.” Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of Am., 919 F.

Supp. 332, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

Plaintiff does not dispute that at no time during her

employment was she ever discharged, suspended without pay,

demoted, laid off, or given pay reduction. (UF ¶ 7). At the

time defendants filed their motions for summary judgment,

plaintiff still remained employed by Cal Water on an unpaid leave

of absence. (McFarlane Decl. ¶ 27). Therefore, plaintiff does

not have a viable claim under Section 8 as a matter of law

because she has never been terminated. Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claims for violation of

Section 8 are GRANTED. 

G. Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff brings claims against defendants against

defendants Cal Water and Cox under state law for violations of

public policy. The only sources that plaintiff identifies for

that “public policy” are FEHA and Title VII. (Compl. ¶¶ 43-46). 

Hence, even if the court were to assume that California tort law

allows a self-standing public policy claim of this sort, there is

nothing to distinguish the bases for this claim from the other

causes of action already discussed above. Therefore, for the

reasons set forth above, defendants’ motions for summary judgment

are GRANTED.

H. State Contract and Tort Claims

Plaintiff brings a variety of state contract and tort claims

against defendants Cal Water and Cox. Defendants contend that

these claims must be dismissed because they are preempted by

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and

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plaintiff has failed to exhaust the grievance procedure set forth

in the collective bargaining agreement.

Section 301 provides federal jurisdiction over “[s]uits for

violation of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185. “A suit for breach of a

collective bargaining agreement is governed exclusively by

federal law under section 301.” Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos,

Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987); citing Franchise Tax Bd.

v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). 

Section 301 also contemplates suits by individual employees and

encompasses those seeking to vindicate “uniquely personal” rights

of employees. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554,

562 (1976). “[T]he preemptive force of section 301 is so

powerful as to displace entirely any state claim based on a

collective bargaining agreement and any state claim whose outcome

depends on the analysis of the terms of the agreement.” Id.

Parties cannot escape the preemptive effect of section 301 by

converting their contract claims into tort claims. AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985). The key to

determining the scope of preemption is “whether the claims can be

resolved only be referring to the terms of the collective

bargaining agreement.” Young, 830 F.2d at 999 (internal

citations omitted). 

Plaintiff brings a state law claim for breach of the

collective bargaining agreement. This claim is preempted by the

LMRA. See Young, 830 F.2d at 993 (“A suit for breach of a

collective bargaining agreement is governed exclusively by

federal law under section 301.”).

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11 Plaintiff’s defamation claim must also be dismissed for

failure to comply with the statute of limitations. The allegedly

defamatory statement occurred on January 29, 2003, and was heard

by plaintiff when made. The statute of limitations for claims of

defamation is one year. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(c). 

Plaintiff did not file her complaint until July 6, 2004. As

such, plaintiff’s claim is barred.

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Plaintiff also brings claims for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and

negligent interference with employment agreement, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and

defamation.11 Each of these claims arise out of plaintiff’s

contention that defendants did not comply with the standards set

forth in section 3 (and other applicable sections) of the

collective bargaining agreement. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 19). An

evaluation of these claims is substantially dependant upon an

analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and

would require the court to interpret provisions of the collective

bargaining agreement. See Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc.,

784 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, plaintiffs’ tort

claims are preempted by federal labor law. 

Plaintiff does not contend that her state contract and tort

claims do not arise out of conduct regulated by the collective

bargaining agreement. Rather, plaintiff points to section 3 of

the agreement as the source of her state law claims. (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 19). Nor does plaintiff contend that some exception to

federal preemption applies. Plaintiff’s sole argument in support

of her assertion that her claims are not preempted is that she is

a third party beneficiary to the collective bargaining agreement

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12 In support of this argument, plaintiff cites cases

decided prior to the adoption of Section 301 of the LMRA and to

out of date treatises.

13 Further, plaintiff failed to exhaust the grievance

procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. (UF

¶¶ 26-29).

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with an independent right to enforce its provisions.12 This

argument is entirely without merit and disregards decades of

legislation and judicial precedent. 

Because plaintiff’s state contract and tort claims directly

implicate the collective bargaining agreement and would require

the court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, these

claims are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.13 Therefore,

defendants’ motions for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’

state contract and tort claims are GRANTED. 

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Plaintiff’s also seek attorneys’ fees. The Civil Rights

Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 states in relevant part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 

. . . 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 . . . the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than

the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part

of the costs.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff must be a prevailing party in

order to have a claim for fees under § 1988. Because, for the

reasons set forth above, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a

triable issue of fact as to any of her claims, plaintiff is not a

prevailing party and cannot collect attorneys’ fees. Defendants

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ § 1988 claims

is GRANTED.

/////

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ Cal Water and Cox’s

motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court

is directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 24, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-02143-FCD-JFM Document 50 Filed 02/27/06 Page 33 of 33