Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05028/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barlow & Haun, Inc.
Appellant
Nowio-s, LLC
Appellant
Nowio-v, LLC
Appellant
Tricontinental Resources
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BARLOW & HAUN, INC., A WYOMING 

CORPORATION, TRICONTINENTAL RESOURCES, 

A WYOMING PARTNERSHIP, NOWIO-S, LLC, A 

WYOMING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 

NOWIO-V, LLC, A WYOMING LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5028

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:08-cv-00847-MMS, Judge Margaret M. 

Sweeney. 

______________________ 

Decided: October 9, 2015

______________________ 

 DRAKE D. HILL, The Hill Law Firm, Cheyenne, WY, 

argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by

THOMAS FRANK REESE, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, 

Casper, WY.

 ERIKA KRANZ, Environment and Natural Resources 

Division, United States Department of Justice, WashingCase: 15-5028 Document: 54-2 Page: 1 Filed: 10/09/2015
2 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

ton, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by KATHERINE J. BARTON, JOHN C. CRUDEN. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and O’MALLEY, Circuit

Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

Barlow & Haun, Inc. (“Barlow”), TriContinental Resources (“TriContinental”), NOWIO-S, LLC (“NOWIO-S”), 

and NOWIO-V, LLC (“NOWIO-V”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the judgment of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims dismissing: (1) Barlow’s breach of contract 

claim on the merits, (2) Barlow’s takings claim as unripe, 

and (3) TriContinental’s, NOWIO-S’s, and NOWIO-V’s 

breach of contract claim for lack of standing. Barlow & 

Haun, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 597, 623 (2014). 

Because the trial court made no legal error or clearly 

erroneous factual finding, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the mineral-rich state of Wyoming, a conflict between oil and gas development and trona1 mining on 

public lands has developed over the last twenty years. 

Given the risks posed by oil and gas development to the 

extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of 

Land Management (“BLM”), which manages the leasing 

of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in one area of Wyoming, known as the mechanically mineable trona area or 

“MMTA.” At issue in this case is the effect of this indefinite suspension on twenty six pre-existing oil and gas 

leases owned by Barlow in the MMTA. 

1 Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is 

processed into soda ash or baking soda. 

 

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BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 3

As the custodian of federal lands, the BLM is authorized to award oil and gas leases, approve applications for 

a permit to drill (“APD”), and develop land use plans. The 

Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the Secretary of the 

Interior to manage the leasing of public lands for developing deposits of coal, natural gas, oil, sodium phosphates, 

and other minerals. See generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 

(2012); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2012); 43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-

3 (2013) (implementing regulations). 

Barlow filed suit against the government in November 

2008, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas 

leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests in the 

twenty six leases without just compensation in violation 

of the Fifth Amendment (count I of the complaint). Barlow further alleged that the BLM’s suspension constituted 

a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and

their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing 

(count II of the complaint). After the close of discovery, 

both sides moved for summary judgment.2 The Court of 

Federal Claims denied both sides’ motions, finding that 

there was a factual dispute as to the duration of the 

suspensions. The case proceeded to trial on April 15-30 

and September 16-17, 2013. The parties filed post-trial 

briefing and the trial court issued its post-trial opinion on 

September 26, 2014. 

2 Appellants filed a partial summary judgment motion on the issue of the government’s liability for breach of 

the leases, and the government filed a motion on Appellants’ claims for breach of contract and a taking without 

just compensation. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. 

United States, No. 1:08-cv-00847 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 22, 2012), 

ECF No. 105. 

 

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4 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

In its post-trial opinion, the Court of Federal Claims

concluded that Barlow’s breach of contract claim failed on 

the merits, that Barlow’s takings claim was unripe, and 

that three of the four Appellants—TriContinental, 

NOWIO-S, and NOWIO-V—lacked standing to assert a 

claim for breach of contract.3 The court found that Barlow’s breach of contract claim failed because the BLM had 

not repudiated the contract. Barlow argued that the BLM 

breached the leases by eliminating its right under the 

leases to explore for and produce oil and gas, and by 

imposing new conditions on the leases, such as accommodating the concerns of the trona industry and ensuring 

the safety of underground trona miners, which were not 

contemplated at the time the leases were executed. The 

court found, however, that the BLM’s statements about 

the cessation of oil and gas development in the trona 

conflict area did not foreclose the possibility that Barlow 

could still be approved to drill there, because the BLM 

repeatedly stated that it would recognize valid existing 

rights. Additionally, the court concluded that the allegedly “new” provisions were already encompassed by existing 

lease provisions. Therefore, the court found that any 

requirement that the BLM consider the impact of oil and 

gas drilling on trona mining and miners in an APD would 

not constitute a repudiation of the lease. Accordingly, the 

court rejected Barlow’s claim for breach of contract. 

The Court of Federal Claims next determined that 

Barlow’s takings claim was not ripe because Barlow had 

not submitted an APD to the BLM. Barlow, 118 Fed. Cl. 

at 618-619. Although Barlow argued that filing an APD 

would have been futile, the court disagreed, finding that, 

3 In this opinion, the Court of Federal Claims also 

rejected the government’s argument that Appellants’ 

claims accrued beyond the applicable limitations period. 

The parties did not appeal this finding. 

 

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BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 5

in light of the BLM’s statements that it would recognize 

rights in preexisting leases, the BLM “retained the discretion to allow oil and gas development in appropriate 

circumstances.” Id. Accordingly, the court found that the 

takings claim was not ripe. 

Finally, the Court of Federal Claims determined that 

three of the four plaintiffs—TriContinental, NOWIO-S, 

and NOWIO-V—did not have standing to pursue a breach 

of contract claim because they were not in privity of 

contract with the government. Id. at 619-20. The court 

noted that there was no evidence presented at trial indicating that these parties had any contractual agreement 

with the government. Instead, the evidence of record 

showed that only Barlow had title in the leases. Thus, the 

court dismissed the claims of TriContinental, NOWIO-S, 

and NOWIO-V for lack of standing. 

The court then entered final judgment in favor of the 

government. Appellants filed a timely appeal. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review legal conclusions of the Court of Federal 

Claims without deference, but defer to factual findings 

unless clearly erroneous. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. 

United States, 685 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A 

factual finding is clearly erroneous when we are “left with 

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” Id.

Contract interpretation is a question of law that we 

review without deference. Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. 

United States, 536 F.3d 1268, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

Similarly, we review the Court of Federal Claims’s determination with respect to ripeness de novo. McGuire v. 

United States, 707 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

Whether a taking has occurred is a question of law 

based on factual underpinnings. Wyatt v. United States, 

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6 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A trial court’s

determination that a takings claim is not ripe for adjudication is an issue we review de novo. Morris v. United 

States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

We review de novo a determination of a party’s standing, while reviewing any factual findings relevant to that determination for clear error. Bard 

Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 776 F.3d 

837, 842 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

DISCUSSION

Appellants argue that the BLM breached Barlow’s oil 

and gas leases; that the BLM’s regulations restricting oil 

and gas mining constituted a taking; and that TriContinental’s, NOWIO-S’s, and NOWIO-V’s breach of contract 

claim was improperly dismissed for lack of standing. We 

discuss each of these arguments in turn.

A. Breach of Contract

Barlow argues that the BLM breached the oil and gas 

leases in two ways: (1) by indefinitely suspending the 

leases, the BLM barred Barlow’s right to utilize its leases 

for their only purpose, namely, oil and gas development; 

and (2) by imposing new conditions not contemplated at 

the time of contracting, the BLM unilaterally altered the

terms of the contract and denied Barlow the benefit of its

bargain. For the reasons below, we find these arguments 

to be without merit.

“When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally 

by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.” Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast v. 

United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000) (quotation omitted). Such rights include a party’s entitlement “to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on” the other 

party if that party repudiates the contract. Id. (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373 (1979)). A party 

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BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 7

repudiates a contract by a “statement . . . indicating that 

[he] will commit a breach that would of itself give the 

[non-repudiating party] a claim for damages for total 

breach.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Repudiation occurs 

when one party refuses to perform and communicates 

that refusal distinctly and unqualifiedly to the other 

party.” Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 

1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000). And, total breach is a breach that 

“so substantially impairs the value of the contract to the 

injured party at the time of the breach that it is just in

the circumstances to allow him to recover damages based 

on all his remaining rights to performance.” Mobil Oil, 

530 U.S. at 608 (quotation omitted). 

The BLM can create resource management plans to 

define how a particular piece of land will be managed in 

the future. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-2 (2012). Such plans are 

implemented via a multi-step process, which includes 

preparing a draft plan and environmental impact statement (“EIS”), receiving comments on the draft plan,

publishing the proposed resource management plan,

resolving any protests of the proposed plan, and approving the proposed plan. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.4-1610.5. Once 

these management plans have been approved, they can be 

amended, but the amendment process must include the 

preparation of an environmental assessment or impact 

report. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-5.

The BLM created three versions of resource management plans relevant here: the 2007 draft resource management plan (“the 2007 Draft RMP”), the 2008 proposed 

resource management plan (“the 2008 Draft RMP”), and 

the 2010 final resource management plan (“the 2010 Final 

RMP”). As set forth below, a review of the language in 

the management plans makes clear that the BLM understood its obligation to honor its commitments under the 

pre-existing leases in the MMTA. Therefore, we reject 

Barlow’s argument that the BLM repudiated its contracts. 

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8 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

The 2007 Draft RMP indicated the BLM’s intent to 

recognize existing contracts, stating that “[t]he BLM 

must, by law, recognize all valid existing rights.” Barlow, 

118 Fed. Cl. at 609. The 2007 Draft RMP noted that 

“[t]he preferred course of action is to administer the area 

exclusively for trona extraction until conventional trona 

mining is complete.” Id. at 609-610. In addition, the

Draft 2007 RMP indicated that “an area has been designated, the MMTA, in which oil and gas leasing and development are currently prohibited.” Id. The Draft 2007 

RMP noted, however, that “[n]o formal decision has yet 

been made on the management of the oil and gas and 

trona resources within the MMTA boundary.” Id. In 

sum, the 2007 Draft RMP evidenced the BLM’s intent to 

honor Barlow’s existing rights, and noted that the BLM’s 

decision with respect to trona management and oil and 

gas management was not a final decision. Id.

The BLM again noted in the 2008 Draft RMP that it 

“must, by law, recognize all valid existing rights.” Barlow, 118 Fed. Cl. at 610. The 2008 Draft RMP recognized 

that “[w]hen an oil and gas lease is issued, it constitutes a 

valid existing right; BLM cannot unilaterally change the

terms and conditions of the lease.” Id. The 2008 Draft 

RMP further clarified that “[e]xisting leases would not be 

affected by decisions resulting from this RMP.” Id.

The 2010 Final RMP reaffirmed that “[t]he revised 

RMP will recognize valid existing rights.” Barlow, 118 

Fed. Cl. at 611. In addition, the 2010 Final RMP specified 

that “[t]he MMTA is administratively unavailable for new

fluid mineral leasing until the oil and gas resources can 

be recovered without compromising the safety of underground miners.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the 2010 

Final RMP indicates that the BLM does not intend to 

breach existing contracts.

It is evident from the language of the drafts and the 

enacted resource management plan that the BLM underCase: 15-5028 Document: 54-2 Page: 8 Filed: 10/09/2015
BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 9

stood its obligation to accommodate the preexisting leases 

in the MMTA. Barlow is correct that some of the language in the draft RMPs indicated that oil and gas leasing 

and development would be prohibited. In the 2010 Final 

RMP, however, the BLM clearly makes a distinction 

between new leasing and preexisting leases. 

In addition, the trial testimony indicated that the

BLM would still consider an APD, even though it had 

suspended oil and gas development generally in the 

MMTA. Barlow, 118 Fed. Cl. at 611. The Court of Federal Claims credited this testimony, see id., and we defer to 

these factual findings. Further, there was evidence that 

the BLM had granted other APDs in similar circumstances to another company, Saurus Resources, Inc. (“Saurus”). 

Id. at 607-09. Though Saurus applied for APDs while oil 

and gas development was suspended, the BLM ultimately 

approved Saurus’s APDs, lifting of the suspension for 

those sites covered by Saurus’s APDs. Id. Because the 

BLM stated unequivocally in the final EIS and the 2010 

RMP that existing contractual rights would be recognized, 

and because it retains the discretion to approve APDs 

within the MMTA after the issuance of those documents, 

the final EIS and RMP cannot constitute a “distinct[] and 

unqualified[]” refusal to perform. Dow Chem., 226 F.3d at 

1344. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined 

that the BLM’s decisions and statements regarding drilling in the MMTA did not constitute repudiation of the 

contract by the government.

We next consider Barlow’s argument that the BLM

breached the contract because it improperly altered the 

terms of the contract. In making this argument, Barlow 

relies heavily on Mobil Oil and the case upon which it 

relies, Conoco, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 331 

(1996). 

In this lineage of cases, two oil companies had lease 

contracts affording them the right to explore for and 

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10 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

develop oil off of the North Carolina coast. Mobil Oil, 530 

U.S. at 607. These contracts included several provisions, 

including one that required the Department of the Interior (“Interior”) to approve a company’s plan for exploration 

within 30 days of its submission. Id. at 610. Pursuant to 

their contracts, the companies in Mobil Oil submitted 

their final exploration plans to Interior. After the parties 

entered into their leases with the government, but two 

days prior to the submissions of their final exploration 

plans, Congress passed a new law that prohibited the 

Secretary of the Interior from approving any Exploration 

Plan or Development and Production Plan. Id. at 611. 

The Department of the Interior decided to suspend the 

leases. Id. at 615. 

The Supreme Court held that the Department of the 

Interior could not suspend the leases, because there was 

no basis for this type of suspension in the regulations. 

Mobil Oil, 530 U.S. at 615-618. And the government 

could not rely upon the new statute to justify the suspension, since the statute was passed after the leases were 

entered. Id. at 616. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 

found that, under the law in effect when the leases were 

signed, the government exceeded its authority in suspending the leases. Id.

Here, Barlow argues that the BLM’s regulations imposed new provisions regarding trona miner safety not 

contemplated by the leases. We disagree. Contrary to 

Barlow’s argument, the BLM had authority to regulate

the safety of trona miners under the regulations that were 

in effect when the leases began. For example, 43 C.F.R. 

§ 3162.1(a) provides that lease operators must conduct all 

operations “in a manner which . . . protects life and property.” Additionally, 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-2(a) states that a 

lease operator “shall utilize and maintain materials and 

equipment necessary to insure the safety of operating 

conditions and procedures.” Barlow responds that the

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BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 11

regulations must specifically reference a particular mineral (here trona), and must explicitly list other worker 

safety, in order for leases incorporating these regulations 

to extend to trona miner worker safety. Barlow failed to 

cite any case law in support of its position that such 

specificity is required in the BLM’s regulations. Barlow’s 

argument is also contradicted by the language of the 

regulations, which expressly mention safety and the 

protection of life and property. Accordingly, we hold that

the government did not breach the contract by imposing 

conditions that protect worker safety. 

B. Ripeness

Barlow also disputes the trial court’s dismissal of its 

takings claim for lack of ripeness. Barlow argues that 

implementation of the BLM’s regulations, which ended all 

oil and gas development until trona mining was completed, constituted a taking. Finding that Barlow’s takings 

claim was not ripe, the Court of Federal Claims declined 

to reach the merits of this claim. Specifically, the trial 

court found that Barlow was required to apply for an APD 

after the final resource management plan had been approved, but that Barlow failed to do so. The court further 

found that filing such an application would not have been

futile. Barlow disputes these findings. 

Barlow argues that any APD application would have 

been futile because the resource management plans made 

clear the BLM’s intent to suspend oil and gas leases in the 

MMTA. Barlow further argues that the BLM cannot 

contradict the resource management plans and the final 

EIS, which prohibited oil and gas drilling. Therefore, 

Barlow contends, there could be no doubt that the BLM 

would reject any APD application. 

The BLM asserts that the Court of Federal Claims

correctly dismissed Barlow’s takings claim. The BLM 

reasons that, since there was no final decision denying 

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12 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

Barlow’s ability to develop the leases, Barlow’s takings 

claim is not ripe.4 The BLM also argues that Barlow’s 

argument regarding the futility of any APD application 

fails because the BLM has discretion to grant or deny any

APD application.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that private property shall not “be taken for 

public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. 

amend. V. A takings claim can be premised on a regulation “that deprives land of all economically beneficial use.” 

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–15 

(1992); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999). 

“A claimant can show its claim was ripe with sufficient evidence of the futility of further pursuit of a permit 

through the administrative process.” Anaheim Gardens v. 

United States, 444 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing 

MacDonald v. City of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 350 n. 7 (1986)). 

To determine if a takings claim is ripe, a court must 

determine whether a party has obtained a final decision 

from the reviewing agency, or whether the final decision 

was unnecessary due to lack of discretion on the agency’s 

part. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618–20 

(2001) (“While a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to permit 

any development, or the permissible uses of the property 

4 In the alternative, the BLM argues that Barlow’s 

contract based rights cannot give rise to a takings claim

because the government acted within the framework of 

the contract. The Court of Federal Claims did not reach 

this argument. Because we find that Barlow’s takings 

claim is not ripe, we likewise decline to address this 

argument.

 

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BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 13

are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings 

claim is likely to have ripened.”).

“The general rule is that a claim for a regulatory taking ‘is not ripe until the government entity charged with 

implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 

regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.’” Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376 

(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning 

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985) 

(holding that the agency must have “arrived at a final, 

definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, a party must have first 

“followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion” so that the 

extent of the restriction on the property is known. 

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620-21. We have recognized that 

“[t]he mere fact that an adverse decision may have been 

likely does not excuse a party from a statutory or regulatory requirement that it exhaust administrative remedies.” Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “The failure to follow all applicable 

administrative procedures can [] be excused in the limited 

circumstance in which the administrative entity has no 

discretion regarding the regulation’s applicability and its 

only option is enforcement,” however. Greenbrier v. 

United States, 193 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see

Anaheim Gardens, 444 F.3d at 1316. Thus, the 

“[r]ipeness doctrine does not require a landowner to 

submit applications for their own sake.” Palazzolo, 533 

U.S. at 622. 

Here, Barlow’s takings claim is not ripe because there 

has not been a final decision from the BLM. Barlow relies 

heavily on Washoe County v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) to argue that the BLM’s indefinite suspension constitutes a final decision. In Washoe, the 

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14 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

appellants had submitted to the Department of Interior a 

right-of-way permit for a water pipeline to cross federal 

lands. Id. at 1323. Before it could approve the permit, 

BLM had to complete an EIS and distribute it for comment. It was during this process that the Secretary of the 

Interior ordered the BLM to suspend its work on the EIS

until issues with the Army, an Indian Tribe, and the U.S. 

Geological Survey could be resolved. Id. Since these 

issues were never resolved, the Washoe appellants were 

prevented from proceeding with their pipeline. While the 

government alleged that the Washoe appellants’ takings 

claim was not ripe because there was no final decision to 

grant or deny the application for a right-of-way permit, 

this court disagreed. Id. at 1324. Specifically, we found 

that “there was no further reasonable and necessary step 

Washoe County could have taken to allow the BLM an 

opportunity to exercise its full discretion in acting upon 

Washoe County’s permit application.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Barlow further argues that filing an APD here would 

have been futile because the BLM does not have the 

discretion to approve an APD in light of the 2010 final 

resource management plan and the final EIS. We disagree. Unlike the appellant in Washoe, Barlow still had 

the opportunity to file an APD with the BLM, and the 

BLM had discretion to permit or deny the APD. The 

testimony at trial supports the BLM’s contention that it 

had discretion to decide whether to approve an APD even 

after the suspension of oil and gas lease and development. 

See Barlow, 118 Fed. Cl. at 611-12. In particular, the 

testimony indicated that the BLM could still consider an 

APD even if the leases were currently suspended. Id. 

The BLM’s resource management plans also reflect this 

discretion. Id. at 621 (“The revised RMP will recognize 

valid existing rights.”); id. (“Existing leases would not be 

affected by decisions resulting from this RMP that desigCase: 15-5028 Document: 54-2 Page: 14 Filed: 10/09/2015
BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 15

nate areas administratively unavailable for oil and gas 

leasing.”). The fact that the BLM actually approved APDs

for Saurus during the early 2000s, when oil and gas 

leases were suspended, further supports the trial court’s 

finding that BLM did have discretion to grant APDs. See 

id. at 607-09. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did 

not err when it concluded that Barlow’s takings claim was 

not ripe. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620-21. 

We also find that Barlow failed to demonstrate that 

the BLM made a decision with respect to its specific 

property rights, as is required to establish a takings 

claim. See id. Here, the BLM had established a welldefined administrative process, which Barlow elected not 

to engage in. The BLM could not make a property-specific 

decision here because Barlow never submitted an APD to 

develop any of the leases. For example, had Barlow 

submitted an APD, the BLM could have determined

whether the proposed drilling site could avoid interaction 

with a trona mine. Since the BLM has discretion to 

evaluate each APD according to its individual merits, 

Barlow could not have known how the agency would apply 

the regulations to an APD. The trial court did not err in 

concluding that the BLM did not have an opportunity to 

make a specific determination with respect to Barlow’s 

rights. While Barlow may be correct that the likelihood 

that its APD would be approved is not high, we cannot 

say it would have been futile for Barlow to submit an APD

in the first instance. We accordingly affirm the trial 

court’s dismissal of Barlow’s takings claim for lack of 

ripeness.

C. Standing

The Court of Federal Claims determined that Barlow 

failed to establish standing for three of the four plaintiff 

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16 BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US

parties—TriContinental, NOWIO-S, and NOWIO-V.5 

Appellants dispute this dismissal, arguing that because 

these entities have operating rights in the leases, they 

should be joined to this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19(a)(1)(B). 

In order to maintain a claim for breach of contract, a 

party must be in privity with the United States. Cienega 

Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 

1998). In contesting the parties’ dismissal, Appellants 

cite to testimony that discusses the types of rights held by 

the three dismissed parties. Contrary to Appellants’

assertions, however, the cited testimony does not demonstrate that these parties had a contractual relationship 

with the government. 

After considering the parties’ testimony, the Court of 

Federal Claims found that there was no evidence that 

NOWIO-S and NOWIO-V had ever entered into a contractual relationship with the United States. Barlow, 118 

Fed. Cl. at 620. The trial court next found that TriContinental had no privity of contract with the United States 

since June 1, 2000, well before the alleged breach of

contract occurred here. Id. The court thus determined 

that the cited testimony merely demonstrates that these 

parties had operating rights, not that they were in privity 

with the government. Id. at 608 n.12. We see no error in 

5 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed sua sponte the claims of TriContinental, NOWIO-S, and NOWIOV. The court can examine standing at all stages of the 

litigation, and if it determines that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over a claim at any time, it must dismiss the 

claim. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 

(1990); Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., 320 F.3d 

1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, the trial court did not 

exceed its authority in dismissing the claims sua sponte. 

 

Case: 15-5028 Document: 54-2 Page: 16 Filed: 10/09/2015
BARLOW & HAUN, INC. v. US 17

the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm the 

dismissal of TriContinental’s, NOWIO-S’s, and NOWIOV’s breach of contract claim. 

CONCLUSION

We find no reversible error in the trial court’s conclusions that (1) Barlow’s claim for breach of contract fails on 

the merits; (2) Barlow’s takings claim is unripe, and 

(3) TriContinental’s, NOWIO-S’s, and NOWIO-V’s breach 

of contract claim fails for lack of standing. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

AFFIRMED 

Case: 15-5028 Document: 54-2 Page: 17 Filed: 10/09/2015