Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-08047/USCOURTS-ca10-91-08047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Black Butte Coal Company
Appellant
William D. Christenson
Appellee
Russell Wayne Crandall
Appellee
Jimmie Earl Erikson
Appellee
Lonnie Semon
Appellee
Joyce Sewell
Appellee
Manuel J. Trujillo
Appellee
Ricky L. Walsh
Appellee

Document Text:

Fl l.J jjjD UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unirecl Stat(!B C.Ourtof App.:nh Tc>".th Clr-:ui"'. 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 2 G 1992 

JOYCE SEWELL, MANUEL J. TRUJILLO, 

RUSSELL WAYNE CRANDALL, JIMMIE EARL 

ERIKSON, LONNIE SEMON, RICKY L. WALSH, 

WILLIAM D. CHRISTENSON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

BLACK BUTTE COAL COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ROBERT L. HOECKEE 

Clerl: . ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-8047 

) (D.C. No. 90-274J) 

) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Defendant's Motion for Oral Argument 

is therefore denied and the case is ordered submitted on the 

briefs. 

Plaintiffs brought this diversity action against Defendant, 

their former employer, following their termination during a 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 1
reduction in force (RIF) necessitated by unexpected economic 

conditions. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district 

court held that Defendant's employee handbook, which contained 

provisions relating to the proper conduct of a RIF, see Opening 

Brief of Defendant-appellant Black Butte Coal Co. (Opening Brief}, 

tab A at 27, gave rise to an implied contract under applicable 

Wyoming case law, ~ Opening Brief, tab C (Order filed 

January 14, 1991) at 5-8, and that the issue of its breach must be 

decided by the trier of fact, see id. at 8-9. 1 Ultimately, the 

district court entered judgment for Plaintiffs on a jury verdict 

in the collective amount of $305,052. Defendant appealed, raising 

one issue with respect to liability and two related issues on 

damages. For reasons discussed below, we affirm the finding of 

liability but reverse the compensatory damage award and remand for 

an award of nominal damages. 

Defendant no longer disputes that its employee handbook 

created an implied contract under Wyoming law; nor does Defendant 

challenge the jury's finding that it failed to comply with the RIF 

provisions set out therein. Instead, Defendant restricts its 

position on liability to the contention that the procedure it 

adopted for conducting the RIF, the so called Objective Job 

Quotient (OJQ} rating system, itself became part of the parties' 

implied contract, thereby precluding any finding of breach. For 

purposes of our review, the asserted modification of a contract 

1 Plaintiffs initially asserted several theories of relief, but 

only their claim for breach of implied contract remains for our 

consideration. See Answer Brief of Plaintiffs-appellees (Answer 

Brief} at 3 n.2; see also Opening Brief at 6 n.3. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 2
raises a question of law under clear and unambiguous 

circumstances, and a mixed question of law and fact otherwise. 

See Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wyo. 

1986). Where, as here, the latter circumstance obtains, the 

critical issue is one of contractual intent, which, if genuinely 

disputed, is properly reserved to the trier of fact. See, e.g., 

McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869 (Wyo. 

1990), aff'd on reh'g, 820 P.2d 986, 990-91 (1991); see also 

Deepwater Invs., Ltd . v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 

1112 & n.11 (10th Cir. 199l)(citing Wyoming authorities for 

general rule that parties' intent to create contractual rights is 

question of fact to be decided at trial). 

The primary focus of this first assignment of error is the 

district court's pretrial Order denying Defendant's Motion for 

Summary Judgment, in which the court held "that the question of 

... the effect of defendant's modification of [the handbook's 

RIF] provisions through announcement of the expected use of the 

OJQ evaluation procedure. must be reserved for the trier of 

fact." Opening Brief, tab C at 11-12. However, it is by now 

fairly well established that the denial of summary judgment on 

such grounds, i.e., that factual disputes warrant a trial on the 

merits, is not subject to review on appeal after the factfinder 

has found against the movant on the evidence presented at trial. 

See, e.g. , Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 

1990); Locricchio v. Legal Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 

(9th Cir. 1987); Glares v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573 

n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1072 (1987); see 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 3
also Boyles Galvanizing & Plating Co. v. Hartford Accident & 

Indem. Co., 372 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1967); Holley v. Northrop 

Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 

1988). 

Defendant states that it reasserted the issue at trial, see 

Opening Brief at 23, citing to Tr. Vol.Vat 153 (App., tab 10 at 

149)(defense counsel "renew[ing] my motion for a directed verdict 

[on other grounds, see App., tabs 8-9 at 137-48] and incorporating 

all the motions earlier")(emphasis added), but we seriously 

question the efficacy of this obscure, overbroad, catch-all 

renewal of (now procedurally inapt) pretrial motions in the middle 

of trial. Moreover, even if its rather oblique reference to the 

earlier Motion for Summary Judgment were deemed sufficient to 

reintroduce the matter at trial as a proper challenge to the 

sufficiency of Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendant has, in any event, 

substantially failed to comply with its obligation to cite to and 

supply this court with the ample trial record relating to the 

issue of modification (compare the evidence provided by 

Plaintiffs, discussed infra). See Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 

917 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990)(absent references to record, 

we defer to trial court's rulings); Turnbull v. Wilcken, 893 F.2d 

256, 258 (10th Cir. 1990)(failure to designate transcript 

containing evidence relating to challenged ruling precludes 

reversal on appeal); see also Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2)("If the 

appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 

is unsupported by the evidence ., the appellant shall include 

in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 4
finding or conclusion."); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)("The argument 

[in the appellant's brief] shall contain the contentions of the 

appellant ... , with citations to the authorities, statutes and 

parts of the record relied on."). Under the circumstances, 

Defendant cannot establish its entitlement to appellate relief. 

Furthermore, the trial record supplied by Plaintiffs fully 

supports the determination of the jury, which Defendant admits was 

properly instructed on the issue, see Opening Brief at 26-27. 

Ample testimony indicated that Defendant had an established 

procedure for amending the handbook, involving issuance of 

replacement pages containing amendments to employees for inclusion 

in their personal copies of the handbook, but that this procedure 

was not followed in the case of the OJQ. 2 See Appellee Supp. App. 

at 44-46, 98, 120-21, 143-44, 227-30; cf. Adams v . Square D. Co., 

775 F. Supp. 869, 870-73 (D.S.C. 199l)(modification of 

handbook/contract found where amendments were set out in new 

handbook issued to employees); Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 

F. Supp. 1128, 1131-32 (D. Ariz . 1988)(same) . Defendant made no 

effort to apprise employees that use of the OJQ might involve a 

departure from the handbook RIF provisions, see Appellee Supp . 

App. at 59, 92-93, 227-29, and nothing in the letter announcing 

the use of the OJQ procedure informed employees that it 

constituted an amendment of, or even conflicted with, the handbook 

RIF provi sions, see App., tab 7 at 105-06. See generally Durtsche 

v. American Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007, __ , slip op. at 7-9 

2 Evidently, the handbook ' s RIF provisions were not formally 

amended in any way during the period i n question. See, e . g . , Appellee Supp. App. at 66, 87-88, 229. 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 5
(10th Cir. 1992)(to be effective, employer's modification of 

handbook must clearly and conspicuously explain nature of change 

to employees). Finally, Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs 

affirmatively acquiesced in the use of the OJQ procedure by 

participating in its implementation (at their employer's 

direction) is undercut by trial testimony establishing that the 

decision to adopt the procedure in the first place was 

unilaterally made by Defendant and imposed upon its employees 

without their input or approval. See, e.g., Appellee Supp. App. 

at 68-69, 85, 171, 221-22. We conclude that, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing Plaintiffs, the record before us 

contains the requisite "substantial evidence" to support the 

jury's decision on liability. See Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., 

Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 663 (10th Cir. 1991). 

To summarize our analysis of the liability issue, Defendant's 

primary argument, regarding the denial of its Motion for Summary 

Judgment, is procedurally barred, and any challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence presented on the matter at trial, if 

made and preserved at all, is without merit. We therefore affirm 

the judgment of the district court insofar as it reflects 

Defendant's liability for breach of the implied contract created 

by the employee handbook. We turn now to the matter of damages. 

Damages for breach of contract are intended to compensate the 

aggrieved party only "for the loss which would have been prevented 

by a full performance of the contract." Robert w. Anderson 

Housewrecking & Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 681 P.2d 

1326, 1333 (Wyo. 1984). "The burden .. is upon those seeking 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 6
more than mere nominal damages to prove their damages[,]" Adel v. 

Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 892 (Wyo. 1984); see also Concrete 

Specialties v. H. C. Smith Constr. Co., 423 F.2d 670, 671-72 (10th 

Cir. 1970)(plaintiff has burden "of proving ... breach of the 

contract and of proving its damages from the breach"), and proof 

of breach does not, by itself, satisfy that burden, see Leet v. 

Joder, 295 P.2d 733, 738 (Wyo. 1956). Accordingly, Defendant 

argues that because Plaintiffs were unable to establish that they 

would have retained their jobs under a proper application of the 

handbook's RIF provisions, they did not prove any compensable loss 

resulting from use of the OJQ procedure and are therefore entitled 

to nothing more than nominal damages. We agree. 

Substantial references to, and quotations from, the trial 

record support Defendant's contention that none of the witnesses, 

including Plaintiffs' expert, could say whether use of the 

handbook's RIF provisions would have resulted in retention of any 

of the Plaintiffs. See Opening Brief at 42-46. Plaintiffs do not 

dispute this, but argue that once they established Defendant's 

breach of the handbook RIF provisions, they were entitled to 

compensation for their lost jobs absent disproof of such damages 

by Defendant. Plaintiffs' position on the burden of proof is in 

direct conflict with the general authorities cited above, as well 

as the more immediately pertinent case law cited by Defendant. 

See Rompf v. John O. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 29 (Wyo. 

1984)(employer entitled to judgment as matter of law because 

"alleged breach of this particular section [of handbook requiring 

evaluation of new employees within six weeks of hire] did not 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 7
cause damages to the appellant," as even exemplary evaluation 

would not have prevented his dismissal for economic reasons); 

Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 981 (D. 

Wyo . 1988)(citing Rompf and rejecting implied contract claim 

because alleged breach of notice requirement did not damage 

plaintiff, who admitted he would have done nothing differently had 

employer given proper notice). 

The only pertinent evidence adduced by Plaintiffs consisted 

of their predominantly satisfactory performance evaluations and 

apparently good records regarding safety, attendance, and 

punctuality. However, Plaintiffs did not present any evidence 

from which the jury could infer Plaintiffs' relative standing on 

these handbook RIF criteria vis-a-vis co-employees retained under 

the OJQ procedure. Thus, the jury's implicit finding that 

Plaintiffs lost their jobs because the handbook was disregarded in 

favor of the OJQ procedure entailed the sort of speculation or 

conjecture that Wyoming law does not allow as the basis of a 

damage award. See Reiman Constr. Co. v. Jerry Hiller Co., 709 

P . 2d 1271, 1277 (Wyo. 1985). Consequently, the award of 

compensatory damages cannot stand. 

Defendant also assigns as error the district court's refusal 

of its tendered instruction on nominal damages. In light of our 

reversal of the damage award, this last issue is moot. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 8
the cause is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this Order 

and Judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-8047 Document: 010110254292 Date Filed: 05/26/1992 Page: 9