Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00888/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00888-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanley Bradford Clarke
Plaintiff
County of Madera
Defendant
Department of Social Services
Defendant
Sandra Upton
Defendant
Amparo Williams
Defendant

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANLEY BRADFORD CLARKE, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

SANDRA UPTON and COUNTY OF )

MADERA, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-888 OWW/SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

(Doc. 8), DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE, AND DENYING IN PART

AND GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 4) 

On June 21, 2007, Defendants removed Plaintiff's Third

Amended Complaint (TAC) from the Madera County Superior Court on

the basis of federal question on the ground that the Third

Amended Complaint alleges at least one cause of action arises

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The Notice of Removal states

in pertinent part that “Defendants Sandra Upton, the County of

Madera, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, hereby remove to this

Court the state court action described below.”

Plaintiff is proceeding in pro per. The TAC is 101 pages

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On August 8, 2007, Plaintiff filed a declaration and 1

memorandum in support of the motion to remand (Docs. 10 & 11). On

August 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a declaration and memorandum in

opposition to the motion to dismiss (Docs. 13 & 14). All of these

pleadings are untimely pursuant to Rule 78-230, Local Rules of

Practice and are not considered in resolving these pending motions.

Plaintiff is advised that it is his obligation to familiarize

himself and comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

2

long and sets forth 268 paragraphs of allegations. Defendants

are Sandra Upton, the County of Merced, the Department of Social

Services, Amparo Williams and Does 3-50. 

Very generally, the TAC alleges that Defendants negligently

and/or intentionally falsified or misrepresented evidence in

juvenile dependency proceedings involving the placement of

Plaintiff’s son with the mother, that Defendants were negligent

or abused their discretion in conducting the investigation and

the juvenile dependency proceedings, and that Defendants’ actions

were motivated by racial bias or discrimination based on

Plaintiff’s American Indian ancestry and/or by gender bias based

on preference for placement of a child with the mother rather

than the father.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the TAC for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

a motion to strike specified paragraphs of the TAC pursuant to

Rule 12(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff has filed a written opposition to Defendants'

motion coupled with a motion to remand this action to the Madera

County Superior Court.1

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the Local Rules of Practice. Failure to do so may result in the

imposition of sanctions, including the sanction of dismissal. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that removal was improper 2

because Defendants did not include all copies of pleadings filed in

the state court action with the notice of removal. Plaintiff was

referring to copies of exhibits he provided to the Madera County

Superior Court on June 22. Because the notice of removal was filed

with this Court on June 21, Plaintiff’s contention is without

merit. 

3

A. Motion to Remand.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' removal was "based on

strategy, not necessity, and thereby further delays the

settlement of this case, adding to the overall costs of suit." 

Plaintiff contends that there are several defects in Defendant's

removal.2

First, Plaintiff contends, Defendants failed to file and

serve an answer to Plaintiff's "complaint". 

Plaintiff’s contention is without merit. Rule 81(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 

In a removed action in which the defendant

has not answered, the defendant shall answer

or present the other defenses or objections

available under these rules within 20 days

after the receipt or otherwise of a copy of

the initial pleading setting forth the claim

for relief upon which the action or

proceeding is based, or within 20 days after

the service of summons upon such initial

pleading, then filed, or within 5 days after

the filing of the petition for removal,

whichever period is longest.

The fact that Defendants had not filed an Answer to the TAC does

not ipso facto preclude removal.

Plaintiff further asserts that the removal was untimely

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because the Second Amended

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Complaint (SAC), filed and served on February 1, 2007, "did

thereby first and at that time pleaded [sic] causes of action for

Discrimination and a cause of action for Failure to Disclose

Exculpatory Evidence, a Brady violation, raising Federal

questions and permitting removal by Defendants at that time." 

The SAC named only Sandra Upton and the County of Madera as

defendants. The SAC alleges that "[t]his action is brought on

behalf of Plaintiff to remedy violations of California's state

statutes and to seek relief for damages suffered and arising as a

direct result of the conduct, fraud, discrimination, negligent

misrepresentation and omissions of material facts and written

documentation by the defendant Sandra Upton, acting individually

and under the color of authority as an un-licensed social worker

for the County of Madera, repudiating the laws and ethical

guidelines of her profession and duties to impartially protect

and serve the public and the welfare of children" (SAC ¶ 1) The

SAC further alleges: 

4. Based upon the obligations of law and

ethics imposed upon the Defendant and their

experience in the department, Defendant's

[sic] either knew, recklessly disregarded,

reasonably should have known or were

obligated under the law to understand that

the conduct and behavior that they continued

to engage in was activity in violation of the

law, in violation of ethical standards and

protocol, in violation of Plaintiff's civil

rights to be free from sex and race based

discrimination, in violation of the

Department's policies of fairness,

neutrality, and impartiality, and

furthermore, not in the best interest of the

minor child's welfare. Defendant's

malfeasant conduct and activity was executed

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outside of any judicial proceedings and the

compounded effect of discrimination and bias

consumed Upton's ability to maintain

objectivity and neutrality inhibiting her

impartial judgment and thus creating an

insurmountable prejudice against the

Plaintiff. Such conduct is of a conduct is

of a continuing nature that requires prompt

relief, since the Defendant's [sic] have not

revealed the true facts and have not taken

appropriate corrective relief.

The SAC contains no reference to Brady v. Maryland or any

allegations that Defendants had a duty to provide information to

Plaintiff pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. A Brady violation

occurs when the government suppresses material evidence,

including impeachment evidence, favorable to the accused. Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150, 154-155 (1972).

Defendants argue that removal of the action based on these

allegations of the SAC does not make the removal untimely. There

is no reference in the SAC to any federal statutes upon which the

claims for relief are based and no reference to the United States

Constitution. As Defendants note, anti-discrimination statutes

and constitutional provisions exist under California law as well

as federal law. Under the "well pleaded" complaint rule, absent

diversity of citizenship, a case is removable only where a

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's

complaint. Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil

Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 2:709. If the state court complaint

does not set forth the statutory basis for a particular claim

without specifying whether the right derives from state or

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At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that the initial Complaint 3

filed in state court alleged violations of federal civil rights.

The Complaint alleges intentional torts based on “perjury in court

documents,” “failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,” and

“malicious prosecution.” The section of the form where the

Plaintiff is required to check a box describing the basis of the

complaint contains a box for “civil rights”. Plaintiff did not

check that box. For the reasons stated above, the allegations in

the Complaint did not present a federal question on the face of the

Complaint. 

6

federal law, defendants are obliged to ascertain through

discovery or otherwise, whether plaintiff intends to proceed

under the alternative federal statute and, if so, may then

remove. Id. at ¶ 2:711. 

3

Plaintiff argues that the action was "improperly removed for

the purpose of delaying this case in Superior Court based on the

fact that Defendant's [sic] filed notice of removal on or about

the last day that their answer was due in Superior Court, and to

frustrate Plaintiff's choice of forum." 

Prejudice to the Plaintiff is not a ground for remand of an

otherwise properly removed action. Plaintiff cites no authority

that an action may be remanded merely because it was removed on

the last day available for removal. 

Plaintiff contends that this action was improperly removed

"without the joinder and consent of all individually named

Defendants who have been properly served with summons on June 27,

2007, before the receipt of service by mail of Defendant's Notice

of Removal, which was post-marked June 25, 2007, and not received

until June 27, 2005." 

The Notice of Removal was filed on June 21, 2007 and

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specifically asserts:

8. All named individual defendants are

employees of the County of Madera who are

sued in their capacities as employees of the

County of Madera, and no joinder of

defendants is necessary.

In all cases with multiple defendants, all defendants who

have been served must consent to the removal of a case to federal

court. Seraphin v. Parapella, 489 F.Supp.2d 1354 (S.D.Fla.2007). 

The well-settled exception to this rule is that a nominal

defendant need not join in or consent to removal. Id.

A defendant is a nominal party where his role is limited to that

of a stakeholder or depositary. Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798

F.2d 1230, 1232-1233 (9 Cir.1986). th

Plaintiff's motion to remand states that he did not serve

summons and the TAC on the following Doe Defendants until June

27, 2007: Department of Social Services; Amparo Williams; Susan

Arteaga; Allyson Cookson; Maria Cruz; Rae Hovertz; Beth Inman;

Bill Martin; Beverly Reyes; Veronica Reyes; Paige Sambueso;

Heather Sharp; and Hubert Walsh. Because none of these

defendants had been served when the Notice of Removal was filed,

their consent to joinder was not required. The Notice of Removal

purports to remove the state court action on the part of the Doe

Defendants. 

An issue arises whether the failure of Sandra Upton to

consent to the removal renders the removal defective. It is

arguable that the TAC names her as a defendant in both her

official and individual capacities. If Sandra Upton is also sued

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in her individual capacity, then she is not simply a stand-in for

the County of Madera, but a defendant in her own right, facing

potential liability for money damages. See Baldi v. Brown, 2007

WL 1229389 (D.N.H.2007). However, the prior pleadings filed in

the Madera County Superior Court demonstrate that Sandra Upton is

represented by the same attorneys who represent the County of

Madera, i.e., Madera County Counsel. In Getty Oil, Div. of

Texaco v. Ins. Co. of North America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11

(5 Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit noted: th

But while it may be true that consent to

removal is all that is required under section

1446, a defendant must do so itself. This

does not mean that each defendant must sign

the original petition for removal, but there

must be some timely written indication from

each served defendant, or from some person or

entity purporting to formally act on its

behalf in the respect and to have authority

to do so, that it has actually consented to

such action. Otherwise, there would be

nothing on the record to ‘bind’ the allegedly

consenting defendant. 

In Nixon v. Wheatley, 368 F.Supp.2d 635, 639 (E.D.Tex.2005), the

District Court held:

In the case at bar, Wheatley and George are

represented by the same counsel. In the

notice of removal, Defendants state that

‘both defendants file and join in this Notice

of Removal.’ Plaintiffs assert that

Defendants’ notice was defective because

neither Wheatley nor George signed the notice

of removal ‘or a separate form agreeing to

the notice of removal.’ Defendants, however,

need not have personally signed the notice of

removal. See Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at

1262 n. 11. It is sufficient that consent to

removal come ‘from some person purporting to

act formally on [the defendant’s] behalf and

with the authority to do so.’ Id. ... Here,

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9

Defendants’ counsel had the authority to

remove on their behalf and did so ... As a

consequence, the proper parties joined in the

notice of removal, and remand for lack of

consent is unfounded.

Because Defendant Sandra Upton is represented by Madera County

Counsel, her failure to formally join the Notice of Removal does

not negate the validity of the removal even if the TAC sues her

in her individual capacity.

Plaintiff asserts that remand is required because “[u]pon

joinder of the named Doe Defendants, this action is not removable

to Federal Court due to the fact that all parties joined and

served as Defendants are citizens of this state” and because the

Notice of Removal fails to plead that the amount in question is

within the jurisdictional limits.

Plaintiff’s contentions are without merit. The action was

not removed on the basis of diversity of citizenship, but on the

basis of a federal question. Jurisdiction on the basis of a

federal question does not require diversity of citizenship or a

base amount in controversy.

Plaintiff asserts that the Court should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “as the

majority of Plaintiff’s other claims substantially predominate

over the Discrimination and Brady Rule violation claims, which

were brought in Superior Court.”

Plaintiff’s position is without merit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)

provides:

Whenever a separate and independent claim or

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cause of action within the jurisdiction

conferred by section 1331 of this title

[federal question] is joined with one or more

otherwise non-removable claims or causes of

action, the entire case may be removed and

the district court may determine all issues

therein, or, in its discretion, may remand

all matters in which State law predominates.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

Except as provided in subsection[] ... (c) or

as expressly provided otherwise by Federal

statute, in any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction,

the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are

so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under

Article III of the United States Constitution

....

Section 1367(c) provides that the district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue

of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over

the claim or claims over which the district

court has original jurisdiction;

(3) the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction. 

As explained in Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Intern.

Inc., 344 F.3d 931, amended on other grounds, 350 F.3d 916 (9th

Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004):

[S]ection 1447(c) means that it if it is

discovered at any time in the litigation that

there is no federal jurisdiction, a removed

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case must be remanded to the state court

rather than dismissed. Section 1447(c) does

not mean that if a facially valid claim

giving rise to federal jurisdiction is

dismissed, then supplemental jurisdiction is

vitiated and the case must be remanded. Once

supplemental jurisdiction exists, it remains,

subject to the discretionary provision for

remand in section 1441.

Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

Defendants move to strike all allegations in the TAC which

refer to exhibits attached to the TAC. Defendants assert that,

because these exhibits are not actually attached to the TAC,

these allegations are not material and, therefore, subject to

being stricken under Rule 12(f), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Plaintiff responds that this aspect of the motion to strike

is not moot because Defendants were served the “exhibits of

evidence” specified in the TAC.

Defendants reply that this aspect of the motion to strike is

not moot:

As of June 21, 2007, the date of removal,

Defendants had not been served with any

exhibits by Plaintiff, the most recent

document to be filed with the notice of

removal was the Third Amended Complaint. If

Plaintiff had any exhibits, he waited to file

and serve them until after the notice of

removal was filed, and therefore Defendants

had no obligation to file them with the

District Court. As Plaintiff has not filed

the exhibits with the District Court, they

cannot be considered in ruling on the Motion

to Dismiss and Motion to Strike.

Resolution of this issue requires Plaintiff to file a Fourth

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Amended Complaint with the accompanying exhibits. The motion to

strike is DENIED AS MOOT. 

Defendants also move to strike as scandalous the

allegations in Paragraph 59 of the TAC. Paragraph 59 alleges:

59. Factual allegation. Plaintiff’s minor

child was taken away and placed in Foster

Care for 5 months and not returned to

Plaintiff father, the non-offending parent,

during the associated phases of the

Jurisdictional, Detention, Evidentiary, and

final Dispositional Hearings from January to

June of 2005. Plaintiff’s minor child

suffered in Foster care from separation

anxiety and other emotional distresses of

which he still mentions today. Plaintiff’s

minor child was then placed in full custody

of and with his non-Indian mother, who was

the offending child abuse suspect on

September 16, 2005. For over 15 months of

having Plaintiff’s minor child being taken

away as a ward of the court, and Plaintiff

being denied custody and at times denied

visitation, the MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES did not ask, inquire,

investigate, or explain the Indian Child

Welfare Act to Plaintiff father, who is part

Cherokee Indian and eligible through ancestry

possessing CDIB card [Certified Degree of

Indian Blood] and roll status, for enrollment

in several Federally recognized Cherokee

Indian tribes, although not currently

actively participating. Plaintiff’s minor

child is also eligible for this enrollment.

When this fact was brought to the court’s

attention on or about March of 206, the

Juvenile Court Judge and the County Counsel

Bill Smith made the most callus [sic] and

racially insensitive statements that it did

not matter that they hadn’t informed

Plaintiff of his Indian rights because they

never actually or really took the child away

from Plaintiff, the Indian father. The Judge

and Bill Smith claimed that their mistake had

only affected notification, and could not

undue anything that they had already

accomplished in the case, referring to

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against the Indian father Plaintiff. These

state officials and actors had no empathy or

decency and did not stop to realize how this

Indian father might feel having his son

completely removed from his life for over a

year and placed with the person who had

abused the Indian father’s son. This was

accomplished based on fraud, deceit, and

false allegations by state actors who had

already subjected Plaintiff, the Indian

father, to prejudice and discrimination. 

This Plaintiff Indian father can truly state

that it is no less painful or degrading to be

discriminated against for being Indian than

it is when being discriminated against for

being a father of the male gender.

This Plaintiff can attest to the fact that

many persons with Indian ancestry are not

actively involved with Government controlled

cultural heritage programs because in the

past, admitting Indian ancestry resulted in

being stripped of your rights and belongings,

being placed in government controlled areas,

and at times being killed, all by government

and state actors. It is a stigmatic stereotype [sic] that continues to discriminate as

much today. Defendants including County

Counsel and the Juvenile court Judge are

racially insensitive to this Plaintiff an

Plaintiff’s minor child.

Defendants argue that this allegation should be stricken as

scandalous because of the allegations that Madera County counsel

are racists who seek to destroy Native Americans and their

culture. See Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. 2, 4-5

(D.D.C.2003)(striking contention that counsel are racist because

they were “unsupported by evidence, constitute a form of

harassment, and are scandalous”). 

Plaintiff responds that “Defendant’s [sic] have not carried

their burden of proof to strike out statements in Plaintiff’s

Complaint [sic] that are relevant to establish a pattern of

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Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities is missing 4

page 4.

14

behavior by Defendants.” 

The motion to strike on this ground is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants move to dismiss the TAC for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4

1. Governing Standards.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). The court th

must construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in

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determining whether a claim has been stated. Ortez v. 

Washington County, State of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9 Cir. th

1996); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9 Cir. 1987). th

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto

v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). Immunities th

and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to

dismiss only when they are established on the face of the

complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

2. GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL.

Defendants assert ten separate grounds for dismissal of the

TAC:

1. The TAC does not comply with Rule

8(a)(2);

2. Defendants have no duty under the

Constitution to protect Plaintiff’s son from

Plaintiff’s ex-wife, whom Plaintiff alleges

inflicted injury on Plaintiff’s son;

3. Defendants have absolute immunity from

liability under Section 1983 for any injuries

allegedly caused by perjured testimony or

statements;

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4. Defendants have absolute immunity from

liability under Section 1983, as the role,

powers and discretion of a social worker or

deputy county counsel in instituting

juvenile-dependency proceedings under

California law are analogous to the role,

powers and discretion of a prosecutor in

determining whether to charge a person with

crime;

5. Defendants are immune under California

Government Code section 815.2(b) and 821.6

from liability for injuries resulting from

the institution or maintenance of judicial

proceedings against Plaintiff, including

juvenile dependency proceedings.

6. Defendants are immune under California

Government Code section 815.2(b) and 820.2

for injuries resulting from Defendants’

exercise of discretion in their capacities as

employees of the County of Madera charged

with investigating child abuse and protecting

children from abuse or neglect.

7. Defendants are immune under California

Government Code sections 818.2 and 821 for

injuries resulting from Defendants’ alleged

failure to enforce the law;

8. Defendants are immune under California

Government Code sections 818.2 and 820.4 for

injuries resulting from Defendants’

enforcement of the law.

9. Defendants are immune under California

Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.8 for

injuries proximately caused by the act or

omission of another person, to wit,

Plaintiff’s ex-wife.

10. Defendants are immune under California

Civil Code section 47(b) for statements made

as part of a judicial or official proceeding.

Plaintiff’s entire opposition to this motion is:

7. Plaintiff has stated claims upon which

relief can be granted.

8. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint was

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drafted for State Court, not envisioning

compliance with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

9. Defendants do not enjoy absolute immunity

from liability.

3. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 8(a)(2).

Rule 81(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:

These rules apply to civil actions removed to

the United States district courts from the

state courts and govern procedure after

removal. Repleading is not necessary unless

the court so orders.

Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires

that a pleading set forth a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Under Rule

8(a)(2), a pleading must give fair notice and state the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). A th

complaint that is verbose, conclusory and confusing does not

comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.,

651 F.2d 671, 674 (9 Cir. 1981). However, before a district th

court’s dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend will be

affirmed, the district court must have first adopted less drastic

alternatives, such as advising plaintiff of the deficiencies in

the pleading and giving leave to amend to correct them. Id.

The TAC does not comply with Rule 8(a)(2). The TAC is 101

pages long (and that does not include the exhibits which

Plaintiff failed to attach) and contains 268 paragraphs of

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allegations. The TAC is confusing, unnecessarily verbose and

repetitive, and contains citations to California civil and

criminal statutes. It violates Rule 8(a)(2)’s mandate that any

claim be set forth in a short and plain statement. Pursuant to

Rule 8(a)(2), evidentiary documents should not be attached to the

pleading unless those documents are necessary to the statement of

a claim.

The motion to dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF OR

PLAINTIFF’S SON.

The TAC alleges that when Plaintiff’s son became the victim

of sexual abuse by the child’s mother, the County and its

employees brought a proceeding against Plaintiff to remove the

child from Plaintiff’s custody and place the child with the

mother, which resulted in additional sexual abuse, and that

Plaintiff’s civil rights were violated by Defendants’ failure to

protect the child and Plaintiff. 

Defendants, citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of

Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), argue that these

allegations and claims based on them should be dismissed because

there was no duty on Defendants under the Constitution to protect

the Plaintiff or his child from the mother.

In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that “a State’s failure

to protect an individual against private violence simply does not

constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” 489 U.S. at

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197. The Supreme Court reasoned:

[N]othing in the language of the Due Process

Clause itself requires the State to protect

the life, liberty, and property of its

citizens against invasion by private actors. 

The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the

State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of

certain minimal levels of safety and

security. It forbids the State itself to

deprive individuals of life, liberty, or

property without ‘due process of law,’ but

its language cannot fairly be extended to

impose an affirmative obligation on the State

to ensure that those interests do not come to

harm through other means.

Id. at 195. As explained in Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d

634 (9 Cir.2007): th

The general rule announced in DeShaney that

members of the public have no constitutional

right to sue state actors who fail to protect

them from harm inflicted by third parties ‘is

modified by two exceptions: (1) the “special

relationship” exception; and (2) the “danger

created exception.” 

The special relationship exception arises when the government

enters into a special relationship with a party, such as taking

the party into custody or placing him into involuntary

hospitalization. The danger created exception arises when

affirmative conduct on the part of the state places a party in

danger he otherwise would not have been in. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974

F.2d 119, 121 (9 Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). th

Because of the exceptions to DeShaney may raise an issue of

fact before the legal issue of duty may be resolved and because

Plaintiff will be required to file a Fourth Amended Complaint,

this ground for dismissal is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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5. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.

Defendants move to dismiss the constitutional claims in the

TAC on the ground that they have absolute immunity from liability

under Section 1983 for any injuries allegedly caused by perjured

testimony or statements made in the state court proceedings

concerning custody of the minor child.

In Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 812

F.2d 1154, 1157 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987), th

the Ninth Circuit held:

[S]ocial workers are entitled to absolute

immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial

functions connected with the initiation and

pursuit of child dependency proceedings.

See also Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 826 (9 Cir.2003), cert. th

denied, 542 U.S. 904 (2004):

The Does contend that Herrera both failed to

investigate possible exculpatory evidence and

fabricated evidence in the dependency

petitions she submitted to the dependency

court. Herrera, however, engaged in these

actions as part of her initiation and pursuit

of child dependency proceedings - she filed 

a dependency petition in state court on

November 4, 1999, and dependency proceedings

were held on November 5, 1999. Herrera’s

actions therefore had the ‘requisite

connection to the judicial process’ to be

protected by absolute immunity. Miller, 335

F.3d at 896.

Indeed, in Meyers v. Contra Costa County

Department of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154,

1157 (9 Cir.1987), we recognized that th

‘social workers are entitled to absolute

immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial

functions connected with the initiation and

pursuit of child dependency proceedings.’ 

See also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416, 431 & n.34

... (holding that prosecutors are entitled to

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absolute immunity ‘in initiating a

prosecution and in presenting the State’s

case,’ even where the prosecutor willfully

used perjured testimony and willfully

suppressed exculpatory information at trial);

Miller, 335 F.3d at 898; Mabe, 237 F.3d at

1109 (holding, where there are allegations

that social workers did not conduct their

investigation properly and submitted false

evidence during juvenile court proceedings,

that the social workers were entitled to

absolute immunity because their actions were

part of the initiation and pursuit of

dependency proceedings).

See also Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dept. of Soc. Serv., 237

F.3d 1101, 1109 (9 Cir.2001): th

Moreover, social workers ‘enjoy absolute,

quasi-judicial immunity when making postadjudication custody decisions pursuant to a

valid court order.’ Babcock b. Tyler, 884

F.2d 497, 503 (9 Cir.1989)(holding social th

workers entitled to absolute immunity from a

claim that they erred in placing minor

dependents in foster home where the minors

were later sexually abused).

Defendants assert that the allegations in the TAC are that

Defendants improperly investigated Plaintiff on suspicion of

child abuse, brought false charges of kidnapping and child abuse

against him, and provided false evidence in state court

dependency proceedings while failing to investigate claims that

the mother of the child was alleging sexually abusing the child. 

These allegations, Defendants argue, fall squarely within the

case authority cited above and entitle the County employees to

absolute immunity.

Plaintiff has alleged no facts other than that the County

social workers were proceeding in a quasi-prosecutorial function.

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The motion to dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND.

6. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY UNDER STATE LAW.

Direct tort liability of public entities under state law 

must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable,

or at least creating some specific duty of care. Munoz v. City

of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1112-1113 (2004).

Defendants, citing Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit

Dist., 40 Cal.App.3d 780, 795 (1985), move to dismiss the TAC on

the ground that Plaintiff “has to follow the general rule that

statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity and

show every fact essential to the existence of statutory

liability.” Citing Keyes v. Santa Clara Water Dist., 128

Cal.App.3d 882, 885 (1982), Defendants move to dismiss the TAC

because “Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that the

causes of action lie outside the breadth of any statutory

immunity to avoid a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim.

Pleading in federal court is governed by federal pleading

rules. Rule 8(a)(2) only requires notice pleading. Therefore,

this ground for dismissal of the TAC is DENIED.

7. IMMUNITY UNDER LITIGATION PRIVILEGE OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL CODE § 47(b).

Defendants assert that all of Plaintiff’s causes of action

allege, either separately or by incorporation of other causes of

action, that the County’s social workers and deputy county

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counsel made misleading or defamatory statements about Plaintiff

in court proceedings or in communications with law enforcement

agencies and the attorneys for the minor child and for the

mother.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to dismissal of

these claims pursuant to California Civil Code § 47(b). 

Section 47(b) bars a civil action for damages based on

statements made in any judicial proceeding, in any official

proceeding authorized by law, or in the initiation or course of

any mandate-reviewable proceedings authorized by law. The

litigation privilege provided in Section 47(b) applies to any

communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;

(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to

achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some

connection or logical relation to the action. A.F. Brown Elec.

Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec., 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126

(2006). Section 47(b) establishes an absolute privilege for such

statements and bars all tort causes of action based on them

except a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Hagberg v.

California Federal Bank, 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 (2004). “‘Section

47 gives all persons the right to report crimes to the police,

the local prosecutor or an appropriate regulatory agency, even if

the report is made in bad faith.’” Hagberg, id. at 365. “‘[A]

communication concerning possible wrongdoing, made to an official

governmental agency such as a local police department, and which

communication is designed to prompt action by that entity is as

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much a part of an “official proceeding” as a communication made

after an official investigation has commenced ... After all,

‘[t]he policy underlying the privilege is to assure utmost

freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities

whose responsibility it is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.’

... The importance of providing to citizens free and open access

to governmental agencies for the reporting of suspected criminal

activity outweighs the occasional harm that might befall a

defamed individual. Thus the absolute privilege is essential.”’” 

Id. at 364-365. Section 47(b)’s absolute privilege applies to

“communications intended to instigate official investigation into

[suspected] wrongdoing.” Id. at 369. Statements made to prompt

an official investigation that may result in the initiation of

judicial proceedings also fall within the privilege set forth in

Section 47(b). Id. at 361-36.

Defendants assert that all of the allegedly damaging

statements were made by social workers or deputy county counsel

in the course and context of initiating or maintaining the

underlying juvenile dependency case involving Plaintiff’s son,

including the preparation of reports and presentation of witness

testimony. Defendants contend that the statements were made to

achieve the underlying objectives of the litigation, i.e., the

investigation of alleged harm to Plaintiff’s son and the taking

of the child into protective care at a foster home while the

County’s social workers investigated the clashing claims of

Plaintiff and the mother that accused each other of harming the

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child. Therefore, Defendants argue, they are entitled to

dismissal of these claims based on Section 47(b).

Defendants are correct that all statements made as any part

of the litigation process are absolutely privileged. The motion

to dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

8. STATE IMMUNITY FROM CLAIMS BASED ON FAILING TO

ENFORCE THE LAW.

Plaintiff alleges in the TAC that the County’s social

workers were negligent by failing to investigate or report child

abuse allegedly committed by the child’s mother.

California Government Code § 818.2 provides that “[a] public

entity is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing

to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law.” 

California Government Code § 821 provides that “[a] public

employee is not liable for an injury caused by his adoption or

for failure to adopt an enactment or by his failure to enforce an

enactment. In defining law enforcement for purposes of these

sections, California courts hold that “‘to enforce a law normally

means to compel obedience to the law by actual force, such as

involuntary detention, arrest or punishment ....’” Ronald S. v.

County of San Diego, 16 Cal.App.4th 887, 896 (1993), quoting

Clemente v. State of California, 101 Cal.App.3d 374, 378 (1980). 

Ronald S. held:

Insofar as Ronald’s claim of negligence

related to his release to his parents after

the several police detentions, we believe

section 818.2 immunity would be applicable. 

Such release involved use of the County’s

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coercive power over Ronald and the Mundys,

and hence the decision to return Ronald would

come, we believe, within the definition of

‘law enforcement.’ 

Id.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims of injury resulting

from his son being removed for his home, placement in foster

care, and then placement in the mother’s home is subject to these

immunities because of the use of the County’s coercive power over

Plaintiff and his son to remove the child and place him with

persons other than Plaintiff, even if those persons are alleged

or proven to be abusive.

The motion to dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND.

9. STATE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY REGARDING ENFORCEMENT

OF CHILD ABUSE LAWS.

Defendants argue that the County and its employees are

immune from liability under California Government Code §§ 820.4

and 815.2(b) for injury allegedly caused by the employees’ acts

or omissions in the execution or enforcement of laws regarding

child abuse.

California Government Code § 820.4 provides:

A public employee is not liable for his act

or omission, exercising due care, in the

execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing

in this section exonerates a public employee

from liability for false arrest or false

imprisonment.

California Government Code § 815.2(b) provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

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public entity is not liable for an injury

resulting from an act or omission of an

employee of the public entity where the

employee is immune from liability.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations against the

County employees, and particularly against Defendant Sandra

Upton, claim that Upton was abusing her discretion as a social

worker for the County when investigating the juvenile dependency

case involving Plaintiff’s son by allegedly falsifying reports,

among other things, and that Upton acted in the course and scope

of her employment when doing so. Citing Miller v. Hoagland, 247

Cal.App.2d 57 (1966), Defendants assert that when a public

employee acting within the course and scope of his or her

employment makes reports or statements as part of the execution

or enforcement of law is protected by these immunities. 

Defendants assert that Defendant Upton was acting within the

course and scope of carrying out her duties under the California

Welfare and Institutions Code as a County social worker charged

with conducting investigations of suspected child abuse and

preparing a plan for family reunification and maintenance.

In Miller, the City Attorney wrote a letter to the judge in

a pending public nuisance abatement suit which was alleged by

Miller to have misrepresented facts with fraudulent intent. When

Miller filed suit against the attorney, the Court of Appeals held

in pertinent part:

Even though Miller, as a pleader, used such

words as malice and maliciously, the

protection of immunity is not destroyed

thought the mere use of terms such as those

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contained in the amended complaint. The 1963

California Tort Claims Act extends immunity

to public employees even if discretion is

abused by them, and even if their act is

malicious and without probable cause, or is

an intentional tort. (See Gov.Code §§ 820.2,

821., 822.2, 820.4, 820.6 and 820.8; Tietz v.

Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 238

Cal.App.2d 905, 911-912.)

The motion to dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND.

10. STATE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY

ALLEGED MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s allegations that

County employees committed abuse of process by instituting or

maintaining the juvenile dependency proceedings on the ground of

state immunity.

California Government Code § 821.6 provides that “[a] public

employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the

scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.” This immunity applies the employee’s agency

and to the County. Cal.Gov.Code § 815.2(b). 

Defendants cite Jenkins v. County of Orange, 212 Cal.App.3d

278, 284 (1989):

[B]arrington has immunity for her

investigation of the child abuse reports

pursuant to her statutory duty; she did so

‘within the scope of [her] employment ....’

(§ 821.6.) Barrington is also immune from

suit for allegedly failing and refusing to

consider all of the evidence and thereby

misrepresenting information to the juvenile

court. Weighing and presenting evidence are

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prosecutorial functions. As such, these acts

are within the ambit of ‘instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative

proceeding with the scope of [Barrington’s]

employment ....’ (§ 821.6).

See also Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869,

883 (1990); Citizens Capital Corp. v. Spohn, 133 Cal.App.3d 887,

889 (1982)(“[I]mmunity [under § 821.6], even from wrongfully

motivated action, is granted as a matter of public policy, to

avoid the risk of public officers avoiding their public duty for

fear of the burden of trial and risk of its outcome.”). 

The motion to dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND.

11. STATE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR ACTS OR

OMISSIONS RESULTING FROM EXERCISE OF DISCRETION.

The TAC alleges that Defendants have substantial discretion

to investigate and respond to abuse and to determine a child’s

placement and that Defendants abused that discretion by selective

reporting of incidents and injuries in the course of

investigating suspected child abuse. 

Defendants move to dismiss these allegations on the ground

of immunity pursuant to California Government Code § 820.2.

Section 820.2 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided

by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury

resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was

the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion be abused.”

The immunity set forth in Section 820.2 applies to claims of

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negligent and intentional conduct alleged in connection with a

child abuse investigation, Alicia T., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at

882-883, as well as to decisions concerning the ultimate

placement of a dependent child, see County of Los Angeles v.

Superior Court, 102 Cal.App.4th 627, 644-646 (2002); Ronald S.,

supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at 897-899.

These immunities bar suit against County employees who

exercised and performed discretionary acts. The motion to

dismiss on this ground is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

12. STATE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURY

PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY PERSON NOT A COUNTY EMPLOYEE.

Defendants move to dismiss the TAC pursuant to California

Government Code § 820.8:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

public employee is not liable for an injury

caused by the act or omission of another

person. Nothing in this section exonerates a

public employee from liability for injury

proximately caused by his own negligent or

wrongful act or omission.

Relying on Section 820.8, Defendants argue that they are

entitled to dismissal of the TAC:

The underlying premise of the Third Amended

Complaint is that the mother of Plaintiff’s

son sexually abused Plaintiff’s son on

several occasions, and that Plaintiff’s

mental and physical anguish is the result of

the sexual abuse and the County’s handling of

the abuse through the juvenile dependency

judicial process. If not for the alleged

sexual abuse by the mother, the County and

its employees would not have investigated and

commenced the case, and thus Plaintiff would

not have been injured by the County and its

employees, as there would have been no

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judicial proceedings instituted by the County

that would have injured Plaintiff’s rights.

Because the alleged sexual abuse by the

child’s mother is the entire premise upon

which the juvenile dependency case, and hence

this case, arose, then any injuries by

Plaintiff were caused by the act of another

person who was not an employee or agent of

the County.

This ground for dismissal raises questions of fact more

properly resolved at summary judgment or trial. The motion on

this ground is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART AND

GRANTED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

3. Counsel for Defendants shall prepare and lodge a form of

Order within 5 days of the filing date of this Memorandum

Decision;

3. Plaintiff shall file a Fourth Amended Complaint in

compliance with the rulings herein within 30 days of the filing

date of the Order. Failure to timely comply will result in the

dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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