Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02489/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02489-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
LaRoe Haney
Appellee
Vinnie Payton Hoover
Appellant
Gina Manders
Appellant
State of Oklahoma
Appellee

Document Text:

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

,niteo jtates Qfourt of J\ppeafs 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

June 15, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: Nos. 87-2005, 87-2045, 87-2489 

Manders v. State of Oklahoma 

Filed May 4, 1989, by Judge Earl E. O'Connor 

Attached is a corrected cover page which should be 

substituted for the cover page of the opinion filed May 4, 

1989, in the captioned cases. The new cover page reflects 

that Robert H. Henry was on the brief with Sue Wycoff. 

RLH:oac 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TELEPHONE 

(303 > 844·3157 

<FTS) 564·3157 

Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GINA MANDERS and ) 

VINNIE PAYTON HOOVER, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, EX REL ) 

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH ) 

and EASTERN STATE HOSPITAL, ) 

and LAROE HANEY' ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Fil,ED United States Court ot Appeals 'ft\nt.h r,ire11it 

MAYO 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 87-2005, 

87-2045, 

and 

87-2489 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA . (D.C. ~Nos. 86-C-436 and 437-B). 

·Steven R. Hickman of Frasier & Frasier, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Karen A. Pepper Mueller (Joel L. Carson with her on the brief) of 

Carson, Rayburn, Pierce & Mueller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellees Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and 

Eastern State Hospital. 

Sue Wycoff, Assistant Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, 

(Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, with her on the brief), 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee LaRoe Haney. 

Before ANDERSON and' BRORBY, circu"it Judges,· and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.* 

O'CONNOR, District Judge 

*Honorable Ear 1 E. o 'Connor, Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation . 

. .: . ..... ,••, 

Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 2 
,nite~ jtates Qfourt of J\ppeafo 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK May 16, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: Nos. 87-2005, 87-2045, 87-2489 

Manders v. State of Oklahoma 

Filed May 4, 1989 by Judge Earl E. O'Connor 

On May 4, 1989, the court filed its opinion in the 

captioned cases. Because of clerical error, the cover 

page on that opinion referred to cases 87-2005 and 87-2045, 

but omitted reference to case 87-2489. 

Attached is a corrected cover page showing all three 

cases. Please substitute the corrected cover page for the 

cover page on the opinion filed May 4, 1989. 

Sincerely, 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·315'1 

(FTSJ 564·3157 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

Enclosure 

RLH:tl 

Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 3 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GINA MANDERS and ) 

VINNIE PAYTON HOOVER, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, EX REL ) 

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH ) 

and EASTERN STATE HOSPITAL, ) 

and LAROE HANEY, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Fll,ED UniU!d Stat.ea Court ot Appeals 'r"nth r,ir1mit 

MAYO 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 87-2005, 

87-2045, 

and 

87-2489 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. 86-C-436 and 437-B) 

Steven R. Hickman of Frasier & Frasier, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Karen A. Pepper Mueller (Joel L. Carson with her on the brief) of 

Carson, Rayburn, Pierce & Mueller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellees Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and 

Eastern state Hospital. 

Sue Wycoff, Assistant Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee LaRoe Haney. 

Before ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.* 

O'CONNOR, District Judge 

*Honorable Ear 1 E. O'Connor, Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation., 

Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 4 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GINA MANDERS and ) 

VINNIE PAYTON HOOVER, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, EX REL ) 

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH ) 

and EASTERN STATE HOSPITAL, ) 

and LAROE HANEY, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAYO 41989 

ROBER'I' L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 87-2005 

and 

87-2045 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. 86-C-436 and 437-B) 

Steven R. Hickman of Frasier & Frasier, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Karen A. Pepper Mueller (Joel L. Carson with her on the brief) of 

Carson, Rayburn, Pierce & Mueller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellees Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and 

Eastern State Hospital. 

Sue Wycoff, Assistant Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, 

(Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, with her on the brief) 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee LaRoe Haney. 

Before ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.* 

O'CONNOR, District Judge 

. *Honorable Ear 1 E. O 'Conn9r, .Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 5 
I 

( Plaintiffs, Gina Manders.and Vinnie Payton Hoover, brought 

t t . 1 separa e ac ions in the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma against LaRoe Haney ( their supervisor), Eastern State Hospital (their place of employment), and 

the Department of Mental Health of the State of Oklahoma, claiming 

money damages for sexual harassment by Haney. Plaintiffs also 

sought recovery, of their attorneys' fees under section 706 ( k) of 

Title VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(k), for services performed at an 

administrative grievance procedure. 

Plaintiffs have appealed and seek reversal of three district court rulings: (1) the grant of summary judgment to defendant Haney in his individual capacity on plaintiffs' section 1983 

claims; (2) the dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds of plaintiffs' Title 

VII sexual harassment claim as to all defendants; and (3) the dismissal on 12(b) (6) grounds of plaintiffs' request for attorneys' 

fees. For the reasons discussed below, the district court's 

decisions will be affirmed. 

Summary Judgment -- Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims 

Defendant Haney, in his individual capac~ty, moved for 

summary judgment, claiming among other things, that plaintiffs' 

section 1983 claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute 

of limitations. Plaintiffs filed their action May 5, 1986. 

Therefore, under the two-year statute of limitations, the conduct 

complained of must have occurred after May 5, 1984. 

1 The court consolidated plaintiffs' separate actions by order 

dated June 9, 1986. · 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 6 
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary 

judgment. Hydro Conduit Corp. v. American-First Title · & Trust 

Co., 808 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1986). In considering a party's 

motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barber 

v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272, 1276 n.l (10th Cir. 1981). 

summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a ma t t e r of 1 aw • " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under 

this rule, the initial burden is on the moving party to show the 

court "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

325 (1986). The moving party's burden may be met when that party 

identifies those portions of the record which demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

Once the moving party has met these requirements, the 

burden shifts to the party resisting the motion. The nonmoving 

party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 

of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322; see 

also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 

The party resisting the motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings" to avoid summary judgment. 

Anderson., 477 U.S. at 248. The mere existence of a scintilla of 

evidence will not avoid summary judgment; there must be sufficient 

evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving 

·party. Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement Company v. Munson, 81 U.S. 

(14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872)). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 7 
A review of the record reveals that plaintiffs failed. to 

offer evidence of any conduct by defendant Haney after May 5, 

1984, which indicated a continuation of his alleged sexual 

harassment. Plaintiffs conceded that Haney's sexual advances 

ended before May 5, 1984, but argued that Haney continued to 

sexually harass them after May 5, 1984, by acting "vengefully" in 

~esponse to their rebuffs. Essentially, plaintiffs contended 

that defendant Haney's "vengefulness" was a continuation of his 

ear 1 ie r sexua 1 harassment because it was intended to punish the 

plaintiffs for not acquiescing to his sexual advances. Plaintiffs 

relied on the following statement to respond to defendant Haney's 

motion for summary judgment: 

Defendant's attitude toward the plaintiffs changed and 

he became vengeful and harassed them in just the opposite 

way. Plaintiffs submit that such negative actions in the 

face of unrequited love are just as sexually motivated as 

the fondling. As the two attitudes of Defendant Haney 

are interconnected and causally related, Defendant Haney 

should be held just as 1 iable for his negative at tacks 

as he would for his forward ones. These negative acts 

occurred up to the filing of the grievance in September, 

1984, and the statute of limitations does not bar this 

action. 

We agree with the district court's conclusion that the above 

statement is insufficient to defeat defendant Haney's motion for 

summary judgment under the Celotex and Anderson standards. Other 

than bald allegations of "vengefulness," plaintiffs offered no 

evidence to indicate that defendant Haney continued his alleged 

sexual harassment after May 5, 1984; that is, plaintiffs offered 

no evidence of specific acts by defendant Haney within the two 

years preceding the filing of the complaints. Thus, the district 

·court correctly granted defendant Haney's motion for summary 

judgment on· statute of 1 i mi tat i on s grounds . 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 8 
I 

( 

Dismissal of Title VII Sexual Harassment Claims 

Defendants moved for dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII 

sexual harassment claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The district court granted defendants' motion, finding 

that the plaintiffs pled causes of action only for recovery of 

attorneys' fees under Title VII. In reviewing a dismissal for 

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, we take 

the well-pleaded allegations of the complaints as true. Martinez 

v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 433 (10th Cir. 1985), vacated on other 

grounds, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986). "[A) complaint should not be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond 

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 

his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

Even a liberal reading of plaintiffs' original and amended 

complaints cannot support a Title VII sexual harassment claim. 

Plaintiffs' allegations state that they seek compensatory damages 

for emotional pain, assault, and battery. Since it is a wellestablished rule that Title VI I pro vi des for equitable remedies 

and not compensatory ones, plaintiffs' remedy requests belie a 

Title VII claim. See, e.g., Pea·rson v. Western Electric Co., 542 

F.2d 1150, 1151 (10th Cir. 1976), Additionally, plaintiffs did 

not contend that their complaints asserted a Title VII sexual 

harassment claim until after the trial court issued an order 

limiting plaintiffs' claims to section 1983 sexual harassment 

claims against defendant Haney in his individual capacity.. The 

··district court correctly disallowed plaintiffs' belated attempts 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 9 
to imbue into their Title VII claims for attqrneys' fees sexual 

harassment claims which had not been properly pled. Therefore, 

plaintiffs' Title VII sexual harassment claims were properly dismissed on Rule 12(b)(6) grou~ds. 

Attorneys' Fees 

The State of Oklahoma, pursuant to statute, provides a 

grievance procedure for its state employees. 74 o.s. § 841.9. 

The Department of Mental Health, an arm of the state, had complied 

with this statute and had an established grievance procedure in 

place for its employees. Plaintiffs followed this grievance 

procedure to seek relief from their supervisor's alleged sexual 

harassment. After several days of hearings in October 1984, the 

Superintendent of Eastern State Hospital found insufficient evidence of sexual harassment and denied plaintiffs' request for 

defendant Haney's termination. However, the Superintendent demated and transferred Haney for mismanagement and misconduct. 2 

In May 1986, after filing a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), plaintiffs filed their actions in 

federal court. Plaintiffs' complaints requested an award of 

attorneys' fees in the amount of $6,500 for the services rendered 

during the internal grievance procedure. 

The issue presented by plaintiffs' appeal of the trial 

court's dismissal of the claim for attorneys' fees is whether 

2 Defendant Haney filed a grievance of his own with 

Oklahoma Ethics and Merits Commission, which resulted in 

.Commission vacating the order demo~ing and transferring him. 

- 6 -

the 

the 

Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 10 
section 706(k) of Title .VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(k), supports an 

award ·of attorneys' fees · for services rendered in an optional 

internal grievance procedure. We agree with the di strict court 

and hold that the statute does not support such an award. 

Section 706(k) 

under this title 

the prevailing party • 

the costs " 

provides: "In any action or proceeding 

• the court, in its di sere tion, may al low 

•. a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 

To come within the statute, the internal 

grievance procedure pursued by plaintiffs must be an "action or 

proceeding." The supreme Court recently interpreted the meaning 

of the words "action or proceeding" in New York Gaslight Club, 

Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), holding that the actions or 

proceedings contemplated by section 706(k) are those required or 

mandated procedures to which complainants must resort prior to 

bringing a Title VII action in the district court. Id. at 62. 

Stated another way, the proceedings for which attorneys' fees are 

allowed under section 706(k) are those which are an integral part 

of the Title VII scheme. 

Under the Title VII scheme, initial resort to state and 

local remedies is mandated. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(c); Carey, 447 

U.S. at 65. Section 2000e-5(c) has resulted in the development 

of a referral and deferral system: "[w]hen a charge is filed 

with the EEOC prior to exhaustion of state or local remedies, the 

Commission refers the complaint to the appropriate local agency." 

Carey, 447 U.S. at 64. The local agencies to which the EEOC 

refers and defers charges are called "706 Agencies." 29 C.F.R. 

-§ 1601. 70(a) (1988). The 706 Agency in Oklahoma is the Oklahoma 

Human Rights Commission. Id. § 1601.74(a). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 11 
Reading Title VII!s attorneys' fee provision in conjunction 

with the referral/deferral scheme briefly outlined above, the 

Carey Court concluded that section 706 ( k) allows "an award of 

attorney's fees for work done by the prevailing complainant in 

state proceedings to which the complainant was referred pursuant 

to the provisions of Title VII[,]" Carey, 447 U.S. at 71, i.e., 

those proceedings which are a prerequisite to a court action. 

Id. at 73 (J. Stevens, concurring). 

The internal grievance procedure provided by the state of 

Oklahoma for its Department of Mental Health employees is not an 

"action or proceeding" as defined in Carey. 3 The grievance 

procedure is optional. Whether employees pursue the internal 

grievance procedure or not, they at all times have the right to 

file their cases with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission, Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission or the Ethics and Merit commission. Thus, the procedure is an enforcement mechanism additional 

to, not a precondition of, Title VI I enforcement, and is not an 

integral part of the Title VII scheme. See Meritor Savings Bank, 

FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (implicit in the Court's 

3 As far as the court can determine, only one circuit court has 

chosen to expand section 706 ( k) to include attorneys' fees for 

procedures not manda tea by Title VI I. In Chrapl i wy v. Uni royal, 

Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 

TI"9"8"3), the Seventh Circuit, on rather unusual facts, concluded 

that "section 706(k) should be interpreted as allowing attorneys' 

fees to the prevailing plaintiffs for services which contribute 

to the ultimate termination of the Title VII action." The 

Chrapliwy case did not concern an internal grievance procedure 

like the one at issue: instead, it concerned a debarment proceeding pursuant to an Executive Order. Additionally, the Title VII 

action was well under· way when the plaintiffs sought relief 

_through the alternate debarment procedure~ Therefore, it is distinguishable on its facts from the case at bar. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 12 
conclusion that complaipant's failure to invoke an employer's 

grievance procedure does not insulate the employer from Title VII 

liability is that optional internal grievance procedures are not 

required or mandated proceedings to which complainants must resort before pursuing a Title VII action in court). Because the 

internal grievance procedure was not a prerequisite to the plaintiffs' filing a Title VII action, the procedure does not fall 

within section 706(k)'s "action or proceeding" language and 

attorneys' fees for services during the grievance procedure are 

not available. 

By so holding, we remain true to Carey's reasoning and to 

a public policy of encouraging employers to provide informal 

resolutions to discrimination in the work environment. The Carey 

Court reasoned that to effectuate Congress' purpose in enacting 

section 706(k) making it easier for a plaintiff of limited 

means to bring a meritorious suit attorneys' fees must be 

available to compensate counsels' efforts in required administrative proceedings to prevent plaintiffs from being deterred from 

pursuing meritorious claims by the prospect of having to pay 

fees. Carey, 447 U.S. at 63; Webb v. County Board of Education 

of Dyer County, Tenn., 715 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 

471 U.S. 234 (1985) (§ 1988 case). Plaintiffs could have filed 

their charges with the Oklahoma Human Rights Cammi ssion without 

resorting to the internal grievance procedure; consequently, they 

would not have been deterred from asserting their federal rights 

had they known that attorneys' fees would be unavailable for the 

· services performed in connection with the optional proceedings. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 13 
( 

Thus, the probl~m faced ~y Title VII litigants that section 706(k) 

was designed to solve is not present here. 

Finally, allowing recovery of attorneys' lees in optional 

internal grievance procedures would tend to discourage private 

employers, as well as public employers like the defendants in this 

case, from instituting such potentially ameliorative procedures. 

such a result is avoided by following the Court's definitive construction of section 706(k) in Carey. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2489 Document: 01019957833 Date Filed: 05/04/1989 Page: 14