Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-11666/USCOURTS-ca11-23-11666-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diangilo Antuan Bell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11666

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus

DIANGILO ANTUAN BELL, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00017-TCB-RGV-2

____________________

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 1 of 14
2 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Diangilo Bell appeals his conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. After review, we 

affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

Bell asserts the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his 2014 drug arrest and convictions under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b) because the risk of prejudice from such 

evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. He also 

contends the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was not sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find he constructively possessed methamphetamine, as opposed to merely being present near the drugs. Finally, 

he asserts the district court clearly erred in attributing 2,980 grams 

of actual methamphetamine to him, resulting in a base offense 

level of 36, based on evidence presented at trial when the jury did 

not make findings as to the drug purity and quantity. 

A. Rule 404(b)

Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible as 

proof of the defendant’s character to show he acted in accordance 

with his character on a particular occasion. Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such evidence may be admissible to 

prove, among other things, intent, knowledge, and absence of 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 2 of 14
23-11666 Opinion of the Court 3

mistake. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible under Rule 

404(b), the evidence must be “(1) relevant to one of the enumerated issues other than the defendant’s character, (2) supported by 

sufficient evidence to allow a jury to determine that the defendant 

committed the act, and (3) not unduly prejudicial under the standard set forth in Rule 403.” United States v. Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d 409, 

417 (11th Cir. 2016). Specifically, “[e]vidence of prior drug dealings 

is highly probative of intent to distribute a controlled substance.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

The district court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, a 

danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The strength of the 

government’s case is a key consideration when evaluating the probative value of evidence of other acts because such evidence is only 

relevant if it tends to prove a material fact still at issue and is unnecessary if the other evidence is strong enough that the material 

fact is no longer at issue. United States v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 926 

(11th Cir. 1991). Therefore, Rule 404(b) evidence must “actually 

be necessary to establish the material element” to be admissible. 

Id. Exclusion under Rule 403 is “an extraordinary remedy to be 

used sparingly.” Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d at 417. In determining 

whether Rule 404(b) evidence was unduly prejudicial, we consider 

whether the defendant’s intent was at issue, the overall similarity 

of the charged and extrinsic offenses, and the temporal proximity 

between the charged and extrinsic offenses. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007).

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 3 of 14
4 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

evidence of Bell’s 2014 convictions under Rule 404(b). See United 

States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1091 (11th Cir. 2009) (reviewing a 

district court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for an 

abuse of discretion). The district court admitted the evidence not 

to show Bell acted in accordance with a propensity toward criminality, but for the specific, admissible reasons of showing Bell acted 

knowingly, with intent, and not out of mistake. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(b)(1), (2); Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d at 417. And the probative 

value of the prior convictions was not substantially outweighed by 

a danger of unfair prejudice because Bell’s intent was at issue, his 

prior convictions were similar in nature to the charged offense, and 

the court issued limiting instructions to mitigate any prejudicial effect. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d at 417; Edouard, 

485 F.3d at 1346 (stating a district court can mitigate any unfair 

prejudice possibly caused by the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence 

by issuing a limiting instruction on the use of that evidence).

First, Bell’s prior convictions were probative of his 

knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake in possessing the drugs with 

intent to distribute. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Bell argues his prior 

convictions were not probative of whether he committed the 

charged offense because those convictions involved cocaine and 

marijuana as opposed to methamphetamine. However, Bell’s 

prior convictions need not be identical to be probative. See United 

States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 238 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A prior crime 

need not be factually identical in order for it to be probative.”). 

Furthermore, the prior convictions were similar in a salient way—

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 4 of 14
23-11666 Opinion of the Court 5

they involved identical intent to the charged offense, intent to possess and distribute a controlled substance. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 

1345. By pleading not guilty, Bell put his intent at issue, and evidence of prior drug trafficking was highly probative of his intent 

toward drug distribution. Bell also put his lack of mistake at issue 

by arguing he was merely present near the backpack, with no evidence he knew about the methamphetamine. Evidence of his prior 

drug-trafficking convictions tended to show he would appreciate 

the implications of transporting a sealed backpack full of three kilograms of unknown cargo or, if he opened the backpack, recognize 

the methamphetamine and the kilogram packaging typical of drug 

trafficking. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d at 417.

Moreover, although Bell argued his prior convictions were

too remote to have any probative value as to the instant offense, 

the district court correctly noted we have not adopted a bright-line 

rule as to when a conviction is too remote to be admissible but instead weigh the remoteness of the prior offenses and the similarity 

between the prior offenses and the instant offense in its discretion 

to determine admissibility. See United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 

1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to adopt a bright-line rule regarding temporal proximity between the extrinsic act and the 

charged offense and affording district courts broad discretion to 

determine whether an offense is too remote to be probative). Bell’s 

instant drug offense was only five years after the prior convictions 

and the offense was the same, possession with intent to distribute 

a controlled substance, even if the controlled substance differed. 

See United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1995) 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 5 of 14
6 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

(holding an intervening period of 15 years did not render extrinsic 

evidence of small-scale marijuana convictions inadmissible despite 

the convictions’ “differing nature and remoteness in time” from 

the defendant’s charged participation in a large-scale cocaine deal); 

see also Sterling, 738 F.3d at 239 (affirming admission of a 15-yearold prior crime). Additionally, Bell was incarcerated during most 

of the intervening five years and committed the instant offense less 

than a year after being released into supervision, so there was no 

significant period in which he was released from prison and not engaged in criminality. See Sterling, 738 F.3d at 238 (“[T]he prior 

crime need not be very recent, especially where a substantial portion of the gap in time occurred while the defendant was incarcerated.”). 

Second, the danger of undue prejudice to Bell did not substantially outweigh the probative value of evidence of his prior convictions. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The district court limited the risk 

of prejudice to Bell by issuing limiting instructions to the jury prior 

to deliberation. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1346. The court stated 

that evidence of Bell’s prior convictions could only be considered 

for the limited purposes of determining whether Bell had the 

knowledge and intent to possess the methamphetamine with intent to distribute it and did not have the methamphetamine in his 

car by mistake, and not for the purpose of deciding whether he was 

once again dealing drugs. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 6 of 14
23-11666 Opinion of the Court 7

The court may enter a judgment of acquittal at the close of 

the government’s evidence or at the close of all evidence, either 

upon the defendant’s motion or sua sponte, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The test for 

sufficiency of evidence is the same regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, with no distinction in the weight 

given to each. United States v. Guevara, 894 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th 

Cir. 2018). But where “the government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, not mere speculation, must support 

the conviction.” United States v. Mendez, 528 F.3d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 

2008). 

To convict a defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government must establish three elements: (1) possession of a controlled substance, (2) knowledge of that possession, and (3) intent 

to distribute the controlled substance. United States v. Woodard, 531 

F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008). Each of these elements may be 

proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Capers, 

708 F.3d 1286, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). Intent to distribute may be 

inferred from a large quantity of drugs seized. United States v. 

Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1123 (11th Cir. 2002). “Possession may be 

actual or constructive.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 

(11th Cir. 2004).

A defendant constructively possesses a substance if he has 

ownership or dominion and control over the substance or the 

premises where it is concealed. Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1360. However, mere presence where a controlled substance is discovered or 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 7 of 14
8 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

proximity to a controlled substance are not enough to establish actual or constructive possession. Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 

1080 (11th Cir. 2003). There must exist “some nexus” between the 

defendant and the controlled substance to sustain a finding of possession. Id. Thus, mere presence in a car containing contraband 

cannot sustain a conviction. United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 

1320 (11th Cir. 1994). To constructively possess a controlled substance, a defendant must know of both its existence and his power 

or right to exercise dominion and control over it. United States v. 

Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1104 (11th Cir. 2019). 

The district court did not err in denying Bell’s Rule 29 motion because, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bell knowingly possessed the methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See United States v. Clay, 832 

F.3d 1259, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining “[w]e will not overturn 

a jury’s verdict if there is any reasonable construction of the evidence that would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation marks omitted)); United 

States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating we will 

uphold the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that 

the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 

1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015) (reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence and the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 de 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 8 of 14
23-11666 Opinion of the Court 9

novo). While Bell’s mere presence near the methamphetamine was 

insufficient to show possession with intent to distribute the drugs, 

a reasonable jury could have found, from the totality of the evidence presented, that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine in the backpack and intended to traffic it. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1); Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1360. 

First, the Government presented sufficient evidence to find 

Bell knew of the methamphetamine. See Woodard, 531 F.3d at 

1360. Bell’s knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. See Stanley, 24 F.3d at 1320-21 (explaining knowledge may 

be inferred from evidence of surrounding circumstances). A reasonable jury could find it was unlikely a drug trafficker would entrust over $20,000 worth of methamphetamine to Bell alone if Bell 

did not at least know about the drugs. See United States v. QuilcaCarpio, 118 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A reasonable jury could 

infer from the quantity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is 

not likely to entrust such valuable cargo to an innocent person 

without that person’s knowledge.”). A reasonable jury could also 

determine Bell’s behavior as described by Hastings—including his 

abrupt lane changes, movements as if to flee on foot, and efforts to 

divert Hastings’ attention to the marijuana—showed consciousness of guilt. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable 

jury to infer Bell had knowledge of the methamphetamine.

Second, the Government presented sufficient evidence to 

find Bell constructively possessed the methamphetamine. See 

Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1360. Bell owned the vehicle where the 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 9 of 14
10 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

methamphetamine was discovered and was the driver and sole occupant. Bell’s ownership and control over the vehicle was a 

“nexus” to the methamphetamine discovered there. See Holmes, 

321 F.3d at 1080; Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1360. Additionally, the backpack was uncovered on the floorboard of the passenger’s seat, accessible to Bell in the driver’s seat. See Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1104. Bell 

was not merely present, but controlled the vehicle, which was the 

premises where the methamphetamine was discovered, and had 

access to the backpack. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Bell had constructive possession of the methamphetamine. 

Third, the Government presented sufficient evidence to find 

Bell intended to distribute the methamphetamine. See Woodard, 

531 F.3d at 1360. As discussed above, Bell’s prior drug trafficking 

convictions were probative of his intent to distribute controlled 

substances. See Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d at 417. A reasonable jury 

could also infer intent to distribute the methamphetamine because 

the quantity discovered, about three kilograms, exceeded the 

amounts typical of personal use. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1123. Additionally, the methamphetamine recovered from the backpack 

was packaged into three plastic bags containing almost exactly one 

kilogram, a typical unit for drug trafficking. Finally, a reasonable 

jury could find the presence of the marijuana and the scale suggested that Bell was generally involved in drug trafficking. Thus, 

the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that Bell 

intended to distribute the methamphetamine. 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 10 of 14
23-11666 Opinion of the Court 11

The Government produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bell possessed 

the methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s denial of Bell’s Rule 29 motion. 

C. Drug Quantity

The government must establish the drug quantity attributable to the defendant at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 506 (11th Cir. 2014). 

The court’s estimate of drug quantity for sentencing purposes must 

be fair, accurate, and conservative and cannot be based on mere 

speculation. Id. It may base its drug quantity determination on, 

among other things, trial testimony and documentary evidence admitted at trial. See id. at 506-07 (testimony); United States v. Ifediba, 

46 F.4th 1225, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 2022) (documentary evidence), 

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2586 (2023). The sentencing court may consider any information with sufficient indicia of reliability. See 

U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). 

Under § 2D1.1(a)(5), a defendant’s base offense level for drug 

possession with intent to distribute is determined by the drug quantity at issue in the defendant’s conduct. Id. § 2D1.1(a)(5). The Drug 

Quantity Table in § 2D1.1(c) provides the base offense level is 36 if 

the offense involved at least 15 kilograms but less than 45 kilograms 

of methamphetamine, or at least 1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of actual methamphetamine. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(2). The base 

offense level is 30 if the offense involved at least 500 grams but less 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 11 of 14
12 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

than 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine, or at least 50 grams but 

less than 150 grams of actual methamphetamine. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(5). 

The district court did not err in finding the methamphetamine recovered from Bell’s vehicle was 99 percent pure, yielding 

almost 2,980 grams of actual methamphetamine, and imposing a 

base offense level of 36 accordingly. See Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506 (reviewing for clear error the district court’s determination of drug 

quantity at sentencing); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 824, 829 

(11th Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v. 

Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (reviewing a preserved constitutional challenge to a sentence de novo). First, although Bell argues that, as an extension of Apprendi1 and Alleyne,2

the drug quantity attributable to him should have been determined 

by a jury because it affected his Guidelines range and sentence, that 

is not the holding of those cases. In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court clarified that enhancing a defendant’s advisoryGuidelines range based on judicial findings of fact made by a preponderance of the evidence—as the district court did in enhancing Bell’s 

Guidelines range based on its determination of drug quantity—

does not violate the Sixth Amendment. 543 U.S. 220, 233, 243-44 

(2005). Apprendi and Alleyne mandate a jury finding only as to factual determinations that alter the statutory minimum and maximum penalties for an offense, not facts that merely impact the advisory sentencing range. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Alleyne, 570 

1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

2 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 12 of 14
23-11666 Opinion of the Court 13

U.S. at 115-16. The district court had the authority to enhance 

Bell’s sentence based on its drug quantity determination, without 

a jury finding, because that determination did not increase his sentence beyond the statutory maximum penalty authorized by the 

conviction. See United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 854 (11th Cir. 

2007) (explaining a district court may enhance a sentence based on 

its judicial fact findings, so long as it recognizes the Guidelines are 

advisory and its findings do not increase the sentence beyond the 

statutory maximum authorized by the offense).

Second, the district court did not clearly err in determining

the drug quantity attributable to Bell by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506. It based its findings as to the 

purity of the methamphetamine, and therefore the quantity of actual methamphetamine, on the specific and reliable report and testimony of expert witness Jonathan Liu and not on mere speculation. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506. Thus, although Bell contends the appropriate base offense level in calculating his Guidelines range was 30 because the jury found only that 

he possessed at least 500 grams of methamphetamine mixture, the 

reliable evidence of Liu’s report and testimony supports a base offense level of 36 because the 3 kilograms of methamphetamine 

mixture yielded close to 2,980 grams of actual methamphetamine. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(2), (c)(5); Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506-07; 

Ifediba, 46 F.4th at 1246-47. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue. 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 13 of 14
14 Opinion of the Court 23-11666

II. CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

evidence of Bell’s prior drug-trafficking convictions because such 

evidence was probative of his knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake in the instant drug offense and the prejudicial effect was mitigated by the court’s limiting instruction to the jury. The district 

court also did not err in denying Bell’s motion for a judgment of 

acquittal because the Government presented sufficient evidence 

for a reasonable jury to infer that Bell knew of and intended to traffic the methamphetamine in the backpack discovered in his vehicle. Finally, the district court did not err in determining the drug 

quantity attributable to Bell at sentencing because even though its 

finding affected Bell’s advisory Guidelines range, it did not alter the 

statutory minimum and maximum penalties for his offense. Accordingly, we affirm Bell’s conviction and sentence. 

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 23-11666 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025 Page: 14 of 14