Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04332/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04332-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shawn Hatton
Respondent
Mario Torres
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO TORRES,

Petitioner,

v.

SHAWN HATTON,

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-04332-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY 

AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING 

CASE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 17

Petitioner, a state prisoner, filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The original petition was dismissed with leave to amend. The court 

noted that the petition was quite confusing and several of petitioner’s claims were not 

proper federal habeas claims. It was also not clear what claims had been exhausted. 

Petitioner filed an amended motion for a stay, but failed to file an amended petition. The 

motion to stay was dismissed with leave to amend because petitioner failed to present 

any arguments. Petitioner has filed a second amended petition and a second amended 

motion to stay.

BACKGROUND

It appears that after petitioner’s conviction was reversed by the California Court of 

Appeal, petitioner pled guilty to several counts on February 5, 2015. It does not appear 

that he filed a direct appeal of his conviction. Petitioner did file more than twenty state 

habeas petitions and writs of mandate. A few of the petitions were to the California 

Supreme Court, though it is not clear what claims were presented to that court. 

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DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet 

heightened pleading requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An 

application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody 

pursuant to a judgment of a state court must “specify all the grounds for relief available to 

the petitioner ... [and] state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the 

petition is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” 

Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 

1970)).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Petitioner seeks a stay pursuant to the three-step procedure outlined in Kelly v. 

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) and King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009).1 

A petitioner seeking to avail himself of the Kelly three-step procedure is not required to 

show good cause, as under Rhines, but rather must show that the amendment of any 

newly exhausted claims back into the petition satisfies both Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 

655 (2005), by sharing a “common core of operative facts” and Duncan v. Walker, 533 

U.S. 167 (2001), by complying with the statute of limitations. King, 564 F.3d at 1141-43 

(finding district court’s dismissal of unexhausted claims was improper because petitioner 

was not required to show good cause to avail himself of the Kelly three-part procedure 

 

1

“Pursuant to the Kelly procedure, (1) a petitioner amends his petition to delete any 

unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully 

exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to 

exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and reattaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d at 

1134 (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71).

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but affirming the dismissal as harmless because the unexhausted claims did not relate 

back to the claims in the original petition that were fully exhausted at the time of filing). 

Petitioner has filed a second amended petition containing what he contends is an 

exhausted claim that he is actually innocent. He seeks to exhaust the following claims: 

(1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the plea; (2) that his plea 

agreement was not fulfilled; (3) that he was denied counsel; and (4) that his sentence is 

illegal.

Petitioner’s request for a stay pursuant to Kelly is denied. Petitioner has not 

presented any arguments that his new claims he seeks to exhaust share a “common core 

of operative facts” with the exhausted claim or that he has complied with the statute of 

limitations. However, in light of petitioner’s pro se status and after a review of his petition, 

the court finds that petitioner has demonstrated good cause for a stay under Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). In Rhines, the United States Supreme Court found that a 

stay and abeyance of a mixed federal petition should be available only in the limited 

circumstance that good cause is shown for a failure to have first exhausted the claims in 

state court, that the claim or claims at issue potentially have merit and that there has 

been no indication that petitioner has been intentionally dilatory in pursuing the litigation. 

Rhines, supra, at 277-78. Liberally construing the motion, petitioner has shown good 

cause for his failure to exhaust the claims before filing this action, the claims do not 

appear patently meritless, and there do not appear to be any intentionally dilatory 

litigation tactics by petitioner. 

This case will be stayed for petitioner to exhaust the remaining claims.2 Petitioner 

is informed that before he may challenge either the fact or length of his confinement in a 

habeas petition in this court, he must present to the California Supreme Court any claims 

 

2 Even if petitioner has not exhausted any claims the case may still be stayed. A district 

court has the discretion to stay a petition containing only unexhausted claims under the 

circumstances set forth in Rhines. Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 2016). 

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he wishes to raise in this court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding 

every claim raised in federal habeas petition must be exhausted). 

With respect to the claims in the petition, petitioner is informed that a defendant 

who pleads guilty cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings independent claims 

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty. 

See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty plea forecloses consideration 

of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 

(1973) (same); United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012) (by 

pleading guilty defendant waived right to challenge pre-plea violation of Speedy Trial 

Act).

The only challenges left open in federal habeas corpus after a guilty plea is the 

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to 

plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. A defendant 

who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 

character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. “[W]hen a 

plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that 

it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 

fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Cuero v. Cate, 827 F.3d 

879, 882-83, 891 (9th Cir. 2016) (granting habeas where state trial court erroneously 

allowed prosecutor to amend the complaint to allege an additional prior strike after plea 

agreement had already been entered and accepted by the court).

In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the Court assumed without 

deciding that "in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' 

made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant 

federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." 

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. The Court has declined to answer the question left open in 

Herrera and hold that freestanding actual innocence claims (i.e., claims in which the 

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petitioner argues that the evidence sufficiently establishes his innocence, irrespective of 

any constitutional error at trial or sentencing) are possible. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 

518, 554-55 (2006). 

After Herrera, the Ninth Circuit initially found that there could be no habeas relief 

based solely on a petitioner's actual innocence of the crime in a noncapital case. See 

Coley v. Gonzalez, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995). But it has held since that it is “still 

an open question” whether federal habeas relief is available based on a freestanding 

claim of actual innocence. Taylor v. Beard, 811 F.3d 326, 334 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013)).

Petitioner may raise all of these claims in state court, but only cognizable federal 

claims will continue in this court once they have been properly exhausted.

CONCLUSION

1. Petitioner’s motion for a stay (Docket No. 17) is GRANTED and this case is 

STAYED to allow petitioner to present his unexhausted claims in state court. The motion 

to file an oversized habeas petition (Docket No. 15) is GRANTED. If petitioner is not 

granted relief in state court, he may return to this court and ask that the stay be lifted. 

2. The stay is subject to the following conditions: 

(1) Petitioner must diligently pursue his state court habeas proceedings; and 

(2) Petitioner must notify this court within thirty days after the state courts have 

completed their review of his claim or after they have refused review of his claims. 

If either condition of the stay is not satisfied, this court may vacate the stay and act 

on this petition. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (district court must effectuate timeliness 

concerns of AEDPA by placing “reasonable limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and 

back.”).

The Clerk shall administratively close this case. The closure has no legal effect; it 

is purely a statistical matter. The case will be reopened and the stay vacated upon 

notification by petitioner in accordance with section (2) above.

3. Petitioner must keep the court informed of any change of address and must 

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comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the 

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b). See Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 

41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2018

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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