Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00095/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00095-20/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sherwana Lynn Marcus
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

MIRIAM R. HINMAN 

Assistant United States Attorney 

501 I Street, Suite 10-100 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Telephone: (916) 554-2700 

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SHERWANA LYNN MARCUS, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-00095 TLN 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

DATE: November 12, 2020 

TIME: 9:30 a.m. 

COURT: Hon. Troy L. Nunley 

This case is set for a status conference on November 12, 2020. On April 17, 2020, this Court 

issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled 

to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date 

after June 1. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which extends the restrictions of 

General Order 617 and allows district judges to continue criminal matters until further notice. These 

and previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

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judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable— General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

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 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

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STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 12, 2020, and time was 

excluded through that date. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until 

December 3, 2020, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between November 12, 2020, and December 3, 

2020, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) On August 23, 2019, the government produced over 13,000 pages of discovery to 

defense counsel, after entry of the parties’ stipulated protective order on August 9, 2019. 

Between September 2019 and March 2020, the government produced over 1500 pages of 

additional discovery. 

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery, meet with the 

defendant, and conduct additional investigation. The protective order in this case bars the 

defendant from possessing certain discovery. As a result, defense counsel needs to meet with the 

defendant to go over certain discovery. Defense counsel has been in the process of reviewing 

discovery and consulting with her client, but counsel wishes to be able to conduct additional inperson meetings with her client. Defense counsel is also currently working on investigation and 

requires more time to complete that investigation. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence. 

d) The government does not object to the continuance. 

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 617, and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because defense counsel wishes to meet in person with her client and conduct additional 

in-person investigation. Counsel has been encouraged by the Federal Defender’s Office and by 

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the proclamations of state and local government officials to minimize personal contact to the 

greatest extent possible. Minimizing personal contact during the pandemic has been important to 

protect the health of counsel, the defendant, and the public, but it has delayed counsel’s ability to 

conduct investigation and review certain discovery with the defendant. 

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 12, 2020 to December 

3, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local 

Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on 

the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: November 10, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ MIRIAM R. HINMAN 

 MIRIAM R. HINMAN 

Assistant United States Attorney 

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Dated: November 10, 2020 /s/ HANNAH LABAREE 

HANNAH LABAREE 

Counsel for Defendant 

Sherwana Lynn Marcus 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 2020. 

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