Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30066/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30066-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge Armando Cisneros
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JORGE ARMANDO CISNEROS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30066

D.C. No.

1:11-cr-30051-PA-1

OPINION

On Remand From the United States Supreme Court

Filed June 22, 2016

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Sandra S. Ikuta, and N. Randy

Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

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2 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the panel vacated a

sentence and remanded for resentencing without application

of the 15-year mandatory minimum prison term required by

the Armed Career Criminal Act where a defendant has three

previous convictions that qualify as a “violent felony” or

“serious drug offense.”

The defendant conceded that his conviction for

conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance under Oregon

Revised Statutes sections 161.450 and 475.752 is a serious

drug offense under United States v. Parry, 479 F.3d 722 (9th

Cir. 2007). The panel rejected the defendant’s argument that

Parry was wrongly decided, and noted that a three-judge

panel may not overrule a prior decision of the court. The

panel agreed with the government’s concession that the

defendant’s convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude a

police officer under Oregon Revised Statutes section

811.540(1) are not serious drug offenses or violent felonies.

The panel held that the defendant’s burglary convictions

under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.225 do not qualify

as violent felonies because the Oregon statute defines

“building” more broadly than does generic burglary and the

building element of section 164.225 is indivisible.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 3

COUNSEL

Brian C. Butler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal

Public Defender’s Office, Medford, Oregon, for DefendantAppellant.

Douglas W. Fong, Assistant United States Attorney; Kelly A.

Zusman, Appellate Chief; Billy J. Williams, United States

Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, Medford,

Oregon; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Jorge Armando Cisneros appeals the district court’s

decision to sentence him to a mandatory-minimum sentence

of fifteen years in prison under the Armed Career Criminal

Act (“ACCA”). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Cisneros does

not have “three previous convictions” that qualify as “a

violent felony or a serious drug offense” under ACCA. Id. 

Accordingly, we vacate Cisneros’s sentence and remand to

the district court for resentencing.

I.

Under ACCA, a defendant convicted of violating

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) faces a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum

sentence if he “has three previous convictions . . . for a

violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.” Id.

§ 922(e)(1). ACCA defines “serious drug offense” as

follows:

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4 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances

Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled

Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.

951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46, for

which a maximum term of imprisonment of

ten years or more is prescribed by law; or

(ii) an offense under State law, involving

manufacturing, distributing, or possessing

with intent to manufacture or distribute, a

controlled substance (as defined in section

102 of the Controlled Substances Act

(21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term

of imprisonment of ten years or more is

prescribed by law[.]

Id. § 924(e)(2)(A). ACCA also defines “violent felony”:

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year, or any act of

juvenile delinquency involving the use or

carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive

device that would be punishable by

imprisonment for such term if committed by

an adult, that–

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the

person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or]

involves use of explosives[.]

Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 5

At the time the district court sentenced Cisneros, a prior

conviction also qualified as a violent felony if it “otherwise

involve[d] conduct that presented a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We

previously relied on this “residual clause” to affirm

Cisneros’s sentence. See United States v. Cisneros, 763 F.3d

1236 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the Supreme Court

subsequently invalidated ACCA’s residual clause, reasoning

that it violated “the Constitution’s prohibition of vague

criminal laws.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,

2555–57 (2015). Therefore, we must determine whether, in

the absence of ACCA’s residual clause, at least three of

Cisneros’s previous convictions nonetheless qualify as

predicate offenses.

II.

On November 26, 2012, Cisneros pleaded guilty to being

a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). The government sought to enhance Cisneros’s

sentence under ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The

government based its proposed sentence enhancement on six

of Cisneros’s prior convictions: one conviction for conspiracy

to deliver a controlled substance, see Or. Rev. Stat.

§§ 161.450, 475.752, three convictions for fleeing or

attempting to elude a police officer, see id. § 811.540(1), and

two convictions for first-degree burglary, see id. § 164.225. 

The district court held that all six of Cisneros’s prior

convictions qualified as ACCA predicate offenses and

sentenced Cisneros to the mandatory-minimum sentence of

fifteen years in prison.

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6 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

III.

We review de novo whether Cisneros’s prior convictions

qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA. United States v.

Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997). We must

determine whether at least three of Cisneros’s previous

convictions are either serious drug offenses or violent

felonies under ACCA.

IV.

We would first address Cisneros’s conviction for

conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance under Oregon

Revised Statutes sections 161.450 and 475.752. However,

Cisneros concedes that this prior conviction is a serious drug

offense under United States v. Parry, 479 F.3d 722, 724–25

(9th Cir. 2007).1

We next review Cisneros’s three convictions for fleeing

or attempting to elude a police officer under Oregon Revised

Statutes section 811.540(1). The government concedes that

these prior convictions are not serious drug offenses or

violent felonies. We agree. These prior convictions are not

serious drug offenses under § 922(e)(2)(A). Further, they are

not violent felonies—they did not have “as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” see

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and are not one of the enumerated offenses

listed in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1 We reject Cisneros’s argument that Parry was wrongly decided;

further, as a “three-judge panel[, we] may not overrule a prior decision of

the court.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc).

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 7

V.

Accordingly, in order for ACCA’s mandatory-minimum

sentence to apply to Cisneros, both of his previous

convictions for first-degree burglary under Oregon Revised

Statutes section 164.2252 must qualify as either serious drug

offenses or violent felonies. It is evident that such

convictions do not qualify as serious drug offenses under

§ 922(e)(2)(A). Further, they do not have “as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” See

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

Therefore, we must determine whether Cisneros’s

convictions for first-degree burglary qualify as violent

felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—i.e. whether a conviction

for first-degree burglary under Oregon law is a categorical

match to generic burglary under federal law. In order to do

so, we apply the three-step process set forth in Descamps v.

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013):

At the first step, we compare the elements of

the state offense to the elements of the generic

offense defined by federal law. If this

“categorical approach” reveals that the

elements of the state crime are the same as or

narrower than the elements of the federal

offense, then the state crime is a categorical

2 Section 164.225 provides in relevant part: “A person commits the

crime of burglary in the first degree if the person violates ORS 164.215

[the second degree burglary statute] and the building is a dwelling.”

Section 164.215 provides: “[A] person commits the crime of burglary

in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a

building with intent to commit a crime therein.”

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8 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

match and every conviction under that statute

qualifies as an aggravated felony. When a

statute is “overbroad,” meaning that it

criminalizes conduct that goes beyond the

elements of the federal offense, we turn to

step two: determining whether the statute is

“divisible” or “indivisible.” If the statute is

indivisible, “our inquiry ends, because a

conviction under an indivisible, overbroad

statute can neverserve as a predicate offense.” 

Onlywhen a statute is overbroad and divisible

do we turn to step three—the “modified

categorical approach.” At this step, we may

examine certain documents from the

defendant’s record of conviction to determine

what elements of the divisible statute he was

convicted of violating.

Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 867–68 (9th Cir.

2015) (internal citations omitted) (citing Descamps, 133

S. Ct. at 2293).

A. Step One: Oregon’s Burglary Statute is Overbroad.

The first step is to “compare the elements of the crime of

conviction . . . with the elements of the generic crime.” 

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. We have previously

determined that Oregon’s first-degree burglary statute is not

a “categorical match” to generic burglary. In United States

v. Grisel, we recognized that “Oregon defines second-degree

burglary more broadly than the ACCA,” because “[t]he text

of the statute expressly includes in its definition that which

the Supreme Court expressly excluded from the generic,

federal definition.” 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 9

banc). In United States v. Mayer, we confirmed that Oregon

defines first-degree burglary more broadly as well. 560 F.3d

948, 959 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Oregon Revised Statutes section

164.225 is therefore broader than the definition of generic

burglary because the statute does not limit burglary to

‘building[s] or structure[s],’ but also includes non-structures

(such as booths, vehicles, boats, and aircraft) that are

regularly or intermittently used as lodgings.” (alterations in

original)).

Confirming our prior analysis, Cisneros was convicted of

first-degree burglary under Oregon Revised Statutes section

164.225. Under such law, a person commits first-degree

burglary if he “enters or remains unlawfully in a building

with intent to commit a crime therein,” Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 164.215, “and the building is a dwelling,” Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 164.225. Oregon defines “building” to include “in addition

to its ordinary meaning . . . any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft

or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation of

persons or for carrying on business therein.” Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 164.205(1). Oregon defines “dwelling” as “a building

which regularly or intermittently is occupied by a person

lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually

present.” Id. § 164.205(2).

Similar to Oregon’s burglary statute, generic burglary has

“the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or

remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a

crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). 

However, the “building or structure” element of generic

burglary does not include booths, vehicles, boats, or aircrafts. 

See id. (“A few States’ burglary statutes . . . define burglary

more broadly . . . by including places, such as automobiles

and vending machines, other than buildings.”).

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10 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

Accordingly, Oregon’s burglary statute is not a

categorical match to generic burglary, because the Oregon

statute defines building more broadly than does generic

burglary and therefore criminalizes more conduct than

generic burglary.

B. Step Two: Oregon’s Burglary Statute is Indivisible.

Step two requires us to determine whether Oregon

Revised Statutes section 164.225 has “multiple, alternative

elements, and so effectively creates ‘several different . . .

crimes.’” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (quoting Nijhawan

v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)). If the statute has

alternative elements, “it is divisible and we continue to step

three—the modified categorical approach.” Almanza-Arenas

v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 476 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

However, if the statute “has a ‘single, indivisible set of

elements’ with different means of committing one crime, then

it is indivisible and we end our inquiry, concluding that there

is no categorical match to the generic federal offense.” Id. at

476–77 (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286).

The first step of our divisibility inquiry “begins with the

text of the statute of conviction.” Id. at 477 (citing

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818 (1999)). The

text of Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.225 presents

three elements: (1) a person enters or remains unlawfully;

(2) a building that is a dwelling; and (3) the person had the

intent to commit a crime at the time of entering or remaining

unlawfully. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.215, 164.225. 

Cisneros first argues that the second element of section

164.225 is indivisible, because the alternative definitions of

building represent different means of committing the same

offense. We agree. Although Oregon Revised Statutes

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 11

section 164.205(1) uses disjunctive phrasing to define

building—“any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other

structure”—here “the use of ‘or’ does not create additional

elements.” Almanza-Arenas, 815 F.3d at 478. “Rather, the

disjunctive phrasing creates different means of committing

the one offense.” Id. The text of the statute does not suggest

that a trier of fact must specify which alternative applies for

any given conviction.

We next look to “confirm this statutory interpretation by

first examining the Shepard documents to see whether the

statute displays alternative elements instead of alternative

means of committing the same crime.” Id. at 478 (citing

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2); see generally Shepard v.

United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). The indictments for both

of Cisneros’s burglary convictions state that he was accused

of “Burglary in the First Degree.” Similarly, the plea

colloquies both state that Cisneros pleaded guilty to

“Burglary in the First Degree.”3 Neither the indictments nor

3 Cisneros’s indictments and plea colloquies further describe the

underlying facts of the crimes and explain that, on both occasions,

Cisneros entered a dwelling located at a specific address. In United States

v. Snyder, we applied the modified categorical approach (without first

conducting a divisibility analysis) to Oregon’s second-degree burglary

statute and determined that the use of “the term ‘building’ together with

a street address provided adequate proof . . . that the defendant was

convicted of the entering or remaining in a ‘building’ . . . as is meant in

the generic definition of burglary.” 643 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 2011). 

We concluded that “[b]ecause the facts admitted constitute generic

burglary, that alone is enough for it to be a predicate crime under ACCA.” 

Id. at 697. However, our decision in Snyder predates Descamps, where

the Supreme Court concluded that the modified categorical approach only

applies if a statute is divisible. 133 S. Ct. at 2282. As explained herein,

Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.225 is not divisible. “The modified

approach thus has no role to play in this case.” Id. at 2285.

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12 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

the plea colloquies show “that [a] jury necessarily had to find

an entry of a building [in its ordinary meaning] to convict.” 

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.

Finally, “we must verify that our interpretation of

elements versus means is consistent with how [Oregon]

would instruct a jury as to this offense.” Almanza-Arenas,

815 F.3d at 479. Oregon’s pattern criminal jury instructions

make clear that Oregon law treats the disjunctive phrasing in

the definition of “building” as the means of committing the

offense and not separate elements. Oregon Uniform Criminal

JuryInstruction No. 1901 provides the appropriate instruction

for persons who are charged with violating Oregon Revised

Statutes section 164.225:

Oregon law provides that a person commits

the crime of burglary in the first degree if the

person enters or remains unlawfully in a

dwelling with the intent to commit a crime

therein.

In this case, to establish the crime of burglary

in the first degree, the state must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt the following

elements:

(1) The act occurred on or about

___________, 20___;

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 13

(2) [Defendant’s name] entered or remained

unlawfully in the premises described in the

charge

[4]

;

(3) The premises described in the charge is a

dwelling; and

(4) At the time of entering or remaining

unlawfully, [defendant’s name] had the intent

to commit the crime of _________ therein.

Under this instruction, a jury is not required to specify which

alternate type of building applies.

Oregon federal district courts have likewise concluded

that Oregon’s burglary statutes are not divisible. See, e.g.,

United States v. Mayer, —F. Supp. 3d—, 2016 WL 520967,

at *8 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2016) (concluding that Oregon’s firstdegree burglary statute is not divisible because the definition

of building does not provide for alternative elements); United

States v. Bayya, No. 3:13-cr-00558-HZ, 2015 WL 8751795,

at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2015) (“‘[B]uilding’ is a single element

of first-degree burglary and does not encompass separate,

4 Under Oregon law, there is no evidence that an indictment must

specify whether the dwelling at issue was a building (in the ordinary

sense) rather than a booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure. 

Indeed, the comments to Oregon Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction No.

1901 refer generally to the statutory definition of “dwelling” and

“building.” In contrast, the comments explain that for the intent element

of burglary, an indictment must specify the crime a defendant intended to

commit at the time of the unlawful entry. See also State v. Sanders,

572 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Or. 1977) (concluding that an indictment must

“specify[] the intent which the defendant is charged with having at the

time of the breaking and entering”).

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14 UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS

alternative crimes . . . there is no indication that the

legislature intended to require juror unanimity about the type

of building into which a defendant unlawfully entered or

remained before finding him guilty of burglary.”); United

States v. Snyder, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1263 (D. Or. 2014)

(“The text of the Oregon burglary statute indicates that

‘building’ is a single element.”).

VI.

Cisneros also argues that, aside from the “building”

element, the “enters or remains unlawfully” element is

indivisible. We have already concluded that the “building”

element of Oregon’s first-degree burglary statute is

indivisible. Thus, whether the “enters or remains unlawfully”

element is also indivisible is irrelevant to our analysis. Even

if we were to assume that “enters or remains unlawfully”

creates two separate crimes, a conviction under Oregon’s

first-degree burglary statute could never be a categorical

match to generic burglary because of the “building” element. 

Accordingly, we need not determine whether the enters or

remains unlawfully element is divisible.

VII.

Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.225 is not divisible. 

“This conclusion ends our inquiry; we need not proceed to

step three.” Almanza-Arenas, 815 F.3d at 482. Cisneros’s

burglary convictions are not a categorical match to generic

burglary, because the Oregon statute is overbroad and

indivisible. Therefore, such convictions do not qualify as

violent felonies under § 922(e)(2)(B) and ACCA’s mandatory

minimum sentence is not applicable to Cisneros.

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UNITED STATES V. CISNEROS 15

Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence and REMAND

to the district court for resentencing without applying the

ACCA enhancement.

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