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Parties Involved:
Rosemary Arbuckle Anderman
Appellant
JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association
Appellee
Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PLLC
Appellee
Carolyn Arbuckle Platt
Appellant
Marilyn Arbuckle Scheidt
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-13734

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01034-WFJ-CPT

ROSEMARY ARBUCKLE ANDERMAN, 

CAROLYN ARBUCKLE PLATT, 

MARILYN ARBUCKLE SCHEIDT, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

 versus

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

PHELAN HALLINAN DIAMOND & JONES, PLLC, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(February 11, 2020)

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiffs—Rosemary Arbuckle Anderman, Carolyn Arbuckle Platt, and 

Marilyn Arbuckle Scheidt—appeal the dismissal of their complaint, filed on behalf 

of themselves and a putative class. The plaintiffs alleged that JP Morgan Chase 

Bank and its law firm, Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PLLC, violated the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act by naming them in a state-court foreclosure action

relating to their deceased brother’s home. The district court dismissed the 

plaintiffs’ complaint, deciding that Chase was not a “debt collector” within the 

meaning of the FDCPA and that the conduct alleged in the complaint was not 

actionable under the FDCPA. We agree with the district court and affirm. 

I

The parties are familiar with the facts, so we state them only briefly here. 

The plaintiffs are the sisters and heirs of Clinton Arbuckle, who passed away in 

2012 while in default on his mortgage. The promissory note and the mortgage 

both identify Chase as the lender and Clinton Arbuckle as the borrower. Chase

foreclosed on the mortgage and, in an amended state-court complaint (filed by its 

lawyers at Phelan), stated that the full amount was payable. All of the plaintiffs

here—Anderman, Platt, and Scheidt—were listed as foreclosure defendants. 

Chase’s complaint alleged that each of the plaintiffs “may have or claim an interest 

in the property that is subject to this foreclosure action by virtue of being a possible 

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heir” of Clinton Arbuckle and that any such interest “is subordinate in time and 

inferior in right” to Chase’s. 

As relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims, the foreclosure complaint requested that 

the state court enter a judgment foreclosing the mortgage and “retaining 

jurisdiction . . . to make any and all further orders and judgments as may be 

necessary and proper, including . . . the entry of a deficiency judgment if the 

proceeds of the sale are insufficient.” The defendants also served Scheidt and 

Anderman a summons, which stated: “If you do not file your response on time, 

you may lose the case, and your wages, money, and property may thereafter be 

taken without further warning from the court.” 

The plaintiffs filed a federal class-action complaint against Chase and 

Phelan, alleging that the summons and state-court complaint violated the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. 

This is their appeal. 

II

“We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute.” Davidson 

v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015). We also 

review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & 

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Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face,’ meaning it must contain ‘factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.’” Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009)). It cannot simply provide “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).1

III

The plaintiffs’ claims arise under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, which “was passed ‘to eliminate abusive debt collection 

practices,’ to ensure that ‘debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 

collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged,’ and to promote 

consistent state action in protecting consumers against debt collection abuses.” 

Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1312–13 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). In their complaint, 

the plaintiffs allege violations of § 1692e, which prohibits a “debt collector” from 

using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection 

with the collection of any debt.” They also claim that the defendants violated

§ 1692f, which prohibits a “debt collector” from using “unfair or unconscionable 

1 To the extent that documents are attached to the complaint, “we treat them as part of the 

complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.” Reese, 678 F.3d at 1215–16.

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means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” To state a claim under the 

FDCPA then, “a plaintiff must allege, among other things (1) that the defendant is 

a ‘debt collector’ and (2) that the challenged conduct is related to debt collection.” 

Reese, 678 F.3d at 1216.2

A

The first issue is whether the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Chase 

and Phelan are “debt collector[s]” under the FDCPA. The district court held that

because Chase originated the debt at issue and sought to collect it on its own 

behalf, it was not a “debt collector.” The court did not make a determination as to 

whether Phelan was a “debt collector,” instead deciding that because the alleged 

conduct did not violate the FDCPA, the complaint did not state a claim against 

either Chase or Phelan. 

For the plaintiffs to survive the motions to dismiss, they “must plead ‘factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that’ [Chase and 

Phelan are] ‘debt collector[s]’ under the FDCPA and therefore liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

The FDCPA defines a “debt collector,” in relevant part, as “any person” (1) “who 

uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the 

2 Reese arose in the context of § 1692e. 678 F.3d at 1216. But because both § 1692e and 

§ 1692f use the term “debt collector” and refer to debt collection, we utilize the same inquiry.

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principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” or (2) “who regularly 

collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted 

to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); see also Reese, 678 F.3d at 

1218 (stating that a party can be a “debt collector” in these two ways). 

First, we consider Chase. The plaintiffs’ complaint states that Chase meets 

the first definition of “debt collector” because “the principal purpose of its business 

is to collect on defaulted debts and because it regularly collects or attempts to 

collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due 

another.” When compared with the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector,” it 

appears that the plaintiffs simply restated the definition in their complaint, without 

alleging any factual support. While their complaint “does not need detailed factual 

allegations,” the plaintiffs must come forward with “more than labels and 

conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. They have not. 

Plaintiffs’ next assertion—that Chase collects debts “owed or due another”

and is therefore a “debt collector” under the second definition in the FDCPA—is 

contradicted by the facts alleged in the complaint. The use of the word “another” 

in the statute indicates “that a person must regularly collect or attempt to collect 

debts for others in order to qualify as a ‘debt collector’ under the second definition 

of the term.” Id. at 1315–16. But the complaint and attached documents confirm

that Chase was seeking to foreclose on a mortgage that it, itself, originated. The 

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plaintiffs’ complaint states that “Mr. Arbuckle executed a promissory note and a 

mortgage securing payment of the note,” and the promissory note attached to the 

complaint—which we may consider here, see Reese, 678 F.3d at 1215–16—shows 

Chase as the “Lender” and Clinton Arbuckle as the “Borrower.” In attempting to 

foreclose on Clinton Arbuckle’s mortgage, Chase was acting on its own behalf and 

cannot be considered as attempting to collect debts “owed or due another.” Chase 

is the originating lender and is therefore exempt from the FDCPA’s definition of 

“debt collector.” See § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (“The term [“debt collector”] does not 

include . . . any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or 

asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt 

which was originated by such person.”). 

As to defendant Phelan, the complaint recites verbatim the same conclusory 

allegations that it does against Chase in arguing that Phelan is a “debt collector”

and subject to the FDCPA. Although the district court did not specifically decide 

whether Phelan could be considered a “debt collector,” we conclude that the 

plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege that Phelan is a “debt collector.” The plaintiffs 

were required, but failed, to properly plead sufficient factual content showing that

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either Phelan’s “principal purpose” is debt collection or that Phelan “regularly 

collects” debt that is “owed or due another.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).3

 

B

But even if Chase and Phelan could be considered “debt collector[s]” under 

the FDCPA, the plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded that the state-court 

foreclosure complaint and summons “are an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ within the 

meaning of the FDCPA.”4

 Reese, 678 F.3d at 1216. We have acknowledged that

residential mortgage obligations qualify as “debt” for FDCPA purposes, id. at 

1216–17 (stating that a “promissory note is a ‘debt’ within the plain language of 

§ 1692a(5)”), and that the FDCPA applies to documents filed in litigation,

Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“Absent a statutory exception . . . documents filed in court in the course of judicial 

3 The plaintiffs also assert that Chase and Phelan are debt collectors because “an entity 

attempting to collect on a consumer debt must be either a creditor or a debt collector,” and 

because Chase and Phelan aren’t creditors as to the plaintiffs they “necessarily must be . . . debt 

collector[s].” Although it is true that “creditors typically are not subject to the FDCPA,” 

Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1313, the fact that an entity is not a creditor does not make it a “debt 

collector” for FDCPA purposes. In Davidson, we held that just because a person is not excluded 

from the definition of “debt collector,” “the person may be a debt collector, but the person is not 

undoubtedly a debt collector; one of two statutory standards [under § 1692a(6)] still must be 

met.” Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1315. As explained above, the plaintiffs have not alleged facts that 

Chase and Phelan fall within the statutory definition.

4 It is not clear whether all three plaintiffs received both the complaint and the summons. The 

complaint does not allege that Chase served Platt the summons, although it does allege that all 

three plaintiffs were served a copy of the complaint. We will assume, without deciding, that all 

three plaintiffs received both the complaint and summons for the purposes of addressing (and 

rejecting) the plaintiffs’ argument that the complaint and summons, when taken together,

violated the FDCPA. 

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proceedings to collect on a debt . . . are subject to the FDCPA.”). To determine 

whether a communication is an attempt to collect debt, we examine its language. 

Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2014). In 

Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, for example, we held that the letter at 

issue constituted an attempt to collect a debt because, in the letter, the lender’s law 

firm demanded full and immediate payment, threatened attorneys’ fees unless the 

borrowers paid, and outright stated that the law firm was “acting as a debt collector

attempting to collect a debt.” 678 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis omitted). 

The state-court foreclosure complaint and the summons were not attempts to 

collect debt from the plaintiffs. First, the foreclosure complaint did not seek a 

“deficiency” against the plaintiffs, as they allege. The plaintiffs point to the clause 

(quoted in relevant part above) that requested that the state court retain jurisdiction 

over the matter to enter other orders, including, if necessary, a deficiency 

judgment. This does not constitute an implicit or explicit demand for any payment 

from the plaintiffs. While the foreclosure complaint elsewhere states that the “full 

amount payable under the Note and Mortgage [was] due and payable,” the 

plaintiffs acknowledge in their FDCPA complaint that it was Clinton Arbuckle—

not them—who signed and executed the promissory note and mortgage. If the 

foreclosure complaint demanded payment at all, it was not from the plaintiffs. The 

foreclosure complaint identified the plaintiffs as persons who “may have or claim 

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an interest in the property that is subject to this foreclosure action,” not as persons 

against whom the bank was seeking a deficiency judgment. 

The plaintiffs also point to a summons they received (quoted in relevant part 

above) that stated that the plaintiffs must respond to Chase’s foreclosure complaint 

or risk adverse action. The language that the plaintiffs take issue with is form 

language provided by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 

Form 1.902. Like the foreclosure complaint, the summons does not constitute an 

implicit or explicit demand for the plaintiffs to pay any debt. It refers generally to 

consequences that may result from failing to respond to a complaint; and the 

foreclosure complaint at issue here simply joined the plaintiffs in the foreclosure 

action because they may have an interest in Clinton Arbuckle’s property—not 

because they owed any payment. 

* * *

In conclusion, the plaintiffs have failed to properly plead that Chase and 

Phelan are debt collectors under the FDCPA and that the conduct alleged was

related to debt collection. See Reese, 678 F.3d at 1216. The district court therefore 

did not err in dismissing their complaint. 

AFFIRMED.

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