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Parties Involved:
Kyocera Mexicana S.A. de C.V.
Appellant
Kyocera Solar, Inc.
Appellant
SolarWorld Americas, Inc.
Appellee
United States International Trade Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KYOCERA SOLAR, INC., KYOCERA MEXICANA 

S.A. DE C.V.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION, SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1348

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:15-cv-00084-NT, Senior Judge Nicholas 

Tsoucalas.

______________________ 

Decided: December 15, 2016

______________________ 

 JAMES KEVIN HORGAN, DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also 

represented by JOHN J. KENKEL, GREGORY S. MENEGAZ,

ALEXANDRA H. SALZMAN. 

 MARY JANE ALVES, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States 

International Trade Commission. Also represented by 

ANDREA C. CASSON, DOMINIC L. BIANCHI. 

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2 KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC

 TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee SolarWorld Americas, Inc. Also represented by STEPHANIE MANAKER BELL,

TESSA V. CAPELOTO, LAURA EL-SABAAWI, DERICK HOLT,

USHA NEELAKANTAN, MAUREEN E. THORSON. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Kyocera Solar Inc. and Kyocera Mexicana S.A. de C.V. 

(collectively, “Kyocera”) appeal a final determination by 

the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”). The CIT 

reviewed and affirmed the International Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) determination that the statutory 

text did not support Kyocera’s proposed interpretation of 

the statute. Because we agree that the plain meaning of 

the statute forecloses Kyocera’s proposed interpretation, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns solar modules (i.e., solar panels)

that incorporate crystalline silicon photovoltaic (“CSPV”) 

cells from Taiwan. CSPV cells convert sunlight into 

electricity using mono- or multi-crystalline silicon cells. 

The CSPV cells are strung together, sealed, laminated, 

and framed to make solar modules, also known as CSPV 

modules. CSPV cells are the main electricity-generating 

component of solar modules.

Kyocera produces and manufactures solar modules 

abroad and imports them for sale in the United States. 

The solar modules at issue in this case are ultimately 

assembled in and imported from Mexico but incorporate

Taiwanese CSPV cells. These solar modules were subject 

to an antidumping duty investigation into CSPV products 

from China and Taiwan. SolarWorld Industries America, 

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KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC 3

Inc., an American producer of CSPV cells and modules, 

had filed antidumping and countervailing duty petitions 

alleging material injury and threat of material injury to a 

domestic industry by CSPV product imports from China 

and Taiwan.

The Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) defined 

the investigation’s scope to include cells and modules 

produced in Taiwan and certain modules “completed or 

partially manufactured” in other countries. The relevant 

portion of Commerce’s scope definition is reproduced 

below: 

The merchandise covered by these investigations 

is crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, and modules, laminates and/or panels consisting of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not 

partially or fully assembled into other products, 

including building integrated materials. For purposes of these investigations, subject merchandise 

also includes modules, laminates and/or panels 

assembled in the subject country consisting of 

crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells that are completed or partially manufactured within a customs 

territory other than that subject country, using 

ingots that are manufactured in the subject country, wafers that are manufactured in the subject 

country, or cells where the manufacturing process 

begins in the subject country and is completed in a 

non-subject country.

Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products From 

the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, 79 Fed. Reg. 

4661, 4667 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 29, 2014) (initiating 

antidumping duty investigations). 

Kyocera later challenged Commerce’s scope determination and requested that it exclude solar modules produced in Mexico from the investigation’s scope, including 

modules produced in Mexico using CSPV cells manufacCase: 16-1348 Document: 58-2 Page: 3 Filed: 12/15/2016
4 KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC

tured in Taiwan. Commerce declined Kyocera’s request. 

It determined that the investigation would include solar 

modules produced in Mexico that incorporated Taiwanese 

CSPV cells. Commerce explained that “[m]odules, laminates, and panels produced in a third-country from cells 

produced in Taiwan are covered by this investigation.” 

Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from 

Taiwan, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,966, 76,968 (Dep’t of Commerce 

Dec. 23, 2014) (final determination). Kyocera challenged 

this scope determination in a separate civil action; Commerce’s scope determination is not at issue in this case. 

See Kyocera Solar, Inc. v. United States, CIT Ct. No. 15–

00081 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed Mar. 20, 2015).

Using Commerce’s scope determination, the Commission determined that an industry within the United 

States had been materially injured by imports of CSPV 

products from Taiwan. The Commission explained that it 

“must defer to Commerce’s determination of the scope of 

the merchandise subject to these investigations, and 

Commerce has determined that U.S. imports of CSPV 

modules assembled in third countries such as Mexico from 

CSPV cells made in Taiwan are U.S. imports of subject 

merchandise from Taiwan.” Certain Crystalline Silicon 

Photovoltaic Prods. from China & Taiwan, Inv. No. 701-

TA-511, USITC Pub. 4519 (Feb. 1, 2015) (Final), 2015 WL 

10553313, at *13 n.110.

Kyocera nevertheless argued that the Commission 

had to conduct a separate negligibility analysis regarding 

Mexican solar panels incorporating Taiwanese CSPV 

cells. Section 1677(24) of Title 19 of the United States 

Code defines “[n]egligible imports” as “imports from a 

country of merchandise corresponding to a domestic like 

product identified by the Commission . . . account[ing] for 

less than 3 percent of the volume of all such merchandise 

imported into the United States in the most recent 12-

month period for which data are available that precedes” 

the filing of the petition or the initiation of the investigaCase: 16-1348 Document: 58-2 Page: 4 Filed: 12/15/2016
KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC 5

tion. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24). Under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673d(b)(1)(B), “[i]f the Commission determines that 

imports of the subject merchandise are negligible, the 

investigation shall be terminated.” Kyocera argued that 

this statutory scheme required the Commission to conduct 

a separate negligibility analysis for its solar modules 

assembled in Mexico incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells

in contrast to solar modules assembled in Taiwan incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells. In particular, Kyocera 

argued that § 1677(24) requires a negligibility analysis for 

imports from “a country,” and that its Mexican imports 

were from “a country,” so the Commission should separately conduct a negligibility analysis to determine 

whether solar modules imported from Mexico “account for 

less than 3 percent of the volume” of solar modules imported into the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24). 

The Commission rejected Kyocera’s argument, explaining that it reflected both an improper attempt to 

circumvent Commerce’s scope determination and an 

incorrect reading of the statute: 

Kyocera’s arguments are based on two flawed 

premises. First, Kyocera overlooks that the 

Commission must defer to Commerce’s definition 

of the scope of the merchandise subject to these 

investigations, and Commerce has determined 

that U.S. imports of CSPV modules assembled in 

third countries such as Mexico from CSPV cells 

made in Taiwan are U.S. imports of subject merchandise from Taiwan, as discussed earlier. 

Moreover, Kyocera does not read the negligible 

imports language in tandem with 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b), which direct the Commission to determine whether a domestic industry is 

materially injured “by reason of imports, or sales 

(or the likelihood of sales) for importation, of the 

merchandise with respect to which the administering authority has made an affirmative determinaCase: 16-1348 Document: 58-2 Page: 5 Filed: 12/15/2016
6 KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC

tion under subsection (a)(1) of this section. If the 

Commission determines that imports of the subject merchandise are negligible, the investigation 

shall be terminated.” (emphasis added). It is not 

reasonable to read “any country” into the definition of negligible imports without taking into account that the statute centers the negligibility 

analysis on the imports of the subject merchandise with respect to which Commerce has made an

affirmative determination.

Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Prods. from 

China & Taiwan, 2015 WL 10553313, at *13 n.110. 

Kyocera appealed the Commission’s determination to 

the CIT, which affirmed the Commission’s refusal to 

conduct a separate negligibility analysis for Kyocera’s 

solar modules incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells in 

Mexican manufacturing plants. It explained that “Kyocera ignores the fact that Commerce’s investigation defines 

the scope of the [Commission’s] analysis.” J.A. 10. It 

explained that “[h]ere, Commerce determined that the 

solar modules produced by Kyocera in Mexico using 

Taiwanese cells are considered Taiwanese in origin, and 

are within the scope of this Taiwanese investigation.” Id. 

(quotation marks and brackets omitted). The CIT concluded that “the [Commission] was bound by Commerce’s 

determination and tasked with examining whether imports from Taiwan, including modules from Mexico, were 

negligible. Accordingly, the [Commission] correctly 

declined to conduct a separate negligibility analysis with 

Mexico as the country of origin.” J.A. 11 (citation omitted). 

Kyocera appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

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KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC 7

DISCUSSION

We review the CIT’s assessment of the Commission’s 

final determination by reapplying the CIT’s standard of 

review. Specifically, we ask whether the Commission’s 

determination is unsupported by substantial evidence or 

otherwise not in accordance with the law. Siemens Energy, Inc. v. United States, 806 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). “In undertaking this review, we give great weight 

to ‘the informed opinion of the [CIT].’” Nippon Steel Corp. 

v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(quoting Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. 

United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 

Kyocera’s appeal raises an issue of statutory construction. We review issues of statutory construction under 

the two-prong analysis announced in Chevron, U.S.A., 

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 

837 (1984). We first determine “whether Congress has 

directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 

842. If it has, our inquiry ends, for we “give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 843. 

If, however, the statute does not answer the question at 

hand because it is “silent or ambiguous,” then, under 

Chevron’s second prong, we determine whether the agency provided “a permissible construction of the statute.” 

Id. “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to 

fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the 

agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 

regulation.” Id. at 843–44. “Such legislative regulations 

are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 

capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 

844 (footnote omitted).

We find that this dispute is resolved by the plain 

meaning of the statute. “In order to determine whether a 

statute clearly shows the intent of Congress in a Chevron

step-one analysis, we employ traditional tools of statutory 

construction and examine ‘the statute’s text, structure, 

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8 KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC

and legislative history, and apply the relevant canons of 

interpretation.’” Heino v. Shinseki, 683 F.3d 1372, 1378 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Delverde, SrL v. United States, 

202 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a 

statute must be read in their context and with a view to 

their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” FDA v. 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 

(2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 

803, 809 (1989)). That principle rings particularly true 

here. The statutory structure before us offers important 

context that guides our understanding of the disputed 

text’s meaning. 

We begin with 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b) and 1673d(b), 

which outline the Commission’s final determination

inquiry in countervailing duties and antidumping investigations, respectively. These sections task the Commission 

with finally determining whether certain imports, those 

that fall within the scope of a final affirmative antidumping or countervailing duty determination made by Commerce, are harming an industry within the United States. 

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d. Section 1671d(b), which is 

mirrored by § 1673d(b), reads as follows:

(b) Final determination by Commission

(1) In general

The Commission shall make a final determination of whether--

(A) an industry in the United 

States--

(i) is materially injured, or

(ii) is threatened with material 

injury, or

(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materiCase: 16-1348 Document: 58-2 Page: 8 Filed: 12/15/2016
KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC 9

ally retarded, by reason of imports, or sales (or the likelihood of 

sales) for importation, of the merchandise with respect to which the 

administering authority has made 

an affirmative determination under subsection (a) of this section. 

If the Commission determines that 

imports of the subject merchandise 

are negligible, the investigation 

shall be terminated. 

These sections also require the Commission to conduct a 

negligibility determination and to terminate the investigation if it “determines that imports of the subject merchandise are negligible.” Id. (emphasis added). This

negligibility determination is further defined in 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677(24), which explains that “imports from a country of 

merchandise corresponding to a domestic like product 

identified by the Commission are ‘negligible’ if such 

imports account for less than 3 percent of the volume of 

all such merchandise imported into the United States” in 

a specified time period.

It is § 1677(24)’s definition of negligible merchandise 

that Kyocera reads as “direct[ing] the Commission to 

consider whether ‘imports from a country’ are negligible.” 

Appellant Br. 20. Kyocera argues that “[t]he language of 

the statute is not ambiguous. ‘A country’ means exactly 

that—a country. Mexico is a country.” Id. It follows, 

Kyocera argues, that its imports of solar modules assembled in Mexico incorporating Taiwanese CSPV cells are 

from Mexico, and thus the Commission should have 

conducted a separate negligibility analysis for these 

modules. 

We disagree. Kyocera’s statutory reading improperly 

wrests a line of statutory text from its context. See Brown 

& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133. Here, the statute plainly 

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10 KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC

requires that the Commission make its determinations 

with regard to subject merchandise. And the statute 

vests Commerce with the role of determining the scope of

the merchandise subject to investigation. See 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a)(2), 

1673e(a)(2) (explaining that Commerce shall include in 

antidumping and countervailing duty orders “a description of the subject merchandise, in such detail as [Commerce] deems necessary”). Indeed, the negligibility 

determination requires an inquiry into whether “imports 

of the subject merchandise are negligible.” 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1671d(b)(1), 1673d(b)(1). And the statute defines 

“subject merchandise” as “the class or kind of merchandise that is within the scope of an investigation.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1677(25). Thus, the Commission’s determinations of domestic injury and negligibility are made with 

respect to the subject merchandise—i.e., the merchandise 

within the scope of Commerce’s investigation. We therefore agree with the Commission’s observation that “[i]t is 

not reasonable to read ‘any country’ into the definition of 

negligible imports without taking into account that the 

statute centers the negligibility analysis on the imports of 

the subject merchandise with respect to which Commerce 

has made an affirmative determination.” Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Prods. from China & Taiwan, 

2015 WL 10553313, at *13 n.110. 

Moreover, Kyocera cannot challenge Commerce’s determination that the solar modules finally assembled in 

Mexico are Taiwanese in origin. Indeed, Kyocera “does 

not dispute” that “[t]he Commerce Department determined that solar products produced in Mexico from Taiwanese origin cells[] are subject merchandise and 

Taiwanese in origin.” Appellant Reply Br. 4. In fact, that 

very determination is the subject of a separate civil proceeding in the CIT, see CIT Ct. No. 15–00081, filed by 

Kyocera. And both parties agree that Commerce’s scope 

determination is not before us today. Kyocera argues, 

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KYOCERA SOLAR, INC. v. ITC 11

however, that “the Commission is required to examine the 

negligibility of subject merchandise (in this case, Taiwanese origin solar products produced in Mexico) imported 

from Mexico.” Appellant Br. 4. We disagree. The statute 

does not support Kyocera’s proposed distinction between 

Commerce’s determination of origin and the origin of 

goods referred to in the negligibility statute. As we 

explained above, the statute centers the negligibility 

determination on subject merchandise. In this case, 

Commerce determined that the solar modules that Kyocera claims are “from Mexico” are Taiwanese in origin. 

Following the statutory structure, the Commission 

properly treated the cells as Taiwanese in origin, and thus 

correctly refused to conduct a separate negligibility determination for Kyocera’s solar cells.

We have considered Kyocera’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

Because we find Kyocera’s position unambiguously refuted by the plain meaning of the statute, we conclude our 

analysis under the first prong of Chevron and do not reach 

its second prong. As Kyocera does not otherwise challenge the Commission’s determination, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS. 

No Costs.

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