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Parties Involved:
Donald Ray Draffin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 2002 Decided April 26, 2002

No. 01-3039

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Donald Ray Draffin,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00391-01)

Sean Grimsley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for the appellant. A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on brief. Gregory L. Poe, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Matthew P. Cohen, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

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United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief.

Before: Henderson and Garland, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Donald Ray

Draffin appeals his sentence on the ground that the district

court erred in not departing from the sentencing range

mandated by the career offender provisions of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). Under circuit precedent, because Draffin did not request the departure below,

the failure to depart is either not reviewable or, at most,

reviewable for plain error only. We conclude that the district

court's failure to grant an unrequested departure should be

reviewed for plain error and that Draffin has demonstrated

none. Accordingly, his sentence is affirmed.

I.

On September 25, 1997 Draffin was indicted on one count

of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 2113(a), to which

he pleaded guilty on November 20, 1997. On April 5, 2001

the district court sentenced Draffin as a career offender

under U.S.S.G. s 4B1.11 to 151 months' imprisonment,2 consecutive to an unrelated felony sentence and to be followed by

three years' supervised release, and imposed a $100 special

assessment. Draffin appeals his sentence.

II.

In sentencing Draffin, the district court rejected his contentions that the government had failed to prove that the

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1 Section 4B1.1 enhances the sentence of a career offender, that

is, a defendant whose offense of conviction is at least his third adult

felony conviction of a crime of violence and/or a controlled substance offense.

2 This sentence is at the bottom of the sentencing range of 151-

188 months the court below found applicable to Draffin as a career

offender with an offense level of 29 and a criminal history of VI.

robbery fit the definition of "crime of violence" set out in

U.S.S.G. s 4B1.2, that the court should depart from the

career offender provisions of the Guidelines based on diminished capacity pursuant to U.S.S.G. s 5K2.13 and that the

sentence should be concurrent with the other felony sentence.

On appeal Draffin does not urge any of the arguments raised

below but asserts instead that the district court should have

departed under U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3 either because the offense

of conviction should not be considered a crime of violence3 or

because the career criminal status overstates Draffin's criminal history and likelihood of recidivism. Before addressing

the merits of his claim we must determine the appropriate

__________

3 This court acknowledged such a departure ground, at least

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where the violent nature of previous crimes is challenged, in United

States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494

U.S. 1089 (1990):

A sentencing judge retains discretion to examine the facts of a

predicate crime to determine whether it was a crime of violence

notwithstanding the Commentary to the guidelines' predetermined list of crimes which it considers to be crimes of violence.

Obviously, the guidelines' definitions, commentary and the like

provide a solid starting point for determining whether a prior

conviction was in fact a crime of violence. However, it may be

appropriate, as provided by the guidelines, for a district judge

to depart from the guidelines' statutory definition of a particular crime depending on the facts of the case. We remand for

reconsideration of the defendant's previous robbery conviction

to determine whether or not it was in fact a crime of violence

under 18 U.S.C. s 16(a).

886 F.2d at 389-90; see also United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d

1446, 1453 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993). We subsequently clarified that this

authority to depart arises under U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3, which authorizes

departure "if reliable information indicates that the criminal history

category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will

commit other crimes." See United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47,

54 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Clark. 8 F.3d 839, 843 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). We need not and do not decide here whether the

departure ground applies to the offense of conviction as well as to

earlier crimes.

scope of our review. Because the level of review depends on

whether Draffin has preserved his departure argument for

appeal, we must first determine whether, as Draffin maintains, he adequately presented the argument to the district

court. We conclude he did not.

The record below reveals that Draffin at no time asked the

district court to depart based on the specific grounds he now

cites. It is true he argued the offense of conviction is not one

of violence but he did so within the confines of the Guidelines,

asserting the offense does not fit within the Guidelines'

definition of "crime of violence." He did not claim that

characterizing the robbery as a crime of violence "so distorted

the sentence as to take it out of the Guidelines' heartland"

and therefore to justify departing from the Guidelines sentencing range. See United States v. Vizcaino, 202 F.3d 345,

348 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We therefore review Draffin's sentence

pursuant to our precedent governing unrequested departures.

As a general rule, the sentencing court's failure to depart

"is reviewable ... if it rests on a misconstruction of its

authority to depart" but the "court's discretionary decision

that the particular circumstances of a given case do not

warrant a departure ... is not reviewable." United States v.

Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, some of our decisions have reasoned that, when

a defendant does not raise a departure argument before the

sentencing court, the court's consequently unexplained failure

to depart is as unreviewable as an expressed discretionary

decision not to depart. See United States v. Bradshaw, 935

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F.2d 295, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (defendant who did not "press

that specific argument before the district court" failed to

preserve assertion "it was error for the district court to fail to

determine whether his prior robberies were actually crimes of

violence justifying a career offender designation"); United

States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (failure to

depart either "not reviewable" or "waived" where "record

does not support the assertion that appellant ever made a

request for a section 4A1.3 departure" and "[a]ppellant does

not even allege that the trial judge misconstrued his legal

authority to depart"); United States v. Pinnick, 47 F.3d at

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439-40 (failure to depart "not reviewable" because defendant

did not object after court "imposed sentence without commenting on the departure request"); In re Sealed Case, 199

F.3d 488 490-92 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sealed Case I) (no review

where defense "never specifically argued for ... departure

from the appropriate Guideline range before or during the

sentencing hearing") (citing Pinnick). In apparent contrast,

other decisions have concluded the failure to grant an unrequested departure should be reviewable for plain error. See

United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(where "appellant failed to request a downward departure

under section 5K2.13," court "review[s] the district court's

failure, sua sponte, to depart downward on the basis of

appellant's diminished capacity under plain error"); In re

Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1171-72 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (plain

error applies where defendant "never argued [the asserted

departure ground] to the district court" and therefore "the

issue of whether the district court had authority to depart [on

that ground] was never presented in the district court"). Still

other cases have reviewed for plain error without expressly

deciding which standard should apply. See United States v.

Albritton, 75 F.3d 709, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[a]ssuming,

without deciding" that plain error applies to "district court's

failure to grant sua sponte a section 5K2.0 departure");

United States v. Vizcaino, 202 F.3d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

("Because Vizcaino failed to preserve the argument for appeal, we review the district court's failure to depart sua

sponte at most for plain error."); cf. Sealed Case I, 199 F.3d

at 491("[I]f a different rule does apply, then it would seem

that at best, the waived objection should be reviewed for plain

error."). We believe the correct standard is plain error.

The cited caselaw is not so inconsistent as it may seem. As

a practical matter, denying review of the failure to depart sua

sponte and reviewing it for plain error will ordinarily yield

the same result: the sentence will be upheld. Although the

plain error standard appears more lenient than no review at

all, it is, as the decisions cited above make manifest, almost

impossible to satisfy in the departure setting.

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To establish plain error an appellant must show that "from

the perspective of the trial court, the claimed error was 'so

"plain" the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in

detecting it.' " United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163

(1982)) (other citations omitted). Ordinarily, such error will

not be found where the lawyer fails to propose a discretionary

departure ground because " '[u]nder these circumstances, we

assume that the district court kn[ew] and applie[d] the law

correctly.' " Sealed Case I, 199 F.3d at 491 (quoting Pinnick,

47 F.3d at 439-40) (quotation omitted); see also Pinnick, 47

F.3d at 439 ("[T]he appellant, not us, has the initial responsibility to ensure that the district court explains its reasoning

for the record."). We have, however, recognized one unlikely

circumstance--and there may conceivably be others--in

which plain error might be shown: namely, when, notwithstanding the defendant's silence, the sentencing court makes

it plain on the record sua sponte that it is choosing not to

depart on a particular ground because it believes (mistakenly,

as it turns out) it lacks authority to do so. See Sealed Case I,

199 F.3d at 490-91. Because of the possibility of such

reversible error, however remote, we conclude we should

apply the plain error standard rather than withhold review

altogether. We find no plain error here.

Draffin claims the record shows the court below misunderstood its authority to depart because of statements by the

judge indicating she sympathized with Draffin but was required to follow sentencing rules. See 4/5/2001 Sentencing

Tr. 96-97. The cited language, however, is at most ambiguous, particularly in light of the court's simultaneous acknowledgment that she "ha[d] some discretion," id. 97, and the

absence of any express refusal to depart. Cf. In re Sealed

Case I, 199 F.3d at 490-91 (finding "at worst ambiguous"

judge's statement "that he 'wish[ed]' he could have sentenced

appellant below the guideline range but concluded that he did

not 'have any alternative' "). As Draffin himself acknowledges, see Reply Br. at 11, ambiguous statements cannot

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redeem a defendant's failure to ask for departure. See

Sealed Case I, 199 F.3d at 491 ("To hold ... that a record at

worst ambiguous supports reversal is hardly consistent with

plain error review.").

For the preceding reasons, we conclude the district court's

failure to depart under U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3 was not plain error

because Draffin did not ask the court to grant such a departure and he has not unequivocally demonstrated the sentencing court misconstrued its authority to depart. Accordingly,

the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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