Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00730/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00730-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andre J. Brooks
Plaintiff
Jeff Macomber
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANDRE J. BROOKS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JEFF MACOMBER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0730 TLN AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint. ECF No. 10. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to 

survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must 

contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a 

legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure ' 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 

under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

II. First Amended Complaint 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Macomber, Holmes, Cantlay, and Mayfield violated his 

constitutional rights when they took away his ability to have minor visitors. ECF No. 10 at 3-4. 

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He alleges that on June 9, 2005, he was informed by defendant Holmes that because of a new 

regulation, 15 C.C.R. § 3173.1, he would no longer be allowed to have minor visitors. Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Holmes was the head of the committee that decided he would be 

prohibited from having minor visitors and that Holmes was the one responsible for the 

committee’s decision. Id. He further alleges that defendants Cantlay and Mayfield were also 

members of the committee and that they simply went along with Holmes decision. Id. As 

warden, defendant Macomber oversees all staff and signs all committee decisions. Id. at 3. As a 

result of the decision to prohibit plaintiff from having minor visitors, his grandchildren are no 

longer allowed to visit. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was not given advance notice of the hearing 

and that he has never had an incident related to visitation during his twenty-four years of 

incarceration. Id. at 4. He requests that the court examine § 3173.1, passed in 2003, and grant 

him visitation with his grandchildren. Id. at 3. 

III. 15 C.C.R. § 3173.1 

 Section 3173.1 of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations restricts visitation with 

minors for inmates convicted of certain crimes, mostly sex offenses. The original version of the 

regulation, which went into effect in 2003, provided that all visitation with any minor was 

prohibited when the inmate had been sentenced for specified crimes unless visitation was 

authorized by a juvenile court. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3173.1 (2003). The victim of the 

crimes did not have to be a minor. Id. Where there was substantial evidence of certain types of 

misconduct, an inmate could be limited to non-contact visits or prohibited from any visits with 

minors regardless of whether there was a conviction. Id. 

The regulation was substantially amended in December 2005. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 

3173.1 (2005). After the amendment, visitation with minor victims of certain crimes was 

prohibited except as ordered by the juvenile court and for other crimes limited to non-contact 

visits. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3173.1(a), (c) (2005). Visits with minors who were not victims 

was limited to non-contact visits, except as authorized by the Institution Classification 

Committee. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3173.1(b), (d) (2005). If an inmate was arrested but not 

convicted of one of the crimes specified in the regulation, a classification committee was to 

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determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether visitation with minors should be limited to noncontact status. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3173.1(e) (2005). The inmate’s visitation status is to 

remain unrestricted until the classification committee has made its determination. Id. The current 

version of the regulation is largely the same as the 2005 version. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 

3173.1 (2015). 

III. Failure to State a Claim 

Due to the brief nature of plaintiff’s complaint, it is difficult to determine exactly what 

rights he claims have been violated. However, it appears that he may be attempting to allege 

claims for violation of his rights to due process, freedom of association, and equal protection. 

A. Due Process 

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of 

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In order to invoke the protection of the Due 

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the 

protection is sought. Id. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from 

state law. Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in 

avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. Under state law, the existence of a 

liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the 

deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law 

are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

There is no constitutional right to visitation for convicted prisoners. Overton v. Bazzetta, 

539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (upholding prison regulations banning visitation privileges entirely 

for a two-year period for inmates with two substance abuse violations and regulating the 

conditions of visitation as not affecting constitutional rights that survive incarceration); Kentucky 

Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1989) (no liberty interest in “unfettered 

visitation” or visits with “a particular visitor”). “[A]n inmate’s inability to visit with whom he 

wishes is an ‘ordinary incident of prison life.’” Macedon v. California Dep’t of Corr., 67 F. 

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App’x 407, 408 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that inmates do not have a constitutional right 

to contact visits and in so holding stated that the “rational connection between a ban on contact 

visits and internal security of a detention facility is too obvious to warrant extended discussion.” 

Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586-88 (1984); see also Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 

621 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional right while 

incarcerated to contact visits.”) (citations omitted); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1113 

(9th Cir. 1986) (denial of contact visitation does not violate Eighth Amendment), abrogated in 

part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. The Court also held that a complete ban on 

contact visits did not infringe on constitutional rights. Block, 468 U.S. at 588. 

The complaint appears to allege that plaintiff is being denied any kind of visitation with 

all minors. ECF No. 10 at 4. However, the complaint also refers to the process for determining 

whether an inmate will be limited to non-contact visits, which indicates that plaintiff may be 

alleging that he has been denied contact visits with minors rather than all visitation. ECF No. 10 

at 4. However, whether plaintiff is being permitted non-contact visits with minors or being 

denied visitation with minors all together is ultimately irrelevant. There is no constitutional right 

to contact visits nor is there a constitutional right to visits with a particular person or class of 

persons. While the court is sympathetic to plaintiff’s desire to have visitation with his 

grandchildren, he is not being denied all visitation, only visitation with minors, and this is 

insufficient to state a claim for relief.1

 B. Freedom of Association 

“An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. Overton, 539 

U.S. at 131 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 

(1977); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001)). “[F]reedom of association is among the 

rights least compatible with incarceration.” Id. (citing Jones, 433 U.S. at 125-26; Hewitt v. 

Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). It is not necessary to determine the extent to which freedom of 

 

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 Based on the current state of the law, it is questionable whether plaintiff’s constitutional rights 

would be violated even if he were being denied all visitation. 

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association survives incarceration if the regulation at issue bears a rational relationship to 

legitimate penological interests. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. 

It has been established that there is a rational basis for § 3173.1, Shallowhorn v. Molina, 

572 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014), and both the original and current version of the regulation 

have been found to be reasonable under Turner,2 Valdez v. Woodford, No. C 05-4443 SI (pr), 

2007 WL 1848032, at *4-9, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46525, at *12-27 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) 

(original version of § 3173.1 reasonable under Turner); Vaden v. Dickenson, No. 2:10-cv-1676 

KJN P, 2011 WL 2313043, at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61917, at *4-7 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2011) 

(Turner analysis of original version of § 3173.1 applies equally to current version). Plaintiff 

therefore cannot state a claim for violation of his rights to free association and this claim must be 

dismissed. 

C. Equal Protection 

The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people 

equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “To state a claim 

for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with 

an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his membership in a protected class.” 

Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Alternatively, plaintiff can show “that [he] has been intentionally 

treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “Similarly 

situated” persons are those “who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 

1, 10 (1992). The rationale is that “[w]hen those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless 

treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the 

difference, to ensure that all persons subject to legislation or regulation are indeed being ‘treated 

alike, under like circumstances and conditions.’” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 

591, 602 (2008). 

 

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 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 

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Plaintiff may be attempting to assert an equal protection claim. In the complaint he states 

that § 3173.1 “targets that crime,[3] when visiting is a privilege for all inmate[s] of all kinds of 

crime.” ECF No. 10 at 3. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that § 3173.1 does not violate the 

Equal Protection Clause because inmates who have committed certain crimes against minors do 

not constitute a protected class and “California had a rational basis for promulgating the 

regulation.” Shallowhorn, 572 F. App’x at 547; see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 

F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (sex offenders not a suspect or protected class) (citing United 

States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, plaintiff does not allege 

that he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates, he alleges that he is being treated 

differently from inmates who have not committed the crimes specified in § 3173.1 and are 

therefore not similarly situated. Because plaintiff cannot state an equal protection claim, the 

claim should be dismissed. 

IV. No Leave to Amend 

 If the court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court 

has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the 

complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. 

United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to 

amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that 

the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a 

complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Id. at 

1105-06. 

 The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, given the nature of the claims plaintiff 

is making, this court is persuaded that plaintiff is unable to allege any additional facts that would 

 

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 Based on the original complaint “that crime” likely refers to sex offenses. See ECF No. 1 at 3. 

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state a cognizable claim and therefore concludes that further amendment would be futile. “A 

district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” Hartmann v. CDCR, 

707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 

725-26 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

V. Summary 

 Plaintiff’s due process claim should be dismissed because restrictions on visitation, like 

the denial of visitation with minors, are not unusual for someone in prison and therefore are not 

unconstitutional. The freedom of association claim should also be dismissed because prisoners 

do not have the same right as non-prisoners to spend time with the people they want to. Also, § 

3173.1 has been found to be reasonable and therefore constitutional. To the extent plaintiff is 

attempting to make a claim that he is being treated unequally, this claim must also be dismissed 

because plaintiff has not alleged that he is part of a protected class or that he is being treated 

differently from other inmates who are in the same position as him. These claims should be 

dismissed without leave to amend because there are no facts that plaintiff could allege that would 

allow him to state a claim. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the first amended complaint be 

dismissed without leave to amend. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 4, 2016 

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