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Parties Involved:
Aaron Lowden
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CL£RK 

TO: 

RE: 

~nit(>b ~tat~s @ourt of ~ppenfs 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER. COLORADO 80294 

April llt 1990 

ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

89-2052t USA v. Aaron Lowden 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

lFTSl 564·3157 

There was an opinion entered on March 29, 1990, in the 

above captioned case. Attached is a corrected opinion, which 

gives subsequent history on a citation, and should be substituted 

for the previous opinion. 

Very truly yours, 

::BERTP:k~:&:- Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 1 
~· l L ,1!; JJ Unltecl~St~k·~ Court¢( Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

PUBLI SH MAR 2c:l 1990 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERI CA, 

Plaintiff-Appel lee, 

v. 

AARON LOWDEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

} 

} 

No. 89-2052 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. CR 88-352) 

Teresa E. Storch, Assistant Fede ral Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, Attorney for De fendant-Appellant . 

Jim Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, and Joe M. Romero, Jr., Assistant United 

States At t orney, on the bri ef ), Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney 

for Plaint iff-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant-appellant Aaron Lowden was convicted of assault 

within Indian c ountry, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and 

sentenced to thirty mo nths in prison, fol lowed by two years of 

supervised release. He cha l lenges both his conviction and his 

sentence. 

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 2 
I. PROPRIETY OF THE CONVICTION 

During her closing argument, Lowden's counsel attacked the 

probative value of several admissions made by Lowden to Augustine 

Abeita, a criminal investigator for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

because the investigative reports were only summaries, not 

verbatim recordings, of Lowden's statements. See R. Vol. III at 

165-66. She also told the jury that Jody Ray, the victim of the 

assault, was "a young man who drinks and has problems with his 

drinking" and "a young man who's quick to fight." Id. at 167-68. 

During his rebuttal closing argument , the prosecuting attorney made the following statement: 

"Ladies and gentlemen, during this closing argument that 

[d]efense counsel gave, she did what is commonly done by 

defense counsel when the facts aren't on their side and 

when the law isn't on their side. They put--" 

Id . at 176. 

At this point, defense counsel objected. At a meeting at the 

bench, the court told the prosecutor: 

"I think you're entitled to point out that the argument 

made was made because there was a lack of facts or lack 

of law to support the othe r one's position. But, you 

know, to say things like it's a common tactic of defense 

lawyers, I think that is what's creating a problem, and 

so I'd like you to depersonalize it." 

Id . at 177. The court then inst ructed the jury as follows: 

"[T]he arguments of counsel may be helpful to you in 

helping you to recall what the evidence in the case was. 

But the arguments of counsel or statements of counsel 

are not in and of themselves evidence in the case and 

you're to rely on your own memory of what the testimony 

was and what the exhibits say as to what the evidence in 

the case actually is." 

Id. at 178. 

The prosecuting attorney then continued: 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 3 
Id. 

11Ladi es and gentlemen, during the closing argument 

that you heard moments ago, there was reference made to 

the fact of some discrepancies in the reports that were 

made by Mr. Abeita and other law enforcement officials. 

There were references made to the fa ct that Jody Ray was 

drinking that day and that perhaps he's an alcoholic . Ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you that these references were made to divert you r attention from what this 

Defendant did , from who is on trial here. It is this 

Defendant who is on trial . Jody Ray is the victim in 

this case and the fact that he was drink i ng that day 

when he was stabbed does not mean that it's okay to stab 

somebody just because he was drinking . 

And there were disc repancies and there always are 

discrepancies when human beings are involved in making 

reports and in taking interviews. But as to the basic 

facts that make up the charge in this case, there were 

no discrepancies." 

Lowden cont ends that the prosecutor' s initial remark 

pre judiced him by impugning the integrit y of Lowden 's counsel a nd 

implying that she believed him to be guilty , by referring to facts 

not in ev idence, and by implying that the prosecu ting attorney 

thought that Lowden was gui lty. "[W]e will not overturn the 

verdic t on this basis 'unless the misconduct "was enough to influence t he jury to render a convic tion on grounds beyond the admissible evidence presented. 11 '" United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 

833 P.2d 24 4, 248 (lO th Ci r . 1987) (quoting United States v. 

Espi nosa, 771 F . 2d 1382, 1401 (lOth Cir.) (quoting United States 

v. Dickey, 736 F .2d 571 , 596 (lO th Cir. 1984), ce rt. denied , 469 

u.s. 1188 (1985)), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1023 (1985)). Because 

the statement is not as rife with pr e judice as Lowden contends , we 

affirm his convi ction. 

In United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571 (lOth Cir . 1984) , 

cert . deni ed, 469 u.s. 1188 (198 5) , and Hopkinson v . Shillinge r , 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 4 
866 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir.), on reh'g en bane~ other grounds, 888 

F.2d 1286 (lOth Cir. 1989), the prosecution's closing argument 

included a statement quite similar to the remark made in this 

case. The Dickey prosecutor said: 

"From defense attorneys here or defense attorneys a 

block south of here in the state courthouse, you hear 

the same. Whether it is the State of Oklahoma against a 

defendant or the United States of America against a 

defendant. I have yet to hear a defense attorney stand 

here and say my client is guilty. They have a great 

deal of common [sic]. They behave a great deal alike in 

their arguments and some of the rules are these. If the 

law is against you argue the facts. Now, if the facts 

are against you you argue the law. But if they both are 

against you try the prosecution. Let's try somebody 

else." 

united States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 592 (emphasis added). The 

Hopkinson prosecutor said: 

"It is always, ladies and gentlemen, the ploy of 

skilled defense attorneys to attack the State and the 

best defense is sometimes a good offense. The State 

prostituted itself. Now, we need to look at this matter 

in retrospect and to judge what was done." 

Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d at 1208 (emphasis added). In 

both cases, this court held that these comments could not have 

influenced the jury to render a conviction on improper grounds. 

Id. at 1210-11; United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 596. 1 

1 Lowden correctly points out that the statement in Dickey was 

reviewed only for plain error, because no objection was made at 

trial. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 596. Also, 

Hopkinson came to this court on a writ of habeas corpus, rather 

than direct review. See Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 U.S. at 

1191. But the above-quoted passages were parts of much longer and 

more aspersive philippics against defense counsel. See id. at 

1208-09; Dickey v. United States, 736 F.2d at 592-93-.--While the 

comment in this case is subject to a stricter standard of review, 

it also was less inflammatory. Just as the arguments discussed 

above were not reversible errors, the argument in this case, where 

the contested comment was but an isolated remark, is not grounds 

for reversal. Moreover, because no objections were lodged to the 

[footnote continued ••• ] 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 5 
In Manriquez Arbizo, the prosecutor's closing argument 

included an explicit statement of things the statement in this 

case is alleged merely to have implied. The defendant was charged 

with distributing marijuana. Referring to the cross-examination 

of someone who, according to the government, just transported 

marijuana for the defendant, the prosecutor said: 

"[I]t's interesting to note that [defense counsel] in 

cross[-]examination of Mr. Paul, said you're a hauler of 

marijuana. 

It seems to me that her question to Paul seemed to 

give--at least she had it in her mind that he wasn't the 

source of marijuana, he was the haul er of marijuana." 

United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 247 (emphasis 

added). This court said that "referring to what defense counsel 

must have been thinking ... was clearly inappropriate," id ., but 

that, even though no instruction to dissipate the effect of the 

statement was given immediately after it was made, 2 

"the prosecutor's comment was not so egregious as to 

i nfluence the jury to convict Arvizo on evidence not in 

the record. The comment was singular and isolated. 

Further, the government put on substantial independent 

evidence of Arbizo's guilt and the trial court 

instructed the jury that the attorneys' arguments were 

not to be considered as evidence." 

Id. at 248 {citation omitted). 

Similarly, the comment at issue here, as inartful as it may 

have been, did not have the effect which Lowden ascribes to it. 

[ ... footnote continued ] 

above-quoted statements, they were never specifically dealt with 

in a jury instruction. In this case, the jury was instructed 

immediately after the statement on the its value vel 

2 In fact , the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection, s aying "This is a proper final argument.'' Manriquez Arbizo, 

833 F.2d at 247. This might have even heightened the stature of 

the comment in the minds of the jurors. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 6 
It became clear as the prosecuting attorney completed his 

presentation that his initial comment referred solely to defense 

counsel's critiques of Abeita and Ray. Of course, the fac t that 

the prosecutor was responding to defense counsel's closing argument did not give him carte blanche to make improper statements. 

Uni ted States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 503 (lOth Cir. 1975). But 

the fact that the statement was part of a response and not part of 

a general attack on defense counsel lessened its effect. See 

Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d at 1210-11 (citing United States 

v. Young, 470 u.s. 1, 12 {1985)). Any harm which may have been 

caused by the i ll-worded introductory sentence was undone by the 

timely ins truction on the limited meaning o f arguments by counsel. 

See United Sta tes v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 1401 (c iting, e.g., 

Devine v. United States, 403 F.2d 93, 96 ( lOth Cir. 1968), cert. 

denied, 394 U.S. 1003 {1969)).3 "The prosecutor's remarks, in our 

judgment , could not have substantially swayed the jury in assessing the verdict, so as to 'affect the substantial rights of the 

accused."' United States v. Haskins, 737 F.2d 844, 850 (lOth Cir. 

1984) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S . 778, 82 {1935)). 

Because Lowden was not prejudiced, his conviction is affirmed. 

3 Also, Lowden's claims of prejudice are based sole ly upon 

inferences which purportedly arose from the opening remark. We 

will not read improper meaning into a prosecutor's closing 

argument "unless it '"was man ifestly intended or was of such 

c ha racter that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it 

to"'" have that meaning. United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 

1402 (quoti ng United States v. Bennett, 542 F .2d 63, 64 (10th Cir. 

1976) (quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 , 170 (lOth 

Cir. 1955)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977)); see ,~~ 

Hopkinson v. Shi llinger, 866 F.2d at 1205. Th is is not such a 

case. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 7 
II. PROPRIETY OF THE SENTENCE 

A number of circumstances surrounding the crime were thought 

by Lowden to justify a downward departure by the court from the 

range of sentences prescribed by the sentencing guidelines.4 At 

the sentencing hearing, the court stated : 

"I have considered at some l ength the motion to depart 

from the sentencing guidelines and feel that it does not 

state the grounds on which I could depart from the 

guidelines and I will therefore deny the motion. 

I am very much concerned, of course, about the 

circumstances under which, the crime of which Mr. Lowden 

was convicted took place ...• I'm afraid, however, 

that I simpl y cannot use that circumstance as a basis 

for depart i ng below the guidelines that have been 

proscribed [sic] for the Court . 

. I believe that it is simply a ma tter of 

interpreting the guidelines and I don't believe that 

there's anything that I've seen in the motion that would 

justify my departure below the guidelines in this 

instance." 

R. Vol. IV at 1 7, 21. 

The parties are sharply divided over what the court meant 

when it said that there were no grounds upon which a downward 

departure could be made. Lowden inte rprets the statement to mean 

that the court thought itself powerless to depart based upon the 

proffered circumstances. In that case our review would be 

plenary. United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 (lOth Cir. 

1990}. The government contends that the court considered the 

facts, and decided that they did not warrant a departure. Such a 

4 United States Sentencing Commission, Guideline s Manual (Nov. 

1989}. The issues raised in Lowden's challenge to the constitutionality of the guidelines were resolved in the government's 

favor in United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 542-44 (lOth Cir. 

1989). We see no need to revisit the question. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 8 
refusal to depart would be a different matter. See id. Counsel 

for both parties conceded at oral argument that if we considered 

the trial court's explanation to be ambiguous, some further 

explication by the district court would be in order. 

The reasoning behind a court's departure decision should be 

clearly stated. "[W]e will not speculate as to what those 

considerations may have been." Id. "Without particularization by 

the trial court of its reasons . , this court cannot engage in 

• meaningful review .• " United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 

720, 724 (lOth Cir. 1989). As the First Circuit stated when faced 

with the same problem: 

"After reading the sentencing hearing transcript, 

we are unable to decide definitively between these differing assessments of the district court's view of its 

own discretion •••. 

In light of this ambiguity, we feel that the best 

course is for us to retain appellate jurisdiction and to 

ask the district court for clarification of its own 

decision-making process." 

United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 18, 20, 21 {1st Cir. 1989). 

The clerk of this court will transmit this opinion to the district 

court, with a request that it inform us whether or not it thought 

that it had the power to make a downward departure based upon the 

circumstances proffered by Lowden. 

Lowden's conviction is AFFIRMED. The clerk is instructed to 

transmit this opinion to the district court. We retain appellate 

jurisdiction. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 9 
PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

MAil ~ 9 ·iQQO 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

} 

) 

} 

} 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-2052 

AARON LOWDEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. CR 88-352) 

Teresa E. Storch, Assistant Federal Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 

Jim Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, and Joe M. Romero, Jr., Assistant United 

States Attorney, on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant-appellant Aaron Lowden was convicted of assault 

within Indian country, a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1153, and 

sentenced to thirty months in prison, followed by two years of 

supervised release. He challenges both his conviction and his 

sentence. 

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 10 
I. PROPRIETY OF THE CONVICTION 

During her closing argument, Lowden•s counsel attacked the 

probative value of several admissions made by Lowden to Augustine 

Abeita, a criminal investigator for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

because the investigative reports were only summaries, not 

verbatim recordings, of Lowden's statements. See R. Vol. III at 

165-66. She also told the jury that Jody Ray, the victim of the 

assault, was "a young man who drinks and has problems with his 

drinking" and "a young man who's quick to fight." Id. at 167-68. 

During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecuting attorney made the following statement: 

"Ladies and gentlemen, during this closing argument that 

[d]efense counsel gave, she did what is commonly done by 

defense counsel when the facts aren't on their side and 

when the law isn't on their side. They put--" 

Id. at 176. 

At this point, defense counsel objected. At a meeting at the 

bench, the court told the prosecutor: 

"I think you're entitled to point out that the argument 

made was made because there was a lack of facts or lack 

of law to support the other one•s position. But, you 

know, to say things like it's a common tactic of defense 

lawyers, I think that is what's creating a problem, and 

so l 1 d like you to depersonalize it." 

Id. at 177. The court then instructed the jury as follows: 

"[T]he arguments of counsel may be helpful to you in 

helping you to recall what the evidence in the case was. 

But the arguments of counsel or statements of counsel 

are not in and of themselves evidence in the case and 

you're to rely on your own memory of what the testimony 

was and what the exhibits say as to what the evidence in 

the case actually is." 

Id. at 178. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 11 
Id . 

The prosecuti ng attorney then continued : 

"Ladies and gentlemen, during the closing argument 

that you heard moments ago, there was refer ence made to 

the fact of some discrepancies in the repor ts that were 

made by Mr. Abeita and other law enforcement officials. 

There were references made to the fact that Jody Ray was 

drinking that day and that perhaps he's an alcoholic . Ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you that these references were made to divert your attention from what this 

Defendant did , from who is on trial here. It is this 

Defendant who is on trial. Jody Ray is the victim in 

this case and the fact that he was drinking that day 

when he was stabbed does not mean that it's okay to stab 

somebody just because he was drinking. 

And there were discrepancies and there always are 

discrepancies when human beings are involved in making 

reports and in taking interviews. But as to the basic 

facts that make up the charge in this case, there were 

no discrepancies ." 

Lowden contends that the prosecutor's initial remark 

prejudiced him by impugning the integrity of Lowden's counsel and 

implying that she believed him to be guilty, by referring to facts 

not in evidence, and by implying t ha t the prosecuting attorney 

thought that Lowden was guil ty . "(W]e will not overturn the 

verdict on this basis 'unless the misconduct "was enough to influence the jury to render a conviction on grounds beyond the admissible evidence presented.""' United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 

833 F.2d 244 , 248 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. 

Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382 , 1401 (lOth Cir . ) (quoting United States 

v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 596 (lOth Cir . 1984), cert. denied, 469 

u.s. 1188 (198 5)) , cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1023 (19 85) ). Because 

the statement is not as rife with prejudice as Lowden contends, we 

affirm his conviction. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 12 
In United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571 (lOth Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied , 469 U.S. 1188 ( 1985) , and Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 

866 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1989), the prosecution's c losing argument 

included a statement quite similar to the remark made in this 

case . The Dickey prosecutor said: 

11 From defense attorneys here or defense attorneys a 

block south of here in the state courthouse, you hear 

the same. Whether it is the State of Oklahoma against a 

defendant or the United States of America against a 

defendant. I have yet to hear a defense attorney stand 

here and say my client is guilty. They have a great 

deal of common [sic]. They behave a great deal alike in 

t heir arguments and some of the rules are these . If the 

law is aga inst you argue the facts. Now , if the facts 

are against you you argue the law. But if they both are 

against you try the prosecution. Let's try somebody 

else. 11 

United States v. Dickey , 736 F .2d at 592 (emphasis added). The 

Hopkinson prosecutor said: 

"It is always, ladies and gentlemen , the ploy of 

skilled defense attorneys to attack the State and the 

best defense is sometimes a good offense. The State 

prostituted itself. Now, we need to look at this matter 

in retrospect and to judge what was done ." 

Hopkinson v. Shi llinger, 866 F.2d at 1208 (emphasis added) . In 

both cases, this court held that these comments could not have 

influenced the jury to render a conviction on improper grounds. 

Id. at 1210-11; United Sta tes v. Dickey, 73 6 F .2d at 596 . 1 

1 Lowden correctly points out that the statement in Dickey was 

reviewed only for plain error, because no objection was made at 

trial. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 596. Also, 

Hopkinson came to this court on a wr it of habeas corpus, rather 

than direct review. See Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 u.s. at 

1191. But the above-quoted passages were parts of much longer and 

more aspersive philippics against defense counsel. See id. at 

1208-09; Dickey v. United States, 736 F.2d at 592-93-.--While the 

comment in this case is subject to a stricter standard of review, 

it also was less inflammatory. Just as the arguments discussed 

above were not reversible errors, the argument in this case, where 

[footnote continued ••• ) 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 13 
In Manriquez Arbizo, the prosecutor's closing argument 

included an explicit statement of things the statement in this 

case is alleged merely to have implied. The defendant was charged 

with distributing marijuana. Referring to the cross-examination 

of someone who, according to the government, just transported 

marijuana for the defendant, the prosecutor said: 

"[I]t's interesting to note that [defense counse l] in 

cross[-]examination of Mr . Paul, said you're a hauler of 

marijuana. 

It seems to me that her question to Paul seemed to 

give--at least she had it in her mind that he wasn't the 

source of marijuana, he was the hauler of marijuana." 

United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 247 (emphasis 

added). This court said that "referring to what defense counsel 

must have been thinking ••• was clearly inappropriate," id., but 

that, even though no instruction to dissipate the effect of the 

statement was given immediately after it was made, 2 

"the prosecutor's comment was not so egregious as to 

influence the jury to convict Arvizo on evidence not in 

the record. The comment was singular and isolated . Further, the government put on substantial independent 

evidence of Arbizo's guilt and the trial court 

instructed the jury that the attorneys' arguments were 

not to be considered as evidence." 

Id. at 248 (citation omitted). 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

the contested comment was but an isolated remark, is not grounds 

for reversal. Moreover, because no objections were lodged to the 

above-quoted statements, they were never specifically dealt with 

in a jury instruction. In this case, the jury was instructed 

immedia tely after the statement on the its value vel ~· 

2 In fact, the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection, saying "This is a proper final argument." Manriquez Arbizo, 

833 F.2d at 247. This might have even heightened the stature of 

the comment in the minds of the jurors. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 14 
Similarly, the comment at issue here, as inartful as it may 

have been, did not have the effect which Lowden ascribes to it. 

It became clear as the prosecuting attorney completed his 

presentation that his initial comment referred sol ely to defense 

counsel's critiques of Abeita and Ray. Of course, the fact that 

the prosecutor was responding to defense counsel 1 s closing argument did not give him carte blanche to make improper statements. 

United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 503 (lOth Cir. 1975). But 

the fact that the statement was part of a response and not part of 

a general attack on defense counsel lessened its effect. See 

Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d at 1210-11 (citing United States 

v. Young, 470 u.s. 1, 12 (1985)). Any harm which may have been 

caused by the ill-worded introductory sentence was undone by the 

timely instruction on the limited meaning of arguments by counsel. 

See United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 1401 (citing, e.g., 

Devine v. United States, 403 F.2d 93, 96 (lOth Cir. 1968), cert. 

denied, 394 u.s. 1003 { 1969)}. 3 "The prosecutor's remarks, in our 

judgment, could not have substantially swayed the jury in assessing the verdict, so as to 'affect the substantial rights of the 

accused.' 11 United States v. Haskins, 737 F.2d 844, 850 (lOth Cir. 

3 Also, Lowden•s claims of prejudice are based solely upon 

inferences which purportedly arose from the opening remark. We 

will not read improper meaning into a prosecutor's closing 

argument "unless it '"was manifestly intended or was of such 

character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it 

to•••n have that meaning. United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 

1402 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 542 F.2d 63, 64 (lOth Cir. 

1976) (quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (lOth 

Cir. 1955)), cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1048 (1977)); see, ~, 

Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d at 1205. This is not such a 

case. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 15 
1984) {quoting Berger v. United States, 295 u.s. 778, 82 (1935)). 

Because Lowden was not prejudiced, his conviction is affirmed. 

II. PROPRIETY OF THE SENTENCE 

A number of circumstances surrounding the crime were thought 

by Lowden to justify a downward departure by the court from the 

range of sentences prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. 4 At 

the sentencing hearing, the court stated: 

"I have considered at some length the motion to depart 

from the sentencing guidelines and feel that it does not 

state the grounds on which I could depart from the 

guidelines and I will therefore deny the motion. 

I am very much concerned, of course, about the 

circumstances under which, the crime of which Mr. Lowden 

was convicted took place • • • • I'm afraid, however, 

that I simply cannot use that circumstance as a basis 

for departing below the guidelines that have been 

proscribed [sic] for the Court • 

• I believe that it is simply a matter of 

interpreting the guidelines and I don't believe that 

there's anything that I've seen in the motion that would 

justify my departure below the guidelines in this 

instance." 

R. Vol. IV at 17, 21. 

The parties are sharply divided over what the court meant 

when it said that there were no grounds upon which a downward 

departure could be made. Lowden interprets the statement to mean 

that the court thought itself powerless to depart based upon the 

proffered circumstances. In that case our review would be 

4 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 

1989}. The issues raised in Lowden's challenge to the constitutionality of the guidelines were resolved in the government's 

favor in United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 542-44 (lOth Cir. 

1989). We see no need to revisit the question. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-2052 Document: 01019748596 Date Filed: 04/11/1990 Page: 16 
plenary. United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 {lOth Cir. 

1990). The government contends that the court considered the 

facts, and decided that they did not warrant a departure. Such a 

refusal to depart would be a different matter. See id. Counsel 

for both parties conceded at ora l argument that if we considered 

the trial court's explanation to be ambiguous, some further 

explication by the district court would be in order. 

The reasoning behind a court's departure decision should be 

clearly stated. "[W]e will not speculate as to what those 

considerations may have been." Id. "Without particularization by 

the trial court of its reasons . , this court cannot engage in 

• meaningful review • . It United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 

720, 724 (lOth Cir. 1989}. As the First Circuit stated when faced 

with the same problem: 

"After reading the sentencing hearing transcript, 

we are unable to decide definitively between these differing assessments of the district court's view of its 

own discretion •••• 

In light of this ambiguity, we feel that the best 

course is for us to retain appellate jurisdiction and to 

ask the district court for clarification of its own 

decision-making process." 

United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 18, 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1989). 

The clerk of this court will transmit this opinion to the district 

court, with a request that it inform us whether or not it thought 

that it had the power to make a downward departure based upon the 

circumstances proffered by Lowden. 

Lowden's conviction is AFFIRMED. The clerk is instructed to 

transmit this opi nion to the district court. We retain appell ate 

jurisdiction. 

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