Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05069/USCOURTS-ca13-14-05069-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Land Recovery, Inc.
Appellant
Resource Investments, Inc.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RESOURCE INVESTMENTS, INC., LAND 

RECOVERY, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5069

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:98-cv-00419-LB, Judge Lawrence J. 

Block.

______________________ 

Decided: May 12, 2015 

______________________ 

 MARK S. PARRIS, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 

Seattle, WA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by DAVID S. KEENAN, DANIEL D. SYRDAL; MARC

SHAPIRO, New York, NY.

LANE N. MCFADDEN, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by SAM HIRSCH. 

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2 RESOURCE INVESTMENTS, INC. v. US

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Resource Investments, Inc. and Land Recovery, Inc. 

(collectively, “Resource Investments”) appeal the Court of 

Federal Claims’ (“Claims Court”) dismissal of their Fifth 

Amendment takings claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1500. 

We affirm.

BACKGROUND 

This case requires that we again consider § 1500, 

which limits the Claims Court’s jurisdiction when at the 

time of the Claims Court filing there was a pending action

against the United States in another court involving the 

same subject matter. Section 1500 provides: “The United 

States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction 

of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his 

assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1500. 

The question here is whether Resource Investments’ 

takings claim in the Claims Court based on the denial of a 

federal permit under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 

(“CWA permit”), 33 U.S.C. § 1344, was barred by an

earlier district court suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) challenging the permit denial.

In 1987, Resource Investments purchased a 320-acre 

property in the State of Washington which it sought to 

use as a landfill. Beginning in 1989, Resource Investments applied for various state permits to construct the 

landfill. Because the proposed landfill project involved 

the fill of wetland areas, Resource Investments filed an 

application on August 8, 1990, for a CWA permit from the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”). See 33 

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RESOURCE INVESTMENTS, INC. v. US 3

U.S.C. § 1344. The requisite state permits were ultimately issued in 1996 on the condition that Resource Investments obtain, inter alia, a federal CWA permit from the 

Corps. On March 4, 1994, as part of the CWA permitting 

process, the Corps determined that it would require a 

federal Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the 

proposed landfill site. After the Corps’ draft EIS preliminarily concluded that Resource Investments had not fully 

demonstrated that there were no practicable alternatives 

to the proposed landfill project (as required by 40 C.F.R. 

§ 230.10(a)), Resource Investments requested that the 

Corps terminate the federal EIS process, which the Corps 

did on June 7, 1996. The Corps formally denied Resource 

Investments’ CWA permit on September 30, 1996.

On October 31, 1996, Resource Investments filed suit 

in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington under the APA, challenging the denial 

of the CWA permit. Resource Investments alleged, inter 

alia, that the Corps’ permitting process and ultimate 

denial of the permit violated the Clean Water Act and was 

arbitrary and capricious under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et 

seq. (“count IV”). Count IV alleged “a cost to [Resource 

Investments] of several millions of dollars,” J.A. 474, and

that Resource Investments stood to “lose the large sums 

already invested in the project, as well as the economic 

value of its investment in the project site,” J.A. 483.

The district court upheld the Corps’ denial of the 

permit under the APA, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, 

finding that the Corps lacked authority to require a CWA 

permit because, under the Resource Conservation and 

Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941–6949a, the regulation of 

municipal solid waste in landfills constructed on wetlands 

areas lies solely with the Environmental Protection 

Agency (“EPA”) or states (such as Washington) with solid 

waste permit programs approved by the EPA. See Res. 

Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 

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4 RESOURCE INVESTMENTS, INC. v. US

1167–69 (9th Cir. 1998). Under the Ninth Circuit’s holding, no CWA permit was required, and Resource Investments began construction of its landfill in October 1998. 

The landfill became operational in 1999.

On May 4, 1998, while the Ninth Circuit appeal was 

pending, Resource Investments filed a complaint in the 

Claims Court alleging that the Corps’ denial of the CWA 

permit was a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.1 

The Claims Court complaint alleged that “[i]n denying the 

Section 404 permit, the Corps has deprived plaintiffs of 

their valuable property interests in the Site without just 

compensation.” J.A. 86. And the prayer for relief sought 

judgment against the United States “for just compensation and damages equal to the value of the Site but for the 

Corps’ Section 404 Permit denial.” J.A. 91. On October 

13, 2005, several years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision 

in the appeal of the district court action, Resource Investments filed an amended complaint in the Claims 

Court action alleging that the Corps’ denial of the permit 

was a temporary taking under various legal theories.

While the Claims Court action was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Tohono O’Odham 

Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011), holding that “[t]wo suits 

are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the [Claims Court], if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief 

sought in each suit.” Id. at 1731. On June 10, 2011, after 

the Claims Court action had been pending for several 

years, the United States, in light of Tohono, filed a motion 

1 Interestingly, Resource Investments did not allege 

that the taking resulted from the assertion that a permit 

was required even though no permit was, in fact, necessary. 

 

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to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Claims Court granted the government’s motion to 

dismiss, finding that count IV of the district court action 

and the Claims Court action shared substantially the 

same operative facts, in particular because the denial of 

the CWA permit was central to both suits.2 The Claims 

Court found that “the facts underlying the Corps’ decision 

to deny the permit were material to plaintiffs’ claim that 

the Corps violated applicable regulations because the 

denial of the permit was the culmination of a series of 

allegedly improper acts taken by the Corps.” J.A. 34. The 

Claims Court also denied Resource Investments’ motion 

for reconsideration, rejecting Resource Investments’ 

argument that the denial of the permit was merely the 

“impetus” for bringing the two lawsuits, rather than an 

operative fact, because “the denial of the permit was in 

fact not only operative but also dispositive—as the court 

pointed out, but for the denial of the permit, plaintiffs 

would not have been able to argue these claims.” J.A. 44–

45.

Resource Investments appeals. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We review the Claims 

Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de 

2 The Claims Court also found that count III of the 

district court suit, which alleged violations of the National 

Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., shared 

substantially the same operative facts as the Claims 

Court action. Resource Investments argues that because 

count III was not appealed to the Ninth Circuit, it was not 

pending when they filed the Claims Court action. Because we find that count IV of the district court action 

arises from substantially the same operative facts as the 

Claims Court action, we need not address count III.

 

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novo. Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

I 

As we held in Brandt, “[t]o determine whether § 1500 

applies, a court must make two inquiries: (1) whether 

there is an earlier-filed ‘suit or process’ pending in another court, and, if so, (2) whether the claims asserted in the 

earlier-filed case are ‘for or in respect to’ the same claim(s) 

asserted in the later-filed Court of Federal Claims action.” 

710 F.3d at 1374. Resource Investments does not dispute 

that the district court action constitutes an earlier-filed 

suit for purposes of the first § 1500 inquiry. 

In undertaking the second inquiry, we compare count 

IV of the district court action with the Claims Court 

action to determine whether they are “for or in respect to” 

each other. 28 U.S.C. § 1500. The Supreme Court held in 

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993), that 

the relevant comparison under § 1500 analyzes whether 

the two suits were “based on substantially the same 

operative facts.” Id. at 212. In Tohono, the Court addressed an issue expressly left unresolved by Keene: 

whether the § 1500 bar applied to two actions based on 

the same operative facts that sought completely different 

relief. Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 1727–28. The Court held 

that the § 1500 bar still applied in that scenario: “Two 

suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding 

jurisdiction in the [Claims Court], if they are based on 

substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the 

relief sought in each suit.” Id. at 1731. Here, the Claims 

Court held that the same operative facts test was satisfied 

because both suits were based on the denial of the CWA 

permit and the economic injury to Resource Investments 

that the permit denial allegedly caused.

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Resource Investments first argues that the denial of 

the permit was not an “operative fact” in the Claims 

Court action, but rather merely a “background fact.” In 

support of this argument, Resource Investments relies on 

language in Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 697 

F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012), suggesting that overlap in 

background facts does not require dismissal under § 1500. 

Id. at 1365. But as the Claims Court found, the denial of 

the permit was not merely a background fact. The basis 

for each of the actions was, in significant part, the Corps’ 

denial of the permit. The allegations that the Corps 

denied the permit, and the alleged economic loss attributable thereto, were central to both count IV of the district 

court action and the Claims Court action. The Claims 

Court complaint alleged: 

The Section 404 Permit denial furthers no legitimate government interest; it wholly frustrates 

plaintiffs’ investment backed expectations, denies 

all practical, beneficial and economic use of the 

Site, and wholly destroys the economic value of 

plaintiffs’ property rights in the Site. Accordingly,

the action of the [Corps] . . . constitutes a taking of 

plaintiffs’ property . . . . 

J.A. 71. The Claims Court action’s prayer for relief specifically sought damages “equal to the value of the Site but 

for the Corps’ Section 404 permit denial.” J.A. 91 (emphasis added). Similarly, count IV of the district court action, 

challenging the Corps’ conduct in denying the permit 

application, was clearly based on the denial of the permit. 

Count IV alleged that “[t]he Corps’ decision to deny the 

permit application was the product of its systematic bias, 

prejudgment and bad faith in reviewing the permit application,” and complained “of the Corps’ misconduct in 

reviewing the permit application.” J.A. 473. Count IV 

further alleged that the denial of the permit “must be 

reversed and remanded with instructions that defendants 

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8 RESOURCE INVESTMENTS, INC. v. US

reconsider the permit application in good faith under the 

proper standards as ordered by the Court.” J.A. 486. And 

the prayer for relief in the district court action “request[ed] a determination that the Corps’ decision denying the permit was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious 

because it was the product of systematic bias, prejudgment and bad faith.” Complaint for Judicial Review of 

Administrative Action at 103, Res. Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army 

Corps of Eng’rs, No. C96-5920 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 1996).

Resource Investments argues that even if the permit 

denial and economic injury are operative facts common to 

the two actions, additional—and different—operative 

facts are necessary to establish each claim. For example, 

Resource Investments points to the character of the 

government action and investment-backed expectations in

the landfill site as operative facts in the Claims Court 

action that were irrelevant to the district court action.

To determine whether the overlap as to the permit 

denial and economic loss is sufficient we apply the res 

judicata test approved by Tohono. In determining whether two suits were “based on substantially the same operative facts,” 131 S. Ct. at 1731, the Supreme Court 

analogized § 1500 to res judicata (or claim preclusion), 

explaining that “the principles of preclusion law [are] 

embodied in” § 1500. Id. at 1730; see also Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1164 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court referenced “[t]he nowaccepted test in preclusion law for determining whether 

two suits involve the same claim or cause of action,” 

which “depends on factual overlap, barring ‘claims arising 

from the same transaction.’” Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 1730 

(quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 

n.22 (1982)). The Court explained that although “[t]he 

transaction test is . . . much younger than the rule embodied in § 1500, . . . even in the 19th century it was not 

uncommon to identify a claim for preclusion purposes 

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based on facts rather than relief.” Id. (citing J. Wells, Res 

Adjudicata and Stare Decisis § 241, p. 208 (1878); 2 H. 

Black, Law of Judgments § 726, p. 866 (1891)).

Under Tohono, the question is whether the second 

Claims Court takings suit would have been barred by res 

judicata if it had been brought in a district court. Although there is an exception to res judicata where “[t]he 

plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case 

or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first 

action because of the limitations on the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the courts,” Restatement (2d) of Judgments 

§ 26(1)(c), that exception does not apply to § 1500 in light 

of Tohono’s holding that the statute bars suit on the same 

claim regardless of the relief sought. See Tohono, 131 S. 

Ct. at 1731; see also id. at 1737–38 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

In light of Tohono and Trusted Integration, the relevant res judicata inquiry under § 1500 looks to res judicata principles as of 1868, when the predecessor to § 15003

was first enacted. See Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 8, 15 

Stat. 77; see also Keene, 508 U.S. at 206–07. In Trusted 

Integration, we explained that Tohono “made clear that it 

is the [res judicata] tests in place at the time the predecessor to § 1500 was enacted by which we must be guided.” 659 F.3d at 1168 n.4 (citing Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 

1730). The res judicata bar to “issues that were or could 

have been raised” in a prior action, San Remo Hotel, L.P. 

v. City & Cnty. of S.F., Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 336 n.16 (2005), 

dates back to the mid-nineteenth century. In Aurora City 

v. West, 74 U.S. 82 (1868), decided the same year as the 

predecessor to § 1500 was enacted, the Court articulated 

the res judicata standard as follows:

3 Section 1500 is “identical in most respects to the 

original statute.” Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 1727.

 

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[W]here every objection urged in the second suit 

was open to the party within the legitimate scope 

of the pleadings in the first suit, and might have 

been presented in that trial, the matter must be 

considered as having passed in rem judicatam, 

and the former judgment in such a case is conclusive between the parties. Except in special cases, 

the plea of res judicata, says Taylor, applies not 

only to points upon which the court was actually 

required to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to 

the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought 

forward at the time.

Id. at 102 (citing, inter alia, 2 John Pitt Taylor, A Treatise 

on the Law of Evidence § 1513 (3d ed. 1858)) (emphasis 

added); see also Beloit v. Morgan, 74 U.S. 619, 622 (1868) 

(Res judicata “extends not only to the questions of fact 

and of law, which were decided in the former suit, but also 

to the grounds of recovery or defence which might have 

been, but were not, presented.”).

Also at the time when the predecessor to § 1500 was 

enacted, there were two governing tests for determining 

whether claims were precluded by an earlier litigation: 

the act or contract test, and the evidence test. Trusted 

Integration, 659 F.3d at 1169. Since we conclude that the 

act or contract test is satisfied here, we need not address 

the evidence test. See id. at 1170 n.5 (“If two suits are 

determined to arise from the same claim under either of 

these res judicata tests, however, application of the bar of 

§ 1500 is likely compelled.”).

In Tohono, the Supreme Court articulated the nineteenth century “act or contract test” as follows: “The true 

distinction between demands or rights of action which are 

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tinct, is, that the former immediately arise out of one and 

the same act or contract, and the latter out of different 

acts or contracts.” 131 S. Ct. at 1730 (quoting J.C. Wells, 

A Treatise on the Doctrines of Res Adjudicata and Stare 

Decisis § 241 (1879)); see also Trusted Integration, 659 

F.3d at 1169. The nineteenth century act or contract test 

is narrower than the modern transactional test. See 

Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 24 cmt. a; Cent. Pines, 

697 F.3d at 1365 (distinguishing background facts that 

should not be considered in a § 1500 analysis from operative facts that were “critical to plaintiffs’ claims in both 

actions”). 

Because there are some similarities, however, it can

be informative to refer to authorities on the modern 

transactional test when determining whether claims are 

based on substantially the same operative facts. See 

Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1168 n.4.4 Under the 

transactional test, “[t]he claim extinguished includes all 

rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant 

4 See also Beloit, 74 U.S. at 623 (“A party can no 

more split up defences than indivisible demands, and 

present them by piecemeal in successive suits growing out 

of the same transaction.”); Washington, Alexandria, & 

Georgetown Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles, 65 U.S. 333, 338, 

343, 345–46 (1860) (reversing a holding of estoppel where 

the defendant argued that different counts “represent[ed] 

distinct and independent transactions”; the Court noted 

that “transactions have become more complicated and 

numerous, and law and fact have become more closely 

interwoven, so as to render their separation more embarrassing”); Wells, § 231, p. 201 (“But the various items 

must be connected with the same transaction . . . .”); id. at 

§ 239, p. 206 (“all the consequences are but the unavoidable result of a single act”). 

 

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with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series 

of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. 

What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction’, and 

what groupings constitute a ‘series’, are to be determined 

pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as 

whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or 

motivation . . . .” Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 24. 

And, contrary to Resource Investments’ argument, the bar 

to subsequent litigation applies “even though the plaintiff 

is prepared in the second action . . . [t]o present evidence 

or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the 

first action.” Id. § 25. Different legal theories do not 

create separate claims for res judicata purposes even 

though “the several legal theories depend on different 

shadings of the facts, or would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of 

liability or different kinds of relief.” Id. § 24 cmt. c. 

Thus, in Harbuck v. United States, 378 F.3d 1324 

(Fed. Cir. 2004), we determined that an Equal Employment Act claim in the Claims Court was based on the 

same operative facts as a district court Title VII sex 

discrimination claim, thus barring the Claims Court suit 

under § 1500. Id. at 1328. This was so even though the 

appellant argued “that the two suits involved different 

claims because the Title VII complaint ‘centered on’ her 

non-selection for promotion, and the Equal Employment 

Act claim ‘centered around’ her ‘assuming the position of 

a male employee . . . and not receiving the same pay.’” Id.

at 1329. In affirming the dismissal under § 1500, we held

that “[t]he difference between the two theories upon 

which she relies are but different manifestations of the 

same underlying claim that the Air Force discriminated 

against women by paying them less than men.” Id. 

Other circuits have come to similar conclusions. In 

Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1984), 

the Seventh Circuit, in a case similar to this one, held

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that res judicata barred a federal suit alleging, inter alia, 

a takings claim due to the revocation of a building permit 

because of a prior state lawsuit seeking to enjoin the 

revocation of that same permit. Id. at 511, 514. The 

Seventh Circuit applied the transactional test and found 

that “[t]he appellants’ current suit is for damages allegedly flowing from the very same conduct complained of in 

the appellants’ first suit, Evanston’s obstruction of the 

appellants’ construction project.” Id. at 515. 

In Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 

2012), a police officer challenged his termination for 

misconduct in state court. Id. at 812. He later filed a 

Title VII complaint in federal district court. Id. at 813. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied the transactional 

test and held that the two suits arose from the same 

operative facts “because the underlying transaction of 

both actions [wa]s not only related in time, space, origin, 

and motivation, but the underlying transaction—Hayes’s 

termination from the Chicago Police Department—[wa]s 

identical.” Id. at 814. See also Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. 

Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 327 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The fact that a 

second suit contains some additional factual allegations 

does not mean it does not arise from the same factual

transaction.”). 

So too in Trusted Integration, where both the district 

court complaint and the Claims Court complaint alleged 

that the government failed to adequately offer or promote 

plaintiffs’ security compliance product and replaced that 

product with a government-developed alternative. 659 

F.3d at 1161, 1165. In the Claims Court, the plaintiff 

alleged a breach of an implied agreement. Id. at 1165. In 

the district court, the plaintiff alleged a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Applying the act or contract test, we concluded that both actions were based on the same conduct. 

Id. at 1165, 1169. We “compar[ed] the conduct pleaded” 

in the two actions, and found that “it [was] apparent that 

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each count involve[d] nearly identical conduct.” Id. at 

1165. The appellant “was, therefore, alleging that the 

same conduct gave rise to different claims based upon 

purportedly distinct legal theories.” Id.5

Applying these principles, it is clear that the operative facts outlined in count IV of the district court action 

and the Claims Court action are the same, in particular 

the allegations with respect to the denial of the CWA 

permit and Resource Investments’ economic loss attributable thereto. Thus, the two actions relate to the same 

underlying transaction and § 1500 bars the Claims Court 

action here. 

II

Resource Investments additionally argues that even if 

its permanent takings claim in the Claims Court complaint was barred, its temporary takings claim still survives the § 1500 bar. According to Resource Investments, 

the denial of the permit was not an operative fact with 

respect to the temporary takings claim because that claim 

was based on the delay in the permitting process rather 

than the ultimate denial of the permit. We need not 

reach this issue for two reasons. 

First, under Supreme Court pleading standards, Resource Investments did not sufficiently allege a temporary 

takings claim in the original complaint. See Bell Atl. 

5 We distinguished this circumstance from those—

also at issue in Trusted Integration—where, despite an 

overlap of certain background facts, those facts necessary 

to establish two different causes of action, i.e., the legally 

operative facts, differ, and the two claims do not merely 

represent alternative legal theories premised on a single

set of facts. 659 F.3d at 1168–70. Those latter circumstances are not at issue here.

 

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement 

to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” (quotations and alteration omitted)); see also 

ABB Turbo Sys. AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979, 984 

(Fed. Cir. 2014). The sole reference to a temporary takings claim in Resource Investments’ original Claims Court 

complaint alleged: “Even in the event the Corps’ action is 

overturned by the federal courts, plaintiffs have suffered a 

temporary taking of property which requires compensation.” J.A. 86. This passing reference is no more than a 

conclusory assertion of a temporary taking, which fails to 

satisfy the Twombly pleading standard.

Second, we cannot consider the more extensive temporary takings allegations in Resource Investments’

amended Claims Court complaint.6 The relevant comparison focuses on whether count IV of the original district 

court action arises from substantially the same operative 

facts as the original Claims Court complaint. The 

amended Claims Court complaint is irrelevant because of

“the longstanding principle that the jurisdiction of the 

Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the 

action brought.” Keene, 508 U.S. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we held in Central Pines, 

“[t]ogether, the plain language of the statute and legislative history leave no doubt that at least a time-of-filing 

rule applies such that jurisdiction under § 1500 is dependent on the state of things when the action is brought, 

and cannot be rescued by subsequent action of either 

party or by resolution of the co-pending litigation.” 697 

6 Contrary to Resource Investments’ argument, the 

Claims Court did not order it to file an amended complaint. See J.A. 93.

 

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F.3d at 1367 (internal quotation marks and alteration 

omitted); see also Dico, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1199, 

1203 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he § 1500 bar rises, if at all, at 

the time the [original] complaint is filed in the Court of 

Federal Claims.”).

III

Finally, Resource Investments argues that § 1500 

should be construed to avoid constitutional difficulties

which arise because under the Claims Court’s § 1500 

analysis Resource Investments is precluded from obtaining relief on its constitutional takings claim. See SKF 

USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 556 F.3d 1337, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (relying on “our well established 

obligation to construe statutes to avoid constitutional 

difficulties”). But under current Federal Circuit law there 

is no significant constitutional issue raised by requiring 

the Claims Court action to be filed before the district 

court action in order to secure compensation for a takings 

claim against the government. 

In Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 

943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), our predecessor court found that the 

§ 1500 bar operates “only when the suit shall have been 

commenced in the other court before the claim was filed in 

[the Claims Court].” Id. at 949. That rule continues to be 

followed in the Claims Court. See, e.g., Otoe-Missouria 

Tribe of Indians, Okla. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 136, 

138–39 (2012); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee 

Indians in Okla. v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 180, 187 

(2012); Nez Perce Tribe v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 139, 

142–43 (2011). We are bound by Tecon,7 which “remains 

7 In Tohono, the Supreme Court expressly declined 

to overrule Tecon, noting that “[t]he Tecon holding is not 

presented in this case because the [Claims Court] action 

 

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the law of this circuit.” Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1379 n.7. In 

light of Tecon, we see no constitutional problem with the 

first-to-file rule. Resource Investments could have sought 

relief for its takings claim had it filed its Claims Court 

action before its district court action, and we need not 

consider what constitutional issues might be presented if 

Tecon were to be overruled.8 Similarly, the fact that 

Resource Investments could have dismissed and refiled its 

Claims Court action following the Ninth Circuit’s decision

without facing a limitations problem9 also eliminates any 

constitutional concerns. 

IV

Count IV of the earlier-filed district court action and 

the Claims Court action were based on substantially the 

same operative facts. Under these circumstances, the 

Claims Court correctly dismissed Resource Investments’ 

complaint as barred by § 1500. 

AFFIRMED

here was filed after the District Court suit.” 131 S. Ct. at 

1729–30.

8 “The government has argued that Tecon’s orderof-filing rule is no longer good law . . . .” Ministerio Roca 

Solida v. United States, 778 F.3d 1351, 1361 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (Taranto, J., concurring). 

9 The six-year statute of limitations on the Claims 

Court takings claim (28 U.S.C. § 2501) did not bar Resource Investments from dismissing and refiling because 

the July 27, 1998, Ninth Circuit decision was less than 

two years following the September 30, 1996, permit 

denial.

 

Case: 14-5069 Document: 63-2 Page: 17 Filed: 05/12/2015