Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00239/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00239-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dylan G. Abshire
Petitioner
J Price
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), Petitioner has 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge 

to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry 

of final judgment, by manifesting his written consent filed on 

December 15, 2014. (Doc. 5.) Pending before the Court is the 

petition, which was filed on December 3, 2014, and transferred to 

this Court on February 13, 2015.

///

DYLAN G. ABSHIRE,

 Petitioner,

v.

J PRICE,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00239-SKO-HC

ORDER VACATING ORDER REGARDING

CONSENT (DOC. 10)

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

STATE COURT REMEDIES (DOC. 1)

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

AND DIRECTING THE CLERK 

TO CLOSE THE CASE

Case 1:15-cv-00239-SKO Document 11 Filed 02/17/15 Page 1 of 9
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I. Vacating the Court’s Order regarding Consent

Before this case was transferred to this Court, Petitioner 

filed his consent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge to 

conduct all further proceedings and enter final judgment in this 

case. (Doc. 5, filed December 15, 2014.) When the case was 

received in this Court on February 13, 2014, this Court issued new 

case documents, including an order to Petitioner regarding consent 

to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 10). Because the order 

regarding consent was redundant and unnecessary, it will be vacated.

II. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a 

preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court....” Habeas Rule 4; 

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each 

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not 

sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 

908 F.2d at 491.

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The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition 

has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 

Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 

2001). However, a petition for habeas corpus should not be 

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable 

claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. 

Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the Deuel Vocational

Institution serving a sentence of four years imposed in the Superior 

Court of the State of California, County of Mariposa. Petitioner 

challenges his conviction and sentence, arguing that his plea was 

invalid and that he lacked adequate representation by counsel. 

III. Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge 

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives 

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. 

Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting 

it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy 

remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); 

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Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court 

will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair 

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superseded by statute as

stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the 

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. 

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 

1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme 

Court reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct= alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule 

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), 

as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 

2001), stating: 

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Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended 

by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where none of a petitioner=s claims has been presented to the 

highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the 

Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed petition in 

abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been 

extended to petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 

448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner states that he did not appeal his conviction, 

and he did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 

1, 6.) Thus, Petitioner admits he has not exhausted state court 

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remedies as to any of the claims in the petition.

Although non-exhaustion of state court remedies has been viewed 

as an affirmative defense, it is petitioner’s burden to prove that 

state judicial remedies were properly exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1950), 

overruled in part on other grounds in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 

(1963); Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). If 

available state court remedies have not been exhausted as to all 

claims, a district court must dismiss a petition. Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. at 515-16.

Here, Petitioner’s petition is premature because Petitioner 

admits he has not submitted his claims to the California Supreme 

Court for a ruling. A search of the official website of the 

California Supreme Court reflects no information that would tend to 

show that Petitioner has presented his claims to the California 

Supreme Court.1

In summary, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to 

establish that before coming to this Court with these challenges to 

the judgment and sentence pursuant to which he is confined, he 

exhausted his state court remedies. Accordingly, the petition will 

be dismissed without prejudice 2

 

1

The Court takes judicial notice of the docket as posted on the official website 

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 

999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket 

sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), 

cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official website of the 

California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov.

2

A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and 

Petitioner will not be barred by the prohibition against filing second habeas 

petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) from returning to federal court after 

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for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Habeas Rule 11(a). 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

 

Petitioner exhausts available state remedies. See, In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 

(9th Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

[I]n the habeas corpus context is would be appropriate for

 an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an applicant

 that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

 exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). 

 Once the petitioner is made aware of the exhaustion 

 requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all

 potential claims before returning to federal court. The

 failure to comply with an order of the court is grounds for

 dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal 

court and files a mixed petition of both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the 

petition may be dismissed with prejudice. 

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473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

 Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court will decline to 

issue a certificate of appealability.

V. Disposition

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

1) The Court’s order regarding consent that was filed and 

served on Petitioner on February 13, 2015, is VACATED; 

2) The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice for 

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies; 

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability; 

and

///

///

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4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case because dismissal 

will terminate the proceeding in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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