Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01140/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01140-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GeoTag, Inc.
Appellant
Google Inc.
Appellee
Microsoft Corporation
Not party
Taleo Corporation
Not party

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 

TALEO CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs

GOOGLE INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GEOTAG, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1140

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:11-cv-00175-RGA, Judge 

Richard G. Andrews.

______________________ 

Decided: April 1, 2016

______________________ 

DARYL JOSEFFER, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by 

PAUL ALESSIO MEZZINA; ADAM CONRAD, Charlotte, NC; 

ROBERT A. VAN NEST, ASIM BHANSALI, MATTHIAS A.

KAMBER, Keker & Van Nest, LLP, San Francisco, CA.

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2 MICROSOFT CORP. v. GEOTAG, INC. 

JOEL WILSON REESE, Reese Gordon, Dallas, TX, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by ADAM 

COOPER SANDERSON, KENDAL CATHERINE SIMPSON. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant GeoTag, Inc. (“GeoTag”) appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the District of 

Delaware (“District Court”) finding that it had subject 

matter jurisdiction over (1) Appellee Google Inc.’s 

(“Google”) First Amended Complaint, which sought a 

declaratory judgment that U.S. Patent No. 5,930,474 (“the 

’474 patent”) (J.A. 89–133) is invalid and not infringed by 

Google; and (2) GeoTag’s counterclaims, which alleged

that Google infringed the ’474 patent. See Microsoft Corp. 

v. GeoTag, Inc., No. 11-175-RGA, 2014 WL 4312167 (D. 

Del. Aug. 29, 2014). GeoTag also challenges the District 

Court’s decision granting summary judgment that Google 

did not infringe the ’474 patent. See Microsoft Corp. v. 

GeoTag, Inc., No. 11-175-RGA (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2014) (J.A. 

45–63). We affirm the District Court, although we find 

jurisdiction on different grounds. 

BACKGROUND

I. The ’474 Patent

The ’474 patent claims systems and methods of 

searching online information within a geographically and 

topically organized database. ’474 patent, Abstract. The 

specification describes a preferred embodiment that 

organizes websites and files within a directory-like structure of folders categorized by geography and topic. Id. col. 

19 ll. 52–57; see also id. fig.10. In that embodiment, an 

Internet user may navigate to a folder labeled for a particular geographic area and then conduct a topical search 

within that area, such as for “information about specific 

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MICROSOFT CORP. v. GEOTAG, INC. 3

goods and services in the geographic location.” Id., Abstract. Independent claim 1 is illustrative and describes

A system which associates on-line information 

with geographic areas, said system comprising:

a computer network wherein a plurality of 

computers have access to said network; and

an organizer executing in said computer network, wherein said organizer is configured to 

receive search requests from any one of said 

plurality of computers, said organizer comprising:

a database of information organized into a 

hierarchy of geographical areas wherein 

entries corresponding to each one of said 

hierarchy of geographical areas is further 

organized into topics; and 

a search engine in communication with 

said database, said search engine configured to search geographically and topically, said search engine further configured 

to [s]elect one of said hierarchy of geographical areas prior to selection of a topic 

so as to provide a geographical search area 

wherein within said hierarchy of geographical areas at least one of said entries 

associated with a [broader] geographical 

area is dynamically replicated into at least 

o[n]e narrower geographical area, said 

search engine further configured to search 

said topics within said selected geographical search area.

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Id. col. 38 ll. 36–58 (emphasis added to reflect disputed 

claim language).1 Importantly, the “dynamically replicated” limitation occurs after the system conducts a search 

within a limited geographic area. Id. col. 38 ll. 47–58. 

Through that limitation, the system includes search 

results associated with the narrow geographic area and 

then automatically adds results associated with a broader 

geographic area. Id. col. 38 ll. 55–58.

II. Procedural History

This appeal is an outgrowth of litigation that began in 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of Texas in December 2010. In the Texas actions, “GeoTag sued more than 300 entities in ten separate complaints . . . based on store locator services used by the 

entities but, for some of the defendants, provided by 

Microsoft [Corporation (“Microsoft”)] and Google.”2 GeoTag, 2014 WL 4312167, at *1 (citation omitted). GeoTag 

alleged in those actions that Google’s customers infringed 

the ’474 patent. See, e.g., J.A. 5000.

“In response to GeoTag’s suits [in Texas against 

Google’s customers], Google . . . filed a declaratory judgment action against GeoTag” in the District Court. GeoTag, 2014 WL 4312167, at *1 (citation omitted). The 

Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the ’474 

 

1 In April 2002, the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office issued a certificate of correction that 

corrected certain errors in claim 1 of the ’474 patent. J.A. 

133. Those corrections are reflected in brackets in the 

passage quoting claim 1.

2 All claims by and against Microsoft have been 

severed and dismissed by stipulation and, thus, are not 

part of this appeal. J.A. 7790. 

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patent “is invalid and is not infringed by the use of 

[Google’s] web mapping services.” J.A. 5192.

GeoTag answered Google’s Complaint and counterclaimed that Google AdWords—an online platform for 

displaying advertisements to users that conduct a search 

on Google’s website—directly infringes the ’474 patent. 

GeoTag, 2014 WL 4312167, at *1 (citation omitted); J.A. 

5577–87 (GeoTag’s Answer and Counterclaims). In 

relevant part, AdWords runs a search against its “entire 

database” of ads, “yield[ing] all possible results” that are 

then “progressively filtered[] using factors such as geography.” J.A. 61; see J.A. 59–60 (providing a technical

description of the AdWords system).

Google moved for summary judgment that it did not 

infringe independent claims 1, 20, and 31 (“the asserted 

independent claims”) and dependent claims 3, 5, 9–15, 

18–19, 24–25, 32, and 36–38 of the ’474 patent, which the 

District Court granted. J.A. 57, 63.3 The District Court 

held that AdWords does not practice the “dynamically 

replicated” limitation in claim 1 of the ’474 patent because 

it does not search a narrow geographic area and automatically add results from a broader area; instead, it was 

“uncontested” that AdWords conducts a broad search for 

“all responsive ads” and then “consecutively filters” the 

results.4 J.A. 60–61; see J.A. 61 (“Therefore, Google’s 

 

3 The District Court issued its summary judgment 

decision under seal; however, GeoTag appended the 

decision to the public version of its opening brief and 

redacted only certain portions of the document, to which 

Google did not object. Appellant’s App. 14–32. Accordingly, the non-redacted portions of the District Court’s summary judgment decision are in the public domain.

4 The District Court found that, because the asserted independent claims each require a form of dynamic 

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accused system does not trace up linkages in a hierarchy, 

or repeat the search in order to obtain results from a 

broader geographic area, as the claim limitation would 

require, and thus cannot meet the ‘dynamic replication’ 

requirement of the ’474 [p]atent.”)

Shortly before the District Court issued its summary 

judgment decision, this court addressed declaratory 

judgment relief in Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 

F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The District Court obtained 

additional briefing on DataTern from Google and GeoTag. 

J.A. 180–81 (oral order requesting additional briefing), 

7103–06 (Google), 7791–93 (GeoTag). It subsequently 

permitted Google to file its First Amended Complaint. 

J.A. 7634–35 (Order), 7636–48 (First Amended Complaint).

GeoTag in turn filed a Motion to Dismiss the First 

Amended Complaint, asserting that the District Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 

J.A. 7698–99. Specifically, GeoTag asserted that “[t]he 

minimal additional allegations” in the First Amended 

Complaint did not establish a substantial controversy 

between GeoTag and Google “of sufficient immediacy and 

reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” GeoTag, 2014 WL 4312167, at *1–2 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). GeoTag also 

alleged its counterclaims against Google “were compulsory, [not permissive,] and therefore should be dismissed if 

 

replication, its “analysis applies equally to” each of those 

claims. J.A. 58 n.5. And because the District Court found 

that Google did not infringe any of the asserted independent claims, it held that “the dependent claims cannot, by 

definition, be infringed.” J.A. 58 n.5 (citing Muniauction, 

Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 

2008)).

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the declaratory judgment action lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction.”5 Id. at *3.

The District Court denied GeoTag’s Motion, finding 

that Google’s First Amended Complaint established a 

substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy to warrant declaratory relief and, thus, that it possessed subject 

matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. at *2–3. The 

District Court also held that, even if the First Amended 

Complaint did not establish sufficient grounds for declaratory relief, “there would still be an independent basis for 

subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims.” Id.

at *3 (footnote omitted). In reaching the conclusion that 

it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over GeoTag’s 

counterclaims, the District Court found the counterclaims

permissive, rather than compulsory, under Federal Circuit law and held that it retained subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims under Third Circuit law. Id.

at *4 (“Whether I retain subject matter jurisdiction over a 

permissive counterclaim is a procedural issue to which 

Federal Circuit law does not apply.” (citing Woods v. 

DeAngelo Marine Exhaust, Inc., 692 F.3d 1272, 1279 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012)).

Following the denial of its Motion to Dismiss Google’s 

First Amended Complaint, GeoTag stipulated to the entry 

of final judgment based on the District Court’s summary 

 

5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 defines a 

“compulsory counterclaim” as a “claim that—at the time 

of its service—the pleader has against an opposing party” 

that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is 

the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim” and 

“does not require adding another party over whom the 

court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

13(a)(1)(A)–(B). A “permissive counterclaim” includes 

“any claim that is not compulsory.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).

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8 MICROSOFT CORP. v. GEOTAG, INC. 

judgment ruling. J.A. 32–34. GeoTag timely appealed 

the District Court’s final judgment. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).6

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

A. Choice of Law

Before we address whether the District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over GeoTag’s patent 

infringement counterclaims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1338(a), we must first determine whether our law or 

that of the Third Circuit applies to the jurisdiction question. We find that the District Court erred in determining 

that Third Circuit law governs whether it had jurisdiction. See GeoTag, 2014 WL 4312167, at *4.

A “procedural question not unique to patent law” is 

governed by the law of the regional circuit. See, e.g., 

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). The denial of a motion to dismiss normally raises a 

procedural question not unique to patent law. See, e.g., 

Intel Corp. v. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org., 

455 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, the 

motion to dismiss in this case requires the court to determine whether this dispute arises under 28 U.S.C. 

 

6 In passing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 

(“AIA”), Congress amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295 and 1338. 

Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a)–(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 

(2011). However, because those amendments apply only 

to civil actions commenced on or after September 16, 

2011, the pre-AIA versions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295 and 1338 

apply to this appeal. See id. § 19(e), 125 Stat. at 333; see 

also J.A. 5192 (Google’s Complaint, which it filed on 

March 1, 2011).

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§ 1338(a), for both Google’s First Amended Complaint and 

GeoTag’s counterclaims assert jurisdiction on the basis of 

that statute. J.A. 7638 (Google’s First Amended Complaint), 5580 (GeoTag’s Counterclaims).

Section 1338(a) states in relevant part that the District Court “shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 

action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 

patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Whether a civil action 

arises under an act of Congress related to patents necessarily presents an issue that is unique to patent law. See 

Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 

1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant part) (“[A] 

procedural issue that is not itself a substantive patent law 

issue is nonetheless governed by Federal Circuit law if the 

issue pertains to patent law, . . . if it bears an essential 

relationship to matters committed to our exclusive control 

by statute, . . . or if it implicates the jurisprudential 

responsibilities of this court in a field within its exclusive 

jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and 

citations omitted)); Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon 

Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The issue 

whether the district court had jurisdiction [under § 1338] 

to hear Mars’ claim of Japanese patent infringement is of 

importance to the development of the patent law and is 

clearly a matter that falls within the exclusive subject 

matter responsibility of this court.” (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted)); see also Helfgott & Karas, 

P.C. v. Dickinson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 

(explaining that whether an action arises under the scope 

§ 1338 presents a question that is unique to patent law). 

Therefore, Federal Circuit law applies to the jurisdiction 

question in this appeal. 

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B. The District Court Retained Subject Matter Jurisdiction over GeoTag’s Patent Infringement Counterclaims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)

“This court reviews a grant or denial of a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” 

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 

1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We review factual findings underlying the jurisdiction determination for 

clear error. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelecs., Inc., 480 

F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

GeoTag principally argues that the District Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Google’s First 

Amended Complaint, which seeks a declaratory judgment 

that the ’474 patent is invalid and not infringed by 

Google. Appellant’s Br. 20–40. If the District Court lacks 

such jurisdiction, GeoTag continues, then it also lacks 

jurisdiction over GeoTag’s patent infringement counterclaims. Id. at 21. GeoTag therefore argues that the 

District Court’s “judgment should be vacated.” Id. at 20. 

With respect to its patent infringement counterclaims, 

GeoTag alleges that they “cannot serve as an independent 

basis for jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Br. 34. However, 

where a complaint and a counterclaim both raise issues 

arising under federal patent law, the district court may 

retain subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), even if the district court 

later dismisses or finds a defect in the complaint that 

raises a question arising under federal patent law.7 See

 

7 We similarly possess subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) over counterclaims

accompanied by a complaint raising a question arising 

under federal patent law, for “the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the district court, 

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Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 833–34 & n.4, superseded by 

statute, AIA § 19(a)–(b), 125 Stat. at 331–32.8 Indeed, 

Holmes Group expressly distinguished cases like the 

instant appeal where both the complaint and counterclaims raise issues arising under federal patent law from 

those cases where only the counterclaims do so. See 535 

U.S. at 834 n.4.

The District Court retained subject matter jurisdiction over GeoTag’s patent infringement counterclaims

pursuant to § 1338(a), such that we need not determine 

whether the District Court properly found that it had 

jurisdiction over Google’s First Amended Complaint. 

GeoTag’s counterclaims charged Google with infringement of the ’474 patent and sought money damages for 

infringement. J.A. 5583–86. Accordingly, GeoTag’s 

counterclaim arose under an “Act of Congress relating to 

 

and turns on whether the action arises under federal 

patent law.” Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 

Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (footnote omitted).

8 GeoTag asserts that Holmes Group ushered in a 

change in law that precludes federal courts from looking 

to counterclaims to determine jurisdiction. Appellant’s 

Br. 36. GeoTag’s argument reflects an overly broad 

reading of Holmes Group. In that decision, the Supreme 

Court addressed whether counterclaims can provide 

jurisdiction over a complaint that does not raise a question arising under federal patent law. 535 U.S. at 831–32. 

The Supreme Court applied the well-pleaded complaint 

rule to determine that they could not. Id. Here, the wellpleaded complaint rule is satisfied because Google’s First 

Amended Complaint unquestionably raises issues arising 

under federal patent law—i.e., whether the ’474 patent is 

invalid and not infringed by Google. J.A. 7636–48.

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patents,” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and so the District Court 

retained jurisdiction over those claims, irrespective of any 

dismissal or defect in Google’s First Amended Complaint. 

Further, as GeoTag “actually charged [Google] with 

infringement of the patent, there is, necessarily, a case or 

controversy adequate to support jurisdiction” under 

Article III. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 

508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993). Thus, even assuming that the 

First Amended Complaint was dismissed or deficient in 

some respect, the District Court retained subject matter 

jurisdiction over GeoTag’s patent infringement counterclaims. 

GeoTag’s other arguments do not require us to find 

that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

Specifically, GeoTag contends that the District Court’s 

decision would “effectively reverse DataTern” by allowing 

a counterclaim to “retroactively establish[] jurisdiction” 

over a declaratory judgment complaint. Appellant’s 

Br. 35. DataTern is inapposite. In that decision, we held 

that conditional counterclaims could not establish jurisdiction to address the claims in a declaratory judgment 

complaint. 755 F.3d at 906. We did not consider the 

distinct question of whether a district court could retain 

subject matter jurisdiction over a counterclaim if a complaint is dismissed or deemed defective. See generally id.

Finally, GeoTag challenges the District Court’s finding that its counterclaims are permissive. In particular, 

GeoTag alleges that, “[e]ven if a permissi[ve] counterclaim 

could create jurisdiction, it makes no difference because 

GeoTag’s counterclaims were compulsory.” Appellant’s 

Br. 38 (discussing GeoTag, 2014 WL 4312167, at *3–4); 

see id. at 38–40 (arguing that GeoTag’s counterclaims 

were compulsory). Because its counterclaims are compulsory, GeoTag continues, the District Court could not

retain subject matter jurisdiction over its patent infringement counterclaims. See id. at 38.

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The District Court and GeoTag offer a distinction 

based on counterclaim status that has no bearing on the 

question of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. We have 

not addressed whether a counterclaim’s permissive or 

compulsory status is relevant to retaining jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. However, nothing in the text of 

section 1338 suggests that Congress conditioned its grant 

of jurisdiction to the District Court on the compulsory or 

permissive nature of the counterclaim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1338(a). Nor would the distinction make sense in disputes before the District Court, which has “original jurisdiction of any civil action,” § 1338(a) (emphasis added), 

regardless of the counterclaim status, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

13(a)–(b) (permitting parties to file compulsory and 

permissive counterclaims before the District Court).

II. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment

The review of a grant of summary judgment involves 

an issue not unique to patent law, so we look to the law of 

the regional circuit in which the district court sits. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 

892, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In the Third Circuit, the court 

reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Al–

Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 

207, 210 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). The Third Circuit 

affirms the grant of summary judgment if “the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 

F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a)). A genuine dispute over a material fact exists when 

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

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“[O]n appeal from a grant of summary judgment of 

noninfringement, we must determine whether . . . the 

district court correctly concluded that no reasonable jury 

could find [literal] infringement” or infringement under 

the doctrine of equivalents. Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. 

v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish literal infringement, every limitation 

set forth in a claim must be found in an accused product, 

exactly,” Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 

F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), 

whereas under the doctrine of equivalents infringement 

occurs when “there is equivalence between the elements 

of the accused product . . . and the claimed elements of the 

patented invention,” Duramed Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock 

Labs., Inc., 644 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. The District Court Properly Held that Google’s AdWords Does Not Infringe the ’474 Patent 

GeoTag’s infringement allegations principally concern 

the “dynamically replicated” limitation in claim 1 of the 

’474 patent. As previously mentioned, the “dynamically 

replicated” limitation occurs after the system conducts a 

search within a limited geographic area. ’474 patent col. 

38 ll. 36–58. Through that limitation, the system includes 

search results associated with the narrow geographic area 

and then automatically adds results associated with a 

broader geographic area. Id.

GeoTag alleges that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment that Google did not infringe the 

’474 patent. Specifically, GeoTag argues that (1) “the 

[D]istrict [C]ourt erroneously added new limitations, 

including that dynamic replication requires at least two 

searches and that one of those searches must be inherited 

into the other search,” Appellant’s Br. 60, and (2) 

“Google’s AdWords System practices dynamic replication,” 

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id. at 64. It also contends that the District Court “wrongly substituted itself for the jury by finding that ‘filtering’ 

is not a search.” Id. at 68.

The District Court properly granted summary judgment. AdWords searches its “entire database” of ads

without geographic limitation, identifies “all possible 

results” independent of geographic restrictions, and then 

“consecutively filters” those results by, among other 

things, eliminating results not associated with the targeted geographic areas. J.A. 61. Because AdWords searches 

its entire database without regard to geography and then 

filters the results, rather than searches only within a 

targeted geographic area and automatically adds results 

from outside that area in the manner claimed by the ’474 

patent, AdWords does not practice “dynamic replication” 

under any construction of that limitation. J.A. 60–62. 

Indeed, AdWords’s performance of a broad search of all 

possible ads, without regard to geography, means that it 

has no need or opportunity to “dynamically replicat[e]” 

entries from a broader geographic area into a narrower 

one, as the ’474 patent claims. J.A. 58 n.5. Thus, no 

reasonable jury could find that AdWords infringes the 

’474 patent.

GeoTag’s arguments do not warrant a different conclusion. GeoTag first contends that the District Court 

added a new limitation by requiring dynamic replication 

to be implemented through multiple searches. Appellant’s Br. 60–64. The District Court made no such holding. The ’474 patent’s claims require both a search and a 

dynamic replication at the time of the search. ’474 patent 

col. 38 ll. 47–58. The District Court required some action 

in AdWords—apart from its broad search of its entire 

database of ads—that could qualify as dynamic replication and found none. J.A. 61 (“Google’s accused system 

does not trace up linkages in a hierarchy, or repeat the 

search in order to obtain results from a broader geographic area.” (emphasis added)).

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Similarly, GeoTag argues that the District Court 

erred in assuming that filtering is not a search. Appellant’s Br. 68–72. That argument incorrectly assumes that 

the District Court required a second search. It did not. 

J.A. 60–62. Moreover, AdWords’s progressive filtering of 

the results of its search could not qualify as dynamic 

replication because that filtering eliminates ads from the 

search results, rather than adds to them as dynamic 

replication requires under the ’474 patent. J.A. 61.

GeoTag next asserts that AdWords practices dynamic 

replication when it “filters adgroups by those not being 

geo-targeted, campaigns with adgroups associated with a 

broader geographical area . . . are dynamically replicated . . . into the search area at the location of the user.” 

Appellant’s Br. 71; see also J.A. 61 (where GeoTag presented the same argument to the District Court). The 

District Court properly rejected that argument as looking 

“only to the result of Google’s accused system and not its 

method.” J.A. 61. To infringe, AdWords would have to 

produce results by performing all of the claim limitations, 

including dynamically replicating ads associated with 

broader areas into the results for narrower areas. See 

Duramed Pharm., 644 F.3d at 1380 (discussing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Southwall 

Techs., 54 F.3d at 1575 (discussing literal infringement). 

Merely producing that same result in a different way does 

not suffice. See Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 

F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Finally, GeoTag asserts that “there is nothing in the 

[’474] patent that would exclude the practice of dynamic 

replication through the use of a single search aimed at 

gathering entries associated with both narrower and 

broader geographical areas.” Appellant’s Br. 64. As an 

initial matter, the absence of evidence supporting a 

particular fact does not equate to affirmative evidence of a 

genuine dispute as to a material fact, such that a grant of 

summary judgment is improper. Cf. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. 

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PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). In any event, GeoTag’s argument would read the 

dynamic replication limitation out of the ’474 patent’s

claims and expand the scope of the claims to cover virtually every instance of searching within a geographically 

organized database. We decline to adopt that construction. 

B. GeoTag’s Claim Construction Arguments Are Inapposite

GeoTag alleges that the District Court erred in its 

construction of the asserted independent claims of the 

’474 patent. Specifically, GeoTag alleges that, when the 

District Court construed “hierarchy of geographic areas” 

to mean “interrelated geographic areas such that there 

are parent geographic areas and child geographic areas,” 

it improperly imported a parent-child limitation into the 

asserted independent claims. Appellant’s Br. 43–53. It 

also argues that, when the District Court construed the 

“dynamically replicated” limitation to mean “automatically inheriting at the time of a search,” it improperly imported a parent-child limitation into the asserted 

independent claims from the specification and should 

have substituted “copying or inheriting” for “inheriting.” 

Id. at 53–59. 

Even if correct, these arguments do not warrant reversal of the District Court. As to “hierarchy of geographic areas,” the District Court’s construction of that phrase 

played no role in its grant of summary judgment. Instead, the District Court relied solely on certain uncontested aspects of dynamic replication in granting 

summary judgment. J.A. 58 (“The Court finds that the 

accused Google product does not infringe the ‘dynamic 

replication’ requirement of the patent claims and therefore will focus the remainder of this section on this limitation alone.” (footnote omitted)). Because “the construction 

of this term did not form the basis for any judgment of 

Case: 15-1140 Document: 87-2 Page: 17 Filed: 04/01/2016
18 MICROSOFT CORP. v. GEOTAG, INC. 

non-infringement by the [D]istrict [C]ourt,” it “is irrelevant to the judgment that is on appeal” and will not be 

addressed. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed 

Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1334 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(citation omitted).

Similarly, the contested aspects of the District Court’s 

construction of the “dynamically replicated” limitation did 

not impact its grant of summary judgment. The District 

Court observed that

for the independent claims to be infringed[,] the 

accused device must conduct “dynamic replication.” This limitation requires that the accused 

system “automatically inherit[s] at the time of the 

search” from one search to another search. Each 

of the three independent claims requires that this 

inheritance occur from a larger search area to a 

smaller search area, though the smaller search 

area is not necessarily a subset of the larger 

search area. . . . However, as the Google system 

performs only a single search and then simply filters the results, it is not possible for a second 

search to inherit from the first search, as there is 

no second search. Furthermore, as the AdWords 

System does not repeat the search, there can be 

no larger or smaller search area.

J.A. 61–62. The District Court did not base its summary 

judgment grant on any parent-child limitation in the 

“dynamically replicated” limitation, nor did it find that 

how dynamic replication occurred (i.e., whether through 

inheritance or copying) answered the infringement question. Instead, it found that Google’s AdWords does not 

practice “dynamic replication” under any construction of 

that phrase. J.A. 60–61. Thus, because the disputed 

construction did not form the basis of the District Court’s 

summary judgment grant, we will not address it. See 

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 261 F.3d at 1334 n.2.

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MICROSOFT CORP. v. GEOTAG, INC. 19

CONCLUSION

We have considered GeoTag’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision of 

the United States District Court for the District of Delaware is

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-1140 Document: 87-2 Page: 19 Filed: 04/01/2016