Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00165/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00165-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dezmaighne McClain
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

MICHELE BECKWITH

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DEZMAIGHNE MCCLAIN,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-0165 MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: February 11, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 11, 2021, and time was 

excluded under the Speedy Trial Act and Local Code T4.

2. Pursuant to General Order 611, issued on March 17, 2020, the Chief Judge of this Court 

allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2020, based on the public 

health crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Based on the continuing crisis, the Chief Judge of this

Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until 

further notice.”1 In addition to these and other General Orders addressing the pandemic, the Court also 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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declared a judicial emergency based on the Court’s backlog of cases caused by judicial vacancies and 

exacerbated by the pandemic. The Ninth Circuit approved such action in April 2020. 

3. Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide 

health concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive open-endedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

4. Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both 

mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the declarations of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

5. The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of 

justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly 

address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

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6. In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the 

following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the 

ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a 

new date for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting 

any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

7. The parties hereby stipulate to continue the status conference in this case to March 25, 

2021, and to exclude time between February 11, 2021, and March 25, 2021, under Local Code T4. 

8. The parties further agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports, audio and video recordings, and reports of interview, among other 

documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made 

available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to conduct investigation and 

research related to the charges, review discovery in this matter, to discuss the case with his

client, and to prepare for trial, if necessary. Present defense counsel is the third attorney to be 

assigned to represent the defendant and the pandemic has posed challenges in preparing for trial.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 11, 2021 to March 25, 

2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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T4] because it results from a continuance based on the Court’s finding that the ends of justice 

served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.

9. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: February 8, 2021 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ MICHELE BECKWITH

MICHELE BECKWITH

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: February 8, 2021 /s/ MARK REICHEL

MARK REICHEL

Counsel for Defendant 

Dezmaighne McClain

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 10, 2021

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