Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07023/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American President Lines, LTD
Appellee
Government of the Territory of Guam
Appellant
Micronesian Brokers Incorporated
Appellant
Pacific International Co., Inc.
Appellant
R.R. Cruz Market
Appellant
Sea-Land Service, Inc.
Appellee
Town House Department Stores, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

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1Appellants are the Government of the Territory of Guam,

Pacific International Co., Inc., Town House Department Stores,

Inc., Micronesian Brokers Incorporated, and R.R. Cruz Market. 

2Appellees are American President Lines, Ltd. and Sea-Land

Service, Inc. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 1994 Decided July 8, 1994

No. 93-7023

THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92CV00622)

Curtis C. Mechling argued the cause for appellants. With him on

the briefs was Panagiotis C. Bayz. Marvin G. Pickholz entered an

appearance.

I. Michael Greenberger argued the cause for appellees. With him on

the brief were John Townsend Rich, Richard L. Brusca, and Robert S.

Zuckerman. Raina H. Fishbane entered an appearance.

Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, and BUCKLEY, and ROGERS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Appellant shippers, including the

Government of Guam,1 sought reparations from appellee carriers2 in

a proceeding before the Federal Maritime Commission for allegedly

unlawful rates under the Shipping Act, 1916, and the Intercoastal

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3Two statutes are at issue. Appellants alleged that

appellee carriers charged rates in violation of (1) §§ 16 First,

17, and 18(a) of the Shipping Act, 1916, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 815

First, 816, & 817(a) (1988), and (2) § 2 of the Intercoastal

Shipping Act, 1933, 46 U.S.C. app. § 844 (1988). In this opinion

we refer to the former statute as the Shipping Act and to both

acts as the Shipping Acts. 

Shipping Act, 1933.3 Appellants thereafter filed a virtually

identical claim in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. The district court dismissed the complaint

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellants now contend

that the district court erred by not inferring an implied private

civil action under the Shipping Acts, and by not allowing

appellants an opportunity to amend the complaint. For

substantially the reasons set forth in the thoughtful opinion of

the district court, Government of Guam v. American President Lines,

Ltd., 809 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1993) (Guam I ), we affirm the

dismissal of the complaint. Further, we hold that appellants have

waived the right to raise the amendment claim of error on appeal

because they did not file a motion to amend, or seek leave to

amend, the complaint in the district court, and they have presented

no special circumstances to excuse their failure to do so.

I.

The context in which this appeal arises is set forth in the

District Court's opinion from which we quote:

On December 7, 1989, the Government of Guam filed a

complaint with the Commission. That complaint is

virtually identical to the complaint in the instant case.

Each complaint includes four counts. Counts I and II

allege that both defendants charge Guam shippers unjust,

unreasonable, and discriminatory rates in violation of

sections 16 First, 17, and 18(a) of the Shipping Act, 46

U.S.C.App. §§ 815 First, 816, & 817(a), and section 2 of

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* As of June 23, 1989, Sea-Land began filing tariffs with

the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) instead of the FMC. The

two Commissions have separate jurisdictions, the FMC governing

port-to-port water carriers and the ICC governing intermodal

(e.g., rail-and-water) carriers. See 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 801, 832,

& 845b. 

the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 844.

Counts III and IV allege that defendant Sea-Land operates

as a water common carrier without having a required

tariff on file with the Commission,* and also that SeaLand improperly charges varying rates for similarly

situated shippers, in violation of sections 16 First and

17 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 815 First & 816,

and section 2 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 46

U.S.C.App. § 844.

On March 9, 1990, an administrative law judge

granted Guam leave to amend the Commission complaint to

add four shippers as plaintiffs. Three of those shippers

are among the plaintiffs in the present case. In the

same ruling, the ALJ dismissed that portion of the

complaint seeking reparations on behalf of all similarly

situated Guam shippers under a parens patriae theory. In

so ruling, the ALJ relied on Commission decisions holding

that reparations may be awarded only to those who have

actually paid unreasonable rates unless there has been a

valid assignment from one with a legal right to

reparations. The Commission proceeding is presently

ongoing.

Plaintiffs' complaint was filed in this Court on

March 10, 1992. Plaintiffs' asserted purpose in bringing

this action in court is to "toll" the two-year statute of

limitations for the numerous Guam shippers that have

allegedly been injured by defendants' shipping rates.

They have thus moved for certification of a class

consisting of shippers and persons who have dispatched or

received shipments into or out of Guam via the defendant

carriers. At the same time, plaintiffs have moved for a

stay of proceedings in this case pending the Commission's

determination in the parallel administrative proceeding.

Plaintiffs thus concede that the Commission has the task

of resolving the merits of the dispute; they call on

this Court essentially to preserve, and ultimately to

administer, the claims of the class.

Guam I, supra, 809 F. Supp. at 151-52. We write to emphasize two

points.

II.

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1In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court identified four factors: 

(1) whether the plaintiff is part of "the class for whose

especial benefit the statute was enacted"; (2) the evidence of

"legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such

a remedy or to deny one"; (3) whether inferring such a right is

"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative

scheme"; and (4) whether the cause of action is one

traditionally relegated to state law. 422 U.S. at 78. 

Implying a private cause of action where the statute provides

a remedy. Appellants concede that the Shipping Acts do not

expressly provide for a private federal cause of action by a

shipper to challenge a carrier's rates, but they contend that the

district court erred in declining to infer, upon applying the

factors in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), a protective cause of

action on behalf of the Guam shippers as a class. Appellants

maintain that Congress intended such a private cause of action

because an analogous proceeding is impermissible before the Federal

Maritime Commission and the only available way for the Guam

shippers to obtain recovery is by a class action in district court.

Where a statute provides an express remedy, Cort v. Ash is,

strictly speaking, inapplicable. In that case, the Supreme Court

stated that "[i]n determining whether a private remedy is implicit

in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are

relevant."1 422 U.S. at 78. There, the Court faced the issue of

whether a stockholder's derivative suit for damages against

corporate directors could be implied under a criminal statute

prohibiting corporations from making contributions in connection

with Presidential elections. Id. at 68. The Court held that

"implication of such a federal cause of action is not suggested by

the legislative context of [the criminal provision] or required to

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accomplish Congress' purposes in enacting the [Federal Election

Campaign Act]." Id. at 68-69. Thus, because the Shipping Acts

provide appellants with an express reparations remedy before the

Federal Maritime Commission, see 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 821(a), 845a,

the district court concluded that the Cort analysis did not appear

to be directly applicable to appellants' claim that appellee

carriers had violated the provisions of the Shipping Acts requiring

"just and reasonable rates." Guam I, supra, 809 F. Supp. at 153.

Yet, as our opinion in Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation

Training Ctr., Inc., 941 F.2d 1220, 1227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1991),

recognizes, the Cort v. Ash factors are relevant in determining

whether the express remedy provided in a statute was intended by

Congress to be the exclusive remedy. The Danielsen court noted

with approval the Ninth Circuit's application of the Cort test in

determining whether a private civil right of action could be

inferred under the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351, which

itself provided an administrative remedy. Id. (citing

Miscellaneous Serv. Workers, Local # 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661

F.2d 776, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1981)). This court agreed that

implication of a private right would undercut the specific

administrative remedy prescribed by Congress in that statute. Id.

at 1228.

More precisely, the Supreme Court has made clear that when

Congress has provided an express remedy, not all of the Cort

factors have the same weight because the central analysis is

directed at discovering legislative intent by means of "the

language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other

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source." Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local

1263, 489 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1989) (quoting Thompson v. Thompson,

484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (in turn quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc.

v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981))); Transamerica

Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979) (citing

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)).

Where Congress has provided an express remedy, the Court has

explained, "[t]he presumption that a remedy was deliberately

omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a

comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of

procedures for enforcement." Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc.

v. Transport Workers, supra, 451 U.S. at 97). While this

presumption may be overcome without evidence that Members of

Congress actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of

action, see Thompson v. Thompson, supra, 484 U.S. at 179, and

California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981), rebutting the

presumption is not easily accomplished given the "elemental canon"

of statutory construction that "where a statute expressly provides

a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional

remedies." Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, supra,

489 U.S. at 533 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.

Lewis, supra, 444 U.S. at 19). " "[I]n the absence of strong

indicia of contrary congressional intent, [the Court is] compelled

to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it

considered appropriate.' " Id. (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage

Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981)).

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Accordingly, in the instant case, the district court

concluded, upon examining the statutory scheme in the Shipping Acts

and the different language in the Interstate Commerce Act, that in

the absence of evidence of congressional intent to imply a cause of

action, the conclusion was compelled, under California v. Sierra

Club, supra, 451 U.S. at 293, that no implied right of action

should be inferred. Guam I, supra, 809 F. Supp. at 153-54. In

addition, the district court noted that under the Cort factors, see

supra note 4, the first and third factors did not lend weight to

appellants' argument and that appellants had not offered any

supporting legislative history. Id. at 153 n.4.

We find no error in the district court's analysis. First, the

Shipping Acts include a specific reparations remedy. See 46 U.S.C.

app. §§ 821(a), 845a. Second, the statutes provide for enforcement

proceedings in the district court. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 828 &

829; Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, supra, 473 U.S.

at 147. Third, although modeled after the Interstate Commerce Act,

the Shipping Acts do not include a provision, which is in the

Interstate Commerce Act, providing for a district court cause of

action as an alternative to the administrative proceeding. See 49

U.S.C. § 11705(c)(1); United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S.

Co., 284 U.S. 474, 481 (1932). Under the analysis in Karahalios v.

National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, supra, 489 U.S. at 532-33, these

provisions together reinforce the conclusion that an implied right

cannot be inferred because Congress provided for rate regulation in

an administrative agency and specified the circumstances in which

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2Appellants' contention that the district court erred in

applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is meritless. That

doctrine does not create jurisdiction where none otherwise

exists. See United States v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 717

F.2d 593, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Johnson v. Nyack Hosp.,

964 F.2d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 1992). 

3Appellants mistakenly suggest that Cort v. Ash, supra,

discarded statute comparison as a method of gleaning

congressional intent. In Cort, the Supreme Court simply found

the statutory comparison before it to be unhelpful. Cort v. Ash,

supra, 422 U.S. at 82-83 n.14; see also Karahalios v. National

Fed'n of Fed. Employees, supra, 489 U.S. at 534-35. 

it intended for there to be a federal cause of action.2 See

T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 469 (1959)

("reasonable rates" provision creates criterion for administrative

determination of lawful rate rather than a justiciable legal right)

(citing Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co.,

341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951)). A contrary conclusion would undermine

the statutory scheme. Paraphrasing a statement by the Supreme

Court in analogous circumstances, "[o]nly through the action of

[the Federal Maritime Commission] could there be secured the

uniformity of ruling upon which appropriate protection from

unreasonable exactions and unjust discriminations must depend."

United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., supra, 284 U.S. at

483 (referring to the Interstate Commerce Act and quoting Board of

R.R. Comm'rs v. Great N. Ry. Co., 281 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1930)).3

Application of the Cort factors leaves appellants in no better

position. Even assuming that they meet the first and third Cort

factorsif appellants are within the class for whose benefit the

Shipping Acts were enacted and if inferring a private cause of

action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the

legislative schemeappellants point to no legislative history or

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4Appellees maintain that "[p]rior to enactment of the

Shipping Act, several bills were introduced and considered that

would have given express rights to sue for damages caused by

violations of the Act, yet these provisions were rejected in

favor of the administrative remedy ultimately enacted into law." 

See H.R. 17328, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 19 (June 18, 1914); H.R.

450, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (Dec. 6, 1915) (reintroducing

H.R. 17328); H.R. 14337, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 12, 14 (Apr.

7, 1916); and H.R. 10500, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (Jan. 31,

1916). Each of these bills provided for a district court damages

action. Appellees rely, therefore, on the fact that while

Congress incorporated a number of provisions from these bills

into final enactment, it did not incorporate the provisions

providing a district court damages action.

The legislative history indicates that Congress decided to

create a separate shipping board "vested with such powers [as the

Interstate Commerce Commission has]" rather than extend the

jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to common

carriers. See H.R. REP. NO. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 32

(1916); HOUSE COMM. ON THE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON

STEAMSHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN AND DOMESTIC TRADE, H.R.

DOC. NO. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1914) (the Alexander

other source to suggest that Congress intended to imply an

additional remedy to the express administrative remedy it provided

(the second Cort factor) in the Shipping Acts. Appellants have the

burden to show some evidence of congressional intent to create a

remedy in addition to that expressly provided, Suter v. Artist M.,

112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992), and it is not enough simply to argue

that there is nothing in the legislative history that could

reasonably be construed to deny creation of an implied private

federal district court action for Shipping Act violations. See

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U.S. at 571 ("implying

a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is

a hazardous enterprise, at best"). Moreover, appellees point with

some persuasive force to the legislative history of the Shipping

Act as indicating an implicit rejection by Congress of a judicial

damages remedy for shippers.4 Consequently, the district court

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Report). Congress omitted from the Shipping Act a provision

comparable to one in the Interstate Commerce Act providing

shippers a private federal cause of action as an alternative to

an administrative proceeding. See 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1959). To this

extent, the omission suggests that Congress implicitly rejected

the idea of a private remedy under the Shipping Act. See United

States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., supra, 284 U.S. at 481

(Congress intended Shipping Act and Interstate Commerce Act

"should have like interpretation, application and effect," unless

"there be something peculiar in the question under consideration,

or dissimilarity in the terms of the [the two acts] requir[es] a

different conclusion"); id. at 484. Compare Massachusetts Mut.

Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, supra, 473 U.S. at 146 (refusing to

base legislative intent on committee reports describing version

of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 before

floor debate and before Senate-House conferees had "finalized the

operative language") with Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed.

Employees, supra, 489 U.S. at 533-34 (unsuccessful legislative

effort to authorize private litigation demonstrated congressional

intent not to create a private cause of action in legislation

passed as Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). 

could properly conclude that application of the Cort factors is

unlikely to warrant the inference of a private right of action

under the Shipping Acts. Guam I, supra, 809 F. Supp. at 153 n.4.

Appellants' contention that their position does not involve an

attempt to "usurp" the authority of the Federal Maritime Commission

is beside the point. Appellants consider the administrative remedy

inadequate because of (1) the costs to individual shippers in an

administrative proceeding attacking an entire tariff structure, as

distinct from a proceeding seeking reparations for overcharges on

a particular cargo shipment, (2) the two-year statute of

limitations in the face of a proceeding that has been going on for

more than three years, and (3) the unavailability of class action

or parens patriae administrative procedures. Whether procedural

inadequacies exist in the administrative proceeding can be

addressed on appeal from a final order of the Federal Maritime

Commission, as appellants acknowledge. Further, as appellants'

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5The district court suggested to appellants' counsel that

there could be representation of other shippers by appellants'

counsel, and that equitable and other remedies could be a part of

the administrative proceedings, including requesting that the

Guam shippers be certified as a class before the administrative

agency. Noting that appellants' counsel had not asked the

administrative agency for class relief, the district court

observed that although the agency rules were silent on class

relief, there was nothing to prohibit it. Appellants' counsel

did not dispute that these possibilities could be pursued in the

administrative proceedings, but counsel focused on the burden of

notifying all Guam shippers in addition to the three points noted

in the text of this opinion. In their brief on appeal,

appellants acknowledge the possibility of assignment of claims. 

colloquy with the district court regarding the possibility of a

class action before the Commission makes clear, their contention

that the remedies under the Shipping Acts are unavailable to the

Guam shippers is still to be demonstrated.5 Indeed, were there

evidence that the administrative proceedings could not adapt to

what appellants characterize as a proceeding that is unique in

scope, such considerations would not overcome the absence of

evidence that Congress intended to imply the existence of a private

protective cause of action in anticipation of a favorable

administrative ruling on behalf of a class. See Saltzman v. Farm

Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 950 F.2d 466, 469 (7th Cir.

1991) (citing California v. Sierra Club, supra, 451 U.S. at 297);

cf. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs.,

Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 1988).

Many of the cases relied on by appellants for inferring a

cause of action were decided before Cort v. Ash, supra, (1975), and

Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, supra, (1989),

where the Supreme Court made clear its shift in emphasis from its

prior standard to evidence of congressional intent to imply a

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6Thus, Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,

200-01 (1967), J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964),

and Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916),

indicating that a statutory provision for an express remedy

enhanced the possibility that other private causes of action

would be inferred, are irrelevant in light of the shift in the

Supreme Court's position. Their context is distinguishable as

well. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, supra, 289

U.S. at 204 (suit by United States to recover costs of removing

negligently sunk vessel: congressional intent not to withhold a

remedy that ensures full effectiveness of Rivers and Harbors Act

of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432 (§ 27 of

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes federal cause of

action for rescission or damages by stockholder with regard to

merger authorized by proxy statement alleged to contain false and

misleading statements violative of § 14 of the Act: "[p]rivate

enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to

Commission action"); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, supra,

241 U.S. at 39 (safety of employees and travelers principal

object of statutes at issue, and right of private action by

injured employee, even without Employers' Liability Act, never

doubted). 

7Maritime Serv. Corp. v. Sweet Brokerage De Puerto Rico,

Inc., 537 F.2d 560, 562 (1st Cir. 1976), and Sea-Land Serv., Inc.

v. Murrey & Son's Co., 824 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1987), cited

by appellants, involved implied rights of action for carriers

under the Shipping Acts. See Guam I, supra, 809 F. Supp. at 154

(§ 22(a) of the Shipping Act provides no remedy for carriers, in

contrast to the express remedy for shippers). Both cases note

that the Supreme Court had found an implied private cause of

action for carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act, on which

the Shipping Act was modeled, before the Interstate Commerce Act

was amended to provide carriers with an express remedy. Maritime

Serv. Corp. v. Sweet Brokerage De Puerto Rico, Inc., supra, 537

F.2d at 563; Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Murrey & Son's Co., supra,

824 F.2d at 743. Appellants also cite Orleans Materials and

Equip. Co. v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 325, 331 (E.D.

La. 1963) (Orleans I ) (Federal Maritime Commission has primary

jurisdiction, court retains jurisdiction), and Orleans Materials

and Equip. Co. v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 322, 324

(E.D. La. 1963) (on rehearing) (Orleans II ) (contract claims

presented federal question under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1357), which we do

not find persuasive authority because, for example, they involved

claims under contracts, not challenges to the reasonableness of

rates. See also Nepera Chemical, Inc. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,

794 F.2d 688, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (shipper's common law

negligence action against common carrier not barred by statutory

rate-correction procedure; relying on five considerations of

Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84

(1962)). 

private cause of action.6 Other cases are readily distinguishable.7

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8There is no merit to appellants' contention that Carnation

Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 & 932 (1966)

(antitrust treble damages action), disavowed the holdings in

United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., supra, 284 U.S.

474, and Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570

(1952)on which the Second Circuit relied in Piazza, supra, 210

F.2d at 948that actions for reparations from violations of the

Shipping Act lie within the "exclusive primary jurisdiction" of

the Federal Maritime Commission. In Carnation the Court was

addressing reconciliation of the antitrust laws with the

antitrust exemption in the Shipping Act. Indeed, the Court

itself found no conflict with Cunard, supra, 284 U.S. at 484, and

Far East, supra, 342 U.S. at 573-76. Carnation Co. v. Pacific

Contrary to appellants' contention, nothing suggests that the

parties' failure in Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees,

supra, to pursue their administrative remedies prior to bringing

suit in court was a relevant consideration in the Supreme Court's

decision not to infer a private cause of action; rather, the

Court's conclusion was based on the lack of evidence of

congressional intent. 489 U.S. at 532-33, 536. Furthermore, we

agree with the district court, Guam I, supra, 809 F. Supp. at 154,

and appellees, that D.L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, Inc., 210

F.2d 947 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839 (1954) (Piazza ), is

most clearly on point. In that case, after losing before the

Federal Maritime Board, the Piazza company sued in federal district

court for the same amount of reparations sought in the

administrative proceeding. Piazza, supra, 210 F.2d at 948. The

Second Circuit, noting that the Supreme Court had held that

exclusive primary jurisdiction over recovery of reparations under

the Shipping Act is in the Federal Maritime Board, held that the

company's only remedy was that in the statute, namely review of the

Board's decision by the court of appeals. Id. Appellants'

argument that Piazza is no longer good law is unpersuasive.8 Their

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Westbound Conference, supra, 383 U.S. at 220, 222. Nor can

Carnation be read, as appellants suggest, as authority for the

general proposition that in the absence of an express judicial

remedy, where rights would be lost as a result of a statute of

limitations bar, the district court must retain jurisdiction in

order to toll the limitations period. In Carnation, the

plaintiffs were proceeding under the antitrust statutes, which

provided judicial remedies. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific

Westbound Conference, 336 F.2d 650, 651 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964). 

Similarly, the contract actions over which the district court and

the Federal Maritime Commission have concurrent jurisdiction, see

Firearms Import & Export Corp. v. Lykes Bros. S.S Co., 458

F.Supp. 88, 90 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (admiralty action to recover

affreightment overcharges); Orleans I, supra note 10, 213 F.

Supp. at 329, do not support appellants' contention that Piazza

is no longer good law; those cases involve contract causes of

actions that predate, and were not preempted by, the Shipping

Acts, not claims that tariffs are unlawful under the Shipping

Acts' reasonable-rate regulatory scheme. 

9The underlying claim in Interconex, Inc. v. Federal

Maritime Comm'n, supra, 572 F.2d 27, was that Interconex, a

carrier, applied the wrong tariff rate because of its own alleged

misstatements regarding the weights and measures of certain

shipments. 572 F.2d at 28. The order under review was a final

order of the Federal Maritime Commission dismissing Interconex's

claim against a third carrier, which Interconex had engaged to

transport the cargo. Id. The issue of subject-matter

jurisdiction over shippers' suits for reparations was never

before the court. Although there is dictum in Interconex that

"it would have been possible for Interconex to file a protective

action" in district court, id. at 29, as appellees point out,

that action would have been similar to the admiralty action in

Firearms Import & Export Corp. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., supra

note 11, 458 F. Supp. 88, or the contract action in Orleans I,

supra note 10, 213 F. Supp. 325, not the reparations suit in the

instant case. 

reliance on Interconex, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 572 F.2d

27 (2d Cir. 1978), is misplaced because the Piazza issue was not

before the court.9

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of

appellants' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

III.

Amending a complaint. Appellants also contend that the

district court erred in dismissing the complaint without affording

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10The concluding paragraph of appellants' opposition to the

motion to dismiss also stated that:

plaintiffs can and will amend their Complaint, if

necessary, to assert additional claims, under different

legal theories, which are indisputably within this

Court's jurisdiction. If there is any doubt about this

Court's jurisdiction over the claims already pled,

therefore, plaintiffs request that the motion be denied

on the condition that plaintiffs amend their Complaint

as discussed above. See Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d

810 (11th Cir. 1985) (first emphasis in original; 

second emphasis added). 

11Appellants' counsel twice stated that appellants wanted

the district court to deny appellees' motion to dismiss or,

alternatively, "to stay the case, and to await a determination by

the [Federal Maritime Commission] as to an issue that could

clearly give us a jurisdictional basis to proceed before the

court." 

them an opportunity to amend. With such an opportunity, they

maintain that they could have added new legal theories under the

Interstate Commerce Act, see 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a), and in

admiralty, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

The complaint purported to state a cause of action under the

Shipping Acts, exclusively. However, in their opposition to the

motion to dismiss, appellants stated that if the Federal Maritime

Commission were to agree with one of the carriers that it was

subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,

then appellants would amend their complaint to add a claim under

the Interstate Commerce Act and a claim in admiralty.10 Likewise,

during argument on the motion to dismiss, appellants' counsel

indicated that their interest in pursuing other legal theories

rested on a future ruling by the Federal Maritime Commission and

the court of appeals.11

"The normal procedure for requesting an amendment to the

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12FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) provides:

A party may amend the party's pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsible

pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which

no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has

not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may

so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is

served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent

of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires. 

13Appellants' reliance on Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of

St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.

899 (1979), is misplaced because the Eighth Circuit was not

addressing the amendment issue, and it did not suggest that the

complaint in federal court is to file a FED. R. CIV. P. 15 motion to

amend together with the proposed amendment or new pleading."12 Bank

of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1192

(7th Cir. 1990); 3 JAMES W. MOORE & RICHARD D. FREER, MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE ¶ 15.12, at 15-115 to 15-116 (2d ed. 1994). Because

appellants had not previously amended their complaint and a motion

to dismiss is not ordinarily considered a "responsive pleading"

under Rule 15(a), appellants were free to amend the complaint as a

matter of right prior to the district court's ruling on the motion

to dismiss. See Confederate Memorial Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines, 995

F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Appellants' counsel did not file a motion to amend the

complaint, nor did they submit an amended complaint to the district

court. The district court's remarks during argument, expressing

doubts about appellants' theory of an implied cause of action under

the Shipping Acts, put appellants on notice of the need to amend

the complaint if they wanted new theories to be considered by the

district court.13 Yet, appellants' counsel did not advise the

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district court must search for legal theories favorable to the

plaintiffs that are not mentioned in the complaint. 

district court of their readiness to amend the complaint, even in

the face of appellees' counsel's reference during argument to the

fact that appellants had not amended either their administrative

complaint or their district court complaint to state a claim under

the Interstate Commerce Act. Under these circumstances, we

conclude that neither appellants' opposition to the motion to

dismiss, nor their counsel's reference to the assertion of new

legal theories contingent on future administrative action, was

sufficient to constitute a motion under Rule 15(a) to amend the

complaint. See Glenn v. First Nat'l Bank in Grand Junction, 868

F.2d 368, 370 (10th Cir. 1989); cf. Kowal v. MCI Communications

Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

7(b) and quoting Confederate Memorial Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines, supra,

995 F.2d at 299).

Appellants also did not seek leave to amend their complaint

after the district court granted appellees' motion to dismiss;

instead appellants filed a notice of appeal. See Confederate

Memorial Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines, supra, 995 F.2d at 299; see also

Glenn v. First Nat'l Bank in Grand Junction, supra, 868 F.2d at

371; National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 930

F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1991). Appellants offer no explanation for

not seeking leave to amend. See Twohy v. First Nat'l Bank of

Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1985); cf. Bank of Waunakee

v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., supra, 906 F.2d at 1192. However,

their failure to seek leave to amend is consistent with their

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14See National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf,

supra, 930 F.2d at 245; Glenn v. First Nat'l Bank in Grand

Junction, supra, 868 F.2d at 371; 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1489, at 694 (2d ed. 1990). 

15See, e.g., The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889

F.2d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing "long-odds exception"

allowing amendment after appeal where "[j]ustice ... requires

further proceedings") (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843

F.2d 631, 635-36 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Royal Business

Group, Inc. v. Realist, Inc., 933 F.2d 1056, 1066 (1st Cir.

1991); Powers v. Boston Cooper Corp., 926 F.2d 109, 111 (1st.

Cir. 1991). 

counsel's representations to the district court that appellants'

interest in amending the complaint was tied to future

administrative action.

Appellants, further, have not suggested why an exception to

the general rules favoring the finality of judgments and the

expeditious resolution of litigation should be made in their case.14

While our approach need not be inflexible,15 appellants offer no

reason for not following the normal course for amending a

complaint, and we are confronted with a record showing that their

interest in amending the complaint rested on a future contingency

that has yet to occur. Accordingly, we hold that appellants have

waived the right to raise the amendment claim of error on appeal,

see The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, supra note 18, 889

F.2d at 22-23; see also Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., supra,

16 F.3d at 1280 (citing Confederate Memorial Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines,

supra, 995 F.2d at 299), and they have failed to show that they are

entitled to a remand by this court to permit them to seek leave to

amend. See Royal Business Group, Inc. v. Realist, Inc., supra note

18, 933 F.2d at 1066; 3 MOORE, supra, at 15-109 to 15-110; 6

WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 698.

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Affirmed.

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