Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01892/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01892-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ford Motor Company
Defendant
Derek Rhodehouse
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEREK RHODEHOUSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DOES 1

to 20, Inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-01892-JAM-CMK

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Derek Rhodehouse (“Mr. Rhodehouse” or “Plaintiff”) 

sued Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) in California state 

court. ECF No. 1-3. Ford removed the case to federal court, ECF 

No. 1, and filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Rhodehouse’s complaint, 

ECF No. 6. Mr. Rhodehouse opposes the motion. ECF No. 8. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES 

in part Ford’s motion to dismiss and gives Plaintiff leave to 

amend.1

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for October 18, 2016.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2014, Mr. Rhodehouse was injured while riding as 

a passenger in a 1999 Ford F-350. First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) at 4, ECF No. 6-3. Mr. Rhodehouse alleges that he was 

injured when the car rolled over, the roof crushed, and his 

seatbelt failed. Id. Mr. Rhodehouse also alleges that Ford knew 

that seatbelts in some Ford cars were “unsafe and would unbuckle 

in an accident.” FAC at 5. Additionally, Mr. Rhodehouse alleges 

that Ford knew “that the construction, fabrication, and 

manufacture of and on the vehicle in which Plaintiff was riding 

was below standard and that . . . [an] accident would result in 

the roof crushing down and injuring passengers.” Id. 

Mr. Rhodehouse filed his suit against Ford in Trinity County 

Superior Court in January 2015. Notice of Removal Ex. 1, at 1. 

Seven months later, Mr. Rhodehouse amended his complaint and 

served Ford with the FAC. FAC at 1; Notice of Removal Ex. 1, at 

11. Ford removed the case to this Court based on diversity 

jurisdiction. Notice of Removal at 2. A week later, Ford filed 

a motion to dismiss Mr. Rhodehouse’s case based on lack of 

personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Mot. to 

Dismiss at 1. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

When a defendant moves to dismiss based on lack of personal 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

that jurisdiction is proper. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 

1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). “There are two types of personal 

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jurisdiction: general and specific.” Ziegler v. Indian River 

Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). General jurisdiction 

exists if the nonresident's contacts with the forum are 

continuous and systematic, and the exercise of jurisdiction 

satisfies “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Id. A court may have general jurisdiction over a 

defendant even when the claims at issue are not related to the 

defendant’s activity in that forum. Durham v. Halibrand 

Performance Corp., 2014 WL 12519938, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 

2014). Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, allows a court 

“to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose forum-related 

activities gave rise to the action before the court.” Id. 

B. Analysis

1. Specific Jurisdiction

Mr. Rhodehouse does not argue that this Court has general 

jurisdiction over Ford. Rather, Mr. Rhodehouse argues that his 

injuries arose out of and relate to Ford’s forum-related 

activities. Opp’n at 11. 

The Ninth Circuit has set forth a three-part test to 

determine whether a defendant's contacts with the forum state 

are sufficient to subject the defendant to specific 

jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 

1995). Under the three-part test, specific jurisdiction exists 

if: (1) the out-of-state defendant purposefully availed itself 

of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the forum 

state’s laws; (2) the claims arise out of or result from the 

defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of 

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jurisdiction is reasonable and comports with fair play and 

substantial justice. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing the first two prongs of the test. Royal & Sun All. 

Ins. Plc v. Castor Transp., LLC, 2016 WL 633443, at *5 (S.D. 

Cal. Feb. 17, 2016). If the plaintiff successfully establishes 

the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to 

“‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction 

would not be reasonable.” Id. (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred 

Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Plaintiff argues that he can establish the first prong 

because “Ford has very extensive contacts with California.” 

Opp’n at 11. Mr. Rhodehouse asserts that

Ford advertises extensively in California . . . It 

sells large quantities . . . of its vehicles in this 

state. It has offices and employees in this state. It 

has been qualified to do business in this state since 

1922. It has an agent for service of process in this 

state. 

Opp’n at 11. 

Ford does not vigorously contest that this first

jurisdictional prong has been satisfied. Additionally, another 

federal court in California determining whether it had specific 

jurisdiction over Ford “assumed” the first prong was satisfied 

by “Ford’s business presence in California.” Sullivan v. Ford 

Motor Co., 2016 WL 6520174, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016). 

Given that Ford vehicles saturate California roads and 

dealerships and that Ford advertisements pervade California 

media, this Court finds that Ford has purposefully availed 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California. 

With respect to the second jurisdictional prong, i.e 

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whether the claims arise out of or result from the defendant’s 

forum-related activities, the Ninth Circuit uses a “but for” 

analysis. Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. 

Supp. 3d 981, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2015). “Under the ‘but for’ test, 

‘a lawsuit arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum 

state if a direct nexus exists between those contacts and the 

cause of action.’” In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust 

Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Oneok, 

Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). Additionally,

“[i]n a specific jurisdiction inquiry, [courts in the Ninth 

Circuit] consider the extent of the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum and the degree to which the plaintiff’s suit is 

related to those contacts. A strong showing on one axis will 

permit a lesser showing on the other.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue 

Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, 

“specific jurisdiction might . . . exist as to a defendant with 

more extensive contacts with the forum even though those 

contacts are not as closely related to the claims being 

asserted.” Senne, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 1041. 

Mr. Rhodehouse argues that his injuries arose out of and 

relate to Ford’s forum-related activities for various reasons. 

First, Mr. Rhodehouse notes that at the time of his injury, 

Plaintiff resided in California and the vehicle involved was 

registered in California. Opp’n at 11. Mr. Rhodehouse adds 

that “Ford’s systematic activities in this State make it likely 

that many of its vehicles sold in other forums will end up 

owned, registered, and operated in this State.” Id. Mr. 

Rhodehouse implies that without Ford’s extensive advertising and

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network of dealerships in California, the truck in which Mr. 

Rhodehouse was injured would not have been in California. Id. 

Ford counters that no specific jurisdiction exists here

because “[t]he subject truck was manufactured in Kentucky and 

sold to an independently-owned dealership in Canada.” Reply at 

5. Ford argues that the fact that “the vehicle was registered 

in California and Plaintiff was injured in California is of no 

import.” Id. 

Ford cites to several cases from around the country in 

support of its contentions, arguing that these cases compel this 

Court to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The Court disagrees. 

Ford relies heavily on the Supreme Court case Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). In Daimler, the Court held that it 

violated due process for a California court to exercise general 

jurisdiction over Daimler, a subsidiary of Mercedes-Benz USA. 

Id. at 763. But Ford’s reliance on Daimler is misplaced. 

First, Daimler dealt only with general jurisdiction, not 

specific jurisdiction. Second, Daimler involved “a claim 

brought by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based 

on events occurring entirely outside the United States.” Id. at 

750. Finally, Daimler included this telling footnote: 

Colloquy at oral argument illustrated the respective 

provinces of general and specific jurisdiction over 

persons. Two hypothetical scenarios were posed: 

First, if a California plaintiff, injured in a 

California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured 

vehicle, sued Daimler in California court alleging 

that the vehicle was defectively designed, that 

court’s adjudicatory authority would be premised on 

specific jurisdiction. . . . Second, if a similar 

accident took place in Poland and injured Polish 

plaintiffs sued Daimler in California court, the 

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question would be one of general jurisdiction. 

Id. at 754 n.5 (emphasis added). This footnote expressly 

contemplates the situation here. Mr. Rhodehouse, California 

resident, was injured in a California accident while riding in a 

vehicle manufactured by Ford. The Daimler footnote thus suggests 

that this Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Ford. 

Ford also cites Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 

3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2015), where the court found it did not have 

personal jurisdiction over Ford. Mot. at 7. But, in Cahen, the 

plaintiffs did “not address or oppose Ford’s contention that 

specific jurisdiction does not lie here.” Cahen, 147 F. Supp. 

3d at 962. Additionally, the Cahen court summarized its finding 

regarding lack of specific jurisdiction, stating that “[i]n 

short, the Ford plaintiffs bring solely Oregon and Washington 

causes of action stemming from transactions that occurred in 

those states.” Id. The court also noted that the plaintiffs 

did not reside in California. Id. Here, unlike in Cahen, the 

events giving rise to this suit occurred in a Ford vehicle in 

California. 

Ford next cites to Pitts v. Ford Motor Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d 

676 (S.D. Miss. 2015). In Pitts, the accident occurred in 

Mississippi, but the plaintiffs did not reside in Mississippi,

and there was no evidence that the car was registered in 

Mississippi. Id. at 679-80. Pitts, therefore, is not directly 

analogous to Mr. Rhodehouse’s case. Even if Pitts were directly 

analogous, Pitts was not necessarily correct in its ruling. The

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia expressly disagreed 

with the Pitts holding, stating that it “unreasonably limits 

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state authority.” State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. McGraw, 788 

S.E.2d 319, 343 (W.Va. 2016). The McGraw court also 

“[d]ecline[d] to use the place of sale as a per se rule to 

defeat specific jurisdiction.” Id.

Despite citing a litany of non-binding cases, Ford ignores

Plaintiff’s arguments in his opposition concerning an

instructive and binding Supreme Court case: J. McIntyre 

Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). In 

McIntyre, the Supreme Court held that a New Jersey court could 

not exercise personal jurisdiction over an English machine 

manufacturer. Id. at 2791. Justice Breyer’s controlling 

concurrence (joined by Justice Alito) provided the narrowest 

grounds for the decision. Justice Breyer stated that he agreed 

with Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion only to the extent that 

it held that New Jersey could not exercise jurisdiction over the 

specific defendant. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2794(Breyer, J.,

concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer disagreed with the 

lower court’s bright-line rule that “a producer is subject to 

jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it

‘knows or reasonably should know that its products are 

distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might

lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.’” 

Id. at 2793 (emphasis in original). But Justice Breyer also 

disagreed “with the plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction 

rule.” Id.

Justice Breyer’s concurrence in McIntyre contemplates a 

rule that considers the size of the defendant manufacturer’s 

business. He stated:

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What might appear fair in the case of a large 

manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an

equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a 

distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small 

manufacturer who sells his product exclusively to a 

large distributor, who resells a single item to a 

buyer from a distant State.

Id. (parentheticals omitted). Justice Breyer continued, “[i]t 

may be that a larger firm can readily ‘alleviate the risk of 

burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the 

expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, 

severing its connection with the state.” Id. at 2794 (citing 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 

(1980)). Justice Breyer’s opinion clearly expresses a concern

of requiring a small manufacturer to litigate a case in a forum 

to which the small manufacturer has no connection. At the same 

time, the opinion also implies that it would not be 

fundamentally unfair to require a large manufacturer such as

Ford to be required to respond in the chosen forum in a products 

liability action initiated by a plaintiff such as Mr. Rhodehouse 

who is allegedly injured in one of the manufacturer’s primary 

consumer markets. As Plaintiff argues, the Supreme Court’s 

divided opinion in McIntyre suggests that a Supreme Court 

majority would find that exercising jurisdiction here does not

violate due process.

Ford has strong and pervasive connections to California, 

i.e. Ford “specifically seeks, or expects” to sell its cars in 

California. In light of these strong connections, the fact that 

the accident injured a California resident and occurred in the 

state of California in a California-registered vehicle

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sufficiently establishes a nexus between Ford’s contacts with 

California and Mr. Rhodehouse’s claims. The Court therefore 

finds that Plaintiff has established the second prong of the 

Ninth Circuit’s three-part test for jurisdiction. 

As to the third prong, Ford does not argue that it would be

“unreasonable” for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over 

Ford.

In summary, applying Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 

precedent to the facts of this case demonstrates that exercising

specific jurisdiction over Ford in this case comports with due 

process. The Court limits its holding specifically to the facts 

of this case and this opinion should not be read to suggest that 

California courts have general jurisdiction over Ford or that as 

a general principle of law a California court can assert 

specific jurisdiction over Ford in a case involving an accident 

that did not occur in California. 

2. Failure to State a Claim

Ford argues that Mr. Rhodehouse’s FAC fails under Rule 

12(b)(6) in its entirety. As to Mr. Rhodehouse’s first cause of 

action for strict products liability, Ford argues that Mr. 

Rhodehouse “fails to even specify whether the alleged defect is a 

manufacturing or design defect.” Mot. at 11. But Plaintiff 

alleges both design and manufacturing defects. See FAC at 4, 

¶ L-4(b) (indicating that Ford “designed and manufactured 

component parts” of the vehicle). Plaintiff also indicates the

allegedly defective parts of the vehicle: the roof and the 

seatbelts. Id. at 4-5. Mr. Rhodehouse has sufficiently pled a

strict products liability claim.

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Mr. Rhodehouse also brings negligence and breach of warranty 

claims. FAC at 4. Because the FAC does not support these claims 

with any facts, the Court dismisses both claims with leave to 

amend. 

III. SANCTIONS

The Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements (“Order”) 

on August 11, 2016. ECF No. 3-2. The Order limits memoranda in 

support of and in opposition to motions to dismiss to fifteen 

pages and reply memoranda in support of motions to dismiss to 

five pages. The Order also states that an attorney who exceeds 

the page limits must pay monetary sanctions of $50.00 per page 

and that the Court will not consider any arguments made past the 

page limit. Ford’s reply memorandum exceeds the page limit by 

five pages. The Court therefore orders Ford’s counsel to pay 

$250.00 in sanctions to the Clerk of the Court within five days 

of the date of this Order.

IV. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART

without prejudice AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss. Plaintiff must file his amended complaint within twenty 

days of the date of this Order. Defendant’s responsive pleading 

shall be filed 20 days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2016

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