Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-30262/USCOURTS-ca9-11-30262-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Faustino Gomez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FAUSTINO GOMEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-30262

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-06004-

LRS-1

ORDER AND

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 4, 2013—Seattle, Washington

Filed April 24, 2014

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Ronald M. Gould,

and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Paez

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2 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel withdrew an opinion filed October 7, 2013,

filed a new opinion, and denied as moot the defendant’s

petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in an

appeal from an illegal reentry conviction and sentence.

In the new opinion, the panel affirmed the conviction,

vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

The panel held that the underlying removal was invalid

for two independent reasons: (1) the stipulated removal

proceeding violated the defendant’s right to due process

because he was denied his right to appeal the removal order,

and (2) the immigration judge violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b)

by finding the defendant’s waiver of rights “voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent” on the basis of an insufficient

record. The panel nonetheless affirmed the conviction

because the violations were harmless given that the defendant

was ineligible for voluntary departure at the time of the

removal proceeding.

The panel held that the defendant’s prior conviction for

sexual conduct with a minor under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405

did not constitute a “crime of violence” within the meaning

of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The panel held that § 13-

1405, including the version for offenses against victims

“under fifteen,” is not categorically a “crime of violence”

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 3

because it is missing an element of the generic offenses of

sexual abuse and statutory rape, and the district court’s

finding to the contrary was reversible error. The panel

answered in the affirmative the previously-open question

whether a four-year age difference is an element of generic

statutory rape. Because § 13-1405 is missing an element of

these generic crimes, the panel did not undertake the modified

categorical analysis. The panel rejected the government’s

argument that the sentencing error was harmless.

COUNSEL

Rebecca L. Pennell (argued), Federal Defenders of Eastern

Washington & Idaho, Yakima, Washington, for DefendantAppellant.

Alexander C. Ekstrom (argued), United States Attorney’s

Office for the Eastern District of Washington, Yakima,

Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

ORDER

The opinion filed on October 7, 2013 and reported at 732

F.3d 971 is withdrawn. The opinion shall not be cited as

precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit. It is

replaced by the new opinion filed concurrently with this

order.

With the withdrawal of the prior opinion, the Appellant’s

Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc is

denied as moot. A petition for rehearing may be filed in

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4 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

response to the new opinion as provided by Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 35 and 40.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Faustino Gomez appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with illegal

reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Gomez argues that his

underlying 2006 removal was invalid because the stipulated

removal proceeding violated his right to due process and

denied him an opportunity to seek voluntary departure. We

hold that the removal was invalid for two independent

reasons: (1) the stipulated removal proceeding violated

Gomez’s right to due process because he was denied his right

to appeal the removal order, and (2) the Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) by finding Gomez’s

waiver of rights “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” on the

basis of an insufficient record. Nonetheless, we affirm

Gomez’s § 1326 conviction because the violations were

harmless given that Gomez was ineligible for voluntary

departure at the time of the 2006 proceeding.

Gomez also challenges the district court’s imposition of

a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement. He argues that his

2004 conviction for sexual conduct with a minor under

Arizona Revised Statute section 13-1405 does not constitute

a “crime of violence” as defined by United States Sentencing

Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). We

agree. We hold that § 13-1405, including the version for

offenses against victims “under fifteen,” does not

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 5

categorically meet the generic definition of “sexual abuse of

a minor” or of “statutory rape.” After Descamps v. United

States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), we no longer analyze a statute

missing an element of a generic offense, as here, under the

modified categorical approach. Thus, we vacate Gomez’s

sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

A.

In January 2004, Gomez was indicted on three counts of

violating Arizona Revised Statute section 13-1405 for sexual

conduct with a minor who was under the age of fifteen. 

Count one charged Gomez with digitally penetrating the

victim, and Counts two and three charged him with having

sexual intercourse with her. In September 2004, Gomez

signed a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of

“Attempted Sexual Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of

15” in violation of § 13-1001 (attempt) and § 13-1405 (sexual

conduct with a minor). In November 2004, Gomez was

sentenced to a term of imprisonment, not to be released until

January 16, 2006.

On January 17, 2006, the immigration authorities served

Gomez, who was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s

(“ICE”) custody, with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). Gomez

signed and returned a “request for prompt hearing.” The

NTA included the allegation that he had been convicted of the

§ 13-1405 offenses. ICE transferred Gomez to Eloy

Detention Center where he received, on January 19, 2006, a

revised NTA that omitted any reference to his past

conviction. Gomez again signed a “request for prompt

hearing.” While Gomez was in a cell with other aliens, an

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6 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

immigration official read to them en masse a Stipulated

Removal form in Spanish. Gomez does not remember

whether he had a copy of the form when it was read to the

group. After the en masse reading, Gomez met individually

with an immigration officer who told Gomez that he could be

removed immediately if he signed the form. Gomez claims

that during the individual meeting, “the form was not

reviewed again, and [he] did not read the form.” The whole

process lasted less than forty-five minutes. Gomez signed the

preprinted form, which contained both English and Spanish

statements waiving Gomez’s rights to counsel, ¶4, to a

hearing before an IJ, ¶5, to any form of relief (including

voluntary departure), ¶8, and to appeal, ¶13. Without a

hearing, the IJ issued a two paragraph decision and order on

January 20, 2006, finding Gomez’s uncounseled waiver of

rights to be “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Gomez

was removed to Mexico via Nogales, Arizona that same day.

B.

On December 23, 2010, Gomez was arrested for driving

under the influence of alcohol in Washington state. A day

later, an ICE agent located Gomez in the Franklin County Jail

in Washington. Gomez was indicted on January 11, 2011, for

illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.1 Gomez

1

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) provides that “any alien who–(1) has been denied

admission, excluded, deported, or removed . . . and thereafter (2) enters,

attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States [barring

some exceptions] . . . shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more

than 2 years [subject to enhanced penalties under § 1326(b)], or both.”

We have recognized that “the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (‘IIRIRA’) amended the

immigration statutes so as to eliminate the previous legal distinction

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 7

moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the

underlying stipulated removal proceeding was invalid. The

district court denied the motion. A week later, Gomez filed

a motion for reconsideration along with a declaration, stating,

inter alia, that he had not understood the stipulated removal

proceeding.

2 Although the district court denied Gomez’s

motion for reconsideration, the court characterized the

validity of Gomez’s removal proceeding as “a close

question.” Gomez entered a guilty plea, reserving his right to

appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. 

The probation officer prepared a pre-sentence report

(“PSR”) and recommended a total offense level of twentytwo. The total offense level included a sixteen-level

enhancement based on the probation officer’s determination

that Gomez had been previously deported after being

convicted of a “crime of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The PSR assigned Gomez six criminal

history points, for a criminal history category of III, and a

Guidelines sentencing range of fifty-one to sixty-three

months imprisonment. Without the sixteen-level

enhancement, the sentencing range for Gomez would likely

between deportation, removal and exclusion, merging all of these

proceedings into a broader category entitled ‘removal proceedings.’” 

United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 933, 934 (9th Cir. 1999)

(footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Pantin, 155 F.3d 91, 92 (2d Cir.

1998)). We refer to Gomez’s “removal” proceedings, though we note that

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and other cases we cite sometimes refer to

“deportation” proceedings. “[A]ny distinction between deportation and

removal is legally insignificant for purposes of § 1326.” Id. at 935.

2 According to the pre-sentence report prepared for sentencing, Gomez

completed the sixth grade in Mexico and is able to read and write in

Spanish, but unable to communicate in English.

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8 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

have been ten to sixteen months. See United States

Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, Sentencing

Table (Nov. 1, 2010).3

On September 8, 2011, the district court conducted a

hearing on objections to the PSR. Gomez’s primaryobjection

was to the sixteen-level sentencing enhancement for his 2004

§ 13-1405 conviction. Gomez argued that the conviction did

not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the categorical or

modified categorical approaches.

On September 15, 2011, the district court conducted a

sentencing hearing. The district court acknowledged the

PSR’s recommended Guidelines sentencing range offifty-one

to sixty-three months, and found that Gomez’s § 13-1405

conviction was “in fact categorically statutory rape,” which

is a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The

district court also conducted an alternative analysis, assuming

that the generic definition of “statutory rape” included a fouryear age differential, and found that Gomez satisfied this

element because the court could consider Gomez’s age at the

time of the § 13-1405 conviction given that his date of birth

appeared on the “judgement [sic] paperwork.” Finally, the

district court noted several reasons for imposing a belowGuidelines sentence. It also noted that it would likely have

given the same sentence even if it erred in applying the

sixteen-level enhancement. The district court then imposed

3 The PSR used the 2010 United States Sentencing Commission

Guidelines Manual. Pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D), if Gomez’s Arizona

conviction had not qualified as a crime of violence, his base offense level

likely would have been increased by only four levels, rather than sixteen,

yielding a total offense level of ten, rather than twenty-two.

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 9

a sentence of twenty-two months imprisonment and three

years of supervised release.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to review a final judgment of the

district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de

novo a claim that a defect in a prior removal proceeding

precludes reliance on the final removal order in a subsequent

§ 1326 proceeding.” United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d

1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 322

(2012). “We review the district court’s findings of fact for

clear error. We may affirm a district court’s denial of a

motion to dismiss an indictment on any basis supported by

the record.” Id. (citation omitted).

“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of

the Sentencing Guidelines,” United States v. RodriguezOcampo, 664 F.3d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009))

(internal quotation marks omitted), including a “district

court’s determination that a prior conviction qualifies as a

‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines,” United States v.

Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 907

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Conviction

When an alien defendant is prosecuted for illegal reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, he may not collaterally attack the

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underlying deportation order “unless the alien demonstrates”

that:

(1) [he] exhausted any administrative

remedies that may have been available to seek

relief against the order; (2) the deportation

proceedings at which the order was issued

improperly deprived the alien of the

opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the

entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); United States v. Gonzalez-Villalobos, 724

F.3d 1125, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2013). “An underlying removal

order is ‘fundamentally unfair’ if: ‘(1) [a defendant’s] due

process rights were violated by defects in his underlying

deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a

result of the defects.’” United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa,

364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)

(quoting United States v. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d 1194,

1197 (9th Cir. 1998)).

A defendant can establish the first two prongs of

§ 1326(d) by showing that he was denied judicial review of

his removal proceeding in violation of due process. See

Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1043; Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d

at 1049–50. Due process requires that

[W]here a determination made in an

administrative proceeding is to play a critical

role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal

sanction, there must be some meaningful

review of the administrative proceeding. This

principle means at the very least that where

the defects in an administrative proceeding

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 11

foreclose judicial review of that proceeding,

an alternative means of obtaining judicial

review must be made available before the

administrative order may be used to establish

conclusively an element of a criminal offense.

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–38

(1987) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also United

States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1993).

A defendant can also satisfy the first two prongs of

§ 1326(d) by showing that immigration officials in the

underlying removal proceeding violated a regulation designed

to protect an alien’s right to judicial review. See United

States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1084–85 (9th Cir.

2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1983 (2012). “[T]he Supreme

Court has ruled that when Congress enacts a procedure, aliens

are entitled to it.” Id. (citing United States ex rel. Knauff v.

Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the

procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far

as an alien denied entry is concerned.”)); see also United

States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is a

well-known maxim that agencies must complywith their own

regulations.” (quoting Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d

1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Once a due process or a qualifying regulatory violation

has been established, we evaluate the third prong of § 1326(d)

(that the deportation order was “fundamentally unfair”) as a

“prejudice” inquiry. See Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1039

(noting that we have long held that “a defendant seeking to

exclude evidence of a prior removal order in a prosecution for

illegal reentry” must demonstrate a due process violation and

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“‘bears the burden of proving prejudice.’” (quoting United

States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992) (en

banc) and citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3))); see also United

States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1980)

(explaining that for the purposes of a § 1326 prosecution we

conduct a two-step inquiry to determine if a regulatory

violation invalidates an underlying removal order: (1) “the

regulation itself must serve a purpose of benefit to the alien”

and (2) the violation must have “prejudiced interests of the

alien which were protected by the regulation” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Here we conclude that Gomez’s 2006 deportation was

invalid for two independent reasons. First, Gomez was

denied his right to appeal his removal order in violation of

due process because immigration officials failed to obtain a

knowing waiver of that right. Second, the IJ who ordered

Gomez removed violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) by finding

that Gomez’s waiver of his rights was “voluntary, knowing,

and intelligent” when there was an insufficient factual basis

for such a finding. However, we affirm the denial of

Gomez’s motion to dismiss the § 1326 conviction because he

cannot show that he was prejudiced by these violations given

that he was ineligible for any form of relief at the time of the

2006 proceeding.

1. Violations 

a. Invalid Waiver

Obtaining an invalid waiver of the right to appeal a

deportation order violates due process. Lopez-Vasquez,

1 F.3d at 753–54 (“Although a deportee may waive his right

to judicial review of his deportation order, that waiver must

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 13

be considered and intelligent. Otherwise, the deportee is

deprived of judicial review in violation of due process.”

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mendoza-Lopez,

481 U.S. at 837–38)). Thus, although “an alien cannot

collaterally attack an underlying deportation order if he

validly waived the right to appeal that order,” United States

v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000), “[a] valid

waiver of the right to appeal ‘must be both considered and

intelligent,’” Ramos, 623 F.3d at 680 (quoting Arrieta, 224

F.3d at 1079) (additional internal quotation marks omitted).

The first two prongs of § 1326(d) are satisfied if the right

to appeal was denied in violation of due process. See ReyesBonilla, 671 F.3d at 1043 (“If Reyes did not validly waive his

right of appeal, the first two requirements under § 1326(d)

will be satisfied.”); Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1049–50;

see also Gonzalez-Villalobos, 724 F.3d at 1130–31 & n.7.

At the time of his removal proceeding, Gomez signed a

Stipulated Removal form, printed in English and Spanish,

waiving his right to appeal the deportation order. Gomez

argues that because he contests the validity of his waiver, the

government’s reliance on that form—without more—is

insufficient to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that

his waiver was valid. Guided by Ramos and Reyes-Bonilla,

we agree.

The parties begin by debating who bears the burden of

proving the validity of Gomez’s waiver. Under the same

circumstances as those in this case, we have said

unmistakably that “[t]he government bears the burden of

proving valid waiver in a collateral attack of the underlying

removal proceedings.” Ramos, 623 F.3d at 680 (citing LopezVasquez, 1 F.3d at 754–54); see also Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d

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at 1043. The government must prove a valid waiver “by clear

and convincing evidence.” Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1043

(citing United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1097

(9th Cir. 2004)).

We find unavailing the government’s argument that

United States v. Medina, 236 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001),

is to the contrary. In Medina, the defendant argued that the

government could not prove that he had in fact been deported

without a tape recording of the deportation proceeding. Id.

We noted that “the lawfulness of the prior deportation is not

an element of the offense under § 1326.” Id. (quoting United

States v. Delgado, 98 F.3d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, in establishing the fact of a

prior deportation as an element of an illegal reentry offense,

“[t]he government merely needs to prove that [the defendant]

was in fact previously deported.” Id. Gomez does not

challenge the government’s ability to prove that he was in

fact deported. Rather, Gomez argues under a separate

provision of the statute—§ 1326(d)—that his deportation was

invalid. In spelling out the elements of an illegal reentry

offense in Medina, we did not silently overrule our prior

precedent holding that “[t]he government bears the burden of

proving the waiver.” Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d at 754 (citing

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (“[I]t [is]

incumbent upon the State to prove an intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or

privilege.” (internal quotation marks omitted))).4

4 Nor did Medina overrule our long-established precedent merely by

saying that “[i]n order to collaterally attack his prior deportation, Medina

must show that the deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair and that

he was prejudiced by the error.” 236 F.3d at 1031 (emphasis added). At

most, this statement merely reiterates the statutory requirement that the

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 15

As Ramos emphasized, this court should “‘indulge every

reasonable presumption against waiver,’” and should “‘not

presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’” 623

F.3d at 680 (quoting Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d at 75[4]); see

also Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1044. We carefully abide by

this principle, especially where an uncounseled individual

purportedly waived his right to appeal.

Where an alien defendant (1) was represented by counsel

at his deportation proceeding and (2) did not allege facts

undermining the validity of his waiver, we held that the

government met its initial burden of proving a valid waiver

by introducing an official immigration record. United States

v. Galicia-Gonzalez, 997 F.2d 602, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1993). 

We stated that “where the government introduces official

records which on their face show a valid waiver of rights in

connection with a deportation proceeding, the burden shifts

to the defendant to come forward with evidence tending to

prove the waiver was invalid.” Id. at 604. There, GaliciaGonzalez’s counsel signed a waiver of rights form “along

with a declaration that she fully explained the contents of the

agreement to him and that he entered it with full knowledge.” 

Id. at 603. And Galicia-Gonzalez did “not even allege[] there

was anything wrong with his deportation, i.e., that his rights

were improperly explained or that he was coerced into

waiving them. The government’s prima facie showing thus

stands unchallenged and this satisfies the government’s

burden of showing a valid deportation for purposes of section

1326.” Id. at 604.

alien “demonstrate” the prongs of § 1326(d) and prove prejudice. See

Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1039.

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Galicia-Gonzalez is not controlling here for two

independent reasons: (1) Gomez was not represented by

counsel at his removal proceeding, and (2) Gomez contested

the validity of his waiver and alleged facts supporting its

invalidity in the district court when prosecuted for illegal

reentry. First, Ramos explicitly held that the district court

erred by relying on Galicia-Gonzalez to shift the burden to

Ramos, because Galicia-Gonzalez was represented at his

deportation proceeding while Ramos was not. Ramos, 623

F.3d at 680 (noting “that the district court erred in concluding

that the validity of Ramos’s stipulated removal order was

controlled by our decision in Galicia-Gonzalez” because

“unlike the petitioner in Galicia-Gonzalez, who had received

a full explanation of a stipulated removal agreement from his

counsel, and who had entered into the stipulation through

counsel, Ramos lacked the benefit of legal representation”). 

Second, when a defendant in a § 1326 prosecution contests

the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal his deportation

order, we have held that the government’s introduction of an

official document signed by the defendant waiving his right

to appeal is insufficient to meet the government’s burden of

proving a valid waiver. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at 1043–45

(noting that the district court’s finding of valid waiver “would

be sound if Reyes had not contested his understanding of the

notice” but holding that the signed notice was inadequate to

meet the government’s burden where Reyes testified in

district court that he had lacked understanding of the removal

proceedings). 

The circumstances underlying the stipulated deportation

in Ramos are strikingly similar to the circumstances here. 

Like Ramos, Gomez was unrepresented and, like Ramos, was

deported pursuant to a stipulated removal proceeding at the

Eloy, Arizona detention facility. See Ramos, 623 F.3d at 677. 

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 17

Ramos signed the same stipulation as Gomez. The preprinted

stipulation form contains both English and Spanish

statements that waive the alien’s rights to counsel, ¶4, to a

hearing before an IJ, ¶5, to any form of relief (including

voluntary departure), ¶8, and to appeal, ¶13. In Ramos, we

described the process for stipulated removal proceedings at

Eloy:

After detainees are selected for participation

in the stipulated removal program, deportation

officers typically prepare an NTA and a

Stipulated Removal form for each individual. 

Deportation officers then gather detainees

selected for the program for a group

presentation. There, an immigration

enforcement agent explains in Spanish that a

detainee has two options: first, to accept

stipulated removal, or second, to appear

before an IJ, where the detainee may ask to

remain legally in the United States or seek

voluntary departure. The agent also advises

the group that under the stipulated removal

program, a detainee can be removed that very

day; whereas it could take anywhere from two

to three weeks or longer to appear before an IJ

if the detainee chooses not to sign the form. 

The agent then reads the text of the Stipulated

Removal form aloud in Spanish, and

concludes the presentation. Next, DHS

deportation officers meet individually with

each detainee to determine whether he or she

wants to sign the Stipulated Removal form.

Deportation officers do not review the

detainee’s A-file at any time before or during

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18 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

the individual meeting. No transcriber,

interpreter, or attorney is present during the

detainee’s individual meeting with the

deportation officer.

Id. at 678. This description is consistent with the record in

this case, in particular Gomez’s sworn declaration. 

In Ramos, we described the testimony of the immigration

officer who met individually with Ramos after the en masse

reading, and we noted her limited Spanish language skills. 

623 F.3d at 678–79. We concluded that “Ramos’s waiver of

his right to appeal was invalid for several independent

reasons” including because his waiver “was not ‘considered

or intelligent’ because he did not receive a competent Spanish

language translation of his right to appeal when he signed the

form.” Id. at 680. 

We are not persuaded by the government’s argument that

Ramos relied on the incompetence of the immigration

officer’s individual translation. This argument improperly

shifts the burden to the alien defendant to prove an

incompetent explanation of the alien’s rights; however, the

burden to prove a competent explanation, and thus valid

waiver, rests with the government. “We cannot conclude that

waiver of rights, including the right to appeal, was

‘considered or intelligent’ without evidence that a detainee

was ‘able to understand the questions posed to him’ when put

to the choice of foregoing all rights or remaining in detention

until he could appear before an IJ.” Ramos, 623 F.3d at 681

(emphasis added) (citing Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773,

778 (9th Cir. 2000)). The fact that Ramos signed a

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 19

stipulation indicating his understanding and waiver, and that

the IJ found his waiver to be “voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent,” id. at 679, was insufficient to meet the

government’s burden of proof; and the government offers

nothing more here. See also Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d at

1044–45 (concluding that the government failed to meet its

burden of proving a valid waiver where the evidence was

“unclear” as to whether the immigration officer explained to

Reyes “in a language he could understand” his right to appeal

and there was “no evidence as to the extent of the explanation

given or [the immigration officer’s] ability to communicate

in Spanish”).

Thus, we see no reason to distinguish Ramos. If anything,

there is more evidence here that Gomez had difficulty

understanding the stipulated removal proceeding. Gomez

stated in his declaration that he filed in the district court that

he has difficulty reading Spanish, that he did not understand

the stipulated proceeding, and that he received the same sort

of en masse reading of the stipulation as Ramos. Gomez also

stated that the immigration officer did not review the

Stipulated Removal form with him during his individual

meeting with the officer. The government has presented no

evidence—other than the signed form—that Gomez was

provided with a competent translation when he signed it. As

we held in Ramos, due process requires that an alien be

provided an individual explanation that is competently

translated “when he sign[s] the form” above and beyond an

en masse explanation. 623 F.3d at 680. 

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20 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

Moreover, shifting the burden to Gomez to prove an

incompetent translation would skew the government’s

incentives and create an insurmountable hurdle for alien

defendants. In Ramos, the government produced the

immigration officer at a hearing only to have the court find

that her translation had been inadequate. As here, the

government may not always be able to produce the

immigration officer; or she may be otherwise unavailable. 

Thus, it is not realistic to expect the defendant to produce the

officer. Furthermore, if the government can stand silent and

merely rely on the signed stipulation as sufficiently “clear and

convincing” evidence, then it would have no incentive to

produce an immigration officer witness.

In sum, we hold that the stipulated removal proceeding at

Eloy violated Gomez’s right to due process by obtaining an

invalid waiver of Gomez’s right to appeal the deportation

order. The government has not met its burden of proving by

“clear and convincing evidence” that Gomez validly waived

his right to that appeal.5

5 The government’s argument—that the stipulated removal process set

forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) is constitutional—misses the point. Gomez

does not contend that the regulation is unconstitutional, but rather that

immigration authorities frequently abuse the regulatory procedure in

violation of due process, and did so here. It is not uncommon that the

Constitution requires more than what is included in the bare text of any

given statute or regulation. To hold, as Ramos did, that the government

must meet its burden of proving a valid waiver does not invalidate the

procedures set forth in § 1003.25(b).

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 21

b. Regulatory violation

Gomez also argues that his deportation was invalid

because the IJ violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) by finding that

Gomez’s waiver of rights was “voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent” without a sufficient factual record.6 Again, our

 

6

 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) provides in full:

An Immigration Judge may enter an order of

deportation, exclusion or removal stipulated to by the

alien (or the alien’s representative) and the Service. 

The Immigration Judge may enter such an order

without a hearing and in the absence of the parties

based on a review of the charging document, the

written stipulation, and supporting documents, if any. 

If the alien is unrepresented, the Immigration Judge

must determine that the alien’s waiver is voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent. The stipulated request and

required waivers shall be signed on behalf of the

government and by the alien and his or her attorney or

representative, if any. The attorney or representative

shall file a Notice of Appearance in accordance with

§ 1003.16(b). A stipulated order shall constitute a

conclusive determination of the alien’s deportability or

removability from the United States. The stipulation

shall include:

(1) An admission that all factual allegations contained

in the charging document are true and correct as

written;

(2) A concession of deportability or inadmissibility as

charged;

(3) A statement that the alien makes no application for

relief under the Act;

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reasoning in Ramos is directly on point and does not rely on

the concern of incompetent translation. Independent of the

invalid waiver issue, we found that Ramos’s Stipulated

Removal form provided an inadequate basis on which the IJ

could rely to evaluate the validity of Ramos’s waiver of

rights. “Without any independent inquiry of the petitioner,

and depending solely on information provided by DHS, the

IJ concluded that Ramos had ‘voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently’ waived his due process rights.” Ramos, 623

F.3d at 683. Despite the form’s explicit waiver language, we

concluded that the IJ’s finding “violated 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.25(b) by failing to determine whether [Ramos’s]

waiver was ‘voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,’ as required

by the regulation.” Id. We concluded that the regulatory

violation would have been sufficient to invalidate Ramos’s

underlying removal but for a lack of prejudice. See id. at

683–84. 

(4) A designation of a country for deportation or

removal under section 241(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act;

(5) A concession to the introduction of the written

stipulation of the alien as an exhibit to the Record of

Proceeding;

(6) A statement that the alien understands the

consequences ofthe stipulated request and that the alien

enters the request voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently;

(7) A statement that the alien will accept a written order

for his or her deportation, exclusion or removal as a

final disposition of the proceedings; and

(8) A waiver of appeal of the written order of

deportation or removal.

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 23

Here, on January 19, 2006, Gomez signed the revised

Notice to Appear requesting a prompt hearing before an IJ. 

On the same day, he signed the Stipulated Removal form

waiving, inter alia, the right to a hearing before an IJ. 

Without a hearing, and only on the basis of Gomez’s signed

Stipulated Removal form, the IJfound Gomez’s “waiver to be

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” The IJ then found,

“upon review of the charging document and the written

stipulation that he is removable based upon clear and

convincing evidence in the form of his own admissions” and

ordered him removed.7

We do not read Ramos to require an actual appearance by

every alien before an IJ, a possibility that the district court

considered here. Rather, as the district court also discussed,

8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) can be read to contain two disjunctive

provisions: 

[1] An Immigration Judge may enter an order

of deportation, exclusion or removal

stipulated to by the alien (or the alien’s

representative) and the Service. The

Immigration Judge may enter such an order

without a hearing and in the absence of the

parties based on a review of the charging

document, the written stipulation, and

supporting documents, if any. [Or,]

[2] [i]f the alien is unrepresented, the

Immigration Judge must determine that the

7 We are left to assume that the stipulation was signed subsequent to the

demand for a prompt hearing (which appears on the NTA) and that the IJ

inferred that the stipulation was controlling.

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alien’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent. 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b). In other words, we could read the

second provision to rebut the first: where an alien is

unrepresented, the IJ’s duty to determine the waiver’s validity

supercedes the IJ’s ability to do so without a hearing. 

However, we need not decide that issue. Rather, as Gomez

points out, there are several other avenues that immigration

officials could pursue to create a sufficient factual record

without conducting a hearing. For example, the government

could provide a written declaration by the immigration officer

of the circumstances surrounding the alien’s waiver, stating

that avenues of relief were discussed and that the officer

provided a competentlytranslated, individualized explanation

of the rights the alien waived.8

Here, we conclude that the procedures followed in

removing Gomez violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) because the

IJ could not have found that Gomez’s waiver was “voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent” based on the evidence before him,

and thus violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b). See Ramos, 623

F.3d at 683.

Therefore, on the basis of both his invalid waiver of the

right to appeal the deportation order and the IJ’s regulatory

violation, Gomez has met the requirements of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d)(1)–(2) to attack collaterally the validity of his 2006

8 We do not purport to set forth an exhaustive list of what would be

necessary or sufficient to comply with this requirement in every case. The

gravamen of our holding is that an IJ must have before him a sufficient

record on which to determine that an alien’s waiver ofrights is “voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b).

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 25

deportation. We next turn to whether Gomez was prejudiced

by these violations.

2. Prejudice

As discussed supra, in a collateral attack on the validity

of a deportation order the defendant bears the burden of

proving prejudice under § 1326(d)(3). See Medina, 236 F.3d

at 1032. To establish prejudice in this context, the defendant

must show that it was “plausible” that he would have received

some form of relief from removal had his rights not been

violated in the removal proceedings. See Arrieta, 224 F.3d at

1079. “In order to demonstrate prejudice, [an alien] would

also have to show that he is not barred from receiving relief. 

If he is barred from receiving relief, his claim is not

‘plausible.’” United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d

1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).

Gomez argues that he was prejudiced by the due process

and regulatory violations during his removal proceeding

because he was eligible for and would have pursued prehearing voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. The

government contends that Gomez was ineligible for voluntary

departure because his previous Arizona conviction qualifies

as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).9

 

9

 Gomez also argues that his Arizona conviction is irrelevant because

it was not included on the revised NTA that formed the basis for his

deportation. This court has held, however, “that due process does not

require inclusion of charges in the NTA that are not grounds for removal

but are grounds for denial of relief from removal.” Salviejo-Fernandez v.

Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, even when the

NTA fails to include a reference to an aggravated felony, that omission

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Under § 1229c, an alien is generally eligible for voluntary

departure so long as he has not been convicted of an

“aggravated felony” rendering him deportable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and is not deportable for reasons of

national security under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4). Id.

§ 1229c(b)(1)(C). The “aggravated felony” definition is set

forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and includes “sexual abuse

of a minor,” id. § 1101(a)(43)(A), and “an attempt . . . to

commit an offense described in this paragraph,” id.

§ 1101(a)(43)(U).10

would not bar the government from introducing such a conviction later in

an immigration proceeding as a basis for the IJ to find an alien ineligible

for voluntary departure.

10 We note that “based on a review of Arizona’s caselaw, it is clear that

Arizona’s definition of attempt is coextensive with the federal definition.” 

United States v. Taylor, 529 F.3d 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing

several Arizona cases that pre-date Gomez’s conviction and deportation);

see alsoUnited States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9thCir.

2012). Here, Gomez was convicted of “attempted sexual conduct with a

minor under the age of 15” in violation of Arizona Revised Statute

sections 13-1001 and 13-1405. Because Arizona’s attempt statute (§ 13-

1001) is “coextensive with the federal definition,” Taylor, 529 F.3d at

1238, “we are satisfied that [he] was convicted of the generic elements of

attempt,” Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d at 1175. Therefore, we only

address the definition of the substantive crime set forth in § 13-1405.

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 27

Aside from a narrow exception not presented here,11 we

look to the law at the time of the deportation proceedings to

determine whether an alien was eligible for relief from

deportation. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1017–19; LopezVelasquez, 629 F.3d at 895, 897, 901. Gomez argues that

Vidal-Mendoza and Lopez-Velasquez are inapplicable to our

prejudice inquiry here. He asserts that those cases dealt only

with our due process inquiry and that we must look to current

case law when deciding prejudice. We read our case law

more broadly. Gomez offers no persuasive authority or logic

11 United States v. Leon-Paz, 340 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2003) presents the

only example of the “narrow circumstances [where] we [have] applied

subsequent precedent in reviewing a deportation order.” United States v.

Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 899 (9thCir. 2010) (en banc); see United

States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2013).

Leon-Paz [] involved an alien’s collateral challenge to

his removal order on the ground that the IJ failed to

inform him of his “apparent eligibility” for

discretionary relief under § 212(c). 340 F.3d at 1005. 

At the time of his removal hearing, Congress had

changed the law to limit the availability of § 212(c)

relief for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, but

we had not yet weighed in on whether these statutory

changes were applicable retroactively to aliens like

Leon-Paz. See id. at 1006–07. Shortly after LeonPaz’s removal hearing, the Supreme Court held that

these changes applied prospectively only. INS v. St.

Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).

Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1017–18. This situation is not presented here. 

Rather, as in Vidal-Mendoza and Lopez-Velasquez, “the post-removal

precedent . . . created a new, previously unavailable, possibility of relief

by making a ‘deviation’ from ‘longstanding Ninth Circuit and BIA

precedent.’” Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1018 (quotingLopez-Velasquez,

629 F.3d at 898). We evaluate this new precedent with respect to

Gomez’s sentencing arguments, infra at III.B.

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on which to distinguish our reasoning in Vidal-Mendoza and

Lopez-Velasquez when deciding prejudice.12

Therefore, we must decide whether Gomez’s conviction

for “attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of

15” in violation of Arizona Revised Statute section 13-1405

qualified as an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43),

at the time he was ordered deported in January 2006.13 We

12 United States v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2006), is

inapposite. It concerned whether a Supreme Court case decided after

Camacho-Lopez’s deportation proceedings was nonetheless applicable on

collateral review to determine whether he was subject to removal as

charged—not, as in this case, whether, although removable, he was

entitled to discretionary relief. Moreover, the government in

Camacho-Lopez conceded that the new precedent should be retroactively

applied to answer the removability question. Id. at 930. Where, as here,

the case concerns relief from removal, not removability, and the

government does not so concede, we look to the law as it existed at the

time of the deportation proceedings to determine whether an alien was

prejudiced by the IJ’s due process violations. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d

at 1017–19; Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 900–01.

 

13 Gomez’s statute of conviction provides: “A person commits sexual

conduct with a minor by [1] intentionally or knowingly [2] engaging in

sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with [3] any person who is under

eighteen years of age.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405A. “Sexual conduct

with a minor who is under fifteen years of age is a class 2 felony . . . .” Id.

§ 13-1405B. Subsection B also criminalizes sexual conduct with minors

who are “at least fifteen years of age” if certain additional factors not at

issue here are present. See id. Gomez argues that we should only look to

the statutory language in subsection A. We disagree. Gomez was indicted

for and convicted of violating Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1405B. 

Therefore, our analysis is limited to that provision. Section 13-1405B

defines the victim as being either “at least fifteen” or “under fifteen.” 

Consequently, it is divisible with respect to the age of the victim, and,

under the governing law in 2006, we may consider the indictment and plea

agreement’s clear language showing that Gomez was charged with sexual

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 29

conclude that Gomez’s conviction would have qualified as

“sexual abuse of a minor,” defined as an aggravated felony

under § 1101(a)(43)(A).

We first defined the term ‘sexual abuse of a

minor’ for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(A) in

United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d

1144[, 1146–47] (9th Cir. 1999), where we

applied the ‘ordinary, contemporary, and

common meaning’ of ‘sexual abuse of a

minor,’ and concluded that any ‘use of young

children for the gratification of sexual desires

constitutes an abuse’ because the ‘child [is]

too young to understand the nature of

[defendant’s] . . . advances.’ 

Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1019 (second and third

alterations in original).14 The statute at issue in BaronMedina criminalized “the touching of an underage child’s

conduct with “a minor under the age of fifteen.” See Shepard v. United

States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 26 (2005) (holding that a court determining the

character of an underlying crime using the modified categorical approach

may consider, inter alia, the “charging document” and “written plea

agreement”); see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–85 (describing that

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) permitted courts to

review a limited group of documents when the statute of conviction is

“‘divisible’—i.e., comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime”). 

Gomez’s indictment and judgment allege that he was convicted of the

“under fifteen” version of § 13-1405B.

14 We also “pointed out that Congress did not cross-reference any

federal substantive offense in listing ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ as an

aggravated felony,” and therefore did not limit the term to a single federal

definition. Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.

2003).

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body . . . with a sexual intent,” where the child was under

fourteen years of age. 187 F.3d at 1145, 1147; accord

Cedano-Viera, 324 F.3d at 1065–66 & n.4. We later held that

a conviction under a Virginia statute criminalizing intercourse

with “a child . . . under fifteen years of age” constituted

“sexual abuse of a minor” in the sentencing context where the

defendant was twenty-six years old and the victim was

thirteen years old. United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337

F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original).15

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) precedent

also guides our conclusion. In In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22

I. & N. Dec. 991 (B.I.A. 1999), the BIA broadly defined

“sexual abuse of a minor” to exceed the definitions set forth

in various federal criminal statutes, so as to include abuse that

did not involve actual contact. Id. at 995–96. In so holding,

the BIA looked to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) (1994) (setting forth

the rights of child victims and witnesses), which “defines

‘sexual abuse’ as ‘the employment, use, persuasion,

inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in,

or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit

conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form

of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.’” 

15 We note that the analysis for defining substantive offenses enumerated

in § 1101(a)(43)—such as “rape” or “sexual abuse of a minor”—“is the

same for a ‘crime of violence’ in the sentencing context, U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2.” United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1107 n.1

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1013 n.1

(9th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511–12

(9th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944,

947 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying in the context of criminal sentencing upon

cases defining “sexual abuse of a minor” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)). 

Therefore, the analysis in sentencing cases such as Pereira-Salmeron is

directly applicable to our analysis here.

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Id. at 995 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8)). The BIA did not

set forth a threshold age at which such conduct would

constitute “abuse,” although § 3509(a)(2) defines “child” as

“a person who is under the age of 18.”

Most tellingly, in April 2006—just three months after

Gomez’s deportation—we relied on In re RodriguezRodriguezto affirm the BIA’s holding that sexual intercourse

with a 17-year-old constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” as

defined by § 1101(a)(43)(A). Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d

1212, 1214–17 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by EstradaEspinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc), overruled on other grounds by United States v. AguilaMontes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per

curiam), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276.16 Unlike

Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1152, Afridi—like all of our

cases preceding Gomez’s 2006 deportation—did not

explicitly rely on the fact that the subject statute required the

defendant to be a certain number of years older than the

victim. 442 F.3d at 1217. Applying the categorical approach,

we held that the California statute of conviction that

criminalizes conduct by “‘[a]ny person who engages in an act

of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than

three years younger than the perpetrator,’” was categorically

“sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code

§ 261.5(c)). We stated: 

16 We have said that Estrada-Espinoza, which was not decided until

2008, “sharply departed from” our prior precedent defining “sexual abuse

of a minor” for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(A). Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d

at 1020. We evaluate our current law, including Estrada-Espinoza, infra

at III.B.

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A conviction under this statute meets the

BIA’s interpretation of “sexual abuse of a

minor” as encompassing any offense that

involves “the employment, use, persuasion,

inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child

to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct

. . . .” In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N.

Dec. at 991, 995. Mr. Afridi had sexual

intercourse with a seventeen-year-old girl who

was more than three years younger than he. 

Sexual intercourse clearly constitutes

“sexually explicit conduct,” and the

seventeen-year-old victim in this matter was

a “minor” as that term is commonly defined. 

Further, the BIA’s definition of “sexual abuse

of a minor” is not limited to victims of any

certain age. Therefore, his offense falls

within that definition. Accordingly, the BIA

properly found that Petitioner was removable

for having committed an aggravated felony

. . . .

Id. (first and second alterations in original).

Construing the two statutory provisions together, see

supra note 13, Gomez’s statute of conviction contains three

elements: (1) a mens rea of “intentionally or knowingly”; (2)

an act of “engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual

contact”; and (3) a victim “who is under fifteen years of age.” 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405. Although the case law that

existed in 2006 did not explicitly enumerate the elements of

“sexual abuse of a minor,” these three elements were

sufficient to fall categorically within the then-existing BIA

and Ninth Circuit definition. The “sexual intercourse or oral

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 33

sexual contact” element of § 13-1405 clearly constitutes

“sexually explicit conduct.” See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez,

22 I. & N. Dec. at 995. And a victim under fifteen years of

age fits squarely within the definition of “minor.” Id. at

995–97; Afridi, 442 F.3d at 1217. Under the logic of In re

Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 995–96, and

Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d at 1155, such conduct with a

victim under fifteen years of age constituted “abuse” at the

time. 

Thus, under the governing case law at the time of his

deportation, Gomez’s crime would have categorically

qualified as “sexual abuse of a minor” for the purposes of

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), and he would not have been

eligible for voluntary departure. Because Gomez was not

prejudiced by the due process and regulatory violations that

occurred in his 2006 removal proceeding, we affirm the

district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

B. Sentencing

We next determine whether, under current law, Gomez’s

§ 13-1405 conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” within

the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Because our

case law has evolved since 2006, we reach the opposite

conclusion from what we concluded in analyzing the

prejudice inquiry. That is, we hold that Arizona Revised

Statute section 13-1405 (including the “under fifteen”

version) is not categorically a “crime of violence” because it

is missing an element of the generic offenses of sexual abuse

of a minor and statutory rape, and the district court’s finding

to the contrary was reversible error. Thus, we vacate

Gomez’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

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34 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for a

sixteen-level enhancement where the defendant was

previously deported after a conviction for “a crime of

violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The commentary

defines “crime of violence” as “any of the following offenses

under federal, state, or local law: . . . statutory rape, [or]

sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. cmt. 1(B)(iii).17 Attempt

convictions for offenses counted under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1) also qualify as crimes of violence. Id. cmt. 5. 

The district court imposed a sixteen-level sentencing

enhancement because it found that Gomez’s conviction was

categorically a conviction for “statutory rape.” 

We begin by analyzing Gomez’s conviction under the

familiar categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Under this approach, we look

only to the elements of Gomez’s statute of conviction, and

not the particular facts underlying his conviction. 495 U.S.

at 600.18 As we explained above, Gomez’s conviction under

Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1405B contains three

elements: (1) a mens rea of “intentionally or knowingly”; (2)

an act of “engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual

17 The government argues only that Gomez’s Arizona conviction

qualifies as either “statutory rape” or as “sexual abuse of a minor.”

18 As we discussed supra at note 13, however, we may consider that

Gomez was convicted pursuant to the “under fifteen” version of the

statute. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–85 (reiterating that courts may

consider a limited group of documents when the statute of conviction is

“‘divisible’—i.e., comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime”). 

Although we ultimately conclude that § 13-1405 is missing elements of

the relevant generic offenses, the provisions set forth in § 13-1405B are

indeed “divisible” as to the age of the victim because the statute defines

the victim as being either “at least fifteen” or “under fifteen.”

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 35

contact”; and (3) a victim “who is under fifteen years of age.” 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405. Then, we look to the generic

definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor” and of “statutory

rape” to determine if the elements of § 13-1405B are the

same as, or more narrow than, the generic offenses. See

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. “[I]f the [state]statute sweeps

more broadly than the generic crime, a conviction under that

law cannot count” for the purposes of a sentencing

enhancement. Id. For the reasons set forth below, we

conclude that Gomez’s conviction under § 13-1405B is not

categorically a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor or

statutory rape because it is missing an element of each

generic offense.

1. Generic Sexual Abuse of a Minor

We turn first to the generic definition of “sexual abuse of

a minor.” Three related lines of cases compel us to conclude

that the statute, even including the “under fifteen” version, is

missing an element of “sexual abuse of a minor.” First, in a

unanimous en banc opinion considering whether a conviction

constitutes the aggravated felony “sexual abuse of a minor”

as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), we defined the

generic offense of “sexual abuse of a minor” as requiring

“four elements: (1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a

sexual act; (3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16;

and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the

defendant and the minor.” Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at

1152, 1156; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2243.19 We have

 

19 Although dicta in Estrada-Espinoza states that offenses bearing the

title “‘sexual abuse of a minor’ . . . . define what would, in more common

parlance, be referred to as statutory rape,” 546 F.3d at 1156, we have

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36 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

recognized that the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” set

forth in Estrada-Espinoza applies equally to U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2. See Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1105, 1107

(applying Estrada-Espinoza’s definition of “sexual abuse of

a minor” in the sentencing context); Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d

at 511 (reaffirming that the “decisional law defining the term

‘sexual abuse of a minor’ in the sentencing context, U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2, is informed by the definition of the same term in the

immigration context, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), and vice

versa” (footnote omitted)); supra note 15. 

Second, in Medina-Villa, we held that Estrada-Espinoza

did not set forth the exclusive definition of “sexual abuse of

a minor.” 567 F.3d at 516. We noted that EstradaEspinoza’s definition of “sexual abuse of a minor”

“encompassed statutory rape crimes only,” and recognized

that a residual category of “sexual abuse of a minor” exists

that encompasses statutes where (1) “the conduct proscribed

. . . is sexual;” (2) “the statute protects a minor;” and (3) “the

statute requires abuse.” Id. at 513–14. In turn, we defined

the term “abuse” as “physical or psychological harm in light

of the age of the victim in question.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). We have noted that sexual contact with a

victim under the age of fourteen is categorically “abuse,” see

United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir.

2006), but we have never held that such a per se rule applies

to consensual sex with persons fourteen and older, see

Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107 & n.2 (recognizing the

two distinct generic definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor”

and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under

the Medina-Villa definition if it “applies to sexual conduct

never held that Estrada-Espinoza sets forth the elements of generic

statutory rape.

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 37

with children younger than fourteen years”); Pelayo-Garcia,

589 F.3d at 1015–16 (rejecting argument that a statute that

criminalizes sex between someone over twenty-one with a

minor under sixteen is per se “abusive”).

Third, in addressing the “under eighteen” version of the

statute, we have expressly determined that convictions under

Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1405 meet neither the

generic definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” set forth in

Estrada-Espinoza nor the generic definition of “abuse of a

minor” set forth in Medina-Villa. Rivera-Cuartas v. Holder,

605 F.3d 699, 701–02 (9th Cir. 2010). A conviction under

this statute does not meet the definition set forth in EstradaEspinoza “for two reasons: (1) it lacks the age difference

requirement; and (2) is broader than the generic offense with

respect to the age of the minor because the statute applies to

persons under eighteen years of age.” Id. at 702. Here,

analyzing the “under fifteen” version of § 13-1405, the statute

continues to lack the age difference element. “Section 13-

1405 also does not meet the generic definition of ‘sexual

abuse of a minor’ under the Medina-Villa framework as it

lacks the element of ‘abuse.’” Id. Again, analyzing the

“under fifteen” version, the statute continues to lack the

element of “abuse” because the statute may apply to victims

who are not “younger than fourteen years.” ValenciaBarragan, 608 F.3d at 1107; see also Pelayo-Garcia, 589

F.3d at 1015–16.

2. Generic Statutory Rape

Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1405 is also missing

an element of the generic offense of statutory rape. Whether

the generic offense of statutory rape has, as an element, a

four-year age difference, is an issue of first impression. The

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38 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

development of our law in this area, as well as the statutory

law of other jurisdictions, leads us to conclude that a fouryear age difference is an element of the generic offense of

statutory rape. Because § 13-1405, even the “under fifteen”

version of the statute, is missing this element, a conviction

under the statute is not categorically a crime of violence. 

We first addressed the generic offense of statutory rape in

United States v. Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d 599 (9th Cir.

2007). There, we held that “[t]he term ‘statutory rape’ is

ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to

mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the

age of consent specified by state statute.” Id. at 603. In

Gomez-Mendez, we did not address what other elements, if

any, comprised the generic offense of statutory rape.

Shortly after Gomez-Mendez, we revisited the definition

of the generic offense of statutory rape. See United States v.

Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738, 744–46 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In Rodriguez-Guzman, we reached one of the issues left open

by Gomez-Mendez: “the ordinary, contemporary, and

common meaning of the term ‘minor’ in the context of a

statutory rape law.” Id. at 745. Finding that at least thirty

states set the age of consent at sixteen and the Model Penal

Code and the federal statutory rape provision had as an

element a victim under the age of sixteen, we held that the

ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the term

“minor” in the context of statutory rape law was a person

under sixteen years of age. Id. Again, we did not consider

whether the generic offense of statutory rape included any

other elements. 

In United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419 (9th

Cir. 2011), we were faced with the same question presented

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 39

here: whether a conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes

section 13-1405 was categorically a crime of violence for the

purposes of sentencing. Id. at 425–26. The district court held

that it was, but did not specify whether the conviction was

categorically a conviction for the generic offense of

“statutory rape” or “sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. at 423–24,

425. Gonzalez-Aparicio did not object below, but on appeal,

he argued that the generic offense of statutory rape has, as

one of the elements, a four-year age difference. Id. at

425–26. We recognized that Estrada-Espinoza’s definition

of “sexual abuse of a minor” might bear on the definition of

generic statutory rape. See id. at 429–30. Ultimately,

however, we declined to decide “whether—and how[—]

Estrada-Espinoza should be applied in defining the

generic crime of ‘statutory rape’ under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).” Id. at 431. Acknowledging that

“whether the generic federal definition of ‘statutory rape’

includes a [four]–year age difference element” is a “difficult

issue,” we also declined to resolve that question. Id. Instead,

we held that any error that may have been committed by the

district court in imposing the sixteen-level crime of violence

sentencing enhancement was not plain error. Id. at 432. 

Finally, in United States v. Zamorano-Ponce, 699 F.3d

1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012), we again addressed the elements

of the generic offense of statutory rape. Zamorano-Ponce

argued that his conviction was not categorically a conviction

for the generic offense of statutory rape because the statute of

conviction did not include a mens rea element of

“knowingly,” relying on Estrada-Espinoza. ZamoranoPonce, 699 F.3d at 1120. We rejected this argument,

explaining:

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40 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

Defendant’s reliance on Estrada-Espinoza is

misplaced. That case defined the term “sexual

abuse of a minor” for the purpose of

considering whether a prior conviction

constituted an “aggravated felony” under the

Immigration and Nationality Act. Nothing in

Estrada-Espinoza purports to require that

“statutory rape,” within the meaning of the

commentaryto the Guidelines, contain a mens

rea element. Nor does the case overrule or

undermine Gomez-Mendez or RodriguezGuzman in any other way. In fact, we have

recognized previously that Estrada-Espinoza

never discussed or even cited to our prior

“statutory rape” decisions in Gomez-Mendez

and Rodriguez-Guzman.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Having

rejected the argument that Estrada-Espinoza sets forth the

elements of the generic offense of statutory rape, we held,

based onGomez-Mendez and Rodriguez-Guzman, that generic

statutory rape does not have, as an element, a mens rea of

“knowingly.” Id. at 1119–20. Although we held that

Estrada-Espinoza does not set forth the elements of generic

statutoryrape, we nonetheless recognized that whether a fouryear age difference is an element of generic statutory rape

remains an open question. Id. at 1119. 

We now answer that question in the affirmative. In

reaching this conclusion, we follow the approach we took in

Rodriguez-Guzman, looking to theModel Penal Code, federal

law, and state statutory rape laws to determine whether

statutory rape, in the generic sense, includes a four-year age

difference. See 506 F.3d at 745; see also Estrada-Espinoza,

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 41

546 F.3d at 1152 (“In the absence of specific congressional

guidance as to the elements of a crime, courts have been left

to determine the generic sense in which the term is now used

in the criminal codes of most States.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)). 

The Model Penal Code’s statutoryrape provision, entitled

“Corruption of Minors and Seduction,” requires a four-year

age difference between the victim and the perpetrator. Model

Penal Code § 213.3(1)(a). It provides that: 

A male who has sexual intercourse with a

female not his wife, or any person who

engages in deviate sexual intercourse or

causes another to engage in deviate sexual

intercourse is guilty of an offense if: 

(a) the other person is less than [16] years

old and the actor is at least [four] years older

than the other person . . . .

Id.; see also Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 745. Likewise,

the federal statute that most closely matches generic statutory

rape, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), see Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d

at 745, also includes a four-year age difference.20

20 Notably, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) is the statute we relied upon in EstradaEspinoza for the elements of the generic offense of “sexual abuse of a

minor.” In Rodriguez-Guzman, however, we characterized this statute as

setting out the “[f]ederal defin[ition] [of] statutory rape.” We continue to

treat § 2243 as the federal statutory rape provision. Although a conviction

under § 2243 would not categorically constitute a conviction for generic

statutory rape because it does not have, as an element, sexual intercourse,

there are no federal offenses specifically criminalizing sexual intercourse

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42 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

Furthermore, a substantial number of state statutes now

include at least a four-year age difference in their statutory

rape laws.21 Forty-one states have an age difference in at

least some of their statutory rape laws.22 Of those, thirty-two

with minors. Section 2243 is the closest federal analog to generic

statutory rape. 

21 Most states have multiple provisions governing statutory rape. 

Typically, the extent—and existence—of the age gap depends on the age

of the victim. This makes extrapolating a generic definition of statutory

rape somewhat complicated. Nonetheless, after carefully surveying the

state laws, we conclude a consensus can be gleaned that statutory rape

ordinarily involves at least a four-year age gap. 

22 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-61(a)(3); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.436(a)(1);

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-127(a)(1)(A); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d); Colo.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-402(a)(1)(d); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-70(a)(2);

Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 773(a)(5); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05(1); Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 707-730(c); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6101(1); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.

5/11-1.40(a)(1); In. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-9(a); Iowa Code Ann.

§ 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.050(1)(a); La. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 14:80A; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 254; Md. Code Ann.,

Crim. Law § 3-304(a)(3); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 23A(a);

Minn. Stat. § 609.342(1)(b); Miss. Code. Ann. § 97-3-95(1)(c); Mo. Ann.

Stat. § 566.034; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-502(3); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-

319.01(1); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 200.364, 200.368; N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 632-A:3(II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(4); N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 30-9-11(G)(1); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.25(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-

27.2; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-05(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.04;

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(1); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3122.1(a);

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-37-6; S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1(5); Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-13-506(b); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401.2; Vt. Stat. Ann.

tit. 13, § 3253(a)(8); Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 9A.44.079; W. Va. Code

Ann. § 61-8B-5(a)(2); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i).

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 43

states require an age difference of four years or more.23

Rodriguez-Guzman held that the common understanding of

the term “minor” in the context of statutory rape laws is a

person under the age of sixteen based on a comparable

number of states—thirty—setting their age of consent at

sixteen. 506 F.3d at 745. Moreover, of the states with an

age-gap requirement, only twelve require a three-year age

difference in any of their provisions24and only twelve require

a two-year age difference in any of their provisions.25

In

23 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-61(a)(3); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.436(a)(1);

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-127(a)(1)(A); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d); Colo.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-402(a)(1)(d); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 773(a)(5);

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05(1); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-730(c); 720 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/11-1.40(a)(1); Iowa Code Ann. § 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d); Ky. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 510.050(1)(a); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:80A; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.

tit. 17-A § 254; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-304(a)(3); Mass. Gen.

Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 23A(a); Minn. Stat. § 609.342(1)(b); Mo. Ann. Stat.

§ 566.034; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319.01(1); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-

A:3(II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(4); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(G)(1);

N.Y. Penal Law § 130.25(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-27.2; N.D. Cent.

Code § 12.1-20-05(2); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(1); 18 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 3122.1(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506(b)(1); Utah Code

Ann. § 76-5-401.2; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3253(a)(8); Wash. Rev. Code.

Ann. § 9A.44.079; W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8B-5(a)(2); Wyo. Stat. Ann.

§ 6-2-315(a)(i).

24 See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.434(a)(1); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c);

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-71(a)(1); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6101(2);

Minn. Stat. § 609.342(1)(a); Miss. Code. Ann. § 97-3-95(1)(c); Mont.

Code Ann. § 45-5-502(3); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.30(1); S.D. Codified

Laws § 22-22-1(5); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3252(c); Wash. Rev. Code.

Ann. § 9A.44.076; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(i).

25

See Ala. Code § 13A-6-62(a)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.

§ 53a-70(a)(2); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6101(1); In. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-

9(a); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:80.1A; Minn. Stat. § 609.344(1)(b); Miss.

Code. Ann. § 97-3-95(1)(d); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 200.364, 200.368;

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44 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

contrast, twenty-two states require a four-year age gap in at

least some of their statutory rape laws.26 Moreover,

seventeen states require an even greater age difference—

ranging from five years to twelve years—in at least some of

their statutory rape provisions.27 Based on the foregoing, we

conclude that there is significant consensus among the states

that statutory rape is characterized by an age difference

between the victim and the defendant, and a four-year age

difference is the most common line that states have drawn.

We recognize that thirty-five states have at least one

provision criminalizing sexual intercourse with minors that

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.04; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-37-6; Wash.

Rev. Code. Ann. § 9A.44.073; W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8B-3(a)(2).

26 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-61(a)(3); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.436(a)(1);

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-127(a)(1)(A); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-

402(a)(1)(d); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.40(a)(1); Iowa Code Ann.

§ 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.050(1)(a); La. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 14:80A; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-304(a)(3); Minn. Stat.

§ 609.342(1)(b); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.034; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-

A:3(II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(4); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(G)(1);

N.Y. Penal Law § 130.25(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-27.2; Okla. Stat.

Ann. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(1); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3122.1(a); Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-13-506(b); Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 9A.44.079; W. Va.

Code Ann. § 61-8B-5(a)(2); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i).

27 See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-

402(a)(1)(e); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 §§ 770(a)(2), 771(a)(1), 772(a)(2)(g),

773(a)(5); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05(1); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-730(c); 720

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.60(d); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.060(1)(b); Me.

Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 254; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 23A(a),

(b); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319.01(1); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.35(4); N.C.

Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-27.2A, 14-27.7A; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-05(2);

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3122.1(b); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-506(b)(2),

39-13-506(c); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401.2; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13,

§ 3253(a)(8).

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 45

includes no age difference element whatsoever.28 However,

in seventeen of these states, such statutes always have, as an

element, a victim who is under the age of fourteen.29

Moreover, in another seven of these states, at least some of

the provisions that lack an age difference element require as

28 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1405; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-

103(a)(3), 5-14-126(a)(2)(A); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(b); Del. Code.

Ann. tit. 11 § 770(a)(1); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.04(4)(a); Ga. Code Ann.

§ 16-6-3; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-730(b); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.30(b),

1.50(b); In. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(a); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 709.3(1)(b),

709.4(1)(b)(2);Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 21-5503(a)(3), 21-5506(b), 21-5507(a);

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.040(1)(b)(2); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A

§ 253; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 23; Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann.

§§ 750.520b(1)(a), 750.520d(1)(a); Minn. Stat. § 609.344(1)(a);Mo. Ann.

Stat. § 566.032; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(D), 45-5-503(1);

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:3(III); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(a)(1); N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(D)(1); N.Y. Penal Law§ 130.35(3); N.D. Cent. Code

§§ 12.1-20-03(1)(d), 12.1-20-05(1); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02;

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 1111, 1114(B); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§§ 163.375(1)(b), 163.365(1), 163.375(1)(b); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 3121(c); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-37-8.1; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-

655(A), (B); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1(1); Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 22.011(a)(2), (c)(1); UtahCode Ann. §§ 76-5-401, 76-5-402.1; Vt. Stat.

Ann. tit. 13, § 3252(c); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-61, 18.2-63; Wis. Stat.

Ann. §§ 948.02(1), 948.02(2), 948.09.

29 See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-103(a)(3), 5-14-126(a)(2)(A); Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 707-730(b); In. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(a); Iowa Code Ann.

§§ 709.3(1)(b), 709.4(1)(b)(2); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.040(1)(b)(2);

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 253; Minn. Stat. § 609.344(1)(a); Mo.

Ann. Stat. § 566.032; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:3(III); N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:14-2(a)(1); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(D)(1); N.Y. Penal Law

§ 130.35(3); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 3121(c); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-37-8.1; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-

655(A), (B); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1(1).

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46 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

an element a victim under the age of fourteen.30,31 Because

only eighteen states ever criminalize sexual intercourse with

older minors irrespective of an age difference,32 we are not

persuaded that these state laws are probative of the elements

of generic statutory rape, which involves sexual intercourse

with minors under the age of sixteen, not just the very young. 

Cf. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 745 (basing the generic

definition of the term “minor” within the context of statutory

rape on a consensus of thirty states). When viewed as a

whole, the state statutory rape laws, the Model Penal Code,

and federal law support our conclusion that statutory rape is

ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to

30 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.30(b); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-

5503(a)(3); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 750.520b(1)(a); Or. Rev. Stat.

Ann. §§ 163.375(1)(b), 163.365(1); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1; Va.

Code Ann. § 18.2-61; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.02(1).

31 Likewise, federal law and the Model Penal Code also include

provisions criminalizing sexual intercourse with minors that lack an agedifference element. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c); Model Penal Code

§ 213.1(1)(d). These provisions also require as an element an especially

young victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (criminalizing sexual acts with

children under the age of twelve); Model Penal Code § 213.1(1)(d)

(including as an element a victim under the age of ten). 

32 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1405; Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(b); Del.

Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 770(a)(1); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.04(4)(a); Ga. Code

Ann. § 16-6-3; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1.50(b); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-

5506(b), 21-5507(a); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 23; Mich. Comp.

Laws. Ann. § 750.520d(1)(a); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(D),

45-5-503(1); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-20-03(1)(d), 12.1-20-05(1); Okla.

Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 1111, 1114(B); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.375(1)(b);

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2), (c)(1); UtahCode Ann. § 76-5-401;

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3252(c); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-63; Wis. Stat. Ann.

§§ 948.02(2), 948.09.

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 47

include as an element a four-year age difference between the

victim and the defendant. 

To summarize, the elements of generic statutory rape are:

(1) sexual intercourse (2) with a minor under the age of

sixteen (3) who is at least four years younger than the

defendant. Generic statutory rape does not have, as an

element, a mens rea requirement of “knowingly.” Arizona

Revised Statutes section 13-1405 is missing the four-year age

difference element of the generic offense of statutory rape.33

Therefore, ArizonaRevisedStatute section 13-1405, even

the “under fifteen” version, is missing an element of generic

“statutory rape” and generic “sexual abuse of a minor.” Thus,

a conviction under the statute is not categorically a conviction

for a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). 

Because the statute is missing an element of these generic

crimes, our inquiry ends here—we do not undertake a

modified categorical analysis. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283,

2292 (holding that the modified categorical approach does not

apply to statutes that contain an “‘indivisible’ set of elements

sweeping more broadly than the corresponding generic

offense,” meaning that “the statute of conviction has an

33 Gomez’s conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1405

may also be missing another element of the generic offense of statutory

rape. The statute criminalizes both “sexual intercourse” and “oral sexual

contact,” but our case law has held that the generic offense of statutory

rape requires “sexual intercourse.” Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d at 603. The

statute is divisible as to the actus reus element, so we may employ the

modified categorical approach to determine whether Gomez’s conviction

contains, as an element, “sexual intercourse.” See Descamps, 133 S. Ct.

at 2281. However, because Gomez did not raise the issue, we do not

decide whether his conviction has this element of the generic offense of

statutory rape. 

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48 UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ

overbroad or missing element”). “Because of the mismatch

in elements, a person convicted under [such a]statute is never

convicted of the generic crime.” Id. at 2292.

3. Harmless Error

We also reject the government’s argument that the

sentencing error was harmless. In imposing the sentence, the

district court stated:

I would also note that if I’m wrong on the

calculations . . . [and] the Court or court on

appeal . . . find[s] that . . . the four-year age

differential is essential[,] . . . I . . . doubt very

much that there would be any significant

change in the sentence that’s about to be

imposed. 

The district court did not actually calculate the sentence it

would have imposed absent the enhancement and imposed a

sentence that was above the Guidelines range absent the

enhancement. See United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631

F.3d 1028, 1030 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that a Guidelines

calculation error may be harmless if one of four nonexhaustive factors is satisfied, including if the district court

“chooses a within-Guidelines sentence that falls within . . .

the correct Guidelines range”); see also United States v.

Acosta-Chavez, 727 F.3d 903, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2013). 

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, we hold that the IJ violated an immigration

regulation designed to protect an alien’s right to judicial

review and that Gomez was denied due process in his 2006

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UNITED STATES V. GOMEZ 49

removal proceedings, but that these violations were harmless

in light of his ineligibility for relief from removal. We

therefore affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss the

indictment. We further hold that Gomez’s conviction under

Arizona Revised Statute section 13-1405 did not constitute a

“crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), and therefore the district court erred in

applying a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement. Thus, we

vacate Gomez’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

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