Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-03241/USCOURTS-ca10-16-03241-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frito-Lay, Inc.
Appellee
Greg Henault
Appellee
Byron Lewis
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

BYRON LEWIS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

FRITO-LAY, INC., 

 Defendant - Appellee, 

and 

GREG HENAULT, 

 Defendant. 

No. 16-3241 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-07339-JAR) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Byron Lewis appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Frito-Lay on his claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 3, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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I 

Lewis is African-American. He worked as a packer at Frito-Lay’s 

manufacturing plant in Topeka, Kansas, from 1991 until Frito-Lay terminated his 

employment in 2012. Frito-Lay has a progressive discipline policy that involves four 

steps: (1) verbal warning; (2) written warning; (3) suspension; and (4) termination. 

Frito-Lay also has discretion to offer a Last Chance Agreement (“LCA”) to an 

employee who is otherwise subject to termination. 

Lewis received a verbal warning in December 2011, a written warning in 

February 2012, a suspension in March 2012, and a second suspension in June 2012. 

In July 2012, Lewis violated another work rule and was placed on indefinite 

suspension. Due to Lewis’ disciplinary history, manufacturing director Scott Denny 

made the decision to terminate Lewis’ employment. 

Lewis and his union filed a grievance. Denny met with Lewis and union 

representative Mark McCarter to discuss the grievance. At the meeting, McCarter 

asked for an LCA on behalf of Lewis. Denny ultimately denied Lewis’ grievance, 

thereby also denying his request for an LCA. After being notified that he would not 

receive an LCA, Lewis met with the Executive Board of the union and asked them to 

take his case to arbitration. The Board declined. 

Lewis filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”), and later filed a complaint in federal district court. He alleged that 

Frito-Lay discriminated against him on the basis of race by treating him less 

favorably than similarly situated white employees when it terminated his employment 

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rather than entering into an LCA. The district court granted Frito-Lay’s motion for 

summary judgment.1

 Lewis appeals. 

II 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing 

the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Campbell v. Gambro 

Healthcare, Inc., 478 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is 

appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

We evaluate Lewis’ § 1981 claim under the three-part McDonnell Douglas2

burden-shifting framework. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 

1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000). Under that framework, the plaintiff has the initial 

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at 1226. The 

burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for its employment action. Id. If the defendant does so, then the plaintiff must show 

that the defendant’s justification is pretextual. Id. The parties’ arguments on appeal 

relate solely to the district court’s determination at the third step. 

A 

A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by “showing that the plaintiff was treated 

differently from others similarly situated.” Jaramillo v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. 14, 

 1

 The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Greg Henault, 

Lewis’ supervisor. Lewis does not appeal that ruling. 

2

 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 

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680 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2012). But “it is up to the plaintiff to establish not 

only that differential treatment occurred, but also to rule out nondiscriminatory 

explanations for the differential treatment.” Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 

483 F.3d 1106, 1121 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

The district court determined that Lewis had not presented sufficient evidence 

that Frito-Lay treated similarly situated employees differently. It held that Lewis and 

the white employees he identified (Christine McComas and Mark Dugger) were not 

similarly situated because they did not share the same immediate supervisor. 

Alternatively, it concluded that differential treatment was explained by a 

nondiscriminatory motive: the union in both McComas’ and Dugger’s cases 

threatened arbitration, prompting Frito-Lay to enter into an LCA. 

Lewis argues that Denny, who made the decision whether to offer LCAs to all 

three employees, should be considered the supervisor for purposes of determining 

whether Lewis is similarly situated to McComas and Dugger. But regardless of 

whether Denny was the relevant supervisor, we agree with the district court that 

Lewis was not similarly situated to the other employees he identifies. Denny testified 

in his deposition that he offered an LCA only if the union threatened or filed 

arbitration. And Frito-Lay showed that the union threatened arbitration in McComas’ 

and Dugger’s cases, but not in Lewis’ case. Lewis does not challenge on appeal the 

district court’s alternate ground for its ruling on this issue. Accordingly, we affirm 

that alternate ruling. See Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder Cty. Soc. Servs., 569 F.3d 

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1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2009) (“When an appellant does not challenge a district court’s 

alternate ground for its ruling, we may affirm the ruling.”). 

B 

A plaintiff may also show pretext “by demonstrating such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherenc[i]es, or contradictions in the employer’s 

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 

find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the 

asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.” Jaramillo, 680 F.3d at 1269 (quotation 

omitted). 

Lewis asserts that Frito-Lay offered inconsistent explanations as to why it 

enters into LCAs. In response to a request for information from the EEOC, a 

Frito-Lay representative explained that the company would enter into an LCA if it 

was preferable to the uncertain outcome of an arbitration. Denny testified in his 

deposition that the company would enter into an LCA if the union threatened 

arbitration. Lewis contends these statements are inconsistent because the former 

implies an arbitration is already pending and makes no express reference to a threat. 

We agree with the district court that the statements are not meaningfully inconsistent. 

Lewis also argues that Frito-Lay made contradictory statements about when it 

decides to enter into an LCA. Denny testified that the union’s request for an LCA is 

part of the grievance procedure, and his denial of a grievance is also a denial of an 

LCA request. He further testified that he never granted LCAs at the third step of the 

grievance procedure, and that the union’s threat of arbitration would occur after he 

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denied the grievance and the LCA. As the district court explained, these statements 

merely demonstrate that Denny would deny LCA requests in the grievance process, 

after which the union would threaten arbitration, prompting Denny to negotiate an 

LCA. We agree with the district court that these statements do not create a genuine 

dispute of fact as to pretext. 

C 

Lastly, a plaintiff can also show pretext by presenting “evidence that the 

defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was false.” Kendrick, 

220 F.3d at 1230. Lewis argues that a reasonable jury could find that Denny was 

dishonest about why he decided to enter into an LCA with McComas and Dugger—

because the union threatened arbitration over their terminations. 

Denny testified that the union could threaten arbitration by placing an 

employee’s name on a list. But in the disciplinary documents relating to McComas 

and Dugger, there is no list of cases to be arbitrated that contains their names. Lewis 

therefore argues that a reasonable jury could find Denny’s explanation was false. But 

Denny further testified that the union could also threaten arbitration simply by telling 

Denny or the Human Resources Department that it would bring the case to 

arbitration, and that the union did so for both McComas and Dugger. We agree with 

the district court that the absence of a list in the cases of McComas and Dugger does 

not create a genuine dispute of material fact. 

Lewis also contends that Denny’s inability to remember specific details about 

the union’s verbal threats of arbitration in the cases of McComas and Dugger could 

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lead a jury to find Denny’s explanation unworthy of belief. But as the district court 

explained, Denny’s inability to remember details of events that happened years prior 

does not create a factual dispute as to whether his statements regarding the threats of 

arbitration were false. 

III 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Carlos F. Lucero 

 Circuit Judge 

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