Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15601/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15601-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Arnold
Appellee
Eric Michael Clark
Appellant
Terry L. Goddard
Appellee
Charles L. Ryan
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC MICHAEL CLARK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JAMES ARNOLD; TERRY L.

GODDARD; CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-15601

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-08006-

JAT

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 13, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed October 8, 2014

Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit

Judges, and James C. Mahan, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bybee

* The Honorable James C. Mahan, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

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2 CLARK V. ARNOLD

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment denying

Eric Michael Clark’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition

challenging a conviction of murdering a law enforcement

officer in the line of duty.

Clark argued his trial counsel was ineffective under

Strickland v. Washington for not preserving “observation

evidence” that could negate the mens rea element of the crime

and for failing to request a reevaluation of his competency

during trial. He also argued that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise those issues on appeal.

In light of the “doubly deferential” standard afforded to

Strickland claims brought under § 2254, the panel concluded

that it was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Strickland for the state court to determine that Clark’s trial

counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to

preserve explicitly the issue of observation evidence or by

failing to request a reevaluation of Clark’s competency. The

panel held that Clark’s claim of ineffective appellate counsel

is procedurally defaulted. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 3

COUNSEL

Carla G. Ryan (argued), Law Office of Carla G. Ryan,

Tucson, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Michael T. O’Toole (argued), Assistant Attorney General;

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General; Kent E. Cattani,

Division Chief Counsel; Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief

Counsel, Phoenix, Arizona, for Respondents-Appellees.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Arizona state prisoner Eric Michael Clark appeals from

the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas

corpus petition challenging his conviction of murdering a law

enforcement officer in the line of duty. Clark argues his trial

counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), for not preserving “observation

evidence” that could negate the mens rea element of the crime

and for failing to request a reevaluation of his competency

during trial. He also argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise those issues on appeal.

In light of the “doubly deferential” standard afforded to

Strickland claims brought under § 2254, Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009), we conclude that it

was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Strickland for the state court to determine that Clark’s trial

counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to

preserve explicitly the issue of observation evidence or by

failing to request a reevaluation of Clark’s competency. We

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4 CLARK V. ARNOLD

hold that Clark’s claim of ineffective appellate counsel is

procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the district court denying Clark’s habeas petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Offense and Trial

The instant appeal is the latest chapter in this case’s long

and complex history. The facts of the underlying crime are

straightforward. As described by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Clark’s direct appeal:

In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer

Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police

responded in uniform to complaints that a

pickup truck with loud music blaring was

circling a residential block. When he located

the truck, the officer turned on the emergency

lights and siren of his marked patrol car,

which prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the

truck’s driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer

Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark

to stay where he was. Less than a minute

later, Clark shot the officer, who died soon

after but not before calling the police

dispatcher for help. Clark ran away on foot

but was arrested later that day with

gunpowder residue on his hands; the gun that

killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed

into a knit cap.

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 (2006).

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 5

Clark was charged with first-degree murder for

intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer

in the line of duty under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

1105(A)(3).1Independent psychological experts appointed

by the court deemed him incompetent to stand trial. The

parties subsequently stipulated to Clark’s incompetence.

1. Competency

Clark underwent treatment to restore competency at a

state hospital beginning in April 2001. In October 2001,

Arizona State Hospital evaluator Edward Jasinski, Ph.D.,

concluded “to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty

that[] Mr. Clark is competent to stand trial.” He deemed any

lack of cooperation between Clark and his evaluators

“volitional.” Court-appointed doctors came to similar

conclusions. M.B. Kassell, M.D., wrote in November 2001

that Clark was “at this time . . . quite [c]ompetent.” John P.

DiBacco, Ph.D., wrote that at that time Clark was “competent

to stand trial and, more specifically, can assist his attorney in

his own defense as well as understand the process to the

extent necessary.”

Competency hearings followed in the summer of 2002. 

Drs. DiBacco, Kassell, and Jasinski testified that Clark was

competent and that any failure to cooperate with his attorney

was volitional. Clark’s expert, Susan Parrish, Ph.D.,

disagreed with this finding, writing that Clark “can’t fully

appreciate the situation,” and that any failure to work with his

1 Section 13–1105(A)(3) provides that “[a] person commits first degree

murder if . . . [i]ntending or knowing that the person’s conduct will cause

death to a law enforcement officer, the person causes the death of a law

enforcement officer who is in the line of duty.”

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6 CLARK V. ARNOLD

lawyers “is not volitional.” The court considered all the

evidence and ordered Clark readmitted to the hospital in

September 2002 and ordered periodic reports from his

doctors. Drs. Kassell and Jasinski submitted further reports

attesting to Clark’s competence.2 Barry Morenz, M.D.,

another expert retained by Clark, provided an assessment in

April 2003, concluding that Clark “does have some cognitive

awareness of his current legal predicament” and he “could be

considered marginally competent to stand trial but his

competency would have to be considered qualified.” He

noted that injections of an antipsychotic drug called Haldol

“are probably helping him, at least to some degree . . . ,” but

it was “not clear that Mr. Clark can rationally assist his

attorney in his own defense since Mr. Clark has yet to have

a rational conversation with his attorney about his case. To

conclude that Mr. Clark is clearly competent would imply

that Mr. Clark is malingering,” which Dr. Morenz called

“possible” but “not likely.”

In May 2003, after reviewing “the records submitted by

Dr. Kassel, Dr. DiBacco, Dr. Morenz, and Dr. Jasinski and

all other information,” the court concluded that Clark was

“competent to stand [t]rial, understands the proceedings, and

if he chooses, can assist his attorney in his defense. The

Defendant’s status, at this time, is one of volition, as opposed

2

Jasinski noted that Clark “ask[ed] questions about civil commitments,

GEI [guilty except for insanity], and prison sentences” and “wanted to

know where you would have to serve the longest sentence and if you were

under a civil commitment, would your charges be dropped.” Clark later

told Jasinski: “I’m charged with murdering a police officer, but I am

innocent.” Jasinski wrote Clark “does have a good understanding of his

legal situation, does have an awareness of various legal options in this

case, and in fact is weighting various options.”

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 7

to any inability.” The bench trial began on August 5, 2003,

and lasted eleven days.

On the seventh day of the trial, Clark’s attorney, Byron

Middlebrook, told the judge that he and co-counsel David

Goldberg “have some concerns that [Clark] may not be

following what’s occurring in court” and said that there was

“some concern about making sure that [he] gets medicated

and stuff. And I will be the first to admit that we have kind

of let that drop off. . . . [W]e probably need to get him

medicated. We’re getting a little concerned that he’s not

following.” The court said it would contact the jail to make

sure it was aware of a court order requiring that Clark be

given his medication, specifically Haldol, even involuntarily. 

This colloquy is the extent of any concerns raised during trial

about Clark’s mental health.

2. The Insanity Defense Under Arizona Law

Arizona’s traditional approach to the insanity defense was

adapted from M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718

(Q.B.), the single most influential articulation of the common

law insanity defense.3In that case, in 1843, Daniel

3

See Renée Melançon, Note, Arizona’s Insane Response to Insanity,

40 Ariz. L. Rev. 287, 294 (1998) [hereinafter Response to Insanity]

(“Arizona’s original insanity defense statute was basically the M’Naghten

test.”); see also Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir.

1954), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d

969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he House of Lords in the famous M’Naghten

case restated what had become the accepted ‘right-wrong’ test in a form

which has since been followed, not only in England but in most American

jurisdictions as an exclusive test of criminal responsibility.”) (footnotes

omitted); Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 7.2 (2d ed.) (“In a

majority of the jurisdictions in this country, what is most often referred to

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8 CLARK V. ARNOLD

M’Naghten shot and killed Edward Drummond, the secretary

to Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, believing that Drummond

was Peel. See id. at 719; Fradella, From Insanity, at 15. 

M’Naghten was under the delusion that Peel was persecuting

him, and he was acquitted of murder on the ground of

insanity. Subsequently, the House of Lords put several

questions relating to insanity to English judges. See

M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720. The judges’ answers became

known as the M’Naghten Rules, the most important of which

provided:

[T]o establish a defence on the ground of

insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the

time of the committing of the act, the party

accused was labouring under such a defect of

reason, from disease of the mind, as not to

know the nature and quality of the act he was

doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not

know he was doing what was wrong.

Id. at 722.

as the M’Naghten rule has long been accepted as the test to be applied for

the defense of insanity.”); Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond

Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the

Post-Clark Era, 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 7, 15 (2007) [hereinafter

From Insanity] (“In 1843, the M’Naghten case set forth a legal standard

for insanity that many U.S. jurisdictions still use today.”) (footnotes

omitted); cf. Clark, 548 U.S. at 749 (“Even a cursory examination of the

traditional Anglo-American approaches to insanity reveals significant

differences among them, with four traditional strains variously combined

to yield a diversity of American standards[,]” although the first two strains

“emanate from the alternatives stated in the M’Naghten rule.”).

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 9

M’Naghten essentially established a two pronged insanity

defense. The first, the cognitive incapacity prong, asks

whether a mental defect left a defendant at the time of the act

unable to understand what he was doing—to form the

requisite mens rea of the crime charged. See Clark, 548 U.S.

at 747; Fradella, From Insanity, at 18 (“The cognitive

incapacity part of the test relieves the defendant of liability

when the defendant is incapable of forming mens rea.”). If,

for example, “in crushing the skull of a human being with an

iron bar, [a person] believed that he was smashing a glass

jar,” he would be deemed insane under the cognitive

incapacity prong of M’Naghten. 2 Wharton’s Crim. L. § 101

(15th ed.); see also Fradella, From Insanity, at 18 (“For

example, if a man strangled another person believing that he

was squeezing the juice out of a lemon, he did not understand

the nature and quality of his act.”).

The second prong, called the moral incapacityprong, asks

whether a mental disease or defect left the defendant unable

to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act. See Clark, 548 U.S.

at 747. In that circumstance, the defendant “knew what he

was doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull of a human

being with an iron bar. However, because of mental disease,

he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. He

believed, for example, that he was carrying out a command

from God.” 2 Wharton’s Crim. L. § 101. In that example,

the defendant would have satisfied the cognitive capacity

prong—because he had the mens rea for he knew he was

crushing a human skull with intent to kill—but he could be

adjudged insane because he did not think his doing so was

wrong given the context. See Fradella, From Insanity, at 18

(describing this prong of M’Naghten as “usually at the crux

of an insanity defense”).

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10 CLARK V. ARNOLD

Until the early 1990s, Arizona “uniformly adhered” to

“the Rule of M’Naghten’s Case as the test for criminal

insanity.” State v. Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 525 (1965) (citing

cases from 1921). When Arizona “first codified an insanity

rule [in 1978] it adopted the full M’Naghten statement.”

Clark, 548 U.S. at 747. The 1978 law read in relevant part:

A person is not responsible for criminal

conduct if at the time of such conduct the

person was suffering from such a mental

disease or defect as not to know the nature

and quality of the act or, if such person did

know, that such person did not know that

what he was doing was wrong.

Id. at 747–48 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–502 (West

1978)).

But in 1993, after a defendant in a highly publicized

murder trial was found not guilty by reason of insanity and

was later released, Arizona’s legislature changed the insanity

defense and adopted a much more restrictive version of the

test. Melançon, Response to Insanity, at 290. The new law

did not include a “cognitive incapacity” provision; it left only

the second prong of the M’Naghten test, the so-called moral

incapacity test:

A person may be found guilty except insane if

at the time of the commission of the criminal

act the person was afflicted with a mental

disease or defect of such severity that the

person did not know the criminal act was

wrong. A mental disease or defect

constituting legal insanity is an affirmative

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 11

defense. Mental disease or defect does not

include disorders that result from acute

voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from

alcohol or drugs, character defects,

psychosexual disorders or impulse control

disorders. Conditions that do not constitute

legal insanity include but are not limited to

momentary, temporary conditions arising

from the pressure of the circumstances, moral

decadence, depravity or passion growing out

of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred or other

motives in a person who does not suffer from

a mental disease or defect or an abnormality

that is manifested only by criminal conduct.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-502(A).

In State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997), the Arizona

Supreme Court addressed what kind of evidence could be

admitted at trial to negate specific intent under the new law. 

Mott concerned expert evidence on battered woman

syndrome (“BWS”). 931 P.2d at 1049. The defendant was

convicted of two counts of child abuse and first-degree

murder and sought to introduce testimony from an expert on

BWS to show that the defendant’s mental capacity negated

the specific intent necessary to “knowingly or intentionally”

commit child abuse. Id. The trial court denied the admission

of such evidence, but the appellate court reversed. The

Arizona Supreme Court reversed again. Id. Reviewing the

Arizona insanity defense statute, the court concluded that the

legislature’s rejection of a diminished capacity defense (the

cognitive prong) was also a bar on “evidence of a defendant’s

mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative

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12 CLARK V. ARNOLD

defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime.” Id. at

1051.

The BWS expert’s “testimonywas offered to demonstrate

that defendant’s mental incapacity negated specific intent.” 

Id. at 1054. The court held it was not admissible for that

purpose, and “did not meet the standards of the one test for

criminal responsibility—the M’Naghten test—that Arizona

does follow”—the moral incapacity prong of the test. Id. at

1054–55. “Furthermore, if [the court] adopted the

defendant’s position and allowed expert testimony such as

this to negate specific intent, the result would be . . . to

compel juries to ‘release[ ] upon society many dangerous

criminals who obviously should be placed under

confinement.’” Id. at 1055 (alteration in original) (citation

omitted).4

3. The State Trial

Clark was tried without a jury. The revised version of the

insanity defense, as interpreted by Mott, was the operative

law during Clark’s bench trial. After the state presented its

case, Clark moved for a directed judgment of acquittal

claiming that there was insufficient evidence that he knew the

4 Mott later filed a habeas petition that the Arizona district court granted

in an unpublished opinion. Mott v. Stewart, 98-CV-239, 2002 WL

31017646 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished). The court concluded

that “[t]he exclusion of evidence of mental disease or defect offered to

negate the specific intent element of an offense or to establish an

alternative explanation for a defendant’s conduct is disproportionate to the

purposes stated by the court that it was designed to serve.” Id. at *6. 

Clark’s trial court did not rely on Mott’s habeas proceeding when it

construed Mott, concluding that an unpublished federal opinion was not

“the law of the land of the State of Arizona.”

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 13

officer whom he shot “was actually a police officer and that

he was actually intending to kill a police officer,” and not an

alien. Clark had told others that he believed that aliens had

invaded Flagstaff and were impersonating government

agents. In response, the state introduced evidence that the

officer displayed all the indicia of the police: he drove a

squad car, turned on his lights and sirens, and wore a uniform,

and that Clark pulled over as ordered. The court denied the

motion.

During trial, Clark claimed mental illness and sought to

introduce evidence of such illness for two purposes. First,

Clark raised the affirmative defense of insanityunder Arizona

law—that “at the time of the commission of the criminal act

[he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such

severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong.” 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–502(A). Second, he sought to

rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea

under the first-degree murder statute, that he had acted

intentionally or knowingly to kill a law enforcement officer. 

See Clark, 548 U.S. at 744.

On the second ground, the trial court interpreted Mott as

barring evidence of insanity to dispute mens rea, but

permitted the evidence to be admitted. The court stated that

“after reading all [of] the Mott case,” and recognizing that

“all” of the defense counsel’s evidence “has to do with the

insanity [claim but] could also arguably be made along the

lines of the Mott issues as to form and intent and [Clark’s]

capacity for intent,” it would “let [counsel] go ahead and get

all that stuff in [the record] because it goes to the insanity

issue and because we’re not in front of a jury.” The court

added that “[a]t the end, I’ll let [counsel] make an offer of

proof as to the intent, the Mott issues, but I still think the

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14 CLARK V. ARNOLD

[Arizona] supreme court decision [in Mott] is the law of the

land in this state.” “I will certainly allow you to preserve the

issue, you can argue or not argue, but you can make an offer

of proof at the conclusion of the case, but I don’t think it’s the

law of the land at this point.”

Clark presented significant evidence of his mental state

and the nature and effect of his delusions. Witnesses

included a psychiatrist as well as “classmates, school

officials, and his family [who] describ[ed] his increasingly

bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting.” Clark,

548 U.S. at 745.

Witnesses testified, for example,that paranoid

delusions led Clark to rig a fishing line with

beads and wind chimes at home to alert him to

intrusion by invaders, and to keep a bird in his

automobile to warn of airborne poison. There

was lay and expert testimony that Clark

thought Flagstaff was populated with “aliens”

(some impersonating government agents), the

“aliens” were trying to kill him, and bullets

were the only way to stop them. A

psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering

from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions

about “aliens” when he killed Officer Moritz,

and he concluded that Clark was incapable of

luring the officer or understanding right from

wrong and that he was thus insane at the time

of the killing. In rebuttal, a psychiatrist for

the State gave his opinion that Clark’s

paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from

appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct,

as shown by his actions before and after the

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 15

shooting (such as circling the residential block

with music blaring as if to lure the police to

intervene, evading the police after the

shooting, and hiding the gun).

Id.

At the conclusion of his trial, Clark renewed his motion

for a directed verdict, which the court denied. On September

3, 2003, the court rejected Clark’s insanity defense and found

him guilty of first-degree murder. The court noted that the

case “was well prepared and professionally tried,” and that

the “state and the defense were exceedingly well represented

in this case.” The court divided its verdict into two parts. 

First, it “f[ou]nd beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant, Eric Clark, shot and caused the death of police

officer, Jeff Moritz.” Second, it noted that Clark had entered

a plea of guilty but insane and it asked, (a) whether the

defendant was “afflicted with a mental disease or defect,”

and—after concluding that he was—asked (b) if that “disease

or defect caused him to not know his criminal act was

wrong,” as required by Arizona’s moral incapacity test. The

court concluded that Clark’s schizophrenia “did not . . .

distort his perception of reality so severely that he did not

know his actions were wrong.”

The court sentenced Clark to life in prison with possible

release after twenty-five years.

B. Direct Appeal and Clark’s Tripartite Framework

On appeal to the Arizona intermediate appellate court,

Clark argued “that it was not inconsistent with Mott to

consider nonexpert evidence indicating mental illness on the

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16 CLARK V. ARNOLD

issue of mens rea, and [he] argued that the trial judge had

failed to do so.” The State responded that Mott barred “any

evidence reflecting upon a mentally ill criminal defendant’s

ability to form the necessary mens rea.”

In January 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Clark’s conviction and sentence. While it noted that Clark

had argued that the court erred in refusing to consider

evidence of his mental disease or defect in determining

whether he had the requisite mens rea to commit the murder,

“the record shows that the trial court did not prevent Clark

from presenting such evidence, despite our supreme court’s

decision to the contrary in Mott, even going so far as to

permit him to make an offer of proof on the issue at the close

of the evidence.” However, “[a]side from the evidence

offered to prove his insanity generally, Clark specified no

evidence in his offer of proof that demonstrated he was not

capable of knowing he was killing a police officer.” The

appellate court allowed that, “[e]ven assuming such evidence

was sufficient, the trial court was bound by the [Arizona]

supreme court’s decision in Mott, which held that ‘Arizona

does not allow evidence of a defendant’s mental disorder

short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate

the mens rea element of a crime.’” Arizona v. Clark, 1 CACR 03-0851; 1 CA-CR 03-0985 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 25,

2005) (quoting Mott, 931 P.3d at 1051) The Arizona Supreme

Court denied Clark’s petition for review.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider,

first, “whether due process prohibits Arizona’s use of an

insanity test stated solely in terms of the capacity to tell

whether an act charged as a crime was right or wrong,” and,

second, “whether Arizona violates due process in restricting

consideration of defense evidence of mental illness and

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 17

incapacity to its bearing on a claim of insanity, thus

eliminating its significance directly on the issue of the mental

element of the crime charged (known in legal shorthand as

the mens rea, or guilty mind).” Clark, 548 U.S. at 742. The

Court held “there [was] no violation of due process in either

instance” and affirmed the conviction. Id.

With regard to the second issue, which is at the heart of

the instant appeal, the Court described three categories of

evidence bearing on insanity: (1) “observation evidence,”

(2) “mental-disease evidence,” and (3) “capacity evidence. 

Id. at 757–59.

It defined observation evidence as “testimony from those

who observed what Clark did and heard what he said; this

category would also include testimony that an expert witness

might give about Clark’s tendency to think in a certain way

and his behavioral characteristics.” Id. at 757. Such evidence

could “support a professional diagnosis of mental disease and

in any event is the kind of evidence that can be relevant to

show what in fact was on Clark’s mind when he fired the

gun.” Id. It “covers Clark’s behavior at home and with

friends, his expressions of belief around the time of the

killing that ‘aliens’ were inhabiting the bodies of local people

(including government agents), his driving around the

neighborhood before the police arrived, and so on.” Id.

(footnote omitted). Observation evidence can be presented

by “either lay or expert witnesses.” Id. at 758.

Second, “mental-disease evidence” is “opinion testimony

that Clark suffered from a mental disease with features

described by the witness.” Id. “As was true here, this

evidence characteristically but not always comes from

professional psychologists or psychiatrists who testify as

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18 CLARK V. ARNOLD

expert witnesses and base their opinions in part on

examination of a defendant.” Id. Such evidence at trial

suggested Clark “fell within the category of schizophrenia.” 

Id.

Third, “capacity evidence” refers to evidence of “a

defendant’s capacity for cognition and moral judgment (and

ultimately also his capacity to form mens rea).” Such

testimony can come from experts and focuses “on those

specific details of the mental condition that make the

difference between sanity and insanity under the Arizona

definition.” Id. The majority noted that these categories went

to core differences, not the margins, and reserved decision on

the “[e]xact limits” between them. Id. at 759.

After describing this taxonomy, the Court interpreted

Mott differently than the Arizona Court of Appeals. It read

Mott not as an absolute bar on all evidence of mental illness

that could negate mens rea, as the Arizona appellate court

had, but to bar only so-called mental disease and capacity

evidence: “It is clear that Mott itself imposed no restriction

on considering evidence of the first sort, the observation

evidence.” Id. at 760.

The Court faulted Clark’s counsel for failing to recognize

that Mott was so limited and for not preserving a claim that

the trial court improperly excluded observation evidence. Id.

at 764. But even on this central issue, the Court seemed to

contradict itself. “In this case,” the Court wrote, “the trial

court seems to have applied the Mott restriction to all

evidence offered byClark for the purpose of showing what he

called his inability to form the required mens rea.” Id. at 760

(citation omitted). But that was not clear: “[T]he trial court’s

restriction may have covered not only mental-disease and

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 19

capacity evidence . . . but also observation evidence offered

by lay (and expert) witnesses who described Clark’s unusual

behavior.” Id. Later, the Court asserted more forcefully that

“[a]t no point did the trial judge specify any particular

evidence that he refused to consider on the mens rea issue.” 

Id. at 763.

Finally, the Court concluded: “In sum, the trial court’s

ruling, with its uncertain edges, may have restricted

observation evidence admissible on mens rea to the insanity

defense alone, but we cannot be sure.” Id. at 764–65. 

Nevertheless, it deemed a due process challenge to “a

restriction of observation evidence . . . neither pressed nor

passed” below, so it did not consider it. Id. at 765.5It went

on to consider Clark’s claim that his due process rights were

violated by “Arizona’s prohibition of diminished capacity

evidence by criminal defendants”—not on observation

evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court

concluded that Mott’s (limited) restrictions were permissible. 

Id. at 770.

The three-part evidentiary categorization the Court

created was a novel invention.6 The dissent criticized it as a

5 The dissent was more assertive, writing that the trial court’s ruling and

the terms of the verdict lead to the conclusion that the “most reasonable

assumption, then would seem to be that the trial court did not consider [all

evidence offered byClark on his inability to formmens rea], and the Court

does not hold otherwise.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 784 (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting).

6

See Susan D. Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explaining

the Otherwise Inexplicable Clark v. Arizona, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 19,

44 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s breakdown of relevant evidence into

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20 CLARK V. ARNOLD

“restructured evidentiary universe, with no convincing

authority to support it” and claimed it was “unworkable on its

own terms.” Id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It criticized

the Court for “refus[ing] to consider the key part of Clark’s

claim because his counsel did not predict the Court’s own

invention. It is unrealistic, and most unfair, to hold that

Clark’s counsel erred in failing to anticipate so novel an

approach.” Id. at 781–82.7

C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

1. State Court

In September 2006, Clark filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court asserting five ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims. The Arizona trial court denied

all of Clark’s claims. As pertinent to our review, it held that

Clark’s trial counsel was not ineffective when they did not

raise the issue of competency after Clark had already been

found competent. While Clark’s counsel testified in a postconviction hearing that he thought Clark may have been

incompetent when he stopped drawing nonsensical symbols

and appeared to sleep during part of the trial, the court held

that “[m]inimal attorney competence does not place upon an

observational, mental-disease, and capacity categories has no basis in

anything that has come before.”).

7

Justice Breyer’s concurrence “agree[d] with the Court’s basic

categorization” but allowed that “the distinction among these kinds of

evidence will be unclear in some cases.” Id. at 780 (Breyer, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part). He favored remanding the case to the

Arizona courts to “determine whether Arizona law, as set forth in Mott

and other cases, is consistent with the distinction the Court draws and

whether the trial court so applied Arizona law here.” Id.

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 21

attorney a duty to rely on subjective personal opinions about

a defendant’s mental state, disregarding the opinions of

numerous mental health experts.” It also held that

Middlebrook was not deficient for not seeking a competency

reevaluation based on a test by one of Clark’s psychiatrists

that was of “questionable methodology.”

The court additionally held that trial counsel was not

ineffective for not preserving an observation evidence claim

in light of the Supreme Court’s disagreement on the issue. 

“Where arguably, three of the best legal minds in our country

disagree with five others, finding that petitioner preserved his

claim, this Court is hard pressed to find an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim,” it wrote. Because it held that

Clark’s counsel rendered adequate performance, the court did

not address prejudice on either claim. The Arizona Court of

Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court denied further review.

2. Federal District Court

In June 2009, Clark filed a federal habeas petition

asserting the following grounds for relief: (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support Clark’s conviction for firstdegree murder; (2) the trial court’s conclusion that Clark was

not insane at the time of the offense was unreasonable;

(3) Clark’s sentence constituted cruel and unusual

punishment; (4) Clark was not competent to stand trial or

waive his right to a jury trial; (5) Clark’s trial counsel was

ineffective for various reasons, including not preserving an

“observation evidence” claim and not re-raising the issue of

competency during trial; (6) the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct by not advising the trial court of the need for a

competency hearing regarding waiving a jury trial; and

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(7) Clark’s appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising

a competency claim and an observational-evidence claim.

a. Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

In November 2011, the magistrate judge issued a Report

and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that Clark be

granted habeas release on his claim that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to

preserve an observational evidence claim. The R&R found

that the remainder of Petitioner’s claims were either

procedurally defaulted or without merit. The magistrate’s

R&R concluded that, even before the Supreme Court’s

decision in Clark, Mott did not exclude the entire field of

evidence—expert psychological evidence, diminished

capacity evidence, and what we now call observation

evidence—and that Clark’s counsel rendered deficient

performance when they failed to recognize that and make an

offer of proof, prejudicing Clark.

b. District Court Ruling

The district court disagreed with the R&R’s resolution of

the observation-evidence claim, and concluded that Clark’s

trial counsel was not ineffective for not preserving an

observational-evidence claim, and, even if his counsel did

render deficient performance, Clark failed to establish he was

prejudiced. The district court held that all the relevant

evidence was admitted by the trial court, although perhaps not

considered, and that there was no excluded evidence on

which the counsel could have made an offer of proof. 

Furthermore, it held that Clark’s counsel raised the mens rea

issue “generally with the trial court, and then felt bound to

abide by the trial court’s ruling that he could not use this

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 23

evidence to negate mens rea other than to preserve the

underlying evidence for appeal.” Accordingly, the court

found the performance of Clark’s counsel adequate. And

while it did not need to reach the prejudice prong, the court

opined that Clark would have suffered no prejudice even if

the evidence had been omitted in light of the State’s

overwhelming evidence establishing the requisite mens rea.8

Clark timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under AEDPA,

habeas relief can be granted only if the state court’s

proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), (2). Under this “highly deferential standard,”

we “presume that ‘state courts know and follow the law.’”

Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

Under § 2254, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state

court’s application” of the Supreme Court precedent “was

unreasonable[,]” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785

(2011), as opposed to merely “incorrect or erroneous[,]”

8 Although the district court held that a claim by Clark that his appellate

counsel was ineffective was procedurally defaulted, the court addressed

it out of an abundance of caution, finding that Clark’s claim was meritless.

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Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). In applying this

standard, we must give “state-court decisions . . . the benefit

of the doubt,” Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24, and we will refrain

from issuing a writ “so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Under § 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination”

clause, “a state-court’s factual determination is not

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would

have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

The “clearly established federal law” for ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is articulated in Strickland. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). “Surmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). To succeed on a

Strickland claim, a defendant must prove that (1) his

counsel’s performance was deficient in violation of the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) he was prejudiced by

counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687–88.

Counsel is constitutionally deficient if the representation

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that

it was outside “the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “The proper measure of attorney

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms.” Id. at 688. “Judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and the

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 25

court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after

conviction.” Id. at 689. When evaluating counsel’s conduct,

“we must make every effort ‘to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, . . . and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel’s perspective at the time.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan,

738 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689).

A defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A

“reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome” of a proceeding. Id.

Thus, a petitioner need not prove “counsel’s actions more

likely than not altered the outcome,” but rather he must

demonstrate that “[t]he likelihood of a different result [is]

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Because we are reviewing the Arizona courts’ assessment

of counsel’s performance under AEDPA, our review is

“doubly deferential.” Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 123. Subject

to the constraints of Strickland, the Arizona courts must defer

to counsel’s judgment, and, subject to AEDPA’s standards,

we must defer to the Arizona courts’ assessment of counsel’s

judgment. See Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 13.

We review a district court’s denial of a writ of habeas

corpus de novo. Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th

Cir. 2000).

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III. DISCUSSION

The district court certified three issues for appeal: 

(1) whether “trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

preserve the issue of observational evidence,” (2) whether

trial counsel was ineffective because the “defendant was not

competent for the entire trial and trial counsel . . . failed to

request a re-evaluation,” and (3) whether “appellate counsel

. . . was ineffective because he failed to raise the issue of

competency in the appeal and failed to preserve the

observational evidence at trial for appellate review and filed

to this issue in the appeal.” We will consider each claim in

turn.

A. “Observation Evidence”

On appeal, Clark relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s

holding that his trial counsel did not preserve observation

evidence as to mens rea. Clark, 598 U.S. at 763. Clark

argues that reasonable counsel would have preserved the

issue through an offer of proof when the trial court offered,

and failing to do so prejudiced Clark.

The State argues that Clark’s tripartite evidence

distinctions and its narrow interpretation of Mott created new

law that Clark’s counsel could not have reasonably been

expected to anticipate. Appellee’s Opening Brief 14 (citing

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986)). With regard to

prejudice, the State argues that there was no evidence to

suggest that Clark did not know the victim was a police

officer, so even if observation evidence were considered on

the subject of mens rea, Clark’s claim would fail.

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 27

1. Ineffective Assistance

We conclude that it was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, Strickland for the state court to

determine that Clark’s trial counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance by failing to preserve explicitly the

issue of observation evidence. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

First, it was unclear what evidence Mott excluded before the

Supreme Court established the definitive interpretation in

Clark. Mott concerned the testimony of an expert on BWS,

but its language swept broadly: “Arizona does not allow

evidence of a defendant’s mental disorder short of insanity

either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea

element of a crime.” Mott, 931 P.2d at 1051 (first emphasis

added). The Arizona Supreme Court wrote of “evidence,”

not merely expert evidence that could speak to a defendant’s

mental disorder, and it held that such evidence offered to

“negate[] specific intent” was “not admissible for this

purpose.” Id. at 1054. Subsequent Arizona cases did not

clarify the ambiguity. See State v. McKeon, 38 P.3d 1236,

1240 n.2 (Ariz. 2002) (distinguishing Mott on the ground that

Mott concerned a mental disorder, unlike the involuntary

intoxication defense at issue). Even the magistrate judge,

who recommended granting the petition, noted that, “prior to

Clark there was no jurisprudence holding that Mott was

limited to expert testimony and did not include ‘observational

evidence.’” During Clark’s direct appeal, the State argued

that Mott barred “any evidence reflecting upon a mentally ill

criminal defendant’s ability to form the necessary mens rea,”

which was the interpretation the Arizona Court of Appeals

adopted. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court itself debated,

it was not clear before Clark whether Mott announced an

“expansive rule of exclusion . . . without any suggestion of a

limitation depending on the kind of evidence,” or one

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“limited to expert testimony.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 786

(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see id. at 762 (majority opinion)

(“[W]e understand that Mott is meant to confine to the

insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior

associated with mental disease.”) (citations omitted).

In light of the ambiguities within Mott itself, the paucity

of other relevant case law interpreting it, and the overlapping,

inexact boundaries between the categories of observation,

mental-disease, and capacity evidence within the Supreme

Court’s own formulation, see id. at 759, it was not an

unreasonable application of Strickland for the state court to

determine that Clark’s trial counsel was not ineffective when

it interpreted Mott more broadly than the Court did. Doing so

did not fall “outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, especially

where “‘[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to . . . evaluate the conduct from

counsel’s perspective at the time.’” Smith v. Murray,

477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (first alteration in original) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). That is all the more true here,

since “[w]e do not expect counsel to be prescient about the

direction the law will take.” Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926,

940 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated in part on other grounds,

552 U.S. 117, 128 (2008) (per curiam); see also Lowry v.

Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a

lawyer is not ineffective for failing to anticipate a decision in

a later case).

Second, while the U.S. Supreme Court and the Arizona

Court of Appeals referred to Clark’s counsel’s failure to make

an offer of proof, the record shows that all of the evidence

that could have negated Clark’s mens rea was admitted and

it is, at best, unclear what evidence the trial court considered

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 29

and what it excluded. With regard to evidence of Clark’s

delusions, the trial court said it was bound by Mott and would

focus on the evidence’s relevance to the insanity defense, but

it would let counsel “get all that stuff in because it goes to the

insanity issue and because [the trial was] not in front of a

jury.” Middlebrook, one of Clark’s trial lawyers, later said

that, following the court’s ruling on the Mott issues, he

thought he “had preserved” the issue of “being able to bring

in lay people to discuss mens rea and, in effect, to negate

[Clark’s] ability to premeditate and/or perceive that Officer

Moritz was in fact a police officer versus an alien.” And,

during trial, Clark presented significant evidence from expert

and laywitnesses who spoke of Clark’s odd behaviors and his

expressed beliefs that aliens were taking the form of

government agents in Flagstaff. Clark’s trial counsel

believed that they had introduced “all the evidence” that they

thought was needed. “It wasn’t like we left out a piece of

evidence,” Middlebrook later said.

In Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the trial

judge did not “specify any particular evidence that he refused

to consider on the mens rea issue.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 763. 

And, while holding that Clark’s counsel did not preserve the

observation evidence claim, the Court hedged, concluding

that the trial court “may have restricted observation evidence

admissible on mens rea to the insanity defense alone, but we

cannot be sure.” Id. at 764–65 (first emphasis added).

And if the Supreme Court itself was uncertain what the

state court had considered, it was not deficient performance

for Clark’s counsel to believe that the state court had

considered all of the relevant evidence going to Clark’s mens

rea consistent with the then-prevailing interpretation of Mott. 

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (“We do not think

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30 CLARK V. ARNOLD

that a federal court can presume so lightly that a state court

failed to apply its own law.”); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.

639, 653 (1990) (“Trial judges are presumed to know the law

and to apply it in making their decisions.”), overruled on

other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 

Accordingly, we hold that the state court did not

unreasonably apply Strickland when it held that Clark’s trial

counsel did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

(2003); see also Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 954 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“We will not second-guess such decisions or use

hindsight to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct.”).

2. Prejudice

Because a defendant must show both that his counsel was

deficient and that he was prejudiced by the counsel’s actions,

our finding on performance would end our analysis. See

Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2001).

However, even if Clark could show that the trial court did not

consider observation evidence, he cannot show that he was

prejudiced because he cannot show that there was a

“substantial, not just conceivable” likelihood of a different

result if the court had considered such evidence. Richter,

131 S. Ct. at 792.

Since “the state courts found the representation adequate,

they never reached the issue of prejudice, and so we examine

this element of the Strickland claim de novo.” Rompilla v.

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (internal citation omitted).

“[I]n order to determine whether counsel’s errors

prejudiced the outcome of the trial, ‘it is essential to compare

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 31

the evidence that actually was presented to the jury with the

evidence that might have been presented had counsel acted

differently.’” Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 940 (quoting Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). In the instant

case, the state presented substantial evidence that Clark had

the required mens rea—of “knowing[ly] . . . caus[ing] the

death of a law enforcement officer.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-1105(A)(3). Specifically, the state presented evidence

of: Clark’s professed anger toward the police and his

fantasies of retaliating against them; his efforts to attract a

police officer the night of the killing by circling a residential

block with loud music blaring; the use of a weapon at close

range from behind, showing an intent to kill; Clark’s

recognition of and response to police indicia (i.e., Mortiz

wore a uniform and Clark pulled over in response to

emergency lights and sirens); and Clark’s flight from the

scene and attempt to dispose of the murder weapon.

The magistrate judge wrote that such evidence was “not

inconsistent with a paranoid delusion that the officer was an

alien intent on killing him. . . . A malevolent alien in a police

uniform, driving a squad car with lights and sirens, is still a

malevolent alien.” Such conclusions draw us too deeply into

the shadowy details of Clark’s hallucinations. The statute

requires proving that Clark intentionally or knowingly killed

a police officer—that Clark might have thought the officer

was possessed by an alien does not otherwise negate the mens

rea needed to violate the statute. And, more to the point, the

substantial evidence the State presented that showed Clark’s

intent to kill a police officer, regardless of whether Clark

believed that the police officer was otherwise possessed,

means that Clark cannot show, as he must, “that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors,” if they occurred, “the result of the proceeding would

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32 CLARK V. ARNOLD

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that the result of the

proceeding would not have been different even if Clark’s

counsel’s was deficient, Clark was not prejudiced. See

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 782 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding

petitioner did not establish prejudice even where counsel’s

performance likely proved deficient).

B. Competency During Trial

A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial if he “has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding and . . . has a

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402

(1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once

a defendant is deemed competent and a trial has begun, a trial

court must “sua sponte inquire into a defendant’s competency

if a reasonable judge would be expected to have a bona fide

doubt as to the defendant’s competence. A bona fide doubt

exists if there is substantial evidence of incompetence.” 

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted), overruled on

other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We have recognized a high bar for

what constitutes a “bona fide doubt” of competence. See

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 606 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“[T]here is no constitutional prohibition against the trial and

conviction of a defendant who fails to pay attention in

court—whether out of indifference, fear, confusion, boredom,

or sleepiness—unless that defendant cannot understand the

nature of the proceedings against him or adequately assist

counsel in conducting a defense.”) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted); de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 33

975, 978–79 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding counsel was not

ineffective when he did not seek a hearing on defendant’s

competency where defendant made isolated outburst and

psychiatric testimony characterized him as “severely

disturbed”).

1. Ineffective Assistance

On appeal, Clark argues that his counsel was ineffective

for failing to call for another competency hearing after

Middlebrook noticed Clark did not seem to be paying

attention. Clark points to two pieces of evidence to support

his contention. First, he argues that while the state court

deemed him competent to stand trial in May 2003, his expert,

Dr. Susan Parrish, issued another report in July 2003, shortly

before the start of trial, in which she reiterated her concerns

that Clark was incompetent. Second, Middlebrook testified

during the state post-conviction relief proceedings that he

knew Clark was taking his Haldol injections but not taking a

second medication called Cogentin and that he noticed Clark

was not scribbling nonsensically as often as he used to and

was putting his head on the counsel’s table. Middlebrook

further testified that he believed a reasonable attorney would

have requested Clark’s reevaluation.

The State argues that Dr. Parrish had never believed Clark

was competent and her July report did not address whether

Clark’s lack of cooperation with his lawyers was volitional. 

It criticizes the test Parrish administered, referred to as the

MacCAT-CA, as irrelevant, since only one part of the

test—the “understanding section”—is relevant to whether a

defendant understands the proceedings. It also argues that

Middlebrook’s after-the-fact personal impressions are

insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance.

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The State has the better of the argument here. First, as the

Arizona court pointed out, “[f]rom the beginning Dr. Parrish

never found [Clark] competent,” and thus her July 2003

report “was completely consistent with her opinion known to

all parties.” Three mental health experts—Drs. DiBacco,

Kassell, and Jasinski—had disagreed with Dr. Parrish, and

the trial court had found Clark competent. It was not

ineffective for “Mr. Middlebrook [to have] relied on the

experts’ opinions even though personally he disagreed with

them and proceeded to trial.”

Moreover, Dr. Parrish’s July 2003 report was

inconclusive. Dr. Parrish found that “Clark’s scores with

regard to a factual understanding of the legal proceedings

associated with adjudication placed him in the bottom 20% of

defendants considered competent and slightlyabove the mean

for defendants who were confirmed to be incompetent.” His

score “placed him on the borderline between Minimal or no

impairment and Mild impairment.” And, the Arizona court

found that even though Middlebrook thought Clark was not

competent to stand trial, counsel later admitted that Clark

“was competent at least early on in the beginning of trial.”

Second, Middlebrook was not ineffective because he

acted on his concern for Clark’s mental health when he told

the court he had doubts that Clark was receiving his

medication. The court said it would contact the jail to make

sure they were aware of a court order requiring he be given

his injections, even if involuntarily. After-the-fact secondguessing about what Middlebrook should have done without

“substantial evidence” of incompetence is not required,

Amaya-Ruiz, 121 F.3d at 489, and does not comport with

Strickland’s restriction on adjudicating by hindsight. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Edwards v. Lamarque,

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 35

475 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“The trial

court need not accept a self-proclaimed assertion by trial

counsel that trial counsel’s performance was inadequate.”).

2. Prejudice

With regard to prejudice,9

 to succeed, Clark has to show

not only that the trial court would have ordered a

reevaluation, but also that there was “a reasonable probability

that the defendant would have been found incompetent to

stand trial had the issue been raised and fully considered.” 

Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 283 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. In light of the lengthy

competency process, the reports of several doctors attesting

to Clark’s competence, the absence of any new information

in Dr. Parrish’s July 2003 report, and the judge’s order that

Clark be forciblymedicated, it is not reasonably probable that

the trial court would have granted a second competency

hearing and deemed Clark incompetent. See Hibbler v.

Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,

133 S. Ct. 1262 (2013); Stanley, 633 F.3d at 863; see also

Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 287 (holding there was no reasonable

probability court would have found defendant insane). 

Accordingly, it was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, Strickland for the state court to determine that

Clark’s trial counsel was not ineffective when they did not

request a reevaluation of Clark’s competency during trial.

9 We address the prejudice prong de novo since the state court did not

reach it. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390.

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36 CLARK V. ARNOLD

C. Appellate Counsel

Clark argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

not raising the observation evidence or competency claims on

appeal.

The magistrate judge concluded that Clark did not fairly

present a federal claim that his appellate counsel was

ineffective, and that the claim was procedurally defaulted

because it was too late to return to the Arizona courts to raise

the claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

conclusion but also disposed of the claim on the merits, in the

alternative, in the event that a Supreme Court case then

pending—ultimately decided as Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.

1309 (2012)—would materially change the law.

Clark did not contest the district court’s ruling on

procedural default in his opening brief. “We review only

issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s

opening brief.” Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th

Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we deem Clark’s claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel abandoned because

he “d[id] not adequately raise this point in his appeal.” Smith

v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 356 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004).10

10 Martinez established that, if, under state law, “claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral

proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from

hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial

review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that

proceeding was ineffective.” 132 S. Ct. at 1320. It does not excuse

Clark’s failure to brief the issue of procedural default on appeal.

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CLARK V. ARNOLD 37

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that it was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, Strickland for the state court to

determine that Clark’s trial counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance by failing to preserve explicitly the

issue of observation evidence or by failing to request a

reevaluation of Clark’s competency during trial. We also

hold that Clark’s claim of ineffective appellate counsel is

procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the district court’s

order is

AFFIRMED.

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