Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06044/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allen Galbreath
Appellant
Kevin Parton
Not Party
The City of Oklahoma City
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ALLEN GALBREATH, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY; 

KEVIN PARTON, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-6044 

(D.C. No. 5:11-CV-01336-HE) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 A jury rejected Allen Galbreath’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Oklahoma City’s 

disorderly-conduct ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. He now appeals the district 

court’s order denying his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 4, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-6044 Document: 01019534364 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 Page: 1 
2 

I

 On the morning of June 7, 2010, Mary Franklin was at Goodholm Park in 

Oklahoma City with her grandchildren. She called 911 upon being frightened by a 

man—Galbreath—who she claimed was behaving erratically and swinging what looked 

like “a Samurai sword” or “a very big stick.” Police Officer Kevin Parton responded to 

the park and observed Galbreath, who was “singing or humming” and “twirling . . . and 

spinning” his stick. 

Galbreath told Parton he was in the park “doing his exercises and giving candy to 

the kids” if they answered his questions correctly. Galbreath “was unsteady on his feet” 

and speaking “incoherent[ly].” Parton did not recognize Galbreath’s behavior as any sort 

of exercise. Parton patted Galbreath down and inquired further about his presence in the 

park. At some point, Galbreath became agitated and started yelling. Parton handcuffed 

him and placed him in a patrol car as a protective measure. 

 Parton then reviewed the City’s disorderly-conduct ordinance, which proscribes 

“caus[ing] public alarm without justification.” Okla. City, Okla., Mun. Code § 30-81(b). 

He concluded that it applied, given: (1) Galbreath’s behavior, which ranged from 

“singing and doing his thing” to “get[ting] really agitated”; and (2) “the potential for 

anything else to happen either with the kids or with somebody else.” And Parton 

specifically concluded that Galbreath had not provided “reasonable explanation of his 

behavior.” Galbreath was arrested, but the City later dismissed the charge. 

 Galbreath sued Parton and the City alleging violation of his civil rights. The 

district court entered summary judgment against him. This court reversed on the claim 

Appellate Case: 15-6044 Document: 01019534364 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 Page: 2 
3 

that the ordinance was vague, concluding that the district court had not viewed the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Galbreath. See Galbreath v. City of Okla. City, 

568 F. App’x 534, 541 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). At the ensuing jury trial, 

Galbreath testified he was a former professional ballet dancer and was in the park doing 

physical-therapy exercises for a bone disease affecting his hips. He further stated that the 

stick he twirled in the park was his cane and that he gave candy to children who 

participated in his stretching class. Parton testified, describing his encounter with 

Galbreath and stating that he did not recognize Galbreath’s stick as a cane and that he 

was not using it as a cane. Galbreath unsuccessfully sought judgment as a matter of law. 

The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the City. 

 Galbreath renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court again 

rejected the motion. He timely appealed. 

II

 

 “A judgment as a matter of law is warranted only if the evidence points but one 

way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing 

party’s position.” Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 2007). We 

review the district court’s decision de novo, considering the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

“As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute 

define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 

understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 

and discriminatory enforcement.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148-49 (2007). “A 

Appellate Case: 15-6044 Document: 01019534364 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 Page: 3 
4 

law can be unconstitutionally vague on its face or in application.” United States v. 

Rodebaugh, 798 F.3d 1281, 1294 (10th Cir. 2015). 

 Preliminarily, we note that Galbreath appears to argue the ordinance is facially 

vague because a hypothetical “arresting [officer] alone decides whether to use a standard 

to evaluate the ‘justification’ prong, and if some standard is used, what standard to 

apply.” But “Galbreath’s counsel abandoned his challenge to the ordinance’s facial 

validity” in his prior appeal, Galbreath, 568 F. App’x at 538, and he may not resurrect 

that argument. 

 With the facial argument foreclosed, Galbreath contends that the ordinance’s 

“without justification” language is so vague he was left to guess what conduct the 

ordinance prohibited. He did not, however, advance this contention in his pre-verdict 

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Instead, he argued that the language was so 

vague it provided too much discretion to the arresting officer. He is thus limited to that 

argument. See Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 474 F.3d 733, 738-39 (10th Cir. 

2007) (“The renewed motion [for judgment as a matter of law] under Rule 50(b) cannot 

assert grounds for relief not asserted in the original motion.”); see also Vanderhurst v. 

Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 915 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A Rule 50 motion for 

judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence preserves for review 

only those grounds specified at the time, and no others.”). 

 A “statute can be impermissibly vague . . . if it authorizes or even encourages 

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1251 

(10th Cir. 2005). However, under the circumstances of this case, the “without 

Appellate Case: 15-6044 Document: 01019534364 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 Page: 4 
5 

justification” language in the City’s disorderly-conduct ordinance does not do so.1

 

“Justify” commonly means a “to prove or show to be . . . reasonable.” Webster’s Ninth 

New Collegiate Dictionary 656 (9th ed. 1991). Galbreath provided two reasons for his 

presence in the park: exercising and giving candy to children. Insofar as Galbreath 

stated he was giving candy to children who correctly answered his questions, that 

potentially troubling statement does not explain his twirling a stick above his head while 

singing and behaving erratically. Parton specifically considered Galbreath’s failure to 

provide a reasonable explanation for his actions in deciding to charge him with disorderly 

conduct. A reasonable jury could conclude that Galbreath did not provide justification 

for his actions. 

III 

 As applied to Galbreath’s arrest, the ordinance’s prohibition against causing public 

alarm “without justification” did not authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement. The ordinance is therefore not impermissibly vague as applied, and the 

district court properly denied Galbreath’s renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of 

law. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 1

 Galbreath does not contest that his actions caused “public alarm.” 

Appellate Case: 15-6044 Document: 01019534364 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 Page: 5