Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01960/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01960-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JobDiva, Inc.
Appellant
Jobvite, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC.,

Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1960

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in 

No. 92050828.

______________________ 

Decided: December 12, 2016 

______________________ 

DANIEL I. SCHLOSS, Greenberg Traurig LLP, New 

York, NY, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

MASAHIRO NODA. 

MARY BETH WALKER, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented 

by THOMAS W. KRAUSE, CHRISTINA HIEBER. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

In this trademark case, we must decide whether JobDiva, Inc. used its marks in connection with personnel 

placement and recruitment services, or whether the 

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2 IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board correctly held that 

JobDiva failed to do so because it used its marks on 

software offerings, without more. The Board required 

JobDiva to prove that it used its marks on more than just

software because its software sales alone could not, in the 

Board’s view, constitute personnel and recruitment services. We disagree with the Board’s approach. The 

proper question is whether JobDiva, through its software, 

performed personnel placement and recruitment services 

and whether consumers would associate JobDiva’s registered marks with personnel placement and recruitment 

services, regardless of whether the steps of the service 

were performed by software. Because the Board must 

visit that question in the first instance, we vacate its

decision and remand for further consideration. 

BACKGROUND

I.

On June 8, 2004, the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office issued Registration No. 2851917 (“the 

’917 registration”) to JobDiva for the service mark 

JOBDIVA for “personnel placement and recruitment” 

services. On November 8, 2005, it issued Registration 

No. 3013235 (“the ’235 registration”) to JobDiva for the 

service mark shown below: 

for “personnel placement and recruitment services; computer services, namely, providing databases featuring 

recruitment and employment, employment advertising, 

career information and resources, resume creation, resume transmittals and communication of responses 

thereto via a global computer network.” J.A. 498; see also 

J.A. 52–53. 

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IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 3

JobDiva uses its trademarks in connection with its 

product and service offerings, which its website describes 

as “the largest, ultimate, full service solution for the 

staffing industry with an extensive suite of products & 

tools, front to back end, covering all staffing needs.” 

J.A. 117. JobDiva offers, in the words of its Chief Executive Officer, “an applicant tracking system for recruiting 

departments, [and] for HR departments seeking to staff 

people.” J.A. 212. JobDiva uses software to automatically 

provide these offerings to clients.

JobDiva’s software generally provides a database of 

employment applications that a hiring manager or recruiter might use to fill a job opening. J.A. 223. The 

software performs multiple functions to facilitate this jobfilling process. It employs automated “harvesters” to find

potential job candidates by automatically scraping job 

boards and aggregating relevant resumes. J.A. 223, 461–

63. And it reviews and analyzes job candidates’ resumes

to determine if any candidate’s qualifications match the 

job’s requirements. J.A. 393. It thus “replaces a tedious 

manual search” previously performed by hiring managers 

or recruiters. J.A. 462–63. JobDiva also helps hiring 

managers directly communicate with job candidates. For 

instance, it permits hiring managers to post job openings

in a job candidate portal. J.A. 221. This candidate portal 

may also be embedded into a company’s website. J.A. 13. 

The software further assists job candidates by recommending potential openings to the candidates based on 

skillsets and provides them automated resume feedback. 

J.A. 221. 

In many circumstances, JobDiva renders these offerings on a software-as-a-service, or “SaaS,” basis to its 

customers. As the Board explained, “Software as a Service (SaaS) leverages software by delivering it over the 

Internet.” JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc., Cancellation 

No. 92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, at *1 (T.T.A.B. May 20, 

2015) (“JobDiva Rehearing”). The Board noted that SaaS

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4 IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 

is “also known as cloud computing.” Id. at *2. “Cloud 

computing,” according to the Board, “is defined as ‘computing operations carried out on servers that are accessed 

through the Internet, rather than on one’s own personal 

computers.’” Id. at *2 (quoting Dictionary of Computer 

and Internet Terms 434 (11th ed. 2013)). By hosting its 

software remotely, JobDiva provides its clients a product 

without the need to download “cumbersome software . . . onto office desktops or laptops.” J.A. 474. 

As the Board explained, JobDiva’s SaaS model of 

software delivery also changes the way that users interact 

with JobDiva: “The users pay for the computing as a 

service rather than owning the machines and software to 

do it.” JobDiva Rehearing, 2015 WL 3542849, at *2 

(quoting Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms, 

supra, at 434). Unlike a locally installed software program, which might be downloaded from the Internet or a 

disk, JobDiva’s software resides on remote servers and 

customers access it via the Internet. 

II.

The Board cancelled JobDiva’s marks in a proceeding 

that JobDiva originally requested. JobDiva initially 

petitioned the Board to cancel a registration owned by 

Jobvite, Inc., which is no longer a party to this case. 

JobDiva asserted, inter alia, a likelihood of confusion 

between Jobvite’s and JobDiva’s service marks. To establish its claim, JobDiva asserted ownership of its two 

marks introduced above.

Jobvite counterclaimed, petitioning the Board to cancel JobDiva’s trademark registrations by alleging that 

JobDiva failed to perform personnel placement and recruitment services. Jobvite requested that the Board 

cancel the ’917 registration in whole and its ’235 registration in part. Notably, Jobvite did not submit affirmative 

evidence of abandonment or challenge that JobDiva used 

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IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 5

the ’235 registration to identify the other services specified in its registration. 

A.

The Board granted Jobvite’s counterclaim, cancelling 

the ’917 registration in whole and the ’235 registration in 

part. JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc., Cancellation 

No. 92050828, 2015 WL 2170162 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2015). 

The Board explained that under Section 45 of the Trademark Act, “[a] mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen its use has been discontinued with

intent not to resume such use.” Id. at *7 (quoting 15 

U.S.C. § 1125).

The Board started its analysis of JobDiva’s use of its 

marks by defining the scope of JobDiva’s registrations for 

“personnel placement and recruitment” services and 

consulting dictionary definitions for each word. Id. at *6. 

Combining these definitions, the Board found that “personnel placement and recruitment” meant “that [JobDiva] 

is finding and placing people in jobs at other companies or 

providing personnel staffing services for others.” Id. 

To prove its use of the marks in connection with personnel placement and recruitment, JobDiva had submitted screenshots from its website and a declaration of its 

CEO, Diya Obeid. But the Board found JobDiva’s evidence insufficient, explaining that “[t]here [was] no reference . . . to Petitioner’s performance of personnel 

placement and recruitment services other than supplying 

Petitioner’s software.” Id. The Board concluded that, 

“[s]ince there is no evidence of use of Petitioner’s marks in 

connection with ‘personnel placement and recruitment’ 

services, there has been nonuse for three consecutive 

years.” Id. The Board therefore cancelled the ’917 registration in whole and amended the ’235 registration to 

delete “personnel placement and recruitment.” Id. 

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6 IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 

B. 

JobDiva petitioned the Board to reconsider its judgment, arguing that “the Board made erroneous findings of 

fact because there is ‘abundant evidence of record’ that 

shows Petitioner providing the service of ‘finding and 

placing people in jobs at other companies or providing 

personnel staffing services for others.’” JobDiva Rehearing, 2015 WL 3542849, at *1. The Board again disagreed, 

finding that JobDiva had failed to prove use of its marks 

for “personnel placement and recruitment” services. 

The Board explained that “[a] term that only identifies a computer program does not become a service mark 

merely because the program is sold or licensed in commerce.” Id. at *2. “Such a mark does not serve to identify 

a service unless it is also used to identify and distinguish 

the service itself, as opposed to the program.” Id. The 

Board counseled, however, that “it is important to review 

the record carefully to determine the manner of use of the 

mark and the impression it is likely to make on purchasers.” Id. 

The Board found JobDiva’s evidence of use insufficient because JobDiva only provided software, but not

additional “personnel placement and recruitment” services. The Board explained that it “looked for evidence

that Petitioner was rendering ‘personnel placement and 

recruitment services’ for others rather than merely 

providing a software solution for clients to use in performing their ‘personnel placement and recruitment’ activities.” Id. The Board criticized JobDiva for “confus[ing]

the service of providing a software solution for personnel 

placement and recruitment with actually rendering 

personnel placement and recruitment services.” Id. at *3. 

The Board repeatedly faulted JobDiva’s evidence as 

proving only that JobDiva offered software for personnel 

placement and recruitment, instead of providing that 

software in addition to offering personnel placement and 

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IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 7

recruitment services. Id. at *3–4. Indeed, the Board 

required JobDiva to prove that “it is rendering ‘personnel 

placement and recruitment’ as an independent activity 

distinct from providing its software to others.” Id. at *4 

(emphasis added).

The Board further made clear that JobDiva did not 

use the marks for services, even though the software itself 

could perform the “personnel placement and recruitment” 

functions. JobDiva’s CEO had testified that JobDiva’s 

software actually performs personnel placement and 

recruitment services: 

“JobDiva aggregates resumes for its clients, employers, from the job boards . . . they apply to job 

boards to source candidates and that is usually a 

manual exercise,” but JobDiva can “search the job 

board’s sites and databases for candidates on behalf of employers who are subscribing to these job 

boards, so it’s almost like an outsource function 

that JobDiva performs in the recruiting process.” 

Id. at *3 (quoting J.A. 223). The Board dismissed this 

evidence, however, because the testimony did “not provide 

any evidence that Petitioner renders ‘personnel placement 

and recruitment services’ other than by providing the 

software that performs those functions.” Id. Thus, the 

Board ultimately found that JobDiva had failed to establish “that it is rendering ‘personnel placement and recruitment’ services for others separate and apart from 

providing its software.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The Board denied JobDiva’s request for reconsideration, and JobDiva appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B). 

DISCUSSION

Section 1(a) of the Lanham Act requires that an application to register a trademark must include “specification 

of . . . the goods in connection with which the mark is 

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8 IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 

used.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). The Supreme Court has 

recognized that “[t]he usages listed in [an] application . . . 

are critical” because of, inter alia, the legal rights that 

trademark registration conveys. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. 

Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015). As such, 

a registrant must use its mark in accordance with goods 

and services recited in the registration. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1064(3); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1058(b)(1)(B). 

A registration may be cancelled on grounds of abandonment when the mark has not been used for the goods 

or services specified in the registration for at least three 

years and there is no showing of an intent to resume use 

of the mark for those goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; 

On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 

1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Because service mark registrations 

are presumed valid, the party seeking cancellation of such 

registration must “establish[] a prima facie case of abandonment by showing proof of nonuse for three consecutive 

years.” On-Line Careline, 229 F.3d at 1087. Whether a 

mark has been used to identify a particular service is a 

question of fact. In re Advert. & Mktg. Dev., Inc., 821 F.2d 

614, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Likewise, whether a trademark 

holder has abandoned its use of a mark is a question of 

fact. On-Line Careline, 229 F.3d at 1087. We review the 

Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings 

for substantial evidence. Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. 

Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

We agree with the Board’s initial observation that, 

with modern technology, the line between services and 

products sometimes blurs. See JobDiva Rehearing, 2015 

WL 3542849, at *2. As the Board correctly observed, “[i]n 

today’s commercial context if a customer goes to a company’s website and accesses the company’s software to 

conduct some type of business, the company may be 

rendering a service, even though the service utilizes 

software.” Id. (quoting In re Ancor Holdings, 

No. 76213721, 2006 WL 1258813 (T.T.A.B. April 28, 

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IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 9

2006)). But a mark used with a web-based offering may

equally identify the provision of software, rather than a 

service. For these reasons, careful analysis is required to 

determine whether web-based offerings, like those JobDiva provides, are products or services: “[I]t is important,” 

as the Board properly noted, “to review all the information in the record to understand both how the mark is 

used and how it will be perceived by potential customers.”

JobDiva Rehearing, 2015 WL 3542849, at *2. 

But while the Board rightly recognized that it is crucial to carefully review the manner of use of the marks 

and their likely impression on purchasers, id., it nevertheless appeared to apply a bright-line rule requiring JobDiva to show that it performed the “personnel placement 

and recruitment” services in a way other than having its 

software perform those services. It stated, for example, 

that “there is no testimony or evidence that supports 

[JobDiva’s] claim that it is rendering ‘personnel placement and recruitment’ as an independent activity distinct

from providing its software to others.” Id. at *4 (emphasis 

added). The Board repeatedly faulted JobDiva for failing 

to prove that it offered personnel placement and recruitment services in addition to its provision of software. Id.

at *3 (“The references on Petitioner’s web sites show that 

Petitioner is supplying ‘personnel placement and recruitment’ software, not that Petitioner itself is rendering 

‘personnel placement and recruitment’ services for others.”); id. at *4 (“Petitioner’s ‘harvesters’ are functions or 

capabilities of the JobDiva software, not activities performed by Petitioner for the purpose of offering ‘personnel 

placement and recruitment services’ for others.”). In 

holding JobDiva to that standard, the Board erred in its 

understanding of the law. 

Even though a service may be performed by a company’s software, the company may well be rendering a 

service. For example, in On-Line Careline, we held that 

AOL had used its ONLINE TODAY mark in connection 

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10 IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 

with services, even though those services were provided 

by software. 229 F.3d at 1088. AOL had used its mark in 

connection with software that “provided its users with 

‘access’ to its service through on-screen menu items.” Id. 

We affirmed the Board’s finding that AOL used its mark

to identify the services described in the registration: 

“providing access to online computer services offering 

computer-industry news, commentary and product reviews.” Id. We explained that, “[i]n a very literal sense, 

the subject mark was the designation by which AOL 

provides users access to the Internet news and information service.” Id. At bottom, we recognized that software may be used by companies to provide services. Id. 

Indeed, here the ’235 registration for “computer services, 

namely, providing databases featuring recruitment and 

employment, employment advertising, career information 

and resources, resume creation, resume transmittals and 

communication of responses thereto via a global computer 

network,” remains unchallenged. 

To determine whether a mark is used in connection 

with the services described in the registration, a key

consideration is the perception of the user. See Lens.com, 

Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 686 F.3d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). The question is whether a user would associate the mark with “personnel placement and recruitment” 

services performed by JobDiva, even if JobDiva’s software 

performs each of the steps of the service.1 In other words, 

 

1 We note that JobDiva, like any entity, may register its marks to identify both software and services performed by software. 37 C.F.R. § 2.86 (“In a single 

application for a trademark, service mark, and/or collective mark, an applicant may apply to register the same 

mark for goods, services, and/or a collective membership 

organization in multiple classes.”). For example, JobDiva 

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IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 11

the question is whether the evidence of JobDiva’s use of 

its marks “sufficiently creates in the minds of purchasers 

an association between the mark[s] and [JobDiva’s personnel placement and recruitment] services.” Ancor 

Holdings, 2006 WL 1258813, at *3. 

This “is a factual determination that must be conducted on a case-by-case basis,” and there are many casespecific factors the Board might examine. Lens.com, 686 

F.3d at 1381–82. For example, in this case, the Board 

should consider the nature of the user’s interaction with 

JobDiva when using JobDiva’s software, as well as the 

location of the software host. If JobDiva sells its software 

to a customer who hosts the software on its own website

and a third-party user’s interactions appear to be with the 

customer (as opposed to JobDiva), it is unlikely that the 

customer or the third-party user would associate the 

JOBDIVA mark with a service performed by JobDiva. 

But if the software is hosted on JobDiva’s website such 

that the user perceives direct interaction with JobDiva 

during operation of the software, a user might well associate JobDiva’s marks with personnel “placement and 

recruitment” services performed by JobDiva. The purchasers’ acquiring ownership in JobDiva’s software likely

will preclude a finding that JobDiva has rendered services, unless JobDiva’s activities after the sale create the 

perception that JobDiva is in fact providing services. 

The ultimate question here is this: whether purchasers would perceive JobDiva’s marks to identify “personnel 

placement and recruitment” services. Because that 

question is a factual one, the Board must answer it in the 

first instance. 

 

might use its marks to identify software sold to some 

customers, but those uses do not somehow negate other 

uses of the same marks to identify service offerings.

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12 IN RE: JOBDIVA, INC. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Board applied the wrong legal standard, 

we vacate its judgment and remand for further consideration in light of this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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