Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-01583/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-01583-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cory Crowe
Defendant
Chris Curry
Defendant
Janet Dockery
Defendant
Nina Ferguson
Defendant
Paul George
Defendant
Steve Goble
Defendant
Terry Gowers
Defendant
Fred Morris
Plaintiff
NaphCare
Defendant
John Samaniego
Defendant
Mike Smitherman
Defendant

Document Text:

Based on this motion, the plaintiff’s claims against defendants Samaniego, Smitherman

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and George have already been dismissed. See Order of October 5, 2006 (doc. 18). Additionally,

although the plaintiff named Correctional Officer Cory Crowe as a defendant in the complaint,

no factual allegations have been made against him. As such, the court shall dismiss the

plaintiff’s claims against this defendant by separate Order. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FRED MORRIS, for the Estate of 

Clint Arlo Morris, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO.: CV-06-J-1583-S

CHRIS CURRY, SHERIFF, 

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the court is defendants Sheriff Chris Curry, Chief Deputy

Sheriff John Samaniego, Captain Mike Smitherman, Sergeant Paul George, Shelby

County Deputy Sheriffs Steve Goble and Terry Gowers, and Shelby County

Correctional Officers Cory Crowe and Janet Dockery’s motion to dismiss (doc. 15), 1

the plaintiff’s response to said motion (doc. 20) and these defendants’(the “Shelby

County defendants”) reply (doc. 21). Having considered said motion, response and

reply, the court finds as follows:

The plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 asserting violations of the

decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights due to deliberate indifference to the

FILED

 2006 Nov-07 PM 03:57

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 1 of 12
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decedent’s medical needs. Counts One and Two of plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

(doc. 11). Count One names only defendant Curry in his individual capacity. Count

Two is stated against all defendants in their individual capacities. The plaintiff also

alleges state law claims for negligence and negligent medical care against defendant

Naphcare and Ferguson only. Counts Three and Four of plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (doc. 11). Each of these claims is based on the decedent’s illness and

subsequent death while a pretrial detainee at the Shelby County jail. 

“A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 268 F.3d

1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001). In deciding on a motion to dismiss, a court must

construe the allegations of the complaint astrue. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636

n. 3 (1980). Therefore, the court considers the following factual allegations to be true

in ruling on this motion. 

The decedent was arrested and placed in the Shelby County jail on July 17,

2004, for failure to appear in court and numerous driving infractions. Complaint, at

4. He was questioned at that time about his medical history. Id. The decedent

informed defendants that he was a drug user but had no other known health problems.

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 2 of 12
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Id. On July 18, 2004, decedent began a detoxification program, which involved

receiving several medications during the course of the day. Id. 

Also on July 18, 2004, decedent was in an altercation with another inmate. Id.

During the following week, the decedent developed pain in his neck and swelling and

weakness of his limbs. Id. Decedent complained to jail personnel beginning July 21,

2004, and asked to see a nurse, but did not see a nurse until July 24, 2006. Id., at 4-6.

The decedent reported to one jail deputy that he had fallen and hurt his neck, and was

told a nurse would make rounds shortly. Complaint, at 5. Decedent told defendant

Dockery he needed to see a nurse but she “never did get around to getting him one.”

Complaint, at 5. Two officers reported to defendant Nurse Nina Ferguson, an

employee of defendant Naphcare, that decedent had requested to see a nurse, but

defendant Ferguson did notsee the decedent, apparently because she did not want to.

Complaint, at 5.

Finally, on July 24, 2004, the decedent was seen by Nurse Melissa Barbee,

another Naphcare employee. Complaint, at 6. She gave him the medications he was

already receiving for detoxification, and did nothing further. Id., at 6. On July 25,

2004, two officersfound decedent incapacitated. Id. Defendant Deputy Steve Goble

reported the decedent’s condition to Nurse Barbee. Id. She again examined the

decedent and received authorization from a medical doctor she called, Dr. DeLong,

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 3 of 12
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that decedent be taken to Shelby Baptist Medical Center. Defendant Deputy Gowers

then transported the decedent to Shelby Baptist Medical Center by patrol car. Id.

The decedent was thereafter transferred to UAB Medical Center. Complaint,

at 6. The Shelby County jail then released the decedent on a recognizance bond. Id.

The decedent was diagnosed at UAB as suffering from a cervical cord lesion and

pharyngeal abscess. Id.. Due to the advanced state of these conditions, treatment was

not successful and decedent died on August 16, 2004. Id., at 7. 

Defendant Sheriff Chris Curry had no direct contact with decedent. First

Amended Complaint, at 3. However, the plaintiff asserts that the sheriff had a policy

which created a “mindset and manner of operating that deprived the Decedent to a

right under the United States Constitution.” Id., at 3. Plaintiff asserts that defendant

Curry’s policy of “bonding out” seriously ill inmates to prevent paying for expensive

medical care created an environment which encouraged inmates to exaggerate their

maladies and further led to a routine disbelief by jail personnel of claims of medical

needs by inmates. Id., at 4.

The plaintiff charges that defendant Curry violated the plaintiff’s rights under

the 14 Amendment, assumably by maintaining the policy of bonding out seriously

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ill inmates. 

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 4 of 12
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The plaintiff asserts that defendant Goble had first hand knowledge of the

decedent’s medical condition, as decedent made numerous complaints to Goble

requesting medical attention. First Amended Complaint, at 4. Plaintiff further asserts

that Goble was “involved in the decision to bond out Morris...” Id., at 4-5. 

Defendant Terry Gowers transported the decedent to the hospital in a patrol car

rather than an ambulance, and “drug (sic) him by the arm while he was unable to walk

under his own power.” First Amended Complaint, at 5. 

Plaintiff asserts that decedent asked defendant Janet Dockery to see a nurse, but

she forgot that decedent had requested medical attention. First Amended Complaint,

at 5. 

The plaintiff also asserts claims against Christopher Reeves and Ron

Davenport, who are apparently jail personnel. First Amended Complaint, at 6. The

plaintiff asserts these two individuals were deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s

medical needs because they placed him in a shower and “hosed him down” after

decedent had urinated and defecated on himself. Id. They are also criticized by

plaintiff for allegedly failing to treat the decedent as a medical emergency and

notifying the nurse on duty of the decedent’s condition instead. Id. However, these

two individuals are not parties to this case, never having been sued or served with a

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 5 of 12
As a pre-trial detainee, the decedent’s rights exist under the due process clause of the 2

Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts

Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983). However, the claims are 

subject to the same Eighth Amendment scrutiny as if they had been. brought as deliberate

indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 n. 8

(11 Cir.2004), citing Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir.1994); Hamm v.

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DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that “in regard to providing

pretrial detainees with such basic necessities as ··· medical care[,] the minimum standard allowed

by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the eighth amendment for convicted

persons.”).

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summons and complaint. As such, the court will not consider these claims as against

these two individuals. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits a person, acting under color of state law, from

depriving another person of his or her rights secured by the United States

Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates no substantive rights on its

own, but merely provides a remedy for deprivation of federal constitutional rights.

Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583 (11 Cir.1996). The plaintiff alleges that the th

defendants’ deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s need formedical care, and deliberate

indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights. 

2

The Shelby County defendants each argue that he or she is entitled to qualified

immunity. “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from civil trial ... and from liability if their conduct violates

no ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 6 of 12
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would have known.’” Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149

(11 Cir.1994) (en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct.

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2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1991)). 

Defendant Curry

The plaintiff alleges the sheriff set forth a policy – the bonding out of seriously

ill inmates – that was deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s serious medical needs.

However, the plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts, as opposed to argument, that

defendant Curry’s policy of bonding out extremely ill inmates in any way contributed

to the decedent’s medical condition. While the plaintiff asserts that the policy caused

jail personnel to not take inmate medical complaints seriously, the plaintiff points to

only one jail employee who did not specifically go seek medical attention for the

plaintiff, namely defendant Dockery. The plaintiff asserts that Dockery stated “I

didn’t get around to it and just forgot about it.” First Amended Complaint, at 5. This

single factual allegation does not rise to a level of “deliberate indifference.” 

It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,

that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or

restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986). In other words,

“a plaintiff must demonstrate that the lawful action was ‘taken with ‘deliberate

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indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences .... Plainly stated, a ‘showing

of simple or even heightened negligence is not enough.” McDowell v. Brown, 392

F.3d 1283, 1291 (11 Cir.2004) (citations omitted); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d th

1248, 1256 (11 Cir.1999). th

Given the factual allegations of the plaintiff, and the lack of any allegation that

defendant Dockery failed to take the decedent’s request seriously, the court finds that

the plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant Curry’s policy of bonding out

seriously ill inmates violated the decedent’s Constitutional rights. See Marsh v.

Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1034-1036 (11 Cir.2001). Therefore, the court th

shall dismiss the claims against defendant Curry by separate Order.

The other Shelby County Defendants

A jail official violates the Fourteenth Amendment when he acts with deliberate

indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (Eighth Amendment prohibition

on cruel and unusual punishment violated when prison official acts with deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need); see also Lancaster v. Monroe

County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n. 6 (11 Cir.1997) (applying deliberate

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indifference standard to claim by pretrial detainee). 

Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 8 of 12
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Deliberate indifference includes both an objective and a subjective component.

Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11 Cir.1994). th

The objective component is judged by contemporary standards of decency, while the

subjective component requires proof of actual knowledge of the need for medical

treatment and intentional refusal to provide it. Id.

In the facts before the court, the plaintiff alleges that each of the named Shelby

County defendants, other than the sheriff, had some direct contact with the decedent

and failed to act on his need for medical care. However, the defendant jail personnel

repeatedly brought the plaintiff’s condition to the attention of the jail nurses. Indeed,

the plaintiff alleges that the decedent was not seen by Nurse Ferguson, because she

did not want to see him, even though two jail correctional officers notified her that

the decedent was in need of medical care. When an official “knows that an inmate

is in serious need of medical care, but he fails or refuses to obtain medical treatment

for the inmate” his actions amount to deliberate indifference. Hill, supra at 1186. 

Given the facts alleged by the plaintiff, the court finds that Shelby County

defendants on at least three occasions reported the decedent’s condition to the nurse

on duty at the jail. The court is of the opinion that these facts simply do not show a

failure or refusal to obtain medical treatment for the inmate. See Hill, supra at 1186.

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The plaintiff also asserts that transporting the decedent to Shelby County

Medical Center by patrol car instead of by “critical care transportation” violated the

decedent’s Constitutional rights. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that defendant Gowers

failure to obtain a wheelchair to take the decedent from the patrol car into the

emergency room “shows deliberate indifference ...” First Amended Complaint, at 5.

However, the plaintiff offers no case which sets forth that the failure to transport a

seriously ill inmate by ambulance or the failure to obtain a wheelchair for that

individual demonstrate a violation of an inmate’s Constitutional rights. 

Each of the Shelby County defendants have asserted the defense of qualified

immunity. In Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233-1235 (11 Cir.2003), the Court th

stated that the federal rights allegedly violated must have been clearly established so

asto avoid qualified immunity. In Rodgers v. Horsley, the Eleventh Circuit explained

that “[f]or a ‘right’ to be clearly established, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.’” Rodgers, 39 F.3d 308, 310 (11 Cir.1994) (emphasis in Rodgers)

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citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97

L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The court further explained that the issue “is not whether, in

general, [detainees] have a legally cognizable interest under the 14 Amendment to

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Case 2:06-cv-01583-IPJ Document 22 Filed 11/07/06 Page 10 of 12
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safe conditions. They do. Instead, the question in this case, as in all qualified

immunity cases, is fact specific ...” Rodgers, 39 F.3d at 311. 

In Vinyard v. Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals further explained

that:

For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has

previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell [v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,]

535, n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411; but it is to say that in the

light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11 Cir.2002). th

Here, the plaintiff has failed to point to any source whatsoever from which

defendant Gowers could have ascertained that the manner in which the decedent was

transported violated his Constitutional rights. 

Similarly, the plaintiff has failed to establish facts which could feasibly support

his argument that defendant Dockery forgetting about decedent’s request rises to the

level of deliberate indifference. The plaintiff alleges that Dockery’s failure

“indicates that no method existed for follow-up or reviewing request (sic) and thus

the request was deliberately ignored by Dockery.” First Amended Complaint, at 5.

The lack of a follow-up procedure does not make Dockery’s forgetfulness into a

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Constitutional violation. The plaintiff’s assertion simply does not follow from the

factual allegations in the Complaint and First Amended Complaint. As set forth

above, Dockery’s inaction could arguably be considered negligent, but negligence is

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

105-106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976) (“in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to

provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”).

Having considered the foregoing, and finding that the defendants’ motion to

dismiss is due to be granted, the court shall so rule by separate order.

DONE this the 7 day of November, 2006. th

 

INGE PRYTZ JOHNSON

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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