Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06292/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Patrick Mythen
Appellant
Jane Ristau
Appellee

Document Text:

' FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 7 19..,1 

R.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

In re: MICHAEL PATRICK MYTHEN, 

Debtor. 

JANE RISTAU, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL PATRICK MYTHEN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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) No. 89-6292 

) (D.C. No. CIV-89-614-T) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON,** District Judge. 

**Honorable Alan 

District Court 

designation. 

* 

B. Johnson, District Judge, United States 

for the District of Wyoming, sitting by 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6292 Document: 010110069665 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 1 
The issue in this case is whether an award made to the 

appellee to reimburse her for contributions made to the 

appellant's professional education are properly dischargeable 

under 11 u.s.c. § 523(a)(5) in the appellant's bankruptcy case. 

Because we conclude that the findings of the bankruptcy court are 

clearly erroneous, we reverse. 

The parties to this appeal were divorced in December, 1987. 

The decree granting the divorce ordered, inter alia, that the 

appellant pay his former wife "alimony in the total sum of 

$75,000.00 to reimburse her for her contributions to the 

defendant's education in monthly payments (according to the 

attached schedule]." Decree of Divorce at 5. In March 1988, the 

appellant filed his voluntary Chapter 7 petition in the Bankruptcy 

Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The appellee filed an 

adversary complaint in that action to determine the 

dischargeability of the debt for reimbursement alimony still owed 

her by appellant. 

Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code enumerates the exceptions 

to discharge, which include: 

(a) A discharge under section 727 ... of this 

title does not discharge an individual debtor from any 

debt--

(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the 

debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of 

such spouse or child, in connection with a separation 

agreement, divorce decree .... 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1989). 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6292 Document: 010110069665 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 2 
The issue for our consideration is whether the $75,000.00 

payment to the appellee represents the division of property, which 

would be dischargeable, or a provision for alimony, maintenance or 

support, which would be nondischargeable. The proper 

characterization of this obligation is a matter of federal 

bankruptcy law. Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th 

Cir. 1989) (citing Goin v. Rives (In re Goin), 808 F.2d 1391, 1392 

(10th Cir. 1987)). The initial inquiry in determining 

dischargeability under section 523 is the intent of the parties at 

the time they entered into their agreement. Id. (citing Yeates v. 

Yeates (In re Yeates), 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986)). In 

making this determination, the bankruptcy court is not bound by 

the language of the decree but, instead, must look to the intent 

of the parties and to the substance of the obligation. In re 

Goin, 808 F.2d at 1392. 

The bankruptcy court found appellant's obligation to be one 

in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, and thus 

nondischargeable. This finding was affirmed by the district 

court. "The bankruptcy court's findings concerning the nature of 

the obligation can be set aside, by the district court or the 

appellate court, only if they are clearly erroneous." Goin, 

808 F.2d at 1393 (citing Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 

1986)). 

In reviewing this matter we are guided by the factors 

enumerated in Goin. There we identified several factors pertinent 

to this determination: 

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Appellate Case: 89-6292 Document: 010110069665 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 3 
(1) if the agreement fails to provide explicitly for 

spousal support, the court may presume that the property 

settlement is intended for support if it appears under 

the circumstances that the spouse needs support; 

(2) when there are minor children and an imbalance of 

income, the payments are likely to be in the nature of 

support; (3) support or maintenance is indicated when 

the payments are made directly to the recipient and are 

paid in installments over a substantial period of time; 

and (4) an obligation that terminates on remarriage or 

death is indicative of an agreement for support. 

Id. at 1392-93 (citing Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th 

Cir. 1984)). 

Although not independently verifiable based on the record 

designated for our review, both the order from the bankruptcy 

court denying discharge and the order from the district court 

affirming the bankruptcy court state that the parties had 

stipulated at the time of the divorce that the appellee needed 

support. Ristau v. Mythen (In re Mythen), No. 88-255, Order 

Denying Discharge of Alimony and Costs at 2 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 

Mar. 7, 1989); Ristau v. Mythen (In re 

No. CIV-89-614-T BK, Order at 2 (W.D. Okla. July 21, 1989). There 

were no children from this marriage so the second Goin factor does 

not apply. The third factor argues in favor of characterizing 

this debt as an obligation for alimony, maintenance or support in 

that the payments were payable directly to the appellee and made 

in installments. However, there is evidence that the installment 

method of payment was ordered because of the inability of the 

appellant to pay the amount in a lump sum rather than because of a 

finding that the appellee needed a continuing and regular source 

of support. As to the fourth factor, there is no indication in 

the decree regarding whether the payments are to terminate upon 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6292 Document: 010110069665 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 4 
the death or remarriage of the appellee. However, the parties 

stipulated that this payment was to be regarded as a payment made 

under the Oklahoma precedent of Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 

(Okla. 1979). Vol. I Doc. 1 Exhibit B; Appellee's Brief at 3. 

This form of reimbursement is also discussed in Adair v. Adair, 

670 P.2d 1002 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983). Since Hubbard payments do 

not terminate upon death, application of this factor suggests that 

this payment is a property division. Thus, the results from 

applying the facts of this case to the Goin factors are 

inconclusive. 

The Goin tests, in any event, are only indicia whereby the 

court can determine the parties' intent. Here we need not 

speculate about the parties' intent because they have expressed it 

clearly by stipulation. They regarded this payment as a Hubbard 

payment. A Hubbard payment is a reimbursement to a spouse of his 

or her share of the costs incurred in assisting the other party to 

the marriage in obtaining a professional degree. The Supreme 

Court of Oklahoma regarded such an award as an equitable means of 

"affording relief by means of a property settlement," Hubbard, 

603 P.2d at 751, and it expressly declined to treat it as "alimony 

for support and maintenance." Id. at 752. The right to such a 

payment is not conditioned upon the spouse remaining unmarried; it 

is not terminated upon death of the spouse; and it is not 

apparently dependent upon a showing of need. Rather, it is 

premised upon a sense of equity that the spouse would have been 

able to share in the fruits of the degree if the divorce had come 

later in marriage so, at the least, he or she should be able to 

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obtain reimbursement of the costs incurred to obtain the degree in 

the first place. Even the question of fault appears largely 

irrelevant to the awarding of Hubbard payments. Adair, 670 P.2d 

at 1003. Thus, it appears undeniable under Oklahoma law that a 

Hubbard award is a property division rather than support alimony. 

Although state law is not controlling, where the parties stipulate 

that an award should be considered a Hubbard award, we believe 

that they have stated their intention in such a manner that it can 

not be disregarded or overridden. 1 

Thus, we hold that this award must be characterized as a 

division of property and thus dischargeable. Because the parties 

have agreed that the dischargeability of the court costs awarded 

to the appellee pursuant to the divorce decree will be controlled 

by the dischargeability of the alimony, amounts due as 

reimbursement for those costs are also dischargeable. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and this case is 

REMANDED to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 

District of Oklahoma for further proceedings. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

1 Appellant argues in the alternative that his inability to pay 

this obligation should be relevant to our determination. We 

reject this argument. In Sylvester, 865 F.2d at 1166, we held 

that a former spouse's present needs were irrelevant in 

determining dischargeability. Similarly, we find here that the 

present ability of a former spouse to pay is also irrelevant. 

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