Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01081/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01081-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Escobedo
Plaintiff
Truong Van Pham
Defendant
Pho Paradise Restaurant
Defendant
TC Property Management, LTD.
Defendant
Que T. Thuong
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ESCOBEDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

QUE T.THUONG, doing business as Pho 

Paradise Restaurant, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

Case No. 1:24-cv-01081-JLT-SKO

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO 

SHOW CAUSE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DECLINE SUPPLEMENTAL 

JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S 

STATE LAW CLAIMS

(Docs. 1, 4, 7)

14 DAY DEADLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff Jose Escobedo (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint against 

Defendants Que T. Thuong, doing business as Pho Paradise Restaurant; Truong Van Pham, doing 

business as Pho Paradise Restaurant; and TC Property Management, LTD (“Defendants”), alleging 

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act

(“Unruh Act”), and California’s Health and Safety Code.

1

 (Doc. 1). These claims stem from alleged 

barriers Plaintiff encountered (such as lack of proper pavement markings and excessive slopes in 

paths of travel) while he visited “Pho Paradise Restaurant,” a facility owned, operated, or leased by 

Defendants. (See id.)

1 Defendant Truong Van Pham, d/b/a/ Pho Paradise Restaurant was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on October 

1, 2024. (See Docs. 6 & 8.)

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On September 16, 2024, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court 

should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims considering the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vo v. Choi. (See Doc. 4.); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) 

(affirming a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim); 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff timely filed a response on September 30, 2024. (Doc. 7.) For 

the reasons discussed below, the undersigned shall discharge the order to show cause and 

recommend that supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims be declined and those 

claims be dismissed without prejudice.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a court that has original jurisdiction over a civil action “shall 

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 

United States Constitution.” The Ninth Circuit has concluded that ADA and Unruh Act claims that 

derive from a common nucleus of operative fact “form part of the ‘same case or controversy’ for 

purposes of § 1367(a).” Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021).

However, even where supplemental jurisdiction over a claim exists under § 1367(a), the 

Court may decline jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(c) if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 

district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, 

or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 

A court deciding whether to apply § 1367(c)(4) must make “a two-part inquiry.” Arroyo, 19 

F.4th at 1210. “First, the district court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are 

exceptional within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4).” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Second, in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction 

in a given case, the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, 

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fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine articulated in [United Mine 

Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)].” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

After considering § 1367(c)(4) and California’s requirements for bringing Unruh Act claims, 

“[n]umerous federal district courts across California have declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Unruh Act . . . claims brought alongside ADA claims.” Rutherford v. Nuway Ins. 

Agency Inc., No. SACV 21-00576-CJC-JDE, 2021 WL 4572008, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2021). 

Underlying these decisions is “the recent confluence of several California-law rules [that] have 

combined to create a highly unusual systemic impact on ADA-based Unruh Act cases that clearly 

threatens to have a significant adverse impact on federal-state comity.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211.

Congress adopted the ADA to address the discrimination encountered by persons with 

disabilities, providing a private cause of action to seek injunctive, but not monetary, relief. See 

Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing background and relief available 

under the ADA). The Unruh Act likewise prohibits disability discrimination, containing a provision, 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), stating that a violation of the ADA also violates the Unruh Act. However, 

unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows a plaintiff to recover “up to a maximum of three times the 

amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a).

In response to perceived abuses of the Unruh Act, California has enacted requirements for 

bringing such claims, which the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, “apply only in 

California state court.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170. For example a provision was added (1) regarding the 

contents of demand letters, Cal. Civ. Code § 55.31; (2) imposing heightened pleading requirements, 

Cal. Civ. Code § 425.50(a); and (3) requiring an additional filing fee of $1,000 for so called “highfrequency litigants,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 70616.5(b), see Cal. Civ. Code § 425.55(b) (defining a highfrequency litigant to include “[a] plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a 

construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the 

filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.”).

These heightened pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a “construction-related 

accessibility claim,” which California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil action with respect 

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to a place of public accommodation, including but not limited to, a claim brought under Section 51, 

54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of any construction-related 

accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). The requirements apply to claims brought 

under the Unruh Act as well as to related claims under the California Health & Safety Code. See 

Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21cv1338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023). By 

enacting such restrictions, California has expressed a “desire to limit the financial burdens 

California’s businesses may face from claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act.” Arroyo, 

19 F.4th at 1209 (internal quotations omitted). However, “Unruh Act plaintiffs have evaded these 

limits by filing in a federal forum in which [they] can claim these state law damages in a manner 

inconsistent with the state law’s requirements.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1213 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Consequently, “the procedural strictures that California put in place have been rendered 

largely toothless, because they can now be readily evaded.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit provided substantial guidance on this issue in Vo v. Choi in affirming a 

district court’s order denying supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim under § 1367(c)(4). 

Vo, 49 F.4th at 1168. In that case, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the 

Unruh Act claim after giving the plaintiff the opportunity to respond and before addressing the 

merits of the case. Id. at 1168-69. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court sufficiently 

explained why the circumstances of the case were exceptional under § 1367(c)(4), agreeing with the 

district court that “it would not be ‘fair’ to defendants and ‘an affront to the comity between federal 

and state courts’ to allow plaintiffs to evade California’s procedural requirements by bringing their 

claims in federal court.” Id. at 1171. The Court also affirmed the district court’s finding that the 

balance of the Gibbs values—economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—provided compelling 

reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction, stating that “the district court [properly] analyzed Vo’s 

situation under the Gibbs values and determined that the values of fairness and comity favored not 

retaining jurisdiction over the claim.” Id. at 1172. Accordingly, “[g]iven these very real concerns, 

in addition to the deferential standard of review, [the Ninth Circuit saw] no reason to hold that the 

district court abused its discretion in determining there were compelling reasons to decline 

jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim.” Id.

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III. ANALYSIS

The Court begins with the first part of the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4)—whether the 

circumstances here are exceptional. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171.

As discussed above, California has enacted various requirements that apply to claims 

alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. If the Court were to exercise jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s state law claims, Plaintiff would be permitted to avoid these requirements. See Arroyo, 

19 F.4th at 1213 (noting that potential evasion of California’s requirements met exceptionalcircumstances prong of § 1367(c)(4)). Further, such evasion would undermine California’s policy 

interests in enforcing its requirements—providing monetary relief but limiting burdens on small 

businesses and disincentivizing plaintiffs’ attorneys from obtaining “monetary settlements at the 

expense of forward-looking relief that might benefit the general public.” Id. Plaintiff offers no 

argument for why such circumstances should not be deemed exceptional, and there is “little doubt 

that the first prong [under § 1367(c)(4)] is satisfied here.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. See also Garcia v. 

Maciel, No. 21-CV-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2022) (collecting cases).

Turning to the second part of the inquiry—whether there are other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction—the Court considers the Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness, 

and comity. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Importantly, this case is an early stage of the litigation—none of 

the defendants have appeared in this case—and thus, the merits of Plaintiff’s claims have not yet 

been addressed. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1214 (noting that the Gibbs values did not support declining 

supplemental jurisdiction where the case was at a “very late stage”). This is not a case “where it 

makes no sense to decline jurisdiction . . . over a pendent state law claim that that court has 

effectively already decided.” Id. Notably, Plaintiff makes no argument that the stage of this case 

warrants exercising jurisdiction.

Moreover, considering the above discussion of California’s requirements for Unruh Act 

claims, it would not be fair, nor would comity be served, by allowing Plaintiff’s state law claims to 

proceed without the state court being able to enforce its policy interests as reflected in its various 

procedural requirements. Id. at 1213 (noting “comity-based concerns that California’s policy 

objectives in this area were being wholly thwarted” by plaintiffs being able to bring Unruh Act 

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claims in federal court). Plaintiff concedes in his response to the show cause order that he would 

be considered a high-frequency litigant and would otherwise have to meet certain California 

requirements, such as paying the $1,000 filing fee in state court.2(Doc. 7 at 2 (“Plaintiff 

acknowledges that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant under California law as he filed 

more than ten construction-related accessibility claims in the twelve months preceding the filing of 

the instant action.”).)

Plaintiff contends that requiring him to bring a second action in state court “would be 

duplicative and would only increase the ultimate burden on the subject businesses, as Plaintiff would 

be entitled to seek recovery of the additional attorney’s fees and costs spent bringing the second 

action.” (Doc. 7 at 3.) As an initial matter, this argument assumes that Plaintiff will be successful 

in this action. Even accepting such an assumption, the fact that the litigation could prove duplicative 

or increase costs does not, in light of the other considerations, warrant retaining jurisdiction. As one 

court has concluded, “if plaintiff legitimately seeks to litigate this action in a single forum, plaintiff 

may dismiss this action and refile it in a state court in accordance with the requirements California 

has imposed on such actions.” Garibay v. Rodriguez, No. CV 18-9187 PA (AFMX), 2019 WL 

5204294, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019). Moreover, it is California’s prerogative to impose a 

heightened filing fee for high-frequency litigants to curb abuses of the Unruh Act at the risk of the 

fee being ultimately paid by defendants. It would undermine comity and fairness were Plaintiff 

permitted to proceed with his state law claims considering California’s policy concerns.

Accordingly, considering the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4), the undersigned 

concludes that this case presents “exceptional circumstances” such that “there are other compelling 

reasons for declining [supplemental] jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

IV. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Court’s order to show cause (Doc. 4) is hereby DISCHARGED. For the reasons set 

forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) and Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), 

2 While the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s concession, it need not determine whether he is in fact a high-frequency 

litigant. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1174 (noting that court was not required to determine whether the plaintiff was in fact a highfrequency litigant).

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the Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 

claim and Plaintiff’s Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and § 19959 claims; and

2. Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and § 19959 claims be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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