Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05214/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter M. Rogoff
Appellant
United Motorcoach Association, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 23, 2010 Decided June 14, 2011

No. 10-5213

AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLEE

v.

PETER M. ROGOFF, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL TRANSIT

ADMINISTRATION AND FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATON,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 10-5214

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00686)

Lewis Yelin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Tony

West, Assistant Attorney General, and Scott R. McIntosh,

Attorney; Ronald C. Machen, U.S. Attorney; and R. Craig

Lawrence, Diane M. Sullivan, and Lauren J. Karam, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #10-5214 Document #1313036 Filed: 06/14/2011 Page 1 of 17
2

Richard P. Schweitzer argued the cause for appellee

American Bus Association. With him on the briefs was Craig

M. Cibak.

Dan R. Mastromarco argued the cause for appellee United

Motorcoach Association, Inc. With him on the brief was David

R. Burton.

Before: GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This appeal raises the following

question: Can Congress constitutionally permit a federallysubsidized transit system to take the residents of Seattle out to

the ball game? We conclude that Congress can, and we

therefore reject the plaintiffs’ challenge to a Washington

Senator’s effort to help her constituents get to Seattle Mariners

games.

I

The Federal Transit Act provides that, as a condition of

receiving federal funding, a public transportation system must

agree not to “provide charter bus transportation service outside

the urban area in which [the system] provides regularly

scheduled public transportation service.” 49 U.S.C. § 5323

(d)(1). This provision is known as the “Charter Rule.” The Act

further provides that, “[o]n receiving a complaint about a

violation of [such an agreement], the Secretary [of

Transportation] shall investigate and decide whether a violation

has occurred.” Id. § 5323(d)(2)(A). “If the Secretary decides

that a violation has occurred, the Secretary shall correct the

violation under terms of the agreement.” Id. § 5323(d)(2)(B). 

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The Transit Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation

to issue implementing regulations, id. § 5334(a)(11), which

authority the Secretary has delegated to the Federal Transit

Administration (FTA), 49 C.F.R. § 1.51(g). The FTA, in turn,

has promulgated regulations that allow interested parties to

request advisory opinions regarding the Charter Rule, as well as

orders to cease and desist from violations of that Rule. Id.

§ 604.17. The regulations also permit interested parties to file

complaints “regarding the provision of charter service by a

recipient” of federal financial assistance. Id. §§ 604.25, .27. 

The FTA may then conduct an investigation, and if it determines

that a violation of the Charter Rule has occurred, it may (inter

alia) bar the offending transit system from receiving future

federal funding. Id. § 604.47(a)(1). A party dissatisfied with

the FTA’s determination may file a petition for judicial review

under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§§ 701-06. See 49 C.F.R. § 604.50(a).

Although the Transit Act’s Charter Rule dates to 1973,

Seattle’s public transportation system, King County Metro

(KCM), began providing special local bus service to Seattle

Mariners baseball games in the late 1990s and continued this

service for more than a decade. In 2008, the FTA issued a

regulation clarifying that the “charter service” barred by the

Transit Act includes irregularly scheduled bus service to special

events, including baseball games. 49 C.F.R. § 604.3(c)(2); see

73 Fed. Reg. 44,933 (2008). Because KCM’s special buses

qualified as “charter service” under the regulation, KCM could

no longer provide the buses without jeopardizing its federal

funding.1

 In March 2008, KCM successfully petitioned the FTA

1

Although the Transit Act itself bars only “transportation service

outside the urban area in which [the transit system] provides regularly

scheduled public transportation service,” 49 U.S.C. § 5323(d)(1)

(emphasis added), the implementing regulations apply to all charter

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for an exception to the Charter Rule for the 2008 baseball

season. United Motor Coach Association (UMA) filed suit

challenging the exception, but that suit was mooted when the

2008 season ended and the exception expired. United Motor

Coach Ass’n v. Welbes, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-10 (D.D.C. 2009).

During the 2009 season, there was no charter bus service to

Mariners games: KCM did not get another exception, and no

private bus company was able to reach an agreement with the

Mariners. To avoid a similar situation for the following season,

Senator Patty Murray of Washington State sponsored an

amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010. 

The Murray Amendment states:

None of the funds provided or limited under this Act

may be used to enforce regulations related to charter

bus service under part 604 of title 49, Code of Federal

Regulations, for any transit agency who during fiscal

year 2008 was both initially granted a 60-day period to

come into compliance with part 604, and then was

subsequently granted an exception from said part.

Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 172 (2009). The only public transit

agency that meets this definition is KCM. Thus, the

Amendment ensured that the FTA could not spend appropriated

funds to enforce the Charter Rule to bar KCM from providing

bus service to Mariners games in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. 

Moreover, although the Murray Amendment originally applied

only to FY 2010 funds, Congress has since enacted a series of

service, whether inside or outside the urban area, see 49 C.F.R. § 604;

73 Fed. Reg. 2327 (2008) (explaining agency rationale). Because no

party disputes (or even addresses) the authority for the regulations’

scope, we assume for purposes of this opinion that the Charter Rule

bars KCM’s special bus service.

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continuing appropriations acts that effectively retain the Murray

Amendment’s limitation through the end of FY 2011.2

 In April

2010, KCM resumed operating its charter bus service for

weekend Mariners home games between the team’s stadium and

four park-and-ride locations. 

In May 2010, two national trade associations representing

the private charter bus industry -- UMA and the American Bus

Association (ABA) -- filed complaints in district court charging

that the Murray Amendment violates the constitutional rights of

their members. They alleged that, by singling out private charter

bus operators in King County as the only such operators that

cannot enforce the Charter Rule against a competitor (KCM),

the Murray Amendment violates those operators’ First

2

The acts continue the funding from the Consolidated

Appropriations Act of 2010, in which the Murray Amendment

appeared. See Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (Sept. 30, 2010);

Pub. L. No. 111-290, 124 Stat. 3063 (Dec. 4, 2010); Pub. L. No.

111-317, 124 Stat. 3454 (Dec. 18, 2010); Pub. L. No. 111-322, 124

Stat. 3518 (Dec. 22, 2010); Pub. L. No. 112-4, 125 Stat. 6 (Mar. 2,

2011); Pub. L. No. 112-6, 125 Stat. 23 (Mar. 18, 2011); Pub. L. No.

112-10, 125 Stat. 38, Slip Copy § 1101(a)(6) (Apr. 15, 2011). The

first of these continuing appropriations acts, which extended funding

until December 3, 2010, stated that “[n]o appropriation or funds made

available . . . pursuant to [the act] shall be used to initiate or resume

any project or activity for which appropriations, funds, or other

authority were not available during fiscal year 2010.” Pub. L. No.

111-242, § 104. Each of the five subsequent acts extended the

application of that act (and of its limiting provision) for a short period

of time. The seventh and final continuing appropriations act continues

the 2010 funding through September 30, 2011. Pub. L. No. 112-10,

§ 1106. It contains limiting language similar to that in the first act. Id.

§ 1105.

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Amendment right to petition and Fifth Amendment right to

equal protection. They also charged that the Murray

Amendment violates their members’ right to procedural due

process under the Fifth Amendment and is inconsistent with

separation of powers principles. After a hearing on the merits,

the district court held the Murray Amendment unconstitutional

on Petition Clause and equal protection grounds and ordered the

FTA to enforce the Charter Rule with respect to KCM. Am. Bus

Ass’n v. Rogoff, 717 F. Supp. 2d 73, 92 (D.D.C. 2010). The

court did not reach the due process or separation of powers

claims.

The FTA appealed, and a special panel of this court stayed

the district court’s decision pending appeal. See Order at 1, Am.

Bus Ass’n v. Rogoff, No. 10-5213 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2010). 

Because a constitutional challenge to a statute “presents a pure

question of law,” we consider the plaintiffs’ claims de novo. 

Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001).3

II

The plaintiffs contend that the Murray Amendment violates

their Fifth Amendment right to equal protection4 by keeping

“only those private charter operators in the Seattle, Washington

geographic region from enjoying the protections afforded by the

3

For the reasons stated by the district court, we agree with the

parties that the plaintiffs have associational standing to assert the

constitutional claims of their private bus operator members. See Am.

Bus Ass’n, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 83-84.

4

See News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has found [the] essential

mandate” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause

“inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and

therefore applicable to the federal government”).

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Charter Rule.” ABA Compl. ¶ 71; see UMA Compl. ¶ 80. 

Ordinarily, such economic regulation would be reviewed only

for minimum rationality. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508

U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see infra Part III. Although stricter

scrutiny is required for classifications that “proceed[] along

suspect lines []or infringe fundamental constitutional rights,” 

Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313, those exceptions do not

apply here. Private bus companies do not represent a suspect

class, and their interest in providing service to baseball games

without competition from subsidized public buses is not a

fundamental interest. 

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs contend and the district court

found that heightened scrutiny is required because the plaintiffs

allege an equal protection violation intertwined with a violation

of their First Amendment right to petition. In News America

Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, we concluded that legislation that

“burden[ed] a single publisher/broadcaster” had to be

scrutinized “under a test more stringent than the ‘minimum

rationality’ criterion typically used for conventional economic

legislation under equal protection analysis.” 844 F.2d 800, 802

(D.C. Cir. 1988). Applying that precedent, the district court first

determined that the Murray Amendment burdens the plaintiffs’

Petition Clause rights, and then applied a more stringent form of

equal protection scrutiny -- which it found the Murray

Amendment could not withstand.

At issue in News America was a statutory provision that

specifically barred the FCC from granting one -- and only one --

publisher the extension of a waiver it needed to acquire

television broadcast licenses. 844 F.2d at 802-03. The

challenged provision thus prevented that publisher from

broadcasting on those stations, directly burdening its freedom of

speech. In this case, the plaintiffs contend that the Murray

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Amendment directly burdens their right to petition the

government. We disagree.

The First Amendment’s Petition Clause provides that

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the

people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.” U.S.CONST. amend. I. “The right to petition is cut

from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First]

Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of

expression.” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). 

The right “extends to [petitioning] all departments of the

Government,” including administrative agencies and courts. 

Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,

510 (1972).

The plaintiffs maintain that the Murray Amendment

abridges their right to petition because it bars the FTA from

“receiv[ing] and adjudicat[ing] requests for advisory opinions,

requests for cease and desist orders, or complaints filed by

private operators who are harmed by the provision of charter

service” by KCM. ABA Compl. ¶ 59; see UMA Compl. ¶ 68.5

Although the government’s reading of the Amendment in the

district court was less than clear, it now maintains that the

Amendment only bars it from expending funds to enforce the

Charter Rule itself. The plaintiffs may still request advisory

5

The plaintiffs also suggest that the Murray Amendment denies

them access to the courts. That contention is plainly incorrect: 

nothing in the Amendment refers to the expenditure of funds by the

courts, and this litigation itself demonstrates that such access has not

been denied. The plaintiffs are also wrong in their specific contention

that the Amendment effectively cuts off judicial review of statutory

claims because it bars the FTA from rendering a response that can be

appealed. Even if it were true that the Amendment bars the FTA from

responding, but see discussion infra, the APA authorizes courts to

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

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opinions and cease and desist orders and may still file

complaints. Gov’t Br. 15. (Indeed, in May 2010, UMA did

both. See Am. Bus Ass’n, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 81.) And the FTA

may still respond to such requests and complaints. Gov’t Brief

at 15-16; see Oral Arg. Recording at 3:10 - :45. The

government is plainly right that the Murray Amendment does

not bar the plaintiffs from making (or the agency from

receiving) such requests and filings. And while the Amendment

could arguably be read to prohibit the government from

expending funds to respond, the agency reasonably reads it as

permitting responses, and we see no reason to construe it

otherwise. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331,

336 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding it inappropriate to “rule on the

constitutionality of a hypothetical interpretation of a statute”

where the administering agency adopted a contrary

interpretation at oral argument).

The plaintiffs’ principal argument is that this is simply not

enough. They contend that “[a]llowing [plaintiffs] to file a

formal complaint, but not allowing the FTA to issue a favorable

ruling, does not satisfy [their] right to petition.” ABA Br. at 9. 

The government agrees, of course, that the Murray Amendment

does not allow the FTA to issue the plaintiffs a favorable ruling. 

For the duration of the appropriations limitation, the Murray

Amendment bars the agency from enforcing the Charter Rule

against KCM; accordingly, the FTA may not issue a cease and

desist order against, or cut off federal funds to, KCM. And

while the FTA may be able to issue an advisory opinion, the

only advice it can give is that the Amendment ties its hands. In

the plaintiffs’ view, this renders the Amendment

unconstitutional because “the Petition Clause guarantees

meaningful consideration of the petition, a decision, and the

possibility of a remedy.” ABA Br. at 9.

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We should pause for a moment and consider what the legal

landscape would look like if the plaintiffs were right that

“allowing [them] to file a formal complaint, but not allowing the

FTA to issue a favorable ruling, does not satisfy [their] right to

petition.” Id. at 9. If that were correct, then Congress could not

enact a statute barring EPA from issuing (or rescinding) a

greenhouse gas rule, because such a statute would deny

environmentalists (or industry) the right to petition the agency

for such a rule (or for its rescission). Closer to home, if the

plaintiffs were correct that the Murray Amendment violates their

petition right because it prevents them from successfully

petitioning the FTA to enforce the Charter Rule against KCM,

then the district court has violated KCM’s own petition right

because its order -- requiring the FTA to enforce the Charter

Rule -- prevents KCM from successfully petitioning the FTA

not to do so. 

It should be no surprise, therefore, that precedent is against

the plaintiffs. Far from holding that the Petition Clause requires

the possibility of a remedy, this circuit held in We the People

Foundation, Inc. v. United States that the clause does not even

“guarantee[] a citizen’s right to receive a government response

to or official consideration of a petition for redress of

grievances.” 485 F.3d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphases

added). Similarly, in Minnesota State Board for Community

Colleges v. Knight, the Supreme Court held that, although the

First Amendment surely “protects the right of an individual to

speak freely, to advocate ideas, to associate with others, and to

petition his government for redress of grievances,” 465 U.S.

271, 286 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[n]othing

in the First Amendment . . . suggests that the rights to speak,

associate, and petition require government policymakers to

listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public

issues,” id. at 285 (citing Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp.,

Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979)). 

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This court’s decision in Marijuana Policy Project v. United

States, 304 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002), is also instructive. At

issue there was a congressional appropriations rider that denied

the District of Columbia authority to enact (including via the

ballot initiative process) any law reducing marijuana penalties. 

Rejecting a claim that the rider violated the rights of plaintiffs

who wanted to speak and petition in favor of a medical

marijuana law, we determined that the rider “restricts no speech;

to the contrary, medical marijuana advocates remain free to

lobby, petition, or engage in other First Amendment-protected

activities to reduce marijuana penalties.” Id. at 85. All the rider

did, we said, was establish “limits on [D.C] legislative authority

-- as opposed to limits on legislative advocacy.” Id. And that

did not violate the First Amendment because the Amendment

“confers no right to legislate on a particular subject.” Id. at 85. 

The rider, we noted, “silences no one; it merely shifts the focus

of debate . . . from the D.C. legislative process . . . to Congress.” 

Id. at 86.

The parallels between Marijuana Policy Project and this

case are evident. The plaintiffs here remain free to speak and

petition in favor of barring KCM from continuing its special bus

service. All the Murray Amendment does is limit the FTA’s

authority to enforce such a bar. Accordingly, if the plaintiffs

want their efforts “to have legal effect, . . . [they] must be

directed to Congress rather than” the FTA. Id. at 85.

The plaintiffs insist that these precedents are inapposite

because they involved petitioners seeking discretionary policy

decisions, rather than a “complainant [who] was denied the

ability to seek redress for rights granted by a statute or rule.” 

ABA Br. at 16 (emphasis added). “[U]nlike the petitioners in

Knight and We the People,” ABA maintains that it “does not

challenge policy decisions, but seeks to vindicate legal rights

guaranteed it and its members by statute.” ABA Br. at 18; see

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ABA Supp. Br. at 12-14 (distinguishing Marijuana Policy

Project on similar grounds).6

 Because ABA’s members

assertedly have “rights” under the Transit Act and Charter Rule,

ABA Br. at 16, the plaintiffs contend that the relevant

precedents are not We The People, Knight, and Marijuana

Policy Project, but rather cases like Bill Johnson’s Restaurants,

Inc. v. NLRB and NAACP v. Button -- cases in which the

Supreme Court held that the government had unlawfully

restricted a complainant’s ability to seek remedies for rights

guaranteed it by law. See Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. 731, 742-43

(1983) (holding that the NLRB could not bar an employer from

pursuing a well-grounded lawsuit for damages under state law);

Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (holding that Virginia

could not bar the NAACP from encouraging and financing

desegregation suits intended to vindicate Fourteenth

Amendment rights).

There are two flaws in this argument. First,

notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ insistence on doctrinal

distinctions between rights and remedies,7

 the fact remains that,

6

The plaintiffs also distinguish We the People on the ground that

the government officials in that case chose not to respond to the

plaintiffs’ petitions; no law barred them from doing so. Although that

is factually correct with respect to We the People, it is not true for

Knight, which involved a Minnesota statute pursuant to which public

employers (state agencies) could “neither ‘meet and negotiate’ nor

‘meet and confer’ with any members of [certain] bargaining unit[s]

except through their exclusive representative.” 465 U.S. at 275.

7

In the government’s view, the plaintiffs have neither rights nor

remedies: “Because the Charter Rule does not apply to KCM during

the 2010 fiscal year,” the government argues, “plaintiffs have no rights

under the Charter Rule [to enforce] against KCM.” Gov’t Br. at 19

(internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S.

327, 347 (2000) (“By establishing new standards for the enforcement

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for the duration of the appropriations limitation, the FTA cannot

enforce the Charter Rule against KCM. Hence, far from

demanding something that they have a right to expect from the

agency, they are making a request that the FTA lacks even the

discretion to grant.

Second, and more important, in Bill Johnson’s and Button

the government interfered with the plaintiffs’ ability to express

their views to a decisionmaker -- in both cases, to a court. Here,

by contrast, Congress has instead interfered with the

decisionmaker’s ability to grant the remedy the plaintiffs seek. 

No case holds that this kind of interference -- whether with

rights or remedies -- abridges the Petition Clause. Cf.

Marijuana Policy, 304 F.3d at 85 (“The [plaintiff] cites no case,

nor are we aware of one, establishing that limits on legislative

authority -- as opposed to limits on legislative advocacy --

violate the First Amendment.”). 

It is true that the plaintiffs cannot persuade the FTA to

enforce the Charter Rule against KCM. But that is not because

Congress has prohibited them from “seeking redress” from the

agency; it is because Congress has deprived the agency of the

funds necessary to grant the redress the plaintiffs seek. It is

likewise true that the plaintiffs cannot persuade a court to

overturn the FTA’s refusal to enforce the Rule on the ground

that it is arbitrary or contrary to law. See APA, 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A). But that is not because Congress has barred the

plaintiffs from arguing their case; it is because an agency does

not act arbitrarily or unlawfully when it follows the mandate of

Congress. 

of prospective relief, . . . Congress has altered the relevant underlying

law.”). In light of the discussion that follows, we need not resolve

that issue.

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At bottom, the obstacle that blocks the plaintiffs’ ability to

invoke the Charter Rule against KCM is Congress’ retraction of

the only remedy it had previously authorized for a transit

system’s violation of the Charter Rule: enforcement by agency

action. See 49 U.S.C. § 5323(d)(2)(B), (C); see also Am. Bus

Ass’n, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (noting that the Transit Act “does

not create a private right of action” for parties aggrieved by its

violation (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is nothing

in the Petition Clause, however, that bars Congress from

changing its mind about whether or how its statutes may be

enforced. If there is a constitutional problem with that retraction

-- a question we pursue further in Part III -- it does not sound in

the First Amendment. 

III

Having concluded that the Murray Amendment does not

burden the plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to petition, the

remainder of their constitutional challenges are readily resolved.

As we noted in Part II, in the absence of a suspect class or

fundamental right, or an intertwining with the First Amendment,

the plaintiffs’ charge that the Murray Amendment violates equal

protection by singling out KCM’s competitors for special

treatment is subject only to rational-basis review. See Beach

Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313; see also News Am., 844 F.2d at 802. 

Under that standard, we must uphold the Amendment as long as

there is a “rational relationship between the disparity of

treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller

v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). We find such a relationship

here.

KCM successfully provided charter service to Mariners

games for more than ten years. In 2009, when the Charter Rule

barred it from continuing those services, no charter service was

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available to Mariners fans. According to Senator Murray, the

Charter Rule “resulted in several specific problems in the Seattle

region including private charter operators that were unable to

accommodate handicapped fans, drastically increased fees for

service, inconvenient and delayed staging, and increased

congestion.” Press Release, Sen. Patty Murray, Murray

Provision Will Restore Metro Bus Service to UW, Mariners,

Seahawks Games (Dec. 9, 2009) (J.A. 46). Because the

Amendment is rationally related to the legitimate governmental

goals of accommodating handicapped fans, restoring more

affordable service, and reducing traffic congestion on game

days, it readily passes muster under the rational-basis test.

The critique of this rationale, which won the day for the

plaintiffs under the heightened scrutiny applied by the district

court, cannot prevail when the rational-basis test is applied. It

may be true that the government’s interest in affording

convenient transportation to baseball games is not compelling. 

But cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972) (“‘Baseball’s

status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that it would not

strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial notice that

baseball is everybody’s business.’” (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309

F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y.1970))). But rational-basis review

requires only a legitimate interest. It is certainly true that the

rationale set forth in the preceding paragraph was not expressly

stated by Congress, and instead finds its expression in a press

release issued by Senator Murray. Under rational-basis scrutiny,

however, “a legislature . . . need not ‘actually articulate at any

time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’” 

Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.

1, 15 (1992)). Rather, a statute “must be upheld against equal

protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state

of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” 

Id. (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313). 

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Of course, there may well be another side to the story: the

plaintiffs contend that “there are privately-owned charter

operators willing and able to provide affordable, efficient, and

accessible service to Mariners games.” ABA Br. at. 7. But

rational-basis review “is not a license for courts to judge the

wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Beach

Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313. The plaintiffs may also be right

that the Murray Amendment is both underinclusive because

baseball fans in other cities might benefit from a similar

exemption, and overinclusive because the exemption could be

limited to cases in which private charter service is proven to be

inadequate or unaffordable. See Am. Bus Ass’n, 717 F. Supp. 2d

at 91. But “courts are compelled under rational-basis review to

accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an

imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321.

Indeed, neither the district court nor the plaintiffs dispute

this analysis. The court did not disagree that the Murray

Amendment would “withstand” rational-basis scrutiny, although

in its estimation only “barely” so. 717 F. Supp. 2d at 92. And

the plaintiffs’ appellate briefs do not argue that they can win if

such minimum scrutiny is applied. 

In addition to their Petition Clause and equal protection

claims, the plaintiffs also charge that the Murray Amendment

violates both their Fifth Amendment procedural due process

rights and separation of powers principles. The district court did

not reach those arguments, and the plaintiffs give them short

shrift in their appellate briefs. And for good reason. Even if the

plaintiffs were correct that the Charter Rule gave them a

property interest in operating free from federally-subsidized

competition, the Supreme Court has made clear that the

legislative process provides all the process that is

constitutionally due before Congress may enact a provision like

the Murray Amendment. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115,

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17

128-30 (1985); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,

239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915); Decatur Liquors, Inc. v. District

of Columbia, 478 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As for the

claim that Congress transgressed the separation of powers by

stripping the FTA of its authority to enforce the Charter Rule

against KCM, there is no transgression when Congress does

nothing more than prospectively withdraw an enforcement

authority it had previously conferred. See Miller v. French, 530

U.S. 327, 347 (2000); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503

U.S. 429, 437-41 (1992). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ subsidiary

arguments have no greater purchase than their principal claims.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Murray

Amendment is not unconstitutional. If the plaintiffs wish to

prevent KCM from taking Mariners fans out to the ball game,

they will have to direct their petitions to Congress. The

judgment of the district court is

Reversed.

USCA Case #10-5214 Document #1313036 Filed: 06/14/2011 Page 17 of 17