Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02440/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02440-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Bonnie Hilkemeyer
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Sarah W. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for decision by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2000).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2440

___________

Bonnie Hilkemeyer, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner *

of Social Security, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2004

 Filed: August 26, 2004 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Bonnie Hilkemeyer appeals from the order of the District Court1

 granting

summary judgment to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on

Hilkemeyer's application for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits. We

affirm.

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
-2-

The Commissioner denied Hilkemeyer's application for benefits both initially

and upon reconsideration. Hilkemeyer then requested a hearing, which took place in

June 2000. On January 10, 2001, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") rendered her

decision that Hilkemeyer was not eligible for SSI benefits because she did not suffer

from a disability sufficient to entitle her to benefits under the Social Security Act.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2000) ("[A]n individual shall be considered to be

disabled . . . if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than twelve months."). The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's

decision, which thus stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.

In her initial application, Hilkemeyer alleged that she became unable to work

as of June 1, 1998, but at the hearing she amended her onset-of-disability date to

April 26, 1999. At the time of the hearing, Hilkemeyer was 39 years old, had

completed the tenth grade, had not received her GED, and had no vocational training.

She had a limited work history, which included jobs as a cashier, photograph printer,

lens cleaner, and some minimal experience working at a book bindery. Hilkemeyer

claimed that she was entitled to SSI benefits based on severe exertional and nonexertional impairments. 

From 1998 through 2000, Hilkemeyer saw several doctors and other healthcare providers for a variety of mental and physical complaints. In June 1998,

Hilkemeyer received a diagnosis of depression from Kay Barney, D.O. From June

1998 through May 2000, Hilkemeyer sought treatment for depression from

psychiatrist Sreekumar Nair, M.D. In June 1998, Dr. Nair diagnosed Hilkemeyer as

suffering from major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder. In July 1999,

Hilkemeyer was examined by a psychologist, Alan Israel, who diagnosed delayedonset post-traumatic stress disorder, dysthymic disorder, and obsessive-compulsive

personality disorder. He opined that Hilkemeyer would have difficulty adapting to

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
-3-

any work-related environment that included men. In contrast, Dr. Nair, who had

continued treating Hilkemeyer for depression, noted in August 1999 that she was

"much improved." Tri-County Mental Health Servs., Inc., Psychiatric Progress Notes

(Aug. 6, 1999). In January 2000, Hilkemeyer decompensated and was admitted to the

North Kansas City Hospital. Upon discharge Mohammed Mirza, M.D., diagnosed her

with "bipolar disorder, type II, with depression and some paranoid thinking." North

Kansas City Hospital, Discharge Summary at 1 (Jan. 21, 2000). Nonetheless, by

March 2000, Dr. Nair noted that Hilkemeyer was "doing better" and was stable. TriCounty Medical Health Servs., Inc., Integrated Progress Notes (Mar. 17, 2000). In

July 2000, Hilkemeyer's mental status was evaluated by another psychologist,

Franklin Boraks, who diagnosed panic disorder with agoraphobia, major depression

and obsessive-compulsive disorder.

In addition to these complaints of mental disorders, Hilkemeyer sought

treatment for a variety of physical ailments from 1998 to 2000. In June 1999,

Hilkemeyer complained of swelling in her left hand, but x-rays demonstrated normal

anatomy throughout. A sleep study conducted in July 1999 indicated moderately

severe sleep apnea, but the condition was improved by the use of a continuous

positive airway pressure ("CPAP") machine. Despite complaints of right knee pain

in March and April 2000, x-rays indicated no abnormality.

At the hearing, Hilkemeyer testified that she had pain in her right knee, which

limited her ability to stand for long periods of time. Similarly, she indicated an old

wrist injury restricted her ability to lift more than five pounds. She testified to

shortness of breath and to the use of inhalers to treat asthma but admitted that she

continued to smoke. She indicated that she had difficulty being around men, but

revealed that she had lived with a man until the day before the hearing. She testified

to keeping up with the household chores such as vacuuming, doing laundry, and

cleaning. She indicated that she drove herself to doctor's appointments and to the

grocery store. As to her mental faculties, Hilkemeyer testified to difficulties with her

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
2

An affective disorder is a "severe mental disorder marked by periods of

extreme depression or elation." 1 J. E. Schmidt, Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine

and Word Finder at A-185 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003).

-4-

short-term memory and, because of recurring nightmares, with her sleep patterns. She

further testified to feeling anxious while in crowds and to wanting to spend most of

her time in her apartment away from others. She claimed that she had left former

employment due to mental stress occasioned by dealing with her co-workers.

In her written decision, the ALJ carefully worked through the five-step

sequential analysis to determine whether Hilkemeyer was disabled and entitled to SSI

benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2004) (setting forth the five-step

analysis). The ALJ first determined that Hilkemeyer had not performed any

substantial gainful activity while her application was pending. At the second step,

the ALJ noted that the medical evidence in the record established that Hilkemeyer had

a severe affective disorder,2

 but the ALJ determined that the diagnosed post-traumatic

stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and dysthymia were either non-severe

or not corroborated by clinical evidence in the record. She further determined that

the alleged physical impairments—the right knee disorder, sleep apnea and

pulmonary dysfunction—were not severe. Next, the ALJ determined that

Hilkemeyer's affective disorder did not reach listing level. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.04 (detailing the required level of severity for affective disorders

to entitle a claimant to benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii)). The ALJ

considered all the medical evidence she found credible and determined that

Hilkemeyer had the RFC to perform medium or light work, so long as she was limited

to simple repetitive tasks with no work with the public and a low degree of contact

with her co-workers and supervisors. In light of Hilkemeyer's sporadic work history,

the ALJ determined that there was no past relevant work to which she could return.

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
-5-

At the hearing, the ALJ had taken the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE").

The ALJ asked the VE whether jobs existed in the national economy for an individual

of the same age, education, and work experience as Hilkemeyer, who had the residual

functional capacity ("RFC") to perform medium work, and who could only perform

simple, repetitive tasks, with no work with the public, and with limited contact with

co-workers and supervisors. The VE testified that there were numerous jobs widely

available in the national and regional economies for such an individual, including

order picker, machine tender, photocopy-machine operator, and light cleaner. Based

on the VE's testimony, the ALJ concluded that, in view of Hilkemeyer's ability to

perform jobs available in the national economy requiring only medium or light work,

she was not disabled. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, R. 202.18 & 203.25.

In this appeal, Hilkemeyer argues that the evidence in the record does not

support the ALJ's findings. She also argues that the hypothetical question posed to

the VE was defective because it was based upon an RFC finding that is not supported

by the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (2000). "We must affirm the

ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole."

Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g)). Our review is deferential; we may not substitute our judgment for that of

the ALJ. Garrett, 366 F.3d at 646. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance,

and it merely requires that the record contain evidence sufficient for a reasonable

individual to find it adequate to support the conclusions drawn by the ALJ.

Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).

Hilkemeyer first argues that the ALJ did not properly determine the severity of

her impairment. Although Hilkemeyer argues otherwise, the ALJ's written decision

is clear and explains that, despite Hilkemeyer's complaints of numerous physical and

mental impairments, the clinical evidence in the record supports only a conclusion

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
3

Hilkemeyer claims that the ALJ fails to identify these treating sources, but, in

her decision, the ALJ clearly referenced the reports of those individuals who are

treating sources. Soc. Sec. Admin. Office of Hearings & Appeals, Decision at 3, 5

(Jan. 10, 2001). Furthermore, at the hearing Hilkemeyer recognized Dr. Nair as her

treating psychiatrist. Soc. Sec. Admin. Office of Hearings and Appeals, Tr. of Oral

Hearing at 3 (June 23, 2000).

-6-

that her affective disorder was a severe impairment. Social Security Administration

Office of Hearings and Appeals, Decision at 2 (Jan. 10, 2001). The ALJ thoroughly

considered all of the medical evidence in reaching this conclusion, which is based on

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The ALJ carefully considered the

evidence from Hilkemeyer's treating sources,3

 who all agreed that Hilkemeyer was

suffering from a depression. The ALJ noted that the diagnoses of other mental

disorders by others who examined Hilkemeyer, such as Boraks and Israel, were not

consistent with the diagnoses in the treatment record nor with their own notes and

examinations, so the ALJ refused to give them significant weight. The record

evidence shows that the only consistent diagnosis from Hilkemeyer's treating sources

was affective disorder; thus the ALJ was justified in rejecting diagnoses of other

mental disorders by sources who conducted a single examination of Hilkemeyer, and

whose conclusions seemed to be based solely upon her subjective complaints.

Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Hilkemeyer's

physical impairments were non-severe: the sleep apnea was ameliorated by use of a

CPAP machine and x-rays and MRI results indicated no knee abnormalities.

Hilkemeyer also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to conclude that Hilkemyer

was disabled under Listings 12.04 and 12.08. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.

1 §§ 12.04 (affective disorders) & 12.08 (personality disorders). Because the ALJ's

determination that Hilkemeyer's only severe impairment was an affective disorder is

supported by substantial evidence, the only relevant listing at step three of the

analysis was Listing 12.04. The ALJ's decision to reject considering Hilkemeyer's

claim under other listings is supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, her

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
-7-

determination that Hilkemeyer's affective disorder does not reach listing level is also

supported by substantial evidence. Before an affective disorder is sufficiently severe

that it leads to the automatic payment of SSI benefits under § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), it

must result in at least two of the following: "1. Marked restriction of activities of

daily living; or 2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or 3. Marked

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; or 4. Repeated episodes

of decompensation." 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.04(B). Hilkemeyer's

disorder only led to slight restrictions on the activities of daily living: she testified

that she is able to do minor household chores, drive to her doctor's appointments, and

go grocery shopping with the aid of her daughter. Hilkemeyer's moderate social

dysfunction was not sufficient to meet listing requirements. Furthermore, medical

evidence from treating and examining sources alike indicated that her abilities to

concentrate and remember were in the normal range. See Campbell & Associates,

Psychological Eval. Report at 2, 3 (July 31, 2000); Alan R. Israel, Consultative

Examination Report at 2, 3 (July 13, 1999); Tri-County Mental Health Servs., Inc.,

Initial Psychiatric Eval. at 2 (June 30, 1998). Finally, substantial evidence supported

the ALJ's determination that Hilkemeyer had suffered only a single episode of

decompensation of extended duration. The ALJ did not err in determining that

Hilkemeyer's affective disorder did not reach listing level.

Hilkemeyer argues that the ALJ erred in finding Hilkemeyer had the RFC to

perform medium or light work. We disagree. The ALJ's RFC determination is based

on substantial evidence in the record. In examining all the relevant credible evidence

in the record, 20 C.F.R. § 416.945, the ALJ properly determined that Hilkemeyer

retained the residual functional capacity for a range of medium to light work, so long

as it was restricted to simple repetitive tasks, with no work with the public, and with

a limited degree of contact with co-workers and supervisors. The evidence from

various examiners is that Hilkemeyer's memory and concentration abilities were in

the normal range, so the ALJ did not err when she determined that Hilkemeyer's

purported memory difficulties were not sufficient to limit her ability to perform

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654 
4

Hilkemeyer also argues that the ALJ should have recognized limits imposed

by Hilkemeyer's pulmonary dysfunction because such limits were recognized in the

physical RFC determination made upon Hilkemeyer's initial application for SSI

benefits. We reject this argument because the ALJ is not bound by such earlier

findings. See 20 C.F.R. 416.946(c) ("If your case is at the [ALJ] hearing level . . . the

[ALJ] . . . is responsible for assessing your [RFC].").

-8-

simple tasks. Similarly, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that

Hilkemeyer suffered from moderate social dysfunction, which the ALJ took into

account by not requiring Hilkemeyer to perform work with the public and to have

only limited contact with co-workers and supervisors. 

Hilkemeyer argues that due to her pulmonary dysfunction her RFC should have

limited her exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation. Medical

evidence in the record indicated only a mild pulmonary dysfunction. The ALJ's

decision not to incorporate this mild pulmonary dysfunction in the RFC, as well as

in the hypothetical posed to the VE, was not error because the record does not suggest

there were any limitations caused by this nonsevere impairment.4

 The VE's testimony

that Hilkemeyer could perform work in the national economy provided substantial

evidence in support of the ALJ's determination that Hilkemeyer was not disabled.

Miller v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 611, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District Court's order.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-2440 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/26/2004 Entry ID: 1803654