Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06572/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06572-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Ruiz
Petitioner
Stuart Ryan
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO RUIZ,

Petitioner,

v.

STUART RYAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-06572-WHO (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Pedro Ruiz seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions for sex 

crimes against a minor on grounds that trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. Because the state court’s rejection of his claims was reasonable, the petition for 

federal habeas relief is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

Ruiz had sex with a 12-year-old, Jane Doe, his friend’s sister. The facts were 

summarized by the state appellate court: 

In November 2014, Jane Doe’s brother played in a band with 24-year-old 

[Ruiz]. Jane Doe, who was 12 years old, had watched the band practice.

On the evening of November 16, 2014, Jane Doe’s parents and brother went 

to a party at their apartment complex. Jane Doe was supposed to attend the 

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party. When her family members left for the party, she was using the family 

computer and said she would be at the party in a few minutes. After they 

arrived at the party, Jane Doe’s father and brother saw [Ruiz]’s car drive into 

the apartment complex. After a few minutes, [Ruiz]’s car exited the 

apartment complex.

Jane Doe’s family members noticed that Jane Doe had not joined them at the 

party. Jane Doe’s mother went to the family’s apartment to get Jane Doe, 

but Jane Doe was not there. Jane Doe’s brother checked the family computer, 

and he saw Facebook messages that [Ruiz] and Jane Doe had exchanged. In 

the messages, [Ruiz] said he wanted to see Jane Doe and would meet her in 

10 minutes.

Jane Doe’s father, mother, and brother got into the family car and looked for 

Jane Doe. They eventually saw [Ruiz]’s car parked in a parking lot. Jane 

Doe’s father opened [Ruiz]’s car door. [Ruiz] was lying on top of Jane Doe 

in the reclined passenger seat, and he and Jane Doe were both naked. [Ruiz] 

was positioned “in between” Jane Doe’s legs. Jane Doe’s father grabbed and 

held [Ruiz]. [Ruiz] was sweaty and slippery, and [Ruiz] said that ‘she wanted 

it.’ Jane Doe’s brother saw a police car and flagged it down. Jane Doe’s 

brother told the police officer inside the car that his sister was being ‘raped.’ 

The police officer arrested [Ruiz] and took him to the police station.

Jane Doe refused to speak with the police or her family members about what 

had happened with [Ruiz]. She did not testify at trial.

(Ans., State Appellate Opinion, Dkt. No. 9-11 at 3-4.)1

Ruiz confessed to police that he had had sex with Jane Doe; he knew she was a 

minor under the age of 14; they had been in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship for four 

months; he knew the relationship was wrong; they had arranged to meet on November 16; 

he had touched her vagina and kissed her before November 16; and he had sent her 

through Facebook a photograph of his penis. (Id. at 4.) 

Messages Ruiz and Doe sent to each other through Facebook were presented at trial. 

In his messages, Ruiz (i) acknowledges he could be put “in jail for 15 years for being with 

a minor girl”; (ii) states that he “like[d] her tasty thing” and asked to “touch it well next 

time”; (iii) asks Doe to shower with him; and (iv) states Doe makes him “want to make 

love” to her. (Id. at 5.) 

 

1 People v. Ruiz, No. H042398, 2016 WL 3610870, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 28, 2016). 

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In 2015, a Monterey County Superior Court jury convicted Ruiz of committing 

lewd acts with a child under the age of 14, contacting a minor with intent to commit a 

sexual offense, and arranging to meet and meeting a minor with intent to commit a sexual 

offense. (Id. at 2.) A sentence of 12 years in state prison was imposed. (Id.) Ruiz’s 

attempts to overturn the decision in state court were unsuccessful. This federal habeas 

petition followed. 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Ruiz claims (i) defense counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, particularly when Miranda, jury instruction, and Confrontation 

Clause issues arose; and (ii) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), this 

Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 

(2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 

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413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” 

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

DISCUSSION

Ruiz claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) have his 

confession suppressed based on his alleged invocation of silence during his arrest; (b) have 

his confession suppressed based on his invalid waiver of his Miranda rights during 

interrogation; (c) challenge jury instructions; and (d) raise a Confrontation Clause 

objection. He also alleges that (e) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to raise Claims a–d on direct appeal. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must establish that 

(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of 

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687-688 (1984), and (2) he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., 

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694. When the defendant is 

challenging his conviction, the appropriate question is “whether there is a reasonable 

probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 

respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not 

just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

693).

The standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland are “highly deferential . . . and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). “The question [under § 2254(d)] is not whether counsel’s 

actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that 

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counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

Ruiz’s claims were not raised on direct appeal, but rather only on collateral review 

to the state supreme court, which summarily denied the claims. (Ans., Dkt. No. 9-13 at 

131.) When presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for 

its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This review is not de novo. “[W]here a state 

court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still 

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

a. Body Camera Footage

Ruiz claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

examine the arresting officer’s body camera footage of his arrest. He contends that this 

failure prevented her from knowing that during the arrest Ruiz had invoked his right to 

remain silent. Had she known this, she would have been able to have his confession 

suppressed. Had the confession been suppressed, he would not have been found guilty of 

putting his penis inside Jane Doe, the act that constituted the predicate offense of Count 1.2 

(Pet., Dkt. No. 1 at 18.) 

Ruiz’s argument lacks factual support. Defense counsel moved to exclude this 

same footage, so the claim that counsel failed to review the footage is wrong. (Ans., 

Clerk’s Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-3 at 57-58.) The motion was withdrawn after the prosecutor

announced he would not present the footage at trial. (Id., Reporter’s Transcript, Dkt. No. 

9-6 at 26.) Ruiz’s claim is premised on the mistaken belief that because the prosecution 

declined to present the body camera footage, the recording was never disclosed to the 

defense. (Ans., Dkt. No. 9-1 at 15.) The footage was sent to defense counsel, as noted in 

 

2 Ruiz was charged with four counts of lewd acts with a child: Count 1 (described as 

“inserting his penis into her vagina”); Count 2 (touching vagina); Count 5 (“rubbing her 

vagina with his hand”); and Count 6 (“kissing”). (Ans., State Appellate Opinion, Dkt. No. 

9-11 at 2.) 

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the motion to exclude (id., Dkt. No. 9-3 at 58), and was the subject of that motion. 

Accordingly, Ruiz’s claim lacks merit. He has not shown that counsel’s 

performance was deficient; the record indicates that she did review the footage and moved 

to exclude it. Ruiz’s conclusory assertion that she did not is insufficient in the context of

this record. Young v. Gipson, 163 F. Supp. 3d 647, 689 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (petitioner’s 

conclusory assertion that counsel failed to review evidence is insufficient to show 

ineffective assistance). 

Nor could he show prejudice. Evidence other than his confession — the eyewitness 

accounts of Jane Doe’s father and brother, who both testified at trial — provided sufficient 

evidence that he had vaginal sex with Doe. After opening the car door, Ruiz was seen 

“lying on top of Jane Doe in the reclined passenger seat” positioned “in between her legs.” 

Both were “naked.” Ruiz, who was “sweaty and slippery,” declared that Doe “wanted it.” 

Doe’s brother told the police officer he had flagged down that his sister was being “raped.” 

This testimony, along with Ruiz’s Facebook messages to Doe, provide grounds for the 

state court to reject the contention that but for the confession, there was a reasonable 

probability that the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. 

After conducting an independent review of the record, I conclude that the state 

court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. The 

claim is DENIED. 

b. Waiver of Miranda Rights

Ruiz claims counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to have his 

confession suppressed because he did not waive his Miranda rights. The transcript records 

that he said, “Uh-hum,” in response to questions about whether he understood his Miranda

rights. Counsel, Ruiz alleges, was ineffective for failing to argue that Ruiz did not 

knowingly and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination. (Pet., Dkt. No. 1 at 

24.) 

Ruiz’s interrogation was conducted in Spanish. The interrogating officer told Ruiz 

that he would be informed of his rights before questioning began. (Ans., Interrogation 

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Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-3 at 119-120.) Ruiz answered, “Yes.” (Id. at 120.) He was then 

told he had the right to remain silent, to which he responded, “Uh-hum.” (Id.) When told 

that anything he said could be used in court, he said, “Uh-hum.” (Id.) He was then 

advised of his right to an attorney and his other Miranda rights. (Id.) When asked whether 

he understood his rights as they had been read to him, he nodded. (Id., Reporter’s 

Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-4 at 10.) The interrogating officer responded, “Yes? Ok,” as 

petitioner continued to nod.3 (Id., Interrogation Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-3 at 120; Reporter’s 

Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-4 at 10.) 

At no time during the interrogation did Ruiz invoke his rights or indicate that he did 

not understand them. In fact, later in the interrogation he reaffirmed that he understood his 

rights. There was a pause in the interrogation when the officer left the room for a while. 

(Id., Interrogation Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-3 at 147.) When the officer returned, he asked 

Ruiz whether he remembered the rights that had been read to him earlier. Ruiz said, 

“Yes.” (Id.) When asked whether he needed to have the rights read to him again, he said, 

“No, we’re good.” (Id.) The interrogation continued; Ruiz answered all the questions he 

was asked. (Id.) 

Ruiz claims that he did not waive his Miranda rights. A person subjected to 

custodial interrogation must be advised that “he has the right to remain silent, that any 

statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 

presence of an attorney.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Once properly 

advised of his rights, an accused may waive them voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 

See id. A valid waiver of Miranda rights depends upon the totality of the circumstances. 

“The waiver inquiry ‘has two distinct dimensions’: waiver must be ‘voluntary in the sense 

that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 

deception,’ and ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 

 

3 The transcript has Ruiz saying “Yes. Ok.” in response to the officer’s question about 

whether petitioner understood his rights as read. (Ans., Interrogation Transcript, Dkt. No. 

9-3 at 120.) The parties agree that it was the officer who said “Yes. Ok,” not Ruiz. (Ans., 

at 10 n.6; Pet., Dkt. No. 1 at 26.) 

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abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 

560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). The 

waiver may be implied by conduct, and need not be explicit or written. Id. at 383. 

“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was 

understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied 

waiver of the right to remain silent.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384. The law presumes that an 

individual who fully understands his rights and acts in a manner inconsistent with them has 

made “a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.” Id. at 385; see, 

e.g., United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding implied 

waiver based on evidence that after defendant was advised, but before questioning, he 

made a spontaneous statement and responded to further questions without reference to 

counsel). 

Nothing in the record indicates that Ruiz did not understand his Miranda rights, or 

that he invoked these rights, or that did not waive his rights. Indeed, his contention that he 

did not waive his rights indicates that he heard and understood them. The government, 

then, has shown that (i) the Miranda warnings were given; (ii) Ruiz understood his rights; 

and (iii) he made “a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.” His 

interpretation of his “Uh-hum” is a thin basis on which to premise a lack of waiver (or 

invocation of rights) and is unsupported by anything else in the record. 

The facts in this case are similar to the facts in United States v. Hurtado, 421 F. 

Supp. 3d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2014), where the defendant’s “mhmm” given in response to 

Miranda warnings “unambiguously communicated an affirmative response to the officer’s 

question.” Id. at 1041. Defendant’s answers to questions after the Miranda warnings had 

been given also constituted a “course of conduct indicating waiver.” Id. at 1042. In light 

of Hurtado and the other legal authorities cited above, Ruiz’s “Uh-hum” is insufficient to 

meet his burden to show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. Because Ruiz has not shown that he invoked (or did not 

waive) his rights, his claim of ineffective assistance necessarily fails. 

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Furthermore, the erroneous admission of a coerced confession is subject to harmless 

error analysis. Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991). In other words, 

habeas relief is appropriate only if the coerced confession had a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 637 (1993). The eyewitness accounts provided by Doe’s father and brother, along 

with Ruiz’s Facebook messages to Doe, provided substantial evidence of guilt. Even 

without the confession, the jury had sufficient evidence on which to base its verdicts. 

After conducting an independent review of the record, I conclude that the state 

court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. The 

claim is DENIED. 

c. Jury Instructions

Ruiz claims that a certain jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 1110) was flawed 

and that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the flawed instruction. 

According to Ruiz, the instruction wrongly allowed the jury to convict him of 

lewdly touching a child even if the touching itself was not lewd. (Pet., Dkt. No. 1 at 

29.) 

CALCRIM No. 1110 was given to the jury to guide its deliberations on whether 

Ruiz was guilty of committing lewd and lascivious acts (Cal. Penal Code § 288). Section 

288, as explained by No. 1110, has the following elements: touching any part of a child 

(under the age of 14) on the bare skin or through clothing with the intent of arousing or 

appealing to the lusts of the perpetrator or the child. (Ans., Clerk’s Transcript, Dkt. No. 9-

3 at 175.) The touching need not be done in a lewd or sexual manner, as explained by No. 

1110. (Id.) The instruction also gave four predicate incidents of touching Ruiz committed: 

inserting his penis into Doe; twice rubbing Doe’s vagina; and kissing. (Id.) 

A state court’s interpretation of state law binds a federal court sitting in habeas 

corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). The California Supreme Court has 

rejected Ruiz’s contention that the acts of touching must be in themselves lewd. People v. 

Martinez, 11 Cal. 4th 434, 444 (Cal. 1995.) Intent, not the nature of the touching, is the 

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crucial factor. “[T]he form, manner, or nature of the offending act” is not controlled by 

statute. Id. “[T]he courts have long indicated that section 288 prohibits all forms of 

sexually motivated contact with an underage child. Indeed, the ‘gist’ of the offense has 

always been the defendant’s intent to sexually exploit a child, not the nature of the 

offending act.” Id. This is so even if the act may have “the outward appearance of 

innocence.” Id., quoting People v. Hobbs, 109 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192 (Cal. 1952). 

In light of this, Ruiz’s claim of ineffective assistance necessarily fails. Because the 

instruction gave the correct version of state law, any objection would have been rejected. 

It is both reasonable and not prejudicial for defense counsel to forego a meritless 

objection. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005).

Upon an independent review of the record, I conclude that the state court’s rejection 

of this claim was not objectively unreasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. The 

claim is DENIED. 

d. Admission of Messages

Ruiz claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object on 

Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of the electronic messages that he and Jane 

Doe sent to each other. These messages, he contends, were testimonial hearsay. (Pet., 

Dkt. No. 1 at 32.) 

Ruiz cites no specific message, so I assume that he means the messages described 

by the state appellate court: 

Between November 14, 2014 and November 16, 2014, [Ruiz] and Jane Doe 

engaged in many conversations through Facebook. The prosecution 

introduced those Facebook messages into evidence.

In a Facebook conversation on November 14, [Ruiz] asked Jane Doe when 

she would turn 13 years old and when she could have a boyfriend. Jane Doe 

informed [Ruiz] that she would not turn 13 years old until June.

In other Facebook conversations on November 14, [Ruiz] and Jane Doe 

arranged to meet late that night. [Ruiz] expressed fear that they would be 

caught meeting, stating that he could be put ‘in jail for 15 years for being 

with a minor girl.’ At 12:29 a.m. on November 15, [Ruiz] informed Jane 

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Doe that he was at her house. At 12:37 a.m. on November 15, Jane Doe 

responded, ‘Okay.’ In the next message, sent at 1:46 a.m. on November 15, 

[Ruiz] said to Jane Doe, ‘Until tomorrow, beautiful girl.’

Later on November 15, [Ruiz] sent Jane Doe the following message through 

Facebook: ‘How I wish you were older . . . You are very beautiful. I like 

your tasty thing.’ Jane Doe replied with a smiley face image. [Ruiz] then 

asked, ‘Will you let me touch it well next time?’ In other Facebook 

conversations on November 15, [Ruiz] and Jane Doe expressed their love for 

each other, and [Ruiz] said Jane Doe caused him ‘damage’ because she was 

‘prohibited.’

In the morning on November 16, [Ruiz] sent Jane Doe Facebook messages 

in which he said he was going to take a shower and in which he invited her 

to shower with him. Later on November 16, [Ruiz] and Jane Doe sent 

Facebook messages expressing their love for each other, and [Ruiz] told Jane 

Doe, ‘I want you.’ In another Facebook message sent on November 16, 

[Ruiz] told Jane Doe, ‘[Y]ou make me want to make love to you.’ [Ruiz] also 

told Jane Doe that he was ‘afraid’ because she was ‘very young.’

In the evening on November 16, [Ruiz] used Facebook to arrange a meeting 

with Jane Doe. [Ruiz] sent Jane Doe the following message: ‘Can you come 

out so I can see you?’ Jane Doe responded, ‘Yes.’ [Ruiz] informed Jane 

Doe: ‘I will wait for you where we were last night.’ [Ruiz] told Jane Doe 

he would be there in 10 minutes, and she replied, ‘Okay.’ [Ruiz] then sent 

Jane Doe the following message: ‘I am here. Come.’ 

(Ans., State Appellate Opinion, Dkt. No. 9-11 at 5-6.) 

The Confrontation Clause applies to all out-of-court testimonial statements offered 

for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., “testimonial hearsay.” Crawford v. Washington, 

541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). “Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation 

made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). “An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 

testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 

not.” Id. While the Supreme Court has not articulated a comprehensive definition of 

testimonial hearsay, it has said that “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a 

minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former 

trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. at 68. Hearsay that is not testimonial, “while 

subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation 

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Clause.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). 

None of the messages qualifies as a testimonial statement. None was “a solemn 

declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” In 

Crawford’s terms, they are far more akin to a casual statement to an acquaintance than a 

formal statement to a government officer. Because none of the messages was testimonial, 

the Confrontation Clause does not apply to them. Any objection to the admission of the 

messages on Confrontation Clause grounds would almost certainly have been rejected.4 It 

is both reasonable and not prejudicial for defense counsel to forgo a meritless 

objection. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005). Ruiz’s ineffective 

assistance claim necessarily fails.

Upon an independent review of the record, I conclude that the state court’s rejection 

of this claim was not objectively unreasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. The 

claim is DENIED. 

i. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the 

standard set out in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. A defendant therefore must show that 

counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would have 

prevailed on appeal. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). Ruiz claims 

that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel because of the claims discussed above.

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous 

issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). 

Appellate counsel will frequently remain above an objective standard of competence and 

cause his client no prejudice when she declines to raise a weak issue. Id. 

 

4 Any hearsay objection to Ruiz’s messages would almost certainly have been rejected. 

Admissions of a party-opponent (here Ruiz) are “not made inadmissible by the hearsay 

rule.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1220. 

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As discussed below, none of Ruiz’s claims regarding trial counsel has merit. 

Therefore, his appellate counsel’s failure to raise these claims on appeal cannot constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Upon an independent review of the record, I conclude that the state court’s rejection 

of this claim was not objectively unreasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. The 

claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

The state court’s adjudication of Ruiz’s claims did not result in decisions that were 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor 

did they result in decisions that were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition 

is DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Ruiz may seek a certificate of appealability from the 

Ninth Circuit. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2019

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-06572-WHO Document 16 Filed 03/27/19 Page 13 of 13