Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00970/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00970-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamar C. Berry
Plaintiff
Kalani Marshall Black
Plaintiff
Melinda Dubroff
Defendant
Christina Fugazi
Plaintiff
Alex Gonzalez
Plaintiff
Benjamin R. Herrera
Plaintiff
Jo A. Laing
Plaintiff
Divine Jane Leanos
Plaintiff
Valdomero Lopez
Plaintiff
Francisco Macias
Plaintiff
Kathy Miller
Defendant
Tooba Naveed
Plaintiff
Alex Padilla
Defendant
Tarkdeep Singh
Plaintiff
Elizabeth Lawrence White
Plaintiff
Marc Lawrence White
Plaintiff
Annette Zimmer
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTINA FUGAZI; ALEX 

GONZALEZ; ANNETTE ZIMMER; 

FRANCISCO MACIAS; JAMAR C. 

BERRY; JO A. LAING; BENJAMIN R. 

HERRERA; DIVINE JANE LEANOS; 

ELIZABETH LAWRENCE WHITE; 

MARC LAWRENCE WHITE; 

KALANI MARSHALL BLACK; 

TARKDEEP SINGH; TOOBA 

NAVEED; VALDOMERO LOPEZ, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ALEX PADILLA, in his official capacity 

as Secretary of State for the State of 

California; MELINDA DUBROFF, in her 

official capacity of the San Joaquin County 

Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 through 

50, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:20-CV-00970-KJM-AC 

ORDER 

Plaintiffs move for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the Secretary of 

State for the State of California and the San Joaquin County Registrar of Voters (collectively 

“defendants”), from completing the recount of votes for the March 3, 2020 Primary Election and 

finalizing the election results without including vote-by-mail ballots cast by plaintiff voters who 

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provided signature verifications to the Registrar by April 21, 2020. The court, having considered 

the arguments of counsel on May 19, 2020, and the papers submitted with this matter including 

defendants’ surreply filed May 20, 2020, DENIES plaintiffs’ motion, without prejudice to 

plaintiffs’ filing a motion for preliminary injunction. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background and Allegations 

1. March 3 Presidential Primary: Executive Order Modifies Original 

 Deadlines 

Plaintiffs are Christina Fugazi, a candidate to represent California Assembly 

District 13 in the Primary Election held on March 3, 2020, and thirteen persons registered to vote 

in San Joaquin County who seek to represent a class of similarly situated voters. The thirteen 

voter plaintiffs are Alex Gonzalez, Annette Zimmer, Francisco Macias, Jamar C. Berry, Jo A. 

Laing, Benjamin R. Herrera, Divine Jane Leanos, Elizabeth Lawrence White, Marc Lawrence 

White,1 Kalani Marshall Black,2 Tarakdeep Singh, Tooba Naveed and Valdomero Lopez 

(collectively “voter plaintiffs”). Compl. ¶¶ 22–23, ECF No. 1; Mot. TRO, Ex. 1 (Fugazi Decl.) 

¶ 1, ECF No. 4-1. 

On March 4, 2020, the day after the March 3 Presidential Primary Election, the 

Governor of California proclaimed a State of Emergency in the state due to the coronavirus 

(COVID-19) pandemic.3 Compl. ¶ 12. Slightly more than two weeks later, on March 20, 2020, 

1

 The court notes named plaintiff Marc Lawrence White or Marc Lawrence is not 

identified on the Registrar’s log entitled, “Voters Contacted Due to Initially Challenged Ballot for 

the Presidential Primary Election on March 3, 2020.” Surreply, ECF No. 23, at 10 & n.4. 

Defendants confirm there is a “Marc Eugene Lawrence” registered in the County, and his mail 

ballot was counted. Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 12. The court does not reach the issue of name 

disparities for purposes of this motion. 

 

2

 The court also notes named plaintiff Kalani Black, listed as Kalani Marshall Black in the 

caption, appears to be listed in the Registrar’s voter log by the name Kalani Tyson Marshall. 

Reply, Ex. 1 (Voter Log), ECF No. 16-1, at 49. 

 

3

 The court notes and takes judicial notice sua sponte of Governor Newsom’s March 19, 

2020, shelter in place order, available at: https://covid19.ca.gov/img/N-33-20.pdf. 

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the Governor specifically addressed the effect of COVID-19 on the counting of votes cast in the 

March 3rd Primary by issuing Executive Order N-34-20. Id. This Executive Order “[extended] 

all deadlines associated with completing, auditing, and reporting on the official canvass” by 21 

days, to provide relief to California’s 58 county elections officials who were in the middle of the 

official canvass for the March Primary. Id.; see also Req. for Judicial Not., Ex. 2 (Executive 

Order N-34-20 (“Governor’s Order”)) ¶ 2 at 8, ECF No. 5-1. In this Order, on the one hand, the 

Governor urged county elections officials “to complete activities related to the official canvass 

according to the deadlines ordinarily imposed by state law, to the extent possible.” Governor’s 

Order ¶ 4 at 9. At the same time, however, the Governor directed that “[e]lections officials shall 

provide maximum possible notice to voters about how to participate in each of these elections, 

paying particular attention to the needs of voters at high risk from COVID-19, individuals with 

disabilities, and other voters with particularized needs.” Id. ¶ 3 at 8–9. 

Following the Governor’s issuance of the March 20 Executive Order, on March 

23, 2020, the California Secretary of State issued Memorandum No. 20068, directed to county 

elections officials regarding compliance with the order, identifying which calendar entries in the 

Secretary of State’s March 3, 2020, Primary Election calendar were extended by the executive 

order. Padilla Opp’n, ECF No. 8, at 5; see also id., Ex. C (Sec’y of State’s Mem. No. 20068), 

ECF No. 8, at 22–23 (referencing the Primary Election calendar). 

2. San Joaquin Voter Registrar’s Original Election Certification 

 Prior to the Governor’s Order extending the dates by which to complete voter 

canvasses, the San Joaquin County Registrar of Voters, Melinda Dubroff (“the Registrar”), would 

have been required to certify her county’s election results by April 2, 2020, the 30-day deadline in 

effect on the primary election date. Mot. TRO, ECF No. 4, at 5. After the Governor’s Order took 

effect, the Registrar certified the election on April 5, 2020, as detailed below. 

 The Registrar’s Office, located at 44 N. San Joaquin Street, Ste. 350, in Stockton, 

California, was closed to the public at some point in light of the statewide state of emergency. 

Ms. Fugazi says the Registrar told her the office was closed starting March 23, 2020. Fugazi 

Decl. ¶ 2. The Registrar avers the building in which her office is located closed to the public 

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“[e]ffective April 1.” Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10; see also id., Ex. B (Public Notice), ECF No. 24-

2, at 2 (“Effective April, 2020, the County Administration Building is closed to the public until 

further notice”). The Registrar says that after her office was closed, her staff remained available 

to answer incoming calls, including to the phone number, (209) 468-2890, listed in the cure 

notices sent to voters described below. Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10. 

 At one point the Registrar planned to certify the election results one day later than 

the original deadline, on Friday, April 3, 2020, but ultimately certified them on Sunday, April 5, 

2020. Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs allege the Registrar did not provide voters a 

minimum eight days’ notice prior to this certification date, to allow them to cure mismatched 

signatures or the absence of signatures on ballot envelopes, as required by the California 

Elections Code. Mot. TRO at 6; see also Cal. Elec. Code § 3019(d)(1). Eight days prior to April 

5 was Thursday March 26, 2020. Dubroff Decl. ¶ 12. 

3. Recount Occasioned By Plaintiff Fugazi’s Recount Request; Plaintiff 

 Voters Attempt to Cure Signatures During Recount Period 

 On April 14, 2020, Ms. Fugazi requested a recount of the ballots cast for 

candidates for Assembly District 13.4 Fugazi Decl. ¶ 4. During the course of the recount, on 

April 21, 2020, approximately, thirty-five vote-by-mail voters submitted5 their signature 

4

 Under the recount rules prescribed by the state Elections Code, the requestor of a recount 

is responsible for the costs associated with carrying the recount out. Fugazi Decl. ¶ 4. To date 

Ms. Fugazi avers she has incurred approximately $115,902 in costs for daily reviews of elections 

materials. Id. ¶ 7. The court notes that, while Ms. Fugazi complains that the Registrar has 

arbitrarily overstated the deposit amounts required, neither the complaint nor the application for a 

TRO make a legal claim for relief on these grounds. As of the date of hearing on May 19, 2020, 

the recount was continuing, meaning Ms. Fugazi had made the required deposits through that 

date. While counsel represented the recount currently is anticipated to continue through June 9, if 

Ms. Fugazi does not make a deposit as required, the recount will cease and the TRO motion may 

become moot. At hearing the parties agreed to a stipulation based on defense counsel’s 

representation, that the recount would under no circumstances be completed before next Monday, 

May 25, 2020. 

5

 The complaint pleads that the proposed class “consists of thirty-six (36) voters registered 

to vote in the San Joaquin County” March 3 election. Compl. ¶ 36. Ms. Fugazi’s declaration also 

states, “we have identified thirty-six voters.” Fugazi Decl. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO 

represents that “approximately, 35 Vote-by-Mail voters submitted their signature verifications to 

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verifications to the Registrar. Mot. TRO at 7. Plaintiffs do not expressly identify which of the 

voter plaintiffs attempted to cure by April 21, 2020. To date, the Registrar has declined to count 

the votes of those persons who submitted cure documents, on grounds their verification 

statements were untimely. Dubroff Opp’n, ECF No. 10, at 12 (citing Elections Code 

§ 3019(e)(C)(1) (“If timely submitted, the elections official shall accept any completed unsigned 

ballot statement.”)). 

 The defendants argue in surreply that the record on the TRO motion should be 

narrowed to eight plaintiffs to whom the Registrar sent notices on March 11 or March 16, eight 

and three days, respectively. These dates are after the Governor’s executive order declaring a 

state of emergency and before the Governor’s March 19, 2020, shelter in place order took effect, 

and so fall within the period of time when disruption to the vote-counting process was most 

likely. Surreply at 9. For purposes of this motion, given the record before, the court accepts this 

argument and considers the motion as based on the facts with respect to the following voters: 

Voter Plaintiff Name Date Registrar Mailed Notice 

Valdomero Lopez 3/11/2020 

Alex Gonzalez 3/11/2020 

Jamar Ceasar Berry 3/11/2020 

Divine Jane Leanos 3/11/2020 

Francisco Daniel Macias 3/16/2020 

Elizabeth Lawrence White 3/16/2020 

Kalani Marshall Black 3/16/2020 

Tooba Naveed 3/16/2020 

Id. at 9–10. 

the Registrar by . . . April 21, 2020[.]” Mot. TRO at 7. None of these documents clarifies 

whether the number 35 or 36 voters includes all the named voter plaintiffs. 

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 The only voter on this list to have submitted a declaration in support of the TRO6

is Valdomero Lopez, who says he “did not receive notice by mail that there was a deficiency in 

[his] signature” and “never received a phone call from the San Joaquin County Registrar’s Office 

advising [him] of any extension of time granted by the Governor of California to cure [his] vote.” 

Reply, Ex. 7 (Lopez Decl.) ¶¶ 5, 7, ECF No. 16-7. Moreover, Mr. Lopez explains with the 

backdrop of COVID-19 he “would not have gone to the Registrar’s office because of potential 

exposure” and he wanted to prevent “bringing it home to his wife who is [suffering from 

cancer.]” Id. ¶ 6. 

 During the recount, on April 23, 2020, Ms. Fugazi spoke with the Registrar. 

While Ms. Fugazi does not quote the Registrar directly, she says the Registrar told her that her 

“staff [had] identified issues with signature sheets for vote by mail ballots” but “it was now too 

late to send out mail curing notices and affidavits to voters, so staff made calls.” Fugazi Decl. 

¶ 1. Fugazi says the Registrar said she was “not sure” if logs were kept of staff calls to voters in 

an attempt to cure vote by mail signature issues. Id. In their declarations, two other recount 

observers also paraphrase a conversation in which they assert the Registrar said, in substance, 

“there was not enough time to write all voters that needed to cure deficiency in vote by mail 

signatures and in some instances . . . the Registrar’s staff phoned said voters instead.” Reply, Ex. 

2 (Reiman-Estes Decl.) ¶¶ 4–8, ECF No. 16–2; id., Ex. 3 (Estes Decl.) ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 16-3. In 

surreply, the Registrar states she does not recall making such a comment and counters “to the 

extent that such a statement was in fact made, it was off-the-cuff and inaccurate as it relates to 

sending Cure Letters to voters.” Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13. 

 On May 15, 2020, while the recount continued, the Registrar discovered that 21 

voted ballots had been placed in boxes for unused ballots after the polls had closed on election 

day. Reply at 8. On May 18, 2020, six weeks after certification, the Registrar decided to accept 

and tabulate these 21 newly discovered ballots. Id. Registrar does not explain why she opted to 

count these ballots. 

6

 To be clear, only one other voter submitted a declaration that does not affect the court’s 

decision here, for additional reasons described below. See note 8 infra. 

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B. Procedural History7

On May 12, 2020, plaintiffs filed their complaint against defendants Alex Padilla, 

Secretary of State for the State of California, and Melinda Dubroff, San Joaquin County Registrar 

of Voters. Both are sued in their official capacity only. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8. The court has granted 

Kathy Miller’s request to be joined as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

19(a)(2). See Order, ECF No. 22. 

Plaintiffs make the following claims: (1) violations of the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; (2) violation of the Voting Rights Act; (3) violation of 

procedural and substantive due process; and (4) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

See generally Compl. Plaintiffs ask the court to order the San Joaquin County Registrar of Voters 

to immediately count the thirty-five voters in California Assembly District 13 of San Joaquin 

County that voted “before 5:00 p.m. on April 21, 2020,” Compl. at 25 (prayer for relief), and to 

order fair, reasonable and constitutionally sufficient procedures in future 2020 elections to allow 

plaintiffs and others to safely participate in those elections without concerns over COVID-19. Id. 

On May 13, 2020, citing urgent circumstances, plaintiffs moved the court to 

temporarily restrain the Registrar from completing the recount requested by Ms. Fugazi without 

counting the vote-by-mail voter verifications and signatures that plaintiffs and all other voters 

submitted by April 21, 2020. See generally Mot. TRO. Defendants opposed the motion, ECF 

Nos. 8–10, and plaintiffs replied, ECF No. 16. On May 19, 2020, the court held a telephonic 

hearing on the motion, ECF No. 21. As allowed by the court, Melinda Dubroff filed a surreply, 

ECF No. 23. 

7

 On April 27, 2020, Ms. Fugazi alone filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and 

application for temporary restraining order against the same defendants in the San Joaquin 

County Superior Court, alleging state election law violations. Miller Req. for Judicial Not., Exs. 

A–B (San Joaquin Superior Court Docs.), ECF No. 12, at 4–39. That court denied plaintiffs’ 

TRO application. Id., Ex. D (May 6, 2020 Sup. Ct. Min. Order) at 46. The voter plaintiffs are not 

a party to the ongoing state case. Reply at 11. The California Secretary of State also is not a 

party to the state court filing. Id. 

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Plaintiffs’ TRO application, on its face, is not a model of clarity in identifying the 

federal basis on which the motion is brought. As discussed further below, defendant Dubroff 

fairly questions in her surreply whether the motion is based on more than alleged violations of 

state law not cognizable in this federal court. Although plaintiffs assert at one point the “mere 

fact that the Registrar chose to mail some individuals notice of her rejection of ballots and their 

right to cure, and to contact others by telephone, claiming she did not have time to mail them their 

notices prior to the rushed certification date, constitutes unequal protection,” they do so under a 

heading referencing the “State Constitution.” Mot. TRO at 15. By their reply, plaintiffs bring a 

bit more focus to the federal nature of their request here, referencing the federal claims made in 

their complaint and arguing that this action is “about failed processes that the San Joaquin County 

Registrar utilized in giving voter plaintiffs an opportunity to cure their votes that were cast in the 

Presidential Primary Election.” Reply at 2. Argument at hearing clarified the motion is best 

construed as based on the third claim in the complaint, and specifically alleged violations of 

procedural due process rights. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing “that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 

in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The analysis for temporary restraining orders and 

preliminary injunctions is “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 

Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy, never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 

(2008). In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts must consider whether 

the moving party (1) “is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) is “likely to suffer irreparable harm 

in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and (4) “an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. The moving party has the burden of proving this 

extraordinary remedy is warranted by clear and convincing evidence. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

520 U.S. 958, 972 (1997) (“And what is at issue here is not even a defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment, but a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, as to which the 

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requirement for substantial proof is much higher.”); see also Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 

Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442 (1974). Although these “shorthand formulations” regarding 

plaintiff’s burden of persuasion “aptly express the courts’ general reluctance to impose an interim 

restraint on defendant before the parties’ rights have been adjudicated, they do not take the place 

of a sound evaluation of the factors relevant to granting relief under Rule 65(a).” 11A Charles 

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948 (2d 

ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted). 

 The Ninth Circuit sometimes employs an alternate formulation of the Winter test, 

referred to as the “serious questions” test. Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 

2012). “A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious 

questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips strongly in the 

plaintiff’s favor.’” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 986–87 (9th 

Cir. 2008)). Under the “serious questions” approach to a preliminary injunction, the court may 

use a “sliding scale” where “[t]he elements of the preliminary injunction test must be balanced, so 

that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Lopez v. 

Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). Winter was decided after the initial articulation of 

the “serious questions” test but does not overrule it. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135. The “serious 

questions” test must be applied in conjunction with review of the other two Winter factors, 

likelihood of irreparable injury and whether the injunction is in the public interest. Id. 

III. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 

“The first factor under Winter is the most important . . . [b]ecause . . . when a 

plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, [the court] need not consider 

the remaining three [Winter elements].” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 

2015) (last alteration in original) (quotations marks and citations omitted). As explained below, 

the court finds plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden under the first prong of the Winter test, 

including by raising serious questions, so as to warrant the extraordinary relief of a temporary 

restraining order; the court thus does not reach the three other prongs of the Winter test. 

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A. Parties’ Arguments 

Plaintiffs effectively contend, as clarified by their factual arguments at hearing, 

that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their procedural due process claim on the grounds 

that the Registrar failed to provide voters with adequate notice of the need to cure their ballots, 

under the circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, before she certified the election 

as required by the California Elections Code. Mot. TRO at 9–10; Reply at 2. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

concedes Executive Order N-34-20 does not require county elections officials to extend their 

“canvass-related deadlines” by the full 21 days allowed, but rather is permissive. Counsel, 

however, argued at hearing that the Secretary of State’s Memorandum providing the actual dates 

of the new deadlines is mandatory. But the plain language of the Memorandum undermines this 

argument; the Memorandum itself simply extends all deadlines associated with the official 

canvass for “elections officials and the Secretary of State.” See Sec’y of State’s Mem. No. 20068 

at 22–23. Rather, the true gist of plaintiffs’ argument appears to be that the disruption caused by 

the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic by early March 2020 impaired the voter plaintiffs’ ability to 

review and follow through on any notice the Registrar provided of their right to cure signature 

problems with their ballots, such that they should have been given more time to cure. See Reply 

at 4–5. Moreover, for those voters who were able to review the notice, plaintiffs argue the notice 

itself was deficient because it did not provide the actual date the Registrar planned to certify the 

election results; rather it only instructed “[t]he signature verification statement must be received 

by the elections official of the county where you are registered to vote no later than 5 p.m. two 

days prior to certification of the election.” Cal. Elec. Code § 3019(d)(2); see also Dubroff Decl., 

Ex. 1 (Unsigned Ballot Envelope Letter & Signature Verification Letter), ECF No. 11-1, at 1–4. 

Voters who went to the Registrar’s website could not have found additional information to clarify 

the date by which they had to cure, as the website did not post the date for certification; rather it 

displayed only an old notice to cure for a past election in 2018. Compl. ¶ 20. Finally, plaintiffs 

suggest that the experience of one voter in particular, Valdomero Lopez, signals the potential for 

broader systemic problems with the Registrar’s provision of notice during the relevant time 

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period: Mr. Lopez avers he did not receive a mailed notice nor did he receive a phone call from 

the Registrar. Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7.8 

Defendants argue plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits because from 

February 15, 2020, through March 18, 2020, Registrar Dubroff’s office provided 1,585 voters 

with notice of the opportunity to cure defects in their signatures in accordance with California 

Elections Code section 3019(d)(1). Dubroff Opp’n at 9; see Dubroff Decl. ¶ 10; Dubroff Suppl. 

Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6 (correcting previous figures regarding number of voters); see also Notice of Errata 

to Dubroff Suppl. Decl., ECF No. 26 (further corrections). Defendant Dubroff argues “San 

Joaquin County had 31 days to cure their absentee ballots.” Surreply at 11–12. Defendants also 

contend the language of the notice itself complied with state law and provided recipients with all 

of the information they needed to cure the signature issues with their ballots in a timely manner. 

Specifically, the notice provided the correct number to call, which was answered at regular hours 

even after the Registrar’s office closed to the public in light of COVID-19. Dubroff Suppl. Decl. 

¶ 10. If a voter attempted to return documents in person, the Registrar had set up drop-boxes at 

the entrances to the building in which her office was located. See Surreply at 6. The last date 

notices were mailed was March 18, 2020, fifteen days after the election, supporting a conclusion 

voters received the notices within 3 days, by March 21, 2020. See Dubroff Decl. ¶¶ 11–12; 

Surreply at 5 (court can presume Postal Service generally delivers mail within three days). In 

sum, the Registrar posits that with certification on April 5, the last voters to be sent notices had 

ten days to cure, more than the eight required. 

Defendant Dubroff also argues in her surreply that plaintiffs have not identified a 

federal claim as the basis of their motion for a TRO. Surreply at 10. The court addresses this 

argument as a threshold matter below, to clarify the basis for its issuance of this order. 

8

 The court notes plaintiffs also submitted a declaration by Vickie L. Milano. Reply, Ex. 

F (Milano Decl.), ECF No. 16-6; see Voter Log at 53. This declaration does not support 

plaintiff’s motion in light of Ms. Milano’s admitting she received cure notice sent by the 

Registrar, and says only vaguely that she did not have enough time to return it. Id. ¶ 5. Ms. 

Milano is not a named plaintiff in this action. 

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B. Claim Underlying TRO Request 

Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs fail to make any argument or provide 

evidence of any federal claim in their TRO application impliedly invokes the party presentation 

principle addressed recently by the Supreme Court: 

In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party 

presentation. As this Court stated in Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 

(2008), ‘in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal . . . , we 

rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of 

neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’ Id., at 243. In criminal cases, 

departures from the party presentation principle have usually occurred ‘to protect a 

pro se litigant’s rights.’ Id., at 244; see, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 

381–383 (2003) (affirming courts’ authority to recast pro se litigants’ motions to 

‘avoid an unnecessary dismissal’ or ‘inappropriately stringent application of formal 

labeling requirements, or to create a better correspondence between the substance 

of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis’ (citation omitted)). But 

as a general rule, our system ‘is designed around the premise that [parties 

represented by competent counsel] know what is best for them, and are responsible 

for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’ Id., at 386 (Scalia, 

J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 

In short: ‘[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government.’ United 

States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (CA8 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in 

denial of reh’g en banc)). They ‘do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking 

for wrongs to right. [They] wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, 

courts] normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’ Ibid.

 United States v. Sineneng-Smith, No. 19-67, slip op. at 3–4 (U.S. May 7, 2020). 

 In Sineneng-Smith, the criminal defendant argued in the trial court the case against 

her should be dismissed based on her First Amendment rights of free speech and petition. Id. at 

3. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit solicited briefs from three amici on a First Amendment 

overbreadth argument not briefed in the trial court and ultimately adopted the amici’s arguments 

in concluding the federal statute at issue was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. The Supreme 

Court held the appeals panel had committed an abuse of discretion, as the overbreadth argument 

on which the case was decided had not been presented by a party to the suit. Id. 

 Unlike in Sineneng-Smith, plaintiffs here put the defendants on notice of their 

federal claims in their complaint and have argued at least a colorable question of procedural due 

process in their moving papers as clarified in reply and at hearing. Although the court agrees 

with defendants that the elements of a federal constitutional violation are not spelled out as 

clearly in the moving papers as they could be, it does not require any particular deductive leap 

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from plaintiffs’ factual arguments and evidence to understand the federal due process claim on 

which they rely, however inartfully. “A court is not hide-bound by the precise arguments of 

counsel,” id. at 8, and the court finds the principle of party presentation is satisfied at least as to 

that claim.

9

 Id. (citing Cal. Elec. Code § 3019(d)(2)). 

 The court also notes that election cases of the type plaintiffs attempt to bring 

typically turn on substantive due process claims. See, e.g., Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 

1224 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing substantive due process claim related to election procedure), as 

amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (June 23, 1998); Wilkins v. Cty. of Alameda, 571 

F. App'x 621, 623 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (characterizing plaintiffs potential substantive due process 

claim as “coextensive” with his “right-to-vote claim”). But plaintiffs’ pleading of their due 

process claim, while including the word “substantive” in the label, does not incorporate language 

to suggest a substantive due process claim is actually asserted. And plaintiffs have made no effort 

to argue, legally or factually, that the elements of a substantive due process claim are met here 

and so the court finds such a claim not fairly presented at this time. 

C. Elements of Procedural Due Process Claim 

Consistent with the observations made above, plaintiffs plead in their complaint 

that, “[u]nder the law of the Ninth Circuit, a 42 U.S. Code § 1983 claim alleging a procedural due 

process denial requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest; (2) a state action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process.” Compl. ¶ 91; see 

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (§ 1983 claim requires state 

action and procedural due process violation requires “(1) a protectible liberty or property interest 

. . . and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections”). 

9

 Plaintiffs do not challenge California Elections Code section 3019’s requirement that 

election officials notify voters of the right to cure “no later than 5 p.m. two days prior to 

certification of the election,” Cal. Elec. Code § 3019(d)(1), without a corresponding requirement 

to provide the actual date of anticipated certification, see also id. § 3019(d)(2) (prescribed form, 

which does not call for specific date to be plugged in, and which Registrar’s notice language 

tracks exactly). Because plaintiffs have not presented such a claim to the court, any remedy to a 

flaw in the statutory language is for the California Legislature to consider. 

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“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which 

deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 

The right to vote is a constitutionally protected right. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) 

(“Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to 

vote, in state as well as in federal elections.”); see also Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 705 

(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that one substantive guarantee of due process clause is “the right to be 

free from the purposeful decision of state officials to deny the citizens of a state the right to vote 

in an election mandated by law”); Samuel v. Virgin Islands Joint Bd. of Elections, No. 2012-0094, 

2013 WL 842946, at *5 n.2 (D.V.I. Mar. 7, 2013) (“[t]he right to vote—to the extent it exists and 

an individual has been deprived of it—is certainly a protected liberty interest” (citation omitted)). 

Where “plaintiffs have alleged that they were deprived of a constitutionallyprotected [liberty or] property interest as a result of state action, due process is implicated and the 

question becomes what process is due.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 

2003). To answer this question, the Supreme Court has directed courts to consider three factors: 

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

requirement would entail. 

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Compl. ¶ 93. 

D. Analysis 

The crux of plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim is that, “[h]aving created an 

absentee voter regime through which qualified voters can exercise their fundamental right to vote, 

the State must now provide absentee voters with constitutionally adequate due process 

protection” before refusing to count an absentee ballot with a signature issue. Compl. ¶ 92. As 

explained below, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing serious questions or a likelihood 

of success on the merits of this claim, because they have not shown they satisfy by clear and 

convincing evidence the second factor articulated in Mathews, namely the “risk of an erroneous 

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deprivation” of their interest in having their votes counted. Specifically here, plaintiffs have not 

shown the Registrar provided constitutionally inadequate procedures to cure their ballot 

signatures. See Lemons v. Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiffs’ 

procedural due process claim based on county’s rejection of unverifiable referendum signatures 

without allowing an opportunity to cure signatures, finding “the state’s important interests justify 

the minimal burden on plaintiffs’ right[]” to vote). 

First, the court notes that plaintiffs’ allegations and arguments appear to raise some 

fair questions regarding the clarity and adequacy of the notice provided to voters whose vote-bymail ballots raised signature issues that required curing. The letter the Registrar sent to these 

voters to notify them of the need to cure instructs them to deliver a signature verification 

statement in person to the Registrar’s office, or by mail, fax or email “no later than . . . two days 

prior to the certification of the election,” without providing a date of certification for reference 

anywhere on the letter. See Unsigned Ballot Envelope Letter at 1–4. This wording effectively 

meant that, without additional investigation from the voter, no due date was obvious by which he 

or she needed to send in the necessary information to cure a challenged ballot. Voters could not 

necessarily visit the Registrar’s physical office, as it was closed to the public starting either 

March 23 or April 1, 2020, due to the County’s shelter-in-place order during the coronavirus 

pandemic. See Fugazi Decl. ¶ 1 (March 23, 2020); Suppl. Dubroff Decl. ¶ 10 (April 1, 2020). 

Perhaps most troubling, if a voter were to have visited the Registrar’s website for clarification, 

that voter would have found only a notice from a prior election, displaying the past date of 

November 25, 2018, as the deadline by which voters could submit their cure forms. Compl. ¶ 20. 

During an election cycle disrupted by pandemic, potentially heightening the importance of being 

able to vote by mail where that option is available under state law, the lack of attention to the kind 

of meaningful detail voters might be looking for could raise a red flag if supported by meaningful 

evidentiary detail. 

At the same time, however, on this record the court cannot find a likelihood that 

the failure to provide a clear due date in writing or on the website deprived plaintiff voters of 

procedural due process, as the Registrar here has submitted evidence showing voters were able to 

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phone the Registrar’s office at the number provided on the cure notice during all times when the 

office doors were closed to the public. Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10 (Registrar’s staff assigned to 

answer telephone calls, emails and faxes after April 1, 2020); id., Ex. B, ECF No. 24-2 

(Registrar’s notice explaining “essential services” available by phone during San Joaquin 

County’s pandemic-related shutdown). Plaintiffs provide no evidence to suggest voters tried to 

call the Registrar’s office and got no answer, or that voters called the office and received incorrect 

information about the date by which they needed to return the necessary documents to cure their 

ballots’ signature issues. Moreover, plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence showing any of 

the named plaintiffs were unable to cure their ballots by two days prior to certification as a result 

of the lack of clarity in the notice, and if so why. Plaintiffs have not shown “the risk of an 

erroneous deprivation of [plaintiffs’] interest through the procedures used,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 

335, was high enough to warrant additional safeguards here. Cf. Lemons, 538 F.3d at 1104. 

Second, plaintiffs present evidence that at least one voter may not have received 

any notice at all that his ballot required curing, at least not until the recount was underway. 

Lopez Decl. ¶ 5 (“I did not receive notice by mail that there was a deficiency in my signature.”). 

The Registrar says her office did mail notices to every voter whose ballot was challenged, 

providing her own declaration generally verifying that notices were mailed, and pointing to a log 

of the 1,585 voters sent the notices. Suppl. Dubroff Decl. ¶ 13; Voter Log at 46. The Registrar 

takes the position that the evidence she has provided raises the presumption that Mr. Lopez 

received the mailing, and that it is fair to assume he received it three days after her mailing. 

Surreply at 7. But the Registrar’s evidence does not satisfy the requirements for the presumption 

to kick in here. See, e.g., Lynch v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1165 

(D. Idaho 2018) (finding testimony of organizational officer in charge of mailroom competent 

evidence for mailroom’s customary practice, but inadmissible to show specific piece of mail was 

sent for lack of personal knowledge). The court thus considers Mr. Lopez’s declaration as 

evidence of his nonreceipt of the notice, absent the presumption of receipt. 

The Registrar also says she arranged for staff in her office to make phone calls to 

voters who were sent cure notices and did not return them, going beyond what state law requires 

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of her. Dubroff Decl. ¶ 11. Mr. Lopez says he also did not receive a call from anyone about an 

opportunity to cure his ballot. Lopez Decl. ¶ 7. A Registrar’s Office staff member who made 

these phone calls has provided a declaration saying she made calls between March 16 and March 

27, describing the statements she made on the calls, and noting that she “carefully maintained” a 

handwritten record of her calls on her own copy of the log. Magathen Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 25. 

Her copy of the report with her notes, however, “was not retained.” Id. As noted above, 

plaintiffs submit evidence suggesting the Registrar admitted in a discussion with Ms. Fugazi that 

“it was now too late to send out mail curing notices and affidavits to voters, so staff made calls,” 

Fugazi Decl. ¶ 1; see also Reply, Ex. 8 (Sawyer Decl.) ¶ 6; Reiman-Estes Decl., ¶¶ 4–8; Estes 

Decl., ¶¶ 4–5. The Registrar’s staff member who made the calls does not say she called only the 

subset of voters who were mailed notices and had not returned those notices by the date of her 

call; rather she says she placed calls to “the subset of voters that had returned vote-by-mail ballots 

[] that had deficiencies related to the identification envelopes, such as no signature or a 

mismatched signature, that resulted in their [] ballots being disqualified.” Magathen Decl. ¶¶ 2–3. 

Given that the Registrar’s staff member made calls starting on March 16, before the Registrar 

says the last notices were mailed on March 18, Dubroff Decl. ¶ 10, there may be something to 

plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Registrar said she was running out of time, although the Registrar 

says she does not recall saying what plaintiff Fugazi heard. Dubroff Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13. The court 

need not resolve any credibility contest raised by the declarations on this point at this stage, 

however. Even if due process required phone calls under the circumstances, a proposition for 

which plaintiff offers no supporting authority, plaintiffs provide only the single, unadorned Lopez 

declaration saying he received neither a mailed notice nor a call. This lone declaration is not 

sufficient to raise a serious question and, in the context of the current record, suggests only a 

“garden variety” state election irregularity, the type of “mistake” that typically does not rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation, as opposed to the kind of systemic flaw plaintiffs believe is 

exposed by the Registrar’s practices, constituting “a pervasive error that undermines the integrity 

of the vote,” Bennett, 140 F.3d 1226–27. Even if plaintiffs might ultimately be able to 

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demonstrate more widespread problems of a constitutional nature, they have not done so at this 

time. 

In sum, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing by clear and convincing 

evidence they are likely to succeed on their claim that Registrar Dubroff violated their procedural 

due process rights by failing to provide voters with adequate notice prior to certifying the election 

results. The first and most important prong of the Winter test is not satisfied, and the court need 

not reach the other prongs. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 4, is DENIED 

without prejudice to the filing of a motion for a preliminary injunction and seeking in connection 

with any such motion expedited discovery. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 22, 2020. 

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