Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07095/USCOURTS-ca10-91-07095-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dexter E. Pickens
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILL D 

United St.ates C.otart of Appeale Tenth Circuit 

APR 2 0 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No . 91-7095 

v . 

DEXTER E . PICKENS, 

Defendant-Appellant . 

(D.C. No. CR-91-006-04-S ) 

(E. Di st. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and KELLY,** District 

Judge. 

Dexter E. Pickens appeals from a conviction for conspiracy to 

violate the drug laws. 1 Mr. Pickens argues that the trial court 

committed two errors requiring reversal of his conviction: 

failure to grant a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct, 

and the admission of evidence of prior crimes without the 

requisite showing under Fed. R. Evid . 404(b). Mr. Pickens further 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case , 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

** The Honorable Patrick F. Kelly, United States District Judge for 

the Distri ct of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

1 The indictment alleges that Mr. Pickens conspired to 

distribute cocaine, to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 

and to use a communication facility to facilitate the commission 

of the se offenses. 

Appellate Case: 91-7095 Document: 010110212790 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 1 
contends that the trial court committed error in setting his 

sentence. We find no error in the proceedings below requiring 

reversal and therefore affirm. 

Mr . Pickens argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain 

his conviction for conspiracy. We review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government to determine whether the 

evidence is substantial enough to establish guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1429 

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986) . Although 

Mr. Pickens was acquitted of the substantive offenses underlying 

the conspiracy, this does not preclude a conviction for 

conspiracy. See United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th 

Cir. 1992 ) (en bane}. In considering all of the evidence 

presented against Mr. Pickens, including evidence of the counts 

from which he was acquitted, we believe there is substantial 

evidence to sustain his conspiracy conviction. 

Mr . Pickens next argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to grant a mistrial based upon prosecutorial 

misconduct. This issue was fully considered in the case of one of 

Mr. Pickens' co-defendants, United States v. Williams, No. 91-7094 

(10th Cir., April 19, 1993) . In that case, we held that t he 

alleged misconduct was rendered harmless by the trial court's 

instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence. Therefore, t he 

trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial. 

Mr. Pickens' third argument concerns the testimony of Wanetta 

Lee in which she stated that she purchased cocaine from Dexter 

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Appellate Case: 91-7095 Document: 010110212790 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 2 
Pickens in the past. Mr. Pickens contends that the trial court 

erred in admitting Ms. Lee's testimony because the court did not 

make the necessary findings under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) . The 

Government argues that the drug transactions Ms. Lee spoke of took 

place within the time frame of the conspiracy and therefore are 

not "other crimes" within the meaning of Rule 404(b). 

Ms. Lee testified that she began using drugs in 1988, rec., 

vol. VI, at 3 . 571, and that when she began using drugs, she 

"bought them from Dexter a couple of times." Id. The exact time 

in 1988 of the purchases from Dexter Pickens is uncertain. The 

indictment charges a conspiracy starting "on or about the summer 

of 1988." Rec., vol. I, doc. 1, at 11. While the "on or about" 

language allows courts to consider events which occurred prior to 

the date stated in the indictment, United States v. Young, 862 

F.2d 815, 818-19 (10th Cir. 1989), we decline the Government's 

invitation to consider events which have taken place as much as 

six months before the stated beginning of the conspiracy. 

Therefore, Ms. Lee's testimony concerns events which are "other 

crimes," and must be analyzed under Rule 404(b). 

We review the trial court's admission of evidence for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 

1988). Rule 404(b) allows the admission of "other crimes" so long 

as such testimony is admitted for a proper purpose. 2 Huddleston 

2 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

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Appellate Case: 91-7095 Document: 010110212790 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 3 
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988 ) . The government argues 

that Ms. Lee's testimony was offered to show motive and intent. 

Mr. Pickens' attorney argued in his opening statement that Mr. 

Pickens was a mere drug user and not a drug dealer. Thus, it was 

proper to admit Ms. Lee's testimony in order to rebut Mr. Pickens' 

defense and prove motive or intent. 

Mr. Pickens points out that the trial court did not make 

findings as to the purpose or basis for the admission of Ms. Lee's 

testimony. This failure is harmless if "the purpose for admitting 

the other acts testimony is apparent from the record, and the 

district court's decision to admit was correct." United States v. 

Orr, 864 F . 2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1988). We believe the record 

clearly demonstrates the purpose for the admission of Ms. Lee's 

testimony, and that such admission was not unfairly prejudicial to 

Mr. Pickens. Therefore, we hold that the trial judge did not 

abuse his discretion in admitting Ms. Lee's testimony. 

Finally, Mr. Pickens argues that the trial court erroneously 

considered charges from which he was acquitted and a quantity of 

drugs not reasonably foreseeable in setting his sentence. Mr. 

Pickens was sentenced to 168 months based on 494.6 grams of 

cocaine base. In sentencing a defendant for conspiracy, the base 

level offense is determined by the conduct of the defendant and 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

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conduct "for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable." 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1) (1991). Conduct for which a defendant is 

otherwise accountable includes "conduct of others in furtherance 

of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity that 

was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, 

comment n.1 (1991 ) . Mr. Pickens argues that the scope of the 

conspiracy was not reasonably foreseeable to him and thus he 

should not have been sentenced for 494.6 grams. 

We review the trial court's factual findings under the 

clearly erroneous standard, United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 

1466, 1475 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 143 (1991), 

giving due deference to a sentencing judge's application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines to the facts. United States v. Coleman, 947 

F.2d 1424, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1590 

(1992); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988). The sentencing judge 

specifically found that "Dexter Pickens had a reasonably 

foreseeable knowledge of the purpose and scope of the drug sale 

activity engaged in with defendants Eddie Williams and Johnnie 

Pickens." Rec., vol. VIII, at 115. In making this determination, 

the court relied upon information contained in counts of which Mr. 

Pickens was acquitted . Use of information from counts of 

acquittal is proper, Coleman, 947 F.2d 1428-29, provided that such 

factual determinations are supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th 

Cir. 1990) , cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2066 (1991). The district 

c ourt found that the reliability of the information contained in 

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the counts of acquittal "has been established by a preponderance 

of the evidence." Rec., vol. VIII, at 113. Reviewing the record 

and the sentencing judge's explicit findings, we cannot say that 

the factual determinations underlying Mr. Pickens' sentence are 

clearly erroneous. 

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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