Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01420/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01420-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Berry Plastics Corporation
Cross-Appellant
Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM HOLDINGS, 

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BERRY PLASTICS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1420, 2015-1477

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Tennessee in No. 2:12-cv-02108-WGYcgc, Judge William G. Young (by designation). 

______________________ 

Decided: August 4, 2016 

______________________ 

MELISSA HUNTER SMITH, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, 

Nashville, TN, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JOEL T. BERES, Louisville, KY. 

MARK A. HAGEDORN, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Chicago, IL, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also 

represented by ELIZABETH A. PETERS, JONATHAN PAUL 

FROEMEL. 

______________________ 

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2 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

Before DYK, PLAGER, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge 

TARANTO. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. (“Multilayer”) brought suit against Berry Plastics Corp. (“Berry”), alleging infringement of at least claim 1 of U.S. 

Patent No. 6,265,055 (“the ’055 patent”), which relates to 

multilayered plastic cling wrap films. The district court 

construed the claims of the ’055 patent as not covering 

(i.e., closed to) blends of the four resins expressly recited 

by those claims or unlisted resins, instead requiring that 

each of five inner layers within the film be composed of 

only one of the listed resins. Multilayer Stretch Cling 

Film Holdings, Inc. v. Inteplast Grp. Ltd. (“Multilayer v. 

Inteplast”), No. 2:12-cv-2107, 2013 WL 5972195, at *27

(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2013) (claim construction order). The 

court subsequently granted Berry’s motion for summary 

judgment of non-infringement based on its claim construction. Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. 

Berry Plastics Corp. (“Multilayer v. Berry”), 63 F. Supp. 3d 

786, 795 (W.D. Tenn. 2014). The district court also invalidated claim 10 of the ’055 patent under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112(d). Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at 

*39–40. The district court denied Berry’s request for 

sanctions against Multilayer under Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). 

We hold that the district court erred in one aspect of

its claim construction, and we reverse in part its construction of claims 1 and 28. We vacate the court’s summary 

judgment of non-infringement, which was predicated on 

this aspect of its claim construction, and remand for 

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further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

affirm the district court’s conclusion that claim 10 of the 

’055 patent is invalid and the court’s decision not to 

impose sanctions against Multilayer under Rule 11. 

BACKGROUND

Multilayer’s ’055 patent claims multilayered thermoplastic stretch wrap films. In the words of the patent, 

“[t]he present invention relates to multi-layer stretch 

cling films having at least seven individual layers in the 

film composition offering acceptable cling performance, 

good balance of strength and good elongation properties.” 

’055 patent col. 1 ll. 5–8. Such stretch films cling to 

themselves and can be used to securely wrap boxes, 

furniture, and other items. The plastic films of the ’055 

patent are distinguished by their structure: the films 

contain two outer layers and at least five inner layers, 

each of which is compositionally distinct from its immediate neighbors. According to the patent, the outer layers 

contribute “moderate to high controlled cling,” and the 

inner layers “assist in producing mechanical strength and 

stretchability.” Id. col. 1 ll. 55–58.

The ’055 patent underwent three rounds of ex parte

reexamination by the United States Patent & Trademark 

Office (“PTO”), during which its claims were amended. 

Claim 1 is the broadest claim; as amended, it recites,

1. A multi-layer, thermoplastic stretch wrap film 

containing seven separately identifiable polymeric 

layers, comprising:

(a) two identifiable outer layers, at least one of 

which having a cling performance of at least 100 

grams/inch, said outer layer being selected from 

the group consisting of linear low density polyethylene, very low density polyethylene, and ultra 

low density polyethylene resins, said resins being 

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homopolymers, copolymers, or terpolymers, of 

ethylene and alpha-olefins; and

(b) five identifiable inner layers, with each layer 

being selected from the group consisting of linear 

low density polyethylene, very low density polyethylene, ultra low density polyethylene, and metallocene-catalyzed linear low density 

polyethylene resins; said resins are homopolymers, copolymers, or terpolymers, of ethylene and 

C3 to C20 alpha-olefins;

wherein each of said two outer layers and each of 

said five inner layers have different compositional 

properties when compared to a neighboring layer.

U.S. 6,265,055 C2 col. 1 l. 43–col. 2 l. 3 (as corrected by 

the Certificate of Correction of July 14, 2009). 

Most of the language of claim 1 describes the multiple

layers of the film and the various types of polymeric 

“resins”—plastics prepared by polymerization of one or 

more olefin compounds—that are suitable for use in 

preparing those layers. Claim 1 describes outer layers 

that contain linear low density polyethylene (“LLDPE”), 

very low density polyethylene (“VLDPE”), or ultra low 

density polyethylene (“ULDPE”) resins and inner layers 

that contain these three resins or a fourth resin, metallocene-catalyzed linear low density polyethylene 

(“mLLDPE”).

Claim 28 is the only other independent claim of the 

’055 patent. Like claim 1, claim 28 recites a plastic film 

that contains at least seven layers, but claim 28 further 

specifies that at least one of the inner layers must comprise an mLLDPE resin: 

28. A multi-layer, thermoplastic stretch wrap film 

containing seven polymeric layers, comprising: 

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(a) two outer layers, at least one of which having a 

cling performance of at least 100 grams/inch, said 

outer layer being selected from the group consisting of linear low density polyethylene, very low 

density polyethylene, and ultra low density polyethylene resins, said resins being homopolymers, 

copolymers, or terpolymers, of ethylene and alphaolefins; and 

(b) five inner layers, with each layer being selected from the group consisting of linear low density 

polyethylene, very low density polyethylene, ultra 

low density polyethylene, and metallocenecatalyzed linear low density polyethylene resins; 

said resins being homopolymers, copolymers, or 

terpolymers, of ethylene and C3 to C20 alphaolefins,

wherein at least one of said inner layers comprises 

a metallocene catalyzed linear low density polyethylene resin with a melt index of 0.5 to 3 dg/min 

and a melt index ratio of 16 to 80; and wherein 

each of said two outer layers and each of said five 

inner layers have different compositional properties when compared to a neighboring layer.

U.S. 6,265,055 C2 col. 2 ll. 4–27. 

In 2012, Multilayer sued Berry in the U.S. District 

Court for the Western District of Tennessee for infringement of the ’055 patent. Multilayer’s complaint accused

various plastic stretch films manufactured by Berry of 

infringing at least claim 1. The district court issued its

claim construction order on November 8, 2013. Multilayer 

v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195. While the court formally 

construed thirteen claim terms, only three are relevant to 

this appeal. The first relevant claim term is a part of 

element (b) of claims 1 and 28, which the court construed

as follows:

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Disputed part of element (b) of claims 1 and

28:

District court’s construction:

five [identifiable]1 inner 

layers, with each layer 

being selected from the 

group consisting of linear 

low density polyethylene

[(LLDPE)], very low density polyethylene [(VLDPE)], 

ultra low density polyethylene [(ULDPE)], and 

metallocene-catalyzed 

linear low density polyethylene [(mLLDPE)] resins

each of five identifiable 

inner layers must contain 

only one class of the following resins, and no other 

resin(s): linear low density 

polyethylene [(LLDPE)] 

resins, very low density 

polyethylene [(VLDPE)] 

resins, ultra low density 

polyethylene [(ULDPE)]

resins, or metallocenecatalyzed linear low density 

polyethylene [(mLLDPE)]

resins

Multilayer v. Berry, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 790. Notably, the 

court’s construction of element (b) required that each 

inner layer “must contain only one class of [the listed]

resins, and no other resin(s),” thereby excluding blends of 

more than one type of resin and all unlisted resins. Id. at 

793. 

The second relevant claim term is “linear low density 

polyethylene” (LLDPE), which appears in claims 1 and 28. 

The court construed “linear low density polyethylene” to 

1 The term “identifiable” appears in element (b) of 

claim 1 but not in element (b) of claim 28. Neither party 

argued in the district court, or argues now, that the 

presence of the word “identifiable” in claim 1 affects the 

construction of element (b). See Multilayer v. Berry, 63 F. 

Supp. 3d at 790 n.5. 

 

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mean “a class of copolymers of ethylene and alpha-olefins, 

which are characterized by relatively straight polymer 

chains with short chain branching and little or no long 

chain branching.” Id. at 791 (emphasis omitted). The 

court found that this relatively broad construction of 

LLDPE encompasses the other types of resin recited in 

element (b), namely, very low density polyethylene 

(VLDPE), ultra low density polyethylene (ULDPE), and 

metallocene-catalyzed linear low density polyethylene

(mLLDPE). Id. at 794. However, the court held that 

when a particular resin qualifies as an mLLDPE, mixture 

of that resin with non-metallocene-catalyzed LLDPE 

creates a blend. “The fact that a resin can be described as 

both an mLLDPE resin and also as a broader LLDPE 

resin does not mean that the combination, in an inner 

layer of a stretch film, of an mLLDPE resin and a LLDPE 

resin catalyzed using an agent other than metallocene 

does not constitute a prohibited blend.” Id. 

The third relevant claim term is “low density polyethylene homopolymers” (“LDPE”), a resin not listed in 

element (b). The district court construed this term to 

mean “a class of polymer formed entirely of ethylene 

monomers, the polymer chains being characterized by a 

branched polymer backbone consisting of short-chain 

branches and long-chain branches.” Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *40. The ’055 patent itself 

differentiates “low density polyethylene (LDPE)” from 

“linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE).” ’055 patent 

col. 1 ll. 60–61 (emphasis added). The court held that “a 

distinction between LLDPE and LDPE is necessary,” 

given that “[t]he patent itself uses the terms LLDPE and 

LDPE separately.” Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 

5972195, at *29. 

In its claim construction order, the district court held 

that dependent claim 10 is invalid under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112(d). Id. at *39–40. Claim 10 depends from claim 1 

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and further requires that “at least one said inner layer 

comprises low density polyethylene homopolymers.” ’055 

patent col. 10 ll. 14–15. The court found that, because 

LDPE is not listed in claim 1 and is chemically distinct 

from the four resins that are recited, “Claim 10 attempts 

to improperly broaden the scope of the closed Markush 

Group in element (b) of Claim 1.” Multilayer v. Inteplast, 

2013 WL 5972195, at *39. 

Thereafter, on March 14, 2014, Berry moved for 

summary judgment of non-infringement. Multilayer 

opposed the motion, arguing that summary judgment was 

premature because claim construction and discovery had 

not been completed. The district court granted Berry 

summary judgment of non-infringement on November 7, 

2014. Multilayer v. Berry, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 793. The 

district court concluded that the case was ripe for summary judgment, as “[a]n analysis of the record does not 

evidence any insufficiency in discovery undertaken” and 

“all terms relevant to the instant motion have been construed.” Id. at 792. 

The parties had agreed that “at least one of the inner 

layers of the Accused Films contains blends of resins from 

the classes of mLLDPE, ULDPE, and LLDPE—all classes 

of resins separately specified in claims 1 and 28.” Id. at 

795. The district court consequently held that, as a 

matter of law, the accused Berry films could not infringe 

claims 1 and 28 because those claims had been construed 

as closed to blends of listed resins within the inner layers 

of the film. “[I]t is apparent that the permissibility of 

blends of resins within a film’s inner layer was directly 

considered and rejected during claim construction.” Id. at 

794. “At this juncture, to permit blends would impermissibly require the Court to ignore the specific limitations of 

the ’055 Patent . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

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On December 5, 2014, Berry moved for sanctions 

against Multilayer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, arguing that 

Multilayer’s infringement case relied on frivolous claim 

constructions and that Multilayer improperly maintained 

its infringement suit after the district court issued its 

claim construction order. The district court denied Berry’s motion for sanctions on January 28, 2015, in a onepage order. Multilayer v. Berry, No. 2:12-cv-02108, ECF 

No. 162.

Multilayer appeals the judgment of non-infringement 

and the invalidation of claim 10, arguing that the district 

court erred in its claim constructions. Berry crossappeals, requesting reversal of the district court’s denial 

of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. See Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, 783 

F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 

788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015). Claim construction is a 

question of law, reviewed de novo, but any extrinsic factfinding by the district court in the course of claim construction is reviewed for clear error. Teva Pharm. USA, 

Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836–37 (2015). 

“[W]hen the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic 

to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along 

with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law, 

and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de 

novo.” Id. at 841; see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, 

LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The

district court’s denial of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 

is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. 

Co., 617 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Cooter & 

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990). 

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I 

We first address element (b) of claims 1 and 28 of the 

’055 patent. The disputed part of element (b) recites, “five 

[identifiable] inner layers, with each layer being selected 

from the group consisting of linear low density polyethylene [(LLDPE)], very low density polyethylene 

[(VLDPE)], ultra low density polyethylene [(ULDPE)], 

and metallocene-catalyzed linear low density polyethylene 

[(mLLDPE)] resins.” U.S. 6,265,055 C2 col. 1 ll. 37–41 (as 

corrected by the Certificate of Correction of July 14, 

2009); id. col. 2 ll. 14–18. The parties agreed in the

district court and agree on appeal that element (b) of 

claims 1 and 28 is written in “Markush” claim format. 

A Markush claim is a particular kind of patent claim

that lists alternative species or elements that can be 

selected as part of the claimed invention. See Abbott 

Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). “‘Markush’ was the name of an applicant 

for patent (Eugene A. Markush) who happened to use in a 

claim a type of definition of a genus or subgenus by enumeration of species . . . .” In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 

719–20 (CCPA 1980). “[T]he name ‘Markush’ became 

attached to a type of claim expression, and that is all it 

connotes.” Id. at 720. Markush claims create a customized “Markush group”—a listed group of species that are 

useful for the purposes of the claim. “Claim drafters often 

use the term ‘group of’ to signal a Markush group. A 

Markush group lists specified alternatives in a patent 

claim, typically in the form: a member selected from the 

group consisting of A, B, and C.” Gillette Co. v. Energizer 

Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see 

also Abbott, 334 F.3d at 1280. “It is generally understood 

that . . . the members of the Markush group . . . are alternatively usable for the purposes of the invention . . . .” In 

re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (CCPA 1977); see also 

Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”)

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§ 803.02 (“Markush-type generic claims . . . recite a plurality of alternatively usable substances or members.”).2 

Here, element (b) creates a Markush group that lists four 

species or types of resin—LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and 

mLLDPE—which are understood to be alternately useable for preparing the inner layers of the claimed film. 

There are two separate issues of claim construction here: 

first, whether the Markush group of element (b) is closed 

to resins other than the listed four, and, second, whether 

the Markush group is closed to blends of the four listed 

resins. 

II

The district court construed element (b) as closed to 

unrecited resins—i.e., types of resin other than LLDPE, 

VLDPE, ULDPE, and mLLDPE. Multilayer v. Berry, 63 

2 No precise linguistic formula is required to create 

a Markush claim. For example, our predecessor court 

held that the claim language “‘selected from spirit soluble 

azo dyes and finely divided pigmenting material,’ sets 

forth a type of Markush group.” Metcalfe v. Hampel, 532 

F.2d 1360, 1362 (CCPA 1976); see also Merck & Co., Inc. 

v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 

1999) (characterizing a claim reciting a “polymer vehicle 

comprising 0–120 mg of a water-soluble polymer selected 

from [a list of six polymers]” as being in “Markush form”). 

Under the PTO’s guidelines for patent examination, 

“[a]lternative expressions are permitted” so long as the 

claim “recites a list of alternatively useable species” with 

no “uncertainty or ambiguity with respect to the question 

of scope or clarity of the claims.” MPEP § 2173.05(h). 

“[T]he phrase ‘Markush claim’ means any claim that 

recites a list of alternatively useable species regardless of 

format.” Id. 

 

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F. Supp. 3d at 790. Multilayer now argues that the 

district court erred and that “[t]he intrinsic evidence 

clearly establishes that the Markush groups in claims 1 

and 28 should be construed as open” to other resins. 

Appellant’s Br. at 23. 

We agree with the district court that the Markush 

group of element (b) must be construed as closed to resins 

other than LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and mLLDPE. To 

construe the inner layers of element (b) as open not only 

to the four recited resins but also to any other polyolefin 

resin conceivably suitable for use in a stretchable plastic

cling film would be to construe the claims to cover any 

plastic film with five compositionally different inner 

layers, each of which contains any amount of one of the 

four recited resins. Construing element (b) in this manner would render the ’055 patent’s Markush language—

“each layer being selected from the group consisting of”—

equivalent to the phrase “each layer comprising one or 

more of.” 

What is critical here is that the transitional phrase

that appears in element (b), “consisting of,” is a term of 

art in patent law with a distinct and well-established 

meaning. Use of the transitional phrase “consisting of” to 

set off a patent claim element creates a very strong presumption that that claim element is “closed” and therefore “exclude[s] any elements, steps, or ingredients not 

specified in the claim.” AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG 

Co., Inc., 239 F.3d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “‘Consisting of’ is a term of patent convention meaning that the 

claimed invention contains only what is expressly set 

forth in the claim.” Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 

F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, if a patent claim 

recites “a member selected from the group consisting of A, 

B, and C,” the “member” is presumed to be closed to 

alternative ingredients D, E, and F. By contrast, the 

alternative transitional term “‘comprising’ creates a 

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presumption that the recited elements are only a part of 

the device, that the claim does not exclude additional, 

unrecited elements.” Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. 

TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348 

(Fed. Cir. 2001).

The presumption that a claim term set off by the 

transitional phrase “consisting of” is closed to unrecited 

elements is at least a century old and has been reaffirmed

many times by our court and other courts.3 We are una3 See, e.g., CIAS, Inc. v. All. Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 

1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“It is . . . well understood in 

patent usage that ‘consisting of’ is closed-ended and 

conveys limitation and exclusion. . . . For patent claims 

the distinction between “comprising” and “consisting” is 

established . . . .”); Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, 

460 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“‘[C]onsisting of’ is a 

term of art in patent law with its own construction . . . .”); 

Norian, 363 F.3d at 1331 (quoted supra); AFG Indus., 239 

F.3d at 1245 (quoted supra); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. 

Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 

2000) (“The phrase ‘consisting of’ is a term of art in patent 

law signifying restriction and exclusion, while, in contrast, the term ‘comprising’ indicates an open-ended 

construction. . . . In simple terms, a drafter uses the 

phrase ‘consisting of’ to mean ‘I claim what follows and 

nothing else.’” (citations omitted)); Georgia-Pacific Corp. 

v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 

1999) (“The transitional phrase ‘consisting of’ excludes 

any element step, or ingredient not specified in the claim.” 

(quoting MPEP § 2111.03)); Parmelee Pharm. Co. v. Zink, 

285 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he word ‘consisting’

is one of restriction and exclusion.”); In re Davis and 

Tuukkanen, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Board of Patent Interferences 1949) (“‘[C]onsisting of’ . . . clos[es] the claim to the 

 

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ware of any case that has construed a patent claim’s use 

of “consisting of” to have the same open meaning as 

“comprising,” and Multilayer points us to none. There 

may be a scenario where a patent’s specification or prosecution history give “consisting of” the meaning of “comprising”; our decision in Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & 

Environmental International noted that “it is not inconceivable that a patentee could break with conventional 

claim construction and become his own lexicographer,” so 

as to give “consisting of” an alternative, less restrictive 

meaning. 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But 

to overcome the exceptionally strong presumption that a 

claim term set off with “consisting of” is closed to unrecited elements, the specification and prosecution history 

must unmistakably manifest an alternative meaning. See 

id. They do not here. 

Multilayer contends that the specification of the ’055 

patent does indeed evince an unmistakable intent to open 

the Markush group of element (b) to unrecited resins. 

Rather than argue that the claimed inner layers should 

inclusion of materials other than those recited except for 

impurities ordinarily associated therewith . . . . We regard 

the meaning of the terms ‘comprising’ and ‘consisting of’ 

to be well settled by numerous decisions . . . .”); In re 

Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 521 (CCPA 1931) (“Claim 4 uses the 

term ‘consists’ and is therefore drawn to an alloy of silver 

and indium without other elements.”); Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. 

Gen. Elec. Co., 212 F. 422, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1913) (“‘Consist’ 

means to stand together, to be composed of or made up of. 

It is a more specific term than [‘comprise’].”), aff’d, 224 F. 

464 (7th Cir. 1915). 

 

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be open to any and all resins,4 Multilayer focuses on one 

resin, low density polyethylene (LDPE), which is specifically mentioned in dependent claims 10, 18, and 19. We 

do not agree that the ’055 patent manifests a clear intent 

to open the Markush group of element (b) to LDPE or to 

any other resin not expressly listed in the claim. 

It is true that several passages of the specification of 

the ’055 patent describe LDPE as a resin suitable for use 

in both inner and outer layers. “The resins used in the 

film composition include . . . low density polyethylene 

(LDPE) . . . .” ’055 patent Abstract; see also id. col. 1. ll. 

58–65. A passage of the Detailed Description describing 

“Inner Layers” of the invention states that “low density 

polyethylene homopolymers (LDPE)” are “[a]lso suitable 

for use in the inner five layers.” ’055 patent col. 4 ll. 53–

55. Two of the three embodiments of multilayered film 

described in the Detailed Description include an inner 

layer of composition “C,” which can contain LDPE blended 

with LLDPE. Id. col. 7 ll. 36–45 & col. 8 ll. 7–12. 

The specification of the ’055 patent also describes several other types of resin as suitable for incorporation into 

the inner layers—polypropylene, medium density polyethylene, and high density polyethylene—which, like 

LDPE, are not recited in the Markush group of element 

(b). “The resins used in the film composition include 

polypropylene (PP), ethylene propylene copolymers, low 

density polyethylene (LDPE), linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE), medium density polyethylene (MDPE), 

high density polyethylene (HDPE), metallocene-catalyzed 

polyethylene (mPE), very low density polyethylene 

(VLDPE), and/or ultralow density polyethylene 

4 Counsel for Multilayer conceded at argument, “I 

don’t believe the layers can be made out of anything.” 

Oral Argument at 1:15–1:18. 

 

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(ULDPE).” Id. Abstract. We do not think that the listing 

of these other resins in the specification is sufficient to 

overcome the presumption created by the “consisting of” 

claim language. 

Multilayer also makes much of the fact that the ’055 

patent includes dependent claims that describe inner 

layers containing LDPE. Multilayer contends that 

“[b]ecause claim 10 includes the additional limitation of 

low density polyethylene in one of said five inner layers, it 

necessarily follows that claim 1 already permits the use of 

low density polyethylene in the inner layers.” Appellant’s 

Reply Br. at 3. Claim 10 recites, in relevant part, “[t]he 

multi-layer, thermoplastic stretch wrap film of claim 1, 

wherein at least one said inner layer comprises low density polyethylene homopolymers.” ’055 patent col. 10 ll. 13–

15. Two additional dependent claims, 18 and 19, also 

describe films with inner layers that contain LDPE. Id.

col. 10 l. 57–col. 11 l. 60. Multilayer argues that recitation of LDPE in dependent claims of the ’055 patent 

should be determinative, citing Ortho-McNeil for the 

canon that a court should “strive[] to reach a claim construction that does not render claim language in dependent claims meaningless.” Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. 

Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

It is true that “[o]ther claims of the patent in question 

. . . can . . . be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the 

meaning of a claim term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). But the language of a dependent claim cannot change the scope of an 

independent claim whose meaning is clear on its face. We 

have held that “[w]hile it is true that dependent claims 

can aid in interpreting the scope of claims from which 

they depend, they are only an aid to interpretation and 

are not conclusive. The dependent claim tail cannot wag 

the independent claim dog.” N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. 

Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also 

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MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 17

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal. Inc., 517 

F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the presumption that an independent claim should be construed 

in view of its dependent claim is rebuttable).5 

We conclude that the specification of the ’055 patent, 

including its dependent claims, is insufficient to overcome 

the very strong presumption, created by the patent’s use 

of the transitional phrase “consisting of,” that the 

Markush group of element (b) is closed to resins other 

than the four recited: LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and 

mLLDPE. Multilayer points to nothing in the prosecution 

history that supports its theory. Here, Multilayer’s use of 

5 Multilayer also cites dependent claim 32 as evidence that the Markush group of claim 1 should be construed as open to unrecited resins. Claim 32, which was 

added in reexamination, recites “[t]he film of claim 1, 

wherein the compositional property is the presence of a 

resin additive.” U.S. 6,265,055 C2 col. 3 ll. 34–35. The 

district court construed “resin additive” to be “a substance 

that by its properties is not typically by itself formed into 

a stretch wrap film layer and that is compounded into a 

resin”—i.e., a non-resin substance. Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *43. Multilayer does not 

contest this construction on appeal. Because claim 32 

merely describes incorporation of a non-resin, it is not 

evidence that claim 1 should be open to incorporation of 

an unrecited resin. See Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1360 (noting 

that “[a]lthough ‘consisting of’ is a term of restriction, the 

restriction is not absolute” and may permit impurities or 

“additional components or steps that are unrelated to the 

invention”); see also Norian, 363 F.3d at 1331 (holding 

that “while ‘consisting of’ limits the claimed invention, it 

does not limit aspects unrelated to the invention”). 

 

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the term of art “consisting of” restricts the scope of its 

claims to the listed resins. 

Disagreeing with the majority’s claim construction as 

requiring a layer formed from the listed resins, the dissent argues that a “layer” is an open-ended physical 

structure “characterized at least by a spatial relationship 

to some other physical element” and that the “layer” does 

not “have to be one or more of the listed species” of resin. 

Dissent at 4. But, to the extent the language of element 

(b) is ambiguous, the district court resolved any ambiguity, construing “layer” to be “a polymer composition within 

the multilayer polymer structure lying over or under

another.” Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at 

*19 (emphasis added). That is, the district construed 

“layer” to be a chemical composition, one consisting of 

resins (polymers) or, optionally, resins combined with 

non-resin additives. “[O]ne skilled in the art would 

understand the patent to teach that layers made from

polymers or layers made from polymers combined with 

additives must be present in each of the seven layers.” Id.

at *19 (emphasis added). The resin (or the resin combined with a non-resin additive) itself is the layer. Multilayer has not appealed this aspect of the district court’s 

claim construction and has repeatedly agreed that the 

claim is in Markush format, requiring a layer “made 

from” the listed resins. See Multilayer’s Responsive 

Claim Construction Brief, Multilayer Stretch Cling Film 

Holdings, Inc. v. MSC Mktg. & Tech., Inc., No. 2:12-cv02112 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 14, 2013), ECF No. 57, at 27–30;

Appellant’s Br. at 27; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8–9; see 

also Oral Argument at 29:57–30:03 (Multilayer’s counsel

stating that “the district court was led to believe this is a 

Markush group because that’s what we’ve argued all 

along”). 

The dissent’s argument was not made by the patentee 

in the district court. Indeed, in the district court MultiCase: 15-1420 Document: 82-2 Page: 18 Filed: 08/04/2016
MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 19

layer proposed that the term “each layer being selected 

from the group consisting of linear low density polyethylene [(LLDPE)], very low density polyethylene 

[(VLDPE)], ultra low density polyethylene [(ULDPE)], 

and metallocene-catalyzed linear low density polyethylene 

[(mLLDPE)] resins” should be construed to mean “made 

from linear low density polyethylene [(LLDPE)], very low 

density polyethylene [(VLDPE)], ultra low density polyethylene [(ULDPE)], metallocene-catalyzed linear low 

density polyethylene resin [(mLLDPE)], or blends thereof.” Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *26 

(emphasis added). That is, Multilayer argued the very 

claim construction that we now adopt.6 Multilayer cannot 

now allege that the layers of element (b) of claims 1 and 

28 do not have to be “made from” the listed resins. See 

Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 715 

(Fed. Cir. 1998); Transclean Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 

474 F.3d 1298, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

The consequence of our construction of element (b) is 

that claim 10 is invalid. Claim 10 recites, in relevant 

part, “[t]he multi-layer, thermoplastic stretch wrap film of 

claim 1, wherein at least one said inner layer comprises 

low density polyethylene homopolymers [(LDPE)].” ’055 

patent col. 10 ll. 13–15. In its opening brief Multilayer 

conceded that LDPE is not encompassed by LLDPE or the 

6 While Multilayer also argued in the district court

that this construction permitted blends that include 

LDPE, see Multilayer’s Responsive Claim Construction 

Brief, Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. 

MSC Mktg. & Tech., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02112 (W.D. Tenn. 

Jan. 14, 2013), ECF No. 57, at 9 n.4, 27–30, the construction, urged by Multilayer itself, is limited to the listed 

resins and “blends thereof,” which by its terms necessarily

excludes unlisted resins such as LDPE. 

 

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20 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

other types of resin recited in element (b). “[T]here can 

be no dispute that LDPE refers to a different category of 

resins than those listed in claim 1.” Appellant’s Br. at 29; 

see also id. at 31 (“The intrinsic evidence thus confirms 

that . . . LDPE may be blended with the resins claimed in 

the inner layer Markush group.”).7 

Because we agree with the district court that the inner layers of claim 1 must be construed as closed to unrecited resins, including LDPE, we see no error in the 

district court’s conclusion that dependent claim 10 is 

invalid.8 Independent claim 1 excludes LDPE from the 

inner layers, while dependent claim 10 includes it. As 

such, claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, 

7 In Multilayer’s reply brief, however, there is a 

confusing suggestion that LLDPE, properly construed, 

should encompass LDPE. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 13 

(stating that LLDPE, ULDPE, mLLDPE, polypropylene, 

and LDPE all “fall within a single class of resins—

LLDPE”). We understand this to be an argument that 

Berry’s description of certain resins in its accused films as 

“LDPE” misrepresents the films’ true composition. This is 

a factual question relevant to infringement, not an issue 

of claim construction. 

8 The district court held claim 10 invalid under 35 

U.S.C. § 112(d) of the America Invents Act (“AIA”). See 

Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *40. 35 

U.S.C. § 112(d) replaced the earlier (pre-AIA) 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 ¶ 4 when § 4(c) of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), 

Pub.L. No. 112–29, took effect on September 16, 2012. 

125 Stat. 284, 296, 297 (2011). Because the ’055 patent 

was filed in 1999, long before this effective date, pre-AIA 

35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 in fact controls. The district court’s 

error is harmless, as the AIA did not alter the substance 

of this provision. 

 

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contradicts claim 1. A dependent claim that contradicts, 

rather than narrows, the claim from which it depends is 

invalid. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (requiring that “a claim in 

dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the 

subject matter claimed” (emphasis added)); Pfizer, Inc. v. 

Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “nonoverlapping” with the claim from which it depended); 

Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 

1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that a dependent 

claim can be invalid for failing to comply with pre-AIA 35 

U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. 

Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

(holding that claims that were internally contradictory 

were invalid as indefinite); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell 

Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that 

claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as 

indefinite). “[W]here . . . claims are susceptible to only 

one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation 

results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a 

whole, the claim must be invalidated . . . .” Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999).

We note that asserted claims 18 and 19 of the ’055 patent also depend from claim 1 and, like claim 10, recite 

inner layers that include LDPE. The possible invalidity of 

these claims is a question for the district court to consider 

on remand.

III

We next consider whether element (b) of claims 1 and 

28 is closed to blends of LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and 

mLLDPE, as the district court held. In this respect, we 

agree with Multilayer that the district court erred. The 

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22 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

Markush group of element (b) must be construed to permit blends of the four recited resins. 

By itself, the use of the transitional phrase “consisting 

of” does not necessarily suggest that a Markush group is 

closed to mixtures, combinations, or blends. Here, a layer 

could still “consist” of the listed resins even if the layer 

“consists” of a mixture of those resins. Nonetheless, we 

held in Abbott that there is a presumption that a 

Markush group is closed to mixtures of the listed elements. Abbott, 334 F.3d at 1281. Abbott held that if a 

Markush claim recites “a member selected from the group 

consisting of A, B, and C,” the claim is presumed to permit the member to be one and only one of A, B, or C, and 

to exclude mixtures or combinations of A, B, and C. Id. 

Typically, 

[i]f a patentee desires mixtures or combinations of 

the members of the Markush group, the patentee 

would need to add qualifying language while 

drafting the claim. See Meeting Held to Promote 

Uniform Practice In Chemical Divisions, [28 J. 

Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 849, 852 (1946)] (citing examples of qualifying language such as: “and 

mixtures thereof” and “at least one member of the 

group”). Thus, without expressly indicating the 

selection of multiple members of a Markush 

grouping, a patentee does not claim anything other than the plain reading of the closed claim language.

Id. Incorporation of additional language—e.g., “a member 

selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C, and 

mixtures thereof”—expressly opens the Markush group to 

mixtures of A, B, and C. Id.

The district court correctly observed that there is no 

express language in element (b) permitting “mixtures,” 

“combinations,” or “blends” of LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, 

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MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 23

and mLLDPE. Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, 

at *22–23, 27. Under Abbott, the Markush group of 

element (b) is therefore presumed closed to blends. The 

question is whether that presumption can be overcome by 

a combination of other claim language and the specification itself. 

All patent claims, including Markush claims, must be 

construed in view of “the words of the claims, the specification, the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic 

evidence.” SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 

1073, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 

1315–17). Abbott itself reminds us that “[t]his court 

interprets patent claims in light of the specification,” 334 

F.3d at 1280, and Abbott looked beyond the language of 

the Markush claim at issue to the patent’s prosecution 

history to confirm that the patentee had not overcome the 

presumption that the Markush group was closed to mixtures, id. at 1281. Thus, Abbott suggests that the presumptions created by Markush claim language can be 

overcome by intrinsic evidence. “Court decisions construe 

Markush clauses as meaning ‘closed’ unless other language or evidence alters that meaning.” Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.06[2][b] (emphasis added) 

(citing Abbott, 334 F.3d at 1280–81). And PTO practice is 

not to the contrary. According to the MPEP, “[t]he determination of what is or is not excluded by a transitional 

phrase must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of 

the facts of each case.” MPEP § 2111.03. The Abbott 

presumption that Markush claims are closed to blends is 

distinct from, and not as strong as, the presumption that

unlisted resins are excluded, which flows from the transitional phrase “consisting of.”

Here, the intrinsic evidence of the ’055 patent is unequivocal that the inner layers described in element (b) of 

claims 1 and 28 are open, not closed, to blends of the 

recited resins, LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and mLLDPE. 

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24 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

For one, it is clear on its face that the term “linear low 

density polyethylene” (LLDPE) is one that encompasses 

at least metallocene-catalyzed linear low density polyethylene (mLLDPE), as mLLDPE is, by its very terms, a subtype of LLDPE prepared with a particular kind of catalyst

(metallocenes). See Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 

5972195, at *31 (“LLDPE, as the extrinsic evidence 

shows, is a broader term [than mLLDPE] and includes 

polyethylenes that can be produced using various catalysts.”); id. at *35 (finding that “m-LLDPE is a type of 

LLDPE, only produced with a different catalyst”). Thus,

the resins listed in element (b) do not constitute four 

entirely different species but instead overlap to some 

extent.9 It follows that claims 1 and 28 contemplate the 

use of polyolefin resins that are classifiable both as an 

LLDPE and as an mLLDPE, which supports reading 

element (b) as open to “blending” LLDPE and mLLDPE 

within a single layer (and open to other blends of the

listed resins). Dependent claim 24 also suggests reading 

element (b) as open to blends, as it recites “[t]he multilayer, thermoplastic stretch wrap film of claim 1, wherein 

at least one layer comprises a blend of at least two of said 

resins.”10 ’055 patent col. 12 ll. 27–29. 

9 The district court also found that at least some

VLDPE and ULDPE resins can also be broadly characterized as LLDPE resins. Id. at *32; see also Multilayer v. 

Berry, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 794 (holding that, under the 

district court’s construction of “LLDPE,” “resins within 

the classes of mLLDPE, VLDPE, and ULDPE can (also) 

broadly be characterized as LLDPE resins”). 

10 Claim 24 does not specify whether the “blend of at 

least two of said resins” must be found in the inner layers 

of the film (described in element (b)), the outer layers 

(described in element (a)), or both. 

 

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MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 25

The ’055 patent’s specification similarly supports construing element (b) as open to blends, as it repeatedly and 

consistently references blends in describing any and all 

resins, including the four resins of element (b). According 

to the patent’s Abstract, “[t]he resins used in the film 

composition . . . may be blended to achieve a desired range 

of physical or mechanical properties of the final film 

product.” Id. Abstract. The Summary of the Invention 

states that “at least two of the resins may be blended to 

achieve a desired range of physical or mechanical properties of the final film product.” Id. col. 1 ll. 65–67. Three 

embodiments of the claimed multilayered stretch wrap 

film described in the Detailed Description include inner 

layers of composition “C,” which can contain “blended” 

LLDPE within a single layer. Id. col. 7 ll. 36–45, col. 8 ll. 

7–12 & ll. 35–39. There is nothing in the prosecution 

history of the ’055 patent to suggest that blends are 

excluded and therefore nothing to contradict what is 

apparent from the specification. 

In the light of this strong intrinsic evidence, the 

Markush group of element (b) must be read as open to 

blends of the four listed resins, LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, 

and mLLDPE.11 We reverse this aspect of the district 

court’s claim construction. 

11 The district court also found, based on extrinsic 

evidence, that “one skilled in the art likely understands 

blends of polymers to be common in the art.” Multilayer

v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *23 (discussing prior 

art Miro, Simmons, and Eichbauer patents, which describe multilayered plastic stretch films that include 

layers composed of blends of more than one resin). We 

discern no error in this finding of fact, and our construction is consistent with it. 

 

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26 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

IV

The district court’s grant of summary judgment of 

non-infringement was predicated on its incorrect construction of claims 1 and 28 as closed to blends of LLDPE, 

VLDPE, ULDPE, and mLLDPE. Id. at 795. We therefore 

vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for 

reconsideration of infringement under the correct construction. Multilayer’s briefs acknowledge that each of 

Berry’s accused films has a different structure and composition, and Multilayer conceded at argument that some 

of Berry’s products do not infringe under a construction of 

claims 1 and 28 that is open to blends of LLDPE, VLDPE, 

ULDPE, and mLLDPE in the inner layers but closed to 

other resins. Oral Argument at 8:30–9:40. We express no 

opinion on the question of whether certain resins in 

Berry’s films should be classified as polypropylene (which 

is outside the Markush group of element (b)), LDPE

(same), and/or LLDPE (which is within the Markush 

group); that is a factual question for the district court to 

consider on remand.

We do not agree that the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment of non-infringement was premature. 

Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We 

address this issue because the district court may again on 

remand consider summary judgment of non-infringement. 

Multilayer argues that there were unresolved issues 

of fact discovery and that “[t]he district court should have 

denied Berry’s premature motion at least until Berry 

produced to Multilayer highly relevant information relating to the Accused Films.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. In 

particular, Multilayer contends that Berry refused to 

produce material documents, including the “Traveler’s 

Reports” that Multilayer alleges would have provided 

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MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 27

detailed compositional information on Berry’s films. 

Berry points out that Multilayer had opportunity to 

inspect these documents but did not do so and never 

moved to compel production. Multilayer also suggests 

that it identified additional potentially infringing Berry 

films late in discovery, after Berry moved for summary 

judgment, necessitating further discovery, but Multilayer

presents no concrete evidence that these products might 

infringe. We agree with Berry that the district court was 

within its discretion in addressing summary judgment

when it did, and we see no reason why the district court 

should be precluded from entertaining further motions for 

summary judgment on remand. Whether additional 

discovery would be necessary for Multilayer to respond to 

such motions is an issue for the district court in the first 

instance. 

V 

Lastly, we consider Berry’s cross-appeal. Berry alleges that “[t]he District Court abused its discretion by 

denying Berry’s Motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P.

11, despite substantial evidence of violations.” CrossAppellant’s Br. at 46. Berry contends that Multilayer 

failed to make reasonable pre-suit investigation of infringement and, in particular, that Multilayer’s claim 

construction positions were frivolous. “Multilayer based 

its entire pre-suit investigation on a frivolous claim

construction that flies in the face of well-settled patent 

law. Multilayer’s claim construction position in its alleged pre-suit investigation—that a Markush group claim 

using the term ‘consisting of’ (with no broadening language) is open—has no basis in law and violates Rule 

11(b)(2).” Cross-Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1. Berry also 

alleges that Multilayer improperly maintained its infringement suit after the district court issued its claim 

construction order. 

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28 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

We find Berry’s cross-appeal meritless. This case presents numerous close and difficult questions of claim 

construction, as shown by the fact that we disagree (in 

part) with the district court’s interpretation of the inner 

layers of the claimed film. Berry has not demonstrated 

that Multilayer’s proffered claim constructions were

frivolous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose sanctions under Rule 11. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district 

court’s construction of claims 1 and 28 of the ’055 patent 

as closed to blends of LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and 

mLLDPE in the inner layers of the claimed films but 

affirm its conclusion that the inner layers must be construed as closed to other resins. We affirm the district 

court’s conclusion that claim 10 is invalid, and we affirm 

the court’s decision not to impose sanctions against Multilayer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. We vacate the court’s 

summary judgment of non-infringement and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 15-1420 Document: 82-2 Page: 28 Filed: 08/04/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM HOLDINGS, 

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BERRY PLASTICS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1420, 2015-1477

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Tennessee in No. 2:12-cv-02108-WGYcgc, Judge William G. Young (by designation). 

______________________ 

TARANTO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.

I join the court’s opinion except for Part II, which

holds that element (b) of claims 1 and 28 must be construed so that the claimed layers must contain only the 

listed resins, i.e., may not contain any unrecited resins (a 

construction that invalidates claim 10). The court’s 

opinion lays out the parts of the patent—the specification 

and dependent claims—that strongly indicate intended 

coverage of layers that include at least some unrecited 

resins. But the court holds that such coverage is excluded 

from element (b). The court reasons that the claim language has so plain a “closed” meaning—based on patent 

law’s settled approach to the “comprising”/“consisting of” 

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2 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

distinction and to the scope of Markush-group claiming 

language—that a contrary reading would require support

in other intrinsic evidence so compelling that even the 

strong evidence here is insufficient. I think that this is a 

close call, but I would conclude that the claim language is 

not so plain. 

The operative claim language is “layer being selected 

from the group consisting of” specified resins. That 

particular language does not make plain the precise 

relationship between “layer” and the listed resins—

specifically, whether the layer may contain resins (or 

anything) other than the listed resins. If different language had been used, the relationship would have been 

plain based on settled patent-law (and ordinary English) 

meanings. But the language actually used is a step 

removed from the words that would have left no semantic 

uncertainty on the issue. 

If the claim had said, “layer consisting of” one or more 

of the listed resins, the meaning would have been plain. 

That language would have plainly conveyed that the layer 

must be made out of only the listed resins, and not others. 

As the court’s opinion explains, in patent law (and probably in the dominant strand of formal English), “consisting

of” means “including only” (“containing only,” “composed 

of only,” “made of only”). Such language would convey the 

well-established closed meaning that is the opposite of the 

equally well-established open meaning of “comprising,” 

which means simply “including.” 

The language of element (b) in this case is different. 

In element (b), “consisting of” does not follow and directly 

modify “layer”; it follows and directly modifies “group.” 

Thus, the phrase characterizes the relationship between 

“group” and the listed resins: the latter are all the members of the former. It does not characterize the (closed or 

open) relationship between “layer” and what materials 

can be ingredients of the layer. The claim phrase naming 

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MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 3

that relationship is “selected from,” not “consisting of.” 

The established meaning of “consisting of” therefore does 

not determine the meaning of the claim language here. 

The claim language here is also different from traditional Markush-group language, which does include the 

phrase “selected from.” Although Markush claim language can vary, one aspect of the language seems to be 

essentially constant. Markush-group language characteristically recites “an X [being] selected from a group consisting of A, B, and C,” where A, B, and C are actually 

instances of X.1 That is, the term (X) introducing the 

enumeration is a genus or generic descriptor—sometimes 

not even a word but a pure variable representing the 

group, e.g., In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1246 (CCPA 

1977)—for species A, B, and C. See Merck, 190 F.3d at 

1340. Here, for example, a generic term for the items 

listed in element (b) would be “resin,” so if the claim here 

used standard Markush-group language, it would refer to 

“resins [being] selected from the group consisting of” the 

listed resins. See, e.g., ’055 patent, col. 1, lines 58–65. 

1 See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 

582 F.3d 1288, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Abbott Labs. v. 

Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 

2003); Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 

1297, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Merck & Co. v. Mylan 

Pharm., Inc., 190 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re 

Emert, 124 F.3d 1458, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997); N. Am. 

Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1573–74 

(Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Bulloch, 604 F.2d 1362, 1363 

(CCPA 1979); In re Skoll, 523 F.2d 1392, 1394 (CCPA 

1975); In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053, 1054 (CCPA 1973); In re 

Rainer, 305 F.2d 505, 506–07 (CCPA 1962); In re Azorlosa, 241 F.2d 939, 940 (CCPA 1957); Ex parte Dahlen & 

Zwilgmeyer, 42 U.S.P.Q. 208 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1938); Ex 

parte Clark & Malm, 11 U.S.P.Q. 52 (Comm’r Pat. 1930). 

 

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4 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

With such language, or language using a generic term like 

“materials,” it would be the combination of “selected 

from,” the “consisting of” group language, and the genusspecies relation that would make plain the closed nature 

of the relationship: the things named before “selected 

from” would have to be one or more of the listed species. 

Although the label “Markush group” or “Markush form”

may be used more loosely to label “selected from the group 

. . .” language, as it was in this case, the label does not 

determine the interpretation. What is critical is that the 

closed-nature interpretation has been judicially settled 

only when the genus-species relationship has been present, as far as I can tell. 

Element (b), at issue here, is different. It requires 

that a “layer,” not “resins” or “materials,” be “selected 

from” the group of listed resins. A “layer” is a structure (a 

“composition” in the sense of something composed) characterized at least by a spatial relationship to some other 

physical element, perhaps also by its shape (here it must 

be part of a “film,” suggesting thinness). See Multilayer 

Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Inteplast Grp. Ltd.,

No. 2:12-cv-2107, 2013 WL 5972195, at *19 (W.D. Tenn. 

Nov. 8, 2013) (“a polymer composition within the multilayer polymer structure lying over or under another”) 

(emphases added). The structure may be made from

various materials (e.g., polymers plus other things), and 

the group here lists such materials.2 The relationship

2 The dispute over “layer” in the district court was 

not over the definitional spatial-relation requirement of 

“layer” (lying over or under another), or over any equating 

of the layer with what it was made from, but over whether “polymers” had to be among the materials from which 

it was made. The district court both recognized the 

distinction and identified the dispute when it summarized 

its conclusion: “one skilled in the art would understand 

 

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MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS 5

between “layer” and the members of the specified group of 

materials, therefore, is not one of genus and species, and 

so is not defined by the inherent logic of the genus-species 

relationship. In brief, the meaning of the language at 

issue here cannot simply be borrowed from the meaning of 

traditional Markush-group language.

Element (b) is distinctive, and slightly imprecise, in 

calling for a spatial-relation-defined (and perhaps shapedefined) structure to be “selected from” a list of materials 

from which it can be made. The language is naturally 

understood as a shorthand for what is actually a pair of 

separate logical links: a link from “layer” to a generic 

term for ingredients (such as “resins” or “materials”); and 

a second link from the generic term to the Markush-group 

list. The second link is clearly closed from the invocation 

of Markush-group terminology—“resins (materials) selected from the group consisting of” the listed ones. But 

the first link in the expansion of element (b)’s shorthand 

is not clear. The expanded, more precise phrase could be 

“layer consisting of resins being selected from” the group 

or “layer comprising resins being selected from” the group. 

I cannot rule out either one as a way of translating the 

unusual language of element (b) into more precise terms.3 

the patent to teach that layers made from polymers or 

layers made from polymers combined with additives must 

be present in each of the seven layers.” Multilayer v. 

Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *19 (emphases added). 3 For an example of a two-link “Markush form” 

phrase with the first link using open “comprising” language (while leaving “group” implied), see Merck, 190 

F.3d at 1339 (a “polymer vehicle comprising 0–120 mg of a 

water-soluble polymer selected from hydroxypropyl cellulose [HPC], hydroxypropyl methylcellulose [HPMC], 

polyvinyl pyrrolidone, polyethylene glycol, starch and 

methyl cellulose”) (emphases added). For an example 

 

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6 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

I am inclined to think that the former would be the 

better reading if we considered the claim words alone in 

light of background patent-law meanings. Indeed, I think 

that “selected from” is somewhat more suggestive of a 

closed concept than “made from”—which is the phrase 

that Multilayer proposed in the district court in expressly 

arguing for a construction open to unrecited resins. 

Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *26.4 But I 

do not think the meaning plain, and the claim language 

does not stand alone.

Once it is seen that there really is a semantic uncertainty in the claim language—that is the judgment call—

we must look to the specification and (here) dependent 

with the first link using “consisting of,” see Shire Dev., 

LLC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (“an inner lipophilic matrix consisting of substances selected from the group consisting of unsaturated 

and/or hydrogenated fatty acid, salts, esters or amides 

thereof, fatty acid mono-, di- or triglycerid[e]s, waxes, 

ceramides, and cholesterol derivatives with melting points 

below 90° C”) (emphasis added).

4 “Made from,” which can refer to origins or components, can have an “open” meaning in ordinary usage: e.g., 

one can say “Vicodin is made from hydrocodone” even 

though it also contains acetaminophen. Moreover, “made 

from” seems more open than “composed of,” which we 

have held is itself not always “closed,” but depends for its 

meaning in a particular patent on other intrinsic evidence. See AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 

1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Indeed, “made from” is at 

least as open as “made up of,” and the court in AFG 

rejected a closed construction for “composed of” in the 

particular patent partly in reliance on Cardinal’s use of 

“made up of” as a term clearly permitting some unrecited 

components. Id. at 1246.

 

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claims to resolve the uncertainty in a way that stays true 

to the range of permissible meanings of the language 

actually used. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 

1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (approving as a succinct 

summary: “‘Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a 

term can only be determined and confirmed with a full 

understanding of what the inventors actually invented 

and intended to envelop with the claim. The construction 

that stays true to the claim language and most naturally 

aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will 

be, in the end, the correct construction.’”). For the reasons stated, I conclude that there is relevant imprecision 

in the claim words used here, i.e., that they are not plain

in the respect that is disputed, and that the “open” construction is a permissible one for the language used. 

As the court’s opinion sets forth, the specification and 

dependent claims provide strong support for the “open” 

reading. See Maj. Op. at 15–17. The specification describes three embodiments, two of which have an inner 

layer formed from a blend of LLDPE with LDPE, a resin 

not recited in the Markush group. ’055 patent, col. 7, line 

15, through col. 8, line 40. Claims 10, 18, and 19, all 

depending on claim 1, claim those embodiments. 

Of course, patentees sometimes write particular 

claims that exclude described embodiments (e.g., when 

other claims capture those embodiments) and sometimes 

mistakenly write dependent claims that invalidly add 

elements inconsistent with their independent claims. But 

except for the argument about the plainness of element 

(b)’s language, we have been pointed to no good reason to 

think that the patentees in this case excluded the justnoted embodiments from the independent claims or, 

therefore, wrote dependent claims that are invalid because inconsistent with the independent claims. The only 

real argument advanced for drawing those conclusions 

here is that the claim language is plainly to the contrary. 

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8 MULTILAYER STRETCH CLING FILM v. BERRY PLASTICS

As I have explained, I am not persuaded by that argument. 

For those reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 

holding that the inner layers of claims 1 and 28 cannot 

include unrecited resins and that claim 10 is invalid. 

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