Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-06127/USCOURTS-ca10-96-06127-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas D. Barnhardt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

IJni&fd Stat~ Court or Appeals Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 0 1996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS D. BARNHARDT, 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

No. 96-6127 

(W. Dist. of Okla.) 

(D.C. No. CIV-96-181-A) 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Thomas D. Barnhardt, Pro Se. 

Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, M. Jay Farber, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. ~ Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 96-6127 Document: 01019279704 Date Filed: 08/20/1996 Page: 1 
Thomas D. Barnhardt (Barnhardt), appearing QLQ ~ and having 

been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, appeals the 

district court's Order of March 18, 1996, dismissing his motion to 

vacate, set aside or correct sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. 

On June 14, 1990, Barnhardt waived his right to a jury trial 

and pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 

approximately one kilogram of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a) (1) (Count 2); using or carrying a firearm during and in 

relation to a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924 (c) ( 1) (Count 3) ; and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a) (3) (Count 9) . 1 He was 

sentenced to 63 months imprisonment on Counts 2 and 9 , to run 

concurrently, and 60 months imprisonment on Count 3, to run 

consecutively. Barnhardt did not file a direct appeal. 

On February 2, 1996, Barnhardt filed a motion to vacate, set 

aside or correct sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. 2 In his 

1 Barnhardt also agreed to the forfeiture of certain 

personal property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Count 10). 

2 This is Barnhardt's second § 2255 motion. On February 

19, 1993, Barnhardt filed a § 2255 motion concerning the 

retroactive application of U.S.S.G . § 3E1.1 which was denied by 

the district court on September 24, 1993. There was no appeal 

from that order. 

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motion, Barnhardt challenged his conviction and sentence on Count 

3, using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drugtrafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1). He 

argued that he never "used" a firearm within the meaning of § 

924 (c) (1) as defined in Bailey v. United States, 

S. Ct . 501 ( 19 9 5) . 

u.s. 1 116 

On March 18, 1996, the district court dismissed Barnhardt's § 

2255 motion, concluding that there was ample evidence on the record 

to support his conviction and sentence on Count 3 under the "carry" 

prong of § 924 (c) (1). 

On appeal, Barnhardt contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing his § 2255 motion, inasmuch as his plea was involuntary, 

and a factual issue remains as to whether he had the firearm on his 

person at the time the offense was committed. 

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether (1) Barnhardt 

waived his right to challenge the factual basis of his plea by 

pleading guilty, and (2) whether Bailey applies retroactively to 

allow relief in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

I. Waiver 

In United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 565 (1989), the 

Supreme Court held that a defendant is precluded from collaterally 

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attacking a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. 3 However, the 

Court noted that an exception to the rule barring collateral attack 

on a guilty plea applies when the defendant had "'the right not to 

be haled into court at all upon the felony charge.'" .l.d. at 574-75 

(quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)). 

In United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420 (lOth Cir. 1985), we 

followed Blackledge. Barboa pled guilty to conspiracy to damage 

and destroy by explosives a building used in an activity affecting 

interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. .l.d. at 1421. 

Following sentencing, Barboa filed a § 2255 motion on the grounds 

that his sole coconspirator was a government informant. Id. at 

1422. On appeal, we rejected the government's argument that 

Barboa's guilty plea served as an admission that he committed the 

crime of conspiracy. l_d. at 1423 n.3. We held that a plea of 

guilty does not bar a claim that the defendant's conviction lS 

unconstitutional "'no matter how validly his factual guilt is 

established'" if the facts he pled guilty to are subsequently 

3 Notwithstanding the dictates of Broce, we note that 

"those courts which have addressed Bailey in the context of a 

prisoner's § 2255 motion applied the Bailey analysis to the 

petitioner's conviction, notwithstanding the fact that the 

petitioner had pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c) (1) ." United States v. Fletcher, 919 F. Supp. 384, 387 (D. 

Kan. 1996) (citations omitted). 

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determined not to be criminal. IQ. (quoting Menna v. New York, 423 

U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975)). 

Here, the facts are analogous to those in Barboa. Barnhardt 

argues that he did not "use" a firearm under § 924 (c) (1) as defined 

by Bailey, i.e., that the factual basis for his guilty plea does 

not constitute a crime under§ 924(c) (1) and Bailey. Therefore, we 

hold that he may attack the validity of his conviction under 28 

u.s.c. § 2255. 

II. Retroactivity 

Next, we must determine whether Bailey has retroactive 

application to cases on collateral review. 4 The courts which have 

addressed this issue have concluded that Bailey applies 

retroactively and we now add ourselves to that list. 5 ~United 

States v. Cota-Loaiza, 1996 WL 403303 (D. Colo. 1996) (citations 

omitted). In so doing, the courts have relied on Davis v. United 

States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974), wherein the Supreme Court held 

4 

1995) 1 

9284) 1 

direct 

In United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (lOth Cir. 

petition .fill;:~- filed, (U.S. June 10, 1996) (No. 95-

we decided that Bailey applied retroactively to cases on 

review on the date it was decided, December 6, 1995. 

5 This decision is supported by our unpublished decision, 

United States v. Parker, 1996 WL 202607 (lOth Cir. April 26, 

1996), wherein we reversed the defendant's conviction and 

sentence under§ 924(c) (1) and remanded to the trial court for 

further factual determinations. 

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that a petitioner collaterally attacking his conviction should be 

given the benefit of case law decided after his conviction when the 

conviction was "for an act that the law does not make criminal." 

In United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298 (lOth Cir. 1995), we 

applied Davis and held that substantive changes in the law, as 

opposed to procedural changes, apply retroactively. In Dashney, 

the defendant was convicted in 1990 of violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 

5322(a) and 5324(3) by structuring cash transactions in order to 

evade currency reporting requirements. lQ. at 298. In 1994, the 

Supreme Court held that a conviction under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 

5324(3) required that the defendant know that the structuring in 

which he engaged was unlawful. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 

135 (1994). On appeal from the district court's denial of his § 

2255 motion, we concluded that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.B. 288, 296 

(1989), which holds that new constitutional rules of criminal 

procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases on 

collateral review, was distinguishable because Ratzlaf established 

a new substantive rule of law rather than a new procedural rule of 

law. 6 Therefore, we held that Ratzlaf applied retroactively. 

6 For a very thorough discussion of retroactivity, 

Teague, and Bailey, see Sanabria v. United States, 916 F. Supp. 

106 (D. Puerto Rico 1996). 

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Like Ratzlaf, Bailey establishes a new non-constitutional rule 

of substantive law which may produce a different result under the 

facts of this case than that dictated by prior law. In other 

words, actions that were criminal pre-Bailey may no longer be such. 

Therefore, we hold that Bailey applies retroactively to convictions 

under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1). 

III. Bailey 

Having concluded that Barnhardt has not waived his right to 

challenge his conviction under § 2255 and that Bailey applies 

retroactively, we must now address the application of Bailey in a 

case where the defendant pled guilty to a charge that he used or 

carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 

offense, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 924 (c) (1). 

In United States v. Miller, 84 F. 3d 1244, 1257 (lOth Cir. 

1996), we discussed Bailey's application where a defendant was 

convicted by a jury of using or carrying a firearm during and in 

relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of§ 924(c) (1). 

In Miller, we concluded that if (a) the indictment alleged that the 

defendant both "used" and "carried" the firearm in question, (b) 

the jury was instructed on both the "use" and "carry" prongs of § 

924 (c) (1), and (c) the "use" instruction was erroneous in light of 

Bailey, then the defendant's conviction under§ 924(c) (1) must be 

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reversed unless the reviewing court is absolutely certain that the 

jury convicted solely under the "carry" prong. Id. at 1256-57. 

Our "reason for this approach is simple: 'Jurors are not generally 

equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction 

submitted to them is contrary to law,' Griffin [v. United States], 

502 U.S. [46, 59 (1991)], and may have intended to convict the 

defendant on a legally invalid ground, while rejecting the evidence 

supporting the legally valid one." Miller, 84 F.3d at 1257. The 

only way to remedy the problem is to order a retrial and put the 

government to its proof before a properly instructed jury. XQ. at 

1257. 

However, when a defendant pleads guilty the concerns 

underlying our decision in Miller are not implicated. When a 

defendant pleads guilty, it is necessary only that the court 

"mak[e] such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual 

basis for the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(f). ~United States v. 

Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 643 (lOth Cir.), ~. denied, u.s. 

(1995). Accordingly, the determination of Barnhardt's motion 

depends on whether there is an adequate factual basis for his 

guilty plea. 7 

7 This conclusion is supported by the "overwhelming 

weight of authority from other jurisdictions." United States v. 

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At Barnhardt's change of plea hearing, the following exchange 

too.k place between Barnhardt, Mr. Farber (government counsel), and 

the court: 

MR. FARBER: And as a result of your meeting with 

him, you then went to a Holiday Inn located here in the 

Oklahoma City area and you well, you purchased 

approximately a kilo [of] cocaine. 

DEFENDANT BARNHARDT: Yes, sir. 

MR. FARBER: 

that cocaine? 

Correct? And you had possession of 

DEFENDANT BARNHARDT: Yes, sir. 

MR. FARBER: Okay. And you at a later point in 

time, I imagine, were going to redistribute that cocaine 

and earn a profit, correct? 

DEFENDANT BARNHARDT: Yes, sir. 

MR. FARBER: Okay. And at the time of your arrest 

there was a firearm, a .38 caliber revolver, found tucked 

down I believe the back of you pants, is that correct? 

DEFENDANT BARNHARDT: Yes, sir. 

MR. FARBER: Okay. And you used that firearm, 

again, in relation to the purchase of the narcotics that 

you had just undertaken, correct? 

THE COURT: Well, do you mean use it or carried it 

in the event you might have to use it? 

DEFENDANT BARNHARDT: Carried it. 

MR. FARBER: You had it for [a] reason, in case 

Cota-Loaiza, 1996 WL 403303 (D. Colo. 1996) (citations omitted) . 

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something occurred that you would need to use that gun to 

protect yourself, protect you money or whatever? 

DEFENDANT BARNHARDT: Yes, sir. 

(Tr. Guilty Plea at 35-36). 

Based on his statements, the district court found that a 

factual basis for Barnhardt's guilty plea existed and that his plea 

was made voluntarily, with a full understanding of the charges and 

consequences. LQ. at 36. 

"The acceptance of a guilty plea is deemed a factual finding 

that there is an adequate factual basis for the plea." Blair, 54 

F.3d at 643 (quoting United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509 (5th 

Cir. 1992)). Therefore, our review is under the clearly erroneous 

standard, Blair, 54 F. 3d at 643, and a finding of fact is not 

clearly erroneous unless it is without factual support in the 

record or, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Exxon 

Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002, 1005 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that "§ 924(c) (1) requires 

evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by 

the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in 

relation to the predicated offense." U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 

505 (emphasis original) . "Evidence that the defendant brandished, 

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displayed, bartered, fired or attempted to fire a firearm, or used 

it to strike another person will support a jury verdict that the 

defendant 'used' a firearm, as will evidence the defendant made 'a 

reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the 

circumstances of the predicate offense.'" Miller, 84 F.3d at 1256 

(quoting Bailey, U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 508). 

Inasmuch as the Court did not specifically define the "carry" 

prong of § 924 (c) (1), it did state that: 

[u]nder the interpretation we enunciate today, a firearm 

can be used without being carried, e.g., when an offender 

has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters 

with a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be 

carried without being used, e.g., when an offender keeps 

a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug 

transaction. 

Bailey, U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 507. 

In this case, it is clear that Barnhardt did not "use" the 

firearm as Bailey defines "use" in terms of § 924 (c) (1); there was 

no "active employment" of a firearm. However, Barnhardt admitted, 

1n response to direct questioning from the court, at his change of 

plea hearing, that he "carried" the firearm in question tucked into 

the back of his pants during the drug transaction, handy in the 

event that he might need to use it. This is exactly the type of 

situation envisioned by the Supreme Court in Bailey to distinguish 

"use" from "carry" under § 924 (c) (1) 

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Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in 

upholding Barnhardt's conviction for using or carrying a firearm 

during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), based on the carrying prong. 

AFFIRMED. 

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