Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00725/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00725-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felker
Respondent
David Charles Thatcher
Petitioner

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID CHARLES THATCHER,

Petitioner,

v.

FELKER,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 07-00725 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 14]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in the Tulare County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of

four counts of robbery and one count of grand theft of a firearm. The jury also found true that

Petitioner used a firearm in the commission of three robberies and a knife in the commission of

one robbery. In a bifurcated proceeding the trial court found true allegations that Petitioner

committed two prior offenses within the meaning of the three strikes law, suffered a prior serious

felony conviction and served a prior prison term. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate

state prison term of 162 years to life. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 1-2.) 

On April 16, 2003, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the

judgment. (Lodged Doc. No. 2.) Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme Court

which was denied on June 25, 2003. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 3-4.) 

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Petitioner filed five pro se state post-conviction collateral challenges. The first petition

was filed in the Tulare County Superior Court on March 4, 2004, and denied on March 12, 2004

with citations to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780791 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750,

797-798 (1993). (Lodged Docs. Nos. 5-6.) 

The second petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Fifth District Court of

Appeal on August 23, 2005, and denied on January 26, 2006. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 7, 8.)

The third petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the California Supreme Court on

July 6, 2006, and denied on February 7, 2007. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 9, 10.)

The fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Tulare County Superior

Court on April 17, 2007, and denied on the same day. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 11, 12.)

The fifth and last petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Fifth District Court of

Appeal on May 15, 2007, and denied on June 14, 2007. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 13, 14.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 16, 2007. (Court

Doc. 1.) Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss the petition on August 13, 2007. (Court

Doc. 14.) Petitioner filed a traverse on September 13, 2007, and Respondent filed a reply on

September 24, 2007. (Court Docs. 17, 18.) Petitioner filed a sur-reply on October 4, 2007. 

(Court Doc. 21.)

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

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(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

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Cal. R. Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a decision 1

of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. 

See Sup.Ct. R. 13(1) 2

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 3

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

4

In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on 

 June 25, 2003. Thus, direct review would conclude on September 23, 2003, when the ninety 1

(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. 2

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999) th

(concluding period of "direct review" includes the period within which one can file a petition for

a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347

(8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year from September 24, 2003, absent applicable th

tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

th

Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations

period. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 3

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

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premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling for any petition denied by the state court as untimely, because such a

petition is considered “neither ‘properly filed’ nor ‘pending’” in the state courts within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645 (9 Cir. 2007) (citing th

Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9 Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, th

417 (2005); see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006). The limitations period, also,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). 

1. First Petition Was Not a Properly Filed Petition

In denying the first state habeas corpus petition on March 12, 2004, the Tulare County

Superior Court cited to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780-791 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th

750, 797-798 (1993). These citations refer to the petition’s untimeliness. Under Pace and

Chavis, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling for the time the untimely petition was

pending. The state superior court’s alternative merits ruling does not change this result. Pace,

544 U.S. at 412. 

2. The Second Petitioner Was Not a Properly Filed Petition

As previously stated, Petitioner filed his second habeas corpus petition in the California

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, on August 23, 2005. (Lodged Doc. No. 7.) The

appellate court denied the petition without comment on January 26, 2006. (Lodged Doc. No. 8.) 

Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this

Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California

Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas

review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where

former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7

(9 Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining th

whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable

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application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

The last reasoned decision was issued by the state superior court on March 12, 2004. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 6.) As discussed in section “C(1),” ante, the superior court denied the petition

as untimely and alternatively for lack of merit. (Id.) As previously stated, the finding of

untimely rendered the superior court petition as not “properly filed.” Because it is presumed the

second petition was rejected for the same reason, it too was not “properly filed,” and does not

serve to toll the limitations period.

However, as Respondent submits, even if the Court were to find that the first petition was

properly filed because of the alternative merits ruling, the second state petition was filed after the

one-year limitations period expired. If tolled, the statute of limitations would have expired on

October 2, 2004, adding the nine days the first state petition was pending. Thus, even if the first

petition were tolled, the instant federal petition is still untimely, as it was not filed until May 16,

2007, over two years later. 

3. Subsequent Post-Conviction Actions Do Not Toll

The second through fifth state petitions were filed after the expiration of the limitations

period. Consequently, they do not serve to toll the limitations period. (Lodged Docs. Nos. 7-14.) 

It is well-established that the filing of a state collateral action after expiration of the limitations

period does not restart the clock at zero or otherwise save a claim from being time-barred. In

other words, once the statute has run, a collateral action cannot revive it. Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9 Cir. 2001). th

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations may be equitably tolled if Petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and

prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (quoting Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Equitable tolling is generally unavailable in most

cases, and the prisoner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9 Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Indeed, th

“the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

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rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9 Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. th

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7 Cir. 2000)). th

In his opposition, Petitioner contends he is ignorant of the law and was unaware of the

time limitations. (Opposition, at 2.) Petitioner further contends that he was not allowed access

to the law library. (Id.) In his sur-reply, Petitioner continues to claim that he was ignorant of the

law and was denied access to the law library. (Sur-reply, at 1-2.)

 The Ninth Circuit has held that claims of ignorance of the law and illiteracy are

insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See e.g.,Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006) (a petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d

905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but th

insufficient to establish cause); Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9 Cir. 2000) (lack of th

knowledge of state law not cause); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.2d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir. 2000); Fisher th

v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). th

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that he was ignorant of the law is clearly not a valid basis for

equitable tolling. 

Second, the ordinary limitations placed on Petitioner’s access to the prison law library do

not establish a basis for equitable tolling. More specifically, Petitioner does not even state why

he was denied access to the law library, nor does Petitioner provide any specifics in support of

his claim or any showing that he diligently attempting to pursue his claims. Petitioner’s claim is

simply too conclusory and vague to warrant a basis for equitably tolling the petition.

Lack of access to the library does not automatically justify a basis for equitable tolling. 

See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9 Cir. 2001). In general, unpredictable lockdowns th

and library closures do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling

where the petitioner fails to make a showing how the lockdowns and library restrictions

interfered with the year available to him. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. 1108,

1111 (C.D.Cal.1997) (inability to secure copies of transcripts from court reporters and lockdowns

at prison lasting several days and allegedly eliminating access to law library were not

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extraordinary circumstances and did not equitably toll one-year statute of limitations); Atkins v.

Harris, 1999 WL 13719, *2 (N.D.Cal. Jan.7, 1999) ("lockdowns, restricted library access and

transfers do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to equitably toll the [AEDPA]

statute of limitations. Prisoners familiar with the routine restrictions of prison life must take such

matters into account when calculating when to file a federal [habeas] petition.... Petitioner's

alleged lack of legal sophistication also does not excuse the delay."). Further, the Constitution

does not guarantee unlimited access to the law library and an inmate having to wait for his or her

turn is not denied access to the courts. Lindquist v. Idaho Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851,

858 (9 Cir. 1985); Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618- th

619 (3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10 Cir. 1998). Petitioner has not th

demonstrated any connection to his apparent lack of or limited access to the law library and his

inability to file a timely petition. Nor has Petitioner made any showing that he was attempting to

diligently pursue his rights. Petitioner has simply presented nothing more than conclusory

allegations, which are insufficient to demonstrate equitable tolling. Because Petitioner bears the

burden of proof of entitlement to equitable tolling and he has failed to meet his burden, the

instant petition is untimely. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d

809, 814 (9 Cir. 2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9 Cir. 1993). th th

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred be GRANTED; and

2. The action be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

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objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 9, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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