Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03123/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03123-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abdul J. Gbemisola
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 20, 2000 Decided September 12, 2000

No. 99-3123

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Abdul J. Gbemisola,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00129-01)

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Elizabeth Carroll, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, Unites States Attorney, and John R. Fisher,

Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., William J. O'Malley, Jr., and Eumi

Choi, Assistant United States Attorneys.

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Before: Sentelle, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Abdul J. Gbemisola appeals his

conviction for possession with intent to distribute over one

kilogram of heroin. He argues that evidence obtained

through the use of an electronic tracking device should have

been suppressed because the device was installed outside the

jurisdiction of the magistrate judge who issued the warrant

for its installation. He also argues that the evidence at trial

was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was

improperly joined for trial with two co-defendants. We find

no merit to these arguments and affirm the conviction.

I

On March 6, 1998, the U.S. Customs Service at the port of

entry in Memphis, Tennessee selected for examination a box

being shipped by Federal Express from Cambodia to a "Mail

Boxes Etc." location in Washington, D.C.1 The box aroused

Customs' suspicions because it came from a narcotics source

country, had atypical merchandise, and had no value listed on

the waybill. Upon opening the box, agents found six cooking

pots that smelled of fresh paint, were unusually heavy, and

had observable "depth discrepancies"--i.e., false bottoms.

Inside the false bottom of each pot was a translucent bag of

heroin. Customs then checked for other boxes from the same

shipper and found another also addressed to Mail Boxes Etc.

in the District of Columbia, albeit at a different District

location. This one, too, contained six pots and they, too,

contained heroin secreted in false bottoms. Customs found a

third box, also containing six freshly-painted pots with false

bottoms filled with heroin, in a Federal Express shipment in

Indianapolis, Indiana. The third box had been shipped from

the Philippines and was bound for yet a third Mail Boxes Etc.

location in the District of Columbia. Each box contained

approximately 1500 grams of heroin with a very high level of

__________

1 Mail Boxes Etc. rents mailboxes with 24-hour access at

numerous locations in the Washington, D.C. area and worldwide.

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purity--approximately 90%. The heroin in each box had a

street value of approximately $1 million.

Customs agents repackaged the pots in their original boxes

and sent them on to Customs' Washington, D.C. area field

office at Dulles Airport in Northern Virginia. There, agents

reopened the boxes and installed electronic tracking devices

pursuant to a warrant obtained from a federal magistrate

judge in the District of Columbia. Each device emitted a

radio signal with the capacity to indicate when the box was

moving and to disclose when it was opened. Agents removed

some of the pots from each box, and diluted the heroin in the

remaining pots with flour. Telephone books were added to

the boxes to compensate for the weight of the removed pots.

The boxes were then resealed and delivered to the three Mail

Boxes Etc. addresses on the shipping labels: 1429 G Street,

N.W.; 4401 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.; and 5505 Connecticut

Avenue, N.W.

Meanwhile, on March 4, 1998, around the time that the

boxes were being shipped from Southeast Asia, a person

using the name "Winston" made three telephone reservations

for travel on March 9 from O'Hare International Airport in

Chicago to Baltimore-Washington International Airport

(BWI) in Maryland. The reservations were made in the

names of "Abdul Gevemisola [sic]," "Wahab Akanni," and

"Winston Gillsillian [sic]." On March 9, "Winston" made new

reservations for the same three to travel on March 10. On

that day, the tickets were purchased with cash because the

credit card with which "Winston" initially attempted to make

the purchase was reported as unverifiable. The plane arrived

at BWI at 10:17 a.m., and a ticket for three travelers--later

found in the pocket of Gbemisola's co-defendant Wahab Akanni--was purchased for the 12:00 p.m. "Super Shuttle" from

BWI to downtown Washington, D.C. The Shuttle ride takes

approximately one hour.

Just after 1:00 p.m., an individual, later identified as Gbemisola's co-defendant Winston Gillfillian, entered the Mail

Boxes Etc. location at 1429 G Street, N.W. in downtown

Washington. An employee testified that Gillfillian appeared

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to be accompanied by two other men, one of whom had a

shoulder bag, who remained waiting outside. Although Gillfillian attempted to retrieve the Federal Express package,

which had been delivered to a box in the name of "Aldrich

Hinton," Customs had already removed it. Gillfillian left

empty-handed.

A half hour later, defendant Gbemisola entered the Mail

Boxes Etc. franchise at 4401 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,

carrying a shoulder bag. One of the three Federal Express

boxes had been addressed to the mailbox of "Anthony Brown"

at that location. Gbemisola presented a notice of mail for

"Anthony Brown" and retrieved the box. Before leaving the

premises, Gbemisola renewed the rental of "Brown's" box for

another three months.

Gbemisola then walked out the door, and law enforcement

agents watched as he entered a taxi. They followed in their

own car. Almost immediately, the electronic tracking device

alerted the agents that the box had been opened. The agents

stopped the taxi and arrested Gbemisola. They found the

Federal Express box lying open on the floor of the taxi's back

seat. Inside Gbemisola's shoulder bag was the pot of heroin

and the telephone books, as well as an envelope addressed to

"Anthony Brown" at 4401 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. The

envelope contained an auto repair estimate in the name of codefendant Akanni.

At about the time of Gbemisola's arrest, co-defendant Akanni entered a taxi in the 4600 block of Connecticut Avenue,

N.W. The third co-defendant, Gillfillian, was already in the

taxi. The taxi proceeded northbound to the 5500 block of

Connecticut Avenue N.W., where Akanni exited. The taxi

continued and, minutes later, stopped again to let Gillfillian

out. Akanni then entered the third Mail Boxes Etc. location

at 5505 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., where he picked up the

third Federal Express box, which had been addressed to

"Cecil Dover." Like Gbemisola, Akanni renewed the rental

on the box for another three months. As Akanni left the

store with the box, co-defendant Gillfillian hailed a cab. Both

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were then arrested. Agents found documents related to the

two other Mail Boxes Etc. stores on Gillfillian's person.

A grand jury returned an indictment against the three

men. In Count One, all three were charged with conspiracy

to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846. In

Count Two, Gbemisola alone was charged with possession

with intent to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(I). In Count

Three, the other two men were charged with the same crime.

The three were tried together. None of the defendants

testified, and Gbemisola did not present any witnesses. During the trial, the government moved to dismiss the conspiracy

charge because of discrepancies in dates listed in the indictment, and the court granted the motion. The jury found

Gbemisola guilty on his remaining count, but acquitted his codefendants on theirs.

Gbemisola appeals his conviction, citing three motions that

he contends the trial court erroneously denied. First, during

the trial a government witness testified that although the

warrant for the tracking devices had been issued by a magistrate judge sitting in Washington, D.C., the devices were

actually installed in Virginia. Contending that this rendered

the warrant invalid, defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the use of the tracking device in the box

he retrieved. Second, after the court dismissed the conspiracy count mid-trial, Gbemisola moved to sever his case from

that of his co-defendants. Finally, Gbemisola moved for

judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain the conviction.

II

Gbemisola's appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress

does not involve any factual dispute. Both parties agree that

the warrant purporting to authorize installation of the tracking device was issued in the District of Columbia, that the

monitoring actually occurred in the District, but that the

agents installed the device in Virginia. The only question is a

legal one--whether the evidence obtained through use of the

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device was unlawfully obtained. We decide that question de

novo. See In re Sealed Case No. 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 764

(D.C. Cir. 1998).

Section 3117(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code states

as follows:

If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order

for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such

order may authorize the use of that device within the

jurisdiction of the court, and outside the jurisdiction if

the device is installed in that jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C. s 3117(a). Defendant contends that this statute

does not empower a court to authorize the installation of a

tracking device outside its jurisdiction. Although we are

inclined to agree,2 and although at oral argument the govern-

__________

2 In fact, the statute does not appear to authorize installation

of a tracking device at all. On its face, the statute is addressed to a

court already "empowered" by some other authority to issue an

order for the installation of such a device. The statute merely

permits such an otherwise-empowered court to authorize the use of

that device both inside the jurisdiction and outside the jurisdiction if

the installation is made inside. See also Sen. Rep. No. 99-541, at

33-34 (1986). Before section 3117 was enacted in 1986, courts

relied on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 for the power to

issue search warrants authorizing the installation and use of tracking devices. See In re Application of the United States ("White

Truck"), 155 F.R.D. 401, 402-03 (D. Mass. 1994) (discussing historical practice); cf. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,

169-70 (1977) (holding Rule 41 broad enough to authorize installation and use of pen registers). At the time, however, Rule 41 only

authorized warrants issued by "a federal magistrate ... within the

district wherein the property or person sought is located," thus

rendering uncertain a court's power to issue a warrant permitting

the continued use of a mobile tracking device after it (and the

container in which it had been placed) left the district. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 41(a) (1986); see Clifford Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices

and The Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions

Still Unanswered, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 277, 375 (1985). Section 3117

resolved that uncertainty by providing the necessary authority. See

White Truck, 155 F.R.D. at 403. In 1990, Rule 41 itself was

ment indicated its agreement as well, that agreement does

not resolve the suppression issue.

As is apparent on its face, section 3117 provides a basis for

authorizing the use of a mobile tracking device. But by

contrast to statutes governing other kinds of electronic surveillance devices, section 3117 does not prohibit the use of a

tracking device in the absence of conformity with the section.

Cf. 18 U.S.C. s 3121(a) ("Except as provided in this section,

no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and

trace device without first obtaining a court order.... "); id.

s 2511(1) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any

person who--(a) intentionally intercepts ... any wire, oral, or

electronic communication ... shall be punished.... "). Nor

does it bar the use of evidence acquired without a section

3117 order. Cf. id. s 2515 (barring use as evidence of wire or

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oral communications intercepted in violation of statute). Indeed, the statute that bars the interception of any "electronic

communication" except in conformity with its provisions expressly excludes section 3117 tracking devices from the definition of "electronic communication." See id. s 2510(12)(c).

Similarly, the legislative history of section 3117 makes clear

Congress' understanding that, under the Supreme Court's

decisions in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), and

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), warrants are not

always required for either the installation or use of mobile

tracking devices. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 60 (1986)

(noting that Karo held a warrant was "not required where the

owner consents to installation," and that Knotts held the

warrantless "installation of a beeper on a container to follow

on a public roadway does not violate the Fourth Amendment"). Accordingly, the question at issue in this case is

__________

amended to permit a magistrate to issue a search warrant not only

for property within the judicial district, but also for property "either

within or outside the district if the property ... is within the

district when the warrant is sought but might move outside the

district before the warrant is executed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a); see

also id. Advisory Committee's note on 1990 amendment (suggesting

that amendment provides authority for issuance of warrant to follow

beeper across state lines).

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whether Customs needed an authorizing warrant in the first

place--or instead whether the warrant that issued, although

perhaps invalid, was superfluous.

We conclude that the government did not require a warrant

to authorize its conduct in this case. Defendant concedes

that no warrant was required for the initial opening of the

box, as it arrived at the border via international mail. See

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (holding

that neither warrant nor probable cause is required for

search of letters sent through international mail). As defendant further concedes, installing the tracking device did not

require any additional intrusion into anyone's reasonable

expectation of privacy. Without such an intrusion, there can

be no Fourth Amendment violation. See Karo, 468 U.S. at

712-13 (holding that placement of beeper does not violate

Fourth Amendment unless reasonable expectation of privacy

is infringed); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)

("No protected privacy interest remains in contraband in a

container once government officers lawfully have opened that

container and identified its contents as illegal.").3

The remaining question is whether a warrant was required

for the continuing use of the device--that is, for the electronic

reports it made concerning the location and reopening of the

box. In Karo, the Supreme Court held that a warrant was

required to monitor the location of a tracking device in a

private home because of the legitimate expectation of privacy

within a home. See 468 U.S. at 714-18. However, the Court

also held that no warrant was required for monitoring the

device during the time it was en route to the house in a truck

on a public road. See id. at 721. Reaffirming its previous

decision in Knotts, the Court declared that "the warrantless

monitoring of an electronic tracking device .. [does] not

__________

3 Moreover, under the theory suggested by defense counsel in

closing argument--that Gbemisola was merely picking up the box

for a friend--Gbemisola would not have had the necessary expectation of privacy in the first place. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.

128, 143 (1978); United States v. Magnum, 100 F.3d 164, 170 (D.C.

Cir. 1996).

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violate the Fourth Amendment when it reveal[s] no information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance." Id. at 707.

The same analysis applies here. As Gbemisola left the

Mail Boxes Etc. building, entered a taxi, and drove away, he

was followed by a team of surveillance agents. Although the

tracking device reported the location of the box, so too did the

agents' visual surveillance. With respect to location, the

device added nothing to what the agents could see with their

eyes. That surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as Gbemisola "ha[d] no reasonable expectation of privacy" with respect to his travels on the public street. Knotts,

460 U.S. at 281. "[S]ince the movements of the automobile

and ... of the [object] containing the beeper ... could have

been observed by the naked eye, no Fourth Amendment

violation was committed.... " Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-714.

But, Gbemisola argues, the device also reported when the

box was opened--an event that the officers did not see. The

decisive issue, however, is not what the officers saw but what

they could have seen. See id.; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282, 285.

At any time, the surveillance vehicle could have pulled alongside of the taxi and the officers could have watched Gbemisola

through its window. Indeed, the taxi driver himself could

have seen the event simply by looking in his rear-view mirror

or turning around. As one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning an act performed within the visual

range of a complete stranger, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was not implicated. See Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ( "What a person knowingly

exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").

In sum, because no warrant was required for either the

installation or use of the mobile tracking device, the fruits of

that use were admissible at trial regardless of the validity of

the warrant obtained by the government. See, e.g., United

States v. Martinez, 78 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding

search of car under automobile exception regardless of validity of warrant).

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III

Defendant's remaining two arguments, relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and to the

propriety of a joint trial, merit only brief discussion.

We must affirm a jury's verdict if " 'any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.' " United States v. Lucas, 67

F.3d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In making that determination, "the

prosecution's evidence is to be viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, drawing no distinction between

direct and circumstantial evidence, and giving full play to the

right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence

and draw justifiable inferences of fact." United States v.

Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation omitted).

In the district court, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence to show anything more than that he "was

picking up a box for a friend," a box the contents of which he

did not know. See Trial Tr. at 1699 (closing argument). But

the evidence recounted in Part I above--including travel to a

distant city, the suspicious manner in which the three men

fanned out to retrieve the three packages, the use of false

names on the mailboxes at all three locations, the defendant's

renewal of the mailbox account in a false name, and the

defendant's removal of the contents from the package--was

more than sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that

Gbemisola knew he was picking up a box of contraband. On

appeal, defendant contends that all of this could be explained

if Gbemisola had been involved in an illegal scheme to import

cultural artifacts, and that it need not necessarily mean he

knew the artifacts contained narcotics. Not only was this

theory not offered at trial, it does not "explain" what happened in this case. The Southeast Asian shippers placed

heroin in the false bottoms of the pots--in an amount (and

value) the jury could reasonably have doubted they would

have entrusted to recipients who thought they were merely

importing artifacts, and in a location that would have been

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particularly risky if an "innocent" recipient had decided to use

the cooking pots for their apparent purpose. See United

States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1997)

(holding that reasonable jury could infer from quantity of

drugs in false bottom of suitcase "that a 'prudent smuggler' is

not likely to entrust such valuable cargo to an innocent

person without that person's knowledge"); United States v.

Herrera, 931 F.2d 761, 763 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that to

sustain conviction it "is not necessary that the evidence

exclude every" innocent explanation for lack of knowledge of

drugs in false suitcase compartment); see also United States

v. Brown, 33 F.3d 1014, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1994) (sustaining

conviction where defendant used false name to pick up United

Parcel Service package containing hidden narcotics).

Gbemisola fares no better with his attack on his joint trial.

First, defendant argues that once the court dismissed the

conspiracy count, there was misjoinder under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 8(b), which provides that:

Two or more defendants may be charged in the same

indictment or information if they are alleged to have

participated in the same act or transaction or in the same

series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or

offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or

more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.

In Schaffer v. United States, however, the Supreme Court

held that if a conspiracy count makes initial joinder of defendants permissible, the mid-trial dismissal of that count does

not render joinder improper under Rule 8(b). 362 U.S. 511,

514-16 (1960); see United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 262

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Indeed, even if there had never been a

conspiracy count in this case, joinder of the remaining counts

was proper because the government "presented evidence that

[defendants'] offenses arose out of their participation in the

same drug distribution scheme." United States v. Halliman,

923 F.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see United States v.

Perry, 731 F.2d 985, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Contrary to

defendant's contention, the charges in Counts Two and Three

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did not refer to "two discrete events which ... were separated by time, location and their participants." Def. Br. at 14.

Rather, everything from the identical nature of the three

boxes and their contents, to the co-defendants' joint travel, to

their possession of documents in each other's names, makes

clear that defendants were involved in a common scheme.

As joinder was proper under Rule 8(b), the remaining

question is whether the district court should nonetheless have

severed the defendants to avoid prejudice, as permitted by

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. See Schaffer, 362

U.S. at 514-15; Clarke, 24 F.3d at 262.4 We review the

court's refusal to do so only for abuse of discretion, see

United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

and we find no abuse here. All of the evidence admitted at

the joint trial could properly have been admitted at a separate trial to show the nature of the drug distribution scheme

in which Gbemisola was an active participant. Hence, no

prejudice arose from the joinder, and the court did not err in

trying the defendants together. See Schaffer, 362 U.S. at

514-15; United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 916-18 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); United States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 56 (D.C. Cir.

1990).

IV

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

__________

4 Rule 14 states in relevant part:

If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the

court may order an election or separate trials of counts,

grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other

relief justice requires.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.

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