Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03896/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03896-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karen Black
Appellant
Merrill Lynch Life Insurance Company
Not Party
Donald Richmond
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3896

___________

Merrill Lynch Life Insurance *

Company, Inc., *

*

Interpleader - Plaintiff. *

____________________________ *

*

Karen Black, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Claimant - Appellant, * District of North Dakota.

*

v. * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Donald Richmond, *

*

Claimant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 24, 2005

Filed: July 20, 2005 (Corrected July 25, 2005)

___________

Before RILEY, BRIGHT, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this interpleader action by the stakeholder, Merrill Lynch Life Insurance

Company (“Merrill Lynch”), two adverse parties claim the proceeds of a $200,000

single premium life insurance policy (now worth about $501,000) obtained in

September 1986 by Lois Richmond (“Lois”). Lois died on March 5, 2003 at age 88.

Appellate Case: 04-3896 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/20/2005 Entry ID: 1930308
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The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of North Dakota.

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Donald Richmond (“Richmond”), who lived with the decedent as her husband for

over twenty years, claimed the policy as the named beneficiary. Lois’ daughter,

Karen Black (“Black”), asserted fraud relating to the policy on the basis that Lois

entered in a marriage with Richmond believing it was valid, when Richmond, in fact,

was still married to another woman. In addition, Black asserted that Richmond

falsely represented that he had been divorced, and that he induced Lois to marry him

in order to be named beneficiary of her later-acquired life insurance policy. Black

claimed further that her mother never would have lived with a man unless they were

married. The district court1

 granted summary judgment and awarded the policy

proceeds to Richmond. Black appeals. We affirm.

In 1982, Lois, Black’s mother, apparently married Richmond in Mexico. In

1986, Lois purchased a life insurance policy from a subsidiary of Merrill Lynch and,

at that time, named Richmond the beneficiary, which Lois could do whether or not

the marriage was valid. 

In March 2003, Richmond notified Merrill Lynch of Lois’ death. Shortly

thereafter Merrill Lynch advised Richmond that Black had contacted the company

alleging that her mother’s marriage to Richmond was fraudulent and void. Black

claimed that the insurance proceeds should be paid to her rather than to the named

beneficiary, Donald Richmond. The beneficiary had never been changed since the

purchase of the policy, about seventeen years earlier.

Merrill Lynch filed an interpleader action in November 2003 to determine the

person entitled to the proceeds of Lois’ policy. The policy’s proceeds were deposited

with the court. With its deposit, Merrill Lynch obtained a dismissal from the district

court.

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Henrietta is still alive but because of age and illness is mentally incompetent

to testify.

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Black alleged in her answer to the interpleader complaint that her mother’s

marriage to Richmond was induced by fraud as Richmond and his wife, Henrietta

Richmond (“Henrietta”), were never divorced.2

 Black alleged that Richmond,

through the invalid marriage which Lois thought was valid, fraudulently induced Lois

to name Richmond as the beneficiary of the policy.

Richmond initially filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district

court denied. After additional discovery, the district court granted Richmond

summary judgment entitling him to the policy proceeds.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards

as the district court: whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Barrera v. Con Agra, Inc.,

244 F.3d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 2001). 

On appeal, Black argues the district court erred in granting Richmond summary

judgment because there exist genuine issues of fact relating to fraud by Richmond,

and the naming of Richmond as beneficiary of the policy.

After carefully reviewing the record, we determine that the district court

correctly decided that no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial. Black’s

complaint alleged that Richmond fraudulently induced her mother, Lois, to marry

him, and that Lois would not have named Richmond as beneficiary had she known

the marriage was invalid. The district court correctly determined that no evidence

existed that Richmond falsely represented that he and Henrietta were divorced, or that

Lois, through Richmond’s false representation, was induced to live with Richmond

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As we have noted, at her death Lois was almost 89 years old and Richmond

was approximately 85 years old. Richmond was named beneficiary on the policy

approximately 17 years earlier and no change was ever made. The failure to change

the beneficiary may mean that the bulk of the policy proceeds could remain in

Richmond’s estate upon his death. A single premium life insurance policy functions

in many ways as an attractive investment permitting the interest earned on the original

deposit, if not withdrawn, to increase the value of the investment without income tax

consequences. Lois’ last will dated November 8, 2001named Black as the special

recipient of “savings and investment accounts of any nature.” Black made no claim

in this case that such a provision applied to the funds here in question.

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as his wife, at a time before the policy was issued. With or without a legal marriage,

Lois could name Richmond, with whom she lived as though he was her husband, as

beneficiary of the policy. Fraud cannot be a matter of surmise or speculation.

We conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment on the

record made in this case. Accordingly, we affirm.3

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3896 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/20/2005 Entry ID: 1930308