Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07096/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee
Pamela Melvin
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PAMELA MELVIN,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7096

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 13-2986, Judge Robert N. Davis.

______________________ 

Decided: December 14, 2015 

______________________ 

 PAMELA MELVIN, Fayetteville, NC, pro se.

 MARTIN M. TOMLINSON, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by SCOTT D. AUSTIN, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., BENJAMIN C. MIZER; CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, Y. KEN 

Case: 15-7096 Document: 20-2 Page: 1 Filed: 12/14/2015
2 MELVIN v. MCDONALD

LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM 

Pamela Melvin appeals from a decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans 

Court”) dismissing Ms. Melvin’s appeal in part as timebarred. We conclude that the decision of the Veterans 

Court was in this respect erroneous as the appeal was not 

time-barred. However, as Ms. Melvin argues, the Board 

decision was non-final, and thus Ms. Melvin’s appeal was 

premature. On this ground we affirm the dismissal of her 

appeal in the Veterans Court. 

BACKGROUND

In 2001, Ms. Melvin submitted to the VA a serviceconnected disability claim for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In a decision dated January 6, 2010, the 

Board of Veterans Appeals (“the Board”) denied the claim. 

The Board decision was initially mailed to an incorrect 

address, but Ms. Melvin acknowledges receiving a copy on 

March 6, 2012. By statute, Ms. Melvin had 120 days from 

receipt of the decision to appeal, that is, until July 4, 

2012. Within the 120-day appeal period, on April 13, 

2012, Ms. Melvin submitted a filing with the Board that 

the Board construed as two separate motions: (1) a motion 

to vacate the Board decision based on alleged substantive 

errors; and (2) a motion to vacate pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 

§ 20.904(a) based on an alleged violation of Ms. Melvin’s 

procedural due process rights. The filing of a motion to 

vacate rendered the Board decision non-final, and thus 

non-appealable. 

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MELVIN v. MCDONALD 3

In an October 4, 2012, letter, the Board purported to 

deny Ms. Melvin’s motion to vacate based on alleged

procedural due process violations. The letter informed 

Ms. Melvin that it had construed her arguments based on 

alleged substantive errors in the Board’s decision as a 

CUE motion, which it was going to address separately. A 

subsequent October 11, 2012, letter from the Board informed Ms. Melvin that the motion to vacate (construed 

as a CUE motion) could not be considered until the Board 

decision became final. 

On October 11, 2013, Ms. Melvin filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court. The court held that because the Board never took action on the substantive

motion to vacate, the Board decision in that respect

remained non-final, and Ms. Melvin’s appeal based on 

substantive challenges was unripe. The court therefore 

dismissed the appeal on this ground. As for Ms. Melvin’s

procedural due process arguments, the Veterans Court 

found that the Board had rejected them in its October 4, 

2012, letter to her, and thus the appeal in this respect 

was untimely, requiring dismissal of her appeal on this 

ground. 

Ms. Melvin appeals only the Veterans Court’s dismissal of her due process arguments. We have jurisdiction 

under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. See Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 

1154, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 679 

(2013); Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1381–82 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002). We review questions of law de novo. Smith v. 

Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We may not 

review factual determinations or applications of law to 

fact. Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the government commendably agrees that 

the Veterans Court erred in treating Ms. Melvin as havCase: 15-7096 Document: 20-2 Page: 3 Filed: 12/14/2015
4 MELVIN v. MCDONALD

ing filed two separate motions and two appeals and in

dismissing her procedural appeal as untimely. The two 

motions should have been treated as one single motion 

arguing on two separate grounds. The filing of the motion 

within 120 days of receipt of the Board decision rendered

that decision non-final until the motion was denied. See 

Linville v. West, 165 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 

Browne v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 278, 283 (Vet. App. 

2002). Because the substantive challenge (as opposed to 

the procedural challenge) has not yet been resolved by the 

Board, Ms. Melvin’s appeal was premature, as she argues. 

Section 7266(a) of title 38 provides that a person must 

file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court within 120 

days after receiving “a final decision of the Board.” The 

Board’s October 4, 2012, letter was not a final decision 

within the meaning of the statute. When multiple theories are raised with respect to a single claim, as here, the 

Veterans Court has explained that “the 120-day requirement for filing a Notice of Appeal will not begin to run 

until the Board has denied all theories in support of the 

claim that it has identified for consideration.” Roebuck v. 

Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 307, 315–316 (Vet. App. 2006). 

Here, both parties agree that Ms. Melvin has raised 

only one claim: that she should receive benefits for PTSD. 

That Ms. Melvin’s April 13, 2012, filing raised both procedural and substantive theories to challenge the Board 

Decision does not change the number of underlying 

claims. The Board has yet to deny Ms. Melvin’s substantive challenges. Accordingly, the 120-day requirement for 

appealing Ms. Melvin’s claim did not begin to run on her 

receipt of the October 4, 2012, letter, and the Veterans 

Court erred in holding that her procedural challenge was 

untimely. 

Because the Veterans Court should have dismissed 

Ms. Melvin’s appeal as premature, we affirm the dismisCase: 15-7096 Document: 20-2 Page: 4 Filed: 12/14/2015
MELVIN v. MCDONALD 5

sal of her appeal solely on that ground. Once the Board 

addresses Ms. Melvin’s motion to vacate based on substantive arguments, which we assume that it will do 

promptly, and the Board decision becomes final, Ms. 

Melvin will have 120 days to appeal the Board decision 

based on both procedural and substantive theories. 

Finally, we reject Ms. Melvin’s argument for sanctions

with respect to the case before the Veterans Court. 

Whether sanctions are appropriate is a factual matter 

outside the jurisdiction of this court. El Malik v. McDonald, No. 2015-7060, 2015 WL 4080155, *4 (Fed. Cir. July 

7, 2015) (unpublished). 

AFFIRMED

Costs to appellant. 

Case: 15-7096 Document: 20-2 Page: 5 Filed: 12/14/2015