Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03009/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kerry Newman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 2, 2015 Decided November 17, 2015

No. 15-3009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

KERRY NEWMAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:01-cr-00361-1)

Rion O. Latimore argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellant.

Stephen F. Rickard, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. On the brief were Vincent H. Cohen Jr., 

Acting U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. 

Danello, and Ann K.H. Simon, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Appellant Kerry Newman seeks to 

vacate his conviction for federal wire fraud on the ground that 

his attorney failed to properly advise him about the 

immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The district 

court denied his request partly because it believed he was

unable to show prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, we 

reverse and remand.

I.

A Jamaican citizen, Kerry Newman became a lawful 

permanent resident of the United States in 1980. Many years 

later, in 2001, he pled guilty to one count of federal wire fraud 

for his participation in a real estate “flipping” scheme. Prior to 

and at his plea hearing, his defense attorney failed to advise

him that pleading guilty could affect his immigration status. 

Newman Aff. 2. Indeed, even after the district court warned 

Newman that a guilty plea to the felony offense “could have 

the consequence of deportation or exclusion from admission 

to the United States,” Plea Hr’g Tr. 8–9, his lawyer said 

nothing, see Newman Aff. 2–3.

At sentencing eleven months later, Newman’s attorney

finally did comment on the potential immigration 

consequences of a conviction, although he got the law wrong. 

Both he and the prosecutor indicated that there might be “INS 

implications” if the judge imposed a sentence of more than a 

year and a day, but not if he imposed less. Sentencing Hr’g 

Tr. 8, 18. In fact, Newman’s immigration status turned not on 

his sentence, but on the nature of the crime to which he pled.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (providing that an alien 

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is 

inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that an 

alien convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable). His 

attorney offered this inaccurate view of immigration law

despite the obvious importance Newman placed on the 

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immigration consequences of his conviction. See Sentencing 

Hr’g Tr. at 18 (expressing Newman’s desire to avoid 

immigration consequences). The district court, moreover,

relied on the attorney’s misrepresentations to impose a 

sentence that it believed would be “beneficial to [Newman] 

with respect to the INS.” Id. at 22.

Although Newman subsequently completed his sentence 

and traveled abroad several times without incident, 

immigration authorities stopped him at the U.S. border in 

2007 and charged him as inadmissible based on his conviction 

for a crime involving moral turpitude. Newman retained an

immigration lawyer who informed him that wire fraud did 

indeed qualify as such a crime and that, based on the loss 

amount, his conviction also made him an “aggravated felon”

for immigration purposes. See Newman Aff. 4. She thus 

advised him that he “did not have a chance of getting relief”

and that he should consent to removal. Id. Newman followed 

that advice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to 

Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from 

much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, 

and from the country he had called home for most of his life.

Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray 

of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), it held

that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when 

they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation 

consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, 

Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which 

provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when 

the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. 

Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (recognizing the All Writs Act 

gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to

correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the 

person is no longer in custody). Newman argued that a writ 

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was appropriate because Padilla made it clear that his defense 

attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform

him of, and by affirmatively misadvising him about, the 

potential immigration consequences of his conviction.

While Newman’s petition was pending, however, the

Supreme Court cast a dark cloud over the case. In Chaidez v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), the Court held that 

Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure, at least 

insofar as it required attorneys to advise their clients about the 

risks of deportation. This meant that only defendants whose 

convictions, unlike Newman’s, became final after Padilla

could benefit from its holding. See id. at 1113.

No longer able to rely on his attorney’s failure to counsel 

him about immigration risks, Newman maintained that his 

attorney’s performance was nonetheless deficient in two other

respects. First, he failed to “negotiate an effective plea 

bargain” by neglecting to research and consider immigration 

consequences when negotiating Newman’s plea. Second, he

provided erroneous immigration advice prior to and at 

sentencing. On this latter point, Newman argued that although 

Padilla announced a new rule requiring attorneys to advise 

their clients about deportation risks, it did not announce a new 

rule requiring attorneys to refrain from providing erroneous 

immigration advice. That, he contended, was a constitutional 

duty that predated Padilla.

The district court rejected both arguments. With respect 

to the first alleged deficiency, the court pointed out that 

“before Padilla, Newman’s counsel was not required to 

affirmatively advise him before or at his plea of the possible 

immigration consequences of his plea.” United States v. 

Newman, 74 F. Supp. 3d 484, 489 (D.D.C. 2014). With 

respect to the second alleged deficiency—defense counsel’s

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erroneous immigration advice—the court concluded that

Newman was unable to establish prejudice. Id. “[B]ecause the 

misrepresentations by Newman’s attorney occurred after 

[Newman] already had pled guilty,” the court explained, he 

could not show “that the result of his proceeding would have 

been different absent these post-plea misrepresentations.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The district court therefore 

denied Newman’s petition, although it did so “reluctantly.” 

Id. at 486.

Newman now appeals, advancing the same two bases for 

his ineffective assistance claim.

II.

“A petition for a writ of coram nobis provides a way to 

collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a person . . . who 

is no longer ‘in custody’ and therefore cannot seek habeas 

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241.” Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 

at 1106 n.1. Courts may grant coram nobis relief only in

“extraordinary cases” where it is necessary “to achieve 

justice.” United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, and central

to this case, coram nobis may be used to redress “fundamental 

error[s]” in criminal proceedings, such as violations of the 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. (citing Morgan, 

346 U.S. at 513).

Although courts have articulated several factors that may 

bear on the propriety of granting such relief, see, e.g., United 

States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); United 

States v. Faison, 956 F. Supp. 2d 267, 269 (D.D.C. 2013), the 

parties’ only dispute in this case is whether Newman has

demonstrated a fundamental error warranting the writ. More 

specifically, their sole disagreement focuses on whether 

Newman can show that he was denied effective assistance of 

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counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

To do so, he must show that his lawyer’s performance was 

“deficient” and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687, 694. 

This circuit has yet to resolve the standard of review 

governing ineffective assistance claims. As we recently 

explained in United States v. Shabban, such claims “present[]

mixed questions of law and fact, which are sometimes 

reviewed de novo and sometimes only for abuse of 

discretion.” 782 F.3d 3, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In Shabban, we 

saw “no reason” to resolve the question because the 

defendant’s claim in that case “fail[ed] even under the more 

searching de novo standard.” Id. We likewise have no need to 

resolve that question here because the standard of review has 

no effect on the outcome. 

A.

Newman first contends that his lawyer’s performance

was deficient because he failed to “negotiate an effective plea 

bargain” and to “mitigate harm under the plea agreement.” 

Appellant’s Br. 15. By this, he faults counsel for failing to 

research and consider potential immigration consequences 

when negotiating his plea deal. See id. at 18–20. 

This argument is foreclosed by Padilla and Chaidez. 

Simply put, it makes no sense to suggest that although

defense attorneys had no duty to advise their clients about the 

immigration consequences of pleading guilty prior to Padilla, 

they nonetheless had a duty to research those consequences 

and take them into account when negotiating a plea deal.

Accordingly, even under the more searching de novo 

standard, we conclude that the district court properly rejected 

Newman’s first claim for ineffective assistance.

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B.

We have a different view about Newman’s second 

argument—that his attorney provided ineffective assistance

by affirmatively misrepresenting the potential immigration

consequences of a conviction. The government does not

question the proposition that, at the time Newman was 

convicted, a lawyer’s erroneous immigration advice could 

form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. Oral Arg. 

Rec. 17:35–17:53. Instead, the government focuses on 

whether Newman can show prejudice. It believes he is unable 

to do so because his attorney provided inaccurate advice only

after he pled guilty. In other words, as the government sees it, 

the damage was already done. The district court agreed,

writing that Newman could not show prejudice because “the 

misrepresentations by [his] attorney occurred after he already 

had pled guilty.” Newman, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 489.

But nothing about the temporal relationship between 

Newman’s plea and his attorney’s inaccurate advice

categorically bars Newman from establishing prejudice. After 

all, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Newman

could have withdrawn his plea prior to sentencing for any 

“fair and just reason.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). In our 

view, then, the district court should not have denied the 

petition based solely on the timing of defense counsel’s 

misrepresentations, and we must reverse. See Koon v. United 

States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (reversing because of an error 

of law).

Of course, the burden of establishing prejudice falls 

squarely on Newman’s shoulders. To prevail, he must show a 

reasonable probability that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, he would have sought to 

withdraw his plea and the court would have permitted him to 

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do so. He must also demonstrate a reasonable probability that

after withdrawing his plea he would either have insisted on 

going to trial, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), or

obtained a plea deal with different immigration consequences, 

see Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). To do so,

he must confront, among other things, the fact that he pled 

guilty after the district court expressly warned him that his 

plea could affect his immigration status. See, e.g., In re Sealed 

Case, 488 F.3d 1011, 1016–17 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that 

although trial court’s warning at plea colloquy did not defeat 

defendant’s prejudice claim, it weakened his claim that he 

relied on his attorney’s sentencing prediction when entering 

plea).

Ultimately, we decline to express an opinion on whether 

Newman can carry his burden here and instead remand the 

case to the district court for further consideration. We believe 

this is the best course for several reasons. First, determining 

whether Newman was prejudiced requires resolution of

difficult legal and factual questions, such as whether Newman 

can show he would have had a “fair and just” reason to 

withdraw his plea and whether he can demonstrate he would 

have been able to negotiate a more beneficial plea even 

though the prosecutor never offered one. But because the 

government focused exclusively on the timing of defense 

counsel’s misrepresentations, the parties have not briefed 

these issues, and we thus consider it unwise to reach them. 

Second, given the fact-intensive nature of the prejudice 

inquiry, and given that the district court presided over 

Newman’s earlier criminal proceedings, it is in a far better 

position to evaluate whether Newman suffered any prejudice. 

On this point, we think it not insignificant that the district 

court denied the petition “reluctantly,” perhaps suggesting it 

believed the question was close. Finally, this approach 

comports with our general practice of remanding ineffective 

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assistance claims unless the record “conclusively shows” that 

an appellant is entitled to no relief. See, e.g., United States v. 

Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909–910 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining 

that, in direct appeals, “this court’s general practice is to 

remand the claim for an evidentiary hearing unless the trial 

record alone conclusively shows that the defendant either is or 

is not entitled to relief”). Indeed, the Supreme Court followed

this precise approach in a coram nobis case like this one. See 

Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512 (“Where it cannot be deduced from 

the record whether counsel was properly waived, we think . . . 

this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of coram 

nobis must be heard by the federal trial court.”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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