Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04137/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Kevin Boston
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4137

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

 * Southern District of Iowa. 

Mark Kevin Boston, *

 * 

Defendant - Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: June 11, 2007

 Filed: July 16, 2007

 ____________

Before MURPHY, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

 ____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

The district court1

 found Mark Kevin Boston guilty of producing child

pornography and sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment followed by lifetime

supervised release. Boston appeals, arguing that the district court erred by denying

his suppression motions and by imposing a sentencing enhancement for engaging in

an offense involving sexual contact and that certain of the special conditions of his

supervised release violate his constitutional rights. We affirm.

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On April 10, 2005 at approximately 5:00 pm, off duty Des Moines police

officer Benjamin Ihde was riding his bicycle on the Riverview Park trail when he saw

Boston walking at a slow pace approximately 150 feet ahead of him. Boston was

looking toward the river where a group of adults and children were fishing, and he

appeared to be masturbating. As Ihde came closer to him, Boston turned to the side

and Ihde saw that his penis was exposed. Ihde yelled, "Hey, put that thing away,"

stopped his bike, and identified himself to Boston as a Des Moines police officer. 

Ihde asked Boston for identification. Boston took a backpack off his shoulder

and set it on the ground before reaching into his pocket for his wallet. Ihde asked him

what was inside the backpack, and Boston said it contained a knife and some pictures

of children. Ihde asked, "Are they naughty pictures?" When Boston replied "Yes,"

Ihde told him to step away from the backpack. Ihde opened the bag and saw an 8" x

10" computer printout of a 12 or 13 year old boy with his genitals exposed. He closed

the bag, told Boston to place his hands behind his head, and patted him down to

confirm he did not have any weapons on his person.

After Ihde called police dispatch and requested assistance from on duty officers,

Boston told him he had been urinating when Ihde first saw him, not masturbating.

Officers Ballantini and Carter responded to Ihde's call and took Boston to jail where

they searched his backpack. Inside the bag they found approximately 163 computer

printed pictures of minors engaged in sexual activity, a Polaroid camera and film, a

knife, a pellet gun, two condoms, a jar of petroleum jelly, a box of flushable wipes,

pens, golf balls, and other items. When police searched his home the following day,

they found that Boston had stored hundreds of pictures of child pornography, some

of which matched the printouts found by Ihde in Boston's backpack during his arrest.

The backpack also contained several Polaroid pictures of a juvenile male, Z,

whose penis was exposed. There was also writing on a note card that said, "[Z],

white, no glasses, age 12, small build, going in seventh grade at Harding, size eight

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shoe." Based on the note card description and the Polaroid pictures, Detective Larry

Penland of the Des Moines Police Department's sexual abuse unit was able to identify

Z as a local resident. Penland then arranged to interview Z at Harding Middle School

on April 12, 2005.

Z told Detective Penland that he had been fishing near Riverview Park on

August 13, 2004, when an older white male approached him and started asking a lot

of "weird" sexual questions about his "privates." After being shown the Polaroid

pictures of himself, Z acknowledged that the man had taken pictures of him and

described the camera the man had used. His description matched the camera seized

from Boston on April 10, 2005. Z also said the man had driven a small red car. When

police later went to Boston's residence, they saw a small maroon or red colored Sable

in the driveway. During the interview, Z told Detective Penland that the man 

had touched him in "sick places." He then became very upset and did not want to

explain what he meant in any more detail. 

Detective Penland told Z that he would like to show him a photographic lineup.

Before showing the lineup Penland read Z the department's standard instructions for

pretrial identification. After reading the instructions verbatim and confirming that Z

understood them, Penland showed Z a photographic lineup which contained Boston's

picture and five booking photos from the Polk County jail records. All six

photographs showed male subjects with similar skin color, hair style, and age. Z

looked at the photos for approximately thirty seconds before identifying Boston as the

man from "the pond." When asked how sure he was on a scale of one to ten that

Boston was the right man, Z responded "five." He stated that he did not recognize any

of the other men pictured.

Boston was indicted for producing visual depictions of a minor engaged in

sexually explicit conduct, using materials transported in interstate commerce, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), for receiving child pornography, in violation of 18

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U.S.C. §2252(a)(2), and for possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252(a)(4)(B). Boston waived his right to a jury trial, and prior to trial the

government moved to sever the counts charging receipt and possession of child

pornography. Boston went to trial before the court on the single count of producing

visual depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The district court

found Boston guilty of the production charge and dismissed the receipt and possession

counts on the government's motion at sentencing. 

The district court set Boston's base offense level under the advisory sentencing

guidelines at 32, for sexually exploiting a minor by production of sexually explicit

visual or printed material. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(a). The court then applied a two level

enhancement because the offense involved a minor between the ages of 12 and 16, see

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(B), and another two level enhancement because the offense

involved a sexual act or sexual contact. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A). With a total

offense level of 36 and criminal history V, Boston's advisory guideline range was 300

to 365 months. The district court sentenced him to 360 months imprisonment and

recommended it be served in the sexual offender program at the Federal Medical

Center in Butner, North Carolina. The district court also ordered that Boston be

placed on lifetime supervised release following his term of imprisonment with

eighteen special conditions. Special condition 4 prohibits Boston from viewing,

possessing, or entering a location that sells any form of pornography or sexually

explicit material deemed inappropriate by his probation officer or treatment staff.

Special condition 14 prohibits him from accessing or possessing computers without

prior written approval of his probation officer.

Boston appeals his conviction and sentence. He contends that the district court

should have suppressed the evidence seized from his backpack and house and Z's

pretrial identification, that the district court erred by applying a two level enhancement

for committing a sexual act or sexual contact with the minor, and that his supervised

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"A person who exposes the person's genitals . . . or who commits a sex act in

the presence of or view of a third person, commits a serious misdemeanor, if the

person does so to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either party and the person

knows or reasonably should know that the act is offensive to the viewer."

3

 A Des Moines city ordinance does provide that "no person shall expose [his

penis] to another in any public place . . . ." Des Moines Municipal Code § 70-181; §

86-27(g) (violation is arrestable offense).

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release special conditions 4 and 14 are overbroad and violate his First Amendment

rights.

Boston argues that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence

seized during his April 10, 2005 arrest. He claims Officer Ihde's testimony that he

was masturbating instead of urinating was not credible and could not support the

district court's finding that Ihde had probable cause to arrest him. Boston concedes

that Ihde could have arrested him under Iowa Code § 7-9092

 if he had been

masturbating, but he asserts that the statute requires a sexual motive and would not

authorize an arrest for urinating and that there is no equivalent statute prohibiting

public urination.3

 Boston contends that because Ihde was on a bike wearing

headphones and some trees were in his line of sight, he would not have been able to

tell whether Boston was masturbating or urinating. The government responds that the

district court's decision to credit Ihde's testimony that Boston was masturbating is

virtually unreviewable on appeal and that the arrest was valid as a matter of law.

On an appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we review the district

court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States

v. Black Bear, 422 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2005). Ihde testified at the suppression

hearing that he perceived that Boston was masturbating and this led to his decision to

arrest him. In denying the motion the district court stated that it believed the facts

were as Ihde testified, a determination that is "virtually unreviewable on appeal."

United States v. Hernandez, 281 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

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omitted). The district court found it implausible that "one urinating would keep

walking forward as he urinates." We conclude that the district court did not err in

finding that Boston was masturbating, that Ihde had probable cause to believe he was

violating Iowa Code § 7-909, and that Ihde's arrest was valid. Iowa Code § 804.7

(peace officer may arrest without warrant where a public offense is committed in his

presence); Iowa Code § 701.2 ("public offense" is prohibited by statute and punishable

by fine or imprisonment). Boston's statements to Ihde that he had a knife and naughty

pictures of children in his backpack were not extracted by threats, violence, or

promises and were voluntarily made. See United States v. Gipp, 147 F.3d 680, 683

(8th Cir. 1998). For these reasons Ihde had probable cause both to search Boston and

to search his backpack incident to his arrest. United States v. Oakley, 153 F.3d 696,

698 (8th Cir. 1998). The district court did not err in denying Boston's motion to

suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrest.

Boston also challenges the warrant to search his home. The government argues

that this issue is moot because the court dismissed the counts charging receipt and

possession of child pornography, which were based on evidence discovered in his

residence. We conclude that the issue is not moot because the evidence may have

been considered in imposing the special conditions of supervised release about which

Boston complains. Boston argues that there was not probable cause to support the

search warrant because Ihde's testimony that he was masturbating was mistaken and

the contents of his backpack were discovered after an invalid arrest. If the application

for the warrant had included his statement that he was urinating as it should have, no

warrant would have issued he argues. 

The requirements for a search warrant are well established. Probable cause

exists "when an affidavit [or testimony] in support of the warrant sets forth sufficient

facts to establish that there is a 'fair probability contraband or evidence of' criminal

activity will be found in the particular place to be searched." United States v. Proell,

485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). We have already

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concluded that the district court's finding that Boston was masturbating was not clear

error, that Ihde made a valid arrest, and that the results of the search incident to that

arrest were admissible. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish

probable cause for a search warrant for Boston's residence. Boston fails to show how

inclusion in the warrant of his statement that he had been urinating would have

affected the determination of probable cause given the other evidence. 

Boston argues that Z's pretrial identification of him should have been

suppressed because two of the six persons included in the photographic lineup were

significantly younger than Boston, his photograph was placed first, and because

Detective Penland's extensive involvement in the investigation created an "opportunity

for suggestive verbal and non-verbal cues to the witness" during the lineup process.

The government responds that the six photographs resembled each other and that

neither the lineup nor the administration of the identification was impermissibly

suggestive. The admission of a pretrial identification is reviewed de novo using a two

part test. United States v. Donelson, 450 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2006). The threshold

issue is whether appellant has shown that the identification procedures were

"impermissibly suggestive." Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,

384 (1968)). If such a showing is made, we examine the totality of the circumstances

to determine whether they created a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification." Id. at 773. 

The photographic lineup presented to Z contained pictures of six individuals

with similar physical characteristics and no other identifying information. Id. (citing

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977)). Z was instructed to look at all of the

photos before identifying one, and the order in which the photos were placed was

random. There was no evidence that Penland made any suggestive sounds or gestures

during the photographic lineup, and there is no requirement that such lineups be

administered by officers who are independent from the investigation. Before viewing

the lineup, Z described the perpetrator as a white male and described his camera and

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 "Sexual act" means "the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the

genetalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to

. . . arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D). 

"Sexual contact" means "the intentional touching, either directly or through the

clothing, of the genitalia, anus, . . . or buttocks of any person with an intent to . . .

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3). 

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car in terms that matched Boston's camera and car. The district court did not err in

denying Boston's motion to suppress the pretrial identification.

Boston argues that the district court erred when it enhanced his advisory

guideline range by two levels for an offense involving a sexual act or sexual contact.

Boston claims the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

his contact with Z met the definition of "sexual act" or "sexual contact" under 18

U.S.C. § 2246.4

 The government argues that Z's emotional description of being

touched by Boston in "sick places" coupled with the Polaroid pictures showing Z's

exposed penis constituted sufficient evidence that Boston had touched his penis. We

review a district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Francis, 462

F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court stated at sentencing that it would

have liked to have had direct trial testimony from Z that Boston had touched him, but

after reviewing the record it found that a preponderance of the evidence led to its

finding that Boston had made sexual contact with Z by touching his private parts with

his hand. Considering the circumstances as described by Z, it was logical to infer that

Boston had touched Z's penis for sexual pleasure after convincing him to take his

pants off for pictures. Based upon this record we conclude that the district court did

not err in imposing an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A).

Boston appeals the constitutionality of two of the eighteen special conditions

imposed on his supervised release. Special condition 4 prohibits Boston from

viewing, possessing, or entering any location that sells any form of pornography,

sexually stimulating, or sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by his

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probation officer and/or treatment staff. Special condition 14 prohibits Boston from

accessing or possessing a computer without prior approval of his probation officer.

He argues here, as he did at his sentencing hearing, that these special conditions

violate 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) because they amount to a greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary to achieve their purposes. The government argues these

terms are reasonable and rationally related to his offense. 

We review the district court's imposition of the terms and conditions of

supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d

1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court is afforded wide discretion in imposing

conditions on a defendant's supervised release so long as they meet the requirements

of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir.

2006). 

Under § 3583(d), each condition must be reasonably related to the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,

deterrence of criminal conduct, protection of the public, and treatment of the

defendant's correctional needs. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Furthermore, the condition

may not result in any "greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary" for

the purposes of deterring criminal conduct, protecting the public from the defendant,

and treating the defendant's correctional needs. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Finally, each

condition must be consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).

Special condition 4 provides that Boston 

shall not view or possess any form of pornography, sexually

stimulating or sexually oriented material including books, videos,

magazines, cut-outs or pornography of any kind as deemed

inappropriate by the probation officer and/or treatment staff. You

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shall not enter any location where pornography or erotica are the

primary products for purchase or viewing. You shall not enter any

location where the primary function is to provide adult entertainment.

He argued at his sentencing hearing that this restriction was overbroad and an

unconstitutional restriction of his right of association because it includes a prohibition

on sexually explicit material involving adults while his criminal history includes only

sexual offenses involving minors. He urged the court to limit the restriction to

"pornography involving children." Given Boston's history of sexual offenses and the

desire to deter him from this conduct in the future, the condition in prohibiting his

access to sexually explicit material involving adults is not overly broad. 

Under special condition 14, Boston "shall not have access to or possess a

computer at home or elsewhere without the prior written approval of the U.S.

Probation Officer." A restriction on computer usage does not constitute an abuse of

discretion if the district court has found that the defendant used his computer to do

more than merely possess child pornography, particularly if the prohibition on

computer usage is not absolute. See United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 696 (8th

Cir. 2003). Such findings may be based on any information other than materially false

information. See United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 1999). The

special condition here, prohibiting Boston from accessing or possessing a computer

without written approval of his probation officer, did not constitute an abuse of

discretion because it was not absolute and because evidence was presented at the

suppression hearing that Boston had used a computer to print out images of child

pornography which could easily have been done for the purpose of transferring them

to others. See Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696.

For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

________________________________

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