Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00353/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00353-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent
Hamzeh Obeid
Petitioner
David O. Streiff
Respondent

Document Text:

1 Petitioner describes himself as a native and citizen of Palestine. (Doc. 1, at 2)

However, because Palestine is part of the Occupied Territories of the West Bank of Israel (see

Doc. 11, Declaration of Jaime C. Alfaro, at ¶ 6), this Court adopts the respondents’ description

of petitioner’s citizenship.

2 Petitioner is in the actual and present physical custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. See Rumsfeld v.

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2724, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) (“Whenever a § 2241

habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he

should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.”).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HAMZEH OBEID, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 08-0353-KD-C

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney :

General of the United States, et al., 

:

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Hamzeh Obeid, a Palestinian and native and citizen of Jordan1 ordered

removed from the United States and presently being detained by the United

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arm of the Department

of Homeland Security, has petitioned this Court for habeas relief pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241.2

 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for entry

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of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and

Local Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be GRANTED,

on the basis that the removal of petitioner from the United States is not

reasonably foreseeable, and that petitioner be granted his immediate

supervised release from ICE under conditions to be enumerated by ICE.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Obeid is a Palestinian and a native and citizen of Jordan who

entered the United States on August 6, 1999 on a 6-month B2 visa for

pleasure. (Doc. 11, Declaration of Christopher Sobolewski, at ¶¶ 3-4; see also

Doc. 1, at 2) Obeid overstayed his visa (Doc. 1, at 2) and his June, 2003

request to change his status to lawful permanent resident was denied (Doc. 11,

Sobolewski declar., at ¶ 5). 

2. Obeid has been convicted of three felony offenses since

overstaying his visa. (See Doc. 1, Exhibit A (“Review of your criminal history

reveals six known arrests that resulted in one misdemeanor and three felony

convictions for offenses that include: Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer,

Assault, Criminal Mischief and Sale of Fraudulent Documents.”)) Petitioner

admits in his complaint that, most recently, in the winter of 2007, he entered

a counseled guilty plea to assault in a New Jersey state court and was

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sentenced to a five-year term of probation. (Doc. 1, at 2) 

3. On April 17, 2007, Obeid was arrested and placed into ICE

custody; removal proceedings were begun based upon petitioner’s numerous

criminal convictions and because he was an alien lacking proper

documentation. (See Doc. 1, at 2)

4. “On August 17, 2007, an Immigration Judge issued an order

[that] Obeid be removed from the United States.” (Doc. 11, Sobolewski

declar., at ¶ 7; cf. Doc. 11, Alfaro declar., at ¶ 6 (“Mr. Obeid was ordered

removed to Occupied Territories of West Bank (Israel) [] or in the alternative

to Jordan from the United States by an Immigration Judge on August 1,

2007.”)) Petitioner did not appeal the Immigration Judge’s removal order to

the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 11, Sobolewski declar., at ¶ 7)

5. On more than one occasion since September of 2007, ICE has

contacted the Jordanian Embassy in the United States to obtain travel

documents for Obeid so that petitioner can return to Jordan. (Doc. 11, Alfaro

declar., at ¶¶ 7-13) Jaime Alfaro, a Detention and Deportation Officer in the

Travel Document Unit of ICE, does not identify in his declaration at what

point during the period between March 31, 2008 and July 7, 2008 someone in

the Jordanian Embassy contacted his unit with the information that it was

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3 Apparently because of foot-dragging by the Jordanian Embassy, Alfaro “directed

Field TDU to send a travel document package request to Israel on July 30, 2008 with

documentation of his birth in Israel.” (Id. at ¶ 14)

4

“ready to issue a travel document” and that same would “be sent via DHL.”

(See id. at ¶¶ 10-12) To date, of course, no travel document has been

forthcoming from the Jordanian Embassy. (See id. at ¶¶ 12-13)3

6. On November 20, 2007, ICE reviewed petitioner’s custody status

and determined that his detention should continue. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A)

This letter is to inform you that your custody status has

been reviewed and it has been determined that you will not be

released from the custody of US Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision has been made

based upon a review of your file and/or your personal interview

and in consideration of any information you submitted to the

reviewing officials.

Review of your criminal history reveals six known arrests

that resulted in one misdemeanor and three felony convictions

for offenses that include: Aggravated Assault on a Police

Officer, Assault, Criminal Mischief and Sale of Fraudulent

Documents. It is noted that your first known arrest occurred

when you were not yet 16 years old and you were then arrested

six times within five years. The nature and scope of your

criminal history clearly suggests that you would pose a

significant danger to the community if you were released from

ICE custody. You do not appear to meet the criteria for release

as set forth in 8 CFR 241.4. Therefore, you will not be released

from ICE custody at this time. 

You are advised that you must demonstrate that you are

making reasonable efforts to comply with the order of removal

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4 There is nothing in the record to indicate that the HQCDU made a final

determination regarding Obeid’s custody status on or after February 1, 2008.

5

and that you are cooperating with the ICE efforts to remove you

by taking whatever lawful actions the ICE requests to affect

your removal. You are also advised that any willful failure or

refusal on your part to make timely application in good faith for

travel or other documents necessary for your departure, or any

conspiracy or actions to prevent your removal or obstruct the

issuance of a travel document, may subject you to criminal

prosecution under 8 USC Section 1253(a).

If you have not been removed from the United States or

released from ICE custody by 02/01/2008, your case will be

referred to the Headquarters Custody Determination Unit

(HQCDU), 800 K St. N.W., Washington, DC 20536. HQCDU

will make a final determination regarding your custody status.4

(Id. (footnote added))

7. Obeid has not only cooperated with ICE to effectuate his

removal from this country (see Doc. 11, Alvaro declar., at ¶ 7 (“Mr. Obeid was

required to assist the field office in acquiring a travel document. He produced

all his documentation, including a Jordanian passport, to acquire a travel

document to Jordan and it was presented to the Jordan[ian] consulate on

September 6, 2007.”)), but, as well, has sought asylum, albeit unsuccessfully,

in both Israel and Germany (Doc. 1, Exhibits B & C). 

8. Obeid filed his petition seeking habeas corpus relief, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241, in this Court on June 19, 2008 (Doc. 1), some fourteen (14)

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months after being taking into ICE custody. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2498,

150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Supreme Court determined that “§ 2241 habeas

corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional

challenges to post-removal-period detention.” 

2. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the post-removalperiod detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “read in light of the Constitution’s

demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United

States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. at

2498. 

3. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered

removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when

an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall

remove the alien from the United States within a period

of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal

period”).

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(B) Beginning of period

 The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal

becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final

order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration process), the date

the alien is released from detention or

confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in detention

during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses

to make timely application in good faith for travel or

other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or

conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to

an order of removal.

(2) Detention

During the removal period, the Attorney General

shall detain the alien. Under no circumstances during the

removal period shall the Attorney General release an

alien who has been found inadmissible under section

1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

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Id. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court in Zadvydas concluded that six

months represents a presumptively reasonable period of time to detain a

removable alien awaiting deportation pursuant to the provisions of this statute.

533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. at 2505 (“While an argument can be made for

confining any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that when Congress shortened

the removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably

foreseeable removals could be accomplished in that time. We do have reason

to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of

detention for more than six months. . . . Consequently, for the sake of uniform

administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-

month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And

for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’

conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does

not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To

the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

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future.”); see Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the sixmonth period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.”).

4. In this case, the federal respondents implicitly concede, as they

must, that the presumptively reasonable six-month detention period has long

since passed. (See Doc. 11, at 4 (“The Court of Appeals has held that Zadvydas

does not set out a per se rule that mandates an alien’s release after six

months.”)) Obeid’s six-month presumably reasonable removal period began

on September 17, 2007, the date the order of removal became administratively

final, compare 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(c) (2007) (“An order of removal made by the

immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the

Act shall become final: . . . [u]pon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal

if the respondent does not file an appeal within that time[.]”) with 8 C.F.R. §

1003.38(b) (“The Notice of Appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals of

Decision of Immigration Judge [] shall be filed directly with the Board of

Immigration Appeals within 30 calendar days after the stating of an

Immigration Judge’s oral decision or the mailing of an Immigration Judge’s

written decision.”), and expired on or about March 17, 2008. Approximately

three months elapsed between the end of petitioner’s presumptively-reasonable

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detention period and the filing of the instant habeas corpus petition and another

two and one-half (21⁄2) months has elapsed since the filing of the petition with

the federal respondents unable to make any realistic prediction when Obeid

will be repatriated to his native Jordan (or Israel) (see Doc. 11, Alfaro declar.,

at ¶¶ 10-15 (“On March 31, 2008, Field TDU contacted the [Jordanian]

Embassy by telephone, but was unable to leave a voice message because the

voice mailbox was full. The Embassy contacted Field TDU to indicate that it

is ready to issue a travel document and that it will be sent via DHL. As of July

7, 2008, the travel document was still pending per the Embassy. On July 30,

2008, additional information was also sent to the Jordanian Consulate to

finalize the travel document and Jordan gave no indication that a travel

document would not be forthcoming. In the alternative, I directed Field TDU

to send a travel document package request to Israel on July 30, 2008 with

documentation of his birth in Israel. It is my experience that Israel requires

approximately six months to review the travel document package and issue a

travel document.”)). Accordingly, Obeid has been in ICE custody now for

some sixteen (16) months since April 17, 2007, twelve and one-half of which

he has endured since being ordered removed to his native Jordan (or Israel).

5. In Zadvydas, supra, the Supreme Court indicated that “[a]fter

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this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there

is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And

for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’

conversely would have to shrink.” 533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. at 2505; see also

id. at 699-700, 121 S.Ct. at 2405 (“[T]he habeas court must ask whether the

detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.

It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s basic

purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.

Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued

detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.”). 

6. The undersigned concludes that Obeid has provided good reason

to believe that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner has now been detained by ICE

awaiting removal for over 16 months (twelve and one-half of which has

elapsed since the Immigration Judge ordered his removal)--well in excess of

the six-month presumptively reasonable period--with no assurance received

from either the Jordanian Embassy (or the Israeli Embassy) in Washington,

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5 Sobolewski is a Deportation Officer for ICE. (Doc. 11, Sobolewski declar., at ¶ 1)

12

D.C. that a travel document is forthcoming. See Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft,

215 F.Supp.2d 37, 48 (D. D.C. 2002) (“Based on this record of the continued

detention of petitioner awaiting removal for well over three years (far in excess

of the six-month presumptively reasonable period), with no success by the INS

(and arguably little effort) in obtaining travel documents, the Court concludes

that petitioner has met his burden of showing ‘good reason to believe that there

is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”)).

For its part, ICE has not provided sufficient evidence to rebut Obeid’s

showing. The August 14, 2008 declaration statement of Jaime Alfaro that

Obeid will be removed to Jordan (or Israel) once a travel document is

finalized, as well as the similar declaration statement from Christopher

Sobolewski5

 on August 21, 2008 (Doc. 11, Sobolewski declar., at ¶ 12 (“As

recently as July 2008 contact[s] [with] Jordanian Consulate officials have

indicated that travel documents are pending to secure Obeid’s removal.”)), do

nothing but underscore petitioner’s showing that there is no significant

likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future given that ICE

officials, with petitioner’s assistance, have been trying to obtain a travel

document from the Jordanian Embassy for almost one year (Doc. 11, Alfaro

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6 Perhaps the Jordanian Embassy’s hesitancy in issuing a travel document has

something to do with the fact that Obeid was born in Israel.

13

declar., at ¶ 7 (“Mr. Obeid was required to assist the field office in acquiring

a travel document. He produced all his documentation, including a Jordanian

passport, to acquire a travel document to Jordan and it was presented to the

Jordan[ian] consulate on September 6, 2007.”)) and have recently shifted gears

to try to obtain a travel document from Israel (Doc. 11, Alvaro declar., at ¶¶

14 & 15 (“In the alternative, I directed Field TDU to send a travel document

package request to Israel on July 30, 2008 with documentation of his birth in

Israel.6

 It has been my experience that Israel requires approximately six

months to review the travel document package and issue a travel document.”).

See Andreasyan v. Gonzales, 446 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2006)

(“Petitioner has now been detained for more than eight months since his order

of removal became final on November 17, 2005. Given the time that has

passed since the R & R without the production of travel documents, and given

that six weeks have passed since Respondents’ last request for a ‘few more

weeks,’ this Court now finds that the Government has not responded with

enough evidence to rebut Petitioner’s claim that removal is not likely in the

reasonably foreseeable future.”).

7. It is clear to the undersigned not only that there is no significant

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7 The respondents have offered absolutely no evidence that petitioner has ever been

on supervised release with ICE, much less that he failed to report.

14

likelihood of Obeid’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future but, as well,

that his continued detention does not meet the purposes of the statute. As

recognized in Zadvydas, supra, the purposes of the statute are ensuring the

alien’s presence at the moment of removal and preventing danger to the

community. See 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. at 2499 (citation omitted). The

respondents have parenthetically argued that “[p]etitioner’s most recent arrest

and his failure to report while on supervised release with ICE,7

 establish both

a reason to doubt that he will voluntarily present himself for removal and a

reason to believe that he presents a risk to the community of further criminal

activity.” (Doc. 11, at 3 n.1 (footnote added); see id. at 3 & 4, n.2

(“Petitioner’s prior felony convictions in New Jersey and the fact that these

convictions occurred while he overstayed as a visitor in the United States are

reason to doubt that he will voluntarily present himself for removal and reason

to believe that he presents a risk to the community of further criminal

activity.”)) 

But by definition the first justification-preventing flight-is weak

or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best.

As this Court said in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct.

1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), where detention’s goal is no

longer practically attainable, detention no longer “bear[s] [a]

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reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was]

committed.” Id., at 738, 92 S.Ct., at 1845.

The second justification-protecting the community-does

not necessarily diminish in force over time. But we have upheld

preventive detention based on dangerousness only when limited

to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong

procedural protections. . . . In cases in which preventive

detention is of potentially indefinite duration, we have also

demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied by

some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that

helps to create the danger.

533 U.S. at 690-691, 121 S.Ct. at 2499. 

8. Given the risk-of-flight analysis by the Supreme Court in

Zadvydas, the argument made by the federal respondents in this case is

adequately countered by the undersigned’s earlier determination that

petitioner’s removal from this country is not reasonably foreseeable. 

9. Relevant to the respondents’ argument that petitioner represents

a danger to the community, the Supreme Court indicated in Zadvydas that

“once the flight risk justification evaporates, the only special circumstance

present is the alien’s removable status itself, which bears no relation to a

detainee’s dangerousness.” 533 U.S. at 691-692, 121 S.Ct. at 2499 (citations

omitted). While petitioner’s most recent arrest for assault does constitute a

crime of violence, that the State of New Jersey chose to punish him with a

term of probation, rather than a term of imprisonment, and release him into the

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community speaks volumes against a finding that he is a specially dangerous

person. Moreover, there is no evidence of any attendant special circumstance

in this case, such as mental illness or a volitional impairment. Accordingly, the

respondents’ danger-to-the-community argument need be rejected.

10. In light of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this

Court release petitioner from custody, subject to reasonable conditions ICE

deems necessary to ensure Obeid’s appearance and return--including those set

forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a)--pending the issuance of a travel document by the

Jordanian Embassy (or the Israeli Embassy) to effectuate his removal to his

native country. See Zadvydas, supra, 533 U.S. at 700, 121 S.Ct. at 2504

(“[T]he alien’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various

forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the

alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation of those

conditions.”).

CONCLUSION

It is recommended that this Court grant Hamzeh Obeid’s habeas corpus

petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and order his immediate supervised

release under conditions set forth by the ICE arm of 

the Department of Homeland Security.

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The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain

important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 2nd day of September, 2008.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

_S/WILLIAM E. CASSADY___________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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