Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-01666/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-01666-16/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sullivan R. From
Plaintiff
David Hawkins
Defendant
Placer County Office of Education
Defendant
Rocklin Unified School District
Defendant
Alicia Wagnon
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALICIA WAGNON, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROCKLIN UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:17-cv-01666 CSK

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS IN LIMINE

(ECF Nos. 85, 95)

Plaintiffs Alicia Wagnon and Sullivan R. From bring this action against Defendants 

Rocklin Unified School District (“RUSD”), Placer County Office of Education (“PCOE”)

and David Hawkins asserting state and federal law violations arising from alleged 

abused suffered by From while receiving special education services from Defendants. 

See generally Compl. (ECF No. 1); 10/31/2024 Amended Final Pretrial Order at 2-3

(ECF No. 111) (listing claims). This case is set for a jury trial beginning November 4, 

2024. In advance of the trial, Defendants have filed five motions in limine, which Plaintiffs 

oppose. Defs. Mot. (ECF No. 85); Defs. MIL No. 5 (ECF No. 95); Pls. Opp’n (ECF No.

88); Pls. Opp’n to MIL No. 5 (ECF No. 105).

1 Hearings were held on October 15, 2024

1 At the October 15, 2024 Final Pretrial Conference and motion in limine hearing, 

Defendants raised their objections to testimony by Plaintiffs’ non-retained expert Heather 

Conn. The Court provided Defendants until close of business October 18, 2024 to file a

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and October 30, 2024 on Defendants’ motions in limine. Attorney Allison Hyatt appeared 

on behalf of Plaintiffs and Attorney Carol Wieckowski appeared on behalf of Defendants. 

(ECF Nos. 91, 110.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions in limine are 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

“The Supreme Court has recognized that a ruling on a motion in limine is

essentially a preliminary opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district 

court.” United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999). “A motion in 

limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a 

particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). “Motions in 

limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored, and such issues are 

better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises.” Brown v. 

Kavanaugh, 2013 WL 1124301, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. DEFENDANTS’ FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE: WAGNON’S TESTIMONY RE: 

NEGLIGENCE CLAIM

In their first motion in limine, Defendants move to exclude any testimony by 

Wagnon relating to her negligence claim against Hawkins. Defs. Mot. at 4-6. Defendants 

argue that Wagnon does not have a viable negligence claim because she is neither a 

direct victim, nor does she fall within the limits of bystanders entitled to a duty of care 

from Hawkins. Id. at 5-6. Defendants argue there is no case law or statute to support 

Wagnon’s position that she, as From’s mother, is entitled to a duty of care from a bus 

driver. Id. at 4. Defendants argue instead that a school’s duty of care when supervising 

students is owed only to students and not to parents. Id. Accordingly, Defendants seek 

to exclude Wagnon’s testimony related to her emotional distress damages and wage 

loss damages. Id.

Wagnon concedes she is not asserting a negligence claim against Hawkins based 

fifth motion in limine to exclude Conn’s testimony, with Plaintiff’s opposition due by close 

of business October 24, 2024. 

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on bystander liability. Pls. Opp’n at 9. Wagnon instead argues she has a viable 

negligence claim as a direct victim against Hawkins because of the “special relationship 

RUSD and Hawkins had with [From] and Wagnon in providing special education 

transportation services to [From].” Id. at 9 (citing Compl. ¶ 63). Plaintiff asserts there is 

case law to support the proposition that a school owes a duty of care not only to its 

students but also to parents because the school stands “in loco parentis.” Id. (citing R.N. 

by & Through Neff v. Travis Unified Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 7227561 at *8-9, 15 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 8, 2020)). Wagnon argues a parent can state a negligence claim against school 

districts and individual school district defendants “based on alleged harm directly 

suffered by the parents as a result of a defendant’s action or inaction regarding their 

child.” Id. (citing Zuccaro v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 10807692, at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 27, 2016)). 

To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show that a 

“defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach 

was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 

47 Cal.3d 278, 292 (1988). Whether a defendant has a duty is a threshold issue that is a 

question of law. See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 213 (2021); Burgess v. 

Superior Ct., 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 (1992). “In a case involving harm caused by a third 

party, a person may have an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another's harm if 

that person is in what the law calls a ‘special relationship’ with either the victim or the 

person who created the harm.” Brown, 11 Cal.5th at 215. “As a matter of law, a school 

owes a duty of care not only to its students, but also to parents because the school 

stands ‘in loco parentis’ and the students’ care is ‘entrusted to’ them.” R.N. by & through 

Neff, 2020 WL 7227561, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Phyllis v. Superior Ct., 183 

Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1196 (Ct. App. 1986)). “Negligence requires that the school knew or 

should have known of a foreseeable risk of harm to [the student].” Kauhako v. Hawaii 

Bd. of Educ. Dep't of Educ., 744 F. App'x 344, 347 (9th Cir. 2018).

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Hawkins owed Wagnon a duty of care in: 

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(1) “providing special education transportation services to [From]”; (2) in “delivering 

special education services to [From]”; and (3) in preventing “harm to [From] at the hands 

of anyone, including H[awkins].” Compl. ¶ 63. The Complaint sufficiently alleges duty

owed to Wagnon based on a “special relationship” with RUSD and with Hawkins, thereby 

giving her standing to pursue this claim against Hawkins. See C.A. v. William S. Hart 

Union High Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 4th 861, 870 (2012) (“[T]he duty of care owed by school 

personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from 

foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally.”); see 

also R.N. by & through Neff, 2020 WL 7227561, at *8 (denying district defendants’ 

motion to dismiss finding that parents of the injured student had standing to pursue their 

separate claims of negligence against all district defendants, including a special 

education teacher, based on a “special relationship” between the parents and the district 

defendants); Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 80 Cal. App. 5th 528, 

537 (2022) (“Special relationship” does not necessarily end with the classroom day but 

may extend to “school-related or encouraged functions.”)

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled an existence of a “special 

relationship” between her and Hawkins, the Court DENIES Defendants’ first motion in 

limine. See Phyllis, 183 Cal.3d at 1197 (where special relationship between teachers 

and parents existed, mother could recover emotional distress damages as a direct victim 

on negligence claim).2

III. DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE: HAWKINS’ FAILURE TO 

FOLLOW IEP OR BIP

In their second motion in limine, Defendants move to exclude any testimony or 

evidence related to Hawkins’ failure to follow From’s Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) or 

Behavior Intervention Plan (“BIP”). Defs. Mot. at 6-9. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ 

2 To the extent Defendants continue to assert that Wagnon has not established 

negligence against Hawkins, at trial, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide other 

avenues to raise such challenges. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (motion for judgment as 

a matter of law).

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claims for monetary damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the 

Rehabilitation Act § 504 are not viable because From’s IEP and BIP do not provide 

special education services while From rides the bus and because there is no case law or 

statute requiring a bus driver to follow an IEP or BIP. Id. at 7-8. Additionally, Defendants 

argue Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish Hawkins’ actions were intentionally 

discriminatory or that he acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 9. Plaintiffs oppose the 

motion arguing that From’s claims under the ADA and § 504 are brought against RUSD 

and not Hawkins. Pls. Opp’n at 10. Plaintiffs argue Defendants were aware From needed 

behavior intervention accommodations to be implemented in all school settings, 

including From’s bus ride to and from school, because it was included in From’s IEP. Id.

Plaintiffs further argue that because RUSD and PCOE chose not to train Hawkins on 

behavior response techniques to be used with From during school transportation 

services, this establishes their deliberate indifference in providing reasonable 

accommodations to From. Id.

To bring a suit under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act § 504, a plaintiff must show: 

“(1) the child is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was denied a reasonable 

accommodation that she needs to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits of public 

services; and (3) the program providing the benefit receives federal financial assistance.” 

McIntyre v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 976 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 2020). “A public entity can 

be liable for damages under Section 504 or the ADA ‘if it intentionally or with deliberate 

indifference fails to provide meaningful access or reasonable accommodation to 

disabled persons.’“ Id. (quoting A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 

F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2016)). “The plaintiff establishes the requisite knowledge (or 

notice) on behalf of the defendant when she shows that she ‘alerted the public entity to 

her need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious or 

required by statute or regulation).’” A.G., 815 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Duvall v. Cnty. of 

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 11, 

2001)). Testimony or evidence related to Hawkins’ failure to follow From’s IEP or BEP is 

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relevant to whether Defendants acted with intentional or deliberate indifference in 

providing From meaningful access or reasonable accommodation in his bus rides to and 

from school. The Court DENIES Defendants’ second motion in limine.

IV. DEFENDANTS’ THIRD MOTION IN LIMINE: WAGNON’S OPINIONS

In their third motion in limine, Defendants seek to exclude Wagnon from giving 

opinion testimony regarding: (1) Hawkins’ conduct and intent on the bus; and (2) From’s 

emotional thought process in response to Hawkins’ actions toward him. Defs. Mot. at 9-

11. Defendants argue Wagnon will likely testify about her observations when watching 

the bus surveillance videos related to the incident and give her opinion on Hawkins’ 

motivation and intent towards From, as well as her observations regarding From’s

thought process and/or emotional reactions to Hawkins’ conduct. Id. Defendants 

specifically point to Wagnon’s deposition testimony as examples of impermissible 

testimony. Defs. Supp. Br. Re: MIL No. 3 (ECF No. 94 at 5-6).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness may testify to opinions 

that are: (a) “rationally based on the witness's perception;” (b) “helpful to clearly 

understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue;” and (c) “not 

based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” within the scope of expert 

testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 701. Lay opinion testimony is admissible only if it is 

helpful to the fact-finding process.

First, Wagnon may not testify as to Hawkins’ intent, including testifying that 

Hawkins retaliated against From. Such testimony is unhelpful, speculative, and improper 

opinion testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. Plaintiffs have essentially conceded this point. 

Pls. Opp’n at 11 (“Plaintiffs agree Wagnon will not offer her opinions as to the intent of 

Hawkins’ actions toward From as proof of his intent.”). The Court also notes that it 

previously addressed a similar issue at summary judgment. 7/5/2023 Order at 13-15 

(ECF No. 76).

Second, Wagnon may not testify as to Hawkins’ conduct that she did not directly 

observe because it would be unhelpful, speculative, and improper opinion testimony. 

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See Fed. R. Evid. 701. The parties intend to present videos that depict Hawkins’

conduct.

Third, as to Wagnon’s testimony regarding From’s reactions and behavior in 

response to Hawkins’ conduct, Plaintiffs argue it would be prejudicial to exclude such 

testimony given From is nonverbal and Wagnon, as From’s mother, is “certainly qualified 

to testify as to her observations regarding From’s vocalizations, facial expressions, 

posture, and repetitive movements exhibited in the videos and her experiences as to 

what they mean.” Pls. Opp’n at 12. The Court agrees that Wagnon’s testimony regarding 

From’s reactions and behavior in response to Hawkins’ conduct may be helpful to the 

jury, especially given that From is nonverbal. 

Wagnon may not, however, testify as to a diagnosis, opinion, or the cause of 

From’s alleged injuries. See Howell v. Burns, 2021 WL 4975187, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26,

2021) (plaintiff prohibited from testifying “regarding a diagnosis, prognosis, opinions, 

inferences, or causation of his alleged injuries as he has no medical expertise, training, 

or education”); see also Crawford v. City of Bakersfield, 944 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 

2019) (Mother of deceased son killed by police could testify as a lay witness regarding 

her observations of her son’s past symptoms of mental illness because the evidence 

was relevant to the likely conduct of the deceased on the day at issue and therefore to 

the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct but had to stop “short of opining [her son] 

had a mental illness.”).

Therefore, Defendants’ third motion in limine is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART. Wagnon may not testify as to Hawkins’ intent. As to Hawkins’ conduct, 

Wagnon may not testify regarding conduct that she did not directly observe. Wagnon 

may testify as to From’s behavior and reactions to Hawkins’ conduct. Wagnon may not, 

however, testify as to a diagnosis, opinion, or the cause of From’s alleged injuries.

V. DEFENDANTS’ FOURTH MOTION IN LIMINE: BUS ROUTE 32

In their fourth motion in limine, Defendants move to exclude any evidence that 

RUSD’s management of bus route 32 was intended to discriminate against From. Defs. 

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Mot. at 11-12. Defendants argue “any evidence about [From]’s commute” would be 

prejudicial if mentioned at trial because these allegations were not pled in Plaintiffs’ 

complaint and because it would cause an “undue consumption of court time to refute.” 

Id. at 12. At the hearing, Defendants argued Plaintiffs seek to raise a new theory not 

previously raised in the Complaint and should therefore be excluded from presenting any 

evidence on this new theory. Plaintiffs confirmed at the hearing that they will not be 

arguing or presenting evidence that Defendants tried to give From the longest bus ride. 

Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the evidence related to the bus route is to establish 

deliberate indifference pursuant to their ADA and Rehabilitation Act § 504 claims and as 

to damages. Given Plaintiffs confirmed that they will not be presenting a new theory and 

that there is no issue regarding the length of the bus route, the Court DENIES

Defendants’ fourth motion in limine. 

VI. DEFENDANTS’ FIFTH MOTION IN LIMINE: EXCLUDE HEATHER CONN

In their fifth motion in limine, Defendants move to exclude Plaintiff’s non-retained 

expert Heather Conn from testifying because though she is proffered to provide opinions 

formed outside the context of her employment with RUSD, Plaintiffs failed to produce a

written expert report for Conn as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). 

Defs. MIL No. 5 (ECF No. 95). Plaintiffs argue that Conn was properly designated as a 

non-retained expert under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) and that she is “not specially employed or 

retained to give expert testimony.” Pls. Opp’n MIL No. 5 at 4 (ECF No. 105). Plaintiffs 

further argue that Conn’s testimony falls within “her involvement in the case from before 

the litigation commenced,” Defendants themselves disclosed Conn as a witness, and 

Defendants had the opportunity to question Conn at her deposition. Id. at 4-5.

Conn’s proposed testimony falls into two categories: (1) her percipient knowledge 

as a RUSD Board Certified Behavior Analyst in 2016-2017; and (2) her opinions based 

on materials she reviewed after her employment ended with RUSD and provided in 

preparation for this litigation. First, her proposed testimony based on her percipient 

knowledge, including the trainings she conducted in 2016-2017 as a RUSD Board 

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Certified Behavior Analyst is permissible lay testimony. See, e.g., Defs. MIL No. 5, Exh. 

A (“Conn Depo”) at 37 (ECF No. 95 at 7-27) (conducted trainings with RUSD’s 

transportation department between 2016-2017); 38 (Conn did not talk about behavior 

intervention plans during her 2016 training); 39 (during a 2016 training, Conn did not talk 

about BIPs because she supported Tier 1 interventions for all students and BIPs were in 

a Tier 3 support). Defendants conceded at the hearing that this testimony was 

permissible. The Court DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to exclude as to Conn’s 

testimony based on her percipient knowledge as a RUSD Board Certified Behavior 

Analyst in 2016-2017.

The second category of Conn’s proposed testimony— opinions regarding From’s 

IEP, From’s BIP, the bus surveillance videos, and whether From’s BIP was being 

followed by Hawkins and school staff in those videos— is expert testimony because it is 

based on specialized knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26(a)(2) requires a party to identify any witness it may use at trial to present expert 

evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A).

As well as disclosing the identity of expert witnesses, a party must disclose additional 

information about each expert witness's potential testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(2)(B)-(C). A written report is required “if the witness is one retained or specially 

employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's 

employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Under 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B), an expert witness must prepare and sign a written report that satisfies 

several requirements, including providing “(i) a complete statement of all opinions the 

witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts or data considered 

by the witness in forming them;” (iii) exhibits used to summarize or support the opinions; 

(iv) the witness’s qualifications, including all publications authored in the last 10 years; 

(v) a list of all cases in which the witness testified during the previous 4 years as an 

expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) the witness’s compensation for the case. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Alternatively, expert witnesses that fall under Rule 

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26(a)(2)(C), must disclose only “the subject matter on which the witness is expected to 

present evidence,” and “a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is 

expected to testify.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). 

Plaintiffs designated Conn as an expert in their Initial Expert Witness Disclosures 

as follows: 

Heather Conn was the Board Certified Behavior Analyst 

employed by Defendant Rocklin Unified School District during 

the time period relevant to the Complaint and is being 

designated as an unretained expert by Plaintiffs. Ms. Conn is 

expected to provide expert testimony, consistent with her 

testimony provided during her deposition, regarding Plaintiff 

From’s Individualized Education Plan, including his Behavior 

Intervention Plan (BIP), and her opinion as to how and when 

Plaintiff From’s BIP was to be followed and the effects, if any, 

of not following his BIP. Ms. Conn is also expected to provide 

testimony regarding her observations of the bus surveillance

videos of Plaintiff From’s bus rides to and from school and 

whether his BIP was being followed by school staff, including 

Defendant David Hawkins, in those videos.

(ECF No. 53 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs did not disclose a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) written expert report for 

Conn. Plaintiffs’ witness list describes Conn’s anticipated testimony at trial as follows: 

Ms. Conn is expected to provide expert testimony regarding 

S.R.F.’s IEP and BIP, and her opinion as to how and when 

Plaintiff From’s BIP was to be followed and the effects of not

following his BIP. Ms. Conn is also expected to provide 

testimony regarding her observations of the bus surveillance 

videos of S.R.F’s bus rides to and from school and whether 

his BIP was being followed by school staff, including 

Defendant David Hawkins, in those videos.

(ECF No. 84-1 at 5.)

Conn’s opinions are based on her review of materials received from Plaintiffs’ 

counsel in preparation for this litigation and are not based on her first-hand knowledge

from her time as a RUSD employee. See Defs. MIL No. 5 at 4; Pls. Opp’n MIL No. 5 at 2; 

see also Britz Fertilizers, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 2009 WL 1748775, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 

17, 2009) (describing percipient witness testimony). Conn did not review the bus 

surveillance videos, From’s IEP, or From’s BIP until after her RUSD employment ended

and when Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the videos and documents to Conn to review before 

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her deposition that Plaintiffs noticed. See Defs. MIL No. 5 at 4; Pls. Opp’n at 2. Conn’s 

deposition confirms this. See Conn Depo at 53-54 (Conn reviewed From’s IEP for the 

first time in preparation for her deposition); 54 (Conn did not know who From was and 

has never met him); 90-91 (Plaintiff’s counsel confirming that the bus surveillance videos 

were sent to Conn by counsel); 114 (Conn was asked by Plaintiffs’ counsel in August 

2022 to be deposed, and to review videos, a BIP, and a training that she had completed 

for bus drivers during the time she had worked there); 122 (Conn did not provide training 

to a bus driver on implementation of a BIP). 

Rule 26(a)(2) “requires parties to disclose the identity of any expert witness. If the 

expert is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or 

whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony, the 

disclosure must be accompanied by a written report.” Goodman v. Staples The Off. 

Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2011). “The critical distinction between 

retained and non-retained experts is the nature of the testimony the expert will provide, 

and whether it is based only on percipient knowledge or on information reviewed in 

anticipation for trial.” Cantu v. United States, 2015 WL 12743881, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 

2015). Conn’s deposition testimony clearly establishes that her opinions proffered in this 

case were not based on her personal knowledge or her RUSD employment, and instead 

were based on reviewing information provided by Plaintiffs’ counsel during this litigation. 

Compare Shrader v. Pape Trucks, Inc., 2020 WL 5203459, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 

2020) (non-retained experts required to provide a written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 

because the court considered them to be “retained experts” because they relied “on 

more than just their percipient observations from examining plaintiff” and their reports 

were prepared for litigation purposes.), with Doe 1 v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. 

Dist., 2020 WL 7931596, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2020) (a former district employee was 

not required to provide a written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) as a non-retained expert 

because she had percipient knowledge about the underlying allegations and her 

testimony was based on the Title IX investigation and report she wrote prior to the 

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commencement of the litigation and during her employment at the school district.).

Because Conn’s opinions are based on specialized knowledge, go beyond what 

she personally observed and outside her prior RUSD employment, and are based on her 

review of information she obtained during and in preparation for this litigation, Plaintiffs 

were required to submit a written expert report pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See also 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The distinguishing characteristic between expert opinions that require 

a report and those that do not is whether the opinion is based on information the expert 

witness acquired through percipient observations or whether, as in the case of retained 

experts, the opinion is based on information provided by others in a manner other than 

by being a percipient witness to the events in issue.” In re Application of Republic of 

Ecuador, 280 F.R.D. 506, 511 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quotation marks omitted), aff'd sub nom. 

Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Goodman, 644 

F.3d at 826 (holding a treating physician is “only exempt from providing a written report 

under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) witness to the extent that his opinions were formed during the 

course of treatment” and for opinions formed on the basis of information obtained by the 

physician other than in the course of the treatment, a written report under Rule 

26(a)(2)(B) is required.). The fact that Plaintiffs did not separately compensate or retain 

Conn does not obviate the requirement for a written expert report.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) sets forth the consequences for failing to 

“provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(c)(1). If a party fails to properly disclose its experts and their reports as required 

under Rule 26(a)(2), that “party is not allowed to use that information or witness to 

supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was 

substantially justified or is harmless.” Id.; see also Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor 

Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 37 (c)(1) gives teeth to these 

requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by

Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed.”). “Among the factors that may properly guide a 

district court in determining whether a violation of a discovery deadline is justified or 

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harmless are: (1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; 

(2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; 

and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Lanard 

Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 F. App'x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). “The burden is on the 

party facing exclusion of its expert's testimony to prove the delay was justified or 

harmless.” Id.

At the hearing, the Court provided Plaintiffs with an additional opportunity to 

provide further argument regarding substantial justification and harmlessness. Plaintiffs

argued that Defendants had an opportunity to question Conn during her deposition and 

that Defendants first disclosed Conn as a witness. Plaintiffs also argued that Conn is 

similar to Sarah Brunkhorst, a Placer County Office of Education employee who 

Defendants disclosed as a non-retained expert and who both sides have listed as a trial 

witness. See Defs. Expert Discl. at 2 (ECF No. 51); Pl. Witness List at 5 (ECF No. 84-1); 

Defs. Witness List at 3 (ECF No. 84-2). Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Brunkhorst fails 

because unlike Conn, Brunkhorst has direct percipient knowledge because she knows 

and worked with Sullivan From in her employment, including direct knowledge of From’s

IEP and BIP. Defendants argued that though they were present at Conn’s deposition, 

they were ambushed and unprepared to question her because they had no idea that 

Conn would be offering the extensive opinions she offered that were not based on her 

percipient knowledge. Defendants were not aware until Conn’s deposition that Plaintiffs’ 

counsel had provided Conn with the bus surveillance videos, From’s IEP, or From’s BIP. 

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish substantial justification or harmlessness. 

Because Plaintiffs did not disclose a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) written report for Conn and 

their failure to disclose was not substantially justified or harmless, Conn may not testify 

as to facts or opinions outside her personal knowledge while she was a RUSD 

employee, including her opinions based on her review of the bus surveillance videos, 

From’s IEP, From’s BIP, or other documents reviewed in preparation for this litigation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Goodman, 644 F.3d at 826 & n.2, 827; Yeti by Molly, Ltd., 

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259 F.3d at 1106.

In conclusion, Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Conn is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Conn may testify as to her personal 

knowledge from serving as a RUSD Board Certified Behavior Analyst in 2016-2017, 

including the trainings she conducted during this time period. Conn may not, however,

testify as to facts or opinions outside her personal knowledge while she was a RUSD 

Board Certified Behavior Analyst, including her opinions based on her review of the bus 

surveillance videos, From’s IEP, From’s BIP, or other documents reviewed in preparation 

for this litigation.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions in limine are GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART. Motions in Limine Nos. 1, 2, and 4 are DENIED. 

Defendants’ Motions in Limine Nos. 3 and 5 are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART. 

Dated: October 31, 2024

4, wagn1666.17

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