Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01683/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01683-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yvonne Atiba-Davies
Plaintiff
Corrections Corporation of America
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Yvonne Atiba-Davies, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Corrections Corporation of America, a

foreign corporation,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-01683-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 7.) As explained below,

the Court will grant the motion and dismiss all claims for insufficient service of process.

Normally such a dismissal would be without prejudice. In this case, however, the Court will

dismiss all but one claim with prejudice for failure to timely file a charge of discrimination

with the appropriate agencies.

I. Facts (Presumed to Be True for this Motion)

Plaintiff Yvonne Atiba-Davies is an Arizona resident. Defendant Corrections

Corporation of America (“CCA”) is apparently a Tennessee corporation that operates private

correctional facilities in Arizona. CCA has a statutory agent in Phoenix for service of

process.

CCA hired Atiba-Davies in October 2008 to work as an educational instructor for

inmates at CCA’s Red Rock Correctional Center. Atiba-Davies, who is a black woman with

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a doctorate degree and prior teaching experience, had actually applied to be the principal of

the school at Red Rock, but that job went to a younger, less-qualified white man.

Throughout her time at Red Rock, Atiba-Davies experienced less favorable treatment

than her non-black coworkers, about which she complained internally to a human resources

manager in March 2009. At the same time, she also complained about the earlier incident

of being passed over for the principal job. In April 2009, she complained internally of

additional racial harassment, as well as sexual harassment.

On May 1, 2009, Atiba-Davies learned that a Hispanic male coworker had submitted

a complaint accusing Atiba-Davies of sexual harassment. On May 6, 2009, CCA fired AtibaDavies. Atiba-Davies believes that she was falsely accused of sexual harassment and fired

in retaliation for her internal discrimination complaints.

On November 27, 2009, Atiba-Davies filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Atiba-Davies’s charge of discrimination claims two discriminatory events — not being hired

as the principal in October 2008, and then being fired in retaliation for her complaints on

May 6, 2009. The EEOC closed its file and issued a right-to-sue letter on May 12, 2010.

Atiba-Davies sued CCA on August 10, 2010 for violations of the Arizona Civil Rights Act

(ACRA), Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

II. Analysis

A. Service of Process

CCA claims that Atiba-Davies’s complaint must be dismissed for insufficient service

of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Atiba-Davies purported to serve process on CCA by

mailing the summons and complaint to CCA’s registered agent in Phoenix. Atiba-Davies

argues that this was proper because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow service upon

a corporation through any procedure authorized by state law for serving individuals, see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), 4(h)(1)(A), and Arizona state law supposedly permits service via mail to

the registered agent. Atiba-Davies specifically points to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(c), which reads

(in relevant part):

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When the whereabouts of a party outside the state is known,

service may be made by depositing the summons and a copy of

the pleadings being served in the post office, postage prepaid, to

be sent to the person to be served by any form of mail requiring

a signed and returned receipt.

Atiba-Davies argues that this rule applies because (1) CCA is a foreign corporation, and

therefore a party outside the state, (2) CCA’s whereabouts are known, and therefore (3) she

may serve CCA, via its local agent, through registered mail.

Atiba-Davies misinterprets this rule. It applies to service outside of the state, not to

service of in-state agents of parties outside the state. As it stands, simply mailing the

summons and complaint to a local agent does not satisfy any authorized form of service

under state or federal law. The Court will therefore dismiss the complaint for insufficient

service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).

B. Failure to Timely File with the EEOC and Arizona Civil Rights

Division

CCA argues that this Court should dismiss Atiba-Davies’s claims with prejudice

because her complaint shows that she failed to timely file her discrimination grievances with

the EEOC and the Civil Rights Division of the Arizona Attorney General’s Office. As

explained below, CCA is correct as to all but one claim.

1. Federal Claims (Title VII and ADEA)

Generally, one who believes she has been discriminated against in employment in

violation of federal law must file a charge of discrimination “within one hundred and eighty

days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

However, this time period extends to 300 days if “the person aggrieved has initially instituted

proceedings with a State . . . with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.” Id.

ACRA makes Arizona such a state. Therefore, if Atiba-Davies “initially instituted”

proceedings by filing with the Civil Rights Division, then she gets the benefit of a 300-day

period in which to file with the EEOC.

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In this case, Atiba-Davies only filed one charge of discrimination form, and that with

the EEOC. On its face, then, it would seem that she did not “initially institute[] proceedings

with [the] State.” However, the EEOC in Arizona and the Arizona Civil Rights Division

have a “referral” relationship, through which the EEOC accepts charges of discrimination

and automatically forwards them to the Civil Rights Division. The Supreme Court has held

that this arrangement qualifies as “initially institut[ing] proceedings with [the] State.” See

EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 111 (1988) (“The EEOC’s referral of

a charge initially filed with the EEOC to the appropriate state or local agency properly

institutes the [state] agency’s proceedings within the meaning of [Title VII].” (alterations in

original)). Therefore, Atiba-Davies appears to receive the benefit of the 300-day time period

for filing grievances with the EEOC.

Under the 300-day standard, and with a filing date of November 27, 2009, AtibaDavies can assert any claim based on an unlawful employment practice which occurred on

or after January 31, 2009. Therefore, Atiba-Davies’s federal claims based on being passed

over for the principal position in October 2008 are time-barred and dismissed with prejudice.

Her retaliation claim, however, was timely because the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred on May 6, 2009. Her federal retaliation claim is therefore dismissed

without prejudice.

2. State-law Claims (ACRA)

Concerning Atiba-Davies’s ACRA claims, Arizona law requires her to file a charge

of discrimination with the Civil Rights Division “within one hundred eighty days after the

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” A.R.S. § 41-1481(A), similar to federal law

except that there is no extension to 300 days under the state-federal sharing relationship. The

first unlawful employment practice of which Atiba-Davies complains is being passed over

for the principal position in October 2008. Therefore, she needed to file with the Civil Rights

Division sometime in April 2009. She did not file until November 2009. Therefore, AtibaDavies’s ACRA claim based on being passed over for the principal position is time-barred

and is dismissed with prejudice.

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The second unlawful employment practice of which Atiba-Davies complains is being

fired in retaliation for her complaints of racial discrimination, age discrimination, sexual

harassment. This happened on May 6, 2009. She therefore needed to file with the Civil

Rights Division by November 17, 2009. She did not file until November 27, 2009.

Therefore, Atiba-Davies’s ACRA claim based on retaliation is time-barred and is dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that CCA’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is

GRANTED as follows: (1) Atiba-Davies’s ACRA claims are dismissed with prejudice;

(2) Atiba-Davies’s federal discrimination claims based on being passed over for the principal

position in October 2008 are dismissed with prejudice; and (3) Atiba-Davies’s federal

discrimination claims based on retaliation in or around May 2009 are dismissed without

prejudice for insufficient service of process.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Atiba-Davies wishes to continue with this suit,

she must file an amended complaint on or before February 18, 2011, and proof of service

thereof on or before March 4, 2011. Failure to do so may result in termination of this case

without further notice.

DATED this 1st day of February, 2011.

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