Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-03045/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-03045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dexter Brown
Plaintiff
Edmund G. Brown
Defendant
Duffy
Defendant
State of California
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEXTER BROWN, 

Plaintiff, No. 2: 12-cv-3045 JFM (PC)

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

I. Screening

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

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claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based

on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. 

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however

inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain

more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other

words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94

(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

The complaint names three defendants, the State of California, Edmund G. Brown

and Warden Duffy. It also asserts three claims. In Claim I, plaintiff asserts that his primary care

physician ordered plaintiff a typewriter as a means of communication with the court and to

prevent further injury as a result of his carpal tunnel syndrome. However, he asserts that the

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State of California refused to provide him with a typewriter. In Claim II, plaintiff asserts as

follows:

Defendant and Governor Edmund G. Brown was repeatedly

advised that his appointee - Secretary of Corrections Matthew

Cates - was and is directing correctional personnel to obstruct

plaintiff’s access to the courts. 

Defendant and Governor Edmund G. Brown was advised that his

cabinet appointee and Secretary of Corrections - Matthew Cates -

was overseeing a monumental conspiracy to obstruct justice,

wherein crimes committed by correctional personnel were

concealed and went without investigation. 

Defendant and Governor Edmund G. Brown had/has the authority

to stop his subordinate appointee, and cabinet secretary - Matthew

Cates - yet knowingly and recklessly allowed Secretary Cates et al.

to perpetrate a “campaign of criminal predation” upon plaintiff, so

as to avoid the sociopolitical ramifications certain to follow public

notice of the CDCR corruption referenced immediately

hereinabove.

Defendant and Governor Edmund G. Brown, knowingly and

recklessly provided tacit approval to his appointee and subordinate

Secretary - Matthew Cates - even as plaintiff reported attempted

homicides orchestrated by correctional officials under the direction

of Secretary Cates.

(ECF No. 1 at p. 4.)

In Claim III, plaintiff asserts as follows:

Warden Duffy . . . has knowingly, deliberately, and recklessly

permitted his subordinate personnel to engage in criminal acts and

other malfeasance with the intention of inflicting duress upon

plaintiff, so as to prevent plaintiffs:

A. Continued communication with the courts,

press, and other law enforcement agencies.

B. Successful prosecution of civil rights

complaints.

C. Efforts to expose the extent of criminal activity

perpetrated by prison personnel with impunity.

D. Efforts to expose the criminal complicity of

high ranking correctional officials whom obstructed

justice by preventing criminal investigations, and/or

concealing crimes perpetrated by prison personnel. 

E. Efforts to seek redress from or for crimes

already suffered by plaintiff.

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Warden Duffy has the authority as warden to stop, prevent or have

investigated the criminal acts and other malfeasance referenced

above, yet he (def. Duffy) has only encouraged the criminal

predation now being suffered by allowing his staff to engage in the

same with impunity, and to the continued detriment and injury of

plaintiff. 

(ECF No. 1 at p. 5.) 

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory

that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Although the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. See Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint

must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th

Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In Claim I, plaintiff asserts that his primary care physician ordered plaintiff a

typewriter due to his carpal tunnel syndrome and de quervain’s tenosynovitis. However, he

asserts that “correctional administrators” refused to provide plaintiff with a typewriter. In any

amended complaint that plaintiff may elect to file, plaintiff is advised that there is no

constitutional right to the use of a typewriter. See Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corr., 776

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F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). However, to the extent that plaintiff is attempting to raise in

Claim I an access to the courts claim, he is advised that such an allegation can state a cognizable

claim for the denial of access to the court to the extent the plaintiff can establish actual injury to

court access under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996), as a direct result of lack of access

to a typewriter. Plaintiff must also allege that defendants’ hindrance of his access to the court,

by denying him a typewriter, was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See

id. at 361.

With respect to Claims II and III, it appears that plaintiff is also attempting to

raise an access to the courts claim. However, once again, as with Claim I, plaintiff must allege

in any amended complaint that the lack of access to the courts caused him actual injury. An

“actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation,

such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see

also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (1994). 

Furthermore, in any amended complaint that plaintiff may elect to file, he is

further informed that the Civil Rights Act under which this action is filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statue requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

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actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).

In this case, plaintiff has named the State of California, Governor Edmund G.

Brown and Warden Duffy as the three defendants. First, the State of California is not a “person”

and not a proper party. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“We

hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under §

1983.”). Additionally, in any amended complaint that plaintiff elects to file, he must allege a

causal link between the named defendants and the claimed constitutional violation. 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for

injunctive relief. The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the

moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying

controversy and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant's favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v.

Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 762

F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale

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with the focal point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. See Oakland Tribune, 762

F.2d at 1376. Under any formulation of the test, however, the moving party must demonstrate

that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury. See id. In the absence of a significant

showing of possible irreparable harm, the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success

on the merits. See id. The loss of money, or an injury whose measure of damages can be

calculated in terms of money, will not be considered irreparable. See id. at 1334-35.

The standard for a temporary restraining order is essentially the same. The

purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a more

complete hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a temporary

restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the hearing on

a preliminary injunction. It is apparent however, that requests for temporary restraining orders

are governed by the same general standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977). 

The Eastern District of California Local Rules impose additional requirements for

a motion for a temporary restraining order. First, the court will consider whether the moving

party could have sought relief by a noticed motion for a preliminary injunctive at an earlier date

without the necessity of seeking last-minute relief by motion for a temporary restraining order.

See Local Rule 231(b). Second, the moving party must provide specific documents to the court

in support of the requested temporary restraining order. See Local Rule 231(c). Additionally,

for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must provide a proposed

order. See id. 

Finally, in cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must be narrowly drawn, extend no further 

than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least

intrusive means necessary to correct the harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

A motion for injunctive relief must relate to the allegations in the complaint. If

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there is no relation, it is not an injunctive relief situation. A party seeking preliminary injunctive

relief “must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion

and the conduct asserted in the complaint. See Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir.

1994); see also De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd., v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).

In this case, plaintiff’s complaint is being dismissed with leave to amend. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction will

be denied without prejudice as the court cannot determine whether the relief requested in the

motion will relate to the conduct that plaintiff may decide to allege in any amended complaint

plaintiff elects to file. 

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2.) is

GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the

attached Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must

bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to 

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file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of this

action.

5. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and motion for a

preliminary injunction (ECF No. 4) is denied without prejudice. 

DATED: April 2, 2013.

 

ALLISON CLAIRE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14

fisc2595.14new

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEXTER BROWN,

Plaintiff, No. 2: 12-cv-3045 JFM (PC)

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

_____________________________/

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's

order filed :

______________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

 

Plaintiff

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