Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02251/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02251-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barton Lee Murphy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT AUG! 3 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

BARTON LEE MURPHY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 91-2251 

(D.C. No. CR-90-194-JB) 

(D.N.M.) 

Before BALDOCK, SETH and KELLY, Circuit Judges.** 

In a jury trial, Defendant-appellant Barton Lee Murphy was 

convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, five counts of 

possession with intent to distribute less than 500 grams of 

cocaine, maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing 

cocaine, and using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of 

cocaine. 21 u.s.c. SS 841(a)(l), 843, 856, 846: 18 u.s.c. S 2. 

He was sentenced to several concurrent terms, the longest of which 

was ten years with eight years of supervised release. On appeal, 

Mr. Murphy argues that the district court erred (1) in admitting 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** Pursuant to our July 2, 1992, order, this case was submitted 

for disposition on the briefs pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) 

and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

Appellate Case: 91-2251 Document: 010110276721 Date Filed: 08/13/1992 Page: 1
certain coconspirator statements that were not in furtherance of 

the conspiracy, and (2) in conditionally admitting coconspirator 

hearsay before making necessary findings. Our jurisdiction arises 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

Mr. Murphy contends that the district court failed to follow 

United States v. Radeker, 664 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1981), which was 

reaffirmed in United States v. Perez, 959 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 

1992), concerning the admission of coconspirator hearsay. 

Coconspirator hearsay is not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 

802(d)(2)(E) unless the trial court makes three findings: (1) a 

conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and the defendants were 

members, and (3) the statements were made during the course and in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. Perez, 959 F.2d at 164; Radeker, 

664 F.2d at 243. In his brief, Mr. Murphy refers to "independent 

evidence" necessary for such findings. The district court is not 

restricted to evidence independent of the hearsay statements in 

deciding whether a conspiracy exists and whether defendant was a 

member of it. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 173, 180, 

183-84 (1987). Here, the district court made the requisite 

findings after the government's case, rather than at the time the 

statements were offered over Mr. Murphy's objection. 

Mr. Murphy contends that the requisite findings should have 

been made prior to the admission of hearsay statements, in 

conformity with the "preferred order of proof." See United States 

v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. 

denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 

961, 964-66 (10th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has declined to 

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pass on the "preferred order of proof," Bourjailyf 483 U.S. at 176 

n.1, and the rationale for it has been undercut somewhat by the 

Supreme Court's elimination of our "independent evidence" 

requirement for proving the existence of a conspiracy and 

membership therein. Be that as it may, we have recognized that a 

trial judge has "considerable discretion" to conditionally admit 

the statements subject to their later being connected up. 

Hernandez, 829 F.2d at 994 n.6. Indeed, the "preferred order of 

proof" may be a rule more honored in the breach. See United 

States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 669 (10th Cir. 1989) (collecting 

cases where trial court's discretion to deviate upheld). See also 

United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426, 432-33 (10th Cir. 1988). 

What matters is that the trial judge made the requisite findings, 

thus, this case is distinguishable from Radeker and Perez where 

the lack of any such findings was reversible error. The trial 

judge did not abuse his discretion in making the necessary 

findings at the close of the government's case. 

Mr. Murphy objected to various taped statements made by a 

coconspirator to a cooperating witness which portrayed Mr. Murphy 

as a cartel-volume drug dealer. The cooperating witness 

ostensibly was purchasing cocaine and the coconspirator's 

statements were calculated to reassure him concerning the 

reliability of the supplier, Mr. Murphy. While some of the 

statements are crude, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting them. See United States v. Brown, 943 

F.2d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1991) (abuse of discretion standard). 

Such statements were designed to advance the purpose of the 

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conspiracy, to supply cocaine. See United States v. Smith, 833 

F.2d 213, 219 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 

947, 953 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987). The 

judgment of conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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