Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03023/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas R. Fuller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3023

___________

United States of America *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the Western

Thomas R. Fuller, * District of Missouri.

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 13, 2004

Filed: July 7, 2004 (Corrected: July 30, 2004)

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, RILEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Fuller was convicted in federal district court1

 of possessing cocaine

base (crack) with the intent to distribute it, conspiring to distribute it, aiding and

abetting its distribution, carrying a weapon during a drug transaction, and being a

felon in possession of a firearm. His appeal raises objections to the denial of his

motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him, and matters

relating to his sentencing. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court

in all respects.

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I.

The following facts are undisputed. A police officer stationed on the rooftop

of a parking garage observed two cars (a GMC van and a Buick sedan) in the parking

lot below. The drivers of the two vehicles were talking. The driver of the sedan,

Mr. Fuller, then opened the trunk of the sedan and handed the driver of the van, who

turned out to be Mr. Fuller's stepson, a large plastic sack. After receiving the sack,

the stepson drove off in the van, which was immediately stopped by a police cruiser

that the officer atop the parking garage had alerted by radio. The officers in the

cruiser noticed a smell of marijuana coming from the van and asked for permission

to search it. The stepson gave them permission, and the search uncovered a large

plastic bag containing marijuana, 119 grams of crack cocaine, $2,218 in cash, some

live rounds of .38 caliber ammunition, and an electronic scale. Mr. Fuller moved to

suppress this evidence on fourth amendment grounds, but the district court denied the

motion. In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review its

findings of fact for clear error and its application of law de novo. See United States

v. Payne, 119 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 987 (1997). 

Mr. Fuller first argues that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop

his stepson. The stop of Mr. Fuller's stepson (as opposed to the subsequent search of

the van) actually raises two potential fourth amendment difficulties. First, there was

the stop of the stepson himself, which implicates his right to be free from random,

unauthorized investigatory seizures. Cf. United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 699

(8th Cir. 2001). Because this right belongs to the stepson, Mr. Fuller cannot

complain about its violation. See United States v. Lloyd, 36 F.3d 761, 764 n. 2 (8th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 (1995); see also Minnesota v. Carter,

525 U.S. 83, 92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). Second, there was the stop and

detention of the van itself, which implicates the right to be secure from unreasonable

seizures of "effects." See U.S. Const. amend. IV. The question thus arises whether

Mr. Fuller had a sufficient interest in the van to assert a fourth amendment claim with

regard to its stop.

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Based on the factual findings of the district court, in which we find no clear

error, we conclude that Mr. Fuller did indeed have a substantial property interest in

the van. Although the title to the van bore the name of his wife, Mr. Fuller made all

of the payments on it, regularly drove it to work, controlled the keys, and otherwise

exercised regular dominion over it. On the night in question, he had allowed his

stepson to drive the van, but this was a rare occurrence. These are considerations that

support a determination that an individual has fourth amendment rights in an object.

See Payne, 119 F.3d at 641. 

Though Mr. Fuller had a substantial property interest in the van, he had

entrusted the van to another person and that is an important consideration in

evaluating his fourth amendment claim. Indeed, we believe that it is determinative.

We think that the closest analogies to the current case are provided by cases involving

packages that government investigators stop in transit. Like Mr. Fuller's van, the

packages in these cases are "effects" protected by the fourth amendment that have

been entrusted to the care of a third party, and the issue is the extent of the bailor's

fourth amendment rights in the object while it is in the third party's care. These cases

involve three kinds of detention by state officials subject to three different levels of

constitutional scrutiny. 

If a government investigator merely observes the outside of a package or lifts

it from a conveyor belt and handles it briefly for inspection, then there is no seizure

for fourth amendment purposes, and the government action is subject to no scrutiny

at all. See United States v. Gomez, 312 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002). When the

government removes a package from the mail stream and takes it to another part of

a mail processing facility for more thorough inspection, generally by a drug-sniffing

dog, then it has conducted a stop subject to constitutional scrutiny. See United States

v. Morones, 355 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 2004). This kind of stop is analogous

to a so-called Terry stop and must be supported by reasonable suspicion. See Gomez,

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312 F.3d at 923-24 (citing generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Finally, there

are full-fledged seizures, where the government asserts "dominion and control over

the package and its contents." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984).

These seizures must be supported by probable cause. See id. at 121-22.

Applying these principles to Mr. Fuller's van, we conclude that the stop of the

vehicle did not implicate his constitutional rights at all. A person who lends an

automobile to another of course does not give up his or her fourth amendment interest

altogether. The lender's right to possession when the bailment terminates, for

instance, is a valuable property right. On the other hand, the lender's right to control

the property during the bailment is greatly diminished, and he or she no longer has

a reasonable expectation of a possessory interest in it for a time. When Mr. Fuller

lent the van to his stepson, he gave up any significant expectation related to

controlling its movement. Indeed, while his stepson had control of the van, it would

of necessity move from place to place and start and stop at intervals in ways that were

completely beyond Mr. Fuller's control. Of course, he had a reasonable expectation

that his stepson would maintain general control of the van, but this expectation is

quite different from the stepson's own expectation in minute-to-minute control of the

vehicle while driving. It is important to realize that a person's interest in his or her

loaned effects is not identical to the possessory interest of the bailee who has direct

control of the effects, and the lender cannot assert the bailee's independent fourth

amendment right to have the bailee's interest protected from unreasonable

government interference. 

A brief stop by the police of a loaned automobile being driven by a third party

does not significantly impair the interests of the person who lent the automobile. We

think that such stops are like those that occur when postal inspectors pick up

packages and examine them without more decisively removing them from the rest of

the mail. The burden that such stops impose on the bailor's interest, if burden at all,

is too slight to amount to a fourth amendment seizure. Cf. Gomez, 312 F.3d at 923.

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So that there is no confusion about our holding, we point out that where a party is

asserting his or her personal right to be free from government seizure, a different

standard applies. For example, had Mr. Fuller been driving the van when it was

stopped, the case would be governed by Terry, and the police would need to

demonstrate that they had a reasonable suspicion. In this case, however, the only

rights of his that are implicated in the stop are his rights in the van itself.

Mr. Fuller also challenges the voluntariness of his stepson's consent to search

the van, and we assume, for the purpose of this discussion only, that he has retained

a sufficient property interest in the loaned van to raise an objection to a search of it.

The courts have long held that a person can challenge a search of his or her property

consented to by another who had the right to consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177, 179-81 (1990). The voluntariness of a consent is a question of fact to

be determined from the totality of the relevant circumstances. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Reviewing the record, we cannot say that the

district court's finding that the stepson's consent was voluntary was clearly erroneous.

Mr. Fuller points out that the police officer making the request was holding the

stepson's driver's license at the time and that there were three armed police officers

present. These facts are insufficient to establish clear error on the part of the district

court. The stepson was eighteen years old at the time, a high school graduate, and

there is no evidence that the police threatened or coerced him.

Because we reject Mr. Fuller's challenge to the search of the van, we also reject

his challenge to evidence obtained as a result of that search. The search was valid,

and thus the evidence cannot be excluded as the fruit of a poisonous tree. See United

States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1027 (8th Cir. 2004).

II.

Mr. Fuller also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction on the drug charges. He was charged with conspiring with his stepson and

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others to distribute at least 50 grams of a substance containing crack, see 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, aiding and abetting his stepson to possess with an intent

to distribute at least 50 grams of a substance containing crack, see 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and possessing at least 5 grams of a substance

containing crack with the intent to distribute it, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and accept all reasonable inferences that support it. United

States v. Sheikh, 367 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 2004). We will reverse only if no

reasonable jury could have found Mr. Fuller guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

At trial, an officer testified that he observed Mr. Fuller exchange a large plastic

bag with his stepson for a substantial amount of cash. The bag, which contained over

100 grams of crack cocaine, was almost immediately recovered by the police from the

stepson. A later search of the van that Mr. Fuller’s stepson was driving revealed an

automatic weapon and additional crack. There was certainly enough evidence in the

trial record to support the guilty verdict.

Mr. Fuller relies on the fact that the jury acquitted his stepson, who was tried

with him, to support the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence for the

verdict that he conspired with and aided and abetted his stepson. But it is well

established that inconsistent verdicts on the same indictment as to the same defendant

are unobjectionable. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 62-63 (1984). For

example, in Powell, id. at 69, the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction

for using a telephone in the course of a conspiracy even though she was acquitted of

the conspiracy itself. The rationale for this rule lies in the unique place of the jury

in our criminal law. According to Blackstone, the purpose of the jury at common law

was to place a "strong ... barrier ... between the liberties of the people, and the

prerogative of the crown." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *343. The ideal of

the jury as an independent decision-maker in criminal cases is prominent on our law,

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most notably perhaps in the double jeopardy clause, which protects jury acquittals

from subsequent attack. 

The same reluctance to compromise the independence of the jury by inquiring

into its deliberations underlies the rule that inconsistent verdicts are not

objectionable. Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that when a jury renders inconsistent

verdicts, there is no way of knowing whether the verdict of acquittal or conviction

reflects the jury's true conclusions, and the inconsistency may be the result of

confusion or lenity on the part of the jury. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,

393-94 (1932). So long as the guilty verdict is supported by sufficient evidence,

courts have no cause to interfere. See id. at 392-94. As we have said, there is more

than ample evidence in the record to support a guilty verdict here, and we discern no

barrier to applying the usual rule to a case of inconsistent verdicts that occurs when

accused co-conspirators are tried together.

III.

Mr. Fuller asserts that the district court erred in not granting him a downward

adjustment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of

responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E.1.1. The commentary to § 3E.1.1 states that "[t]his

adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its

burden of proof at trial." U.S.S.G. § 3E.1.1 comment. (n.2). There are of course

exceptions to this general rule (most notably defendants who go to trial in order to

preserve some constitutional challenge), see id., but, as we have previously observed,

"[i]n practice ... holding the government to its burden of proving the defendant's

factual guilt presents a near absolute bar to a defendant receiving a reduction under

this section," Chapman, 356 F.3d at 848. Mr. Fuller argues that at trial he testified to

dealing drugs and did not essentially contest the government's case. But he pleaded

not guilty to the indictment, extensively cross-examined government witnesses,

contested the quantity of drugs possessed, and denied conspiring with his coAppellate Case: 03-3023 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/07/2004 Entry ID: 1785048 
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defendant. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's conclusion on this

point.

IV.

In his lengthy pro se brief, Mr. Fuller raised various other issues. We find that

all of these points are either without merit or inappropriate for resolution on direct

appellate review.

Affirmed.

______________________________

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