Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01077/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
North Dakota Breeders Fund
Appellant
North Dakota Promotions Fund
Appellant
North Dakota Purse Fund
Appellant
North Dakota Racing Commission
Appellant
PW Enterprises
Appellee
Racing Services
Not Party
State of North Dakota
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1077

___________________________

In re: Racing Services, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor

------------------------------

PW Enterprises, Inc., a Nevada corporation

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellee

v.

State of North Dakota, a governmental entity; North Dakota Racing Commission,

a regulatory agency; North Dakota Breeders Fund, a special fund; North Dakota

Purse Fund, a special fund; North Dakota Promotions Fund, a special fund

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellants

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Fargo

____________

 Submitted: October 6, 2014

 Filed: February 20, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Chief Judge.

North Dakota, the North Dakota Racing Commission, and three special funds

administered by the commission (collectively, state) appeal from a district court

1

decision reversing the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to the state

against PW Enterprises, Inc. (PWE)—the largest non-governmental creditor of

Racing Services, Inc. (RSI), formerly a state-licensed horse racing simulcast service

provider. After RSI filed bankruptcy, PWE derivatively brought this suit on behalf

of all creditors to recover the money the state collected from RSI as taxes on

parimutuel account wagering. See In re Racing Servs., Inc., 540 F.3d 892, 901-02

2

(8th Cir. 2008). On appeal, the district court concluded “[t]he money collected from

RSI in the form of taxes on account wagering must be returned to the bankruptcy

estate” because North Dakota law did not authorize the state “to collect taxes on

account wagering during the time period in question.” With appellate jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 158, we affirm.

3

The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the District of North Dakota.

Parimutuel wagering is “a systemof betting (as on a horse race) in which those

2

who bet on the winner share the total stakes minus a small percent for the

management.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1642 (1993). 

Under § 158(d)(1), we “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, 3

judgments, orders, and decrees entered” by the district court. (Emphasis added). In

reversing the bankruptcy court’s judgment for the state, the district court ordered

remand to calculate the amount the state must return to the bankruptcy estate, but the

state appealed before remand. See In re Vekco, Inc., 792 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir.

1986) (“[A] district court decision involving remand normally will not be considered

final for purposes of appeal to this court.”). We may consider “a decision requiring

remand . . . final if the district court has effectively resolved the merits of the

controversy, and on remand all that remains is a purely mechanical, computational,

or in short, ministerial task, whose performance is unlikely to generate a new appeal

or to affect the issue that the disappointed party wants to raise on appeal from the

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I. BACKGROUND4

In 1987, the North Dakota legislature authorized parimutuel betting for live

horse races in North Dakota. See N.D. Cent. Code § 53-06.2-10 (1987); 1987 N.D.

Laws ch. 618, § 10. In what the state calls the “Takeout Statute,” N.D. Cent. Code

§ 53-06.2-11, the legislature established formulas for deducting from the wager pool

to (1) offset the licensed service provider’s expenses, and (2) make revenue payments

to the state treasurer—i.e., taxes. See 1987 N.D. Laws ch. 618, § 11. The balance of

the pool went to the winning bettors. Id. Beginning in 1989, the state allowed “off

track” parimutuel wagering for races inside and outside of North Dakota—later

reclassified as “simulcast wagering”—and modified the takeout formulas to include

this new type of wagering. See N.D. Cent. Code § 53-06.2-10.1 (1989); 1989 N.D.

Laws ch. 624, § 8; 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 556, §§ 5, 6.

In 2001, the state legislature authorized “account wagering,” which is “a form

of parimutuel wagering in which an individual deposits money in an account and uses

the account balance to pay for parimutuel wagers.” 2001 N.D. Laws ch. 466, § 1. 

But, as the state concedes, the legislature did not amend § 53-06.2-11 to include

deductions for account wagering. Id. The legislature adjusted the takeout formulas

in 2003 and 2005, but again did not amend the statute to include account wagering. 

See 2003 N.D. Laws ch. 452, § 1; 2005 N.D. Laws ch. 469, § 1. In 2007, the

legislature amended § 53-06.2-11 to create a new subsection for account wagering

and included specific formulasfor account wagering that charged, at certain wagering

order of remand.” Id. (quotation and internal citation omitted). Based on our

thorough review of the record and the parties’ agreement that a relatively simple

mathematical calculation is all that remains for remand, we conclude the district

court’s order is final within the meaning of § 158(d)(1).

Neither party challenges the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for the

4

purposes of this appeal. 

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levels, lower rates than live-race wagering and simulcast wagering. See 2007 N.D.

Laws ch. 448, § 7, ch. 449, § 2. 

RSI, the debtor in this case, was a licensed simulcast service provider that

assumed responsibility for paying the required taxes to the state. Starting in 1999,

PWE used RSI’s services to place a high volume of parimutuel wagers on North

Dakota horse races. PWE’s bets were very successful. By 2003, PWE had

accumulated an account balance at RSI of $2,248,100.86. 

In July 2003, when PWE learned RSI was being investigated by the federal

government for illegal gaming, PWE stopped betting through RSI and demanded its

account balance. PWE also contacted the state to discuss RSI. After several detailed

discussions, PWE believed the state would protect PWE’s interests, in part to prompt

PWE to resume wagering in North Dakota.

On August 21, 2003, the state sued RSI and secured a court-appointed receiver

to stabilize the floundering company. PWE originally cooperated with the receiver,

but grew dissatisfied with the receiver’s performance. When the state, without notice

to PWE, drew on an RSI letter of credit secured by a $225,000 certificate of deposit

PWE had pledged, the bank liquidated PWE’s certificate and paid its funds to the

state. PWE felt betrayed. PWE later learned that in the year before RSI filed

bankruptcy, the state had also inconspicuously collected $5,270,101.20 in taxes from

RSI. 

On February 3, 2004, RSI filed a voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization petition,

later converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. PWE submitted a proof of claim for the

$2,248,100.86 balance ofits account with RSI. The state ultimately submitted a proof

of claim for $6,422,243.58.

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In early 2006, PWE asked the bankruptcy trustee to initiate an adversary

proceeding against the state to avoid the taxes the state had collected as preferential

and fraudulent transfers. See In re Racing Servs., 540 F.3d at 896. When the trustee

declined, PWE, through litigation, obtained “derivative standing” to bring this

adversary proceeding against the state on behalf of all RSI’s creditors. Id. at 902,

905. 

In its complaint, PWE asked the bankruptcy court to (1) disallow the state’s

claim against the bankruptcy estate for unpaid taxes, (2) deny priority to the state’s

claim, (3) avoid and recover allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers to the

state, and (4) equitably subordinate the state’s claim. On cross-motionsfor summary

judgment, the bankruptcy court granted the state’s motion with respect to PWE’s

challenge to the state’s tax claim, but denied summary judgment as to the remaining

claims. This appeal concerns only the first claim.

In rejecting PWE’s claim, the bankruptcy court “conclude[d] that during the

times relevant to this case, N.D. [Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-11 authorized taxation on

account wagering.” The bankruptcy court reasoned,

When the legislature amended N.D. [Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-10.1 to

authorize account wagering in 2001, it characterized account wagering

as a form of simulcast parimut[u]el wagering. Although the 2002-2003

version of N.D. [Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-11 did not expressly reference

account wagering activity, it did apply to simulcast wagering. By virtue

of N.D. [Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-10.1, account wagering was simulcast

wagering, and the tax for simulcast wagering was authorized under N.D.

[Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-11.

The bankruptcy court further decided that “[e]ven if N.D. [Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-11

were ambiguous as to whether it applied to account wagering,” ordinary rules of

statutory construction indicated the state had authority to collect taxes for account

wagering.

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PWE appealed the grant ofsummary judgment. The district court reversed and

remanded for further proceedings. Finding “North Dakota’s gambling laws [] plain

and unambiguous,” the district court determined “[t]here was no legislative authority

to collect taxes on account wagering during the time period in question and there is

no legal basis to infer or imply authorization to do so.” The state now appeals the

district court’s order that the money the state “collected from RSI in the form of taxes

on account wagering must be returned to the bankruptcy estate.” 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Sitting “as a second court of review in bankruptcy matters, [we] generally

apply[] the same standards of review asthe district court and review[] the bankruptcy

court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” In re

M & S Grading, Inc., 526 F.3d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 2008). “The interpretation of a

statute is a question of law for the trial court, subject to de novo review on appeal.” 

In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1991); accord Salve Regina Coll. v.

Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239 (1991). “Because th[is] case presents a matter of first

impression in [North Dakota], we must predict, as best we can, how the [North

Dakota] Supreme Court would decide it.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson,

719 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2013).

B. Plain Meaning 

In 2001, the North Dakota legislature amended § 53-06.2-10.1 to authorize

“account wagering.” As amended, § 53-06.2-10.1 provided in relevant part,

53-06.2-10.1. Simulcast wagering. In addition to racing under

the certificate system, as authorized by this chapter, and conducted upon

the premises of a racetrack, simulcast parimutuel wagering may be

conducted in accordance with this chapter and interim standards that

need not complywith chapter 28-32, orrules adopted by the commission

under this chapter. . . . The certificate system also permits parimutuel

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wagering to be conducted through account wagering. As used in this

section, “account wagering” means a form of parimutuel wagering in

which an individual deposits money in an account and uses the account

balance to pay for parimutuel wagers. An account wager made on an

account established in this state may only be made through the licensed

simulcast service provider authorized by the commission to operate the

simulcast parimutuel wagering system under the certificate system. An

account wager may be made in person, by direct telephone

communication, or through other electronic communication in

accordance with rules adopted by the commission.

2001 N.D. Laws ch. 466, § 1. The state concedes that in amending § 53-06.2-10.1 to

allow account wagering in 2001, the legislature did not, as it had with prior

amendments, make any corresponding changes to § 53-06.2-11 or otherwise alter the

statutory takeout formulas. The legislature did not specifically amend § 53-06.2-11

to authorize a tax on account wagering until 2007—several years after the state

collected the taxes at issue in this case. See 2007 N.D. Laws ch. 448, § 7. 

The contested issue in this appeal is whether North Dakota law impliedly

authorized the state to collect taxes from RSI for account wagering during the period

preceding RSI’s bankruptcy, even though, as the district court observed, “there was

no direct legislative authority to collect a tax on account wagering prior to the 2007

amendments.” Based on the plain meaning of the relevant statutes and fundamental

principles of North Dakota law, we agree with the district court and conclude North

Dakota law did not expressly or impliedly authorize the state to collect taxes for

account wagering during the time period in dispute here. 

The state—though acknowledging the clear and unambiguousmeaning of § 53-

06.2-11 and the absence of affirmative legislative action to tax account

wagering—urgesthe court to infer an implied tax on account wagering. Yet the state

fails to provide any compelling legal basis for taking such an unprecedented step. 

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The North Dakota Constitution provides, “No tax shall be levied except in

pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the

same, to which only it shall be applied.” N.D. Const. art. X, § 3. The North Dakota

Supreme Court has long held, “The power to impose taxes should not be extended

beyond the clear meaning of the statutes.” Great N. Ry. Co. v. Flaten, 225 N.W.2d

75, 78 (N.D. 1974); accord Rice v. United States, 53 F. 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1893) (“‘It

is a general rule, in the interpretation of all statutes levying taxes or duties upon

subjects or citizens, not to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear

import of the language used, or to enlarge their operation so asto embrace matters not

specially pointed out, although standing upon a close analogy.’” (quoting United

States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595, 596-97 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass.

1842) (No. 16,690))).

Our review of North Dakota tax law “is limited by the doctrine of separation

of powers. Taxation of property is a legislative function, not a judicial function, and

courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the” legislature. Dakota Nw.

Assocs. Ltd. v. Burleigh Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 616 N.W.2d 349, 350-51 (N.D.

2000) (internal citations omitted). Under North Dakota law, our “primary objective

is ‘to ascertain the intent of the Legislature by looking at the language of the statute

itself and giving it its plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.’” City of

Fargo v. White, 839 N.W.2d 829, 832 (N.D. 2013) (quoting McDowell v. Gillie, 626

N.W.2d 666, 671 (N.D. 2001)). We first must “look[] to the statutory language, and

if the language is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent is presumed clear from

the face of the statute.” Id.

“If, however, the statute is ambiguous or if adherence to the strict letter of the

statute would lead to an absurd or ludicrous result, a court may resort to extrinsic

aids, such as legislative history, to interpret the statute.” State v. Fasteen, 740

N.W.2d 60, 63 (N.D. 2007). “When other means of ascertaining the legislature’s

intentions have failed,” the North Dakota Supreme Court strictly construes

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ambiguous tax statutes in favor of the taxpayer. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. State ex

rel. Tax Comm’r, 704 N.W.2d 8, 17 (N.D. 2005); Great N. Ry. Co., 225 N.W.2d at

78 (“Where legislative intention is doubtful with respect to the meaning of the

statutes granting taxing authority, the doubt must be resolved against the government

and in favor of the taxpayer.”). 

As relevant to this appeal, the bankruptcy court determined “application ofthe

5

rules of statutory construction . . . lead[s] to the conclusion that [N.D. Cent. Code

§ 53-06.2-11] did apply to account wagering.” As the bankruptcy court saw it, “[h]ad

the legislature not intended for account wagering to be subject to taxation under N.D.

[Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-11, the activity authorized by the legislature in N.D. [Cent.

Code] § 53-06.2-10.1 would have been in contravention of the prohibition against

games of chance without a charitable purpose as delineated in the North Dakota

Constitution.” See N.D. Const. art. XI, § 25 (“[T]he entire net proceeds of such

games of chance are to be devoted to educational, charitable, patriotic, fraternal,

religious, or other public-spirited uses.”). The bankruptcy court thought such a result

would be “absurd.” 

The state advances that argument on appeal, contending account wagering

“requires a bet payoff formula to accomplish that[constitutional] goal” of a charitable

purpose and “[t]he Takeout Statute [§ 53-06.2-11] is the only such available

mechanism that would serve that purpose.” The state does not contend taxes satisfy

the constitutional requirement, rather it argues taxes are “inseparably intertwined”

6

On appeal, the state concedes the bankruptcy court erroneously concluded

5

“account wagering was simulcast wagering, and the tax for simulcast wagering was

authorized under N.D. [Cent. Code] § 53-06.2-11.” 

The district court noted “[t]axes are not enumerated” in N.D. Const. art. XI,

6

§ 25. PWE argues horse racing is not a game of chance and thus not subject to the

restrictions in N.D. Const. art. XI, § 25 at all. We assume for the purposes of this

appeal that N.D. Const. art. XI, § 25 applies to parimutuel wagering. 

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with the statutory directive to pay the balance of the wager pool to charitable

organizations. According to the state, “to avoid the absurd result of authorizing a

form of parimutuel wagering without a corresponding bet payoff formula that would

satisfy the constitutional requirements, even despite requiring the payment of

revenues to theState,” this court—notwithstanding admittedly unambiguous statutory

language to the contrary—should consider § 53-06.2-11 “to have been amended by

implication to include account wagering within its scope of coverage.”

The state asks too much. “The function of the courtsisto interpret the law, not

to legislate.” CybrCollect, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 703 N.W.2d 285, 294

(N.D. 2005). We are “not free to ‘amend’ or ‘clarify’ the clear language of the

statute,” Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 829 N.W.2d 453, 457 (N.D. 2013), nor can

we disregard the letter of a “clear and unambiguous” statute “‘under the pretext of

pursuing its spirit.’” Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n of State, 830 N.W.2d 535, 541

(N.D. 2013) (quoting N.D. Cent. Code § 1-02-05); accord Little v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d

700, 705 (N.D. 1993) (“[T]he law is what the Legislature says, not what is unsaid.”). 

The state has not provided, and we have not found, any authority recognizing

a judicial power to infer an implied tax under North Dakota law. To the contrary, the

North Dakota Supreme Court has routinely rejected similar “invitation[s] to rewrite

the statute to express [a party’s] interpretation of the legislature’s alleged ‘true’

intent.” Gilstad, 829 N.W.2d at 457; see also, e.g., Doyle ex rel. Doyle v.

Sprynczynatyk, 621 N.W.2d 353, 357 (N.D. 2001) (“We have said many times if

changes are to be made in the statute, we leave that matter to the legislature.”). Not

only must this court “presume the legislature meant what it said and said all it

intended to say,” but also “that the legislature made no mistake in expressing its

purpose and intent.” Gilstad, 829 N.W.2d at 457. “‘If the rule is wrong, the

Legislature has ample power to change it. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the

law as it exists.’” Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601, 604 (N.D. 1965)

(quoting Anderson v. Bd. of Ed. of Fargo, 190 N.W. 807, 811 (N.D. 1922)

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(Christianson, J., concurring)). “‘Consequently, we will not correct an alleged

legislative “oversight” by rewriting unambiguous statutes to cover the situation at

hand.’” Gilstad, 829 N.W.2d at 457 (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wimbledon

Grain Co., 663 N.W.2d 186, 196 (N.D. 2003)). 

To be clear, the state does not ask us to adopt an alternative interpretation of

the relevant statutory language. It asks us to infer an alternative legislative intent

despite the clear and unambiguous statutory language, and thereby amend § 53-06.2-

11 to carry out that unstated intent. “It is for the legislature, not the courts, to amend

a statute if the plain language of the statute does not accurately reflect the

legislature’s intent.” Olson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 747 N.W.2d 71, 78 (N.D.

2008). The legislature ostensibly did that here in 2007, notably imposing lower tax

rates on account wagering under § 53-06.2-11. See 2007 N.D. Laws ch. 448, § 7. 

Taxes the state collected from RSI on account wagering before that time were

unauthorized under North Dakota law and must be repaid to the bankruptcy estate.

C. Legislative History

The state’s appeal to what it broadly refers to as “legislative history” does not

convince us otherwise. See Little, 497 N.W.2d at 705 (“Usually, when the plain

meaning of a statute is apparent, it is unwise and unnecessary to delve further.”). In

the state’s view, “it is apparent from the legislative history that the Legislature

approved account wagering legislation with the understanding that the new form of

wagering would generate revenue for the State ‘under the existing charitable system’

– i.e., including the Takeout Statute.” 

To the extent, if at all, extrinsic aids are proper here, where the state admits the

statute is unambiguous, see Schaefer v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 462 N.W.2d

179, 182 (N.D. 1990) (“[W]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous it is improper for

courtsto attempt to go behind the express terms of the provision so asto legislate that

which the words of the statute do not themselves provide.”), the state’s evidence of

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legislative history “provideslittle insight,” MetricConstr., Inc. v. Great Plains Props.,

344 N.W.2d 679, 683 (N.D. 1984), much less an intimation so compelling it would

justify a federal court taking the unprecedented step of inferring an implied tax under

North Dakota law. 

In support of its proposed intent, the state primarily relies on the following: 

statements RSI’s owner made while lobbying to get the account wagering bill passed;

“legislative points” RSI provided to “severalstate senators”; a senate notice of intent;

and a statement about revenue from one of the bill’s sponsors. This evidence is far

from convincing. “Random statements by legislative committee members, while

possibly useful if they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative

history, are of little value in fixing legislative intent.” Little, 497 N.W.2d at 705. 

And we are especially wary of divining legislative intent from statements by RSI’s

owner, who lobbied for account wagering legislation but was not a member of the

legislature and did not vote on the bill. Cf. Metric Constr., 344 N.W.2d at 683

(questioning the value of extrinsic evidence that “mostly consist[ed] of sponsor

testimony or citizen testimony preserved in the form of sparse committee notes”). 

Though some members of the legislature may have understood account

wagering would be taxed similarly to existing forms of parimutuel wagering, the state

fails to establish that understanding was widely held or that it necessarily follows

from the scant legislative history. The state’s belief also does not make the statute as

written ambiguous or require this court to strain to infer a legislative intent to tax that

is entirely absent from the statutory language. See Olson, 747 N.W.2d at 78. Obliged

as we are to apply what is undisputed plain language, see id., our diversion into

legislative history reveals no reason to doubt the plain meaning of the statute’s text. 

D. Constitutional Avoidance

Finally, the state points out the North Dakota Supreme Court generally

“construe[s] statutes, if possible, in a manner to avoid constitutional infirmities.” 

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Ellis v. N.D. State Univ., 764 N.W.2d 192, 202 (N.D. 2009); accord Ash v. Traynor,

579 N.W.2d 180, 182 (N.D. 1998) (“If a statute may be construed in two ways, one

that renders it of doubtful constitutionality and one that does not, we adopt the

construction that avoids constitutional conflict.”). This canon cuts both ways. 

First, we are not convinced, under a natural reading of § 53-06.2-10.1, that the

absence of a tax levy or “corresponding bet payoff formula” necessarily makes the

legislative authorization of account wagering unconstitutional under N.D. Const. art.

XI, § 25. See Paluck v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Stark Cnty., 307 N.W.2d 852, 857

(N.D. 1981) (“[A]n enactment of the Legislature is presumed to be constitutional; the

courts will construe statutesso asto harmonize their provisions with the Constitution

if it is possible to do so.”). As long as “the entire net proceeds” of account wagering

serve “educational, charitable, patriotic, fraternal, religious, or other public-spirited

uses,” account wagering does not violate N.D. Const. art. X, § 25, regardless of the

absence of a specific statutory payoff formula. Without the assessment oftaxes, more

money is available for the beneficent purposes. If the state were to determine some

part of the net proceeds of statutorily authorized account wagering were not serving

such purposes, the state could simply stop those unconstitutional activities. We fail

to see any absurdity here.

Second, assuming the requisite statutory ambiguity, avoiding constitutional

infirmities is not so easy where, as here, two constitutional provisions are pitted

against each other. The state urges the court to infer an implied tax on account

wagering because “unless parimutuel accountwagering wassubject to taxation during

the period of time relevant to this case, account wagering would have been contrary

to the constitutional prohibition against games of chance under N.D. Const. art XI,

§ 25.” In contrast, PWE suggests a judicially implied tax, which also requires an

implied tax rate and collection method, violates the requirements of N.D. Const. art.

X, § 3. By PWE’s measure, we cannot “imply authority to tax and an amount of tax

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to avoid [the state’s] perceived unconstitutionality” because “if the Court were to

imply a tax, this implied tax would, itself, be unconstitutional.” 

Confronted with the requirements of N.D. Const. art. X, § 3, the state proposes

it is “trying to address the constitutional provision after [it] impl[ies] the account

wagering into the taxation.” (Emphasis added). That is, once the tax is “inferred or

implied,” the requirements of N.D. Const. art. X, § 3 are met. The state’s analysis

puts the cart before the horse. And at any rate, “[t]he canon of constitutional

avoidance does not supplant traditional modes of statutory interpretation,”

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008), and “is not a license for the judiciary

to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,

59-60 (1997) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)). Here,

the unambiguous statutory language did not authorize the taxes the state collected on

account wagering. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court and remand to the bankruptcy

court for the calculation of the amount of unauthorized taxes the state must return to

the bankruptcy estate. 

______________________________

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