Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-04850/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-04850-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. Adams
Respondent
Charles W. Harrington
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Citations to “Exh.” are to the record lodged with the court by the Attorney General.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES W. HARRINGTON,

Petitioner,

 v.

 D. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 02-4850 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer with a memorandum of points and authorities in support,

and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The

matter is submitted.

BACKGROUND

On October 13, 1998, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed an amended

complaint charging Petitioner, Charles Harrington, with one count of continuous sexual

abuse of a minor (Cal. Pen. Code § 288.5), three counts of oral copulation with a minor

(Cal. Pen. Code § 288a(b)(1)), and three counts of genital penetration of a minor with a

foreign object (Cal. Pen. Code § 289(h)). Exh. 4 (Clerk’s Transcript) at 3-14.1

 On October

23, 1998, Petitioner waived preliminary hearing and the amended complaint was deemed

to be the criminal information. Exh. 4 at 9, 15. On February 21, 2000, a jury found

Petitioner guilty on all counts. Exh. 4 at 398-406. The court sentenced Petitioner to a term

of twenty years in state prison. Exh. 4 at 488, 650-652. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, and the California

Supreme Court denied review. Exh. 8, 10. Petitioner’s subsequent petition for a writ of

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habeas corpus was denied by the California Supreme Court. Exh. 12. 

The following facts are distilled from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal. 

See Exh. 8 at 2-3. On October 8, 1998, a police officer was dispatched to Ukiah High

School, Ukiah, California, after a teacher had received a report from one of her students

about possible sexual molestation. The police officer conducted an interview with Suzanne

R., which led to Petitioner being criminally charged and tried in the instant proceeding.

The evidence revealed that Petitioner began dating Suzanne’s mother, Doreen, in

approximately 1990. At trial, Suzanne described a history of sexual abuse perpetrated by

Petitioner over an eight-year period beginning when she was seven years old. Suzanne

testified that she had to orally copulate Petitioner “two to three times a week.”

While actual sexual intercourse had never taken place, Suzanne was required to

perform oral sex on Petitioner hundreds of times. Additionally, he orally copulated and

digitally penetrated Suzanne many times. Petitioner told Suzanne that she would never be

believed if she reported the abuse because he was a former law enforcement officer. 

Suzanne also described how he used fear and intimidation to control the entire family. 

After Suzanne turned sixteen years of age, Petitioner began stating his desire to have

sexual intercourse with her. She testified at trial that she would rather “kill myself first,” and

she reported the sexual abuse to her teacher.

On October 13, 1998, Barbara S. contacted authorities after reading about

Petitioner’s arrest on sex offenses. She testified at trial that she, too, was a victim of

Petitioner’s sexual misconduct about twenty-five years earlier. The sexual abuse occurred

from 1969, when Barbara was nine years old, until 1977, after her mother married

Petitioner. The acts included oral copulation, digital penetration, and sexual intercourse. 

At trial, Barbara estimated that she had been forced to engage in between 200-300 sexual

acts with Petitioner. Petitioner told Barbara that if she reported the abuse, he would kill her

mother in front of her and then kill her. By 1977, when she reported the molestation,

Barbara had attempted suicide three times, had been hospitalized for mental health

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problems, and had run away from home to stop the sexual abuse. She reported Petitioner

to the authorities because she did not want to be returned home, but criminal proceedings

were never pursued. At trial she described herself as a drug addict and an alcoholic.

Petitioner testified in his own defense. He denied having any sexual contact with

Suzanne or his former stepdaughter, Barbara. He testified that at the time of his arrest, he

weighed approximately 540 pounds. He claimed that as a result of his weight, he was

impotent and unable to perform sexually.

After Petitioner was convicted, he brought a motion for a new trial primarily based on

the argument that the court erred in admitting Barbara’s testimony under California

Evidence Code section 1108. The motion was denied and Petitioner received a prison

term of twenty years.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by the [Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than the [Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

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of” Supreme Court authority, according to the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion, here that of the California

Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v.

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

As grounds for habeas relief, Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) his due

process and equal protection rights were violated by admission of evidence of prior sexual

offenses; (2) the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in admitting

certain “propensity” evidence; (3) his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

by the trial court’s giving revised CALJIC 2.50.1 and 2.01; (4) his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s giving CALJIC 17.41.1; and (5) his

rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated by the trial court’s

refusal to appoint him a new lawyer. In its Order to Show Cause, this court dismissed

Petitioner’s CALJIC 17.41.1 claim as without merit. Accordingly, the court shall consider

his remaining claims in turn.

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A. Admission of Evidence of Prior Sexual Offenses

Petitioner first contends that the trial court’s admission under California Evidence

Code section 1108 of uncharged sex acts violated his right to due process. This section

permits a trial court to admit prior sexual offenses as evidence of a propensity to commit

such acts. Cal. Evid. Code § 1108. Petitioner argues that by abolishing a longstanding

rule against admission of disposition evidence, section 1108 contravenes the presumption

of innocence and his right to a fair trial.

A state court’s admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless

the evidentiary ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair

trial guaranteed by due process. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). There are no

published federal opinions which have addressed the constitutionality of section 1108. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Federal Rule of Evidence 414, which is analogous

to section 1108, does not violate the right to due process. United States v. LeMay, 260

F.3d 1018, 1027 (2001). Rule 414 states that “[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is

accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of

another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for

its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” Id. at 1024. The court held in LeMay that

Rule 414 is not unconstitutional because it is limited in its function by Rule 403. Id. at

1026-27. Rule 403 directs judges to exclude any evidence submitted under Rule 414 that

is more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 1027. The court reasoned that this balancing

process eliminates any due process concerns about Rule 414, stating: “[a]s long as the

protections of Rule 403 remain in place to ensure that potentially devastating evidence of

little probative value will not reach the jury, the right to a fair trial remains adequately

safeguarded.” Id. at 1026.

The reasoning of LeMay applies equally to this case because section 1108 of the

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Section 1108 of the California Evidence Code provides: “[In a criminal action in which

the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of

another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence

is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”

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Section 352 of the California Evidence Code provides: “The court in its discretion may

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “Although relevant, evidence may

be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

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California Evidence Code is similar to Rule 414.2 Evidence that is admissible under section

1108 is limited by California Evidence Code section 352. Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a). 

Section 352 parallels Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it permits a trial

judge to exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect.3 Just as Rule 403 did in LeMay, section 352 ensures that evidence

admitted under section 1108 will not infringe on the right to a fair trial guaranteed under the

Due Process Clause.

The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim on this issue, relying on the California

Supreme Court opinion in People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903 (1999). Exh. 8 at 5. In

Falsetta, the state supreme court held that the admission of propensity evidence in sex

cases does not offend fundamental principles of justice, id. at 913-15, and that California

Evidence Code section 352 provides an adequate safeguard against undue prejudice, id. at

915-17. The court of appeal rightly noted that it is bound by the California Supreme Court’s

holding. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455 (1962).

Finally, the United States Supreme Court has never held that the admission of

evidence of prior crimes violates the right to due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 75 n. 5 (1991) (declining to rule on the constitutionality of propensity evidence). 

Because federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court decision was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

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determined by the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), when there is no "clearly

established law as determined by the United State Supreme Court," as here, habeas relief

is barred. 

The state appellate courts' rejection of petitioner's sole claim was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. 

Petitioner also raises a claim that section 1108 violates the Equal Protection Clause

by treating sex offenders different from other classes of offenders. The state appellate

court rejected this claim, explaining that sex offenders were not similarly situated to other

offenders, and noted that the rational basis test was the appropriate standard for reviewing

a challenge to the state’s treatment of offenders. Exh. 8 at 5-6. The state court, relying on

People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172, 184-85 (1997), concluded that the legislature had a

rational basis for singling out sex offenders under section 1108 in light of the nature of sex

offenses, and that “both their seriousness and their secretive commission” resulted in

credibility contests. Exh. 8 at 6.

In LeMay, the Supreme Court held that “Rule 414 does not discriminate against any

group of individuals on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Sex offenders are

not a suspect class.” 260 F.3d at 1030. It further held that a child molester does not have

a 

fundamental right to [ ] a trial free from relevant propensity

evidence that is not unduly prejudicial. . . . Because Rule 414

does not burden a fundamental right, and because sex

offenders are not a suspect class, Rule 414 is constitutional if it

bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government

interest. Prosecuting crime effectively is certainly a legitimate

government interest. Rule 414 furthers that interest by allowing

prosecutors to introduce relevant evidence to help convict sex

offenders.

Id. at 1030-31. 

As discussed above, Rule 414 is analogous to section 1108; therefore, it is

reasonable to conclude that equal protection is no more violated under section 1108. 

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Accordingly, the state court’s determination was not an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent. 

B. Admission of Certain “Propensity” Evidence

Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred in admitting Barbara’s testimony. 

Specifically, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by ruling

that the evidence of his prior sexual assault was more probative than prejudicial under

California Evidence Code section 352. Petitioner argues that the evidence was highly

prejudicial and resulted in an unfair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

1. Exhaustion Requirements

As a preliminary matter, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted

because he did not present this claim to the California Supreme Court. In his traverse,

Petitioner argues that all claims in his petition have been presented to the California

Supreme Court. A defendant convicted in state court must first exhaust all available state

remedies before turning to the federal courts for habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

However, an application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be denied on the merits,

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts

of the State.” Id. at § 2254(b)(2). As discussed below, the court finds that Petitioner’s

claim must be denied on the merits; thus it may consider his claim without determining

whether he properly exhausted the issue in state court.

2. Legal Standard

Permitting a jury to hear evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may violate due

process. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6 (1983); Fritchie v. McCarthy,

664 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967)). 

However, a state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas

review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair

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trial guaranteed by due process. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 41; Jammal v. Van de Kamp,

926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot disturb on due

process grounds a state court's decision to admit evidence of prior crimes or bad acts

unless the admission of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v.

Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). 

The admission of other crimes evidence violates due process where there are no

permissible inferences the jury can draw from the evidence (in other words, no inference

other than conduct in conformity therewith). Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. But it is generally

upheld where: (1) there is sufficient proof that the defendant committed the prior act; (2) the

prior act is not too remote in time; (3) the prior act is similar (if admitted to show intent); (4)

the prior act is used to prove a material element; and (5) the probative value of admitting

evidence of the prior act is not substantially outweighed by any prejudice the defendant

may suffer as a result of its admission. McDowell v. Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1366 (9th

Cir.) (sentencer may rely on prior criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction if the

evidence has "some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation"), amended, 116

F.3d 364 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated in part by 130 F.3d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1103.

A statute or rule of evidence allowing admission of evidence of prior crimes to show

a propensity to commit the charged offense does not facially violate due process if the

evidence to be admitted is subject to a balancing test by the trial court. LeMay, 260 F.3d at

1031 (new federal rules of evidence allowing evidence of prior sexual offenses to show a

propensity to commit the charged offense do not violate due process because evidence is

still subject to trial court balancing test which provides for meaningful appellate review).

3. Application to the Case at Bar

Applying this standard to the present case, Petitioner’s claim must fail. The state

court of appeal correctly observed that the evidence was admissible for a legitimate

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purpose and gave rise to a permissible inference. In reaching its decision, the court of

appeal considered the factors listed above and determined that the crucial factor was “the

striking similarity between certain aspects of the charged offenses against Suzanne and

[Petitioner’s] prior offenses against Barbara. Exh. 8 at 7-8. Specifically, the court of appeal

considered the following:

In both cases, [Petitioner] deliberately exploited his position as

the domineering and threatening male adult in the household to

perpetrate years of sexual abuse on a vulnerable female child in

the family. While details surrounding the uncharged and

charged incidents differ in some respects, the incidents

themselves were remarkably alike. [Petitioner] began molesting

Barbara when she was nine years old, shortly after he moved in

with her mother. The molestation occurred continuously from

1969 to 1977. [Petitioner] began molesting Suzanne when she

was seven years old, shortly after he moved in with her mother. 

He molested Suzanne continuously from 1990 to 1998. In both

cases, [Petitioner] engaged in a consistent pattern of control

and extreme physical abuse of family members in conjunction

with the sexual abuse. [Petitioner] used the same modus

operandi (i.e., having the mother take the other children out of

the house) to get the girls alone so he could molest them.

[Petitioner] engaged in the same type of sexual acts with both

girls – [Petitioner] sat or laid on the edge of a bed and had the

girls orally copulate him. In both cases, he sometimes forced

them to swallow his semen after he ejaculated. [Petitioner]

threatened both of the victims with dire consequences if they

revealed the molestations. He had sexual intercourse with

Barbara when she was only nine years old, and threatened to

force Suzanne to have sexual intercourse once she turned 16,

telling her she was old enough.

Exh. 8 at 8-9.

In addition to similarity, which it considered the crucial factor, the court of appeals

also considered the other McDowell factors and determined that “there was a factually

justified and reasonable basis for the trial court’s conclusion that this evidence was more

probative than prejudicial under section 352.” Exh. 8 at 9-11. Thus, the admission of

Barbara’s testimony was not arbitrary and, given the “remarkable similarities” between the

prior and current sexual assaults, as well as the trial court’s careful balancing of the

relevant factors, it was not so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Accordingly, this court cannot disturb on due process grounds the state court's decision to

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admit Barbara’s testimony. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357.

C. Instructional Error

Petitioner next argues that the instruction the jury was given on how to evaluate

Barbara S.’s testimony violated his federal constitutional right to have his guilt proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. He expresses the concern that the jury may have been

confused about the burden of proof and may have found him guilty of the charged crimes

based on proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court instructed on the use of Barbara S.’s testimony with the 1999 revised

version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, which in written form told the jury:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or more occasions

other than that charged in the case. . . . 

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you

may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition

to commit the same or similar type sexual offenses. If you find that the

defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer

that he was likely to commit and did commit the crime or crimes of

which he is accused. 

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant committed [one or more] prior sexual offenses, that is not

sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed the charged crimes. The weight and significance of the

evidence, if any, are for you to decide.

You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.

Exh. 4 at 350 (emphasis added).

After instructing the jury on the definition of the charged crimes, the court also

delivered CALJIC 2.50.1 (Evidence of Other Crimes by the Defendant Proved by a

Preponderance of the Evidence) and CALJIC 2.50.2 (Definition of Preponderance of the

Evidence). Exh. 4 at 356-57. The jury was also instructed with CALJIC 2.90 regarding

reasonable doubt, and CALJIC 2.01 regarding sufficiency of the evidence where

circumstantial evidence has been presented. Exh. 4 at 338, 360. Based on these different

standards, Petitioner argues that the jury could have determined, by a preponderance of

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 This language from the 1999 revised instructions distinguishes this case from Gibson

v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner’s due

process rights were violated when the trial court gave the 1996 version of the 2.50.01 

instruction. Id. at 814. The prior version of 2.50.01 allowed a jury to consider evidence of prior

uncharged sex offenses and to infer the defendant’s guilt of the current offense from the prior

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the evidence, that he molested Barbara S., and then concluded that he had the propensity

to and did molest Suzanne, without passing that inference through a proof beyond a

reasonable doubt filter.

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

71-72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. Id. at 72. The instruction may not be judged in artificial

isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

record. Id. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the

overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977));

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988). The

court must inquire whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury erroneously

applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 & n.4.

Here, the court of appeal concluded that the instructions did not allow the jury to

infer that Petitioner committed the charged crime solely from proof that he committed the

prior acts. The court noted that both the prosecutor and defense counsel stressed that the

jury had to find Petitioner guilty of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and that

all of the related standard instructions were given, which clarified the prosecution’s burden

of proof. Exh. 8 at 12. This court agrees. CALJIC No. 2.50.01 explicitly instructed the jury

that “if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed prior

sexual offenses, that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed the charged crimes.”4

 Given such a specific mandate, it is not reasonably likely

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uncharged offences. Id. 817-18. As the 1996 version of CALJIC 2.50.1 required only a

preponderance of the evidence to prove the uncharged offenses, CALJIC 2.50.1 and 2.50.01

together allowed a jury to find a defendant guilty without requiring proof beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. at 822. The heart of the Gibson decision is the court’s conclusion that the prerevision instructions given in that case provided “two routes of conviction, one by a

constitutionally sufficient standard and one by a constitutionally deficient one.” Id. at 823.

When it is impossible to know whether a jury used the impermissible legal theory or the one

which meets constitutional requirements, the unconstitutionality of one of the routes requires

that the conviction be set aside. Id. at 825. In the revised version of the instruction, however,

the constitutionally-deficient route was blocked off: The revised instruction tells the jury in

unequivocal words that it cannot find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt just because

it had found by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed prior bad acts. Indeed,

Gibson suggested that the revised instruction would pass constitutional muster. 387 F.3d at

818-19.

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that the jury might believe they could convict on a preponderance standard.

Moreover, the other jury instructions bolster this conclusion. The trial court

instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.90 that the prosecution had “the burden of proving

[Petitioner] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” (Exh. 4 at 360), and with CALJIC No. 2.01,

which provides that “each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances

necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In

other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference

necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Exh. 4 at 338.

The trial court also instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 1.01 (instructions

must be considered as a whole), (Exh. 4 at 333), CALJIC No. 2.02 (sufficiency of

circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent), (Exh. 4 at 339), CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2 &

2.27 (directing jurors to consider all of the evidence adduced at trial in reaching its verdict),

(Exh. 4 at 346 & 349), CALJIC Nos. 10.41, 10.42.6, 10.45, & 10.49 (defining elements of

the charged offenses and requiring jury find each element proven beyond a reasonable

doubt for a guilty verdict), (Exh. 4 at 351-55, 362-66, 368), CALJIC No. 4.71.5 (“In order to

find the defendant guilty, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the commission of . . . a specific act or acts constituting that crime within the period

alleged.”), (Exh. 4 at 371), and CALJIC Nos. 2.50.1 & 2.50.2 (explaining meaning and

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5 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970).

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applicability of preponderance standard, and instructing jury, “You should consider all of the

evidence bearing upon every issue regardless of who produced it.”). Exh. 4 at 356-57. 

Given that juries are presumed to follow their instructions, Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S.

225, 234 (2000), there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury, in considering the

instructions as a whole, erroneously applied CALJIC 2.50.01 in a way that violates the

Constitution.

The parties’ closing arguments further limited the possibility of any misinterpretation

or confusion by reinforcing the fact that the prosecution must still prove each element of

each offense beyond a reasonable doubt before Petitioner could be found guilty. See Exh.

1 at 1070, 1077 (prosecution noting burden of proof for offenses beyond a reasonable

doubt); Exh. 1 at 1094 (defense argument explaining prosecution’s burden of proof was

beyond a reasonable doubt); Exh. 4 at 1138, 1146 (prosecution rebuttal argument

reiterating that prosecution’s burden was beyond a reasonable doubt). These arguments

further served to eliminate any potential misunderstanding of the instructions. See, e.g.,

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (explaining state court may assume prosecution’s

argument resolved legal ambiguity in instructions, particularly when the prosecution’s

argument resolves ambiguity in favor of defendant).

On this record, the appellate court’s conclusion, that it is not reasonably likely a jury

could interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the charged offenses based on a

lowered standard of proof, is a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 

D. Effective Assistance of Counsel

In Petitioner’s final claim, he asserts that he had an irreconcilable conflict with his

trial counsel, and the state court’s denial of his two Marsden5

 motions violated his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. Petitioner brought the first Marsden motion shortly before the

start of trial, after the trial court ruled pursuant to section 1108 that the prosecution could

introduce Barbara S.’s testimony about his prior sexual assault. Exh. 2. Petitioner

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6

 Petitioner provided the cases to counsel less than one hour prior to the hearing. Exh.

2 at 6.

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disagreed with the court’s ruling and presented cases to his counsel that he felt showed the

court was wrong. In denying the first Marsden motion, the court found that counsel had

properly represented Petitioner and, if there was a personality conflict, it was a result of the

time pressure under which Petitioner’s counsel had to review the cases rather than lack of

due diligence.6

 Exh. 2 at 8-9. The court permitted counsel time to review the cases and to

file additional motions if necessary. Exh. 2 at 8.

Petitioner brought his second Marsden motion after the jury found him guilty of the

charged offenses. Exh. 3. Petitioner explained that he no longer trusted his attorney and

informed the court that he was filing a civil rights complaint against his attorney in federal

district court and was going to send a letter to the state bar. Exh. 3 at 3. Petitioner

complained that counsel “failed to call any witnesses for [him],” but did not specify any

witnesses that should have been called. Petitioner also asserted that counsel called him

names and tried to intimidate him by telling him during the plea bargaining stage that the

judge had said he was going to lose the case. Exh. 3 at 4. Petitioner also complained that

counsel “should have done a little more investigating in some of the motions that were

made,” referring back to the earlier dispute about the prior sexual assault evidence. Exh. 3

at 4-5. 

After hearing counsel’s response to Petitioner’s claims, and after giving Petitioner

the opportunity to reply, the court made the following findings:

All right. To the extent that there are conflicts between the

statements made by Mr. Harrington and [counsel] this morning, the

Court believes [counsel] and I disbelieve Mr. Harrington for the

following reasons. The Court observed this trial. It was a lengthy

trial. The Court indicated I believe at one point on the record that

there were probably as many motions in this trial as I had heard in

any other trial, and perhaps more.

That as to the trust factor, the Court should observe for this

purpose that during the course of the trial, Mr. Harrington was in

frequent communication with the investigator as well as [counsel]

and sometimes talking as the witness was in fact testifying. I don’t

know what Mr. Harrington was attempting to communicate, but that

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this occurred frequently. Mr. Harrington also had paper upon which

he could write, and I noted several times for myself that Mr.

Harrington was indeed writing.

That [counsel] did call witnesses, that there were a number

of duplicated witnesses from both lists, that many of those

witnesses were indeed called by the People, and that [counsel]

cross-examined witnesses that were indeed on his list of witnesses

to call.

I was more than impressed with the quality of investigation

that was done in this case. I have no idea except for what was just

represented by [counsel] how many investigative hours were spent

or how many pages of report were written. But I do know that there

was extensive investigation in this case and that in fact at your - at

your request or [counsel’s] request and your concurrence, Mr.

Harrington, that the trial was indeed continued a number of times. 

And I’m not going to go back through the record here and try to

figure out how many, but a number of times so that further

investigation could be made.

I distinctly remember when reports were presented

sometimes for the first time to [counsel], he would come and say,

“I’m going to have to have a continuance in order to investigate

these things.” And some of those and many of those were on the

uncharged prior acts that you referred to. I don’t know if you recall,

Mr. Harrington, but the Court, as a result of motions made by your

attorney, kept out one of the uncharged prior victims in this case. 

And I did not allow that testi[mony] to come in.

The Defendant: No, but you allowed the one that hung me.

The Court: I allowed what was permitted under - and which I

was required to do under the law. I kept out one that I did not feel

was a relevant.

. . . [¶] . . .

But in any event, I kept out, as a result of investigation and

preparation that the investigator and [counsel] did, kept out items of

evidence. I limited the prosecution’s . . . examination into certain

areas . . . [¶] . . . I kept out any number of items, and I think the

record is fairly clear and will be clear as to what was kept out. But it

was - what was kept out was as a direct consequence of the

preparation and investigation and the motion work done by

investigator and attorney.

Exh. 3 at 10-12.

The court found that “[counsel] has more than adequately represented you and is

capable of continuing to adequately represent you.” Exh. 3 at 12, 13. The court added: “If

there’s been some breakdown, Mr. Harrington, if there’s some breakdown in relationship

between you and [counsel] such that it would make it impossible for [counsel] to represent

you, then I find that that was as a direct consequence of actions by you and not by

[counsel].” Exh. 3 at 13.

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Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his Marsden motions

because he had a “conflict with and had lost all hope and trust in” his court-appointed

counsel. Petitioner also contends that the trial court conducted rushed hearings on the

motions.

1. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants who can afford to retain counsel a

qualified right to hire counsel of their choice. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159,

164 (1988). A criminal defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel, however, has no

right to counsel of his own choosing. Id. at 159. The Sixth Amendment guarantees

effective assistance of counsel, not a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and

his counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). The essential aim is “to guarantee an

effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will

inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.

Nonetheless, to compel a criminal defendant to undergo a trial with the assistance of

an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive the

defendant of any counsel whatsoever. Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197-1201

(9th Cir. 2005). Thus, if a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, the court

should conduct an inquiry to determine if an irreconcilable conflict exists. Brown v. Craven,

424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). “However, not every conflict or disagreement

between the defendant and counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights.” Schell v. Witek,

218 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). On federal habeas review, the issue is not

whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel, but

whether constitutional error occurred. Id. at 1025. Thus, “the basic question is simply

whether the conflict between [defendant] and his attorney prevented effective assistance of

counsel.” Id. at 1026. That is, the habeas court considers whether the trial court's denial of

the motion "actually violated [the petitioner's] constitutional rights in that the conflict

between [the petitioner] and his attorney had become so great that it resulted in a total lack

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of communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client

relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth Amendment." Id. 

To resolve this question, the court must ascertain “(1) the nature and extent of the

conflict between [the defendant] and his attorney, and (2) whether that conflict deprived [the

defendant] of the representation to which he was entitled by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at

1027; see also United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979) (court considers

whether the conflict was so great that it resulted in a “total lack of communication

preventing an adequate defense”). In order for substitution of counsel to be constitutionally

compelled, there must be a complete breakdown in communication; mere friction and

disagreement does not require new counsel. United States v. George, 85 F.3d 1433, 1439

(9th Cir. 1996). In addition, strategic differences do not require substitution; rather, the

attorney is entitled to make tactical decisions, “even in the face of his client’s

incomprehension or even explicit disapproval.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 & n.8 (internal

quotation omitted). And the mere fact that the defendant uses “buzz words” from case law

to claim a “complete and total failure of communication” does not require substitution if the

evidence does not substantiate the claim. United States v. McDaniel, 995 F. Supp. 1095,

1097 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

2. Application to the Case at Bar

Based on this standard, the court finds that Petitioner’s claim is without merit. The

state court’s factual findings that defense counsel conducted full and adequate

investigation into the charges, presented witnesses, maintained communication, and

diligently represented Petitioner at trial are fully supported by the record and have not been

rebutted by Petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In his

first Marsden motion, Petitioner disagreed with the trial court’s admission of Barbara S.’s

testimony and argued that counsel failed to consider cases he wanted him to consider. 

The trial court found that any conflict was a result of the lack of time Petitioner gave his

counsel to review the cases, having presented them less than one hour prior to the

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 In fact, while it appears that Petitioner may have filed a complaint in this district against

his counsel, that complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Harrington v.

Hamilton, C-00-0458 EDL, Doc. #4.

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Marsden hearing. The court permitted counsel time to review the cases and to file

additional motions if necessary, and there is no indication that a conflict on this issue

persisted. 

As to the second Marsden hearing, Petitioner raised several issues, none of which

the trial court found constituted a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. 

Petitioner argued that counsel failed to call any witnesses for him. The court, however,

found that counsel “did call witnesses, that there were a number of duplicated witnesses

from both lists, that many of those witnesses were indeed called by the People, and that

[counsel] cross-examined witnesses that were indeed on his list of witnesses to call.” As to

witnesses that counsel cross-examined rather than calling, he stated his approach was to

cross-examine the witnesses that were also on the People’s witness list rather than calling

them again in the defense case. There is no indication that Petitioner objected to this

tactic. Regardless, as stated above, strategic differences do not require substitution, and

the attorney is entitled to make tactical decisions, even in the face of his client’s explicit

disapproval. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 & n.8.

Petitioner also argued that a conflict existed because he filed a civil rights complaint

against counsel in federal district court and he intended to send a letter to the state bar. 

While a lawsuit between a defendant and counsel can potentially create a conflict of

interest, the mere fact that Petitioner threatened a lawsuit does not create an actual

conflict. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “finding an actual conflict from a mere threat would

allow defendants to manufacture a conflict in any case. We decline to adopt such an

unbounded rule.” United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 1998). Petitioner

does not pursue this issue in his First Amended Petition and there is no indication that his

lawsuit stated a valid claim7

; thus he has failed to rebut the trial court’s finding by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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Petitioner also argued that counsel called him names and tried to intimidate him. 

Counsel denied both allegations. In denying Petitioner’s motion on this ground, the trial

court found that despite conflicts between statements made by Petitioner and counsel, it

believed counsel and disbelieved Petitioner based on the court’s observations during trial. 

Petitioner has failed to rebut this finding. Even assuming that Petitioner’s argument was

correct, he has failed to demonstrate that the conflict resulted in a deficient performance by

counsel which adversely affected his trial. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S 162, 166 (2002) (“As

a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.”) (internal quotation omitted). Given the record in

this matter, which reflects diligent representation by counsel, Petitioner has failed to meet

his burden. 

Petitioner also complained that counsel “should have done a little more investigating

in some of the motions that were made,” referring back to the earlier dispute about the prior

sexual assault evidence. However, the trial court found that it “was more than impressed

with the quality of investigation” that was done in the case, and that the trial was continued

a number of times to permit further investigation by counsel. Moreover, given that

Evidence Code section 1108 permits prior sexual offenses as evidence of a propensity to

commit such acts, and that the trial court determined the probative value of Barbara S.’s

testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect, Petitioner has failed to show that any further

investigation would have prevented her testimony. Instead, Petitioner’s argument is more a

challenge to 1108 than a legitimate claim of failure of his counsel to investigate.

Finally, the court notes that Petitioner has not rebutted the trial court’s finding that, if

a conflict did exist, he was its sole source. As noted above, Petitioner is entitled only to the

effective assistance of counsel, not counsel whom he likes or with whom he gets along. 

See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 10, 13-14; United States v. George, 85 F.3d at 1439. 

The California appellate court’s rejection of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim

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was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 17, 2007.

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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