Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02703/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02703-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Cedar Rapids
Appellee
Gerald R. Duhaime
Appellant
Krisanne M. Duhaime
Appellant
Susan M. Dumbaugh
Appellant
Daniel Ray French
Not Party
Gatso USA, Inc.
Appellee
Gary Hughes
Appellant
Roger L. Lee
Appellant
David Mazgaj
Appellant
Jerry Northrup
Appellant
Edward G. Robinson
Not Party
James Louis Sparks
Appellant
Jeffrey V. Stimpson
Appellant
Arash Yarpezeshkan
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2703

___________________________

Gary Hughes; Arash Yarpezeshkan; David Mazgaj

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

Edward G. Robinson

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

James Louis Sparks; Jerry Northrup

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

Daniel Ray French

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

Jeffrey V. Stimpson; Roger L. Lee; Krisanne M. Duhaime; Gerald R. Duhaime;

Susan M. Dumbaugh

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Gatso USA, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

____________

Appellate Case: 15-2703 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/02/2016 Entry ID: 4465419 
 Submitted: September 20, 2016

 Filed: November 2, 2016 

____________

Before LOKEN, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge

A group of driverssued the City of Cedar Rapids and Gatso USA, Inc., arguing

that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. 

The district court dismissed the drivers’ claims. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands. 

I. 

In 2011, the City, by ordinance, authorized an ATE system. Cedar Rapids,

Iowa Mun. Code § 61.138. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate

the system. When a vehicle speeds or runs a red light, an ATE camera takes an

image. Gatso then mails a Notice of Violation to the vehicle owner. The driverssued

in Iowa state court, arguing that the ATE system violatestheir right to procedural due

process, their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code § 602.6101, and causes unjust

enrichment for the City and Gatso. They removed the case to federal court and

moved to dismiss.

The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing: Gary Hughes and

David L. Mazgaj’s claims, and the procedural-due-process claims of Edward G.

Robinson, James L. Sparks, Jeffrey L. Northrup, Arash C. Yarpezeshkan, Daniel R.

French, and Jeffrey V. Stimpson. For the drivers with standing, the district court

dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the drivers contend that the district

court erred by dismissing their complaint and not remanding to state court those

claims dismissed for lack of standing.

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II. 

According to the City and Gatso, drivers Hughes, Mazgaj, and Roger L. Lee

lack Article III standing for their claims. This court reviews standing determinations

de novo. Plymouth Cty., Iowa v. Merscorp, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (8th Cir.

2014). 

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases

and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To establish Article III standing, a

plaintiff must show 1) an injury in fact, 2) a sufficient causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of, and 3) a likelihood that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to establish these

elements. Id. 

A. 

The City and Gatso object to Hughes’s Article III standing, claiming he has no

injury in fact. Hughes asserts a “fear that, as a Vehicle Owner regularly using the

roads in Cedar Rapids, [he] may be subject to . . . civil liability resulting from the

operation of the City’s fixed or mobile ATE system’s cameras.” He has not received

a Notice of Violation. A person threatened with law enforcement may challenge the

law “under circumstances that render the threatened enforcement sufficiently

imminent.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014). The

person need not demonstrate it is “literally certain that the harms they identify will

come about.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l. USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). 

Standing may be based on a “substantial risk” of harm that prompts plaintiffs to

“reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.” Id.

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Hughes does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or avoid the

threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an ATE citation is sufficiently

imminent. Hughes does not have standing.

B. 

The City and Gatso claim Mazgaj has no injury in fact. His wife received the

Notice of Violation, but Mazgaj was driving the car (which she owned). He asserts

third-party standing on behalf of his wife. “[T]here may be circumstances where it

is necessary to grant a third-party standing to assert the rights of another.” Kowalski

v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004). For example, a plaintiff may show “a close

relationship with the person who possesses the right” and “a hindrance to the

possessor’s ability to protect [her] own interests.” Id. at 130. 

Mazgaj fails to show a hindrance to his wife’s ability to protect her own

interests. He does not have third-party standing. Mazgaj believes he need not assert

third-party standing. But then his claim is just a “generally available grievance . . .

seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public

at large.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013). Mazgaj does not

state an Article III case or controversy.

C. 

According to the City and Gatso, Lee’s claims are not ripe for adjudication. 

“[T]he ripeness inquiry requires the examination of both ‘the fitness of the issues for

judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’”

Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 572-73 (8th Cir.

2003), quoting Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Fitness depends

on whether a case needs further factual development. Id. Hardship requires that the

plaintiff “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury

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as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.” Id. The plaintiff “must

necessarily satisfy both prongs to at least a minimal degree.” Neb. Pub. Power Dist.

v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1039 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Lee satisfies both prongs. He was found guilty of violating the ordinance; no

further factual development is necessary. Lee has the hardship of citation and the

cost of litigation. Lee’s claims are ripe.

D. 

Hughes and Mazgaj reason that if they lack Article III standing, the district

court must remand their claims to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any

time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). The City and Gatso counter that the

district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction and properly dismissed the claims

for lack of Article III standing. 

A court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claimif the claimant

lacks Article III standing. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 351-52

(2006) (“What we have never done is . . . permit a federal court to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy those elements of

the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing . . . .”). If a case is removed

from state court, those claims lacking Article III standing shall be remanded. See

Shaw v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 605 F.3d 1039, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (remanding some

claims where after removal, some plaintiffs, but not all, lacked standing); Lee v.

American Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).

Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998), is

inapplicable here. There, plaintiff argued that if the “district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over any claim, then every claim, i.e., the entire case, must be

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Appellate Case: 15-2703 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/02/2016 Entry ID: 4465419 
remanded to the state court.” Id. at 391 (emphasis in original). The Court disagreed,

holding that remand of an entire case was improper where the court had jurisdiction

over some related claims. Id. Here, the drivers do not argue that every claim in the

case should be remanded; they seek remand of only those claims that lack Article III

standing. 

The district court never had jurisdiction of Hughes and Mazgaj’s claims. See

DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-52. Their claims should be remanded to state

court. See Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1032 (8th Cir. 2014)

(finding that where a state case is removed to federal court but lacks Article III

standing, the proper remedy is remand to state court).

III.

A.

The district court found that drivers Robinson, Sparks, Northrup,

Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson lack standing to bring a procedural-due-process

claim, because they chose not to participate in the process they attack. The district

court invoked Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (M.D.N.C.

2003): where the plaintiff has not “availed himself of the process Defendants have

provided, Plaintiff has not suffered a concrete and particularized injury as a result of

allegedly deficient process and therefore has no standing to challenge it.”

Unfortunately, Shavitz confusesthe injury-in-fact requirement with the statinga-valid-claim requirement. Determining the adequacy of the process is generally a

merits question, even if a plaintiff does not use the process provided. See Cochran

v. Illinois State Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 600-01 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressing,

at the meritsstage, the argument “the hearing to which [plaintiff] was entitled, but did

not request, would not have provided him with a meaningful opportunity to be

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heard.”). See also Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, 632 F. Supp. 2d 586, 599 (E.D. La

2008) (“[T]his Court would be remiss if it incorporated an assessment of the

adequacy of . . . adjudication procedures, or the plaintiff’s failure to take advantage

of those procedures, into its standing analysis.”). Otherwise, in order to have

standing, a plaintiff would always have to show the inadequacy of the due

process—the central claim. 

The district court here addressed the substance of the due process argument as

part of the standing analysis. The allegations that the procedure is inadequate—even

if drivers shun it—sufficiently establishes an injury in fact for Article III standing. 

These six drivers also satisfy the causation and redressability requirements. 

The drivers’ alleged injury is inadequate process directly traceable to the City and

Gatso. If the court awards damages, their claims are redressed. See Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). Drivers

Robinson, Sparks, Northrup, Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson have standing to

bring procedural-due-process claims.

 B.

To demonstrate a procedural-due-process violation, the drivers must show a

deprivation of life, liberty, or property without sufficient process. Clark v. Kansas

City Mo. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 2004). To determine the kind of

process due, courts balance three factors:

1) the nature and weight of the private interest affected by the

challenged official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation

of such interest as a result of the summary procedures used; and

3) the governmental function involved and state interests served

by such procedures, as well as the administrative and fiscal

burdens, if any, that would results from the substitute procedures

sought. 

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Booker v. City of Saint Paul, 762 F.3d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 2014), citing Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). This court reviews de novo the grant of a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, taking all facts in the complaint as true.

Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dept. of Human Servs., 775 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.

2014).

The drivers’ claim fails at the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous

deprivation . . . as a result of the summary procedures used.” Booker, 762 F.3d at

734. The drivers attack the administrative process as a “rubber stamp” and a “sham

of a process.” A court need not accept conclusory allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding that a pleading is insufficient if it contains mere labels

and conclusions or tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement). 

See also Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 112 F. Supp. 3d 817, 847-48 (N.D. Iowa.

2015) (noting the two ways, plus appeals, to challenge an ATE citation).

The drivers also allege that the process isinadequate because some cameras are

not calibrated to Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) standards. The drivers

claimthat the IDOT standards are “a standard applicable to their claims.” The drivers

cite no authority that a state agency’s regulations are the standard for procedural due

process. See Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1993) (“It is clear, however, that,

without more, the mere violation of a state law or rule does not constitute a federal

due process violation.”). The district court correctly ruled that “the ATE Program

may comply with procedural due process even if it is not compliant with IDOT

regulations.” The drivers do not state a violation of their procedural-due-process

rights.

IV. 

The drivers next focus on substantive due process. “To establish a substantive

due process violation, [plaintiff] must demonstrate that a fundamental right was

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violated and that the conduct shocks the conscience.” Akins v. Epperly, 588 F.3d

1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 2009), citing Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 651 (8th Cir.

2002) (Bye, J., concurring). 

A. 

The right to travel is a fundamental right. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.

745, 757 (1966). It has three different components: 1) the right of a citizen of one

state to enter and leave another state, 2) the right to be a welcome visitor, not an

unfriendly alien, when temporarily present in another state, and 3) for those travelers

who become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that

state. Sanez v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1999). The first two components are at

issue here. 

1. 

The first component protects the “right to go from one place to another.” Id.

at 500. If a statute does not burden entry into or exit from the state, then it does not

directly impair the right to free interstate movement. Id. See Edwards v. California,

314 U.S. 160 (1941) (holding unconstitutional a state law making it illegal for a

person to bring out-of-state, indigent persons into the state). The right to travel does

not prevent toll roads, speed limits, or travel-related taxes. See Matsuo v. United

States, 586 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[N]ot everything that deters travel

burdens the fundamental right to travel. States and the federal government would

otherwise find it quite hard to tax airports, hotels, moving companies, or anything else

involved in interstate movement.”). 

The drivers allege that the ATE system infringes their right to travel because

it is a “speed trap” affecting the choices of interstate travelers. A state may enforce

conventional traffic regulations—even if they deter travel—without violating the 

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fundamental right to travel. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 270 n.41 (3d Cir.

1990). 

1

2. 

The Privileges and Immunities Clause is the basis for the second component

of the right to travel, “bar[ring] discrimination against citizens of other States where

there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are

citizens of other States.” Sanez, 526 U.S. at 502. “[A] purely intrastate restriction

does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if it is applied intentionally

against travelersfromother States, unlessit is applied discriminatorily against them.” 

Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993) (emphasis in

original). For the Clause to apply, the discriminatory treatment must burden out-ofstate residents. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of

Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984) (“As an initial matter, the court must decide

whether the ordinance burdens one of those privileges and immunities protected by

the Clause.”). 

The drivers fail to allege discriminatory enforcement against out-of-state

drivers. They state that the ATE system issues more citations to out-of-state drivers

than to in-state drivers. However, they do not allege that the ATE system issues

The drivers assert they have a right to intrastate travel under the Iowa 1

Constitution. They cite no Iowa law supporting this claim. Cf. Scheckel v. State, 838

N.W.2d 870, 2013 WL 4504919, *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (unpublished table

opinion) (stating that “the right to travel does not give an individual the right to travel

at their discretion with disregard to the traffic laws”); State v. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d

852, 856 (Iowa 1989) (holding mandatory seat belt law did not infringe upon a

fundamental right); Veach v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 374 N.W.2d 248, 249 (Iowa

1985) (holding that a regulation denying work permits to individuals whose drivers’

licenses had been suspended did not implicate a fundamental right). 

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citations discriminatorily based on whether a vehicle has in-state or out-of-state

registration. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 277. The drivers note that the ATE system allows

out-of-state residentsto contest, by mail, a Notice of Violation. This convenience for

non-residents does not burden the right to travel. See United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 218. 

The drivers do not allege a violation of the right to travel under the Privileges and

Immunities Clause.

The drivers do try to state a violation of substantive due process, claiming that

the challenged conduct shocks the conscience. See Akins, 588 F.3d at 1183. To the

contrary, the City and Gatso’s acts are not “so disproportionate to the need presented,

and . . . so inspired by malice orsadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess

of zeal that it amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally

shocking to the conscience.” Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d

927, 937 (8th Cir. 2012). The City and Gatso’s actions do not otherwise offend

judicial notions of fairness.

B. 

The drivers posit an Equal Protection Clause violation of their fundamental

right to travel. “[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative

classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise

of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” 

Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). The drivers admit that they

are not members of a suspect class, and as discussed, the ordinance does not burden

their fundamental right to travel. When no fundamental right or suspect class is at

issue, a challenged law must pass the rational basis test. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.

292, 301 (1993). 

The drivers attack the rational basis of the ordinance. In rational basis review,

“legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on

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rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” FCC v. Beach

Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “It is enough that there is an evil at hand

for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was

a rational way to correct it.” Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88,

(1955). 

The ordinance passes rational basis. The City could rationally conclude that

the ATE system would reduce the number of people violating traffic laws. See Idris

v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (A “system thatsimultaneously

raises money and improves compliance with traffic laws has much to recommend and

it cannot be called unconstitutionally whimsical”); Hughes, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 842-

43 (rejecting an equal-protection challenge to distinctions based on licence-plate

location and types of vehicles in the database). There is no Equal Protection Clause

violation here.

C.

The drivers emphasize pending state-court litigation about the ATE system. 

In March 2015, IDOT ruled that some traffic cameras in the City should be removed. 

IDOT found thatsome cameras were “beyond the area of concern” or placed too close

to a speed-reduction sign. Evaluation of Cedar Rapids Automated Traffic Enf’t

Report, Iowa Dep't of Transp., (2015) available at http://www.iowadot.gov/

ATEReports/pdfs/Final%20Cedar%20Rapids%20ATE%20Response.pdf. The

City’s appeal is still pending in Iowa state court. City of Muscatine v. Iowa Dep’t of

Trans., 05771 CVCV049988 (Polk Cty. Dist. Ct. filed June 10, 2015).

According to the drivers, IDOT’s ruling shows that the ordinance does not

have a rational basis. Even if the ordinance did violate IDOT regulations, a “violation

of state law does not by itself constitute a violation of the Federal Constitution.” 

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Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 25 (1992). The district court properly determined

that the ordinance would survive rational basis even if it did violate IDOT rules. 

The drivers allege that the violation of IDOT rules demonstrates a claim under

the Iowa Constitution. Because the City’s appeal of the IDOT’s ruling is still

pending, this claim is not ripe. See Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr,

No. 15-2172, 2016 WL 4056057 (8th Cir. July 29, 2016) (explaining that ripeness

prevents “judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized

and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties”) (citation omitted). 

The status of the IDOT ruling is central to a claim based on it. The district court

should dismiss without prejudice the drivers’ state-law claims based on the alleged

violation of IDOT rules. See Idris, 552 F.3d at 567 (dismissing without prejudice

plaintiffs’ state law claim that a Chicago ATE ordinance is in conflict with a state

statute). 

V.

The drivers believe the City and Gatso have been unjustly enriched. An unjust

enrichment claim requires: “(1) defendant was enriched by the receipt of a benefit;

(2) the enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it is unjust to allow the

defendant to retain the benefit under the circumstances.” State ex rel. Palmer v.

Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154-55 (Iowa 2001). The drivers think that Gatso

was unjustly enriched by an unlawful delegation of police power from the City. The

drivers’ only authority, Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W.2d 660, 665-66 (Iowa 1960),

is inapposite because the statute there did not improperly delegate police power. A

municipality “can . . . delegate its right to perform certain acts and duties necessary

to transact and carry out its powers. These delegable acts typically involve functions

that require little judgment or discretion.” Warren Cty. Bd. of Health v. Warren Cty.

Bd. of Supervisors, 654 N.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Iowa 2002). Subject to later

development ofthe law, the Iowa Supreme Court has allowed ATE systems to operate

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with private contractors, thus implicitly rejecting the delegation challenge. See City

of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 2015) (allowing Sioux City

to operate an ATE system with a private contract). Cf. City of Davenport v.

Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 544 (Iowa 2008) (recognizing that “a number ofstatutory

and constitutional questions have been raised to ATE ordinances that are not

presented in this appeal,” including whether they “improperly delegat[e] government

authority to a private vendor.”).

The drivers also argue that the ordinance violatesIowa Code § 602.6101, again

as an improper delegation of police power, by making Gatso a court. Section

2

602.6101 establishes the jurisdiction of the Iowa District Court as “exclusive, 

general, and original jurisdiction of all actions . . . except in cases where exclusive 

or concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon some other court, tribunal, or

administrative body.” The drivers’ argument fails for the same reason as their claim

for unjust enrichment; there is no improper delegation (or in statutory terms,

conferral) of power upon Gatso. See Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d at 337. Cf. Seymour,

755 N.W.2d at 544. 

VI. 

The drivers object that the district court considered matters outside of the

pleadings, effectively converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),

matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). District

courts may consider “those materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” 

Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 774 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2014). Those

materials include “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose

The drivers did not plead a violation of Iowa Code § 364.22. 

2

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authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

pleadings.” Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003). Courts

may look outside the pleadings to determine jurisdiction. See Osborn v. United

States, 918 F.3d 724, 728 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990).

The drivers list three items outside the pleadings: 1) checks and payment

receipts for the drivers’ various citations, 2) a letter from a City police officer

dismissing Susan M. Dumbaugh’s citation, and 3) a certified statement from a City

police captain verifying drivers’ citation documents. The drivers do not dispute that

the first two items were used to resolve jurisdictional questions, which means that the

district court could consider them. See Osborn, 918 F.3d at 728 n.4. As for the third

item, the district court did not rely on the certified statement. 

According to the drivers, the district court made some findings that rejected

their allegations or failed to draw all reasonable inferencesin their favor. First, while

the district court did find that the City (not Gatso) mails the Notices of Violation, the

drivers do not articulate the materiality of this mistake. Cont’l Holdings, Inc. v.

Crown Holdings Inc., 672 F.3d 567, 575 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A district court’s ruling

should be reversed if the error affects the substantial rights of a party.”). Second,

contrary to the drivers’ view, the district court properly found that the ordinance

provides two ways to contest the Notice of Violation—a legal conclusion based on

the plain text of the ordinance. 

* * * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Hughes and Mazgaj’s

claims are remanded for remand to state court. The drivers’ state law claims based

on IDOT standards are remanded for dismissal without prejudice. The judgment is

otherwise affirmed, and the case remanded. 

______________________________

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