Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-04373/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-04373-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Toriano Germaine Hudson
Petitioner
M. Sexton
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TORIANO GERMAINE HUDSON,

Petitioner,

v.

M. SEXTON,

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-04373-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Toriano Germaine Hudson, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the California State PrisonSolano, filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. 

Hudson’s petition is now before the Court for review on the merits. For the reasons discussed 

below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crime

On January 17, 2014, Lucio Sanchez was driving his pickup truck in the northbound lane 

of Seventh Street in Richmond when he was struck on the side by an SUV. Mr. Sanchez never 

saw the SUV until it crossed into his lane and struck him from the left. Reporter’s Transcript 

(“RT”) 302-304. After hitting Mr. Sanchez’s car, the SUV reversed, then drove forward, striking 

other cars. Mr. Sanchez observed Mr. Hudson exit the vehicle, and later identified him to police 

as the driver of the SUV. RT 308-313. 

Giovanni Wafer drove her mother-in-law, Martha Wilson, to Ms. Wilson’s sister’s house 

on Seventh Street. RT 215, 240-41. Ms. Wafer parked by the curb, and Ms. Wilson opened the 

door and began to exit. The car was struck on the driver’s side headlight by a Cadillac Escalade, 

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knocking Ms. Wilson out of the vehicle. RT 216, 241-43. Ms. Wilson fell on her face and hit the 

left side of her body on the sidewalk. When Ms. Wafer observed Ms. Wilson after she was thrown 

from the car, Ms. Wilson was face down and not moving. RT 245. She was transported to the 

hospital where she received stitches in her head. RT 218. 

Lakeya Green heard some loud crashes and, when she came outside to see what happened, 

she observed that all the cars in front of the house had been “smashed up,” and an Escalade, with 

Mr. Hudson in the driver’s seat, had crashed next door. RT 185-86, 187-89. After the Escalade 

backed up and then drove forward, hitting Ms. Wafer’s car again, Ms. Green banged on Mr. 

Hudson’s window and opened his SUV door, yelling for him to stop. RT 190-92.

Police Officer Anthony Diaz arrived at the scene and observed the Cadillac SUV with 

smoke coming from the hood, as well as several parked cars with major damage. No one was in 

the SUV, but a large crowd had gathered and informed Officer Diaz that Mr. Hudson had fled and 

was in a rear yard area. RT 375-380. Other police officers arrived, and Mr. Hudson was arrested. 

RT 381-82. Mr. Hudson was placed in the police car, but later the officers attempted to remove 

him from the police car and an altercation ensued. RT 388-405. Mr. Hudson was taken to the 

hospital where his blood was drawn. RT 255, 257. A criminalist later testified that the result of 

the blood draw showed Mr. Hudson had a blood alcohol content of 0.20 percent, a level at which 

anyone driving an automobile would be impaired. RT 292, 296.

B. Procedural History

Mr. Hudson was charged in Contra Costa County Superior Court with the following

counts: (1) driving under the influence causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(a)); (2) driving 

with a blood alcohol level of 0.08% causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(b)); (3) leaving the 

scene of an accident with injury (Cal. Veh. Code § 20001(a)/(b)(1)); (4) hit and run driving (Cal. 

Veh. Code § 20002(a)); (5) resisting an officer by force, violence or threats (Cal. Pen. Code § 69); 

(6) battery on a peace officer (Cal. Pen. Code § 242/243(b)); and (7) obstructing a peace officer 

(Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1)). Counts 1 and 2 also alleged that Mr. Hudson personally inflicted 

great bodily injury, see Cal. Pen. Code § 12022.7(a). It was also alleged that Mr. Hudson had 

suffered two prior serious felony strike convictions, see Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(a)(1); (b)-(i) and 

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1170.12. CT 260-266. The jury returned guilty verdicts on counts 1 through 4, deadlocked on the 

remaining counts, and found true the great bodily injury allegations. CT 368-371, 381-386. The 

trial court found true allegations that Mr. Hudson had suffered two prior serious felony 

convictions. On July 31, 2015, the trial court sentenced Mr. Hudson to a total term of 35 years to 

life in state prison. CT 387; 432-439. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. 

People v. Hudson, 2017 WL 1075430 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017). The California Supreme 

Court denied review. Docket No. 17-8. 

Mr. Hudson then filed his federal habeas petition, where he raised three claims: (1) that he 

received an illegal sentencing enhancement; (2) that his right to counsel was denied; and (3) that 

the trial court erroneously denied his Marsden motion for new counsel. Because his first claim 

was unexhausted, while his federal habeas petition was pending, Mr. Hudson also filed a habeas

petition before the California Supreme Court to exhaust the first claim, which was denied. Docket

No. 17-9. He then filed an amended federal habeas petition, Docket. No. 16, which is currently 

before the Court. Mr. Hudson’s amended habeas petition raises three claims: (1) that he lacked the 

requisite specific intent necessary for a sentencing enhancement; (2) that he was not competent to 

stand trial or to represent himself; and (3) that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 

when the trial judge denied his Marsden motion for new counsel. Respondent filed an answer to 

the order to show cause. Docket No. 17. Mr. Hudson filed a traverse, Docket No. 20, and an 

amended traverse, Docket No. 22. The Court has considered both the traverse and the amended 

traverse.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition 

concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Contra Costa County, California, 

which is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 

to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of 

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A 

federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state 

court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

The state-court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court, if there is a reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). 

When confronted with an unexplained decision from the last state court to have been presented 

with the issue, “the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related 

state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the 

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 

(2018). 

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence For Sentence Enhancement

1. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings 

either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, 

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court 

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in 

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982).

Mr. Hudson’s first claim is that his sentence should not have been enhanced for causing 

great bodily injury because he lacked the requisite specific intent. Amended Petition, Docket No.

16 at 5. Respondent asserts that this claim has not been exhausted and that it fails on the merits. 

Previously Mr. Hudson conceded that the claim was not exhausted because it was not presented in 

his state appellate proceedings, but in the intervening time he filed a habeas petition in state court 

to exhaust the claim. However, Mr. Hudson’s state habeas petition did not include any supporting 

documents, and the California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition, with a citation to People 

v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995), including the parenthetical that “a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence.” Mr. Hudson’s 

specific intent claim was raised only in his state habeas petition, thus the last reasoned decision is 

the California Supreme Court’s denial of his habeas petition. 

Under California law, a denial of a habeas petition with a citation to Duvall indicates that a 

petitioner has failed to include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence, a curable 

defect. It can be cured in a renewed state petition that includes the documentary evidence, and 

state judicial remedies are not exhausted in such a case. When the California Supreme Court 

summarily denies a petition for writ of habeas corpus with citations to both Duvall and In re. 

Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1949), the decision is in effect, the grant of a demurrer. See

Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2016). Although the California Supreme Court did 

not cite Swain, it did cite to Duvall. The court thus dismissed the petition for failure to attach 

necessary documents; this suggests Mr. Hudson could return to the California Supreme Court with 

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a new petition for writ of habeas corpus with the necessary documents. Here, Mr. Hudson could 

exhaust by filing a new habeas petition in the California Supreme Court and attaching the 

necessary supporting documents. The claim is therefore unexhausted.

The district court may deny, but not grant, relief on a habeas petition that presents an 

unexhausted claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The district court can deny an unexhausted claim 

on the merits if “it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal 

claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, despite 

Mr. Hudson’s failure to properly exhaust his claim regarding specific intent, the Court will 

nevertheless deny the claim on the merits. 

2. The Claim Fails on The Merits

A sentence enhancement violates due process if there is insufficient evidence to support 

the enhancement. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 321 (1979); Garcia v. Carey, 395 

F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the Jackson standard to state sentence enhancements). 

Mr. Hudson challenges the sentence enhancement he received under California Penal Code 

Section 12022.7(a). That section provides: “Any person who personally inflicts great bodily 

injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony 

shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 

three years.” Under California law, section 12022.7(a) does not require a showing of specific 

intent to inflict great bodily injury (GBI). See People v. Poroj, 190 Cal.App.4th 165, 172 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2010) (“[S]ection 12022.7, subdivision (a) does not require a showing of intent to inflict 

GBI, either general or specific. Rather, in order to have found the enhancement allegations true in 

counts 2 and 3, the jury only had to find defendant acted with general intent in committing the 

underlying DUI felonies and personally inflicted GBI on [the victim] in the commission of those 

felonies.”); People v. Carter, 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 755-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (subdivision (a) 

originally required the defendant to intend to inflict GBI, but has since been amended to repeal the 

element of specific intent to inflict GBI) (citing Stats. 1995, ch. 341 § 1); Hodge v. Uribe, 2012 

WL 6014666, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2012). 

Mr. Hudson cites People v. Santos, 222 Cal.App.3d 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), which held 

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that section 12022.7 requires specific intent to inflict great bodily injury. However, Santos

predates the 1995 amendments which removed the specific intent requirement. Accordingly, it no 

longer applies. See e.g. People v. Modiri, 39 Cal.4th 481, 501 n.11 (Cal. 2006) (noting that the 

California Legislature long ago removed from section 12022.7(a) the requirement that great bodily 

injury be personally inflicted “with the intent to inflict the injury”) (citing Stats.1995, ch. 341, § 1, 

p. 1851); Poroj, 190 Cal. App.4th at 172; Carter, 60 Cal.App.4th at 755-56; Hodge, 2012 WL 

6014666 at *11.

Federal courts must look to state courts for the definitions of the substantive elements of 

state criminal offenses, and such determinations are binding on federal courts. See Bradshaw v. 

Rickey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s 

interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, 

binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus”). Even a determination of state law made by an 

intermediate appellate court must be followed and may not be ‘“disregarded by a federal court 

unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide 

otherwise.”’ Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 n.3 (1988) (citation omitted). 

This Court is bound by the California Court of Appeal’s more recent holding in Poroj that

§ 12022.7(a) does not require specific intent to inflict great bodily injury for a sentencing 

enhancement under that section. Poroj, 190 Cal.App.4th at 172. Mr. Hudson’s due process claim 

that he lacked the requisite specific intent for a great bodily injury enhancement necessarily fails

because it is inapposite. Accordingly, Mr. Hudson is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

B. Competence

Mr. Hudson claims that his due process rights were violated because he was both 

incompetent to stand trial and incompetent to represent himself. Respondent asserts that Mr. 

Hudson points to nothing in the record suggesting that the court of appeal’s conclusion --- that the 

trial court conducted an adequate competence inquiry and the record did not support overturning 

the presumption of competence --- was unreasonable. The standard for competence to stand trial 

is different than the standard for competence to represent one’s self, and thus the claims will be 

analyzed separately. 

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1. Competence to Stand Trial

The opinion of the court of appeal summarized the trial court competency proceedings as 

follows: 

On March 24, 2015, appointed counsel advised Judge Mockler of a 

doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial. Pursuant to Penal 

Code 1 section 1369, and over defendant's vehement protests, Judge 

Mockler appointed two psychologists to examine defendant. So far 

as the record reveals, only one of the psychologists contacted 

defendant and/or reported to the court. Dr. Jeremy Coles advised 

Judge Mockler: “I attempted to evaluate Mr. Hudson at the Contra 

Costa County Jail in Martinez .... However, when he entered the

examination room and I informed him as to why I was there to see 

him, he responded, ‘I’m competent man. They’re full of shit 

because I wouldn’t take their deal. They’re saying I’m not 

competent. They’re full of shit. I ain’t got time.’ He then exited the 

evaluation room.”2 After speaking with defendant's counsel, and 

reviewing some jail records, Dr. Coles concluded: “Without a 

current interview, it is not possible to make a sufficiently informed 

determination regarding Mr. Hudson’s legal competency” or “Mr. 

Hudson's need for psychiatric medication.”

[Footnote 2:] At a subsequent hearing, defense counsel told 

Judge Mockler that “Mr. Hudson refused to talk to the other 

doctor as well.” (See fn. 6, post.)

On April 30, 2015, following receipt of Dr. Coles’s report, Judge 

Mockler held a hearing at which the following transpired:

“THE COURT: Mr. Hudson had been represented starting in 

August of 2014 by Mr. Daniel Cook, who was appointed 

counsel. He went through a preliminary examination with 

Mr. Cook and then through his arraignment up here. Then in 

November of 2014, Mr. Hudson requested to represent 

himself. I granted that. The matter was set for trial on 

December 17 of 2014. Mr. Hudson, who was representing 

himself at that point, was sent to a trial department and 

requested at that time that counsel be appointed. So on 

December 18th, the matter was back in front of me. And Mr. 

Briggs was appointed to represent Mr. Hudson. Mr. Briggs 

had made six appearances with Mr. Hudson up until and 

including March 19 of 2015. Then on March 24th of 2015, 

Mr. Briggs declared a doubt, criminal proceedings were 

suspended and two doctors were appointed ... to evaluate Mr. 

Hudson. We did receive one doctor's report from Dr. Coles, 

which is—does not—let’s put it this way, does not have an 

opinion by the doctor one way or the other as to Mr. 

Hudson’s competence.

*2 “The reason I’m making this record is because I do 

believe under Godinez vs. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 and Indiana 

vs. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, that despite the fact that there has

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been a recent declaration by counsel of a doubt as to Mr. 

Hudson's competence, I don't—I think that I can still make a 

determination whether Mr. Hudson is competent to represent 

himself. There has been no opinion and no court finding that 

Mr. Hudson is not competent. And, in fact, I have no 

evidence before me that he's not competent. So I'm going to 

find at this point by [a] preponderance of evidence that Mr. 

Hudson is competent and criminal proceedings are 

reinstated.

Hudson, 2017 WL 1075430 at *1-2. The California Court of Appeal found that, in determining 

that Mr. Hudson was competent to stand trial, the judge “understood the statutory procedures and 

complied with them,” and that given the unusual circumstances present in Mr. Hudson’s case, any 

“noncompliance with the literal letter of these procedure could not be considered prejudicial.” Id.

at *4. The court of appeal reviewed the trial judge’s decision “to determine whether, construing 

the record most favorably to that decision, it has the support of substantial evidence,” and rejected 

Mr. Hudson’s claim that prejudicial procedural or substantive error undermined Judge Mockler’s 

competency determination. Id. at *3, 6.

As the last reasoned decision from a state court, the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

is the decision to which § 2254(d) is applied. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Mr. Hudson is 

entitled to habeas relief only if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court, or was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his 

right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently. Godinez v. 

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). The conviction of a defendant while legally incompetent 

violates due process. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1994). The test for 

competence to stand trial is whether the defendant demonstrates the ability “to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396. The question “is not 

whether mental illness substantially affects a decision, but whether a mental disease, disorder or 

defect substantially affects the prisoner’s capacity to appreciate his options and make a rational 

choice.” Dennis v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 890 (9th Cir. 2004). “A ‘rational choice’ does not mean 

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a sensible decision.” Id. A state court’s finding of competency to stand trial is presumed correct if 

fairly supported by the record. Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013). No formal 

evidentiary hearing is required for the presumption to apply. Id. A habeas petitioner must come 

forward with clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. Id. 

Mr. Hudson asserts that Judge Mockler did not conduct a full competency hearing. 

However, in reviewing the competency proceedings and the judge’s findings, the court of appeal

applied the presumption from Penal Code § 1369 that a defendant is mentally competent unless he 

is proved by a preponderance of the evidence to be otherwise. The appellate court noted that a 

defendant is deemed competent to stand trial if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him. This is the correct standard under federal law, as 

Godinez requires that the defendant demonstrates the ability “to consult with his lawyer with a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understanding of 

the proceedings against him.” 509 U.S. at 396. 

The appellate court further noted that Mr. Hudson’s attorney did not call other experts to 

testify nor proffer any form of additional evidence. Defense counsel did not cite to any of the 

statements he made to the psychologist nor draw the judge’s attention to any behavior or in-court 

actions by Mr. Hudson that would be relevant to competency. Accordingly, the court of appeal 

reasonably found that Judge Mockler conducted an adequate competency hearing, albeit a 

truncated one due to the dearth of evidence, and “given the unusual circumstances, any 

noncompliance with the literal letter of [the California Rules of Court procedures for a trial on 

mental competency] could not be considered prejudicial” and it was “hard to conceive what the 

‘full competency hearing’ desired by the defendant would have revealed.” Hudson, 2017 WL 

1075430 at *4. In light of this record, the court of appeal reasonably concluded that there was not 

evidence to overturn the presumption of competence. 

Mr. Hudson turned down a plea deal for a 32-month sentence, opting instead to take his 

case to trial and represent himself, decisions which he now asserts had disastrous consequences

and showed his incompetence. The court of appeal’s opinion reviewed the portions of the trial 

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transcript where Judge Mockler went over the paperwork that Mr. Hudson filled out with the 

charges against him and the possible sentence he could receive, and reasonably determined that he 

had an understanding of the facts of the case against him and the potential for a life sentence. See

RT 67-69.

Mr. Hudson asserts that there was evidence of his incompetence. He asserts that 

notwithstanding Dr. Coles’ ultimate conclusion --- that he could not make a finding of 

incompetence without interviewing Mr. Hudson --- the provisional opinion in Dr. Coles’ report 

was that Mr. Hudson was not competent. As noted by the court of appeal, Dr. Coles’ provisional 

opinion came from reviewing Mr. Hudson’s file and an interview with defense counsel who

described Mr. Hudson as unable to cooperate with counsel in a meaningful manner, becoming 

belligerent when asked to cooperate, and employing unusual and delusional thoughts such as a 

fixation with the resisting arrest charge and a belief that he would prevail on a civil suit against the 

police for excessive force and therefore did not mind a lengthy prison sentence as he would be 

wealthy once released.

1 Dr. Coles’ report noted that Mr. Hudson’s jail records showed that while 

incarcerated Mr. Hudson had:

“been treated intermittently for psychological symptoms. At times 

he has demonstrated an oppositional attitude. A history of 

depression was noted. . . intrusive memories of death and dying 

which he related to his history of the several gunshot wounds he 

incurred in 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2008. . . Multiple aggressive 

symptoms and anxiety symptoms are noted in the record. No 

evidence of psychotic symptomology was provided in this record. 

Mr. Hudson has received varied diagnosis while treated at the jail, 

including mood disorder not otherwise specified, anxiety disorder 

not otherwise specified, and PTSD.” 

RT 508-511. The court of appeal acknowledged that Dr. Coles’ report contained a provisional 

opinion, quoting the portion of the report where Dr. Coles stated: “In summary, it is most probable

that Mr. Hudson is not legally competent at the present time but an interview is necessary to 

confirm this provisional opinion.” Hudson, 2017 WL 1075430 at *5. However, the court of 

 

1 Mr. Hudson’s view that the resisting arrest charge was unfounded was not baseless. As noted by 

the court of appeal, the jury did not reach a verdict on the “resisting-officer” charges that Mr. 

Hudson faced. Hudson, 2017 WL 1075430 at n. 4. 

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appeal ultimately concluded that there was no evidence that Mr. Hudson was incompetent to stand 

trial:

The lack of a firm opinion from Dr. Coles does not establish the 

absence of substantial evidence, for expert evidence is not a 

requisite to a competency determination. Defendant’s poor relations 

with Mr. Briggs are not probative. Because it was not Judge 

Mockler who declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence, it may 

be presumed that nothing she observed led her to suspect that 

defendant was irrational or incompetent. Even the hearsay 

“delusions” attributed to defendant do not show that he failed to 

understand the nature of the proceedings against him. The fact that 

Judge Mockler had previously found defendant competent to waive 

his right to counsel is also significant, for that was certainly 

information “otherwise made available to the trial court” “at the 

time of its decision.” 

Id. (internal citations omitted). Mr. Hudson attempts to parlay the inconclusive report, written by 

a psychologist who was unable to interview him, into a showing of mental incompetence. The 

state courts reasonably rejected his argument for the reasons explained above. The opinion of the 

California Court of Appeal upholding Judge Mockler’s competency determination was neither 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It was not 

unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Mr. Hudson had the ability “to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him.” The trial judge had two occasions to observe Mr. 

Hudson’s competence: (1) when he did the Faretta paperwork, and (2) in the colloquy before 

being allowed to represent himself. Both times reflect Mr. Hudson’s understanding of the 

proceedings against him. The only evidence which could have suggested incompetence was the 

letter from the one psychologist stating his report was inconclusive because he could not interview 

Mr. Hudson. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396. Mr. Hudson has not put forth clear and convincing 

evidence to rebut the presumption that the state court’s competency finding was reasonable. 

Accordingly, Mr. Hudson is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Competence for Self-Representation

The trial court found Mr. Hudson competent and went through the following colloquy for 

self-representation pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): 

THE COURT: ...Mr. Hudson, I see that you have initialed the 

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appropriate paragraphs on the Faretta form. 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: You do indicate... here as to ---in answer to 2(d) that 

you did represent yourself in the year 2000, right?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

THE COURT: Under charges and consequences I see you’ve written 

out all the charges you’re facing and you’ve also indicated based on 

the enhancements that your maximum sentence is 35 [years] to life, 

which may be a little over-stating the maximum amount of time, but 

that’s fine. The important thing is that you understand that you 

could potentially get a life sentence. So Mr. Hudson, just so we 

make a record here, you understand that if you --- if I grant your 

right [sic: request] to represent yourself, that you will be expected to 

conduct yourself in the court proceedings just the way any other 

attorney would be expected to conduct themselves. Do you 

understand that, sir?

The DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 

THE COURT: You also understand that if you actually go to a trial, 

or any type of contested hearing, a motion or whatever, that the 

judge who is hearing the trial or the motion can’t help you out and 

that you will be up against a seasoned prosecutor who is going to 

know the rules of evidence and have tried cases before. Do you 

understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 

MR. BOLEN [the prosecutor]: The Court should also be aware that 

last time he was in trial he said he couldn’t do a trial. He’s playing 

games [with] the Court. It should be clear to the Court he told the 

last judge in the trial department, I can’t do a trial without an 

attorney. He was ready to go to trial with Mr. Briggs and started 

giving Mr. Briggs a hard time because he [defendant] didn’t want to 

go to trial. And Mr. Hudson clearly doesn’t want to go to trial. . .

He’s going to be back again asking for an attorney.

THE COURT: The Court is well aware of that, but the Court is also 

aware of the fact that it is reversible error per se for a judge to deny 

a person’s rights to represent themselves in the absence of evidence 

that they’ve been abusing the process or are patently mentally ill or 

are threatening witnesses. I don’t have any of that evidence here. 

RT 67-69. The trial court then warned Mr. Hudson that he (Hudson) was not to engage in dilatory 

tactics: “[Y]ou can’t be getting into a trial department and saying you can’t handle it and you want 

an attorney, only to find fault with every attorney who represents you.” RT 70. 

The court of appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that Mr. Hudson was competent to 

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represent himself. In upholding the trial court’s decision finding Mr. Hudson competent to 

represent himself and granting his request to represent himself pursuant to Faretta, the Court of 

Appeal noted the limited exception from Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), for “grayarea” defendants with severe mental illness, but stated that Mr. Hudson had no history or diagnosis 

of mental illness, severe or otherwise. Psychologist Dr. Coles said in one paragraph of his letter 

that he reviewed 8 months of jail medical records and that Mr. Hudson had various diagnoses in 

jail. However, there were no details regarding the various jail diagnoses such as who diagnosed,

how symptoms presented, what treatment was given, etc. Mr. Hudson’s attorney did not submit 

any evidence of mental illness. Thus there was no tangible evidence of a particular mental illness, 

and no evidence regarding severity. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Hudson’s 

claim that prejudicial procedural or substantive error undermined the trial judge’s determination 

that he was competent to represent himself. 

As the last reasoned decision from a state court, the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

is the decision to which § 2254(d) is applied. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Mr. Hudson is 

entitled to habeas relief only if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court, or was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

The standard for a defendant to be competent to represent himself at trial is higher than the 

standard to stand trial; a defendant may be “competent” to stand trial, but not have sufficient 

mental capacity to “carry out the basic tasks needed” to represent himself at trial. Edwards, 554 

U.S. at 174-78. “Here the higher standard seeks to measure the defendant's ability to conduct trial 

proceedings.” Id. at 173. “In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky's

mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time 

he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help 

of counsel.” Id. at 175-176. “The Supreme Court has not set forth a specific standard for a 

criminal defendant’s competence to exercise his right to self-representation, however, instead 

leaving the determination of whether the defendant is competent to conduct trial proceedings to 

the trial court’s discretion. The Edwards court reasoned that the trial judge will often prove best 

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able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized 

circumstances of a particular defendant.” Dixon v. Ryan, 932 F.3d 789, 804 (9th Cir. 2019)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

If the defendant is in the “gray area” where he is competent to stand trial and waive 

counsel but suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to conduct 

trial proceedings, the Sixth Amendment does not bar the state from insisting upon representation. 

Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172-77 (holding that the defendant -- who suffered from severe 

schizophrenia, was found incompetent to stand trial multiple times, and was committed to the state 

hospital while awaiting trial -- was competent to stand trial but not competent to represent himself

due to his severe mental illness).

Additionally, as stated in Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted):

Due process requires a court to conduct a competency hearing on its 

own motion before permitting a defendant to waive constitutional 

rights, whenever a reasonable judge would be expected to have a 

bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence. A bona fide

doubt should exist when there is substantial evidence of 

incompetence. Although no particular facts signal incompetence, 

suggestive evidence includes a defendant's demeanor before the trial 

court, previous irrational behavior, and available medical 

evaluations.” 

A state may presume that a defendant is competent and require him to shoulder the burden 

of proving his incompetence. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1994). A state 

therefore is not constitutionally obligated to place the burden of proof on the prosecution to 

establish competence, or to relieve defendant of the burden of establishing his incompetence. See 

Moran, 57 F.3d at 697.

To determine whether a defendant actually understands the nature and consequences of a 

request to waive counsel, the court must abide by the principles set forth in Faretta, 422 U.S. at

835. The defendant must “be aware of the nature of the charges against him, the possible 

penalties, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” United States v. Balough, 

820 F.2d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987). The defendant must be allowed to exercise his right to selfrepresentation so long as he knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel and is able and 

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willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 

168, 173 (1984). 

Mr. Hudson asserts that the trial judge misunderstood the scope of her discretion in 

determining whether he was competent to represent himself and should have held a full 

competency hearing before granting his Faretta motion. However, as noted in the Court of 

Appeal opinion, the trial judge did hold a competency hearing. It was a truncated hearing because 

the defense presented no evidence to show incompetence. Mr. Hudson cannot fault the trial court 

for not stretching out the hearing where there was so little evidence. 

In his traverse Mr. Hudson points to Dr. Coles’ report, and the fact that he turned down a 

32- month plea deal when facing a life sentence as evidence of his incompetence to represent 

himself. He argues that his offense was a non-violent DUI and should have been a California 

Vehicle Code case, not a criminal matter, and that he believed the 32 months offered would be the 

most time given and never believed he would be given a life sentence because a DUI case carried 

only penalties of 16 months, 2 years and 3 years. These assertions are belied by the record, which 

shows that Mr. Hudson twice filled out Faretta paperwork and in so doing reviewed with the 

judge the nature of the case against him, the charges, and the potential penalties. 

While in hindsight Mr. Hudson acknowledges that rejecting the plea deal was a poor 

decision, he points to nothing in the record that would rebut the presumption that the state court 

correctly found him competent. Mr. Hudson’s former attorney, Mr. Briggs, did express a doubt 

regarding competence, but did not submit any evidence of incompetence. Mr. Hudson vehemently 

asserted he was competent and refused to meet with the court-appointed psychologist Dr. Coles.

2

 

While Dr. Coles’ report offers a provisional determination of incompetence based on reviewing

jail medical records and information from defense counsel, Dr. Coles’ report clearly states that it is

inconclusive because Dr. Coles was unable to complete the evaluation. The only evidence of 

possible mental illness in the record is Dr. Coles’ report which notes varying diagnoses from jail 

records. But as noted above, the record does not contain evidence of a severe mental illness such 

 

2 Defense counsel informed the judge that Mr. Hudson also refused to allow the other psychologist 

to examine him. Hudson, 2017 WL 1075430 at n. 2, 6.

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as that which the Court in Edwards found to fall into the “gray area.” 554 U.S. at 172-77. The

record is distinguishable from the record in Edwards where there was a diagnosis of severe 

schizophrenia, multiple psychiatric evaluations and reports, and several state hospital 

commitments due to being found incompetent to stand trial on several occasions. Id. As with his 

claim that he was incompetent to stand trial, Mr. Hudson attempts to parlay Dr. Coles’ 

inconclusive report into a showing that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself. Again, 

the court of appeal reasonably rejected his argument.

In reviewing Mr. Hudson’s competency claim, the court of appeal’s opinion was not an 

unreasonable application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. State court competency 

determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021, 

1027 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735 (1990)). A federal court may 

overturn a state court competency finding only if it is not fairly supported by the record. See id. 

Here, the state court competency finding is fairly supported by the record. The decision of the 

court of appeal was neither unreasonable nor contrary to federal law, and Mr. Hudson is not 

entitled to habeas on this claim. 

C. Marsden Motion

Mr. Hudson claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial 

judge denied his pretrial motion for substitute counsel when he was represented by Mr. Briggs. 

He no longer wished to be represented by Mr. Briggs because he felt they were in conflict and he 

wanted to represent himself. 

Initially, Mr. Hudson was represented by an appointed attorney named Mr. Cook. Mr. 

Hudson tried unsuccessfully to have Mr. Cook replaced because Mr. Hudson said there was a 

conflict and he couldn’t work with Mr. Cook. After that Marsden3 motion to replace Mr. Cook 

was denied, Mr. Hudson’s Faretta motion was granted and he began representing himself. On

December 17, 2014, the day his case was set for trial, Mr. Hudson requested a lawyer and the 

 

3

In People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (Cal. 1970), the court set forth the procedural requirement 

for a hearing to inquire into the reasons for requesting substitute counsel and reviewed the 

erroneous denial of substitute counsel. 

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following day Mr. Briggs was appointed to represent him. The trial was postponed. Four months 

later, Mr. Hudson requested a Marsden hearing because he no longer wanted to be represented by 

Mr. Briggs, stating that “Briggs and I conflict a hundred percent.” RT 56. During the closed 

hearing, the following exchange occurred: 

THE COURT: So, Mr. Hudson, I mean it’s clear you’ve made it 

evident in open court that you’re very very unhappy. Why don’t we 

– what is it that – I mean, what is it that you want to do in this case? 

THE DEFENDANT: I would like to have my pro per status back –

returned. This man is like a surrogate prosecutor. He went behind 

my back and labeled me incompetent, violating my right to a speedy 

trial. There was no need to label me incompetent. They violated my 

rights to a speedy trial by doing that, knowing that they had ten days 

to have me in court. This was a blatant attempt by the D.A., and this 

man, he’s in cahoots with them. This man cannot save the -- I 

would probably catch a case if I was in a room with this man alone. 

So I can be nowhere near this man, period. That’s my word, your 

Honor. This man labeled me incompetent behind my back. As far 

as I’m concerned he’s a surrogate prosecutor and works with the 

D.A. He’s probably a D.A. himself. 

THE COURT: Mr. Hudson, is there any attorney that you would feel 

was not -- let me put it in a more positive point of view. Is there 

any attorney that you feel you could work with? 

THE DEFENDANT: I’m quite sure there’s an attorney that I would 

be able to work with. This man would not be the attorney. That is 

definite. Like I said, I’m more competent than probably he is, 

considering the way he has handled this case so far. And he has the 

nerve to name me incompetent. That is a disgrace and a mark 

against me, period. He show [sic] his incompetence in doing that. 

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Hudson, you did have a different attorney 

through the prelim and during your initial proceedings in this 

department. And you were – you had several Marsdens with that 

attorney. 

THE DEFENDANT: Correct. The only thing that I needed to do is 

which was why I took this attorney on was to get my motions filed 

when I was pro per. When I was filing my motions, they weren’t 

going through the proper channels, so I would have this attorney 

send my motions through the proper channels. He didn’t do that 

correctly. He stepped on my toes in every way that I was 

representing my case. He had my case going. He changed to a 

complete different route which let’s [sic] me know this man is not in 

the best interest of me. He’s only thinking about his pockets. 

RT 59-60. When asked if he wanted to add anything, Mr. Briggs stated, “Just to deny Mr. 

Hudson’s outrageous allegations.” RT 61. When asked by the judge if he felt he could still work

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with Mr. Hudson, Mr. Briggs answered: “Based on his comments today, no, I don’t.” Id. The 

judge then indicated she was inclined to deny the Marden and grant a new Faretta motion. She 

stated: “I don’t think I have grounds to grant the Marsden. I mean, Mr. Hudson, I know you don’t 

want to work with Mr. Briggs. And, you — to me as a judge it’s like a situation where a 

defendant files a complaint against a lawyer with the State Bar. That has never been sufficient to 

constitute a conflict requiring an attorney to get off the case.” RT 62. See Consiglio v. Prunty, 

121 F.3d 715(9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (mere filing of a bar complaint, on its own, does not 

constitute an irreconcilable conflict requiring the granting of a motion to substitute counsel).

Ultimately, because proceedings were still suspended for the competency hearing, the judge only 

denied the Marsden motion, gave Mr. Hudson the Faretta paperwork to complete, and ordered 

everyone back for a hearing two days later. At that hearing Mr. Hudson’s Faretta motion was 

granted.

On appeal Mr. Hudson challenged the denial of his Marsden motion pertaining to attorney 

Briggs. The opinion of the California Court of Appeal stated that even assuming error, solely for 

the purposes of the appeal, it would not require reversal. The court of appeal reasoned that 

because only 48 hours passed between the denial of the Marsden and the granting of the Faretta, 

and nothing adverse to Mr. Hudson happened during those 48 hours, the assumed erroneous denial 

of the Marsden motion would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of its decision 

the court of appeal relied on two cases, People v. Chavez, 26 Cal.3d 334, 348-349 (Cal. 1980) and 

People v. Loya, 1 Cal.App.5th 932, 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). In Chavez, the court held that the 

Marsden case did not enunciate a per se reversible error test, rather a defendant must show 

prejudice when a trial judge erroneously denies a request for the continued appointment of 

particular counsel without adequately inquiring into the reasons for the request. In Loya, the court 

noted that the standard for prejudice for a denied Marsden motion is whether the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard for reviewing constitutional errors set 

forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 

As the last reasoned decision from a state court, the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

is the decision to which § 2254(d) is applied. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Mr. Hudson is 

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entitled to habeas relief only if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court, or was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants who can afford to retain counsel a 

qualified right to hire counsel of their choice. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 164 

(1988). A criminal defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel has no right to counsel of his 

own choosing. See id. at 159. The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel, 

not a “meaningful relationship” between an accused and his counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 

U.S. 1, 14 (1983). The essential aim is “to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal 

defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer 

whom he prefers.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. Nonetheless, to compel a criminal defendant to 

undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in 

irreconcilable conflict is to deprive the defendant of any counsel whatsoever. Daniels v. 

Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 

When a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the trial judge 

should make a thorough inquiry into the reasons for the defendant’s dissatisfaction. Hudson v. 

Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982). The inquiry need only be as comprehensive as the 

circumstances reasonably would permit, however. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In reviewing whether the trial judge should have granted a motion to substitute 

counsel, the reviewing habeas court may consider the extent of the conflict, whether the trial judge 

made an appropriate inquiry into the extent of the conflict, and the timeliness of the motion to 

substitute counsel. Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1197-98. 

In Schell v. Witek, the Ninth Circuit held that the “ultimate constitutional question” on 

federal habeas review is whether the state trial court’s denial of the Marsden motion “actually 

violated [the defendant’s] constitutional rights in that the conflict between [the defendant] and his 

attorney had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant 

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by 

the Sixth Amendment.” 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Not every conflict or 

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disagreement between the defendant and counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 1027 

(citing Morris, 461 U.S. at 13-14). However, if a serious conflict resulted in the constructive 

denial of counsel, no further showing of prejudice is required and the defendant’s trial is presumed 

to have been unfair. See id. at 1027-28 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 

(1984)). “Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed 

to result in prejudice.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. But if a serious conflict did not rise to the 

level of a constructive denial of counsel, the defendant must prove that he was prejudiced by the 

conflict. See Schell, at 1027-28 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92).

4

 

“[H]abeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can 

establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (citing

Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a state court 

finds an error harmless, that determination is reviewed under the highly deferential AEDPA 

standard. Id. at 2198. This means that habeas relief is not available for the error “unless the 

harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” Id. at 2199 (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 

112, 119 (2007). 

During the closed hearing in which Judge Mockler inquired into Mr. Hudson’s conflict 

with Mr. Briggs, Mr. Hudson was clear that what he wanted was a return to his pro per status. 

Indeed, when asked at the onset, “What is it that you want to do in this case?” Mr. Hudson 

promptly stated: “I would like to have my pro per status back.” RT 59. The main example that 

Mr. Hudson gave of why he was unhappy with Mr. Briggs was that Mr. Briggs had raised 

competency concerns, which angered Mr. Hudson as he felt he was more than competent. Mr. 

Hudson was also unhappy because he claimed that the only reason he asked for an attorney was to 

 

4 The term “conflict of interest” is a term of art that ordinarily “denotes representation of multiple 

conflicting interests, such as an attorney’s representation of more than one defendant in the same 

criminal case, or a representation of a defendant where the attorney is being prosecuted for related 

crimes.” See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). That sort of conflict could 

be the basis for a motion for substitution of counsel. There is also another kind of conflict, usually 

pertaining to the conduct of the defense or trial strategy, that is referred to as an “irreconcilable 

conflict” between attorney and client that gives rise to many motions to substitute counsel. See id. 

It is this latter sort of perceived irreconcilable conflict that prompted Mr. Hudson’s Marsden

motion. 

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file motions he wanted filed, and Mr. Briggs hadn’t filed the motions, instead “stepping on my 

toes in every way that I was representing my case.” RT 60. Mr. Hudson also believed that Mr. 

Briggs was working with the prosecution and acting like a prosecutor. 

These disagreements about defense strategy, and Mr. Hudson’s clear dislike and distrust of 

Mr. Briggs, reflect a situation in which Mr. Hudson likely did not have a “meaningful 

relationship” with Mr. Briggs, see Morris, 461 U.S. at 14, but not a situation in which Mr. 

Hudson’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the trial judge’s refusal to appoint 

substitute counsel. The case is unlike cases where courts have recognized a complete breakdown 

in communication, such as: Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197-1201 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(finding constructive denial of counsel where defendant’s distrust of counsel was 

“understandable” given mishandling by the trial judge of several issues, and resulted in complete 

breakdown in the communication between defendant and counsel; complete breakdown in 

communication meant that counsel was unable to discuss possible defense strategies with 

defendant or to discover and assess basic information about the case from his perspective so that 

they might pursue that strategy); U.S. v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1998)

(testimony by defendant and counsel evidenced irreconcilable conflict amounting to breakdown of 

attorney─client relationship, for example: defendant threatened to sue attorney for malpractice, and 

attorney testified he felt physically threatened by defendant; defendant described several instances 

when he was unsatisfied with the attorney’s work or lack thereof, and instances when the attorney 

refused to communicate with him; defendant persistently came before the judge on several 

occasions to show evidence of irreconcilable conflict.); U.S. v. Adelo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772,778-

780 (9th Cir. 2001) (Defendant recounted bad language and threats from attorney, including 

attorney threatening to “sink him for 105 years,” in court attorney called his client a liar and 

openly opposed substitution.) “An irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment 

occurs only where there is a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and 

client, and the breakdown prevents effective assistance of counsel. Disagreements over strategical 

or tactical decisions do not rise to level of a complete breakdown in communication.” Stenson, 

504 F.3d at 886 (internal citations omitted).

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Northern District of California

In light of the record, it was not unreasonable for the state court of appeal go directly to a 

harmless error analysis. Mr. Hudson’s complaints about Mr. Briggs do not reflect a conflict so 

serious that it rose to the level of a constructive denial of counsel. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026-

28. The Court of Appeal assumed error in the trial court’s denial of the pre-trial Marsden motion 

for purposes of the appeal, but found that even any assumed error was harmless because there was 

no showing of prejudice as nothing adverse occurred during the two days between the denial of the 

Marsden and the granting of the Faretta. Mr. Hudson has not shown that he was prejudiced by 

the denial of his Marsden motion. See Davis, 135 S.Ct. at 2197. The California Court of Appeal’s 

conclusion – that there was no showing of prejudice where nothing adverse happened in Mr. 

Hudson’s case during the two days between the denial of his Marsden and him resuming his pro 

per status – was not unreasonable.

The decision of the court of appeal was neither an unreasonable application of federal law 

nor contrary to federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, Mr. Hudson is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this claim. 

1. No Certificate Of Appealability

A certificate of appealability will not issue because reasonable jurists “would not find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Petitioner’s 

request for a ruling is moot as this order constitutes the ruling, and his request for an evidentiary 

hearing is denied as unnecessary. The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-04373-EMC Document 29 Filed 09/18/19 Page 23 of 23