Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03409/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald T. Cecil
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-3409 

GERALD T. CECIL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

FILED ~ ..... &fates CDWt 01 APJUie 

T nell Cwtulf 

SEP 2 5 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 95-CR-10038) 

Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, Stephen K. Lester, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Laura B. Shaneyfelt, Focht, Hughey & Calvert, L.L.C., Wichita, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

• After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. ~Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 95-3409 Document: 01019279757 Date Filed: 09/25/1996 Page: 1 
Defendant Gerald T. Cecil sold a kilogram of cocaine to a confidential informant 

working for the government. The government indicted Defendant for distributing a 

kilogram of cocaine in violation of21 U.S.C. § 841(a){l) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. At trial, 

Defendant argued that he was entrapped. The district court instructed the jury on the 

defense of entrapment and the jury convicted Defendant. On appeal from his conviction, 

Defendant claims the district court erroneously refused to instruct the jury that the 

government had to prove that Defendant was predisposed to sell cocaine at the time he 

was contacted by the confidential informant. Defendant also asserts the district court, in 

response to a question from the jury, misinformed the jury that the government had to 

prove that Defendant was predisposed to distribute cocaine, but did not have to prove that 

Defendant was predisposed to distribute a kilo~am of cocaine. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. 

At trial, the district court delivered the following lengthy instruction to the jury 

regarding the entrapment defense: 

Defendant Cecil asserts that he was the victim of entrapment as to 

the offense charged in the indictment. 

Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law, 

but is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents to 

commit a crime, he is the victim of entrapment, and the law as a matter of 

policy forbids his conviction in such a case. 

On the other hand, where a person already has the readiness and 

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willingness to break the law, the mere fact that government agents provide 

what appears to be a favorable opportunity is not entrapment. For example, 

it is not entrapment for a government agent to pretend to be someone else 

and to offer, either directly or through an informer or other decoy, to engage 

in an unlawful transaction. 

If, then, you should fmd beyond a reasonable doubt from the 

evidence in the case that, before anything at all occurred respecting the 

alleged offense involved in this case, the defendant was predisposed to 

commit a crime such as charged here, whenever the opportunity was 

afforded, and that government officers or their agents did no more than 

offer the opportunity, then you should find defendant Cecil was not the 

victim of entrapment. 

On the other hand, if the evidence should leave you with a 

reasonable doubt whether defendant had the predisposition to commit an 

offense of the character char~ed, apart from the inducement or persuasion 

of some officer or agent of the government, then it is your duty to fmd 

defendant Cecil not guilty. 

Evidence of predisposition may consist of a showing of a person's 

desire for profit, his eagerness to participate in the transaction, and/or his 

ready response, if any, to the government's inducement offers. 

Thus, if you find from the evidence that defendant Cecil was induced 

to commit the crime addressed in the indictment, and at the time was not 

predisposed to otherwise commit the crime, you must acquit the defendant. 

The United States denies defendant Cecil's contentions of fact, and 

claims that his involvement was as set forth in the indictment. 

The burden is on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant was not entrapped. 

Vol. 1., Doc. 61, Instruction No. 15 (emphasis added). During deliberations, the jury 

submitted the following written question to the court: 

Question on Instruction No. 15 "predisposition to commit an offense ofthe 

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character charged" Does the above wording mean the predisposition to 

commit an offense of a "kilo" buy? 

Vol. III, No.2. Defendant asked the district court to give this instruction in response to 

the jury's question: 

In response to your question whether the government must prove that the 

defendant Cecil was predisposed to distribute a kilogram of cocaine, the 

court instructs you that "predisposition" is defmed as a defendant's 

inclination to engage in the illegal activity for which he has been charged, 

i.e. that he is ready and willing to commit the crime. It focuses on 

defendant's state of mind before government agents suggest that he commit 

a crime. Predisposition may be inferred from a defendant's history of 

involvement in the type of criminal activity for which he has been charged, 

combined with his ready response to the inducement offer. The government 

has the burden of proof to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant lacked predisposition to commit the crime charged at the time 

that the government agent (Jeff Schoenthaler) began his efforts to engage 

the defendant in criminal conduct. 

Vol I, Doc. 58. After argument from counsel, the court rejected Defendant's suggested 

instruction and sent the following answer to the jury: "No." The jury convicted 

Defendant. 

II. 

On appeal from his conviction, Defendant argues the district court erroneously 

instructed the jury and misstated the law when it answered the jury's question. 

Specifically, Defendant contends that the district court erred by: (1) "refusing to instruct 

the jury that the government must prove the defendant was predisposed to sell cocaine at 

the time that the informant began contacting the defendant;" (2) refusing to deliver his 

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Appellate Case: 95-3409 Document: 01019279757 Date Filed: 09/25/1996 Page: 4 
suggested instruction to the jury; and (3) responding "No" to the jury's question whether 

the government had to prove that Defendant was predisposed to distribute a kilogram of 

cocame. We address Defendant's arguments in tum. 

A. 

Defendant first asserts that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury 

that the government's burden required it to prove that Defendant was predisposed to sell 

cocaine when the confidential informant first contacted him. Defendant argues that 

Instruction No. 15 was deficient as a matter of law because it "did not address, in any 

meaningful manner, the important issue oftiming of predisposition." Aplt. Br. at 11. 

According to Defendant, "not one reference in the instruction informs the jury that the 

predisposition must have been in place at the time the informant first began contacting the 

defendant." .14.. Consequently, Defendant urges us to reverse his conviction and remand 

for a new trial. 

We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, the 

instructions correctly state the governing law and provide the jury with an ample 

understanding of the issues and applicable standards. E.,&, United States v. de 

Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405, 1409 (lOth Cir. 1991). The instructions must cover the 

issues presented by the evidence and accurately state the law. United States v. Davis, 953 

F.2d 1482, 1492 (lOth Cir.), ~denied, 504 U.S. 945 (1992). We will reverse only 

when the failure to give an instruction is prejudicial in view of the entire record. United 

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States y. Martin, 18 F.3d 1515, 1519 (lOth Cir.), &m.. denied, 115 S. Ct. 187 (1994). 

The Supreme Court has distilled the principles governing the defense of 

entrapment in the following passage: 

[T]here can be no dispute that the Government may use undercover 

agents to enforce the law. It is well settled that the fact that officers or 

employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for 

the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and 

stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises. 

In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government agents may 

not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind the 

disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the 

crime so that the Government may prosecute. Where the Government has 

induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at 

issue ... the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first bein~ 

approached by Government a~ents. 

Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) (quotations and citations 

omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Beal, 961 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (lOth 

Cir. 1992); United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Viewing Instruction No. 15 against this authoritative statement of the entrapment 

defense, we conclude the challenged instruction neither misstated the law nor failed to 

provide the jury with an ample understanding of the applicable standards. Instruction No. 

15 did not, as Defendant urges, fail to "address, in any meaningful manner, the important 

issue of timing of predisposition." Aplt. Br. at 11. Instruction No. 15 cohered with the 

Supreme Court's statement that it is the prosecution's burden to "prove beyond 

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reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to frrst 

being approached by Government agents." Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549. That is, 

Instruction No. 15 informed the jury at least three separate times ofthe importance ofthe 

timing of the predisposition: "[ w ]here a person has no previous intent or purpose to 

violate the law ... he is a victim of entrapment," and "[i]f, then, you should find beyond 

a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that, before anythio~ at all occurred 

respectin~ the alle~ed offense involved in this case, the defendant was predisposed to 

commit a crime such as charged here ... then you should fmd defendant Cecil was not 

the victim of entrapment," and fmally, "where a person already has the readiness and 

willingness to break the law, the mere fact that government agents provide what appears 

to be a favorable opportunity is not entrapment." Vol. I., Doc. 61, Instruction No. 15 

(emphasis added). Consequently, we reject Defendant's argument that Instruction No. 15 

was fatally deficient because it did not inform the jury that the government had the 

burden of proving that defendant was predisposed to sell cocaine when the confidential 

informant first contacted him. 

B. 

Next, Defendant argues that the district court erred in refusing to deliver his 

suggested instruction to the jury. Defendant contends that the district court should have 

tendered his instruction to the jury to "fully inform the jury" about the timing of 

predisposition. Aplt. Br. at 11. We reject Defendant's argument that the district court 

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erred in refusing to tender his instruction to the jury because Defendant's instruction 

misstates the law. 

Defendant's instruction provided: 

The government has the burden of proof to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant lacked predisposition to commit the crime charged 

at the time that the government agent (Jeff Schoenthaler) began his efforts 

to engage the defendant in criminal conduct. 

Vol. 1., Doc 58 (emphasis added). Contrary to Defendant's suggested instruction, the 

government does not carry the burden of proving that the defendant "lacked predisposition" 

to commit the crime. Instead, Jacobson instructs that "the prosecution must prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first 

being approached by Government agents." Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added). 

Thus, the government's evidentiary burden requires it to prove that the defendant was 

"disposed to commit the crime" not that the defendant "lacked predisposition to commit the 

crime." ld.. Absence of predisposition to commit the crime is the defendant's evidentiary 

burden, not the government's. E.&, Qrtiz, 804 F.2d at 1165 ("The defendant must point to 

evidence ofboth lack of predisposition and government inducement before the trial judge can 

determine whether entrapment has been shown sufficiently to present it to the jury.") 

(emphasis added). Defendant's suggested jury instruction is wrong because it contravenes 

the clear mandate of Jacobson and places Defendant's burden to raise the entrapment defense 

on the government. 

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c. 

Finally, Defendant contends that the district court misstated the law when it answered 

the jury's question regarding predisposition. Specifically, Defendant argues the district court 

erred when it responded "No" to the jury's question whether the government was required 

to prove that Defendant was predisposed to distribute a kilo~ of cocaine. Because he was 

charged with distributing a kilogram of cocaine, Defendant maintains that the government 

"had the burden of proving that the defendant was predisposed, at the time the informant first 

contacted him on behalf of the police, to sell a kilogram of cocaine." Aplt. Br. at 12. We 

disagree. 

When the defense of entrapment is at issue, "the prosecution must prove beyond 

reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first 

being approached by Government agents." Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added);~ 

alsQ ~' 961 F.2d at 1516. Thus, Defendant's argument requires us to determine what 

criminal act the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant was 

predisposed to commit. 

Defendant was indicted (and convicted) ofviolating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l). The drug 

trafficking provision of§ 841 contains two distinct parts:§ 841(a) and§ 841(b). Subsection 

(a), entitled "Unlawful acts," defines the criminal act, and prohibits trafficking in "a 

controlled substance" without reference to quantity. Subsection (b), entitled "Penalties," 

specifies the punishment for various drug quantities and "does not itself state a criminal 

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offense." United States v. Puzyear, 940 F.2d 602, 604 (lOth Cir. 1991). Because§ 84l(a) 

does not refer to quantity, settled precedent recognizes that the quantity of the drug is not an 

element ofthe offense under§ 84l(a). United States y. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331, 334 (lOth Cir. 

1989) ("[T]he quantity of the substance in the possession of the defendant . . .is not an 

element of the substantive offense upon which the[§ 84l(a)] charge is based."); United 

States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697, 699 (lOth Cir.) ("It is well settled that the presence and 

identity of the drug is the thing and that the quantity of it is not important."),~ denied, 429 

u.s. 982 (1976). 

In contrast, § 841 (b) vests the quantity determination in the sentencing court. Puzyear, 

940 F.2d at 604; Jenkins, 866 F.2d at 334. "Congress clearly intended§ 84l(b)(l)(B) to be 

a sentencing provision independent of the substantive charge to which it applies." Jenkins, 

866 F.2d at 334. Thus, a jury is not required to make a quantity finding to find a defendant 

guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l). :W.. 

These principles demonstrate that although the government was required to prove that 

Defendant was predisposed to distribute cocaine prior to first being contacted by the 

confidential informant, it was not required to prove that Defendant was predisposed to 

distribute a kilogram of cocaine. Although the indictment refers to one kilogram of cocaine, 

the quantity of cocaine is not an element of the criminal act under§ 84l(a)(l). Instead, the 

quantity of cocaine is legally relevant for the sentencing court under § 841 (b). 4, Jenkins, 

866 F.2d at 334 (recognizing that § 84l(a) does not require the jury to make a quantity 

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• 

.. 

determination to return a verdict of guilty and thus a defendant is not entitled to a quantity 

finding beyond a reasonable doubt). Defendant's entrapment defense required the jury to 

determine whether the government had established beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant 

was predisposed to knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully distribute cocaine in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l). Consequently, we hold the district court did not err when it 

informed the jury that "predisposition to commit an offense of the character charged" did not 

require the government to prove, as the jury inquired, "predisposition to commit an offense 

of a 'kilo' buy." 

AFFIRMED. 

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