Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-05001/USCOURTS-ca10-19-05001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BNSF Railway Company
Appellee
Tyler D. Malinski
Appellant
Paula Smith
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TYLER D. MALINSKI, 

 Plaintiff Counter Defendant - 

 Appellant, 

and 

PAULA SMITH, 

 Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, 

 Defendant Counterclaimant - 

Appellee.

No. 19-5001 

(D.C. No. 4:15-CV-00502-JED-FHM) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Tyler Malinski and Paula Smith appeal the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). For the reasons explained 

below, we affirm. 

 * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its 

persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 9, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 1
2 

Background

On December 4, 2014,1 a train owned and operated by BNSF struck Malinski’s

pickup truck as he drove through a railroad grade crossing near Afton, Oklahoma. 

The crossing is passive: signs mark the crossing, but there is no physical barrier to 

prevent a vehicle from driving across. It is undisputed that the train was traveling at 

55 miles per hour at the time of the accident and that it sounded its horn for 

approximately 15 seconds prior to the accident. A video captured by a recording 

device on the locomotive at the front of the train shows that as the train approached 

the crossing, a pickup truck driven by Malinski’s cousin crossed the tracks in front of 

Malinski. Malinski, who was headed to the same destination as his cousin, followed 

him through the crossing without stopping. As Malinski did so, the train struck his 

truck. The collision injured Malinski and his passenger, Nathan Smith, who later died 

from his injuries. 

Malinski sued BNSF,2 claiming that it acted negligently in maintaining the 

crossing and that this negligence proximately caused Malinski’s injuries. BNSF twice 

moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Malinski was negligent per se

because (1) he violated Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 11-701(A)(3) by failing to stop at the 

crossing after the train emitted a signal audible from approximately 1500 feet away 

 1 Although parts of the record indicate that the accident occurred on December 

5, 2014, the district court order stated it occurred on December 4, 2014, and on 

appeal the parties do not dispute this latter date. 

2 Paula Smith, Nathan Smith’s mother, later intervened; she and Malinski 

submitted joint briefing on appeal. Throughout this opinion, we refer to Paula Smith 

as “Smith” and use Nathan Smith’s full name where necessary. 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 2
3 

from the crossing and (2) this statutory violation caused the collision. In support of 

its second motion for summary judgment, BNSF provided evidence of the horn test

that it conducted ten days after the collision. The testing demonstrated that when 

measured 100 feet in front of the locomotive, the horn’s volume was 100.5 decibels. 

BNSF also noted that its signal was compliant with the decibel range required by the

Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) regulations for locomotive horns and 

argued that the regulations were developed to ensure the horn’s audibility within a 

quarter-mile, or 1320-foot, range. BNSF also provided testimony from a local 

resident who can hear the train’s horn from his home, which is located more than 

1500 feet from the crossing.

The district court granted BNSF’s second motion for summary judgment.

3 It 

found that BNSF’s horn test, the rationale for the FRA’s horn regulations, and the 

local resident’s testimony all demonstrated that the signal was audible from 

approximately 1500 feet away from the crossing. Based on this audibility finding, the 

district court concluded that Malinski violated § 11-701(A)(3). The district court then 

ruled that Malinski’s statutory violation proximately caused the collision.

Accordingly, it determined that Malinski was negligent per se and granted summary 

judgment to BNSF. Malinski and Smith now appeal. 

 3

 In its first motion for summary judgment, BNSF neither explained the 

significance of the horn testing nor included the local resident’s testimony. The 

district court denied the motion, concluding that “[w]hile BNSF may, at most, have 

demonstrated that the train emitted an audible signal from one-hundred feet away, 

there is no evidence to show that the signal was audible from approximately 1,500 

feet away, as required by the statute.” App. vol. 1, 234.

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 3
4 

Analysis

We review de novo a ruling on summary judgment, “applying the same 

standard as the district court.” Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1180 (10th 

Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if, under the governing law, 

it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is 

‘genuine’ if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the 

evidence presented.” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013)

(quoting EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 

2000)).

Here, BNSF is the movant and thus bears the “initial burden of making a prima 

facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Savant 

Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Libertarian 

Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2007)). If BNSF meets this 

initial burden, the burden then shifts to nonmovants Malinski and Smith to “set forth 

specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find for” them. Id. (quoting 

Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309). In evaluating the record, we make all 

“reasonable inferences . . . in the light most favorable to” nonmovants Malinski and 

Smith. Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995). 

The district court granted BNSF’s second motion for summary judgment

because it found Malinski negligent per se. Under Oklahoma law, a statutory 

violation amounts to negligence per se when “(1) the violation of a statute . . . caused 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 4
5 

the injury, (2) the harm sustained [is] of the type intended to be prevented by the 

statute[,] and (3) ‘the injured party [is] one of the class intended to be protected by 

the statute.’” Nye v. BNSF Ry. Co., 428 P.3d 863, 873 (Okla. 2018) (quoting Ohio 

Cas. Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 510 (Okla. 1991)), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1600 

(2019). Because the parties do not dispute that the second and third elements are 

satisfied here, this case turns solely on the first element. The district court found this

first element satisfied, ruling both that Malinski violated the statute and that the 

violation caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan Smith’s death. Malinski and Smith 

challenge both rulings on appeal.

Thus, applying the summary-judgment standard and the negligence-per-se test, 

we must determine if BNSF “ma[de] a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a 

genuine” factual dispute regarding (1) whether Malinski violated the statute and, if he 

did, (2) whether that statutory violation caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan 

Smith’s death. Savant Homes, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Libertarian Party of 

N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309); see also Nye, 428 P.3d at 873. If we find that BNSF has 

made such a demonstration, we must then determine whether Malinski and Smith “set 

forth specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find” either that Malinski 

did not violate the statute or that the violation did not cause Malinski’s injuries and 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 5
6 

Nathan Smith’s death. Id. at 1137 (quoting Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d 

at 1309). 

I. Statutory Violation

We first consider whether the evidence BNSF presented makes a prima facie 

demonstration that Malinski violated § 11-701(A)(3) and, if so, whether Malinski and 

Smith set forth sufficient evidence to place that demonstration in dispute. Section 11-

701(A)(3) requires a driver at a “railroad grade crossing” to stop in the presence of 

certain visual or auditory signals indicating that a train is crossing or approaching.4

When considering whether such a signal is present, Oklahoma courts apply an 

“objective test” and ask whether a “reasonably prudent person, situated as was the 

 4 In full, § 11-701(A) provides: 

A. Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a 

railroad grade crossing under any of the circumstances 

stated in this section, the driver of such vehicle shall stop 

within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from 

the nearest rail of such railroad, and shall not proceed until 

he can do so safely. The foregoing requirements shall 

apply when:

1. A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device 

gives warning of the immediate approach of a railroad 

train;

2. A crossing gate is lowered or when a human flagman 

gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or 

passage of a railroad train;

3. A railroad train approaching within approximately one 

thousand five (1,500) hundred feet of the highway crossing 

emits a signal audible from such distance and such railroad 

train, by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing, is 

an immediate hazard;

4. An approaching railroad train is plainly visible and is in 

hazardous proximity to such crossing; or

5. The tracks at the crossing are not clear.

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 6
7 

motorist and exercising ordinary care for his own safety, should have” perceived the 

signal. Nye, 428 P.3d at 874–75 (second quoting Ross v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe 

Ry. Co., 528 F. App’x 960, 963 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)). 

As relevant here, § 11-701(A)(3) requires drivers to stop if “[a] railroad train 

approaching within approximately [1500] feet of the highway crossing emits a signal 

audible from such distance and such railroad train, by reason of its speed or nearness 

to such crossing, is an immediate hazard.” Accordingly, when Malinski failed to stop 

at the crossing, he violated the statute if a “reasonably prudent” driver in Malinski’s 

position should have heard the signal from approximately 1500 feet.5 Nye, 428 P.3d 

at 874 (quoting Ross, 528 F. App’x at 963). Thus, to meet its prima facie burden of 

demonstrating that Malinski violated the statute, BNSF must show two things: 

(1) sufficient distance, i.e., that the train signal sounded approximately 1500 feet 

 5 Although the statute creates a duty to stop if a “train approaching within

approximately [1500] feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such 

distance,” § 11-701(A)(3) (emphasis added), the district court interpreted this to 

mean that the statutory duty to stop is triggered if “the train’s horn was audible at

approximately 1,500 feet,” App. vol. 4, 893 (emphasis added); see also Turnbull v. 

Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., No. CIV-90-1432-R, 1991 WL 544257, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 

10, 1991) (unpublished) (noting that to establish violation of § 11-701(A)(3), “a 

signal must be audible from 1,500 feet from the crossing”), aff’d sub nom. Robinson 

v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1994). And the parties do not dispute 

this interpretation on appeal. Further, this interpretation accords with jury 

instructions based on § 11-701(A)(3) that the Oklahoma Supreme Court found 

“adequate.” Myers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 52 P.3d 1014, 1031 (Okla. 2002) (approving 

instruction providing that “a motorist is required to stop at a railroad crossing . . . 

if . . . the train emits a signal audible from approximately 1,500 feet from the 

crossing”). Thus, we assume that the signal must be audible at, and not merely 

within, approximately 1500 feet from the crossing in order to trigger a driver’s duty 

to stop under § 11-701(A)(3).

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 7
8 

away from the crossing, and (2) audibility, i.e., that the signal sounded loudly enough 

that a reasonably prudent person at the crossing should have heard it. 

As to sufficient distance, the parties do not dispute that the video shows the 

horn sounded for 15 seconds before the collision. Because the train was moving at 55 

miles per hour, we can deduce that this signal began sounding approximately 1210 

feet before the crossing.6 And a signal audible from as close as only 1100 feet

triggers a driver’s duty to stop under § 11-701(A)(3). Henning v. Union Pac. R.R.

Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding it “flies in the face of the 

plain language of the statute” to argue that driver did not violate § 11-701(A)(3) 

because train emitted signal 1100 feet and not 1500 feet from crossing because

statute requires audibility from only “approximately” 1500 feet). Thus, BNSF has

established that the signal began sounding approximately 1500 feet from the 

crossing.

As to audibility, the horn test demonstrates that the signal was audible from 

that distance.

7

 Ten days after the collision, BNSF tested the horn and found that, as 

 6 The district court reached this same conclusion, and our calculations support 

it. Converting 55 miles per hour to feet per second, a train traveling at this speed is 

traveling at 4840 feet per minute and thus travels 1210 feet in 15 seconds.

7 In addition to the facts discussed here, BNSF presented testimony from a 

nearby resident who could hear the train from his house, which is located more than 

1500 feet from the crossing. The district court relied in part on this testimony in 

determining that BNSF met its prima facie burden. Malinski and Smith argue that this 

reliance subverts the reasonably-prudent-driver standard because the testimony 

merely demonstrates that a local resident sometimes hears the signal from over 1500 

feet away from the crossing—not that a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s 

position should have heard the signal on the day of the accident. But unlike the 

district court, we do not find the resident’s testimony useful or necessary and thus do 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 8
9 

measured at 100 feet in front of the locomotive, the horn’s volume was 100.5 

decibels. This volume is within the 96- to 110-decibel range (as measured at 100 feet 

in front of the locomotive) required by FRA regulations, which were designed to 

provide for audibility from 1320 feet. See 49 C.F.R. § 229.129(a); Use of Locomotive 

Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,586, 70,610, 70,627 (Dec. 

18, 2003). Specifically, during the rulemaking process, the FRA sought to “establish 

and quantify . . . the level of sound that needs to be delivered to be detectable.” Use 

of Locomotive Horns, 68 Fed. Reg. at 70,610. In doing so, it determined that when a 

horn sounds at a volume of 100 decibels (measured from 100 feet away), that volume

“will have diminished to roughly 75 [decibels] at one-quarter mile[, or 1320 feet,] in 

front of the locomotive,” which is “near the outer margin of utility in terms of 

alerting the motorist to oncoming trains at that crossing.” Id. at 70,627 (emphasis 

added). But because such a horn signal sounding from 1320 feet away is near the 

outer margin of utility for warning motorists at this distance, it is within the margin 

of utility. And for a signal to be of any utility at all, it must be audible. See id. at 

70,602 (determining that “[s]ounding the horn [within the required decibel range] 

over a distance greater than one-quarter mile would add no value, since the loss of 

volume . . . would almost certainly prevent any effective warning”). Thus, per the

rulemaking history, a 100.5-decibel signal (measured from 100 feet away) is audible 

 

not rely on it. Because, as explained below, we find that BNSF meets its prima facie 

burden even without the resident’s testimony, we need not determine whether the 

district court erred in relying on this testimony.

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 9
10

from at least a quarter mile away. And a signal audible from a quarter mile away 

triggers a driver’s duty to stop under § 11-701(A)(3). See Henning, 530 F.3d at 1221. 

Malinski and Smith do not dispute the results of the horn test. But they do 

dispute the relevance of the horn test in combination with the FRA decibel-range 

regulations. They first argue that the regulations are not relevant because they

regulate trains rather than drivers. But the significance of the regulations is not 

BNSF’s compliance with them; it is that the rulemaking history demonstrates that a 

horn sounding at 100 decibels (measured from 100 feet away) is evidence of 

audibility from approximately 1500 feet. 

Next, Malinski and Smith argue that a study underlying the decibel-range 

regulations is unrepresentative. In particular, they fault the study because in 

analyzing the safety of crossings, it did not consider whether “railway companies 

failed to maintain the crossing in a reasonably safe manner,” as they alleged BNSF 

did. Aplt. Br. 27. But the maintenance of the crossing is irrelevant to the conclusion 

we draw from the FRA’s regulations and rulemaking history: that a 100.5-decibel 

signal is audible from at least quarter mile, or 1320 feet. 68 Fed. Reg. 70,586, 70,627. 

Thus, like the district court, we find that BNSF’s compliance with the FRA decibelrange requirements provides evidence of audibility in this case. And Malinski and 

Smith’s arguments to the contrary fail to undermine that conclusion.8

 8 Malinski and Smith also argue that the signal was tested “in a train yard, 

while it was immobile, and during different weather conditions” than those on the 

day of the collision. Aplt. Br. 29. They contend that these differences make the 

testing unreliable evidence of what occurred on the day of the accident. But they 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 10
11

Taking the video and testing evidence together, then, the BNSF train signaled 

at 100.5 decibels (as measured from 100 feet) when it was approximately 1500 feet 

away from the crossing where it struck Malinski and Nathan Smith. See Henning, 530 

F.3d at 1221. And because such a signal is audible from that distance, the BNSF 

signal was audible from approximately 1500 feet at the crossing where the train 

struck Malinski and Smith. See id.; Use of Locomotive Horns, 68 Fed. Reg. 

at 70,627. 

We therefore conclude that BNSF meets its initial burden to make a prima 

facie demonstration that a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s position should 

have heard the signal when the train was approximately 1500 feet away from the 

crossing. See Savant Homes, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1137. The burden now shifts to 

Malinski and Smith, who must “identify specific facts that show the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact.” Thomas, 48 F.3d at 484. 

In attempting to do so, Malinski and Smith first argue that they raised a 

genuine issue of material fact when Malinski testified that he could not hear the 

signal. They contend that the district court misapplied the reasonably-prudent-driver 

standard when finding otherwise. In doing so, they maintain that when a driver 

“claims an inability to detect an approaching train—a jury, not the courts—must 

decide” the issue of audibility. Aplt. Br. 16. But this is a subjective analysis: it asks 

 

make this attack on BNSF’s testing for the first time on appeal and do not argue for 

plain-error review. We therefore decline to consider this waived argument. See

Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2011). 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 11
12

whether Malinski actually heard the signal, not whether a reasonably prudent driver 

in Malinski’s situation should have heard it. See Nye, 428 P.3d at 875 (explaining 

that “an objective test is consistent with [the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s] longstanding jurisprudence”). Even Ross, which Malinski and Smith rely on for this point, 

frames the inquiry as “whether the train emitted a signal that would have been

audible to a reasonably prudent driver in [the driver’s] position at the crossing.” 528 

F. App’x at 966 (emphasis added). 

To be sure, Malinski and Smith cite cases that consider witness testimony as a 

relevant factor when denying summary judgment in § 11-701(A) cases. In those 

cases, however, either additional evidence corroborated the witness testimony or the 

railroad had not made a prima facie demonstration that a § 11-703(A) visual or 

audible signal was present. See, e.g., id. (denying summary judgment when multiple 

witnesses, including crewmembers on train, did not recall hearing train’s signal and 

expert opined that driver’s vehicle would have been “significant acoustical barrier” to 

hearing signal (quoting App. 328)); Cornwell v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 08-CV-638-

JHP, 2010 WL 3521668, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished) (denying 

summary judgment because railroad had not established whether driver was “given 

notice of the train’s approach by way of the sounding of the horn/whistle”). Thus, 

Malinski’s testimony does not raise a factual dispute.

Next, Malinski and Smith contend that the district court impermissibly drew an 

inference in BNSF’s favor by determining that the music playing in Malinski’s truck 

was loud. But Malinski and Smith do not explain how this alleged error affects our 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 12
13

analysis here. So although we acknowledge the practical possibility that the volume 

of music in a vehicle could theoretically impact the audibility analysis (for example, 

if a reasonably prudent person would listen to music at a passive railroad crossing at 

such a volume as to impact a signal’s audibility), such a possibility is not before us in 

this case. See Wilburn v. Mid-S. Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 

2003) (declining to consider inadequately briefed argument). 

Finally, Malinski and Smith argue that the district court ignored the facts that 

Malinski was driving on a gravel road as he approached the crossing, that it was 

raining at the time of the collision, that he approached the crossing at dusk, and that 

the driver who crossed the tracks before Malinski testified that he could not hear the 

signal. But as BNSF points out, Malinski and Smith did not argue in the district court 

that any of these facts impacted the signal’s audibility, and they do not argue for 

plain-error review on appeal. Therefore, any arguments based on these allegedly 

ignored facts are waived. See Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127–28; Adler v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 675 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding summary judgment in 

part by determining that party waived argument it made on appeal because it did not 

“raise and support [the] argument below”). 

Thus, we do not find that either Malinski’s testimony or any of Malinski and 

Smith’s other arguments “show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact” as 

to whether the signal was audible to a reasonably prudent driver. Thomas, 48 F.3d 

at 484. Accordingly, Malinski and Smith have not rebutted BNSF’s prima facie 

demonstration that a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s position should have 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 13
14

heard the signal from approximately 1500 feet, triggering Malinski’s duty to stop 

under § 11-701(A)(3).

9 And because Malinski did not stop, he violated § 11-

701(A)(3). Nye, 428 P.3d at 873. 

II. Causation

Even though Malinski violated § 11-701(A)(3), this statutory violation gives 

rise to negligence per se only if the violation proximately caused the collision that led 

to his injuries and to Nathan Smith’s death. See id. Proximate cause is the “cause 

[that] sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury.” Akin v. Mo.

Pac. R.R. Co., 977 P.2d 1040, 1054 (Okla. 1998). Here, BNSF can prevail on 

summary judgment only if it makes a prima facie demonstration that Malinski’s 

failure to stop in the presence of an audible signal “set[] in motion the chain of 

circumstances leading to” his injuries and Nathan Smith’s death. Id. 

The video shows that the collision occurred immediately after Malinski failed 

to stop, without any intervening events. The video therefore establishes a prima facie 

demonstration that Malinski’s § 11-701(A)(3) violation proximately caused the 

 9 Malinski and Smith argue that a “driver does not solely bear the burden for 

preventing accidents”; instead, they contend, a “driver’s duty to stop depends on 

whether the railway company first satisfies its duty to maintain its crossing in a

reasonably safe manner.” Aplt. Br. 17, 20. But this argument misunderstands 

negligence per se, where the statute defines the duty. Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 299 

P.3d 463, 467 (Okla. 2013) (“The negligence per se doctrine is employed to 

substitute statutory standards for parallel common[-]law, reasonable[-]care duties.”). 

Here, a driver has a duty to stop when a signal is audible from approximately 1500 

feet. § 11-701(A)(3).

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 14
15

collision, which in turn caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan Smith’s death. The 

burden now shifts to Malinski and Smith to rebut this prima facie demonstration. 

In attempting to meet their burden, Malinski and Smith argue that summary 

judgment is not appropriate because (1) BNSF’s negligence in maintaining the 

crossing proximately caused Malinski’s injuries and Nathan Smith’s death and 

(2) there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether any negligence on 

Malinski’s part, in violating § 11-701(A)(3), supervened that cause. A supervening 

cause “is a new, independent[,] and efficient cause of the injury [that] was neither 

anticipated nor reasonably foreseeable” and breaks the chain of causation between an 

otherwise proximate cause and the injury. Id. at 1054–55. Malinski and Smith argue 

that there are fact issues as to (1) whether Malinski’s “inability to hear the train was 

independent from BNSF’s negligent maintenance, building, and construct[ion] of the 

crossing” and (2) whether Malinski’s decision to cross the tracks without stopping 

was “reasonably foreseeable considering BNSF’s negligent conduct.” Aplt. Br. 35

(emphases added). Thus, they reason, summary judgment is not appropriate because 

of fact issues as to whether Malinski’s alleged negligence broke the chain of 

proximate causation between BNSF’s alleged negligence and the injuries.

This argument fails because, as a matter of law in Oklahoma, a driver’s 

violation of § 11-701(A) proximately causes injuries from resulting train collisions. 

Akin, 977 P.2d at 1055; Hamilton v. Allen, 852 P.2d 697, 701 (Okla. 1993). This 

remains true “even if” the railroad “could have been shown to be [in] breach of its 

common-law duty of care.” Akin, 977 P.2d at 1056. In Oklahoma, a driver’s violation 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 15
16

of § 11-701(A) “constitutes a supervening act of negligence [that] insulates the 

railroad from the legal consequences of its own lack of due care, if any.” Id.; see also 

Hamilton, 852 P.2d at 700–01 (explaining that when “it is undisputed that warnings 

were given,” the issue of proximate cause “becomes one of law”).

Malinski and Smith argue that Hamilton and Akin are inapposite because the 

collisions in those cases occurred at crossings with visual active-warning systems 

such as crossing gates. However, they do not explain why or how the proximatecause analysis should differ based on whether the crossing was passive or active or 

whether the signals were visual or audible. Indeed, § 11-701(A) creates a duty to stop 

both in the presence of active visual signals, § 11-701(A)(1)–(2), and in the presence 

of an audible signal, § 11-701(A)(3). They also attempt to distinguish these cases 

because they involve instances where the driver obviously “broke the law” by, for 

example, driving along the center line past two stopped cars and lowered crossing 

gates in order to cross the tracks. Rep. Br. 13; see Hamilton, 985 P.2d at 698–99. But 

even if Malinski’s failure to stop was not as egregious as that in Hamilton, he 

nevertheless violated the statute. Accordingly, Hamilton and Akin’s conclusion that a 

§ 11-701(A) violation is the proximate cause for any resulting injuries applies equally 

here.

The three cases Malinski and Smith rely on do not say otherwise. First, none 

of the cases address the legal rule that a § 11-701(A) violation supervenes any 

negligence on the part of a railroad. Next, two of these cases are not negligence-perse cases and instead involved situations where it was unclear whether any warning 

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 16
17

signal was present. See Kan., Okla. & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Collins, 251 P.2d 178, 180 

(Okla. 1952) (finding proximate cause was jury question when “evidence as to 

whether or not the whistle was blown or bell rung when the train approached the 

crossing [was] in conflict”); Okla. Union Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 242 P. 176, 178 (Okla. 

1925) (denying summary judgment when “the evidence was very conflicting . . . as to 

whether or not any signal warning was given”). These two cases are not relevant here 

because, as explained above, Malinski and Smith have failed to rebut or call into 

question BNSF’s prima facie demonstration that the signal was audible. And thus—

unlike Collins and Lynch—this case must be analyzed as a per-se-negligence case, 

where the statutory violation proximately causes the injury as a matter of law. 

Finally, in the third case, the court found that a jury must determine whether a police 

officer’s negligence in violating a law that required him to use an audible signal 

before crossing a highway median proximately caused a multi-car collision. See 

Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067, 1072 (Okla. 1995). But in that case, multiple actors 

intervened between when the officer crossed the median without an audible signal 

and when the collision occurred. Id. at 1070. Here, there are no other actors who may 

have supervened Malinski’s negligence, so Jackson, too, is inapposite. 

In sum, then, Malinski and Smith fail to rebut or call into question BNSF’s 

prima facie demonstration that Malinski’s § 11-701(A)(3) violation proximately 

caused the collision that led to his injuries and Nathan Smith’s death.

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 17
18

Conclusion

Through the video and horn test, BNSF made a prima facie demonstration that 

the train signal, when sounded approximately 1500 feet away from the crossing, was 

audible to a reasonably prudent driver in Malinski’s position at the crossing. Because 

we find that Malinski and Smith did not provide evidence sufficient to create a 

genuine issue of material fact on this issue, we conclude that Malinski violated 

§ 11-701(A). And because under Oklahoma law a driver’s violation of § 11-701(A) 

acts as a supervening cause to any negligence on a railroad’s part, we find that

Malinski’s negligence proximately caused the collision that led to Malinski’s injuries 

and Nathan Smith’s death. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order ruling that 

Malinski was negligent per se and granting summary judgment to BNSF.

10

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

 10 BNSF argues in the alternative that the Federal Railroad Safety Act 

preempts Malinski and Smith’s state-law claims. Because we affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on negligence per se, we do not reach this 

argument.

Appellate Case: 19-5001 Document: 010110315906 Date Filed: 03/09/2020 Page: 18