Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01171/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01171-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamie D. Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1171

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jamie D. Jones

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: December 12, 2014

 Filed: July 29, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Jamie Duwayne Jones on two counts of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He

appeals, claiming the magistrate judge did not adequately inquire into his pre-trial 1

The Honorable Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri.

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pro se motion to substitute counsel, his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were

violated, and the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by introducing a

prejudicial video (which the district court played during deliberations). Having

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I. 

Jones was arraigned on October 23, 2012. The magistrate judge appointed

counsel and set a November 26 trial date. His attorney sought five continuances. The

first request asked for time to negotiate a plea agreement. The next two, for time to

provide substantial assistance before entering a plea agreement. The last two, for

time to respond to an additional charge in a superseding indictment. Each stated that

Jones wanted to assist the government and agreed that it was “in his best interests to

waive his rights to a speedy trial.” The district court granted each continuance “in the

interest of justice.”

Jones filed a pro se motion for ineffective assistance of counsel on July 15,

2013—about five weeks before trial. Jones listed his reasons for new counsel in these

words:

(1) Dose not take my Phone calls no more. 

(2) She tells me she is coming to see me so we can get ready for trial.

(never dose)

(3) I’ve been to Pre-trial twice now. Both times I never went to trial. 

She Contenue each time. I’ve wrote her and made it Court record that

I want to go too trial. no Contenue’s.

(4) Each time I don’t go to trial I call my attorney with no answer. Then

I have to write to the clerk find out my next Trial date. 

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri. 

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(5) In a criminal case, A attorney files motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Evidance and file with the Court to Surrpress the Evidance, This maybe

Lazyness or that the attorney Has no interest in my case. no Disposition

were tooken in my case. 

(6) My case in not a complex case. I’ve been in Jail for 9 months now. 

More then enough time to Perpair for trial. 

(7) If this isn’t enough evidance to Prove Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel. I don’t know what it is. I’ve wrote Letters to the Court about,

my attroney getting Contenue’s to make some kind of record to Prove

my greivance to this Court. All these things about in (5) was told to me

was going to be filed and Disposition were to be tooken. But none of

these were done. and Didn’t Keep my trial within the fast and speedy

trial clause. Thank you for your time in this matter. I’m Just asking for

a fair Trial. 

Respectfully submitted This day July 11, 2013 

I want a different attorney. 

/s/ Jamie Jones 

Without holding a hearing, the magistrate judge denied the motion, and ordered

Jones’s counsel to meet with him, inform the court if she found that a “substantial

complaint exists,” and if so, request a hearing date. Neither Jones nor his attorney

said anything more about the substitution motion—either by written correspondence

or at the pre-trial hearing 14 days later. About a month after filing his pro se motion,

Jones proceeded to trial with the same counsel.

The government presented evidence that a confidential informant and

undercover agent went to Jones’s house to buy a handgun from Jones. (Count One)

The agent noticed the gun’s grip was wrapped in black tape. Over a year later, police

searched a different house looking for drugs. Jones was in bed with a woman in the

southeast bedroom. In that bedroom, police found mail addressed to Jones and a gun

hidden in the vent. (Count Two) The gun’s grip was wrapped in black tape. A DNA

criminalist testified that some of Jones’s DNA markers were on this gun. Jones did

not live in the house.

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The government introduced a video of the search, but showed the jury only still

photographs. Jones did not object to the video. During deliberations the jury

requested to see the video. The court asked the government if anything on the video

differed from the still photographs shown at trial. The government responded, “It’s

a fluid video, but—” and the court ordered it played. In the first 11 minutes, the

video shows three individuals sitting handcuffed outside, multiple cars, and four

people (including Jones) inside. The house is untidy. The people inside, including

Jones, appear dazed or tired. The southeast bedroom is disorganized. The video

shows the vent where the gun was found, along with the gun and a bag of bullets

wrapped in electrical tape. Inside the vent, underneath the gun, is a stack of papers

with a letterhead from a bankruptcy firm. The stack of papers is addressed, not to

Jones, but to another person. The video continues with police finding a briefcase in

the southeast bedroom with multiple papers and credit cards. An envelope addressed

to Jones is in a drawer in the bedroom. The same drawer has a black bag with an

email receipt for Xanax and other items. The receipt is attached to a copy of a credit

card with the same name as the papers located in the vent. A box containing a green

leafy substance, scales, baggies, multiple pills, possible methamphetamine, and a W-2

belonging to yet another person is shown under the bed in a different bedroom.

The court stopped the video after about 11 minutes, asked counsel why the

whole video was agreed to “because there’s more stuff on there than needed to be

covered.” The court then instructed the jury, “I think you’ve seen enough that was

relevant to the case presented and maybe some that was not pertinent to the evidence

in the case, and I’m sure you will be able to separate that out as you reflect upon the

testimony and the elements for each offense in this case.”

The jury convicted Jones on both counts. 

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II.

Jones argues that the magistrate judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel by failing to hold an adequate inquiry into his substitution motion.

A.

Jones moved to substitute counsel on July 15. The magistrate judge denied the

motion on July 17. Jones did not mention the motion when appearing before the

magistrate judge 14 days later for his pre-trial conference. He did not file an

objection to the district court. Because Jones “did not contest the magistrate judge’s

ruling by filing an objection in the district court, . . . he is precluded from assigning

error to this ruling now on appeal.” United States v. Kelley, 774 F.3d 434, 438 (8th

Cir. 2014), citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a) (Nondispositive Matters) (“Failure to object

in accordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review.”). Rule 59(a) “‘is

intended to establish the requirements for objecting in a district court in order to

preserve appellate review of magistrate judges’ decisions.’” Id., quoting Fed. R.

Crim. P. 59(a) advisory committee’s note. By failing to raise his objection to the

magistrate judge’s ruling on this nondispositive motion, Jones may have waived his

right to appeal the issue.

However, the government did not argue that Jones waived review. Because

Rule 59(a) is a “nonjurisdictional waiver provision,” see Kelley, 774 F.3d at 439

(internal quotation marks omitted), the government’s failure to raise this issue

cautions against holding Jones’s procedural default against him. At any rate, this

court “‘may excuse the default in the interests of justice.’” See id., quoting Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985). 

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B.

This court reviews a trial court’s denial of a substitution motion for abuse of

discretion. Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012) (“Because a trial court’s

decision on substitution is so fact-specific, it deserves deference; a reviewing court

may overturn it only for an abuse of discretion.”). Even if a trial court abuses its

discretion in denying a substitution motion without inquiry, the Sixth Amendment

does not require an automatic reversal of the conviction. See id. at 1289 n. 4 (“We

note as well that the Court of Appeals ordered the wrong remedy even assuming the

DistrictCourt had abused its discretion in denying Clair’s substitutionmotion without

inquiry. The way to cure that error would have been to remand to the District Court

to decide whether substitution was appropriate at the time of Clair’s letter.”). See

also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The

constitutional question must turn on whether trial counsel had a conflict of interest

that hampered the representation, not on whether the trial judge should have been

more assiduous in taking prophylacticmeasures.”); Ausler v. United States, 545 F.3d

1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting automatic reversal rule in Holloway v. Arkansas,

435 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1978), only applies when defense counsel is forced to

represent codefendants over objection, unless trial court determines no conflict

exists).

The magistrate judge analyzed Jones’s motion under this circuit’s “justifiable

dissatisfaction” standard. Under this standard, a criminal defendant who is 3

In Clair, the Supreme Court held that in federal habeas cases, district courts 3

should use the “interests of justice” standard from 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) to evaluate

substitution motions. Even though habeas petitioners do not have a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, the Court held that “[s]ection 3006A applies the

‘interests of justice’ standard to substitution motions even when the Sixth

Amendment does not require representation.” Clair, 132 S. Ct. at 1286. The

“interests of justice” factors are derived from the considerations courts of appeals use

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dissatisfied with appointed counsel must show “justifiable dissatisfaction” to warrant

substitution of counsel, such as “a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or

a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant.” 

United States v. Exson, 328 F.3d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 2003). “When faced with a

motion to appoint substitute counsel, the district court must balance several factors,

including the need to ensure effective legal representation, the need to thwart abusive

delay tactics, and the reality that a person accused of crime is often genuinely

unhappy with an appointed counsel who is nonetheless doing a good job.” Kelley,

774 F.3d at 438. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v.

Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The defendant’s right to counsel,

however, ‘does not involve the right to a “meaningful relationship” between an

accused and his counsel.’” (quoting United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 952 (1st

Cir. 1989))). A trial court has an obligation to inquire thoroughly into situations

where a defendant makes a “seemingly substantial complaint about counsel.” Smith

v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991). “[I]n some instances, the court

[has] the relevant facts without engaging in an intensive inquiry.” United States v.

Rodriguez, 612 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir. 2010). See also United States v. Jones,

662 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] thorough inquiry may not necessitate a

separate hearing on the matter.”); United States v. Blum, 65 F.3d 1436 (8th Cir.

1995) (“The inquiry, if any, must be on the record” (emphasis added)). 

An on-the-record inquiry into Jones’s substitution motion would have aided

this court’s review. See Clair, 132 S. Ct. at 1287 (“[A]n on-the-record inquiry into

the defendant’s allegations ‘permits meaningful appellate review’ of a trial court’s

exercise of discretion.” (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336-37

in reviewing substitution motions. Id. at 1287. In federal habeas cases, where the

Sixth Amendment does not apply, trial courts must use the “interests of justice”

standard outlined in Clair. See Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 894 (2015). 

This is not a federal habeas case. 

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(1988))). Nonetheless, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying

Jones’s substitutionmotion without inquiry. Jones’s motion thoroughly explained his

reasons for requesting a new lawyer, and the district court had all the information

necessary to make a ruling. See, e.g., Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 872 (8th Cir. 1999)

(“[I]n some cases, no inquiry may be required because all of the relevant facts have

been disclosed to the court.”); United States v. Velazquez, 772 F.3d 788, 798 (7thCir.

2014) (“‘Unless the complaint underlying a request for substitution of counsel is

sufficiently detailed, the court may not rule on the motion without conducting a

proper hearing . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Zillges, 978 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir.

1992)) (emphasis added)); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 353 (5th Cir. 2007)

(“The duty to inquire is not so formalistic as to require affirmative questioning when

such is rendered unnecessary because the parties have volunteered all the relevant

information for a court to determine that no substantial conflict exists.”); McKee v.

Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding harmlessthe district court’s failure

to inquire after defendant already explained his reasons for requesting new counsel

and made no new arguments on appeal). Cf. Clair, 132 S. Ct. at 1288 (“As all

Circuits agree, courts cannot properly resolve substitution motions without probing

why a defendant wants a new lawyer.”).

First, Jones said that his attorney had not met with him to prepare for trial and

was no longer taking his phone calls. He claimed not to know the reason for his

attorney’s silence and inaction, but surmised it was either due to laziness or

disinterest in his case. Although Jones complains of a lack of communication with

his attorney, nowhere does he allege a “complete” breakdown in communication. See

Kelley, 774 F.3d at 439 (finding no justifiable dissatisfaction where a defendant

“requested substitute counsel because of . . . a purported lack of communication” and

“wished his attorney had been more open and spent more time with him”). Jones also

said that his was “not a complex case” and his counsel had been given more than

enough time to prepare for trial. Since the trial was more than five weeks away, and

since Jones did not complain that he and his attorney were unable to communicate,

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a stern command to defense counsel to meet with Jones sufficiently addressed Jones’s

communication frustrations. See United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 670 (2d

Cir. 1972) (although defendant complained, among other things, that counsel did not

meet with him in five months preceding trial, district court’s failure to inquire into

complaint was harmless where facts indicated case was uncomplicated and counsel

had ample time to prepare).

Second, Jones expressed frustration that his attorney did not file motions to

suppress and dismiss for lack of evidence. His “frustration with appointed counsel’s

performance or disagreement with counsel’s tactical decisions is not justifiable

dissatisfaction.” United States v. Taylor, 652 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2011).

Finally, Jones assertsthat he presented a conflict of interest because he did not

agree to continuances and did not want to give up his speedy trial rights (his

attorney’s continuance requests claimed he waived them). However, the Supreme

Court has held, “a defendant may not prospectively waive the application of the

[Speedy Trial] Act.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500 (2006). The record

indicatesthat the district court gavemany reasons, other than the defendant’s consent,

in finding the “ends of justice” were served by each continuance, and a defendant’s

consent to a continuance is not required for a court to make such a finding. United

States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504, 510 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he plain language of section

3161(h)(7)(A) does not require a defendant’s consent to the continuance if the judge

granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served

by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Jones’s claim that he wrote the

4

court to make a record of his opposition to the continuancesrequested by his attorney

is not supported by the record. The only other letter from Jones in the record is one

Counsel’s conflict of interest, of course, may entitle a client to new counsel. 

4

See Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 894. 

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where he expressed a desire to “help himself” by making a deal with the government. 

For this very reason his attorney made three continuance requests. See Clair, 132 S.

Ct. at 1288 (excusing district court’s failure to inquire into substitution motion, in

part, because court had “reason to think” defendant’s charges “lacked merit”). The

magistrate judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s detailed motion for

new counsel without inquiry.

III.

Jones claims his Speedy Trial Act rights were violated because the grounds in

his counsel’s continuance requests did not support the “ends of justice” finding

required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The Speedy Trial Act requires a defendant

be brought to trial within 70 days after his indictment or first appearance in court

where the charge is pending—whichever is later. See id. § 3161(c)(1). “Any period

of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . . at the request of the

defendant or his counsel . . . if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his

findings that the ends of justice served . . . outweigh the best interest of the public and

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). “When a defendant fails to

assert his right to a speedy trial by moving for a dismissal before trial, the right is

waived.” United States v. Williams, 605 F.3d 556, 572-73 (8th Cir. 2010).

By failing to assert his Speedy Trial Act rights before trial, Jones waived any

arguments against the district court’s grants ofthe continuance requests. Jones argues

that his July 15 motion should be construed as a dismissal request under the Speedy

Trial Act because it suggests that he did not want his case continued and that his

attorney did not “keep my trial within the fast and speedy trial clause.” However, the

court did not interpret Jones’s motion as a dismissal request under the Speedy Trial

Act—a fair interpretation since Jones ends his motion with, “I’mJust asking for a fair

Trial” and “I want a different attorney.” See id. at 573 (finding defendant waived

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right to assert SpeedyTrial Act violation even though defendant had attempted to file 

pro se motion to dismiss, which district court refused to accept into record).

IV.

Jones asserts prosecutorial misconduct for introduction of the video of the

search. He claims the video was “clearly inadmissible” because “the depiction of the

small amount of drugs, coupled with individualssitting handcuffed outside the house,

individuals laying around the house who appeared dazed and likely on drugs and the

general disarray of the house had nothing to do with whether he possessed the gun.”

He also argues that “the most prejudicial evidence was the four credit cards in three

different names found in a briefcase with other papers belonging to [Jones] in the

same Southeast bedroom where the gun and [Jones] were found.”

“The test for reversible prosecutorial misconduct has two parts: (1) the

prosecutor’s remarks or conduct must in fact have been improper, and (2) such

remarks or conduct must have prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights

so asto deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” United States v. Wilkens, 742 F.3d 354,

361 (8th Cir. 2014). Since Jones’s counsel did not object to the video, his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Darden,

688 F.3d 382, 388 (8th Cir. 2012). Under plain-error review, this court will reverse

only if there is error that is plain and affects Jones’s substantial rights. See United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A reviewing court should not correct a

forfeited error “unless the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (brackets omitted), quoting United States

v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).

At trial, Jones’s counselmentioned that police searched the house for drugs and

drug paraphernalia because an undercover detective had made a drug purchase there. 

The government also presented evidence that police searched the house because

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someone other than Jones had sold drugs there. The government linked Jones to the

second gun because he was in the southeast bedroom when they arrived, they found

the gun in the bedroom vent, the gun had black tape wrapped around the grip (like the

tape on the gun Jones sold in count one), police found an envelope addressed to Jones

in a drawer in the bedroom, and a DNA analyst found some of Jones’s DNA markers

on the gun. The government presented no evidence connecting Jones to the black

bag, the briefcase, or the box located in the second bedroom. Jones argued that he did

not live in the house, multiple people had occupied the southeast bedroom, and the

gun could have belonged to anyone. 

The video contains relevant evidence. “In felon-in-possession cases, we have

permitted the introduction of evidence that provides the context in which the crime

occurred, including events immediately preceding the defendant’s arrest and the

circumstances of the arrest itself.” United States v. Byers, 603 F.3d 503, 506 (8th

Cir. 2010). See also United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 731 (8th Cir. 1996)

(“Rule 404(b) only forbids introduction of extrinsic bad acts whose only relevance

isto prove character, not bad acts that form the factual setting of the crime in issue.”). 

Likewise, the ownership of items in the southeast bedroom wasrelevant to show who

had occupied the room. The video is even arguably beneficial to Jones because it

shows two separate documents belonging to an individual other than Jones in the

same room as the gun. See United States v. Conrad, 320 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir.

2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of drug paraphernalia in

a gun possession case to prove possession and control of apartment). 

Although other parts ofthe video are irrelevant, Jones cannot demonstrate that

it prejudicially affected his substantial rights, depriving him of a fair trial. The box

containing suspected marijuana, meth, scales, and baggies was found in the other

bedroom, and the jury had already been informed by both defense counsel and the

government that illegal drug activity had occurred at the house. The government

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presented no evidence at trial connecting Jones to the briefcase filled with credit cards

and financial papers. Although thisinformation probably should have been excluded,

the evidence linking Jones to the gun was strong. The gun’s grip was wrapped in

black tape similar to the gun Jones sold in count one, and some of his DNA markers

were found on the gun. Further, the district court told the jury that the video

contained non-pertinent information and instructed them to “separate that out.” See

Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298, 1305 (8th Cir. 1996) (“It is

certainly reasonable to believe, absent evidence to the contrary, that the jury adhered

to the judge’s instructions.”). 

* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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