Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00985/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00985-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bill Blake
Defendant
David C. Corser
Plaintiff
Gloria Cortez-Keene
Defendant
Paul Fillebrown
Defendant
Larry Gonzales
Defendant
Maria Socorro Gonzales
Defendant
County Of Merced
Defendant
L. Miller
Defendant
Parrish
Defendant
Mark Pazin
Defendant
Smallwood
Defendant
Ruth Stone
Defendant
Demetrios Tatum
Defendant
Zyskowski
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID C. CORSER,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

COUNTY OF MERCED; GLORIA CORTEZKEENE; DEMETRIOS TATUM; Merced

County Sheriff’s employees

SHERIFF MARK PAZIN, UNDERSHERIFF

BILL BLAKE, COMMANDER PARRISH,

DEPUTY ZYSKOWSKI, DEPUTY L.

MILLER, VOLUNTEER SMALLWOOD,

(BADGE #V330); Merced County

Public Works Director PAUL

FILLEBROWN; LARRY GONZALES;

MARIA SOCORRO GONZALES; RUTH

STONE; and DOES 1 through 50, 

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-00985 OWW DLB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT

LARRY GONZALES’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE SECOND, FIFTH,

AND SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION

PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6),

F.R.Civ.P., AND DENYING

DEFENDANT LARRY GONZALES’

MOTION TO STRIKE THE FIFTH

CAUSE OF ACTION PURSUANT TO

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE

SECTION 425.15 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff brings this suit against the above-named

Defendants pursuant to Title 42, Section 1983, of the United

States Code for illegal warrantless arrest, First-Amendment

retaliation, and conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights. 

He also brings supplemental claims under state law: assault,

battery, and the use of excessive force in effecting an arrest;

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false arrest and false imprisonment; violations of his

constitutional rights for which liability can be imposed pursuant

to Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code; and negligent

training and supervision. 

Defendant Gonzales moves to dismiss the Second, Fifth, and

Seventh Causes of Action for failure to state a claim. He also

moves to strike the Fifth Cause of Action, pursuant to California

Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, on the grounds that it is

a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 29, 2005. Defendant

Gonzales filed the instant motion to dismiss on September 30th. 

On October 24th, the Plaintiff filed his opposition to the

motion. Defendant Gonzales replied on October 28th. 

III. BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, a political dispute arose

between Plaintiff and Defendants concerning urban expansion in

the Planada area. Complaint, ¶ 35. In particular, Plaintiff,

both as an individual and in his role as the Programs Director of

the Planada Community Development Corporation (hereinafter, “the

Planada CDC”), contested, in fora and ways protected by the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the advisability of

certain projects advocated by Defendant Gloria Cortez-Keene

(hereinafter, “Defendant Keene”). Complaint, ¶ 21. Defendant

Keene was at all relevant times a member of the Board of

Supervisors of Merced County (hereinafter, “the MCBS”), and as

such she also sat as a member of the Board of Governors of the

Merced County Community Action Agency (hereinafter, “the MCCAA”). 

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Complaint, ¶ 3. Plaintiff pleads on information and belief that

among the projects which Plaintiff challenged were some which

would have yielded improper benefits to Defendant Keene or her

close associates. Complaint, ¶ 21. 

At all relevant times, Defendant Gonzales was a member of

the Planada CDC and of the Planada Municipal Advisory Council

(hereinafter, “the Planada MAC”). Members of the Planada MAC

serve by appointment of the MCBS. Complaint, ¶ 8.

The complaint alleges that Defendants, including Defendant

Gonzales, engaged in a series of actions intended to harass

Plaintiff into abandoning his opposition to the program of

development advocated by Defendant Keene. Complaint, ¶ 36. The

Plaintiff alleges that the measures employed by the Defendants in

their program of harassment included procuring the eviction of

the Planada CDC, Plaintiff’s employer, from its offices at the

Planada Community Center and denying it access thereto,

Complaint, ¶¶ 19, 27, 35, and inducing the Planada CDC’s main

funding source to withdraw its funds, effectively ending

Plaintiff’s employment, Complaint, ¶ 35; using Defendant Merced

Sheriff’s Deputies for the purpose of intimidating Defendant

Keene’s opponents, Complaint, ¶¶ 22, 26, 37; conditioning a grant

of fifty thousand dollars to the Planada CDC on the removal of

two of Plaintiff’s supporters from the Planada CDC Board,

Complaint, ¶ 26; and procuring Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and

detention, during which he was subjected to excessive force and

physical injury by Defendant Zyskowski, Complaint, ¶¶ 31-34. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants committed all these

acts under color of state law, in violation of his civil rights

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under the Constitution of the United States and the California

Constitution. Complaint, ¶ 18.

In his First Cause of Action, Plaintiff sues Defendants the

County of Merced (hereinafter, “County”), Volunteer Smallwood,

Deputy Zyskowski, Maria Gonzales, and Does 1 through 15,

inclusive, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for depriving him of rights

guaranteed him by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution by subjecting him to excessive

force, unjustifiable denial of liberty, and deprivation of

necessary medical care while in custody, and conspiring to

conceal their misconduct by attempting to cause a fraudulent

criminal proceeding to be brought against Plaintiff in the

California courts in connection with his arrest.

In his Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff sues Defendants

County, Keene, Tatum, Pazin, Blake, Larry Gonzales, Smallwood,

Zyskowski, Maria Gonzales, Stone, Fillebrown, and Does 1 through

35, inclusive, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds that they

engaged in alleged retaliatory acts against Plaintiff to chill

his exercise of his rights to freedom of speech and to petition

the government guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and by the

Constitution and laws of California. 

In his Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff sues Defendants

County, Zyskowski, Smallwood, Miller, and Does 1 through 25,

inclusive, for assault, battery, and use of excessive force, in

violation of California Penal Code Sections 149 and 245. 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action alleges false arrest and

false imprisonment, supplemental state-law claims, against

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Defendants County, Maria Gonzales, Zyskowski, Smallwood, and Does

1 through 35, inclusive.

In his Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff sues all the

Defendants under California Code Section 52.1(b) for violations

of rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States

and the Constitution and laws of the State of California. 

In his Sixth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants County, Pazin, Blake, and Does 36 through 50,

inclusive, were negligent in their training or supervision of

Defendants Zyskowski, Smallwood, Miller, and County employees and

volunteers Does 1 through 35, resulting in the injuries to

Plaintiff as set forth in his complaint.

Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action alleges, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, that, in conspiring together to silence the

Plaintiff’s criticisms of the plans for land development

advocated by Defendant Keene in the manner set forth in his

general allegations, and by “establishing, ratifying,

encouraging[,] or implementing procedures or practices or customs

or patterns or conduct, pursuant to which C[ounty] employees

acted, whereby [P]laintiff was falsely accused, unlawfully

arrested and jailed, and falsely imprisoned,” Complaint, ¶ 71, 

the Defendants deprived him of his rights under the First,

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

Defendant Larry Gonzales moves to dismiss the Second, Fifth,

and Seventh Causes of Action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and to

strike the Fifth Cause of Action pursuant to California Code of

Civil Procedure Section 425.15. 

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IV. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

1. The Second Cause of Action

Gonzales argues that no relief is available under Section

1983 against him as an individual. Defendant Gonzales first

argues that Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendant Gonzales was

acting under color of law. Defendant Gonzales’ second argument

is that his alleged actions are subject to legislative immunity. 

His third argument is that Plaintiff fails to allege a “policy or

custom.”

a. Color of State Law

Defendant Gonzales characterizes the Planada CDC as a

“private, non-profit corporation that develops projects to

benefit Planada.” Mot. to Dismiss at 4. He argues that the only

conduct of his about which the Plaintiff has complained is

allegedly violating Plaintiff’s federal and state civil rights by

terminating Plaintiff’s employment from the Planada CDC. Mot. to

Dismiss at 6. This conduct stems from Defendant Gonzales’

activity for a private corporation, and no state action is

present, which bars a Section 1983 claim against Gonzales.

Plaintiff first objects to the narrow way in which Defendant

Gonzales characterizes the allegations against him. Plaintiff

reiterates that Defendant Gonzales participated in a broad-based

campaign of harassment, of which Plaintiff’s eventual dismissal

was only a part. Plaintiff notes Gonzales’ concession that the

Planada CDC is a “quasi-governmental entity.” Mot. in Opp. at 2;

see Mot. to Dismiss at 13 (arguing that the Planada CDC’s

meetings and activities fall under the purview of California Code

of Civil Procedure Section 425.15, the “Anti-SLAPP” statute). 

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Although generally inapplicable to private parties, a Section

1983 claim can lie against a private party when he is a willful

participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Peng

v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2003). In

Brunette v. Humane Society of Ventura County, an opinion cited by

neither side, the Ninth Circuit stated that proof of a conspiracy

between the state and a private party to deprive another of his

constitutional rights can satisfy the joint-action test for

Section 1983 liability. Brunette, 294 F.3d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.

2002). 

The complaint, the factual averments of which the court 

accepts as true for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss,

see ASW v. Oregon, 424 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2005), alleges in

substance that Defendant Gonzales conspired with the other

Defendants, themselves allegedly state actors, and acted in

concert with them to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional

rights. The Second Cause of Action particularizes this claim to

the deprivation of First Amendment free-speech and petition

rights. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the colorof-state-law requirement. 

b. Legislative Immunity to Section 1983 Suit

Defendant argues that Defendant Gonzales is absolutely

immune from suit in his individual capacity for conduct he

undertook in his role as a member of the Planada MAC because that

entity is a legislative body. Mot. to Dismiss at 6. “[T]he

Planada MAC is an integral part of the policy[-]making process

for the County of Merced. It advises the County with regard to

the necessity for and provision of public services relating to,

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among other things, public health, safety, welfare, public works,

and planning for [] Planada and its residents.” Mot. to Dismiss

at 7.

Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s characterization of the

Planada MAC as a legislative entity. Mot. in Opp. at 4. More

importantly, Plaintiff notes the distinction, overlooked by

Defendant Gonzales, which the United States Supreme Court has

drawn, and which the Ninth Circuit has recognized, between

legislative activity, which is accorded absolute immunity, and

non-legislative activity, which is not. Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5

(citing Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (absolute

immunity for all actions taken “in the sphere of legitimate

legislative activity”); Kaahumanu v. County of Maui, 315 F.3d

1215 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

“Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the

act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official

performing it.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. In Kaahumanu, the Ninth

Circuit recognized four criteria for whether a particular action

is legislative: (1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies

to a few individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the

act is formally legislative in character; and (4) whether it

bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. Kaahumanu,

315 F.3d at 1220.

Plaintiff alleges a program of harassment, engaged in by

Defendant Gonzales and others, meant to silence the criticism by

those, including Plaintiff, who disagreed with the projects

advocated by Defendant Keene. This program allegedly included:

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“arrangement of Sheriff’s deputies to be present at public

meetings where their presence was not required and could only be

intimidating to the persons attending [citation]; attempting in a

private meeting to bully plaintiff into resigning his position

[citation]; conspiring with other defendants, including his wife,

to secure plaintiff’s unlawful arrest [citation]; and conspiring

with other defendants to violate plaintiff’s and others’ rights

of free speech and political action by misuse of county Sheriff’s

officers and other personnel [citation].” Mot. in Opp. at 8-9.

“The burden of proof in establishing absolute immunity is on

the individual asserting it.” Id. (citing Trevino v. Gates, 23

F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994)). None of the actions alleged is

a law-making activity. The actions only applied to Plaintiff and

a few individuals, not the public at large. Legislative immunity

is not established on the face of the pleadings. The motion to

dismiss the First Cause of Action against Defendant Gonzales on

legislative immunity grounds is DENIED. 

c. Policy or Custom

To sue a local government entity or its employees in a

federal court for civil rights violations, a plaintiff must rely

on statutory provisions that permit individuals to seek relief in

federal court. Title 42, Section 1983, of the United States

Code, under which Plaintiff brings this cause of action, provides

in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

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States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.... 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against a person

who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights

guaranteed under the Constitution.” Henderson v. City of Simi

Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.2002).

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under Section 1983. Haugen v. Brosseau,

339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611

(1978)). “[T]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of

1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend

municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Monell, 436 U.S. at

690. Local governments can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or

injunctive relief where such suits arise out of unconstitutional

actions that implement or execute a “policy statement, ordinance,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s

officers....” Id. 690-1. If no official policy exists, “customs

and usages” may fulfill this element of a § 1983 claim against a

local government. Id.

A local government's liability is limited, however. 

Although a local government can be held liable for its official

policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s

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actions outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “A

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “A local government may not be sued

under [Section] 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its law-makers or

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an

entity is responsible under [Section] 1983." Id. at 694.

To prevail on a Section 1983 complaint against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: (1) the local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2)

the violation must be a part of policy or custom and may not be

an isolated incident; and (3) a nexus must link the specific

policy or custom to the plaintiff's injury. See Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690-92.

“[Section] 1983 claims against government officials in their

official capacities are really suits against the governmental

employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded.”

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir.2002) (citing

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v.

Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.1997)

(finding that "a suit against a state official in his official

capacity is no different from a suit against the [official's

office or the] State itself") (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of

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State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989)). “As the Supreme Court

has stated, ‘official-capacity suits ... generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167

F.3d 514, 524 n. 3 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at

165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and an

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham, 473

U.S. at 166).

Defendant Gonzales argues that Plaintiff has failed to

properly allege that the civil-rights violations of which he

complains are part of a policy or custom on the part of the

County, as he must do in order to assert a Monell claim against

Defendant Gonzales in his official capacity, and that Defendant

Gonzales is consequently entitled to dismissal. Mot. to Dismiss

at 7-8.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gonzales took part in a

broad-based conspiracy to violate the First Amendment rights of

those who challenged the advisability of projects advocated by

Defendant Keene in her official capacity, which was known to an

acquiesced in by the County Board of Supervisors, and her

political supporters; and that this conspiracy resulted in the

violations of Plaintiff’s state and federal civil rights to free

speech and petition for redress of grievances. Mot. in Opp. at

6. 

The motion to dismiss the Second Cause of Action is DENIED. 

2. The Fifth Cause of Action

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a. Failure to State a Claim under California Civil Code Section

52.1

California Civil Code Section 52.1 provides, in relevant

part:

If a person or persons, whether or not acting under

color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or

coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or

enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or

laws of this state . . . [said individual or

individuals] may institute and prosecute in his or her

own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action

for damages, including, but not limited to, damages

under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other

appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable

exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (a), (b). 

Gonzales mis-characterizes Plaintiff’s allegations against

him by stating that, “[t]he only allegations contained within

Plaintiff’s Complaint pertaining to [Defendant Gonzales] arise

directly and solely from Plaintiff’s employment relationship with

the Planada CDC.” Because the Unruh Civil Rights Act, of which

California Civil Code Section 52.1 is a part, does not apply to

employment discrimination, Defendant Gonzales argues, the

provision is inapplicable, and the Fifth Cause of Action must be

dismissed. Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10; Reply in Supp. at 7-8.

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In response, Plaintiff re-iterates that his allegations

against Defendant Gonzales are not limited to adverse employment

actions, but also include harassment, intimidation, and

participation in Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest, for the purpose of

depriving him of his First Amendment rights. Mot. in Opp. at 7. 

Taking these allegations as true, as the court must do on a

motion to dismiss, the claims survive. The motion to dismiss the

fifth claim is denied. 

b. Defendant Gonzales’ Motion to Strike Under the Anti-SLAPP

Statute (California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gonzales participated in a

conspiracy to chill the valid exercise of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for

redress of grievances. Plaintiff alleges that actions taken in

furtherance of this conspiracy included using Merced County

Sheriff’s Deputies, acting in their official capacities, to

intimidate Defendant Keene’s political opposition during sessions

of the Planada CDC, and procuring the unlawful arrest of

Plaintiff, the latter accompanied by the application of excessive

force. 

Defendant Gonzales argues that the Fifth Cause of Action is

a “strategic” lawsuit intended by the Plaintiff to deter

Defendant Gonzales in the exercise of his First Amendment rights,

and as such ought to be stricken pursuant to California Code of

Civil Procedure Section 425.16, the “Anti-SLAPP” statute.

Section 425.16 provides in relevant part:

A cause of action against a person arising from any act

of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of

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petition or free speech under the United States or

California Constitution in connection with a public

issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike,

unless the court determines that the plaintiff has

established that there is a probability that the

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a

person’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States or California Constitution in connection

with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral

statement or writing made before a legislative,

executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other

official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written

or oral statement or writing made in connection with an

issue under consideration or review by a legislative,

executive, or judicial body, or any other official

proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral

statement or writing made in a place open to the public

or a public forum in connection with an issue of public

interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of

the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or

the constitutional right of free speech in connection

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1) & (e). 

A court considering a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP

statute must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, a defendant

must make an initial prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s

suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s rights

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of petition or free speech. The defendant need not show that the

plaintiff’s suit was brought with the intent to chill the

defendant’s speech; the plaintiff’s intentions are ultimately

beside the point. Similarly, the defendant bringing a motion to

strike need not show that any speech was actually chilled. 

Second, once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on the challenged claims. If the court determines

that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability

that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, the motion to

strike must be denied. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

A defendant who files a special motion to strike bears the

initial burden of demonstrating that the challenged cause of

action “aris[es] from” protected activity. Brill Media Co. v.

TCW Group, Inc. 132 Cal.App.4th 324, 329, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 371

(2005); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1). As the California

Supreme Court has observed, however, “the ‘arising from’

requirement is not always easily met.” Equilon Enterprises v.

Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 66, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52

P.3d 685 (2002). A cause of action does not “arise from”

protected activity simply because it is filed after protected

activity took place. City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69,

76-77, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695 (2002). Nor does the

fact “[t]hat a cause of action arguably may have been triggered

by protected activity” necessarily mean that it arises from such

activity. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th at 78, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52

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P.3d 695. The trial court must instead focus on the substance of

the plaintiff’s lawsuit in analyzing the first prong of a special

motion to strike. Scott v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc. 115

Cal.App.4th 404, 413-414, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (2004); see Cashman,

29 Cal.4th at 78, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695. In

performing this analysis, the California Supreme Court has

stressed, “the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of

action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the

defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” Cashman, 29

Cal.4th at 78, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695 (emphasis in

original). In other words, “the defendant’s act underlying the

plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in

furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” Id. “The

anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the

plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity

that gives rise to his or her asserted liability – and whether

that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” 

Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52

P.3d 703 (2002).

Defendant Gonzales argues that “the gravamen of Plaintiff’s

claims against [Defendant Gonzales] emanate[s] from [Defendant

Gonzales’] Motion [sic] to remove Plaintiff from his position as

Program Director for the Planada CDC.” Reply in Supp. at 8. 

The court must focus, however, on the activity which the

Plaintiff alleges gave rise to Defendant Gonzales’ liability, in

order to determine whether it was an act in furtherance of

Defendant Gonzales’ right of petition or free speech. Navellier,

29 Cal.4th at 92; Cashman, 29 Cal.4th at 78. 

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Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Defendant

Gonzales participated in a conspiracy to retaliate against the

Plaintiff for the Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment

rights, and that this conspiracy eventuated in, inter alia,

conduct against Plaintiff to effect his unlawful arrest and

physical abuse at the hands of the arresting officer, to chill

Plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment rights. Such activity

does not qualify as acts in furtherance of Defendant Gonzales’

right of petition or free speech, as defined by subsection (e) of

the statute. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(1)-(4). The

motion under the anti-SLAPP statute must be DENIED. 

c. Under Color of State Law

In his reply in support of the motion to dismiss, Defendant

Gonzales adds the argument that the Fifth Cause of Action should

be dismissed because it does not properly allege that Defendant

Gonzales was acting under color of state law. Reply at 3. Since

Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code expressly does not

require that the actor act under color of law, this argument is

meritless. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (“whether or not acting under

color of law”). 

d. Not Acting as a Government Agent

Defendant Gonzales’ reply also contends that Plaintiff has

failed to properly allege that Defendant Gonzales was acting as

the agent of a governmental entity or that his alleged conduct

was part of or had a direct causal link to a governmental

entity’s systematic policy of discrimination. Reply at 6.

This argument lacks merit because Section 52.1 does not

require government agency. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; Jones v. Kmart

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Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329 (1998) (Section 52.1 authorizes suit

against anyone who interferes with the exercise or enjoyment of

rights under federal or state law). 

3. The Seventh Cause of Action

The Seventh Cause of Action alleges that the Defendants’

alleged conspiracy, under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff

of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

Plaintiff sues them pursuant to Title 42, Section 1983 of the

United States Code. Complaint, ¶¶ 71-73.

The reply advances three grounds for dismissal of this cause

of action: (a) that Plaintiff has not properly alleged that

Defendant Gonzales was acting under color of state law, Reply at

3-4; (b) that Defendant Gonzales’ alleged actions are immune from

suit under legislative immunity, Reply at 4-6; (c) that Plaintiff

has failed to properly allege that Defendant Gonzales was acting

as the agent of a governmental entity or that his alleged conduct

was part of or had a direct causal link to a governmental

entity’s systematic policy of discrimination, Reply at 6-7. 

a. Under Color of State Law

This argument has been addressed in the context of the

joint-conduct analysis of the Second Cause of Action.

b. Legislative Immunity

This argument has also been addressed in the context of the

Second Cause of Action.

c. Governmental Entity

This argument presents nothing new and is disposed of by the

analysis of the Second Cause of Action.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Gonzales’ motions to

dismiss and to strike are DENIED. 

SO ORDERED

DATED: January 10, 2006

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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