Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01219/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ted Cady
Petitioner
Dominion Transmission, Inc.
Intervenor for Respondent
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Franz Gerner
Petitioner
Tammy Mangan
Petitioner
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Community, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 2014 Decided April 24, 2015 

No. 13-1219 

MYERSVILLE CITIZENS FOR A RURAL COMMUNITY, INC., ET 

AL., 

PETITIONERS

v. 

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 

RESPONDENT

DOMINION TRANSMISSION, INC., 

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of Orders of the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

Carolyn Elefant argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

petitioners. 

Karin L. Larson, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With her on 

the brief were David L. Morenoff, Acting General Counsel, 

and Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor. 

Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for intervenor. On 

the brief were J. Patrick Nevins, Christopher T. Handman, 

and Sean Marotta. 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 1 of 44
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Before: TATEL, MILLETT, and PILLARD, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Citizens of the small town of 

Myersville, in Frederick County, Maryland, oppose the 

construction of a natural gas facility called a compressor 

station in their town. The compressor station is a small part 

of a larger expansion of natural gas facilities in the 

northeastern United States proposed by Dominion 

Transmission, Inc., a regional natural gas company and 

Intervenor in this case. Dominion, which is in the business of 

storing and transporting natural gas, requested approval from 

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to move ahead 

with the project. The Commission, over the objections of the 

Myersville citizens, conditionally approved it in December 

2012. Dominion then fulfilled the Commission’s conditions, 

including obtaining a Clean Air Act permit from the 

Maryland Department of the Environment. Dominion built 

the station, and it has been operating for approximately six 

months. 

The Myersville citizens petition this court to vacate the 

Commission’s order approving the project. They attack the 

Commission’s decision on a number of fronts. They argue 

that the Commission lacked substantial evidence to conclude 

that there was a public need for the project Dominion 

proposed. They assert that the Commission unlawfully 

interfered with Maryland’s rights under the Clean Air Act. 

They challenge the Commission’s environmental review of 

the project, including its consideration of potential 

alternatives. And they claim the Commission unlawfully 

withheld hydraulic flow diagrams from them in violation of 

their due process rights. Because we conclude that each of 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 2 of 44
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Petitioners’ challenges lacks merit, we deny the petition for 

review. 

I. 

Dominion runs underground natural gas storage and 

transportation facilities in six northeastern and mid-Atlantic 

states. Dominion operates over 947 billion cubic feet of 

storage capacity and approximately 11,000 miles of natural 

gas pipeline. Before it sought the Commission’s approval, 

Dominion conducted an “open season” in which it offered 

contracts for future supply of natural gas to potential 

customers. It entered contracts with two municipal utilities 

and a natural gas distribution company for firm transportation 

and storage services.1

 Dominion’s proposed project, called 

the “Allegheny Storage Project,” called for new or expanded 

natural gas facilities in Maryland, Ohio, West Virginia, and 

Pennsylvania, thereby providing to Dominion’s customers an 

additional 115,000 dekatherms per day of firm transportation, 

7.5 billion cubic feet of storage capacity, and 125,000 

dekatherms per day of storage withdrawal at an estimated cost 

of over $112 million.2 

The Project required the building of two compressor 

stations—facilities along a pipeline that compress gas to move 

it through the system at high speeds—and additional pipeline 

to serve the compressors. One of those compressor stations is 

 

1

 “Firm” transportation service, as opposed to “interruptible” 

service, means the delivery of natural gas is guaranteed regardless 

of the proportion of the pipeline’s capacity that is in use. See 

United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1123 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 

1996). 

2

 A dekatherm is a unit of heat equal to one million British Thermal 

Units, or over one billion joules. 

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located on a twenty-one-acre plot in the town of Myersville. 

That compressor station is the subject of this appeal. 

Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 

821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq.), 

with the “principal purpose” of “encourag[ing] the orderly 

development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at 

reasonable prices,” NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 

662, 669-70 (1976). “[S]ubsidiary” purposes include 

respecting “conservation, environmental, and antitrust” 

limitations. Id. at 670 & n.6. The Act vests the Commission 

with authority to regulate the transportation and sale of 

natural gas in interstate commerce, including authority to 

issue certificates permitting the construction or extension of 

natural gas transportation facilities, such as those Dominion 

operates. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). 

Before any applicant may construct or extend natural gas 

transportation facilities, it must obtain a “certificate of public 

convenience and necessity” from the Commission pursuant to 

Section 7(c) of the Act. Id. § 717f(c)(1)(A). The 

Commission may issue a certificate to “any qualified 

applicant” if it finds that “the applicant is able and willing 

properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed 

. . . and that the proposed service” and “construction . . . is or 

will be required by the present or future public convenience 

and necessity.” Id. § 717f(e). As part of its certificate 

authority, the Commission has the “power to attach to the 

issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights 

granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as 

the public convenience and necessity may require.” Id. 

Petitioners in this case—Myersville Citizens for a Rural 

Community, Inc. and citizens of Myersville Franz Gerner, 

Ted Cady, and Tammy Mangan—protest the building of the 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 4 of 44
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Myersville compressor station. During the public comment 

process before the Commission, they raised objections, 

several of which form the basis of the current petition. 

After preparing an Environmental Assessment of the 

Allegheny Storage Project, the Commission rejected the 

objections made by Petitioners and others and granted 

Dominion a conditional Section 7 certificate. Dominion 

Transmission, Inc., 141 FERC ¶ 61,240 (Dec. 20, 2012) 

(“Certificate Order”). The Commission conditioned the 

certificate, in part, on Dominion’s ability to secure all 

necessary federal authorizations, including Clean Air Act 

permits. Certificate Order, App. B, Envtl. Condition 8. After 

considering renewed objections, the Commission denied 

rehearing. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 143 FERC ¶ 61,148 

(May 16, 2013) (“Rehearing Order”). The Myersville 

compressor station was placed into service on November 1, 

2014. FERC, Docket No. CP12-72, Supplemental 

Information Filing Replacing Previous filed In Service 

Notification Request of Dominion Transmission, Inc. under 

CP12-72 (filed Nov. 10, 2014). Petitioners timely petitioned 

for review of the Commission’s orders. 

*** 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). 

Our review of the Commission’s decision is limited to 

determining whether the order was “arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. 

& Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “If 

supported by substantial evidence, the Commission’s findings 

of fact are conclusive.” B&J Oil & Gas v. FERC, 353 F.3d 

71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)). We 

must assure ourselves that the Commission’s “decisionmaking 

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is reasoned, principled, and based upon the record.” Am. Gas 

Ass’n v. FERC, 593 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we consider “whether 

the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant 

factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” 

ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1083 

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Because the grant or denial of a Section 7 

certificate of public convenience and necessity is a matter 

“peculiarly within the discretion of the Commission,” Okla. 

Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 257 F.2d 634, 639 

(D.C. Cir. 1958), this court does not “substitute its judgment 

for that of the Commission,” Nat’l Comm. for the New River 

v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Moreover, 

“[w]hen considering FERC’s evaluation of ‘scientific data 

within its technical expertise,’ we afford FERC ‘an extreme 

degree of deference.’” Washington Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 

532 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Comm. for 

the New River, Inc., 373 F.3d at 1327). 

II. 

Petitioners challenge the Commission’s finding of public 

need for the Project as unsupported by substantial evidence. 

They fault the Commission for approving the Project without 

requiring Dominion to submit its revised agreements with the 

new natural gas customers that subscribed to the added 

capacity. They contend that the absence of current gas 

contracts in the record undermines the Commission’s finding 

that there is a public need for the Project adequate to ensure 

that pre-existing customers will not subsidize it. They also 

claim that the Project will result in an expansion of natural 

gas storage and transportation capacity beyond what 

Dominion disclosed to the Commission. 

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The Commission has outlined in a policy statement the 

criteria it considers in determining whether a proposed facility 

will receive a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 

Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline 

Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (Sept. 15, 1999), clarified, 90 

FERC ¶ 61,128 (Feb. 9, 2000), further clarified, 92 FERC 

¶ 61,094 (July 28, 2000). The “threshold” question the 

Commission considers is “whether the project can proceed 

without subsidies from [the applicant’s] existing customers.” 

88 FERC at 61,745. To ensure that a project will not be 

subsidized by existing customers, the applicant must show 

that there is market need for the project. The project must 

“stand on its own financially” through investment by the 

applicant and support from new customers subscribed to the 

expanded capacity through “preconstruction contracts.” Id. at 

61,746; see also 90 FERC at 61,392. 

Provided a project will not be subsidized by existing 

customers, the Commission then balances the “public benefits 

against the potential adverse consequences” of the proposal. 

88 FERC at 61,745. If no adverse effects would stem from 

the project, no balancing is required, and the Commission 

proceeds to environmental review. Otherwise, the 

Commission balances the adverse effects with the public 

benefits of the project, as measured by an “economic test.” 

Id. Adverse effects may include increased rates for preexisting customers, degradation in service, unfair competition, 

or negative impact on the environment or landowners’ 

property. Id. at 61,747-48. Public benefits may include 

“meeting unserved demand, eliminating bottlenecks, access to 

new supplies, lower costs to consumers, providing new 

interconnects that improve the interstate grid, providing 

competitive alternatives, increasing electric reliability, or 

advancing clean air objectives.” Id. at 61,748. 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 7 of 44
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Applying those criteria, the Commission found that the 

Project would not be subsidized by existing customers and 

that the “minimal” adverse effects were outweighed by the 

public benefits. Certificate Order ¶ 21. In finding a public 

need for the project, the Commission found that “[a]ll of the 

proposed capacity has been subscribed under long-term 

contracts, demonstrating the existence of a market for the 

project.” Id. The Commission concluded that the Project 

would ensure “the ability of two local distribution companies 

[Washington Gas Light Co. and Baltimore Gas & Electric] to 

meet the needs of their overall 1.5 million customers during 

periods of peak demand (i.e., the winter heating season),” 

providing “sufficient justification to authorize the 

construction and operation” of the Project. Id. ¶ 66. 

We review the Commission’s factual findings to ensure 

they are supported by “substantial evidence,” or “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Colo. Interstate Gas Co. 

v. FERC, 599 F.3d 698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). The 

standard “‘requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied 

by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.’” 

Minisink, 762 F.3d at 108 (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro 

LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

A. 

We first address the Commission’s finding that the 

Project was supported by market need. 

Dominion secured precedent agreements with three 

natural gas customers through the “open season” it conducted 

in the summer of 2007 for what was then called the “Storage 

Factory Project.” Certificate Order ¶ 10. A precedent 

agreement is a long-term contract subscribing to expanded 

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natural gas capacity. See, e.g., Process Gas Consumers Grp. 

v. FERC, 177 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Technical 

issues led Dominion to abandon the Storage Factory Project 

in November 2008. Certificate Order ¶ 10 n.8. It revised and 

renamed the project the Allegheny Storage Project. Id. 

Dominion stated in its application that its precedent 

agreements were revised to reflect the changes, and that the 

Allegheny Storage Project was designed “to meet the needs of 

the prospective Storage Factory Project customers.” Id. 

Dominion did not submit those revised precedent agreements 

to the Commission. Instead, it provided a summary of 

relevant terms of the original agreements and the affidavit of 

Dominion’s Director of Gas Business Development stating 

that the Allegheny Storage Project customers had executed 

“binding precedent agreements representing 100% market 

commitment” for fifteen years for the expanded capacity. 

J.A. 96-98. 

Petitioners argue that the Commission’s finding of 

market need was unsupported by substantial evidence because 

Dominion did not submit the revised precedent agreements 

themselves for the record. To the extent that Petitioners argue 

the Commission is legally required to include in the record the 

most current version of precedent agreements in order to find 

that a project is supported by market need, that argument was 

not preserved for appeal. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (“No 

objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered 

by the court unless such objection shall have been urged 

before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless 

there is reasonable ground for failure so to do.”). Petitioners 

did not argue before the Commission that it lacks the 

authority to find public need unless the most current 

precedent agreements, as distinct from other evidence of 

demand, are in the administrative record. The closest they 

came was in a request for rehearing, where, in a footnote, they 

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stated: “It should be noted that there do[ ] not appear to be 

even sample or generic precedent agreements available in the 

public record.” J.A. 467 n.20. That did not adequately raise 

the issue, and, in any case, we need not consider arguments 

“tucked away in a footnote” in a request for rehearing. North 

Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see 

also Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 

F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Petitioners nonetheless preserved the more case-specific 

version of the argument: that the absence of the updated 

precedent agreements from this particular administrative 

record rendered the Commission’s factual finding that the 

Project was fully subscribed unsupported by substantial 

evidence. Petitioners argued on rehearing that the agreements 

were “out of date” and that they “relate to a completely 

different project so at best, they demonstrate only a need for 

the Storage Factory Project, not for the [Allegheny Storage 

Project].” J.A. 467. In denying rehearing, the Commission 

addressed and rejected that argument. See Rehearing Order

¶ 30 n.29. It was therefore preserved for review. 

Petitioners’ challenge to the Commission’s finding of 

market need fails on the record even in the absence of the 

updated precedent agreements. In addition to the sworn 

affidavit stating that the Project was fully subscribed, the 

Commission had before it motions to intervene filed by the 

two customers subscribed to the new natural gas 

transportation service and the bulk of the storage service. J.A. 

123, 571. Both customers restated the amount of added 

capacity expected from the Project and identified themselves 

as the customers of that added capacity. While they did not 

identify how it would be allocated between them, Dominion’s 

customers nevertheless made clear under oath that they had 

subscribed to the capacity Dominion proposed to add to its 

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natural gas infrastructure. Consistent with its Certificate 

Policy Statement, and based on the evidence before it, the 

Commission concluded that Dominion had adequately 

demonstrated market need. Applying our standard of review, 

in light of the facts taken together, we conclude that the 

Commission’s finding was supported by substantial evidence, 

despite the absence of more specifics on the revised precedent 

agreements. 

Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, this case therefore does 

not resemble Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. v. FERC, 78 F.3d 

659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where we held that the agency 

could not rely on a report outside the record in defending its 

factual findings, nor does it present a lack of evidence or 

reasoned findings such as was at issue in Atlantic Refining 

Co. v. Public Service Commission, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). The 

Commission here does not attempt to rely on non-record 

evidence, nor did it lack sufficient evidence; instead, it argues 

that the affidavit and motions to intervene constituted 

substantial evidence to conclude that the Project was fully 

subscribed pursuant to precedent agreements. We agree. 

Even assuming the precedent agreements were executed 

and the Project is fully subscribed, Petitioners urge us to 

consider a market study showing declining demand for natural 

gas as evidence of insufficient market demand. The 

Commission considered that same study, but found that it did 

not warrant a finding of lack of public need for two reasons. 

First, for a variety of reasons related to the nature of the 

market, “it is Commission policy to not look behind precedent 

or service agreements to make judgments about the needs of 

individual shippers.” Certificate Order ¶ 66. In keeping with 

its policy, the Commission concluded that the evidence that 

the Project was fully subscribed was adequate to support the 

finding of market need. Rehearing Order ¶ 30. It is the case 

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here, as it was in Minisink, that “Petitioners identify nothing 

in the policy statement or in any precedent construing it to 

suggest that it requires, rather than permits, the Commission 

to assess a project’s benefits by looking beyond the market 

need reflected by the applicant’s existing contracts with 

shippers.” 762 F.3d at 111 n.10. 

Second, even if the market study were relevant, the 

Commission found it unpersuasive because the study 

“provide[s] general overviews of demand by sector (that is, 

residential vs. industrial consumption), as well as general 

overviews of domestic inventories which are tied to weather 

extremes. The studies do not demonstrate that there is a 

decline in demand for natural gas in the markets which the 

Allegheny Storage Project is intended to serve.” Rehearing 

Order ¶ 31. The petition does not respond to the 

Commission’s analysis. We therefore see no reason to disturb 

the Commission’s well reasoned finding. 

B. 

Petitioners also attack the Project as unsupported by 

market need because, in their view, there is evidence that 

Dominion designed the Project to add capacity to its natural 

gas infrastructure beyond the amount disclosed in its 

application—that is, that the Project would be “overbuilt.” 

Even assuming that the precedent agreements were executed 

by Dominion’s customers, Petitioners argue, the Project as 

proposed would produce excess capacity. 

To “[o]verbuild” an energy project means to “build 

capacity for which there is not a demonstrated market need.” 

90 FERC at 61,391. Petitioners have no clear evidence that 

the Project is overbuilt, but they believe there are grounds to 

infer that Dominion’s Myersville compressor station is larger 

and more powerful than it needs to be. In particular, they 

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argue that the 16,000 horsepower Myersville compressor 

station is more powerful than the 14,000 horsepower 

Middletown station originally proposed in connection with 

the Storage Factory Project—Dominion’s predecessor to the 

Allegheny Storage Project—and therefore is meant to provide 

more service than originally proposed. Petitioners provide no 

evidence beyond the difference in horsepower to substantiate 

that claim, and they do not explain how the size and power of 

a compressor station relates to the total capacity added to the 

natural gas network. 

As is evident from the structure of the natural gas system 

and the purpose of a compressor, a difference in horsepower 

does not necessarily mean a difference in storage and 

transportation capacity. A compressor station “‘boost[s] the 

system pressure’ along pipelines in order to ‘maintain 

required flow rates.’” Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. 

Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (alterations in 

original) (citing FERC, An Interstate Natural Gas Facility On 

My Land? What Do I Need To Know? 22 (2010)). Simply 

put, gas in a pipeline requires compression, or pressure, to 

keep it moving at desired rates. Given the capacity added by 

the Allegheny Storage Project to its pipeline network, 

Dominion identified a twelve-mile corridor between a 

compressor station in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and 

another in Leesburg, Virginia where a new compressor station 

would have to be sited in order to maintain adequate natural 

gas pressure. J.A. 236. The Commission “independently 

analyzed the hydraulic corridor and [Dominion’s] associated 

assumptions and determined that they were accurate for the 

12-mile range.” Id. 

Myersville falls along that twelve-mile corridor, as did 

several possible alternative sites the Commission considered 

in its Environmental Assessment, including some other sites 

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in Myersville. One of the alternatives was the site proposed 

in the Storage Factory Project for a compressor station in 

nearby Middletown, Maryland. The Commission’s 

Environmental Assessment demonstrates the many 

differences between the two proposed sites, including that the 

Middletown station would need a 14,000 horsepower 

compressor to maintain adequate pressure, whereas the 

Myersville station would need a 16,000 horsepower 

compressor due to its different placement. J.A. 237. 

Petitioners seek to compare the two compressors in a 

vacuum, without regard to their different geographic 

placements and other changes necessitated by Dominion’s 

overall shift from the original Storage Factory Project. The 

Myersville station is one of several interconnected facilities in 

a larger network, as was the proposed Middletown station. 

Petitioners have only pointed to the horsepower difference 

without explanation. The change in horsepower does not, 

however, provide a basis for this court to conclude that the 

Commission’s finding that the station is not overbuilt was 

unsupported by substantial evidence. A change in one aspect 

of one facility as a result of the revision of the Project says 

nothing about the overall storage and transportation capacity 

the Project will add to Dominion’s pipeline network. We see 

no basis upon which to overturn the Commission’s finding. 

Similarly, Petitioners’ claim that “Dominion intends to 

use the facility for a purpose other than that stated in its 

application,” i.e. “to export gas through Dominion’s Cove 

Point liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility in Calvert 

County, Maryland. Pet’rs’ Br. 29-30. Petitioners’ argument 

stems from their review of hydraulic flow diagrams filed 

confidentially with the Commission (and not in the record on 

appeal). They believe the flow diagrams demonstrate that 

natural gas that passes through Myersville will ultimately 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 14 of 44
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make it to the Cove Point LNG Terminal. If that is the case, 

they claim, it undermines Dominion’s application for a 

Section 7 certificate, which sought to expand domestic natural 

gas capacity, not add to Dominion’s export capacity. 

The Commission has repeatedly rejected Petitioners’ 

argument that the Project was built, at least in part, to export 

natural gas through Cove Point, concluding that the 

Allegheny Storage Project “is not associated in any way with 

the Cove Point LNG Terminal or potential export authority at 

the terminal.” Rehearing Order ¶ 33. First, in its Certificate 

Order, the Commission concluded that Petitioners’ reading of 

the flow diagrams “overlooks the fact that Washington Gas 

[one of the customers of the Allegheny Storage Project] has 

numerous delivery points off the Dominion Cove Point 

Pipeline,” which explains why the Cove Point Pipeline is 

associated with the Allegheny Storage Project. Certificate 

Order ¶ 161 n.109. It also noted that Petitioners’ reading was 

inaccurate because it sought to “compare design day 

(contractual obligation) flow with non-coincidental peak 

deliveries; such comparisons are not valid.” Id. In denying 

rehearing, the Commission further explained that 

[a]lthough a pipeline is constructed to meet contracted 

peak demands during periods of 100 percent load 

conditions, customers are not required to, and rarely 

do, use 100 percent of their contracted capacity every 

day of the year. This means that on any given day 

there may well be unutilized capacity in a pipeline. 

However, such capacity can be used to satisfy 

additional demand on an interruptible and short term 

firm basis. 

Rehearing Order ¶ 32. Acknowledging that Dominion had 

recently filed an application to, “among other things, 

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construct, modify, own and operate certain facilities to enable 

the liquefaction of natural gas for export at its existing Cove 

Point LNG terminal,” the Commission added that “Dominion 

Cove Point LNG’s application does not indicate that the 

Myersville Compressor Station is needed to support the 

export of the liquefied natural gas.” Id. ¶ 33 n.31. 

The Commission’s analysis is thorough and persuasive. 

In order to ensure adequate pressure during periods when all 

of the capacity required by the precedent agreements is being 

used, i.e., during periods of peak demand, a compressor 

station somewhere along the twelve-mile corridor that 

includes Myersville must be built. But, as Dominion 

explained at oral argument, natural gas molecules are not 

stamped with a destination when they enter an interstate 

pipeline. Oral Arg. Tr. 33. Nor can each molecule be traced 

from entry to exit. When the precedent agreement customers 

are not using their full capacity, and the compressor station is 

not working at full power, “there may well be unutilized 

capacity in a pipeline,” which could “satisfy additional 

demand on an interruptible and short term firm basis.” 

Rehearing Order ¶ 32. And because one of those customers, 

Washington Gas Light, has delivery points along a pipeline 

that ends at the Cove Point LNG terminal, when Washington 

Gas is not using full capacity, some gas that passes through 

Myersville may reach the Cove Point LNG Terminal. That 

does not imply that the compressor station is too large, 

because it says nothing about the horsepower needed to keep 

the system functioning when Dominion’s customers use all of 

their contractually guaranteed capacity. Those realities 

associated with fluctuating customer demand and the pooled 

character of gas within the pipeline system do not vitiate the 

public need for the Project. Petitioners provide no response to 

the Commission’s explanation of the flow diagrams, instead 

reiterating that the Commission has misread them. 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 16 of 44
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Petitioners also point to what they perceive to be new 

evidence in support of their contention that the Project’s 

capacity exceeds market need. After briefing in this case was 

completed, the Commission issued an order granting 

Dominion’s separate Cove Point application. Dominion Cove 

Point LNG, LP, 148 FERC ¶ 61,244, 2014 WL 4854467 

(Sept. 29, 2014). Petitioners submitted the Cove Point 

certificate order as supplemental authority for their argument 

that the Myersville compressor station is designed to help 

provide excess capacity to Cove Point for export, and hence, 

overbuilt. We disagree with Petitioners’ inference from the 

Cove Point order because that order is entirely consistent with 

the two orders we review in this case. 

After completion of the Cove Point LNG export project, 

the expansion or modification of existing compressor stations 

in Virginia, “together with the use of capacity from a 

terminated contract,” will enable Dominion to transport up to 

860,000 dekatherms per day of natural gas on a firm basis to 

the Cove Point terminal for export to customers it has already 

secured. Id. at *3. Commenters in that proceeding raised the 

question whether the Allegheny Storage Project will result in 

added capacity exported through Cove Point. The 

Commission reiterated the position it took in this case: The 

Allegheny Storage Project “significantly predated the Cove 

Point Liquefaction Project and is not in any way connected 

with it.” Id. at *56. It repeated that Washington Gas has 

delivery points located on the Cove Point Pipeline, that the 

Myersville compressor station is required for periods of peak 

demand, and that the Commission’s independent hydraulic 

analysis demonstrates that the two projects are separate and 

unrelated. Id. at *56-60. The Commission also 

acknowledged, as it did in this case, that during non-peak 

times, depending on a number of factors, Dominion “may be 

able to provide additional gas supplies, if nominated, to the 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 17 of 44
18 

Dominion Cove Point Pipeline for liquefaction. This situation 

is no different than operating conditions on other Commission 

regulated pipeline facilities.” Id. at *58. 

In sum, Petitioners have not shown that the Commission 

was required to disapprove the Myersville compressor station 

on the ground that it would be overbuilt. Faced with 

Petitioners’ challenge, we need only assure ourselves that the 

Commission’s decision making is “reasoned, principled, and 

based upon the record.” Am. Gas Ass’n, 593 F.3d at 19 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We review the 

Commission’s decision in light of its broad discretion in 

determining whether a particular project is supported by 

public convenience and necessity, see Okla. Natural Gas Co., 

257 F.2d at 639, and we must afford an “extreme degree of 

deference” to the Commission’s scientific analysis, 

Washington Gas Light, 532 F.3d at 930 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In light of the Commission’s well supported 

and thoroughly reasoned finding that the Myersville 

compressor station appropriately responds to market need and 

is not overbuilt, and Petitioners’ failure to adduce evidence 

convincingly contradicting that finding, we hold that the 

Commission’s decision to issue a Section 7 certificate of 

public convenience and necessity was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

III. 

The Natural Gas Act occupies the field of interstate 

natural gas transportation and sale, largely to the exclusion of 

state law. The Act confers on the Commission “exclusive 

jurisdiction” over transportation and sale, as well as over the 

rates and facilities of natural gas companies engaged in 

transportation and sale. See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR 

Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306-08 (1988); N. Natural Gas 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 18 of 44
19 

Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2004); 

Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 894 F.2d 

571, 576 (2d Cir. 1990). However, the Commission’s power 

to preempt state and local law is circumscribed by the Natural 

Gas Act’s savings clause, which saves from preemption the 

“rights of States” under the Clean Air Act and two other 

statutes.3

 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et 

seq. (Clean Air Act). Petitioners argue that the Commission’s 

issuance of a Section 7 certificate to Dominion conditioned on 

its subsequent receipt of an air quality permit under the Clean 

Air Act violated either provisions of the Natural Gas Act itself 

or provisions of the Clean Air Act that the Natural Gas Act’s 

savings clause preserved. 

The parties do not address the standard of review we 

should apply in evaluating the Commission’s authority to 

issue the challenged certificate of public convenience and 

necessity. We have previously reviewed the Commission’s 

interpretation of its authority to issue such a certificate by 

applying the two-step analytical framework of Chevron 

U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Okla. Natural 

Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994); N. 

Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 827 F.2d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). We find the Commission’s interpretation not only 

reasonable but persuasive and hold that its certificate order 

did not violate the savings clause or any of the other statutory 

provisions Petitioners identified. 

 

3

 The other two statutes are the Coastal Zone Management Act of 

1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq., and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1251 et seq.

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 19 of 44
20 

A. 

Dominion, as an intervenor in this proceeding, asserts 

that Petitioners lack “prudential standing” to argue that the 

Commission violated the Natural Gas Act’s savings clause. 

Petitioners live in Myersville near the compressor station and 

claim they are affected by its construction and operation 

because of the effect it will have on their property values, its 

impact on the environment, the safety hazards they believe the 

facility poses, the noise it produces, and the aesthetic 

“eyesore” it presents. See Pet’rs’ Br. 21-22 & add. 47-54. 

Dominion argues that Petitioners cannot complain about the 

Commission’s encroachment on Maryland’s Clean Air Act 

rights because they are not within the “zone of interests” of 

the savings clause they seek to enforce. We disagree. 

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lexmark Int’l, 

Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 

(2014), clarifies that “‘prudential standing is a misnomer’ as 

applied to the zone-of-interests analysis.” Id. (quoting Ass’n 

of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675-76 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J. concurring)). The zone of interests 

test simply “requires us to determine, using traditional tools of 

statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred 

cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” 

Id. “[W]e presume that a statutory cause of action extends 

only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of 

interests protected by the law invoked.” Id. at 1388 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The test is “lenient” and “not 

especially demanding.” Id. at 1389 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In addition, “we generally presume that a statutory 

cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are 

proximately caused by violations of the statute.” Id. at 1390. 

The petition before us easily fits within both of the 

presumptions Lexmark identifies, and, indeed, Dominion does 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 20 of 44
21 

not dispute that Petitioners’ claimed injuries are proximately 

caused by the Commission’s approval of the Project. 

Relying on our statement in Grand Council of Crees v. 

FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that the zone of 

interests is to be determined “‘by reference to the particular 

provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies,’” id. (quoting 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175-76 (1997)), Dominion 

argues that Petitioners “rely” on the Natural Gas Act’s 

savings clause in arguing that the Commission acted 

unlawfully. Because Petitioners’ interests fall outside the 

“rights of States” protected by the savings clause, asserts 

Dominion, they fail the zone of interests test. 

Dominion, however, understates the interests “arguably 

within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated” by 

the relevant provisions of the Natural Gas Act and the Clean 

Air Act. Id. at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

zone of interests test is not demanding. See id. at 955. A 

would-be plaintiff is outside the statute’s “zone of interests” 

only if “the plaintiff’s ‘interests are so marginally related to or 

inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it 

cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to 

permit the suit.’” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 

Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) 

(quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 

(1987)). Petitioners here rely on provisions focused primarily 

on the preservation of state and local authority in the fields of 

environmental and land use regulation, and it is precisely 

injuries in those domains that Petitioners assert. The statutory 

provision at issue, moreover, need not be intended to benefit 

Petitioners; it is sufficient that the interest asserted arguably 

falls within the provision’s scope. Id. at 2210 & n.7. The 

environmental injuries asserted by Petitioners suffice to bring 

a claim under the provisions of the Natural Gas Act and the 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 21 of 44
22 

Clean Air Act they cite. We are not empowered to decline for 

prudential reasons to hear their claim. 

Finally, we reject Dominion’s reliance on Delaware 

Department of Natural Resources & Environmental Control 

v. FERC, 558 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009), for the proposition 

that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. There, we held that 

Delaware lacked Article III standing because it asserted only 

a “procedural injury” that was not accompanied by a 

“concrete substantive interest.” Id. at 578-79. Importantly, 

Delaware identified no prejudice from the Commission’s 

having approved a project before Delaware had completed its 

regulatory process under the Coastal Zone Management Act 

and the Clean Air Act, other than the potential for “intense 

political pressure to acquiesce in the Commission’s 

conditional approval,” which we held was not a cognizable 

injury. Id. at 578. In contrast to Delaware, Petitioners in this 

case have alleged various concrete injuries that they contend 

flow from the siting of the compressor station, including 

depressed property values, increased noise and air pollution, 

visual blight, and heightened safety risks. Their claims are 

not merely political or procedural. Petitioners have asserted a 

cognizable injury in fact stemming from the allegedly 

unlawful approval of the Project that is redressable through 

judicial review of the Commission’s order. 

B. 

Turning to the merits, we begin by reviewing the 

regulatory background and Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. 

Summers, our earlier decision relating to the project at issue 

here. See 723 F.3d at 238. 

The Clean Air Act “is an exercise in cooperative 

federalism.” Id. at 240. The Environmental Protection 

Agency promulgates air quality standards, and the states, if 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 22 of 44
23 

they wish, adopt state implementation plans (SIPs) 

“‘providing for the implementation, maintenance, and 

enforcement of’” those air quality standards; “‘such plans are 

then submitted to EPA for approval.’” Id. (quoting Michigan 

v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 7410(a). Maryland’s SIP, incorporated by reference 

in the Code of Federal Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1070, 

includes Maryland Code Section 2-404, a provision of the 

state’s environmental law that governs permits to construct 

emissions sources such as the Myersville compressor station. 

Section 2-404(b)(1) prohibits the Maryland Department of the 

Environment (MDE) from accepting an application for an air 

quality permit unless the applicant submits documentation: 

(i) That demonstrates that the proposal has been 

approved by the local jurisdiction for all zoning and 

land use requirements; or 

(ii) That the source meets all applicable zoning and 

land use requirements. 

In the summer of 2012, pursuant to Section 2-404(b)(1), 

the MDE refused to process Dominion’s permit application 

because the compressor station had not “been approved by the 

local jurisdiction for all zoning and land use requirements” 

nor, in its view, had Dominion shown that the station “meets 

all applicable zoning and land use requirements.” Summers, 

723 F.3d at 241. Shortly thereafter, Myersville denied zoning 

approval for the proposed Myersville compressor station. Id.

at 241-42. The Commission then issued its certificate order 

conditionally approving the Project. Id. at 242. “[W]ith 

FERC’s certificate in hand, Dominion applied to the [MDE] 

once again for an air quality permit. Its cover letter stated it 

now satisfied § 2-404(b)(1) because all local zoning and land 

use requirements had been preempted by FERC’s certificate 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 23 of 44
24 

and were therefore not ‘applicable.’” Id. The MDE again 

refused to process the application. Id.

Dominion then petitioned this Court to review 

Maryland’s refusal to issue an air quality permit for a facility 

conditionally approved by the Commission. In Summers, we 

agreed with Maryland that Section 2-404(b)(1) formed a part 

of Maryland’s SIP. Id. Consequently, by virtue of the 

Natural Gas Act’s savings clause, we held that the 

Commission’s certificate order approving the Allegheny 

Storage Project did not preempt Section 2-404(b)(1), and that 

the MDE was entitled to enforce it. Id. at 243-44. 

We also held, however, that the MDE failed to enforce 

Section 2-404(b)(1) according to its terms. The MDE argued 

that it could refuse to process Dominion’s permit application 

until Myersville granted the compressor station zoning 

approval. Id. at 244. We disagreed because the Natural Gas 

Act requires a state agency “to issue, condition, or deny” 

permits that federal law requires for subject facilities, and not 

merely to refuse to act on a permit application. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 717r(d)(2). MDE contended that Dominion had not 

satisfied Maryland’s SIP because it had not shown that it had 

met all applicable zoning and land use requirements by 

merely submitting its own letter claiming compliance; a letter 

from the local authorities, it claimed, was necessary. 

Summers, 723 F.3d at 244. We held, however, that “the plain 

meaning of § 2-404(b) . . . expressly permits the applicant to 

avoid involvement by the local zoning authority altogether,” 

so requiring their written statement was contrary to law. Id. at 

244-45. We reasoned that the use of the phrase “meets all 

applicable zoning and land use requirements,” as an 

alternative to the subsection specifically referencing local 

approval, admitted the possibility that some such 

requirements might be satisfied other than by obtaining 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 24 of 44
25 

affirmative approval from the local authorities. Id. at 245. 

Dominion’s documentation might, for example, show that it 

had in fact met all the local requirements. We also considered 

the possibility that Section 2-404(b)(1)(ii) might, despite the 

savings clause preserving the “rights of States” under the 

Clean Air Act, be designed to invite some amount of 

preemption of those rights by the Natural Gas Act, rendering 

any preempted rights no longer “applicable.” It thus struck us 

as at least plausible that, as a matter of Maryland law, 

Dominion might, without local approval in hand, “meet” all 

or some of whatever local requirements were “applicable.” 

Id. We held that the MDE could not refuse to process an 

application without first evaluating which local laws were 

“applicable,” and which were not. Id.

Importantly, however, we declined to determine in the 

first instance the scope of any preemption that may have been 

effected by the Commission’s certificate order. In its order, 

the Commission had done the same thing, choosing to defer to 

Maryland to determine whether the Commission’s order had 

any effect on the applicability of Myersville’s local zoning 

laws. See Certificate Order ¶ 71. We thus remanded to the 

MDE to “either identify one or more ‘applicable’ (that is, not 

preempted) zoning or land use requirements with which 

Dominion has not demonstrated compliance, or . . . process 

Dominion’s application for an air quality permit.” Summers, 

723 F.3d at 245. 

On remand, the MDE concluded that the “only 

Myersville zoning or land use regulation that is applicable, 

i.e., not preempted by the Natural Gas Act, is a requirement 

for submission of a construction site plan to the Town.” 

Resp. to Comments for the Dominion Transmission, Inc. 

Natural Gas Compressor Station, Md. Dept. Env. Docket No. 

20-13, Permit Nos. 021-0707-5-0460 & -0461, at 3-4 (Jan. 16, 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 25 of 44
26 

2014), available at http://www.mde.state.md.us/programs 

/Permits/AirManagementPermits/Documents/DTIResponseto

Comments%20(1).pdf. Because Dominion had complied with 

the site plan requirement, the MDE processed Dominion’s air 

quality permit application; the MDE then approved the 

application and issued an air quality permit on June 10, 2014.4

 

Dominion Rule 28(j) Letter, Ex. A (filed June 24, 2014). 

 

4

 The issuance of the air quality permit, after briefing in this case, 

rendered moot two arguments Petitioners made based on the Clean 

Air Act. First, they argued that the Commission could not approve 

a facility before an air quality permit issued because, if the state 

were to deny the requisite permit, the facility “may never be built.” 

Pet’rs’ Br. 32. Second, they argued that the Commission could not 

measure the compressor station’s potential to emit based on a 6000 

hour-per-year limitation that had not been incorporated into an 

enforceable air quality permit. Pet’rs’ Br. 36. The air quality 

permit that the MDE has now issued for the construction of the 

Myersville compressor station incorporated that 6000 hour-per-year 

limitation. Both of those arguments are now moot. See, e.g., 

Schering Corp. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 

(citing Los Angeles Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). To 

the extent that Petitioners challenge the Commission’s assessment 

of the compressor station’s air quality impact more generally, the 

Commission’s Environmental Assessment reflects that the 

Commission reviewed modeling performed by Dominion and 

agreed that, for a range of pollutants, the Myersville compressor 

station would not have a significant air quality impact or would 

otherwise be below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 

See Certificate Order ¶ 111, J.A. 206-07. Other than the now moot 

objection to the 6000 hours-per-year cap, Petitioners do not 

meaningfully challenge that analysis. 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 26 of 44
27 

C. 

Petitioners point to two statutory bases for their challenge 

to the Commission’s ability to issue a Section 7 certificate 

conditioned on an applicant’s subsequent receipt of the 

requisite air quality permit. Neither supports their argument. 

First, they note that, to issue a certificate of public 

convenience and necessity, the Commission must conclude 

that the applicant is “able and willing properly to do the acts 

and to perform the service proposed and to conform to the 

provisions of this chapter and the requirements, rules, and 

regulations of the Commission thereunder.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 717f(e). That provision requires nothing more than a 

finding that the applicant is “able and willing” to comply with 

the Natural Gas Act and the “requirements, rules, and 

regulations” promulgated thereunder. Petitioners have not 

identified any requirement under the Natural Gas Act that 

Dominion could not satisfy. As for the Clean Air Act permit 

specifically, it is clear that Dominion was “able and willing” 

to do so; indeed, it did. 

Second, Petitioners claim that the Commission’s 

certificate “undermines the Clean Air Act as well,” because 

the Clean Air Act “expressly preserves local authority.” 

Pet’rs’ Br. 34. But the provision on which they rely, 42 

U.S.C. § 7431, states only that “[n]othing in [the Clean Air 

Act] constitutes an infringement on the existing authority of 

counties and cities to plan or control land use.” It does not 

purport to constrain the Commission beyond the constraints 

already provided by the Natural Gas Act and the Clean Air 

Act.5

 

5

 An arguably relevant provision of the Clean Air Act, cited only by 

the Commission, is 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1), which provides that 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 27 of 44
28 

The lack of those claimed legal prohibitions against the 

Commission issuing a conditional certificate does not resolve 

what effect, if any, that certificate might have on Maryland’s 

decision whether and on what terms to issue an air quality 

permit. The Commission’s power to preempt state and local 

regulation by approving the construction of natural gas 

facilities is limited by the Natural Gas Act’s savings clause, 

which provides that the Natural Gas Act’s terms must not be 

construed to “affect[] the rights of States” under the Clean Air 

Act. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(2). Invoking our decision in 

Summers, Petitioners assert that the Commission affected 

Maryland’s Clean Air Act rights because its certificate order 

preempted then-“applicable” zoning and land use 

requirements, removing them as obstacles to Dominion’s air 

quality permit. Had the Commission’s conditional certificate 

not issued unless and until Maryland granted the requisite 

Clean Air Act permit, Petitioners argue, Dominion could not 

have secured the permit. In thus “affect[ing] the rights of” 

Maryland under the Clean Air Act, contend Petitioners, the 

Commission violated the savings clause. 

 

“[n]o department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal 

Government shall engage in, support in any way or provide 

financial assistance for, license or permit, or approve, any activity 

which does not conform to an implementation plan after it has been 

approved or promulgated under section 7410 of this title.” It 

appears the Commission decided that it was not required to perform 

a § 7506 general conformity determination. J.A. 211-12. 

Petitioners have not challenged that decision, so we decline to 

address it and express no opinion on whether § 7506 affects the 

Commission’s authority to issue Section 7 certificates conditioned 

on the receipt of air quality permits. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 93.153 

(applicability of conformity determination requirement), 93.158 

(criteria for determining conformity). 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 28 of 44
29 

We conclude that the effect Petitioners complain of is 

illusory, premised on a misunderstanding of our Summers 

decision, the statutory scheme, and the operation of 

preemption in this case. While Petitioners claim that the 

Commission’s Section 7 certificate had the effect of 

unlawfully influencing the MDE’s consideration of 

Dominion’s application for an air quality permit, their 

objections largely boil down to a challenge to the MDE’s

decision regarding the preemptive interaction between the 

certificate and the relevant provisions of Maryland law, not to 

the Commission’s freestanding authority to issue a 

conditional certificate. The propriety of the MDE’s decision, 

however, is not properly before this court. 

Maryland’s rights under the Clean Air Act are those that 

it can exercise under its SIP.6

 Cf. AES Sparrows Point LNG, 

LLC v. Smith, 527 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding 

“rights of States” under Coastal Zone Management Act are 

those rights that states can “exercise” under their Coastal 

Management Plans, analogues to Clean Air Act SIPs). While 

the Commission’s certificate order set forth the preemption 

standard as the Commission understands it, the Commission 

did not purport to preempt any local law, nor any portion of 

Maryland’s SIP. Indeed, it did not even identify whether any 

conflict with state or local law existed, as it explicitly 

declined to interpret “local, state and federal laws that are 

outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction.” Certificate Order 

¶ 71 (“[T]he Maryland state and local agencies retain full 

authority to grant or deny air quality permits; if the State of 

 

6

 To the extent Petitioners’ claim rests on an assumption that the 

“rights of States” under the Clean Air Act extend beyond their 

power to enforce the provisions of their SIPs, no party has briefed 

the argument, and we decline to address it. See Ark Las Vegas Rest. 

Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 108 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 29 of 44
30 

Maryland rejects [Dominion’s] air quality permit application, 

or refuses to process it, then it is up to [Dominion] to 

determine how it wishes to proceed.”). In addition, the 

Commission conditioned the certificate on Dominion’s ability 

to secure all necessary federal authorizations, including the 

requisite federal Clean Air Act air quality permit obtainable 

from the MDE. Certificate Order, App. B, Env’l Condition 8. 

We, too, declined in Summers to determine the scope of 

any preemption that might have been effectuated by the 

Commission’s certificate order. We recognized that Section 

2-404(b)(1) is part of Maryland’s SIP, and therefore saved 

from preemption. We also decided, however, that the MDE 

was “better situated” to interpret the SIP and determine in the 

first instance the scope of the Natural Gas Act’s preemptive 

footprint and the extent to which local land use and zoning 

law is incorporated into Maryland’s SIP, and thereby shielded 

from preemption by the Natural Gas Act’s savings clause. 

723 F.3d at 245. 

In Summers, Dominion argued that Section 2-

404(b)(1)(ii) does not incorporate any local land use laws in a 

way that would save them from preemption by the 

Commission. Rather, Dominion argued, the provision refers 

only to “applicable” laws because it anticipates the possibility 

that some laws will not be “applicable” by virtue of 

preemption. Petitioners read the word “applicable” as it 

appears in Section 2-404(b)(1)(ii) more broadly. Under 

Petitioners’ view, Maryland’s SIP incorporates Maryland’s 

zoning and land use requirements wholesale, saving them 

from preemption by the Commission. Advancing that view, 

Petitioners are participating in a challenge in Maryland state 

court to the MDE’s decision to process Dominion’s air quality 

permit application. See Oral Arg. Tr. 18. 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 30 of 44
31 

We decline here, as we did in Summers, to address which 

interpretation of Section 2-404(b)(1)(ii) is correct, because it 

makes no difference in this case. The Commission’s 

certificate order has no bearing on what is and is not included 

in Maryland’s SIP, and therefore has no bearing on what are 

or are not Maryland’s “rights” saved by the Natural Gas Act’s 

clause preserving the “rights of States” under the Clean Air 

Act. The Commission did not “force[] MDE to accept an air 

quality permit application which would have otherwise been 

deemed deficient.” Pet’rs’ Br. 34. Nor did we. 

Regardless of how the scope of Section 2-404(b)(1) is 

accurately described, the Commission did not act unlawfully 

in granting a conditional certificate order. Correctly 

understood, Petitioners’ complaint appears to be not with the 

certificate order as such, but with the MDE’s interpretation of 

its SIP in the wake of Summers and the certificate order. If 

Petitioners are right that the SIP’s reference to Section 2-

404(b)(1)(ii) saves Myersville’s zoning and land use laws 

from preemption, it was the MDE, not the Commission, that 

erred by treating the Commission’s certificate order as 

preempting more than, by hypothesis, it lawfully could. 

Conversely, if the MDE correctly concluded that the SIP does 

not, under the circumstances here, require compliance with 

Myersville’s zoning laws, then, by the same token, the 

Commission did not exceed its statutory authority. In any 

event, the certificate order did not affect Maryland’s Clean 

Air Act rights. Under either interpretation, the certificate 

order has only whatever preemptive force it can lawfully 

exert, and no more. It did not purport to contravene the 

Natural Gas Act’s savings clause. Nor did it purport to 

compel the MDE’s interpretation of Maryland’s SIP. 

The precise scope of Maryland’s SIP and the preemptive 

effect of the Commission’s order is not before us. Petitioners 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 31 of 44
32 

may continue to challenge the MDE’s conclusion on that 

score in the appropriate forum. We are called on to decide 

only whether it was lawful for the Commission to approve the 

Allegheny Storage Project subject to its compliance with 

Maryland’s Clean Air Act permitting process. Because no 

provision of the Natural Gas Act or the Clean Air Act 

identified by Petitioners barred the Commission from issuing 

a conditional Section 7 certificate under these circumstances, 

and the preemptive effect of that decision in light of the 

interaction of the two Acts and Maryland’s SIP is not properly 

before us, we hold that Petitioners’ challenges must be 

rejected. 

IV. 

Petitioners claim error in the Commission’s performance 

of its obligations under the National Environmental Policy 

Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 

U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.), which requires federal agencies to 

“consider fully the environmental effects of their proposed 

actions.” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 

661 F.3d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Any proposed “major Federal action[] significantly 

affecting the quality of the human environment” triggers in an 

agency the obligation to prepare an Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS) discussing in detail the environmental impact 

of the proposed action, alternatives to the action, and other 

considerations. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). An agency may 

preliminarily prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) to 

determine whether the more rigorous EIS is required. See 40 

C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9. An EIS is unnecessary if an 

agency makes a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) 

on the human environment; a FONSI discharges the agency’s 

NEPA documentation obligations. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9(a)(1), 

1508.13; 18 C.F.R. § 380.2(g). An agency’s NEPA 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 32 of 44
33 

obligations are “essentially procedural.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear 

Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). NEPA 

does not require any particular substantive result. Id.; see also

Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 661 F.3d at 68. 

Here, the Commission prepared an Environmental 

Assessment of the Allegheny Storage Project. Finding that 

the Project “would not constitute a major federal action 

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” 

the Commission prepared a FONSI and declined to prepare an 

EIS. J.A. 242. Petitioners challenge the Commission’s 

Environmental Assessment, arguing that it failed adequately 

to consider alternatives, that it failed fully to consider the 

impact on local residents’ property values, and that it 

unlawfully segmented its environmental review of the 

Allegheny Storage Project and Dominion’s Cove Point LNG 

export terminal, which Petitioners contend the Commission 

should have reviewed together as a single project. 

We overturn an agency decision under NEPA only if it is 

arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or if the 

agency has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of the 

statute. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 661 F.3d at 

72. To issue a FONSI and decline to prepare an EIS, an 

agency must have concluded that “there would be no 

significant impact or have planned measures to mitigate such 

impacts.” Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 

F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Our role in reviewing an 

agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS is a “‘limited’” one, 

“designed primarily to ensure ‘that no arguably significant 

consequences have been ignored.’” TOMAC v. Norton, 433 

F.3d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l 

Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256, 267 (D.C. Cir. 

1988)). We ask “whether the agency ‘(1) has accurately 

identified the relevant environmental concern, (2) has taken a 

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34 

hard look at the problem in preparing its EA, (3) is able to 

make a convincing case for its finding of no significant 

impact, and (4) has shown that even if there is an impact of 

true significance, an EIS is unnecessary because changes or 

safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a 

minimum.’” Mich. Gambling, 525 F.3d at 29 (quoting 

TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 861). In both the EA and EIS contexts, 

this court applies a “rule of reason” to an agency’s NEPA 

analysis and has repeatedly refused to “flyspeck” the agency’s 

findings in search of “any deficiency no matter how minor.” 

Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 

see also Minisink, 762 F.3d at 112.

A. 

An Environmental Assessment must include a “brief 

discussion[]”of reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b). An alternative is “‘reasonable’ if it is 

objectively feasible as well as ‘reasonable in light of [the 

agency’s] objectives.’” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation 

P’ship, 661 F.3d at 72 (alterations in original) (quoting City of 

Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see 

also 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(b) (defining “reasonable alternatives” 

in the context of an EIS as those alternatives “that are 

technically and economically practical or feasible and meet 

the purpose and need of the proposed action”). The 

Commission’s specification of the range of reasonable 

alternatives is entitled to deference. Citizens Against 

Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Although a consideration of alternatives is required regardless 

of whether the agency issues a FONSI, the relevant 

regulations provide that the consideration of alternatives in an 

Environmental Assessment need not be as rigorous as the 

consideration of alternatives in an EIS. Compare 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.9(b) (requiring “brief discussion[]” of alternatives in 

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35 

an EA) with id. § 1502.14(a) (requiring agency to 

“[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable 

alternatives” when EIS required). See also Envtl. Prot. Info. 

Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(“[A]n agency’s obligation to consider alternatives under an 

EA is a lesser one than under an EIS”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n-W. v. Rowan, 

463 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he range of 

alternatives that the [agency] must consider decreases as the 

environmental impact of the proposed action becomes less 

and less substantial.”) (second alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Mt. Lookout-Mt. Nebo Prop. Prot. 

Ass’n v. FERC, 143 F.3d 165, 172 (4th Cir. 1998); Friends of 

Ompompanoosuc v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1549, 1558 (2d Cir. 

1992); Olmsted Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. United States, 

793 F.2d 201, 208 (8th Cir. 1986); River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. 

Corps of Engineers of U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 

1985). 

Petitioners claim that the Environmental Assessment 

lacks adequate consideration of two alternatives—an “existing 

pipeline” alternative and a “looping” alternative.7

 On both 

counts, Petitioners mischaracterize the Environmental 

Assessment, which considered and rejected both alternatives, 

adequately discharging the Commission’s NEPA obligations. 

First, Petitioners argue that “there are numerous other 

pipeline systems in the region that could be used to meet” the 

needs of Dominion’s customers. Pet’rs’ Br. 40. The 

Commission’s Environmental Assessment rejected the 

 

7

 Although Petitioners also discuss the alternative of an electric 

compressor three times in passing, see Pet’rs’ Br. 6, 15, 20, they do 

not make any argument specific to that alternative, so we decline to 

address it. 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 35 of 44
36 

proposition that there was existing, unused capacity that could 

satisfy the new demand. J.A. 233 (apart from alternatives 

considered in EA, the Commission “did not identify any other 

existing pipeline systems in the region that could provide the 

capacity of the Project.”). Petitioner Ted Cady, seeking 

rehearing, listed five pipeline systems that he believed had 

sufficient unused capacity. J.A. 416-17. His request for 

rehearing provided no explanation or technical analysis, 

however, relating to whether those pipelines are fully 

subscribed, for example, or whether they are located so as to 

be able to serve Dominion’s customers. Because the record is 

devoid of evidence that the Commission unreasonably 

concluded that the construction of new facilities was needed 

to meet demand, and that the use of existing pipelines was not 

feasible, we decline to second-guess the Commission. The 

Commission’s consideration of the “existing pipeline” 

alternative in its Environmental Assessment was adequate. 

Second, Petitioners argue that the Commission 

inadequately considered the “looping” alternative, which 

would have involved a thirty-mile loop of pipeline rather than 

a compressor station in Myersville. The Commission rejected 

the looping alternative because building it would disturb more 

land than would building the compressor station. See J.A. 

234. In the Commission’s view, a pipeline loop “would cause 

a greater environmental disturbance” than would the 

compressor station, so the loop was “not an environmentally 

preferable” alternative. Id. Petitioners claim the 

Commission’s finding was flawed because the loop would 

cost only $2 million more than the compressor station, but 

would result in no emissions. NEPA, however, does not 

require a general focus “on the monetary costs and benefits of 

the respective proposals . . . particularly where only an 

environmental assessment, rather than an environment impact 

statement, is involved.” Minisink, 762 F.3d at 112; see

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 36 of 44
37 

Webster v. USDA, 685 F.3d 411, 430 (4th Cir. 2012). And 

NEPA does not compel a particular result. Even if an agency 

has conceded that an alternative is environmentally superior, 

it nevertheless may be entitled under the circumstances not to 

choose that alternative. See Robertson v. Methow Valley 

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“If the adverse 

environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately 

identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by 

NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the 

environmental costs.”). 

Petitioners also assert that the Commission overestimated 

the amount of land that would be disturbed by the looping 

option. The Commission estimated 527 acres for construction 

and operation; Petitioners estimated 102. See J.A. 500. That 

challenge falls under the category of “flyspecking,” and 

encroaches on the deference to which the Commission is 

entitled for its technical analysis. The Commission stands by 

its estimate, and, in any case, responds that Petitioners’ lower 

estimate would not have changed its analysis, since it far 

outstrips the 21-acre land disturbance required for 

construction and operation of the Myersville compressor 

station. See Resp.’s Br. 35. The looping option would 

require a significantly greater amount of land than the 

compressor station, and would adversely affect the 

environment in other significant ways discussed in the 

Environmental Assessment. The Commission adequately 

considered, and rejected, the looping option. That was 

sufficient to discharge its NEPA obligations. 

B. 

Petitioners also argue that the Environmental Assessment 

failed to take a “hard look” at “quantifying the impacts of the 

project on property values and lost development 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 37 of 44
38 

opportunities” in Myersville. Pet’rs’ Br. 42. The definition 

of “hard look” may be “imprecise,” but we have explained 

that an agency has taken a “hard look” at the environmental 

impacts of a proposed action if “‘the statement contains 

sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and opposing 

viewpoints,’ and . . . the agency’s decision is ‘fully informed’ 

and ‘well-considered.’” Nevada, 457 F.3d at 93 (quoting 

NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 

In response to community concern about the Myersville 

station’s potential impact on property values, the 

Environmental Assessment noted that each purchaser of 

property has different criteria and values, but that, generally 

speaking, a compressor station could depress property values, 

particularly those of adjacent and nearby land. J.A. 200. 

Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that the Myersville 

compressor station “would not significantly reduce property 

or resale values” in Myersville because of the Commission’s 

recommendations for noise and visual screening. Id. Views 

of the compressor station would be significantly screened by 

natural vegetation both in summer and winter, and there 

would be “no perceptible operational noise from the 

compressor station at the nearest residences.” Id. Indeed, the 

compressor station would contribute less noise and vibration 

to the local area than is already produced by the portion of I70 running next to it. J.A. 218. 

The Commission also acknowledged the “lack of studies 

evaluating property values and aboveground natural gas 

facilities,” and that “the effects on property values are 

difficult to quantify.” J.A. 200. Seizing on that statement, 

Petitioners argue that the Commission should be required to 

do more to take into account the effects that safety concerns 

and pollution have on property values. But the Commission 

acknowledged three times, in the Environmental Assessment, 

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39 

in its certificate order, and in its order denying rehearing, that 

property values could be negatively affected by the 

compressor station. It chose nevertheless to approve the 

project because the negative impact was not “sufficient to 

alter our determination that the Myersville Compressor 

Station is required by the public convenience and necessity.” 

Certificate Order ¶ 104. 

In Minisink, we recently turned away a challenge similar 

to this one. The Commission acknowledged the Minisink

project’s adverse effects on property values but nevertheless 

approved it. Because the Environmental Assessment in 

Minisink “clearly addressed this issue,” and because the 

Commission concluded that some of those property-value 

effects could be mitigated through visual screening, we found 

the Environmental Assessment was adequate. 762 F.3d at 

112. The same is true here. “Though we can see how 

Petitioners may disagree with [the Commission’s] takeaway, 

their disagreement does not mean that the Commission failed 

to consider the issue altogether, as they suggest.” Id.

Petitioners also argue that the Commission should be 

required to take into account the impact on property values 

stemming from “preemption.” Pet’rs’ Br. 42-43. According 

to Petitioners, “[a]s a result of preemption, the Town of 

Myersville and its residents suffered a loss because a site that 

would have once sustained uses that would benefit the 

community has now been taken off the market by Dominion.” 

Id. at 43. It is not clear what independent effects on 

Petitioners’ property value they argue would stem from 

“preemption” as opposed to the construction and operation of 

the compressor station, which the Environmental Assessment 

evaluated, and we decline to guess. The Commission’s 

consideration of this issue was reasonable as well. See 

Rehearing Order ¶ 64. 

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40 

C. 

Finally, Petitioners reiterate their assertion that the 

“overbuilt” Allegheny Storage Project will produce excess 

natural gas capacity destined for export through Dominion’s 

Cove Point LNG terminal. By virtue of that alleged 

connection between the Project and Cove Point, Petitioners 

argue that the Commission should be required to review their 

environmental effects together.8

Under applicable NEPA regulations, the Commission is 

required to include “connected actions,” “cumulative actions,” 

and “similar actions” in an Environmental Assessment. 40 

C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)-(3). “An agency impermissibly 

‘segments’ NEPA review when it divides connected, 

cumulative, or similar federal actions into separate projects 

and thereby fails to address the true scope and impact of the 

activities that should be under consideration.” Del. 

Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose 

of this requirement is to prevent agencies from dividing one 

project into multiple individual actions each of which 

individually has an insignificant environmental impact, but 

which collectively have a substantial impact.” Hodel, 865 

F.2d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Connected 

actions” include actions that are “interdependent parts of a 

 

8

 We conclude that Petitioners’ argument is adequately preserved 

because it was raised below, if briefly, and the Commission 

addressed the issue in denying rehearing. See Rehearing Order

¶ 33 n.31. 

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41 

larger action and depend on the larger action for their 

justification.”9

 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(iii). 

Petitioners claim that the Cove Point LNG export project 

is a “connected action” that NEPA requires be considered 

together with the Allegheny Storage Project. In Delaware 

Riverkeeper, we held that the Commission unlawfully 

segmented its environmental review where four other pipeline 

projects were “certainly ‘connected actions’” that, taken 

together, would result in “a single pipeline,” that was “linear 

and physically interdependent,” and contained “no physical 

offshoots.” 753 F.3d at 1308, 1316. In addition, the other 

pipelines were under construction or pending review when the 

contested application was filed, the Commission’s review of 

the projects was overlapping, and their cumulative effects 

were visited on the same environmental resources. We 

premised our decision requiring joint NEPA consideration on 

the unquestionable connectedness of the projects, the fact that 

the projects all were under consideration by the Commission 

at the same time, and the fact that the projects were 

financially interdependent. Id. at 1318. 

The absence of all of those factors led us to reject an 

analogy to Delaware Riverkeeper in Minisink. There, as here, 

the petitioners argued that a project that the Commission 

found unrelated was nevertheless a “connected action.” We 

rejected that argument and distinguished the connectedness 

and timing of the projects at issue in Delaware Riverkeeper. 

Minisink, 762 F.3d at 113 n.11. The same distinctions apply 

 

9

 “Connected actions” also include actions that “(i) [a]utomatically 

trigger other actions which may require environmental impact 

statements,” and actions that “(ii) [c]annot or will not proceed 

unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously.” 40 

C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(i)-(ii). 

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42 

here. Unlike in Delaware Riverkeeper, the Commission in 

this case made clear that the Allegheny Storage Project and 

the Cove Point LNG terminal are unrelated, and that neither 

depends on the other for its justification. See 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.25(a)(1)(iii). This is therefore not a case in which 

“financially and functionally interdependent pipeline 

improvements were considered separately even though there 

was no apparent logic to where one project began and the 

other ended.” Del. Riverkeeper, 753 F.3d at 1318. The 

absence of evidence that would compel a finding of 

connectedness between the Allegheny Storage Project and the 

Cove Point LNG export terminal defeats Petitioners’ 

challenge. 

V. 

Finally, Petitioners Cady and Gerner claim they suffered 

due process violations because the Commission failed to 

provide them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on 

the Environmental Assessment. Petitioners claim they were 

deprived of a “meaningful opportunity” to comment on 

Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) that they 

requested from the Commission—in particular, Dominion’s 

hydraulic flow diagrams.10

 

10 CEII is “specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design 

information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure that: 

(i) Relates details about the production, generation, transportation, 

transmission, or distribution of energy; (ii) Could be useful to a 

person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure; (iii) Is 

exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of 

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; and (iv) Does not simply give the 

general location of the critical infrastructure.” 18 C.F.R. 

§ 388.113(c)(1). 

USCA Case #13-1219 Document #1549014 Filed: 04/24/2015 Page 42 of 44
43 

Due process challenges to agency action are subject to 

the general prejudicial error rule. See Air Canada v. Dep’t of 

Transp., 148 F.3d 1142, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706. “Due process requires only a ‘meaningful opportunity’ 

to challenge new evidence.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. 

Bd., 453 F.3d 473, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976)); see also Blumenthal v. 

FERC, 613 F.3d 1142, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In BNSF 

Railway, we observed that, even where an opportunity to 

rebut evidence may be obstructed at one point in a 

proceeding, a rebuttal opportunity that arises before the 

issuance of a final order is sufficient for purposes of due 

process. See 453 F.3d at 486; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r 

of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941) (“The 

demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial 

stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an 

administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is 

held before the final order becomes effective.”)). 

Consequently, we have held that a commenter before the 

Commission who has ample time to comment on evidence 

before the deadline for rehearing is not deprived of a 

meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence. Minisink, 

762 F.3d at 115. Cady and Gerner argue that they received 

the CEII too late to comment at their preferred time in the 

proceeding, but neither contends that they lacked ample time 

to comment on the evidence before the deadline to seek 

rehearing. We conclude that Petitioners Cady and Gerner 

both had a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge the CEII 

before rehearing, and therefore suffered no prejudice from 

any alleged procedural deficiency in the way the CEII was 

produced to them. 

Moreover, Petitioners do not identify what they would 

have done differently with the CEII had the Commission 

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44 

produced it earlier in the proceeding. “To show that error was 

prejudicial, a plaintiff must indicate with reasonable 

specificity what portions of the documents it objects to and 

how it might have responded if given the opportunity.” 

Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioners have failed to 

satisfy that standard. 

* * * 

Because each of Petitioners’ challenges to the 

Commission’s conditional approval of the Allegheny Storage 

Project falls short, the petition for review is denied. 

So ordered. 

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