Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00035/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00035-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Ramos
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

LAUREL J. MONTOYA

Assistant United States Attorney

Robert E. Coyle Federal Courthouse

2500 Tulare Street

Fresno, CA 93721

(559) 497-4000

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES RAMOS,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-00035-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: September 22, 2021

TIME: 1 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on September 22, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court 

issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further 

notice. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Further, pursuant to General Order 614, 620, 624, 628, and 630 and the CARES Act, this Court’s 

declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s 

Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district 

judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 1, 2020.1

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

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Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and 620 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the 

case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).2

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 22, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until 

December 8, 2021, and to exclude time between September 22, 2021, and December 8, 2021, under 

Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case has 

been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) A plea agreement has been provided to the defendant and negotiations are 

ongoing.

c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, discuss 

case resolution, and review the discovery.

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The government does not object to the continuance.

f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because Counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal 

contact should the hearing proceed.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

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original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 22, 2021 to December 

8, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local 

Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on 

the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: September 15, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA

LAUREL J. MONTOYA

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: September 15, 2021 /s/ MILES A. HARRIS

MILES A. HARRIS

Counsel for Defendant 

JAMES RAMOS

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ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the status conference is continued from September 22, 2021, to 

December 8, 2021, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2021 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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