Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01006/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee
Appellee
United States
Appellee
Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO., LTD.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE 

ACTION COMMITTEE,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1006

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:14-cv-00092-DCP, Judge Donald C. Pogue.

______________________ 

Decided: October 11, 2016

______________________ 

MATTHEW R. NICELY, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by DANIEL MARTIN WITKOWSKI. 

KARA WESTERCAMP, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United 

States. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE 

E. DAVIDSON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, JOSHUA E.

KURLAND; MYKHAYLO GRYZLOV, Office of Chief Counsel for 

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2 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

MEIXUAN LI, Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-appellee Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade 

Action Committee. Also represented by NATHANIEL 

RICKARD, ANDREW WILLIAM KENTZ, ROOP BHATTI. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, CHEN and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd., successor in interest to Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. 

(collectively Grobest), appeals the decision of the Court of 

International Trade (CIT) affirming the U.S. Department 

of Commerce’s final results in the reconducted fourth 

administrative review of the antidumping duty order on 

certain frozen warmwater shrimp from Vietnam. See 

Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist 

Republic of Vietnam, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,309 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 19, 2014) (final results of reconducted administrative review of Grobest and intent not to revoke) 

(Reconducted Final Results). Grobest argues that the CIT 

erred in sustaining Commerce’s decision to refuse 

Grobest’s request to terminate the individual examination 

of Grobest and also erred in sustaining Commerce’s 

decision to assign a 25.76% antidumping duty rate using 

adverse facts available after Grobest failed to cooperate 

with the examination. See Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co. v. 

United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015). 

For the reasons below, we affirm.

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VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 3

BACKGROUND

A.

The antidumping statute provides for the assessment 

of remedial duties on foreign merchandise sold in the 

United States at less than fair market value that materially injures or threatens to injure a domestic industry. 

See 19 U.S.C. § 1673. An antidumping duty reflects the 

amount by which the normal value exceeds the export 

price of the merchandise. Id. §§ 1673e(a)(1), 1677(35). 

Under the statute, Commerce is generally charged with 

determining individual dumping margins for each known 

exporter and producer of the subject merchandise and 

assigning each an individual duty rate. Id. § 1677f–

1(c)(1). Each year, Commerce provides interested parties 

with an opportunity to request an administrative review 

of exporters and producers covered by the order to reevaluate the propriety of the assigned duty rate. Id.

§ 1675(a)(1)(B). In particular, an interested member of 

the affected domestic industry may request an administrative review of the duty order if it believes a currently

assigned rate is too low. 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(b)(1). Conversely, an exporter or producer may request administrative review of the order if it believes its currently assigned 

rate is too high. Id. § 351.213(b)(2). Absent such a request for review, the duty continues to be assessed at the

preexisting rate. Id. § 351.212(c)(1)(i). 

In cases where a large number of exporters and producers are involved in an administrative review proceeding and it is not practical to determine individual rates for 

each, the antidumping duty statute allows Commerce to 

limit individual examination to a reasonable number of 

companies. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f–1(c)(2). In such cases, 

Commerce generally selects a subset of companies for 

mandatory review and determines an individual dumping 

rate for each of those mandatory respondents. A company

that is not selected for individual examination as a manCase: 16-1006 Document: 50-2 Page: 3 Filed: 10/11/2016
4 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

datory respondent will generally receive what is known as 

the “all-others” rate. See id. § 1673d(c)(1)(B)(i)(II). 

In addition, a company not selected for individual examination may voluntarily submit questionnaire responses containing all of the information requested from 

mandatory respondents and request individual examination under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a)(1).1 However, Commerce 

may decline to fully investigate the respondents seeking 

voluntary examination if it determines that the number of 

exporters or producers who have submitted such requests 

is so large that individual examination of these voluntary 

respondents “would be unduly burdensome and inhibit

the timely completion of the investigation.” Id. § 

1677m(a)(2). Thus, in the typical proceeding, an exporter 

or producer may receive an individual duty rate as either 

a mandatory or voluntary respondent or the “all-others” 

rate if not individually examined.

Proceedings involving a nonmarket economy (NME) 

country operate slightly differently than the typical 

proceeding covering goods exported from a country with a 

market-based economy. Because an NME does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, the 

normal value may not reflect the fair value of the merchandise. See id. § 1677(18)(A). In NME proceedings, 

Commerce begins with the presumption that all respondents in the investigation are under foreign government 

control and should receive a single countrywide dumping 

rate. Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 

821 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This presumption is 

 

1 These questionnaires generally seek corporate information, including corporate and business structure, 

affiliations with other companies, and ownership details, 

as well as sales and production data. Commerce may also 

issue supplemental questionnaires if additional information is required.

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VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 5

rebuttable and a company importing goods covered by the 

order can prove, through responses to a separate rate 

questionnaire, that it is not subject to government control 

and is entitled to a separate, individualized rate. See, 

e.g., Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 294 F.3d 1371, 1373 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, in NME proceedings, a company 

that demonstrates its entitlement to separate rate status 

receives either an individual rate (as a mandatory or 

voluntary respondent) or the weighted-average separate

rate (if individual examination is impractical or unduly 

burdensome). And a company that fails to demonstrate

independence from the NME country receives the higher 

countrywide rate. 

B.

On February 1, 2005, Commerce made a final determination that certain frozen warmwater shrimp from 

Vietnam were likely being sold at less than fair market 

value and published a duty order directing customs 

officers to assess antidumping duties on imports of the 

subject merchandise. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp 

from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,152 

(Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice of amended final 

determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order). Vietnam is designated as a NME 

country and Commerce begins with a rebuttable presumption that a company operating within Vietnam is 

subject to state control. See Certain Frozen and Canned 

Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,005 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 8, 

2004). Commerce presumptively applies a single countrywide antidumping rate of 25.76%—the Vietnam-wide 

rate—to all imports of frozen warmwater shrimp from 

Vietnam. 

Grobest is a producer of frozen warmwater shrimp 

from Vietnam covered by the antidumping duty order.

Although not individually examined as a mandatory or 

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6 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

voluntary respondent during the first three administrative review periods (AR1–AR3), Grobest demonstrated its 

entitlement to separate rate status and was assigned—for 

reasons not relevant here—a separate antidumping duty 

rate of 0% in each review period.2 In February of 2009, 

Grobest and the domestic industry of warmwater shrimp 

producers—the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee 

(the Domestic Producers)—each submitted separate 

requests for review of Grobest in the fourth administrative review of the duty order (AR4), covering the period of 

February 1, 2008, through January 31, 2009. 

In March 2009, Commerce initiated the review of 

nearly 200 exporters and producers for AR4. Because of 

the large number of companies involved in AR4, Commerce determined that individual examination of each 

would be impractical. Instead, as it had done in previous 

review periods, Commerce selected for mandatory individual examination the two largest companies by volume—Minh Phu Group and Nha Trang Seafoods. 

Although not selected as a mandatory respondent, 

Grobest requested to be individually examined for AR4 as 

a voluntary respondent pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a), 

rather than receive the all-others separate-rate. Commerce declined to examine Grobest individually and on

 

2 See Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,052 (Dep’t 

of Commerce Sept. 12, 2007) (final results of the first 

antidumping duty administrative review and first new 

shipper review); Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from 

the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 73 Fed. Reg. 52,273 

(Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 9, 2008) (final results of second 

administrative review); Certain Frozen Warmwater 

Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 74 Fed. 

Reg. 47,191 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 15, 2009) (final 

results of third administrative review).

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VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 7

August 9, 2010, published the Final Results for AR4. 

Minh Phu Group was assigned an individual rate of 

2.96%, Nha Trang Seafoods was assigned a rate of 4.89% 

and Grobest, like all other non-selected companies satisfying the requirements for separate-rate status, received 

the average of the mandatory respondents’ margins—i.e., 

3.92%. Companies that did not demonstrate freedom 

from government control sufficient to achieve separaterate status received the Vietnam-wide rate of 25.76%. 

Grobest brought suit in the CIT on August 19, 2010, 

challenging Commerce’s refusal to individually examine 

Grobest as a voluntary respondent.3 Grobest argued the 

refusal was unlawful because Commerce is required to 

examine any company that seeks individual review unless 

it would be unduly burdensome pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677m(a)(2). And, according to Grobest, Commerce’s 

justification for not individually examining Grobest was 

lacking. After nearly two years of litigation, the CIT 

agreed with Grobest and ordered Commerce to examine

Grobest as a voluntary respondent. See Grobest & I-Mei 

Indus. (Vietnam) v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 

1362 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012); Grobest & I-Mei Indus. (Vietnam) v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2012). The CIT entered Final Judgment on September 13, 2012, ordering that Commerce “shall reconduct its administrative review . . . of the anti-dumping 

order . . . by individually examining Grobest as a voluntary respondent.” JA3246.

On October 17, 2012, Commerce published a notice 

that it would conduct the administrative review of 

 

3 Shortly thereafter, on December 31, 2010, Grobest 

& I-Mei’s shrimp processing operation was purchased by 

Viet I-Mei, who continued to press for individual examination and assignment of an individualized antidumping 

rate for Grobest in AR4. 

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8 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

Grobest consistent with the CIT’s Final Judgment. 

Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist 

Republic of Vietnam, 77 Fed. Reg. 63,786 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 17, 2012) (notice of court decision not in harmony with final results of administrative review, notice of 

re-conducted administrative review of Grobest & I-Mei 

Industrial (Vietnam) Co., Ltd., and notice of amended 

final results of administrative review). But then Grobest 

had a change of heart. On December 12, 2012, less than 

two months later, Grobest submitted a request to withdraw its participation from the individual examination 

that it had been fighting for years to secure. Grobest 

stated that its reversal of position was “due to the significant management, personnel and accounting changes that 

have occurred . . . since the time of the period of review.” 

JA3275. Without any explanation, Grobest continued

that “[i]n short, the administrative and legal costs of this 

examination are greater than the company wishes to 

incur at this time.” Id. Instead, Grobest requested to be 

given the 3.92% separate rate it previously disputed. 

Commerce did not respond to Grobest’s withdrawal 

request and issued a supplemental questionnaire seeking 

clarification of discrepancies in Grobest’s previously 

reported data and further details concerning Grobest’s 

affiliations. Commerce warned Grobest that failure to 

provide complete and accurate information by the response deadline of January 29, 2013 may result in a 

finding based on adverse facts available. The Domestic 

Producers voiced their objection to Grobest’s request to 

withdraw in a letter to Commerce on January 25, 2013. 

And on the response due date, instead of providing answers to the questionnaires or requesting an extension of 

time to do so, Grobest submitted a second request to 

rescind the examination. 

On February 6, 2013, Commerce indicated its intent

to proceed with the individual examination of Grobest and 

it again sought answers to the supplemental questionCase: 16-1006 Document: 50-2 Page: 8 Filed: 10/11/2016
VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 9

naire, extending the deadline to February 13, 2013. 

Commerce reiterated that failure to cooperate may result 

in the application of adverse facts to arrive at a rate. 

Once again, on the due date set by Commerce, Grobest 

refused to answer the questionnaire and instead submitted a third request to discontinue examination, claiming 

again that it no longer wished to continue with the examination because the costs of proceeding were greater than 

the company wished to incur. 

In September 2013, Commerce issued the preliminary 

results of the reconducted AR4 review of Grobest (Reconducted Preliminary Results). In response to Grobest’s 

requests to forgo the individual examination ordered in

the CIT’s Final Judgment, Commerce stated it “does not 

consider that the circumstances here warrant such a 

departure.” JA3313. Commerce went on to explain:

 Grobest’s principle [sic] contention is that it is 

unwilling to incur the administrative and legal 

costs associated with participating in the administrative review. However, a company may not impede an antidumping proceeding by refusing to 

incur administrative and legal costs associated 

with participating in the proceeding. Moreover, 

the Department has spent significant resources as 

a result of Grobest’s challenge to the Department’s original decision not to review Grobest individually.

Id. Turning next to the appropriate rate to assign 

Grobest, Commerce preliminarily determined that 

Grobest failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its 

ability to comply with repeated requests for information

and impeded the proceeding within the meaning of 19 

U.S.C. §§ 1677e(a)(2) and 1677e(b). Commerce noted that 

under such circumstances, the agency consistently assigns an adverse facts available (AFA) rate equal to the 

highest rate determined for any respondent in any segCase: 16-1006 Document: 50-2 Page: 9 Filed: 10/11/2016
10 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

ment of the proceeding. Thus, it assigned Grobest an 

AFA rate of 25.76%—the Vietnam-wide rate assigned to 

those companies unable to establish an entitlement to 

separate rate status. Commerce explained that this rate 

“is appropriate for Grobest in that it is sufficient to ensure 

that Grobest does not benefit from failing to cooperate in 

[the reconducted] review by refusing to respond to [Commerce]’s request for complete information regarding its 

affiliations, sales of subject merchandise, and factors of 

production.” JA3315.

Grobest requested that Commerce reconsider its conclusions in the Reconducted Preliminary Results. Grobest 

first argued that Commerce should rescind the reconducted review because the CIT’s Final Judgment should not 

be considered binding on Commerce and Grobest filed a 

request to withdraw within the 90-day time period pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1). Grobest went on to argue

that it would not gain any undue or unfair advantage if it

withdrew its voluntary respondent request. The Domestic 

Producers, in turn, presented a different explanation for 

Grobest’s new position. They argued that Grobest’s 

decision to withdraw was driven by a desire to avoid 

disclosing its affiliation with companies recently found to 

have committed material misrepresentations in connection with efforts to evade antidumping duties on warmwater shrimp from Vietnam and China. They then urged 

that Grobest’s “[a]voidance of [Commerce’s] affiliation 

inquiry should be given weight in interpreting and evaluating Grobest’s explanation for declining to further participate in a proceeding that it requested.” JA3369. The 

Domestic Producers concluded that “the respondent’s own 

actions led directly to it being preliminarily assigned the 

25.76% Vietnam-wide rate as AFA.” JA 3373.

In March, 2014, Commerce published the Reconducted Final Results, in which it continued to reject Grobest’s 

request to rescind the examination and affirmed its 

decision to apply the Vietnam-wide rate of 25.76%. ComCase: 16-1006 Document: 50-2 Page: 10 Filed: 10/11/2016
VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 11

merce reasoned that the CIT had “specifically ordered 

[Commerce] to conduct an individual examination of 

Grobest, [and] rescission would be in conflict with the CIT

order and judgment.” JA3376-77. Commerce next explained that Grobest’s reliance on 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.213(d)(1) was misplaced because that regulation 

pertains to withdrawal of an initial request for administrative review and not a request for individual examination as a voluntary respondent. Even if the regulation 

was applicable, Commerce explained that such a request 

must be made within ninety days of the initiation of the 

administrative review (which had long since passed) and 

must also be made by all parties who requested the administrative review (including the Domestic Producers 

who had not withdrawn their request for review and 

opposed Grobest’s request to withdraw). Commerce 

concluded that “the unique circumstances surrounding 

this review, including the Final Judgment and the request for review by Petitioners” weighed against rescinding the voluntary review of Grobest. Commerce also 

noted the seriousness of the Domestic Producers’ allegation of a scheme to avoid antidumping duties, but declined 

to consider it in making its determination due to the lack 

of supporting evidence in the record. 

Grobest filed a complaint with the CIT, appealing 

Commerce’s Reconducted Final Results. Before the CIT, 

Grobest argued that Commerce unlawfully refused to 

permit Grobest to withdraw its individual review request 

and that Grobest’s assigned rate was retaliatory and 

impermissibly punitive. Grobest acknowledged that the 

statutory and regulatory framework does not expressly 

contemplate a voluntary respondent’s rescission of a 

request for individual examination. However, it argued 

that the 90-day deadline found in 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.213(d)(1), applicable to rescinding an administrative 

review generally, should also apply to its request to 

withdraw from the CIT’s ordered individual review. 

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12 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

Given that it made its withdrawal request within ninety 

days of the start of the reconducted review, Commerce, 

according to Grobest, could not have expended significant 

resources during that limited time frame, and the Domestic Producers would not be prejudiced because Grobest 

would still be assigned the separate rate of 3.92% for AR4.

Commerce, for its part, stressed to the CIT that there 

was no regulation requiring Commerce to terminate the 

proceeding and the 90-day grace period contemplated by 

19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) was simply inapplicable. Commerce explained that under 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(d)(2), 

voluntary respondents selected for examination are to be 

treated like mandatory respondents. And mandatory 

respondents are not permitted to unilaterally dictate their 

level of involvement in the proceeding. Even if Commerce 

was to look to 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) for guidance, it 

contended that the legislative history of the statute 

authorizing Commerce to conduct an administrative 

review makes clear “Commerce could rightfully continue a 

review in which there is an expressed interest,” further 

indicating that Grobest had no entitlement to withdraw, 

especially in light of the Domestic Producers’ objection to 

rescinding the examination. According to Commerce, the 

CIT’s command to review Grobest and the weakness of 

Grobest’s excuse for discontinuing the review at such a 

late hour further counseled against withdrawal. Commerce thus argued that it reasonably determined to 

proceed with the examination and to use AFA when 

Grobest withheld information and failed to cooperate to 

the best of its ability. 

Following briefing and oral argument, the CIT sustained Commerce’s Reconducted Final Results. Viet-I Mei 

Frozen Foods Co. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1345 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2015). The CIT found Grobest’s professed 

reasons for requesting withdrawal unpersuasive, noting:

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VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 13

[T]his change of ownership occurred nearly two 

years prior to the entry of judgment, in favor of 

Grobest, on its initial request for individual examination. In that time, Grobest could easily have 

voluntarily dismissed its litigation in demand of 

individual examination (thereby obtaining the 

very result that Grobest now seeks), but chose not 

to do so.

Id. at 1356–57. The CIT also noted that Commerce was 

not required by any statutory or regulatory authority to 

terminate the examination. Id. at 1362. In addition, the 

CIT found that sound policy considerations warranted 

Commerce’s treatment of voluntary respondents as mandatory respondents with no right to withdraw. Id. It

went on to find Commerce’s assignment of the Vietnamwide rate of 25.76% was appropriate and not punitive

given Grobest’s failure to cooperate. Id. at 1363. Grobest 

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

This court reviews a CIT decision regarding Commerce’s antidumping determinations de novo, applying 

the same standard used by the CIT in evaluating Commerce’s determinations, findings, and conclusions. Apex 

Exports v. United States, 777 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). We will uphold Commerce’s decision unless it is 

“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Substantial evidence is defined as 

evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). An agency finding may 

still be supported by substantial evidence even if two 

inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. 

Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). 

I.

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We turn first to Grobest’s argument that Commerce

erred when it denied Grobest’s request to rescind the

reconducted individual examination. Grobest concedes 

that voluntary respondents, once selected, do not have an 

absolute right to determine whether an individual examination will proceed. Nevertheless, it argues that Commerce was required to terminate the individual 

examination of Grobest based on the circumstances here. 

The foundation for Grobest’s argument is that the 

administrative and policy concerns embedded in 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.213(d)(1), which relates to complete rescission of an 

administrative review, should also be used to judge the 

reasonableness of Commerce’s treatment of requests by 

voluntary respondents to withdraw from individual 

examination. Under the regulation, if a request to rescind 

is made within ninety days of the notice of initiation of 

the administrative review, Commerce will grant the 

request. Otherwise, Commerce retains the discretion to 

rescind outside the 90-day window but may take into 

account whether, for example, Commerce has devoted 

considerable time and resources to the review. Grobest 

argues that in promulgating this regulation, Commerce 

was seeking to strike a balance between the party’s 

interests in foregoing examination and maintaining the 

status quo with Commerce’s need to avoid procedural 

abuses and wasting resources. It reasons that Commerce 

should likewise conduct the same inquiry when a voluntary respondent is in the analogous position of seeking to 

cancel an individual examination (within an ongoing 

review) it has requested. Having set the stage for its view 

of how Commerce should have approached the inquiry, 

Grobest argues that Commerce misevaluated the circumstances here. 

First, Grobest contends that Commerce incorrectly believed it was bound as a matter of law by the CIT’s earlier 

Final Judgment ordering Commerce to conduct an individual examination of Grobest and similarly bound by the 

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Domestic Producers’ objection to rescinding the examination. It thus argues that Commerce improperly failed to 

consider the circumstances weighing in favor of rescinding the voluntary review. Next, Grobest argues that to 

the extent Commerce undertook any evaluation of the 

circumstances, Commerce’s analysis was unreasonable 

given the timing of Grobest’s request within the 90-day 

deadline set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) and the fact 

that Commerce could not have yet expended considerable 

resources in connection with the reconducted examination. 

Like Commerce and the CIT, we reject Grobest’s attempt to analogize its request to withdraw from the 

individual examination as a voluntary respondent with a 

withdrawal of a request for an administrative review 

under 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1). The regulations lack any 

“90-day provision” that permits a voluntary respondent

like Grobest to withdraw from an instituted individual 

examination and we decline Grobest’s invitation to essentially promulgate one. Moreover, this court has previously recognized that Congress intended to allow Commerce 

the authority to avoid the investigative burden associated 

with an administrative review in situations where the 

domestic industry has no continued interest in proceeding. See Oregon Steel Mills Inc. v. United States, 862 F. 

2d 1541, 1545–46 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 

98-1156, at 181 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

5220, 5298) and noting “[a]dministrative reviews . . . are 

expensive and burdensome. If industry interest is lacking, Congress intended to eliminate that investigative 

burden”); see also Ferro Union v. United States, 44 F. 

Supp. 2d 1310, 1315–16 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (noting 

Commerce’s well-established policy of not rescinding a 

party’s review under 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) if another 

interested party has expressed a desire to continue). 

Unlike a complete rescission where the domestic industry 

no longer seeks the assessment of any duties, the DomesCase: 16-1006 Document: 50-2 Page: 15 Filed: 10/11/2016
16 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

tic Producers here expressed a continued and keen interest in having Commerce follow through with an individual 

examination of Grobest. In addition, because Grobest’s 

preferred outcome would not lead to the entire rescission 

of the administrative review, its request will not entirely 

eliminate the expense and burden placed on Commerce in 

connection with the review. Thus, the policies underlying 

19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) do not so easily match to the 

present situation where all parties, including Grobest, 

still seek continuing the administrative review and the 

Domestic Producers still seek examination of Grobest in 

particular.

If anything, Commerce’s regulations point away from 

granting a voluntary respondent’s request to cancel an 

individual examination it had requested. Under 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.204(d)(2), “[a] voluntary respondent accepted for 

individual examination . . . will be subject to the same 

requirements as an exporter or producer initially selected 

by [Commerce] for individual examination under [19 

U.S.C. § 1677f–1(c)(2) as a mandatory respondent].” In 

other words, voluntary respondents, like mandatory 

respondents, cannot unilaterally dictate their level of 

participation once accepted for examination. As the CIT 

recognized below, “[i]f it were otherwise, the voluntary 

respondent process would be subject to potential manipulation by companies seeking individual review and then 

declining to proceed if the review started to look unfavorable.” Viet-I Mei Frozen Foods, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 1358. 

Thus, Commerce was reasonable in treating Grobest as a 

mandatory respondent with no right to escape review once 

it was selected for individual examination pursuant to the 

CIT’s Final Judgment. Nor was Commerce required by 

any statutory or regulatory authority to rescind the courtordered individual examination simply because Grobest

no longer wished to proceed, regardless of the timing of its 

rescission request. 

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We need not reach the issue of whether Commerce 

was in fact bound as a matter of law by the Final Judgment or the Domestic Producers’ objection (which the CIT 

also chose not to address) because we disagree with 

Grobest’s characterization of Commerce’s justifications for 

denying Grobest’s request to rescind the individual review. Contrary to Grobest’s allegation, Commerce explained in the Reconducted Preliminary and Final Results

that multiple factors, including but not limited to the 

Final Judgment and the Domestic Producers’ objection, 

counseled against granting Grobest’s request. Those 

additional considerations included Commerce’s expenditure of resources to date and the insufficiency of Grobest’s 

justification for seeking to avoid review. Thus, we reject 

Grobest’s argument that Commerce somehow erred as a 

matter of law on that basis. 

Moreover, we agree with Commerce that it was eminently reasonable for it to point to the CIT’s Final Judgment as well as the Domestic Producers’ objections to 

Grobest’s sudden desire to withdraw as legitimate reasons 

to maintain the individual examination. And given the 

nature of the supplemental questionnaire, Commerce 

appeared to have reasonable concerns with the veracity or 

completeness of Grobest’s previously submitted data, 

warranting further investigation. Grobest also does not 

meaningfully refute Commerce’s justification that it was 

not inclined to rescind the individual examination because it had already expended considerable time and 

resources in connection with the individual examination. 

Commerce’s efforts reviewing Grobest’s initial questionnaire responses, identifying and documenting numerous 

discrepancies in Grobest’s representations (including the 

company’s affiliations, the quantity and value of its sales 

of subject merchandise, and factors of production), and 

formulating supplemental questions to address those 

concerns cannot be readily dismissed as insignificant. 

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18 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

These considerations all further support the reasonableness of Commerce’s decision to continue the examination.

Conversely, Grobest’s professed reason for withdrawing its request for review—the change in ownership—does 

not withstand scrutiny. The change of ownership from 

Grobest & I-Mei to Viet I-Mei took place in December 

2010. Like Commerce and the CIT, we find unpersuasive 

Grobest’s argument that it was not until years later, after 

the Final Judgment was entered and after the notice of

reconducted examination was published in October 2012, 

that it appreciated the impact of this change in ownership. 

We also find unpersuasive Grobest’s argument on appeal that withdrawal was necessary because it was no 

longer confident in its ability to provide complete and 

accurate data. Grobest neither voiced that concern to 

Commerce nor did it take advantage of the statutory 

procedures designed to address those concerns.4 Rather, 

it stated only that “the administrative and legal costs of 

this examination are greater than the company wishes to 

incur at this time.” JA3275. But, as Commerce explained 

in its Reconducted Preliminary Results, a respondent has 

no legitimate interest in impeding Commerce’s investigations simply to avoid the costs of participating. 

 

4 “If an interested party, promptly after receiving a 

request from [Commerce] for information, notifies [Commerce] that such party is unable to submit the information requested in the requested form and manner, 

together with a full explanation and suggested alternative 

forms in which such party is able to submit the information, [then Commerce] shall consider the ability of the 

interested party to submit the information in the requested form and manner and may modify such requirements 

to the extent necessary to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on that party.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1).

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VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 19

Accordingly, because Commerce’s decision to continue 

the court-ordered individual examination was both a 

reasonable exercise of its authority and supported by 

substantial evidence, we affirm.

II. 

Grobest next challenges the application of AFA and 

specifically the assignment of the 25.76% Vietnam-wide 

rate. First, Grobest argues that the application of AFA 

was unreasonable because its inability to cooperate in the 

reconducted individual examination was the direct result 

of Commerce’s prior unlawful actions and the years of 

litigation that ensued. Next, it argues that the specific

AFA rate of 25.76%, more than five times the separate

rate of 3.92%, was far beyond commercial reality and any 

deterrence factor warranted by the facts of this case. At 

most, Grobest argues, the proper adverse inference would 

have been to deny Grobest the benefit of voluntary examination and assign it the 3.92% separate rate it had 

fought for years to avoid. 

During the course of an administrative review, when 

a respondent “withholds information that has been requested by [Commerce],” “fails to provide such information by the deadlines . . . or in the form and manner 

requested,” “significantly impedes a proceeding,” or “provides such information but the information cannot be 

verified,” Commerce “shall” use “facts otherwise available” in reaching any necessary determinations. 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677e(a)(2)(A)–(D). If Commerce further finds a respondent has “failed to cooperate by not acting to the best 

of its ability to comply with a request for information,” it 

“may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of 

that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise 

available.” Id. § 1677e(b). In other words, it may apply a 

rate derived from adverse facts available. Commerce 

“may employ [such] inferences . . . to ensure that the 

party does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to 

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20 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

cooperate than if it had cooperated fully.” Statement of 

Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round 

Agreements Act (SAA), H.R. REP. NO. 103–316, vol. 1, at 

870 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4199. 

In selecting an AFA rate, Commerce may use information from the petition, investigation, prior administrative reviews, or “any other information placed on the 

record.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see also Gallant Ocean 

(Thailand) Co. v. United States, 602 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed.

Cir. 2010) (noting that “in the case of uncooperative 

respondents,” Commerce has discretion to “select from a 

list of secondary sources as a basis for its adverse inferences”); F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. 

United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

We first address Grobest’s attempts to relieve itself 

from responsibility for Commerce’s application of the AFA 

rules to derive a rate. Even if we were to accept Grobest’s 

contention that it was unable to provide complete and 

accurate information due to the passage of time, that 

alone does not discharge its duty to act to the best of its 

ability in responding to Commerce’s requests. Regardless 

of the circumstances that Grobest believed were the cause 

of its situation, “the statutory mandate that a respondent 

act to ‘the best of its ability’ requires the respondent to do 

the maximum it is able to do.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. 

United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Here, Grobest’s rote explanation that it no longer wished 

to incur the costs of examination, its failure to explain the 

specific information it believed was missing or inaccurate, 

and its decision not to comply with the statutory procedures available to respondents with such concerns fall far 

short of Grobest’s statutory obligation. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot say that Commerce’s reliance 

on AFA was unreasonable.

We also reject Grobest’s suggestion that at most an 

AFA rate of 3.92% would be appropriate here. That is the 

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VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US 21

same rate that was received by cooperative respondents 

and indeed is lower than the 4.98% rate assigned to

mandatory respondent Nha Trang Seafoods, who fully 

cooperated with Commerce and justified its entitlement to 

its separate rate. Thus, Grobest’s proposal would only 

incentivize gamesmanship and undermine the purpose of 

the AFA provisions if recalcitrant respondents like 

Grobest were rewarded with favorable rates over those 

given to fully cooperative respondents. See SAA at 870 

(explaining that Commerce “may employ [such] inferences 

. . . to ensure that the party does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to cooperate than if it had cooperated fully”). We find that substantial evidence supports 

Commerce’s determination that the 25.76% Vietnam-wide 

rate was appropriate to ensure Grobest did not benefit 

from refusing to cooperate with Commerce’s requests for 

complete information regarding its affiliations, sales of 

subject merchandise, and factors of production. Moreover, 

the selected rate was derived directly from the original 

investigation and corroborated by comparing the rate to 

the transaction-specific margins of cooperating respondents in AR4. Grobest has never meaningfully challenged 

this corroboration analysis or questioned the reliability of 

the Vietnam-wide rate. Thus, given Grobest’s failure to 

cooperate in the examination and the lack of any specific 

challenge to Commerce’s corroboration analysis, we find 

the application of the Vietnam-wide rate is amply supported by the record. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we find no error in Commerce’s refusal to discontinue the individual examination of Grobest 

and assignment of an AFA duty rate of 25.76% after 

Grobest repeatedly refused to cooperate with Commerce’s 

requests for information. We have considered the parties’ 

remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. 

Accordingly, the CIT’s decision is affirmed.

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22 VIET I-MEI FROZEN FOODS CO. v. US

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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