Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01384/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01384-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Floyd Munoz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 89-1384 

FIL j 

United States G:wf! <,f A. 

Temh Ci~cuir 

D -c 2 7 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

-vs-

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-253) 

(D. Colo.) 

FLOYD MUNOZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Michael J. Norton, U. 

S: Attorney, ~nd 3ernard E. Hobson, Assistant U.S. Attorney with 

him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-A~~ellee. 

Normando R. Pacheco, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, 

District Judge.•• 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable David L. Russell, United States District Judge for 

the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant Floyd Munoz was convicted of conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine; three counts of distribution of cocaine; 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine; and the use of a 

firearm during a drug trafficking crime. The district court 

sentenced the defendant, pursuant to the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines, to sixty-three months' incarceration for the drug 

counts and sixty months for the firearms count, to be served 

consecutively. 

On appeal, defendant makes the following arguments: 1) The 

trial court erred by admitting into evidence the weapon which was 

seized from defendant's residence because the weapon was not listed 

in the search warrant; (2) The trial court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury concerning the voluntariness of an incriminating 

statement allegedly made by the defendant; 3) The evidence failed 

to establish a necessary element of the offense of using a firearm 

during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 924(c) (1) and the trial court erred by not granting defendant's 

motion for judgment of acquittal as to that count; and 4) A 

mandatory consecutive sentence provided for the Section 924 (c) 

offense in connection with a drug trafficking offense and the 

sentence elevator of the Sentencing Guidelines, Section 5K2.6, as 

applied to drug trafficking offenses, constitute dual punishment 

for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy. 

I. 

Admission of the weapon 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence, 

including the weapon, see R. Vol. I at Tab 7 & Vol. III at 6-7, 

79-82 & 85-87, but the record is devoid of any argument or 

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assertion that the gun should be suppressed because it was not 

specifically listed in the search warrant or of any objection to 

admission of the weapon in evidence at trial. See R. Vol. IV at 

129. Indeed, defendant's counsel volunteered that there was no 

objection to admission of the gun into evidence. Id. Accordingly, 

we review this issue under a "plain error" standard. See F. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 202 (10th 

Cir. 1980) (trial court's admission into evidence of the fruits of 

an allegedly illegal search where lawfulness of search is raised 

for the first time on appeal is reviewed for "plain error"). See 

also United states v. Young. 470 U.S. 1, 14-16, 105 s.ct. 1038, 

1045-47, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 11-13 (1985); United States v. Lord, 907 

F.2d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversal of convictions based upon 

admission of evidence not objected to at trial only upon a showing 

of "plain error"). 

The record establishes that the pistol seized was in plain 

view of the officer who seized it who was lawfully in and searching 

defendant's residence pursuant to a valid search warrant. See R. 

Vol. IV at 129, 139, 141 & 154. The pistol was on the right side 

of the headboard of the bed, id. at 130, which was directly in 

front of the door for entrance to the bedroom, see id. at 149, and 

within five to six feet of a closet to the right of the bed, id. 

at 133, 149 & 151, where cocaine and drug paraphernalia were found 

while executing a search warrant for, inter alia, those items. Id. 

at 134-37, 149-50; R. Vol. VIII (Search Warrant, Appendix A, 11 5 

& 6). The pistol "caught [the officer's] attention 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 3 
immediately" as he began searching in the area where the bed was. 

R. Vol. IV at 129. 

Seizure of an object does not violate the Fourth Amendment 

when the officer seizing the object is lawfully in the place where 

the object is viewed, with a lawful right of access to the object 

itself; the object can be plainly seen; and the object's 

incriminating character is immediately apparent, even if the 

observation or discovery of the object is not inadvertent. Horton 

v. California, -- U.S.--' 110 s.ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 58 

U.S.L.W. 4694 (1990). See United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 

247-48 (10th Cir. 1989) (police officer lawfully in a particular 

place may seize object within his plain view if there is probable 

cause to associate the object with criminal activity), cert. 

denied, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 2593, 110 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1990); 

Kaiser v. Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 735 (10th Cir. 1989) (furs in plain 

view seized during search pursuant to search warrant for cocaine, 

which were located in compartment which could have contained drugs 

and which officer had probable cause to believe were stolen, were 

properly seized). 

Since this issue was not raised before or at trial, there is 

no testimony in the record concerning whether the gun's 

incriminating character was immediately apparent to the officer who 

seized it. But it is common knowledge that "the nature of the 

illicit drug business is ... dangerous," United States v. Mabry. 

809 F.2d 671, 677 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874, 108 

S. Ct. 33, 98 L.Ed. 2d 164 (1987), and that weapons are often used 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 4 
by those involved in drug trafficking. Because the use of a weapon 

during and in relation to any drug trafficking crime is itself a 

crime, there can be no doubt, applying an objective standard, that 

the gun's incriminating character as contraband was immediately 

apparent. 

No contention is made nor could it be made that in approaching 

the area of the bed, the officer exceeded the scope of the search 

warrant. Items specifically described in the search warrant could 

have been located under the bed or mattress or behind or in the 

headboard. 

Because seizure of the gun was lawful, the district court 

committed no error in admitting it into evidence and hence no 

"plain error." See United States v. Lord, 907 F.2d at 1029. 

II. 

Voluntariness of Defendant•s Statement 

The issue of whether a certain incriminating statement 

allegedly made by the defendant 1 was voluntarily made was not 

raised by the defendant either in his motion to suppress2 , see R. 

1 FBI agent Robert Mark Evans testified that after advising 

defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant indicated he was 

willing to talk, R. Vol.Vat 194-95, he asked the defendant whose 

gun it was that had been found in the bedroom. Id. at 96. The 

defendant allegedly replied that "it was his and that he had it 

there for protection." Id. 

2 Although defendant's "Motion to Suppress Statements" 

requested suppression of "any statement" of the defendant, R. Vol. 

I at Tab 4, at the hearing on this motion defendant sought 

suppression only of his statement concerning the location of the 

cocaine and non-verbal communication showing the officers where the 

cocaine was located, those communications which defendant made 

before he was given the Miranda warning. R. Vol III at 80-82. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 5 
Vol. I, Tab 4 & Vol. III at 80-82, or at trial. Defendant did not 

object to admission of the statement in evidence, R. Vol.Vat 196, 

nor did he make the voluntariness the subject of his crossexamination of the government witness who related the statement. 

Id. at 215-222. Defendant presented no evidence concerning the 

voluntariness of the statement and did not argue the issue in 

closing argument. Finally, the record does not reflect a requested 

jury instruction on this issue and defendant did not object to the 

court's instructions on th~ ground that an instruction on the 

voluntariness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) was not included. 

Accordingly, no genuine issue of fact concerning the 

voluntariness of defendant's incriminating statement was raised by 

the evidence presented to the jury. When no genuine issue is 

presented, Section 3501(a) does not require that an instruction on 

voluntariness be given. See United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 

1098, 1118 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bondurant, 689 F.2d 

1246, 1249 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 

1253 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 

56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978); United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 535 

(2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sansone v. United states, 434 

U.S. 959, 98 S. Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); United States v. 

Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 

909, 97 s.ct. 1181, 51 L.Ed.2d 585 (1977). Cf. United States v. 

Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 666-67 (10th Cir. 1984) (where there is no issue 

of voluntariness raised, the court is not required, under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3501(a), to hold a hearing to determine whether a defendant's 

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Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 6 
confession was voluntary), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161, 105 S. Ct. 

914, 83 L.Ed.2d 927 (1985). Moreover, by failing to object to the 

court's instructions, defendant waived any error in this respect. 

See United States v. Houle, 620 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1980). 

Even if we assume that the failure to give an instruction on the 

voluntariness of defendant's statement was error, it was not "plain 

error." F.R. Crim. P. 52(b). When viewed against the context of 

the entire record, the error was not an egregious one which 

threatened to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. 

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. at 16, 105 s.ct. at __ , 84 

L.Ed.2d at 13. 

III. 

section 924(c) (1) Offense - Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground, inter 

alia, that there was no evidence that the weapon was "used to 

facilitate" or "was an integral part of" a drug trafficking 

offense. The district court denied the motion, relying on the 

rationale expressed in United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24 (2nd 

Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bradley v. United States, __ U.S. 

_, 110 s. ct. 166, 107 L.Ed.2d 123 (1989). Defendant now asserts 

that the court erred in denying the motion, arguing that the only 

evidence of a connection between the defendant and the weapon is 

the statement attributed to him that the weapon was his and that 

he had it for protection. 3 Moreover, he asserts that there was no 

showing that the gun was within reach during commission of the 

3 See note 1, supra. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 7 
crime of possession with intent to distribute as defendant contends 

was the case in United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250 (2nd 

Cir. 1988); United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 

1988) and United States v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986) 

because at the time the weapon and drugs were found defendant was 

in the bathroom, not within reach of the gun, and thereafter was 

in custody. He further contends that the circumstances present in 

United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. 

denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 s. ct. 1130, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977) and 

in United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, were vastly 

different than those in this case and that in any event intent 

cannot be inferred from the mere proximity of a weapon to drugs and 

drug paraphernalia. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, 

we consider in the light most favorable to the prosecution all the 

evidence, both direct and circumstantial, presented at trial and 

all reasonable inferences therefrom to determine whether a 

reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Johnson, 911 

F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Frank, 901 F.2d 

846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990). This is the same standard by which we 

review any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

a conviction. See United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 419, 420 

(1990); United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, -- U.S.--' 109 s.ct. 3197, 105 L.Ed.2d 705 (1989). 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 8 
The predicate drug trafficking offense for the§ 924(c) (1) 

offense with which defendant was charged and convicted was the 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At the time the 

weapon was found and seized, it was located a mere five to six feet 

from a kilogram of cocaine, cutting agents, packaging materials, 

a scale, cocaine test kits and other drug paraphernalia. R. Vol. 

IV at 133, 149 & 151. The gun was loaded, see id. at 130-32, 140 

& 154, and, based upon subsequent testing showing that it was 

operable, id. at 158, it is readily inferable that the gun was 

capable of being used to protect the cocaine stash or to intimidate 

others. Al though differing inferences can be drawn from the 

defendant's statement that the gun was for protection, a reasonable 

jury could infer therefrom that the weapon was used to protect the 

cocaine and to ensure its availability for distribution. 

During surveillance of the defendant, the investigating 

officers never saw the defendant carry a weapon. R. Vol.Vat 205-

06. The defendant never made any attempt to get the weapon between 

the time that law enforcement officers entered the defendant's 

residence and got to the bedroom door, a period of two to three 

minutes, and during the twenty to thirty seconds which elapsed 

while the officers were attempting to gain access to the bedroom, 

see R. Vol. IV at 140 & Vol.Vat 218, a period long enough for 

someone to pick up the weapon if he or she intended to use it. R. 

Vol. IV at 141. During this period the defendant and his wife were 

in the shower in the bathroom, which had a connecting door to the 

bedroom. Id. at 128; R. Vol. Vat 187. However, the officers 

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Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 9 
conducting the search located the defendant and his wife in the 

bathroom and secured them before the officers attempted to gain 

entry to the bedroom. R. Vol. IV at 127-28 & 142; Vol.Vat 187 

& 218. 

The defendant's statement that the gun was his and that it was 

for protection shows that the defendant had the -requisite dominion 

and control over the weapon to use it. Cf. United States v. 

Martinez, 912 F.2d at 420 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1535-36 (possession through the exercise of 

dominion or control as a necessary element of "carrying"). The 

weapon was located where it would ordinarily be within easy reach 

of the defendant while in the bedroom and readily accessible to him 

for the purpose of protecting the illicit drug and paraphernalia. 

A reasonable jury could infer from these facts that the weapon was 

an integral part of the defendant's undertaking because it provided 

a means of protecting the cocaine to ensure its availability for 

distribution, thereby increasing the likelihood that the 

defendant's criminal undertaking would succeed. See United States 

v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United 

Stated v. Matra, 841 U.S. 837, 843 (8th Cir. 1988); United States 

v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1988)). Accord united 

States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 29 (2nd Cir. 1989) (use requires 

possession of a gun under circumstances where the weapon is so 

placed as to be an integral part of the offense; jury could 

reasonably infer that five loaded shotguns in the apartment were 

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Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 10 
on hand to protect the apartment as a storage and processing place 

for narcotics and therefore that the weapons furthered or 

facilitated the narcotics operation and were integral thereto). 

See also United States v. Munoz-Fabela, 896 F.2d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 

1990) ("It is enough that the firearm was present at the drugtrafficking scene, that the weapon could have been used to protect 

or facilitate the operation, and that the presence of the weapon 

was in some way connected with drug trafficking."), cert. denied, 

-- U.S. --' 111 s. ct. 76, -- L.Ed.2d -- (1990); United 

States v. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1985) (presence and 

availability of weapons in light of the evident need for them, 

inferred from their utility in protecting the valuable drug supply 

and cash on hand, demonstrates the use of the firearm to commit a 

felony). 

The cases of United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250; 

United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872; and United States v. 

Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895 do not support defendant's position. 

Feliz-Cordero is factually distinguishable because the gun was 

in a dresser drawer and there was "no basis to conclude that the 

gun would have been quickly accessible if needed." 859 F.2d at 

254. The court concluded that intent to use the firearm could not 

be inferred from the mere fact that the firearm was found in the 

same room where drug paraphernalia was found during execution of 

a search warrant. Id. In the case before this court, the loaded 

weapon was in close proximity to the drugs, located where it would 

be easily available for use to protect the drug stash, and was 

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Appellate Case: 89-1384 Document: 010110097366 Date Filed: 12/27/1990 Page: 11 
admittedly kept for protection. When it is considered that the 

predicate drug trafficking offense in this case was possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine, rather than distribution, and the 

concept of possession with intent to distribute is substituted for 

"transaction," it is clear that one of the two bases for inferring 

intent to use a gun during and in relation to a drug trafficking 

offense recognized in Feliz-Cordero is present here: the 

circumstances surrounding the presence of a firearm in a place 

where drugs intended for distribution are stored suggests that the 

firearm was strategically located so as to be quickly and easily 

available to protect possession of the drug supply for 

distribution. See United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d at 254. 

The defendant in Brockington was charged with and convicted 

of carrying a firearm during and in relation to the drug 

trafficking crime of possession with intent to distribute but the 

focus of the Fourth Circuit's opinion was whether there was a 

sufficient connection between possession of a firearm and the drug 

trafficking offense. United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d at 

875-76. Noting that legislative history indicated that the 

necessary relation existed "'if from the circumstances or otherwise 

it could be found that the defendant intended to use the gun if a 

contingency arose or to make his escape,'" 849 F. 2d at 876 (quoting 

H.R. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 314 n. 10 (1983), 

reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3492 n. 10), 

the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find the necessary 

relation from the evidence, which included evidence that at the 

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time of defendant's arrest, drugs were located on his person and 

a fully loaded semi-automatic pistol, which defendant later 

acknowledged he carried for protection, was under the floormat 

beneath the defendant's seat in a taxi in which he was then riding. 

We do not view the fact that the weapon was not within defendant's 

reach at the time of the arrest in this case, because defendant was 

in the shower, as a fact which necessarily distinguishes this case 

from Brockington. A reasonable jury could infer from the evidence 

in this case, as in Brockington, that the defendant intended to use 

the gun if necessary to protect the supply of drugs intended for 

distribution. 

The case of United States v. Gonzalez, 800 F.2d 895, cited by 

the defendant, is inapposite. The defendant's unsuccessful 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

§ 924 (c) conviction for use of a firearm during a robbery was 

apparently based solely on the fact that the gun was not loaded or 

was inoperable. 895 F.2d at 899. 

United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, involved the issue of 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under an 

earlier version of Section 924(c) (1), which made it unlawful to use 

a firearm to commit a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1) (1970). 

Although the amount of security employed by the defendant in that 

case was considerably greater than one firearm -- the defendant's 

office/residence was a "veritable fortress" with television 

monitors, steel reinforced doors and door frames and heavy duty 

locks, and the number of guns found in the rooms "amounted to a 

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small arsenal," 545 F.2d at 1312-13, the strategic location of the 

guns in that case as in this case permitted the inference that they 

were "used. to protect large quantities of cocaine and hence 

to commit the felony of possessing cocaine with intent to 

distribute it." Id. at 1312. 

IV. 

Double Jeopardy 

The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 

sixty-three (63) months on counts 1 through 5 and to imprisonment 

for a term of sixty (60) months on count 7, 4 the § 924(c) (1) 

offense, the latter sentence to be served consecutively to that 

imposed for counts 1 through 5. R. Vol. I Tab 18. Defendant 

suggests that the consecutive sentence required by 18 U. s. C. 

§ 924(c) constitutes double jeopardy because the Sentencing 

Guidelines permit the sentencing court to increase the base offense 

level by 2 levels for the use of a firearm in connection with the 

offenses charged in counts 1 through 5 of which defendant was 

convicted. See Sentencing Guidelines at§ 2D1.l(b) (1). 

The district court did not enhance the defendant's sentence 

for counts 1 through 5 under the guidelines because of the use of 

a firearm. See R. Vol. I Tab 18 & Vol. VII. Congress clearly and 

expressly intended that any sentence imposed for the offense of 

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug 

trafficking offense run consecutively with any sentence imposed for 

a drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried. 

4 Count 6 of the Indictment was dismissed. 

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18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1). "Where Congress intended, as it did here, 

to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does 

not violate the Constitution." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 

333, 344, 101 s.ct. 1137, __ 67 L.Ed.2d 275, 285 (1981). Accord 

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 s. ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 

(1983) (cumulative punishment under two statutes specifically 

authorized by state legislature does not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe 

the same conduct). Accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not 

violated by subjecting defendant to possible cumulative punishments 

for the same conduct or by the consecutive sentences imposed. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

DAVID L. RUSSELL 

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