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Parties Involved:
Tony Calvin Tsosie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FIL.L l1 

United States Court of Appeah: Tenth Circuit 

FEBO 8 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No. 92-2103 

v . 

TONY CALVIN TSOSIE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C . No. CR-91-363-SC) 

(D . New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, and MOORE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Tony Calvin Tsosie was convicted of one count of aggravated 

sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241 (c), and 

2245(2) {A) and (C) . The district court sentenced him to 168 

months' imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release . The 

defendant raises three issues in this direct appeal: (1) whether 

the trial court's limitation of the defendant's cross-examination 

of a witness violated his Sixth Amendment rights or was otherwise 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-2103 Document: 010110170299 Date Filed: 02/08/1993 Page: 1 
improper; (2) whether the government provided sufficient evidence 

to convict; and (3) whether the trial court's exclusion of 

polygraph evidence violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 

We conclude the district court abused its discretion in limiting 

cross-examination on a critical issue and reverse for a new trial. 

In anticipation of the recurrence of the issue, we hold the trial 

court did not err in denying the use of polygraph evidence . We 

also conclude the evidence was sufficient for conviction. 

Cecelia Caesar left her five-year-old daughter, Julia, at her 

cousin's home where Julia was to play with Travis, one of the 

children living there. After Ms. Caesar left, defendant hailed to 

Julia from the house and asked her to come inside. When the child 

entered, defendant called her to him, picked her up, and laid her 

on a couch . Defendant then pulled down her shorts and underwear 

and, according to Julia, "put his whole hand in my private part." 

When the defendant stopped, he pulled up her shorts, told her not 

to cry, and said he would buy her some candy. 

Julia then went outside, found Travis, and told him the 

defendant had touched her. She later saw her nine-year-old 

brother, Conan, ran up to him, grabbed his arm, and told him 

defendant touched her. Conan said Julia appeared frightened, so 

he told her to tell their mother . When their mother arrived, 

Conan saw Julia run toward her. 

Ms. Caesar testified when she returned to the house, Julia 

ran to her crying, and said, "Tony hurt me . " Ms. Caesar asked 

Julia who Tony was, and Julia pointed to t he defendant who was 

standing outside the house . Ms. Caesar approached the defendant 

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and asked what he had done to Julia. 

Julia all day and did not do anything 

mother the defendant was lying. 

He replied he had not seen 

to her. Julia told her 

After this exchange, Ms . Caesar left with Conan and Julia. 

They drove to Shiprock, New Mexico, to report the incident to the 

Shiprock Tribal Police. After talking to the police, Ms. Caesar 

took Julia to the Shiprock Indian Health Services Hospital for an 

examination. 

Dr. Martin Nygaard, Chief of Pediatrics at the Shiprock 

Indian Health Services Hospital, examined Julia shortly after the 

incident. Dr. Nygaard testified Julia told him "he pulled my 

pants down and he stuck his finger in my butt . " When he attempted 

to clarify what she meant by "butt," she pointed to her vaginal 

area. He examined Julia and discovered an area of redness, two 

millimeters in diameter, inside the vaginal opening. He did not 

observe tears, lacerations, or bleeding in the genital area, but 

he stated it is possible to have digital penetration with no tears 

or bleeding. 

Dr. Nygaard testified the redness h e noticed was consistent 

with Julia's story of sexual assault. However, he a l so stated 

this was a nonspecific finding, meaning the redness could have 

resulted from other causes. Finally, he stated Jul ia's genital 

opening was not big enough for a man's hand; and, "if she had told 

me that he had placed his entire hand in the opening, in that 

small opening, it would have changed the way I looked at it. " 

On dir ect e xami nation, Ms. Caesar testified that after the 

incident Julia began wetting the bed and having n i ghtmares. On 

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cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether Ms. Caesar loved 

her daughter and was upset over her daughter's report of the 

attack. Then he asked, "[D)uring this same general time period 

you were getting divorced from your husband, is that right? 111 The 

government objected, and in an ensuing bench conference defense 

counsel argued: 

Judge, the government provided some medical reports to 

me and in those reports it states that, one, they were 

in the process of a divorce; and, two, that the child 

had witnessed domestic violence, fighting between the 

mother and father, and I think that is a legitimate 

reason to state other reasons why she may have been 

having bed wetting problems, nightmares. 

Counsel then stated he "would like to ask if [Julia] witnessed 

that" because he thought it was "reasonable to argue to the 

jury. 112 The trial court responded: 

I think if it is relevant . . . it is way out on the 

fringes of relevance, and if it is relevant I'm not 

going to allow it on 403 grounds. I think the probative 

value is greatly outweighed by the possible confusion of 

the issues and possible prejudice. Objection will be 

sustained. 

After this conference, defense counsel did not ask Ms. Caesar or 

any other witness about Julia's bed wetting and nightmares. 

During closing argument, the government reminded the jury Ms. 

Caesar had testified about changes in Julia's behavior, stating: 

1 During opening argument, defense counsel stated, without 

objection, "[t]he evidence will show that Julia Caesar's parents 

were in the process of divorcing. She [Julia] had lost her 

father. Evidence shows that she had watched her parents involved 

in domestic violence and watched her father hurt her mother. " 

2 On cross- examination, Julia had stated that her father had 

left their home around the time this happened, and she was sad 

about his leaving . 

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[T]o moms this is significant. And mom is somebody who 

is with her child all the time, and she knows when 

there's--something, some major change in her child's 

life that results in these. major changes in behavior. 

Hadn't been bed [wetting] before, now starting to 

happen. Starting to have nightmares. Also highly 

corroborative. 

The defendant makes two arguments concerning the trial 

court's refusal to allow him to question Ms. Caesar regarding her 

divorce and whether Julia witnessed violence between Ms. Caesar 

and her husband. First, the defendant contends the trial court's 

ruling precluded his inquiry into an entire area of relevant 

cross-examination, thus infringing upon his Sixth Amendment right 

of confrontation. See United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 

287-88 (10th Cir. 1983) (defendant's right to confrontation may be 

violated if court precludes an entire area of relevant crossexamination). "'A constitutional violation occurs only when the 

defendant is prohibited from engaging in "otherwise appropriate 

cross-examination" and thereby prevented from exposing facts from 

which jurors "could appropriately draw inferences relating to the 

reliability of the witness."'" United States v. Ellzey. 936 F. 2d 

492, 496 (10th Cir.) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 

(1974))), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 400 (1991). The court reviews 

Confrontation Clause claims de novo. Id. at 495. 

Alternatively, if the ruling did not constitute a Sixth 

Amendment violation, defendant argues the trial court erred in 

limiting the extent of cross-examination. "[T]his is a matter of 

the trial judge's discretion and will not lead to reversal unless 

an abuse of discretion, clearly prejudicial to the defendant, is 

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shown." Valentine, 706 F.2d at 288. The trial judge has broad 

discretion to limit cross-examination based on concerns about 

prejudice, harassment, and confusion of the issues. Ellzey, 936 

F.2d at 496 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679). Here, the 

trial court ruled the 

whether Ms. Caesar 

probative value of questions concerning 

was divorcing her husband and whether Julia 

witnessed domestic violence was outweighed by possible prejudice 

and confusion of the issues. 

We start from the premise that the government opened the area 

of bed wetting and nightmares and their significance on direct 

examination, 

appropriate. 

Cir. 1991) 

examination). 

and, therefore, cross-examination on this area was 

See United States v. Drake, 932 F.2d 861, 866 (10th 

(direct examination on an area opens it to crossWhile this evidence was appropriately used to 

corroborate Julia's testimony, the trial court's ruling deprived 

the defense of its only practical opportunity to explore whether 

there were causes of Julia's bed wetting and nightmares other than 

the assault allegedly committed upon her. This denial left 

unchallenged the government's attempt to buttress the testimony of 

its key witness. 

The government argues the ruling did not preclude the 

defendant from obtaining similar evidence from other sources. The 

prosecution maintains the ruling merely precluded the defendant 

from asking questions about Ms. Caesar's marital problems. We 

would agree, but the argument does not assuage the total impact of 

the ruling. Although it did not result in a Sixth Amendment 

violation, it did have a detrimental effect on the trial. 

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The defense had a concrete basis for believing the marital 

difficulties between Julia's parents were serious potential causes 

of the child's behavioral changes. Moreover, it is not beyond 

reason to believe witnessing violence between her parents coupled 

with the attendant loss of her father's companionship through the 

divorce could produce an alteration of the child's behavior. 

In the context of this trial, only Ms. Caesar could have 

testified whether the acts of violence had occurred and whether 

the child had witnessed them. Thus, while counsel was not 

prevented from establishing other pertinent circumstances through 

different witnesses, the district court improperly curtailed 

appropriate and critical cross-examination. 

We believe the court's conclusion that cross-examination 

would have been confusing to the jury resulted from a mistaken 

reading of the purpose behind the line of questioning. The 

defense was not trying to inject extraneous facts into evidence , 

but to legitimately attack the government's effort to provide 

substantial support to its key witness. Rather than confuse the 

jury, the testimony could have given it a validly contested matter 

of fact to resolve . 

Under the circumstances, depriving the defense of the 

opportunity to explore this important avenue was an abuse of 

discretion. Although led to the erroneous conclusion by the 

government's misdirected objection, the effect of the court's 

ruling leads us to conclude the defendant must be given another 

trial. Because other issues raised may have bearing on the 

outcome of that trial, our inquiry cannot end here, however. 

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We have reviewed the record and conclude the evidence was 

sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. "A conviction 

can constitutionally stand only if, after viewing all of the 

evidence presented at the trial in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational 

essential elements of the 

trier-of-fact could have found the 

crime charged beyond a reasonable 

doubt . " Beachum v. Tansy. 903 F.2d 1321, 1332 (10th Cir. ) (citing 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 269 (1990) . 

In this case, the government's burden was to establish that 

there had been penetration, however slight, of the victim's 

genital opening by a hand or finger, done with an intent to abuse, 

humiliate, harass, or degrade the victim, or arouse or gratify the 

defendant's sexual desires. 18 U. S.C. §§ 2241(c) and 2245 (2 ) (C) 

and (3). The essential elements of the crime were established by 

Julia's testimony. Defendant's attempt to discredit this 

testimony merely goes to its weight and not to a deficiency in the 

elements of proof. 

Defendant next argues the trial court's exclusion of his 

polygraph evidence violated his right to due process and a fair 

trial. This court reviews the trial court's admissibility 

decision under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. 

Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The defendant asserts Ms. Caesar's testimony that Julia said 

he was lying was an attack on his credibility. He "would have 

used the evidence that he had passed a polygraph examination to 

rebut the government's direct and preceding evidence that 

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the defendant lied when he denied sexually abusing or assaulting 

[Julia] . 11 Under Hall, defendant argues, the fact he oassed a 

polygraph examination is admissible to rebut the government's 

attack on his credibility. 

In Hall, the court admitted evidence the defendant had taken 

and failed two polygraph tests. Prior to the trial, the court 

warned the defendant that if he sought to impugn the quality of 

the government's investigation, the court would allow a detective 

to testify that she considered a full investigation unnecessary 

because the defendant had failed two polygraph examinations. 

During cross-examination of the detective, the defendant raised 

the issue of the investigation's quality, and, on redirect, the 

court allowed the detective to explain she narrowed the 

investigation to the defendant because he failed two polygraph 

examinations. Id. at 1415. 

"In this Circuit, polygraphs are not admissible to show that 

one is truthful. This is so because of the belief that the 

reliability of such tests is yet in doubt, although it has been 

noted that, in a proper case, the evidence might be admissible . " 

Id. at 1416 (citations omitted). While there have been 

circumstances which have led other circuits to allow polygraph 

evidence for limited purposes, United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 

1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1979) ("party offering the evidence was not 

asserting the accuracy of the test results"), cert. denied, 446 

U.S. 954 (1980); Tyler v . United States, 193 F . 2d 24, 31 (D.C. 

Cir. 1951) (to show circumstances leading to a confession to rebut 

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charges of coercion), cert. denied, 343 U.S . 908 (1952), this case 

does not fall within their shadow. 

Although defendant attempts to establish this case is one of 

those "proper cases" where polygraph evidence comes in as rebuttal 

evidence, his effort falls short. While he argues he wanted to 

use the evidence to rebut the testimony that he was lying, the 

substance of his effort was simply to show he was truthful. This 

falls squarely within Hall's holding polygraphs are not admissible 

to show truthfulness. 

Moreover, the cases the defendant cites do not bolster his 

argument. See Toussaint v. McCarthy. 926 F.2d 800, 802-03 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (prison officials may use polygraph evidence to 

determine if prisoners have given up gang affiliation and are 

eligible for release from segregation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 

213 (1991); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 

1989) (polygraph evidence might be admissible for a limited 

purpose unrelated to the substantive correctness of the results of 

the polygraph examination) (citing Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 

1397 (9th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F . 2d 1529, 

1535-37 (11th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (revisiting issue of 

admissibility of polygraph evidence and setting standards for 

admissibility). The trial court did not err in refusing the 

testimony. 

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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

REVERSED IN PART. The case is REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL in 

accordance with the provisions of this order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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