Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06366/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06366-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma
Appellee
Ron Champion
Appellee
Mark D. Demoss
Appellant

Document Text:

FILLD 

UNITED STATES COURT OF AP~ StatesCoμrt~Appea\! Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 14 1993 ---------------- MARK D. DeMOSS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

RON CHAMPION; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-6366 

(D.C. No. CIV-92-1514 ) 

(W. Dist. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Mark David DeMoss, a state prisoner appearing prose, brought 

this petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 u.s.c. § 2254 

(1988), alleging that he has been denied a timely direct appeal of 

his state court convictions and seeking to have his case treated 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

b e cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6366 Document: 010110200948 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 1 
under Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991 ) .

1 The 

action was referred to a magistrate judge, who issued a report and 

recommendation concluding that the instant situation does not fall 

under the circumstances present in Harris, and recommending that 

the petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court 

remedies. The district court agreed that this case is not 

appropriate for consolidation with the Harris cases and that 

therefore exhaustion should not be excused. Accordingly, the 

court dismissed the petition without prejudice. We grant DeMoss' 

motions for a certificate of probable cause and to proceed in 

forma pauperis, and we affirm. 

In his federal habeas petition, DeMoss raises only his 

failure to obtain a timely direct appeal and does not assert any 

other constitutional defects regarding his state court 

convictions. The facts underlying his claim are as follows. 

DeMoss was sentenced on his state court convictions on October 17, 

1991, and filed a timely notice of intent to appeal on October 22, 

1991. On October 24, DeMoss filed a timely designation of record 

for appeal. These motions were apparently filed by DeMoss' trial 

counsel. DeMoss' petition in error was required to be filed with 

1 DeMoss o riginally filed his petition in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, which 

transferred the case to the Western District. DeMoss argues on 

appeal that the transfer was improper because the Western District 

is without jurisdiction to rule on cases asserting a Harris claim. 

DeMoss is mistaken. This court granted rehearing and amended the 

original order in Harris. See 938 F.2d at 1072-73 . The order on 

rehearing makes clear that when a Harris-type case arises in the 

Northern, Eastern, or Western Districts, each district will review 

the petition accordingly. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6366 Document: 010110200948 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 2 
the state court of criminal appeals by April 17, 1992. Sometime 

between October 24 and April 17, DeMoss was provided appointed 

counsel through the state indigent defense system. The appellate 

indigent defender received the records and transcripts in DeMoss' 

case on April 17, but did not receive the order appointing that 

office as counsel. Once that problem was sorted out, on April 27, 

1992, the appellate defender began efforts to obtain leave to file 

the petition in error out of time, which would result in the time 

for appeal starting anew. Those efforts resulted in an order on 

July 29, 1992, requiring DeMoss' petition in error to be filed 

sixty days after that date, with the parties' briefs due sixty 

days thereafter. 

There is no indication in the papers before this court, other 

than the initial five-month delay, that DeMoss' direct appeal is 

not proceeding according to the above schedule. In Harris, to the 

contrary, the petitioner was sentenced on September 29, 1988, was 

granted a late appeal on May 18, 1989, and was told almost a year 

after that that his brief would not be filed for at least three 

more years. See 938 F.2d at 1064. We held there that this 

excessive and unjustified delay relieved the petitioner of his 

obligation to exhaust the very remedies he claimed were being 

unconstitutionally protracted. Id. at 1068-69. The instant 

circumstances, involving as they do a five-month delay, simply do 

n ot invo lve the "'inordinate, excessive and inexcusable delay'" in 

the appellate process presented in Harris, id . at 1065 . 

Accordingly, we conclude that DeMoss is required to exhaust his 

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Appellate Case: 92-6366 Document: 010110200948 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 3 
claim that the delay in his direct criminal appeal viol ated his 

constitutional rights. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED . The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

-4-

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6366 Document: 010110200948 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 4