Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02299/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pamela Lynn Rux
Plaintiff
Starbucks Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA LYNN RUX,

Plaintiff,

v.

STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a

Washington corporation; and 

DOES I through XX, inclusive;

Defendants.

CIV S-05-2299 MCE PAN 

ORDER 

— —

On February 1, 2006, the parties filed a stipulation and

proposed protective order that would permit any party or third

party to designate as “Confidential” any material that

“constitutes or includes proprietary business or financial, or

personal information or information furnished to it in confidence

by any third-party, which information is not known or freely

accessible to the general public” or “would violate the

legitimate privacy interests of either party or third parties.” 

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The proposed order would allow any party to pursue an ex parte

motion on shortened time to file “Confidential” material under

seal in this court. 

For the reasons set forth below, the proposed order is

denied without prejudice to this court’s consideration of a more

narrowly drawn request for protective order consistent with the

principles set forth below and made by motion pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(c).

There exists in the Ninth Circuit a strong presumption in

favor of public access to court records in civil cases. Foltz v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.

2003)(citing Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir.

1995)). The fruits of pretrial discovery are presumptively

public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 187

F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999); Citizens First Nat’l Bank v.

Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he

public at large pays for the courts and therefore has an interest

in what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding.”). 

On the other hand, there is no public interest in

documents exchanged between the parties in pretrial discovery

that are not filed with the court, and the parties may do as they

agree among themselves without approval of the court regarding

classification of such documents as confidential. Seattle Times

Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984)(“[m]uch of the

information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be

unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause

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of action”). 

The public right of access surfaces when parties seek to

seal documents filed in conjunction with a discovery motion and

ripens when documents are filed in conjunction with a dispositive

motion or at trial. When parties rely upon and file documents to

support motions requiring a decision on the merits of a pending

dispute, i.e., by dispositive motion, the public interest in

access to court records grows stronger, see Foltz, 331 F.3d at

1135 (citing Rushford v. The New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249,

252 (4th Cir. 1988)), and is at its zenith in the context of

civil trial, Hagestad, 49 F.3d 1424. 

 When parties make a discovery motion that requires

consideration of potentially confidential documents, the public

interest in understanding the proceedings must be balanced

against the interests of the parties in avoiding unwarranted

disclosure of proprietary information, infringement of trade

secrets, and the like. The confidentiality of discovery

documents is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which provides: 

“Upon motion by a party or by a person from whom discovery is

sought . . . and for good cause shown, the court in which the

action is pending . . . may make any order which justice requires

to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The party seeking

protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm

will result if no protective order is granted. Phillips v.

General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002); see

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San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1102 (holding that to gain a

protective order the party must make “particularized showing of

good cause with respect to any individual document”); Beckman

Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th

Cir. 1992) (holding that “broad allegations of harm,

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do

not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”).

If a court finds specific harm will result from

disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the

public and private interests to decide whether a protective order

is necessary. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211; Glenmede Trust Co. v.

Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). Several factors,

which are neither mandatory nor exhaustive, may be considered in

evaluating whether good cause for a protective order exists,

including (1) whether disclosure will violate privacy interests,

(2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate

purpose, (3) whether disclosure will cause a party embarrassment,

(4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information

important to public health and safety, (5) whether the sharing of

information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency,

(6) whether the putative beneficiary of the order is a public

entity or official entitled to less protection than a private

person, and (7) whether the case involves issues important to the

public. Glenmede, 56 F.3d at 483.

If a protective order is warranted it should be limited

in scope and narrowly tailored, protecting only that information

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1 When documents are sealed, they must be described obscurely in the

docket, which degrades the usefulness of the docket as an index. The

documents are sealed, literally, in separate envelopes and kept in a safe. No

law clerk or judge can retrieve the court file for comprehensive review

without “checking out” the sealed documents from the safe. Hearings become

awkward because of concern about observing the sealing order. Writing

decisions about the merits is made more difficult and time consuming. 

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necessary to guard the movant’s privacy or property rights, or

both, and no more. See Citizens, 178 F.3d at 945. Blanket

stipulated protective orders are disfavored; they are inherently

subject to challenge and modification because the party resisting

disclosure has not made a particularized showing of good cause

with respect to an individual document. San Jose Mercury News,

187 F.3d at 1103.

The proposed protective order does not allow for the kind

of balancing this court must undertake. Significant matters of

public interest are presented by this case, even at the discovery

phase. The public’s interest in Starbuck’s employment practices

is substantial, and plaintiff’s initiation of this lawsuit

necessarily diminishes her right to withhold pertinent private

information.

Consideration must also be given to the sealing orders 

have on the clerk of court, law clerks, and judges assigned to

this case, both to observe the order and to specially handle

sealed documents.1

Accordingly, the proposed order is denied without

prejudice to consideration of a narrowly drawn motion for

protective order made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and in

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compliance with E. D. Cal. L. R. 37-251.

So ordered.

Dated: February 6, 2006. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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