Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-15-05045/USCOURTS-ca6-15-05045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Brian Vance
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 17a0020p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CHRIS YOUNG (14-6081); ALTO PARNELL (14-

6451); BRIAN VANCE (15-5045); DEMETRIUS 

DUNCAN (15-5738), 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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Nos. 14-6081/ 14-6451/ 

 15-5045/ 15-5738 

Appeal from the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. 

No. 3:11-cr-00012—Kevin H. Sharp, Chief District Judge. 

Argued: October 19, 2016 

Decided and Filed: January 26, 2017 

 Before: KEITH, BATCHELDER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: James G. Thomas, NEAL & HARWELL, PLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant 

in 14-6081. William Nolan, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL FEDERAL 

APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant in 14-6451. Manuel 

B. Russ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant in 15-5045. Benjamin H. Perry, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for Appellant in 15-5738. Finnuala K. Tessier, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James G. Thomas, Andrew A. 

Warth, NEAL & HARWELL, PLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant in 14-6081. William 

Nolan, Melissa M. Salinas, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL FEDERAL 

APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant in 14-6451. Manuel 

B. Russ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant in 15-5045. Benjamin H. Perry, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for Appellant in 15-5738. Finnuala K. Tessier, Sunny A.M. Koshy, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 

>

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_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendants Chris Young (“Young”), Demetrius Duncan 

(“Duncan”), Alto Parnell (“Parnell’), and Brian Vance (“Vance”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 

appeal their convictions and sentences (collectively, “judgments”) entered by the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee for conspiracy, inter alia, to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine 

base. The district court sentenced Vance to 200-months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Young 

and Parnell each to two concurrent terms of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility 

of parole, and Duncan to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 

For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgments for all four 

Defendants. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This case arises out of a multi-year investigation into a large drug-trafficking 

organization in Clarksville, Tennessee. The leader of the organization, Robert Porter (“Porter”), 

distributed large quantities of cocaine to Vance, Young, and others. Vance distributed powder 

and crack cocaine to Parnell, Duncan, and others, using a stash house in the Summit Heights 

housing projects and a cookhouse nearby. Parnell and Duncan then sold the cocaine and crack 

cocaine to Clarksville residents. Federal agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) 

obtained wiretap applications and search warrants, which provided the government with enough 

evidence to arrest twenty-six individuals associated with the drug trafficking organization, 

including Defendants. 

Porter was in the process of selling thousands of dollars of cocaine to Young when he 

was arrested. The morning after Porter’s arrest, agents executed search warrants and seized 

drugs, guns, cash, and drug paraphernalia from the homes of Duncan, Vance, and others. In 

total, thirty-six individuals were charged in an indictment. Thirty-three of those individuals 

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pleaded guilty, including Vance, who was sentenced to a below Guidelines term of 200-months’ 

imprisonment. Duncan, Young, and Parnell went to trial, and were each found guilty of multiple 

offenses and sentenced to mandatory terms of life imprisonment without parole. 

Procedural History 

A. Indictment 

On January 12, 2011, a grand jury charged Vance, Duncan, Parnell, and Young in a fourcount indictment with conspiracy, among other things, to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute controlled substances, including 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more 

of cocaine base, otherwise known as crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 

846 (Count One). Vance was also charged with possession with intent to distribute crack 

cocaine, in violation of § 841(a)(1) (Count Two). 

B. Superseding Indictment 

On April 17, 2013, a grand jury returned a twenty-two count superseding indictment 

charging, among other things, Duncan, Parnell, and Young with conspiracy to distribute and 

possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count One). 

Vance was also charged with being an accessory after the fact to a Hobbs Act violation 

and to possession and discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in 

death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 924(c), and 924(j) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3 (Count 

Eight) and conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2 

(Count Nine). 

Duncan and Parnell were separately charged with possessing cocaine and crack cocaine 

within 1,000 feet of a public housing authority with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and 860 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Four). Duncan was individually charged with: 

possession of cocaine base and marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of § 841(a)(1) 

(Count Sixteen); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation 

of §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and § 924(c) (Count Seventeen); and being a felon in possession of a 

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firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count Eighteen). Young was also 

charged separately with: attempted possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school with 

intent to distribute, in violation of §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 860 (Count Eleven); possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and 

§ 924(c) (Count Twelve); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 

§§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count Thirteen).1

C. Vance Pleads Guilty to Remaining Charges 

Vance pleaded guilty to the conspiracy and possession charges on April 15, 2013. 

On June 10, 2013, Vance pleaded guilty to both Hobbs Act counts, and on September 16, 2013, 

the district court sentenced Vance to a 200-month term of imprisonment and a five year term of 

supervised release. 

D. Trial and Sentencing 

On August 6, 2013, trial commenced on the remaining counts for Young, Duncan, and 

Parnell. The government provided evidence in the form of testimony from five co-conspirators 

and a witness to a warranted search of Duncan’s residence, testimony from law enforcement 

agents, more than two hundred intercepted phone conversations between co-conspirators, 

surveillance footage, and evidence seized during the warranted searches and arrests. The jury 

convicted Duncan, Parnell, and Young on all counts, except for Duncan, who was acquitted on 

Count Four. 

On September 28, 2014, the district court sentenced Young to concurrent mandatory 

terms of life imprisonment on the drug-related offenses (Counts One and Eleven). On November 

24, 2014, the district court sentenced Parnell to concurrent mandatory terms of life imprisonment 

on Counts One and Four. On April 27, 2015, the district court sentenced Duncan to a mandatory 

term of life imprisonment on Count One. 

 1

On August 1, 2013, Young pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession count. 

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Statement of Facts 

Robert Porter, the leader of the Vice Lords drug organization, trafficked large amounts of 

cocaine in Clarksville, Tennessee. Porter obtained the cocaine from suppliers, such as Quinice 

Cross and Gregory Brooks (“Brooks”). Brooks testified at trial that he supplied Porter with 

10 kilograms of cocaine between 2009 and 2010, with each kilogram costing between $30,000 

and $35,000. Porter would then supply Vance, Young, and others with cocaine. Donnie 

Patterson (“Patterson”), a co-conspirator, testified at trial that Porter would supply him with a 

quarter to half a kilogram of cocaine about twice a week. Patterson also testified that he saw 

Porter supply Vance with cocaine. Dmitri Johnson (“Johnson”), another co-conspirator, testified 

that he saw Porter cook powder cocaine into crack cocaine at his home on a regular basis, and 

that he witnessed Porter supply crack cocaine to Young at least twice. 

A. Young’s Involvement in the Conspiracy 

Intercepted telephone conversations between Young and Porter and surveillance footage 

revealed that Porter had provided Young with tens of thousands of dollars of cocaine for 

distribution. For instance, on September 12, 2010, Young told Porter that he was “waitin on one 

more person” and with that he should have “fifty five all together,” or $5,500, for the cocaine 

that Porter had provided him. (Appendix A GX 98a.) 

Porter also taught Young how to cook crack cocaine. During a long phone call on 

September 18, 2010, Young discussed with Porter his concern that he was not producing all of 

the crack he could be, due to his inability to properly cook the powder. “I clearly seen when I 

knocked it down that it was not all that it was supposed to be . . . [It] wasn’t nothin but twelve 

but I’m wonderin like why and how did it be like that.” (Appendix A GX 136a.) Porter then 

told Young that he was not “trippin . . . I still [mess] up too . . . so that aint your first time that 

aint goin to be your last.” (Id.) 

On December 9, 2010, a federal magistrate judge issued a search warrant. On December 

10, 2010, agents executed the warrant for Porter while he was in the middle of selling cocaine to 

Young at a gas station. Agents located a cell phone inside Porter’s car. They also found bundles 

of cash, totaling $10,190 underneath where Young was sitting in the vehicle and from his pants 

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pocket. Additionally, the agents uncovered a loaded handgun, as well as a digital scale from the 

center console of Young’s car. The scale was covered in white residue that later tested positive 

for cocaine. During trial, Young stipulated that he unlawfully possessed the loaded gun. 

Although not directly related to Young’s involvement in the conspiracy, agents recovered 

192 grams of cocaine and 159 grams of crack cocaine from the center console of Porter’s vehicle 

during the arrest. 

B. Vance’s Involvement 

Vance, the highest-ranking member of the gang out of the four Defendants in this appeal, 

sold the cocaine he purchased from Porter to Duncan, Parnell, and others. On December 11, 

2010, a search warrant was executed at Vance’s residence, where agents seized $11,000 from a 

safe, 90 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, a holstered and loaded firearm, ammunition, gun 

cases for the holstered firearm, gun cases for a pistol, and boxes for an assault rifle. Testimony 

at the trial also revealed that Vance cooked powder cocaine into crack cocaine at the residence of 

Jevita Banister on Happy Hollow Road. 

C. Parnell’s Involvement 

Parnell usually obtained cocaine directly from Vance; however, on August 27, 2010, 

Vance told Parnell over an intercepted telephone conversation that he obtained his drugs from 

Porter, and Parnell responded that he had “figured that.” (Appendix A GX 73a.) 

On various occasions, Vance and Parnell were worried that they and their fellow gang 

members were on the verge of being caught by the authorities. For instance, on August 6, 2010, 

Parnell telephoned Vance to warn him about the police “vice truck, the K-9 truck” and how it 

had pulled someone over on Thompkins Lane. (Appendix A GX 27a.) In another conversation 

on October 9, 2010, Vance called Parnell to inform him that he could not come over because he 

was “packed” and “too dirty.” (Appendix A GX 163a.) In that same conversation, Parnell asked 

Vance how he did, or how he “pull[ed]” last night,” and Vance responded that he “had nothing 

but a quarter,” and that he “put 21 in and got 19, the shit look like [ ] if you crush it up it look . . . 

real funny, crunchy looking but it jumped though . . . and the powder real real hard.” (Id.) On 

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November 20, 2010, Vance and Parnell discussed how law enforcement arrested other members 

of the conspiracy and how they “almost caught [Parnell] walking out of Toya’s crib [ ] with an 

ounce of powder on [him].” (Appendix A GX 191a.) Vance and Parnell also discussed enlisting 

younger individuals to sell the cocaine and crack cocaine for them: “They gotta sell it. They got 

to.” (Id.) Vance then stated, “[I]f we fall it’s a [w]rap . . . [w]hat they gonna do . . . without me 

or you?” (Id.) 

D. Duncan’s Involvement 

Duncan usually obtained crack cocaine from Vance in one-ounce quantities (28 grams), 

which he then sold to others. On October 29, 2010, Duncan called Vance to ask about buying 

some “whip” because he had “three plays.” (Appendix A GX 175a.) Testimony from law 

enforcement agents at trial revealed that “whip” stands for crack cocaine, and a “play” is a 

customer. On November 17, 2010, Duncan and Vance discussed how much cocaine Duncan had 

purchased from Vance and then sold to clients, and how much Vance was storing at Duncan’s. 

(Appendix A GX 187a) (Vance stated to Duncan that “you had nine, you sold one that made 

eight, and I put three with it, [t]hen I took it, I took four, so theres [sic] seven of that there . . . 

seven whip.”). Duncan obtained cocaine and crack cocaine from other members of the 

conspiracy. For example, on November 24, 2010, when Duncan asked Vance for nine ounces 

(255 grams) of cocaine powder to cook into crack cocaine, Vance told him to call Young Money 

(another co-conspirator). (Appendix A GX 197a). Duncan was also aware that Porter was 

Vance’s supplier. For instance, on September 7, 2010, Duncan spoke with Vance on the 

telephone and asked if Porter was still selling cocaine and crack cocaine by the ounce. 

(Appendix A GX 89a). 

On December 11, 2010, agents executed a search, pursuant to the search warrant issued 

December 9, 2010, of Duncan’s home. During the search, agents found a Smith & Wesson 

.40 caliber handgun, three loaded magazines for the .40 caliber handgun, and a gun holster in 

Duncan’s bedroom, right near a $902 stack of cash. Duncan stipulated at trial that he was a 

convicted felon prohibited from possessing a firearm. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

Defendants raise numerous challenges to their convictions and sentences. Specifically, 

Duncan argues that the district court erred in denying: (1) his motions to suppress the 

communications intercepted from Vance’s phone, and the drugs, guns, and cash seized from 

Duncan’s home pursuant to the search warrant; and (2) his request for an evidentiary hearing 

pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 

Parnell argues that the district court erred in admitting: (1) co-conspirator statements; 

(2) a law enforcement agent’s testimony concerning background evidence about the 

investigation; (3) cooperating witness testimony about their guilty pleas; (4) evidence of gun 

crimes committed by co-conspirators and co-defendants; and (5) evidence of other crimes 

committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

Young, Parnell, and Duncan argue that the district court erred in: (1) admitting a law 

enforcement agent’s testimony interpreting the wiretapped conversations during trial; (2) failing 

to give a cautionary jury instruction addressing the dual roles of the testimony given by the case 

agents; (3) declining to strike 21 U.S.C. § 851 informations; and (4) concluding that the Eighth 

Amendment does not prohibit a term of life imprisonment for a drug felon convicted of 

conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. 

Finally, Parnell and Vance challenge their respective sentences. 

A. Motions to Suppress 

Duncan challenges the district court’s denial of motions to suppress filed by Vance and 

Duncan with regard to the wiretap for Vance’s phone, which intercepted calls between Vance 

and Duncan, in addition to subsequent wiretap applications and renewals relying on that wiretap 

application. 

1. Waiver 

First and foremost, we conclude that Duncan has waived his challenge to the denial of the 

motions to suppress. Duncan merely cites to the governing rules and relevant case law on Fourth 

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Amendment jurisprudence and wiretap applications, without citations to the record explaining 

why there was no probable cause. Duncan attempts to provide justification for his perfunctory 

argument by explaining that the “word limitations of the instant Brief do[] not allow for the 

parsing of the deficiencies in the 16 authorizations at issue in this appeal.” (Duncan Br. 34.) 

Duncan then points to the “respective motions [to suppress] in the record” for the “particularized 

analysis relevant to each application.” (Duncan Br. 34.) Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

28(a)(8)(A) provides that the argument section of an appellate brief must contain “appellant’s 

contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on 

which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). 

Here, Duncan cites to the parts in the record where the motions to suppress are located, 

and also to the part where the district court denied them. However, Duncan does not point to any 

findings in the record which would demonstrate how the district court erred or why the wiretap 

application lacked probable cause. See United States v. Meda, 812 F.3d 502, 519 (6th Cir. 2015) 

(holding argument in brief that was not supported by citation need not be addressed by the court 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A)); see also Dog Pound, LLC v. City 

of Monroe, Mich., 558 F. App’x 589, 594 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that appellant waived 

argument on appeal by failing to “advance a single argument as to why the judgment of the 

district court . . . was in error,” and the “district court’s reasoning [was not] brought into 

question.”). 

Even if Duncan did not waive this argument, his challenge to the denial of the motions to 

suppress would still fail because the wiretap application established probable cause that 

surveillance of Vance’s telephone would reveal communications concerning drug trafficking and 

necessity for the warrant. 

2. Standard of Review 

When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we review the lower 

court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Lyons, 

687 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 450 (6th Cir. 

2010)). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the Court, on reviewing the evidence, “is left 

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with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. 

Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Whether a search and 

seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law. United States v. 

Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 628 

(6th Cir. 2003)). Because the district court denied the motions to suppress, we review all 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Long. 464 F.3d 569, 

572 (6th Cir. 2006). 

3. Analysis 

a. Wiretap of Vance’s Phone 

Duncan first argues (1) that the affidavit in support of the wiretap application failed to 

establish probable cause, and (2) the wiretaps were not necessary to the investigation because the 

investigation’s objectives could have been satisfied without resorting to such an extraordinary 

surveillance technique. 

In order to conduct electronic surveillance using a wiretap, federal law enforcement 

officials must secure authorization by making an application containing “a full and complete 

statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why 

they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2518(1)(c). This provision, commonly referred to as the “needs statement provision,” was 

designed to insure that wiretapping is not resorted to in a situation where traditional investigative 

techniques “would suffice to expose the crime.” United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163 (6th 

Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). “[W]hat is needed is to show that 

wiretaps are not being routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation.” Id. 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A district court has “considerable discretion” in 

determining whether the requirements of § 2518(1)(c) have been satisfied. United States v. 

Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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i. Probable Cause in Affidavit 

We hold that the affidavit underlying the wiretap application for Vance’s phone 

established probable cause that a wiretap of Vance’s phone would lead to evidence relating to the 

Porter drug trafficking organization. The affiant, Agent Whitsett, noted that he had participated 

in the investigation of the Porter drug trafficking organization since 2006 and was familiar with 

the facts and circumstances of the investigation due to his oral and written communications with 

other DEA agents, other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, and confidential 

informants. Agent Whitsett provided information specifically relating to Vance’s telephone, i.e., 

Target Telephone 2 (“TT2”). Agent Whitsett stated that in the course of interceptions of Target 

Telephone 1 (“TT1”), a phone used by known drug trafficker, Donnie Patterson, agents verified 

that Patterson called TT2 from TT1 after a confidential informant asked Patterson if he had any 

drugs to sell. 

Agent Whitsett confirmed that Vance, also known as “Bird,” was using TT2 to talk to 

Patterson about availability and pricing for controlled substances. (R. 752, Agent Whitsett’s 

Wiretap Affidavit for Vance’s Telephone, PageID# 2712−13.)2 Agent Whitsett also noted that 

Patterson called Vance on TT2, in which Vance references that he is “in the kitchen.” (Id. at 

2714.) Agent Whitsett discussed in the affidavit that “in the kitchen” or “cooking” are code 

terms for manufacturing crack cocaine, and that Vance’s reference to one of these terms meant 

that he was in the kitchen making crack cocaine. (Id.) On another phone call, Patterson called 

Vance and discussed the arrests of fellow drug dealers and Vance’s run from police when he was 

“loaded,” which means, according to Agent Whitsett, that Vance was carrying controlled 

substances on his person. (Id. at 2715−19.) 

In another phone call between Vance and Patterson, Patterson asks Vance for money, and 

Vance replies that Vance “can get [Patterson] five thousand if [he] need[s] it.” (Id. at 2720−21.) 

Agent Whitsett notes that Vance is letting Patterson know that he has large sums of money on 

him. Agent Whitsett also provides information in the affidavit on prior drug investigations 

 2

We note that the PageID numbers correspond to either to the PageID number listed at the top right-hand 

corner of the document or the page number of the individual document due to the voluminous nature of the record 

and the fact that parts of the record did not have PageID numbers listed at the top of the page. 

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involving Vance for crack cocaine and manufacturing of crack cocaine offenses. Additionally, 

Agent Whitsett described TT2’s toll analysis which showed an “extreme frequency” of calls to 

and from TT2 over a short period of time, and contact with telephone numbers associated with 

other known or suspected controlled substance traffickers. Agent Whitsett described both of 

these observations as indicators that the phone is being used to traffic controlled substances. 

ii. Wiretap was Necessary 

Second, we find that the government met their burden of demonstrating necessity. 

The government “is not required to prove that every other conceivable method has been tried and 

failed or that all avenues of investigation have been exhausted.” Alfano, 838 F.2d at 163. We 

have summarized the “necessity requirement” as follows: 

All that is required is that the investigators give serious consideration to the nonwiretap techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the court be 

informed of the reasons for the investigators’ belief that such non-wiretap 

techniques have been or will likely be inadequate. 

Id. at 163−64. This is precisely what the government did in this case. Agent Whitsett stated in 

the wiretap application that the agents used telephone toll records and pen register data as an 

investigative tool; however, he noted that “[t]his technique . . . only will provide agents with a 

list of numbers called and will not establish the identities of the persons called or the content of 

the conversations . . . . Such information is most productive when used in conjunction with 

intercepted conversations.” (R. 752 at 2732.) Moreover, the affiant noted that “the information 

gleaned from [these] telephone records alone has not enabled agents to identify additional Target 

Subjects, i.e., the source(s) of supply, or ascertain the inner-workings of the organization.” (Id.) 

Additionally, with regard to the use of confidential informants and cooperating codefendants, Agent Whitsett stated that “[e]ven though confidential sources and cooperating 

defendants provide valuable information and assistance, [the] [a]ffiant believes that such 

information is limited and the continued use of confidential sources and or cooperating 

defendants, even combined with other conventional investigative techniques, would not result in 

the dismantlement of the [Porter Drug Trafficking Organization] PDTO.” (Id. at 2737.) Agent 

Whitsett also noted that, with regard to the use of undercover agents as another investigative 

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technique, “[m]embers of large-scale drug trafficking organizations are particularly suspicious of 

individuals with whom they are not familiar.” (Id.) Agent Whitsett stated that “it is extremely 

unlikely that an undercover agent could successfully infiltrate [the PDTO]” at such a high level. 

(Id.) Moreover, the case agent noted that they had asked a confidential informant familiar with 

Vance to assist law enforcement in targeting Vance, but that he was unwilling to do so. (Id.) 

The affiant also mentioned how Grand Jury subpoenas would reveal the investigation and expose 

the prosecution before it was necessary to do so, and how physical undercover surveillance, 

especially in concentrated residential areas, is often impossible as there is a high risk that the 

surveillance will be spotted by the Target Subjects. (Id. at 2730−31.) 

The district court, after holding a hearing on the motion to suppress, found that there was 

probable cause for authorization of the wiretaps. The court found that there was a substantial 

basis to conclude that there was an on-going conspiracy that had been in existence for many 

years, and thus, the “[wire]taps and the reasons therefor[e] are current and not stale.” (R. 2374, 

Wiretap Hearing, PageID# 12343.) The district court further found that the case agent met the 

burden of necessity because he demonstrated that “traditional techniques have been considered 

or employed such as confidential information, physical surveillance, pen registers, toll 

information, financial investigations, Grand Jury subpoenas, undercover agent and tracking 

devices,” which “clearly evidence[d] the limitations and the need for wiretap surveillance in 

order to complete the investigation of the conspiracy.” (R. 2374 at 12345−46.) 

Duncan argues that the government could have “take[n] down the [ ]PDTO during the 

time period they were readily using CIs,” but did not do that “in order to stockpile evidence that 

ultimately lead to the request for wiretaps.” Duncan also argues that the stated wiretap objective 

was to learn the identity of the leaders and sources, but law enforcement knew the identity of 

these individuals for years prior to the wiretap, thus, this objective could have been met without 

resort to wiretapping. We are not persuaded by Duncan’s arguments because the stated objective 

of the investigation was to dismantle the drug trafficking organization, and wiretapping 

individuals alleged to be involved in the conspiracy certainly furthered that objective. Thus, we 

hold that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because the affidavit 

gave a substantial basis for finding probable cause and necessity. 

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b. Search of Duncan’s Residence 

Duncan next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 

evidence obtained from the search of residence because: (1) the search warrant was without 

probable cause because it relied on communications from the unlawful wiretaps; (2) the affidavit 

underlying the search warrant possessed no information that drug trafficking occurred at the 

residence: (3) the affidavit possessed no information that Duncan resided at the residence 

searched; (4) the affidavit fails to establish any reasonable nexus between drug trafficking and 

the residence searched; and (5) the affidavit relied on stale information 

To determine whether probable cause for a search exists, a judge issuing a warrant must 

“make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 

affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying 

hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238−39 (1983). The duty of a 

reviewing court is to insure that the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that 

probable cause existed. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to establish 

probable cause, there must be a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought. 

See United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

We conclude that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 

cause for a search existed. As mentioned above, the wiretaps were not unlawful. Thus, evidence 

obtained pursuant to the intercepted communications can be relied upon by the issuing judge to 

conclude that probable cause existed for the search of the residence. 

Numerous wiretapped phone calls between Duncan, Porter, Vance, and other members of 

the conspiracy demonstrate that Duncan resides at 964 Woody Hills Drive, and used the 

residence to store cocaine, proceeds from the sale and/or receipt of narcotics trafficking, 

narcotics trafficking paraphernalia, and firearms. 

The affidavit identified Duncan as a ranking member of the Vice Lord street gang who 

supplied cocaine to numerous Vice Lord gang members. The wiretaps identified a number of 

locations being used to store cocaine and marijuana along with cash from the sale of controlled 

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substances. One of the locations was 964 Woody Hills Drive, Clarksville, Tennessee. GPS on 

one of Vance’s wiretapped telephones placed Vance at the Woody Hills Drive location when he 

stated he was at “Whirley’s,” which is a moniker used to refer to Duncan by the members of the 

conspiracy. 

For instance, on September 13, 2010, Porter called Duncan and in that phone 

conversation, Duncan informed Porter that he had $600.00 with which he wished to purchase 

cocaine from Porter. On October 29, 2010, Duncan called Vance and stated that he had “about 

three plays,” that Vance had “no whip,” and that Vance would have to “get to it.” (R. 403, 

Search Warrant Application, PageID# 177−78.) The affiant stated that the term “play” is used 

by crack cocaine traffickers to describe a customer, the term “whip” refers to crack cocaine.” 

(Id.) 

On November 21, 2010, Vance, using a wiretapped telephone, made a call to Duncan, in 

which Vance stated that he “left [his] strap over there.” (Id. at 178.) Duncan then responded, 

“[O]ver at my house?,” to which Vance responded in the affirmative. (Id.) Vance then stated 

that he was going to take Duncan’s gun that night, and Duncan responded that he did not want 

Vance to take his gun because he would not stay at his residence without a firearm. The affiant 

believed that this call showed that both Vance and Duncan are regularly armed with a firearm, 

that Vance left his firearm at Duncan’s residence, and that Duncan generally has his firearm at 

that residence. 

The affidavit also stated that on April 2, 2010, Duncan received a traffic ticket and gave 

his address as 964 Woody Hills Drive. The affidavit also establishes that electric service at that 

location is in the name of Mary A. Duncan. When Duncan was arrested on September 21, 2008, 

he had a tattoo “Mary Ann Duncan” on his back and gave 964 Woody Hills Drive as his address. 

(Id.) 

Together, these interceptions, along with others noted in the affidavit, establish probable 

cause for a search of Duncan’s residence. See United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 686 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he courts should take a totality of the circumstances approach in their review of 

the affidavit, and the courts may afford considerable weight to the conclusion of experienced law 

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enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found and [the courts 

are] entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on 

the nature of the crime and type of offense.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In Williams, we joined our sister circuits that have held in “cases involving a variety of suspected 

crimes, that an issuing judge may infer that a criminal suspect keeps the ‘instrumentalities and 

fruits’ of his crime in his residence.” 544 F.3d at 688 (collecting cases). Here, it was reasonable 

for the issuing judge to infer that a ranking member of a criminal enterprise kept money, guns, 

and drugs at his residence. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in denying the 

motion to suppress the fruits of the search of Duncan’s residence. 

In addition, the warrant did not rely on stale evidence because the conspiracy at issue was 

ongoing and the place to be searched was a secure operations base for the conspiracy. 

See United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 923 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing W. LaFave, Search and 

Seizure § 3.7 (3d ed. 1996) (noting as a general matter that stale information cannot be used in a 

probable cause determination)). The staleness probe depends on the “inherent nature of the 

crime.” Id. (quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1382 (6th Cir. 1988)). We must 

inquire into whether information in the affidavit that is arguably three to six weeks old is stale. 

Cf. United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that information that is 

sixteen-months old in the drug trade is usually stale because drugs are sold and consumed in a 

prompt fashion). 

In analyzing whether information is stale, this Court considers the following factors: 

(1) the character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating 

conspiracy?), 

(2) the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), 

(3) the thing to be seized (perishable and easily transferable or of enduring 

utility to its holder?), and 

(4) the place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure 

operational base?). 

Frechette, 583 F.3d at 378 (citing United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 572−73 (6th 

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted)). See also United States v. Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136, 1142 (8th Cir. 

2005) (“[I]nformation of an unknown and undetermined vintage relaying the location of mobile, 

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easily concealed, readily consumable, and highly incriminating narcotics could quickly go stale 

in the absence of information indicating an ongoing and continuing narcotics operation.”) 

(citations omitted). 

Specifically, Duncan argues that the affidavit does not establish the 964 Woody Hills 

residence as a “notorious drug den” because at most, the search warrant provides only “six 

attempted purchases by Defendant Duncan.” Duncan further avers that five of these attempted 

purchases occurred during a 37-day period ending on September 13, 2010, and the sixth 

conversation occurred on October 29, 2010. Duncan argues that this pattern is more indicative 

of an addict than a drug dealer, and that there is no allegation that Duncan attempted to purchase 

narcotics within 41 days prior to the submission of the search warrant application on December 

9, 2010. 

We find Duncan’s argument unpersuasive. First, the character of the crime, conspiracy to 

traffic narcotics, is not a chance encounter in the night. It is a regenerating conspiracy. 

See Abboud, 438 F.3d at 573; United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(finding information supplied by an informant two years prior to issuance and execution of 

search warrant was sufficient to defeat claim of staleness due to ongoing nature of illegal activity 

because informant had purchased narcotics at least twelve times at defendant’s house): see also 

United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding ongoing activity at the 

defendant’s house four years prior to issuance and execution of the search warrant was sufficient 

to defeat claim of staleness). 

Second, the affidavit established that Duncan was not nomadic. Indeed, the information 

in the affidavit indicated that Duncan lived in the Woody Hills residence from at least September 

21, 2008, when, upon being arrested, he listed this address as his residence, to November 21, 

2010, when he referred to the Woody Hills residence as his house in an intercepted phone call 

with Vance. Although the warrant was not issued and executed until three weeks after the 

November 21, 2010 conversation, the information in the affidavit indicated that Duncan lived in 

the same house for the period leading up to the search. See Abboud, 438 F.3d at 573. 

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Regarding the last two Abboud factors, although generally speaking, narcotics are easily 

consumable and mobile, narcotics underlying an ongoing conspiracy to traffic drugs are likely to 

be at an operational base. Thus, the affidavit contained information which established that 

Duncan purchased and sold narcotics from the Woody Hills residence throughout the period 

leading up to the search. See Spikes, 158 F.3d at 924 (stating that “the affidavit provide[d] a 

continuing series of incidents involving either the manufacture, sale, or distribution of crack 

cocaine that are all connected in one form or another to [defendant’s residence]”.) Indeed, all of 

the Abboud factors indicate that the evidence was not stale in this case. 

As discussed in the next section, Duncan argues that the affidavit contained false 

information because Agent Whitsett did not inform the issuing judge that one of the confidential 

informants was related to Vance. Even with the inclusion of this information, there was a 

substantial basis for the determination of probable cause to search Duncan’s residence. The 187-

page affidavit contained information that Duncan illegally possessed a firearm in his home and 

that he was a drug trafficker for the Porter drug-trafficking organization who purchased and sold 

drugs out of his home. 

Even if Duncan did not waive his argument and even if the district court erred in denying 

Duncan’s suppression motion, the error was harmless because the evidence presented at trial, 

separate and apart from the evidence seized from his home, proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Duncan participated in the trafficking conspiracy. The jury listened to Duncan discuss his 

drug sales and possession of firearms with Vance on intercepted calls, among other pieces of 

evidence that were presented to the jury. 

c. Failure to Provide a Franks Hearing 

Lastly, Duncan argues that the district court erred in denying a Franks hearing because 

the wiretap applications contained deliberate falsehoods or statements that were made with a 

reckless disregard for the truth. Duncan briefly mentions in his statement of facts that Agent 

Whitsett deliberately withheld information and misled the issuing judge as to the relationship 

between a confidential informant and Vance, the relationship being that the confidential 

informant was a relative of Vance. 

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Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing based upon a challenge to the validity of a search 

warrant’s affidavit, given alleged misstatements and omissions, is committed to the sound 

discretion of the district court. See United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir. 2001). 

When reviewing the district court’s denial of a Franks hearing, we review findings of fact for 

clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358, 369 (6th Cir. 

2015) (quoting United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 369−70 (6th Cir. 2013)). 

“A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing if he: 1) makes a substantial preliminary 

showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 

included a false statement or material omission in the affidavit; and 2) proves that the false 

statement or material omission is necessary to the probable cause finding in the affidavit.” 

Pirosko, 787 F.3d at 369 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

We find that the district court did not err in denying a Franks hearing because the record 

demonstrates that Duncan did not put forth a strong preliminary showing that Agent Whitsett 

intended to mislead and exclude critical information from the affidavit. Duncan presented 

nothing more than an allegation that Agent Whitsett intended to mislead the issuing judge. 

See United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the allegations must 

be more than conclusory and must be accompanied with an offer of proof and supporting 

affidavits, and if this is satisfied, then the issue becomes whether, absent challenged statements, 

there remains sufficient content in the affidavit to support a finding of probable cause). Duncan 

has not met this “heavy burden.” Id. Duncan does not argue why this information was critical to 

the finding of probable cause. More importantly, there was sufficient content in the affidavit 

regardless of whether this information was included or not. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying a Franks hearing. 

Therefore, Duncan waived his arguments challenging the motions to suppress and the 

denial of the Franks hearing, and even if he had not waived these arguments, the district court 

did not err in denying the motions to suppress and the Franks hearing. 

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B. Evidentiary Rulings 

Next, Young, Parnell, and Duncan argue that the district court erred in admitting Agent 

Whitsett’s testimony which interpreted the wiretapped conversations. Parnell additionally 

challenges whether the district court erred in admitting: (1) co-conspirator statements; (2) the 

case agent’s testimony concerning background evidence about the investigation; (3) cooperating 

witnesses testimony about their guilty pleas; (4) evidence of gun crimes committed by coconspirators and co-defendants; and (5) evidence of other crimes committed in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. 

1. Standard of Review 

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 378 (6th Cir. 2015). In determining whether the district court abused 

its discretion, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government 

by maximizing the probative value of the evidence and minimizing its potential prejudice.” 

United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The prejudice to 

be weighed is the “unfair prejudice caused by admission of the evidence. Evidence that is 

prejudicial only in the sense that it paints the defendant in a bad light is not unfairly prejudicial 

pursuant to [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 403.” Id. (citing United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 

1365, 1373 (6th Cir. 1994)). This Court reviews an evidentiary ruling for plain error if a 

defendant fails to object at trial. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at 378 (citing United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. 725, 731−32 (1993)). 

An erroneous evidentiary ruling does not automatically result in a new trial. Id. 

Evidentiary errors are subject to harmless error review. Id. Under the “harmless error” rule, any 

“error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be 

disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Non-constitutional errors are subject to the Rule 52(a) 

harmless error analysis, in which the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the error did not materially affect the verdict. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at 378. In cases where a 

non-constitutional error occurred, when the record is “so evenly balanced that a conscientious 

judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error,” the judgment must be reversed. Id. at 

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379−80 (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437−38 (1995)). When a constitutional 

error occurs, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect 

the verdict. United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 342, 350 (citing Neder v. United States, 

527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)). 

2. Agent Whitsett’s Testimony 

Young, Duncan, and Parnell argue that Agent Whitsett’s testimony was by based on 

generalized knowledge without any specific foundation, and Agent Whitsett invaded the jury’s 

province by repeatedly interpreting ordinary English language terms in violation of United States 

v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 595−99 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Courts frequently qualify law enforcement officers as expert witnesses under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 702 to interpret intercepted conversations that use “slang, street language, and 

the jargon of the illegal drug trade.” Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at 379 (quoting United States v. 

Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 2001)). Conversely, when a law enforcement officer is not 

an expert witness, the officer’s lay opinion testimony is admissible “only when the law 

enforcement officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal knowledge of the facts 

being related in the conversation, or observed the conversations as they occurred.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 701 states that if a witness is 

not testifying as an expert, “an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the 

witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 

determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. The proponent of this testimony 

must establish that all three requirements are met. Freeman, 730 F.3d at 595−96. The purpose 

of lay opinion testimony is to “describe[e] something that the jurors could not otherwise 

experience for themselves by drawing upon the witness’s sensory and experiential observations 

that were made as a first-hand witness to a particular event.” Id. at 595 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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a. Interpreting Wiretapped Interceptions 

Young, Duncan, and Parnell failed to object to most of the challenged testimony. 

The only testimony Defendants actually objected to was Agent Whitsett’s statement that the term 

“quarter” could mean a term used by the Vice Lords or a “quarter ounce of crack cocaine.” 

(R. 1871, Trial Tr. Aug 8, 2013, PageID# 27−28.) They objected to the inference that “quarter” 

referred to crack cocaine, and requested a continuing objection “so [they] don’t have to jump up 

and down every time this happens.” (Id. at 28−29.) The district court overruled the objection to 

Agent Whitsett’s testimony about the meaning of “quarter” because Agent Whitsett had two 

possible interpretations for the phrase and had not determined which of the two meanings he 

thought was correct. (Id. at 29−30.) The district court further instructed Defendants that if a 

future objection “is exactly like this one, [they] have got a continuing objection,” but “it may not 

be. So don’t sit there if [they] have an objection. Go ahead and make it.” (Id.) Young, Duncan, 

and Parnell were clearly instructed to object to any future testimony that was different than the 

testimony about the meaning of “quarter.” They did not object as instructed. Therefore, we 

review for plain error most of Young’s, Duncan’s, and Parnell’s challenges to the agent’s 

testimony, except for the testimony concerning the meaning of “quarter.” 

We hold that the district court did not plainly err in admitting Agent Whitsett’s testimony 

because, as the district court noted during trial, “[t]here was enough slang and jargon used that 

[Agent Whitsett’s] testimony as to what they were talking about was necessary and will be 

helpful to the jury.” (R. 1862, Trial Tr. Aug. 21, 2013, PageID# 169.) 

In Freeman, a murder-for-hire case in which this Court addressed the extent to which 

agents may give lay opinion testimony that interprets intercepted conversation, we held that the 

agent’s testimony interpreting intercepted phone calls was inadmissible under Rule 701 because 

the agent “repeatedly relied on the general knowledge of the FBI and the investigation as a 

whole” when offering his interpretations. 730 F.3d at 596. Unlike the agent who testified in 

Freeman, the agent who testified in this case established a personal knowledge for his testimony. 

Agent Whitsett testified numerous times to his personal involvement in the investigation since its 

inception in 2006, as he was the lead agent on the case by the time the wiretap applications were 

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sought, interviewed witnesses, conducted surveillance, and reviewed thousands of hours of 

phone calls. (R. 1871 at 22−23 (Agent Whitsett noting that he would come in everyday and try 

to listen to every call that had been recorded, but at some point that became impossible, so he 

listened to as many as he could).) Thus, we hold that the district court did not plainly err in 

admitting Agent Whitsett’s testimony interpreting the wiretapped phone calls. 

b. Background Information of Investigation 

Parnell additionally argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting testimony 

concerning background information about the wiretap and search warrant application process. 

Parnell concedes that the standard of review is plain error since he did not object to this 

testimony at trial. We hold that the district court did not plainly err in admitting this testimony. 

Agents are permitted to testify regarding how they became involved in a case, what 

allegations they were investigating, who the suspects were, and similar background information. 

Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at 381 (citing United States v. Goosby, 523 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 2008)). 

“This sort of testimony, which is designed to set the stage for the introduction of evidence, 

differs substantively from problematic ‘preview testimony’ that ‘purports to sum up (in advance 

of the evidence) the government’s overall case.’” Id. at 381−82 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In Kilpatrick, this Court held that the case agent’s testimony concerning the 

allegations she investigated was proper lay opinion testimony because “[s]he did not offer 

conclusions or impermissibly argue the government’s case.” Id. at 382. “Explaining the 

allegations underlying an investigation does not implicate Rule 701 or Freeman.” Id. 

Specifically, Parnell argues that the prejudicial effect of Agent Whitsett’s testimony 

concerning background information outweighed its probative value under Rule 403. Parnell 

cites to an out-of-circuit case, United States v. Cunningham, 462 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2006), which 

held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony relating to the procedures 

used to obtain wiretap authorizations. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the government agent’s 

testimony about the numerous levels of approval required to obtain the wiretap was irrelevant 

and unfairly prejudicial because the court permitted the jury to infer that the defendant was 

engaged in illegal activity before the wiretap since a federal judge, the government attorneys, and 

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federal law enforcement had approved it. Id. at 713. However, as the government points out 

here, the Seventh Circuit has limited Cunningham: the impermissible inference from the type of 

testimony present in Cunningham is missing when the government places a wiretap on a phone 

belonging to someone other than the defendant. United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 529 

(7th Cir. 2009). “[T]estimony regarding a wiretap on a co-conspirator’s telephone permitted a 

jury to infer that the co-conspirator was engaged in illegal activity before the wiretap.” Id. 

(citing United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 888 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

Here, the wiretap was not placed on Parnell’s phone. The concern in Cunningham, “that 

the testimony permitted the jury to infer that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity before

the wiretap because law enforcement, government attorneys, and a district judge each approved 

it,” is not present here. Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 529. Rather, the inference that the jury could have 

drawn from Agent Whitsett’s testimony was that Parnell’s co-conspirators were engaged in 

illegal activity before the wiretap. See Bustamante, 493 F.3d at 888. Accordingly, we find that 

the district court did not plainly err in admitting Agent Whitsett’s background information 

testimony. 

3. Co-conspirator Statements 

Parnell next argues that the district court erred by admitting co-conspirator statements 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Specifically, Parnell contends that the district 

court erred by not making any factual or legal findings as to whether the requirements under 

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) were satisfied. 

“To admit statements of a co-conspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a trial court must find 

that: (1) the conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) the 

co-conspirator made the proffered statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. 

Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 335 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 920 

(6th Cir. 1999)). This is sometimes referred to as an Enright finding. Id.; see also United States 

v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986−87 (6th Cir. 1978). The district court may “admit the hearsay 

statements subject to later demonstration of their admissibility by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Warman, 578 F.3d at 335. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether 

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the government made the necessary showing is a question of fact that this Court reviews for clear 

error. United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1007 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). This 

Court reviews the district court’s legal conclusion regarding admissibility de novo. Id. (citing 

United States v. Carter, 14 F.3d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

First, Parnell appears to have made a general objection to the co-conspirator statements 

being admitted vis-a-vis Duncan’s objection that the “proof has failed to show that Mr. Duncan 

was a part of the alleged conspiracy in this case, and that those calls, other than the calls that 

obviously captured Mr. Duncan, should be stricken from the record.” (R. 1862, Trial Tr. Aug. 

21, 2013, PageID# 152; see also R. 1871, Trial Tr. Aug. 8, 2013, PageID# 19 (district court 

granting motion that an objection by one defendant is an objection by all).) The record indicates 

that the district court instructed Defendants to object to the statements as the government sought 

their admission so the court could “have on the record that there are no objections” because that 

“is the way [the district court] ha[d] been doing it.” (R. 1871, Trial Tr. Aug. 8, 2013, PageID# 

19−20). But the record indicates that despite this instruction, Parnell did not object to the coconspirator statements as instructed. Moreover, even if the brief reference by Duncan’s counsel 

preserved Parnell’s objections, it preserved them only to the extent that Parnell argued he was 

not a member of the conspiracy. 

Because Parnell challenges all three conspiracy requirements before this Court, the 

standard of review here is abuse of discretion for Parnell’s challenge to the finding that he was a 

member of the conspiracy, and plain error for the finding that a conspiracy existed and that the 

statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

For a defendant “[t]o be found guilty of conspiracy, the government must prove that [the 

defendant] was aware of the object of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily associated himself 

with it to further its objectives.” United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 1991)). “A buyer/seller 

relationship alone is not enough to establish participation in the conspiracy, but further evidence 

indicating knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy can be enough to link the defendant 

to the conspiracy.” Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 421−22. 

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We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err in admitting the 

co-conspirator statements because the record demonstrated that a conspiracy existed, that Parnell 

was a member of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. The district court made factual and legal findings concerning Parnell’s membership 

in the conspiracy in its order denying Parnell’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and, in 

the alternative, motion for new trial. The court found “that there was more than sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Parnell was a member of the conspiracy to 

distribute drugs in Summit Heights.” (R. 2003, District Court’s Order Den. Parnell’s Mot. for J. 

of Acquittal, PageID# 11.) The court went through the evidence presented by the government 

and explained why the evidence suggested that Parnell was a member of the conspiracy and that 

he had more than a mere buyer-seller relationship with other members of the conspiracy. The 

record also demonstrates that the district court found that a conspiracy existed. (R. 2003 at 15 

(finding evidence showed Parnell and Vance “engaged in a joint venture to cook crack 

cocaine.”).) The district court also found that the co-conspirator statements were made in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. (Id. at 10701 (finding conversations with other members of the 

conspiracy “were not about those individuals’ well-being, but conversations relating to those 

individuals in the sale and cooking of cocaine, and the yields they obtained.”).) 

Moreover, it was not abuse of discretion or plain error for the district court to make these 

findings at the close of the trial, as long as it made such findings. See United States v. Conrad, 

507 F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding district court erred in failing to make requisite 

findings regarding context and timing of co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements before 

admitting them); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that district 

court may defer its Rule 801(d)(2)(E) findings until close of government’s case but it is error to 

omit such findings altogether). Moreover, any error or abuse of discretion was harmless because 

Parnell failed to demonstrate that any error affected his substantial rights. 

4. Cooperating Witnesses’ Testimony 

Parnell further argues that the district court plainly erred in allowing cooperating coconspirators to testify that they pleaded guilty to offenses in connection with the charged 

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conspiracy when such testimony was elicited on direct examination without a cautionary jury 

instruction. The government contends that “guilty pleas and convictions may be introduced into 

evidence if the co-conspirator or co-defendant testifies at trial, so that the factfinder will have 

appropriate facts on hand to assess the witness’s credibility.” Sanders, 95 F.3d at 454 (citation 

omitted). 

We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in allowing this testimony to be 

presented at trial. The sole case Parnell relies on for this argument, United States v. Austin, 

786 F.2d 986, 991−91 (10th Cir. 1986), concerns whether the government can question coconspirators or co-defendants about one of their principal witnesses’ prior convictions prior to 

that witness needing to be impeached or rehabilitated. Id. at 991−92. The Tenth Circuit held 

that “it is the testifying witness’ own prior conviction that is admissible on cross-examination to 

impeach his credibility or on redirect to rehabilitate him.” Id. at 992. Here, the witnesses were 

being asked about their own guilty pleas, which this Court permits. See United States v. Francis, 

170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1999) (“We have allowed a prosecutor to refer to the plea agreement 

of a testifying witness . . . . The prosecutor may elicit testimony about its terms, attack the 

credibility of the witness because of it and even refer to the plea agreement of a government 

witness in an attempt to deflect defense counsel’s use of the agreement to attack the witness’s 

credibility.”) 

Moreover, Parnell is entirely incorrect in arguing that the district court did not give a 

proper cautionary instruction. The district court gave the following instruction: 

You have heard the testimony of witnesses who have plea agreements in which 

the government has promised him or her that the government may make a 

recommendation for a lesser sentence and exchange for his or her cooperation. It 

is permissible for the government to make such a promise. But you should 

consider such testimony with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. 

Consider whether his or her testimony make have been influenced by the 

government’s promise. . . . 

You have heard testimony of Demetrius Johnson, Gregory Brooks, and Donnie 

Patterson. You have also heard that before this trial, each was convicted of a 

crime. This earlier conviction was brought to your attention only as one way of 

helping you decide how believable their testimony was. Do not use it for any 

other purpose. It’s not evidence of anything else. 

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(R. 1889, Jury Instr. Tr., PageID# 216−17) See also Sanders, 95 F.3d at 454 (“When a guilty 

plea or conviction is introduced into evidence, the district court is required to give a cautionary 

jury instruction to the effect that the jury may use the conviction or guilty plea only to determine 

the testifying witness’s credibility.”) 

Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in permitting this 

testimony to be presented to the factfinder. 

5. Physical Evidence 

Parnell also argues that the district court erred by admitting physical evidence of 

firearms, ammunition, magazines, and body armor because this evidence was inflammatory and 

highly prejudicial, especially since the government also introduced photographs and verbal 

descriptions of the weapons. 

As a threshold matter, we conclude that Parnell did not properly preserve this argument 

for appeal. Prior to trial, Defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the physical 

evidence of the firearms and ammunition, and other related evidence. At the commencement of 

trial, the district court declined to rule on the motion in limine, and stated that “we’re going to 

have to take it and object as they are about to introduce something . . . . I understand the problem 

that creates for you, but I don’t know another way to do it that’s fair.” (R. 1894, Trial Tr. Aug. 

6, 2013, PageID# 6.) During trial, the court raised this issue sua sponte and asked the 

government why the introduction of this evidence furthers the government’s theory. Duncan’s 

counsel stated that he had a “confrontation issue” with the admission of the firearms because 

they were not found in his client’s residence and he was unable to cross-examine the owner of 

the home where the firearms were found. However, Parnell did not object to the admission of 

this evidence as he was instructed to do by the district court. “An attorney cannot agree in open 

court with a judge’s proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following 

that course.” United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). 

Because Parnell did not object to this during trial, the standard of review is plain error. 

We hold that the district court did not plainly err in admitting the physical evidence. First and 

foremost, the government had to establish the existence of a conspiracy and that Defendants 

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were members of that conspiracy, and firearms, ammunition, body armor, and magazines are 

relevant evidence in a drug conspiracy trial. See United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 417−18 

(6th Cir. 1998) (evidence of an array of firearms “directly supports” the cocaine conspiracy 

distribution charge against the defendant); United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 

1993) (“[E]vidence of possession of firearms is admissible to prove conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute controlled substances because such possession is ostensibly for the purpose of 

protecting the efficiency of the drug trafficking enterprise.”), abrogated on other grounds by 

United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 389−90; Jennings v. Rees, 800 F.2d 72, 75 

(6th Cir. 1986) (noting that the loaded firearm “could properly have been treated as evidence . . . 

of the crime of drug trafficking” and that the “loaded handgun may fairly be viewed as a tool of 

the drug trafficker’s trade.”) 

Even though Parnell argues that none of the firearms that were presented as evidence 

were his, that fact, alone, does not persuade us. We have held that “a co-conspirator’s firearm 

possession is foreseeable based solely on the quantity of drugs involved only when the quantity 

of drugs at issue is so large that the participants would expect others to be carrying protection.” 

United States v. Wade, 318 F.3d 698, 702 (6th Cir. 2003). Agent Whitsett testified that there 

were numerous types of firearms, including hand guns, assault rifles, Glocks, pistols, 

ammunition, bullet proof vests, deposits slips and cash seized totaling tens of thousands of 

dollars, among other seizures. (See generally R. 1873.) The amount of firearms, cash, and drugs 

seized is similar in size to other situations where we have found firearm possession to be 

foreseeable. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 102 F.3d 227, 230, 238 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding 

foreseeability when defendants had $5,000 cash and co-conspirator stated that the defendants 

knew of his gun presence); United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 959 (6th Cir. 1994) (agreeing 

with the Seventh Circuit’s observation in United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 

1988), that “the illegal drug industry is . . . a dangerous, violent business. When an individual 

conspires to take part in a street transaction involving a kilogram of cocaine worth $39,000, it 

certainly is quite reasonable to assume that a weapon of some kind would be carried.”) 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not plainly err in admitting the firearms, 

ammunition, and bullet-proof vests. 

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6. Evidence of Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of the Conspiracy 

Parnell finally argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes 

committed by co-conspirators within the scope of the conspiracy. Specifically, Parnell argues 

that the testimony describing: (1) violent acts by Porter’s co-conspirators; (2) attempts to 

implicate Parnell in a murder investigation; (3) graphically describing the murder of an 

individual unconnected to Defendants; and (4) calls suggesting a co-conspirator had committed a 

drug-related murder, should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the 

testimony was more prejudicial than probative as it implied that Parnell was a dangerous 

individual and even a potential murderer. 

Parnell also cites to United States v. Arbelaez-Agudelo, 19 F. App’x 203 (6th Cir. 2001) 

for the premise that “[b]ad acts by other participants in a common scheme are admissible ‘as 

long as they constitute part of the same criminal episode, whether or not a conspiracy is charged, 

and as long as independent evidence ties the defendant to that scheme.’” Id. at 207 (citing 

United States v. Toney, 161 F.3d 404, 413−14 (6th Cir. 1998)). In Arbelaez-Agudelo, this Court 

found no abuse of discretion or plain error by the district court, in part, because the government 

reminded the jury during its closing argument that the defendant was not involved in the murder. 

Id. at 207−08. 

First, there is independent evidence that ties Parnell to the conspiracy, separate and apart 

from the bad acts committed by the other co-conspirators. For example, Vance and Parnell were 

worried that they and their fellow gang members were on the verge of being caught by the 

authorities. On August 6, 2010, Parnell telephoned Vance to warn him about the police “vice 

truck, the K-9 truck” and how it had pulled someone over on Thompkins Lane. (Appendix A 

GX 27a.) In another conversation, Vance called Parnell to inform him that he could not come 

over because he was “too dirty.” (Appendix A GX 163a.) Vance and Parnell also discussed 

enlisting younger individuals to sell the cocaine and crack cocaine for them: “They gotta sell it. 

They got to.” (Appendix A GX 191a.) Vance then stated, “[I]f we fall it's a [w]rap . . . [w]hat 

they gonna do . . . without me or you?” (Id.) 

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Second, the government made clear that Parnell was not involved in “the shooting, th[e] 

robbery and any of that part of it.” (R. 1908, Trial Tr. Aug. 9, 2013, PageID# 32.) Cf. Old Chief 

v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (improper grounds for admissions of prior bad acts 

include generalizing a defendant’s prior bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the 

likelihood he did the bad act now charged). Third, this evidence helped the government show a 

connection between Porter (the kingpin) and Defendants, and helped to establish the broad 

conspiracy charged in the operative indictment. One of the phone calls admitted was a recording 

between Young and Porter in which they were discussing the murder committed by Vance’s 

younger brother, James Farley (a.k.a. Baby James). (Id. at 10.) The government sought to admit 

the recording to establish drug quantities and to establish the connection between Young and 

Porter. The district court asked Defendants if they would stipulate to the quantity since that is 

what the government was getting at; however, they would not stipulate as such. Moreover, the 

government did not end up admitting the actual recording; rather, it elicited a summary of the 

recording through agent testimony. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of other 

crimes committed by co-conspirators within the scope of the conspiracy. 

Therefore, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in permitting the six 

aforementioned evidentiary admissions. 

C. Jury Instructions 

Young, Duncan, and Parnell next argue that the district court’s failure to demarcate 

between Agents Whitsett and McClintock’s testimony as expert and lay witnesses was plain 

error. 

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1. Standard of Review 

Young, Duncan, and Parnell did not object to the jury instructions or to the dual role 

testimony given by case agents Whitsett and McClintock; thus, this Court reviews for plain error. 

Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 743 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Johnson, 520 U.S. 461, 

465−66 (1997)). 

2. Analysis 

We hold that the district court plainly erred by not giving the jury an expert witness 

instruction, but that this error was harmless because it did not affect Young, Duncan, and 

Parnell’s substantial rights. 

This Court has permitted an officer’s dual testimony as a fact and expert witness when an 

adequate cautionary jury instruction was provided. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 743. When an 

officer is permitted to testify as both a fact witness and an expert witness, we have noted that 

“both the district court and the prosecutor should take care to assure that the jury is informed of 

the dual roles of a law enforcement officer as a fact witness and an expert witness, so that the 

jury can give proper weight to each type of testimony.” Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 

74 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 

522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In cases where the district court 

did not explicitly caution the jury regarding a law enforcement agent’s dual role, the jury 

instructions “have at least included an instruction on how to weigh expert opinion testimony.” 

Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 743. 

In United States v. Swafford, we found no error in permitting a law enforcement officer to 

give opinion testimony because the jury was instructed as to the following: 

[The agent] was offered as an expert in the area of methamphetamine 

investigations. An expert witness has special knowledge or experience that 

allows the witness to give an opinion. You do not have to accept an expert’s 

opinion. In deciding how much weight to give it, you should consider the 

witness’s qualifications and how he reached his conclusions as well as any other 

factors you think are relevant to determining whether the expert is a credible 

witness. 

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385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2004). Similarly, in United States v. Thomas, this Court found no 

abuse of discretion, in part, because the jury was instructed as to the following: 

You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case, and 

give it such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that the 

opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and 

experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the 

opinion are not sound, or that the opinion is outweighed by other evidence, then 

you may disregard the opinion entirely. 

74 F.3d at 683. In finding no abuse of discretion in Thomas, we focused not only on the district 

court’s cautionary instruction, but also on the fact that the prosecutor demarcated the transition 

between the examination of the agent as a fact witness and questions relating to his role as an 

expert witness. 74 F.3d at 683. 

Moreover, in United States v. Tocco, we found no abuse of discretion because, in addition 

to the existence of a cautionary “dual role” jury instruction, the case agent’s “dual roles were 

emphasized to the jury by the fact that he testified at two different times—once early in the trial 

as a fact witness, and again at the conclusion of trial as an expert witness.” 200 F.3d 401, 419 

(6th Cir. 2000). 

In Lopez-Medina, the government agents testified as both expert and fact witnesses. 

461 F.3d at 744. The trial court gave an instruction stating that the government agents’ 

testimony “is not entitled to any greater weight,” and that “it is quite legitimate for defense 

counsel to try to attack the credibility of a law enforcement agent witness on the grounds that his 

or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional interest in the outcome of the 

case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We held that: 

This instruction, however, does not address the particular concerns that may arise 

when an officer gives expert opinion testimony. A general instruction on 

weighing officer testimony does not guard against a jury mistakenly weighing 

opinion testimony as if the opinion were fact, nor does it instruct the jury that they 

are free to reject the opinions given. 

Id. Because the lower court did not give an instruction on expert testimony, or an instruction on 

the agents’ dual role as fact and expert witnesses, this Court, in finding that the district court 

committed plain error, concluded that “the jury instruction given was insufficient to guard 

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against the risk of confusion inherent when a law enforcement agent testifies as both a fact 

witness and as an expert witness.” Id. 

Here, the district court gave the jury an instruction specific to opinion testimony and 

testimony given by law enforcement officers: 

You have heard testimony of several witnesses who testified about their opinions. 

You do not have to accept those opinions. In deciding how much weight to give 

them, you should consider the witness’ qualifications and how he reached his 

conclusions. Also consider the other factors discussed in these instructions for 

weighing credibility of witnesses. Remember that you alone decide how much of 

a witness’ testimony to believe and how much weight it deserves. 

People employed by the federal, state, or local government, including law 

enforcement officers, do not stand in any higher station in the community than 

other persons, and their testimony is not entitled to any greater weight. You shall 

recall their demeanor on the stand, their manner of testifying, the substance of 

their testimony, and the weight and balance – and weight and balance it just as 

carefully as you would the testimony of other witnesses. 

(R. 1889, Trial Tr. Aug. 22, 2013, PageID# 216−17.) 

The government concedes that Agents Whitsett and McClintock presented both fact and 

opinion testimony. However, the district court did not qualify Agents Whitsett and McClintock 

as expert witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, nor did Young, Duncan, and Parnell 

request such designations. 

The salient issue before us is whether the district court plainly erred in not giving an 

expert witness instruction, but instead giving a general instruction on weighing opinion 

testimony and a cautionary instruction on weighing law enforcement testimony, when the agents 

were not qualified as experts but gave expert opinion testimony. We conclude that the district 

court plainly erred in failing to give an expert witness instruction. 

In Lopez-Medina, we found plain error because the lower court failed to give a cautionary 

expert jury instruction when law enforcement agents testified as both fact and expert witnesses. 

Additionally, in Lopez-Medina, we found that the agents possessed “obvious qualifications,” and 

thus no abuse of discretion occurred in the district court’s failure to qualify the witnesses 

formally before allowing their expert testimony. Id. at 743. Likewise, in United States v. 

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Neeley, 308 F. App’x 870, 872 (6th Cir. 2009), the law enforcement agents gave a combination 

of expert opinion and fact testimony, although neither was formally qualified by the lower court 

as an expert. We found error in Lopez-Medina for not giving an expert witness instruction, and 

we found no error in Neeley for giving an expert witness instruction and a general instruction on 

witness credibility. 

In Lopez-Medina, the instruction given to the jury included language stating that the 

testimony of government agents “is not entitled to any greater weight.” 461 F.3d at 744. Part of 

our reasoning in Lopez-Medina for finding error was that a “general instruction on weighing 

officer testimony does not guard against a jury mistakenly weighing opinion testimony as if the 

opinion were fact, nor does it instruct the jury that they are free to reject the opinions given.” Id. 

at 744. In Neeley, the expert opinion instruction informed the jury that they did not have to 

accept the expert’s opinion. 308 F. App’x at 879. 

Here, the district court expressly instructed the jury that they “do not have to accept those 

opinions,” and that the jury “alone decide[s] how much of a witness’ testimony to believe and 

how much weight it deserves.” (R. 1889 at 216.) Similar to Neeley, the lower court in this 

matter gave a general opinion instruction informing the jury that they did not have to accept the 

opinion testimony, in addition to an instruction on law enforcement testimony. 

Despite this inclusion, we hold that the district court plainly erred by not giving the jury a 

dual role witness instruction. The agents’ testimony lacked any clear demarcation between 

expert and fact witness roles, which is similar to the agents’ testimony in Lopez-Medina. 

461 F.3d at 744. The government does not repudiate this contention, nor does the voluminous 

record demonstrate that the two types of testimony were separated. In Thomas and Tocco, this 

Court found that, in addition to the cautionary jury instruction, the dual roles of the agents were 

emphasized by the fact that the agents testified at different times—first as fact witnesses, and 

then as expert witnesses. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 683; Tocco, 200 F.3d at 419. 

Because there was no proper cautionary instruction given regarding the agents’ dual roles 

or a clear demarcation between their fact testimony and expert opinion testimony, we find that 

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the district court committed an error that was plain or obvious in permitting the dual role 

testimony. See Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745 (holding same). 

Although Defendants demonstrated that the district court’s failure to give a cautionary 

jury instruction was plain error, the error was harmless because it did not affect Defendants’ 

substantial rights. “An effect on substantial rights is typically established through a showing of 

an actual effect on the outcome of the case.” Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745 (citation omitted). 

In Lopez-Medina, we determined that the defendant made such a showing because the failure to 

give a cautionary “dual role” jury instruction, in addition to the other evidentiary errors, likely 

affected the outcome of the trial. Id. In circumstances where the only evidentiary error is the 

failure to provide the cautionary “dual role” jury instruction, we have not determined that 

the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. 

See Martin, 520 F.3d at 659−60 (holding that the lack of a cautionary instruction for an officer’s 

dual role testimony, although erroneous, did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the proceedings in the absence of other evidentiary errors). Here, there were no 

other evidentiary errors. Therefore, Young, Duncan, and Parnell cannot establish an effect on 

their substantial rights. 

Accordingly, the district court erred by not giving a dual role jury instruction, but that 

that error was harmless because it did not affect their substantial rights. 

D. 21 U.S.C. § 851 Informations 

Duncan, Young, and Parnell argue that the filing of the § 851 informations violated their 

Fifth Amendment rights to due process because it was an act of prosecutorial vindictiveness 

motivated by a desire to punish them for going to trial. 

1. Preservation of the Issue 

As a threshold matter, we find that Young and Parnell did not preserve their § 851 and 

Eighth Amendment arguments for appeal because they did not raise these arguments before they 

filed their notices of appeal. Duncan timely asserted his § 851 and Eighth Amendment 

challenges in district court prior to filing his notice of appeal. 

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Young and Parnell attempted to join in Duncan’s motion challenging his § 851 

information and sentence; however, Young and Parnell moved to join after they had filed their 

notices of appeal. A notice of appeal divests the district court of its control over aspects of the 

case involved in the appeal. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) 

(noting that filing of notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on court of appeals and divests district 

court of control over aspects of case involved in appeal, but notice of appeal from unappealable 

order does not divest district court of jurisdiction) (citations omitted). 

Thus, we hold that Young and Parnell did not preserve their § 851 and Eighth 

Amendment arguments for appeal, while Duncan did preserve those arguments. We now turn to 

the issue of the proper standard of review for the § 851 informations challenge. 

2. Standard of Review 

Because it was preserved for appeal, the proper standard of review for Duncan’s § 851 

challenge is abuse of discretion. The proper standard of review for Young and Parnell’s § 851 

challenges is plain error because they were not preserved. See Meda, 812 F.3d at 510 (stating 

that if motion to dismiss indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness is untimely, standard of 

review is plain error); United States v. LaDeau, 734 F.3d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding 

that decision whether to dismiss indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness is reversible only if 

district court abused its discretion); United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(citation omitted). 

“‘A district court abuses its discretion when [it] relies on erroneous findings of fact, 

applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard when reaching a 

conclusion, or makes a clear error of judgment.’” Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 

646 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Where the district court’s decision to 

dismiss hinges upon factual findings, we defer to the district court’s decision unless the findings 

upon which it was predicated are clearly erroneous. See LaDeau, 734 F.3d at 566 (citation 

omitted). 

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3. Analysis 

We hold that the district court did not plainly err or abuse its discretion in denying 

Young, Parnell, and Duncan’s motions to strike the § 851 informations because increased 

charges resulting from a breakdown of the plea bargaining process is not a violation of their Fifth 

Amendment right to due process. 

“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due 

process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) 

(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). “A showing of vindictive 

prosecution requires (1) an exercise of a protected right; (2) a prosecutorial stake in the exercise 

of that right; (3) unreasonableness of the prosecutor’s conduct; and (4) the intent to punish the 

defendant for exercise of the protected right.” Meda, 812 F.3d at 510 (citation omitted). Due 

process protects against prosecutorial retaliation for a defendant’s exercise of a statutory or 

constitutional right. United States v. Poole, 407 F.3d 767, 774 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Goodwin, 

457 U.S. at 372). “[T]he Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased 

punishment . . ., [] only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.” United States 

v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 443 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 

(1974)). 

Defendants raise an almost identical argument to one that was raised in United States v. 

Zolicoffer, 570 App’x 540, 543−44 (6th Cir. 2014). In that case, the defendant argued that the 

prosecutor’s filing of the § 851 information regarding his prior felony drug conviction was an act 

of prosecutorial vindictiveness to punish him for not accepting the plea bargain. Id. at 543. 

Because the defendant did not raise the issue in the district court, this Court reviewed for plain 

error. Id. We stated that: 

To show “actual vindictiveness,” a defendant must show “objective evidence that 

a prosecutor acted in order to punish the defendant for standing on his legal 

rights,” [] or present sufficient evidence to create a “presumption of 

vindictiveness” by examining the “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness” and 

focusing “on the prosecutor’s ‘stake’ in deterring the exercise of a protected right 

and the unreasonableness of his actions.” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 489 (6th Cir. 2003)). 

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Young, Duncan, and Parnell have made threadbare allegations of prosecutorial 

vindictiveness. Defendants have not presented any direct or objective evidence to show that the 

prosecutor acted vindictively. See Zolicoffer, 570 F. App’x at 543. Nor have Defendants 

presented evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of vindictiveness. 

First, Defendants have not shown how the prosecutor had any special stake in the 

proceeding beyond getting Defendants to plead guilty. See Dupree, 323 F.3d at 489 (“[T]he 

[Supreme] Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the 

prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forego his right to 

plead not guilty.”) (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364). “[A]voidance of trial as a 

prosecutorial stake is implicit in the plea bargaining process, and therefore exempt under 

Bordenkircher from being held vindictive.” Suarez, 263 F.3d at 480. 

Second, Defendants have not shown how the prosecutor acted unreasonably in filing the 

§ 851 enhancements. Defendants argue that the only three defendants who went to trial, 

i.e., Young, Duncan, and Parnell, were slammed with these enhancements right before trial. 

But this, alone, does not raise an inference of misconduct. For one, the prosecutor timely filed 

the informations. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (requires filing before trial or before entry of a plea 

of guilty). Before the first scheduled trial date in August 2012, the government filed § 851 

informations for Duncan, Young, and Parnell, noting that each had prior felony drug convictions 

and that, if convicted of the drug conspiracy charge, each faced a mandatory sentence of life 

imprisonment. 

Third, § 851 does not compel the government to file the information in every case. 

Prosecutors have discretion. United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 848 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting 

that § 851 created prosecutorial discretion). Fourth, the government filed § 851 informations for 

seven other co-defendants, not including Young, Duncan, and Parnell. (See R. 1110 (Donald 

Ewing), 1111 (Dominique Simons), 1113 (Xavier Parnell), 1165 (Dontrell Pittman), 

1385 (Robert Porter), 1389 (Robert Porter), 1445 (Ray Ozen), 1898 (Derrick Campbell).) Codefendants Ewing, Simons, and Xavier Parnell’s § 851 informations were filed the same day as 

Alto Parnell’s first §851 information, August 3, 2012. Co-defendant Pittman’s § 851 

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information was filed the same day as Duncan’s first information, August 27, 2012, and Young’s 

first information was filed August 16, 2012. Robert Porter’s information was filed April 9, 2013, 

and Ray Ozen’s was filed April 23, 2013. 

The record does not support an inference of prosecutorial vindictiveness. If the 

government had filed § 851 informations only for the three defendants who went to trial, then an 

inference of prosecutorial vindictiveness may have been suggested. However, that is not the case 

here. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err 

in declining to strike Young, Parnell, and Duncan’s § 851 informations. 

E. Eighth Amendment Challenge 

1. Standard of Review 

We review de novo a constitutional challenge to a district court’s sentence. United States 

v. Kelsor, 665 F.3d 684, 701 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Jones, 569 F.3d 569, 573 

(6th Cir. 2009). However, this Court reviews for plain error an unpreserved claim that a 

sentence is cruel and unusual. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial 

rights may be considered even though it was not brought to court’s attention”); see also United 

States v. Ervin, 266 F. App’x 428, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). 

We review de novo Duncan’s timely constitutional challenge to his sentence, and review 

for plain error Young and Parnell’s untimely challenge to their sentences. See Kelsor, 665 F.3d 

at 701; Ervin, 266 F. App’x at 437. 

2. Analysis 

Young, Parnell, and Duncan argue that their sentences are not proportionate to the crimes 

for which they were convicted, and therefore, their sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The convictions relevant to Duncan, Young, and 

Parnell’s Eighth Amendment challenge are the drug conspiracy and possession of controlled 

substances near public housing authority convictions, Counts One and Four, because those 

convictions triggered mandatory terms of life imprisonment for felons with two or more felony 

drug convictions. 

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This Court adheres to the “narrow proportionality principle” for evaluating Eighth 

Amendment claims articulated in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) 

(Kennedy, J., concurring). See United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50–51 (6th Cir. 1994). A plurality in Harmelin rejected the 

claim that the Eighth Amendment required strict proportionality and concluded that it prohibited 

only “extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” 501 U.S. at 1001. 

Applying this principle, the Supreme Court upheld Michigan’s penalty of mandatory life 

sentence without the possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine, and 

rejected the defendant’s assertion that his sentence of life imprisonment without parole was 

grossly disproportionate to the crime since he was a first-time felony offender in possession of 

650 grams of cocaine. Id. 

This Court also upheld a defendant’s mandatory life sentence for a conspiracy conviction 

to distribute and possess more than 1,000 grams of heroin pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

See Kelsor, 665 F.3d at 700–01. In Kelsor, like the instant matter, “[t]he government had filed 

an information pursuant to § 851 identifying a number of prior convictions as the basis for 

statutorily enhanced penalties.” Id. at 691. The Kelsor Court further held that “[t]o the extent 

that defendant asserts a lack of proportionality between himself and others convicted of similar 

offenses, this [C]ourt held that comparative proportionality is not mandated by the Constitution.” 

Id. at 701 (citing United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2003)). 

In like manner, we have held that imposition of a life sentence without parole for a third 

felony drug conviction pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) is not “grossly disproportionate” to the 

crime. See Hill, 30 F.3d at 50–51. Likewise, in Jones, 569 F.3d at 574, we upheld the 

defendant’s ten-year sentence for a conviction of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams 

or more of cocaine base, and rejected the defendant’s argument that his history as an adult was 

relatively crime free and that he scored just one criminal history point. Moreover, in United 

States v. Wimbley, 553 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2009), we rejected a defendant’s argument that his 

life sentence, as mandated by § 841(b)(1)(A), was cruel and unusual because he did not attempt 

to distinguish his case from Hill. See also United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 247 (6th Cir. 

2006) (rejecting as meritless an Eighth Amendment claim that failed to differentiate Hill). 

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Defendants cite United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2014), for the general 

proposition that “[a] defendant’s particular circumstances are relevant to an as-applied Eighth 

Amendment claim and could render a sentence unconstitutional.” Id. at 626 (citing Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)). In Young, the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory 15-year 

term for being a felon in possession of ammunition under the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”). Id. at 622. The defendant was found with seven shotgun shells that he had acquired 

while helping a neighbor sell her late husband’s possessions. Id. at 623. We held that his 

Achilles heel was his recidivism, which included four counts of burglary and seven counts of 

aggravated burglary. Id. at 627−28. We went through sentences for recidivist offenders, and 

stated that “the line is different.” Id. at 628. For example, a life sentence for a recidivist felon 

who passed a bad check was too harsh, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), while a twenty-fiveyear sentence is not too harsh for a recidivist felon who stole $1,200 worth of merchandise, 

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), and a fifteen-year sentence is not too harsh for a 

recidivist felon who possessed a firearm while beating his girlfriend, United States v. Moore, 643 

F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2011). Young, 766 F.3d at 628. We ultimately held that the defendant’s 

sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crime under Ewing and Solem. Id. 

Defendants’ Eighth Amendment claims fare no better than the defendants’ parallel claims 

mentioned above. Defendants do not attempt to distinguish their case from Hill, Kelsor, 

Wimbley, Jones, or Caver, which are relevant to this appeal. Moreover, Defendants’ citation to 

Young is not helpful to their argument, since the Young Court found his sentence constitutional. 

Moreover, the Young defendant was not sentenced pursuant to the conspiracy statute under 

which Defendants were sentenced here, nor was he charged with the same crimes as Defendants 

here. 

Likewise, the Supreme Court cases to which Defendants cite are not germane to their 

arguments. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that mandatory life 

imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes 

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments); Graham

(holding that the imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile offender who did not 

commit homicide violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 

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punishments). Young attempts to differentiate his situation from those of his co-defendants and 

compares his situation to those of the juveniles in Miller and Graham. Young argues that 

because he was a 22-year old “juvenile” when he committed the offenses at issue, we should take 

his particular circumstance into account and follow the Supreme Court’s line of reasoning in 

Miller and Graham to overturn his interminable life sentence. Young’s “juvenile” argument 

contravenes the precedent set by the Supreme Court and this Court. 

Applying the narrow proportionality principle of Harmelin, and in light of the Supreme 

Court and this Court’s precedent, this case does not present the same kind of “extreme disparity 

between the sentence imposed and the crime committed that would offend the Eighth 

Amendment.” Jones, 569 F.3d at 574. Because this Court has previously upheld a mandatory 

life sentence without parole for a defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base 

and found that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, the 

sentences handed down are not so grossly disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment.

See Hill, 30 F.3d at 50–51. Therefore, the district court did not err in sentencing Young, Parnell, 

and Duncan. 

F. Parnell’s Sentencing Challenge 

Parnell challenges the imposition of his sentence on three additional grounds, separate 

and apart from the Fifth and Eighth Amendment grounds mentioned above. Parnell argues that 

the district court plainly erred because: (1) it sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment on 

Count One without submitting to the jury the amount of drugs attributable to his participation in 

the offense; (2) sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment on Count Four without submitting 

to the jury the amount of drugs involved in the offense; and (3) failed to submit evidence of 

Parnell’s prior drug convictions to a jury.

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1. Standard of Review 

We review Parnell’s sentencing challenge for plain error because Parnell did not preserve 

his arguments related to his sentencing, as discussed above. See United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 

594, 607 (6th Cir. 2013). 

2. Analysis 

a. Count One 

Parnell first argues that the district court plainly erred because it sentenced him to a term 

of life imprisonment on Count One without submitting to the jury the amount of drugs 

attributable to his participation in the offense. Parnell contends that because the mandatory 

minimum sentence imposed depends upon the amount of narcotics involved in the offense, the 

amount of narcotics is an element of 21 U.S.C. § 841 that must be submitted to the jury and 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The government argues that the district court did not plainly 

err by determining the quantity of cocaine involved in the conspiracy, as a whole, and Parnell’s 

prior felony drug convictions triggered a mandatory life sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A). 

Parnell was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The jury determined that the drug 

conspiracy as a whole involved 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine 

base. Section 841(a) (1) states that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 

intentionally” to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 

distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” Section 846 states that “[a]ny person who 

attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the 

same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the 

attempt or conspiracy.” 

Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) states that “any person who violates subsection (a) of this 

section” “[i]n the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving” “280 grams or 

more of a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base” . . . “after two or more prior 

convictions for a felony drug offense” “shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life 

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imprisonment without release.” Section 841(b)(1)(A) goes on to state that “[n]o person 

sentenced under this subparagraph shall be eligible for parole during the time of imprisonment 

imposed therein.” 

Parnell argues that our holding in United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998), 

compels us to find that he is not culpable for the quantity of controlled substances attributable to 

the conspiracy as a whole, but only the amount attributable to him. Parnell’s argument fails to 

persuade us, as we addressed this same argument in United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632 (6th 

Cir. 2008). As we noted in Robinson, the issue in Pruitt was “whether a conspiracy involving 

multiple overt acts is nonetheless a violation of § 841(a) such that the drug quantities from those 

multiple acts can be aggregated for sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).” 547 F.3d at 638 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Pruitt Court held that drug quantities from 

multiple overt acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy can be aggregated for sentencing 

purposes. Robinson, 547 F.3d at 638. Thus, we have “interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to 

focus on the threshold quantity involved in the entire conspiracy.” Id. The Robinson Court 

explained that “[a]lthough a ‘small-time’ drug seller may not be responsible for all the 

transactions or actions of his associates, he is responsible for the conspiracy in which he 

participated.” Id. at 639. We also recognized that § 841(b)(1)(A) prescribes mandatory 

sentences for conspiracy convictions involving certain threshold amounts of drugs. Id. (citation 

omitted). 

The government asserts that we have been inconsistent in addressing whether mandatory 

minimum sentences for § 846 drug conspiracy offenses are determined by conspiracy-wide or 

defendant-specific drug quantities.3

 (See Appeal R. 97, Gov’t’s Rule 28(j) Notice of Suppl. 

Authorities.) The government contends that Robinson is inconsistent with United States v. 

Swiney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000), because Swiney held that an individualized approach, as 

articulated in the Sentencing Guidelines, determines the statutory range, whereras Robinson

holds that a conspiracy-wide drug quantity determines the statutory penalty range. 

 3

The government also mentions that it has adopted a defendant-specific approach to charging future drug 

conspiracies. 

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The government also asserts that our decision in United States v. Watson, 620 F. App’x 

493, 509 (6th Cir. 2015) incorrectly reconciled Robinson and Swiney. The defendants in Watson

were convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of § 846 and were 

sentenced pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 841(b)(1)(B). The defendants were sentenced to 

mandatory minimums due to the quantity of drugs attributable to the individual defendants and 

all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the conspiracy. 

Id. at 513. One of the defendants was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment because of two 

prior felony drug convictions based on a § 851 information. The Watson Court reconciled 

Swiney and Robinson by stating that “[the][Swiney] opinion—which stated ‘that Pinkerton

principles, as articulated in the relevant conduct guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), 

determine whether a defendant convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 846 is subject to penalty set forth in 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)’—concerns sentencing under the Guidelines.” Id. at 509. The Watson

Court went on to state that “[a] different standard of foreseeability applies in that context to the 

standard applicable to the drug quantity finding for § 846 purposes, which Robinson discusses.” 

Id. 

After reviewing Swiney, Robinson, and Watson, we find that regardless of which 

approach we apply to Parnell’s sentence, the outcome is the same. Thus, there is no need for us 

to reconcile these cases at this time. Under the individual approach, “‘[w]here a defendant is part 

of a jointly undertaken criminal activity involving drugs, the defendant is accountable for all 

quantities of contraband with which [he] was directly involved and . . . all reasonably foreseeable 

quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that [he] jointly 

undertook.’” Watson, 620 F. App’x at 513 (quoting United States v. Begley, 602 F. App’x 622, 

626 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

A “jointly undertaken criminal activity” includes a conspiracy. Id. 

We “must accept a district court’s determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to a 

defendant for sentencing purposes unless that determination was clearly erroneous.” United 

States v. Dillard, 505 F. App’x. 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 

562, 570 (6th Cir. 2008)). “If the exact amount of drugs is undetermined, ‘an estimate will 

suffice but . . . a preponderance of the evidence must support the estimate.’” Jeross, 521 F.3d at 

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570 (quoting United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also United 

States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d 541, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2005). “[A] district court's approximation of 

drug quantity is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by competent evidence in the record.” 

Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570 (citing United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1993)). 

Under this individual-defendant approach, we find that the district court did not err in 

sentencing Parnell to life imprisonment for Count One because the quantity of cocaine and crack 

cocaine required for a conviction under Count One were within the scope of the conspiracy of 

which Parnell was a part and was reasonably attributable to Parnell. The evidence presented at 

trial demonstrated that Parnell knew Vance, Parnell’s usual supplier, and obtained his supply 

from Porter, the kingpin of the drug conspiracy who trafficked kilograms of cocaine. On August 

27, 2010, Vance told Parnell over an intercepted telephone conversation that he obtained his 

drugs from Porter, and Parnell responded that he had “figured that.” (Appendix A GX 73a.) 

Moreover, Parnell expressed concern that he and his fellow gang members were on the verge of 

being caught by the authorities. On August 6, 2010, Parnell telephoned Vance to warn him 

about the police “vice truck, the K-9 truck” and how it had pulled someone over on Thompkins 

Lane. (Appendix A GX 27a.) In another conversation on October 9, 2010, Vance called Parnell 

to inform him that he could not come over because he was “packed” and “too dirty.” (Appendix 

A GX 163a.) Parnell was also concerned with the manufacturing of the crack cocaine from 

powder cocaine. For instance, in that same October 9, 2010 conversation, Parnell asked Vance 

how he did, or how he “pull[ed]” last night,” and Vance responded that he “had nothing but a 

quarter,” and that he “put 21 in and got 19, the shit look like [ ] if you crush it up it look . . . real 

funny, crunchy looking but it jumped though . . . and the powder real real hard.” (Id.) 

Parnell also discussed how law enforcement arrested other members of the conspiracy 

and admitted that they “almost caught [Parnell] walking out of Toya’s crib [ ] with an ounce of 

powder on [him].” (Appendix A GX 191a.) Parnell also discussed with Vance that they should 

enlist younger individuals to sell the cocaine and crack cocaine for them: “They gotta sell it. 

They got to.” (Id.) Vance then stated, “[I]f we fall it’s a [w]rap . . . [w]hat they gonna do . . . 

without me or you?” (Id.) These conversations established that Parnell knew his supplier, 

Vance, received cocaine from Porter, knew that Vance manufactured crack cocaine, knew that 

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other gang members were being arrested by law enforcement for possessing drugs, and it was 

reasonably foreseeable to someone in Parnell’s position that Porter, Vance, and the other gang 

members would have possessed over the course of the conspiracy over 500 grams of cocaine and 

over 280 grams of crack cocaine. 

Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in sentencing Parnell to life 

imprisonment on Count One. 

b. Count Four 

Parnell next argues that the district court plainly erred by sentencing him to a term of life 

imprisonment on Count Four without submitting to the jury the amount of drugs involved in the 

offense. The government contends that it did not matter whether the jury determined the amount 

of drugs involved because mandatory life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A) is triggered by two 

prior felony drug convictions and violations of §§ 841(a)(1) and 860, which prohibits possession 

of a detectable amount of cocaine or crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing area 

with intent to distribute. Specifically, the government asserts that § 860 provides for mandatory 

life imprisonment for violations of § 841(a) if the offender has two prior felony convictions. 

Parnell was convicted of possessing a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base 

within 1,000 feet of a public housing area with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and 860. Section 860 states that for “[a]ny person who violates section 841(a)(1) of 

this title . . . by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled 

substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of . . . [a] housing facility owned by a public 

housing authority” “[p]enalties for third and subsequent convictions shall be governed by section 

841(b)(1)(A) of this title.” 21 U.S.C. § 860(b). The jury found Parnell guilty of possessing a 

detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a public housing authority. 

Section 860 does not require a separate finding by the jury of a certain quantity of controlled 

substances. Section 860 expressly states that a person shall violate it if he or she possesses “a 

controlled substance” within 1,000 feet of a public housing authority. Id. 

The jury found Parnell to have a detectable amount of a controlled substance on his 

person when he was within 1,000 feet of a housing facility owned by a public housing authority. 

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Because Parnell has two prior felony convictions, his § 860 conviction is governed by section 

841(b)(1)(A), which mandates a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Section 841(b)(1)(A) 

specifies that a violation of § 860 mandates that a person who has two or more felony drug 

convictions be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. 

Thus, the district court did not err because the jury was not required to find a certain 

quantity of a controlled substance on Parnell, insofar as they found him to possess “a controlled 

substance.” 

c. Prior Convictions 

Finally, Parnell avers that the district court plainly erred in failing to submit evidence of 

Parnell’s prior drug convictions to a jury. Parnell specifically argues that the district court, in 

accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 851 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres, 

523 U.S. 224 (1998), sentenced Parnell to two mandatory concurrent terms of life imprisonment 

for Counts One and Four, even though Almendarez-Torres is irreconcilable with the Supreme 

Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). The government responds that this Court is bound by AlmendarezTorres, which held that a fact of a prior conviction need not be submitted to a jury, because it is 

still good law and will remain so until the Supreme Court overrules it. 

Parnell’s last argument has been expressly rejected by this Court. We have held that 

Apprendi preserved the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Almendarez-Torres. United States v. 

Nagy, 760 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2014). In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held that the 

Sixth Amendment does not require the government to set forth in the indictment and prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a prior conviction. 523 U.S. at 228−29. In Alleyne, the 

Supreme Court held that any fact increasing the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an 

element of that crime, not a sentencing factor, and therefore, the element must be submitted to 

the jury for determination. 133 S. Ct. at 2155, 2160 n.1. The analysis of Alleyne “springs from 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), where the Court held the Sixth Amendment 

requires any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 

sentence, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to the jury and proved 

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mack, 729 F.3d at 607. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court explicitly 

declined to overrule Almendarez-Torres’ narrow exception to this general rule for the fact of a 

prior conviction. Id. at 609. 

We have repeatedly addressed and rejected arguments identical to Parnell’s. “Nagy’s 

contention that the holding in Almendarez-Torres has been ‘whittled away,’ and that 

‘Almendarez-Torres has been overruled by implication,’ and is ‘no longer good law,’ is 

unavailing.” Nagy, 760 F.3d at 488. “Almendarez-Torres is still good law and will remain so 

until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules it.” United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 398 

(6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Although Almendarez-Torres may stand on shifting sands, 

the case presently remains good law and we must follow it until the Supreme Court expressly 

overrules it.” Mack, 729 F.3d at 609. In United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir. 

2014), we reiterated that Almendarez-Torres has not been overruled: “Alleyne did not disturb the 

holding in Almendarez-Torres.” Parnell’s challenge is without merit. Therefore, we hold that 

the district court did not err in sentencing Parnell. 

G. Vance’s Sentencing Challenge 

Finally, Vance argues that his sentence was unreasonable because: (1) the district court 

erred in failing to adequately consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) the district 

court erroneously relied on the 18-to-1 cocaine to crack cocaine ratio in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) and 

rejected Vance’s policy-based argument as to why the ratio disproportionately impacts the 

African-American community; and (3) the district court did not fully appreciate its own authority 

in crafting a fair sentence. 

1. Standard of Review 

As a threshold matter, the government asserts that Vance did not timely appeal his 

sentence. Vance contends that his appeal was timely since the entry of judgment occurred on 

January 8, 2015 and not on December 3, 2013. The district court entered judgment against 

Vance on December 3, 2013. On September 17, 2014, Vance filed a motion to vacate, set aside, 

or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On January 8, 2015, the district court 

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granted Vance’s § 2255 motion for the limited purpose of filing a delayed appeal in the 

underlying criminal case. Vance filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 2015. 

We hold that Vance’s appeal was timely. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 

(2000) (“[W]e hold that when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a 

defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a 

successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.”). 

We review a district court’s factual findings in sentencing a defendant under the clearly 

erroneous standard, United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005), and its 

application and interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, United States v. Cousins, 

469 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 2006). A district court’s decision will be found to be clearly 

erroneous where, having reviewed all of the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. Jeross, 521 F.3d at 569 (citing United States v. 

Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1999)). 

The ultimate sentence is reviewed for reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007); see also United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 2007). We use the 

abuse of discretion standard to determine whether a defendant’s sentence is reasonable. Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51 (“Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines 

range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 

2. Analysis 

A review for reasonableness has both procedural and substantive components. Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51. In regards to the procedural component, the Supreme Court has stated that the 

appellate court: 

[M]ust ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, 

such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, 

treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, 

selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the 

Guidelines range. 

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Id. “[W]here a district court makes a mistake in calculating a guidelines range for purposes of 

determining a sentence under section 3553(a), we are required to remand for resentencing unless 

we are certain that any such error was harmless.” United States v. Vicol, 514 F.3d 559, 561 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A sentencing error is harmless if we 

are certain that the error “did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” 

Hazelwood, 398 F.3d at 801 (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). 

If the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, we should then consider 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Id. During this review, we will take into account the totality of the circumstances, including: 

[T]he extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence is within 

the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a 

presumption of reasonableness. [ ] But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines 

range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may 

consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district 

court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 

variance. The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a 

different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district 

court. 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, “it must be proportionate to 

the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater 

than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).” United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 

503, 512 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

a. Consideration of § 3553(a) Factors 

Vance first argues that the district court erred in failing to adequately consider the factors 

set forth in § 3553(a). Vance pleaded guilty to: Count One, conspiracy to distribute and possess 

with the intent to distribute controlled substances, including 500 grams or more of cocaine and 

280 grams or more of crack cocaine; Count Two, possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or 

more of crack cocaine; Count Eight, accessory after the fact of a Hobbs Act violation (robbery) 

resulting in death; and Count Nine, conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. 

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The district court found Vance to have a total offense level of 39 and a criminal history 

category I. These findings were in line with Vance’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 

filed by the probation office. Vance accepted that he was responsible for selling three kilograms 

of crack cocaine, which resulted in a base offense level of 36 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). 

Two levels were added because Vance possessed a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), 

and another four levels were added because Vance was an organizer or leader of a criminal 

activity that involved five or more participants pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), resulting in an 

adjusted offense level of 42. The offense level was adjusted downward by three levels for 

Vance’s acceptance of responsibility. 

Based on the adjusted offense level and Vance’s criminal history category, the Guidelines 

range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment for counts One, Two, Eight, and Nine. The 

district court ultimately sentenced Vance to a below Guidelines sentence of 200-months’ 

imprisonment and supervised release of five years for all counts running concurrently. 

The record clearly demonstrates that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors. 

After listening to defense counsel, Vance, and Vance’s witness for several hours at the 

sentencing hearing, the court stated the following: 

“[W]e’ve spent a lot of time talking about the 3553 factors and when imposing 

that sentence. I’ve considered the nature and circumstances of the offenses. 

They’re clearly serious offenses. There’s no way around that. And you were 

clearly incredibly involved not just in your part but as a leadership role in this, 

your role in the gang, your role in the distribution and the movement of the drugs 

in and out. 

I’ve also considered your criminal history or in this case a lack of criminal 

history. There’s clearly a need to impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness 

of these offenses. You know, [the witness] talked about the serious public health 

issue that drugs cause in this community, your community, all of our 

communities. There was, having listened to the tapes and reading what is an 

accurate presentation of the facts in this case through the presentence report, a 

complete lack of respect for the law. 

There’s clearly a need in this case to provide not only a just punishment but 

provide deterrence to others. . . . There is a need to avoid the unwarranted 

sentencing disparities. I think it was important to look and its important to factor 

in what the other co-defendants got in this case, but I think you have to look at the 

262, that at least three, maybe four, but I think three of the co-defendants got and 

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they had – I think they were all career offenders and very different. Although 

their offense levels were slightly less, their history levels were significantly 

greater. So I’ve included that in my analysis in trying to come up with a just 

punishment that’s an aggregate of all those factors and that sufficient but not more 

harsh than necessary. 

(R. 2293, Sentencing Tr. Brian Vance, PageID# 118−19.) As the record demonstrates, the 

district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and fashioned a sentence that reflected those 

factors. Although the court was clearly concerned with the nature and seriousness of the 

offenses, it also considered other § 3553(a) factors, such as protecting the public, adequately 

deterring others, providing just punishment for the offense, promoting respect for the law, 

reflecting the seriousness of the offense, and the history and characteristics of Vance. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, we find that the district court did not err in considering the § 3553(a) 

factors. 

b. Policy-based Variance from Guidelines 

Vance next argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court 

erroneously relied on the 18-to-1 cocaine to crack cocaine ratio in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) and 

rejected Vance’s policy-based argument as to why the ratio disproportionately impacts the 

African-American community. 

During sentencing, Vance advanced a substantive, policy-based reason why the district 

court should impose a lower sentence: that the Sentencing Guidelines disproportionately punish 

those convicted of crimes involving crack cocaine and those convicted of such crimes are 

predominately from the African-American community. Specifically, Vance objected to the 

district court’s application of the Guidelines’ drug tables, or the 18-to-1 ratio for crack cocaine 

versus powder cocaine identified in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 

For example, the Guidelines sentence those convicted of possessing 28 grams of crack 

cocaine to the same sentence as those who possess 500 grams of cocaine powder, resulting in an 

18-to-1 ratio of powder-to-crack cocaine quantities that trigger the same offense level. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7)(2011). The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 

Stat. 2372, established the current ratio, lowering it from a harsher 100-to-1 ratio in response to 

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criticism from courts and commentators. United States v. Thomas, 501 F. App’x 391, 392 (6th 

Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Shull, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1050−57 (S.D. Ohio 2011) 

(recounting history of the Fair Sentencing Act)). 

Vance urged the district court to adopt a 1-to-1 ratio. Vance discussed the criticism 

surrounding the ratio, supporting cases, and included statistics such as the report generated by the 

Sentencing Commission which “confirm[ed] that in 2006, 82 percent of individuals convicted of 

federal crack cocaine offenses were African American while just 9 percent were white.” (R. 

2293 at 26−71.) The court considered Vance’s two-hour long argument on this matter, but 

resolved to apply the 18-to-1 ratio: “I think justice can be done in this case using and applying 

the 18-to-1 ratio. It’s appropriate in this case. In this case that’s consistent with the 3553 goals, 

so I’m going to apply the 18-to-1 ratio.” (Id. at 72−73.) 

District courts enjoy broad discretion to fashion a sentence within the Guidelines range. 

See United States v. Overmyer, 663 F.3d 862, 863 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005)). Vance argues that the district court erred in rejecting his 1-

to-1 policy-based argument, and that he was prejudiced by this error because his total offense 

level would have been 31 rather than 39, which would have provided Vance with a Guidelines 

range of 108 to 135 months. “[T]he fact that a district court may disagree with a Guideline for 

policy reasons and may reject the Guidelines range because of that disagreement does not mean 

that the court must disagree with that Guideline or that it must reject the Guidelines range if it 

disagrees.” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. 

Mikowski, 332 F. App’x 250, 255−56 (6th Cir. 2009)). Although there may be merit to the 

policy-based argument, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to follow it. 

c. Appreciation of Authority 

Vance also avers that the district court did not appreciate its authority in crafting a fair 

sentence. The record of the sentencing hearing repudiates Vance’s assertion: “I’m not bound to 

sentence Mr. Vance within the suggested range. Rather, I can use my discretion in deciding 

whether to depart or vary up or down weighing factors in 3553(a). . . . Clearly the [c]ourt has the 

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authority to vary from that ratio. . . . I think justice can be done in this case using and applying 

the 18-to-1 ratio. . . . In this case that’s consistent with the 3553 goals.” (R. 2293 at 5−6, 71−72.) 

In addition, the district court expressly stated that the Guidelines “are merely advisory.” 

(R. 2293 at 5.) This Court has held that “when a district court observes that the Guidelines are 

advisory and provides no indication that policy disagreements are not a proper basis to vary, then 

a sentence within the Guidelines range remains presumptively reasonable on appeal.” United 

States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). 

To belabor the point, we have noted that “simple logic compels the conclusion that, if a 

sentence of 324 to 405 months would have been presumptively reasonable in length, defendant’s 

task of persuading us that the more lenient sentence of 240 months is unreasonably long is even 

more demanding.” United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United 

States v. Bailey, 264 F. App’x 480 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that since, per United States v. 

Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389−90 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), a within Guidelines sentence would be 

presumptively reasonable, it logically follows that a below Guidelines sentence is “presumed not 

to be unreasonably severe”)). Vance has not met that demanding burden. 

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not plainly err in sentencing Vance. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We recognize that Defendants’ trial and sentencings were not without error, although 

none of the errors are reversible. Having carefully examined the record, we are satisfied that 

Defendants received a fundamentally fair trial. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Defendants’ 

convictions and sentences. 

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