Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03048/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Donald Barnes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 2002 Decided July 23, 2002

No. 01-3048

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

John Donald Barnes,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00295-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for the appellant. A. J. Kramer, Federal

Public Defender, was on brief. Gregory L. Poe, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Jeannie S. Rhee, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III

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and Barry Wiegand, Assistant United States Attorneys, were

on brief.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: John D.

Barnes (Barnes) appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(9), which makes it unlawful for a person convicted of

a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to possess firearms or ammunition. Barnes challenges whether his 1998

assault conviction under D.C. Code s 22-504(a) constitutes a

"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as defined in 18

U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(A) because section 22-504(a) does not

include as an express element of the offense any relationship

between the offender and the victim. Our sister circuits that

have addressed this question have rejected Barnes's reading

of section 921(a)(33)(A). It is an issue of first impression for

us. Barnes also raises several constitutional challenges to his

firearms conviction. While section 921(a)(33)(A) is not a

paradigm of precise draftsmanship, we nonetheless join the

other circuits in concluding that section 921(a)(33)(A) does not

require the predicate "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to contain as an express element a relationship between the offender and his victim.

I.

On August 5, 1997 Barnes was charged in D.C. Superior

Court with assault under D.C. Code s 22-504(a).1 The

charging information alleged that on or about July 21, 1997

Barnes unlawfully assaulted Keisha Ellis, who, Barnes ultimately acknowledged, is his son's mother. See Charging

__________

1 Section 22-504(a) of the D.C. Code, now codified at s 22-404(a)

(2001), stated: "Whoever unlawfully assaults, or threatens another

in a menacing manner, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be

imprisoned not more than 180 days, or both." The recodification

did not change the language.

Information in No. M-11747-97; January 14, 1998 Transcript

in No. M-11747-97 at 16. After pleading guilty to the

charge, Barnes was sentenced to a prison term of 180 days,

execution of which was suspended on the condition of a oneyear period of probation. The judgment and commitment/probation order required Barnes to observe standard

conditions of probation and, in particular, to enroll in and

complete the local court's domestic violence intervention program. See May 5, 1998 Judgment and Commitment Order at

1.

On August 17, 2000 an officer of the Metropolitan Police

Department observed a vehicle being driven by Barnes. A

paper trash bag obscured the right rear vent window. See

8/22/00 Tr. at 6. Believing that the car was stolen, the officer

made a traffic stop and ran a search on Barnes's driver's

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license. The search revealed that he did not have a valid

license. Upon placing Barnes under arrest for driving without a permit, the police officer conducted a search and

discovered that Barnes had two .45 caliber bullets in his left

pocket. See 8/22/00 Tr. 6-7. Another officer, who arrived at

the scene before Barnes's arrest, searched the car and found

a loaded and operable Sig Sauer .45 caliber pistol underneath

the driver's seat. After a records check revealed that Barnes

had been convicted of assault under D.C. Code s 22-504(a),

see D.C. Superior Court Case No. M-11747-97, Barnes was

charged with the unlawful and knowing receipt and possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(9). See Information in Cr. No. 00-295. On October

6, 2001 pursuant to a plea agreement, Barnes entered a

conditional guilty plea to the one-count criminal information.

In accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), his plea agreement explicitly reserved his right to challenge whether his

May 5, 1998 assault conviction constituted a "misdemeanor

crime of domestic violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C.

s 921(a)(33)(A). Plea Agreement in United States v. Barnes,

Cr. No. 00-0295 at 2.

On February 1, 2001 Barnes filed a brief in district court,

raising the statutory claim explicitly reserved in his plea

agreement, see February 1, 2001 Defendant's Memorandum

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of Law (App. 20-58), along with an unopposed motion to

supplement that claim with several constitutional arguments.

See February 1, 2001 Defendant's Unopposed Motion to

Supplement (App. 16-19). Barnes maintained that his assault

conviction under D.C. Code s 22-504(a), which "does not

include the relational element set forth in 18 U.S.C.

s 921(a)(33)(A)," does not qualify as a "misdemeanor crime of

domestic violence" under section 922(g)(9). February 1, 2001

Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 3-6 (App. 22-25). He

also claimed that his conviction violated "principles of equal

protection contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment" and that section 922(g)(9), read in conjunction

with 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(A), was "unconstitutionally

vague." Id. at 6-7. The government opposed Barnes's

claims. See February 27, 2001 Government Memorandum of

Law (App. 59-66).

On March 19, 2001 the district court held that Barnes's

"conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

in Criminal Case No. M-11747-97 for simple assault under

D.C. Code s 22-504 constitutes a 'misdemeanor crime of

domestic violence' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

s 921(a)(33)(A) and can thus serve as a predicate for conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(9)." March 19, 2001 Order at 1

(App. 76). Regarding the statutory question, the district

court adopted the reasoning of the First and Eighth Circuits,

stating that "[h]ad Congress intended to require the prosecution to prove as elements of the offense both the use of force

and the relationship of the defendant to the victim, it surely

could have done so by using the plural, 'elements,' rather than

the singular, 'element,' when writing s 921(a)(33)'s definition

of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." See March 19,

2001 Memorandum Opinion at 4 (citing United States v.

Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218-20 (1st Cir. 1999), and United

States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619-20 (8th 1999)). The

district court also rejected Barnes's constitutional challenges.

See March 19, 2001 Memorandum Opinion at 7-11. On April

17, 2001 the district court sentenced Barnes to a term of

imprisonment of twelve months and one day, followed by two

years' supervised release as well as a special assessment of

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$100. 4/17/01 Tr. 7. Barnes filed a timely notice of appeal

and the district court stayed execution of the sentence pending appeal.

II.

Because the district court's ruling involved solely questions

of law, our review is de novo. See Butler v. West, 164 F.3d

634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); United States v.

Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)

(first amendment challenge subject to de novo review).

A. Elements of "Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence"

In 1996, the Congress amended the Gun Control Act of

1968, 18 U.S.C. s 922 (1994), by providing that:

It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been

convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, ... to ship or transport in interstate or

foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,

any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or

ammunition which has been shipped or transported in

interstate commerce.

18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(9). Section 921 of Title 18, entitled "Definitions," provides in pertinent part:

the term "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"

means an offense that--

(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and

(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of

physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,

committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or

guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim

shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse,

parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a

spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim

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18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(A).2

Barnes asserts that the definition of "misdemeanor crime of

domestic violence" set forth in section 921(a)(33)(A) requires

the predicate offense to "contain, 'as an element,' not only the

'use or attempted use of physical force ...' but also that the

use of force be 'committed by' a person who maintained a

domestic relationship with the victim, as specifically defined

in the statute." See Barnes's Br. at 7-8. The government

responds that "the text and legislative purpose" demonstrate

that section 921(a)(33)(A) "does not require that the necessary domestic relationship be established as an element of the

predicate offense." Gov't Br. at 12-13.

In construing a statute, we look first for the plain meaning

of the text. If the language of the statute has a "plain and

unambiguous meaning," our inquiry ends so long as the

resulting "statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." See

United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)

(internal quotations omitted)). Whether statutory language

is plain depends on "the language itself, the specific context in

which that language is used, and the broader context of the

statute as a whole." Id. (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341).

Both sides agree that D.C. Code s 22-504(a) constitutes a

"misdemeanor under ... State Law" within the meaning of

section 921(a)(33)(A)(i). Barnes and the government also

agree that section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) requires that a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" contain "as an element"

"the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened

use of a deadly weapon." 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

Moreover, there is no dispute that section 22-504(a) of the

D.C. Code contains a similar element.3 It also appears

__________

2 Section 924(a)(2) of Title 18 provides that "[w]hoever knowingly

violates ... [922(g)(9)] shall be fined as provided in this title,

imprisoned not more than 10 years or both." See 18 U.S.C.

s 924(a)(2).

3 Assault under D.C. Code s 22-504(a) consists of: "(1) an act on

the part of the accused (which need not result in injury); (2) the

apparent present ability to injure the victim at the time the act is

undisputed that Barnes and the victim of his assault, Keisha

Ellis, had a son together at the time of the assault and thus

share one of the domestic relationships included in section

921(a)(33)(A)(ii) ("committed ... by a person with whom the

victim shares a child in common"). See February 1, 2001

Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 2 ("Mr. Barnes shares a

child in common with the complaintant [sic] in M-11747-97")

(App. 21); February 1, 2001 Defendant's Memorandum of

Law Exh. 3 at 16 (App. 45) and 22 (App. 51). Barnes

contends, however, that the applicable relationship is an

express element of the predicate offense because the prohibited "use of force" must be "committed" by a person with that

relationship. Having been convicted of assault under D.C.

Code s 22-504(a), which does not require a relationship between offender and victim, Barnes argues that his subsequent

possession of a firearm is not prohibited by section 922(g)(9)

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because he has not been convicted of a "misdemeanor crime

of domestic violence." While the domestic relationship requirement of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) must unquestionably be

established in a section 922(g)(9) prosecution, the dispute here

is whether the predicate offense must itself expressly include

the requirement.

The premise of Barnes's reading of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)

is that the "committed by" language modifies the "use of

force" clause immediately preceding it and thus is included in

the "element" that a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" must contain. Barnes refers to what is known as the

"Rule of the Last Antecedent," whereby "[o]rdinarily, qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to

others more remote." United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d

455, 459 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Accordingly, Barnes argues

that the "committed by" phrase modifies the "use of force"

element because the latter immediately precedes the former

__________

committed; and (3) the intent to perform the act which constitutes

the assault at the time the act is committed." Ruffin v. United

States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. 1994) (citing Criminal Jury

Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.07 (4th ed. 1993)).

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within subpart (ii). As was noted in Pritchett, however, "the

Rule of Last Antecedent is not an inflexible rule, and is not

applied where the context indicates otherwise." Id. at 459.

Here, context is everything. Bearing in mind that, "when

construing a statute, we are obliged to give effect, if possible,

to every word Congress used," Murphy Exploration & Prod.

Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 481 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339

(1979)); see also Alabama Power Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450,

455 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[s]tatutory text is to be interpreted to

give consistent and harmonious effect to each of its provisions"), we must determine if "committed by" can, consistent

with its meaning, modify "use of force." The verb "commit"

means "to do (something wrong or reprehensible), to perpetrate, be guilty of (a crime or offence, etc.)." Oxford English

Dictionary 559 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). The use of

force is not "committed," "done" or "perpetrated."4 An "offense" is "committed" or "perpetrated." And here, the offense of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" must be

committed by a person in one of the specific relationships.

Subpart (ii) of section 921(a)(33)(A) is not a complete sentence--subsection 921(a)(33)(A) is itself one sentence that

begins with "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subparagraph

(C), the term 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' means

an offense that--" and continues through subparts (i) and

(ii).5 In short, a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"

means an offense that is a misdemeanor, has, as an element,

the use of force and was committed by a person with the

requisite relationship. An illustration using simpler language

demonstrates the point. If the statute read

"larceny means an offense that has, as an element,

monetary gain, committed by a person ...,"

it would be obvious that "committed" modifies "offense" and

that monetary gain is the only "element." Just as "monetary

__________

4 While "commit" can also mean "obligate" or "pledge" as in "the

President committed to the use of force," that meaning is plainly

inapplicable. Oxford English Dictionary 560.

5 Interestingly, the sentence has no punctuation mark at the end.

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gain" is not "committed," the "use of force" is not "committed." The "offense" is "committed."6

Barnes argues that if the Congress had intended the

predicate offense to include only the "use of force" as an

express element, it would have inserted the words "and was"

before "committed by" and placed the remainder of (ii) in a

subpart numbered (iii). Barnes Br. at 11. Needless to say, if

the Congress had more precisely articulated its intention, our

task would have been easier. In interpreting a statute,

however, we are to determine its true, natural meaning,

where ascertainable, irrespective of cumbersome syntax. See

United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

("or" read as conjunctive because "strict grammatical construction will frustrate legislative intent" evinced by legislative history and statutory purpose); United States Nat'l

Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508

U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993) (purported "plain-meaning" analysis

based only on punctuation inadequate where "deployment of

quotation marks" points in one direction and "all of the other

evidence from the statute points the other way"); cf. United

States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 82-83

(1932) ("To determine the intent of the law, the court, in

construing a statute will disregard the punctuation, or will

repunctuate, if that be necessary, in order to arrive at the

__________

6 In section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the word "committed" is a past

participle used adjectivally to modify the noun "offense." "[O]ffense" is a predicate nominative referring to the subject of the

sentence "the term 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.' "

"[U]se of force" is the direct object of the verb "has," which here

means "includes" or "contains." Merriam-Webster's Third New

International Dictionary 1039 (1993). The phrase "as an element"

adjectivally modifies "use of force." See generally Martha Kolln,

Understanding English Grammar 21-53 ("Sentence Patterns") (4th

Ed. 1994). Indeed, the entire "committed by" phrase can be

construed to modify the language that begins with "offense."

Again, a simpler sentence will demonstrate: "Act 284 is a law that

deals with robbery, enacted by the legislature in 1975." In this

sentence, "enacted by the legislature in 1975" can modify both "a

law" as well as "a law that deals with robbery."

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natural meaning of the words employed."). In a Ninth

Circuit decision, Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d

1307 (9th Cir. 1992), the court analyzed the following language of the Clean Water Act: "in approving or promulgating

any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311,

1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title." Id. at 1310 (quoting 33

U.S.C. s 1369(b)(1)(E)). The critical question, the court declared, was "[d]oes the modifier reach back?" In other

words, do the listed sections modify "other limitation" only or

"any effluent limitation" as well? It first noted that "[g]rammatically, either interpretation could be correct, and the

[first] interpretation would more likely be right. 'Subordinate clauses should be placed near the words they modify.'

Margaret Shertzer, The Elements of Grammar 47 (1986).

That is why we say, 'As I was flying into Ketchikan, I saw a

pod of whales,' not 'I saw a pod of whales flying into Ketchikan.' " Id. at 1310-11. In concluding that the modifier does

indeed reach back, the court stated:

Syntax cannot always control construction. The legislative process may have subordinated clear writing to some

other goal. We must examine the meaning of the words

to see whether one construction makes more sense than

the other as a means of attributing a rational purpose to

Congress. Read for rational purpose, the syntactically

disfavored construction of section 1369(b)(1)(E) is sensible, the other as unlikely as the flying whales.

Id. at 1311. The fact that the Congress somewhat awkwardly

included the "committed by" phrase in subpart (ii) (instead of

adding a subpart (iii)) is not significant in view of the unnatural reading that would result if "committed by" were construed to modify "use of force."7

The dissent questions the majority's adoption of a construction of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) that was not advanced by the

__________

7 In fact, if the Rule of Last Antecedent were literally applied,

"committed by" would modify "threatened use of a deadly weapon."

Would Barnes prevail if he then argued that he cannot be convicted

under section 922(g)(9) because the underlying assault did not

involve a deadly weapon?

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government, namely that "committed" modifies "offense."

See Dissent op. at 3-4. But the meaning of the statute is "the

issue ... properly before the court," Kamen v. Kemper Fin.

Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991),8 and thus "the court ...,

retains the independent power to identify and apply the

proper construction of governing law." Id. (emphasis added).

Alluding briefly to the merits, the dissent rejects what it

refers to as "the majority's ipse dixit." Dissent op. at 4.

"Ipse dixit" means a "bare assertion resting on the authority

of an individual." Black's Law Dictionary 961 (4th ed. 1968).

The "individuals" on whose authority the majority rests for

the meaning of "committed" are the Oxford English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary. See supra at 8. Our dissenting colleague declares

that it "cannot be gainsaid that the language of this statute is

ambiguous," adding that the majority opinion is "rife with

allusions to its ambiguity." Dissent op. at 2. The dissent has

not read the majority opinion carefully. As the foregoing

discussion manifests, we refer to imprecision (not "ambiguity") only in connection with the syntax of the statute, not

with the meaning of the language used.

That the district court as well as every other court that has

considered the issue concluded, albeit on a different basis,

that section 921(a)(33)(A)'s language plainly requires only one

element, i.e., the use of force, further bolsters our interpretation. See March 19, 2001 Memorandum Opinion at 4; United

States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000)

(concluding that conviction under 18 U.S.C. s 113(a)(4), general assault statute for U.S. territories, constitutes "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"); United States v. Meade,

175 F.3d 215, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1999) (defendant's state misdemeanor conviction for assaulting his spouse, under Massachusett's general assault and battery statute, is "misdemeanor

crime of domestic violence," within 18 U.S.C.

__________

8 Barnes defines the "Issue Presented for Review" as "[w]hether

[his] conviction ... must be reversed because his prior conviction

... does not constitute a 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,'

as defined by 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(A)...." Barnes's Br. 1-2

(emphasis added). See also Gov't Br. ix.

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ss 921(a)(33)(A), 922(g)(9)); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d

617, 620 (8th Cir. 1999) (conviction under Iowa misdemeanor

simple assault statute for defendant's assault of mother of his

child constitutes "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence");

United States v. Thomson, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D.

Utah 2001); United States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 68 (D.

Mass. 1997); United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286, 291-

92 (N.D. Iowa); see also United States v. Ball, 7 Fed. Appx.

210, 213 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 226 (2001)

(unpublished per curiam order). These courts found the

Congress's use of the singular "element" rather than "elements" determinative. As the district court in Meade stated:

The crux of the matter is whether the phrase "as an

element" modifies both requirements or just the use of

force requirement. The inclusion of both the use of force

and domestic relationship requirements in one sentence

does not mandate that they be treated as one element.

In drafting the statute Congress placed the singular

word "element" immediately before the use of force

requirement. In choosing the singular word "element,"

Congress intended to modify only the language immediately following the phrase. If Congress had intended

that both requirements be mandatory elements of the

underlying state statute the word "element" would have

been in the plural to encompass both requirements.

Reading the phrase "has, as an element" in its ordinary

plain meaning, it is clear the singular "element" modifies

only the use of force requirement.

Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 68. Barnes counters that if, as he

contends, the "committed by" language modifies the use of

force clause, "Congress could have reasonably viewed the two

factual requirements as a single element." Barnes Br. at 12.

Under this view, the use of the singular element is not

determinative because a qualifying "misdemeanor crime of

domestic violence" simply has one element with two subparts.

To be sure, the Congress has used the singular "element"

when referring to more than one factor in other provisions of

Title 18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. s 16(a) (defining "crime of

violence" as "an offense that has as an element the use,

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attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person or property of another"(emphasis added)). Nonetheless, while a "crime of violence" may have a necessarily twopronged single "element," namely (1) use of force (2) against

another's person or property, the singular "element" used in

section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is followed by two independent, and

unlinked, factors, the use of force and the perpetrator's

relationship to the victim.9 Our research has revealed that

section 921(a)(33)(A) of Title 18 appears to be the only federal

criminal statute in which the "has, as an element," language is

set off by commas. In addition, that the "committed by"

language is itself separated from the "use of force" language

by a comma (as well as by the clause "or the threatened use

of a deadly weapon") reinforces the separateness of the "use

of force" element from the "committed by" language. In

defining crimes that have more than one distinct element, the

Congress generally uses the phrase "has as its elements"

(emphasis added). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. s 3559(2)(A) ("the

term 'assault with intent to commit rape' means an offense

that has as its elements engaging in physical contact with

another person or using or brandishing a weapon against

another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual

abuse or sexual abuse").10 While we do not necessarily find

the singular versus plural rationale determinative, it does

__________

9 While the "has as an element" language appears throughout

Title 18, it is generally used in reference to a "crime of violence"

and is defined as in 18 U.S.C. s 16(a). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ss 373,

924(c)(3)(A), 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

10 See also 18 U.S.C. s 3559(2)(B) ("the term 'arson' means an

offense that has as its elements maliciously damaging or destroying

any building, inhabited structure, vehicle, vessel, or real property

by means of fire or an explosive"); 18 U.S.C. s 3559(2)(C) ("the

term 'extortion' means an offense that has as its elements the

extraction of anything of value from another person by threatening

or placing that person in fear of injury to any person or kidnapping

of any person"); 18 U.S.C. s 3559(2)(D) ("the term 'firearms use'

means an offense that has as its elements those described in section

924(c) or 929(a), if the firearm was brandished, discharged, or

otherwise used as a weapon and the crime of violence or drug

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support our interpretation of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) as requiring that a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"

include only the use of force as an element.

We are also influenced by the fact that Barnes's interpretation of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) would create a "significant

practical anomaly," rendering the law a nullity in a majority

of the states as well as at the Federal level. Meade, 175 F.3d

at 220. A "statute should ordinarily be read to effectuate its

purposes rather than frustrate them." See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159,

1165 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).11 Section 922(g)(9)

of Title 18, known as the "Lautenberg Amendment," 142

Cong. Rec. D927-02, *D928 (1996), was enacted in order to

remedy the nationwide problem that those convicted of a

felony involving domestic assault were prohibited from firearms possession while those convicted of a misdemeanor

involving domestic assault were not. In explaining the law's

disparate treatment of a person convicted of a domestic

assault misdemeanor, Senator Lautenberg stated:

__________

trafficking crime during and relation to which the firearm was used

was subject to prosecution in a court of the United States or a court

of a State, or both"); 18 U.S.C. s 3559(2)(E) ("the term 'kidnapping'

means an offense that has as its elements the abduction, restraining, confining, or carrying away of another person by force or

threat of force"); see also 42 U.S.C. s 14071(a)(3)(B) ("The term

'sexually violent offense' means ... an offense that has as its

elements engaging in physical contact with another person with

intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse.").

11 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms takes the position that "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" includes "all

misdemeanors that involve the use or attempted use of physical

force (e.g., simple assault, assault and battery) if the offense is

committed by one of the defined parties. This is true whether or

not the State statute or local ordinance specifically defines the

offense as a domestic violence misdemeanor." Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Open Letter to All

State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, http://www.atf.

treas.gov/firearms/information/opltrleo.htm, (last visited June 24,

2002).

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Under current Federal law, it is illegal for persons

convicted of felonies to possess firearms. Yet, many

people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse

ultimately are not charged with or convicted of felonies.

At the end of the day, due to outdated laws or thinking,

perhaps after a plea bargain, they are, at most, convicted

of a misdemeanor.... Often acts of serious spouse

abuse are not even considered felonies.... This amendment would close this dangerous loophole and keep guns

away from violent individuals who threaten their own

families[.]

142 Cong. Rec. S10377-01, *S10377-78 (1996). Fewer than

half of the states currently have a "domestic assault" statute

that expressly includes as elements both the use of force and

a specific relationship between the offender and victim.12

Most states, and the District of Columbia, charge domestic

violence offenders under general assault statutes. Under

Barnes's construction, the Congress remedied one disparity--

between felony and misdemeanor domestic violence convictions--while at the same time creating a new disparity among

(and sometimes, within) states. A person who abused his

spouse in a state with a domestic assault statute would lose

the right to possess a firearm while a person who engaged in

the same conduct but was convicted of simple assault would

not. Moreover, Barnes's interpretation would make section

921(a)(33)(A)(i)'s reference to a misdemeanor under "Federal

law" a nullity because there is no federal misdemeanor that

includes both the use of force and the domestic relationship

as express elements. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. s 113(a)(4) (misdemeanor simple assault within maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States).

__________

12 According to the district court in Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 293, in

1997 "only seventeen of the fifty states and Puerto Rico have a law

that would qualify under section 921(a)(33) if the domestic relationship was a required element of the predicate offense." The government asserts that the number currently stands at nineteen. See

Gov't Br. at 18 n.11 (listing statutes).

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The legislative history of the Lautenberg Amendment confirms what the natural meaning of the statutory language

reveals, namely that the "has as an element" language refers

solely to the use of force. We "do not resort to legislative

history to cloud a statutory text that is clear," which we

believe section 921(a)(33)(A) to be. Were it unclear, we could

look to legislative history to "shed new light on congressional

intent." U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FBI, 276 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). In describing the

legislation's enforcement provisions, Senator Lautenberg foresaw the statutory construction question central to this case:

Mr. President, the final agreement does not merely make

it against the law for someone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms.

It also incorporates this new category of offenders into

the Brady law, which provides for a waiting period for

handgun purchases. Under the Brady law, local law

enforcement authorities are required to make reasonable

efforts to ensure that those who are seeking to purchase

a handgun are not prohibited under Federal law from

doing so. Mr. President, convictions for domestic violence-related crimes often are for crimes, such as assault, that are not explicitly identified as related to

domestic violence. Therefore, it will not always be possible for law enforcement authorities to determine from

the face of someone's criminal record whether a particular misdemeanor conviction involves domestic violence, as

defined in the new law.

142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01, *S11878 (1996) (emphasis added).

See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27

(1982) ("remarks ... of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction"); see also Amalgamated Transit Union v. Skinner, 894 F.2d 1362, 1370 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990). His statements

express the unmistakable intent that a "misdemeanor crime

of domestic violence" need not expressly include a domestic

relationship element.

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The legislative history also reveals that the "has, as an

element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the

threatened use of a deadly weapon" language was added to

the statute shortly before the provision was enacted. Replacing the originally proposed language that defined the predicate offense as a "crime of violence," Senator Lautenberg

explained that the addition of the "as an element" language

was not intended to apply to the domestic relationship language:

Under the final agreement, the ban applies to crimes

that have, as an element, the use or attempted use of

physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.

This is an improvement over the earlier version, which

did not explicitly include within the ban crimes involving

an attempt to use force, or the threatened use of a

weapon, if such an attempt or threat did not also involve

actual physical violence. In my view, anyone who attempts or threatens violence against a loved one has

demonstrated that he or she poses an unacceptable risk,

and should be prohibited from possessing firearms.

142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01.13 Based on our "natural meaning"

reading of the text, we reject Barnes's interpretation of

section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and conclude instead that his conviction under D.C. Code s 22-504(a) qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" within the meaning of the

Lautenberg Amendment.14

__________

13 There was concern expressed that "crime of violence" was

potentially "too broad, and could be interpreted to include an act

such as cutting up a credit card with a pair of scissors." 142 Cong.

Rec. S11872-01.

14 We also reject Barnes's invocation of the rule of lenity in

construing the Lautenberg Amendment. The United States Supreme Court stated in Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990),

that the rule of lenity is reserved for a case in which "reasonable

doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to

the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating

policies of the statute." Id. at 108 (quotations omitted). We have

no such doubt regarding section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

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B. Vagueness

Barnes contends the district court's interpretation of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) renders it unconstitutionally vague because "there is no way for a person to know from its language

whether the relational requirement is an element of the

predicate crime." Barnes Br. at 16. He further argues that

the relationship requirement itself is infirm because "a defendant convicted of simple assault cannot be sure whether he or

she might later be held to be a 'guardian' of the victim ... or

'similarly situated' to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the

victim." Id. at 17. A similar argument has been rejected by

two circuit courts. See Meade, 175 F.3d at 222 (section

921(a)(33)(A)(ii) contains no ambiguity as to either persons to

whom prohibitions apply or proscribed conduct); Smith, 171

F.3d at 623 (rejecting vagueness challenge).

To decide a vagueness challenge, we must assess whether it

"either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so

vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily

guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." United

States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). We have noted

before that "the Constitution does not require unattainable

feats of statutory clarity." Hutchins v. District of Columbia,

188 F.3d 531, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). As

the Eighth Circuit in Smith declared, "[w]e would be hard

pressed to find an individual of common, or even not so

common, intelligence who could not determine whether he

was in one of the enumerated relationships when he committed a misdemeanor crime including an element of physical

force." 171 F.3d at 623. Barnes's alternative interpretation

of the statutory text does not by itself establish vagueness.

"Since words, by their nature, are imprecise instruments,

even laws that easily survive vagueness challenges may have

gray areas at the margins." United States v. Nason, 269

F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2001) ("use of force" in s 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)

not unconstitutionally vague) (citing United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930)). We conclude that section

921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is sufficiently clear to reject Barnes's vagueness attack.

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C. Due Process

Barnes further argues that section 922(g)(9) violates his

due process right under the Fifth Amendment because it does

not require the government to prove, as an element of the

offense, that he knew his possession of a firearm was illegal.

A long line of circuit courts has rejected this argument. See,

e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.)

(citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1992), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 849 (2000)). Moreover, Barnes did not

adequately raise this argument below and, thus, we review it

for plain error only.15

As we already noted, section 922(g)(9) requires the defendant to "knowingly" violate the statute. See supra at 4 n.2.

The Supreme Court has made clear that "the knowledge

requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law." Bryan v.

United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Bryan Court concluded that "unless the

text of the statute dictates a different result, the term 'knowingly' merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that

constitute the offense." Id. at 193. The rule in Bryan has

been applied by other circuit courts without exception in

interpreting section 924(a)(2), which requires that a section

922(g)(9) offense be "knowingly" committed. See, e.g., United

States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722-23 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

527 U.S. 1029 (1999); United States v. Beavers, 206 F.3d 706,

708-09 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215,

226 n.5 (1st Cir.1999). Barnes knowingly possessed the firearm and that is the only knowledge required to convict him.

He argues, however, that section 922(g)(9) falls within the

narrow exception carved out by the holding in Lambert v.

United States, 355 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1957). See Barnes Br. at

19. Lambert involved a city ordinance that made it a crime

__________

15 Barnes raised the issue in district court at the end of his

memorandum in the last sentence of the last footnote and merely

cited a dissenting opinion in United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966,

969 (8th Cir. 2000). See February 1, 2001 Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 7 n.7 (App. 26).

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for any felon to remain in Los Angeles for more than five

days without registering with the police. Lambert, 355 U.S.

at 226-27. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's

conviction on due process grounds because the city failed to

establish that the defendant had notice that her "wholly

passive conduct" could constitute a crime. Id. at 228.

Barnes contends that section 922(g)(9) is a similar statute

that subjects to criminal prosecution an individual engaged in

otherwise innocent conduct--possession of a firearm. The

salient fact in Lambert, however, was that the defendant had

no reason to know, or even to attempt to discover, that she

was required to register in order to continue living in Los

Angeles. Other circuit courts that have addressed this argument have uniformly rejected it. The Sixth Circuit's observation in United States v. Beavers is instructive:

We conclude that Beavers's conviction on a domestic

violence offense sufficiently placed him on notice that the

government might regulate his ability to own or possess

a firearm. As noted in Baker and Meade, domestic

abuse is a well-known problem, and it should not surprise

anyone that the government has enacted legislation in an

attempt to limit the means by which persons who have a

history of domestic violence might cause harm in the

future.

206 F.3d at 710. Having been convicted of a violent crime,

Barnes had reason to know that the government could regulate his possession of firearms and thus he cannot avail

himself of the limited Lambert exception.16

D. Equal Protection

Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) provides an exception to section

922(g)(9) "if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or

is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has

had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdic-

__________

16 The Supreme Court has steadfastly resisted efforts to expand

Lambert's reach. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,

609 (1971) (declining to extend Lambert to possession of hand

grenades).

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tion provides for the loss of civil rights under such an

offense)." In the District of Columbia, as in most states, an

individual convicted of a misdemeanor does not forfeit his civil

rights. Barnes argues that he is thus in a worse position

than a person convicted in a jurisdiction that authorizes the

loss of civil rights but can also restore them. Claiming that

there is no rational basis for this distinction, he asserts that

his conviction violates equal protection. See Barnes Br. at 21

(citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). His claim

is without merit.

Because domestic violence misdemeanants are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes and because no

"fundamental right" is implicated, the classification will be

upheld "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts

that could provide a rational basis for the classification."

Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 903

(D.C. Cir.) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928

(1999). The Congress's decision to incorporate state law

governing forfeiture of civil rights was rational irrespective of

differences among states regarding restoration. Furthermore, the Congress provided other methods such as expungement and pardon that Barnes might use to come within the

exception of section 921(a)(33). See McGrath v. United

States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1121 (1996).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's

holding that Barnes's conviction of assault under D.C. Code

s 22-504(a) constitutes a "misdemeanor crime of domestic

violence" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(A) and

thus validly serves as a predicate offense for his conviction

under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(9).

So ordered.

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Sentelle, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Defendant Barnes

appeals from a judgment sentencing him for the violation of a

statute which, in pertinent part, declares it "unlawful for any

person ... who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ... possess ... any

firearm...." 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(9). The statute defines the

term "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as meaning

an offense that is a misdemeanor under federal or state law;

and "has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical

force, or threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by

... a person with whom the victim shares a child in common...." 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(i) & (ii).

The case before us turns on statutory interpretation. If

the language of a statute has a "plain and unambiguous

meaning," our inquiry ends so long as the resulting "statutory

scheme" is coherent and consistent. United States v. Wilson,

290 F.3d 347, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2002). As I read the federal

firearms statute at issue, Congress required that the underlying misdemeanor statute of conviction must have had as an

element "the use or attempted use of physical force, or the

threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a [specified

related person]." Barnes, according to the record in the case,

did possess a firearm and had been convicted of violating D.C.

Code s 22-504(a), which outlaws general assaults but makes

no mention of the status of any relationship between the

perpetrator and the victim. That is, the D.C. statute Barnes

previously violated does not have as an element the use of

force committed by one of the persons enumerated in 18

U.S.C. s 921(a)(33)(ii). To me, the analysis ends there. Appellant's record offense is not included within the statutory

definition, and the judgment appealed from cannot stand.

The United States argues that Congress's use of the word

"element," as opposed to "elements," means that the gravamen of the underlying offense needs to include only the use of

force or threatened use of force with an extra-statutory

finding that the forbidden use or threat of force was committed by a person who bears the relevant relationship. This

argument has been accepted by our District Court, the majority today, and at least one other circuit. See United States v.

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Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United

States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1999) (alluding to

the "singular term 'element' " but with little supporting or

elucidating reasoning). Nonetheless, with due respect to all

the judges who have concluded otherwise, I find the argument not only unconvincing, but largely meaningless. For

the argument today is not how many elements are involved,

but what the singular element is.

As Meade properly describes it, that singular word "element" refers "to the immediately following attribute."

Meade, 175 F.3d at 219. Just so, but so what? The restatement of "element" as "attribute" begs the question of what

single element-turned-attribute the statute requires. Just as

an element might be either simple or complex and remain a

single element, so might an attribute. For example, if a

purchaser were to express a strong desire to own a pickup

truck which has as an attribute tires manufactured by an

American company, that purchaser would not likely be satisfied to sign a contract of purchase specifying only that the

truck "have as an attribute tires," leaving the question of

their manufacturer for some discussion outside the contract.

We have before us something far more important than a

contract of sale. We have a penal statute. Fundamental to

our fairness-centered criminal justice system is the rule of

lenity for the interpretation of ambiguous penal statutes.

See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 13 & n.12

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (collecting authorities). Under the rule of

lenity, a criminal defendant is, and should be, afforded the

benefit of the doubtful application of ambiguous statutory

language. It cannot be gainsaid that the language of this

statute is ambiguous. The majority opinion itself is rife with

allusions to its ambiguity. "[S]ection 921(a)(33)(A) is not a

paradigm of precise draftsmanship." Maj. Op. at 2. "[I]f the

statute read [otherwise], it would be obvious that 'committed'

modifies 'offense.' " Maj. Op. at 8. "If the Congress had

more precisely articulated its intention, our task would have

been easier." Maj. Op. at 9. "[T]he Congress somewhat

awkwardly included the 'committed by' phrase in subpart

(ii)." Maj. Op. at 10. The majority's grammatical and synUSCA Case #01-3048 Document #691192 Filed: 07/23/2002 Page 23 of 25
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tactical analysis defending its interpretation of the statute is

quite detailed and quite skilled. But the necessity for such a

detailed and skilled analysis itself illustrates the ambiguity of

the words construed. I would apply the rule of lenity, and I

would reverse the judgment of the District Court.

The supportive arguments offered by the government are

equally unconvincing. That a snippet of legislative history is

more consistent with the less lenient application of a criminal

statute hardly erodes the laudable principles of the rule of

lenity. This proposition seems to me quite offensive to our

historic sense of fairness in criminal law, indeed, perhaps to

the Due Process Clause. Though I do not reach the constitutional argument, it seems to me most inconsistent with fundamental fairness and certainly with the rule of lenity to

suppose that for a defendant to understand that his conduct is

illegal, he must read not only the words of the statute, but

find and construe the abstruse comments of a single senator

on a single day. See 142 Cong. Rec. 510377-01, *510377-78

(1996).

As to the argument that the statute as I would construe it

applies in fewer states than the statute as construed by the

government, I frankly do not see how this proves anything at

all. The government admits in its brief that the Supreme

Court has held repeatedly that Congress may validly and

constitutionally adopt criminal laws that apply differently in

different states based upon variances in state law. See, e.g.,

United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293 (1958) (holding

that Congress had constitutional authority to pass the Assimilative Crimes Act, making state law applicable to federal

enclaves within the states, and citing other statutes that

define federal offenses based upon variances in state law);

see also United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.

1974) (the fact that federal statute prohibiting illegal gambling businesses applies only in states where gambling is

illegal "does not result in a denial of equality").

Finally, the majority stresses an argument based on the

use of the word "committed" theorizing that "use of force" is

not "committed." I would note at the outset that this is an

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argument not made by the parties. As a matter of first

principles, I have no problem with that fact. As I have

written before, the appropriate question is not whether an

argument is raised by the parties, but whether an issue is

properly brought before the court. " 'When an issue or claim

is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the

particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather

retains the independent power to identify and apply the

proper construction of governing law.' " Eldred v. Reno, 239

F.3d 372, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of

Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993)). However, the majority's

reliance upon an argument not made by the parties is at least

arguably in conflict with circuit law. See Seattle Opera v.

NLRB, --- F.3d ----, slip op. at 10 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. June 11,

2002). Nonetheless, even if we treat the argument as properly before us, I find it unconvincing. I see no reason beyond

the majority's ipse dixit to conclude that the "use of force" is

not "committed" by the related person.

In short, I respectfully dissent.

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