Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05437/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05437-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
G. Jack King
Appellee
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc.
Appellee
United States Department of Justice
Appellant
Frederic Whitehurst
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 30, 1999 Decided July 16, 1999

No. 98-5437

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc.,

G. Jack King and Dr. Frederic Whitehurst,

Appellees

v.

United States Department of Justice,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00372)

Alfred Mollin, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General at the time

the briefs were filed, William B. Ogden, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Daniel Mach argued the cause for appellees. With him on

the brief were David W. DeBruin and Daniel S. Alcorn.

David K. Colapinto and Stephen M. Kohn entered appearances.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: The Department of Justice appeals the district court's interim award of attorney's fees to

the plaintiff National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in this case filed under the Freedom of Information Act,

5 U.S.C. s 552. In the alternative, the Department petitions

this court to issue a writ of mandamus reversing the award.

We dismiss the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to review

the interim award until the district court enters a final

judgment; we deny the petition because the circumstances do

not warrant relief by way of mandamus.

I. Background

In 1995 the Department of Justice's Office of Inspector

General opened an investigation into allegations of wrongdoing at the crime laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In late January 1997 newspapers reported that the

OIG had completed its investigation. See, e.g., FBI Warns of

Possible Flaws in Lab Evidence, L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 1997, at

A1; Report Finds F.B.I. Lab Slipping from Pinnacle of

Crime Fighting, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1997, at A1. In February the NACDL, invoking the FOIA, asked the Department

for "access to or a copy of any and all drafts" of the OIG

report on the crime lab. At that time the only document

responsive to the NACDL's request was a working draft of

the OIG report.

When the NACDL had not received a response within ten

business days, it filed suit in the district court. See 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(6)(A)(i), (a)(6)(C) (1997). The NACDL also moved

for a preliminary injunction to expedite release of the OIG

report on the ground that the one-year limitation period for

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filing petitions for habeas corpus, enacted as part of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.

L. No. 104-132, ss 101, 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220, was set to

expire on April 24, 1997; it feared "that criminal defendants

whose convictions might have turned on tainted FBI evidence

would be precluded from collaterally attacking those convictions." Shortly after the NACDL filed this suit, it learned

that the Department had rejected its request, invoking the

exemption for "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes ... to the extent that the production of

such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings," 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(A).

At a March 7 status hearing the NACDL informed the

district court that it also sought disclosure of the final OIG

report, when complete. The Department reiterated its opposition to releasing the draft report and refused to commit to

releasing the final report to anyone other than the Attorney

General and the Congress. One week later, however, the

Department modified its position, advising the court it would

release the final report to the public at roughly the same time

that it released the report to the Attorney General and to the

Congress. Upon the statute of limitations issue the Department took the position that prisoners "will have one year

from [the] date [of public release] to file habeas petitions for

relief." Based "in large part" upon these representations, the

district court denied the NACDL's motion for a preliminary

injunction. On April 15, 1997 the Department publicly released the OIG's final report on the FBI crime lab.

Shortly thereafter the NACDL filed additional FOIA requests with the OIG and with the Deputy Attorney General,

seeking "access to or copies of any and all records relating to"

the OIG's investigation into the FBI crime lab. When neither recipient had responded conclusively within ten business

days, the NACDL amended its complaint to include those two

requests. See 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1997) (response

must state whether agency will comply with request).

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While litigation continued over the exemption from disclosure claimed by the Department for the draft report and

portions of the OIG's working papers, the NACDL moved the

court for an interim award of attorney's fees. In June 1998

the district court awarded the NACDL a bit more than

$118,000 in fees. Although it recognized that this court had

yet to rule upon the propriety of an interim award in a FOIA

case, the district court concluded that the power to make such

an award "lies in the sound discretion of the court."

Finding that the protracted litigation had imposed a financial hardship upon counsel for NACDL, the court held that an

interim award of attorney's fees would be warranted if the

NACDL could satisfy the criteria used to determine whether

to award fees at the end of a FOIA case: "First, ... whether

the party requesting fees is eligible for them. ... Second,

... whether [that] party is entitled to fees." Chesapeake Bay

Found., Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 11 F.3d 211, 216

(D.C. Cir. 1993). As to eligibility, the district court found

that although the case was not over the NACDL had substantially prevailed upon two issues: its suit was a significant

cause of the public release of the final report, and "it was only

the urging of Plaintiffs and the Court that led the Government to expedite its processing" of the OIG's working papers.* As to entitlement, the court considered the factors set

out in Chesapeake Bay--"(1) the public benefit derived from

the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the

nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4)

whether the Government had a reasonable basis for withholding requested information"--and concluded that the NACDL

was entitled to an interim award of attorney's fees. 11 F.3d

at 216.

The Department then moved to require the NACDL to

post a bond sufficient to cover the amount of the award. The

__________

* Initially the Department informed the NACDL and the district

court that it could take up to four and one-half years to produce the

working papers. In the event, however, the Government produced

nearly all the documents that it deemed non-exempt within seven

months.

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district court denied the motion, reasoning that a bond requirement would "make ... nonsense of the concept of an

interim award," and ordered the Department to pay the fees

"without further delay."

The Department filed a notice of appeal and moved the

district court for a stay of its order pending appeal. After

the district court denied the stay the Department filed a

similar motion in this court. See Fed. R. App. P. 8. Based

upon the NACDL's agreement not to seek enforcement of the

district court's order prior to our disposition of the Department's motion for a stay, we deferred consideration of that

motion pending resolution of the case. We now dismiss the

motion as moot.

II. Analysis

On appeal the Department objects only to the district

court's discretionary decision to award interim attorney's

fees; it challenges neither the court's legal authority to make

such an award under the FOIA nor its refusal to require the

NACDL to post a bond. The NACDL contends that this

court lacks jurisdiction to review an interim award of fees

because it is not a final judgment and does not fall within any

exception to the final judgment rule. The Department acknowledges that the interim award is not a final judgment,

but argues that we have jurisdiction to review the award

under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial

Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949). Alternatively, the Department argues that we should review the

district court's decision by way of a writ of mandamus in the

exercise of our "supervisory" power over the district court.

See In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1989);

see also 16 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure s 3934.1 (2d ed. 1996).

A. Collateral Order Doctrine

Under the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. s 1291, this

court has jurisdiction only "of appeals from ... final decisions

of the district courts of the United States." See also Linder

v. Department of Defense, 133 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

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(rule "avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed

justice that can accompany piecemeal litigation"). The Supreme Court, however, in Cohen recognized "a narrow class

of collateral orders which do not meet th[e] definition of

finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable

under s 1291." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

706, 712 (1996). To be appealable under the collateral order

doctrine, an "order must [1] conclusively determine [a] disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &

Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). An appellant

can satisfy the third requirement by showing that it will

suffer irreparable harm if denied interlocutory review. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981).

We have addressed the application of the collateral order

doctrine to an interim award of attorney's fees only once

before. In Trout v. Garrett, 891 F.2d 332 (1989), a Title VII

case, we held that such an award was not appealable because

it did "not even dispositively determine fees due up to this

stage of the litigation" and because "the government ... [had

not] demonstrat[ed] a real prospect of irreparable harm." Id.

at 335. Although the NACDL reads Trout as "clear, binding

authority forbidding interlocutory appeals of interim fee

awards," we do not. In Trout, we held only that upon the

facts of that case the Government had satisfied neither the

first nor the third requirement of Cohen. Indeed, the implication of Trout is that an interim award of attorney's fees

that does satisfy all three of the Cohen criteria is immediately

appealable. At least six circuits have so held. See Law v.

NCAA, 134 F.3d 1025, 1027 (10th Cir. 1998); Rosenfeld v.

United States, 859 F.2d 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1988); Dardar v.

Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1988);

Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 1988);

Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318-20 (7th Cir.

1986); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1493

(11th Cir. 1986).

As in Trout the present parties dispute whether the Department has satisfied the first and third of the Cohen tests.

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With respect to the first, we agree with the Department that

the district court's order "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. In

Trout the district court had awarded only "the minimum

irreducible amount[ ]" to which the plaintiffs were entitled for

the issues upon which they had prevailed, leaving open the

possibility of further awards for work that had already been

done on those issues. 891 F.2d at 333 n.2. Here, in contrast,

the award is, as the Department correctly states, "the last

word on fees for purposes of the release of the Inspector

General's Final Report and for any expedition achieved in the

release of related documents." The NACDL does not disagree with respect to the draft and final versions of the OIG

report, but points out that it is continuing in the district court

to oppose the Department's claims that some of the OIG's

working papers are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.

Even if the NACDL substantially prevails upon the latter

issue, however, any future award of attorney's fees would not

be for the work that caused the Department to expedite

processing of the OIG's papers. Accordingly, we hold that

the district court's order meets the first criterion of Cohen.

Turning to the third criterion, however, we do not believe

the Department has demonstrated a "real prospect of irreparable harm." Trout, 891 F.2d at 335. The Department has

made no showing that the NACDL will likely be unable to

repay the fees if the award is later reduced or overturned.

See Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721-22 (party appealing interim

award of attorney's fees bears burden of showing irreparable

harm). The Department does point out that the NACDL, in

arguing for an interim award of attorneys fees, stated before

the district court not only that its counsel was experiencing

financial hardship but also that it had "limited resources."

Before this court, however, the NACDL has in no uncertain

terms represented that it is able, and acknowledged that it

would be obligated, "to repay the fees if they are ultimately

reversed on appeal after final judgment." The Department

contends that the two NACDL statements are contradictory.

While we agree that a party may not "blow hot and cold and

take now a position contrary to that taken in the proceedings

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it invoked to obtain [relief]," Callanan Road Improvement

Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507, 513 (1953), we see no such

inconsistency in the NACDL's position viewed overall.

In the district court the NACDL opposed the Department's

motion to require it to post a bond as follows:

NACDL believes that the likelihood of the government

overturning the interim fee award on appeal is extremely

remote, but whatever the outcome NACDL plans to be in

existence for the indefinite future. Thus the purported

harm claimed by the government--not having a party

from which to seek reimbursement in the unlikely event

it is needed--does not exist. The government's argument fails because it states that NACDL can collateralize

a bond for more than the amount of the award but that

NACDL is not substantial enough to seek reimbursement [from] in the very remote event of appeal. Pl.'s

Suppl. Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Amend Ct.'s Order (R.89),

at 2.

While the Department characterizes this submission as "evasive[ ]" and designed to confirm the implication "that [the

NACDL's] resources were insufficient to afford counsel," we

understand it merely to point out an inconsistency in the

Department's own argument.

Moreover, we agree with the NACDL that the financial

hardship that may warrant an interim award of attorney's

fees is not the same as the irreparable harm needed to justify

interlocutory review. For an interim award of attorney's fees

it is enough that the fee is high relative to the party's or its

counsel's ability to continue financing the litigation. See

Allen v. FBI, 716 F. Supp. 667, 670 (D.D.C. 1989). On the

other hand, the irreparable harm necessary to bring a case

within the "tight 'collateral order doctrine' of Cohen," Trout,

891 F.2d at 335, must entail some prospect that the party is

or will become judgment proof. See Campanioni v. Barr, 962

F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1992). The NACDL's submissions to

the district court are evidence only that paying its counsel

would cause it financial hardship; they do not raise the

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prospect that, if called upon to do so, the NACDL would be

unable to repay the Department.

In sum, because the interim award of attorney's fees is

neither a final judgment under s 1291 nor a collateral order

under Cohen, we do not have jurisdiction to review it.

B. Mandamus

As we have often noted, the writ of mandamus is "an

extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations." In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d 1059, 1063 (1998); accord

In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 250 (1998) ("Lax rules on

mandamus would undercut [the final judgment rule] ... and

would lead to piecemeal appellate litigation"). Accordingly,

we are not quick to issue a writ of mandamus in the exercise

of our supervisory power over the district court. See In re

Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n, Inc., 949 F.2d 1165, 1167

(1991) ("While recognizing that this litigation qualifies as

'really extraordinary,' we open no door for 'indiscriminate use'

of the remedy to avoid the strictures of the final judgment

rule"); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 309 n.62

(1980) ("Although the Supreme Court ... and this court ...

have expressed a willingness to employ the writ ... in a

supervisory capacity to remedy certain classes of error not

traditionally thought remediable by mandamus, this willingness cannot be read expansively").

We have yet systematically to set forth criteria by which to

determine whether a "supervisory" writ of mandamus shall

issue. See, e.g., Bituminous Coal, 949 F.2d at 1167-68; In re

United States, 872 F.2d at 477-79; Potomac Elec. Power Co.

v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Four of our

sister circuits, however, have adopted guidelines that we find

instructive and apply today. See Bauman v. United States

Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977); see also United States

v. Amlani, 169 F.3d 1189, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1999) (following

Bauman); In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir.

1997) (same); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 810

(10th Cir. 1997) (same); In re Kansas City Star Co., 73 F.3d

191, 194 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). They consider:

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(1) whether the party seeking the writ has any other

adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the

desired relief;

(2) whether that party will be harmed in a way not

correctable on appeal;

(3) whether the district court clearly erred or abused its

discretion;

(4) whether the district court's order is an oft-repeated

error; and

(5) whether the district court's order raises important

and novel problems or issues of law.

See, e.g., Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654-55. Following these

guidelines, we see that a supervisory writ of mandamus is

unwarranted in this case.

We have already concluded, first, that the Department can

seek review of the interim award of attorney's fees following

entry of a final judgment in this case and, second, that it will

not suffer irreparable injury in the meantime. We will

assume the third consideration, clear error, for the sake of

the present argument. As to the fifth and fourth considerations, respectively, the Department argues that, though the

district court's erroneous rationale for the award of fees is

novel, it could between now and our resolution of the appeal

from the final judgment in this case become "a 'persistent'

error ... and thus threaten the proper administration of

justice in this Circuit." Specifically, the Department claims

that the district court, by determining that the NACDL

substantially prevailed even though the Department released

the final report to the public the day it was completed and

was under no obligation to expedite the release of the OIG's

working papers, ignored our teaching in Chesapeake Bay: if

"the Government's position is legally correct.... no fees are

recoverable," regardless whether "information was disclosed

after initial resistance." 11 F.3d at 216.

We do not share the Department's concern that the decision of the district court will "invite[ ] abuse of the FOIA"

with respect to interim awards of fees. As noted, the Department's claims of error are rooted in the particulars of this

case; it does not challenge wholesale the district court's

authority to issue an interim award of fees. Apart from the

question of legal authority, the district court rendered only a

fact-specific discretionary decision based upon credibility determinations and the narrow legal arguments the parties

placed before it. The Department's claim that the district

court set a precedent with portents well beyond the facts and

arguments in this litigation lies somewhere between exaggeration and speculation.

At most, then, only the Department's argument that the

district court's decision is clearly erroneous may survive

scrutiny, and upon that issue we express no opinion. In no

event, however, could clear error alone support the issuance

of a writ of mandamus in this case because, as we have seen,

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any error--even a clear one--could be corrected on appeal

without irreparable harm either to the Department or to the

administration of the FOIA in this circuit. In these circumstances the court will not issue a writ of mandamus.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction and the petition for mandamus is denied.

So ordered.

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