Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-03090/USCOURTS-ca13-13-03090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard E. DeOcampo
Petitioner
Department of the Army
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RICHARD E. DEOCAMPO,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2013-3090

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF0752110534-C-1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 7, 2014

______________________ 

DAVID P. CLISHAM, Clisham & Sortor, of San Francisco, California, for petitioner. With him on the brief was 

JUSTINE L. CLISHAM. 

JANE C. DEMPSEY, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. On the brief 

were STUART F. DELERY, Assistant Attorney General, 

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and DEBORAH A. BYNUM, 

Assistant Director. Of counsel was ELIZABETH A. SPECK, 

Trial Attorney. 

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2 DEOCAMPO v. ARMY

______________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) affirmed 

the denial of Mr. Richard DeOcampo’s petition for enforcement against the Department of the Army (Army). 

Because Mr. DeOcampo improperly raises new arguments 

on appeal and because the Board’s decision contains no 

reversible error of fact or law, this court affirms.

I.

In March 2011, Mr. DeOcampo lost his position as a 

federal police officer for breaching safety procedures, 

which resulted in the negligent discharge of his firearm 

and an injury to his lower leg. Mr. DeOcampo appealed 

his removal to the Board, which dismissed the appeal 

after Mr. DeOcampo entered into a settlement agreement

with the Army. Under the terms of the agreement, the 

Army agreed to rescind Mr. DeOcampo’s removal and 

reinstate him effective March 27, 2011. For his part, Mr. 

DeOcampo agreed to “resign for medical reasons” effective 

September 16, 2011. Finally, the agreement specified 

that the Army would pay Mr. DeOcampo back pay within 

60 days under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. J.A. 

193–96. The agreement was fully executed on October 4, 

2011. 

On December 21, 2011, more than 60 days after the 

settlement agreement went into effect, Mr. DeOcampo 

filed a petition for enforcement, contending that the Army 

had not paid him back pay compensation. In response, 

the Army provided details concerning its effort to process

Mr. DeOcampo’s back pay and included copies of numerous e-mail exchanges, time cards, Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS) spreadsheets, and an affidavit 

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DEOCAMPO v. ARMY 3

from the technician specialist responsible for processing 

Mr. DeOcampo’s back pay. J.A. 59–81. 

Mr. DeOcampo received his back pay check on January 13, 2012, around 40 days after it was due. However, 

Mr. DeOcampo contended that his regular pay was short 

18 hours, that his Sunday premium pay was short 12 

hours, that his night shift deferential was short one hour, 

that his annual leave was short one hour, and that his 

accrued sick leave, holiday pay, and annual uniform 

allowance were not included. Finally he contended that 

24 hours of leave without pay was erroneously deducted. 

J.A. 85–90. The Army processed these objections and 

informed the Board that it agreed with certain errors 

identified by Mr. DeOcampo, but explained that others 

were without foundation. Following a teleconference with 

the Administrative Judge, Mr. DeOcampo identified only 

“three outstanding issues: (1) uniform allowance payment 

of $800; (2) payment for accrued and unused sick leave; 

and (3) attorneys fees.” J.A. 163–64. The Army granted 

Mr. DeOcampo’s request for a uniform allowance payment 

of $800, but denied the two remaining issues. 

II.

On April 19, 2012, the Administrative Judge issued 

an initial decision denying Mr. DeOcampo’s petition for 

enforcement. The Administrative Judge found that 

although the Army’s payment to Mr. DeOcampo was late, 

the Army exercised reasonable diligence and made payment, with interest, in January 2012. J.A. 6. The Administrative Judge also agreed with the Army that Mr. 

DeOcampo was not entitled to unused sick leave under 

the Back Pay Act and its implementing regulations. The 

Administrative Judge instructed Mr. DeOcampo to renew 

his attorney fees motion following the Board’s final decision. J.A. 8. 

On May 24, 2012, Mr. DeOcampo petitioned for review, contending that the Army did not provide him a 

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4 DEOCAMPO v. ARMY

copy of the “Command Letter” from the Civilian Personnel 

Office to the Civilian Payroll Office, which lists an employee’s back pay entitlements, and that the Army did not 

implement 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(d), which Mr. DeOcampo 

believes mandates payment of unused sick leave. J.A. 

264–73. The Board affirmed the Administrative Judge’s 

initial decision, holding that the settlement agreement 

did not require the production of the “Command Letter” 

and that Mr. DeOcampo did not show that the Army’s

detailed accounting was insufficient. J.A. 16. The Board 

further held that Mr. DeOcampo was not entitled to a 

lump-sum payment for unused sick leave “because there 

is nothing in the language of the Back Pay Act itself that 

authorizes lump-sum payments for sick leave.” J.A. 16–

17. Mr. DeOcampo appeals the Board’s decision. 

III.

This court “must affirm unless the Board’s decision is 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 

not in accordance with law, obtained without procedures 

required by rule, law, or regulation, or unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” Addison v. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1184, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see 

also 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). This court has defined “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

McEntee v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 404 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005).

Mr. DeOcampo argues that the Army is in breach of 

the settlement agreement, and therefore, the agreement 

should be rescinded. Specifically, Mr. DeOcampo argues 

that the Army did not provide him a copy of his Official 

Personnel File and any other file used for personnel 

purposes under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) and 5 C.F.R. § 293.102. 

Mr. DeOcampo further charges that the Army did not 

produce evidence that it paid Mr. DeOcampo back pay 

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DEOCAMPO v. ARMY 5

within 60 days of the settlement agreement and did not 

provide Mr. DeOcampo payment for unused sick leave. 

Mr. DeOcampo has waived his first argument. He did 

not argue to the Board that he is entitled to documents

under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) and 5 C.F.R. § 293.102. See 

Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 

1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Our precedent clearly establishes the impropriety of seeking a reversal of the 

[B]oard’s decision on the basis of assertions never presented to the presiding official or to the [B]oard.”). To the 

extent Mr. DeOcampo alleges that he did not receive 

evidence of the Army’s compliance with the settlement 

agreement, this assertion is contrary to substantial evidence contained in the record. For example, the record 

contains “detailed spreadsheets supported by affidavits 

that explained the back pay calculation pay period by pay 

period.” J.A. 16. Accordingly, the Board’s finding that 

the Army’s accounting was sufficient to establish compliance with the settlement agreement is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

Mr. DeOcampo’s contention that the Army did not pay

him back pay within 60 days is not disputed. The Army 

concedes that it paid Mr. DeOcampo around 40 days late. 

However, the record shows that Mr. DeOcampo was 

continuously advised of the Army’s efforts and that he

received interest on the late payment to compensate for 

the delay. J.A. 4. The Board correctly determined that 

the Army’s minor delay in processing Mr. DeOcampo’s 

payment does not constitute a material breach of the 

settlement agreement that warrants rescission. See Lutz 

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 485 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

(“A breach is material when it relates to a matter of vital 

importance, or goes to the essence of the contract.”). 

Mr. DeOcampo’s argument about unused sick leave is 

likewise unavailing. Mr. DeOcampo relies on 5 C.F.R. § 

550.805(d), which states:

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6 DEOCAMPO v. ARMY

In computing the amount of back pay under section 5596 of title 5, United States Code, and this 

subpart, an agency shall grant, upon request of an 

employee, any sick or annual leave available to 

the employee for a period of incapacitation if the 

employee can establish that the period of incapacitation was the result of illness or injury. 

5. C.F.R. § 550.805(d) (emphasis added). The language 

requiring an employee to “establish that the period of 

incapacitation was the result of illness or injury” clearly 

indicates that this provision is unrelated to the lump-sum 

payment of unused sick leave. Rather, as the Board 

stated, this provision means that “the employee can 

choose to use available annual or sick leave during a back 

pay period . . . instead of being placed in a regular pay 

status during the back pay period if he determined that to 

be advantageous. It does not authorize a pay-out of sick 

leave.” J.A. 17–18. 

Furthermore, the Board’s reliance on the Back Pay 

Act and its implementing regulation is reasonable. The 

Back Pay Act entitles Mr. DeOcampo to “pay, allowances, 

or differentials.” 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b). The Back Pay Act’s 

implementing regulation defines the terms “pay, allowances, and differentials,” and specifically excludes monetary benefits “payable to separated or retired employees 

based upon a separation from service, such as retirement 

benefits, severance payments, and lump-sum payments 

for annual leave.” 5 C.F.R. § 550.803. Mr. DeOcampo’s 

argument that he is not a “separated” employee ignores 

the fact that Mr. DeOcampo, under the terms of the 

stipulation, agreed to resign. 

IV.

Mr. DeOcampo’s remaining arguments have been 

carefully considered and found unpersuasive. This court 

holds that the Board’s decision is in accordance with law 

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DEOCAMPO v. ARMY 7

and supported by substantial evidence. The decision of 

the Board is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

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