Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02145/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02145-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pam Huber
Plaintiff
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

PAM HUBER PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 04-2145

WAL-MART STORES, INC. DEFENDANT

ORDER ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND DAMAGES

There comes on for consideration Plaintiff’s Verified Motion

for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 40), and First Supplemental Fee Petition

(Doc. 47), Defendant’s Verified Response and Brief to Plaintiff’s

Verified Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 45), Plaintiff’s Reply to

Wal-Mart’s Response to the Fee Petition (Doc. 50), Defendant’s

Response to Plaintiff’s First Supplemental Fee Petition (Doc. 52),

Plaintiff’s Petition to Establish Damages and Receive Reinstatement

(Doc. 42), Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Petition to Establish

Damages and Receive Reinstatement (Doc. 44), and Plaintiff’s Reply

to Wal-Mart’s Response to the Damages Motion (Doc. 51). On December

7, 2005, the Court issued its decision which held Defendant failed

to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability by not reassigning

her to a vacant position for which she was qualified. (Doc. 39.)

As the prevailing party on her ADA claim, Plaintiff contends she is

entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as

reinstatement, back pay, and pre-judgment interest. 

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the

amount of $20,968.32. (Docs. 40 and 47.) Defendant does not object

to Plaintiff receiving some fees and costs, but objects to the

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hourly billing rate of lead counsel, the requested hourly rate

enhancement, contends there is excessive time for some entries, and

that there is no itemization or documentation for some of the costs

incurred. (Doc. 45.) Defendant does not object to the $95/per hour

rate claimed by Ms. Rebekah Kennedy. (Doc. 45, p.3.) 

Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, back pay in the amount of

$33,945.60, and pre-judgment interest at the rate of six percent.

(Doc. 42.) Defendant objects to reinstatement, contending that it

is the only one who can make the decision regarding reinstatement or

an increase in pay. (Doc. 44.) Defendant also objects to any award

of back pay over the stipulated amount of $28,000, and objects to

the award of pre-judgment interest. Id.

I. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS.

“The Americans with Disabilities Act permits the court to award

fees and costs to the prevailing party.” Salitros v. Chrysler

Corporation, 306 F.3d 562, 576 (8 Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § th

12205 (1994)). “The stating point in determining attorney fees is

the lodestar, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rates.” Fish v. St.

Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8 Cir. 2002); Hensley v. th

Echkerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The district court ... should

exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not

“reasonably expended” including hours that are excessive, redundant,

or otherwise unnecessary. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quoting S. Rep.

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No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976)). In determining the amount of attorney’s

fees, the court should consider twelve factors: 

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the question, (3) the skill requisite to

perform the legal services properly, (4) the preclusion of

other employment due to acceptance of the case, (5) the

customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent,

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation and ability of

the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client and (12) awards in similar cases.

Winter v. Cerro Gordo County Conservation Bd., 925 F.2d 1069, 1074

n.8 (8 Cir. 1991) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430). Defendant th

does not object to Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs, but

objects to specific charges as well as the requested enhancement

rate. Additionally, Defendant contends that the $150/per hour rate

claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel C. Brian Meadors is excessive.

Plaintiff is seeking attorneys’ fees for 47.28 hours for Mr. Meadors

and 88.40 hours for Ms. Kennedy. (Docs. 40, 47.)

A. Excessive Billing Rate

Defendant contends that the rate of $150/per hour for Mr.

Meadors is unreasonable. Defendant relies on the rate paid to its

attorney as a reasonable rate for a person with more experience than

Mr. Meadors. Defendant’s attorney is paid $140/per hour. However,

Plaintiff counters Defendant’s contention by pointing out that Ms.

Madison represents Defendant on a routine basis and that Defendant

is a regular client, which justifies the charging of a lower rate

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than normal. Defendant concedes that the regular charge for its

attorney would be $160/per hour. Defendant requests that the Court

award attorney fees for Mr. Meadors at the rate of $135/per hour. 

Plaintiff contends that Mr. Meadors’ experience and the current

market dictate that $150/per hour is reasonable, for this is the

rate currently paid by Mr. Meadors’ regular clients. One client

pays less but provides him with a high volume of legal work.

Plaintiff also points to a 2005 case in Sebastian County Circuit

Court where the rate of $150/per hour was awarded to him. Plaintiff

contends that the facts show that the $150/per hour rate is

reasonable and comparable to other local attorneys with similar

experience. We agree with Plaintiff and find that $150/per hour is

a reasonable rate for Mr. Meadors.

B. Request for Enhancement

Plaintiff also requests a 30% enhancement to both Mr. Meadors’

and Ms. Kennedy’s fees, resulting in a fee rate of $195/per hour for

Mr. Meadors and $123.50/per hour for Kennedy. Plaintiff argues the

case was taken on a full contingency basis with expenses advanced,

and that there will be a substantial delay in payment (the case was

initially filed in June 2004). The Plaintiff contends that ADA

cases against large corporations are difficult, and that the hourly

rate set by the Court in computing the lodestar should have the

effect of encouraging competent counsel to take contingent ADA cases

against sophisticated and resourceful defendants like Wal-mart.

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Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reasons for enhancement do not

justify the requested enhancement.

Although courts had awarded enhancements to contingency cases

in times past, the United States Supreme Court ruled that

enhancements based on contingency are “not consistent with our

general rejection of the contingent-fee model for fee awards, nor is

it necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee.” Jeffers v.

Clinton, 992 F.2d 826, 830 (8 Cir. 1993) (quoting City of th

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)). Plaintiff’s

contention is similar to the reasoning of the district court in City

of Burlington. The district court in City of Burlington granted the

enhancement because “attorneys were retained on a contingent fee

basis and that without such enhancement respondents would have faced

substantial difficulties in obtaining suitable counsel.” Id. at

830. That position was rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. 

Plaintiff contends that enhancement is warranted due to the

delay of payment to her attorney. This case was filed in June 2004,

less than two years before this decision. Plaintiff cites Missouri

by Jenkins v. Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 282 (1989) for support of her

contention. However, the Court in Missouri found that enhancement

was warranted due to the delay (nearly three years)

coupled with the fact that . . . the attorney’s expenses

are not deferred pending completion of the litigation, can

cause considerable hardship. The present case provides an

illustration. During a period of nearly three years, the

demands of this case precluded attorney Benson from

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accepting other employment. In order to pay his staff and

meet other operating expenses, he was obliged to borrow

$633,000. As of January 1987, he had paid over $113,000

in interest on this debt, and was continuing to borrow to

meet interest payments. 

Id. at 283 n.6.

The facts in the case do not reflect the extreme financial

strain experienced by the attorney in Missouri. There has been no

showing that Plaintiff’s counsel were unable to take additional

cases or were forced to take out loans in order to meet expenses.

Nor is there any showing that an adjustment is necessary due to a

change in the hourly rates over a significant passage of time. See

id. at 283-84 (“Clearly compensation received several years after

the services were rendered - as it frequently is in complex civil

rights litigation - is not equivalent to the same dollar amount

received reasonably promptly as the legal services are performed, as

would normally be the case with private billings.”). 

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue of

enhancing an attorney’s fees in a case where there had been a sixyear delay. Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8 Cir. 1989), th

abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789

(2002). The Court found that the enhancement was not necessary due

to the six-year delay, as “delay is normally compensated for in the

‘reasonable hourly rate,’ either by basing the award on current

rates or by adjusting the fee based on historical rates to reflect

its present value.” Id. at 365 (citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware

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Defendant stated in one place that 1.9 hours by Mr. Meadors was spent 1

 on administrative tasks, and then referred to 2.4 hours. (Doc. 45, p. 6-7.) 

 It appears that the 1.9 was a typographical error, as the listed time 

 objected to adds up to 2.4 hours for Mr. Meadors. 

7

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987)).

Plaintiff has failed to show that the present case was

unusually complex or difficult to prepare, nor were the results

exceptional. See Forshee v. Waterloo Industries, Inc., 178 F.3d

527, 532 (8 Cir. 1999). Therefore, upon due consideration, th

Plaintiff’s request for an enhancement is DENIED.

C. Excessive Hours

Plaintiff claims 41.6 hours for Mr. Meadors and 88.4 hours for

Ms. Kennedy. Defendant contends that 9.20 hours (8.2 hours for Ms.

Kennedy and 1 hour for Mr. Meadors) in preparing a response to

Defendant’s motion to strike is excessive. Additionally, Defendant

contends that the 2.4 hours spent by Mr. Meadors and 3.3 hours spent 1

by Ms. Kennedy are both excessive as they were spent on

administrative tasks that should have been included in office

overhead.

The time spent on the response to Defendant’s motion to strike

was reasonable, as the motion was denied. Ms. Kennedy took a

reduction in her hourly rate ($125 to $95/per hour) because of the

need to spend additional time to prepare. The tasks Defendant

contends were administrative were tasks reasonably performed by

attorneys.

Defendant points out that Plaintiff deducted from the bill the

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time for intra-office conferences, but neglected to deduct three

intra-office conferences totaling 0.7 hour by Mr. Meadors.

Plaintiff contends that the previous deductions were voluntary and

declines to make any further deductions. We find the 0.7 hour spent

in intra-office conferences reasonable. Plaintiff’s request for

attorney fees for 47.28 hours for Mr. Meadors and 88.40 hours for

Ms. Kennedy is GRANTED, and Defendant’s request to have the

attorneys’ fees reduced by what it contends is excessive time is

DENIED. 

D. Unexplained Costs

Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to provide proper

documentation for six of the claimed costs, totaling $483.13:

1. A Federal Express fee on January 5, 2005 for $19.85;

2. A Federal Express fee on April 21, 2005 for $17.39;

3. An unexplained charge for “inv. 23614; File no: 76124" on

March 24, 2005 for $30.50;

4. PACER copies on May 24, 2005, July 20, 2005, and October 17,

2005 for $2.40;

5. Unexplained copy expenses with no accounting for the number

of copies made for a total of $356.25; and

6. Unexplained postage expenses totaling $56.74.

Plaintiff’s counsel contends that he is charging as litigation

expenses those expenses that would have been charged to any normal

client and at the same rates that the normal client would be

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charged. (Doc. 41.) Plaintiff explains that the two federal

express charges were likely for delivering discovery to and from the

client and obtaining medical records. The invoice is probably a

Docuprint bill for copying medical records. The PACER charge of

$2.40 was spent to ensure that the attorney was aware of all

activity and filings. Plaintiff contends the copy charge of twentyfive cents per page and postage charges were reasonable.

Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s argument that its

lawyers are paid only eight cents a page does not make

unreasonableness his twenty-five cents a page charge. Plaintiff

points out that Defendant does not state what its attorneys charge

other clients. (Doc. 50.)

We find that the costs are adequately explained by Plaintiff

and constitute reasonable litigation expenses that should be

compensated for by Defendant. Plaintiff’s request to be reimbursed

$831.32 in litigation expenses is GRANTED. 

II. DAMAGES.

A. Back Pay

The parties filed a Joint Statement in which they stipulated

that Plaintiff’s “back pay and compensatory damages total $28,000.”

(Doc. 31, p. 3.) Plaintiff is now seeking additional back pay for

the time since the parties entered into the stipulation on June 28,

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 Defendant contends that it conceded the issue of whether Plaintiff was 2

 disabled, which it had previously advanced. (Doc. 44, p. 2.)

10

2005. It appears that Defendant conceded potential arguments in 2

deciding to forego trial in exchange for Plaintiff limiting the

amount of back pay she would be allowed to collect. See Doc. 44, p.

2.

“[S]tipulations by the parties regarding questions of fact are

conclusive.... Trial courts are bound by the facts established by

the stipulation.” Gander v. Gander, 250 F.3d 606, 609 (8 Cir. th

2001) (citation omitted) (finding that “[v]alid stipulations are

controlling and conclusive and courts must enforce them.”).

Plaintiff contends that the stipulation is silent on what would

occur if a significant passage of time passed between the stipulated

facts and final judgment and thus is open to interpretation. (Doc.

51, p. 2.) Plaintiff states that in interpreting the stipulation,

the Court can make an equitable decision as to what is fair. Id.

However, Plaintiff fails to provide any authority for her position.

We find that the stipulation clearly states what the back pay

and compensatory damages would be should the Court determine the

Plaintiff eligible for damages. There was no unanticipated delay in

ruling on this case. The stipulation clearly states that back pay

and compensatory damages would be $28,000, and Plaintiff is awarded

that amount, and Plaintiff’s request for additional back pay is

DENIED.

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B. Reinstatement

The parties stipulated the Plaintiff would accept either

reinstatement or a pay increase in lieu of front pay. (Doc. 31, p.

3.) Plaintiff now seeks reinstatement to the Router position. 

“Reinstatement is the preferred remedy for unlawful employment

discrimination, and front pay is the disfavored alternative,

available only when reinstatement is impracticable or impossible.”

Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 572 (8 Cir. 2002). th

“Reinstatement should be the norm.” Kucia v. Southeast Arkansas

Community Action Corp., 284 F.3d 944, 949 (8 Cir. 2002) (reversing th

the trial court’s award of front pay without finding that

reinstatement was impracticable or impossible”). 

Defendant has offered no evidence that reinstatement is

impracticable or impossible. Instead, Defendant states that it

intends to appeal the Court’s ruling to the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals and it also intends to ask the Court to stay any Order

compelling injunctive relief. (Doc. 44, p. 4, n1.) Defendant

states that “it would be inefficient to evaluate the practicality of

reinstatement today if the reinstatement order could very well be

delayed pending appeal.” Id. Defendant requests that the Court

enforce the parties’ stipulation. However, the stipulation does not

state that Defendant is awarded the choice of reinstatement or a pay

increase, as Defendant contends. See Doc. 44, p. 4. The

stipulation merely states that Plaintiff would be willing to accept

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either. Reinstatement is proper as there has been no showing of

impracticablity or impossibility, and Plaintiff’s request for

reinstatement is GRANTED. 

C. Pre-judgment Interest

The Court has discretion in whether it awards pre-judgment

interest in employment discrimination cases. See Washington v.

Kroger Co., 671 F.2d 1072, 1078 (8 Cir. 1982). “Generally, th

prejudgment interest should be awarded ‘unless exceptional

circumstances exist making the award of interest inequitable.’”

Frazier v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 200 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8 Cir. th

2000) (quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d

743, 752 (8 Cir. 1986)). In Frazier, the employer failed to cite th

any authority to support its contention that prejudgment interest

cannot be awarded on back pay awards. 200 F.3d at 1194. “To the

extent, however, that the damages awarded to the plaintiff represent

compensation for lost wages, ‘it is ordinarily an abuse of

discretion not to include pre-judgment interest.” Gierlinger v.

Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2 Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). How nd

pre-judgment interest is computed is left to the discretion of the

district court. Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, Local

201, 170 F.3d 1111, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A

district court may use the post-judgment standards of 28 U.S.C. §

1961(a), however, it is not compelled to do so. Taxman v. Board of

Education of Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3 Cir. 1996), rd

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The interest formula set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). 3

 Federal Reserve Statistical Release (June 27, 2005), at 4

 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/20050627.

13

cert. Dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). 

We conclude that the federal rate set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is

the appropriate rate in this case to apply to an award of prejudgment interest. Plaintiff seeks pre-judgment interest from July

1, 2005 to December 15, 2005. The weekly average 1-year constant

maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System, for the calender week preceding the week

of July 1, 2005 was 3.40 percent. 3 4

Plaintiff is requesting pre-judgment interest from July 1, 2005

until entry of judgment. (Doc. 42, p. 2.) Plaintiff is awarded

pre-judgment interest of 3.40 percent on the $28,000 from July 1,

2005 until entry of judgment. Consequently, Plaintiff will receive

interest at a rate of $2.6082 per day for 274 days, for a total

amount of pre-judgment interest of $714.65. 

III. CONCLUSION.

Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fee enhancement is DENIED.

All other attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses requested by

Plaintiff are GRANTED. Upon due consideration, Plaintiff is awarded

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,490(Mr. Meadors - 47.28 hours

at $150/per hour; Ms. Kennedy - 88.40 hours at $95/per hour) and

litigation expenses in the amount of $831.32. Plaintiff is awarded

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 Petitioner requested these actions in the event Defendant challenges 5

 the attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 40, p. 6.) Additional information was not 

 necessary to render a decision on the contested issues.

14

reinstatement, $28,000 in back pay and compensatory damages, and

$714.65 in pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff’s claims for additional

back pay and for attorneys’ fee enhancement are DENIED. Plaintiff’s

request for Leave to Conduct Discovery on the attorney’s fees issue,

and request for a hearing regarding the fee petition are DENIED.5

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 31 day of March 2006. st

/S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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