Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-50407/USCOURTS-ca9-10-50407-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Michael Dennis Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTOINE LAMONT JOHNSON, AKA

O Killer, AKA OK,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50401

D.C. No.

2:05-cr-00920-

RSWL-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL DENNIS WILLIAMS, AKA

Baby Treystone, AKA Treystone,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50407

D.C. No.

2:05-cr-00920-

RSWL-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Ronald S.W. Lew, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 3, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed September 12, 2014

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2 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit

Judges, and John R. Tunheim, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed Antoine Johnson’s and Michael

Williams’s convictions for armed robbery and murder in a

case in which the district court admitted, pursuant to the

forfeiture exception to the Confrontation Clause, an

unavailable witness’s out-of-court testimonial statements to

the police.

The forfeiture exception applies when the defendant is

responsible for the witness being unavailable. The panel held

that preponderance of the evidence remains, after Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the standard by which the

Government must prove that the defendant intentionally

secured the witness’s absence. The panel therefore rejected

Johnson’s contention that the applicable standard is clear and

convincing evidence. The panel held that the district court

did not err in concluding that the Government produced

* The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 3

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Johnson had

intentionally prevented the witness from testifying.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Williams’s request for severance before

Johnson’s attorney elicited testimony from the investigating

officer that the witness had identified Williams, where the

witness’s statements were not strongly inculpatory of

Williams and there is no reason to conclude that the district

court’s limiting instruction was insufficient. 

The panel rejected as meritless the defendants’ claims of

several additional trial errors.

COUNSEL

Benjamin L. Coleman, Coleman & Balogh LLP, San Diego,

California; Ethan A. Balogh (argued), Coleman & Balogh

LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant

Antoine Lamont Johnson.

John C. Lemon (argued), San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant Michael Dennis Williams.

André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Robert E. Dugdale,

Karen I. Meyer, and Elizabeth R. Yang (argued), Assistant

United States Attorneys, Los Angeles, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America.

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4 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

The world of evidence was shaken about ten years ago

when the Supreme Court ruled that out-of-court “testimonial”

statements of unavailable witnesses can be admitted only if

they have been subject to cross-examination, regardless of the

indicia of reliability. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36

(2004). This criminal appeal presents an issue of first

impression for our circuit, post-Crawford.

The issue concerns the so-called “forfeiture exception” to

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. That

exception applies when the defendant is responsible for the

witness being unavailable. We must decide whether proof of

the defendant’s responsibility for the witness’s absence must

be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, as provided by

Rule 804(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or, in light

of Crawford and its progeny, by clear and convincing

evidence.

The appellants are Antoine Johnson and Michael

Williams, who appeal their convictions for armed robbery

and murder. They each raise a number of issues from their

joint trial for the robbery of an armored truck and murder of

a guard, for which each received a life sentence. We affirm.

With respect to the forfeiture exception, we join the

circuits that have decided the issue since Crawford in holding

that the standard has not changed and the provisions of the

Rule continue to apply. See Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d

161, 167 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Dinkins,

691 F.3d 358, 383 (4th Cir. 2012). That is the clear

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 5

implication of the Supreme Court’s post-Crawford opinion in

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006),

acknowledging that the circuits are following the standard set

forth in the evidentiary rule. It is also the assumption

underlying Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), as

expressly noted in Justice Souter’s concurrence, 554 U.S. at

379.

FACTS

On March 1, 2004, four assailants ambushed an armored

truck as it was making a cash delivery to a Bank of America

in South Central Los Angeles. One of the assailants was

wearing a Rastafarian wig and at least one was wearing

gloves. During the robbery, one of the armored truck security

guards was shot and killed. On June 19, 2007, appellants

Antoine Johnson and Michael Williams, both of whom had

affiliations with a group known as the Hoover Street Gang,

were indicted by a grand jury for their involvement in the

robbery and murder. The charges carried a maximum

possible penalty of death.

At trial, the Government introduced several out-of-court

statements made by an informant, Veronica Burgess. These

statements form the basis for the Sixth Amendment issues in

this appeal.

Burgess had come forward to police in 2004, claiming

that, while eating lunch at a restaurant in Watts, she had

overheard several Hoover gang members planning an

armored truck heist. She identified Johnson from a photo

spread as one of the participants, and later testified to this

effect before the grand jury. Burgess also picked Williams

out of a photo-lineup on one occasion, although in a later

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6 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

interview, she confused him with a different individual. 

Burgess was to be an important witness at trial, but shortly

before trial the Government was unable to locate her, even

after checking her public records and conducting extensive

surveillance of her known residences.

The district court in this case permitted the Government,

after a pretrial hearing, to introduce her statements against

Johnson under the forfeiture exception to the hearsay rule. 

To support admissibility, the Government contended that

Johnson had threatened Burgess in order to prevent her from

testifying. In the pretrial hearing, the Government presented

evidence that Burgess had received death threats from

members of the Hoover gang. Her live-in boyfriend, Patrick

Smith, told police that the Hoovers had placed a “hit” on

Burgess for “snitching on a boy fighting death.” Smith also

told police that the “mother of one of the guys in jail looking

at death” had contacted Smith trying to find Burgess. 

Burgess then disappeared and had no more contact with

police until after the trial.

The Government’s position in the pretrial hearing was

that there was sufficient evidence to infer that the “boy

fighting death” was in fact Johnson, who had informed

members of the Hoover gang that Burgess was set to testify

against him. Burgess began receiving threats the day after

defense attorneys were permitted to disclose the identity of

the witnesses to the defendants. On that same day, Johnson’s

counsel visited him in prison. Johnson’s attorney had stated

in a previous pretrial conference that Johnson was aware of

the fact that his counsel could disclose the identities of

witnesses forty-five days prior to trial and was eager to have

this information.

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 7

The Government posited that, once Johnson learned from

his lawyer of Burgess’s intent to testify, he informed

members of the Hoover gang who then threatened Burgess in

order to prevent her from testifying. Though Johnson was

confined in a “Special Housing Unit” at the time and had lost

his phone privileges, a prison guard declared that inmates in

the Special Housing Unit routinely communicate with each

other by speaking through the air vents and passing written

messages, called “kites,” through the plumbing system. The

guard also noted that he had seen Johnson communicate with

other inmates in this manner and that he was “constantly”

doing so. The Government presented further evidence

demonstrating thatinmates are generallyable to communicate

with those on the outside by various means.

The Government pointed out that Johnson not only had

the means to threaten Burgess, but that he alone had the

motive. Burgess had consistently identified Johnson as being

present at the meeting in Watts where the robbery was

planned, but she failed to consistently identify Williams. 

Accordingly, Williams had little reason to threaten her. 

While Burgess had identified other individuals whom the

government was pursuing as suspects, only Johnson was

currently facing the death penalty. Finally, the Government

established that Johnson’s mother was involved with a known

Hoover gang member, suggesting not only that Johnson had

close ties to the Hoover gang, but also that his mother was the

person looking for Burgess who had contacted Patrick Smith.

Johnson, in response, denied that he threatened Burgess. 

His counsel insisted that, while in confinement, he had no

means of communicating with Burgess, or anyone else on the

outside. Counsel also noted that there were several other

suspects, and they also had a motive to threaten Burgess. 

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8 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

Johnson speculated that these other suspects had learned of

Burgess’s identity when his lawyers began conducting

interviews within the community in preparation for his trial. 

Johnson also questioned whether Burgess had actually been

threatened. Johnson’s private investigator independently

interviewed Burgess and testified that she recanted her

identification of Johnson, claiming that she only implicated

him to collect reward money.

The district court found the Government had established

that Johnson was responsible for Burgess’s absence. When

Johnson argued it had not been established by clear and

convincing evidence, the district court ruled the

preponderance standard of Rule 804 applied. The

Government wisely does not contend that the clear and

convincing standard was satisfied.

In Williams’s appeal, he contends there should have been

a severance. The Government introduced Burgess’s

statements at trial only against Johnson, not Williams. This

was because Williams was not found to have participated in

the coercion of Burgess. On cross-examination of one of the

Government’s witnesses, however, Johnson’s attorney

elicited statements indicating that Burgess had also identified

Williams, albeit not consistently. Williams requested a

severance. The district court denied this request and elected

instead to give the jury a limiting instruction, admonishing

them not to consider Burgess’s testimony when assessing

Williams’s guilt.

The evidence at trial incriminating both Johnson and

Williams was strong. Jamal Dunagan, a former Hoover gang

member, testified that both Johnson and Williams had

confessed to having participated in the robbery-murder. He

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 9

also testified that Derrick Maddox, an uncharged coconspirator, had given him a detailed account of the robbery

and subsequent shootout, including the extent of Johnson and

Williams’s involvement. In addition, the Government

introduced evidence that DNA recovered from a wig and

latex gloves that were found on the scene matched the DNA

profiles of Johnson and Williams respectively.

After nearly four days of deliberation, the jury convicted

both defendants for conspiracy, robbery, and discharging a

firearm causing death. They each received life sentences.

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Johnson argues that the introduction of Burgess’s out-ofcourt statements to the police violated his confrontation rights

because the government failed to produce clear and

convincing evidence that he intentionally secured her

absence. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of

“testimonial” hearsay when the defendant has not had the

opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declarant, but

the bar is subject to certain limited exceptions. Crawford,

541 U.S. at 59. Burgess’s statements in this case were

“testimonial” because they were given in front of a grand jury

and to police who were conducting an investigation in

preparation for trial. See id. at 51–52. They were meant to

describe what happened. Ordinarily they would not be

admissible under the hearsay rules and the protections of the

Confrontation Clause, which guarantees a defendant the right

“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.

Const. amend. VI; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52.

A defendant may forfeit confrontation rights and render

hearsay rules inapplicable if the defendant is responsible for

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10 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

the witness’s unavailability, i.e., if the defendant “engaged or

acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,

procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” 

Giles, 554 U.S. at 367 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6)).

The district court found that the government in this case

had proven forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence,

referring to the applicable Rule of Evidence, 804(b)(6). 

Johnson contends that the court should have applied the more

demanding clear and convincing standard. Our research tells

us that while the history of the exception began on his side,

it did not stay there.

The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56

(1980), held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the

admission of hearsay statements that bear the “adequate

‘indicia of reliability.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). The first federal appellate court,

after Roberts, to consider what standard of proof governs

admissibility under the forfeiture exception was the Fifth

Circuit in United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.

1982). There, the court held that, because the clear and

convincing standard generallyapplieswhenever the reliability

of the evidence is at issue, it should therefore apply in the

forfeiture context as well. Id. at 631.

Since then, however, every other circuit to consider the

issue has declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning. 

See, e.g., United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (holding that the government must demonstrate

forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence); United States

v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996) (same). The

Second Circuit reasoned in United States v. Mastrangelo,

693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982), that a heightened standard of

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 11

admissibility is not necessary under the forfeiture exception

because a claim that the defendant intentionally prevented a

witness from testifying is not “unusually subject to

deception.” Id. at 273. It further held that the preponderance

standard should apply because a more demanding standard

would encourage defendants to harm and intimidate

witnesses, a “behavior which strikes at the heart of the system

of justice itself.” Id.

In 1997, the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to

include the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. Fed. R.

Evid. 804(b)(6). The Advisory Committee adopted the

preponderance standard in order to deter defendants from

trying to prevent witnesses from testifying, noting that this

was the majority rule among the circuits. The advisory

committee note provides: “[t]he usual Rule 104(a)

preponderance of the evidence standard has been adopted in

light of the behavior the new Rule 804(b)(6) seeks to

discourage.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s

note.

In 2004, the Supreme Court issued its seminal opinion in

Crawford. In Crawford, the Court rejected the “indicia of

reliability” test in favor of a general rule that testimonial

hearsay is not admissible under the Confrontation Clause

unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to confront the

witness. Id. at 59. The Court, however, clarified that it was

not also dispensing with the forfeiture exception that it

recognized was well established, because that principle is

based on equitable concerns and not on measuring the

reliability of the evidence. Id. at 62.

Johnson argues that, after Crawford, the Confrontation

Clause requires that there be clear and convincing evidence

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12 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

of forfeiture before testimonial hearsay may be introduced

under the forfeiture exception. Johnson points out that

Crawford had the effect of limiting the admissibility of

testimonial hearsay, so he argues further limitations are

appropriate to ensure that constitutional rights are properly

protected. Johnson relies on the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in

Thevis. See 665 F.2d at 631. The Court’s discussion of the

forfeiture exception in Crawford, however, is directly

contrary to Thevis. After Crawford, reliability is no longer

the touchstone of confrontation analysis. As the Court made

clear, the forfeiture exception is consistent with the

Confrontation Clause, not because it is a means for

determining whether hearsay is reliable, but because it is an

equitable doctrine designed to prevent defendants from

profiting from their own wrongdoing. See Crawford,

541 U.S. at 62. There is no suggestion in Crawford that the

Court was heightening the standard of proof for exceptions to

confrontation guarantees.

The Court’s subsequent opinions interpreting the scope of

the forfeiture exception also strongly suggest, if not squarely

hold, that the preponderance standard applies. In Davis, the

Court declined to decide the issue of the applicable standard.

547 U.S. at 833. It acknowledged, however, that “federal

courts using Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(6), which

codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the

Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” 

Id. It further emphasized that Crawford “did not destroy the

ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.” 

Id. at 834. This sends a strong message that the

preponderance standard remains applicable.

The Court most recently addressed the forfeiture

exception in Giles. The issue was whether the statements of

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 13

a defendant who had killed the declarant were admissible

under the forfeiture doctrine in the defendant’s murder trial. 

There, the Court concluded that a murder victim’s out-ofcourt statements could not be admitted under the forfeiture

exception solely upon a showing that the defendant had

caused the victim’s death. The Court held that the

Confrontation Clause additionally requires “a showing that

the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.” 

Giles, 554 U.S. at 361. The Government must therefore show

that the defendant committed the murder specifically for the

purpose of silencing the victim. Id. at 361–62. Importantly,

the Court reiterated its prior observation in Davisthat Federal

Rules of Evidence 804(b)(6) codifies the forfeiture exception. 

Id. at 367. Its advisory notes tell us to apply the

preponderance standard. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory

committee’s note.

As Justice Souter’s concurrence makes clear, the principle

underlying Giles was to preserve the distinct functions of the

judge in making evidentiary rulings and the jury in

determining guilt or innocence. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 379

(Souter, J., concurring). The judge determines admissibility

by a preponderance of the evidence whereas the jury

determines guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

Without the need to find an intent to make a witness

unavailable, however, the judge in a hearsay ruling could

usurp the role of the jury and determine guilt in the first

instance by applying the less demanding preponderance

standard. See id. (“Equity demands something more than this

near circularity before the right to confrontation is forfeited,

and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness

from testifying.”). The intent requirement thus ensures that

the judge’s inquiry is focused on whether the defendant

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14 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

intended to compromise the integrity of the proceedings, not

on whether the defendant committed the underlying offense.

After Giles, the Circuit courts that have addressed the

forfeiture exception have continued to apply the

preponderance standard. In Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d 161,

167 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit reiterated its prior

holding that the forfeiture exception is governed by the

preponderance standard, although it recognized that the issue

was not necessarily dispositive in the case before it, id. at 173

n. 9. More recently, the Fourth Circuit stressed that the

forfeiture exception should be read broadly in order to

prevent defendants from undermining the integrity of the

judicial process. United States v. Jackson, 706 F.3d 264, 268

(4th Cir. 2013). It has applied the preponderance standard

accordingly. See United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 383

(4th Cir. 2012) (“Before applying the forfeiture-bywrongdoing exception, a trial court must find, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that . . . the defendant

engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing . . . that was intended

to render the declarant . . . .”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We agree with these circuits in holding that, in

order to introduce evidence under the forfeiture exception, the

Government must demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant intentionally secured the

declarant’s absence.

The district court applied the preponderance standard

here. The court did not err in concluding that the

Government produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that

Johnson had intentionally prevented Burgess from testifying. 

There is no serious dispute that the government wanted

Burgess to testify and was unable to locate her. The district

court concluded that, based on Johnson’s actions and the

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 15

timing of Burgess’s disappearance, it could reasonably be

inferred that Johnson had informed other Hoover gang

members of Burgess’s identity so that they could threaten her

against testifying. As the district court noted, Burgess began

receiving threats one day after the defense attorneys were

permitted to disclose the witness lists to their clients. 

Johnson’s attorney visited him on that same day, and Johnson

had previously expressed interest in receiving the witness list.

Johnson contends that Williams could also have been

responsible for Burgess’s disappearance, but Williams did not

receive a visit from his attorney on that day. Further,

Williams did not have as strong a motive to threaten Burgess,

because she had not consistently identified him. Johnson

correctly points out that Burgess had identified others as

conspirators. None of them had been charged, however, and

there was no evidence that they knew about Burgess. 

Johnson also suggests that other members of the Hoover gang

could have been responsible because knowledge of Burgess’s

identity may have spread throughout the community upon his

counsel’s initiation of interviews with witnesses. But

presenting a plausible alternative for her disappearance does

not negate the government’s affirmative evidence that

independently supported a determination that the

preponderance of the evidence indicates that Johnson was the

most likely suspect. On this record, Johnson is clearly the

most likely suspect.

Johnson tries to rely on the Second Circuit’s opinion in

Perkins, 596 F.3d 161, where the Second Circuit emphasized

that the state had failed to demonstrate forfeiture by a

preponderance because it could not explain how the

defendant, while incarcerated, had intimidated the witness.

Id. at 173. Here, however, the Government produced

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16 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

declarations from a prison guard and an ATF agent describing

how inmates communicate with each other and relay those

communications to those on the outside. The prison guard

further declared that he had seen Johnson engage in such

communications. The requisite piece of the puzzle that was

missing in Perkins was thus present here.

In short, the evidence tended to show that Johnson alone

had the means, motive, and opportunity to threaten Burgess,

and did not show anyone else did. This was sufficient to

satisfy the preponderance standard.

WILLIAMS’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CLAIM

Williams contends a severance was required. The

government sought to introduce Burgess’s out-of-court

statements against Johnson, but not Williams, as there was no

evidence that Williams had tried to prevent Burgess from

testifying. On cross-examination, however, Johnson’s

attorney elicited testimony from the investigating officer

indicating that Burgess had also identified Williams. Prior to

the introduction of this testimony Williams requested a

severance on the grounds that this testimony would violate

his confrontation rights. The trial judge denied this request

and gave the jury a limiting instruction instead. The jury was

told, “[y]ou may not consider this evidence in any way as to

Defendant Michael Williams. . . . Burgess’s testimony

through these witnesses are only to be used against Defendant

Johnson.”

We review this decision for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). There

was none. Johnson’s attorney’s cross-examination revealed

that Burgess’s statements regarding Williams were

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 17

inconsistent, and she was unable accurately to identify him in

a photo-spread. To the extent that there was any risk that the

jury might rely on Burgess’s statements when deciding

Williams’s guilt, the trial judge properly gave a limiting

instruction, informing the jurythat Burgess’s statements were

admissible against Johnson only. There is a strong

presumption that jurors follow a court’s instructions. Escriba

v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247 (9th Cir.

2014). While some hearsay statements are so “powerfully

incriminating” that juries cannot be expected to ignore them,

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968), that is not

the case with the statements at issue here. Burgess’s

statements were not strongly inculpatory of Williams given

their inconsistency, and there is no reason to conclude the

limiting instruction was insufficient. Severance was not

required.

REMAINING ISSUES

Johnson and Williams raised claims of several additional

trial errors, but none have merit. During its rebuttal, the

prosecution tried repeatedly to elicit testimony from one of

the investigating officers regarding out-of-court statements

made by Larry “Big Al” Jordan, one of Johnson’s coconspirators, regarding a possible lead. The district court

sustained the defense’s repeated objections to this line of

questioning as leading and on hearsay and relevancygrounds. 

Johnson argues that the prosecutor’s leading questions

violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and Fifth

Amendment due process rights. Yet no out-of-court

statement was ever admitted. See Mason v. Yarborough,

447 F.3d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court

sustained Johnson’s objections before the witness could

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18 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

answer and then later instructed the jury that questions by

counsel are not evidence.

The government concedes that the prosecutor should not

have pursued leading questions, but Johnson must show more

than mere impropriety. He must demonstrate that the

prosecutor’s actions “so infected the trial with unfairness as

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, the prosecutor’s questions

did not come close to doing so.

Johnson also claims that the prosecution made comments

at trial that infringed on his Fifth Amendment right to silence. 

In its closing argument, the prosecution commented on

Johnson’s failure to explain the presence of his DNA on a

wig that was purportedly worn by one of the assailants. 

Johnson argues that, in doing so, the prosecution improperly

commented on his failure to testify because he was the only

one who could have provided such an explanation.

It is well established that a defendant’s right to silence

prohibits the Government from commenting on his or her

decision not to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,

615 (1965). The Government, however, may “call attention

to the defendant’s failure to present exculpatory evidence

more generally.” United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174,

1185 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the prosecution’s comments

focused on Johnson’s failure to present evidence, not his

failure to testify. We recognize the difference. See United

States v. Sehnal, 930 F.2d 1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Our

court has developed a fine line separating comment on the

defendant’s failure to testify and the failure of the ‘defense’

to explain the evidence.”).

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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON 19

Moreover, there were other ways in which Johnson could

have rebutted the government’s DNA evidence without

taking the stand himself. For example, he could have

presented expert testimony describing how hair can be easily

transferred from one item to another. In fact, Johnson’s

counsel questioned the government’s expert on this very

issue. He also could have presented evidence that the

government’s DNA collection procedures were flawed, or

that its tests were inaccurate. The prosecution’s comments

were therefore not “of such a character that the jury would

naturally and necessarily take [them] to be a comment on the

failure to testify.” Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Finally, Williams argues that the district court

erroneously admitted inculpatory hearsay statements of a

former gang member. The district court permitted Jamal

Dunagan to testify about statements allegedly made by

Derrick Maddox, an uncharged co-conspirator. Dunagan

testified that Maddox had informed him that he was

organizing an armored truck heist. The day after the armored

truck incident, Maddox again confided in Dunagan and

explained how the robbery had been botched after Williams

became “trigger happy” and “opened fire on the security

guards.” The district court concluded that Maddox’s out-ofcourt statements were admissible under the statement against

interest exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid.

804(b)(3).

Under Rule 804(b)(3), hearsay statements made by an

unavailable witness are admissible if they “tended to subject

the declarant to criminal liability . . . [and] corroborating

circumstances clearly indicate [their] trustworthiness.”

United States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 Case: 10-50407, 09/12/2014, ID: 9237937, DktEntry: 85-1, Page 19 of 20
20 UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

Williams argues that Maddox’s statements were not selfincriminating because Maddox was trying to shift the blame

for the killing of the security guard onto Williams. The

district court found, however, that Maddox’s statements

clearly had the potential to expose him to criminal liability. 

The finding was not clearly erroneous.

The statements did not lack trustworthiness. As the

district court noted, Maddox had personal knowledge of the

robbery, his statements to Dunagan were given voluntarily

and in confidence, and he made them shortly after the robbery

had occurred. We have said that similar factors tend to

establish statements are sufficiently trustworthy. See United

States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). The

district court did not abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the convictions of Johnson and

Williams are AFFIRMED.

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