Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-71127/USCOURTS-ca9-13-71127-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Feroli
Amicus Curiae
Thomas Hutchins
Amicus Curiae
Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center
Amicus Curiae
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Agustin Ortega-Lopez
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AGUSTIN ORTEGA-LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 13-71127

Agency No.

A088-994-318

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 8, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed August 23, 2016

Before: Harry Pregerson, Carlos T. Bea,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens;

Concurrence by Judge Bea

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2 ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel granted Agustin Ortega-Lopez’s petition for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ published

precedential decision, Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. & N.

Dec. 99 (BIA 2013), which held that his conviction for

sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting

venture under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is a categorical crime

involving moral turpitude.

The panel found that the IJ and BIA did not discuss how

the statute of conviction, cockfighting, involves an action that

affects a protected class of victim. The panel cited the

finding in Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir.

2010), that “non-fraudulent crimes of moral turpitude almost

always involve an intent to harm someone, the actual

infliction of harm upon someone, or an action that affects a

protected class of victim." The panel wrote that although this

court’s case law does not explicitly require the BIA to apply

the language in Nunez, it thought a remand to consider the

language was appropriate because the crime at issue

involving harm to chickens is outside the normal realm of

CIMTs.

Concurring fully in the majority opinion, Judge Bea wrote

separately to emphasize the unsuitability of the Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), framework to determine

whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Navid David Shamloo (argued), N. David Shamloo, Esq.,

Portland, Oregon, for Petitioner.

Joanna L. Watson (argued), Trial Attorney; Ernesto H.

Molina, Jr., Senior Litigation Counsel; Civil Division, Office

of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Thomas Hutchins and James Feroli, Immigrant & Refugee

Appellate Center, Alexandria, Virginia, for Amici Curiae

Thomas Hutchins, James Feroli, and Immigrant & Refugee

Appellate Center.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Agustin Ortega-Lopez, a Mexican citizen, contends that

his misdemeanor conviction for participating in cockfighting

in violation of the Unlawful Animal Venture Prohibition,

7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1), does not qualify as a categorical crime

involvingmoral turpitude (“CIMT”). The Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluded

that it did. We grant the petition and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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4 ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Ortega-Lopez and Cockfighting

Ortega-Lopez came to the United States without

permission in 1992. He has three children who are United

States citizens. In 2008, Ortega-Lopez pled guilty to one

misdemeanor count of cockfighting. He was hardly the Don

Corleone (or even the Fredo) of this enterprise. Rather, as the

government’s sentencing position detailed: “his involvement

in the overall crime was relatively minor compared to” the

other defendants in the case. His punishment—one year of

probation with no jail time—reflected his limited culpability. 

He has no other convictions.

B. Removal Proceedings

In March 2008, the Department of Homeland Security

alleged that Ortega-Lopez was removable as “an alien present

in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” See

INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). OrtegaLopez filed an application for cancellation of removal under

INA § 240(A)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).

On February 14, 2011, the IJ held that Ortega-Lopez was

ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction

was a CIMT. See INA § 240(A)(b)(1)(C). Applying Taylor

v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the IJ concluded that

the conviction “categorically involves moral turpitude

because it criminalizes willful conduct that is inherently base

and depraved.” The IJ explained:

Animal fights . . . serve no purpose other than

entertainment. Unlike hunting or racing,

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ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH 5

animal fighting is a spectacle, the entire

purpose of which is the intentional infliction

of harm or pain on sentient beings that are

compelled to fight, often to the death. The

spectacle of forcing animals to cause each

other extreme pain or death necessarily

appeals to prurient interests.

Turning specifically to cockfighting, the IJ noted that all 50

states outlawed the practice and that society had found

“animal fighting ventures morally reprehensible.” The judge

reasoned that because animal fighting constituted animal

cruelty in many states, and courts had concluded that cruel

acts towards children inhere moral turpitude, animal fighting,

which also involved defenseless living beings akin to

children, was necessarily morally turpitudinous. OrtegaLopez appealed.

C. Appeal to BIA

In a March 2013 published decision, the BIA agreed with

the IJ that the offense of sponsoring or exhibiting an animal

in an animal fighting venture was categorically a CIMT. 

Also applying the categorical approach, the BIA sought to

“compare the statute of conviction to the generic definition of

moral turpitude.” Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th

Cir. 2012). The BIA defined moral turpitude as “conduct

which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to

the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between

persons or to society in general.” Matter of Ajami, 22 I. & N.

Dec. 949, 950 (BIA 1999). The BIA concluded that animal

fighting “clearly involves reprehensible conduct” and cited

several cases describing dog fighting as “cruel” and

“inhumane.” See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.

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6 ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH

1577, 1601–02 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v.

Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 2011). Turning to

cockfighting, the BIA, like the IJ earlier, emphasized that this

practice had been outlawed in all 50 states and this “sweeping

prohibition” confirmed that our society found it morally

reprehensible. This petition timely followed.

II. Discussion

Whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of

law that we review de novo. Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d

1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). We afford deference under

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984), however, to the BIA’s published

determination that “specified conduct constitutes a CIMT,”

Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 2010),

unless the “BIA did not support its conclusion with any

statutory interpretation or reasoning,” Rivera v. Lynch,

816 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015).

Congress has declared cockfighting a scourge that

warrants prosecution, and we have no quarrel with that.1 Yet

that is not our inquiry here—rather, we must determine

whether the conviction at issue is a CIMT. In answering this

question, the government urges us to hold that cockfighting

is a vile and depraved practice, which in its view ends the

story. It does not.

1 Unlike dogfighting, which is illegal everywhere in the United States,

cockfighting remains legal in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto

Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See White v. United States, 601 F.3d

545, 549 (6th Cir. 2010).

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ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH 7

We have recognized that whether a crime is a CIMT is a

“nebulous question that we are required to answer on the

basis of judicially established categories of criminal

conduct.” Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.

2010). To interpret the entrails of Taylor, we employ the

categorical approach, the modified categorical approach, and

other mechanisms that the Supreme Court dictates (and then

often undermines just a couple of Terms later). See, e.g.,

Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 483 (9th Cir. 2015)

(en banc) (Owens, J., concurring) (explaining that “[a]lmost

every Term, the Supreme Court issues a ‘new’ decision with

slightlydifferent language that forces federal judges, litigants,

lawyers and probation officers to hit the reset button once

again” in determining whether a crime is a CIMT).

Fortunately, this case does not require another painful

ascent of Mount Taylor. CIMTs fall into two categories:

“[1] those involving fraud and [2] those involving grave acts

of baseness or depravity.” Robles-Urrea v. Lynch, 678 F.3d

702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012). The parties agree that only this

second category is potentially in play here.

“[N]on-fraudulent crimes of moral turpitude almost

always involve an intent to harm someone, the actual

infliction of harm upon someone, or an action that affects a

protected class of victim.” Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1131. In their

opinions, the IJ and BIA never discussed how the statute of

conviction—cockfighting—involved a “protected class of

victim.” The government’s briefing never addressed Nunez,

and when asked about it at oral argument, government

counsel had no answer.

While our case law does not explicitly require the BIA to

apply this language in Nunez, we think a remand to consider

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8 ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH

this language is appropriate here, as the crime at issue

involving harm to chickens is, at first blush, outside the

normal realm of CIMTs. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d

799, 806–07 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that remand is proper to

permit BIA to consider question in the first instance); see also

Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.

2013) (reviewing BIA decision de novo and holding that

simple kidnapping under California law was not a CIMT

because it “does not require an intent to injure, actual injury,

or a special class of victims” (citation omitted)); Turijan v.

Holder, 744 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing

unpublished BIA decision and holding that felony false

imprisonment did not qualify as a CIMT because it does not

require an intent to injure someone, an actual injury, or a

protected class of victims); Linares-Gonzalez v. Lynch,

823 F.3d 508, 517–18 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that BIA erred

in determining that identity theft under California law was a

CIMT where it “does not require ‘intent to injure, actual

injury, or a protected class of victim’” (citation omitted)). 

The answer cannot be that outlawing cockfighting in the 50

states automatically qualifies cockfighting as a CIMT—more

is required. See, e.g., Navarro-Lopez v. Holder, 503 F.3d

1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that a

definition of moral turpitude that encompassed all criminal

conduct would be overbroad and contrary to the intent of

Congress), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en

banc).

PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.

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ORTEGA-LOPEZ V. LYNCH 9

BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur fully in Judge Owens’ opinion. I write separately

only to emphasize the unsuitability of the Taylor framework

for determining whether a particular crime is one involving

moral turpitude. See Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 785–89

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting); Navarro-Lopez

v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1084–86 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) (“There is no generic federal crime

of moral turpitude with elements similar to, or different from,

a state crime of moral turpitude for the simple reason there is

no state crime of moral turpitude. One has to have a crime,

such as burglary, to use the Taylor categorical analysis.”).

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