Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50059/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin U. Rangel-Guzman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN U. RANGEL-GUZMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50059

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-04881-H-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 10, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 28, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Richard R. Clifton,

Circuit Judge, and Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski

* The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by

designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for importation of

marijuana, vacated the sentence, and remanded for

resentencing in a case in which the prosecutor’s invocation of

her own personal knowledge during cross-examination was,

as the government concedes, improper.

Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that the

defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutorial error

affected his substantial rights.

The panel held that the district court didn’t adequately

explain why it declined to apply a two-level sentence

reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16).

COUNSEL

Holly A. Sullivan (argued), San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney; William P. Cole, Assistant

United States Attorney; Kyle W. Hoffman, Assistant United

States Attorney (argued), San Diego, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN 3

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

It is said that every dog has its day. Unfortunately for

Kevin Rangel-Guzman, the drug detection dog at the Otay

Mesa Port of Entry was having a fine day on September 5,

2011, when Rangel-Guzman and a friend attempted to reenter the United States. The dog alerted to their vehicle, and

Customs and Border Protection officers conducted a search. 

Officers found 91.4 kilograms of marijuana, hidden in a

compartment behind the backseat. Good dog!

Rangel-Guzman and his friend were promptly arrested

and interviewed separately. They both said Rangel-Guzman

had borrowed the car so that they could drive from Los

Angeles to Ensenada, Mexico. Rangel-Guzman, but not his

friend, was charged with importation of marijuana. See

21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960.

At his trial, Rangel-Guzman told a convoluted tale that

differed substantially from the story he had given the border

agents immediately after his arrest. He claimed that he met

his Aunt Martha and cousin Daniel for the first time at a

Quinceanera—a traditional Latino celebration of a girl’s

fifteenth birthday. During the Quinceanera, which allegedly

occurred just a month prior to Rangel-Guzman’s arrest,

Martha invited him to a wedding in Tecate, Mexico. He

claimed he went to the wedding by taking a bus from Los

Angeles to Tijuana and either a taxi or another bus to Tecate,

then returned to Los Angeles the same way.

The day after the wedding, he decided to return to Mexico

to “have a good time.” Aunt Martha agreed to lend him a car,

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4 UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN

which he picked up at her home. Rangel-Guzman and his

friend drove to his cousin Daniel’s house in Tecate, where

they left the car. They then took a lengthy cab ride to

Ensenada, where they spent a couple hours, before returning

to Daniel’s house to pick up the car. Rather than re-entering

the United States at Tecate, they drove to Otay Mesa,

ostensibly because Daniel said it would be quicker.

During cross-examination, the Assistant United States

Attorneyrepeatedlyattempted to impeachRangel-Guzman by

referring to a meeting between herself, Homeland Security

Agent Baxter, Rangel-Guzman and Rangel-Guzman’s

attorney. In doing so, the AUSA made it clear that she had

questioned Rangel-Guzman and that he had made certain

statements inconsistent with his current testimony: “You told

us that you and your mother ran into Martha . . . You told us

that four or five months before . . . That’s what you told us

last week . . . Don’t you remember that I was shocked that

you were saying it was four to five months before you got

arrested?”

Rangel-Guzman’s attorneydidn’t object, the district judge

didn’t intervene and Rangel-Guzman was convicted. On

appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly

vouched and violated the advocate-witness rule. RangelGuzman also claims that the district court erred when it held

that he failed to qualify for a two-point reduction in his base

sentencing level because he didn’t meet the requirements of

safety-valve relief. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D.1(b)(16), 5C1.2(a).

I. The Conviction

Because Rangel-Guzman didn’t object to the line of

questioning he now claims was improper, we review for plain

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UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN 5

error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–34 (1993). 

Rangel-Guzman must therefore show an error that was both

plain and affected his substantial rights, meaning there is a

reasonable probability that, absent the error, the outcome of

his trial would have been different. Id. at 734–35.

A. Plain Error

Rangel-Guzman argues that the prosecutor engaged in

improper vouching by effectively acting as a witness. 

Vouching occurs when a prosecutor “place[s] the prestige of

the government behind the witness or . . . indicate[s] that

information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s

testimony.” United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th

Cir. 1980). The advocate-witness rule prohibits attorneys

from testifying in a trial they’re litigating; the rule “expresses

an institutional concern, especially pronounced when the

government is a litigant, that public confidence in our

criminal justice system not be eroded by even the appearance

of impropriety.” United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553

(9th Cir. 1985). We have previously found error where a

prosecutor’s actions might have “tak[en] advantage of the

natural tendency of jury members to believe in the honesty of

. . . government attorneys” even when those actions didn’t “fit

neatly under either the advocate-witness rule or the vouching

rule.” United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.

1998).

The prosecutor made a number of statements that used

variations on “but you told us” and “I asked you and you

said,” as well as assertions of fact about what had occurred

during the meeting: “Well, we went over and over it, Mr.

Rangel,” “[D]o you remember last week I specifically asked

you multiple times who accompanied you to the

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6 UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN

Quinceanera?” And she left no doubt about her personal

feelings during the meeting: “Don’t you remember that I was

shocked that you were saying that it was four to five months

before you got arrested [that you met Martha]?”

When a prosecutor interviews a suspect prior to trial, the

“correct procedure” is to do so “in the presence of a third

person so that the third person can testify about the

interview.” United States v. Watson, 87 F.3d 927, 932 (7th

Cir. 1996). Here, Agent Baxter was present for the interview,

so he could have taken the stand and testified that RangelGuzman had made the prior inconsistent statements. See

United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1972).

Instead of calling Baxter, the prosecutor became her own

rebuttal witness. By phrasing the questions as she did, she

essentially testified that Rangel-Guzman had made those

prior inconsistent statements. Doing so clearly took

“advantage of the natural tendency of jury members to

believe” in a prosecutor, Edwards, 154 F.3d at 922, and

required the jury to “segregate the exhortations of the

advocate from the testimonial accounts of the witness,”

Prantil, 764 F.2d at 553. And, because the prosecutor wasn’t

actually a witness, Rangel-Guzman had no opportunity to

cross-examine her about the accuracy or truthfulness of her

account.

There can be no doubt that the AUSA was asking the jury

to choose whether to believe her or the defendant. This was

highly improper and unfair to the defendant.

After oral argument before us, the United States Attorney

“concede[d] that [the] cross-examination of defendant was

error” and advised us that she “has instituted—in addition to

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UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN 7

existing training—a semi-monthly training update for the

Criminal Division regarding pre-trial and trial phases . . . in

which prosecutorial error may occur.” We commend the

United States Attorney for the Southern District of California

for her forthrightness and hope that her example will be

followed by prosecutors across the circuit.

We recognize the difficulty in identifying errors absent an

objection. And we understand the district court’s reluctance

to intervene when the opposing party, perhaps strategically,

declines to do so. But the prosecutor’s invocation of her own

personal knowledge during cross-examination was

unquestionably improper. Even absent objection, the court

should have recognized this and put a stop to it. See

Henderson v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 1129–30 (2013).

B. Substantial Rights

Rangel-Guzman must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that he wouldn’t have been found guilty had the

error not occurred. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734–35. The case

against him was strong. He was arrested attempting to enter

the United States with 91.4 kilograms of marijuana hidden in

his car. His only defense was that he didn’t know the drugs

were there. But a border patrol agent who inspected RangelGuzman’s vehicle testified that the backseat was “abnormally

formed” and jutted out “very far.” And the story RangelGuzman told the jury about how a large quantity of narcotics

wound up stuffed in the backseat without his knowledge

would have been tough to believe even had he made no prior

inconsistent statements.

Rangel-Guzman’s only corroboration for his convoluted

tale came from the friend who had accompanied him to

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8 UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN

Mexico. Like Rangel-Guzman, the friend told a very

different story at trial than she did to the agents when she was

first arrested. She admitted on the stand that, during her postarrest interview, she didn’t mention the existence of RangelGuzman’s cousin, Daniel, or that Rangel-Guzman had left the

borrowed car at Daniel’s house. In fact, she never said they’d

gone to Tecate at all. Instead, she told the officers that she

and Rangel-Guzman had driven the car directly to Ensenada. 

And she admitted during cross-examination that, by the time

she told a very different story at trial, she and RangelGuzman had begun a romantic relationship. Because there’s

no reason to believe the jury would have accepted the version

of events posited by Rangel-Guzman and his friend at

trial—even absent the prosecutor’s erroneous crossexamination—Rangel-Guzman has failed to demonstrate that

the prosecutorial error in this case affected his substantial

rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.

II. The Sentence

The district court’s factual determination that a defendant

doesn’t qualify for safety-valve relief is reviewed for clear

error. United States v. Real-Hernandez, 90 F.3d 356, 360

(9th Cir. 1996). But the court must provide its reasons for

applying or declining to apply the safety-valve provision. Id.

The safety-valve provision requires the district court to

impose a sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum

sentence” if five factors are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see

also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). And the sentencing guidelines

provide for a two-level decrease in the defendant’s base

offense level if the safety-valve requirements are met. 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16). Although Rangel-Guzman didn’t

face a minimum sentence, he argues that he qualified for the

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UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN 9

two-level decrease. The parties agree that Rangel-Guzman

satisfies the first four safety-valve factors—the only dispute

is whether he “truthfully provided to the Government all

information and evidence . . . concerning the offense . . . .” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5).

We agree with Rangel-Guzman that the district court

didn’t adequately explain why it declined to apply the twolevel sentence reduction. The sentencing hearing began with

the court discussing the government’s request for an

obstruction of justice enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 

The court, the government and Rangel-Guzman’s lawyer then

discussed the cooperation Rangel-Guzman provided and the

alleged inconsistencies between what he told the government

and what he testified to. The first mention of the safety-valve

came when the district court noted its disagreement “with the

defense recommendation for a safety valve . . . I don’t think

that he’s met all the prongs of the safety valve.” The court

immediately turned back to the obstruction enhancement and

reviewed the evidence presented at sentencing before

eventually declining to apply the obstruction enhancement.

The government argues that the same evidence speaks to

both the obstruction of justice enhancement and the safetyvalve provision and, consequently, the court’s reasons for

denying the safety-valve were included in its discussion of

obstruction. The government’s obstruction argument was that

Rangel-Guzman committed perjury. The prosecutor

conceded that Rangel-Guzman had provided information to

the government during the course of the investigation, but

asserted that “the crux of our inquiry [at sentencing] is . . . his

testimony at trial.”

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10 UNITED STATES V. RANGEL-GUZMAN

But the safety-valve provision turns on whether RangelGuzman provided the government with “all information and

evidence . . . concerning the offense,” not the veracity of his

trial testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). And even if RangelGuzman’s truthfulness at trial were an issue, the district court

clearly wasn’t convinced Rangel-Guzman had lied on the

stand, declining to applythe obstruction enhancement. While

it’s possible that the district court decided that the safetyvalve requirements weren’t met for the same reasons that it

found the obstruction enhancement was inappropriate, there

is nothing in the record to indicate that is so. We decline the

government’s invitation to guess what the district judge was

thinking.

* * *

Although the government admits that the prosecutor’s

cross-examination of Rangel-Guzman was error, RangelGuzman has not shown that the outcome of the trial would

have been different, had the error not occurred. We therefore

affirm the conviction. But, because the district court failed to

adequately explain its reasons for denying Rangel-Guzman’s

request for a two-level reduction in his Guidelines sentence,

we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part and

REMANDED.

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