Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03097/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03097-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry William Gewin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 2014 Decided July 25, 2014

No. 12-3097

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

BARRY WILLIAM GEWIN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:03-cr-00366-1)

Cheryl D. Stein argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Elizabeth D. Collery, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief 

was Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General. 

Demetra D. Lambros, Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered appearances.

Before: BROWN, MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

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Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Barry Gewin was convicted of 

securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud. 

He was sentenced to nine years in prison and ordered to pay 

almost $2 million in restitution jointly and severally with his 

co-conspirators and a $500,000 fine. The sentencing court 

found Gewin had about $650,000 available to him at the time 

of sentencing and ordered him to turn those funds over to the 

court as partial payment of his financial obligations. Two 

years later, the court held a hearing because Gewin had paid 

only a negligible amount toward his fine and restitution. 

Gewin assured the court payment would be forthcoming, but 

subsequently delivered to the clerk of court only a fictitious 

International Bill of Exchange of his own creation.

In September 2007, the district court held a hearing to 

determine whether it should hold Gewin in civil contempt 

until he made the court-ordered payment. Gewin, appearing 

pro se, asserted no defense; was held in contempt; and 

remained incarcerated—with his original sentence 

suspended—for the next five years with little progress made 

in his case. Gewin never complied with the court’s payment 

order or successfully asserted a defense to the contempt order. 

In 2012, Gewin filed a series of documents asserting he could 

not make the required payments. In November 2012, the 

district court ruled Gewin had not met his burden of making 

out an inability-to-comply defense, and ordered Gewin’s 

contempt status continued. Gewin appealed the November 

2012 order, for the first time challenging his contempt status 

in this court.

Gewin’s primary argument on appeal is that the district 

court violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process by 

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holding him in contempt without appointing counsel to 

represent him. Gewin asks this court to vacate his contempt 

citation nunc pro tunc to September 5, 2007. We lack 

jurisdiction to hear Gewin’s various challenges to the district 

court’s 2007 order because Gewin failed to timely appeal that 

order. With regard to the 2012 proceedings, we hold Gewin 

waived any due process right to counsel he may have had. 

We deny Gewin’s remaining challenges and affirm the order 

of the district court.

I

In 2003, a grand jury indicted Gewin and several codefendants on counts of securities fraud, wire fraud, and 

conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud. Gewin 

proceeded at trial pro se following a “wide-ranging colloquy” 

in which the court ensured Gewin understood his decision to 

proceed without a lawyer and the risks involved. United 

States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 199–200 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

After a jury convicted Gewin of multiple counts, he hired 

counsel to represent him at sentencing. Gewin refused to 

provide the probation office with a full release of information 

for his financial records, and the court largely based its 

determination of Gewin’s assets on a financial affidavit he 

had completed. The court found Gewin had available to him 

for payment of a fine and restitution $120,000 to $140,000 in 

a BB&T bank account; $150,000 that had been taken from 

that bank account to be given to Gewin’s wife, Tommi 

Ferguson, but that Ferguson had not yet deposited in her own 

account; $5,898.82 in a Global Bank of Commerce Account 

in Antigua; about $270,000 in a Janney Montgomery Scott 

LLC account in Ferguson’s name; and $85,643 in a Sky Bank 

account also controlled by Ferguson. The court held the 

accounts in Ferguson’s name or under her control were 

available to Gewin, and considered those funds in its 

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sentencing determination. Thus, the court held Gewin had 

$651,541.82 available for the payment of a fine or restitution. 

On April 1, 2005, the court sentenced Gewin to imprisonment 

for 108 months, ordered Gewin to pay $1,975,786 in 

restitution, jointly and severally with his co-defendants, and 

imposed a $500,000 fine. The court also ordered Gewin to 

transfer all of the funds described above to the court in partial 

payment of the restitution and fine. Gewin, represented by 

new counsel, appealed his conviction and sentence, including, 

specifically, the determination that he was or would become 

able to pay a $500,000 fine—albeit without challenging the 

district court’s finding of his control over Ferguson’s 

accounts. A panel of this court affirmed the judgment of the 

district court. See Gewin, 471 F.3d 197.

In early 2007, after Gewin’s appeal had concluded and at 

the government’s request, the district court held a status 

conference regarding Gewin’s failure to comply with the

restitution and fine order. At that time, Gewin had paid only 

$1,325 toward his obligations. The court informed Gewin 

that if he failed to make the required payments and, in 

particular, to turn over the money in the accounts specified in 

the court’s April 2005 judgment, the government would seek 

to hold him in contempt. The court also stated that if Gewin 

did not intend to pay, the court wanted to discuss whether 

Gewin was going to be represented by counsel for any 

contempt proceedings. The court told Gewin he could hire 

his own attorney or the court would appoint one for him. 

Gewin admitted responsibility for the outstanding fine and 

restitution and promised he could and would pay both in full. 

The court ordered payment by June 8, 2007.

Around June 8, the clerk of court received from Gewin a 

fictitious International Bill of Exchange in the amount of 

$2,500,000. The court issued an order to show cause why 

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Gewin should not be held in contempt and ordered Gewin be 

brought to court for a hearing on September 5, 2007. Gewin 

appeared pro se at the hearing and advanced no legitimate 

defense regarding his failure to pay. The court held Gewin in 

civil contempt until he paid the required restitution and fine. 

Gewin was already in prison serving his criminal sentence, 

and the court informed Gewin that time during which he was 

held in contempt would not count toward that sentence and 

would delay Gewin’s ultimate release date, which had 

originally been projected for March 28, 2012. Gewin did not 

appeal the district court’s contempt order.

In October 2007, Gewin wrote to the court asserting, for 

the first time, he was unable to pay his financial obligations to 

the court. Gewin stated he had spent his own assets on 

attorney’s fees and living expenses and that the court could 

not order him to turn over Ferguson’s funds. In December 

2007, the court ordered the government to file a response to 

Gewin’s letter addressing, in particular, whether Gewin could 

be held in civil contempt for failing to pay an amount that 

exceeded the $651,541.82 the court had found Gewin able to 

pay at his sentencing hearing. In September 2008, after 

receiving the government’s response, the court clarified that 

Gewin was only being held in contempt until he paid 

$651,541.82, and the court acknowledged that inability to 

comply with a court order is a complete defense to a finding 

of civil contempt. Nevertheless, the court held Gewin had 

failed to establish the defense because his letter contained 

nothing but his own unsworn statement regarding his inability 

to make the required payment.

In July 2009, the government filed a notice reminding the 

district court of Gewin’s continued civil contempt status. 

Gewin responded by filing a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus and by stating he did not need the court to appoint an 

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attorney to represent him. The district court denied Gewin’s 

collateral attack as procedurally barred and without factual or 

legal merit. Gewin did not appeal from this April 2011 

decision by the district court.

In May 2011, the district court scheduled another status 

conference on Gewin’s continued incarceration for civil 

contempt. The court appointed A.J. Kramer, the Federal 

Public Defender, as advisory counsel to Gewin. At a July 19, 

2011 status conference, Mr. Kramer indicated he had offered 

to move to purge the contempt, but Gewin had declined. In 

response to questions from the district judge, Gewin reiterated 

this refusal on the record. Mr. Kramer told Gewin that if 

Gewin changed his mind, he could contact Mr. Kramer.

In February 2012, as Gewin’s original release date was 

approaching, Gewin filed several challenges to his civil 

contempt status. He acknowledged evidence of his inability 

to pay had been requested years earlier, apologized for taking 

so long to respond, and explained he was distracted over the 

years by efforts to vacate his conviction. Gewin insisted he 

had no control over his wife’s accounts and provided no 

information about what had happened to these funds. With 

respect to accounts in his name, Gewin said he spent the funds

on legal and personal expenses. He attached assorted bank 

statements displaying a widely fluctuating balance. He also 

attached receipts showing various payments for legal 

expenses, but provided no documentation about the source of 

those payments. On the contrary, there was some evidence 

his relatives paid those expenses from previously undisclosed 

bank accounts. Gewin was unrepresented before the district 

court throughout 2012.

On November 6, 2012, after the government responded to 

Gewin’s filings, the district court issued an order finding 

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Gewin had failed to demonstrate his current inability to pay 

the amounts owed and continuing to hold him in contempt. 

On November 19, 2012, Gewin filed this appeal challenging 

the district court’s November 6, 2012 order.

While this appeal was pending, the government moved to 

terminate Gewin’s ongoing civil contempt status. The 

government stated it no longer thought continued contempt 

would induce Gewin to comply with the court’s orders. 

Accordingly, the district court terminated the contempt on 

October 24, 2013. The district court noted Gewin’s contempt 

had added six years to his term of incarceration.

In this appeal, Gewin alleges various errors in both the 

district court’s original 2007 contempt order and its more 

recent 2012 order continuing Gewin’s contempt status. 

Gewin asks this court to vacate his contempt status nunc pro 

tunc and order that the entire time he has spent incarcerated 

for civil contempt be counted toward the fulfillment of his 

underlying sentence.

II

We begin by clarifying the scope of our jurisdiction and 

the standard of review. This appeal, filed on November 19, 

2012, arises from the district court’s November 6, 2012 order 

continuing to hold Gewin in civil contempt. Yet Gewin 

alleges certain errors arising from the district court’s showcause hearing on September 5, 2007 and the court’s contempt 

finding of that date. Gewin failed to timely appeal the 

September 5, 2007 order, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) (notice of 

appeal must be filed within 60 days after entry of order 

appealed from where the United States is a party), and we 

therefore lack jurisdiction to address alleged errors in the 

original contempt order, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 

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209–10 (2007) (“[T]he taking of an appeal [in a civil case] 

within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.”). 

The fact that the 2012 order related to the same continuing 

contempt as the 2007 order does not give us jurisdiction to 

hear an untimely appeal from an earlier order, which was 

itself an appealable final order. Cf. In re Grand Jury 

Proceedings, 795 F.2d 226, 229–30 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding a 

motion to purge contempt does not toll time for appeal of 

contempt order, nor can court hearing appeal of order denying 

a motion to purge review alleged errors in original contempt 

order); 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3916, 3917 n.70 (2d ed. 1992 

& Supp. 2014) (“It is . . . well settled that appeal from denial 

of a motion to vacate a judgment does not support review of 

the original judgment.”).

At oral argument, Gewin’s counsel suggested we have

jurisdiction to review errors from the 2007 proceedings under 

equitable principles because Gewin’s failure to appeal in 2007 

resulted from his lack of counsel in the contempt proceedings. 

But even if we were inclined to adopt such an equitable 

principle, we “ha[ve] no authority to create equitable 

exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.” Bowles, 551 U.S.

at 214; see Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 254 n.9 (3d 

Cir. 2008) (rejecting argument that previous counsel’s failure 

to file timely notice of appeal could be excused because that

argument “seeks essentially equitable relief from the time 

limit on appeals,” which Bowles precludes). Gewin claims he 

is aided in this argument by Rodriquez v. United States, 395 

U.S. 327, 331–32 (1969), which held that where a criminal 

defendant fails to file a timely appeal because he was not 

informed at sentencing of his right to appeal or that the clerk 

would, on request, file a notice of appeal for him, the 

defendant is entitled to resentencing so he may perfect a 

timely appeal. However, no case establishes an analogous 

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remedy for civil litigants. Indeed, the Rodriquez remedy is 

triggered when a district court fails to abide by Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32(j)(1), which requires a district court 

to advise a defendant of his right to appeal. See id. There is 

no such rule in civil cases. Furthermore, to the extent 

Rodriquez relied on equitable principles, we cannot transfer

its reasoning to the civil context because the time limit for 

filing a civil appeal—as opposed to that for filing a criminal 

appeal—is jurisdictional. See United States v. Byfield, 522 

F.3d 400, 403 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008).1

We have jurisdiction only to review errors arising from 

the November 2012 order from which Gewin appealed. 

Gewin may bring a challenge to the district court’s decision 

not to purge the contempt at that time, but he cannot challenge 

the district court’s original finding of contempt. Insofar as 

Gewin appeals the district court’s 2007 contempt order, we 

dismiss that portion of the appeal.

Even with regard to the alleged errors properly before 

this court, Gewin failed to raise many of his objections—and 

we note below which ones in particular—before the district 

court. “To preserve a claim of error on appeal, a party 

typically must raise the issue before the trial court. No 

procedural principle is more familiar than that a right may be 

forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to 

make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having 

 1 Gewin also suggested in rebuttal at oral argument that the 2007 

order is reviewable because it is “inextricably bound up with” the 

2012 order from which Gewin properly appealed. See Salazar ex 

rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 434, 436 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). But Gewin forfeited any such argument by failing to 

make it in his briefs or even in his opening remarks at oral 

argument. See Ark Las Vegas Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 

108 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

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jurisdiction to determine it.” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. 

District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Most of the arguments Gewin raises for the first time on 

appeal are forfeited. Therefore, Gewin will have to 

demonstrate error under a more onerous standard of review in 

order to obtain reversal.

“Generally, an argument not made in the trial 

court . . . will not be considered absent exceptional 

circumstances.” Id. at 437. Exceptional circumstances 

include “cases involving uncertainty in the law; novel, 

important, and recurring questions of federal law; intervening 

change in the law; and extraordinary situations with the 

potential for miscarriages of justice.” Flynn v. Comm’r, 269 

F.3d 1064, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Some courts, importing a 

standard from the criminal context, see FED. R. CRIM. P.

52(b), have indicated they will review unpreserved claims in 

civil cases for plain error. See Salazar, 602 F.3d at 437. A 

court reverses for plain error where the appellant 

demonstrates there is (1) a legal error that (2) is plain at the 

time of appellate review, (3) affects substantial rights of the 

parties, and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.; see also United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). We have yet to 

determine whether the “exceptional circumstances” test and 

“plain error” review inquiries are coterminous. Salazar, 602 

F.3d at 437. We need not decide this question now because, 

as we explain below, Gewin’s forfeited arguments 

demonstrate neither exceptional circumstances nor plain error.

III

Gewin argues the district court violated his Fifth 

Amendment right to due process by not offering to appoint 

counsel to represent him through the contempt proceedings. 

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Gewin’s argument primarily focuses on his right to counsel at 

the original contempt hearing in 2007. However, as explained 

above, Gewin’s right-to-counsel claim is before us only as it 

relates to the proceedings leading up to the November 2012 

order. We offer no opinion on whether Gewin had a right to 

counsel at his original contempt hearing.

With regard to the 2012 proceedings, the government 

argues Gewin forfeited his due process claim by not raising it 

before the district court and, therefore, we should not review 

that claim absent exceptional circumstances. Gewin responds 

that the right to counsel is not subject to forfeiture, and that 

the right may be waived only by an intentional 

relinquishment. Whether Gewin’s claim was subject to 

forfeiture depends on whether the due process right to counsel 

is best analogized to other due process claims, which are 

subject to forfeiture, or to the right to counsel that emanates 

from other constitutional provisions, which generally cannot 

be forfeited. Compare, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 

1354, 1366–67 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reviewing for plain error a 

due process argument, not raised in district court, that 

defendant was not given notice his conduct constituted a 

crime), Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 960 

F.2d 754, 756–57 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying review of 

argument not made in district court that the application of the 

statute of limitations violated due process), and In re Grand 

Jury Proceedings, 875 F.2d 927, 931–32 (1st Cir. 1989) 

(holding criminal contemnor’s failure to argue before the 

district court that show cause order violated due process right 

to notice and opportunity to prepare a defense “deprived him 

of any right to raise these matters on appeal” absent plain 

error), with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)

(requiring “intelligent waiver” of the Sixth Amendment right 

to counsel in criminal proceedings), and Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436, 467–71 (1966) (holding an individual’s failure 

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to ask for a lawyer prior to interrogation does not constitute 

waiver of the right to counsel derived from the Fifth 

Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause). But see United 

States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362–63 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(noting a defendant may forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel through “extremely serious misconduct”). We need 

not decide in this case whether a civil defendant’s claimed

due process right to counsel is forfeited if not raised before 

the district court, however. Nor do we need to decide whether 

Gewin had a right to counsel under Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. 

Ct. 2507 (2011), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 

(1976), which establish the framework for determining 

whether due process requires a civil contemnor be afforded 

counsel in a particular case. Even assuming arguendo Gewin 

had a right to counsel that was not forfeited, the record in this 

case demonstrates Gewin intentionally waived any such right.

The district court made clear to Gewin as early as April 

2007 that, in the event the government moved for a finding of 

civil contempt against Gewin, he could obtain his own 

attorney or the court would appoint one for him. Supp’l J.A. 

262–63, 286–87. While the offer to appoint counsel was not 

reiterated at the September 2007 show cause hearing, the 

district judge did make clear to Gewin the consequences of 

his being found in contempt, specifying both at that hearing 

and in a subsequent order that Gewin would be incarcerated 

until he complied with the court’s payment orders and that the 

running of his criminal sentence would be suspended during 

that time.

Gewin’s own actions and statements confirm that Gewin 

was aware of a general right to counsel and of the court’s 

continuing ability and willingness to appoint counsel for him. 

Gewin had previously chosen to represent himself at trial. 

After an adverse jury decision, Gewin exercised his right by 

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hiring counsel to represent him at sentencing and on appeal. 

And Gewin chose to challenge before this court his waiver of 

trial counsel, receiving from us a decision rejecting his claim 

and finding his waiver knowing and voluntary. See Gewin, 

471 F.3d at 198–200. In July 2009, Gewin filed a habeas 

petition in which he informed the court of his dissatisfaction 

with his previous representation, declared that he was 

competent to handle his own affairs, and stated that 

“no . . . attorneys need to be appointed” for him. Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, United States v. Gewin, No. 1:03-cr00366 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009), ECF No. 558. In response, the 

district court confirmed its continuing “inclin[ation] to 

appoint counsel to represent Mr. Gewin and/or to consult with 

him regarding his own pro se representation if requested,” but 

accepted Gewin’s request that it not do so. Order of Nov. 19, 

2009, United States v. Gewin, No. 1:03-cr-00366 (D.D.C.), 

ECF No. 563.

Moreover, in April 2011, the district court directed the 

Federal Public Defender’s Office to meet with Gewin, and the 

court subsequently appointed the Public Defender himself, 

A.J. Kramer, as advisory counsel to Gewin in connection with 

the July 2011 status conference on his contempt. Mr. Kramer 

consulted with Gewin. Although Gewin declined to allow 

Mr. Kramer to file anything on his behalf at that time, Gewin 

knew Mr. Kramer remained available if he ever changed his 

mind and desired such legal representation. Tr. of Status 

Hearing at 6, July 19, 2011, Supp’l J.A. 357. The court 

explained that it had appointed Mr. Kramer to make sure 

Gewin was aware of all possible grounds on which he could 

seek to purge the contempt, id. at 5, Supp’l J.A. 356, and Mr. 

Kramer promised to keep in touch with Gewin, id. at 12, 

Supp’l J.A. 363. In short, by 2012, the district court had 

informed Gewin fully and repeatedly of the availability of 

appointed counsel to represent or assist him in the contempt 

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proceedings. Gewin was aware of the district court’s offer of 

counsel, and his actions demonstrate that he knowingly and 

intelligently declined to accept.

Given all of these facts and circumstances, Gewin’s 

decision to proceed pro se in his submissions to the court in 

2012 are sufficient to constitute a waiver of any due process 

right to counsel he may have had in 2012. Cf. Buhl v. 

Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 789–90 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Waiver of 

the right to counsel depends in each case upon the particular 

facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 

background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”);

United States v. Veltman, 9 F.3d 718, 721 & n.5 (8th Cir. 

1993) (holding a prisoner’s due process right to independent 

assistance when threatened with involuntary commitment to a 

mental hospital is subject to lower standard of waiver than 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings); 

id. at 721 (“The right to counsel varies depending on the 

context in which it is invoked, as do the requisites for 

waiver.”).

We reiterate that our finding that Gewin waived his 

alleged right to counsel is not a decision that Gewin’s due 

process claim could not be lost by means short of waiver. 

Furthermore, our decision is not a holding that Gewin in fact 

had a due process right to counsel. Rather, we hold simply 

that even if Gewin’s due process claim was not forfeited, and 

even if Gewin had a right to counsel under the Due Process 

Clause, Gewin waived that right in the course of the district 

court proceedings. We will deny Gewin’s due process claim.

IV

Gewin argues the district court erred in the 2012 

proceedings by refusing to reopen the court’s determination 

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made at the 2005 sentencing hearing that Gewin had control 

over the bank accounts in his wife’s name or under her 

control. In his 2012 filings, Gewin argued he was unable to 

pay the fine and restitution because he did not have, and never 

had, control over his wife’s accounts. The district court 

rejected this argument by relying on its finding at sentencing.

Gewin’s argument implicates two distinct principles. 

The first is that present inability to comply is a complete 

defense to civil contempt. See United States v. Rylander, 460 

U.S. 752, 757 (1983). The second is that “a contempt 

proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or 

factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and 

thus become a retrial of the original controversy.” Maggio v. 

Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948). One of the factual bases of the 

district court’s sentencing order was its finding that 

Ferguson’s accounts could be used to pay Gewin’s fine and 

restitution as of the time of sentencing. Gewin was not 

permitted to challenge this finding at the contempt 

proceedings. On the other hand, Gewin was permitted to 

argue in 2012 that he no longer had access to his wife’s 

accounts. See id. at 76. The district court was bound to allow 

Gewin to “give any evidence of present conditions or 

intervening events which corroborate him.” See id. For 

instance, if Gewin had presented evidence that between his 

2005 sentencing and the 2012 contempt proceedings his wife 

had moved her assets to a different account to which Gewin 

had no access, the district court would be bound to consider 

whether Gewin still had access to his wife’s assets. 

Alternatively, if Gewin had presented evidence that he had 

attempted in good faith to access the funds at issue but had 

been denied access by the relevant banks because he was not 

an account holder, and had been denied assistance in 

accessing the funds by his wife, the district court would have 

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been obligated to consider whether the facts found at 

sentencing were still true.

The district court correctly adhered to these principles. 

The court properly rejected Gewin’s attempt to show he never 

had access to his wife’s funds because such an argument was 

an attempt to reopen the factual basis for the 2005 sentencing. 

See Order of Nov. 6, 2012, at 6–7, United States v. Gewin, 

No. 1:03-cr-00366 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 602. The district court 

additionally recognized Gewin might be able to demonstrate 

current inability to access the funds but rejected any such 

argument on the merits. The court stated: “Gewin’s 2012 

filings provide no additional factual content suggesting cause 

to revisit [the 2005] finding.” Id. at 7. The district court did 

not err in this finding because Gewin’s 2012 filings were 

directed at attacking the court’s 2005 determination rather 

than demonstrating any changed circumstances. See Gewin 

Letter of Feb. 6, 2012, United States v. Gewin, No. 1:03-cr00366 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 581 (presenting no new facts and 

noting the relevant facts “have been before the court for 7 or 8 

years”); Motion for Court’s Acknowledgement, United States 

v. Gewin, No. 1:03-cr-00366 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2012), ECF No. 

583 (resting defense on fraud allegedly perpetrated by the 

government at the 2005 sentencing); Supplement #1, United 

States v. Gewin, No. 1:03-cr-00366 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), 

ECF No. 585 (same). Gewin did not submit substantial 

evidence of a present inability to access his wife’s funds.2

 2 Neither party has addressed whether this alleged error affected the 

outcome of the district court proceedings, and thus whether reversal 

would be warranted even if Gewin were able to demonstrate error. 

See FED R. CIV. P. 61 (“Unless justice requires otherwise, no 

error . . . is ground for . . . vacating, modifying, or otherwise 

disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, 

the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any 

party’s substantial rights.”); Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 16 of 34
17

V

In addition to the arguments already addressed, Gewin 

claims the district court made numerous other errors. Because 

these arguments are plainly meritless, we address them only 

briefly.

First, Gewin claims the district court erred by holding 

him in contempt without finding he had a present ability to 

pay. Whatever may be the case with regard to the district 

court’s 2007 order, it is clear that in 2012 the district court 

considered and rejected Gewin’s argument that he was unable 

to pay. The district court stated:

Regrettably, because Gewin has once again declined the 

opportunity to provide the documents and information 

 

Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Since the 

district court also held Gewin had not shown he lacked present 

access to the funds that had been held in his own name as of the 

time of sentencing, see Sentencing Tr. at 104, Apr. 1, 2005, Supp’l 

J.A. 238, it is doubtful that simply prevailing on the issue of 

whether Gewin had access to Ferguson’s funds in 2012 would have 

been sufficient to establish Gewin’s inability to comply, at least 

partially, with the fine and restitution order.

Gewin does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in 

holding he had not met his burden in demonstrating he had 

dissipated his own funds by 2012. Indeed, Gewin is caught in a 

Catch-22 in this regard. If Gewin had been able to convince the 

district court he had spent his funds—and that he did not have 

access to Ferguson’s accounts—he would have successfully made 

out a defense to civil contempt. But he also would have exposed 

himself to a charge of criminal contempt for willfully dissipating 

his funds in contravention of a court order. A criminal contempt 

conviction would likely have carried its own term of incarceration.

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 17 of 34
18

that would seem most readily to support a present 

inability to pay the fine and restitution amounts due and 

owing, he has failed to provide a basis upon which this 

Court should reconsider its Civil Contempt Order.

Order of Nov. 6, 2012, at 11–12, United States v. Gewin, No. 

1:03-cr-00366 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 602. Because the court 

explicitly found Gewin had failed to meet his burden of proof 

in asserting an inability-to-pay defense, Gewin’s claim that 

the court did not consider the defense at all must be rejected.

Second, Gewin claims the district court erred by holding 

him in civil contempt rather than acting under the provisions 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613A and 3615. Although this alleged error 

would have been most properly raised in the context of the 

2007 proceedings, we broadly construe Gewin’s argument as 

challenging the power of the district court to continue 

Gewin’s contempt sanction in 2012. But even as it relates to 

the 2012 order, this argument is forfeited because Gewin 

failed to assert it before the district court. Gewin has 

demonstrated neither plain error nor exceptional 

circumstances warranting reversal. The court’s alleged failure 

to comply with the procedural dictates of § 3613A—even if 

error—was not prejudicial.3

 And nothing in § 3615, which 

 3 18 U.S.C. § 3613A requires that a court, in determining what 

action to take when a defendant is in default on payment of a fine or 

restitution, “consider the defendant’s employment status, earning 

ability, financial resources, the willfulness in failing to comply with 

the fine or restitution order, and any other circumstances that may 

have a bearing on the defendant’s ability or failure to comply with 

the order of a fine or restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(2). The 

statute also states that, “[t]o the extent practicable,” in a hearing 

held to address a defendant’s default, the prisoner should participate 

via telephone or video conference without being removed from the 

prison in which he is confined. Id. § 3613A(b)(2).

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 18 of 34
19

provides that a defendant’s willful failure to pay a fine is a 

misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to 

one year, suggests Congress meant the statute to preempt the 

courts’ common law civil contempt power. Indeed, other 

statutes suggest the opposite. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(1) 

(“Upon a finding that the defendant is in default on a payment 

of a fine or restitution, the court may . . . hold the defendant in 

contempt of court . . . or take any other action necessary to 

obtain compliance with the order of a fine or restitution.”).

Third, Gewin argues the length of his confinement for 

civil contempt demonstrates that at some point the contempt 

lost its coercive effect and became punitive. Cf. Maggio, 333 

U.S. at 76 (“It is everywhere admitted that even if he is 

committed, he will not be held in jail forever if he does not 

comply. His denial of possession is given credit after 

demonstration that a period in prison does not produce the 

goods.”). Because this claim was never presented to the 

district court, it is forfeited. Gewin has not met his burden of 

demonstrating his lengthy incarceration for contempt ever 

became punitive in nature. Indeed, he has identified no 

particular date as of which the incarceration became punitive, 

nor has he presented any evidence that would allow us to 

determine such a date. There is no evidence the contempt 

sanction had become punitive as of the district court’s 

November 2012 order. On the contrary, it seems Gewin took 

no serious efforts to contest his contempt status until 2012, as 

his original release date was approaching. Indeed, Gewin 

admitted as much, conceding in a March 21, 2012 filing that 

he “probably did not handle this contempt issue properly,” 

having “basically ignored it (except for [his] October 30, 2007 

letter) over the years.” Supplement #2, at 9, United States v. 

Gewin, No. 1:03-cr-00366 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2012), ECF No. 

586. This suggests it was only in 2012—when it seems that, 

after numerous warnings by the district court that his criminal 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 19 of 34
20

sentence had been suspended, Gewin actually began to feel 

the reality of his contempt status—that the contempt sanction 

had the most coercive force. Gewin has shown neither plain 

error nor exceptional circumstances warranting reversal.

Finally, Gewin asks this case be reassigned to a different 

district judge for further proceedings that may arise during the 

court’s supervision of his sentence. Although Gewin argues 

the “long and torturous history” of the case has “engendered 

some personal animus on the part of the trial court,” 

Appellant’s Br. 45, he points to no evidence of such animus. 

The protracted nature of the proceedings below does not 

justify reassignment of this case. See Liteky v. United States, 

510 U.S. 540, 551, 555–56 (1994). We will deny Gewin’s 

request for reassignment.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Gewin’s appeal is dismissed 

insofar as he challenges the district court’s 2007 contempt 

order. Gewin’s challenges to the November 2012 order are 

denied, and the order of the district court is

Affirmed.

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 20 of 34
BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring: Being in full 

agreement with the court’s opinion, I write separately only to

emphasize that the Supreme Court has never articulated a 

presumptive right to counsel in the civil context. As Judge 

Pillard acknowledges in her concurrence, we are not dealing 

here with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The question

is whether the Due Process Clause entitled Gewin to 

appointed counsel at his civil contempt proceeding. That 

determination—were it necessary for the court to decide it—

would necessarily depend on a case-by-case assessment rather 

than a categorical rule. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 

2507, 2517–18, 2520 (2011); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 

319, 334–35 (1976).

Contrary to the implication of the concurrence, Turner

does not craft a narrow exception to the general rule that an 

indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel whenever he 

is threatened with the deprivation of his physical liberty. The 

Court in fact recognizes “the presumption that an indigent 

litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, 

he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Turner, 131 S. 

Ct. at 2516 (emphasis added). Thus, whereas the Supreme 

Court acknowledged the threat of incarceration is a necessary

condition to the finding of a right to counsel in the civil 

context, the concurrence suggests such a threat is a sufficient 

condition to invoke a presumption of a right to counsel. Not 

so. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding a 

criminal offender facing revocation of probation and 

imprisonment does not have a right to counsel at a probation 

revocation hearing). Indeed, the Supreme Court makes this 

point exceedingly clear in the next paragraph of Turner: 

“[T]he Court previously ha[s] found a right to counsel “only” 

in cases involving incarceration, not that a right to counsel 

exists in all such cases (a position that would have been 

difficult to reconcile with Gagnon).” 131 S. Ct. at 2517.

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 21 of 34
2

Turner does not establish (or perpetuate) a presumption 

that an indigent civil defendant threatened with incarceration 

is entitled to counsel under the Due Process Clause.1

 On the 

contrary, the Supreme Court held that, rather than apply any

presumption, courts are to evaluate a litigant’s due process 

right to counsel claim under the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge 

framework. Under that framework, a court is to consider 

three factors: “(1) the nature of the private interest that will 

be affected, (2) the comparative risk of an erroneous 

deprivation of that interest with and without additional or 

substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the nature and 

magnitude of any countervailing interest in not providing 

additional or substitute procedural requirements.” Turner, 

131 S. Ct. at 2517–18. The application of these three factors 

to Gewin’s circumstances is complicated.2

 1 Turner overruled earlier cases from the Courts of Appeals to the 

extent they were inconsistent with this proposition, including 

Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985). See 

Concurrence at 5. Compare Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520 (“[T]he Due 

Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of 

counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who 

is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces 

incarceration (for up to a year).”), with Walker, 768 F.2d at 1185 

(“[D]ue process does require, at a minimum, that an indigent 

defendant threatened with incarceration for civil contempt for 

nonsupport . . . be appointed counsel to assist him in his defense.”).

2 It is worth noting that the court does not decide the antecedent 

question of whether Gewin was indigent. Judge Pillard concludes 

that because Gewin owed as fine and restitution more than the 

district court had found his assets were worth, Gewin would have 

been unable to pay for his own lawyer at the civil contempt 

proceedings. But that conclusion ignores Gewin’s experience at 

hiding his assets, and as an appellate court we are in no position to 

make an initial factual determination regarding Gewin’s ability to 

hire a lawyer. Further, despite the district court’s sentence, Gewin 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 22 of 34
3

While the threat of an indefinite period of incarceration

“argues strongly for the right to counsel,” id. at 2518, 

reasonable minds could differ as to the risk of erroneous 

deprivation or the nature of countervailing interests. Gewin 

appears to be a sophisticated litigant who sought counsel 

when he desired it and whose commitment offense involved 

financial fraud including concealment of assets. Indeed, 

Gewin’s secretive and uncooperative attitude was largely 

responsible for the contempt finding and continually clouded 

the question of indigence.

* * *

No doubt it would be a “best practice” for the district 

court, where it is clear that a civil contemnor has a due 

process right to counsel, to engage a civil defendant in a 

colloquy to ensure he understands his right. But to demand 

the colloquy because it would help a reviewing court 

determine whether waiver of the right was “knowing and 

intelligent” puts the cart before the horse. I need merely 

reiterate what the court’s opinion makes exceedingly clear: 

we do not decide today whether such a high standard of 

waiver is necessary for a civil defendant to forgo a due 

process right to counsel. It is entirely possible that this court 

will, in a future case, conclude that this right, like so many 

others, can be lost by simple forfeiture. We need not, and do 

not, resolve this issue now.

 

was able to hire a lawyer to represent him before this court both on 

direct appeal from his criminal conviction and in the instant appeal. 

His indigence in 2007 was anything but certain.

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 23 of 34
PILLARD, Circuit Judge, concurring: The legal system is 

not functioning at its best when an uncounseled man serves 

six years in prison for civil contempt of court. Such an 

extraordinary period of imprisonment for contempt is 

especially troubling where, as here, the contemnor was 

evidently unable to afford a lawyer. The district court 

assumed when it held Barry Gewin in contempt in 2007 that 

he had a right to court-appointed counsel, but this case is 

before us because the court did not conduct a colloquy on the 

record at that time. It was not until 2011 that a waiver of that 

right was clear on the record. 

As the court aptly explains, any 2007 deprivation of the 

right to counsel that Gewin may have suffered is beyond our 

power to remedy because he did not raise or appeal the lack of 

appointed counsel until now. Gewin here appeals from the 

2012 order continuing his contempt. By the time the district 

judge entered that order, she had appointed the Federal Public 

Defender himself as advisory counsel. The Federal Public 

Defender had met with Gewin and made both concrete and 

ongoing offers of full representation, which Gewin declined. 

I concur in the court’s opinion because I conclude that, in the 

circumstances of this case, the Federal Public Defender’s inperson proffer of full and free representation, with the court’s 

encouragement, and Gewin’s refusal of that offer validly 

waived any right to counsel that Gewin may have had relating 

to the order under review.1

 

 

1

 I concur in the court’s conclusion that Gewin waived his right to 

counsel, but I disagree with the court’s reliance, even in part, on the 

fact that Gewin received a warning at his criminal trial informing 

him of the dangers of proceeding pro se and had chosen to 

represent himself through the criminal trial. See Slip Op. at 12-13. 

Gewin’s right to counsel in the criminal proceedings derived from 

the Sixth Amendment. The civil contempt hearing, in contrast, was 

a separate and distinct civil proceeding. Any information Gewin 

received about his right to counsel during his criminal proceeding 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 24 of 34
2 

I write separately to clarify two points. First, to the 

extent that there is any suggestion in the court’s opinion that 

Gewin effectively waived his right to counsel before the 

Federal Public Defender appeared and Gewin refused his 

representation, I disagree that waiver could be accomplished 

by the limited and unclear communications on the record 

leading up to the Defender’s appearance. Second, given the 

course of the contempt proceedings in the district court, it 

bears emphasis that, where a due process right to counsel 

attaches, a prompt and explicit colloquy on the record 

ordinarily is required before a court may find a valid waiver 

of that right. 

One hopes an extended contempt imposed on an 

uncounseled person, without contemporaneous waiver of a 

right to representation, is exceedingly rare. But situations that 

prompt judges to use our contempt power tend to be fraught. 

Disobedient and disrespectful litigants understandably raise 

the risk of confusion and error. It is thus especially important 

to follow standard “best practices,” such as the Civil 

Contempt Procedure set out in the Federal Judicial Center’s 

Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges, before imprisoning 

an uncounseled, indigent person for contempt of court. 

* * * 

Gewin faced civil contempt because he did not pay the 

fine and restitution he owed under his felony sentence for 

securities and wire fraud and conspiracy. At sentencing, all of 

his identifiable assets totaled approximately $650,000, and the 

district court ordered him immediately to pay the full amount 

towards his $2.4 million fine and restitution obligation. 

 

was insufficient to put him on notice that he had a similar right to 

counsel when faced with civil contempt. 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 25 of 34
3 

Owing more than his known assets to the court, Gewin 

presumptively had no funds available to pay a lawyer during 

his subsequent civil contempt proceeding. An indigent civil 

contemnor facing a deprivation of his physical liberty is not 

automatically entitled to court-appointed counsel. But, the 

factors that tipped the due process analysis against appointing 

counsel in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), favored 

it here, as the district court seems to have assumed. The 

district judge accordingly told Gewin at an April 2007 hearing 

that, if she had to resort to the contempt power to induce him 

to pay his fine and restitution, he could get his own lawyer or 

she would “appoint somebody since there are ramifications 

for you.” Supp’l J.A. at 287. The court appears to have 

assumed, reasonably enough, that Gewin was indigent, given 

that the sentencing obligation of $2.4 million far exceeded the 

funds in his identified accounts. 

Five months later, when Gewin failed to comply with the 

order to pay, the district judge held him in contempt. At the 

September 2007 contempt hearing, the judge did not follow 

up on her comment at the April hearing that she would ensure 

that Gewin had counsel. She did not inform Gewin on the 

record whether he had a right to counsel and, if so, that 

waiving it carried serious risks. She did not record any 

knowing and intelligent waiver. Instead, communications 

between the court and Gewin about any right to counsel 

occurred at later conferences or hearings, were not fully 

explicit, and spread over years, making it hard to determine 

what Gewin knew and what he intended regarding his right to 

counsel. Gewin remained in prison for contempt for six 

years. 

It was not until 2011 that the district judge summoned the 

Federal Public Defender to meet and confer privately with 

Gewin and offer his assistance. The Defender offered to 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 26 of 34
4 

represent Gewin, and he proposed filing a motion to purge the 

contempt. Gewin declined the Defender’s offer of free and 

expert legal representation. 

In 2013, during the pendency of this appeal, the 

government acknowledged that the contempt order had lost 

any coercive force and so should end. Gewin has thus only 

recently begun to serve his sentence of incarceration—a 

sentence that, but for the contempt, would now be complete.2

The district judge assumed without deciding that due 

process required her to appoint counsel—or to determine on 

the record that Gewin waived any such right—before she held 

him in contempt. We, too, dispose of the appeal without 

deciding that issue. Cf. Appellee Br. at 33 (the government 

 

2

 Gewin contended, for the first time at oral argument on appeal, 

that his right to retained counsel was also violated because, when he 

appeared at the September 2007 contempt hearing without counsel, 

the court failed to provide him with a reasonable amount of time to 

hire his own lawyer. Oral Arg. Tr. at 13:19-24. Gewin correctly 

notes that the Due Process Clause is not only relevant to the 

question whether an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed 

counsel, but also ensures that a non-indigent civil contemnor has 

the right to retain an attorney to represent him during contempt 

proceedings. See generally Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 

F.2d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 1986) (“[A] civil litigant does have a 

constitutional right, deriving from due process, to retain hired 

counsel in a civil case.”); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 

F.2d 1101, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 

397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (a recipient of welfare benefits must be 

allowed to retain an attorney to represent him during a hearing to 

terminate those benefits, if he so desires). Gewin, who is 

represented by counsel on appeal, forfeited that argument, however, 

by failing to discuss it in his briefing and not raising it until oral 

argument. See Ark Las Vegas Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 

108 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 27 of 34
5 

assumes that, “[h]ad Gewin sought court-appointed counsel” 

in October 2007, when he wrote to the court that he had “no 

funds, or so-called ‘money’ in any accounts,” appointed 

counsel “would no doubt have been supplied”). Those 

assumptions that a right to counsel may have attached in these 

circumstances are at least reasonable. 

Potential civil contemnors facing incarceration have a 

due process right to appointed counsel, subject to the Supreme 

Court’s analysis in Turner. See generally Walker v. McLain, 

768 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1985) (collecting pre-Turner

cases holding that a civil contemnor had a due process right to 

counsel). Before Turner, the Court had recognized in certain 

contexts “the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right 

to appointed counsel,” limited to cases in which the litigant 

“may be deprived of his physical liberty.” 131 S. Ct. at 2516 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Turner found that 

presumption rebutted in the context of a state civil contempt 

proceeding for failure to pay child support. Id. at 2520. In 

doing so, the Court identified an exception to, but did not 

generally eliminate, the due process right to counsel. See id.

(holding that Turner’s due process rights were violated 

because he received “neither counsel nor the benefit of 

alternative procedures”). Turner reaffirmed that, when 

determining whether due process requires appointment of 

counsel, a court must consider the factors set forth in 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Turner, 131 

S. Ct. at 2517-18. Those factors include (1) the nature of the 

private interest affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous 

deprivation of that interest without appointed counsel, and (3) 

the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interests. Id. 

 The Mathews factors suggest why it was reasonable to 

assume that Gewin had a due process right to appointed 

counsel: 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 28 of 34
6 

First, as in Turner, the “private interest that [was] 

affected” in Gewin’s contempt proceeding—the “loss of 

personal liberty through imprisonment”—“argues strongly for 

the right to counsel.” See id. at 2518 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But, unlike Turner, who was facing a 

maximum term of imprisonment of up to a year, no statute 

limited the period Gewin could be held, and he ended up 

serving six years—an extraordinary period of civil contempt. 

Second, “[g]iven the importance of the interest at stake, it 

is obviously important to assure accurate decisionmaking” 

with respect to Gewin’s ability to pay the restitution and fine, 

see id., and counsel most likely would have improved the 

accuracy of decisionmaking here. Here, as in Turner, it was 

important to make an accurate determination of “the key 

‘ability to pay’ question” that supports continued confinement 

for civil contempt. Id. 

Third, the three subsidiary considerations that argued 

against requiring the state to provide counsel in Turner’s civil 

contempt proceeding point in the other direction here. Unlike 

in Turner, the question at issue in Gewin’s contempt 

proceeding was not “straightforward.” Compare id. at 2519. 

As our opinion observes, Gewin was caught in a Catch-22. 

Slip Op. at 17 n.2. Gewin very well may have spent the funds 

identified in the court’s sentencing order. If so, he could have 

come forward with that evidence to defend against civil 

contempt, but in doing so he would have exposed himself to 

criminal contempt or prosecution on another ground for 

dissipating funds in violation of the court’s order. Id. 

Alternatively, if he avoided criminal jeopardy by declining to 

present that evidence to the court, he would remain in 

contempt, with no apparent end to his incarceration. The 

hazards surrounding those choices underscore that Gewin’s 

circumstances presented legal issues far more complex than 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 29 of 34
7 

those characterized in Turner as simple enough that an 

indigent could navigate them effectively on his own, aided 

only by a system of simple forms and follow-up questioning. 

See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519; see also United States v. 

Bobart Travel Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618, 619-20 (2d Cir. 

1983) (“To guide a client between the Scylla of contempt and 

the Charybdis of waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege 

requires not only a lawyer but an astute one.”). 

This case is also unlike Turner insofar as appointment of 

counsel to Turner, who had refused in that case to pay child 

support, would have unfairly and disproportionately 

empowered him against the child’s mother, the unrepresented 

custodial parent. The Court concluded that “[t]he needs of 

such families play an important role in our analysis”; 

appointing counsel to Turner would create an “asymmetry of 

representation” that could make the proceedings “less fair 

overall.” Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2519. In this case, in contrast, 

the only party opposing Gewin in the civil contempt 

proceeding was the United States government, and providing 

him counsel would have helped to level the playing field. 

Finally, unlike in Turner, there is no contention here that 

counsel was unnecessary because of any substitute procedural 

safeguards that might be used instead of counsel to reduce the 

risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. Compare id. at 

2520. 

Given Gewin’s apparent entitlement to appointed 

counsel, our inquiry focuses on whether Gewin waived that 

right. The majority’s opinion does an admirable job of sifting 

through the record to ascertain that Gewin did in fact waive 

his right to counsel. But had the trial judge followed best 

practices in the first instance, our confirmation of Gewin’s 

waiver would have been vastly simplified. Indeed, here, the 

district court appears to have recognized what needed to be 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 30 of 34
8 

done, yet for whatever reason did not go through those formal 

steps. In the absence of an adequate colloquy on the record 

reflecting knowing and intelligent waiver, the kind of wholerecord review that we conducted here will continue to be 

necessary. Such review is not ideal, however, and can readily 

be avoided. 

Rather, the best practice is for the district court to hold a 

formal colloquy on the record—similar to the standard 

colloquy that is required in criminal cases—in order to inform 

an indigent litigant of the right to counsel, if any, and inquire 

whether the litigant wants the court to appoint counsel. 

On-the-record colloquy for assignment or waiver of 

counsel is the standard operating procedure in criminal trials. 

See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Johnson 

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). In the context of the 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases, the 

Supreme Court explained that “[i]t is the solemn duty of a 

federal judge before whom a defendant appears without 

counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps 

necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional 

right at every stage of the proceedings.” Von Moltke v. 

Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948). Also in the context of the 

Sixth Amendment right, our court has emphasized the 

practical benefit of timely and explicit on-the-record inquiry: 

“The most certain assurance” that the defendant is aware of 

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation “is by a 

colloquy on the record between judge and defendant.” United 

States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “It is 

precisely because of the ambiguities that commonly 

accompany purported waivers of counsel” that courts in 

criminal cases “have generally required a ‘recorded colloquy’ 

between the defendant and the court, one in which the 

accused is informed of his right to an attorney, his right to 

USCA Case #12-3097 Document #1504459 Filed: 07/25/2014 Page 31 of 34
9 

self-representation, and the decided advantages of competent 

legal representation.” United States v. Tompkins, 623 F.2d 

824, 828 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Bailey, 675 F.2d at 1299-

1300. 

The differences between criminal and civil proceedings, 

and the distinct constitutional grounds for the right to counsel 

in civil and criminal cases, do not change the fact that a 

litigant’s knowing and intelligent waiver requires notice of the 

right. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); Walker, 768 

F.2d at 1185. And the practical benefits of an on-the-record 

colloquy are not limited to the criminal setting. 

The 2013 Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 

accordingly recognizes that, although the bases of the right to 

counsel in the criminal and civil context differ, where a right 

exists, effective process for protecting it is quite analogous. 

The Benchbook sets forth model “civil contempt procedures” 

for judges to follow with uncounseled litigants. If the 

potential contemnor “desires an attorney but cannot afford 

one, [the court] must appoint counsel for him . . . unless 

waived.” Fed. Judicial Ctr., Benchbook for U.S. District 

Court Judges § 7.02, at 236 (6th ed. 2013). The process the 

Benchbook recommends, by explicit cross-reference, is the 

same as the process where right to counsel attaches in the 

criminal context: If a defendant does not have an attorney, 

the court should inform the defendant of his “constitutional 

right,” if any, “to be represented by an attorney at every stage 

of the proceedings” and tell him that if he “is unable to afford 

an attorney, the court will appoint one without cost to him.” 

Id. § 1.02, at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).3

 The Benchbook 

 

3

 Section 3006A is primarily concerned with providing appointed 

counsel to defendants facing criminal charges, but it is not confined 

to criminal defendants. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(G) 

(material witnesses). The statute states that representation shall be 

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10 

instructs that, after providing the defendant with that 

information, the court should ask the defendant if he or she 

understands the right to an attorney, wishes and is able to 

obtain counsel, or wants the court to appoint counsel. Id.

§ 1.02, at 6. If the defendant does not want counsel, the court 

“must make clear on the record that the defendant is fully 

aware of the hazards and disadvantages of selfrepresentation.” Id.

Any additional burden on a court that conducts a 

colloquy on the record “is more than offset by avoidance of 

lengthy appeals to determine whether the defendant’s [due 

process right] has been violated.” See United States v. 

Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Because a 

reviewing court will have the most certain assurances that a 

defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 

counsel when that waiver is made on the record, after an 

adequate colloquy between the judge and contemnor, district 

courts are well advised to make such a record. Indeed, “a 

brief intercession on the record of this kind” would have 

effectively eliminated this appeal. Bailey, 675 F.2d at 1300. 

Had the district court conducted a standard colloquy on the 

right to counsel before holding Gewin in contempt and had he 

then clearly waived the right on the record, it seems virtually 

certain this appeal could have been dismissed as frivolous. 

 

 

provided to any financially eligible individual when the individual 

“faces loss of liberty in a case, and Federal law requires the 

appointment of counsel.” Id. § 3006A(a)(1)(I). Civil contemnors 

face loss of liberty, and, as noted above, the Due Process Clause in 

some circumstances requires appointment of counsel. 

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* * * 

A contempt proceeding by its nature deals with conflict 

between an individual and a court. Gewin was a challenging 

litigant. He promised to pay and then sent in a fake check; at 

a later court appearance he “charged” the court $500,000 each 

time the judge uttered his name, which he claimed offset his 

debt to the court; he failed to timely appeal the order holding 

him in contempt, concentrating instead on filing repeated, 

unsuccessful habeas petitions directed at his criminal 

sentence. It is often unclear on the cold record what Gewin’s 

intentions were: He seemed at once grandiose and furtive, 

manipulative and delusional, fraudulent and confused. But it 

is perfectly clear that Gewin’s uncooperative conduct made 

proceedings difficult for the district court. Things would have 

been easier on the court, and Gewin’s rights and interests 

would have been better served, had he been represented by 

counsel. 

People who should be represented nevertheless routinely 

refuse counsel. Many suffer dire consequences. That is their 

prerogative, as it was Gewin’s in this case. But it is the 

courts’ obligation to present such grave choices as clearly as 

possible. This record leaves nagging doubts whether any 

right to counsel Gewin may have had was promptly honored. 

There are few substitutes for routine use of pre-contempt 

colloquies to protect litigants’ rights and autonomy and to 

enable just and efficient judicial review. 

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