Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03224/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03224-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Caulton D. Allen
Petitioner
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CAULTON D. ALLEN,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3224

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-07-0694-C-6.

______________________ 

Decided: June 7, 2016

______________________ 

CAULTON D. ALLEN, Fort Washington, MD, pro se.

WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ALLISON KIDD-MILLER; GIA MARIE CHEMSIAN, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

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2 ALLEN v. DVA

Before PROST, Chief Judge, O’MALLEY, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Caulton D. Allen appeals from the final decision of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) in Allen v. Dep’t 

of Veteran Affairs, No. DC-0752-07-0694-C-6, which 

denied his fourth petition for enforcement of a settlement 

agreement with the Department of Veterans Affairs (the 

agency). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In 2007, the agency removed Mr. Allen from his position as an Equal Opportunity Specialist, GS-0360-12. Mr. 

Allen filed a petition for review with the Board challenging his removal. Shortly after, on August 30, 2007, the

parties agreed to resolve the appeal through a settlement 

agreement. In the parties’ settlement agreement, Mr. 

Allen agreed to, among other things, waive and withdraw 

in their entirety all proceedings against the agency, 

including his appeal, and to refrain from bringing any 

future proceedings against the agency, with the exception 

of any claims arising from a breach of the settlement 

agreement. J.A. 22–23 ¶¶ 1–6. In return, the agency 

agreed to “immediately cancel [Mr. Allen’s] removal and 

reinstate him, effective May 26, 2007, for the purpose of 

facilitating his resignation.” J.A. 24 ¶ 9. The agreement 

also obligated the agency to: 

[R]emove any and all information related to [Mr. 

Allen’s] removal action from [his] Official Personnel File (OPF), change his removal to voluntary 

resignation, and make the following changes:

a. SF 50–B Notification of Personnel Action. Removal, dated May 26, 2007, will be 

canceled and removed, and [agency] will 

substitute a form SF 50–B Notification of 

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ALLEN v. DVA 3

Personnel Action reflecting [Mr. Allen’s] 

resignation. 

b. SF–50–B Notification of Personnel Action. Suspension, dated August 28, 2006, 

will be cancelled and removed.

J.A. 24 ¶ 10. The agency also agreed that Human Resource Officer Jeanette Anderson, or her successor, if 

contacted regarding any employment inquiry or reference 

for Mr. Allen, would provide only the specific information 

contained in an exhibit to the agreement (Exhibit C), 

unless otherwise required by law. J.A. 24–25 ¶ 12. 

The administrative judge presiding over the appeal 

determined that the settlement agreement was lawful on 

its face, freely reached by the parties, and that the parties 

understood the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the 

judge entered the agreement into the record for enforcement purposes and dismissed Mr. Allen’s appeal. See 

Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. DC-0752-07-0694-I-1, 

2007 WL 4199611 (M.S.P.B. Sep. 6, 2007). 

Mr. Allen has subsequently challenged the agency’s 

compliance with the terms of the agreement on multiple 

occasions. Much of that history is detailed in this court’s 

prior opinion regarding Mr. Allen’s first and second 

petitions for enforcement of the agreement, Allen v. Dep’t 

of Veteran Affairs, 420 F. App’x. 980 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We 

recount below the portions of that long history relevant to 

this appeal. 

After the parties executed the settlement agreement, 

on December 30, 2008, Mr. Allen applied to the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) for disability retirement benefits, claiming 

that he sustained a compensable, work-related “mental

disorder/psychiatric illness.” Mr. Allen alleged that he 

sustained serious emotional injury after being subjected 

to hostility and harassment from his supervisor prior to 

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4 ALLEN v. DVA

his separation from the agency. In connection with Mr. 

Allen’s benefits application, OWCP sent the agency a 

letter requesting specific information regarding the accuracy of Mr. Allen’s claim. The letter also asked whether 

Mr. Allen had any performance or conduct problems. Ms.

Anderson responded to these inquiries in narrative form

and also enclosed supporting documentary evidence, 

including copies of Mr. Allen’s removal notice and other 

documents related to his removal. 

On May 11, 2009, Mr. Allen filed a petition for enforcement of the settlement agreement, alleging that the 

agency breached the agreement by (1) providing information to OWCP that it had agreed to expunge from Mr.

Allen’s OPF and (2) disclosing information other than 

what was contained in Exhibit C, despite having no legal 

obligation to do so. The agency responded that it had in 

fact purged the removal-related documents from his OPF 

pursuant to the agreement. It then argued that its disclosure did not violate the settlement agreement because the 

information came from a file other than Mr. Allen’s OPF. 

On June 10, 2009, the administrative judge issued an 

initial decision denying Mr. Allen’s enforcement petition, 

finding that Mr. Allen failed to prove the agency breached 

the agreement. See Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No.

DC-0752-07-0694-C-3, 2009 WL 2253664 (M.S.P.B. June

10, 2009). Mr. Allen filed a petition for review and the 

Board affirmed the initial decision. Allen v. Dep’t of 

Veteran Affairs, 2009 M.S.P.B. 238 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 29, 

2009). The Board concluded that the agreement only 

required the agency to expunge removal-related information from Mr. Allen’s OPF and not from all agencymaintained files. The Board also found that the agency 

complied with the settlement agreement by removing 

from Mr. Allen’s OPF all documents related to his removal. Finally, the Board also concluded that the agency was 

required by law to provide the disclosed information to 

OWCP and, in any event, Mr. Allen did not bargain for 

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ALLEN v. DVA 5

non-disclosure to OWCP. Mr. Allen timely appealed the 

Board’s final decision to this court on February 24, 2010, 

in Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, Docket No. 2010-3178. 

While Mr. Allen’s appeal to this court was pending, on 

March 19, 2010, OWCP notified Mr. Allen that he was not 

eligible for the requested benefits due to his resignation 

from the agency. The agency subsequently revealed to 

Mr. Allen that the removal-related documents shared 

with OWCP were separately maintained in an “unofficial 

settlement file.” Mr. Allen filed a second petition for 

enforcement on April 20, 2010, this time alleging that the

agency breached the agreement by maintaining removalrelated documents in his “OPF and/or another unauthorized secret personnel file.” The petition also claimed that 

the agency had been “dishonest” about the location of his 

OPF since his resignation. On May 26, 2010, the administrative judge denied Mr. Allen’s second petition. See 

Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. DC-0752-07-0694-C4, 2010 WL 2532749 (M.S.P.B. May 26, 2010). The Board 

held that collateral estoppel barred Mr. Allen from relitigating these issues because the Board’s earlier 2009 Final 

Decision specifically found that all removal-related documents were expunged from his OPF and that the retention of these documents outside of his OPF did not breach 

the terms of the settlement agreement. That decision 

became final on June 30, 2010. On August 30, 2010, Mr. 

Allen appealed to this court in Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran 

Affairs, Docket No. 2010-3178, and his two appeals were 

consolidated.

In the first appeal (No. 2010-3088), Mr. Allen argued 

that the Board erred in finding that the agency did not

materially breach the parties’ agreement by retaining 

removal-related documents and furnishing them to 

OWCP. He also argued that the Board “failed to address 

[his] claims of bias exhibited by the [administrative judge] 

during compliance proceedings” and, instead, “exhibit[ed] 

its own bias by presenting arguments on behalf of the 

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6 ALLEN v. DVA

agency.” In the second appeal (No. 2010-3178), Mr. Allen 

argued that the administrative judge misapplied the 

collateral estoppel doctrine and improperly barred him 

from litigating the “issue of whether documents related to 

[his] removal action were properly expunged from [his] 

OPF.” On May 13, 2011, we affirmed both of the Board’s 

final decisions in Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 420 F. 

App’x. 980 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

As to Mr. Allen’s first petition for enforcement, we 

agreed with the Board that the plain language of the 

agreement required only the removal of documents from 

his OPF. We also concluded that the Board’s finding that 

the agency was required by law to disclose the documents 

to OWCP was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 

Finally, we found meritless Mr. Allen’s arguments that 

the Board was biased against him and that he was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing. As to Mr. Allen’s

second petition for enforcement, we found that the Board 

properly applied the collateral estoppel doctrine to bar 

Mr. Allen’s second challenge to the agency’s retention of 

removal-related documents. 

Mr. Allen then filed a third petition for enforcement of 

the settlement agreement, in which he alleged the agency 

breached the agreement in connection with a reference 

check. In response to an inquiry from a potential employer regarding Mr. Allen’s work performance, trustworthiness, and interpersonal skills, Ms. Anderson indicated 

that she could not speak to Mr. Allen’s work performance 

and trustworthiness because she was a Human Resources 

Officer and not his supervisor. According to Mr. Allen, 

this response suggested that Ms. Anderson was limited in 

the information she could provide regarding his employment history and, thus, was a breach of the settlement 

agreement. The administrative judge disagreed and 

denied the petition for enforcement. Allen v. Dep’t of 

Veteran Affairs, No. DC-0752-07-0694-C-5, 2012 WL 

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ALLEN v. DVA 7

2869818 (M.S.P.B. May 31, 2012). The administrative 

judge found the settlement agreement “specifically provided [Ms. Anderson] could tell prospective employers she 

was not ‘[Mr. Allen’s] supervisor’” and “adding that she

was a ‘Human Resources Officer’ only supplements the 

statement she was not his supervisor, and is not a statement that is contradictory to the essence of the contract.” 

Id. On petition for review, the Board affirmed the initial 

decision. See Allen v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. DC0752-07-0694-C-5, 2013 WL 9668780 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 1, 

2013). Mr. Allen did not appeal the Board’s final decision. 

On December 31, 2014, Mr. Allen filed the current petition for enforcement—the fourth alleging that the agency breached the parties’ settlement agreement. In the 

petition, Mr. Allen sought to have the agreement deemed 

invalid and unenforceable for failure to satisfy the requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(ADEA) and the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act 

(OWBPA). J.A. 19–21; J.A. 27. According to Mr. Allen, 

“any ‘knowing and voluntary’ waiver of rights under the 

ADEA in a settlement agreement must specifically refer 

to the rights or claims under the ADEA in the paragraph 

that references the benefits that it covers and must refer 

to the ADEA by name in connection with the waiver.” 

J.A. 19. Mr. Allen alleged that the agreement was defective for failing to satisfy this requirement and, thus, must 

be set aside. Mr. Allen also alleged that the agency

materially breached the agreement by engaging in repeated acts of post-settlement retaliation. J.A. 28–31. 

Finally, he again argued that the agency materially 

breached the agreement by continuing to maintain documents related to his removal in 2007. J.A. 31–32. 

The administrative judge issued an initial decision 

denying Mr. Allen’s fourth petition for enforcement. Allen 

v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. DC-0752-07-0694-C-6,

2015 WL 4485924 (M.S.P.B. July 17, 2015). As to Mr. 

Allen’s challenge to the validity of the agreement, the 

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8 ALLEN v. DVA

administrative judge concluded there is nothing in the 

cited regulations to indicate the parties’ 2007 settlement 

agreement failed to comply with the requirements of the 

ADEA or OWBPA. The administrative judge went on to 

state that, in any event, even if Mr. Allen had a valid 

claim that the parties’ agreement was inconsistent with 

the requirements of the OWBPA, the Board’s compliance 

jurisdiction under a petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement does not cover issues as to the validity of 

that agreement. The judge also found that none of Mr. 

Allen’s examples of “retaliatory post-settlement behavior” 

constituted material breaches of the settlement agreement. And the judge found that the Board had already 

evaluated and rejected Mr. Allen’s argument as to the 

retention of removal-documents, barring him from again 

raising this argument under the collateral estoppel doctrine. 

Mr. Allen chose not to file a petition for review with 

the full Board and the administrative judge’s initial 

decision became the final decision of the Board. Mr. Allen 

now seeks review from this court. We have jurisdiction 

over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of Board decisions is limited by statute. 

Hamel v. President’s Comm’n on Exec. Exch., 987 F.2d 

1561, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“We review Board decisions 

under a very narrow standard.”). We can set a Board 

decision aside only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, 

rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Briggs 

v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing 

any errors in the Board’s decision. Harris v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

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ALLEN v. DVA 9

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, Mr. Allen contends that the administrative judge (1) erred in refusing to invalidate the settlement agreement; (2) erred in finding that the agency 

did not breach the agreement; and (3) was biased against 

Mr. Allen and deprived him of a fair opportunity to present his case in violation of his right to due process. 

Because the administrative judge’s decision was not 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

in conflict with law, and was supported by substantial 

evidence, we affirm. We address each of Mr. Allen’s 

arguments in turn.

I.

Mr. Allen first argues that the Board should have invalidated the parties’ settlement agreement because it 

does not meet the strict requirements set forth in the 

OWBPA regarding waiver of employment-related benefits. Pet. Inf. Br. at 1–2. We have previously noted, 

however, that a petitioner may not challenge the validity 

of a settlement agreement in an appeal arising from a

petition for enforcement. Harris, 142 F.3d at 1468 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998) (noting that, under Board precedent, the petitioner may not question validity of a settlement agreement in a petition for enforcement because “the Board 

only entertains allegations that a settlement agreement is 

invalid in a petition for review”); see also Hatcher v. Dep’t 

of Justice, 76 M.S.P.R. 97, 99 (M.S.P.B. 1997) (“It is wellsettled that an attack on the validity of a settlement 

agreement must be made in the form of a petition for 

review of the initial decision, and not in a petition for 

enforcement.”). 

The proper vehicle for Mr. Allen to challenge the validity of the agreement would have been in a petition for 

review of the September 6, 2007 initial decision in Allen v. 

Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, No. DC-0752-07-0694-I-1, 2007 

WL 4199611 (M.S.P.B. Sep. 6, 2007), that dismissed his 

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10 ALLEN v. DVA

appeal as settled. The administrative judge thus correctly 

recognized that it did not possess jurisdiction to entertain 

Mr. Allen’s validity challenge based on the alleged failure 

to satisfy the requirements of the OWBPA. 

II.

Mr. Allen also argues that the agency breached the 

agreement by engaging in a pattern of retaliatory actions 

designed to deny him the benefits of the settlement 

agreement in violation of the implied covenant of good 

faith. Pet. Inf. Br. 3–8. He identifies eight specific instances where the agency allegedly submitted incomplete, 

inaccurate, and untimely information in connection with 

his claims for benefits. Mr. Allen does not argue that 

each of these separate acts breach the express terms of 

the contract. Id. He instead contends that: 

When all eight (8) examples of retaliatory acts are 

reviewed together, they clearly demonstrate a pattern of animosity, hostility, and determination by 

Agency employees, specifically Agency HR employee Jeanette Anderson, to deprive the Petitioner of the benefits that he received as a bargain for 

in exchange for agreeing to withdraw his appeal of 

the Agency’s fabricated charges of misconduct. 

Id. at 4. Having reviewed the record, we agree with the 

administrative judge that Mr. Allen failed to establish

that the agency breached the agreement by engaging in 

bad faith retaliation. 

A settlement agreement is a contract, the interpretation of which is a matter of law reviewed by this court de 

novo. Harris, 142 F.3d at 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Whether 

a settlement agreement has been breached is a factual 

finding, which we review for substantial evidence. See 

Thomas v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 124 F.3d 1439, 

1441–42 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Every contract contains an 

implied covenant that the parties fulfill their respective 

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ALLEN v. DVA 11

contractual obligations in good faith. See Link v. Dep’t of 

the Treasury, 51 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, a 

party breaches its obligation of good faith and fair dealing 

by acting in bad faith with respect to a settlement term. 

Id. “Bad faith” is not simply bad judgment or negligence 

but instead implies conscious wrongdoing because of 

dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. See Silva v. U.S. 

Postal Service, 59 M.S.P.R. 268, 272 (1993) (quoting 

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.), aff’d, 40 F.3d 1250 (Fed.

Cir. 1994) (Table)).

Without any citation to evidence in the record, Mr. Allen argues “[t]he [a]gency’s ‘bad faith’ is embedded in the 

fact that Agency Office of Resolution Management employees are still angry and humiliated that it had to 

resolve [his] appeal of his wrongful termination based on 

fabricated charges of misconduct by allowing him to be 

reinstated, resign, give him a ‘clean record’, and access to 

employment related benefits that he was entitled to claim 

and receive, rather than end his employment based on 

fabricated charges of misconduct.” Pet. Inf. Br. at 4. The 

record on appeal, however, shows that Mr. Allen only 

made allegations that isolated actions of incorrect and/or 

delayed processing of benefits claims were purposeful; he 

did not support those bare allegations with any actual 

evidence of conscious wrongdoing. Although Mr. Allen 

argues the administrative judge failed to properly consider all material and relevant facts, he does not identify the 

specific facts of dishonest purpose that he believes the 

administrative judge overlooked. Accordingly, Mr. Allen 

has not carried his burden of demonstrating error in the 

administrative judge’s failure to find bad faith. 

The administrative judge also properly concluded that 

Mr. Allen is precluded from once again relitigating the 

agency’s retention of removal documents. See Stephen 

Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enter., Inc., 702 F.3d 640, 644 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The doctrine of issue preclusion, or 

collateral estoppel, protects the finality of judgments by 

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12 ALLEN v. DVA

preclud[ing] relitigation in a second suit of issues actually 

litigated and determined in the first suit.” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). We already affirmed 

the Board’s prior application of collateral estoppel to bar 

Mr. Allen’s challenge to the retention of removal-related 

documents. See Allen, 420 F. App’x at 991. 

We, therefore, cannot conclude that the administrative judge’s decision rejecting Mr. Allen’s claims of breach 

of the settlement agreement is arbitrary, capricious, or 

unsupported by substantial evidence.1

III.

Last, Mr. Allen claims that the administrative judge

was biased against him and violated his right to due 

process. Pet. Inf. Br. at 9–12. In support of his claim of 

bias, Mr. Allen cites the administrative judge’s refusal to 

 

1 Mr. Allen also appears to argue that, alternatively, the settlement agreement is invalid because the agency’s post-settlement actions demonstrate that the agency 

engaged in bad faith when it negotiated the settlement

terms. Pet. Inf. Br. at 4. He urges that the agency “made 

illusory promises designed to entice [him] into settling 

their dispute and once he withdrew his right to a hearing, 

the [a]gency’s bargain, the [a]gency intended to deny him 

the benefit of his bargain.” Pet Inf. Reply Br. at 24–25. 

To the extent that this is a distinct invalidity argument 

based on “bad faith” in the formation of the contract, 

rather than a post-settlement breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith, it is similarly flawed for lack of 

jurisdiction in this petition for enforcement. We also note 

that these bald allegations of bad faith, unsupported by 

any corroborating evidence, fall far short of meeting the 

“heavy burden” to prove that the settlement agreement 

was invalid. Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 

F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982).

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ALLEN v. DVA 13

hold both an evidentiary hearing and obtain a handwriting expert to authenticate the signatures on four declarations of Ms. Anderson submitted by the agency in 

response to Mr. Allen’s various petitions for enforcement. 

Id. Because of the perceived bias by the administrative 

judge, Mr. Allen requests this court remand his case for 

review by an impartial “Special Panel” rather than the 

Board. Id. at 8–9. 

According to Mr. Allen, the signatures in each of Ms. 

Anderson’s declarations are different, thus indicating that

each declaration must not have been signed by Ms. Anderson. Id. at 9. Mr. Allen contends this is evidence that 

the agency engaged in fraud upon the Board. Id. Mr. 

Allen argues the administrative judge’s determination 

that the signatures appear sufficiently similar to indicate 

they were signed by the same person is “erroneous and an 

attempt to conceal the errors in adjudication that have 

been intentionally committed at the [Board] in an effort to 

bind [Mr. Allen] to an invalid settlement agreement 

because of the costs financially to the [a]gency, as well as 

the reputations of the [agency] and [Board], if the [Board] 

dare overturn the parties’ 2007 settlement agreement.” 

Id.

To establish bias by the administrative judge or the 

Board, the appellant must make a showing of “a 

deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make 

fair judgment impossible[.]” Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 

287 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Here, as in Mr. 

Allen’s previous appeal to this court, Allen, 420 F. App’x 

at 989, his allegations of bias are nothing more than 

assertions of abuse of discretion and legal error. In any 

event, they lack merit. 

There is no right to an evidentiary hearing in a petition for enforcement, and the decision to hold such a 

hearing is within the sound discretion of the Board. See 5 

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14 ALLEN v. DVA

C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(3); see also Allen, 420 F. App’x at 

989. Mr. Allen’s argument that the judge was required to 

have a handwriting expert review the contested signatures pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) is also 

misplaced because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 

apply to Board hearings. Yanopoulos v. Department of 

Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 471 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Regardless, Mr. 

Allen has not established that the perceived inconsistencies relate to a material issue of fact in his petition for 

enforcement. 

Mr. Allen has also not shown how the administrative 

judge’s exercise of discretion is evidence of favoritism or 

antagonism, and so he does not come close to meeting the 

high standard set out in Bieber. The record in the present case establishes that the administrative judge applied settled law to the facts of Mr. Allen’s case, and that 

his conclusions based on those facts were supported by 

substantial evidence. Mr. Allen has, therefore, not shown 

that the administrative judge was biased against him or 

that his right to due process was violated.2

 

2 Mr. Allen dedicates much of his argument to recounting the alleged bias of the administrative judge that 

he previously accused of bias in Allen, 420 F. App’x 980. 

Pet. Inf. Br. at 10–11. However, Mr. Allen does not

demonstrate why the actions of the previous administrative judge should be attributed to the administrative 

judge presiding over the petition that is the subject of this 

appeal and, in any event, this court already considered 

those allegations of bias and found them without merit. 

Id. at 989.

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ALLEN v. DVA 15

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised in Mr. 

Allen’s informal brief. We find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision of the Board is affirmed.3

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs awarded to the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

 

3 We have also considered both of Mr. Allen’s belated motions filed on May 26, 2016 and find them to be 

without merit. In the first motion, Mr. Allen seeks to 

have his appeal transferred to the District Court for the 

District of Columbia on the grounds that we (1) lack 

jurisdiction over his appeal and (2) have exhibited such 

extreme bias against him in the past that we are incapable of issuing an impartial decision in this case. In the 

second motion, Mr. Allen seeks to withdraw his purported 

challenge that the allegedly retaliatory post-settlement 

acts were motivated by illegal discrimination under Title 

VII on the grounds that we lack jurisdiction over that 

issue. As to the jurisdictional issue, we have reviewed the 

available record and find that the illegal discrimination 

Mr. Allen now references was neither put forth as a basis 

for his petition for review nor in his appeal to this court. 

Thus, this appeal is not excluded from our jurisdiction as 

one of discrimination pursuant to the provisions of 5 

U.S.C. §§ 7702, 7703(b)(1), and we retain exclusive jurisdiction. See Meehan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 718 F.2d 1069, 

1074 (Fed. Cir. 1983). As to Mr. Allen’s allegations of this 

court’s bias, we find that, like his prior allegations of bias 

against the Board and its administrative judges, they too 

lack any merit. We, therefore, deny Mr. Allen’s request to 

transfer his appeal. 

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