Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04150/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04150-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Air Force Logistics Command
Appellee
Department of the Air Force
Appellee
Hill Air Force Base
Appellee
Delbert Rasmussen
Appellant
United States Department of Defense
Appellee

Document Text:

Fl .u .u .u 

United Stat~ Court of App~!--. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Te,.l'l r ·-~-.,_;~ 

DELBERT RASMUSSEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR 

FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND, HILL 

AIR FORCE BASE, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Office 

of Personnel Management, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APR2 4 i992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEE 

Clerk 

No. 91-4150 

(D.C. No. 90-CV-lSJ) 

(Dist. of Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRE'IT and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Delbert Rasmussen appeals from an order of the district court 

granting summary judgment in favor of the Department o f the Air 

Force, Air Force Logistic Command, Hill Air Force Base, and the 

Department of Defense, Office of Personnel Management, hereinafter 

collectively referred to as appellees. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes o f establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-4150 Document: 010110243069 Date Filed: 04/24/1992 Page: 1
Rasmussen is a retired army major employed as a civilian by 

the Air Force at Hill Air Force Base. During 1988 and 1989, 

Rasmussen applied for two jobs at the Base . He was not hired for 

either job. Rasmussen then filed a grievance. On January 12, 

1990, the Air Force issued a decision letter denying Rasmussen's 

grievance. 

On February 12, 1990, Rasmussen filed this action, alleging 

age and sex discrimination and violations of the Veterans 

Preference Act. He did not name the Secretary of the Air Force as 

a defendant. In September, 1990, appellees moved to dismiss and 

for summary judgement, alleging that Rasmussen had failed to name 

a proper party, the Secretary of the Air Force, in accordance with 

42 U.S . C. § 2000e-16{c). In response, Rasmussen argued that he 

should be allowed to amend his complaint to name the Secretary o f 

the Air Force as a defendant and that the amendment should relate 

back to the original filing date of his complaint. 

In its order denying Rasmussen's request to amend and 

granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, the court found: 

Section 2000e-16{c) requires the action to be filed 

within thirty days of the final Department [Air Force] 

decision. The final Department decision was issued 

January 12, 1990 . The Department was not served until 

June 7, 1990. Even if notice to the Department could be 

imputed to the Secretary, such notice to the Department 

did not come within the required statutory period. 

* * * 

In the instant case plaintiff has not raised any 

defense or excuse for his failure to name and serve the 

appropriate party within the statutory period which 

would justify the application of equitable tolling. 

-2 -

Appellate Case: 91-4150 Document: 010110243069 Date Filed: 04/24/1992 Page: 2
(R., Memorandum Opinion and Order, pp. 6 and 8). 

On appeal, Rasmussen contends that "the lower court abused 

its discretion by failing to determine, in the alternative, either 

that service upon the Department of the Air Force was effective, 

even though the Secretary of the Air Force was not named, or 

allowing [him] to amend his complaint to specifically designate 

the name Secretary of the Air Force and to allow that amendment to 

relate back to the original filing date of February 12, 1990." 

(Brief of Appellant at p. 4). 

We review a grant of summary judgment under the same standard 

applied by the district court. Lucas v. Mountain States Tel . & 

Tel., 909 F.2d 419, 420 (10th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment "shall 

be rendered forthwith if ... there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the evidence 

in the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

the motion. Lucas, supra, at p. 420. 

We have heretofore recognized that the thirty day time 

limitation of § 2000e-16(c) is not jurisdictional and may be 

subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Johnson v. 

U.S. Postal Service, 861 F.2d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir. 1988) , cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989), quoting, Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 

1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984). However, "[f]ederal courts have 

typically extended equitable relief only sparingly." Irwin v. 

Veterans Administration, 111 S. Ct . 453, 457 (1990). 

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Appellate Case: 91-4150 Document: 010110243069 Date Filed: 04/24/1992 Page: 3
In Irwin, the Court, in holding that no basis existed for 

equitably tolling§ 2000e - 16(c) 's thirty day time limitation, 

opined: 

We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where 

the claimant actively pursued his judicial remedies by 

filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, 

or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by 

his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing 

deadline to pass. We have generally been much less 

forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant 

failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal 

rights ... [and] the principles of equitable tolling 

described above do not extend to what is at best a 

garden variety claim of excusable neglect. 

111 S. Ct. at 457-8. 

We agree with the district court that Rasmussen "has not 

raised any defense or excuse for his failure to name and serve t he 

appropriate party within the statutory p e riod which would justify 

the application of equitable t olling," supra. Mo reover, inasmuch 

as the principles of equitable tolling 11 do not extend to what i s 

at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglec t," Irwin, 

supra, we hold that the district court did not e rr in g r anting 

summary judgment in favor of appellees based on Rasmussen's 

failure to file his complaint within the thirty day time 

limitation pe riod of§ 2000e-16 (c). 

AFFIRMED. 

-4-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Se nio r Unite d States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-4150 Document: 010110243069 Date Filed: 04/24/1992 Page: 4