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Parties Involved:
Heartland Plymouth Court MI, LLC
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-1034 September Term, 2015

 FILED ON: MAY 3, 2016

HEARTLAND PLYMOUTH COURT MI, LLC, D/B/A/ HEARTLAND HEALTH CARE 

CENTER - PLYMOUTH COURT,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 15-1045 

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order 

of the National Labor Relations Board

Before: BROWN and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This petition for review and cross-application for enforcement of an order of the National 

Labor Relations Board (Board) was considered on the record and the briefs of the parties. See 

FED. R. APP. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 34(j). The court has accorded the issues full consideration 

and has determined they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the 

reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for review be GRANTED and the Board’s 

cross-application for enforcement be DENIED. 

Heartland Plymouth Court is a 109-bed healthcare facility that provides long-term care and 

rehabilitation for patients in Plymouth, Michigan. SEIU Healthcare Michigan (“the Union”) 

represents a unit of some of the facility’s full-time and part-time employees, including the dietary 

staff. In September 2011, in response to a lowered patient census, Heartland reduced and 

reallocated the hours of its dietary employees. Management and the Union held several meetings 

before the Union filed a grievance claiming Heartland violated their collective bargaining 

USCA Case #15-1034 Document #1611466 Filed: 05/03/2016 Page 1 of 3
agreement (CBA) by reducing employee hours. The Union sought arbitration, and the arbitrator 

ruled for Heartland on all counts, finding the reduction violated no clause in the CBA. The 

Board reversed. After declining to defer to the arbitrator’s decision, the Board applied its “clear 

and unmistakable waiver” doctrine to find Heartland had an obligation to bargain over the effects

of its decision even though Heartland was free under the CBA to decide to reduce hours without 

bargaining.

As we have noted several times, there is a “fundamental and long-running disagreement” 

between this court and the Board as to the appropriate approach by which to determine “whether 

an employer has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act when it refuses to 

bargain with its union over a subject allegedly contained in a collective bargaining agreement.” 

Enloe Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 433 F.3d 834, 835 (2005). The Board insists such questions turn on 

whether the Union “clearly and unmistakably” waived its bargaining rights on the subject 

through the CBA, but we have repeatedly held “the proper inquiry is simply whether the subject 

that is the focus of the dispute is ‘covered by’ the agreement.” Id. at 838; see, e.g., S. Nuclear 

Operating Co. v. NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2008); NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 

F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under our precedent, if a subject is covered by the contract, then 

the employer generally has no ongoing obligation to bargain with its employees about that 

subject during the life of the agreement. See U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d at 836-37. 

Here, the Board refused to follow our controlling precedent and instead determined the 

Union had not clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the effects of Heartland’s 

decision to reduce employee hours. See Heartland-Plymouth Court MI, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 

155 (2013). The Board’s refusal to adhere to our precedent dooms its decision before this court. 

See Enloe, 433 F.3d at 838 (noting that the “Board’s implementation of its [clear and 

unmistakable waiver] policy is stalemated” by our precedent unless and until the Board seeks 

certiorari). We are free to interpret the contract’s language de novo. See id. at 839 n.4. In doing 

so here, we conclude the plain language of the CBA extinguishes the Union’s right to bargain 

over the subject of employee hours—including any effects of an hourly reduction. The CBA’s 

“Management Rights” clause vests Heartland with the right to “determine and change starting 

times, quitting times and shifts.” J.A. 152. Moreover, “[i]t would be rather unusual . . . to 

interpret a contract as granting an employer the unilateral right to make a particular decision but 

as reserving a union’s right to bargain over the effects of that decision” without “some language 

or bargaining history to support the proposition that the parties intended to treat the issues 

separately.” Enloe, 433 F.3d at 839. No such evidence is found here. 

The Board undoubtedly erred under our precedent by refusing to apply our contract coverage

approach to the parties’ dispute—when the plain language of the CBA clearly authorizes 

Heartland to reduce hours without the need to bargain over the decision or its effects. Because 

application of the contract coverage rule resolves this case, we have no reason to reach the 

parties’ arguments concerning the Board’s decision not to defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation 

of the CBA or whether the Board’s remedy was appropriate. For the foregoing reasons, we grant 

the employer’s petition for review and deny the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. 

Pursuant to D.C. CIRCUIT RULE 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

USCA Case #15-1034 Document #1611466 Filed: 05/03/2016 Page 2 of 3
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any 

timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R.

41(a)(1). 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Ken Meadows

 Deputy Clerk

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