Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01285/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01285-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. Baires
Defendant
James E. Bryant
Plaintiff
Ken Clark
Defendant
J. Lias
Defendant
J. Nesmith
Defendant
L. Smart
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES E. BRYANT,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEN CLARK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01285-GBC PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM 

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff James E. Bryant (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently pending before the Court

is the complaint, filed July 23, 2009. (Doc. 1.) 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading standard

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555

(2007)). 

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires

the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint [that]

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations

contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1949. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

II. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff is in the custodyof the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and

is housed at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran. On August 2, 2006, inmate

Jackson was assigned be Plaintiff’s cellmate. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10.) Inmate Jackson asked Plaintiff for help

with his appeal and Plaintiff responded that he wouldn’t help Jackson across the street, the State

should have killed him instead of sentencing him to twenty five to life. Plaintiff then told inmate

Jackson, “I guess you’ll try and kill me since the staff around here tell everyone I’m gay.” (Id., ¶ 11.) 

Inmate Jackson began to jump on his bed until he was removed from the cell byDefendant Nesmith. 

(Id.) 

On August 6, 2006, Defendant Nesmith wrote a confidential chrono stating that Plaintiff had

attempted to engage in sex games with his cellmate, inmate Jackson, and that Plaintiff had stated he

was going to beat up and rape his cellmate. (Id., p. 30.) The chrono was placed in Plaintiff’s central

file and inmate Jackson was listed as an enemy of Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was placed in

administrative segregation (“ad seg”) based upon his being perceived as a threat to the safety and

security of the institution. (Id., ¶ 14, p. 31.) On August 7, 2006, Defendant Smart came to ad seg

for a review and ordered Plaintiff to remain in ad seg and to be housed and exercised alone pending

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the ICC review. (Id., ¶ 16.) 

On August 9, 2006, Defendant Smart appeared at the ICC review. (Id., ¶ 17.) On August

18, 2006, a rule violation report was issued charging Plaintiff with threatening an inmate. (Id., ¶ 18.) 

On September 15, 2006, Defendant Baires conducted a disciplinary hearing on the rule violation and

Plaintiff was found not guilty due to lack of corroborating evidence. (Id., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff continued

to be housed in ad seg due to enemy concerns. (Id., p. 52.) 

On October 19, 2006, Plaintiff appeared before the ICC. (Id., ¶ 22.) On January 18, 2007,

Plaintiff requested documents be removed from his central file. Defendant Baires told Plaintiff that

only the documents ordered to be removed by Defendant Smart would be removed from the file. 

(Id., ¶ 25.) On November 6, 2006, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Clark expressing his concern of

being housed alone due to his asthma and heart condition. (Id., ¶ 26.) On January 25, 2007, Plaintiff

appeared before another ICC committee. Although Plaintiff requested that he be transferred to

another prison, he was released from ad seg into D facility and was ordered to be housed alone

because he was determined to be a predator of his cellmates. (Id.)

On February 9, 2007, Plaintiff was told he was to be moved to the yard. A short time later

Plaintiff was told bySgt. Munoz that Defendant Lias had said he was to be single celled and Plaintiff

was ordered to remain in ad seg. (Id., ¶ 28.) On February 13, 2007, the lock up order was rescinded

and Plaintiff was moved to D facility on February 15, 2007. (Id., ¶ 29.) On February 23, 2007,

Plaintiff appeared before the UCC committee, chaired by Defendant Smart, and was designated to

have an “R” (sex) and “S” (single cell) suffix on his file and no gate passes for work or placement

in building one because Plaintiff could be a predator on inmates housed there. (Id., ¶ 30.) Plaintiff 1

alleges that he suffered a heart attack which required open heart surgery from the “undue stressful

situations, assaults by staff and inmates orchestrated by staff” and mental and emotional stress. (Id.,

¶ 31.) The remaining fourteen pages of the complaint consist mainly of legal argument and case

citations. 

///

Plaintiff refers to Exhibit L. However there is no Exhibit L filed with the complaint.

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First Cause of Action

Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in restrictive custody for 194 days without procedural

safeguards required by Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976) in violation of due

process and Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Defendants engaged in retaliatory

conduct because he has been active in pursuing the rights of other prisoners which has made him

unpopular with prison staff and “a bunch of [like minded] inmates.” (Id., p. 17.) Plaintiff contends

that if the report is to be believed he was placed in ad seg for protected conduct, talking about sex,

which was retaliatory conduct. (Id., p. 19.) 

Second Cause of Action

Plaintiff contends that his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments were

violated by leaving documents in his central file. Defendant Nesmith never observed any conduct

and knew the information was unreliable. Defendant Nesmith never complied with Plaintiff’s

repeated demands that a sex kit be required, and if Defendants thought such conduct had occurred

criminal charges would have been pursued. (Id., pp. 23, 24.) 

Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants Ken Clark, J. Lias, L. Smart, M. Baires, and J.

Nesmith. He is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the documents regarding this

incident and the “R” and “S” suffixes be removed from his central file and that he be allowed to

double cell with the inmate of his choice, and monetary damages. 

III. Discussion

A. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). In order to state a cause of action for a deprivation

of due process, a plaintiff must first identify a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. The

Due Process Clause does not confer a liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within a

prisoner’s imposed sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995). However, a state may

“create libertyinterests which are protected bythe Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. 

A prisoner has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause only where the restraint

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim as his complaint does not allege an interest protected

by the Due Process Clause.

 1. Administrative Segregation

The Due Process Clause does not “create a liberty interest in freedom from administrative

segregation.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated in part on

other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. Administrative segregation is the type of confinement that

should be reasonably anticipated by inmates at some point in their incarceration. Id. (quoting Hewitt

v. Helms, 459 U.S.460, 468 (1983)). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that prisoners have no liberty

interest in remaining free from administrative segregation or solitary confinement. See May v.

Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1997). 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Wright v. Enomoto, is misplaced. The finding of a liberty interest in

Wright was based upon the conditions that were presented to that court and did not establish a liberty

interest for all confinement in administrative segregation. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1091-92.

2. Reclassification

A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a particular classification while

incarcerated. Hernandez v. Johnson, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987). Since there is no

constitutional right to a particular classification while incarcerated, no liberty interests exists in

Plaintiff’s being assigned the “R” and “S” suffix.

3. False Reports

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to allege a liberty interest regarding the submission of

false reports against him, he fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Due Process Clause itself

does not contain any language that grants a broad right to be free from false accusations, but

guarantees certain procedural protections to defend against false accusations. Freeman v. Rideout,

808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986). However, “prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a

criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not

apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

///

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4. Expungement of Records from Plaintiff’s Central File

The Ninth Circuit has not found that prisoners have an independent right, grounded in the

Due Process Clause, to an accurate prison record. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318-19

(9th Cir. 1987); see Velasquez v. Woods 329 F.3d 420, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2003). As previously

stated, liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Plaintiff has alleged no facts with regard to the information

that Plaintiff seeks to have expunged or corrected in his central file that establish the existence of

a liberty interest entitling Plaintiff to due process. 

B. Retaliation

A viable claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment consists of five elements:

“(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonable advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that he was charged in a rule violation for protected

conduct. The allegation was that Plaintiff threatened to beat up and rape his cellmate. Directly

threatening harm is not activity protected under the First Amendment. Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d

824, 830 (9th Cir. 2008). Nor does Plaintiff link any Defendant to knowledge of any protected

conduct that would be sufficient to state a cognizable claim for a violation of the First Amendment. 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.

C. California Code of Regulations, Title 15

Section 1983 provides a cause of action where a state actor’s “conduct deprived the claimant

of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535

(1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)). There is no

independent cause of action for a violation of Title 15 regulations. See Davis v. Kissinger, No. CIV

S-04-0878 GEB DAD P, 2009 WL 256574, *12 n.4 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 3, 2009). “To the extent that

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the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond

that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, [s]ection 1983 offers no redress.” Sweaney v. Ada

County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90

F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996).

D. Fifth Amendment

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no one shall “be deprived of

life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law.” “[T]he Fifth Amendment’s due process clause

applies only to the federal government.” Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Since all Defendant’s in this action are state employees the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

does not apply.

E. Rule 18

Plaintiff may not pursue multiple, unrelated claims in this action. Pursuant to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, [a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim

may join, as independent or alternate claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against

Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims

against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a

multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners paythe required

filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals

that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff will not be permitted to proceed with a

“mishmash of a complaint,” id., and is cautioned that if his amended complaint fails to comply with

Rule 18(a), the Court will choose which claims will proceed and will dismiss out all unrelated

claims.

Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies described

in this order. Plaintiff is advised that the failure to comply with the Local Rules, the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the Court’s orders will result in Plaintiff’s amended complaint being stricken

from the record. Plaintiff is further warned that failure to take meaningful steps to obey the Court’s

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orders may result in this action being dismissed for failure to obey a court order. See Local Rule

110.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff shall state as briefly as possible the facts of his case,

describing how each defendant is involved, and Plaintiff shall not give any legal arguments or cite

to any cases or statutes. See Form Complaint, § IV, enclosed with this order. Finally, if Plaintiff

chooses to amend the complaint, the amended complaint may not exceed twenty pages in length, and

it will be stricken from the record if it violates this page limitation. 

V. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief for

a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within

thirty days. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the

nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at

607 (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights,

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Although accepted as true, the

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must

be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are

waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th

Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed July 23, 2009, is dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, 

a. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint;

b. The amended complaint shall not exceed twenty pages in length; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 5, 2011 

cm411 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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