Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00729/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00729-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David B. Long
Respondent
Cebram L. Roston
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CEBRAM L. ROSTON,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID B. LONG, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-00729-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Cebram L. Roston, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the California City 

Correctional Facility, brings the instant pro se habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge 

his 2012 conviction and sentence rendered in the Lake County Superior Court. Having read and 

considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court 

hereby DENIES the petition for the reasons set forth below. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal described the relevant facts as follows:

Jerry Maggio testified that on April 8, 2012, between 11:00 and 

11:30 p.m., he was standing outside the side of the Safeway in 

Clearlake eating some cereal. He noticed a car pull up to the front 

of the store and saw two people get out. Appellant, with whom 

Maggio had gone to high school, got out and walked toward the 

front of the store while the driver stood by the back of the vehicle.

About six minutes later, appellant walked up to Maggio and, without 

saying anything, punched him in the face. Maggio fell. Appellant 

grabbed his jacket with both hands, shook him, and said loudly, 

“Give me your money.” Maggio said his spine was injured and 

asked appellant not to hurt him. Appellant shook Maggio several 

more times, each time demanding money and each time Maggio 

saying he did not have any. Appellant reached into Maggio’s right 

pants pocket with his right hand and felt around, and shook Maggio 

several more times, lifting him more than a foot and a half off the 

ground and hitting his lower spine on the concrete. After the 

seventh shaking, appellant pulled out of Maggio’s right pocket a 

plastic Safeway shopping bag containing an insurance card, a bank 

card, some appointment cards, some receipts, a flashlight and a 

lighter. Appellant threw the bag to his right and Maggio’s bank 

card, driver[’]s license, two appointment cards and two receipts fell 

out. Appellant then reached into Maggio’s left pants pocket and 

ripped it upward, ripping the pants from the pocket to the leg area 

and across to the waist. Appellant shook Maggio again, Maggio 

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again said he had no money, and appellant ripped open Maggio’s 

jacket, which had been zipped and buttoned, and felt around the 

inside of the jacket. Appellant released Maggio, who fell to the 

ground, stepped to his right, picked up the plastic bag with Maggio’s 

belongings, and left in the car, which had pulled around from the 

parking lot. Maggio never got back his lighter, his flashlight, some 

of his appointment cards, his insurance card or his bank card. 

Although he initially testified only that appellant picked up the bag 

and took it with him when he left, he later testified that appellant 

also picked up the bank card that had fallen on the ground and took 

that as well.

Maggio got up and picked up a receipt he had seen fall out of 

appellant’s pocket, as well as two appointment cards that appellant 

had dropped. A woman who worked in the store approached and 

asked Maggio if he was okay and if he wanted to contact the police. 

He went into the store with her and she called the police, who 

arrived a few moments later. Maggio explained to Officer Cook 

what had happened. The officer left, then returned later and showed 

Maggio some photographs. Maggio identified appellant and gave 

Cook the receipt that appellant had dropped.

Maggio had not been drinking alcohol or taking any medication 

before the assault.

On cross examination, defense counsel elicited Maggio’s testimony 

that he had talked to Officer Cook and to the prosecutor the day 

before but did not discuss the questions he would be asked when he 

testified. Maggio had trouble remembering the specific 

conversations, saying he had spoken with the prosecutor more than 

once and with Cook more than five but not more than seven times, 

not six times, and finally estimating nine times. Maggio said Cook 

had talked to him the day before about 13 photographs that defense 

counsel showed him. He acknowledged having testified in an earlier 

proceeding that appellant lifted him off the ground at most six to 

eight inches, whereas at trial he said it was at least one and a half 

feet. Maggio testified that he had not taken any medication within 

the past 24 hours that might affect his ability to remember and 

communicate the events of April 8, 2012, including Vicodin or other 

pain killers. When defense counsel asked whether Maggio had been 

the victim of another assault, the court sustained the prosecutor’s 

relevance and Evidence Code section 352 objections.

Sandra Kirby, a Safeway employee, was in the parking lot around 

11:00 p.m. on April 8, 2012, returning her shopping cart after 

putting groceries in her car. She heard a person saying “I don’t have 

any money, dude” and looked over to see Maggio, whom she knew 

as a regular Safeway customer, being assaulted about 150 feet away. 

The assailant was bent over, holding Maggio’s jacket with both 

hands and “picking him up and slamming him on the ground.”

Kirby could not see who the assailant was or whether he was 

reaching into Maggio’s pocket. Kirby yelled “hey, stop” and turned 

around to get her cell phone from her car and call the police. She 

then saw the assailant run to the end of the parking lot, get in the 

passenger side of a car and leave.

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Kirby called to Maggio, who was standing and picking up a few 

cards that had been in his pocket, asking if he was alright. When 

she got over to him, Maggio was holding the side of his face; he 

asked if it was swollen because he had been punched. Maggio’s 

pants were torn along the seam by the pocket. Kirby and Maggio 

went into the store and Kirby called the police.

David Lewis, who was working as a checker at the Safeway on the 

night of April 8, 2012, testified that a large black male wearing a 

blue shirt with white lettering or design on the front bought some 

candy on his line that night. Lewis identified the receipt Maggio 

had given to Cook, which showed the time 11:22 p.m., as being the 

time when the man bought the items. The man did not appear to 

have been drinking. Lewis testified that it was possible appellant 

was the man he saw, but he saw too many faces each day to be sure.

Joseph Flores testified that he drove to Safeway with appellant on 

April 8. He parked in front of the store and appellant got out of the 

car. About eight or nine minutes later, Flores saw appellant hit a 

man at the corner of the store. The man fell to the ground.[FN 1] 

Flores pulled the car over and told appellant to stop; appellant got in, 

and they left. Flores asked appellant why he had beaten the man and 

appellant said he was “stressed out about needing money” and was 

“angry and took it out on the first person he seen.” Asked if he had 

told the police that appellant said “I’m mad and I need someone’s 

money,” Flores stated, “if that’s what’s in the report that’s—I guess 

that’s probably what I said, but, you know, he’s just stressed 

because he needed money, you know really.”

[FN 1:] When interviewed by the police that night, Flores said that 

appellant had knocked the man down and “started slamming him 

into the ground[]” but he testified that this was a bad choice of 

words; the man was holding onto appellant and appellant was 

“shaking him off.”

Flores had been convicted of two felonies, burglary in 1996 and 

receiving stolen property in 2007, and four misdemeanors, accessory 

after the fact in 2000, vandalism in 2003, automobile theft in 2005, 

and receiving stolen property in 2012. He was on probation at the 

time he testified. He had known appellant since he was a kid and 

did not want to see anything bad happen to him.

Police Officer Elvis Cook was dispatched to the Safeway about 

11:33 p.m. on April 8, where he interviewed Maggio, Kirby, and 

Lewis. Maggio, who appeared upset and distressed, had a cut on his 

lip and slight redness on his cheek and lip area, and his pants pocket 

was ripped open. He told Cook what had happened and identified 

his assailant as “Larry,” which the parties had stipulated was the 

name by which appellant was known in the community. From 

Maggio’s description, Cook believed he knew who the suspect was, 

so he returned to the police station and compiled a photographic 

lineup to show Maggio. He returned to the scene, and Maggio 

identified appellant’s photograph. During this second interview, 

Maggio gave Cook a Safeway receipt he said appellant had left at 

the scene.

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Cook went to Flores’s house, spoke with him and photographed his 

car, which was parked in front. He then went to appellant’s house, 

next door to Flores’s, arriving there about 1:05 or 1:10 a.m. on April 

9. Appellant was asleep when Cook arrived. Once woken, 

appellant showed signs of having consumed alcohol but did not 

appear highly intoxicated; his demeanor, balance and speech were 

“normal.” Appellant was wearing clothes that matched the 

description Maggio and Lewis had given to Cook. The police did 

not search appellant’s home, but saw a plastic Safeway bag in plain 

sight. None of the items Maggio reported being stolen were 

recovered.

Cook’s contact with appellant was captured on an audio recording, 

which was consistent with Cook’s description. Asked to tell Cook 

what happened at Safeway, appellant said, “I’m a little upset that my 

money wasn’t on my card and that was it. [¶] . . . [¶] I spent more, 

spent my, more money than I thought and . . . .” Cook queried, “So 

you were a little upset ‘cause you didn’t have any money?’”

Appellant replied, “Yes sir.” Appellant said he had drunk “[a]lmost 

a thirty pack” that night, commenting that it was his birthday. 

Appellant said he had walked to Safeway by himself. He initially 

said he did not buy anything, then when told that the store camera 

showed him buying something and Cook had the receipt, appellant 

said he bought Snickers bars.[FN 2] Appellant acknowledged 

pushing and hitting Maggio, grabbing him by the jacket and yelling 

at him, but did not remember what he yelled and denied taking 

anything from him.

[FN 2:] Cook’s statement about the camera was not true; it was a 

“ruse” to make appellant “more forthcoming.”

People v. Roston, No. A136743, 2014 WL 4088196, *1-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2014) (footnotes 

in original), Dkt. 9-15.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2012, a Lake County jury convicted Petitioner of robbery pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 211, and Petitioner subsequently admitted that he served a prior prison 

term within the meaning of California Penal Code § 667.5(b). CT 6-7. On September 26, 2012, 

the trial court sentenced Petitioner to six years in state prison. CT 314.

On March 14, 2013, Petitioner appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal. 

Dkt. 9, Ex. 3. On August 20, 2014, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction. Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *11.

On September 26, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court. Dkt. 9, Ex. 10. On November 19, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. 

Dkt. 9, Ex. 11.

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On February 17, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging: (1) his trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress Petitioner’s statement to police on 

the basis that it was obtained as a result of an unlawful warrantless entry into his home; and (2) the 

trial court erred by excluding evidence of Mr. Maggio’s prior accusations of being victimized, 

thereby violating Petitioner’s constitutional rights to cross-examine witnesses against him and 

present a defense. Dkt. 1 at 5. 

On May 1, 2015, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause. Dkt. 4. Respondent filed an 

Answer. Dkt. 9. Although given the opportunity to do so, Petitioner did not file a Traverse. The 

matter is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state prisoner “only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, 

a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a 

claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the 

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong 

applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, see Williams (Terry) v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of section 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently 

than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 

U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court 

authority, falling under the second clause of section 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the 

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governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may 

not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” 

Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. 

Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “a determination of a factual issue made 

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have the burden of 

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1).

Even if constitutional error is established, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 

532 U.S. 782, 795-96 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). 

On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating 

state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). When there is no 

reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to 

the last reasoned opinion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. 

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, a federal court will “look through” the 

unexplained orders of the state courts rejecting a petitioner’s claims and analyze whether the last 

reasoned opinion of the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. See Ylst, 501 

U.S. at 804-06; LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). The last reasoned 

decision in this case is the Court of Appeal’s unpublished disposition issued on August 20, 2014.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move 

to suppress his statement to the police on the basis that it was obtained as a result of an unlawful 

warrantless entry into his home. Dkt. 1 at 5. 

1. Background

As mentioned above, Officer Cook went to Petitioner’s home at about 1:05 or 1:10 a.m. on 

April 9, 2012. Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *3. Officer Cook recorded his interview of Petitioner, 

and the defense prepared a transcript of that recording for trial. CT 127-134. The transcript

reflected that the officers first made contact with Petitioner’s girlfriend, Ms. Canevari, at 

Petitioner’s home after knocking on the door, and that the following encounter occurred as 

follows:

(Knocking)

CANEVARI: Who is it?

COOK: Police Department.

CANEVARI: Yes?

COOK: Hello.

CANEVARI: Hi.

COOK: Is Larry here?

CANEVARI: He’s sleeping.

COOK: Can we talk to him? Where’s he at?

CANEVARI: Larry. Larry.

UNKNOWN: Ma’am.

COOK: Ma’am, do me a favour, step on out here.

UNKNOWN: Come on out.

CANEVARI: Larry.

COOK: Ma’am. Do me a favour.

UNKNOWN: Ma’am, ma’am. Come out here.

CANEVARI: Sorry. Uh.

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COOK: Larry, do me a favour, stand on up.

UNKNOWN: (Unintelligible)

UNKNOWN: Hey Larry.

COOK: Walk on out this way Larry. Don’t grab anything, 

don’t reach in your pockets.

CANEVARI: What the hell babe. What happened?

ROSTON: (Unintelligible) ---- (makes noise)

COOK: Do me a favour Larry, turn around, put your hands on 

the wall. Larry, put your hands behind your back.

CANEVARI: What happened? Please tell me.

UNKNOWN: We’ll tell you, hang on ma’am.

CT 127-28.

After Officer Cook read Petitioner his Miranda1rights, he asked Petitioner “what 

happened over at Safeway.” CT 129. Petitioner admitted that the night before, he had gone into 

the Safeway to buy something, but he did not have any money. CT 130. Petitioner stated that he 

was “a little upset that [his] money wasn’t on [his] card . . . .” CT 130. Petitioner claimed that he 

had been drinking because it was his birthday, and that he consumed “[a]lmost a thirty pack.” CT 

130. Petitioner then stated that when he walked outside the Safeway, he “hit a man.” CT 132. 

Petitioner said he knew the man because he went to school with him, and that his name was 

“Jerry.”

2 CT 132. Petitioner added that he “pushed [Mr. Maggio],” and caused Mr. Maggio to fall 

over. CT 132. Petitioner admitted to grabbing Mr. Maggio by the jacket and yelling at him, but 

Petitioner could not remember what he was yelling about. CT 133. Petitioner claimed that he did 

not take anything from Mr. Maggio. CT 133. Petitioner was then told he was being placed under 

arrest for assault and robbery. CT 134. None of the items Mr. Maggio complained of as being 

stolen were recovered. 2RT 420.

The state appellate court recited the following background facts relating to defense 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 As mentioned above, the victim’s name is Jerry Maggio.

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counsel’s motion to suppress:

On July 9, 2012, appellant filed a motion in the trial court seeking to 

suppress all evidence obtained from him on the grounds that the 

police lacked probable cause to detain appellant and unreasonably 

acted without a warrant. On July 12, defense counsel told the court 

she had erred in not filing the motion earlier and asked the court to 

hear it despite it being untimely. The court questioned whether it 

had jurisdiction to do so. After discussing the matter with appellant 

and defense co-counsel, appellant’s attorney stated that they had 

decided to withdraw the motion to suppress because the argument 

was “legally weak” in light of “the underlying legal authority for 

exigent circumstances in pursuit of a fleeing felon.” Counsel instead 

pursued an alternative argument that appellant did not validly waive 

his Miranda rights.

Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *3 (footnote omitted). Defense counsel also informed the trial court 

that Petitioner “concur[red]” in her decision to withdraw the aforementioned motion to suppress. 

1RT 71. The trial court subsequently acknowledged defense counsel’s request to withdraw the 

motion to suppress, and the motion was withdrawn. 1RT 70-72. The court then conducted a 

hearing on whether there was a compliance with Miranda to show that the aforementioned 

statements during Officer Cook’s interview were given voluntarily by Petitioner by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 1RT 72-115. After listening to the testimony of Officer Cook and 

the arguments of counsel, the trial court found that Petitioner’s aforementioned statements were 

voluntary based on finding of a valid implied waiver, and thus determined that they were 

admissible. 1RT 116-121.

2. State Court Opinion

The state appellate court applied the standard of review set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *3-8. The state appellate court relied on the rule that when a 

defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon defense counsel’s failure 

to bring a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, he is required to 

demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment claim had merit. Id. at *4 (citing People v. Frye, 18 Cal.

4th 894, 989 (1998), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390, 421, n.22 

(2009)). The state appellate court emphasized that there are several exceptions to the warrant 

requirement, stating as follows:

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“‘It is axiomatic that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil 

against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” 

(Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748.) A warrantless entry 

is ‘presumptively unreasonable.’ (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 

U.S. 573, 586.) This presumption can be overcome by a showing of 

one of the few ‘specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions’ to the warrant requirement (Katz v. United States (1967) 

389 U.S. 347, 357), such as ‘“hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or 

imminent destruction of evidence, . . . or the need to prevent a 

suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other 

persons inside or outside the dwelling”’ (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 

495 U.S. 91, 100). The United States Supreme Court has indicated 

that entry into a home based on exigent circumstances requires 

probable cause to believe that the entry is justified by one of these 

factors . . . . (Ibid.)” (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 667, 676.)

“[I]n appropriate circumstances the fresh pursuit of a fleeing felon 

may constitute a sufficiently grave emergency to justify an 

exception to the warrant requirement and make it constitutionally 

reasonable for the police to enter a private dwelling without prior 

authorization of a magistrate. (See, e.g., Coolidge v. New 

Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 481; Warden v. Hayden (1967) 387 

U.S. 294, 298-299; People v. Wetzel (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 104, 108 & 

fn. 4; People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal. 3d 871, 882.) ‘There is no 

ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, 

and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be 

measured by the facts known to the officers.’ (People v. Ramey

(1976)[ ]16 Cal. 3d 263, 276.)” (People v. Escudero (1979) 23 Cal. 

3d 800, 808-809.) “[A]lthough ‘fresh pursuit’ of a fleeing felon 

must be substantially continuous and afford the law enforcement 

authorities no reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant, it is not 

necessary that the suspect be kept physically in view at all times.”

(Escudero, at p. 810.)

Id. The state appellate court questioned whether the fresh-pursuit-of-a-fleeing-felon exception 

applied, stating:

It is questionable whether the “fresh pursuit” doctrine would apply 

in the present case, because “there was no immediate or continuous

pursuit of the [suspect] from the scene of a crime.” (Welsh v. 

Wisconsin, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 753.) There was an immediate, 

continuous and expeditious investigation that led the police to 

appellant’s home within a short time, but the “pursuit”

characterization is not accurate.

Id. at *5. However, the state appellate court found that the officers’ warrantless entry into 

Petitioner’s home was justified based on Ms. Canevari’s consent and the exigent circumstances 

exception, and, thus, Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he had a meritorious Fourth 

Amendment claim. Id. at *5-8. In doing so, the state appellate court stated as follows:

Nevertheless, appellant has not demonstrated he had a meritorious 

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Fourth Amendment claim. First, the warrantless entry may have 

been permissible due to the implied consent of appellant’s girlfriend, 

Canevari. Consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement, and that consent may be given 

by a third party “‘who possesses common authority over the 

premises.’” (People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.

App. 4th 1183, 1198, quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 

177, 181.) It may be inferred from the fact Canevari and appellant 

lived together that Canevari possessed authority to consent to the 

officers’ entry into their joint home. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.

4th at p. 990.) Consent to enter may be express or implied. (Ibid.)

Respondent maintains that it is inferable from the transcript of the

recorded encounter at appellant’s home that Canevari permitted the 

officers to enter and led them to the bedroom where appellant was 

sleeping. The transcript reflects that when Canevari answered the 

door, Cook asked for appellant and she said he was sleeping. Cook 

asked where he was, Canevari said appellant’s name, Cook asked 

Canevari to “step on out here,” Canevari said appellant’s name 

again, Cook and another officer repeated, “ma’am, come out here,”

Canevari said, “sorry,” and Cook asked appellant to stand up. The 

recording of this exchange demonstrates that it happened quickly; 

less than 16 seconds passed from when Canevari answered the door 

to when Cook asked appellant to stand up. The volume of the 

voices on the tape indicate Canevari was close by the officers. 

These facts suggest that it was not far from the door of the house to 

where appellant was sleeping, and that Canevari accompanied the 

officers from one location to the other. There is no indication 

Canevari said anything to suggest she did not want the officers to 

enter the home. On the other hand, there is no way to tell from the 

transcript or the recording itself whether Canevari’s nonverbal 

conduct expressed any desire to permit or prevent entry, and it is 

impossible to tell what was happening when the officers were asking 

her to “come out here.”

If Canevari consented to the entry, of course, appellant’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel would fail because a suppression 

motion would not have succeeded. But even the ambiguity of the 

recording undermines appellant’s claim: Had the suppression 

motion been made, the prosecution may well have been able to 

present other evidence demonstrating consent, such as testimony 

from one or more of the officers. In this context, it is appellant’s 

burden to demonstrate the absence of consent.

Respondent also urges that the police entry into appellant’s home 

was justified under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the 

warrant requirement. “‘“[E]xigent circumstances” means an 

emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent 

danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the 

imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence. There is 

no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances 

exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must 

be measured by the facts known to the officers.’” (People v. 

Williams (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 1112, 1138, quoting People v. Ramey, 

supra, 16 Cal. 3d at p. 276.) The relevant inquiry is “whether, in 

light of all of the circumstances, there was an objectively urgent 

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need to justify a warrantless entry.” (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 

Cal. 4th 1136, 1160-1161.) “Generally, a court will find a 

warrantless entry justified if the facts available to the officer at the 

moment of the entry would cause a person of reasonable caution to 

believe that the action taken was appropriate.” (Id. at p. 1157.)

Here, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the 

circumstances justified the warrantless entry. By proceeding to 

appellant’s home as soon as he determined that appellant was the 

suspect in the assault and robbery, within two hours of the incident, 

Cook minimized appellant’s opportunity to eliminate evidence of 

the offense. In fact, appellant was found wearing clothes that fit the 

description given by Maggio and Lewis of what the assailant was 

wearing, adding further weight to appellant’s identification as the 

perpetrator. (See, People v. Escudero, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at pp. 810-

811, fn. 6 [distinctive shirt worn by suspect not significantly less 

‘disposable’ than narcotics or other contraband].) Appellant argues 

that the fact Cook returned to the police station to prepare a 

photographic lineup demonstrates there would have been time to 

obtain a search warrant, but the lineup permitted Maggio to make 

the identification that gave Cook probable cause to arrest appellant. 

Prior to this photographic identification, Cook “thought” he knew 

the person Maggio was describing, but it was the photographic 

identification that confirmed Cook’s suspicion. It does not appear 

there was “unjustified delay” during which an arrest warrant could 

have been obtained. (See, People v. Williams, supra, 48 Cal. 3d at 

p. 1139.)

Id. at *5-6 (footnote omitted). The state appellate court further found that there was no prejudice, 

explaining:

In any event, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether appellant 

in fact would have prevailed if his attorney had pursued the motion 

to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, nor whether counsel’s 

choice to drop the motion was reasonable, because there is no 

reasonable probability the result at trial would have been more 

favorable to appellant if his statements had been excluded.

With respect to the assault, the evidence against appellant—without 

consideration of his own statements to Cook—was overwhelming. 

Maggio, who had gone to school with appellant, identified him as 

the assailant; Flores saw appellant assaulting Maggio. Appellant’s 

argument at trial was that he assaulted Maggio but did not rob him. 

Thus, the only real question is the significance of appellant’s 

statements to Cook on the issue of intent to rob.

Appellant argues that his statement was the crux of the prosecution’s 

case, emphasized repeatedly in the prosecutor’s closing argument as 

establishing appellant’s intent to rob Maggio and also providing the 

basis for the prosecutor to argue that appellant’s lies—telling Cook, 

for example, that he walked to Safeway alone rather than having 

driven with Flores, and saying he had not bought anything until 

Cook said the police had evidence he had done so—were evidence 

of his guilt. The latter point is of little consequence in terms of 

prejudice, as the lies did not in any way bear on appellant’s intent 

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and, as we have said, the evidence that appellant was the assailant 

was overwhelming. As to appellant’s intent to rob Maggio, even 

without his own statements, the prosecution’s case was very strong. 

Maggio, of course, described being robbed, and his story was 

corroborated by his torn pocket. Kirby heard Maggio yelling that he 

did not have any money, further corroborating that a robbery was in 

progress. And Flores’s description of what appellant said when 

Flores asked him why he had assaulted Maggio was even more 

damning than appellant’s own statement. Appellant’s statement to 

Cook was that he was “a little upset” that he did not have any money 

on his card. Flores initially testified that when he asked why 

appellant had assaulted Maggio, appellant said he was “stressed out 

about needing money” and was “angry” and “took it out on the first 

person” he saw. Flores then acknowledged that he could have told 

the police appellant had said, “I’m mad, . . . I need someone’s 

money.”

Appellant argues that if his statement had been suppressed, he would 

not have had to take the stand to explain it. As appellant did not 

testify, this argument is difficult to comprehend.

Appellant also argues that if his statement had been suppressed he 

would have been free to attack Flores’s credibility, suggesting that 

defense counsel did not vigorously challenge Flores’s credibility 

because Flores’s testimony was consistent with appellant’s own 

statements. Further, appellant urges that in the absence of his 

statement, the defense could have highlighted Flores’s motivation to 

testify against appellant in exchange for being given immunity from 

prosecution for his own role in the robbery. As it was, according to 

appellant, the jury heard only the prosecution’s argument that while 

Flores’s criminal history might undermine his credibility in general, 

his motivation as appellant’s friend was to minimize appellant’s 

conduct, so that anything he said against appellant should be 

considered trustworthy.

The prosecutor reminded the jury of the stipulation it had heard 

setting forth Flores’s criminal history, and explained that this history 

provided “insight into the guy” to help the jury decide whether he 

was “completely believable.” The prosecutor explained that juries 

are informed of a witnesses “moral turpitude crimes” because “the 

law says if you commit a moral turpitude crime conduct or 

conviction that means you might have a readiness to do evil,” which 

“bears directly on this guy’s credibility.” The prosecutor stated that 

Flores’s record would make it easy to decide not to believe anything 

he said, and asked the jurors not to do this, pointing out that Flores 

made clear his interest in not hurting appellant.

Perhaps defense counsel could have attempted to persuade the jury 

that Flores’s record made him an entirely untrustworthy witness, 

motivated to testify against appellant. But Flores’s testimony 

completely supported the prosecutor’s characterization. Flores 

plainly did not want to testify against appellant. Although he related 

appellant’s statement about needing money, he tried to minimize 

what the prosecutor wanted him to say—that appellant said he 

needed “someone’s” money—acknowledging that “if that’s in the 

[police] report . . . I guess that’s probably what I said” but reiterating 

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that appellant was stressed and angry about needing money in 

general. Flores testified, “he was angry that night and it was bad 

time, you know. And shit happens, excuse my language.” The 

prosecutor told Flores his demeanor suggested he was “having a 

little bit of trouble coming in and testifying about this” and asked if 

he did not want to testify, and Flores replied, “Well, I’m right here, 

you know, trying to keep it as honest as I can without him going, 

yeah.” In the face of Flores’s obvious discomfort, it would have 

been very difficult for the defense to have convinced the jury that 

Flores was manufacturing a statement to incriminate appellant. As it 

was, defense counsel tried to explain how Flores’s testimony might 

be less damaging than it appeared: Counsel argued that it would 

have made no sense for appellant to have gotten into Flores’s car 

saying “I need someone’s money” and instead he might have said “I 

need some money.” Defense counsel also told the jury, regarding 

Flores’s prior convictions, that it could not assume appellant to be a 

“bad guy” because he “hangs out with the bad guy.”

Given Flores’s description of appellant’s statement in the car, which 

was more damaging than appellant’s own statement, and the other 

evidence described above, there is no reasonable probability 

appellant would have achieved a more favorable outcome at trial if 

his statement to the police had been excluded. His claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel thus fails. (People v. Mesa (2006) 

144 Cal. App. 4th 1000, 1008-1010.)

Id. at *6-8. 

3. Applicable Law

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment is reviewed under 

the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under the first 

prong, a petitioner must show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” Id. at 688. Because of the difficulties inherent in fairly evaluating counsel’s 

performance, courts must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. “This requires showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant 

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. To satisfy the second prong under Strickland, a petitioner 

must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s substandard performance. See Gonzalez v. 

Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Thus, to 

prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the petitioner must demonstrate by a reasonable 

probability that but for the error of counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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Under AEDPA, a federal court is not to exercise its independent judgment in assessing 

whether the state court decision applied the Strickland standard correctly; rather, the petitioner 

must show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 170, 189-90 (2011) (federal habeas court’s review of state court’s decision on ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim is “doubly deferential”). The Supreme Court has specifically warned 

that: “Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under

Strickland with unreasonableness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). When section 2254(d) applies, the 

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (emphasis added).

“To show prejudice under Strickland resulting from the failure to file a motion, a 

[petitioner] must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court 

would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that 

there would have been an outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-374 (1986) (so stating with 

respect to failure to file a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds)); see also Van Tran 

v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2000) (no prejudice suffered as a result of counsel’s 

failure to pursue a motion to suppress a lineup identification), overruled on other grounds by 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).

4. Analysis

Where, as here, defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 

competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, Petitioner must also prove: (1) “that his 

Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious”; and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that the 

verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual 

prejudice.” See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375; see also Wilson, 185 F.3d at 990. Respondent 

argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the state appellate court properly found 

defense counsel performed adequately as the Fourth Amendment claim lacked merit. Dkt. 9 at 12.

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This Court agrees. Specifically, the state appellate court found that a successful motion to 

suppress based on the warrantless entry was foreclosed by: (1) Ms. Canevari’s implied consent to 

the officers’ entry into her and appellant’s home; and (2) the exigent circumstances exception. 

Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *5-6. Therefore, as explained below, the state appellate court 

reasonably found Petitioner had failed to meet his burden to prove that he had a meritorious 

Fourth Amendment claim. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375.

a. Implied Consent to Enter Home

The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, 

whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 

(1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). The prohibition does not apply, however, to 

situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property 

is searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), or from a third party who 

possesses common authority over the premises, see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 

(1974).

Consent to enter or search must be freely and voluntarily rendered and not a product of 

police coercion. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. Whether a consent was voluntarily given depends 

on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227-28. Relevant factors include the length and nature 

of detention, the use of coercion or punishment by the police, and indications of “more subtle 

forms of coercion that might flaw [an individual’s] judgment.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 

411, 424 (1976). 

The Supreme Court’s cases “firmly establish that police officers may search [or enter] 

jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents.” Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 

1126, 1129 (2014). For example, a person with common authority over property can consent to a 

search of that property, or in this case to entry into such property, without the permission of the 

other persons with whom he shares that authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 

Here, it was inferable from the fact that Ms. Canevari and Petitioner resided in the home 

that Ms. Canevari had the authority to consent to the police officers’ entry. See Matlock, 415 U.S. 

at 171. Furthermore, it is inferable from the transcript that Ms. Canevari gave the officers 

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permission to enter the home and led them to where Petitioner was apparently sleeping nearby. 

CT 127-128. After she answered the door, at no time did Ms. Canevari tell officers that they could 

not come in. CT 127. Instead, she led them to Petitioner, who was sleeping. CT 127. Ms. 

Canevari seemed was more concerned about asking Petitioner “what happened,” and did not 

seemed concerned about whether or not she had given consent to the officers who had already

entered their home. CT 127-128. In light of Ms. Canevari’s implied consent, this Court finds 

objectively reasonable the state appellate court’s finding the officers’ warrantless entry into 

Petitioner’s home was justified. This Court further finds objectively reasonable the state appellate 

court’s conclusion that defense counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to challenge the 

admission of Petitioner’s statement to police based on warrantless entry.

b. Exigent Circumstances Exception

“Where . . . the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in 

conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of 

evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 462, 471-72 (2011). There 

are exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry by police officers into a home if the 

officers have a reasonable belief that their entry is “‘necessary to prevent physical harm to the 

officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some 

other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.’” Huff v. City of 

Burbank, 632 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2009)), rev’d on other grounds, Ryburn v. Huff, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012). 

Officers meet their heavy burden only by showing specific and articulable facts that justify a 

finding of exigent circumstances. Huff, 632 F.3d at 545.

 Here, when the officers arrived at Petitioner’s home in the early morning hours of April 9, 

2012 and knocked on his door, less than two hours had passed since the incident. Roston, 2014 

WL 4088196, *2-3, *6. Even though Petitioner was not in the officers’ constant sight during their 

pursuit of him, this factor did not undermine the exigency of the circumstances. See e.g., People 

v. Escudero, 23 Cal. 3d 800, 809 (1979) (finding exigent circumstances where the victim lost sight 

of the burglar, but promptly gave the police the burglar’s description and registration information 

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which led the officers to the burglar’s house within an hour). The police officers had just gathered 

information from the victim, Mr. Maggio (including Mr. Maggio’s positive identification of 

Petitioner in a photographic lineup), which pointed to Petitioner as the perpetrator. Roston, 2014 

WL 4088196, *3. Officers then acted on that information as quickly as possible in pursuing

Petitioner by going straight to his house. Id. at *3. By proceeding to Petitioner’s house as soon as 

the officers determined that Petitioner was the suspect in the assault and robbery, the officers 

minimized Petitioner’s opportunity to eliminate any evidence. See Skinner v. Railway Labor 

Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (because the “delay necessary to procure a 

warrant . . . may result in the destruction of valuable evidence,” the evidence should be sought and 

obtained as soon as possible); see also People v. Seaton, 26 Cal. 4th 598, 632 (2001) (the exigent 

circumstance to which a police officer responds may consist of the need to quickly prevent the 

evidence from being destroyed). Indeed, when they found Petitioner, he was still wearing the 

clothes that fit the victim’s and witness’s descriptions of what the attacker had been wearing, 

bolstering the victim’s identification of Petitioner. Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *3, *6. Under 

these circumstances, this Court finds objectively reasonable the state appellate court’s finding that 

the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement justified the officers’

warrantless entry into Petitioner’s home. 

In sum, defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress his statement to the police—on the 

basis that it was obtained as a result of an unlawful warrantless entry into his home—did not fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and did not result in prejudice to Petitioner. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. Accordingly, the state appellate court’s finding that 

Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress 

was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. Id.

B. Exclusion of Evidence of Mr. Maggio’s Prior Claims of Victimization

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to 

introduce evidence that Mr. Maggio had previously made false accusations of being victimized, 

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thereby violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to cross-examine the witnesses against him and 

present a defense. Dkt. 1 at 5. 

1. Background

The state appellate court gave the following background information relating to this claim:

Appellant’s defense, as we have said, was that he assaulted Maggio 

but did not rob him. The only direct evidence of robbery came from 

Maggio. Appellant wanted to demonstrate that Maggio had mental 

or emotional problems that led him to believe, incorrectly, that he 

was being victimized in the Safeway incident.

At the time of trial, Maggio had a criminal case pending against him 

for violation of Penal Code section 653f, subdivision (a), on January 

30, 2012, in which a question had been raised as to Maggio’s 

competency to stand trial. The prosecution filed a motion in limine 

seeking to preclude the defense from presenting evidence of this 

competency question, arguing that competency to stand trial and 

competency to act as a witness are not determined by the same 

standard.

In response, appellant disavowed any intent to introduce evidence 

about the competency issue for the truth of the matter but sought to 

introduce evidence on a number of points in order to impeach 

Maggio’s capacity to perceive and character for veracity. The points 

appellant raised were that Maggio had made previous claims of 

being a victim of criminal conduct that were not credible; Maggio 

was addicted to pain medication; Maggio had been unable to relate 

truthful facts of previous emergency situations; and Maggio had 

refused to acknowledge the trial court’s authority “to return to court 

and to contact medical personnel regarding possible competency 

issues.” The motion stated that Maggio had previously claimed he 

was “under assault” by his doctor because the doctor would not 

prescribe more pain medication; that Maggio was facing criminal 

charges for abusing the 911 emergency dispatch system by making 

numerous 911 calls even after being admonished to stop by the 

dispatcher and being threatened with arrest by police officers; that 

Maggio told police officers his doctor was assaulting him by not 

providing him with two tetanus shots and three Benadryl shots he 

claimed to need before 10:00 a.m. the next morning to avoid serious 

illness, and told police officers, “‘I am being held hostage’ by my 

doctor, you must arrest me now”; that Maggio then called 911 five 

times about “‘a seven-year problem surrounding a loan’” which he 

felt was a crime and as to which no report was taken; and that 

Maggio had refused to comply with court orders (issued by the same 

judge as in the present case) to report for two psychiatric 

evaluations, and had an outstanding court order for an arrest warrant 

for intentional failure to appear in court on these matters. In the 

present case, according to the motion, Maggio had continuously 

asked the investigating officer to sew his torn pocket; had testified at 

the preliminary hearing that he declined the option Officer Cook 

gave him of going to the hospital when in fact Cook had refused to 

take Maggio to the hospital because he had had multiple contacts 

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with Maggio at the hospital in which Maggio demanded pain 

medication that the staff refused, indicating Maggio might be an 

addict; and Maggio had testified at the preliminary hearing that 

appellant stole his driver’s license, then admitted on cross 

examination that he had added this information to his claim when he 

met with the investigating officer just before the hearing, and that in 

fact appellant did not steal his license.

With respect to the pending case, the court noted that any 

questioning would raise the issue of Maggio’s Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination, requiring the court to consider 

whether the probative value of the evidence would outweigh the 

time consumed by dealing with “all the circumstances surrounding 

this and also dealing with Fifth Amendment privilege and also 

dealing with potential immunity proceedings.” The court questioned 

the probative value of the evidence because the facts underlying the 

pending case occurred some four months before the present incident. 

The court did not view Maggio’s statements to the 911 dispatcher 

and police as having much probative value absent proof that the 

statements were in fact false, and did not want to have a “mini-trial”

concerning the pending case.

The trial court ruled that the defense could ask Maggio about his 

expectations in the pending case and whether any promises of 

leniency had been made to him, but not about the underlying facts. 

The court stated that defense counsel would be permitted “vigorous 

cross-examination to go into his emotional and mental stability” but 

not necessarily to address the pending case for that purpose. 

Regarding addiction to pain medication, the court noted that 

evidence of a witness’s drug addiction is admissible only if it tends 

to show the witness was under the influence while testifying or 

when the events being related occurred, or that the witness’s mental 

faculties were impaired by use of the drugs.

Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *8-9.

2. State Court Opinion

First, the state appellate court concluded that the trial court did abuse its discretion by 

excluding the proposed evidence pursuant to California Evidence Code section 352, stating:

Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court discretion to exclude 

evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption 

of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “‘A trial court’s 

exercise of discretion under section 352 will be upheld on appeal 

unless the court abused its discretion, that is, unless it exercised its 

discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.’

(People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 771, 806.)” (People v. Suff

(2014) 58 Cal. 4th 1013, 1066.)

Appellant views the evidence he sought to present as relevant and 

necessary to demonstrate that Maggio had a propensity to 

exaggerate claims of being criminally victimized, thereby 

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supporting appellant’s defense that he assaulted but did not rob 

Maggio. We disagree with appellant’s view of the probative value 

of the proposed evidence and, therefore, find no basis to fault the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion.

While evidence of a person’s character or trait of character is 

generally inadmissible to prove his or her conduct on a specified 

occasion (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), this rule does not make 

inadmissible “evidence of the character or a trait of character (in the 

form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific 

instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the 

defendant is being prosecuted . . . if the evidence is [¶] [o]ffered by 

the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the 

character or trait of character.” (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1).) 

Pursuant to this rule, for example, in a rape prosecution, evidence 

that the victim has previously made false accusations of rape may be 

highly probative. (People v. Adams (1988) 198 Cal. App. 3d 10, 16-

17, 19; People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 593, 597-

600.) Similarly, in a prosecution for sexual assault, People v. 

Randle (1982) 130 Cal. App. 3d 286, 295-296, found error in the 

exclusion of evidence that the victim had previously made false 

claims of being the victim of a purse snatch and of having been 

kidnapped at the same bar and restaurant where the charged offenses 

were alleged to have occurred. On the other hand, where the 

evidence of past conduct has little probative value on the issue for 

which it is introduced, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in 

excluding evidence that would be admissible under this statute. 

(People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal. App. 3d 660, 666 [evidence that 

victim of sexual assault aggressively sought attention from men, 

hugged and kissed men in a public place, and encouraged men to 

take her home not probative on question whether sex with defendant 

was consensual].)

Maggio’s complaints to 911 and police officers bear no similarity to 

the charged offenses in the present case. Appellant characterizes the 

prior reports as false or exaggerated claims of being the victim of 

criminal offenses. But it is obvious that those reports were not 

referring to anything like the assault and robbery here. The claim of 

having been “assaulted” by his doctor’s failure to provide the 

treatment Maggio believed he needed did not portray Maggio as the 

victim of a criminal offense; it expressed frustration and distress 

over a perceived lack of medical care. Further, as the trial court 

discussed, the defense had no basis for anything other than 

speculation as to the truth or falsity of Maggio’s belief that he 

needed the treatment in question. To the extent the reports of a loan 

“problem” Maggio believed to be a crime could be seen as an actual 

report of a criminal offense, again, the defense had no information 

regarding the validity of the claim. The evidence simply does not 

appear to cast light on the issue for which appellant sought to use 

it—Maggio’s ability to perceive, during a physical assault, whether 

he was being robbed or merely assaulted.

Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s emphasis on the past 

complaints having been made several months before the present 

incident, seeing this as too recent to support the trial court’s view of 

them as “remote.” But the trial court’s point was that Maggio’s 

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mental state was only relevant, for appellant’s purposes, to the 

extent it had bearing on his ability to perceive and communicate at 

the time of the incident. Even if the past complaints reflected an 

impairment causing Maggio to misperceive himself as a victim, 

without a similarity in circumstances or explanation of what might 

cause the prior kind of misperception to operate in the present 

circumstances, the several month time difference served to further 

undermine the probative value of the evidence.

At the same time, the proposed evidence would have brought into 

the present case the as yet untried charges against Maggio for abuse 

of the 911 system, raising issues about Maggio’s constitutional 

privilege against self incrimination, as well as the potential for 

undue consumption of time. Significantly, the trial court did not 

preclude appellant from cross-examining Maggio concerning his 

mental state and ability to perceive and relate the incident. On the 

contrary the court said it would permit “vigorous” crossexamination in this area. The court only precluded evidence 

concerning the pending case against Maggio.

Roston, 2014 WL 4088196, *9-10.

Second, the state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial court violated his 

constitutional rights to cross-examine and to present a defense. Id. at *10. In doing so, the state 

appellate court explained as follows:

Appellant’s contention that the trial court violated his constitutional 

rights to cross examine and to present a defense is unavailing.

Portraying the court’s ruling as precluding him from crossexamining Maggio, the sole witness to the disputed element of theft, 

on his ability to perceive and relate the events, appellant relies upon 

Franklin v. Henry (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 1270 to argue that 

evidence of Maggio’s prior accusations “would have shown [the 

complaining witness] capable of fantasies about [others] analogous 

to the charges [he] made against [appellant].” (Id. at p. 1273.) As 

with the cases we have already discussed, the similarity between the 

prior accusations and charged conduct in Franklin is in no way 

matched in the present case. In Franklin, the defendant was accused 

of molesting the five-year-old daughter of a friend with whose 

family the defendant had lived for several months. Six months after 

the defendant left the household, the child reported that he had 

“licked her ‘private’ and made her lick his ‘private.’” (Id. at p. 

1271.) The trial court refused to permit the defendant to testify that 

in his presence, the child told her brothers that the previous night 

“her mother had come into her room and ‘licked her private.’” (Id.

at p. 1272.) The California Court of Appeal found the ruling error, 

but harmless, and the Supreme Court denied review. (Ibid.) The 

Ninth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus, 

finding the error was of constitutional magnitude and prejudicial.

(Id. at p. 1273.) The Franklin court emphasized that the 

prosecutor’s case was “not a strong one” and rested on whether the 

jury believed the child, and that, if believed, the defendant’s 

testimony would have shown the child “capable of fantasies about 

her mother analogous to the charges she made against” the 

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defendant. (Id. at p. 1273.) Therefore, exclusion of the evidence 

“deprived [the defendant] ‘of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s 

case encounter and “survive the crucible of meaningful testing.”’”

(Ibid., quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690–691.)

For the reasons above, the present case does not rise to this 

level.[FN 5]

[FN 5:] Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider 

respondent’s argument that appellant forfeited his constitutional 

claim by failing to raise it in the trial court, or appellant’s argument 

that this failure by defense counsel constituted ineffective assistance 

of counsel.

Id. (footnote in original).

3

3. Applicable Law

a. Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses Against Him

A defendant meets his burden of showing a Confrontation Clause violation by showing 

that “[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [a witness’] 

credibility . . . had counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). However, the Confrontation Clause does not 

prevent a trial judge from imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns of 

harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only 

marginally relevant. Id. at 679. The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 

extent, the defense might wish. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). 

To determine whether a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has been 

violated by the exclusion of evidence on cross-examination, a court inquires whether the evidence 

was relevant, whether there were other legitimate interests outweighing the defendant’s interests in 

presenting the evidence, and whether the exclusion of evidence left the jury with sufficient 

information to assess the credibility of the witness. United States v. Beardslee, 197 F.3d 378, 383-

84 (9th Cir.), amended, 204 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2000). See generally Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 

 

3

 This Court notes that in 2002, the Ninth Circuit overruled Franklin v. Henry, albeit on 

other grounds than what this case was relied upon by Petitioner in state court. See Payton v. 

Woodford, 299 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), vac’d on other grounds, 538 U.S. 975 (2003), 

on remand at Payton v. Woodford, 346 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Brown 

v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, (2005). The Payton court overruled Franklin on the issue of the burden 

of proof under Brecht. See Payton, 299 F.3d at 829 n.11.

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F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2000) (circuit-based law alone cannot form the basis for habeas relief 

under the AEDPA, but circuit decisions are relevant as persuasive authority to determine whether 

the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent).

b. Right to Present a Defense

The United States Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to present a defense. 

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the 

Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution 

guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane 

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations omitted). The Compulsory Process Clause of the 

Sixth Amendment preserves the right of a defendant in a criminal trial to have compulsory process 

for obtaining a favorable witness. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). But the right is 

only implicated when the evidence the defendant seeks to admit is “relevant and material, and . . . 

vital to the defense.” Id. at 16.4The Sixth Amendment right to present relevant testimony “may, 

in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” 

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11 

(1988) (right to compulsory process is not absolute). The Court has explained that a defendant 

“‘does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged or otherwise 

inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.’” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1996) 

(plurality opinion) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)). Even relevant evidence 

may be excluded on account of certain evidentiary rules. See id. at 42. “[T]o say that the right to 

introduce relevant evidence is not absolute is not to say that the Due Process Clause places no

limits upon restriction of that right”; rather, it means that the defendant has the heavy burden to 

show that the decision to exclude evidence “‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the 

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” Id. at 43 (citation 

 

4

To determine whether the excluded evidence is relevant and material, and vital to the 

defense, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the probative value of the excluded 

evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier 

of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it 

constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. See United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 755-

56 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985)).

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omitted). Even if the exclusion of evidence was a constitutional error, habeas relief is not 

available unless the erroneous exclusion had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.

4. Analysis

The state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, these Supreme Court holdings. Petitioner has not identified any 

Supreme Court holding to the effect that the right to present a defense includes a right to present 

irrelevant evidence, or that the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him includes a right to 

cross-examine them about irrelevant evidence. The requirement that evidence must be relevant to 

be admissible is a core evidentiary rule, and is found in the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as 

the California Evidence Code. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible”); 

Cal. Evid. Code § 350 (“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence”). Petitioner also has 

not identified any Supreme Court holding to the effect that an evidence rule that (like California 

Evidence Code § 352) allows the exclusion of evidence—when its probative value is outweighed 

by issue of undue time-consumption or confusion—violates the constitutional rights to present a 

defense or due process. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that Section 352, the California rule at 

issue, offends some “fundamental principle of justice” such that the rule itself violates a criminal 

defendant’s right to due process. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43.

It is debatable whether Supreme Court precedents on the right to present a defense could 

support a finding of a violation of that right based on the application of an otherwise permissible 

rule. That is, the state court reasonably could determine that the right to present a defense is only 

implicated if the rule itself is unconstitutional. Even assuming arguendo that the right to present a 

defense could be violated by the state court’s application of a rule that did not itself violate a 

constitutional right, Petitioner still would not be entitled to relief because the state court’s 

exclusion of the evidence under California Evidence Code § 352 was not an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law. 

Section 352, like its federal analog, Federal Rule of Evidence 403, is a rather 

commonplace kind of evidentiary rule allowing the exclusion of evidence where its probative 

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value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue 

consumption of time, be unduly prejudicial, confuse the issues or mislead the jury. As mentioned 

above, Section 352 itself does not offend due process or the right to present a defense. Cf. 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as 

the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination 

based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”). 

The application of Section 352 in Petitioner’s case to exclude evidence of Mr. Maggio’s 

prior claims of victimization did not result in a Confrontation Clause violation. Nor did it violate 

Petitioner’s right to present a defense. Specifically, the state appellate court reasonably 

determined that Petitioner had not shown the relevance of the evidence. The state appellate court 

recognized that, consistent with Section 352 and the state evidentiary rules, the trial court properly 

concluded that the evidence of Mr. Maggio’s prior claims of victimization had little or no 

probative value on the issue of whether he was credible and had a propensity to exaggerate claims 

of being criminally victimized. Mr. Maggio’s prior complaints to the police and the 911 

dispatcher were dissimilar to his complaints about Petitioner. Mr. Maggio’s prior complaints had 

nothing to do with the crimes of robbery and assault. Instead, one of Mr. Maggio’s prior 

complaints amounted to his frustration with his doctor for not prescribing him certain medications,

and another complaint was based on his belief that his loan problem constituted a crime against 

him. CT 97. Thus, Mr. Maggio’s prior complaints were irrelevant as to whether his claim of 

Petitioner’s assault and robbery of him was credible. In addition, as the trial court stated, the 

falsity of Mr. Maggio’s beliefs that he needed the medication and that the loan problem 

constituted a crime against him was based on speculation. The defense had no information 

regarding the validity of Mr. Maggio’s claims. Furthermore, a danger existed that if defense 

counsel cross-examined Mr. Maggio about the statements and circumstances pertaining to the 

charges against him, it would consume an undue amount of trial time, confuse the jury, and lead to 

a mini trial in Petitioner’s case regarding an irrelevant, collateral matter. This Court finds that the 

Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing reasonable limits on crossCase 4:15-cv-00729-YGR Document 10 Filed 03/28/16 Page 26 of 28
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examination based on these concerns. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. 

Moreover, the exclusion of the aforementioned evidence left the jury with enough 

information to assess properly the credibility of the witness. Specifically, the trial court’s ruling 

excluding the instances pertaining to Mr. Maggio’s own case did not result in a blanket exclusion 

of evidence pertaining to Mr. Maggio’s credibility, mental and emotional instability, or his ability 

to perceive the incident involving Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner had the opportunity to crossexamine effectively Mr. Maggio and was not denied his right of confrontation by the trial court’s 

ruling. 

Finally, the exclusion of the aforementioned evidence also did not deprive Petitioner of the 

right to present a defense, i.e., from presenting the defense that he assaulted, but did not rob Mr. 

Maggio and attempting to elicit such testimony during cross-examination of Mr. Maggio. 2RT 

271-286, 294-303. The right to present a defense “includes, ‘at a minimum . . . the right to put 

before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.’” Stever, 603 F.3d at 755

(quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987)). Here, Petitioner had the full 

opportunity to present evidence that could influence the determination of his guilt. The trial court 

made it clear that defense counsel was entitled to “vigorously cross-examine” Mr. Maggio 

regarding his ability to perceive the incident involving Petitioner (1RT 36-37, 2RT 267), and 

defense counsel did so (see e.g., 2RT 272-286, 294-303). During closing argument, defense 

counsel highlighted weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, including the possibility that Mr. 

Maggio could have been “getting confused in his perception of the facts of what actually 

occurred.” 3RT 526; see e.g., 3RT 525-532, 535-538. Defense counsel also pointed out to the 

jury that Petitioner had admitted to Officer Cook that he assaulted Mr. Maggio, but did not take 

anything from him. See e.g., 3RT 537-541.

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law on the constitutional rights to crossexamine the witnesses against him or to present a defense. Therefore, this claim is DENIED.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set out above, 

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jurists of reason would not find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. See 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a Certificate 

of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of 

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases.

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. All claims from the petition are DENIED, and a certificate of appealability will not 

issue. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate any pending motions and 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 28, 2016

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