Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04731/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04731-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of San Carlos
Defendant
Javier Ian Larson
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER IAN LARSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN CARLOS,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04731-JD 

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

This case arises out of the euthanasia of a pit bull. In September 2013, defendant City of 

San Carlos (“San Carlos”) impounded plaintiff’s pit bull, Reapa, for biting a person. Dkt. No. 1 at 8. 

In October 2013, San Carlos advised plaintiff Javier Larson (Reapa’s owner) that Reapa had been 

designated a vicious animal under a municipal ordinance and would be euthanized. Id. at 9. At 

plaintiff’s request, San Carlos held a hearing on the matter in February 2014, and decided to proceed 

with the euthanasia. Id. In May 2014, Larson filed an action in state court to free Reapa; the case was 

dismissed. Id. In October 2014, on the very day Reapa was scheduled to be euthanized, plaintiff 

filed this action and requested a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against San Carlos. Dkt. 

No. 15. The Court granted the TRO to preserve the status quo while San Carlos responded to 

plaintiff’s allegations. Id. After reviewing the City’s response, the Court lifted the TRO and 

denied Larson’s request for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 19. Reapa was euthanized on 

October 31, 2014. Dkt. No. 22. 

Despite Reapa’s passing, plaintiff wants to maintain a complaint challenging the vicious 

animal ordinance and procedures. Specifically, plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief 

against San Carlos Municipal Code §§ 6.04.010, 6.04.105 and 6.04.115, which set out the 

procedures for declaring animals dangerous or vicious and the animal owner’s hearing rights. 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff does not allege any claim for damages or that he owns any other dog currently subject to 

the municipal ordinances. 

While the Court is sympathetic to plaintiff’s loss of a beloved pet, the complaint fails to 

meet the requirements of Article III of the Constitution for federal jurisdiction. The bedrock of the 

federal judiciary is the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As the 

Supreme Court has held, “[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our 

system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases 

or controversies.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). In light of the 

importance of this limitation, the Court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself that each 

case before it is within its subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 

(2006) (citation omitted). 

“‘One element of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that 

they have standing to sue.’” Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1146 (citation omitted). To establish standing, 

a plaintiff must demonstrate three “irreducible” core elements: “(1) injury-in-fact -- plaintiff must 

allege ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent’ harm to a legally protected interest; 

(2) causal connection -- the injury must be ‘fairly traceable’ to the conduct complained of; and (3) 

redressability -- a favorable decision must be ‘likely’ to redress the injury-in fact.” Barnum 

Timber Co. v. United States EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.2011) (citations omitted). The 

plaintiff must “establish[] these requirements at every stage of the litigation.” Krottner v. 

Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). In other words, “[a]n actual controversy 

must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for 

Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted). 

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, he must also show 

“a very significant possibility of future harm.” Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 

F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1147 (standing may be based on 

threatened injury only if it is “certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that allegations 

of possible future injury are not sufficient.”). “To have standing to assert a claim for prospective 

injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

[the injury].’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting City of L.A. v. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)).

These factors doom any possibility that plaintiff has standing to maintain this case. 

Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief -- he asks the Court to enjoin the enforcement 

of the municipal codes and declare them unconstitutional. Dkt. No. 1 at 13-14. No damages or 

economic harm are claimed, and plaintiff does not allege that any other dog he owns is currently, 

or will imminently be, the subject of proceedings under the challenged ordinances. There is 

simply no live controversy or substantial threat of an imminent live controversy sufficient to 

establish plaintiff’s standing to sue over the ordinances. Larson argues that he owns other dogs 

that might someday face Reapa’s fate, but mere ownership of those animals is not enough to spark 

a case or controversy that allows plaintiff to challenge the ordinance. If that were the case, the 

owner of any dog in San Carlos, including the most benign and gentle-tempered miniature 

schnauzer, would have standing to challenge the vicious dog ordinances. That stretches the limits 

of Article III well past the breaking point. 

Consequently, the Court finds that Larson does not have standing to maintain this case. It 

is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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