Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01211/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01211-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dale Robert Bach
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1211

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Dale Robert Bach, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2004

Filed: March 14, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Dale Robert Bach for possessing visual depictions of a minor

engaged in sexually explicit activity, for transporting such an image, for using a

minor to produce such material, and for the receipt of child pornography, all in

interstate or foreign commerce. The district court1

 sentenced Bach to 180 months on

the manufacturing count and 121 months on each of the other three counts, all to run

concurrently. Bach appeals, arguing that there was no probable cause for the search

of his residence, that his convictions are constitutionally infirm, and that the district

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Initials are used when minors are referenced.

3

An individual registered with Yahoo! can create a public profile on its member

directory.

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court erred by applying a mandatory minimum sentence on the manufacturing count.

We affirm.

I.

In October 2000 Sergeant Brook Schaub of the St. Paul Police Department was

contacted by a mother concerned about a document on her family computer. It

contained a partial log of a communication between her minor son (AM)2

 and

someone using the name "dlbch15," asking if AM wanted to see dlbch15 again and

to suggest a place where he could hide something for AM. Dlbch15 added that he

would like to see AM if he were going to drive to St. Paul to deliver it. When the

police questioned AM about this message, he said it had been received in a chat room

on the website www.yahoo.com and that dlbch15 planned to hide Playboy magazines

for him in the bushes near a business on Ford Parkway. AM admitted that he had met

dlbch15 on Ford Parkway, but he denied any sexual contact with him. Police showed

AM a photo of Bach, but he did not identify him as dlbch15.

When Sergeant Schaub accessed the user profile3

 for dlbch15 at Yahoo!, he

found it listed a male named Dale, age 26, from Minneapolis. Schaub also discovered

that the nickname dlbch15 was linked to the email address dlbch15@prodigy.com,

and he sent an administrative subpoena to Prodigy seeking subscriber information.

Prodigy identified Dale Bach as the subscriber and listed his address and telephone

number. Further investigation revealed that Bach was a registered sex offender

because of a 1995 state conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the third degree,

involving sex with a fourteen year old boy.

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An IP is generated when one computer connects with another through the

internet; each IP is unique to a particular computer at the time of the connection and

can be used to identify the source of the connection.

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Schaub sent a letter to Yahoo!, requesting that it retain on its server any

incoming or outgoing email messages associated with the account

dlbch15@yahoo.com. He then obtained a Ramsey County search warrant on January

3, 2001, seeking Yahoo! emails between dlbch15 and possible victims of criminal

sexual conduct, including but not limited to AM. The warrant also sought internet

protocol addresses (IPs)4

 linking dlbch15 to possible victims of criminal sexual

conduct or of online enticement for sexual purposes. The warrant was faxed from

Minnesota to Yahoo! in Santa Clara, California.

Five days later Schaub received a package from Yahoo!. Inside was a zip disk

containing all of the emails preserved in the accounts belonging to AM and Bach

(dlbch15@yahoo.com). Yahoo! also sent printed copies of six emails retrieved from

Bach's account. Among them was one dated August 1, 2000, apparently a reply to a

message from dlbch15@yahoo.com about meeting the next day and exchanging

pictures. Other email messages concerned dlbch15's meeting and exchanging

pictures with various individuals.

One email in Bach's account had been received from Fabio Marco in Italy; that

transmission is the basis for Bach's conviction for receiving child pornography.

Marco's email to Bach had an attached photograph which showed a young nude boy

sitting in a tree, grinning, with his pelvis tilted upward, his legs opened wide, and a

full erection. Below the image was the name of AC, a well known child entertainer.

Evidence at trial showed that a photograph of AC's head had been skillfully inserted

onto the photograph of the nude boy so that the resulting image appeared to be a nude

picture of AC posing in the tree.

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In some of his email messages, dlbch15 directed the recipient to visit a

particular site to view a picture of himself. The individual pictured at that site looks

like Bach's driver license photo. The Yahoo! files also revealed that dlbch15 used

other screen names, including "seeknboyz" and one incorporating Bach's telephone

number. The registration material associated with the Yahoo! account listed

Minneapolis as dlbch15's residence and December 27, 1958 as his birthdate, the same

day as Bach's. Since Yahoo! was not Bach's internet service provider, it was unable

to generate and provide IPs linking him to other addresses.

Officers obtained a search warrant to search Bach's residence near the end of

January 2001. The warrant authorized seizure of computer hard drives, storage

devices, and other evidence tending "to show the possession or distribution of child

pornography or the enticement of children online." The warrant was executed on

January 29, and officers seized various items, including Bach's computer, his disks,

and a digital camera. Among the effects seized were seven digital camera images

which Bach had taken in August 2000 of a boy engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

These pictures were of RH, who testified at trial that he was the boy in the photos and

that he had been sixteen at the time they were made. The trial evidence also showed

that one photograph of RH had been sent on the internet from Bach's computer to

another minor with whom he corresponded.

Bach was indicted on August 7, 2001 in eight counts: for possessing visual

depictions produced by using a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in

interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (count 1); for

transmitting in interstate or foreign commerce a visual depiction produced by using

a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)

(count 4); for receiving visual depictions produced by using a minor engaged in

sexually explicit conduct in interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252(a)(2) (count 5); for possessing child pornography in interstate or foreign

commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) (count 2); for transmitting child

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pornography in interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2252A(a)(1) (count 3); for receiving child pornography in interstate or foreign

commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (count 6); and for employing a

minor to produce visual depictions involving sexually explicit conduct in interstate

or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (count 7). An eighth count

charged forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2253, but Bach stipulated to that count before

trial.

Bach moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the search warrants. The

district court suppressed the evidence obtained from Yahoo! on the ground that a

police officer had not been present when the warrant was executed, but the court

declined to suppress the evidence from Bach's residence, finding independent

probable cause for that warrant. The government filed an interlocutory appeal from

the order suppressing evidence, and we reversed and remanded. United States v.

Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 993 (2003).

Before trial Bach moved to dismiss counts 2, 3, and 6, which all charged

offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. He argued that the same criminal conduct had

been charged in counts 1, 4, and 5 under 18 U.S.C. § 2252. After the district court

granted the motion, the government moved for reconsideration. The court decided

on reconsideration that the government could proceed to trial under § 2252A for the

charge in count 6 rather than being limited to the § 2252 charge in count 5, ruling that

that prosecution was not barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free

Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).

The indictment was redacted as a result of the pretrial motions, and the case

was presented to the jury on four counts. Count 1 charged Bach with possession of

visual depictions whose production involved the use of a minor engaged in sexually

explicit conduct in interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2252(a)(4). Count 4 charged Bach with transmission in interstate or foreign

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Bach also argues that the Ramsey County court did not have jurisdiction to

issue a warrant authorizing a search of his Yahoo! account in California. He raised

this argument in the district court about a month before trial, but the court declined

to reach it because it was raised at such a late date. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e)

(objection waived if not raised by deadline set by the court). Bach has not shown that

this was an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Casares-Cardenas, 14 F.3d 1283,

1286 (8th Cir. 1994) (district court has discretion to refuse to consider untimely

pretrial motions where no good cause is offered for late submission).

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commerce of a visual depiction whose production involved the use of a minor

engaged in sexually explicit conduct (one picture of RH), in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252(a)(1). Count 6 charged Bach with receiving child pornography in interstate

or foreign commerce (the picture with AC's face), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2252A(a)(2). Count 7 charged Bach with employing a minor to produce visual

depictions of the minor involved in sexually explicit conduct in interstate or foreign

commerce (pictures of RH), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Bach was convicted

on all four counts, and the district court imposed concurrent sentences of 121 months

for counts 1, 4, and 6 and 180 months for count 7.

II.

On appeal, Bach argues that there was not probable cause to search his

residence, that the images he took of RH were protected under Lawrence v. Texas,

539 U.S. 558 (2003), that his prosecution for receipt of child pornography under 18

U.S.C. § 2252A was unconstitutional under Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535

U.S. 234 (2002), and that the district court erred in imposing a 15 year mandatory

minimum sentence for his conviction for manufacturing visual depictions of a minor

involved in sexually explicit conduct. The government responds that the district court

did not err in its rulings on these issues.5

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We review factual findings of the district court for clear error and findings of

probable cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). We also

apply de novo review to constitutional challenges to a criminal statute, United States

v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2002), and to questions of federal law

involving statutory interpretation. Johnston v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 241 F.3d

623, 628 (8th Cir. 2001).

A.

Under the Fourth Amendment a search warrant can only be issued with

probable cause. Probable cause exists if under the totality of the circumstances,

"there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" in the

place to be searched. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). When a warrant is

not supported by probable cause, any evidence obtained in a search is generally

inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).

Bach argues that there was no probable cause to search for a computer in his

residence because he could have accessed the internet from other locations. He

contends that a valid warrant for searching his home computer could not have been

obtained without cross references between his telephone records and IPs provided by

his service provider. There was no showing he says of any link between the alleged

criminal activity and a computer located at his residence.

Sergeant Quinn-Robinson prepared an affidavit in support of the warrant to

search Bach's apartment, for items such as computer systems and data on hard drives

or removable media. Her affidavit incorporated information from the earlier affidavit

of Sergeant Schaub in support of the Yahoo! warrant. She recounted that Schaub had

specialized training and experience in the investigation of internet crimes and in the

search and seizure of computer systems, that he was aware that computers and the

internet had frequently replaced file cabinets as storage places for evidence, and that

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it was not uncommon for individuals to retain text records of chats with children for

later review and fantasy. Sergeant Quinn-Robinson stated that she was also informed

that dlbch15 had corresponded over the internet and had met in person with the minor

AM, that the user profile of dlbch15's Yahoo! account listed a male named Dale, aged

26, from Minneapolis, Minnesota, and that the subscriber information for the Prodigy

account dlbch15@prodigy.com listed Dale Bach, Bach's address, and his telephone

number. Her affidavit also indicated that Bach had previously been convicted of

criminal sexual conduct for having sex with a fourteen year old male.

In addition, the affidavit included information obtained from Yahoo! under the

warrant faxed to the company. Registration material for dlbch15's Yahoo! account

showed Minneapolis as the user's city of residence and listed Bach's date of birth.

The account material listed an additional screen name that incorporated Bach's home

telephone number. Sergeant Quinn-Robinson's affidavit also reported information

about email messages produced from Bach's Yahoo! account, including the picture

with AC's face and communications about exchanging pictures.

Probable cause is not a rigidly defined concept, for it depends on the totality

of the circumstances and the specific facts in a given situation. Gates, 462 U.S. at

232. Even without IPs, it was reasonable to believe on the basis of the other

information in the affidavit that Bach had a computer at his residence where he

engaged in chats and received or stored images. We conclude that the information

contained in the application to search Bach's residence, for a computer and data

contained on the computer and storage devices, was sufficient to create probable

cause that evidence of criminal activity would be found there.

B.

Digital photos which Bach took at his apartment of sixteen year old RH are

connected to counts 1, 4, and 7. These counts charged Bach with possessing visual

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depictions which had been produced by using a minor engaged in sexually explicit

conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (count 1), transmitting such a visual

depiction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (count 4), and using a minor to

produce visual depictions of the minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in

violation of § 2251(a) (count 7). Some of these visual depictions show RH

masturbating and Bach performing oral sex on him.

Bach argues that these photos portray noncriminal consensual sexual conduct

because RH was sixteen and the age of consent under Minnesota and federal law is

sixteen. Minn. Stat. § 609.342 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. § 2243. He contends that the images

are protected by the liberty and privacy components of the due process clause of the

Fifth Amendment under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The government

responds that the relevant definition of a minor for these offenses is found in 18

U.S.C. § 2256, which defines a minor as any person under the age of eighteen years.

It asserts that Congress had a rational basis for criminalizing pornography involving

this age group and that Bach's activities were not protected under the First or Fifth

Amendments, pointing out that Lawrence did not involve a minor or the production

and distribution of child pornography.

Bach's constitutional arguments relating to his prosecution for possession of

pictures of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct are founded on Lawrence.

In that case the Supreme Court recognized a protected liberty interest, under the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for private and consensual sexual

conduct between same sex adults. As the Court specifically pointed out, Lawrence

did not involve minors or others "who might be injured or coerced," 539 U.S. at 578,

and the conduct protected there was very different from that involved in Bach's

prosecution. Here, a forty one year old defendant took pictures of a sixteen year old

boy masturbating and engaging in oral sex, kept the pictures, and then transmitted one

of them over the internet. RH testified that he had at first refused many requests by

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Bach to pose nude and finally posed without pants after Bach offered him money to

do it.

The liberty interest the Court recognized in Lawrence was for adults engaging

in consensual sexual relations in private, but in this case Bach engaged in sex with

a minor and pressured him to pose nude for photographs, one of which was sent over

the internet. We find no support in Lawrence to prevent Bach's prosecution under §§

2251 and 2252. Bach's privacy argument also fails, for his activities related to child

pornography are not protected by a constitutional right of privacy. See United States

v. Vincent, 167 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1999). As we pointed out in Vincent, "[t]he

Constitution offers less protection when sexually explicit material depicts minors

rather than adults." Id. Bach has not shown that the conduct charged in counts 1, 4,

and 7 was constitutionally protected.

The First Amendment does not prevent prosecution for child pornography,

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), and Congress may regulate pornography

involving all minors under the age of eighteen if it has a rational basis for doing so.

See United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1987). Congress

changed the definition of minor in the child pornography laws in 1984 to apply to

anyone under eighteen. It found that the previous ceiling of sixteen had hampered

enforcement of child pornography laws. With that ceiling there was sometimes

confusion about whether a subject was a minor since children enter puberty at

differing ages. H.R. Rep. No. 98-536, at 7-8 (1983), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.

492, 498-99; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 1293. We conclude that the congressional choice

to regulate child pornography by defining minor as an individual under eighteen is

rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in enforcing child

pornography laws, id., and that Bach's convictions for possessing, transmitting, and

manufacturing any visual depiction produced using a minor engaged in sexually

explicit conduct should be affirmed.

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C.

Bach contends that his conviction on count 6 for receipt of child pornography

under §2252A(a)(2), based on the picture of a nude boy with AC's face, violates the

First Amendment. He relies on Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234

(2002), to argue that his conviction was unconstitutional, contending that the

government did not prove that a real minor was used to produce the image. The

government responds that count 6 involves the image of an identifiable minor and this

prosecution is not subject to the constitutional infirmity identified in Free Speech

Coalition.

The district court instructed the jury that it could find Bach guilty of violating

§ 2252A(a)(2) if it found that he knowingly received a visual depiction that "involves

the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct" or "has been created,

adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually

explicit conduct." This instruction incorporated § 2256(8)(A), the definition of child

pornography before the passage of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996

(CPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq., as well as the definition in § 2256(8)(C) added by

the CPPA. The judge also instructed the jury that the term "sexually explicit conduct"

includes the lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2).

Bach argues that his conviction is invalid because the definition of child

pornography in § 2256(8)(C) violates the First Amendment. He contends that the

definition covers images that only appear to depict an identifiable minor and that the

definitions found unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition used similar language.

He argues virtual pornography was protected by the Court in Free Speech Coalition

because it did not involve the abuse of a real minor and there was no evidence that

a real minor was used to produce the image with AC's head. In support he cites

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The Reedy court stated incorrectly in dicta that Free Speech Coalition found

all definitions in §2256(8)(B)-(D) overbroad, and it described the definition in §

2256(8)(C) without reference to the identifiable minor provision.

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United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2002), a case in which the Fifth Circuit

remanded convictions under § 2252 and § 2252A for resentencing under § 2252.6

The government responds that morphed images such as the one in count 6

involve real children with consequential mental harm. It asserts that a morphed image

may victimize several children at once because it may contain an underlying picture

of real children being abused and exploited, as well as the face of an identifiable child

whose own mental health and reputation may suffer. The government also argues that

if the definition of child pornography in § 2256(8)(C) were held unconstitutional,

pornographers could avoid prosecution by simply pasting the heads of young stars

over the faces of their victimized real children. In support it cites United States v.

Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2003), a case in which the Fourth Circuit overturned

a conviction under § 2252A because it had been submitted with an instruction using

the definition of child pornography in § 2256(8)(B), and also noted that Free Speech

Coalition recognized that "unlike virtual images, morphed images 'implicate the

interests of real children.'" Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 529 n.2.

Section 2252A was enacted as part of the CPPA to target any person who

"knowingly receives or distributes ... any child pornography that has been mailed, or

shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by

computer." 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme

Court declared that the CPPA definitions of child pornography in § 2256(8)(B) and

(D) were unconstitutional. These definitions were held to be overly broad and to

prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment. Bach contends that § 2256(8)(C),

the definition of child pornography at issue in his conviction under § 2252A(a)(2),

is similarly unconstitutional.

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The definition sections found infirm in Free Speech Coalition were broad

enough to include apparent or suggested sexual conduct of a minor. Section

2256(8)(B) applied to any visual depiction that "is, or appears to be, of a minor

engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and § 2256(8)(D) covered the depiction of

sexually explicit conduct "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed"

in a manner to suggest that the material shows a minor engaging in such conduct.

Before the CPPA was enacted with its new definitions, child pornography had been

defined simply as any visual depiction produced by using a minor engaged in sexually

explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, and that definition was retained in § 2256(8)(A)

of the new legislation.

Section 2256(8)(C), the definition applied in Bach's prosecution for receiving

the image with AC's face, covers any visual depiction that "has been created, adapted,

or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit

conduct." The definition in subsection (C) was intended by Congress to prevent

harm to minors resulting from the use of "identifiable images ... in pornographic

depictions, even where the identifiable minor is not directly involved in sexually

explicit activities." S. Rep. 104-358, at 8 (1996). In contrast to the definitions of

child pornography in subsections (B) and (D), the definition in subsection (C) targets

harm to an identifiable minor.

In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982), the Supreme Court

recognized a compelling government interest in preventing the sexual exploitation

and abuse of children. The distribution of child pornography is "intrinsically related"

to the sexual abuse of children because it creates a "permanent record of the children's

participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by [its] circulation," and the

production of pornography requiring the sexual exploitation of children cannot be

"effectively controlled" unless that network is closed. Id. at 759. In Free Speech

Coalition the Court again focused on these harms, stating that "[l]ike a defamatory

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statement, each new publication ... would cause new injury to the child's reputation

and emotional well-being." 535 U.S. at 249.

Free Speech Coalition noted that the definition of child pornography in §

2256(8)(B) "covers materials beyond the categories" recognized in its earlier

decisions in Ferber and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)." 535 U.S. at 256.

As examples, it suggested that § 2256(8)(B) could potentially be applied to

Hollywood movies filmed without any child actors, a Renaissance painting depicting

a scene from classic mythology, and a computer generated image if the image

"appears to be" a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 241. The Court

stated that such images would not harm or involve any actual children in the

production process. Id. Unlike the speech in Ferber which was itself "the record of

sexual abuse," some speech covered by subsection (B) would record no crime and

create no victims by its production since the virtual pornography covered under the

section would not be "'intrinsically related' to the sexual abuse of children." Id. at 250.

Subsection (B) went beyond the concerns in Ferber by prohibiting images that do not

"depict an actual child," id. at 239, and the definition could therefore not withstand

facial attack under the First Amendment. Id. at 256. The Court held that § 2256(8)(D)

was also similarly overbroad because sexually explicit materials advertised as child

pornography could be prohibited under it, even if no children were actually pictured.

Id. at 257-58.

Because the definitions in subsections (B) and (D) could be applied to

situations where no actual child could be harmed by the production or distribution of

the image, the Court struck them down in the declaratory judgment action in Free

Speech Coalition. Not only did the Supreme Court not extend its analysis to the

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definition in §2256(8)(C), it explicitly stated that it was not addressing the

constitutionality of subsection (C). It differentiated the definition in (C), noting that

it

prohibits a more common and lower tech means of creating visual

images, known as computer morphing. Rather than creating original

images, pornographers can alter innocent pictures of real children so that

the children appear to be engaged in sexual activity. Although morphed

images may fall within the definition of virtual child pornography, they

implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer to the

images in Ferber.

Id. at 242.

Unlike the virtual pornography protected by the Supreme Court in Free Speech

Coalition, the picture with AC's face implicates the interests of a real child and does

record a crime. The picture depicts a young nude boy who is grinning and sitting in

a tree in a lascivious pose with a full erection, his legs spread, and his pelvis tilted

upward. The jury could find from looking at the picture that it is an image of an

identifiable minor, and that the interests of a real child were implicated by being

posed in such a way. This is not the typical morphing case in which an innocent

picture of a child has been altered to appear that the child is engaging in sexually

explicit conduct, for the lasciviously posed body is that of a child. See S. Rep. No.

108-002, at n.2 (2003) ("[T]he morphing provision is explicitly aimed at the creation

of a sexually explicit image using an innocent image of a child.").

Evidence in the record indicates that a photograph of the head of a well known

juvenile, AC, was skillfully inserted onto the body of the nude boy so that the

resulting depiction appears to be a picture of AC engaging in sexually explicit

conduct with a knowing grin. Although there is no contention that the nude body

actually is that of AC or that he was involved in the production of the image, a lasting

record has been created of AC, an identifiable minor child, seemingly engaged in

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sexually explicit activity. He is thus victimized every time the picture is displayed.

Unlike the virtual pornography or the pornography using youthful looking adults

which could be prosecuted under subsections (B) and (D), as discussed in Free

Speech Coalition, this image created an identifiable child victim of sexual

exploitation. In Free Speech Coalition the Supreme Court continued to recognize the

government's compelling interest in protecting a minor's physical and psychological

well being, see 535 U.S. at 249-50, building on its decision in Ferber, pointing out the

harm arising from pornography which is "intrinsically related" to the sexual abuse of

children. 458 U.S. at 759.

Although there may well be instances in which the application of § 2256(8)(C)

violates the First Amendment, this is not such a case. The interests of real children

are implicated in the image received by Bach showing a boy with the identifiable face

of AC in a lascivious pose. This image involves the type of harm which can

constitutionally be prosecuted under Free Speech Coalition and Ferber.

D.

Bach's final argument relates to his sentence on count 7. The district court

sentenced him to 15 years on his conviction on that count under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a),

for employing a minor to produce a visual depiction of the minor involved in sexually

explicit conduct. At the time of Bach's offense there was a mandatory minimum

punishment of 15 years for a § 2251(a) conviction, if the defendant had been

previously convicted under state law for an offense "relating to the sexual

exploitation of children." 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (2001). Although Congress amended

the statute in 2003 to increase the mandatory minimum punishment to 25 years by

adding § 2251(e), Bach was appropriately sentenced under the lower mandatory term

rather than the one in effect at the time of sentencing.

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Bach contends that the district court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum

sentence, arguing that his prior state conviction did not relate to the sexual

exploitation of children but to child abuse, and so his conviction did not fit within the

federal statute's triggering definition. He asserts that his 1995 Minnesota conviction

for third degree criminal sexual conduct did not involve the production of child

pornography and that due process and the rule of lenity require that the term "sexual

exploitation of children" be strictly construed against the government and in his

favor.

Bach argues that the legislative history of the Protection of Children Against

Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 under which § 2251 was initially enacted, supports

his interpretation in that its purpose was to curtail the production and widespread

trafficking of child pornography. See S. Rep. No. 95-438 (1977). His conviction for

criminal sexual conduct had nothing to do with this activity he asserts. Congress was

aware of the distinction between "sexual exploitation of children" and "child abuse"

he says, because it distinguished the two terms in other federal statutes. He mentions

as an example 18 U.S.C. § 3509, which defines exploitation as "child pornography

or child prostitution" and child abuse as "the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse

or exploitation, or negligent treatment of a child." He points out that the title of

Chapter 110, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260, is "Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of

Children" while § 2251, which criminalizes the manufacture of child pornography,

is entitled "Sexual exploitation of children."

The government argues that Bach's argument is misplaced, pointing out that

this court specifically held in United States v. Smith, 367 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir.

2004), that the term "[sexual exploitation of children] unambiguously refers to any

criminal sexual conduct with a child." The Minnesota statute on criminal sexual

conduct in the third degree covers sexual penetration of a child between 13 and 16.

Minn. Stat. § 609.344 subd. 1(b). The government asserts that this Minnesota

statutory definition of criminal sexual conduct covers the exact type of conduct

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Congress had in mind when it created the § 2251(d) enhancement, citing United

States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2001) (in applying the § 2251(d)

enhancement, court should look to statutory definition of prior offense rather than to

the conduct giving rise to the conviction).

Bach responds that even though we held in Smith that "sexual exploitation of

children" includes any criminal sexual conduct with a child, we should now apply the

rule of lenity because Smith did not involve a due process challenge to the

interpretation of § 2251(d). We reject this contention. The defendant in Smith had

also argued that "sexual exploitation of children" is limited to pornography or

criminal sexual conduct captured in visual depictions, but the argument was rejected.

Although the federal statute does not define the term sexual exploitation of children,

it covers "any criminal sexual conduct with a child [which by its very nature] takes

advantage of, or exploits, a child sexually." Smith, 367 F.3d at 751. We also

observed that the federal crimes listed in § 2251(d) as triggering the mandatory

minimum penalty were not limited to offenses involving pornography or visual

depictions. Id. In Smith we held that the term "sexual exploitation of children"

unambiguously refers to any criminal sexual conduct with a child, and the rule of

lenity does not apply where a statute is unambiguous. Moskal v. United States, 498

U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990). We conclude that the district court did not err by imposing

a mandatory minimum sentence under § 2251(d) based on Bach's state court

conviction for engaging in criminal sexual conduct with a child.

Bach also argues that the mandatory minimum sentence he received under §

2251(d) is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We

disagree because Bach's sentence was within the twenty year maximum sentence

authorized by § 2251(d). A prior felony conviction is a sentencing factor and not a

separate offense and does not need to be presented to a jury. Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). That rule was maintained in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), where the Court excluded the fact of a prior

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7

Bach did not identify any other Blakely issue in his briefs or at oral argument

but retains the option of a petition for rehearing.

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conviction from those issues which must be presented to a jury. United States v.

Booker specifically reaffirmed that holding: "Any fact (other than a prior conviction)

which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the

facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant

or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005). We

conclude that application of the mandatory minimum sentence based on Bach's prior

state conviction was appropriate and not unconstitutional under Booker, Blakely,

Apprendi, or Almendarez-Torres.

7

III.

In sum, probable cause existed for the warrant to search Bach's residence for a

computer and related evidence. His constitutional and statutory challenges to his

convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252(a)(1) and (a)(4), are without merit,

and § 2252A(a)(2) was not unconstitutionally applied in his prosecution for receiving

child pornography in interstate or foreign commerce. Finally, we conclude that the

district court did not err in imposing a 15 year mandatory minimum sentence on the

manufacturing count. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the majority’s well-reasoned opinion. I write separately only with

respect to Bach’s conviction for receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(2). Bach contends that this conviction is constitutionally infirm because

it rests on a definition of child pornography, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C),

which he claims violates the First Amendment. Had Bach challenged this statute on

the ground that it was facially overbroad, as did the respondents in Ashcroft v. Free

Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002), he may well have prevailed on his claim.

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In my view, the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Speech

Coalition, which held subsections (B) and (D) of § 2256(8) unconstitutionally

overbroad, applies with equal force to subsection (C). The record reveals, however,

that Bach only challenged the statute as it was applied to him. See United States v.

Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528, 530-31 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting the court of appeals generally

does not consider issues or arguments that have not been raised or articulated on

appeal). I agree with the majority that the statute survives scrutiny as applied, and

therefore concur.

______________________________

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