Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01552/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01552-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
Appellee
Margaret Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

MARGARET WRIGHT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, 

v.

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILY SERVICES, 

Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 1:09-cv-01085-MMM-JAG — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 20, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2015 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, 

District Judge.



RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Margaret Wright retired from her 

position as a caseworker at the Peoria Field Office of the 

 

The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“the 

Department”) after the Department ordered her to undergo 

a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Ms. Wright then filed this 

action alleging, among other claims, that the Department 

had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), by ordering her to undergo the 

evaluation and by causing her subsequent constructive 

discharge. The case was tried before a jury (“Wright I”), 

which found in favor of Ms. Wright on the ADA claim but 

awarded no compensatory damages. The Department filed a 

motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for 

a new trial, contending that Ms. Wright had failed to 

establish an ADA violation and that the jury had been 

instructed improperly. The district court granted the 

Department’s motion for a new trial. 

During the second trial (“Wright II”), after Ms. Wright 

rested her case, the Department moved for judgment as a 

matter of law on the ground that Ms. Wright had failed to 

establish that she had been constructively discharged. The 

court granted the motion and entered judgment for the 

Department. Ms. Wright now appeals the district court’s 

order granting a new trial in Wright I and its order granting 

the Department’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in 

Wright II. The Department appeals the court’s order denying 

its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ADA claim 

in Wright I. 

We hold that the district court did not err in denying the 

Department’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in 

Wright I. On the record before it, there was a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether the Department’s fitness-for-duty 

evaluation order was consistent with business necessity. The 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 3

district court did not err in granting a new trial in Wright I. 

The initial constructive discharge jury instruction failed to 

reference the Department’s conduct. Finally, the court did 

not err in granting the Department’s motion for judgment as 

a matter of law in Wright II. Ms. Wright did not establish that 

the Department’s conduct communicated that her 

termination was imminent. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the district court. 

I 

BACKGROUND 

A. 

From 1982 to 2007, Ms. Wright worked for the Illinois 

Department of Children and Family Services, primarily as a 

caseworker. 

In 2005, Ms. Wright became the caseworker for CPL, a 

then-ten-year-old ward of the Department. CPL resided at 

the Rice Child and Family Center (“Rice”). Having 

experienced physical and sexual abuse, CPL suffered from 

post-traumatic stress disorder and was highly medicated. 

She had undergone several hospitalizations for psychiatric 

problems and had been placed in multiple homes. 

Following an incident at Rice on April 19, 2007, 

Dr. Petronilo Costa interviewed CPL. According to Dr. 

Costa, Ms. Wright threw CPL into a “manicking frenzy” by 

telling her that there were four foster families available for 

her, even though CPL was not yet on the Department’s 

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4 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

foster-care list due to her emotional issues.1

 In response to 

Ms. Wright’s comments, CPL began saying that, because she 

was leaving Rice, she no longer had to listen to anyone and 

did not have to take her medication. CPL’s frenzy incited a 

riot in her unit at Rice during which the children threw and 

broke furniture and attempted to attack the staff. Dr. Costa, 

who described Ms. Wright’s conduct as “unheard of,” 

concluded that Ms. Wright posed a risk to CPL.2

 

Following up on his conclusion, Dr. Costa issued a 

medical order to the Department barring Ms. Wright from 

having further contact with CPL. After receiving Dr. Costa’s 

order, Mary Bullock, the Department’s assistant 

administrator for the central region, contacted a Rice staff 

member, Jill Foster (Ms. Wright’s supervisor), and Foster’s 

supervisor. Bullock then directed that Ms. Wright have no 

further contact with CPL. Ms. Wright made several inquiries 

to Bullock and Foster about why she was ordered to have no 

contact with CPL, but the Department did not provide her 

with any additional information. 

On May 2, 2007, Bullock removed Ms. Wright from CPL’s 

case. Ms. Wright, who as a member of a union was covered 

by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), filed a 

grievance in response to her removal. The next day, Bullock 

and Foster met with Dr. Costa and others at Rice to discuss 

the situation. Dr. Costa told Bullock and Foster that 

Ms. Wright “runs her own shop” and “that she tries to 

 

1 R.279 at 177–78. 

2 Id. at 141. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 5

terrorize folks.”3

 At that same meeting, either Bullock or 

Foster told Dr. Costa that Ms. Wright was “unsupervisable,” 

“[t]hat she would not get along with any supervisor,” and 

that her failure to follow orders once resulted in a lasting 

injury to a child.4

 They also told him that she “did not get 

along with anybody in the office, that she would not do 

what she was assigned to,” “[a]nd that she had had plenty of 

grievances and lawsuits against everyone.”5

 They stated 

“that they had been concerned about her for a long time and 

that at this time they were going to ask her to go for an 

assessment to see if she was fit to have that type of work.”6

Dr. Costa “backed up” their decision to ask for an 

assessment.7

 At the end of the meeting, Dr. Costa agreed to 

put this recommendation in writing. Thereafter, Dr. Costa 

wrote a letter, dated May 15, 2007, which stated that he 

“believe[d] that there [was] enough clinical data to wonder 

about Ms. Maggie Wright’s ability to work with children” 

and that “her mental health needs to be assessed.”8 

Following the meeting, Bullock talked with Larry 

Chasey, an associate deputy director of the Department and 

Bullock’s supervisor, and David Hoover, a labor relations 

 

3 Id. at 147. 

4 Id. at 149. 

5 Id. at 150. 

6 Id. 

7 Id. 

8 R.126 at 31. 

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6 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

specialist and supervisor. These discussions focused on 

whether to discipline Ms. Wright or to order a fitness-forduty evaluation. Relying in part on Dr. Costa’s letter, 

Bullock then ordered that Ms. Wright undergo an 

evaluation. Ms. Wright was notified of the evaluation order 

on June 4, 2007, and her evaluation was scheduled for June 

20 in Chicago. The notice informed Ms. Wright that she had 

“exhibited behavior that put[] into question [her] personal 

safety and that of others in the workplace.”9 In the medical 

examination recommendation, Bullock provided the 

following description of Ms. Wright’s “behavior/illness”: 

Ms. Wright has a history of defiance to all 

levels of management, she does not trust 

management and fails to provide any 

information that she feels would not reflect 

well on her. She has failed to see risk to 

children in foster care and to report incidents 

of unexplained injury. Many cases have had to 

be removed from her caseload and she refused 

to accept agency decisions or she was verbally 

abusive and had an abrasive manner with 

foster parents and they requested a change in 

caseworker or they would ask for child’s 

removal from their home. She has consistently 

refused to follow her management chain of 

supervision by contacting Deputy Directors. 

Ms. Wright is demanding in her demeanor, she 

has a demanding presence to her voice, 

 

9 R.279 at 37. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 7

appears to physically be very stressed, her face 

is flushed, she fans herself as if very flushed. 

She has blatant disregard for any rules or 

procedures both inside the agency and outside 

the agency whether it is the residential 

schedule or a school schedule. She demands 

attention immediately. She makes derogatory 

remarks about anyone who makes a clerical 

mistake, clerical do not want to do work for 

her a[s] they fear her rath [sic] and disdain.[10]

Ms. Wright filed a grievance protesting the evaluation order. 

After a meeting with Ms. Wright and her union 

representative on June 7, 2007, the Department cancelled the 

order because it had cited the wrong CBA section and 

because the doctor’s office was located too far away.11 

 

10 R.150-1 at 31. 

11 The CBA provided that the Department would serve written charges 

on an employee when it had good cause to believe that the employee 

had engaged in workplace misconduct. The employee, her union 

representative, and a Department manager then would attend a 

predisciplinary hearing where the employee could offer a rebuttal to the 

charges. After the rebuttal, the Department had forty-five days to decide 

whether to discipline the employee. 

The CBA also authorized the Department to order an employee to 

undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation when there was good cause to 

believe that she may be unable to perform the essential functions of her 

position. The evaluation request had to be approved at all levels of the 

Department’s management and by its labor relations office. If an 

employee refused to be evaluated, the Department could charge her with 

insubordination and impose discipline. The continued refusal to submit 

to the evaluation could result in discharge. 

(continued...) 

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8 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

On July 9, 2007, Pete Wessel, another labor relations 

specialist at the Department, sent Ms. Wright a 

memorandum informing her that she was required to 

undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation on July 16, 2007, at the 

office of Dr. R. Patil. Ms. Wright again refused to be 

evaluated and filed a grievance. The Department then 

charged Ms. Wright with insubordination for not attending 

the evaluation. After a predisciplinary hearing, Ms. Wright 

received a fifteen-day suspension. 

On July 30, 2007, Ms. Wright was placed on desk duty. 

While on desk duty, she could not oversee any cases. During 

her time on desk duty, she was given no new work duties. 

On August 2, 2007, Ms. Wright received a “second and 

final” order to undergo an evaluation with Dr. Patil, 

scheduled for August 22.12 Ms. Wright then served her 

fifteen-day suspension from August 5 to August 20. On 

August 22, Ms. Wright went to Dr. Patil’s office but did not 

submit to an evaluation. Instead, she questioned Dr. Patil 

 

(...continued) 

The Illinois Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”), 

which provides management services for over sixty Illinois agencies, was 

responsible for overseeing the disciplinary actions brought against 

Department employees. Within a twelve-month period, the Department, 

acting on its own, could discipline an employee with a thirty-day 

suspension. CMS had to approve any other or additional discipline. If 

the Department determined that an employee should be discharged, it 

would place her on a thirty-day suspension pending discharge, and CMS 

would make the final discharge decision. 

12 R.281 at 109. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 9

about why an evaluation was ordered and what he knew 

about her work status. 

Ms. Wright received her second insubordination charge 

for refusing to be evaluated on September 4, 2007. Ms. 

Wright did not attend the predisciplinary hearing on 

September 5. Instead, her union representative gave a 

rebuttal to the charges. Ms. Wright then used her vacation 

time and was away from work between September 7 and 

September 17. 

On September 7, 2007, Ms. Wright received in the mail a 

bill for health insurance premiums from CMS. Her health 

insurance premiums ordinarily were deducted from her 

paycheck, but because she was not paid during her fifteenday suspension, she had no paycheck from which to deduct 

the premiums and owed that portion of her premiums. The 

bill also stated that payment was due for the period between 

September 1 and September 30. The second page of the bill 

stated: “ENROLLMENT INFORMATION—Effective 09 06 

2007”; “LEAVE OF ABSENCE DOCK/SUSP > 30 Days.”13

Ms. Wright called CMS to ask about the bill and, as a followup to that call, only paid the premiums that were owed on 

account of her fifteen-day suspension. At no point during 

this period did Ms. Wright receive any notice from the 

Department informing her that she had received an 

additional suspension, including a suspension pending 

discharge. 

On September 13, 2007, while she was on vacation, 

Ms. Wright contacted the State Employees’ Retirement 

 

13 R.150-2 at 17; accord R.275 at 89.

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10 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

System of Illinois to determine the impact that quitting or 

being discharged would have on her pension. She learned 

that she was eligible to retire with a reduced pension. 

Although Ms. Wright and her husband, who also worked for 

the Department, had planned on retiring in December of 

2008 when they were eligible to receive full pensions, they 

decided to retire early because Ms. Wright believed that she 

eventually would be discharged. Ms. Wright returned to 

work after her ten-day vacation period on September 17, 

2007, and submitted her paperwork for retirement, effective 

September 30, 2007. 

Prior to her retirement, the Department had not decided 

what discipline to impose on Ms. Wright. Department 

officials testified that they were contemplating issuing a 

third evaluation order with the hope that Ms. Wright could 

be convinced to comply. After Ms. Wright retired, the 

Department abandoned its efforts to discipline her, and the 

union withdrew Ms. Wright’s grievances. 

B. 

On March 10, 2009, Ms. Wright filed this action alleging 

twelve counts against seven defendants.14 For the purposes 

 

14 Specifically, Ms. Wright alleged that Bullock, Foster, Wessel, Dr. Costa, 

and Cindy Petty invaded her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 

privacy rights by ordering her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation 

(Counts I–V); that Dr. Costa, Petty, the Children’s Home and Aid 

Society, and Foster interfered with her employment relationship with the 

Department (Counts VI–IX); that Foster and Bullock intentionally 

inflicted emotional distress on her (Counts X and XI); and that the 

Department violated the ADA (Count XII). 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 11

of this appeal, she contested only the disposition of the ADA 

claim (Count XII), which alleged that the Department 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) by ordering her to 

undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation, resulting in her 

constructive discharge. At the first trial (Wright I), the district 

court instructed the jury that the Department had to prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the order for Ms. 

Wright to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation was jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. If the jury 

found for Ms. Wright on that issue, it then had to decide 

whether her retirement “was voluntary or constituted a 

constructive discharge.”15 The jury returned a verdict for 

Ms. Wright. It concluded that Ms. Wright was constructively 

discharged from her employment, but awarded her no 

compensatory damages. 

Following the jury’s verdict, the Department filed a 

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a 

new trial under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59. 

The Department contended that, as a matter of law, it had 

not constructively discharged Ms. Wright. In the alternative, 

it maintained that a new trial was warranted because the 

court incorrectly had instructed the jury on the elements of 

constructive discharge. 

The district court denied the Department’s motion for 

judgment as a matter of law; it concluded that a reasonable 

jury could find that ordering the evaluation was not 

consistent with business necessity. The court granted, 

however, the Department’s motion for a new trial; it 

 

15 R.218 at 37. 

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12 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

concluded that the jury instruction, as given, focused too 

much on the employee’s subjective belief rather than on the 

employer’s conduct. 

The second trial (Wright II), focused solely on the 

constructive discharge issue. Ms. Wright presented 

essentially the same evidence as that presented in Wright I. 

After the close of Ms. Wright’s case, the Department moved 

for judgment as a matter of law, contending that Ms. Wright 

did not establish that her discharge was involuntary or that 

her termination would occur immediately. The district court 

granted the Department’s motion, concluding that 

Ms. Wright did not establish that her working conditions 

were intolerable. In its memorandum opinion, the court 

explained that, in order to prevail on a constructive 

discharge claim under the theory relied upon by Ms. Wright, 

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the Department had taken 

actions that would communicate to a reasonable employee 

that she would be terminated and also must show that her 

working conditions had become intolerable. Although the 

district court was willing to say that a jury could determine 

that Ms. Wright reasonably could conclude that her 

employment was about to be terminated, there was 

insufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude that the 

conditions of her employment had become unbearable. 

As this case comes to us, both parties ask us to review the 

district court’s decisions. Ms. Wright challenges the district 

court’s order granting a new trial in Wright I and, of course, 

the court’s order in Wright II, granting the Department’s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law because she had not 

produced sufficient evidence of a constructive discharge. For 

its part, the Department challenges the court’s order denying 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 13

the Department’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in 

Wright I concerning the fitness-for-duty evaluation.16 

II 

DISCUSSION 

A. 

We first address the Department’s contention that it was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law in Wright I. The 

district court decided “that the jury could have concluded 

that the fitness-for-duty request was not based on business 

necessity.”17 The court noted that the Department had 

“presented the jury with evidence that showed that it was in 

receipt of a letter from the ward’s psychiatrist indicating 

Wright’s conduct interfered with the ward’s therapy.”18 It 

also recognized, however, that “other evidence presented 

could certainly lead a jury to the conclusion that this was not 

an unsolicited letter, but rather one her supervisors sought 

out.”19 The court further noted that “the evidence presented 

showed that the normal practice of [the Department was] to 

place an employee subject to a fitness for duty evaluation on 

administrative leave or give the person restricted duties; 

 

16 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 

jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

17 R.235 at 12. 

18 Id. at 11. 

19 Id. 

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14 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

however, Wright continued her day-to-day duties after the 

decision to subject her to an [evaluation] was made.”20 

The Department contends that “no reasonable jury could 

find that the Department did not perceive that Wright’s 

ability to perform the duties of a caseworker was impaired, 

and that ordering an evaluation to discover whether and to 

what extent she was impaired in performing those duties 

was not consistent with business necessity.”21 It submits that 

Ms. Wright exhibited inappropriate behavior between 2004 

and 2007, displayed boundary issues with CPL, undermined 

CPL’s treatment team, and acted aggressively toward the 

staff at Rice. The Department relies, in part, on two 

communications from Dr. Costa to support its order that 

Ms. Wright undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. First, on 

April 20, 2007, Dr. Costa issued an order that barred 

Ms. Wright from having further contact with CPL. Second, 

on May 15, 2007, Dr. Costa wrote Bullock a letter suggesting 

“that there is enough clinical data to wonder about 

Ms. Maggie Wright’s ability to work with children and 

families in the capacity with which she is working now.”22

He stated that Ms. Wright’s “mental health needs to be 

assessed to help to determine what type of work she will be 

able to effectively do for [the Department].”23 

 

20 Id. 

21 Appellee’s Br. 35–36. Citations to the Appellant’s or Appellee’s Briefs, 

unless otherwise indicated, are to their initial brief on appeal. 

22 R.126 at 31. 

23 Id. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 15

We review a district court’s decision denying judgment 

as a matter of law de novo and will “reverse the verdict only 

if no rational jury could have found for the prevailing 

party.” EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 834–35 (7th Cir. 

2013). The ADA provides, in relevant part:

A covered entity shall not require a medical 

examination and shall not make inquiries of an 

employee as to whether such employee is an 

individual with a disability or as to the nature 

or severity of the disability, unless such 

examination or inquiry is shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). All employees, regardless of 

whether they have a qualifying disability under the ADA, 

are protected under this subsection.24 

According to the enforcement guidance provided by the 

EEOC, an “examination is job-related and consistent with 

business necessity when an employer has a reasonable belief 

based on objective evidence that a medical condition will 

 

24 See Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2014); 

Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2013); 

U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: DisabilityRelated Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (July 27, 2000), 

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [hereinafter 

“EEOC Guidance”] (noting that “the use of the term ‘employee’ in this 

provision reflects Congress’s intent to cover a broader class of individuals and to prevent employers from asking questions and conducting 

medical examinations that serve no legitimate purpose”).

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16 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

impair an employee’s ability to perform essential job 

functions or that the employee will pose a threat due to a 

medical condition.”25 Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 

F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2009). The employer’s reasonable 

belief “must be based on objective evidence obtained, or 

reasonably available to the employer, prior to making a 

disability-related inquiry or requiring a medical 

examination. Such a belief requires an assessment of the 

employee and his/her position and cannot be based on 

general assumptions.” EEOC Guidance (emphasis in 

original); accord Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 

506, 518 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he ADA’s requirement 

that [a fitness-for-duty examination] be consistent with 

business necessity is an objective one”). 

An employer bears the burden of establishing that an 

examination is consistent with business necessity, see Thomas 

v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007), and that burden 

is “quite high,” Conroy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 

333 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). An employer must “show that the asserted 

‘business necessity’ is vital to the business,” as opposed to a 

“mere expediency.” Id.; accord Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance 

Auth., 763 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that an 

 

25 We previously have recognized that, “[a]lthough not binding on this 

court, such administrative interpretations do constitute a body of 

experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 

properly resort for guidance.” O’Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 

1009 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coffman v. 

Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2009) (relying on the 

EEOC enforcement guidance). 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 17

employer cannot rely on a “bare assertion that a medical 

examination was merely convenient or expedient”). In 

addition, the examination must “genuinely serve[] the 

asserted business necessity and ... must be a reasonably 

effective method of achieving the employer’s goal.” Conroy, 

333 F.3d at 98. An employer “cannot merely rely on reasons 

that have been found valid in other cases but must actually 

show that the ... requirement contributes to the achievement 

of those business necessities.”26 Id. at 101. 

Courts consequently require that an employer provide 

“significant evidence that could cause a reasonable person to 

inquire as to whether an employee is still capable of 

performing his job.” Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 

F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Conroy, 333 F.3d at 98 

 

26 The statute expresses Congress’s desire to prohibit an employer from 

harassing, or otherwise discriminating against, employees who are able 

to perform efficiently the essential functions of their jobs. See S. Rep. No. 

101-116, at 39 (1989) (noting that “[a]n inquiry or medical examination 

that is not job-related serves no legitimate employer purpose, but simply 

serves to stigmatize the person with a disability,” and that “the actual 

performance on the job is, of course, the best measure of ability to do the 

job”); EEOC Guidance (“The ADA’s provisions concerning disabilityrelated inquiries and medical examinations reflect Congress’s intent to 

protect the rights of applicants and employees to be assessed on merit 

alone, while protecting the rights of employers to ensure that individuals 

in the workplace can efficiently perform the essential functions of their 

jobs.”); see also Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 

2010) (noting that the statute “prohibits employers from using medical 

exams as a pretext to harass employees or to fish for nonwork-related 

medical issues and the attendant unwanted exposure of the employee’s 

disability and the stigma it may carry” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

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18 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

(noting “that courts will readily find a business 

necessity ... when the employer can identify legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to doubt the employee’s capacity to 

perform his or her duties”). That an employee’s behavior 

could be described as “annoying or inefficient [does not] 

justify an examination; rather, there must be genuine reason 

to doubt whether that employee can perform job-related 

functions.” Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 811 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In contrast, “[w]e have acknowledged that 

inquiries into an employee’s psychiatric health may be 

permissible when they reflect concern for the safety of 

employees and the ‘public at large.’” Coffman, 578 F.3d at 565 

(quoting Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 

2000)). In undertaking this analysis, “an employer’s standard 

practice with regard to medical examinations is certainly 

relevant evidence of what is ‘necessary,’” as is “an 

employer’s differential application of a medical examination 

requirement.” Tice, 247 F.3d at 518. 

Accordingly, we must determine here whether, based on 

the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could find (1) that 

the Department did not have a reasonable belief based on 

objective evidence that Ms. Wright was unable to perform 

the essential functions of her job or that she posed a threat to 

herself or to others based on a medical condition; or (2) that 

Ms. Wright’s examination did not genuinely serve the 

Department’s asserted business necessity. 

In our view, the district court correctly determined that 

the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to establish, 

as a matter of law, that requiring Ms. Wright to undergo a 

fitness-for-duty evaluation was consistent with business 

necessity. Several Department employees testified that it was 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 19

the Department’s common practice to place a caseworker on 

desk duty when she was ordered to undergo an evaluation. 

Specifically, Wessel, a labor relations specialist at the 

Department, testified that “for employees who are field 

workers that go out into the field, ... I don’t recall any where 

they were not placed on desk duty” following a request for 

an evaluation.27 He also testified that, during his time with 

the Department, all employees who worked in the field and 

who were asked to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation 

were placed on desk duty.28 Chasey, an associate deputy 

director of the Department, testified that “typically when 

someone is sitting for an [evaluation] or going for an 

[evaluation], we put them on some sort of administrative 

restriction—desk duty, something like that—and we should 

have done that in this situation.”29 He was not aware of any 

caseworker who ever had been ordered to undergo a 

psychiatric evaluation without also having been placed on 

desk duty or administrative leave. 

In contrast to the Department’s customary practice, 

Ms. Wright was not placed on desk duty when she was 

ordered to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation on June 4. 

Instead, for almost two months, she continued to oversee her 

normal case load, which included approximately twentytwo cases. The Department’s inconsistent application of its 

evaluation procedures provided objective evidence that the 

 

27 R.278 at 59. 

28 See id. at 81; R.282 at 71. 

29 R.279 at 88. 

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20 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

evaluation order was not consistent with business necessity, 

creating a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.30 Cf. 

 

30 The cases on which the Department relies underscore the peculiarity 

of the Department’s decision to order that Ms. Wright undergo an 

evaluation without placing her on desk duty. In none of those cases did 

an employee who was thought to be unable to perform her job remain 

active in her position. Instead, the employees were placed on some form 

of administrative leave at the time the evaluation was ordered. See

Owusu-Ansah, 715 F.3d at 1309 (noting that Owusu-Ansah was “placed 

on paid leave to allow for further evaluation”); Brownfield, 612 F.3d at 

1143 (noting that Brownfield’s supervisor placed him on administrative 

leave when he ordered him to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination); 

Coffman, 578 F.3d at 562 (noting that a supervisor “recommended that 

Coffman be transferred immediately from firefighting and EMS duties to 

‘limited duty status’” when he recommended that she undergo an 

examination); Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 523 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting 

that Thomas was placed in a “sick leave pool” pending her fitness-forduty evaluation); Lanman v. Johnson Cty., 393 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 

2004) (noting that “Lanman was placed on administrative leave on May 

9, pending the results of a psychological fitness for duty exam”); Sullivan 

v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that the 

school district suspended Sullivan with pay pending its decision 

concerning whether to require that he undergo a fitness-for-duty 

examination); Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 597 

(8th Cir. 1998) (noting that the employer “offer[ed] Cody a paid leave of 

absence with her return contingent upon undergoing a psychiatric 

evaluation”); cf. Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (noting that after the examination revealed that he was unfit to 

work, “Timmons was put on disability leave that day”); Tice v. Centre 

Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 510 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the 

employer required that Tice submit to an examination before he would 

be allowed to return to work). Although an employer’s decision to place, 

or not to place, an employee on administrative leave is not 

determinative, it is evidence that the jury can consider in determining 

whether the evaluation truly served a business necessity.

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 21

Tice, 247 F.3d at 518 (noting that Tice did not “produce[] 

evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the 

necessity of the” examination because he did not establish 

that other similarly situated employees were treated 

differently). 

In addition, in early July, Ms. Wright was assigned a new

case. Indeed, Bullock recognized that it was a “sensitive 

case” and testified that, although she had requested that Ms. 

Wright undergo the evaluation, she never considered taking 

the case away from her.31 Significantly, Bullock admitted at 

trial that she had thought it “somewhat contradictory to 

send a caseworker in to a fitness-for-duty evaluation because 

she may be a risk to children and at the same time continue 

to assign cases to her.”32 She further testified that if she 

“sincerely believed that [Ms.] Wright was a risk to children,” 

she would have removed her from those cases and “would 

not have assigned her a new case where she might go to the 

state of Mississippi and pick up a child.”33 

Further undermining the Department’s position are 

emails between Foster and Hoover that indicate that the 

examination was unrelated to the Department’s concerns 

about Ms. Wright’s ability to perform her job. Cf. Coffman, 

578 F.3d at 566 (noting that the employer’s “e-mails paint a 

consistent picture of genuine concern that Coffman’s 

behavior was uncharacteristic and was adversely impacting 

 

31 R.279 at 48. 

32 Id. at 50. 

33 Id. at 51. 

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22 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

her ability to perform her job” (emphasis added)). Foster 

emailed Hoover stating that placing Ms. Wright on desk 

duty would “serve no purpose.”34 The email continued: 

Putting her on desk duty would mean what? 

She can’t go and see her clients in-person? 

She’s a placement worker and has to travel to 

see folks. She’s done most of that for the month 

already. For those that haven’t been seen, that 

then puts the responsibility on other team 

members or myself.[35] 

Hoover replied: 

The point is that if we believe that she is so 

incapable of doing her work that we’re sending 

her to be checked out....why in the world 

would we continue to send her out to see kids 

and put them in danger.......It’s not meant to 

get anything done....but to protect kids and our 

position. 

If on the other hand, you’re saying she doesn’t 

have any problems, then why am I wasting the 

agencies [sic] time, resources, and money?[36]

Foster responded that she “underst[ood] the complexity of it 

all,” and stated that it was her opinion that Ms. Wright 

“shouldn’t have been allowed to work for a number of years 

 

34 R.150-2 at 4. 

35 Id.

36 Id. (ellipses in original). 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 23

now.”37 Foster, however, did not recommend that Ms. 

Wright be placed on desk duty. It was not until Chasey, who 

had not been involved in the decision to order Ms. Wright to 

undergo an evaluation, discovered that Ms. Wright had not 

been placed on desk duty that Ms. Wright finally was 

relieved of her case work. 

The evidence presented at trial supports a finding that 

the Department did not believe that Ms. Wright posed a 

safety risk to the children with whom she worked and, 

instead, that it considered her competent to continue 

working with approximately two-dozen children. Given this 

evidence, a reasonable jury could determine that Ms. 

Wright’s fitness-for-duty examination was not, in fact, 

consistent with business necessity. The district court 

therefore did not err in denying the Department’s motion for 

judgment as a matter of law. 

B. 

We turn next to Ms. Wright’s claim that the district court 

erred in granting a new trial after Wright I. During Wright I, 

the district court provided the jury with the following 

constructive discharge instruction: 

A constructive discharge occurs when an 

employee resigns or retires from employment, 

but the resignation or retirement was not truly 

voluntary. 

 

37 Id.

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24 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

A constructive discharge can occur in either 

of two ways. 

The first is when an employer makes the 

working condition sufficiently intolerable so 

that a reasonable person standing in the 

position of the employee would have resigned 

or retired. 

The second is when, at the time the 

employee resigns or retires, the employee 

reasonably believes that, had he not resigned 

or retired, he would have been immediately 

fired.[38] 

The district court concluded that this instruction did not 

sufficiently explain the second type of constructive 

discharge, the one upon which Ms. Wright had premised her 

case. More precisely, the court believed that the instruction 

had unduly focused on the employee’s subjective perception 

of the employer’s actions that allegedly communicated to the 

employee that dismissal was inevitable. The focus, the court 

concluded, should be on the nature of the employer’s actions 

and whether those actions were so intolerable as to 

communicate to a reasonable employee that her discharge 

was inevitable. In the district court’s view, giving the 

instruction resulted in prejudicial error because it did not 

focus on an objective assessment of the employer’s acts, an 

assessment reached through an evaluation of the totality of 

the circumstances surrounding the employer’s treatment of 

the employee. 

 

38 R.218 at 38. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 25

As a general proposition, we review a district court’s 

decision to grant a new trial for an abuse of discretion.39

However, when the motion for a new trial presents a purely 

legal issue, our review is de novo. See United States v. Cotton, 

101 F.3d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Cotts v. Osafo, 692 F.3d 

564, 567 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that whether a jury 

instruction provided a fair and accurate statement of the 

governing law is a legal question reviewed de novo). Here, 

the district court determined that a new trial was warranted 

after concluding that “[t]he jury instruction [did] not 

accurately reflect the law.”40 Accordingly, our review is de 

novo. Cf. Cotton, 101 F.3d at 57 (holding that the district 

court’s decision granting a new trial based on a faulty jury 

instruction was an incorrect determination of law). To 

determine whether a jury instruction accurately stated the 

law, we “examin[e] the instructions as a whole, in a common 

sense manner, avoiding nitpicking.” Lewis v. City of Chicago 

Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The principles governing our review are well settled. An 

employee is constructively discharged when, from the 

standpoint of a reasonable employee, the working 

conditions become unbearable. See Chapin v. Fort-Rohr 

Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010). An employee’s 

constructive discharge can come in two forms. See id. 

 

39 See Vojdani v. Pharmsan Labs, Inc., 741 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2013); Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that, “[b]ecause the 

trial judge is uniquely situated to rule on such a motion, the district court 

has great discretion in determining whether to grant a new trial”). 

40 R.235 at 7. 

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26 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

In the first form, an employee resigns due 

to alleged discriminatory harassment. Such 

cases require a plaintiff to show working 

conditions even more egregious than that 

required for a hostile work environment claim 

because employees are generally expected to 

remain employed while seeking redress, 

thereby allowing an employer to address a 

situation before it causes the employee to quit. 

Id. (citation omitted). The second form of constructive 

discharge “occurs ‘[w]hen an employer acts in a manner so 

as to have communicated to a reasonable employee that she 

will be terminated.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 332 (7th Cir. 

2002)). 

The district court was on solid ground in deciding that its 

jury instruction incorrectly emphasized the employee’s 

subjective belief. See id. at 679–80 (focusing on whether the 

employer acted in a manner that would have communicated 

to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated). 

Ms. Wright asserts that the initial instruction accurately 

conveyed the governing law because it used the phrase 

“reasonably believes.” She submits that “a reasonable belief 

could only come from the actions of the Department in 

communicating to Wright that she was about to be fired.”41

But, contrary to Ms. Wright’s assertion, the use of the term 

“reasonable” is insufficient to cure the deficiency in the 

initial jury instruction. A finding that Ms. Wright reasonably 

 

41 Appellant’s Br. 43. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 27

believed that she would be fired is not the same as a finding 

that a reasonable employee in Ms. Wright’s position would 

believe, based on the Department’s actions, that she imminently 

and inevitably would be terminated. Under the instruction 

originally provided, a jury could have premised liability on a 

determination that Ms. Wright had been constructively 

discharged because, after having performed her job poorly 

or otherwise acted improperly, she “reasonably believe[d] 

that” she “would have been immediately fired” “had [s]he 

not resigned or retired.”42 More specifically, the jury could 

have found that it was reasonable for Ms. Wright to believe 

that she would be fired solely because she failed to attend 

the second evaluation, which often results in an employee’s 

termination. Our case law requires, however, that the jury 

consider whether a reasonable person would believe that her 

employer had acted in a manner that communicated that the 

employee would be terminated imminently, not simply 

whether the employee reasonably thought she would be 

terminated. The absence of any reference to the conduct of 

the employer was, as the district court concluded, reversible 

error. 

Because the district court correctly concluded that the 

constructive discharge jury instruction did not fairly and 

accurately state the law, it did not err in granting a new trial. 

 

42 R.218 at 38. 

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28 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

C. 

Finally, we address whether the district court erred in 

granting the Department’s motion for judgment as a matter 

of law in Wright II. We review de novo a district court’s 

decision granting judgment as a matter of law. Estate of 

Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 403 (7th Cir. 2012). 

“Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when there is 

‘no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury’ 

to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Zimmermann 

v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 360 F.3d 612, 623 (7th Cir. 2004)). 

In granting the Department’s motion, the district court 

concluded that, while “the prospect of discharge[] was 

certainly lurking,” Ms. Wright’s conditions of employment 

at the time she chose to retire voluntarily could not be 

characterized as intolerable or unbearable.43 Therefore her 

departure could not be characterized as a constructive 

discharge. In the court’s view, Ms. Wright simply “decided 

to unilaterally end the [disciplinary] process by retiring 

instead of allowing it to play out to its end.”44 

The district court was correct in its understanding that, 

under the second form of constructive discharge, an 

employee must prove that her working conditions had 

become intolerable. See Chapin, 621 F.3d at 679. In our prior 

cases, we have centered our inquiry on whether the 

employee’s working conditions had become intolerable 

because the employer had conducted itself in a manner that 

 

43 R.260 at 4. 

44 Id. 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 29

made it objectively clear that the employee’s discharge was 

imminent and inevitable. See, e.g., id. at 679 (noting that “a 

working condition does not become intolerable or 

unbearable merely because a ‘prospect of discharge lurks in 

the background’” (quoting Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 

388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004))). An employee’s work 

environment thus becomes intolerable under the second 

form of constructive discharge when the employer’s actions

communicate to the employee that she immediately and 

unavoidably will be terminated. Requiring that an employee 

demonstrate that she immediately will be discharged 

comports with the rationale underlying the constructivedischarge doctrine. We require that an employee’s working 

conditions become intolerable before finding a constructive 

discharge “because employees are generally expected to 

remain employed while seeking redress.” See id. 

The parties really do not dispute the appropriate 

inquiry.45 Their dispute is over whether Ms. Wright 

presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that her 

discharge from the Department was certain and imminent 

when she announced her retirement. On this question, the 

 

45 Ms. Wright submits that “[t]he thread common to all of [our] cases is 

that the focus, in determining whether a plaintiff’s working conditions 

were intolerable in a Type II constructive discharge situation, turns upon 

whether the employer’s conduct would convey to a reasonable employee 

that he is about to be terminated.” Appellant’s Br. 37. The Department 

provides a similar formulation, stating that “intolerable” under the 

second form of constructive discharge “means the employee’s working 

conditions are such that his opportunities with his employer are at an 

end.” Appellee’s Br. 48; see also Appellant’s Second Br. 47 (noting that 

“[t]he Department apparently agrees with Wright’s contention”). 

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30 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

decision of the district court rests comfortably within our 

case law. 

In University of Chicago Hospitals, we held that the EEOC 

had “demonstrated that a reasonable employee standing in 

[the employee’s] shoes would have believed that had she not 

resigned, she would have been terminated.” 276 F.3d at 332. 

In that case, the employee arrived at work to find that “her 

belongings were packed and her office was being used for 

storage.” Id. The employee also knew of her supervisor’s 

“intent, plan, and attempt to terminate her.” Id. We 

concluded that “[t]his environment, in which her employer 

made reasonably clear to her that she had reached the end of 

the line ... [,] could have indeed been to a reasonable 

employee unbearable.” Id. Similarly, in Kodish v. Oakbrook 

Terrace Fire Protection District, 604 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2010), we 

held that an employee had been constructively discharged 

because it was clear that “had [the employee] not resigned 

he would have been terminated immediately.” Id. at 502. We 

relied on the evidence that the employee’s supervisor had 

“handed [him] a letter of resignation and informed him that 

he could resign or be terminated immediately.” Id. at 494. 

In contrast to those cases, we have held that an employee 

did not demonstrate that she was discharged constructively 

when she received notice of her employer’s intent to 

commence a process that could lead to her discharge and 

“the employer [did] not undermine the employee’s position, 

perquisites, or dignity in the interim.” Cigan, 388 F.3d at 333. 

We noted that to hold otherwise “would take us a long 

distance indeed from ‘unendurable working conditions’ and 

require courts to engage in speculation.” Id. We questioned 

how “a judge or jury [could] be confident that the 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 31

superintendent would not have changed his mind” and 

noted that “arrangements and assurances satisfactory to 

both sides may have been possible.”46 Id. “The only way to 

know how matters will turn out,” we explained, “is to let the 

process run its course.” Id. “Litigation to determine what 

would have happened, had the employee contested the 

recommendation, is a poor substitute for the actual results of 

real deliberation within the employer’s hierarchy.” Id. at 

333–34 (emphasis in original). Simply put, “the prospect of 

being fired at the conclusion of an extended process is not 

itself a constructive discharge.” Id. at 334; see also Levenstein 

v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

the employee was not constructively discharged by being 

“put in a state of enforced idleness for almost a year” in part 

because the employer’s investigation was still pending). 

Most recently, in Chapin, we held that, “even construing 

all the evidence in Chapin’s favor, no reasonable employee 

standing in Chapin’s shoes would believe that had he not 

resigned, he would have been immediately fired.” 621 F.3d 

at 680. We explained that “Chapin may have had ample 

reason to believe his termination to be imminent” when his 

employer had “threatened to fire him and very clearly tied 

that threat to his EEOC complaint”; however, after the 

employer retracted the threat, he “had no reason to continue 

to believe that.” Id. Thus, “[u]nlike in University of Chicago 

Hospitals, there [was] nothing to indicate that a firing ... was 

 

46 We also noted that the employee was not “given tasks demeaning to 

her education and accomplishments” and that “she held the same post 

and duties that she had found satisfactory for three decades.” Cigan v. 

Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004). 

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32 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

an imminent and inevitable event.” Id. It was “not a situation 

where the ‘handwriting was on the wall’ and the plaintiff 

quit ‘just ahead of [the] fall of the axe.’” Id. (quoting Lindale 

v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1998)). We noted 

that, had Chapin “returned to work, without having 

withdrawn the EEOC charge, perhaps [his employer] would 

have fired him,” or “his supervisors or coworkers may have 

constantly harassed him to the point where his safety was at 

risk.” Id. We repeated, however, “that it is not a court’s 

position to speculate on ‘what ifs.’” Id. “This is particularly 

true,” we explained, “in the constructive discharge context, 

where we recognize that the burden remains on the 

employee to show why he would have had to ‘quit 

immediately, before he found the other job; why, in other 

words, his duty to mitigate damages did not require him to 

remain.’” Id. at 680–81 (quoting Lindale, 145 F.3d at 956). 

This case law makes clear that the district court correctly 

concluded that Ms. Wright had failed to demonstrate that 

she was constructively discharged. There is no evidence that 

the Department had decided to terminate Ms. Wright. It 

certainly had not told Ms. Wright that she would be fired, 

nor did her supervisors’ conduct suggest such a result was a 

certainty. Cf. Kodish, 604 F.3d at 502; Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 

276 F.3d at 332. Given the possibility of harm to the children 

with whom she inevitably would come in contact had she 

performed her regular duties, the Department quite 

reasonably assigned her to desk duty until the result of her 

fitness-for-duty examination could be evaluated. Moreover, 

while on desk duty, Ms. Wright had ample time to work on 

her grievance and, as far as the record discloses, to assist, if 

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 33

she chose, other case workers.47 Once she refused to submit 

to the examination, the Department initiated disciplinary 

proceedings against her. While those proceedings were 

pending, Ms. Wright chose to use her vacation time and 

remove herself from the office. Upon her return, she elected 

to submit her retirement paperwork. 

Ms. Wright attempts to show that her termination was 

imminent by suggesting that employees who fail to undergo 

multiple fitness-for-duty evaluations typically are 

discharged. But, as we have noted, “[l]itigation to determine 

what would have happened ... is a poor substitute for the 

actual results of real deliberation within the employer’s 

 

47 During her testimony, Ms. Wright stated: 

Well, the workers who—on my team who got my 

cases already had full caseloads of their own, and I 

could have helped them. I could have—I could have 

staffed with them and told them what I knew and knew 

to be the status of their work or lack of work they would 

have. Oriented them to my cases. 

I could have helped them with those cases and other 

cases by pulling documents out of the file as needed for 

court reports, for administrative case reviews, staffings 

on children in residential care. There are a number of 

things that we do that require piles of documents pulled 

from the file in chronological order, and those are done 

by the caseworkers. I could have done that for them. 

R.275 at 58–59. She then acknowledged that this type of work normally 

was done by caseworkers and that those were tasks that she “could have 

done and done within the restrictions” of her desk duty. Id. at 59. There 

is no evidence in the record that she was precluded from engaging in this 

type of work. 

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34 Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 

hierarchy.” Cigan, 388 F.3d at 333–34 (emphasis in original); 

accord Chapin, 621 F.3d at 680 (refusing to speculate about 

what would have happened had the employee not given up 

his position). Like the employee in Cigan, Ms. Wright 

refused to wait for her employer’s discharge process to run 

its course. That Ms. Wright may have been discharged at the 

conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding does not amount 

to a constructive discharge. See Cigan, 388 F.3d at 333–34. 

Ms. Wright also relies on the insurance bill that she 

received from CMS, which contained a bureaucratic notation 

that she was suspended pending discharge. She admitted, 

however, that, had she actually been suspended pending

discharge, she would have received a “notice in writing” 

from the Department and that the Department would have 

had “to hand-deliver it.”48 

The record is clear that Ms. Wright simply made the 

personal assessment that it was time to retire. She had 

contacted the State Employees’ Retirement System, which 

told her that she and her husband “had enough credits and 

accumulated vacation and all to take an early retirement 

with a reduced pension.”49 When Ms. Wright “found out 

that [they] could take an early retirement, [she] called [her 

husband] at work, and it took seconds to make that 

 

48 Id. at 96. She further stated that she “didn’t assume [that she had] been 

suspended” because the insurance bill was “not a formal notice from the 

Department.” Id. at 98.

49 Id. at 91. Specifically, she was told that they “had enough credits to 

retire under a different rule because [they] were 55 or older and [they] 

had 25 years of service.” Id.

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Nos. 13-1552 & 13-1553 35

decision.”50 Her testimony makes clear that she had not 

contemplated leaving the Department until she learned that 

she could retire immediately and collect a reduced pension. 

Thus, it was not the Department’s conduct or her belief that 

she immediately would be terminated that led to her 

retirement, but her realization that she could retire earlier 

than she initially had believed. 

In sum, the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that 

the Department did not act in a manner that would 

communicate to a reasonable employee in Ms. Wright’s 

position that the termination of her employment was 

imminent. Instead, the Department initiated a disciplinary 

proceeding against Ms. Wright and, while the Department’s 

decision was pending, Ms. Wright elected to retire. The 

district court’s decision falls within the heartland of our case 

law; the district court correctly granted the Department’s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law. 

Conclusion 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED 

 

50 Id. at 91–92. Ms. Wright testified that it was “absolutely true” that, 

prior to her speaking with the State Employees’ Retirement System, she 

did not “plan on retiring when [she] did.” Id. at 107. Instead, she had 

planned “to stick it out until this was over”; she was going to let the 

disciplinary process “run its course.” Id. at 101–02. 

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