Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08076/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08076-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alan Bruce Klein
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH F I L E D 

United StateA Court of Appeilla 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 0 1996 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 95-8076 

ALAN BRUCE KLEIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 95-CR-10) 

John R. Green, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. Freudenthal, United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Daniel G. Blythe of Rogers, Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Following a jury trial, Allen Bruce Klein was convicted of one count of 

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conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of 

methamphetamine in violation of21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l) and 846. The district 

court denied Mr. Klein's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to 240 months 

of imprisonment, eight years of supervised release, and fined him $10,000. Mr. 

Klein challenges his conviction and the $10,000 fine. We exercise jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Mr. Klein challenges his conviction on three grounds. First, he contends 

the incriminating statements he made to police following his arrest should have 

been suppressed because they were the fruits of an unlawful arrest. Second, Mr. 

Klein contends the trial court erred in permitting a witness named Dwight David 

Rogers to make an in-court identification of him. Third, he contends the trial 

court erred in submitting the indictment to the jury during their deliberations 

without redacting references to unproven overt acts. Finally, Mr. Klein 

challenges the $10,000 fine on the ground the trial court failed to consider his 

present or future ability to pay. 

A. Suppression of Incriminating Statements 

After his arrest and advisement of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 

U.S. 436 (1966), Mr. Klein admitted he was a supplier of large amounts of 

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methamphetamine, including over a pound of methamphetamine that was shipped 

to Wyoming. Mr. Klein moved to have these incriminating statements 

suppressed, and the district court denied his motion. Mr. Klein contends the 

statements should have been suppressed because he was arrested without probable 

cause. 

The events leading to Mr. Klein's arrest began when Wyoming authorities 

arrested Dwight David Rogers for his role in shipping a package of 

methamphetamine from Phoenix, Arizona, to Reliance, Wyoming. After his arrest, 

Mr. Rogers made statements detailing the transaction and those involved. He 

discussed the role of his supplier in Phoenix, a man whom he knew only as 

"Bruce." Mr. Rogers described Bruce as being approximately five-ten to six feet 

tall with gray-brown hair and of Basque nationality. He explained how he drove 

to Phoenix, contacted Bruce, and purchased over a pound of methamphetamine 

from Bruce at a home in Chandler, Arizona, a suburb of Phoenix. Based on 

information provided by Mr. Rogers, the Wyoming authorities flew to Arizona to 

investigate and verify Mr. Rogers' story. After arriving in Arizona, the officers 

contacted Mr. Rogers back in Wyoming and had him give them directions to the 

house where he had bought the methamphetamine from Bruce. The directions led 

to 372 North Hartford, Chandler, Arizona, where the officers observed a blue 

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Pontiac Sunbird Mr. Rogers had described as the car used by Bruce. The listed 

owner of the house and the car was Richard West. Upon being shown a 

photograph of Richard West, Mr. Rogers said the person was definitely not Bruce. 

The Wyoming authorities surveilled the house in Chandler. At one point, the 

officers observed a man in the Sunbird who fit the description Mr. Rogers had 

given for Bruce. The officers followed the man to a department store and 

obtained a backside photograph of him as he entered the store. They sent this 

photograph, along with ones of the house and the Sun bird, to Wyoming for Mr. 

Rogers' identification. Mr. Rogers identified the car as the one he had seen Bruce 

in and identified the house as the one in which he had purchased 

methamphetamine from Bruce. Mr. Rogers thought the photograph of the man 

looked like Bruce, but could not be sure because of the distance from which it 

was taken. The Wyoming officers learned from Arizona authorities that they had 

information that a man named Bruce lived at 372 North Hartford in Chandler and 

was selling large quantities of methamphetamine. The Wyoming officers could 

not, however, locate or identify this Bruce. 

In an effort to learn more about Bruce and the methamphetamine 

connection between Arizona and Wyoming, the Wyoming officers eventually 

obtained a search warrant for the house in Chandler from a federal magistrate in 

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Phoenix. The officers executed the warrant with help from Arizona officials. 

During the search, the officers encountered two women, Elizabeth Clark and 

Laura Beikler. Ms. Clark, who was in the house when officers began the search, 

confirmed that a man name Bruce lived at the house and was involved in 

trafficking methamphetamine. Ms. Beikler arrived at the house in the course of 

the search and was driving the blue Sunbird associated with Bruce. She 

confirmed that Bruce was a big trafficker of methamphetamine. She also 

explained that she had switched cars with Bruce and that he was en route to 

California in her car to piCk up more methamphetamine. During the officers' 

interview of Ms. Beikler, a man called the house, identified himself as Bruce, and 

asked to speak with Ms. Beikler. Bruce told Ms. Beikler she had forgotten to 

leave her registration in her car and specified a convenience store at which she 

was to meet him with the registration. The officers got a description from Ms. 

Beikler of what Bruce looked like, what he was wearing, and what her car looked 

like. They relayed this information to a SWAT team, which left to look for the 

car and Bruce. At this point, the officers still did not know Bruce's last name. 

Upon arriving at the specified convenience store, the SWAT team identified Ms. 

Beikler's car. Though the car contained only a woman, officers observed a man in 

the store who matched the description given by Ms. Beikler. The officers arrested 

the man and took him to the house at 372 North Hartford, where the other officers 

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were still searching the residence. After being advised of his rights, the man 

identified himself as Bruce Klein and admitted to selling Mr. Rogers over a pound 

of methamphetamine. 

A warrantless arrest for a felony normally is permissible as long as the 

arresting officer has probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-

23 (1976). The proper probable cause inquiry asks whether at the time of the 

arrest "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which 

they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent 

man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense." 

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). "'[P]robable cause can rest upon the 

collective knowledge of the police, rather than solely on that of the officer who 

actually makes the arrest."' United States v. Swingler, 758 F .2d 4 77, 487 (1Oth 

Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 

1977)). 1 

1 We note that "in absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the 

state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity even for 

federal crimes." Swingler, 758 F.2d at 487 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Assuming this rule applies in this case, the relevant substantive law 

would not change. Arizona permits warrantless arrests for felonies under the 

same standards as those established by the Supreme Court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. § 13-3883; Arizona v. Romero, 870 P.2d 1141, 1146-47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1994). 

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After a careful review of the record, we conclude probable cause supported 

Mr. Klein's arrest. From Mr. Rogers, the officers knew that a man named Bruce 

sold methamphetamine out of a home located at 372 North Hartford in Chandler, 

Arizona. They also knew he drove a blue Pontiac Sunbird. Upon executing a 

search warrant at 372 North Hartford, the officers were told by Ms. Clark that a 

man named Bruce lived at the house and trafficked in methamphetamine. Ms. 

Beikler corroborated Ms. Clark's appraisal of Bruce's methamphetamine 

trafficking and further informed the officers that Bruce could be found at a 

specified convenience store. She explained she was driving his blue Pontiac 

Sunbird because he was taking her car to California to pick up more 

methamphetamine. She gave them his description and told them what he was 

wearing. Upon arriving at the store, officers saw Mr. Klein and observed he 

matched the description of Bruce given by Ms. Beikler. Given these 

circumstances, we believe the officers had probable cause to believe Mr. Klein 

was the Bruce described to them by Mr. Rogers, Ms. Clark and Ms. Beikler as a 

methamphetamine trafficker. That the officers did not know Mr. Klein's actual 

identity until after they arrested him is of no moment. The arrest was lawful and 

the district court properly denied Mr. Klein's motion to suppress. 

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B. In-Court Identification 

Mr. Klein contends the trial court erred by permitting Mr. Rogers to make 

an in-court identification of him. Mr. Klein argues the court should not have 

permitted Mr. Rogers to make the in-court identification on the grounds that a 

pre-trial photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive and because the 

prosecution inadvertently identified Mr. Klein for Mr. Rogers during triaU After 

a hearing in which it heard testimony concerning the pre-trial photographic 

lineup, the district court ruled that even though the pre-trial photographic 

identification was unnecessarily suggestive and should be suppressed, the in-court 

identification was nevertheless permissible. With respect to Mr. Klein's 

complaint with the prosecution's alleged identification of Mr. Klein for Mr. 

Rogers during trial, the district court found this was "a problem that [was] greatly 

diluted by the earlier suggestive [photographic] lineup." 

2 The government's alleged inadvertent identification of Mr. Klein for Mr. 

Rogers arose during trial. With the jury dismissed and Mr. Rogers on the stand, 

the attorneys and the court were discussing the admissibility of a hearsay 

statement. Mr. Rogers was in the process of testifying about a telephone 

conversation he had had with the as yet unidentified "Bruce" whom he eventually 

identified as Mr. Klein. The government offered the following argument: 

MR. GREEN: Judge, what I would submit is that we will 

connect up the voice to a person that's involved in this case, and that 

person ultimately will be the defendant, Bruce Klein, and that in the 

context of this statement, it's a statement made by a coconspirator. 

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As the Supreme Court has decreed, "[r ]eliability is the linchpin in 

determining the admissibility of identification testimony." Manson v. 

Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Accordingly, we inquire whether Mr. 

Rogers' in-court identification of Mr. Klein was sufficiently reliable such that it 

did not create "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 

First, and most importantly, Mr. Rogers met personally with Mr. Klein 

three times in two days. The first meeting, in which Mr. Rogers and Mr. Klein 

negotiated toward a methamphetamine transaction, lasted approximately twenty to 

thirty minutes. The second meeting, in which Mr. Rogers and Mr. Klein 

conducted the transaction, lasted approximately ten minutes. During the third 

meeting, which lasted thirty to forty-five minutes, Mr. Rogers negotiated with Mr. 

Klein for more methamphetamine. With respect to the first meeting, Mr. Rogers 

was able to offer a detailed description of the meeting, its circumstances, and 

location. With respect to Mr. Klein's physical appearance, Mr. Rogers described 

him as approximately six feet tall, 155 pounds, with grayish-brown hair, and of 

Basque origin. Though Mr. Rogers overestimated Mr. Klein's height, there is no 

indication his physical description was otherwise inaccurate. In our view, these 

facts indicate Mr. Rogers' in-court identification of Mr. Klein was sufficiently 

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reliable to overcome the risk of misidentification created by the suggestive 

photographic lineup and the government's alleged inadvertent identification of 

Mr. Klein to Mr. Rogers in court. The identification, therefore, did not violate 

Mr. Klein's due process rights. 

C. Submission of Unredacted Indictment to Jury 

Mr. Klein contends the district court erred by submitting the indictment to 

the jury without redacting references to overt acts not in evidence. The 

indictment, in part, read: "On or about December 7, 1994, KLEIN possessed with 

the intent to distribute approximately two ounces of methamphetamine, 

approximately $19,000.00 in cash, and a loaded Firestar .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun, serial number 2068522, in Chandler, Arizona." As the 

government concedes, it presented at trial no evidence as to the gun and evidence 

as to only part of the alleged $19,000. After the court received the jury's guilty 

verdict of conspiracy with respect to Mr. Klein and the jury had been dismissed, 

one of the jurors apparently informed Mr. Klein's counsel that she had not wanted 

to convict his client but that the .45 handgun and the $19,000 in cash mentioned 

in the indictment made the difference. After learning this, Mr. Klein's counsel 

returned to the courtroom and moved for a mistrial, explaining to the judge and 

the government what he had just learned. Concluding any error was harmless, the 

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district court denied the motion. 

Mr. Klein then filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

33. The district court held a hearing on the motion. Mr. Klein argued the 

unredacted references in the indictment were extraneous prejudicial information 

erroneously submitted to the jury. Mr. Klein then urged the court to examine the 

jurors pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) to determine to what extent they 

considered this extrinsic evidence in reaching their verdict. The district court 

first found that the unredacted indictment was submitted to the jury. Concluding 

that Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) prohibited the court from making an inquiry into the 

actual effect the unredacted references might have had on the jury's deliberative 

process, the district court determined the submission of the unredacted indictment 

was harmless error. The court then denied the motion for a new trial. Mr. Klein 

contends the district court erred and that he is entitled to a new trial. 

We begin our discussion of this issue with the juror's explanation to Mr. 

Klein's counsel that the references in the indictment to the handgun and the 

money helped her conclude Mr. Klein was guilty. We have no first-hand 

knowledge of this juror's reasoning. The ju'ror's statements came into the record 

through the statements of Mr. Klein's attorney. Mr. Klein places great emphasis 

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on the juror's explanation of her guilty vote. According to Mr. Klein, since we 

know the indictment tainted the juror's deliberative process, we must grant him a 

new trial. 

Unfortunately for Mr. Klein, we are prohibited from considering the actual 

effect the unredacted indictment may have had on the juror's thought processes. 

"While a juror 'may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 

information was improperly brought to the jury's attention,' a juror 'may not 

testify as to ... the effect of anything ... concerning the juror's mental processes in 

connection therewith."' United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1482 (lOth Cir. 

1995) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1829 (1996). If the 

juror herself would be prohibited from explaining to the court the effect of the 

indictment on her decision to vote guilty, then clearly we may not consider the 

same just because it comes to us through the unsworn statement of Mr. Klein's 

attorney. It is not that we doubt the honesty of Mr. Klein's attorney, but that Rule 

606(b) limits us to an objective evaluation of the effect the unredacted indictment 

had on the jury's verdict. United States v. Hornung, 848 F .2d 1040, 1045 (1Oth 

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069 (1989); see Mayhue v. St. Francis Hasp. 

ofWichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 923-24 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

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It rests within the district court's discretion to submit the indictment to the 

JUry. United States v. Skolek, 474 F.2d 582, 586 (lOth Cir. 1973). When the 

court, however, fails to redact references to prejudicial facts that are not in 

evidence, we believe the court may err by improperly placing before the jury 

extrinsic material the jury should not consider. Of course, the trial court's failure 

to redact surplusage from an indictment will not always amount to error. See 

United States v. Crossland, 642 F .2d 1113, 1115 (1Oth Cir. 1981) (not an abuse of 

discretion to submit indictment to jury without redacting testifying 

coconspirator's name). But when the unredacted information relates to prejudicial 

unproven facts such as that an alleged drug conspirator also possessed a handgun 

and large amounts of cash, we believe the risk of biasing the jury is great enough 

to require redaction. See United States v. England, 966 F.2d 403, 408 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1025 (1992); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 75, 81 

(1st Cir. 1986) (district court erred by failing to redact from indictment unproven 

claim that alleged drug conspirator possessed a sawed-off shotgun), cert. denied, 

481 U.S. 1030 ( 1987). Mr. Klein contends failure to redact such potentially 

prejudicial information from an indictment is an error of constitutional dimension. 

Courts appear to go both ways on this issue. Compare, e.g., Williams, 808 F .2d at 

80 (failure to redact unproven overt acts from conspiracy indictment is error of 

constitutional dimension) with England, 966 F.2d at 408-09 (finding error where 

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trial court failed to redact from indictment unproven allegations but not applying 

harmless error standard required by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 

To support his contention the district court committed constitutional error, Mr. 

Klein argues this case is analogous to situations where a jury is exposed to 

information, like a newspaper article or communication by a third party, that is 

completely extraneous to the trial. See, e.g., Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 921-22 Uury 

consulted dictionary during its deliberations); United States v. Thompson, 908 

F .2d 648, 649-50 (1Oth Cir. 1990) (some juror's may have read newspaper article 

containing prejudicial information excluded at trial); Hornung, 848 F .2d at 1043-

44 Uuror received information about the defendant from a third party). 

Because it does not alter our conclusion that the district court's error was 

harmless, we assume, without deciding, that Mr. Klein is correct that the district 

court's failure to redact the challenged allegations from the indictment was an 

error of constitutional dimension. In such cases, the error is presumed to be 

prejudicial and the government is required to demonstrate the error was harmless. 

Davis, 60 F.3d at 1484-85; Thompson, 908 F.2d at 652-53; see Chapman, 386 

U.S. at 24. As the Eighth Circuit has explained, 

[b ]ecause Rule 606(b) precludes the district court from investigating 

the subjective effects of any extrinsic material on the jurors, whether 

such effects might be shown to affirm or negate the conclusion of 

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actual prejudice, a presumption of prejudice is created and the burden 

is on the government to prove harmlessness. 

United States v. Bassler, 651 F .2d 600, 603 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 944 

(1981); see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (establishing 

presumption of prejudice when juror is contacted by third party about the case). 

"[A]s a general rule ... an error is harmless if the [government] can prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict." Thompson, 908 F .2d 

at 653 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). Whether the error contributed to the 

verdict is, of course, evaluated objectively. Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1045. 

After objectively "reviewing the entire record, analyzing the substance of 

the [ unredacted information], and comparing it to that information of which the 

jurors were properly aware," Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1045 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted), we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure 

to redact the challenged information was harmless error. We begin with the 

district court's repeated admonitions to the jury that the indictment was not 

evidence. During jury selection the district court explained: 

I'm about to read a portion of the indictment that has been filed 

in this case, and I want to caution you that it is not evidence of any 

wrongdoing. It is a charge. It is notice of the claims that are being 

asserted by the government .. .. So you must not consider it as 

evidence .... 

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The court gave a similar admonition during selection of alternate jurors, and right 

before opening arguments again instructed the jury: "The indictment against the 

defendants brought by the Government is only an accusation, nothing more. It is 

not proof of guilt or anything else." Finally, at the close of trial the district court 

instructed the jury, "An Indictment is but a formal method of accusing a 

defendant of a crime. It is not evidence of any kind against the accused." The 

court read this instruction to the jury and submitted it to them in writing to 

consult during their deliberations. In our view, and that of other courts that have 

examined the problem, a proper covering instruction with respect to the 

indictment goes a long way toward curing any potential for prejudice created by 

giving the indictment to the jury. See United States v. Utz, 886 F .2d 1148, 1151 

(9th Cir. 1989) (submission of unredacted indictment to jury would be harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt if judge properly instructed jury that indictment is not 

evidence), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990); Williams, 809 F.2d at 80 n. 3; 

United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1985); see also England, 

966 F .2d at 408. 

Next, we note the district court properly instructed the jury that to establish 

guilt under 21 U.S.C. § 846 the government need not prove any alleged member 

of the conspiracy performed any particular overt act in furtherance of the 

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conspiracy. United States v. Savaiano, 843 F .2d 1280, 1294 (1Oth Cir. ), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 836 (1988). The unproven allegations that Mr. Klein possessed 

a handgun and large amounts of cash were alleged overt acts. That the 

government did not need to prove Mr. Klein engaged in any overt acts diminishes 

any potential for harm created by the jury learning of unproven overt acts. See 

England, 966 F .2d at 408. 

Finally, we note that overwhelming evidence of Mr. Klein's guilt supported 

the jury's verdict. After he was arrested and advised of his rights! Mr. Klein 

agreed to talk with police officers. When told he was going to be charged with 

conspiracy to distribute two pounds of methamphetamine to Wyoming, Mr. Klein 

responded, "How could it be two pounds when all they got from me was a pound 

and a quarter?" Mr. Klein then bragged his distribution of two or three pounds of 

methamphetamine to Wyoming was "nothing" because he distributed forty pounds 

per week in the Phoenix area. The jury heard these incriminating statements by 

Mr. Klein through the testimony of one of the Drug Enforcement Agents who 

interviewed Mr. Klein. Also, as already noted, Mr. Rogers identified Mr. Klein to 

the jury as the man whom he met three times and from whom he purchased one 

and a quarter pounds of methamphetamine. In our view, Mr. Klein's confession to 

police officers, as corroborated by Mr. Rogers, provided overwhelming evidence 

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of his guilt. As is well-recognized, "the most common means of demonstrating 

the harmlessness of an extraneous contact is to show the existence of 

'overwhelming evidence of [the] defendant's guilt."' Davis, 60 F.3d at 1485 

(quoting Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1045); see Williams, 809 F.2d at 81-82 (applying 

overwhelming evidence test when court submitted indictment to jury without 

redacting references to unproven overt acts); United States v. Parker, 586 F.2d 

1253, 1258 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Marx, 485 F .2d 1179, 1184 

(1Oth Cir. 1973) Uury's viewing of unadmitted exhibits was harmless because 

there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 

(1974). 

We believe the reasons given above provide us more than enough 

justification to conclude the government met its burden of proving the district 

court committed harmless error when it submitted the unredacted indictment to 

the jury. 

D. The $10,000 Fine 

Mr. Klein disputes the district court's decision to include a $10,000 fine as 

part of his sentence. We review the imposition of a fine under the sentencing 

guidelines for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Meuli, 8 F .3d 1481, 1487 

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(lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1403 (1994). The sentencing guidelines 

require the court to "impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant 

establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any 

fine." U.S.S.G. §5E 1.2(a). With a total offense level of 34, the fine range for 

Mr. Klein's conviction was $17,500 to $8,000,000 pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§5El.2(c)(3) & (4) and 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(A). After reviewing the evidence 

before him, the district court exercised its discretion in imposing a fine 

significantly lower than the guideline minimum. U.S.S.G. §5E1.2, comment. (n. 

3). 

Mr. Klein contends the district court erred by failing to consider his present 

or future ability to pay. After carefully reviewing the record we find this 

contention to be without merit. Mr. Klein bore the burden of proving his inability 

to pay a fine. United States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 1114 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 2762 (1994). During preparation of his presentence report and 

at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Klein failed to produce any evidence of his 

inability to pay a fine. Instead he asked the court to delay its decision so it could 

review an affidavit showing his indigence, which affidavit he was preparing to 

support his request for the appointment of an attorney under the Criminal Justice 

Act. Mr. Klein stated this affidavit would support his claim that he is without 

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assets. The district court declined to wait for the submission of this affidavit and 

found: 

I would note there is an employment record showing that the 

defendant has been employed as a service manager of an auto repair 

business earning 200 to $250 per week, has been self-employed 

buying and selling Harley Davidson motorcycles, has worked in the 

· photography business for Mr. Logan, a movie set design and odd 

jobs, and has also owned a construction company in the early 1980s 

in Florida. 

At this point the Court is able to find from the presentence 

report that the defendant has an earning capacity, that is, ability to 

maintain employment, to be involved in gainful employment, earning 

upwards to 250 per week. 

There is no evidence of financial resources that has been 

demonstrated. There is no evidence of financial dependency upon 

the defendant that would indicate that he is responsible for the 

welfare of other persons who are financially dependent upon him. 

Any fine ordered by this Court would result in a pecuniary loss 

inflicted upon the defendant rather than others. Certainly there is a 

policy to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from the 

offense and here there is no restitution issue for the Court to be 

concerned with. 

There are no assets from which a fine may be collected that the 

Court has any awareness. So a fine appears to be payable from the 

earnings of the defendant, if any, that he may accumulate from time 

to time. 

In its findings, the district court clearly accepts Mr. Klein's claims that he 

possesses no assets and instead relies on his earning potential in assessing the 

fine . After the sentencing hearing, Mr. Klein submitted a motion to relieve his 

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obligation to pay the fine and attached the above referenced affidavit. The 

district court denied this motion and again acknowledged Mr. Klein's lack of 

assets, employment history and earning capacity. 

Mr. Klein's indigence at the time of sentencing did not preclude imposition 

of a fine. United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1586 (lOth Cir. 1994) (finding no 

plain error where court based fine on defendant's earning capacity); United States 

v. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 

(1994 ); United States v. Hagmann, 950 F .2d 175, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1991 ), cert. 

denied, 506 U.S. 835 (1992); United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 907 

(D.C. Cir. 1991 ). Mr. Klein has failed to submit any evidence establishing his 

inability to find future employment or any evidence indicating current or future 

financial liabilities which would prevent him from using his future earnings to 

pay the fine. He simply rests on his current lack of assets. This reliance on his 

current insolvency is not enough to meet his burden of proving his inability to pay 

the fine sometime in the future. In light of the evidence submitted to the district 

court and the small size of the fine compared to the range permitted by the 

sentencing guidelines, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing a $10,000 fine against Mr. Klein. 

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Appellate Case: 95-8076 Document: 01019279708 Date Filed: 08/20/1996 Page: 21 
For the reasons given above, the decisions of the district court challenged 

by Mr. Klein are AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 95-8076 Document: 01019279708 Date Filed: 08/20/1996 Page: 22