Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cr-00210/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cr-00210-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
George Vortman
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

USA,

Plaintiff,

v.

GEORGE VORTMAN,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cr-00210-TEH-1 

ORDER RE: DECEMBER 5, 2016

HEARING

Counsel shall come prepared to address the following questions at the December 5, 

2016 hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion to suppress: 

For Government:

1. Could the NIT Warrant have been deployed in a manner such that it would 

only target individuals who downloaded or uploaded child pornography? If 

so, why did the government not do so? 

2. The NIT Warrant requested the government’s ability to “deploy the NIT 

more discreetly against particular users, such as those who have attained a 

higher status on [Playpen]” in order to “ensure technical feasibility and avoid 

detection.” ECF No. 58-1, at 28 n. 8. 

a. Given the government’s ability to deploy the NIT warrant in a more 

targeted manner, how is the NIT Warrant compliant with the Fourth 

Amendment’s particularity requirement? See United States v. 

Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Generic classifications in 

a warrant are acceptable only when a more precise description is not 

possible.”). 

b. Also, wouldn’t the government’s ability to deploy the NIT warrant in 

a more targeted manner mean the government had unfettered 

discretion in deciding who to target and in what particular manner? 

3. You argue that the NIT was valid under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(4) as a 

tracking device. ECF No. 59, at 19. But the NIT appears to have done more 

than merely track movement. It infiltrated the Defendant’s computer, 

instructed it to execute a command, and then instructed the computer to send 

Case 3:16-cr-00210-WHA Document 70 Filed 11/30/16 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

Northern District of California

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several pieces of information – not just the Defendant’s location – to the 

government. How does the NIT fit within the definition of a tracking device 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b): “an electronic or mechanical device which permits 

the tracking of the movement of a person or object”? 

For Defendant:

4. You failed to address the government’s reference to United States v. 

Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990) in your reply. Please address whether 

Mitchell controls the outcome in this case. 

5. You contend there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in your IP 

address. ECF No. 55-1, at 19; ECF No. 61, at 9–10. Yet, every district court 

in this circuit to address the NIT warrant has found there is no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in an IP address. How do you reconcile your position 

with these other district courts and with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2007)? 

6. Assuming the Court finds the government violated Rule 41, you argue the 

violation was unconstitutional or fundamental because “[a] warrant issued by 

a judge who has no jurisdiction to issue it is no warrant at all.” ECF No. 61, 

at 9. How do you reconcile your argument with United States v. Ritter, 752 

F.2d 435, 440–441 (9th Cir. 1985)? 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/30/2016 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cr-00210-WHA Document 70 Filed 11/30/16 Page 2 of 2