Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03718/USCOURTS-ca8-15-03718-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Harrison Headbird
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3718

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Christopher Harrison Headbird

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

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 Submitted: June 16, 2016

 Filed: August 9, 2016

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Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Headbird pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

The district court determined that Headbird had three prior violent felony convictions

and sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act

(ACCA). Headbird appeals, contending that his juvenile adjudication for second

degree assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, does not qualify as an ACCA predicate

offense. We vacate Headbird's sentence and remand for resentencing.

Appellate Case: 15-3718 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/09/2016 Entry ID: 4435366 
I.

On August 19, 2014 the Leech Lake Tribal Police responded to a call from

Headbird's aunt reporting that he had threatened and hit her. When the police arrived,

Headbird took his girlfriend hostage inside a house. He eventually surrendered,

however, and handed his shotgun to the police. Headbird was subsequently indicted

with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm to which he pled guilty. See

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). At sentencing the district court determined that

Headbird had two prior convictions for aggravated robbery and a prior juvenile

adjudication for assault, all of which qualified as ACCA predicate offenses. The court

then sentenced Headbird to 235 months imprisonment, and Headbird appeals.

II.

Headbird contends his juvenile adjudication for Minnesota second degree

assault does not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. We review de novo the

district court's determination of whether a conviction so qualifies. United States v.

Schaffer, 818 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 2016). The ACCA imposes a mandatory

minimum 15 year sentence for a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession

of a firearm who "has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony." 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(1). A crime qualifies as a predicate offense under the force clause of the

ACCA definition of "violent felony" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use,

or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." Id.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). To determine whether a prior conviction fits that definition, we

"start with the formal categorical approach and look only to the fact of conviction and

the statutory definition of the prior offense." United States v. Jordan, 812 F.3d 1183,

1186 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Soileau, 686 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir.

2012)). If the statute "criminalizes both conduct that does and does not qualify as a

violent felony" and the statute is divisible, we apply the "modified categorical

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approach" and may review certain judicial records "to identify which section of the

statute supplied the basis for a defendant's conviction." Id.

A.

Headbird first argues that Minnesota's second degree assault statute is not a

violent felony under the ACCA because the state definition of assault does not contain

an element which requires proof of "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Minnesota Statutes section 609.222,

subd. 1, makes it a felony to "assault[] another with a dangerous weapon." Assault is

defined as "(1) an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily

harm or death; or (2) the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon

another." Id. § 609.02, subd. 10. These two forms of assault are referred to in

Minnesota respectively as "assault fear" and "assault harm." State v. Fleck, 810

N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).

In Schaffer, we analyzed a Minnesota statute which criminalizes "an act with

intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death" and concluded that

it qualifies as a violent felony. 818 F.3d at 798; Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1). 

The language in the "assault fear" part of the definition at issue here is materially

identical to the statute in Schaffer. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1). Moreover,

Headbird's argument that the "assault harm" part of the definition does not necessarily

encompass the use or attempted use of physical force is foreclosed by United States

v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2016). In Rice we rejected a variation of

Headbird's argument that "bodily harm" can be accomplished without violent force. 

See id. We thus agree with the holding in United States v. Harvey , ___ Fed. App'x

___, 2016 WL 1696816 (8th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016) (per curiam) (citing Schaffer and

Rice), that Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, is a violent felony under either definition

of assault.

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B.

Because Headbird's conviction for second degree assault was a juvenile

adjudication, it must also have "involve[d] the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or

destructive device" in order to qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B). Headbird was convicted of assault "with a dangerous weapon," a term

defined as:

any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a

weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm, any

combustible or flammable liquid or other device or instrumentality that,

in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to

produce death or great bodily harm, or any fire that is used to produce

death or great bodily harm.

Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. We must therefore determine whether Minnesota's

second degree assault statute is divisible with respect to the type of dangerous weapon

used by Headbird to commit his crime. See United States v. Bankhead, 746 F.3d 323,

326 (8th Cir. 2014).

Headbird argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the assault

statute is divisible and then applied the modified categorical approach to determine

that he had used a firearm when committing the assault. The government initially

argued that the statute is divisible under our decision in United States v. Mathis, 786

F.3d 1068, 1074–75 (8th Cir. 2015), but the Supreme Court reversed that decision in

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016). In light of the Supreme Court's

decision in Mathis, the government now concedes that the phrase "with a dangerous

weapon" in Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 is not divisible. We agree.

To decide whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate, we must

first determine which words or phrases in the statute are elements of the crime. See

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Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. The elements of a crime are the "'constituent parts' of a

crime's legal definition—the things the 'prosecution must prove to sustain a

conviction.'" Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). A prior

conviction "cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than

those of a listed generic offense" (in this case a "violent felony" involving the use of

a firearm, knife, or destructive device). Id. at 2251. The only items of consequence

under the ACCA are the "elements of the statute of conviction." Id. (quoting Taylor

v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990)). In contrast, the "'particular facts

underlying [the prior] convictions'—the means by which the defendant, in real life,

committed his crimes"—are irrelevant in our ACCA analysis. Id. (quoting Taylor,

495 U.S. at 600) (alteration in original). Thus, "when a statute, instead of merely

laying out a crime's elements, lists alternative means of fulfilling one (or more)"

elements, we consider only whether the elements satisfy the ACCA and do not apply

the modified categorical approach to the list of means. Id. at 2253.

Minnesota's second degree assault statute makes it a felony to "assault[] another

with a dangerous weapon." Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1. The text of this statute

contains two elements: (1) assault, and (2) the use of a "dangerous weapon." Id.; see

also Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides—Criminal (CRIMJIG) § 13.10 (2016). 

"Dangerous weapon" is defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6, which lists the types

of weapons which qualify as dangerous. The definition in § 609.02 describes what

the Supreme Court has called the "brute facts" of the defendant's weapon. See Mathis,

136 S. Ct. at 2248. The definition of "dangerous weapon," in other words,

"enumerates various factual means of committing a single element." Id. at 2249.

In Mathis, the Supreme Court described a hypothetical statute requiring the "use

of a 'deadly weapon' as an element of [the] crime" and stating that "the use of a 'knife,

gun, bat, or similar weapon' would all qualify." 136 S. Ct. at 2249. Such a statute, the

Court explained, "merely specifies diverse means of satisfying a single element of a

single crime—or otherwise said, spells out various factual ways of committing some

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component of the offense." Id. Minnesota's assault statute is functionally identical

to the Court's hypothetical statute. Although the Minnesota definition of "dangerous

weapon" lists various ways in which a person can commit second degree assault—for

example, with a firearm or a flammable liquid—it does not change the elements of the

crime. 

There are no published Minnesota cases analyzing the question of whether the

various terms in the definition of "dangerous weapon" are intended as elements of the

crime or only means by which the crime is committed. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256

(looking to state case law to determine whether listed items in a statute are elements

or means). Two unpublished decisions from the Minnesota Court of Appeals do

support the proposition that the definition is a list of means, however. State v. Holen

stated that "[t]he essential element of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon

is the fact that a dangerous weapon was used. The actual weapon used is the means

by which the offense is committed." No. A12-2299, 2013 WL 6389857, at *4 (Minn.

Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2013) (unpublished). In State v. Robb, the state court explained that

jury unanimity "is not required as to the specific ways a [second degree assault] was

committed," and therefore it "is not essential that the jury unanimously agree whether

the instrumentality constituting the dangerous weapon was a bat, a pipe, a pole, or a

golf club" because any of these objects "would constitute a dangerous weapon." No.

C0-01-305, 2001 WL 1646457, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001) (unpublished);

see Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (describing how a jury must find each element of a

crime but not particular factual circumstances or events). We see no reason why the

Minnesota Supreme Court would disagree with the analysis in those cases. 

The fact that the definition of "dangerous weapon" is contained in a separate

section of the Minnesota criminal statutes provides textual support for the conclusion

that "with a dangerous weapon" is intended as an element of the crime and that the list

of dangerous weapons contains means by which that element may be committed. See

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250 (analyzing Iowa burglary statute and noting that its list of

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locations "lay[s] out alternative ways of satisfying a single locational element"); Iowa

Code § 713.1 (burglary of an "occupied structure"); id. § 702.12 (definition of

"occupied structure"); cf. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–84 (2013)

(describing a hypothetical burglary statute prohibiting "entry of an automobile as well

as a building" as a statute with "alternative elements" requiring a modified categorical

analysis). The Minnesota Legislature's use of the term "dangerous weapon" both

standing alone, and within disjunctive lists, also indicates that it is intended to be an

element of a crime. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (felony to "assault[]

another with a dangerous weapon"), and id. § 609.71, subd. 1 (felony to disturb the

peace when "armed with a dangerous weapon"), with id. § 609.66, subd. 1g(1)

(felony to "possess[] a dangerous weapon, ammunition, or explosives" in a

courthouse), and id. § 609.582, subd. 1(b) (burglary while possessing "a dangerous

weapon, any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably

believe it to be a dangerous weapon, or an explosive").1

We conclude that the phrase "with a dangerous weapon" is an element of

Minnesota's second degree assault statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, and that the

separate definition of "dangerous weapon" in § 609.02, subd. 6, lists means for

committing that element. The element "with a dangerous weapon" is not divisible. 

Minnesota's definition of "dangerous weapon" is broader than the ACCA's

requirement that a juvenile adjudication "involve[] the use or carrying of a firearm,

knife, or destructive device," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The state's second degree

assault statue "cover[s] a greater swath of conduct than the elements of the relevant

ACCA offense." Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251. Headbird's juvenile adjudication was

1

Like the phrase "dangerous weapon," the "assault" element of second degree

assault is also defined in a separate section of the statutes, § 609.02, subd. 10. See

part II.A, supra. Unlike "dangerous weapon," however, the statutory definition of

"assault" defines the elements of a common law crime. When giving the jury

instructions for second degree assault, Minnesota courts also give a separate

instruction containing the elements of assault. See Minnesota CRIMJIG § 13.10.

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thus not an ACCA predicate offense, and he does not qualify as an armed career

criminal because he had only two prior ACCA predicate convictions.

III.

For these reasons we vacate Headbird's sentence and remand for resentencing

consistent with this opinion.

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