Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01725/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rosemary Ndoh
Respondent
Efrain Armenta Rivera
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EFRAIN ARMENTA RIVERA,

Petitioner,

v.

ROSEMARY NDOH,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01725-AWI-SAB-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DISMISS PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(ECF No. 6)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

I.

BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2013, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Fresno County Superior 

Court of multiple counts of sexual assault by sodomy against a child, forcible sodomy against a 

minor, and having contact or communication with a minor with the intent to commit a sexual 

offense. On October 25, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 180 years to 

life, plus 17 years. (LDs

1

1, 2). On November 13, 2015, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District affirmed the judgment. (LD 2). On January 20, 2016, the California Supreme 

Court denied the petition for review. (LDs 3, 4). On July 4, 2019,

2 Petitioner constructively filed 

 

1

“LD” refers to the documents electronically filed by Respondent on February 6, 2020. (ECF No. 8).

2 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is filed “at the time . . . [it is] delivered . . . to the 

prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) 

Case 1:19-cv-01725-AWI-SAB Document 10 Filed 03/27/20 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition on October 30, 

2019. (LDs 5, 6).

On December 8, 2019, Petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition for writ 

of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1). On February 6, 2020, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the 

petition as untimely. (ECF No. 6). To date, no opposition to the motion to dismiss has been filed, 

and the time for doing so has passed.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the 

enactment of AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). The 

mailbox rule applies to both federal and state habeas petitions. Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 

2010). Respondent applies the mailbox rule in the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 6 at 2 n.1).

Case 1:19-cv-01725-AWI-SAB Document 10 Filed 03/27/20 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Here, the judgment

became final on April 19, 2016, when the ninety-day period to file a petition for writ of certiorari 

in the United States Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 

1999). The one-year limitation period commenced running the following day, April 20, 2016, 

and absent tolling, was set to expire on April 19, 2017. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 

1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)).

B. Statutory Tolling

The “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward” the one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In the instant case, the limitation 

period expired before Petitioner constructively filed his first and only state habeas petition on 

July 4, 2019, and § 2244(d) “does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has 

ended before the state petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003). Accordingly, the instant federal petition is untimely unless Petitioner establishes that 

equitable tolling is warranted.

C. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period also is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates 

“‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Petitioner bears the burden 

of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

Case 1:19-cv-01725-AWI-SAB Document 10 Filed 03/27/20 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Here, however, Petitioner has not made any showing that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

Indeed, Petitioner failed to oppose this motion to dismiss in any way. Therefore, the instant 

federal petition was not timely filed, and dismissal is warranted on this ground.

III.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) be GRANTED; and

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as untimely.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:19-cv-01725-AWI-SAB Document 10 Filed 03/27/20 Page 4 of 4