Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04205/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathleen Allison
Defendant
Ralph Diaz
Defendant
Tammy Foss
Defendant
Chad Kester
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD KESTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-04205-JST 

ORDER OF SERVICE; GRANTING EX 

PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER; SETTING 

BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 

HEARING ON PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION MOTION

Re: ECF No. 2

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), filed this pro se civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also brings a motion for temporary restraining order 

(“TRO”) and for preliminary injunction. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis in a separate order. His complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before the Court for 

review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and 

deny in part the motion for TRO, issue an order to show cause regarding the preliminary 

injunction, and find that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for failure to protect under 

the Eighth Amendment. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Complaint

1. Standard of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental 

entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

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granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

2. Legal Claims

Before screening the complaint, the Court notes that the complaint in this action is almost 

identical to the complaint filed in Ruiz v. Diaz, Case No. 19-cv-01928 LHK (PR), with the same 

statement of claim and the same defendants.1 The related request for a preliminary 

injunction/temporary restraining order is also similar, with an identical2supporting declaration 

from Kim McGill, an organizer with the Youth Justice Coalition.3 

 

1

In Ruiz, the court has related over twenty-two complaints because the complaints are nearly 

identical. See Ruiz, ECF Nos. 31, 35.

2 Ms. McGill’s declaration states, “I am writing this declaration in support of Joel Reyes’ motion 

for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.” ECF No. 4 at 1. Plaintiff’s name is 

not Joel Reyes. 

3

It appears that Plaintiff’s papers may have been drafted by an undisclosed paralegal or attorney. 

The courts frown upon ghostwriting. See Walker v. Pac. Mar. Assoc., No. C07-3100 BZ, 2008 

WL 1734757, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2008) (warning that ghostwriting could lead to sanctions 

being imposed); see also Makreas v. Moore Law Grp., A.P.C., No. C-11-2406 MMC, 2012 WL 

1458191, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (“ghostwriting is not permitted in the federal courts”). 

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The complaint names as defendants California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Secretary Ralph Diaz,4 CDCR Acting Undersecretary Kathleen Allison, 

and Acting SVSP Warden Tammy Foss. On December 12, 2017, Defendant Allison announced 

that an expansion of the program whereby inmates housed in Sensitive Needs Yards (“SNY 

inmates”) would be housed with General Population inmates (“GP inmates”) in all Level 1 and 

Level 2 yards. On September 10, 2018, Defendant Diaz issued a memorandum setting forth the 

schedule for such mergers, and scheduling the SVSP merger for December 2018. As a result of 

the merger, there was a major riot that resulted in multiple injuries. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 3.

According to the complaint, it has long been understood that SNY inmates cannot safely 

merge with GP inmates. The complaint alleges that it is well documented that when SNY inmates 

and GP inmates have previously merged, there have been incidents of violence. SNY inmates 

either preemptively attacked GP inmates because they feared for their lives, or SNY inmates were 

attacked by GP inmates. Compl. at 3.

Plaintiff also references the incremental releases of members of the Fresno Bulldogs prison 

gang, Compl. at 3, but does not explain how the Fresno Bulldogs are related to the merger or pose 

a specific danger to Plaintiff. This seemingly unrelated reference to the Fresno Bulldogs may be 

due to the use of a boilerplate complaint submitted on behalf of multiple inmates. See note 2, 

supra. 

It is unclear where Plaintiff is currently housed or where he was housed at the time he filed 

 

There are at least two problems with the submission of ghostwritten pleadings and memoranda. 

First, because a generic boilerplate complaint is intended to describe the circumstances of an entire 

group of plaintiffs, it will often fail to accurately or completely describe an individual plaintiff’s 

circumstances. One prisoner-plaintiff might have a stronger case than other prisoner-plaintiffs 

based on his or her individual circumstances, but those circumstances will not be clear to a court if 

the complaint uses boilerplate language. Second, regardless of whether the language is 

boilerplate, the use of a third party to draft documents, particularly when that third party is a 

lawyer, “affords [the prisoner-plaintiff] the benefit of this court’s liberal construction of pro se 

pleadings, but . . . inappropriately shields [the third party] from responsibility and accountability 

for his actions and counsel.” Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations 

omitted). 

4 Defendant Diaz is no longer the acting CDCR Secretary. In March 2019, Defendant Diaz was 

appointed CDCR Secretary. See California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

Secretary Ralph Diaz – California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

http://cdcr.ca.gov/about-cdcr/secretary (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).

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the complaint. According to the grievance attached to the complaint, as of February 28, 2019, 

Plaintiff was housed at SVSP Level-III SNY facility with a Level-II Placement Score of 34, and 

had been endorsed to California Institution for Men (“CIM”) Level II-Sensitive Needs Yard. 

However, since his endorsement, CIM Level I and Level II yards converted to Non-Designated 

Programming Facilities (“NDPF”), which means that Level I and Level II GP and SNY inmates 

are housed together. Plaintiff has remained housed at SVSP pending the transfer to CIM, but it is 

unclear if he remains in the SVSP Level-III SNY facility or has transferred to an SVSP Level-II 

facility that is an NDPF.

Plaintiff alleges that the “planned merge[r] would place [him] at serious risk of harm or 

injury and in violation of his right to be protected from violence,” and that Defendants “are well 

aware of and are completely disregarding such [] excessive risk to [his] health and safety.” 

Compl. at 3. The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, 

prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id.

at 833. The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from 

dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are 

met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, 

subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Id. at 834. A prison official is 

deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety 

by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s 

allegations state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect.

B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff has filed an ex parte emergency motion requesting that the Court enjoin 

Defendants and all persons acting on their behalf from placing Plaintiff on an NDPF yard. ECF 

No. 2 at 2. Plaintiff also requests that Defendants be enjoined from merging SNY and GP 

prisoners, pending entry by the Court of a final judgment in this action. Id. at 3. 

1. Background

According to the exhibits attached to the complaint, as of November 2018, Plaintiff was 

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housed on an NDPF yard. Compl. at 6. Sometime between November 2018 and February 2019, 

Plaintiff was housed at SVSP’s Level-III SNY facility with a Level-II Placement Score of 34. 

Compl. at 4. Plaintiff was endorsed to CIM Level-II SNY at his prior annual review but remained 

housed at SVSP pending the transfer. Compl. at 4. Since the endorsement, CIM Level-II SNY 

converted to an NDPF. Compl. at 4. In November 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting a 

transfer to an SNY facility instead of CIM, claiming that he faced a credible threat to his safety. 

Compl. at 6. On February 28, 2018, the grievance was denied at the third and final level on the 

grounds that Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to support that placement in an NDPF 

presented any greater, or more specific, risk to his safety beyond that inherent in the correctional 

environment. Compl. at 5. 

In a declaration dated July 11, 2019, made under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746, Plaintiff stated that he feared for his life if he were to be placed in an NDPF yard because 

he is a convicted sex offender and a drop-out gang member; he has helped law enforcement obtain 

convictions for at least two GP inmates; and two separate GP gangs have offered a bounty for his 

death. ECF No. 3 at 3. Plaintiff has already been the victim of two violent attacks. Plaintiff states 

that he suffers from mental illness, has been diagnosed as bipolar and “schizo-affective,” has 

mobility issues requiring him to use a cane for walking, and has substance abuse issues. ECF No. 

3 at 1. Plaintiff’s declaration requests that the Court enter an order making it impossible for him 

to be exposed to GP inmates. ECF No. 3 at 2. 

Plaintiff does not specify where he is currently housed, but based on his July 11, 2019 

declaration, the Court presumes that Plaintiff remains in SNY housing and is not currently housed

on an NDPF yard. 

2. Standard

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) restricts the power of the court to 

grant prospective relief in any action involving prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). 

Section 3626(a)(2) permits the court to enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary 

injunction “to the extent otherwise authorized by law” but requires that such an order “be narrowly 

drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary 

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relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3626(a)(2). The court must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or 

the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief.” Id. 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (noting that such remedies are extraordinary, and not 

granted as of right). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these 

elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009). “The Ninth Circuit 

weighs these factors on a sliding scale, such that where there are only ’serious questions going to 

the merits’—that is, less than a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’—a preliminary injunction 

may still issue so long as ’the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor’ and the 

other two factors are satisfied.” Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Shell 

Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)). 

Even where the balance tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, however, the plaintiff must still make 

the threshold showing of likely success on the merits or a serious legal question. See Leyva-Perez 

v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven certainty of irreparable harm has 

never entitled one to a stay.”) (emphasis in original). In addition, the issuance of a preliminary 

injunction is at the discretion of the district court. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 

F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction are “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. 

Brush and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

3. Analysis

a) Request to Enjoin Defendants from Placing Plaintiff on NDPF 

Yard

With respect to Plaintiff’s request for a TRO enjoining Defendants from placing Plaintiff 

on an NDPF yard or otherwise requiring him to be housed with GP inmates, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has demonstrated there is a likelihood of success on the merits, that the balance of 

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hardships tips sharply in his favor, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest. 

The Court first finds that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. The Court notes 

that the Ninth Circuit has previously granted judgment in favor of a pretrial detainee on a due 

process failure-to-protect claim5 where the plaintiff-detainee was raped after being placed in a 

housing situation that exposed him to harm. Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 

1991), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In Redman, the 

plaintiff-inmate was an 18-year-old pretrial detainee standing 5’6” tall and weighing 

approximately 130 pounds, who had no prior criminal convictions. He was originally placed in 

the jail’s “young and tender” unit. After a week, however, he was transferred to the jail’s general 

population and assigned to a single cell with an inmate incarcerated for violation of parole upon a 

conviction of sex offense. That inmate had been labelled an “aggressive homosexual”6on his 

inmate status report, and had been transferred from the homosexual housing to the general 

population because of reported incidents of coercing and manipulating the homosexual inmates for 

sexual favors. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part the district court’s directed verdict in favor of the 

defendants, finding that the evidence presented would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that 

San Diego County and two of the individually named defendants were deliberately indifferent to 

Redman’s constitutional right to personal security. The court reasoned that although defendants 

conceded that the desirable course of action was to isolate inmates labeled as “aggressive 

homosexuals” or place them in smaller units for observation, San Diego County had an unwritten 

policy of transferring aggressive homosexuals from the homosexual module to the general 

population to protect inmates labeled as “passive homosexuals” because it was assumed that 

heterosexual inmates could protect themselves; and because San Diego County correctional 

 

5 Deliberate indifference to inmate safety claims brought by pretrial detainees arise under the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment Clause. See Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 

2016).

6 Terms such as “aggressive homosexual” are inherently problematic because they rely on and 

perpetuate unfounded stereotypes concerning LGBTQ individuals. The Court reluctantly uses

such terms to accurately reflect the labelling and categories used at San Diego County’s South Bay 

Detention Facility, where the relevant events took place in Redman. 

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facilities were so overcrowded that there was both a supervision and safety problem.7 

Plaintiff has also demonstrated that he may suffer irreparable harm if placed in an NDPF 

yard. Plaintiff is currently endorsed for SNY housing, indicating that there is reason for him to be 

placed in protective custody. Plaintiff has assisted in the conviction of two current GP inmates. 

See Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that being 

known as an informer can expose inmate to violence from other inmates). Plaintiff is a convicted 

sex offender. State regulations require that inmates who are held pending civil process under the 

sexually violent predator act shall be held in separate and secure housing, Cal. Penal Code § 

4002(b), indicating that Plaintiff’s status as a sex offender may expose him to violence if housed 

in the general population. Finally, two GP gangs have offered a bounty for Plaintiff’s death.8 

Given that Plaintiff may suffer a severe assault or death if placed on an NDPF yard and 

that he is currently housed in an SNY yard, the balance of equities tips in his favor. The TRO 

would simply maintain the status quo and reduce the risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Cf. Univ. of Texas 

v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to 

preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”).

Finally, an injunction would be in the public interest. The public has an interest in 

protecting inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to their safety. 

“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” 

Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The Court notes that Plaintiff did not give notice before bringing his motion for TRO. A

court may grant a temporary restraining order ex parte for “good cause shown,” N.D. Cal. Civ. L. 

R. 65-1(b) and under the following circumstances:

 

7 Although Redman is a Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, it is still relevant to the 

instant action because Plaintiff alleges the subjective awareness required to prevail on an Eighth 

Amendment failure-to-protect claim. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect 

claim, a prisoner must prove an individual defendant’s subjective awareness of a risk of harm, 

whereas a pretrial detainee need not do the same in order to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068-70 (holding that objective standard of 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), applicable to excessive force claims brought by 

pretrial detainees, also applies to failure-to-protect claims brought by pretrial detainees). 

8 Plaintiff has recently been assaulted twice, but it is unclear if these assaults were motivated by 

Plaintiff being a dropout gang member, convicted sex offender, and informant. 

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The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or 

oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show 

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to 

the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give 

notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 

As discussed supra, Plaintiff’s declaration sets forth specific facts indicating that he will 

suffer irreparable harm. The harm could happen immediately upon his placement on an NDPF 

yard. Plaintiff does not have the resources to effect service on his own and must rely on the 

United States Marshal for that purpose. It is therefore unclear how long Plaintiff would be 

exposed to potential harm before adequate notice and a hearing could be provided. Requiring 

Plaintiff, an inmate-plaintiff proceeding pro se, to wait until Defendants are served and appear in 

this action before filing a request for a temporary restraining order exposes Plaintiff to a credible 

risk of assault or death, according to the facts set forth in his declaration. 

The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a TRO enjoining Defendants 

from placing him on a NDPF yard. ECF No. 2. Pursuant to Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants are enjoined from placing Plaintiff 

on an NDPF yard or otherwise requiring him to be housed with GP inmates. 

b) Request to Enjoin the Merger of the GP and SNY populations

Plaintiff has also requested that the Court enjoin the merger of the GP and SNY 

populations. As discussed supra, the PLRA requires that a temporary restraining order “be 

narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 

preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3626(a)(2). 

As applied here, because the Court can address the harm to Plaintiff by enjoining the

CDCR from housing him with GP inmates, an order that affected other inmates would “extend 

further than necessary” and would not be “the least intrusive means necessary to correct that 

harm.” Moreover, given that numerous similar cases are now pending before Judge Lucy Koh, 

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sound principles of case management – including the need to avoid conflicting rulings or the 

unnecessary duplication of judicial effort – counsel in favor of letting her resolve any issues that 

go beyond Plaintiff Kester’s individual case. Finally, Plaintiff’s requested state-wide relief 

extends to facilities and yards as to which he has no first-hand knowledge.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a TRO enjoining the merger of the GP and SNY 

populations is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court hereby ENJOINS Defendants and 

their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other person or entity subject to 

their control or acting directly or indirectly in concert or participation with Defendants from 

placing Plaintiff on an NDPF yard or otherwise requiring him to be housed with GP inmates. This 

Temporary Restraining Order shall take effect immediately and shall remain in effect until 

September 19, 2018 or further order of this Court. Plaintiff’s request for a TRO enjoining the 

merger of the GP and SNY populations is DENIED. 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Defendants, and each of them, is hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on September 

18, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in the courtroom of the 

Honorable Jon S. Tigar, located at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California, why they, and each of 

them, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other person or entity 

subject to their control or acting directly or indirectly in concert or participation with Defendants, 

should not be enjoined from taking any action placing Plaintiff on an NDPF yard or otherwise 

requiring him to be housed with GP inmates. Defendants are also ordered to show cause why such 

relief would not be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 

Federal right, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, 

see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1), such that final injunctive relief may be entered at that time, id. 

Defendants shall file with the Court and serve on Plaintiff an opposition to the preliminary 

injunction motion by September 9, 2019. In light of the time constraints imposed by Rule 65 and 

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the difficulties Plaintiff will face in filing a reply, the Court will not provide for a written reply but 

will allow Plaintiff to respond at the hearing. 

Plaintiff Chad Kester, CDCR #BA1121 shall attend via telephone by dialing (510) 637-

3347, and Defendants shall attend in person in Courtroom 6, Second Floor of the United States 

Courthouse at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California. A copy of this order has been sent via email 

to the Salinas Valley State Prison Litigation Coordinator. 

Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court may grant 

a preliminary injunction “only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers 

proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 

enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The district court retains discretion “as to the 

amount of security required, if any.” Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In light of Plaintiff’s 

indigent status, the Court finds it appropriate to waive a bond. See Taylor-Failor v. County of 

Hawaii, 90 F.Supp.3d 1095, 1103 (D. Haw. 2015) *869 (“Plaintiffs are individuals of limited 

financial means and there is a significant public interest underlying this action.”). 

SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Regarding the screening of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court orders as follows.

1. The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for 

deliberate indifference to his safety.

2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint with all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order 

upon defendants CDCR Secretary Ralph Diaz and CDCR Acting Undersecretary Kathleen 

Allison at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations, 1515 S. Street, 

Sacramento, CA 95811 and Acting SVSP Warden Tammy Foss at Salinas Valley State Prison 

at 31625 Highway 101, Soledad CA 93960. 

A courtesy copy of the complaint with attachments and this order shall also be mailed to 

the California Attorney General’s Office. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

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a. No later than 91 days from the date this Order is filed, Defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or a motion to stay as 

indicated above. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 

judgment, Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for 

summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that Plaintiff will have fair, 

timely, and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. 

Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A 

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies similarly must be 

accompanied by a Wyatt notice. Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff also must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding motions to dismiss for nonexhaustion provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion to dismiss. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

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as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

Plaintiff also is advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. You must “develop a record” and present it in your opposition in order to dispute any 

“factual record” presented by Defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 

1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).

(The Rand and Wyatt notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve said 

notices again concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative 

remedies and motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants’ 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant’s 

counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to the 

defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

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to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2019

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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