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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Dontavis Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 3, 2010

Decided February 4, 2010

Before

     KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

     TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

     DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1418

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DONTAVIS WILLIAMS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 55‐3

Ronald A. Guzmán,

Judge.

O R D E R

Dontavis Williams was arrested after he arranged to buy ten kilograms of cocaine

from a confidential source working with the government.  He pleaded guilty to conspiring

to possess drugs with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to

the statutory minimum, 120 months in prison.  In the plea agreement Williams waived all

his appellate rights but filed a notice of appeal anyway.  His appellate counsel requests

permission to withdraw because he concludes that any challenge to the validity of the

waiver would be frivolous.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Despite three

extensions of time to respond to counsel’s submission, see CIR. R. 51(b), Williams has failed

to file a response, and so we confine our review to the issues identified in counsel’s facially

adequate brief.  United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1418 Page 2

Because the appeal waiver stands or falls with the plea, Nunez v. United States, 546

F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2008), counsel first examines whether Williams has a basis to

challenge the voluntariness of the plea.  But counsel does not say whether Williams wants to

withdraw his plea, see United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671‐72 (7th Cir. 2002), nor can we

tell from Williams’s other filings whether he wishes to have his plea set aside.

Even if Williams wished to withdraw his plea, however, we agree with counsel that

any challenge to the voluntariness of the plea would be frivolous.  Because Williams did not

move to withdraw his plea in the district court, we would review it for plain error.  United

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002); United States v. Villarreal‐Tamayo, 467 F.3d 630, 633 (7th

Cir. 2006).  A district court ensures the voluntariness of a guilty plea by substantially

complying with the admonishments listed in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure.  Schuh, 289 F.3d at 975.  Although the plea colloquy was otherwise extensive, the

court omitted reference to the right to have counsel appointed if necessary.  FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(1)(D).  But Williams was aware that he had the right to an appointed lawyer because

the court appointed a lawyer for him after he lost retained counsel.  Additionally, the court

did not inform Williams that it could order restitution or was obligated to impose a special

assessment.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(K), (L).  But the failure to mention the possibility of

restitution was inconsequential because the court did not order restitution, and Williams

knew about the special assessment from the plea agreement.

Counsel next proceeds to consider whether Williams would have any nonfrivolous

basis to challenge his sentence.  But the appeal waiver precludes Williams from challenging

“any part of the sentence (or the manner in which that sentence was determined), including

any term of imprisonment and fine within the maximums provided by law, and including

any order of restitution or forfeiture.”  Therefore, we need not examine the sentence any

further.  See United States v. Linder, 530 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2008).

The waiver does not apply to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding

the waiver or its negotiation.  But counsel correctly concludes that any such claim would

rely on evidence outside the record, and so Williams would be better served by saving any

ineffective‐assistance claim for a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Massaro v. United

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504‐05 (2003); United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557‐58 (7th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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