Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05013/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Coy Arthur Hill
Appellant
Dan Reynolds
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unital States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 3 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

COY ARTHUR HILL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

DAN REYNOLDS; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-5013 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 90-C-769-B) 

Coy Arthur Hill, Petitioner-Appellant, on the briefs, pro se. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma; Sandra D. Howard, 

Assistant Attorney General; and Alecia A. George, Assistant 

Attorney General, on the brief for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner Coy Arthur Hill seeks our review of the district 

court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies. We reverse and remand for a consolidated 

hearing with two recent cases raising similar issues. 1 

Hill timely filed a notice of appeal from his conviction in 

March 1988 and the state court assigned him counsel to perfect his 

appeal. Hill's state-appointed counsel filed a petition in error 

in September 1988. In November of 1988, Hill's counsel requested 

and received the first of seven extensions to file the brief in 

Hill's criminal appeal. The Appellate Public Defender handling 

Hill's case premised these extensions on "an extremely heavy 

caseload" and consequent inability to review the record in Hill's 

case. In a letter responding to one of Hill's letters, counsel 

indicated he had completed briefs in several cases docketed after 

Hill's because the court had ordered him to do so. In December 

1990, two years and nine months after the notice of appeal was 

filed and counsel appointed, the state Appellate Public Defender 

filed Hill's appellate brief. 

The record indicates that during this period, Hill wrote 

several letters to the Appellate Public Defender's Office seeking 

to expedite his state appeal. These letters evince Hill's 

frustration with that office's inaction and unresponsiveness. 

Hill included with one of these letters a pro se appellate brief 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 2 
and a request that counsel withdraw so Hill could pursue his own 

appeal. 

Hill contends the state's delay in adjudicating his appeal 

constitutes a violation of his right to due process and excuses 

him from the requirement that he exhaust his state remedies before 

seeking federal habeas corpus relief. The district court rejected 

this argument, apparently holding the delay in filing Hill's brief 

was due to a strategy decision by Hill's counsel and was not 

inherent in the appeals process. The district judge held delay in 

itself does not constitute a violation of due process rights. We 

reach Hill's appeal of the dismissal of his federal habeas 

petition three years and four months after he filed his notice of 

appeal in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Hill's state 

court appeal is still pending. 

We review the district court's factual findings for clear 

error. Anderson Y..!.. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 

(1985) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a))· We review the court's 

legal conclusions de novo. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, 836 F.2d 1263, 

1266 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Pref iling Delay 

This case is governed, in part, by our recent decision in 

Harris Y..!.. Champion, Nos. 90-5223, 90-5224 (10th Cir. June 17, 

1991). In that case petitioner Harris sought to appeal his state 

criminal conviction in the northern district of Oklahoma. 

Approximately one year after his application for late appeal was 

granted, Harris received a letter from the Appellate Public 

Defender notifying him his brief would not be filed for at least 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 3 
three years. Harris, Nos. 90-5223, 90-5224, slip op. at 2. 

Shortly after receiving this letter, Harris filed a petition for 

federal habeas corpus alleging the Appellate Public Defender's 

delay in filing his brief constituted a due process violation and 

excused the normal exhaustion of remedies requirement. Id. at 2-

3. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice, 

holding Harris had failed to exhaust his state remedies because 

his appeal was pending in the state criminal appellate court. Id. 

at 3. Harris appealed the dismissal to this court. 

On appeal, respondents in Harris argued Harris should not be 

excused from the exhaustion requirement because the delay was due 

entirely to the extensions granted Harris' counsel. Id. at 5. We 

rejected this argument because the letter from Harris' stateappointed counsel indicated he was "unable to address petitioner's 

case in a timely fashion." Id. We further noted "the record 

suggests that this delay has been endorsed and made possible by 

the willingness of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to grant 

the lengthy continuances requested by the Appellate Public 

Defender's Office." Id. at 5-6. We therefore refused to 

attribute the delay to the indigent petitioner, who had neither 

caused nor condoned it. Id. at 5-7. we held in those 

circumstances the delay must be attributed to the state. Id. 

We did not fault the Appellate Public Defender's Office for 

creating the delay; but we concluded the overwhelming caseload in 

that office was not sufficient justification for withholding 

federal relief when a petitioner complains of that very delay. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 4 
Id. at 6. After noting the exhaustion requirement is a matter of 

comity, not jurisdiction, id. at 6-7, we concluded: 

It is the duty of the state in this case to provide 

effective and adequate counsel that will ensure indigent 

convicts a timely direct appeal. Petitioner has alleged 

facts not controverted by the state, which are 

sufficient to constitute an excuse from his having to 

further exhaust state remedies. 

Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Although we held Harris need not 

exhaust state remedies before petitioning for federal habeas 

relief, we left the resolution of his due process claim to the 

district court. Id. at 10 n.5. 

Part of Hill's petition complains of the same type of delay 

in the same state criminal court system as Harris. Hill 

experienced delays in having the same Appellate Public Defender's 

Office file his state criminal appellate brief. We find no support 

in the record for the finding of the court below that these delays 

resulted from the strategic planning of Hill's counsel. We 

therefore cannot uphold the district court's characterization of 

the extensions as "strategy" -- necessity born of desperation, 

perhaps, but not strategy. As in Harris, the record 

uncontrovertedly reveals these delays were the result of an 

overwhelming caseload in the Appellate Public Defender's office and 

of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals extending the filing 

deadline. Following Harris, we refuse to attribute this delay to 

Hill. See also Richards Y.!.. Bellmon, [Proposed No. 91-6099], slip 

op. at 3 (citing Manous Y.!.. State, 797 P.2d 1005 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1990) in which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals noticed the 

significant delay in the Appellate Public Defender System). 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 5 
Respondents on appeal seek to disown the district court's 

finding that the extensions were a strategic maneuver by Hill's 

counsel. Respondents claim that in context, the court merely meant 

to distinguish the actions of the Appellate Public Defender's 

Office from those of the state court corrective process. 

Appellee's Brief at 9. Harris refutes respondents' proffered 

interpretation of the district court's comments. In Harris we 

noted the delay was caused not only by an overworked public 

defender seeking extensions, but also by the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals granting them. In Harris we held the state 

accountable for this type of delay because the petitioner had not 

caused or condoned the delay. Harris, Nos. 90-5223, 90-5224, slip 

op. at 5-7. Hill alleges the same scenario, so the respondents' 

attempt to distinguish between the actions of the public defender 

and the "state corrective process" is illusory. 

We reverse the district court's holding that the delay in 

filing Hill's state appellate brief does not excuse Hill from 

exhausting his state remedies. The distinction that Harris involved 

a four-year delay and Hill had to wait two years and nine months is 

not material in these circumstances. As we noted in Harris, we 

have previously held a fifteen-month delay elicits "'grave concerns 

in the realm of due process,'" Harris, slip op. at 7 n.3 (quoting 

Prescher Y.!.. Crouse, 431 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1970)); and we have 

held an eighteen-month delay warrants a hearing to determine 

whether the delay is inordinate or inexcusable, see Way Y.!.. Crouse, 

421 F.2d 145, 146 (10th Cir. 1970). We are convinced the delay 

Hill faced in having a direct appeal filed proves his state 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 6 
remedies ineffective. See Harris, Nos. 90-5223, 90-5224, slip op. 

at 14. 

Post-filing Delay 

Hill's petition seeks relief not only from the delay in 

filing his brief but in the entire adjudicative process, and on 

remand the district court should consider what part of the whole 

period of delay caused by the state may have violated Hill's right 

to due process. As the district court observed, we have held the 

mere passage of time in adjudication of a case does not constitute 

denial of a constitutional right. Jones Y..!.. Crouse, 360 F.2d 157, 

158 (10th Cir. 1966). Only passage of an inordinate amount of time 

triggers due process concern. Id.; see also Barker Y..!.. Wingo, 407 

U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972); DeLancy Y..!.. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1246-

47 (10th Cir. 1984). The appellate process inevitably takes some 

time. The rules of appellate procedure provide certain periods for 

filing opening and response briefs. Rules of the Okla. Ct. of 

Crim. Apps. 3.4(B), (C). The rules also recognize some extensions 

of these periods can be necessary. Id., Rule 3.4(D). Similarly, 

once all the briefs are filed, the court needs time to prepare for 

and schedule the hearing of a case. These periods may constitute 

"delay" from the petitioner's perspective; but, if reasonable, they 

are not "inordinate." 

Following Harris, we hold the district court must review the 

period before the brief was filed for a due process violation 

without assuming either that the delay may be attributed to Hill or 

that responsibility for the delay can be divided between the public 

defender's office and the state court. The prefiling delay is 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 7 
attributable to the state in this case. Hill's case differs from 

Harris, however, in that here the petitioner's brief has been filed 

in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The period after Hill's 

brief was filed to the present entails a continuing delay in the 

adjudication of Hill's appeal, but not all of this period can be 

cumulated with the prefiling period and attributed to the state. 

If respondents took no longer than the rules normally allow to file 

their brief, 2 this period cannot be considered inordinate delay 

attributable to the state. Cf. Mucie ~Missouri State Dept. of 

Corrections, 543 F.2d 633, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1976) (because state 

took over one year to file response to petition for postconviction 

remedy, petitioner excused from exhaustion requirement). Also, 

because some, if not all, of the period after Hill's brief was 

filed is reasonably necessary for the court to prepare for and 

schedule adjudication of Hill's case, the district court will have 

to determine whether any of the delay in this part of the process 

is inordinate. Thus, although the time after Hill's brief was 

filed is part of the delay Hill faces, only some of this period can 

be attributed to the state, and even less can be considered 

inordinate. 

The district court is not without guidance in determining 

whether this delay is inordinate. In Barker, the Supreme Court 

outlined the factors a court should consider to decide whether a 

defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. 407 U.S. at 

530-33. In DeLancy, we adopted this format for determining whether 

2 Any extensions respondents may have obtained should be 

evaluated following Harris. 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-5013 Document: 01019731433 Date Filed: 08/23/1991 Page: 8 
a defendant has been denied due process in the timely adjudication 

of an appeal. 741 F.2d at 1248 (citing Rheuark Y...!.. Shaw, 628 F.2d 

297, 303 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981)); see 

also Harris, Nos. 90-5223, 90-5224, slip op. at 11-12. 

As in Harris, we leave the determination of the due process 

claim and the fashioning of any appropriate remedy to the sound 

discretion of the district court. Harris, Nos. 90-5223, 90-5224, 

slip op. at 10 n.5, 11-20. We reiterate the concern we expressed 

in Harris regarding the situation in the Appellate Public 

Defender's Office. Although we recognize the courts cannot cure 

the overstaffing problems, see Manous, 797 P.2d at 1005, we must 

examine the constitutional issues these problems raise. We cannot 

require exhaustion of state remedies when the failure to exhaust is 

itself linked to the constitutional claims. Harris, Nos. 90-5223, 

90-5224, slip op. at 5-7, 13-14. The solution lies with the state 

of Oklahoma. All members of the bar of that state share 

responsibility for providing adequate representation for indigent 

defendants. Involvement of the state bar could provide a 

constructive step toward resolution of this problem. Ultimately, 

however, the state itself is responsible for any constitutional 

deprivations the district court may find. If, for example, the 

district court finds the delay in filing briefs is inordinate, 

assessment against the state of costs and possibly even attorneys' 

fees could be part of an appropriate remedy. We discussed at 

length the problems of fashioning a remedy in Harris, and that 

discussion should amply guide the district court should it find a 

remedy necessary. See id. at 13-20. 

9 

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We REVERSE and REMAND the order dismissing the petition for a 

consolidated hearing with Harris Y..!... Champion and for determination 

consistent with this order. 

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