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Parties Involved:
John Joseph O'Brien
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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TENTH CIRCUIT P.UG 2 ~ 1992 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN JOSEPH O'BRIEN 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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~ ...ZNo. 91-3212 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-30009-01) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and BRIMMER, 

District Judge**· 

Appellant John Joseph O'Brien was indicted on five counts of 

making and using a material false writing in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

S 1001. The indictment charged that O'Brien, in completing various 

documents in conjunction with his employment at the U.S. 

Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, failed to disclose he had been 

- fired from employment with the State of Missouri Department of 

* This order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 

** Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

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Social Services, Division of Youth Services. A jury found O'Brien 

guilty on counts one, two, and four, and not guilty on count five. 1 

The trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the third 

count. 2 

Appellant worked for the Missouri Division of Youth Services 

from on or about August 22, 1986 until on or about November 10, 

1986. In his position as a youth specialist, he supervised and 

provided rudimentary counseling to female children aged twelve to 

seventeen who had been committed to the agency as status offenders 

or for other reasons, including delinquency. Appellant's immediate 

supervisor, John Robertson, recommended on October 30, 1986 that 

O'Brien be fired due to allegations of unprofessional conduct with 

the children. On or about November 10, 1986, appellant was 

dismissed from his employment. He maintains he was not fired from 

his position. 

Subsequently, appellant applied for a position at the United 

States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. He was given an 

integrity interview on December 10, 1987 by Jacqueline Fullove, 

Personnel Officer. That interview consisted of a question and 

1 Count 1 concerned appellant's certification that all of the 

answers and statements found in Standard Form 171, Application for 

Federal Employment, were true, complete, and correct. Count 2 

involved a certification of answers and statements taken in an 

integrity interview; Count 4 concerned the certification of answers 

and statements for Standard Form 86, Questionnaire For Sensitive 

Position signed on September 22, 1988; and Count 5 involved a 

certification for Standard Form 86 signed on April 21, 1989. 

2 count 3 involved appellant's certification that all answers 

and statements found in Standard Form 61-B, Declaration of 

Appointee, were true, complete and correct 

2 

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answer session wherein appellant was asked about his past in order 

to determine his suitability for government employment. During 

the interview, Ms. Fullove inquired about appellant's work history, 

and asked if he had ever been dismissed for cause from a job. He 

answered in the negative. Furthermore, she asked if he had ever 

been involved in any serious misconduct in former or current 

employment in the prior five years. Again, he answered in the 

negative. At the conclusion of the interview, appellant reviewed 

and signed the document Ms. Fullove had prepared. 

On his S.F. 171 Employment Application for the penitentiary, 

appellant failed to mention his period of employment with the 

Missouri Division of Youth services. He indicated continuous 

employment from August to November 1986 at Joseph Bold, Certified 

Public Accountants, in Kansas City, Missouri. Appellant further 

indicated he had never been fired from a job. He signed the S.F. 

171 form on July 22, 1987. 

In addition, appellant prepared and signed a Standard Form 86, 

Questionnaire for Sensitive Position, on September 22, 1988. On 

that form, he attested to his continuous employment with Joseph 

Bold, CPA, between August and November of 1986. Moreover, 

appellant indicated he had not quit, been fired, or left any 

employment by mutual agreement within the prior fifteen years. 

The United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas employed 

appellant as a correctional officer from 1988 until 1990. That 

position required a thorough background check. Although appellant 

began his employment in 1988, the requisite background 

3 

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investigation had not been completed. Cynthia Perez, Supervisory 

Investigator with the United States Office of Personnel Management, 

interviewed appellant twice in August of 1989 for purposes of that 

background investigation. During his conversations with Ms. Perez, 

appellant admitted his omission of the State of Missouri employment 

from the pertinent documents, and declared he voluntarily left that 

position. 

During his employment at Leavenworth, but prior to the United 

States' indictment of appellant on charges of falsifying documents, 

the penitentiary suspended appellant because he was charged by the 

State of Missouri with possession of stolen property. As a union 

member, appellant's suspension was taken by the union to 

arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the penitentiary. 

After the arbitrator's decision, the state charges against O'Brien 

were dismissed. Before the union could ask the arbitrator to 

reconsider his decision in light of the dismissal of charges, the 

United States Department of Justice indicted O'Brien under 

falsification of documents charges. 

The union entered its grievance asking for review of the 

stolen property issue, and the arbitration hearing on that matter 

was scheduled in April, 1991. During the pendency of the second 

arbitration hearing, the falsification of documents case proceeded 

in federal court. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, contending 

he was selectively prosecuted on the falsification of documents 

charges because he utilized the union grievance procedure against 

the United states Penitentiary. 

4 

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After a hearing on January 14, 1991, the district court ruled 

that appellant failed to demonstrate evidence of selective 

prosecution. Accordingly, the court granted the United States' 

motion in limine to exclude evidence of o' Brien's pursual of a 

union grievance. Furthermore, the court quashed O'Brien's 

subpoenas because the individuals to be summoned would have 

testified concerning issues relating to the union grievance. 

Finally, the court granted O'Brien's motion in limine concerning 

any allegations of sexual misconduct at his job with the State of 

Missouri, or any evidence of the stolen property charges. The 

ensuing jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict on three counts of 

falsifying documents. Appellant was placed on probation for one 

year, and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000. 

Appellant contends that (1) the district court erred in 

overruling his motion to dismiss based on selective prosecution; 

(2) the court erred in granting the government's motions in limine, 

and in quashing defense subpoenas; (3) prosecutorial misconduct 

resulted from cross-examination in an area the court had ruled 

could not be delved into; and (4) the evidence adduced at trial did 

not support the verdict. 

We affirm. 

I. Denial of appellant's motion to dismiss for selective 

prosecution. 

Selective prosecution is an issue of law to be determined by 

the court. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 495 (D.C. 

1983) . A selective prosecution claim, when judged according to 

5 

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ordinary equal protection standards, requires a showing that a 

passive enforcement policy exists, the policy has a discriminatory 

effect, and it is motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Who'd v. 

United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see also United States v. 

Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 1991). While we do not rule on 

the issue of whether a passive enforcement policy actually existed, 

we will assume ad arguendo that the passive enforcement policy 

alleged in the instant case was the government's "bringing to 

light" any employees who had falsified information on employment 

forms. 

The chronology of events began when appellant filed his 

pretrial motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, alleging that 

he had been prosecuted for exercising his First Amendment rights 

of freedom of speech and association and for exercising his 

statutory right to union arbitration, and that his Equal Protection 

rights had been violated. At a motion hearing held on January 14, 

1991, Larry Scott Raney, a cook foreman and vice-president for the 

union at the U.S. Penitentiary in Leavenworth, testified that he 

had personal knowledge of "three or four different cases where 

people have been called in and asked to clarify things in their 

background investigation." (R.O.A. Vol. II at 49). To Raney•s 

knowledge, those cases did not involve criminal allegations or 

conduct. (R.O.A. Vol. II at 55). This testimony was the only 

evidence presented at the hearing concerning similarly situated 

individuals. 

At the request of the District Court, both parties briefed 

6 

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the question of First Amendment and equal protection rights as 

pertaining to union representation. After considering those briefs 

and the testimony and argument at the motion hearing, the court 

entered an order overruling and denying O'Brien's motion, basing 

its opinion on the Equal Protection argument. The court properly 

denied the motion to dismiss because O'Brien failed to present 

admissible evidence on the issue of other instances involving 

falsification of employment records. 

Appellant subsequently submitted an affidavit purporting to 

present such evidence. (R.O.A. Volume I at Tab 22). The affiant, 

defense counsel Marilyn Trubey, declared that Len Peterson, who had 

been hired as a correctional officer at the United States 

Penitentiary, had falsified employment documents. Peterson had 

been required to sign the identical forms as had appellant, and did 

not reveal the fact that he had been previously employed and 

subsequently terminated by the Pinkerton agency. The background 

investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

revealed that prior employment with Pinkerton. As a result of the 

FBI's investigation, Peterson was required to submit a memorandum 

to the Penitentiary administration at Leavenworth regarding the 

employment with Pinkerton. Peterson was not prosecuted for making 

false statements on employment documents, nor was there any 

disciplinary action taken against him. 

Accordingly, the government entered the affidavit of Joseph 

Michael Rivera, Jr., Senior Special Agent of the United States 

Department of Justice, Off ice of the Inspector General. The 

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district court, on a sua sponte motion, found that the government's 

affidavit sufficiently refuted appellant's defense of selective 

prosecution. The court found no basis for the selective 

prosecution claim, and would not disturb its prior ruling which 

denied O'Brien's motion to dismiss. 

Appellant asks for a de novo review of the district court's 

denial. Unfortunately, appellant has not seen fit to include the 

government's affidavit in the record before this Court. 3 Since we 

lack the government's affidavit for comparison, it is difficult to 

determine whether the district court's sua sponte denial of the 

motion to dismiss was improper. The missing affidavit creates a 

problem because we cannot review the basis for the court's 

conclusion that the government's affidavit effectively refuted the 

defense's affidavit. We easily affirm the court's conclusion that 

the appellant failed to present admissible evidence on the issue 

of other instances involving falsification of employment records 

during the January 14, 1991 motion hearing: as a matter of law, 

3 10th cir. R. 10.2.3., as amended by the Court's Order, 

filed October 25, 1990, Appendices to Briefs, states in part that: 

Excerpts of the record must be filed in an appendix to 

appellant's brief. While non-essential parts of the 

record should not be included in an appendix (see Section 

B-3, Costs), it is counsel's responsibility to see that 

the record excerpts in the appendix are sufficient for 

consideration and determination of the issues on appeal 

and the court is under no obligation to remedy any 

failure of counsel to fulfill that responsibility. 

10th Cir. R. 10. 2. 3., as amended by the Court's Order, filed 

October 25, 1990, Appendices to Briefs, B.2(d), states: "Other 

items, including excerpts of transcript, should be included when 

expressly referred to in the brief and when they are relevant to 

an issue raised on appeal." 

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the district court did not err in that instance by denying 

appellant's motion to dismiss on the basis of selective 

prosecution. As a matter of principal, in the absence of the 

government's affidavit we are required to affirm the judgment of 

the district court in regard to the sua sponte reconsideration and 

denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. 4 

F.2d 281, 286 (10th Cir. 1977). 

See Neu v. Grant, 548 

II. Granting of the government's motions in limine, and the 

quashing of defense subpoenas. 

The United States moved in limine to deny admittance of any 

evidence of the following: that O'Brien was simultaneously 

pursuing a union grievance to be reinstated at the United States 

Penitentiary in Leavenworth; that O'Brien was indicted after he had 

filed that union grievance; and that the prosecution was in any way 

related to the union grievance. o 'Brien sought to bring in 

4 Even if we were to assume that the government's affidavit 

did not refute defense counsel's affidavit, however, the result 

would be the same. Appellant contends that other employees 

falsifying information had not been prosecuted as he was: those 

employees were merely required to submit an explanatory memorandum, 

and the matter went no further. Defense counsel's affidavit 

concerning Len Peterson substantiates that there was at least one 

other instance of an employee falsifying former employment 

information. However, the affidavit does not sufficiently set out 

the facts concerning Peterson. It merely says that he failed to 

report his employment and termination with the Pinkerton agency. 

The affidavit does not explain how long Peterson was employed, or 

what circumstances prompted his termination. The affidavit is 

insufficient to show that Peterson and O'Brien were similarly 

situated, and thus fails to meet the showing required in Who'd that 

any policy established by the government had a discriminatory 

effect. Who'd, 470 U.S. at 608. Appellant's contention that he 

presented adequate evidence to support his selective prosecution 

claim therefore fails. 

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evidence regarding the stolen property dispute with the 

administration at the Leavenworth Penitentiary, and evidence of a 

vendetta against him by prison officials because of his complaints 

regarding the treatment of Cuban inmates and favoritism shown to 

certain employees. He claimed denial of his Fifth Amendment right 

to due process, and denial of his sixth Amendment right to have 

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. 

Contending the evidence it requested to exclude bore directly 

on the issue of selective prosecution which had previously been 

ruled upon, the government declared the evidence to be irrelevant 

to the issues before the jury. The court sustained the 

government's motion. Appellant maintains that his right to a fair 

trial was thwarted because he was denied the right to present a 

portion of his defense. He requests that the lower court's 

decision be reversed, and that the case be remanded for a new 

trial. 

The grant or denial of a motion in limine dealing with a 

question of relevancy is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 

standard. United States v. Agnew, 931 F.2d 1397, 1409-10 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 112 s.ct. 237 (1991); see also United states 

v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). The evidence 

appellant sought to introduce was relevant only to his selective 

prosecution argument which had already been denied by the district 

court as a matter of law. Since the court determined appellant was 

not the victim of selective prosecution, evidence supporting that 

claim was irrelevant. The court correctly balanced the probative 

10 

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value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effect, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403. We discern no abuse of discretion 

in the district court's grant of the government's motion in limine, 

and therefore affirm. 

III. Allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. 

Appellant filed a motion in limine on March 5, 1991 to exclude 

the fact he had been charged with possession of stolen property, 

and to exclude allegations of sexual misconduct during his 

employment with the Missouri Division of Youth Services. That 

motion was granted on March 6, 1991. The court determined 

appellant's past problems to be "irrelevant and inflammatory" and 

sustained the motion (R. o. A. Vol. III at 10, 13) , saying "of 

course, we can always look at it again, but as of this time I think 

it would be prejudicial .••. 11 (R.O.A. Vol. III at 13). 

During trial, O'Brien testified on direct that he quit his job 

because of a personality conflict with his supervisor, and that he 

had been accused of making a racial slur. (R.O.A. Vol.Vat 120, 

121) on cross-examination, the prosecutor delved into the reasons 

appellant left his job, and questioned him concerning allegations 

that he had approached one of the girls at the Division of Youth 

Services and commented he thought she was a knockout. Appellant's 

counsel immediately objected, and asked for a bench conference. 

The court declared that it would "stay with my ruling on the Motion 

in Limine and not allow [the prosecutor] to go into this." (R.O.A. 

Vol. V at 141) . 

The standard of review applying to claims of prosecutorial 

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misconduct where a timely objection was made at trial involves a 

two-step analysis. United States v. Lonedog. 929 F.2d 568, 572 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 s.ct. 164 (1991). We must first 

determine whether the conduct was improper. Id. at 572. 

conduct was improper, we must then ascertain whether 

If the 

that 

misconduct warrants reversal. Id. Prosecutorial misconduct does 

not warrant reversal if it was harmless error. Id. at 572 (citing 

United States v. Alexander, 849 F.2d at 1296; United States v. 

Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 838 (1987)). A non-constitutional error is harmless unless 

"it had a •substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 

'grave doubt' as to whether it had such an effect." United States 

v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (citation 

omitted). Most constitutional errors are harmless only if we are 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that they did not affect the 

outcome of the trial. Lonedog. 929 F. 2d at 572; Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 111 s.ct. 1246, 1265 (1991). In analyzing whether the 

misconduct affected the outcome of the trial, the court considers 

"the curative acts of the district court, the extent of the 

misconduct, and the role of the misconduct within the case as a 

whole." Lonedog, 929 F.2d at 572 (quoting United States v. 

Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416 (10th Cir. 1988). 

In the case before us, the prosecutor's cross-examination of 

appellant regarding allegations of sexual misconduct violated the 

court ' s order in 1 imine. Appellant asserts that the line of 

questioning was designed to appeal to the jury's passion or bias, 

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and was so prejudicial as to deny appellant a fair trial. O'Brien 

requests reversal and remand for a new trial. 

We need not decide whether there was prosecutorial misconduct, 

because the protested inquiry did not affect the outcome of the 

trial. See Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d at 417. The question posed to 

appellant was as follows: "I sn ' t it true that [Mr. Robertson) 

confronted you with approaching one of these girls, having made the 

comment to them [sic) that you thought they [sic) were a knockout?" 

Defense counsel immediately objected to the line of questioning, 

and the court enforced its prior order in limine by barring the 

prosecution from further inquiry into allegations of sexual 

misconduct. 5 

Moreover, the district court's remarks at the motion in limine 

hearing clearly indicated that the matter of the alleged sexual 

misconduct might be broached at the right time, and therefore 

evidenced the court's willingness to entertain such evidence at an 

opportune moment. (R.O.A. Vol. III at 13). While the prosecutor 

violated the standing order in limine, he also had reason to 

believe that the order was subject to change when given the right 

circumstances. In light of the circumstances, the prosecutor may 

have believed in good faith he was entitled to open up this area 

5 The record before us does not demonstrate whether the jury 

was instructed as part of the general charge that evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts should not be considered by the jury as 

evidence of the defendant's character. Thus, we would not 

recognize any argument by appellant that such an instruction was 

not given, or did not have a curative effect if given. Seen. 3, 

supra. 

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of cross examination to impeach appellant on his contention that 

he quit his job over a personality conflict. The extent of the 

misconduct was therefore slight. See Lonedog. 929 F.2d at 573. 

Furthermore, the role of any perceived misconduct within the 

case as an entirety was equally negligible. See id. The reference 

made to any sexual misconduct was certainly nebulous, at best, and 

no further references were made. We hold that the outcome of the 

trial was not affected. 

4. Whether the evidence supported the verdict. 

Finally, appellant maintains that the evidence did not support 

the verdict because it did not rise to the required level of 

substantiality. We have stated that 

[o]ur standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence 

on criminal convictions is whether "[t]he evidence--both 

direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom--is sufficient if, when 

taken in the light most favorable to the government, a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt." United states v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 

1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 475 U.S. 1128, 106 

s.ct. 1657, 90 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986). Evidence supporting 

the conviction "must be •substantial; that is, it must 

do more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt.'" United 

States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting United States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100, 1103 

(10th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 

993, 92 s.ct. 541, 30 L.Ed.2d 545 (1971)). 

United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 973 (1988). 

The evidence presented at trial amply supports the three-count 

guilty verdict. Appellant's supervisor at the Missouri Division 

of Youth Services, John Robertson, testified that O'Brien was 

fired, and his testimony was supported by written documents. 

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Moreover, the evidence regarding o' Brien's false statements is 

overwhelming. He was employed by the State of Missouri from August 

25, 1986 to November 10, 1986. Documents he prepared for his 

federal position completely omitted that period of employment. 

Therefore, upon viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the government, we find that a reasonable jury could have found 

appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

We AFFIRM the district court's rulings. The court properly 

denied appellant's motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, and 

did not err in sustaining the government's motion in limine and in 

quashing appellant's subpoenas. Furthermore, any alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct did not affect the outcome of appellant's 

trial. 

verdict. 

Lastly, there was sufficient evidence supporting the 

15 

Entered for the Court 

Clarence A. Brimmer 

District Judge 

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