Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01223/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01223-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Interior
Respondent
Kenneth L. Gray
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KENNETH L. GRAY,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1223

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DE-0752-14-0450-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: July 8, 2016

______________________ 

KENNETH L. GRAY, Sandy, UT, pro se.

KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, LINN, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Case: 16-1223 Document: 33-2 Page: 1 Filed: 07/08/2016
2 GRAY v. MSPB

Kenneth L. Gray appeals from a Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) decision dismissing his appeal as 

barred by the doctrine of laches. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Dr. Gray began working for the Department of the Interior (“agency”) as a Sociologist on March 7, 1974 pursuant to a temporary appointment, not to exceed July 7, 

1974. On July 3, 1974, his temporary appointment expired. After a three-day break in service, Dr. Gray was 

placed on a career-conditional competitive service appointment to the position of Sociologist. He later resigned 

on May 30, 1975.

The agency utilizes Standard Form 50 (SF-50) to record personnel actions. An SF-50 dated July 5, 1974 

(“First SF-50”) states Dr. Gray was subject to a one-year 

probationary period beginning on March 7, 1974. Over 

six months later, on January 22, 1975, a second SF-50 

issued as a “correction” (“Corrected SF-50”), delaying the 

start of Dr. Gray’s probationary period to July 7, 1974. 

Dr. Gray’s May 30, 1975 resignation is recorded in a third 

SF-50 (“Resignation SF-50”), indicating he resigned

“during probation” and because of “policy disagreements.” 

In 2014, Dr. Gray requested documentation of his employment with the agency, which Dr. Gray’s current

employer had asked him to obtain. With this request,

Dr. Gray received a portion of his personnel record containing the three above-discussed SF-50s. He subsequently filed his initial appeal regarding his May 30, 1975 

resignation. He alleged that in 1975, his supervisor 

forced him to resign or face termination. He further 

alleged that his supervisor falsified the Corrected SF-50 

and Resignation SF-50 to reflect that he resigned before 

completing his probationary period, and falsely informed 

him that he had no appeal rights. He argued that the 

agency failed to notify him of his right of appeal. 

Case: 16-1223 Document: 33-2 Page: 2 Filed: 07/08/2016
GRAY v. MSPB 3

In its Initial Decision, the Board held that it lacked 

jurisdiction because Dr. Gray was not a “covered employee” with appeal rights. The 1975 version of 5 C.F.R. 

§ 752.201 provides appeal rights only to employees who 

(1) are not serving a probationary period; and (2) have 

completed one year of current continuous employment. 

The Board held that Dr. Gray was not a “covered employee” because as of his resignation on May 30, 1975, he was 

still serving a one-year probationary period and had not 

completed one year of current continuous employment due 

to his three-day break in service.

Dr. Gray petitioned for review, and the Board vacated 

its Initial Decision. The Board held that Dr. Gray completed his probationary period on March 6, 1975, consistent with the First SF-50, as opposed to the Corrected 

SF-50, and therefore was a “covered employee” with 

appeal rights. In particular, the Board determined that 

under the regulations in place in 1975, Dr. Gray’s service 

under his temporary appointment—rendered immediately 

prior to his career-conditional appointment, in the same 

line of work, for the same agency, and with only one break 

of service occurring less than 30 days—could count toward 

his completion of his probationary period. But the Board 

held that Dr. Gray’s appeal was barred by the doctrine of 

laches. It held that the agency was not obligated to 

inform Dr. Gray of his right to appeal, and found that 

Dr. Gray’s 40-year delay was unreasonable and inexcusable. It also found that the agency was overwhelmingly 

prejudiced by Dr. Gray’s delay and could not defend itself

against Dr. Gray’s claim. Dr. Gray appeals. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

Our review of the Board’s decision is limited by statute. We affirm a final decision of the Board unless it is 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures 

Case: 16-1223 Document: 33-2 Page: 3 Filed: 07/08/2016
4 GRAY v. MSPB

required by law, rule or regulation having been followed; 

or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c). We review the Board’s application of the doctrine of laches for an abuse of discretion. See Nuss v. 

Office of Personnel Mgmt., 974 F.2d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 

1992).

To invoke the affirmative defense of laches, the agency bears the burden of proving two factors: (1) Dr. Gray’s 

40-year delay was unreasonable and inexcusable; and 

(2) Dr. Gray’s delay materially prejudiced the agency. Id. 

“Prejudice may not be presumed from the length of a 

claimant’s delay.” Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 

1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The agency can show material prejudice stemming from Dr. Gray’s delay through

either economic or defense prejudice. Id. at 1378. Here, 

the agency relies on defense prejudice. The agency asserts that it is unable to mount a defense due to the 

unavailability and faded memories of witnesses and the 

potential loss of relevant documents, such as notes written by Dr. Gray’s former supervisor or personnel specialists. 

We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in holding that Dr. Gray’s claim was barred by laches. The Board determined that Dr. Gray’s 40-year delay 

was unreasonable and inexcusable, finding that Dr. Gray 

could have requested his complete personnel file at any 

time over the past 40 years. The Board also determined 

that the agency was materially prejudiced by Dr. Gray’s 

delay, finding that the agency is unable to defend itself 

against Dr. Gray’s claim due to the unavailability of 

witnesses and loss of relevant documents. Under the

deference owed to the Board, the laches bar in this case 

must stand. We cannot say that the Board abused its 

discretion in light of Dr. Gray’s 40-year delay.

Case: 16-1223 Document: 33-2 Page: 4 Filed: 07/08/2016
GRAY v. MSPB 5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is 

affirmed. 

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 16-1223 Document: 33-2 Page: 5 Filed: 07/08/2016