Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02124/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Carey
Respondent
Atik Pathan
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ATIK PATHAN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

TOM CAREY, Warden,

Respondent. 

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C 05-2124 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

AND INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE CLERK

INTRODUCTION

Atik Pathan, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison,

Solano, has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On July 28, 2005, this Court issued an order to show cause. On November 17, 2005,

Respondent filed an answer to the petition. On March 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a

motion seeking a “stay and abeyance” to exhaust additional claims in the state courts,

which was denied. This order denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the

merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County

of two counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child under 14 years old and 10 or

more years younger than Petitioner (counts 1 & 2, Cal Penal Code § 269), six counts of

a lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14 years old (counts 3-8, Cal. Penal Code §

288(a)), and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years old (count

9, Cal. Penal Code § 288.5(a)).

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On January 5, 2001 Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life

for count 1, with a concurrent 12-year term for count 9. The trial court dismissed count

2 and stayed the terms for counts 3-8 pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 1385 and

654.

On December 13, 2002, the California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment

of the trial court and remanded the matter for re-sentencing. The state appellate court

rejected all of Petitioner’s non-sentencing claims: that his statements to the victim’s

father should have been suppressed; that his confession should have been suppressed;

that there was insufficient evidence to support the aggravated sexual assault

convictions; and that the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions on sodomy. 

However, it held that Penal Code § 288.5(c) precludes conviction of both continuous

sexual abuse (count 9) and individual sexual offenses (counts 1-8) concerning the same

victim and during the same period. The court remanded for re-sentencing, “to permit

the trial court to decide whether to strike the continuous sexual abuse count or the

individual sex offense counts” and “to allow the trial court to resentence defendant on

the remaining count or counts.” People v. Pathan, No. H022600, 2002 Cal. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 11875, at *34 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002). On February 25, 2003,

the Supreme Court of California denied review of the appellate court’s decision.

On May 1, 2003, the trial court re-sentenced Petitioner to a term of 15 years to

life for one count of aggravated sexual assault on a child (count 1, Cal. Penal Code §

269), dismissed the second count of aggravated sexual assault on a child (count 2),

stayed the terms for six counts of lewd or lascivious acts on a child (counts 3-8, Cal.

Penal Code § 288(a)), and struck the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child

(count 9, Cal. Penal Code § 288.5(a)).

On April 8, 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the

trial court and denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by the Petitioner’s

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appointed counsel. On June 16 and July 14, 2004, the Supreme Court of California

denied review of both decisions of the California Court of Appeal. Petitioner filed a

habeas petition in this Court on May 24, 2005.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses as found by the State of California,

Sixth Appellate District, are summarized as follows:

Defendant is a native of India whose primary language is Hindi. In

January of 1998, Nasir R. hired defendant to teach Islamic religion to his

children. Shaikh R., his son, was 10 years old at the time. Defendant

taught Shaikh two to three days per week, for one hour at a time, except

for a few months when defendant was in India, through June of 1999.

According to Shaikh, on two to 10 occasions, defendant touched Shaikh's

penis with his hand. Defendant would sometimes rub his own penis on

the front of Shaikh's body. Defendant would also touch Shaikh's butt.

Defendant had Shaikh touch defendant's penis on many occasions.

Defendant would grab Shaikh's hand, place it on defendant's penis, and

pat it. Defendant's penis would get hard and Shaikh would feel

'something sticky' come out of it. These incidents occurred 'most of the

times' that defendant came over to tutor Shaikh. Defendant would

sometimes talk to Shaikh about the religious lesson during the touchings.

Shaikh described a specific touching in the family room. Defendant had

instructed Shaikh to perform a push-up exercise, so that Shaikh was

kneeling with his chest pressed against the back of the sofa. Defendant

touched Shaikh's penis.

Shaikh described another touching, in the upstairs study. Shaikh was

lying face-down pursuant to defendant's instructions for another exercise.

Defendant told Shaikh to move his butt up and down. Defendant sat on

Shaikh's legs and rubbed his penis 'in the crack' of Shaikh's butt. Shaikh

tried to move away 'when he was trying to penetrate,' because it hurt.

Defendant's penis did not go into Shaikh's anus, but it 'put pressure on'

the anus. Defendant tried to do the same thing the next day, but Shaikh

made an excuse about having to go to the bathroom. On more than 20

other occasions, defendant rubbed his penis against Shaikh's butt but did

not try to penetrate.

Shaikh wanted to tell defendant that he didn't want to do the exercises,

but he 'didn't have the guts to.' Shaikh felt 'some sort of fear inside

[himself].' 

On June 18, 1999, Nasir R. called defendant on the telephone. Nasir R.

said that 'something very wrong has happened' and asked to talk to

defendant about it. Defendant told him, 'I just want to apologize for my

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act and please excuse me for it.' Nasir R. asked defendant to come over

for a discussion.

On June 20, 1999, defendant came to Nasir R.'s house, where he spoke

with Nasir R. and Sahibzada Rafeeqi. Nasir R. asked defendant what he

had apologized for on the telephone. Defendant said, 'I was doing

something wrong and I was apologizing for that.' He said, 'I was teaching

[Shaikh] to do physical exercises.' Nasir R. asked if defendant had

uncovered his penis and inserted it into Shaikh's anus. Defendant

admitted that he had, but stated, 'I didn't have intercourse.' Defendant

then broke down, weeping. At some point during their conversation,

Nasir R. and Rafeeqi told defendant that he should remember 'that he is

in front of God Almighty.' However, neither Nasir R. nor Rafeeqi

threatened defendant in any way.

During the conversation, a few other people were present in an adjoining

hallway. Defendant had been teaching their children also. These people

came into the room about 10 or 15 minutes into the conversation. Nasir

R. wrote out a statement in English and translated it out loud in front of

the group. Defendant said he understood and signed the statement. The

statement read: 'On June 20, 1999, I, Atik Hareem Pathan, accept the

guilt of sodomy against a minor child [Shaikh], under the years of 12

years of age.' Nasir R. told defendant that sodomy meant 'pushing the

penis into the anus.'

After defendant signed the statement, Nasir R. asked for defendant's

green card. Defendant gave it to him. The group discussed telling

defendant's father what he had done. They also asked defendant what

would be the punishment for his offenses in the Islamic religion.

Defendant said 'it was a very serious crime and the police would give 80

lashes.'

Defendant was arrested on June 23, 1999, by Palo Alto Police Officer

Ron Watson. The Palo Alto police contacted Milpitas Police Officer Raj

Maharaj, who is a native speaker of Hindi and certified to translate Hindi

to English. Before participating in the interview of defendant, he had

translated about 25 other times. Although Officer Maharaj learned Hindi

in Fuji and therefore spoke a different dialect, defendant appeared to

understand him during the interview. Palo Alto Police Officer Jean

Bready also participated in the interview. She spoke English to

defendant, and defendant responded in English during 'a vast majority' of

the interview. Officer Maharaj assisted defendant with words he did not

understand.

Officer Maharaj read defendant the Miranda advisements in Hindi.

However, he used the English word 'attorney' because he did not know

the Hindi word for attorney. Officer Maharaj did not know that in India,

attorneys are called advocates. Defendant asked if he could speak with a

friend. Officer Maharaj asked if the person was an attorney, again using

the English word. Defendant said no, so Officer Maharaj said he could

call the person after the interview. Defendant asked Officer Maharaj

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what would happen if he did not talk to the police. Officer Maharaj said

that defendant would be booked into jail and possibly handcuffed.

Officer Bready asked defendant to tell her 'some of the things that you

did which you know were wrong.' Defendant described how he would

get behind Shaikh and tell Shaikh to do his push-ups so that Shaikh's

bottom came into contact with defendant's body. Defendant asserted that

this happened 'just one time.' Defendant also described how sometimes

Shaikh would take his hand and touch defendant's penis, but he claimed

this happened 'by accident.'

Officer Bready told defendant that 'because of what happened,' Shaikh

was 'very, very sad' and felt that defendant 'betrayed him.' She explained

that Shaikh felt that 'he did something wrong' and was 'at fault for what

happened.' She told defendant that he needed to tell the truth, asking

him, 'it was more than one time, wasn't it?' When Officer Bready

reiterated that defendant needed to tell the truth in order to 'help that

boy,' defendant admitted that he placed Shaikh's hand on his penis 'two

or three times.' Defendant also admitted that he rubbed his penis against

Shaikh's buttocks with sexual intent 'two or three times.' However,

defendant denied that he had tried to insert his penis into Shaikh's

buttocks. He denied having Shaikh put his mouth on defendant's penis.

He denied touching Shaikh's penis intentionally, claiming it happened

once 'by accident.'

At the end of the interview, Officer Bready asked defendant if he had any

questions. Defendant stated that he was worried about his family. He

said, 'I know what, what I did is wrong. This is my own fault.' He said

that evil had gotten control over him. He said he was 'really sorry.'

Officer Bready suggested that it might help defendant feel better if he

wrote a letter of apology to Shaikh and his family. She told him, 'You

say whatever comes from your heart.' Defendant asked if such a letter

would help him. Officer Bready said, 'I can't promise that it, it will help

the court case any, but I think it would make you feel better in your heart

if you have the opportunity.' She explained that defendant would be

booked into jail and would have to go to court, but would not be allowed

any contact with Shaikh or his family other than a letter. 

People v. Pathan, No. H022600, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11875, at *34 (Cal. Ct.

App. Dec. 13, 2002). 

SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS

I. Initial Sentencing

At the initial sentencing on January 5, 2001, the trial court began by listing

supplemental documents considered in preparation for the hearing, including the

probation report, a letter from the victim’s mother, a letter from defendant, letters from

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eight concerned individuals and a statement in aggravation prepared by the

prosecution. The court then identified what it viewed as the two central issues at

sentencing: 

[W]hether the court ... is required to impose both [15-year-to-life terms].

And even if the court has the authority to strike one of them ... whether

the court should. And then, the other question is the aggravated or the

mid terms, or the mitigated terms on ... counts ... three through nine. 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 759. 

Defense counsel successfully argued that the court had the authority not to

impose both counts and that it should exercise that discretion. Counsel emphasized

that Petitioner was relatively young, had no prior criminal record and that while he had

an opportunity to molest other children, he had not. Id. at 760. Counsel also pointed

to a letter from the victim’s parents asking for leniency, adding, “I think that ought to

be considered strongly by the court in imposing sentence.” Id. at 761. 

In reply and in support of imposing a maximum sentence, the prosecution

reiterated portions of its statement in aggravation, including that defendant’s acts were

multiple and had escalated to sodomy by force and duress and that defendant picked

his victim because he was “particularly vulnerable.” Id. at 763. The prosecution also

addressed the “large number of letters from the community” and the letter from the

victim’s parents, positing that the letter from the victim’s parents was a product of

community pressure (evidenced by statements in the record and by a number of the

letters from the community) and should be treated accordingly. Id. at 764-65. The

prosecution further argued, “given the trust and authority that he [defendant] had in the

community, that he had in ... victim’s house, and that he abused not just once, not

twice, but multiple times over the course of a year and a half,” the court should impose

the “absolutely maximum sentence.” Id. at 765.

The probation officer recommended that the court strike count two, providing

the following explanation for the recommendation: 

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[A]lthough this is a very serious case, the defendant is relatively young, has no

prior record, appeared to be extremely remorseful for his behavior, and in light

of the parent’s request for leniency. 

Also ... it appears that the victim’s mother stated that the defendant [sic] was

disturbed at the beginning of the situation, but after two or three weeks had been

doing well, overall, and in school, and she was thankful for that, and he was not

involved in any kind of counseling at this time. Id. at 769.

Having considered all of the above, the court ruled as follows: 

I know that I was the trial judge in this case, and I certainly believe that, at least

with respect to count one, that is an appropriate sentence ... And the court will

impose a sentence of 15 years to life for count one. 

With respect to count two, based on the defendant’s extreme remorse and based

on the request for leniency on the part of the victim and the victim’s family, the

defendant’s lack of a record, any prior criminal record, and his – in the

community, I will grant the defense motion to strike count two, pursuant to

penal code section 1385 ... Id. at 770.

The judge then proceeded to impose the mid term on all the remaining counts

(counts three to nine), which were stayed pursuant to Penal Code § 654, which

precludes the punishment of one act under multiple provisions, where the same act is

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. 

II. Re-sentencing

At re-sentencing on May 1, 2003, Petitioner’s brother, Obed Pathan, addressed

the court on behalf of Petitioner’s family. He proposed that Petitioner be deported to

India rather than incarcerated, “humbly request[ing] that ... [the court] give [his

brother] one more chance to live his life with his family.” Reporter’s Transcript of

Proceedings Probation and Sentence (“Re-sentencing RT”) at 5-6. The family had

allegedly consulted professionals about Petitioner’s “problem” and believed that if

deported, he would not “do it again.” Id. In India, Petitioner would be reunited with

his young, financially dependent wife and son and placed among a vigilant community.

He would also have the intimacy of his wife and “not be tested.” Id. at 6. 

“[E]verybody in our family and in the India community knows about his problem,

knows about the disease and will watch him like a hawk and make sure that he does

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not do it again.” Id. Petitioner’s brother also emphasized that this was Petitioner’s first

offense. 

Following Obed Pathan’s statements, the matter was submitted and the court

ruled as follows: 

All right. Well, my sympathy goes out to the defendant. I think the acts

in this case were ... multiple acts. It wasn’t just one, isolated incident.

Multiple acts. He betrayed the position of trust. He had access to the

home because of the fact that he was a spiritual guidance [sic]. And I

think that this is just pretty egregious conduct because of that and

because of the fact that this young man, who was the victim, has to have

been traumatized because the person who perpetrated these acts on him

is someone that the family trusted and looked up to. 

So for Count 1, I’m imposing the term of 15 years to life[.] Id. at 7. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d). 

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if a state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

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the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit:

“A state court’s decision can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it

either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” 

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other grounds,

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-07). 

In deciding whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of

the highest state court to address the merits of Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned

decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Summary denials of a Petitioner’s claims in state court are adjudications on the

merits. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002), amended 311 F.3d 928 (9th

Cir. 2002). However, where state courts fail to provide a reasoned explanation for

their denials, “we [the district courts] must conduct ‘an independent review of the

record ... to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law.’” Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (alteration

in original) (quoting Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Finally, even if a constitutional error occurred, habeas relief is only warranted if

that error is structural error or had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-96 (2001)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

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DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at resentencing because defense counsel failed to properly investigate his case and to

present “mitigating” factors to the court. Specifically, Petitioner claims that defense

counsel failed to call the victim’s family to testify as witnesses in his defense and that

had counsel done so, the victim’s father was willing and ready to testify that the victim

“Shaikh, has been doing well and has not shown any long term effects [from] Pathan’s

inappropriate touching” and “that my family requests leniency in the terms of resentencing to whatever extent allowed as per statutes of California law.” Raheem

Decl. at 2. Petitioner further asserts that “this testimony would have allowed the [resentencing] court to sentence petitioner pursuant to P.C. 286,” a lesser included offense

to California Penal Code § 269, or pursuant to Cal. P.C. § 264.1, also a lesser offense. 

The question raised here is whether defense counsel’s failure to investigate and

present the evidence highlighted by Petitioner and counsel’s failure to argue for

sentencing on a lesser offense amounted to constitutionally deficient performance, and,

if so, whether Petitioner was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency.

1. Legal Standard

The Supreme Court has not decided what standard should apply to counsel’s

performance in non-capital sentencing proceedings. Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397

F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 442 (2005). Strickland declined to

“‘consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which ... may require a

different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance.’” Id.

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). Nor has any later

Supreme Court decision considered, let alone determined, the matter. Id.

Consequently, there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing

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ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the noncapital sentencing context. See

Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1157-59 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding no clearly

established federal law in the sentencing context where petitioner alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing based on counsel’s failure to investigate or present

mitigating evidence); Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1244-45. 

However, under the Strickland ineffective assistance standard, a petitioner must

establish both that defense counsel’s performance was deficient and that said

deficiency prejudiced his case. If a petitioner fails to establish either of these two

elements, his claim of ineffective assistance fails and the court need not make any

determination as to the other element. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737

(9th Cir. 1998). 

To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel’s

representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The relevant inquiry is not what

defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense

counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.

1998). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Wildman

v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no deficient performance by

counsel who did not retain a ballistics expert on a menacing charge where the same

expert had been used in the successful defense of the same defendant on a felon-inpossession charge). 

Second, the defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688. The test for prejudice is not outcome-determinative, i.e., defendant need

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not show that the deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the

case; however, a simple showing that the defense was impaired is also not sufficient. 

Id. at 693. The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different;

a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id. at 694. To establish prejudice caused by the failure to investigate or call

a witness, a Petitioner must show, among other things, that the absence of the witness’

testimony created a reasonable probability that the Court would have applied a

sentence more favorable to the Petitioner. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-

73.

2. Analysis

In this case, a jury found Petitioner guilty of multiple sex offenses involving the

same juvenile victim, including two counts of California Penal Code § 269, each of

which carries a mandatory sentence of 15 years to life. On appeal, the state appellate

court rejected Petitioner’s non-sentencing claims (including his claim that there was

insufficient evidence to support his § 269 convictions), instead remanding to permit the

trial court to decide “whether to strike the continuous sexual abuse count [§ 288.5(a)]

or the individual sex offense counts [including § 269]” and “to allow the trial court to

re-sentence defendant on the remaining count or counts.” Pathan, 2002 Cal. App.

Unpub. LEXIS at *34. In remanding, the appellate court instructed the trial court to

be guided by People v. Torres, 102 Cal.App.4th 1053, and People v. Alvarez, 100

Cal.App.4th 1170.

Torres and Alvarez hold that a defendant should be re-sentenced on the

alternative offenses that are “most commensurate with his culpability.” See e.g. Torres,

102 Cal.App.4th at 1059. Petitioner argues that the court should have been informed

of evidence relevant to his culpability such as possible mitigating or aggravating

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evidence because the re-sentencing court had discretion to choose between alternative

offenses. However, here, the sentencing court was so informed: the same judge tried

and initially sentenced Petitioner and at re-sentencing, the judge discussed the evidence

presented at the earlier proceedings, including Petitioner’s culpability, which included

arguments made by defense counsel against the court imposing a maximum sentence,

and chose to vacate the sentence under the continuous sexual abuse count (a 12 year

term) and impose the same term on count one that she had imposed at the earlier

sentencing. 

The Ninth Circuit has determined that Strickland is not clearly established law

applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Davis, 443 F.3d

at 1158. However, even if the Strickland standard applied, Petitioner’s claim still fails. 

Among the mitigating evidence presented by defense counsel at the initial sentencing

hearing was a letter from the victim’s parents requesting leniency as well as argument

that Petitioner was relatively young, had no prior record and had not molested any

other children. Also, at the initial hearing, the probation officer for the case stated for

the record, “that the victim’s mother stated that the defendant [sic] was disturbed at the

beginning of this situation [after he first reported the sexual abuse to his parents], but

that after two or three weeks he had been doing well, overall, and in school, and she

was thankful for that, and he was not involved in any kind of counseling at this time.” 

This testimony was also included in the probation department’s supplemental

probation report to the re-sentencing court (recommending a sentence of fifteen years

to life). Moreover, at the initial sentencing, prior to striking count two (the second §

269 count facing Petitioner), the Judge stated clearly, “I certainly believe that, at least

with respect to count one [the first § 269 count], that is an appropriate sentence.” 

Viewed in light of this evidence, it is impossible to conclude that defense counsel

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sentencing, where the evidence that he contends counsel failed to offer at the resentencing was already before the sentencing court. It cannot be said that counsel’s

assistance was ineffective in this regard. 

This conclusion is further supported by Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d

374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986), which holds that a claim of failure to interview a witness

cannot establish ineffective assistance when the person’s account is otherwise fairly

known to defense counsel. The father’s request for leniency was absolutely known to

defense counsel as well as to the court. Similarly, the boy’s alleged recovery was

made fairly known by the victim’s mother’s statement that, “after two or three weeks

[Shaikh] had been doing well, overall.” Defense counsel clearly fairly knew the

family’s account of the boy’s recovery and its desire that Petitioner be sentenced

leniently. Further, this information was before the sentencing court.

Even if Eggleston did not apply, the victim’s father’s account is so akin to

earlier statements before the sentencing court, that it is unreasonable to argue that

defense counsel’s failure regarding this testimony amounts to ineffective assistance,

much less that it prejudiced the case. Petitioner’s defense gains virtually nothing from

the father’s account. As noted, the re-sentencing judge did not need the father’s

testimony to be informed of the boy’s alleged recovery or of the family’s request for

leniency. At most, this testimony would have provided the court an update as to the

family’s view of the victim’s recovery and reinforced its position regarding leniency. 

It is likely that any leniency the father’s testimony might have garnered had already

been granted by the judge based on similar testimony at the initial sentencing. See RT

at 769-70 (imposing one §269 count as “certainly ... appropriate” but dismissing a

second, “based on the defendant’s extreme remorse and based on the request for

leniency on the part of the victim and the victim’s family ...”). 

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Finally, Petitioner also claims that defense counsel should have argued for

sentencing on some lesser offense (one for which he had not been convicted by the

jury). Petitioner alleges that but for this alleged deficiency, the court would have resentenced him on such a lesser offense. However, Petitioner has not established that

the sentencing judge had such discretion upon remand, or that it is reasonably probable

that she would have exercised that discretion based on the evidence Petitioner

complains was not presented. The re-sentencing court had already been presented with

similar evidence. Nothing Petitioner has presented to this Court suggests that

Petitioner was prejudiced, specifically that there is a reasonable probability that but for

the alleged deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance, the re-sentencing court

would have sentenced Petitioner on a lesser offense. As such, the state courts’ denial

of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

interpretation of established Supreme Court precedent. 

II. Abuse of Discretion

Petitioner also claims that the re-sentencing court abused its discretion by resentencing him on the basis of facts not introduced into evidence, specifically that the

crime was “pretty egregious” and that the victim “has to be traumatized.” Resentencing RT at 22-24.

1. Legal Standard

State sentencing courts must be accorded wide latitude in their decisions

as to punishment. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 926, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988). Generally, therefore, a

federal court may not review a state sentence that is within statutory limits. See id.

There are, however, exceptions to this general rule; for example, the constitutional

guarantee of due process is fully applicable at sentencing. See Gardner v. Florida, 430

U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Thus, a federal court may vacate a state sentence imposed in

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violation of due process, such as (1) if a state trial judge imposed a sentence in excess

of state law, see Walker, 850 F.2d at 476, or (2) enhanced a sentence based on

materially false or unreliable information or based on a conviction infected by

constitutional error. 

State law also may guarantee a defendant certain procedural rights at sentencing

which may not be arbitrarily denied without violating due process. See Hicks v.

Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (defendant may not be arbitrarily denied statecreated liberty interest in sentencing procedure); Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295,

1300 (9th Cir. 1993) (when state provides specific method for determining whether

certain sentence shall be imposed, “‘it is not correct to say that the defendant’s interest

in having that method adhered to ‘is merely a matter of state procedural law’”). 

However, a federal court may not review a claim that a state court failed to state its

reasoning for a particular sentence pursuant to state law when the sentence imposed

was clearly within its discretion. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504 , 507

(9th Cir. 1994) (failure to abide by state requirement that trial court state reasons for

sentencing consecutively does not rise to level of federal habeas due process claim;

Branch v. Cupp, 736 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1984).

2. Analysis

According to state law, the sentence imposed by the re-sentencing court

on count 1 in this case was clearly within its discretion: 15 years to life is the only

sentence available under § 269, one of several counts of which Petitioner was

convicted after a jury trial. Thus, unless Petitioner establishes that there was the type

of violation that creates an exception to the general rule prohibiting federal review of

state sentencing decisions that are within statutory limits, his claim must fail. 

The appellate court denied all of Petitioner’s non-sentencing claims, including

that the evidence was insufficient to support his § 269 convictions. Pathan, 2002 Cal.

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App. Unpub. *LEXIS 11875. Additionally, Petitioner has not established that a resentencing judge may not express her opinion as to the nature of a crime or its effect

on a victim, here a then 10 year old boy, particularly where that opinion is wellfounded in the record. Thus, to the extent that Petitioner might have based his claim

on any of these arguments for federal review, his claim fails. 

Likewise, if Petitioner is arguing that the re-sentencing court deprived him of a

due process right guaranteed by Torres, 102 Cal. App.4th 1053, and Alvarez, 100

Cal.App.4th 1170, his claim fails. On remand, the re-sentencing court was directed to

be guided by Torres and Alvarez. These decisions held that in circumstances such as

this case, a re-sentencing court should sentence based on those counts most

“commensurate with [defendant’s] culpability.” Here, the re-sentencing judge

appropriately considered the evidence, noting that Petitioner’s acts were multiple, that

he had access to the home because he was a spiritual guide, that the family trusted and

looked up to him, and that Petitioner had betrayed his position of trust. Not only does

this evidence explain and support the judge’s statements that the crime was “pretty

egregious” and that the victim “has to be traumatized,” but is sufficient to justify her

decision to sentence Petitioner on § 269 instead of § 288.5(a), finding that sentencing

based on § 269 was more “commensurate” with Petitioner’s culpability. 

Moreover, at the initial sentencing hearing, the judge heard argument from the

prosecution in favor of applying the maximum possible sentence. This argument

included: that Petitioner was convicted of multiple acts over the course of a year and

half, that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that Petitioner picked the victim

and not others for that very reason, that the nature of the molestations escalated, that as

a result of the case the victim’s family had been isolated from their community, that

many in the community did not believe the victim and that a number of them had either

openly turned against the family and/or pressured the family to lessen Petitioner’s

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sentence. While the judge may not have had all of these arguments in mind, they

certainly support her statements and sentencing decision. Thus, Petitioner’s claim of

abuse of discretion fails. Petitioner has not established that the judge’s statements

violated due process or in any other way contravene state or federal law. 

CONCLUSION

The state courts that considered these claims issued summary denials. As such,

this court has conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d). The state court did not commit

such error and, accordingly, this Court joins it in denying Petitioner’s claims. For the

foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall

close the file and enter judgment in accordance with this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 10/16/07 

Thelton E. Henderson 

United States District Judge

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