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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Ralph Joseph Walker
Appellee

Document Text:

~ttiteh ~tatez Qfourt of J\ppea1z 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE Cl.ERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER September 6, 1991 CLERK 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED ORDER ON PETITION 

FOR REHEARING 

RE: No. 90-4067; USA vs. Walker 

Filed August 13, 1991, by Judge Wesley E. Brown 

Attached is a new page 5 to be substituted for page 5 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

<FTSl 564·3157 

in the original order which was sent to·you on August 13, 1991. 

Very truly yours, 

. HOECKER, Clerk 

\ \ 

By : '.. 1/At;l 1 

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trick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 1 
.I 

the subjective intrusion may be somewhat lessened by the fact that 

such questioning only occurred after a motorist had been lawfully 

detained in the first instance for a traffic violation, the officer 

was apparently free to choose which individuals would be detained 

for additional questioning and which individuals would not be. Cf. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 ("This kind of standardless and 

unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when 

in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the 

official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.") 

In terms of the subjective intrusion on a motorist stopped for a 

traffic infraction, the record in this case indicates that the 

seizure at issue more closely resembled the type of random "roving 

patrol" denounced in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 

95 s.ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) than the systematic checkpoint 

that the Court approved of in Sitz. Cf. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 

("We cannot assume that the physical and psychological intrusion 

visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check 

documents is of any less moment than that occasioned by a stop by 

border agents on roving patrol. * * * For Fourth Amendment 

purposes, we also see insufficient resemblance between sporadic and 

random stops of individual vehicles making their way through city 

traffic and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles 

are brought to a halt or to a near halt, and all are subjected to 

a show of the police power of the community.") Moreover, the 

questioning that took place here cannot be characterized as idle 

conversation; it clearly was directed toward the motorist's 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) No. 

vs. ) 

) 

RALPH JOSEPH WALKER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appel lee, ) 

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 

FI LED 

United Scares Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG. 13 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

90-4067 

Before SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN; District 

Judge.* 

BROWN, District Judge. 

This matter is before the panel on appellant's petition for 

rehearing. The relevant facts were outlined in the panel's 

opinion, United States v. Walker, No. 90-4067 (10th Cir. May 7, 

1991), and will not be repeated here. Appellant contends that in 

the initial opinion we erroneously applied a "bright line" rule 

that was contrary to established Fourth Amendment precedent. We 

disagree. The principle applied in this case came directly from 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 88 s.ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and 

its progeny, which established that the Fourth Amendment usually 

requires some degree of individualized suspicion amounting to an 

objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to 

justify even a temporary seizure for questioning. We found that 

*The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Senior 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 3 
the seizure in the instant case was not reasonably related in scope 

to the circumstances that justified the detention in the first 

place (a speeding violation), and we therefore concluded that it 

was unreasonable under Terry because there was no objective 

reasonable suspicion upon which to detain the defendant for 

questioning about contraband. In doing so, we reached the same 

conclusion reached by the court under similar circumstances in. 

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th cir. 19S8). Although 

appellant again contends that there are "several important factual 

differences" between the instant case and Guzman, appellant does 

not explain how Guzman differs in any material respect from this 

case. Similarly, we find no conflict between the rule applied in 

the instant case and other Tenth Circuit decisions cited by 

appellant. 

The government correctly points out, however, that the Supreme 

Court has recognized that in certain limited circumstances the 

government's interest in law enforcement may justify an intrusion 

on privacy without any measure of individualized suspicion. See 

Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 

103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). Specifically, the Court has applied this 

principle in several cases dealing with stops of motorists on 

public highways. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 

543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Michigan State Police 

v. Sitz, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 

U.S. 648, 99 s.ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Upon further 

review of appellant's argument, it appears that the government 

2 

1 

I 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 4 
raised an issue in this case that was not raised in Guzman 1 : that 

holding the defendant to ask him questions about contraband was 

reasonable--not because it was reasonably related to the initial 

justification for the stop--but because the special needs of the 

government in detecting drug traffickers outweighed the brief 

intrusion on the defendant's liberty caused by detaining him for a 

few questions. In our initial opinion, we dealt only with the 

question of whether the detention of the defendant extended beyond 

what was reasonably necessary to issue a traffic citation. In 

doing so, we failed to address appellant's argument that the 

detention was lawful even in the absence of any reasonable 

suspicion. 

In support of its argument, appellant cites Michigan State 

Police v. Sitz, supra~ and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 

(1977). In Sitz, the Supreme court upheld the validity of a 

sobriety checkpoint operated by the Michigan State Police. In that 

case, a checkpoint to detect drunk drivers was established at a 

selected site on a state road. All motorists traveling through 

this checkpoint were briefly detained while officers asked the 

drivers a few questions and looked for signs of intoxication. The 

Supreme Court rejected an argument from motorists who had been 

stopped at the checkpoint that the detention constituted an 

unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found 

that the seizure was reasonable even though the motorists were 

1 The Supreme Court's opinion in Michigan State Police v. 

Sitz, supra, was issued after our decision in Guzman. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 5 
stopped in the absence of any individualized suspicion because the 

state's interest in reducing drunk driving and the harms associated 

with it outweighed the measure of the intrusion on the motorists 

who were stopped briefly at the checkpoint. 

The checkpoint cases cited by appellant do not lead to the 

conclusion that the seizure in the instant case was reasonable. In 

Sitz, the Court found that the level of intrusion on motorists 

stopped at a sobriety checkpoint was slight. The Court reached 

this conclusion by examining what it called the level of 

"objective" and "subjective" intrusion on the motorist. The 

objective intrusion was gauged by the duration of the seizure and 

the intensity of the investigation. It is true that the duration 

of the seizure in the instant case (a few minutes at most) and the 

intensity of the investigation (four or five questions relating to 

contraband) are not unlike those found in Sitz. The so-called 

subjective intrusion in this case, however, differs markedly from 

that found in Sitz. One factor in this subjective inquiry is the 

fear and surprise engendered in law abiding motorists by the nature 

of the detention. Sitz, 110 L.Ed.2d at 421. As noted in Delaware 

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), this 

type of concern is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint 

stop than it is when an officer makes a sporadic or random decision 

to detain an individual. There is nothing in the record before us 

to indicate that the officer's discretion in this case was 

constrained in any way with regard to which traffic violators would 

be detained for additional questioning about contraband. Although 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 6 
the subjective intrusion may be somewhat lessened by the fact that 

such questioning only occurred after a motorist had been lawfully 

detained in the first instance for a traffic violation, the officer 

was apparently free to choose which individuals would be detained 

for additional questioning and which individuals would not be. Cf. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 ("This kind of standardless and 

unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when 

in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the 

official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.") 

In terms of the subjective intrusion on a motorist stopped for a 

traffic infraction, the record in this case indicates that the 

seizure at issue more closely resembled the type of random "roving 

patrol" denounced in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 428 U.S. 543, 

96 s.ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) than the systematic 

checkpoint that the Court approved of in Sitz. Cf. Prouse, 440 

U.S. at 657 ("We cannot assume that the physical and psychological 

intrusion visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop 

to check documents is of any less moment than that occasioned by a 

stop by border agents on roving patrol. * * * For Fourth Amendment 

purposes, we also see insufficient resemblance between sporadic and 

random stops of individual vehicles making their way through city 

traffic and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles 

are brought to a halt or to a near halt, and all are subjected to 

a show of the police power of the community.") Moreover, the 

questioning that took place here cannot be characterized as idle 

conversation; it clearly was directed toward the motorist's 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 7 
possible involvement in serious criminal activity unrelated to the 

speeding violation. 2 We think this type of questioning--about 

matters unrelated to the reason for the stop--would naturally 

engender fear and resentment in otherwise law-abiding citizens who 

expect to be detained briefly for the purpose of receiving a 

traffic citation. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 

s.ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (The ordinary traffic stop is 

"nonthreatening" because the individual will be detained briefly 

while the officer conducts an inquiry reasonably related in scope 

to the justification for the stop). 

We recognize that the government has a significant interest in 

preventing the transportation and distribution of illegal drugs and 

other contraband. The question remains whether the method of 

furthering that interest that was used in the present case 

justifies the intrusion upon those Fourth Amendment interests 

outlined above. We find that on the record before us it does not. 

As previously noted, the lack of any constraint on an officer's 

decision to detain some individuals and to let others go creates a 

situation ripe for abuse. Such unfettered discretion undermines 

the liberty and privacy interests protected by the Fourth 

Amendment. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 (Even though the 

intrusion incident to a stop by border agents to detect illegal 

aliens is modest, it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to 

make such stops on a random basis) and Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. s. at 

2 The Government did not argue that the circumstances in the 

instant case gave rise to a suspicion that the defendant was under 

the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 8 
566-67 ("The principal protection of Fourth Amendment rights at 

checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the 

stop.") Additionally, there is no evidence in the record before us 

relating to the effectiveness of the method employed by the 

government to further its interest. The record sheds no light on 

whether detaining traffic violators to question them about 

contraband is an effective way to uncover the transportation of 

such substances or whether it unjustifiably burdens those using the 

highways for legitimate purposes. It certainly cannot be said that 

there is some manifest relationship between individuals who violate 

the traffic laws regulating vehicle speed and those involved in the 

transportation of illegal substances. Cf. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 

("Absent some empirical data to the contrary, it must be assumed 

that finding an unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic 

violations is a much more likely event than finding an unlicensed 

driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe of drivers.") 

Thus, the cases cited by appellant do not support the conclusion 

that the seizure in the instant case was reasonable even in the 

absence of an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms likewise does not support a finding that 

the detention in the instant case was reasonable. In Mimms, the 

Court found that it was reasonable for an officer making a routine 

traffic stop to direct a motorist to step out of the car while a 

citation was issued even though the officer had no suspicion that 

the driver was armed with a weapon. The Court found that the 

statets interest in furthering the safety of the officer outweighed 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 9 
the intrusion on the driver's liberty caused by the order to get 

out of the car. The Court found that the additional intrusion 

caused by making the driver get out of the car was "de minimis. 11 

Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. The Court noted that the driver was only 

being asked to expose to view a little more of his person than was 

already expo~ed and.that the only effect of the order was that the 

driver would spend the time during the stop along side of the car 

instead of in the driver's seat. This was termed at most "a mere 

inconvenience." We do not think that the detention of the 

defendant in the instant case is comparable to the order to get out 

of the car in Mimms. Appellant is correct that because the initial 

stop of the defendant was unquestionably lawful that we should only 

be concerned with the incremental intrusion caused by Officer 

Graham detaining the defendant to ask the series of questions 

relating to contraband. Cf. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. But 

notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recognition that an individual 

operating an automobile upon the highway may have a lesser 

expectation of privacy than does an individual in a residence, the 

person operating a car "does not lose all reasonable expectation of 

privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to 

governmental regulation." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662. We think that 

the detention of a motorist stopped for speeding to question him 

about what he has in his car that is not subject to public view3 

3 The district court found that the questions asked of the 

defendant in this case were 11 intrusive" in nature. We find this 

characterization to be accurate. We do not address the Government's 

concern that the ruling in this case in effect bars an officer from 

engaging in ordinary conversation with motorists during traffic 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 10 
and whether he is carrying large amounts of cash clearly impacts to 

some extent upon legitimate Fourth Amendment interests in privacy 

and security. This is clearly something more than a "mere 

inconvenience" and cannot be justified under the rationale of 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms. We therefore reaffirm our initial 

conclusion that the detention of the defendant constituted an 

unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 

Appellant next contends that the panel used the wrong standard 

of review in examining whether there was a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity to support the detention in this case. The panel 

stated that an appellate court must accept the district court's 

determination that the circumstances did not give rise to an 

objective reasonable suspicion unless that determination was 

clearly erroneous. Slip Op. at 11. Citing generally to United 

states v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, appellant contends that de novo 

review is appropriate in these circumstances. Although appellant 

contends that the Supreme Court "made clear" that de nova review is 

appropriate, we find no mention of the appropriate standard of 

review in Sokolow. 

There appears to be a split among the circuits regarding the 

proper standard of review on this issue. See United States v. 

Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying clearly 

erroneous standard of review) ; United states v. Rose, 889 F. 2d 

stops. Such is not the case. As the Government persuasively points 

out, it is impossible to draw "bright lines" in the area of Fourth 

Amendment rights. Each case must be dealt with upon the totality of 

the circumstances presented. 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 11 
1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Mondello, 927 

F.2d 1463, 1~70 (9th Cir. 1991) (whether the agent had a reasonable 

suspicion is a mixed question of fact and law subject to de l1QYQ 

review); United States v. Uribe-Velasco, 930 F.2d 1029, 1032 (2nd 

cir. 1991) (de DQY.Q review is appropriate). See also United States 

v. Bell, 892 F.2d-959, 969 (Ebel, J., dissenting). The question of 

reasonable articulable suspicion to support an investigatory 

detention, which this court reviews under the clearly erroneous 

standard, should not be confused with the ultimate determination of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, which we review de novo, 

see, ~, United states v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 

1990) . 

In the instant case, the panel found that the "clearly 

erroneous" standard was appropriate, relying on United states v. 

Turner, 928 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1991). Because a three-judge panel 

cannot overrule circuit precedent, we must deny the petition for 

rehearing. See United states v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 710 n. 

3 (10th Cir. 1990). The panel opinion was clearly consistent with 

prior Tenth Circuit precedent. 

It is therefore ordered that the petition for rehearing is 

denied. 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-4067 Document: 01019731398 Date Filed: 09/06/1991 Page: 12