Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03106/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03106-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Victor Hershberger
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3106

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Jeffrey Victor Hershberger, *

*

Appellant. *

------------------------------------ * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern

United States of America, * District of Iowa.

*

Appellee, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

v. *

*

Jeffrey Victor Hershberger, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: February 6, 2006

 Filed: February 7, 2006

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Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

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After Jeffrey Victor Hershberger pleaded guilty to federal charges of bank

robbery and carjacking, the district court sentenced Hershberger to 151 months

imprisonment and 2 years supervised release. Hershberger appeals, and we vacate his

sentence and remand for resentencing.

At sentencing, the district court concluded Hershberger was a career offender

based in part on his prior felony convictions for burglary and escape. See U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1(a) (career-offender status requires, among other things, two prior felony

convictions for either crime of violence or controlled substance offense). Hershberger

argues these convictions did not qualify him as a career offender because only one

was countable in his criminal history score. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c)(2) (for purposes

of career-offender Guideline, “two prior felony convictions” means sentences for at

least two qualifying convictions are counted separately in criminal history).

Specifically, from 1984 to 1993, Hershberger served consecutive prison sentences of

10 years on the burglary conviction and 5years on the escape conviction, and

Hershberger argues only the escape sentence should be counted in his criminal history

score. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) (count any earlier sentence of imprisonment

exceeding 13 months if it resulted in defendant being incarcerated during any part of

15-year period before commencement of instant offense). Hershberger alternatively

argues because Iowa law made his consecutive sentences “one continuous term of

imprisonment,” see Iowa Code § 908.8 (2003), he had only one conviction for the

two crimes. The district court rejected both arguments, and Hershberger renews them

here.

We need not reach Hershberger’s arguments. Even if only the escape

conviction is counted as one of the predicate crimes of violence, see United States v.

Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001) (escape qualifies as crime of violence),

Hershberger has another felony crime of violence to serve as the second predicate

crime of violence, namely, a 1996 conviction for operating a vehicle without the

owner’s consent, for which he was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. See United

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States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 754-55 (8th Cir. 2005) (defendant’s earlier Iowa

conviction for operating vehicle without owner’s consent was crime of violence for

purposes of § 4B1.2). Thus, the district court correctly concluded Hershberger was

a career offender. 

In addition to concluding Hershberger was a career offender, the district court

calculated Hershberger’s offense level under Chapters Two and Three of the

Guidelines, and in doing so assessed enhancements for threat of death and reckless

endangerment; the court also denied a minor-role adjustment. Hershberger’s resulting

total offense level was the same as his Chapter Four career-offender-based total

offense level. On appeal Hershberger takes issue with the district court’s rulings on

the threat-of-death, reckless-endangerment, and minor-role adjustments. We need not

address these issues because “if the offense level for a career offender . . . is greater

than the offense level otherwise applicable, the [career offender] offense level . . .

shall apply.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 792 (8th

Cir. 1999) (erroneous 5-level enhancement to offense level harmless where it did not

affect sentence), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1029 (2000); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d

1507, 1548 n.17 (8th Cir. 1995) (declining to review argument which would not affect

sentence), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1149 and 518 U.S. 1026 (1996); see also Williams

v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (error with no affect on court’s selection

of sentence imposed is harmless)

This does not conclude our analysis, however, because the district court

erroneously sentenced Hershberger under a mandatory Guidelines regime, see United

States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005) (holding Guidelines to be only

advisory), and Hershberger preserved this issue at sentencing by raising an objection

under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Having reviewed for harmless

error, see United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005), we are left

with "grave doubt" whether the error was harmless: Hershberger was sentenced at the

bottom of the applicable Guidelines range, and there is nothing in the record to

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suggest the district court would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory

system. See id. 

Accordingly, we remand for resentencing.

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