Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00298/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00298-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne Bolton
Plaintiff
Kim Holland
Defendant
Brandon Moser
Defendant
O.S. Owolabi
Defendant
Erik Sodergra
Defendant
Beau Steadman
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE BOLTON.

Plaintiff,

v.

HOLLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00298-SKO (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Plaintiff, Wayne Bolton, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. As discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state a 

cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted and the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave 

to file a first amended complaint.

B. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Violations of Rule 8, at both ends of the spectrum, warrant dismissal. A violation occurs 

when a pleading says too little -- the baseline threshold of factual and legal allegations required 

was the central issue in the Iqbal line of cases. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). The Rule is also violated, though, when a pleading says too much. 

Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir.2011) (“[W]e 

have never held -- and we know of no authority supporting the proposition -- that a pleading may 

be of unlimited length and opacity. Our cases instruct otherwise.”) (citing cases); see also 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir.1996) (affirming a dismissal under Rule 8, 

and recognizing that “[p]rolix, confusing complaints such as the ones plaintiffs filed in this case 

impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges”). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and 

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Further, “repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s ‘short 

and plain statement’ requirement are strikes as ‘fail[ures] to state a claim,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 

when the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no 

modification within a reasonable time.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

As discussed below, Plaintiff’s allegations are exceedingly conclusory and fail to show 

factual basis to meet the plausibility standard of Iqbal. Plaintiff must state factual allegations for 

the element of each claim he desires to pursue in this action. If he chooses to file a first amended 

complaint, Plaintiff should make it as concise as possible by merely stating which of his 

constitutional rights he believes were violated by each Defendant and its factual basis. Plaintiff 

need not and should not cite legal authority for his claims in a first amended complaint as his 

factual allegations are accepted as true. 

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) & 20(a)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a party asserting a claim to relief as an 

original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim to join, either as independent or as 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

alternate claims, as many claims as the party has against an opposing party. However, Plaintiff 

may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 

20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the 

claim(s) arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, 

and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 

130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 

623 F.3d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) 

will the Court review the additional claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), 

which permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party.

The Court must be able to discern a relationship between Plaintiff’s claims or there must 

be a similarity of parties. The fact that all of Plaintiff’s allegations are based on the same type of 

constitutional violation (i.e. retaliation by different actors on different dates, under different 

factual events) does not necessarily make claims related for purposes of Rule 18(a). All claims 

that do not comply with Rules 18(a) and 20(a)(2) are subject to dismissal. Plaintiff is cautioned 

that if he fails to elect which category of claims to pursue and his amended complaint sets forth 

improperly joined claims, the Court will determine which claims should proceed and which 

claims will be dismissed. Visendi v. Bank of America, N.A., 733 F3d 863, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Whether any claims will be subject to severance by future order will depend on the viability of 

claims pled in the amended complaint. 

3. Linkage and Causation 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, 

or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of his federal 

rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff’s allegations must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the 

presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility 

of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. However, prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their 

pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 

342. 

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), in Soledad, 

California, but his allegations are based on circumstances that allegedly occurred at the California 

Correctional Institution (“CCI”), in Tehachapi, California. Plaintiff names the following prison 

staff as Defendants: CCI Warden, Kim Holland; Warden Holland’s “responding agent,” Erik 

Sodergra; Supervising Plumbers, Brandon Moser and Beau Steadman; and Dr. O.S. Owolabi. 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 26, 2014, he was working his assigned job as an inmate 

plumber and was instructed by Defendants Moser and Steadman to remove materials which 

contained asbestos without safety equipment such as gloves and a mask. Plaintiff developed 

symptoms related to asbestos exposure (coughing, throat and eye irritation, and frequent nosebleeds), for which he was subsequently seen by Dr. Owolabi. Dr. Owolabi “refused” to 

acknowledge Plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos and ordered allergy medication which only made 

Plaintiff’s symptoms worse. Plaintiff stopped using the allergy medication and filed an inmate 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

appeal.

As discussed in detail below, Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims. However, he 

will be provided the applicable legal standards for his stated claims and an opportunity to file an 

amended complaint. 

B. Legal Standards 

1. Deliberate Indifference 

a. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 

Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 

officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference. . . .” 

Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. 

First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer at 834. 

Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). 

For screening purposes, inhalation of asbestos is sufficiently serious to meet the objective 

prong. However, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to meet the subjective prong. Specifically, Plaintiff 

fails to show that Defendant Sodergra knew that inmates were being exposed to asbestos aside 

from his involvement in responding to Plaintiff’s inmate appeal which, as discussed in detail 

below, is not cognizable. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Moser and Steadman denied his 

requests for safety equipment because as long as the material was wet, it posed no threat to 

Plaintiff or his co-workers. This does not show that Defendants Moser and Steadman 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

intentionally exposed Plaintiff to a condition that they knew posed a serious risk of harm. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Warden Holland (based on supervisory liability) and Dr. Owolabi 

(based on his serious medical needs) are discussed in the corresponding sections below.

b. Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘ “significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” ’ ” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 

(quotation marks omitted)). 

As to the first prong, indications of a serious medical need “include the existence of an 

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). For screening purposes, Plaintiff’s

exposure to asbestos, which resulted in coughing, throat and eye irritation and frequent nosebleeds, is accepted as a serious medical need. 

As to the second prong, deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than 

negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

safety.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). 

Deliberate indifference is shown where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial 

risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” 

Id., at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “A prisoner need not show his harm was 

substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate's claim that the 

defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin, 974 

F.2d at 1060. 

Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir.2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person 

‘must also draw the inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison 

official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the 

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, 

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Owolabi refused to acknowledge that Plaintiff had been 

exposed to asbestos and prescribed allergy medication that he knew would not work are not 

cognizable since they are conclusory and lack the requisite factual detail to be facially plausible. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, Plaintiff fails to state any allegations to show that Dr. Owolabi’s 

allergy diagnosis and treatment was anything other than professional error or a difference of 

opinion -- which is not cognizable. See Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th 

Cir.1980) (indifference, negligence, or medical malpractice insufficient); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (difference of opinion between a plaintiff and prison medical staff regarding 

his diagnosis, treatment and medical records is insufficient to state a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment violation). 

/ / /

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

 2. Conspiracy 

A claim brought for violation of section 1985(3) requires Afour elements: (1) a conspiracy; 

(2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the 

equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act 

in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property 

or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.@ Sever v. Alaska Pulp 

Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A racial, or perhaps otherwise 

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus is an indispensable element of a section 1985(3) 

claim. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotations and 

citation omitted). Plaintiff fails to state any allegations to meet any of the required elements for a 

conspiracy claim. 

3. Supervisory Liability 

It appears that Plaintiff named Warden Holland as a Defendant based on her supervisory 

position. Generally, supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior -- when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under this theory, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory 

defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew 

of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so 

deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of 

the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 

citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

To show this, “a plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was 

the proximate cause of the injury. The law clearly allows actions against supervisors under 

section 1983 as long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the plaintiff was deprived 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

under color of law of a federally secured right.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 

1447 (9th Cir. 1991)(internal quotation marks omitted)(abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 

“The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of 

acts by others,” id. (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted), or by “knowingly 

refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably 

should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury,” Dubner v. City & Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.2001). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual 

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 

1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff's allegations can be construed to allege that by reviewing Plaintiff's IAs on this 

issue, Warden Holland and Sodergra knew that Plaintiff was being exposed to asbestos without 

safety equipment and failed to take preventative/reparative action. However, "inmates lack a 

separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no 

entitlement to a specific grievance procedure), citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1988). A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any 

substantive right upon the inmates.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 

accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Massey v. Helman, 259 

F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on 

prisoner). 

However, a plaintiff may "state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference 

based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or 

her subordinates," Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (2011), which may be shown via the 

inmate appeals process where the supervisor reviewed Plaintiff's applicable inmate appeal and 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

failed to take corrective action, allowing the violation to continue. 

Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Sodergra rest exclusively on his involvement in the 

handling and processing of Plaintiff’s inmate appeal as the “responding agent of Warden 

Holland,” (Doc. 1, p. 2), which is not actionable. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. Likewise, Plaintiff’s 

allegations against Warden Holland are not actionable as he fails to show that Warden Holland 

knew inmates were being exposed to asbestos without safety equipment prior to Plaintiff’s inmate 

appeal. Plaintiff’s allegations that Warden Holland knew the facility contained asbestos and 

continued to allow her subordinates to expose inmate workers to asbestos without protective 

equipment are merely consistent with Warden’s liability and “fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, to be liable in a supervisorial capacity, 

Plaintiff must first state cognizable claims against Warden Holland’s subordinates, which as 

discussed above, Plaintiff has not done. 

4. State Law Claims

a. Government Claims Act 

Under the Government Claims Act (“GCA”),1set forth in California Government Code 

sections 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against a public 

employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presented the claim to the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board (“VCGCB” or “Board”), and the Board acted on 

the claim, or the time for doing so expired. “The Tort Claims Act requires that any civil 

complaint for money or damages first be presented to and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” 

Munoz v. California, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 (1995). The purpose of this 

requirement is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately 

investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” City of 

San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701 (1974) 

(citations omitted). Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” constitutes an 

 

1

The Government Claims Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior 

Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 741-42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than 

California Tort Claims Act).

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official. State v. Superior 

Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 (2004). Thus, in the state 

courts, “failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation 

requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of 

action.” Id. at 1239, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 (fn. omitted).

Federal courts likewise must require compliance with the GCA for pendant state law 

claims that seek damages against state public employees or entities. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 

702, 704 (9th Cir.1969); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 

(9th Cir.1995). State tort claims included in a federal action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

may proceed only if the claims were first presented to the state in compliance with the claim 

presentation requirement. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 

(9th Cir.1988); Butler v. Los Angeles County, 617 F.Supp.2d 994, 1001 (C.D.Cal.2008).

Plaintiff fails to state any allegations which show he complied with the GCA so as to be 

able to pursue claims for violation of California law in this action. Further, though Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants Holland and Sodergra violated California Penal Code sections 132 and 

134, a private right of action under a criminal statute has rarely been implied. Chrysler Corp. v. 

Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979). Where a private right of action has been implied, A>there was 

at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of 

someone.=@ Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 316 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975)). The 

Court has reviewed sections 132 and 134, and finds no indication that civil enforcement of any 

kind is available to Plaintiff. Cort, 422 U.S. at 79-80; Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass=n v. 

Hawaiian Homes Comm=n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under state law based on alleged violations of 

California Penal Code sections 132 and 134. 

5. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief via medical treatment for asbestos exposure; prohibiting 

harassment and retaliation for filing this action; and facilitating his communication with persons 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

necessary to his pursuit of this action. (Doc. 1, p. 6.)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for 

preliminary injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it 

have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 

S.Ct. 1660, 1665 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church 

and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an actual case or 

controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in question. Id.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff must establish that he has standing to seek preliminary 

injunctive relief. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493-94, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149 

(2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff Amust show that he 

is under threat of suffering an >injury in fact= that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be 

actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to challenged 

conduct of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or 

redress the injury.@ Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Mayfield, 

599 F.3d at 969. Requests for prospective relief are limited by 18 U.S.C. ' 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the Arelief [sought] is narrowly 

drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.@ 

The pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in 

general or over Plaintiff=s medical issues. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 

969. Jurisdiction is limited to the parties in this action and to the cognizable legal claims upon 

which this action is proceeding. Id.

The claims which Plaintiff alleges in this action arise from events which occurred at CCI 

while Plaintiff is currently housed at SVSP. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing in this action to 

seek relief directed at his current conditions of confinement at SVSP. Further his requests for 

injunctive relief to remedy his conditions of confinement at CCI were rendered moot upon his

transfer to SVSP. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s request for injunctive 

relief. 

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with leave to file a first 

amended complaint within thirty (30) days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply 

with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than thirty (30) 

days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions of which he 

complains resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further reminded that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court is providing Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies 

identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first 

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" 

complaints).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a 

first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a cognizable claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2017 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00298-LJO-SKO Document 18 Filed 02/22/17 Page 15 of 15