Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-04172/USCOURTS-ca3-09-04172-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kermit Ceasar
Appellant
J. Grondolsky
Appellee

Document Text:

BLD-080 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-4172

___________

KERMIT CEASAR,

Appellant

v.

J. GRONDOLSKY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. N.J. Civil No. 09-cv-03324)

District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 23, 2009

Before: MCKEE, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 16, 2010)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Kermit Ceasar appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his habeas

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We will

summarily affirm because we agree that Ceasar cannot challenge his conviction by means

Case: 09-4172 Document: 003110060422 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/16/2010
 The sentence later was reduced to 262 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 1

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of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

I.

In December 2002, the United States District Court for the District of New

Hampshire imposed a 324-month sentence based on Ceasar’s guilty plea to distribution of

crack cocaine and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack

cocaine. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. In July 2009, 1

Ceasar filed this petition, his third collateral attack on his conviction, but his first attempt

at proceeding under § 2241, claiming that he was denied the right to counsel during plea

negotiations, that he is actually innocent of the conspiracy charge, and that the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After determining that the sentencing court could have

entertained Ceasar’s claims, the District Court concluded that § 2255 was not

“inadequate” or “ineffective.” See § 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.

1997). Therefore, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

Ceasar appealed. 

II.

We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. §

2253(a). A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the denial of this §

2241 petition. See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). We exercise

plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions, and review its factual findings

Case: 09-4172 Document: 003110060422 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/16/2010
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for clear error. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 

III.

The District Court properly dismissed Ceasar’s petition. A federal prisoner can

seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or

ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536,

538 (3d Cir. 2002); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Lack of

success in a previous § 2255 motion, without more, does not render § 2255 inadequate or

ineffective; nor do AEDPA’s restrictions on filing successive § 2255 motions. See

Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539. We agree with the District Court that Ceasar’s case does not fit

within the narrow class of circumstances in which a § 2255 motion would be inadequate

or ineffective to challenge a conviction. Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal of

the petition on jurisdictional grounds was proper. Because no “substantial question” is

presented by this appeal, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 

Case: 09-4172 Document: 003110060422 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/16/2010