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Parties Involved:
Teamsters Local Union No. 61
Appellant
United Parcel Service, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 17, 2001 Decided December 7, 2001

No. 00-7239

Teamsters Local Union No. 61, affiliated with the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO,

Appellant

v.

United Parcel Service, Inc.,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00935)

Jonathan G. Axelrod argued the cause for the appellant.

Edward P. Lynch argued the cause for the appellee. William J. Kilberg and Lauren S. Goodman were on brief.

Eugene Scalia entered an appearance.

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Before: Henderson, Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Teamsters

Local Union No. 61 (Local 61) seeks reversal of the district

court's grant of summary judgment to United Parcel Service,

Inc. (UPS), affirming two rulings of the Atlantic Area Parcel

Grievance Committee (Committee), a joint management-labor

panel created to resolve UPS employee grievances. In resolving a discharge grievance brought by employee Mark

Thompson, the Committee decided on January 20, 1999 that

the case could proceed to the merits; on February 16, 1999 it

upheld Thompson's discharge. In district court, Local 61

argued that the two decisions were invalid because each was

made absent a quorum. Finding that the Committee's impartial arbitrator had the authority to decide to proceed to the

merits and that the Committee could decide the merits in the

absence of the union Committee members, the district court

held that Local 61 did "not meet the substantial burden

required to vacate the arbitration decision" and it granted

UPS's motion for summary judgment. Joint Appendix (JA)

255. We agree and therefore affirm the district court's grant

of summary judgment.

I.

Local 61, an unincorporated labor organization, challenged

in district court the Committee's decision to affirm the discharge of Mark Thompson, a UPS package pickup and delivery driver. Local 61 and UPS are bound by collective

bargaining agreements known as the National Master United

Parcel Service Agreement (NMA) and the Atlantic Area

Supplemental Agreement (Supplement). The agreements

mandate that if a grievance cannot be resolved on the job by

management, it must be submitted to the Committee for

arbitration. See generally Supplement, Article 49, section 2.

The Committee meets monthly for a three-day period. See

Supplement, Article 49, section 4(b). Each monthly Committee is to consist of an equal number of representatives from

management and the union--no fewer than two and no more

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than three members each. See Supplement, Article 49, section 2(e). The Supplement requires in a discharge or suspension case that an "impartial arbitrator" serve as the fifth or

seventh member and further provides that he "shall render a

bench decision on [sic] all deadlocked cases." Supplement,

Article 49, section 4(c).

The January 1999 Committee designated to consider the

Thompson grievance consisted of seven members--three

management members, three union members and the impartial arbitrator, Joseph Sharnoff. Shortly after the January 19

hearing began, Local 61 questioned the Committee's authority to hear the case in view of an alleged agreement between

the parties that discharge cases involving productivity were

not to be resolved by arbitration. Raising a point of order,1

Local 61 argued that UPS was precluded from defending

Thompson's discharge on the ground that he had failed to

meet production standards. The Committee then considered

the issue in executive session. During the session, one management member moved to deny Local 61's point of order.

Before the motion was seconded, however, the three union

members left the room. They did not return that day.

The Committee reconvened on January 20, recommenced

its executive session and resumed discussions regarding the

productivity issue. Once again a management member

moved to deny the point of order. The motion was seconded

but, once again, the three union members left the room

before a vote could be taken. When the arbitrator's efforts to

get the three to return were unsuccessful, he ruled that their

absence amounted to three votes to uphold Local 61's point of

order and to dismiss the Thompson grievance on the basis

that it involved productivity. The three management members then voted to deny the productivity point of order,

creating a 3-3 deadlock. The arbitrator broke the deadlock

__________

1 A point of order, in Committee parlance, appears to be the

arbitration equivalent of an objection in a trial court proceeding.

See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 6 (describing Local 61's productivity

point of order); Br. of Appellee at 7 (same).

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by voting to deny the point of order and to proceed to the

merits.

When the Committee reconvened on January 21 to hear the

merits, two of the three union Committee members refused to

participate in the hearing and remained instead in an adjoining room. Local 61 then raised a point of order that there

was no quorum. The arbitrator again attempted to get the

union members to participate and again he failed. Upon

returning to the hearing room, the arbitrator stated that "we

do not have, to my view, a properly constituted panel ...

[b]ecause there are two [u]nion members absent, for whatever

reason." JA 48. He recommended that "we proceed to put

the record on tape ... [a]nd at such point as everybody's

finished stating what their positions are we'll proceed, I

guess, with however [UPS] determines that we can proceed."

JA 48. UPS then raised a point of order asserting that the

union Committee members' refusal to proceed violated Article

7 of the NMA, which provides in part that "[t]he [u]nion

agrees it will not unreasonably delay the processing of [discharge or suspension] cases." NMA Article 7. UPS threatened to remove Thompson from the payroll but the remaining

union Committee member objected that doing so would violate both the NMA and the Supplement. The Committee did

not rule on the Article 7 point of order before adjourning.

A different five-member Committee convened on February

16 with two management members, two union members and

the same arbitrator in attendance. When the Committee

called the Thompson case, one union member refused to

participate. Local 61 again raised a point of order that there

was no quorum, although four of the five Committee members

(two management members, one union member and the arbitrator) remained present. In executive session, the Committee denied Local 61's point of order. Local 61 then stated

that it would not participate any further or be bound by any

Committee decision, again insisting--in spite of the Committee's ruling to the contrary--that there was no quorum.

When UPS began presenting its case, the remaining union

Committee member left the hearing, echoing Local 61's objection that there was no quorum. After UPS's presentation,

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"the Panel ruled in favor of the Company," JA 54, and upheld

Thompson's discharge, JA 120.

Local 61 sought in district court to vacate the Committee's

decisions, arguing that both the January 20 decision to proceed and the February 16 decision on the merits were invalid

because they were made without a quorum. On September 7,

2000 the district court granted UPS's motion for summary

judgment.

II.

Our review of a district court's decision on a summary

judgment motion is de novo. See Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

895 F.2d 1463, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Since pretrial summary

judgment decisions are rendered exclusively on the basis of a

'paper' record, an appellate court is equally well-positioned as

a trial judge to assess the evidence at issue."). We will affirm

the district court's grant of summary judgment to UPS only if

UPS has demonstrated in view of all the facts--and the

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most

favorable to Local 61, the non-moving party--that "there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-24 (1986). Local 61 appeals the grant of summary

judgment to UPS on three grounds.

First, Local 61 argues that the district court had the

"broad authority" and even the duty to "scrutinize strictly"

the Committee's January 20 decision to proceed because that

decision was substantive, not procedural, and because it "seriously undermined the integrity of the arbitral process." Br.

of Appellant at 17. We reject this contention.

It is well-settled that "the courts play only a limited role

when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator." United

Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.

29, 36 (1987). Indeed, we "are not authorized to reconsider

the merits of an award even though the parties may allege

that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation

of the contract." Id.; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v.

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Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) ("The

federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would

be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the

awards."). We have repeatedly recognized that "judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely limited" and that we "do

not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator

as [we would] in reviewing decisions of lower courts." Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38). The United

States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed these general principles, holding that "if an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his

authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed

serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504,

__, 121 S. Ct. 1724, 1728, 149 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2001) (per

curiam) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Judicial deference to an arbitrator is broader still if the arbitrator's decision is a procedural one. See John Wiley & Sons,

Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964). In Wiley, the

Court made clear that procedural questions include such

issues as "whether grievance procedures or some part of

them apply to a particular dispute, whether such procedures

have been followed or excused, or whether the unexcused

failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbitrate." Id. at

557; see Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc., 767 F.2d 687, 690 (10th

Cir. 1985) (quoting Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557); see also McKesson Corp. v. Local 150 IBT, 969 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1992)

(question of limitations on time in which arbitrator may

render decision is procedural); Beer, Soft Drink, Water,

Fruit Juice, Carbonic Gas, Liquor Sales Drivers et al., Local

Union No. 744 v. Metro. Distribs. Inc., 763 F.2d 300, 303 (7th

Cir. 1985) (issues of waiver and timeliness of filing are

procedural under Wiley).

As the district court observed, there is no dispute that a

quorum existed at the outset of the January 20 hearing

during which the Committee decided to proceed to the merits.

See JA 252; see also Oral Arg. Tr. at 4 (Local 61 stating that

"[a]t the beginning of the hearing, all three members of each

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side were present and the neutral arbitrator was present").

Neither the collective bargaining agreements nor the Committee's Rules of Procedure (Committee Rules)2 clearly address the question whether the union members' subsequent

walkout prevented a quorum. True, the Committee Rules

provide that the Committee "shall be composed of members

or alternates representing the [u]nion and members or alternates representing the [e]mployer." Committee Rules, Article II, section 2. And they provide that each Committee

"shall consist" of an equal number of management and union

members. Committee Rules, Article IV, section 2; see also

Supplement, Article 49, section 2(e). But these provisions

might simply require the presence of an equal number of

management and union members at the commencement of

any particular Committee hearing.

Whether the provisions require an equal number of management and union Committee members at the time of voting

and whether the union members' walkout prevented further

proceedings--that is, "whether [these] grievance procedures

or some part of them apply to [Thompson's discharge arbitration], whether such procedures have been followed or excused

[here], or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids

the [union's] duty to arbitrate," Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557--are

procedural questions. It is likely that one reason the parties

bargained for a neutral arbitrator in the first place was to

provide a vehicle for resolving on a case-by-case basis these

very questions--ones the collective bargaining agreements

left unclear but ones that still "grow out of the dispute and

bear on its final disposition." Id. at 556-57 ("Questions

concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not

arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual

dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those

__________

2 Pursuant to an agreement between "[t]he Local Unions party to

the Atlantic Area Supplement" and UPS, the Rules of Procedure

"implement the provisions set forth in the grievance procedure of

the Atlantic Area Supplement," although nothing contained in the

Rules "shall in any way be deemed to alter or amend the procedures set forth in such Supplement." JA 108 (Committee Rules,

Article I).

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covered by it."). Given the special deference we owe the

arbitrator on procedural matters, see id. at 557, we cannot say

that his January 20 decision to go forward in spite of the

union members' walkout was in error.

Moreover, even if the arbitrator's decision to proceed were

substantive,3 as Local 61 contends, the holding in Garvey

would still counsel deference. It is at least "arguabl[e]"

under the Garvey standard that because there was a quorum

at the beginning of the January 20 session, any quorum

requirement that existed was met. As the district court put

it:

If an arbitration [decision] ... draws its essence from

the collective bargaining agreement, the Court will uphold the [decision].... Article 7 of the National Master

Agreement states that "The [u]nion agrees it will not

unreasonably delay the processing of [discharge] cases."

... The arbitrator's decision to go forward after repeated and unexplained departures by the [u]nion [Committee] members is consistent with this provision of the

collective bargaining agreement.

JA 254 (citations omitted).

Like the district court, we conclude that the arbitrator was

"within the scope of his authority," Garvey, 532 U.S. at __,

121 S. Ct. at 1728, in first declaring and then breaking the

deadlock on January 20. Contrary to Local 61's contentions,

the arbitrator is "more suited than the courts to interpret

[the NMA] and to resolve contractual problems which occur

between labor and management." Teamsters Local 623 v.

UPS, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 509, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1992); see United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363

__________

3 Local 61 asserts that "substantive" questions include "whether

non-parties to the contract may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute"

and whether "fundamental procedural irregularities [have tainted]

the arbitration proceeding." Br. of Appellant at 19 (citations omitted). It cites no authority, however, for its proposition that a

quorum vel non is a "substantive" issue. See id.

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U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (arbitrator "is usually chosen because of

the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of

the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to

bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract

as criteria for judgment"). Consistent with this principle, the

district court recognized that "[t]he party seeking to vacate

an arbitration award," here Local 61, "faces a 'steep upward

grade.' " JA 251 (quoting Local 2094, American Fed'n of

State, County & Mun. Employees v. Howard Univ. Hosp.,

996 F. Supp. 61, 65 (D.D.C. 1998)).4

Local 61 is mistaken in its assertion that the union Committee members' conduct in absenting themselves constituted

misconduct that serves as a basis for vacating the Committee's decision to proceed. Local 61 did not challenge the

union Committee members' conduct at any time before this

appeal. Here, Local 61 alleges for the first time that the

union members' alleged misconduct in walking out should be

attributed to the Committee as a whole. Because this argument was not raised in the district court, it is not properly

before this court. See United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283,

1287 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (adhering to "general rule ... that a

federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed

upon below") (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120

(1976)).

More importantly, if we were to accept this argument, the

practical result would be perverse at best--whenever union

members believed a grievant's discharge was wrongful, they

could simply refuse to participate in the arbitration, claim the

Committee was "biased" and by default the grievant would

retain his job with pay. See NMA Article 7. This is not the

arbitration procedure for which UPS bargained. Article 7

prevents both sides from derailing the arbitration process.

Under that provision, UPS agreed to allow the discharged

__________

4 Moreover, Local 61 does not, and cannot, dispute the district

court's finding that the vote to proceed caused it no harm because

the arbitrator decided to count the union Committee members'

absence as three votes to uphold Local 61's point of order. See JA

253.

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employee to remain on the job, without loss of pay, "unless

and until the discharge or suspension is sustained under the

grievance procedure" and, in return, the union agreed that it

"will not unreasonably delay the processing of [discharge]

cases." Id. We decline to deny UPS the benefit of its

bargain by holding that the union Committee members' tactics provide a basis for vacating the Committee's January 20

decision to proceed.

Local 61's second ground of appeal is that the district court

committed reversible error in failing to scrutinize the Committee's January 20 decision to proceed under a narrow

"public policy" exception that denies enforcement of an arbitration award if it "violates established law or seeks to compel

some unlawful action." Am. Postal Workers Union, AFLCIO v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir.

1986) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l

Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).

The claim is without merit.

We have explained that the public policy exception to the

enforceability of an arbitration award "is extremely narrow[,]

... [and] applies only when the public policy emanates from

clear statutory or case law, not from general considerations

of supposed public interests." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Local 61 cites no statutory

authority or case law supporting its proposition that a quorum is required as a matter of public policy. It correctly

observes that "[n]ational labor policy concerning arbitration

awards flows from the statutory principle that '[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is ... the

desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes.' " Br.

of Appellant at 16 (quoting 29 U.S.C. s 173(d)). That principle, however, supports UPS's position, not Local 61's--the

parties accepted an arbitration method under which procedural conflicts are to be resolved by an arbitrator, see Wiley, 376

U.S. at 557, and agreed that neither side would derail the

resolution of discharge cases, see NMA Article 7. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly deferred to

the Committee's January 20 decision to proceed to the merits

of Thompson's grievance.

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Local 61's third challenge goes to the Committee's February 16 merits decision to uphold Thompson's discharge. The

union asserts, simply, that a merits decision made in the

absence of a quorum is void per se. This claim can be

disposed of in short order.

Neither the NMA nor the Supplement nor any of the

Committee Rules uses the word "quorum." As we mentioned, the Supplement and Rules do state that each monthly

Committee is to consist of an equal number of management

and union members. See Supplement, Article 49, section 2(e);

Committee Rules, Article IV, section 2. Nevertheless, it is at

least "arguabl[e]" under Garvey deference that whatever

"quorum" requirement the Supplement and Rules may impose was met when all five Committee members were present

at the commencement of the February 16 proceeding. Moreover, Article 7 of the NMA at least suggests that Committee

action in the absence of a quorum is appropriate if union

Committee members "unreasonably delay the processing" of

a discharge case by subsequently boycotting the proceeding.5

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of

summary judgment to UPS is

Affirmed.

__________

5 The only support Local 61 can muster for its claim is Robert's

Rules of Order, which state that "[i]n the absence of a quorum, any

business transacted ... is null and void." Robert's Rules of Order,

Newly Revised 341 (9th ed. 1990). These, of course, are no support

at all. The parties' collective bargaining agreements (and the

arbitrator's interpretations thereof) determine Committee procedure. Nowhere do the agreements or the Committee Rules (or the

arbitrator's interpretations thereof) suggest that Robert's Rules

apply. Therefore, like the district court, we are unpersuaded by

Local 61's "analogy between the proceedings before the [Committee] and proceedings before Congress." JA 255.

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