Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07089/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07089-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis P. McChesky
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DENNIS P. MCCHESKY,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7089

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-3121, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: December 15, 2015

______________________ 

DENNIS P. MCCHESKY, Bohol, Phillippines, pro se. 

JESSICA L. COLE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN 

F. HOCKEY; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, CHRISTINA L. GREGG, Office 

of General Counsel, United Stated Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

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2 MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD

Before DYK, BRYSON, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Pro se appellant Dennis McChesky appeals the decision of the United Stated Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims (“Veterans Court”), denying his petition for writ of 

mandamus. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. McChesky served on active duty in the Navy from 

1965 to 1968. In 2004, he filed a claim seeking service 

connection for hypertension. The Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”) denied his claim due to the absence of 

evidence establishing that the “condition began in service 

or developed to a compensable degree within a year from 

service discharge,” Appellee’s App. 81, a determination 

the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Veterans’ Board”) upheld 

on appeal in 2008. See In re Dennis P. McChesky, Docket 

No. 06-25 266 (Bd. Vet. App. July 11, 2008) (Appellee’s

App. 69–77). 

On further appeal, on January 25, 2010, the Veterans 

Court remanded to the Veterans’ Board to search for more 

evidence. In turn, the Veterans’ Board remanded to the 

Philippines Regional Office (“RO”) in April 2010, directing 

the RO to: (1) contact the National Personnel Records 

Center (“NPRC”) to obtain additional records reporting 

Mr. McChesky’s blood pressure at the relevant times; (2) 

conduct a VA examination of Mr. McChesky to evaluate 

the origin of his hypertension; and (3) readjudicate his 

claim. 

In an August 2010 VA examination, Mr. McChesky 

was diagnosed with hypertension. The examiner initially 

“opined that it was at least as likely as not that the Veteran’s current hypertension was related to active service,” 

because he “had borderline elevated blood pressure of 

138/90 during [an] enlistment physical examination that 

could have progressed into the current hypertension.” 

Appellee’s App. 49. However, the following month, after 

Mr. McChesky’s claims file was returned to the examiner, 

the examiner issued an addendum opinion concluding 

that, due to Mr. McChesky’s “minimal service records 

available for review,” it could not be determined whether 

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MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD 3

the enlistment blood pressure reading was aggravated by 

service. Id. The Veterans’ Board found the examiner’s 

initial conclusion was not supported by “a medical explanation” and determined that “another opinion should be 

obtained.” Id. at 51–52. 

The Veterans’ Board also determined that, although 

the RO had requested some of Mr. McChesky’s records 

from the NPRC, it had failed to request records from 

several sources specifically identified in the previous 

remand order. Moreover, the RO had not notified Mr. 

McChesky of the results of the record requests that it had 

initiated. The Veterans’ Board again remanded to the 

RO, directing it to request relevant records via the NPRC 

“or any other appropriate service department office,” to 

inform Mr. McChesky of the results of the search efforts, 

to submit Mr. McChesky’s claims file to a VA medical 

examiner to opine on service connection of the hypertension, and to readjudicate the claim. Id. at 52–53. 

The RO sought records pursuant to the remand order, 

but was again unsuccessful, and in August 2014 Mr. 

McChesky was notified accordingly. The following month, 

a VA medical opinion was issued in response to the remand order, but the examiner stated he “cannot resolve 

this issue [of service connection] without resort to mere 

speculation,” because of “minimal pertinent service medical records available for review.” Id. at 33 (capitalization 

omitted). The RO thereafter issued a Supplemental 

Statement of the Case (“SSOC”) denying service connection for Mr. McChesky’s hypertension. 

Mr. McChesky then filed a petition for writ of mandamus1 with the Veterans Court, asserting the VA was 

not proceeding in an expeditious manner. The Veterans 

1 In addition to the petition now at issue, Mr. 

McChesky filed two previous petitions for writs of mandamus. See McChesky v. Shinseki, No. 12-2199, 2012 WL 

3192619 (Vet. App. Aug. 7, 2012) (denying a mandamus 

petition filed July 17, 2012); McChesky v. Shinseki, No. 

11-3713, 2012 WL 135699 (Vet. App. Jan. 17, 2012) (dismissing as moot a mandamus petition filed December 8, 

2011). 

 

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4 MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD

Court denied the petition in a single-judge order. Mr. 

McChesky then filed a motion requesting a panel decision 

by the Veteran’s Court, asserting the single-judge order 

erroneously stated that VA medical examination reports 

had been prepared on August 28, 2014, and September 

22, 2014, when in fact the September 22 report was from 

2010, not 2014. See McChesky v. Shinseki, No. 14-3121 

(Vet. App. Dec. 29, 2014) (Appellee’s App. 1–4) (“Reconsideration Order”). The Veterans Court determined 

single-judge reconsideration was appropriate, reconsidered the petition for writ of mandamus, and issued a 

Reconsideration Order denying it. Id. Mr. McChesky’s 

appeal to this court followed. We have jurisdiction to 

review decisions of the Veterans Court under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292 (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the 

Veterans Court is limited. By statute, this court has 

“exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge 

to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof . . ., and to interpret constitutional and 

statutory provisions.” Id. § 7292(c). Unless a constitutional issue is presented, this court lacks jurisdiction to 

review either “(A) a challenge to a factual determination, 

or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the 

facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2). Despite this 

court’s limited jurisdiction to review facts of a veteran’s 

underlying claim, we have noted “[i]t is unlikely that 

[§ 7292(d)(2)] was intended to insulate from our review 

[the Veteran’s Court’s] decisions under the All Writs Act,” 

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012), i.e., the relevant law authorizing writs of mandamus. Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 

1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Section 7292 further provides that this court

shall hold unlawful and set aside any regulation 

or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied 

upon in the decision of the [Veterans Court] that 

[this court] finds to be— (A) arbitrary, capricious, 

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MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD 5

ance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, 

power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of 

statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 

in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). We review legal determinations of 

the Veterans Court de novo. Dixon v. Shinseki, 741 F.3d 

1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A denial by the Veterans 

Court of a petition for writ of mandamus may be reviewed 

when the decision “raises a non-frivolous legal question.” 

Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

II. Mandamus

A. Legal Standard for Granting Petitions for Writs of 

Mandamus

In general, “[a] writ of mandamus may be used to 

compel an inferior tribunal to act on a matter within its 

jurisdiction, but not to control its discretion while acting, 

nor reverse its decisions when made.” Ex parte Burtis, 

103 U.S. 238, 238 (1880) (citation omitted); see also Mandamus, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (explaining a writ of mandamus is a court’s written order 

“compel[ling] performance of a particular act by a lower 

court or a governmental officer or body, usu[ally] to correct a prior action or failure to act”). Congress authorized 

the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in An Act 

to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to the 

Judiciary, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 234, 36 Stat. 1087, 1156 

(1911), and authority for all federal courts to issue writs 

of mandamus is now found in 28 U.S.C. § 1651,2 which 

Mr. McChesky cites as a principal basis for his claim, see 

Appellant’s Br. 3, 4. Section 1651(a) states, in its entirety, that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established 

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 

agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1651(a). 

2 Section 1651 is commonly referred to as the “All 

Writs Act.” See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 

367, 378 (2004).

 

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The Supreme Court has explained, in the context of 

§ 1651(a), a court may grant a petition for writ of mandamus only if each of three conditions is satisfied:

First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must

have no other adequate means to attain the relief 

he desires—a condition designed to ensure that 

the writ will not be used as a substitute for the 

regular appeals process. Second, the petitioner 

must satisfy the burden of showing that his right 

to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. 

Third, even if the first two prerequisites have 

been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its 

discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. 

Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81 (emphases added) (internal 

quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). The 

Court has further noted “[t]he remedy of mandamus is a 

drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)

(citations omitted). 

The burden of proving there are no other adequate 

means to attain relief rests with the party seeking a writ 

of mandamus, as does the burden of establishing that the 

right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. In 

re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Moreover, even where the first two conditions described in 

Cheney are satisfied, the issuance of a writ of mandamus 

under § 1651 is discretionary. Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403. 

Accordingly, we must determine whether the Veterans 

Court “abused its discretion or committed other legal 

error” in denying mandamus. Lamb, 284 F.3d at 1384. 

B. The Veterans Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or 

Commit Legal Error in Denying the Petition for Writ of 

Mandamus

Mr. McChesky first asserts the Veterans Court “did 

not invoke the ‘All Writs ACT 28 U.S.C. ~1651(a).’” 

Appellant’s Br. 3. However, the Veterans Court did 

consider § 1651, acknowledging in its single-judge Reconsideration Order that it “has the authority to issue extraordinary writs in aid of its jurisdiction pursuant to the 

All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).” Appellee’s App. 3. 

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MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD 7

The Veterans Court set forth the relevant legal standard 

for issuing writs of mandamus, concluding that Mr. 

McChesky “has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating

a clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus.” 

Id. The Veterans Court also found that because “the RO 

is actively developing and adjudicating the claim,” Mr. 

McChesky had not established that the VA had arbitrarily refused to act. Id. 

Because it is apparent from the Veterans Court’s Reconsideration Order that it did consider § 1651, Mr. 

McChesky’s claim is best understood as challenging the 

Veterans Court’s conclusion that the standard for issuing 

a writ of mandamus has not been satisfied. He asserts 

the VA engaged in “obvious stonewalling, delay, redundancy, etc. that points to the Veterans Affairs refusing to 

act.” Appellant’s Br. 4. In a supplemental filing, which 

we have treated as a Memorandum in Lieu of Oral Argument (CM/ECF Doc. No. 15, filed Nov. 13, 2015) (“Memorandum”), Mr. McChesky points out that twenty-three 

months elapsed between the first remand to the Veterans’ 

Board in January 2010 (which then remanded to the RO 

in April 2010) and the date he filed his first petition for 

writ of mandamus in December 2011, and that the RO 

denied his claim five days after the mandamus petition 

was filed. Memorandum at 1–2. He similarly asserts 

that after the second remand to the RO (September 2012), 

twenty-four months elapsed before the RO issued an 

SSOC, and that the SSOC was issued ten days after the 

current petition (i.e., Mr. McChesky’s third petition) for 

writ of mandamus was filed. Id. at 2; see also Appellee’s 

Br. 10 (noting the ten-day period). From these and other 

facts, Mr. McChesky concludes “[m]y petitions . . . motivate the VA and [Veterans’ Board] to act.” Id. 

The Veteran’s Court did not abuse its discretion or 

commit legal error in denying the petition. Mandamus is 

an extraordinary remedy. Kerr, 426 U.S. at 402. Although certain periods between RO actions may have 

spanned twenty-three or twenty-four months, we cannot 

say “the delay amounts to an arbitrary refusal to act”

rather than “the product of a burdened system.” Costanza 

v. West, 12 Vet. App. 133, 134 (1999); see also Lamb, 284 

F.3d at 1384 (“[E]xtraordinary writs cannot be used as 

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8 MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD

substitutes for appeals, even though hardship may result 

from delay . . . .” (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. 

Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953))). Given that the RO 

issued the SSOC following the filing of the Mr. 

McChesky’s petition for writ of mandamus now under 

review, Mr. McChesky could then have responded to the 

SSOC, meaning that he had other adequate means of 

relief. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81 (“[T]he party seeking 

issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means

to attain the relief he desires . . . .” (second alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Although Mr. McChesky asserts the VA is “refusing to 

act,” Appellant’s Br. 4, the record indicates the VA denied 

his claim in 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, and 2015, see Appellee’s App. 2, 16, 28, 70, 80. Given these denials and Mr. 

McChesky’s request that this court “require the [Veteran’s 

Court] to decide my case and give me 10% to 20% VA 

disability compensation,” Mr. McChesky’s complaint is 

primarily directed at the outcome of the VA’s actions 

rather than its failure to act. Memorandum at 2. Whether the VA properly applied the law to the facts in this 

case, however, is not a matter within this court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

Mr. McChesky’s assertion that the Veterans Court 

failed to apply the reasonable doubt doctrine as provided 

in 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 also cannot satisfy the standards for 

issuance of a writ of mandamus. See Appellant’s Br. 3. 

That regulation states: 

When, after careful consideration of all procurable 

and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability, or 

any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant. By reasonable doubt is meant 

one which exists because of an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does 

not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. It is 

a substantial doubt and one within the range of 

probability as distinguished from pure speculation 

or remote possibility. It is not a means of reconciling actual conflict or a contradiction in the evidence. Mere suspicion or doubt as to the truth of 

any statements submitted, as distinguished from 

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MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD 9

impeachment or contradiction by evidence or 

known facts, is not justifiable basis for denying 

the application of the reasonable doubt doctrine if 

the entire, complete record otherwise warrants 

invoking this doctrine. The reasonable doubt doctrine is also applicable even in the absence of official records, particularly if the basic incident 

allegedly arose under combat, or similarly strenuous conditions, and is consistent with the probable 

results of such known hardships.

38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2015) (emphases added). Mr. 

McChesky refers to the reasonable doubt doctrine as a 

means to explain the absence of blood pressure readings. 

See Appellant’s Reply Br. 6 (“My sworn testimony answers the question why I don’t have any blood pressure 

readings . . . . (38C.F.R. 3102 [sic] Reasonable doubt).”). 

That testimony, contained in an affidavit from 2006, is 

that at the time of Mr. McChesky’s discharge physical in 

1968, an assistant told him he “had high blood pressure 

and that [he] would receive [twenty] to [thirty] dollars a 

month and receive free medical.” Appellee’s App. 22. The 

affidavit also states that Mr. McChesky saw his doctor “go 

through [his] medical file and throw away maybe [two] or 

[three] papers and then another.” Id. He argues in his 

brief that “[t]hese [discarded documents] were my blood 

pressure readings.” Appellant’s Br. 3. 

These asserted facts do not satisfy the mandamus 

standard as set forth in Cheney. Whether the VA properly 

applied the reasonable doubt doctrine, or failed to apply 

it, is a matter than can be addressed in Mr. McChesky’s 

response to the most recent SSOC. Therefore, there are 

“other adequate means” to assert this argument in pursuance of the relief Mr. McChesky seeks. Cheney, 542 U.S. 

at 380. To the extent Mr. McChesky asks this court to 

apply the reasonable doubt doctrine of 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 

and “require the [Veteran’s Court] to decide [his] case and 

give [him] 10% to 20% VA disability compensation,” 

Memorandum at 3, we note that this court lacks jurisdiction to review either “(A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied 

to the facts of a particular case,” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

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10 MCCHESKY v. MCDONALD

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the decision of the Veterans Court 

is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

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