Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00686/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00686-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Rebecca Taylor
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 By order dated March 11, 2005 (Doc. 12), this cause was set for oral argument on

May 4, 2005 (id.); however, by order dated April 6, 2005 oral argument in this case was cancelled

(Doc. 14). This case can be decided by the undersigned without the benefit of oral argument.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

REBECCA TAYLOR, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 04-0686-CB-C

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, :

Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying her claim for supplemental security income. This action has been

referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon consideration of the administrative record,

plaintiff's proposed report and recommendation, and the Commissioner's

proposed report and recommendation,1it is determined that the decision to deny

benefits should be reversed and this cause remanded for further consideration

not inconsistent with this decision.

Case 1:04-cv-00686-CB-C Document 16 Filed 04/28/05 Page 1 of 13
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Plaintiff alleges disability due to morbid obesity, marked osteoarthritis,

diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made

the following relevant findings:

2. The claimant has morbid obesity and musculoskeletal

aches and pain secondary to morbid obesity, considered “severe”

based on the requirements in the Regulations 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(b).

3. These medically determinable impairments do not meet or

medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, and Regulation No. 4.

4. The undersigned finds the claimant’s allegations regarding

her limitations are not totally credible for the reasons set forth

in the body of the decision.

5. The undersigned has carefully considered all of the

medical opinions in the record regarding the severity of the

claimant’s impairments and is persuaded by the opinions of Dr.

Nayeem set forth in Exhibits 7F and 21F (20 CFR § 416.927).

6. The claimant has the following residual functional

capacity: stand one half hour at a time for a total of two hours per

eight-hour workday. She can walk 1/4 hour for a total of one hour

per eight-hour workday. The claimant has no limits on her ability

to sit. She can constantly lift and carry items weighing up to five

pounds, frequently lift up to ten pounds, and occasionally lift up

to 15 pounds. She can occasionally carry items weighing as much

as ten pounds. She can never lift and carry items weighing greater

than twenty pounds. The claimant is not capable of stooping,

kneeling, crouching, or crawling. She can occasionally climb and

balance. She cannot work in extreme temperatures or in high

places. She is limited to sedentary work activity.

7. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR §

416.965).

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8. The claimant is a ‘younger individual between the ages of

18 and 44' (20 CFR § 416.963).

9. The claimant has ‘a high school education’ (20 CFR §

416.964).

10. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform a wide range of sedentary work (20 CFR § 416.967). 

11. Using Medical-Vocational Rule 201.27 for decisionmaking, there are a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that the claimant could perform. An example of such

jobs includes work as assembler at the sedentary level numbering

300,000 in the national economy.

12. The claimant was not under a “disability,” as defined in the

Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision

(20 CFR § 416.920(f)).

(Tr. 21-22 (emphasis supplied)) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's

decision (Tr. 5-7) and thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In supplemental security income cases where the claimant has no past

vocationally-relevant work, as here, it is the Commissioner’s burden to prove

that claimant is capable of performing work which exists in significant numbers

in the national economy. See Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir.

1989) (citation omitted). The ALJ’s articulation of specific jobs the claimant

is capable of performing must be supported by substantial evidence. Id. (citation

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2 This Court's review of the Commissioner's application of legal principles, however, is

plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

3 The undersigned also determines that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff can

perform a wide range of sedentary work.

4

omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d

842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view

the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as

unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).2

The claimant contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by: (1)

failing to consider all of her impairments; (2) failing to accord proper weight

to the opinion of Dr. Maurice Fitzgerald; and (3) failing to comply with the

Appeals Council’s remand order. Because it is found that the ALJ erred in

failing to consider all of plaintiff’s impairments and in failing to comply with

the remand order,3this Court need not address the other issue raised by plaintiff.

See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Because the

‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone warrants a reversal,’ we do not consider

the appellant’s other claims.”).

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Plaintiff’s first assignment of error is that the ALJ failed to consider all

of her impairments, namely her diabetes, hypertension and osteoarthritis. In

Finding Number 2, the ALJ indicates that plaintiff’s only severe impairments are

morbid obesity and musculoskeletal aches and pain secondary to her morbid

obesity (Tr. 21, Finding No. 2), yet in the body of his decision he appears to

suggest that her hypertension and diabetes also are severe impairments (Tr. 15

(“The second step in the sequential evaluation process requires the undersigned

to determine whether the claimant has a ‘severe’ impairment. A medically

determinable impairment or combination of impairments is severe if it

significantly limits an individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities (20 CFR § 416.921). The medical evidence indicates that the claimant

is morbidly obese and has musculoskeletal aches and pain secondary to morbid

obesity and cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, impairments that are severe within

the meaning of the Regulations. She also has hypertension controlled with

medication and diabetes that is under control with medication.”)). 

In this circuit, an impairment can be considered not severe “only if it is

a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it

would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work,

irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d

914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984). Because it is clear that plaintiff’s hypertension and

Case 1:04-cv-00686-CB-C Document 16 Filed 04/28/05 Page 5 of 13
4 See also Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 187 (3rd Cir. 2003) (ALJ found

plaintiff’s hypertension to be a severe impairment); Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir.

2003) (court noted that plaintiff’s diabetes and hypertension were admittedly severe impairments);

Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997) (ALJ found one of claimant’s severe

impairments to be his “longstanding hypertension controlled by medication[]”). 

6

diabetes are severe impairments, the ALJ having made that clear determination

in his initial hearing decision (see Tr. 39 (“[T]he undersigned finds that claimant

suffers from non-insulin dependent diabetes, hypertension, gallstones, and

obesity, which are ‘severe’ impairments within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and regulations.”)),4and these impairments are crucial to the ALJ’s

proper analysis of the obesity remand issue (compare Tr. 74 (“In part, the

Administrative Law Judge found the claimant’s obesity was a severe impairment.

However, the decision does not reflect that consideration was given to this

impairment under the guidelines set forth in Social Security Ruling 00-3p.

Therefore, further assessment is warranted. Upon remand, the Administrative

Law Judge will . . . [f]urther evaluate the claimant’s obesity under the guidelines

set forth in Social Security Ruling 00-3p, providing rationale for the

conclusions reached.”) with Doc. 11, Attachment C, SSR 00-3p (“Obesity is a

risk factor that increases an individual’s chances of developing impairments in

most body systems. It commonly leads to, and often complicates, chronic

diseases of the cardiovascular, pulmonary, and musculoskeletal body systems.

Case 1:04-cv-00686-CB-C Document 16 Filed 04/28/05 Page 6 of 13
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Obesity increases the risk of developing impairments such as type II [] diabetes

mellitus; . . . gall bladder disease; hypertension; heart disease; peripheral

vascular disease; dyslipidemia[]; stroke; osteoarthritis; and sleep apnea.”)), on

remand the ALJ must specifically address the severity of all of plaintiff’s

impairments, singly, and in combination, and address those impairments within

the guidelines set forth in SSR 00-3p.

Despite the Appeals Council’s directions in its September 26, 2002

order of remand that the ALJ evaluate Taylor’s obesity under the guidelines set

forth in SSR 00-3p (Tr. 74), it is apparent that the ALJ ignored this portion of

the remand order inasmuch as he neither acknowledges this portion of the order

(Tr.14 (“The Appeals[] Council granted review and by Order dated September 26,

2002, remanded the case back to the Office of Hearings and Appeals for further

consideration of the claimant’s subjective complaints and the effectiveness and

side effects of her medications.”)) nor does he mention SSR 00-3p anywhere

in his decision (see Tr. 14-22). While the ALJ finds plaintiff’s obesity is a

severe impairment (Tr. 21), he found that to be the case in his first decision (see

Tr. 74) and he does not go beyond that, as ordered, and evaluate this impairment

under the guidelines set forth in SSR 00-3p. This is an important omission not

only in relation to the Step 3 analysis (compare Tr. 17 (“The medical evidence

shows that while her impairments are severe, they are not severe enough to meet

Case 1:04-cv-00686-CB-C Document 16 Filed 04/28/05 Page 7 of 13
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or medically equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4. The claimant’s most severe problem was an acute gallbladder

problem, which was corrected by surgical removal. The claimant has not been

treated in the emergency room for stomach pain since shortly after her surgery.

She has been treated for family planning and blood pressure checks and to get

physicals for medication refills, etc. Not until she wanted a disability statement

from her treating doctor did she seek treatment for pain related to her hips,

knees and back. . . . The undersigned finds the evidence does not support a

finding that her impairments meet or equal the requirements of a listing.”) with

Doc. 11, Attachment C, SSR 00-3p (“[E]ven though we deleted listing 9.09, we

made some changes to the listings to ensure that obesity is still addressed in our

listings. In the final rule, we added paragraphs to the prefaces of the

musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular body system listings that

provide guidance about the potential effects obesity has in causing or

contributing to impairments in those body systems. See listings sections 1.00F,

3.00I, and 4.00F. The paragraphs state that we consider obesity to be a medically

determinable impairment and remind adjudicators to consider its effects when

evaluating disability. The provisions also remind adjudicators that the combined

effects of obesity with other impairments can be greater than the effects of each

of the impairments considered separately.”)), but, as well, in relation to

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assessing residual functional capacity (see Doc. 11, Attachment C, SSR 00-3p

(“[The provisions] also instruct adjudicators to consider the effects of obesity

not only under the listings but also when assessing a claim at other steps of the

sequential evaluation process, including when assessing an individual’s residual

functional capacity.”)). Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ must evaluate

claimant’s obesity in accordance with SSR 00-3p.

This case also needs to be remanded for further proceedings because the

ALJ’s determination that plaintiff can perform a wide range of sedentary work

(Tr. 22, Finding No. 10) is not supported by substantial evidence. Relying upon

Dr. Mohammed Nayeem’s opinion regarding Taylor’s residual functional

capacity (compare Tr. 19 (“The undersigned finds Dr. Nayeem’s opinion

persuasive and consistent with the weight of the evidence of record.”) with Tr.

293-295 (Dr. Nayeem’s RFC assessment)), the ALJ determined that plaintiff

has the following residual functional capacity:

stand one half hour at a time for a total of two hours per eighthour workday. She can walk 1/4 hour for a total of one hour per

eight-hour workday. The claimant has no limits on her ability to

sit. She can constantly lift and carry items weighing up to five

pounds, frequently lift up to ten pounds, and occasionally lift up

to 15 pounds. She can occasionally carry items weighing as much

as ten pounds. She can never lift and carry items weighing greater

than twenty pounds. The claimant is not capable of stooping,

kneeling, crouching, or crawling. She can occasionally climb and

balance. She cannot work in extreme temperatures or in high

places. She is limited to sedentary work activity. 

Case 1:04-cv-00686-CB-C Document 16 Filed 04/28/05 Page 9 of 13
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In addition, the ALJ mistakenly finds that the number of such jobs in the national

economy comes to approximately 300,000. (Tr. 22) The vocational expert (“VE”), in fact, testified that

10

(Tr. 21, Finding No. 6 (emphasis supplied)) 

Sedentary work is defined in the Commissioner’s regulations as follows:

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time

and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files,

ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as

one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and

standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are

sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and

other sedentary criteria are met.

20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) (2004). In addition, most unskilled sedentary jobs

require the ability to stoop occasionally, that is, from very little to up to onethird of the time. SSR 96-9p. “A complete inability to stoop would significantly

erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the

individual is disabled would usually apply[.]” Id. (emphasis supplied).

In this case, the ALJ fully embraced the RFC assessment of Dr. Nayeem,

including the limitation that plaintiff can never stoop. In light of this limitation,

plaintiff certainly cannot perform a wide range of sedentary work as noted by the

ALJ and the grids, therefore, are simply inapplicable. The ALJ is not saved in his

fifth step analysis by citation to sedentary assembler jobs as an example of jobs

plaintiff can perform as he has come forward with no evidence that sedentary

assembler jobs require no stooping5 nor explained why such limitation does not

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sedentary assembler jobs number 108,000 nationally and 7,800 in the region. (Tr. 359) 

6 Although the plaintiff’s application in this case is solely for supplemental security income

benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), remand is proper under sentence four of § 405(g)

because § 1383(c)(3) provides that “[t]he final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after a

hearing under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title

to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 405 of this title.”

11

result in a finding of disability in this case. Accordingly, this cause need be

remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for identification of those

specific sedentary jobs, if any, plaintiff can perform in light of her impairments

and limitations. 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff benefits be be reversed and

remanded pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g),6 see Melkonyan v. Sullivan,

501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of §

405(g) makes the plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access

to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over

this matter. 

Case 1:04-cv-00686-CB-C Document 16 Filed 04/28/05 Page 11 of 13
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The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DONE this the 27th day of April, 2005.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and

original records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a

judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will

pay the cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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