Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-24-01412/USCOURTS-ca1-24-01412-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rasheed Akinsanya
Petitioner
Merrick B. Garland
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 24-1412

RASHEED AKINSANYA,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND,

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Montecalvo, Howard, and Aframe,

Circuit Judges.

Benjamin Osorio, with whom Alaina Taylor and Murray Osorio PPLC,

were on brief, for petitioner.

Liza S. Murcia, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, with 

whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil 

Division, and Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States Department of Justice, were on brief, for 

respondent.

SangYeob Kim, with whom Gilles Bissonnette was on brief, for 

American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, amicus curiae.

January 10, 2025

 

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AFRAME, Circuit Judge. Rasheed Akinsanya is a Nigerian 

citizen. He has brought a petition for review challenging the 

administrative denial of his application for deferral of removal pursuant 

to the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). 

Akinsanya contends that if he were to return to Nigeria, he would be 

tortured by a terrorist organization called Boko Haram. The Board of 

Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the conclusions of the Immigration 

Judge ("IJ") that Akinsanya could not obtain deferral of removal under 

the CAT because he failed to demonstrate that Nigerian officials would 

acquiesce to his potential torture. In evaluating Akinsanya's claim, 

the BIA did not correctly apply the appropriate legal test for 

acquiescence. We therefore grant the petition and remand for further 

proceedings. 

I.

Before entering the United States, Akinsanya served in the

Special Anti-Robbery Squad ("SARS") of the Nigeria Police Force. In 

2013, the Nigerian government investigated Akinsanya's SARS unit for a 

host of allegations including corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, and 

providing material support to Boko Haram, a terrorist group present in 

Nigeria.1 Akinsanya cooperated in the investigation, which culminated 

in the arrest of several officers, including a deputy commissioner.

1 The IJ describes Boko Haram as an "insurgent group operating 

and expanding out of the Northeast region of Nigeria with aspirations 

to replace Nigeria's secular state structure with an Islamic state." 

Since 2009, Boko Haram has caused more than forty thousand deaths in 

Nigeria.

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Following the investigation, the government reassigned 

Akinsanya to a different police unit in the northern region of Nigeria. 

This new unit was focused on combatting kidnapping and human trafficking 

by Boko Haram. Meanwhile, Akinsanya began receiving anonymous telephone 

calls and texts that caused him concern for his safety.

In October 2013, Akinsanya entered the United States on a B-1 

visa to attend a police conference. The visa authorized Akinsanya to 

remain in the country until April 2014. While in the United States, 

Akinsanya learned that one or more people had broken into his house. 

They took his laptop, vandalized a file cabinet, removed a confidential 

file identifying Boko Haram informants, and left a threatening letter. 

Akinsanya also learned that Boko Haram had attacked his new division and

caused the deaths of eight officers, including two who had been 

reassigned with him.

After these events, Akinsanya decided to remain in the United 

States beyond the expiration of his visa. He testified that he made 

this decision because he feared that Boko Haram would murder him if he 

returned to Nigeria.

In the ensuing years, Akinsanya discovered that several other

officers involved in the 2013 investigation of his SARS unit had died 

under suspicious circumstances or been forced to retire from the police 

force. Then, on two occasions in 2021, members of Akinsanya's family 

in Nigeria were attacked by individuals looking for Akinsanya. 

In early 2021, Akinsanya's ex-wife and daughters were beaten 

and subsequently hospitalized. During the attack, the individuals 

interrogated the family about Akinsanya's whereabouts. His ex-wife 

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informed the intruders that he was in the United States and that they 

had divorced six years earlier. The police investigated the incident. 

Akinsanya believes the attackers were associated with Boko Haram. 

Later in 2021, Akinsanya's sister, Toyin Olufunke Oladunjoye, 

was attacked at home by at least three disguised individuals. During 

the attack, the individuals inquired into Akinsanya's whereabouts and 

stated that they would kill him if he ever were to return. Before 

leaving, the attackers shot Akinsanya's sister. She survived the attack 

but was hospitalized for several days during which time the police

interviewed her. She testified that she stopped inquiring about the 

investigation after the police demanded payment each time she visited 

the station. She believes that the attackers were affiliated with Boko 

Haram based on their dialect. 

On May 29, 2018, about five years after arriving in the United 

States, Akinsanya was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, under 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349, and aggravated identify theft, under 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)-(2), in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Texas. He received an eighty-seven-month prison 

sentence. 

While Akinsanya was serving his sentence, the government 

identified him as a removable noncitizen. In April 2023, after Akinsanya 

completed his sentence, the Bureau of Prisons transferred him to the 

custody of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") for removal 

proceedings. DHS charged Akinsanya as removable for remaining in the 

United States longer than permitted and for his aggravated felony 

conviction.

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On June 13, 2023, Akinsanya filed an application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ 

held several hearings during which he heard testimony from Akinsanya;

his friend, Taju Okeleye; his sister, Toyin Olufunke Oladunjoye; and his

expert witness, Dr. Godwin Onuoha.

Following the hearings, the IJ issued a written decision. 

The IJ found that Akinsanya and his witnesses were credible and that 

Akinsanya's expert was qualified. The IJ determined that Akinsanya was 

removable from the United States for staying beyond his visa expiration

and because of his aggravated felony conviction. The IJ then concluded 

that Akinsanya was statutorily barred from obtaining asylum and 

withholding of removal because of his conviction for a particularly 

serious crime.

Having rejected Akinsanya's requests for asylum and 

withholding of removal, the IJ turned to his request for deferral of 

removal under the CAT. The IJ concluded that Akinsanya was ineligible 

for deferral of removal because he had failed to establish that he would 

be tortured upon returning to Nigeria by or with the acquiescence of a 

public official.

The IJ began its CAT analysis with a detailed review of the 

relevant testimony and evidence. He acknowledged that Nigeria is subject 

to threats from multiple armed groups, including Boko Haram. He also 

noted that Nigeria's government is constrained in its ability to protect 

its citizens, that the police are under-resourced, and that weak 

institutions and corruption have allowed Boko Haram to "gain a foothold 

and continue its operations." Regarding Akinsanya directly, the IJ noted

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the expert's testimony that he "'may be exposed to the possibility of 

being killed, if returned to Nigeria' in view of [his] past experiences

and the Nigerian government's overall difficulty reining in Boko Haram." 

The IJ nevertheless concluded that Akinsanya was ineligible 

for CAT relief because the "evidence . . . d[id] not support a finding 

that the Nigerian government or a public official would acquiesce or 

turn a blind eye to [his] torture." In support of this conclusion, the 

IJ cataloged a series of actions taken by the Nigerian government to 

combat Boko Haram: designating Boko Haram a terrorist organization;

criminalizing membership and arresting individuals affiliated with the 

group; engaging in counterterrorism efforts and joint military exercises

with other nations; investigating officers in the SARS unit for providing 

Boko Haram with material support; and infiltrating Boko Haram, as 

demonstrated by the list of confidential informants stolen from 

Akinsanya's home. The IJ also noted that the police responded to the 

2013 break-in at Akinsanya's home and the 2021 attacks on his ex-wife 

and sister.

The IJ acknowledged that "these efforts may not be entirely 

effective" and that "the Nigerian government certainly faces an uphill 

battle against Boko Haram." The IJ further acknowledged that "torture 

may occur at times in Nigeria," and Akinsanya may have difficulty 

avoiding harm from Boko Haram. Despite this, the IJ rejected Akinsanya's 

claim for CAT protection, concluding that acquiescence cannot be based 

on the government's "general ineffectiveness" in "prevent[ing] 

widespread violence and crime affecting the population at large." 

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Akinsanya appealed to the BIA only the denial of his 

application for deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA affirmed. 

It acknowledged that Nigerian officials may lack the ability to protect 

Akinsanya but endorsed the IJ's view that an acquiescence finding cannot 

rest on that basis. The BIA determined that, despite the possibility 

for violence, Akinsanya's claim failed because Nigerian authorities were 

taking some preventative measures to combat Boko Haram and the potential 

ineffectiveness of those measures was not a sufficient ground to 

establish government acquiescence. 

Akinsanya petitioned this Court for review of the BIA's 

ruling.

II.

When considering petitions for review of BIA rulings, we 

generally focus on the BIA's final decision. Loja-Tene v. Barr, 975 

F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2020). To the extent "the BIA has adopted and 

affirmed the IJ's ruling, but has included discussion of some of the 

IJ's bases for decision, we review both the IJ's and BIA's opinions." 

Bonnet v. Garland, 20 F.4th 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Chanthou Hem

v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2008)). When discussing the BIA 

and IJ as a unit, we refer to them together as "the agency." Khalil v. 

Garland, 97 F.4th 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2024). We review factual findings 

under the substantial-evidence standard to determine whether "the record 

compels a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the agency." 

DeCarvalho v. Garland, 18 F.4th 66, 74 (1st Cir. 2021). We review legal 

conclusions de novo. Murillo Morocho v. Garland, 80 F.4th 61, 65 (1st 

Cir. 2023). 

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III.

Akinsanya's primary claim, and our basis for resolving this 

petition, is that the BIA did not adequately analyze whether the Nigerian 

authorities would likely acquiesce in Akinsanya's torture. We begin our 

discussion by describing the requirements for obtaining deferral of 

removal under the CAT regulations with a particular focus on the standard 

for proving government acquiescence.

To prove eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT, 

a petitioner must establish "that it is more likely than not that he 

will be tortured if returned to his home country." Bonnet, 20 F.4th at 

84 (quoting Mazariegos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 280, 287 (1st Cir. 2015)); 8 

C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2022). "[T]orture is defined as 'any act by which 

severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 

inflicted on a person . . . by, or at the instigation of, or with the 

consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official 

capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.'" Bazile v. 

Garland, 76 F.4th 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2023) (second alteration in original) 

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2022)). 

This Court has articulated a "two-part, successive inquiry"

to determine whether a public official acquiesced to torture inflicted 

by a private actor. H.H. v. Garland, 52 F.4th 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2022); 

see also Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 67; Khalil, 97 F.4th at 67; Morgan

v. Garland, 120 F.4th 913, 930 (1st Cir. 2024). "[A]n applicant . . . 

must first demonstrate the likelihood of a foreign government's awareness 

of torture, and then show a likely breach of the government's duty to 

intervene to prevent the torture." H.H., 52 F.4th at 19-20. In 

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discussing the duty to intervene prong, this Court has articulated 

several considerations that bear on the pending petition:

• Applying the duty to intervene requires the agency to identify 

the nature of the legal duty that the government owes under the 

circumstances and then consider whether the steps (if any) taken 

by government officials satisfy that duty. See Murillo Morocho, 

80 F.4th at 68; Khalil, 97 F.4th at 68-69. 

• This Court has "express[ed] skepticism that any record evidence 

of efforts taken by the foreign government to prevent torture

. . . will necessarily be sufficient to preclude the agency from 

finding that a breach of the duty to intervene is likely to 

occur." H.H., 52 F.4th at 21.

• The duty to intervene inquiry is especially important where the 

record "suggest[s] that the government's steps have been 

inadequate and ineffectual." Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 68. 

The agency must explain why the government's steps, though 

inadequate or ineffectual, nevertheless satisfy its duty to 

intervene. Id.

• The agency may only determine whether an applicant has 

established a breach of the duty to intervene "after carefully 

weighing all facts in the record." H.H., 52 F.4th at 21.

Guided by these considerations, we conclude that the agency 

incorrectly analyzed whether Akinsanya proved government acquiescence in 

his torture. We therefore remand. See Khalil, 97 F.4th at 70 (remanding 

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where the BIA's acquiescence analysis "[did] not indicate it applied the 

correct legal test"); Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 68 (same). 

A.

The BIA's legal analysis of Akinsanya's CAT claim began with 

a general statement that Akinsanya was required to show, first, that it 

is "more likely than not that [he] will be tortured upon return to [his] 

homeland; and second, [that there is] sufficient state action involved 

in that torture," which includes acquiescence by a public official. The 

BIA then asserted that a government's inability to protect its citizens 

does not amount to acquiescence. Relying on that proposition, the BIA 

affirmed the IJ's no-acquiescence finding, writing that "[p]otential 

instances of violence committed by non-governmental actors against 

citizens, together with speculation that the police or government might

not prevent that violence, are generally insufficient to prove government 

acquiescence." 

On its face, the BIA's ruling does not appear to apply the 

correct legal standard for acquiescence. The BIA did not state the 

two-step acquiescence inquiry; nor did it cite any of this Court's 

relevant cases.2 The decision also failed to discuss both prongs of the 

2 The BIA cited two First Circuit cases. It first cited H.H., 

52 F.4th 8, which, as we note above, does set out the correct legal 

standard. But the BIA cited H.H. only for the different proposition 

that an IJ is not required to "accept all the testimony and opinions 

provided as facts." The BIA also cited Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 

F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2017). That case was decided before H.H. articulated 

the two-step acquiescence inquiry and rejected the CAT claim summarily. 

See 857 F.3d at 136 (concluding that "[petitioner's] application for 

protection under the CAT . . . fails for substantially the same reason 

as do his challenges to the denials of his request for asylum and 

withholding of removal").

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inquiry. Specifically, the BIA did not identify the legal duty that the 

Nigerian government owed to Akinsanya. See Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th 

at 68 (remanding in part due to the agency's failure to address the 

government's legal duty); Khalil, 97 F.4th at 70 (same). 

The government acknowledges these omissions but contends 

that, "although [the BIA did] not parse the two-prong acquiescence 

inquiry, [its] path may reasonably be discerned." We disagree.

The BIA based its no-acquiescence finding principally on the 

proposition that a government's inability to protect its citizens does 

not amount to acquiescence and that the Nigerian authorities have been

taking some steps to combat Boko Haram. But this approach, seemingly 

derived from Fifth Circuit authorities, is inconsistent with this Court's 

treatment of public-official acquiescence.3 A no-acquiescence finding 

cannot rest solely on the fact that the government has taken some 

responsive action to combat private violence. 

For starters, such reasoning is hard to reconcile with our 

previously "express[ed] skepticism that any record evidence of efforts 

taken by the foreign government to prevent torture . . . will necessarily 

be sufficient to preclude the agency from finding that a breach of the 

duty to intervene is likely to occur." H.H., 52 F.4th at 21. 

3 Akinsanya, supported by the American Civil Liberties Union of 

New Hampshire as amicus curiae, argues that the BIA erred by citing Fifth 

Circuit authorities because this case was governed by First Circuit law. 

The government contends that the BIA applied First Circuit law, while 

also relying "on persuasive case law from the Fifth Circuit" to support 

its analysis. Of course, the BIA may rely on persuasive authority from 

other courts so long as the authority cited aligns with the governing 

law. The problem here is that the BIA's understanding of Fifth Circuit 

caselaw led it afield from the acquiescence inquiry required by this 

Court in H.H., Murillo Morocho, and Khalil. 

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More to the point, looking only to whether a government takes 

some responsive action to prevent private violence fails to account for 

instances where a foreign government takes some measures but still does 

not satisfy its legal duty to intervene. Sometimes, despite having taken 

some action, a government may still have "a legal responsibility to do 

more." H.H., 52 F.4th at 20 (quoting Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 

335 (2d Cir. 2020)). That is why we require the agency to address 

whether the government's actions demonstrate that it will adequately 

meet its legal responsibility to intervene. See id. at 20-21. 

Addressing this part of the inquiry is especially important where a 

government's preventative actions have been ineffective. As we have 

explained, although "'concerns about . . . the overall effectiveness of 

[] law enforcement efforts do not compel the conclusion' of 

[public-official] acquiescence," Morgan, 120 F.4th at 931 (quoting 

DeCarvalho, 18 F.4th at 75); see also Urias-Orellana v. Garland, 121 

F.4th 327, 338-39 (1st Cir. 2024) (same), such concerns remain pertinent 

to whether a government is likely to meet its legal duty to intervene, 

see Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 68 (explaining that an evaluation of a 

government's efforts in light of the government's legal duty is 

particularly important where "the record suggest[s] that the 

government's steps have been inadequate and ineffectual"). 

Here, the BIA acknowledged evidence that "the Nigerian 

government is actively combating numerous terrorist groups and rebels 

throughout the country, including Boko Haram," and the possibility that 

such efforts may be ineffective. The BIA did not, however, articulate 

the Nigerian government's duty to protect Akinsanya, one of its law 

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enforcement officers, from Boko Haram's violent retaliation. Nor did 

the BIA explain whether, in this situation, the fact that the "Nigerian 

government is actively combating numerous terrorist groups and rebels" 

was sufficient to establish a likelihood that Nigerian officials would 

satisfy their legal duty to intervene. 

By resting its decision solely on the fact that the Nigerian 

government has taken some responsive actions to combat Boko Haram but 

neglecting to analyze whether those actions satisfy the duty to 

intervene, the BIA failed to correctly perform the acquiescence inquiry.4 

Accordingly, we remand for the BIA to address "what 'legal duty'

[governmental] authorities [owe] in this situation and whether the 

4 Akinsanya separately contends that, in crediting the Nigerian 

government's country-wide efforts to combat Boko Haram when evaluating 

acquiescence, the agency imposed on Akinsanya an "improperly high burden"

to establish acquiescence. The agency, he argues, effectively required 

him to prove that "the entire Nigerian government," and not just "'a'

public official," would acquiesce in his torture.

As we are remanding in any event, we do not reach this 

argument. But we offer two observations. First, the agency did not 

consider only country-wide efforts to combat Boko Haram; the IJ described

efforts by the police that were specific to Akinsanya and his family. 

Second, general governmental efforts to address violence are relevant, 

but not necessarily dispositive, considerations when evaluating 

government acquiescence. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guerrero v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 

572, 575 (1st Cir. 2018)(crediting a country report detailing several 

government agencies and policies designed to combat violence against 

women); Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10, 21 (1st Cir. 

2021)(crediting general governmental efforts to address gang violence); 

Khalil, 97 F.4th at 69 (stating that "'the fact that some officials take 

action to prevent the torture' is 'neither inconsistent with a finding 

of government acquiescence nor necessarily responsive to the question 

of whether torture would be "inflicted . . . with the consent or 

acquiescence of a public official"'" (alteration in original) (quoting 

De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2010))). 

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government's efforts satisf[y]" that duty.5 Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th 

at 68. 

B.

The government alternatively argues that, even if the BIA 

committed legal error when considering acquiescence, we may still affirm 

because BIA and IJ decisions are sometimes read as a unit, and here, the 

IJ correctly applied the acquiescence inquiry. We disagree for three 

reasons.

First, the IJ's role is to perform only an initial assessment 

of the petitioner's claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.10(b) (2024); DeCarvalho, 18 F.4th at 73. The BIA then reviews 

findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions and questions of 

discretion and judgment de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (2024); 

DeCarvalho, 18 F.4th at 73. Specifically, the BIA reviews de novo the 

IJ's application of facts to determine whether a public official's 

response to potential torture establishes that the official "breach[ed]

his or her 'legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such'" torture. 

5 Akinsanya also asks this Court to further define what 

constitutes a public official's legal duty to intervene. Specifically, 

he requests that this Court direct the BIA to apply a "due diligence"

standard borrowed from the United Nations Committee Against Torture's 

General Comment No. 2. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Gen. Comment No. 

2, Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2,

at ¶ 18 (Jan. 24, 2008). We decline that request. "Our task is to 

review the agency's legal interpretation, not perform it in the first 

instance." Tillery v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 182, 186 (1st Cir. 2016); see 

also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009); Guta-Tolossa v.

Holder, 674 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2012). We leave it to the BIA, in the 

first instance, to define the legal duty to intervene. 

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Khalil, 97 F.4th at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Myrie v. Att'y 

Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Retreating to the IJ's no-acquiescence conclusion where the 

BIA introduces legal error by not properly applying a legal standard 

deprives a petitioner of meaningful de novo review by the BIA. That is

no small thing. The BIA's de novo review of an IJ's no-acquiescence 

determination presents a substantial opportunity for the petitioner to 

reverse that determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2024); see

also Tillery, 821 F.3d at 185 (noting the BIA has "broad authority to 

exercise independent judgment and to rest on an alternative basis [to 

the IJ] when denying a petition"). But the BIA's de novo review is 

meaningless if it incorrectly applies the legal standard. When that 

occurs, we must remand so that the petitioner may obtain meaningful BIA

review. See, e.g., Khalil, 97 F.4th at 70 (remanding where the BIA's 

acquiescence analysis "[did] not indicate it applied the correct legal 

test").

Second, even were we to consider the IJ's no-acquiescence 

conclusion directly, we still would deem it inadequate. Unlike the BIA, 

the IJ correctly stated the two-pronged acquiescence standard. The IJ 

then reviewed the relevant testimony and evidence. It described the 

steps being taken by the Nigerian government to combat Boko Haram, 

including efforts specific to Akinsanya. The IJ acknowledged that such

efforts "may not be entirely effective" but nonetheless rejected 

Akinsanya's acquiescence claim on the ground that "[a] general 

ineffectiveness on the government's part to prevent widespread violence 

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and crime affecting the population at large does not suffice to show 

acquiescence such that protection under the CAT is warranted." 

The IJ's acquiescence analysis is insufficient. Merely 

stating the proper standard does not discharge the obligation to 

correctly apply the standard. See Khalil, 97 F.4th at 68-69, 70 

(remanding for the BIA to evaluate acquiescence de novo despite both the 

BIA and IJ having cited the correct legal standard). Here, the IJ 

acknowledged expert testimony that Akinsanya may face violence from Boko 

Haram and listed potentially ineffective efforts by the Nigerian 

government to protect him. However, as we have already explained, to 

base a no-acquiescence finding on these ineffective efforts, the IJ also 

had to define the government's legal duty to intervene and explain why 

the government's actions establish a likelihood that it would discharge

its duty. See Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 68. That critical aspect 

of the inquiry is missing. See Khalil, 97 F.4th at 69 (remanding where 

the BIA and the IJ failed to "evaluate[] the effectiveness of those steps 

and whether they met the government's duty to intervene" (quoting Murillo

Morocho, 80 F.4th at 68)).

Finally, the IJ appears to have made its no-acquiescence 

determination without "carefully weighing all facts in the record." 

H.H., 52 F.4th at 21. Akinsanya's expert testified that Boko Haram had 

infiltrated various levels of the Nigerian government, citing ties 

between the terror organization and a Nigerian vice president, a 

government minister, and a senator. The record also indicates that 

members of Akinsanya's initial police division, the SARS unit, were 

investigated in part for providing material support to Boko Haram. 

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Evidence of such infiltration could be pertinent to the acquiescence 

inquiry, but none of this evidence was discussed by the IJ in its findings 

of fact or legal analysis. By not addressing even the possibility that 

Boko Haram had infiltrated the Nigerian government, the agency failed 

to satisfy its obligation to weigh all the facts.6 See id.

For the reasons discussed, we cannot conclude that the agency

correctly applied the legal test for acquiescence. We therefore must 

remand so that the agency can give Akinsanya's CAT claim "reasoned 

consideration."7 H.H., 52 F.4th at 23 (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 

270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)); Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th at 68.

6 The government contends that some of the infiltration evidence 

presented by Akinsanya's expert was undermined on cross-examination. 

Because there is no mention of this evidence in the IJ's decision, we 

cannot determine whether the IJ concluded that there was no infiltration 

as a matter of fact, whether it simply overlooked the infiltration 

evidence presented, or whether it deemed the evidence irrelevant to the 

inquiry.

7 Akinsanya makes two alternative arguments. First, he 

contends that the agency, in denying his claim, erred by considering

only whether the Nigerian government would acquiesce in his torture and 

not the necessary antecedent -- whether Akinsanya would in fact be 

tortured. But a petitioner's inability to satisfy any prong of the legal 

test for CAT protection is dispositive. See Murillo Morocho, 80 F.4th 

at 66. The agency need not reach a second prong where the first will 

suffice. Id. If the agency decides on remand to grant relief, it will 

have to determine that Akinsanya has satisfied all aspects of the torture 

inquiry.

Akinsanya relatedly argues that this Court must remand as the 

"uncontroverted record evidence compels a finding that [he] would suffer 

death if returned to Nigeria," and "the IJ and the BIA failed to explain 

why they did not find in accordance with the expert’s testimony." As 

we are remanding for reconsideration of the acquiescence question, we

leave it for the agency to decide, in the first instance, whether 

Akinsanya proved he would experience torture if he were to return to 

Nigeria.

Case: 24-1412 Document: 00118234134 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/10/2025 Entry ID: 6692286
- 18 -

IV.

We grant Akinsanya's petition for review, vacate the agency's 

decision, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

Case: 24-1412 Document: 00118234134 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/10/2025 Entry ID: 6692286