Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03533/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03533-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Michael Mohr
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3533

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota. 

Christopher Michael Mohr, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2004

Filed: August 23, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges. 

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Christopher Michael Mohr pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court1

 concluded that

Mohr was a career offender and sentenced him to 188 months imprisonment. Mohr

appeals the district court's application of the career offender provision and its denial

of a downward departure. We affirm. 

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On December 6, 2001, a confidential informant for the Stearns County Sheriff

Department made a controlled purchase of a half ounce of methamphetamine from

Mohr. The following day the informant purchased an ounce of methamphetamine

from Mohr and his codefendant, John Moen. Mohr then arranged for the informant

to purchase a quarter pound of methamphetamine from Moen, and Mohr went with

him to Moen's motel room on December 11 where the sale was completed. Officers

obtained and executed search warrants for Moen's motel room and home; the

evidence they found there included another ounce and a half of methamphetamine,

a loaded shotgun, a sawed off shotgun, and cash. They also executed a search

warrant at Mohr's home where additional evidence was obtained. 

The two men were indicted on multiple charges, and Mohr pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine on April 16, 2002. About three months

later he escaped from custody while on his way to a court appearance in a different

case, but he was soon apprehended with assistance from a helicopter and infrared

detection equipment. 

Mohr was sentenced on September 30, 2003. The district court took note of

his two prior felony convictions, possession of short barreled shotguns and burglary

of an automobile repair shop, and concluded they were crimes of violence. Mohr did

not dispute that possession of a short barreled shotgun qualifies as a crime of violence

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2003), see United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 651

(8th Cir. 1999), but he argues that burglary of a commercial building does not qualify

unless the facts of the particular case were to show that the crime created a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another. The district court disagreed, ruling that

under United States v. Blahowski, 324 F.3d 592, 595-96 (8th Cir. 2003), his burglary

fit the category of crime of violence and that he was therefore a career offender.

Mohr also moved for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, arguing that his

criminal history category significantly overrepresented the seriousness of his record.

The court denied this motion, characterizing Mohr as "close to a one-man crime wave

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Since Mohr had twenty four criminal history points, he fit criminal history

category VI regardless of whether the career offender enhancement applied. His prior

convictions included theft of a motor vehicle, felony possession of a short barreled

shotgun, attempts to purchase vehicles and a stereo with forged checks, endangerment

of a child by driving while intoxicated, giving a false name to the police, third degree

burglary of an auto repair shop, receipt of stolen property, theft, and twelve counts

of driving after his license was suspended. He had also frequently violated probation

and committed this offense while on probation and in violation of his bond on a

residential burglary charge. 

3

The government objected to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility in

light of Mohr's escape from custody on July 23, 2003, but it has not appealed. 

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since the time he was a child." As a career offender Mohr's base offense level was

34, and his criminal history category was VI.2

 The district court granted a three level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility which led to a total offense level of 31.

The resulting sentencing range was 188 to 235 months,3

 and Mohr was sentenced at

the low point to 188 months. 

Mohr argues that the district court erred by considering his prior conviction for

burglary of a commercial building a crime of violence. He contends that the 1997

amendment to the commentary for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 requires consideration of his

actual offense conduct and that our contrary holding in Blahowski, 324 F.3d at 595-

96, failed to respond to the amendment. He also argues for the first time on appeal

that Blahowski violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers and the

case and controversy clause of Article III by legislating a new rule for future cases.

He finally contends that the district court erred by failing to depart downward because

his criminal history category substantially overrepresented the seriousness of his past

crimes. 

We review de novo the district court's conclusion that burglary of a commercial

building was a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender provision.

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United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 1996). Mohr has not previously

raised his constitutional arguments so we apply a plain error standard in considering

them. See United States v. Grap, 368 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2004). A district court's

refusal to grant a downward departure is generally unreviewable on appeal unless

there is evidence of an unconstitutional motive or the court mistakenly believed it was

without authority to grant the departure. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d

793, 799 (8th Cir. 2003).

The sentencing guidelines provide that a defendant must have "at least two

prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance

offense" to be considered a career offender. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(3). The guideline

defines crime of violence as

any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for

a term exceeding one year, that — 

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves

use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Burglary, whether of a dwelling or a commercial building, has

as its elements the "unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building

or structure, with intent to commit a crime." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,

598 (1990).

Our court has reasoned that since burglary always creates a "serious potential

risk of physical injury to another," it qualifies as a crime of violence. United States

v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Fiore, 983

F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992) (burglary of a commercial building poses a potential for

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Prior to the amendment, an application note to § 4B1.2 stated that a prior

offense would qualify as a crime of violence if "the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly

charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted . . . by its nature,

presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." In 1997 that

language was altered to read "in determining whether an offense is a crime of

violence . . . the offense of conviction (i.e., the conduct of which the defendant was

convicted) is the focus of inquiry." As we noted in Blahowski, "[i]f anything, the

addition of the phrase 'the offense of conviction' in the post-amendment version

emphasizes that the criminal offense itself and not the individual circumstances

surrounding the defendant's conviction is the focus of the inquiry." 324 F.3d at 596.

5

Mohr's case is unaffected by Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct 2531, 2536

(2004), because the fact of a prior conviction need not be proved to a jury in order to

support an increase in a defendant's sentence. See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The only enhancement to Mohr's sentence was because of his

prior convictions. 

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episodic violence so substantial as to be a crime of violence). This rule was expressly

reaffirmed in Blahowski, 324 F.3d at 595-96, a case decided after the 1997

amendment to the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2,4

 and it remains the law of the

circuit. See United States v. Wilson, 315 F.3d 972, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2003) (only the

court en banc can overrule a circuit precedent). The district court thus did not err in

concluding that Mohr's prior burglary of a commercial building was a crime of

violence for purposes of the career offender provision.5

Mohr contends for the first time on appeal that Hascall and Blahowski were

advisory opinions which legislated a per se rule for application to future cases in

violation of Article III and separation of powers principles. He cites no authority for

the proposition that the Constitution is violated by a judicial interpretation requiring

a particular outcome in a category of cases, and he does not distinguish the circuit

precedent under which his possession of a sawed off shotgun was treated as a crime

of violence without regard to the individual circumstances of the case. See Allegree,

175 F.3d at 651. Nor does he explain how Hascall and Blahowski can be seen as

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advisory opinions when both applied the sentencing guidelines in actual cases and

controversies. Mohr has not shown any clear constitutional error by the district court

in applying Hascall and Blahowski, and we find no plain error. United States v.

Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Mohr finally argues that the district court erred by denying his downward

departure motion because his criminal history significantly overrepresents the

seriousness of his past criminal conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Although he

recognizes that a district court's refusal to depart downward is generally

unreviewable, see Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d at 799, he argues that here the district

court believed that it was without authority to depart because of its erroneous finding

that Mohr had been "close to a one-man crime wave since the time he was a child."

This argument ignores the district court's recognition at sentencing of United States

v. Senior, 935 F.2d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1991), which held that a downward departure

is permissible if a defendant's criminal history category overstates his criminal record.

The record indicates that the district court was well aware of its authority to depart

downward, but decided that a departure was not warranted because of Mohr's

extensive criminal background. For this reason, the court's decision not to depart is

unreviewable. See United States v. Dabney, 367 F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Christopher Michael Mohr’s case is an example of the misconception that the

guidelines have been successful at reducing sentencing disparities. Mohr’s sentence

is more than double that which similar defendants throughout the country would

expect to receive under the guidelines, due solely to our circuit’s interpretation of

what constitutes a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender

enhancement. We have adhered to the fiction that every burglary of a commercial

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building is a “crime of violence” as defined by the guidelines. This view has been

rejected by nearly every circuit to consider the issue, and I suggest our circuit

reconsider the matter.

The guideline provisions concerning the career offender enhancement are wellestablished, and warrant additional discussion here. As relevant to Mohr’s case, a

defendant convicted of a controlled substance offense must be treated as a career

offender, and accordingly sentenced much more severely, if he has two prior felony

convictions for crimes of violence. USSG § 4B1.1. Crimes of violence include

“burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,” and those which “involve[] the use of

explosives, or otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2).

One of Mohr’s qualifying “violent” offenses was a Minnesota conviction for

burglary in third degree. See Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3. This conviction could

not be considered “burglary of a dwelling” for purposes of the career offender

enhancement. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a) (specifically listing the

elements of burglary in the second degree to include entering a dwelling), with Minn.

Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3 (omitting any reference to dwellings and referring only to

unlawful entry of a “building” for the offense of burglary in the third degree).

Nevertheless, Mohr’s third degree burglary conviction was considered to be a violent

offense because, as the majority notes, our court has held that “burglary always

creates a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Ante at 4 (quoting

United States v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 1996)0; see also USSG

4.B1.2(a)(2) (directing sentencing courts to treat convictions as crimes of violence if

the underlying conduct created “serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).

Time and again, our circuit has reaffirmed this approach of characterizing all

burglaries as violent crimes, regardless of the underlying circumstances. See United

States v. Blahowski, 324 F.3d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).

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Perhaps in the abstract, such an approach has some appeal. Hascall recognized

that the threat of some physical injury was inherent in the commission of any

burglary, a point beyond dispute. Hascall, 76 F.3d at 904-05. Certainly, the

guidelines themselves acknowledge this principle by specifying that burglaries of

dwellings must always be considered crimes of violence. USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2).

Notably, though, the guidelines do not mandate that sentencing courts always treat

burglaries of commercial buildings as violent crimes; they are silent on the issue.

Circuits have split on the precise meaning of this omission, but they are nearly

unanimous in holding that burglaries of commercial buildings should not generally

be treated as violent crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 920

(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that while certain burglaries of a commercial building may

qualify as crimes of violence, “the burglary of a non-dwelling is not a crime of

violence per se under [the guidelines]”); United States v. Nelson, 143 F.3d 373, 374-

75 (7th Cir. 1998) (declining to adopt a per se rule that burglaries of commercial

buildings are crimes of violence); United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115, 119 (4th

Cir. 1995) (declining to apply the career offender enhancement when there was no

evidence that predicate convictions involved burglaries of dwellings since “under

USSG § 4B1.2 only burglary of a dwelling constitutes a crime of violence”); United

States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By explicitly including the

burglary of a dwelling as a crime of violence, the Guidelines intended to exclude from

the violent crime category those burglaries which do not involve dwellings and

occupied structures.”); United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 730-34 (10th Cir. 1993)

(holding that burglary of a commercial office is not a crime of violence). Only one

circuit, save our own, has maintained that burglaries of unoccupied, commercial

buildings are always classified as violent crimes for purposes of the career offender

enhancement. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 438-39 (1st Cir. 2002)

(reaffirming in dicta its holding in United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992),

that burglaries of commercial buildings are crimes of violence due to the risk of

injury associated with such conduct).

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I believe our circuit–joined only by one other circuit to speak on the issue–has

far too broad a conception of what the guidelines mean by stating that violent crimes

include “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

USSG § 4B.2(a)(2). Certainly, the risk of physical injury exists in nearly every

felony. The guidelines, however, focus on whether that risk is a serious one, not just

an abstract possibility. To my mind, our circuit’s approach, which unequivocally

holds that the risk always exists in burglaries of commercial buildings, does not

adequately consider the conduct underlying such convictions. For instance, Mohr’s

burglary conviction, or “violent crime,” was for acting as a look-out while his two

accomplices broke the office of Mohr’s former employer, the Auto Doctor, to steal

electronic equipment. Obviously, the potential risk of injury was present in the

crime, but without any indication that the business was occupied, the gravity of that

risk was not significant enough to characterize the crime as a violent one. In this

circuit, however, we ignore the reality of a defendant’s underlying conduct and

charged offense, and focus solely on the question of whether the defendant was

convicted of burglary or some derivation thereof.

Our panel is not at liberty to overturn our prior precedent, although our court

may do so en banc. If our court fails to correct its missteps en banc and the Supreme

Court does not clarify the qualifications for predicate career offender convictions,

significant sentencing disparities will continue to exist based solely on the circuit in

which a federal defendant is sentenced.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Based on this circuit’s precedent, I concur in the majority’s affirmance of

Mohr’s sentence. I also join in Judge Heaney’s concurrence and his objections to the

rule in this circuit making any burglary a “crime of violence” for the purposes of the

career offender enhancement under the sentencing guidelines. In addition, I write

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separately to reemphasize my views on this issue as stated in my dissent in United

States v. Blahowski, 324 F.3d 592, 598-99 (8th Cir. 2003) (Bright, J., dissenting). 

The United States Supreme Court may wish to review the issue of whether the

burglary of a commercial building categorically meets the definition of a crime of

violence for the purposes of the career offender enhancement. Mohr may wish to file

an appropriate petition seeking a resolution of the circuit split in the law on this issue.

______________________________

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