Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02451/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02451-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Gary Lee Wipf
Appellant

Document Text:

1

Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 03-2451

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

Gary Lee Wipf, * 

* 

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: October 22, 2004

Filed: February 16, 2005 

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and SMITH, Circuit

Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Gary Wipf was convicted of multiple counts of aggravated sexual abuse and

a single count of sexual abuse in the United States District Court.1

 For reversal, Wipf

argues that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated. We find no

error and affirm. 

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I. Background 

On April 4, 2002, twenty-one-year-old J.D. reported to Pat Mills, the Director

of Public Safety of the Red Lake Tribal Police Department, that he had been molested

by Gary Wipf during the time he attended St. Mary's Mission School on the Red Lake

Indian Reservation in the early 1990s. J.D. explained that the molestation began while

he was in the fourth grade and ceased at the end of his fifth-grade year. According to

J.D., Wipf had taken explicit photographs of him and other young boys Wipf had

molested. J.D. described multiple occasions of sexual activity including oral and anal

sex at Wipf' s residence, church, and school. In addition, J.D. explained that Wipf had

videotaped him performing sexual acts.

Investigator Jason Lawrence, who was assigned to J.D.'s case, interviewed St.

Mary's school counselor, Victoria Graves. Lawrence learned that Wipf held a position

as a custodian and as a gym teacher for St. Mary's from 1990 through 1993, and from

1997 through the fall of 2001. From 1997 through 2001, Wipf coached St. Mary's

boys' fifth-grade basketball and tribal youth recreation teams. Graves gave Lawrence

the names of other boys linked to Wipf through St. Mary's.

Using these names, Lawrence interviewed two of the young men and then

again talked to J.D. about Wipf. At this meeting, J.D. identified several additional

boys who he suspected Wipf had abused. Lawrence then obtained tribal search and

arrest warrants for Wipf' s residence and person. At the time of his arrest, Wipf was

on a game trip in Bemidji, Minnesota, with the St. Mary's fifth-grade basketball team.

Wipf was found in a hotel room sharing a bed with one young boy and accompanied

by four other young boys. 

On that same day, Lawrence executed the search warrant at Wipf's home.

During the search, Lawrence seized a number of videotapes, thirty-four rolls of

undeveloped film, and thirty-two photo albums filled with photos of young boys.

Police then obtained a second tribal search warrant for viewing the seized videotapes.

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One videotape contained graphic pornographic images of Wipf sexually assaulting

a young boy identified as G.A.S. 

Local authorities notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Based

upon violation of federal child pornography laws, FBI Special Agent John Englehoff

and Lawrence arrested Wipf, who had been released on bond, at his residence.

Following arrest, Wipf was read his Miranda rights and transported to the Red Lake

Law Enforcement Center.

At the Red Lake Law Enforcement Center, Englehoff and Lawrence

interviewed Wipf. Englehoff reintroduced himself and Wipf asked, "Do I get a

lawyer?" Englehoff advised Wipf that he would receive counsel, but Englehoff first

wanted to advise Wipf of his Miranda rights, tell him the situation, and explain the

charges against him. Englehoff then told Wipf that he had been arrested for

possession of child pornography based on a number of tapes that had been seized

from his home. At that point, Wipf said something to the effect of "you got me," or

"you caught me." Wipf explained that he did not want to answer any questions, but

Englehoff requested that Wipf reconsider his request for an attorney and talk to him

about the victims who may require counseling. Wipf requested an attorney and the

encounter ended.

Later, Englehoff arranged for J.D. and other juveniles to be interviewed by Dr.

Darryl Zitzow, a psychologist. Confronted by Dr. Zitzow with the existence of video

tapes, one of the interviewees, G.A.S., recounted how Wipf molested him.

Originally, a one-count indictment was filed in the District of Minnesota

charging Wipf with possession of child pornography. Wipf immediately filed a

motion to suppress his inculpatory custodial statement and filed a separate

suppression motion for the evidence seized from his home. Following a hearing,

Magistrate Judge Erickson recommended that Wipf's suppression motion be denied

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with respect to the custodial statements, but that the motion be granted with respect

to the evidence seized from Wipf's home. The district court adopted the Magistrate

Judge's recommendations.

The government filed a nine-count superseding indictment in the District of

Minnesota charging Wipf with possession and manufacturing of child pornography;

aggravated sexual abuse of J.D., a minor; sexual abuse of G.A.S., a minor; and

transportation of a minor with intent to engage in sexual activity. Prior to trial, the

government moved to dismiss the charges of possession and manufacturing of child

pornography as they were predicated on evidence suppressed by the district court. In

addition, the district court dismissed the charge of transportation of a minor with

intent to engage in sexual activity. A jury convicted Wipf on the remaining charges,

and the district court sentenced him to 480 months' imprisonment for the three counts

of aggravated sexual abuse of J.D., and 180 months' imprisonment for the sexual

abuse of G.A.S., all to be served concurrently.

II. Discussion

A. Confrontation Clause and Hearsay

Wipf first argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to

confront witnesses by allowing Dr. Zitzow to testify about his interviews with J.D.

and G.A.S. For support, Wipf points to United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1185

(8th Cir. 2000), where we held that the admission of a child-victim's hearsay

statement to a clinical psychologist violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause. However, the child victim did not testify at trial in Sumner. We have

explained that "the Confrontation Clause is . . . satisfied when the hearsay declarant

testifies at trial and is available for cross-examination." Bear Stops v. United States,

339 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003). In this case, both J.D. and G.A.S. testified at trial

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Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause

bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarants are

unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. See

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Crawford is inapplicable to the facts

of this case. 

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and were available for cross-examination. Wipf has shown no violation of the

Confrontation Clause with respect to Dr. Zitzow's testimony.2

Wipf also claims that the district court erred in admitting the statements of J.D.

and G.A.S. under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule.

See Fed. R. Evid 803(4). Even if a district court errs with respect to an evidentiary

ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless. United States v.

Lupino, 301 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 2002). An evidentiary error is harmless if the

substantial rights of the defendant were unaffected and the error did not influence or

had only a slight influence on the verdict. United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989

(8th Cir. 2004). In this case, the trial testimony of both G.A.S. and J.D. mirrored the

testimony of Dr. Zitzow. As such, Dr. Zitzow's testimony was merely cumulative and

did not likely influence the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575 (8th

Cir. 1992) (holding erroneous admission of child victim's hearsay statements to aunt

was cumulative and, therefore, harmless in prosecution for aggravated sexual assault).

B. Limitation on Cross-Examination 

For his second point on appeal, Wipf contends that the district court

impermissibly restricted his cross-examination of J.D. The United States Supreme

Court has emphasized that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,

20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). Thus, "trial judges retain wide latitude

insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,

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prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679

(1986); see also Newton v. Kemna, 354 F.3d 776, 781 (8th Cir. 2004). We review a

district court's decision to limit cross-examination for an abuse of discretion,

reversing only if there has been clear abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice

to the defendant. United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1997). 

Following direct examination of J.D., Wipf sought to discredit him and

establish a sinister motive for J.D.'s reporting Wipf's sexual abuse to authorities.

According to Wipf, J.D. made the sexual-abuse claim in an attempt to exculpate

himself from an alleged sexual assault. Wipf had only an unsubstantiated allegation

found in a police report to support this impeachment theory. At the time J.D. made

his report of abuse, he was neither under investigation nor suspected of any criminal

activity. Given the lack of supporting evidence, we cannot say the district court

abused its discretion in limiting this line of questioning. 

Wipf relies on United States v. Love, 329 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2003), where we

held that a defendant's right of confrontation was violated in a prosecution for being

a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court prohibited cross-examination of

a key government witness as to his mental defects. Id. The witness testified that he

observed the defendant with firearms, but the witness had been diagnosed with a

short-term and a long-term memory impairment six years earlier. Id. The facts in this

case are not analogous. First, impeachment based on motive does not approximate

questioning a witness's ability to remember. Second, in Love, the defense had

admissible evidence of the witness's memory impairment; here, Wipf provided no

evidence supporting the allegation that J.D. had committed sexual abuse. 

 Other courts have affirmed a trial court's limitation of cross-examination based

on unsupported allegations. See United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 482–83 (9th Cir.

2000) (affirming limitation on cross-examination into fraud allegations because of

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"the highly speculative nature" of those allegations); United States v. Adams, 216

F.3d 1073 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that although the fact that a witness was under

current investigation might reveal a possible motivation for untruthfulness, the

underlying facts of the claim were of minimal or no probative value, and admitting

such evidence would have risked a peripheral trial on the external allegation).

Furthermore, the district court granted Wipf considerable leeway to cross-examine

J.D. and to impeach his credibility. Accordingly, we affirm on this point. 

C. Exclusion of Evidence

In his third point on appeal, Wipf contends that the district court erred when

it failed to exclude the testimony of G.A.S. According to Wipf, police only acquired

G.A.S.'s testimony through an illegal search of his home. Wipf argues that because

the police identified G.A.S. as a victim from a seized videotape suppressed by the

district court, G.A.S.'s trial testimony was "fruit of the poisonous tree," and, therefore,

inadmissible. Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the exclusionary rule

bars the admission of physical evidence and live witness testimony obtained directly

or indirectly through the exploitation of police illegality. Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d

463, 465 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,

484–88 (1963)). However, challenged evidence derived through police illegality will

still be admissible under the "attenuation" doctrine if the causal connection between

the constitutional violation and the discovery of the evidence has become so

attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Id. (citing United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.

268, 273–80 (1978)). 

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A police officer, while taking a break in the defendant's business shop, noticed

an envelope containing money lying on the cash register. United States v. Ceccolini,

435 U.S. 268 (1978). Upon closer examination, the officer found that the envelope

also contained slips of paper indicating unlawful gambling activity. Id. The officer

questioned one of the defendant's employees, who explained that the envelope

belonged to the defendant. Id. That information was forwarded to an FBI agent, who

later interviewed the employee without referring to the incident involving the police

officer. Id. The defendant later testified falsely before a federal grand jury that he had

never been involved in any way with gambling operations. Id. The defendant's

employee testified for the prosecution at a subsequent trial for perjury. Id. Prior to

trial, the defendant sought to suppress his employee's testimony as "fruit of the

poisonous tree." Id. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the employeewitness "first came directly to the attention of the government as a result of an illegal

search." Id. at 273. The court of appeals affirmed, but the United States Supreme

Court reversed. Id. 

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In Ceccolini,

3

 the Supreme Court set forth an analytical framework to evaluate

the admissibility of live witness testimony under the attenuation doctrine. Id. at

274–79. The Court emphasized that live witness testimony should be excluded when

"the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its application" in a

particular case. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276. Two important considerations are the

costs of permanently disabling a witness from testifying and the degree of free will

exercised by the witness in testifying. Id. at 276–78. The Court reasoned that where

the cooperation of a witness is in fact the result of an exercise of the individual's free

will, unaffected by police misconduct, the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not

be served by disallowing the testimony. Id. In determining the strength of the link

between the illegality and a witness's testimony, Ceccolini directs us to consider (1)

the stated willingness of the witness to testify, (2) the role played by the illegally

seized evidence in gaining the witness's cooperation, (3) the proximity between the

illegal behavior, the decision to cooperate and the actual testimony at trial, and (4) the

police motivation in engaging in the illegal conduct. Hamilton, 809 F.2d at 476. 

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 Our review of the record convinces us that G.A.S. testified willingly. G.A.S.

took the stand and gave the same account of his relationship with Wipf that he gave

to Dr. Zitzow. See Satchell v. Cardwell, 653 F.2d 408, 409–10 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1154 (1982) (explaining that the attenuation doctrine would

apply where a brutally beaten multiple-rape victim would probably have come

forward to testify even if she had not been discovered as the result of an illegal entry).

Moving to the second consideration, we note that the illegally seized tapes were

indirectly used to get G.A.S. to talk with Dr. Zitzow. Specifically, both G.A.S.'s

parents and Dr. Zitzow confronted G.A.S. with the existence of the videotape before

G.A.S. came forward. However, the videotape was never shown to G.A.S. and law

enforcement never confronted G.A.S. with the existence of the videotape. With

respect to the temporal element enunciated in Ceccolini, approximately nine to twelve

days elapsed between the time of the illegal search and first contact with G.A.S. From

that point, about nine months passed before G.A.S. was called to testify at trial. 

Lastly, the record reveals that the police did not search Wipf's residence to

identify other victims or witnesses. Rather, the search was done in response to J.D.'s

claim of molestation and was an attempt by police to corroborate J.D.'s claim. The

Supreme Court has noted that "the illegality which led to the discovery of the witness

very often will not play any meaningful part in the witness' willingness to testify."

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277. We hold that there was sufficient attenuation to allow

G.A.S. to testify at trial. 

D. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination 

Wipf next argues that the district court erred in admitting his incriminating

statement made to police after Wipf requested an attorney. After being taken into

custody at the police station, Wipf asked Englehoff, "Do I get a lawyer?" Englehoff

advised Wipf that he would receive counsel, but Englehoff first wanted to advise

Wipf of his Miranda rights, tell him the situation, and explain the charges against

him. Englehoff then told Wipf that he had been arrested for possession of child

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pornography based on a number of tapes that had been seized from inside his home.

At that point, and without provocation, Wipf made the incriminating statement "you

got me," or "you caught me." 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that, "[if an] individual states that

he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.

477 (1981). Interrogation, properly understood, involves either "express questioning

or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

Accordingly, interrogation encompasses "any words or actions on the part of the

police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police

should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the

suspect." Id. at 301.

The First Circuit has stated that a "law enforcement officer's mere description

of the evidence and of potential charges against a suspect, in direct response to the

suspect's importuning, hardly can be classified as interrogatory." United States v.

Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Trimble, 986 F.2d

394, 401 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1992);

United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, an

inculpatory statement is not considered the product of custodial interrogation merely

because it is made after the suspect has been told the charges against him. See People

v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315, 319 (Colo. 2000); Conley, 156 F.3d at 83.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Englehoff's statement that he

wanted to tell Wipf "the situation, and explain the charges against him," amounts to

custodial interrogation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in allowing Wipf's

statements into evidence. 

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E. Right to Jurors from Specific Division 

For his final point on appeal, Wipf contends that the district court erred by

failing to summon a jury panel from the Sixth Division of the District of Minnesota,

the division where Wipf committed the crime. We have stated that:

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a

trial be held in the state and district where the crime was committed.

However, a defendant does not have a right to be tried in a particular

division.

United States v. Davis, 785 F.2d 610, 616 (8th Cir. 1986). Wipf attempts to

distinguish the law of this circuit, arguing that while the trial location is within the

discretion of the district court, a defendant has a right to have jurors summoned from

a geographic boundary of a specific judicial division. We refuse to create such a

distinction. The Sixth Amendment does not require jurors to be summoned from a

particular division.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Wipf's conviction and sentence.

______________________________

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