Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02292/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Gonzales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

AUG 3 0 1995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER - Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 93-2292 

) 

MIGUEL GONZALES, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 93-2293 

) 

ORLENIS HERNANDEZ-DIAZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 93-2294 

) 

LUIS LEON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 93-2295 

) 

Appellate Case: 93-2292 Document: 01019279751 Date Filed: 08/30/1995 Page: 1 
MARIO PEREZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-92-236-JC) 

Edward 0. Bustamante, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellant Miguel Gonzales (93-2292). 

Angela Arellanes, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant 

Orlenis Hernandez-Diaz (93-2293). 

Susan L. Foreman, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant Luis Leon (93-2294). 

Roberto Albertorio, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellant Mario Perez (93-2295). 

Presiliano Torrez, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. 

Kelly, United States Attorney, and Thomas L. English, Assistant 

United States Attorney, on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before HENRY and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR,* Senior 

District Judge. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District 

Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2292 Document: 01019279751 Date Filed: 08/30/1995 Page: 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

This case began as a 11 reverse sting11 operation by the 

Albuquerque Police Department. In a reverse sting, police 

officers assume the role of drug dealers in order to infiltrate 

drug rings. On April 22, 1991, Officer James Torres of the 

Albuquerque Police Department met a confidential informant and 

Appellant Leon at the Kettle Restaurant in Albuquerque. (Tr. at 

20-21) The purpose of the meeting was to arrange the sale of 

100 pounds of marijuana to Mr. Leon and his 11money people 11 for 

eventual distribution in Miami, Florida. (Tr. at 22) Mr. Leon 

did not identify his "money people 11 to Officer Torres during 

their initial meeting, but did say they were coming to 

Albuquerque via Dallas, Texas. (Tr. at 24) Later that same 

day, Appellant Leon contacted Officer Torres and said his 

11 people 11 had arrived and wanted to see a sample of the marijuana. (Tr. at 25) At approximately 6:30 p.m. on April 22, 

Officer Torres met Luis Leon at a Circle K in Albuquerque and 

was introduced to two of Mr. Leon's co-conspirators, Miguel 

Gonzales and Orlenis Hernandez-Diaz. (Tr. at 26) Detective 

Gloria later joined Officer Torres and the three appellants at 

the Circle K and showed the appellants a 35-pound bale of marijuana that was in the trunk of his undercover vehicle. (Tr. at 

29) After examining the marijuana, the appellants agreed to buy 

100 pounds of marijuana for $60,000. The transaction was to 

occur the next day at 9:00 a.m. (Tr. at 3, 33) 

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At approximately 9:30 a.m. the next morning, Officer Torres 

met Mr. Leon and Mr. Gonzales at the Circle K. Mr. Leon asked 

whether Officer Torres had the marijuana with him, and Officer 

Torres replied that he did not because he wanted to see the 

money first. (Tr. at 34) Mr. Leon took Officer Torres to his 

apartment to view the purchase money. (Tr. at 34-35) When he 

entered the apartment, Officer Torres met co-conspirator Mr. 

Perez. Messrs. Perez, Hernandez-Diaz, and Leon were all in the 

apartment at that time. (Tr. at 35) The three dealers wanted 

to see the marijuana again before handing over the $60,000, so 

Officer Torres took Mr. Leon back to the Circle K so he could 

again view the drugs. (Tr. at 36) Officer Torres telephoned 

Detective Gloria and instructed him to bring the marijuana to 

the Circle K. Upon reaching the store, Appellant Leon once more 

examined the drugs, then took Officer Torres back to his apartment to complete the transaction. (Tr. at 36) On the way back 

to the apartment, Mr. Leon told Officer Torres to circle the 

area to make sure there were no police cars in the vicinity. 

The officer did as he was instructed and passed two marked 

patrol cars on the way. Mr. Leon became concerned and asked 

Officer Torres if he were a police officer. Officer Torres 

replied that he was not and that he just wanted to complete the 

deal. 

After finishing the circle, Officer Torres pulled into the 

parking lot below Appellant Leon's apartment and instructed 

Detective Gloria to park his vehicle east of a Ford Bronco into 

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which the marijuana would be loaded. (Tr. at 37) Once in the 

parking lot, Appellants Gonzales and Leon again said they wanted 

to see the marijuana, so all four of them--Officer Torres, 

Detective Gloria, Appellant Gonzales, and Appellant Leon--went 

to the back of the undercover vehicle to view the 100 poun~s of 

marijuana. (Tr. at 39) Then, Appellant Leon and Officer Torres 

went upstairs to Mr. Leon's apartment to count the money. 

Once inside the apartment, Mr. Hernandez-Diaz pulled a gun 

on Officer Torres. Officer Torres raised his hands and pleaded 

with Mr. Hernandez-Diaz to spare his life. Mr. Leon, who was 

standing next to Officer Torres, also raised his hands and asked 

what was going on. Mr. Hernandez-Diaz then relieved Mr. Leon of 

his weapon, a handgun which was concealed in his waistband. 

Officer Torres was taken hostage at gunpoint by Mr. HernandezDiaz, who apparently intended to steal the marijuana without 

paying for it. Mr. Hernandez-Diaz placed a cushion against the 

officer's body and placed the gun against it, telling him to be 

quiet or he would be killed. While Mr. Hernandez-Diaz held the 

officer at gunpoint, Appellant Perez patted him down and took 

his handgun. (Tr. at 53) Officer Torres was then taken into an 

adjacent bedroom and his hands and feet were taped together and 

his mouth was taped shut. 

It was at this point that the other officers came running 

up the stairs, kicked in the door, and arrested Appellants 

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Hernandez and Leon. 

later captured. 

(Tr. at 52) Appellant Perez fled, but was 

As Officer Torres was being held at gunpoint upstairs, 

Detective Gloria likewise was being held at gunpoint by Appellant Gonzales downstairs. (Tr. at 321) After seeing Officer 

Torres and Mr. Leon go to the apartment, Mr. Gonzales tapped on 

the window of Detective Gloria's car and asked to see the marijuana again. Once the trunk was open, Mr. Gonzales pulled out a 

handgun and pointed it at Detective Gloria, ordering him to go 

upstairs. (Tr. at 321) Detective Gloria ignored the orders and 

tried to slam the trunk shut. (Tr. at 321) He then raised his 

hands in the air, enabling Mr. Gonzales to see the gun in his 

holster. As Mr. Gonzales reached forward and took the gun, a 

siren went off. Mr. Gonzales immediately fled the area. (Tr. 

at 322) Detective Gloria then joined the other officers who 

were running upstairs to rescue Officer Torres. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The defendants were all convicted of conspiracy to possess 

and distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 u.s.c. §§ 841 

(a) (1) and (b) (1) (D); and the use or carrying of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). They 

received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months. In addition, 

the defendants had previously received substantial state sentences for convictions arising out of the same conduct. The 

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defendants, aside from Mr. Perez, have not directly challenged 

their conspiracy or firearm convictions, but all have appealed 

their convictions for possession. They also each raise several 

other issues. Because common issues predominated, the appeals 

of Messrs. Gonzales, Hernandez-Diaz, and Perez were consolidated 

on appeal. Because Mr. Leon's appeal also raises common issues, 

we have addressed his appeal together with those of his coconspirators in this opinion. We will first address the common 

issues and then turn to the individual issues.l 

DISCUSSION 

All of ·the defendants were given three level increases in 

their sentences pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3a1.2(b). This sentence 

enhancement applies when, "during the course of the offense 

. . . the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant 

is otherwise accountable, knowing or having reasonable cause to 

believe that a person was a law enforcement ... officer, 

assaulted such officer in a manner creating a substantial risk 

1 As a threshold matter, the government suggests that we do not 

have jurisdiction over the appeal of one of the defendants, Mr. 

Gonzales, because he did not file his appeal in a timely fashion. 

Upon receipt of the admittedly late appeal, we remanded to the 

district court for a determination of whether counsel or Mr. 

Gonzales could demonstrate excusable neglect for his failure. The 

district court found excusable neglect and granted appellant's 

retroactive Rule 4(b) Motion for Extension of Time to file his 

appeal. We cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion 

because there was a genuine issue about the correctness of the 

original judgment, which was later amended. While the amendment 

to the original judgment was technical in nature and perhaps did 

not qualify as a new judgment for purposes of the date for filing 

an appeal, the confusion surrounding the issue was at least substantial enough to create excusable neglect. Thus, we do have 

jurisdiction over Mr. Gonzales' appeal as well as those of his codefendants. 

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of serious bodily injury." Id. § 3a1.2(b). The appellants 

concede that they assaulted an officer so as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. Nevertheless, the 

appellants claim that the application of this enhancement was in 

error because they did not know or have reasonable cause t~ 

believe that the person(s) assaulted were police officers. · 

The government points to several facts which it contends 

demonstrate that the appellants reasonably should have known 

that they were dealing with police officers: first, the fact 

that Officer Torres and Detective Gloria were carrying guns; 

second, the presence of marked police cars in the vicinity; and, 

third, the fact that the appellants themselves expressed suspicions that Officer Torres was a cop. Taken together, we conclude that these facts are insufficient to support the application of this enhancement. 

The fact that Officer Torres and Detective Gloria carried 

weapons would not provide a basis for the reasonable drug dealer 

to believe that he was dealing with police officers. We have 

frequently noted in other contexts that firearms are a practically ubiquitous accoutrement of those in the drug trafficking 

trade. Indeed, each of the drug dealers in this case carried a 

firearm; there were no unarmed persons at the scene. Thus, the 

fact that the officers were armed does not in any way label them 

as police officers. 

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Similarly, the presence of police cars in the neighborhood 

did not provide a reasonable basis for the defendants to conclude that they were dealing with police officers. Police cars 

are a common sight on city streets everywhere, particularly in 

areas of high crime. There was absolutely nothing in particular 

that would cause the appellants to link Officer Torres and 

Detective Gloria with the marked police cars. 

Finally, the government makes much of the fact that the 

appellants voiced suspicions about whether Officer Torres might 

be a police officer and in fact asked him repeatedly if he were. 

What the government ignores is that Officer Torres successfully 

allayed their suspicions and convinced the appellants that he 

was a legitimate criminal. Furthermore, it is only natural for 

those engaged in highly illegal activities to be concerned about 

whether they are involved in a sting. Thus, mere suspicion 

based on speculation alone does not equate to "reasonable cause 

to believe." See United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1236 

(2d Cir. 1991). The success of the sting operation in this case 

itself demonstrates that the appellants were convinced that 

Officer Torres and Detective Gloria were criminals, not cops. 

The appellants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for possession of marijuana 

with intent to distribute. In order to convict a defendant of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the government must prove the following 

elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant knowingly 

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possessed the illegal drug, and (2) the defendant possessed the 

drug with the specific intent to distribute it. United States 

v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 372 (lOth Cir. 1985). We must sustain the 

conviction if the evidence, "taken in the light most favorable 

to the government," would allow a fact finder to find guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. There is no question that the 

appellants had the intent to distribute drugs; however, the 

appellants deny that they ever possessed the drugs in question. 

The government concedes that the defendants did not actually possess the drugs in this case, but contends that the test 

for constructive possession has been satisfied. It is not disputed that possession of drugs may be either actual or constructive and that constructive possession may be established by 

circumstantial evidence if the government shows a sufficient 

nexus between the defendant and the drugs. United States v. 

Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881-82 (lOth Cir. 1987). Generally, a 

person has constructive possession of narcotics if she or he 

knowingly has ownership, dominion, or control over the drugs or 

the premises where they are found. United States v. Parrish, 

925 F.2d 1293, 1296 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

The government theorizes that Mr. Gonzales exercised 

dominion and control over the drugs when he pulled the gun on 

Detective Gloria because he "could have taken the car keys and 

driven away, killed or wounded Officer Gloria and taken the 

marijuana or simply have picked up the marijuana and walked 

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away." Aple's Brief at 31. However, the fact remains that none 

of these possibilities occurred. Mr. Gonzales never exercised 

dominion and control over the marijuana because he never had the 

keys and because Detective Gloria, by attempting to slam the 

trunk, made it clear that he was not relinquishing possession of 

the drugs.2 Nor did Mr. Gonzales exercise dominion and control 

of the premises where the drugs were found: the parking lot was 

under surveillance by undercover officers, the area was not 

secured, and Mr. Gonzales had no power to exclude anyone from 

the area. 

we conclude that there was insufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Gonzales had constructive 

possession of the drugs. His conviction on this count must be 

reversed. Because the other defendants were convicted for aiding and abetting Mr. Gonzales, their convictions for this crime 

must also be overturned. 

All of the appellants received five-year sentences for using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). While the appellants do not dispute the 

sufficiency of the conviction, three of the appellants (Messrs. 

Gonzales, Perez, and Hernandez-Diaz) claim that the district 

court erred in ruling that they are to serve their sentence for 

2 We note, moreover, that Mr. Gonzales fled immediately after 

Detective Gloria slammed the trunk. 

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this crime consecutive to the completion of their state sentences arising out of the same conduct. The question we must 

answer is whether§ 924(c) 's mandatory five-year sentence may 

run concurrently with a previously imposed state sentence that a 

defendant has already begun to serve. We hold that it can. 

At sentencing, the district court ruled that each defendant's sentence for the underlying substantive federal offenses 

should run concurrently with the sentence previously imposed by 

the state court for the identical offenses. The district court 

then ordered that the five-year term imposed under§ 924(c) 

should run consecutively to both the federal and the state 

charges, obviously reading § 924(c) as barring the imposition of 

a sentence concurrent with any prior state sentence. In so ruling, the district court joined good company--every circuit to 

have considered the issue has held that § 924(c) '·s plain language prohibits sentences imposed under that statute from running concurrently with state sentences, although most of these 

opinions have not been published. See, e.g., United States v. 

McLymont, 45 F.3d 400, 401-02 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. 

Ct. 1723 (1995); United States v. Gibson, 23 F.3d 403 (table), 

1994 WL 191609, at *2 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ospina, 

18 F.3d 1332, 1335-36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2721 

(1994); United States v. Hoard, 12 F.3d 1101 (table) 1993 WL 

473690, at *8-9 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Maillett, 967 

F.2d 594 (table), 1992 WL 144713, at *1 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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In general, the choice between imposing concurrent and 

consecutive prison terms is left to the sound discretion of the 

sentencing court. See United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 

1097-98 (lOth Cir. 1991). Hence, we ordinarily review such sentences for an abuse of discretion. See id. But where, as.here, 

a district court's leeway is cabined by statute, we review that 

court's construction of the statute de novo. United States v. 

Hall, 20 F.3d 1084, 1088 (lOth Cir. 1994). We also review de 

novo a district court's reading of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 852 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

In interpreting a statute, we begin with the language of 

the statute itself. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. CokP. v. Bonjorno, 

494 u.s. 827, 835 (1990). However, where a literal reading of 

the statutory language would produce an absurd result--particularly one clearly not contemplated by Congress--courts will 

adopt a more sensible statutory construction. This principle 

was announced more than a century ago in Church of the Holy 

Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), and is still 

alive and well today: 

Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 

"compel an odd result," we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its 

proper scope .... Looking beyond the naked text for 

guidance is perfectly proper when the result it 

apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it 

seems inconsistent with Congress' intention. 

Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 

454-55 (1989) (citations omitted); accord In reInvestment 

Bankers. Inc., 4 F.3d 1556, 1564 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 

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114 s. Ct. 1061 (1994). As the ensuing discussion reflects, 

this concept controls the application of § 924(c} to these 

defendants, requiring us to go beyond the literal language of 

the code section and "'venture into the thicket of legislative 

history.'" Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506, 1508 

(lOth Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 

The following language of § 924(c) (1) was in effect at the 

time of the relevant offenses: 

Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drug 

trafficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted 

in a court of the United States, uses or carries a 

firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided 

for such crime ... , be sentenced to imprisonment for 

five years . . . . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or 

suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a 

violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of 

imprisonment imposed under this SubSection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or 

carried. 

18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1) (1988) (emphasis added). There are two 

plausible ways in which the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" could be read. Taken most literally, "any other term of 

imprisonment" would encompass not only all federal sentences but 

state sentences as well. However, since this is a federal 

statute, with presumed concern for the treatment of federal 

crimes, the language could be read more narrowly to apply only 

to federal sentences, excluding state sentences from its scope. 

The principal clue to the proper choice between these alternatives follows from this question: Why did Congress choose to 

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use the statute's roundabout locution, which negates the imposition of a concurrent sentence, rather than to employ more conventional and straightforward declaratory language to require 

consecutive sentences? For example, Congress might have said: 

Any term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection 

shall run consecutively to any other term of impris- · onment including that imposed for the crime in which 

the firearm was used or carried.3 

The answer to this question may be found in Congress' 

statement of its intention in enacting the 1984 amendment to 

§ 924(c) (the version we are concerned with here). The Senate 

Report that accompanied the 1984 amendment to § 924(c) reads: 

In either case, the defendant could not be given a 

suspended or probationary sentence, nor could any 

sentence under the revised subsection be made to run 

concurrently with that for the predicate crime or with 

that for any other offense. In addition. the 

Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under 

the revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the 

start of the sentence for the underlying or any other 

offense. 

S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 313-14, reprinted in 1984 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492 (emphasis added) .4 

3 When Congress intended to require that one prison term follow 

another sentence, it knew how to say so. See. e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 

314 6 (b) ( 2) ( 19 8 8) ( "A term of imprisonment imposed under this 

section shall be consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for 

any other offense."). Congress' omission of a similarly 

straightforward directive in§ 924(c) thus appears to be a deliberate choice rather than a mere oversight. Compare Custis v. 

United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (1994). 

4 Committee reports accompanying ultimately enacted bills are a 

favored authoritative source of legislative history. Thornburg v. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986). While we have, on more than 

one occasion, cited this Senate Report in addressing the interpretation of § 924(c), see. e.g., United States v. Overstreet, 40 

F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 

(1995); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1315-16 (lOth Cir. 

1987), we have not previously visited this particular passage. 

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Both Courts of Appeals that have been aware of this stated 

congressional purpose have honored it. Jackson v. United 

States, 976 F.2d 679, 682 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Rodger 

v. White, 907 F.2d 151 (table), 1990 WL 95624, at *4 (6th Cir. 

1990). One of our own district courts has also acknowledg~d 

this legislative intention. Johnson v. Matthews, 751 F. Supp. 

190, 192 (D. Kan. 1990). Although several of our own earlier 

opinions referred in dicta to § 924(c) sentences as being served 

"consecutively to" (that is, after) other substantive-offense 

sentences, these opinions were apparently issued without an 

awareness of the express congressional intent that we have, of 

necessity, discovered in this case. See. e.g., United States v. 

Moore, 958 F.2d 310, 312 (lOth Cir. 1992); United States v. 

Lanzi, 933 F.2d 824, 826 (lOth Cir. 1991); Chalan, 812 F.2d at 

1315.5 Furthermore, none of these opinions dealt with the 

anomaly that follows from combining the incorrect "consecutive 

to" approach with an all-inclusive reading of "any other term of 

imprisonment." 

The result for these defendants of such a combined reading, 

under which the five-year sentence on the § 924(c) gun count 

5 This unawareness also apparently extended to the Sentencing 

Commission. Application Note 1 to § 2k2.4 refers to § 924(c) as 

calling for a term that runs "consecutively to any other term of 

imprisonment." U.S.S.G. § 2k2.4 Note 1. The First Circuit has 

also interpreted§ 924(c) in this manner, but did so without any 

claimed support other than a citation to § 924(c) itself. United 

States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 464 (1st Cir. 1994). 

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would have to follow a previously imposed state sentence and 

would have to precede a corresponding federal sentence, would 

be: 

Sentences in Years: 

Hernandez-Diaz: 

Gonzales: 

Perez: 

State 

14.5 

13 

17 

§924(c) 

5 

5 

5 

Federal 

5 

5 

7.25 

Total 

24.5 

23 

29.25 

In each instance this approach would more than double the custodial price that Congress and the Guidelines have set for committing the total criminal conduct engaged in by these defendants. 

The adoption of a reading that§ 924(c)'s prohibition 

against concurrent sentences refers only to federal sentences 

does not at all depreciate the severity of the crimes involved. 

Under such a reading, in which the gun-charge sentence would 

begin immediately upon the district court's imposition of sentence (thus running concurrently with the pre-existing state 

sentence) , and would be followed immediately by the other federal sentences for any other substantive cffenses, every defendant would be required to serve at least the combined term for 

the gun offense and the underlying federal offense. Where, as 

here, a state sovereign has previously viewed the same criminal 

conduct more seriously than Congress and the Sentencing 

Commission have decreed, the defendant would therefore have to 

remain in prison until the longer state sentence had expired. 

Mr. Hernandez-Diaz, for example, would have to serve out any 

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remaining portion of his fourteen-and-one-half-year state sentence at the end of the custodial portion of his aggregate tenyear federal sentence. 

Our conclusion that the phrase "any other offense" encompasses only federal offenses is required if we are to follow 

Congress' stated intent that § 924(c) sentences be served prior 

to "any other offense," for if a defendant is sentenced in state 

court first, there is no way in which a later-sentencing federal 

court can cause the mandatory five-year§ 924(c) sentence to be 

served before a state sentence that is already being served. 

Our interpretation is also entirely consistent with the Guidelines. Guideline§ SG1.3(b), which is applicable where, as 

here, a defendant is prosecuted in both federal and state court 

for the same conduct, states: 

If . . . the undischarged term of imprisonment 

resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken 

into account in the determination of the offense level 

for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant 

offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the 

undischarged term of imprisonment. 

"'The intended purpose of§ SG1.3(b) is to effectively "credit[] 

for guidelines purposes" defendants who have already served 

time--generally in another jurisdiction--for the same conduct or 

course of conduct.'" United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 1079, 

1082 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Flowers, 13 F.3d 

395, 397 (11th Cir. 1994)). If the all-encompassing reading of 

§ 924(c) were adopted so that the gun-charge sentence would have 

to follow the service of the entire pre-existing state sentence 

and precede the federal sentence covering the identical conduct, 

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§ SG1.3's concurrent sentencing scheme would be rendered nugatory. We decline to endorse such a contradictory interpretation. 

Appellants Gonzales, Perez, and Hernandez-Diaz also contend 

that the district court erred by refusing to award pre-sentence 

' credit to them for time that they spent in federal custody prior 

to sentencing. Their claim is based on 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), 

which states: 

A defendant shall be given credit toward the service 

of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent 

in official detention prior to the date the sentence 

commences . . . as a result of the offense for which 

the sentence was imposed . . . that has not been 

credited against another sentence. 

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (1988). The government does not dispute that 

§ 3585(b) is applicable and that the appellants may be entitled to 

credit for the time in question, but instead argues that we need 

not reach that issue. We agree. The proper inquiry is whether 

the district court had the authority to award the credit sought at 

all. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that it 

did not. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the 

Court held that it is the Attorney General, not the district 

court, who computes the amount of § 358S(b) time a defendant 

should receive as credit against his sentence. Id. at 332-33. 

Therefore, in order to be credited for time served prior to sentencing in this case, the appellants must seek an administrative 

remedy. The district court's denial of pre-sentence credit is 

therefore affirmed. 

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Appellants Hernandez-Diaz and Gonzales also challenge various 

evidentiary rulings by the district court. The trial court's 

decision to admit testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Suntar Roofing. Inc., 897 F.2d 

469, 479 (lOth Cir. 1990). We find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court's rulings. All of the admitted evidence was relevant, none was unduly prejudicial, and no exceptions applied. 

Mr. Leon appeals the application to him of a two-point sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3 for restraining a victim. 

Mr. Leon does not dispute that Officer Torres and Detective Gloria 

were restrained. Rather, he argues that Officer Torres and 

Detective Gloria were restrained by co-defendants Hernandez-Diaz 

and Gonzales in an attempt to rob them of their drugs and money. 

Because this action was not a reasonably foreseeable act in furtherance of the agreed-upon conspiracy (to purchase drugs), he 

argues that he should not be held accountable for their actions. 

The government counters that these events were readily foreseeable 

to Mr. Leon. However, the evidence strongly supports Mr. Leon's 

claim that he was "out of the loop" and unaware of any plan to rob 

Detective Gloria and Officer Torres. The government has offered 

no explanation of why Mr. Leon raised his hands when Mr. 

Hernandez-Diaz pulled his gun on Officer Torres, or why Mr. 

Hernandez-Diaz relieved both Mr. Leon and Officer Torres of their 

weapons. The record, moreover, indicates that Mr. Leon, who was 

the local connection between the defendants and the officers, 

anticipated an on-going drug-trafficking relationship with the 

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officers. Mr. Leon, significantly, had been promised a $10,000 

payoff by Detective Gloria and Officer Torres if the sale took 

place. He therefore had no incentive to rob the officers--his 

hoped-for future partners. 

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1) (B), a co-conspirator is only to 

be held responsible for the actions of others that are reasonably 

foreseeable and in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 

activity. Mr. Leon conspired to engage in an effort to deal, not 

to steal, drugs. He should not be held accountable when his coconspirators substantially altered the agreed-upon plan without 

his knowledge or acquiescence. Accordingly, this two-level 

enhancement was improperly applied. 

Finally, Mr. Perez challenges the overall sufficiency of the 

evidence to connect him with conspiracy. We shall interpret this 

as a challenge to the district court's refusal to grant his motion 

for acquittal. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government, there was adequate evidence to connect Mr. 

Perez to the conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana, and 

for a reasonable jury to convict him. The district court did not 

err in refusing to acquit Mr. Perez. 

Mr. Perez also complains that his due process rights were 

violated because the government refused to accept his guilty plea 

to lesser charges unless the other co-defendants also pled guilty. 

"[T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain." Weatherford 

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v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). It is the prosecutor's prerogative to offer a "package deal," or no deal at all. See United 

States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd 486 

U.S. 153 (1988). Mr. Perez has therefore failed to state a claim 

for relief. 

CONCLUSION 

The convictions of Messrs. Gonzales, Hernandez-Diaz, Perez 

and Leon for possession of drugs with intent to distribute, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and (b) (1) (D), are REVERSED. The sentences 

imposed on the defendants for the conspiracy and firearm convictions are VACATED, and these matters are REMANDED to the district 

court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. The conviction of Mr. Perez for conspiracy is AFFIRMED. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED and REMANDED. 

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