Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03213/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03213-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Appellee
Debra J. Renfrow
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3213

___________

Debra J. Renfrow, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of *

Social Security, *

*

Defendant/Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: March 16, 2007

Filed: August 13, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Debra J. Renfrow appeals from the district court's1

 grant of summary judgment

against her on her claim for social security disability insurance. Renfrow claims that

the Administrative Law Judge who handled her claim at the administrative level erred

in failing to ask the vocational expert who testified at her hearing whether there was

any conflict between the opinion he offered and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

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(4th ed. 1991). We conclude that any error by the ALJ was harmless on the record

before us and therefore we affirm.

The issue before us is very narrow. Renfrow and the Commissioner of Social

Security agree that the ALJ correctly proceeded through the first four steps of the fivestep inquiry dictated by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ found that Renfrow has

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date on which she alleges she

became disabled. Second, the ALJ found that Renfrow suffered from mitral stenosis,

muscularskeletal and neurological disorders of the right hand, bilateral shoulder

disorders, neck disorders, asthma, sleep apnea, left foot pain, and depression, which

amounted to a severe impairment. Third, the impairments were not severe enough to

meet or equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.

Part 404. Fourth, based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found

Renfrow did not retain sufficient residual functional capacity to perform her past

relevant work, which required a very heavy exertional level. 

Arriving at the last step of the inquiry, the ALJ considered whether the Social

Security Administration had borne its burden of proving that there were jobs in the

economy for a person of Renfrow's residual functional capacity. At the hearing, the

ALJ asked the vocational expert a hypothetical question:

Q: If we hypothetically take a woman 40 to 45 years of age, with

education and work experience like the claimant has, and if she's limited

to lifting 10 pounds maximum, and–but primarily with her left

nondominant hand, and cannot be using her dominant hand for any

strenuous or repetitive activity, and cannot be lifting over 3 pounds with

that occasionally, and cannot be expected to do complex technical work,

should have only brief and superficial [sic] with, with others, and let's

say those are the only limitations our hypothetical person had. 

. . . 

Would there be unskilled work that could accommodate those

limitations, if they were the only limitations? 

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The Honorable Arthur J. Boylan, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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The vocational expert responded:

Well, you'd have to look at the sedentary level of work and you have to

look into things like information clerks, customer service clerks, those

type of occupations. The–probably the information–yeah, that–those

would be fine, and–

Q. (by the ALJ): You can do those without needing repetitive use of your

dominant hand?

A: Well, you know the information clerks, if you're looking at rest areas

and, you know, hospitals, that kind of thing, I believe you could, yes.

The ALJ then asked about how many such jobs existed:

Q. How many of those jobs did you say to the first hypothetical that

exist? Do they really exist in the real world?

A. Well, the information clerk that fall in a sedentary classification of

work , there at [sic] 15,500 of those.

 . . . And customer service clerks, there are a wide variety of those.

There are, you know, 3 or 400,000, but if you reduce them by not having

repetitive activity, you're probably getting down into 10 to 15 percent of

those jobs. So, we're taking 3–you know, 30,000 or so.

Based on this testimony, the ALJ found that "considering the claimant's age,

educational background, work experience, and residual functional capacity, she is

capable of making a successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers

in the national economy." Accordingly, the ALJ held that Renfrow was not disabled.

Renfrow requested review by the administrative Appeals Council; when that

was denied, she filed suit for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner

and Renfrow both moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge2

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recommended granting the Commissioner's motion and denying Renfrow's, and the

district court adopted that recommendation. Under section 405(g), the

Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole. We review de novo the district court's decision upholding

the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Hillier v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 359, 364

(8th Cir. 2007).

On appeal, Renfrow contends that the ALJ erred by failing to ask the vocational

expert whether his testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles. The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ did err, since the Commission's own

policy, SSR 00-4p, mandates: "When a [vocational expert] or [vocational specialist]

provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has

an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that

[vocational expert] or [vocational specialist] evidence and the information provided

in the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles]." The ALJ was required not only to ask the

expert whether there was a conflict, but also to obtain an explanation for any such

conflict. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2007) (collecting

cases). The ALJ did not follow this policy and so erred. See id.

The Commissioner contends that the ALJ's error was harmless because there

was no conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles. This is the fighting point in this case. Renfrow contends that the

vocational expert specified two jobs, "Information Clerk," No. 237.367-018, and

"Customer Service Clerk," No. 299.367-010, that are specifically designated by the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles as requiring "light work," whereas she has only the

capacity to do sedentary work. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ's testimony

did not specify those particular two jobs, but instead referred to the broad categories

of information clerk and customer service clerk and rendered his opinion about the

jobs existing in that category that he thought compatible with Renfrow's limitations.

Our review of the expert's testimony shows that he in fact referred to broad categories,

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rather than the two particular jobs identified by Renfrow, since the expert specifically

referred to "the information clerk that fall in a sedentary classification" and the "wide

variety" of customer service clerk jobs amounting to 300,000 to 400,000 jobs

nationwide. 

So the real question is whether there is a conflict between the vocational

expert's opinion that Renfrow could do jobs within the information and customer

service clerk categories and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles' requirements for

those jobs. The Commissioner contends that there are jobs within those two

categories that are consistent with Renfrow's limitations, and he points to two jobs,

"Telephone Quotation Clerk," No. 237.367-046, and "Charge Account Clerk," No.

205.367-014, which fall within the general categories of information and customer

service clerks, but which require only a sedentary exertional level. 

In her reply brief, Renfrow argues that those two jobs exceed her capacities

because they require a reasoning level of three (on a six level scale) and "frequent

reaching and handling," which she contends conflicts with her inability to do complex

work and her inability to use her right hand for repetitive activity. The jobs in

question are both classified as unskilled and so do not appear to be "complex." See

Hillier, 486 F.3d at 367 (expert's opinion that claimant who was limited to following

"simple, concrete instructions" could work as cashier was not inconsistent with

Dictionary of Occupational Titles description of cashier as requiring level three

reasoning). Further, the frequent reaching and handling requirements are not

equivalent to repetitive use of the right hand. 

In sum, the ALJ's error in failing to ask the vocational expert about possible

conflicts between his testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was

harmless, since no such conflict appears to exist. See Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 n.9

(failure to follow SSR 00-4p would have been harmless if there had been no conflict

between opinion and Dictionary).

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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