Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01795/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01795-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joy Orji
Plaintiff
Walmart Superstores, Inc
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOY ORJI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WALMART SUPERSTORES, INC., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:23-cv-1795-TLN-SCR 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

Plaintiff Joy Orji is proceeding pro se in this action, which was referred to the undersigned 

in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1). Pending before the 

undersigned are Defendant WalMart Superstores, Inc.’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) and 

motion to strike portions of the Complaint (ECF No. 8), as well as Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

file a sur-reply to each motion (ECF No. 26). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants leave 

to file the sur-replies, recommends the motion to dismiss be granted without leave to amend, and 

recommends the motion to strike be denied. 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiff commenced this action on August 23, 2023, by filing a Complaint and paying the 

applicable filing fee. ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleges that she is “a United States citizen . . . 

who is Black with African ancestry.” Id. at ¶ 3. After paying for items at a cash register in one of 

Defendant’s stores, Plaintiff was barred from leaving by a guard “Kathy” because the receipt 

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showed she did not pay for some of the items. Id. at ¶¶ 14-21. Plaintiff asked Kathy to have the 

cashier who had assisted her join them to scan the unpaid items without forcing Plaintiff to stand 

in line again. Id. at ¶23. When Plaintiff repeated this to a supervisor named “Shanika,” the 

supervisor yelled at her to go back in line, telling her to “go back to where ever you are from” and 

“we don’t do that here in America” among “other racial epitaphs [sic] not clearly heard by the 

Plaintiff[.]” Id. at ¶¶ 25-26. Once Plaintiff told the manager on duty about this incident, the 

manager apologized and gave the disputed items to Plaintiff for free. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. Shanika 

refused to apologize for her conduct. Id. at ¶29. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct constituted racial discrimination in violation of 

42 U.S.C. §1981 and California Civil Code § 51 (“Unruh Act”). Id. at ¶¶ 46-59. Plaintiff further 

alleges she was subjected to false imprisonment because she felt she could not leave the store 

until she paid for items, despite believing she had already paid for them. Id. at ¶¶ 62-68. 

 Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney fees, and costs under 

Section 1981 and the Unruh Act. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 53. The requested injunctive relief includes an 

injunction “to enjoin Defendant from violating the Unruh Act,” and the Complaint cites 

California Civil Code § 52(a) to support its claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at ¶61. 

Plaintiff’s prayers for relief include requests for “[i]njunctive relief, preventive relief, or any other 

relief the court deems proper[,]” and for “[i]nterest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of 

this action.” Id. at Prayer, ¶¶ 1, 4. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

I. Motion to Dismiss 

A defendant may move to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the allegation “fail[s] to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive, the 

plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This standard is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court 

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and to “draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 

(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 

938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stating a claim “requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider all materials incorporated into the 

complaint by reference, as well as evidence properly subject to judicial notice. Weston Fam. 

P’ship LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 617-18 (9th Cir. 2022). “Ultimately, dismissal is 

proper under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of 

facts to support its claims.” Boquist, 32 F.4th at 773–74 (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted) (cleaned up). 

The court may dismiss for failure to state a claim when the allegations of the complaint 

and judicially noticeable materials establish an affirmative defense or other bar to recovery, such 

as the expiration of the statute of limitations. See Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)); see also Goddard v. Google Inc., 

640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199, n. 5 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that “affirmative defenses routinely 

serve as a basis for granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions where the defense is apparent from the face of 

the [c]omplaint”). However, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper if the allegations of the 

complaint and judicially noticeable materials concerning the defense involve disputed issues of 

fact. ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Scott v. 

Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). 

 “[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Doe, 58 F.3d 

494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 

complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by 

amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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II. Motion to Strike 

A motion to strike allows a court to strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he 

function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise 

from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial[.]” Whittlestone, Inc. 

v. Handi-Craft, Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 

F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 

517, 114 (1994); see also Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike applying these standards lies within the sound 

discretion of the district court. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527; see also California Dept. of Toxic 

Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1032-33 (C.D. Cal. 2002).1

ANALYSIS 

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to File Surreplies (ECF No. 26) 

 On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed surreplies to both Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

and motion to strike. ECF Nos. 21-22. Defendant objected to both surreplies on December 28, 

2023 for failure to seek prior approval pursuant to Local Rule 230(m). ECF Nos. 24-25. Plaintiff 

seeks leave to file the surreplies as responses to new arguments and evidence that Defendant 

introduced in its reply briefs. ECF No. 26 at 1. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that “where new evidence is presented in a reply” to a motion, 

“the district court should not consider the new evidence without giving the [non-]movant an 

opportunity to respond.” Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Black 

v. TIC INV. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 116 (7th Cir. 1990)). Defendant’s reply briefs argue that 

Plaintiff’s opposition briefs were untimely, that Defendant’s counsel had warned her during meet 

and confer conversations that there were substantial issues with the pleadings, and that Plaintiff 

failed to articulate why the motions should not be granted. ECF No. 19 at 2-6, ECF No. 20 at 2-6. 

Both briefs include a declaration from Defendant’s counsel detailing the meet and confer efforts 

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 Defendant requests judicial notice of the Complaint in this action. ECF No. 8-3. That request 

is denied because the Complaint is already part of the record in this case. 

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and Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to the motions, with Defendant’s emails to Plaintiff 

attached as exhibits. ECF Nos. 19-1, 20-1. 

In her surreplies, Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise its discretion to consider the 

opposition briefs, disputes Defendant’s narrative of efforts to meet and confer, argues that 

Defendant’s counsel acknowledged the discriminatory nature of Plaintiff’s treatment, and asks for 

leave to amend the Complaint should the Court grant either motion. ECF Nos. 21-22. Plaintiff 

also attached an email from Defendant’s counsel as evidence in support of her surreply to the 

motion to dismiss. ECF No. 21 at 8-10. Plaintiff also submitted a declaration explaining her 

failure to timely oppose the motions and detailing the history of efforts to meet and confer. ECF 

No. 23. 

Plaintiff’s surreply includes evidence to rebut Defendant’s new evidence regarding 

whether Defendant adequately met and conferred with Plaintiff prior to filing either motion. The 

Court therefore GRANTS leave to file surreplies and will consider the surreplies filed on 

December 27, 2023. 

II. Untimely Oppositions 

 Defendant filed its motions to dismiss the Complaint and to strike portions thereof on 

November 22, 2023. ECF Nos. 8-9. Plaintiff filed her opposition briefs on December 13, 2023. 

ECF Nos. 14-15. Defendant argues in reply that because any opposition should be filed no more 

than fourteen days after the motion, Plaintiff’s opposition should be disregarded as untimely. 

ECF No. 19 at 2, 20 at 2 (citing Local Rule 230(c)). Defendant further argues that a pro se 

plaintiff is still required to abide by both the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. ECF No. 19 at 2-3 (citing Local Rule 183; Mazur v. Department of Transportation, 

507 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.Pa.1980)). Plaintiff responds that when “a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for 

the protection of civil rights the court should endeavor to construe the plaintiff's pleading without 

regard for technicalities[.]” ECF No. 21 at 2 (quoting Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 

240, 244 (3rd Cir. 1945)).2

 A pro se litigant’s failure to comply with applicable rules “may be ground for dismissal, 

2

 Plaintiff miscites Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972). ECF No. 21 at 2. 

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judgment by default, or any other sanction appropriate[.]” Local Rule 183(a). The current 

circumstances do not merit such sanctions. Although failure to file a timely opposition “may...be 

construed by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion[,]” the Court is not required to make 

this finding. Local Rule 230(c) (emphasis added). That a party who fails to file the opposition is 

not “entitled to be heard in opposition to a motion at oral arguments” is irrelevant when, as here, 

no oral argument is to be heard on this matter. Id. 

As the moving party, Defendant addressed in its reply briefs the merits of Plaintiff’s reply 

as to meet-and-confer efforts and whether the Complaint’s factual allegations state a plausible 

claim to relief. See ECF No. 19 at 3-5. Defendant is not prejudiced by consideration of the 

untimely opposition briefs. 

III. Meet and Confer 

Plaintiff disputes whether Defendant has fulfilled an asserted duty to meet and confer as to 

the motions to dismiss and to strike. ECF No. 22 at 3. As a threshold matter, neither the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure nor this Court’s Local Rules nor the undersigned’s Civil Standing 

Orders require a defendant to meet and confer with a plaintiff prior to filing a motion to dismiss. 

The Court accordingly construes Plaintiff’s argument in this realm as an argument that Defendant 

acted in bad faith. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s counsel informed her on October 31, 

2023, that Defendant planned to enter settlement negotiations for this matter, that counsel did not 

intend to file a motion to dismiss, and that she needed an extension of the deadline to answer the 

Complaint that was due the next day. ECF No. 15 at 2-3, 22 at 3. Defendant asserts that its 

counsel asked for more time to appear in this matter, not answer the Complaint, and warned 

Plaintiff about the Complaint’s deficiencies and plans to file motions in response. ECF No. 19 at 

3-4, 19-1 at 2. 

After a phone call between Plaintiff’s husband and Defendant’s counsel on October 31, 

2023, Defendant’s counsel emailed both Plaintiff and her husband. ECF No. 19-1 at 8. The 

email specified that there were “some concerns about portions of the complaint[,]” particularly 

the requests for injunctive relief and prejudgment interest. Id. Defendant’s counsel asserts that 

she spoke with Plaintiff herself via phone after this email, whereas Plaintiff asserts the email 

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memorialized a phone conversation that preceded it. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s declaration asserts that 

during the phone call, counsel told her the Complaint looked fine but for those issues and 

promised to send a stipulation to strike them. ECF No. 23 at 1. 

 At minimum, the emails show that the parties discussed deficiencies with the Complaint. 

The contents of the emails are not necessarily a complete or exclusive list of the issues discussed. 

Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence showing that the issues raised in the motion to dismiss 

were not discussed or that Defendant acted in bad faith. Even if applicable procedural rules or the 

undersigned’s standing order imposed a meet and confer requirement, Defendant would have 

fulfilled that requirement prior to filing. 

IV. Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

Under federal law, everyone has the same right: 

to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 

equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property 

as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 

42 U.S.C. §1981(a). The right to “make and enforce contracts” includes “the making, 

performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, 

privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. §1981(b). 

To state a claim pursuant to Section 1981, the Complaint must allege: (1) the plaintiff is a 

member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; 

and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute, i.e., 

the making and enforcing of a contract.3

 Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 

1996). A plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for cause of [her] injury.” 

Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass'n of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 333 (2020). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim because her right to contract with 

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 The concept of race discrimination under Section 1981 is expansive. “Congress intended to 

protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional 

discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is 

racial discrimination that Congress intended Section 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be 

classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory.” Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 

481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). 

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Walmart was not infringed. ECF No. 9-1 at 8-9. It notes that when Plaintiff tried to leave the 

store, Kathy only stopped her because her receipt showed that she did not pay for every item she 

had bought. Id. at 9. Although the supervisor Shanika then used “racial epitaphs” [sic], 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate they were racially motivated. Id. In any case, 

Shanika took no further action to actually interfere with Plaintiff’s efforts to contract with 

Walmart, and a store manager eventually gave the disputed items to Plaintiff for free. Id. at 10. 

Plaintiff is therefore unable to show that she could not freely enter a contractual relationship with 

the store, or that she would have but for the alleged misconduct. Id.

Plaintiff responds that by saying “...you can go back to where ever you are from[...]we 

don’t do that here in America[,]” Shanika and therefore Defendant excluded Plaintiff from those 

who have the right to “enjoy” the right to contract with the store. ECF No. 15-1 at 2 (citing 42 

U.S.C. §1981(a)). Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s customers are all entitled to “[q]uiet 

enjoyment of a contractual relationship, respect for one’s dignity, and equal treatment of all 

patrons[,]” which Defendant denied to Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Plaintiff adds in surreply that the racist 

comment negatively affected her self-esteem and her confidence in dealing with others in her 

personal life. ECF No. 22 at 5. She further argues that Defendant’s counsel acknowledged the 

basis of Plaintiff’s claim by saying, “I am sorry for what you went through, even though I have 

not suffered discrimination based on national origin as you have, but as a woman, I know what it 

means to be discriminated against[.]” Id. Plaintiff concludes that the Complaint has therefore 

alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim under Section 1981(a). Id. at 6. 

As Plaintiff notes, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to treat all 

factual allegations as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This requires, however, distinguishing 

between a factual allegation and a conclusion of law. The Complaint’s factual allegations include 

that (1) the cashier improperly scanned the items, (2) Kathy stopped Plaintiff from leaving until 

she paid for all items, (3) Kathy denied her request to have the cashier come scan the items, (4) 

Plaintiff repeated this request to Shanika, (5) Shanika responded by telling Plaintiff to go back to 

where she came from, and (6) the manager eventually paid for the items and let Plaintiff go. But 

Plaintiff’s statement that Defendant therefore “den[ied] Plaintiff ‘full and equal enjoyment’ [of] 

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contract, use of the services, privileges and advantages of the Walmart Supercenter” as defined in 

Section 1981(a) is a conclusion of law. See ECF No. 1 at ¶50. 

Based on the alleged facts, racial discrimination did not deprive Plaintiff of her ability to 

contract with Defendant. See Comcast, 589 U.S. at 333. The United States Supreme Court has 

emphasized that Section 1981 is not “an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice” and is “limited 

to situations involving contracts.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479 (2006). 

A claim exists when the alleged racial discrimination either “blocks the creation of a contractual 

relationship” or “impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would 

have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Id. at 476. 

It appears there is no Ninth Circuit precedent applying these principles to a situation 

involving discriminatory statements in a retail setting. There is, however, consensus among other 

courts about the standard that applies in this situation. In Hammond v. Kmart Corp., the First 

Circuit Court of Appeals held that comments “fueled by racial animus” that “humiliated and 

deeply offended” the plaintiff are insufficient to violate Section 1981 when a customer was still 

able to purchase and obtain the desired items through the same procedure and at the same price as 

other customers. 733 F.3d 360, 364 (1st Cir. 2013). See also Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 

94, 101-02 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff does not have an actionable claim when the 

alleged discrimination did not prevent him from making the desired purchases or enjoying the use 

of the purchased items). While Hammond is the leading case on this issue, “[v]irtually all federal 

courts that have analyzed Section 1981 claims in the retail merchandise context have required the 

plaintiff to show that he was actually prevented from making a purchase.” Benzinger v. NYSARC, 

Inc. N.Y.C. Chapter, 385 F. Supp. 3d 224, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 

Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to the allegations underlying the complaint in Hammond. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that she ultimately received the goods she tried to buy, when the 

manager paid for the disputed items and let Plaintiff leave the store. She instead argues that 

Shanika’s comments during the transaction were discriminatory and kept her from “enjoying” the 

benefits thereof. As in Hammond, however, this employee conduct did not hinder the contractual 

relationship at issue—the exchange of items for money. 

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To be clear, the Court’s analysis turns on the fact that Plaintiff was subjected to limited 

offensive comments by one of Defendant’s employees, which did not stand in the way of Plaintiff 

completing her transaction. Had Plaintiff alleged severe and pervasive discriminatory statements 

by Defendant’s employees, the outcome might very well be different. In such a case, the retail 

environment could be so discriminatory that it would effectively prevent Plaintiff from entering 

into a contractual relationship. Indeed, in the employment context, “[s]imple teasing, offhand 

comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not” violate Section 1981, 

Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.2003), but “severe and pervasive” comments 

that “interfere[] with an employee’s work performance” do violate Section 1981, Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir.2008). Because Plaintiff was not 

subjected to severe and pervasive discriminatory conduct, the Court need not expand further on 

how such a “severe and pervasive” standard might fit within the retail framework described by 

Hammond and other courts. 

While the Court does not discount the impact that Shanika’s comments had on Plaintiff, 

Plaintiff’s right to enter a contractual relationship with Defendant was not impeded. She has 

therefore failed to articulate a plausible claim under Section 1981. The Court recommends that 

the motion to dismiss this cause of action be GRANTED. 

V. Claim Under the Unruh Act 

 Under the Unruh Act: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter 

what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical 

condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, 

primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 

establishments of every kind whatsoever. 

Cal. Civ. Code §51(b). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove that her treatment was unequal compared to 

how a white customer would have been treated if he had unpaid items in his cart when leaving the 

store. ECF No. 9-1 at 12. Defendant then argues that the claim under the Unruh Act fails for the 

same reasons as a claim under Section 1981. Id. Plaintiff responds that the Unruh Act covers “all 

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arbitrary and intentional discrimination by a business establishment on the basis of” race and 

similar characteristics. ECF No. 15-1 at 3. 

The Unruh Act “focuses on discriminatory behavior by business establishments” and 

seeks “to compel recognition of the equality of all persons in the right to the particular service 

offered by an organization or entity covered by the act.” Ramirez v. Wong, 188 Cal.App.4th 

1480, 1485 (quoting Stamps v. Superior Court, 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448, 1452 (2006)). 

Ramirez decided whether female apartment tenants had a claim under the Unruh Act against a 

landlord who went into their bedrooms and invaded their privacy. 188 Cal.App.4th at 1483. The 

Court held that although the landlord might be liable under other causes of action, he was not 

liable under the Unruh Act because his conduct “had nothing to do with the denial of equal 

accommodations or facilities on the basis of sex.” Id. 

Whether a white customer in Plaintiff’s situation would have been treated differently is 

unclear. Kathy, for example, may have complied with a white customer’s request to have the 

cashier meet them to scan any items missing from the receipt. Regardless, as with the claim 

under Section 1981, Plaintiff cannot show that either Kathy’s behavior or Shanika’s 

discriminatory comments affected her ability to purchase the disputed items, particularly after the 

manager gifted them to her. See supra. Because Plaintiff cannot show that she was denied the 

right to purchase Defendant’s goods, she cannot plead sufficient facts to support a claim under the 

Unruh Act. The Court recommends that the motion to dismiss this cause of action is GRANTED. 

VI. Claim of False Imprisonment 

 The tort of false imprisonment “is premised upon a violation of the personal liberty of 

another accomplished without lawful authority.” Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744, 

753 (1997). An actor is liable for false imprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other 

or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, (b) his act directly or indirectly results in 

such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by 

it. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §35. Even if there is a reasonable means of escape, such 

confinement is considered complete unless the other person is aware of such means. Id. at 

§36(b). Under the shopkeeper’s privilege, however, a shopkeeper “may detain a person for a 

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reasonable time for the purpose of conducting an investigation in a reasonable manner whenever 

the merchant has probable cause to believe the person to be detained is attempting to unlawfully 

take or has unlawfully taken merchandise from the merchant's premises.” Cal. Penal Code 

§490.5(f)(1). See also Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 701, 716 (1994) (noting that the 

California Penal Code codified the preexisting shopkeeper’s privilege). 

 The Complaint asserts that because Plaintiff felt like she could not leave the store without 

being wrongfully tagged as a shoplifter, despite believing she had already paid for the items, 

Defendant had falsely imprisoned her in the store. ECF No. 1 at 7. Defendant asserts that the 

situation cannot constitute false imprisonment because Plaintiff knew about two reasonable 

means of escape. ECF No. 9-1 at 13. She could pay for the disputed items at a cashier’s station 

or a self-checkout area, or she could give the unpaid items to Kathy and exit the store. Id. To the 

extent that the Complaint alleges Plaintiff was imprisoned through intimidation rather than 

physical means, Defendant responds that any such intimidation only began after Plaintiff had 

refused to go back to the cashier to pay. ECF No. 9-1 at 13. 

Assuming arguendo that the Complaint sufficiently pleads a prima facie case of false 

imprisonment, Defendant also argues that the shopkeeper’s privilege applies. Id. at 14. 

Defendant asserts that it had reasonable cause to believe Plaintiff had not paid for all the goods 

she tried taking with her because the receipt did not say she had done so. Id. To the extent that 

the time Plaintiff was detained was unreasonable, Defendant argues that Plaintiff subjected 

herself to the extra time by refusing to go back to the cashier to pay the outstanding amount owed. 

Id. 

 Plaintiff responds that there was no legal justification for her restraint because the 

confusion as to whether she had paid for all her items was caused by the Defendant’s own 

negligence. ECF No. 15-1 at 4. Plaintiff adds in surreply that whether the shopkeeper privilege 

applies is a question for a trier of fact and not appropriate to resolve via motion to dismiss. ECF 

No. 22 at 5. 

Although the Court must accept a complaint’s factual allegations as true when assessing a 

motion to dismiss, it does not accept the conclusory allegations of law as true. See supra; Iqbal, 

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556 U.S. at 678. Whether the Complaint’s factual allegations support a claim of false 

imprisonment or the shopkeeper’s privilege are questions of law. In the Complaint, Plaintiff 

admits that when Kathy asked for her receipt, it showed that Plaintiff had paid for only one out of 

five items stuck together. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 19-20. Plaintiff conceded that she needed to pay for 

the others by asking both Kathy and Shanika to have the cashier scan her items without making 

her stand in line again. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. Defendant did not just have “reasonable cause” to believe 

that Plaintiff had not paid for everything; both parties knew it. See ECF No. 9-1 at 14. Assuming 

arguendo that Plaintiff was imprisoned under tort law, any imprisonment until the manager either 

ensured Plaintiff had paid for the remaining items (or, as happened here, gave those items to 

Plaintiff for free) was protected under shopkeeper’s privilege. 

Because the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to conclude that an affirmative defense 

applies, it necessarily does not plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that Plaintiff has a plausible 

claim for false imprisonment. The Court recommends GRANTING the motion to dismiss this 

cause of action. 

VII. Leave to Amend Causes of Action 

When a motion to dismiss claims is granted, a “district court should grant leave to amend 

even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Doe, 58 

F.3d at 497). Plaintiff requests such leave to amend her Complaint. ECF No. 22 at 5. 

Plaintiff does not identify any facts she can add to cure the defects with each cause of 

action. The reasons for granting this motion suggest that she cannot. Claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981 and the Unruh Act fail because Plaintiff’s allegations show she successfully purchased (or 

was gifted) the disputed items from Defendant, notwithstanding an employee’s conduct during 

the incident. See supra; ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-29. The claim for false imprisonment fails because 

the Defendant only prevented Plaintiff from leaving the store until someone paid for the disputed 

items. See supra; ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 19-29. Plaintiff cannot cure these defects by amending her 

Complaint without admitting that the current allegations are false. See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. 

N. Cal. Collection Service, 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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The Court recommends DENYING leave to amend. 

VIII. Motion to Strike Remedies 

“[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money 

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial[.]” 

Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973. Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike applying these 

standards lies within the sound discretion of the district court. Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1527. 

Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney fees, and costs based 

on violations of Section 1981 and the Unruh Act. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 53. The requested injunctive relief 

includes an injunction “to enjoin Defendant from violating the Unruh Act,” and the Complaint 

cites California Civil Code section 52(a) to support its claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 

¶61. Plaintiff’s prayers for relief include requests for “[i]njunctive relief, preventive relief, or any 

other relief the Court deems proper[,]” and for “[i]nterest at the legal rate from the date of the 

filing of this action.” Id. at Prayer, ¶¶ 1, 4. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to support all three causes of action, Defendant argues the Court should strike 

these requests for relief. ECF No. 8-1 at 4-5. 

The Ninth Circuit does not permit courts to strike a prayer for relief pursuant to a Rule 

12(f) motion to strike. Based on the rule’s plain meaning, the court in Whittlestone reviewed a 

decision to strike a prayer for damages based on whether it was “(1) an insufficient defense; (2) 

redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5) scandalous.” 618 F.3d at 973-74. It found the 

prayer was none of the five. Id. at 974. Specifically, the prayer could not be immaterial or 

impertinent because the recoverability of such damages “relate[d] directly to the plaintiff’s 

underlying claim for relief.” Id. (citing Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527). To the extent that the moving 

party argued those damages were precluded as a matter of law, the Ninth Circuit held that such an 

argument was in effect “an attempt to have certain portions of...[the] complaint 

dismissed...better suited for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion...not a Rule 12(f) motion.” Id. This rule 

from Whittlestone has been applied to deny motions to strike prayers for prejudgment interest, 

even when such interest is unavailable as a matter of law. See Brown v. County of San 

Bernardino, 2021 WL 99722, at *8 (C.D. Cal.). 

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The Court recommends DENYING the motion to strike. 

CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to file surreplies to Defendant’s motions to dismiss and strike (ECF 

No. 26) is GRANTED; 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) be GRANTED and the Complaint 

dismissed without leave to amend. 

2. Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 8) be DENIED. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 14, 2025 

 

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