Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02483/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02483-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Narendra Tulsiram
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

14‐2483‐cr

United States v. Tulsiram

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2015

No. 14‐2483‐cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

NARENDRA TULSIRAM,

Defendant‐Appellant.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

   

ARGUED: MARCH 1, 2016

DECIDED: MARCH 7, 2016

   

Before: CABRANES, PARKER, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

   

Case 14-2483, Document 113, 03/07/2016, 1720160, Page1 of 14
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This case presents two questions. The first is whether a

judgment of conviction is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

therefore appealable, if it imposes a sentence including incarceration

and restitution but does not determine the restitution amount. The

second is whether—if we have jurisdiction over this appeal—we

must vacate the guilty plea of defendant‐appellant Narendra

Tulsiram (“Tulsiram”), because the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge) did not

advise him about mandatory restitution during the plea proceeding.  

We hold that a judgment of conviction is final for purposes of

§ 1291 whenever it imposes a sentence of incarceration, even if post‐

conviction proceedings to set a restitution amount remain pending.

We also conclude that the District Court’s failure to advise Tulsiram

that restitution would be imposed did not constitute plain error. We

therefore AFFIRM the June 30, 2014 judgment of the District Court.

   

         MARSHALL ARON MINTZ, Mintz &

Oppenheim LLP, New York, NY, for

Defendant‐Appellant.

RAHUL MUKHI (Kristy J. Greenberg, Michael

A. Levy, on the brief), Assistant United States

Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States

Attorney for the Southern District of New

York, New York, NY, for Appellee.   

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PER CURIAM:

This case presents two questions. The first is whether a

judgment of conviction is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

therefore appealable, if it imposes a sentence including incarceration

and restitution but does not determine the restitution amount. The

second is whether—if we have jurisdiction over this appeal—we

must vacate the guilty plea of defendant‐appellant Narendra

Tulsiram (“Tulsiram”), because the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge) did not

advise him about mandatory restitution during the plea proceeding.  

We hold that a judgment of conviction is final for purposes of

§ 1291 whenever it imposes a sentence of incarceration, even if post‐

conviction proceedings to set a restitution amount remain pending.

We also conclude that the District Court’s failure to advise Tulsiram

that restitution would be imposed did not constitute plain error. We

therefore AFFIRM the June 30, 2014 judgment of the District Court.

BACKGROUND

For about five years, Tulsiram sexually abused a teenage girl

who was his de facto stepdaughter. He also took sexually explicit

pictures of her—about 80 of which were discovered on his phone at

the time of his arrest—and threatened to send them to her family and

friends if she resisted his demands for sex.

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As a result of this conduct, Tulsiram was charged in a

superseding indictment with sexual exploitation of a minor in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (“Count One”) and 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b)

(“Count Two”); transportation of child pornography in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1) (“Count Three”); and possession

of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)

(“Count Four”). The superseding indictment also included a

forfeiture count.

The Government later provided Tulsiram with a so‐called

Pimentel letter, as we suggested in United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d

1029 (2d Cir. 1991).1 The letter informed him that, based on the

charged offenses, the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(“Guidelines”) called for a sentence of 90 years’ imprisonment and

that he faced a maximum term of supervised release of life. The letter

also advised Tulsiram that each count carried a $100 mandatory

special assessment and a maximum fine “of the greatest of $250,000,

twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the

gross pecuniary loss to persons other than the defendant resulting

from the offense.” App. 16. Finally, the letter told Tulsiram that for

Counts Three and Four, “the Court must order restitution as

specified below,” although the letter did not in fact provide specifics.

Id.  

 1 “A Pimentel letter generally refers to an informational letter from the

government containing an estimate of a defendant’s likely sentence under the

Sentencing Guidelines. . . . [I]t is often relied upon by defendants in entering

guilty pleas.” United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 315 n.3 (2d Cir. 2011).

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Tulsiram pleaded guilty to all counts on April 1, 2013, without

the benefit of a plea agreement. Before accepting his plea, the District

Court advised him of the same potential terms of imprisonment,

potential terms of supervised release, potential fines, and mandatory

special assessments that the Pimentel letter had described. (Tulsiram

confirmed that he had seen the Pimentel letter and had discussed it

with his attorney.) In addition, the Court advised Tulsiram that his

offenses could entail forfeiture, which the Pimentel letter (but not the

indictment) had omitted. The Court did not, however, mention

restitution.

The District Court sentenced Tulsiram on June 23, 2014, to 25

years’ imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervision. The

Court also imposed the mandatory special assessment of $400 but

declined to impose a fine, finding that Tulsiram lacked any ability to

pay. At the Government’s prompting, the Court ordered restitution

but deferred setting the amount “for up to 90 days,” so that the

Government could “work[ ] out what the appropriate amount would

be.” App. 119, 120. In its judgment of June 30, 2014, the Court

specified that the determination of restitution was deferred until

September 23, 2014. No such determination has ever been made,

however, nor has the Court entered an amended judgment.2  

 2 The Government states that it will “request that the District Court set the

amount of restitution at zero, but has refrained from doing so out of concern that”

Tulsiram’s appeal has deprived that court of jurisdiction. Gov’t Br. 22. That

concern is misplaced. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 806 F.3d 692, 692 & n.1 (2d

Cir. 2015) (noting that a district court set restitution after the defendant filed a

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Tulsiram filed a timely notice of appeal. His appellate counsel

thereafter filed a motion to withdraw from the case pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and the Government moved

for summary affirmance.3 A panel of this Court deferred

consideration of those motions and instead ordered the parties to file

supplemental briefs addressing “whether the district court’s

judgment is appealable.” Docket No. 67. Tulsiram’s counsel then

filed a motion to withdraw his Anders motion and to file a brief

addressing, inter alia, the jurisdictional question. We granted the

motion and vacated our earlier order for supplemental briefing.

Docket No. 72.  

DISCUSSION

A. This Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction

The first issue we must resolve is whether we have jurisdiction

over this appeal. Although both parties agree that we do have

 

notice of appeal from the initial sentence); United States v. Muzio, 757 F.3d 1243,

1254 (11th Cir.) (“While it is typically true that the filing of an appeal divests

district courts of jurisdiction over the matters contained in the appeal . . . the

district court retains the power to determine the amount of restitution even if an

appeal from the initial judgment has been filed with us.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.

395 (2014), reh’g denied, 135 S. Ct. 1035 (2015).  

3 In Anders, the Supreme Court required that in an appeal from a criminal

judgment, “a defense attorney who believes that his client’s appeal would be

frivolous must, inter alia, move to be relieved on that basis and brief all arguably

meritorious appellate issues.” In re Aranda, 789 F.3d 48, 53 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015).

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jurisdiction, we must nonetheless consider the issue independently.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Rogich, 781 F.3d 647, 648 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015).

Our jurisdiction extends to “appeals from all final decisions of

the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis

supplied). “[L]ike many legal terms,” the meaning of final “depends

on context.” See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). In the

context of a direct criminal appeal, finality typically attaches “when

the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to

be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment.”

Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting

Clay, 537 U.S. at 527). Accordingly, it is clear that “[a] criminal

judgment containing a restitution order is a final judgment for the

purposes of a direct appeal.” Id. We have not yet resolved, however,

whether a criminal judgment that imposes an undetermined amount

of restitution is also final.  

The Supreme Court declined to answer that very question in

Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 618 (2010). Nonetheless, the Court

noted in dicta that “strong arguments favor the appealability of”

such judgments. Id. at 617. The Court began by citing Corey v. United

States, 375 U.S. 169, 174–75 (1963), which held that a criminal

defendant could appeal from a sentence committing him to custody,

even if the district court had not yet determined the final sentence.

The Supreme Court then noted that the statute authorizing

restitution “provides that a ‘sentence that imposes an order of

restitution . . . is a final judgment.’” Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618 (quoting 18

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U.S.C. § 3664(o)).4 The same is true, the Court observed, of judgments

imposing imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b), supervised release, id.

§ 3583(a), and fines, id. § 3572(c). Accordingly, the Court found it

unsurprising that courts of appeals—including the Second Circuit—

have permitted defendants to appeal from an initial sentence

imposing a term of imprisonment, even if restitution proceedings

remained pending. Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618 (citing, inter alia, United

States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2000)). This approach “makes

sense,” the Supreme Court suggested, because defendants might

otherwise have to wait for months before seeking review of their

conviction and initial sentence. Id.

5

Following Dolan, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits—the only

two to decide the issue so far—have held that a judgment imposing

incarceration and restitution, but not specifying the amount of

restitution, is “final” for purposes of § 1291. United States v. Gilbert,

807 F.3d 1197, 1199–200 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Muzio, 757

F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 395 (2014), reh’g

denied, 135 S. Ct. 1035 (2015).  

 4 This is true even though an order of restitution may be “corrected,”

“appealed and modified,” “amended,” or “adjusted,” and even though “[t]he

defendant may be resentenced.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o).

5 Cf. United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 1998) (reading 18

U.S.C. § 3582(b) as designed to avoid the “unacceptable” scenario of forcing a

defendant to begin serving a sentence he could not challenge immediately).

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We cited the Eleventh Circuit’s approach approvingly in

Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d at 237. In Gonzalez, we were asked

to determine when a criminal judgment became “final” for purposes

of triggering the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We noted that

the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dolan and Corey, together with the

Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Muzio, supported the conclusion that a

criminal defendant has two opportunities to appeal: first, “from an

initial sentence, even if some aspects of the sentence are not final”;

and again “from the final order disposing of the case in the district

court.” Gonzalez, 792 F.3d at 237.  

Relying on Gonzalez, we reached the same conclusion in United

States v. Ryan, 806 F.3d 691 (2d Cir. 2015). Ryan, unlike Gonzalez,

involved a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction that, as in the

instant case, imposed a term of imprisonment and an undetermined

amount of restitution. Although we held the appeal in abeyance until

the district court entered an amended judgment setting restitution,

we noted in dicta that “[t]he original judgment was a final

judgment.” Id. at 692 n.1 (citing Gonzalez, 792 F.3d at 237).6  

 6 Our statement in Ryan was dictum because we did not actually hear that

appeal until “completion of the restitution proceedings that resulted in the

amended judgment.” Ryan, 806 F.3d at 692. In other words, Ryan, unlike the

instant case, did not actually involve an appeal from a judgment in which

restitution had not been set. Although we assumed that we had had jurisdiction

from the time that the defendant “filed a notice of appeal of the original

judgment,” id. at 692 n.1, we never exercised that jurisdiction. We merely held the

appeal in abeyance until entry of the amended judgment—an action that would

also have been consistent with our treating the initial sentence as non‐final. Cf.

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In light of our dicta in Gonzalez and Ryan, the Supreme Court’s

observations in Dolan, the holdings of our sister circuits, and our own

past practice,7 we have no difficulty in reaching our holding today: a

judgment of conviction that imposes a sentence including

incarceration and restitution is “final” within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 1291, even if the sentence defers determination of the

amount of restitution.8 In such situations, § 1291 permits a defendant

 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(2) (“A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a

decision, sentence, or order—but before the entry of the judgment or order—is

treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.”); United States v. Owen, 553 F.3d

161, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting our practice of holding a “protective” notice of

appeal in abeyance until it becomes “effective”).  

7 See, e.g., Stevens, 211 F.3d at 1. In United States v. Gushlak, 495 F. App’x 132

(2d Cir. 2012), we assumed that a judgment of conviction was appealable even if

restitution proceedings remained pending. We never discussed the issue

explicitly, however, and in any event that decision was nonprecedential. See also

United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that “[t]he

[district] court entered judgment while the restitution issue remained pending in

order to enable [the defendant] to appeal his conviction and sentence

immediately”).

8 We need not decide whether a sentence imposing an undetermined

amount of restitution, but not incarceration, would also be final. On the one hand,

such a sentence would not impose the immediate “judicial control” or

“discipline” that prompted the Supreme Court’s concern in Corey, 375 U.S. at 174

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the cases on which we have relied

all involved “a judgment imposing a term of imprisonment.” Muzio, 757 F.3d at

1244; see Dolan, 560 U.S. at 617; Ryan, 806 F.3d at 692; Gonzalez, 792 F.3d at 233;

Gilbert, 807 F.3d at 1200 (“[A] sentence of incarceration coupled with an unspecified

amount of restitution is a sufficiently final judgment to support a direct appeal.”

(emphasis supplied)). On the other hand, the mere fact of conviction—apart from

any sentence—imposes disabilities that a defendant has an interest in challenging

promptly. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937). And courts have

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either to appeal immediately from the initial sentence or to wait until

all aspects of the sentence have been determined. Cf. Gonzalez, 792

F.3d at 237; Muzio, 757 F.3d at 1250. We therefore have jurisdiction

over the present appeal.

B. Tulsiram’s Guilty Plea

Having assured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to the

merits of Tulsiram’s appeal.  

Rule 11(b)(1)(K) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

requires a district court, before accepting a plea of guilty, to “inform

the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . .

the court’s authority to order restitution.” Tulsiram argues that the

District Court violated that rule by failing to inform him that the

offenses to which he was pleading guilty required the imposition of

restitution, and that we must therefore vacate his plea.  

Because Tulsiram did not raise this objection below, our review

is for plain error.9 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Vonn, 535

U.S. 55, 59 (2002). He therefore bears the burden of establishing that  

 

expressed concern about making a defendant postpone his appeal “indefinitely” if

a district court is tardy in setting restitution. See Muzio, 757 F.3d at 1246–48.

9 Tulsiram insists that plain‐error review does not apply in this particular

circumstance. Even if we were so persuaded, his claim would fail even under a

harmless‐error standard.

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(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious,

rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error

affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the

ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.

United States v. Tarbell, 728 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010)). In the Rule 11

context, the plain‐error standard requires a defendant to “establish

that the violation affected substantial rights and that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have

entered the plea.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the first two requirements of the plain‐error standard are

undisputedly satisfied: the District Court clearly erred in failing to

advise Tulsiram regarding restitution during the plea proceeding.

Tulsiram has not, however, shown that he would not have pleaded

guilty but for that particular Rule 11 violation. Indeed, several

considerations persuade us that he was aware of the possibility of

restitution before he entered his plea, and that the Rule 11 error did

not affect his decision.  

First, the Pimentel letter warned Tulsiram before he entered his

plea that the court was required to order restitution. It seems

improbable, then, that the District Court’s mentioning restitution

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again during the plea proceeding would have altered Tulsiram’s

resolve.  

Second, both the Pimentel letter and the plea colloquy

instructed Tulsiram that he faced a potential fine of $1 million—far

more than what he could reasonably have expected to pay in

restitution. Cf. United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005)

(collecting cases finding no plain error where a district court failed to

advise a defendant regarding restitution but did advise the

defendant regarding larger potential fines). The Government and the

District Court also informed Tulsiram that the crimes to which he

pleaded guilty carried a maximum sentence of ninety years’

imprisonment. Finally, the District Court reminded Tulsiram that the

indictment contained a forfeiture count. It beggars the imagination to

suppose that Tulsiram was willing to face these stiff punishments,

but not the mere possibility of paying restitution, by pleading guilty.  

Finally, Tulsiram “failed to object when the restitution order

was actually imposed.” Id.; cf. id. (“Where a defendant, before

sentencing, learns of information erroneously omitted in violation of

Rule 11 but fails to attempt to withdraw his plea based on that

violation, there can be no reasonable probability that, but for the Rule

11 violation, he would not have entered the plea, and the plain error

standard is not met.” (alteration and internal quotation marks

omitted)).  

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In short, Tulsiram has failed to meet his burden of showing

that he would not have entered his plea but for the District Court’s

Rule 11 error, and his plea must stand.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Tulsiram’s arguments on appeal and

find them to be without merit. To summarize, we hold as follows:

(1) A judgment of conviction that imposes a sentence including

incarceration and restitution, but which leaves the amount

of restitution to be determined, is “final” within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may therefore be

appealed; and

(2) Although the District Court violated Rule 11(b)(1)(K) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to advise

Tulsiram during the plea proceeding regarding mandatory

restitution, Tulsiram has not shown that there was a

reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded

guilty but for that violation.  Accordingly, the District Court

did not commit “plain error,” and Tulsiram may not

withdraw his plea.

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.  

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