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Parties Involved:
Charles Michael Kissick
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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I:;ILBO 

U!lited St1i11 C®rr of Appeals ·r enth Circuit 

UNITED· STATES· COURT ·OF APPEALS M Y 3 0 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT &OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CHARLES MICHAEL KISSICK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 89-6143 

(D.C. No. CR-88-273-P) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Circuit Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and 

BROWN, Senior District Judge.** 

Defendant Charles M. Kissick appeals his conviction on 

fourteen counts related to distribution of cocaine. He asserts 

three errors: (1) the trial court failed to suppress statements 

he made to investigators; (2) improperly enhanced his sentence 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior Judge for the United 

St ates District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-6143 Document: 010110036115 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 1 
based upon his role in the criminal transaction; and (3) 

improperly -enhanced his sentence upon the premise defendant's 

trial testimony was false. We find no error and affirm. 

Mr. Kissick was convicted of possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine upon the testimony of witnesses who had 

received cocaine from Mr. Kissick or sold it to him. Two FBI 

agents, whose interrogation of Mr. Kissick resulted in his 

producing a sack of brown substance, later identified as cocaine, 

testified as well. The sack was obtained after the agents visited 

defendant at his residence, questioned him, and then took him in 

their car to a storage locker where defendant retrieved the sack. 

Defendant sought to suppress this evidence on intermingled 

theories. 1 Defendant's major contention at the hearing on his 

motion was a Sixth Amendment right to counsel theory premised upon 

defendant's testimony that the agents had told him nothing he said 

during their interrogation would be used against him. This 

assertion was denied by the agents; nonetheless, counsel persisted 

in the theory. The precise argument was: 

What this matter turns on is that he felt safe in 

speaking with him [sic] based on their assurances. 

After these assurances were forthcoming, Mr. Kissick 

felt no desire to request counsel, didn't think he 

needed an attorney at that time, and felt that anything 

he said or used [sic] would not be used against him, 

again based on their assurances. 

1counsel filed a written motion to suppress, but that paper is not 

included in the record. At the suppression hearing, the direct 

testimony of all witnesses, including the defendant, was presented 

in the form of affidavits. Those documents are not part of the 

record either. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6143 Document: 010110036115 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 2 
interview was brief; and, even during his own testimony at the 

mot-ions· hearing, he .. failed ·to · state that he believed:· he was under 

any form of restraint. Although at oral argument counsel 

contended the restraint occurred when Mr. Kissick rode with the 

officers to the storage shed, the theory is belied by the fact 

that defendant left the car and went alone into the shed and was 

thereafter returned by the agents to his residence. 

When these circumstances are coupled with the findings of the 

trial court, there is no substance to defendant's arguments. The 

trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. 

Defendant next argues the trial court erred in applying 

Guideline§ 3Bl.l(a) which allows an increase of the offense level 

if the defendant was a leader of a criminal activity that involved 

five or more participants or was extensive. Defendant argues 

application of this guideline was inappropriate because "at most 

this was a small group of people involved in activities with 

little or no planning and absolutely no hierarchy." That argument 

notwithstanding, the trial court found that "the defendant 

qualifies as either an organizer, a leader, or a supervisor of 

criminal activity involving five or more participants." The court 

amplified that finding by stating: 

[H]e clearly qualified as a supervisor or an organizer 

or a leader in that he was viewed as a source of supply 

by several individuals; that he undertook activities, 

such as requesting the pawning of an automobile for 

payment of cocaine; that he had contacts at a 

substantial level in terms of the source of supply for 

cocaine. 

And the court finds that his recruitment of 

accomplice witnesses and his interstate travel also 

indicates his status as either an organizer, a leader, 

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Appellate Case: 89-6143 Document: 010110036115 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 3 
or a supervisor of a criminal activity involving five or 

more participants. 

Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion the trial 

court's determination was not clearly erroneous. Mr. Kissick was 

a supplier to not less than six persons and joined with at least 

three persons in sales of cocaine to others. He conducted his 

cocaine business by means of a telephone pager, giving code 

numbers by which his customers could contact him. His personal 

telephone book contained the code numbers of eleven such 

customers. The evidence indicated Mr. Kissick controlled the 

times, places, and quantities of cocaine sales. While there is no 

evidence defendant sold large quantities of cocaine, there is 

ample evidence to indicate his criminal activity was extensive. 

Under these circumstances, we believe the district court properly 

applied§ 3B1.l(a). United States v. Barreto, 871 F.2d 511, 512-

13 (5th Cir. 1989). 

Defendant finally argues the trial court should not have 

enhanced his sentence under Guideline § 3Cl.l based upon the 

court's finding that the defendant testified falsely. Defendant 

argues this enhancement amounts to punishment for taking the stand 

and making a general denial of the charges. He further contends 

application of this guideline somehow interferes with his right to 

testify. 

Calling defendant's testimony a "general denial" is akin to 

calling Michelangelo's David a ''statue." The appellation simply 

fails to do justice to the art. Here, defendant did not simply 

deny his guilt; he systematically refuted every inculpating 

statement made by the government's witnesses. Even from the cold 

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Appellate Case: 89-6143 Document: 010110036115 Date Filed: 05/30/1990 Page: 4 
record, his dissembly is patent. It is manifest that either he or 

those witnesse~ were : lying .about material facts~n the case. That 

the trial court chose to disbelieve defendant is neither 

surprising nor clearly erroneous. 

The district court was fully justified by the facts before it 

to conclude defendant had testified falsely. This conclusion 

supports an enhancement under § 3Cl.l, and we find nothing 

erroneous in the trial court's action. United States v. Wagner, 

884 F.2d 1090, 1098-99 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. AcostaCazares, 878 F.2d 945, 953 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 

255 (1989); United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 800 (5th 

Cir. 1989). 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

PER CURIAM 

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