Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00834/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00834-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A.C.
Plaintiff
A.S.
Plaintiff
Dedric Belcher
Plaintiff
Kimberly Belcher
Plaintiff
L.B.
Plaintiff
The Grand Reserve MGM, LLC
Defendant
The Grand Reserve Pike Road
Defendant

Document Text:

Page 1 of 10 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KIMBERLY BELCHER, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO. 2:15-cv-834-WKW 

 ) 

THE GRAND RESERVE MGM, LLC, ) 

et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) this case was referred to the undersigned United States 

Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and 

conclusions of law (Doc. 9, filed November 6, 2016). Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for an Injunction (Doc. 2, filed November 5, 2015) and an Amended Motion for injunction 

(Doc. 38, filed February 16, 2016). For good cause, it is the Recommendation of the Magistrate 

Judge that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunction and Amended Motion for Injunction be denied. 

I. PARTIES

Plaintiffs are Kimberly Belcher, Dedric Belcher, and their minor children (A.J., L.B., and 

A.C.). Collectively they shall be referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “The Belchers.” 

 Defendants are identified by Plaintiffs as Grand Reserve M.G.M., LLC and Grand Reserve 

Pike Road. As discussed in their answer to the first amended complaint, Defendants are properly 

identified as The Grand Reserve MGM, LLC d/b/a The Grand Reserve Pike Road. Collectively 

they shall be referred to as “The Grand Reserve.” 

II. JURISDICTION

The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 1 of 10
Page 2 of 10 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) as Plaintiffs bring claims for violations of the Fair 

Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367 for the state law claims. 

The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations 

to support both. 

III. NATURE OF THE CASE & MOTION FOR INJUNCTION

The Belchers initiated this action on November 5, 2015. See Doc. 1, “Complaint.” The 

Belchers – a married couple with three minor children – bring the action under the Fair Housing 

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. and state law. They allege Defendants discriminated and retaliated 

against them in the rental of an apartment on the basis of their familial status, race, and disabilities. 

Plaintiffs contend that certain rules at the apartment complex are discriminatory on their face and 

as applied. In conjunction with their complaint, Plaintiffs also filed a motion for temporary 

restraining order and preliminary injunction. See Docs. 2-3. In the motion, Plaintiffs request the 

Court restrain and enjoin Defendants’ “unlawful practices and retaliation” and to “impos[e] 

injunctive relief requiring Defendants . . . to take affirmative action to provide equal housing 

opportunities to all tenants and prospective tenants regardless of familial status, race, and 

disability.” See Doc. 1 at p. 17. On November 6, 2015, the district judge denied the temporary 

restraining order and referred the request for a preliminary injunction to the undersigned for 

further proceedings and recommendation. See Doc. 9. 

 On December 29, 2015, the Court entered an order to show cause why the motion for 

preliminary injunction should not be granted. See Doc. 18. Shortly thereafter, on January 4, 

2015, the Belchers filed an amended complaint. See Doc. 24. The amended complaint still 

requests a preliminary injunction. Id. at p. 1, 17. In response to the show cause order, 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 2 of 10
Page 3 of 10 

Defendants timely filed their response in opposition to the request for preliminary injunction. See

Docs. 28-29. Plaintiffs requested to file a reply brief which the Court granted while also 

permitting a sur-reply to any new issues raised. See Docs. 30-32. After consideration of all the 

written submissions, the Court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on February 10, 2016. 

Just prior to the hearing, Defendants submitted a supplemental brief which raised a new issue 

pertaining to standing as they had received some evidence that Plaintiffs may have moved out of 

the apartment on Defendants’ premises. The Court held a hearing on the matter on February 10, 

2016. 

 Subsequent to the hearing, on February 16, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an addendum to their 

original request for preliminary injunction providing new allegations wherein they stated 

Defendants had improperly initiated eviction proceedings against them. See Doc. 38. As 

Plaintiffs indicated it was an emergency request, the Court set a status conference for 2 days later 

and permitted Defendants to file a response prior to the status conference. See Doc. 40. The 

Defendants submitted a timely response and Plaintiffs submitted yet another motion to amend their 

preliminary injunction request. See Doc. 43. A status conference was held on February 18, 

2016. At the hearing, Defendants indicated they wanted to correct a misstatement and the Court 

permitted them to file an amended submission. See Doc. 44. 

After receiving the numerous written submissions, evidence submitted at the hearing, and 

upon consideration of the oral arguments by counsel, the motion is fully ripe for the Court’s 

consideration. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Though this case involves both questions of state and federal law, whether or not to grant 

or deny a preliminary injunction is reviewed under the auspices of federal law. See Ferrerro v. 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 3 of 10
Page 4 of 10 

Assoc. Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Mitsubishi Intern. Corp. v. 

Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507, 1525 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Ferrerro and stating 

“[u]nder Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, federal law, rather than [state] law, governs the grant of a preliminary 

injunction to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”). 

“The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits 

of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 

268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Northeastern Fl. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. 

Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fl., 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990)). The 

decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district 

court.” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The party 

seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to relief. Scott 

v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010). 

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish the following 

prerequisites: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer 

irreparable injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs possible 

harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction would not 

disserve the public interest.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 

1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 

(11th Cir. 2004); see also American Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 

1410 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating same 4 requirements). “[A] preliminary injunction is an 

extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries its 

burden of persuasion on each of these prerequisites.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, 788 F.3d at 1322 

(quoting Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001)); accord 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 4 of 10
Page 5 of 10 

Café 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993) (“A preliminary 

injunction is a drastic remedy and [the movant] bears the burden to clearly establish each of the 

four prerequisites.”); see also Texas v. Seatrain Int’l S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) 

(“[G]ranting a preliminary injunction is the exception rather than the rule.” and movant must 

clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a single 

element may defeat the request regardless of the party’s ability to establish any of the other 

elements. See, e.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to show 

irreparable injury); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) (failure to 

establish substantial likelihood of success on the merits). 

V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Standing

 The first issue the Court must address is standing. After the initial filing on the motion for 

preliminary injunction, the Belchers’ home situation has changed somewhat. Mr. and Mrs. 

Belcher have separated and now reside in separate locations. Mrs. Belcher and the children 

remain in the apartment at The Grand Reserve. Mr. Belcher now lives in a different apartment 

complex and turned in his keys to the complex. 

 “A plaintiff has standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief only when he alleges facts 

from which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” 

Bowen v. First Family Fin. Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). Further, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 

present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief...if unaccompanied by any continuing, 

present adverse effects.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1665, 

75 L.Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 676, 38 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 5 of 10
Page 6 of 10 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). Moreover, a plaintiff may have standing to bring a damages claim, but that 

does not automatically convey “standing to litigate a claim for injunctive relief arising out of the 

same set of operative facts.” Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Uncontroverted evidence establishes that Mr. Belcher moved out of the apartment 

sometime between February 1, 2016 and February 16, 2016. At the hearing on February 10, 

2016, Plaintiff Mrs. Belcher testified she and her husband separated and he moved out of the 

apartment. Further, Mr. Belcher turned in his apartment keys on February 16, 2016. See Doc. 

42, Atch 1. As Mr. Belcher no longer lives in the apartment, he lacks standing to request 

injunctive relief against the apartment complex as there is no live case and controversy. 

Therefore, Mr. Belcher’s requests for a preliminary injunction on his behalf merits denial based 

upon the standing requirement. This holding has no effect on his request for damages for past 

wrongs. 

B. Request for Injunction 

(i) Original Request for Preliminary Injunction – The Apartment Rules 

To establish their entitlement to a preliminary injunction, Mrs. Belcher and the three minor 

children must clearly show what they seek to enjoin and establish all four prerequisites for a 

preliminary injunction. At present, they have filed a lawsuit claiming past wrongs related to 

certain apartment rules and regulations. However, none of this shows the threat of future harm. 

Further, uncontroverted testimony presented at the February 10, 2016 hearing established that the 

rules at issue had been rescinded and no residents (including the Belchers) would be fined in the 

future. Plaintiffs tried to make an issue of the fact no notice went out to tenants that the rules had 

been rescinded, but this does not serve to show that there is actual threat of future harm. Further, 

when pressed on exactly what the Plaintiffs wished for the Court to enjoin, they merely requested 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 6 of 10
Page 7 of 10 

the Court issue an injunction regarding the rules. As those rules no longer exist, Plaintiffs fail to 

meet 2 elements for the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction – that they will suffer 

irreparable injury unless the injunction is issued and the threat of injury outweighs the possible 

harm to the opposing party. For that reason alone, the Court must deny the request for a 

preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiffs argue that under the holding in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000), the issue is not moot. 

However, this case does not stand for the proposition that Plaintiffs argued in the hearing. 

Plaintiffs are correct in that this case states a defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful 

conduct does not necessarily moot a claim. However, the facts of Friends of the Earth are readily 

distinguishable from the situation at hand. The question here is not mootness, but rather the need 

for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs simply have not carried their burden on the request for a 

preliminary injunction because they cannot show an immediate threat of harm without an 

injunction since the rules have been rescinded and are not enforced. Plaintiffs’ arguments at the 

original hearing seem to conflate their arguments on the ultimate determination on an injunction, 

declaratory relief, and damages. That is not this issue at present. Nothing about the denial of a 

preliminary injunction here reflects upon the ultimate merits of the case – rather it simply denies 

the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. In fact, the Court need not even look to 

element 1 (a substantial likelihood of success on the merits) because Plaintiffs’ request for a 

preliminary injunction fails on different elements. The Court makes no determinations as to the 

ultimate merits of Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. 

(ii) Additional Request for an Injunction Preventing Eviction 

Six days after the initial February 10, 2016 hearing, Plaintiffs filed an emergency request 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 7 of 10
Page 8 of 10 

for an injunction preventing eviction proceedings. See Doc. 38. They attached as evidence a 

document entitled “Past Due Notice and Demand for Possession.” See Doc. 38, Atch 2. The 

notice is dated February 8, 2016 and states the Belchers had not yet paid their February rent and 

would be assessed a late charge of $100 and $5 days for every day beyond February 8, 2016 that 

they had not yet paid their rent. The total past due as of February 8, 2016 was $1175 (rent plus 

late fees). The notice then stated “pursuant to Alabama law and our company policy we request 

and demand that you either pay the delinquent amount in full or vacate the premises by 12:00 noon 

on 2/15/2016.” Id. Plaintiffs filed this as evidence in support of their request for an injunction 

against eviction proceedings. They also attached several excerpts from the Fair Housing Act and 

the Alabama Code on unlawful discriminatory housing practices. This motion was filed on 

February 16, 2016 wherein Plaintiffs assert Defendants are threatening and harassing them in 

violation of the Fair Housing Act and Alabama Fair Housing Law. Specifically, they argue 

Plaintiffs have been “placed in fear of eviction proceedings and adverse consequences to their 

credit and employment.” Id. at p. 1. They also request the Court waive the bond requirement of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Id. at p. 2. 

What is notably absent from Plaintiffs motion and request is that the Belchers were 

delinquent in their rent and as of the filing of their motion, they still had not paid the February rent 

(making it already sixteen days late). Rather, it wasn’t until after Defendants’ response that the 

Belchers finally paid the rent on February 17, 2016 around 3:44 p.m. showing at payment in the 

amount of $1,220.00 was initiated and would be processed in 3 business days. See Doc. 43, Atch 

1-2. Even at the February 10, 2016 hearing, Plaintiff Mrs. Belcher testified she had not yet paid 

the rent for February 1 (which meant it was already 10 days overdue). Evidence also showed the 

Belchers were frequently late on their rental payments and had a number of late fines assessed on 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 8 of 10
Page 9 of 10 

their account. Furthermore, it is clear that the letter to the Plaintiff was merely a notice of 

delinquency with an instruction to pay the amount due or vacate the premises. It was not, as 

Plaintiff’s suggested, an actual eviction notice. In short, until the rent payment was paid on 

February 17, 2016, Plaintiffs were in violation of their lease. Further, there was no evidence 

presented to the Court that this notice was discriminatory in nature – on its face or as applied. 

The Court has found no law nor when asked could the Plaintiffs provide any legal authority 

which would allow for Plaintiffs to remain in their apartment delinquent in their rent, in violation 

of the lease, and/or remaining in the apartment rent free. Rather, a fundamental and basic 

principle behind a lease agreement is that rent is due on a certain day of the month and if not paid 

by the lessee, a lessor has the right to demand payment and/or initiate eviction proceedings. 

This particular issue is now moot, as Plaintiffs paid the overdue rent which satisfied the 

notice to pay. However, even if Plaintiffs had not paid, they would have failed to establish the 

requirements for a preliminary injunction because they could not satisfy elements 3 and 4 – i.e. that 

the threatened injury outweighs possible harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; 

and that the injunction would not disserve the public interest. The harm to the opposing party – 

The Grand Reserve – would have been forcing them to permit a tenant to live in the apartment rent 

free in violation of the lease. This would be a disservice to the public interest of enforcing valid 

lease contracts. 

V. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) and subsequent injunctive requests (Docs. 38, 43) be DENIED. 

 It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before March 9, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically identify 

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 9 of 10
Page 10 of 10 

the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, 

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are 

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not 

appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the 

report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest 

injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 

667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, 

en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

DONE this 24th day of February, 2016. 

 

 /s/ Terry F. Moorer 

 TERRY F. MOORER 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:15-cv-00834-KS-WC Document 46 Filed 02/24/16 Page 10 of 10