Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-70333/USCOURTS-ca9-15-70333-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Connors
Petitioner
Michael P. Huerta
Respondent
National Transportation Safety Board
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL CONNORS,

Petitioner,

v.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 

SAFETY BOARD; MICHAEL P.

HUERTA, Administrator, Federal 

Aviation Administration,

Respondents.

No. 15-70333

NTSB No. SE-19621

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

National Transportation Safety Board

Submitted November 9, 2016*

Pasadena, California

Filed January 4, 2017

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, 

Circuit Judges, and Jack Zouhary,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Nguyen

 * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

 

 

 

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2 CONNORS V. NTSB

SUMMARY***

National Transportation Safety Board

The panel denied a petition for review of a decision of 

the National Transportation Safety Board affirming an order 

of the Federal Aviation Administration revoking petitioner’s 

aircraft registration certificate.

Petitioner admitted to the FAA that he used his aircraft 

to transport marijuana. The FAA revoked his registration 

certificate because “the aircraft was used to carry out, or 

facilitate, an activity that is punishable” as a drug-related 

felony. 49 U.S.C. § 44106(b)(1)(A). Separate state court 

criminal proceedings against petitioner were then dismissed 

after the trial court suppressed the drug evidence found on 

his plane. Petitioner argued that § 44106 did not apply to 

him because, in light of the suppression order, his act was no 

longer “punishable.”

The panel held that under the statute’s plain language, 

the proper inquiry was whether the “activity” is 

“punishable,” not whether the certificate holder is at risk of 

being punished. Because the activity—transporting 

marijuana—was punishable as a felony, petitioner’s 

certificate was properly revoked even though he may no 

longer have been subject to punishment under state law.

 *** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CONNORS V. NTSB 3

COUNSEL

Robert J. Hajek, Esq., Del Mar, California, for Petitioner.

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General; Mark B. Stern and Katherine Twomey Allen, 

Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. for Respondent Michael P. Huerta.

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

Paul Connors petitions for review of a National 

Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) decision affirming 

an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 

revoking his aircraft registration certificate. Connors 

admitted to the FAA that he used his aircraft to transport 

marijuana. The FAA revoked his registration certificate 

because “the aircraft was used to carry out, or facilitate, an 

activity that is punishable” as a drug-related felony. 

49 U.S.C. § 44106(b)(1)(A). Separate, state court criminal 

proceedings against Connors were dismissed after the trial 

court suppressed the drug evidence found on his plane.

Connors argues that § 44106 does not apply to him 

because, in light of the suppression order, his act is no longer 

“punishable.” Under the statute’s plain language, however, 

the proper inquiry is whether the “activity” is “punishable,” 

not whether the certificate holder is at risk of being punished. 

Because the activity—transporting marijuana—was 

punishable as a felony, Connors’s certificate was properly 

revoked even though he may no longer be subject to 

punishment under state law.

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4 CONNORS V. NTSB

I.

Connors flew his Lancair aircraft to a municipal airport 

in Portales, New Mexico. When he landed, law enforcement 

personnel searched the aircraft and found 15 pounds of 

marijuana. He was charged in state court with possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-

22(A)(1). The district attorney dismissed the charges with 

prejudice after the trial court found the search warrant 

invalid and suppressed the evidence.

After the evidence was suppressed but before the 

criminal charges were dismissed, the FAA revoked 

Connors’s aircraft registration certificate for his knowing 

use of the aircraft to transport marijuana in violation of 

49 U.S.C. § 44106(b)(1). In response, Connors admitted

that he “knowingly transported” the marijuana but appealed 

the FAA’s revocation order on the basis of the state court’s 

suppression order.

It was while the administrative proceedings were 

pending before an NTSB administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

that Connors’s criminal case was dismissed. The ALJ 

affirmed the FAA’s revocation order, and, after Connors 

appealed, the NTSB affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

II.

Section 44106 authorizes the FAA to revoke an aircraft 

registration certificate for a controlled substance violation. 

Appeals from a revocation order are heard by the NTSB. 

49 U.S.C. §§ 1133(2), 44106(d). We have jurisdiction to 

review the NTSB’s decision pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 

§ 1153(a).

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CONNORS V. NTSB 5

Review of an NTSB decision is governed by the 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

Andrzejewski v. FAA, 563 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2009). We 

may set aside the decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). We review legal 

questions de novo. Janka v. Dep’t of Transp., 925 F.2d 

1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). We apply Chevron deference, 

however, to the agency’s interpretation of the statute it 

administers. See Donnelly v. FAA, 411 F.3d 267, 271 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)) (determining 

whether FAA reasonably interpreted “use” in 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44710(b)(2) to revoke airman’s certificate).

Under Chevron, “we are prohibited from substituting our 

‘own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 

interpretation made by the administrator of an agency’” 

when Congress has not directly addressed the provision’s 

meaning. Redmond-Issaquah R.R. Pres. Ass’n v. Surface 

Transp. Bd., 223 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844). If, on the other hand, 

“the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 

for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” The 

Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 

1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Chevron, 

467 U.S. at 842–43).

III. 

In general, an aircraft may not be operated in the United 

States unless it is registered. 49 U.S.C. § 44101(a). Upon a 

successful application, the FAA issues a certificate of 

registration to the aircraft’s owner. Id. § 44103(a). The 

FAA may revoke a registration certificate, however, if the 

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6 CONNORS V. NTSB

aircraft is knowingly used for felonious drug-related 

activity:

[T]he [FAA] shall issue an order revoking the 

certificate of registration for an aircraft . . . if 

[it] finds that—(A) the aircraft was used to 

carry out, or facilitate, an activity that is 

punishable by . . . imprisonment for more 

than one year under a law . . . related to a 

controlled substance . . . ; and (B) the owner 

of the aircraft permitted the use of the aircraft 

knowing that the aircraft was to be used for 

the activity . . . .

49 U.S.C. § 44106(b)(1) (emphasis added).

Connors argues that “punishable” means that “there must 

at least be the possibility of conviction and imprisonment” 

under the law, and the suppression of the evidence from his 

plane foreclosed any chance of his conviction.1 (Emphasis 

added). The NTSB concluded that under the plain language 

of the statute, “punishable” refers to the “proscribed 

activity”—not, as Connors would have it, a “person” or his 

specific “act.” Applying that concept to Connors, the agency 

noted that transporting marijuana, which Connors admitted 

he “knowingly” did, was an “activity [that] carried with it 

 1 Connors also argued to the NTSB that his act was not punishable 

because the criminal charge was dismissed with prejudice. The NTSB 

rejected that argument, and he does not appeal the decision on that 

ground.

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CONNORS V. NTSB 7

the possibility of more than one year imprisonment” under 

New Mexico law.2

We agree that § 44106(b)(1) plainly connects 

“punishable” to the “activity,” such that an aircraft 

certificate may be revoked regardless of whether the 

certificate holder could be convicted for “carry[ing] out” or 

“facilitat[ing]” the activity. Notably, the statute applies 

where a third party conducts the punishable activity, as long 

as the owner knows that the aircraft was used for the activity. 

See 49 U.S.C. § 44106(b)(1)(B). This third-party scenario, 

express in the statute, confirms that the statute applies 

whether or not the aircraft owner is at risk of criminal 

punishment. Nothing in the statutory language ties the 

revocation of an aircraft’s registration certificate to the 

possibility of a successful criminal prosecution of the owner.

Moreover, the statute provides an exception for 

acquittals that would be unnecessary if Connors’s 

interpretation were correct. The FAA may not revoke the 

registration of a certificate holder who “is acquitted of all 

charges related to a controlled substance in an indictment or 

information arising from the [felonious drug-related] 

activity.” 49 U.S.C. § 44106(e)(1). If “punishable” required 

“the possibility of conviction and imprisonment,” an 

acquittal would categorically exclude such possibility, see

U.S. Const. amend. V; Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 

1074 (2013) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial 

following a court-decreed acquittal . . . .”), and 

§ 44106(e)(1) would serve no purpose. We avoid 

 2 When the FAA revoked Connors’s certificate, distribution or 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana was punishable under New 

Mexico law by imprisonment for 18 months or more. See N.M. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 30-31-22(A)(1), 31-18-15(A).

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8 CONNORS V. NTSB

constructions that render a statutory provision superfluous. 

Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).

Even if the statute’s meaning were not clear on its face, 

the NTSB reasoned, and we agree, that the legislative history 

leaves no doubt that Congress intended to give the FAA 

authority to revoke a registration certificate even in 

situations where a criminal conviction is not possible. 

Congress enacted this provision as part of the Aviation 

Drug-Trafficking Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-499, § 4(a), 

98 Stat. 2312 (1984). The conference report explains that 

the FAA can “proceed against individuals who have engaged 

in activities which are prohibited by state or federal drug 

laws, but who have not been convicted of a drug law 

offense,” such as when “an airman is not convicted because 

of technicalities which apply to criminal proceedings but not 

to administrative proceedings involving loss of a license.”3 

H.R. Rep. No. 98-1085, at 9 (1984), reprinted in 1984 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3992. The report continues:

 3 This statement addressed a similar provision with the same 

language authorizing the FAA to revoke an airman certificate—a type of 

license—for felonious drug-related activity. See 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44710(b)(2) (“The [FAA] shall issue an order revoking an airman 

certificate . . . if [it] finds that—(A) the individual knowingly carried out 

an activity punishable, under a [felony] law . . . related to a controlled 

substance . . . ; (B) an aircraft was used to carry out or facilitate the 

activity; and (C) the individual served as an airman, or was on the 

aircraft, in connection with carrying out, or facilitating the carrying out 

of, the activity.”). The conference report notes that “[t]he procedures to 

be followed” in both provisions “are similar.” H.R. Rep. No. 98-1085, 

at 12. An “airman” is a “pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew” who 

“command[s]” or “navigates aircraft when under way” or a person “who 

is directly in charge of inspecting, maintaining, overhauling, or repairing 

aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances” or “who serves as an 

aircraft dispatcher or air traffic control-tower operator.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 40102(a)(8).

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CONNORS V. NTSB 9

It should be clearly understood that the 

reference to existing criminal law applies 

only to the elements of the violation. We do 

not intend to require [the] FAA or NTSB to 

follow criminal law procedures or standards 

of proof. These matters will be determined 

by general principles of administrative law 

applicable to license [and registration] 

revocation cases.

Id.

IV.

Whether the suppression of the evidence against 

Connors precluded his conviction is irrelevant. He 

knowingly allowed his plane to be used to transport 

marijuana, an “activity” that was punishable by 

imprisonment for more than one year. The FAA properly 

revoked his registration certificate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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