Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02044/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maurice McCurdy
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MAURICE McCURDY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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NOV 2 1.1994 

No. 94-2044 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-93-530-JC) 

Louis M. Fischer (John J. Kelly United States Attorney, and Presiliano A. Torrez, Assistant United States Attorney, District of 

New Mexico with him on the briefs), Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant. 

Judith A. Rosentstein, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for defendant-appellee. 

Before MOORE and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS*, District 

Court Judge. 

*The Honorable Richard 

States District Court for 

designation. 

D. Rogers, Senior District Judge, United 

the District of Kansas, sitting by 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-2044 Document: 01019301023 Date Filed: 11/21/1994 Page: 1 
The United States (government) appeals from the orders of the 

district court granting Maurice McCurdy's (McCurdy) motion to 

suppress certain statements and physical evidence and denying its 

motion for reconsideration. 

Facts 

On October 1, 1993, officers of the United States Forest 

Service received information from a hunter that he had found a 

marijuana plantation in a remote area of the Santa Fe National 

Forest. Several days later, Forest Service Officer John Dickerson 

(Dickerson) and Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Morris (Morris) located the 

site. Both officers drew their weapons while surveying the site. 

They observed a backpack on the ground near some gardening and 

pruning tools and a note written on cardboard. The note read, "I 

see both of you. I know who you are. I was here when you . came 

in. I have worked very hard at this work, please do not rob me or 

bust me. Thank you." (R., Vol. II at 26-7). 

The officers then observed an individual, later determined to 

be McCurdy, dressed in camouflage pants, boots, and no shirt, 

walking up to the site. Morris ordered McCurdy not to move, to 

raise his hands, and to turn around in a circle. Morris then 

patted McCurdy down for weapons. After determining that McCurdy 

was not armed, Morris and Dickerson holstered their weapons and 

asked McCurdy for identification. McCurdy responded that his 

identification was in his truck. 

Dickerson radioed his office and notified Senior Special 

Forest Service Agent Benjamin Tafoya (Tafoya), a criminal 

investigator, that they had a person at the site and that they 

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needed some assistance in questioning him. McCurdy waited with 

~ 

Dickerson and Morris for approximately three hours until Tafoya 

arrived. While they were waiting, McCurdy told the officers that 

he had been hiking in the area, that he had no knowledge of the 

site and that he had no interest in the backpack. During this 

time, neither Morris nor Dickerson advised McCurdy of his Miranda1 

rights nor did they tell him that he was free to leave or that he 

was not free to leave. 

When Tafoya arrived he questioned McCurdy, without first 

advising him of his Miranda rights, relative to the site and the 

backpack. McCurdy, in response to Tafoya's specific questioning, 

again denied any knowledge of the site and any ownership in the 

backpack. Tafoya then opened the backpack and observed a headset 

and several camouflage shirts. According to McCurdy, who stands 

5' 5" and weighs 115 pounds, Tafoya was aggressive and threatening. McCurdy testified that Tafoya twice shoved him to the 

ground, and that Tafoya terrified him when Tafoya threatened to 

"come down real hard" on him if he did not admit his association 

with the plantation. Tafoya denied pushing McCurdy down. 

McCurdy subsequently led Tafoya and Morris through the dense 

forest to his truck. During portions of the walk to the truck, 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holds that the 

prosecution may not use statements stemming from the custodial 

interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 

procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 

self-incrimination. Under Miranda, before any custodial 

interrogation, a defendant must be warned that he has the right to 

remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 

evidence against him, that he has the right to the presence of an 

attorney, either retained or appointed, and that if he cannot 

afford an attorney, one will be provided for him. 

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Tafoya held onto one of McCurdy's belt loops. Once at the truck, 

Tafoya retrieved McCurdy's wallet and shirt from underneath the 

seat. Tafoya also retrieved a box which contained a photo of a 

headset resembling the headset found in the backpack. After 

seeing the photo, Tafoya turned toward McCurdy and McCurdy said 

something like "bingo." McCurdy then stated, "Okay, I'm the one 

that is responsible for everything. No one else is up there. I 

don't [sic] think you'd believe me." {R., Vol. II at 65). 

Immediately thereafter, McCurdy was handcuffed and advised of his 

Miranda rights. McCurdy and Tafoya then walked back to the site, 

during which time McCurdy gave Tafoya a full statement about the 

site. 

The parties agree that McCurdy was in custody f9r purposes of 

Miranda from the time Dickerson and Morris initially detained him. 

Motion to Suggress 

Prior to trial, McCurdy moved to suppress all of the statements made to the officers as well as any physical evidence removed from his truck on the grounds that "the statements were 

obtained in violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights and 

that the evidence was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment 

rights . " { R . , Vol . I , Tab 19 at 1 ) . 

Within his motion, McCurdy alleged, inter alia, that: after 

his initial encounter with Morris and Dickerson, he was ordered to 

remain in the area until Tafoya arrived; he was guarded by Morris 

who related that he could not leave; Tafoya twice shoved him to 

his knees; he did not believe he was free to leave; he believed 

that he had to cooperate with the officers; he led Tafoya and 

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Morris to his pickup where Tafoya grabbed his keys and proceeded 

to unlock the truck and search inside; at some point during the 

search, Tafoya requested permission to search, but he responded 

that since Tafoya was already searching he had no choice but to 

allow him to continue searching; he was not informed that he had 

the right to refuse permission to search; and he made certain incriminating statements after Tafoya located a box containing a 

. photo of a headset similar to the one found at the marijuana site. 

McCurdy's motion to suppress argued that: he was clearly in 

custody and was prevented from leaving the site after he was 

initially questioned; any statements he made while in custody and 

prior to being advised of his Miranda rights were inadmissible; 

the warrantless, non-consensual search of his vehicle violated his 

Fourth Amendment rights; the statements made after his formal 

arrest and Miranda warnings were inadmissible as fruits of the 

poisonous tree; the statements made after his formal arrest and 

Miranda warnings were not voluntary and should be suppressed; the 

officers did not have probable cause to arrest him and search his 

vehicle prior to his incriminating statement; and, his consent to 

the search of his truck was not voluntary. 

District Court's Ruling 

Following a hearing, the district court granted McCurdy's 

motion to suppress. In so doing, the court found: 

The Court: We've got the officers who were tipped 

off to the marijuana. So they go out there and finally 

find it, a very remote area, totally remote. Not a 

place where hikers go. No question about that. 

All right. Then they see ... they find the grow 

and they see this sign . . 

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Well, to my way of thinking, when the defendant 

then arrives on the scene, the officers have that, and 

they in essence, have a confession from him that its his 

grow. They're way out in no place. They probably had 

probable cause to arrest at that time. 

I don't have to reach that point. He gets there. 

They say, "Hold up your hands." They have their guns 

out, pat him down, all of which is all right. They .. 

. ask him if he had any associates. There's no doubt in 

their mind . they thought they had the person with 

the grow. 

I don't see how you can now say that this. is not 

custodial in the sense of Miranda, because they have 

him, they make him sit for three hours. I'm going to 

find that everything he said after Agent Tafoya got 

there is certainly to be suppressed. I've got nothing 

in front· of me that says they would have ever found the 

truck. Had they found the truck, then they could have 

inventoried the truck and they would have found all of 

this. But I don't have anything in front of me that 

says they would have found the truck . 

. I can't say that they would have ever found 

the truck and had an opportunity to search that. The 

only question I really have in my mind is when the of~ 

ficers said, "Either we're going to detain you or would 

you stay around to talk to the other fellow," is that he 

then said, "Well, I could see why you would want to do 

it, to detain me." Obviously, that's incriminating. 

Seems like to me that he was in actual custody for 

Miranda purposes prior to that time. 

I'm going to suppress that also. 

* * * 

I'm going to suppress what was found in the truck, 

only on the basis that there's nothing before me that 

would say they would have ever found the truck. 

So from the time he starts talking, I'm going to 

suppress it. 

(R., Vol. II at 121-23). 

Thereafter, Assistant United States Attorney Torrez asked the 

court to make a finding as to whether or not McCurdy consented to 

the search of his vehicle: 

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Mr. Torrez: 

whether or not 

hicle .. 

I'm asking the court to make a finding 

he consented to the search of his veIf the court finds that he consented you 

don't get the items in the vehicle suppressed because 

that's a ... Fourth Amendment issue as opposed to a 

Fifth Amendment issue, and I think that the court has to 

make a separate finding as to whether the Fourth 

Amendment has been violated here .... 

The Court: The interplay between the Fourth and 

Fifth, when he's not Mirandized, he's not totally and 

doesn't have to make a statement, how can I ~hen say 

that you don't have to make any statement, but we want 

you to lead us down to the car. It's still, to me, 

fruit of the poisoned tree .... 

Mr. Torrez: 

consent . 

But it's a different inquiry for 

The Court: I know that. And I believe it spills 

over into that inquiry. I'm going to suppress it all. 

. . . he should have been Mirandized at that time, 

made aware of all of his rights. 

* * * 

Mr. Torrez: . And I'd ask the court make that 

finding [that McCurdy consented to the search of his 

truck] . . despite the violation of Miranda, that it 

was, in fact, a voluntary statement. 

The Court: I think no doubt that once he got down 

there to the truck that what he said was pretty freely 

and voluntarily given. But I can't say that since he 

wasn't Mirandized at the right time ... for all I 

know, he wouldn't have said anything. I'm not going to 

make that finding for you. This case was not handled 

correctly. You're asking me to set it up for you, and 

I'm not going to make that finding for you. 

(R., Vol. II at 125-26). 

The government subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. During the motion hearing, the following colloquy occurred 

between Torrez and the court: 

Mr. Torrez: ... there's a dispute on the consent 

issue . . . . 

* * * 

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I'd like the court to make a finding that the police officers received his permission, that he said, 

despite the Miranda violation, that they received his 

permission to get in that vehicle. 

The Court: .. that has no merit either way, 

because the failure to Mirandize him was of such a gross 

nature that anything else he did is out. It's all fruit 

of the poisoned tree .... 

* * * 

Mr. Torrez: ... as the court has said, there is 

an arrest, but that it was a lawful arrest based 

because the court finds there was sufficient factors and 

there was probable cause, I'm asking the court to also 

find if it was a Miranda violation as opposed to a due 

process violation. A due process violation would be 

something where the police conduct, they put a gun to 

his head. 

The Court: No. 

Mr. Torrez: 

violation. 

So then all we have is a Miranda 

The Court: Failure to Mirandize him; correct. 

* * * 

Mr. Torrez: Okay. So then the court is, based on 

the Miranda violation, suppressing the intervening 

statements, the statements of Tafoya and the physical 

evidence. 

The Court: That's right. 

Mr. Torrez: Okay. 

* * * 

Mr. Torrez: And ... just so the findings will be 

clear, the Court is refusing ... does not believe that 

we've reached the issue of the consent on the truck. 

The Court: That's correct. 

Mr. Torrez: If we were to reach the issue on the 

consent to the truck, based on the totality of the 

circumstances and search of the truck, would the court 

find that it was a voluntary consent? 

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The Court: No, I won't ... there is no way I can 

put myself in ~s mind to know what he would have done 

had he been told all of this two and a half, three and a 

half hours before .. 

(R., Vol. II at 139-42). 

Issues 

On appeal, the government does not argue. for the admissibility of the statements McCurdy made prior to the time he received his Miranda warnings. Rather, the government.contends that 

the court erred in granting McCurdy's motion to suppress the 

statements he made after receiving the Miranda warnings and the 

physical evidence the officers found in his pickup truck. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept 

the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Girolamo, 23 F.3d 320, 326 (lOth Cir. 

1994) . However, we review de novo the "ultimate determination of 

Fourth Amendment reasonableness." United States v. Little, 18 

F.3d 1499, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Allen, 

986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (lOth Cir. 1993)). 

The fifth amendment "does not independently proscribe the 

compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but 

applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial 

communication that is incriminating." Fisher v. United States, 

425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (emphasis in original). For example, the 

"[d]isclosure of name and address is essentially a neutral act," 

and "it would be the 'extravagant' extension of the privilege 

Justice Holmes warned against to hold that it is testimonial ip 

the Fifth Amendment sense." California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 

431-32 (1971). Moreover, one's identification would inevitably be 

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discovered via fingerprints, dental records or 

testimonial evidence. 

a. 

other nonThe government acknowledges that McCurdy was in custody for 

Fifth Amendment purposes when Dickerson and Morris initially detained him and that the officers' failure to Mirandize him at that 

time mandated the suppression of the statements he made prior to 

being Mirandized. It seems clear that the investigation was no 

longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime after McCurdy was 

taken into custody; the focus was on him. See Escabedo v. 

Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The government argues, 

however, that the officers' failure to Mirandize McCurdy at the 

time he was initially detained did not require the s~ppression of 

McCurdy's statements made after he was formally arrested and 

Mirandized. 

McCurdy responds that his statements "acknowledging ownership of the truck, indicating where the truck was, permitting 

Tafoya to search his truck and confessing responsibility for the 

marijuana plantation, were all obtained in violation of Miranda," 

(Appellee's Answer Brief at 20), and that the court properly 

suppressed both his pre- and post-Miranda statements. 

Our analysis begins with Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 

(1985). In that case, defendant Elstad was picked up at his home 

as a suspect in a burglary. He made an incriminating statement 

prior to the time the officers apprised him of his rights under 

Miranda. After Elstad was taken to the station house and after he 

was advised of and had waived his Miranda rights, he executed a 

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written confession. Following Elstad's conviction, the Oregon 

Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the written confession 

should have been excluded. 

The Supreme Court reversed, holding: 

Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of an accused's 

in custody statements was·judged solely on whether they 

were "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process 

Clause. . . . The court in Miranda required suppression 

of many statements that would have been admissible under 

traditional due process analysis by presum~ng that 

statements made while in custody and without adequate 

warnings were protected by the Fifth Amendment .... 

* * * 

Respondent's contention that his confession was 

tainted by the earlier failure of the police to provide 

Miranda warnings and must be excluded as "fruit of the 

poisonous ·tree" assumes the existence of a constitutional violation. . . . 

* * * 

In Michigan v. Tucker [417 U.S. 433 (1974)], the 

court was asked to extend the Wong Sun fruits doctrine 

to suppress the testimony of a witness for the prosecution whose identity was discovered as the result of a 

statement taken from the accused without the benefit of 

full Miranda warnings. . . . The court concluded that 

the unwarned questioning "did not abridge respondent's 

constitutional privilege . . but departed only from 

the prophylactic standards later laid down by this court 

in Miranda to safeguard that privilege." ... 

We believe that this reasoning applies with equal 

force when the alleged "fruit" of a noncoercive Miranda 

violation is neither a witness nor an article of evidence but the accused's own testimony. Once 

warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition 

in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the 

authorities .... 

* * * 

It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold 

that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to 

exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory 

process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver 

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is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though 

Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be 

suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on 

whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. 

* * * 

We hold today that a suspect who has once responded 

to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is no·t thereby 

disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he 

has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. 

470 U.S. at 305-09 and 318. 

Elstad "makes clear that a failure to administer Miranda 

warnings, without more, does not automatically require suppression 

of the 'fruits' of the uncounseled statement." United States v. 

Sangineto-Mirada, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517 {6th Cir. 1988). "Where the 

uncounseled statement is voluntary, and thus not a product of 

'inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due 

process' . there is no fifth amendment violation and the 

'fruits' may be admissible in the Government's case in chief." 

Id. Similarly, under Elstad, "[i]f the unwarned statement was 

voluntary, and the allegedly tainted second statement was also 

voluntary, the second, warned statement is admissible" since 

"[t]he Fifth Amendment ... prohibits only the use of compelled 

testimony." United States v. Wiley, 997 F.2d 378, 383 (8th Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, u.s. (1993). 

We followed Elstad in United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 

1414 (lOth Cir. 1986), holding that "[t]he record reflects that 

after Hall was fully advised of his rights, he chose to give a 

recorded statement to Detective Marquez, and under the ruling in 

Oregon v. Elstad there was no error in admitting that 

statement." The government, citing Hall, argues that "[s] ince 

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McCurdy's pre-Miranda statement was voluntary, and he voluntarily 

waived his rights before making his post-Miranda statement, under 

Elstad his post-Miranda statements are admissible." (Opening Brief 

for Appellant at 11) . 

McCurdy responds that the court properly found that suppression of his post-Miranda statements was warranted because "the 

officers' violation of Miranda was so gross" and "were the product 

of ... behavior that demonstrates so much contempt for Miranda." 

(Appellee's Answer Brief at 25-6). McCurdy argues that United 

States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989), "is virtually on 

all fours with this case" and compels the suppression of his 

statements. 

In Carter, the officers did not Mirandize defendant Carter 

until after they had induced him to turn over incriminating evidence and to make incriminating statements. Moreover, there was 

no break in time between Carter's unwarned confession, his receipt 

of Miranda warnings, and his second confession. In suppressing 

Carter's second confession, the court, following a review of 

Elstad, held "[a]ssuming arguendo that the first, unwarned 

confession was voluntary, we find that the circumstances of this 

case do not warrant admission of the second, warned, confession . 

[since] the second confession came almost directly .on the 

heels of the first." Id. at 373. The court reasoned that there 

was no passage of time between the unwarned confession, the 

subsequent Miranda warning, and the second confession -. they were 

"part and parcel of a continuous process." Id. The court concluded that "[e]ven assuming ... that Elstad permits the second 

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confession's admission, we hold alternatively . [a] s we 

affirm the district court's conclusion that Carter's consent 

to the search was not obtained voluntarily that his confession must be suppressed as the fruit of the fourth amendment 

violation." Id. In our view, Carter is distinguishable from the 

case at bar. 

Unlike Carter, the district court in our case found that the 

. officers did not coerce McCurdy into making any incriminating 

statements prior to his receipt of the Miranda warnings. Also, 

there was a delay of several hours between the time that the 

officers detained McCurdy in their custody and the time that he 

was formally arrested, Mirandized, and gave his statement. The 

district court granted McCurdy's motion to suppress based solely 

on its finding that the officers had violated Miranda. The 

district court did not rule on whether McCurdy's post-Miranda 

statements were voluntary, notwithstanding the court's specific 

finding that the actions of the officers did not give rise to a 

due process violation. 

It can almost always be said that interrogation results in a 

confession or an incriminating statement. However, admissibility 

of a confession (or an incriminating statement) requires an independent examination of the entire record and a consideration of 

the totality of the circumstances. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 

u.s. 279 {1991); Unites States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445 {lOth Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, u.s. {1992). 

We hold that the district court, having determined that the 

officers did not violate McCurdy's due process rights, erred, as a 

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matter of law, in concluding that the actions of the officers 

4a-- • 

constituted a "gross" violation of Miranda. 

We reverse the order of the district court suppressing 

McCUrdy's post-Miranda statements and remand for further proceedings, mindful that under Elstad, the court must determine both 

whether the officers complied with Miranda which protects "defendants against governmental coercion leading them to surrender 

rights protected by the Fifth Amendment," Colorado v. Connelly, 

479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986), and whether the defendant's post-Miranda 

statements were voluntary within the meaning of the due process 

clause. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 {"[t]hough Miranda requires that 

the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of 

any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely 

on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made" {emphasis 

added)) . In conjunction therewith, "title 18, § 3501{a) 

unmistakenly mandates that '[b]efore [a] confession is received in 

evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the iuk¥, 

determine any issue as to voluntariness.'" United States v. Care, 

965 F.2d 1548, 1552 {lOth Cir. 1992) {emphasis added). 

b. 

The government contends that the district court erred in 

suppressing the physical evidence found in McCurdy's truck,. citing 

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 {1974). In Tucker, the Court declined to suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was 

discovered as the result of an alibi statement given by the defendant at a time when the defendant had not been give his full 

Miranda warnings. The government argues that this rationale 

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should be applied here, and that since McCurdy's consent to 

search his truck and the unwarned statements were both voluntary, 

the photo of the headset found in the truck was also admissible 

under Elstad. 

McCurdy responds that the district court correctly suppressed 

the physical evidence found in his truck since "[t]hat evidence 

was discovered as a direct result of McCurdy's statements re-

. garding the ownership and location of the truck and of his cons·ent 

to search, statements obtained in blatant violation of Miranda." 

(Appellee's Answer Brief at 29). McCurdy states that the 

government's reliance on Michigan v. Tucker "does not help its 

argument" since the police in that case acted in good faith with 

the existing law and "[h]ere, the officers deliber~tely violated 

Miranda in order to obtain additional evidence." Id. at 32. 

McCurdy argues that "[e]ven if the Miranda violation alone 

does not warrant suppression of every statement by [him] and of 

the evidence found in [his] truck," the district court was free to 

suppress the evidence on other grounds "[s]ince the record would 

support a finding of involuntariness with respect to both the 

statements and the consent." (Appellee's Answer Brief at 33). 

McCurdy acknowledges that "the District Court explicitly refused" 

to determine whether his statements or consent to search were 

voluntary. Id. 

An officer's request to search a defendant's automobile does 

not constitute interrogation invoking a defendant's Miranda 

rights. United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 

(lOth Cir. 1993); United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 379-80 (lOth 

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Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 

(11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th 

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, U.S. (1994); Cody v. Solem, 755 

F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 883 

(1985). Thus, officers may, following a voluntary consent to 

search, search a vehicle or portion thereof without first 

apprising the owner of the vehicle of his rights under Miranda. 

A consent to search, however, is valid only if voluntary. We 

determine the voluntariness of a consent to search under the 

"totality of the circumstances, with the government bearing the 

burden of proof." United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 758 

(lOth Cir. 1993). The "government must show that there was no 

duress or coercion, express or implied, that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was freely and intelligently 

given." Id. (quoting United State v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 

(lOth Cir. 1993)). If a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth 

Amendment violation, the government must prove both the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances 

and that there was a break in the casual connection between the 

illegality and the evidence obtained. United States v. MelendezGarcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (lOth Cir. 1994). See also United 

States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1993) (incriminating statements and consents to search made following an illegal 

arrest must be considered inadmissible as tainted unless the 

government can establish that the statements were purged of the 

taint of the unlawful invasion) . 

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Here, however, McCurdy was lawfully in police custody. There 

was no Fourth Amendment violation. Accordingly, the government 

was entitled to introduce into evidence the physical evidence 

found in McCurdy's vehicle if the government established that 

McCurdy voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle and if 

the search did not exceed the scope of his consent. See United 

States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1270 (lOth Cir. 1991), followed in 

. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557 (lOth Cir. 1993) and 

United States v. Nicholson, 983.F.2d 983, 988 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

The district court, despite the government's requests, refused to 

rule on the voluntariness of McCurdy's consent to search. 

We hold that the district court erred in suppressing the 

physical evidence found in McCurdy's truck without first ruling on 

the voluntariness of McCurdy's consent to search his truck .. Thus, 

we reverse the order of the district court suppressing the 

physical evidence found in McCurdy's truck. Upon remand, the 

district court must make specific findings as to whether McCurdy 

voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle for identification and whether McCurdy thereafter consented to the continued 

search of his vehicle after Tafoya discovered his shirt and 

identification. 

The district court must make these determinations based on 

the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. McKneely, 

6 F.3d 1447, 1452 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. 

Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (lOth Cir. 1990)). In determining 

whether a consent to search is voluntary, a court should consider, 

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Appellate Case: 94-2044 Document: 01019301023 Date Filed: 11/21/1994 Page: 18 
inter alia, physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, 

threats of violence, promises or inducements, deception or 

trickery, and the physical and mental condition and capacity of 

the defendant within the totality of the circumstances. An 

officer's request for consent to search does not taint an 

otherwise consensual encounter "as long as the police do not 

convey a message that compliance with their request is required." 

United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1517 (lOth Cir. 1993). See 

also United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(holding consent was voluntary absent any police threats or coercion) . 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

herewith. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2044 Document: 01019301023 Date Filed: 11/21/1994 Page: 19