Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73313/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73313-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Maribel Preciado
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REYES ABIGAIL LINARESGONZALEZ, AKA Reyes Abigail

Linares,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-71142

Agency No.

A075-679-882

MARIBEL PRECIADO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-73313

Agency No.

A095-759-507

OPINION

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

October 20, 2015—Pasadena, California

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 1 of 21
2 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

Filed March 21, 2016

Before: Harry Pregerson and Consuelo M. Callahan,

Circuit Judges and Stanley Allen Bastian,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Reyes Linares-Gonzales’ and Maribel

Preciado’s petitions for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ orders finding them ineligible for cancellation of

removal in part because their convictions for identity theft

under California Penal Code §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) were

categorical crimes involving moral turpitude.

The panel held that the BIA erred in finding petitioners’

convictions categorical crimes involving moral turpitude,

because violations of CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) do not

constitute fraud-based crimes; and nor do they necessarily

involve vile, base, or depraved conduct. The panel remanded

for further proceedings on an open record regarding whether

petitioners meet the requirements for discretionary relief. 

* The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by

designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 2 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 3

The panel addressed Linares’ claims for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture in a concurrently-filed memorandum

disposition.

COUNSEL

Elsa Martinez, Los Angeles, California; Maria Teresa

Delgado (argued), Ventura, California, for Petitioner Maribel

Preciado.

Rosana Kit Wai Cheung and Jamie Lefkowitz (argued), Los

Angeles, California, for Petitioner Linares-Gonzalez.

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division;

Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director; Francis W. Fraser,

Senior Litigation Counsel; Linda Y. Cheng; Annette M.

Wietecha; Jane T. Schaffner (argued); Office of Immigration

Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners Reyes Abigail Linares-Gonzales (“Linares”)

and Maribel Preciado (“Preciado”) challenge the denial of

their applications for cancellation of removal. The

immigration judges (“IJ”) denied their applications, and the

Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, finding,

among other things, that they were ineligible for cancellation

of removal because their convictions for identity theft under

California Penal Code (“CPC”) §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) were

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 3 of 21
4 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

categorical crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”).1 We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we

grant the petitions.

I

1. Linares-Gonzalez v. Lynch, No. 12-71142

Linares is a native and citizen of Guatemala who arrived

in the United States without inspection in 1998. The

Department of Homeland Security initiated removal

proceedings in September 2004, and Linares eventually filed

an application for special rule cancellation of removal under

the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act

(“NACARA”)2as a derivative beneficiary on his father’s

application.3See Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160,

2193–2201 (1997).

1 All references to CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) refer to the thenapplicable versions of the statutes at the time of Petitioners’ convictions,

unless noted otherwise. These versions of the statutes were effective from

January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2011.

2 NACARA allows certain classes of aliens to seek “special rule

cancellation of removal” under the less stringent requirements for

cancellation of removal applied before enactment of the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. Aragon-Salazar v. Holder, 769 F.3d 699,

701 (9th Cir. 2014).

3 Linares also applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture. Linares’ petition with respect to

this relief is addressed in a separate memorandum disposition filed

concurrently with this opinion.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 4 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 5

In October 2008, while these proceedings were ongoing,

Linares pled guilty to three counts of identity theft under CPC

§ 530.5(d)(2), a felony. He received a sentence of 180 days

in jail and 36 months’ probation and was ordered to pay

restitution.4 Linares testified to the immigration judge that he

obtained credit card numbers from about six customers at the

restaurant where he worked, and he gave the numbers to a

friend who paid him $20 for each number. He also testified

that he did not know what his friend did with the numbers,

but he thought that the friend used the numbers “to get

money.” Linares served 122 days of his 180-day sentence.

The IJ denied Linares’ application for cancellation of

removal in June 2010. The IJ held, among other things, that

1) Linares was not eligible for cancellation of removal

because his 2008 identity theft conviction was a categorical

CIMT because it involved an element of fraud and he did not

have 10 years of continuous presence in the United States

following the 2008 conviction; and 2) Linares failed to show

good moral character during the required period of physical

presence because he had four convictions, including three

theft convictions, in the last eight years.

The BIA dismissed Linares’ appeal in August 2011. The

BIA held that 1) Linares was ineligible for the “petty offense

exception” under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)

§ 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)5

because he was convicted of three counts

of identity theft; 2) Linares’ conviction in 2008 for three

4 Linares was convicted for at least three other crimes while his removal

proceedings were pending, including taking a vehicle without the owner’s

consent, burglary, and driving under the influence.

 

5

 INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii).

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 5 of 21
6 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

counts of identity theft was categorically a crime involving

moral turpitude, because “selling, transferring or conveying

the personal identifying information of another knowing that

it will be used for an unlawful purpose . . . involves conduct

that is inherently base, vile, or depraved and contrary to

accepted rules of morality and duties owed between persons

or to society in general”; and 3) CPC § 530.5(d)(2) contains

the requisite scienter required to constitute a CIMT. 

Accordingly, the BIA held that Linares had not shown a

“realistic probability” that CPC § 530.5(d)(2) may be applied

to non-turpitudinous conduct.

The BIA held that because Linares had committed a

CIMT, he was subject to the heightened 10-year continuous

presence requirement for special rule cancellation of removal. 

The BIA determined that Linares had not met the 10-year

requirement, measured from the time of his identity theft

conviction and rejected Linares’ claim that the 10 years were

measured from the date of his arrival in the United States. 

The BIA further held that Linares could not show good moral

character under the catch-all provision of INA § 101(f),

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) because of his convictions in 2004, 2007,

and 2008.6

2. Preciado v. Lynch, No. 12-73313

Preciado is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered

the United States without inspection in 1990. Preciado pled

guilty to and was convicted for felony identity theft under

6 Linares moved to reconsider, and the BIA denied the motion in March

2012. Among other rulings, the BIA reaffirmed its prior determination

that Linares had not shown 10 years of continuous physical presence or

good moral character after his 2008 conviction.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 6 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 7

CPC § 530.5(a) in September 2008. Under the terms of the

plea agreement, Preciado admitted the allegations of the

complaint and agreed that the statutorymaximum prison term

was three years.7 Preciado received a suspended sentence of

120 days in jail and probation for 36 months and was ordered

to pay restitution.

In January 2009, the Department of Homeland Security

began removal proceedings against Preciado, and she filed an

application for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied the

application in November 2010, finding that her identity theft

conviction was a categorical crime involving moral turpitude

that barred relief. In doing so, the IJ noted that in her plea

agreement and conviction, Preciado admitted that she

willfully obtained personal identifying information of the

victim without authorization and used or attempted to use the

information to obtain credit, goods and services, or medical

information in the name of the victim without consent. The

IJ also held that she did not qualify for the petty offense

exception and had not demonstrated good moral character for

the necessary time period.

After the IJ denied relief, and while Preciado’s appeal to

the BIA was pending, her identity theft conviction was

reduced to a misdemeanor by the California Superior Court

in February 2012, pursuant to her motion for expungement. 

Before the BIA, Preciado argued that her identity theft

7

 The felony complaint alleged that Preciado violated CPC § 530.5(a),

“a Felony,” “[o]n or about June 26, 2004 through June 26, 2007” when

she “did willfully and unlawfully obtain personal identifying information

on Marifie Drabik without authorization, and used that information for an

unlawful purpose and to obtain, and attempt to obtain, credit, goods and

services and medical information in the name of Marifie Drabik without

consent.”

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 7 of 21
8 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

conviction was subject to the petty offense exception listed at

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). Preciado contended that the

petty offense exception applies where the maximum possible

sentence for the applicable offense does not exceed

imprisonment for one year and the alien is not sentenced to a

term of imprisonment in excess of six months. In her view,

because the maximum punishment for CPC § 530.5(a) is

imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, and her

actual sentence was 120 days in jail, the petty offense

exception applied, even if CPC § 530.5(a) was a CIMT. 

Preciado also argued that her case should be remanded in

light of the reduction of her felony conviction to a

misdemeanor, which she claimed was additional support for

her contention that she was eligible for the petty offense

exception.

The BIA dismissed Preciado’s appeal in September 2012. 

The BIA acknowledged that CPC § 530.5(a) did not require

an intent to defraud. However, the BIA held that CPC

§ 530.5(a) was still a categorical CIMT because there was no

realistic possibility that the applicable statute would be

applied to non-turpitudinous conduct. The BIA reasoned that

there were no cases where CPC § 530.5(a) had been applied

to non-turpitudinous conduct, and identitytheft was described

by the statute as an “indisputable evil.”

The BIA also held that the petty offense exception did not

apply, even though her conviction had been reduced to a

misdemeanor, because 1) even if a crime would otherwise

qualify for the petty offense exception, if it is a CIMT it may

still disqualify an applicant from cancellation of removal; and

2) the later reduction of Preciado’s conviction to a

misdemeanor, or even its expungement, did not alter the fact

that she had originally been convicted for a CIMT for which

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 8 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 9

a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. Thus, the

BIA held that Preciado’s identity theft conviction rendered

her ineligible for cancellation of removal.

II

To show his eligibility for cancellation of removal under

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), a nonpermanent resident alien must

show that he:

(A) has been physically present in the

United States for a continuous period

of not less than 10 years immediately

preceding the date of such application;

(B) has been a person of good moral

character during such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense

under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2),

or 1227(a)(3) of this title, subject to

paragraph (5); and

(D) establishes that removal would result

in exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent,

or child, who is a citizen of the United

States or an alien lawfully admitted

for permanent residence.

Offenses listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), which render an

alien ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b),

include crimes of moral turpitude. Cf. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (alien who commits a crime of moral

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 9 of 21
10 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

turpitude is inadmissible). NACARA imposes similar

requirements for cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.66.

III

The BIA dismissed Linares’ and Preciado’s appeals based

in part on its determination that both had committed CIMTs,

due to their identity theft convictions under CPC § 530.5. 

Both Linares and Preciado argue that their violations of CPC

§ 530.5 were not categorical CIMTs.8

In determining whether the conduct proscribed by the

statute involves moral turpitude, we apply the categorical

approach of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598–602

(1990), comparing the elements of the state offense to those

of the generic CIMT to determine if there is a categorical

match. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,

2283–86 (2013). To show that a state offense is broader than

the applicable generic crime as defined by federal law, the

defendant or alien must show that there is a “realistic

probability” that the statute would be applied to acts not

covered by the generic federal statute. Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). To do so, the defendant

or alien “must at least point to his own case or other cases in

which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the

special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Id.

8 The government has not argued, and it does not appear, that CPC

§§ 530.5(a) or (d)(2) are generic “theft” offenses that would render an

alien ineligible for cancellation of removal, because the statutes do not

require that the defendant act with “criminal intent to deprive the owner

of the rights and benefits of ownership.” See United States v. Vidal,

504 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007).

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 10 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 11

“[T]he federal generic definition of a CIMT is a crime

involving fraud or conduct that 1) is vile, base, or depraved

and 2) violates accepted moral standards.” SaavedraFigueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted); see also Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d

702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012) (CIMTs are generally defined as

crimes that are “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and

contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed

between persons or to society in general.”) (citations

omitted). “[F]raud crimes are categorically crimes involving

moral turpitude, simply by virtue of their fraudulent nature.” 

Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2011). “Nonfraudulent CIMTs ‘almost always involve an intent to harm

someone,’” Saavedra-Figueroa, 625 F.3d at 626 (quoting

Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2010)),

or “intent to injure, actual injury, or a protected class of

victim,” Turijan v. Holder, 744 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted). In determining whether an offense is a

CIMT, the BIA has examined “whether the act is

accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind” because

“evil or malicious intent is . . . the essence of moral

turpitude.” Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). We have approved this

approach. Id.

Linares and Preciado were convicted under separate but

similar subsections of CPC § 530.5. The then-applicable

version of CPC § 530.5(a) stated:

Every person who willfully obtains personal

identifying information . . . of another person,

and uses that information for any unlawful

purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to

obtain, credit, goods, services, real property,

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 11 of 21
12 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

or medical information without the consent of

that person, is guilty of a public offense, and

upon conviction therefor, shall be punished by

a fine, by imprisonment in a county jail not to

exceed one year, or by both a fine and

imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state

prison.

The then-applicable version of CPC § 530.5(d)(2) stated:

Every person who, with actual knowledge that

the personal identifying information . . . of a

specific person will be used to commit a

violation of subdivision (a), sells, transfers, or

conveys that same personal identifying

information is guilty of a public offense, and

upon conviction therefor, shall be punished by

a fine, by imprisonment in the state prison, or

by both a fine and imprisonment.

In essence, § 530.5(a) prohibits someone knowingly

obtaining personal identifying information and using that

information for any unlawful purpose, while § 530.5(d)(2)

prohibits someone transferring that information to someone

else, knowing that the transferee will use it for an unlawful

purpose.

A. CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are not categorical fraud

crimes

The government argues that violations of CPC § 530.5(a)

are inherently fraudulent because “false statements that were

made with the intent of inducing reliance is a form of fraud.” 

In its view, the statute requires the perpetrator to willfully and

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 12 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 13

unlawfully obtain another person’s identity through false

representations in order to obtain a benefit or something of

value. Thus, the government argues, violations of CPC

§ 530.5(a) are necessarily acts of fraud, even though there is

no explicit fraud element. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d

1071, 1075–76, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing CPC

§ 532a(1), which prohibits making a false statement with the

intent that it be relied on to obtain “delivery of personal

property, the payment of cash, the making of a loan or

credit,” but which does not expressly require intent to

defraud); Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

2008) (“[I]ntent to defraud is implicit in the nature of the

crime when the individual makes false statements in order to

procure something of value, either monetary or nonmonetary.”).

The government’s contention that violations of CPC

§ 530.5(a) are inherently fraudulent is not persuasive. 

California appellate courts have specifically stated that CPC

§ 530.5(a) does not require intent to defraud. In People v.

Hagedorn, 127 Cal. App. 4th 734, 741 (2005), the California

Court of Appeal explained that “subdivision (a) clearly and

unambiguously does not require intent to defraud.” The

Hagedorn court noted that another subsection of the identity

fraud statute, which criminalized the acquisition or

possession of personal identifying information but did not

require its use, specifically required intent to defraud.9 The

court indicated that “if the Legislature meant for subdivision

(a) to require an intent to defraud, it knew how to so provide,”

but it viewed the use of personal identifying information “as

9 The Hagedorn court’s statement here appears to refer to § 530.5(d)(1). 

Subsections 530.5(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) also require intent to defraud

and do not require the use of the personal identifying information.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 13 of 21
14 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

the more serious offense and worthy of a more expansive

scope” than “mere acquisition or possession.” Id. at 742; see

also People v. Johnson, 209 Cal. App. 4th 800 (2012)

(discussing Hagedorn and explaining that the purpose of the

California identity theft statute is to criminalize the willful

use of another’s personal identifying information, regardless

of whether the user intends to defraud or whether any actual

harm or loss is caused). The same reasoning applies with

equal force to CPC § 530.5(d)(2).

Our prior case law also supports a determination that CPC

§§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are not fraud crimes. In Blanco,

518 F.3d at 720, we held that falsely identifying oneself to an

officer under CPC § 148.9(a) is not a categorical CIMT. We

determined the statute only required that a forbidden act was

done deliberately and with knowledge, but not with evil

intent. We further explained that “[f]raud . . . does not equate

with mere dishonesty, because fraud requires an attempt to

induce another to act to his or her detriment. One can act

dishonestly without seeking to induce reliance. Our cases

have therefore recognized fraudulent intent only when the

individual employs false statements to obtain something

tangible.” Id. at 719 (citations omitted). Thus, we held that

a violation of the false identification statute was not a CIMT,

because “[w]hen the only ‘benefit’ the individual obtains is

to impede the enforcement of the law, the crime does not

involve moral turpitude.” Id.; see also Tijani, 628 F.3d at

1075 (“[T]o be inherently fraudulent, a crime must involve

knowingly false representation to gain something of value.”)

(quoting Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1076

(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).

Just as the statute in Blanco did not require that the

perpetrator obtain a tangible benefit, CPC §§ 530.5(a) and

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 14 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 15

(d)(2) do not require that the perpetrator obtain anything of

value. Rather, they require only that the perpetrator use the

victim’s identifying information for an unlawful purpose, or

transfer the information with the knowledge that it will be

used for an unlawful purpose. Indeed, in In re Rolando S.,

197 Cal. App. 4th 936 (2001), the defendant was convicted

under CPC § 530.5(a) after using the victim’s identifying

information to post obscene messages using the victim’s

Facebook account. Although the defendant in Rolando may

have enjoyed some personal satisfaction from doing so, he

obtained no tangible benefit from his identity theft. 

Accordingly, the Rolando defendant did not commit fraud,

showing that CPC § 530.5(a) has been applied to nonfraudulent conduct.

Given the express holdings of Hagedorn and Johnson that

no fraudulent intent is required and the fact that a person may

violate CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) without obtaining any

tangible benefit, we reject the government’s argument that

violations of these subsections are categorical fraud-based

CIMTs.10

10 Both the lack of fraudulent intent and the lack of a requirement that

the defendant obtain something of value distinguish the statutes at issue

from at least two other identity theft statutes we have previously

examined. In Ibarra-Hernandez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1280, 1281–82 (9th

Cir. 2014), we held that an Arizona identity theft statute was not a

categorical fraud crime because it was possible to commit a violation of

the statute using a fictitious person’s name. However, we agreed with the

BIA that, employing the modified categorical approach and reviewing the

record of conviction, the petitioner’s taking of a Social Security number

of another person to obtain employment was a form of theft involving

fraud. In Juarez-Romero v. Holder, 359 F. App’x 799, 799 (2009), we

held that a Washington identity theft statute was a categorical fraud crime

because it required “the knowing use of another person’s identification to

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 15 of 21
16 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

B. CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) do not necessarily involve

vile, base, or depraved conduct

Even though violations of CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are

not categorical fraud crimes, they may still be categorical

CIMTs if they involve conduct that is vile, base, or depraved

and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties

owed between persons or to society in general. See RoblesUrrea, 678 F.3d at 708. Preciado relies on Rolando, 197 Cal.

App. 4th 936, to argue that CPC § 530.5(a) has been applied

to conduct that was not vile, base, or depraved, and thus her

conviction was not categorically a CIMT. According to

Preciado, she established the required “realistic probability”

that the statute was applied to non-turpitudinous conduct

because Rolando applied CPC § 530.5(a) to non-fraudulent

conduct that was merely harassing or annoying. Although

Preciado goes too far in describing the conduct at issue in

Rolando as merely annoying or harassing, in light of existing

Ninth Circuit case law, the BIA erred in determining that

violations of CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are categorically

vile, base, and depraved.

In Rolando, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

defendant’s conviction for identity theft under § 530.5(a) for

obtaining the victim’s identifying information and posting

vulgar messages using her Facebook account. Specifically,

the defendant obtained the victim’s email password to gain

access to her Facebook account, and then posted extremely

crude and offensive messages on two of her male friends’

Facebook “walls” and “altered her profile description in a

vulgar manner.” 197 Cal. App. 4th at 939–42. On appeal, the

obtain something of value . . . with the intent to commit (or to aid and

abet) any crime.”

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 16 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 17

defendant argued, among other things, that there was

insufficient evidence that he used the victim’s identifying

information for an unlawful purpose. He claimed that at most

he “possibly defamed” the victim, and that as a civil tort, libel

does not constitute an unlawful purpose under CPC

§ 530.5(a). Id. at 942.

The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument,

holding that “any unlawful purpose” included civil torts, not

strictly criminal conduct. Id. at 943–47. The court explained

that before the statute was amended in 1998, “identity theft

was a misdemeanor crime and had to specifically involve the

perpetrator’s use of the victim’s information ‘to obtain, or

attempt to obtain, credit, goods, or services’ in the name of

the victim without his or her consent.” Id. at 944. By adding

the “for any unlawful purpose” language, the amendment

greatly expanded the range of unlawful purposes for which a

perpetrator could be found guilty of identity theft, as intended

by the legislature.11 Id. at 945 (citations omitted).

The Rolando court noted that the California Supreme

Court has defined the term “unlawful” to include wrongful

conduct that is not criminal, specifically conduct “proscribed

by some constitutional, statutory,regulatory, common law, or

other determinable legal standard.” Id. at 946 (citations

omitted). Thus, if a defendant committed identity theft with

the intent to commit an intentional civil tort, including libel,

he had sufficient intent to be convicted under CPC § 530.5. 

Id. at 946–47.

11 The Rolando court also noted that the statute had been amended

several times without the legislature limiting the unlawful purpose

language. Id. at 946.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 17 of 21
18 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

The Rolando court then looked at libel under California

law, which is defined as “a false and unprivileged publication

by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed

representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred,

contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be

shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in

his occupation.” Id. at 946–47. The court explained that the

defendant, through his Facebook posts, had “clearly exposed

the victim to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy with his

actions.” Id. at 947.

The Rolando case and the language of the statute show

that the BIA erred in determining that identity theft under

CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) is categorically vile, base, or

depraved, and that violations of these subsections are

therefore CIMTs. The statute does not require “intent to

injure, actual injury, or a protected class of victim.” See

Turijan, 744 F.3d at 619 (citation omitted). As discussed in

Johnson, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 818, the identity theft statute

criminalizes the “willful use of another’s personal identifying

information, regardless of whether the user intends to defraud

and regardless of whether any actual harm or loss is caused.” 

The statute only requires that the perpetrator use the

information for an unlawful purpose. If, for example, the

perpetrator uses someone’s identifying information to obtain

a credit card but pays off the balance every month, he would

still be guilty of violating CPC § 530.5(a) even if he did not

have any intent to cause harm. He also may not have caused

any actual injury to the victim, and would not have victimized

a member of a special class.12

12 Of course, under this example, the perpetrator would have committed

fraud. This example simply shows that CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2) do not

require intent to cause harm or actual injury.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 18 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 19

The discussion of the underlying unlawful purpose in

Rolando also tends to show that identity theft is not

categorically vile, base, or depraved. The Rolando court held

that the defendant had used the victim’s identifying

information for an unlawful purpose—libel—because there

was clearlysufficient evidence that the defendant’s posting of

obscene comments in the name of the victim “exposed the

victim to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy with his

actions.” 197 Cal. App. 4th at 946–47. However,

California’s definition of libel neither requires that the

defendant intend to harm the victim nor that the victim is in

fact harmed. Rather, the defendant need only publish

something that is false and unprivileged, without any

requirement regarding the defendant’s intent. Further, the

publication need not actually harm the victim, as it is

sufficient to “have a tendency to injure” the victim in his

occupation, even if no harm actually occurs. Id.

Moreover, Rolando shows that a perpetrator could violate

§ 530.5(a) by using a victim’s personal identifying

information to hijack the victim’s social media accounts and

use his or her accounts to post obscene messages, with only

the intent to annoy. See id. at 947. The court in Rolando held

that the defendant willfully used the victim’s identifying

information for an unlawful purpose because his actions

constituted both libel and a violation of CPC § 653m. Id. 

This statute requires that someone “with intent to annoy,

telephones or makes contact by means of an electronic

communication device with another and addresses to or about

the other person any obscene language or any threat to inflict

injury. . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 653m. While the defendant in

Rolando may have actually acted with intent to harm and

appears to have caused significant harm, CPC § 653m’s

language shows that a person need not have an intent to harm

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 19 of 21
20 LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH

or actually cause harm in order to violate CPC §§ 530.5(a) or

(d)(2).

It may be the case that most cases of identity theft under

CPC § 530.5 involve the use of identifying information to

obtain credit, goods, or services, which are implicitly

fraudulent uses and therefore morally turpitudinous. 

Nevertheless, the lack of any requirement that the defendant

intend to harm the victim or that actual loss occur, and the

fact that the statute does not protect a special class of victims,

shows a realistic probability that CPC §§ 530.5(a) and (d)(2)

could be applied to non-turpitudinous conduct.

13

Accordingly, the BIA erred in holding that these subsections

are categorical CIMTs, and we grant Preciado’s and Linares’

petitions on this ground.14

13 The BIA is correct that CPC § 530.5(d)(2) [and by extension,

§ 530.5(a)] requires that the defendant act with scienter, specifically

“actual knowledge,” because the defendant must willfully obtain the

victim’s identifying information and use it for an unlawful purpose, or

transfer the information knowing that it will be used for an unlawful

purpose. However, this scienter is not enough alone to make these crimes

vile, base, or depraved, absent any requirement of intent to harm, actual

harm, or a special class of victim.

14 We reject Linares’ other arguments in support of his contention that

his identity theft crime was not a categorical CIMT. Linares appears to be

contesting in part the sufficiency of the evidence showing he acted

willfully, though he cannot collaterally attack his state conviction on a

petition for review of the BIA decision. See Leal v. Holder, 771 F.3d

1140, 1148 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting contention that petitioner could

point to the facts of his state case to argue that the offense was not a

CIMT, as the court looks only to the elements of the state offense and “a

petitioner cannot collaterally attack his criminal conviction” by arguing

that there was an inadequate factual basis for the offense). Moreover,

when he pled guilty to violating CPC § 530.5(d)(2), Linares admitted that

he willfully obtained personal identifying information of another person

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 20 of 21
LINARES-GONZALEZ V. LYNCH 21

IV

Linares’ and Preciado’s petitions for review of the BIA’s

denial of their requests for cancellation of removal are hereby

granted. Because we grant the petitions based on the BIA’s

erroneous determination that Petitioners’ crimes under CPC

§ 530.5 were categorical CIMTs, we do not address the

parties’ arguments on whether the petty offense exception

applies in either case. We also express no opinion on

1) whether CPC §§ 530.5(a) or (d)(2) are divisible such that

the modified categorical approach may apply; 2) assuming

the modified categorical approach applies, whether the record

of conviction shows that Linares or Preciado committed

CIMTs; and 3) whether Petitioners can satisfy the physical

presence and good moral character requirements for

cancellation of removal. Accordingly, we remand for further

proceedings on an open record to determine whether

Petitioners meet the requirements for discretionary relief.

PETITIONS GRANTED.

and that he transferred the information to another person knowing it would

be used for an unlawful purpose.

 Case: 12-73313, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908524, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 21 of 21