Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10400/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10400-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adalberto Murguia-Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADALBERTO MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ,

AKA Adalberto Rodriguez-Murguia,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10400

D.C. No. 

4:14-cr-00444-

CKJ-BGM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

August 11, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed March 1, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, A. Wallace Tashima, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

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2 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction, vacated a sentence, and

remanded for resentencing in a case in which the district court

took the defendant’s statement that the sentencing proceeding

could proceed in English as a waiver of his right to have an

interpreter during that proceeding.

The panel held that the defendant did not validly waive

his right to an interpreter, and that the district court dismissed

his court-appointed interpreter without complying with the

procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1), depriving

the defendant of his right to an interpreter in violation of the

Court Interpreters Act. The panel declined to exercise its

discretion to consider whether the district court’s error was

harmless.

The panel affirmed the conviction for reasons discussed

in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that the defendantfailed

to object to any error at his sentencing and appeal, and that

the majority absolves the defendant of his burden to show

prejudice, granting relief that he doesn’t seek.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 3

COUNSEL

Daniel L. Kaplan (argued), Assistant Federal Public

Defender, and John M. Sands, Federal Public Defender,

Phoenix, Arizona, for the Defendant-Appellant.

Carmen F. Corbin (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney; Robert L. Miskell,

Appellate Chief, United States Attorneys’ Office, Tucson,

Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The Court Interpreters Act protects the rights of federal

litigants with limited English proficiency by requiring that

courts utilize the services of certified interpreters in

proceedings instituted by the United States when the failure

to do so would inhibit the party’s ability to participate fully

in the proceedings. The Act also provides procedural

safeguards to ensure that any waiver of this right is done

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Prior to his trial,

Defendant Adalberto Murguia-Rodriguez stipulated that law

enforcement officers found marijuana in the truck he had

been driving. At trial, with the assistance of an interpreter, he

explained that he had borrowed the vehicle and did not know

that there was marijuana inside. He was convicted of

possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. He was

then sentenced to 55 months in custody. He did not,

however, have an interpreter at the sentencing proceeding,

because the district court took his statement that the

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4 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

sentencing proceeding could proceed “in English” as a waiver

of his right to have an interpreter during that proceeding.

On appeal, Murguia-Rodriguez challenges his conviction,

arguing that the district court erred by failing to ensure that

his stipulation was knowing and voluntary. He also contends

that the district court erred at sentencing by, among other

things, dismissing his court-appointed interpreter contrary to

the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act. In a

memorandum disposition filed concurrently, we hold that the

district court did not err in concluding that MurguiaRodriguez entered into his trial stipulation knowingly and

voluntarily. In this opinion, however, we hold that the district

court dismissed Murguia-Rodriguez’s interpreter without

adhering to the procedures required by the Court Interpreters

Act. Accordingly, we affirm Murguia-Rodriguez’s

conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new

sentencing hearing. 

I. BACKGROUND

Interpreters play an important role in protecting the rights

of non-English speaking persons. Over 60 million people in

the United States speak a language other than English at

home. U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use in the United

States: 2011 at 3 (Aug. 2013).1 Of that number, 15.4% speak

English “not well” and 7% (over 4 million) speak English

“not at all.” Id. Effective language assistance is necessary to

ensure that these individuals have meaningful access to

government entities and programs. See Guidance to Federal

Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI

Prohibition Against National Origin DiscriminationAffecting

 

1

 Available at: https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdf.

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 5

Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41455,

41457 (June 18, 2002). Such assistance is of particular

importance in the courtroom where individuals must

communicate in “precise language” under stressful conditions

and key determinations affecting the individual’s personal

liberty or financial well-being are often “made based on

credibility.” Id. at 41471. This is especially so in criminal

proceedings.

The Court Interpreter’s Act of 1978 was designed to

accommodate individuals with limited English proficiency

and to ensure that they could fully “understand and

participate in their own defense.” H.R. Rep. 95-1687 at 4

(1978). The Act requires that a certified interpreter be

utilized in proceedings instituted by the United States when

a party “speaks only or primarily a language other than the

English language . . . [thus] inhibit[ing] such party’s

comprehension of the proceedings or communication with

counsel or the presiding judicial officer[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1827(d)(1).2 The Act also restricts the party’s ability to

waive his right to an interpreter. A party may waive that

statutory right if, and “only if,” (1) the waiver is made

“expressly on the record” by the party, (2) “after opportunity

to consult with counsel,” (3) the presiding judge has

explained to the party “the nature and effect of the waiver,”

and (4) the waiver is approved by the presiding judge. 28

U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1).3

2 The law also requires use of an interpreter for hearing-impaired

individuals.

3 As to condition (3), the explanation of the nature and effect of the

waiver must be made through “the services of the most available certified

interpreter, or when no certified interpreter is reasonably available . . . the

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6 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

Murguia-Rodriguez was charged with (1) the knowing

and intentional possession with the intent to distribute

marijuana and (2) the knowing possession of ammunition as

a previously convicted felon. Murguia-Rodriguez, a legal

permanent resident of this country for many years, could read

English, but only understood spoken English “about 60

percent” of the time. The presiding magistrate judge

determined at Murguia-Rodriguez’s initial appearance that he

required a Spanish-language interpreter, and one was

appointed for him. 

Before trial, Murguia-Rodriguez stipulated that (1) law

enforcement officers found 60 kilograms of marijuana in the

truck that he had been driving, (2) law enforcement officers

also found 45 rounds of .32 caliber ammunition in that

vehicle, and (3) he had previously been convicted of a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 

At trial, with the assistance of his court-appointed interpreter,

Murguia-Rodriguez testified that he was unaware of the

presence of the drugs and ammunition in the vehicle. The

jury returned a mixed verdict. It convicted MurguiaRodriguez of Count 1, and found that the offense involved 50

kilograms or more of marijuana. The jury acquitted MurguiaRodriguez on Count 2, the possession of ammunition. Based

on Murguia-Rodriguez’s offense level and criminal history,

the probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 51 to 63

months. 

Murguia-Rodriguez filed a sentencing memorandum in

which he urged the court to consider the “effect of [his]

services of an otherwise competent interpreter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1). 

We need not consider the additional language because the judge made no

explanation at all in this case.

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 7

imprisonment on third parties.” He noted that he was in an

11-year common-law relationship with a woman named

Belinda Angulo, with whom he had a 12-year-old son. He

further noted that he helped raise Angulo’s teenaged children,

and that prior to his arrest, he “use[d] to take them and pick

them up from school” and was “actively involved in their

lives providing guidance and support.” He concluded his

sentencing memorandum with a request for 33 months of

incarceration.

At the outset of his sentencing hearing, the district judge

said to Murguia-Rodriguez: “[J]ust before the case was

called the interpreter indicated that you had indicated you

prefer to proceed in the English language this morning. Is

that correct, sir?” Murguia-Rodrigez replied affirmatively. 

The judge then asked: “Do you want the interpreter to remain

in case you have any difficulties, or is it okay with you if she

leaves the courtroom?” To which Murguia-Rodriguez

replied, “She can stay.” 

The judge then urged Murguia-Rodriguez to let the

interpreter cease performing her duties, stating: “But do you

need her—she has other duties. Do you need her to stay, or

do you feel comfortable proceeding in English?” MurguiaRodriguez answered “I am comfortable proceeding in

English,” and the judge promptly dismissed the interpreter.

Ultimately, the judge accepted the probation officer’s

guidelines calculation of 51 to 63 months. She sentenced

Murguia-Rodriguez to 55 months of custody, followed by

three years of supervised release. She entered judgment that

same day, and Murguia-Rodriguez filed his notice of appeal

three days later.

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8 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

II. ANALYSIS

Murguia-Rodriguez challenges his sentence on three

grounds: (1) that the dismissal of his court interpreter

violated the Court Interpreters Act, (2) that the district court

erred procedurally by failing to address his non-frivolous

argument in support of a below-Guidelines sentence, and (3)

that the court should reconsider his sentence in light of recent

retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. He

also challenges his conviction on the ground that the district

court failed to ensure that his guilt-phase stipulation was

entered into knowingly and voluntarily, an argument that we

address in the memorandum disposition filed concurrently

with this opinion.

When a court becomes aware of a criminal defendant’s

potential difficulties in understanding or speaking the English

language, it has a mandatory duty to make a determination on

the record whether an interpreter is required, and if so, to

appoint a certified individual. See, e.g., United States v. Si,

333 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003). Any waiver of the right

to a certified interpreter, whether before or after that

determination, must comply with the express provisions of

the Court Interpreters Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1). 

At the outset, we note that this case is unlike the other

Court Interpreters Act cases that we have previously

encountered. Those cases have typically come before us in

one of two postures. First, we have considered cases in

which the defendant’s need for an interpreter was overlooked

by the district court and an interpreter was never appointed. 

Rather than decide whether an interpreter was required for the

first time on appeal, we have regularly remanded these cases

to the district court to make an initial determination whether

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 9

the defendant should have been provided with an interpreter. 

See, e.g., Si, 33 F.3d at 1043 n.4 & 1044; Mayans, 17 F.3d at

1179–81; United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.

1986). 

Second, we have encountered cases in which the

defendant challenges the district court’s explicit decision not

to appoint an interpreter. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States,

33 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). In those cases, we

review the district court’s determination for clear error and

make a determination on the merits. Id.

This case does not fall into either of the above categories. 

Here, the magistrate judge presiding over MurguiaRodriguez’s initial appearance determined that an interpreter

was required, and one was appointed for him.4 The district

4 Although very little was stated on the record about why MurguiaRodriguez required an interpreter, this appears to be consistent with

congressional intent. As the House Report on the Court Interpreters Act

states, “[i]t is anticipated that the need for formal proceedings to make an

initial determination of whether the appointment of an interpreter is

required will be minimal.” H.R. Rep. 95-1687, at 6 (1978). The

procedures here may have been minimal, but the magistrate judge clearly

determined that an interpreter was required. The dissent suggests that an

interpreter may have been appointed in an abundance of caution, but that

is irrelevant. There is sufficient evidence to support the finding that an

interpreter was “required” because Murguia-Rodriguez could understand

English only about “60 percent” of the time, which the judge could surely

find “inhibit[ed]” his “comprehension of the proceedings or

communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1827(d). The dissent also notes that Murguia-Rodriguez asked for a

remand to determine whether he needed an interpreter at sentencing. 

Remand is the remedy we have granted in previous cases—cases in which

the court failed to determine whether an interpreter was required and the

case proceeded to a final decision without one. This case, however, is not

about whether an interpreter should have been appointed, but about what

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10 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

judge continued to use an interpreter throughout MurguiaRodriguez’s trial, and indeed, an interpreter was present in

the courtroom ready to provide services to him at the

sentencing hearing. After a colloquy with the defendant, the

district judge appeared to conclude that the defendant was

willing to have the hearing held without an interpreter,

although she made no finding that the original appointment

of an interpreter was erroneous or should be vacated.5 The

question in this case, therefore, is not whether MurguiaRodriguez required an interpreter, but whether he validly

waived his right to an interpreter. We conclude that he did

not. 

procedures the court must follow before finding a waiver. It presents a

question of law which requires no factual development, and thus no

remand is necessary.

5 The dissent tries to scrape together pieces of Murguia-Rodriguez’s

testimony to suggest that a hypothetical judge might have determined that

an interpreter was not needed, but the only finding of fact actually made

in the proceedings was that an interpreter was “required.” We typically

review findings of fact for clear error, and do not substitute our own

findings for the district court’s. If, as the dissent suggests, an interpreter

was no longer necessary at the sentencing hearing, the district court would

have been required to find as much on the record. No such findings were

made, and it appears that the district judge intended to proceed with an

interpreter at the sentencing hearing until she erroneously concluded that

Murguia-Rodriguez was willing to waive his right to one. Furthermore,

contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Murguia-Rodriguez has not

“conceded” that there was no fact-finding in this case regarding whether

he required an interpreter. Rather, he suggested that the district court

“might be entitled to deference” if its decision to dismiss the interpreter

had been based on a finding that he could “understand the proceedings and

express himself clearly without an interpreter. But the court made no such

finding here[.]” Obviously, Murguia-Rodriguez’s contention is not that

there was no fact-finding as to whether he required an interpreter, but that

there was no finding of fact that an interpreter was no longer required. 

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 11

The Court Interpreters Act is unambiguous on the point

at issue. A party may waive his right to utilize an interpreter

“only if” the waiver has been made “expressly by [the party]

on the record,” “after opportunity to consult with counsel,”

and “after the presiding judicial officer has explained to such

individual . . . the nature and effect of the waiver.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1827(f)(1). Then, and only then, may the presiding judicial

officer approve a waiver. 

Murguia-Rodriguez did not validly waive his right to an

interpreter. To begin with, Murguia-Rodriguez never asked

to dismiss his interpreter. Instead, he asked if he could

proceed in English, and, when questioned by the district

judge, he indicated that in case he had any difficulties, he

wanted the interpreter to remain present. At no point,

however, did Murguia-Rodriguez “expressly” state his desire

to waive his right to the interpreter. He merely stated that he

wanted to “proceed in English”—in other words, that he

wished to make his allocution in English—perhaps in the

hope that doing so would make the sentencing judge more

sympathetic to him and to his argument. MurguiaRodriguez’s statement did not convey either expressly or

implicitly a desire to no longer have an interpreter to help him

comprehend the proceedings generally or to communicate

with his lawyer specifically. That the defendant chose to

make his sentencing statement in English does not signify in

any way that he no longer needed or wanted help in

comprehending statements made by the judge, including the

court’s pronouncement of his sentence, or by the prosecutor.

Moreover, rather than explain to Murguia-Rodriguez the

nature and effect of his waiver, the judge indicated to him that

she wished to dismiss the interpreter: “She has other duties. 

Do you need her to stay or are you comfortable proceeding in

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12 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

English?” The requirement that judges explain the nature and

effect of the waiver is not a hollow technical command. By

explaining to defendants the nature and effect of any

prospective waiver, a judge not only ensures that the waiver

is knowing and voluntary, but also that the judge and the

defendant have a shared understanding as to its scope. A

waiver, after all, can come in many forms. A defendant may

wish, for example, to waive all translation, or he may merely

want to waive the right to a certified translator in favor of

having a family member translate. By failing to comply with

the procedural safeguards of 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1), a judge

unnecessarily risks misunderstanding the defendant’s

intentions, and therefore risks depriving him of an interpreter

without his consent, as the judge did in this case.6 

It goes without saying that in Murguia-Rodriguez’s case

not only did he not make a waiver “expressly on the record,”

but the district judge did not explain to him “the nature and

effect of the waiver.” Instead, she presented him with a false

choice: whether he was “comfortable proceeding [with his

allocution] in English” or having the interpreter remain and

continue to perform her duties. Murguia-Rodriguez quite

properly initially indicated that he preferred both, but the

district judge erroneously refused to accept this answer and

continued to press him to do one or the other. In the end,

there was, of course, no waiver at all.

6 The difference between the dissent’s interpretation of the words “she

can stay” (that she could stay if she wants), see Dissent Op. at 21 n.2, and

our own (that he actually wanted her to stay) highlights this risk of

potential misunderstanding—especially when dealing with individuals

who have limited English proficiency. 

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 13

In sum, we conclude that because the judge clearly erred

in failing to comply with the procedural requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1), Murguia-Rodriguez was deprived of his

right to an interpreter in violation of the Court Interpreters

Act.

Although the government failed to raise the issue of

harmlessness in its brief, and thus waived that issue, the

dissent asserts that we should hold that the deprivation of

Murguia-Rodriguez’s rights was harmless. As a general and

consistent rule, “when the government fails to argue

harmlessness, we deem the issue waived and do not consider

the harmlessness of any errors we find.” United States v.

Kloehn, 620 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United

States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.

2005)); United States v. Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d 1174, 1180

(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1026

(9th Cir. 2001). This is true even when the government

“mentions” that harmless error applies in its brief but fails to

advance a developed theory about how the errors were

harmless, Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d at 1100 n.4, as well as

when the government makes no argument whatsoever as to

harmlessness in its brief, see United States v. Dreyer, 804

F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[A]n appellee

waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief.”). 

We have discretion to consider the issue of harmlessness

nostra sponte in “extraordinarycases.” Gonzalez-Flores, 418

F.3d at 1100–01. This case is not, however, an extraordinary

one. The error committed by the district judge, although

motivated by a concern for judicial efficiency, is precisely the

type of error the statute was designed to prevent. The Court

Interpreters Act seeks to protect the basic rights of litigants

who are summoned into court by the United States and cannot

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14 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

fully comprehend the proceedings. Moreover, sentencing is

a critical part of the judicial process, especially in an era

when the vast majority of convictions result from pleas rather

than trials. Notwithstanding the sentencing guidelines, an

individual’s explanation to a judge as to why his sentence

should be less than the judge may be considering plays an

important role in the sentencing process. Conversely, the

ability of the defendant to fully comprehend why the judge

has chosen the sentence he has is essential to the proper

functioning of the criminal justice system. The court’s

explanation of its reasons is intended to encourage the

defendant and perhaps others to refrain from further unlawful

conduct and to become law-abiding individuals following the

period of incarceration. Further, resentencing will not require

more than the expenditure of minimal judicial resources and

provides a far better resolution of the issue than expanding

the doctrine of harmlessness, which will only encourage the

government’s laxness and failure to follow this court’s clear,

applicable precedent. Finally, it would be exceedingly

difficult in the ordinary case for a court to determine on

appeal what effect the lack of an interpreter had on a

defendant’s ability to understand the entire course of the

sentencing proceedings. Cf. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d at

1101. Accordingly, we will not exercise our discretion to

consider whether the district court’s error was harmless. 

The dissent also suggests that the plain error doctrine

applies to the issue before us because Murguia-Rodriguez

failed to object to the district court’s dismissal of the

interpreter. Once again, the dissent relies on an issue not

raised by the government. The United States has never once

suggested that Murguia-Rodriguez did not preserve this issue

or that the plain error doctrine is applicable to the question of

the failure of the district court to follow the statutory

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 15

procedures. Indeed, the government consistently stated that

clear error applies to that issue, even though it asserted that

plain error applies to two of the three other errors that

Muguia-Rodriguez raised on this appeal.7 As we stated in

United States v. Kortgaard, and as a number of other circuit

courts have agreed, the government may waive the argument

that an error was not objected to and was therefore forfeited. 

Without a forfeited error, plain error does not apply. United

States v. Kortgaard, 425 F.3d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 2005)

(treating a potentially forfeited error as preserved because the

government “elected to address the merits” without

addressing whether the defendant had raised the issue below

and declining to apply plain error because the government

therefore “‘waived’ any waiver argument it may have had”).8

The First Circuit follows the same rule. It has held that when

the government “fails to request plain error review, we, and

many of our sister circuits, review the claim under the

7 The government is correct to suggest that clear error is the appropriate

standard to apply when reviewing a district court’s determination whether

an interpreter is required. See Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1179. Here, however,

where the only question is whether the district court complied with the

waiver provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)—a question of law—there is a

strong argument that the standard should be reviewed de novo. We need

not decide this question, however, because the result would be the same

under either standard. We can state unequivocally that we have a definite

and firm conviction that the district court clearly erred by failing to follow

the statutory procedures contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f).

8 This is not inconsistent with the dissent’s point that the burden of

showing prejudice under the plain error standard is on the defendant, not

the government. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 

The plain error doctrine applies only when an error has been forfeited, or

in other words, not appropriately preserved by the defendant. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 51 & 52(b). If the error is not forfeited, or if the government has

waived any contention that it is forfeited, the government has waived the

waiver, and plain error does not apply.

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standard of review that is applied when the issue is properly

preserved below.” United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787

F.3d 581, 586 (1st Cir. 2015) (listing cases); see also United

States v. Paulino-Guzman, 2015 WL 8284615, *2 n.5 (1st

Cir. Dec. 9, 2015) (reiterating the rule). As the Sixth Circuit

put it, “we will not apply the plain-error standard unless

requested to do so by one of the parties.” United States v.

Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 502 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011). Finally, in a

case that closely resembles ours, the Seventh Circuit stated,

“when a party fails to raise an issue in the trial court, we

generally review for plain error. However, the government

asserts that in this case we review the district court’s

determinations . . . for clear error. It therefore has waived its

right to rely on plain error review.” United States v. Salem,

597 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2010).9

9 The First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have explicitly held that a court

may decline to apply plain error review when the government has failed

to assert that the challenged error was forfeited. The Fifth and D.C.

Circuits have indicated their approval of this holding. See United States

v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 691 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (declining to apply plain

error and noting that “[t]he Government does not seek plain error

review”); United States v. Cyr, 29 F. App’x 1, 4 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(unpublished) (“[B]ecause the government does not argue for ‘plain error’

review, we consider only whether the error was ‘clear.’”). A number of

these circuits, moreover, recognize our circuit as applying this rule. See,

e.g., Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d at 586. Even the concurrence in United

States v. Williams, which criticizes the majority’s decision not to apply

plain error, and questions the decisions by other circuits adopting that

position, describes Kortgaard as: “holding that plain error is waivable

because litigants can waive waiver arguments.” 641 F.3d 758, 772 (6th

Cir. 2011) (Thapar, District Judge, concurring). Our dissenting colleague

cites no circuit cases to the contrary. Finally, while the dissent is correct

to note that “[a] party’s concession on the standard of review does not

bind the court,” Dissent Op. 27 (quoting United States v. Bain, 586 F.3d

634, 639 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original)), that is not

inconsistent with our holding. “The ‘waiver of waiver’ doctrine” that we

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 17

Our rule, of course, is discretionary, and there may well

be good reason to apply plain error in a particular case, even

if the government has failed to assert that the error has not

been preserved. In this case, however, there is no such

reason. The government expressly chose to argue that plain

error applied to two of the three other issues in MurguiaRodriguez’s appeal, but chose not to do so with respect to the

district court’s failure to follow the statutory commands. 

Moreover, many of the reasons why we decline to consider

harmlessness apply with equal force to the plain error

question raised sua sponte by the dissent. We particularly see

no reason to exercise our discretion in this sentencing case in

which a remand for resentencing requires minimal

expenditure of judicial and prosecutorial time and resources. 

Thus, without applying the plain error standard, but applying

either clear error or de novo, we vacate Murguia-Rodriguez’s

sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Because

this remedy obviates the need to address the other asserted

sentencing errors, we do not consider them here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed in the concurrently filed

memorandum disposition, we affirm Murguia-Rodriguez’s

conviction. We hold, however, that Murguia-Rodriguez was

deprived of his right to an interpreter at sentencing in

violation of the Court Interpreters Act. Accordingly, we

vacate Murguia-Rodriguez’s sentence and remand for a new

sentencing hearing at which Murguia-Rodriguez may utilize

apply here is “like waiver generally—a discretionary doctrine.” See

United States v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1017 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus,

the court may exercise its discretion to apply plain error, and is not bound

by any concession made by the government.

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18 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

the services of a certified interpreter unless appropriately

waived through the required procedures of the Court

Interpreters Act or the presiding judge makes a proper

determination on the record that an interpreter is no longer

required. 

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I agree with the majority that interpreters play an

important role in our criminal justice system. But the

majority’s opinion does not safeguard defendants, it punishes

inarticulate district courts and rewards “gotcha” tactics. 

Murguia-Rodriguez was convicted of drug trafficking after a

jury rejected his story that he “did not know” anything about

the 130 pounds of marijuana in his truck as he was crossing

the United States-Mexico border. After his full trial on the

merits with an interpreter, Murguia-Rodriguez, a bilingual

defendant, requested to proceed in English at his sentencing

hearing. The district court granted his request and excused

the interpreter. The court then listened to arguments from

Murguia-Rodriguez’s counsel, heard from MurguiaRodriguez himself, and sentenced him to a middle-of-theguidelines sentence.

Armed with new counsel on appeal, Murguia-Rodriguez

claims that the district court erred by not explaining the

nature and effect of his waiver of an interpreter prior to

dismissing the interpreter. But while the district court may

have erred, Murguia-Rodriguez failed to object to any error

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 19

at his sentencing and on appeal he fails to show prejudice. 

Our Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent informs us

that the correct standard of review is plain error review, and

the record demonstrates that any error was not prejudicial

under any standard. The majority sets the wrong standard of

review, flouting relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent. They also ignore Murguia-Rodriguez’s

concessions on appeal and engage in improper appellate factfinding. The majority thus absolves Murguia-Rodriguez of

his burden to show prejudice and grants relief that he doesn’t

seek. I respectfully dissent. 

I. Background

Alberto Murguia-Rodriguez was born in Mexico but

relocated to the United States when he was a young child. He

has lived in Arizona, Wisconsin, California, and Nevada. He

attended high school through at least the 11th grade in

Tucson, Arizona, where he played football. He has been

married and has several children. He has worked at a

carwash, construction companies, and restaurants. He has

owned cars and has credit accounts. He has four adult

siblings who also live in the United States. Unsurprisingly,

he is bilingual and literate in both Spanish and English. 

In 2014, Murguia-Rodriguez was caught at the ArizonaMexico border in a truck that had over 130 pounds of

marijuana in the back of its extended cab as well as

ammunition in the center console and driver’s side door. He

was indicted for possession with intent to distribute marijuana

and being a felon in possession of ammunition. MurguiaRodriguez stipulated to the marijuana’s presence in the truck,

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20 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

but he denied having known about the marijuana or having

ever seen it.1

A short jury trial was conducted which lasted less than

two days, including voir dire, opening and closing arguments,

four witnesses’ testimony, jury instructions, and jury

deliberations. The jury convicted Murguia-Rodriguez of

possession with intent to distribute, but acquitted him of the

felon in possession of ammunition charge.

Although Murguia-Rodriguez used interpreter services at

trial, at his sentencing hearing he requested to proceed in

English:

MR. BOURS: Good morning, your Honor.

Ricardo Bours on behalf of Adalberto

Murguia-Rodriguez.

THE COURT: Good morning. And Mr.

Murguia-Rodriguez, just before the case was

called the interpreter indicated that you had

indicated you prefer to proceed in the English

language this morning. Is that correct, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct, ma’am.

THE COURT: All right, so you’re

comfortable conducting these proceedings in

English today?

1 We hold that Murguia-Rodriguez entered into this stipulation

knowingly and voluntarily in a concurrently filed memorandum

disposition.

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 21

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yes, I am, your

Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want the interpreter to

remain in case you have any difficulties, or is

it okay with you if she leaves the courtroom?

THE DEFENDANT: She can stay.

THE COURT: But do you need her -- she has

other duties. Do you need her to stay, or do

you feel comfortable proceeding in English?

THE DEFENDANT: I feel comfortable

proceeding in English.

THE COURT: All right. Then thank you, Ms.

Garcia. You may be excused. And Mr. Bours,

if you want to come on up with your client,

and we’ll proceed with sentencing.

Thus, at the outset of the sentencing, Murguia-Rodriguez,

without any prompting from the court, affirmatively

requested to proceed in English. The district court confirmed

his request on the record, asked if Murguia-Rodriguez was

comfortable proceeding in English, and Murguia-Rodriguez

answered in English that he preferred and was comfortable

proceeding in English.2

 

2

 While the majority suggests that Murguia-Rodriguez’s statement that

the interpreter “can stay” meant that he wanted the interpreter to remain

present, it seems more likely that he meant that the interpreter could stay

if she wanted to.

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22 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

Additionally, Murguia-Rodriguez’s counsel acceded to

his client’s request to proceed in English and to the district

court’s excusing the interpreter. Counsel then argued several

cogent points in favor of mitigation during sentencing. 

Murguia-Rodriguez allocuted in English at the sentencing,

expressed regret for his actions, expressed concern for his

family, and promised to rehabilitate. At no time during the

hearing did counsel or Murguia-Rodriguez express any

concern that Murguia-Rodriguez could not understand the

nature of the proceedings or communicate. The district court

sentenced Murguia-Rodriguez to 55months ofimprisonment,

reflecting a sentence in the middle of the guideline range. 

The sentencing hearing lasted 27 minutes. 

II. Legal Standard

In judicial proceedings instituted by the United States, the

services of an interpreter shall be used “if the presiding

judicial officer determines . . . that such party . . . speaks only

or primarily a language other than the English language . . .

so as to inhibit such party’s comprehension of the

proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding

judicial officer . . . .” 28 U.S.C. 1827(d)(1). A defendant

may waive an interpreter but “[s]uch a waiver shall be

effective only if approved by the presiding judicial officer

and made expressly by such individual on the record after

opportunity to consult with counsel and after the presiding

judicial officer has explained to such individual, utilizing the

services of the most available certified interpreter . . . the

nature and effect of the waiver.” 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1).

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 23

A. Plain Error Review Applies 

Because Murguia-Rodriguez failed to raise any issue with

the Court Interpreters Act before the district court, we review

for plain error. See United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174,

1180 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Jimenez,

258 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing defendant’s

claims for plain error when an “inadvertent forfeiture of

[defendant’s] right to object occurred”).3

“Such review

permits us to notice and correct a district court’s deviation

from a legal rule only if three conditions are met”: (1) there

is error; (2) the error is plain or obvious; and (3) the error

affected the defendant’s substantial rights (i.e., the error must

be prejudicial). Jimenez, 258 F.3d at 1124 (citing United

3 Other circuits have applied plain error review to alleged violations of

the Court Interpreters Act. See, e.g., United States v. Batista, 684 F.3d

333, 341 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Even if the argument were not waived, we

would find that the District Court did not plainly err.”); United States v.

Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Because Gonzales failed

to raise this issue before the district court, we review for plain error.”);

United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying

plain error review to purported violation of Court Interpreters Act when

“Osuna did not raise the issue to the trial court”); see also United States

v. Maytin-Caballero, 532 F. App’x 875, 877 (11thCir. 2013) (per curiam)

(unpublished) (applying plain error review to purported violation ofCourt

Interpreters Act “[b]ecause Maytin–Caballero did not raise this issue

before the district court”); United States v. Amador, 214 F. App’x 303,

305 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (applying plain error review where

appellant did not object to his sentencing hearing on the ground that “the

district court did not obtain his waiver of the right to an interpreter directly

from him and did not employ an interpreter to explain the consequences

of this waiver pursuant to the Court Interpreters Act”); United States v.

Garcia-Perez, 190 F. App’x 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished)

(“Because Defendant did not object to the interpreter he received before

the district court, this Court reviews the appointment of the interpreter for

plain error.”).

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24 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). “Should all three

conditions be met, we have discretion to reverse the district

court if the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting

Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). “The defendant bears the burden of

showing that the forfeited error was prejudicial.” Id. at 1126.

Plain error review applies because, as the majorityadmits,

the provision that Murguia-Rodriguez asserts that the district

court violated was procedural in nature. Maj. Op. 13 (“[T]he

[district] judge clearly erred in failing to comply with the

procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1).”). The

Supreme Court has held in a similar context that a defendant

is required to object to a district court’s failure to provide

procedural admonishments. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S.

55, 73 (2002). In Vonn, the Court held that a defendant who

seeks to change his plea to guilty must object to any

deficiencies in the district court’s advisements provided

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 at the time

they are given. Id. Moreover, we have held, en banc, that we

are bound by Vonn, and have applied plain error review

where a defendant did not object to a district court’s failure

to provide sufficient advisements in a proceeding to establish

prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). United States v.

Severino, 316 F.3d 939, 947 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

The majority contravenes both Supreme Court law and

our en banc decision by not applying plain error review. 

Worse yet, the majority appears to hold that any violation of

the waiver provisions of the Court Interpreters Act is per se

reversible error. Such a broad holding, however, has no

support in the text of the Act or the case law interpreting it. 

To the contrary, Congress has directed federal courts

reviewing criminal convictions to “give judgment after an

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 25

examination of the record without regard to errors or defects

which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 28

U.S.C. § 2111. This rule, as well as the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, requires that we disregard errors that are

not prejudicial. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–8

(1999); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)–(b). By ignoring the

applicable legal standard, the majority vacates MurguiaRodriguez’s sentence without addressing his failure to argue

that any error prejudiced him and his failure to meet his

burden on appeal.

Moreover, this is the precise situation to which plain error

review should apply. The Supreme Court in Vonn explained: 

[A] defendant could choose to say nothing

about a judge’s plain lapse under Rule 11 until

the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which

time the burden would always fall on the

Government to prove harmlessness. A

defendant could simply relax and wait to see

if the sentence later struck him as satisfactory;

if not, his Rule 11 silence would have left him

with clear but uncorrected Rule 11 error to

place on the Government’s shoulders. . . .

[T]he value of finality requires defense

counsel to be on his toes, not just the judge,

and the defendant who just sits there when a

mistake can be fixed cannot just sit there

when he speaks up later on.

Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73.

The Supreme Court’s cautionary tale is exactly what

Murguia-Rodriguez did here. Murguia-Rodriguez did not

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26 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

preserve the error below, or in any way suggest that the

district court somehow violated the Court Interpreters Act. 

As discussed, Murguia-Rodriguez affirmatively asked to

proceed in English, and he was represented by competent

counsel at sentencing who never objected to his request to

proceed in English or when the interpreter left. Instead,

Murguia waited to raise his argument that the district court

failed to comply with the waiver provisions of the Court

Interpreters Act until after he received his sentence and was

armed with new counsel. The Supreme Court and our court

have rejected such “gotcha” tactics. See id.; see also

Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1994) (“To

allow a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial and

then . . . assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an

open invitation to abuse.” (citation omitted)).

B. A Party’s Concession on the Standard of Review Does 

not Bind the Court

The majority contends that the government waived its

right to rely on plain error review by failing to raise the plain

error doctrine in its brief, citing United States v. Kortgaard,

425 F.3d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 2015).

4 This would be a fair

4 Kortgaard is very different case in a very different context. At issue

in Kortgaard was whether the district court had violated the Sixth

Amendment in sentencing the defendant, specifically by granting an

upward departure on the ground that the guideline range calculation

inadequately represented the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal

history. 425 F.3d at 610. The Ninth Circuit held that because the district

court sentenced the defendant under the then-mandatory sentencing

regime, any sentence greater than the maximum of the guideline range had

to be based on facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond

a reasonable doubt. Id. at 608–10. Because the district court found facts

to support the upward departure, the panel held that the departure violated

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 27

point, except that “[a] party’s concession on the standard of

review does not bind the court.” United States v. Bain, 586

F.3d 634, 639 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.

Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1017, n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Which

standard of review to apply is a pure issue of law, and,

exercising our discretion, we apply the plain error standard of

review notwithstanding the government’s failure to argue that

it should apply.” (citation omitted)), cert. petition filed;

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1022 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part) (“[A] party cannot, by waiver or estoppel,

change the applicable standard of review.”); United States v.

Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bea,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e must not

abdicate our responsibility as the reviewing court to

determine whether plain error has occurred.”); United States

v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 763-64 (6th Cir. 2011) (Tharpar,

D.J., concurring) (“plain error review ought to be

unwaivable”). For example, no appellate court would apply

an abuse of discretion standard of review to evaluate whether

a district court properly granted summary judgment,

regardless of whether a party argued that abuse of discretion

should apply. Similarly, the majority errs when it refuses to

apply plain error review notwithstanding the government’s

the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 611. Even though it appeared that Kortgaard

had not preserved the Sixth Amendment error below, the Ninth Circuit

considered whether the departure violated the Sixth Amendment anyway,

declining to apply plain error review. Id. at 610. During Kortgaard’s

appeal, the Supreme Court issued the watershed cases Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), revolutionizing criminal sentencing jurisprudence. Thus, the

NinthCircuit’s decision to overlook the defendant’s failure to object to his

sentence in Kortgaard has little bearing on this case. 

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ostensible failure and Murguia-Rodriguez’s failure to argue

that plain error review should apply.

5

 

III. The District Court Never Determined Whether

Murguia-Rodriguez’s English Skills Limited His Ability

to Communicate in or Understand His Sentencing

Proceedings, as He Concedes

Regardless of what standard of review applies, it is not

clear that the district court erred in excusing the interpreter at

Murguia-Rodriguez’s sentencing hearing. Under the Court

Interpreters Act, if Murguia-Rodriguez was not entitled to an

interpreter at his sentencing proceedings, then no error

existed when the district court at sentencing relieved the

interpreter after he requested to proceed in English. See, e.g.,

United States v. Si, 333 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, there was no finding that Murguia-Rodriguez’s English

language skills “inhibit[ed] [his] comprehension of the

proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding

judicial officer.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1). He admits the

district court was never asked to determine and never

determined whether he needed an interpreter. Indeed, on

5 The majority also admits that this “waiver of waiver” doctrine is a

discretionary one. Maj. Op. 16–17 n.9; see also Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics

Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012). I would exercise discretion

to confront this issue of pure law: what standard of review to apply when

a district court fails to articulate the nature and effect of a waiver prior to

excusing a court interpreter. The parties’ confusion as to the correct

standard of law favors our consideration of this issue. Both parties,

relying on our circuit’s case law, cited the “clear error” standard. But

those cited cases addressed whether the district court had appropriately

determined whether an interpreter was required, not whether the district

court complied with the waiver provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f). 

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 29

appeal Murguia-Rodriguez seeks only a “remand [of]the case

to the district court with instructions that it determine whether

Mr. Murguia-Rodriguez’s language abilities inhibited his

comprehension of, or ability to express himself clearly in, the

sentencing hearing – and if so, that it conduct a de novo

sentencing hearing at which an interpreter will be available to

assist him.” The majority ignores this concession.

Instead, the majority insists that the district court had

already determined that Murguia-Rodriguez was entitled to

an interpreter because a docket entry from his first

appearance noted that an interpreter was “required.” Maj.

Op. 9. The majority thus concludes that the only way the

district court could excuse an interpreter at the sentencing

was if it fully complied with the waiver provision in 28

U.S.C. § 1827(f)(1). But the single reference in a docket

entry that an interpreter is “required” is not a sufficient

factual finding as to whether Murguia-Rodriguez’s English

language skills inhibited his comprehension of the

proceedings or communication with counsel or the judge.6

The transcript reveals no evidence that the district court

assessed Murguia-Rodriguez’s English language or

comprehension skills, let alone determined that they inhibited

his ability to understand the proceedings or communicate. 

Dist. Ct. ECF No. 58. 

6 Busy district courts will likely be surprised to learn that a mere court

clerk docket entry that an interpreter was “required” at a criminal

defendant’s first appearance is sufficient in itself to allow the Ninth

Circuit to hold that defendant’s English language skills inhibited his

comprehension of and ability to communicate in sentencing proceedings

under 28 U.S.C. § 1827.

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Although the court used an interpreter at MurguiaRodriguez’s first appearance, district courts are advised to

appoint an interpreter out of an abundance of caution if a

defendant’s English language skills are in doubt. See, e.g.,

Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court

Judges 1 (6th ed. 2013) (“If you have any doubts about the

defendant’s ability to speak and understand English, consider

appointing a certified interpreter in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 1827.”); id. at 27 (“If the defendant has an attorney,

ask counsel if he or she has been able to communicate with

the defendant. If you doubt the defendant’s capacity to

understand English, use a certified interpreter.”). 

In fact, at Murguia-Rodriguez’s next appearance, his

detention and preliminary hearing, his attorney represented

that he was “English speaking.” Dist. Ct. ECF No. 59 at 2

(“Ricardo Bours, Your Honor, for Adalberto MurguiaRodriguez, present, in custody, English speaking.”).7

Moreover, after his trial, the U.S. Probation Department

interviewed Murguia-Rodriguez and described him as

“bilingual and literate in both Spanish and English” in his

pre-sentence report. There is no indication that MurguiaRodriguez objected to the description of himself as bilingual,

and the district court adopted the facts in the pre-sentence

report as true. 

Murguia-Rodriguez’s testimonyat trial that he understood

60% of English and spoke 60 to 70% of English is not

conclusive that his language abilities impeded his ability to

communicate or understand his sentencing proceedings. At

7 Mr. Bours represented Murguia-Rodriguez in his pretrial matters,

during trial, and at sentencing, but he is not Murguia-Rodriguez’s attorney

on appeal. 

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 31

most, the potential conflict between Murguia-Rodriguez’s

trial testimony, his attorney’s representation that he spoke

English, and the Probation Department’s conclusion that he

was bilingual, underscores the need for the district court to

make an express factual finding under the Court Interpreters

Act as to whether his English language skills inhibited his

ability to understand or communicate at his sentencing

proceeding.

Because the district court never determined whether

Murguia-Rodriguez’s English was limited and because

Murguia-Rodriguez concedes that the district court never

made such a finding, I dissent from the majority’s sua sponte

appellate fact-finding. If there are questions regarding

Murguia-Rodriguez’s language skills, the proper remedy is a

remand to the district court for fact-finding, not a vacatur of

his sentence.8See Si, 333 F.3d at 1045 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“remand[ing] the matter to the district court solely for the

purpose of determining . . . whether Si’s language abilities

inhibited his comprehension of the proceedings or his ability

to communicate with counsel and the court”); Lim, 794 F.2d

at 470 (remanding to district court “for further findings and

appropriate further evidentiary proceedings” where “it was

very difficult to determine whether any lack of interpreter’s

8 The majority objects that the district court appeared to present

Murguia-Rodriguez with a choice to either (1) proceed in English without

the interpreter or (2) proceed in Spanish with an interpreter. Maj. Op. 12. 

The majority would require that the district court explicitly state that

Murguia-Rodriguez had a third option: proceed in English with the

interpreter present in case he needed something translated. There is no

such requirement in the Court Interpreters Act. Moreover, nothing

prohibited Murguia-Rodriguez or his counsel from requesting that the

interpreter stay for that precise reason, or requesting that the interpreter

return to the sentencing proceeding after it had begun. 

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32 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

assistance affected the ability of any of the defendants to

understand the proceedings or communicate with counsel”);

cf. Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

1994) (no remand necessary because “the district court judge

here specifically determined that Gonzalez’s language

difficulties did not constitute a ‘major’ problem”). The

majority grants relief that Murguia-Rodriguez has not even

sought. 

IV. Even Assuming That The District Court Plainly

Erred, Murguia-Rodriguez Has Not Met His Burden of

Demonstrating Prejudice

Even ignoring Murguia-Rodriguez’s concession on

appeal, remand would not be required. Murguia-Rodriguez

has not met his burden of demonstrating any prejudice. See

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. As noted previously, because

Murguia-Rodriguez failed to raise any issue with the Court

Interpreters Act before the district court, he bears the burden

to show that any error affected his substantial rights (i.e., the

error must be prejudicial). See Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1180 n.4;

Jimenez, 258 F.3d at 1124 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 

But he does not argue that if the district court had explained

the “nature and effect” of waiving an interpreter he would

have insisted that the interpreter remain. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1827(f)(1). Nor does Murguia-Rodriguez assert that if an

interpreter had remained that his sentencing would have

changed in any way. Murguia-Rodriguez allocuted in

English at the sentencing, expressed regret for his actions,

expressed concern for his family, and promised to

rehabilitate. He does not claim that he was unable to

understand the proceedings, or proffer any additional

information that he would have been able to express if an

interpreter had remained.

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 33

Although the government only belatedly argues that any

error was harmless, this does not excuse Murguia-Rodriguez

from his burden to establish prejudice. As the Supreme Court

stated in Olano:

In sum, [defendants] have not met their

burden of showing prejudice under [plain

error review of] Rule 52(b). Whether the

Government could have met its burden of

showing the absence of prejudice, under

[harmless error review of] Rule 52(a), if

[defendants] had not forfeited their claim of

error, is not at issue here. This is a plain-error

case, and it is [defendants] who must persuade

the appellate court that the deviation . . . was

prejudicial.

507 U.S. at 741. Here, Murguia-Rodriguez has not even

attempted to meet his burden of demonstrating prejudice. 

In any event, we have discretion to overlook a failure to

argue harmlessness when “the harmlessness of any error is

clear beyond serious debate and further proceedings are

certain to replicate the original result.” United States v.

Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Applying the factors in Gonzalez-Flores, any error here was

harmless. First, the record is not lengthy or complex. The

majority’s sua sponte discovery and citation of the docket

entryregarding a “required” interpreter emphasizes this point. 

Second, as previously discussed, the harmlessness of the

district court’s failure to explain the nature and effect of

Murguia-Rodriguez’s waiver is beyond doubt as he sought to

proceed in English and even he does not contend that he was

unable to communicate in or understand his sentencing

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34 UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ

proceedings. Thus, ordering new sentencing proceedings

requires “ultimately futile proceedings in the district court.” 

See id.

* * *

“[T]he value of finality requires defense counsel to be on

his toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just sits

there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit there when

he speaks up later on.” Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73. The district

court may have erred by not explaining the nature and effect

of waiving an interpreter prior to dismissing the interpreter at

Murguia-Rodriguez’s sentencing. But Murguia-Rodriguez

failed to object at his sentencing and fails to show any

prejudice. Our Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent

informs us that the correct standard of review is plain error

review, and the record demonstrates that any error was not

prejudicial by any measurement. 

District courts are already overwhelmed with the need for

interpreters. The District Court of Arizona alone conducts

over 56,000 proceedings per year with the assistance of a

Spanish interpreter.9 The majority’s approach will waste

judicial resources and encourage mischief and manipulation

in the district courts, likelywithout benefit to either MurguiaRodriguez or future defendants. It may impede bilingual and

multi-lingual defendants from proceeding in English at

sentencing hearings, even if that is their preference. District

courts may insist that defendants use interpreters or that

interpreters remain present even though they are not needed

9

See Interpreter Usage by District Courts, 2014, United States Courts

for the Ninth Circuit, 2014 Annual Report at 77,

http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/AnnualReport2014.pdf. 

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UNITED STATES V. MURGUIA-RODRIGUEZ 35

or wanted for fear that a hyper-technical violation of the

Court Interpreters Act will result in an automatic reversal of

a lawfully imposed sentence. Worse yet, the majority’s

approach may encourage defendants to allow the informal

dismissal of an interpreter, thereby assuring an issue on

appeal, exactly the scenario proscribed by the Supreme Court

in Vonn. Accordingly, I dissent.10

 

10 As I find no error and no prejudice by the district court with respect

to the Court Interpreters Act, I would reach Murguia-Rodriguez’s other

appellate challenges to his sentence, which I find to be without merit. I

would affirm the district court in all respects.

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