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Parties Involved:
Larry D. Richards
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

~TEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. No. 94-4052 

LARRY D. RICHARDS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

. FILED 

lJDated States Court or Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2 8 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-168-A) 

ON REHEARING EN BANC 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney, Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States 

Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Loni F. DeLand, McRae & DeLand, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, and PORFILIO, ANDERSON, BALDOCK, BRORBY, 

EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

• Judge Tacha took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 1 
This case requires us to determine whether a combination of liquid by-products 

and methamphetamine constitute a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 

of methamphetamine" for purposes of sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Applied to 

the facts, we must decide whether thirty-two kilograms of liquid by-products containing 

methamphetamine, or twenty-eight grams of pure methamphetamine alone, should be 

used to calculate Defendant Larry D. Richards' sentence under§ 841(b). We conclude 

that the plain language of§ 841 (b), and Supreme Court precedent, require us to use the 

entire thirty-two kilogram weight of the methamphetamine and liquid by-product mixture 

to calculate Defendant's sentence. We accordingly reverse and remand. 

I. 

Methamphetamine is commonly synthesized via a process that yields 

methamphetamine in a liquid solution. Operators of clandestine methamphetamine 

laboratories attempt to extract the pure methamphetamine from the liquid mixture. 

Defendant possessed thirty-two kilograms of a liquid mixture containing twenty-eight 

grams of pure methamphetamine. Defendant sought to extract the pure 

methamphetamine from the liquid mixture. Before he was able to do so, law enforcement 

officials seized the liquid mixture and arrested Defendant. 

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of 1000 grams or more of a liquid mixture 

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, with intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine in powder form, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(l)(A)(viii). The presentence 

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report determined that the thirty-two kilogram liquid mixture contained twenty-eight 

grams of pure methamphetamine. Applying U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1, the court sentenced 

Defendant based upon the entire thirty-two kilogram liquid mixture to 188 months 

imprisonment. ~ U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1 application note* ("In the case of a mixture or 

substance containing ... methamphetamine, use the offense level determined by the 

entire weight of the mixture or substance or the offense level determined by the weight of 

the pure ... methamphetamine, whichever is greater."). 

Defendant did not appeal his sentence. Instead, he filed a motion to vacate his 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the motion. Defendant 

filed a second motion under§ 2255. In his second motion, Defendant argued that the 

district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines by inciuding both the weight of liquid 

by-products and extractable methamphetamine in determining his base offense level. The 

district court granted this motion. 

On appeal, we concluded that Defendant's second petition constituted an abuse of 

the writ and reversed. United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369 (lOth Cir. 1993). We 

noted, however, that the United States Sentencing Commission had proposed an 

amendment to§ 2Dl.l, which if adopted and applied retroactively, might afford 

Defendant relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)_1 

1 Under§ 3582(c)(2), a court may modify a term of imprisonment "in the case of a 

defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range 

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." 

3 

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Effective November I, I993, the Sentencing Commission amended the 

commentary following U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.I and defined "mixture or substance" for purposes 

of the Sentencin~ Guidelines as follows: 

"Mixture or substance" as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 

2I U.S.C. § 84I, except as expressly provided. Mixture or substance does 

not include materials that must be separated from the controlled substance 

before the controlled substance can be used. Examples of such materials 

include ... waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a 

controlled substance. 

U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.I application note I. The Sentencing Commission expressly made this 

amendment retroactive. U.S.S.G. § IBI.IO(c). 

Thereafter, Defendant filed the instant motion for modification of sentence under 

§ 3582(c)(2). Defendant argued that the amended commentary to§ 2Dl.I mandated that 

the court exclude the liquid by-products and recalculate his sentence based only upon the 

twenty-eight grams of pure methamphetamine. Defendant maintained that the district 

court must accordingly reduce his I88 month sentence to 60 months. 2I U.S.C. 

§ 84I(b)(l)(B)(viii) (providing a mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment for 

possession with intent to manufacture "I 0 grams or more of methamphetamine."). 

The government conceded that the amended commentary applied to Defendant and 

that the court could reduce Defendant's sentence. The government argued, however, that 

Defendant was still subject to a mandatory minimum ten-year term of imprisonment 

under 21 U.S.C. § 84I(b)(l)(A)(viii). The government maintained that the amended 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 4 
commentary to § 2D 1.1 did not alter § 841 's definition of "mixture or substance." 

Applying the statutory definition the government asserted that Defendant possessed 

thirty-two kilograms of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 

methamphetamine," and therefore remained subject to a mandatory minimum ten-year 

term of imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). The government therefore 

maintained that the court could not reduce Defendant's sentence below ten years, or 120 

months. 

The district court agreed with Defendant. The court reasoned that § 2D 1.1 and 

§ 841 should ~'be interpreted harmoniously where reasonably possible," because, to give 

the statute a different meaning than the guideline would produce illogical and inconsistent 

results. Thus, the court interpreted § 841 's terms "mixture or substance" consistent with 

the amended guidelines' definition and sentenced Defendant based on twenty-eight grams 

of methamphetamine, instead of thirty-two kilograms of a mixture containing 

methamphetamine. The court granted Defendant's motion to modify sentence, and 

resentenced him to 60 months imprisonment. A divided panel of this court affirmed, 

holding that the Supreme Court's "recognition of Congress' 'market-oriented' approach 

dictates that we not treat unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable"; and that, under a 

"congruent approach," § 841 should be interpreted consistent with the construction 

provided by the Sentencing Commission. United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531, 1536 

(lOth Cir. 1995). We granted en bane review to determine whether the Sentencing 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 5 
Commission's amended construction of"mixture or substance" authoritatively defines the 

terms "mixture or substance" in § 841, or whether the statutory terms retain their plain 

meaning as construed by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 

(1991). 

II. 

The government maintains the district court erred by interpreting § 841 's terms 

"mixture or substance" consistent with the Sentencing Commission's definition set forth 

in the amended commentary to§ 2Dl.l. The government contends that the Supreme 

Court defined.§ 841 's terms "mixture or substance" in Chapman in accord with the plain, 

dictionary meanings of the words. The government argues that the liquid solution 

containing methamphetamine constitutes a "mixture" under the plain meaning of the 

word. Thus, the government asserts the district court erred in reducing Defendant's 

sentence because Defendant possessed thirty-two kilograms of a "mixture or substance 

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine," within the meaning of 

§ 84l(b)(l)(A)(viii). Accordingly, the government asserts Defendant remains subject to a 

ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. 

Defendant responds that the district court correctly construed § 841 's terms 

"mixture or substance" in accord with the Sentencing Commission's amended guidelines 

definition. Defendant maintains that the unusable and unmarketable portion of the drug 

mixtures should be excluded from the calculation of his statutory sentence. Defendant 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 6 
relies on the rulings of other circuits that have embraced this "marketable" approach. 2 

Applied to the facts, Defendant maintains that he should be sentenced for the twenty-eight 

grams of methamphetamine, not the unmarketable thirty-two kilograms of liquid. 

A. 

The parties' arguments require us to interpret the terms "mixture or substance" in 

2 The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have embraced the 

"marketable" approach. ~~,United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 553-54 (2d Cir. 

1992) (in determining defendant's sentence under§ 2Dl.1, exclude weight of unusable 

creme liqueur portion in creme liqueur and cocaine mixture); United States v. Rodriquez, 

975 F.2d 999, 1007 (3d Cir. 1992) (in determining a defendant's sentence under§ 2Dl.1, 

exclude weight of unusable boric acid portion in boric acid and cocaine mixture); United 

States v. Jennin~s, 945 F.2d 129, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1991) (in determining a defendant's 

sentence under § 841 and § 2D 1.1, exclude weight of uningestible waste water in waste 

water and methamphetamine mixture); United States v. Johnson, 999 F .2d 1192, 1196-97 

(7th Cir. 1993) (in determining a defendant's sentence under§ 2Dl.1, exclude weight of 

unusable waste water in waste water and cocaine base mixture); United States v. 

Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 1991) (in determining a defendant's 

sentence under § 2D 1.1, exclude weight of unusable waste water portion in cocaine and 

waste water mixture). 

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have followed the "marketable" approach in some 

cases, but adhered to the plain meaning of "mixture or substance" in others, depending 

upon the controlled substance at issue. Compare United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 

1501, 1509-10 (5th Cir. 1992) (court should use entire weight of mixture of 

methamphetamine and waste water to determine defendant's sentence under§ 2D1.1), 

~denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992), 507 U.S. 953 (1993) with United States v. PalaciosMolina, 7 F.3d 49, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1993) (court should exclude the waste water portion of 

cocaine and waste water mixture to fix a defendant's guidelines' sentence); and compare 

United States v. Beltran-Felix, 934 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) (court should use 

entire weight of methamphetamine and waste water mixture to calculate defendant's 

sentence under§ 841), ~denied, 502 U.S. 1065 (1992) with United States v. Robins, 

967 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1992) (court should exclude the unusable cornmeal portion 

of a cocaine and cornmeal mixture in determining defendant's sentence under§ 2Dl.1). 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 7 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Congress did not define "mixture or substance" in§ 841. We need 

not perform our own interpretive analysis, however. The Supreme Court has 

authoritatively construed the terms in Chapman. 

In Chapman, the Court confronted the question whether the weight of blotter paper 

containing LSD or the weight of pure LSD alone should be used to determine a 

defendant's eligibility for a mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(l)(B)(v). Under§ 841(b)(1)(B)(v), a defendant is subject to a mandatory 

minimum five-year term of imprisonment ifhe, inter alia, distributes "1 gram or more of 

a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of' LSD. The Supreme Court had 

to decide whether the blotter paper and LSD distributed by the defendants constituted a 

"mixture or substance" for purposes of the statute. 

The Court noted that, in addition to LSD, § 841 uses the statutory phrase "mixture 

or substance" in connection with a number of controlled substances, including 

methamphetamine, but does not define it. Using time-honored principles of statutory 

construction, the Court concluded that the words "mixture or substance" in § 841 had to 

be given their ordinary meaning because Congress did not provide a statutory definition. 

The Court determined: 

A "mixture" is defined to include "a portion of matter consisting of two or 

more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one another and that 

however thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate 

existence." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1449 (1986). A 

"mixture" may also consist of two substances blended together so that the 

8 

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particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other. 9 Oxford 

Eo~lish Dictionary 921 (2d ed. 1989). 

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462. 

Applying these definitions, the Court concluded that blotter paper and LSD 

constitute a "mixture" under the plain meaning of that term because the LSD crystals are 

diffused among the fibers of the blotter paper. l.d... Because the blotter paper and LSD 

weighed 5. 7 grams, the defendants distributed "1 gram or more of a mixture or substance 

containing a detectable amount of' LSD. As a result, the defendants were subject to 

§ 841(b)(l)(B)(v)'s mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment. 

The Court concluded this result was consistent with the purpose of§ 841, as 

expressed in the legislative history. The Court examined the legislative history and 

concluded that Congress adopted a "'market-oriented' approach to punishing drug 

trafficking." l.d... at 461. The Court noted that with respect to methamphetamine and PCP, 

Congress drafted § 841 to penalize drug offenders based not only on the weight of the 

"pure" drug, but also on the weight of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable 

amount of a" controlled substance. l.d... at 459. The Court referred to Congress' approach 

under § 841 as "market-oriented" because it reflects the reality of the illicit drug 

marketplace. ~lit at 465-66. That is, drug traffickers trade not only in "pure" drugs, 

but often mix drugs with cutting agents, carrier mediums, and other substances. ~ lit 

Congress' "street effective" solution sets penalties according to specified minimum 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 9 
quantities of a "mixture or substance" that would be indicative of a major trafficker, 

including a manufacturer or retailer: 

The Committee strongly believes that the Federal Government's most 

intense focus ought to be on major traffickers, the manufacturers or the 

heads of organizations, who are responsible for creating and delivering very 

large quantities of drugs. After consulting with a number ofDEA agents 

and prosecutors about the distribution patterns for these various drugs, the 

Committee selected quantities of drugs which if possessed by an individual 

would likely be indicative of operating at such a high level. The 

Committee's statement of quantities is of mixtures ... that contain a 

detectable amount of the drug--these are not necessarily quantities of pure 

substance. One result of this market-oriented approach is that the 

Committee has not generally related these quantities to the number of doses 

of the drug that might be present in a given sample. The quantity is based 

on the minimum quantity that might be controlled or directed by a trafficker 

in a high place in the processing and distribution chain. 

The Committee determined that a second level of focus ought to be on 

the managers of the retail level traffic, the person who is filling the bags of 

heroin, packaging crack into vials or wrapping pep in aluminum foil, and 

doing so in substantial street quantities. The Committee is calling such 

traffickers serious traffickers because they keep the street markets going. 

H.R. Rep. 99-845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986) (emphasis added). Congress did not 

make distinctions between kinds of mixtures; instead, it intended the "penalties for drug 

trafficking to be graduated according to the weight of the drugs in whatever form they 

were found--cut or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready for distribution at 

the retail level." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that 

both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history demonstrate that the 

weight of an entire mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of a controlled 

10 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 10 
substance determines a defendant's eligibility for a mandatory minimum sentence under 

§ 841. M.. at 459-63. The Court did not rule, however, that only a usable, marketable, or 

consumable mixture constitutes a "mixture or substance" under§ 841. In the Court's 

words, "[ s ]o long as it contains a detectable amount, the entire mixture or substance is to 

be weighed when calculating the sentence." Id. at 459. 

c. 

In Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996), the Court reaffirmed that Chapman 

sets forth the governing definition of "mixture or substance" for purposes of§ 841. In 

Neal, the Sentencing Commission amended the guidelines post-Chapman to revise the 

method of calculating the weight of LSD for purposes of sentencing under the guidelines. 

Id. at 765. The defendant argued that the Sentencing Commission's revised definition 

controlled the mandatory-minimum sentence calculation under§ 841(b). The Court 

rejected this argument, reiterating that Chapman defined the terms "mixture or substance" 

for purposes of§ 841, and that "[o]nce we have determined a statute's meaning, we 

adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later 

interpretation of the statute against that settled law." Id. at 768-69. The Court held that 

Chapman's plain meaning interpretation of "mixture or substance" governs the 

determination of a defendant's statutory mandatory minimum sentence under § 841, even 

where the Sentencing Commission adopts a conflicting definition in the sentencing 

guidelines. rd.. at 768-69; see~ United States v. Novey, 78 F.3d 1483, 1486-87 (lOth 

11 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 11 
Cir. 1996) ("Sentencing Commission does not have the authority to override or amend a 

statute."), petition for~ filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 2627 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-8791). 

III. 

A. 

Chapman's plain-meaning interpretation of"mixture or substance" in§ 841 

governs our resolution of this case. E.~., Johnson v. Sawyer, 4 F.3d 369, 385 n. 82 (5th 

Cir. 1993) ("This court is of course bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court regarding the interpretation of federal statutes."). Although the Court in Chapman 

specifically interpreted "mixture or substance" in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(v), its 

interpretation is not limited to that subsection. Under settled canons of statutory 

construction, we presume that identical terms in the same statute have the same meaning. 

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992); Boise Cascade Corp. 

v. United States EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the plain 

meaning of"mixture or substance" governs Defendant's mandatory minimum sentence 

calculation under§ 841(b). Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461-62; Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 768-69. 

Applying the plain meaning of"mixture," the methamphetamine and liquid 

by-products Defendant possessed constitute "two substances blended together so that the 

particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462 

(citing 9 Oxford En~lish Dictionazy 921 (2d ed. 1989)). Liquid by-products containing 

methamphetamine therefore constitute a "mixture or substance containing a detectable 

12 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 12 
amount of methamphetamine" for purposes of§ 841 (b). Defendant possessed a thirtytwo kilogram mixture of methamphetamine and liquid by-products. Thus, Defendant 

possessed "1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 

of methamphetamine." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Under§ 841, Defendant is 

subject to a mandatory minimum ten-year term of imprisonment. ld..? 

B. 

Because the plain meaning of§ 841 and Supreme Court precedent compel our 

holding, we reject Defendant's invitation to define the statute in accord with the 

Sentencing Commission's amendment under a "congruent" approach. The Sentencing 

Commission's amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 did not, and could not, override or amend 

the statutory definition supplied by the Supreme Court. ~' 116 S. Ct. at 768-69; 

Novey, 78 F.3d at 1486-87. Chapman's interpretation of§ 841 controls. Johnson, 4 F.3d 

at 385. 

We also reject Defendant's version of the "marketable" approach. Defendant 

relies on authority from the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits ruling 

3 This is not a "rare case[]" where adhering to the plain language of § 841 

"produce[s] a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." United 

States v. Ron Pair Enters .. Inc., 489 U.S. 235,242 (1989). As the Supreme Court 

recognized in Chapman: "It may be true that the weights of containers and packaging 

materials generally are not included in determining a sentence for drug distribution, but 

that is because those items are ... clearly not mixed or otherwise combined with the 

drug." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463. The instant case does not involve a "container" or 

"packaging materials." 

13 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 13 
that only usable or marketable portions of drug mixtures constitute "mixtures" for 

purposes of sentencing under§ 841. Acosta, 963 F.2d at 553-54; Rodriquez, 975 F.2d at 

1007; Jennin~s, 945 F.2d at 136-37; Johnson, 999 F.2d at 1196-97; Rolande-Gabriel, 938 

F.2d at 1237-38. As we explained in United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 927 (lOth Cir. 

1993), ~denied, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994), "[t]hese courts reason that it is logical to 

include the weight of materials that are marketable or facilitate the marketability of the 

drug in question, and to exclude the weight of materials that do not." ld. at 932. The 

Second Circuit observed, "[v]iewed through a market-oriented prism, there is no 

difference in culpability between individuals bringing the identical amount and purity of 

drugs to market but concealing the drugs in different amounts of unusable mixtures." 

Acosta, 963 F.2d at 554. 

In essence, Defendant contends that it is fairest to sentence based only on the 

marketable or usable portions of drug mixtures defendants bring to the marketplace. 

Congress, however, did not adopt this approach. One searches in vain to find the words 

"marketable," "usable," or "consumable" in the plain language of§ 841 or its legislative 

history. Congress did not enact these concepts into the statutory scheme. Instead, 

Congress recognized the reality of the illicit drug market when it stated that a defendant is 

eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant commits a drug offense 

involving a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of' a controlled 

substance. In no way did Congress limit § 841 to usable or marketable mixtures 

14 

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containing controlled substances. "Detectable amount," and not usable, marketable, or 

consumable, is therefore the hallmark of an § 841 "mixture or substance." See Chapman, 

500 U.S. at 459 ("So long as it contains a detectable amount, the entire mixture or 

substance is to be weighed when calculating the sentence."). Hence, as long as the 

defendant possesses the specified quantity of a "mixture or substance containing a 

detectable amount of" a controlled substance, Congress requires a mandatory minimum 

sentence. Such a broad sentencing scheme may result in sentencing disparities. Policy 

decisions, however, vest in the legislative branch, not the judicial: "Congress, not this 

Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes." Neal, 116 S. Ct. At 769. 

Accordingly, we reject Defendant's version of the "marketable" approach. 

IV. 

In sum, Defendant possessed thirty-two kilograms of a "mixture or substance 

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine" under§ 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). Thus, 

Defendant possessed "1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a 

detectable amount of methamphetamine." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Defendant is 

therefore subject to a mandatory minimum ten-year term of imprisonment. The district 

court erred by reducing Defendant's sentence to 60 months imprisonment. The panel 

opinion at 67 F.3d 1531 is hereby VACATED. We REVERSE and REMAND to the 

district court with instructions to resentence Defendant in accordance with this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

15 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 15 
No. 94-4052, United States of America v. Larry D. Richards 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, with whom PORFILIO and HENRY, Circuit Judges, 

join, dissenting. 

The majority bases its construction of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) upon its determination that the Supreme Court's ruling in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 

(1991 ), governs this case. I agree with that premise, but not with the majority's 

reading of Chapman. The majority has divorced the holding in Chapman from its 

underlying circumstances and rationale, and has applied the holding to produce a 

result which in this case is directly at odds with that rationale. Because I agree with 

the majority of my sister circuits addressing the issue that Congress intended its 

reference to "mixture or substance" in section 841 (b) to refer to a marketable or 

usable mixture, I dissent. 

"Our job in construing statutes is to effectuate the intent reflected in the 

language of the enactment and the legislative process .... " State of Colorado v. 

Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1494 (lOth Cir. 1990). Although a combination 

of methamphetamine and waste water fits within a dictionary definition of "mixture," 

we are not required to '"produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 16 
of [a statute's] drafters. "'4 United States v. Ron Pair Enter .. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 

(1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors. Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see 

.al.s.Q. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957). The Court said in Lion Oil 

QQ...: 

If the above words are read in complete isolation from their context in 

the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, "In expounding 

a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 

sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object 

and policy." Moreover, in Mastro Plastics we cautioned against 

accepting a construction that "would produce incongruous results." 

Id. at 288 (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285, 286 (1956) 

(citations omitted). 

The Court in Chapman looked for Congress' intent in both the language of 21 

U.S.C. § 841 and in its legislative history. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 460-61. The Court 

found that "Con~ress adopted a 'market-oriented' approach to punishing drug 

trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the 

amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence." lit. 

at 461 (emphasis added). The Court said: 

By measurin~ the quantity of the dru~s accordin~ to the "street wei~ht" 

4 "Thus it is not enough for the judge just to use a dictionary. If he 

should do no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible 

man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was really intended; 

which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose." Learned 

Hand, How Far Is a Jud~e Free in Renderin~ a Decision?, in The Spirit of 

Liberty, 103, 106 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). 

-2-

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 17 
of the dru~s in the diluted form in which they are sold, rather than 

according to the net weight of the active component, the statute . . . 

increase[s] the penalty for persons who possess large quantities of 

drugs, regardless of their purity. That is a rational sentencin~ scheme. 

This is as true with respect to LSD as it is with respect to other drugs. 

Although LSD is not sold by weight, but by dose, and a carrier medium 

is not. strictly speakjn~. used to "dilute" the dru~. that medium is used 

to facilitate the distribution of the dru~. Blotter paper makes LSD 

easier to transport, store, conceal, and sell. It is a tool of the trade for 

those who traffic in the dru~, and therefore it was rational for Congress 

to set penalties based on this chosen tool. 

Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court held that "the statute 

requires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when determining the 

appropriate sentence for traf-ficking in LSD." ld. at 468 . 

.In my judgment, Chapman's recognition of Congress' "market-oriented" 

approach dictates that we not treat unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable. 

Here, as the majority points out, defendant pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a), 

(b)(l)(A)(viii) to possession of 1000 grams or more of a liquid mixture containing 

a detectable amount of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine in powder form. Defendant was not intending to market the waste 

water, which would have been discarded in the manufacturing process. The waste 

water was neither a carrier medium for the distribution of methamphetamine nor a 

cutting agent. 

Five circuits have distinguished between usable and unusable drug mixtures 

-3-

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 18 
in interpreting "mixture" for purposes of section 841 and U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l. ~ 

United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[E]ven though the 

cocaine/creme liqueur may fall within the dictionary definition of 'mixture,' the 

legislative history convinces us that the weight of the creme liqueur must be 

excluded."); United States v. Rodriquez, 975 F.2d 999, 1007 (3d Cir. 1992) ("We 

find that the usable/unusable differentiation adopted by the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and 

Eleventh Circuits, rather than the First Circuit approach, best follows the reasoning 

in Chapman."); United States v. Jennin~s, 945 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1991) 

("[I]nterpreting the statute to require inclusion of the entire [mixture] for sentencing 

in this case would both produce an illogical result and be contrary to the legislative 

intent underlying the statute."); United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th 

Cir. 1993) ("To read the statute or Chapman as requiring inclusion of the weight of 

all mixtures, whether or not they are usable, ingestible, or marketable, leads to 

absurd and irrational results contrary to congressional intent."); United States v. 

Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The Court in Chapman 

found that a plain meaning interpretation of "mixture" does not create an irrational 

result in the context of LSD and standard carrier mediums; however, in the present 

case it would be irrational for the court to fail to distinguish between usable and 

unusable drug mixtures .... "). See also United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F .3d 

49, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding waste liquids in which cocaine was transported 

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Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 19 
not a "mixture," and distinguishing prior Fifth Circuit authority). But see United 

States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 625-26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 

1009 (1991); United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1509-10 (5th Cir. 1992); 

United States v. Beltran-Felix, 934 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991). This 

usable/unusable distinction has been applied by two circuits in the context of 

methamphetamine in waste water, see Jennin~s, 945 F.2d 129; United States v. 

Newsome, 998 F .2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1993), and by two circuits in the context of 

cocaine waste water, see Johnson, 999 F .2d 1192; Palacios-Molina, 7 F .3d 49. 

This interpretation of "mixture or substance" for statutory purposes also would 

permit us to refer to the guideline definition and "adopt a congruent interpretation 

of the statutory term as an original matter." United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150, 

154 (2d Cir. 1993). Congress created the Sentencing Commission in 1984 and 

charged it with the task of "'establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the 

Federal criminal justice system."' Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 40-41 

(1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 991(b)(l)). Commentary promulgated by the Commission 

is authoritative "unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 

inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, [the relevant] guideline." Id. at 

38. Because of its sweeping authority and "significant discretion" in sentencing 

matters, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377 (1989), we may draw on the 

Commission's interpretation of federal sentencing standards when endeavoring to 

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Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 20 
reach our own interpretation of a sentencing statute. 

The Sentencing Commission specifically addressed the current issue in its 

amended commentary to section 2D 1.1 and unambiguously excluded the weight of 

waste water from the measurement of a "mixture or substance." U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1 

comment. n.1. The commentary provides: 

Mixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated 

from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be 

used. Examples of such materials include the fiberglass in a 

cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax 

statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture 

a controlled substance. 

Adopting an interpretation contrary to that of the Sentencing Commission for 

purposes of applying the statutory mandatory minimum will lead to unnecessary 

conflict and confusion. We have recognized the importance of harmonizing the 

statutory penalty provisions and the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. 

Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1128 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037 

(1992); see also United States v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The 

statutory scheme of sentencing, including the [g]uidelines, must be construed 

harmoniously as a whole."), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1838 (1994). Furthermore, 

because the statutory mandatory minimum automatically becomes the guideline 

sentence when it is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, see 

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U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), allowing waste water to comprise a "mixture or substance" 

under the statute will effectively nullify the Commission's policy choice. 5 In light 

of this persuasive authority, I would hold that section 841 does not include the 

weight of waste by-products in the measurement of a "mixture or substance." 

In deciding to the contrary, the majority relies upon the result in Chapman 

while rejecting Chapman's conclusion that this result was the necessary product of 

Congress' decision to adopt "a 'market-oriented' approach to punishing drug 

trafficking." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461. The majority disregards the Supreme 

Court's holding that the market approach drove Congress' drug sentencing scheme 

and makes it rationally based. ~ id. at 465-66. When section 841 (b) is examined 

in light of this approach, it is clear that including a usable LSD carrier medium in the 

5 In establishing the Sentencing Commission, Congress "sought 

reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in 

sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar 

offenders." U.S. S. G. Ch. 1, Part A.3 (policy statement). 

In adopting the new commentary, the Commission attempted to 

implement this policy by eliminating highly disparate sentences for the 

same quantity of drugs. For example, prior to the new commentary, if a 

beeswax statue and an acrylic suitcase contained the same amount of 

cocaine but the suitcase weighed considerably more, the defendant with the 

suitcase would receive a much higher sentence. Under the new 

commentary, the defendants would be classified in the same sentencing 

range. If we adopt a conflicting interpretation of "mixture or substance," 

the mandatory minimum would still impose a significantly higher sentence 

on the defendant with the suitcase. See also Chapman v. United States, 500 

U.S. 453,458 n.2 (1991) (detailing disparate sentences imposed under 

Chapman). 

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definition of "mixture or substance" furthers that approach, while including 

methamphetamine waste water does not. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 23 
No. 94-4052, United States of America v. Larry D. Richards 

PORFILIO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I join the dissent of Chief Judge Seymour in all respects. Because I believe the 

majority has effectively reduced the precept of following the plain language of legislation 

to a mere shibolith, I write only to remind the court of the wise admonition of Learned 

Hand that "one of the surest indexes of a mature judiciary [is] not to make a fortress out 

of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to 

accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their 

meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2nd Cir.), affd 326 U.S. 404 (1945). 

Appellate Case: 94-4052 Document: 01019279487 Date Filed: 06/28/1996 Page: 24