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Parties Involved:
Stephanie Richard Abner
Petitioner
Pierre Jude Richard
Petitioner
Saskya Leila Richard
Petitioner
U.S. Attorney General
Respondent

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10097

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A200-567-680

PIERRE JUDE RICHARD, 

STEPHANIE RICHARD ABNER, 

SASKYA LEILA RICHARD, 

 Petitioners,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(November 12, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Petitioner Pierre Jude Richard is a native and citizen of Haiti. An 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) because he 

found Richard’s testimony in support of his application not credible.

1

 The IJ 

alternatively concluded, as to asylum and withholding of removal, that Richard did 

not meet the standards for relief because he failed to establish that he was 

persecuted on the basis of a protected characteristic or that he attempted to relocate 

within Haiti to avoid his alleged persecution, and further that Richard did not meet 

his burden as to CAT relief. 

Richard appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”) and challenged the adverse-credibility finding and the IJ’s alternative 

reasons for denying him relief. The BIA adopted the IJ’s adverse-credibility 

finding and dismissed Richard’s appeal, concluding that since Richard had not 

provided credible or other evidence that he suffered past persecution or torture, or 

that it was more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened if 

returned to Haiti, he was not eligible for relief. The BIA expressly declined to 

review the IJ’s alternative grounds for denying Richard relief. 

 1

 Petitioner Stephania Richard Abner is Richard’s wife. She and their daughter, 

petitioner Saskya Leila Richard, are derivatives on Richard’s application for asylum, withholding 

of removal and CAT relief. 

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Richard now petitions this Court to review the BIA’s decision, arguing that 

the record compels the reversal of its adverse-credibility finding.2

 We review that 

credibility finding, like other findings of fact, under “the highly deferential 

substantial evidence test.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 

2001) (en banc). Under that standard, we “must affirm the [BIA’s] decision if it is 

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a 

whole.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In the review at hand, our task is to determine whether 

the record “compels” the reversal of the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse-credibility finding. 

Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). 

An applicant for asylum must meet the Immigration and Nationality Act’s 

[INA’s] definition of a refugee. INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The 

definition of “refugee” includes:

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . 

and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling 

to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion. 

INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Thus, in order to meet the 

definition of a refugee, the applicant must, “with specific and credible evidence, 

 2 “When the [BIA] issues a decision, [we] review only that decision.” Chacon-Botero v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the BIA explicitly agrees 

with particular findings of the IJ, we review both the BIA’s and the IJ’s conclusions regarding 

such findings. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010).

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demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a 

well-founded fear that the statutorily listed factor will cause future persecution.” 

Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257 (quotation marks omitted). 

In order to support a claim for withholding of removal, an applicant must 

show that it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted or tortured on his 

return to the country in question. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). Similarly, to support a 

claim for CAT relief, an applicant must show that it is more likely than not that he 

will be tortured if returned to his home country. D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

388 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2004). 

An applicant’s testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain his burden 

of proof, without corroborating evidence. Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1255. Conversely, if 

the applicant relies solely on his testimony, an adverse-credibility finding may 

alone be sufficient to support the denial of an application. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005). “If, however, the applicant produces 

other evidence of persecution, whatever form it may take, the IJ must consider that 

evidence, and it is not sufficient for the IJ to rely solely on an adverse-credibility 

determination in those instances.” Id. When the IJ makes an adverse-credibility 

finding, the applicant must demonstrate that the decision was not supported by 

“specific, cogent reasons” or was not based on substantial evidence. Ruiz, 440 

F.3d at 1255. 

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Pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13 § 101, 119 Stat. 

302, for applications filed after May 11, 2005, a credibility finding may be based 

on the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) the demeanor, candor, and 

responsiveness of the applicant; (2) the plausibility of the applicant’s account; 

(3) the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral statements; (4) the 

internal consistency of each statement; and (5) the consistency of the applicant’s 

statements with other record evidence, including country reports. INA 

§ 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Moreover, an adverse-credibility 

finding may be based on inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods, regardless of 

whether they relate to the heart of an applicant’s claim. Id. 

Even one inconsistency and one omission may justify an adverse-credibility 

finding where the applicant did not provide corroborating evidence that would 

have rebutted the inconsistency and omission. See Xia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d 

1233, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that an adverse-credibility finding was 

supported where the applicant’s testimony “included at least on internal 

inconsistency (how old she was when she had the abortion) and one omission 

(identifying data on the abortion operations certificate)” and thus the record 

provided “ample support for the IJ’s specifically stated finding that Xia’s 

testimony regarding the critical events at issue was not credible”). However, 

minor perceived inconsistencies and omissions may be insufficient to support an 

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adverse-credibility finding. See Kueviakoe v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 567 F.3d 1301, 

1305-06 (11th Cir. 2009). In Kueviakoe, we concluded that three perceived 

inconsistencies, including the use of the word “car” during testimony and the use 

of the word “truck” in the written statement, were insufficient to support an 

adverse credibility finding. 567 F.3d at 1305. We noted that, in both the testimony 

and written application, the words were translated from French, which suggested 

that the applicant was not the person making the word choice. Id. Moreover, the 

pertinent information remained the same, as the applicant repeatedly asserted that 

he was dragged to a car and that ten other people were with him in the vehicle. Id. 

Therefore, we determined that the record compelled the conclusion that this 

inconsistency was immaterial. Id. The other inconsistencies cited by the BIA were 

based on a misreading of the record and were therefore illusory. Id. at 1306.

In this case, the record compels reversal of the adverse-credibility finding. 

See Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1255. First, although the IJ noted that Richard provided no 

letter from the Haitian National Police stating he was the sole witness against gang 

leader Evans Jeune, Richard provided a news article that confirmed that fact. 

Second, the IJ relied on the fact that Richard’s testimony omitted the names of 

certain family and associates of Jeune whom he said he feared in his asylum 

application; however, Richard generally described those persons at the hearing and 

was never asked their names. Third, although Richard inconsistently testified that 

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an injury he suffered was to his knee and later to his foot, his application stated it 

was to his leg under his knee, and this inconsistency is insufficient in light of the 

record as a whole, which shows Richard testified consistently on other points and 

provided corroboration for many of the critical aspects of his claim, notably that he 

was the sole witness to testify against the captured gang leader. Accordingly, we 

vacate the BIA’s decision.

Because the BIA declined to reach Richard’s alternative arguments 

concerning his eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, we 

remand to the BIA to consider in the first instance whether–when viewing Richard 

as a credible witness–the IJ’s denial of relief was proper. See Calle v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2007).

PETITION GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.

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