Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00165/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00165-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dezmaighne McClain
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

MICHELE BECKWITH

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DEZMAIGHNE MCCLAIN,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-00165-MCE

AMENDEDED STIPULATION REGARDING 

EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY 

TRIAL ACT; ORDER

DATE: June 11, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case was set for status conference on June 11, 2020. On June 4, 2020, this Court issued a 

minute order continuing the status conference to July 23, 2020. 

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California “until further notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s 

declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s 

Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district 

judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2021.1 This and previous General Orders, 

as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health concerns related 

to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 2:19-cr-00165-WBS-AC Document 29 Filed 06/10/20 Page 2 of 4
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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 11, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 23, 

2020, and to exclude time between June 11, 2020, and July 23, 2020, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), 

B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) On January 27, 2020, the Court allowed the previously assigned Assistant Federal 

Defender to be replaced with the currently designated defense counsel. 

b) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports, audio and video recordings, and reports of interview, among other 

documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made 

available for inspection and copying.

c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, to review 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and 

copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with her client, and to otherwise 

prepare for trial, if necessary.

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The government does not object to the continuance.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 11, 2020 to July 23, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Failure to exclude time under these circumstances would result in a miscarriage of justice 

under 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(B)(i). 

Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy 

Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must 

commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 8, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ MICHELE BECKWITH

MICHELE BECKWITH

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: June 8, 2020 /s/ SHARI GAIL RUSK

SHARI GAIL RUSK

Counsel for Defendant 

Dezmaighne McClain

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2020

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