Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07107/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Herbert L. Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILLO 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEA.fnited States C.OUrtof Appeal! Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

HERBERT L. MILLER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APR 14 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

No. 92-7107 

(D.C. No . CR-90-12-01) 

(E . D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Herbert L. Miller was sentenced to eight years imprisonment 

after being convicted of three counts of submitting false tax 

refund claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. On direct appeal, 

Mr. Miller argued that his conviction resulted from a vindictive 

prosecution because the government had indicted him after he had 

filed civil lawsuits against his former employer, the Internal 

Revenue Service ("IRS" ) , for wrongful termination. This court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-7107 Document: 010110200953 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 1 
disagreed and affirmed. See United States v. Miller, 948 F.2d 631 

(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1278 (1992 ) . Miller 

then moved the district court for reduction of his sentence 

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (b). The court denied the motion. 

Miller now appeals the district court's denial of his Rule 35 (b) 

motion to reduce sentence. In this prose appeal, Miller argues 

that (1) his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, (2) the 

district court abused its discretion in denying his motion, (3) 

the district court erred by permitting him to appear prose, and 

(4) his sentence is based on a nonexistent statute. 

Miller's conviction is based on acts which occurred before 

November 1, 1987, the effective date of the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. The version of Rule 35(b) applicable to 

such convictions provides: 

A motion to reduce a sentence may be made ... within 

120 days after the sentence is imposed ... or within 

120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the 

Supreme Court denying review of ... a judgment of conviction .... The court shall determine the motion 

within a reasonable time. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (as amended Apr. 29, 1985). A motion under 

Rule 35(b) does not attack the merits of the conviction or the 

validity of the sentence. Rather, it is a request that the 

sentencing judge reconsider the severity of a permissible 

sentence -- a plea for leniency. We review the decision to deny a 

motion to reduce only for an abuse of the sentencing court's 

discretion. United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d 613, 615 (10th Cir. 

1990 ) ; United States v. Galoob, 573 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 

19 7 8) . 

-2-

Appellate Case: 92-7107 Document: 010110200953 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 2 
11 [O]nce a sentencing court, for whatever reason, declines to 

reduce a sentence under a timely filed Rule 35 motion, the cou rt 

of appeals cannot overturn the sentence imposed unless it is in 

excess of the maximum l imits or constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment . " Galoob, 573 F.2d at 1171. "If a sentence imp osed is 

within the prescribed statutory limits, the appellate court 

generally will not regard it as cruel and unusual punishment." 

United States v. Gourley, 835 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir. 1987) , 

cert. denied, 486 U. S . 1010 (1988 ) . 11 ' [U)nless we are convinced 

that the sentences are 'unconscionably excessive' the trial 

court's discretion in imposing sentences within statutory limits 

will not be disturbed." United States v. Rogers, 960 F . 2d 1501, 

1514 (10th Cir. ) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 

804 (10th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct . 817 (1992 ). 

In this case, each count carried a maximum possible penalty 

o f five years imprisonment. The district court imposed three-year 

sentences f or two counts and a two-year sentence on the third 

count. Imposed consecutively, Miller received an eight- year 

sentence out of a possible fifteen-year sentence. Miller's 

sentence clearly was wi thin the statutory limits, and, although 

Miller may find the penalty harsh, we do not find an eight-year 

s e n t ence c rue l or unusual punishment for an IRS employee wh o 

submits multiple f raudule nt tax refund claims. In denying t he 

mo tion, t he district court stated that it believed that the 

original sen tence was 11 appropriate , just and reasonable. " 

Alth ough Mill er no tes that he did not receive a hearin g on his 

motion and sta t es t hat the court's brief orde r demonst rat es t hat 

-3-

Appellate Case: 92-7107 Document: 010110200953 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 3 
it abused its discretion by not seriously reconsidering the 

sentence, the district was not required either to hold a hearing, 

see United States v. Catch the Bear, 727 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 

1984), or to set forth a lengthy explanation for its decision, see 

United States v. Baraldini, 803 F.2d 776, 777 (2d Cir. 1986). 

Miller further contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by considering Miller's prose motion without inquiring 

as to why Miller was not receiving the assistance of his courtappointed counsel. Miller, however, had no right to counsel for 

that proceeding. See United States v. Nevarez-Diaz, 648 F. Supp . 

1226, 1229 - 33 (N. D. Ind. 1986); United States v. Webb, 534 F. 

Supp. 28, 30 (W.D. Okla. 1981). It therefore was natural that 

the district court attached no significance to Miller's prose 

status. We hold that the district court's order denying Miller's 

motion to reduce sentence was a permissible exercise of the 

court's discretion. 

Finally, Miller contends that his sentence is void because it 

was imposed pursuant to a nonexistent statute, 18 U. S.C. § 276. 

The record reveals, however, that the district court sentenced 

Miller by referring to the counts for which Miller had been 

charged under the applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287. Only the 

written judgment form referred to the nonexistent§ 276. "It is 

firmly established in this circuit that an orally pronounced 

sentence controls over a judgment and commitment order when the 

two conflict." United States v. Blackner, 901 F.2d 853, 855 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 92-7107 Document: 010110200953 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 4 
The order denying Mr. Miller's motion to reduce sentence is 

AFFIRMED. Miller also recently filed with this court a "motion 

for summary judgment" regarding the pending appeal of his motion 

to reduce his sentence. Because such a motion is not cognizable 

in this court, it is DISMISSED without prejudice . The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

-5-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-7107 Document: 010110200953 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 5 
Appellate Case: 92-7107 Document: 010110200953 Date Filed: 04/14/1993 Page: 6