Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00984/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00984-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. Carichoff
Defendant
Jessica Lynn Coleman
Defendant
George S. Louie
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE S. LOUIE, No. CIV.S-05-0984 DFL DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ROBERT A. CARICHOFF, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative summary judgment. 

Attorney Robert A. Carichoff appeared on his own behalf and on behalf

of defendant Jessica Lynn Coleman at the hearing on the motion. J.

Grant Kennedy appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Having considered all

written materials submitted in connection with the motion, and after

hearing oral argument, the undersigned will recommend that

defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and this action be dismissed

with prejudice.

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 At the time defendants filed their motion to dismiss the 1

operative pleading in this case was plaintiff’s original complaint. 

In response to defendants’ motion, plaintiff filed an amended

complaint, which he was entitled to do. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(“[a] party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of

course at any time before a responsive pleading is served); Doe v.

United States, 58 F.3d 494, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1995). While in some

instances the filing of an amended pleading moots a motion to

dismiss, such is not the case here. As explained below, plaintiff’s

amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies detailed in

defendants’ motion. Therefore, the undersigned has considered

defendants’ motion to dismiss as directed at plaintiff’s amended

complaint. See Schwarzer, Tashima and Wagstaffe, Federal Procedure

Before Trial, ¶ 9:262 (The Rutter Group 2004)(“An amended complaint

supersedes the prior complaint as a pleading. Thus, the court will

usually treat the motion to dismiss as mooted. It may, however,

proceed with the motion if the amendment does not cure the defect.”).

The court has disregarded plaintiff’s second amended complaint

because it was filed without leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a).

 Mr. Carichoff is the main defendant. Ms. Coleman is named 2

because, as her counsel’s client, she allegedly “acted so as to

precipitate” and/or “failed to prevent” Mr. Carichoff’s actions. 

(Compl. at 3.)

2

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT1

Plaintiff has brought this action under the Americans With

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), against defendant Jessica Lynn Coleman and

her lawyer, defendant Robert A. Carichoff. Mr. Carichoff represents

Ms. Coleman in connection with the defense of an action brought by

plaintiff against her in Yolo County Superior Court, George Louie v.

Jessica Lynn Coleman, No. CV 04-885. This federal action arises out

of a dispute over where plaintiff’s deposition in that state court

action should be taken.

According to the amended complaint, during discovery in

state court Mr. Carichoff noticed the deposition of plaintiff to

occur at a local deposition reporters’ office. On the same day the 2

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deposition notice was served, plaintiff, who often requires a

wheelchair to travel about in public, paid a visit to the office in

question and “encountered discriminatory conditions (including, but

not limited to, inaccessible handicapped parking and a lack of lower

service counters.”) (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff advised the deposition

reporters’ office of those conditions. Several weeks later, and four

days prior to the noticed deposition, plaintiff advised Mr. Carichoff

of the access problem and “insisted that any deposition location ...

meet federal requirements for accessibility.” (Compl. at 3.) 

Plaintiff declined Mr. Carichoff’s invitation to identify a suitable

location for the deposition. Mr. Carichoff then re-noticed the

deposition to be held at a large commercial office building in

downtown Sacramento.

A few weeks prior to the re-scheduled deposition, plaintiff

visited the commercial office building in question and again

“encountered discriminatory conditions (including, but not limited

to, a lack of lower service counters).” (Am. Compl. at 4.) 

Plaintiff advised the building’s management of such conditions. 

While it is unclear from the amended complaint, since Mr. Carichoff

filed a motion in the state court proceedings to compel plaintiff’s

attendance at the re-noticed deposition he appears to have been made

aware of plaintiff’s concerns regarding conditions at that location. 

The amended complaint alleges that the motion to compel was filed

prior to the date for plaintiff’s deposition and that plaintiff did

not cancel either of his depositions nor did he refuse to appear as

suggested in the motion to compel. According to the amended

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 As one district court has explained: 3

The ADA initially was enacted as Public Law 101-

336 and was organized into Titles I through V. 

When the ADA was codified as 42 U.S.C. § 12101,

et seq., the “Titles” were re-labeled as

“Subchapters.” Titles I, II, and III became

Subchapters I, II, and III, respectively, and

Title V became Subchapter IV.

Van Hulle v. Pacific Telesis Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 n.2

(N.D. Cal. 2000).

4

complaint, plaintiff perceived the motion to compel as “an effort to

force the abdication of federal rights ....” (Compl. at 4-5.) 

Plaintiff then initiated this ADA action.

The amended complaint alleges that Mr. Carichoff “showed

that he planned to operate” the deposition reporters’ office and

commercial office building by noticing depositions there. (Am.

Compl. at 3, 4.) The amended complaint alleges six causes of action. 

The first cause of action is brought under Title III of the ADA 3

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D)(i) which provides that “[a]n

individual or entity shall not, directly or through contractual or

other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of

administration ... that have the effect of discriminating on the

basis of disability[.]” The amended complaint alleges that Mr.

Carichoff’s “standards or criteria for the selection of venues for

depositions have the effect of discriminating on the basis of

disability ....” (Am. Compl. at 5.)

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is a Title III claim

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) which, in 

/////

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prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability, defines

discrimination as follows:

a failure to make reasonable modifications in

policies, practices, or procedures, when such

modifications are necessary to afford such goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations to individuals with disabilities,

unless the entity can demonstrate that making

such modifications would fundamentally alter the

nature of such goods, services, facilities,

privileges, advantages, or accommodations[.]

Here, plaintiff alleges that Mr. Carichoff “has failed to make

reasonable modifications to his policies” regarding noticing

depositions of disabled persons “even though he has been put on

notice that the venues he has selected have repeatedly been

inaccessible.” (Am. Compl. at 6.)

The third cause of action is brought under Title V of the

ADA and alleges that Mr. Carichoff retaliated against plaintiff in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), which provides as follows:

No person shall discriminate against any

individual because such individual has opposed

any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter

or because such individual made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this chapter.

According to plaintiff’s allegations, the motion to compel filed by

Mr. Carichoff, and a related motion to have plaintiff declared a

vexatious litigant, amount to retaliatory conduct in response to

plaintiff’s “protected opposition to Carichoff’s discriminatory

standards ... vis-a-vis selection of venues for depositions of

disabled persons ...” (Compl. at 6.)

/////

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 Plaintiff’s use of boilerplate allegations renders the fifth 4

and sixth causes of action somewhat difficult to decipher. 

Nonetheless the fifth cause of action refers to California Civil Code

§ 51 and the sixth cause of action refers to § 54. Therefore, the

court has construed the causes of action as described above.

6

The amended complaint’s fourth cause of action also is

brought under Title V and alleges that Mr. Carichoff engaged in

coercive, intimidating and threatening conduct in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 12203(b) which states:

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate,

threaten, or interfere with any individual in the

exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or

her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of

his or her having aided or encouraged any other

individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any

right granted or protected by this chapter.

In this regard, plaintiff alleges that Mr. Carichoff has coerced,

threatened and intimated plaintiff by “repeatedly” noticing his

depositions for locations that are inaccessible and “attempt[ing] to

arrogate unto himself the authority to require [plaintiff] to locate

an accessible venue ....” (Am. Compl. at 7.)

Finally, in the fifth and sixth causes of action plaintiff

alleges that defendants’ conduct has denied plaintiff equal access to

deposition facilities in violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights

Act, California Civil Code § 51, and the California Disabled Persons

Act, California Civil Code § 54, respectively.4

LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th

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 Plaintiff was proceeding pro se when he drafted the amended 5

complaint which is the subject of the pending motion.

7

Cir. 2003), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1050 (2005); North Star Int’l v.

Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal

of the complaint or of any claim within it “can be based on the lack

of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, the court accepts as true all material allegations in the

complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In a case where the plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation

to construe the pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)(en banc). However, the court’s liberal

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential

elements of a claim that are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d

469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).5

ANALYSIS

The allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint speak for

themselves. As the undersigned observed at the hearing on

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 For this reason, the undersigned does not reach defendants’ 6

contention that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this

matter, although there is authority to support such a contention. 

See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (recognizing that a claim

is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction where it is “wholly

insubstantial and frivolous” and “so patently without merit”); Hagans

v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974)(a claim may be dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction where it is “so insubstantial, implausible,

foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court or otherwise completely

devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the

jurisdiction of the District Court”). 

 The amended complaint alleges that Mr. Carichoff “showed that 7

he planned to operate” the venues in question by noticing depositions

at these locations. (Am. Compl. at 3, 4.) 

8

defendants’ motion, this action borders on frivolous. Nonetheless,

the undersigned resolves the instant motion as if the allegations in

the amended complaint are pled in good faith.6

As set forth above, plaintiff’s first and second causes of

action are brought under Title III pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

12182(b)(1)(D)(i) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), respectively. By its

terms, § 12182 applies to “any person who owns, leases (or leases

to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Defendants argue

that plaintiff’s first and second causes of action must be dismissed

because they are not “operators” of a place of public accommodation

as alleged in the amended complaint. The undersigned agrees. 7

Because the ADA does not define the term "operates," the

court should "construe it in accord with its ordinary and natural

meaning." See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). 

Relying on a variety of dictionary definitions, the Ninth Circuit

recently recognized that to "operate," in the context of a business,

means "to put or keep in operation," “[t]o control or direct the

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functioning of," and "[t]o conduct the affairs of; manage." Disabled

Rights Action Committee v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 878

n.14 (9th Cir. 2004)(citations omitted). In that same case the court

observed:

[W]hether Title III applies to [a rodeo’s sponsor

and presenter] depends on whether those private

entities exercise sufficient control over the

Center, and in particular over the configuration

of the facilities, even temporarily, with regard

to accessibility, that they can be said to

‘operate’ the stadium. 

375 F.3d at 878.

Here, defendants do not rise to the level of “operators”

simply by noticing depositions at a space in a court reporter’s

office or in a commercial office building. By convening a deposition

in a conference room, a person does not put or keep the entire

building in operation; he or she does not control the functioning of

the facilities; nor does he or she manage the affairs of the

buildings. In the context of litigating the underlying state court

action and conducting routine discovery, defendants did not exercise

the required management, control or oversight of the subject

buildings to become “operators” of those facilities. There is no

allegation that the defendants exercised sufficient control over the

configuration of the facilities with regard to accessibility. For

all of these reasons, defendants are not “operators” of the venues in

question and Title III does not apply to them. See Aikins v. St.

Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994)(Title III did

not apply to independent contractor physician at a hospital where the

physician was not on hospital's board of directors, had no authority

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 Plaintiff’s citation to Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 8

(9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) in a post-hearing letter

brief is not persuasive with respect to the issue posed here. The

court in Martin was not called upon to address the meaning of “to

operate” in that it appears to have been undisputed in that case that

“[o]n days of tour competition, PGA is the operator of the golf

course.” 204 F.3d at 996.

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to enact or amend hospital policy, and lacked power to control

hospital policy on use of interpreters). Therefore, plaintiff’s

first and second causes of action under Title III should be

dismissed.8

The undersigned also will recommend dismissal of the third

and fourth causes of action for retaliation and intimidation under

Title V, respectively. There currently is a split among the circuits

as to whether individuals can be liable under Title V of the ADA. 

Compare Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1179-80

(11th Cir. 2003)(holding that an individual may be sued in his

personal capacity for violating § 12203) with Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d

462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Congress did not intend

individuals to be liable under § 12203). The Ninth Circuit has not

addressed the issue in a published opinion and district courts within

this circuit are split on the matter. Compare Cable v. Dep't. of

Dev. Servs. of the State of Cal., 973 F. Supp. 937, 943 (C.D. Cal.

1997)("individuals cannot be held liable under Title V of the ADA")

and Stern v. California State Archives, 982 F. Supp. 690, 691 (E.D.

Cal. 1997)(“the court holds that individuals who do not qualify as

‘employers’ are not subject to personal liability under section

12112(a)” with Ostrach v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 957 F. Supp.

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196, 200 (E.D. Cal. 1997) ("[p]laintiff may sue the individual

defendants under the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA").

Nonetheless, even if the Ninth Circuit were to determine

that individuals can be held liable under § 12203(a) and (b), the

court finds that the actions allegedly engaged in by defendants

Carichoff and Coleman do not fall within the “retaliation,”

“coercion,” “intimidation,” “threats,” or “interference” contemplated

by Congress in enacting § 12203. A motion to compel plaintiff’s

deposition within the context of a civil lawsuit initiated by

plaintiff, and after at least two unsuccessful attempts to secure

plaintiff’s deposition testimony, can hardly be characterized as

retaliation. Nor can defendants’ efforts in noticing the deposition,

and attempting to cooperate with plaintiff to find a suitable

location for the deposition, be characterized as any kind of coercive

or threatening behavior. The unfortunate events leading to the

initiation of this action amount to a routine discovery dispute in

state court, not a federal civil rights lawsuit. For these reasons,

the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s Title V claims fail as a

matter of law and will recommend that the third and fourth causes of

action be dismissed with prejudice. See Douris v. Office of the

Pennsylvania Attorney General, No. Civ. A. 03-CV-5661, 2004 WL

322907, *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2004)(even if individuals could be held

liable under Title V, “[c]ertainly the refusal to pay money to settle

a claim and the refusal to capitulate to all demands of accommodation

cannot be characterized as ‘retaliation’").

/////

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Next, plaintiff’s state law claims are predicated on his

ADA claims. A violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of

California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), and the

California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c). Molski v.

Mandarin Touch Restaurant, 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862-63 (C.D. Cal.

2004); Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal.

2004). Because plaintiff is unable to state a cognizable claim under

the ADA, plaintiff’s state law claims must also be dismissed without

leave to amend.

Finally, defendants seek an order declaring plaintiff a

vexatious litigant and subjecting him to a pre-filing order. 

Defendants seek such an order on the grounds that plaintiff has filed

over 1,000 lawsuits alleging violations of the ADA. They rely on the

decision in Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant, 347 F. Supp. 2d 860

(C.D. Cal. 2004). However, the reasoning of the district court in

the Molski decision has recently been compellingly refuted. See

Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (E.D. Cal. 2006) 

Moreover, vexatious litigant orders are rarely justified. See De

Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1990); Wood v.

Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1523-26 (9th

Cir. 1993); Wilson, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. Clearly “mere

litigiousness is insufficient” to justify such an order. De Long,

912 F.2d 1147; Wilson, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.

Here, defendants have not even attempted to demonstrate

that any of plaintiff’s previously filed lawsuits were frivolous. 

There has been no representation by defendants that plaintiff has

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filed other meritless actions arising out of discovery disputes in

state court actions. Therefore, the court will recommend that

defendants’ request for an order declaring plaintiff a vexatious

litigant be denied without prejudice to renewal in the event

plaintiff were to pursue additional abusive lawsuits of this same

nature. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and this

entire action be dismissed with prejudice; and 

2. Defendants’ request for an order declaring plaintiff a

vexatious litigant be denied without prejudice. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 16, 2006.

DAD:th

ddad1\orders.prose\louie984.f&r.mtd

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