Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-04323/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-04323-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamal T. Everett
Petitioner
M.D. McDonald
Respondent

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMAL T. EVERETT, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

M.D. MCDONALD, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 10-cv-04323-CW (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner Jamal T. Everett, a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, filed this amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state criminal 

conviction, asserting the following four claims: (1) violation of 

his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436 (1966); (2) violation of his right to a fair trial by 

the trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser 

included offense; (3) violation of his right to a public trial; 

and (4) violation of his right to effective assistance of trial 

counsel. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of 

points and authorities in support thereof and Petitioner has 

filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

DENIES the petition and a certificate of appealability. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural History 

On June 15, 2004, a complaint was filed charging Petitioner 

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and two co-defendants with the murder of Jose Roberto. People v. 

Everett, 2009 WL 5153747, *3 (Cal. Ct. App.) (unpublished). The 

complaint alleged that Petitioner intentionally murdered Roberto 

by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle and that he 

personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm, 

causing death. Id. Although Petitioner was seventeen at the 

time of the offense, he was tried as an adult. Id. at *4. By 

the time the case came to trial in 2008, Petitioner was no longer 

a minor. Id. On May 19, 2008, Petitioner’s case was severed 

from that of his co-defendants for trial. Id. On June 9, 2008, 

a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder and found 

true the allegations that he personally used a firearm, causing 

death. Id. On July 29, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to forty 

years to life in prison. Id. 

Petitioner submitted two claims on direct appeal: (1) a 

Miranda violation; and (2) trial court error in failing to 

instruct on a lesser included offense. On December 10, 2009, the 

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an 

unpublished opinion. Ex. 10; Everett, 2009 WL 5153747. On March 

10, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied review. Ex. 12. 

On September 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a timely petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Dkt. No. 1. On 

February 2, 2011, the Court granted Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the petition as unexhausted. Dkt. No. 7. On March 1, 

2011, the Court ordered the proceedings stayed so Petitioner 

could exhaust his unexhausted claims. Dkt. No. 14. 

On June 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the Alameda County Superior Court, asserting two 

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claims: (1) the violation of his right to a public trial; and 

(2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ex. 13. On August 

12, 2011, the Superior Court denied the petition as untimely and 

failing to state a prima facie case for relief. Ex. 14. On 

March 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily 

denied on June 13, 2012. Exs. 15 & 16. 

On July 12, 2012, Petitioner notified this Court that the 

California Supreme Court had denied his petition and moved to 

reopen the action and lift the stay. Dkt. No. 27. On March 8, 

2013, the Court lifted the stay and directed Petitioner to file 

an amended petition, which he filed on April 11, 2013. 

II. Statement of Facts 

 The following is a summary of facts taken from the Court of 

Appeal opinion. On the evening of September 26, 2003, Petitioner 

and two other young men were driving in Oakland in a gray Toyota 

Cressida. Everett, 2009 WL 5153747, at *2. Petitioner was in 

possession of a nine-millimeter Glock pistol with about eight 

bullets in it, which he had purchased the preceding day. Id. 

Petitioner’s friend, Steve Bell, had a black .38-caliber 

revolver. Id. Timothy Allen was driving the car. Id. at *3. 

Because Petitioner and Bell both had guns, they decided they 

“might as well go get some of the people that they were having 

problems with.” Id. One of the people they discussed was named 

J.D. Id. 

 The three men drove along Coolidge Avenue where they thought 

their target would be. Id. Petitioner spotted some people, 

pointed them out, urged Bell to shoot, and then to shoot again. 

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Id. After Bell fired two shots, Petitioner “got out the window” 

and started to shoot his own gun, firing over the roof of the car 

in the direction of the driver’s side. Id. Petitioner and Bell 

emptied their guns and drove away. Id. 

 There were five or six people in the group at whom 

Petitioner and Bell were firing. Id. Petitioner was aiming at 

the person he knew as J.D. Id. According to Petitioner, he was 

shooting at J.D. in order to scare him and induce him to leave 

Petitioner’s friend alone. Id. He told police that he did not 

intend to kill J.D., but acknowledged that he was aiming at him 

and trying to shoot him, and was aware that J.D.’s death could 

result. Id. 

 J.D. was not shot, but an individual in the group named Jose 

Roberto was shot in the head and killed. Id. at *2. Petitioner 

said he did not intend to kill Roberto. Id. at *3. A firearms 

expert testified at Petitioner’s trial that Petitioner’s gun 

fired the casings found on the street at the crime scene. Id. at 

*2. The expert testified that the markings on the ninemillimeter bullet recovered from Roberto’s body indicated that it 

had probably been fired from a Glock, although he could not say 

for certain that it was the same Glock that fired the casings. 

Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation 

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant 

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habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court 

authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), 

only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court 

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 

529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable 

application of” Supreme Court authority, under the second clause 

of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal 

principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. 

at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the 

writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. 

Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to 

support granting the writ. Id. at 409. Under AEDPA, the writ 

may be granted only “where there is no possibility fairminded 

jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts 

with this Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 

770, 786 (2011). 

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 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In the present 

case, the highest court to issue a reasoned decision on the 

Miranda and jury instruction claims is the California Court of 

Appeal and the highest court to issue a reasoned decision on the 

public trial and ineffective assistance of counsel claims is the 

Alameda County Superior Court. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Miranda Violation 

 A. Federal Authority 

 Miranda requires that a person subjected to custodial 

interrogation be advised that "he has the right to remain silent, 

that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 

him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney." 

384 U.S. at 444. The warnings must precede any custodial 

interrogation, which occurs whenever law enforcement officers 

question a person after taking that person into custody or 

otherwise significantly deprive a person of freedom of action. 

Id. The requirements of Miranda are "clearly established" 

federal law for purposes of federal habeas corpus review under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th 

Cir. 2005). 

 If a suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of 

the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney," all 

questioning must cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. A suspect 

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who has expressed a desire to have counsel present during 

custodial interrogation therefore is not subject to further 

interrogation by the authorities until counsel is made available 

to him, unless the suspect himself initiates further 

communication with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 

484-85 (1981). 

 B. Court of Appeal Opinion 

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows: 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing 

on appellant’s motion to suppress his 

statements to the police. The evidence at 

that hearing was as follows. On June 11, 

2004, FN4 Sergeant Phil Green of the Oakland 

Police Department and his partner, both 

wearing plain clothes, picked appellant up at 

Juvenile Hall and transported him to the 

Oakland Police Department Homicide Section 

for questioning. Although Green was not in 

uniform, he was wearing his police badge in a 

visible location, but appellant denied seeing 

it. Appellant was not given Miranda FN5 

warnings at Juvenile Hall before being taken 

to the police station. According to Green, 

between the time he met appellant at Juvenile 

Hall until he was placed in an interrogation 

room at the police station, appellant never 

requested that he be given an attorney or 

allowed to call his mother. 

FN4 This date was about a month before 

appellant’s 18th birthday. 

 FN5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 

 436. 

According to appellant, he was alarmed when 

two men in plain clothes picked him up from 

Juvenile Hall and refused to tell him who 

they were, or anything other than that they 

were taking him “downtown.” Appellant 

testified that before leaving Juvenile Hall, 

he asked to call his mother or a lawyer, but 

was not permitted to do so. He asserted that 

a Juvenile Hall employee, Bennie Elzy, 

overheard him making this request and asked 

why he wanted a lawyer, and that he then 

repeated it, explaining that he wanted to 

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call his mother or his lawyer so that they 

could meet him “downtown.” 

Appellant called Elzy as a witness at the 

evidentiary hearing, but she testified that 

she did not remember the incident due to the 

passage of time, and did not recall one way 

or the other whether she heard appellant ask 

the police to let him make a call. She 

acknowledged, however, that it was not 

unusual for minors at Juvenile Hall to ask 

officers or the staff to let them make a 

phone call to a parent or a lawyer. Elzy had 

known appellant through her work since he was 

about 12 or 13 years old, and he was “just 

like any other kid” in terms of his 

willingness to ask questions or make 

requests. 

Appellant was put into the interrogation room 

at about 6:20 p.m., without having been given 

any Miranda warnings. Between then and 11:17 

p.m., the police interviewed appellant’s 

codefendants, Allen and Bell. Appellant 

testified that during this time, the police 

came into the interrogation room, showed him 

a photograph, and asked him who it was. 

Appellant averred that he again asked to call 

his mother or a lawyer during this 

conversation, but was not permitted to do so 

at that time or afterwards. In contrast, 

Green testified that he did not talk to 

appellant between the time he was put into 

the interrogation room and 11:17 p.m., and 

the police log regarding appellant’s stay in 

the interrogation room did not reflect that 

the police had any substantive contact with 

appellant during that period. The police did 

show appellant a photograph of the crime 

scene, but this occurred later on, during the 

tape-recorded interview. 

 

At 11:21 p.m., Green returned to the room, 

and told appellant that he was suspected of 

being involved in a shooting, and that the 

police wanted to talk to him about it. Green 

testified that he gave appellant Miranda 

warnings at this time, and then he and his 

partner questioned appellant in an unrecorded 

conversation for about an hour. Appellant 

denied having been advised of his rights 

before the police started questioning him. 

He acknowledged, however, that before he was 

advised of his Miranda rights, the police 

told him that he was being questioned in 

connection with a murder. FN6 

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FN6 There is an inconsistency in 

appellant’s testimony in this regard. 

On redirect examination, he testified 

that the reason he asked to call a 

lawyer or his mother on this occasion 

was that he had been told he was being 

questioned about a murder, and knew that 

this was a serious offense. In his 

direct testimony, however, he stated 

that his request for a phone call was 

made before he left Juvenile Hall, and 

that he did not know at that time why 

the men who had come to collect him were 

taking him downtown. 

According to Green, appellant did not 

ask to talk to his mother or to a lawyer 

at any time during the interrogation. 

At trial, Green testified again that at 

no time between Green’s first contact 

with appellant at Juvenile Hall and the 

end of their interviews did appellant 

ever ask to call his mother or a lawyer. 

Appellant acknowledged that after he started 

talking to the police, they did give him 

Miranda warnings, and that he did not ask for 

a lawyer or ask to talk to his mother after 

they had done so. Appellant then gave the 

three tape-recorded statements that were the 

subject of his motion to suppress. At the 

start of the first tape-recorded interview, 

Green noted that appellant had been given 

Miranda warnings and reiterated their 

content. Appellant confirmed on the tape 

that he had been given the warnings, and that 

he had agreed to talk to the police after 

receiving them. 

 

Green testified that his custom and practice 

was to allow juvenile suspects to call their 

parents upon request; that appellant never 

made such a request during the unrecorded 

portions of their encounter; and that if 

appellant had asked to call his mother, Green 

would have permitted him to do so. As an 

example, Green testified that when 

appellant’s codefendant, Bell, asked for a 

lawyer during a follow-up interview with the 

police, Green and his partner memorialized 

the request in their notes, and then 

immediately concluded the interview and left. 

Green acknowledged, however, that he did not 

tell appellant that he could make any phone 

calls, did not tell him how he could get a 

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lawyer, and did not offer him a chance to use 

a telephone. 

 

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, 

the court engaged in a colloquy with 

appellant’s trial counsel, and confirmed that 

counsel did not have any evidence 

corroborating appellant’s testimony. 

Appellant’s trial counsel then acknowledged 

that the issue boiled down to one of 

credibility as between Green and appellant. 

The court pointed out that by the time of his 

interview with the police in this case, 

appellant had extensive prior experience with 

the juvenile justice system, had been given 

Miranda warnings on several occasions, had 

waived those rights and given statements in 

the past, and had expressly waived them 

during the tape-recorded portion of his 

interview in this case. The court also took 

note that at the end of the interview, when 

the police asked appellant if they had 

“treat[ed][him] all right” during his 

encounter with them, appellant responded 

affirmatively. 

 

The trial court denied the motion “based upon 

the totality of the circumstances and 

everything that has been in front of th[e] 

court,” without expressly stating on the 

record that the court was making a factual 

finding that appellant did not ask to call 

his mother or an attorney. In context, 

however, it is clear from the trial court’s 

remarks that the motion hinged on a 

straightforward credibility issue, which the 

court resolved adversely to appellant. Thus, 

we read the record as including an implied 

factual finding by the trial court that 

appellant did not in fact invoke his right to 

contact his mother or an attorney, either 

before or during his interview by the police. 

This implied finding is one of historical 

fact, which we must affirm if it is supported 

by substantial evidence. . . . 

In this case, the trial court’s implied 

finding is supported by Officer Green’s 

unequivocal testimony that appellant did not 

ask to call his mother or an attorney at any 

time between the time he was picked up at 

Juvenile Hall to be taken to the police 

station and the end of his discussions with 

the police. This testimony was corroborated 

by appellant’s tape-recorded admission, 

toward the end of the interview, that the 

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police had treated him appropriately. The 

trial court’s decision to reject appellant’s 

uncorroborated contrary testimony as not 

credible is also supported by appellant’s 

prior history of waiving his rights after 

receiving Miranda admonitions. 

 

Appellant relies on authorities holding that 

uncontradicted testimony that a minor suspect 

asked to call a parent before or during an 

interrogation must be considered sufficient 

to show an invocation of the minor’s Fifth 

Amendment rights. (People v. Burton (1971) 6 

Cal.3d 375, 383-384.) In the present case, 

however, appellant’s testimony was squarely 

controverted by Green’s. Thus, these cases 

are inapposite. Under the applicable 

standard of review, the record provides us 

with no basis for reversing the trial court’s 

ruling denying appellant’s motion to suppress 

his statements. 

Everett, 2009 WL 5153747, at *4-6 (emphasis in original)(footnote 

7 omitted). 

 C. Analysis 

 Petitioner argues that the state appellate court 

unreasonably denied his Miranda claim because he did ask to speak 

to his mother or a lawyer, and he did so twice, first before he 

left Juvenile Hall with the detectives and again after he arrived 

at the police station. 

 As the appellate court reasonably concluded, the trial 

court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s motion to suppress, after 

holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue, was based upon its 

assessment of the credibility of Petitioner and of Oakland Police 

Sergeant Green. Petitioner’s argument requires this Court to redetermine the credibility of these witnesses. However, this 

Court must defer to the state court’s finding regarding who was 

the more credible witness because “no sort of factual finding [] 

is more appropriate for deferential treatment than [] a state 

court’s credibility determination.” Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 

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F.2d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 1986). “‘Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives 

federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of 

witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial 

court, but not by them.’” Id. (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 

459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). The Supreme Court has stated, “When a 

trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the 

testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told 

a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted 

by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally 

inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v. 

City of Bessemer, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 

 At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner and Sgt. Green gave 

directly contradictory testimony that was not contradicted by 

external evidence. The trial judge’s observations of the 

witnesses’ demeanor and tone of voice that “bear so heavily on 

the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said” must 

be given great deference. See id. Furthermore, as pointed out 

by the appellate court, the credibility determination was 

supported by Petitioner’s testimony that he had been arrested 

“numerous times” and had been given his Miranda rights on at 

least five previous occasions, establishing his experience with 

the police and his knowledge of his rights to remain silent and 

ask for a lawyer. Ex. 5, 5 Reporter’s Transcript (RT) at 105-11. 

Additional support for the court’s credibility determination 

comes from the fact that, at the end of the tape-recorded 

interview, when Sgt. Green asked Petitioner if he had been 

treated well, Petitioner responded, “Yes.” He did not say that 

he had asked for a lawyer, but Sgt. Green did not allow him to 

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have one and made him talk instead. RT at 111. 

 Petitioner also argues the appellate court unreasonably 

found, based on the fact that he did not know at Juvenile Hall 

that he was going to be questioned about a murder, that his 

statements about asking twice to speak to his mother and a lawyer 

were inconsistent. Petitioner contends his statements were not 

inconsistent because he knew at Juvenile Hall he was going to be 

questioned about a murder in that the police previously 

questioned his brother about Petitioner’s involvement in a 

murder. However, this argument is also belied by the trial 

court’s determination that Petitioner was not a credible witness, 

to which this Court must defer. 

For all of these reasons, the state court’s denial of this 

claim was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

authority or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the record evidence. 

II. Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense 

 Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to 

instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser 

included offense. In ruling on this claim, the Court of Appeal 

first noted that the jury’s guilty verdict of second degree 

murder implied it found that Petitioner deliberately fired his 

gun into a crowd of people with conscious disregard for the 

danger to human life inherent in that act. Everett, 2009 WL 

5153747, at *7. The Court of Appeal then rejected the claim on 

the ground that no substantial evidence supported a finding by a 

reasonable jury that Roberto’s killing occurred unintentionally. 

An unintentional killing would require a finding that Petitioner 

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had acted “without due caution and circumspection” rather “than 

with conscious disregard of a known danger to life” when he fired 

his gun into a crowd of people. Id. 

 A claim based on a state court’s interpretation of its own 

law and state law jury instructions is not cognizable on federal 

habeas review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991) 

(that an instruction was incorrect under state law provides no 

basis for habeas relief); see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 

1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005) (state court’s determination that, 

under state law, insufficient evidence warranted a defense 

instruction, was dispositive of instructional error claim). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s argument that the Court of Appeal 

improperly applied California law does not create a basis for 

federal habeas relief. 

 To the extent that Petitioner argues an involuntary 

manslaughter instruction was required by the Due Process Clause, 

it is refuted by the case law holding that due process requires a 

trial court to give a jury an instruction on a lesser included 

offense only when the evidence warrants it. See Hopper v. Evans, 

456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982); Menendez, 422 F.3d at 1029. As the 

Court of Appeal explained, Petitioner’s statement to the police 

that he did not intend to kill, taken in the context of the rest 

of his statement that he knew “just by simply pulling the 

trigger, there’s a good chance you’re gonna end up killing 

somebody,” and that “he was trying to shoot J.D.,” did not 

constitute evidence supporting an involuntary manslaughter 

instruction. Everett, 2009 WL 5153747, at *7. The Court of 

Appeal also reasonably found that a witness’s testimony that he 

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initially thought the gun could have been fired in the air rather 

than at the group of people was “far too slender a thread from 

which to hang the argument that substantial evidence supported an 

involuntary manslaughter instruction.” Id. at *8. 

III. Right to a Public Trial 

 Petitioner contends his right to a public trial was violated 

because his family and friends were not allowed in the courtroom 

during jury selection and the trial. Petitioner first presented 

this claim in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

Alameda County Superior Court, which denied it as untimely, 

noting that Petitioner had not demonstrated good cause for the 

delay or that his claim fell within any exception to the 

untimeliness bar. The California Supreme Court denied the 

petition without explanation; thus, it is assumed to have denied 

it on the same grounds as the Superior Court. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Pham v. Terhune, 400 

F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 A federal court will not review questions of federal law 

decided by a state court if the decision rests on a state law 

ground that is independent of the federal ground and is adequate 

to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–

30 (1991). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his 

claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate 

state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is 

barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default 

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of 

federal law, or demonstrate that a failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750. 

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California’s practice of barring a petitioner from collaterally 

attacking his conviction if the filing is “substantially delayed” 

is an independent and adequate state procedural bar. Walker v. 

Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1130-31 (2011). Therefore, this claim 

is procedurally defaulted unless Petitioner can show cause and 

prejudice for the default or that a failure to consider this 

claim will result in a miscarriage of justice. 

 In his traverse, Petitioner argues that his delay in filing 

his state petition was caused by the fact that, after this Court 

granted his motion to stay his petition on March 1, 2011, he was 

transferred to another prison and was not given his property 

until June 16, 2011, after which he promptly filed his state 

petition. Petitioner also argues that he told his appellate 

counsel to raise this claim on appeal, but counsel responded that 

it “would not work for him.” Apparently, Petitioner is arguing 

that his transfer and his appellate counsel’s refusal constituted 

“cause” for his late-filed state petition. 

 The cause standard requires a petitioner to show that "'some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's 

efforts' to construct or raise the claim." McCleskey v. Zant, 

499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991). Such objective factors include 

interference by officials that makes compliance with the state's 

procedural rule impracticable and a showing that the factual or 

legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel. 

Id. at 493-94. 

 Petitioner’s reasons for his delay are not based on 

objective factors external to the defense. Even if Petitioner 

had filed his state petition immediately after this Court granted 

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a stay, it would have been filed approximately one year after the 

California Supreme Court denied review of his appeal, which would 

have already been untimely. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 

784 (1998) (petition not entitled to presumption of timeliness 

unless it is filed “within 90 days after the final due date for 

appellant’s filing of the reply brief on the direct appeal”). 

And, because the factual basis of this claim was known to both 

trial and appellate counsel, Petitioner has not shown that an 

objective factor impeded counsel’s ability to raise the claim. 

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show cause. He also fails to 

argue prejudice. 

 He does argue that excluding this claim from review will 

cause a miscarriage of justice. However, the "miscarriage of 

justice" exception is limited to habeas petitioners who can show 

that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986)); see Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 936-38 (9th Cir. 

2008) (miscarriage of justice exception limited to extraordinary 

cases where petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes the 

court cannot have confidence in the finding of guilt). A 

petitioner must present evidence that creates a colorable claim 

that he is innocent of the charge for which he is incarcerated, 

as opposed to legal innocence as a result of legal error. 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. It is not enough that the evidence show 

the existence of reasonable doubt, a petitioner must show "that 

it is more likely than not that no 'reasonable juror' would have 

convicted him." Id. at 329. 

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 Petitioner bases his claim of innocence on the fact that the 

prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense the testimony of the 

individuals contained on his witness list. Undisclosed 

exculpatory evidence showing Petitioner was innocent might be 

sufficient to satisfy Schlup. However, Petitioner does not 

indicate the nature of the undisclosed evidence. It appears that 

his claim of innocence is based on the fact that the prosecutor 

placed on his witness list individuals whom he did not intend to 

call, in order to exclude them from the courtroom. This does not 

show that Petitioner was actually innocent. 

 Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred from federal 

habeas review. 

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

 Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel on several grounds. Petitioner first raised this claim 

in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Alameda County 

Superior Court, which denied it as untimely and because he failed 

to state a prima facie case for relief. For the reasons 

discussed above, unless Petitioner can show cause and prejudice 

or actual innocence, this claim is procedurally barred. 

Petitioner fails to argue cause and prejudice regarding this 

claim, and again fails to show actual innocence. Therefore, the 

claim is procedurally defaulted. 

 Moreover, it fails on the merits. To prevail on a Sixth 

Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s 

performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective 

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, 

he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome. Id. A “doubly” deferential judicial review is 

appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

under § 2254. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410-11 

(2011); Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788; Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 

733, 740 (2011). The general rule of Strickland, to review a 

defense counsel’s effectiveness with great deference, gives the 

state courts greater leeway in reasonably applying that rule, 

which in turn “translates to a narrower range of decisions that 

are objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v. Washington, 

614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). When § 2254(d) applies, “the question 

is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question 

is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 131 S. 

Ct. at 788. 

 A. Inadequate Consultation and Poor Communication 

 Petitioner claims defense counsel came to see him only once 

during the first three years of his incarceration, he did not 

return phone calls and he missed several appointments with 

Petitioner’s family. Petitioner raised these points at the 

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hearing on the Marsden motion1 filed by counsel on behalf of 

Petitioner. At the hearing, counsel: (1) agreed with Petitioner 

that he had not met with Petitioner since he represented him at 

the preliminary hearing because his heavy caseload did not allow 

him time to do so; and (2) stated that he did have conversations 

with Petitioner’s mother and missed an appointment with her but, 

when he called her back, he could not reach her. 6 RT at 3-4, 6-

7. The trial court denied the Marsden motion, noting that 

Petitioner’s counsel represented him at his preliminary hearing 

so he knew about Petitioner’s case and that any lack of 

communication was due to counsel’s heavy caseload rather than 

lack of interest in the case. 6 RT at 8-9. 

 "Adequate consultation between attorney and client is an 

essential element of competent representation of a criminal 

defendant." Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 457 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(citation omitted). However, there is no minimum number of 

meetings between counsel and client prior to trial necessary to 

prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of counsel. 

United States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1988). An 

experienced attorney can elicit more information from one 

interview with a client than a neophyte lawyer. Id. 

 Because counsel represented Petitioner at his preliminary 

hearing, as the trial court found, he was familiar with the facts 

of Petitioner’s case. Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the 

 

1

People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 123 (1970), held that a trial 

court must hold a hearing on a criminal defendant’s motion to 

substitute counsel to determine if the right to assistance of 

counsel would be substantially impaired if the motion were not 

granted. 

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number of meetings he had with his attorney does not establish 

deficient performance. See Olson, 846 F.2d at 1108. To the 

contrary, at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, the trial court 

stated that counsel’s performance, especially his closing 

argument, was a key factor in the jury returning a verdict of 

second degree instead of first degree murder. 5 RT at 554-55. 

 Petitioner also fails to establish prejudice as a result of 

the few consultations because he does not indicate what further 

consultation would have achieved. See United States v. Rogers, 

769 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (to establish prejudice, 

petitioner must indicate what further consultation with attorney 

would have revealed). 

 B. Counsel Violated Attorney-Client Privilege 

 Counsel’s duty of loyalty and duty to avoid conflicts of 

interest are two essential components of reasonable performance 

by criminal defense counsel. McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 

1241 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

Counsel’s duty to keep the client’s confidences, in all but a few 

limited circumstances, is a critical component of reasonable 

representation such that a departure from this rule “‘make[s] out 

a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.’” Id. at 

1242-43 (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986)). 

 Petitioner contends that counsel breached the attorneyclient privilege by discussing his case with Tracy Smith, another 

of counsel’s clients, who was housed in the same pod as 

Petitioner. Petitioner brought this up at the Marsden hearing 

and counsel said he did not tell Smith “one word about 

Petitioner’s case.” 6 RT at 5. In his amended petition, 

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Petitioner contends that at a later Marsden hearing,2 counsel 

admitted that he may have told Smith that he represented a guy 

charged with a drive-by shooting, but also said he did not 

discuss the details of any client’s case with any other client. 

Am. Pet. at 11-12. Petitioner argues that counsel’s discussion 

with Smith prejudiced him because Smith could have falsely 

testified at Petitioner’s trial to get a reduced sentence. 

 Even if counsel did mention to Smith that he represented 

someone who was charged with a drive-by shooting, Petitioner does 

not establish prejudice because Smith did not testify at 

Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner’s speculation about Smith does 

not show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is 

a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been 

different. 

 C. Counsel Sent Wrong Discovery to Petitioner 

 Petitioner contends that counsel sent him the wrong 

paperwork regarding his case more than once and did not send him 

the correct paperwork and his taped statement until one year 

before the trial. Am. Pet. at 12. At the Marsden hearing, 

counsel explained that he had asked his secretary to send 

Petitioner the paperwork and there was a letter in the file 

indicating the paperwork had been mailed but, because his 

secretary had sent it, he could not vouch with certainty that it 

was the correct discovery. The record shows that counsel 

obtained a court order allowing Petitioner to have a tape player 

 

2

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Marsden hearing as part of the record on appeal and, therefore, 

it is not part of the record here. 

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on April 11, 2007, over one year before trial commenced. 1 CT at 

274. Petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by the late 

delivery of the correct paperwork because it denied him “a chance 

to study his case,” and to file motions on his own behalf when 

defense counsel failed to do so. Trav. at 12. 

 Petitioner’s receipt of his paperwork and the tape more than 

one year before his trial allowed him adequate time “to study his 

case” before trial and he could not have filed motions pro se 

while he was represented by counsel. See People v. Williams, 58 

Cal. 4th 197, 255 (2013) (criminal defendant has no right to 

“hybrid representation,” that is, to be represented by an 

attorney and also to represent himself); People v. Moore, 51 Cal. 

4th 1104, 1119-20 (2011) (criminal defendant has right to have an 

attorney represent him and the right to represent himself, but 

these rights are mutually exclusive). 

 D. Counsel Rarely Came to Court Hearings 

 Petitioner contends defense counsel rarely came to 

Petitioner’s court hearings. Am. Pet. at 12. However, the 

record shows that counsel appeared for Petitioner at the 

preliminary hearing, numerous other court hearings, trial and 

sentencing. 1 Clerk’s Transcript (CT) at 7-248 (preliminary 

hearing), 255; 257; 259; 260; 265; 270; 271 (Marsden motion 

hearing); 272; 277-78; 287-321; 234-57 (jury trial); 361-79 (jury 

trial); 430 (sentencing hearing). Another attorney appeared for 

defense counsel at several scheduling conferences. Petitioner 

fails to show how counsel’s occasional use of substitute counsel 

at scheduling conferences constituted deficient performance or 

had any effect on the outcome of the trial. 

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 E. Defense Counsel Wanted to be Replaced 

 Petitioner contends that, at the Marsden hearing, defense 

counsel stated it would be in counsel’s best interest if another 

attorney were appointed to represent Petitioner. Am. Pet. at 13. 

Petitioner misinterprets counsel’s statement. At the hearing, 

counsel, noting that Petitioner was angry with him for a lack of 

communication, stated, “I don’t know if I can do anything to make 

him happy with me, and perhaps it would be in his best interest 

to be able to get somebody else.” 6 RT at 7. Counsel clearly 

was stating he thought it would be better for Petitioner to have 

another attorney; he was not speaking about himself, as 

Petitioner contends. Id. 

 Even if Petitioner is arguing counsel should have been 

dismissed because of his own dissatisfaction with counsel’s 

performance, he fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel. 

See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (Sixth Amendment does 

not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and 

his counsel; it only guarantees effective representation of 

counsel); United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 

1991) (Sixth Amendment does not entitle criminal defendant to an 

attorney who likes and feels comfortable with him). 

 F. Delayed Filing of Miranda Motion 

 Petitioner contends that counsel unreasonably delayed filing 

a motion to suppress until 2008, after one of his potential 

witnesses died in a car accident and the other witness was unable 

to remember what happened when the police took Petitioner from 

Juvenile Hall to the police station. He argues that, if the 

motion had been filed and heard earlier, the witnesses would have 

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corroborated his testimony that, at Juvenile Hall, he had asked 

the officers to let him speak to his mother or to a lawyer and 

the judge would have then granted his motion to suppress his 

inculpatory statement to the police. 

 Although defense counsel could have brought the motion to 

suppress earlier in the process, his decision to file it once the 

case was assigned to a trial court was reasonable. When he made 

this decision, he could not have known that one potential witness 

would die and one potential witness would forget what, if 

anything, Petitioner said at Juvenile Hall. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690 (reasonableness of counsel’s performance must be 

viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct, not in hindsight). 

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show counsel was ineffective. 

 Petitioner also fails to meet his burden of showing 

prejudice because he cannot show that, had the motion been filed 

earlier, either witness would have testified favorably to him. 

Therefore, he does not show that, but for counsel’s error, “there 

is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

 In summary, none of the grounds Petitioner raises shows that 

counsel performed deficiently or that prejudice resulted from 

counsel’s alleged deficiency. Habeas relief based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel is denied. 

V. Certificate of Appealability 

 No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. 

See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 (requiring district court to rule on certificate of 

appealability in same order that denies petition). Petitioner 

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has failed to make a substantial showing that any claim amounted 

to a denial of his constitutional rights or to demonstrate that a 

reasonable jurist would find this Court’s denial of his claims 

debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000). 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

 1. The amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

denied. 

 2. The Clerk of the Court shall to enter judgment and close 

the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 04/02/2015 

__________________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

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