Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01482/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01482-25/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
E. & J. Gallo Winery
Counter Claimant
Vineyard Investigations
Counter Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINEYARD INVESTIGATIONS,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. & J. GALLO WINERY,

Defendant.

.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART THE PARTIES’ 

NOTICE AND JOINT REQUEST TO 

SEAL DOCUMENTS

(Doc. 138) 

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 2024, Plaintiff Vineyard Investigations (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant E. & J. 

Gallo (“Defendant”) filed a “Notice of Joint Request to Seal Documents” (Doc. 138) (the “Notice”)

and submitted to the Court a “Joint Request to Seal Documents,” pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local Rule 

141, seeking to seal their joint statement and exhibits relating to Defendant’s “Motion to Disqualify 

Vineyard Investigations’ Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan” (Doc. 135) (the “Joint Request”). The Court 

has reviewed the Notice and Joint Request, and the documents sought to be sealed, and has 

determined that the Notice and Joint Request establish good cause to seal some of the documents 

but lack the requisite good cause as to other documents. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Notice and Joint Request, with leave to re-file a 

request that corrects the deficiencies set forth in this order.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

All documents filed with the court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 

v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). This is because “the courts of this country

recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 

records and documents.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 

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2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 

overcoming the strong public access presumption. Id.

Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents: the “compelling reasons” 

standard for documents directly related to the underlying causes of action, such as documents 

attached to summary judgment motions, and the lesser “good cause” standard for documents only 

tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, such as those offered in support of nondispositive, discovery type motions:

[J]udicial records attached to dispositive motions [are treated] differently from 

records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those who seek to maintain the 

secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold 

of showing that “compelling reasons” support secrecy. A “good cause” showing 

under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non-dispositive 

motions.

Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see 

also Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098; Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 

(9th Cir. 2009).

The good cause standard, applicable here, “comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the 

issuance of protective orders in the discovery process.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1097. 

Rule 26(c) states that the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see 

also Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (stating that the good cause standard under Rule 26(c) asks “whether 

‘good cause’ exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the 

needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality”).

As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a blanket protective order does not by itself demonstrate 

“good cause” for sealing specific information and documents. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 

(“[a]lthough the magistrate judge expressly approved and entered the protective order, the order 

contained no good cause findings as to specific documents that would justify reliance by the United 

States”); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] party 

seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order typically does not make the ‘good 

cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document.”); San Jose Mercury 

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News, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1103; Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 

1992) (“Further, because the protective order was a stipulated blanket order, International never had 

to make a ‘good cause’ showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) of the need for protection of the 

deposition transcripts in the first place. Nor does it allege specific prejudice or harm now. Broad 

allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy 

the Rule 26(c) test.” (citations omitted)); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 

854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Even if the parties agree that a protective order should be entered, they 

still have the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is equally 

apparent that the obverse also is true, i.e., if good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in 

question should not receive judicial protection.” (citations omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

The parties seek to seal the following documents relating to Defendant’s “Motion to 

Disqualify Vineyard Investigations’ Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan” (Doc. 135): (1) the parties’ Rule 

251 Joint Statement Regarding Discovery Dispute; (2) Exhibits 3 and 4 to the Declaration of 

Matthew Chung in support of the parties’ Rule 251 Joint Statement Regarding Gallo’s Motion to 

Disqualify Vineyard Investigations’ Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan (the “Chung Declaration”); and (3) 

Exhibits B and C to the Declaration of Michelle Lewis in support of the parties’ Rule 251 Joint 

Statement Regarding Gallo’s Motion to Disqualify Vineyard Investigations’ Expert Dr. Mark 

Greenspan (the “Lewis Declaration”). 

On November 14, 2024, the Court entered a minute order indicating it was in receipt of the 

parties’ attachments to their Joint Request but it was unclear whether the parties sought several of 

the attached documents to be redacted or sealed in their entirety, as the documents did not include 

proposed redactions to evaluate pursuant to the good cause standard. (Doc. 141.) The Court 

instructed the parties to resubmit submissions as to their Joint Statement, as well as Exhibits B and 

C to the Lewis Declaration clarifying (1) what highlighted material therein is proposed to be 

redacted or (2) whether the document is requested to be sealed in its entirety. The Court also advised 

the parties that it was, consistent with its prior order (see Doc. 119), it was disinclined to seal the 

documents in their entirety. The parties resubmitted their documents in response to the Court’s 

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order adding proposed redactions to the Joint Statement, but not to Exhibits B and C to the Lewis 

Declaration. (Doc. 143.) 

The parties’ primary stated justification for sealing these documents is that they are either 

designated as “Confidential”1or “Trade Secret Model and Algorithm Information”2under the 

parties’ stipulated protective order. See Declaration of Matthew Chung In Support of Joint Request 

to Seal (“Chung Sealing Declaration”) at 2–3.

As set forth above, a blanket protective order does not establish good cause to file documents 

under seal. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. This Court did not make findings of good cause as to any 

specific document in the litigation, see id. at 1133. Therefore, in the instance of documents allegedly 

containing “Trade Secret Model and Algorithm Information,” in order for the Court to grant the 

request, the parties must have articulated with particularity why such information it is “proprietary” 

and “sensitive” or what “significant efforts” have been taken by Defendant to maintain its “secrecy”

(Doc. 43 at 7). See Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476.

A. Joint Statement and Exhibits 3 & 4

While the parties’ primary justification for sealing is based on provisions of the Protective 

Order, the parties also provide a sentence of “articulated reasoning” in support of the suggested 

redactions as to each the Joint Statement and Exhibits 3 and 4 to the Chung Declaration. See 

Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476. Chung Sealing Declaration at 2–3. And, importantly, they 

do not seek these documents to be sealed in their entirety. 

Consistent with prior requests for sealing that have been granted (see Docs. 125, 144), the 

parties contend the documents contain confidential business information, including non-public 

information such as technical information related to Defendant’s research and development.

1

“Confidential” information is defined in the parties’ stipulated protective order as “information that qualifies for 

protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), including information that a Producing Party, including any 

Party to this action and any Non-Party producing information or material voluntarily or pursuant to a subpoena or a 

court order, considers in good faith to constitute or contain confidential technical, sales, marketing, financial, or other 

commercially sensitive information, whether embodied in physical objects, documents, or the factual knowledge of 

persons, and which has been so designated by the Producing Party.” (Doc. 43 at 4.)

2

“Trade Secret Model and Algorithm Information” is defined in the parties’ stipulated protective order as “Highly 

Confidential-Attorneys’ Eyes Only information that consists of proprietary and sensitive modeling data and algorithms, 

or portions thereof, developed by [Defendant] for use in its irrigation decisions and the secrecy of which [Defendant]

has taken significant efforts to maintain.” (Doc. 43 at 7.)

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Technical information is typically sealable. Digital Reg of Texas, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. C 

12-1971 CW, 2014 WL 6986068, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014). Court finds the parties’ have 

adequately articulated “good cause” for maintaining confidentiality. See Zavala v. GreatBanc Trust 

Co., No. 1:19-cv-00239-DAD-SKO, 2022 WL 17830231, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022). Further, 

by submitting a revised joint request with specific redactions consistent with redactions already 

accepted by the Court in relation to other discovery requests, the parties have sufficiently 

demonstrated a “particularized showing” as to these documents. See In re High-Tech Employee 

Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2013 WL 163779, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2013) (“Even 

under the ‘good cause’ standard of Rule 26(c), . . . a party must make a ‘particularized showing’ 

with respect to any individual document in order to justify sealing the relevant document.”) (quoting 

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180). For these reasons, the Court will GRANT the parties’ Joint Request

as to Joint Statement and Exhibits 3 and 4 to the Chung Declaration.

B. Exhibits B & C

The parties did not propose any redactions to Exhibits B and C to the Lewis Declaration.

While the parties did not “indicate . . . whether [Exhibits B and C to the Lewis Declaration are] 

requested to be sealed in [their] entirety” (Doc. 141), the Court construes the parties request as one 

seeking that these documents be sealed in toto. As the Court has previously indicated (Docs. 119, 

141), the Court is disinclined to seal documents in toto, in light of the rule that “[a]ny order sealing 

documents should be ‘narrowly tailored’ to remove from public view only the material that is 

protected.” Ervine v. Warden, 214 F. Supp. 3d 917, 919 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Press-Enter. Co. 

v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984)). Because the parties fail to meaningfully support their 

contention that aged employee handbooks should be sealed in toto, their request is overbroad. See, 

e.g., Thomas v. Arroyo, No. 2:13-CV-1743-RFB-VCF, 2015 WL 1805235, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 

2015) (rejecting request to seal entire motion to dismiss because it referenced purportedly privileged 

and/or confidential documents). 

The Court is somewhat skeptical of the contention that employee handbooks that are 

approximately two decades old are “commercially sensitive” or that the aged information about 

Defendant’s “internal operations” warrant any protection from public disclosure by way of 

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redaction, let alone sealing in toto. See, e.g., White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., No. 20-

1866 MJP, 2022 WL 1136804, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2022) (“It is not self-evident that these 

records—which are ten or more years old—provide to competitors much more than historical insight 

into Defendants’ business operations.” (citations omitted)); Allen v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-

CV-01279-WHO, 2020 WL 4673914, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2020) (“I will not seal any business 

documents that are more than ten years old, no matter how confidential and proprietary they were 

at the time of their creation.”); cf. Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 633 F. Supp. 336, 346 (C.D. Cal. 1986) 

(“Although it is true that the age of the documents alone will not justify the conclusion that there 

are no retained or residual privacy interests and it is similarly true that age may also diminish the 

public interest in disclosure . . . ‘a blanket assertion of privacy involving records over 20 years old 

is impermissible.’”)

Because there has been no “particularized showing” of good cause as to Exhibits B and C to 

the Lewis Declaration, the parties request as to these documents will be denied. See In re HighTech Employee Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 163779, at *2 (“Even under the ‘good cause’ standard of 

Rule 26(c), . . . a party must make a ‘particularized showing’ with respect to any individual 

document in order to justify sealing the relevant document.”) (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 

1180).

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the parties’ Notice and Joint Request to Seal Documents 

(Doc. 118) is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

The Court ORDERS that the unredacted documents listed in the Joint Request for which the 

Court grants the parties request for sealing—specifically, the parties’ Rule 251 Joint Statement 

Regarding Discovery Dispute and Exhibits 3 and 4 to the Chung Declaration in support of the 

parties’ Rule 251 Joint Statement Regarding Gallo’s Motion to Disqualify Vineyard Investigations’ 

Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan (the “Chung Declaration”) —be FILED UNDER SEAL in accordance 

with Local Rule 141. By no later than two (2) days of the date of this Order, the parties SHALL 

file on the docket redacted versions of those documents.

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The parties are granted leave to re-file a request to seal Exhibits B and C to the Lewis 

Declaration, identifying the specific portions of documents which they believe must be redacted 

and/or filed under seal, see E.D. Local Rules 140(b), (d), 141(b), and providing the good cause in 

support of the request.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 25, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3 To avoid spending limited resources “denying motions to seal a wide variety of standard business documents,” the 

Court advises the parties to request sealing only if they are able to make a particularized good cause showing, 

independent of the terms of the protective order. Melwani v. Amazon.com Inc., 2:21-cv-01329-RSM (W.D. Wash. Aug. 

14, 2023) (Doc. 81).

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