Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03414/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03414-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Becky Holman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BECKY HOLMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 12-CR-217 — C.N. Clevert, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 21, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Becky Holman pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and was initially sentenced to 

thirty-six months in prison. She appealed, and for reasons unrelated to this appeal, we vacated Holman’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced Holman to thirty-three months’ imprisonment. Holman now appeals, arguing that the district court procedurally 

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erred at resentencing by lengthening her prison term to promote rehabilitation from her heroin addiction. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the district court’s sentence.

I. Background

Becky Holman began using heroin to manage pain associated with rheumatoid arthritis. She became addicted, and financed her addiction by dealing in a conspiracy that operated 

in rural central Wisconsin from 2011 to 2012. 

In April 2012, Amalia Henschel died of a heroin overdose. 

In the course of investigating that death, Wisconsin law enforcement discovered Holman’s heroin distribution ring and 

found that one of Holman’s co-conspirators had provided 

Henschel with heroin on the day she died. Several members 

of the conspiracy identified Holman as a regular participant. 

On July 28, 2012, law-enforcement agents conducted a controlled purchase of heroin from Holman. Holman was arrested and charged with participating in a drug conspiracy 

involving one kilogram or more of a mixture containing heroin, which caused a death. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C). The government later dropped the causing-death element from § 841(b)(1)(A). 

On February 19, 2014, Holman pled guilty to one count of 

conspiring to distribute heroin. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 

841(b)(1)(C). At her first sentencing hearing on September 10, 

2014, the district court accounted for downward adjustments 

under the “safety valve” provision of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and for 

acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 

The court then calculated Holman’s final Guidelines sentencing range as fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The district 

court considered probation inadequate, but found that the 

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Guidelines range was higher than necessary, and sentenced 

Holman to thirty-six months’ imprisonment. The court stated, 

among other things, that “the critical thing in this case is the 

fact that this conspiracy is one that ultimately resulted in the 

death of someone. I should say someone who was taking heroin supplied by this conspiracy died....And so the Court sees

your offense as serious.”

Holman appealed her sentence to this court, and while 

that appeal was pending, the district court conducted sentencing proceedings for the co-conspirator who had supplied 

Henschel with heroin on the day she died. In April 2015, at 

the conclusion of those proceedings, the district court found 

the government’s evidence insufficient to prove that the coconspirator’s heroin actually caused Henschel’s overdose. As 

a result, on June 23, 2015, this Court vacated Holman’s judgment of conviction and remanded for resentencing, so that the 

district court could re-determine Holman’s sentence without 

consideration of the death. 

At resentencing on October 14, 2015, the district court explained that it would not consider the death in determining 

Holman’s sentence. The government asked the district court 

to again impose a thirty-six-month sentence, and Holman 

asked for probation. Holman noted, among other things, that 

her addiction resulted from her attempts to alleviate “chronic 

pain,” and that she had entered a drug treatment program in 

September 2012 and had not relapsed since that time. She also 

stated that her incarceration thus far had been at a medical 

center that did not meet her needs, and asked that “if there’s 

any need for incarceration, ... that the Court indicate that she 

be housed at a grade-five facility which ... is more consistent 

with her illness.” 

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The district court considered in turn many of the factors in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It explained that conspiring to distribute 

heroin is “undoubtedly ... a serious offense,” and that there 

remained “a need for general deterrence so that others involved in the crime of distributing heroin might think twice.”

The court also considered “the needs of the public,” and the 

need to keep heroin “out of the hands of [potential users].” 

The court then addressed the defendant’s drug problem, stating:

At this stage, ... [t]he Court is not satisfied that 

Ms. Holman has undergone sufficient treatment 

for her drug problem.

[Defense counsel] has noted that in his view the 

Bureau of Prisons by virtue of its placement of 

Ms. Holman in a level-four facility where little 

attention was given to her drug problem until 

sometime in August of this year, consequently, 

it would—it does seem to me prudent that Ms. 

Holman receive further treatment and/or counseling so that she can continue with her life unencumbered by a drug addiction. And certainly 

Ms. Holman needs the tools to cope with the potential of relapse after she is finished with her 

obligations in this case.

Finally, the district court considered the applicable Guidelines range—fifty-seven to seventy-one months’ imprisonment—and the sentences of Holman’s co-defendants, which 

ranged from time served to 124 months. The court also noted:

[A] small reduction in the sentence that was previously imposed is warranted, in part, because 

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Ms. Holman was eligible for safety valve consideration and is in criminal history category 

one. 

Moreover, upon further reflection, more weight 

should be given to her level of cooperation and 

the trigger for her involvement in this case.

Consequently, the district court imposed a thirty-threemonth prison sentence. It later underscored:

[T]here is a need for Ms. Holman to undergo 

monitoring of her potential to continue using 

drugs particularly in light of stressors that may 

occur. Pain is something that arises sometimes 

out of the blue, and stressful situations arise as 

well. 

When a person has been addicted as Ms. Holman has been addicted, it is important that there 

be counseling and treatment available.

The court asked whether there were any additional matters or arguments that the parties wished to raise, and Holman asked the court to recommend that she be “eligible for 

the residential drug treatment program offered by the Bureau 

of Prisons.” The district court agreed, “inasmuch as she does 

have an addiction that should continue to be treated; and it 

would be useful in her rehab in preparation for release.”

Holman then objected to the thirty-three-month sentence 

“in general,” arguing that the district court ignored the requirement contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that the court impose a sentence that is “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” The district court responded that the sentence was, in 

its view, “no greater than necessary under the circumstance,” 

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in light of the Sentencing Guidelines, in order to avoid a disparity with Holman’s codefendants, and because Holman 

was responsible for conspiring to distribute one to three kilograms of heroin. The district court elaborated:

And so when I look at the distribution of heroin 

here and the conspiracy to which your client 

was involved, a sentence of 33 months given 

Ms. Holman’s addiction take into account her 

acceptance of responsibility, take into account 

her debriefing which resulted in her eligibility 

for the safety valve, and looking at her need for 

rehab and treatment. 

I just cannot come to the conclusion that a probationary sentence such as you have urged or a 

lesser sentence would be appropriate given all 

of the circumstances here. 

And as I pointed out, heroin distribution is a serious offense particularly in view of the consequences that flow from using this drug. People 

need to be chilled from distributing this drug 

and using this drug.

Holman objected again, noting that she had not used 

drugs since her initial appearance in the case. The district 

court responded, “So are you suggesting that she not go to a 

drug facility so I can take that out?” Holman explained that 

ongoing drug treatment would be appropriate, but contended 

that her sentence should be shorter because, “as far as a danger to the community, she ha[d] taken a huge step in the right 

direction.” The district court clarified and concluded:

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I’m not suggesting [that] she represents a clear 

and present danger to the community at this 

time. I did not suggest that. And if that was suggested by my remarks, I do want to clarify what 

I said to make sure it is clear that, no, I’m not 

suggesting that she is currently a danger because she represents the potential of going out 

and reselling. 

What I was more concerned about and was trying to address is that the fact that she does have 

a potential of relapsing given her history and 

the need to make sure that she has the coping 

skills to handle her personal affairs when she 

leaves prison and when she goes back into the 

community where stressors do occur.

Holman responded, “I’m aware of that.... I think [the] 

Court made that clear,” and raised no other objections, stating, “That will do it.” Before the hearing ended, Holman again 

sought the court’s “recommendation that she be admitted to 

a program,” and the court confirmed that “[t]he recommendation for admission to the 500 Hour Drug Program will be 

included.” This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Holman claims that the district court improperly lengthened her prison term to promote rehabilitation from her heroin addiction. The Supreme Court in Tapia v. United States, 564 

U.S. 319 (2011), interpreted § 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act to prohibit a district court from imposing or lengthening a prison sentence to promote an offender’s rehabilitation. 564 U.S. at 327, 333. However, the Court also held that 

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“[a] court commits no error by discussing the opportunities 

for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific 

treatment or training programs,” nor by “trying to get [a defendant] into an effective drug treatment program.” Id. at 334.

A. Standard of Review

As an initial matter, the parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review. Holman contends that the district 

court procedurally erred by “lengthen[ing]” her prison sentence to promote rehabilitation, and de novo review should 

apply. See, e.g., United States v. Annoreno, 713 F.3d 352, 356 (7th 

Cir. 2013); United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 

2010) (“Whether the district court followed proper sentencing 

procedure is a question of law we review de novo.”) (citation 

omitted). The government argues, however, that the “plain 

error” standard of Rule 52(b) applies because Holman lodged 

no Tapia objection at the time of resentencing. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044 (7th 

Cir. 2016) (explaining that, although “we [generally] review a 

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de 

novo....[m]ore deference is due ... where an appellant failed 

to properly raise a claim below”); id. at 1045 (“[F]orfeited [issues] are reviewed for plain error.”); United States v. GuajardoMartinez, 635 F.3d 1056, 1058 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because the appellant did not raise these objections during the sentencing 

hearing, we review the decisions for plain error.”) (citation 

omitted).

We agree that Holman did not raise a Tapia objection before the district court. “To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a proper objection at trial that alerts 

the court and opposing party to the specific grounds for the 

objection.” United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 997 (7th Cir. 

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2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Otherwise, “the party is deemed to have waived the issue on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). At resentencing, Holman asked 

the court to recommend that she be “eligible for the residential drug treatment program offered by the Bureau of Prisons,” and the court agreed. She then objected “in general” to 

the sentence as “ignor[ing] the [§] 3553 caveat[] that the sentence shall be sufficient but not greater than necessary,” but 

did not specify a possible Tapia violation by name or in substance. When Holman noted that she had “been drug-free 

since before she made her initial appearance ... in this case,” 

the district court understood her to be referencing her access 

to a drug treatment program while incarcerated, not the 

length of her sentence. After Holman clarified that she did 

need treatment but that she had made progress with respect 

to not being “a danger to the community,” the district court 

explained that Holman’s addiction had come up during the 

hearing not because she posed a danger to the community (as 

Holman seemed to think), but because Holman could benefit 

from the drug treatment program. At no point did Holman 

suggest that the district court was lengthening or imposing 

her sentence in order to rehabilitate her. Instead, Holman expressed satisfaction with the district court’s explanation, stating, “That will do it.” Holman’s general objection that her sentence was “greater than necessary” thus did not properly preserve an objection under Tapia.

In the alternative, Holman argues that we should consider 

the alleged Tapia violation to be an “exception” to the district 

court’s order, which Holman need not have raised below to 

preserve de novo appellate review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(a) 

(“Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary.”). “Where the district court has already made a decision 

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and said definitively that it is imposing [a sentence], a defendant need not take an ‘exception’ to preserve the issue for appeal.” United States v. Gabriel, No. 15-3427, 2016 WL 4087225,

at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (citation omitted); see also United 

States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] litigant 

[need not] complain about a judicial choice after it has been 

made. Such a complaint is properly called, not an objection, 

but an exception.”). “But a district court can announce a tentative decision or view and invite objections. A failure to object in those circumstances can amount to waiver.” Gabriel, 

2016 WL 4087225, at *3 (citation omitted).

The district court here, after announcing its thirty-threemonth sentence, explicitly told Holman, “[I]f you believe that 

this Court has imposed an illegal sentence or that there are 

some issues or matters the Court has failed to take into account, you through your counsel may be heard before the 

Court completes its sentencing hearing.” The district court 

then asked whether there were “additional matters or arguments that the parties believe the Court has not taken into account fully.” The sentence was not yet definitive, and Holman 

still had an opportunity to object and potentially affect her ultimate sentence. She did not do so with respect to a possible 

Tapia violation, and we thus review for plain error.

B. References to Holman’s addiction and rehabilitation

To establish plain error, the defendant must show: “(1) an 

error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affected his substantial rights; 

and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Guajardo-Martinez, 

635 F.3d at 1059 (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 

1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004)). The government contends that 

“Holman’s argument fails at the first step, because there is no 

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‘error’ here.” Holman points to three comments during her 

resentencing that she argues reveal a Tapia violation. 

1. Comment One

First, Holman objects to the following statement by the 

district court:

In the case of someone such as Ms. Holman, the 

Court had in the first instance, and still feels in 

this particular instance, a need to address the 

defendant’s drug problem. At this stage, ... [t]he 

Court is not satisfied that Ms. Holman has undergone sufficient treatment for her drug problem.

[Defense counsel] has noted that in his view the 

Bureau of Prisons by virtue of its placement of 

Ms. Holman in a level-four facility where little 

attention was given to her drug problem until 

sometime in August of this year, consequently, 

it would—it does seem to me prudent that Ms. 

Holman receive further treatment and/or counseling so that she can continue with her life unencumbered by a drug addiction. And certainly 

Ms. Holman needs the tools to cope with the potential of relapse after she is finished with her 

obligations in this case.

Holman claims that this language arose in the context of the 

district court’s explanation of why a prison sentence was necessary, after the district court considered the Guidelines range 

and recognized the need for general deterrence and to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities with similarly situated 

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defendants. Thus, Holman argues, the district court took Holman’s need for rehabilitation into account in imposing the 

thirty-three-month prison sentence.

In context, however, it is clear that the district court’s comment acknowledges Holman’s earlier request that “she be 

housed at a grade-five facility which ... is more consistent 

with her illness.” Immediately before the comment at issue, 

the court had referenced “the needs of the public and potential users of illicit drugs,” and the “need to keep heroin out of 

the hands of individuals who might ... prolong their addiction.” The district court then logically moved to considering 

the defendant’s own addiction and the opportunity for treatment while incarcerated. It revisited the issue later on, noting

that “[w]hen a person has been addicted as Ms. Holman has 

been addicted, it is important that there be counseling and 

treatment available.” The Supreme Court explicitly stated in 

Tapia that it did “not disapprove [of courts]....discussing the 

opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits 

of specific treatment or training programs.” 564 U.S. at 334. 

That is exactly what the district court did at sentencing. It referred to defense counsel’s position that Holman ought to be 

placed somewhere with an effective drug treatment program,

without discussing the length of time that one needs to qualify for or complete the program. See United States v. Lucas, 670 

F.3d 784, 795 (7th Cir. 2012).

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2. Comment Two

Second, Holman objects to the district’s court explanation 

of why the thirty-three-month sentence was “appropriate 

given all of the circumstances here,” which it provided after

Holman objected to the sentence under § 3553(a). The court 

said:

And so when I look at the distribution of heroin 

here and the conspiracy to which your client 

was involved, a sentence of 33 months given 

Ms. Holman’s addiction take into account her 

acceptance of responsibility, take into account 

her debriefing which resulted in her eligibility 

for the safety valve, and looking at her need for 

rehab and treatment.

Holman argues that the district court thus improperly considered “her need for rehab and treatment” as an aggravating 

factor in its decision to impose a prison sentence, rather than 

granting her request for probation.

In fact, the resentencing record shows that the district 

court considered Holman’s “need for rehab and treatment” as 

one of the mitigating factors in her case, along with her “acceptance of responsibility,” and the “debriefing” that resulted 

in her “eligibility for the safety valve.” This is consistent with

Holman’s own statement earlier in the proceeding that her 

addiction resulted from attempts to alleviate chronic pain, as 

well as the district court’s prior explanation that Holman’s eligibility for the safety valve, low criminal history category of 

one, level of cooperation, and “the trigger for her involvement 

in this case” (that is, her addiction to heroin as a painkiller)

together warranted a sentence shorter than thirty-six months. 

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3. Comment Three

Third, Holman objects to the following portion of the district court’s response to her § 3553(a) objection:

What I was more concerned about and was trying to address is the fact that she does have a 

potential of relapsing given her history and the 

need to make sure that she has the coping skills 

to handle her personal affairs when she leaves 

prison and when she goes back into the community where stressors do occur.

For the reasons already discussed, the district court’s 

statement merely explains that Holman’s addiction had come 

up during the hearing because Holman could benefit from the 

drug treatment program, which the district court had just referenced a moment earlier. Whereas the sentencing court in 

Tapia had stated that the defendant needed to be “in long 

enough” to get drug treatment, 564 U.S. at 322, here, the district court’s language does not suggest that it lengthened or 

imposed Holman’s sentence in order to ensure that Holman 

qualified for or completed a treatment program.

In sum, read in context, none of these comments alone or 

togetherindicate that the district court lengthened or imposed

Holman’s sentence to facilitate her rehabilitation. The court’s

references to Holman’s addiction either explained the opportunities and benefits of Holman serving her sentence at a facility with effective addiction treatment, see Lucas, 670 F.3d at 

795, or considered her addiction as a mitigating factor, neither 

of which is prohibited under Tapia. Moreover, any ambiguity 

with respect to the district court’s statements is debatable at 

most and thus does not rise to level of plain error. See United 

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States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[Plain error] cannot be subtle, arcane, debatable, or factually complicated.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 

F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under a plain error standard, 

an error must be clear or obvious ....”) (citation omitted).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment and 

sentence of the district court.

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