Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-00909/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-00909-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanley G. Curry
Plaintiff
Talladega Housing Authority
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

STANLEY L. CURRY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TALLADEGA HOUSING

AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-CV-909-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This employment discrimination case was filed on June 1, 2015, by the

Plaintiff, StanleyG. Curry, against the Defendant, hisformer employer, the Talladega

Housing Authority (“THA”). (Doc. 1). The Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff was

terminated, on account of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) (Count One). 

The case comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 13). For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be GRANTED,

and this case will be DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. STANDARD

Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there

FILED

 2016 Sep-19 PM 04:33

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 1 of 32
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the

moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go

beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324. By its own affidavits – or

by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file – it must

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which

are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All

reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor

of the non-movant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the

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entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party’s

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may still be granted. Id. at 249.

How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether

that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v.

City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden

of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on

summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact – that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict

if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such

an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce

“significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue offact.”

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can

satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115-16.

First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-movant’s case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance, the

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non-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains

supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2)

proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on

the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116-17. When responding, the non-movant

may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific

facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996). The second method a movant in this

position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence

demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.

Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering

evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought

to be negated. Id.

II. THE DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO STRIKE

The Defendant scatters motions to strike throughout its reply brief. The

Plaintiff filed a short response to the Defendant’s motions to strike which merely

stated that he “continuesto stand by all previousresponses.” (Doc. 24 at 1-2). For the

reasons stated in this section, the motions to strike will be DENIED.

A. The Plaintiff’s Responses to the Defendant’s Proffered Facts

The Defendant moves to strike certain of the Plaintiff’s responses to facts the

Defendant has proffered in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 23

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at 5-7, ¶¶3, 5, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 32, 33, 40, 41, 43, and 44). As to paragraphs 3,

18, and 19, the Defendant argues that they are “irrelevant” and “immaterial” “under

the provisions of Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc.

23 at 5-6, ¶3; doc. 23 at 6, ¶¶18, 19) (italics in original). The Court assumes that the

Defendant meant to cite to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence describes circumstances under which relevant evidence may be

excluded. The Defendant has failed to explain how either rule applies here. Further,

the court will examine the relevance of any particular fact when assessing what

should and should not be included in this opinion. Only material facts will be used

as a basis for this Court’s analysis.

The Defendant moves to strike the remaining responses as allegedly without

evidentiary support. The Court points out that, to the extent a proffered fact is not

disputed, it is typically included in this opinion.

1 To the extent a proffered fact is

disputed, the Court examinesthe evidence offered by both sidesto see if the evidence

supports a dispute. If so, the fact is cast in the light most favorable to the non-movant.

When no evidence is cited to support the dispute of a proffered fact, and the Court is

aware of no other evidence establishing a dispute, the proffered fact is typically

1

 The Court’s process is more fully described in Appendix II to the Court Uniform initial

Order. (Doc. 2 at 14). 

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included to the extent it has an evidentiary basis. Accordingly, there is no reason to

“strike” unsupported responses, and the Court will not do so.

B. The Plaintiff’s Proffered Facts

The Defendant has also moved to strike certain of the Plaintiff'sfacts proffered

in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 23 at 1-5, ¶¶ 48, 49, 51,

52, 53, 57, 58, and 62). The Defendant makes the same arguments for striking these

facts that the Court addressed in the previous section. For those same reasons, the

Court will not strike these proffered facts, but will handle them as explained above.

III. FACTS

The Plaintiff, Stanley G. Curry, is an African American male who was hired by

THA on February 2, 1990.

A. Safety Policy

On February 8, 2007, the Plaintiff signed a document confirming that it was his

responsibility to read and know the contents of the THA employee Safety Policy, and

thereafter abide by the policies and procedures therein to the best of his abilities. He

also confirmed that he had the right to request clarification as needed to fully

understand his responsibilities as set forth in the Safety Policy. 

Section II, paragraph 19 of that policy provides: “Possession of firearms or

other weapons while on THA property, in THA vehicles, or while conducting THA

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businessisstrictly prohibited except for THA Investigative officers who are licensed

to carry firearms.” (Doc. 14-4 at 4) (original bold omitted). The Plaintiff had never

been an investigative officer for THA at any time during his employment. (Doc. 14-3

at 2).

Section VII, N, paragraph 1, of the Safety Policy provides: “In addition to any

regulation required by the THA, all drivers of THA vehicles will comply with state

law governing said vehicles.” (Doc. 14-4 at 15) (original bold omitted). Section VII,

N, paragraphs 13b and 13e provides that employees who are required to operate a

moving vehicle must “[k]now and obey the applicable federal, state, county, and city

laws and regulations [of the area] in which they are driving,” and “[c]omply with all

posted speed limits, signs and signals, and make a complete stop at all stop signs.”

(Doc. 14-4 at 16).

B. The Vehicle Use Policy

On or about January 14, 2013, the Plaintiff confirmed that he received, read

and understood the Vehicle Usage Policy of the THA and agreed to abide by the rules

and regulations set forth therein. That policy provides in part:

3. [THA] vehicles shall not be used for personal business unless

prior approval is granted by the Executive Director and/or Board

of Commissioners.

* * *

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5. Driving under the influence of drugs or alcoholshall be cause for

immediate termination. 

(Doc. 14-6 at 1). The Plaintiff had never been given approval to drive a THA vehicle

for personal business by the Board of Commissioners or the Executive Director,

Nettie Goodwin. (Doc. 14-3 at 3-4). However, in her deposition, Goodwin stated that

it was not a violation of company policy to use a company vehicle to go back and

forth from home to work. (Doc. 19 at 3(8)). She also admitted that employees could

use a company vehicle to run errands which were “on the way home.” (Doc. 19 at

3(8)). 

C. Drug-Free Workplace Policy

On or about February 8, 2007, the Plaintiff executed a document confirming

receipt of the THA Drug Free Workplace Policy. That policy strictly prohibits

employees from “[b]ringing and/or storing (including in a desk, locker, automobile,

or other repository) alcohol on [THA] premises or property, including [THA]-owned

or leased vehicles, or vehicles used for [THA] purposes.” (Doc. 14-5 at 6). The policy

also states: “As an exception, storage of sealed, unopened alcohol containers in a

vehicle on [THA] property is not a violation.” (Doc. 14-5 at 6) (italics in original).

The policy also prohibited employees from “[h]aving possession of, being under the

influence of, testing positive for or having in one’ssystem, alcohol [during work time

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or on THA premises or property].” (Doc. 14-5 at 6). 

D. The Traffic Stop

On or about February 3, 2014, the Plaintiff was driving a THA vehicle through

THA property when he was stopped by City of Talladega Police Officer, John

McCoy. The Plaintiff was off work at the time of the stop. McCoy testified in his

deposition:

When I heard him coming, I started looking to try to figure out where

the vehicle was coming from, and I looked up and saw the truck coming

toward the entrance exit area . . . and he come [sic] over the speed

breakers. And I saw the rate of speed he was going and made the

determination I was going to pull him over. So when he came by me, I

pulled out behind him. 

(Doc. 14-19 at 3(12)-4(13)). McCoy wrote the Plaintiff a ticket for: “Reasonable and

prudent speed.” (Doc. 14-19 at 4(15)). McCoy testified that the speed limit in that

area was 15 miles per hour, and that the Plaintiff was going “[w]ell over 15 miles an

hour.” (Doc. 14-19 at 4(15-16)).2 The Plaintiff denies that he was speeding, but he

2

 The Plaintiff disputes these facts and cites his deposition at pages 38 and 39. (Doc. 17

at 3 (“Plaintiff denies that he was speeding when arrested by Officer John McCoy.”)) (citing doc.

14-20 at 10(38-39)) Nothing in the cited portion of the Plaintiff’s deposition disputes that he was

speeding. It merely recounts the following exchange which he says took place between he and

McCoy: 

I said I ain’t driving no faster than I’ve been driving. And I said why did you stop

me? He said well – he said I was speeding. And I asked him how fast I was

going. He said I don’t have a radar or nothing like that. How can you tell how

fast I was going, so how you know I was speeding?

(Doc. 14-20 at 10(38)). Still, in another section of the Plaintiff’s deposition, which the Plaintiff

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ultimately pled guilty to that charge in the City of Talladega Municipal Court. (Doc.

14-20 at 9(36)-10(37), 11(41)).

McCoy also had the Plaintiff perform a field sobriety test. McCoy explained

that he did so

[b]ecause I smelled the odor of alcohol coming from his breath and

person when I approached the vehicle, and during our contact, he

admitted that he had drank I believe it was some tall boys prior to our

contact.

(Doc. 14-19 at 5(18)). The Plaintiff testified that he told McCoy that he had not been

drinking. (Doc. 14-20 at 10(38)). When asked how the Plaintiff did on the field

sobriety test, McCoy stated “[h]e didn’t fail it.” (Doc. 14-19 at 4(14)).

McCoy searched the vehicle during the stop. He stated:

There were several empty beer cans. I think one empty beer can as a

matter of fact was a tall boy in the cab, and I think there was a full

unopened tall boy in the bed of the truck.

(Doc. 14-19 at 5(19)). McCoy also remembers “a lot of beer cans in some type of

container.” (Doc. 14-19 at 6(21)). He put the number of cans at “maybe between five

and 15.” (Doc. 14-19 at 6(22)). When the Plaintiff was asked about thissubject in his

deposition, the following exchange took place:

did not cite, he was asked “What did he stop you for?” to which the Plaintiff responded, “To me

nothing, but he said I was speeding.” (Doc. 14-20 at 9(36)). The Court will give the Plaintiff the

benefit of the doubt here and holds that a reasonable jury could consider this a denial that he was

speeding.

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Q. But there was, you know, there was beer cans in the truck, wasn’t

there?

A. Plenty.

Q. Plenty of beer cans in the truck.

A. Yes, sir. Not in the truck.

Q. What kind of beer cans were they?

A. All kinds, Coke, beer bottles, all of them.

Q. Those were open?

A. Yeah. Most of them, everything was open.

Q. Where were those located?

A. On the back of the pickup truck in a milk crate.

(Doc. 14-20 at 11(41-42)). When asked in his deposition how that alcohol got into the

truck, the Plaintiff testified:

I pick up cans and things while working. I was told by Ms. Goodwin

that when we come up on an area and the parking lot is nasty and dirty,

we pick it up. And I kept a basket, a pickup stick and stuff on my truck

when I do inspections. When I come out, I pick up and clean, clean up

the parking lot, put it on the back of the truck in a crate, take it back to

the shop and dispose of the trash, keep the cans, and I brought them

home and save the cans.

(Doc. 14-21 at 8(113)). The Plaintiff testified that he “had authorization” to pick up

cans with alcohol in them and store them in the truck. (Doc. 14-21 at 8(113)). 

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 11 of 32
McCoy also searched the Plaintiff’s vehicle and found a 25 caliber automatic

pistol. The Plaintiff had a permit to carry the pistol.

During his deposition, McCoy was asked if, during the traffic stop, he asked

the Plaintiff what he was doing or where he had been. McCoy responded:

Yes. He said – at first he said that he was on a call out, and then while

we were talking, I asked him what was on fire. Why he was trying to get

out of there so fast. And after we talked for a minute or two, he changed

his story and said that he was out at another apartmentseeing somebody

and that his wife called him. He wastrying to hurry up and get home. So

that was the reason he was speeding coming out of public housing. 

(Doc. 14-19 at 5(18-19)). In his deposition, the Plaintiff denied telling McCoy that

he was seeing another woman at the housing community. (Doc. 14-20 at 10(37),

11(42)). Instead, the Plaintiff testified that he was there to get his fishing gear. (Doc.

14-20 at 11(42), 17(67)). The Plaintiff admits that he was off work at the time he was

stopped by Officer McCoy. He was stopped at about 5:30 and he had gotten off work

at 4:30.

In her affidavit, Goodwin stated:

Officer McCoy was working under a contract between the [THA] and

him to provide police services in or around properties owned by [THA]

during certain of his off hours from the [THA]. Part of the agreement

provided that he could be called away at any time for City of Talladega

police work unrelated to the [THA], if he chose to do so. Neither I [nor]

anyone else at the [THA] reserved or exercised at any time the right to

control the methods, manner or means by which Mr. McCoy

accomplished the final product for which [THA] contracted to wit:

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engaging in police work in or around [THA] properties.

(Doc. 14-3 at 7).3 However, in McCoy’s deposition, the following exchange took

place:

Q. Okay. On February the 3rd, 2014, were you employed and on

duty at the Talladega Housing Authority?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you there as a Talladega Housing Authority employee or

Talladega city police?

A. I was actually working for the Talladega Housing Authority. 

(Doc. 14-19 at 2(6-7)). It is undisputed that McCoy had previously attended THA

meetings with the Plaintiff, but, on February 3, 2014, stated that he did not know the

Plaintiff. 

E. Investigation by Goodwin

On February 3, 2014, Goodwin received a call from the Plaintiff where he

stated: “I have messed up and I am in trouble.” Goodwin told him to see her first

thing in the morning. On the morning of February 4, 2014, Goodwin learned of the

traffic stop previously described and hand delivered a letter to Curry outlining the

3

 The Plaintiff disputes this account, saying that he and McCoy “knew each other and

Mr. McCoy was an employee of THA when McCoy arrested the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 17 at 3). In

support of this statement, the Plaintiff cites his own deposition at page 47. (Doc. 14-20 at

12(47)). Nothing on that page of his deposition supports the Plaintiff’s contention that McCoy

was an “employee” of THA. 

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policy violations that may have been committed, suspended him without pay until

February 17, 2014, and informed him that a decision would be made at that time

regarding his continued employment. She also requested that he put in writing the

events that led to the action and that might be relevant. 

On February 8, 2014, Goodwin delivered a letter to the Plaintiff advising him

that a hearing would take place on February 11, 2014, at 10:00, and at that time he

would be given an opportunity to be heard prior to a decision being made. (Doc. 14-8

at 1). In that same letter, he was also given notice of that the following THA policies

Goodwin felt may have been violated:

1. Using a company vehicle for [a] person[al] reason.

2. Speeding and driving recklessly in a company vehicle.

3. Drinking while driving a company vehicle,

4. Having alcohol in a company vehicle. . . .

5. Having a weapon in a vehicle in violation of the Alabama State

Statute. This violation occurred in a THA vehicle (property).

(Doc. 14-8 at 1). Goodwin’s letter also noted that she had twice requested that the

Plaintiff put in writing the events that took place, and that his written account had not

yet been received. 

The hearing of February 11, 2014, was conducted on that date and in the

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fashion described in the letter of February 8, 2014. The parties have not cited the

Court to any evidence as to the events of that hearing. On February 14, 2014,

Goodwin hand delivered a letter to the Plaintiff extending hissuspension to February

24, 2014. (Doc. 14-10). 

On February 10, 2014, the Plaintiff provided his written account of the

incidents made the basis of his suspension. (Doc. 14-9). In that letter, the Plaintiff

admitted, among other things, that on the date of the stop:

– he drove the THA truck on a personal errand to pick up money that was owed

to him, and then onto THA property to pick up his fishing gear;

– he put a bag with a gun and beer in it into the back of the truck;

– he took the gun out of the bag from the back of the truck because it started

to rain; and

– McCoy found the gun in his coat during the traffic stop.

(Doc. 14-9 at 1). 

Goodwin also reviewed a statement from McCoy, a statement from witness

Kenneth Price, a report from Chief Investigator Tom Lloyd, phone records from a

THA phone issued to the Plaintiff, and photographs of the alcohol containers found

by McCoy in the Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Docs. 14-11, 14-12, 14-13, 14-14, 14-15). In

McCoy’s statement, he stated, inter alia, that:

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 15 of 32
– the Plaintiff was speeding when he was stopped;

– the Plaintiff stated that he had been on THA property seeing a woman who

was not his wife;

– the Plaintiff smelled of alcohol and his eyes were bloodshot when he was

stopped;

– the Plaintiff admitted to drinking “two tall boys;”

– McCoy found an empty tall boy beer can and full tall boy beer can in the bed

of the truck, along with several empty beer cans, and fishing gear; and

– McCoy found the Plaintiff’s pistol in the Plaintiff’sjacket pocket in the THA

vehicle.

(Doc. 14-11). Price was the second officer on the scene of the traffic stop. Price

confirmed that:

– the Plaintiff exuded a strong odor of alcohol while sitting in Price’s patrol

car; and

– Price asked the Plaintiff how many “alcoholic beers” he had had, and the

Plaintiff stated “several.”

(Doc. 14-12). In Lloyd’s investigative report, he recounted McCoy and Price’s

statements, and also noted that when Lloyd secured the Plaintiff’s personal items

from the truck, the Plaintiff’s bag (which wasin the back of the truck) contained a full

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 16 of 32
can of beer. (Doc. 14-13 at 2).

On February 19, 2014, Goodwin delivered a letter to the Plaintiff saying that

she had made a decision regarding his continued employment and she would inform

him of that decision on February 24, 2014 at 10:00 in her office. (Doc. 14-16). On

February 24, 2014, Goodwin authored a letter that she intended to give the Plaintiff

which would terminate his employment and provide the reasons therefore. (Doc. 14-

17). The reasons she listed were:

1. Using a company vehicle for [a] personal reason.

2. Speeding and driving recklessly in a company vehicle.

3. Bringing and/or storing (including in a desk, locker, automobile,

or other repository) alcohol on [THA] premises or property,

including [THA]-owned or leased vehicles, or vehicles used for

[THA] purposes.

4. Having possession of, being under the influence of, testing

positive for or having in one’s system, alcohol.

5. Using, consuming, transporting, distributing, or attempting to

distribute, manufacturing, selling, or dispensing alcohol.

6. Possession of firearms or other weapons while on THA property,

in THA vehicles, or while conducting THA business . . ..

(Doc. 14-17). 

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The Plaintiff was terminated on February 24th.

4 Nettie Goodwin insists that

when Mr. Curry arrived on February 24th for the anticipated meeting, he informed

Nettie Goodwin that he would be resigning, effective that day, and delivered to her

a letter to that effect. (Doc. 14-3 at 6; doc. 14-18). At the Plaintiff’s request, she

delivered to him the termination letter she had authored. (Doc. 14-3 at 6).5 The

Plaintiff testified that he did write a resignation letter, and he did walk into that

meeting with it, but that he did not give it to Goodwin until after she terminated him.

(Doc. 14-21 at 11(126-127)). 

F. The Disciplinary Policy in the Employee Handbook

The THA employee Handbook provides, in pertinent part:

M. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

4

 The Plaintiff contends that he was “terminated from his employment.” (Doc. 17 at 6,

¶48). The Defendant “denies that the [P]laintiff was terminated by . . . Nettie Goodwin.” (Doc.

23 at 1, ¶48). The Defendant also moves the Court to strike the Plaintiff’s claim that he was

terminated “for lack of evidentiary support.” (Doc. 23 at 1, ¶48). As noted above, there is

evidentiary support for the Plaintiff being terminated. Further, the Court notes that fact 33,

proffered by the Defendant states:

33. The sole reason Nettie Goodwin terminated the employment was because

of the clear violations of the applicable policies and the severity of those

violations.

(Doc. 13 at 11, ¶33) (emphasis added). The Motion to Strike is DENIED.

5

 The Plaintiff disputes the facts stated in these last two sentences, but cites the very same

evidence, which supports the facts as stated. (See doc. 17 at 5, ¶32) (referring the reader to doc.

17 at 6, ¶48). 

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 18 of 32
This section on employee disciplinary procedures and separations

(Section N) is for guidance to supervisory personnel only. It is not a

contract between the company and its employees. This section merely

describes for supervisory personnel the company’s general philosophy

in grievance procedures and termination decisions. The company

recognizes that each disciplinary decision and termination must be

judged on its own particular facts. Fairness and common sense dictates

that these unique situations will be reviewed and decided in the context

of surrounding circumstances. The commissioners are responsible for all

disciplinary actions that involve the Executive Director. To the extent

possible, such actions shall be in the form and manner as described

below:

a. Verbal warnings

First offense, or first violation, of [THA] policies. All

verbal warnings shall be documented by the supervisor.

The date and time of the warning shall be indicated.

b. Written warning

Second offense, or violation, of any [THA] policy within

six months of the first violation.

c. Suspension without pay/termination of employment

Suspension without pay . . . that may result in termination

will be affected whenever an employee receives two

written warnings within the same six-month period; or in

the event an employee receives three written warnings

within the same 12-month period.

Not withstanding [sic] any of the above, any employee who

is away from duty for a two (2) day period without prior

approval . . . or removes [THA] property or other property

for his or her personal use or consumption is subject to

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 19 of 32
immediate termination.

All disciplinary action is subject to the Complaint

Procedure (except of [sic] violations of the Alcohol and

Substance Abuse Policy, see part V

6

for grievance process)

as outlined in Section X

7

herein. Suspensions without pay,

as noted in Section H.58

, shall be authorized and

recognized as a form of disciplinary action, but only by the

specific authorization of the Executive Director. 

(Doc. 18 at 3) (bold in original). Section N of the Employee Handbook provides that

employees are subject to “immediate suspension without pay and then dismissal” for

“violations of regulations.” (Doc. 23 at 11).9

In his deposition, the Plaintiff testified

that was not given any verbal or written warnings prior to his termination. (Doc. 14-

21 at 1(87)).10

G. Comparators

6

 “Part V” has not been included in the record, so the Court cannot quote from or

consider it.

7

 “Section X” has not been included in the record, so the Court cannot quote from or

consider it.

8

 “Section H.5” has not been included in the record, so the Court cannot quote from or

consider it.

9

 Although a number of specific examples of such violations are mentioned, the policy is

clear that the types of violations to which the section refers are not limited to those set out.

10

 The Defendant disputes this fact but cites only letters from Goodwin to the Plaintiff

regarding the traffic stop at issue in this case. (See Doc. 14-7 at 1; doc. 14-8 at 1; doc. 14-10 at

1; doc. 14-16 at 1). The Plaintiff’s argument is that, if the Plaintiff committed a violation, the

Defendant was obligated to warn him first and then, if he committed the same violation again,

move up the progressive discipline policy. Citations to letters regarding this incident are

irrelevant to that point. 

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The only three individuals that the Plaintiff can identify as comparators are

Steve Watts, Tom Lloyd, and Jay McElroy.

1. Steve Watts

The Plaintiff does not know of any time that Steve Watts violated the speeding

policy or the policy of carrying a firearmor the policy of having alcohol in a company

vehicle or in his system on THA property. 

Goodwin testified in her deposition that she was aware of an incident between

Watts, who is white, and Byron Garrett, who is African American, where Watts used

racially derogatory language towards Garrett. (Doc. 20 at 3(33)). Watts was “written

up” for that, but was not terminated. (Doc. 20 at 3(33)).

Watts at one time brought his grandson to work. Goodwin remembers telling

Wattsthat he needed to find a baby sitter or go home. (Doc. 19 at 7(24)). She does not

know where the child was. (Doc. 20 at 1(25)). She stated that “[s]omeone told me,

and I contacted Steve and said you need to go home or send the child home.” (Doc.

20 at 1(25)). She testified that she did so “[b]ecause the child shouldn’t have been

there.” (Doc. 20 at 1(25)).11

11

 The Plaintiff, who originally proffered the facts regarding Watts’s grandson’s presence

on THA property, insists that the child was “on a backhoe [Watts] was operating.” (Doc. 17 at 7,

¶51). None of the evidence cited by the Plaintiff supports that the child was on a backhoe Watts

was operating.

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2. Tom Lloyd

The Plaintiff has no knowledge of Tom Lloyd, who is white, ever pleading

guilty or being cited for speeding. He also has no knowledge of Lloyd not operating

a vehicle at a reasonable speed. Lloyd is a police officer, so there have been timesthat

he confiscated alcohol from people on THA property, but the Plaintiff knows of no

other times that Lloyd had alcohol on THA premises.

Lloyd had his wife, who is not a THA employee, helping him with his office

work in the THA office. Lloyd’s wife was a volunteer employee for the THA who

was on THA insurance. (Doc. 19 at 4(10-11)). Lloyd was not reprimanded for having

her help out. 

3. Jay McElroy

The Plaintiff knows of no time that Jay McElroy was cited for speeding or

having alcohol in THA vehicles or on THA premises or being in possession of

firearms on THA property or in THA vehicles. McElroy allowed his son to ride a

THA lawn mower and in a company truck with Byron Garrett, but Nettie Goodwin

said she had no prior knowledge of these facts.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Complaint sets out only one claim: race discrimination in violation of

Title VII. In that claim, the Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against on the

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basis of his race, African American, when he was fired as a result of the traffic stop

which occurred on February 24, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 4).12

A. Applicable Law

Title VII provides:

[i]tshall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail

or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “In evaluating disparate treatment claims supported by

circumstantial evidence13

, we use the framework established by the Supreme Court

12

 The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has claimed “two adverse employment actions

to wit: (1) Being stopped by Officer John McCoy for speeding and (2) Being terminated from his

employment by the Talladega Housing Authority.” (Doc. 13 at 14). However, in the only count

of the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges:

Plaintiff has been treated less favorably with respect to discipline by the

[D]efendant than similarly situated white male employees in that they were either

not disciplined at all nor was their employment terminated.

(Doc. 1 at 4) (emphasis added). There is no mention of the stop in Count One. The Court will

not address any arguments regarding whether Officer McCoy was an employee or agent of THA,

or whether McCoy’s actions amounted to discrimination. (See doc. 13 at 14-15).

13

 The Plaintiff, in the last line of his brief, argues that he “has proven by direct

evidence, for the reasons stated in the above discussion that . . . THA[] racially discriminated

against him.” (Doc. 17 at 13). Direct evidence is “evidence, that, if believed, proves [the]

existence of [a] fact without inference or presumption. . . . Only the most blatant remarks, whose

intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor

constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,

1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). There is no direct evidence of

discrimination in this case.

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in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668

(1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101

S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,

1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Under that framework, 

[t]he Title VII plaintiff bears “the ultimate burden of proving

discriminatory treatment by a preponderance of the evidence.” Earley v.

Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1990). Thus,

under the first part of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish

by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

If she does, the burden of production shifts to the employer, which

requires the employer to introduce evidence of “some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason” for its employment decision. McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer satisfies its burden, “the

presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.” Collado v.

United Parcel Serv. Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir.2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because the burden of persuasion remains

with the employee, she must then show that the seemingly legitimate

reason the employer gave was pretextual—i.e., the “proffered reason

was not the true reason for the employment decision.” St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collado, 419 F.3d

at 1150 (noting that once the employer satisfies its burden “the

presumption of discrimination that arose when the plaintiff made [her]

prima facie showing ‘drops from the case,’ and ‘the case is placed back

into the traditional framework—in other words, the plaintiff still bears

the burden of proving, more probably than not, that the employer took

an adverse employment action against [her] on the basis of a protected

personal characteristic’ ” (internal citations omitted)).

Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2013). 

The Defendant argues both that the Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case

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of discrimination, and that, even if the Plaintiff could do so, the Plaintiff cannotshow

that Defendant’s legitimate proffered reason for the Plaintiff’s termination was

pretextual. The court will address each argument in turn.

B. The Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

The Eleventh Circuit has noted:

When . . . the plaintiff claims that his employer discharged him on

account of his race, he must establish four elements: (1) that he is a

member of a protected class . . . ; (2) that he was qualified for the

position he held; (3) that he was discharged from that position; and (4)

that in terminating his employment, his employer treated him less

favorably than a similarly situated individual outside of his protected

class . . ..

Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2011); Connor v.

Bell Microproducts-Future Tech, Inc., 492 F. App'x 963, 965 (11th Cir. 2012)

(referring to the “discharge” element as being “subjected to an adverse employment

action”).14 

14

 The Defendant states the elements this way:

To prevail on a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a

prima facie case. A prima facie case of desperate treatment such as the claim of

the plaintiff herein on the basis of race, requires that the plaintiff show (1) He

belongs to a protected class, (2) He suffered some form of adverse employment

action and (3) The adverse employment action occurred under circumstances

given [sic] rise to the inference of an unlawful discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407

(1993)[.]

(Doc. 13 at 13). St. Mary’s actually sets out the same elements as this Court. See, St. Mary's,

509 U.S. at 506 (noting that the plaintiff in that case had proven a prima facie case of

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 25 of 32
The Defendant agrees that the Plaintiff is a member of a protected class (doc.

13 at 13-14). However, it “denies that the [P]laintiff has suffered some form of

adverse employment action.” (Doc. 13 at 14). It also disputes that the Plaintiff can

produce evidence that he wastreated worse than similarly situated employees outside

of his protected class.

15

discriminatory termination by showing: “(1) that he is black, (2) that he was qualified for the

position of shift commander, (3) that he was demoted from that position and ultimately

discharged, and (4) that the position remained open and was ultimately filled by a white man”). 

That is not to say that the Defendant is wrong. As explained recently by a panel of the Eleventh

Circuit:

“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not

onerous.” Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct.

1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the challenged employment action occurred “under

circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id.

Kilgore v. Trussville Dev., LLC, 646 F. App'x 765, 773–74 (11th Cir. 2016). However, the panel

also noted:

 “The methods of presenting a prima facie case are not fixed; they are flexible and

depend to a large degree upon the employment situation.” [Wilson v. B/E

Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004)]. In cases of termination,

the plaintiff generally must show that she is a member of a protected class and

either was replaced by someone outside the protected class, Coutu v. Martin Cty.

Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir.1995), or was treated worse

than similarly situated employees outside of her protected class, Wilson, 376 F.3d

at 1091.

Kilgore, 646 F. App’x at 774 (emphasis added). In his brief, the Plaintiff attempts to satisfy his

prima facie case by using the elements stated in the manner in which the Court has set them out. 

(Doc. 17 at 11). Accordingly, the Court will also use that articulation of the elements.

15

 The Defendant actually states that it “denies . . . that the adverse employment action

occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” (Doc.

13 at 14). The Defendant’s argument on that point centers on the comparator evidence. In light

26

Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 26 of 32
1. Adverse Employment Action

In arguing that the Plaintiff did not experience an adverse employment action,

the Defendant states:

The plaintiff failed to avail himself of the administrative options

provided to him by Talladega Housing Authority and resigned in the

face of the adverse accusations of violating at least four clear policies of

the Talladega Housing Authority on the night he was stopped for

speeding. As a result, the plaintiff has not suffered a constructive

discharge altering the terms and conditions of his employment.

Swearnigen-El v. Cook County Sheriff's Department, 602 F.3d 852, (7th

Cir. 2010). 

(Doc. 13 at 15). The Court does not know what “administrative options” the

Defendant is referring to, as there was no discussion of any in the parties’ proffered

facts, and there is no further argument on this point. This underdeveloped, vague

argument is without merit. Further, the Court is confused by the Defendant’s

attempted rebuttal of a constructive discharge claim that appears nowhere in the

Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant fired him. As noted in

this Court’s discussion of the facts, the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, supports this position.

2. Comparators

The Eleventh Circuit has noted:

of that, and in consideration of the Eleventh Circuit law discussed in the previous footnote, the

Court treats this argument as a “lack of comparator” argument.

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As part of the Title VII plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff must

show that his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his

classification more favorably than herself. Coutu v. Martin Cty. Bd. of

Cty. Commissioners, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir.1995). To make a

comparison of the plaintiff's treatment to that of non-minority

employees, the plaintiff must show that he and the employees are

similarly situated in all relevant respects. Smith v. Stratus Computer,

Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.1994); Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964

F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992); Smith v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 770

F.2d 719, 723 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct.

1273, 89 L.Ed.2d 581 (1986). In determining whether employees are

similarly situated for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is

necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused

of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.

Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir.1994). If a

plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated employee,

summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of

discrimination is present. See, e.g., Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific

Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir.1989).

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997); see also, Rioux v. City of

Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he most important factors in

a comparator analysis in the disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses

committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.”); Calhoun v. McHugh, 2 F.

Supp. 3d 1217, 1236 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (Hopkins, J.) (same).

The Plaintiff argues:

Plaintiff accused Defendant of allowing Steve Watts to have his

grandson on the “THA” property in violation of “THA” policy and only

told him to get a baby sitter or go home. Mr. Watts was also allowed to

use racially derogatory language toward a Black employee, Byron

Garrett, and was written up but not terminated. 

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Tom Lloyd was allowed to have his wife, who was not a “THA”

employee to assist himin the “THA” office with his office work and was

not reprimanded.

Jay McElroy allowed his son to ride a company lawn mower and

in a company truck with Byron Garrett and was not disciplined. 

(Doc. 17 at 12). Recall that Nettie Goodwin’s letter to the Plaintiff stated he was

being terminated for:

1. Using a company vehicle for [a] personal reason.

2. Speeding and driving recklessly in a company vehicle.

3. Bringing and/or storing (including in a desk, locker, automobile,

or other repository) alcohol on [THA] premises or property,

including [THA]-owned or leased vehicles, or vehicles used for

[THA] purposes.

4. Having possession of, being under the influence of, testing

positive for or having in one’s system, alcohol.

5. Using, consuming, transporting, distributing, or attempting to

distribute, manufacturing, selling, or dispensing alcohol.

6. Possession of firearms or other weapons while on THA property,

in THA vehicles, or while conducting THA business . . ..

(Doc. 14-17). The Plaintiff’s comparators’ conduct is not the same or similar conduct

to that in which the Plaintiff engaged.

16 Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot establish a

16

 Further, the Plaintiff does not know of any time that Watts violated the speeding policy

or the policy of carrying a firearm or the policy of having alcohol in a company vehicle or in his

system on Talladega Housing Authority property. The Plaintiff has no knowledge of Lloyd ever

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 29 of 32
prima facie case of discrimination. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate.17

C. Pretext

The Plaintiff’s case also fails because he cannot prove that the Defendant’s

legitimate non-discrimination reason for his termination–the violation of workplace

rules and policies–was merely a pretext for discrimination. 

The Plaintiff’s entire argument on this point is: “‘THA’s stated reasons for

termination of the Plaintiff are a pretext for race discrimination because by [sic] the

reasons stated in Plaintiff's factual statements 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63.” (Doc.

17 at 13). The Court doubts whether one sentence referring the Court to another

section of the Plaintiff’s brief is a sufficient “showing” in this regard. Regardless, it

is undisputed that at least two of the reasons Goodwin cited–the possession of the

firearm in a company vehicle and use of the vehicle for personal reasons

18

–were

pleading guilty to or being cited for speeding. He also has no knowledge of Lloyd operating a

vehicle at an unreasonable speed. The Plaintiff knows of no times that Lloyd had alcohol

without authorization on the Talladega Housing Authority premises. The Plaintiff knows of no

time that McElroy was cited for speeding or having alcohol in THA vehicles or on THA premises

or being in possession of firearms on THA property or in THA vehicles. 

17

 Under any formulation of the elements, it cannot reasonably be said that the Plaintiff’s

termination occurred “under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination.” Kilgore, 646 F. App'x at 773–74. First, the Plaintiff admitted to using the THA

vehicle for a personal reason, and to having the weapon on company property. Second, Goodwin

considered statements from several witnesses which supported her determination that several

other violations had occurred. 

18

 Although Goodwin stated in her deposition that the Plaintiff could use the vehicle to

run errands while going back and forth to work, there is no evidence that that is what he was

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Case 1:15-cv-00909-VEH Document 25 Filed 09/19/16 Page 30 of 32
true.19 Section N of the Employee Handbook provides that employees are subject to

“immediate suspension without pay and then dismissal” for “violations of

regulations.” (Doc. 23 at 11). The Plaintiff makes no argument that he could not have

been fired for one, or both, of these admitted offenses.

Also, even if Goodwin was incorrect as to any of the alleged violations, “[a]

reason is not pretext for discrimination ‘unless it is shown both that the reason was

false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’” Brooks v. Cty. Comm'n of

Jefferson Cty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting St. Mary's Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). In the

instant case, not only has the Plaintiff not shown that all of the Defendant’s reasons

were false, he has made no attempt to show that, even if they were, discrimination

was the real reason that he was fired. The evidence is all to the contrary. In addition

to the admissions by the Plaintiff, Goodwin considered statements from several

witnesses which supported her determination that the violations had occurred. There

is no evidence that race played any part in her decision to terminate the Plaintiff.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Defendants Motions to Strike will be DENIED,

doing when he was stopped.

19

 Although it is also undisputed that the Plaintiff had a permit for the weapon, he was

not allowed to have it on THA property, or in a THA vehicle.

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the Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED, and this case will be

DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate final order will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of September, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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