Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04106/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04106-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kramer
Respondent
Chantha Nhim
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANTHA NHIM,

Petitioner,

 vs.

MATTHEW KRAMER, Warden,

Respondent(s).

 

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No. C 04-4106 CRB (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Doc # 7)

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Sierra Conservation Center in

Jamestown, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per

order filed on February 28, 2005, the court noted that the petition appears untimely

and ordered respondent to move to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is

untimely, or otherwise inform the court that respondent is of the opinion that a

motion to dismiss is unwarranted in this case. Respondent filed a motion to

dismiss the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner filed an

opposition arguing that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the pertinent limitation

period, and respondent filed a reply.

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BACKGROUND

On February 14, 1991, petitioner was sentenced to 15 years to life in state

prison after pleading guilty to second degree murder in the Superior Court of the

State of California in and for the County of Santa Clara. He did not appeal.

On July 21, 2003, petitioner began seeking collateral relief from the state

courts by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. It was denied on September 16, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in the Supreme Court of California. It was denied on June 23, 2004. 

On September 29, 2004, petitioner filed the instant federal petition.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")

became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitation

on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed

within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final

after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review;

(2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action

was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional

right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral

review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during which

a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period did not start to run earlier than April

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24, 1996. A state prisoner with a conviction finalized before April 24, 1996, such

as petitioner, therefore generally had until April 23, 1997 to file a federal habeas

petition. See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1287 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds byCalderon v. United

States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The instant

petition was not filed until September 29, 2004, however. It is untimely unless the

limitation period was tolled for a substantial period of time. 

Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the one-year limitation period for the "time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). Unfortunately for petitioner, by the time he filed his first state habeas

petition on July 21, 2003, the one-year limitation period had long expired on April

24, 1997. A state habeas petition filed after AEDPA's statute of limitation ended

cannot toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2). See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot "revive" the limitation period once it has run

(i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet

fully run. "Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no

longer serve to avoid the statute of limitations." Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp.

254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

Petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period

because: (1) he lacks English language skills and education; (2) lockdowns were

imposed during the relevant time period; and (3) he is actually innocent.

The one-year limitation period may be equitably tolled if "extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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1See, e.g., Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)

(finding equitable tolling warranted where prison litigation coordinator promises 

prisoner’s lawyer to obtain prisoner’s signature in time for filing petition, but then

breaks his promise, causing petition to be late); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874,

878 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding equitable tolling warranted where district court

erroneously refused to accept petition for filing because of technical deficiency in

cover sheet and lost body of petition by the time petitioner sent in corrected cover

sheet); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding equitable

tolling warranted where prison authorities failed to follow prisoner's request to

draw filing fee for habeas petition from his trust account and mail it with petition

to district court for filing).

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The prisoner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of

his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). Equitable tolling is justified in few cases. “Indeed, the threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).1 The prisoner “bears the burden of showing that this

extraordinary exclusion should apply to him.” Id. at 1065.

Petitioner’s claim for equitable tolling based on his assertion that he lacks

English skills and education is without merit. It is well-established that neither

illiteracy nor pro se status are extraordinary circumstances or external factors that

may excuse the many and oftentimes complex procedural requirements a prisoner

encounters when seeking federal habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (illiteracy of pro se

petitioner not sufficient cause to avoid procedural bar); United States v. Flores,

981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (pro se status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of

legal training not external factors excusing abuse of the writ); Cantu-Tzin v.

Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1998) (pro se status during state habeas

proceedings did not justify equitable tolling). Petitioner’s alleged lack of English

skills and education do not compel a different result here. Accord Hansana v.

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Garcia, No. C 03-1137 SI (PR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24471, at *4 (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 2, 2004) (lack of legal training and limited English language skills not

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling); Ramos v. Carey, No. C

03-1323 SI (PR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13304, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2003)

(rejecting prisoner’s claim for equitable tolling because his “knowledge of the

English language is severely limited”). After all, petitioner has communicated

effectively with the court and respondent throughout these proceedings. He has

not shown that his alleged lack of English skills and education “were the cause of

his untimeliness.” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. 

Petitioner’s claim for equitable tolling based on his assertion that while a

prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison “lockdowns, and no movement periods lasted

years at a time” is without merit. Petitioner sets forth no allegations whatsoever

specifying the dates he was actually on lockdown, or explaining how being on

lockdown during those dates made it impossible for him to file a petition on time. 

His conclusory allegations of lockdowns do not warrant equitable tolling. Cf.

Lindo v. Lefever, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[t]ransfers between

prison facilities, solitary confinement, lockdowns, restricted access to the law

library and an inability to secure court documents [generally] do not qualify as

extraordinary circumstances”). Petitioner has not shown that any alleged

lockdowns “were the cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. 

Petitioner’s claim for equitable tolling based on his assertion of actual

innocence is without merit as well. The Ninth Circuit has held that the actual

innocence gateway established in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), may be

available to a petitioner whose federal habeas petition is otherwise barred by

AEDPA’s limitation period. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776-77 (9th Cir.

2002) (implying that unavailability of actual innocence gateway would raise

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serious constitutional concerns and remanding to district court for a determination

of whether actual innocence claim was established before deciding whether

gateway is available under AEDPA). Under Schlup, 

[I]f a petitioner . . . presents evidence of innocence so strong that a

court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the

court is also satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless

constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through

the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claim. 

513 U.S. at 316. The required evidence must create a colorable claim of actual

innocence, that the petitioner is innocent of the charge for which he is

incarcerated, as opposed to legal innocence as a result of legal error. Id. at 321. It

is not enough that the evidence show the existence of reasonable doubt, petitioner

must show "that it is more likely than not that no 'reasonable juror' would have

convicted him." Id. at 329. As the Ninth Circuit has put it, "the test is whether, with

the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found [p]etitioner guilty." Van Buskirk v. Baldwin, 265 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir.

2001). 

"To be credible, [a claim of actual innocence] requires petitioner to support

his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence--that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. This

does not mean a petitioner need always affirmatively show physical evidence that

he did not commit the crime with which he is charged. Gandarela v. Johnson, 286

F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). A petitioner may pass through the Schlup

gateway by promulgating evidence "that significantly undermines or impeaches the

credibility of witnesses presented at trial, if all the evidence, including new

evidence, makes it 'more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 US at 327). 

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The "new" evidence need not be newly available, just newly presented – that is,

evidence that was not presented at trial. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961-63

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, petitioner, who pleaded guilty to second degree murder, offers only

the assertion that he was not the “actual shooter.” This will not do. Besides the

fact that petitioner may be lawfully convicted of second degree murder for aiding

and abetting, as opposed to being the “actual shooter,” see Cal. Penal Code § 31, he

presents no “new reliable evidence” in support of his claim of actual innocence to

warrant relief under the gateway rationale of Schlup. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as

untimely (doc # 7) is GRANTED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2005 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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