Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02693/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02693-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Lazaro Perez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

PILED 

United s,,_ C4uttol AneaJ,s 

TendtOrmk 

F£8 22 f988 

ROBB.RTL HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

EDWARD LAZARO PEREZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 86-2693 

(D.C. No. 86-CR-141) 

(D. Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant, Edward Lazaro Perez, appeals from his conviction 

by a jury for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) and§ 846, and for unlawful use of a telephone 

to facilitate the distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 

u.s.c. § 843(b). On appeal, defendant alleges that several errors 

by the district court require reversal. 

I 

Defendant complains on three grounds that the court 

erroneously refused to suppress his postarrest statement to the 

police. First, he contends that he gave the statement without 

having been fully advised of his rights, as required by Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The government shoulders the burden 

of proving whether a full warning was given. Id. at 475. The 

only evidence the government presented at the suppression hearing 

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was the testimony of Detective Larry Subia of the Denver Police 

Department, who took defendant's statement; he testified that he 

recited full, timely Miranda warnings to defendant. Defendant 

presented no evidence to undermine Subia's credibility. The 

district court believed Subia and refused to suppress the 

statement. Defendant also signed a waiver which acknowledged the 

voluntariness of his statement, but this waiver did not enumerate 

the specific rights contained in a Miranda warning. 

In a case like this it would be desirable to have a written 

waiver. But under the circumstances, we cannot hold the district 

court's finding to be clearly erroneous. In North Carolina v. 

Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld the 

sufficiency of factual findings concerning the circumstances of 

incommunicado interrogations, when such findings were based solely 

on testimony by police officers and "the actions and words of the 

person interrogated." Id. at 373. That case has made clear that 

Miranda waivers need not be written. In Butler, the Court stated: 

"An explicit written or oral statement of waiver ... is not 

inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. 

The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant 

in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in 

the Miranda case." 441 U.S. at 373. The government "need prove 

waiver [of Miranda rights) only by a preponderance of the 

evidence." Colorado v. Connelly, 55 U.S. L. W. 4043, 4046 (U.S. 

Dec. 10, 1986). 

Second, defendant contends that the government did not meet 

its burden of proving that he was of clear mind when he gave his 

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Appellate Case: 86-2693 Document: 010110027450 Date Filed: 02/22/1988 Page: 2 
statement. He apparently argues that he might have been suffering 

from heroin withdrawal at the time of his statement. We reject 

this argument. Subia testified on this point at length at the 

suppression hearing, both on direct and cross-examination. The 

district court accepted Subia's testimony, and defendant does not 

demonstrate that this finding was clearly erroneous. 

Defendant presents no evidence--except for his bare 

allegation at the suppression hearing and on appeal--of his third 

contention, that he requested an attorney at some point during his 

postarrest statement. Subia's testimony on this point, accepted 

by the district court as credible, satisfies Connelly's 

"preponderance of the evidence" standard. In summary, we affirm 

in all respects the district court's finding that defendant's 

postarrest statement was not given or obtained unconstitutionally. 

II 

Defendant alleges that the government failed to comply with 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a), which requires that a defendant be taken 

before a magistrate for advisement of his rights and the charges 

against him "without unreasonable delay" after his arrest. This 

allegation defies evaluation, since the record is silent as to the 

time at which defendant actually appeared before a magistrate. 

Defendant should have, but did not, raise this claim below. Had 

he done so, factfinding at the district court level could have 

corrected this omission. 

We 

default. 

do not base our decision, however, upon this procedural 

Defendant's allegation, even if true, falls short of 

reversible error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) and the McNabb-Mallory 

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rule requiring suppression of confessions obtained in violation of 

Rule 5(a), see Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); 

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), were designed "to 

ensure that suspects are advised of their rights to silence and 

counsel" before being subjected to the coersive atmosphere of 

prolonged custodial isolation. United States v. Poole, 495 F.2d 

115, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1974). When a suspect is advised of his 

rights at the time of arrest, in accordance with Miranda, the 

purpose of the McNabb-Mallory automatic exclusion rule has been 

satisfied. Therefore, although delay between arrest and the 

suspect's appearance before a magistrate may be evidence of a 

confession's potential involuntariness, a suspect who knowingly 

and intelligently waives his Miranda rights "is not entitled ... 

to an automatic interdiction of a voluntary confession on the 

basis of Mallory and Rule 5(a)," id. 

III 

Defendant finally complains that the government, on redirect 

examination of Lieutenant Tom Sanchez of the Denver Police 

Department, elicited improper opinion evidence of defendant's 

reputation as a drug dealer. Defendant has misconstrued the 

nature of the alleged evidentiary violation. Sanchez did not 

express an opinion that defendant was a drug dealer; rather, 

Sanchez stated that "I also had information that he was a drug 

dealer." VII Supp. R. 946. This testimony falls under the rubric 

of hearsay, not opinion evidence. 

Construing defendant's complaint as an objection to hearsay, 

we hold that the admission of the testimony, even if error, was 

harmless. Defendant's postarrest statement, coupled with evidence 

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adduced from legally wiretapped phone calls and bookkeeping 

entries, provided overwhelming proof of his guilt. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

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