Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03032/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03032-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Willie L. Yelverton
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 21, 1999 Decided December 10, 1999

No. 99-3032

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Willie L. Yelverton,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00284-02)

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown,

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DeMaurice F. Smith and G. Bradley Weinsheimer, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Silberman, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Appellant Willie L. Yelverton appeals his conviction by a jury of kidnaping and related

charges on four principal grounds.1 Only two require more

than brief discussion. Specifically, Yelverton contends that

the district court erred by (1) enhancing his sentence under

United States Sentencing Guidelines s 2A4.1(b)(3) for "use"

of a gun where he did no more than display or brandish the

gun during the course of the kidnaping, and (2) denying his

motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to speedy sentencing. We hold that

s 2A4.1(b)(3) is properly applied where the gun is employed

in a manner designed to coerce a third party so as to

complete the kidnaping offense, that is, where a photograph

of a person pointing a gun at the head of a kidnaping victim is

shown to the victim's parent in tandem with a telephonic

threat of further injury to the victim in order to coerce the

parent into paying a ransom. Assuming that the Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial extends to sentencing, see

Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957), we hold

that Yelverton fails to meet his burden under Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Although his sentencing was

unnecessarily delayed for thirty-three months despite his

repeated requests for prompt sentencing, he has demonstrated neither prosecutorial misconduct nor prejudice, key factors

in the determination of whether a defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right. Concluding further

that Yelverton's other challenges to his conviction are meritless, we affirm.

__________

1 Yelverton was convicted of conspiracy to kidnap, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. s 371, kidnaping, 18 U.S.C. s 1201(a) and s 2, interference with commerce by threats and violence, 18 U.S.C. s 1951 and

s 2, and interstate transmission of extortionate threats, 18 U.S.C.

s 2.

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I.

Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G."), the punishment for kidnaping, abduction, and unlawful restraint is to be increased by two levels

"[i]f a dangerous weapon was used." U.S.S.G. s 2A4.1(b)(3)

(1995). The Application Notes state that the phrase " '[a]

dangerous weapon was used' means that a firearm was discharged, or a 'firearm' or 'dangerous weapon' was 'otherwise

used.' " U.S.S.G. s 2A4.1 comment, n.2. The U.S.S.G. commentary defines the term "otherwise used" to mean "that the

conduct did not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was

more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or

other dangerous weapon." U.S.S.G. s 1B1.1 comment, n.1(g).

Additionally, "brandished" is defined to mean that the weapon

was "pointed or waved about, or displayed in a threatening

manner." U.S.S.G. s 1B1.1 comment, n.1(c).

The district court enhanced Yelverton's sentence based on

evidence that he and his co-defendants informed the kidnaping victim's mother and a detective posing as his father that

their son was in custody and would be tortured and killed

unless they paid a ransom. During a subsequent telephone

call, the mother and the detective were directed to a photograph that showed the son blindfolded and another person's

arm holding a gun to his head.

Yelverton contends that the pointing of a gun at the son's

head in a photograph seen by his mother, combined with

threats to the son's safety directed at his mother in an effort

to extract ransom money from her, cannot constitute "use" of

a firearm under the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, Yelverton contends that the case law establishes that a firearm is

"otherwise used" only where the firearm is pointed at a

specific victim, and is accompanied by a specific command to

the same victim to facilitate the underlying crime. Because

the basis for enhancement here was the use of a gun pointed

at the son in order to coerce his mother to pay a ransom,

Yelverton contends that the district court erred; the gun was

merely "brandished" or "displayed." Our review of the district court's application of a Sentencing Guideline is for clear

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error as to factual findings and with due deference to the

district court's application of the guideline to a factual setting.

See United States v. Becraft, 117 F.3d 1450, 1451 (D.C. Cir.

1997); United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 516-17 (D.C. Cir.

1994).

Virtually all of the circuits to address the question have

held that where a dangerous weapon is pointed at a person

and some further verbal threat or order accompanies the

pointing of the weapon to facilitate commission of the underlying crime, an enhancement for the use of the weapon is

justified. See, e.g., United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674,

676-77 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d

702, 705 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hernandez, 106

F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Fuller, 99 F.3d

926, 927 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952,

953-54 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d

238, 240-41 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. De La Rosa, 911

F.2d 985, 992 (5th Cir. 1990).2 The underlying rationale of

the majority view suggests that the key consideration is

whether a gun (or other weapon) was pointed at a specific

__________

2 Two decisions to the effect that a dangerous weapon is merely

"brandished" rather than "used" when it is pointed directly at a

person and is accompanied by an express demand or threat, are

contrary to weight of authority and distinguishable on their facts.

See Wooden, 163 F.3d at 677 n.5 (citing United States v. Gonzales,

40 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Matthews, 20

F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 1994)). In Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit vacated and

remanded for re-sentencing, holding that the district court erred in

ruling that pointing a gun at a cashier, coupled with a demand for

money, was "use" of a gun. Unlike the instant case, there were no

explicit threats communicated that anyone would be tortured and

killed absent cooperation by others in facilitating the robbery. And

while the Second Circuit in United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538,

554 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for re-sentencing because

the district court erred in ruling that pointing a gun combined with

an explicit threat constituted "use," the court noted that "[i]t could

well be concluded that the expressed threat to shoot one person in

order to extort action from another goes beyond what [the sentencing guidelines are] intended to encompass in 'brandish[ing].' " Id.

The instant case is such a case.

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person in an effort to create fear so as to facilitate compliance

with a demand, and ultimately to facilitate the commission of

the crime. See, e.g., Hernandez, 106 F.3d at 741; Fuller, 99

F.3d at 927; Gordon, 19 F.3d at 1388. This is distinct from a

rationale based on the fact that the gun was pointed at the

same person in whom fear was sought to be instilled, or even

that the person sought to be coerced was the victim of the

crime, as opposed to a third party whose complicity the

perpetrator sought to ensure. With regard to the latter, for

example, courts have found "use" of a weapon where a knife

was held to the throat of a third party (a bank patron) to

facilitate commission of a bank robbery, see Elkins, 16 F.3d

at 953-54, and where a gun was waved by a kidnaper during

an argument with her accomplices, and she "warned that

anyone going to the police would have to deal with her." De

La Rosa, 911 F.2d at 993.

What distinguishes Yelverton's case from the other cases is

the fact that the gun and the threats were directed at two

different people in two different locations at two different

times. While Yelverton conceded at oral argument that

s 2A4.1(b)(3) would apply where the gun holder did something that increased the inherent threat to those in his

presence, he asserts that extension of the enhancement to a

person who is not at the same location as the weapon carries

the enhancement farther than was intended. We find nothing

to suggest that the temporal and spatial elements he identifies are necessary, in contrast to sufficient, in order for

s 2A4.1(b)(3) to apply. While we have found no case directly

on point, inasmuch as most of the cases involve the time and

space elements that Yelverton posits, nothing in the language

of the Guidelines or the case law suggests that a weapon can

only be "otherwise used" in those circumstances. Instead,

the rationale of the weight of authority focuses on the use of

the gun or other dangerous weapon to instill fear to promote

commission of the underlying crime. See, e.g., Hernandez,

106 F.3d at 741; Fuller, 99 F.3d at 927; Gordon, 19 F.3d at

1388. Splitting the "use" of the gun between two persons at

different locations, so long as the pointing of the gun at one

person is used to instill fear in the other person so as to

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coerce compliance, and hence facilitate commission of the

underlying crime, does not diminish the culpable "use" at

issue in the Guidelines.

Yelverton and his accomplices sought to coerce the mother's payment of a ransom by putting her in fear for her

kidnaped son's life. That the mother learned of the gun at a

different time and in a different place than when and where

the gun actually was held to her son's head is irrelevant; the

photograph to which the mother was directed, combined with

explicit threats to her son's life and safety, and the fact that

the son remained in custody at the time his mother's attention was directed to the photograph, make clear that the gun

was used to suggest it would be used against her son if she

did not pay the ransom. Given the approach of the Guidelines toward the use of dangerous weapons as increasing the

coerciveness or dangerousness of criminal activity, cf., e.g.,

Hernandez, 106 F.3d at 741, it is entirely fitting that "use" of

a dangerous weapon include situations where a gun is pointed

at a victim in involuntary custody in an effort to frighten a

family member to pay a ransom, thereby completing the

kidnaping scheme by seeking "ransom or reward." 18 U.S.C.

s 1201(a). This is particularly so where the threat of potential torture or murder of the kidnaping victim should ransom

not be paid is made explicit to the family member, as here by

a telephone call to the mother that enhanced the significance

of the dangerous situation portrayed in the photograph.

Where, then, the deployment of the gun is accompanied by

direct and explicit threats to a mother about her son's wellbeing in order to coerce her into paying a ransom, holding

s 2A4.1(b)(3) inapplicable would serve no purpose other than

to undercut the purpose of the enhancement provision.

Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in

enhancing Yelverton's sentence under s 2A4.1(b)(3).3

__________

3 Yelverton's contention that enhancement for "use" of a firearm is inappropriate because he was acquitted of firearms charges

under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c), is meritless. A sentencing court may

consider conduct for which a defendant was acquitted, "so long as

that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence."

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II.

Yelverton contends that the thirty-three month delay between the return of the jury's verdict and the imposition of

his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to speedy

sentencing. The Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed, which district shall have been

previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with

the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process

for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

U.S. Const. amend. VI. Neither the Supreme Court nor this

court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

trial reaches sentencing, but in Pollard v. United States, 352

U.S. 354, 361 (1957), the Supreme Court assumed that it did.

In Pollard, the Court explained that "the delay must not be

purposeful or oppressive," observing that "[t]he time for

sentence is of course not at the will of the judge [because]

Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the imposition of a sentence 'without unreasonable

delay.' "4 Id. Subsequently, in establishing the test for

determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his

Sixth Amendment rights due to unreasonable pre-trial delay,

the Court cited Pollard, as well as cases involving pre-trial

delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 n.32 (1972). That

__________

United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see

also United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d 120, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

4 Rule 32(a) was amended in 1994 to read:

In General; Time for Sentencing. When a presentence

investigation and report are made under subdivision (b)(1),

sentence should be imposed without unnecessary delay following completion of the process prescribed by subdivision (b)(6).

The time limits prescribed in subdivision (b)(6) may be either

shortened or lengthened for good cause.

test involved the balancing of four factors: the "[l]ength of

delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his

right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. Yelverton maintains that the district court abused its discretion by failing to

apply this four-factor balancing test and thus erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.5

The record shows that Yelverton's sentencing hearing originally was to be held on August 19, 1996. The district court

held a pre-sentence hearing on August 14, 1996, which resulted in a continuance until September 5, 1996, to allow Yelverton time to respond to the government's motion for an

upward departure under U.S.S.C. s 4A1.3, which he did on

August 20, 1996. At the September 5th hearing, the district

court rejected the government's attempt to rely on an armed

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robbery conviction that was more than twenty-five years old

to justify an upward departure, but stated that it wished to

examine the record of the 1987 drug conspiracy conviction

reversed on appeal to obtain information about Yelverton's

underlying conduct; accordingly sentencing was continued

until September 16, 1996, to permit review of the 1987

records. By that date, the 1987 records had not been located,

and the district court again continued Yelverton's sentencing

hearing while imposing sentences on co-defendants Seals and

Sweatt.6

On September 25, 1996, Yelverton filed a motion for immediate sentencing within the guideline range, which was 135 to

168 months imprisonment. No action appears to have been

taken on this motion. On January 16, 1997, the government

__________

5 Those Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered the

question apply a Barker v. Wingo analysis in evaluating speedy

sentencing claims. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d

299, 303 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d

161, 167 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rothrock, 20 F.3d 709,

711-12 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861,

866-67 (9th Cir. 1988); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 252-54

(10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692, 694 (3d

Cir. 1978).

6 Both co-defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment.

filed a supplemental memorandum citing United States v.

Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), for the proposition that acquitted

conduct may be considered in sentencing, and pointed to the

statement of facts in its 1987 appellate brief; no transcripts

relating to the 1987 conviction were produced. The government requested that the district court set a sentencing date

and rule on the motion for an upward departure. Yelverton

filed a response on February 10, 1997, purportedly arguing

that the government's materials did not shed light on the

evidence in the 1987 case and that the government thus failed

to meet its burden of demonstrating that he had engaged in

conduct that supported an upward departure; he requested

again that he be sentenced within the Guideline range.

By letter of June 25, 1997, Yelverton's counsel alerted the

district court that Yelverton still had not been sentenced and

that no sentencing date had been set. On March 25, 1998,

Yelverton filed a motion requesting that a sentencing date be

set, purportedly noting that almost two years had elapsed

since the date of his conviction, and repeating that the

government had found no information about his prior criminal

conduct that would support an upward departure and had

apparently abandoned its effort. The government did not

respond.

Finally, sentencing was set for February 19, 1999. Yelverton filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds

that the district court had failed to impose sentence in a

timely manner. At the hearing, the district court ruled that

it lacked sufficient evidence to support an upward departure

based on Yelverton's conduct underlying the 1987 conviction,

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denied Yelverton's motion to dismiss the indictment in the

absence of evidence of prejudice from the delay of sentencing,

and sentenced him to 150 months' imprisonment, in the

middle of the Guideline range, in consideration of the delay.7

__________

7 In declining to impose an upward departure based on Yelverton's conduct underlying a 1987 narcotics conspiracy conviction that

had been overturned on appeal, the district court determined that it

"could not be satisfied that [it] had reviewed sufficient evidence to

find as a factual matter ... that the defendant committed the

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From this record, Yelverton draws the conclusion that the

first three factors of the Barker v. Wingo test weigh heavily

in favor of dismissal of the indictment and that he also

presented evidence of the requisite prejudice. He notes,

first, that the length of the delay--thirty-three months--was

exceptional.8 He maintains, second, that the reason for the

delay demonstrates its unreasonableness: his sentencing was

substantially delayed as a result of the government's efforts

to obtain information to support an upward departure under

U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3, although it was clear by at least February

1997 that the government had come up empty-handed because its extended searches had produced only its own brief.

To the extent that the government sought to supplement its

motion for enhancement of Yelverton's sentence with any

information that the district court's own efforts might uncover, Yelverton's counsel had inspected that information and

advised the district court by memorandum filed February 10,

1997, that the records did not support the government's

position. Still sentencing did not occur for two more years.

As to the third Barker v. Wingo factor, Yelverton notes his

repeated requests for sentencing. Finally, he maintains, he

was prejudiced by the delay in exercising his right of appeal;

by a lengthy and unnecessary period in the District of

Columbia Jail, "a facility with well publicized shortcomings";

and by almost three years' anxiety as a result of the government's prolonged efforts to obtain a life sentence.

We agree that Yelverton's sentencing was unnecessarily

delayed. Assuredly, both the prosecutor and the district

court bear responsibility for ensuring that sentencing occurs

within a reasonable time after conviction. See Pollard, 352

__________

offense [of murder, on which the jury apparently hung]," having

access only to briefs and other materials but not a transcript of the

trial proceedings or other evidence.

8 The court has noted in the context of pre-trial delay that "any

delay of a year or more triggers our scrutiny." United States v.

Lindsey, 47 F.3d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other

grounds, Robinson v. United States, 516 U.S. 1023 (1995); see also

Thomas, 167 F.3d at 304.

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U.S. at 486 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)). Yelverton points

to the government's neglect in failing to respond to his motion

to dismiss the indictment, and he faults the district court for

failing to consider the Barker factors other than prejudice at

the time of sentencing, much less for failing to respond to his

requests for prompt sentencing. Once the government advised the district court that its repeated searches of the 1987

records were unproductive, the need for further delay appears to have evaporated and Yelverton should have been

promptly sentenced. While it was in his interest to be

sentenced without waiting for the government to uncover

material to support an upward departure, his requests to be

sentenced took on added significance as the delay in sentencing increased. According leeway to the district court in light

of demands on its schedule, thirty-three months is too long.

The district court was apparently of the same view, sentencing Yelverton in the middle rather than at the high end of the

Guideline sentencing range in view of the delay.

On the other hand, despite the excessive delay and repeated requests for sentencing, Yelverton fails to show any

misconduct by the government; rather the record shows that

the delay was inadvertent or accidental, not purposeful or due

to malevolent conduct by the government. See Pollard, 352

U.S. at 361-62. Initially, the government could not locate the

1987 records; when it did, it proceeded to search for relevant

material. Yelverton properly concedes that some delay to

allow the government to search for information to support an

upward departure is appropriate. His complaint arises once

the government reported the futility of its efforts. That he

did not seek mandamus from this court to compel the district

court to impose sentence, suggests, perhaps, that he saw no

misconduct afoot.

Consequently, as the district court recognized, the key

factor in evaluating his Sixth Amendment claim is prejudice,

and here the delay of Yelverton's right of appeal is the most

problematic.9 The government ignores this claim of prejudice

__________

9 Yelverton's other evidence of prejudice is unavailing. First,

mere generalized anxiety is insufficient to establish prejudice, even

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in its brief on appeal. Obviously, where a defendant proves

to have a meritorious claim on appeal, the prejudice from a

delayed appeal is clear. But a showing of prejudice cannot be

entirely contingent upon success on appeal, for that would

seriously undermine the right to a speedy sentencing, if such

a right exists. Consequently, it is precisely because it will be

difficult to determine at the time of sentencing whether an

appeal will result in a reversal of the conviction or other relief

for a defendant that the requirement of Rule 32(a) that

sentence be imposed "without unnecessary delay" assumes

added significance. Put otherwise, prejudice caused by a

delayed "right of appeal" does not fit easily within the pretrial jurisprudence on the prejudice factor of the Barker v.

Wingo test. Protection of the right of appeal, insofar as it is

implicated by the right to speedy sentencing, rests heavily on

the government and the district court. This we view to be

implicit in the mandate of the federal rule. When these

__________

when such anxiety is due to a pre-trial delay in excess of four years.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 534. As this court has noted, such generalized

anxiety in itself "is neither 'necessary [n]or sufficient ... to the

finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.' " Lindsey, 47

F.3d at 443 (quoting Baker, 407 U.S. at 533). Cf. Perez, 793 F.2d at

257. Of course, a life sentence, which Yelverton knew the government sought, is significantly different from fourteen-years imprisonment under the Guidelines, and some generalized anxiety on his

part as he awaited sentencing was understandable. However,

absent evidence of severe anxiety, as, perhaps, documented by

psychiatric records or expert testimony, we are left with what

amounts to rank speculation about Yelverton's general state of

mind, and this is insufficient to establish a Sixth Amendment

violation. See id.; see also Thomas, 167 F.3d at 305; Rothrock, 20

F.3d at 712; Martinez, 837 F.2d at 867.

Likewise, little weight need be given to Yelverton's complaint

about his extended stay at the D.C. Jail while he awaited sentencing

in the absence of any evidence that he was a victim of untoward or

unusual suffering as a result. To the contrary, it is well established

that a prisoner does not have a right to be housed in a particular

institution. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478-79

(1995); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Thomas, 167

F.3d at 305; Perez, 793 F.2d at 257.

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protections fail, the question of appropriate remedy, if any,

remains.

Yelverton's complaint that a judicial apology for the delay

and several months' reduction in sentence as a result of the

delay is an inadequate remedy overlooks the jurisprudence

under Barker v. Wingo, which takes into account the severity

of the prejudice in evaluating a Sixth Amendment claim. See,

e.g., Lindsey, 47 F.3d at 443. The fact that Yelverton's

challenges to the legitimacy of his conviction clearly lack

merit, see infra n.11, combined with the fact that Yelverton

was facing a minimum sentence--even if his sentencing enhancement argument under U.S.S.G. s 2A4.1(b)(3) had prevailed--far in excess of his delay in sentencing, suggest that

any prejudice suffered by Yelverton with respect to the delay

of his right to appeal did not merit a remedy greater than

that provided by the district court. Cf. Pollard, 352 U.S. at

362. He makes no claim that the delay affected his ability to

present his position on his sentence or adversely affected the

sentence he received. There also is nothing in the record to

suggest that he suffered the type of "purposeful or oppressive" delay that was of concern to the Supreme Court in

Pollard. Id. at 361. Absent some indication that Yelverton's

sentence would have been shorter or substantively different

without the delay, his status as a convicted defendant weighs

more heavily in evaluating the appropriate remedy. See, e.g.,

Thomas, 167 F.3d at 305; Rothrock, 20 F.3d at 712; Martinez, 837 F.2d at 867; Perez, 793 F.2d at 257. Of course,

"inadvertent delay" or "accidental delay" of this magnitude,

particularly in view of defense and government requests that

sentencing proceed, might, notwithstanding the change in the

defendant's status after conviction, take on added weight

were there evidence of meaningful prejudice, as discussed in

Barker, but Yelverton does not demonstrate such prejudice.

Accordingly, in view of the inadvertence of the delay after

January 1997 and the absence of any evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or of serious prejudice, Yelverton's Sixth

Amendment claim fails under the Barker v. Wingo test,10 and

__________

10 Because of the clarity of the record on which Yelverton

relies, a remand, which Yelverton suggests as alternative relief to

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because his other challenges to his conviction are meritless,11

we affirm.

__________

dismissal of the indictment, to allow the district judge to place on

the record its findings about the Barker factors in addition to

prejudice, see United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455, 464 (D.C. Cir.

1991), would be meaningless. See United States v. Davis, 181 F.3d

147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

11 Yelverton's contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy

Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. s 3161 et seq., where the government proceeded in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia until a federal

indictment was brought more than thirty days later, is controlled by

United States v. Seals, 130 F.3d 451, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 118 S.Ct. 2323 (1998), and 119 S.Ct. 111 (1998), where the

court rejected a similar claim by one of his co-defendants.

Nor do we find an abuse of discretion by the district court in

denying Yelverton's motion for severance under Fed. R. Crim. P.

14, because his defense was not fundamentally inconsistent with

that of his co-defendants and there was no risk that the jury would

infer his guilt from a conflict. See United States v. Tarantino, 846

F.2d 1384, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Credibility problems arising

from his co-defendants' evidence attempting to exculpate him is not

the kind of conflict that a severance is designed to cure, see id.,

especially where Yelverton did not present a defense, much less

testify himself. Yelverton presents no authority to the contrary. Cf.

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993).

USCA Case #99-3032 Document #482851 Filed: 12/10/1999 Page 14 of 14