Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00126/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00126-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Galen L. Carroll
Defendant
City of Modesto
Defendant
Modesto Police Department
Defendant
Ryan Olson
Defendant
Jason B. Perkins
Plaintiff
Jerry J. Ramar
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON B. PERKINS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MODESTO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00126-LJO-EPG

ORDER:

1. GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO COMPEL;

2. FINDING SPOLIATION IN RELATION 

TO CELL PHONE ESI;

3. DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

REVOKE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 

ORDERS;

4. OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S 

OBJECTIONS REGARDING PUBLIC 

DISCLOSURE OF OFFICER 

PERSONNEL AND IA FILES WITH 

LEAVE TO PROPOSE REDACTIONS;

5. GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR EXPENSES; AND

6. DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

GENERAL SANCTIONS.

(ECF Nos. 44, 49)

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel and various other discovery 

motions. (ECF Nos. 44, 49). The Court finds the motions appropriate for decision on the record, 

without oral argument, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motion 

to compel, finds spoliation in relation to the cell phone ESI, denies Plaintiff’s motion to revoke 

the stipulated protective orders, overrules Defendants’ objection to public disclosure of police 

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personnel files and internal affairs investigation (“IA”) files, grants Plaintiff’s motion for 

expenses, and denies Plaintiff’s motion for general sanctions. As to the overruling of Defendants’ 

objection to public disclosure of police personnel and IA files, the Court grants Defendants leave 

to file a motion seeking to keep specific officer personnel and IA files confidential and/or 

proposing redactions to such files prior to public disclosure and orders the parties to maintain the 

confidentiality of such files pending resolution of such motion.

In ruling on the pending motions, the Court declines to consider arguments and 

information provided by the Parties in the non-compliant, 148-page joint statement of discovery 

dispute and attachments thereto, except as to the issue of spoliation. (See ECF Nos. 46, 47.)

I. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations of Amended Complaint

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action on January 29, 2019 (ECF No. 1) and filed an 

amended complaint on June 13, 2019 (ECF No. 22). The amended complaint alleges the 

following: 

On November 6, 2017, Plaintiff drove his significant other, Shannon Agnitsch, to the 

bank, and waited in his vehicle, sitting in the driver’s seat, in the bank’s parking lot while Ms. 

Agnitsch entered the bank. Plaintiff’s vehicle was approached by Defendants Jerry J. Ramar and 

Ryan Olson, on-duty Modesto Police Department (“MPD”) police officers. Plaintiff was not 

aware that these officers had approached his vehicle. Defendant Ramar unholstered and fired his 

MPD-issued firearm at Plaintiff without warning and without provocation, shooting at Plaintiff 

and Plaintiff’s vehicle. Ramar shot at Plaintiff approximately six times, including in the face, 

chest, left arm, and left shoulder. Defendant Ryan Olson stood by as Ramar shot Plaintiff, without 

protesting or intervening, despite the opportunity to do so.

Plaintiff required life-saving medical treatment at the scene of the shooting and was 

transported to the hospital for further life-saving treatment, including several surgeries. Plaintiff 

remained in critical condition for two weeks following the shooting. Plaintiff still has three bullets 

and/or metal jackets lodged inside his body and has been advised the removal of these would be 

dangerous. Plaintiff has also undergone two additional surgeries since the shooting and expects 

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that at least a few more surgeries will be needed in the future. His resulting injuries have left him 

with paralysis in his left hand, right arm, and face.

On June 28, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a citizen complaint form to Defendant Modesto 

Police Department, alleging misconduct in connection with the November 6, 2017, officerinvolved shooting of Plaintiff. On December 18, 2018, the MPD Shooting Review Board, 

concluded that Defendant Ramar’s discharge of his firearm against Plaintiff was “within policy,” 

and, as a result that the allegations in Plaintiff’s citizen complaint form were “Unfounded.” 

On January 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed this action, naming as defendants the City of Modesto, 

the Modesto Police Department, Galen L. Carroll, Jerry J. Ramar, and Ryan Olson. (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff brings claims for use of unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; and California state law claims of unreasonable force, 

assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and violation of the 

Bane Act.

On March 11, 2019, Defendant Ramar resigned from the MPD to accept a promotional 

lieutenant-rank position with the Oakdale Police Department. On May 9, 2019, more than four 

months after the present action was filed, MPD sent Plaintiff correspondence informing him that, 

“as a result of [Ramar’s] resignation this complaint has been closed,” pursuant to the MPD’s 

Citizen Complaint Policy, which states, “A complaint is considered ‘Closed’ when an employee 

resigns his/her employment prior to the completion of the investigation.”

B. Stipulated Protective Orders

On August 6, 2019, the Parties filed their first stipulation for a protective order (ECF No. 

28), and the Court entered the first stipulated protective order on August 6, 2019 (ECF No. 29).

On September 9, 2019, the parties file a second stipulation for a protective order (ECF No. 32) 

and the Court entered the second stipulated protective order on September 10, 2019 (ECF 

No. 33). In both the first and second stipulated protective order, Plaintiff specified that he was not 

waiving, forfeiting, or abandoning “his contention that Defendants failed timely and appropriately 

to move for a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).” (ECF No. 29 at 3 n.1; ECF No. 33 

at 4 n.1.)

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C. Discovery Disputes

In November 2019, the parties informed the Court that they had a discovery dispute and 

requested that the Court set an informal discovery dispute conference. The Court held the 

requested informal discovery dispute conference on November 21, 2019, and granted Plaintiff 

leave to file a motion to compel and/or for sanctions based on any issue raised in the informal 

discovery dispute letters submitted to the Court on November 20, 2019, as well as any issues 

discussed during the informal discovery dispute conference. (See ECF No. 41.) The Court also set 

a hearing for January 24, 2020, for Plaintiff’s anticipated motion to compel. (Id.) 

On January 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed his motion seeking to compel discovery and raising 

various other discovery issues (ECF No. 44). On January 17, 2020, the parties submitted their 

joint statement of discovery disagreement (ECF No. 46). The joint statement was 148 pages long 

(and included 377 pages of exhibits) and thus violated the Court’s Scheduling Order, which 

provides that joint statements of discovery disputes “shall not exceed to twenty-five (25) pages” 

not including exhibits. (ECF No. 20 at 4.) The joint statement also violated the Local Rules 

regarding discovery dispute statements because, for example, it did not contain a clear statement 

of what documents were claimed to be still outstanding. See Local Rule 251(c). The Court 

therefore vacated the January 24, 2020, hearing on the motion to compel and directed the parties 

to file a revised joint statement of discovery dispute that complied with the Court’s scheduling 

order and the Local Rules. However, given the number of issues raised by Plaintiff, the Court 

granted the parties an additional five pages, for a total length of thirty pages, for the joint 

statement. (ECF No. 47.) The Court also informed the parties that they did not need to rebrief the 

spoliation issue as that issue was sufficiently presented in the non-compliant joint statement 

already submitted. (Id.) The parties filed the revised joint statement of discovery dispute on 

February 5, 2020. (ECF No. 49.) The motion seeking to compel discovery and raising other 

discovery disputes (ECF No. 44) and the revised joint statement of discovery dispute (ECF No. 

49) are currently before the Court.

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II. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

A. Legal Standards

A party responding to a discovery request must provide all responsive information in that 

party’s “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1). “‘Accordingly, a party has an 

obligation to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of his responses to discovery. 

Based on that inquiry, a party responding to a request for production ‘is under an affirmative duty 

to seek that information reasonably available’ to it and make an appropriate production of 

responsive documents.’” Hartline v. Nat'l Univ., 2018 WL 1014611, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 

2018) (citations omitted); see Kaur v. Alameida, 2007 WL 1449723, *2 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2007) 

(ordering defendants to conduct additional research for responsive documents and reminding 

defendants and counsel “of their duty under Rule 34 to conduct a diligent search and reasonable 

inquiry in effort to obtain responsive documents”).

The responding party “cannot furnish only that information within his immediate 

knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek that information reasonably 

available to him from his employees, agents, or others subject to his control.” Rogers v. Giurbino, 

288 F.R.D. 469, 485 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Lopez 

v. Florez, 2013 WL 1151948, * 2 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2013) (“A responding party has an 

affirmative duty to reasonably seek information requested under Rule 34(a) from its agents or 

others under its control.”) (citing Hill v. Eddie Bauer, 242 F.R.D. 556, 560 (C.D. Cal. 2007)). “A 

party is deemed to have control over documents if he or she has a legal right to obtain them.” 

Giurbino, 288 F.R.D. at 485 (citations omitted). The responding party must “make a reasonable 

inquiry to determine whether responsive documents exist, and if they do not, the party should so 

state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the party made a 

reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

A party propounding discovery requests “is entitled to individualized, complete responses 

to each discovery request, and generalized responses that do not specifically indicate whether all 

responsive documents to a particular discovery request have been produced are insufficient.” 

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Washington v. Rouch, No. 1:15-cv-00725-DAD-BAM, 2017 WL 4123384, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 

15, 2017) (citing Louen v. Twedt, 236 F.R.D. 502, 504-05 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

Discovery responses must also be signed by at least one attorney of record in the 

attorney’s own name. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). By signing, the attorney is certifying that, to the 

best of her or his “knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry,” that a 

“disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made” and, that a response or objection to a 

discovery request is:

(i) consistent with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and 

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing 

new law;

(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and

(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, 

considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the 

amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in 

the action.

Id. A court is required to strike “an unsigned disclosure, request, response, or objection . . . unless 

a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the attorney’s . . . attention.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2).

The duty to make a “reasonable inquiry” referred to in Rule 26(g), 

is satisfied if the investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions 

drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an objective 

standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11. In making the inquiry, the 

attorney may rely on assertions by the client and on communications with other 

counsel in the case as long as that reliance is appropriate under the circumstances. 

Ultimately, what is reasonable is a matter for the court to decide on the totality of 

the circumstances.

Rule 26(g) does not require the signing attorney to certify the truthfulness of the 

client’s factual responses to a discovery request. Rather, the signature certifies 

that the lawyer has made a reasonable effort to assure that the client has provided 

all the information and documents available to him that are responsive to the 

discovery demand. Thus, the lawyer's certification under Rule 26(g) should be 

distinguished from other signature requirements in the rules, such as those in 

Rules 30(e) and 33.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g), Advisory Committee Notes (1993) (citations omitted). 

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Rule 26(g) requires counsel to be “proactive in ensuring that his clients are conducting 

thorough and appropriate document searches, especially in light of obvious gaps and 

underproduction.” Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc., 2013 WL 3967750, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 

Under such circumstances, it is not enough for counsel to simply give instructions 

to his clients and count on them to fulfill their discovery obligations. The Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure place an affirmative obligation on an attorney to ensure 

that a client’s search for responsive documents and information is complete. As 

the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26(g) states, “[t]he duty to make a 

‘reasonable inquiry’ is satisfied if the investigation undertaken by the attorney and 

the conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances.” 

Therefore, where . . . counsel notices obvious “gaps in the production” of 

documents by his clients, he is obligated to make a reasonable inquiry as to the 

thoroughness of that search.

Id. (citations omitted).

The party propounding discovery may seek an order to compel responses when the 

opposing party fails to respond or has provided evasive or incomplete responses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(a)(3)(B). “[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a 

failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Further, “a failure to object to 

discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.” Richmark 

Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Unknown Outstanding Discovery

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff states, “he has no way of knowing what responsive discovery remains 

outstanding,” and that he “is only aware of the existence of outstanding discovery that was 

obviously not produced, based on its ascertainable omission from discovery that was produced.” 

He notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(1) requires “a responding party’s attorney to 

certify that a discovery response is complete and ‘formed after a reasonable inquiry,’” but that the 

City “unilaterally decided (over Plaintiff’s repeated objections) that it would only produce 

discovery on a ‘rolling’ basis, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A)’s time-limits.” Plaintiff 

thus believes that neither Defendants nor their counsel have adequately certified that all 

responsive documents have been submitted with respect to any discovery request. 

Plaintiff cites to three specific examples that he says support his belief. (ECF No. 49 at 3-

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4.) Plaintiff argues that the types of unexplained omissions demonstrated in these three examples, 

in addition to Defendants’ counsel’s repeated unfulfilled promises to produce documents by dates 

certain, have caused “Plaintiff to have grave doubt that Defendant City has complied with its 

discovery obligations.” (ECF No. 49 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that this is the type of situation 

where it is appropriate to have the responding party produce a verification after double-checking 

its files.

The first example cited by Plaintiff is an unproduced video-recorded officer-involved 

shooting (“OIS”) interview of Defendant Ramar. Plaintiff states:

On July 25, 2019, Defendant City belatedly and informally produced what was 

represented to be the officer-involved shooting (“OIS”) investigation and 

associated materials (Bates 1-1576). At least one document was obviously 

unproduced, a “recording” of Defendant Ramar’s interview, acknowledged to 

exist in a document that was produced (Bates No. 1057). Plaintiff’s counsel 

inquired as to why the document was missing. On January 3, 2020, Defendant 

City informally produced the recording, without an explanation as to why it had 

not been produced with the supposedly-complete OIS investigation.

(ECF No. 49 at 3) (citations to ECF No. 46 omitted).)

The second example cited by Plaintiff is an unproduced pre-employment psychiatric 

evaluation. Plaintiff states: 

On August 2, 2019, Defendant City belatedly and informally produced what was 

represented to be Defendant Ramar’s personnel file. (Bates No. 1257-1508). On 

August 7, 2019, Defendant City’s counsel certified, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(g)(1), in an amended discovery response that the personnel file had been 

produced. California requires that peace officers undergo a psychological 

screening prior to employment, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 1955(a). This document 

was missing from Defendant City’s supposedly-complete production. Plaintiff’s 

counsel inquired as to why the document was missing. On September 26, 2019, 

Defendant City informally produced Defendant Ramar’s pre-employment 

psychological evaluation, without explanation as to why it had not been produced 

with the supposedly-complete personnel file.

(ECF No. 49 at 3-4) (citations to ECF No. 46 omitted).)

The third example cited by Plaintiff is unproduced documents from Reed v. City of 

Modesto. Plaintiff states:

On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff requested “All DOCUMENTS relating to any 

investigation concerning the subjects giving rise to Reed v. City of Modesto, E.D. 

Cal. Case No. 1:11-cv-01083-AWI-GSA—including, but not limited to, formal 

and informal complaints, interviews conducted, statements received, 

correspondence sent or received, video/audio recordings, reports and memos 

prepared.” On October 24, 2019, Defendant City responded: “The Modesto Police 

Department has performed a diligent and thorough search and does not possess 

any ‘formal or informal complaints, interviews conducted, statements received, 

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correspondence sent or received, video/audio records, reports and memos 

prepared’ for this incident.” However, on January 24, 2020, Defendant City’s 

counsel stated that he “received the IA report that corresponds with the Reed v. 

Modesto lawsuit,” confirming that the previous unsuccessful search for responsive 

documents was not “a diligent and thorough search.”

(ECF No. 49 at 4) (citations to ECF No. 46 omitted).)

2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants have responded to the examples provided by Plaintiff. As to the first and 

second examples provided by Plaintiff—the unproduced video-recorded OIS interview of 

Defendant Ramar and the unproduced pre-employment psychiatric evaluation—Defendants state 

the following: “To Defendants’ knowledge, this is not a live issue. There is no disagreement for 

the Court to adjudicate. This [recording and evaluation] has been produced.” (ECF No. 49 at 16.) 

As to the third example provided by Plaintiff—the unproduced Reed v. City of Modesto 

documents—Defendants state:

Defendants previously indicated that Modesto Police Department did [not] possess any 

documents related to the Reed v. Modesto case. At the November 21, 2019 informal 

discovery dispute telephone conference, Judge Grosjean requested that counsel for 

Defendants contact the prior attorneys who represented the City. Counsel contacted Susan 

Coleman, a private attorney who represented the City. Ms. Coleman sent the IA for the 

incident, which has been BATES stamped and has been offered to be produced pursuant 

to a protective order.

(ECF No. 49 at 16.)

3. Analysis

While the Court appreciates that Defendants have supplemented their production, 

Defendants’ response on this issue misses the point. Plaintiff contends that neither Defendants nor 

their counsel have adequately certified that all responsive documents have been submitted with 

respect to any discovery request. Plaintiff also contends that the specific examples he provides 

demonstrate unexplained omissions from Defendants’ discovery responses and that it is still 

unclear whether all information responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests have been disclosed 

by Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff contends that Defendants should be required to produce a 

verification after double-checking its files.

Defendants have not denied or otherwise responded to Plaintiff’s contentions. (See ECF 

No. 49 at 16.) Instead, Defendants merely state their belief that they have provided information 

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responsive to the three specific examples Plaintiff cites or that they will do so subject to a 

protective order.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g), discovery responses must be signed, 

certifying that, to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a 

reasonable inquiry, the discovery response is “complete and correct as of the time it is made.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). A court is required to strike “an unsigned disclosure, request, response, 

or objection . . . unless a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the 

attorney’s . . . attention.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2).

Here, based on Plaintiff’s uncontested arguments, the Court finds that Defendants have

failed to provide adequate certification that its discovery responses were complete and correct as 

of the time made and, as discussed further below, that Defendants have failed to provide 

discovery in a timely manner and have later located information Defendants initially indicated 

was not available. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require Defendants to doublecheck for responsive information in its possession, custody, or control, and provide a verification 

that both explains the steps taken to conduct the double-check and certifies that all responsive 

documents have been provided. See Duenez v. City of Manteca, No. 2:11-CV-1820, 2013 WL 

684654, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (“[C]ounsel for defendants admitted that they have had 

past success in locating documents responsive to other discovery requests propounded by 

plaintiffs after ‘double-checking’ their files. Accordingly, the City is directed to double-check its 

files with respect to this request and to either produce any newly-found responsive documents or 

submit an amended verification that documents responsive to this request do not exist.”).

The Court will therefore direct that Defendants, within forty-five days of the date this 

order is entered, do the following as to each of Plaintiff’s discovery requests: (1) double-check for 

information in its possession, custody, or control that is responsive to the discovery request; (2) 

produce any newly-found responsive documents; and (3) submit a verification that both explains 

the steps it took to conduct the double-check and certifies that all responsive documents have 

been provided. The Court will also grant Plaintiff leave to request that Defendants provide a 

declaration and/or appear for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) deposition on efforts 

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Defendants have taken to search for information responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery request(s) and 

will require Defendants to comply with such request(s). 

Finally, to the extent Defendants have failed to disclose documents because such 

documents are not subject to an existing protective order, the burden is on Defendants to 

affirmatively seek a protective order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). If Plaintiff will not stipulate to a 

protective order, Defendants must file a motion for a protective order. See id. Defendants may not 

simply withhold information responsive to a discovery request on the condition that Plaintiff 

agree to enter into a protective order. Any request by Defendant for a protective order shall be 

filed on an expedited basis.

C. “Document Dump”

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff argues that he has no way of knowing whether all responsive documents have 

been produced by Defendant City because of Defendant City’s November 27, 2019, unorganized 

“document dump.” Specifically, Plaintiff argues, 

Defendant City’s third and final ‘rolling’ production of internal affairs (“IA”) and 

administrative investigations came in an unorganized form, with 509 individual items 

contain[ed] in a single folder, where all previous productions had been organized and 

segregated by Modesto Police Department’s assigned IA or investigation number. Even 

Bates numbers applied to the documents are out-of-order, making manual segregation 

difficult. 

(ECF No. 49 at 5.) Plaintiff provides the following table of the document description and Bates 

numbers from this “document dump”:

Document Description Bates Nos.

Modesto Police Department IA15-011 3347-3514

Modesto Police Department IA16-048 3581-7643, 7689, 7694, 7695, 7723, 

7730, 7731, 7760, 7790, 7791, 7821, 

7822, 7842, 7864-7868, 7869-7917, 

7918-7919 & 8801-9467

Modesto Police Department FD14-002 9773-9781, 9796-9968 & 9969-10157

Modesto Police Department FD15-002 11586-11784 & 11785-11974

Modesto Police Department FD15-003 12690-12857 & 12858-12946

Modesto Police Department FD15-004 13787-13980 & 13981-14136

Modesto Police Department FD16-001 14937-14987, 15589-15606 & 15607-

15877

Modesto Police Department FD16-003 16640-16662, 16663-16679 & 16680-

16707

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Modesto Police Department FD16-005 17487-17488, 17490-17494, 17507-

17543, 18468-18525, 20962-20965, 

20966-20994, 20995-21003, 21004-

21045 & 21053-21382

Modesto Police Department FD16-006 22214-22655

Modesto Police Department FD17-001 22730-22764, 22768-22805, 22892-

22893, 24188-24437 & 24438-24697

Modesto Police Department FD17-002 1639-1651

(ECF No. 49 at 5.)

2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants state they “have worked to efficiently to BATES stamp twelve prior in 

custody deaths and/or prior shooting investigations. Defendants have indicated which documents 

pertain to which investigation.” (ECF No. 49 at 16.)

3. Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(E), which addresses the production of 

documents or electronically stored information, provides that, unless otherwise stipulated or 

ordered by the court, a “party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of 

business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E).

As noted, Defendants state only that they have indicated which documents pertain to 

which investigation. They do not indicate that the production of the documents was as the 

documents were kept in the usual course of business and, based on the uncontradicted information 

provided by Plaintiff, the documents produced by Defendants on November 27, 2019, were also 

not organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in Plaintiff’s discovery requests.

Thus, Defendants’ November 27, 2019, discovery response does not comply with Rule 

34(b)(2)(E) and is accordingly deficient.

The Court will require Defendants to reproduce, within forty-five days of the date this 

order is entered, Defendants’ November 27, 2019, discovery response in compliance with Rule 

34(b)(2)(E), which requires that Defendants “must produce documents as they are kept in the 

usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the 

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request[s].” Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 34(b)(2)(E). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to have Defendants

produce the documents in a manner other than as required by Rule 34(b)(2)(E), Plaintiff must 

seek and obtain a stipulation from Defendants for such production. See id.

D. RPD No. 7 (Defendant Ramar’s Personnel Files)

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff contends that he “is aware of at least two unproduced pages from within 

Defendant City’s production of Defendant Ramar’s personnel file (Bates Nos. 1257-1508). “The 

missing documents are pages one and two from a four-page 2017 performance evaluation of 

Defendant Ramar, where only pages three and four were produced (Bates 1294-1295).” (ECF No. 

49 at 6.) Plaintiff states that the missing documents are particularly relevant to this case “because 

they cover the period during which the incident giving rise to this action occurred—i.e., 

Defendant Ramar’s shooting Plaintiff on November 6, 2017.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that on 

January 3, 2020, after Plaintiff had requested the missing documents for several months and after 

the filing of the motion to compel, Defendant City produced the declaration of Sgt. Christopher 

Adams which stated the following: “I personally searched Sgt. Jerry Ramar’s personnel file. I 

found the ‘Sergeant Performance Appraisal’ evaluation” but “I could not locate a page 1 or page 

2 for the evaluation.” Plaintiff contends that this is not a sufficient response, and that the City was 

required to provide an explanation of the search conducted with sufficient specificity to allow the 

Court to determine whether the City made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence. 

“Simply searching Defendant Ramar’s personnel file is not a ‘reasonable inquiry,’ where the 

missing documents may be found in some other location within Defendant City’s ‘possession, 

custody, or control,’” such as “the computer or server on which the performance evaluation was 

originally prepared and/or stored.” (ECF No. 49 at 6 (citations omitted).)

2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants state: “Defendants have nothing to add to Sgt. Adams’s declaration.” (ECF 

No. 49 at 16.)

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3. Analysis

“A party responding to a document request cannot furnish only that information within his 

immediate knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek that information 

reasonably available to him from his employees, agents, or others subject to his control.” Rogers, 

288 F.R.D. at 485. “A party must make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether responsive 

documents exist, and if they do not, the party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow 

the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.” 

Id. (citations and internal citation marks omitted).

Here, it is clear that there are documents missing from the production of Ramar’s 

personnel file. Defendants state, through the declaration of Sgt. Christopher Adams, that they 

have searched for the missing documents by searching Ramar’s personnel file itself. This is 

insufficient. Defendants are under an affirmative duty to exercise due diligence and make a 

reasonable inquiry to determine whether responsive documents exist. A search of Ramar’s 

personnel file does not fulfill that duty. For example, as Plaintiff has suggested, the missing pages 

may be located on a computer, server, or other location within Defendants’ possession, custody, 

or control. 

The Court will therefore require that Defendants, within forty-five days from the date this 

order is entered, do the following as to the 2017 performance review of Defendant Ramar and any 

other information responsive to Plaintiff’s Request for Production (“RPD”) No. 7: (1) doublecheck for information in its possession, custody, or control that is responsive to this discovery 

request, and specifically, search on the City’s computers, servers, and other locations within 

Defendants’ possession, custody, or control; (2) produce any newly-found responsive documents; 

and (3) submit a verification that both explains the steps taken to conduct the double-check and 

certifies that all responsive documents have been provided.

E. RPD No. 14 (Defendant Ramar’s Prior Testimony)

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff states his belief that the City has not produced all documents responsive to a 

request for Ramar’s “testimony . . . provided in any civil action—including, but not limited to, 

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deposition testimony.” Plaintiff explains that the City has responded only that Ramar was 

previously sued in Holcomb v. Ramar, Case 1:13-cv-01102-AWI-SKO, that the case was tried, 

and,

[t]he trial resulted in a defense verdict. Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver, & Wilson 

represented Jerry Ramar and the City of Modesto in the case. The trial attorney 

was Blake Loebs who is deceased. [¶] In August 2019, Meyers, Nave Riback, 

Silver, & Wilson performed a search for prior testimony for Ramar for this case 

and was unable to find any responsive documents.

(ECF No. 49 at 6 (citation omitted).)

Plaintiff contends that this response is not sufficient because it does not provide an 

explanation of the search conducted with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine 

whether the City made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence. Specifically, “[s]imply 

asking a firm that previously represented Defendant Ramar if it possessed any testimony is not a 

‘reasonable inquiry,’ where such testimony may be found in some other location within 

Defendant City’s ‘possession, custody, or control,” such as through “the court reporting company 

that transcribed Defendant Ramar’s testimony.” (ECF No. 49 at 6-7.)

2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants state: “To Defendants’ knowledge, this is not a live issue. Their prior 

attorneys searched and found no responsive documents.” (ECF No. 49 at 16.)

3. Analysis

A party responding to a document request “cannot furnish only that information within his 

immediate knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek that information 

reasonably available to him from his employees, agents, or others subject to his control.” Rogers, 

288 F.R.D. at 485. “A party must make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether responsive 

documents exist, and if they do not, the party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow 

the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.” 

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants indicate that they sought information from their prior attorneys as to one case 

in which Ramar was a defendant, Holcomb v. Ramar, Case 1:13-cv-01102-AWI-SKO. 

Defendants have not, however, described the inquiry and efforts Defendants made to 

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affirmatively seek information available to them from other sources, including their own records,

as to any prior testimony provided by Ramar in that prior case or any other case in which Ramar 

was involved.

Turning to the case of Holcomb v. Ramar, Case 1:13-cv-01102-AWI-SKO, the Court 

notes that judgment in that case was entered on August 21, 2017, following a jury trial. (See 

Holcomb v. Ramar, ECF Nos. 188, 192.). Defendants represent that they reached out to the prior 

attorneys in August 2019, just two years later, and that those prior attorneys indicate that they do 

not have any information responsive to the request for prior testimony of Ramar. The Court finds 

it highly unlikely that there is neither deposition nor trial testimony from Ramar from that prior 

case. Thus, to the extent there is a case file from this prior case, that file is likely to contain at 

least deposition testimony, if not trial testimony, from Ramar.

The California Rules of Professional Conduct do not appear to have a bright-line rule on 

how long Defendants’ prior attorneys are required to maintain the file from this prior case. See 

Cal. State Bar Formal Opinion No. 2001-157 (addressing ethical duties of attorney regarding 

retention of former clients’ files, and explaining that there is “no shortcut, ‘bright line’ rule” for 

determining how long items in a closed file must be maintained). However, unless there is an 

agreement with the client on the disposition of papers in a closed file, the prior attorneys are 

required to make reasonable efforts to obtain a client’s consent before destroying the items in the 

file. Id. Thus, it appears likely that the prior attorneys would still have the file from the prior case, 

which, as noted, concluded just two years prior to the purported search for Ramar’s testimony, or 

that the prior attorneys would have obtained permission from Defendants, including Ramar, to 

destroy the file from the prior case. 

In light of the above, the Court finds Defendants’ response to RPD No. 14, seeking 

Ramar’s former testimony, to be inadequate. The Court will therefore require that Defendants, 

within forty-five days of the date this order is entered, do the following as to RPD No. 14: 

(1) double-check for information in their possession, custody, or control that is responsive to this 

discovery request, and specifically search the City’s computers, servers, archived documents, and 

other locations within Defendants’ possession, custody, or control; (2) produce any responsive 

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documents; and (3) submit a verification that both explains the steps Defendants took to conduct 

the double-check and certifies that all responsive documents have been provided. If information 

responsive to RPD No. 14 is unavailable because the information has been destroyed by or with 

the permission of Defendants, an explanation as to such destruction shall be included in the 

verification. If former counsel for Defendants in Holcomb v. Ramar has indicated that responsive 

information is not available, Defendants shall provide the name of the attorney who so indicated 

along with an explanation from that attorney as to why the information is no longer available.

F. RPD No. 59 (Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, 1:10-cv-01370-LJO-MJS) and 

RPD No. 60 (Olvera v. City of Modesto, 1:11-cv-00540-AWI-GSA)

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff states that in response to his requests for Monell discovery related to prior 

litigation in Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:10-cv-01370-LJO-MJS, and Olvera v. 

City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:11-cv-00540-AWI-GSA, the City responded that after “a 

diligent and thorough search,” it found it “does not possess” responsive documents. Plaintiff 

contends this is not sufficient because it does not provide an explanation of the search conducted 

with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the City made a reasonable 

inquiry and exercised due diligence. Plaintiff also notes that Defendants are required to produce 

documents in their “possession, custody, or control,” and not merely documents in their 

“possession.”

2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants respond as to both of these requests as follows: 

Modesto Police Department had no responsive records. At the November 1, 2019 

informal discovery dispute telephone conference, Judge Grosjean requested that 

counsel for Defendants contact the prior attorneys who represented the City in this 

case. Blake Loebs of Meyers Nave was the trial attorney on this case. He is now 

deceased. Myers Nave has searched for responsive documents. If responsive 

documents exist, they will be produced.

(ECF No. 49 at 16-17.)

3. Analysis

A party responding to a document request “cannot furnish only that information within his 

immediate knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek that information 

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reasonably available to him from his employees, agents, or others subject to his control.” Rogers, 

288 F.R.D. at 485. “A party must make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether responsive 

documents exist, and if they do not, the party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow 

the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.” 

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants indicate that they sought information from their prior attorneys and that if 

documents exist, they will be produced. The Court notes that Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, E.D. 

Cal. Case 1:10-cv-01370-LJO-MJS, was dismissed by stipulation on July 27, 2015 (Rodriguez v. 

City of Modesto, ECF No. 98); and that Olvera v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:11-cv-00540-

AWI-GSA, was dismissed by stipulation on September 19, 2015 (Olvera v. City of Modesto, ECF 

No. 67). As discussed above in relation to RPD No.14, it appears likely that the former attorneys 

would still have these case files or would have obtained permission from Defendant City to 

destroy the files. 

In light of the above, the Court finds Defendants’ response to RPD Nos. 59 and 60, 

seeking Monell discovery related to prior litigation in Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. 

Case 1:10-cv-01370-LJO-MJS, and Olvera v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:11-cv-00540-

AWI-GSA, to be inadequate. The Court will therefore require that Defendants, within forty-five

days from the date this order is entered, do the following as to RPD Nos. 59 and 60: (1) doublecheck for information in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control that is responsive to these 

discovery requests, and specifically search the City’s computers, servers, archived documents, 

and other locations within Defendants’ possession, custody, or control; (2) produce any 

responsive documents; and (3) submit a verification that both explains the steps Defendants took 

to conduct the double-check and certifies that all responsive documents have been provided. If 

information responsive to RPD Nos. 59 and 60 is unavailable because the information has been 

destroyed by or with the permission of Defendants, an explanation as to such destruction shall be 

included in the verification. If former counsel for Defendants has indicated that responsive 

information is not available, Defendants shall provide the name of the attorney who so indicated 

along with an explanation from that attorney as to why the information is no longer available.

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G. RPD No. 61 (Reed v. City of Modesto, 1:11-cv-01083-AWI-GSA)

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff states that in response to his request for Monell discovery related to prior 

litigation in Reed v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:11-cv-01083-AWI-GSA, the City 

responded that after “a diligent and thorough search,” it found it “does not possess” responsive 

documents. “However, on January 24, 2020, Defendant City’s counsel acknowledged—for the 

very first time—that responsive documents do exist. However, to date, Defendant City has 

refused to produce the documents unless and until Plaintiff agrees to a stipulated protective order 

covering the documents. Plaintiff refuses because Defendant City failed timely to move for a 

protective order and, in any event, the documents are not subject to protection under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(c).” (ECF No. 49 at 7.) 

a. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants respond:

Modesto Police Department had no responsive records. At the November 1, 2019 

informal discovery dispute telephone conference, Judge Grosjean requested that 

counsel for Defendants contact the prior attorneys who represented the City. 

Defense counsel contacted Susan Coleman, a private attorney who represented the 

City. Ms. Coleman sent the IA for the incident, which has been BATES stamped 

and has been offered to be produced pursuant to a protective order.

(ECF No. 49 at 17.)

b. Analysis

Defendants’ response is insufficient. Defendants must affirmatively seek a protective 

order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). If Plaintiff will not stipulate to a protective order, Defendants 

must file a motion for a protective order. Defendants may not simply withhold information 

responsive to a discovery request on the condition that Plaintiff agree to enter into a protective 

order.

The Court will direct that final production of all documents responsive to RPD No. 61 

shall be completed within forty-five days of the date this order is entered. If Defendants have not 

provided documents responsive to RPD No. 61 within forty-five days of the date this order is 

entered, unless this deadline is extended by the Court in response to a motion, the Court will 

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sanction Defendants $100 for each day the responsive documents are impermissibly withheld. If 

Defendants believe a protective order is needed, and are unable to obtain a stipulation from 

Plaintiff, they must file an expedited motion seeking a protective order.

H. RPD No. 62 (Mugrauer v. City of Modesto, 1:16-cv-00480-AWI-SAB) and RPD 

No. 63 (Schmidt v. City of Modesto, 1:17-cv-01411-DAD-MJS)

1. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff states that he requested Monell discovery related to prior litigation in Mugrauer 

v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:16-cv-00480-AWI-SAB and Schmidt v. City of Modesto, 

E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:17-cv-01411-DAD-MJS. In response, Defendant City stated that it would 

produce the “Modesto Police Department’s investigation of this incident in its possession,” but

“the documents were produced in the unorganized ‘document dump,’ described above.” (ECF No. 

49 at 7-8.) “Further, production of only the ‘Modesto Police Department’s investigation of this 

incident’ is insufficient, where several other documents related to this incident and litigation must 

exist—e.g., discovery requests and responses, testimony, etc.” (Id.)

2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendant responds as follows:

Modesto Police Department had no responsive records. At the November 1, 2019 

informal discovery dispute telephone conference, Judge Grosjean requested that 

counsel for Defendants contact the prior attorneys who represented the City in this 

case. Blake Loebs of Meyers Nave was the trial attorney on this case. He is now 

deceased. Myers Nave has searched for responsive documents. If responsive 

documents exist, they will be produced.

(ECF No. 49 at 17.)

3. Analysis

A party responding to a document request “cannot furnish only that information within his 

immediate knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek that information 

reasonably available to him from his employees, agents, or others subject to his control.” Rogers, 

288 F.R.D. at 485. “A party must make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether responsive 

documents exist, and if they do not, the party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow 

the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.” 

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Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants indicate that they sought information from their prior attorneys and that if 

documents exist, they will be produced. Defendants have not, however, described the inquiry and 

efforts Defendants made to affirmatively seek information available to them from other sources, 

including their own records.

As to Defendants’ attempts to obtain the information from their prior attorneys, the Court 

notes that Mugrauer v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:16-cv-00480-AWI-SAB, was 

dismissed by stipulation of the parties on May 28, 2017 (Mugrauer v. City of Modesto, ECF No. 

37), and Schmidt v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:17-cv-01411-DAD-MJ, was dismissed 

by stipulation of the parties on March 28, 2018 (Schmidt v. City of Modesto, ECF No. 27). As 

discussed above in relation to RPD No.14, it appears likely that the former attorneys would still 

have the files for these cases or would have obtained permission from Defendant City to destroy 

the files. Thus, the Court finds Defendants’ responses to RPD Nos. 62 and 63, seeking Monell 

discovery related to prior litigation in Mugrauer v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:16-cv00480-AWI-SAB, and Schmidt v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:17-cv-01411-DADMJS, to be inadequate. 

The Court will therefore require that Defendants, within forty-five days of the date this 

order is entered, do the following as to RPD Nos. 62 and 63: (1) double-check for information in 

Defendants’ possession, custody, or control that is responsive to these discovery requests, and 

specifically search the City’s computers, servers, archived documents, and other locations within 

Defendants’ possession, custody, or control; (2) produce any responsive documents; and (3) 

submit a verification that both explains the steps Defendants took to conduct the double-check 

and certifies that all responsive documents have been provided. If information responsive to RPD 

Nos. 62 and 63 is unavailable because the information has been destroyed by or with the 

permission of Defendants, an explanation as to such destruction shall be included in the 

verification. If former counsel for Defendants has indicated that responsive information is not 

available, Defendants shall provide the name of the attorney who so indicated along with an 

explanation from that attorney as to why the information is no longer available.

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III. SPOLIATION OF ESI

As noted previously, Plaintiff submitted a citizen complaint form to the MPD alleging 

misconduct in connection with the November 6, 2017, officer-involved shooting of Plaintiff. On 

December 18, 2018, the MPD Shooting Review Board concluded that Defendant Ramar’s 

discharge of his firearm against Plaintiff was “within policy,” and, as a result that the allegations 

in Plaintiff’s citizen complaint form were “Unfounded.” On January 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed the 

present action, and the Modesto Police Department was served on January 31, 2019.

On May 15, 2019, Plaintiff sought electronically stored information (“ESI”) from the City 

in connection with the shooting of Plaintiff, including (1) documents “sent by” Officer Ramar, 

including “statements, correspondence, reports, memos, and emails”; (2) documents “received 

by” Ramar, including “statements, correspondence, reports, memos, and e-mails”; “text 

messages/short message service (‘SMS’) sent by” Ramar; and (4) “text messages/short message 

service (‘SMS’) received by” Ramar. (ECF No. 46 at 115-16.) 

On August 30, 2019, the City’s counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel, “Ramar returned his 

work cell phone when he resigned,” “[n]o data was attempted to be recovered from it,” and the 

MPD “no longer has the cell phone.” (ECF No. 46 at 116.) On September 18, 2019, Plaintiff’s 

counsel requested an explanation as to “why and how Defendant City disposed [of Ramar’s cell 

phone] which could have been relevant to this action, while this action was pending.” (Id.) On 

September 24, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel had a telephonic conference 

during which Defendants’ counsel agreed to provide, by September 26, 2019, a declaration of the 

person most knowledgeable about the collection and non-retention of Ramar’s cell phone. (Id.) 

On September 26, 2019, Defendants’ counsel stated that Defendant City would produce a 

declaration concerning the spoliation of Ramar’s cell phone “in two weeks.” (Id.) 

On November 15, 2019, Defendants’ counsel conceded that he had still not produced a 

declaration regarding the spoliation of Ramar’s cell phone, and stated that a declaration would be 

provided, but failed to specify a date for such production. No declaration had been provided by 

Plaintiff as of the date Plaintiff filed the motion to compel. (Id.)

On January 9, 2020, the City informally produced by email a declaration regarding the 

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cell phone. In this declaration, Lt. Tait explained that (1) on March 11, 2019, Ramar returned the 

cell phone he had been assigned by the MPD after Ramar resigned his employment; (2) later on 

March 11, 2019, the MPD reset Ramar’s cell phone “to factory setting and erased of all contents”;

(3) Ramar’s cell phone was then returned to AT&T; (4) on November 21, 2019, Cpt. Gundlach 

had Ramar’s cell phone “returned” to the MPD; (5) Ramar’s cell phone was stored at MPD until 

January 5, 2020, when it was “booked [] into evidence.” (Id.)

A. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have lost the ESI on Ramar’s cell phone and that this loss 

is due to the failure of Defendants to take reasonable steps to preserve that information. Plaintiff 

points out that litigation was initiated in this case on January 29, 2019; that the MPD was served 

on January 31, 2019; that on March 11, 2019, Ramar returned the cell phone that had been 

assigned to him by the MPD, and that, later that same day, the MPD reset the cell phone to 

factory settings and “erased all contents” on the cell phone, resulting in the loss of all of the ESI 

on that phone.

Plaintiff also argues that the loss of this information is prejudicial. Plaintiff states that he 

does not know the contents of the ESI that was destroyed because it was destroyed before 

Plaintiff had a chance to obtain it. However, the ESI may have included information admissible at 

trial, and the fact that the ESI of a key Defendant witness has been destroyed permits the 

reasonable inference that Plaintiff has been prejudiced by the City’s spoliation. (ECF No. 46 at 

117.)

Plaintiff seeks sanctions for the spoliation of the ESI from the cell phone but does not 

specify what sanctions he seeks. (ECF No. 46 at 117-18.)

B. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants state that they have provided the declaration of Lt. Aaron Tait regarding the 

cell phone, but do not otherwise provide any argument. (ECF No. 46 at 118 (citing to ECF No. 

46-2 at 8-14.)

The declaration of Lt. Tait states that when the MPD issues a cell phone to an officer for 

the first time, the cell phone contains no information in the contents or settings. (ECF No. 46-2 at 

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8.) When an officer returns a cell phone to the MPD, the cell phone may be reassigned to another 

officer and prior to that reassignment, the MPD erases the cell phone of all information in its 

contents and settings. (Id.) MPD issued Ramar an Apple iPhone on October 30, 2015, and Ramar 

returned the cell phone to the MPD on March 11, 2019. (Id. at 9.) On March 11, 2019, the MPD 

reset the cell phone to factory settings and erased all content. On March 19, 2019, the same cell 

phone was reassigned to another officer. The cell phone was then returned to AT&T on an 

unspecified date. (Id.) On November 21, 2019, Captain Gundlach had the cell phone returned to 

the MPD. Between December 20, 2019, and December 22, 2019, Captain Gundlach had the cell 

phone placed in the office of Lt. Tait. On December 23, 2019, Lt. Tait located the cell phone on 

his desk. Lt. Tait stored the cell phone in his office until January 5, 2020, when he booked it into 

evidence. (Id.)

C. Analysis

The spoliation of ESI is covered by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which 

provides: 

(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If electronically stored 

information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 

litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and 

it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:

(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may 

order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or 

(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another 

party of the information's use in the litigation may: 

(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;

(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was 

unfavorable to the party; or

(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).

Plaintiff argues, and Defendants do not dispute, that Ramar’s cell phone had ESI that 

should have been preserved. Ramar is alleged to be the officer who shot Plaintiff during the 

incident at issue in this case. Thus, the cell phone that MPD issued to Ramar and that Ramar was 

using at the time of and following the incident may have had relevant ESI.

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Plaintiff also argues, and Defendants do not dispute, that the ESI on the cell phone has 

been lost and that the ESI cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery. Plaintiff 

contends that Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the ESI on this cell phone. 

Defendants have not responded to this contention. Indeed, the declaration of Lt. Tate 

demonstrates that absolutely no steps were taken by Defendants to preserve the ESI on the cell 

phone, even though litigation was pending by the time the cell phone was erased and reset to 

factory settings.

The question that remains is exactly why the City/MPD did not preserve the ESI from 

Ramar’s cell phone.

“Although the Ninth Circuit has not precisely defined when the duty to preserve is 

triggered, trial courts in this Circuit generally agree [it is triggered] ‘[a]s soon as a potential claim 

is identified.’” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 

(quoting In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006); other 

citations omitted). A party must preserve evidence it knows or should know is relevant to a claim 

or defense of any party, or that may lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. This duty to 

preserve arises not only during litigation, but also during the period before litigation when a party 

should reasonably know that evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation. Compass Bank v. 

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1051 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citations 

omitted); see U.S. v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) (routine 

destruction constitutes spoliation where party “had ‘some notice that the documents were 

potentially relevant’ to the litigation before they were destroyed”) (citation omitted). 

“Once the duty to preserve attaches, a party must suspend any existing policies related to 

deleting or destroying files and preserve all relevant documents related to the litigation,” and 

courts may sanction parties responsible for spoliation of evidence. Compass Bank, 104 F. Supp. 

3d at 1052 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Napster, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d at 

1066, 1070. Making “some efforts” to preserve documents does not meet this obligation; 

implementation of a full litigation hold to ensure preservation of relevant documents is required. 

Apple Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d at 991-92; see Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 

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2006) (“A party’s destruction of evidence qualifies as willful spoliation if the party has ‘some 

notice that the documents were potentially relevant to the litigation before they were destroyed.’” 

(citation omitted)).

Here, Defendants knew or should have known of a potential claim against them in 

November 2017, after the shooting occurred. To the extent there was any doubt regarding a 

potential claim, that doubt was eliminated in June 2018, when Plaintiff submitted a citizen

complaint to the MPD, and was again eliminated in January 2019, when Plaintiff filed the present 

action. Yet, there is no indication that the City, MPD, Ramar, or any other defendant issued a 

litigation hold or otherwise sought to preserve relevant evidence, including the ESI on the cell 

phone that Ramar had been issued by MPD, that Ramar was using at the time of the shooting, and 

that Ramar continued to use until he resigned in March 2019. There also is no indication that 

counsel for Defendants, who first entered an appearance on February 8, 2019, issued a litigation 

hold or otherwise sought to preserve the cell phone or ESI on that phone

Despite the pending litigation, when Ramar resigned in March 2019, the cell phone and 

ESI contained thereon were completely erased. That this may have been done pursuant to MPD’s 

existing policies does not excuse the spoliation of the evidence. See Compass Bank, 104 F. Supp. 

3d at 1052; In re Napster, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1066, 1070 (once duty to preserve attaches, 

litigant or potential litigant is required to suspend any existing policies related to deleting or 

destroying evidence and preserve all relevant evidence related to the litigation).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds spoliation by Defendants of the ESI from the cell 

phone that had been issued to Ramar. The Court also notes that Defendants City of Modesto and 

the Modesto Police Department have been subject to multiple civil actions in the past and thus are 

well aware of their obligations to issue a litigation hold and preserve evidence.

As to prejudice, Plaintiff askes the Court to presume that the lost ESI from the cell phone 

was prejudicial because the ESI was destroyed before Plaintiff had a chance to obtain and review 

it. “In the Ninth Circuit, spoliation of evidence raises a presumption that the destroyed evidence 

goes to the merits of the case, and further, that such evidence was adverse to the party that 

destroyed it.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 

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(collecting cases). The Court agrees that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate here. Again, 

the lost ESI was from the cell phone of Ramar, who is alleged to have shot Plaintiff multiple 

times during the incident at issue in this case. The cell phone may have thus contained relevant 

information, including communications by and to Ramar related to the shooting incident, and this 

information may have, in turn, been admissible at trial for purposes such as impeachment.

The Court therefore finds both spoliation of ESI from the cell phone that had been issued 

to Ramar, and prejudice resulting from the loss of that ESI. As to the measures necessary to cure 

the prejudice resulting from the loss of this ESI, the Court leaves that determination for the trial 

judge, but notes that Plaintiff may want to request, for example, an instruction to the jury, further 

exclusion of evidence, or testimony to the jury regarding the spoliation.

VII. MOTION TO REVOKE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDERS

A. Plaintiffs Arguments

Plaintiff seeks to revoke the two stipulated protective orders that have been entered in this 

case, raising several different arguments in support of revocation.

First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not timely move for a protective order and 

instead demanded that Plaintiff stipulate to entry of a protective order as a condition of receiving 

responsive discovery. (ECF No. 49 at 8.) Plaintiff notes that although he stipulated to entry of the 

protective orders, in doing so he reserved this objection. (Id.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant City has improperly utilized the protective orders 

to designate documents on a blanket-wide basis. (ECF No. 49 at 9.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that it has complied with the challenge procedures set out in the 

stipulated protective orders by providing Defendants with detailed correspondence explaining the 

basis for his challenge that confidentiality designations were not proper. Plaintiff contends that 

Defendants have, however, failed to comply with the challenge procedures set out in the 

stipulated protective orders and have, instead, stated only that they “disagree” and that it “will 

provide our analysis for our position in the moving papers. . . .” (ECF No. 49 at 9.)

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to demonstrate the good cause 

required to designate documents subject to a protective order. (ECF No. 49 at 9.) Specifically, 

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Plaintiff contends that Defendants have failed to demonstrate a “particularized harm”; that the 

balancing of interests favors disclosure; and that, even if a protective order is appropriate, it 

should only cover narrow limited categories as opposed to the entire documents designated by 

Defendants. (ECF No. 49 at 9-13.)

B. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants request that the Court retain the confidentiality of the documents disclosed 

pursuant to the protective orders. Defendants argue that they have “produced thousands of pages 

of confidential documents in this matter,” that the first batch of confidential documents was 

produced in reliance on “Stipulated Protective Order Re: IA Investigations,” filed on September 

10, 2019; and that “the second batch of confidential documents were produced in reliance on this 

Court’s Minute Order of November 22, 2019 (Docket No. 41).” Finally, Defendants argue that 

“Defendants and the community of Modesto will be harmed by the public dissemination of the 

documents” covered by the protective orders, and that “[n]either Plaintiff nor the public will 

suffer harm if the documents remain confidential.”

C. Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which sets forth the grounds for protective orders, 

“was enacted as a safeguard for the protection of parties and witnesses in view of the broad 

discovery rights authorized in Rule 26(b).” United States v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 666 F.2d 

364, 368-69 (9th Cir. 1982). “Generally, the public can gain access to litigation documents and 

information produced during discovery unless the party opposing disclosure shows ‘good cause’ 

why a protective order is necessary.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 

F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). To satisfy this “good cause” standard, the party seeking a 

protective order must explain the specific prejudice or harm that will result if the information is 

not protected. Id. at 1211.

As Plaintiff points out, Defendants have not moved for a protective order. Instead, the 

parties have entered into two stipulated protective orders. However, in entering these protective 

orders, Plaintiff reserved the right to raise an objection to the timeliness of Defendants’ seeking of 

the protective orders. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant City did not timely move for a 

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protective order and instead demanded that Plaintiff stipulate to entry of a protective order as a 

condition of receiving responsive discovery. (ECF No. 49 at 8.)

The Court finds Defendants’ approach of withholding discovery unless Plaintiff agreed to 

a stipulated protective order to be inappropriate and not well-taken. Defendants should have, 

instead, sought to obtain a stipulation from Plaintiff for entry of a protective order and then, if 

unsuccessful, moved the Court for entry of a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26(c). The Court does not, however, find that Defendants’ approach warrants 

revocation of the stipulated protective orders that have been entered in this case. Rule 26(c) does 

not impose a time constraint on requests for protective orders and anticipates that a discovery 

request may already be pending when a request for a protective order is sought. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(c) (“A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order 

in the court where the action is pending.”). Thus, the timing of Defendants’ request for a 

stipulated protective order does not, by itself, warrant revocation of the protective orders that are 

already in place. 

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants have improperly utilized the protective orders to 

designate documents on a blanket-wide basis. (ECF No. 49 at 9.) “Blanket protective orders are 

routinely entered in civil litigation, generally at the joint request of the parties where discovery 

involves confidential information,” and are intended “to facilitate the exchange of discovery 

documents. [Blanket protective orders] make no findings that a particular document is 

confidential or that a document’s disclosure would cause harm.” Acosta v. Heritage, 332 F.R.D. 

347, 349 (D. Haw. 2019). Thus, that blanket protective orders have been entered and/or that 

Defendants are making blanket designations thereunder do not provide a basis for revoking the 

protective orders.

Plaintiff argues that it has complied with the challenge procedures set out in the stipulated 

protective orders by providing Defendant City with detailed correspondence explaining the basis 

for his challenge to Defendants’ confidentiality designations. Plaintiff contends that Defendant 

City has, however, failed to comply with the challenge procedures and has, instead, stated only 

that it “disagrees” and that it “will provide our analysis for our position in the moving 

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papers. . . .” (ECF No. 49 at 9.) The Court does not find Defendants’ purported failures to comply 

with the challenge procedures to be a sufficient reason to revoke the protective orders.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to demonstrate the good cause 

required to designate documents subject to a protective order. (ECF No. 49 at 9.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have failed to demonstrate a “particularized harm”; that the 

balancing of interests favors disclosure; and that, even if a protective order is appropriate, it 

should only cover narrow limited categories as opposed to the entire documents designated by the 

City. (ECF No. 49 at 9-13.)

The Court previously granted Plaintiff permission to file a motion challenging designation 

of particular IA documents as confidential. (ECF No. 41.) However, Plaintiff appears to, instead, 

be raising a general challenge to Defendants’ designation of officer personnel files, including IA 

investigation files, as protected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). All of this 

information has already been disclosed to Plaintiff subject to the protective order. Thus, 

disclosure to Plaintiff is not at issue here. Instead, the issue is whether this information should be 

disclosed to the public. Resolution of this issue will not result in, and does not support, wholesale 

revocation of the stipulated protective orders. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff relies on this 

issue to support revocation of the stipulated protective orders, that reliance is misplaced. 

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s request to revoke the stipulated protective orders.

VIII. MOTION FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OFFICER PERSONNEL AND IA 

FILES

Plaintiff seeks an order allowing disclosure to the public of officer personnel files, 

including IA files, that are currently deemed confidential under the stipulated protective orders.

“Historically, courts have ‘recognize[d] a general right to inspect and copy public records 

and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 

1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). 

“[J]udicial records are public documents almost by definition, and the public is entitled to access 

by default.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2006). This 

“federal common law right of access” to court documents generally extends to “all information 

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filed with the court,” and “creates a strong presumption in favor of access to judicial documents 

which can be overcome only by showing sufficiently important countervailing interests.” Phillips 

ex. Rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, Defendants claim the officer personnel files, including the IA files, are subject to the 

official information privilege. 

The “common law governmental privilege (encompassing and referred to sometimes as 

the official or state secret privilege) . . . is only a qualified privilege, contingent upon the 

competing interests of the requesting litigant and subject to disclosure. . . .” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. 

for N. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth 

Circuit has since followed Kerr in requiring in camera review and a balancing of interests in 

ruling on the government’s claim of the official information privilege. See, e.g., Breed v. U.S. 

Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 542 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[A]s required by Kerr, we 

recognize ‘that in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims 

of governmental privilege.’”) (quoting Kerr v. U. S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 

406 (1976)); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1990), as amended 

on denial of reh'g (Feb. 27, 1991), as amended on denial of reh'g (May 24, 1991) (“Government 

personnel files are considered official information. To determine whether the information sought 

is privileged, courts must weigh the potential benefits of disclosure against the potential 

disadvantages. If the latter is greater, the privilege bars discovery.”) (internal citations omitted). 

However, under California Penal Code § 832.7, effective January 1, 2019, certain peace 

officer personnel records are no longer confidential and are to be made available for public 

inspection. Personnel records disclosable to the public include those records relating to the report, 

investigation, or findings of “(i) An incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a 

peace officer or custodial officer”; or “(ii) An incident in which the use of force by a peace officer 

or custodial officer against a person resulted in death, or in great bodily injury.” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 832.7(b)(1)(A). Also disclosable to the public are personnel records,

relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law 

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enforcement agency or oversight agency of dishonesty by a peace officer or 

custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a 

crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, 

another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any 

sustained finding of perjury, false statements, filing false reports, destruction, 

falsifying, or concealing of evidence.

Cal. Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(C). 

The types of records subject to disclosure under § 832.7(b)(1) include,

all investigative reports; photographic, audio, and video evidence; transcripts or 

recordings of interviews; autopsy reports; all materials compiled and presented for 

review to the district attorney or to any person or body charged with determining 

whether to file criminal charges against an officer in connection with an incident, 

or whether the officer's action was consistent with law and agency policy for 

purposes of discipline or administrative action, or what discipline to impose or 

corrective action to take; documents setting forth findings or recommended 

findings; and copies of disciplinary records relating to the incident, including any 

letters of intent to impose discipline, any documents reflecting modifications of 

discipline due to the Skelly or grievance process, and letters indicating final 

imposition of discipline or other documentation reflecting implementation of 

corrective action.

Cal. Penal Code § 832.7(b)(2).

“If an investigation or incident involves multiple officers, information about 

allegations of misconduct by, or the analysis or disposition of an investigation of, an 

officer shall not be released pursuant to subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1), unless 

it relates to a sustained finding against that officer.” Cal. Penal Code § 832.7(b)(4). 

“However, factual information about that action of an officer during an incident, or the 

statements of an officer about an incident, shall be released if they are relevant to a 

sustained finding against another officer that is subject to release pursuant to 

subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1).” Id. Further, prior to disclosure of personnel 

records, certain information must be redacted. See Cal. Penal Code § 832.7(b)(5). There 

are also some exceptions to the disclosure requirement, including, for example, when 

there are pending related criminal charges. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 832.7(b)(6)-(8).

Here, Defendants argue that public disclosure of officer personnel files, including the IA 

investigation files, would violate the privacy interests of defendant officers as well as the privacy 

interests of non-defendant officers, witnesses, victims, and other complainants. Defendants have 

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also submitted evidence that public disclosure of the IA files would negatively impact future IA 

investigations, including the willingness of witnesses and victims to cooperate in future 

investigations, and the morale and privacy interests of the officers named in the investigations.

Defendants have not, however, addressed the applicability of California Penal Code 

§ 832.7 or explained why the personnel and IA files are not subject to disclosure under this 

provision, with appropriate redactions.

Plaintiff also does not address the applicability of California Penal Code § 832.7, but 

instead merely seeks a broad ruling from the Court that all of the personnel files, including the IA 

files, should be disclosed to the public. Plaintiff contends that any privacy interest in these files is 

outweighed by the presumption of public access. 

Plaintiff cites to the case of Rodrique v. County of Sacramento, E.D. Cal. Case No. 2:17-

cv-02698-WBS-EFB, stating that this case is instructive. (ECF No. 49 at 10.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff states that after the Rodrique case was settled, the plaintiff’s counsel in that case

“successfully obtained the release of the [IA] documents from the terms of the stipulated 

protective order.” (Id.) However, a review of the orders issued in the Rodrique case demonstrates

that the Rodrique court rejected the challenge to the protective order’s designation of documents

as “confidential,” and ordered the plaintiff in that case to comply with the provisions of the 

protective order, which required that the plaintiff either destroy or return the confidential 

documents disclosed under the protective order. See Rodrique, Order After Hearing (Aug. 6, 

2019) (Rodrique ECF No. 58). A stipulated order was later entered in the Rodrique case that 

allowed intervenor The Sacramento Bee to have access to and publish a one-page high-level 

summary of use-of-force incidents. However, this high-level summary provided only the date of 

the incidents, the IA numbers, the alleged injuries, in a few instances the names of the involved 

officer(s), the finding of the IA investigations, and the discipline imposed in those investigations 

where the charge of excessive force was sustained. (See Rodrique ECF No. 74 (Stipulation and 

Order Modifying Protective Order (entered Oct. 16, 2019); Rodrique ECF No. 50-15 (one-page 

summary).) The stipulated order did not allow release of entire IA files.

Plaintiff also cites Macias v. Cleaver, No. 1:13-CV-01819-BAM, 2016 WL 3549257, at 

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*4-*6 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2016). In that case, the court allowed public disclosure of IA 

investigation reports where those reports determined that the defendant officer had engaged in 

misconduct and the investigation resulted in a recommendation to terminate the defendant officer.

Id. In allowing this disclosure, the court found that the defendants had failed to provide specific 

facts demonstrating compelling reasons that overcame the presumption of public access. Id. The 

court ordered the IA investigation reports unsealed, requiring only limited redactions to protect 

privacy interests. Id. at *6. Thus, the disclosure in Macias was only of IA investigations in which 

the officer was found to have engaged in misconduct and resulted in a recommendation that the 

officer be terminated. 

Here, the Court cannot determine, based on the information currently before it, whether 

the subject personnel and IA files are subject to public disclosure under Cal. Penal. Code 832.7. 

Further, even if the files are not subject to disclosure under § 832.7, the information before the 

Court is insufficient for the Court to determine whether there is a compelling reason to keep the

files confidential.

The Court will overrule Defendants’ objections to the public disclosure of these files

based only on the official information privilege. The Court will, however, grant Defendants leave 

to file, within forty-five days of the date this order is entered, a motion seeking to keep specific 

officer personnel and IA files confidential and/or proposing redactions to such files prior to public 

disclosure. Defendants shall also, in conjunction with the filing of such motion, submit for in 

camera review the documents Defendants seek to keep confidential. Plaintiff may file an 

opposition within fourteen days following the filing of Defendants’ motion. The Court will 

require the parties to maintain the confidentiality of the files until said motion has been resolved 

by the Court. In the event Defendants fail to timely file a motion seeking to keep specific officer 

personnel and IA files confidential, the documents may be disclosed to the public, with such 

disclosure to be made in compliance with the redaction and other requirements of state and 

federal law, including California Penal Code § 832.7.

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IX. MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF EXPENSES

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides that if a motion to compel is granted, or if the 

disclosures or requested discovery is provided after the filing of the motion, “the court must, after 

giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the 

motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable 

expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). 

However, the court “must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before 

attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the 

opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other 

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” 

Here, Plaintiff seeks an award of expenses incurred in bringing the motion to compel. 

(ECF No. 49 at 13-15.) In support, Plaintiff contends that Defendants “interposed numerous 

unsupported, unexplained, and generalized boilerplate objections in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(g)”; withheld responses without seeking a protective order; did not timely respond to 

Plaintiff’s discovery requests and instead produced documents on a rolling basis (over Plaintiff’s 

objections); and only produced responsive documents after it became clear that they would be 

compelled to do so. (Id.)

Defendants do not deny any of Plaintiff’s contentions, stating only that “Defendants 

recognize this court’s inherent power and authority to award expenses, attorney’s fees, and 

sanction parties and attorneys. Defendants respectfully request that this court not award[] any 

expenses, attorney’s fees, or sanctions.” (ECF No. 49 at 27.)

As set forth above, the Court is granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel. Defendants have 

repeatedly failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, failed to provide complete 

responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, and failed to provide the certification required under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(1).

The Court also finds that Plaintiff made a good faith attempt to obtain discovery from 

Defendants without the Court’s intervention but was unable to do so, and that Defendants’ 

conduct thus necessitated Court intervention. Defendants have also failed to provide any 

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substantial justification for their failures to timely and appropriately respond to Plaintiff’s 

discovery requests. Finally, Defendants have not provided the Court with any information 

indicating that an award of expenses against them would be unjust. Accordingly, the Court will 

award Plaintiff expenses incurred in bringing the motion to compel, including attorney’s fees.

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X. REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS: DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to have sanctions imposed on Defendant City for general discovery 

misconduct. Plaintiff argues,

Despite herculean efforts to avoid the filing of these motions, Plaintiff was left 

with no choice based on Defendant City and its counsel’s repeated efforts to delay 

and obstruct the discovery process. Counsel’s unprofessional behavior took many 

forms, including difficulty and delay in crafting the joint statement, itself. As a 

result of this misconduct, Plaintiff’s counsel was forced to expend substantial 

efforts over the course of eight months to extract the discovery to which Plaintiff 

was undisputedly entitled. Defendant City and its counsel’s conduct was 

inconsistent with the “self-executing’ process that is meant to be discovery and, as 

a result, they should be sanctioned in an amount commensurate with the 

misconduct.

(ECF No. 49 at 15.)

Defendants respond as follows:

This court wisely and previously cautioned the parties to act civilly during 

discussions in this matter, and no incidents of incivility have occurred since the 

admonishment. Counsel for Defendants considers the referenced phone call to be 

a moot issue.

Counsel for Defendant disagrees with prior assertions that he has been 

“unprofessional, dishonest, and obstructive,” and respectfully asks this court to 

exercise its discretion and not award sanctions.

(ECF No. 49 at 27.)

As to Defendant’s reference to a phone call, Plaintiff does not specifically reference any 

phone call. Presumably, the phone call at issue is the one addressed during the previous, informal 

discovery dispute conference and Plaintiff has not again specifically raised it. 

As to Plaintiff’s request for general sanctions, the Court will deny that request. The Court 

is troubled by Defendants’ ongoing and repeated failures to provide timely and complete 

discovery responses, and failure to generally comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

governing discovery, as detailed above. The Court also acknowledges that Plaintiff sought to 

1 The Court will not award fees for the preparation and filing of the non-compliant, 148-page joint statement of 

discovery dispute. (See ECF Nos. 46, 47.)

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resolve discovery issues without seeking Court interference but notes that the appropriate remedy 

for a party’s ongoing failure to comply with discovery is a motion to compel following the 

procedure the Court has set out in its Scheduling Order. The imposition of general discovery 

sanctions is not warranted here.

XI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel and for other 

discovery relief (ECF No. 44) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

1. Within forty-five (45) days following entry of this Order, Defendants shall:

a. As to each of Plaintiff’s discovery requests: (1) double-check for information in 

Defendants’ possession, custody, or control that is responsive to the discovery 

request; (2) produce any newly-found responsive documents; and (3) submit a 

verification that both explains the steps taken to conduct the double-check and 

certifies that all responsive documents have been provided.

b. As to Defendants’ November 27, 2019, response to discovery: Reproduce the 

November 27, 2019, discovery response to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 34(b)(2)(E). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to have Defendants

produce the documents in a manner other than as required by Rule 34(b)(2)(E), 

Plaintiff must seek and obtain a stipulation from Defense counsel for such 

production.

c. As to the 2017 performance review of Defendant Ramar and any other 

information responsive to Plaintiff’s RPD No. 7: (1) double-check for information 

in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control that is responsive to this discovery 

request and specifically search on the City’s computers, servers, and other 

locations within the City’s possession, custody, or control; (2) produce any 

newly-found responsive documents; and (3) submit a verification that both 

explains the steps Defendants took to conduct the double-check and certifies that 

all responsive documents have been provided.

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d. As to RPD No. 14, seeking Defendant Ramar’s former testimony: (1) doublecheck for information in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control that is 

responsive to this discovery request, and specifically search the City’s computers, 

servers, archived documents, and other locations within the City’s possession, 

custody, or control, including court records from previous cases in which 

Defendant Ramar has testified; (2) produce any responsive documents; and 

(3) submit a verification that both explains the steps Defendants took to conduct 

the double-check and certifies that all responsive documents have been provided. 

If information responsive to RPD No. 14 is unavailable because the information 

has been destroyed by or with the permission of Defendants, an explanation as to 

such destruction shall be included in the verification. If former counsel for 

Defendants in Holcomb v. Ramar has indicated that responsive information is not 

available, Defendants shall provide the name of the attorney who so indicated 

along with an explanation from that attorney as to why the information is no 

longer available.

e. As to RPD Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63, seeking Monell discovery related to prior 

litigation in Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:10-cv-01370-LJOMJS; Olvera v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:11-cv-00540-AWI-GSA; Reed 

v. City of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case 1:11-cv-01083-AWI-GSA; Mugrauer v. City 

of Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:16-cv-00480-AWI-SAB; and Schmidt v. City of 

Modesto, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:17-cv-01411-DAD-MJS: (1) double-check for 

information in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control that is responsive to 

these discovery requests, and specifically search the City’s computers, servers, 

archived documents, and other locations within the City’s possession, custody, or 

control; (2) produce any responsive documents; and (3) submit a verification that 

both explains the steps Defendants took to conduct the double-check and certifies 

that all responsive documents have been provided. If information responsive to 

RPD Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62, or 63, is unavailable because the information has been 

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destroyed by or with the permission of Defendants, an explanation as to such 

destruction shall be included in the verification. If former counsel for Defendants 

in the cases referred to in RPD Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63, has indicated that 

responsive information is not available, Defendants shall provide the name of the 

attorney(s) who so indicated along with an explanation from that attorney(s) as to 

why the information is no longer available.

f. As to RPD No. 61, final production of all responsive documents shall be 

completed within forty-five (45) days of the date this order is entered. If 

Defendants have not provided all documents responsive to RPD No. 61 within 

forty-five (45) days of the date this order is entered, unless this deadline is 

extended by the Court in response to a motion, the Court will sanction Defendants 

$100 for each day the responsive documents are impermissibly withheld. If 

Defendants believe a protective order is needed, and are unable to obtain a 

stipulation from Plaintiff, they must file an expedited motion seeking a protective 

order.

g. As to any other documents Defendants have withheld because there is not a 

protective order covering such documents, final production of all of these 

responsive documents shall be completed within forty-five (45) days of the date 

this order is entered. If Defendants believe a protective order is needed, and are 

unable to obtain a stipulation from Plaintiff, they must file an expedited motion 

seeking a protective order.

2. Plaintiff is granted leave to request, within forty-five (45) days after entry of this 

order, that Defendants provide a declaration and/or appear for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

30(b)(6) deposition on efforts Defendants have taken to search for information responsive to 

Plaintiff’s discovery request(s). Defendants are directed to comply with any such request from 

Plaintiff. 

3. The Court finds spoliation by the City of Modesto/Modesto Police Department of ESI 

from the cell phone that was issued to Defendant Ramar, and prejudice resulting from the loss of 

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that ESI. The Court leaves to the trial judge the determination of the measures necessary to cure 

the prejudice resulting from the loss of the ESI.

4. Plaintiff’s motion to revoke the stipulated protective orders is DENIED.

5. The Court overrules Defendants’ objections to the public disclosure of officer 

personnel and IA files. Defendants may file, within forty-five (45) days of the date this order is 

entered, a motion not to exceed ten (10) pages in length seeking to keep specific officer 

personnel and IA files confidential and/or proposing redactions to such files prior to public 

disclosure. In conjunction with the filing of such motion, Defendants shall also submit for in 

camera review the documents Defendants seek to keep confidential.2 Plaintiff may file, within 

fourteen (14) days of the filing of Defendants’ motion, an opposition that is not to exceed ten 

(10) pages in length. The Court will require the parties to maintain the confidentiality of the files 

until said motion has been resolved by the Court. In the event Defendants fail to timely file a 

motion seeking to keep specific officer personnel and IA files confidential, the documents may 

be disclosed to the public, with such disclosure to be made in compliance with the redaction and 

other requirements of federal and state law, including California Penal Code § 832.7.

6. Plaintiff’s motion for expenses for filing the motion to compel is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff is directed to file a bill of costs and an accounting of attorneys’ fees. 3

7. Plaintiff’s motion for general sanctions for discovery misconduct is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 Defendants may submit documents for in camera review by mailing them to the attention of Magistrate Judge Erica 

P. Grosjean at the following address: 

Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California

2500 Tulare Street

Fresno, California 93721

3 Again, the Court will not award expenses for the preparation and filing of the non-compliant joint statement of 

discovery dispute.

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