Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00548/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00548-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries
Defendant
Shannon Burton
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1. At pretrial conference, counsel for Burton

clarified that the race-discrimination and retaliation

claims were based solely on Title VII and not on 42

U.S.C. § 1981.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

SHANNON BURTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:07cv548-MHT

) (WO) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

AGRICULTURE & INDUSTRIES, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Shannon Burton, an American of African

descent, brings this lawsuit against defendant Alabama

Department of Agriculture and Industries, asserting a

procedural-due-process violation under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution as enforced

by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as race discrimination and

retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to

2000e-17.1

 Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C.

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 1 of 41
2

§ 2000e-5(f) (Title VII) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil

rights).

This case is currently before the court on the

department’s motion for summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part

and denied in part.

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding

whether summary judgment should be granted, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 2 of 41
3

II. BACKGROUND

In September 2001, Burton began to work for the

department as an Administrative Support Assistant in

Agriculture Compliance. In 2003, she was promoted to the

position of Administrative Support Assistant III; as part

of this promotion, she received a pay raise and a

transfer to the Food Safety Division, where she began

supervising two other employees.

Burton’s lawsuit primarily concerns a series of

events set in motion in October 2005. Burton had been

out of the office for five days for jury duty, and upon

her return she found that other employees had not opened

all of the department mail received in her absence. She

reported to her supervisor that important, time-sensitive

mail had not been opened. Her supervisor, Lance Hester,

appeared unconcerned. She told Hester that if she had

been the one to leave the mail unopened, he would have

made it “a federal case.” Pl.’s Ex. 5 (Doc. 20), at 2.

Apparently believing that the unopened mail would become

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 3 of 41
4

a significant problem for her in the future, she showed

him the postmarks on the mail and stated that she

believed Hester would either not remember or not tell the

truth about the matter if it were to come up again. 

After thinking about the incident for three days,

Hester decided that Burton had been disruptive and

insubordinate; he issued her a written warning. Hester

and Burton met to discuss the warning, and Burton did not

sign the warning despite being instructed to do so. A

week later, Burton submitted a written response to the

warning in which she asserted that it was merely her

opinion and belief that Hester would not tell the truth

about the mail and that she refused to sign the warning

because she would not “sign a false statement.” Pl.’s

Ex. 9 (Doc. 20), at 8. Burton received a memorandum

informing her that she would receive a written reprimand

if she failed to sign the warning, and she did receive

such a reprimand. Burton eventually signed the original

warning, but she twice refused to sign the written

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 4 of 41
5

reprimand. Commissioner Ron Sparks suspended Burton for

10 days, from November 21 through December 5, 2005.

Pursuant to the department’s regulations, any

suspended employee may receive a hearing before the

commissioner prior to a suspension. Although Burton

received notice of her hearing late in the afternoon on

the day prior to the hearing, she did appear before the

commissioner the next morning. Burton was given a chance

in this informal hearing to tell her side of the story.

Afterward, the commissioner imposed the suspension and

informed Burton of her right to a post-suspension review

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 

Burton immediately appealed her suspension. The

post-suspension hearing was eventually held in February

2006, and Burton was able to present witnesses and other

evidence and make arguments about the propriety of her

suspension under department policies. The ALJ issued an

opinion on April 18 recommending that the suspension be

rescinded. Even though the ALJ found that the suspension

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 5 of 41
6

was not justified, state regulations make clear that the

commissioner, as the final decisionmaker regarding the

appeal, is not bound by the ALJ’s recommendation.

Nonetheless, department regulations require the

commissioner “to inform the employee in writing of [the

ALJ’s] findings and his final decision.” Pl.’s Ex. 7

(Doc. 20), at 1. Accordingly, the ALJ opinion indicated

that, “No rights are finally determined until the

commissioner decides whether to accept, reject, or modify

this recommendation.” Pl.’s Ex. 9 (Doc. 20), at 26.

Commissioner Sparks took absolutely no action on the

recommendation until August 11, 2008, when this court

inquired about the status of the ALJ’s recommendation

during pretrial conference in this litigation and counsel

for the department indicated that no action had yet been

taken on the recommendation. At the suggestion of the

court, the commissioner promptly issued a final

determination in writing that same day; he rejected the

ALJ’s recommendation and upheld Burton’s suspension.

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 6 of 41
7

In the meantime, on June 23, 2006, Burton and other

black department employees met with the Alabama State

Employees Association (ASEA) to express complaints about

race discrimination at the department. They discussed

disparities in both hiring and promotion practices, as

well as in the issuance of state cars. Burton also

discussed her suspension.

 Burton asserts that, in the aftermath of her appeal

of her suspension and her meeting with the employee

association, the department took a number of retaliatory

actions against her, including: 

• The commissioner’s continued refusal to accept,

reject, or modify the ALJ’s recommendation for

approximately 2 1/3 years, despite Burton’s

counsel’s requests that he do so.

• Changes in Burton’s job duties during a division

office meeting to include answering the main

phone line, a job that had previously been

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 7 of 41
2. Burton asserts that each of her other evaluations

since 1999 indicated that she “Exceeds Standards,”

including her evaluations for 2006-2007 and 2007-2008.

8

performed by one of the employees Burton

supervised until May 2005.

Burton also complains of several other retaliatory

practices, but, as acknowledged by Burton’s counsel at

pretrial conference, these claims were not timely raised

in an EEOC complaint and are therefore barred. Among

these are the deduction of 17 points from Burton’s annual

performance review, held on November 30, 2005, which had

the effect of decreasing her score from “exceeds

standards” to “partially meets standards.”2

 Burton

contends that her evaluation was unduly affected by

events occurring in a short period before her review, as

the evaluation should cover the entire year. Also timebarred is Burton’s claim of changes to her office,

particularly the removal of a refrigerator from her

office and a cubicle privacy wall from around her desk

almost immediately after her decision to appeal the

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 8 of 41
9

suspension. Burton also claims that she was followed

outside work on at least one occasion. Finally, Burton

asserts that her supervisory authority was removed from

her without the proper completion of a Form 40. However,

while Burton casts this removal of her authority as

retaliation for having appealed her suspension, the

department has produced a memorandum demonstrating that

the change in Burton’s supervisory responsibilities

occurred on May 10, 2005, several months before the

events leading to Burton’s suspension. Def.’s Ex. 1

(Doc. No. 16), at 6. Burton also acknowledged in her

deposition that this removal of authority occurred in May

2005, well before the incidents in question here.

Burton filed a charge of discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on

September 27, 2006. She filed this federal lawsuit on

June 20, 2007.

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 9 of 41
10

III. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Due-Process Claim

Burton claims both that she was not given timely

notice of her initial pre-suspension hearing and that she

was never given a final decision on her appeal as

required by department policy and due process. This

latter contention essentially amounts to an argument that

she never received a completed post-suspension hearing.

A protected property interest exists if an employee

“has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued

employment.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601

(1972). That determination is made using state law.

Epps v. Watson, 492 F.3d 1240, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under Alabama law, Burton plainly had a right to

continued employment. See Best v. Boswell, 696 F.2d

1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The Alabama Code invests

state merit system employees with a protected property

interest.”). 

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 10 of 41
11

When employees have a protected property interest in

continued employment, temporary suspensions without pay

are considered deprivations and are evaluated under the

same basic framework as permanent actions such as

terminations. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55,

66 (1979) (holding that temporary suspension of horse

training license implicated protected property right);

FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (employing balancing

test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to

determine the procedures required when a property

interest in employment deprived by suspension); Gilbert

v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (assuming that suspension

affected a protected property interest and finding that

a pre-suspension hearing is not required in all cases but

emphasizing the presence of a post-suspension hearing and

its likely importance to a balancing of due-process

concerns); Hardiman v. Jefferson County Bd. of Education,

709 F.2d 635, 638 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The parties do

not dispute, and we hold, that Hardiman, as a tenured

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 11 of 41
12

teacher in the midst of his contract, had a due process

property interest in his position. Thus, absent an

extraordinary situation, Hardiman would have been

entitled to some form of hearing prior to being suspended

without pay.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Here, Burton’s suspension worked a significant

deprivation of a protected property interest. She lost

two weeks’ wages--a significant amount for any individual

or family--and received a substantially downgraded yearly

evaluation pursuant to the department’s suspension

policy, which resulted in her ineligibility for a more

permanent salary increase. See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 243

(evaluating procedures required for suspensions and

noting that an employee’s “interest in continued

employment is without doubt an important interest that

ought not be interrupted without substantial

justification” and emphasizing that “[w]e have repeatedly

recognized the severity of depriving someone of his or

her livelihood”). Burton also received a permanent

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 12 of 41
13

letter in her file, affecting her chances of promotion

and advancement within state government.

Both state and department regulations recognize the

seriousness of Burton’s deprivation. State personnel

regulations indicate that suspension “is a severe and

extremely serious step in the employee’s career in state

government.” State of Alabama Progressive Discipline

Manual, Pl.’s Ex. 7 (Doc. 20), at 14. Moreover,

department and state rules--specifically citing the

State’s interpretation of the mandates of due

process--require both a pre-suspension hearing with the

commissioner and a full post-suspension review before a

neutral hearing officer. See id.

The department may not deprive Burton of this

important property interest without “appropriate

procedural safeguards.” Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. V.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (internal quotations

removed). In calibrating the proper procedural

requirements accompanying any particular deprivation,

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 13 of 41
14

courts employ the three-factor balancing test set forth

in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See

Homar, 520 U.S. at 931-934 (applying Mathews factors to

determine process required for a suspension without pay).

Thus, pursuant to Mathews, “[i]n determining how long a

delay is justified in affording a post-suspension hearing

and decision, it is appropriate to examine the importance

of the private interest and the harm to this interest

occasioned by delay; the justification offered by the

Government for delay and its relation to the underlying

governmental interest; and the likelihood that the

interim decision may have been mistaken.” Mallen, 486

U.S. at 242.

After applying this balancing test, courts

consistently require a prompt post-suspension hearing

when the full process required was not provided prior to

the suspension. In Barchi, the Supreme Court noted that

“the consequences ... of even a temporary suspension can

be severe; and we have held that the opportunity to be

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 14 of 41
15

heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.” 443 U.S. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).

In Barchi, the plaintiff had utilized some predeprivation procedures before the State suspended his

horse-training license. The Court found that the minimal

procedures at this hearing were sufficient provided that,

after the suspension, the plaintiff had the opportunity

for a more full determination of the issues. The Court

wrote: “That the State's presuspension procedures were

satisfactory, however, still leaves unresolved how and

when the adequacy of the grounds for suspension is

ultimately to be determined.” Id. Of crucial importance

in Barchi was the finding that there was “little or no

state interest, and the State has suggested none, in an

appreciable delay in going forward with a full hearing.”

Id. As a result, the Court held that: “In these

circumstances, it was necessary that Barchi be assured a

prompt postsuspension hearing, one that would proceed and

be concluded without appreciable delay.” Id.

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 15 of 41
3. The Court also stressed that the somewhat lengthy

period was justified in Mallen because the federal

statute at issue recognized the importance of maintaining

confidence in the banking system, and thus the longer

delay before the full hearing on the bank executive’s

conduct enhanced public confidence in the regulatory

scheme and provided more time for a thorough hearing.

(continued...)

16

Similarly, in Mallen, the Supreme Court had to decide

if the employee’s post-suspension hearing occurred within

a reasonable time. There, but for the court case, the

plaintiff could have received a decision within 49 days

of his request for a full hearing. At a maximum, the

statute at issue provided that employees could receive a

decision within 90 days. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242-43.

The Court found that, under the circumstances, the delay

was “not so long that it will always violate due

process.” Id. at 244. Crucial to the Court’s decision

was the uniquely low risk of erroneous deprivation in

Mallen because the employee had already been indicted by

a grand jury. Thus, a neutral factfinder had already

determined that there was probable cause for the

suspension.3

 Thus, in some special cases, a delay of 49

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 16 of 41
3. (...continued)

Nothing resembling this public interest is present here.

17

to 90 days before a hearing on a suspension without pay

would not violate due process. 

The delay between Burton’s request for a full hearing

and a final decision on her suspension was far more

significant and far less justified than in either Barchi

or Mallen. While Burton received a full hearing in early

2006, the commissioner--the final decisionmaker with

respect to the appeal--did not make a decision until this

court suggested that he do so at pretrial conference in

this case in August 2008, some 2 1/3 years later. Even

though he was the final decisionmaker over Burton’s

appeal, there is no evidence that, over the 2 1/3-year

period, the commissioner even examined the ALJ’s

recommendation, reviewed the evidence from the full

hearing, or gave even a moment’s thought to the decision

he was required to make in order to make the suspension

final; nor does anything or anyone suggest any state

interest possibly served by withholding the decision for

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 17 of 41
18

so long. Moreover, no independent determinations have

been made as to Burton’s culpability or the propriety of

her suspension as in Mallen. To the contrary, the only

independent agent formally to review the case found that

the suspension was unjustified. Because the hearing and

appeal obviously cannot be complete without the

decisionmaker considering the evidence and rendering a

decision, Burton did not receive a completed postsuspension review for 2 1/3 years. 

Burton, for her part, went through all of the motions

of the full hearing and appeal to which she had a right.

She never received, however, a crucial component of that

right: an evaluation of the evidence and a decision by

the appropriate decisionmaker. The department correctly

argues that its policies do not explicitly require the

commissioner’s decision to come within any specific time

period. Due process, however, takes greater offense to

such unjustifiable delay.

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 18 of 41
19

Burton’s claim that the notice was inadequate prior

to her pre-suspension hearing is of less import. Despite

the short notice, Burton appeared at the informal hearing

with the commissioner and told her story. Nothing

indicates that the short notice prevented Burton from

participating in this hearing to the extent called for by

the nature of the proceeding. Provided that an employee

is given more complete post-suspension process, this kind

of informal “hearing” is all that is required at that

stage. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46 (holding that

pre-termination hearing “need not be elaborate” and that

the employee is “entitled [only] to oral or written

notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the

employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his

side of the story”). But the procedural protections

received by an employee must be viewed in their entirety.

Burton, of course, did not receive proper post-suspension

process. Thus, the problem lies not in the notice

provided prior to the pre-suspension hearing, but rather

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 19 of 41
20

in the “total package” of process that Burton received.

The department could obviously have avoided the need

for a prompt post-suspension review process had it

provided Burton a complete pre-suspension review.

Indeed, the State’s own manuals give the option of a

complete pre-deprivation hearing in which the employee

can present exhibits and evidence. Neither party argues

that Burton received such a hearing. She was told about

the initial hearing only the day before, the hearing was

referred to by the parties as “informal,” and all the

evidence indicates that Burton merely told her side of

the story. Moreover, the parties chose to have a more

complete post-suspension hearing, at which Burton put on

witnesses and was able to argue more fully about the

propriety of her suspension pursuant to department

policies. Thus, while the short notice before the

initial hearing is not itself problematic, the initial

hearing itself was insufficient to ensure Burton’s rights

without a properly completed post-suspension hearing.

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 20 of 41
21

Therefore, Burton’s due-process rights were violated

only by the lengthy and inexplicable delay in the

commissioner’s decision. The department’s motion for

summary judgement with respect to that issue is therefore

denied.

B. Title VII Claims

1. Timeliness of EEOC complaint

The department argues that, because Burton’s EEOC

charge was filed on September 27, 2006, any claims

arising from acts prior to March 31, 2006, are barred

because Burton did not file her EEOC charge within 180

days of those acts. Congress intentionally chose the

short 180-day deadline “to encourage the prompt

processing of all charges of employment discrimination,”

and the department is correct that in the event of a

“series of actionable wrongs, a timely EEOC charge must

be filed with respect to each discrete alleged

violation.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 21 of 41
4. As discussed in more detail above, at pretrial

conference, Burton’s counsel admitted that events before

March 31, 2006 could not be the basis for Burton’s Title

(continued...)

22

U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2170, 2175 (2007) (emphasis

added). As such, the court may examine only violations

that took place in the 180 days prior to Burton’s filing

of her EEOC complaint--that is, violations that occurred

between March 31, 2006, and September 27, 2006. The only

relevant events in Burton’s complaint that occurred in

this window are the ALJ’s rendering her recommendation,

on April 18, 2006, that Burton’s suspension be rescinded

and the changes in Burton’s job responsibilities

(answering the main phone line) in May 2006. As such,

she may pursue her discrimination and retaliation claims

on the basis of the commissioner’s inaction following the

ALJ’s recommendation and her supervisor’s reallocation of

her duties. She may not pursue claims based on the other

incidents--including Burton’s actual suspension and the

physical changes made to her office--that took place

prior to March 31, 2006.4

 

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 22 of 41
4. (...continued)

VII claims and thus acknowledged that Burton’s initial

suspension could not qualify.

23

2. Scope of EEOC complaint

The department contends that a number of Burton’s

allegations were not presented in her EEOC complaint and

are therefore barred. The starting point in ascertaining

the permissible scope of a judicial complaint alleging

employment discrimination is the administrative charge

and investigation. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516,

1522 (11th Cir. 1985). No action alleging a violation of

Title VII may be brought unless the alleged

discrimination has been made the subject of a timely

filed EEOC charge. Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d

1303, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); see also 29 U.S.C.A. §

626(d). Not all acts complained of, however, need have

been included in the EEOC charge; rather, an employee may

include in her lawsuit a claim for injury resulting from

any practice which “was or should have been included in

a reasonable investigation of the administrative

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 23 of 41
24

complaint.” Griffin, 755 F.2d at 1522. Thus, an

employee’s lawsuit is limited by the scope of the EEOC

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow

out of a charge of discrimination. Evans v. U.S. Pipe &

Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1983).

Burton’s EEOC charge states as follows:

“I began my employment with the employer

named above as an administrative

assistant on September 1, 2001. Since

on or about February 21, 2006, I have

been subjected to adverse terms and

conditions of employment to include my

having to remove my personal

refrigerator from my office, having the

privacy wall removed from around my

desk, having my job duties and

responsibilities changed to include

being given duties that a White female

did not want. I have been followed by

a member of management when I was off

work on annual leave. In August of

2006, I was denied a promotion to the

position of agriculture marketing

specialist based on my lack of

education, although I have a master’s

degree. However, a lesser qualified

white was selected for the position.

“I believe that I was discriminated

against in violation of Title VII of the

1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended

because of my race, Black and in

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 24 of 41
5. Burton is not pursuing relief for not having been

promoted to the position of agriculture marketing

specialist. Additionally, Burton does not pursue relief

for having been denied a promotion to a nutrition

program; the department attributes this claim to Burton,

but it is present nowhere in her filings. 

25

retaliation to my complaint that I was

suspended because of my race.”5

Def.’s Ex. 11 (Doc. No. 16). The department argues that

Burton’s EEOC charge failed to mention any discrimination

or retaliation in connection with the commissioner’s

inaction with respect to the ALJ’s recommendation that

Burton’s suspension be rescinded. While the EEOC charge

does not specifically mention this ground for

retaliation, the charge clearly states that Burton

believed she was subject to retaliation resulting from

her complaint that she was suspended because of her race.

Any investigation into Burton’s suspension would quickly

reveal the events that took place before and after the

suspension and would consider any role that retaliation

might have played in those decisions, including the

significant and related decision of whether to act on the

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 25 of 41
26

ALJ’s recommendation. Therefore, the more specific

allegation in Burton’s judicial complaint does not exceed

the scope of her EEOC charge of discrimination. See

Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1333 (finding that claims not

mentioned in EEOC charge were “sufficiently similar” to

claims in the charge “to be fairly characterized as

arising out of similar discriminatory treatment to that

specifically alleged before the EEOC”). 

3. Prima-facie cases 

for discrimination and retaliation

a. Discrimination

Burton’s Title VII claim is governed by the familiar

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Burton must first establish a

prima-facie case of illegal discrimination. Standard v.

A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir.

1998). If Burton establishes a prima-facie case, the

department must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. The burden is then shifted back

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 26 of 41
27

to Burton to produce “sufficient evidence to find that

the employer’s asserted justification is false” and a

pretext for unlawful intentional discrimination. Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).

Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the

court begins its discriminatory-treatment analysis by

determining whether Burton can establish a prima-facie

case. To make such a case, Burton must show that she (1)

is a member of a protected class; (2) suffered an

adverse-employment action; and (3) was treated less

favorably than a similarly situated individual not in the

protected class. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace Inc., 376

F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Maynard v. Bd.

of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342

F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). There is no dispute

that Burton is a member of a protected class. But even

if the court were to assume that Burton could meet the

second element, she has simply not offered any evidence

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 27 of 41
6. In fact, Burton’s affidavit indicates that

Catrett simply moved out of the Food Safety Division,

which may explain why some of her duties may have been

given to another employee.

28

demonstrating that she was treated less favorably than

similarly situated white employees. 

Burton offers absolutely no evidence that the

commissioner’s failure to act on the ALJ’s recommendation

was inconsistent with the commissioner’s treatment of

other similarly situated employees. Moreover, Burton

offers almost no evidence whatsoever concerning the

changes in her job duties. She asserts briefly without

any explanation or factual development that the person

responsible for answering the main phone line prior to

her being given that duty was Mary Catrett (who is

white). It is unclear from Burton’s affidavit what other

aspects of Catrett’s job duties, if any, were shifted to

Burton. There is also no evidence how Catrett’s duties

may have changed or why.6

 Burton does not even offer

Catrett as a similarly situated comparator let alone

provide evidence by which to make any comparison. There

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 28 of 41
29

is similarly no claim--let alone evidence--that the

duties of other employees were not reshuffled at the same

time as Burton’s (perhaps even at the same Food Safety

Division office meeting) or that the type of changes in

Burton’s duties was inconsistent with the kinds of

changes commonly experienced by other similar employees

of the department. The fact that an employee previously

assigned certain responsibilities happened to be white,

without any claim that the employee is similarly situated

and without any other evidence about that employee, those

responsibilities, or the circumstances behind the

changes, cannot establish that Burton was treated

differently from a similarly situated white employee.

b. Retaliation

Title VII forbids “discrimination against an employee

or job applicant who, inter alia, has ‘made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII

proceeding or investigation.” Burlington Northern &

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 29 of 41
7. Because the parties do not dispute this issue,

the court will not decide whether Burton’s conduct

constitutes the kind of activity protected by Title VII’s

anti-retaliation provisions. The court will assume that

Burton has met this first element.

30

Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The same McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework applies.

To establish a prima-facie case of illegal

retaliation, Burton must show (1) that she engaged in

statutorily protected conduct; (2) that she suffered an

adverse-employment action; and (3) that there is some

causal relation between the two events. See McCann v.

Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Here, the parties agree that Burton’s protected

conduct was her decision to appeal the suspension in

November 2005 and her complaint to the ASEA in June 2006.7

To establish that a particular decision was adverse,

“a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would

have found the challenged action materially adverse,

which in this context means it well might have dissuaded

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 30 of 41
8. The record includes a memorandum from Hester to

Burton confirming that if the ALJ review process

determined that her suspension was improper, then they

would redo her evaluation and make sure that she was not

“in any way be penalized monetarily.” Memorandum from

Lance Hester to Shannon Burton, Pl.’s Ex. 15 (Doc. 20).

31

a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal

quotations omitted). In making this determination,

Burlington instructs that “context” is crucial. Id. The

commissioner’s refusal to act on the ALJ recommendation,

which maintained the status quo for 2 1/3 years,

certainly could discourage employees from expending the

time, effort, money, and discomfort involved in filing

such appeals. More simply, had the commissioner

rescinded the suspension, it would have led to changes in

Burton’s personnel file relevant to her future

advancement, as well as to compensation to make up for

the pay she missed during her suspension and the pay that

would have been due to her had her suspension not reduced

her performance rating.8

 It is true that Burton’s

suspension has now been finally affirmed. However, but

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 31 of 41
32

for the court’s suggestion, there is no indication Burton

would ever have received a final determination. As

discussed above, Burton should have received a

sufficiently prompt plenary hearing reviewing her

suspension. Such an interminable delay, contrary to

department policy of notifying employees in writing,

could no doubt greatly discourage employees from engaging

in protected activity, because the delay indicates that

they can be suspended without ever getting the completed

hearing to which they are entitled on appeal. 

Burton has not made any showing, however, that the

change in her job duties, including requiring her to

answer the main telephone, is an action that a jury could

find “might well dissuade” a reasonable employee from

filing a complaint. Burton only vaguely asserts that she

was given the additional duty of answering the main phone

line and otherwise completely fails to develop factually

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 32 of 41
9. Although Burton’s affidavit it extremely unclear,

it could be read to suggest that in addition to being

given phone-answering duties, she was also given other

tasks that had previously been performed by Catrett,

including processing checks and handling egg-inspection

reports. Nothing about these potentially changed duties

suggests that they were adverse.

33

this claim, support for which is also absent from her

brief in opposition to summary judgment.9

 

Because Burlington emphasizes context, Burton’s

complete failure to provide any context renders the court

unable to judge whether requiring Burton to answer the

phone should be considered an adverse action considering

both Burton’s previous duties and the particular

employment environment of the department. It is simply

not enough to allege merely that she was required to

answer phones--a task that might well be an improvement

in job duties for many employees depending on the

situation. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (“The real

social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a

constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations,

and relationships which are not fully captured by a

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 33 of 41
34

simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts

performed.” (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,

523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)). For example, Burton might

have provided evidence about who usually answers the main

phone line--for instance whether people of her level

(Administrative Support Assistance III) usually performed

that task at the department. Indeed, in some workplaces,

employees of all ranks answer the phone. Similarly, if

a vice president is suddenly told to answer phones it

would presumably be more adverse than if a lower level

employee were assigned the same task.

Burlington explained its focus on factual context by

offering an example: a mere change in work schedules

would be of little significance to many employees but

could very well constitute an adverse action for a young

mother with schoolage children. 548 U.S. at 68. Perhaps

forcing Burton to answer phones could be adverse if it

required her now to work a daytime shift when she had

previously worked only during the evenings because of

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 34 of 41
35

family constraints. However, based on the complete lack

of factual context within which to place Burton’s new job

duties, there is simply no way to determine that the

changes to Burton’s duties were adverse. Thus, only

Burton’s claim regarding the refusal to act on the ALJ’s

recommendation (the commissioner’s failure to provide her

with the completed hearing to which she was entitled) is

an adverse action sufficient to meet the second element

for a prima-facie showing.

 A more complicated question is whether Burton has

put forward any evidence to satisfy the third element: a

causal relationship between her protected activity and

the putatively retaliatory action. The causal link is

interpreted broadly, so that “a plaintiff merely has to

prove that the protected activity and the negative

employment action are not completely unrelated.” Olmsted

v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1998).

In the absence of any evidence to indicate retaliation,

“close temporal proximity” alone can suffice to show a

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 35 of 41
36

causal connection. McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370,

1376 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Burton has provided some circumstantial

evidence to suggest a retaliatory motive. While her

claims regarding the destruction of her office and being

followed outside work cannot themselves form the basis of

an actionable claim for the reasons discussed earlier,

they can nonetheless be used as evidence to show that a

retaliatory motive lay behind the refusal to act on the

ALJ’s recommendation. These earlier actions by the

department, combined with the refusal to act on the ALJ

recommendation and the change in Burton’s duties must be

considered together with other evidence provided by

Burton, such as her employment evaluations, in which she

scored “Exceeds Standards” in every year since 1999

(other than the year of her suspension). Moreover,

Burton has provided a letter from Hester indicating that

if the ALJ found her suspension improper, her evaluation

would be redone and her compensation restored; neither

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 36 of 41
37

promise was fulfilled in the wake of the ALJ’s opinion,

and no explanation was given. While Burton certainly has

not offered detailed, comprehensive evidence, she has

provided enough context reasonably to question whether

the department’s inaction was improperly influenced by

her persistent pursuit of a forum to complain about her

suspension, first in front of the commissioner, then

before the ALJ, and finally before the ASEA. This is

sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a primafacie case of causal connection. 

If Burton had not produced any evidence that

suggested a retaliatory motive, Burton’s claim of

retaliation based on the failure to act on the ALJ’s

recommendation would present a more difficult question.

The department correctly notes that the ALJ did not issue

her recommendation until April 18, 2006, and thus the

commissioner’s failure to act on that recommendation did

not begin until at least five months after Burton’s

protected conduct. The Supreme Court has not often

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 37 of 41
38

examined this issue, but it has found a period of 20

months to be too lengthy by itself to suggest causality.

Clark County Sch. Dist. V. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74

(2001). Nonetheless, there are no bright-lines rules

establishing the length of time within which causality is

presumed. Indeed, if there were, any employer could

simply wait out that period before retaliating. Given

the context-dependent nature of the retaliation inquiry

after Burlington and the Court’s sensitivity to the

exigencies of real employment environments, courts must

be prepared to examine context in determining whether a

given action is sufficiently temporally proximate. 

The kind of retaliation claimed by Burton would, by

its very nature, have been impossible until the ALJ had

ruled. Thus, while the commissioner had notice of

Burton’s protected conduct in November, he could not have

retaliated by ignoring the ALJ’s recommendation until

April, when that recommendation was issued. Thus, the

context of the putatively retaliatory action here

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 38 of 41
10. The common use of temporal proximity as a primafacie suggestion of causation is, at first, an awkward

fit in Burton’s case because she complains of an

omission, not a discrete act. Here, the “retaliatory

omission” stretched for a period of years, and it is thus

difficult to identify discrete moments of decision from

which to engage in the calculus of temporal proximity.

Ironically, the longer the commissioner abstained, the

further in time each moment of omission from Burton’s

(continued...)

39

demonstrates that the alleged retaliation began as soon

as it possibly could have. Moreover, Burton’s visit to

ASEA occurred in June 2006, and after that complaint the

commissioner continued to withhold any action on the

ALJ’s recommendation, despite a formal request from

Burton’s counsel to do so. Ignoring the findings of the

ALJ, by simply refusing to accept, reject, or modify

them, is contrary to the policy of the department, which

requires the commissioner to inform the employee of the

final decision in writing. This inaction, contrary to

policy, began immediately after the ALJ’s recommendation

was issued, and thus, given the total circumstances, is

sufficiently proximate in time to suggest that Burton’s

protected conduct was not completely unrelated.10

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 39 of 41
10. (...continued)

protected conduct. But omitting to act, particularly

when one is required to do so, constitutes an active

decision at each moment, and thus temporal proximity can

be calculated beginning roughly at the moment the

commissioner could have acted--namely, when he received

the ALJ’s recommendation.

11. By notable contrast, the department was able to

at least suggest alternative explanations for many of

Burton’s other claims of retaliatory behavior made

throughout this litigation.

40

The department offers no explanation for the

commissioner’s failure to issue a final decision after

the ALJ’s recommendation.11 The department simply asserts

that nothing in the regulations requires the mandated

written decision to be issued within any period of time.

This explanation is hardly, however, a reason that such

a written decision was not issued in this case for 2 1/3

years. In many Title VII cases the action at

issue--perhaps a suspension or a termination or a

demotion--was technically within the proper power of the

employer. The burden-shifting framework, however,

requires some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason why that

action was taken at that time against that particular

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 40 of 41
employee. The department has provided nothing of the

sort, and its motion for summary judgement with respect

to the retaliation claim based on the commissioner’s

inaction must therefore be denied.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that

defendant Alabama Department of Agriculture &

Industries’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is

denied with respect to plaintiff Shannon Burton’s dueprocess and retaliation claims that the Commissioner of

the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries

failed to provide her with a completed hearing in a

timely manner, and the motion is granted in all other

respects.

DONE, this the 20th day of November, 2008.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00548-MHT-TFM Document 66 Filed 11/20/08 Page 41 of 41