Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02274/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02274-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ana Luisa Salinas de Valle
Plaintiff
Sierra Cascade Nursery, Inc.
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANA LUISA SALINAS DE VALLE )

et al., individually, and )

acting in the interest of other ) 

current and former employees, )

) 2:06-cv-2274-GEB-DAD

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

SIERRA CASCADE NURSERY, Inc., a )

California corporation, )

and DOES ONE through TWENTY, )

inclusive, )

)

Defendants. ) )

Plaintiffs move to remand this action to the state court

from which it was removed. Defendant opposes the motion. For the

following reasons, the motion will be granted. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are alien farm workers from Mexico whom Defendant

recruited to work as strawberry trimmers in Defendant’s strawberry

nurseries in Tulelake, California. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) Plaintiffs were

admitted into the United States as temporary workers under the federal

Guest Worker program, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (“H-2A”), and

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entered into H-2A Employment Agreements (“H-2A Agreements”) with

Defendant. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 8.) The Department of Labor requires employers

of temporary workers with H-2 Agreements to comply with specific

federal employment regulations. 

Plaintiffs filed this action in Siskiyou County Superior

Court on October 16, 2006, alleging various employment and living

condition claims under California law. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 21-85.) 

Defendant removed the action, arguing Plaintiffs have alleged a

federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since Plaintiffs’ claims

“arise under” federal law. (Mot. at 2-3.) 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek to remand this action under 28 U.S.C. §

1477(c), arguing that the federal court lacks removal jurisdiction. 

(Id. at 3.) Defendant counters that three of Plaintiffs’ claims arise

under federal law: breach of contract, misrepresentation (California

Labor Code section 970), and unlawful competition (California Business

and Professions Code section 17200). (Opp’n at 4, 6, 7.)

 Thus, the issue is whether “the ‘arising under’ gateway

into federal court” authorized Defendant’s removal. Eastman v. Marine

Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2006). This portal can be

used when “the right to relief depends on the resolution of a

substantial, disputed federal question.” Arco Envtl. Remediation,

L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th

Cir. 2000.) As the Supreme Court explained in Grable & Sons Metal

Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308,

312, 313 (2005), under this “variety of federal ‘arising under’

jurisdiction . . . a contested federal issue [must be] a substantial

one, indicating a serious federal interest . . . .” 

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“[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise

a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a

federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally

approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Id.

at 314. In Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct.

2121, 2137 (2006), the Supreme Court explained “Grable emphasized that

it takes more than a federal element ‘to open the ‘arising under’

door[,]’” and concerns a “slim category” of cases. 

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains a

claim that turns on resolution of a substantial, disputed question of

federal law. Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains references to H2A regulations, Plaintiffs argue that their action is governed

exclusively by California law. “Because of the ‘congressional purpose

to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal,’ the

[removal] statute is strictly construed, and federal jurisdiction

‘must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in

the first instance.’” Duncan v. Suetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.

1996). Defendant has “[t]he burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction. . . .” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195

(9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 

I. Plaintiffs’ Breach of Contract Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim

“arises under” federal law since it refers to federal H-2A regulations

and therefore “the Court necessarily must analyze, interpret, and

construe H-2A regulations.” (Opp’n at 4-5.) Plaintiffs counter that

the mere fact that federal regulations might be construed in

connection with their contract claim does not automatically mean that

claim arises under federal law. Further, Plaintiffs argue that

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“Defendants fail to chronicle the myriad of state requirements” on

which their contract claim is based, which include violations of state

minimum wage standards; failure to pay wages for each hour worked and

provide all benefits under California law; failure to provide

necessary tools and equipment; and failure to provide no cost housing

which meets the minimum standards of habitability under California

law. (Reply at 4.) Plaintiffs concede the federal standards

“incorporated into” their asserted contractual rights are important to

the resolution of these claims; however, they contend that their

claims only arise under state law and there is no substantial,

disputed federal question in Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. 

(Id. at 4-5.) 

Defendant has not shown that resolving any arguable

ambiguity in the terms of the contract presents a substantial federal

question that “is so important that it ‘sensibly belongs in federal

court.’” Eastman, 438 F.3d at 552 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 315). 

See also Mitchell v. Osceola Farms Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313

(S.D. Fla. 2006.) It takes more than the mere existence of a federal

element in a state claim to open the “arising under” jurisdictional

door. Empire, 126 S. Ct. at 2136. “Although federal law might be

consulted or referred to in interpreting the contract, [Defendant has]

not [shown that it] governs the action.” Corre v. Steltenkamp, 2006

WL 2385352, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2006). 

II. Plaintiffs’ Misrepresentation Claim (Cal. Lab. Code § 970)

Defendant also argues that to resolve Plaintiffs’

misrepresentation claim alleged under California Labor Code section

970, “the Court will be required to analyze and interpret” the minimum

productivity provisions of the H-2A regulations for determining

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 1 California Labor Code section 970 states, in relevant

part: “No person . . . shall influence, persuade, or engage any person

to change . . . from any place outside to any place within the State,

. . . for the purpose of working in any branch of labor, through . . .

knowingly false representations. . . concerning . . . [t]he kind,

character, or existence of such work.”

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“exactly when Sierra Cascade was required to disclose the existence of

the [work] production quota to Plaintiffs.” (Opp’n at 6.) Plaintiffs

reply that they

[D]o not need to prove that the failure to

disclose production quotas is a violation of the

H-2A regulations . . . since the California Labor

Code clearly prohibits the engagement of any

person to change from any place outside to any

place within the State, for the purpose of working

in any branch of labor, through or by means of

knowingly false representations concerning the

kind, character, or existence of such work.1

 

(Reply at 7.) 

Even if this claim is supported by federal regulations as

Defendant argues, Defendant has not shown that this claim “arises

under” federal law in the situation here where Plaintiff alleges it is

supported by California law. See generally Rains v. Criterion Sys.,

Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 347 (9th Cir. 1966).

III. Plaintiffs’ Unfair Competition Claim (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200) 

Lastly, Defendant argues federal question jurisdiction

exists over Plaintiffs’ state law claim for violation of California’s

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) because “‘at least one of the federal

issues embedded in the complaint must be addressed.’” (Opp’n at 6

(quoting County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d

1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2005).) Plaintiffs respond that although their

UCL claim “does reference violation of the H-2A statute and

regulations . . . this does not necessarily raise a federal issue

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because Plaintiffs’. . . claim contains numerous separate and

independent state law claims which may be relied upon in finding a

violation of California’s UCL.” (Reply at 8 (citing Rains, 80 F.3d at

345).) Further, Plaintiffs argue their UCL claim contains allegations

that could be sustained without resort to federal law. (Id.) 

“If . . . plaintiff[s] can support [their] claim with alternative and

independent theories - one of which is a state law theory and one of

which is a federal law theory - federal question jurisdiction does not

attach.’” Lippit v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033,

1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rains, 80 F.3d at 346). 

Defendant has not shown why Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is not

supported by an “alternative and independent” state law theory. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted and

this case is remanded to the Siskiyou County Superior Court in

California.

Dated: January 24, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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