Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05285/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05285-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Arnold
Respondent
James Allen Clark
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ALLEN CLARK,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-05285-JD 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

James Allen Clark, a California prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The original petition was dismissed with leave to amend and Clark 

has filed an amended petition.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. 

Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading 

requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An application for a federal writ of 

habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court 

must “specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner ... [and] state the facts supporting 

each ground.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “‘[N]otice’ 

pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility 

of constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 

688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)).

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II. LEGAL CLAIMS

Clark states that he was sentenced on March 2, 1989, to life without the possibility of 

parole. He argues that he was sentenced under the indeterminate sentencing law (“ISL”) and his 

sentence should now be governed by the newer determinate sentencing law (“DSL”). It appears 

he is bringing a due process and ex post facto claim. 

California used the ISL until 1977 and has used the DSL since July 1, 1977. Under the 

ISL, the trial court did not set a term of years but instead typically sentenced the defendant to a 

wide range of years as provided by law, such as “1 year to life,” after which the parole authority 

would determine the length of the term each defendant actually would serve. When a person was 

convicted of an offense for which imprisonment was prescribed by law, the court imposing the 

sentence did not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment. See In re Rodriguez, 14 

Cal. 3d 639, 643 n.4 (Cal. 1975) (quoting former Cal. Penal Code § 1168). Instead, the Adult 

Authority was authorized to determine the length of time a person should remain in prison within 

the outer limits of the indeterminate sentence imposed. See id. at 645 n.11 (quoting former Cal. 

Penal Code § 3020). The Adult Authority also was authorized to allow prisoners to go upon 

parole. See id. at 645 (quoting former Cal. Penal Code § 3040). The matter of parole was 

discretionary, as the Adult Authority was permitted to determine parole “at any time after the 

actual commencement of [such] imprisonment.” Id. at 646 (quoting former Cal. Penal Code § 

3041).

As of July 1, 1977, the DSL replaced the ISL. The DSL prescribed sentences of a set 

duration for each crime, e.g., 2, 4 or 6 years in prison. However, the sentences for most murders 

(and some kidnappings) remained indeterminate.

Clark cannot demonstrate an ex post facto violation because he was sentenced in 1989 

under the DSL, many years after the ISL was replaced. Even if Clark was given an indeterminate 

sentence, as opposed to life without the possibility of parole, he is still not entitled to federal 

habeas relief on any theory. California law establishes that an indeterminate life sentence such as 

Clark’s is in legal effect a sentence for the maximum term of life. People v. Dyer, 269 Cal. App.

2d 209, 214 (1969). 

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The Ninth Circuit has found that “the DSL guidelines require consideration of the same 

criteria as did the ISL.” Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ex post facto clause nor the due 

process clause is violated when a petitioner sentenced under the ISL is denied parole under the 

DSL guidelines. Id. at 1033-35. Under the ISL and the DSL, “a life prisoner must first be found 

suitable for parole before a parole date is set.” In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 183 (1982). 

“Either the current commitment offense or the offense deemed most serious by the parole panel in 

the event of multiple-commitment offenses is then selected as the base offense.” Id. “The panel 

then sets a ‘base period of confinement,’ which under both systems is based solely on the gravity 

of the base offense.” Id. at 6.

Under the ISL, “suggested base ranges were established for each offense.” Stanworth, 33 

Cal. 3d at 184. Under the DSL, “the base term ‘shall be established by utilizing the appropriate 

matrix of base terms ... for the base offense ...’” Id., quoting Cal.Code Regs. tit.xv, § 2282(a). 

The ISL and DSL (for indeterminate sentences such as Clark is serving) both required that the 

prisoner be found suitable for parole before the base term was set. Id. at 183. Therefore, even if 

Clark had been convicted under the ISL scheme, he could not raise a claim challenging the failure 

of the BPH to apply the ISL base term guidelines until such time as he had been found suitable for 

parole, which is when his base term would be set.

While Clark may assert his rights under the California Constitution are jeopardized, the 

term-setting concern is a state law matter. Clark’s claim therefore amounts to nothing more than 

that the BPH is not following state law or that, by following state law, the BPH might violate the 

California Constitution. Federal habeas relief is not available for an alleged state law error. See 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state 

court’s interpretation and application of state law). Nor can Clark make a state law claim into a 

federal one simply by classifying it under “due process.” See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 

1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (litigant cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by 

asserting a violation of due process”). There is no cognizable federal claim. 

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CONCLUSION

The petition is DISMISSED for the reasons set forth above. Because reasonable jurists 

would not find the result here debatable, a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is DENIED. See 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) (standard for COA). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ALLEN CLARK,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-05285-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on November 20, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

James Allen Clark ID: E12050

California State Prison, Solano III

P.O. Box 4000 Facility AG-113

Vacaville, CA 95696-4000 

Dated: November 20, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

Case 3:14-cv-05285-JD Document 15 Filed 11/20/15 Page 5 of 5