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Parties Involved:
Walter Michael Rising
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 87-2567 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

WALTER MICHAEL RISING, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 0 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 87-30009-01) 

Allan A. Hazlett, Topeka, Kansas, Attorney 

Appellant. 

for DefendantRichard L. Hathaway, Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin L. 

Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, TACHA, and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 1 
This case arises out of a homicide which occurred in the 

United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas on February 23, 

1987. In Count l of a superseding indictment, Walter Michael Rising, an inmate in that institution, was charged with the murder of 

a fellow inmate, Paul Leon Jordan, with premeditation and malice 

aforethought, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1111. In a second 

count, Rising was charged with the unlawful possession of a knife 

in the penitentiary, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 179l(a)(2). 

A jury convicted Rising on both counts. Rising was sentenced 

to life imprisonment on the murder charge, with the sentence to be 

served consecutively to the sentence he was then serving. On 

count 2, Rising was sentenced to five years imprisonment, to be 

served concurrently to the life sentence imposed under count 1. 

Also, pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3013, Rising was assessed $50 on 

each conviction to be paid into the Crime Victims Fund. Rising 

appeals the convictions and sentences imposed thereon and urges 

twelve grounds for reversal. We perceive no reversible error and 

accordingly affirm. 

On February .23, 1987, Paul Leon Jordan, a black inmate, was 

stabbed nine times in the back by Rising, a white inmate, with a 

butter knife which had been sharpened on both edges to resemble a 

dagger and to which a handle had been affixed. Jordan died from 

the wounds. Rising admits the killing, but claims he acted in 

self-defense. Only a brief statement of the background facts is 

necessary. 

Both the victim and the defendant frequented the educational 

building in the penit~ntiary, the victim as a student and the 

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defendant as a student and an orderly. About four days before the 

homicide, a prison official broke up a gambling game in a· restroom 

in the educational building and placed all of the participants on 

report. The participants in the game were all black. Neither the 

victim nor the defendant was involved in the game. However, the 

defendant was in the environs and was warned by the prison official who broke up the game to be "on guard," as he might be 

suspected of being a ''snitch." In fact, the official who broke up 

the game was acting on a tip relayed to him on the telephone by 

another prison official. 

Shortly after the game was broken up, the victim and the 

defendant had words in the educational building, wherein the 

victim accused the defendant, inter alia, of being a "snitch, a 

faggot, and a punk. 111 The two almost came to blows on this occasion, but managed to avoid a physical confrontation. 

Over the next four days, the victim made threats on the 

defendant's life. These threats were made to intermediaries sent 

by the defendant to attempt to placate the victim and were relayed 

to the defendant. The defendant got the knife with which he 

ultimately killed Jordan "to protect" himself from the victim and 

his "henchmen." 

The government's evidence showed that on February 23, 1987, 

when there was a general movement of the prison population from 

one area to another, the defendant jumped Jordan from behind and 

stabbed him nine times in the back of the neck, in the shoulder 

area, and in the lower back. These stab wounds were fatal. The 

1 "Punk" is apparently a prison synonym for "homosexual." 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 3 
evidence establishes quite convincingly that the defendant was the 

aggressor. One government witness, for example, testified that 

the defendant and Jordan were never "face-to-face." No weapon was 

found on the victim.2 Additional facts will only be developed as 

is necessary to an understanding of the various grounds urged for 

reversal. 

1. 

Counsel called as defense witnesses several fellow inmates in 

an effort to show that ~wo or three days before the homicide the 

victim had made threats against the defendant's life, and that 

these threats had been communicated to the defendant. The first 

two prison inmates, Favis Clay Martin and Sherman Banks, on 

objection by the prosecuting attorney, were not allowed to testify 

as to the threats made by the victim. The objection was that such 

inquiry would elicit hearsay. The following day the district 

judge changed his mind and allowed similar testimony, from other 

witnesses, to be introduced pursuant to the exception contained in 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). Specifically, defense witnesses J. C. 

2 The defendant testified that approximately three hours before 

the fatal incident, he observed the victim obtain a shard of glass 

from a broken window and observed one of his henchmen with a knife 

in the educational building. He further testified that the victim 

kicked him immediately prior to the killing. Be that as it may, 

the jury could nonetheless find, under the instructions, that such 

testimony did not make out a case for self-defense. Much of the 

defendant's testimony is inconsistent with his own prior 

statements given shortly after the homicide. These inconsistencies were developed on cross-examination. And, as 

indicated, the jury was well within reasonable bounds in finding 

that the defendant's testimony, even if believed, did not 

establish an "imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm" 

necessary for the defense of self-defense. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 4 
Hampton, William Post, and Thomas Reece, all inmates at· the 

penitentiary, were permitted to testify, over objection, that the 

victim had made threats against the defendant's life and that 

these threats had been communicated to the defendant. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the district court permitted 

three witnesses, as well as the defendant, to testify concerning 

communicated threats by the victim on defendant's ~ife, counsel, 

on appeal, argues that precluding the first two prison inmates to 

also testify regarding the threats is reversible error. No 

authority is cited for this proposition. Any possible error was 

cured by the district court's reversal of position which allowed 

three other inmates to testify concerning threats. Indeed, the 

trial court could have refused to admit the evidence as 

cumulative. Thus, at worst, the trial court limited the defense 

only in the presentation of cumulative evidence, a matter well 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Peterson v. 

United States, 268 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1959). Finally, counsel 

himself must have been satisfied with the state of the record, for 

he did not request that either Martin or Banks be returned to 

court for further questioning. 

2. 

Although there was evidence that the victim considered the 

defendant to be a snitch, there was also considerable evidence 

adduced during the case that the victim accused defendant of being 

a homosexual. Part of this testimony came from the defendant's 

own witnesses. There was also testimony that· an acidusation of 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 5 
homosexuality which was not true constituted "fighting words." In 

this general setting the government called, as a rebuttal witness, 

a former teacher at the penitentiary who had been well acquainted 

with the defendant. This witness testified that in one of his 

conversations with the defendant the latter stated that he didn't 

like homosexuals, wouldn't work with them, and stated, "in fact I 

hate them." This same witness, over objection, was permitted to 

answer a question as to what the defendant was "capable" of doing 

if someone accused him of homosexuality. The witness testified 

that "he (the defendant) would kill them." 

On appeal, counsel argues that the latter answer was improper 

and dictates a reversal. No authority is cited in support of this 

proposition. The defendant's theory of the case was that the 

victim was in reality the aggressor and that he (the defendant) 

was a peaceful, nonviolent person who tried to avoid difficulty by 

sending intermediaries to the victim in an effort to placate him. 

Evidence that the defendant reacted violently ~o homosexuals and 

unfounded charges of his homosexuality was arguably permissible to 

rebut the defendant's claims of peacefulness. See Fed. R. Evid. 

404(9)(1) & 701. In any event, any possible error was harmless 

when viewed in the light of the total record. See Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 52(9). Eyewitness testimony from several guards established 

without a doubt that in the seconds before the assault there were 

no words or confrontation between the victim and the defendant, 

and that the defendant jumped the victim from behind and stabbed 

him nine times in the back. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 6 
3. 

Counsel tendered an instruction to the effect that the brutal 

nature of a homicide did not necessarily defeat the defense of 

self defense. The district court denied the request that such an 

instruction be given the jury, although the jury was instructed 

that the mere fact that excessive force may have been used does 

not in itself negate a claim of self defense. We perceive no error in the district court's rejection of the tendered instruction. 

A defendant is not entitled to a particular form of instru6tion, 

so long as the instruction correctly states the law. Ebel v. 

United States, 364·F.2d 127, 134 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 

87 S. Ct. 726 (1966). 

Counsel also argues that it was error for the district court 

to refuse to instruct the jury that Count 2 charged an offense 

which was a "lesser included" offense to the one charged in Count 

1. The district court, to the contrary, instructed the jury that 

Counts 1 and 2 charged different offenses and separate forms of 

verdicts were submitted. We find no error in these instructions. 

The test to be applied to determine if the same act or transaction 

constitutes violations of two separate criminal statutes is 

whether each statute requires proof of a fact which the other does 

not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The 

essential elements of the two crimes charged are not the same, 

each involving an element, or elements, not present in the other. 

Indeed, on the facts, defendant had violated the statutory 

prohibition against possession of a knife in a penitentiary before 

he ever accosted the victim. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 7 
4. 

We find no pretrial motion to dismiss Count 2 on the ground 

that it is a lesser included offense of the offense alleged in 

Count 1. However, after the jury convicted the defendant on both 

counts, in a post-_trial motion, the defendant did contend that the 

charge in Count 2 should have been dismissed "because it is a 

lesser included offense of murder." That motion was denied, arid 

the defendant on appeal asserts that denial as reversible error. 

As previously indicated, Counts 1 and 2 alleged separate and 

distinct offenses. There are differing essential elements in 

each. Count 1 charges the defendant with the premeditated murder 

of Jordan. Count 2 charges the defendant with the mere possession 

of a knife within the confines of the penitentiary. Even under 

the defendant's version of events, he was undeniably guilty under 

Count 2 even if he had never assaulted Jordan on the fateful day 

of his death. In addition, the. defendant could have completed the 

crime of murder without possessing a knife. Consequently, the 

allegation that Count 2 is included in Count 1 is incorrect. 

s. 

An administrative hearing was held in connection with 

defendant's killing of Jordan, and he was given administrative 

punishment. By pretrial motion, defendant claimed that such 

administrative punishment barred criminal prosecution, the latter 

constituting double jeopardy. .The denial of that motion is assigned on appeal as reversible error. We perceive no error. It 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 8 
is well established in this Circuit that administrative ·punishment 

imposed by· prison officials does not render a subsequent judicial 

proceeding, criminal in nature, violative of the double jeopardy 

clause. United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1978); 

United States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1974); United 

States v. Hedges, 458 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1972); and Hut.chison v. 

United States, 450 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1971). 

6. 

By pretrial motion the defendant moved to dismiss both counts 

in · the indictment on the grounds that neither charged a criminal 

offense. The district court denied that motion. We agree. Count 

1 charged a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1111 and Count 2 charged a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1791(a)(2). The indictment sets forth 

the customary statutory language to charge the defendant with 

first degree murder and with possession. Since it tracks the 

statutory language, the indictment is sufficient. Carter v. 

United States, 173 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1949). 

7. 

As noted at the outset, under 18 u.s.c. § 3013 d~fendant was 

assessed $50 on each count to be paid to the Crime Victims Fund. 

On appeal, defendant argues that such an assessment was improper 

since the defendant was, at the time, indigent and that it was 

"inconceivable'' that he would ever be able to pay that assessment. 

The assessment provided for in S 3013 has been held to be mandatory, and imposition of the assessment on an indigent does not, 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 9 
per se, offend the Constitution. Constitutional principles will 

be implicated only if enforcement is later sought at a time when 

the defendant is unable, through no fault of his own, to pay the 

assessment. United States v. P~gan, 785 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1986). 

8. 

Counsel argues that it was improper for the district court to 

provide that the life sentence imposed under Count 1 be served 

consecutively to the sentence the defendant was serving at the 

time of the murder. We find no error. This was a discretionary 

matter with the district court, and ordering the life sentence to 

commence after defendant completes the sentence he was then serving seems fair and just and does not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. We note that the statute itself provides that in a 

case of "multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different 

times," if the district court does not affirmatively order that 

they be served qoncurrently, they shall be served consecutively. 

18 u.s.c. § 3584(a). 

9. 

Prior to trial, defendant made a very generalized motion to 

be allowed to examine the minutes of the Grand Jury, alleging that 

the witnesses before the Grand Jury had "reason to be hostile" and 

had provided "self-serving testimony." That motion was denied, 

the district court believing that there had been no showing of any 

"particularized need" for such inspection, citing Pittsburgh Plate 

Glass Co. v. ·.United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). We agree. A 

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general claim that disclosure of Grand Jury transcripts will possibly reveal exculpatory evidence is not enough to demonstrate 

"particularized need." United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178 (6th 

Cir. 1982); United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290-91 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978). 

10. 

The defendant also sought to have the indictment dismissed on 

the ground that the petit jury was itself "illegally composed." 

In this regard, the defendant complained about the use of voter 

lists in selection of the petit jury. The use of voter lists is 

not itself a ground for challenge to a petit jury unless such use 

systematically excludes a distinct, cognizable class of persons 

from jury service. United States v. Afflebach, 754 F.2d 866 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985). and United States v. 

Test, 550 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1976). No such systematic exclusion 

has been shown. 

11. 

Defendant also challenges the composition of the grand jury 

by incorporating the cases and argument used in "Point 10" above. 

Similarly, we incorporate our discussion under ''Point 10" and hold 

that the composition of the grand jury does not establish a ground 

for reversal. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2567 Document: 01019739970 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 11 
12. 

Counsel argues that the district court abused its discretion 

in limiting the number of witnesses he could call as defense witnesses and refusing to issue compulsory process for their attendance. We find no abuse of discretion. The witnesses in question were, in the main, inmates at the institution, and, as 

indicated above, the defendant did call five witnesses ·who were 

inmates at the penitentiary. Limiting cumulative testimony is 

well within the discretion of the trial judge. Peterson v. United 

States, 268 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1959). 

Judgment affirmed. 

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