Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00184/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00184-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jennifer Barretto
Respondent
Robert McDaniels
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MCDANIELS,

Petitioner,

v.

JENNIFER BARRETTO,

Respondent.

No. 2:16-cv-0184 KJN P

ORDER

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se, with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2012 conviction in the Sacramento 

County Superior Court. Petitioner consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Petitioner has now filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 

the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

In his petition, petitioner only asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to confront 

witnesses was violated. Because petitioner’s confrontation clause was filed in the California 

Supreme Court, the petition is fully exhausted. However, petitioner appended a document 

entitled “Notice of Case History and Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice of attached 

Document.” (ECF No. 7-1.) In such document, petitioner refers the court to his initial filing in 

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which he sought a stay so that he could exhaust state court remedies as to three new claims not 

contained in the instant petition, and also refers to Appendix A to his petition. (ECF No. 7-1.) 

Appendix A to the petition is a copy of petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the 

Sacramento County Superior Court on February 11, 2016, in which he raises the three claims 

included in his motion for stay. (ECF No. 7 at 18-26.)1

Petitioner’s initial motion for stay was denied without prejudice to its renewal upon the 

filing of his pleading. Taking together petitioner’s notice, his Appendix A, as well as his prior 

motion for stay, it appears that petitioner is attempting to renew his motion for stay. The court 

finds that, after review of the record, petitioner’s renewed motion for stay is denied without 

prejudice as set forth below. Petitioner is granted an extension of time in which to inform the 

court how he wishes to proceed. 

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must be waived 

explicitly by respondents’ counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).2 A waiver of exhaustion, thus, may 

not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the 

highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to 

the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 

1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

The state court has had an opportunity to rule on the merits when the petitioner has fairly 

presented the claim to that court. The fair presentation requirement is met where the petitioner 

has described the operative facts and legal theory on which his claim is based. Picard, 404 U.S. at 

277-78. Generally, it is “not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were 

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1

 Review of state court records reflects that the petition was denied on June 13, 2016. McDaniels

v. Barretto, No. 16HC00055 (Sac. Co. Superior Court). Plaintiff’s case records are accessed 

through the Sacramento County Superior Court’s Public Case Access records, 

<https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess>, accessed on October 31, 2016.

2

 A petition may be denied on the merits without exhaustion of state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2). 

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before the state courts . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Instead, 

[i]f state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged 

violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to 

the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United 

States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of 

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not 

only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). Accordingly, “a claim for relief in habeas corpus 

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the 

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996). The United 

States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not entertain a petition for habeas 

corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with respect to each of the claims raised. 

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 

Because petitioner’s new claims are not exhausted, petitioner must decide whether to 

proceed on his exhausted petition, or he must file a motion for stay that identifies the type of stay 

he seeks.

Federal law recognizes two different procedures that a prisoner may use to stay a federal 

habeas action. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (staying timely mixed petition); Kelly 

v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing prisoner to dismiss unexhausted claims and 

stay action as to exhausted claims subject to potential later amendment of petition).

First, under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition if the following conditions 

are met: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust,” (2) “his unexhausted 

claims are potentially meritorious,” and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id., 544 U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court has made clear 

that this option “should be available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 277. Moreover, a stay 

that is granted pursuant to Rhines may not be indefinite; reasonable time limits must be imposed 

on a petitioner’s return to state court. Id. at 277-78.

“Good cause” under Rhines is not clearly defined. The Supreme Court has explained that 

in order to promote the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) twin goals 

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of encouraging the finality of state judgments and reducing delays in federal habeas review, “stay 

and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. The 

Ninth Circuit has provided no clear guidance beyond holding that the test is less stringent than an 

“extraordinary circumstances” standard. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Several district courts have concluded that the standard is more generous than the showing 

needed for “cause” to excuse a procedural default. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 408 F. Supp. 2d 

844, 849 (D. S.D. 2005) (applying the Supreme Court’s mandate on remand). This view finds 

support in Pace, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that a petitioner’s “reasonable 

confusion” about the timeliness of his federal petition would generally constitute good cause for 

his failure to exhaust state remedies before filing his federal petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005). However, in Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), the 

Ninth Circuit ruled that petitioner did not show good cause by arguing that he was “under the 

impression” that his counsel had raised all claims before the state court of appeal. Wooten, 540 

F.3d at 1024. The Ninth Circuit explained that finding good cause in that argument “would 

render stay-and-abey orders routine” and “would run afoul of Rhines and its instruction that 

district courts should only stay mixed petitions in ‘limited circumstances.’” Wooten, 540 F.3d at 

1024. In 2014, the Ninth Circuit clarified that “[t]he good cause element is the equitable 

component of the Rhines test,” and that although “a bald assertion cannot amount to a showing of 

good cause, a reasonable excuse, supported by evidence to justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust, 

will.” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Second, the court may also stay a petition setting forth only exhausted claims, to permit 

exhaustion of additional claims with the intention that they will be added by amendment 

following exhaustion. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 

1063). If the petition currently on file was fully exhausted, petitioner could seek a stay-andabeyance order to exhaust claims not raised in that federal petition under Kelly. However, the 

Ninth Circuit has warned that “[a] petitioner seeking to use the Kelly procedure will be able to 

amend his unexhausted claims back into his federal petition once he has exhausted them only if 

those claims are determined to be timely . . . [a]nd demonstrating timeliness will often be 

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problematic under the now-applicable legal principles.” King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. If a 

petitioner’s newly-exhausted claims are untimely, he will be able to amend his petition to include 

them only if they share a “common core of operative facts” with the claims in the original federal 

petition. 

Unless petitioner is granted a motion to stay, the court must proceed solely as to the 

exhausted claim. The Rhines approach is not available to petitioner because the petition he filed 

is wholly exhausted; Rhines only applies to “mixed” petitions, that is, petitions containing both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims. Thus, if petitioner seeks a stay under Rhines, he must file a 

motion under Rhines and address its required elements, and also file an amended petition that 

contains all four claims (the exhausted confrontation clause claim as well as the three new, but 

unexhausted, claims). If petitioner seeks to stay this action under Kelly, petitioner is warned that 

the Kelly approach is riskier for petitioners in that the timeliness of the new claims will depend on 

whether they “relate back” to the original, timely filed claims. King, 564 F.3d at 1142, citing 

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). In the alternative, petitioner may choose to simply proceed 

on the current petition; however, if he chooses to proceed in this manner, he risks forfeiting 

consideration of any claims presently unexhausted. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); 

see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21; Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Of course, if 

petitioner exhausts his new claims during the pendency of this action, petitioner may seek leave 

to amend his petition at that time to include such newly-exhausted claims. Woods v. Carey, 525 

F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (if a new petition is filed when a previous habeas petition is still 

pending before the district court without a decision having been rendered, then the new petition 

should be construed as a motion to amend the pending petition). 

Petitioner is granted thirty days in which to notify the court how he wishes to proceed. 

However, petitioner is cautioned that he should not unduly delay the exhaustion of his new claims 

in state court. A one year statute of limitations is applicable to all claims presented in a federal 

habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164 

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the one year statute of limitations applied to each claim in a habeas 

petition on an individual basis). Petitioner’s superior court filing was denied, and it does not 

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appear that petitioner has yet filed such petition in either the state appellate court or the California 

Supreme Court.3 Generally, a gap of 30 to 60 days between state petitions is considered a 

“reasonable time” during which the statute of limitations is tolled, but six months is not 

reasonable. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 210 (2006) (using 30 to 60 days as general 

measurement for reasonableness based on other states’ rules governing time to appeal to the state 

supreme court); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002) (same); Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 

729, 731 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that six months between successive filings was not a 

“reasonable time”). Thus, petitioner must exercise all due diligence in pursuing his state court 

remedies.

Finally, petitioner is cautioned that failure to timely respond to this order will result in an 

order serving the instant petition on respondent, and the action proceeding solely on petitioner’s 

confrontation clause claim.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Within thirty days from the date of this order, petitioner shall complete the attached 

Notice of Election and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Election; and

b. If petitioner elects to file a motion for stay under Rhines, he must file a motion 

for Rhines stay addressing its elements and provide an amended petition setting forth all four 

claims; or, if petitioner elects to file a motion for stay under Kelly, he must file a motion for stay 

under Kelly; or, if petitioner elects to proceed on the instant petition, he shall so indicate on the 

Notice of Election form. 

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3

 Petitioner’s only filing in the Third Appellate District for California is his direct appeal. People 

v. McDaniels, No. C072707 (Cal. 3d Dist. October 24, 2014). California Courts Website, 

<http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov> (accessed November 1, 2016). The only habeas petition 

filed in the California Supreme Court was denied on April 12, 2006. McDaniels (Robert) on 

Habeas Corpus, No. S133488 (Cal. S. Ct. 2006). Id.

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3. The Clerk of the Court shall send petitioner the form for filing a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus.

Dated: November 3, 2016

 

/mcda0184.sty.fb

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT McDANIELS,

Petitioner,

v.

JENNIFER BARRETTO,

Respondent.

No. 2:16-cv-0184 KJN P 

NOTICE OF ELECTION

Petitioner submits the following documents in compliance with the court’s order filed 

_____________________:

____ Motion for stay under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), along with 

an amended petition asserting all four claims. 

OR

____ Motion for stay under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). 

OR

____ Petitioner chooses to proceed with the petition filed April 12, 2016.

DATED: 

________________________________ 

Plaintiff

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