Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02425/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02425-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Las Vegas
Appellee
Thomas Gillespie
Appellee
Cayetano Gurule
Not Party
Ralph Sena
Appellant

Document Text:

. PtLED 

Umted Stilft~ Cm.t,r gf Appeals 

Tenrh Cirrult 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 16 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RALPH SENA, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant, 

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, a municipal 

corporation; THOMAS GILLESPIE, 

Defendants-Appellants and 

Cross-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Nos. 88-2332 

& 

88-2425 

(D.C. No. 86-831-M) 

(D. New Mexico) 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Ralph Sena brought this section 1983 action against the City 

of Las Vegas, New Mexico, and its former police chief, Thomas 

Gillespie, for personal injuries and civil rights deprivations 

Sena sustained during the course of an altercation with Cayetano 

Gurule, Las Vegas' animal control officer. After trial to a jury, 

judgment was entered on the verdict awarding $125,000 to Sena. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 1 
w 

Gillespie and Las Vegas moved for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict or new trial or, in the alternative, for remittitur. 

Their motion was denied, and Gillespie and Las Vegas appeal. In 

addition, Gillespie and Las Vegas appeal the district court's 

imposition of sanctions for certain discovery matters. Sena 

cross-appeals, questioning removal from the jury of one of his 

claims · against Gillespie and the city, and questioning the 

exclusion of certain evidentiary material. 

There is general agreement as to the description of the 

incident which precipitated this lawsuit, although certain details 

are contested. Gurule was in Sena's neighborhood in Las Vegas, 

unsuccessfully attempting to capture a dog which had been reported 

to be roaming free and to have bitten some children on their way 

to school. The dog achieved a safe haven on the front porch of 

one home, 1 and later in the back yard of the apartment in which 

Sena lived. When Gurule attempted to capture the dog in the yard, 

Sena objected and the two men had a loud and angry verbal excha~ge 

and physical struggle, culminating in Sena's arrest inside his own 

kitchen. Police officers assisted Gurule in escorting Sena to the 

police station for booking procedures and to the hospital for 

examination. Sena claimed permanent injuries to his back and 

shoulder, as well as other injuries to his feet and head as a 

result of the fight. The district attorney brought charges 

against Sena for resisting a peace officer and battery upon a 

peace officer, and the case proceeded to a criminal trial. The 

jury acquitted Sena of both criminal charges. 

2 

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Sena brought suit in the federal district court asserting 

federal claims based on 42 u.s.c. S 1983 (1982), and pendent state 

claims. In addition to claiming that Gillespie was liable for 

failure properly to train, supervise, monitor, and discipline 

Gurule on the use of force, and that the city was liable for 

establishing a custom or practice through supervision and training 

which condoned the use of excessive force by its employees, Sena 

sued for malicious prosecution. 

dismissed. 

His pendent state claims were 

Gillespie and Las Vegas submitted a motion in limine to 

exclude evidence as to the criminal prosecution. The court did 

not rule on this motion in limine, and the jury heard evidence 

concerning the prosecution during the trial, admitted over 

repeated objections by Gillespie and Las Vegas. Gillespie and Las 

Vegas also submitted a timely motion for directed verdict on the 

malicious prosecution claim, to which the court did not explicitly 

respond. Nevertheless, the court did not instruct the jury as to 

that claim. 

After the judgment was entered, Sena requested that the 

district court sanction Gillespie and Las Vegas, pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, for problems associated with the production of 

certain discovery materials. Six months after requests for 

production were served on Gillespie and Las Vegas, Sena was given 

tape recorded interviews of witnesses to a 1980 incident involving 

a Las Vegas policeman, referred to as the Grace/Romero incident. 

The tapes were discovered in a storage area of the Las Veg~s city 

buildings. Counsel for Sena were notified immediately, and the 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 3 
tapes were transcribed for Sena at Gillespie and Las Vegas' 

expense and were hand delivered. They were delivered to Sena's 

counsel seven months prior to trial, after the deposition of one 

of Sena's experts on police administration. The expert reviewed 

the tapes prior to trial, however, and was examined and 

cross-examined on their content. Counsel for Gillespie and Las 

Vegas did not attempt to impeach the expert based on his 

deposition testimony concerning the Grace/Romero incident. In 

addition, a memo from Gillespie concerning Gillespie's discipline 

of Grace following the Grace/Romero incident was delivered to 

Sena's attorney on the eve of the last day of trial. This memo 

could have been utilized as part of Gillespie and Las Vegas' 

defense, but because the memo was not discovered in the city's 

storage facility until that late point in time, the trial court 

refused to admit it into evidence, and there were no references 

made to the document in front of the jury. Citing Rule 11 and 

utilization of an objective standard of reasonableness, the 

district court granted Sena's counsel $500 in attorney's fees, the 

amount which Sena's counsel identified as his cost for preparing 

the request for sanctions. 

For the reasons set forth below, we find that there was 

insufficient evidence to support Sena's section 1983 claims 

against Gillespie and Las Vegas, and that the imposition of Rule 

11 sanctions for alleged discovery abuses was erroneous. In 

addition, we find that we lack jurisdiction to hear the 

cross-appeal. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 4 
I. 

Las Vegas argues on appeal that there was inadequate evidence 

to support the section 1983 claim which alleged that Las Vegas 

maintained a custom or practice of supervision and training of its 

employees which condoned the use of excessive force. 

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

690 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality could be 

determined to be a "person" liable under section 19831 for the 

violation of an individual's constitutional rights. Monell held 

that municipal liability cannot be imposed under respondeat 

superior, or vicarious liability, but rather attaches only for the 

acts of the municipality itself in the form of official policy or 

well-established custom. See id. at 694. Subsequent Supreme 

Court decisions established that "'[i]t is only when the execution 

of the government's policy or custom. inflicts the injury 

that the municipality may be held liable under S 1983.'" City of 

Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989)(quoting City of 

Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987)(O'Connor, J., 

dissenting)). 

1 Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. S 1979, 

as amended, 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1982), provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

•.• subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress .. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 5 
The "official policy" or "custom" requirement sets apart the 

liability of a municipality from that of its employees. Pembaur 

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). The mere 

exercise of discretion by an employee is not sufficient to 

establish official policy; the employee must have final 

policy-making authority and must be establishing policy within his 

area of authority. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 

112, 123 (1988); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83. A municipality can 

also be liable for an unconstitutional unwritten practice so 

permanent and well-settled as to constitute a "custom and usage" 

with the force of law. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. 

A municipality is not liable under section 1983 for failure 

to train or supervise unless it displays deliberate indifference 

to constitutional deprivation caused by its employees. City of 

Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1204-05. Mere negligence, or even gross 

negligence, is not sufficient for municipal liability to attach. 

Id. at 1204 n.7, 1206. Instead, it must be shown that the policy 

causally related to the constitutional deprivation was a 

"deliberate" or "conscious" choice by a municipality. See id. at 

1205. 

The Tenth Circuit has had a number of occasions to address 

the issue of municipal liability under section 1983. See, ~, 

Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842; 867-68 (10th Cir. 

1989)(municipal liability under section 1983 limited to actions of 

policy-maker with final authority, pervasive and widespread custom 

or usage, or subsequent ratification by person in authority); 

Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 818 (10th Cir. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 6 
1989)(municipality liable only for those acts which the 

municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered); Meade v. 

Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1529 (10th Cir. 1988) (unless county policy 

or custom, promulgated by those whose edicts or acts represent 

official policy, is unconstitutional, a single incident cannot 

generally lead to county liability). 

We recognize error in the denial of a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict "only if the evidence points but one 

way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the 

party [opposing the motion]." Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 1988). We consider such 

matter de novo. See Guilfoyle ex rel. Wild v. Missouri, Kan. & 

Tex. R. R. Co., 812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1987). When the 

basis of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is 

insufficiency of the evidence, we examine "whether the record 

contains substantial evidence to support the jury's or court's 

conclusion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party." Kitchens v. Bryan County Nat'l Bank, 825 

F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Ware v. Unified School 

Dist. No. 492, 881 F.2d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 1989). 

After a thorough review of the record and the transcript of 

the trial, we find that there was insufficient evidence for the 

jury to have found that those in decision- or policy-making 

positions for the City of Las Vegas established a custom or policy 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 7 
of deliberate indifference to the use of excessive force by 

employees in the police and animal control department. 2 

The evidence showed that the city hired a competent chief of 

police and maintained communication with him through the city 

manager and through regular meetings with the city council. The 

city funded improvements in equipment which its police officers 

and animal control officers needed to function professionally. It 

arranged for the financing of a new animal shelter, removed the 

animal control officer's office from the police department to the 

shelter, and hired a second officer and a secretary/shelter 

manager. It provided the animal control officers with uniforms 

and patches which were distinctive from those of the police. The 

2 The jury was instructed, somewhat 

objection, see Tr. at 1422, to weigh 

"deliberate indifference" standard. 

obliquely but without 

the evidence under the 

[A] city is liable for the unconstitutional action of 

the individuals whom it employs. 

This occurs when a city implicitly or tacitly 

authorizes, sanctions, ratifies, or acquiesces in the 

constitutional deprivations alleged so that such city's 

official policy or custom is the "moving force" that 

causes the constitutional violations and when the city 

officials acted wantonly or with obdurate disregard or 

deliberate indifference in tacitly approving the 

constitutionally offensive conduct. 

If you find that the city had a policy or custom of 

permitting the unconstitutional acts of Cayetano Gurule 

or that the city maintained a policy or custom of 

improper supervision, training, monitoring, or 

disciplining of subordinate officers, then you must 

decide whether the policy or custom was a proximate 

cause of the violation of constitutional rights. 

R. tab 173, jury instruction No. 13 (emphasis added). 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 8 
only incident prior to the Sena/Gurule incident during Gillespie's 

four-year term as police chief in which a claim of excessive force 

was filed, the Grace/Romero incident, was followed by a lengthy 

internal affairs investigation, sanctions against the police 

officer involved, and the subsequent resignation of the police 

officer. There were no previous claims of excessive force against 

Gurule. Psychological counseling was provided by the city free of 

cost to Gurule to help him better handle the stress of his job as 

an animal control officer. While Sena's expert witnesses were of 

the opinion that these measures were insufficient to prevent 

Gurule from "playing police officer," under Monell and its progeny 

a city cannot be vicariously liable under section 1983 for the 

mere negligence or even the gross negligence of its employees, and 

Sena did not offer any evidence that the city was deliberately 

indifferent to excessive use of force or that any city policy or 

custom was "closely related" to the Sena/Gurule incident. 3 

That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily 

trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on 

the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have 

resulted from factors other than a faulty training 

program. It may be, for example, that an otherwise 

sound program has occasionally been negligently 

administered. Neither will it suffice to prove that an 

injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer 

had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him 

to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct. Such a 

claim could be made about almost any encounter resulting 

in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program 

to enable officers to respond properly to the usual and 

recurring situations with which they must deal. And 

plainly, adequately trained officers occasionally make 

mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the 

3 The only contrary evidence was a conclusory statement by 

Sena's expert witness which did not refer to any evidence which 

would support a policy of deliberate indifference to the 

constitutional rights of those with whom city employees dealt. 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 9 
training program or the legal basis for holding the city 

liable. 

City of Canton, 109 s. Ct. at 1206 (citations omitted). 

Because our review of the record reveals no evidence to 

support a jury verdict that the policy or custom of the City of 

Las Vegas was deliberately indifferent to an unconstitutional 

deprivation of rights of others through the excessive use of force 

by its employees, we conclude that the district court erred in 

denying Las Vegas' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. 

II. 

Gillespie similarly argues on appeal that there was 

inadequate evidence to support the section 1983 claim against him 

for inadequate supervision, training, monitoring, and discipline 

of Gurule. 

At the time of the incident, Gillespie had been chief of 

police for four years. He had responsibility for the conduct of 

the police department, as well as the animal control officers. He 

was, in turn, responsible to the city manager, and to the maY,or 

and city council, although he had a great deal of autonomy in his 

position. As an animal control officer under Gillespie's 

supervision, Gurule picked up 700-900 stray dogs per year. In the 

course of his work, Gurule had been physically attacked by dogs 

and by people, the windshield of his city vehicle had been shot 

out on at least two occasions, and the vehicle's tires had been 

flattened by gunfire numerous times. He utilized a tranquilizing 

dart gun and rifle for control of some animals. Gurule was 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 10 
commissioned with a police commission and identification card as a 

"Humane Officer" to enable him to issue citations for violation of 

animal control ordinances. 

Under Tenth Circuit law, a supervisor is not liable under 

section 1983 for the acts of those under him unless an affirmative 

link can be established between the unconstitutional deprivation 

and the supervisor's personal participation or failure to 

supervise. See Meade, 841 F.2d at 1528. For liability to attach 

to a supervisor individually for failure to train or supervise, 

the supervisor's failure to train must be so complete, or the 

training so deficient, that the conduct causing the constitutional 

deprivation is "almost inevitable." Id. 

In contrast to the deliberate indifference standard that must 

be met to hold a municipality liable under a theory of failure to 

train or supervise, the Supreme Court has not clarified the 

standard applicable to the acts of a supervisor. See Daniels v. 

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986). When the Supreme Court 

specified that municipal liability is to be judged against a 

deliberate indifference standard, City of Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 

1204, it noted the independence of the standard for municipal 

liability from that of the underlying constitutional violations by 

the city's employees. Id. at 1024 n.8. 

There have been many different pronouncements of the standard 

to be applied in evaluating individual liability under section 

1983, and they have ranged from gross negligence, Meade, 841 F.2d 

at 1528, to recklessness, Archuleta v. Mcshan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 

(10th Cir. 1990)(dicta), to deliberate indifference, Sample v. 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 11 
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1989). However, here we 

need not attempt to define the standard with precision because we 

find insufficient evidence against Gillespie regardless of what 

standard is used. 4 

The evidence showed that Gillespie was active in his 

supervision and training of Gurule as an animal control officer. 

There was contested expert opinion testimony that Gillespie should 

not have allowed Gurule to have the training which he received and 

that he should not have issued a police commission and commission 

identification card to Gurule. Further, there was expert opinion 

testimony that the investigation of the Grace/Romero incident was 

deficient, with insufficient post-incident discipline of the 

officer involved with that incident. 

4 The jury was instructed, without objection, that: 

In order for Chief Gillespie to be liable to plaintiff, 

the plaintiff must show that he either encouraged the 

specific incident of alleged misconduct, or in some 

other way directly participated in it. At a minimum 

plaintiff must show that Chief Gillespie at least 

officially authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced 

in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending 

officer. Personal participation in the immediate act 

which violated the plaintiff's rights is not required. 

It is sufficient if Chief Gillespie set in motion a 

series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to 

terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or 

reasonably should have known would cause others to 

inflict the constitutional injury. 

R. tab 173, jury instruction No. 11. Since Sena raised no 

objection to this instruction, it may be used as the standard 

against which to measure the evidence, even if it does not 

precisely state the proper standard. See Melton v. City of 

Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 718 (10th Cir. 1990)(plain error 

exception to Fed. R. Civ. P. Sl's requirement of 

contemporaneous objection is applied rarely and only in the 

interest of justice). 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 12 
There was, however, also evidence that Gillespie prepared and 

distributed written guidelines, which Gurule received as the 

animal control officer, for the operation of the police department 

which met or exceeded national standards, including guidelines as 

to the use of force and protection of citizens' constitutional 

rights. Gillespie organized and required in-service training 

programs. He reorganized the chain of command within the police 

department and animal control department and insisted on 

professional discipline. He "rode along" with police officers and 

animal control officers to familiarize himself with their 

professional problems and their personal strengths and weaknesses. 

He issued specific orders regulating the use of force by animal 

control officers. He fired police officers "on the spot" for the 

use of excessive force, displayin~ a lack of tolerance for such 

behavior. He arranged for psychological counseling at city 

expense for Gurule, to enable Gurule to better handle the stress 

of the animal control officer's responsibilities. 

Taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to Sena, 

we cannot find any substantial evidence to support a jury verdict 

that Gillespie was grossly negligent or reckless, or was 

deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of others in 

his supervision of the police and animal control departments in 

general or Gurule individually. Accordingly, we reverse the 

district court's order denying Gillespie's motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict. 5 

5 Gillespie and Las Vegas also cite as reversible error the 

denial of its motion in limine to exclude evidence supporting 

(continued on next page) 

13 

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III. 

Sena's request for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. was 

premised on the proposition that Gillespie and Las Vegas made 

unreasonable and insufficient inquiry into the location of the 

required records and utilized a cavalier approach to the 

production of documents. R. tab 186. Gillespie and Las Vegas 

respond that there was no evidence of knowing concealment of the 

documents, that a total of 188 documents were timely produced in 

response to Sena's request for production, that when the tapes 

were discovered they were transcribed at Gillespie and Las Vegas' 

(Continued from previous page) 

Sena's malicious prosecution claim. We do not reach this question 

in light of our disposition of the section 1983 claims against 

Gillespie and Las Vegas. In addition, because of our disposition 

of the section 1983 claims against Gillespie and Las Vegas, we do 

not reach the issue of whether the district court's denial of 

Gillespie and Las Vegas' motion for remittitur was erroneous. 

6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 states in pertinent part: 

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 

represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 

one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name 

• • • . The signature of an attorney or party 

constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer 

has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to 

the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and 

belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 

grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 

good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 

reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed 

for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause 

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 

litigation. • • • If a pleading, motion, or other 

paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, 

upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 

upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 

both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 

order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 

the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing 

of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 

reasonable attorney's fee. 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 14 
expense, and that Sena suffered no prejudice as a result of the 

failure to timely produce these requested documents. Gillespie 

and Las Vegas further responded that they diligently attempted to 

satisfy the requests for production and that the tapes and the 

memo were tendered to Sena immediately upon their discovery. 

R. tab 188. 

In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit 

articulated the appropriate standards of review used in a 

challenge to imposition of Rule 11 sanctions: 

Appellate review of orders imposing sanctions under 

Rule 11 may require a number of separate inquiries. If 

the facts relied upon by the district court to establish 

a violation of the Rule are disputed on appeal, we 

review the factual determinations of the district court 

under a clearly erroneous standard. If the legal 

conclusion of the district court that the facts 

constitute a violation of the Rule is disputed, we 

review that legal conclusion de novo. Finally, if the 

appropriateness of the sanction"Tiiiposed is challenged, 

we review the sanction under an abuse of discretion 

standard. 

780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986)(footnote omitted). 7 In the case 

before us today, the issue on which we focus is whether Rule 11 

was violated, and hence, we will review the district court 

decision under a de novo standard. 

The notes of the advisory committee accompanying Rule 11, as 

amended in 1983, state that, "Although the encompassing reference 

7 In the case of Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 

1986), we applied the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 903. 

In Cotner, a case filed by a prisoner against prison officials, 

the district court relied on Rule 11 to impose a monetary fine and 

to bar the plaintiff from filing further actions until the fine 

was paid in full. Id. at 902-03. Because Cotner turned on the 

appropriateness of sanctions imposed under Rule 11, id. at 903, it 

is consistent with the distinctions recognized in zaicITvar that we 

adopt today. 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 15 
to 'other papers' in new Rule 11 literally includes discovery 

papers, the certification requirement in that context is governed 

by proposed new Rule 26(g). Discovery motions, however, fall 

within the ambit of Rule 11." Sena cites this note in support of 

his position, claiming that the initial, incomplete response to 

his discovery request was a "discovery motion," falling under Rule 

11. Gillespie and Las Vegas cite the first sentence of the quoted 

portion of the note to indicate that Rule 11 was an improper 

vehicle for this sanction, although they also challenge the 

propriety of the sanction itself. 

"Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to expand the authority of 

district courts to impose sanctions to discourage dilatory or 

abusive tactics by litigants or their attorneys." Cotner, 795 

F . 2d at 903. However, we are ultimately persuaded that Rule 

26(g), 8 rather than Rule 11, is the governing rule for claimed or 

8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g), entitled "Signing 

Requests, Responses, and Objections," states: 

of Discovery 

Every request for discovery or response or objection 

thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall 

be signed by at least one attorney of record in the 

attorney's individual name, • . . . The signature of 

the attorney or party constitutes a certification that 

the signer has read the request, response, or objection, 

and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 

information, and belief formed after a reasonable 

inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and 

warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 

the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 

law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such 

as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 

increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not 

unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given 

the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the 

case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of 

the issues at stake in the litigation .... 

(continued on next page) 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 16 
perceived discovery abuses such as the claim here. We find 

helpful the reasoning of the court in National Association of 

Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987), 

when it held: 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26{g) contains sanction provisions 

parallel to those found in Rule 11. The primary 

distinction is that Rule 26 applies exclusively to 

discovery requests and responses, while Rule 11 applies 

to any paper, pleading, or motion •••. While Rule 11 

is reserved for those papers, pleadings, and motions for 

which there are not other applicable sanction 

provisions, and thus cannot be used to preempt the 

application of Rule 26{g) to discovery responses and 

requests, its interpretation nonetheless guides the 

application of Rule 26{g). 

Id. at 555 {citations omitted); see also Sheets v. Yamaha Motors 

Corp., U.S.A., 849 F.2d 179, 186 {5th Cir. 1988){dictum; while 

Rule 26{g) and Rule 11 appear to overlap, Rule 26{g) applies 

exclusively to discovery requests, responses, and objections while 

Rule 11 applies only to those papers, pleadings, and motions for 

which other sanction provisions are not applicable); Thomas v. 

Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 {5th Cir. 1988){en 

banc){dictum; "Ample protection from the use of abusive tactics in 

litigation in respects other than the signing of papers is 

provided by other rules governing attorney conduct. 

Discovery papers are regulated by Rule 26{g) ...• "); cf. 

Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830 {"Nor is [Rule 11] properly used to 

{Continued from previous page) 

If a certification is made in violation of the rule, 

the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 

impose upon the person who made the certification, the 

party on whose behalf the request, response, or 

objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, 

which may include an order to pay the amount of 

reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, 

including a reasonable attorney's fee. 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-2425 Document: 01019970166 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 17 
sanction the inappropriate filing of papers where other rules more 

directly apply. For example, excessive discovery requests should 

be dealt with under Rule 26(g) rather than Rule 11 ••.• "). 

Under the circumstances before us, the district court erred 

in utilizing Rule 11, rather than Rule 26(g), as the basis for the 

sanction of what it considered unwarranted delay in the delivery 

of a discovery response. However, the record does not support the 

imposition of sanctions under either rule. In this case there 

were delays in the production of requested discovery materials, 

but there was no showing of a pattern of dilatory or harassing 

tactics by Gillespie or Las Vegas during the discovery process, or 

prejudice to the party to whom the sanctions were awarded. From 

the record before us, the responses to Sena's discovery requests 

appear to have been reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, we 

must reverse the district court's sanction of $500 in attorney's 

fees against Gillespie, Las Vegas, and their attorneys. 

IV. 

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3), "[i]f a timely notice of 

appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of 

appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 

appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this 

Rule 4(a), whichever period last expires." Gillespie and Las 

Vegas filed a notice of appeal on August 25, 1988. Thus, the 

deadline for filing the cross-appeal was September 8, 1988. 

Sena's counsel hired another attorney to file Sena's notice of 

cross-appeal and mistakenly told her that it could be filed on 

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September 9, 1988. She stated in an affidavit that she did not 

double-check his calculations, and consequently she filed Sena's 

notice of cross-appeal on September 9, 1988, one day late. After 

request by the clerk of our court to submit briefs concerning 

appellate jurisdiction over the cross-appeal, Sena submitted a 

motion to the district court for an extension of time to file a 

notice of the cross-appeal, claiming excusable neglect. The 

district court granted the motion, over Gillespie and Las Vegas' 

vigorous objection. 9 

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), "The district court, upon a 

showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time 

for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 

days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 

4(a)." Thus, the controlling procedural rule unambiguously states 

the standard in the disjunctive. The rule does not include any 

restriction as to which standard is to be used depending upon 

whether the request is filed before or after the original 

deadline. The advisory committee notes, however, would modify 

this language by limiting the standard of "excusable neglect" to 

requests made after the time for filing a notice of appeal has run 

9 Pursuant to local Rule 9(e) of the New Mexico District Court, 

Gillespie and Las Vegas had ten days in which to respond to Sena's 

motion for an extension of time in which to file a notice of 

cross-appeal. Gillespie and Las Vegas responded within seven 

days, but the district court filed its ruling on the seventh day, 

apparently without considering Gillespie and Las Vegas' response. 

Gillespie and Las Vegas now complain that the district court's 

grant of an extension of time was "ex parte" because the district 

court did not consider their arguments. We disagree. Gillespie 

and Las Vegas received a copy of the motion for an extension of 

time, as shown by the certificate of mailing. The opportunity to 

respond is provided by timely notice. See Oda v. Transcon Lines 

Corp., 650 F.2d 231, 233 (10th Cir. 1981)-. -

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• 

and limiting the standard of "good cause" to requests made before 

the expiration of the initial time. 10 

The circuits are split on whether the standard to be applied 

to each request changes depending on whether the request is filed 

before or after the deadline. Compare Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 

300,. 301 (1st Cir. 1986)(the interpretation that "good cause" is 

applicable only when the motion is filed before the time for 

filing the appeal has expired is an "unwarranted maiming of the 

rule," rather than giving the motion a practical meaning), and 

Wilson v. United Sav. of Texas (In re Missionary Baptist 

Foundation of Am., Inc.), 792 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1986), with 

Oregon v. Champion Int'l Corp., 680 F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 

1982)("good cause" applies to motion filed before the time for 

filing the appeal; "excusable neglect" applies to motions filed 

after the time for filing has expired), Redfield v. Continental 

Casualty Corp., 818 F. 2d 596, 601 ( 7th Cir. 1987), and 

Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp. v. New York State Dep't of Transp. (In 

re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp.), 763 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985). See also 9 Moore's Federal 

Practice t 204.13(1.-3] at 4-98. 

10 

Fed. 

The advisory committee notes to the 1979 amendments 

R. App. P. 4(a) provide: 

The proposed amended rule expands to some extent 

the standard of the grant of an extension of time. The 

present rule requires a "showing of excusable neglect." 

While this was an appropriate standard in cases in which 

the motion is made after the time for filing the notice 

of appeal has run, and remains so, it has never fit 

exactly the situation in which the appellant seeks an 

extension before the expiration of the initial time. In 

such a case "good cause," which is the standard that is 

applied in the granting of other extensions of time 

under Rule 26(b) seems to be more appropriate. 

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We need not resolve this controversy in this case because we 

hold that Sena fails to satisfy either test. The Ninth Circuit 

wrote persuasively on this issue, involving a notice of appeal 

filed one day late. In Sprout v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 681 

F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982), the court stated: 

There was neither excusable neglect nor good cause 

in this case. Counsel simply neglected to prepare the 

notice of appeal until it was too late to file it before 

the deadline. The Sprouts argue the notice was "only" 

one day late and it would be "harsh" to apply the rule 

to them. But the requirements of Fed. R. App. 4(a) are 

mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder v. Director, 

Illinois Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 26-65, 

98 s. Ct. 556, 560-61, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978); Wallace v. 

Chappell, 637 F.2d 1345, 1346 (9th Cir. 198l)(en bane). 

Where, as here, there is no excuse for the late filing 

of a notice of appeal, it is an abuse of discretion for 

a district court to grant an extension of time and the 

court of appeals does not have jurisdiction. 

Sprout, 681 F.2d at 588. See Savage v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 

737 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1984)(timely filing of cross-appeal 

is mandatory and jurisdictional). 

Sena's attorneys miscounted the number of days in which to 

file. They intended to file on the day that they filed, and that 

day was one day late. There were no circumstances which would 

have prevented them from filing the motion before the deadline. 

These facts support neither the good cause standard nor the 

excusable neglect standard. We find that the district court 

abused its discretion in granting the motion for extension, and 

that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 

arguments made on cross-appeal. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is REVERSED. This matter is remanded to 

the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Thomas 

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• 

Gillespie and the City of Las Vegas, New Mexico; for withdrawal of 

the order imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Gillespie, Las Vegas, 

and their attorneys; and for such other proceedings as may be 

necessary, consistent with this opinion. 

22 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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