Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03061/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03061-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Lyn Hawley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED . lJnlttd Stitt~ Court of Appeals Tttuh Circuit 

AUG 1 9 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

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No. 95-3061 

v. 

VICTOR L YN HAWLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-40039) 

Submitted on the briefs:· 

David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender and Marilyn M. Trubey, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

• After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 1Oth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 95-3061 Document: 01019279697 Date Filed: 08/19/1996 Page: 1 
• 

Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney and Gregory G. Hough, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

On August 4, 1994, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against 

Defendant-Appellant Victor Lyn Hawley and James Lopez Guardado, charging 

that on or about the 25th day of July, 1994, through the 28th day of July, 1994, 

they conspired to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of 

methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

846; and that they possessed with the intent to distribute 100 grams or more of 

methamphetamine, to wit: approximately 440 grams of methamphetamine, a 

Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l). On 

November 3, 1994, Hawley entered a plea of guilty to Count I for conspiracy and 

agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. In exchange, the government dropped 

Count II. Hawley was sentenced on February 6, 1995. His sentence included a 

term of incarceration of 97 months. Hawley now appeals, alleging that the 

government breached its plea agreement "not to oppose" certain sentencing 

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• 

adjustments favorable to the Defendant and to file a motion for downward 

adjustment for substantial assistance "if appropriate." Hawley also claims that 

enhancing his offense level by two points for obstruction of justice constituted 

double jeopardy because judgment previously was entered against him on the 

same conduct when he violated his appearance bond. We exercise jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND 

On July 29, 1994, Hawley and Guardado had their first appearances before 

United States Magistrate Judge Ronald C. Newman relating to the above 

mentioned charges. At Hawley's detention hearing on August 1, 1994, Judge 

Newman released Hawley on a $50,000 unsecured bond payable to the United 

States upon failure to appear as ordered. In the appearance bond, Hawley agreed 

to appear at all scheduled appearances in the case. Judge Newman also advised 

Hawley that his next appearance date was August 16, 1994, at 9:00 a.m. at the 

U.S. District Court in Topeka, Kansas for arraignment. 

On August 16, 1994, Hawley failed to appear at his arraignment. On that 

same day, Judge Newman signed an order forfeiting Hawley's bond and directing 

issuance of a bench warrant for Hawley's arrest. On August 24, 1994, United 

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States District Court Judge Sam Crow signed an order granting the United States' 

motion for judgment on bond forfeiture in the Hawley matter. Hawley was 

eventually arrested again on September 9, 1994, in Arkansas, and he was 

arraigned on September 30, 1994, before Judge Newman. After a hearing on the 

United States' motion for revocation of Hawley's pretrial release, on October 6, 

1994, Judge Newman revoked Hawley's pretrial release and entered an order of 

detention. 

On November 3, 1994, Hawley, as part of a plea agreement with the United 

States Attorney's office, entered a plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment. At 

that time, Hawley stipulated to facts sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the offense charged in Count I of the indictment. 1 In addition 

to pleading guilty to Count I of the indictment, Hawley agreed to provide 

information about the matters charged in the indictment in this case and to submit 

to a polygraph examination on the information provided. In exchange for 

Hawley's plea, the government agreed to dismiss Count II of the indictment; "to 

not oppose that [Hawley] receive a three level reduction" for acceptance of 

responsibility; "to not oppose that [Hawley] not receive a two level enhancement 

Those facts were summarized as follows: On July 28, 1994, Hawley and 

Guardado were detained during a routine traffic stop by a Kansas State Highway 

Trooper. The trooper discovered 440 grams of methamphetamine in the car and 

Hawley ultimately acknowledged participation in a conspiracy to distribute that 

methamphetamine. 

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for obstruction of justice;" and "if appropriate, prior to sentencing," to file a 

motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.l for any substantial assistance provided 

pursuant to the agreement. 

Prior to sentencing, Hawley learned that the government did not intend to 

file a motion for a downward departure based on substantial assistance. He then 

filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement because he had provided information 

to law enforcement. In addition, he filed a motion to continue the sentencing 

hearing scheduled for January 20, 1995 . The district court, in chambers, held a 

hearing concerning matters that were relevant to Hawley's ability to provide 

information pursuant to the plea agreement. Hawley argued that he had been 

debriefed by the DEA subsequent to his entering a plea, and that he had provided 

information regarding drug activities in California and Arkansas. He further 

argued that, notwithstanding assurances from certain law enforcement officials in 

Arkansas that Hawley was still valuable to investigations there, his ability to 

provide information regarding drug activities in Arkansas had been compromised 

by law enforcement, and he suggested there was reason to suspect that law 

enforcement themselves were involved in the drug activities. Hawley requested 

that the court order an investigation to determine whether his "attempted" 

cooperation had been undermined by law enforcement in any way. 

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The court denied the motion to enforce the plea agreement on the 

government's representation that no assistance had been provided to date that 

would be deemed substantial. However, the court continued the sentencing 

hearing to allow for an investigation into whether federal agents and/or local law 

enforcement agents in Arkansas were engaged in any misconduct which precluded 

Hawley's cooperation. 

The matter proceeded to sentencing on February 6, 1995. Hawley again 

filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing because reports from the earlier 

investigation had not been completed. In addition, he filed a renewed motion to 

enforce the plea agreement, incorporating the arguments from the earlier motion 

and stating in addition that he was now willing to provide the government with 

any information it desired, including information concerning his brother's drug 

activities which he had declined to provide earlier. The government responded 

that the investigation by the FBI had preliminarily indicated that the allegations 

made at the previous hearing were unsubstantiated. The government questioned 

Hawley's good faith claim of cooperation and stated that the information he had 

provided was not substantial and did not merit a downward departure motion. 

The court denied both of the motions made on behalf of Hawley. 

The court then determined the total offense level applicable to Hawley to 

be 30. In calculating this base offense level, the court determined that a two-

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point enhancement for obstruction of justice was merited due to Hawley's failure 

to appear at a prior court hearing. Further, the court concluded that Hawley was 

not entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Hawley 

argued that the obstruction enhancement was precluded under the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because judgment in the amount of 

$50,000 had been taken against him on his appearance bond based on conduct 

also used to apply the enhancement. Further, Hawley argued that he was entitled 

to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because he had cooperated with 

authorities subsequent to his arrest and had timely entered a plea of guilty. 

The government acknowledged its obligations under the plea agreement not 

to oppose an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and not to argue in favor 

of an obstruction of justice enhancement. However, the government went on to 

note that it was not aware of certain facts contained in the presentence report at 

the time of the plea agreement, and that the record did not indicate that this was a 

"circumstance meriting any extraordinary credit." In light of the government's 

position, Hawley requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea due to the 

government's violation of the terms of the plea agreement. The court denied that 

request, concluded that the base offense level was accurately calculated at 30, and 

sentenced Hawley to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 97 

months. 

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On appeal, Hawley argues that: (1) He was subjected to double punishment 

for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when the district 

court enhanced his base offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice after 

previously entering judgment against him on his appearance bond for the same 

conduct; (2) The district court erred in not granting him a reduction in his base 

offense level for acceptance of responsibility; (3) The district court erred in 

denying his Motion To Enforce The Plea Agreement; and ( 4) The district court 

erred in denying his Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea. 

DISCUSSION 

DOUBLE JEOPARDY 

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-point increase in the base 

offense level "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l. The district 

court assessed this enhancement against Hawley because he failed to appear for 

arraignment as ordered. Hawley contends this constitutes double punishment in 

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because judgment previously was entered 

against him on his $50,000 appearance bond as a result of the same conduct. We 

review the district court's factual findings as to the obstruction of justice under 

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the clearly erroneous standard, and review de novo the district court's legal 

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Janus Industries, 48 

F.3d 1548, 1559-60 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 87 (1995). We also 

review de novo the district court's legal conclusion regarding double jeopardy. 

United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 665 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects against a 

second prosecution for the same offense and against multiple punishments for the 

same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Hawley's 

double jeopardy argument is based solely upon the latter protection against 

multiple punishments for the same offense. We have recognized that the 

forfeiture of a bail bond is a civil proceeding arising from a criminal one. United 

States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415 (lOth Cir. 1984). However, the fact that 

a sanction is fairly characterized as "civil" does not mean that it can never 

constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. The Supreme 

Court in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989), stated that: 

[T]he labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of paramount 

importance. It is commonly understood that civil 

proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial 

goals, and, conversely, that both may be served by criminal 

penalties . . . . [T]he determination of whether a given civil 

sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense 

requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed 

and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to 

serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction 

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constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the 

individual case serves the goals of punishment. 

The rule announced in Halper is that a civil sanction may be considered punitive 

when it subjects the offender to a "sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to 

the damages he has caused ... [and when] the civil penalty ... bears no rational 

relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss .... " Id. at 449; 

see also Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 193 7, 194 7-48 ( 1994) 

(relying on Halper to conclude that a state tax on illegally grown marijuana 

exacted punishment and not merely revenue). 2 

The government argues that Hawley's bail bond was a form of contract 

between the government on the one hand and Hawley and his surety on the other. 

When Hawley violated the terms of his pretrial release he breached the contract 

with the government and the judgment entered in the government's favor on the 

appearance bond was the government's remedy under the contract. The 

government argues that this civil sanction served a "remedial purpose," and was 

reasonably related to the government's damages. We agree. 

2 The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Ursery,_ U.S._, 

No. 95-345, 1996 WL 340815, * 16 (June 24, 1996), is not directly dispositive 

because it held that in rem civil forfeitures do not implicate the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. Here, there was no in rem forfeiture because Hawley's appearance bond 

was unsecured; rather upon his breach of the terms of the bond an in personam 

judgment in the $50,000 face amount of the bond was entered against him. 

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The Court in Halper stated that courts should undertake a "particularized 

assessment" of the civil penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may 

fairly be said to serve when determining whether a given civil sanction constitutes 

punishment. 490 U.S. at 448. In making such an assessment, we note that not 

every monetary penalty exceeding actual financial loss is per se punitive. "[T]he 

government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand 

compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable 

liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages, without being deemed to 

have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis." 

Id. at 446. 

In this case, Hawley's failure to appear for a scheduled court proceeding 

delayed the timely disposition of this case. A warrant had to be issued for 

Hawley's arrest in order to bring him back to the District of Kansas. Based on 

these facts, we conclude that the $50,000 judgment for violating the appearance 

bond was not overly disproportionate to the government's anticipated costs 

associated with being forced to delay Hawley's criminal proceeding and hunt him 

down. Therefore, that judgment was remedial and not punitive, posing no double 

jeopardy bar to the enhancement of Hawley's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l. 

Cf. United States v. Barger, 458 F .2d 396, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1972) (forfeiting bail 

compensates for damages and is deemed civil, not criminal in nature; hence, it 

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does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant is also 

convicted of the crime of jumping bail); United States v. Garcia-Trevino, 843 F. 

Supp. 1134, 1134-35 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (applying Halper and concluding that "the 

entry of a civil judgment forfeiting a bond for failure to appear at trial solely 

serves a remedial purpose, not punishment of the defendant, and therefore is not a 

bar to subsequent criminal prosecution for failure to appear based on the same 

conduct"). 

Furthermore, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Witte v. United 

States, 115 S.Ct. 2199 (1995), we are compelled to conclude that the enhancement 

for obstruction of justice was not punishment for any conduct other than the 

conduct to which Hawley pleaded guilty. In Witte, the defendant pleaded guilty 

to a federal marijuana charge. 115 S.Ct. at 2203. The presentence report 

calculated the base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines by aggregating 

the total quantity of drugs involved, including drugs relating to uncharged 

criminal conduct, in this case, cocaine. Id. Under the Guidelines, the sentencing 

range for an offense is calculated on the basis of all "relevant conduct" in which 

the defendant was engaged and is not limited to the conduct underlying the 

offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.3. When the defendant was subsequently 

indicted for offenses relating to his involvement with cocaine, he moved to 

dismiss the charges, arguing that he had already been punished for the offenses 

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because the cocaine had been considered as "relevant conduct" at his marijuana 

sentencing. Witte, 115 S.Ct. at 2203-04. Thus, defendant argued, the subsequent 

prosecution on cocaine charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that "use of evidence of 

related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime 

within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for that 

conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause." I d. at 2206. 

Furthermore, "it makes no difference ... whether the enhancement occurred in 

the first or second sentencing proceeding." I d. 

The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing 

Guidelines, like their criminal history counterparts and the 

recidivism statutes ... , are sentencing enhancement 

regimes evincing the judgment that a particular offense 

should receive a more serious sentence within the 

authorized range if it was either accompanied by or 

preceded by additional criminal activity . . . . We hold that, 

where the legislature has authorized such a particular 

punishment range for a given crime, the resulting sentence 

within that range constitutes punishment only for the 

offense of conviction for purposes of the double jeopardy 

mqmry. 

Id. at 2208. We conclude that the facts of this case are governed by Witte. The 

enhancement of Hawley's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.1 was punishment for 

the underlying offense to which he pleaded guilty, not punishment for failing to 

appear. See also United States v. Carey, 943 F.2d 44, 46-47 (11th Cir. 1991) 

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(citing several other circuits and holding that a two level increase for obstruction 

of justice in first case relating to credit card fraud does not constitute punishment 

for failure to appear and does not bar a later prosecution for failing to appear), 

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 987 (1992). 

ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 

Hawley next argues that the district court erred in not granting him a 

reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. We review 

for clear error the district court's refusal to grant a reduction in offense level for 

acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1223 n.l (lOth 

Cir. 1995). "We recognize that '[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the 

determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review."' 

United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 853 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 

3El.l, comment. (n.5)) (alteration in original). 

U.S.S.G. § 3El.l provides in relevant part as follows: "(a) If the defendant 

clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the 

offense level by 2 levels." Application Note 3 to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l provides that 

entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with 

admission of the conduct of the offense of conviction and any other additional 

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relevant conduct constitutes significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility. 

Application Note 3 goes on to say, however, that this evidence may be 

"outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance 

of responsibility," and that the guilty plea does not entitle the defendant to an 

adjustment as a matter of right. Application Note 4 then advises that " [ c ]onduct 

resulting in an enhancement under § 3C 1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the 

Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted 

responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary 

cases in which adjustments under both§§ 3Cl.1 and 3El.1 may apply." 

The district court denied the § 3El.1 downward adjustment for acceptance 

of responsibility on the basis of Application Note 4, concluding that there were no 

exceptional circumstances warranting a§ 3El.1 adjustment in light of Hawley's 

conduct of flight that gave rise to an upward enhancement for obstructing justice 

under § 3C 1.1. Hawley argues that, if he loses his double jeopardy challenge to 

the upward adjustment for obstructing justice (as he has), this is nevertheless one 

of those "extraordinary cases" where an adjustment under both §§ 3C 1.1 and 

3El.1 is appropriate. He relies principally on United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 

3 78, 3 83 (9th Cir. 1994 ), where the Ninth Circuit held that an enhancement for 

obstruction of justice is not inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility 

adjustment "when a defendant, although initially attempting to conceal the crime, 

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eventually accepts responsibility for the crime and abandons all attempts to 

obstruct justice." Hawley contends that the conduct constituting obstruction of 

justice did not continue after he was received back into custody in September, 

1994, and that upon his return to Kansas in late September, 1994, he immediately 

entered into negotiations with the government to provide information concerning 

other criminal activity and entered his plea of guilty. Thus, the conduct forming 

the basis for the obstruction of justice enhancement ceased and was replaced by 

conduct indicating a clear acceptance of responsibility. 

In determining whether a defendant has "accepted responsibility," we have 

held that "the sentencing court can consider if there has been a 'voluntary 

termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations."' United States 

v. Amos, 984 F.2d 1067, 1073 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, 

Application Note l(b)). In this case, assuming arguendo that Hawley accurately 

characterizes his conduct after being returned to Kansas, there still remains the 

question as to whether his "good conduct" was in fact voluntary. Hawley fails to 

appreciate the fact that he had been arrested, released on an appearance bond, and 

then violated his appearance bond. He had to be returned to Kansas by law 

enforcement; he did not return on his own. Conduct amounting to escape or 

violation of an appearance bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept 

responsibility, and this fact alone provides adequate foundation for the district 

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court's decision. ~ id. at 1072-73 (concluding that defendant's attempted 

escape from jail while awaiting sentencing supported application of enhancement 

for obstruction of justice and provided adequate grounds for denial of downward 

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility). Thus, notwithstanding Hawley's 

emphasis on Hopper and his conduct after returning to Kansas, the district court 

did not clearly err in its conclusion that Hawley failed to "clearly demonstrate[] 

acceptance of responsibility" entitling him to a reduction in his sentence under § 

3El.l. See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). 3 

3 Hawley also claims that he qualifies for the additional one-point downward 

adjustment under subsection (b), which authorizes such an adjustment in the 

following situation: 

(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under 

subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the 

operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and the 

defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or 

prosecution of his own misconduct by taking one or 

more of the following steps: 

( 1) timely providing complete information to the 

government concerning his own involvement in 

the offense; or 

(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to 

enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the 

government to avoid preparing for trial and 

permitting the court to allocate its resources 

efficiently. 

Because Hawley's entitlement to an adjustment under subsection (b) turns on 

(continued ... ) 

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MOTION TO ENFORCE THE PLEA AGREEMENT 

Hawley asserts that he was entitled to a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 

5Kl.l (substantial assistance), 4 and also that the government was required to file 

such motion pursuant to the plea agreement. He alleges that the government 

acted in bad faith in not filing the motion. Whether government conduct has 

violated a plea agreement is a question of law which we review de novo. United 

States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 133 

(1995). "[P]lea bargains are governed by contract principles, and if any 

ambiguities are present, they will be resolved against the drafter." United States 

v. Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824 (lOth Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (alteration in 

original). 

In exchange for Hawley's plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment, the 

government made certain concessions. The concession at issue here is found at 

paragraph 7(D) of the Plea Agreement. In paragraph 7(D) the government agreed: 

If appropriate, prior to sentencing, to file a motion pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.l, to reduce [Hawley's] sentence to 

3

( ... continued) 

whether he first meets the requirements of subsection (a), which he has not done, 

we reject this argument as well. 

4 U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.l provides in part: "Upon motion of the government 

stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation 

or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may 

depart from the guidelines." 

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reflect his substantial assistance, if any, in the investigation 

and/or prosecution of another person(s) involved in this 

offense or other offenses .... 

Paragraph 8, however, states that "[t]he defendant acknowledges and understands 

that the decision, whether to file this motion, and whether he has provided 

substantial assistance, is a matter that resides in the sole and exclusive discretion 

of the United States Attorney for the District of Kansas." 

Hawley contends that he did "substantially assist" the government by: (1) 

providing information concerning the activities which formed the basis of the 

Indictment, both in California and Arkansas; (2) providing information to the 

court regarding conduct in Arkansas which interfered with his ability to 

cooperate; and (3) expressing his willingness to provide information about his 

brother's drug activities. Hawley further contends that the government took no 

steps to have a polygraph examination administered to him concerning the 

information he provided and that the government conducted a "less than 

enthusiastic investigation" into his claims regarding interference with his ability 

to cooperate before concluding them to be meritless. The government responds 

that Hawley did not substantially assist its investigations, and that after Hawley 

was returned to custody, he "further obstructed justice by making false 

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allegations of law enforcement corruption in Arkansas," which, upon 

investigation, turned out to be fictitious. 5 

The district court concluded that "the government has demonstrated it has 

abided by the terms of the plea agreement and the government has reasonably and 

apparently in good faith concluded that the information provided by the defendant 

is not sufficient to warrant the filing of a motion pursuant to § 5Kl.l, and the 

defendant's failure to -- failure and inability to provide information that would 

substantially assist the government in its investigation of criminal activities 

clearly justify the government decision not to file a motion for a reduction of 

sentence for substantial assistance, and therefore, a motion to enforce the plea 

agreement is again denied." 

As with other decisions made by prosecutors, "federal district courts have 

authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion 

and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an 

unconstitutional motive." Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 

( 1992) (stating as an example of an unconstitutional motive a situation where a 

5 At the sentencing hearing the government also informed the court that 

"there is evidence that indicates that during the period of time that [Hawley] was 

at-large between the time that he failed to appear and subsequently was arrested, 

knowing that the codefendant was providing information, the defendant provided 

information to others, particularly his brother, indicating the codefendant was 

providing information, and in that manner obstructed the assistance of the 

codefendant." 

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prosecutor refuses to file a substantial-assistance motion because of the 

defendant's race or religion). "It follows that a claim that a defendant merely 

provided substantial assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to 

discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor would additional but generalized 

allegations of improper motive." I d. at 1844. "[A]bsent an unconstitutional 

motive for refusing to do so, the prosecution enjoys complete discretion in 

determining whether to file a substantial assistance motion, and ... a claim 

seeking to compel a motion based on a defendant's view of what he or she deems 

to have been 'substantial assistance' will not be entertained." Massey, 997 F .2d at 

824 (citing Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844). 

We have stated that "Congress wisely or unwisely left the matter of 

substantial assistance to the prosecutor, unless there's a formal agreement which 

would bind the prosecutor." Massey, 997 F.2d at 824 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under Hawley's Plea Agreement the decision whether to file a motion 

for substantial assistance resides within the "sole and exclusive discretion" of the 

prosecutor. Hawley does not allege that the government in this case had an 

unconstitutional motive for its refusal to file a motion for substantial assistance 

on his behalf. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim further. ~ 

United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93,95 (lOth Cir. 1994) (exercising jurisdiction 

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to review "alleged constitutional infirmities arising from the prosecutor's 

discretionary refusal to file a § 5Kl.l motion"). 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUlL TY PLEA 

In exchange for Hawley entering a plea of guilty to Count I of the 

Indictment, the government also agreed, inter alia, not to oppose that Hawley 

receive a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and not to oppose 

that Hawley not receive a two level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The 

presentence report recommended that Hawley should receive a two-level 

enhancement for obstruction of justice and that, pursuant to Application Note 4 of 

U.S.S.G. § 3E 1.1, Hawley be denied a downward adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility. In the government's written response to the presentence report, the 

government made the following comments: 

The government responds in acknowledging its obligation 

under the plea agreement not to advocate such an 

enhancement but agrees with the facts related to the 

presentence report. 

The government acknowledges its obligation under the plea 

agreement to not oppose a three-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. Further, the government 

agrees with the facts related in the presentence report and 

states there is no evidence that this is "an extraordinary 

case" allowing for both an enhancement pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l and a reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 

3El.l. 

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At the sentencing hearing the government made the following additional 

comments to the judge: 

May it please the court, your honor, regarding the 

defendant's objections, we have filed a formal response to 

the formal objections. They are considered in the 

presentence investigation report. They accurately reflect 

the government's position. Pursuant to plea agreement, our 

position was that, at the time that the agreement was 

signed, to not oppose that no enhancement for obstruction 

occur, and not oppose that exception -- acceptance of 

responsibility credit be given; however, we note for the 

record the facts contained in the presentence investigation 

report that we were not aware of at the time of the 

agreement. We also note the facts regarding the 

defendant's debriefing that -- or lack thereof that were 

unknown to us at the time that we entered into the plea 

agreement. We believe that in spite of our absence of 

opposition to the defendant's not getting the obstruction 

and getting acceptance that the facts are accurately recited 

in the PSIR. 

As it relates to this, however, being an extraordinary 

circumstance meriting any extraordinary credit, we believe 

the record is completely devoid of that and that the record 

would be in the PSIR, and we believe that the court, upon 

reflection of the facts contained therein, should come to a 

similar conclusion. There is just nothing extraordinary 

about this matter as it relates to the role in the offense, the 

defendant's role in the offense between him and Mr. 

Guardado. He would have been above Mr. Guardado, and 

in fact, it appears that through his relationship with his 

brother would have had a substantially superior role to 

others involved in this matter as a purely factual matter, 

and for that reason, largely for that reason, he was 

unwilling to give up any information whatsoever in a timely 

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fashion regarding his brother, in a fashion where anything 

regarding the allegations in this indictment could have been 

reasonably linked to his brother, so for those reasons, we 

would ask the court to consider the plea agreement and to 

consider the facts contained in the PSIR that were 

considered in responding to the defendant's objections in 

light of those facts that were unknown to the government at 

the time that the plea agreement was entered. Thank you. 

Immediately following the government's comments during the sentencing hearing, 

Hawley made the following motion: 

Your Honor, the government, by the comments that it has 

just made, has completely violated every term of the plea 

agreement that was entered into herein; therefore we move 

to withdraw the plea. 

The district court denied the motion. 

"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of 

the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 

such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 

(1971). Furthermore, "[i]n order to comply with the plea agreement, the 

government cannot rely upon a 'rigidly literal construction of the language' of the 

agreement, nor may it accomplish 'through indirect means what it promised not to 

do directly."' United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting 

United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F .2d 253, 256 (1Oth Cir. 1989)). We review de 

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novo whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement. Allen v. 

Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1534 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 544 (1995). 

Plea agreements are governed by contract principles, Massey, 997 F .2d at 

824, and we must construe the Plea Agreement according to what Hawley 

"reasonably understood" when he entered his plea, Shorteeth, 887 F .2d at 256. 

After review of the Plea Agreement in this case, and the governments statements 

to the court during sentencing, we conclude that the Agreement can reasonably be 

interpreted as proscribing the comments made by the government at the 

sentencing hearing. Furthermore, we conclude that the comments accomplished 

by indirect means what the government promised not to do directly. The 

government argues that it was only fulfilling its obligation to apprise the court of 

"information which protects the sentencing decision from the taint of incomplete 

and inaccurate information." The government further contends that provision of 

such information does not violate a plea agreement where the prosecutor does not 

attempt to characterize or argue its effect to the sentencing judge. 

However, here the government was not responding to "inaccurate 

information." See Hand, 913 F .2d at 856 (indicating that the prosecutor has a 

responsibility to inform the court so that its decision will not be "tainted by 

incomplete and inaccurate information"). To the contrary, the government merely 

underscored the facts recited in the PSIR and argued that such facts did not show 

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that Hawley had presented an extraordinary situation that would entitle him to a 

reduction in his sentence given the finding that he had obstructed justice. Taken 

as a whole, the prosecutor's comments here appear to be a thinly disguised, if 

disguised at all, effort to persuade the court in a way that the government had 

promised it would not do. In Hand, the government agreed in a plea agreement to 

recommend a two-level reduction for the defendant's role as a minor participant in 

the offense. 913 F.2d at 855. At the defendant's sentencing hearing, the 

defendant personally testified concerning his role in the offense and called 

witness to support his position. Id. The government cross-examined these 

witnesses, and in doing so elicited certain factual clarifications which tended to 

undermine the defendant's position that he played a minor role in the offense. Id. 

The government ultimately did recommend that the defendant receive a reduction 

for having a minor role in the offense, stating to the court that "the court's well 

aware of the facts in this case and can make its own conclusion." I d. at 856. The 

defendant argued that the government violated the plea agreement by eliciting 

unfavorable facts on cross examination during the sentencing hearing and by the 

prosecutor's comments that the court was free to reach its own conclusion based 

on the facts before it. Id. We rejected defendant's claim, holding that "[a] 

promise to 'recommend a reduction' is not a promise to stand mute in the face of 

incorrect or misleading testimony offered before the trial court." I d. We did, 

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however, suggest that if the prosecutor had attempted to "characterize the 

evidence elicited on cross examination," or to "argue the effect of such evidence 

to the sentencing judge," the result might have been different. Id. & n.3. 

Here, the government's comments do characterize the facts and do argue a 

conclusion to the sentencing judge. The government's negative comments with 

regard to whether this case was "extraordinary" could only have the effect of 

opposing Hawley's receipt of an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. As 

discussed earlier, the only way Hawley could have received a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility after having received an enhancement for obstruction 

of justice would have been if he qualified as an "extraordinary" case. U.S.S.G. § 

3El.l, Application Note 4. Furthermore, the government was not correcting 

inaccurate information when it asserted that the record is "devoid" of facts 

indicating that this is an extraordinary case, and stating that "we believe that the 

court, upon reflection of the facts contained therein, should come to a similar 

conclusion." These statements do more than merely state facts or simply validate 

those facts found in the Presentence Report; they provide a legal 

"characterization" of those facts and "argue the effect" of those facts to the 

sentencing judge. 

Finally, the fact that the government may not have been aware of certain 

facts in the Presentence Report at the time it entered into the Agreement with 

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Hawley does not excuse or justify its conduct at the sentencing hearing. When 

plea agreements are made with "full knowledge of the facts at hand," those 

agreements must be adhered to by the prosecution in order to maintain the 

integrity of the plea. United States v. Cooper, 70 F .3d 563, 567 (1Oth Cir. 1995) 

(emphasis added). 

If at a later date the government discovers facts that cause 

it to believe that its prosecutorial discretion was not 

properly exercised, it has the ethical obligation to withdraw 

from the plea agreement and advise the defendant so that he 

or she may prepare for trial or renegotiate. It is certainly 

not proper for the government to wait until the sentencing 

hearing then breach the terms of the plea agreement, 

shielding its behavior by claiming its obligation to be an 

ethical officer of the court. 

Id. The government breached its plea agreement with Hawley, and Hawley is 

entitled to relief regardless of whether the government's conduct actually affected 

the sentencing judge. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63 (holding that whether or not 

the prosecutor's conduct actually influenced the judge's decision or not, "the 

interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in 

relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served 

by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration"). 

The Court in Santobello remanded the case back to the state courts to 

determine the defendant's ultimate relief because the state court was "in a better 

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position to decide whether the circumstances of [the] case require only that there 

be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case [defendant] 

should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state 

court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by [defendant], i.e., the 

opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263 (footnote 

omitted). Providing this type of latitude for the district court on remand is 

preferable in light of the district court's position with respect to the case. See 

Allen, 57 F .3d at 1534 (citing Santobello and stating that "[i]f the court finds that 

the government breached the plea agreement, the court must remand the case 

either for specific performance or withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea"). 

Compare Cooper, 70 F .3d at 567 (when it is clear from the appellate record that 

the government's breach of the plea agreement is intentional or egregious, the 

appellate court may conclude that resentencing is not an adequate remedy and it 

may order that defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea). Here, we 

believe it is appropriate to remand this matter to the district court for its 

determination of whether the defendant should be permitted to withdraw his 

guilty plea or whether he should simply be resentenced by another judge under 

conditions where the government fulfills the promises it made in the Plea 

Agreement to not oppose that Hawley receive a three level reduction for 

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,.. 

acceptance of responsibility and to not oppose that Hawley not receive a two level 

enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing discussion, we AFFIRM the district court's rulings 

in this case in all respects, with the exception of it's denial of Hawley's Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Plea. We REMAND with instructions that the district court 

determine whether Hawley's plea should be vacated, allowing him to replead, or 

whether Hawley should be resentenced by a different judge. 

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