Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03151/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03151-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality
Appellant
Eugene Pfeifer
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 03-3151/3264

___________

Arkansas Department of Environmental *

Quality, *

*

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, * Appeals from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Arkansas.

*

Eugene Pfeifer, doing business as One * [UNPUBLISHED]

Source Home and Building Centers, *

*

Appellee/Cross-Appellant. *

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Submitted: August 11, 2004

Filed: August 19, 2004

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Before SMITH, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

The Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) appeals the

district court’s*

 adverse grant of summary judgment in ADEQ’s action under the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991, 6991b.

Eugene Pfeifer, doing business as One Source Home and Building Centers (One

Source), cross-appeals the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

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ADEQ’s amended complaint, in relevant part, sought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 6991b(h)(6)(A) and Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-807(b) recovery of funds expended on

response and corrective actions in connection with the release of petroleum from

underground storage tanks (USTs) formerly located on property owned by Pfeifer,

and a declaratory judgment holding Pfeifer liable for the cost of future response and

corrective actions in connection with such release. 

Pfeifer moved for summary judgment and attorney’s fees. The district court

granted summary judgment, finding as relevant Pfeifer was never the owner of the

USTs. The court, however, denied Pfeifer attorney’s fees because ADEQ’s case “was

not totally unsupported.”

I. Summary Judgment

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Meyers v. Neb. Health

and Human Servs., 324 F.3d 655, 658-59 (8th Cir. 2003). Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment must be granted if “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” However, the nonmoving party “‘must present more than a scintilla

of evidence and must advance specific facts to create a genuine issue of material fact

for trial.’” See Meyers, 324 F.3d at 659 (quoted case omitted). 

Under RCRA, the term “owner,” in the case of a UST “in use on November 8,

1984, or brought into use after that date,” means “any person who owns [a UST] used

for the storage, use, or dispensing of regulated sustances [sic].” See 42 U.S.C.

§ 6991(3)(A). We find the evidence shows Pfeifer was not the owner of the USTs

before they were removed by Pollution Management, Inc. (PMI). While One Source

was designated as owner in various documents filed with ADEQ, apparently all

prepared by PMI, these documents predate Pfeifer’s purchase of the land on which

the USTs were located. Further, there is no indication Pfeifer intended to make use

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of the USTs other than to remove them from the land, as is evidenced by Pfeifer’s

execution of the warranty deed only after PMI had completed their removal. These

circumstances support Pfeifer’s uncontroverted attestation he conditioned purchase

of the land on removal of the USTs, and evidence Pfeifer sought a cost estimate from

PMI regarding their removal is consistent with this conclusion. Thus, while Pfeifer

surely was interested in making certain the USTs were properly removed, a

reasonable trier of fact could not find Pfeifer was an “owner” of the USTs as defined

by section 6691(3)(A). See Herring v. Can. Life Assurance Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1028

(8th Cir. 2000) (dispute is not “genuine” unless evidence is such that reasonable trier

of fact could return verdict for nonmovant). 

II. Attorney’s Fees

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for

attorney’s fees. See Gelco Corp. v. Baker Indus., Inc., 779 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir.

1985) (per curiam). The district court may award attorney’s fees to a litigant if the

other party acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” See

Hoover v. Armco, Inc., 915 F.2d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961

(1991). An award of attorney's fees is not necessarily justified merely because a party

loses on summary judgment. In this case, we find colorable arguments were made in

support of each of the controlling issues. Thus, even though a reasonable trier of fact

could not conclude Pfeifer was the owner of the USTs, we find the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Pfeifer attorney’s fees. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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