Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08094/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marjorie Hatfield
Appellant
M. V. Lehner
Appellee
Ernie Orrell
Appellee
John Pexton
Appellee
John Rider
Appellee
Sherry Shillenn
Appellee
The Board of County Commissioners for Converse County
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARJORIE HATFIELD, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

Fl LED ft,~ tJaited States Court '!f APP~ Tenth Circuat 

APR 11 i995 

PATR!CK FISH'EU 

Clertt 

No. 93-8094 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

FOR CONVERSE COUNTY, JOHN PEXTON, 

JOHN RIDER, M. V. LEHNER, as the 

present Commissioners of Converse 

County; ERNIE ORRELL, Converse 

County Treasurer; SHERRY SHILLENN, 

Converse County Deputy Treasurer, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-254) 

Bruce S. Asay, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellant. 

Dale W. Cottam (Gary R. Scott, with him on the briefs) of Hirst & 

Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for appellees the Board of County 

Commissioners for Converse County, John Pexton, John Rider, M. V. 

Lehner. 

Scott E. Ortiz (Patrick J. Murphy, with him on the briefs) of 

Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, Wyoming, for appellee 

Ernie Orrell, Converse County Treasurer. 

Patrick Dixon, Dixon and Despain, Casper, Wyoming, for appellee 

Sherry Shillenn. 

Before TACHA, McKAY, Circuit Judges, and HANSEN,t District Judge. 

t The Honorable C. LeRoy Hansen, United States District Judge 

for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-8094 Document: 01019282767 Date Filed: 04/11/1995 Page: 1 
TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Marjorie Hatfield brought suit in federal court 

against defendants after she was terminated from her employment as 

a clerk in the Treasurer's Office of Converse County, Wyoming. 

She has asserted five separate claims: (1) denial of due process; 

(2) breach of contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing; (4) negligent supervision; and (5) 

promissory estoppel. The district court granted defendants 

summary judgment on each of plaintiff's claims. This court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

I 

Converse County hired plaintiff to work in its Treasurer's 

Office in December 1988. Plaintiff initially worked in the auto 

license department, but she later transferred to the tax 

department. Her duties in the tax department apparently required 

computer skills that she initially lacked, causing her problems in 

completing her tasks. Moreover, plaintiff's co-workers in the tax 

department allegedly isolated her by excluding her from 

conversations and training activities, closely monitoring her 

performance, and reporting to management her minor deviations from 

office policy. 

In October 1991, several of plaintiff's co-workers complained 

to the County Treasurer, Jim Read, about plaintiff's job 

performance. Mr. Read reprimanded plaintiff and placed her on 

probation. According to plaintiff, Mr. Read assured her that she 

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would not be fired. But two days later, on October 25, plaintiff 

received a formal letter of termination. She had no written 

contract of employment with the County. 

After receiving the termination letter, plaintiff initiated a 

formal Grievance Board proceeding against Mr. Read in accordance 

with the Converse County personnel policy manual (the "policy 

manual"). Plaintiff alleged that she had been harassed and 

falsely accused by her co-workers and that she was terminated in 

contravention of Mr. Read's express assurances that she would not 

be fired. 

The County placed plaintiff on administrative leave with pay 

while the hearing was pending. The hearing began on January 3, 

1992. Midway through the proceedings, the hearing was suspended 

to allow the parties to settle the matter. Plaintiff contends 

that the hearing was suspended after County officials assured her 

that she would regain a position with the County. The hearing was 

suspended for a period not to exceed six weeks. 

According to plaintiff, on February 13 John Pexton, a County 

Commissioner and Chairman of the Grievance Board, assured 

plaintiff that she would be reinstated within a week and that she 

would return to work in the Treasurer's office. But on February 

24, plaintiff received a termination letter from the newly 

appointed treasurer, Ernie Orrell. Mr. Orrell had reviewed 

plaintiff's employment file, discussed plaintiff's performance 

with her co-workers, and decided to terminate her employment. 

Plaintiff then sought to reopen her Grievance Board hearing, but 

the County dismissed the proceedings. 

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Plaintiff brought suit against defendants in federal district 

court. She asserted four state law claims -- breach of contract, 

breach of implied covenant·of good faith and fair dealing, 

negligent supervision, and promissory estoppel -- and one claim 

based on federal law -- that she was denied procedural due process 

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted defendants' motion with 

respect to each of plaintiff's claims, and Ms. Hatfield now 

appeals. 

II 

Before addressing the merits of plaintiff's claims, we must 

first resolve a jurisdictional issue. Defendants contend that 

plaintiff's notice of appeal from the district court's order 

granting summary judgment was untimely and that, consequently, 

this court only has jurisdiction to review the district court's 

August 27, 1993 order denying plaintiff's "motion for 

reconsideration." 

On August 18, 1993 -- eleven business days after the district 

court entered its summary judgment order -- plaintiff filed a 

document entitled "Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 

Summary Judgment or in the Alternative a Notice of Appeal" (the 

"combined document"). On August 27, the district court denied 

plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff then filed a separate notice of 

appeal on September 24. 

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require litigants in 

civil cases to file a notice of appeal "with the clerk of the 

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district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 

judgment or order appealed from." Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a) (1). 

Plaintiff's September 24 filing was therefore untimely as a notice 

of appeal from the district court's summary judgment order; it was 

timely only as a notice of appeal from the district court's denial 

of plaintiff's "motion to reconsider." If, however, the August 18 

combined document constituted a valid notice of appeal from the 

summary judgment order, it was timely, and this court would have 

jurisdiction to review the merits of plaintiff's appeal. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize no "motion for 

reconsideration." Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 

1243 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 89 (1992). 

Instead, this court construes such a filing in one of two ways. 

If the motion is filed within ten days of the district court's 

entry of judgment, the motion is treated as a motion to alter or 

amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Id. 

Alternatively, if the motion is filed more than ten days after the 

entry of judgment, it is considered a motion seeking relief from 

the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Id. This distinction 

can be significant in determining the timeliness of a notice of 

appeal, for a Rule 59(e) motion tolls the 30-day period, Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a) (4) (E), while a Rule 60(b) motion does not, Marshall 

v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 453, 454 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 s. 

Ct. 1309 (1994). 

In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881 (lOth Cir. 1986) (per 

curiam) , this court confronted a similar combined motion for 

relief/notice of appeal under the same version of Fed. R. App. P. 

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4 as was in force when plaintiff filed her combined document in 

this case.1 The appellant in Skagerberg entitled his filing a 

"Motion for Rule 60 Relief, or Appeal" and filed the document 

seven days after the district court entered its judgment. Id. at 

882. Because the appellant had filed the document within ten days 

of the entry of judgment, the court treated the motion portion of 

his filing as a Rule 59(e) motion (despite the appellant's 

characterization to the contrary). Id. at 883. The court 

emphasized that because a timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the 

period for filing a notice of appeal, "[a] notice of appeal filed 

while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pending is ineffective to 

confer jurisdiction on a court of appeals." Id.; see also Griggs 

v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982). In 

essence, a district court's judgment becomes "final for appeal 

purposes only after the district court's disposition of the Rule 

59(e) motion." Skagerberg, 797 F.2d at 883. As a result, under 

the old version of Rule 4, "when a timely Rule 59(e) motion and a 

notice of appeal are combined in one document the notice of appeal 

is premature and has no effect." Id.2 

1 Rule 4 has subsequently been amended, partially overruling 

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982), the 

decision on which a portion of our holding in Skagerberg was 

based. See note 2 infra. The new version of Rule 4 became 

effective December 1, 1993, roughly three months after plaintiff 

filed her combined document in this case. Because the motion. 

portion of plaintiff's combined document was not a Rule 59(e) 

motion, see infra, the change in Rule 4 would be immaterial to the 

disposition of this case even if we applied the new version 

retroactively. 

2 The amended version of Rule 4 effectively overrules this 

aspect of Griggs and Skagerberg. Under the current version, a 

notice of appeal filed while a Rule 59(e) motion is still pending 

ripens into an effective notice of appeal once the district court 

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Unlike the appellant in Skagerberg, plaintiff here filed his 

combined document eleven working days after the entry of judgment. 

The motion portion of plaintiff's filing therefore was a motion 

seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), not a 

Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Cf. Van Skiver, 

952 F.2d at 1243. Unlike a Rule 59(e) motion, a Rule 60(b) motion 

does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and does not 

affect the finality of the district court's judgment. Browder v. 

Director. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 262 n.7 (1978). 

Consequently, a pending Rule 60(b) motion does not prevent an 

otherwise valid notice of appeal from conferring jurisdiction on 

the court of appeals. See Marshall, 5 F.3d at 454. Moreover, 

nothing in Skagerberg indicates that an otherwise valid notice of 

appeal is made ineffectual by its presentation in the same 

document as a separate motion. Thus, so long as plaintiff's 

combined document complied with the content requirements of Fed. 

R. App. P. 3(c), it constituted a timely notice of appeal from the 

district court's summary judgment order. 

Rule 3(c) requires a notice of appeal to specify the party 

making the appeal, the judgment or order from which the party 

appeals, and the court to which the appeal is taken. Plaintiff's 

combined document, while also operating as a motion pursuant to 

Rule 60(b), comports with each of these requirements;3 defendants 

has ruled on the pending motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (4); see 

also Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 454 n.2 (lOth Cir. 

1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 750 (1995). 

3 We find no importance in the fact that plaintiff phrased his 

notice of appeal as an alternative to the motion ("Motion for 

Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment or in the 

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do not contend otherwise. We therefore conclude that the combined 

document filed by plaintiff on August 18, 1993, constituted a 

timely notice of appeal from the district court's summary judgment 

order, and this court has jurisdiction to review the merits of 

plaintiff's appeal. 

III 

We review a district court's granting of summary judgment de 

novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district court. 

Allen v. Minnstar. Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1476 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate only 

if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

resisting the motion, reveals no genuine issue of material fact 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A 

fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing law," and a "genuine" issue exists if "the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

Alternative a Notice of Appeal"). It is well-settled that courts 

should construe the requirements of Rule 3(c) liberally where the 

document is the functional equivalent of a technically proper 

notice of appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 

(1992) ("Courts will liberally construe the requirements of Rule 

3."); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988) 

(if a document is "technically at variance with the letter of 

[Rule 3] , a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has 

complied with the rule if the litigant's action is the functional 

equivalent of what the rule requires"); Ayala v. United States, 

980 F.2d 1342, 1344 (lOth Cir. 1992) (holding that documents 

"technically at variance with Rule 3(c)" were nevertheless valid 

because they were "the functional equivalent of a proper notice of 

appeal"). To the extent plaintiff's combined document was not a 

technically proper notice of appeal under Rule 3(c), it was 

nevertheless a functional equivalent. 

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the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). 

Under Rule 56(c), the "initial burden is on the moving party 

to show the court 'that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the nonmoving party's case.'" Manders v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't 

of Mental Health, 875 F.2d 263, 264 (lOth Cir. 1989) (quoting 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). If the 

moving party meets this threshold requirement, the burden shifts 

to the nonmoving party to "make a showing sufficient to establish 

the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The party resisting the motion "may not 

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Rather, "there must be sufficient evidence on which a jury could 

reasonably find for the nonmoving party." Manders, 875 F.2d at 

265. With this in mind, we turn to the merits of plaintiff's 

claims. 

A 

We first address plaintiff's due process claim. To assess 

whether an individual was denied procedural due process, "courts 

must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess 

a protected interest such that the due process protections were 

applicable; and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an 

appropriate level of process." Farthing v. City of Shawnee, 39 

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Appellate Case: 93-8094 Document: 01019282767 Date Filed: 04/11/1995 Page: 9 
F.3d 1131, 1135 (lOth Cir. 1994); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 

To prevail on a due process claim against state officials, a 

plaintiff must first demonstrate that the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty or property interest 

of which she was allegedly deprived. Board of Regents of State 

Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) ("The requirements of 

procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty 

and property."). In this case, although plaintiff had no written 

contract, she contends that the policy manual created an impliedin-fact contract of employment that prohibited the County from 

firing her except for cause. Plaintiff points primarily to 

provisions in the policy manual for a systematic employee 

disciplinary procedure and for employee grievance hearings before 

the Board of County Commissioners. 

Whether state officials have violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment is a question of federal constitutional law, but the 

preliminary question of whether a plaintiff possessed a protected 

property interest must be "determined by reference to state law." 

Casias v. City of Raton, 738 F.2d 392, 394 (lOth Cir. 1984); see 

also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (stating that 

property "interests attain ... constitutional status by virtue 

of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected 

by state law"). Moreover, any of several sources of state law, 

including a local government's personnel policy manual, can create 

a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See 

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Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1437 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

(stating that protected property interests may be created by 

"state statutes, local ordinances, established rules, or mutually 

explicit understandings"). "In the context of a public employee . 

. . , the touchstone is whether, under state law, the employee has 

'a legitimate claim of entitlement' in continued employment, as 

opposed to a 'unilateral expectation' or 'an abstract need or 

desire' for it." Farthing, 39 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Roth, 408 

U.S. at 577). We therefore must examine Wyoming law to determine 

whether the policy manual endowed plaintiff with a "legitimate 

claim of entitlement" to continued employment with the County. 

Central to our inquiry is whether plaintiff was an "at-will" 

employee at the time of her termination. If plaintiff served at 

the will of the County Treasurer, she could be terminated "at any 

time, for any reason or for no reason at all." Wilder v. Cody 

Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 (Wyo. 1994). She 

therefore could not have had any "legitimate claim of entitlement" 

to employment with the County. Rusillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 

1167, 1170 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("Ordinarily, an employee's at-will 

status forecloses a property interest claim because the employee 

has no legitimate expectation of future employment."); Lentsch v. 

Marshall, 741 F.2d 301, 305 (lOth Cir. 1984) ("Generally, a 

government employee ... who may be dismissed 'at will' does not 

[have a protected property interest]."). On the other hand, if 

the policy manual created an implied-in-fact contract of 

employment prohibiting the County from firing plaintiff except for 

cause, she may have had a legitimate claim of entitlement to her 

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job and hence a protected property interest. See West v. Grand 

County, 967 F.2d 362, 366 (lOth Cir. 1992) (county personnel 

policy manual stating that employees could not be fired "except 

for cause or reasons of curtailment of work or lack of funds" 

conferred "a property interest in continued employment that could 

not be curtailed without constitutional protections"); Patrick v. 

Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1245 (lOth Cir. 1992) (city charter stating 

that "appointments and removals shall be made upon the basis of 

merit and fitness alone" created "a legitimate expectation of 

continued employment amounting to a property interest that was 

entitled to due process protection"). 

The general presumption under Wyoming law is that employees 

serve at the will of their employers. Sanchez v. Life Care Ctrs. 

of Am .. Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Wyo. 1993); Rompf v. John 0. 

Hammons Hotels. Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 1984). The Supreme 

Court of Wyoming, however, has recognized that an employee 

handbook or personnel manual may create an implied-in-fact 

contract of employment. See. e.g., Sanchez, 855 P.2d at 1259; 

Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wyo. 1986); 

Mobil Coal Producing. Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Wyo. 

1985). "The implied in fact contract of employment arises from a 

mutual agreement and intent to promise which is found in the acts 

or conduct of the party sought to be bound." Wilder, 868 P.2d at 

216. More specifically, under Wyoming law, "a systematic 

discipline procedure or other language in an employee handbook 

implying termination may be for cause only may defeat the 

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rebuttable presumption that employment is at will." Lincoln v. 

Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1994). 

But in Lincoln, the court also explained that employers who 

use personnel policy manuals can nevertheless avoid creating 

_implied-in-fact contracts of employment by providing their 

employees with a "conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer." 

Lincoln, 867 P.2d at 703. "The employment at will presumption of 

Wyoming law may be sustained when unambiguous language disclaiming 

the formation of a contract is sufficiently conspicuous and 

present in documents that would otherwise comprise terms of an 

implied in fact contract of employment." Id. Under Wyoming law, 

a conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer that tells the employee 

that she is an at-will employee puts her "on notice that general 

statements or conduct [by the employer] do not promise employment 

security and are not to be relied upon by the employee." Id. 

In this case, the County provided plaintiff with three 

separate disclaimers. First, section 103 of the policy manual 

establishes that employment with the County is presumptively atwill: "In no event shall the hiring of an employee be considered 

as creating a contractual relationship between the employee and 

Converse County; and unless otherwise provided in writing, the 

relationship shall be defined as 'employment at will,' where 

either party, with appropriate notice, may dissolve the 

relationship."4 Second, section 206 of the manual states that 

4 Comment 1 to section 103 further states: "Employees who do 

not have a written employment agreement are employed at the will 

of the County and are subject to termination at any time, for any 

reason, with or without cause, and with or without notice." 

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"the County reserves the right to terminate employment for any 

reason." Finally, a separate disclaimer document, signed by 

plaintiff on May 5, 1991, states: 

I, Marjorie Hatfield [written by hand], HAVE READ SECTION 103 

OF THE CONVERSE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY MANUAL. I UNDERSTAND 

THAT I AM HIRED AT THE WILL OF JAMES L. READ, THE HEAD OF THE 

TREASURER'S OFFICE, AND THAT I AM SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT 

ANY TIME, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE, AND 

THAT NOTHING CONTAINED IN THE CONVERSE COUNTY PERSONNEL 

MANUAL, EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION OR OTHER MATERIALS GIVEN TO ME 

IN CONNECTION WITH MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COUNTY CREATES AN 

EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR A DEFINITE 

PERIOD OF TIME. 

We need not decide whether sections 103 and 206 of the policy 

manual by themselves were adequate to place plaintiff on notice 

that her employment was at-will, for the separate disclaimer 

document, with its explicit incorporation of section 103, was 

sufficiently conspicuous and unambiguous under Wyoming law. 

In determining whether an at-will employment disclaimer is 

sufficiently conspicuous and unambiguous, Wyoming courts apply a 

three-part test. See Lincoln, 867 P.2d at 703-05; Sanchez, 855 

P.2d at 1259. First, a court must assess the prominence of the 

text of the disclaimer: Was the text accentuated with larger, 

contrasting, or capitalized print, or by some other means? 

Lincoln, 867 P.2d at 703. Second, a court must examine the 

placement of the disclaimer: Was it a separate provision such 

that a reasonable person should have noticed it, or was it 

presented within a broader, general provision? Id. at 703-04. 

Finally, a court must determine whether the language of the 

disclaimer is unambiguous: Does the disclaimer clearly state that 

employment is at-will, or is it ambiguous concerning the precise 

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effect of the disclaimer on the employment relationship? Id. at 

704. 

We find that the disclaimer at issue in this case meets each 

element of this three-part test. Cf. Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 

878 P.2d 510, 512 (Wyo. 1994) (holding that "a separate 8.5" X 11" 

page which contained a disclaimer and which [the employee] was 

required to sign" prevented the creation of an implied-in-fact 

contract of employment). First, the text is prominent; it is 

printed in capital letters and is the only text appearing on the 

one-page document. Cf. Lincoln, 867 P.2d at 704 (listing fact 

that lettering in disclaimer was capitalized as factor enhancing 

its prominence). Second, given its placement, plaintiff should 

have noticed the disclaimer; it was presented in a document 

completely separate from the manual, and plaintiff filled in her 

name by hand and signed it. Cf. Sanchez, 855 P.2d at 1259 

(holding that disclaimer was not physically conspicuous where it 

was "buried" in the introductory paragraphs of an employee 

handbook). Finally, the text of the disclaimer is unambiguous; it 

places any reasonable signatory on notice that her employment with 

the County is at-will and that the policy manual does not create 

an implied-in-fact contract of employment. Cf. Lincoln, 867 P.2d 

at 705 (holding that similarly worded disclaimer was sufficiently 

unambiguous) . 

Because the disclaimer was sufficiently conspicuous and 

unambiguous, the policy manual did not create an implied-in-fact 

contract of employment. Plaintiff therefore was an at-will 

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employee and could not claim any protected property interest in 

her continued employment with the County. 

Plaintiff nevertheless contends that because the County 

initiated the Grievance Board hearing and suspended those 

proceedings only after plaintiff was assured that she would be 

reinstated, defendants conferred upon her a "legitimate claim of 

entitlement" to continued employment. That is, even though 

plaintiff was an at-will employee prior to the commencement of the 

Grievance Board proceeding, the subsequent events -- particularly 

the assurance that she would be reinstated -- created a protected 

property interest. 

This argument, however, underestimates the significance of 

plaintiff's status as an at-will employee. The disclaimer signed 

by plaintiff unambiguously states that the County Treasurer could 

discharge plaintiff "at any time, with or without notice, with or 

without cause." The County therefore was under no obligation to 

initiate the Grievance Board hearing in the first place. 

Moreover, any assurances made to plaintiff when the hearing was 

suspended did not alter plaintiff's at-will status. As the 

Wyoming Supreme Court stated in Lincoln, " [a] conspicuous and 

unambiguous disclaimer . make[s] any reliance on the 

subsequent statements of the employer unreasonable." Lincoln, 867 

P.2d at 703. Because plaintiff was an at-will employee at all 

times during her employment with the County, she never possessed a 

protected property interest in her continued employment. 

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B 

Three of plaintiff's remaining four claims are interrelated, 

each turning on whether plaintiff had a contract of employment 

with the County. Having addressed this issue in our resolution of 

plaintiff's due process claim, these contentions require only 

brief further discussion. 

The first of these claims is for breach of contract. 

Plaintiff contends that the policy manual created an implied-infact contract of employment and that the County breached that 

contract by terminating her without cause. We have already held, 

however, that the policy manual did not create an implied-in-fact 

contract; the conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer signed by 

plaintiff put her on notice that she was an at-will employee. 

Because there was no contract that plaintiff could only be fired 

for cause, there could be no breach. 

Plaintiff's next claim is that, by terminating her without 

cause, defendants breached an implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. Plaintiff correctly points out that the Supreme 

Court of Wyoming recently held in Wilder that "all contracts of 

employment contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing." Wilder, 868 P.2d at 220. But plaintiff ignores the 

requisite condition precedent -- that there be a contract of 

employment. Indeed, "Wyoming follows the rule that either party 

may terminate an employment 'at will' contract for any reason or 

without reason and is not violative of any implied covenant of 

good faith or fair dealing." Chasson v. Community Action, 768 

P.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Wyo. 1989). Because plaintiff was an at-will 

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employee, she has no claim for breach of an implied covenant of 

good faith. 

Plaintiff's claim of negligent supervision fails for the same 

reason. Plaintiff specifically asserts that defendants are liable 

for failing to conduct an adequate investigation of the 

circumstances surrounding her termination. In Wilder, the Wyoming 

Supreme Court stated that "' [t]o the extent an employee has an 

employment contract requiring specific reasons for dismissal, then 

the employer must conduct an adequate investigation or be liable 

for breach of that contract.'" Wilder, 868 P.2d at 222 (quoting 

Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wash. App.), review 

denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993)). But again, as the 

aforementioned language illustrates, an employee's claim against 

her employer for negligent supervision is predicated on the 

existence of an employment contract that allows dismissal only for 

cause. Because plaintiff was an at-will employee, she has no 

claim against defendants for negligent supervision under Wyoming 

law. See id. (holding that an employee's action against her 

employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but "with an 

action for breach of contract"). As a result, all three of these 

claims must fail. 

c 

Finally, plaintiff contends that, even if she had no implied 

contract with the County, defendants were estopped from 

terminating her because they promised her that she would not be 

fired. Wyoming courts have explicitly recognized promissory 

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Appellate Case: 93-8094 Document: 01019282767 Date Filed: 04/11/1995 Page: 18 
estoppel as a cause of action: "If an unambiguous promise is made 

in circumstances calculated to induce reliance, and it does so, 

the promisee if hurt as a result can recover damages." Doctors' 

Co. v. Insurance Co. of Am., 864 P.2d 1018, 1029 (Wyo. 1993) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he purpose of estoppel is 

'to prevent an injury arising from actions or declarations which 

have been acted on in good faith and which would be inequitable to 

permit a party to retract.'" Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 347-48 

(Wyo. 1993) (quoting Jankovsky v. Halladay Motors, 482 P.2d 129, 

132 (Wyo. 1971)). 

A plaintiff asserting a claim of promissory estoppel must 

demonstrate three components: "(1) a clear and definite 

agreement; (2) proof that the party urging the doctrine acted to 

its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and (3) a 

finding that the equities support the enforcement of the 

agreement." Michie v. Board of Trustees of Carbon County Sch. 

Dist. No. 1, 847 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 1993) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, an essential element of any estoppel claim 

is that the party seeking to enforce the promise "act[ed] to his 

detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement." Davis, 855 

P.2d at 348. "There can be no estoppel as a matter of law when 

the asserted reliance is not justifiable or reasonable under the 

circumstances of the case considered as a whole." Roth v. First 

Sec. Bank, 684 P.2d 93, 97 (Wyo. 1984). 

In this case, plaintiff asserts that County officials broke 

two promises (on which she relied to her detriment) regarding her 

employment. First, in October 1991, County Treasurer Read assured 

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her that she would not be fired. Second, when plaintiff agreed to 

the suspension of the Grievance Board hearing in January 1992, 

County officials promised her that she would be reinstated within 

six weeks. 

Plaintiff's argument, however, overlooks a critical 

pronouncement by the Wyoming Supreme Court directly in point: "A 

conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer [that employment is atwill] make[s] any reliance on the subsequent statements of the 

employer unreasonable." Lincoln, 867 P.2d at 703. Having held 

that the disclaimer signed by plaintiff was sufficiently 

conspicuous and unambiguous, any reliance by plaintiff on 

subsequent assurances from County officials was unreasonable as a 

matter of law. And without reasonable reliance, plaintiff can 

make no claim of promissory estoppel. 

IV 

Because the disclaimer signed by plaintiff was sufficiently 

conspicuous and unambiguous, plaintiff did not have an implied-infact contract of employment with the County. And without an 

employment contract, plaintiff's claims for denial of due process, 

breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith, and 

negligent supervision must fail. Moreover, because the disclaimer 

made any subsequent reliance by plaintiff unreasonable, she has no 

claim for promissory estoppel. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the 

order of the district court granting defendants summary judgment. 

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