Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01961/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01961-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General of the State of Arizona
Respondent
Jamal Shareef Bradley
Petitioner
Charles L Ryan
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jamal Shareef Bradley,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan; Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01961 PHX NVW MEA

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about September 25, 2013. Respondents filed an Answer to 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 11 & Doc. 12) on January 6, 2014. 

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his petition on May 19, 2014. See Doc. 21. The 

matter was reassigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge on June 30, 2014.

I Procedural History

A indictment returned in the Maricopa County Superior Court on July 13, 2007, 

charged Petitioner with five counts of child abuse, two counts of sexual conduct with a

minor, six counts of kidnapping, one count of sexual abuse, one count of attempted child 

molestation, and three counts of child molestation. Answer, Exh. A. The offenses were 

alleged to have occurred between July 4, 2000, and September 15, 2001. Id., Exh. A. 

On August 6, 2007, Petitioner’s first appointed counsel withdrew due to a conflict. 

Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. Trial was scheduled to begin on November 27, 2007. Id., Exh. D.

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On November 15, 2007, the trial court granted the state’s motion to continue the 

trial date to January 8, 2008. Id., Exh. E & Exh. F. On January 7, 2008, the trial court 

granted the state another continuance and set trial for February 5, 2008. Id., Exh. G & 

Exh. H.

On January 8, 2008, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion to change counsel. 

Id., Exh. J. Approximately two weeks later, Petitioner’s newly-assigned counsel moved 

to withdraw because his contract did not allow him to accept the appointment. Id., Exh. 

K. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw, vacated the February 5, 2008, trial 

date, and set trial for April 1, 2008. Id., Exh. L & Exh. M & Exh. N.

On March 19, 2008, the state trial court indicated that Petitioner would need to be 

appointed new counsel because his then-current counsel, Petitioner’s fourth appointed 

lawyer, had advised the the court he would no longer be practicing law. Id., Exh. O. One

day later, the trial court granted the state’s motion for a continuance. Id., Exh. P &, Exh.

Q.

On March 27, 2008, the trial court allowed counsel to withdraw and granted the 

state’s motion to designate the case complex. Id., Exh. S. On May 20, 2008, trial was set 

for August 4, 2008. Id., Exh. T. Less than two weeks before the trial date, however,

Petitioner’s new counsel filed a motion to continue. Id., Exh. U. The court granted the 

motion and set trial to begin on October 1, 2008. Id., Exh. V & Exh. W.

On September 10, 2008, the state filed a motion seeking again to continue

Petitioner’s trial date, asserting: (1) the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict with a case 

that had previously been continued six times; (2) one of the state’s material witnesses was 

on deployment in Iraq; and (3) the discovery of additional evidence. Id., Exh. X. 

Petitioner joined in the state’s motion to continue and the court continued trial until 

November 5, 2008. Id., Exh. Y & Exh. Z.

On October 16, 2008, the state moved to continue Petitioner’s trial, based on 

another trial conflict. Id., Exh. AA. The court granted the motion and continued trial to 

December 11, 2008. Id., Exh. BB. On December 10, 2008, Petitioner’s counsel asked to 

continue based on a trial scheduling conflict. Id., Exh. CC. The court reset trial to begin 

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on January 5, 2009. Id., Exh. DD.

On January 5, 2009, the date trial was to begin, the trial court permitted 

Petitioner’s counsel to withdraw, noting that “the Defendant having waived the 

applicable time limits...”. Id., Exh. EE. The trial court did not state why counsel’s 

withdrawal was necessary. Id., Exh. EE. 1The court vacated the trial date, appointed new 

counsel to represent Petitioner, and set trial for April 6, 2009. Id., Exh. EE. On January 

13, 2009, the trial court ordered the parties to participate in a settlement conference 

before March 31, 2009. Id., Exh. FF. When the parties moved to continue the April 6, 

2009, trial date, the court set trial for July 16, 2009. Id., Exh. GG & Exh. HH & Exh. II.

On June 17, 2009, the state indicated it had a conflict with the July 16 trial date. 

Id., Exh. JJ. The court therefore set trial to begin on July 22, 2009. Id., Exh. LL & Exh.

NN. On July 22nd, the court continued the trial for one day, and trial commenced on July 

23, 2009, approximately two years after the date the indictment was returned.. Id., Exh. 

OO & Exh. QQ.

Meanwhile, on June 29, 2009, Petitioner, through counsel, moved to dismiss the 

prosecution based on pre-indictment delay. Id., Exh. KK. Petitioner noted that, although 

the primary investigation in the case occurred in 2004, there had been a previous 

investigation in 2001. Id., Exh. KK. at 3–4. Petitioner cited to an excerpt from the case 

agent’s police report explaining why the original 2001 investigation did not result in a 

prosecution:

I have reviewed the original police report and photographs. After reviewing 

the photographs I noted that the bruising that was described on the victim[s] 

was only minor in nature. The original report indicates that this incident 

involved discipline for ongoing problems with the children. There is no 

reason that indicates otherwise or that the discipline was assaultive in 

nature. I had telephone contact with [the CPS caseworker who also] 

indicated that this incident involved discipline and also indicated that there 

is a custody dispute involving the parties that are involved in this report. 

[The caseworker] spoke to the parents of the children and indicated that 

[CPS] would be providing services to the family, as well as anger 

 

1 A later pleading indicates counsel withdrew due to a client conflict. See Answer, Exh 

HH.

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management classes f [Petitioner]. There is little likelihood of successful 

criminal prosecution in this case and CPS intervention is in the best interest 

of the family.

Id., Exh. K at 4.

Petitioner asserted that at least two offenses charged in the indictment (Counts 2 

and 4) were originally disclosed in the 2001 investigation. Id., Exh. K at 5. He also 

stated that, although the investigating officers concluded that they had probable cause for 

all charges no later than 2004, he was not arrested or charged until 2007. Id., Exh. K at 5. 

Petitioner argued that the state criminal case should be dismissed because the delay in 

bringing charges “caused substantial prejudice.” Id., Exh. K at 6. He contended that he 

was unable to call witnesses because “he [had] no direct memory of where he was [or] 

whom he was with” and could “only say that the allegations are false.” Id., Exh. K at 6.

Petitioner also asserted that the delay was “likely” “a timely decision by the state to file 

old unsubstantiated charges over 6 years from the date they were originally reported to 

law enforcement.” Id., Exh. K at 6–7.

The state responded to Petitioner’s motion to dismiss arguing, inter alia ̧ that the 

delay—though unintentional—actually prejudiced the prosecution because during the 

intervening period two of the state’s witnesses were convicted of offenses that could be 

used to impeach them; another witness died; and the victims’ grandparents, also 

witnesses to the offenses, suffered from declining health that made it difficult for them to 

participate in trial preparation. Id., Exh. MM at 5. At oral argument on the motion, the 

prosecutor explained that, inter alia, although there was probable cause to arrest 

Petitioner for all of the charges stated in the indictment in 2004, the police wanted to

interview Petitioner before filing charges and they were unable to locate him until 2007.

Id., Exh. MM at 64–65. Petitioner argued that intentional delay was established by the 

fact that the two offenses that could have been charged in 2001 were not charged until

additional crimes were discovered. Id., Exh. MM at 65–66. He also contended that the

police could have acted more diligently in attempting to locate him. Id., Exh. MM at 66. 

After hearing oral argument, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss based 

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on the pre-indictment delay. Id., Exh. MM at 60–66.

The testimony adduced at trial indicated that Petitioner began dating “Michelle” in 

in 1992. Petitioner and Michelle had two children together and Michelle had three other 

children, for a total of five children living in the household—the second oldest child was 

a girl, “R”, born in 1990. Id., Exh. OOOO (testimony of Michelle) at 153–55. In 2000, 

Petitioner and Michelle and the five children moved into a two bedroom apartment. Id., 

Exh. OOOO at 162. Michelle testified at the trial that Petitioner was physically abusive 

to the children and left bruises when he struck them with a “switch” or belt. Id., Exh. 

OOOO at 174–77. See also Exh. QQQQ (this exhibit is Michelle’s testimony until page 

98 and then R’s testimony) at 4–7, 11, 110–17, 120–28; Exh. SSSS at 114–18, 131–32, 

137–44 (the testimony of the third-oldest child, a son, born to Petitioner and Michelle). 

On some occasions, Petitioner required the children to be naked when he beat them. See

Exh. QQQQ at 128 (testimony of R); Exh. SSSS at 142. 

“R”, the second-oldest child in the household, testified that Petitioner sexually 

abused her over a period of time, including after she reported the abuse to her mother, at 

which time Petitioner denied the abuse. Id., Exh. OOOO at 174–79; Exh.QQQQ at 128–

30, 140–44. Michelle testified that, on one occasion in 2001, she witnessed Petitioner 

having sexual intercourse with “R”, who would have been ten or eleven years old at that 

time. Id., Exh. OOOO at 184-85. After witnessing this incident, Michelle testified she

tried to leave the house to call the police from a pay phone, but Petitioner would not let 

her leave. Id., Exh. OOOO at 187. Michelle testified she did not report the assault 

because she feared Petitioner, but that she eventually took her children to her parents’ 

home. Id., Exh. SSSS at 126.

Michelle testified that, despite the prior abuse, she and the children resumed living 

with Petitioner in September 2001. Id., Exh. QQQQ at 18. Eventually the family 

became homeless and a relative reported seeing bruises on the children, and Child 

Protective Services (“CPS”) subsequently became involved. Id., Exh. QQQQ at 20, 49.

Ultimately, Michelle’s mother and father were awarded physical custody of the children. 

Id., Exh. PPPP at 49–50.

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In 2003, while attending court-ordered counseling, Michelle told her counselor 

about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of “R”. Id., Exh. QQQQ at 24–25. The counselor, a 

“mandatory reporter,” contacted the police. Id., Exh. SSSS at 63–64. Michelle did not 

want to talk to the police and did not respond to their attempts to contact her until early 

2004. Id., Exh. QQQQ 25–30. After Michelle and the children were interviewed, the

police—who were initially unaware of the previous 2001 investigation—attempted to 

locate Petitioner. Id., Exh. QQQQ at 30–31; Id., Exh. UUUU at 55–57. The police 

located Petitioner in July 2007. Id., Exh. UUUU at 56– 58. 

On August 11, 2009, at the conclusion of the state’s case, the trial court denied 

Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion with regard to two counts. Id., Exh. UUU. Petitioner did not 

testify at his trial. The jury heard closing argument and jury instructions on August 12, 

2009. Id., Exh. VVVV. The jury deliberated for a few hours that afternoon and for a few 

hours on August 13, 2009. Id., Exh. WWWW. On Tuesday, August 17, 2009, the jury 

returned their verdicts, acquitting Petitioner of two of the child abuse counts (Counts 2 

and 5), but finding him guilty of the remaining charges (Counts 1, 3–4, 6–18). Id., Exh. 

RR & Exh. XXXX.

On October 16, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to two consecutive life 

terms of imprisonment, without the possibility of parole for 35 years, pursuant to his 

convictions for sexual conduct with a minor (Counts 6 & 17). Id., Exh. SS. The court 

imposed presumptive, consecutive terms of imprisonment on the remaining counts, 

totaling an additional 163 years of imprisonment. Id., Exh. SS. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. 

TT. In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the pre-indictment delay violated his federal 

constitutional right to due process of law and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to a speedy trial. Id., Exh. UU.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in 

an unpublished memorandum decision. Id., Exh. XX. The appellate court rejected 

Petitioner’s claim regarding the pre-indictment delay, concluding that there was no 

support for his contention that the delay was intentional because the record showed that 

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much of the evidence was not gathered until 2004, after which the police decided they 

wanted to locate and interview Petitioner before initiating prosecution, and there was no 

evidence to suggest the state delayed charges for harassment or to gain an advantage. Id., 

Exh. HH at 3–5. The appellate court also held that Petitioner had not established any 

prejudice arising from the delay, finding his general assertion of prejudice was “purely 

speculative” because he did not suggest which witnesses he was prevented from calling 

or what their testimony would have been, and he did not allege the existence of any 

“concrete evidence tending to show material harm caused by the State’s delay.” Id., Exh. 

HH at 5–7. The Court of Appeals also determined, reviewing the second issue for 

fundamental error because it was not raised at trial, that there was no speedy trial 

violation, noting Petitioner was responsible for nearly half of the pretrial delay and that,

although he asserted his speedy trial rights eight months after the indictment, he 

subsequently requested four continuances. Id., Exh. HH at 7–8. The court also 

concluded Petitioner failed to show prejudice because, although he claimed the delay

rendered him unable to accurately recall his “whereabouts at the time of the alleged

offenses” and that he was, therefore, unable to call witnesses to support his defense, this 

claim was “entirely speculative” because “nothing in the record reveal[ed] what

witnesses he would have called or how they would have aided in his defense.” Id., Exh. 

HH at 9–10. The court concluded that, therefore, Petitioner’s constitutional right to a

speedy trial was not violated. Id., Exh. HH at 10.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. 

YY & Exh. ZZ, which request was denied on August 8, 2011. Id., Exh. ZZ.

Petitioner initiated a timely state action for post-conviction relief proceeding 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. BBB. After 

reviewing the record, Petitioner’s appointed counsel notified the court that he was unable 

to find any meritorious issue to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. DDD. The state 

trial court subsequently ordered counsel to provide Petitioner with the trial and appellate 

files, and allowed Petitioner until March 29, 2012, to file a pro per petition delineating his 

claims for relief. Id., Exh. EEE. Petitioner wrote to his counsel asking for numerous 

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documents and evidence, such as recordings of forensic interviews, arrest documents, 

audio recordings of trial proceedings, and copies of various rules, cases, and other legal

authority. Id., Exh. GGG. On March 2, 2012, Petitioner’s counsel notified the court that 

he had provided Petitioner with the entire case file. Id., Exh. FFF. Petitioner, however, 

filed multiple requests for discovery and sought orders requiring counsel to provide him 

with legal authority. Id., Exh. HHH & Exh. III & Exh. LLL. The state trial court denied 

Petitioner’s discovery requests in his state post-conviction action base on his failure to 

show good cause . Id., Exh. NNN.

Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se pleading in his Rule 32 action., in which

Petitioner asserted:

1. The grand jury heard perjured testimony and there was prosecutorial 

misconduct during the grand jury proceedings;

2. The indictment was insufficient due to: (a) “multiplicative charges” in Counts 6 

and 15–18, resulting in a violation of Petitioner’s right to be free of double jeopardy; (b) 

the victim’s age in Count 13; and (3) late reporting of the crime alleged in Count 7;

3. There was insufficient evidence to find him guilty and he was denied his right to 

confront witnesses and to present evidence, including the colposcopy examination video 

and photographs;

4. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the grand jury proceedings by 

withholding the victim’s physical examination report;

5. Prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury for expelling a grand juror, 

denial of effective representation of counsel until after the right to challenge the grand 

jury proceeding had lapsed;

6. Ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel for failing 

to obtain Dr. Phillip Esplin to testify as an expert witness; for not compelling the trial 

court to order a deposition; for failing to compel the trial court to order the colposcopy 

physician to testify; for failing to seek dismissal based on a speedy trial claim, for failing 

to force the prosecution to call Child Protective Services caseworker Cindy Miner as a 

witness; for failing to oppose amendments to the indictment; for failing to seek dismissal 

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for “multiplicative charges”; for failing to object to cruel and unusual punishment; and

for failing to object to excessive punishment due to “multiplicative charges.”

7. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to subpoena a police detective 

involved in the September 2001 child abuse investigation and for failing to investigate 

Petitioner’s background during the time between 2004 and 2007;

8. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to Michelle’s perjured 

testimony regarding moving out of the apartment;

9. Ineffective and unethical conduct of trial counsel for failing to obtain an expert 

witness;

10. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to evaluate the record and 

present issues on appeal concerning the medical examination report regarding “R”, 

prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court’s denial of a mistrial motion, and the denial of a

hearing under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b); and

11. Ineffective representation by post-conviction counsel for failing to raise 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. Id., Exh. OOO.

On October 4, 2012, the state trial court found Petitioner had failed to raise any 

colorable claims for post-conviction relief and dismissed his Rule 32 petition. Id., Exh. 

UUU. On November 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s 

dismissal of his Rule 32 action in the Arizona Court of Appeals. In his petitioner for 

review Petitioner alleged the sentences imposed on him were illegal under state law and 

were based on facts not found by the jury, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

trial by jury; that the statute of limitations had expired; that he experienced preindictment delay and that he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and that his rights 

were violated by a multiplicitous indictment. Id., Exh. WWW.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for review of the trial court’s decision as 

untimely under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c), because it was not filed 

within thirty days of the trial court’s dismissal of the Rule 32 petition. Id., Exh. XXX.

Petitioner then filed a motion asking the trial court to permit the late filing of his petition 

for review. Id., Exh. YYY. Petitioner argued that the trial court had not responded to his 

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earlier motion for an extension of time and that his petition was filed late due to a riot and

resulting lockdown at the prison where he was housed. Id., Exh. YYY at 1–2. On 

December 10, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for an extension of time 

and his motion to accept the petition for review as timely filed. Id., Exh. ZZZ.

On December 28, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing. Id., Exh. AAAA. 

He argued that the court should have accepted his untimely-filed petition for review

because “[d]uring the time between the filing of the Motion to Enlarge Time for Filing 

and November 26, 2012 (the date Petition for Review was submitted) the Prison Complex 

was locked down with no movement and/or access to library in where all legal copies and 

research is conducted.” Id., Exh. AAAA at 2. Petitioner attached a letter from a 

corrections officer stating that “Rynning Unit was locked down during the week of 

November 19th thru November 23rd 2012. During this time there was no movement on 

the yard, thus preventing access to the library for the week.” Id., Exh. AAAA, Attach.

“B” [Arizona Department of Corrections: Inmate Letter Response].

On February 27, 2013, the state court denied Petitioner’s motion for rehearing.

Id., Exh. CCCC. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court 

denied on April 5, 2013. Id., Exh. DDDD & Exh. EEEE.

In his action for federal habeas relief, docketed September 25, 2013, Petitioner 

asserts, as reported by Respondents:

1. A violation of the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy protections, based on an 

allegedly multiplicitous indictment (Claim 1(A));

2. Grand jury “procedure interference” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause (Claim 1(B));

3. Insufficient evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 

(Claim 1(C));

4. A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and public trial (Claim 

2(A));

5. A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses to testify (Claim 

2(B));

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6. A violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause (Claim 2(C));

7. Ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel, in

violation of the Sixth Amendment (Claim 2(D));

8. A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury (Claim 2(E));

9. Pre-indictment delay, in violation of the right to due process (Claim 3(A)); and 

10. Fourteenth Amendment due process violation resulting from the trial court’s 

denial of his discovery requests during the post-conviction relief proceeding and the 

dismissal of his petition for review from the denial of post-conviction relief as untimely

(Claim 3(B)).

Respondents contend:

This Court should dismiss the petition and deny habeas relief. First, only

two of Petitioner’s claims—2(A) and 3(A)—are exhausted. The remaining 

claims are procedurally defaulted either because the Arizona Court of 

Appeals explicitly applied a procedural bar to preclude merits review, or 

because a return to state court in an attempt to exhaust them would be futile 

in light of state procedural rules. Second, in addition to being procedurally 

defaulted, three of Petitioner claims—1(B), 1(C), and 3(B)—are not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and could alternatively be 

dismissed on that basis. Finally, Petitioner’s exhausted claims fail on the 

merits because the state court’s resolution of the claims was not contrary to, 

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the merits of a claim 

which has been exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. 

Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner 

must afford the state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly 

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, 

e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose 

v..Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 

2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona 

for purposes of exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction resulting in a 

non-capital sentence).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the 

Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 

124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal 

habeas claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a specific federal 

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state law or a state procedural rule, the 

federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. 

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state 

courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 

1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the 

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional 

guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 

567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 

S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to support the 

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federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727–28, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553–57(1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 

F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a 

state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar 

direct review ... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 

2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an 

attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow 

category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are limited to claims of being held in 

custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for 

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delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably 

overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 

887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009) (describing Arizona’s preclusion rule).

For the procedural default rule to apply, “the application of the state 

procedural rule must provide an adequate and independent state law basis 

on which the state court can deny relief.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 

580 (9th Cir. 2003) (amended) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 859–60, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 

153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002) (per curiam) (holding denials pursuant to Arizona 

waiver rules are independent of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding Arizona waiver rule consistently and 

regularly applied).

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014).

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is 

considered consistently applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the 

“vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 

417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221 n.6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state 

procedural bar to preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must 

actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of 

the case.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). 

See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 

either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a 

judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, [ ].... Sanders 

v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate 

court’s discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis, the state 

court’s decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law 

ground) ....

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Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims, which have been found to be consistently applied and wellestablished, bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, 

any claim not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal or

Rule 32 action. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2014); Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) 

(holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims 

raised in attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for 

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural 

bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1998). Because Petitioner did not 

properly exhaust the claims presented to the trial court in his Rule 32 action by timely 

seeking appeal of the trial court’s decision denying relief, Petitioner did not properly 

exhaust these claims and they are procedurally defaulted.

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this 

test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded his compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. 

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish 

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

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dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). 

See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998). Generally, a 

petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., 

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional 

error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal 

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617; Correll, 137 

F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the 

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been 

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 

2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and 

prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

A state criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993, (1987); Graves v. 

McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the general rule is that errors 

of counsel during a state post-conviction action cannot constitute “cause” to excuse the

procedural default of a federal habeas claim. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S. 

Ct. at 2565; Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 374 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), established a 

limited exception to this general rule, which exception applies only to Sixth Amendment 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of post

conviction counsel or lack of counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings may

establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at 

trial.” Id. at 1315. In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit expanded Martinez, holding that this doctrine can also apply to excuse the 

procedural default of claims asserting ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel.

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In Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court delineated the Martinez analysis as 

consisting of four prongs:

We consequently read Coleman as containing an exception, allowing a 

federal habeas court to find “cause,” thereby excusing a defendant’s 

procedural default, where (1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” 

review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”

133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013), citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19, 1320–21

(alterations in original).

The first prong of this test requires a petitioner seeking to rely on Martinez to

bring forward facts demonstrating that his underlying ineffective assistance of trial or 

appellate counsel claim is substantial. The Supreme Court has defined “substantial” as a 

claim that “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Stated inversely, a claim is 

“insubstantial” if “it does not have any merit or ... is wholly without factual support.” Id.

at 1319. Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial 

requires the Court to examine the claim under the standard stated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective 

assistance of counsel must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and 

that counsel’s errors “deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Additionally, not just any error or 

omission of counsel will be deemed “deficient performance” that will satisfy Martinez; if 

post-conviction counsel “in the initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below 

constitutional standards,” that attorney’s performance does not constitute “cause.” 132 S.

Ct. at 1319. Most notably, counsel “is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even 

a non-frivolous claim,” much less a frivolous claim. Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 

1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 

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C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law of United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of 

facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

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1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 

2766 (2013). 

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

the state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable 

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; 

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one 

and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have 

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. 

Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 

(2003); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2006). The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate 

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court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 

U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States 

Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in the state 

courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court 

that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 

(2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 

790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

E. Petitioner’s claims for relief

Petitioner did not properly exhaust the claims stated in his action for state postconviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals because the Arizona Court of Appeals 

declined review based on a state procedural rule finding Petitioner had not timely sought 

review of the trial court’s denial of relief. The appellate court found Petitioner’s request 

for review barred by the state rule requiring that Petitioner bring his request for review 

within thirty days of the date the trial court denied relief. Although Petitioner sought an 

extension of this time by the state trial court, the trial court repeatedly denied this relief. 

Accordingly, some of Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were not “properly exhausted” in 

the Arizona state courts because his attempt to fairly present the claims to the state’s 

“highest court” was barred by application of a state procedural rule. These claims have 

been procedurally defaulted. 

In reply to the answer to his petition, with regard to the assertion that he 

procedurally defaulted his claims, Petitioner argues his post-conviction counsel erred by 

alleging there were no meritorious claims to raise when, Petitioner contends, Petitioner 

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had colorable claims to raise and, accordingly, that the cause for his procedural default 

was his post-conviction counsel’s unconstitutional sub-standard performance. Petitioner 

also re-asserts the merits of his claims regarding grand jury proceedings and double 

jeopardy.

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from the procedural 

default of these claims. As explained more fully infra, Petitioner’s post-conviction’s 

counsel’s performance does not constitute cause for the procedural default of his habeas 

claims. With regard to cause, Petitioner argued in the state court that his petition for 

review in his Rule 32 action was not timely because his prison unit was in lockdown, 

however, the prison lockdown occurred after the date Petitioner’s petition for review was 

due. Additionally, with regard to prejudice, Petitioner has not shown that any of the 

defaulted claims are meritorious

As noted supra,

To demonstrate cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural 

default, therefore, Martinez and Detrich require that [petitioner] make two 

showings. First, to establish “cause,” he must establish that his counsel in 

the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective under the standards of 

Strickland. Strickland, in turn, requires him to establish that both (a) postconviction counsel’s performance was deficient, and (b) there was a 

reasonable probability that, absent the deficient performance, the result of 

the post-conviction proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, to establish “prejudice,” he 

must establish that his “underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318.

Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377.

Petitioner has not established that his post-conviction counsel’s performance or 

that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. There is no indication that the result of 

Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings would have been different had post-conviction 

counsel raised the claims Petitioner alleges are meritorious. There is no indication in the 

record that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient; notably, Petitioner’s 

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trial counsel achieved Petitioner’s acquittal on two of the charges against him. There is 

also no evidence that Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel’s performance was deficient in 

not raising the claims pressed by Petitioner pro se in his Rule 32 action. Pursuant to the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, claims regarding pre-trial proceedings and most 

trial proceedings are waived if not brought in a direct appeal. Additionally, there is no 

indication that any of Petitioner’s claims regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

would have been successful if propounded by post-conviction counsel in a Rule 32 

action. Neither has Petitioner established that any of his ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims were “substantial”, pursuant to Martinez, i.e., that the claims have 

“merit.” 

1. Petitioner contends his right to be free of double jeopardy was violated by a 

multiplicitous indictment (Claim 1(A)). 

Petitioner raised this issue in his pro se petition for review in his post-conviction 

action, but the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the merits of all of the claims 

stated based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file the petition for review of the trial court’s 

decision finding Petitioner had failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Petitioner has 

not established cause or prejudice with regard to his failure to properly exhaust this 

claim, i.e., his procedural default of the claim, nor has Petitioner established “actual 

innocence” or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur and, accordingly, the 

Court should not consider the merits of the claim.

To the extent Petitioner contends the failure to properly exhaust this claim is the 

fault of his post-conviction counsel, in Martinez, the Supreme Court held that 

“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial review collateral proceedings may establish 

cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 132 

S. Ct. at 1315 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel’s 

allegedly inadequate performance in failing to pursue this claim cannot constitute cause 

for Petitioner’s procedural default of the claim. 

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2. Petitioner alleges grand jury “procedure interference”, in violation his 

right to due process of law (Claim 1(B)). 

In his pro se brief to the trial court in his Rule 32 action, Petitioner asserted, inter 

alia, that the grand jury heard perjured testimony and there was prosecutorial misconduct 

during the grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, Petitioner at best arguably raised this 

issue in his petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals in his post-conviction 

action, but the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the matter based on 

Petitioner’s failure to timely file the petition. Petitioner has not established cause or 

prejudice with regard to his procedural default of the claim, to the extent the claim stated 

in the habeas petition was “properly presented” to the state court, nor a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice nor actual innocence and, accordingly, the Court should not 

consider the merits of the claim.

3. Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him, in 

violation of his right to due process of law (Claim 1(C)).

Petitioner raised this issue in his petition for review by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in his post-conviction action, but the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of 

the matter based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file the petition. Petitioner has not 

established cause or prejudice with regard to his procedural default of the claim, nor a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice nor actual innocence and, accordingly, the Court 

should not consider the merits of the claim.

4. Petitioner alleges he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and 

public trial (Claim 2(A)). 

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal, and the Arizona Court of Appeals 

denied the claim on the merits. This decision was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals that there was no speedy trial violation, noting 

Petitioner was responsible for nearly half of the pretrial delay and that, although he 

asserted his speedy trial rights eight months after the indictment, he subsequently 

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requested four continuances. Answer, Exh. HH at 7–8. The court also concluded 

Petitioner failed to show prejudice because, although he claimed the delay rendered him 

unable to accurately recall his “whereabouts at the time of the alleged offenses” and that 

he was, therefore, unable to call witnesses to support his defense, this claim was “entirely 

speculative” because “nothing in the record reveal[ed] what witnesses he would have 

called or how they would have aided in his defense.” Id., Exh. HH at 9–10. The court 

concluded that, therefore, Petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not 

violated. Id., Exh. HH at 10.

The Sixth Amendment's provision of a “right to a speedy and public trial ...” 

applies to state court proceedings pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v. 

North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1967). The Sixth 

Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right to a speedy...trial.” The speedy-trial right is “amorphous,” “slippery,” and 

“necessarily relative.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972). 

In Barker, the Court refused to quantify the right or to predicate the right on a defendant’s 

explicit request for a speedy trial. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89-90, 129 S. Ct. 

1283, 1290 (2009) Rejecting such “inflexible approaches,” Barker established a 

“balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are 

weighed.” 407 U.S. at 529, 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2191-92. Some of the factors that should be 

weighed when considering such claims include the length of and reasons for delay, the 

defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant of the delay. Brillon, 

556 U.S. at 89-90, 129 S. Ct. at 1290; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. To 

trigger a speedy trial inquiry, an accused must show that the period between indictment 

and trial passes a threshold point of “presumptively prejudicial” delay. See, e.g., Barker, 

407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. Prejudice normally is presumed if the delay in 

bringing the defendant to trial has exceeded one year. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 

647, 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 n.1 (1992). If this threshold is not met, the Court 

need not proceed with the other Barker factors. Id., 505 U.S. at 651–52, 112 S. Ct. at 

2691; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 

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1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1993). Deliberate delay “to hamper the defense” weighs heavily 

against the prosecution. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. “[M]ore neutral 

reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts” weigh less heavily “but nevertheless 

should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 

with the government rather than with the defendant.” Id. Additionally, because defense 

counsel is defendant’s agent, delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is charged against 

the defendant. See Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90-91, 129 S. Ct. at 1290-91. 

Although lengthy, the delay in Petitioner’s criminal proceedings was not so 

lengthy or prejudicial as to implicate his federal constitutional rights. The delay in 

Petitioner’s criminal proceedings was longer than the one-year presumptively prejudicial 

delay, however, given the reasons for the delay, Petitioner’s abandonment of his assertion 

of his right to a speedy trial, and the absence of evidence of prejudice, the delay did not

violate his constitutional rights and the state appellate court did not err by so holding. 

See Stuard v. Stewart, 401 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 

F.2d 1377, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1978); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 328 (6th Cir.

1998). Compare McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the 

Arizona court’s determination of this issue was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

5. Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to compel 

witnesses to testify (Claim 2(B))

Petitioner did not raise this claim in the state courts. In his Rule 32 action, 

Petitioner asserted his counsel was ineffective for failing to compel witnesses to testify. 

Accordingly, having not “fairly presented” this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 

a procedurally correct manner, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim. Because 

Petitioner has not established cause nor prejudice with regard to this claim nor that a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent consideration of the claim, the Court 

should not consider the merits of the claim.

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6. A violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause (Claim 2(C))

In his pro se brief to the trial court in his Rule 32 action, Petitioner asserted, inter 

alia, that he was denied his right to confront witnesses. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

denied review of the matter based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file the petition for 

review of the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Rule 32 action for failure to state a 

colorable claim for. Petitioner has not established cause or prejudice with regard to his 

procedural default of the claim, to the extent the claim stated in the habeas petition was 

“properly presented” to the state courts, nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice nor 

actual innocence and, accordingly, the Court should not consider the merits of the claim.

`7. Ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel, in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment (Claim 2(D))

State criminal defendants do not have a federal constitutional right to the effective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel. Petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel claim in his pro se petition for Rule 32 relief in the state trial court, 

which found Petitioner had not stated a colorable claim for relief. However, Petitioner 

did not properly exhaust an ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel claim by 

presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner in a timely 

Rule 32 action. 

Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as cause for his 

procedural default of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

This allegation is one pursuant to Martinez, as explained supra. In order to satisfy 

Martinez, a habeas petitioner must show (1) the underlying ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim is substantial; (2) the petitioner had ineffective counsel during the state 

collateral proceeding; (3) the state collateral proceeding was the initial review proceeding 

for the claim; and (4) state law required the petitioner to bring the claim in the initial 

review proceeding. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 375–78; 

Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319 (9th Cir. 2014); Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 494 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

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In Arizona, the state collateral proceeding is the initial review proceeding for 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and state law required 

Petitioner to bring the claim in the Rule 32 proceeding. However, Petitioner has not 

shown that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective; the “failure” to raise a nonmeritorious claim is neither deficient performance nor prejudicial. The Arizona trial 

court considered Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance and impliedly 

concluded that Petitioner’s counsels’ performance was not deficient or prejudicial. 

Petitioner then procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to properly appeal the trial 

court’s decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which declined review based on a state 

procedural bar. For the same reason, i.e., that the Arizona trial court considered 

Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance and impliedly concluded that Petitioner’s 

counsels’ performance was not deficient or prejudicial, Petitioner has not established the 

second prong of the Martinez test, i.e., that the underlying ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim is “substantial.” 

Because Petitioner procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel claims in the state courts and he has not shown cause for nor prejudice 

arising from the default, nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice or actual innocence, the 

Court should not consider the merits of the claim.

8. A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury (Claim 2(E))

Petitioner raised this issue in his pro se petition for review by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in his post-conviction action, but the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of 

the merits of all of the claims stated based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file the petition 

for review of the trial court’s decision finding Petitioner had failed to state a colorable 

claim for relief. Petitioner has not established cause or prejudice with regard to his 

failure to properly exhaust this claim, i.e., his procedural default of the claim, nor has 

Petitioner established “actual innocence” or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will 

occur and, accordingly, the Court should not consider the merits of the claim.

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9. Petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated by the preindictment delay (Claim 3(A))

Petitioner properly exhausted this claim in the state courts. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim regarding the pre-indictment delay. The court 

concluded that there was no support for any contention that the delay was intentional 

because the record showed that much of the evidence was not gathered until 2004, after 

which the police decided they wanted to locate and interview Petitioner before initiating 

prosecution. The state court also determined no evidence suggested the state delayed

bringing charges for harassment or to gain an advantage. See Answer, Exh. HH at 3–5. 

The appellate court also determined Petitioner had not established any prejudice arising 

from the delay, finding his general assertion of prejudice was “purely speculative” 

because he did not suggest which witnesses he was prevented from calling or what their 

testimony would have been, and he did not allege the existence of any “concrete evidence 

tending to show material harm caused by the State’s delay.” Id., Exh. HH at 5–7. .

The appellate court’s decision was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that, 

although statutes of limitations are the primary protection against overly stale criminal 

charges, the “Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against 

oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2048 

(1977). The Court has also held that a due process violation is established when the 

delay of the indictment violates those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at 

the base of our civil and political institutions, and which define the community's sense of 

fair play and decency.” Id., 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S. Ct. at 2048-49 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Establishing a denial of due process through pre-indictment delay requires: (1) 

proof of actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay; and (2) a showing that the 

delay, when balanced against the reason for the delay, offends those “‘fundamental 

conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.’” United 

States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (9th Cir.1992), quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 

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790). Generally, “to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive 

him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the 

lapse of time.” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796, 97 S. Ct. at 2056. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated actual, non-speculative prejudice resulting from 

the pre-indictment delay. A petitioner must do more than assert that “witnesses' 

memories may have faded with the passage of time.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 

318 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying relief 

on this claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

10. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due process because the state 

trial court denied his discovery requests during the post-conviction relief proceeding 

and because his petition for review from the denial of post-conviction relief was 

dismissed as untimely (Claim 3(B)).

A defendant’s complaints about asserted errors in the state post-conviction process 

may not be considered on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 939 (9th Cir.1998) (federal habeas relief is not available to redress alleged 

procedural errors in state post-conviction proceedings”); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 

1027, 1045 (9th Cir.1997) (errors committed during state post-conviction proceedings are 

not cognizable in a federal habeas action); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n. 7 

(9th Cir.1997) (claim that petitioner “was denied due process in his state habeas corpus 

proceedings” was not cognizable on federal habeas review); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 

F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (“a petition alleging errors in the state postconviction review 

process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings”).

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted most of his federal habeas claims by failing to 

present them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner in his 

Rule 32 action. Petitioner has not established cause for nor prejudice arising from his 

procedural default of these claims. Neither has Petitioner established that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice will occur absent consideration of the merits of the claims. 

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Petitioner has not established that he is “actually innocent” of the crimes of convictions 

such that the Court should consider the merits of the procedurally defaulted claims. With 

regard to the claims that were properly exhausted, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision 

that Petitioner was not denied his right to a speedy trial and that his right to due process 

of law was not violated by the preindictment delay was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Bradley’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

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should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

Dated this 11th day of July, 2014.

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