Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35967/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35967-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary L. Johnson
Appellant
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC.
Appellee
MGM Holdings, Inc

Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARY L. JOHNSON, individually 

and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MGM HOLDINGS, INC,

Defendant,

and

METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER 

STUDIOS, INC.; TWENTIETH 

CENTURY FOX HOME 

ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35967

D.C. No.

2:17-cv-00541-RSM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 21, 2019*

Seattle, Washington

Filed December 2, 2019

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit 

Judges, and Jennifer A. Dorsey,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bennett

SUMMARY***

Attorneys’ Fees

The panel affirmed the district court’s order awarding 

attorneys’ fees to plaintiff class counsel following the 

settlement of a consumer protection class action.

Plaintiff challenged the award, arguing that it was 

arbitrary because the district court did not adequately explain 

its decision to cut the number of hours by 25%.

The panel held that the district court’s order awarding 

attorneys’ fees, when read in its entirety, explained the 

lodestar calculation it conducted and its application of the 

percentage-of-recovery analysis as a cross-check of 

reasonableness. The panel concluded that the district court 

adequately explained its reasoning and did not abuse its 

discretion.

** The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge 

for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS 3

In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the 

panel rejected plaintiff’s remaining arguments for reversal.

COUNSEL

Alexander S. Kleinberg, Eisenhower Carlson PLLC, 

Tacoma, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tamerlin J. Godley, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los 

Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

BENNETT, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff moved for an award of $350,000 in fees 

following the settlement of a consumer protection class 

action. The district court conducted a lodestar analysis of 

class counsel’s billing, applied a 25% cut to the hours 

expended by class counsel, and ultimately awarded Plaintiff 

$184,665 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff challenges the award, 

arguing that the entire award was arbitrary because the 

district court did not adequately explain its decision to cut 

the number of hours by 25%. We disagree. The district 

court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees, when read in its 

entirety, explains the lodestar calculation it conducted and 

its application of the percentage-of-recovery analysis as a 

cross-check for reasonableness. We find that the district 

court adequately explained its reasoning and did not abuse 

its discretion.

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4 JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. and Twentieth 

Century Fox Home Entertainment LLC (collectively, 

“Defendants”) marketed several James Bond DVD and Bluray boxsets as containing “[a]ll the Bond films” and “every 

gorgeous girl, nefarious villain and charismatic star.” But the 

boxsets failed to include Casino Royale and Never Say Never 

Again. Plaintiff, Mary Johnson as class representative, 

instituted an action on behalf of a nationwide class of 

consumers, alleging a violation of Washington’s Consumer 

Protection Act, breach of express warranties, and breach of 

the implied warranty of merchantability.

The parties settled, and the settlement agreement 

included Defendants’ agreement to pay attorneys’ fees and 

costs in an amount not exceeding $350,000 and an incentive 

award of $5,000 to Ms. Johnson. Defendants agreed not to 

oppose or challenge awards not exceeding those amounts.

Plaintiff filed an unopposed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

and Expenses and Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award 

(“Motion”) requesting $350,000 for fees and costs and a 

$5,000 incentive award for Ms. Johnson. The district court 

approved the settlement but awarded $184,655 in attorneys’ 

fees, not $350,000. The district court conducted its own 

lodestar calculation and applied a 25% across the board cut 

to class counsel’s requested hours to “reflect a more 

reasonable representation of the work required.” Plaintiff 

appeals from the district court’s order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and 

its chosen method of calculation for an abuse of discretion. 

In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 

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JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS 5

940 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the abuse of discretion standard, 

we “affirm unless the district court applied the wrong legal 

standard or its findings were illogical, implausible, or 

without support in the record.” Gonzalez v. City of 

Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th 

Cir. 2011)).

ANALYSIS

We need a sufficient basis for determining the 

reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award. See In re 

Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943 (reversing and remanding where 

the district court provided “(1) no explicit calculation of a 

reasonable lodestar amount; (2) no comparison between the 

settlement’s attorneys’ fees award and the benefit to the class 

or degree of success in the litigation; and (3) no comparison 

between the lodestar amount and a reasonable percentage 

award”). Here the district court provided an adequate 

explanation for us to review its decision.

First, the district court provided an explicit lodestar 

calculation, determining the reasonable hourly rate and 

number of reasonable hours expended by class counsel.1 The 

district court provided six reasons 2 why a 25% reduction 

1 Plaintiff does not challenge the district court’s determination of a 

reasonable hourly rate.

2 The six reasons were: (1) some block billing; (2) excessive time 

spent on law firm conferences that did not advance the case or the 

interests of the class; (3) unreasonable travel time billed without any 

showing that substantive work was performed; (4) duplicative work; 

(5) unsupported identical conclusory statements of class counsel as the 

only explanation for why the hours requested were reasonable; and 

(6) puffery in describing work performed.

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6 JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS

was appropriate. The district court then conducted a 

percentage-of-recovery analysis as a cross-check.

We encourage district courts to cross-check their 

attorneys’ fee awards using a second method of fee 

calculation. Id. at 944. This helps guard against unreasonable 

awards. Id. For example, when a court conducts a lodestar 

analysis, a percentage-of-recovery method can be used to 

ensure that “counsel’s fee does not dwarf class recovery.” Id.

at 945 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel 

Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 n.40 (3d Cir. 

1995)). If the lodestar amount exceeds the 25% benchmark 

for percentage-of-recovery awards, a second look to evaluate 

the reasonableness of the lodestar calculation is appropriate. 

Id.

Here, in comparing its lodestar calculation ($184,665) to 

its calculation of the benefit achieved for the class 

($138,600), the district court observed that the lodestar 

award exceeded our 25% benchmark for percentage-ofrecovery awards. While the district court noted that even the 

lodestar amount (which was approximately half the amount 

sought) seemed unreasonably large, the district court 

ultimately decided the case did not warrant continued action 

and that it was preferable that Class Counsel—as opposed to 

Defendants—receive any excess. The district court’s final 

decision not to further reduce the award was reasonable.

The district court provided a clear and concise 

explanation for its lodestar calculation and its 

reasonableness cross-check, enabling us to determine that 

the district court’s award was reasonable, based on the 

record before it—our case law requires nothing more. See, 

e.g., McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“[The district court] must explain how it arrived 

at its determination with sufficient specificity to permit an 

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JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS 7

appellate court to determine whether the district court abused 

its discretion in the way the analysis was undertaken.”); see 

also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“[It is] 

important . . . for the district court to provide a concise but 

clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.”). The 

district court acted well within its discretion.

Plaintiff contends that the district court failed to provide 

an explanation as to why it chose a 25% cut, and claims this 

means the cut was arbitrary, relying entirely on our opinion 

in Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 

2013). We disagree. The district court in Gonzalez

considered an attorneys’ fee award in a civil rights case, 

where the lodestar method is typically used. 729 F.3d 

at 1202.3 We reversed and remanded the district court’s 

award because given the district court’s explanation, we 

thought the percentage cuts to the reasonable hours seemed 

arbitrary. Id. at 1204–05. And the cuts were “irreconcilable” 

with certain of the district court’s stated conclusions. Id. 

at 1205. We simply couldn’t conclude that the lodestar 

method, as applied by the district court, produced a 

reasonable attorneys’ fee. Id. at 1208–09. Our decision did 

not rise or fall on the use or omission of any “magic words.”

Here, by contrast, the district court provided a detailed 

explanation of the lodestar calculation and a percentage 

cross-check. Cf. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 

1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that district court’s 

reduction of more than ten percent requires a reasoned 

explanation). The district court’s cross-check provided 

support for the ultimate reasonableness of the district court’s 

3 Gonzalez does not mention a cross-check analysis, presumably 

because the percentage-of-recovery method is not typically used in civil 

rights cases, and the district court did not conduct one.

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8 JOHNSON V. METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS

award. The cross-check also demonstrated that even with the 

25% cut to class counsel’s hours, the fee award was higher 

than the percentage-of-recovery benchmark amount of 25% 

of the recovery to the class. The district court provided a 

more than sufficient basis for us to evaluate the award, and 

we have no difficulty understanding why the court made the 

award it did. The district court’s six reasons for a cut to the 

hours combined with its additional cross-check analysis 

demonstrates reasonable action—the very opposite of 

arbitrary action. No further explanation for the 25% cut was 

necessary.

AFFIRMED.4

4 In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we reject 

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments for reversal.

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