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Parties Involved:
Otis R. Bowen
Appellee
Robert Morris
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

Uoited StiUCf Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci:-ruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR .. 6 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

ROBERT MORRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DR. OTIS R. BOWEN, Secretary of 

Health & Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-1299 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-865) 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Claimant-appellant Robert Morris appeals from an order of the 

district court affirming the Secretary of Health and Human 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1299 Document: 01019966040 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 1 
Service's (Secretary} decisions denying his applications for 

disability benefits and supplemental security income (SSI} under 

the Social Security Act. 1 

This appeal involves Morris's third application for child 

insurance and SSI benefits. He previously sought benefits in 1982 

and 1984 but was denied and took no further judicial action. This 

appeal involves applications filed on January 2, 1986. 

Morris is twenty-seven years old and has an eleventh grade 

education. From the age of nine, he was continuously enrolled in 

special education classes and programs. In the past nine years, 

Morris's only work experience has consisted of six months as a 

security guard in 1981 and three months working in a vocational 

rehabilitation workshop in 1985. 

Medical records and evaluations indicate Morris suffers from 

the residual effects of a severe burn to his left arm, hearing 

impairment, some vision loss, and a personality disorder. In the 

past, he has also suffered from mild depression. His intellectual 

functioning is in the low average range. Mr. Morris's emotional 

problems arose out of his mother's death in August, 1980. He 

spent two weeks at the Colorado State Hospital in the winter of 

1980 as a result of his mental and emotional condition. Claimant 

asserts these impairments qualify him as a disabled person 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). 

1 Morris sought child's insurance disability benefits under 42 

u.s.c. § 402(d} and supplemental security income benefits under 42 

u.s.c. § 1381a. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1299 Document: 01019966040 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 2 
After a hearing on May 21, 1987, the administrative law judge 

(A.L.J.) reviewing the case found Morris was not "disabled" 

pursuant to the statutory framework. The Appeals Council adopted 

the A.L.J. 's decisions regarding both the child's insurance and 

SSI benefits, and they stand as the final decisions of the 

Secretary. The district court upheld the decisions on appeal. 

Here, Morris seeks reversal on three grounds, asserting: 1) that 

the district court erred in finding the Secretary's decision was 

supported by substantial evidence; 2) that the district court 

erred in failing to attribute t he proper weight t o the opinions of 

Morris's treating physicians and the Secretary's consulting 

doctors; and 3) that the district court erred in failing to 

consider Mr. Morris's impairments in combinati o n. We affirm. 

In this setting, our review is limited to determining whether 

there is substantial evidence in the record to support the 

A.L.J. 's findings as adopted by the Secretary. Sorenson v. Bowen, 

888 F.2d 706, 710-11 (10th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is 

defined as "such relevant evidence a s a reas o nable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Broadbent v. Harris, 

698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 1983)(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In considering this question, we have 

examined the entire record in detail. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 

748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988). We find the A.L.J. 's decisions 

supported by substantial evidence. 

In his decisions, the A.L.J. stated: 

After extensive consideration of all of the 

evidence in the record, and giving consideration to the 

claimant's testimony describing his weakness of his left 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1299 Document: 01019966040 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 3 
upper extremity and other alleged symptoms (impaired 

hearing and vision) as well as alleged emotional 

problems, the Administrative Law Judge finds his 

symptoms incompactible [sic] with the vast amount of the 

probative medical evidence, and therefore, not 

persuasive. 

(ROA Vol. II, pp. 15, 27.) We agree with this assessment. 

Contrary to Morris's suggestion, there is nothing in the record to 

indicate the A.L.J. disregarded or gave improper weight to the 

testimony of any physician. 

Generally, the Secretary must give substantial weight to the 

evidence and opinions which the treating physician submits. 

Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1988). 

However, this evidence may be rejected if it is brief, conclusory, 

and wit hout medical foundation. Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 

301 ( 10th Cir. 1988). Here, Morris points to the opinions of 

Doctors Liu, Visconti, and Kraft in support of his assertion that 

there is reliable medical evidence of disability. 

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear these doctors are 

treating physicians. None of them treated Morris for a 

substantial period of time or on a regular basis. See Byron v. 

Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1984)(court erred in 

failing to give appropriate weight to report of "long-time" 

physician who treated plaintiff for over ten years). The only 

reports from these physicians date back to 1981 and 1982. Dr. 

Kraft, for example, apparently saw Morris once for an hour. There 

is nothing in the record to indicate Dr. Liu ever saw him, as his 

entire report consists of two conclusory sentences. Similarly, 

Dr. Visconti's evaluation consists entirely of handwritten notes 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1299 Document: 01019966040 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 4 
with no explanation as to his diagnosis o f Mo rris. For these 

reaso ns, it was appropriate for the A.L.J. to afford little weight 

to these reports. 

In contrast, there are multiple repo r ts in the record from 

other doctors and rehabilitation specia list s s i nce 1982, none of 

which conclude Morris is disabled. 2 Co n trary to Morris's 

sugge s tion, it is clear the majority o f thes e reports were the 

result of in-person evaluations. Additionally, it is significant 

that Morris's employment at the rehabilitation workshop was 

terminated only after he forged a note from a physician indicating 

he could not work. In fact, s e v eral e xami ners identified lack of 

motivation as a factor in Morr is 's inability t o s ecure employment. 

The A.L.J. 's decisions indicate he reviewed all available medical 

materials in making his findings. We conclude there was 

substantial evidence in the record to support his deference to the 

reports of the "non-treating" physicians. 

We now turn to Morris's argument regarding the Secretary's 

failure to consider his impairments in combinati o n. Relying on 

Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1989), Mo rris asserts he is 

disabled by virtue of the compound effect of h i s various injuries 

and emotional problems. The Secretary found to the contrary, and 

we agree. 

stated: 

In his decision denying SSI benefits, the A.L.J. 

The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has 

residual weakness and scar tissue of the left upper 

extremity due to an old third degree burn injury. He 

2 These include the reports of Doctors Dyde, Bozzi, 

Carris, and Hoyer and specialists Fay and Stapleton. 

Locketz, 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1299 Document: 01019966040 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 5 
has mild depression and an inadequate personality and 

borderline intellectual functioning. However, he does 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

listed in or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 

1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. 

(ROA Vol. II, p. 29.) The A.L.J. 's decisions reflect a careful 

review of all of Morris's injuries and emotional problems. He did 

not "fragmentize" the impairments in his evaluation. Walker, 889 

F.2d at 50. It is clear from the medical and psychiatric reports 

prepared in this case that Morris can hold a j o b. He has done so 

in the past. We find no error in the A.L.J. 's review and find 

substantial evidence to support his assessment that Morris's 

combined impairments do not render him disabled. 

Consequently, we AFFIRM the district court's order upholding 

the Secretary's decision denying Mr. Morris benefits. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

6 

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