Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00959/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00959-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Avenal State Prison
Defendant
Cole
Defendant
S. Garcia
Defendant
Killen
Defendant
T. Laney
Defendant
Marmolego
Defendant
Enrique Ortiz
Plaintiff
P. Palmer
Defendant
C. Ross
Defendant
T. Viramontez
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Enrique Ortiz is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

ENRIQUE ORTIZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

AVENAL STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-00959-SAB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY 

WITH FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

18 AND 20

[ECF No. 1]

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

The complaint identifies the following officials at Avenal State Prison as Defendants: (1) 

Avenal State Prison; (2) Marmolego; (3) P. Palmer; (4) T. Viramontez; (5) Cole; (6) Killen; (7) T. 

Laney; (8) S. Garcia; and (9) C. Ross.

Plaintiff raises various different claims in his complaint, including separate incidents of 

excessive force by different defendants, cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, violation of First Amendment right to speech, interference with legal documents, 

and retaliation. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Rule 18 and 20

A basic lawsuit is a single claim against a single defendant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

18(a) allows a plaintiff to add multiple claims to the lawsuit when they are against the same defendant. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants to a lawsuit 

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where the right to relief arises out of the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions” and 

“any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” However, unrelated 

claims that involve different defendants must be brought in separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is not only intended to avoid confusion that arises out of 

bloated lawsuits, but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees for their lawsuits and 

prevent prisoners from circumventing the three strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The fact that claims are premised on the same type of constitutional violation(s) (e.g. excessive 

force) against multiple defendants does not make them factually related. Claims are related when they 

are based on the same precipitating event or on a series of related events caused by the same 

precipitating event. Unrelated claims involving multiple defendants belong in difference suits. 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d at 607. 

Plaintiff may state a single claim against a single defendant. Plaintiff may then add any 

additional claims to his action that are against the same defendant under Rule 18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18. 

Plaintiff may also add any additional claims against other defendants if those claims arise from the 

same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions as his original claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

Any attempt to join claims that are not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will result in 

those claims being dismissed as improperly joined.

In order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must either plead facts demonstrating how his 

claims are related or he must file a separate complaint for each unrelated claim against different 

defendants. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint that does not comply with Rules 18(a) 

and 20(a)(2), all unrelated claims and defendants will be subject to dismissal. 

Because Plaintiff has clearly violated Rules 18 and 20 by setting forth several different 

unrelated claims against several different defendants, the Court will not analyze the cognizability of 

each individual claim. The Court will, however, provide Plaintiff with the applicable legal standards 

for his claims, and allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff files an amended 

complaint, he must choose which claims he wishes to keep and which he wants to omit. 

///

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B. Excessive Force

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citations omitted). For 

claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective 

component of an Eighth Amendment claim is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of 

decency, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and although de minimis uses 

of force do not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always 

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident, 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks omitted); Oliver v. 

Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002). 

C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners 

not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement. 

Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) 

(quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and 

harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 

(citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of 

legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 

a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and 

citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in 

prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To 

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maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. 

Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 

2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th 

Cir. 1998).

D. Americans With Disabilities Act

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 

or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

Title II applies to the services, programs, and activities provided for inmates by jails and prisons. 

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208-13, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998); Simmons 

v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2010); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 

1190, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008). “To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or 

otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and 

(3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 

1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1021; McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 

1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

E. First Amendment 

To state a claim for violation of his first amendment rights, Plaintiff must allege facts showing 

(1) he engaged in speech or conduct protected under the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took 

action against him, and (3) the protected speech or conduct or the chilling of the speech or conduct 

was a substantial motivating factor for the defendant’s actions. See Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 

1469 (9th Cir. 1994). To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “he engaged in 

constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant 

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and 

(3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the 

adverse action.” Blair v. Bethel School Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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F. Interference With Legal Documents

The mere fact that prison officials open and conduct a visual inspection of a prisoner’s

legal correspondence does not state a claim for violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974); Mitchell v. Dupnick, 75 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 

1996). Prison officials may, consistent with the First Amendment, open mail from attorneys in the 

presence of the prisoner for visual inspection. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-7 (1974); 

Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1981). In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Supreme 

Court noted that inspecting mail from attorneys in the presence of the inmate did all, and perhaps even 

more, than the Constitution requires. Id. at 577. The issue of whether or not prison officials may also, 

consistent with the First Amendment, open and visually inspect mail from attorneys outside the 

presence of the prisoner has not been decided by the Supreme Court or by the Ninth Circuit. In Wolff 

v. McDonnell, the legal mail at issue was mail sent to respondent from his own attorney. 

Correspondence between an attorney and a client is entitled to special protection under the attorneyclient privilege. “Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal 

mail.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). “All correspondence from a court to a 

litigant is a public document, which prison personnel could if they want inspect in the court’s files.” 

Id. at 1094 (citing to Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987)).

G. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition 

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 

2011); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 

F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison 

context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that 

a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) 

the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 

559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 

658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level .

. .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All 

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are 

waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 

1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. The amended complaint must comply with Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 18 and 20 concerning joinder of claims and defendants, and if it does not this action 

will be dismissed. 

 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed June 24, 2013, is dismissed for failure to comply with Rules 

18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

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4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this action 

will be dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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