Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00984/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00984-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marion Spearman
Respondent
Reginald W. Wyatt
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD W. WYATT,

Petitioner,

v.

MARION SPEARMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-00984-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Reginald Wyatt, a pro se state prisoner, has brought a habeas petition pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and 

lodged exhibits with the Court. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

Wyatt was found criminally responsible for the death of his 14-month-old son as a result of 

his use of rough wrestling moves that caused severe internal injuries. Wyatt was charged with one 

count of murder and one count of assault on a child causing death (“child assault homicide”). 

Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 97-99. On April 11, 2006, the jury found Wyatt guilty of the lesser 

included offense of involuntary manslaughter and child assault homicide. CT at 327. Wyatt was 

sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. CT at 360. This case was extensively litigated in the 

state courts.

In 2008 the California Court of Appeal rejected several of Wyatt’s claims but reversed the 

conviction for child assault homicide. People v. Wyatt, No. A114612, 2008 WL 258175 (Cal. Ct. 

App. Jan. 31, 2008). The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite 

mens rea because it failed to demonstrate that Wyatt knew he was wrestling too hard with his son. 

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Id. at 15. The California Supreme Court reversed and held that, “substantial evidence established 

that defendant knew he was striking his young son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow, and that 

he used an amount of force a reasonable person would realize was likely to result in great bodily 

injury.” People v. Wyatt, 48 Cal. 4th 776, 779 (2010). The California Supreme Court reversed 

and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeal. Id.

On remand in 2010 the California Court of Appeal rejected several of Wyatt’s claims but 

again reversed the conviction for child assault homicide. People v. Wyatt, No. A114612, 2010 

WL 5006753 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010). The court found the trial court prejudicially erred by 

failing to instruct sua sponte on a simple assault as a lesser included offense of child assault 

homicide. Id. at 16-17. In 2012 the California Supreme Court again reversed, finding no error 

because there was not substantial evidence of simple assault to support the sua sponte issuance of 

it as a lesser included offense instruction. People v. Wyatt, 55 Cal. 4th 694, 703-04 (2012). The 

California Supreme Court ordered the appellate court to reinstate the child assault homicide 

conviction. Id.

The 2008 opinion of the California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as 

follows:

Prosecution Case

Charrikka Harris, mother of Reginald Wyatt Jr. (Reginald), met 

appellant in March 2001. They began a physical relationship, 

although Harris already had a boyfriend. Harris found out she was 

pregnant in July 2001, by which time appellant had another 

girlfriend. At first appellant seemed okay with the pregnancy, but 

shortly before Reginald was born, he said he did not think the baby 

was his and would not assume responsibility until he found out that 

it was his baby. After Reginald was born, appellant refused to sign 

his birth certificate because “it wasn’t his baby.” He also refused to 

take a paternity test or to provide any financial support.

Subsequently, appellant and Harris agreed to go on the Maury 

Povich Show, which was doing a show about paternity. Appellant 

took a paternity test before being flown to New York for the show; 

he and Harris were also given spending money. Povich announced 

on the show that the paternity testing showed that appellant was 

Reginald’s father. After they returned to Oakland, appellant’s 

attitude changed. For about two weeks, he would come to Harris’s 

house to feed and play with Reginald. Then, he and Harris got into 

an argument about appellant’s girlfriend and he stopped coming 

over.

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Appellant still refused to contribute financially and Harris went to 

court to try to get appellant to help support Reginald and spend time 

with him. Appellant then sought a restraining order against Harris. 

The court referred them to a mediator. The court eventually ordered 

visitation for appellant for five hours every Saturday. Appellant was 

inconsistent in his visits. Appellant was also ordered to pay $50 per 

week in child support, which he did.

After Reginald’s first birthday, Harris agreed to let appellant take 

Reginald for overnight visits. After the first overnight visit, Harris 

smelled marijuana on Reginald’s sweater and also saw what 

appeared to be a burn on the back of his neck. She called the police. 

A paramedic looked at the mark and said it was “‘an old scratch.’” 

Another time, she found a lump with a scab on it on Reginald’s 

chest. She took him to the hospital.

On Saturday, May 17, 2003, after agreeing that appellant could take 

Reginald for the weekend, Harris met appellant and he took 

Reginald with the plan that Harris would pick Reginald up the next 

day. Appellant had asked a few days earlier if he could take custody 

of Reginald and whether Harris would let Reginald move in with 

appellant and his girlfriend. Harris said she would think about it. 

Reginald was then 14 months old.

Tiffany Blake was appellant’s girlfriend. They lived together in 

Oakland and had been together since 2002. Their daughter, Valerie, 

was born in February 2003. On Saturday, May 17, 2003, Reginald 

came to spend the night with appellant, Blake, and Valerie in their 

apartment. It was about the third time he had spent the night with 

them. Reginald slept on a pallet-a makeshift bed on the floor with a 

comforter, blankets, and a pillow-at the side of the bed. On Sunday 

morning, May 18, Blake got up at around 7:00 a.m. to get ready to 

go to work. It was her first day back at her job after a maternity 

leave and she had to be at work by 10:00 a.m.

Blake left the apartment at about 9:00 a.m. to catch the bus to work. 

Before that, she saw appellant playing with Reginald. He was lifting 

Reginald up in the air over his head, spinning him around, and 

bouncing him down onto the bed. Reginald had a blank look on his 

face and Blake said to appellant, “Maybe you shouldn’t do that. 

Maybe he doesn’t like it. Maybe he’s not having fun.” After that, 

she saw Reginald sitting and watching television until she left for 

work.

At about 10:00 a.m., appellant called Harris and left a message that 

Reginald had had an asthma attack and needed his asthma machine. 

He sounded nervous. When appellant called back, Harris answered 

the phone. Appellant said Reginald could not breathe; he also said 

an ambulance and the police were there. Harris hung up the phone 

and rushed to Children’s Hospital in Oakland, where she assumed 

Reginald would be taken. Appellant also called Blake at work 

between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. Appellant told her that Reginald 

was not breathing and he was waiting for an ambulance. He called 

her back 20 to 30 minutes later on her cell phone. He was crying 

and said Reginald had died.

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At about 10:45 a.m., Douglas Curtis, who lived in appellant’s 

apartment building, heard a knock at his door and saw a person there 

holding a baby in his arms. Another baby was sitting on the floor 

outside. The man said, “‘Would you please dial 911? My baby is 

not breathing.’” The man, who looked scared, said the baby had 

asthma and that he had tried to call 911 but could not get through. 

So Curtis called 911 and, in about five or ten minutes, an ambulance 

and paramedics arrived.

When paramedics arrived, Reginald was lying on the sidewalk and a 

firefighter was administering C.P.R. Reginald was not breathing 

and there was no pulse. An endotracheal tube was placed in his 

mouth and other efforts to revive him were made, but the efforts 

were not successful. The paramedics then transported him to the 

hospital.

Oakland Police Officer Kaizer Albino obtained a statement from 

appellant while paramedics were still treating Reginald on the 

sidewalk. Appellant “was quite emotional. He was upset. His 

attention was focused on his son. He was not all there, so he wasn’t 

responding to my questions.” Therefore, Albino suggested they go 

up to appellant’s apartment, which they did. In the statement 

obtained from appellant, appellant said he was playing with his two 

children that morning, after which he gave his son a cup of milk and 

put him down on the floor. Appellant then lay on the bed with his 

daughter and fell asleep. When he woke up, appellant noticed that 

Reginald was not breathing and had green fluid coming from his 

nose.

At the hospital, when doctors could not revive him, Reginald was 

pronounced dead. Other than a little scratch on his chin, the treating 

doctor saw no signs of injury or trauma on Reginald’s body. 

Sergeant James Rullamas initially believed it was a SIDS death and 

asked appellant to fill out a form for the coroner’s office. The form 

contained a question about a history of fall or accident, and 

appellant said Reginald fell out of his arms as he was trying to get 

out the door to get help. Appellant said there were no other falls or 

accidents.

The next day, Monday, May 19, 2003, appellant, his brother 

Anthony, Harris’s sister, and a friend were at Harris’s house when 

the coroner called and told Harris that the autopsy results were in 

and that Reginald had broken ribs, a severed liver and spleen, and 

had died from blunt trauma. He also said officers were en route to 

“pick up” appellant. Harris hung up the phone and said to appellant, 

“They’re going to arrest you.” Appellant and his brother then drove 

to the Oakland Police Department.

On that Monday morning, after he learned the results of the autopsy, 

Sergeant Rullamas asked officers to prepare an arrest warrant and to 

arrest appellant for murder. Before any arrest was made, Rullamas 

learned that appellant had come to the police station with his 

brother, Oakland Police Officer Anthony Caldwell. Sergeants 

Rullamas and Nolan interviewed appellant after reading him his 

Miranda rights. In accordance with normal procedures, they 

interviewed appellant before taking a tape-recorded statement. 

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Rullamas acknowledged that it was a difficult interview because 

appellant’s brother was an Oakland police officer whose work 

Rullamas respected. However, harsh tactics were not necessary with 

appellant. It was “a very, very soft interview” since appellant 

“responded to kindness,” which is “fairly unique.”

Two tape-recorded interviews were made and were played for the 

jury during trial. In the first tape-recorded interview, which began at 

6:14 p.m., appellant said that, after he got up on Sunday morning, he 

was wrestling and playing with Reginald. He was lifting him up and 

dropping him on the bed. Appellant described an accident that 

occurred while Blake was still home. Appellant was doing a move 

called “comin’ off the top rope.” As he jumped on the bed, 

Reginald rolled unexpectedly and appellant’s hip came down on his 

stomach with most or all of appellant’s body weight of 170 pounds. 

Reginald grunted like the wind had been knocked out of him. Blake 

then said he was playing too rough with Reginald and could hurt 

him, so he stopped. Reginald did not cry during any of this. He was 

laughing and then, after appellant fell on him, he still had a smile on 

his face.

After Blake left for work, appellant began playing with Reginald 

again. They played for 20 or 30 more minutes. He might have hit 

Reginald harder at that point in their play, since Blake was gone. He 

continued wrestling with Reginald, except he did not “come off the 

top rope” since he had jumped on him earlier. Appellant body 

slammed Reginald about four times, hit Reginald in the chest with 

his fist about 10 or 11 times, did the “atomic elbow” to his head, hit 

him in the upper chest with his forearm about three times, and then 

hit him in the back. Appellant also held Reginald around his neck 

while he had him up in the air, squeezed him between his legs, hit 

Reginald in the back twice with his knee (the knee drop), and did the 

body slam and pretend head butts. He boxed with Reginald and did 

the supplex many times, which involved flipping Reginald over his 

body onto the bed; that move made Reginald laugh every time. 

Appellant did not think he was hurting Reginald because he was 

playing with him.

When Rullamas had asked appellant at the hospital the previous day 

if there was any history of fall or accident, appellant did not tell him 

about the wrestling or falling on Reginald because he was just 

playing with him and “didn’t think that had anything to do with 

anything.” He was not trying to hide anything; he just did not think 

that was the cause.

Sergeant Nolan noted that Sergeant Rullamas had earlier talked 

about every man wanting his son to be kind of tough, to be able to 

take it and be a man, to which appellant responded, “[H]ere my son 

... he’s not movin’ around. I just wanted him to move around ... and 

be active.... [¶] ... [¶] All I was tryin’ to ... just kinda toughen him 

up. Because this ... it's hard out here. Y’all know how many people 

get killed out here, too....”

When Nolan asked if he or Rullamas had made any threats or 

promises to appellant, appellant responded in the negative. When 

Nolan said, “We treated you pretty nice?” appellant said, 

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“Extremely.”

The interview concluded at 7:16 p.m. Rullamas and Nolan left the 

interview room and went over appellant’s statement. Much of what 

appellant said did not make sense to Rullamas and he thought “there 

had to be some kind of anger in there, some kind of punishment, or 

something in there, in my mind, and I wanted to ask him about that.” 

At 8:00 p.m., they returned to the room to discuss this with 

appellant. Appellant said “he was trying to toughen [Reginald] up a 

little bit, but that none of it was out of anger.” Appellant also said 

that it was not an attempt to discipline his son, and that his form of 

discipline was just to take toys away from him. Nor did it have 

anything to do with any frustration he was feeling.

The officers then left the room again and called the district 

attorney’s “call-out team.” A representative from the district 

attorney’s office came to the police station, along with her inspector, 

after 9:00 p.m. After Rullamas briefed them on the case and they 

listened to the tape statement, the team wanted the officers to 

attempt to obtain additional information in three areas: (1) why was 

the child with appellant outside of the hours prescribed by the court 

order; (2) how many times in the past had Reginald been at 

appellant’s apartment; and (3) what was Tiffany Blake’s role in 

raising the child.

Therefore, the officers returned to the interview room and asked 

appellant additional questions. Regarding the court order for 

visitation, appellant said he and Harris had made plans for Reginald 

to start spending more time with him and he wanted Reginald to get 

used to living with him. He also said that Reginald had spent the 

night at his apartment six or seven times and that Blake helped with

Reginald’s care.

At 11:23 p.m., Rullamas and Nolan began a second taped interview 

with appellant. Appellant said he was not really thinking about 

anything when he was wrestling with Reginald; his mind was going 

blank. It was “[l]ike I just had a one-track mind. I was just stuck on 

toughening him up, playin’ with Reggie, beatin’ up Reggie,” by 

which he meant “play fighting with him.” When appellant said his 

mind went blank, he meant that “my mind musta went blank, 

though, for me to really ... hit him hard enough ... to hurt him, and I 

not notice it. I wasn’t payin’ attention, and I wasn’t thinkin'.... [¶] ... 

[¶] ... But then ... came to a point where it got more serious than that, 

and I didn't notice and I wasn’t thinkin’ ... that I can hurt him. I 

wasn’t thinkin’. [¶] ... [¶] [It got more serious] because he was hit 

too hard. He was hit too hard, and I wasn’t ... doin’ nothin’ to, you 

know, not hit him no harder.” When asked how hard he was hitting 

Reginald, appellant said, “I was hittin’ him pretty hard.”

Appellant said he did not listen when Blake told him to stop being 

so rough because he was “[h]ard-headed. Stubborn. Stuck in my 

ways. Didn’t want a woman to be tellin’ me how to raise my son.” 

Appellant said he had wrestled with Reginald before, but this was 

the first time he wrestled with him “like this,” “[t]o this point ... 

where I was outta control.” Appellant thought he lost control at the 

time he started slamming Reginald on the bed. He said, “14 months 

old. Just a little baby. Shouldn’ta been playin’ wit’ ‘im like that.” 

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When asked what made it turn from play wrestling to real wrestling, 

appellant said, “Just wasn’t thinkin’ at all. Just wasn’t thinkin’.”

Appellant said after he landed on Reginald, Reginald lay down and 

appellant said, “‘Nah, it ain’t time to go to sleep. Come on.’ And 

we just kep’ on playin’.” Appellant also acknowledged that he felt 

pressures related to money, getting his barber’s license, “[j]ust the 

every day hustle and bustle ... just tryin’ to make it. Tryin’ to stay 

out the way.” This interview ended at 11:39 p.m. and appellant was 

taken to jail.

Rullamas interviewed Tiffany Blake on May 21, 2003. The jury 

listened to Blake’s tape-recorded interview during trial. During the 

interview, Blake said appellant started playing with Reginald on the 

Sunday morning. He would lift Reginald up in the air, swing him 

around, and put him on the bed. Reginald was crying and so Blake 

told appellant not to play with him like that, that she thought he was 

playing too rough. She thought maybe it scared Reginald to be up in 

the air.

Blake said appellant had never done anything that caused her 

concern regarding his ability to care for his son or their daughter. 

He had never done anything reckless or dangerous and was a good 

father. They were trying to get custody of Reginald and were 

working on getting themselves together so they could have both 

children and support them financially. They were having Reginald 

stay over on the weekends so he could get used to staying with 

them.

Dr. David Levin, a pathologist, performed an autopsy on Reginald’s 

body on May 19, 2003. Reginald, who was 31 inches tall and 

weighed 26 pounds, died of shock and hemorrhage due to blunt 

force trauma to the chest and abdomen. During an external 

examination of the body, Dr. Levin found an abrasion on the chin 

and two abrasions on the neck. There was a laceration of the 

frenulum of the upper lip and a contusion on the chest.

Internally, Dr. Levin found an internal contusion to the forehead, 

hemorrhage on the surface of the heart, on the tissue behind the 

heart, and at the hilus of the left lung. There were multiple 

lacerations to the liver, which caused internal bleeding of 200 

milliliters of blood into the abdominal cavity. There was also 

hemorrhage behind the abdominal cavity and hemorrhage in the 

mesentery of the small and large intestines. There were acute 

fractures of the fifth and sixth ribs on both the right and left side of 

the back of the body. There was also mild cerebral swelling.

Reginald’s injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma to his 

back, abdomen, chest, and head. Some of the injuries could have 

been caused by a person who weighed 170 pounds jumping up and 

landing with his hip onto the midsection of the child. They also 

could have been caused by multiple instances of blunt force trauma. 

There would not necessarily be bruising, especially in softer areas 

like the abdomen. The laceration to the frenulum could have been 

caused by blunt force to the face or something being jammed into 

the mouth. The cerebral swelling could have been caused by blunt 

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force trauma to the head, by changes occurring during the dying 

process, or by administration of a large amount of fluids by medical 

personnel in an attempt to regain blood pressure. The contusion on 

the chest could have been caused by someone attempting to 

administer CPR, but CPR would not have caused the fractured ribs 

in the back of the body.

A child who suffered these injuries would not die instantaneously 

and Dr. Levin would expect that the child would cry. Death could 

occur in less than an hour up to many hours.

Dr. James Crawford, medical director of the Center for Child 

Protection at Children’s Hospital in Oakland, testified as an expert 

in pediatrics, in the medical evaluation of child abuse. Dr. Crawford 

reviewed Reginald’s autopsy protocol. Reginald’s injuries were “at 

the end of the bell curve,” that is, at a level of injury that is 

uncommon in a one year old. The types of injuries he suffered, 

including the multiple lacerations to the liver and the multiple sites 

of internal bleeding, “are seen only in the most serious events,” such 

as children who are in car crashes or hit by motor vehicles.

The likelihood that Reginald’s ribs were broken during CPR was 

“extraordinarily small.” The fractures could conceivably have been 

caused by blunt force trauma to the child's back, but would have to 

have been “something that would have been quite violent, quite out 

of the ordinary,” given how uncommon rib fractures are in children. 

Unless he was unconscious or had a profound neurological 

condition, a child would be expected to react to the types of injuries 

shown to have occurred here by crying and clearly demonstrating 

that he was in distress.

As to his opinion regarding how many times Reginald must have 

been hit in order to receive these injuries, Dr. Crawford believed 

there had to have been “at least multiple, and potentially many 

impacts.” It is remotely possible that one extremely violent lateral 

compression could have caused all of the significant injuries. 

However, it is more likely that the injuries were caused by more 

than one blow. Dr. Crawford explained, “[T]he fewer number of 

impacts that one is invoking, to explain it, the more violent those 

impacts have to be. So a single event would-it was, you know, to 

crush the child's body this way would have been an extraordinarily 

violent act, in order to cause all these injuries at the same time, as 

opposed to multiple lessers, but still dangerously violent acts, to 

different parts of the body.” The level of violence would be 

equivalent to getting hit by a motor vehicle or being a passenger in a 

car crash.

Defense Case

Appellant, who was 31 years old at the time of trial, testified on his 

own behalf. He lived in Winfield, Louisiana until he was 28 years 

old, at which time he moved to California. He initially lived with 

his brother and his stepmother in Oakland. His jobs in California 

included working at a bar, working at Kmart, and working at a 

mattress warehouse. He had prior convictions in Louisiana for 

battery on a police officer, possession of a weapon, and possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine.

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When appellant met Charrikka Harris, he thought he was sterile 

because he had “slept with a lot of girls” and none of them got 

pregnant. When Harris got pregnant, he did not think the baby was 

his. Reginald was born on March 6, 2002. He went on the Maury 

Povich Show to find out if Reginald was his baby. Once he learned 

Reginald was his baby, he wanted to be with him. He saw Reginald 

almost daily for a couple of weeks, but then stopped coming by 

Harris’s home very much and seldom saw his son, partly because he 

and Harris would always argue.

After appellant and Harris went to a mediator, he saw Reginald 

more often. When he and his girlfriend, Tiffany Blake, moved to 

Walnut Street in Oakland, in February 2003, he saw Reginald even 

more regularly because he now had a more stable residence. 

Reginald spent the weekend with appellant five or six times before 

Reginald’s death. Appellant never struck Reginald except for one 

time when he slapped Reginald on the hand for playing with the 

steering wheel in the car. Appellant never had to discipline 

Reginald because he was a good baby and easy to care for.

On Saturday, May 17, 2003, Harris brought Reginald to appellant 

for a weekend visit. On Sunday morning, while Blake was getting 

dressed for work, appellant started playing with Reginald, swinging 

him up in the air and putting him on the bed. Blake told him he was 

playing too rough with Reginald, who was whining. After Blake left 

the apartment, appellant began playing with Reginald again, picking 

him up and tossing him on the bed. Reginald laughed while 

appellant did this. Appellant also put Reginald on the bed and 

jumped on it to make it shake, which he had done in the past.

Appellant never did any wrestling moves on his son. When he 

described to the police the wrestling moves he did on Reginald, it 

was all pretend wrestling he was talking about. He never struck 

Reginald hard, only pushed him while playing with him and doing 

“make-believe wrestling moves,” such as off-the-top-rope, head 

butt, supplex, and an atomic elbow to the head. At one point, an 

accident occurred. Appellant had jumped in the air and was coming 

down on the bed to make it shake, when Reginald rolled toward him 

and appellant fell on Reginald, hitting Reginald in the back with his 

hip. It seemed like Reginald had the wind knocked out of him, like 

he could not get his breath. Then he started breathing again and 

appellant thought he was all right. Reginald did not cry. Other than 

falling on Reginald, appellant did not strike him with force or do 

anything harmful to him.

Appellant stopped playing after he fell on Reginald. He got 

Reginald some milk and sat him down on the floor on his pallet. 

Reginald took his milk, looked at the television, and then lay down. 

Appellant lay down on the bed with his daughter, Valerie, and 

drifted off to sleep. It was about 10:00 a.m. at that point.

When appellant woke up, he saw that Reginald was not on his pallet; 

he was on the floor. He tried to wake Reginald up, but he was not 

responsive. He was breathing faintly and appellant hit him on the 

back and opened his mouth in case something got stuck in there, and 

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then tried to do CPR on him. He also called his stepmother and 

Harris, but neither one answered the phone. At first, he did not 

think to call 911 because in his hometown there was no 911. Then 

he tried to call 911, but could not get through. As he did CPR, some 

green matter came out of Reginald’s nose and appellant panicked.

He picked up Reginald in one hand and Valerie in the other and 

started to leave the apartment, but stumbled over a diaper pail and 

dropped both children. Reginald’s head hit the floor. He picked up 

both children and went to a neighbor’s door, where he told the 

neighbor that his son was not breathing. The man said he would call 

911, and the person on the line talked to appellant as he tried to do 

CPR again until the ambulance came.

While the paramedics were working on Reginald, a police officer 

asked appellant questions. Appellant did not tell the officer that he 

had been playing with Reginald and had fallen on top of him 

because appellant was focused on what was happening to his son 

and he also did not make a connection between falling on Reginald 

and his condition. While riding to the hospital, appellant learned 

that Reginald was dead.

Appellant spent the night at the home of his brother, Anthony 

Caldwell, where he only got a little bit of sleep. The next afternoon, 

appellant’s brother drove them to Harris's house. Harris was there 

with her sister and one or two other people. The coroner’s office 

called while appellant was there. Harris answered the phone; a short 

time later she said, “blunt trauma,” and dropped the phone. She was 

crying and in a state of shock. As appellant tried to comfort her, 

Harris’s sister came in and said someone had hit Reginald in the 

chest hard. No one accused appellant of killing Reginald, and 

appellant did not know what had caused Reginald’s death. 

Appellant first learned during trial that his act of falling on Reginald 

could have caused his son’s substantial injuries.

Caldwell suggested going to the police station because the police 

wanted to talk to appellant. They went to the police station and 

Caldwell spoke with Nolan and Rullamas who said that they were 

just going to ask appellant a few questions and would be through in 

a few hours. The officers told appellant, “‘We’ll take care of you,’”

and also said after he answered the questions, they would let him go 

back home to his family. Caldwell told appellant to “cooperate with 

them in every way, that they [are] going to take care of you, that 

these [are] some good guys.” Appellant did not think he needed a 

lawyer because the officers just wanted to talk to him. He did not 

realize they had already issued a warrant.

Appellant was tired from lack of sleep and his mind was in a 

complete daze. He told the officers that he had been playing with 

Reginald when he accidentally fell on his son. He also explained 

that he was play-wrestling with Reginald. As he described the 

various wrestling terms, he “just kind of took on the terms,” saying, 

“‘I body-slam him,’ whatever.” He thought the officers understood 

he was talking about play-wrestling. Then, when the officers said 

“it had to be [something] more [than just falling on Reginald], I feel 

like, well, in my mind, I start second-guessing myself, even though I 

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knew what I was doing, I start second-guessing myself ... so I start 

being like, well, maybe I did hit him harder than what I really 

thought I was....” His mind was “just shredded” with grief and 

appellant felt shame and guilt about what had happened. Then, 

given that the officers would not take him at his word, he thought 

maybe he was not remembering it clearly and maybe he had hit his 

son hard and had not realized it. He thought the officers had the 

facts, so he went along with what they said.

The officers did not start tape recording appellant’s statement until 

they got him to say that he had hit his son hard while wrestling with 

him. Also before taping him, Sergeant Rullamas said something 

about every man wanting his son to be kind of tough, but appellant 

had only said that Reginald was good and sat still a lot, and 

appellant wanted him to be more active. Then, on tape, appellant 

said he wanted to toughen him up, by which he only meant make 

him more active.

After the first tape-recorded interview, the officers left the room, 

then came back and said “[t]his is not adding up. Something else 

had to happen.” They also said, “[s]ometimes people lose control, 

and it’s all right. You know, we’re all human, and we make 

mistakes. You know, the D.A.s are having a hard time 

understanding this.” The officers introduced a new theme of 

appellant’s losing control and being angry when Reginald got hurt. 

Later that night, the officers took a second tape-recorded statement. 

With both statements, it seemed like everything was scripted, with 

the officers and appellant “[getting] the answers down” before 

making the recordings. Appellant explained that when he said on 

the second tape that his mind went blank and he lost control, he 

meant he had just been playing without thinking about anything and 

he put his son in jeopardy by playing with him. By the end of the 

second interview, appellant had been convinced that he had blacked 

out, struck his son too hard, and killed him. In fact, appellant did 

not recall blacking out or hitting Reginald too hard. He was just 

tired and wanted to go home, and the officers would not accept his 

initial answers.

Anthony Caldwell testified that he is three years older than 

appellant. They have the same mother, but different fathers. 

Caldwell became a police officer in Oakland in 1999 and was an 

officer at the time of appellant’s arrest. He and appellant grew up in 

a very segregated town in Louisiana where Black people knew to 

“stay in your place when authorities approach you for anything.” 

Because appellant’s mother worked at the school board and his 

uncle and brother played football, their family got more favorable 

treatment than other Black people. Caldwell had seen appellant 

interact with children and he was always fun, loving and playful; the 

kids loved him. He never saw appellant get angry or frustrated with 

young children.

Appellant was elated when he learned that Reginald was his son, 

and became more focused on barber college and obtaining his 

license. Caldwell never saw appellant express any frustration 

toward Reginald.

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The day after Reginald died, Caldwell took appellant to Harris’s 

house to make funeral arrangements. While they were there, the 

coroner called with the autopsy results. Harris started screaming, 

“‘He beat my baby. He beat my baby.’” Caldwell called the police 

station and talked to Nolan, who said he needed to talk to appellant. 

Appellant told Caldwell to take him to the police station, which 

Caldwell did. Caldwell told appellant that he had nothing to hide 

and to just be truthful with the officers. Rullamas and Nolan said 

that they would take care of appellant and that he could call them 

when they finished the interview, in maybe two or three hours. 

When they said they would take care of appellant, Caldwell 

understood it to mean simply that they would treat him fairly. He 

believed he would be able to pick appellant up after the questioning, 

not because of anything the officers said, but because Reginald’s 

death had so clearly been an accident. Appellant had told him that 

he had been playing with Reginald when he accidentally fell on him.

Patricia Street, appellant’s mother, testified that appellant had been 

evaluated when he was in fourth grade and was classified as 

hyperactive. Appellant attended college briefly, but dropped out. 

Appellant was excited when he learned Reginald was his son.

Elayne Caldwell, appellant’s stepmother, testified that appellant 

lived with her for about two years starting in 2001 and sometimes 

took care of her granddaughter. Appellant was always a 

considerate, kind, loving person. She saw appellant with Reginald 

on numerous occasions and appellant had nothing but love for his 

son, and wanted to have more time with him.

Lionell Johnson, appellant’s uncle, testified that he helped raise 

appellant. He never knew him to have a violent temper or to do any 

act of violence toward a child. Appellant treated Johnson's children 

with love and they loved and respected him.

Dr. Paul Herrmann, a pathologist, testified as an expert in the field

of pathology. He had reviewed Reginald’s autopsy records and 

believed Reginald's injuries could have resulted from a single sharp 

blow to the back right side, such as from the weight of a 170-pound 

man falling on him. The injuries were not consistent with the child 

being beaten with fists because there was little bruising of the body. 

However, other forms of abuse, such as the child’s abdomen being 

smashed onto one's knee would probably not leave a bruise because 

a knee is such a large, blunt object. If a heavy weight were dropped 

on the child when the child was on the floor, a large blunt object 

would not cause bruising, but would compress the body, with the 

force causing the ribs to break and the liver to be lacerated. It was

equally probable that Reginald’s major injuries were caused by a 

single blow as by multiple blows. Dr. Herrmann believed the 

injuries to Reginald’s heart were likely due to the administration of 

CPR. The cause of the tear to Reginald's frenulum was as consistent 

with an endotracheal tube being placed in his mouth as with violent 

force.

On cross-examination, Dr. Herrmann said he believed the chances of 

Reginald being injured by a person falling on him on a bed would be 

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much less than if the child were on the floor. It would be much less 

common for such extreme injuries to occur if the child was on a bed 

when someone fell on him. However, “it’s still a likelihood or a 

possibility.” The injuries here would be excessive to what Dr. 

Herrmann would expect if someone fell sideways onto the child on a 

bed, as compared to someone “falling free” onto the child. He did 

not have an opinion as to whether Reginald was physically abused.

After receiving these severe injuries a child might be screaming 

from pain or might go into shock immediately and be absolutely 

still. Either way, Dr. Herrmann believed a caregiver would notice a 

difference in the child after such injuries were sustained. Reginald’s 

death was not immediate; he bled to death. If he went into shock, it 

is possible that he lay down or appeared to be going to sleep.

Rebuttal

Rullamas testified on rebuttal that neither he nor anyone in his 

presence ever told appellant that he would be finished in a few 

hours; that he could go home afterwards because he needed to be 

with his family; or that, after he finished answering questions, he 

could go home. In fact, a warrant for appellant's arrest had already 

been issued and he was going to be arrested regardless of whether he 

talked to the officers. Rullamas never brought up the idea that 

appellant was trying to toughen up his son. Rather, appellant 

mentioned that his child was acting like a baby and appellant wanted 

to toughen him up because of the environment in Oakland. He 

never told appellant that he must have lost his temper or that the 

district attorney was having a hard time understanding how it was he 

lost control and that appellant should “‘just say this so the D.A. can 

understand it better.’ “

Wyatt, 2008 WL 258175, at *1-12.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

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[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the Court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Wyatt asserts that: (1) his rights were violated 

because the trial court excluded certain evidence at a pretrial hearing; (2) the trial court failed to 

issue a unanimity instruction; (3) the jury instructions omitted an essential element of child assault 

homicide; (4) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that criminal negligence cannot support an 

assault conviction; and (5) there was insufficient evidence to support child assault homicide.

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I. PRETRIAL HEARING

Wyatt argues that his rights to due process and confrontation were denied because the trial 

court improperly limited cross-examination of a police officer at the pretrial hearing on the 

voluntariness of Wyatt’s statement. He argues that the trial court erred when it sustained two 

objections to trial counsel’s questions related to the police officer’s alleged habit of getting 

suspects to talk by stating he was there to help and that they could return home if they provided a 

statement.

Legal Standard

The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not 

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 

wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). Accordingly, “trial judges 

retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits 

on such cross-examinations based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally 

relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 

Generally speaking, a court errs under the Confrontation Clause only when it prevents a 

defendant from examining a particular and relevant topic. Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections, 

692 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2012). “Restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront 

adverse witnesses and to present evidence ‘may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the 

purposes they are designed to serve.’” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991) (quoting 

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). 

A defendant establishes a Confrontation Clause error by showing that “[a] reasonable jury 

might have received a significantly different impression of [a witness’] credibility had . . . counsel 

been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680; 

Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 2009). The focus of this inquiry “must be on the 

particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire trial,” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680; defense 

counsel’s ability to impeach other witnesses “is irrelevant” to whether the trial court violated the 

Confrontation Clause, Slovik, 556 F.3d at 754-55. A limitation on cross-examination will fail 

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under the Confrontation Clause if it prejudices the defendant and denies the jury sufficient 

information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witnesses. United States v. Urena, 659 

F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court can obtain a federal writ of 

habeas corpus only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A state court’s evidentiary ruling therefore is 

not subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing 

upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the 

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985).

Analysis

Sergeant Rullamas testified in a pretrial hearing regarding Wyatt’s statement to police. 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1-42; CT at 233 (transcript of interview). Wyatt agreed to speak 

to the police after receiving Miranda warnings. CT at 233-34. Wyatt stated that the police treated 

him extremely nice. CT at 266. After trial counsel concluded his cross-examination of Rullamas, 

the trial court asked Rullamas if he had made any threats or promises to get Wyatt to talk. RT at

39. Rullamas stated he did not and noted that Wyatt said he was treated nicely. Id. Trial counsel 

then requested to ask more questions and the following occurred as described by the California 

Court of Appeal:

“[Defense counsel]: And you were telling him the whole time that 

you were there to help him, right?

“[Rullamas]: No.

“[Defense counsel]: Did you ever say that to him? Do you 

remember?

“[Rullamas]: No.

“[Defense counsel]: You don’t remember saying that?

“[Rullamas]: No.

“[Defense counsel]: But sometimes you do say that during your 

interviews. Isn’t that right? That you're there to help the person 

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you’re interviewing?

“[The prosecutor]: Objection. Irrelevant.

“The Court: Sustained.

“[Defense counsel]: Well, it goes to his habit and custom. His 

bearing on-

“The Court: Sustained.

“[Defense counsel]: I’ve got no-is that whole area going to be 

sustained on?

“The Court: Sustained, the objection to that question.

“[Defense counsel]: Isn’t it true you told him you were going to take 

care of him, and if he just provides you with certain information that 

he was going to be okay, and that he was going to go home that 

night?

“[Rullamas]: No.

“[Defense counsel]: Isn’t it true you told him if he just gave you 

some of the details, that he would go home that night?

“[Rullamas]: That is not true.

“[Defense counsel]: Okay. Now you do say that sometimes to 

people in order to have them give you confessions. Isn’t that true?

“[The prosecutor]: Objection. Irrelevant.

“The Court: Sustained.”

Defense counsel moved on to other questions but, during argument 

on the question of voluntariness, counsel said he had been precluded 

from going into whether appellant was persuaded to give his 

statements “by tactics of bold-face lies.” The court responded: “No, 

you weren’t. I sustained two objections to questions that basically 

asked, ‘Well, you’ve used that tactic with other people in the past.’” 

The following exchange then took place between defense counsel 

and the court:

“[Defense counsel]: Right. To show the habit and custom of that 

officer.

“The Court: That’s all I sustained objections to. I did not cut you off 

from inquiring into that. I don’t care what he may have done in the 

past. What’s at issue is what he did here. And in the absence of 

any-here has been no evidence presented so far-and I haven’t asked, 

actually. I should ask you-I don’t know if I asked. Did I ask you if 

you wanted to present any evidence?

“[Defense counsel]: No, you didn't.

“The Court: Do you?

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“[Defense counsel]: No.

“The Court: Okay. There’s no evidence that that’s what was done 

here, so if there ever was a time in the past when he used such a 

tactic, it's not relevant to me. It’s just not. At any rate-

“[Defense counsel]: Anyway, you understand the theory.

“The Court: Absolutely. And all I did was sustain the objection to 

two questions, which asked about tactics he may have used with 

other people in the past. Those are the only two objections that even 

remotely relate to what you're talking about, so I’ve got to disagree 

with you about what I precluded you from doing. I didn’t preclude 

you from inquiring into the subject matter. As a matter of fact, you 

did. He denied it. You asked him point blank.

“[Defense counsel]: That’s why I wanted to get into his habit or 

custom.

“The Court: Yeah, but it’s not relevant to me.

“[Defense counsel]: Fine.

“The Court: Particularly since you've got to keep in mind, your 

question wasn’t even, ‘That’s what you usually do, isn’t it?’ [¶] 

Your question was, ‘Well, there have been occasions in the past 

where you have used that tactic,’ so that doesn’t even establish habit 

and custom, if you want to get picky about it. But at any event, 

those were the objections I sustained along those lines, so I just got 

to take issue with what you feel I cut you off from, because I didn’t 

cut you off from that line of questioning. But rather just those 

particular questions about what he had done in the past, not with this 

defendant. [¶] As to what he did with this defendant, you asked him, 

he gave you a direct answer, and to that extent, it covered the subject 

matter that I consider to be relevant.”

The court then ruled that appellant’s statements “were made freely, 

voluntarily, after proper Miranda warnings.”

Wyatt, 2008 WL 258175, at *16-17.

The California Court of Appeal then described relevant state law and denied this claim.

Here, the trial court made clear that it had not precluded appellant 

from asking questions or presenting evidence regarding the alleged 

habit or custom of Sergeant Rullamas and the Oakland Police 

Department of making false promises to defendants to induce them 

to make statements. As the court stated, it simply sustained 

objections to two questions, not regarding what the officer 

habitually did during interviews, but instead regarding whether he 

had “sometimes” told defendants that he was there to help them or 

that they would go home after answering questions. These questions 

did not relate to Rullamas’s or the Oakland Police Department’s 

“‘regular or consistent response’” to interrogation of suspects. 

(People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal. 3d at p. 681, fn. 22; see People v. 

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Hughes, supra, 27 Cal. 4th at p. 337 [no abuse of discretion in 

exclusion of testimony of two defense witnesses that, on occasions 

when felony-murder victim cleaned her apartment, she left door 

partly open because proffered evidence was insufficient to establish 

that victim had such a habit or custom].)

Since answers to the two questions at issue would not have 

demonstrated that Rullamas habitually said these same things to 

defendants, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it sustained the prosecutor's objections. FN14

FN14. Having concluded that the court did not improperly 

limit defense counsel's cross-examination of Sergeant 

Rullamas, it follows that there was no violation of 

appellant’s rights to a fair hearing and to confront witnesses.

Wyatt, 2008 WL 258175, at *18.

Wyatt has failed to demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority or an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. It was the trial court that initially asked if Rullamas promised or threatened Wyatt, after trial 

counsel finished his questioning. After raising this issue, the trial court allowed trial counsel to 

continue asking questions. The trial court sustained two objections to questions about whether 

Rullamas “sometimes” told defendants in other interviews that he was trying to help them or that 

they could go home if they provided a statement. Rullamas already answered that he did not state 

that to Wyatt nor is it reflected in the transcript of the audio interview that he made such a 

statement. Trial counsel retained the ability to rephrase the questions in a manner that was 

consistent with the state evidence code to determine if Rullamas had a habit or custom of asking 

these types of questions. The California Court of Appeal found that trial counsel’s questions did 

not properly seek evidence of habit under state law and that decision is binding on this Court. See 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (federal habeas unavailable for violations of state 

law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). 

Under these circumstances, there was no violation of the right to confrontation. Wyatt has 

not met his burden in showing that this minor limitation of the testimony prejudiced him and 

denied him an opportunity to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.1 Nor has Wyatt 

 

1 No evidence has been offered that Rullamas had a habit or custom of telling defendants that he 

was trying to help them or that they could go home if they provided a statement. 

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shown that the evidentiary ruling deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial under due process. 

This claim is denied.

II. UNANIMITY JURY INSTRUCTION

Wyatt next argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte issue a unanimity 

instruction for both counts.

Legal Standard

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law is not cognizable in 

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Federal habeas relief is available 

for instructional error only if the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violate[d] due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Petitioner must show 

that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misapplied the instruction. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

72. “It is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must 

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id. A 

determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 

instruction in a way that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. 

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the court also must 

determine that the error had a substantial and injurious influence in determining the jury’s verdict, 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), before granting relief in habeas proceedings. 

Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47.

Criminal defendants in state court have no federal constitutional right to a unanimous jury 

verdict. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972) (rejecting Sixth Amendment right to 

challenge 10-2 state jury verdict); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359–63 (1972) (rejecting 

due process challenge to 9-3 state jury verdict). Similarly, “there is no general requirement that 

the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.” Schad v. 

Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 

(1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).

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Analysis 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Appellant argues that, as to both of the charged offenses, the court 

should, sua sponte, have instructed the jury that it had to agree 

unanimously “that the People have proved that the defendant 

committed at least one of [the acts charged] and you all agree on 

which act [he] committed.” (CALCRIM No. 3500.)

We disagree, for at least two separate and distinct reasons. First, 

and as our Supreme Court made clear recently in one of the leading 

cases on this issue, this sua sponte duty arises only “when the 

evidence suggests more than one discrete crime” and distinctly does 

not obtain “where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime 

but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was 

committed.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 1124, 1132 

(Russo), cited and quoted in the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 

3500 .)

Second, but clearly related to this statement of the rule, there is also 

no such sua sponte duty to instruct if the offense constitutes a 

“continuous course of conduct.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 

Cal.4th 342, 423.) As Division Five of this court has noted recentlyand doing so by quoting a decision of our Division Three-this 

exception arises “‘“when the acts are so closely connected that they 

form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one offense.”’” 

(People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 108, 115 (Napoles), 

quoting People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1303, 1309.) FN15

Both principles clearly apply here: the “roughhousing” with 

Reginald took place, according to all the testimony, exactly in the 

same room of the same apartment within an hour-or at the most two 

hours-of time on the same Sunday morning. Some of the 

“roughhousing” appellant described as forms of wrestling, i.e., 

“atomic elbow,” the “knee drop,” “coming off the top rope,” etc. It 

was, at least per appellant’s first recorded statement to the police, in 

connection with that latter “wrestling” maneuver that appellant’s hip 

came down on Reginald's stomach. (See ante p. 7.) This statement, 

together with the testimony of Dr. Crawford and the results of the 

autopsy on Reginald, makes clear that there was both a “continuous 

course of conduct” here, i.e., “roughhouse wrestling” and, in any 

event, only one “discrete crime.” (Russo, supra, at p. 1132.).

Wyatt, 2008 WL 258175, at *18 (footnotes omitted).

Because there is no federal constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, the trial court’s 

failure to sua sponte give the instruction was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, and Wyatt is therefore not entitled to habeas relief. See Barreto v. Martel, No. C 08-

2008 MHP, 2010 WL 546586, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010) (“Since a criminal defendant in a 

state prosecution is not entitled to a unanimous verdict at all under the federal Constitution, the 

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state court’s determination that an instruction on jury unanimity was unnecessary under state law

in the circumstances of the case cannot possibly be considered a violation of federal due 

process.”). 

III. CHILD ASSAULT HOMICIDE JURY INSTRUCTION

Wyatt contends that the jury instruction provided for child assault homicide, California 

Penal Code section 273ab(a), failed to instruct on the reasonable person test as required by the 

statute.

Analysis

The trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to § 273ab(a):

Now, the Defendant is charged in count two with killing a child 

under the age of eight by assaulting the child with force likely to 

produce great bodily injury.

To prove that the Defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must 

prove the following:

One, that the Defendant had the care or custody of the child who 

was under the age of eight;

Two, he did an act that by its nature would directly and probably 

result in the application of force to the child;

Three, he did that act willfully;

Four, the force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;

Five, when he acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a 

reasonable person to realize that his act, by its nature, would 

directly and probably result in great bodily injury to the child;

And six, when he acted, he had the present ability to apply force 

likely to produce great bodily injury to the child;

And seven, his act caused the child’s death.

RT at 1516-17 (emphasis added). 

The trial court then stated:

Someone commits an act willfully when he does it willingly or on 

purpose. It’s not required that he intend to break the law or hurt 

someone else, or gain any kind of advantage. 

Great bodily injury, as I said before, means significant or substantial 

physical injury. It’s an injury that is greater than minor or moderate 

harm. 

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An act causes death if: 

The death was the natural and probable consequence of the act;

The act was a direct and substantial factor in causing the death;

And the death wouldn’t have happened without the act.

The natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable 

person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. 

In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, you 

should consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

And a substantial factor, as I’ve used that term, is more than a trivial 

or remote factor. However, it doesn’t need to be the only factor that 

caused death.

RT at 1517-18 (emphasis added).

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim in its 2010 opinion:

Appellant’s argument that the court did not instruct the jury on the 

necessity of finding that the force used was such that a reasonable 

person would find it likely to produce great bodily injury does not 

hold up to scrutiny. The trial court certainly explained to the jury 

that child abuse homicide involves force that “was likely to produce 

great bodily injury” and that the jury could find appellant guilty of 

this count if it found that he “was aware of facts that would lead a 

reasonable person to realize that his act, by its nature would directly 

and probably result in great bodily injury to the child.” The court 

also told the jury that the child’s death must be the natural and 

probable consequence of the appellant’s act, and that a “natural and

probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is 

likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” In sum, the trial 

court correctly instructed the jury, under CALCRIM No. 820, that 

the force used must have appeared likely to a reasonable person to 

result in great bodily injury.

Wyatt, 2010 WL 5006753, at *18.

This decision was not unreasonable. The court noted that the jury instruction at issue twice 

referred to the “reasonable person” test. In closing argument the prosecutor also emphasized the 

reasonable person test. See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 438 (2004) (the arguments of 

counsel may clarify a jury instruction). The prosecutor stated:

The next element: A reasonable person would have realized that his 

act, by his nature, would directly and probably result in the great 

bodily injury of the child. Remember what I told you about the 

folks who wrote these instructions? I mean that’s wordy. That’s 

wordy. Basically, a reasonable person would know that by doing 

that to a child could result in great bodily injury. The defendant had 

the present ability to apply force likely to produce great bodily 

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injury.

RT at 1539. 

Wyatt has failed to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the 

instruction, especially as it repeatedly referred to the “reasonable person.” Even if there was an 

error with the jury instruction, it did not have a substantial and injurious influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict. This claim is denied.

IV. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE JURY INSTRUCTION

Wyatt argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct that criminal 

negligence could not support an assault conviction and thereby failed to inform the jury of all the 

elements for child assault homicide. He also argues that the trial court erred by not providing an 

instruction that injury alone is insufficient to establish an assault.

Analysis

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Here, in its instructions involving involuntary manslaughter, the 

court instructed the jury on the meaning of criminal negligence: 

“[M]ore than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in 

judgment. The person acts with criminal negligence when: [¶] he 

acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily 

injury....” The court’s instruction under CALCRIM No. 820 states 

that child abuse homicide involves force that “‘to a reasonable

person would be likely to produce great bodily injury,’” a degree of 

force that is not the same as that involving criminal negligence. 

Wyatt, 2010 WL 5006753, at *19 (alterations and omission in original). The appellate court found 

that the trial court was not required to issue a sua sponte instruction that a violation of section 

273ab cannot be based on criminal negligence and that there was no error in failing to instruct that 

injury alone is insufficient to establish an assault. Id.

The California Court of Appeal noted that the standard for child assault homicide is 

different than the standard for criminal negligence. The child assault homicide instruction 

contained the proper standard, and the different standard for criminal negligence was provided in 

the involuntary manslaughter instruction. Trial counsel did not request any additional instruction,

and Wyatt contends that the trial court should have sua sponte issued an instruction noting this 

difference.

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Wyatt has failed to show that even if the trial court erred in failing to note that criminal 

negligence could not support child assault homicide any error so infected the entire trial that the 

conviction violated due process. The child assault homicide instruction was correct, and Wyatt 

has not shown that there was any likelihood that the jury misapplied the instruction. Wyatt has 

not shown any error, let alone an error that had a substantial and injurious influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict. See Brecht. Nor is he entitled to habeas relief because the trial court failed to 

sua sponte instruct that injury alone is insufficient to establish an assault. There was an abundance 

of evidence that Wyatt used a great deal of force on the victim that a reasonable person would 

believe was likely to result in great bodily injury on a young child. Wyatt, 48 Cal. 4th at 785.2 

This claim is denied.3

V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Wyatt next argues there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for child 

assault homicide.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the 

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, 

see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas 

relief, see id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings . . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

 

2

The 2008 California Court of Appeal opinion noted that misstatements by the prosecutor and the 

failure by trial counsel to request an instruction explaining that criminal negligence cannot support 

the conviction increased the likelihood that the jury convicted Wyatt with insufficient evidence. 

Wyatt, 2008 WL 258175, at *15 n.11. The California Supreme Court reversed this decision, and

Wyatt has not shown that the California Supreme Court denial was objectively unreasonable to 

warrant habeas relief under the exacting standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

3

To the extent that Wyatt argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request these 

instructions, he is not entitled to relief because he cannot show prejudice.

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that the Third Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the 

deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the 

evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing 

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

Analysis 

In 2008, the California Court of Appeal found that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the conviction for child assault homicide. Wyatt, 2008 WL 258175, at *12-15. The 

California Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeal had misapplied the mens rea 

standard for assault under state law as described in People v. Williams, 26 Cal. 4th 779 (2001). 

Wyatt, 48 Cal. 4th at 778. The California Supreme Court stated:

Under Williams, a defendant may commit an assault without 

realizing he is harming the victim, but the prosecution must prove 

the defendant was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable 

person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally, and 

probably result from the defendant’s conduct. Here, substantial 

evidence established that defendant knew he was striking his young 

son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow, and that he used an 

amount of force a reasonable person would realize was likely to 

result in great bodily injury.

Id. at 779.

The California Supreme Court recounted the evidence at trial including the physical 

evidence, the medical expert testimony concerning the injuries to the victim, the testimony of the 

victim’s mother, the testimony of Wyatt’s girlfriend, Wyatt’s tape-recorded interviews, and 

Wyatt’s own testimony at trial. The court then found there was sufficient evidence to support the 

conviction for child abuse homicide:

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Based on the foregoing evidence, a rational jury could find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Reginald, who was 14 months old, died at the 

hands of defendant, a caretaker who intentionally used force that a 

reasonable person would believe was likely to cause great bodily 

injury. (Williams, supra, 26 Cal. 4th at p. 788, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

114, 29 P.3d 197; Albritton, supra, 67 Cal. App. 4th at p. 658, 79 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 169.) First, defendant’s own statements furnished 

substantial evidence that he intentionally acted to strike Reginald 

(People v. Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 214, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

908, 865 P.2d 704; Rocha, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 899, 92 Cal. Rptr. 

172, 479 P.2d 372); by his own account, defendant was fully aware 

he was striking his son a number of times with his fist, forearm, 

knee, and elbow. Second, the physical evidence amply showed that 

Reginald suffered extensive injuries, including internal bleeding at 

multiple sites, multiple lacerations to the liver, acute rib fractures, 

and cerebral swelling. Third, expert testimony established that 

Reginald’s injuries were likely caused by multiple impacts or 

instances of blunt force trauma, that blunt force trauma does not 

necessarily result in external bruising, especially in softer areas like

the abdomen, and that Reginald’s injuries were similar to the types 

of injuries seen only in the most serious events, such as when 

children are hit by cars or are in car crashes. Consequently, even 

though Reginald’s body lacked external signs of significant trauma, 

the nature and extensiveness of his internal injuries provided 

sufficient evidence that defendant used an amount of force a 

reasonable person would believe was likely to result in great bodily 

injury to a young child. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 77 Cal. App. 

4th at pp. 794-795, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888; Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.

App. 4th at p. 656, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169.) On this record, we have 

no trouble concluding that substantial evidence supports defendant’s 

conviction of child abuse homicide.

Wyatt, 48 Cal. 4th at 784-85.

Wyatt’s argument regarding the required intent for assault under state law was rejected by 

the California Supreme Court. To the extent Wyatt argues that the California Supreme Court was 

incorrect in its analysis of state law, he is not entitled to habeas relief. The Jackson standard must 

be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by 

state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; see, e.g., Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 

2011) (concluding it was not unreasonable, in light of Oregon case law, for Oregon court to 

conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner intended to kill 

his victim based on proof that he anally penetrated several victims with knowledge that he could 

infect them with AIDS). The California Supreme Court’s ruling on the state law issue is binding 

on this Court. 

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However, “the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove 

the offense is purely a matter of federal law,” Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2064, yet, Wyatt has not 

shown that the California Supreme Court was objectively unreasonable in finding sufficient 

evidence to support the conviction in light of the high bar for Jackson claims. Evidence was 

presented that the fourteen-month-old victim suffered extensive injuries at multiple places on his 

body. He had internal bleeding, lacerations of the liver, rib fractures, and cerebral swelling. 

Expert testimony demonstrated that the victim’s injuries were likely caused by multiple impacts or 

multiple instances of blunt force trauma. Wyatt’s statements to police recounted that he had 

intentionally used force that a reasonable person would believe was likely to cause great bodily 

injury. While Wyatt testified that his statements to the police were not accurate and that he 

accidentally fell on his son once and then accidentally tripped and dropped him, the jury did not 

credit this testimony or the testimony of the defense expert witness. Viewing all of this evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found the essential elements of 

the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Wyatt has failed to meet the high threshold of a sufficiency 

of the evidence claim and he is not entitled to habeas relief.

VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD W. WYATT,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARION SPEARMAN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00984-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on November 20, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Reginald W. Wyatt ID: #:F33546

Correctional Training Facility (CTF)

Highway 101 North

P.O. Box 705

Soledad, CA 93960 

Dated: November 20, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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