Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02441/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02441-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond Pekah
Appellant
State of Oklahoma
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE 

RAYMOND PEKAH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALrgiited Scares Court of Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

OCT 24 1Q90 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. No. 88-2441 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

(D. C. No. CIV-87-1125-T) 

(W. D. Okla.) 

' 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges 

Petitioner Raymond Pekah (Pekah) appeals from the denial of 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus sought under 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2254. He urges reversal on numerous grounds discussed below. 

We affirm. 

I 

Factual and Procedural Background 

Pekah was convicted in the District Court of Comanche County, 

Oklahoma, of robbery with firearms after former conviction of two 

or more felonies. He is currently serving a 40-year sentence. 

The evidence against Pekah may be summarized as follows. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 1 
The bartender and two patrons of Glen's Lounge, in Lawton, 

Oklahoma, testified that Pekah was one of two men who robbed the 

lounge at approximately 2:30 p.m. on July 18, 1981, of roughly 

$200 by using a pistol and a knife and threatening to kill them. 

See Tr. 14-18; 43-45; 65-69. The arresting officers testified 

that they arrested Pekah in an alley about two blocks from Glen's 

Lounge, shortly after they were alerted to the robbery. Pekah fit 

the description of one of the suspects who had committed the armed 

robbery. In addition, $210.70 was found in a backyard located 

within twenty-five feet from the place where Pekah was arrested. 

A knife similar to the one allegedly used in the robbery was found 

on Pekah's person, but the gun was never located. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, asserting four grounds of 

alleged error. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 

the conviction on direct appeal, remanding for a correction of the 

judgment and sentence. Pekah v. State, 660 P.2d 652 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1983). Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction 

relief in the state court raising eight grounds of alleged error, 

including the four grounds argued on direct appeal. The district 

court denied the petitioner's application for relief, and the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on all grounds except 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which it remanded to 

the district court for further consideration in light of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In its opinion, 

the court noted that three of the grounds raised by the petitioner 

could have been properly brought on direct appeal but were not. 

Thus, the court held that the failure to raise these issues on 

direct appeal barred their consideration on 

2 

post-conviction 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 2 
review. Pekah v. State, No. PC-84-767 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 

1985). On remand, the district court found that Pekah failed to 

support his ineffective assistance claim. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. Pekah v. State, No. 

PC-85-149 (Okla. Crim. App. May 2, 1985). 

The petitioner presents the same eight grounds for relief in 

this federal habeas action that he raised in his application for 

state post-conviction relief. In its Memorandum Opinion, the 

district court concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate 

cause or prejudice as required by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 

(1977), and therefore that petitioner's first three claims were 

procedurally barred from review. (Memorandum Opinion at p.4.) 

The court then addressed petitioner's remaining claims and denied 

the requested habeas relief with respect to each one.

1 

II 

Procedurally Barred Claims 

Petitioner raises three claims in his federal habeas petition 

that were rejected by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and 

by the federal district court, because they were not raised before 

the state court on direct appeal. Those issues were: 

1 

1. Prosecutorial misconduct during the trial and 

in argument during the sentencing phase;2 

The District Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was 

not necessary because the issues could be resolved on the existing 

record. Memorandum Opinion at p.l. Pekah does not challenge this 

ruling on appeal. 

2 

We note that most of the allegations of prosecutorial 

misconduct addressed under this heading, styled as proposition I 

of petitioner's brief, are also raised under other argument 

headings of petitioner's brief. To the extent those claims are 

not procedurally barred, we address their merits infra. 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 3 
2. Alleged error in admitting statements made· by 

the defendant while in custody; 

3. Failure to give a circumstantial evidence 

instruction due to insufficiency of the evidence. 

Pekah argues that he should not be procedurally barred from 

raising these issues in his habeas petition. 

A state prisoner barred by procedural default from litigating 

a claim in state court may not litigate that claim in a federal 

habeas proceeding unless he can show cause for, and actual 

prejudice from, the default. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 

(1982) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)). The 

cause and prejudice test applies to procedural defaults on appeal 

as well as to those at trial. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

489 (1986); ~ also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). We 

must first determine whether Oklahoma has a valid procedural bar 

and whether it has applied the bar in this case. Morishita v. 

Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Oklahoma has a valid procedural rule which requires that 

alleged error at trial must be raised on direct appeal or it will 

be barred from consideration by the state courts in further 

proceedings unless the court finds a ground which, for sufficient 

reason, was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the prior 

application. Jones v. State, 704 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1985); Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); 

Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1080, 1086 (1981). If the state courts 

waive the procedural bar, however, and decide the claim on the 

merits, a federal court will not be barred from a substantive 

review of those claims. See Braiser v. Douglas, 815 F.2d 64, 65 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 4 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1023 (1987). Here, the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that these three claims of 

alleged error raised by the petitioner were procedurally barred 

and refused to consider their merits. Pekah v. 

No. PC-84-767 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 1985). 

reasserts the procedural bar in this appeal. 

Oklahoma, 

The state 

Petitioner argues that the cause for his failure to object to 

the admission of his custodial statement, or to request a 

circumstantial evidence instruction at trial, and his failure to 

raise these issues on direct appeal was the ineffectiveness of his 

trial and appellate counsel. 3 Obviously, many procedural defaults 

are attributable to counsel. In such cases, however, ineffective 

assistance of counsel is sufficient "cause" to excuse the 

procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes only if counsel's 

performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-part 

test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 4 

See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Furthermore, the 

3 

The state argues, and the district court concluded, that 

Pekah has made no attempt to allege cause for his failure to raise 

these issues on direct appeal. We do not agree. While it is true 

that neither Pekah's habeas petition nor his brief on appeal 

contain much more than conclusory allegations of cause, we believe 

that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, if 

established, is sufficient to meet his burden under the cause 

prong of Wainwright v. Sykes. 

4 

The two-prong test of Strickland requires that petitioner 

first demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so deficient 

that he was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the 

Sixth Amendment. Second, he must prove that this deficiency 

prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 692. We 

agree with the Ninth Circuit that if petitioner establishes 

prejudice under Strickland, supra, then he also satisfies the 

prejudice prong of Wainwright. See Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 

1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1989). We address Pekah's ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim infra. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 5 
exhaustion doctrine requires that a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel be presented to the state courts as an 

independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a 

procedural default. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89. 

Here, petitioner alleged in his application for 

post-conviction relief in state court that he was denied his 

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The 

state court reviewed the merits of petitioner's claim, and denied 

relief on that ground. Therefore, petitioner has properly 

exhausted his state court remedies as to this claim. However, 

because we have concluded that petitioner has failed to prove his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see infra, we conclude 

that he has failed to demonstate cause for the procedural default. 

Furthermore, since the requirements of "cause" and "prejudice" are 

conjunctive, and must both be shown, we need not address the 

prejudice prong of Wainwright. See,~, Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. at 134 n.43. Therefore, the district court correctly refused 

to consider petitioner's three issues not raised on direct appeal. 

We now turn to the merits. 

III. 

Remaining Claims 

A. Use of Unsworn Testimony 

Pekah first argues that the prosecutor's use of unsworn 

testimony to impeach an alibi witness was misconduct that resulted 

in fundamental error. In the alternative, Pekah argues that he 

was denied his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 6 
witnesses against him when the prosecutor referred to statements 

made by an uncalled witness. 5 

The alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred during crossexamination of petitioner's common-law wife who testified for the 

defense as an alibi witness. The prosecutor attempted to impeach 

her testimony with contradictory statements of an uncalled 

w1. "t ness. 6 

5 

On direct appeal the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

refused to address the merits of this claim because petitioner's 

counsel "did not make a specific objection [or] request an 

admonishment [from the court] " Pekah v. Oklahoma, 660 

P.2d 652, 654 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (citations omitted). The 

last state court that addressed this claim, however, did not rest 

its judgment on the procedural default. See Pekah v. State, No. 

PC-84-767, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 1985). The 

federal district court reached the merits of Pekah's claim without 

further discussion. 

It is now settled that a procedural default will not preclude 

consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last 

state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly 

states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Harris 

v. Reed, 489 u.s. 255, 263, 109 s.ct. 1038, 1042-43 (1989) 

(adopting the "plain statement" rule of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 

1032, 1042 (1983), for habeas cases). Thus, we hold that it was 

not error for the federal district court to reach the merits of 

this claim. In any case, the state has not challenged that ruling 

on appeal and therefore has waived the procedural bar. Cf. 

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 n.12 (1981); Jenkins v. 

Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n.l (1980). 

6 

The testimony in question follows: 

"[prosecutor] Q: Okay. And after Raymond left, you and 

Sandra went over to the Caprice Lounge, didn't you? 

A. Where he was at. 

Q: What? 

A: I say where he was at. 

Q: Well, now, didn't you go there, not find Raymond at the 

Caprice Lounge? 

A: No. He was leaving. 

Q: You know why Sandra would have said that you went to the 

Caprice Lounge and --

MR. STEIN: Objection, yhour Honor. 

Q: did not find Raymond there? 

A: No. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 7 
The appropriate standard of review for a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct on a writ of habeas corpus is "the narrow 

one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory 

power." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)); see Coleman 

v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 

U.S. 909 (1987). The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecutor's 

actions were 50 egregious that they rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair. "[T)he touchstone of due process analysis 

in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of 

the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. II Smith 

v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Fairness of the trial is 

(Footnote continued): 

THE COURT: Be sustained. 

Q: (By Mr. Perrine) And after you went to the Caprice and 

you --- how long did you stay at the Caprice? 

A: Not long. 

Q: And you went over to the 7-Eleven? 

A: Uh-huh. 

Q: Hadn't met up with Raymond yet, had you? 

A: Yeah. . 

Q: In fact, you didn't meet up with Raymond until about a 

block before -- MR. STEIN: Objection, your Honor. 

Q: he had -- MR. STEIN: I believe the witness testified that 

she met up with Raymond, went to the 7-Eleven. 

THE COURT: Be overruled. This is crossexamination. Go ahead. 

Q: (By Mr. Perrine) In fact, you didn't meet up with 

Raymond until about a block before you were stopped by the 

police, isn't that correct? 

A: No. 

Q: After you left the Caprice, did you walk around and look 

for a ride and you didn't see Raymond until you started back 

home, which is right before you got arrested? 

A: No. 

Q: Isn't that correct? You disagree with what Sandra 

A: Uh-huh. 

Q: -- says? 

(Tr. at 120-21). 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 8 
not generally determined on the basis of the prosecutor's 

statements or conduct standing alone, but must be viewed in the 

context of the whole trial. Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 749 

(10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 

(1985)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 373 (1989). 

We agree with the district court's conclusion that the 

prosecutor's improper reference to unsworn testimony did not 

prejudice petitioner in the overall context of this trial. The 

prosecutor's statements here were not the kind that plausibly 

"could have tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution." 

Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1509 (10th Cir. 1987). The 

evidence used to convict petitioner consisted, inter alia, of the 

uncontradicted testimony of three eye-witnesses who identified him 

as one of the robbers (Tr. at 17-18, 45, 65, 70, 72). Against 

that background, we do not believe that the prosecutor's improper 

statements prejudicially affected the jury's ability to judge the 

evidence fairly. See Young, 470 U.S. at 12. 

Petitioner argues in the alternative that he was denied his 

Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 

against him when the prosecutor made the improper references to 

out-of-court statements. Assuming, arguendo, that the 

prosecutor's conduct constitutes a violation of the Confrontation 

Clause, cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), we are persuaded 

that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (harmless error 

analysis on this basis applies to Confrontation Clause errors). 

In comparison to the strength of the evidence against Pekah, the 

prosecutor's comments appear insignificant. The effort to impeach 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 9 
petitioner's alibi witness was at most a minor part of the 

prosecution's case. While we do not commend the prosecutor's 

conduct, we believe the error was inconsequential here. 

B. Inflanonatory Cononents 

Pekah next argues that comments made by the prosecutor during 

the sentencing stage were designed to inflame the jury and 

increase his sentence, depriving him of a fair trial. 7 As we have 

noted, our review of a state prosecutor's allegedly prejudicial 

conduct is reviewed on the narrow test of due process, and not on 

a standard of supervisory power. For reasons that follow, we 

conclude that this standard is not met here. 

Pekah complains of three incidents that occurred during the 

sentencing stage of a bifurcated proceeding. 8 First, petitioner 

objects to two allegedly improper references to parole. The first 

incident occurred during the state's questioning of a case manager 

at a correctional center where petitioner previously had been 

7 

We note that although defense counsel failed to make the 

necessary objections to all of the allegedly improper remarks of 

counsel, we nevertheless may consider them because the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed them on direct appeal. See 

Pekah v. Oklahoma, 660 P.2d at 654 ("[W]e find that none of the 

statements violated a substantial right of the appellant that 

would require reversal or modification."). "If a state court has 

reached the merits of a claim, a federal habeas court may do the 

same despite the existence of a state procedural bar." Andrews v. 

Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1266 n.8 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 

485 U.S. 919 (1988). This is true even though the state court 

reviewed the remarks only for "fundamental error" as it did here. 

Brasier v. Douglas, 815 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

483 U.S. 1023 (1987); Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209 (10th 

Cir. 1983) . 

8 

In Oklahoma, following a verdict of guilty the jury 

determines the appropriate punishment (within limits fixed by the 

applicable law) in noncapital as well as capital cases. See Okla. 

Stat. tit. 22, § 926 (1981). 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 10 
incarcerated. The purpose of the testimony was to establish one 

f . . . t' 9 o petitoner's prior convic ions. We agree with the district 

court's conclusion that: 

[t]his uninvited reference to parole by the witness does 

not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness needed 

to support a federal habeas claim. The witness 

volunteered the information. It was not requested 

explicitly or impliedly by the prosecutor nor was 

Petitioner's parole status emphasized subtly or openly 

by the prosecutor in subsequent examination of the 

witness. 

(Memorandum Opinion at p. 11.) 

The second reference to parole occurred on recross-

. t. f t' . lO examina ion o pe itioner. We are not persuaded that the 

9 

After laying the proper foundation, the prosecutor continued: 

Q: You have had him out there on another occasion, have you 

not? 

A: Yes, sir; I believe we had him in 1979, I think. We 

received him in August of '79, I believe. And he paroled in 

December of '79, I think. 

( Tr . at 15 7 ) . 

10 

The relevant portion of the transcript is as follows: 

DIRECT EXAMINATION 

BY MR. STEIN: 

Q: Okay, Mr. Pekah, how much time have you spent in prison? 

A: Counting the years, about five and a half. 

(Tr. at 164) . 

CROSS-EXAMINATION 

[by the prosecutor] Q: Now, six felony convictions I 

want to make sure I've got this right. You spend five and a 

half years in prison; that's it? 

A: Yes, sir. 

Q: Five and a half years for six felony convictions? 

A: Yes. 

(Tr. at 166-67). 

REDIRECT EXAMINATION 

BY MR. STEIN [defense counsel] Q: Let's go 

spent spent "only" five and half years in 

(Footnote continued 

11 

to you only 

prison. It's 

on next page) 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 11 
prosecutor's rhetorical question, viewed in context, "so infected 

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process." Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. The amount of 

time petitioner spent in prison was first raised by petitioner, on 

direct and then again on re-direct. It was not until re-cross, 

after petitioner had raised the issue and emphasized it, that the 

prosecutor made the allegedly improper comment. In addition, 

defense counsel's objection was properly sustained by the trial 

court. Moreover, the prosecutor's comment was invited by the 

defense. Although that fact alone does not purge the comment of 

its impropriety, it may affect the context in which the jury views 

the improper statement. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 

12 (1984). Here, we are confident that the prosecutor's comment, 

when viewed in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding, 

did not impair the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. 

Pekah's second and third claims of misconduct concern witness 

testimony and the prosecutor's closing argument at the sentencing 

stage regarding petitioner's future dangerousness. Pekah first 

objects to the prosecutor's inquiry of a policeman witness whether 

(Footnote continued): 

easy for him to say, isn't it? 

A: Yeah, it is. 

(Tr. at 168). 

RECROSS-EXAMINATION 

BY MR. PERRINE: 

Q: It may be easy for me to say five and a half years only, 

Mr. Pekah, but do you mind if I get a little incensed when I 

see that you've been convicted of six felonies and you --

MR. STEIN: Objection. 

Q: haven't spent up to a year in prison on 

MR. STEIN: Badgering the witness. 

Q: each one of them? 

objection. 

(Tr. at 169). 

THE COURT: Just a minute. I'll sustain the 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 12 
he thought, based on petitioner's criminal record, the witness 

noticed a trend by petitioner to go from property-type crimes to 

11 

more dangerous crimes, and his affirmative response. 

We agree with the district court that the admitted evidence 

of Pekah's criminal history is relevant to factors that the jury 

may properly consider. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 

563-64 (1984) (full information on defendant's life and 

characteristics relevant for sentencing). Evidence of Pekah's 

criminal history, including evidence of a trend toward more 

dangerous crimes, is relevant to the 

determination. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 

("[A]ny sentencing authority must predict 

probable future conduct when it engages 

determining what punishment to impose."). 

a 

jury's sentencing 

U.S. 262, 275 (1976) 

convicted person's 

in the process of 

In any event, the 

nature of the inquiry and response was not such as to amount to a 

denial of due process. 

We likewise find no merit to Pekah's third and final claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct. During his closing argument, the 

prosecutor commented on petitioner's future dangerousness along 

11 

The witness testified as follows: 

Q: If you [have] known him since you were in grade school 

and also in your police --

[interruption by the court] 

(cont'd): and also in your police activities for 

least the last ten years, have you noticed a trend by 

Pekah to go from property-type crimes now into -- he's 

been convicted of armed robbery -- into crimes which are 

becoming more dangerous to the citizens of our community? 

A: Yes, sir. 

the, 

Mr. 

just 

now 

(Tr. at 162-63). 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 13 
the same 1 . 12 ines. As before, we agree with the district court's 

conclusion that these remarks did not render the sentencing phase 

of petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair. It is well-settled 

that the prosecutor may comment on evidence properly before the 

jury. "A prosecutor in closing argument has a right to discuss 

the evidence from his standpoint and all inferences and deductions 

arising therefrom." Smith v. State, 727 P.2d 1366, 1373-74 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); 

Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d at 1239. Here, five prior convictions 

were admitted in evidence during the sentencing stage of the 

bifurcated trial. We cannot agree that the comments by the 

prosecutor caused a denial of due process. 

C. Ambiguous Jury Verdict 

Third, Pekah argues that he was deprived of his right to a 

fair and impartial jury verdict. The state trial court, he says, 

should have declared a mistrial or sent the jury back to the jury 

room for further deliberation after the jury foreman incorrectly 

signed both the "guilty" and the "not guilty" jury forms. We 

agree with the federal district court's ruling that, despite the 

12 

The prosecutor commented as follows: 

Most of those other crimes, if you'll notice, were 

what we call property crimes. They're not against 

a person, they're against someone's property. 

They're stealing things. He's now graduated into 

the class of "Let's go hurt somebody" type crimes. 

And what's to keep him from graduating on in the 

next time he gets scared or he gets mad and angry, 

frustrated, the whole works -- he says he's a, he's 

a drunk -- well, he gets drunk and loses his temper 

or control and kills somebody. 

(Tr. at 17 4) • 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 14 
formal error, petitioner's federally protected rights were not 

violated. Memorandum Opinion at 16. 

The record shows that after the jury had announced that they 

had reached a verdict, the state trial judge discovered that the 

jury foreman had signed both verdict forms. After he realized 

what had happened, the judge immediately asked the foreman: 

"Which of these two verdict forms am I to be governed by?" The 

foreman replied, "The guilty one, Sir." (Tr. at 144). The judge 

then polled the individual jurors to determine whether each agreed 

that the guilty verdict was the proper verdict. Each juror 

responded affirmatively. (Tr. at 144-45). The court next asked 

each juror whether the "not guilty" verdict form should be 

disregarded, to which each responded affirmatively. (Tr. at 145-

47). Finally, the court handed the "not guilty" verdict form back 

to the jury foreman and instructed him to confirm in writing that 

the "not guilty" form should be disregarded. The jury foreman 

then wrote, "Void, we find him guilty" on the not guilty verdict 

form. 

Pekah refers to one portion of the transcript which, read in 

isolation, suggests that one of the jurors was equivocal about the 

verdict. When read in context, however, it is clear that the 

juror in question was only confused briefly about the court's 

polling procedures. 13 The unanimous intent of the jurors was made 

13 

The relevant portion of the transcript reads as follows: 

THE COURT: All right, sir, are you the foreman, Mr. 

Banks? 

JUROR BANKS: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Has the jury reached a verdict? 

JUROR BANKS: Yes, we have, sir. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 15 
manifest. Petitioner's argument is therefore without merit. 

D. Excessive Sentence 

Petitioner's fourth ground for federal habeas relief is that 

(Footnote continued): 

THE COURT: Would you hand it to the bailiff, please. 

(Short time later) 

THE COURT: District Court of Comanche County, State of 

Oklahoma. State of Oklahoma vs. Raymond Pekah. CRF-81-459. 

Verdict. We, the Jury, empaneled and sworn to try the issues 

in the above entitled cause, do, upon our oaths, find the 

defendant, Raymond Pekah, guilty of Robbery With Firearm. 

Signed Raymond Banks, Foreman. 

If this is the verdict --hunh--of each of you, please so 

indicate by nodding your head in the affirmative. If not, in 

the negative. Now, I have a problem. I see that you have 

signed the other verdict form. Which of these two verdict 

forms am I to be governed by? 

JUROR BANKS: The guilty one, sir. 

THE COURT: Uh--okay--

JUROR BANKS: Maybe I misread the other one. 

THE COURT: If you ---if you agree with that, Mrs. 

Coggins, will you nod your head in the affirmative. 

JUROR COGGINS: (Indicated yes.) 

THE COURT: Miss Warner. 

[et cetera; whereupon each of the remaining jurors nodded 

affirmatively] 

THE COURT: Do you wish to examine the verdict forms? 

(Later). 

MR. STEIN: (At bench) Move for mistrial anyway. 

THE COURT: Okay, as I understand it, Mr. Banks, the 

verdict form that indicates not guilty is to be disregarded? 

JUROR BANKS: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: If you are in agreement with that statement, 

Miss Coggins, nod your head in the affirmative. 

JUROR COGGINS: (Nodded). 

THE COURT: If you do not agree, it should be in the 

negative. All right, Miss Warner. 

JUROR COGGINS: Did I --what---what---did I do it right? 

THE COURT: Well, it depends. Okay, last time I 

canvassed each of you, it was on the guilty verdict. 

JUROR COGGINS: Right. 

THE COURT: Now then, I'm simply---! asked Mr. Banks if 

I should disregard the not guilty--

JUROR COGGINS: And that's right. 

THE COURT: -- and he said yes. 

JUROR COGGINS: Should disregard it. 

his 

THE COURT: I'm--I'm simply asking now if you agree with 

JUROR COGGINS: Yes. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 16 
the 40-year sentence imposed upon him was excessive because 

evidence of two prior convictions was improperly used to enhance 

his punishment. Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor 

repeatedly referred to a sixth conviction which was not properly 

before the jury. That conviction had been withdrawn because the 

judgment was not entered until after Pekah committed the crime at 

issue. (Tr. at 163-64). We address these arguments in turn. 

Pekah first argues that a 1972 conviction for second degree 

burglary was improperly admitted because the Judgment and Sentence 

(Ex. 1; Tr. at 184) does not conclusively show that Pekah was 

informed of and waived his right to 14 appeal. Beyond that, 

however, petitioner has failed to recite any facts that might 

support his argument. His application for federal habeas relief 

makes no further averment to support his claim of not being 

advised of his right to appeal. See IR., Item 1 at 9-11. In the 

(Footnote continued): 

(Tr. 

14 

13, 

THE COURT: statement that it should be 

JUROR COGGINS: Yes. 

THE COURT: disregarded; so nod your head in the 

affirmative. 

JUROR COGGINS: (Nodded). 

at 143-46). 

The Judgment and Sentence, filed in state court on January 

1972, states in relevant part that: 

Raymond Lee Pekah by and with his attorney Allen Sasser 

appeared and is present in person with his counsel before the 

bar of said court for arraignment upon the charge contained 

in information in said court, and thereupon said information 

was read to said defendant Raymond Lee Pekah and the court 

explained fully to him the nature and cause of accusation 

against him, and the consequences of his plea and also all 

his rights .... 

(emphasis added). 

The judgment then recites the entry of Pekah's plea of 

guilty, inter alia. 

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absence of any showing suggesting otherwise, we agree with the 

federal district court's rejection of this claim. See Johnson v. 

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1958) (state court judgment carries 

presumption of regularity). 

Second, Pekah challenges the use for purposes of enhancement 

of two convictions that were entered on the same date as a result 

of guilty pleas to the same statutory violation, concealing stolen 

property. Pekah argues that the enhancement statute, Okla. Stat. 

tit. 21, § 51(B), prohibits the use of more than one conviciton 

arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. That much is 

correct. Because the record adequately shows, however, that the 

two convictions in question were for unrelated crimes, 

petitioner's claim has no merit. (Tr. at 160-61). The fact that 

the judgments were entered on the same day is of no consequence. 

See Harris v. State, 713 P.2d 601, 602 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). 

Pekah's final excessive sentence claim concerns the 

prosecutor's argument to the jury at the close of the sentencing 

stage of the trial. Pekah argues that the prosecutor improperly 

referred to his sixth conviction which had previously been 

withdrawn because it occurred before the crime for which 

petitioner was charged here. (Tr. at 163-64). We first note that 

two of the complained of references occurred before defense 

counsel moved to strike the sixth convicion. (See Tr. at 148, 

150). We also note that trial counsel made no objection to the 

prosecutor's later references to that conviction. (See Tr. at 

169, 170, 174). We review petitioner's claims for fundamental 

unfairness. Under that standard, petitioner's claims are without 

merit. Although we agree that the three references to Pekah's 

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Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 18 
. sixth conviction that occurred after the defense motion to strike 

were improper, they were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 

federal habeas relief. Five prior convictions were properly 

admitted and only two were required to enhance Pekah's sentence. 

In that situation, improper references to a sixth felony 

conviction were only marginally prejudicial, if at all, and 

petitioner's constitutional claim fails. 

Finally, we emphasize that each of the components of Pekah's 

excessive sentence claim is essentially a question of state law 

which does not warrant federal habeas relief unless the alleged 

error deprived petitioner of a federal right. See Pulley v. 

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1984); 28 u.s.c. § 2254(a) (1982). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate error of such magnitude. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Pekah next argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel at his trial and on 

direct appeal. He bases his claim on the following alleged errors 

by trial counsel, and the corresponding failure of his appellate 

counsel to pursue some of those on direct appeal: failure to make 

certain objections; failure to follow up on sustained objections 

by requesting appropriate limiting instructions; failure to make 

certain motions; and failure to request a specific jury 

instruction. 

In reviewing petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, this court is guided by the Supreme Court's two-part test 

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

First, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance 

was deficient, that is "that counsel's representation fell below 

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Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 19 
an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Judicial 

scrutiny of counsel's perfonnance must be "highly deferential." 

Id. at 689. "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

'might be considered sound trial stategy.'" Id. (quoting Michel 

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955)). 

Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficiency was 

prejudicial to the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. The 

burden is on the defendant to prove actual prejudice; it is not 

enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 693; 

TM also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169-70 (1982). 

Thus, the defendant must demonstrate "that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undennine confidence in 

the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the trial and 

Pekah's specific allegations of attorney error and conclude that 

the complained of omissions do not fall "outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690. First, we disagree with Pekah's claim that trial counsel's 

failure to follow up on the sustained objection to the 

prosecutor's improper 

objectively unreasonable. 

to request a limiting 

reference to unsworn testimony was 

Although it might have been preferable 

instruction, we are not convinced that 

20 

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counsel's failure to do so constitutes incompetence. Likewise, 

Pekah's claim that counsel should have moved for a mistrial at that 

juncture is without foundation. The prosecutor's remarks were 

improper, but it is apparent from the record that Pekah greatly 

exaggerates their prejudicial effect. Furthermore, it is entirely 

possible that counsel's comparatively minimal response to the 

prosecutor's questions was the product of a strategic decision. We 

will not second guess counsel's trial strategy on a petition for 

federal habeas relief. 

Pekah next complains that trial counsel failed to object to the 

allegedly inflammatory references made by the prosecutor during the 

sentencing stage of the trial. The record clearly shows, however, 

that counsel did object to one of those questions by the prosecutor 

and the court sustained the objection. (Tr. at 168-69). While it is 

true that counsel did not object in the other instances the 

uninvited reference to parole, the opinion testimony -regarding Pekah's 

trend toward more dangerous crimes, and the prosecutor's closing 

arguments regarding Pekah's future dangerousness -- the record does 

not support the conclusion that these omissions show objectively 

unreasonable exercises of judgment. Accordingly, we reject 

petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on those 

grounds. 

Pekah's raises his final two ineffective assistance arguments for 

the first time on appeal to this court, and we therefore cannot review 

them. 15 See Gundy v. United States, 728 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 

15 

Pekah assigns error to trial counsel's failure to object to 

the introduction into evidence of a custodial statement allegedly 

made without the benefit of Miranda warnings, (Tr. at 102-105), 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

21 

Appellate Case: 88-2441 Document: 010110064828 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 21 
1984); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ("It is 

the general rule, or course, that a federal appellate court does not 

consider an issue not passed upon below."). 

Finally, we agree with the finding of the federal district court 

that petitioner has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the 

Strickland test as to any aspect of his ineffective assistance claim: 

This Court has reviewed the Petitioner's trial court 

record. The evidence used to convict Petitioner was the 

testimony of three eye-witnesses who identified him as one 

of the robbers (TR-17-18, 45, 65, 70, 72); testimony that 

approximately $210.00 $220.00 was taken in the armed 

robbery (TR-15); testimony describing the clothing worn by 

one of the robbers (TR-20-21; 45-47; 63); testimony that 

Petitioner was wearing clothing similar to the description 

of one of the robbers when near the robbery site close to 

the time of the robbery (TR-7, 77-79, 81); testimony that 

when arrested Petitioner was carrying a knife (TR-80) and 

that a knife was used in the robbery (TR-14); testimony that 

an amount of money, close to the amount taken in the 

robbery, was found in the same vicinity where the Petitioner 

was arrested (TR-87, 95). In light of the evidence 

presented by the prosecution, the Court is unable to find 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the 

trial would have been different. 

(Memorandum Opinion at 21.) 

The judgment is AFFIRMED.· 

(Footnote continued): 

Entered for the Court 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

Chief Judge 

and to counsel's failure to request a circumstantial evidence 

instruction. (See~, Tr. at 49). Pekah further argues that he 

was denied effective assistance of counsel when his appellate 

counsel failed to raise these errors on direct appeal. 

We are troubled by counsel's failure to raise these alleged 

errors in the state courts. However, it is possible that Pekah's 

trial counsel made a deliberate strategic decision not to draw 

undue attention to the statement by challenging the police 

officer's testimony on cross-examination. Similarly, the decision 

to request a particular instruction "is within an attorney's 

tactical discretion." Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1235 (10th 

Cir. 1986). 

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