Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05025/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mohamed Tawhid Al-Saffy
Appellant
John F. Kerry
Appellee
Thomas J. Vilsack
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 11, 2016 Decided July 1, 2016

No. 15-5025

MOHAMED TAWHID AL-SAFFY,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY,

U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE AND JOHN F. KERRY, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-01562)

Susan Laiken Kruger argued the cause for appellant. On 

the briefs was Alan Lescht. 

Damon W. Taaffe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Vincent H. 

Cohen Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, 

and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: TATEL and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #15-5025 Document #1622694 Filed: 07/01/2016 Page 1 of 26
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Mohamed Tawid Al-Saffy filed

complaints with both the Department of Agriculture and the 

Department of State alleging employment discrimination on 

the basis of religion and national origin, and retaliation for 

asserting those discrimination claims. Dissatisfied with the 

agencies’ processes, he filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e et seq. Determining whether Al-Saffy’s lawsuit was 

properly brought requires us to navigate a quagmire of 

procedural rules. Fortunately for Al-Saffy, his claims emerge 

intact (at least for summary judgment purposes), and the 

district court’s order of dismissal must be reversed. 

I

A

Title VII broadly protects “employees or applicants for 

employment” from “discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). 

The statute’s protections extend to employees of the federal 

government. Id.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 

“broad authority to enforce [Title VII’s] antidiscrimination 

mandate within the federal government.” Bowden v. United 

States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997). To that end, the 

Commission has put into place “detailed procedures for the 

administrative resolution of discrimination complaints,”

including time limits for “seeking informal adjustment of 

complaints, filing formal charges, and appealing agency 

decisions to the Commission.” Id. 

To begin with, a federal government employee who 

alleges unlawful discrimination must “initiate contact with a[n] 

[Equal Employment Opportunity] Counselor within 45 days” 

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of a discriminatory event. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).1 The 

Counselor will attempt an informal resolution of the claim. If 

informal counseling does not resolve the employee’s claim,

however, the employee may file a formal complaint with the 

employing agency itself, usually through that agency’s Equal 

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office. See generally id.

§ 1614.106. The agency then has 180 days from the filing of 

the complaint in which to conduct “an impartial and 

appropriate investigation of the complaint[.]” Id.

§ 1614.106(e)(2). 

Once the agency has completed the investigation and 

provided the employee with its investigative report, the 

employee has a variety of options. For starters, if the 

employee requests an immediate decision from the agency, 

then “[t]he agency shall issue [a] final decision within 60 days 

of receiving” that request. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). But if 

the employee fails to respond to the investigative report within 

thirty days, the agency must issue a final decision within sixty 

days of the end of that thirty-day window for the employee’s 

response. Id. Either way, the agency decision “shall consist 

of findings by the agency on the merits of each issue in the 

complaint, * * * and, when discrimination is found, 

appropriate remedies and relief[.]” Id. In addition, the 

agency decision must “contain notice of the right to appeal the 

final action to the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, the right to file a civil action in federal district 

court, the name of the proper defendant in any such lawsuit and 

the applicable time limits for appeals and lawsuits.” Id.

As an alternative to those routes for obtaining a decision 

by the employing agency, the employee may instead request a 

 1 Like the Title VII statute, the governing regulations apply to 

employees, former employees, and applicants for employment. See 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(c). For ease of 

reference, this opinion uses “employee” to cover all of those groups.

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hearing by an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) within thirty days of 

receiving the agency’s investigative report. 29 C.F.R. 

§§ 1614.106(e)(2), 1614.109(a). The Commission will then 

“appoint an administrative judge to conduct a hearing,” and 

that ALJ will “assume full responsibility for the adjudication 

of the complaint.” Id. § 1614.109(a). After reviewing the 

administrative complaint, the ALJ may dismiss the “entire 

complaint,” id. § 1614.107(a), or may determine whether a 

hearing is necessary to resolve the dispute, id. § 1614.109(g).2 

Ultimately, if the complaint is not dismissed, the ALJ “shall 

issue a decision on the complaint, and shall order appropriate 

remedies and relief where discrimination is found” within “180 

days of receipt by the administrative judge of the complaint file 

from the agency.” Id. § 1614.109(i).

Once the ALJ issues a decision, the agency must enter a 

final order within forty days. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a). That 

final order “shall notify the complainant whether or not the 

agency will fully implement the decision of the administrative 

judge,” and “shall contain notice of the complainant’s right to 

appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 

 2 The regulations list nine grounds for dismissal of the “entire 

complaint”: (1) failure to state a claim; (2) failure to comply with 

applicable time limits; (3) a pending or completed civil action in a 

United States District Court that shares the same basis as the 

complaint and to which the employee was a party; (4) the 

employee’s pursuit of the matter in a negotiated grievance 

procedure, or in an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board; (5) 

the complaint is moot or challenges a preliminary step to taking a 

discriminatory action, unless the preliminary step is retaliatory; (6) 

the employee cannot be located; (7) failure to respond adequately to 

the agency’s written request for relevant information, provided that 

the request included a notice of the proposed dismissal; (8) the 

complaint asserts dissatisfaction with the processing of a previously 

filed complaint; or (9) the complaint is part of a clear pattern of 

misuse of the EEO process. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1)–(9).

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right to file a civil action in federal district court, the name of 

the proper defendant in any such lawsuit and the applicable 

time limits for appeals and lawsuits.” Id. If the agency fails 

to issue such an order within forty days, the ALJ’s decision 

“shall become the final action of the agency.” Id.

§ 1614.109(i).

An employee may appeal any final agency action to the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission “within 30 days 

of receipt of the final decision of the agency.” 29 C.F.R. 

§§ 1614.401(a), 1614.402(a). Alternatively, the employee

may file suit in federal district court within ninety days of 

receiving the final agency action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) 

(“Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a 

department, agency, or unit * * * an employee or applicant for 

employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his 

complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his 

complaint, may file a civil action[.]”); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.407(a), (c). 

Finally, if no final agency action is taken and no appeal to 

the Commission has been filed, the employee may file suit in 

federal district court any time “[a]fter 180 days from the date 

of filing” the administrative complaint with the employing 

agency. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(b).

B

Because the district court granted summary judgment in 

favor of the government, we take “the facts in the record and 

all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most 

favorable to” Al-Saffy. DeGraff v. District of Columbia, 120 

F.3d 298, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 

F.3d 1297, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

Al-Saffy is an Egyptian-American Muslim who has been 

employed by the Foreign Agricultural Service, a component of 

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the United States Department of Agriculture, since December 

2001. In 2008, Al-Saffy was named the Director of the Saudi 

Arabia and Yemen Agricultural Trade Offices. Just before 

Al-Saffy was scheduled to depart for Saudi Arabia, Susan 

Schayes, the Assistant Deputy Administrator for the Office of 

Foreign Service Operations for the Agriculture Department, 

placed Al-Saffy’s travel on hold. Al-Saffy filed an EEO

complaint against the Agriculture Department, challenging 

that action and alleging discrimination based on religion and 

national origin, as well as retaliation. He later withdrew his

complaint when Schayes permitted him to travel to Saudi 

Arabia to begin his assignment.

Al-Saffy alleges that, while he was abroad, he was 

harassed by Roland McKay, a State Department 

Economic/Commercial Officer in the United States Embassy 

in Yemen. Between October 2009 and August 2010, McKay 

allegedly obstructed Al-Saffy’s management of his 

subordinates, purported to suspend Al-Saffy’s visits to Yemen, 

interfered with the allocation of funds for which Al-Saffy was 

responsible, and communicated with Al-Saffy’s supervisor 

about matters within Al-Saffy’s purview.

Later, when Al-Saffy traveled back to Washington, D.C., 

to rest and recuperate, his supervisor—Kim Svec, Area 

Director of the Africa and Middle East Division—scheduled 

back-to-back meetings for him, contrary to the normal practice 

of including scheduled breaks. Also, when Svec traveled to 

the Middle East, she did not allow Al-Saffy to travel with her 

from Saudi Arabia to Yemen, although the normal practice is 

for a Trade Office Director to accompany an Area Director to 

other countries that they both cover.

Additionally, during a meeting in D.C., Schayes allegedly

asked Al-Saffy if he was Muslim. After Al-Saffy returned to 

Saudi Arabia, Schayes repeatedly “yelled at him for no reason” 

during phone conversations. J.A. 11 (Compl. ¶ 29). When 

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James Higgiston replaced Schayes on August 17, 2010, he 

immediately informed Al-Saffy that he would no longer be the 

Trade Office Director in Yemen.

Based on those events, Al-Saffy contacted the Agriculture 

Department’s EEO office on September 7, 2010. On March 

4, 2011, Al-Saffy filed a formal EEO complaint against the 

Agriculture Department (“2011 Complaint”), alleging 

discrimination based on national origin and religion, and 

reprisal for exercising his rights against employment 

discrimination. Following the agency’s investigation, 

Al-Saffy requested a hearing before an ALJ on his complaint.

Meanwhile, in August 2011, Al-Saffy filed a request for a 

one-year extension of his position as Director of the Saudi 

Arabia Trade Office. Though such extensions usually are 

routinely approved, Al-Saffy’s was denied. Higgiston also 

modified the position so that Al-Saffy would no longer be 

eligible for it. Al-Saffy further alleges that Schayes, Svec, 

and Higgiston ensured that Al-Saffy received substandard 

housing in Saudi Arabia. Finally, in November 2011, 

Higgiston and Svec refused to allow Al-Saffy to attend a

work-related conference in Atlanta. 

Based on those events, Al-Saffy timely contacted the 

Agriculture Department’s EEO office, and filed another formal 

EEO complaint against the Department on March 27, 2012 

(“2012 Complaint”), also alleging discrimination on the basis 

of religion and national origin, and reprisal for his prior EEO 

activity. 

After Al-Saffy returned to the United States in June 2012, 

he was assigned to a subordinate position as International 

Agriculture Development Specialist. J.A. 14 (Compl. ¶ 50). 

Al-Saffy later amended the 2012 Complaint to identify that

assignment as an additional instance of discrimination. As he 

had with the 2011 Complaint, Al-Saffy requested an ALJ

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hearing on the 2012 Complaint following the agency’s 

investigation.

On March 29, 2013, Al-Saffy sent the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission two identical letters stating that he 

was “withdraw[ing] his request for a hearing” before the ALJs 

on his 2011 Complaint and his 2012 Complaint, and advising 

that he would instead be filing a complaint in federal court. 

J.A. 94, 96.

On April 3, 2013, the ALJ presiding over the 2012 

Complaint issued an order stating: 

Notice is hereby given that the above captioned case 

is DISMISSED pursuant to the attached letter from 

Complainant’s Attorney withdrawing his request for 

a hearing, indicating that he will be filing a complaint 

in federal district court.

J.A. 93.

On April 30, 2013, the ALJ presiding over the 2011 

Complaint issued a differently worded order stating: 

Pursuant to the Complainant’s attached Notice of 

Withdrawal dated March 29, 2013, the hearing 

request for the captioned matter is hereby 

DISMISSED. Absent notice that a civil action has 

been filed in this matter, the Agency shall issue a final 

decision in accordance with the procedures set forth 

at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b) (2012).

J.A. 97. Neither order detailed Al-Saffy’s appeal rights or 

provided any additional information about time limits for

further review.

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Meanwhile, on February 21, 2013, Al-Saffy received the 

Agriculture Department’s administrative motion for summary 

judgment on the 2011 Complaint. Attached to that motion 

were affidavits of two State Department officials describing 

their roles in having Al-Saffy removed from his position as 

Director of the Yemen Trade Office. Angie Bryan, then the 

Deputy Chief of Mission in Yemen, stated that she expressed 

concerns about Al-Saffy to Svec and advocated for Al-Saffy’s 

removal. Stephen Seche, then the United States Ambassador 

to Yemen, stated that he was concerned that Al-Saffy’s 

interpersonal style was so disruptive as to necessitate his 

removal. Bryan’s affidavit also showed that she and Seche 

relied on allegedly false information from Roland McKay in 

advocating for Al-Saffy’s removal.

After receiving those affidavits, Al-Saffy contacted the 

State Department’s EEO office on April 7, 2013. He later 

filed a formal EEO complaint against the State Department in 

July 2013, alleging discrimination based on race, national 

origin, and religion, and reprisal for prior EEO activity. On 

October 1, 2013, the State Department dismissed the complaint 

“in its entirety” for two reasons. J.A. 86. First, the State 

Department said the complaint was redundant of the 2011 

Complaint against the Agriculture Department. Second, the 

State Department ruled that the complaint was untimely 

because Al-Saffy had failed to contact an EEO counselor 

within forty-five days of learning about the State Department’s

allegedly discriminatory participation in his removal as the 

Yemen Trade Office Director. The State Department 

reasoned that the Bryan and Seche affidavits were 

“[p]resumably” included in the Agriculture Department’s 

investigative report on the 2011 Complaint, and on that basis 

“[a]ssum[ed]” that Al-Saffy was “aware of the affidavits” 

before February 21, 2013—which was more than forty-five

days before he contacted an EEO counselor. J.A. 87. 

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C

Al-Saffy subsequently filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the 

Agriculture and State Departments each discriminated against 

him based on religion and national origin, and retaliated 

against him for filing an EEO complaint, all in violation of 

Title VII. The government moved to dismiss the complaint as 

untimely, arguing that Al-Saffy failed to file suit within ninety

days of final agency action on his 2011 and 2012 

administrative complaints. The government also argued that 

the State Department was not a proper defendant and that, even 

if it were, Al-Saffy waited too long to contact the State 

Department’s EEO office.

The district court granted summary judgment for the 

government. The court concluded that the Agriculture 

Department’s inaction for the forty days following the ALJ

orders dismissing Al-Saffy’s 2011 and 2012 Complaints 

rendered those orders “final agency action” and triggered Title 

VII’s ninety-day clocks—ending on July 29, 2013, and July 2, 

2013, respectively—for Al-Saffy to file suit in federal court. 

J.A. 119. Because Al-Saffy did not file his court complaint 

until October 10, 2013, the court found the claims against the 

Agriculture Department to be untimely. 

With respect to the State Department, the district court 

ruled that the Department was not a proper defendant because 

Al-Saffy never alleged that he was an employee or applicant 

for employment with the State Department. The court also 

held that, because Al-Saffy delayed more than forty-five days

before contacting an EEO Counselor after learning of the State

Department’s allegedly discriminatory role in his removal 

from his Yemen position, the complaint was barred.

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II

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, and can affirm only if there is no material error of 

law in the district court’s analysis and there are no genuinely 

disputed issues of material fact. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 

635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If, on the other hand, any material 

facts are at issue or, though undisputed, are susceptible to 

divergent inferences, summary judgment must be denied. Id.

A

The district court held that the ALJ order dismissing 

Al-Saffy’s hearing request for his 2011 Complaint was the 

type of ruling that, after forty days of inaction by the 

Agriculture Department, automatically became “final agency 

action” and triggered Title VII’s ninety-day time limit for 

Al-Saffy to file suit in court. That was error.

1

Title VII and the implementing regulations impose a 

ninety-day limitations period for a federal employee or 

applicant for employment to file suit in federal court that starts 

to run upon the employee’s “notice of final action taken by” 

the employing agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.407(a) & (c). But by its plain text, the ALJ 

order on Al-Saffy’s 2011 Complaint did not finally terminate 

the agency proceedings or in any way dispose of the merits of 

the complaint in a manner that could transmogrify the ALJ

order into “final [agency] action” or a “final [agency] 

decision,” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a). Quite the opposite: all 

the order did was dismiss Al-Saffy’s “hearing request” before 

the ALJ, and send the 2011 Complaint back to the Agriculture 

Department, specifically instructing that “the Agency”—that 

is, the Department of Agriculture—“shall issue a final decision 

in accordance with the procedures set forth at 29 C.F.R. 

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§ 1614.110(b)[],” unless Al-Saffy filed suit in the interim. 

J.A. 97. In other words, all that the order did was return the 

complaint to the same status—pending before the 

agency—that it had prior to Al-Saffy’s request for an ALJ 

hearing. See Hunter v. Keisler, No. 06-5908, 2007 WL 

3171223, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2007) (By withdrawing a 

hearing request, the employee “effectively requested an 

‘immediate final decision’ requiring the Agency to issue a final 

decision with findings on the merits of each issue in the 

complaint.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b)).

That, in fact, is why the ALJ invoked Section 1614.110(b) 

in returning the complaint to the agency. That Section 

provides a mechanism for the agency itself to take final agency 

action on a complaint—sans an ALJ decision or 

hearing—within a defined time period. 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.110(b). To constitute final agency action under that 

Section, the decision “shall” include “findings by the agency 

on the merits of each issue in the complaint, or, as appropriate, 

the rationale for dismissing any claims in the complaint and, 

when discrimination is found, appropriate remedies and 

relief[.]” Id. In addition, the agency decision must “contain 

notice of the right to appeal to the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission, the right to file a civil action in 

federal district court, the name of the proper defendant in any 

such lawsuit and the applicable time limits for appeals and 

lawsuits.” Id.

There is no dispute that the Agriculture Department never 

issued any decision containing those required components 

prior to Al-Saffy filing suit in federal court. And importantly, 

Section 1614.110(b) makes no provision for any ALJ ruling to 

metamorphose into a time-limit-triggering “final [agency]

action” if the agency itself fails to act. 

That means that the ALJ order dismissing the 2011 

Complaint put the ball in the Agriculture Department’s court, 

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and there it stayed, awaiting final agency action, without 

triggering any limitations period for Al-Saffy to file suit. 

Further proof of that procedural posture comes straight from 

the agency’s mouth. On February 12, 2014 (four months after 

Al-Saffy had filed suit), the Agriculture Department issued a 

“Final Agency Decision” on the 2011 Complaint. That 

decision acknowledged that the ALJ order dismissed only the 

hearing request and “remand[ed] the complaint to the Agency 

to issue a Final Agency Decision.” J.A. 100. The decision 

further identifies itself as final agency action “[i]n accordance 

with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]

regulations at * * * § 1614.110(b),” J.A. 99, and dismisses 

Al-Saffy’s complaint “in its entirety,” id. at 100 (citing 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.307(a)(3) (authorizing dismissal where there is 

a pending civil action by the employee)). Finally, that agency 

decision provides the required notice of Al-Saffy’s rights to 

appeal to the Commission or to file a civil action in federal 

district court. J.A. 100–103.

In sum, because the ALJ order dismissing Al-Saffy’s 

hearing request on his 2011 Complaint and remanding for 

agency action under Section 1614.110(b) was not and could 

not become final agency action, Al-Saffy never became subject 

to the ninety-day clock for filing suit on which the district court 

relied to dismiss this case. Instead, the only relevant timing 

provision for Al-Saffy was Section 1614.407(b), which, when 

the Agriculture Department failed to act, gave Al-Saffy the 

option to file suit in court any time “[a]fter 180 days from the 

date of filing” the administrative complaint with that agency. 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(b). There is no dispute that Al-Saffy’s 

federal court complaint was timely filed under that provision.

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2

Rather than accept the ALJ order on its own express terms, 

the district court treated the order as implicating 29 C.F.R. 

§§ 1614.109 and 1614.110(a). But neither provision applies.

Section 1614.109 governs ALJ “hearings” and 

corresponding ALJ decisions, and it authorizes ALJs to 

“dismiss complaints pursuant to § 1614.107.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.109(b). Section 1614.109 also provides that, once an 

ALJ issues a “decision on the complaint” and “order[s] 

appropriate remedies and relief where discrimination is 

found,” then that ALJ decision will become “final [agency]

action” forty days later as long as the agency does not, in the 

interim, issue its own final order responding to the ALJ 

decision. Id. § 1614.109(i); see id. § 1614.110(a) (ALJ 

decisions under Sections 1614.109(b), (g), or (i) require final 

agency action within forty days.). On that basis, the district 

court concluded that the order dismissing the 2011 Complaint 

became final agency action forty days after the order issued, 

which then started the ninety-day clock for filing suit. 

The problem is that the ALJ order dismissing the 2011 

Complaint bears no resemblance to a Section 1614.109 

decision by an ALJ. The order certainly was not a dismissal 

“pursuant to § 1614.107,” as Section 1614.109(b) requires. 

Section 1614.107(a) lists nine grounds for dismissing the 

“entire complaint.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a). But the ALJ 

order plainly did not dismiss the “entire complaint.” It 

dismissed only the “hearing request,” and sent the entire 

complaint back to the agency for further proceedings. J.A. 97 

(“Pursuant to the Complainant’s attached Notice of 

Withdrawal dated March 29, 2013, the hearing request for the 

captioned matter is hereby DISMISSED.”) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, the dismissal was not for any of the grounds 

enumerated in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1)–(9). The ALJ did 

not find that the complaint failed to state a claim, failed to 

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comply with applicable time limits, was the basis of a 

then-pending civil action, was the subject of a negotiated 

grievance procedure, was moot or premature, challenged the 

processing of a previous complaint, or reflected “a clear 

pattern of misuse of the EEO process.” Id. at 

§ 1614.107(a)(1)–(5), (8), (9). Nor did the ALJ find that 

Al-Saffy could not be located or had failed to respond to 

agency requests for necessary information. Id.

§ 1614.107(a)(6) & (7). 

Neither did the ALJ order fall within any other part of 

Section 1614.109. The ALJ did not grant summary judgment

on the merits or find that “some or all facts are not in genuine 

dispute.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). Nor did the order qualify 

as a decision under Section 1614.109(i). That subsection 

requires a substantive “decision on the complaint”—one that 

“order[s] appropriate remedies and relief where discrimination 

is found.” Id. § 1614.109(i). Subsection 1614.109(i) also 

presupposes that an actual hearing was conducted because it 

directs the ALJ to “send copies of the hearing record, including 

the transcript, and the decision to the parties.” Id. The ALJ 

order did none of those things. 

The district court likewise erred in relying on 

Section 1614.110(a), and its parallel provision transforming an 

ALJ decision into “[f]inal action by an agency” after forty days 

of agency inaction. Section 1614.110(a) only applies to ALJ 

orders that “issue[] a decision under § 1614.109(b), (g) or (i).” 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a). As noted, there was no Section 

1614.109(b), (g), or (i) decision in this case.

In sum, the ALJ order was not the result of a “hearing,” a 

dismissal of the “entire complaint,” a determination on 

summary judgment, or a “decision on the complaint.” 29 

C.F.R. §§ 1614.109(b), (g), (i). Instead, the ALJ order 

forwent a hearing, eschewed deciding anything, and told the 

agency to make a decision on the complaint. Such inaction 

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and non-decision does not create final agency action, and thus 

is incapable of triggering Title VII’s ninety-day time limit for 

filing suit, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.407(a).

B

The ALJ order dismissing the 2012 Complaint poses a 

closer question. While the order on the earlier complaint only 

dismissed the hearing request, this ALJ order directed that the 

“case is DISMISSED,” but then added that it was “pursuant to 

the attached letter from Complainant’s Attorney withdrawing 

his request for a hearing[.]” J.A. 93 (emphasis added). 

The district court again concluded that the ALJ order

became final agency action after forty days. But, as with the 

order on the 2011 Complaint, this ALJ order does not fit well 

into the categories of ALJ decisions that are covered by 

Section 1614.110(a)’s provisions for ripening into final agency 

action. The order did not purport to grant summary judgment, 

see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g), or to issue a substantive decision 

after a hearing, see id. § 1614.109(i). Nor did it “dismiss [the] 

complaint[] pursuant to § 1614.107,” id. § 1614.109(b), 

because none of those categories of dismissal applied, id.

§ 1614.107(a). 

Having said that, it cannot be overlooked that the ALJ 

order on the 2012 Complaint dismissed the “case,” and not just 

the hearing request, J.A. 93, so it differs in that respect from the 

order on the 2011 Complaint. Perhaps the signification of that 

language dismissing “the case” is undermined by the order’s 

immediate reference to Al-Saffy’s “attached letter 

withdrawing his request for a hearing.” J.A. 93. After all, 

the ALJ order did not purport to resolve the dispute between 

the employee and the agency, and therefore did not dismiss the 

“complaint” as contemplated by Section 1614.109(b). 

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We need not try to untie that Gordian knot and definitively 

determine whether the order on the 2012 Complaint could have 

potentially ripened into the type of final agency action that 

would trip the ninety-day filing limit. That is because the 

order indisputably did not provide Al-Saffy the required notice 

of his rights to further review. 

Title VII itself expressly conditions the start of the 

ninety-day time limit for filing suit on the employee’s “receipt 

of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or 

unit[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). This court has held, 

moreover, that notice of final agency action alone does not 

start that ninety-day clock running if unaccompanied by 

“notice (1) of [the employee’s] right to file a civil action and 

(2) of the * * * time limit on filing such action.” Williams v. 

Hidalgo, 663 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1980). We held in 

Williams that Title VII “itself required that notice of final 

agency action include notice of the right to sue and of the 

[then] thirty-day limitation.” Id. at 187 (citing Coles v. 

Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (emphasis in 

Williams). Accordingly here, just as in Williams, “to start the 

running of the time limitation of the statute, [the Department] 

was required by regulation, statute and by court decision to 

notify [the employee] of [the] right to sue in federal court and 

of the [time] limit for bringing such an action,” 663 F.2d at 

187.

On its face, the ALJ order dismissing Al-Saffy’s 2012 

Complaint omitted that statutorily required notice. That alone 

bars application of the ninety-day limitation period. Indeed, it 

would be perverse if this cursory ALJ order entirely omitting 

any form of notice, could—through agency inaction no 

less—replace the final agency action that should otherwise 

have provided notice to the employee. We thus agree that 

“[i]t would frustrate the very purpose of the notice regulations 

to hold that ALJ decisions may automatically trigger the 

statute of limitations without providing notices equivalent to 

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those required by § 1614.110.” Staropoli v. Donahoe, 786 F. 

Supp. 2d 384, 390 (D.D.C. 2011); see Moncus v. Johanns, No. 

2:03-cv-416, 2006 WL 163309, at *8 (M.D. Ala. 2006) 

(“Construing § 1614.109(i) to start a complainant’s appeal 

clock without notice from the agency or the administrative 

judge regarding the claimant’s right to appeal to the EEOC or 

file a civil action and the applicable time limits would be 

contrary to the purpose of the regulation, which clearly 

contemplates formal notice to the complainant of appeal 

procedures.”).

Because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the 

employee of his right to appeal and the governing time 

limitation, the order dismissing the 2012 Complaint did not 

trigger the ninety-day deadline for Al-Saffy to file suit. 

Instead, given the lack of timely final action by the agency, 

Al-Saffy could have and did file a civil action more than 180 

days after the filing of the 2012 Complaint with the agency 

(that is, any time after September 23, 2012). See 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.107(b). Al-Saffy’s October 10, 2013 filing in district 

court thus preserved his claims from the 2012 Complaint. 

C

Al-Saffy’s claims against the State Department lack the 

procedural complexity of his claims against the Department of 

Agriculture. Nevertheless, the district court also erred in 

granting summary judgment for the government on those 

claims because there are genuine issues of material fact 

regarding whether Al-Saffy had an employment relationship 

with the State Department within the meaning of Title VII, and 

whether Al-Saffy knew about the State Department’s alleged 

role in discrimination against him prior to 2013. 

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1

To invoke Title VII’s protection against the State 

Department, Al-Saffy had to establish, among other things, 

that he was an “employee[]” of that agency. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16(a) (covering “personnel actions affecting 

employees or applicants for employment” with a federal 

department or agency) (emphasis added). That is because, as 

applied to the federal government, Title VII “cover[s] only 

those individuals in a direct employment relationship with a 

government employer.” Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 

829 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Unfortunately, Title VII includes only a 

“completely circular” definition of the term “employee.” 

Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, 538 U.S. 

440, 444 (2003) (further describing the statutory definition as 

“nominal” and “explain[ing] nothing”) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining 

“employee” as “an individual employed by an employer”). 

Accordingly, we must consult “traditional agency law 

principles” to determine whether Al-Saffy was an employee of 

the State Department. See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 

v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). In analyzing 

employment status, the “common-law element of control is the 

principal guidepost[.]” See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448 

(analyzing employment status under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act).

Hewing to common-law principles, we have recognized 

that an individual may be jointly employed by two or more 

entities. See Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933, 938–939 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). Indeed, “at common law, one could be a dual 

servant acting for two masters simultaneously or a borrowed 

servant who by virtue of being directed or permitted by his 

master to perform services for another may become the servant 

of such other.” Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 

208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

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20

also, e.g., Butler v. Drive Automotive Industries of America, 

793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The joint employment 

doctrine captures instances in which multiple entities control 

an employee.”).

We have recognized two largely overlapping articulations 

of the test for identifying joint-employer status. See Redd, 

232 F.3d at 938–939. The first, taken from Spirides v. 

Reinhardt, speaks in terms of the “‘economic realities’ of the 

work relationship,” emphasizing whether the “employer has 

the right to control and direct the work of an individual, not 

only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to the details by 

which that result is achieved.” 613 F.2d at 831–832. A 

second articulation borrows language from NLRB v. 

Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania, 691 F.2d 1117 

(3d Cir. 1982), asking whether the employer, “while 

contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent 

company, has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms 

and conditions of employment of the employees who are 

employed by the other employer,” id. at 1123. See Redd, 232 

F.3d at 938. 

As their language indicates, in both cases the touchstone is 

control. And because Al-Saffy came forward with evidence 

creating a genuine dispute concerning the State Department’s 

control over his work and employment, the district court 

should not have granted summary judgment. 

Specifically, Al-Saffy put forth evidence showing that, 

“although [he] was not officially employed by State, he 

reported directly to the Ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and 

Yemen, who are State employees.” Pet. Br. 22; see also

Al-Saffy v. Vilsack, 54 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 

13-01562), ECF No. 14, Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at

9. In addition, the record includes identical letters sent by 

Secretary Vilsack to the American Chargé d’Affaires in Saudi 

Arabia and the American Ambassador in Yemen on the 

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21

occasion of Al-Saffy’s appointment as Trade Office Director, 

in which Secretary Vilsack wrote: “[Al-Saffy] will report 

directly to you, so that you will be fully informed of his 

activities in Saudi Arabia. I know that Dr. Al-Saffy will be a 

valuable addition to your staff and a good team player.” J.A. 

107, 109. Those letters are relevant evidence that Al-Saffy’s 

work abroad was controlled at least in part by the State

Department.

In addition, the affidavits of Angie Bryan, the Deputy 

Chief of Mission in Yemen, and Stephen Seche, Ambassador 

to Yemen, offer further corroborative evidence for Al-Saffy. 

Bryan described how Al-Saffy’s allegedly unprofessional 

behavior and “accusational style of communication” caused 

“disruption in the embassy, negatively impacted morale and 

disproportionately consumed [the Deputy Chief of Mission’s] 

and the Ambassador’s time.” J.A. 54 (Bryan Decl. ¶ 22). 

That conduct would have directly implicated Bryan’s 

managerial responsibilities. See id. at 50 (Bryan Decl. ¶ 4)

(“As [Deputy Chief of Mission], I was responsible for the 

day-to-day oversight of the embassy, including personnel 

issues, morale issues, and other management concerns.”). 

Indeed, Bryan and Seche both had recommended Al-Saffy’s 

removal from his Yemen post shortly before it occurred. See 

id. at 54–55 (Bryan Decl. ¶ 26) (“[T]he Ambassador sent three 

email messages to USDA * * * express[ing] his growing 

conviction, which I shared, that a reassignment of coverage 

needed to be made for the Yemen ATO. Although USDA had 

requested that we allow Dr. Al-Saffy time to mend relations 

with embassy staff, and we had hoped that such could occur, 

by August 2010 the Ambassador and I were of the opinion that 

a reassignment needed to occur.”); Id. at 49 (Seche Decl. ¶ 9)

(“I became convinced that Dr. Al-Saffy’s style and manner of 

interacting with our * * * [s]taff and embassy personnel had 

become so disruptive and unhelpful that a reassignment of the 

ATO to another post was the best outcome for all involved.”). 

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Notably, the federal chief of mission statute further 

supports Al-Saffy’s account of his relationship with the 

Department of State. The statute grants the United States 

ambassador in a foreign country plenary authority over other 

executive branch employees in that country. See 22 U.S.C. 

§ 3927(a)(1) (“[T]he chief of mission to a foreign country * * * 

shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, 

and supervision of all Government executive branch 

employees in that country (except for Voice of America 

correspondents on official assignment and employees under 

the command of a United States area military 

commander)[.]”); see also id. § 3902(3) (The chief of mission 

is “the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic mission of the 

United States or of a United States office abroad which is 

designated by the Secretary of State as diplomatic in nature.”). 

The statute also requires other agencies “having employees in 

a foreign country” to “keep the chief of mission to that country 

fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and 

operations of its employees in that country, and [to] insure that 

all of its employees in that country * * * comply fully with all 

applicable directives of the chief of mission.” Id. § 3927(b).

Taken in the light most favorable to Al-Saffy, the

summary judgment record, including the letters to the 

embassies and the affidavits of Bryan and Seche, reinforced by 

the chief of mission statute, discloses genuine questions of 

material fact about whether the State Department exercised 

sufficient control over Al-Saffy’s employment in Yemen to be 

his joint employer.

2

The district court also grounded dismissal in Al-Saffy’s 

purported failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies 

before filing suit. Regulations require “[a]n aggrieved person 

[to] initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date 

of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of 

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23

personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the 

action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. But “if an employee did not 

at the time [of the alleged discriminatory action] know or have 

reason to know that an employment decision was 

discriminatory in nature, the time limits for filing an 

administrative complaint may be tolled.” Stoller v. Marsh, 

682 F.2d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “The time within which 

EEO counseling must be sought is likewise tolled until the 

claimant knows or has reason to know the facts that would 

support a charge of discrimination.” Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 

409, 418–419 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Al-Saffy alleges that he was unaware that the State

Department had participated in the decision to remove him as 

Director of the Yemen Trade Office until February 2013. 

That was when the Department of Agriculture filed a motion 

for summary judgment in district court on the 2011 Complaint, 

and attached the affidavits of Bryan and Seche. Both 

described their concerns about Al-Saffy’s work style, and their 

role in recommending his dismissal close in time to his actual 

termination from the Trade Office post. See J.A. 54–55 

(Bryan Decl. ¶ 22–26); Id. at 49 (Seche Decl. ¶ 9). In 

particular, Bryan described multiple conversations and emails 

between Seche and the Agriculture Department, in which 

Seche described problems with Al-Saffy and expressed his 

opinion, which Bryan shared, that “a reassignment [of the 

Yemen Trade Office Director responsibilities] needed to 

occur.” Id. at 55 (Bryan Decl. ¶ 26). 

Al-Saffy also alleges that Bryan’s affidavit revealed for 

the first time that Bryan and Seche relied on information 

received from Roland McKay, the State Department 

Economic/Commercial Officer in the Yemen embassy, in 

advocating for Al-Saffy’s removal. J.A. 18 (Compl. ¶ 66). 

Indeed, Bryan’s affidavit demonstrates that her negative 

impressions of Al-Saffy stemmed in large part from McKay’s 

reports. See, e.g., id. at 53–54 (Bryan Decl. ¶ 21) (“I came to 

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learn from Mr. McKay * * * that Dr. Al-Saffy regularly treated 

[other embassy employees] rudely and dismissively and 

viewed Mr. McKay’s role—limited as it was—as 

inappropriately interfering with Dr. Al-Saffy’s work in 

Yemen.”). Al-Saffy explained in his EEO complaint to the 

State Department: “I believe that Mr. McKay provided false 

information about me to Ms. Bryan and Mr. Seche based on 

my race, national origin and religion.” Id. at 91. He added 

that “Ms. Bryan and Mr. Seche accepted the false information 

provided by Mr. McKay as true because of my race, national 

origin and religion.” Id. 

Taken in the light most favorable to Al-Saffy, his receipt

of those affidavits in 2013 marked the first time that he learned 

that senior State Department officials had specifically 

recommended his removal from his Yemen post. Al-Saffy 

also discovered at that same time that senior State Department 

officials relied on allegedly false information provided by 

another State Department employee in making that 

recommendation. Those newly discovered facts provided 

Al-Saffy with the basis for his claims that State Department 

officials discriminated against him by sharing false 

information, crediting that false information, and then

recommending his removal. 

The government counters that Al-Saffy knew of his claim 

against the State Department in 2010 because his complaint 

alleges that McKay repeatedly interfered with his work in 2009 

and 2010. See J.A. 9–10 (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 22). The complaint

also alleges that, in 2010, Al-Saffy emailed Bryan, “stating that 

he was considering filing an EEO complaint” regarding 

McKay’s conduct. Id. at 16–17 (Compl. ¶ 58). 

That argument misunderstands the basis for Al-Saffy’s 

complaint against the State Department, which was that he was 

“removed from [his] assignment as Director for the Yemen 

[Trade Office].” J.A. 86. Al-Saffy’s apparent knowledge of 

USCA Case #15-5025 Document #1622694 Filed: 07/01/2016 Page 24 of 26
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troubling conduct by a State Department official that was not 

(at that time at least) connected to his termination from the 

Yemen position does nothing to establish that he was aware of 

the involvement by State Department higher-ups in the alleged 

discriminatory reassignment of his Yemen responsibilities. 

As to the latter event, it was the Bryan and Seche affidavits that 

first disclosed the State Department’s direct role.

The government also points to the 2011 Complaint, the 

scope of which covered the Agriculture Department’s decision 

to remove him from the Yemen Trade Office position. See

J.A. 12 (Compl. ¶ 36). That too misses the point. Neither 

Al-Saffy’s awareness that the Agriculture Department 

removed him nor his invocation of the EEO process put him on 

notice that an entirely different agency—the State 

Department—played an allegedly critical role in his 

termination from his position in Yemen.

3

In short, Al-Saffy has created a genuine issue of material 

fact concerning whether he learned of the State Department’s 

involvement in his removal prior to receipt of the Bryan and 

Seche affidavits on February 21, 2013. Because Al-Saffy 

contacted the State Department’s EEO office within forty-five

days of receiving those affidavits, his claim of timely 

administrative exhaustion should have survived summary 

judgment.

 3 In dismissing Al-Saffy’s administrative complaint, the State 

Department deemed Al-Saffy’s claims untimely, “[p]resum[ing]” 

that the Bryan and Seche affidavits were included in the 

investigatory report on the 2011 Complaint, which would have been 

delivered to Al-Saffy long before 2013. J.A. 87. That defies 

chronological time: the Seche and Bryan affidavits were executed 

in 2013, so could not possibly have been included in the report that 

Al-Saffy received two years earlier on November 20, 2011.

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III

Al-Saffy properly filed EEO complaints against the 

Agriculture and State Departments alleging discrimination on 

the basis of national origin, religion, and retaliation. Because 

no final agency action ever issued as to his 2011 Complaint, he 

timely filed this civil action on October 10, 2013, and properly 

preserved the claims in that complaint. Because any final 

agency action on his 2012 Complaint failed to notify him of his 

right to appeal and the process for doing so, his lawsuit also 

timely raised those claims. Finally, because Al-Saffy created 

genuine issues of material fact as to whether he was an 

“employee” of the State Department within the meaning of 

Title VII, and whether he timely initiated contact with an EEO 

counselor at the State Department, his claims against that

Department also should have survived summary judgment. 

We accordingly reverse the district court’s judgment and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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