Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-23-07082/USCOURTS-ca10-23-07082-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Muskogee
Appellee
Elias Quintana
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DR. ELIAS QUINTANA, 

d/b/a Fort Gibson Investments, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF MUSKOGEE, a political 

subdivision of the State of Oklahoma, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 23-7082 

(D.C. No. 6:19-CV-00066-JWB) 

(E.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

The Rev. Dr. Elias N. Quintana, pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment against him in his lawsuit against the City of Muskogee. He also 

appeals the district court’s denial of postjudgment relief. We affirm the denial of 

postjudgment relief. As explained below, however, this affirmance means Quintana 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 10, 2025

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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did not timely appeal from the summary judgment order, so we dismiss that part of 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Quintana owns the Cherokee Apartments, a 15-unit complex in Muskogee. In 

June 2018, a fire broke out at the apartments and caused serious damage to some of 

them. City of Muskogee officials decided they needed to cut electricity to the 

damaged apartments, but they say it was difficult to locate the correct circuit breakers 

for specific apartments. Thus, they directed the electric company to remove the 

electric meter, thus cutting electricity to all apartments. They declared the 

apartments uninhabitable until electricity and other utilities could be restored. 

Quintana and City officials soon became deadlocked in a dispute over what 

would be required to have the electrical meter reinstalled, thereby restoring electrical 

service. The City building inspector said Quintana would need to install equipment 

for higher electrical capacity and a separate electrical panel for each apartment. 

Quintana learned this would likely cost $75,000. An engineer named Richard Flores 

told him that such upgrades were not necessary. 

Quintana appealed the building inspector’s requirements to the City’s Code 

Appeals Board. The Board held a hearing and decided that the building inspector’s 

requirements were not appropriate. Rather, Quintana could have the electrical meter 

reinstalled after installing fire separation between the apartments and providing fire 

extinguishers and smoke detectors to each apartment. 

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Quintana did not take the steps specified by the Board. He says that Flores, 

his engineering advisor, told him those steps would cause him to violate the building 

code. 

In February 2019, Quintana filed a lawsuit against the City in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. He claimed the City had 

violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. Although he was 

originally represented by an attorney, he began representing himself in January 2020, 

and has done so ever since. 

The case proceeded slowly, in part due to two judge reassignments. In June 

2022, the district court issued an order granting summary judgment in the City’s 

favor on all claims. The district court accordingly entered final judgment and closed 

the case. 

As we will describe in more detail below, Quintana filed a Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59(e) motion, which the district court denied, followed by a “Rule 60 

a & b” motion to reconsider the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion, 

R. vol. II at 610. We will call this second motion the “Rule 60 motion.” The district 

court denied it on November 2, 2023. Quintana filed this appeal on November 14, 

2023. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Quintana argues that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment 

(and therefore final judgment) to the City. However, the district court entered final 

judgment on June 2, 2022. A party in a civil case must normally notice their appeal 

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within thirty days of final judgment, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and a timely 

notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement in a civil case, see Bowles v. Russell, 

551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 

Due to how the Fourth of July weekend fell in 2022, Quintana’s deadline to 

appeal from the June 2 judgment was July 5. Quintana did not file a notice of appeal 

on or before that date. Instead, Quintana filed this appeal on November 14, 2023, 

more than seventeen months after final judgment. We therefore must examine our 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 

(10th Cir. 2001) (“Although neither party challenges our appellate jurisdiction, we 

have an independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction.”). Specifically, we must 

decide if Quintana’s Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 motions extended his appeal deadline. 

We will first discuss the Rule 59(e) motion. A timely Rule 59(e) motion 

cancels the thirty-day appeal clock and resets it as of the order resolving the motion. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Rule 59(e) motions “must be filed no later than 

28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This means Quintana 

needed to file his Rule 59(e) motion no later than Thursday, June 30, 2022. Quintana 

filed his Rule 59(e) motion on Friday, July 1, 2022, one day late. 

The City’s response to the Rule 59(e) motion argued the district court should 

deny the motion as untimely, or, alternatively, on the merits. Quintana filed a reply 

but said nothing about the timeliness issue. He instead defended the merits of his 

motion. 

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The district court resolved the Rule 59(e) motion by order dated June 27, 2023. 

The district court accepted the City’s argument that the motion had not been timely 

filed. The court therefore denied Rule 59(e) relief on that basis—meaning that, for 

our purposes, the motion had no effect on the appeal clock. Then, construing the 

motion as if brought instead under Rule 60(b), the district court further concluded 

that Quintana still was not entitled to relief because he was merely re-raising the 

same arguments decided against him at summary judgment.1

Fourteen days later (July 11, 2023), Quintana filed his Rule 60 motion, asking 

the court to reconsider its denial of the Rule 59(e) motion. Quintana submitted 

affidavits from himself and Flores to the effect that the two of them had a call with 

the district court clerk’s office on June 30, 2022 (the Rule 59(e) deadline). On that 

call, Quintana conveyed that it was his deadline to file a Rule 59(e) motion and he 

wanted to know if he needed to submit the filing by 4:30 PM, which he believed to be 

the end of the business day for the clerk’s office. The clerk’s office employee on the 

other end of the line allegedly responded that the person responsible for handling 

pro se filings was out until the next day (July 1) or until the next week—Quintana’s 

and Flores’s respective affidavits disagree on this point—but anything filed before 

midnight that day (June 30) would be deemed timely. Quintana and Flores say 

1

 The district court’s choice to examine the motion as if brought under 

Rule 60(b) does not change our jurisdictional analysis. A Rule 60(b) motion can 

have the same deadline-resetting effect as a Rule 59(e) motion, but only if the 

Rule 60(b) motion “is filed within the time allowed for filing a motion under 

Rule 59.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). In other words, the same 28-day deadline 

applies. 

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Quintana relied on this representation to submit his motion by e-mail sometime later 

on June 30.2

The City responded by pointing out, among other things, that it had 

specifically argued untimeliness in its response to the Rule 59(e) motion, yet 

Quintana had said nothing in reply. Quintana filed a reply (to the Rule 60 motion) 

but did not explain his previous silence on the timeliness issue. He merely restated 

the assurances he allegedly received from the clerk’s office. 

The district court resolved the Rule 60 motion on November 2, 2023. 

Considering that the City had previously challenged Quintana’s timeliness and 

Quintana offered no response, the district court deemed the Rule 60 motion to be an 

inappropriate attempt to raise matters that could have been raised earlier. The district 

court alternatively ruled that, even if the Rule 59(e) motion had been timely, the court 

would have denied it as an improper reassertion of arguments already decided. 

Quintana filed his notice of appeal on November 14, 2023. This notice is 

timely as to the denial of the Rule 60 motion because Quintana filed it within thirty 

days of that denial and “[t]he district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is 

separately appealable from the district court’s underlying judgment,” Lebahn v. 

Owens, 813 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 2016). “But an appeal from denial of 

Rule 60(b) relief raises for review only the district court’s order of denial and not the 

underlying judgment itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So we have 

2

 When Quintana became pro se, he received permission from the district court 

to file pleadings by e-mailing them to the clerk’s office. 

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jurisdiction to decide whether the district court erred in refusing to grant Rule 60 

relief from the denial of Rule 59(e) relief. If the answer to that is yes, we also have 

jurisdiction to review the Rule 59(e) order. See Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 

1178 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that a second motion for reconsideration stops the 

notice-of-appeal clock as to the denial of the first motion for reconsideration). 

We review Rule 60 denials for abuse of discretion. Lebahn, 813 F.3d at 1305. 

Our analysis here is simple, however, because Quintana makes no argument that the 

district court abused its discretion when it denied Rule 60 relief. Although he 

references that denial by docket number on the opening page of his brief, he never 

returns to it and he never otherwise mentions the district court’s reasons for denying 

his Rule 60 motion (or his Rule 59(e) motion, for that matter). He instead dedicates 

his entire brief to attacking the summary judgment order. 

The only way this court could reach the merits of the summary judgment order 

is if Quintana’s Rule 59(e) motion was timely—otherwise, there was no event to stop 

the notice-of-appeal clock from running, and it ran out on July 5, 2022. Moreover, 

the only way this court could find the Rule 59(e) motion timely is if the district court 

abused its discretion when it refused to entertain Quintana’s belated explanation (in 

his Rule 60 motion) for why the Rule 59(e) motion should have been deemed timely. 

But, as noted, Quintana simply makes no argument in this regard. 

“Because [Quintana] is pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but we will not 

act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). And 

importantly, “[t]he first task of an appellant is to explain to us why the district court’s 

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decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 

(10th Cir. 2015). Quintana’s failure to do so means we will affirm the district court’s 

denial of Rule 60 relief. See id. at 1369 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of 

the appellant’s claim because his “opening brief contain[ed] nary a word to challenge 

the basis of the dismissal”); see also Choice Hospice, Inc. v. Axxess Tech. Sols., Inc., 

No. 24-6002, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 38117, at *10 (10th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025) 

(upholding denial of a second postjudgment motion because it was based on an 

argument that could have been raised in the first postjudgment motion). 

Consequently, Quintana did not timely file his Rule 59(e) motion and, in turn, did not 

timely appeal from the summary judgment order. We therefore lack jurisdiction to 

address his arguments attacking that order. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court’s November 2, 2023, order denying Rule 60 relief 

from its June 27, 2023, order denying Rule 59(e) relief. We dismiss the remainder of 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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