Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03017/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dallas Earl Scott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United Statef Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir01it 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 24 1980 

:&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ROBERT LARRY MAYES, and DALLAS 

EARL SCOTT, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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Nos. 90-3016 and 90-3017 

APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. Nos. 89-30007-01 and 89-30007-02) 

Richard L. Hathaway, Assistant United States Attorney (Lee 

Thompson, United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Topeka, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Robert E. North, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant Robert 

Larry Mayes. 

Mark w. Works, Works, Work~, & Works, P.A., Topeka, Kansas, for 

Defendant-Appellant Dallas Earl Scott. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit 

Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Robert Mayes and Dallas Scott were each convicted, in a joint 

trial, of one count of conspiring to distribute heroin in the 

Leavenworth federal prison and fifteen counts of using a telephone 

in the commission of the crime. 

Appellate Case: 90-3017 Document: 01019311075 Date Filed: 10/24/1990 Page: 1 
I. 

The defendants claim that the indictment should have been 

dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) because of the delay 

between the offense and the indictment, and that the period 

between indictment and trial exceeded that permitted by the Speedy 

Trial Act. 1 

Rule 48(b) provides that "[i]f there is unnecessary delay in 

presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information 

against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district 

court, . . . the court may dismiss the indictment, information or 

complaint." Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) (emphasis added). The 

emphasized phrase requires that the defendant be arrested and 

bound over for trial. 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 

11 48.03[1], at 48-18 n.8 (1990). Mayes and Scott were not arrested on these charges, because they were already incarcerated. 

They have no claim under R~le 48(b). United States v. Marion, 404 

U.S. 307, 319 (1971); United States v. Primrose, 718 F.2d 1484, 

1488 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). 

They also argue that their motion to dismiss for a violation 

of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-74, should have been 

granted. The motion was made on November 2, 1989 and never 

renewed, so any subsequent delay is irrelevant to our inquiry 

(because it was never challenged below). United States v. 

Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1989). Mayes and Scott 

were indicted along with one Frances Nickel. The speedy trial 

1 They make no constitutional claims based on these delays. 

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period did not run as to Nickel because she was a fugitive who had 

not been brought before the court. 18 u.s.c. § 316l(h)(3). 

"Under 18 u.s.c. § 316l(h)(7), any 'reasonable period of 

delay' excludable as to one defendant is excludable as to his or 

her codefendants." United States v. Tranakos, No. 89-8021, slip 

op. at 5 (lOth Cir. Aug. 15, 1990). In determining whether it is 

reasonable to apply this delay to Mayes and Scott, "we must weigh 

the 'relevant circumstances.'" Id. (quoting United States v. 

Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1986)). 

One important factor is that they were already incarcerated, 

so the delay did not affect their liberty. See United States v. 

Tranakos, slip op. at 5 (delay caused by one defendant did not 

affect codefendants' liberty because they were free on bond); 

United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 902, 917 (lOth 

Cir.) (same), modified on other grounds, 881 F.2d 866 (lOth Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 837 (1990). 

Also, "the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial 

resources in trying multiple defendants in a single 

trial" must be considered. United States v. Theron, 782 

F.2d [1510,] 1514 [(lOth Cir. 1986)]. Where "the 

government will recite a single factual history, put on 

a single array of evidence, and call a single group of 

witnesses," a single trial is preferred. United States 

v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d at 916. This is 

such a case, for the defendants were charged with a 

single conspiracy. See, ~' United States v. Wright, 

826 F.2d 938, 945 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

United States v. Tranakos, slip op. at 5. It is also important 

that the defendants never asked to be tried separately from 

Nickel. Id. at 6; United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 

F.2d at 917. We conclude that it is reasonable to apply to Mayes 

and Scott the exclusion caused by Nickel's flight. Therefore, no 

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nonexcludable time ran under the Act. 

II. 

Mayes and Scott did move to be tried separately from each 

other. These motions were denied. "The decision whether to grant 

severance and order separate trials is 'within the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision will not ordinarily be 

reversed in the absence of a strong showing of prejudice.'" 

United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1231 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

(quoting United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 289-90 (lOth 

Cir. 1983)). "The court must weigh any potential prejudice 

against the important considerations of economy and expedition in 

judicial administration." United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 

537 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 u.s. 908 and 991 (1988). 

As noted above, these considerations are quite strong when the 

codefendants allegedly conspired with each other. 

The defendants first contend that the refusal to sever was 

error because Scott testified on his own behalf while Mayes 

exercised his privilege against self-incrimination, allowing the 

jury to infer Mayes's guilt from his failure to testify and then 

impute that guilt to Scott. In essence, Mayes argues that by the 

mere act of testifying, Scott commented on Mayes's silence. We 

disagree. See United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 491 (lOth 

Cir. 1984) (defendant comments on codefendant's silence only by 

statement "of 'such character that the jury would naturally and 

necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused 

to testify'" (quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 

(lOth Cir. 1955))). The rule sought by the defendants would 

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prohibit any joint trial of a testifying defendant and a nontestifying defendant. This is not the law. 

The defendants also contend that, because counts two through 

fifteen of the indictment alleged the same crime (using a telephone in the commission of a felony), the jury was likely to 

become confused as to the evidence against each defendant on each 

count. The court instructed the jury that each count went to a 

different incident, see Tr. at 260-61, and that it should consider 

individually the charges against each defendant, see R. Supp. Vol. 

I at 7, 10. The defendants have not shown prejudice requiring 

separate trials. United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1037-

38 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Carda11, 885 F.2d 656, 668 

(lOth Cir. 1989). 

III. 

Mayes and Scott argue that Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2) 2 

violates the accusation and confrontation clauses of the Sixth 

Amendment3 and their "right to information" under the First Amendment. They cite no authority for these bald assertions. The 

constitution does not grant criminal defendants the right to 

2 The Rule provides: 

(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as 

provided in paragraphs (A), (B), and (D) of subdivision (a)(l), 

this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of 

reports, memoranda, or other internal goverment documents made by 

the attorney for the government or other government agents in 

connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or 

of statements made by government witnesses or prospective 

government witnesses except as provided in 18 u.s.c. § 3500. 

3 The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. 

amend. VI. 

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embark on a "broad or blind fishing expedition among documents 

possessed by the Government .•. " Jencks v. United States, 353 

u.s. 657, 667 (1957). See also United States v. Maranzino, 860 

F.2d 981, 985-86 (lOth Cir. 1988). The record does not indicate 

Mayes Scott were denied access to any material evidence. From 

indictment to sentencing, they were provided with more than enough 

information to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 

There is no First Amendment right to the information sought. 

IV. 

Mayes and Scott contend the trial court erred in denying 

their motion to subpoena certain witnesses pursuant to Fed. R. 

4 Crim. P. 17(b). They apparently allege that the trial court 

should have subpoenaed federal inmates McManamy, Rameriz, and 

Greshiner. 5 They claim McManamy and Ramirez would have testified 

as to defendant Scott's lack of motive, and Greshiner would have 

testified about the Aryan Brotherhood. 

"[A] trial court need not grant a Rule 17(b) motion if a 

requested witness would only provide cumulative evidence." United 

States v. Bloomgren, 814 F.2d 580, 585 (lOth Cir. 1987). We 

review the correctness of 17(b) rulings under the abuse of discre4 Rule 17(b), in pertinent part, provides: 

The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued 

for service on a named witness upon an ex parte application of a 

defendant upon a satisfactory showing that the defendant is 

financially unable to pay the fees of the witness and that the 

presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense. 

5 In support of this contention, they cite to the court's 

discussion of witnesses Bontrager, Hill, and Shuler, all of whom 

the court allowed to testify. Nothing in the record on appeal 

suggests the defendants requested or were denied Rule 17(b) 

subpoenas for McManamy, Ramirez and Greshiner. 

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tion standard. United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 378 

(lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987); United States 

v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 578-79 (lOth Cir. 1975). 

The proposed motive testimony of McManamy and Rameriz was 

cumulative and irrelevant. 6 Greshiner's proposed testimony was 

unnecessary: the defendants obtained a pretrial order prohibiting 

the government from mentioning the Aryan Brotherhood. See infra, 

section VII. If the trial court did deny subpoena requests for 

McManamy, Ramirez and Greshiner, we cannot say it was an abuse of 

its discretion. 

v. 

Midway through the trial, Scott announced that he wanted to 

proceed pro ~· See Tr. at 153. His request was denied. See id. 

at 154. He now argues that this denied him his absolute 

constitutional right to conduct his own defense. 

"It is fundamental, however, that the right to selfrepresentation is unqualified only if demanded before trial." 

United States v. Wesley, 798 F.2d 1155, 1155 (8th Cir. 1986) 

(emphasis added); accord,~' United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 

905, 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1089 (1984). "If the 

right is not asserted before trial, it becomes discretionary with 

the trial court whether to allow the defendant to proceed prose." 

United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559 n.l4 (4th Cir. 1985); 

accord, ~' Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 

1982), reversed on other grounds, 462 U.S. 111 (1983). "In reach6 Scott testified about his lack of motive. 

prosecution's case did not rely on motive. 

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Moreover, the 

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ing its decision, the trial court must balance whatever prejudice 

is alleged by the defense against such factors as disruption of 

the proceedings, inconvenience and delay, and possible confusion 

of the jury." Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d at 362. Other 

considerations include "the reason for the request[ and] the quality of the counsel representing the party • • 

Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976). 

" Sapienza v. 

Scott was represented by counsel through five months of 

pretrial proceedings and two days of trial. On the third day of 

the four-day trial, he requested leave to proceed pro se so that 

he could examine and cross-examine witnesses. Tr. at 153. He did 

not find his counsel unsatisfactory; he just felt that he was 

"better qualified." Id. at 153-54. In view of the narrow purpose 

for which Scott sought to represent himself, the possible disruption of the trial, and the potential jury confusion engendered by 

a defendant representing himself and testifying, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion when it denied Scott's mid-trial 

request to take over for competent counsel. See United States v. 

Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1324-25 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 

440 u.s. 1084 (1980). 

VI. 

Mayes and Scott also appeal the trial court's decision not to 

suppress or exclude tape recordings and transcripts of certain 

telephone conversations. 

They first argue that the transcripts were unnecessary; 

because the recordings were so clear, the jury did not need the 

transcripts to assist them. Limited use of transcripts is in the 

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discretion of the trial court. United States v. Mittleider, 835 

F.2d 769 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 u.s. 980 (1988); 

United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1336 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). Here, as in Mittleider and Watson, 

the court instructed the jury to use the transcripts only to assist them in listening to the tapes. R. Vol. III at 52-53. We 

cannot say the court abused its discretion in this regard. 

Mayes and Scott next object that the transcripts were an "inaccurate" rendition of the conversations because the prosecution 

did not transcribe all of the recorded conversations. They do not 

claim, however, that the resulting transcripts were misleading. 

Moreover, defendants had access to the tape recordings and the 

trial court advised them they were free to introduce any other 

portion they desired. See R. Vol. III at 58-59. It was certainly 

within the trial court's discretion not to require the prosecution 

to transcribe all of the conversations the government recorded. 

The defendants further contend it was error to allow the 

transcripts to identify the respective voices on the tape recordings. This, they suggest, prejudiced the jury because testimonial 

evidence identifying the voices as those of the defendants was not 

introduced until after the recordings and transcripts were 

presented. But the 

"[u]se of transcripts here is not for purposes of 

establishing that a particular voice belongs to a 

particular person, but so that the jury may understand 

which voice the prosecution wants the jury to believe 

belongs to a particular person. 

United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d at 1336 n.7. Such use is within 

the trial court's discretion. Id. 

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Mayes and Scott also contend that the tape recorded telephone 

conversations are inadmissible hearsay and that their introduction 

violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 

Sixteen separate phone conversations (Exhibits 2 through 17) 

were introduced into evidence. Most of the conversations involved 

the defendants and various coconspirators (Exhibits 2 through 15). 

Two of the conversations were between coconspirators Alice 

Rodriguez and Debbie Martinmianakis (Exhibits 16 and 17). The 

briefs on appeal devote considerable space to debating whether the 

defendants' statements in these conversations (Exhibits 2 through 

15) qualify under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) 7 as admissible declarations against penal interest. The debate is irrelevant. The 

defendants' statements are admissions under Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2)(A) 8 , and are not hearsay. See United States v. Allison, 

908 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990). 

7 The Rule provides: 

804(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 

declarant is unavailable as a witness: 

(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the 

time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or 

proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to 

civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the 

declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the 

declarant's position would not have made the statement unless 

believing it to be true. 

8 The Rule provides: 

801(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 

hearsay if--

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against 

a party and is (A) the party's own statement in either an 

individual or representative capacity ..•• 

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Statements of the coconspirators are admissible under Fed. R. 

Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E). 9 Mayes and Scott argue that the conversations 

between Rodriguez and Martinmianakis (Exhibits 16 and 17) were not 

"during the course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy" 10 and 

should not have been admitted into evidence. They assert that, 

since Rodriguez had already surrendered the heroin to the FBI, the 

conspiracy had failed and Martinmianakis' instructions to 

Rodriguez how to smuggle the heroin into Leavenworth could not 

have furthered the conspiracy. 

We review this evidentiary determination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 S.Ct. 348 (1989); United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 

1387, 1393 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988). We 

accept the underlying factual findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 852 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 348 (1989); United States v. Smith, 

833 F.2d 213, 221-222 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

The time at which a conspiracy ends depends upon the 

particular facts of the case. Id. at 220; United States v. 

9 The Rule provides: 

80l(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 

hearsay if--

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 

against a party and is 

(E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course 

and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

10 They do not, on appeal, challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence demonstrating the existence of the conspiracy or their 

connection to it. See United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988, 

993 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 u.s. 1013 (1988); United 

States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. 

denied, 477 u.s. 905 (1980). 

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Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 867 (lOth Cir. 1984). "Generally, a 

conspiracy terminates when its central criminal purposes have been 

attained." United States v. Smith, 833 F.2d at 220; United States 

v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d at 867. The central criminal purpose of 

the conspiracy in this case was to introduce heroin into 

Leavenworth for illicit distribution. We have rejected the 

"proposition that the statements must actually further the 

conspiracy to be admissible. Rule 80l(d)2)(E) explicitly says 

statements need be 'in furtherance of the conspiracy,' not that 

they 'further the conspiracy.' It is enough that they be intended 

to promote the conspiratorial objectives." United States v. 

Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 384 (lOth Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). 

We cannot say the trial court's finding that Martinmianakis 

intended to promote the conspiratorial objectives is clearly erroneous. Nor do we find that the decision to allow the tape 

recorded conversations between Rodriguez and Martinmianakis into 

evidence under 80l(d)(2)(E) was an abuse of the trial court's 

discretion. 

Mayes and Scott did not raise their constitutional argument 

at trial. "[O]rdinarily, a party may not present a Confrontation 

Clause objection for the first time on appeal." United States v. 

Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 954 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 

(1987). Even if we review for plain error, "the requirements for 

admission under Rule 80l(d)(2)(E) are identical to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, and since the statements were 

admissible under the Rule, there was no constitutional problem." 

United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987). 

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VII. 

The defendants allege two incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. 

A. 

A pretrial order prohibited the government from mentioning 

the Aryan Brotherhood, a prison gang to which the defendants 

belonged, without first approaching the court. See R. Vol. I, Tab 

26 at 3. 

Scott testified that a government witness, a fellow prisoner 

named Hutchinson, made accusations against him because 

I've been around in the prison system quite a while and 

have a lot of friends throughout the system, not just at 

Leavenworth, and I think he's scheming enough to know 

that if he testified against me . • . that they would 

have to remove him from the federal prison system for 

his own protection and that way he hoped to get to a 

less secure institution. 

Tr. at 189. The following exchange took place during crossexamination: 

Q. You're a pretty important man over at Leavenworth, 

sir? 

A. I am just another number. 

Q. You've got friends in prisons all around the 

country, don't you, by your own testimony? 

A. Yes. Most prisoners do have friends all over the 

country. 

Q. Well, your friends are a little bit more organized 

than the average prisoner, isn't that true, sir? 

A. No, not--

Q. Your friends run the drugs in the United States 

prisons around the country, don't they, Mr. Scott? 

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A. No, sir, they don't. 

Q. You're not a member of any group that controls the 

drugs in the u.s. prisons? 

MR. WORKS: I'll object to the testimony There's 

no testimony there's any organization like that. 

THE COURT: This is cross-examination. All he has 

to do is say he's not and that is the end of it. 

Q. (By Mr. Hathaway) And it was your testimony, sir, 

that these friends of yours would make it very bad for 

Mr. Hutchinson if he were to do something to cause you a 

problem? 

A. This is true. Again, most convicts --

Q. Would they kill Mr. Hutchinson on your behalf? 

A. Who, friends of mine? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. I wouldn't ever ask them to. I wouldn't ask 

anybody to. 

Id. at 194-95. 

The defendants contend on appeal that "the inflammatory 

insinuations about the defendant[']s membership in a prison gang 

that would commit murder for the defendant is a thinly veiled 

reference to this 'Aryan Brotherhood.'" Brief of Appellants at 28 

(emphasis in original). This issue was not raised below, 11 so we 

review only for plain error. United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 

946, 951 (lOth Cir. 1987). Any reference to the Aryan Brotherhood 

was too "veiled" for the cross-examination to be a plain violation 

11 The only objection made was that the cross-examination 

exceeded the scope of Scott's direct testimony. See Tr. 195. An 

issue is not raised by objecting on other grounds. United States 

v. Gomez, 810 F.2d at 958 n.l4; United States v. Glover, 677 F.2d 

57, 59 (lOth Cir. 1982). 

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of the pretrial order. See United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 

773, 777 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

B. 

Mayes and Scott argued below that the voices in the taped 

telephone conversations were not theirs. Defense counsel stated 

during closing argument: 

I think that you should consider the fact that the 

government had the opportunity to do electronic computer 

assisted voice identification and conclusively prove 

that these were the voices of the defendants. They 

didn't do that, and I don't know why. They went to a 

lot of expense putting on this trial. I don't think it 

was a question of dollars. 

Tr. at 247. 

The government responded: 

The defense counsel would have you let these guys 

go because we didn't get involved with some kind of 

sophisticated voice identification. I don't even know 

what they're talking about, frankly. I don't know of 

any such system of sophisticated voice identification, 

but if there is such a system, you should ask yourself 

why they didn't do something in that regard. They have 

the ~ powers and processes and access to court 

authority as I do. They have the ability to apply to 

the Court for assistance in this case to .:9;:y to get 

scientific testing and that sort of thing. If there is 

such £ test that would have revealed that their clients 

were not the individuals on these phone calls, where are 

the results of that sophisticated test? We put on what 

is the traditional method of identifying a voice, and 

that is individuals who are familiar with that voice. 

And they left no doubt in their testimony. They left no 

doubt in their testimony these were the voices of Larry 

Mayes and Dallas Earl Scott. 

Tr. at 258 (emphasis added). 

The defendants characterize this as an attempt to "shift the 

burden of proof over to Mr. Mayes and Mr. Scott to prove their 

innocence by requiring them to produce voice identifications proving that they were not the parties allegedly tape recorded 

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" Brief of Appellants at 23. However, 

[a]s long as evidence can be solicited other than from 

the mouth of the accused, it proper to comment upon the 

failure of the defense to produce it .•.. [Such a 

comment does] not shift the burden of proof to the 

defendant in light of the trial court's subsequent 

instructions to the jury that arguments of lawyers are 

not evidence, that the burden of proof is with the 

government, and that the defendant has no burden to 

prove innocence, to call witnesses, or to produce any 

evidence at all. 

United States v. Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d 500, 503-04 (lOth Cir. 

1990). 

VIII. 

Finally, Scott argues that the section of the sentencing 

guidelines which provides for reduced sentences for defendants who 

affirmatively accept personal responsibility for their criminal 

conduct, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 

§ 3El.l (Nov. 1989), violates his Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination. We rejected this argument in United 

States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d _917, 924-25 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

1990 US LEXIS 4012, and see no need to repeat the analysis. 12 

CONCLUSION 

We find neither reversible error nor constitutional 

deficiency in the proceedings below. Accordingly, the judgment of 

the district court is AFFIRMED. 

12 He also contends that the guideline violates equal protection 

in that it results in different sentences for defendants convicted 

of the same crime. This argument was rejected in United States v. 

Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1465 (lOth Cir. 1990). Giving defendants 

who accept responsibility for their conduct lighter sentences than 

unrepentant defendants is rationally related to the govenment's 

legitimate interest in rehabilitating convicted criminals. 

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