Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02469/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02469-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Thomas Claybourne
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2469

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Anthony Thomas Claybourne, * 

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: December 15, 2004

 Filed: August 1, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and RILEY, Circuit

Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

After a two-day jury trial, Anthony Claybourne (Claybourne) was convicted of

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Finding Claybourne was an armed career criminal, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.4, the district court1

 sentenced Claybourne to 235 months’ imprisonment. On

appeal, Claybourne claims (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction, (2) the

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At trial, the parties stipulated that Claybourne previously had been convicted

of a felony, the pistol and its ammunition had been manufactured outside of Iowa, and

the pistol functioned as a firearm on the day it was discovered.

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district court abused its discretion in admitting drug-related evidence, (3) the United

States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) are unconstitutional, and (4) the district

court unconstitutionally enhanced Claybourne’s sentence based on the court’s

findings that Claybourne had three prior felony convictions. We affirm Claybourne’s

conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2003, members of the Mid-Iowa Narcotics Task Force executed

a search warrant of Claybourne’s residence. Before police officers entered the

residence, Officer Joseph Torruella (Officer Torruella) looked through a window and

noticed someone moving inside the residence. Upon entering the residence, the

officers encountered Claybourne, who was the only person in the residence. The

officers also discovered the residence had only two small bedrooms. When officers

searched the bedroom where Officer Torruella had seen movement, they discovered

(1) an Iowa nondriver identification card for Claybourne; (2) Claybourne’s Social

Security card; (3) a wireless telephone bill in Claybourne’s name inside a shoe box;

(4) another identification card for Claybourne inside a box on the top shelf of the

closet; (5) a hand scale inside the closet; (6) a box of sandwich baggies; (7) a digital

scale buried under some socks inside a dresser drawer; and (8) $950 in cash wrapped

in a rubber band inside a sock in a clothes basket.

The police also discovered a double extra large man’s t-shirt on the top shelf

of the closet. Concealed inside the t-shirt were an Intratec, Model TEC-9, 9mm,

semiautomatic pistol, its barrel, and its magazine containing twenty-nine rounds of

ammunition.2

 No identifiable prints were discovered on the firearm.

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The government charged Claybourne with being a felon in possession of a

firearm and ammunition. Claybourne pled not guilty. Granting, in part, Claybourne’s

motion in limine to exclude drug-related evidence, the district court allowed the

government only to submit evidence that the firearm “was found in the presence of

drug material, drug paraphernalia.” Evidence of other drug activities and related

investigations was not allowed.

At trial, Claybourne called two witnesses–Nicole Cratty (Cratty) and Angel

Ball (Ball). Cratty, who had known Claybourne only since May 2003, testified the

firearm found in the closet did not belong to Claybourne: “I know that the weapon

was not his. . . . Because I’m the one that put it at the top of the cupboard in the

house.” Cratty testified she first discovered the firearm while she was packing to

move on May 4 or 5. Cratty said she found the firearm wrapped inside a gray t-shirt

above the kitchen cupboard at her apartment. Cratty said Claybourne had never been

to her apartment, but she had allowed a man from Omaha to stay at her apartment

from the end of April to the beginning of May. Cratty testified she did not know the

man’s full name, address or phone number. After consulting Ball, who was helping

her move, Cratty decided to take the firearm with her to her next residence. Cratty

did not stay long at that residence, and decided to move to another apartment on May

28. Before she moved into the apartment, Cratty stayed with Claybourne in his

bedroom on May 26 and 27. Cratty testified that, on May 27, she decided she wanted

to go to the bar and “didn’t want to get pulled over with [the firearm] in [her]

vehicle,” so she “put [the firearm wrapped inside the t-shirt] in the cupboard above

the closet in the first bedroom at [Claybourne]’s.” Cratty said she put the firearm and

the t-shirt in the closet about 9:00 p.m. Cratty testified “[n]obody was there when I

did it,” and she never told Claybourne she put the firearm in his closet. At

approximately 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. on May 28, Cratty, Claybourne and another friend

returned to Claybourne’s residence. After leaving the apartment on the morning of

May 28, Cratty never returned to Claybourne’s residence, never showed the firearm

to Claybourne, and never talked to Claybourne about the firearm.

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Ball testified she has known Cratty since elementary school, but had never met

Claybourne. Ball testified she was the only person who helped Cratty move in early

May 2003, but had not talked to Cratty “for a long time” before that day. Ball stated

that, while she was in another room packing, Cratty “hollered for me to come into the

kitchen and had me get up on the counter to look, and there was a gun there.” Ball

identified the firearm at trial as the one she saw when she was helping Cratty move.

Ball also stated the firearm was wrapped in a gray t-shirt, but did not know if the tshirt produced at trial was “the exact one.” Although Ball first testified she had never

met Claybourne and did not visit Claybourne in jail, Ball later admitted–after the

government produced jail visitation records with Ball’s handwriting–she had visited

Claybourne while he was in jail.

At the close of the government’s case and again at the close of all of the

evidence, Claybourne moved for judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the

motion both times. After the two-day trial, a jury convicted Claybourne on the felonin-possession charge.

The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report

(PSR), which contained ten pages listing Claybourne’s adult convictions. The PSR

calculated a criminal history category of VI. Based on Claybourne’s prior

convictions for second-degree burglary, third-degree burglary, escape, and assault

with intent to inflict serious injury (two convictions for this offense), the PSR

concluded Claybourne should be sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18

U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Claybourne lodged an objection to the PSR,

contending “he is not an armed career criminal,” because the predicate offenses are

not crimes of violence. Overruling Claybourne’s objections, the district court

concluded Claybourne’s two prior felony burglary convictions and felony escape

conviction required that Claybourne be sentenced as an armed career criminal.

Calculating an offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of VI, the district

court determined the Guidelines sentencing range was 235 to 293 months’

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imprisonment. When allowed “to address . . . the issue of where in the guideline

range sentencing is appropriate,” Claybourne’s attorney stated,

We would ask the court to sentence my client to the low end of

the range, the 235 months, Your Honor. The punishment is quite severe

under the law. I believe that 235 months would not only serve as a

deterrent to my client and to society, but it would be severe enough to

satisfy any of the other sentencing factors that the court must take into

account. . . . I believe, under the circumstances of my client’s–the

characteristics of my client and his [young] life, that the 235 months

would be certainly more than adequate to punish him in this matter,

Your Honor.

In sentencing Claybourne, the district court made the following statement:

The court certainly recognizes that, under the circumstances of

this case, the primary issues that would be in consideration in sentencing

with regard to Mr. Claybourne would be the amount of his prior criminal

activity and the fact that he’s had a lot of trouble with the law over a

long period, but all of that has essentially been taken into consideration

by the guidelines and by the applicable law which provided a situation

in this case where he was found to be an armed career criminal.

Therefore, the guidelines have certainly adequately, if not more than

adequately, addressed any issues that are reasonably before the court.

Under the circumstances, at the lowest possible end of the range,

Mr. Claybourne is facing a significant amount of time based upon that

prior criminal activity. Therefore, the court finds no reason here today

to set the sentence anyplace other than at the bottom of the range.

Thus, the district court sentenced Claybourne to 235 months’ imprisonment.

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Section 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person who has been convicted

in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year

. . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive

any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce.”

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Arguing the “government’s evidence at trial was equally strong to infer [his]

innocence . . . as to infer his guilt,” Claybourne contends the district court erroneously

denied his motions for judgment of acquittal. Claybourne confronts “a high hurdle”

when attacking the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, “as we must

employ a very strict standard of review on this issue.” United States v. Cook, 356

F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2004). “We must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the

government, and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that

support the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). We will reverse only if we decide

no reasonable jury could have found Claybourne guilty. Id.

To convict Claybourne under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),3 “the government had to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) [Claybourne] had previously been convicted

of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year;

(2) [Claybourne] knowingly possessed a firearm; [and] (3) the firearm has been in or

has affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th

Cir. 2004). Because the parties stipulated to the first and third elements, the

government had to prove only that Claybourne knowingly possessed a firearm.

The government could prove Claybourne “knowingly possessed the firearm if

he had actual or constructive possession of the firearm, and possession of the firearm

could have been sole or joint.” United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 842, 846-47 (8th

Cir. 2005). “Constructive possession of the firearm is established if the person has

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dominion over the premises where the firearm is located, or control, ownership, or

dominion over the firearm itself.” United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th

Cir. 1993).

Sufficient evidence supports Claybourne’s conviction. The evidence

discovered inside the small bedroom singularly pointed to Claybourne as the person

who exercised dominion over the bedroom where the firearm was discovered. Before

the police officers even entered the residence, Officer Torruella noticed movement

in the bedroom where the firearm was located. As Claybourne was the only person

inside the residence, he must have been the person inside the bedroom when the

police approached the residence. Claybourne’s Iowa nondriver identification card

and Social Security card were found in the bedroom, as was a telephone bill in

Claybourne’s name. Police also found another identification card for Claybourne on

the very shelf where they discovered the firearm. Even Cratty’s testimony revealed

Claybourne exercised dominion over his small bedroom where the firearm was

discovered. Cratty testified she stayed in Claybourne’s room on May 26 and 27,

revealing Claybourne had the authority to determine who stayed in his bedroom.

It is also critical that the firearm was concealed inside a man’s shirt.

Concealing the firearm inside a piece of clothing was consistent with how the $950

in cash was concealed inside a sock in the same bedroom. In addition to recognizing

a pattern of concealing items, the jury also may have reasonably inferred the

movement Officer Torruella saw in the bedroom was Claybourne attempting to

conceal the firearm and cash.

Although criminal defendants often argue the jury should not have believed the

government’s witnesses, see, e.g., Cook, 356 F.3d at 917; United States v. Espino,

317 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2003), Claybourne contends the jury erroneously failed

to believe his witnesses. Claybourne argues his evidence “showed, step by step, how

the gun ended up in the cupboard without [his] knowledge.” Claybourne made this

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“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

5

“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

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argument to the jury, which rejected it. We reiterate the jury “is always the ultimate

arbiter of a witness’s credibility, and this Court will not disturb the jury’s findings in

this regard.” Espino, 317 F.3d at 794. There can be no doubt the jury rejected

Cratty’s and Ball’s convenient testimony about how the firearm found its way into

Claybourne’s closet. We are in no better position to judge Cratty’s and Ball’s

credibility on their crucial testimony. The jury had sufficient circumstantial evidence

upon which to convict Claybourne.

B. Drug-Related Evidence

Relying on Federal Rules of Evidence 4034

 and 404(b)5, Claybourne argues

“the district court’s ruling permitting the admission of the evidence of drug

paraphernalia constitutes an abuse of discretion because the evidence was so

prejudicial that it far outweighed the probative value of the evidence and poisoned

the minds of the jurors.” “We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and

application of the rules of evidence, and review for an abuse of discretion the factual

findings supporting its evidentiary ruling.” United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 706

(8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2004)).

Giving great deference “to the district court’s determination in balancing the

prejudicial effect and probative value of evidence of other crimes” or acts, we will

reverse the district court’s evidentiary decision “only when the evidence admitted

clearly has no bearing on any issue involved.” United States v. White, 356 F.3d 865,

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870 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). We also recognize “Rule 404(b) is a rule of

inclusion rather than exclusion and admits evidence of other crimes or acts relevant

to any issue in the trial, unless it tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United

States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). The district

court acted within its sound discretion in admitting the drug-related evidence if

“(1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in question other than the defendant’s

character; (2) clear and convincing evidence exists that the defendant committed the

prior wrongful acts; and (3) the potential unfair prejudice of the evidence does not

substantially outweigh its probative value.” Id.

Claybourne maintains he had no idea a firearm was in his bedroom. He then

argues the drug-related evidence found in his small bedroom should be excluded as

unfairly prejudicial. Similar to his contention concerning the firearm, Claybourne

makes the following argument: “The mere presence of the [drug-related] items in the

room where Mr. Claybourne stayed is not enough to show that he possessed them.”

We disagree with Claybourne’s circular reasoning and conclude the district court did

not err in admitting the evidence.

Given Claybourne’s contention that Cratty secretly placed the firearm in

Claybourne’s closet next to his identification card and a scale, the jury was entitled

to hear evidence depicting Claybourne’s small bedroom as it existed the morning the

police discovered the firearm. Claybourne argued to the jury that he had no idea a

firearm was hidden inside a man’s t-shirt and placed inside his closet. To counter this

theory, the government presented the jury with plenty of non-drug-related evidence

to convict Claybourne, as we outlined above.

The government also placed the concealed firearm in context, i.e., the firearm

was discovered in the same closet with Claybourne’s identification card and a hand

scale, and outside the closet was a digital scale. Consistent with discovering a

concealed firearm, the police also discovered a large sum of cash concealed inside a

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sock. By allowing the jury to hear how the small bedroom contained a firearm along

with Claybourne’s personal belongings, scales, and concealed cash, the government

was able to attack Claybourne’s theory that he is an innocent victim who

unknowingly allowed a female guest to stash a firearm in his bedroom closet. That

is, the jury was allowed to consider evidence revealing Claybourne had the motive,

opportunity, intent, and plan to possess a firearm to protect his drug-related items and

large stash of cash. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (authorizing evidence of other wrongs

or acts to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

or absence of mistake or accident”); United States v. Conrad, 320 F.3d 851, 857-58

(8th Cir. 2003) (holding drug paraphernalia was “admissible under Rule 404(b) as

probative on the issue of motive to possess a firearm”); United States v. Fuller, 887

F.2d 144, 147 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding drug paraphernalia “was admissible under

Rule 404(b) to show [the defendant]’s motive [to possess a firearm], given the close

and well-known connection between firearms and drugs”); Simon, 767 F.2d at 526-27

(affirming district court’s decision to admit drug-related evidence in a felon-inpossession case). The scales and large amount of concealed cash also tended to prove

the presence of the firearm in Claybourne’s small bedroom was no mistake or

accident. Id. 

If the jury had been precluded from hearing evidence of drug scales and large

amounts of concealed cash, i.e., unable to see the bedroom as it existed when the

firearm was discovered, Cratty’s story would have been powerfully deceptive. We

conclude the district court did not abuse its sound discretion in admitting evidence

of the scales and large amount of cash, which countered Claybourne’s theory that he

had no reason to possess a firearm and a conniving Cratty set him up by secretly

hiding a firearm in his small bedroom.

C. Sentencing Issues

Conceding he “did not object at trial to his sentence on Fifth or Sixth

Amendment grounds,” Claybourne argues on appeal the district court violated the

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Sixth Amendment by using the Guidelines to enhance Claybourne’s sentence. Citing

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (holding Washington’s sentencing

system unconstitutional), Claybourne contends (1) he did not consent to the

application of the unconstitutional Guidelines, and (2) the district court violated the

Sixth Amendment by using the Guidelines to enhance Claybourne’s sentence based

on a finding Claybourne’s prior felony convictions for burglary and escape were

crimes of violence. Claybourne asks this court to hold Claybourne’s Sixth

Amendment rights were violated, remand this case for resentencing, and instruct the

district court to “view the Guidelines as nonbinding and advisory, and sentence Mr.

Claybourne within the statutory minimum and maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).”

We no longer need to speculate whether Blakely applies to the Guidelines–it

does. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755-56 (2005). Our court has

recognized Booker held “the guidelines scheme ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment

insofar as the scheme provided that based on certain facts found by the sentencing

judge, the judge was required to impose a more severe sentence than could have been

imposed based on the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.” United

States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

750). In addition to this Sixth Amendment holding, the Supreme Court excised two

provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, thereby effectively creating an

advisory Guidelines system requiring a sentencing court “to consider Guidelines

ranges,” but also “permit[ting] the court to tailor the sentence in light of other

statutory concerns as well.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57 (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)).

Claybourne argues the Sixth Amendment required the government to prove to

a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Claybourne’s prior felony convictions for

burglary and escape constituted crimes of violence such that he could be sentenced

as an armed career criminal. Because armed career criminal enhancements are based

upon prior convictions, both the Supreme Court and our court have rejected the

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argument that juries, as opposed to sentencing judges, determine whether prior

convictions constitute crimes of violence. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (“Any fact

(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the

maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must

be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”);

Marcussen, 403 F.3d at 984 (holding the district court, and not a jury, determines

whether prior convictions subject a defendant to be sentenced as an armed career

criminal). Thus, the district court’s legal determination that Claybourne’s burglary

and escape convictions qualified him for armed career criminal status did not violate

the Sixth Amendment.

We still must determine whether the district court’s application of the

Guidelines as mandatory, rather than merely advisory, entitles Claybourne to

resentencing. Because Claybourne failed to lodge this objection before the district

court, we review his sentence for plain error, United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543,

549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (failure to preserve issue mandates plain-error review),

which is a demanding standard not easily met, United States v. Rodriguez-Ceballos,

407 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542

U.S. 74, __, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004)).

To gain reversal of his sentence, Claybourne must satisfy the four-part, plainerror test discussed in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993). To

establish plain error, Claybourne must establish “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)

that affect[s] substantial rights.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)

(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). If Claybourne establishes these

three conditions, our court may exercise its discretion to remand for resentencing “if

(4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).

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The district court “committed Booker error by applying the Guidelines as

mandatory, and the error is plain, that is, clear or obvious, at this time,” in light of

Booker. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. The critical question is whether Claybourne has

established the third and fourth conditions–“whether the Booker error affected

[Claybourne]’s ‘substantial rights’ in a manner that ‘seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520

U.S. at 467). To satisfy the third Olano condition, Claybourne must establish “a

‘reasonable probability’ that the district court would have imposed a more favorable

sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines regime mandated by Booker.” Id.

at 547.

We conclude Claybourne has not met his burden to prove the district court

would have imposed a more favorable sentence had it known the Guidelines were

merely advisory. At sentencing, Claybourne argued he is not an armed career

criminal because his convictions for burglary and escape were not crimes of violence.

Claybourne did not contend he should not be sentenced as an armed career criminal

even if his predicate offenses properly classify him as an armed career criminal.

Thus, after the district court determined Claybourne’s burglary and escape

convictions constituted crimes of violence, Claybourne sought to be sentenced at the

low end of the applicable Guidelines range. Acknowledging Claybourne’s extensive

prior criminal activity over a long period of time, the district court accepted

Claybourne’s sentencing argument that he be sentenced to 235 months’

imprisonment–the low end of the Guidelines range. Sentencing Claybourne at the

low end of the Guidelines range does not alone indicate a reasonable probability the

district court would have issued a more favorable sentence under an advisory

Guidelines sentencing system. See id. at 553 (“But sentencing at the bottom of the

range is the norm for many judges, so it is insufficient, without more, to demonstrate

a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence absent

the Booker error.”).

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The only hint the district gave that it may have sentenced Claybourne more

leniently under an advisory Guidelines system occurred when the court made the

following statement: “Therefore, the guidelines have certainly adequately, if not more

than adequately, addressed any issues that are reasonably before the court.” Because

this statement has no context, the statement fails to support the relief Claybourne

seeks on appeal. Given Claybourne’s long criminal history, the ease with which the

district court classified Claybourne as an armed career criminal, and no clear

indication the district court wished to impose a more lenient sentence on Claybourne

than contemplated under the Guidelines, we conclude Claybourne has not established

a reasonable probability the district court would have imposed a more favorable

sentence under an advisory Guidelines system. Id. (stating that, “where the effect of

the [Booker] error on the result in the district court is uncertain or

indeterminate–where we would have to speculate–the appellant has not met his

burden of showing a reasonable probability that the result would have been different

but for the error”) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th

Cir. 2005)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Claybourne’s conviction and sentence. 

______________________________

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