Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03706/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03706-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Steven Gerard Willard
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3706

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Steven Gerard Willard, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 12, 2006

Filed: June 16, 2006

___________

Before SMITH, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Steven Gerard Willard pled guilty to one count of traveling in interstate

commerce for the purpose of sexual conduct with a person under eighteen and one

count of transporting child pornography via the internet. The district court1

 sentenced

him to 168 months of imprisonment, followed by supervised release for life. He

appeals his sentence, and we affirm.

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2

By perhaps strange fortuity, both “girls” Willard chatted with were the same

person.

3

18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).

4

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).

-2-

Willard was indicted following a sting operation aimed at internet-based sexual

predators. He initiated internet-based conversations with what he thought were two

girls, aged twelve and thirteen. In actuality, they were fictitious identities maintained

by an adult private citizen,2

 who contacted police after Willard sent sexually explicit

images to one of her alternate identities, “Fancydancer14.” Willard, a Washington

resident, arranged to meet Fancydancer14 in her home state of Arkansas. When he

arrived at the agreed-upon hotel room, he was arrested. A subsequent search of his

residence uncovered child and adult pornography.

Willard was then charged with one count of traveling in interstate commerce

to engage in sexual conduct with a minor,3

 and five counts of transmitting child

pornography in interstate commerce.4

 He entered into a plea agreement, whereby he

pled guilty to the charge of traveling in interstate commerce to engage in sexual

conduct with a minor and one count of transmitting child pornography in exchange

for the dismissal of the remaining charges. At sentencing, he argued that offenserelated enhancements could not be imposed because they were not admitted or proven

to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court held a lengthy sentencing

hearing in which a number of witnesses were called to present testimony related to

the enhancements. At the end of the hearing, the district court overruled Willard’s

objection, and calculated a guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. Willard was

sentenced to 168 months, and this appeal followed.

Willard first argues that the court could not impose any enhancements unless

they were pled and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by him.

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This contention is at odds with our circuit precedent. “Nothing in [United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)] suggests that sentencing judges are required to find

sentence-enhancing facts beyond a reasonable doubt under the advisory Guidelines

regime.” United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). A

judge may find facts that enhance a sentence without violating a defendant’s jury trial

rights, so long as the judge understands that the guidelines are advisory. United

States v. Morell, 429 F.3d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2005).

The record in this case leaves no question that the district court understood

Booker’s impact. It noted that the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory portion

of the guidelines and left the remainder intact, such that enhancements remained the

product of judicial factfinding. This circuit has previously rejected Willard’s

argument that facts must be found by a jury before they are used to enhance a

sentence. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 551.

Willard next argues his sentence is “unreasonable,” as that term applies to postBooker sentences. A sentence is unreasonable if it appears the court gave significant

weight to an improper factor, failed to fully consider an appropriate factor, or

otherwise made a clear error of judgment. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997,

1004 (8th Cir. 2005). A sentence within the recommended guidelines range,

however, is presumed reasonable. United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th

Cir. 2005).

Willard’s sentence of 168 months is at the low end of his guidelines range, and

thus presumptively reasonable. Willard does not offer any specific reason why his

sentence is unreasonable. Rather, he claims it is unreasonable because it was the

product of enhancements imposed due to judge-found facts. As stated above, that

argument fails, and he directs us to nothing else in the record indicating his sentence

is unreasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. The sentencing transcript contains

a lengthy discussion in which the district court carefully considers those factors and

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how they ought to apply to Willard’s situation and ultimate sentence. We find no

error here.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm.

______________________________

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