Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02143/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02143-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Water Service Co
Defendant
Yvonne Pile-Cox
Defendant
Rosetta Surrell
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ROSETTA SURRELL,

NO. CIV. S-04-2143 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE

COMPANY, a corporation;

YVONNE PILE-COX; DOE 1; 

DOE 2; DOE 3; DOE 4; 

DOES 5 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Yvonne Cox’s

(“Cox”) motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1988(b), the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),

and the court’s inherent power to award sanctions. Defendant Cox

and defendant California Water Services Company (“Cal Water”)

jointly bring a motion for sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel

///

///

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 The factual background underlying this case is more

fully outlined in the court’s previous order granting summary

judgment to defendants. See Memorandum and Order, filed February

27, 2006 (“Order”).

2

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. For the reasons set forth below,1

defendants’ motions are DENIED. 

BACKGROUND2

On July 6, 2004, plaintiff filed numerous employment related

claims against defendants in the Superior Court for the State of

California, alleging that she was denied opportunities and

subjected to harassment because of her age, race, and

disabilities. Defendants removed the action from the California

Superior Court to this court on October 13, 2004. On December

20, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After

more than one year of discovery, the court granted summary

judgment in favor of defendants on February 27, 2006. Defendant

Cox, as the prevailing party, now seeks attorneys’ fees pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), FEHA, and the court’s inherent power to

award sanctions. Defendant Cox, together with defendant Cal

Water, also seeks sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent power. 

STANDARD

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

The Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976 states

in relevant part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 

. . . 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 . . . the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than

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the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part

of the costs.

42 U.S.C. § 1988. Under § 1988 jurisprudence, a prevailing

defendant is treated differently from a prevailing plaintiff and

fees are not awarded routinely or simply because defendant

succeeds. See Patton v. County of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1381

(9th Cir. 1988). To be awarded fees, a prevailing defendant must

demonstrate “plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or

without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad

faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Empl. Opp. Comm’n,

434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). This standard is “stringent” one.

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized repeatedly that attorneys’

fees in civil rights cases “‘should only be awarded to a

defendant in exceptional circumstances.’” Saman v. Robbins, 173

F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barry v. Fowler, 902

F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Herb Hallman Chevrolet,

Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645 (9th Cir. 1999); Brooks v.

Cook, 938 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991). As the Supreme Court

explained in Christiansburg:

[I]t is important that a district court resist the

understandable temptation to engage in post hoc

reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did

not ultimately prevail, his action must have been

unreasonable or without foundation. . . . Even when

the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable

at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable

ground for bringing a suit.

Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. 

The party seeking fees bears the burden of documenting and

substantiating fees, and those fees must be reasonable and

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necessary to the litigation. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 434 (1983) (district court should exclude hours that were

not “reasonably expended”); Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil

Aeronautics Board, 724 F.2d 211, 219 (9th Cir. 1984) (fee

applicant bears burden of documenting appropriate hours

expended). Further, in assessing whether to award attorneys’

fees, the district court must “consider the financial resources

of the plaintiff in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant”

because “the award should not subject the plaintiff to financial

ruin.” Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617,

621 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Patton v. County of Kings, 857 F.2d

1379 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the Miller standard to a case in

which plaintiff was represented by counsel). However, courts

should not refuse to grant attorneys’ fees awards to a prevailing

defendant “solely on the ground of the plaintiff’s financial

situation.” Patton, 857 F.2d at 1382. 

II. California Fair Employment and Housing Act

Section 12965 of the California Government Code states in

relevant part:

In actions brought under [FEHA], the court, in its

discretion, may award to the prevailing party

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert

witness fees, except where the action is filed by a

public agency or a public official, acting in an

official capacity.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b) (West 2006). Because the language,

purpose, and intent of California and federal anti-discrimination

acts are virtually identical, California courts have adopted the

methods and principles developed by the federal courts in

employment discrimination claims. Cummings v. Benco Bldg.

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Servs., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1386 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.). 

Therefore, in California, a trial court uses the standards set

forth in Christiansburg in exercising its discretion to award

fees and costs to a prevailing defendant under FEHA. Id. at

1387. However, a defendant is not a “prevailing party,” and

therefore not entitled to attorneys’ fees under FEHA, where the

plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to

bringing suit. Hon v. Marshall, 53 Cal. App. 4th 470, 478 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2d. Dist.) (concluding that dismissal for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies requires no consideration of the

merits). 

In California, a trial court is required to “make written

findings reflecting the Christiansburg/Cummings standard in every

case where attorneys’ fees are awarded in favor of defendants in

FEHA actions.” Rosenman v. Christensen et al., 91 Cal. App. 4th

859, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d. Dist.). The Rosenman court reasoned

that requiring such findings will limit defendants’ receipt of

attorneys’ fees to the extreme cases envisioned by Christiansburg

and Cummings. Id. 

III. Sanctions

Section 1927 provides:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases

in any court of the United States or any Territory

thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the

court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,

and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such

cost.

28 U.S.C. § 1927 (West 2006). Because § 1927 authorizes

sanctions only for the multiplication of proceedings, § 1927

“applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics once a lawsuit

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3 Because California courts follow the Christiansburg

analysis for awarding attorneys’ fees, the court addresses

defendants’ motions for attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1988 and

FEHA together. See Cummings, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1383.

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has begun.” In re Keegan Management Co. Securities Litigation,

78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1995).

Sanctions imposed pursuant to § 1927 must be supported by a

finding of subjective bad faith.” Id. at 436 (citing New Alaska

Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir.

1989)). “Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or

recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious

claim for the purposes of harassing an opponent.” Id. (quoting

Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Similarly, in sanctioning counsel pursuant to its inherent

powers, counsel’s conduct must constitute or be tantamount to bad

faith. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). 

“Courts many not invoke [inherent] powers without ‘a specific

finding of bad faith.’” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622,

628 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Stoneberger, 805

F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986). 

ANALYSIS

I. Attorneys’ Fees3

Defendant Cox contends that from its inception, plaintiff’s

lawsuit against her was entirely without merit. Defendant Cox

further contends that plaintiff’s statutory discrimination claims

were frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless because they lacked

any basis in law or fact. Therefore, defendant Cox argues that

she is entitled to attorneys’ fees as a result of plaintiff’s 

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4 Defendant Cox relies heavily upon a Ninth Circuit

opinion that was subsequently withdrawn. See E.E.O.C v. Bruno’s

Restaurant, 976 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992) withdrawn and re-filed

by E.E.O.C v. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Unlike the 1992 opinion, the 1993 opinion in Bruno’s Restaurant

vacated an award of attorneys’ fees to the defendant and remanded

for reconsideration. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285.

Defendants’ reliance on the 1992 opinion is misplaced.

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continued pursuit of a meritless lawsuit, which ultimately

resulted in summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

 In order for a prevailing defendant to succeed on a claim

for attorneys’ fees, the defendant must demonstrate that the

“plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without

foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. Further,

attorneys’ fees should only be awarded to the defendant in a

civil rights action in “exceptional circumstances.” See Barry,

902 F.2d at 773. 

The Supreme Court has cautioned that in applying the

criteria to award fees to a defendant under § 1988, district

courts must “resist the understandable temptation to engage in

post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did

not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or

without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22;

E.E.O.C. v. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1993).4

To assess fees against a party simply because that party did not

prevail would undercut the Congressional effort to promote

vigorous enforcement of the anti-discrimination statutes. 

Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 290 (citing Christiansburg, 434

U.S. at 422). Rather, the correct inquiry focuses on the

plaintiff’s reasonable belief in her claims at the onset of

litigation. Id. at 288-290; see also Dixon v. Clem, Slip Copy,

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2006 WL 751235 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (concluding that the court should

initially determine whether the plaintiff’s claim was reasonable

at the time it was asserted). Thus, “[e]ven when the law or

facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party

may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.” 

Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. 

In assessing the propriety of awarding defendant Cox

attorneys’ fees in this case, the court emphasizes that an award

of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant in a § 1981 case

must be granted with exceeding caution so as not to unduly chill

civil rights litigation. While § 1988(b) serves as a deterrent

against frivolous litigation, the Congressional policies which

underlie § 1983 include “vigorous prosecution of civil rights

violations.” Miller, 827 F.2d at 619. Further, the court is

also cognizant that it is often difficult for deserving

plaintiffs to find competent lawyers willing to bring civil

rights actions.

In this case, plaintiff likely had a reasonable belief that

she had been discriminated against because of her race, age, and

disabilities. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she was

(1) drug tested after filing a grievance, (2) denied crosstraining, (3) denied the opportunity to fill in for a week at a

higher position, and (4) subjected to work-related derogatory

comments by her supervisor. Defendants did not dispute that

these actions occurred in some form. However, in opposition to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was unable to

proffer evidence of a prima facie case as to some of these claims

and was unable to present specific evidence in response to

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5 Plaintiff did not allege any facts in her complaint

that defendant Cox was acting under color of state law, and thus,

liable under § 1983. However, defendants did not file a motion

to dismiss, but rather let this claim proceed to the summary

judgment level after the close of discovery. Defendant should

not be awarded for allowing such knowingly meritless claims to

survive through the close of discovery and up until the

dispositive motion deadline. Further, the core of plaintiff’s

claims was employment discrimination, which was brought pursuant

to § 1981 and addressed on the merits in the court’s order.

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defendant’s evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for their conduct. The fact that plaintiff was unable to provide

proper evidence to raise a triable issue of fact, does not mean

that her claims were unreasonable, frivolous, or without a

foundation.5 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. 412; Cummings, 11 Cal.

App. 4th 1383.

Additionally, district courts may consider a plaintiff’s

financial resources in deciding whether to award a defendant

attorneys’ fees because “the award should not subject the

plaintiff to financial ruin.” Miller, 827 F.2d at 621; See also

Patton, 857 F.2d 1379. Here, plaintiff earned an annual salary

of $61,000 through April 2003. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’

Interrogs., Ex. A to Decl. of Raymond F. Lynch in Supp. of Def.’s

Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees, filed March 29, 2006). However, since

December 2003, plaintiff has received no income. (Id.) Based

upon the evidence submitted by defendant Cox, an award of more

than $34,000 in fees to defendant would unduly burden plaintiff. 

While this factor alone does not justify the denial of fees, the

burden on this individual plaintiff coupled with the possible

chilling effect of such an award on future civil rights cases

significantly supports denial of defendant Cox’s motion for

attorneys’ fees.

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Finally, in deciding whether to award fees, the court

considers defendant’s own conduct over the course of this

litigation. Defendant Cox did not file a motion to dismiss in

this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If defendant believed

plaintiff’s claims were truly frivolous from the inception of

this litigation, defendant may have garnered dismissal, or, at a

minimum, narrowed the issues through such a motion. Defendant

did not do so. Instead, defendant admits that she made repeated

requests to plaintiff to dismiss her suit, arguing that the

claims were unfounded and lacked merit. (Mem. of P & A in

support of Defs.’ Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees, filed March 29, 2006, at

1). However, when these informal requests were rejected by

plaintiff, defendant did not file a motion for dismissal. 

Rather, defendant continued to engage in further discovery. Only

after discovery closed did defendant file a motion for summary

judgment. From these facts, it appears defendant litigated this

case as if it had merit. 

In short, defendant Cox seeks to hold plaintiff responsible

for attorneys’ fees incurred over more than a year defending what

defendant now alleges was a frivolous suit. Attorneys’ fees in

civil rights cases are awarded to defendants only in exceptional

cases where plaintiff’s claims are demonstrably frivolous. This

case is not such an exception. Accordingly, defendant Cox’s

motion for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

II. Sanctions

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s counsel should be

sanctioned pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1927 or pursuant to the

court’s inherent authority because he recklessly pursued claims

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6 While some of plaintiff’s counsel’s legal theories and

arguments were entirely without merit, the core of plaintiff’s

claims was not frivolous. Further, defendants allowed these

claims to remain throughout the close of discovery and up to the

summary judgment level, litigating such claims as if they had

merit. 

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that he knew or should have known were frivolous. This court has

authority to award sanctions against an attorney who unreasonably

and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s counsel multiplied the

proceedings by failing to voluntarily dismiss claims and by

“forcing” defendants to file a motion for summary judgment.

The sanctions sought by defendants require a specific

finding of subjective bad faith. In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436-

37. “For sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted

recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not frivolous,

it must be intended to harass.” Id. at 436. For the reasons set

forth above in the court’s discussion of attorneys’ fees,

plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous.6 Therefore, the court

must find that plaintiff’s intended to harass through his

conduct. The court cannot make such a finding on the record

before it. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for sanctions

pursuant to § 1927 is DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Cox’s motion for

attorneys’ fees is DENIED and defendants’ motion for sanctions is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 28, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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