Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03382/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03382-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mikell Bryan
Defendant
City of Santa Rosa, California
Defendant
Joan Cooper
Defendant
General Dynamics Corporation
Defendant
William Jeffrey Gilliam
Plaintiff
J Pederson
Defendant
Bob Smith
Defendant
Sonoma County
Defendant
Timothy Werner
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM JEFFREY GILLIAM,

Plaintiff,

 v

SONOMA COUNTY, CITY OF SANTA

ROSA, CALIFORNIA, BOB SMITH,

TIMOTHY WERNER, J PEDERSON,

MIKELL BRYAN, JOAN COOPER and

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, 

Defendants.

______________________________/

No C 02-3382 VRW

ORDER

Defendant General Dynamics (GD) has filed a motion for

FRCP 11 sanctions and to declare plaintiff William Gilliam

(“Gilliam”) a vexatious litigant (Doc #74). Although the court

agrees with GD that Rule 11 sanctions are substantively warranted

and that it has jurisdiction to entertain such a motion, the court

nonetheless concludes that GD’s failure to comply with the safe

harbor provision of Rule 11 is fatal to its motion. Declaring

Gilliam a vexatious litigant and enjoining him from further

vexatious conduct in this (or any similar) suit is, however, within

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the court’s jurisdiction, procedurally proper and substantively

warranted. Accordingly, GD’s motion is GRANTED IN PART.

I

Gilliam filed the original complaint in this action on

July 15, 2002. It included federal civil rights claims under 42 §§

1983 and 1985. Doc #1. After defendants GD and Sonoma County (the

County) filed motions to dismiss (Doc ##9, 19), the court dismissed

Gilliam’s original complaint as time-barred (Doc #31). On July 3,

2003, Gilliam filed an amended complaint that asserted federal

causes of action based on essentially the same allegations as those

in the original complaint. Doc #33. GD and the County again filed

motions to dismiss (Doc ##35, 39). GD also requested attorney fees

pursuant to 42 USC § 1988(b), which permits such an award to a

prevailing civil rights defendant if a plaintiff’s claims are

unreasonable or vexatious. On November 17, 2003, the court granted

defendants’ motions to dismiss for the same reasons it had

dismissed the original complaint. Doc #48. In that same order,

the court granted GD’s request for attorney fees on the basis that

Gilliam’s amended complaint was groundless and without foundation. 

Because the court required further briefing before determining the

appropriate amount of attorney fees to award, the court ordered GD

to submit a supplemental memorandum by December 8, 2003. The court

further ordered Gilliam submit any objections to GD’s supplemental

memorandum by December 22, 2003.

GD submitted its supplemental memorandum on December 8,

2003. See Doc ##49, 50. As of 5:00 pm on December 22, 2003, the

court had received nothing from Gilliam. The court thus issued an

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order awarding GD $31,771.25 in reasonable attorney fees and costs

of $2,782.69. Doc #51.

Gilliam, however, lodged his objections with the court at

approximately 5:30 pm on December 22, 2003. Doc #53. The court

concluded that it would be preferable to consider Gilliam’s

objections to GD’s supplemental filings (despite the fact that they

were filed at the last minute), rather than keeping the order

granting attorney fees in effect. Accordingly, the court suspended

its December 22, 2003, order awarding GD its reasonable attorney

fees and costs. Doc #52. The court invited GD to submit a reply

to Gilliam’s objections by January 15, 2004, at which time the

court would consider the matter submitted. The court received GD’s

reply on January 15, 2004. Doc #59.

On January 22, 2004, the court issued an order

reinstating its previous order granting GD its attorney fees and

costs in the amount of $34,553.94. Doc #60. In that order, the

court noted that all of Gilliam’s arguments in his objections were

based not on whether the fees requested were reasonable, but on

whether the court should have awarded GD its fees in the first

place. Because the court had conclusively decided that issue in

its November 17, 2003, order, Gilliam’s attempt to reopen that

issue was improper. 1/22/04 Order (Doc #60) at 5:3-6:28. The

court nevertheless marched through Gilliam’s arguments to

reconsider the decision to award fees and found them all meritless. 

Id at 7:2-13:14.

Shortly after reinstating the December 22, 2003, order

determining the proper amount of attorney fees and costs, the court

received three new motions from Gilliam. On January 30, 2004,

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Gilliam moved the court to recuse itself and to alter or amend the

judgment against Gilliam pursuant to FRCP 59(e). Doc ##61, 62. On

February 9, 2004, Gilliam filed a request for judicial notice and a

motion for sanctions against GD. Doc #63. None of these motions

was noticed for hearing. On February 9 and 20, 2004, GD filed

oppositions to Gilliam’s new motions and requested that the court

sanction Gilliam and declare him a vexatious litigant. Doc ##64,

65. 

On April 14, 2004, the court issued an order denying all

of Gilliam’s motions. Doc #68. The court found that Gilliam’s

motion to recuse was frivolous and likely interposed for an

improper purpose, 4/14/04 Order (Doc #68) at 6:2-12:27, concluded

that Gilliam’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was “frivolous

at best and false and disingenuous at worst,” see id at 13:2-20:11,

and denied Gilliam’s motion for sanctions as meritless. Id at

20:13-21:19. Nevertheless, the court declined to grant GD’s

request for sanctions or to declare Gilliam a vexatious litigant

because GD had not filed its request as a separate motion noticed

on the court’s regular motion calendar, as is required by Civ L R

7-2 and 7-8. Id at 21:21-22:27. The court advised Gilliam,

however, that GD appeared to have ample basis to make such a motion

and cautioned him against lodging further frivolous motions with

the court. Id at 23:8-11.

Several days later, Gilliam filed a petition for

bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern

District of California. See In re Gilliam, No 04-42153 (Bankr N D

Cal) (Liguori Decl (Doc #73) ¶5, Exh C). The bankruptcy court

eventually dismissed Gilliam’s petition, finding that the petition

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had been filed in bad faith and that Gilliam had made false

statements under penalty of perjury. Id. The bankruptcy court

prohibited Gilliam from filing another bankruptcy for a period of

180 days. Id. Meanwhile, the Sonoma County superior court entered

a vexatious litigant order against Gilliam on April 20, 2004. See

Liguori Decl (Doc #73) ¶4, Ex B.

On May 13, 2004, Gilliam filed a notice of appeal of the

court’s April 14, 2004, order. Doc #70. Subsequently, on June 16,

2004, GD filed a duly noticed, separately filed motion for

sanctions and to declare Gilliam a vexatious litigant. Doc #72. 

GD filed a corrected version of the motion on July 12, 2004. Doc

#74. The motion was set for a September 2, 2004, hearing.

Gilliam failed to oppose the motion in a timely fashion,

so on August 16, 2004, the court vacated the September 2, 2004,

hearing and issued an order to show cause (OSC) why the motion

should not be treated as unopposed. On August 19, 2004, the court

received an opposition from Gilliam to the motion for sanctions. 

Doc #75. The court invited GD to file a reply brief, Doc #76,

which GD did on September 10, 2004, Doc #77.

II

The first matter the court must address is whether

Gilliam has discharged the August 16, 2004, OSC. Gilliam filed his

opposition to GD’s motion on August 19, 2004. Doc #75. In that

opposition, Gilliam makes several arguments addressing why GD’s

motion should not be granted. Based on Gilliam’s response, the

court is satisfied that Gilliam wishes to oppose the motion and has

raised arguments that address the merits of the motion.

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Gilliam’s August 19 opposition does not, however, address

Gilliam’s reasons for failing to oppose GD’s motion in a timely

manner. Given that the court issued the August 16 OSC only days

before receiving Gilliam’s August 19 opposition, the court suspects

that the OSC and the opposition simply crossed in the mail. In

other words, the opposition probably does not contain a response to

the OSC because Gilliam probably had not received the OSC at the

time he drafted and filed the opposition.

The court remains troubled by Gilliam’s failure to file

the opposition in a timely fashion. Pursuant to Civ L R 7-3,

Gilliam was required to serve and file his opposition no later than

21 days before the September 2 hearing date. Gilliam should be

aware of this rule, as this is not the first time that the court

has issued an OSC to him based on his failure to file opposition

papers on time. Nevertheless, the court believes that it is

preferable to evaluate GD’s motion on its merits, rather than

ruling against Gilliam based on his procedural mistakes. See

Gorlikowski v Tolbert, 52 F3d 1439, 1444 (7th Cir 1995); Nilsson,

Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v Louisiana Hydrolec,

854 F2d 1538, 1546 (9th Cir 1988). Accordingly, the OSC is

DISCHARGED and the court will consider Gilliam’s late-filed

opposition.

III

In light of the pending appeal, the court must take up

the issue of its jurisdiction to entertain GD’s motion for

sanctions or issue a vexatious litigant order.

GD bases its motion for Rule 11 sanctions on Gilliam’s

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three motions that the court denied on April 14, 2004, and bases

its motion for a vexatious litigant order on Gilliam’s lengthy and

abusive litigation history. GD argues that, despite the fact that

Gilliam has filed a notice of appeal, the court retains

jurisdiction to decide the instant motion. Mot Sanctions (Doc #74)

at 6:6-25.

Although an appeal typically divests the district court

of jurisdiction, that rule is not absolute and is a rule of

judicial economy designed simply to avoid the confusion and

inefficiency of two courts determining the same issues at the same

time. Masalosalo v Stonewall Ins Co, 718 F2d 955, 956 (9th Cir

1983); see also Cal Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v Commercial

Realty Projects, Inc, 309 F3d 1113, 1120-21 (9th Cir 2002) (finding

that divestment upon notice of appeal is “a rule of judicial

economy and not one that strips the district court of subject

matter jurisdiction”). The district court thus retains

jurisdiction to determine collateral matters, such as attorney fee

awards or the modification of injunctions. Natural Resources

Defense Council v Southwest Marine, Inc, 242 F3d 1163, 1166 (9th

Cir 2001); Masalosalo, 718 F2d at 957. An issue may be

characterized as “collateral” when the court may resolve it without

(re)adjudicating the merits of the claims or materially altering

the status of the case on appeal. See Southwest Marine, 242 F3d at

1166. The Supreme Court has held that sanctions generally are

collateral matters over which the district court is not easily

divested of jurisdiction. See Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx Corp, 496

US 384 (1990) (holding that a FRCP 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal

does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to entertain a

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motion for sanctions based on the voluntarily dismissed complaint).

GD argues that its motion for sanctions and to declare

Gilliam a vexatious litigant constitutes just such a collateral

matter. GD bases this argument on its contention that Gilliam’s

present appeal only involves the issues whether the court’s

dismissal of the amended complaint and award of § 1988(b) attorney

fees was appropriate. See Mot Sanctions (Doc #74) at 6:24-25. In

other words, GD contends that the appeal does not involve the

issues raised in Gilliam’s motions to recuse, to alter or amend the

judgment and for sanctions.

Gilliam disputes this characterization and argues that

imposing sanctions would involve the consideration of issues that

are currently before the Ninth Circuit on appeal. Gilliam may be

correct about this; the scope of his appeal may be broader than GD

has implied. Gilliam’s notice of appeal is from the court’s April

14, 2004, order denying Gilliam’s motions to recuse, to alter or

amend the judgment and for sanctions. See Liguori Decl (Doc #73)

¶3, Ex A. It is not for the court to determine the scope of the

Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction in this matter, but that court may

well be faced with consideration of Gilliam’s motions to recuse, to

alter or amend and for sanctions. That said, even if the appeal is

as broad as Gilliam suggests, it may nonetheless not divest this

court of jurisdiction over the instant motion.

In its motion and reply, GD fails to cite any published

Ninth Circuit authority that considers in any detail the issue

whether the district court may award Rule 11 sanctions or impose a

vexatious litigant order after the district court’s disposition of

the allegedly frivolous pleadings or motions has been appealed. 

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(GD cites an unpublished 1991 9th Circuit decision (see Mot

Sanctions (Doc #74) at 6:14-17). Of course, the court may not,

rely on that unpublished case. See Civ L R 7-13; 9th Cir Ct App R

36-3.)

The Ninth Circuit discussed this issue briefly in United

Energy Owners Cmte, Inc v United States Energy Management Systems,

Inc, 837 F2d 356 (9th Cir 1988). In United Energy, the Ninth

Circuit noted that, although the district court should not have

imposed sanctions, the district court had retained jurisdiction to

impose those sanctions. 837 F2d at 358. But the district court in

United Energy had imposed sanctions based on the plaintiffs’

failure to release certain writs of attachment in a timely fashion,

rather than on the substantive merits of plaintiffs’ pleadings. Id

at 360. Further, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court’s

decision to deny a motion for sanctions, given that the motion

asked the district court to, in effect, reconsider a prior motion

for similar sanctions that was already on appeal. Trulis v Barton,

107 F3d 685, 694-95 (9th Cir 1995).

Confronted with somewhat limited precedent, the court

must locate this case between the poles of Trulis (where the motion

for sanctions required direct reconsideration of an issue on

appeal) and United Energy (where the motion for sanctions was

entirely collateral). The Supreme Court’s guidance in Cooter &

Gell is instructive, as it suggests that motions for sanctions (and

by extension vexatious litigant orders) are typically collateral

matters. The Ninth Circuit’s principal concerns in this area seem

to be (1) that the district court not disturb orders or judgments

that are on appeal and (2) that the district court and court of

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appeals not do redundant work by simultaneously considering the

same issue. See, e g, Masalosalo, 718 F2d at 956 (referring to

“the confusion and inefficiency of two courts considering the same

issues simultaneously”); cf Southwest Marine, 242 F3d at 1166

(stressing that the salient jurisdictional limitation on modifying

injunctions pending appeal pursuant to FRCP 62(c) is that “any

action taken pursuant to FRCP 62(c) ‘may not materially alter the

status of the case on appeal’”).

In the instant case, the court finds that although

adjudicating GD’s motion might require consideration of some of the

issues that are on appeal, it would not affect the merits of any

order now on appeal. The jurisdictional bar imposed by a notice of

appeal does not prevent the district court from considering matters

related to issues pending on appeal; it only forbids reevaluation

of the very issues that are on appeal. Such a rule is consistent

with the reasoning and result in Cooter & Gell, Masalosalo, United

Energy, Trulis and Southwest Marine.

Here, GD’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions asks the court to

make a substantive finding that Gilliam’s three motions were

objectively meritless. Although that may result in a further

elaboration of the court’s prior orders, it will not modify them or

otherwise venture into matters over which the court of appeals has

jurisdiction.

There are some small inefficiencies to contend with, but

they are not so great that they counsel against retaining

jurisdiction under these circumstances. If the Ninth Circuit

reverses this court’s determinations on the merits of the motions

that triggered GD’s request for sanctions, this court might need to

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revisit any sanctions order predicated on the frivolousness of

those underlying motions. Similarly, there would be a problem with

declaring Gilliam a vexatious litigant: Should the Ninth Circuit

reverse the court’s previous rulings and remand for further

proceedings, it would be an odd result to have enjoined Gilliam

from filing any further papers with this court. Both matters can

be addressed if, as and when they arise; the court could vacate an

award of sanctions and dissolve a vexatious litigant order to allow

Gilliam to proceed in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s mandate.

For these reasons, the court concludes that it has

jurisdiction to impose the sanctions GD requests.

IV

Turning to the merit’s of GD’s motion for Rule 11

sanctions, the court agrees with Gilliam that such a motion is

procedurally improper.

Rule 11 contains a so-called “safe harbor” provision that

requires a party seeking sanctions to serve the Rule 11 motion on

the opposing party at least twenty-one days before filing the

motion with the district court. FRCP 11(c)(1)(A); see also

Brickwood Contractors, Inc v Datanet Engineering, Inc, 369 F3d 385,

389 (4th Cir 2004). The safe harbor provision also restricts the

party seeking sanctions from continuing to do so unless the

challenged pleading is not withdrawn or corrected within the

twenty-one-day window. FRCP 11(c)(1)(A); see also Brickwood

Contractors, 369 F3d at 389. The safe harbor provisions of Rule 11

are mandatory and cannot be avoided simply because the opposing

party has received informal notice of the motion. Barber v Miller,

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146 F3d 707, 710 (9th Cir 1998).

In the case at bar, GD acknowledges that it did not

comply with the 21-day safe harbor. See Reply (Doc #77) at 6

(appealing to out-of-circuit authority for the proposition that

“courts retain discretion to award sanctions upon a determination

that the movant has ‘substantially complied’ with [Rule 11]”). 

That Gilliam may have received actual notice of GD’s intent is

beside the point; the Ninth Circuit has emphasized repeatedly that

the safe harbor requirements must be strictly applied and that only

a formal motion served twenty-one days before its filing is

sufficient for notice purposes. Radcliffe v Rainbow Construction

Co, 254 F3d 772, 789 (9th Cir 2000); Barber, 146 F3d at 710.

Even assuming that GD served Gilliam with a copy of the

motion for sanctions twenty-one days before filing, the court still

must find that the motion is procedurally improper. The Ninth

Circuit has emphasized that a motion for sanctions must be served

before the conclusion of the case or judicial rejection of the

allegedly offending papers. Barber, 146 F3d at 710-11. This is

because serving the motion after judgment or dismissal essentially

deprives the opposing party of an opportunity to withdraw the

allegedly offending papers. The court’s April 14, 2004, order both

disposed of Gilliam’s three motions and effectively ended the

litigation of this case. Service of the motion for sanctions after

the court had ruled on the motions and closed the case, therefore,

essentially deprived Gilliam of his right to withdraw the motions.

Given these procedural infirmities, the court cannot

grant GD’s motion for sanctions. The court further notes that,

despite its view that Gilliam’s three motions were basically

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frivolous, the court should not impose sanctions on its own

initiative pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B). GD has initiated the

proceedings for sanctions, not the court. Any sanctions the court

might impose would, as a practical matter, be imposed as a result

of GD’s requests. See Radcliffe, 254 F3d at 789; Barber, 146 F3d

at 711.

Accordingly, GD’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED.

V

GD also moves the court to declare Gilliam a vexatious

litigant. Mot Sanctions (Doc #74) at 9:16-10:21. A district court

has power under the All Writs Act, 28 USC § 1651(a), to enjoin

litigants who abuse the judicial system. Tripati v Beaman, 878 F2d

351, 352 (9th Cir 1989); Walker v Stanley, 231 BR 343, 350 (N D Cal

1999) (Ware, J); Waldron v Washington Mutual, 1999 US Dist LEXIS

11941, *11 (N D Cal) (Jenkins, J); see DeLong v Hennessey, 912 F2d

1144, 1147 (9th Cir 1999) (recognizing that “there is strong

precedent establishing the inherent power of federal courts to

regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully

tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances”). “Even

onerous conditions may be imposed upon a litigant as long as they

are designed to assist the district court in curbing the particular

abusive behavior involved.” Tripati, 878 F2d at 352 (internal

quotation and citation omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has established four guidelines that a

court must follow in enjoining a vexatious litigant: (1) the

litigant must be provided with notice and a chance to be heard

before the court enters the order; (2) the court should establish

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an adequate record for review, that is, a listing of the cases

and/or abusive activities undertaken by the litigant; (3) the court

must make a substantive finding that the litigant’s activities were

frivolous and harassing; and (4) the court must narrowly tailor the

order to deter the specific vice encountered. DeLong, 912 F2d at

1147-48.

A

In the case at bar, the first DeLong requirement is

readily satisfied. First, Gilliam has been provided with notice

and an opportunity to be heard on the vexatious litigant issue. 

Defendants filed proof of service of the corrected motion on July

12, 2004, and the court issued to Gilliam an OSC why that motion

should not be treated as unopposed on August 16, 2004. On August

19, 2004, Gilliam filed an opposition to the motion, further

demonstrating that he received notice. Doc #75. Although the

court did not take oral argument on the vexatious litigant issue,

“[t]he notice and opportunity requirement does not * * * require an

in-person hearing in the district court.” Tripati, 878 F2d at 354.

B

Second, the court is quite familiar with Gilliam’s

history of vexatious filings. In this case, Gilliam has taken the

following unwarranted actions:

• After the court’s order dismissing the original complaint

(Doc #31), Gilliam filed an amended complaint that failed

to address the weaknesses in the original complaint (Doc

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#33);

• After GD filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint

(Doc #39), Gilliam failed timely to file an opposition,

necessitating the issuance of the September 11, 2003, OSC

(Doc #42);

• After the September 11 OSC, Gilliam filed an untimely

opposition (Doc #45) in which he advanced arguments that

the court had previously rejected;

• After the court granted GD’s motion for § 1988 attorney

fees and requested supplemental briefing on the amount of

such fees (Doc #48), Gilliam filed a response that

addressed the merits of GD’s motion for fees, rather than

the amount of such fees (Doc #53);

• After the court issued its final order on the attorney

fee award issue (Doc #60), Gilliam filed three frivolous,

harassing motions:

< The motion to recuse (Doc #62);

< The motion to alter or to amend the judgment (Doc

#61); and

< The motion for Rule 11 sanctions (Doc #62); and

• After GD filed the present motion for sanctions and to

declare Gilliam a vexatious litigant (Doc #74), Gilliam

failed to respond in a timely fashion, necessitating the

issuance of another OSC on August 16, 2004 (Doc #75).

GD has also presented evidence that Gilliam filed a

bankruptcy petition in bad faith in the bankruptcy court of this

judicial district. See Liguori Decl (Doc #73) ¶5, Ex C. The court

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has also been made aware of at least five other cases, both in this

court and in state court, in which Gilliam makes the same or

similar claims as he made in this case. See 5/27/03 Order (Doc

#31) at 4:1-19 (taking judicial notice of the filings in (1) Cooper

v Gilliam, C 02-499 VRW; (2) Gilliam v Napa County, et al, C 02-705

WHA; (3) Gilliam v Austin, et al, C 02-1389 PJH; (4) Cooper v

Gilliam, SCV 227783 (Sonoma County Super Ct, Aug 22, 2001); and (5)

Cooper v Gilliam, D 02-659 (Contra Costa Super Ct, Feb 15, 2002)). 

While it is unclear whether all of these cases were vexatious,

their existence and numerosity is notable. One Sonoma County judge

found the state court actions vexatious enough to enjoin Gilliam

from filing any new pro se litigation in state court. See Liguori

Decl (Doc #73) ¶4, Ex B.

C

Next, the court turns to the third DeLong requirement,

which is the heart of the matter: whether the evidence submitted

to the court warrants a substantive finding that Gilliam’s

litigation activities were frivolous or harassing. In making this

determination, the court must consider both the number and the

content of Gilliam’s filings. DeLong, 912 F2d at 1148. The court

should examine several factors in this regard: (1) Gilliam’s

history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed

vexatious, harassing or duplicative suits or filings; (2) Gilliam’s

motive in pursuing the litigation, i e, whether Gilliam has an

objective good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether Gilliam

is represented by counsel; (4) whether Gilliam has caused needless

expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the

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courts and their personnel; (5) whether other sanctions would be

adequate to protect the courts and other parties; and (6) whether

Gilliam is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process. Safir

v United States Lines, Inc, 792 F2d 19, 24 (2d Cir 1986); Walker,

231 BR at 350-51.

1

With respect to the first factor, it is clear that

Gilliam has engaged in a pattern of repetitive and often vexatious

litigation tactics. Gilliam has engaged in at least six different

lawsuits that appear to relate in some fashion to the claims at

issue in this case. See 5/27/03 Order (Doc #31) at 4:1-19. 

Gilliam has also filed a bad faith petition for bankruptcy in this

district. See Liguori Decl (Doc #73) ¶5, Ex C. And Gilliam’s

tactics in the present suit have, by any measure, been improper and

vexatious. As the court described in detail in this order and in

previous orders, Gilliam has repeatedly defied court orders, failed

to respond to GD’s motions in a timely fashion, made frivolous

arguments in response to those motions and filed frivolous motions

for improper purposes. There can be no question that Gilliam’s 

litigation history evinces a pattern of vexatiousness.

2

As to the second factor, Gilliam cannot at this point

have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing. Gilliam

has twice had his complaint dismissed. After the first dismissal,

Gilliam filed an amended complaint that failed to correct the flaws

in the first complaint. Not only did this suggest that Gilliam had

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no basis for correcting those flaws, but the complaint was

apparently filed for the purpose of challenging the court’s

previous ruling. Gilliam’s further vexatious filings have been

directed to ancillary matters or have tried improperly to reopen

issues the court had already decided. It is thus apparent that

Gilliam “does not have an objective good faith belief of

prevailing” but rather continues to pursue the matters “solely to

cause the [d]efendants (and the [c]ourt) to expend needless time

and incur expense.” Ray v Lowder, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 17681, at *9

(M D Fla) (Jones, J).

3

The third factor regards whether the litigant is

represented by counsel. Although Gilliam has evidently been

assisted by counsel in related proceedings, he has proceeded pro se

in the present lawsuit. But given his frequent filings, it is

clear that Gilliam is quite familiar with the federal and state

court systems. Indeed, Gilliam has a law degree and professional

experience clerking for licensed attorneys. See Gilliam Decl (Doc

#55) ¶¶5, 6. Gilliam is thus “not the common type of pro se

litigant[] who would normally be entitled to more ‘solicitous and

generous’ consideration.” Castro v United States, 584 F Supp 252,

264 (D PR 1984) (Perez-Giminez, J); see also Walker, 231 BR at 351

(noting that, despite the debtors’ pro se status, nonetheless “they

are familiar with the bankruptcy system”). The fact that Gilliam

is not presently represented by counsel is thus of little moment.

4

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With respect to the fourth factor, Gilliam has caused

needless expense to the various defendants in this case and has

foisted unnecessary burdens on the court. As a result of Gilliam’s

meritless filings, GD has been awarded its reasonable attorney fees

under § 1988. Had the court found it procedurally proper, the

court would have also sanctioned Gilliam pursuant to FRCP 11. More

to the point, Gilliam has filed repeated groundless motions and

other papers.

In particular, all three of Gilliam’s most recent motions

were legally frivolous and undoubtedly presented for an improper

purpose. The court finds that Gilliam’s motion to recuse (Doc #62)

was frivolous and legally unreasonable. In its previous order, the

court noted a number of substantive problems with Gilliam’s motion

to recuse, including: (1) the motion was unaccompanied by an

affidavit as required by 28 USC § 144; and (2) the court’s receipt

of unsolicited letters from a pro se party provided no reasonable

basis for the undersigned to recuse himself. 4/14/04 Order (Doc

#68) at 6:6-10:16. The court expressly found that “the motion is

both frivolous and likely interposed for delay” and did not even

warrant referral to another judge for determination, as is the

usual practice of the court (see Civ L R 3-15). Id at 12:21-26. 

By any standard, Gilliam’s motion for recusal was objectively

unreasonable.

Gilliam’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the court’s

previous orders (Doc #61) was also legally frivolous. In its

previous order, the court noted that Gilliam’s motion was

procedurally improper because it was not noticed for a hearing date

and thus violated Civ L R 7-2(a). 4/14/04 Order (Doc #68) at 13:7-

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16. The court also rejected all of Gilliam’s substantive

arguments, in large part because most of those arguments were

simply attempts to coerce the court into reconsidering arguments it

had rejected in connection with its November 17, 2003, order

dismissing the case and its January 22, 2004, order awarding GD its

attorney fees. See id at 14:3-20:6. At various points in that

analysis, the court characterized Gilliam’s Rule 59(e) arguments as

“ridiculous” (id at 14:9), “patently unwarranted” (id at 16:12) and

“unintelligible” (id at 19:11). The court concluded its analysis

of this motion by stating that “none of the repetitive and perhaps

frivolous arguments that Gilliam raises in his Rule 59(e) motion

justify a finding by the court that it committed clear error or

that the previous orders were manifestly unjust.” Id at 20:7-10. 

The court’s view of the reasonableness of Gilliam’s Rule 59(e)

motion is thus clear from its previous order, and the court

reaffirms its previous characterization of the motion as legally

frivolous.

Likewise, Gilliam’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against

GD (Doc #63) was frivolous. The court has already noted that this

motion suffered from the same Civ L R 7-2(a) defect as the motion

to alter or amend. 4/14/04 Order (Doc #68) at 20:26-21:7. The

court further noted that Gilliam’s motion, which was based on

allegedly improper actions by GD in the South Carolina bankruptcy

court, was “substantively unwarranted” because the court had no

jurisdiction over the South Carolina proceedings and because

Gilliam failed to present any factual documentation of GD’s

improper motivations. Id at 21:8-19. The court agrees with GD

that Gilliam’s motion for sanctions was “a thinly-veiled attempt at

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a tit-for-tat response to [GD’s] award of attorney[] fees and

expenses.” See Mot Sanctions (Doc #74) at 9:1-2. As such,

Gilliam’s motion for sanctions was objectively unreasonable and

legally frivolous.

Furthermore, Gilliam has consistently failed to respond

to motions brought by defendants. This has not only caused

defendants to incur unnecessary expenses, but it has also resulted

in repeated delays and an enormous waste of the court’s time and

energy. In short, the unnecessary burdens placed by Gilliam on

defendants and the court are numerous, repeated and inexcusable.

5

Considering the fifth factor, it is apparent that no

lesser sanction would be adequate to prevent Gilliam from

conducting further harassing activity. In Safir, the Second

Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to enjoin the

plaintiff from filing further vexatious litigation, stating:

We therefore cannot ignore the obvious fact

that mere dismissal of this action will not

hinder [plaintiff] from initiating further

similar proceedings. [Plaintiff’s] abuse of the

judicial process, despite his subjective

conviction that he has suffered an unremedied

injury, cannot be countenanced. In addition,

[plaintiff’s] failure to pay costs and fees

already assessed against him indicates that

other types of sanctions would be unavailing.

Safir, 792 F2d at 25. If the history of these proceedings

demonstrates anything, it is that monetary sanctions are

ineffective to encourage Gilliam to obey the court’s orders or to

cease his vexatious filings. In fact, given Gilliam’s rash of

frivolous filings in the wake of the court’s order awarding §

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1988(b) attorney fees, the imposition of monetary sanctions appears

to have precisely the opposite effect. Although the court would be

willing to impose substantial monetary sanctions if Gilliam

continues his course of vexatious filings, the court has reason to

doubt their efficacy. Further, merely relying on the court’s

previous dismissal of the case is not likely to be effective, as

adverse rulings have not stopped Gilliam -- indeed, dismissing the

case seems to have encouraged such action. As in Safir, no lesser

sanctions are sufficient.

6

With respect to the sixth and final factor, it is quite

likely that Gilliam will continue to abuse the litigation process. 

Gilliam’s repetitive pattern of filing frivolous motions,

disobeying court rulings and the like evince his propensity to

continue to use the legal system to carry out his misguided quest. 

And if past behavior is any predictor, this order may well spur

Gilliam into action again. In short, the court finds that it has

every reason to determine that Gilliam’s actions are frivolous and

vexatious. Thus, the third DeLong guideline is satisfied.

D

Having determined that the first three DeLong guidelines

support an order enjoining Gilliam in some way, the court must now

meet the fourth guideline by fashioning an order that is narrowly

tailored to remedy the particular ills posed by Gilliam. In

determining the scope of the order, the court is mindful that

Gilliam is entitled to some guidelines as to what he must do to

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obtain the court’s permission to file papers or an action. 

Triparti, 878 F2d at 354.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS GD’s motion to declare

Gilliam a vexatious litigant (Doc #74). The court considers relief

to be appropriate as follows:

William Jeffrey Gilliam (“Gilliam”), and his agents, servants,

employees, attorneys, and persons in active concert and

participation with them who receive actual notice of this order are

hereby:

(1) permanently enjoined from filing any additional pleadings

or papers in the case at bar, except as described in

paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6); and

(2) permanently enjoined from attempting to relitigate, by

commencing a lawsuit or any legal proceeding against

General Dynamics Corporation or any of the other

defendants in this case, issues related to Gilliam’s June

13, 2001, arrest and the subsequent emergency protective

order, except as described in paragraphs (3), (4), (5)

and (6).

(3) Should Gilliam seek to file papers or suits as described

in paragraphs (1) and (2), he shall file a petition for

leave to file those papers or suits with the general duty

judge of this court.

(4) Should Gilliam seek to file papers or suits as described

in paragraphs (1) and (2), he must first post a bond with

the court in the amount of $25,000 to cover costs, fees

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and sanctions that may be levied against him.

(5) This injunction does not apply to any filings Gilliam may

make with this court or the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals in connection with his present appeal or any

other appeal in this matter.

(6) Should the Ninth Circuit reverse the court’s 

judgment in this case and remand for further proceedings,

this injunction shall be automatically dissolved upon

issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate, but only as it

pertains to this case as described in paragraph (1), and

not as it pertains to any future litigation covered by

paragraph (2).

(7) Failure to comply with the terms of this injunction shall

be sufficient grounds for this court or any other court

to strike the filing, dismiss the complaint with

prejudice and/or impose a sanction for contempt of court,

as circumstances require.

VI

Gilliam has also filed a “request for an order to show

cause” directed at GD’s registration in the District of South

Carolina of this court’s attorney fee judgment against him. Doc

#79. Gilliam insists that by (1) obtaining a certified judgment

from the clerk, (2) registering the judgment in the District of

South Carolina and (3) withdrawing that registration a few weeks

later, GD “abused the process and procedures of this Court.” Doc

#79 at 1:25. Gilliam’s reasoning is that 28 USC § 1963 (which

provides for registration of judgments) permits registration only

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after a judgment is final following any appeal, and GD registered

the fee award judgment despite the pendency of Gilliam’s appeal of

the fee award.

Matters seem to have resolved themselves. Indeed, GD had

withdrawn its registration in the District of South Carolina even

before Gilliam filed his request for an order to show cause. See

Gilliam Decl (Doc #80) Ex 2 (letter from GD withdrawing

registration of judgment). Unlike Gilliam, the court detects

nothing sinister in GD’s actions. Accordingly, Gilliam’s request

for an order to show cause is DENIED.

VII

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES GD’s motion

for Rule 11 sanctions and GRANTS its motion to declare Gilliam a

vexatious litigant (Doc #74). Despite the fact that the court

agrees with GD that Gilliam’s conduct in this case is sanctionable

under Rule 11, the court cannot as a procedural matter impose such

sanctions. The court has, however, enjoined further vexatious

conduct by Gilliam in this action, and the clerk is DIRECTED to

enter the permanent injunction set forth above. Gilliam’s request

for an order to show cause (Doc #79) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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