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Parties Involved:
Ismael Garibay
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued August 5, 2015

Decided August 21, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2678

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ISMAEL GARIBAY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 789‐2

Gary S. Feinerman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ismael Garibay made the mistake of becoming involved in a drug‐distribution

ring and was caught. His appeal concerns only the sentence he received after he pleaded

guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by possessing with intent to distribute

7.38 kilograms of heroin. Garibay contended that he was entitled to a two‐level

reduction in his advisory offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), because he played only

a minor role in the offense. The district court did not see matters that way. It found

instead that Garibay, a middleman, had provided the essential link in the chain between

the suppliers and local distributors for an 18‐month period. We conclude that the district

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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court did not clearly err in coming to that conclusion, and so we affirm Garibay’s

sentence.

I

Garibay pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, in which he admitted to

coordinating two heroin transactions. On one occasion he obtained the drug from a

supplier for two couriers; on the other occasion he arranged for heroin to be stashed in a

hidden compartment of a car. Garibay also conceded in the agreement that he arranged

three transactions for the sale of cocaine, involving a total of 6 kilograms. He contacted

suppliers, he relayed information about price and quantity to buyers, and he used his

place of business (a local bar) as the drop‐off and pick‐up point.   

Before sentencing, the government interviewed Garibay to see if he might qualify

for safety‐valve treatment and thus escape any applicable statutory minimum sentence.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(17), 5C1.2. During that interview Garibay

characterized himself as a “go‐between” on behalf of a heroin supplier. He used his

connections with suppliers, he explained, to set up deals with buyers who had contacted

his co‐defendant, Jesus Zambrano. This role, Garibay insisted, was practically

mechanical: he did nothing but convey to each side what the other had said; he did not

have any decisionmaking authority. For his efforts, he received up to $1,500 per

transaction. Garibay also acknowledged that he had been present during some

transactions, but he said that he was there for other reasons, such as picking up

promotional material for his business. Finally, he admitted that about 18 months before

his arrest, he began introducing cocaine suppliers to Zambrano and other distributors.   

After the court accepted Garibay’s guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a

presentence investigation report in which she recommended denying a mitigating‐role

reduction in the offense level. As she saw it, Garibay’s role was not minor, because he

was the broker, he knew the amount of drugs being trafficked, and he was present at

some of the deals. In contrast, she suggested, Miguel Lopez (a co‐defendant who

translated between Spanish and English on behalf of the conspirators) was the least

culpable of the defendants. On the spectrum of culpability, Garibay fell somewhere in

the middle, and thus was not substantially less culpable than the others.

Garibay objected to these conclusions, which were set forth in the Presentence

Investigation Report (PSR). At the sentencing hearing, he maintained that he was less

culpable than either Zambrano, the supplier, or the buyer, each of whom made

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significant amounts of money, operated independent organizations, and decided such

critical matters as amount and price. Garibay, in contrast, made at most a paltry $1,500

per transaction, “[sat] in the middle as a go‐between,” served only as a “glorified

gopher” used for his connections, and never possessed the drugs. He argued that

someone who does no more than to put one person in touch with another qualifies as a

“minor participant” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

After finding that Garibay, as the broker, was not less culpable than the average

member of the group, the district court denied the minor‐role reduction. In explaining its

decision, the court classified three members (two couriers and an accountant) as

“average” participants on the ground that they were functionaries who did not make

any decisions. “[U]pstream on the supply chain ... at higher levels” were Zambrano, the

supplier, and the distributor. The court then reasoned that even if Garibay was “merely a

broker” and thus not as culpable as the supplier and distributor, his role connecting

those higher‐level conspirators rendered him “absolutely certainly” on a par with the

average participants. The court rejected Garibay’s assertion that he never possessed

drugs, because Garibay had stipulated in his plea agreement that cocaine was dropped

off at least twice at his bar. And although Garibay’s knowledge about the conspiracy was

“not perfect,” he knew that kilogram quantities of illegal drugs were being transported

and “took an active role” by attending meetings and transactions.   

The court calculated an advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months for

Garibay, after deducting 5 levels for acceptance of responsibility and safety‐valve

treatment, see U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1, 2D1.1(b)(17), and 5C1.2, and taking into account the

then‐pending amendment that was to reduce by two levels the offense levels in the drug

quantity table found in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2014). It chose a sentence of 72 months,

below the advisory range. Had it given Garibay the minor‐role reduction, the advisory

range would have been 51 to 63 months.   

II

On appeal, Garibay focuses only on the court’s refusal to give him the minor‐role

reduction. He takes issue with the weight the court chose to give to certain facts. In

particular, he says it erred by overstating the significance of his presence at a handful of

transactions, by ignoring his lack of control over the drugs, and by failing to recognize

his relative lack of knowledge about who else was involved.

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Perhaps another district court would have weighed the evidence differently, but

that does not mean that this judge erred. The standard of review on appeal is for clear

error. See United States v. Leiskunas, 656 F. 3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, ample

evidence supports the district court’s conclusion, and so we do not see error at all, much

less clear error. According to the safety‐valve proffer, Garibay knew roughly the

quantity being sold and the price per kilogram. He knew most of the other participants,

even if not all. And the court reasonably rejected his argument that he was less culpable

because he supposedly “was not regularly exercising control” over the drugs; this was

inconsistent with the fact that he did exercise control whenever drugs and money were

left at his bar.   

Garibay also maintains that the court should have accepted his characterization of

himself as a middleman. This, he asserts, is the only reasonable conclusion, given how

meager his compensation was and how limited his role as a message‐transmitter. The

problem is that Garibay did more than relay messages. As the court noted, he attended

transactions, he arranged a delivery, and he used his bar as an exchange point. In

addition, the court properly relied on Garibay’s close relationship with higher‐level

members of the group as an additional reason to deny the reduction. See United States v.

Mendoza, 457 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2006). The fact that Garibay did not earn more does

not automatically make him a “minor” participant. United States v. Panaigua‐Verdugo, 537

F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2008).   

Taking a different approach, Garibay also asserts that the district court should

have accepted at face value his statement in his safety‐valve proffer that he served only

as a middleman. There is some support for Garibay’s position that statements accepted

as true in these proffers are credible. See United States v. Rodriguez, 342 F.3d 296, 301 (3d

Cir. 2003); United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 136 F.3d 740, 744 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated on

other grounds, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). But the question here is not whether

to believe what Garibay said; it is how to characterize his proffer statements for legal

purposes. The court is not bound to accept legal characterizations. See generally Bonte v.

U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2010) (for purposes of FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

the court accepts factual allegations as true but not legal conclusions). In this case, the

court acted within its discretion when it found that Garibay qualified for the safety

valve, even though the court did not attach as much significance as Garibay would have

liked to his representation that he acted only as a middleman.   

Finally, Garibay argues for the first time in his reply brief that the district court

impermissibly relied on some uncorroborated hearsay that was included in the PSR. He

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does not specify which factual findings he means, but he has bigger problems with this

point. He has waived it by waiting until the reply brief to raise it. See Hernandez v. Cook

Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2011). In addition, he did not produce any

evidence challenging the PSR’s accuracy or reliability, and so the district court was

entitled to rely on the facts found in the report. See United States v. Turner, 604 F.3d 381,

385 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Artley, 489 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2007).

We therefore AFFIRM Garibay’s sentence.

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