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Parties Involved:
Douglas Hill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 12, 2009

Decided January 4, 2010

Before

   JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

   ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐4289

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DOUGLAS HILL,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

No. 08 CR 50009‐1

Frederick J. Kapala,

Judge.

O R D E R

Douglas Hill pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment.  Hill appeals, but his appointed

lawyers move to withdraw because they are unable to identify any nonfrivolous argument

to pursue.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Hill has not accepted our invitation

to comment on counsel’s motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).  We confine our review to the potential

issues outlined in counsel’s facially adequate brief.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968,

973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

After his indictment Hill moved to suppress the gun on the ground authorities

lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk which resulted in its discovery.  See Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). At the evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motion, the district court

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐4289 Page 2

heard testimony from two sheriff’s deputies, Dominick Barcellona and Eric Pearson.

Barcellona testified that in January 2008 he and Pearson, along with two other officers,

responded to a 911 call from a woman who reported that her boyfriend, Hill, had chased

her out of her house and was shooting at her.  Barcellona stated that they arrived at the

caller’s home within half an hour of her 911 call.  According to Pearson, Hill emerged from

the garage of the house and gestured toward something in his coat pocket.  Pearson testified

that he ordered Hill to the ground, handcuffed him, patted him down for weapons, and

retrieved a handgun from his coat pocket.  After the hearing the district court denied Hill’s

motion to suppress, concluding that the 911 call provided the officers with reasonable

suspicion.  Hill’s conditional guilty plea allows him to challenge this ruling.

Counsel first consider whether Hill could challenge the seizure of the gun from his

pocket on the ground that Deputy Pearson did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a

pat‐down search.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859 (7th

Cir. 2006).   In evaluating the district court’s ruling, we would review de novo all questions

of law, including the existence of reasonable suspicion.  See Lawshea, 461 F.3d at 859; United

States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 2004).  Hill had argued in the district court that

he was stopped on the basis of an “anonymous tip,” but his girlfriend was not anonymous,

see United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2006), and in any event we have held

that even anonymous 911 calls can be sufficiently reliable to give police reasonable

suspicion, see United States v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hicks,

531 F.3d 555, 559‐60 (7th Cir. 2008).  The caller, it is true, did not give her name, but she

identified Hill as her boyfriend and gave the address of her house where the shots had been

fired.  The officers, therefore, had sufficient information to believe that a shooting had just

occurred at or near the caller’s address.  See United States v. Brewer, 561 F.3d 676, 678 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 2009 WL 1980949 (2009).  Moreover, the fact that Hill gestured toward his

pocket when the officers approached him provided the officers with even more justification

for searching him.  See United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 1996).  Thus, we

agree with counsel that any potential claim that Deputy Pearson lacked reasonable

suspicion for the pat‐down search would be frivolous.

Counsel also consider whether Hill could argue that his guilty plea was not knowing

and voluntary.  Because Hill did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, any

challenge would be reviewed for plain error.  See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59

(2002); United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 769 (7th Cir. 2001).  In assessing the plea

colloquy, Hill’s lawyers perceive only one omission: the district court’s failure to mention

that Hill might have to pay restitution.  But restitution was neither contemplated nor

ordered, so we agree with counsel that this omission would not rise to the level of plain

error, and any potential challenge to Hill’s guilty plea on that basis would be frivolous.  

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Finally counsel consider whether Hill could argue that an 84‐month prison sentence

is unreasonable because the district court judge stated that the sentence would be

consecutive to Hill’s sentence in state court that had yet to be imposed.  Although the

district court may not require a sentence to be served consecutively to a state sentence that

will be imposed in the future, Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738‐39 (7th Cir. 2000),

the district court’s error in this case would be harmless.  The district court’s sentence would

be presumptively reasonable because it sentenced Hill within the properly calculated

guidelines range of 77 to 96 months.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United

States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).  The sentencing transcript shows that the

district court adequately considered all of factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United

States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006).  Moreover, based on Hill’s 35 criminal

history points, pending charges in 2 states, and 45 arrests for charges that were dismissed or

for which dispositions were unknown, the district court could have easily imposed an

above‐guidelines sentence. See United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 794 (7th Cir. 2008).

Thus, we agree with counsel that any potential challenge to Hill’s sentence would be

frivolous.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.  

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