Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02623/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02623-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Waheed Rasool
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable George Howard, Jr., late a United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2623

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Curtis Waheed Rasool, * 

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 7, 2008

Filed: July 9, 2008

___________

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Curtis Waheed Rasool appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1

 after

he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846. We affirm.

Because Rasool had a 1996 Arkansas conviction for possession of a controlled

substance with intent to distribute, the government filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 notice

stating its intent to seek an enhancement of his prison term under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)

Appellate Case: 06-2623 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/09/2008 Entry ID: 3449992
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(20-year mandatory minimum if defendant commits instant offense after prior final

felony drug conviction). In his plea agreement, Rasool stipulated that he was subject

to a mandatory minimum prison term of 20 years; at the plea hearing, the court stated

that the 20-year statutory minimum applied, which Rasool acknowledged. At

sentencing, the district court determined that Rasool qualified as a career offender

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based in part on his 1996 Arkansas drug conviction. The

government moved pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a downward departure based on

Rasool’s substantial assistance, and the court granted the motion, imposing a prison

sentence of 159 months--a downward departure of approximately 40% from the low

end of Rasool’s advisory Guidelines range, as calculated.

On appeal, Rasool’s counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), suggesting that the district court erred in

failing to depart further. Rasool has filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that the

district court erred in considering his 1996 Arkansas drug conviction--for which he

received a 5-year suspended sentence--in determining the starting point for the

downward departure, and that he otherwise would have received a lower sentence.

Although he now contends the amount of crack he possessed to be below 50 grams,

in the plea agreement he agreed that he possessed between 50 and 150 grams. He also

raises no other meritorious issues.

To begin, we note that the extent of the district court’s departure is

unreviewable. See United States v. Noe, 411 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 2005) (extent of

§ 5K1.1 downward departure is not reviewable). We further note, as to Rasool’s pro

se arguments, that he did not properly preserve his argument regarding the effect of

his 1996 Arkansas drug conviction on his sentence, and thus our review is for plain

error only. See United States v Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

(to preserve error for appellate review, objection must timely and clearly state grounds

for objection; errors not properly preserved are reviewed for plain error only).

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We conclude that the district court--in arriving at the starting point for its

downward departure--did not plainly err in its Guidelines calculations, including the

section 4B1.1 career-offender enhancement based in part on Rasool’s 1996 Arkansas

drug conviction, and that the section 4B1.1 enhancement was proper notwithstanding

the fact that his conviction resulted in a suspended sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)

(as used in § 4B1.1, term “controlled substance offense” means offense under federal

or state law, punishable by imprisonment for term exceeding 1 year, that prohibits,

inter alia, possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute), comment. (nn.1

& 2) (“prior felony conviction” includes federal or state conviction for offense

punishable by imprisonment for term exceeding 1 year, regardless whether such

offense is specifically designated as felony and regardless of actual sentence imposed;

offense of conviction is focus of inquiry); United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864,

878 (8th Cir. 2005) (failure to object to fact of conviction is considered admission of

conviction for purposes of determining career-offender status); cf. United States v.

Ball, 499 F.3d 890, 899 (8th Cir. 2007) (defendant’s prior Missouri felony drug

conviction which resulted in suspended sentence qualified to trigger enhancement

under § 841(b)(1)(A)).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

judgment and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw on condition that counsel inform

appellant about the procedures for filing petitions for rehearing and for certiorari.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2623 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/09/2008 Entry ID: 3449992