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Parties Involved:
Anthony Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 26, 2016

Decided August 26, 2016

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY J. JOHNSON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:15‐CR‐30061‐DRH‐1

David R. Herndon,

Judge.

O R D E R

Anthony Johnson was caught with heroin at the Federal Correctional Institution

in Greenville, Illinois, while serving a seven‐year prison sentence for possessing a

firearm after a felony conviction. Johnson had been meeting with a visitor when a guard

saw him swallow a small object, and three days later prison staff found in his feces a

balloon containing 1.1 grams of heroin. Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing contraband

while incarcerated, see 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (b)(1), and the district court sentenced him

to a consecutive, 28‐month term of imprisonment. The court also imposed a three‐year

term of supervised release, a $100 fine, and a $100 special assessment.   

Johnson has filed a notice of appeal, but his newly appointed lawyer asserts that

the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3105    Page 2

(1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses

potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. We invited

Johnson to comment on counsel’s motion, but he has not done so. See CIR. R. 51(b).

Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we focus our review on the

subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).   

In his Anders brief, counsel asserts that Johnson does not wish to challenge his

guilty plea, and thus he appropriately refrains from discussing the adequacy of the plea

colloquy, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b), or the voluntariness of the plea. See United States v.

Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71

(7th Cir. 2002). Counsel also advises that he reviewed the district court’s application of

the sentencing guidelines but did not identify a potential claim of error.

Counsel considers whether Johnson could argue that the district court failed to

address his arguments in mitigation, including his assertion that a miscalculation of the

guidelines imprisonment range when he was sentenced for the gun crime led to an

unintended seven‐month increase in his prison term for that crime. But appellate

counsel correctly recognizes that any possible claim along this line has been waived

because former counsel, when asked by the judge if any sentencing argument remained

unaddressed, said no. See United States v. Cruz, 787 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2015); United

States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, the judge did address this

argument by acknowledging his discretion to compensate for the other court’s mistake

but deciding that each prosecution should “stand on its own.”   

Counsel also considers whether Johnson could challenge his prison term as

unreasonable but correctly rejects that potential claim as frivolous. The 28‐month

sentence is within the guidelines range of 24 to 30 months and thus is presumptively

reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Fletcher,

763 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 2014). Counsel has not identified anything in the record

rebutting that presumption, nor have we. The district judge considered the sentencing

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), emphasizing the serious nature of the crime, including the

risk that Johnson was willing to impose on the visitor who smuggled the heroin. The

judge also noted Johnson’s hesitation to admit facts beyond the bare elements of the

offense. Additionally, the judge considered Johnson’s background, concluding that this

offense was part of a well‐established pattern of disregard for authority, as shown by his

lengthy criminal history and his disciplinary record while incarcerated. And the judge

was unpersuaded by Johnson’s argument that he deserved a shorter sentence because he

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had been “clean and sober” for the last year, noting that “the history here is a

longstanding history of somebody that just doesn’t like rules and doesn’t like to abide by

the rules.”   

Finally, counsel identifies two conditions of supervised release as potentially

problematic: The first requires Johnson to “work regularly at a lawful occupation unless

excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons.”

See United States v. Ortiz, 817 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (criticizing similar condition

that, if “read literally,” would require defendant “to work even if he can’t find a job”).

The second requires Johnson to allow a probation officer to visit and search his “place of

business.” See id. (“It’s not clear that allowing the probation officer to visit the defendant

at work is a good idea.”). But counsel informs us that Johnson elected not to object after

receiving from the probation officer advance notice of the proposed conditions of

supervised release. Johnson does not dispute this assertion, and thus we have no reason

to believe that he wishes to challenge either condition on appeal. See United States v.

Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 447

(7th Cir. 2014). And even if he did, any challenge to the conditions was waived when

former counsel, in response to the district court’s question whether Johnson objected to

any of the proposed conditions, answered no. See United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075,

1082–84 (7th Cir. 2016). Moreover, if Johnson later perceives these conditions to be

problematic after he begins serving the term of supervised release, he would be free to

seek modification to the extent authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See United States v.

Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 516–20 (7th Cir. 2016).

Thus, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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