Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03023/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David M. Dale
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 1998 Decided April 14, 1998

No. 97-3023

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

David M. Dale,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr00027-01)

Jeffrey S. Parker argued the cause for the appellant.

Stuart G. Nash, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Mary Lou Leary, United States

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher,

Mary Patrice Brown, Thomas R. Eldridge and Mark H.

Dubester, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

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Before: Wald, Silberman and Henderson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Per Curiam.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Per Curiam: Appellant

David M. Dale invokes the federal habeas corpus statute, 28

U.S.C. s 2255,1 to challenge his fraud and conspiracy convictions on the ground that under United States v. Gaudin, 515

U.S. 506 (1995), issued after Dale's convictions became final,

the district court erroneously decided as a question of law,

rather than remitting to the jury as a question of fact, the

materiality of misrepresentations for which Dale was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. s 1001.2 Because Dale failed either

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1 Section 2255 provides in relevant part:

Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by

Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the

ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was

without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is

otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court

which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the

sentence.

28 U.S.C. s 2255.

2 Section 1001 provides in relevant part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in

any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative,

or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,

knowingly and willfully--

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or

device a material fact;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

statement or representation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the

same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

statement or entry;

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to raise the alleged error during his criminal prosecution or

to establish in this proceeding "cause and prejudice" to

excuse his procedural default, we conclude that he is not

entitled to the relief he seeks.

The details of Dale's charged offenses and of his trial are

set out at length in United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 (1993), (Dale I ) and it is

unnecessary to repeat them here. At the end of the day the

jury convicted Dale of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. s 5371) (count 1)

and of six substantive offenses: subscribing to a false tax

return (26 U.S.C. s 7206(1)) (count 2); attempted tax evasion

(26 U.S.C. s 7201) and aiding and abetting therein (18 U.S.C.

s 2) (count 4); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. s 1343) and aiding and

abetting therein (18 U.S.C. s 2) (count 5); concealing facts by

trick, scheme and artifice (18 U.S.C. s 1001) and aiding and

abetting therein (counts 7 and count 9); and making false

statements (18 U.S.C. s 1001) and aiding and abetting therein

(18 U.S.C. s 2) (count 10). Before deliberations the judge

had expressly instructed the jury that the misrepresentations

alleged in violation of section 1001 (counts 7, 9 and 10) "are

material." App. A82. On July 15, 1991 the trial judge sentenced Dale to 41 months' imprisonment on the conspiracy

count and a concurrent 30-month sentence on each of the

other 6 counts, to be followed by 2 years' supervised release.

The judge also imposed a $350 special assessment, a $675,000

fine and a $58,000 assessment for incarceration costs. In an

opinion issued April 6, 1993 we affirmed Dale's convictions

and sentence with one exception--we reversed the count 2

conviction of subscribing to a false tax return, which merged

with the count 4 conviction of attempted tax evasion, and

remanded for appropriate resentencing. See Dale I. The

United States Supreme Court denied Dale's petition for certiorari on December 3, 1993. Dale v. United States, 510 U.S.

1030 (1993). The district court resentenced Dale on August

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shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5

years, or both.

18 U.S.C. s 1001(a) (emphasis added).

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24, 1994 in accordance with our remand. No appeal was

taken from the new sentence.

On June 19, 1995 the United States Supreme Court issued

its decision in United States v. Gaudin, holding that because

materiality is an element of a section 1001 offense the Fifth

and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution

require that a conviction thereof rest on a jury finding of

materiality. On February 8, 1996 Dale filed a motion in the

district court for collateral relief from his convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255 on the ground that under Gaudin the

trial judge usurped the jury's function by ruling as a matter

of law that the misrepresentations alleged in counts 7, 9 and

10 were material. The district court denied the relief sought,

concluding that Gaudin established a new rule of constitutional procedure that should not be retroactively applied to

criminal convictions already final at the time the decision

issued. Without reaching the retroactivity issue, we affirm

the district court on the ground that Dale is procedurally

barred from arguing Gaudin error in a habeas proceeding.

Having failed to argue in his criminal prosecution that materiality was a jury issue, either before the district court or on

appeal, Dale now "must show both (1) 'cause' excusing his

double procedural default, and (2) 'actual prejudice' resulting

from the errors of which he complains." United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). To establish "actual

prejudice," he "must shoulder the burden of showing, not

merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 170.3 Dale has failed to meet his

burden.4

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3 It is not clear whether the showing of prejudice required to cure

procedural default is identical to--or greater than--the showing

required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, namely, that

"there is a reasonable probability that, but for [the errors], the

result of the proceeding would have been different," Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (emphasis added). See United States v. Walling, 982 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1992); Freeman v.

Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1992); John C.

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The three section 1001 convictions were based on Dale's

failure to disclose interests in and relationships with foreign

corporations on forms he filed with the Department of Defense to obtain security clearance. See Dale I, 991 F.2d at

828-29. In each case the filed form specifically requested the

information withheld and Dale has suggested no facts or

theory to rebut the district judge's legal conclusion that the

charged nondisclosures were material to the Department's

decision whether to grant clearance. Nor did Dale--or his

co-defendant charged with the same nondisclosures--attempt

to challenge the judge's materiality conclusion on direct appeal. In the absence of any basis for finding Dale's misrepresentations were not material, we cannot say that the judge's

failure to submit materiality to the jury "worked to [Dale's]

actual and substantial disadvantage." The failure therefore

was not prejudicial.

Dale asserts that a Gaudin error "cannot be harmless,

because it requires speculation about what a hypothetical jury

could have decided, had it been allowed to do so." Reply Br.

at 17 (citing Waldemer v. United States, 106 F.3d 729, 731-32

(7th Cir. 1997)). We disagree. In Johnson v. United States,

117 S. Ct. 1544, 1550 (1997), the Supreme Court held that the

trial judge's Gaudin error was not "plain error"--so as to

justify reversal on direct appeal in the absence of an objection

made at trial--where "the evidence supporting materiality

was 'overwhelming,' materiality was "essentially uncontroverted" and the appellant "presented no plausible argument"

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dural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679,

684-85 n.25 (1990). Circuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, "by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been

different but for the errors in question." See United States v. Saro,

24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). In any event,

the standard has not been satisfied here.

4 Because we find no showing of prejudice we need not decide

whether Dale has satisfied the "cause" prong of the default standard.

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that the charged misrepresentation was not material. We

can only conclude that the same error can in similar circumstances be nonprejudicial under the habeas standard which

requires a "showing of prejudice" that "is significantly greater than that necessary under 'the more vague inquiry suggested by the words "plain error." ' " See Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 493 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

135 (1982)); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154

(1977) ("The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous

instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral

attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish

plain error on direct appeal."); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d

283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. at 494).5

Finally, Dale argues--belatedly and improvidently in a

post-argument letter filed with the court on March 20, 1998

purportedly pursuant to Local Rule 28(j) 6--that, even if he

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5 In Waldemer v. United States, 106 F.3d 729 (7th Cir.1996), on

which Dale relies, the Seventh Circuit concluded a Gaudin error

was necessarily prejudicial because the government could not "demonstrate that [the petitioner's] trial jury actually determined that

the statements were material," stating: "Our cases hold ... that if

an element of an offense is not actually found by a jury, appellate

court musings as to the actions of a hypothetical rational jury

cannot render such an error harmless." 106 F.3d at 732. The

Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Johnson establishes that,

to the contrary, an actual jury finding of materiality is not necessary to render a Gaudin error harmless.

6 Rule 28(j) provides:

When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after the party's brief has been filed, or after

oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly

advise the clerk of the court, by letter, with a copy to all

counsel, setting forth the citations. There shall be a reference

either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to

which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any

response shall be made promptly and shall be similarly limited.

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has not demonstrated prejudice he is entitled to collateral

relief to prevent a "miscarriage of justice." It is true that a

showing of "fundamental miscarriage of justice" may excuse

default when cause and prejudice are not shown. See Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); United States v. McKie, 73 F.3d

1149 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The petitioner must then "show that 'a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent,' " that is, that "it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

him" but for the error. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326 (quoting

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496). Having concluded that

Dale failed to meet the habeas prejudice standard, we do not

think he can possibly claim a miscarriage of justice which

requires "a stronger showing than that needed to establish

prejudice." Id. We therefore reject this last ditch argument.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district

court is

••••••••Affirmed.

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D.C. Cir. R. 28(j) (emphasis added).

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with the majority opinion that, having failed to

object to the judge's materiality determination at any stage of

his criminal prosecution and having failed to establish in the

habeas proceeding that he was prejudiced by the determination, Dale would be procedurally barred from raising the

Gaudin error--if he were otherwise entitled to its benefit.

He is not. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a plurality

of the United States Supreme Court declared: "Unless they

fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional

rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those

cases which have become final before the new rules are

announced." 489 U.S. at 310. The plurality set out two

exceptions to the general rule: (1) "a new rule should be

applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary,

private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal

law-making authority to proscribe,' " id. at 311 (quoting

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J.,

concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); and

(2) "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires

the observance of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty,' " id. (quoting Mackey, 401

U.S. at 693) (internal quotation omitted). A majority of the

Court has since repeatedly applied both the Teague plurality's retroactivity rule and its two exceptions. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.

484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). I believe that Gaudin established the kind of new rule of constitutional procedure governed by Teague and that it fits within neither of the two

Teague exceptions. I therefore conclude, as did the district

court, that Gaudin 's holding does not apply retroactively to

Dale's convictions.

As a threshold matter, to come under Teague 's retroactivity regime, an intervening court decision must produce "a new

constitutional rule of criminal procedure." That the Gaudin

rule, which derives from a defendant's Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights, is a constitutional one cannot be doubted.

The rule is plainly also one of procedure--it simply dictates

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who must decide the statutory element of materiality--it tells

us nothing of what constitutes a substantive violation of the

statute. Cf. United States v. McKie, 73 F.3d 1149, 1151 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (court's interpretation of "substantive terms" of

criminal statute is not "procedural" rule subject to Teague ).

Moreover, I believe the Gaudin rule was also a "new" rule

when formulated.

The Supreme Court acknowledged in Teague that "[i]t is

admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces

a new rule" and it would "not attempt to define the spectrum

of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity

purposes." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also Mackey, 401

U.S. at 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in

part and dissenting in part) ("[I]n Desist [v. United States,

394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) ] I went to some lengths to point out

the inevitable difficulties that will arise in attempting 'to

determine whether a particular decision has really announced

a "new" rule at all or whether it has simply applied a wellestablished constitutional principle to govern a case which is

closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law.' I remain fully cognizant of these

problems...."). The Teague Court nevertheless offered

guidance for deciding which rules are "new" ones: "In general, ... a case announces a new rule when it breaks new

ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the

Federal Government. To put it differently, a case announces

a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing

at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague,

489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis original). The Gaudin rule comes

easily within the latter characterization. Not only was Gaudin 's holding "not dictated by precedent existing at the

time," it was contrary to both Supreme Court precedent and

that of a large majority of the circuit courts of appeal.

As the Supreme Court noted, the holding in Gaudin was

inconsistent with its earlier decision in Sinclair v. United

States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929). In Sinclair the Court had

rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge to a trial court's

determination of "pertinency" in a criminal contempt proceeding for violation of 2 U.S.C. s 192, which criminalized refusal

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by a Congressional witness "to answer any question pertinent

to the question under inquiry." 1 While Sinclair was "not

controlling in the strictest sense, since it involved the assertion of a Sixth Amendment right to have the jury determine,

not 'materiality' under s 1001, but rather 'pertinency' under

[2 U.S.C. s 192]," the Court nonetheless acknowledged that it

"[could not] hold for respondent ... while still adhering to

the reasoning and the holding of that case," 515 U.S. at 519-

20. The Gaudin Court was therefore required to "repudiate"

much of the "reasoning" in Sinclair. Id. at 520. At the same

time the Court also repudiated the holdings of eleven circuit

courts of appeal, which had held that materiality was a

question of law to be decided by the judge. See 515 U.S. at

527 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Before today, every Court of

Appeals that has considered the issue, except for the Ninth

Circuit, has held that the question of materiality is one of

law.") (citing United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 955 (9th

Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (listing opinions from

eleven circuits so holding)).2 Given the overwhelming, con-

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1 The statute provided in full:

"Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the

authority of either house of Congress, to give testimony or to

produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either

house, or any committee of either house of Congress, willfully

makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any

question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be

deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not

more than $1,000 nor less than $100, and imprisonment in a

common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve

months."

279 U.S. at 284 (quoting 2 U.S.C. s 192).

2 The Ninth Circuit dissent cited the following decisions: United

States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987); United States

v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v.

Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Greber,

760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 1985); Nilson Van & Storage Co. v. Marsh,

755 F.2d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hausmann, 711

F.2d 615, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Chandler, 752

F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Brantley, 786

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trary precedent the Gaudin Court overruled, I must conclude

that its opinion established a "new" rule which cannot be

applied retroactively unless it comes within one of the two

exceptions recognized in Teague and its progeny 3--and the

Gaudin rule does not.

Conceding that the first exception does not apply, Dale

asserts that the Gaudin rule comes within the second exception as one "requir[ing] the observance of 'those procedures

that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " 489

U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693) (internal

quotation omitted). In this he errs. The second Teague

exception is reserved "for 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of

the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495

(1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). The Supreme

Court has "usually cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,

83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), holding that a defendant

has the right to be represented by counsel in all criminal

trials for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule coming

within the exception." Id. The Gaudin rule is not of the

same type. It "has none of the primacy and centrality of the

rule adopted in Gideon or other rules which may be thought

to be within the exception" and, as the majority opinion

demonstrates, its breach "would not seriously diminish the

likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination." Butler v.

McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990). Gaudin 's holding therefore is not within the "small core of rules" that implicate the

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F.2d 1322, 1327 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hicks, 619

F.2d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994,

1004 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359, 1362

n.4 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 950

(D.C. Cir. 1985). 28 F.3d at 955.

3 Dale argues that Teague does not prevent retroactive application of new rules in collateral challenges to federal (rather than

state-court) convictions. This court, however, has twice recognized

Teague 's applicability to federal conviction challenges. See United

States v. McKie, 73 F.3d 1149, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States

v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429 n.8. (D.C. Cir. 1990).

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second Teague exception. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S.

461, 477 (1993) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).

For the foregoing reasons I believe that the rule announced

in Gaudin should not be given retroactive effect. Accord

Bilzerian v. United States, 127 F.3d 237 241 (2d Cir. 1997);

United States v. Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir. 1997).

I would therefore affirm the district court on that basis.

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