Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02122/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Frederick Neely
Petitioner
James Rowland
Respondent

Document Text:

1

 Petitioner raised two ineffective assistance claims in his habeas petition to the California

Superior Court: (1) the failure to argue the law of the case doctrine and (2) the failure to use the prior

allegedly inconsistent testimony to impeach a witness. The Superior Court denied the petition on the first

point as it was pending before the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal. Petitioner has not raised

the second point in his petition to this Court and it has been abandoned. Accordingly, the habeas

proceedings before the California courts are irrelevant to the determination of the petition at bar.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES FREDERICK NEELY,

Case No. 2:00-cv-02122-JKS (HC)

Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

JAMES ROWLAND,

Respondent.

Charles Frederick Neely has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a term of life without possibility of parole in the

California state prison after conviction for murder under special circumstances, robbery and

burglary. Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal,

which, with a modification to the restitution fine imposed, affirmed in a partially published

decision. People v. Neely, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 886 (Cal.App. 1999). The California Supreme Court

denied review. Petitioner also sought post-conviction relief in the California Superior Court,

which denied his petition for reasons stated by the court on the record in open court.1

Subsequent petitions to the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court were summarily

denied.

The history of this case and the facts are well known to the parties and are set forth in

detail in the opinion of the California Court of Appeals. In the interests of brevity they are not

repeated here.

Case 2:00-cv-02122-JKS Document 11 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 6
2

 In the California Court of Appeal opinion, she is identified as Barbara (Teater) Chester or

simply as “Teater.”

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Neely v. Rowland, Case No. 2:00-cv-2122-JKS 2

The habeas corpus proceedings in the California Courts overlapped his direct appeal.

The California Supreme Court denied review on direct appeal on June 23, 1999 and his petition

for habeas corpus on September 29, 1999. Petitioner timely filed his petition in this Court on

September 29, 2000.

Petitioner raises five claims in his petition. (1) The voice identification by Barbara

Chester was the “fruit” of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.2

 (2) In moving to

suppress the voice identification, trial counsel was ineffective by failing to invoke the law of the

case or collateral estoppel. (3) Admission of the extrajudicial statements of Monte Handley (an

accomplice) identifying petitioner as a perpetrator violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right

to confront witnesses. (4) The testimony of Malcolm Centers (an accomplice) that Petitioner

stated to him “We had to shoot the bastard,” violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront

witnesses. (5) Petitioner was prosecuted by a conflicted prosecutor in violation of Petitioner’s

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner alleges, and Respondent admits,

that all his claims have been exhausted.

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the standard of

review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the

California Court of Appeal was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000); see

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (explaining this standard). In applying this

standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court, Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.2004), which in this case was that of the California Court of

Appeal. In addition, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the

petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

Case 2:00-cv-02122-JKS Document 11 Filed 05/22/06 Page 2 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Neely v. Rowland, Case No. 2:00-cv-2122-JKS 3

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's claims, applying the standard set

forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), finding that any error that occurred at

Petitioner's trial was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Under AEDPA, this Court can

grant habeas relief only if the California court's decision applied Chapman in an “objectively

unreasonable” manner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Were this Court to conclude that the state court unreasonably applied Chapman, it would then

have to determine whether any error that did occur had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the

jury's verdict. See Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir.2005). The Court does

not find it necessary to conduct that analysis in this case, however, because the Court concludes

that the state court's application of Chapman was not unreasonable. The California Court of

Appeal held, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d at 791–92 (emphasis by the Court of Appeal):

Defendant's argument for prejudice focuses, appropriately, on the star

witness, Malcolm Centers, who was severely impeached at trial, due to his drug

usage and sales and motive to lie.

The Attorney General surmises — without dispute by defendant — that

the jury based liability on an aider theory. Inasmuch as the jury found the murder

occurred during the course of felonies, yet found personal firearm use

enhancements were not true, we agree. As to aider liability, the evidence — apart

from the Centers testimony — was overwhelming.

Defendant's wife's truck was found at the scene, loaded with evidence,

including a suitcase which contained defendant's clothes and a clip which fit a

High Standard pistol. All three original defendants were seen together at the

restaurant on the morning of the murder. Defendant had worked for the victim.

Most importantly, defendant hid out near the murder scene for three days, during

which time he stole clothes and broke into a vacant home; when arrested, he had

$1,254 on his person.

No plausible explanation for why defendant hid out in the brush or in the

vacant home near the murder scene for three days is tendered on appeal. Defense

counsel asserts defendant may have been off making drug deals, but that does not

explain why he was stealing clothes and hiding out near the murder scene for days

after the crime.

Further, from Centers's girlfriend, Coe, we learn that defendant spoke of

his gun jamming. Three bullets were fired at the scene, but only two shells were

ejected; an expert explained that when a semiautomatic pistol jams, the shell may

not eject. Coe heard discussions about a floor safe and tying a woman up, saw

handcuffs and saw defendant with a gun which could have been a High Standard

Case 2:00-cv-02122-JKS Document 11 Filed 05/22/06 Page 3 of 6
3

 This necessarily follows from the holding that the admission of the testimony, even if erroneous,

was harmless. There is no a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result

would have been different. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 

4

 As a result of this ruling, the Court need not address the issue of whether Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) applies retroactively on collateral review. See Bockting v. Bayer, 399

F.3d 1010 (9th Cir.2005), cert. granted sub nom. Wharton v. Bockting, 2006 WL 1310697 (May 15,

2006).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Neely v. Rowland, Case No. 2:00-cv-2122-JKS 4

.22. At the Chester home there was a floor safe, Chester was handcuffed, and a

clip for a High Standard pistol was found with defendant's clothes at the scene, in

a suitcase in a truck registered to defendant's wife. Coe also connected the plan to

DeArkland, which corroborates the tale told by Centers. That tale, if believed in

almost any particular, thoroughly implicated defendant as an aider, if not as the

shooter.

Finally, the allegedly-tainted evidence — the aural identification by Teater

— was not strong. As defendant notes elsewhere, “Her identification rested on the

delicate footing of a single word uttered in a certain tone.” In addition to

extensive expert analysis of and attack on the circumstance of the identification,

the jury knew it was based on a single spoken word and was based on the tone of

that word. It is unlikely that the jury paid much attention to this evidence, despite

all the ado caused by the competing expert witnesses about its reliability, vel non.

If the evidence should not have come in, the error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

This disposes of three of the five grounds raised: (1) The voice identification by Barbara

Chester (“Teater”); (2) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to invoke the law of the case or

collateral estoppel;3

 and (4) the testimony of Malcolm Centers.4

Turning to the third ground, the admission of the extrajudicial statement of Monte

Hadley, an accomplice, violated the Sixth Amendment. In rejecting Petitioner’s argument, in the

unpublished part of its decision, the California Court of Appeal held:

Contrary to appellate counsel’s view, trial counsel made a hearsay

objection only: “If he wants to bring in Mr. Handley to testify, that’s one thing.

But to try to get Mr. Handley’s testimony in through somebody else where I don’t

get to cross-examine him, that’s another. This is hearsay.” (Italics added.) No

Sixth Amendment objection based on the right of confrontation was made. (Evid.

Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Nor would one have succeeded as this testimony was not

admitted to prove the truth of the matter stated. Officer Hill was available to be

cross-examined about the reasons for his conduct.

California Evidence Code § 353(a) provides:

Case 2:00-cv-02122-JKS Document 11 Filed 05/22/06 Page 4 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Neely v. Rowland, Case No. 2:00-cv-2122-JKS 5

A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or

decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of

evidence unless:

(a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the

evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground

of the objection or motion; and

* * * *

This Court may not reach the merits of procedurally defaulted claims, that is, claims “in

which the petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising the claims * * *”

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338, (1992). Under California law, because Petitioner failed to

object to admission of the evidence on Sixth Amendment grounds, it is forfeited. People v.

Alvarez, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 402-03 (Cal.1996). The California contemporaneous objection rule

is “clear, consistently applied, and well-established” where, as here, a party fails to make a

proper objection to the admission of evidence. Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (9th

Cir.2002). The rule is therefore operative in the case at bar as an “adequate and independent”

state procedural bar. See Collier v. Bayer, 408 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.2005). Moreover, the

California rule is entirely consistent with federal law as established by the United States

Supreme Court, which also requires an objection state the specific ground on which it is based. 

FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); see generally Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (“No

procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be

forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right

before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923,

936–37 (1991) and the cases cited therein. 

Turning to the fifth and final ground raised by Petitioner: that he was prosecuted by a

conflicted prosecutor. In rejecting Petitioner’s argument on that point, after noting that the trial

court precluded the prosecutor from seeking the death penalty, which was not challenged by the

prosecutor, the California Court of Appeal, in the unpublished part of its decision, held:

Defendant asserts: “To the extent that there were discretionary decisions to make

in obtaining a conviction for murder in the first degree with special

circumstances, the bias evidenced by the political campaign was indivisible in

rendering a likelihood that appellant would not receive a fair trial.” We agree that

prosecutors exercise discretion at every stage of a case (see e.g., People v.

Case 2:00-cv-02122-JKS Document 11 Filed 05/22/06 Page 5 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Neely v. Rowland, Case No. 2:00-cv-2122-JKS 6

Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 149), but the only decision contested in the recusal

motion and the hearing was the decision to seek the death penalty. No other

discretionary decision was mentioned in the trial court. There was no claim that

defendant may have suffered by the decision to retry him on the same charges

upon which he was convicted once before. His claim was that another

prosecutorial office should decide whether to seek the death penalty, which he

asserted was due to Lacy’s implied campaign promise. Defendant did not face the

death penalty thereafter and we will not engage in a hypothetical “what if” about

other, less significant, prosecutorial decisions which could have been made

differently, when those decisions were never discussed below. If the deputy

district attorney who actually tried the case made any particular decision which

defendant thought was unfair, he has not pointed it out in his briefs.

Petitioner’s argument before this court, as before the California Court of Appeal, does

not raise any factual basis that the prosecutor was conflicted other than in seeking the death

penalty. This Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the sole “conflict” was

removed when the prosecution was barred from seeking the death penalty. Petitioner’s other

arguments on this issue are not only terse and undeveloped but, also, were not presented to the

California Courts nor do they raise substantial federal questions.

Petitioner Charles Frederick Neely is not entitled to relief on any of the grounds

presented in the Petition.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the Petition

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“reasonable

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further” (internal quotation marks omitted)). All issues raised in the

petition were addressed by the California Court of Appeal in its decision and no reasonable jurist

could find that its decision was “objectively unreasonable.”

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska this 22nd day of May, 2006.

s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:00-cv-02122-JKS Document 11 Filed 05/22/06 Page 6 of 6