Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cr-00072/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cr-00072-23/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel Stone
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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ORDER 

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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SAMUEL STONE, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. CR12-0072-JCC 

ORDER 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the 

Magistrate Judge’s Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s motion to compel. 

(Dkt. No. 118.) Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge erred as a matter of law, by ordering 

that the government turn over certain information no later than 120 days before trial, finding that 

the government did not need to turn over communications between law enforcement agencies, 

and finding that the government did not need to turn over certain information related to the 

Bureau of Prison’s ADX facility. Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the 

relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby DENIES the motion for 

the reasons explained herein. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The history of the discovery proceedings prior to the August 27, 2013 discovery order of 

the Honorable Gary Austin, United States Magistrate Judge, is set out in detail in that order. (See

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ORDER 

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Dkt. No. 106 at 1–3.) Briefly, after extensive discovery proceedings, Defendant filed a new 

motion to compel outlining six remaining areas of discovery that the parties disputed: 

1) Brady/Giglio material, 2) information regarding the non-preservation of 

audio/video recordings, 3) e-mails and other communications between 

government officials and agencies regarding charging decisions in the case, 4) 

training materials and policies outlining protocols for the preservation of evidence 

at the crime scene, 5) information regarding the assault of Stephen Jackson and 

[the] related prosecution, and 6) materials relating to the Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) ADX facility. 

(Dkt. No. 106 at 2.) 

Judge Austin granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion. On August 29, 2013, 

the parties filed a joint request for an extension of time, (Dkt. No. 108), and Judge Austin set 

September 20, 2013, as the latest date by which the parties could file requests for reconsideration 

of the discovery order, and September 27, 2013, as the date by which the parties had to file 

responses to those requests. (Dkt. No. 109.) On September 20, 2013, Defendant filed a “request 

for reconsideration” of the Magistrate Judge’s Order, challenging a number of the Judge Austin’s 

determinations. 1 (Dkt. No. 118.) On October 4, 2013, the government filed a week-late response 

to Defendant’s motion. (Dkt. No. 122.)2

First, defendant argues that the government should turn over certain Brady/Giglio

information immediately, rather than no later than 120 days before trial, as Judge Austin ordered. 

(Dkt. No. 118 at 2–5.) Second, he argues that the communications between the U.S. Attorneys’ 

Office, UPS Atwater, BOP, and the FBI, regarding the timing of the prosecution, is material and 

should be submitted to the Court for in camera review to determine whether those 

 

1

 Given Defendant’s citation to Local Rule 303 and his reference to the standard used by 

a District Court when reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s ruling, (see Dkt. No. 118, at 2), the Court 

assumes that the motion is made under Local Rule 303(c). However, in that case, the motion is 

incorrectly captioned. See E.D. Cal. Local. R. 303(c) (motion for a district court to reconsider a 

Magistrate Judge’s ruling shall be captioned “Request for Reconsideration by the District Court 

of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling”). 

2

 This late response by the government, among others, has already been addressed by the 

Court. (See Dkt. No. 129 at 3.) 

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ORDER 

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communications are privileged. (Id. at 5–7.) Finally, he argues that the requests related to the 

BOP ADX facility should be granted full, and the government should be forced to turn over all 

information requested about that facility. (Id. at 7–12.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Upon a timely motion, a District Court Judge may only revisit and set aside those 

portions of a Magistrate Judge’s nondispositive order that are “clearly erroneous or [] contrary to 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Under the clearly erroneous standard, the 

Court must accept the Magistrate Judge’s ruling unless it has a “definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers 

Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). Review under that standard allows “great 

deference,” and as long as the magistrate judge’s “‘account of the evidence is plausible in light 

of the evidence viewed in its entirety, [the Court] may not reverse it even though convinced that 

had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.’” Phoenix 

Engineering and Supply Inc. v. Universal Elec. Co., Inc., 104 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574–74 (1985)). 

 The Court will review Judge Austin’s purely legal conclusions de novo. Morgal v. 

Maricopa County Bd. Of Sup’rs, 284 F.R.D. 452, 458 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“‘[T]he magistrate 

judge’s legal conclusions . . . are reviewed de novo.’” (quoting Williams v. United States, Case 

No. CV08-0437-ACK-BMK, 2012 WL 406904, at *3 (D. Haw. 2012))); see also Fajardo v. 

McGuinness, Case No. CV08-0624-OWW-SMS, 2009 WL 981699, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“‘An 

order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of 

procedure.’” (quoting DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F.Supp.2d 159, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2006))), Hawaii v. 

Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 469 F.Supp.2d 842, 846 (D. Haw. 2006) (“‘A decision is ‘contrary to 

law’ if it applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to consider an element of the applicable 

standard.’” (quoting Conant v. McCoffey, Case No. CV97-0139-FMS, 1998 WL 164946, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. 1998))). 

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ORDER 

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A. Brady/Giglio Material: Requests 11, 49, and 50 from Dkt. No. 34 

Defendant requests that the prosecution be ordered give Defendant all Brady/Giglio

material immediately, rather than no later than 120 days before trial, as Judge Austin specified. 

(Dkt. No. 118, at 3–4.) Defendant argues that “there is no purpose” or “reason” to delay handing 

over any of the material outlined in the three requests. (Id.) 

The government’s disclosure obligations under Brady and Giglio require that the 

disclosures occur at a time when Defendant can “make practical use” of the material. See United 

States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Guzman, 89 

Fed. App’x 47, 49 (9th Cir. 2004) (disclosure of Brady material after a suppression hearing “was 

cured by the fact that the government’s belated disclosure of the amended notes twenty two days 

before trial” occurred at a time when Defendant could still make use of the disclosure). Here, 

Defendant has not shown that he will be prejudiced if the information is provided no later than 

120 days before trial. Nor has Defendant cited to any authority that supports his position. 

Defendant’s argument that “there is no purpose to the delay,” (Dkt. No. 118 at 4–5), is not a legal 

one, and does not point to a clear factual error by Judge Austin. Thus, Judge Austin’s order that 

the prosecution produce the information no later than 120 days before trial is not clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law. 

B. Law Enforcement Communications: Request 9 from Dkt. No. 34 

Defendant argues that Judge Austin’s denial of his request for documents, emails, and 

other writings containing substantive communications about the case between officials at the 

United States Attorney’s Office, USP Atwater, BOP, and the FBI, (Dkt. No. 99 at 10), 

particularly relating to the timing of the prosecution against Mr. Stone, was clearly erroneous and 

contrary to law. (Dkt. No. 118 at 5.) Judge Austin denied the request because it was overbroad 

and immaterial. (Dkt. No. 106 at 13–14.) However, Judge Austin expressly reserved for 

Defendant the right to submit a new, more narrowly tailored, request. (Id. at 13–14.) 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 

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ORDER 

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does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other 

internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or other 

government agent in connection with investigation or prosecuting the case. Nor 

does [Rule 16] authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by 

prospective government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 

 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). Moreover, Rule 16(a)(2) is a “rule of discovery, related to the work 

product doctrine but not synonymous or coextensive with it.” United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 

1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, Defendant is requesting documents that clearly fall 

under Rule 16(a)(2): substantive communications by the prosecutors about the case to other law 

enforcement agents. Accordingly, even solely under Rule 16 and not under the work-product 

privilege doctrine, Judge Austin’s refusal to compel production of those documents was not 

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 

In addition, however, the information requested is immaterial to Defendant’s actual 

future dangerousness. Defendant is not actually asking for evidence of Defendant’s future 

dangerousness (or lack thereof), but rather for the government’s analysis of that evidence; 

Defendant wants to show that, at some point in the past, the government did not consider 

Defendant to be dangerous. (See Dkt. No. 99, at 11.) Thus, Defendant’s argument appears to be 

that he is entitled not just to material that might impeach the government’s witnesses or 

undermine its evidence in front of a jury, but also to any material that impeaches the 

government’s decision to seek the death penalty against Mr. Stone. 3 However, the government’s 

 

3

 Apart from materiality concerns, the government’s choices about whether to seek the 

death penalty and how to time the prosecution, barring an unconstitutional motive or 

unconstitutional delay, rest within its discretion. Mandating that the government turn over 

documents to allow Defendant to attack a purely discretionary decision raises not only Rule 

16(a)(2) compliance problems and work-product privilege issues, but also separation of powers 

concerns. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987) (“[T]he policy considerations 

behind a prosecutor’s traditionally ‘wide discretion’ suggest the impropriety of our requiring 

prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties, ‘often years after they were 

made.’”) (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1545 (D. 

Kan. 1996) (“[T]he decision whether to seek the death penalty is firmly within a prosecutor’s 

discretion.”); United States v. Slone, Case No. CR12-0028-ART-HAI, 2013 WL 5217932, at *2 

(E.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2013) (given separation of powers concerns, a court “may not direct the 

process by which the government decides whether a death sentence is appropriate”). 

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ORDER 

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analysis of Defendant’s future dangerousness is not relevant to his actual future dangerousness.4

Whatever the government thinks of its own evidence, it is up to the jury to decide what weight to 

give it. While Defendant correctly argues that “information in the possession of the prosecutor 

and his investigating officers that is helpful to the defendant, including evidence that might tend 

to impeach a government witness, must be disclosed prior to trial,” (see Dkt. No. 118 at 7) 

(quoting United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2009), such impeaching and 

“helpful” information is already covered by other requests and must be disclosed no later than 

120 days before trial. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 106 at 8–10.) 

Should Defendant be convicted and the case proceed to the penalty phase, Defendant may 

present his own arguments, based on the evidence, regarding Defendant’s future dangerousness. 

Moreover, the government is still under an ongoing ethical obligation to turn over mitigating 

information. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp.2d 1228, 1246–47 (D. Nev. 2005) 

(prosecutors are obligated to timely disclose any information that “tends to . . . mitigate the 

offense”). However, Defendant is not entitled to the government’s communications about why it 

decided to prosecute him or seek the death penalty. Judge Austin’s denial of Defendant’s request 

for communications related to the government’s decision of whether to charge Defendant, to 

seek the death penalty against him, or the timing behind the prosecution is not clearly erroneous 

or contrary to law, and Defendant cites no law or authority demonstrating otherwise. 

C. Requests Related to the BOP ADX Facility 

Judge Austin granted or granted in part requests (a), (m), (p), (u), (v), 5 and denied 

 

4

 Under Defendant’s interpretation of materiality, the government would be entitled to 

argue that its own analysis of Defendant’s future dangerousness, and its corresponding decision 

to seek the death penalty, is relevant to Defendant’s actual future dangerousness. This can plainly 

not be true, for the same reason that the government’s decision to charge a defendant with a 

crime is not probative of the defendant’s guilt. 

5

 Judge Austin ordered that the information under request (a) be provided to the Court for 

in camera review, or alternatively produced. (Dkt. No. 106 at 16–17.) Similarly, Judge Austin 

granted requests (u) and (v). (Id. at 19.) Defendant does not articulate any specific objections to 

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ORDER 

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requests (h)–(l), (s), (t), (w), which relate to information about the BOP ADX facility. (Dkt. 

No.106 at 16–19.) Some material satisfying requests (h)–(l) had already been disclosed. (Id. at 

17.) Defendant argues that Judge Austin should have granted all requests in full. 

First, Defendant appears to be arguing that Judge Austin should not have limited the 

disclosure of evidence based on his analysis of the evidence’s materiality, as “‘speculative 

prediction[s] about the likely materiality of favorable evidence . . . should not limit the disclosure 

of such evidence, because it is just too difficult to analyze before trial whether particular 

evidence ultimately will prove to be ‘material’ after trial.’” (Dkt. No. 118 at 7–8) (quoting 

United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013). However, Defendant did not 

raise that argument or cite to that authority in his motions to compel or his replies, raising it for 

the first time on a request for reconsideration of Judge Austin’s order. Thus, the Court will not 

consider this argument. See Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 863 F.2d 633, 638 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“[A]llowing parties to litigate fully their case before the magistrate and, if 

unsuccessful, to change their strategy and present a different theory to the district court would 

frustrate the purpose of the Magistrates Act.”) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. 

Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

In the alternative, the Court finds that Defendant is incorrect, and the Court may only 

order the production of “material” information. Under Rule 16, the government need only permit 

Defendant to examine evidence if “the item is material to preparing the defense.” Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 717 F.2d 478, 480 (1983) 

(“In criminal cases . . . . [m]ateriality is a necessary prerequisite to discovery.”). Judge Austin’s 

ruling is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law on that basis. See id. at 480, 482 (District 

Court’s ruling that the Freedom of Information Act supersedes the materiality requirement of 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 was clear error, and “[Rule 16], not the Freedom of 

 

these three rulings, but mentions them in his request for reconsideration. (Dkt. No. 118 at 7.) 

Accordingly, it is not clear to the Court what Defendant’s objections to those rulings are. 

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ORDER 

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Information Act, is the basic rule that will control [criminal] discovery”); see also United States 

v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[O]rdering production by the government 

without any preliminary showing of materiality is inconsistent with Rule 16.”).

Moreover, Defendant appears to have misunderstood Judge Austin’s order. While 

Defendant argues that Judge Austin incorrectly applied post-trial, rather than pre-trial, Brady

materiality standards when considering the discovery requests, (see Dkt. No. 118, at 7–8), Judge 

Austin also analyzed and applied the pre-trial Rule 16 materiality standard: “to show materiality 

[under Rule 16], the evidence in question must enable the defendant to substantially alter the 

quantum of proof in his favor . . . or be ‘relevant to the development of a possible defense.’” 

(Dkt. No. 106, at 3–4) (quoting Mandel, 914 F.2d 1219) (citation omitted). 

Defendant also argues that Judge Austin erred by considering the requested evidence 

item-by-item, rather than collectively. (Dkt. No. 118 at 8.) However, while Judge Austin 

addressed each of Defendant’s requests sequentially, there is nothing in his order that suggests 

that he ignored context of the case as a whole, and Defendant’s other requests for information, 

when considering the materiality of a given request. Judge Austin groups all BOP ADX requests 

into a single section and briefly discusses the arguments for and against production collectively, 

before addressing each request individually. (See Dkt. No. 106 at 16–19.) In his analysis of the 

materiality standards under Brady and Rule 16, Judge Austin says nothing about analyzing each 

piece of evidence independently. (See Dkt. No. 106 at 3–7.) Judge Austin’s decision to explain 

his evaluation of each request sequentially does not mean that he considered each request out-ofcontext of all other evidence provided to and requested by Defendant. 

Defendant argues that the information covered by requests (h)–(1), (s), and (w) is 

material, contrary to Judge Austin’s findings, for two reasons: first, any evidence suggesting that 

Defendant can be safely housed in the ADX facility should be considered material to rebut the 

government’s assertion that Defendant will pose a danger in any setting; and second, any 

evidence suggesting that the BOP is itself complicit in Defendant’s alleged history of violence, 

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ORDER 

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by releasing him from isolation at ADX without following the normal “step-down” procedures, 

is material to show that he is not morally culpable for the history of violence that the government 

intends to use to justify the death penalty. (Dkt. No. 118 at 9–10.) However, “where . . . the 

government has shown that complying with the request would be unduly burdensome, it is 

incumbent upon [a court] to consider the government interests asserted in light of the materiality 

shown.” Mandel, 914 F. 2d at 1219. Judge Austin’s denial of these requests, after weighing of 

the government interest in not being required to, for example, manually extract the required 

information from each individual inmate’s file, (Dkt. No. 80, at 4–6), and the privacy interests of 

the inmates, against Defendant’s arguments of “materiality” in light of all the evidence thus far 

provided and requested by Defendant, was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 

Defendant also argues that Judge Austin erred by considering the privacy interests of 

inmates in deciding whether information was “material” or not, with respect to requests (h)–(l), 

(m), and (p). (Dkt. No. 118 at 8–9.) However, privacy interests are a non-determinative factor 

that may be considered in weighing materiality under Rule 16. See United States v. King, 928 F. 

Supp. 1059, 1062 n.2 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[M]ateriality is a standard that may vary with the 

particular relevance of the requested information, the burden in producing it, the national or 

privacy interests surrounding it, and its availability from other sources.”). Indeed, in the case 

Defendant cites in support of his alternative request for a protective order,6 the Court took the 

privacy interests of third-parties into account, noting that “[p]ursuant to a stipulated protective 

order, the names and other identifying information was sequestered and never revealed in court 

documents.” (Dkt. No. 118, at 9.) Defendant does not present any authority suggesting that a 

court may not take privacy interests into account when considering the materiality of evidence 

under Rule 16. 

In addition, while Defendant cites to a large number of published and unpublished 

 

6

 Of course, the case cited by Defendant is a civil case, and was governed by different, 

broader, discovery rules than this criminal case. 

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ORDER 

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decisions and transcripts from previous death penalty cases about requesting information 

regarding the ADX facility, (see Dkt. No. 47, at 45–55), he does not cite to court orders 

mandating that the government hand over identifying information. In fact, in one of the orders 

that Defendant cites, the Judge noted that the defendant in that case “do[es] not seek the 

disclosure of the name of inmates or any identifying information,” and only seeks “data in terms 

of numbers of inmates and length of detention.” United States v. Hammer, Case No. CR96-0239-

JHS, Dkt. No. 1499, at 10 (M.D. Penn. 2012). 7 Mr. Stone, in contrast, not only emphatically 

requests identifying information, but also requests individualized information about the reason 

each inmate was committed to ADX—requests broader and more sensitive than those in 

Hammer. 

Defendant also argues that Judge Austin should have considered granting a protective 

order rather than denying the requests. (Dkt. No. 118 at 9.) However, because the information 

requested in this case was not material—given the information already provided to Defendant, 

the privacy interests implicated in handing the material over, and the burden to the government 

in producing the information—it was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law for Judge Austin 

not to issue a protective order to protect the identities of the inmates. 

Request (t), asking for documents, diagrams and photographs of Range 13 at the ADX 

facility, raises security concerns. The government has been ordered to produce information about 

the ADX facility and the procedures for keeping an individual incarcerated there, so that 

Defendant may argue that the ADX facility allows him to be safely housed. Judge Austin’s 

determination that the requested information is not material, considering the importance of the 

information to Defendant and the security interests asserted by the government, is not clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law. See United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(district court properly found that “the information sought to be discovered was not sufficiently 

 

7

 This unpublished order is available at Dkt. No. 47, Ex. L. 

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ORDER 

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material to overcome the government’s compelling interests in inmate safety and prison 

security”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Judge Austin’s order denying in part Defendant’s 

motion to compel information relating to ADX Florence was not clearly erroneous or contrary to 

law. The Court has considered all other arguments by Defendant and finds them meritless. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion for reconsideration of Judge Austin’s 

order, (Dkt. No. 118), is DENIED. 

DATED this 5th day of November 2013. 

A 

John C. Coughenour 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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