Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01249/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01249-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Hilliard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1249

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY HILLIARD,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 970 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 24, 2017

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Following a sting operation, Timothy

Hilliard was charged with ten counts relating to numerous

controlled sales of heroin, a heroin‐for‐guns trade, and a gun

and heroin found during the execution of a search warrant at

his home. At trial, Hilliard asserted an entrapment defense;

the jury ultimately found Hilliard guilty on nine of the ten

counts but was unable to reach a verdict on the first count.

Hilliard now appeals, asking that we vacate his conviction

Case: 16-1249 Document: 40 Filed: 03/24/2017 Pages: 33
2 No. 16‐1249

and sentence and remand for a new trial on the basis of alleg‐

edly inappropriate testimony by a government witness at

trial, as well as inadequate jury instructions on entrapment.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. Background

In 2012, Special Agent Chris Labno of the Bureau of Alco‐

hol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) and confidential inform‐

ant Henry “Hank” Romano1 made six controlled purchases of

heroin from Hilliard. Romano and Hilliard had been friends

for several years prior to the investigation, and had used and

distributed cocaine together in the 1990s. Romano had intro‐

duced Labno, who was undercover as Romano’s “cousin,” to

Hilliard. Prior to each transaction, Labno gave Romano an au‐

dio‐ or video‐recording device to wear, and surveillance offic‐

ers were always present.2 Labno and Romano also recorded

some additional meetings with Hilliard. In December 2012,

after Hilliard traded a significant quantity of heroin for eight

guns and a sum of cash, Hilliard was arrested. Shortly there‐

after, law‐enforcement officials recovered additional heroin

                                                 

1 When the investigation of Hilliard began in 2012, Romano had already

pleaded guilty to a narcotics offense, and had been sentenced to nine

months’ imprisonment, based on his cooperation in other, unrelated cases.

(Romano had at that point been cooperating with the government for sev‐

eral years and had provided information in approximately three other

cases.)

2 Romano had also been given a personal recording device that he could

use to record telephone conversations or other meetings with Hilliard. Ro‐

mano could turn this device on or off. Labno had instructed Romano to

record his criminal conversations with Hilliard, but not every pertinent

discussion was recorded because it was sometimes impractical (e.g., if Ro‐

mano had an unexpected contact with Hilliard).

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No. 16‐1249 3

and a gun from Hilliard’s residence during the execution of a

search warrant.

Based on the above, Hilliard was charged in a ten‐count

indictment. The controlled purchases of heroin were charged

in Counts One through Seven as violations of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). The heroin‐for‐guns trade was charged in Count

Eight as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Hilliard’s possession

of the heroin and gun recovered during the search warrant

were respectively charged in Count Nine as a violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and in Count Ten as a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A. Hilliard’s Trial

The parties stipulated at the start of trial that Hilliard’s

criminal history included two prior convictions: (1) a 1997

conviction in Tennessee for delivery of cocaine, and (2) a 2002

conviction in Illinois for possession of a controlled substance.

Three ATF agents testified at trial. ATF Special Agent

Andy Karceski had not been personally involved in Hilliard’s

investigation or case, and testified as an expert in drug traf‐

ficking on topics including: the typical quantities of heroin in‐

volved in personal use and distribution, the manner in which

heroin is purchased and sold throughout the typical distribu‐

tion chain, and drug dealers’tactics to evade law‐enforcement

detection (e.g., using coded words and having legitimate day

jobs). Agent Karceski also explained that law‐enforcement

agents commonly use informants to secure introductions to

wholesale drug traffickers, who otherwise would be leery

about selling narcotics to new customers. He testified that

law‐enforcement officials monitor informants as closely as

possible, often using recording devices or debriefs, but that it

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4 No. 16‐1249

is not feasible to record or write reports on every conversation

or interaction involving informants.  

During Agent Labno’s testimony about his work on the

case, the government published the recordings made of Hilli‐

ard during the investigation,3 and Labno explained his under‐

standing of the conversations. For example, during the con‐

trolled purchase that took place on April 5, 2012, Hilliard had

mentioned his customers: “[L]ast time I had some, some off‐

white shit ..., the tooters likin’ it but the shooters didn’t.”

Agent Labno had understood Hilliard to be referring to his

customers’ responses to a prior batch of heroin.  

On May 22, 2012, Agent Labno and Romano had met with

Hilliard at a bar in Evanston to discuss the exchange of guns

for heroin. During that meeting, Hilliard had explained how

to run a drug business:

Well, just gonna give you a little lesson in, since

you, you know, you fuckin’ around. Only fuck

with the people you fuck with cause when you

go out, you fuck with other motha fuckers, you

put yourself at risk, first of all ... . Second of all,

you never know the quality ... .  

Agent Labno had understood Hilliard to be trying to teach

Labno about dealing only with trusted suppliers because of

the risks that could arise from shopping around. Hilliard had

continued:

Get caught up ... . I learned the hard way, when

my guys don’t have shit dude, I’ll sit ... .I’ll

                                                 

3 Hilliard stipulated to the observations of the surveillance officer at each

purchase.  

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No. 16‐1249 5

wait ... .Never let motha fuckers rush you,

man ... .That’s how you get ... fucked up,

bro  ... . I mean, the guys I’m fuckin’ with dude,

pretty, pretty nice, pretty, respectful loyal,

motha fuckers are business men [sic], you know

what I’m sayin’ ... . [N]ot all money ain’t good

money, man.

Agent Labno explained that he had understood Hilliard to be

saying that when his regular supplier was out of heroin, Hil‐

liard would simply wait until his trusted supplier was ready

rather than looking for another source.  

Hilliard had further explained to Agent Labno the im‐

portance of controlling addicted customers:

[Y]ou’re playin’ with opium dude, you’re

dealin’ with a different product then. When

you’re dealin’ with highly, cause they need it,

cause the[y’re] sick ... .But that’s why you al‐

ways gotta fuckin’, you gotta, you gotta know

how to run your shit. Keep the number, change

it on the[ir] motha fuckin ass, man ... . [Y]ou in

control, bro, but if you start lettin’ them motha

fuckers control you, dog ... [y]ou’re in fuckin’

trouble man ... .

Hilliard had also discussed interactions with law‐enforce‐

ment officials: “Once they’re onto you dude, you gotta

stop ... .(unintelligible) [H]ey, anybody say somethin’ ‘bout

me and I hear, I see the police, nuh, I don’t sell shit ... .That’s

how I do it, cause they gonna watch you, you know what I’m

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6 No. 16‐1249

sayin’.” Agent Labno had understood this to mean that Hilli‐

ard would stop selling drugs as soon as he believed he was

on the radar of law‐enforcement officers.

Further, in a recording from the day of his arrest, Hilliard

had referenced his prior conviction in Tennessee and the les‐

sons he had learned from it:

The only thing about Indiana, or talkin’ like ru‐

ral uh, states. You get caught, you, they gonna

hide you ... .You won’t see [daylight] ... .You

see what happened to me in Tennessee [refer‐

ring to 1997 conviction] ... .Yeah, you, you can

ball, you can ball til you fall but if you get

caught, that’s it ... .You gotta remember in Ten‐

nessee though, informants get paid, crackheads

get paid to snitch ... .The only thing good about

here is, you know what I’m sayin’, in other

states, you know, they can’t do that entrapment

shit here, you, you will beat that shit. But them

other states, that entrapment shit is, they can do

it all day. They can like actually set you up, you

will still get fucked up. Here, you will beat that

shit like a motha fucker.

Agent Labno had understood Hilliard to be discussing (iron‐

ically enough) a mistaken impression that Illinois law‐en‐

forcement officers could not employ sting operations to arrest

targets.

On cross‐examination, Hilliard’s defense counsel empha‐

sized Hilliard’s and Romano’s long friendship and the fact

that Agent Labno did not know what had been said between

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No. 16‐1249 7

Hilliard and Romano in unrecorded conversations either out‐

side Labno’s presence or prior to the start of the investigation.

Agent Labno acknowledged that he was not aware of Hilli‐

ard’s having sold drugs between 2007 and 2011, even though

Romano had been cooperating with the government since

2007.

Defense counsel also asked Agent Labno about uncharged

drug transactions—that is, whether there was evidence that

Hilliard had sold drugs to anyone other than Romano and

Labno:

Q: ... Do you have any evidence of any

other drug deals from my client to any‐

one besides the government?

A: I don’t—we were unable to, no.

Q: There was no video or any surveillance

of my client selling heroin to anybody

else, true?

A: That’s correct.

Defense counsel later returned to the topic of uncharged drug

dealing by Hilliard:

Q: All right. In other words, there’s a possi‐

ble, at least on May 31st of 2012 [the date

of a controlled purchase of heroin by the

informant and Agent Labno], that you

were his only customer?

A: That’s not my understanding, sir.

Q:   Oh, I know it’s not your understanding.

I asked you whether it was possible.

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8 No. 16‐1249

A: Again, anything is possible, but based—

if you’re asking what I believe to be the

case—

Q: Don’t want your opinion.

A: Everything is possible, sir, yes.

Q: I’m not asking for your opinion. But as

you sit here today, on May 31st, 2012,

you have any facts, any evidence that Mr.

Hilliard was selling to anybody but Mr.

Romano?

A:   Yes, I do.

Q:   Tell me.

A:   Based on the conversations that he was

having with me, the details he was ex‐

plaining to me, the way he was teaching

me to be what he considered a better

businessman, a better drug dealer, he

talked about selling to other people, he

talked about the things he did, he talked

about how he operated.

Q:   Allright. Well, he could’ve been reaching

back in his experience from 2001 when he

was dealing cocaine. It’s not that hard to

talk with a drug dealer, someone who’s

been in the business, is it?

A: Well, that’s correct, but cocaine is differ‐

ent than heroin.

Q:   That’s all I’m asking, yes or no. But you

conducted some surveillance during

Case: 16-1249 Document: 40 Filed: 03/24/2017 Pages: 33
No. 16‐1249 9

these 9 months. Every time you did a

deal, you had cars conducting surveil‐

lance out there, true?

A: Yes; that’s correct.

Q: Did you follow him from his home to the

meet and back to his home, true?

A:   That’s correct.

Q:   You never saw him drive anywhere else

to make a delivery of heroin, did you?

A: I believe we followed him on occasion

where we did meet him and we believed

he was doing a transaction but we

weren’t able to identify anybody in‐

volved.

Q: That’s a maybe because I never saw a re‐

port—

[ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY]: Objec‐

tion.

COURT: The objection is sustained.

Q: Well, could you indicate the report that

you documented that?

A: It wouldn’t be my report. I wouldn’t be

out there because, as the undercover

agent, I wouldn’t be expected or wanted

to be covering surveillance deals because

if Mr. Hilliard would see me, it would

be—

Q: So it’s not in a report?

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10 No. 16‐1249

A: No, sir, it is in the report. My under‐

standing is, it’s just not in a report that I

authored. It was in a report that another

agent authored. I believe, in fact, it was

listed as part of one of the stipulations as

well.

Defense counsel asked for a sidebar, which was not tran‐

scribed.4 Following the sidebar, no testimony was stricken

and no additional objections were noted. Defense counsel

continued examining Agent Labno about his basis for believ‐

ing that Hilliard had engaged in an uncharged drug transac‐

tion on a particular date (September 18, 2012):

Q:   You’re referring to stipulation number

15, I believe, where it says: “ ... at ap‐

proximately 6:30 p.m. defendant Timo‐

thy Hilliard was parked in a Buick in the

area of 8025 Keating Avenue, Skokie, Il‐

linois and talking on his cell phone.”

A: Yes, sir.

Q: “[A] short time later he drove, his Buick

was parked in a lot behind the building

at 8025 Keating.” Right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that’s where you’re basing that

there might’ve been another deal?

                                                 

4 Hilliard’s motion for a new trial indicated that defense counsel moved

for a mistrial at this time, which the court eventually denied, without prej‐

udice.

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No. 16‐1249 11

A: Yes. As I said, we weren’t able to identify

anything specific or any people involved.

Q: I’m not asking for your opinion. I’m ask‐

ing, did you see him get out of the car or

they saw him get out of the car and de‐

liver a package to anybody? It’s not in—

A: No, sir.

During redirect, the government did not elicit any testi‐

mony from Agent Labno regarding drug dealing by Hilliard

involving customers other than the informant.  

ATF Special Agent Rene Marano also testified for the gov‐

ernment. He had assisted with the execution of the search

warrant at Hilliard’s home on the evening of Hilliard’s arrest.

Agent Marano testified that, in addition to the handgun and

heroin that were recovered, he had also found a substantial

amount of ammunition, a total of $1,940 in cash, a scale, sev‐

eral plastic baggies, gloves, and a mask at Hilliard’s home.  

At the conclusion of the government’s case‐in‐chief, Hilli‐

ard moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. He

also moved for a mistrial based on “various opinions” that

Agent Labno had allegedly “volunteered from the witness

stand,” including his “testimony regarding other drug deals.”

The government responded that “some of counsel’s questions

asked for those opinions,” and noted that defense counsel

never moved to strike any of Agent Labno’s answers. The dis‐

trict court denied the motion for mistrial without prejudice,

stating: “I could not, with any degree of clarity, find grounds

for a mistrial, but if there’s a defense, the context may make a

difference which is why I’m denying it now to be raised later.”

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12 No. 16‐1249

Hilliard testified at trial in his own defense. He spoke

about his and Romano’s long friendship and admitted that

they had sold cocaine together in the late 1990s. However,

Hilliard testified that he had not been involved in selling her‐

oin or guns at that time, and that he had later turned his life

around, stopped selling drugs, obtained a commercial

driver’s license, and begun working as a truck driver at Tri‐

Air. Hilliard said that Romano had continued to deal ecstasy,

cocaine, guns, and steroids, but they had remained friends

and Romano had attended Hilliard’s wedding in 2007.  

Hilliard testified that from 2007 onward, he would occa‐

sionally run into Romano at the gym or elsewhere, and that

each time, Romano would ask about the prospect of obtaining

cocaine and Hilliard would respond that he was no longer

dealing drugs. In 2010, Hilliard had gotten divorced and had

moved back into his mother’s house, and he testified that his

financial status had declined. Hilliard said that he felt in‐

creased financial pressure in 2012, when his eldest child had

moved in with him. He testified that during this time, Ro‐

mano had continued to ask about obtaining cocaine, had tried

to pressure Hilliard to start selling drugs again, and had often

commented on Hilliard’s worsening financial state.  

Hilliard explained that in January 2012, he had changed

his mind about selling drugs, because he had needed money

to support his mother and children. Hilliard said that at that

point, he had told Romano that he knew only heroin suppli‐

ers, not cocaine suppliers. Although Romano first said he did

not know anything about heroin, about two weeks later he

expressed an interest. Hilliard had then arranged to obtain

heroin from the mother of his son, who had become an addict.

Hilliard explained that his early drug‐related conversations

Case: 16-1249 Document: 40 Filed: 03/24/2017 Pages: 33
No. 16‐1249 13

with Romano had occurred prior to Romano’s first debriefing

with ATF agents about Hilliard in March 2012, and that from

March to December 2012, Hilliard and Romano had had a

number of unrecorded conversations without Agent Labno at

Hilliard’s house, the gym, or a bar.  

Hilliard testified that he never would have sold heroin but

for Romano’s persistence, and that Hilliard had never sold to

anyone besides Romano and undercover Agent Labno. Hilli‐

ard also said that the idea of trading guns for heroin had come

from Romano. Hilliard claimed that the reason he had

sounded so knowledgeable about drug trafficking and guns

during recorded conversations was because Romano had in‐

structed Hilliard to impress Labno, and that Hilliard had

based what he had told Labno about drug dealing on Hilli‐

ard’s experience dealing cocaine years earlier.  

On cross‐examination, Hilliard said that it was only due

to his financial circumstances that he had caved into selling

drugs again, but admitted that there was no discussion of his

purportedly desperate financial status anywhere on the re‐

cordings. Hilliard also admitted that it was illegal for him, a

felon, to possess a gun, but that he had ordered a handgun for

himself from Romano, and that Hilliard had worn gloves dur‐

ing the guns‐for‐heroin trade to avoid leaving fingerprints be‐

hind. Hilliard again denied having any heroin customers

other than Romano and Agent Labno. Hilliard said that when

he would obtain more heroin than Romano and Labno had

ordered, Hilliard would hold it forthem until their next order,

and that the heroin found at his home was going to be sold to

Labno. Hilliard admitted that he had been firm in resisting

Agent Labno’s attempts to negotiate a lower price, telling

Labno that a lower price would happen only if he placed

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14 No. 16‐1249

larger orders consistently. Hilliard also admitted that he had

lied to both Romano and Labno on multiple occasions during

the investigation, but said he was being truthful while testify‐

ing.  

The defense also called two character witnesses: a former

Tri‐Air Vice President of operations who had worked with

Hilliard, and Hilliard’s cousin. Both testified that they knew

Hilliard well and understood his character for honesty and

law‐abidance to be excellent. On cross‐examination, both also

said that if Hilliard had asked for assistance with respect to

his alleged financial difficulties, they would have helped him.  

On rebuttal, the government admitted into evidence rec‐

ords from Hilliard’s phone from September 2011 to June 2012,

as well as a summary chart showing contacts between Hilli‐

ard’s phone and Romano’s phone. Special Agent Marano tes‐

tified that, from September to December of 2011, zero phone

calls or text messages had been exchanged between the two

phone numbers. In January 2012, only one phone call and one

text had been exchanged. In February 2012, there had been

incoming and outgoing contacts between both numbers, the

majority of which had been listed by the phone company as

having a duration of one minute. These could have repre‐

sented calls that had lasted only seconds but had been

rounded up in the phone company’s records.  

During closing arguments, the government made no ref‐

erence to Agent Labno’s testimony about uncharged drug

transactions, and defense counselrepeatedly emphasized that

there was no evidence of uncharged drug dealing by Hilliard.

Hilliard asserted a defense of entrapment as to Counts One

through Nine, and the court gave a series of jury instructions

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No. 16‐1249 15

on entrapment. Four of the government’s proposed entrap‐

ment instructions were given over defense counsel’s objec‐

tions, and the court also refused three instructions proposed

by the defense.

B. Jury Verdict, Post‐Trial Motions, and Sentencing

The jury convicted Hilliard on Counts Two through Ten,

but could not reach a verdict on Count One.5 On December

30, 2014, Hilliard filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on

Counts Two through Nine, claiming that the evidence was in‐

sufficient to prove that he had not been entrapped. Hilliard

also filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that: (1) Agent

Labno had improperly offered expert opinions during cross‐

examination; (2) the district court had erred in denying Hilli‐

ard’s request for a mistrial based on the purported expert tes‐

timony by Agent Labno; (3) the district court had erred in ad‐

mitting Hillard’s prior convictions; and (4) the district court

had erred in instructing the jury on a multi‐factor test for pre‐

disposition. The district court denied both motions on Janu‐

ary 15, 2015. However, it observed, “[T]his was a case which

                                                 

5 On January 15, 2015, in the course of denying Hilliard’s motions for judg‐

ment of acquittal and for retrial, the district court described the verdict as

follows:

My guess would be that the jury thought that maybe there

is entrapment on the first delivery, maybe the second.

And the truth of the matter is [] it was an issue that was

obvious to me as well. But the jury concluded, as I

would’ve concluded, that when you get to the number of

deliveries that were made, the finder of fact could believe

that it might have started with some form of entrapment

but that the government sustained its burden of proof

with respect to the later transactions.

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16 No. 16‐1249

the defense could[ ha]ve won, or put another way, it’s a case

where the government could[ ha]ve lost. There was obviously

some weight, evidenced by the final verdict that was ren‐

dered, that within the jury itself there was some disagree‐

ment.”

On January 11, 2016, Hilliard moved for reconsideration

of the denial of his post‐trial motions. The district court de‐

nied that motion on February 2, 2016. On the same day, Hilli‐

ard was sentenced to sixty‐three months’ imprisonment on

Counts Two through Seven and Count Nine, with all sen‐

tences running concurrently. Hilliard was sentenced to sixty

months’ imprisonment on Count Eight, to run consecutively

to the other sentences. In total, he was sentenced to 123

months’ imprisonment.

II. Discussion

A. Agent Labno’s Testimony

“[A] mistrial is appropriate when an event during trial has

a real likelihood of preventing a jury from evaluating the evi‐

dence fairly and accurately, so that the defendant has been

deprived of a fair trial.” United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481,

489 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The district court’s deni‐

als of Hilliard’s motion for a mistrial and his post‐trial motion

for a new trial are both reviewed for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 327 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted); United States v. Whiteagle, 759 F.3d 734, 756 (7th Cir.

2014) (citation omitted).

Hilliard takes issue with Agent Labno’s testimony on

cross‐examination, when in response to a question asking

whether Labno had ever seen Hilliard “drive anywhere else

to make a delivery of heroin” to other customers, Labno said,

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No. 16‐1249 17

“I believe we followed him on occasion where we did meet

him and we believed he was doing a transaction but we

weren’t able to identify anybody involved.” Hilliard makes

several arguments as to why he deserves a new trial on the

basis of this testimony, including that the testimony was spec‐

ulative, irrelevant, and prejudicial; that it placed Agent Labno

in the dual role of both a fact and expert witness; and that it

evidences a violation of Hilliard’s due‐process rights under

either Brady v. Maryland or Napue v. Illinois. We consider (and

reject) each of these arguments in turn:

1. No Prejudice from Agent Labno’s Testimony  

Hilliard emphasizes that Labno’s response contradicted

his earlier testimony that the government did not have evi‐

dence that Hilliard had sold drugs to others. Hilliard argues

that Labno “took advantage of [defense] counsel’s later ques‐

tion on the identical subject” to “volunteer” testimony that

was speculative and highly prejudicial given Hilliard’s reli‐

ance on a defense of entrapment.  

The government counters that Labno’s answer was re‐

sponsive, particularly in the broader context of the line of

questioning, where Labno had previously conceded in re‐

sponse to defense counsel’s questions that “anything is possi‐

ble,” and defense counsel had earlier asked broadly about

“any facts, any evidence” of uncharged drug dealing. The

government cites to United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511 (7th Cir.

2013), in which defense counsel asked a lay witness on cross‐

examination whether the defendant had known that the wit‐

ness had gone to prison in 2005, and the witness answered, “I

was in prison while he’s locked up,” revealing the defend‐

ant’s criminal history, id. at 512. Defense counsel’s motion for

a mistrial was denied, id., and we affirmed the conviction,

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18 No. 16‐1249

finding no abuse of discretion by the district court because the

witness “gave an answer that was responsive, fair, and en‐

tirely proper given the line of questioning [counsel] was pur‐

suing,” id. at 513 (citation omitted); see also United States v.

Johnson‐Dix, 54 F.3d 1295, 1303–1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (conclud‐

ing district court acted within its discretion in denying motion

for mistrial where agent was asked whether defendant coop‐

erated post‐arrest and agent testified that defendant “was, in

my opinion, telling half‐truths the entire night,” because the

agent’s response was invited by counsel’s question).  

Hilliard counters that Labno’s answer was not responsive

because defense counsel asked for facts, not for speculation or

opinion. However, although Agent Labno’s immediate an‐

swer to defense counsel’s question may have been less obvi‐

ously responsive than the testimony at issue in Zitt or Johnson‐

Dix, any potential confusion was thoroughly cleaned up by

defense counsel’s follow‐up questioning, which made clear

that the Skokie surveillance to which Agent Labno was refer‐

ring had not involved the observation of any transaction or

even the presence of any individual other than Hilliard.6

Moreover, the government did not elicit any related testi‐

mony during redirect, and the government never referred to

or relied on this testimony in arguing that the jury could infer

from the evidence that Hilliard had dealt to other customers.

Instead, the government pointed to the recordings of Hilliard

                                                 

6 Indeed, the government points out (and Hilliard does not contest in his

reply) that Hilliard’s defense counsel never objected to or moved to strike

the testimony, or seek curative instructions for the jury, presumably be‐

cause such actions were unnecessary given the clarifications made

through continued questioning.

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No. 16‐1249 19

discussing how he had run his drug business, controlled ad‐

dicted customers, and avoided law‐enforcement detection;

the absence in the recordings of any evidence of pressure by

Romano; and the lack of phone or text contacts between Ro‐

mano and Hilliard in the fall of 2011 (which undermined Hil‐

liard’s testimony to the contrary). See,e.g., Johnson‐Dix, 54 F.3d

at 1304 (“It is in any event doubtful that the agent’s statement

had any effect on the jury’s assessment of [defendant’s] cred‐

ibility, as the agent already had testified on direct examina‐

tion, without objection from [defense] counsel, that he had

told [defendant] in the course of their discussions that [de‐

fendant] was not being entirely truthful ... .The agent’s state‐

ment thus did not deprive [defendant] of a fair trial.”). Mean‐

while, defense counsel repeatedly emphasized at closing that

there was no evidence of Hilliard having had any drug deals

with customers other than Romano and Labno. As such,

Agent Labno’s testimony was non‐prejudicial and harmless.  

Hilliard points out that the jury deliberated for four days

and ultimately returned a verdict of not guilty on one count

but guilty on the remainder. He claims that this shows a jury

that could very well have been swayed by Labno’s testimony.

However, the district court’s take on the jury’s verdict is rea‐

sonable, and the court thus acted well within its discretion in

denying the motions for a mistrial and for a new trial.

2. No Expert Testimony from Agent Labno  

Hilliard also argues that Agent Labno threw his experi‐

ence as an ATF agent behind his allegedly conjectural testi‐

mony, such that it crossed the line from lay testimony to in‐

appropriate expert testimony. We review de novo a district

court’s interpretation of the rules of evidence, but we review

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20 No. 16‐1249

its rulings to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discre‐

tion. See United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir.

2014) (citation omitted); United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816,

819 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935,

939, 941 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs opinion

testimony of lay witnesses and provides:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testi‐

mony in the form of an opinion is limited to one

that is:  

(a) rationally based on the witness’s per‐

ception;  

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the

witness’s testimony or to determin‐

ing a fact in issue; and  

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge within

the scope of Rule 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 701. Rule 702 contains safeguards for expert tes‐

timony, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G)

requires that such testimony be disclosed to the defendant

prior to trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G).  

Hilliard argues that Labno’s testimony violated Rule

701(a) because Labno himself was not present during the

events in Skokie being discussed—rather, he referred to the

observations of another, non‐testifying agent. Hilliard cites to

United States v. Mendiola, 707 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013), in

support; but we explained in Mendiola that a witness need not

have had “personal interaction” with a defendant in order to

Case: 16-1249 Document: 40 Filed: 03/24/2017 Pages: 33
No. 16‐1249 21

provide appropriate Rule 701 testimony (in that case, identi‐

fying the defendant’s voice in a recording), id. at 741. Rather:  

The requirement that lay opinion be based on

the perception of the witness imports into Rule

701 the personal knowledge standard of Rule

602.[7] And the knowledge required by Rule 602

is not absolute or unlimited knowledge but

simply that awareness of objects or events that

begins with sensory perception of them, a com‐

prehension of them, and an ability to testify at

trial about them. ... [The agent] listened to the

recordings, compared them to the exemplar,

and was able to report her perceptions to the

jury. To reiterate, if there was a question as to

the quality of the perception, that went to the

weight the jury attributed to her comparison.

Id. (citations omitted). In Hilliard’s case, although Labno had

not been present in Skokie and had not personally witnessed

Hilliard’s driving or movements on September 18, 2012,

Labno presumably spoke with the surveillance officer who

had witnessed those things, or reviewed the surveillance re‐

port on which Stipulation 15 was based. And most im‐

portantly, as noted above, later questioning immediately clar‐

ified the limits of Labno’s own knowledge, as well as what

exactly had been observed, and tethered Labno’s testimony to

this particular investigation rather than drawing on his years

                                                 

7 Federal Rule of Evidence 602 provides that “[a] witness may testify to a

matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that

the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove per‐

sonal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.” Fed. R.

Evid. 602.  

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22 No. 16‐1249

of experience. Thus, like the testimony in Mendiola, Labno’s

testimony was reporting to the jury his own (albeit indirect)

knowledge and perceptions of the ongoing surveillance in

this investigation, and the jury was able to decide how much

weight to give Labno’s testimony on this matter.

United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2007), is also

instructive. The agent in Oriedo was first asked whether, “as a

surveillance agent,” a given sequence of events “raise[d] any

red flags” with him. Id. at 602 (alteration in original). The

agent testified that he became concerned in watching a second

vehicle arrive at a drug transaction because “that indicates to

us that there is what is called counter‐surveillance occurring

and they are looking for law enforcement.” Id. Oriedo ob‐

jected that this was an undisclosed expert opinion, so the gov‐

ernment withdrew the question and rephrased to ask whether

the agent was “personally concerned” about the presence of

two vehicles. Id. The agent responded in the affirmative be‐

cause “more than one vehicle ... raises concerns about being

countersurveillance [sic].” Id. (omission and bracketed text in

original). We concluded that this was lay testimony under

Rule 701 because, although the agent’s “specialized

knowledge informed his mental state, he was not called upon

to testify generally about narcotics counter‐surveillance prac‐

tices or to offer an explicit opinion that what he observed was

counter‐surveillance.” Id. (citation omitted); see also United

States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding

that agent could testify as to his “impressions” of intercepted

telephone conversations under Rule 701 because he was ex‐

plaining coded words and phrases that were unique, such

that his understanding came only as result of things he had

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No. 16‐1249 23

perceived, not from specialized knowledge).8 Similarly,

Agent Labno’s experience with the ATF may have informed

his perception of the surveillance results, but he did not testify

generally about signs of a drug transaction or offer an explicit

opinion that what he had observed was somehow a drug

transaction. His testimony was limited to what he recalled

from the surveillance report and/or Stipulation 15—facts de‐

rived exclusively from the investigation. And defense coun‐

sel’s later questioning prevented Labno from making any

connections for the jury based on his specialized background.

See Rollins, 544 F.3d at 832 (“To be sure, the jury was well

aware that Agent McGarry had years of experience as a law

enforcement officer. But we do not think that he was cloaked

with an ‘aura of expertise’ which allowed the jury to be un‐

duly swayed ... or that his testimony was based on his spe‐

cialized knowledge as a DEA agent ... .”).

Hilliard additionally contends that Labno’s “speculation”

was not helpful to understanding his testimony or determin‐

ing a fact in issue, and thus violated Rule 701(b). But Labno

was appropriately responding to defense counsel’s questions

regarding the lack of evidence of other drug deals by Hilliard,

and Labno’s initial response, together with his later answers,

were helpful in clarifying that issue. Hilliard relatedly con‐

tends that Labno’s testimony was irrelevant because it had no

                                                 

8 Hilliard cites to United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 749–51 (2d Cir.

2004), in which the Second Circuit held that an agent’s testimony inter‐

preting recorded phone calls was not proper lay testimony because it

usurped the role of the jury by increasing the risk that the jury would rely

on that testimony rather than on its own interpretation of the calls. How‐

ever, we explicitly disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of

Rule 701 in Rollins. See 544 F.3d at 832.

Case: 16-1249 Document: 40 Filed: 03/24/2017 Pages: 33
24 No. 16‐1249

probative value under Rules 401 and 402, and that because of

the enormous potential for unfair prejudice and confusing the

jury, the testimony should not have been admitted under Rule

403. For the reasons outlined above, however, the testimony

did have some relevance, any risk of prejudice or confusion

was effectively neutralized, and the district judge acted

within his discretion in admitting the testimony.  

3. No Due‐Process Violation Under Either Brady or Na‐

pue

Finally, Hilliard raises claims under both Brady and Napue,

based on Agent Labno’s reference to a “report” by another

agent documenting the Skokie events. On one hand, Hilliard

claims that if a report other than the surveillance report un‐

derlying Stipulation 15 exists and was undisclosed to the de‐

fense, he suffered a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). On the other hand, Hillard claims that if the report ref‐

erenced was the same one underlying Stipulation 15, Labno

distorted the meaning of the report to the point of giving false

or misleading testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360

U.S. 264 (1959).  

The government submits on appeal that Hilliard’s Brady

argument misconstrues the record, and affirms that there was

no other, undisclosed report: Agent Labno clearly was refer‐

ring to the disclosed surveillance report associated with Stip‐

ulation 15, and thus there is no Brady issue. The trial transcript

supports this contention, and Hilliard offers no evidence to

call into question the government’s position. See United States

v. Brendia, 234 F.3d 1274, No. 00‐2178, 2000 WL 1716433, at *3

(7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion) (“A due process

standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would con‐

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No. 16‐1249 25

vert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue bur‐

den upon the district court.”) (citation omitted); United States

v. Morris, 957 F.2d 1391, 1402–03 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming de‐

nial of Brady request and refusing in camera inspection where

government asserted it had turned over all exculpatory mate‐

rial and defendants offered “nothing but pure conjecture or

speculation” that documents contained exculpatory infor‐

mation). We thus move on to Hilliard’s claim under Napue.

Napue stands for the proposition that prosecutors may not

suborn perjury, and holds that a defendant’s due‐process

rights are violated when the government obtains a conviction

through the knowing use of false testimony. See 360 U.S. at

269; United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 2009) (cit‐

ing United States v. Holt, 486 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Hilliard’s Napue claim fails for the reasons already discussed.

Any initial confusion in Agent Labno’s testimony was cleared

up through later questioning, and Labno’s responses ex‐

plained the limits of the report’s content. This neutralized any

specter of “false” testimony, and there was thus no need for

the government to clarify or disavow Labno’s statement—de‐

fense counsel had already done what arguably would have

been needed. Hilliard complains that although “[b]efore this

court the government’s brief makes clear that no other report

exists,” in front of the jury, it was not clear what report was

being discussed, and defense counsel could not question the

authoring agent or any other agent about the events at issue—

he was limited to cross‐examining Agent Labno on the basis

of Stipulation 15. Even so, Napue “does not require the gov‐

ernment ... to clear up any possible confusion when the wit‐

ness’s testimony was not perjurous.” Are, 590 F.3d at 509 (ci‐

tation omitted). Finally, it is again unlikely that the reference

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26 No. 16‐1249

to the report affected the judgment of the jury, as the govern‐

ment did notrely on this part of Labno’s testimony at trial and

the case against Hilliard based on other evidence was sub‐

stantial.

B. Jury Instructions on Entrapment

Hilliard also takes issue with a number of jury instructions

on the defense of entrapment. We review de novo the legal

correctness of jury instructions. E.g., United States v. Ye, 588

F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The district

court has discretion concerning the specific wording of in‐

structions so long as the final result, read as a whole, com‐

pletely and correctly states the law. United States v. Cote, 504

F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408

F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005)). If the instruction contains an er‐

ror or misguides the jury, we reverse a jury verdict only if the

error prejudiced the litigant. Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 379 (citation

omitted).  

1. Elements of Entrapment (Pattern Instruction 6.04)

“Entrapment is a defense to criminal liability when the de‐

fendant was not predisposed to commit the charged crime be‐

fore the intervention of the government’s agents and the gov‐

ernment’s conduct induced him to commit it.” United States v.

Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The two

elements of the defense—lack of predisposition and govern‐

ment inducement—are conceptually related but formally dis‐

tinct. Id. The instruction given on the elements of entrapment

read as follows:

With respect to Counts One through Nine, the

government has the burden of proving beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not

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No. 16‐1249 27

entrapped by the informant or law enforcement

officers. The government must prove either:

1. Law enforcement officers and their

agents did not induce the defendant

to commit the offense; or

2. The defendant was predisposed to

commit the offense before he had

contact with law enforcement officers

or their agents. If the defendant was

predisposed, then he was not en‐

trapped, even though law enforce‐

ment officers or their agents provided

a favorable opportunity to commit

the offense, made committing the of‐

fense easier, or participated in acts es‐

sential to the offense.  

At the instructions conference, Hilliard’s defense counsel

objected based on the difference between subsection 1 of the

instruction given and that of Seventh Circuit Pattern Instruc‐

tion § 6.04, which reads: “Law enforcement officers and their

agents did not persuade or otherwise induce ... .” Pattern Crimi‐

nal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 6.04 (2012) (em‐

phasis added). Hilliard points out on appeal that we used

both “induce” and “persuade” throughout our en banc opin‐

ion in Mayfield, in which we “clarif[ied] the doctrine [of en‐

trapment] both substantively and procedurally.” 771 F.3d at

420. Hilliard also notes that the Supreme Court likewise used

“persuade” in the “seminal” entrapment cases Sorrells v.

United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) and Sherman v. United States,

356 U.S. 369 (1958). Two additional instructions that were

given—one of which the parties both agreed on and the other

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28 No. 16‐1249

one of which defendant agreed to after a minor edit—further

defined the term “inducement.”

The government argued at the instructions conference and

maintains on appeal that Mayfield defined “inducement” in

such a way that retaining the word “persuade” from the pat‐

tern instruction would be inappropriate. Mayfield held in rel‐

evant part that inducement “means more than mere govern‐

ment solicitation of the crime; the fact that government agents

initiated contact with the defendant, suggested the crime, or

furnished the ordinary opportunity to commit it is insufficient

to show inducement.” 771 F.3d at 434; see also id. at 433

(“[S]omething more is required, either in terms of the charac‐

ter and degree of the government’s persistence or persuasion,

or the nature of the enticement or reward ... .”). Rather, “in‐

ducement means government solicitation of the crime plus

some other government conduct that creates a risk that a per‐

son who would not commit the crime if left to his own devices

will do so in response to the government’s efforts.” Id. at 434–

35. We then noted that the “other conduct” could include “re‐

peated attempts at persuasion, fraudulent representations, ...

coercive tactics, harassment,” etc. Id. at 435. Given Mayfield’s

explicit reference to persuasion as only one part of the re‐

quired showing for inducement, Hilliard’s proposed instruc‐

tion (that is, Pattern Instruction § 6.04) could have incorrectly

led the jury to believe a defendant could satisfy the induce‐

ment prong by showing mere persuasion. The district court

thus acted within its discretion in giving the instruction it did.

2. Government’s Good Faith

The court also gave the following non‐pattern instruction

proposed by the government:

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No. 16‐1249 29

The law does not require the government to

have a pre‐existing good faith basis for suspect‐

ing criminal activity before a government of‐

ficer may initiate an undercover investigation.

Hilliard’s defense counsel objected at the instructions confer‐

ence that this instruction was unnecessary to the defense of

entrapment, as “whether or not [the government] had a

preexisting good‐faith basis for suspecting criminal history

has nothing to do with [Hilliard’s] predisposition,” or “in‐

ducement.” Counsel contended that including this irrelevant

instruction could confuse the jury. On appeal, Hilliard again

argues that this non‐pattern instruction was irrelevant and

“served only to provide a gratuitous imprimatur to the gov‐

ernment’s conduct on a matter not in issue.”

The government responds that a key defense argument

was that Hilliard had not been engaged in dealing drugs prior

to being approached by Romano. Thus, the government ar‐

gues, the instruction was helpful in case the jury was confused

about whether predisposition required an inquiry into what

the “agents did know and didn’t know” about Hilliard’s

pre‐sting activities at the time the operation had begun. With‐

out this instruction, which accurately states the law, see, e.g.,

United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1989), the

jury could have mistakenly perceived the government’s initi‐

ation of the operation, without knowledge of prior or ongoing

drug dealing by Hilliard, as evidence of alleged inducement

or entrapment. As such, the district court acted within its dis‐

cretion in including this instruction; and given the numerous

other instructions provided regarding the two elements, there

was little possibility of prejudice to Hilliard stemming from

this particular instruction’s inclusion.

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30 No. 16‐1249

3. Definition of Predisposition

The government and Hilliard each submitted a proposed

instruction defining “predisposition” based on Mayfield. The

government’s proposed instruction, which the court ulti‐

mately adopted, read, “A defendant is predisposed to commit

the charged crime if he was ready and willing to do so and

likely would have committed it without the government’s in‐

tervention, or actively wanted to but hadn’t yet found the

means.”

Hilliard’s proposed instruction consisted of the complete,

verbatim holding in Mayfield on the definition of predisposi‐

tion:  

A defendant is predisposed to commit the

charged crime if he was ready and willing to do

so and likely would have committed it without

the government’s intervention, or actively

wanted to but hadn’t yet found the means. The

defendant’s predisposition is measured at the

time the government first proposed the crime,

but the nature and degree of the government’s

inducement and the defendant’s responses to it

are relevant to the determination of predisposi‐

tion. A prior conviction for a similar offense is

relevant but not conclusive evidence of predis‐

position; a defendant with a criminal record can

be entrapped.

However, the district court found that the defense’s proposed

instruction was unnecessary, because the first two sentences

were already included in the government’s proposed instruc‐

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No. 16‐1249 31

tions and the third sentence was ultimately made into an in‐

dependent instruction. Defense counsel expressed a prefer‐

ence to read all of the above as one instruction, but the district

court explained, “[T]he reason I like [the government’s break‐

down of the definition], is it’s a kind of foreign concept, en‐

trapment, and because I’m turning pages while I’m doing

this, ... I think what it does is it gives emphasis to three theo‐

ries for three aspects of the way we look at entrapment and

does it in a way that might be lost if it’s in one instruction.”

Given this explanation of the district court’s choice of organi‐

zation, as well as the fact that the jury did ultimately hear all

three sentences from the defense’s proposed instruction,

which together accurately stated the law, the district court

acted well within its discretion in giving the instruction it did.

4. Factors to Consider With Respect to Predisposition or

Entrapment

Lastly, both the government and Hilliard submitted pro‐

posed instructions on the factors to be considered in evaluat‐

ing Hilliard’s defense. Hilliard asked that the court give the

pattern instruction listing factors relating to entrapment as a

whole, whereas the government proposed a shorter list of fac‐

tors for predisposition based on Mayfield. The district court

ultimately gave the latter instruction, which read:

Some factors you may consider in deciding

whether the defendant was predisposed in‐

clude:

(1) the defendant’s character or reputa‐

tion;

(2) whether the government initially

suggested the criminal activity;

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32 No. 16‐1249

(3) whether the defendant engaged in

the criminal activity for profit;

(4) whether the defendant evidenced a

reluctance to commit the offense that

was overcome by government per‐

suasion; and

(5) the nature of the inducement or per‐

suasion by the government.

No one factor controls and you may consider

other factors. However, the most significant fac‐

tor you should consider is whether the defend‐

ant was reluctant to commit the offense.

In contrast, the pattern instruction on entrapment included as

a factor “[w]hether the defendant was reluctant to engage in

criminal activity,” and also stated, “It is up to you [the jury]

to determine the weight to be given to any of these factors and

any others that you consider.” Pattern Criminal Jury Instruc‐

tions of the Seventh Circuit § 6.05. Hilliard argues that the

given instruction diverged from the pertinent pattern, which

Mayfield never suggested was wrong, and confused the jury

by elevating the reluctance factor over all others.

The government responds that the pattern instruction pre‐

dates Mayfield, which clarified which factors apply to induce‐

ment, which ones apply to predisposition, and which may ap‐

ply to both. The instruction given lays out verbatim the lan‐

guage from Mayfield for determining predisposition, includ‐

ing the language stating that the most significant factor is

whether the defendant was reluctant to commit the offense.

See 771 F.3d at 435 (citation omitted). Mayfield went on to pro‐

vide the aforementioned “legal definition of predisposition,”

so that jurors would know what to look for when weighing

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No. 16‐1249 33

the above factors, id.; but consideration of the five factors

listed remains the law. Here, it seems the district court did just

as Mayfield recommended: It provided the definition of pre‐

disposition and the factors to be considered in evaluating Hil‐

liard’s defense.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Hilliard’s conviction

and sentence.

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