Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04647/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04647-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lanny Benjamin Bodkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4647

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LANNY BENJAMIN BODKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 06-4652

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANTHOINE PLUNKETT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Danville. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge.

(4:04-cr-70083-1; 4:04-cr-70083-GEC)

Argued: December 7, 2007 Decided: April 18, 2008

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Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD,

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Rhonda Lee Overstreet, LUMSDEN & OVERSTREET, Roanoke,

Virginia; Clifford Lee Harrison, HARRISON & TURK, P.C., Radford,

Virginia, for Appellants. Thomas Ernest Booth, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

William H. Cleaveland, Roanoke, Virginia; James C. Turk, Jr.,

HARRISON & TURK, P.C., Radford, Virginia, for Appellant Lanny

Benjamin Bodkins. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Craig

J. Jacobsen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Anthoine Plunkett was accused of hiring Lanny Bodkins and

Keith Taylor to murder Tyree Wimbush. Following a six-day jury

trial, Plunkett and Bodkins (collectively, Appellants) were

convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce to commit

murder for pecuniary gain and interstate travel to commit murder

for pecuniary gain (Counts I and II); conspiracy to travel in

interstate commerce to commit interstate stalking (Count III);

travel in interstate commerce to commit interstate stalking (Count

IV); and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of

violence that resulted in death (Count V).

Prior to trial, the Attorney General authorized the death

penalty for Appellants, but withdrew the authorization before

sentencing. Appellants were each sentenced to life.

Plunkett made post-trial motions concerning the sufficiency of

the evidence and alleged Brady violations; and Bodkins filed a

motion asserting that the district court should find that he was

entitled to relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The trial

court denied each of these motions. This appeal followed. For the

reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Plunkett, a black drug dealer, hired Bodkins and Keith Taylor,

two white men, to murder Tyree Wimbush, because Plunkett mistakenly

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thought that Wimbush was a confidential informant for local drug

investigators. Each of these individuals used and sold drugs.

On July 22, 1999, Bodkins and Taylor drove from Johnson City,

Tennessee, to Danville, Virginia, to kill Wimbush. Bodkins shot

Wimbush three times, killing him with a wound to the aortic artery.

Just before he fell to the ground, Witness James Lewis Fitts heard

Wimbush say that he had been hit or shot. 

The procedural history, as detailed by the district court, is

as follows: 

Lanny Benjamin Bodkins, Anthoine Plunkett, and Darel

Keith Taylor were indicted by a grand jury on February

17, 2005, and charged with: conspiracy to travel in

interstate commerce with the intent to commit murder for

pecuniary gain; travel in interstate commerce with the

intent to commit murder for pecuniary gain, aiding and

abetting; conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce

with the intent to commit interstate stalking; travel in

interstate commerce with the intent to commit interstate

stalking, aiding and abetting; and use of a firearm

during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting

in death, aiding and abetting. The United States filed

Notices of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty as to Bodkins

and Plunkett on February 17, 2005.

Taylor had confessed to involvement in the murder of

Tyree Wimbush in September of 2002, during investigation

of the murder, and had entered into a plea agreement with

the government. Pursuant to that agreement, he pled

guilty to two counts of the indictment; conspiracy to

travel in interstate commerce with the intent to commit

murder for pecuniary gain (Count One), and use of a

firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence

resulting in death, aiding and abetting (Count Five).

Before the trial began, counsel for the government gave

counsel for Plunkett a tape and transcript of a statement

given by Taylor on September 19, 2002. This was the only

statement from Taylor provided to counsel for Plunkett.

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In the weeks prior to trial of the remaining

defendants, the parties engaged in limited plea

discussions. On August 12,2005, Bodkins made a proffer

to the government that yielded information that was

substantial to the government's case. Prior to the

proffer, Assistant United States Attorney Craig J.

Jacobsen told Bodkins that Bodkins would have two options

in regards to going to trial. Bodkins could either

choose to testify at trial on his own behalf or choose

not to testify at all. Jacobsen told Bodkins that he

thought if Bodkins told the jury the truth, it was his

opinion that the jury would have a much more difficult

time imposing the death penalty. At the proffer, Bodkins

gave the government attorneys information concerning a

Tennessee telephone number. The number, which Bodkins

had originally said was his girlfriend's, received a call

from Plunkett's mother's telephone card at 2:47 a.m. on

July 23, 1999, several hours after the Wimbush murder.

As a result of the information, the government renewed

attempts to obtain the records for that telephone number,

and questioned Taylor about the number. The information

provided by Bodkins was very useful to the government in

the prosecution of the case. The telephone records were

given to Plunkett's attorneys in advance of trial, but

Plunkett was not informed of the proffer given by Bodkins

prior to trial.

Bodkins was offered a plea agreement on August 14,

2005. The terms of the agreement provided that United

States Attorney John Brownlee would recommend to the

Department of Justice that Bodkins would receive a life

sentence without the possibility of parole, if Bodkins

would plead guilty and testify for the government at

trial. Bodkins rejected the plea offer.

The trial began on August 15, 2005. Pursuant to his

plea agreement, Taylor testified at trial. At the start

of trial, both Plunkett and Bodkins were unavailable to

be called as witnesses by the United States. During the

trial, Bodkins advised the court that he would be

available to be called as a witness. Plunkett was still

not informed that Bodkins had been offered a plea

agreement, however. Bodkins later took the stand on his

own behalf, and testified in conformity with the

government's theory of the case. On September 2, 2005,

Bodkins and Plunkett were convicted by a jury on all

counts of the indictment. The evidence at trial

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established that Plunkett hired Bodkins and Taylor to

murder Tyree Wimbush. 

During the penalty phase of the trial, the

government moved to withdraw the death notices as to both

defendants Bodkins and Plunkett. The court granted this

motion. Bodkins and Plunkett now stand convicted of three

capital offenses which are punishable only by life

imprisonment without possibility of release and two

offenses which are punishable by a term of years up to

life imprisonment without possibility of release.

Taylor was sentenced on December 12, 2005. The

court granted the government's motion for a downward

departure for substantial assistance, sentencing Taylor

to 180 months of incarceration on Count One and 120

months of incarceration on Count Five, to run

consecutively. 

After the trial, Bodkins filed a Motion for

Presentencing Relief, alleging that the United States

breached an implied pretrial agreement with Bodkins to

give him the same bargain as Taylor if he made a proffer

of substantial information. Bodkins sought enforcement

of the alleged agreement. The motion was denied by this

court on April 27, 2006.

Defendant Plunkett filed a motion for new trial

based on undisclosed Brady material ("First Brady

Motion") on November 11,2005, alleging that certain

statements made by defendant Taylor were not disclosed to

the defendant prior to trial. Plunkett filed another

motion based on undisclosed Brady material on January

6,2006 ("Third Brady Motion"), seeking a new trial

because he had not been informed of Bodkins' negotiations

with the government prior to his testimony. A hearing on

the motions was held on April 28, 2006.

(J.A. 1939-42) (footnote omitted).

II.

Plunkett argues that the district court erred in finding that

the evidence presented at trial supported his convictions. To

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determine if there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction,

we consider whether, taking the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, substantial evidence supports the

jury’s verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)

(“The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial

evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to

support it.”). 

Substantial evidence is defined as “that evidence which ‘a

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient

to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir.

2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.

1996)). We review both the direct and circumstantial evidence and

accord “the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences

from the facts proven to those sought to be established.” United

States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982) (citation

omitted).

When reviewing claims of sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he

relevant question is not whether the appellate court is convinced

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any

rational trier of facts could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tresvant, 677 F.2d at 1021 (citations

omitted). 

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Concerning Counts One and Two, 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) provides,

in relevant part, that 

[w]hoever travels in or causes another . . . to travel in

interstate . . . commerce . . . with intent that a murder

be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the

United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as

consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything

of pecuniary value, or who conspires to do so, shall be

fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).

Plunkett maintains that certain of the government’s evidence

is inconsistent with other evidence that the government presented,

(Appellants’ Brief 27-29), but that “Defense witnesses offered

testimony free of bias and inconsistency.” (Appellant Brief 29.)

We first note that it is not the duty of this Court to weigh

the evidence and to resolve inconsistences. That, instead, is the

province of the trier of fact. In fact, from our review of the

record, it appears that is exactly what the jury was called upon to

do. 

Moreover, and as observed by the government, the

inconsistencies cited by Plunkett are insignificant. (Appellee’s

Brief 12.) As such, we see no need to detail each one here.

Simply stated, “Taylor’s testimony that Plunkett hired him and

Bodkins to kill Wimbush, Bodkins and Plunkett’s pretrial

admissions, Plunkett and Taylor’s incriminating phone records, and

the eyewitnesses to Wimbush’s murder amply established Plunkett’s

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guilt on [Counts One and Two].” (Appellee’s Brief 11-12.)

Accordingly, we will affirm the district court on this issue.

Counts Three, Four, and Five pertain to the interstate

stalking crimes for which Plunkett was charged. To establish the

crime of interstate stalking, the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant traveled in interstate

commerce; (2) such interstate travel was with intent to injure or

harass the victim; and (3) during or after such travel, the

defendant committed an act of placing the victim in reasonable fear

of death or serious bodily injury. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A; United

States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 493-94 (4th Cir. 2003). 

Plunkett contends that the third element of the offense is not

met. According to Plunkett, 

[t]here is no evidence of a pattern of intimidation or

threats from Plunkett to Wimbush. Evidence established

that Wimbush and Plunkett were friendly acquaintances for

a significant period. The evidence establishes that

Wimbush voluntarily approached the vehicle on the night

of July 22 to conduct a drug deal. If Wimbush had in

fact been in fear for his life, he would not have

approached the vehicle in such a manner.

(Appellants’ Brief 32.) We find these arguments to be unavailing.

The fear element of § 2261A requires only that, for some

period of time, the victim was placed in reasonable fear of death

or serious bodily injury. Wills, 346 F.3d at 494. Whether there

was a pattern of intimidation or a friendly relationship between

the defendant and the victim is of no moment. The fact that

Wimbush freely approached the vehicle is equally inconsequential.

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 At trial, Witness Fitts testified as follows:

Q. When you heard the shots, did you hear [Wimbush] say

anything?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did he say?

A. “I been” -- “I been hit” or “I been shot” or

something like that.

Q. And then after he was shot, what did he do?

A. He just, like, grabbed to where he was shot at and,

like, stood there for a second and then fell over

to the curb.

(J.A. 94.) We are of the opinion that Wimbush’s statement that he

had been shot establishes that he was placed in reasonable fear of

death or serious bodily injury, See Wills, 346 F.3d at 494, albeit

for a very short period of time. Therefore, we will affirm the

district court on this issue as well. 

 

III.

Plunkett next contends that the district court erred in

refusing to grant a new trial on the basis that the government

violated Plunkett’s due process rights by neglecting to divulge one

of its witness’ prior inconsistent statements until midway through

the trial. We review the court’s refusal to grant a new trial for

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Huggins, 191 F.3d 532,

536 (4th Cir. 1999).

A Brady violation occurs when the government fails to disclose

prior to trial “evidence favorable to an accused . . . where the

evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the

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good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This Court has found that the evidence is

favorable if (1) it would exculpate the accused or (2) it could be

employed to impeach a government witness. United States v. Ellis,

121 F.3d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bagley, 473

U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Nevertheless, no due process violation

occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in

time for its effective use at trial. United States v. Smith

Grading and Paving, Inc. 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing

United States v. Higgs,,713 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir. 1983).

Materiality is the final limitation that circumscribes

the prosecutor's duty under Brady to disclose information

favorable to the defense. The touchstone of materiality

is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have

affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, an

individual alleging a Brady violation must demonstrate

that there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

 Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 559 (4th Cir. 1999)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In the instant case, Plunkett maintains that Taylor’s

September 19, 2002, confession was an inconsistent statement that

the government should have made available to him prior to trial.

At trial, Taylor acknowledged that he was not completely candid

with investigators initially in that he attempted to minimize his

role in Wimbush’s murder. 

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At first blush, it may appear that Plunkett has established a

Brady violation. There can be no credible argument against the

assertion that Taylor’s prior statements were favorable to Plunkett

and that they were not disclosed to him until just before the trial

commenced. Moreover, because Taylor’s initial statement was

inconsistent with his testimony at trial, Plunkett could use the

inconsistencies to impeach Taylor’s credibility. It is our

materiality analysis, however, that exposes the fatal flaw in

Plunkett’s Brady claim. 

After our exhaustive review of the record, we are convinced

that Taylor’s September 19, 2002, statements were not material.

Stated differently, we are unable to find “that there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Id.

Pursuant to our examination, we observe that Taylor’s

inconsistent statements were made known at trial. Accordingly,

counsel for Plunkett was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine

Taylor about his prior inconsistent statements. We are thus unable

to fathom how the outcome of the trial might have been different

had Plunkett possessed the prior inconsistent statements earlier.

As noted by the government, any suggestion by Plunkett “that he

would have conducted a better cross-examination had Taylor’s

pretrial statement been disclosed before trial does not establish

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prejudice.” (Appellee’s Brief 17.) Accordingly, we will affirm

the trial court on this issue. 

IV.

Plunkett also maintains that the district court erred in not

granting a new trial on the basis that the government allegedly

knew that it was educing false testimony in its cross-examination

of Bodkins. More specifically, Plunkett alleges that the

government misled the jury in that Bodkins’ testimony inaccurately

led the jury to believe that Bodkins was testifying solely for the

purposes of doing the right thing and bringing comfort to the

Wimbush family. As already noted, the district court’s refusal to

grant a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Huggins, 191 F.3d at 536. 

 As stated above, for purposes of determining whether there is

a Brady violation, we have found that the evidence is favorable if

(1) it would exculpate the accused or (2) it could be employed to

impeach a government witness. Ellis, 121 F.3d at 914; Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682. Moreover, it is well settled that an agreement or

understanding between a government witness regarding future

prosecution should be made known to the jury because such agreement

or understanding goes to the credibility of that witness. Giglio

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). 

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It is indisputable that the agreement between the government

and Bodkins was “favorable” to Plunkett whereas it could be used to

impeach Bodkins and bring into question his credibility.

Nevertheless, Bodkins was not a government witness. Instead, he

testified on his own behalf. Accordingly, Giglio does not require

that the government disclose its plea negotiations with him.

Plunkett, however, argues that it is inconsequential whether

Bodkins was a government witness or a witness testifying on his own

behalf. Nevertheless, he has not set forth and we have not found

any controlling authority to sustain his contention. We must

therefore reject this argument.

Moreover, contrary to Plunkett’s suggestion to the contrary,

we are unable to find that “there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Spicer, 194 F.3d at 559.

Stated differently we do not think that the evidence concerning

Bodkins’ negotiations with the government was material. Therefore,

because a Brady violation occurs only when the government fails to

disclose favorable material evidence, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, we can

find no Brady violation here. 

Plunkett also contends that the government’s failure to

disclose its plea negotiations with Bodkins is violative of the

principles set forth in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). To

establish a constitutional violation under Napue, Plunkett must

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prove that (1) Bodkins testified falsely, (2) the government was

aware that Bodkins’ testimony was false, and (3) Bodkins’ testimony

was material. See United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 828 (5th

Cir. 2002). 

From our examination of Bodkins’ testimony, we are unable to

find that he testified falsely. Although the government offered

Bodkins a plea agreement for a term of life, he rejected the

agreement. He hoped to obtain an offer for a term of years.

Further, the jury was informed of the government and Bodkins’

negotiations as well as Bodkins’ desire that the government would

file a motion for substantial assistance on his behalf. Hence, the

jury was afforded this information on which they could judge

Bodkins’ credibility.

Finally, and as we have already observed, this evidence was

not material for the reason that there is no reasonable likelihood

that the jury verdict would have been different had it been made

known to Plunkett earlier. Therefore, we find no reversible error

here.

V.

Bodkins claims that the district court erred in not holding

that the government’s failure to file a motion pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e) violated the terms of its proffer letter to

Bodkins. Bodkins also asserts that the district court was in error

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in not finding that the government’s failure to make the § 3553(e)

motion was based on Bodkins’ race. 

“We review a district court’s findings regarding what the

parties said or did for clear error, while principles of contract

interpretation applied to the facts are reviewed de novo.” United

States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). As to whether the government

intentionally discriminated against a defendant on the basis of

race, we review this issue for clear error. United States v. Lane,

866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1989). 

Section 3553(e) of Title 18 of the United States Code

provides, in relevant part, that “[u]pon motion of the Government,

the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a

level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect

a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or

prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” 18

U.S.C.A. § 3553(e).

The government is allowed to refuse to make a substantial

assistance motion except (1) for an unconstitutional motive such a

race or religion or (2) where refusal is not rationally related to

a legitimate government objective. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S.

181, 185 (1992). 

The district court found that the government’s reference to

the races of the defendants amounted to “purely tactical

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considerations for trial.” (J.A. 1775.) The court also noted that

Bodkins and Plunkett had “differing situations” and that the

government ultimately offered Bodkins a plea agreement for a life

term that he rejected. (J.A. 1775.) According to the trial court,

there was no “meeting of the minds.” (J.A. 1776.)

Bodkins claims that the trial court erred in deciding that the

government’s refusal to file or to consider filing a § 3553(e)

motion was not violative of the terms of his proffer letter. This

assertion is simply incorrect.

The letter provided that the government, “acting in [its] sole

discretion will determine whether to enter into a plea agreement

with you,” and that the “proffer in no way binds the United States

Attorney, nor does it constitute substantial assistance under the

provisions of Sentencing Guideline 5K1.1 and Title 18, United

States Code, Section 3553(e).” (J.A. 1292.) Therefore,

considering that this letter grants sole discretion to the

government to make a substantial assistance determination, we

cannot find that the government violated the terms of the proffer

letter by not filing a § 3553(e) motion. Bodkins’ claims of fraud

and bad faith are also unpersuasive. 

Bodkins’ argument that the trial court erred in not finding

that the government racially discriminated against him in filing a

§ 3553 motion is equally unavailing. To prevail on this claim,

Bodkins must show that similarly situated individuals of a

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different race were treated differently. United States v.

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). This he cannot do. 

Bodkins and Plunkett were not similarly situated. Bodkins was

the one who (1) had actually shot and killed Wimbush, (2) had been

convicted for robbery shortly after he killed Wimbush, (3) had

shown no remorse for killing Wimbush, and (4) had attempted to get

people to provide for him a false alibi in the case. (J.A. 1392-

93.) Moreover, his criminal history was much more extensive than

that of Plunkett. Thus, it was not error for the district court to

determine that the government’s decision to offer Plunkett a more

favorable plea agreement than Bodkins was based on strategic

reasons alone, and not race. Therefore, we will affirm the

district court on this issue.

VI.

We have considered the remaining contentions set forth by

Appellants, including those contained in Plunkett’s supplemental

brief, but find them to be without merit.

VII.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion and rationale,

the judgment of the district court is hereby

AFFIRMED.

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