Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00086/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00086-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniyar Tuyakbayev
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DANIYAR TUYAKBAYEV, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Case No. 15-cr-00086-RS-1 

ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING MOTION 

TO SUPPRESS AND REQUEST FOR 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Defendant-appellant Daniyar Tuyakbayev appeals a Magistrate Judge’s denial of his 

motion to suppress evidence and request for an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, 

the Magistrate Judge’s order is affirmed. 

II. BACKGROUND 

On the night of January 18, 2015, Tuyakbayev was driving his 2014 Ford Mustang through 

the Presidio of San Francisco when he was stopped by United States Park Police Officer Eric 

Cole. Cole was outside of his parked car talking to a citizen when he heard a loud engine. He saw 

Tuyakbayev’s Mustang approaching, and estimated it was travelling 50 miles per hour, 20 miles 

per hour faster than the posted 30 miles per hour speed limit. He also noticed the Mustang was 

not displaying a front license plate, but he did not observe the back of the vehicle, which displayed 

a California license plate. Cole commanded the car to stop, and as he approached the driver’s 

window he smelled alcohol. The driver, Tuyakbayev, failed a field sobriety test and registered a 

blood alcohol content between 0.141% and .168% on subsequent breathalyzer tests. 

 On February 10, 2015, the government filed a two-count Information charging 

Tuyakbayev with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of 36 

C.F.R. § 1004.23(a)(1), and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 0.08% or 

Case 3:15-cr-00086-MEJ Document 56 Filed 01/03/17 Page 1 of 6
ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER

CASE NO. 15-cr-00086-RS-1

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greater in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 1004.23(a)(2). On June 12, 2015, Tuyakbayev filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, challenging Cole’s basis for the stop and 

requesting an evidentiary hearing. Tuyakbayev argued the government produced no evidence of 

reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, and indicated he would file a reply brief to challenge 

whatever evidence the government identified in response. The government opposed the motion, 

arguing Cole’s observation of Tuyakbayev’s speed and Tuyakbayev’s failure to display a front 

license plate created reasonable suspicion for Cole to make the stop. The government included 

with the response a declaration by Cole attesting to, among other things, his experience with 

license plate display and his ability to estimate visually the speed of a moving car: 

I have made over one thousand traffic stops. In addition, I regularly conduct traffic 

enforcement and scrutinize vehicles for evidence of lawful registration while I am 

on patrol. In my experience, passenger vehicles like the kind driven by Defendant 

on January 18, 2015 that are registered in California are issued two license plates 

by the California Department of Motor Vehicles. I have never encountered a noncommercial sedan or coupe that was issued only one license plate by the California 

Department of Motor Vehicles. 

. . . 

I have been trained and certified to operate motor vehicle speed-measuring 

equipment including laser-based and radar-based devices. As part of that 

certification process, I was trained to accurately visually estimate the speed of a 

moving vehicle. Prior to being certified, I was required to accurately visually 

estimate within five miles per hour the speed of vehicles moving at various speeds, 

including speeds between 20 and 80 miles per hour. 

Cole Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. In reply, Tuyakbayev argued Cole’s observation of his speed did not provide 

reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop, and sought an evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed 

fact of the speed at which he was driving, which he attempted to draw into doubt with his own 

declaration attesting he was aware of the 30 mile per hour speed limit and had been driving 30 

miles per hour and no faster at the time of the stop. Tuyakbayev also argued a missing front plate 

did not create reasonable suspicion because “when only one license plate is issued for use upon a 

vehicle, it shall be attached to the rear thereof.” Cal. Veh. Code § 5200(b).

 The Magistrate Judge denied the motion to suppress, holding that the absence of a front 

plate and Cole’s visual observation of Tuyakbayev’s speed established reasonable suspicion for 

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Cole to initiate the stop. In so doing, the Magistrate Judge also denied Tuyakbayev’s request for 

an evidentiary hearing, holding Tuyakbayev’s declaration did not create a disputed issue of fact 

because it contained no statements supporting the claim he was not speeding. The parties then 

agreed to a stipulated-facts bench trial, and on December 15, 2015, the Magistrate Judge found 

Tuyakbayev guilty on both counts. On June 2, 2016, the Magistrate Judge sentenced Tuyakbayev 

to three years of probation on each count, with the terms to run concurrently. Tuyakbayev now 

appeals, challenging the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion to suppress and request for an 

evidentiary hearing. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusions, including the lawfulness of a search or seizure, 

are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005); Quinn 

v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir. 1986). The Magistrate Judge’s decision whether or not to 

grant an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Howell, 231 

F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000). “An abuse of discretion is a plain error, discretion exercised to an 

end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

as are found.” Rabkin v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

 In addition to disputing whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held regarding 

Cole’s observation of Tuyakbayev’s speed and whether Tuyakbayev’s failure to display a front 

license plate justified the stop, the parties dispute the legal standard for deeming a traffic stop 

justified. 

A. Justification for a Traffic Stop 

The Magistrate Judge evaluated Cole’s stop of Tuyakbayev under the “reasonable 

suspicion” standard. This is the correct standard for traffic stops. See United States v. Choudhry, 

461 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, Tuyakbayev contends “reasonable 

suspicion” applies only to so-called investigative stops, whereas other stops ― like for speeding 

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― require probable cause, a more demanding standard.1 Tuyakbayev constructs this argument by 

seizing on the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable 

suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.” United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 

1101, 1105 (2000) (emphasis added). According to Tuyakbayev, some stops, like his, are not 

investigative in nature because an officer will witness a traffic violation in its entirety and will 

have no need to investigate to confirm or deny her suspicions that a violation occurred. 

Tuyakbayev offers no direct support for this distinction; he instead produces it by comparing 

Lopez-Soto to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding a stop was reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment because the officer making the stop had probable cause to believe a 

traffic violation had occurred). 

 Of course, Lopez-Soto analyzed Whren extensively in concluding reasonable suspicion 

could justify a traffic stop; it could have drawn this distinction, but it did not. See 205 F.3d at 

1104-05. Lopez-Soto includes language indicating its holding applied to all traffic stops, 

implicitly making the point that an investigative stop is synonymous with a traffic stop: “[No] 

cases suggest[] that probable cause is the minimum threshold for constitutionally permissible 

police action in making a traffic stop. In fact, some circuits have explicitly held, post-Whren, that 

reasonable suspicion is all the Fourth Amendment requires.” Id. at 1104 (emphasis added) 

(citations omitted). In addition to these authorities, common experience demonstrates traffic stops 

are investigative stops. After making a stop, an officer communicates with the driver in order to 

investigate if there is an explanation for the suspected violation, whether good (like an emergency) 

or bad (like intoxication). Otherwise, an officer would initiate a stop, stay in her car writing a 

ticket, get out of her car, silently hand the ticket to the driver, and return to her car and drive off. 

 

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 According to the government, Tuyakbayev waived this argument by failing to raise it before the 

Magistrate Judge, and by affirmatively representing reasonable suspicion was the proper standard 

to apply. Tuyakbayev argues, among other things, the rule of waiver should not preclude him 

from raising this argument because it is “discretionary, not jurisdictional.” Davis v. Elec. Arts 

Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Ultimately, whether Tuyakbayev waived this argument is immaterial because the argument fails 

on its merits. 

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This is not how traffic stops transpire. Accordingly, a traffic stop, like Cole’s stop of Tuyakbayev, 

is an investigate stop, sufficiently justified by reasonable suspicion. See Choudhry, 461 F.3d at 

1100 n.2 (“In Lopez-Soto, we considered and rejected the argument that Whren altered the 

standard for traffic stops from “reasonable suspicion” to “probable cause.”). 

B. Evidentiary Hearing 

 An evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress must be held “when the moving papers 

allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to 

conclude” that “a significant disputed factual issue exists such that a hearing is required.” United 

States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 318 (9th Cir. 1995). “[W]hether an evidentiary 

hearing is appropriate rests on the reasoned discretion” of the Magistrate Judge. United States v. 

Santora, 600 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1979), amended on other grounds by 609 F.2d 433. An 

evidentiary hearing “is not required on a motion to suppress if the grounds for suppression consist 

solely of conclusory allegations of” an illegal search. United States v. Ramirez-Garcia, 269 F.3d 

945, 947 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Tuyakbayev claims he was not speeding on the night of January 18, 2015, and thus argues 

the existence of a factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing so that he could challenge 

Cole’s ability to estimate visually the speed of a moving vehicle. In his motion to suppress papers, 

however, he never made this argument ― he simply claimed he was not speeding and that 

therefore there was a disputed issue of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. See Mot. to Suppress 

Reply at 8 (“To the contrary, Daniyar Tuyakbayev states that he was not speeding . . . . Because 

Mr. Tuyakbayev was not speeding that evening, Ofc. Cole was not justified in stopping him, and 

an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this significant disputed fact.”); Order Denying Mot. 

to Suppress at 9-10 (“Defendant does not challenge Officer Cole’s testimony that he was trained to 

visually estimate the speed of moving vehicles, nor does Defendant allege that Officer Cole was 

unable to accurately determine his vehicle’s distance.”). Thus, Tuyakbayev did not “allege facts 

with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable” the Magistrate Judge to conclude a 

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“significant disputed factual issue exist[ed],” Howell, 231 F.3d at 620-21, and the Magistrate 

Judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. See 

Ramirez-Garcia, 269 F.3d at 947 (holding conclusory allegations of an illegal search do not 

necessitate an evidentiary hearing). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded Cole’s 

estimate that Tuyakbayev was driving 20 miles per hour over the speed limit amounted to 

reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. See United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th 

Cir. 2011) (“It’s long been the case that an officer’s visual estimation can supply probable cause to 

support a traffic stop for speeding in appropriate circumstances.”); cf. United States v. Sowards, 

690 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (“Thus, where an officer estimates that a 

vehicle is traveling in significant excess of the legal speed limit, the speed differential — i.e., the 

percentage difference between the estimated speed and the legal speed limit — may itself provide 

sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ to support an officer’s probable cause determination.”).

C. Missing Front License Plate 

Tuyakbayev also argues his failure to display a front license plate did not give Cole 

reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. Because the parties dispute whether Tuyakbayev has 

waived certain aspects of this argument, and because Cole’s visual estimate Tuyakbayev was 

driving 20 miles per hour over the speed limit independently created reasonable suspicion, see 

supra Part IV.B, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to address this argument. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Magistrate Judge denying the motion to 

suppress and the request for an evidentiary hearing is affirmed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 3, 2017 

______________________________________ 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

United States District Judge 

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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