Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01336/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01336-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Traction Wholesale Center Co., Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2000 Decided June 30, 2000

No. 99-1336

Traction Wholesale Center Co., Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Terrence J. Nolan argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Christopher H. Mills.

Rachel I. Gartner, Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were

Leonard R. Page, General Counsel, Linda Sher, Associate

General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate

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General Counsel, Peter Winkler, Supervisory Attorney, and

Jill A. Griffin, Attorney.

Before: Randolph, Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Concurring statement filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Petitioner challenges the National

Labor Relations Board's determination that it committed

unfair labor practices in response to a union organizing

campaign. Petitioner also challenges the Board's imposition

of a bargaining order. Because we conclude that the Board's

unfair labor practice determinations are supported by substantial evidence and that the Board adequately explained the

need for the bargaining order, we deny the petition for review

of those issues and grant the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.

I

Petitioner Traction Wholesale Center Company, Inc., a

wholesale tire distributor, buys tires and wheels from manufacturers and larger distributors, reselling them to tire retailers and gas stations. Operating out of four warehouses--two

in New Jersey and one each in Delaware and Philadelphia--

Traction employed approximately thirty-six people at the time

of the events that gave rise to this case. Traction Wholesale

Ctr. Co., Inc., 328 NLRB No. 148, 1999 WL 1186753 at *10

(July 28, 1999). The unfair labor practices at issue occurred

when Traction learned that a union had garnered support

from a majority of its employees. As determined by an

administrative law judge, the relevant facts are as follows.

In March 1997, several Traction employees approached

Charles Schiavone, one of the company's Philadelphia drivers,

"seeking guidance on how to form a union." Id. at *10. A

seven-year Traction veteran, Schiavone contacted and met

with the Teamsters Union, Local No. 115, about organizing

warehouse employees and drivers working in the company's

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four warehouses. At the end of that meeting, Schiavone

signed a union authorization card designating the union as his

"chosen representative in all matters pertaining to wages,

hours, and working conditions." Id. He also took blank

authorization cards to distribute to Traction drivers and

warehousemen. During the next month, Schiavone kept the

union apprized of his organizing efforts. By April 14, the

union had received signed authorization cards from eleven of

Traction's twenty drivers and warehousemen. Id. at *11.

Armed with the eleven authorization cards, two union representatives went to the Philadelphia warehouse on April 15

to ask Traction to recognize the union. There they met with

the on-site manager, Scott Adams, and showed him the

signed authorization cards. Id. at *11. When Adams told

the union representatives that he had no authority to recognize the union, they asked him to deliver a letter to Traction's

owners, Joseph O'Donnell and Jeffrey Cohen, in which the

union demanded recognition. Id. at *12.

Immediately after the union representatives left, Adams

summoned Schiavone to his office, telling him that he was

upset that Schiavone had not told him about the union

organizing effort and demanding to know who had started it.

Id. at *15, 22. Adams warned that Traction would either

close the warehouse or subcontract for delivery services if the

union campaign succeeded. Id. at *15. If Schiavone "wanted

to be a union thug like other union supporters who destroy

other people's property," Adams said, "then go right on

ahead." Adams then told Schiavone to "get the fuck out of

here." Id. When Schiavone called Adams the next morning

asking whether he should return to work, Adams told him

that he had been fired. Id.

On the same day that the union representatives met with

Adams and showed him the eleven signed cards, Adams

asked Kevin Tryon, another Philadelphia driver, whether he

had signed an authorization card. Id. at *16, 23. When

Tryon, who in fact had signed a card, answered no, Adams

revealed that he had seen Tryon's signature on a card. Id. at

*16. Later that evening, Adams told Tryon that Traction

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would "rather pay niggers $5.00 an hour" than work with the

union. Id. He also told Tryon that Traction was "not afraid

to close down, if that's what it takes." Id.

That same day, Adams announced two policy changes for

the Philadelphia warehouse. First, employees would have to

begin "punching out" and "punching in" on the time clock to

document that they took no more than thirty minutes for

lunch. Id. at *16-17. Second, employees could no longer use

company vans after work for personal reasons. Id. Until

this announcement, Adams had allowed such use even though

company policy prohibited it.

The union then filed a representation petition, and the

Board ordered an election. During the two months before

the election, Traction's two owners and Adams conducted two

meetings with the Philadelphia drivers and warehousemen

that led to additional unfair labor practice charges. At the

first meeting, on April 23, Adams told Tryon that although he

was "due for a raise, he would not be getting it...." Id. at

*18. Also during that meeting, Cohen (one of the owners)

asked the employees what Traction had done to make them

bring in a union, telling them not only that Traction could

offer them more than the union, but that if they had any

personal or job-related problems, Traction could help. Id. at

*18, 24. At a second meeting, this one on June 3, Cohen told

the employees that Traction would "give them more than the

union" and that once they "got past this thing, we can move

on to something bigger and better." Id. at *24.

The union lost the election. Sixteen employees voted

against the union, two voted for it, and two ballots were

contested. Id. at *19. Following an evidentiary hearing, an

administrative law judge found that Traction had committed a

series of unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1)

and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

ss 158(a)(1), (a)(3), by firing Schiavone, denying Tryon's

raise, and changing its policies with respect to personal use of

vans and clocking in and out for lunch. Id. at *37. The ALJ

also concluded that Adams' comments to both Schiavone and

Tryon amounted to unfair labor practices in violation of

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section 8(a)(1), as did Cohen's comments to Traction's Philadelphia employees. Id. The ALJ recommended that the

Board invalidate the election and issue a bargaining order.

Id. at * 38.

The Board agreed that Traction had committed the enumerated unfair labor practices and that a bargaining order

was appropriate. Id. at *1. The Board disagreed with the

ALJ on just one issue. Despite concluding that Traction had

committed an unfair labor practice by changing its van policy,

the ALJ recommended no remedy because Traction had

offered evidence that its insurance policy would not cover

personal use of company vans. Id. at *38 n.30. Without

explanation, the Board ordered Traction to rescind its personal use prohibition. Id. at *1 n.2. Member Brame dissented

on two grounds: he thought that Cohen's remarks at the

April 23 and June 3 meetings did not amount to unfair labor

practices; he also thought the bargaining order inappropriate

because, in his view, the union had never attained majority

support. Id. at *5-6.

In its petition for review, Traction argues that the unfair

labor practice charges stemming from the Schiavone firing,

the changed van policy, the denial of Tryon's raise, and

Cohen's comments are not supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Traction also challenges two of the Board's

remedies: the reinstatement of its personal van use policy

and the bargaining order. With respect to the latter, Traction argues that the Board failed to satisfy this circuit's strict

standards for imposing bargaining orders. See, e.g., Avecor,

Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 934-39 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The

Board cross-petitions for enforcement.

II

Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor

practice for employers "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees" in the exercise of their rights "to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to

bargain collectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the

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purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection...." 29 U.S.C. ss 158(a)(1), 157. Section 8(a)(3)

makes it an unfair labor practice for employers "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term

or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. s 158(a)(3). To establish that an employer's conduct (in this case, Schiavone's

firing, the change in van policy, and the denial of Tryon's

raise) violates section 8(a)(3), the general counsel must first

show that the "protected activity was a motivating factor in

the adverse employment decision." Frazier Indus. Co., Inc.

v. NLRB, No. 99-1297, Slip Op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted). If this prima facie showing is

made, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that

"it would have made the adverse decision even had the

employee not engaged in protected activity." Vincent Ind.

Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(citing Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980)).

In determining whether an employer had a discriminatory

motive, "the NLRB may 'consider[ ] such factors as the employer's knowledge of the employee's union activities, the employer's hostility toward the union, and the timing of the employer's action.' " Id. (quoting Power Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d

409, 418 (D.C. Cir.1994)).

Our review of Board unfair labor practice determinations is

quite narrow. "The Board's findings of fact, if supported by

substantial evidence, are conclusive." Avecor, 931 F.3d at

928. In reviewing the Board's conclusions, "[w]e ask not

whether [petitioner's] view of the facts supports its version of

what happened, but rather whether the Board's interpretation of the facts is reasonably defensible." Harter Tomato

Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "we must

accept the ALJ's credibility determinations, as adopted by the

Board, unless they are patently insupportable." Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1246 (D.C. Cir 1994). "We

are even more deferential when reviewing the Board's conclusions regarding discriminatory motive, because most evidence

of motive is circumstantial." Vincent Plastics, 209 F.3d at

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734. Bearing this deference in mind, we turn to Traction's

four challenges to the Board's unfair labor practice determinations.

Schiavone Firing

This record contains more than substantial evidence to

support the Board's conclusion that anti-union animus motivated the Schiavone firing. Adams fired Schiavone immediately after learning not only that the union had obtained

eleven authorization cards, but that Schiavone had signed

one. Equally indicative of anti-union animus, the ALJ concluded that Adams violated section 8(a)(1) by telling Tryon

and Schiavone that the company would shut down before

working with a union (a conclusion that Traction does not

contest). See Vincent Plastics, 209 F.3d at 735 ("Evidence

that an employer has violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act can

support an inference of anti-union animus.").

Challenging the Board's determination that the general

counsel had made out a prima facie case of anti-union animus,

Traction maintains that Adams decided to fire Schiavone on

April 11, four days before learning that employees had authorized the union. Traction claims that it decided to fire

Schiavone because of two incidents having nothing at all to do

with the union. The first involved Schiavone's alleged misuse

of a company policy that entitled employees to discounts on

tire purchases. When Schiavone bought tires in early April,

he took not just the employee discount to which he was

entitled, but also a discount available only to cash-paying

customers. The latter discount reduced the price of the tires

by an additional $6.59. The other incident involved graffiti

that Adams found on the warehouse wall that said "Chuck"

and "Chuck is cool." Schiavone's first name is Charles.

Adams testified that on April 11, after discovering that

Schiavone had taken the extra discount and after seeing the

graffiti, he told owner O'Donnell that he planned to fire

Schiavone. Adams further testified that he and O'Donnell

had agreed to fire Schiavone on Monday, April 14, but

because one employee called in sick and another was on

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vacation on that day, he postponed firing Schiavone until the

next day. O'Donnell's testimony confirmed the basic elements of Adams' story. Relying on Adams' and O'Donnell's

testimony, Traction argues that Schiavone's firing could not

have been motivated by discriminatory animus because on

April 11--the day it decided to fire him--it was unaware of

the union organizing campaign.

Traction's argument suffers from a fatal flaw: The ALJ

credited neither Adams' nor O'Donnell's testimony. "It was

patently obvious," the ALJ found, "that Adams could not

keep his story straight on several matters, and that much, if

not all, of his testimony was simply fabricated to suit [Traction's] case." Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *19. Calling

Adams' testimony "self-contradictory and filled with inconsistencies," the ALJ rejected it as "simply not credible." Id.

O'Donnell's testimony, the ALJ found, was "equally unpersuasive." Id. at *20. Traction has offered nothing to suggest

that the ALJ's credibility determinations are "patently insupportable." See Exxel/Atmos, 28 F.3d at 1246. Absent

O'Donnell's and Adams' testimony, all evidence in the record,

including the timing of the firing and the section 8(a)(1)

violations, points to anti-union animus.

A prima facie case of discriminatory animus having been

established, Traction could have avoided an unfair labor practice finding only by demonstrating that it would have fired

Schiavone regardless of his union activities. Traction failed

to meet this burden. The Board concluded that neither the

discount policy error nor the graffiti otherwise would have led

to Schiavone's firing. Substantial evidence supports the

Board's conclusion. O'Donnell testified not only that employees often made price code mistakes, but also that when they

inadvertently took extra discounts, the company simply required repayment of the discounted amount. Traction, 1999

WL 1186753 at *27. Moreover, from his "observation of

[Schiavone's] demeanor on the witness stand and throughout

the hearing," the ALJ found that Schiavone was not "someone who would risk losing his job of 7 years for a meager

$6.59." Id. With respect to Traction's other explanation for

firing Schiavone, the ALJ credited Schiavone's testimony that

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the graffiti had been on the wall for close to a month before

Traction fired him. Id. Disbelieving both Adams and

O'Donnell and believing Schiavone, the ALJ thought it

"strain[ed] credulity to believe that Adams, having declined to

take action against Schiavone when he first observed the

writing sometime in March, would decide one month later to

discharge Schiavone, in part, for such activity." Id.

To be sure, the ALJ could have chosen to credit record

evidence supporting Traction's version of events. The only

question before us, however, is whether substantial evidence

supports the Board's view of the disputed events, not Traction's. See Frazier, Slip Op. at 9 (affirming Board's unfair

labor practice finding because "[a]lthough [the employer's]

interpretation of evidence may be reasonable, the Board's

finding to the contrary was supported by substantial evidence"). Because we find no basis for questioning the ALJ's

credibility determinations, we affirm the Board's conclusion

that the Schiavone firing amounted to an unfair labor practice.

Personal Use of Company Vans

Challenging the Board's determination that it violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) by changing its van policy in retaliation

for its employees' organizing efforts, Traction argues (as it

did with respect to the Schiavone firing) that it could not have

been motivated by anti-union animus. When O'Donnell told

Adams to start enforcing the company policy prohibiting

personal use of vans (on April 11), the company says, it did

not know about the union's organizing efforts. According to

Adams, O'Donnell told him to start enforcing the personal use

prohibition because the company had received a summons for

an unpaid New York parking ticket on one of the vans.

Traction also offered a letter from its insurance company

stating that its policy does not cover personal use of company

vans. From this, Traction argues that substantial evidence

does not support the Board's unfair labor practice determination.

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Again, Traction misunderstands the substantial evidence

standard. Having discredited both Adams' and O'Donnell's

testimony, the ALJ found that they had not discussed the van

policy on April 11. Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *31.

"[T]he more credible scenario, and the one I accept as

true,"--and the one to which we owe deference--"is that

Adams never received any such instruction from O'Donnell in

the first place, and imposed the ban only after learning that

his Philadelphia store employees were supporting the Union."

Id. The ALJ also found that the insurance company letter

could not possibly have motivated Adams' April 15 van policy

announcement because the letter was dated May 14. Id. at

*31 n.27. Absent Traction's proffered explanations, the only

record evidence shows that employees were told on April 15,

the same day Adams spoke with the union representatives,

that he would start enforcing the van policy. Given this

timing, together with Adams' threats to close the company if

the union prevailed, the ALJ's conclusion that the enforcement of the van policy was motivated by discriminatory

animus finds more than adequate support in the record.

Insisting that its van policy was not in fact motivated by

anti-union animus, Traction maintains that after April 15,

Adams made exceptions for certain employees, including

Tryon, a known union supporter. Again, while such evidence

may well support Traction's version of the events, the critical

point is that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's view of

the evidence. See Frazier, Slip Op. at 9. We therefore find

no deficiency in the Board's conclusion that the change in van

policy constituted an unfair labor practice.

The Board's remedy is a different matter. The ALJ

recognized that rescission was the ordinary remedy for this

type of unfair labor practice, but he thought it "improper" to

order Traction to rescind the unilateral change, i.e., to order

it to reinstate its prior practice of allowing employees personal use of vans, because it "appears to be the case" that "such

practice is prohibited by its insurance policy." Traction, 1999

WL 1186753 at *38 n.30. The Board disagreed. Stating only

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tion and directed Traction to rescind "the unilateral changes

in ... the van policy." Id. at 1 n.2. Of course, the Board

"is free to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's," Local 702,

Int'l B'hood of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 2000 WL

520950 at *2 (D.C. Cir. 2000), but "when the Board reverses

an ALJ it 'must make clear the basis of its disagreement.' "

Mathews Readymix, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 74, 77 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l

Union, Local 152 v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1470 (D.C.Cir.

1985). See also Chicago Local No. 458-3M v. NLRB, 206

F.3d. 22, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("In order for the court properly

to review the Board's decision, it 'must be able to discern the

rationale' underlying the Board's conclusions.") (quoting Oil,

Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d

82, 90 (D.C.Cir.1995)). Because the Board has failed to

explain, in either its decision or its brief, why it disagreed

with the ALJ that the insurance policy made rescission

inappropriate, we grant the petition for review with respect to

this issue and remand to the Board.

Tryon Raise

In testimony credited by the ALJ, Tryon said that when he

began working for Traction in early March, Adams told him

that he would probably get a raise within thirty to sixty days.

Tryon testified that at the April 23 meeting, Adams said:

"You're due for your raise but now I can't give it to you

because of the union." Adams denied promising Tryon a

raise, explaining that when Tryon requested one, he refused

because he thought it would be "improper" to give Tryon any

benefits during the union organizing campaign. Traction,

1999 WL 1186753 at *29.

Again crediting Tryon's testimony over Adams', the ALJ

found Adams' denial of the raise to have been motivated by

anti-union animus. Id. at *28-29. As the ALJ concluded,

because Adams had promised Tryon a raise, Adams was

obligated to act as he would have had no organizing campaign

been underway, i.e., to give him the raise. See Perdue

Farms, Inc., Cookin' Good Div. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 836

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(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[A]s a general rule, an employer's legal

duty in deciding whether to grant benefits while a representation proceeding is pending is to decide that question precisely

as it would if the union were not on the scene.").

Traction argues that even if Adams had promised Tryon a

raise within thirty to sixty days, because the denial of the

raise had not occured until after sixty days, Tryon was no

longer entitled to it, leaving Adams' explanation--that he

denied the raise because of his concern that it might be

viewed as an unlawful benefit--as the only credible evidence

in the record. To accept this argument, we would have to

infer from the fact that Tryon was told that he was entitled to

a raise within thirty to sixty days that he was not entitled to

the raise unless he asked for it before the sixtieth day. Not

only do we think this rather unlikely, but more important, the

ALJ chose not to draw this inference.

Cohen Statements

Traction begins its challenge to the Board's determination

that Cohen committed unfair labor practices at the employee

meetings on April 23 and June 3 by claiming that substantial

evidence does not demonstrate that Cohen even made the

statements. This argument fails for the same reason that

Traction's other substantial evidence challenges fail: the ALJ

credited the General Counsel's witnesses and reached a different conclusion, a conclusion supported by substantial evidence. Not only did Tryon testify that Cohen made the

statements, but Cohen never directly contradicted Tryon.

Cohen did not testify at all about the June 3 meeting, and

with respect to the April 23 meeting, "while generally denying making any unlawful remarks, [he] admitted to recalling

'absolutely nothing' of what he or O'Donnell may have said."

Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *24.

Traction next argues that even if Cohen made the April 23

statements, they were not unlawful. (Traction does not appear to challenge the ALJ's ULP determination with respect

to Cohen's June 3 comments). Tryon testified about Cohen's

statements at the April 23 meeting as follows: "He just

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stated that if there was ever a problem, ... whether it be

personal or job-wise, Traction was always there to help....

Somebody from management or through the company was

always willing to help or lend a hand." According to Tryon,

Cohen also asked the employees "what it was that the company did wrong ... to bring somebody from the union into the

company," and he told them that "Traction would be able to

offer more than" the union.

Traction does not challenge the standard the Board uses to

determine whether an employer's solicitation of grievances

constitutes an unfair labor practice: Soliciting grievances is

not in itself an unfair labor practice, but implicit or explicit

promises to correct grievances may violate section 8(a)(1)

because "the combined program of inquiry and correction"

suggests that "union representation [is] unnecessary." Reliance Electric Co., 191 NLRB 44, 46 (1971), enf'd, 457 F.2d 503

(6th Cir. 1972). An employer who has not previously solicited

grievances but who begins to do so in the midst of a union

campaign creates a "compelling inference" that the employer

is "implicitly promising" to correct the problems. Id. The

ALJ found, and the Board agreed, that neither Traction nor

Cohen had any past practice of soliciting grievances and that

there was a "compelling inference" that Cohen was implicitly

promising to correct any problems, a promise that was "clearly coercive and designed to show that [management] alone

had the wherewithal to address and resolve employee problems." Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *1-2, 25.

Relying on Member Brame's dissent, Traction argues that

it made no implied promise to correct grievances because

"Cohen's alleged statement merely reflects his view of Traction's past practice with respect to its treatment of employees

and cannot reasonably be construed as a promise to take any

particular action in the future." Because Cohen's statements

were framed in the past tense, Member Brame asserted,

there is no "basis from which it can be inferred 'that the

grievances will be remedied and [no] circumstances giving

rise to the inference that the remedy will only be provided if

the union loses the election.' " Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at

*6.

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No doubt Member Brame's interpretation--that Cohen's

statements referred only to Traction's past practice--is plausible. But the opposite interpretation, the one drawn by the

ALJ and the Board, is equally plausible, and it is to the

Board, not the dissenter, that we owe deference. According

to both the Board and the ALJ, Cohen was "plainly sending

the message that ... [Traction] was now (and would continue

to be) willing to 'lend a hand or help' with any problems

employees might have." Id. at *2. Moreover, because it is

not at all clear whether Tryon was quoting Cohen or paraphrasing what Cohen had said--"He just stated that if there

was ever a problem, ... Traction was always there to help"--

we defer to the interpretation of the ALJ who heard the

testimony and found that "at the April 23 meeting Cohen ...

assured [employees] that if they had any personal or jobrelated problem, [Traction's] management team was there to

help them." Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *24. We therefore think the Board had sufficient basis for inferring that

Cohen's statements represented an implicit promise to correct grievances and, by extension, coercion in violation of

section 8(a)(1). See Avecor, 931 F.2d at 931 ("We recognize

the Board's competence in the first instance to judge the

impact of utterances made in the context of the employeremployee relationship.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

III

This brings us to the heart of this case--Traction's challenge to the bargaining order. Our starting point is the

Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,

Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). "[W]here an employer has committed ... unfair labor practices [in addition to its refusal to

bargain] which have made the holding of a fair election

unlikely or which have in fact undermined a union's majority

and caused an election to be set aside.... [the Board] has the

authority to issue a bargaining order.... [T]he Board has

the same authority even where it is clear that the union,

which once had possession of [authorization] cards from a

majority of the employees, represents only a minority when

the bargaining order is entered." Id. at 610. Bargaining

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orders are sometimes necessary, the Court explained, because

"[i]f an employer has succeeded in undermining a union's

strength and destroying the laboratory conditions necessary

for a fair election, he may see no need to violate a cease-anddesist order by further unlawful activity. The damage will

have been done...." Id. at 612.

Because bargaining orders can deprive employees of their

section 7 right to choose their representative, this court has

carefully delineated the circumstances under which the Board

may issue such orders. Absent "outrageous and pervasive

ULP's," the Board may issue a bargaining order only if it has

substantial evidence that (1) "the Union, at some time, ...

had majority support within the bargaining unit"; (2) "the

employer's unfair practices ... had the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process";

and (3) "the Board [has] determine[d] that the possibility of

erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair

rerun election by the use of traditional remedies is slight and

that employee sentiment once expressed in favor of the Union

would be better protected by a bargaining order." Avecor,

931 F.2d at 934. We also require the Board "to explicitly

balance" several factors to determine whether the need for a

bargaining order outweighs employees' section 7 rights to a

representation election. Vincent Plastics, 209 F.3d at 734.

One additional principle guides our review of the Board's

bargaining order. "In fashioning its remedies ... the Board

draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and

its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect

by reviewing courts." Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32.

"Our essential task as a reviewing court is to assure ourselves

that the Board 'has considered the factors which are relevant

to its choice of remedy, selected a course that is remedial

rather than punitive, and chosen a remedy which can fairly be

said to effectuate the purposes of the Act.' " Caterair Int'l v.

NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Peoples

Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

Traction argues that the bargaining order was not justified

because (1) the union never had majority support, (2) there is

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not substantial evidence to support a bargaining order, (3) the

Board failed adequately to explain the need for the bargaining order, and (4) the Board failed to consider the effect of

employee turnover. We consider each argument in turn.

Majority Support

The Board found that a majority of the bargaining unit

supported the union prior to the election because eleven of

the twenty employees in the unit had signed cards designating the union as their "chosen representative in all matters

pertaining to wages, hours and working conditions." Claiming that the Board should not have counted two of the eleven

authorization cards, Traction argues that the union never

enjoyed majority support.

One of the disputed cards was Anthony Hess's. In support

of its claim that this card should not have been counted,

Traction points to Hess's testimony that he had not read the

card before signing it, that he had not understood that by

signing he was authorizing the union, and that he had been

told that the only effect of signing would be that the union

could hold an election. The ALJ, however, discredited this

testimony, relying instead on Hess's earlier affidavit in which

he said that he had in fact read the card before signing.

Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *33. Finding that Hess had

both read and understood the card, the ALJ counted it.

Because Traction has offered nothing to suggest that the

ALJ's credibility determination is "patently insupportable,"

we have no basis for questioning his conclusion. See

Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d at 1246.

The other disputed card was James Michener's. Michener

never testified, nor did any witness testify to having seen him

sign the card. The ALJ authenticated the card by comparing

the signature on it with Michener's signatures on two forms

in Traction's personnel files: his employment application and

a signed copy of the company's work rules. Traction, 1999

WL 1186753 at *33-34. Agreeing with the ALJ that the card

was authentic, the Board not only examined the two documents itself, but also compared the signature on the card to

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Michener's W-4 federal income tax withholding form. Id. at

*2-3.

Not contesting the authenticity of the three documents on

which the ALJ and the Board relied, Traction argues that the

signatures on those documents have never been properly

authenticated. It relies on Federal Rule of Evidence

901(b)(3), which it says requires the Board to compare the

signature on a card to an authenticated signature, not just to

a signature on an authentic document. Rule 901 provides:

(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent

claims;

(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by

way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements

of this rule:

* * *

(3) ... Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert

witness with specimens which have been authenticated.

We do not share Traction's interpretation of Rule 901. Not

only is subparagraph (3) "by way of illustration only," but

Rule 901 "is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent

claims." Rule 901(a). Surely evidence that the signed documents came from Traction's business files and that the company relied on one of them to hire Michener and another to

withhold federal income taxes is "sufficient to support a

finding" that the signature appearing on them--James P.

Michener--is in fact Michener's. See Weinstein's Federal

Evidence s 901.05[2][b] at 901-26 (listing business records as

an illustration of a method for authenticating handwriting

specimens). For decades, moreover, the Board has treated

employee documents from an employer's personnel files as

genuine specimens for purposes of authenticating signatures

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on authorization cards. See, e.g., Aero Corp., 149 NLRB

1283, 1287 (1964), enf'd 363 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Heck's,

Inc., 166 NLRB 186 n.1 (1967).

Nothing in Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.

1997), on which Traction relies, persuades us otherwise. In

that case, the Fourth Circuit took the Board to task for

counting "highly questionable Union authorization cards,"

including thirteen cards "based upon [the ALJ's] comparison

of the signatures on the cards with the signatures on the

respective employees' W-4 forms." Id. at 279. But because

the court made this statement only after it had concluded that

a bargaining order was not warranted and because it indicated that the authorization card issue "only contribute[s] to our

concern that the Union's majority status was one of agency

construct, rather than grassroots support," id. at 280, we view

the statement as dictum. In any event, to the extent that BeLo suggests that Rule 901 precludes authenticating signatures by comparing them to signatures on authentic business

records including W-4 forms, we disagree and find that the

Board, consistent with long-standing policy, satisfied Rule 901

by comparing the signature on the challenged authorization

card with Michener's signature on the three authentic employment forms.

Substantial Evidence

Traction's second challenge to the bargaining order--that it

is not supported by substantial evidence in the record--

requires little discussion, for the Board's order easily satisfies

the standards we set forth in Skyline Distributors, Inc. v.

NLRB, 99 F.3d 403, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 1996). There, we

summarized the factors justifying a bargaining order as follows:

"First, an unfair labor practice that is viewed as 'deliberate' or 'calculated' is more likely to lead to a bargaining

order than one that is not. Second, much turns on the

significance of the interest being endangered. If the

employer's statements or acts can be characterized as

threatening either a significant economic interest, such

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as retention of jobs, or a fundamental legal right, it is

more likely to lead to a bargaining order. Third, acts of

reprisal, particularly discharges, are considered to be

extremely effective in swaying votes and very difficult to

remedy. Not only is there a great deal of language to

this effect in Board opinions, but also the coincidence of

section 8(a)(3) violations and bargaining orders is notable. Fourth, promises to correct the grievance that led

to union organization are also considered particularly

effective. Finally, and most significantly, the vast majority of bargaining order cases involve a series of unfair

labor practices rather than a single act of illegality."

Skyline, 99 F.3d at 411 (quoting Julius G. Getman & Bretrand B. Pogrebin, Labor Relations: The Basic Processes, Law

And Practice 76 (1988) (footnotes omitted)).

Beginning with the first factor, we have no doubt that

Traction's unfair labor practices were " 'deliberate' or 'calculated.' " The ALJ found that Traction's response to the union

organizing drive, particularly Adams' interrogation of Tryon

and Schiavone and Adams' threat that Traction would "close

down, if that's what it takes," were "clearly designed to nip

the Union's organizational drive in the bud." Traction, 1999

WL 1186753 at *21, 35. Adams' comments, moreover, threatened "a significant economic interest," indeed perhaps the

employees' most significant economic interest--"retention of

jobs." (Factor 2). Not only did Traction threaten to close

down or hire others, but by firing Schiavone, the person most

identified with the union, the company made clear that by

voting for the union, employees risked their jobs. (Again,

Factor 2). Traction's "acts of reprisal, particularly [Schiavone's] discharge[ ]" in violation of section 8(a)(3) "are considered to be extremely effective in swaying votes and very

difficult to remedy." (Factor 3). Repeatedly interrogating

employees, Adams sought to learn what grievances led to the

union campaign, and both Adams and Cohen suggested that

they would correct those grievances and that employees

would get "bigger and better things" by rejecting the union.

Put another way, they "promise[d] to correct the grievance

that led to union organization." (Factor 4).

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Finally, this case involved "a series of unfair labor practices

rather than a single act of illegality." (Factor 5). For

starters, Traction's response to the union organizing drive

was "immediate, swift, and retributive." Traction, 1999 WL

1186753 at *35. Summoning Schiavone to his office, Adams

interrogated him about his union activity, then fired him.

The company "did not stop there." Id. Adams twice interrogated Tryon, denied Tryon's raise, threatened to close the

Philadelphia warehouse, and imposed new and retributive

policies on Philadelphia employees. At two employee meetings, Cohen committed additional unfair labor practices.

Taken together, the evidence reveals a company engaged in a

course of retribution designed not only to punish employees

who gave the union its strongest support, but also to intimidate other employees into voting against the union. And

contrary to Traction's argument, the effects of its actions

extended well beyond the Philadelphia warehouse. Id. at *36.

Such evidence more than sufficiently supports the bargaining

order. See Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162,

1176 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (affirming bargaining order where company's "large number of unfair labor practices, ... committed

by some of the top officials in the company, and ... directed

at numerous employees ... instilled a strong fear of union

representation in the employees.") (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Balancing

Before enforcing a bargaining order, "we require the Board

to explicitly balance three considerations: (1) the employees'

Section 7 rights; (2) whether other purposes of the Act

override the rights of employees to choose their bargaining

representatives; and (3) whether alternative remedies are

adequate to remedy the violations of the Act." Vincent

Plastics, 209 F.3d at 738. Because of the Board's failure to

balance these factors, we have repeatedly refused to enforce

bargaining orders that have come before us in recent years.

In Avecor, for instance, we declined to enforce a bargaining

order because although "the ALJ briefly discussed the first

two factors," he never considered the third, i.e., why tradiUSCA Case #99-1336 Document #526860 Filed: 06/30/2000 Page 20 of 25
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tional remedies, including a re-run election, would have been

inadequate. 931 F.2d at 938. "The ALJ never explained,"

we said, "why the cloud created by these violations was likely

to linger." Id. Rejecting another bargaining order in Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1078-1080

(D.C. Cir. 1996), we "searched the ALJ's decision but ...

found no explanation of why a fair election would not be

possible once the Company has been required to post notices

and reinstate the improperly discharged employees with back

pay." Id. at 1079.

In our most recent rejection of a bargaining order, Vincent

Plastics, neither the ALJ nor the Board had provided any

explanation for the order. Remanding the case with instructions to either provide an adequate justification or vacate the

bargaining order, we expressed our frustration with the

Board's continued recalcitrance: "What is ultimately dissatisfying about this familiar dance is not a sense that this court's

institutional integrity is undermined by the Board's refusal to

modify its behavior in response to operant conditioning, but

that those left in the lurch are precisely those who, in this

case, sought protection from the Board." Vincent Plastics,

209 F.3d at 739.

In this case, the ALJ explored in depth the need for the

bargaining order. After summarizing Traction's "immediate,

swift, and retributive" response to the union's organizing

effort, including its threats to close or hire other workers, as

well as the retaliatory section 8(a)(3) violations, the ALJ

discussed the effect of those actions on Traction's employees.

Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *35. The nature of Traction's

unfair labor practices, he concluded, combined with the unit's

size and the involvement of the two owners in the unfair labor

practices, had created fear so pervasive that a re-run election

would not fairly reflect the views of the majority of the unit.

Id. at 35-36. Adopting the ALJ's recommendation and imposing a bargaining order, the Board rejected Traction's

argument that "an effective alternative to a bargaining order"

would be for a Traction representative to "read the notice to

affected employees prior to the running of a second election."

Id. at 1 n.2. "[S]uch a remedy," the Board explained, would

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be "insufficient to cure the gross interference with free choice

in the election in this case." Id.

The Board's explanation suffers from none of the deficiencies that led to our rejection of bargaining orders in earlier

cases. For instance, in Avecor the Board never explained

"why the cloud created by [the employer's] violations was

likely to linger." 931 F.2d at 938. Here, the ALJ carefully

explained that the section 8(a)(3) violations, particularly Traction's threats to close the warehouse and its discriminatory

discharge of Schiavone, were not only " 'hallmark violations'

of the most pernicious type," but given the small size of the

unit, likely not to have been forgotten. Traction, 1999 WL

1186753 at *35. Moreover, as the ALJ explained, the fact

that the union, having once enjoyed majority support, garnered only two votes in the election provided additional

evidence that Traction's unfair labor practices were both

particularly effective and "likely to linger." Avecor, 931 F.2d

at 938. In Charlotte Amphitheater, we "found no explanation

of why a fair election would not be possible once the Company

has been required to post notices and reinstate the improperly discharged employees with back pay." 82 F.3d at 1079.

But here, the ALJ found that the magnitude of Traction's

unfair labor practices, the small size of the unit, and the

involvement of the company's two owners made its "campaign

to undermine employee support for the Union through fear

and intimidation" so successful that it was unlikely that

traditional remedies would "eras[e] the effects" of that campaign. Traction, 1999 WL 1186753 at *36.

In view of the Board's thorough discussion, and keeping in

mind our deferential standard of review, Gissel Packing, 395

U.S. at 612 n.32, we cannot imagine what more we could

require the Board to say. Indeed, asked at oral argument

what else the Board should have said, Traction's counsel had

no response. In the end, we think the words of Gissel aptly

describe this case: Having "succeeded in undermining [the]

union's strength and destroying the laboratory conditions

necessary for a fair election, [Traction would] see no need to

violate a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity.

The damage [had been] done." Id. at 612.

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Employee Turnover

We turn finally to Traction's argument that the Board

failed to consider the effect of employee turnover between the

time the unfair labor practices occurred and the issuance of

the bargaining order. "[W]e have repeatedly instructed the

Board to determine the appropriateness of a Gissel bargaining order in light of the circumstances existing at the time it

is entered" rather than at the time of the election. Flamingo

Hilton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir.

1998).

The Board argues that Traction waived this issue by failing

to raise it during the administrative proceedings. Claiming

that it had raised the issue, Traction points out that it

excepted to the ALJ's "failure to consider the effect of

mitigating circumstances on the need for a bargaining order."

According to the company, this exception "put the Board on

notice that Traction was challenging, inter alia, the ALJ's

failure to consider the effect of employee turnover." We

disagree. How could the Board have known that by "mitigating circumstances" Traction meant employee turnover? Not

only did Traction fail to mention employee turnover in its

brief to the Board, but the brief contained no citation to the

pages of the record that the company now contends support

its argument that employee turnover actually occurred.

We expect much of the Board, but we have never required

it to sift through a six-hundred plus page record to find

evidence supporting an argument that a petitioner never

made. See Charlotte Amphitheaters 82 F.3d at 1080 ("[T]he

Board has no affirmative duty to inquire whether employee

turnover or the passage of time has attenuated the effects of

earlier unfair labor practices...."). Because Traction does

not claim that some "extraordinary circumstance" explains its

failure to raise employee turnover, we may not consider the

issue. See 29 U.S.C. s 160(e) ("No objection that has not

been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency,

shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect

to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.").

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IV

With the exception of that portion of the order requiring

Traction to allow personal use of company vans, Traction's

petition for review is denied and the Board's cross-petition for

enforcement is granted.

So ordered.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: The Board thinks it

an unfair labor practice for an employer, during an election

campaign, to ask employees what they find wrong at the

workplace. The Board's theory is that in making the solicitation, the employer implies that something will be done to

correct whatever problems are identified, which in turn implies that the employees do not need a union. See Reliance

Elec. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 44, 46 (1971), enforced, 457 F.2d 503

(6th Cir. 1972). I have my doubts about this theory, but as

the court points out, the company did not challenge it in this

case. See op. at 13. The company's argument was that the

evidence did not make out a violation, an argument the

court's opinion rightly rejects. See id. at 14.

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