Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03452/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03452-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Ford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3452 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

BRIAN FORD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 00-CR-227 — Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JUNE 1, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS, 

Circuit Judges. 

WOOD, Chief Judge. Brian Ford keeps getting into trouble. 

After pleading guilty to a drug offense in 2001, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by supervised 

release. While on supervised release, he committed an act of 

prostitution and other violations of the conditions of release, 

and he was sentenced to new terms of imprisonment and 

supervised release. Ford then allegedly committed a subCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
2 No. 14-3452 

stantial battery while serving his second term of supervised 

release. After holding a revocation hearing, the district court 

found that Ford had indeed committed the battery and thus 

had again violated the conditions of his supervised release. 

Ford now appeals, claiming that the district court made a 

number of errors in connection with the revocation. Because 

Ford has waived some arguments and the rest have no merit, 

we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I 

In 2001, Ford pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to 

possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack 

cocaine and more than five kilograms of powder cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. After a series of sentencing reductions, he ultimately was sentenced to 97 months of imprisonment, followed by five years 

of supervised release. In 2009 he was released from prison 

and began his term of supervised release. In 2013, the district 

court revoked Ford’s supervised release after finding that he 

had committed multiple violations of his supervised release 

conditions. The court sentenced him to a 12-month term of 

imprisonment and an 18-month term of supervised release. 

Ford was released from prison on May 30, 2014, and began 

his second term of supervised release. 

On August 4, 2014, Ford allegedly committed a substantial battery. The district court held a revocation hearing on 

September 10, 2014, to determine whether the allegation was 

true. Such an act, if proven, would constitute a violation of 

the condition requiring Ford not to commit another federal, 

state, or local crime. Three witnesses testified at the hearing: 

Scott Rahoi, the alleged victim of the battery, Milwaukee PoCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-3452 3

lice Officer Lafayette Emmons, and Milwaukee Police Detective Andre Matthews. 

The government first called Rahoi, who testified that a 

person he knew as “Tony” was an apartment manager at the 

building in which Rahoi lived. He identified Ford in court as 

Tony. Rahoi stated that on August 4, 2014, Ford barged into 

his apartment and angrily instructed him to vacate the residence. After Rahoi told Ford that he needed time to pack his 

belongings, Ford became more irate and began to punch and 

kick Rahoi, until Rahoi almost lost consciousness. Once Ford 

left the apartment, Rahoi called 911. Officer Emmons arrived 

soon thereafter, and Rahoi told him what had happened. 

Later, while Rahoi was at the hospital, Officer Emmons 

showed Rahoi a photo array, and Rahoi identified a picture 

of the man he knew as Tony. 

Rahoi admitted that he previously had committed a 

felony and that he had problems with alcohol, though he 

later denied that he had been drinking at the time of the 

incident. On cross-examination, he further admitted that he 

had probably seen Ford only twice before August 4, 2014. He 

confessed that he had gotten into a fight with Jasmine Smith, 

another tenant in his apartment, a few days before Ford 

attacked him. During the cross-examination, Ford’s counsel 

referred to a Milwaukee police report labeled Exhibit 5, in 

which Smith had stated that Rahoi smoked crack cocaine on 

the day of the incident. Rahoi denied this allegation. 

Officer Emmons testified next. He stated that Rahoi had 

told him that Tony, the building’s property manager, had 

attacked him. Elaborating, he said that Rahoi had given him 

both a description of Tony and Tony’s phone number, which 

Rahoi had obtained from another tenant. Emmons identified 

Case: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
4 No. 14-3452 

Exhibit 3 as the photo array he had given to Rahoi while 

Rahoi was in the hospital. Emmons indicated that Rahoi had 

identified Ford’s picture as that of his assailant. There was 

some confusion, however, about the order of the photographs on the original array as compared to the order displayed in Exhibit 3. For this reason, it is unclear whether 

Rahoi actually identified Ford or a man named Joseph Diaz. 

Finally, Detective Matthews testified that he interviewed 

Ford a few weeks after the incident. Matthews stated that 

Ford had told him that he was not a property manager for 

Rahoi’s building and that he did not know Rahoi. After being shown Exhibit 5 (the police report), Matthews testified 

that Smith had told him that either Brandon or Tony managed the building. He also said that Smith had identified a 

photo of Ford as Tony. Ford’s counsel did not object to the 

use of Exhibit 5. On cross-examination, counsel briefly questioned Matthews about Smith’s identification of Ford and 

Smith’s statements regarding Rahoi’s crack cocaine use. 

The government then rested. The court asked if the government wanted to enter the police report into evidence, and 

it responded affirmatively. Before admitting the document 

into evidence, the court asked Ford’s counsel if he had any 

objection, to which he responded, “No, sir.” The revocation 

hearing resumed on October 28, 2014. Ford was the only 

witness. Ford denied involvement in the August 4, 2014 attack and testified that he had never seen Rahoi before the 

revocation hearing. He swore that he had been at home on 

the day of the incident and further noted that he had been in 

the property management business before but had stopped 

working in that area over a year ago. During this testimony, 

Ford’s counsel attempted to introduce Smith’s statements 

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No. 14-3452 5

about Rahoi’s drug use, but the court sustained the government’s objection on relevance grounds. 

The district court concluded that the government had 

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Ford had 

violated his supervised release conditions by committing a 

substantial battery against Rahoi. In coming to this decision, 

the court relied on each of the testifying witnesses as well as 

Smith’s statements from the police report. The court sentenced Ford to 36 months of imprisonment with no supervised release, plus restitution in the amount of $646.84. The 

court noted that it considered “all of the factors” under 

§ 3553(a)(2). In particular, it discussed the seriousness of 

Rahoi’s injuries; it stated that “the community should be 

protected from [Ford’s] outbursts”; and it concluded that 

“supervision to date has not been effective.” Finally, the 

court determined that the sentence was “consistent with the 

applicable guideline range of from [sic] 30 to 37 months.” 

Ford timely appealed the district court’s judgment and 

sentence. He raises three arguments. First, he contends that 

the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(b)(2)(C) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment by allowing the government to introduce 

Smith’s statements, as contained in the police report. Second, 

he argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) and (h) dictate that his 

statutory maximum sentence is one year and that his 36-

month sentence thus exceeds this maximum. Finally, Ford 

alleges that the district court committed procedural error by 

not adequately examining the relevant factors listed in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) at sentencing. 

Case: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
6 No. 14-3452 

II 

We begin with Ford’s contention that the district court 

erred in admitting Smith’s statements from the police report, 

Exhibit 5. Ford did not make this objection in the district 

court. In fact, Ford’s counsel was the first to refer to Smith’s 

statements, during his cross-examination of Rahoi. He again 

mentioned Smith’s comments while cross-examining Detective Matthews, albeit after the government had elicited testimony from Matthews about his interview with Smith. 

Counsel also attempted to introduce the statements during 

Ford’s testimony. The district court explicitly asked Ford’s 

counsel whether he objected to the admission of the police 

report that included Smith’s statements into evidence, and 

counsel replied that he did not. 

Waiver occurs where there is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 

U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). In contrast to forfeiture, where “a defendant negligently bypasses a valid argument,” “waiver 

requires a calculated choice to stay silent on a particular matter.” United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 

2010). Ford’s counsel’s actions at the revocation hearing 

demonstrated a calculated choice to remain silent during the 

government’s use of the police report, so that counsel could 

also use the report—particularly Smith’s statements regarding Rahoi’s drug use—to impeach Rahoi. Counsel repeatedly 

brought up these statements, and he—not the government—

made the first reference to the report. Moreover, the court 

clearly brought the admissibility of the report to counsel’s 

attention, and counsel declined to object. These actions indicate that counsel (on behalf of Ford) intentionally relinCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-3452 7

quished the right to object to the admissibility of the report 

and the statements contained within it. 

Ford now argues that because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to supervised release proceedings (and 

because Ford consequently had no right under those Rules 

to prevent the admission of the statements), he could not 

have waived his right to object on appeal. But even if Ford 

had no rights under the Federal Rules of Evidence, he still 

could have complained by invoking either Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) or the Due Process Clause, 

both of which protect defendants in revocation hearings. 

Ford’s counsel did neither, even when prompted by the 

court. Instead, he affirmatively used portions of the very report to which he now objects. This was more than enough to 

demonstrate waiver. 

Even if we are wrong and Ford merely forfeited, rather 

than waived, the objection, we would still not reverse. Because Ford did not object in the district court, our review 

would be limited to a search for plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. 

P. 52(b); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

Plain error requires: “(1) an error or defect (2) that is clear or 

obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s substantial rights (4) 

and seriously impugning the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Anderson, 604 F.3d at 

1002. An error affects the defendant’s substantial rights if it 

“affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”

United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Any error in admitting the statements did not affect the 

outcome of these proceedings. In a revocation hearing, the 

district court must find that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised release by a preponderance of the eviCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
8 No. 14-3452 

dence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Goad, 44 

F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, the alleged victim identified Ford in court as his assailant and stated that he had seen 

Ford, whom he knew as Tony, twice before the battery. Another building tenant gave Rahoi a phone number for the 

apartment manager, which Rahoi then gave to Officer Emmons. This number led to Ford (thus corroborating Rahoi’s 

account of Ford as the apartment manager who went by the 

name of Tony). Finally, Officer Emmons testified as to 

Rahoi’s extensive injuries. The only contradictory evidence 

was Ford’s own account of the events—an account the district court was entitled to reject as not credible. Thus, there 

was no reversible error in the use of the police report; with 

or without it, there was ample evidence to show that Ford 

had committed a substantial battery against Rahoi. 

III 

Ford next argues that his sentence exceeds the statutory 

maximum. We review statutory interpretation questions de 

novo. See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 

2008). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583 limits the length of the prison 

term a court may impose after it revokes a defendant’s supervised release. In general, a court may impose a sentence 

equal to the length of the supervised release authorized by 

statute for the offense that “resulted in” the supervised release that is currently being revoked. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). There are, however, some limitations on the 

court’s choice of sentence. For example, a prison sentence 

following a revocation of a supervised release term that was 

imposed for a class A felony cannot exceed five years, while 

a prison sentence after revocation of supervised release imCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-3452 9

posed in connection with a class B felony cannot exceed 

three years. Section 3583(e)(3) reads in full: 

The court may ... revoke a term of supervised 

release, and require the defendant to serve in 

prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 

resulted in such term of supervised release 

without credit for time previously served on 

postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant 

to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any 

such revocation more than 5 years in prison if 

the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 3 

years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such offense 

is a class C or D felony, or more than one year 

in any other case. 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 

Ford’s argument centers on the phrase “the offense that 

resulted in the term of supervised release.” He contends that 

“offense” in this context refers to whatever action immediately caused the defendant’s most recent term of supervised 

release, and thus does not always signify the offense for 

which supervised release was initially imposed. Consider an 

example: A defendant commits a class A felony and is senCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
10 No. 14-3452 

tenced to imprisonment followed by supervised release. After release from prison, but during her term of supervised 

release, the defendant commits a class B felony, which constitutes a violation of the supervised release. The “offense 

that resulted in” the supervised release was the class A felony; thus, the maximum term of imprisonment that the court 

can impose upon revocation is five years, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). The court imposes a prison sentence and a new 

term of supervised release. While on the second term of supervised release, the defendant commits a class C felony, 

another violation of her supervised release conditions. The 

court again must look to “the offense that resulted in the 

term of supervised release” to determine the statutory maximum sentence upon revocation. Ford argues that this offense is the class B felony, rather than the class A felony, because the class B felony is what directly “resulted in” the defendant’s second supervised release term. Thus, in this case, 

Ford contends that the court should look to his 2013 violation of supervised release conditions, rather than his original 

2001 conviction, in order to determine the maximum prison 

term under § 3583(e)(3). 

For support, Ford contrasts § 3583(e)(3) with § 3583(h). 

The latter provision, which limits the length of new terms of 

supervised release that a court can impose after it revokes a 

term of supervised release, uses the phrase “offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(h) (emphasis added) (“The length of such a term of 

supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised 

release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in 

the original term of supervised release.”). Because 

§ 3583(e)(3)—unlike § 3583(h)—omits the word “original,” 

Ford argues, it must be referring to the defendant’s most reCase: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-3452 11

cent offense, i.e., the one that most immediately caused the 

defendant’s current term of supervised release. 

While we give Ford full marks for creativity, his reading 

of § 3583(e)(3) makes hash of the larger statutory scheme. 

The provision refers to “offense[s],” but violations of 

supervised release need not be criminal in nature: a 

defendant can violate the terms of his supervised release 

without committing a statutorily defined crime. See, e.g., 

United States v. Marvin, 135 F.3d 1129, 1131–32 (7th Cir. 1998) 

(discussing violation of special condition not to obtain loans 

or open new bank accounts). Thus, § 3583(e)(3)’s reference to 

“offense” must signify the offense for which the defendant 

was initially placed on supervised release. 

Ford counters that the term “offense” encompasses noncriminal violations of supervised release. Congress, he says, 

would have used the word “conviction” if it had wanted to 

refer to the original crime. But he points to no statute or case 

using the term “offense” in such a broad way. To the contrary, federal criminal statutes treat the word as referring to expressly criminal activity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining 

“crime of violence” to mean an “offense” with certain characteristics”); id. § 921(a)(33)(A) (same for “misdemeanor 

crime of domestic violence”). The titles of various provisions 

of the criminal code confirm this interpretation. See, e.g., id.

§ 19 (section titled “Petty offense defined”); id. § 24 (section 

titled “Definitions relating to Federal health care offense”); 

id. § 1341 et seq. (chapter titled “Mail Fraud and Other Fraud 

Offenses”); id. § 3271 et seq. (chapter titled “Extraterritorial 

Jurisdiction over Certain Trafficking in Persons Offenses”). 

Moreover, the classification system to which § 3583(e)(3) 

refers would make little sense if “the offense that resulted in 

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12 No. 14-3452 

the term of supervised release” could be a non-criminal violation of supervised release. Section 3583(e)(3) sets the maximum terms of imprisonment based on the letter grade of 

this “offense.” If an offense is not classified by a letter grade 

in the provision that defines it, it is classified at 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3559 according to its maximum term of imprisonment. See 

18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (defining offenses with maximum term of 

life imprisonment as class A felonies, offenses with maximum term of 25 years or more as class B felonies, and so on). 

Under Ford’s interpretation, it is unclear how to classify a 

non-criminal violation of a supervised release condition; the 

condition itself neither contains a letter grade classification 

nor sets out a maximum term of imprisonment for its violation. In addition, § 3559 applies only to sentences for “a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense described 

in any Federal statute.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a). Even if we were 

to credit Ford’s interpretation of offense as encompassing 

violations of supervised release (which we do not), a defendant is not “found guilty” of such a violation. Rather, the 

court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant committed the violation. Ford’s last-ditch attempt 

is to point to § 3583(h), the provision allowing courts to reimpose terms of supervised release upon revocation, as a 

stand-in for the substantive offense. But this provision merely authorizes a court to impose subsequent punishment; it 

does not define an offense, and it does not set a statutory 

maximum term of imprisonment. 

In all, Ford’s interpretation does nothing but create confusion and ambiguity in a statutory scheme that, under the 

normal reading of the language, works reasonably well. The 

phrase “the offense that resulted in the term of supervised 

release” refers to the offense for which the defendant was 

Case: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-3452 13

initially placed on supervised release. For Ford, this is his 

2001 conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack and powder cocaine. That offense carries a 

statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment, see 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and is thus a class A felony. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1). The maximum allowable prison term 

upon revocation in connection with such an offense is five 

years. See id. § 3583(e)(3). Since April 2003, when the 

PROTECT Act took effect, see Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 

650 (2003), the maximum term of imprisonment starts anew 

with each revocation of supervised release. See U.S.

SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO 

SUPERVISED RELEASE 42–43 (July 2010). Ford’s new sentence 

upon his second revocation could thus have been as much as 

60 months, well above the 36 months he received. 

IV 

Ford’s final claim is that the district court committed procedural error by not adequately considering the relevant 

sentencing factors. Our review of a sentence for supervised 

release violations is “highly deferential.” United States v. 

Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, the district court is required to consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines policy statements and relevant sentencing factors. The 

court must “say something that enables the appellate court to 

infer that he considered both sources of guidance,” United 

States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2011), 

though it “need not consider the § 3553 factors in check-list 

form.” Jones, 774 F.3d at 404. When revoking a term of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) requires the court to 

consider several—but not all—of the factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a): (a)(1) (the nature and circumstances of the 

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14 No. 14-3452 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant), 

(a)(2)(B)–(D) (the need for the sentence to deter criminal 

conduct, protect the public from further crimes, and provide 

the defendant with training and treatment), (a)(4) (the guidelines range), (a)(5) (the guidelines policy statements), (a)(6) 

(the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities), and 

(a)(7) (the need to provide restitution to victims). 

The district court’s consideration of these points was satisfactory. The judge noted that he had taken into account “all 

of the factors” under § 3553(a)(2) and singled out the need to 

protect the community from Ford’s “outbursts.” He invoked 

deterrence when he observed that supervision had not been 

effective for Ford and that the Probation Office would be put 

to better use by “working with someone who is more susceptible to behavior modification.” These statements, along 

with the discussion of Rahoi’s injuries, show that the judge 

considered the nature of the crime and Ford’s history and 

characteristics. The judge looked to the guidelines range and 

policy statements when he discussed the appropriate sentencing range, and he addressed the need to impose restitution. While he did not specifically mention the need to provide Ford training and treatment or the goal of avoiding sentencing disparities, he was not required to run through each 

factor one by one. Overall, he said enough. 

Ford also contends that the court impermissibly considered factor (a)(2)(A) when it discussed the extent of Rahoi’s 

injuries. This factor, which is not listed in § 3583(e), describes 

the need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 

offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). It is not clear that the 

court was relying specifically on (a)(2)(A) in its statements; it 

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No. 14-3452 15

never specifically mentioned that factor, and, as noted 

above, the discussion of Rahoi’s injuries easily fits within 

factor (a)(1). But even if it did rely to some extent on the seriousness of Ford’s offense, any such reliance was not error 

under this circuit’s law. See United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 

1106, 1108 (7th Cir. 2014) (siding with the majority of circuits 

to find that court may address factor (a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release “so long as the district court relies 

primarily on the factors listed in § 3583(e)”). The court 

placed little weight on factor (a)(2)(A); instead, it relied on 

other factors that are included in § 3583(e), such as the 

guidelines range, deterrence, protection of the community, 

and the need for restitution. Thus, the court’s references to 

Rahoi’s injuries did not taint the validity of Ford’s sentence.

V 

Ford has waived his objection to the admission of Smith’s 

statements, and, even if he merely forfeited it, he cannot 

show plain error. The statutory maximum prison sentence 

upon revocation of supervised release was properly based 

on the initial offense; thus, Ford’s 36-month sentence was 

permissible. Finally, the district court did not commit procedural error in sentencing Ford. We therefore AFFIRM both the 

district court’s order finding that Ford violated the conditions of his supervised release and the court’s sentence of 36 

months in prison. 

Case: 14-3452 Document: 37 Filed: 08/20/2015 Pages: 15