Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01005/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Norman Cooper
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED . ., 

United States Co~rt '!' Appca..:s 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth C1rcutt 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

NORMAN COOPER, doing business 

as C&H Contracting Company, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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NOV 2 0 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerlt 

No. 95-1005 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-103-N) 

Charlotte J. Mapes, Assistant United States Attorney, (Henry L. 

Solano, United States Attorney with her on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Clifford J. Barnard, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

The defendant, Norman Cooper, appeals his fifteen-month 

sentence for a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 641, Theft of Government 

Property Valued in Excess of $100.00. Mr. Cooper alleges that the 

government breached its plea agreement with him and that he should 

be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the government 

clearly violated the terms of the agreement, we vacate the plea 

and the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 1 
BACKGROUND 

Mr. Cooper was originally charged with theft of government 

property valued at approximately $300,000.00. The parties were 

unable to reach a plea agreement on this charge which the court 

would accept. Because the government was apparently unable to 

prove the $300,000.00 value beyond a reasonable doubt, it 

thereafter filed a superseding indictment charging the defendant 

with theft of government property valued in excess of $100.00. 

The parties then entered into a plea agreement, the pertinent 

provisions of which read as follows: 

[T]he government will recommend that the 

defendant receive a sentence of probation. 

This recommendation is the only 

representation/inducement that the government 

has made to the defendant. 

Pertinent facts are set out below in 

order to provide a factual basis of the plea 

and to provide facts which the parties believe 

are relevant . . . for computing the 

appropriate guideline range .... 

The statement of facts herein does not 

preclude either party from presenting and 

arguing, for sentencing purposes, additional 

facts or factors not included herein which are 

relevant to the guideline computation . . . or 

to sentencing in general . . Nor is the 

court or probation precluded from the 

consideration of such facts .... 

The parties agree that the government's 

evidence would show that the date on which 

conduct relevant to the offense . . . began 

was February 1, 1990. 

Aplt. App. at 38-40. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 2 
In the agreement, the government calculated Mr. Cooper's 

offense level under the sentencing guidelines to be level 5 with a 

corresponding sentencing range of 0 to 6 months. Thus, the 

difficulty of proving the original amount of loss and the 

corresponding calculation of the sentencing range logically 

suggested the government's agreement to a sentence of probation. 

However, something happened on the way to the courthouse. 

Although the government had estimated Mr. Cooper's offense level 

to be 5 in the plea agreement, the probation officer's presentence 

report stated that Mr. Cooper's total offense level was 13, an 

offense level that does not include probation as a possible 

sentence. Prior to accepting Mr. Cooper's guilty plea, the 

district judge reminded the parties that the amount of loss to the 

government might actually be greater than the amount presumed by 

the plea agreement and advised Mr. Cooper that the court could 

consider the additional loss if it were satisfactorily proven for 

sentencing purposes. The court also stated: "I want both of you 

to understand this could be--could well be a situation where the 

Court makes a determination at sentencing that would result in a 

finding that the loss is the same as the loss that was originally 

talked about [in the original indictment]." Aplee. Supp. App. at 

5-6. 

The court thereafter held a sentencing hearing and received 

the testimony of a geologist called as a witness for the 

government. Although the plea agreement had stipulated that 

relevant conduct occurred after January 31, 1990, the government 

proceeded to elicit testimony from the geologist with regard to 

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 3 
conduct occurring prior to that date. This testimony tended to 

show a greater loss to the government than that presumed by the 

parties' plea agreement. 

In her argument at the sentencing hearing, the Assistant 

United States Attorney urged that--based in part on conduct 

occurring prior to January 31, 1990--the loss to the government 

was approximately $301,000.00. The government therefore took the 

position that the proper offense level was 14, carrying a 

sentencing range of 15 to 21 months, rather than the offense level 

of 5 suggested by the government in the plea agreement. 

Additionally, the government never explicitly recommended a 

sentence of probation, but instead recognized its duty under the 

plea agreement only in response to an inquiry by the court, and 

even then argued that probation would be an illegal sentence: 

[THE COURT:] The sentencing plea agreement in 

this case entered into under Rule 11(e) (1) (B) 

requires that the government agreed [sic] that 

probation is the appropriate sentence. At 

least that was the original plea agreement. I 

think that was before [the Assistant United 

States Attorney, Ms. Jenner,] got into the 

case. Am I looking at the wrong--

MS. JENNER: Your Honor--

THE COURT: I'm sorry. 

MS. JENNER: --it was part of the original 

plea agreement. However, once I entered the 

case, I felt bound by that, and I put it in 

there as well. 

THE COURT: All right. 

MS. JENNER: But I recognize that the court 

cannot be bound by something that is illegal 

and impossible under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. So--

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 4 
THE COURT: All right. 

MS. JENNER: It does appear in the plea 

agreement that I drafted and I'm a signatory 

to. 

THE COURT: Okay. The government's 

recommendation is outside the Guideline range, 

and, therefore, I cannot accept the 

recommendation. With that exception, the plea 

and plea agreement are accepted. 

Aplt. App. at 119. 

The district court went on to find that Mr. Cooper had caused 

approximately $301,000.00 in loss and that the appropriate offense 

level was 14. The court thereafter sentenced Mr. Cooper to 

fifteen months imprisonment, stating that probation was outside 

the applicable guidelines range. 

DISCUSSION 

11Whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement 

presents a question of law which we review de novo. 11 Allen v. 

Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1534 (lOth Cir. 1995). Additionally, plea 

agreements are governed by contracts principles. United States v. 

Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

The applicable Supreme Court precedent clearly holds the 

government accountable with regard to any promises made to induce 

a defendant to plead guilty: 11 [W]hen a plea rests in any 

significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 

that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 

such promise must be fulfilled ... Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 

257, 269 (1971) (emphasis added); see also Brady v. United States, 

397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) ( 11 ' 11 [A] plea of guilty entered into by 

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 5 
one fully aware of the direct consequences . . . must stand unless 

induced by . . . misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 

unfulfillable promises)."'") (quoting Shelton v. United States, 

246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane) (quoting Shelton 

v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J., 

dissenting)), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 

Additionally, "In order to comply with the plea agreement, the 

government cannot rely upon a 'rigidly literal construction of the 

language' of the agreement, nor may it accomplish 'through 

indirect means what it promised not to do directly.'" United 

States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting United 

States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256 (lOth Cir. 1989)). 

Mr. Cooper argues that the government breached the plea 

agreement by failing to recommend probation. He also argues that 

the government breached the agreement by presenting evidence of 

conduct occurring prior to January 31, 1990 in contravention of 

the stipulation that all relevant conduct occurred after January 

31, 1990; by presenting evidence of loss that mandated a prison 

sentence greater than probation; and by acting in bad faith by 

knowingly creating a situation in which the court could not 

possibly adopt a recommendation of probation. Thus, Mr. Cooper's 

basic legal argument is that the contract fails because the 

consideration for which he bargained--the government's agreement 

to recommend probation--was illusory. 

The government, on the other hand, argues that it was under 

an ethical duty to bring evidence of loss to the sentencing 

court's attention regardless of the nature of the plea agreement. 

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See Hand, 913 F.2d at 856-57 (citing cases which hold that the 

government must bring pertinent information to the sentencing 

court's attention). The government places particular reliance on 

United States v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

502 U.S. 854 (1991). In Jimenez, the defendant entered a plea 

agreement that required the government to recommend a sentence of 

seven years imprisonment. The government learned, after entering 

the plea agreement but prior to sentencing, that the defendant had 

disseminated transcripts of a witness's grand jury testimony in 

order to intimidate the witness. The prosecutor brought this 

information to the court's attention prior to sentencing, and the 

court thereafter sentenced the defendant to twenty years 

imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor 

had "so undercut its recommendation [of a seven-year sentence] as 

to constitute a violation of the plea agreement." Id. at 363. 

The court held the prosecutor's behavior did not violate the terms 

of the plea agreement: 

Because the plea agreement in this case cannot 

be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the 

government from informing the sentencing court 

of relevant conduct of this nature (which came 

to the government's attention after the 

parties' plea agreement was reached), the 

government's actions did not violate the plea 

agreement. 

. . . It is clear that the fact that a 

plea agreement has been entered into between 

the government and a defendant cannot alone 

prohibit the government from bringing relevant 

information to the attention of the trial 

judge at the time of sentencing. In fact, the 

prosecutor has an ethical duty to disclose 

such information which, in this case, 

postdated the parties' plea agreement. 

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Id. (citation omitted) . The court also concluded that 11 although 

the government attorney undeniably demonstrated a clear lack of 

enthusiasm for the recommended sentence, an unenthusiastic 

recommendation is still a recommendation. On this record, the 

court does not find that the government 'accomplished by indirect 

means what it promised not to do directly.' 11 Id. at 364 (quoting 

United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256 (lOth Cir. 1989)) 

(citation omitted). 

In light of Jimenez, the government argues that regardless of 

the terms of the agreement, the prosecutor had an ethical duty to 

bring the evidence of $301,000.00 of loss to the court's 

attention. However, we believe that the government ignores two 

critical distinctions: First, the government clearly knew of its 

ethical duty in this case when it entered into the plea agreement 

with Mr. Cooper. All of the information that was disclosed by the 

government at sentencing was known by the government when it made 

the plea agreement. Given this knowledge, it is difficult to 

understand how the government could, in good faith, proceed to 

enter into an agreement with Mr. Cooper that could not, consistent 

with its ethical duty of disclosure, be fulfilled. Second, 

Jimenez recognized that the agreed sentence must still be 

recommended by the government. Although the Jimenez court noted 

that 11 the government attorney undeniably demonstrated a clear lack 

of enthusiasm for the recommended sentence, an unenthusiastic 

recommendation is still a recommendation, 11 id. at 364; see also 

United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985) (per curiam) 

(holding that a defendant generally has no right to an 

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 8 
enthusiastic recommendation unless the plea agreement commits the 

government to make the recommendation enthusiastically) , it is 

clear under the facts of that case that the government did indeed 

recommend the seven-year sentence, see Jimenez, 928 F.2d at 360 

("'[The government] will stand by that recommendation if for no 

other reason than as a matter of honor.'") (quoting remarks of the 

government attorney at the defendant's sentencing hearing). In 

the instant case, however, the government never made the promised 

recommendation, but instead merely responded when asked by the 

court that the promise to make the recommendation "does appear in 

the plea agreement." Aplt. App. at 119. The prosecutor then 

proceeded to take with her left hand any conceivable benefit she 

had given with her right hand by stating, "But I recognize the 

Court cannot be bound by something that is illegal and 

impossible." Id. The prosecutor's statements in this case could 

hardly have constituted a "recommendation," enthusiastic or 

otherwise, and actually served to undermine Mr. Cooper's request 

for a sentence of probation. C.f. United States v. Greenwood, 812 

F.2d 637 (lOth Cir. 1987) (holding that government breached 

agreement to not recommend incarceration by arguing to the court 

that the defendant lacked remorse and the court should use the 

case to deter others from committing tax evasion) . 

The prosecutor has many ethical duties, including ethical 

duties of deciding what charges to bring and what plea agreements 

to make. When those agreements are made with full knowledge of 

the facts at hand, those agreements should be, as Hand stated, 

"fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea," not to mention 

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 9 
the integrity of the government. If at a later date the 

government discovers facts that cause it to believe that its 

prosecutorial discretion was not properly exercised, it has the 

ethical obligation to withdraw from the plea agreement and advise 

the defendant so that he or she may prepare for trial or 

renegotiate. It is certainly not proper for the government to 

wait until the sentencing hearing then breach the terms of the 

plea agreement, shielding its behavior by claiming its obligation 

to be an ethical oEficer of the court. 

It is disappointing that the government seeks to create an 

ethical conflict between its duty to inform the court and its duty 

to keep its promises. This ethical dilemma, to the extent that 

there is one, must be resolved at the time the government makes 

its plea agreement. At that point, the government must determine 

whom to charge and what to charge. Should subsequent information 

come to the government's attention requiring it to withdraw from 

the plea agreement, that is certainly understandable. What is not 

understandable is that the government would wait until the 

sentencing hearing and then attempt to disregard the sole 

consideration given for the defendant's guilty plea because of an 

ethical duty of which the government was well aware from the 

start. 

It is critical that the government stand by its agreements 

for many reasons, but two rise to the fore: First, as the 

government attorney in Jimenez noted, as a "matter of honor." 

Second, as the government's attorney admitted during oral argument 

in this case, in order to encourage plea bargaining. Hopefully, 

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Appellate Case: 95-1005 Document: 01019279188 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 10 
government prosecutorial conduct should set the ethical standard; 

minimally it should comply with the law. 

Because the government breached its plea agreement, and 

because the plea agreement in this case was based on an 

"unfulfillable promise," see Brady, 397 U.S. at 755, the only 

adequate remedy in this case is to allow Mr. Cooper to withdraw. 

his guilty plea.l 

We accordingly VACATE Mr. Cooper's guilty plea and REMAND the case 

for further proceedings. 

1 Mr. Cooper also states in his brief that he would like to 

preserve his right to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim in a habeas proceeding. This statement is not necessary to 

preserve Mr. Cooper's right to bring such a claim on collateral 

review. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1242 (lOth 

Cir. 1995) (en bane) ("The rule in this circuit ... is that 

claims of constitutionally ineffective counsel should be brought 

on collateral review .... "). 

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