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Parties Involved:
Brian David Roth
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

AUG O..: 1992 

PAfl~RT L, HOECKE.: .. Clerk 

v. ) No. 91-4195 

BRIAN DAVID ROTH, ) (D.C. No. 89-NCR-32-S) 

) ( D. Utah) 

Defendant - Appellant. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Brian David Roth pled guilty to five counts of 

theft of government property, with a total value of slightly more 

than $10 million, stolen during his tenure on the security police 

squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Under the circumstances of 

the case, the United States Sentencing Guidelines range for 

defendant before departure was thirty to thirty-seven months. The 

sentencing court departed upward, sentencing defendant to 120 

months incarceration. Defendant appealed, and this court found, 

in pertinent part, that the district court's explanation of the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

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Appellate Case: 91-4195 Document: 010110259041 Date Filed: 08/04/1992 Page: 1
reasonableness of the departure was insufficient, vacated the 

sentence, and remanded for resentencing. United States v. Roth, 

934 F.2d 248, 252, 254 (10th Cir. 199l)(Roth I). On remand, the 

district court resentenced defendant to 108 months incarceration, 

providing an explanation of its degree of departure. Defendant 

submitted the instant appeal, again challenging the sufficiency of 

1 the district court's rationale for upward departure. We affirm. 

In Roth I, we followed our three-step review process for 

sentences departing upward from the guidelines. See United States 

v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 277-79 (10th Cir. 1990). First, the 

circumstances cited by the district court must justify an upward 

departure. Id. at 277. In Roth I, we held that the sheer 

quantity of this series of thefts of military equipment, valued at 

$10 million, justified upward departure. 934 F.2d at 251. 

Second, the circumstances cited by the district court to justify 

upward departure must be shown to have actually existed. White, 

893 F.2d at 278. This was not an issue in Roth I, see 934 F.2d at 

251, and is not an issue in this appeal. And third, the degree of 

departure must be reasonable, White, 893 F.2d at 278, and the 

district court must support its degree of departure with specific 

reasons. United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 989-90 (10th 

Cir. 1990)(en bane). In Roth I, we vacated defendant's sentence 

and remanded for resentencing because we found that the district 

court did not set forth specific enough reasons to allow us to 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-4195 Document: 010110259041 Date Filed: 08/04/1992 Page: 2
determine whether the degree of upward departure was reasonable 

under the circumstances of the case. 934 F.2d at 252. 

On remand, the district court again departed upward, 

resentencing defendant to 108 months incarceration. The court 

stated that the degree of departure was the result of its grave 

concern with the national security implications of a theft of 

military equipment of the magnitude involved in this case. The 

court referred to two federal criminal statutes, 18 u.s.c. 

SS 793(d) and 2155, that it determined were analogous to 18 u.s.c. 

§ 641, the statute violated by defendant. Both statutes carry a 

maximum term of ten years, as does § 641. Section 793(d) 

prohibits acts of espionage and carries a sentencing guideli ne 

punishment range of 97-121 months. 2 u.s.s.G. 2M3.2. Section 2155 

prohibits acts of sabotage against property used for national 

defense and carries a sentencing guideline punishment range of 

63-78 months. 3 u.s.s.G. s 2M2.3. 

The district court held that § 793(d) was analogous to 

defendant's conduct because defendant sold the equipment to 

individuals knowing that it could have been resold to others with 

interests adverse to United States national security. R. V. II 

2 The district court incorrectly stated that the base offense 

level for this statute was 121-151 months. R. v. II at 35. That 

is the range for a criminal history level of four, five, or six. 

Defendant's criminal history level was zero. Roth I, 934 F.2d at 

250. In light of our disposition of this case, this error is 

harmless. 

3 The district court incorrectly stated that the base offense 

level for this statute was 78-97 months. R. v. II at 36. That is 

the range for a criminal history level of four, five, or six. 

Defendant's criminal history level was zero. Roth I, 934 F.2d at 

250. In light of our disposition of this case, this error is 

harmless. 

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Appellate Case: 91-4195 Document: 010110259041 Date Filed: 08/04/1992 Page: 3
at 35-36. It held that§ 2155 was analogous because defendant's 

act of selling the equipment and removing it from the Air Force 

base was just as damaging to national security as sabotage of the 

stolen equipment would have been. Id. at 36. The court further 

found that it would have been appropriate to depart upward from 

§ 2155's sentencing range because of the circumstances of the 

case. Arguing that defendant's sentence should be 

proportional to that of an individual convicted under these 

circumstances under § 2155, the district court sentenced the 

defendant to 108 months. Id. at 36-37. 

" [ I ]n determining the reasonableness of the degree of 

departure ... we should afford the trial judge due deference and 

not 'lightly overturn determinations of the appropriate degree of 

departure.'" United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th 

Cir.)(quoting White, 893 F.2d at 279), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 

267 (1990). In the case before us, as required by Roth I the 

district court cited analogous statutes and explained its 

rationale in using the analogous statutes to determine the degree 

of upward departure in defendant's resentencing. Under the due 

deference standard, we hold that the district court explained the 

reasonableness of its degree of upward departure sufficiently. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel, 

Circuit Judge 

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