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Parties Involved:
Shawn Vadell Edwards
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 2004 Decided November 12, 2004

No. 03-3095

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SHAWN VADELL EDWARDS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00054-01)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed,

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-3095 Document #859536 Filed: 11/12/2004 Page 1 of 12
2

Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and Stephen J. Gripkey, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: A jury found defendant Shawn

Edwards guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. At the trial, police officer Brian Glover

testified on direct examination that he apprehended Edwards

after a chase that ended when the officer knocked a gun from

Edwards’ hand. Glover also testified on redirect examination

that he chased Edwards because Edwards ran from him, and

people who had run from him in the past had been carrying

guns or drugs. On appeal, Edwards contends that the latter

testimony was inadmissible because it was not relevant to

whether he possessed a gun on the night in question. Although the government agrees that such testimony would not

have been admissible if offered during direct examination, it

argues that Edwards’ counsel rendered the testimony relevant by a cross-examination that impugned the officer’s motive for chasing the defendant. We agree and affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I

On February 6, 2003, a grand jury indicted Edwards on a

single charge of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The

principal witnesses at Edwards’ trial were police officers

Brian Glover and Christopher Dove. On December 6, 2002,

the two drove a marked police car on routine patrol in

northwest Washington, D.C. Glover testified that, while driving east on the 100 block of Q Street, he and Dove observed a

group of men, including Edwards, loitering in front of a

residence. Because residents of the neighborhood had complained to the police about people standing in front of their

homes, Glover said he called out to the group: ‘‘Gentlemen,

y’all need to move on.’’ 5/8/03 Tr. at 68. The men started to

walk away; Edwards walked in one direction and his companUSCA Case #03-3095 Document #859536 Filed: 11/12/2004 Page 2 of 12
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ions walked in another. Edwards, who had his hand in his

jacket, then yelled at the officers: ‘‘What the f*** you looking

at?’’ Id. at 69.

Glover testified that, because the officers were on a oneway street with traffic behind them, they drove around the

block. As the officers drove down First Street, they again

encountered Edwards, who ‘‘was looking over his shoulder’’ at

them. Id. at 72. According to Dove, Edwards then ‘‘[ran] his

mouth again.’’ Id. at 137. Glover and Dove moved on,

circling the block once more. This time they encountered

Edwards on Bates Street.

Officer Glover testified that, upon this third encounter,

Officer Dove ‘‘yelled over to [Edwards], and stated, what the

F is your problem?’’ Id. at 73. Edwards replied with:

‘‘[W]hat the F are you looking at?’’ Id. As Glover began to

get out of the police car, Edwards took off running through

an alley, holding his left jacket pocket. Glover gave chase on

foot, and Dove drove around to the other end of the alley.

When Edwards emerged from the alley, running in front of

the police car, Dove got out and joined the chase. Both

officers testified that, as Dove neared Edwards, the latter

reached into his jacket, pulled his hand out, and turned

towards Dove with a semi-automatic pistol. Dove then tackled Edwards, knocking the pistol — later found to be fully

loaded — into the snow. After a brief struggle, the officers

subdued Edwards with pepper spray and arrested him.

In the course of cross-examining Officer Glover, defense

counsel repeatedly suggested that, after first encountering

Edwards, the officers pursued him because he had yelled a

profanity at them. This line of questioning reached its

crescendo when counsel suggested that the officers had decided to harass Edwards:

Q. TTT [Y]ou decided on that third sighting to stop

your car there on Bates Street and confront him; is that

right?

A. Yes, sir.

TTTT

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Q. You and Officer Dove had talked about jacking up

this guy who was vulgar and profane with you; isn’t that

right?

A. No, sir.

Q. You had talked about, I think maybe we should

confront this young man about his profanity; isn’t that

right?

A. About the profanity, sir, yes.

Q. So you and Dove had talked about this is what we

should do.

A. No. If we see him, find out what’s his problem, yes,

sir.

Id. at 103-04.

After defense counsel finished cross-examining Officer Glover, the prosecutor alerted the court, in limine, that on

redirect examination he planned to ask Glover certain questions for rehabilitative purposes:

[Defense counsel], through his questioning, from my

perspective elicited testimony that suggests that the

officer was somehow doing something wrong when he

chased someone who immediately fled as he got out of

his car. I intend to ask him questions about other

experiences he’s had where people have fled, whether he

has found drugs and guns on those individualsTTTT I

think that’s appropriate, given the connotations that

[counsel] has raised with his questions TTTT

Id. at 120-21. When the court asked defense counsel whether

he had any objection to this line of questioning, counsel

responded: ‘‘I’ll think about it.’’ Id. at 121. The prosecutor’s

questioning of Glover then proceeded as follows:

Q. Defense counsel also focused on your pursuit of the

defendant when he began running.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you pursued other individuals who have run

when they’ve seen you?

A. Yes.

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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to object on this

point on relevance, what he’s done in other cases.

[PROSECUTOR]: And it’s based on what we raised

before.

THE COURT: I understand that, and I am going to

overrule the objection.

Id. at 126-27. Following the court’s ruling, the prosecutor

resumed his questioning:

Q. And why do you — on those other occasions when

you’ve pursued individuals, have you recovered weapons

and drugs?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that true in every case that you followed someone?

A. On a foot pursuit, yes.

Q. Okay. And when he ran, did you have any suspicion?

A. The way that he was holding his left side of his body,

like if he’s holding something from falling out of his

jacket or pocket area, the left side.

Q. What did you suspect? Did you have any suspicion

about what it might be?

A. On foot chases like that, from my prior knowledge,

could be —

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to object. This is

clearly irrelevant. This is clearly improper.

Id. at 127.

At the ensuing bench conference, Edwards’ counsel

charged that ‘‘the government is now being allowed to create

the impression that because this officer has had successful

foot chases in the past[,] TTT this must have been a successful

foot chase.’’ Id. at 128. The prosecutor denied the charge,

arguing that defense counsel ‘‘has attacked, in essence, the

credibility and the aura of the encounter between Officer

Glover and the defendant, and he attacked the basis for the

officer getting out of his car.’’ Id. The prosecutor continued:

‘‘He’s attacking [the officers’] motives for pursuing the defenUSCA Case #03-3095 Document #859536 Filed: 11/12/2004 Page 5 of 12
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dant, and I am TTT attempting to establish through factual

questions the basis for their having suspicion.’’ Id. at 128-29.

The court agreed with the prosecutor, stating that ‘‘it seems

to me [Glover’s] motive in this case can be that he decides to

chase based on his experiences in other cases.’’ Id. at 129.

Although the court overruled the objection, it offered to give

a limiting instruction to the jury and invited counsel to submit

one. No limiting instruction was submitted.

After the bench conference, the prosecutor concluded his

questioning as follows:

Q. Why were you chasing this man?

A. Because he ran off from when I tried to make

contact with him, and he was holding his left side inside

of his jacket. It was my suspicion that he might have

been carrying narcotics. They usually run and they

throw drugs or possibly a weapon.

Q. But you don’t know — he could have been carrying

nothing; isn’t that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Id. at 131.

Edwards did not testify, and the defense called no witnesses on his behalf. The parties stipulated that Edwards

had a prior felony conviction and that the pistol had been

transported in interstate commerce. On May 12, 2003, the

jury found Edwards guilty as charged.

II

On appeal, Edwards presents a single issue for review:

whether Officer Glover’s testimony — that he chased Edwards because in every case in which an individual had run

from him in the past, the individual had been carrying guns

or drugs — was relevant. Appellant’s Br. at 1 (Statement of

Issues Presented for Review). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. FED.

R. EVID. 402. Evidence is relevant, in turn, if it has ‘‘any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.’’ FED. R.

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EVID. 401. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings,

including its admission of testimony over a relevance objection, for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v.

Smith, 232 F.3d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Edwards contends that the only facts ‘‘of consequence to

the determination’’ of his case were whether he knowingly

possessed a firearm, whether he had previously been convicted of a felony, and whether the firearm had been transported

in interstate commerce. He further contends that Glover’s

redirect testimony had no ‘‘tendency to make the existence

of’’ any of those facts ‘‘more probable or less probable.’’ The

government agrees with Edwards that the testimony would

not have been admissible on direct examination to prove that

the defendant knowingly possessed a gun. Oral Arg. Tape at

17:15-17:50.

Nonetheless, the government contends that Glover’s testimony was relevant to whether Glover was biased against

Edwards and thus not a credible witness. That fact was of

‘‘consequence to the determination of the action,’’ the government maintains, because the cross-examination had made it

so. The government argues that defense counsel’s crossexamination created the inference that Edwards’ use of profanity had so incensed the officers that they decided to harass

him — to ‘‘jack[ ] up this guy who was vulgar and profane,’’

5/8/03 Tr. at 103 — and that the officers’ bias was the motive

both for their pursuit of Edwards and for their subsequent

testimony that the gun in question fell from his hand. It was

to rebut this inference, the government explains, that it

offered Glover’s redirect testimony. The purpose of the

testimony was to show that the chase was motivated not by

Glover’s desire to harass the defendant, but rather by his

experience with people who had fled from him in the past.1

The government’s argument is persuasive. As we have

noted before, ‘‘[s]ome matters are properly provable only

1 Of course, the redirect testimony also had a ‘‘tendency to make’’

an ultimate fact — Edwards’ possession of the pistol — ‘‘more

probable.’’ FED. R. EVID. 401. It had this tendency because, by

rehabilitating Glover after the attack on his credibility, it made it

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because the opposing party has made them such.’’ United

States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1997).2

 Indeed,

Edwards agrees that Glover’s previous experience with fleeing defendants would have been relevant had his counsel

actually questioned Glover’s reasons for chasing Edwards

after he began running. Oral Arg. Tape at 22:20-22:55; see

Reply Br. at 3. But Edwards insists that the crossexamination did not imply that Glover had an improper

motive for chasing him after he fled. Rather, he maintains,

the cross-examination merely suggested that the officer had

an improper motive for repeatedly circling the block after

their first encounter.

We do not believe that the cross-examination can be parsed

so finely. It is true that certain portions focused on the

officers’ motives for circling the block.3

 But other portions

made no distinction between the decision to circle the block

and the decision to chase Glover after he fled.4

 In particular,

more likely that his testimony that Edwards had a gun was true.

See generally FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note (‘‘The

fact to be proved may be ultimate, intermediate, or evidentiary; it

matters not, so long as it is of consequence in the determination of

the action.’’).

2 Cf. United States v. Sumlin, 271 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(suggesting that evidence that an informant previously testified

truthfully may be admissible to rebut a claim of bias arising out of

his plea agreement); Russo, 104 F.3d at 433-34 (holding that the

defendant’s testimony that his wife cleaned other people’s houses

for free was admissible to rebut the prosecutor’s attack on the

credibility of the defendant’s claim that his wife cleaned his employer’s house for free).

3 See, e.g., 5/8/03 Tr. at 98-99 (‘‘Q. How did you feel when he made

that statement to you, ‘What the f*** are you looking at?’ A. Well,

I didn’t think nothing of itTTTT Q. So then it was Officer Dove who

wanted to go around the block to confront him again about that; is

that right?’’).

4 See, e.g., id. at 99 (‘‘Q. TTT [I]f you wanted to know why he had

made that remark to you, then you were trying to confront the

defendant, were you not?’’).

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a jury could readily have viewed defense counsel’s suggestion

that ‘‘[y]ou and Officer Dove had talked about jacking up this

guy who was vulgar and profane with you,’’ 5/8/03 Tr. at 103,

as a wholesale attack on the officers’ motives throughout the

course of events that led to Edwards’ arrest. And as we held

in United States v. Bailey, 319 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 2003),

when evidence gives rise to a ‘‘plausible’’ jury inference —

even if a mistaken one — ‘‘evidence to rebut that inference is

relevant.’’ Id. at 518.

Nor did defense counsel’s statements during the bench

conferences suggest that he perceived the sharp distinction

that Edwards now asserts on appeal. Indeed, when the court

concluded that ‘‘it seems to me [Glover’s] motive in this case

can be that he decided to chase based on his experience in

other cases,’’ 5/8/03 Tr. at 129 (emphasis added), defense

counsel’s response was to attack the form of the prosecutor’s

question, rather than the court’s failure to distinguish between stages of the encounter:

That really wasn’t the question that he asked. Why did

you chase this defendant? Because he fled, and in my

experience, people who flee may have something to hide.

If that had been the question, then I probably would not

have objectedTTTT In other words, the question wasn’t

nearly as focused as I’ve just stated.

Id. at 129 (emphasis added).5

Finally, any doubt as to what inference the defense was

actually trying to suggest to the jury was dispelled by the

defendant’s closing argument. There, defense counsel made

clear he was charging that the officers’ anger over the

defendant’s language and attitude colored every stage of that

evening’s events:

It doesn’t take any kind of fancy legal argument to figure

out what was going on on the night of December 6 at the

5 As noted above, when the prosecutor resumed his redirect

examination after the bench conference, he rephrased his question

in the form suggested by defense counsel. See 5/8/03 Tr. at 131

(‘‘Q. Why were you chasing this man?’’).

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unit block of Q Street. Mr. Edwards dissed the police.

And within 10 minutes or less, 10 minutes or less, he was

chased, he was maced, and he was busted. He made a

profane remark to the police, and within 10 minutes, he

was chased, maced, and busted. And looking back on it,

TTT isn’t it completely obvious that TTT after he made

that remark and after the police started going around the

block, TTT something bad was going to happen to Mr.

Edwards?

5/9/03 Tr. at 14. In short, because counsel claimed that it was

Edwards’ profane remark that motivated each subsequent

encounter — i.e., his being ‘‘chased, maced, and busted’’ —

the district court properly admitted the officer’s testimony

that the pursuit was instead motivated by other considerations.

III

As noted above, the only issue Edwards raises in his

Statement of Issues Presented for Review is the relevance of

Glover’s redirect testimony. Appellant’s Br. at 1. Similarly,

the argument headings of Edwards’ briefs contend only that

the testimony should have been excluded because it was not

relevant. Id. at 9-10; Reply Br. at 2. Edwards has not

expressly argued — either on appeal or at trial — that, even

if relevant, the redirect testimony should have been excluded

as substantially more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.6

 Nonetheless, Edwards’ brief does

declare that Glover’s testimony was prejudicial, arguing that

there was a risk that the jury would take the officer’s

testimony about other fleeing defendants as proof that Edwards fled because he, too, possessed weapons or drugs.

Appellant’s Br. at 13. The government’s brief appears to

6 Rule 403 provides: ‘‘Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.’’ FED. R. EVID. 403.

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treat this as an argument under Rule 403. See Appellee’s Br.

at 17-20.

At oral argument, Edwards’ counsel clarified the defendant’s position. Although Edwards was not mounting a Rule

403 argument, counsel said, Edwards was contending that

any potential prejudice required exclusion of Glover’s redirect

testimony because the testimony was not relevant at all.

This argument misapprehends the structure of the Federal

Rules. If the testimony had been wholly irrelevant, it would

have been inadmissible regardless of whether it was prejudicial. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (‘‘Evidence which is not relevant is

not admissible.’’). But because we have concluded that the

testimony was relevant, it was admissible unless another rule

provided otherwise. See id. (‘‘All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by TTT these rules TTTT’’).

The rule that directly responds to Edwards’ charge of prejudice is Rule 403. And that rule permits the exclusion of

relevant evidence only ‘‘if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’’ FED. R. EVID.

403 (emphasis added).

The defendant’s disinclination to make a Rule 403 argument in this case is well justified. First, the prosecutor

introduced the redirect examination with a reference that

emphasized it was a response to the cross-examination,7

 and

he concluded it with a question making clear that, although

Glover’s prior experience explained why the officer chased

Edwards, it did not establish that Edwards himself had a

gun.8

 Moreover, once the redirect was completed, the prosecutor never referred to it again, either in questioning other

7 See 5/8/03 Tr. at 126 (‘‘Q. Defense counsel also focused on your

pursuit of the defendant when he began running.’’).

8 See 5/8/03 Tr. at 131 (‘‘Q. Why were you chasing this man? A.

Because he ran off from when I tried to make contact with him, and

he was holding his left side inside of his jacket. It was my

suspicion that he might have been carrying narcotics. They usually

run and they throw drugs or possibly a weapon. Q. But you don’t

know — he could have been carrying nothing; isn’t that correct?

A. Yes, sir.’’ (emphasis added)).

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witnesses or in closing argument. Finally, while the risk that

the jury would misuse the testimony could have been further

reduced by a limiting instruction, Edwards cannot object to

the court’s failure to give such an instruction: although the

court expressly invited defense counsel to submit an instruction, he never did so. See United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d

207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that a defendant may not

appeal a district court’s failure to issue a limiting instruction

when the defendant did not request one); see also FED. R.

EVID. 105 (providing that an appropriate limiting instruction

shall be given ‘‘upon request’’).9

 Accordingly, we conclude

that the probative value of Glover’s redirect testimony in

countering the inference of bias was not ‘‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,’’ FED. R. EVID. 403.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court

did not err in admitting the challenged testimony. The

judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

9 The government urges that, because Edwards failed to request

a limiting instruction, he waived any claim that Officer Glover’s

testimony unfairly prejudiced him. See Appellee’s Br. at 17-18. In

United States v. Rogers, however, this court held to the contrary:

‘‘A lawyer can choose not to ask for a limiting instruction, and if he

does choose not to ask for an instruction, he cannot appeal the

district judge’s failure to issue one. In exercising that strategic

prerogative, however, a lawyer does not thereby waive his objection

to the admission of evidence in the first instance.’’ 918 F.2d at 212

(citations omitted).

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