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Parties Involved:
National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 30, 2001 Decided February 26, 2002

No. 00-1390

National Association of Letter Carriers,

AFL-CIO, Branch 3126,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Thomas N. Ciantra argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Keith E. Secular.

James M. Oleske, Jr., Attorney, National Labor Relations

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

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Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Sharon I. Block,

Attorney.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Randolph and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Chief Judge: Because union stewards prevented

a non-union postal employee from filing a grievance, the

National Labor Relations Board required the union not only

to process the grievance but also to pay for the employee to

be represented throughout the grievance proceedings by

counsel of his own choosing. The union now petitions for

review insofar as the Board required it to pay legal fees for

independent representation, and the Board cross-applies for

enforcement of its order. We deny the petition for review

and grant the application for enforcement.

I. Background

Joe Pitlanish, a letter carrier for the post office in Troy,

Michigan, is not a member of the local union, Branch 3126, an

affiliate of the National Association of Letter Carriers. In

January, 1997 Pitlanish tried to file a grievance about the

distribution of overtime opportunities, but the Union stewards

thwarted his efforts. The principal obstacle was steward

Greg Swindall, who referred to Pitlanish as "Scablanish" and

who refused to process the grievance.

The General Counsel issued a complaint alleging the Union

had violated s 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act.

After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge agreed and

ordered the Union to process Pitlanish's grievance. Upon

review the Board upheld the ALJ but modified the recommended remedy by requiring the Union to "bear the reasonable costs of an attorney of Pitlanish's choosing to represent

him at any grievance proceedings, including arbitration, that

may take place." Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 330

N.L.R.B. No. 85, at 2 n.3. The Union sought and the Board

denied reconsideration of that part of its decision.

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II. Analysis

The National Labor Relations Act expansively authorizes

the Board to remedy unfair labor practices by "tak[ing] such

affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of [the

Act]." 29 U.S.C. s 160(c). Hence, the Board's remedial

discretion is "subject only to limited judicial review." SureTan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 (1984). This court

"will not disturb a remedy ordered by the Board unless it can

be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends

other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the

policies of the Act." Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB,

240 F.3d 26, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

For nearly thirty years the Board has required unions to

pay for independent legal representation of employees who

were treated unfairly when they tried to file grievances. See,

e.g., Teamsters Local 186, 203 N.L.R.B. 799, 805 (1973); Am.

Postal Workers Union, 327 N.L.R.B. 759, 770 (1999). The

Second and Ninth Circuits have expressly endorsed this

remedy. S.F. Web Pressmen and Platemakers' Union No. 4

v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[A] union may

be liable for the expense of outside representation if it has

failed to process a nonfrivolous grievance fairly"); NLRB v.

Local 485, 454 F.2d 17, 22 n.9 (2d Cir. 1972).

The Union accuses the Board of imposing the remedy in

this case arbitrarily, offering no justification for it and never

"explain[ing] why such a remedy is appropriate in some cases

but not in others." A standard remedy, however, does not

have to be explained anew in every case; it is the norm.

Only a departure from the norm requires explanation. See

Henry J. Kaiser Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1, 3 n.5 (1981) (explaining

that independent representation was unnecessary because

liability for backpay gave union incentive to "process the

grievance in good faith and with due diligence").

According to the Union, the Ninth Circuit has required the

Board to "link the attorney's fee remedy to the circumstances

of the particular case" in which it is used. Yes and no. In

NLRB v. Local Union 396, 509 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir.

1975), the court ruled that although an "order compelling the

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Union to pay counsel fees was within the [Board's] zone of

discretion," the Board needed to explain why, in the circumstances there presented, it ordered the union to pay "attorney's fees as opposed to fees for a paraprofessional." Id.

The issue was whether a lawyer was needed, not whether the

union should pay if the need was there. In a later case where

the need for a lawyer was not in doubt, the court treated the

order requiring the union to pay as routine. S.F. Web

Pressmen, 794 F.2d at 423.

The Union next maintains that it could have provided

Pitlanish with unbiased in-house representation; but the

Board surely acted within its discretion in deciding that the

Union stewards' mistreatment of Pitlanish rendered independent counsel the more prudent remedial choice. See id. at

423 n.5 ("Exclusive representation by the Union is the rule,

and privately retained counsel the exception. Given the

Union's breach of [its duty to process a nonfrivolous grievance], the Board's order is within the exception"). Similarly,

the Union to the contrary notwithstanding, the Board had the

discretion not to limit its independent counsel remedy to the

first two steps of the grievance process. Although the third

step involves the national rather than the local union, the

Board reasonably doubted the NALC would provide Pitlanish

with vigorous representation in light of its relation to Branch

3126.

The Union also argues that the Board here imposed a

penalty in the guise of a remedy, something clearly beyond its

authority. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.

42, 52 (1979). Providing for independent representation at

the Union's expense was not punitive, however; it merely put

Pitlanish in the position he would have occupied but for the

Union's unfair labor practice. As the Ninth Circuit said of

this type of situation:

If the Union had not violated its duty of fair representation by its discriminatory refusal to process the grievances, the issues would have been resolved by litigation

or arbitration in which the aggrieved employees would

have enjoyed vigorous representation at no added cost to

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themselves. They cannot be restored to that position

unless they are relieved of the expenses they will incur in

securing the independent representation to which they

are concededly entitled.

Local Union 396, 509 F.2d at 1079.

Finally, the Union argues that bringing outside counsel into

the processing of a grievance will undermine the Union as the

exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining

unit. As the Board points out, the Union forfeited this

argument by failing to raise it when it moved the Board for

reconsideration. See 29 U.S.C. s 160(e) ("No objection that

has not been urged before the Board ... shall be considered

by the court"). The Union did there characterize the remedy

as a "wholly unwarranted intrusion on the NALC's right to

administer the collective bargaining agreement," but that was

in support of its argument that an independent counsel is

simply "not necessary ... to ensure the independent and

adequate representation to which [Pitlanish] is entitled." The

Union did not give the Board an opportunity to rule upon the

institutional argument it would now advance. In any event,

the Union's role as the exclusive representative for collective

bargaining does not inoculate it against liability to make

whole an individual employee whom it has wronged.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied

and the cross-application for enforcement is granted.

So ordered.

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