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Parties Involved:
Jack Cowley
Appellee
Ricky Joe Orr
Appellant
The Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL ~D 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tentb Cireuit 

FOR THE TENTH CI RCUIT FEB 1 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RICKY JOE ORR, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

JACK COWLEY; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-7053 

) (D.C. No. 90-289-S) 

) (E.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Petitioner-appellant Ricky Joe Orr is presently serving a 

life sentence in Oklahoma on a conviction for first degree murder. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, and the Oklahoma Court of 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-7053 Document: 010110222588 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 1 
Criminal Appeals affirmed. Orr v. State, 764 P.2d 1362 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1988). Petitioner then filed a state post-conviction 

application. After an evidentiary hearing, the state trial court 

denied the application, which denial was likewise affirmed on 

appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied Petitioner's Writ of 

Certiorari. 

Petitioner 

district court. 

then sought habeas corpus relief 

A magistrate judge recommended 

in federal 

denying the 

petition, and his Findings and Recommendation were adopted by the 

district court. Petitioner now appeals. Our jurisdiction arises 

from 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The district court denied Petitioner's 

motion for certificate of probable cause and leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis. Petitioner moved for a certificate of probable 

cause in this court. We grant probable cause certification and 

affirm. 

I 

In his prose habeas petition before the district court, 

Petitioner contended that the state trial court erred in denying 

his post-conviction application without written findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. The district court found this argument 

meritless "as the record made at the evidentiary hearing reflects 

all the findings made by the (state trial] court judge in regard 

to each issue." Findings and Recommendation, Appellant's App. at 

15. On appeal, Petitioner first contends that this ruling is 

contrary to law. We review Petitioner's assignment of legal error 

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de nova. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 931 F.2d 678, 681 

(10th Cir. 1991) . 

The state trial court determined that the vast majority of 

issues presented in Petitioner's state post-conviction application 

were procedurally barred. Petitioner appears to assert that, 

because the state trial court took evidence on Petitioner's 

claims, but then failed to rule on the merits, the district 

court's subsequent reliance on procedural bar was improper. 

Petitioner also contends that the district court's ruling violated 

his right to a full and fair hearing, and is contrary to state law 

allowing federal habeas review of constitutional issues ruled on 

by state courts. 

Petitioner misunderstands the nature and basis of procedural 

bar. In looking at a state prisoner's federal habeas claims, we 

will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court 

if that state court decision rests on an independent and adequate 

state law ground. See Coleman v . Thompson, 111 s. Ct. 2546, 

2553-54 (1991)(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 

(1977)). "This rule applies whether the state law ground is 

substantive or procedural." Id. at 2554. 

Petitioner' s assertion that, in considering his federal 

claims, the state trial court was bound to rule on the merits, is 

incorrect. Cf. id. at 2558 (rejecting argument that "federal 

courts [should] apply a conclusive presumption of no independent 

and adequate state grounds in every case in which a state prisoner 

presented his federal claims to a state court, regardless of 

whether it fairly appears that the state courts addressed those 

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claims."). Alternatively, Petitioner's argument implies that the 

state trial court reached the merits of Petitioner's federal 

claims and decided them on a federal law basis. The record 

reflects otherwise. The state trial court procedurally barred the 

majority of Petitioner's claims because he had failed to raise 

them in his direct appeal. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, 

Appellant's App. at 102-08. The district court properly applied 

procedural bar. See generally Gilbert v. Scott, 941 F.2d 1065, 

1065-66 (10th Cir. 1991)(noting state disposition, under Oklahoma 

law, that issues not raised in direct appeal are procedurally 

barred when brought in state post-conviction application, citing 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1086 and Webb v. State, 661 P.2d 904, 

905 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959 (1983)). 

Finally, Petitioner's claim that the district court's 

reliance on procedural bar is contrary to 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d) is 

without merit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a state court's 

findings of fact, with certain specified exceptions, carry a 

presumption of correctness in habeas cases. See Hernandez v. New 

York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991). Nothing in that statute 

requires any court to reach the merits of Petitioner's claims. 

II 

Petitioner next asserts that the original trial court's 

refusal to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter, a 

lesser included offense of first degree murder, "infected the 

entire trial so as to completely deny Petitioner due process." 

Appellant's Brief at 10. Our review of this issue is limited to a 

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determination whether the alleged jury instruction error "'had the 

effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as to cause 

a denial of a fair trial in the constitutional sense.'" Shafer v. 

Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir.)(quoting Brinlee v. Crisp, 

608 F.2d 839, 854 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1047 

(1980), and citing Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989)), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 393 (1990). 

The essence of Petitioner's argument is that evidence in the 

record supports a manslaughter instruction, because it contains 

testimony probative of "heat of passion," see Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 21, § 711 (defining first degree manslaughter). "Heat of 

passion" has several elements, including "a strong passion or an 

emotion such as anger, rage or resentment." Allen v. State, 821 

P.2d 371, 374 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). The evidence Petitioner 

claims supports the element of "heat of passion" is evidence that, 

before the shooting, the v i ctim was chasing after Petitioner and 

swinging at him. 

We agree with the district court that the record does not 

support an instruction on first degree manslaughter, because it is 

devoid of any evidence of "strong passion or emotion," and 

therefore, of "heat of passion." See Boltz v. State, 806 P.2d 

1117, 1123-24 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 143 

(1991); cf. Rumbo v. State, 750 P.2d 1132, 1132-33 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1988)(failure to instruct on manslaughter not an abuse of 

court's discretion where no evidence of previous or 

contemporaneous disagreement). We conclude that Petitioner has 

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failed in his "heavy burden" to show that the refusal of an 

instruction on first degree manslaughter was fundamentally unfair 

or a denial of due process. See Shafer, 906 F.2d at 508. 

III 

Petitioner contends that the original trial court precluded 

him from exercising his allowed number of peremptory challenges. 

Under Oklahoma law, nine peremptory challenges are provided the 

defendant in capital cases. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 90 

(1988). The trial court has a duty to inform counsel of the 

proper number of peremptory challenges available. See White v. 

State, 726 P.2d 905, 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)(Parks, P.J. , 

dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 907 (1988). However, counsel 

remains free to waive peremptory challenges. See id. The record 

reflects that each side submitted five peremptory challenges in 

writing. Two of Petitioner's challenges were, apparently, 

duplicates of those submitted by the state. Petitioner's counsel 

objected to the loss of the two duplicated challenges, and the 

trial court overruled the objection. Trial Transcript, 

Appellant's App. at 52. 

On appeal, Petitioner contends that the transcript, though 

not complete, is adequate and demonstrates that the trial court 

erroneously ordered the parties to limit their peremptory 

challenges to five each and erroneously precluded Petitioner from 

re-exercising the duplicated challenges. This issue has two 

distinct parts: 1) did Petitioner waive his right to four of his 

allowed peremptory challenges by agreeing to exercise only five 

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and 2) did Petitioner waive his right to re-exercise the 

duplicated challenges when he agreed to submit his challenges in 

writing? 

The state appellate court, in Petitioner's direct appeal, 

determined that Petitioner's attorney had agreed to reduce the 

number of his peremptory challenges to five. Orr, 764 P.2d at 

1365. This factual finding is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d); ~ Hernandez, 111 s. Ct. at 1869. Petitioner has made 

no showing that questions this presumption. Based on the state 

court's finding, Petitioner waived his right to nine peremptory 

challenges. 

As an alternative ground, both the state trial court on 

direct appeal and the district court ruled that the record was 

insufficient for review. Orr, 764 P.2d 1364; Findings and 

Recommendation, Appellant's App. at 13-14. Following our review 

of the record, we agree. Without a transcript of the state trial 

court's instructions prior to counsels' submission of their 

written peremptory challenges, the record on appeal is inadequate 

for us to review Petitioner's challenge to the loss of the two 

duplicated challenges . In light of this conclusion, we agree with 

the district court that we cannot consider this claim of error. 

See United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 671 (10th Cir. 1984), 

cert . denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985); Brown v. State, 745 P.2d 741, 

742 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)(citing Dollar v. State, 674 P.2d 48, 

50 (Okla. Crim. App 1984)). 

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IV 

Petitioner's fourth argument is that the district court 

improperly relied on procedural bar in his claim of error 

regarding the exclusion of allegedly exculpatory e vidence. The 

record indicates that Petitioner's trial attorney failed to inform 

Petitioner of a Motion in Limine regarding the testimony of 

several juveniles who had allegedly appeared on the scene after 

the shooting and vandalized the victim's truck. Petitioner 

asserted, in his post-conviction suit, that this evidence should 

have been admitted, because it could have provided support for his 

self-defense theory. In Petitioner's post-conviction hearing, the 

state trial court initially denied the claim because Petitioner 

had failed to raise the issue in his direct appeal. Evidentiary 

Hearing Transcript, Appellant's App. at 104. However, that court 

subsequently found that Petitioner did not know about the excluded 

evidence until after his direct appeal. Id. at 108. The district 

court relied on the state court's procedural bar, as affirmed on 

appeal by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and ruled that 

the issue was precluded from review. Findings and Recommendation, 

Appellant's App . at 13 . 

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his 

federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent 

and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas 

review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can 

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice 

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 111 s. Ct. at 2565. Despite its finding that Petitioner 

was unaware of the exclusion of testimony prior to his direct 

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appeal, the state trial court did not address the merits of this 

issue, but found it barred. Therefore, we look to see if the 

district court's reliance on that procedural bar is precluded by a 

showing of cause and prejudice. 

We conclude that Petitioner has not shown cause and 

prejudice; indeed, he alleges neither. 

Petitioner's appellate attorney could 

The record indicates that 

have learned of the 

exclusion of evidence by reference to available court records. 

Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner's lack 

Transcript, 

of knowledge 

Appellant's App. 

of the exclusion 

at 

does 

88. 

not 

constitute cause for his attorney's failure to raise the issue on 

appeal, absent ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner does 

not claim ineffective assistance. See Amadeo v . Zant, 486 U.S. 

214, 222 (1988)(cause must be based on an "objective factor 

external to the defense [which] impeded counsel's efforts," 

quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488 (1986)); Fairchild v. 

Lockhart, 900 F.2d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir.)(counsel's failure to 

discover available and potentially exculpatory evidence not 

legally sufficient cause), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 21 (1990). 

Additionally, Petitioner does not claim prejudice as a result 

of the exclusion of this evidence, nor does Petitioner show that 

considering the claim will prevent a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice . See Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565. 

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V 

Petitioner's final argument concerns the admission of 

evidence of the condition of the victim's body. 1 The district 

court, concurring with the state trial court, found that the 

testimony was specific, relevant, and not so prejudicial as to 

constitute error. Findings and Recommendation, Appellant's App. 

at 14-15. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the district court 

concluded that the body was dragged underneath Petitioner's car. 

He challenges the evidentiary basis for that conclusion, contends 

that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial, and 

asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Petitioner's Motion in Limine to exclude such evidence. 

State court evidentiary rulings are not grounds for habeas 

relief "'unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair as 

to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.'" Chavez 

v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101, 1102 (10th Cir. 1988)(quoting Brinlee, 

608 F . 2d at 850). Petitioner is deprived of a fundamentally fair 

trial if there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of 

the erroneous evidentiary ruling, the outcome of the trial would 

have been different. See Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295 

(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denie d, 480 U.S. 911 (1987). 

The district court found sufficient evidence, outside of the 

evidence of the condition of the victim's body, to convict 

Petitioner of first degree murder. It found the evidence 

1 Medical testimony suggested that the victim's body had 

sustained post-mortem injuries that were consistent with the 

body's having been dragged underneath a car for a mile and a half. 

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relevant, "specific in nature and directed solely to the issues 

before the court." Findings and Recommendation, Appellant's App. 

at 14. Finally, it ruled that the prejudicial effect of the 

evidence was outweighed by its relevance . Following our review of 

the record, we agree . 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

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