Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02733/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02733-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Odell Boulware
Plaintiff
D. M. Dunstan
Defendant
K. L. Hoffman
Defendant
A. P. Kane
Defendant
L. M. Trexler
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN ODELL BOULWARE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

D.M. DUNSTAN, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________

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No. C 06-2733 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket nos. 31, 35)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ruben Odell Boulware, a prisoner of the State of

California, is currently incarcerated at Ironwood State Prison

(ISP). While he was incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility (CTF) in Soledad, California, Plaintiff filed this pro se

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various

constitutional rights violations by CTF prison officials.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants

oppose the motion and have filed motions to dismiss and for summary

judgment. Plaintiff opposes those motions. For the reasons

discussed below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART,

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2006, Plaintiff filed the present action, raising

the following claims: (1) violation of his First Amendment right to

access the courts; (2) violation of his First Amendment rights when

he was retaliated against for filing grievances; (3) violation of

his Due Process rights at a disciplinary hearing; (4) violation of

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment when he was denied clothing; (5) violation of his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when

he was denied outdoor exercise; (6) violation of his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when

he was exposed to overcrowded conditions; (7) violation of his

right to equal protection when he was denied outdoor exercise based

on his race; (8) violation of his right to privacy when he was

strip-searched; and (9) violation of his right to equal protection

when he was strip-searched based on his race.

In an order dated January 31, 2007, the Court found

Plaintiff's first, second and fifth claims to be cognizable;

dismissed Plaintiff's fourth, sixth and eighth claims with

prejudice; and dismissed Plaintiff's third, seventh and ninth

claims with leave to amend. Plaintiff was given thirty days from

the date of the order to file an amended complaint remedying the

deficiencies of his third, seventh and ninth claims. In an order

dated May 30, 2007, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's third, seventh

and ninth claims with prejudice because he failed to file an

amended complaint within the designated time. 

Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that all of

Plaintiff's remaining claims should be dismissed as unexhausted. 

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In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants claim:

(1) the evidence shows that Plaintiff's constitutional rights have

not been violated; and (2) qualified immunity protects them from

liability for the acts alleged in the complaint. 

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff's Grievances

During the times at issue, Plaintiff filed ten grievances. 

Four of those grievances are relevant to Plaintiff's remaining

claims.

On September 10, 2005, Plaintiff submitted inmate grievance

number CTF-05-3006, claiming that Defendants A. P. Kane and L. M.

Trexler denied him outdoor exercise for eight weeks based upon race

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s appeal was

denied at all three levels.

On October 25, 2005, Plaintiff submitted inmate grievance

number CTF-05-3979, claiming the showering and exercise policies at

CTF were insufficient. On February 2, 2006, Plaintiff refused

Defendant K. L. Hoffman’s attempt to interview him regarding this

grievance. The grievance was dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to

participate in the grievance process as required by California Code

of Regulations title 15, § 3084.4(d). Plaintiff did not submit

this appeal to either the Second or Director's Level. 

On December 3, 2005, Plaintiff submitted inmate grievance

number CTF-06-0211, claiming that Defendant D. M. Dunstan was

harassing him. On June 5, 2006, Plaintiff's appeal to the

Director's Level was received. The Director's Level of Review was

completed August 29, 2006. 

On December 5, 2005, Plaintiff submitted inmate grievance

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number CTF-05-3936, claiming staff misconduct by Defendant Dunstan

during a cell search on December 2, 2005. On January 18, 2006,

Plaintiff refused Defendant Dunstan’s attempt to interview him

regarding this appeal. The appeal was dismissed for Plaintiff's

failure to participate in the grievance process as required by

California Code of Regulations title 15, § 3084.4(d). Plaintiff

did not appeal to the Second or Director's Level of Review. 

II. CTF's Lockdown Status

During the times at issue in this case, Plaintiff, a

forty-five-year-old African-American man, was housed at CTF, North

Facility, Shasta Hall. Plaintiff had access to B-yard.

On July 19, 2005, a riot broke out on CTF North Facility

involving African-American and Hispanic inmates. As a result of

this riot, all of North Facility was placed on modified

programming. As of August 23, 2005, all inmates in North Facility,

were returned to normal programming with the exception of the

African-American, Southern Hispanic, and Mexican national inmates

pending further review and investigation of the previous violence. 

As of September 12, 2005, following a stabbing incident

involving Northern Hispanic inmates in North Facility B-yard,

Northern Hispanic, African-American, Southern Hispanic, and Mexican

nationals remained on modified programming. All other inmates in

North Facility B-yard remained on normal programming. As of

September 14, 2005, African-American inmates in North Facility Byard were returned to normal programming.

On September 16, 2005, all inmates in North Facility B-yard

were placed on modified programming following a stabbing incident

involving white inmates on B-yard. On September 29, 2005, all

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inmates in North Facility were returned to normal programming with

the exception of white and Southern Hispanic inmates. As of

October 4, 2005, only Southern Hispanic and white inmates remained

on modified programming.

On October 15, 2005, another riot between African-American and

Hispanic inmates occurred on B-yard, requiring the entire facility

to be placed on modified programming. As of October 18, 2005, only

African-American, Southern Hispanic, and Mexican national inmates

remained on modified programming.

On October 19, 2005, an inmate-manufactured weapon was located

on B-yard necessitating that all B-yard inmates be placed on

modified programming. By October 21, 28 2005, white, 

Northern Hispanic, and other inmates were returned to normal

programming, leaving African-American, Southern Hispanic, and

Mexican nationals on modified programming. 

On November 7, 2005, Northern Hispanic inmates on B-yard in

North Facility were involved in another stabbing incident which

required placing those inmates back on modified programming. At

this time African-American, Northern Hispanic, Southern Hispanic,

and Mexican national inmates remained on modified programming

pending results of investigations relating to the ongoing inmate

unrest. 

As of December 5, 2005, all inmates in North Facility B-yard

were returned to normal programming, with the exception of AfricanAmerican, Southern Hispanic and Mexican national inmates under the

age of thirty-five. 

On December 11, 2005, the entire population in North Facility

was placed back on modified programming following the discovery of

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several missing metal bucket brackets and two missing T-16

canisters. As of December 30, 2005, all inmates in North Facility,

B-yard were returned to normal programming.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants claim that all of Plaintiff's remaining claims

should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies.

A. Legal Standard

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, especially where

civil rights claims are involved. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9

(1980); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In order to satisfy the

requirement, the exhaustion of all "available" remedies is

mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must

they be "plain, speedy, and effective." Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532

U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001).

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the

right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision,

action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having

an adverse effect upon their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies

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within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels

of appeal: (1) informal resolution; (2) formal written appeal on a

602 inmate appeal form; (3) second level appeal to the institution

head or designee; and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Id.

§ 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal.

1997). This satisfies the administrative remedies exhaustion

requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38.

When no other administrative remedy is available, the

exhaustion requirement is deemed fulfilled. Booth, 532 U.S. at 736

n.4. The obligation to exhaust persists as long as some remedy is

available; when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need not

further pursue the grievance. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-

35 (9th Cir. 2005).

Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and inmates are not

required specifically to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their

complaints. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921-22. Because there can be no

absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a

movant claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent

relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels or through

awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of

that process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir.

2005).

B. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment right to access the

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courts was violated by Defendants Dunstan, Hoffman and Trexler when

they attempted to stifle his inmate grievances.

The record shows that Plaintiff has filed one grievance that

could be liberally construed as stating a First Amendment claim. 

In inmate grievance number CTF-05-3936, Plaintiff alleged that, on

December 4, 2005, he submitted an appeal to obtain an informal

response pertaining to a cell-search conducted by Defendant

Dunstan. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dunstan returned the

appeal to him and instructed Plaintiff to "send it to appeals." 

This grievance could be construed as alleging that Defendant

Dunstan tried to stifle Plaintiff's appeal. 

The record shows that grievance CTF-05-3936 was dismissed at

the first level. Plaintiff pursued no further levels of review. 

Therefore, all available administrative remedies with respect to

this grievance have not been exhausted. Barry, 985 F. Supp. at

1237.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Dunstan, Hoffmann and

Trexler collectively blocked his attempt to appeal the grievance

without the authority to do so. Specifically, Plaintiff claims

that he was never interviewed in connection with this grievance.

However, the record shows that Plaintiff refused to leave his cell

to be interviewed by Defendant Trexler. (Dennis Decl. ¶ 13, Ex.

J.) "An appellant's refusal to be interviewed or cooperate with

the reviewer shall result in cancellation of the appeal." Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.4(d).

The Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion of Plaintiff's First

Amendment claim. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed without

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prejudice. Plaintiff may re-file it in another complaint when it

is properly exhausted.

C. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dunstan retaliated against

him for filing inmate grievances. 

The record shows that Plaintiff filed two grievances that

could be liberally construed as stating a retaliation claim: inmate

grievance number CTF-05-3936 and inmate grievance number CTF-06-

0211. As previously discussed, Plaintiff has not exhausted the

administrative remedies for inmate grievance number CTF-05-3936.

In inmate grievance number CTF-06-0211, Plaintiff alleged that

Defendant Dunstan harassed him for filing grievances. On August

29, 2006, this grievance was exhausted. However, because the

grievance was not exhausted until nearly two months after Plaintiff

filed the instant action, the Court may not consider it. See Vaden

v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (A plaintiff

"may initiate litigation in federal court only after the

administrative process ends and leaves his grievances

unredressed.").

Because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies

with respect to his retaliation claim in a timely manner, this

claim is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may re-file it in

another complaint.

D. Denial of Access to Outdoor Exercise

Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment was violated by Defendants

Trexler and Kane when they denied him access to outdoor exercise.

The record shows that Plaintiff filed two grievances that

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could be liberally construed as stating a denial of exercise claim:

inmate grievance number CTF-05-3006 and inmate grievance number

CTF-05-3979. 

In inmate grievance number CTF-05-3979, Plaintiff alleged that

the showering and exercise policies at CTF were insufficient. The

record shows that on February 2, 2006, Plaintiff refused Defendant

Hoffman’s attempt to interview him regarding this grievance. 

(Dennis Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. H.) The grievance was dismissed for

Plaintiff's failure to participate in the grievance process as

required by California Code of Regulations title 15, § 3084.4(d). 

Because Plaintiff did not appeal this grievance to either the

Second or Director's Level, it is not exhausted.

In inmate grievance number CTF-05-3006, Plaintiff stated that

he was denied access to outdoor exercise for eight weeks based

solely on his race. Defendants admit that inmate grievance number

CTF-05-3006 has been exhausted, but argue that the Court should not

consider it because Plaintiff is stating a Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim, which the Court has previously dismissed,

not an Eighth Amendment claim. Nonetheless, the Court will

liberally construe this pro se civil rights claim as stating an

Eighth Amendment claim. See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 9. 

Because Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies with

respect to his denial of exercise claim in a timely and complete

manner, Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim as unexhausted is

DENIED.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's

remaining claims. Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's

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First Amendment and retaliation claims as unexhausted, the Court

does not address them on the merits.

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

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2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

B. Denial of Access to Outdoor Exercise

Plaintiff alleges that from July 19 to the end of September,

2005, he was denied access to outdoor exercise in violation of his

Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but

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neither does it permit inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and

the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny

under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993). In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment," the

Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The Eighth Amendment also

imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners

with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter,

sanitation, medical care and personal safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.

189, 199-200 (1989).

Exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by

the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). 

"[T]he denial of fresh air and regular outdoor exercise and

recreation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). Some form of regular

exercise, including outdoor exercise, "is extremely important to

the psychological and physical well being" of prisoners. Id.

Prison officials therefore may not deprive prisoners long-term of

regular outdoor exercise. Id. 

Deprivation of necessities by a prison official violates the

Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the

deprivation alleged is objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834, and (2) the prison official possesses a

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In determining whether a

deprivation of a basic necessity, such as outdoor exercise, is

sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component, a court

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must consider the circumstances, nature and duration of the

deprivation. Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. To satisfy the subjective

component, the requisite state of mind depends on the nature of the

claim. In prison-conditions cases, the necessary state of mind is

one of "deliberate indifference." See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834 (inmate safety).

The denial of outdoor exercise for security reasons does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1458

(9th Cir. 1993). In LeMaire, the Ninth Circuit reversed the

district court's post-trial findings that depriving the plaintiff

of outdoor exercise during his nearly five year confinement

amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. The plaintiff in

LeMaire had attacked two correctional officers and vowed to attack

again; therefore, the court found that restricting his exercise

privileges to exercising only within his cell did not meet the

subjective requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation because

"prison officials are authorized and indeed required to take

appropriate measures to maintain prison order and discipline and

protect staff and other prisoners from such violent inmates." Id.

Similarly, in Hayward v. Procunier, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

district court's rejection of an Eighth Amendment claim where the

plaintiffs were denied outdoor exercise for five months following a

lockdown in response to a "genuine emergency." 629 F.2d 599, 603

(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981).

Plaintiff's deprivation was not objectively serious. 

Plaintiff was denied access for periods of eleven and eight weeks,

far shorter than the period of deprivation in Spain or Lemaire. 

Furthermore, the record shows that prison officials made various

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attempts during this period to restore privileges and return to

normal programming.

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The record and

Plaintiff's own allegations show that he and other prisoners were

denied outdoor exercise pursuant to various lockdown procedures

enacted by prison officials in response to various incidents of

unrest. As previously noted, the denial of outdoor exercise for

security reasons does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See

Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference because they did not implement lockdown procedures

that would have allowed him access to outdoor exercise. For

example, Plaintiff argues that African-American and Hispanic

inmates could have been given access to medical facilities and

outdoor exercise on alternate days. However, as noted above, case

law dictates that "prison officials are authorized and indeed

required to take appropriate measures to maintain prison order and

discipline and protect staff and other prisoners from such violent

inmates." Lemaire, 12 F.3d at 1458. 

Because Plaintiff has not made a showing sufficient to survive

summary judgment on this claim, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment.

C. Qualified Immunity 

In the alternative, Defendants claim that they are entitled to

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

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conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects "'all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). Defendants may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief

about the facts or about what the law requires in any given

situation. Id. "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established'

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the court must engage in the following inquiries. At the

outset, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). In other words, the court must

ask, "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right?" Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197

(2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this inquiry yields a

positive answer, then the court proceeds to determine if the right

was "clearly established." Id.

The inquiry as to whether the right at issue was clearly

established must be made in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

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202. "Although earlier cases involving 'fundamentally similar'

facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that

the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a

finding." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As the

Supreme Court has explained, "[O]fficials can still be on notice

that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances." Id. at 753. The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the existence of a clearly established right at the time of

the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). 

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could

have believed his or her conduct was lawful in the situation

confronted. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th

Cir. 1993). If the law did not put the officer on notice that his

or her conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Therefore, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when he

or she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,

reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he or

she confronted. Id. at 206. The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, even though

he or she violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Doe v.

Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995);

Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Maraziti,

953 F.2d at 523. 

Even if Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment

rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity because they have

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produced sufficient evidence to show that they could have believed

that their actions were reasonable. During the time at issue, CTF

experienced a series of violent incidents. Reasonable prison

officials in Defendants' position could have thought that

implementing lockdown procedures, whereby Plaintiff was denied

access to outdoor exercise, was justified due the need to take

appropriate measures to maintain prison order and discipline and

protect staff and other prisoners. Accordingly, Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment claim based on qualified immunity.

III. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment on all his

remaining claims. Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's

First Amendment and retaliation claims as unexhausted, the Court

does not address them on the merits. 

Because the parties have filed cross-motions for summary

judgment, the Court has considered all of the evidence submitted by

Defendants in support of their motions, as well as the admissible

evidence submitted by Plaintiff to evaluate whether summary

judgment should be granted to Plaintiff. See Fair Housing Council

of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1135

(9th Cir. 2001). For the reasons discussed above, the Court

concludes that, with respect to his denial of access to outdoor

exercise claim, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants acted

with deliberate indifference or that he suffered physical injury. 

On Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, when the Court, as it

must, regards as true Defendants' evidence and draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of Defendants, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, no

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genuine issues of material fact exist which entitle Plaintiff to

judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment (docket no. 31) is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment

and retaliation claims for failure to exhaust (docket no. 35) is

GRANTED. These claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff

may re-file these claims in a new complaint. Defendants' motion

for summary judgment (docket no. 35) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's

Eighth Amendment claim and judgment in favor of Defendants shall be

entered. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (docket no. 31)

is DENIED.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendants, terminate all pending motions and close the file.

3. This Order terminates Docket nos. 31 and 35.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12/18/07

Dated 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN ODELL BOULWARE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

D.M. DUNSTAN et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-02733 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on December 18, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Emily L. Brinkman

CA Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Ave.

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Ruben Odell Boulware #V16965

California Mens Colony-East

P.O. Box 8101

San Luis Obispo, CA 93409-8101

Dated: December 18, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-02733-CW Document 47 Filed 12/18/07 Page 20 of 20