Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01253/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01253-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bi-Rite Package, Inc.
Appellee
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Appellant
General Lines, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GENERAL LINES, INC . , dba ~i-Rite Payless Drugsv Inc., 

BI-RITE PACKAGE, INC., 

Defendant-Appellees. 

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FILED Uni~ Statea Cour-t of Appeals (tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 01989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1253 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

{C85-0517B) 

John F. Suhre (Charles A. Shaner , General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young 

Reams, Associate General Counsel, Vella M. Fink, Assistant General 

Counsel, with him on the briefs), Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, Washi ngton, D.C., attorney for Appellant. 

Bruce P. Badley (Clay B. Jenkins with him on the brief), Sheridan, 

Wyoming, attorney for Appellee . 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge . 

Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant Equal Employment 

Oppo'rtunity Commission (EEOC} from a final order in an employment 

discrimination action brought on behalf of Ms. Sandra Angel and 

Ms. Joyce Christiansen, pursuant to· Section 704(a) of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 u.s.c . S 2000e-3(a) 

against General Lines,· Inc., d/b/a/ Bi-Rite Pay,less Drugs, Inc., 

and Bi-Rite Package, Inc. (Bi-Rite Liquor), a retail l~quor store 

located in Riverton, Wyoming. EEOC does not challenge the award 

of back pay. It does, however, challenge the district court's 

deniai of reinstatement or front pay awards to Angel and 

Christiansen in lieu thereof and the court's refusal to enjoin BiRite Liquor from retaliating against the charging parties or any 

other employees for opposing employment practices rendered illegal 

under Title VII. 

This action was initiated by EEOC on behalf of Sandra Angel 

and Joyce Christiansen seeking lost wages, back pay and other 

relief to enforce the prohibitions against retaliatory discharges 

proscribed under § 704(a) of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-31 ; and 

§ 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S.C. § 215(a)(3) 

and 29 UoS.C. § 206(d)(l) (The Equal Pay Act). 2 .The crux of the 

EEOC complaint was that on or about November 21, 1982, Ms. Sandra 

1 11 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer 

to discriminate against any of his employees ••• because he has 

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 

title • " This section protects employees who lodge good 

faith complaints of alleged unlawful employment practice. 

2 29 u.s.c. § 215(a}(3) also protects employees who lodge good 

faith wage complaints. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) requires equal pay 

for equal skill and work unless the pay differential is based upon 

four ~pecific exceptions not relevant here. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 2 
Angel and Ms. Joyce Christiansen, then employed as clerks at BiRite Liquor, spoke with Mr. John Prideaux, co-owner of the 

business, and expressed their good faith complaint that a Mr. Dick 

Welch, also a clerk at the liquor store but junior in terms of 

seniority to them, was being paid a higher hourly wage for the 

same work. Angel and Christiansen were fired three days later in 

retaliation for their good faith complaint. The EEOC requested a 

jury trial on all questions .of fact raised by its complaint. 

The parties stipulated that the case did not involve any 

issue of unequal pay and that the pay was equal. (R. , Vol. II, 

pp. 68-9). The district court empaneled an advisory jury pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c). The issue of retaliatory discharge was 

submitted to the advisory jury, together with the issue of lost 

wages and back pay. The EEOC, through its expert witness, Ms. 

Ellen Pearcy, opined that Ms. Christiansen's lost wages-back pay 

amounted to $4,603.37, excluding interest, and that Ms. Angel's 

lost wages-back pay amounted to $27,943 .92 , excluding interest. 

Id. at pp. 78, 80. The jury awarded Ms. Angel the sum of $916.00 

and Ms. Christiansen the sum of $1,002 .00 . The district court 

entered judgment thereon, with interest at the rate of 6.18 

percent (R., Vol. I, Document 97, pp. 1-2). 

The EEOC filed a motion requesting that the court enter an 

order altering or amending the jury verd i ct granting damages or 

backpay to Ms. Angel in amount of $27,943.92 and to Ms. 

Christiansen in amount of $4603.37 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(c) or, in the alternative, a: ju~gment notwithstanding the 

verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. SO(b) to compute and awa rd 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 3 
damages as prayed (R., Vol. I, Document 100). In addi~ion, the 

EEOC moved the court for judgment on its Title VII claims. Id. 

The court denied each of these motions. · Thereafter, the court 

entered its Findings of Fac·t and Conclusion of Law on the Title 

VII claims denying all of the EEOC's requests for equitable relief 

{R., Vol. I, Document 108). The court found/concluded, inter 

alia: 

That Dick Welch, who was hired at Bi-Rite Liquor after 

Sandra Angel and Joyce Christiansen were hired was paid 

a higher wage 11 [b]ecause he performed additional 

maintenance tasks in defendant's drug store as well as 

defendant's liquor store." 

That Sandra Angel and Joyce Christiansen learned of the 

wage disparity and, believing in good faith that Bi-Rite 

Liquor was engaging in an unlawful employment practice 

by paying Dick Welch a higher hourly wage, contacted and 

spoke with Mr. John Prideaux, co-owner of Bi-Rite 

Liquors, on November 21, 1982t and complained about the 

wage disparity involving substanti ally the same work; 

That three days later, on November 24, 1982, Bi -Rite 

Liquors discharged Angel and Christiansen and these 

discharges were in retaliation for their good faith 

objection to that which they believed to be an unlawful 

employment practice; 

That Bi-Rite Liquors failed to establish a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the discharges of Angel and 

Christiansen; 

That the jury found in favor of Angel and Christiansen 

but awarded them substantially less back pay than they 

sought; that denying back pay in these circumstances 

does not frustrate the broad purposes of Title VII; that 

Angel and Christiansen obtained employment following 

their discharges and are no longer entitled to back pay; 

the court therefore declines to enter a second award of 

back pay; 

That the EEOC failed to show that Bi-Rite Liquors 

continues to engage in unlawful employment practices and 

thus there is no need for the permanent injunction 

requested; further, the injunction requested by the EEOC 

fails to meet the specificity requirements of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. § 65(d); 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 4 
That reinstatement of Sandra Angel and Joyce 

Christiansen is denied because both found other work 

following their discharges, and further because Sandra 

Angel relocated to Montana and reinstatement under these 

c ircumstances would not protect her, and further because 

hostility between Joyce Christiansen and Bi-Rite Liquors 

was such as to preclude a productive working 

relationship. 

The district court concluded: 

This result does not frustrate the objectives of Title 

VII. Remedies under the Act are intended to achieve 

equal employment opportunity and to deter employment 

discrimi_nation. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 u.s. 

at 421. Another purpose is to make person_s whole for 

injuries suffered because of unlawful employment 

discrimination. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F . 2d 

333, 342 (lOth Cir. 1975)~ The remedies sought by 

plai ntiff will not serve the purposes of Title VII given 

the facts of this case. First, plainti ff failed to show 

a continuing practice of employment discrimina tion. 

Second, Sandra Angel no longer resides in the community. 

Third, reinstatement will merely promote fri ction. 

Moreover, the jury assessed damages against the 

defendant. This award will deter future unlawful 

employment actions by defendant , promote equal 

employment opportunity, and compensate Sandra Angel and 

Joyce Christiansen for their injuries. 

Id. at 3-4. 

On appeal, the EEOC contends that the district court erred by 

(l) refusing to grant reinstatement to Angel and Christiansen, (2) 

failing to award front pay if reinstatement was inappropriate, and 

(3) by failing to enjoin the defendant from retaliating in the 

future. 

I. and II. 

EEOC contends that the district court erred by refusing to 

grant reinstatement to Angel and Christiansen or to award front 

pay if reinstatement was inappropriate. 

Our standard for review is governed by the clearly erroneous 

rule. We may not set aside trial court findings and 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 5 
determinations on appeal unless they are elear~y erroneous. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 52(a); Verniero v. Air Force Academy District 20, 705 

F.2d 388 (lOth Cir. 1983) (a Title VII action}. The "clearly 

erroneous" rule was well articulated in Higgins v. State of Okla. 

Ex Rel. Okla. Emp. Sec., 642 F.2d 1199, 1202 (lOth Cir. 1981): 

[F]indings are not to be determi ned clearly 

erroneous unless, after a review of the entire record, 

we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 395 u.s. 100, 123i 89 s. Ct. 1562, 1576, 

23 L. Ed . 2d 129 {1969); United States v. United States 

Gypsum Co., 333 u.s. 364, 395, 68 s. Ct. 525, 541, 92 L. 

Ed . 746 (1948); Reyes v. Hoffman, 580 F.2d 393 (lOth 

Cir. 1978). As an appellate court, it is not for us to 

determine whether the trial court reached the correct 

decision, but whether it reached a permissible one in 

light of the evi dence. "When a case is tried to the 

district court, the resolution of conflicting evidence 

and the determination of credibility are ma tters 

particularly within the province of the trial judge who 

heard and observed the demeanor of the witnesses." 

Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1235 (lOth Cir. 

1977) • 

Secondly, the grant of a§firmative relief pursuant 

to 42 o.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) "may" be invoked by the 

district court in order to achieve the "make whole" 

purposes of Title VI!. Thus, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. 

Moody, 422 u.s. 405, 421-22 (1975), the Supreme Court 

defined the 'discreti onary' powers of the district 

courts under Title VII: 

It follows that, given a finding of unlawful 

discrimination, backpay should be denied only 

for reasons· which, if applied generally, would 

not frustrate the central statutory purposes 

of eradicating discrimination throughout the 

economy and making persons whole for injuril~ 

suffered through past discrimination. 

3 "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally 

engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment 

~ractice • • . the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging 

1n such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative 

action as may be appropriate~ which may include, but is not 

limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees , with or without 

back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems 

appropriate." 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 6 
(Footnote 14: It is necessary_, therefore, 

that if a district court does decline to award 

backpay, it carefully articulate its reasons}. 

The courts of appeal s must maintain a 

.consistent and principled application of the 

backpay provisions, consonant with the twin 

statutory objectives, while at the same time 

recognizing that the trial court will often 

have the keener appreciation of these facts 

and circumstances peculiar to particular 

cases. 

This court has held that the "application of equitable 

doctrines rests in the sound d iscretion of the district court; 

absent a showing of abuse of discreti on, the district court's 

exercise thereof will not be disturbed on appeal." McKinney v. 

Gannett Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 659, 670 (lOth Cir. 1987). In Hecht 

Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) , the Supreme Court 

observed: 

The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the 

power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each 

decree to the necessi ties of the particular case. 

Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. 

The qualities of mercy and practicality have·made equity 

the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation 

between the public interest and private needs as well as 

between competing private claims. 

Although nothing in the district cou rt 's order or the briefs 

of the parties describe this case as one in which the employer, 

Bi-Rite Liquor, had both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory 

motives - or mixed or dual motives - for the decision to terminate 

the employment of Ms . Angel and Ms. Christians en, we deem this to 

be such a case. In our view, this analysis properly accounts for 

the trial court's order. In Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th 

Cir. 1985), the en bane court, in a Title VII case, held ~hat once 

a plaintiff establishes a violation of Title VII by proving that 

an unlawful employment practice motive was a discernible factor at 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 7 
the time the unlawful employment decision was made, the plaintiff 

has established a Title VII violation and is entitled to some 

reli ef. However, even after the finding of unlawful employment 

practice is made, the defendant is allowed a further defense in 

order to limit the relief by proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the plaintiff would not have been hired or promoted 

{or retained) even in the absence of the proven disctimination. 

Nowhere in Title VII is there any reference to mixed or dual 

motives. In Bibbs v. Block, supra, the court applied a "but-for n 

or "same decision .. test: 

In that statute (Title VII), Congress has made 

unlawful any kind of racial discrimination, not just 

discrimination that actually deprives someone of a job. 

A defendant's showing that the plaintiff would not have 

gotten the job anyway does not extinguish liability. It 

simply excludes the remedy of retroactive promotion or 

reinstatement . • • e Under this approach, once the 

plaintiff has established a violation of Title VII by 

proving that an unlawful motive played some part in the 

employment decision or decisional process, the plaintiff 

is entitled to some relief, including, as appropri ate, a 

declaratory judgment, partial attorneys• fees, and 

injunctive relief against futur e or continued 

discrimination. However, even after a finding of 

unlawful discrimination is made, the defendant is 

allowed a further defense in order to l~mit the rel2ef. 

The defendant may avo2d an award of reinstatement or 

promotion and back pay if it can prove by ·a 

preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff would 

not have been hired or promoted even in the absence of 

the proven discrimination. (Emphasis suppl i ed). 

778 F.2d at 1323 , 1324. 

We have not found any Supreme Court opinion or one from this 

court which has addressed the mixed motives issue as in Bibbs v. 

Block, supra . However, the Supreme Court, in Mt. Healthy City 

School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 u.s. 274 (1977), 

a 42 u.s.c. § 1983 civil rights case, held that evidence that a 

-aAppellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 8 
teacher's constitutionally ~rotected conduct played a substantial 

part in the school board's decision not to rehire him did not 

dictate any remedial action where the evidence showed that for 

good cause the school board would have reached the same result. 

The Court observed: 

The constitutional principle at stake is 

sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in 

no worse position than if he had engaged in the conduct. 

A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the 

employment question resolved aga inst him because of 

constitutionally protected conduct . But that same 

candidate ou~ht not to be able, by engaging in such 

conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his 

performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire 

on the basis of that record. • . • 

429 u.s. at 285-86 . 

This court has recognized a nd applied the mixed motives 

analysis, but only in regard to whether the discriminatory 

practice was the "determining factor" in the employe r ' s decision. 

Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., Incv., 843 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (lOth 

Cir. 1988)~ CooEer v. ASJ2lundh Tree ExEert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 

1547 (lOth Cir. 1988}; Purr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 

1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1987); E.E.O.C. v. Prudential Federal Sav. 

and Loan Ass' n ., 763 F.2d 1166, 1171 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

474 u.s. 946 (1985); E.E.O.C. v. University of Oklahoma, 774 F.2d 

999 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 u.s. 1120 (1986); Love v. 

Re/Max of America, Inc ., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (lOth Cir. 1984); 

Higgins v . State of Okla. Ex Re1 . Okla. ErnE· Sec., 642 F .2d 1199, 

1201-02 (lOth Cir. 1981 ). 

We believe that the "mixed motives " issue analyzed and 

discussed in Bibbs v. Block is fully applicable in the instant 

case, and accounts for the trial court's denial of any relief 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 9 
beyond the backpay awards granted Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen. 

Bibbs v. Block, supra, stands for the proposition that in Title 

VII mi xed motives cases, the plaintiff is entitled to some remedy 

once the discriminatory prac~ice has been proved, even though the 

employer has established that the same decision would have been 

made , absent the discrimination. That scenario substantially 

explains both the advisory jury's backpay damages awards ($916.00 

awarded to Ms. Angel against $27,943.92 claimed; $1002 . 00 awarded 

to Ms. Christiansen against $4,603 . 37 c l aimed) and the trial 

court•s disposition of the balance of the Ti tle VII claims. The 

result is, we believe, justified based on the evi dence in the 

record a nd the fact that 11 [t]he trial court has wide discretion in 

fashioni ng remedies to make vi ctims of discri mination whole." 

Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 645 F.2d 1365, 1378 

(lOth Ci r. 1981), cert. denied 456 u.s. 964 (1982). 

A. 

Reinstatement 

The EEOC complaint filed in the district court requested that 

Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen be compensated and reinstated. 

(R. , Vol. I, Document 1, p. 5). The right to such relief was put 

at issue by Bi-Rite Liquor•s Answer which contained a general 

denial (R., Vol. I, Document 3). Significantly, at trial, some 

thirty two (32) months following their discharges and at a time 

when both Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen were residing in the 

State of Montana (seeR., Vol. II, pp. 42, 121), neither party, 

under extensive direct and cross-examination, gave any testimony 

that they wished to be reinst ated in their former posi tions a t Bi-

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 10 
Rite Liquors or that they would return to Riverton, Wyoming, if 

reinstatement were ordered by the court . 

We recognize that in Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 

624 F.2d 945 (lOth Cir. 1980) and Whatley v . Skaggs Companies, 

~, 707 F.2d 1129 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U~S. 938 

(1983), we held that the trial court may restore the plaintiff to 

the position he would have held but for the discrimination, even 

though such relief was not sought in the pleadings. In Fitzgerald 

v. Sirloin we observed that the evidence revealed such an 

atmosphere of hostility that reconciliation was impossible and the 

trial court did not err in awarding front pay in lieu of 

reinstatement. In Whatley v. Skaggs, the plaintiff employee, 

following his dismissal, moved from Denver, Colorado, where he had 

been employed by the defendant to Mesa, Arizona, in part for 

health reasons. He did not request reinstatement. We observed 

that the district court 11 [mJay fashion an order in such cases to 

eliminate the effects of discrimination and to restore the 

plaintiff to the position he would have held but for the 

discrimination, and such equitable relief may be provided, even if 

it was not sought in the pleadings." 707 F . 2d at 1137. 

Even though the district court had the power, under Title 

VII, to grant the equitable relief of reinstatement in keeping 

with the congressional purpose that the court provide ltthe most 

complete relief possible, .. Albermarle Paper Co . v . Moody, 422 U.S. 

405, 421 (1974)~ there is nothing in this record beyond the EEOC 

request for reinstatement contained in its complaint which 

indicates that Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen, or either, would 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 11 
return to Riverton, Wyoming, from their respective homes in 

Montana in order to resume their work at Bi-Rite Liquors. 

Appellant EEOC contends that this case is completely different 

from Taylor v .. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (lOth Cir. 1975) 

(where plaintiff testified that he did not wish to be .returned to 

the job he had when discharged) because here the charging parties 

want to be reinstated to the same jobs they had before they were 

unlawfully discharged (Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-13)~ But there 

was no evidence of any kind offered by EEOC in this recor.d to 

support that contention. In fact, notwithstanding the extensive 

direct examination and cross-examination of Ms. Angel and Ms. 

Christiansen, neither expressed any interest in being reinstated. 

We believe that the district court did assume that Ms. Angel 

would not return to Riverton if reinstatement were ordered. In 

our view this is, contrary to EEOC's brief ("makes little sense," 

Appellant's Brief, p. 14), perfectly logical under the totality of 

the circumstances. The failure of Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen 

to give any trial testimony relative to reinstatement is the more 

perplexing in light of Ms. Angel's testimony given on August 18, 

1986, i.e., that when she filed charges with the EEOC on January 

20, 1983, she wanted her job back (R., Vol. II, p. 62). 

Reinstatement is one of the express affirmative actions 

authorized under § 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(9) and certainly 11 front 

pay" would qualify as "other equitable relief" the court. may grant 

if deemed appropriate. Both remedies were considered and rejected 

by the trial court. Specifically, the court found/concluded that 

·sandra Angel no longer resides in the (Riverton) community, 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 12 
clearly indicating that reinstatement was not a feasible, 

practical remedy. The record shows that Ms. Christiansen also 

resided in the State of Montana at the time of trial and there is 

nothing in the record beyond the request for reinstatement 

contained in t he EEOC complaint indicating that she would return 

to Riverton if the court ordered her reinstatement. With regard 

to damages, the court observed that "[t]he jury assessed damages 

against defendant. This award will deter future unlawful 

employment actions by defendant, promote equal employment 

opportunity, and compensate Sandra Angel and Joyce Christiansen 

for their injuries." (R., Vol . I, Document 108, p. 7). Clearly, 

the trial court concluded that in this case the jury's backpay 

award fully compensated Sandra Angel and Joyce Christiansen. 

EEOC argues that because the jury returned a damage award in 

favor of Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen, it necessarily found that 

the ·charging parties were discharged in retaliation for 

complaining about unequal pay and that the reasons proffered by 

the defendant were not true (Brief of Appellant, p. 19). This 

contention, while true, is misleading. 

stands for the proposition that t he jury 

The jury damage award 

was convinced, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, t hat at the time of the discharges 

of Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen, the reason therefore on the 

part of Bi-Rite Liquor was retaliation against Ms. Angel and Ms. 

Christiansen for their good faith complaint about the disparity 

they perceived between their wage and that of Mr. Welch, rather 

than the pooi performance work records advanced by Bi-Ri te Liquor. 

Thus, the jury found that at the time of the discharges the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 13 
reasons advanced by Bi-Rite Liquor for the terminations were a 

pretext~ That does not mean that the jury found that the work 

performances of Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen were good. The 

jury damage award was far below the sums sought by EEOC . Although 

not in issue on appeal , we observe that .after the district court 

e ntered judgment on the jury verdic t , EEOC moved, inter alia: 

4. The Plaintiff r equests this Court enter an 

order altering or amending the jury verdict granting 

damages· or backpay to Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen in 

accordance with its exhibits numbers 17(a) and 18(a), 

pursuant to Rule 59(e). (These exhibits set forth the 

basis for the EEOC's claims on behalf of Ms. Angel for 

backpay of $27,943.92 and Ms. Christiansen for backpay 

of $4 , 603 . 37) . As established by the weight of the 

evide nce , exhibits 17{a) and 18(a) were not properly 

considered by the jury. Therefore, Plaintiff is 

entitled to have the jury verdict amended to increase 

the amount of backpay due. 

5. In the alternative, the jury fa iled to take 

into consideration or c ompute a reasonable amount of 

backpay as damages due to Ms. Angel and Ms. 

Christiansen. As a result, Plaintif f is entitled to a 

judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict entered on 

Augus t 21, 1986. It is within the court's province to 

correct the amount given by this verdict and enter a 

verdict for the amounts shown on Plaintiff's exhibits 

17(a} and 18(a), pursuant to rule 50(b) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure . 

(R., Vol. I, Document 100). 

The district court denied this motion and entered judgme nt on 

the rema ining Title VII claims on December 8 , 1986. As previously 

stated, EEOC does not challenge the sufficiency of the jury 

verdict on appeal. Notwithstandi ng, EEOC argues that because the 

jury found that Ms. Angel and Ms. Christ~ansen were discharged in 

retaliation for complaining about unequal pay, the "[cJourt, when 

ruling on the accompanying equitable claims, was bound by the 

jury 's factual determinations on the legal issue .. and 'was 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 14 
not at liberty to make findings that conflicted with the jury's 

findings,' (quoting Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 

F.2d 1094, 1097 (11th Cir. 1987)." (Brief of Appellant, pp. 19-

20). 

The EEOC misconceives the function of the advisory jury. In 

Trotter v. Todd, 719 F.2d 346 (lOth Cir. 1983} this court, in a 

Title VII case, held that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in impaneling an advisory jury pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 39(c) and that when we review a judgment "[w]here the jury's 

findings are advisory only, we must apply the 'clearly erroneous' 

test to the court ' s findings. • The findings of the trial 

court are not clearly erroneous unless a complete review of the 

record definitely and firmly convinces us that a mistake has been 

made." 719 F.2d at 348-49. 

The evidentiary burdens and the presentation of proof in 

Title VII cases which this court has described as a three stage 

process, E.E.O.C. v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1378 (lOth Cir. 1984), 

apply to facts and circumstances determinative of the question 

whether at the time of the plaintiff's discharge, the termination 

was based on an unlawful or discriminatory employment practice or 

was justified for valid business reasons. 

determining whether to grant equitable 

A district court, when 

relief, such as 

reinstatement, is not confined to the facts determinative of the 

discharge issue. The court may rely on all of the evidence 

adduced at trial and may draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. 

And the scope of our review of the trial court's findings under 

the clearly erroneous standard is narrow when a fact determination 

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Appellate Case: 87-1253 Document: 01019703071 Date Filed: 01/19/1989 Page: 15 
is predicated upon the trial court's assessment of credibility. 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 u.s. 564, 574-575 (1985). 

The district court found that Ms. Angel had "[r]elocated to 

Montana [and] reinstatement will not protect Sandra Angel or 

demonstrate the employer's good faith to other employees.'' (R., 

Vol. I, Document 108, pp. 5-6). The only reasonable inference ~o 

be drawn from this finding is that Ms. Angel did not wish to 

return to her job at Bi-Rite Liquor in Riverton, Wyoming. 

Although the trial court did not make a s imilar finding in the 

case of Ms. Christiansen, the record demonstrates that she, too, 

moved to Corvallis, Montana, where she was residing at the time of 

trial and that nothing in her trial testimony shows that she would 

return to her job at Bi-Rite Liquor in Riverton, Wyoming. In 

Griess v. State of Colo., 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (lOth Cir. 1988), we 

said, quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d 

Cir. 1987) that we are "[f]ree to affirm a district court decision 

on any ground for which there is a record sufficient to permit 

conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district 

court." Thus, we consi der the trial court's finding that 

reinstatement will not protect Ms. Angel because she resides in 

Montana, equally applicable to Ms. Christiansen. It is difficult 

to understand or perceive why Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen did 

not testify that they wished to be reinstated in their prior jobs 

at Bi-Rite Liquor if in fact they desired this remedy. We 

conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the remedy of -

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reinstatement because both Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen had 

relocated to the State of Montana. 

Further, the triai court found that reinstatement of Ms. 

Angel and Ms. Christiansen ''will promote friction" and that, in 

the case of Joyce Christiansen, "hostility between the parties 

will preclude a productive working relationship . " We hold that 

these findings are not clearly erroneous. 

some of the trial testimony will demonstrate 

trial cour~'s findings. 

A summary review of 

the basis for the 

Mr. Eugene Ratliff, who served as a manager at Bi-Rite Liquor 

during the employment of Ms . Angel and Ms. Christiansen, testified 

that: while Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen performed their work 

assignments as clerks satisfactorily ''at first" (R., Vol. III, p. 

13}, their work deteriorated after Mr. Welch was hired, id . at 13-

14; Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen did not do certain work 

assigned to clerks such as dusting, emptying boxes, and displaying 

liquor or rotating the beer, id . at 18-20; during their last few 

months at Bi-Rite Liquor, the work performances of both Ms. Angel 

and Ms. Christiansen deteriorated in that they were slow while 

waiting on customers, sharp with customers thus drawing 

complaints, not properly attired, and they left cash registe rs 

unattended. Id. at 30 , 32-33, 36; and the work performance of Ms. 

Angel and Ms. Christiansen was poor. Id. at 37, 39. 

Ms. Sandra Gilpen-Winter, who served as general or overall 

manager of the combined drugstore and Bi-Rite Liquor store, doing 

business in the same building, testified that: after Mr. Welch was 

hired in 1982, the productivity in the liquor store became nominal 

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and the whole appearance of the operation was poor; she observed a 

lot of "socializing" on the job between Ms. Esther Wicker, Ms. 

Angel and Ms. Christiansen; Ms. Christiansen's wearing attire was 

below standard: the liquor stock in the store was not being dusted 

and the shelves were not being stocked so as to look full, and the 

work performances of Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen were below 

standard. Id. at 130-139. She stated that when she met with Mr. 

Prideaux and Mr. Ratliff, the three conducted an overall 

evaluation of the _ l i quor store and its employees and concluded 

that the liquor store would operate much better if Ms. Wicker, Ms. 

Angel and Ms. Christiansen were terminated. Id. at 142. 

Ms. Angel testified that Mr. Welch, as night manager of the 

liquor store, used foul language and made dirty remarks, and that 

both Mr. Ratliff and Mr. Welch were "very suggestive." (R., Vol. 

II, pp. 58-59). Even so, she was content with her job except for 

what she perceived to be the unequal pay between Mr . Welch and the 

female clerks. Id. at 70. Ms. Angel testified that when she 

filed charges against Bi-Rite Liquor with both EEOC and the State 

of Wyoming, she wanted her job back. Id. at 62-63. She stated 

that she does not now consider Mr. Prideaux a very fa i r man. Id. 

at 113. She gave no tri al or deposition testimony that she 

desired her job back, although she stated that she would not have 

moved back to Mon t ana if she could have continued her work at BiRite Liquor! Id. at 120. 

Ms. Christiansen testified that the only things she did not 

. like about her job at Bi-Rite Liquor were the crude, obscene 

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comments made by Mr. Welch and the pinching of her legs by Welch. 

She denied being a poor worker. Id. at 142-143, 163. 

Ms. Mary Ellen Felton, who worked as assistant manager at BiRite Liquor during the time Ms. Angel, Ms. Christiansen and Mr. 

Welch worked there, testified that all three were good workers. and 

that s he had no problems with them. Id. at 182-187. 

The trial court heard the testimony of these and other 

witnesses and observed their demeanor. The trial judge found that 

reinstatement of Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen should not be 

ordered because Ms. Angel had relocated to Montana, the hostility 

between Ms. Christiansen and Bi-Rite Liquor, and the fric tion 

between the parties. These findings are not clearly erroneous. 

EEOC contends otherwise relying on Prudential Federal Savings and 

Loan Association, 763 F . 2d 1166, 1172 (lOth Ci r.), cert. denied 

474 u.s. 946 (1985), an ADEA case, wherein we held that 

reinstatement may not be appropriate where the employer has 

exhibited such "extreme hostility" as to render a good working 

relationship impossible. EEOC argues that the "extreme hostility" 

standard has not been met here. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 17, 18). 

Further, EEOC points to Fitzgerald v. Sirloin stockade, Inc., 624 

F.2d 945, 957 (lOth Cir. 1980), a Title VII case, where we 

observed that the trial court den i ed reinstatement because the 

defendant employer had "engaged in phychological warfare" against 

the plaintiff. Yet, the criteria for reinstatement was identified 

in Sirloin Stockade as the need for a "warm relationship." Id. 

Furthermore, the trial court in that case denied reinstatment 

11 [ o]n the ground that the environment was hostile." Id . at 956. 

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In the case at bar, the trial court denied reinstatement based 

upon the hostility between the parties and the friction likely to 

impede a good working relationship . 

The trial judge heard the testimony of the witnesses and 

observed their courtroom demeanor. He was in a much better 

position to determine whether the relationshi p between the pa~ties 

justi fied the remedy of reinstatement than this court. The 

resolution of confl i cting evidence and the determination of 

credi bility are matters particula rly assigned to the trier of 

fac t . 

B. 

Front Pay 

EEOC contends that after the district court denied Ms. Angel 

and Ms. Christiansen the remedy of reinstatement, it erred by 

failing to award them front pay even though it was not requested. 

The trial court was cognizant of the b r oad purposes of Title 

VII and t he equitabl e remedies available t o the district courts 

under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). (R., Vol. I, Document 108, pp~ 4-

5). Even so, t he court concluded that the back pay damages 

awarded would deter future unlawful employment actions by Bi-Rite 

Liquor, promote equal employment opportunity and "[c}ompensate 

Sandra Angel and Joyce Ch ristiansen for the i r injuries." Id. at 

7. In Pitre v. Weste r n Elec. Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 1262 (lOth Cir. 

1988), we observed that fron t pay "[i]s intended to compensate 

victims o f discrimination for the continuing future effects of 

discrimination until the victim can be made whole. For example, 

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front pay is a substitute for promotion which cannot be effected 

because no positions are presently available." 

The trial court, based on credibilit~ determinations, found/ 

- concluded that: although Ms. Angel a nd Ms. Christiansen were in 

good faith when they complained to Mr. Prideaux that Mr. Welch was 

being paid a higher wage than they were receiving although he was 

performing substantially the same work, Welch's hourly wage was 

higher because he did in fact perform additional maintenance 

tasks~ hostility between the parties will preclude a productive 

working relationship; and the level of friction was high before 

Angel and Christiansen were discharged. (R., Vol. I, Document 

108). 

A summary of some of the conflicting testimony presented at 

trial upon which the district court's findings were based, all of 

which involved credibility determinations, foll ows. Mr. Ratliff 

testified that Mr . Welch was paid a higher wage because he 

performed additional maintenance tasks and that he (Ratliff) had 

so informed Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen (R . , Vol. III, pp. 13-

27) . Ms. Angel, on the other hand, testified that Mr. Welch did 

not perform any duties other than those of a clerk (R., Vol. II, 

p. 48), and that when she asked Mr. Ratliff why Welch had been 

promoted to night manager and paid a higher wage than the female 

clerks, Ratliff responded that he wanted a man in charge at night 

and could not obtain the services of a man at the hourly wages , 

being paid the female clerks. Id. at 50-55 . Ms. Christiansen 

testified tha t when she learned that Mr. Welch was being paid a 

higher hourly wage than she was receiving, she inqui red of Mr. 

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Ratliff about the matter and that Ratliff responded that he could 

not hire a man to do the same job at a female clerk's wage (R., 

Vol. II, p. 132). She also testified that she never observed Mr. 

Welch doing any maintenance work, id. at 168, and that when she 

spoke with Mr. Prideaux on November 21, 1982, she complained about 

Welch being promote~ to night manager, about Welch pinching her on 

the legs and that Welch intentionally stacked the beer so high 

that it would fall down on her. Id. at 171-72. We have 

heretofore summarized trial 

performances of Ms. Angel and 

testimony relative 

Ms. Christiansen. 

to the 

All of 

work 

this 

testimony, with its attendant credibility factor, convinced the 

trier of fact, the trial court, that under nthese circumstances•• 

the jury's award of back pay, although substantially less than 

that sought, ndoes not frustrate the broad purposes of Title VII" 

and fully compensates Ms. Angel and Ms. Christiansen for their 

injuries. (R., Vol. I, Document 108). 

III. 

Finally, EEOC contends that the district court erred by 

failing to enjoin Bi-Rite Liquor from retaliating in the future. 

While EEOC recognizes that this is a matter within the trial 

court's discretion, it argues that, under Albemarle Paper Co. v. 

Moody, 422 u.s. at 416, such discretion cannot be "unfett ered" but 

must be ''guided by sound legal principles.'' (Brief of Appellant, 

p. 21). EEOC relies on James v. Stockham Values and Fittings Co., 

559 F.2d 310 (5th Ci~. 1977), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 1034 (19 78) , 

for the rule that once a Title VII violation is proven, the burden 

is on the defendant to show that it will no longer fa il to comply 

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with the law, and failure to do so renders an injunction 

mandatory. EEOC failed to point out, however, that James v. 

Stockham involved a class action suit challenging patterns of 

discriminatory practices in employment at the Stockham 

manufacturing facilities in Birmingham, Alabama, including 

segregated facilities and programs, job assignments, transfer, 

promotion, training, recruiting, seniority and testing. 

In United States v. w. T. Grant Co., 345 u.s. 629 (1953), the 

Supreme Court stated that the purpose of injunctive relief is to 

prevent future violat ions and the moving party must demonstrate 

that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violations, 

something more than a mere possibility, which serves to keep the 

case alive. Unlike the proof in James v. Stockham, supra, there 

is nothing in the record in the instant case indicating 11Some 

cognizable danger" that Bi-Rite Liquor will at any future date 

parti cipate in a l i ke Title VII violation. 

There is no evidence in the record on appeal that Bi-Rite 

Liquor has any unlawful employment "practice" or ••policy" which it 

has followed, and certainly there was no pattern established. 

This was a single occurrence violation. In Gurule v. Wilson, 635 

F.2d 782, 791 (lOth Cir. 1980), we observed: 

Injunctive relief is designed to deter future 

wrongful acts . United States v. w. T. Grant Co., 345 

U.S. 629, 633, 73 S. Ct. 894, 897, 97 L. Ed. 1303 

( 1953). The l ikelihood of fu·ture vi ol ations is i nferred 

from the totality of circumstances, including the 

commission of past illegal conduct·. ' 

There is no reason to believe that the single unlawful employment 

practice violation caused by Bi-Rite wi ll likely occur again. 

We AFFIRM. 

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