Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01354/USCOURTS-caDC-06-01354-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Association of Civilian Technicians, New York State Council
Petitioner
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2007 Decided October 26, 2007

No. 06-1354

ASSOCIATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS, NEW YORK STATE

COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner.

James F. Blandford, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief was William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor.

Before: SENTELLE, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

USCA Case #06-1354 Document #1075840 Filed: 10/26/2007 Page 1 of 19
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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The Association of Civilian

Technicians, New York State Council (“the Union” or “the

Association”), petitions for review of an order of the Federal

Labor Relations Authority stemming from a grievance filed by

the Union after the New York Division of Military and Naval

Affairs implemented a state-wide smoking ban at its facilities.

The parties could not resolve the grievance, so the Union

submitted it to binding arbitration in accordance with the terms

of its collective bargaining agreement and the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.

The arbitrator denied the grievance and the Union filed

exceptions to her award with the Authority. The Authority

denied the exceptions in the order at issue here. Because we

find that we lack jurisdiction to review the Authority’s order, we

dismiss.

I. Background

In 2003, New York amended its Clean Indoor Air Act to

prohibit indoor smoking in all “places of employment,”

including workplaces of “the legislative, executive and judicial

branches of state government and any political subdivision of

the state.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-o(1), -n(2).

Accordingly, the New York Division of Military and Naval

Affairs (“DMNA”) issued a new smoking policy that prohibited

all smoking in National Guard facilities in New York.

The Association of Civilian Technicians, New York State

Council, which represents the civil technicians working at the

Guard facilities, filed a grievance charging that the DMNA had

violated their collective bargaining agreement by failing to

negotiate the terms of the new smoking policy. When the

grievance was not resolved, the Union invoked its right to

binding arbitration and added an allegation that DMNA’s

unilateral implementation of the policy constituted an unfair

USCA Case #06-1354 Document #1075840 Filed: 10/26/2007 Page 2 of 19
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labor practice because it was taken in clear and patent breach of

the collective bargaining agreement’s negotiation provisions.

The parties were unable to stipulate to the issues before the

arbitrator. She reviewed their proposed issues and found that,

“[a]t the heart of this case is a dispute over the interpretation and

application of the language of the Parties’ Collective Bargaining

Agreement.” She then framed the issues as “Did the Agency

violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement when it issued a

new smoking policy letter on 23 July 2003?” and “If so, what

should the remedy be?” She concluded that the DMNA had not

violated the collective bargaining agreement because the

smoking ban was a statutory requirement and therefore did not

fall within the agreement’s requirement that rules “within the

purview” of the DMNA be negotiated. 

The Union filed exceptions to the arbitral decision with the

Federal Labor Relations Authority arguing, in pertinent part, that

the arbitrator exceeded her authority when she failed to address

its unfair labor practice allegations. The Authority denied the

Union’s exceptions, finding that the arbitrator had not erred in

framing the issues as arising solely under the collective

bargaining agreement. Under Authority precedent, where

parties do not stipulate to the issues before the arbitrator, the

arbitrator has broad discretion to frame the issues. Ass’n of

Civilian Technicians, N.Y. State Council, 60 F.L.R.A. 890

(2005), recons. denied, 61 F.L.R.A. No. 134 (2006) (citing

AFGE, Local 1367, 60 F.L.R.A. 187, 190 (2004)). Therefore,

in this case, because there was no stipulation that an unfair labor

practice claim was before the arbitrator, the arbitrator was not

obligated to frame the issues as including an unfair labor

practice claim. Id. The Authority deferred to the arbitrator’s

framing of the issues and dismissed all exceptions to her award.

Id. The Union sought reconsideration, which was denied, then

petitioned for review by this Court. 

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*

 Although the statute refers to “section 7118,” the reference

“has been recognized to be an error; the correct reference is to section

7116.” AFGE, Local 2510 v. FLRA, 453 F.3d 500, 502 n.* (D.C. Cir.

2006) (quoting Overseas Educ. Ass'n v. FLRA, 824 F.2d 61, 63 n.2

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“OEA”)).

II. Analysis

We lack jurisdiction to review the Authority’s order

affirming the arbitral decision because it does not “involve[] an

unfair labor practice under section 711[6]” of the Federal

Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7123(a)(1).*

 The Authority’s order instead involves rules

applicable to arbitration which, when applied in this dispute,

resulted in the unfair labor practice claim’s exclusion from

review. We find that this secondary effect on the unfair labor

practice claim is not sufficient to qualify the order as one that

“involves an unfair labor practice” for purposes of 5 U.S.C. §

7123(a)(1).

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute

limits our review to orders of the Authority which involve unfair

labor practices in order to balance a “strong Congressional

policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,” Overseas Educ.

Ass’n, 824 F.2d 61, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1987), with a Congressional

intent for “uniformity in the case law concerning unfair labor

practices,” AFGE, Local 2510 v. FLRA, 453 F.3d 500, 505 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). The Statute contains a “two-track system for

resolving labor disputes.” OEA, 824 F.2d at 62. A party

aggrieved by an unfair labor practice may go down either track,

but not both. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d). Under the first track, not

pursued by the Union in this case, a party may file an unfair

labor practice charge with the Authority’s General Counsel, who

will investigate and issue a complaint, if warranted. Id.

§ 7118(a). The matter is then adjudicated by the Authority, and

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the Authority’s decision is subject to judicial review. Id.

§§ 7118, 7123. Under the second track, which was followed

here, a party may file a grievance in accordance with its

collective bargaining agreement that alleges an unfair labor

practice, a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, or

both. The grievance is subject to binding arbitration, id.

§ 7121(b)(1)(C)(iii), and the arbitral award is subject to review

by the Authority, id. § 7122(a). The Authority’s order is not

subject to judicial review “unless the order involves an unfair

labor practice under section 711[6]” of the Statute. Id.

§ 7123(a)(1). The second track is the track for those who

“prefer[] to benefit from the relatively expeditious and

(presumably) final result that arbitration promise[s].” OEA, 824

F.2d at 66. By offering its one level of review at the

administrative level, it protects Congress’s interest in providing

“arbitration results substantial finality.” Id. at 63. Its limited

exception that allows a second level of review—judicial

review—furthers Congress’s other stated interest of ensuring “a

single, uniform body of case law concerning unfair labor

practices.” AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d at 505. 

Reading the exception broadly, then, would be contrary to

“the proarbitration policy Congress articulated in passing the

Act.” OEA, 824 F.2d at 66. For that reason, we have found that

judicial review is only available where the “substance of the

unfair labor practice” is “‘discussed in some way in, or [is] some

part of, the Authority’s order.’” AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d at

505 (quoting OEA, 824 F.2d at 65). “A mere ‘passing reference’

to an unfair labor practice will not suffice,” id. at 503, nor will

the fact that “the underlying conduct could be characterized as

a statutory unfair labor practice,” OEA, 824 F.2d at 66. Instead,

“the conduct must actually be so characterized and the claim

pursued, by whatever route, as a statutory unfair labor practice,

not as something else.” Id. at 66.

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The order need not address an unfair labor practice “on the

merits” to “involve” an unfair labor practice, but it does need to

include some “sort of substantive evaluation of a statutory unfair

labor practice.” OEA, 824 F.2d at 71. For example, in OEA, the

Authority did not decide an unfair labor practice claim on the

merits because it concluded that the claim was precluded by a

previously-filed claim. Id. Its order nonetheless “involved” an

unfair labor practice because it included a detailed substantive

analysis and comparison of the two unfair labor practice claims

such that its discussion of unfair labor practices was “no mere

citation in passing.” Id. at 70–71. 

On the other hand, we have found that an order did not

“involve” an unfair labor practice where the “arbitrator’s

decision clearly frame[d] the issue as one arising solely under

the parties’ collective bargaining agreements” and the

Authority’s order “repeat[ed] the arbitrator’s statement of the

issue as one sounding in contract.” U.S. Dep’t of Interior v.

FLRA, 26 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“DOI”). We have

also found that the standard was not met where the Authority’s

order reviewing an arbitration fee award contained “neither a

single mention of § 7116 (unfair labor practices) nor any

discussion of the arbitrator’s finding of an unfair labor practice

other than passing references” to the issues in the underlying

dispute. AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d at 504. Where an order

does not contain a substantive discussion of an unfair labor

practice claim, there is no need to depart from Congress’s

“established policy ‘favoring arbitration of labor disputes and

accordingly granting arbitration results substantial finality,’

which . . . underlies the general rule in § 7123 barring judicial

review of arbitral awards” because “there is no risk the

Authority will leave the path of the law of unfair labor practices

and yet escape the review that would bring it back to the straight

and narrow.” Id. at 505 (quoting OEA, 824 F.2d at 63).

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The Authority’s order in this case does not “involve” an

unfair labor practice under our precedent. The Authority did not

engage in any substantive discussion of the Union’s unfair labor

practice claim in its order, but instead explicitly found that the

arbitrator was justified in concluding that the substance of the

unfair labor practice claim was not part of the dispute. As in

DOI, the “arbitrator’s decision clearly frames the issue as one

arising solely under the parties’ collective bargaining

agreements,” the “arbitrator analyzes the case as an alleged

breach of contract,” and the Authority’s order “repeats the

arbitrator’s statement of the issue as one sounding in contract.”

DOI, 26 F.3d at 184. Therefore, as in DOI, the order does not

“involve” an unfair labor practice.

We note that if the Union wished to protect its right to

judicial review of any possible unfair labor practice claims, it

could have utilized the first track provided by the Statute which

leads to judicial review. Because it instead decided to proceed

through the second track, it is bound by the Statute’s ban on

judicial review unless the Authority’s order “involves” an unfair

labor practice.

The Union fails in its attempt to characterize this order as

involving an unfair labor practice by pointing to its effect on the

Union’s unfair labor practice allegations. While the Authority

ensured that the Union’s unfair labor practice claim will not be

considered on its merits by affirming the arbitrator’s framing of

the issues, our caselaw is clear that the Authority’s order itself

must have some “bearing upon the law of unfair labor practices”

in order to qualify as an order that “involve[s] an unfair labor

practice.” AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d at 505. A passing

reference to an unfair labor practice or a mere effect on the

reviewability of an unfair labor practice claim is not enough.

Because the Authority’s order in this case deals solely with

arbitration procedure, and neither discusses nor in any other way

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affects substantive law regarding unfair labor practices, it does

not “involve” an unfair labor practice. We have no jurisdiction

to review the order. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we dismiss the petition for

lack of jurisdiction.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The court concludes that

we lack jurisdiction to hear the union’s challenge to a Federal

Labor Relations Authority order that disposed of the union’s

unfair labor practice claim based solely on an arbitrator’s

unexplained failure to resolve that claim during the grievance

process. Because I believe that the Authority’s order “involves

an unfair labor practice” within the meaning of section

7123(a)(1) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations

Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., and that the court’s

interpretation to the contrary finds no support in our precedent,

I respectfully dissent. 

I.

As the court correctly observes, the statute establishes a

two-track system in which an aggrieved union can either file an

unfair labor practice charge with the Authority’s General

Counsel or submit a grievance to binding arbitration, but may

not do both. See Overseas Educ. Ass’n v. FLRA, 824 F.2d 61,

62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“OEA”). In this case, the union chose

to pursue its unfair labor practice claim through the grievance

process. In its pre-hearing brief before the arbitrator, the union

argued that the employer committed unfair labor practices in

two ways: by changing employee working conditions without

affording the union notice and an opportunity to bargain; and by

committing a clear and patent breach of the collective

bargaining agreement. Although the court mentions only the

latter allegation, see Maj. Op. at 2-3, the arbitrator explicitly

acknowledged both claims in her opinion. Despite reciting the

union’s unfair labor practice charges nearly verbatim, the

arbitrator nonetheless framed the issue before her as arising

solely under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.

Finding no breach of that agreement, she denied the union’s

grievance. In so doing, the arbitrator offered no explanation for

failing to address the union’s unfair labor practice claim.

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When the union appealed to the Authority, arguing that the

arbitrator improperly ignored its unfair labor practice claim, the

employer countered that the arbitrator had in fact addressed the

alleged unfair labor practices, but had simply found against the

union. Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, N.Y. State Council, 60

F.L.R.A. 890, 891 (2005). Correcting this inaccurate assertion,

the Authority “agree[d] with the union that the Arbitrator did not

address whether [the employer]’s actions constituted unfair

labor practices under the Statute.” Id. Nonetheless, the

Authority upheld the arbitrator’s award, reasoning that “[i]n the

absence of a stipulation that . . . included the issue of whether

the [employer] committed any unfair labor practices, the

Arbitrator was not obligated to address and resolve whether the

[employer]’s actions violated the Statute.” Id.

Still seeking some resolution to its unfair labor practice

claim, the union moved for reconsideration, arguing that the

statute provides for (1) a unilateral right to have an unfair labor

practice claim resolved through the grievance process and (2)

appeals to both the Authority and the U.S. Court of Appeals.

The Authority denied the motion, again citing its general policy

of deferring to an arbitrator’s framing of the issues absent an

employer stipulation. Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, N.Y. State

Council, 61 F.L.R.A. 664, 666-67 (2006) (“ACT”).

The union petitioned for review, arguing that the Authority

had denied what the statute expressly requires: resolution of its

unfair labor practice claim. The court now dismisses the union’s

petition for lack of jurisdiction under section 7123(a)(1),

reasoning that the Authority’s order merely “involves rules

applicable to arbitration” that happened to result “in the unfair

labor practice claim’s exclusion from review.” Maj. Op. at 4.

In my view, this result ignores the facts of this dispute and

conflicts with both the statute and our precedent.

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II.

Section 7123(a)(1) allows this court to hear appeals from

Authority decisions reviewing arbitral awards if the award

“involves an unfair labor practice,” a standard we have

addressed in some depth on three separate occasions. In OEA,

we considered two separate Authority orders, finding ourselves

with jurisdiction over one order because it “necessarily

implicated” an unfair labor practice claim, but without

jurisdiction over the other because the union had pursued its

claim on a contract theory. 824 F.2d at 69, 71. In U.S. Dep’t of

the Interior v. FLRA, 26 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“DOI”), we

found ourselves without jurisdiction because the union had made

only two “passing references” to unfair labor practices and had

pursued its claim as a contract action. Id. at 183-84. And in

AFGE, Local 2510 v. FLRA, 453 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2006), we

found ourselves without jurisdiction over an Authority order that

not only failed to “engage at all with the substance of the unfair

labor practice,” but dealt solely with attorneys’ fees. Id. at 505.

Taken together, these three cases demonstrate that we have

jurisdiction to review an Authority order if (1) the aggrieved

union consistently pursued its claim as an unfair labor practice

throughout the grievance process, (2) the Authority’s order

necessarily implicates the unfair labor practice claim, and (3) the

order discusses the substance of the unfair labor practice claim

in some way. This case satisfies all three requirements.

First, as the court correctly notes, for us to have jurisdiction,

a union must characterize and pursue its claim “as a statutory

unfair labor practice, not as something else.” Maj. Op. at 5

(quoting OEA, 824 F.2d at 66). In language directly applicable

to this case yet absent from the court’s opinion, we stated in

OEA that “[i]t is clear that if a dual-natured type of complaint

were pursued as a statutory unfair labor practice, any FLRA

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order would be subject to judicial review under section

7123(a)(1), even if the aggrieved party chose to utilize the

grievance/arbitration route.” 824 F.2d at 64 (emphases altered).

Reaffirming this principle in DOI, we stated, even more

categorically, “[i]f the aggrieved party chose to go the grievance

procedure route, but characterized its claim as a statutory unfair

labor practice, judicial review certainly would be available.” 26

F.3d at 183 (emphasis added). The central thrust of both OEA

and DOI, in other words, is that a union may not pursue its

grievance on a breach of contract theory only to transform it

belatedly into an unfair labor practice claim in an effort to obtain

judicial review.

Here, the union did no such thing. It consistently

characterized its claim as an unfair labor practice and pursued it

as such throughout the grievance process. As noted above, the

union began its pre-hearing brief with its unfair labor practice

allegations. In her statement of the parties’ positions, the

arbitrator spent two paragraphs repeating those allegations. The

employer certainly believed the union had raised the claim, even

arguing that the arbitrator had actually decided it. The union

reasserted its unfair labor practice claim in its exceptions to the

arbitral award and pursued it again in its motion for

reconsideration. In short, the union consistently characterized

the employer’s conduct “as a statutory unfair labor practice, not

as something else.” Maj. Op. at 5 (quoting OEA, 824 F.2d at

66).

Attempting to minimize this fact, the court analogizes this

case to DOI where, as here, the “arbitrator’s decision clearly

frame[d] the issue as one arising solely under the parties’

collective bargaining agreements,” the “arbitrator analyze[d] the

case as an alleged breach of contract,” and the Authority’s order

“repeat[ed] the arbitrator’s statement of the issue as one

sounding in contract.” Maj. Op. at 7 (quoting DOI, 26 F.3d at

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184). This is all true, but irrelevant. The unions in DOI, unlike

the union here, failed to pursue their claims as statutory unfair

labor practices. Instead, the unions insisted their case was

“governed by simple contract law,” and included only two

“essentially gratuitous” references to unfair labor practices in

their post-hearing briefs. DOI, 26 F.3d at 183-84. That both the

arbitrator and Authority characterized the case as a contractual

dispute is therefore hardly surprising.

Second, our case law makes clear that for us to have

jurisdiction the Authority’s order must “necessarily implicate[]”

an unfair labor practice claim. OEA, 824 F.2d at 68. This

language is also conspicuously absent from the court’s opinion,

even though it is the test we adopted in OEA (borrowing the

standard from then-Judge Kennedy’s opinion in U.S. Marshals

Service v. FLRA, 708 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1983)), and have

repeated in every subsequent case presenting this jurisdictional

question. OEA, 824 F.2d at 67-68 (“[T]he standard is that a

statutory unfair labor practice must be either an explicit ground

for, or be necessarily implicated by, the Authority’s decision.”)

(footnote omitted); see also AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d at 504;

U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, U.S. Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 43 F.3d

682, 687 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994); DOI, 26 F.3d at 183.

Here, the Authority’s order “necessarily implicated” the

union’s unfair labor practice claim by effectively terminating it.

Put another way, before the Authority issued its order, the union

had a viable unfair labor practice claim, albeit one that the

arbitrator had inexplicably ignored. After the Authority ruled,

however, the union’s claim was irretrievably lost. Because

section 7116(d) forbids the union from re-filing its allegations

with the General Counsel, the Authority’s order represents the

last word on the union’s claim. See AFGE, Local 1411 v. FLRA,

960 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that the purpose of

section 7116(d) is “to preclude duplicative proceedings by

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requiring an aggrieved party to make an election of remedies”

when “the same facts and the same decision are involved”).

That the Authority grounded its decision in arbitration procedure

does nothing to change the order’s ultimate effect on the union’s

unfair labor practice claim. In short, by disposing of the union’s

claim for all time, the Authority’s order must “necessarily

implicate[]” it. OEA, 824 F.2d at 67-68.

To reach the opposite conclusion, the court relies heavily on

AFGE, Local 2510, but that case provides a telling contrast to

the issue presented here. In AFGE, Local 2510, the arbitrator

had decided the union’s unfair labor practice claim in the

union’s favor, and the employer declined to challenge that ruling

before the Authority, instead appealing only the arbitrator’s

award of attorneys’ fees to the union. 453 F.3d at 502-03. As

a result, the Authority’s order “addressed only the fee award.”

Id. at 504. We dismissed the union’s petition for lack of

jurisdiction, emphasizing that the Authority’s order—not the

arbitral award—must involve an unfair labor practice for us to

have jurisdiction. Id. at 505. Here, of course, the arbitral award

includes no resolution of the union’s statutory claim, but that is

the entire point of the union’s appeal. Unlike its counterpart in

AFGE, Local 2510, the union here does not attempt to bootstrap

an ancillary issue onto a previously decided unfair labor practice

claim in order to obtain judicial review. Rather, the union

argues that it deserves resolution of its statutory claim in the first

instance. Thus, although we concluded that the Authority’s

order in AFGE, Local 2510 did not “necessarily implicate” an

unfair labor practice claim, id. at 504, the facts support the

opposite conclusion here.

Finally, as the court points out, we will review an

Authority’s order when the “substance of the unfair labor

practice” is “‘discussed in some way in, or [is] some part of, the

Authority’s order.’” Maj. Op. at 5 (quoting AFGE, Local 2510,

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453 F.3d at 505). Here, the Authority argues that it never

“assess[ed] the substance of the alleged [unfair labor practice]

at all in the instant case.” Resp’t’s Br. 20 (emphasis added). In

a similar vein, the court states that “the Authority did not engage

in any substantive discussion of the union’s unfair labor practice

claim in its order.” Maj. Op. at 7 (emphasis added). The record

shows otherwise. In denying the union’s motion for

reconsideration—in an order challenged here—the Authority

included the following substantive discussion of the union’s

claims:

Even if we were to address the alleged unfair

labor practices, we would nonetheless find

that the denial of the grievance was not

deficient. Specifically, the Arbitrator found

that the [employer] did not breach the

agreement. Authority precedent establishes

that unless there is a breach of an agreement,

there can be no repudiation in violation of the

Statute, as was alleged by the union at

arbitration. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Air Force,

375th Mission Support Squadron, Scott Air

Force Base, Ill., 51 F.L.R.A. 858, 862 (1996)

(the first element that must be established to

support an allegation of repudiation in

violation of the Statute is that the respondent’s

actions constituted a breach of the agreement

that was clear and patent). In addition, the

record establishes that the Arbitrator enforced

lawful, agreed-upon limits on the obligation to

bargain and that, consequently, the

[employer]’s actions did not constitute a

failure to bargain. See AFGE Local 3529, 52

F.L.R.A. 1313, 1319-20 (1997).

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ACT, 61 F.L.R.A. at 666 n.4. The Authority thus addressed both

of the union’s unfair labor practice allegations. To be sure, the

Authority’s discussion does not amount to a decision on the

merits of the union’s claim, but “something less than treatment

‘on the merits’ is required” for us to have section 7123(a)(1)

jurisdiction. OEA, 824 F.2d at 71.

Ignoring the Authority’s order denying rehearing, the court

demands more. Quoting half a sentence from OEA, it explains

that to confer jurisdiction, the Authority’s order “does need to

include some ‘sort of substantive evaluation of a statutory unfair

labor practice.’” Maj. Op. at 6 (quoting OEA, 824 F.2d at 71).

But in the portion of the sentence not quoted by the court, we

concluded that “th[e] sort of substantive evaluation” at issue in

that case “abundantly suffice[d] to satisfy the relatively

imprecise ‘involves’ standard of section 7123(a)(1).” OEA, 824

F.2d at 71 (emphasis added). Although the discussion here may

not “abundantly suffice[] to satisfy” section 7123(a)(1), it

suffices nonetheless. Not only does the Authority’s order

include a “substantive evaluation” of the union’s claim, but that

evaluation, though dictum, carries precedential weight in future

Authority proceedings. See, e.g., Def. Sec. Assistance Dev. Ctr.,

60 F.L.R.A. 292, 294 (2004) (citing Authority dicta while

analyzing a claim); U.S. Border Patrol Livermore Sector

Dublin, Cal., 58 F.L.R.A. 231, 233 (2002) (same); AFGE, Local

32, 51 F.L.R.A. 491, 502 (1995) (same).

In sum, the union pursued its statutory claim throughout the

grievance process, the Authority’s order “necessarily

implicated” that claim by terminating it, OEA, 824 F.2d at 68,

and the Authority discussed the substance of the claim “in some

way.” AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d at 505 (quoting OEA, 824

F.2d at 65). We have never demanded more to find jurisdiction.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, I would find section 7123(a)(1)

jurisdiction and go on to review the Authority’s conclusion that

an arbitrator has no obligation to resolve a union’s unfair labor

practice claim unless an employer stipulates to that claim. The

union argues that under a plain reading of the statute, “a union

that raises an [unfair labor practice] claim as a grievance has a

unilateral right to demand that the claim be resolved by binding

arbitration.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. 24.

The union’s textual argument proceeds as follows. Section

7116(d) expressly allows unions to raise unfair labor practice

claims in grievance procedures, and section 7121(a)(1), in turn,

requires those procedures to be processes for “resolving

grievances” (emphasis added). Then, citing section

7121(b)(1)(C)(iii), the union argues that because either party to

a dispute may demand that “any grievance not satisfactorily

settled . . . be subject to binding arbitration,” the statute grants

unions the right to have unfair labor practice claims “resolved”

through arbitration. According to the union, allowing a statutory

claim to vanish if an employer refuses to stipulate to it conflicts

with the statute because the grievance procedure would then fail

to “resolve” the grievance.

The union reads the statute correctly. “Resolve” means “to

reach a decision about” or “settle.” Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 1933 (1993). Under the Authority’s

“no obligation” rule, however, the grievance process may end

without deciding a union’s unfair labor practice claim or settling

it in any meaningful sense. The claim can simply evaporate.

The Authority offers no response to the union’s textual

argument. Instead, it argues that not all unfair labor practice

claims are ultimately “resolved” under the statute. As the

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Authority points out, if the General Counsel declines to issue a

complaint upon a union’s request, the issue never reaches the

Authority for review. The statute, however, requires the General

Counsel to give the union a written statement of reasons for

declining to issue a complaint. See 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(1) (“In

any case in which the General Counsel does not issue a

complaint because the charge fails to state an unfair labor

practice, the General Counsel shall provide the person making

the charge a written statement of the reasons for not issuing a

complaint.”). Under the Authority’s rule, unions choosing to

pursue their unfair labor practice claims through

arbitration—their right under the statute—can be denied even

this.

At bottom, the Authority argues that the arbitrator resolved

the union’s claim by ignoring it. Because I believe the statute

requires more, I would grant the union’s petition for review and

remand the case to the Authority with instructions to return it to

the arbitrator for a decision on the merits of the union’s unfair

labor practice claim.

IV.

Contrary to the court’s view—and to return to the

jurisdictional issue—my disposition would further Congress’s

strong pro-arbitration policy by guaranteeing unions some

resolution of their unfair labor practice claims through grievance

procedures. The court’s decision, by contrast, will discourage

unions from choosing the very grievance and arbitration process

that Congress seeks to promote. Eager to preclude judicial

review, employers will have no incentive to stipulate to a

union’s unfair labor practice claim in arbitration and every

reason not to do so. Unions, in turn, will justifiably fear that

arbitrators will ignore their properly raised statutory claims

without explanation, rendering those claims lost for all time.

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The result is easy to predict: instead of seeking arbitration,

unions will file unfair labor practice charges with the General

Counsel. Indeed, unions would be wise to follow this course,

for if the General Counsel declines to pursue their unfair labor

practice claims, they will at least receive a written explanation.

As this case makes abundantly clear, however, unions choose

the grievance track at their peril.

Finally, my proposed disposition, unlike the court’s

decision, would ensure “a single, uniform body of case law

concerning unfair labor practices.” AFGE, Local 2510, 453 F.3d

at 505. If, on remand, the arbitrator ruled against the union, the

union could appeal to the Authority. Judging from the merits

discussion in the Authority’s denial of the union’s motion for

reconsideration, I think it safe to assume that the Authority

would find against the union. If the union sought review here,

we could then perform our statutory function by ensuring that

the Authority had not left “the path of the law of unfair labor

practices” while “escap[ing] the review that would bring it back

to the straight and narrow.” Id. By short-circuiting this process,

the court denies us that opportunity.

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