Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05078/USCOURTS-ca4-08-05078-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jaime Alejandro Alvarado Perez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-5078

JAIME ALEJANDRO ALVARADO PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Roger W. Titus, District Judge.

(8:07-cr-00435-RWT-1)

Argued: May 11, 2010

Decided: July 1, 2010

Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

Arthur L. ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Alarcón wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Gregory joined. Judge Shedd

wrote a separate concurring opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Eun Kyung Cho, HALL & CHO, PC, Rockville,

Maryland, for Appellant. Michael Joseph Leotta, OFFICE OF

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THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States

Attorney, Solette Magnelli, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

OPINION

ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Jaime Alejandro Alvarado Perez ("Alvarado-Perez")

entered a conditional plea to a one-count felony indictment of

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person

previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). He appeals from the district court’s sentencing

decision on two grounds: (1) the district court clearly erred by

applying three sentencing enhancements pursuant to the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 2K2.1(b)(6),

5K2.3, and 5K2.7 relating to Alvarado-Perez’s conduct of

taking a loaded firearm inside a "backpack"1 into the office of

a probation officer, and (2) the district court’s 96-month sentence is unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

We affirm because we conclude that the district court did

not err in applying the sentencing enhancements. We also

have determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Alvarado-Perez to 96 months of imprisonment.

1The parties refer to it as a "backpack." The photograph of the object

introduced into evidence shows that it was a cloth bag with a draw string

that could be carried on a person’s back. 

2 UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ

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I

A

The facts of this case are not in dispute. In their plea agreement, the parties stipulated that the United States would prove

the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt:

The defendant, JAIME ALEJANDRO

ALVARADO-PEREZ, entered the United States

from his native country of El Salvador on December

21, 2001 as a non-immigrant child of a legal permanent resident. This status was valid until December

20, 2003, after which the defendant’s status became

that of an illegal alien. Since that date, the defendant

has been in the United States and has not filed any

applications with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. His status, to date, remains that of an

illegal alien.

On June 30, 2006, [ALVARADO-]PEREZ was

convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery

County, Maryland on the offense of Third Degree

Sexual Offense, which involves the use or threatened

use of force as an element. This offense was committed against a minor. [Alvarado-]Perez was sentenced

to three years’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. His civil rights have not been restored.

In September of 2007, agents from Immigration and

Customs Enforcement ("ICE") became aware that

[ALVARADO-]PEREZ was illegally within the

United States. On September 6, 2007,

[ALVARADO-]PEREZ visited the Montgomery

County Parole and Probation Office for his regular

meeting with his probation officer. On August 23,

2007, that probation officer had visited

[ALVARADO-]PEREZ and had told him that

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because he had missed several appointments and had

failed to maintain the conditions of his probation,

that [he] was on the verge of violating his probation

that would result in his re-incarceration. When

[ALVARADO-]PEREZ arrived for his September

6th meeting, ICE Agents approached him.

[ALVARADO-]PEREZ acknowledged his identity

and admitted that his visa from 2001 expired. ICE

agents then arrested [ALVARADO-]PEREZ for

immigration violations. During a search incident to

this arrest, agents found a .38 caliber revolver,

Model MR 102, serial number 09644, and 16 rounds

of Winchester .38 caliber cartridges in the bag that

the defendant was wearing when he entered the probation office. The firearm was loaded. The firearm

and ammunition were manufactured outside of

Maryland and crossed state lines, in and affecting

interstate commerce. [ALVARADO-]PEREZ

knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition

and brought it to the probation office.

[ALVARADO-]PEREZ was subsequently advised

of his Miranda rights, which he waived. During this

interview, [ALVARADO-]PEREZ stated, among

other things, that: (1) he had arrived in the United

States on December 21, 2001 with a visa that had

since expired; (2) he had brought the firearm with

him to his probation meeting on that date; (3) he did

not need the gun for protection against gang members; and (4) he was an MS-13 gang member in El

Salvador, as reflected by his tattoos.

(Plea Agreement 9.) 

B

On September 26, 2007, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment charging Alvarado-Perez with one count of unlaw4 UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ

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ful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1).2 Alvarado-Perez pled guilty to the one-count

indictment. Section 924(a)(2) provides that "[w]hoever knowingly violates . . . section 922 shall be fined as provided in this

title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(a)(2). At Alvarado-Perez’s sentencing hearing on October 17, 2008, the district court noted that the presentence

report provided for a base offense level of 20 and a criminal

history category II. After a 3-point reduction for acceptance

of responsibility, Alvarado-Perez’s total base offense level

was 17. 

The district court imposed three sentencing enhancements,

however, which increased Alvarado-Perez’s offense level to

25. First, the district court imposed a 4-point sentencing

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) based on its

determination that Alvarado-Perez’s conduct of carrying a

loaded firearm in a backpack at least facilitated or had the

potential of facilitating the crime of reckless endangerment.

Second, the district court imposed a 2-point sentencing

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3 based on its determination that Alvarado-Perez’s conduct of bringing a loaded

firearm into the office of a probation officer caused the officer

psychological injury. Finally, the district court imposed a 2-

point sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7

based on its determination that Alvarado-Perez’s conduct of

bringing a loaded firearm into the probation officer’s office

also caused a significant disruption of a government function.

With a new base offense level of 25 and a criminal history

category II, Alvarado-Perez’s Sentencing Guidelines range

was 63 to 78 months. 

After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the dis2The indictment also charged Alvarado-Perez with one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by an alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).

That count was dismissed on the motion of the Government. 

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 5

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trict court imposed an upward variance and sentenced

Alvarado-Perez to 96 months imprisonment and 3 years

supervised released. Alvarado-Perez filed this timely appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

II

A

Alvarado-Perez contends that the district court erred in

applying an enhancement for facilitating or potentially facilitating the crime of reckless endangerment under U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(6). Alvarado-Perez argues that "[b]ased upon the

facts admitted [ ] and agreed upon by [the parties], the

enhancement does not apply." (Appellant’s Br. 13.)

"In assessing a challenge to a sentencing court’s application

of the Guidelines, we review the court’s factual findings for

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." United States

v. Allen, 446 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing United

States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 536-36 (4th Cir. 2005)).

Section 2K2.1(b)(6) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides:

If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or

ammunition in connection with another felony

offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or

ammunition with knowledge, intent or reason to

believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense, increase by 4

levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level

18, increase to level 18.

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). 

In interpreting § 2K2.1(b)(6), this Court has previously

held that "a firearm is possessed ‘in connection with’ another

felony offense if the firearm ‘facilitated, or had the potential

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of facilitating’ the other offense." United v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d

160, 162 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1). "This

requirement is satisfied if the firearm ‘ha[d] some purpose or

effect’ with respect to the other offense,[ ] including if the

firearm ‘was present for protection or to embolden the actor.’"

Id. (quoting United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 411 (4th

Cir. 2003) and United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 266

(4th Cir. 2000)).

The term "another felony" is defined in § 2K2.1(b)(6) as

"any federal, state, or local offense . . . punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether

a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction obtained."

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n. 14(C).

Section 3-204 of the Maryland Code of Criminal Law provides as follows: 

(a) [a] person may not recklessly:

(1) engage in conduct that creates a substantial risk

of death or serious physical injury to another; or

(2) discharge a firearm from a motor vehicle in a

manner that creates a substantial risk of death or

serious physical injury to another.

(b) A person who violates this section is guilty of the

misdemeanor of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5

years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.

Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 3-204(a) (emphasis added).3

3Although, under Maryland law, a person who is guilty of reckless

endangerment is guilty of a misdemeanor, Boyer v. State, 107 Md.App.

32, 39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), the offense constitutes a felony under

the Guidelines because it is punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n. 14(C). 

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 7

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"Maryland’s reckless endangerment statute is aimed at deterring the commission of potentially harmful conduct before an

injury or death occurs. As a consequence, a defendant may be

guilty of reckless endangerment even where he has caused no

injury." Boyer, 107 Md.App. at 39. "Accordingly, guilt under

the statute does not depend upon whether the accused

intended that his reckless conduct create a substantial risk of

death or serious injury to another; rather, the trier of fact must

determine whether the accused’s conduct, when viewed

objectively, was so reckless as to constitute a gross departure

from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would

observe." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court found that Alvarado-Perez recklessly

endangered other persons. It determined that AlvaradoPerez’s conduct of carrying a loaded firearm in his backpack

was a gross departure from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe and that it created a substantial

risk of death or serious physical injury to another. The district

court reasoned as follows:

Anybody who gets on a public transportation bus,

and who carries with him a fully loaded weapon with

no safety, and a lot of bullets in a bag that can be jostled and easily make the trigger go off is clearly

endangering the public and doing so recklessly. 

. . .

A law-biding person would not want to get on a public bus with a gun, much less with a gun fully

loaded, no safety, in a bag that, with the slightest

agitation, could cause death or serious bodily harm

on that bus. . . . I conclude that it certainly meets the

level of reckless endangerment.

Based upon this record, we agree with the district court that

carrying a fully loaded handgun that has no safety mechanism

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in a cloth bag constitutes reckless endangerment. The district

court did not clearly err in determining that Alvarado-Perez’s

conduct constituted reckless endangerment under Maryland

law.

Alvarado-Perez further maintains that the district court’s

finding that he was guilty of reckless endangerment was

based solely on the court’s determination that "the firearm did

not have a safety." (Appellant’s Br. 16.) Alvarado-Perez

argues that "[t]he district court relied heavily and repeatedly

on [this] fact [which was] not admitted by [him], nor proven

to a jury." (Id.) 

This Court has previously held that:

[s]entencing judges may find facts relevant to determining a Guidelines range by a preponderance of the

evidence, so long as that Guidelines sentence is

treated as advisory and falls within the statutory

maximum authorized . . . Indeed, ‘many individual

Guidelines apply higher sentences in the presence of

special facts’ and ‘[i]n many cases, the sentencing

judge, not the jury, will determine the existence of

those facts.’ Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127

S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). That

‘does not violate the Sixth Amendment,’ however,

because ‘[a]s far as the law is concerned, the judge

could disregard the Guidelines and apply the same

sentence . . . in the absence of the special facts.’ . . .

The point is thus that the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts.

United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, the district court was entitled to consider relevant conduct that was not admitted by Alvarado-Perez in

determining an appropriate sentencing decision. The following colloquy demonstrates that Alvarado-Perez’s counsel was

mindful of this principle at sentencing:

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 9

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THE COURT: I’m entitled to consider conduct

other than the conduct involved in offense of conviction, am I not?

MS. CHO [defense counsel]: I’m sorry, your

Honor?

The Court: I’m entitled to consider conduct including uncharged and acquitted conduct of the defendant that is not part of the offense of conviction

under the sentencing guidelines, am I not?

MS. CHO [defense counsel]: Absolutely your

honor.

Whether or not Alvarado-Perez admitted that the revolver

did not have a safety mechanism, or whether this fact was

presented to a jury, is not controlling because the evidence

presented by the Government was sufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. See Benkahla, 530 F.3d

at 312. At the sentencing hearing, ICE Special Agent Sergeant

Paul Morris testified that the firearm found in AlvaradoPerez’s backpack did not have a safety and that it could have

fired on its own. He testified as follows:

THE COURT: Was the safety on the gun on or off?

WITNESS: [Agent Morris]: I do not believe the

gun had a safety, sir. It was a revolver.

THE COURT: So there would be no safety? In

other words, it could fire —

WITNESS: [Agent Morris]: Correct.

THE COURT: — without any additional effort

required?

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WITNESS: [Agent Morris]: Correct.

Because the district court’s finding that Alvarado-Perez’s

conduct of carrying a loaded firearm in a backpack at least

facilitated or had the potential of facilitating the crime of

reckless endangerment was not clearly erroneous, the court

did not err in applying the 4-point sentencing enhancement

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6).

B

Alvarado-Perez contends that the district court erred in

applying the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3. Section

5K2.3 provides:

If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury

much more serious than that normally resulting from

commission of the offense, the court may increase

the sentence above the authorized guideline range.

The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend

on the severity of the psychological injury and the

extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3. Specifically, Alvarado-Perez argues that

the distress caused to Probation Officer Donna Billeter, which

caused her to wear a bullet proof vest and request a job transfer, was based on inaccurate information.

The district court imposed this enhancement because it

found that Alvarado-Perez’s conduct in bringing a loaded firearm into Officer Billeter’s office caused her psychological

injury. Officer Billeter’s testimony that the fact that AlvaradoPerez brought a gun into Billeter’s office caused her to wear

a bullet proof vest and request a transfer from a job that she

had performed for 25 years is undisputed. 

The district court’s determination that Alvarado-Perez’s

action of bringing a firearm to Billeter’s office caused her

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 11

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serious psychological injury was not clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the 2-

point sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3.

C

Alvarado-Perez contends that the district court erred in

applying the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7. Section

5K2.7 of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, in pertinent

part, provides:

If the defendant’s conduct resulted in a significant

disruption of a governmental function, the court may

increase the sentence above the authorized guideline

range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function affected. Departure from the guidelines

ordinarily would not be justified when the offense of

conviction is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of justice[.]

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7.

Alvarado-Perez contends that the district court failed to

indicate what precautions the probation office took to justify

an enhancement for disruption of a governmental function.

The record supports the district court’s finding that the probation office was significantly disrupted by Alvarado-Perez’s

conduct of bringing a firearm into the probation office. The

probation office transferred Officer Billeter to another position and it posted a new sign stating its policy against bringing weapons into the office. As the district court noted,

Alvarado-Perez’s actions caused the probation office to

come to the realization that they can no longer

assume that those who are on probation are going to

be reasonably well-behaved when [they are] in [the

probation] office.

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It[ ] required [probation officers] to post new signage, required them to give additional notifications,

additional precautions, and . . . it certainly disrupted

the operations of this office.

The district court’s determination that Alvarado-Perez’s

actions had caused a significant disruption of a governmental

function was not clearly erroneous.

III

Alvarado-Perez maintains that the district court abused its

discretion because his sentence of 96 months imprisonment is

unreasonable. He claims that the sentence is "greater than

necessary to conform with the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)." (Appellant’s Br. 25.) Alvarado-Perez contends

that the district court incorrectly assumed that the firearm was

fully loaded, that the failure to have a safety heightened the

normal threat posed by the firearm, and gave undue weight to

uncharged allegations of general criminal activity. (Id. at 25-

26.) In addition, Alvarado-Perez asserts that his sentence of

96 months imprisonment provides no deterrence because he

has never served a sentence of this length. The length of his

previous sentence was 44 days. (Id. at 27.)

In Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), the Supreme

Court instructed that

[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is

inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate

court must review the sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. It must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,

such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,

selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceUNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 13

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including an explanation for any deviation from the

Guidelines range. Assuming, that the district court’s

sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuseof-discretion standard. When conducting this review,

the court will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any

variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence

is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court

may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of

reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the

Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the

extent of the deviation, but must give due deference

to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.

The fact that the appellate court might reasonably

have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district

court.

Practical considerations also underline this legal

principle. The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under

§ 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and

hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations,

has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not

conveyed by the record. The sentencing judge has

access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual

case and the individual defendant before him than

the Commission or the appeals court. Moreover, district courts have an institutional advantage over

appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines sentences than the appellate courts do.

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Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58 and

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996) (internal quotations omitted)). 

Section 3553(a) requires that a sentencing court consider

the following factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and

the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

established for—

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by

the applicable category of defendant as set forth in

the guidelines . . . 

(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . 

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(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have

been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of

the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The district court did not commit a procedural error in

applying § 3553(a). The district court correctly calculated the

Guidelines range and allowed the parties to argue for a sentence they believed to be appropriate. The district court fully

explained its reasoning in consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court reasoned as follows:

[T]he conduct involved in this case is fairly unique

and not just stupid but reckless and outrageous, and

[ ] therefore a variance sentence is going to be necessary in my judgment in order to reflect the factors set

forth in Section 3553.

First of all, the nature and circumstances of the

offense, which at first glance appears to be a garden

variety felon in possession of a firearm case, are by

no means garden variety. This is an extremely serious offense which congress has provided for substantial possible punishment of up to ten years, and

ordinarily it is under circumstances quite different

from this one. In this one, however, the circumstances of the possession by this convicted felon are

truly not stupid, but outrageous. That one would

come to the offices of a government agency that is

required to supervise him because of earlier criminal

conduct, and to march into that building with a

loaded weapon which either does not have a safety

or the safety is off, and with a large supply of additional ammunition, is an extremely serious offense

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when you take into account the full circumstances

relating to this felon’s possession of that weapon.

The history and characteristics of this defendant

are not helpful to this case. This is a person who

wasn’t recruited to MS-13 here in the United States

but came here as a member already, overstayed his

visa, and clearly has been involved in fairly significant and deep involvement with the MS-13 gang as

reflected by the tattoos and by the testimony that’s

been given to me today by the witnesses who I’ve

heard.

This is an especially troublesome gang that endangers the public in a most profound way with a culture that calls for crime as part of its existence, and

it is one to be dealt with in the interest of the public

severely and harshly. My sentence is required to promote respect for the law. . . .

I’m required to consider the need to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant. This

defendant has endangered the public enough. What

he’s done has been truly outrageous, and the public

must be protected from further conduct of this

nature.

I’m required to consider the need to provide the

defendant with needed educational or vocational

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. I think the most

effective manner will be in jail.

I am required to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, and I will attempt to do

so, but I must do so with appropriate measurement

of the seriousness of this offense.

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I am required to consider the need to provide restitution to any victims. And unfortunately, this defendant has no resources, and the — I’m not sure that

I could provide adequate restitution to the impact

this has had, and that I’ve already mentioned, on the

probation officer.

I am going to impose a variance sentence of 96

months, and I want to state very clearly that whether

the guideline recommendation produced a range of

63-78 months, which is what it did produce after I

applied the guidelines, or a sentencing range of 41-

51 months, which would be the way the probation

officer’s original calculations had it, or a sentencing

range of 27-33 months, which would be without the

four level enhancement as provided by the probation

officer, not any one of those sentences to me would

be sufficient to reflect all of the 3553 factors here.

So if I assume for the moment that this defendant

were to prevail on every single argument on every

single offense level adjustment and every single

departure upward, and that I had in front of me a recommended sentence of 27-33 months, I would

impose the exact same sentence. This is a sentence

that must be imposed to reflect more accurately all

of the factors set forth in Section 3553. That is a sentence that is still well below the statutory maximum

in this case. It is 80 percent of a maximum sentence.

And if ever were there a case where an argument

could be made as has been made by the prosecutor

today of seeking the most that congress would authorize, this is one of those cases. But the sentence I’ve

imposed is only 80 percent of that way towards what

would be recommended or authorized by congress in

its wisdom in enacting this regulation. So I’m imposing a sentence of 96 months in custody.

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This Court has held that "the resulting sentence is procedurally reasonable [when] the district court adequately explain[s]

its sentence on alternative grounds supporting a variance sentence, by reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." United

States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 804 (4th Cir. 2009). "This

additional, § 3553(a)-based, explanation of [the] sentence provides independent grounds for a variance sentence and verifies the reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing

determination." Id. at 805. The record shows that the district

court adequately explained the basis for Alvarado-Perez’s

sentence under the § 3553(a) factors apart from the sentencing

enhancements.4

Alvarado-Perez’s argument that a sentence of 96 months is

too long to provide adequate deterrence because his previous

sentence was only for a duration of 44 days is also meritless.

The district court stated that a 96 month sentence was necessary because:

[A] light sentence under the circumstances of this

case, [ ] would utterly undermine the law and would

totally fail to afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct. A sentence by a court occasionally needs to

send a message that would deter others, like this

defendant, who have cheerfully disregarded their status of convicted felons and do have not only possessed weapons but possessed them in a government

building on their way to see a government probation

officer. There really must be and will be deterrence

to that kind of behavior.

4Alvarado-Perez argues that the district court gave undue weight to

hearsay testimony that he engaged in gang activity. However, this Court

previously held that "there is no bar to the use of hearsay at sentencing.

‘United States courts have a long history of using reliable hearsay for sentencing. The trial court may properly consider uncorroborated hearsay evidence that the defendant has had an opportunity to rebut or explain.’"

United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 607 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United

States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1990)). 

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 19

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The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that

Alvarado-Perez’s sentence is substantively reasonable. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Alvarado-Perez to 96 months of imprisonment.

Conclusion

The sentencing decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

SHEDD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Because I agree that the district court did not err in either

calculating Perez-Alvarado’s advisory guideline range or

varying upward from that range, I concur in the majority

opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the sentence could also be affirmed, as the government urges in its

supplemental brief, on the alternate reasoning given by the

district court without deciding whether the court erred in its

calculation of the advisory guideline range. See United States

v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).1

As the majority notes, the district court used an advisory

sentencing range of 63-78 months in imposing the 96-month

variance sentence. To reach this range, the court used several

guideline enhancements. However, the court stated that it

would impose that sentence even if the sentencing range was

27-33 months, which is what Alvarado-Perez contends is

appropriate:

1Alternate sentences are not completely uncommon. Indeed, in a more

limited context, we have previously recommended that district courts

impose alternate sentences. See United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426

(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc order holding that the sentencing guidelines are

mandatory but recommending that district courts impose alternate sentences treating the guidelines as advisory pending Supreme Court guidance), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005) (for further consideration in light of

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 

20 UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ

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I am going to impose a variance sentence of 96

months, and I want to state very clearly that whether

the guideline recommendation produced a range of

63-78 months, which is what it did produce after I

applied the guidelines, or a sentencing range of 41-

51 months, which would be the way the probation

officer’s original calculations had it, or a sentencing

range of 27-33 months, which would be without the

four level enhancement as provided by the probation

officer, not any one of those sentences to me would

be sufficient to reflect all of the 3553 factors here.

So if I assume for the moment that this defendant

were to prevail on every single argument on every

single offense level adjustment and every single

departure upward, and that I had in front of me a

recommended range of sentence of 27-33 months, I

would impose the exact same sentence. This is a sentence that must be imposed to reflect more accurately all of the factors set forth in Section 3553.

That is a sentence that is still well below the statutory maximum in this case. It is 80 percent of a maximum sentence. And if ever were there a case where

an argument could be made as has been made by the

prosecutor today of seeking the most that [C]ongress

would authorize, this is one of those cases. But the

sentence I’ve imposed is only 80 percent of the way

towards what would be recommended or authorized

by [C]ongress in its wisdom in enacting this legislation. So I’m imposing a sentence of 96 months in

custody.

J.A. 233-34 (emphasis added).

In Keene, the district court sentenced the defendant using

a contested sentencing enhancement, but it also stated that

even if the enhancement did not apply it would impose the

same sentence. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed withUNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 21

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out deciding the enhancement issue because it found that the

alternate sentence was reasonable. The Eleventh Circuit

termed its analysis "an assumed error harmlessness inquiry"

that has two components: (1) "knowledge that the district

court would have reached the same result even if it had

decided the guidelines issue the other way," and (2) "a determination that the sentence would be reasonable even if the

guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.

. . ." 470 F.3d at 1349. Applying that analysis to the facts

before it, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that even if there

was any misapplication of the guideline enhancement, 

"the error did not affect the district court’s selection

of the sentence imposed." Put a little differently, it

would make no sense to set aside this reasonable

sentence and send the case back to the district court

since it has already told us that it would impose

exactly the same sentence, a sentence we would be

compelled to affirm.

Id. at 1350 (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193,

203 (1992)). See also United States v. Dean, 517 F.3d 1224,

1232 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Lopez v. United

States, 129 S. Ct. 2155 (2009) (applying the Keene analysis

to affirm the variance sentence). 

Improper calculation of an advisory guideline range constitutes a procedural error, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51 (2007), and "procedural errors at sentencing . . . are routinely subject to harmlessness review," Puckett v. United

States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (2009). Thus, "[i]n evaluating

a district court’s error in its sentencing calculations, we must

determine whether the error was harmless." United States v.

Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentencing calculation error is harmless "if the resulting sentence was not

‘longer than that to which [the defendant] would otherwise be

subject.’" Id. (quoting United States v. Stokes, 261 F.3d 496,

499 (4th Cir. 2001)).

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I am not aware of any published decision in which we have

applied the Keene analysis in the precise situation before us:

that is, where we have entirely given the benefit of the doubt

regarding the appropriate advisory sentencing range to the

defendant and then simply decided the reasonableness of an

alternate variance sentence from that range.2 However, such

an approach seems entirely consistent with our caselaw.

For example, it is not uncommon for us to assume, without

deciding, error in the context of conducting a harmless error

analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625,

637 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Martin v. United

States,___ U.S. ___, 78 U.S.L.W. 3611 (2010) ("Martin raises

several potential errors that the district court made in admitting the 1980 conviction, but we need not address them.

Assuming that the district court erred in admitting the conviction, that error was harmless."); United States v. Lipford, 203

F.3d 259, 273 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e need not decide whether

the conduct here meets that broad definition because even if

we assume, without deciding, that there was error, any such

error would be harmless.").

Indeed, we recently did so in a sentencing case. In United

States v. Boulware, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 Westlaw 1874806

(4th Cir. 2010), the defendant challenged her sentence on

appeal, arguing that the district court did not offer sufficient

reasons to show that it made an individual assessment of the

specific circumstances in her case in light of the relevant

§ 3553(a) factors. Without deciding whether such an error

occurred, we rejected this argument because the alleged error

was harmless:

In light of the strong indications that the district

court fully considered Boulware’s argument for a

2Cf. United States v. Lee, 321 Fed. Appx. 298, 302 (4th Cir.) (Shedd,

J., concurring) (noting that the sentence could have been affirmed under

the Keene analysis), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 204 (2009). 

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below-guidelines sentence, and in light of the weakness of that argument, the notion that having to

explain its analysis further might have changed the

district court’s mind . . . is simply unrealistic in the

present case, and remand for resentencing would be

a pointless waste of resources. We therefore hold

that even assuming that the district court committed

procedural error in failing to sufficiently explain the

sentence imposed in light of the § 3553(a) factors,

any error was harmless.

2010 Westlaw 1874806, at *6.

Moreover, in a slightly different context, we have affirmed

a sentence that was erroneously imposed because we concluded that the district court’s statement of an alternate sentence rendered the error harmless. See United States v.

Shatley, 448 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2006). We explained in that

case:

Thus, even though the district court did impose a

sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines that violated Shatley’s Sixth Amendment rights, it

announced at the same time that if the Sentencing

Guidelines became advisory, it would impose the

same sentence. In making that determination, it

properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. . . . We

take the district court at its word when it stated

plainly that it would impose the same sentence under

an advisory guideline system. Thus, the error was

harmless; to remand this case now in view of these

facts would amount to an "empty formality."

448 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted).

We have come close to applying the Keene analysis on at

least two occasions. For example, in United States v. Evans,

526 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 476 (2008),

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the defendant did not challenge the calculation of his advisory

sentencing range, but he did challenge the district court’s use

of a guideline provision to depart upward from the range.

Without deciding whether the court erred in its use of the

guideline provision, we found the ultimate sentence to be reasonable because the court imposed it by relying on both the

guideline provision and, independently, the § 3553(a) factors.

We noted: "When, as here, a district court offers two or more

independent rationales for its deviation, an appellate court

cannot hold the sentence unreasonable if the appellate court

finds fault with just one of these rationales." 526 F.3d at 165

(emphasis in original). We then concluded: "Accordingly,

even assuming the district court erred in applying the Guideline departure provisions, Evans’ sentence, which is welljustified by § 3553(a) factors, is reasonable." Id.

More recently, in United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793

(4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1923 (2010), the

defendant argued that the district court committed two procedural errors involving two enhancements used to calculate his

guideline range. We rejected the defendant’s argument as to

the first enhancement, finding it to be proper. However, we

noted regarding the second enhancement that the court "may

have erred." 585 F.3d at 804. Nonetheless, we affirmed the

sentence, finding it to be procedurally reasonable "because the

district court adequately explained its sentence on alternative

grounds supporting a variance sentence, by reference to the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." Id.

As the foregoing authorities illustrate, (1) we review procedural sentencing errors (such as guideline range calculations)

for harmlessness, (2) we have previously assumed without

deciding that sentencing errors occurred in affirming sentences under a harmless error analysis, and (3) we have

accepted a district court’s statement of an alternate sentence

as a basis to conclude that a sentencing error was harmless.

Taken together, these analytical approaches form the Keene

"assumed error harmlessness" analysis.

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO PEREZ 25

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Applying that analysis to this case, we (1) initially give

Alvarado-Perez the benefit of the doubt and assume (without

deciding) that he is correct that the sentencing range is 27-33

months and (2) proceed to decide the question of whether a

variance from that range to 96 months is reasonable. Based on

the reasons stated by the district court, and in light of our deferential standard of review, I believe that the variance from

27-33 months to 96 months is reasonable. Accordingly, the

sentence could be affirmed on this basis without reaching the

merits of the claimed guideline calculation errors.

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