Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00666/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00666-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry A Nichols
Petitioner
Unknown Party
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Larry A Nichols, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Unknown Party, named as Warden, 

Respondent.

No. cv-12-666-TUC-DCB (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Habeas 

Petition”) brought pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241. (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner, Larry Nichols, while confined in the Federal Correctional Institution in 

Tucson, Arizona, alleged the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) violated his due process rights 

by removing him from a halfway house and placing him again at FCI-Tucson. (Doc. 1, p. 

4).1

 Respondent answered the Habeas Petition, contesting Petitioner’s claim. (Doc. 9). 

Respondent subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for mootness because 

Petitioner was released from BOP custody. (Doc. 10). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of 

this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Pyle for a Report and 

Recommendation. LR Civ 72.1. 

 

1

 The Magistrate Judge cites to the pagination of the Court’s CM/ECF case 

management system. 

Case 4:12-cv-00666-DCB Document 11 Filed 12/04/12 Page 1 of 4
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Background 

 At the time he filed his Habeas Petition, Petitioner was completing a 100-month 

sentence followed by a three-year term of supervised release for a conviction of 

possessing a shortened shotgun. (Doc. 9-3, p. 1). Prior to filing his Habeas Petition, 

Petitioner had been residing in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”). (Doc. 9-2, pp. 1-

2). While at the RRC, it was discovered that Petitioner may have been having an 

inappropriate relationship with an RRC employee. (Doc. 9-1, pp. 2-3). Because of the 

potential relationship Petitioner was removed from RRC placement and transferred back 

to FCI-Tucson. (Doc. 9-2, pp. 1-2). The RRC employee resigned and the investigation 

into the possible relationship remained open for further review by the Office of Internal 

Affairs. (Doc. 9-1, p. 3). Petitioner was released from the custody of BOP per his good 

conduct time on November 14, 2012. (Doc. 10-1, p. 2). 

 In his Habeas Petition, Petitioner argued BOP violated his due process rights by 

removing him from his RRC placement and transferring him back to FCI-Tucson without 

a disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). Petitioner brought this same claim to the 

attention of BOP by filing a Request for Administrative Remedy with the Warden at FCITucson. (Doc. 9-5, pp. 5-6). It does not appear Petitioner filed an appeal with the 

Regional Office and the Central Office as required for exhaustion. The Court need not 

reach the issue of exhaustion as Petitioner was released from custody in November 2012 

and his claim is now moot. 

Mootness 

 “Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of actual, 

ongoing controversies between litigants.” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 

514, 520 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 

Cir.1998)); see also U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “The requisite personal interest that 

must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its 

existence (mootness).” Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Cook 

Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks 

Case 4:12-cv-00666-DCB Document 11 Filed 12/04/12 Page 2 of 4
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

omitted)). Mootness is a jurisdictional issue, and “federal courts have no jurisdiction to 

hear a case that is moot, that is, where no actual or live controversy exists.” Id. If there is 

no longer any possibility that relief can be obtained for a claim, that claim is moot and 

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. (internal citation omitted). 

 “[T]he function of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to secure immediate release from 

illegal physical custody,” and that is the only relief a court has the power to grant. PicrinPeron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir.1991) (internal citation omitted). Thus, when 

a habeas petitioner has been released from the confinement of which he complains, the 

petition must be dismissed as moot because the court can no longer provide the requested 

relief. Id. at 776 (dismissing § 2241 petition because petitioner had been granted 

immigration parole and released from custody); Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097-

1098 (9th Cir.1997) (finding § 2241 petition challenging conditions of confinement moot 

because petitioner had been paroled, thus, relief sought was unavailable). 

 Petitioner’s request for relief is review of BOP’s decision to transfer Petitioner 

back to FCI-Tucson without a disciplinary hearing. Ultimately, Petitioner seeks relief 

from BOP’s confinement of him in FCI-Tucson. Petitioner was released from the custody 

of BOP per his good conduct time on November 14, 2012. (Doc. 10-1, p. 2). The relief 

Petitioner sought in his Habeas Petition is now unavailable to him and not necessary as 

he is released from custody. 

 Because Petitioner was released from custody, this Court can no longer provide 

him with the relief sought in his Habeas Petition. Even if this Court reviewed Petitioner’s 

arguments and found in his favor, it would be unable to afford him any effective relief as 

a result of his release from custody. Additionally, because no reasonable expectation 

exists that Petitioner will again be subjected to this same set of circumstances, “[t]his is 

not a situation ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ to which the doctrine of 

mootness may not apply.” Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting 

Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.1987)). Therefore, the Court finds that the 

claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Foster, 347 F.3d at 745. 

Case 4:12-cv-00666-DCB Document 11 Filed 12/04/12 Page 3 of 4
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Recommendation 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

DISMISS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and GRANT Respondent’s 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10). 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-666-TUCDCB. 

 Dated this 4th day of December, 2012. 

Case 4:12-cv-00666-DCB Document 11 Filed 12/04/12 Page 4 of 4