Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07124/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CenterPlate/NBSE
Appellee
Esther Fernandez
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided March 24, 2006

No. 05-7124

ESTHER FERNANDEZ,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTERPLATE/NBSE, FORMERLY KNOWN AS VOLUME

SERVICES AMERICA,

APPELLEE

On Motion for Summary Affirmance

______

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00809)

Maurice Baskin filed the motion for summary affirmance

for appellant. With him on the briefs was Brian Hudson. 

Barbara B. Hutchinson filed the opposition for appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON, and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

USCA Case #05-7124 Document #958430 Filed: 03/24/2006 Page 1 of 8
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PER CURIAM: We grant the motion for summary affirmance

by appellee Centerplate/NSBE, Inc. (“Centerplate”), although

we do so, in part, for different reasons than the District Court

stated in dismissing the claims of appellant Esther Fernandez.

Fernandez filed a complaint seeking overtime compensation for

hours she worked in excess of eight per day and forty per week

for Centerplate, invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction

under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (the

“FLSA” or “Act”). Centerplate introduced evidence

demonstrating that it paid Fernandez overtime compensation for

hours worked in excess of forty per week. Fernandez did not

contest that evidence, which only left in dispute her claim that

Centerplate failed to pay overtime for hours worked in excess of

eight per day. Because the FLSA requires employers to pay

overtime compensation for time worked in excess of forty hours

per week, but not for time worked in excess of eight hours per

day, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that Fernandez

does not have a claim under the FLSA. Although the District

Court dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we convert that

dismissal to a grant of summary judgment in favor of

Centerplate because it was predicated upon Centerplate’s

undisputed evidence demonstrating that Fernandez was paid

overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty per week.

Fernandez argues nevertheless that the FLSA provides

federal jurisdiction to hear her additional claim that

Centerplate’s alleged failure to pay overtime for hours worked

in excess of eight per day violated an applicable collective

bargaining agreement. A breach of a collective bargaining

agreement may make out a contract claim, but it does not by

itself raise a federal question under the FLSA. We affirm the

District Court’s dismissal of this claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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I.

Fernandez’s complaint alleges that Centerplate violated

Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by failing to pay her

time-and-a-half compensation for hours worked in excess of

eight per day and forty per week. Centerplate moved to dismiss

the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or, alternatively, for summary

judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Centerplate argued that

Fernandez had, in fact, been paid overtime for all hours worked

in excess of forty per week and that the FLSA did not require it

to pay Fernandez overtime for hours worked in excess of eight

per day. Centerplate proffered a declaration by its Director of

Human Resources, who attested that Fernandez received

overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty

per week. In response, Fernandez conceded that she was paid

overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty

per week. Fernandez nonetheless maintained that Centerplate

violated an agreement with her union and thereby violated the

FLSA by failing to pay overtime compensation for hours she

worked in excess of eight per day. 

The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Relying

upon Centerplate’s undisputed declaration and Fernandez’s

concession that she had, in fact, been paid overtime for time

worked in excess of forty hours per week, the District Court

ruled that Centerplate had not violated the FLSA and therefore

Fernandez failed to establish federal question jurisdiction. In

response to Fernandez’s argument that Centerplate’s alleged

failure to pay overtime for work in excess of eight hours per day

violated an agreement with her union and provided a ground for

jurisdiction under the FLSA, the District Court concluded that,

although Fernandez “frames her allegations [in her complaint]

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 Fernandez argues that a Department of Labor regulation, 29

C.F.R. § 778.102, “brought unpaid overtime compensation for hours

worked in excess of a daily rate . . . under the coverage of the FLSA.”

as a claim under the FLSA,” the entire dispute “amounts to

nothing more than a claim under the collective bargaining

agreement between the Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 25

Union and Centerplate.” Fernandez v. Centerplate/NBSE, Inc.,

No. 04-0809, Slip Op. at 10, 2005 WL 3273370, at *5 (D.D.C.

Aug. 1, 2005). The District Court agreed with a series of cases

holding that breach of an employment contract alone does not

raise a federal question under the FLSA. See Dufrene v.

Browning-Ferris, Inc., 207 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2000);

Sheppard v. Cornelius, 302 F.2d 89, 90-91 (4th Cir. 1962);

Timony v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 59 F. Supp. 779, 780

(S.D.N.Y. 1945). “[A]bsent a claim under the FLSA,” the

District Court noted, “no federal question exists, and . . . this

Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute

in this case.” Id. at 10 & n.5, 2005 WL 3273370, at *6 & n.5.

Fernandez filed a timely notice of appeal, invoking our

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Centerplate now moves for

summary affirmance.

II.

With exceptions not relevant here, Section 7 of the FLSA

requires employers to pay overtime compensation for time

worked in excess of forty hours per week. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 207(a)(1). The Act does not provide, however, for payment of

overtime compensation for work exceeding eight hours per day.

Centerplate’s affidavit establishes that it paid Fernandez for all

hours worked in excess of forty per week, and Fernandez

conceded the affidavit is accurate in that respect. Thus, there is

no material dispute of fact regarding whether Centerplate

violated Section 7 of the FLSA.1

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Contrary to Fernandez’s suggestion, § 778.102 does no such thing.

The portion of § 778.102 relevant here simply provides that “[n]othing

in the [FLSA] . . . will relieve an employer of any obligation he may

have assumed by contract.” A regulation stating that a federal law

does not relieve an employer of burdens imposed by a contract has no

relevance to whether the federal law provides a basis for enforcing the

contract.

The District Court focused on Fernandez’s related claim

that Centerplate violated an agreement with her union. After

concluding that, contrary to Fernandez’s suggestion, the FLSA

did not provide jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim, the District

Court dismissed this entire case pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject matter

jurisdiction. Relying upon Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d

621 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Fernandez argues that the District Court

erred in dismissing her complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) because,

under St. Francis Xavier, her “claim arises under the laws of the

United States and is neither ‘immaterial and made solely for the

purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ nor ‘wholly insubstantial and

frivolous.’” Id. at 623 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,

682-83 (1946)). We agree.

As the Supreme Court determined in Bell v. Hood: 

Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility

that the averments might fail to state a cause of action

on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is

well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of

action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a

dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the

complaint states a cause of action on which relief could

be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact

it must be decided after and not before the court has

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assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court

does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the

allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for

relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the

merits, not for want of jurisdiction. 

327 U.S. at 682. Applying Bell, the Supreme Court recently

concluded that “when Congress does not rank a statutory

limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the

restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245, __ U.S. __, __ (2006). Unless

“the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a

statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,” such a limitation

“is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional

issue.” Id. In Arbaugh, the Court concluded that a provision of

Title VII addressing which employers are covered by the statute

is “not a jurisdictional issue” but merely “an element of a

plaintiff’s claim for relief” because the provision “‘does not

speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the

jurisdiction of the district courts.’” Id. (quoting Zipes v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)). Arbaugh

applied the same analysis as St. Francis Xavier and this Court’s

prior precedent. See St. Francis Xavier, 117 F.3d at 624

(“Nothing in Title VII (or the ADA) expressly limits the district

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also Haddon v.

Walters, 43 F.3d 1488, 1490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

While the merits of Fernandez’s FLSA claim turn on

whether she was paid for hours worked in excess of forty per

week, nothing in the FLSA suggests that a failure to prove this

particular element of her cause of action requires a dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction. Fernandez’s claim that she was not paid

overtime for work in excess of forty hours per week arose under

the laws of the United States and “stated a nonfrivolous federal

claim.” Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank,

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A.G., 370 F.3d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see Arbaugh, 126

S. Ct. at 1244 n.10, __ U.S. at __ n.10; Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83.

It is true that Centerplate’s undisputed affidavit and Fernandez’s

subsequent concession established that she was paid the

overtime required by the FLSA and that Centerplate did not

violate the Act. But that makes resolution of this claim no more

than a matter for summary judgment. The District Court should

have granted Centerplate summary judgment. Where “the

defendant’s motion to dismiss requested summary judgment in

the alternative to dismissal . . . , and if summary judgment is the

correct disposition, we may convert and affirm on those

grounds.” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d

1033, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (parenthetically quoting Taylor v.

FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Fraternal

Order of Police Dep’t of Corr. Labor Comm. v. Williams, 375

F.3d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Haddon, 43 F.3d at 1491.

We do so here and convert the District Court’s dismissal of

Fernandez’s FLSA claim to a grant of summary judgment in

favor of Centerplate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

We still must address Fernandez’s argument that the FLSA

provides federal question jurisdiction to review Centerplate’s

alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. No

violation of the FLSA has been committed and the FLSA does

not, as several courts have noted, contain a provision authorizing

enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. See Dufrene,

207 F.3d at 269; Sheppard, 302 F.2d at 90; Timony, 59 F. Supp.

at 780. As Fernandez only alleges the FLSA as the source for

federal subject matter jurisdiction over her dispute regarding the

collective bargaining agreement, we agree with the District

Court that this claim must be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Centerplate’s motion

for summary affirmance. We convert the District Court’s

dismissal of Fernandez’s claim under Section 7 of the FLSA, 29

U.S.C. § 207, to a grant of summary judgment in favor of

Centerplate and affirm. We affirm the dismissal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction of Fernandez’s collective bargaining

agreement claim.

So ordered.

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