Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-02-03584/USCOURTS-ca7-02-03584-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro L. Castillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

October 26, 2006

Before 

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeals from the United States 

District Court for the Northern 

Plaintiff-Appellee, District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

 v. No. 01 CR 567

PEDRO L. CASTILLO and FRANK James F. Holderman, 

RODRIGUEZ, Chief Judge.

Defendants-Appellants.

O R D E R

These cases are before the court after a limited remand to the district court

pursuant to our decision in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005). 

In a comprehensive and thoughtful reply, the district court has informed us that, had

it known that the United States Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory when it

first imposed sentence, it nevertheless would have imposed the sentence that it did. 

In reaching this decision, the court clearly recognized its obligation to apply the

sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It also reviewed the

transcripts of the original sentencing hearings. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 Page 2

Furthermore, the court specifically confronted the reasons tendered by each

defendant as to why a lesser sentence was appropriate and rejected those

submissions. Moreover, it gave specific reasons why each defendant deserved the

sentence imposed. It noted the Mr. Rodriguez had played a significant role in the

offense. He had introduced the confidential informant to the other defendants; he

had provided the confidential informant with samples of the narcotics. He also had

attempted to intimidate a witness in this case. Finally, the district court noted that

it had considered Rodriquez’ personal characteristics, including his history of mental

illness. 

With respect to Mr. Castillo, the court noted that it had considered his

personal characteristics and personal history and had determined that the imposed

sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense, respect for the law and provided a

just punishment for the offense. 

Before us, the defendants now submit that the sentences imposed by the

district court are not reasonable. They argue that the district court failed to consider

whether a sentence reflecting the disparity between crack and powder cocaine found

in the Guidelines was appropriate. We cannot accept this argument. In its

memorandum opinion, the district court wrote: 

Additionally, this court does not wish to engage in a consideration of the

question of the punishment of crack verses powder cocaine but instead

believes that it should follow the Sentencing Guidelines as established by the

Sentencing Guideline Commission. See United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335,

337 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court is not required to impose a

sentence outside of the Guideline range based on the crack verses powder

cocaine differential). 

We believe that this passage, fairly read in its entirety, makes clear that the district

court understood that it had the authority to impose a sentence that departed from

the formulation found in the Guidelines but chose not to do so. The district court’s

reliance on our decision in United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2005), in

which we held that a sentencing court need not depart from the Guideline’s

formulation, makes clear that the district court can depart if the circumstances of a

particular case so require. Indeed, by accepting the Guidelines’ formulation as the

starting point of the inquiry, the district court simply anticipated our recent decision

in United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2006).

Sentences within the properly calculated guideline range are presumptively

reasonable. The sentences imposed in this case are within that range and were

confirmed by the district court during the Paladino remand only after careful review

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Nos. 02-3584 & 02-4344 Page 3

of the record. Accordingly, we hold that the sentences imposed are reasonable.

We turn briefly to another matter. In our prior opinion, we noted that the

district court needed to clarify that repayment of the $3,000 “buy money” is a

condition of supervised release. In its order, the district court also noted that, in its

consideration of the sentence in the Paladino remand, it did not address the error

that we had noted in our opinion because it believed that our retention of jurisdiction

during the Paladino remand prevented such action. The district court was correct in

its estimation. This matter can be addressed in due course upon the termination of

proceedings in this court and the receipt of our mandate by the district court. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in all respects except that the

district court is directed to clarify that the $3,000 “buy money” is to be repaid as a

condition of supervised release.

IT IS SO ORDERED

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