Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cr-00051/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cr-00051-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Evans
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

JOHN EVANS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

1:06-CR-00051 OWW 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RE: CHALLENGE TO EASTERN

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GENERAL ORDER 441 (SHACKLING

OF IN-CUSTODY CRIMINAL

DEFENDANTS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

JOHN B. BRANDAU, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

1:06-CR-00131 OWW 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

CHRISTINA ANN CARR, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

1:06-CR-00175 OWW 

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision are three related appeals,

filed by three individual defendants, all of whom were required

to make their initial appearances before magistrate judges in the

Eastern District of California wearing “full shackles.” All

three appeals challenge a district-wide policy of shackling incustody criminal defendants during initial appearances. The

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 1 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If not otherwise indicated, all “Doc.” references are to 1

Documents in the Brandau case.

2

challenges are grounded in large part upon the recent Ninth

Circuit decision in United States v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843 (9th

Cir. 2005), which rescinded a district-wide shackling policy

implemented by the Central District of California and recognized

that a criminal defendant’s due process rights are implicated by

shackling during initial appearances. 

Here, defendant Evans made his initial appearance on

misdemeanor charges in the United States Magistrate’s Courtroom

in Yosemite National Park wearing full shackles. He moved to be

unshackled, citing Howard, but his motion was denied. 

Subsequently, on February 15, 2006, the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of California promulgated General

Order 441 (“GO 441"), which requires that all in-custody

defendants be fully shackled at initial appearances. Defendants

Brandau and Carr made their initial appearances after the passage

of GO 441, Brandau in the magistrate’s court in Yosemite, Carr

before a magistrate judge in Fresno. Both requested to be

unshackled, but their requests were denied by the presiding

magistrate judges who cited GO 441. 

A number of motions are before the court for decision. 

First, all three defendants have joined a motion to recuse all of

the Eastern District of California district judges. (Doc. 9,1

Brandau’s recusal motion, filed Jun. 7, 2006; Carr Doc. 10,

Carr’s joinder, filed Jun. 9, 2006; Evans Doc. 1, Evans’ joinder,

filed Jun. 14, 2006.) Second, Defendants Carr and Brandau have

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 2 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

joined in a motion for injunctive relief, specifically requesting

an order prohibiting the enforcement of General Order 441 while

this appeal is pending. (Doc. 14, Brandau’s motion for

injunctive relief, filed Jun. 23, 2006; Carr Doc. 14, Carr’s

joinder, filed June 28, 2006.) Finally, although Evans, Brandau,

and Carr have also appealed the magistrate judges’ decisions

regarding shackling on the merits, only Brandau’s appeal is ripe

for decision at this time. (Doc. 7, Brandau’s Brief, filed May

26, 2006; Doc. 16, United States’ answer, filed June 28, 2006;

Doc. 26, Brandau’s Reply, filed July 24, 2006.) 

The recusal and injunctive relief motions were initially set

for hearing on July 18, 2006, at which time the parties were

afforded additional time to brief certain issues. The United

States filed a supplemental brief on July 22, 2006. (Doc. 25.) 

Brandau and Evan filed supplemental briefs on July 26, 2006. 

(Docs. 27 & Evans Doc. 17.) 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Summary of the Howard Decision.

At the heart of this dispute is the Ninth Circuit’s recent

decision in United States v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.

2005). Howard involved an interlocutory appeal filed by criminal

defendants who challenged the Central District’s district-wide

requirement that pretrial detainees making their first appearance

before a magistrate judge wear leg shackles. The policy was

implemented by the United States Marshals Service for the Central

District of California after consultation with the magistrate

judges. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 3 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The policy was enacted in April of 2003 by the United

States Marshals Service for the Central District of

California. The record indicates that the Marshals

Service consulted with the magistrate judges before

enacting the policy, although it is not clear to what

extent. The record also indicates that, historically,

defendants in the district generally were not shackled

at initial appearances, although there appears to have

been at least some period in the past when defendants

were both shackled and handcuffed at initial

appearances.

There is little in the record to explain why this

policy was adopted. The record does not indicate

whether any other district in this or other circuits

has a similar policy. This record contains the

declaration of Robert Masaitis, Chief Deputy United

States Marshal for the Central District of California.

He states that “it is not possible to conduct an

individualized analysis of a defendant at the time of

the initial appearance,” and further states that the

shackling policy is necessary to ensure safety and

order in the courtroom. He also states that the need

for full restraints is enhanced by the current staffing

shortages in the Marshals Service. The declaration does

not discuss any more specific security problems that

the policy was intended to address, or any incidents

that preceded the enactment of the policy.

We also have a memorandum from Adam N. Torres, United

States Marshal for the Central District of California,

to the district court judges detailing an incident in

one district court judge's courtroom in June of 2003.

That incident did not relate to a first appearance, but

involved conduct of a defendant who was restrained

during the reading of his jury verdict of conviction

after he verbally attacked Assistant United States

Attorneys and an FBI Agent.

Id. at 847 (emphasis added). 

In each of seventeen cases that were consolidated for the

purposes of the Howard appeal, “the defendant was represented by

the Federal Public Defender and made his initial court appearance

shackled. The Federal Public Defender moved that the defendant

be permitted to appear without shackles. In some cases, the

magistrate judge allowed the Federal Public Defender to argue the

motion. In no case did the magistrate judge hold an evidentiary

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 4 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

hearing on the motion. The magistrate judge denied the motion in

each case.” Id. 

A district court judge in the Central District reviewed the

magistrate judges' rulings in a consolidated appeal. Citing

general safety concerns, the district court affirmed the

magistrate judges' shackling decisions. According to the Ninth

Circuit, the district judge did so without any “documentation or

explanation of specific problems that led up to the enactment of

the shackling policy.” Id. at 846. 

As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit determined that the

appeal was not moot “because the issues are capable of repetition

and will otherwise evade review...,” citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

U.S. 103, 111 n.11 (1975). 

In Gerstein, the Supreme Court stated that very brief

pretrial detention is by nature temporary, because it

is most unlikely that any given individual could have

his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is

released or convicted. Id. There the Supreme Court held

the exception to the mootness doctrine for violations

“capable of repetition yet evading review” applied

because the constitutional violation was likely to be

repeated, but would not last long enough to be reviewed

before becoming moot. Id.

An initial proceeding in a criminal case is even more

temporary than the pretrial detention at issue in

Gerstein. This case evades review for essentially the

same reason. The defendants could not have brought the

challenges to the shackling by the magistrate judge to

the district court, much less to us, before the harm of

shackling at the initial proceeding was completed.

This situation giving rise to this challenge also is

capable of repetition. We acknowledge that we cannot

assume that criminal conduct will be recurring on the

part of these defendants. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

U.S. 488, 496 (1974). This case is therefore

distinguishable from an abortion case, the classic case

capable of repetition yet evading review, because we

can assume a woman can become pregnant again. See

generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). This

makes no material difference, however, because a future

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 5 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

charge assuredly will be brought against someone, and

the shackling policy would similarly escape review.

For this reason, we have held that a case is capable of

repetition when the defendants are challenging an

ongoing government policy. 

Id. at 852-53 (parallel citations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit also rejected the government’s suggestion

that “this kind of blanket challenge to a procedure used in

prosecutions must be brought as a civil class action rather than

within the relevant criminal proceedings in which it arose.” Id.

at 849. 

Our case law does not establish that a civil forum is

the exclusive remedy. Indeed, it may be more

appropriate to decide this case in the context of

actual prosecutions rather than by resort to

hypotheticals or generalizations. On a practical level,

we must understand that this particular challenge could

not be made in the civil context, because the only

available attorney to represent these criminal

defendants is the Federal Public Defender. The Federal

Public Defender cannot pursue a civil class action on

their behalf, because there is no provision for the

appointment of a Federal Public Defender in a civil

action, and the office of Federal Public Defender is

barred from instituting any action on its own. See 18

U.S.C. § 3006A(a), Administrative Office of the U.S.

Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures,

Vol. VII, Ch. IV. This is still another reason why we

should not hold that this challenge can proceed as only

a civil action.

On the merits, Howard acknowledged that “shackling a

defendant in any judicial proceeding can have negative effects.” 

The Supreme Court has stated that “the use of

[shackling and restraints] is itself something of an

affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial

proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court expressed concern that

restraints could greatly reduce the defendant's ability

to communicate with his counsel. Id. This court has

noted that shackling may confuse and embarrass the

defendant, thereby impairing his mental faculties.

Shackling may also cause the defendant physical and

emotional pain.

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 6 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted). 

The appeals court also acknowledged that, although existing

shackling jurisprudence was primarily concerned with situations

where shackling might prejudice a jury, the Central District’s

initial appearance shackling policy nevertheless implicated a

defendant’s due process rights: 

At a minimum, due process requires that before there is

any district-wide policy affecting all incarcerated

defendants whom the government must transport to a

first appearance, there must be some justification. The

Supreme Court has stated that “if a restriction or

condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate

goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court

permissibly may infer that the purpose of the

governmental action is punishment that may not

constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua

detainees.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).

Thus, a pretrial detainee has a substantive due process

right against restrictions that amount to punishment.

Id. (parallel citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit, however,

expressed some skepticism about Defendants’ dual contentions that

(1) the propriety of shackling during an initial appearance

should be determined under the same standard used to determine

whether a defendant can be shackled in front of a jury – namely

that “the court must be persuaded by compelling circumstances

that some measure is needed to maintain security, and that no

less restrictive alternatives are available....” and (2) that

“due process requires that there be no restraining whatsoever

without an individualized determination.” Without deciding the

issue, the Ninth Circuit noted that the standards suggested by

Defendants “may go farther than due process requires.” Id. 

Howard then noted that most “[c]ases addressing the

substantive due process rights of pretrial detainees typically

involve challenges to prison policies” and that “[c]ourts

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 7 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

ordinarily defer to the expert judgments and professional

expertise of corrections officials.” Id. Nevertheless,

“Corrections officials must produce at least some evidence that

their policies are based on legitimate penological

justifications.” The court reasoned that even less deference

might be due government courtroom policies:

The conduct of judicial proceedings is the domain of

the courts. Preservation of dignity and decorum are

necessary for the conduct of judicial proceedings that 

determine issues of liberty and life. For this reason

this court cannot give the government courtroom

policies the same degree of deference that it would

give to the government prison policies. 

Id. 

The Howard court suggested a specific test that should be

used to review a courtroom security policy:

A court should insist on some showing that a policy

impinging on defendants' freedoms and ability to

communicate, as well as diminishing the decorum of the

court proceedings, is reasonably related to a

legitimate goal. By requiring the government to

establish the need for the policy, the court can ensure

that the policy does not constitute punishment of

pretrial detainees during judicial proceedings.

Id. at 852. Finally, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that there was

in the record of that case “no explanation of whether a similar

shackling policy exists in any other districts...[and] no

evidence of specific instances that show a need for this

shackling policy in the Central District.” Id.

Rather, the only support for the policy is the

conclusory declaration of a single representative of

the Marshals Service that the policy is necessary

because of safety concerns and financial limitations.

As we have seen, the record contains no evidence of

safety concerns necessitating this policy in this

district. There is no basis on which we can assume the

benefits of the policy outweigh the costs and the

disadvantages. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 8 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

(emphasis added.) Among the justifications the Ninth Circuit

found unacceptable were financial constraints: 

The Supreme Court has already held that financial

concerns should not be a justification for cutting back

on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.

See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.

367, 392 (1992). For example, we have held that a

city's financial crisis does not allow it to maintain

overcrowded jails that deprive people of their

constitutional rights. Stone v. City and County of San

Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 858 (9th Cir.1992); see also

Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986).

Id.

B. General Order 441.

General Order 441 was issued on February 15, 2006, after

being adopted by a majority of all the judges in the Eastern

District. It provides, among other things, that all defendants

will be fully shackled (i.e., in leg shackles, waist chains, and

handcuffs) at all initial appearances, without exceptions based

on individualized circumstances. 

In support of the policy, the court made the following

findings:

1. The United States Marshal for the Eastern District

of California, who is responsible for the security

of the courtroom, recommends full shackling of all

detained defendants at all proceedings in order to

assure the safety of all persons in the courtroom,

including the judge, lawyers, interpreters, court

personnel, defendants, and the public. The

Marshal’s reasons are provided in the attached

memorandum. The court has accepted the

recommendation of the Marshal with the exception

of Rule 11 proceedings and long cause

proceedings....

2. The Eastern District of California has a heavy

criminal caseload. Criminal calendars frequently

are lengthy and require the movement of many

detained prisoners in and out of the courtroom. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 9 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

3. Most criminal proceedings are brief such that the

time in which a defendant is before the court

fully shackled is minimal. 

4. The alternatives to full shackling are not

practical or would merely substitute the presence

of much greater numbers of deputy marshals for

physical restraints, with no significant increase

in decorum or dignity for the defendant. The

resources of the Marshal service in this district

are finite. Unshackling all defendants for all

proceedings would cause very considerable delays

and would disrupt the operation not just of the

calendar court but potentially of all other

courtrooms due to the necessity to draw deputy

marshals from other courtrooms to provide the

additional deputies necessary to assure security

when defendants are unshackled. 

GO 441 at 2-3. 

GO 441 referenced a memorandum from the United States

Marshal to the court. Among other topics, the memorandum

specifically addressed security concerns at initial appearances.

We contend the danger of an incident for prisoner

violence or disturbance is especially acute at initial

appearances before Magistrate Judges given the length

of the calendars, the tight quarters, courtroom design,

and the proximity to the public and the court family. 

Initial appearances are the first opportunity our

office has [for] extended interaction with the

defendants. [FN2]

[FN2] December 2004 (Fresno), a razor blade was

discovered in the pocket of an arrestee just prior

to their initial appearance. 

 

We have almost no information about newly arrested

defendants to determine their histories, propensities

to violence,[FN3] or demeanor while in court. In

addition, experience and common sense recognizes

initial appearances are particularly unpredictable

because of elevated stress resulting from the traumatic

event of arrest and newness of custody, combined with

the high emotional state of any family members [FN4] in

the gallery. 

[FN3] In February 2004 (Fresno), prior to initial

appearance a USMS guard was assaulted in the

cellblock booking area when a detainee’s

restraints were removed.

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 10 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

[FN4] In 2002 (Sacramento), two spectators/family

members were removed from court following a

disturbance during a D’Angelo Davis proceeding.

Our understanding of United States v. Howard, [429 F.3d

843 (9th Cir. 2005), is a district-wide policy could be

adopted when justified on the basis of present

circumstances or past experience. 

Present Circumstance:

The prisoner population has increased by 40 percent in

the Sacramento and Fresno offices, respectively since

2001. The district’s resources and budget have

remained flat over the same period. As of January 2006

our staffing will be 11 percent under our current

authorized level. The budget is important because it

enables us to hire additional independent contract

guards to augment our work force. However, this

funding has become limited because of the cost of other

services. As the prisoner count and judicial caseload

increase, our responsibilities for service of process

and fugitive enforcement increases, drawing on our

already limited manpower. This begins to create a

safety issue for our deputies in court and in the

detention area.

The courtroom design, particularly the Magistrates’

courtrooms, is not conducive to safely securing

detainees without additional restraints. Federal

courts in the Central District of California and some

local courts have hold[ing] areas or barriers in the

courts to restrain detainees with limited use of

individual restrains. [FN5] We do not have such

facilities. 

[FN5] In 1993 (Sacramento), a[] summoned

individual attempted to flee by running from

Magistrate court when he was unexpectedly

remanded. He was subdued by a deputy and Court

Security Officer (CSO). 

Restraining prisoners is also [necessary] for their

safety, though not an assurance. [FN6] As the number

of defendants increase and the length of court

calendars increases defendants remain in holding cells

longer. [FN7] We believe boredom and extended

interaction between prisoners is a huge factor for

incidents in the holding cells. [FN8] This may not

specifically affect court proceedings, but it does

contribute to the prisoners’ overall demeanor. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 11 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

[FN6] In February 2004 (Sacramento), Vincent

Jackson was able to remove his waist chain while

handcuffed to it and beat another prisoner in the

holding cell behind Judge Levi’s courtroom.

[FN7] In August 2005 (Fresno), a prisoner in a

holding cell had his handcuffs and waist chain

removed to use the toilet. The prisoner then

assaulted another prisoner who had slipped one

hand out of his handcuff. They were physically

restrained and separated. 

[FN8] In mid 1990 (Sacramento), an argument broke

out among ten prisoners in the holding cell behind

Judge Burrell’s courtroom. Prisoner Gallant was

pepper sprayed by deputies because he continued to

attack and head butt other prisoners. 

A less tangible but real impact is the reduced

efficiencies of the courts and our staff by removal and

replacement of restraints. The task of restraining and

un-restraining defendants will slowly eat away at court

schedules, bench hours, and attorney-client time, not

to mention the safety to the deputies. 

Past Experiences:

Restraints in court have been a common practice in the

Fresno office since 1997 and in Sacramento since 2001. 

We have learned through training and experience the use

of restraints has greatly reduced, not eliminated,

prisoner violence and incidents. [FN9] However,

measuring what may have occurred is difficult because

of the prevention. [FN10]

[FN9] In 2003, Dwane Mallet spit on his attorney,

Kevin Clymo, in court and stood before the jury

and told the members he would kill them. 

[FN10] In October 2005 (Sacramento), Charles White

was removed from Judge Damrell’s courtroom after

verbally threatening the judge and a testifying

witness. White violently pulled on his restraints

and indicated he would fight the deputies if he

did not have the restraints on. 

In 2005 (Sacramento), Charles White reportedly

took a swing with his elbow at his attorney as he

was being taken out of the courtroom, and told a

deputy in the cell block that he would get the

judge if not restrained. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 12 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Even restrained detainees can be a danger to each

other, the court family, and deputies. [FN11] They

make or have access to homemade weapons while in county

jails. Or, even more conveniently, the weapons they

have access to in the courtrooms. Such as, the pens

and pencils on the podium or attorney’s table,

electrical cords or wires, binders, clothes hangers,

furniture, or even paper clips can be used to attack

someone. 

[FN11] In September 2003, Antelmo Ontiveros was

found to have a shank in his shoe while being

transferred to court from the county jail. 

In January 2005 (Fresno), two co-defendants were

found with shanks in their possession at the

county jail. One was a pencil with a sharp metal

object affixed to the end, wrapped with plastic. 

The other was made from a disposable razor. 

In October 2005 (Fresno), a detainee was found in

possession of a shank made from the blade of a

pencil sharpener attached to a spoon handle with a

string. 

Conclusion:

The lynchpin is that we cannot predict human behavior. 

This inability leaves us at a disadvantage in

fulfilling [our] roles in safeguarding the Judiciary

and the judicial process. A defendant with a long rap

sheet may, unbeknownst to us, intend to cooperate with

the government so that he will be docile and

cooperative. Another defendant, with little or no

record, may be under great stress because of personal

shame, family or employment concerns, or the prospect

of a lengthy prison sentence, and decide to act out. 

No one can predict with unerring accuracy when that may

happen, and we do not want to assume that

responsibility. The risk of an incident outweighs the

return of removing restraints. 

(Amador Letter, Attached to GO 441.)

The Amador evidence far exceeds the showing in Howard and

demonstrates that the Eastern District has a very large criminal

caseload per judge and relatively few Deputy United States

Marshals assigned to court duty, who cannot maintain adequate

security in crowded courtrooms under unpredictable and dangerous

conditions. These concerns are particularly acute at during

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 13 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

first appearances, where defendants are arraigned and, for some,

issues of pre-trial detention are determined. As the Marshal

notes, substantial delays to hear individual unshackling motions

threaten to lengthen the already extended and burdensome criminal

calendars in magistrate courtrooms and impose greater demands on

the understaffed Marshals assigned to court duty. 

C. Procedure Used to Promulgate GO 441.

General Orders are, as a general rule, promulgated without

any notice and comment procedure. GO 441 was not adopted

pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking.

D. Communications between the United States Attorney’s

Office, the Federal Defender’s Office, and the Court

Regarding Shackling. 

Prior to the adoption of GO 441, Representatives of the

Federal Defenders Office and the United States Attorney’s Office

met with Magistrate Judge Hollows and the Marshal’s Service. 

(Doc. 23-1 at 2.) Among other things, the Federal Defender’s

Office expressed concerns about full shackling at a defendant’s

initial appearance before the Magistrate Judge. (Id.) The

Federal Defender specifically requested a pilot program of less

shackling at initial appearances. (Id.) The parties eventually

reached an impasse on the issue. Thereafter, the Federal

Defender’s Office notified the Court and the United States

Attorney’s Office that “each Assistant Federal Defender now had

permission to challenge the shackling of a defendant as he or she

saw fit”. (Id.) After that, numerous unshackling motions were

made that had the potential to unduly delay administration of

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 14 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

lengthy criminal calendars in several courtrooms where upwards of

twenty defendants appear in each courtroom. 

1. Defendant Brandau’s Arrest History.

On March 26, 2006, Mr. Brandau was arrested by the National

Park Service (“NPS”) in Yosemite National park for being under

the influence of alcohol and for disorderly conduct. He was

booked into the Yosemite Holding Facility. (Doc. 7-1 at 2.) The

next day, Mr. Brandau had his initial appearance in the United

States Magistrate Court in Yosemite, where his counsel requested

that Mr. Brandau be unshackled. (Id.) The magistrate judge

denied this request pursuant to General Order 441. (Id.) 

Mr. Brandau pleaded guilty to the charge of being under the

influence of alcohol and was sentenced to twelve months summary

probation with the condition that he serve two days in custody

with credit for the two days served, pay a $250 fine, and attend

alcoholics anonymous. (Id.) The court ordered Mr. Brandau

released from custody forthwith. (Id.) This ended Mr. Brandau’s

interaction with the court.

2. Defendant Evan’s Arrest History.

Mr. Evans was trying to visit his daughter at her elementary

school inside of Yosemite National Park. The school principal

telephoned the National Park Service because she believed that

there was an order prohibiting Mr. Evans from coming to the

school, and because she believed Evans had been drinking. (Evans

Doc. 12-1 at 2.) On February 7, 2006, Mr. Evans was arrested

within the park for being under the influence of alcohol,

possession of .3 grams of marijuana, and violating a court order

from the family court in San Diego. (Id. at 1.) He appeared in

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 15 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

court the following day. (Id.) He was brought from the Yosemite

Holding Facility in a van to the Yosemite courthouse in an orange

jump suit and chains. A federal public defender represented Mr.

Evans over the telephone. The public defender requested that

Evans be unshackled and the following discussion ensued:

THE COURT: And what would the need be to unshackle him?

MS VORIS: So that he wouldn’t be humiliated and

unreasonably burdened at this time when he is only

charged.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think the degree of

humiliation is ameliorated by the fact that the only

people in this room are court security, my staff, and

the prosecutor.

MS. VORIS: Which is also the reason that he should be

unshackled.

MS. WALDOW: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. WALDOW: Your Honor, I’ll have to check that cite,

but I believe the intent is so that a jury is not

unduly prejudiced –

MS. VORIS: No.

MS. WALDOW: -- in this –

MS. VORIS: No. United States vs. –

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait, Ms. Voris. Don’t

interrupt. Let her finish.

MS. WALDOW: Plus I would like to add that logistically

we only have one jailer and it is difficult to

transport, to unshackle, to reshackle a prison (sic)

with only one employee available to carry out that task

and it would put the ranger at a security risk to do

it.

THE COURT: Response?

MS. VORIS: I – the security risk of the ranger is an

unreasonable, -- it – this man has not– there’s no

showing that there’s any security risk. United States

v. Howard is clear that is [sic] doesn’t have to do

with juries and the cite on that is 429 Fed.3d 843. And

it talks about shackling and restraints, that it is an

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 16 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial

proceedings that the Judge is seeking to uphold and

that shackling may confuse and embarrass the defendant

and that it’s a denial of due process. And that’s the

Ninth Circuit Court.

THE COURT: Your request is denied. I find that the

shackling is reasonable under the circumstances and I

think that the safety of the court personnel and the

ranger are paramount here.

MS. WALDOW: And the Court would take notice that he’s

not leg shackled. It’s just a belly chain.

THE COURT: He’s only got a belly chain on and

handcuffs. He’s not shackled in the traditional sense

of leg irons and so forth, and I believe he was

unshackled to permit him to talk to you on the phone in

the lockup.

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. That’s not correct.

THE COURT: I beg your pardon?

THE DEFENDANT: I was forced to hold my hand up like

this so I could have a phone conversation in the – sir.

THE COURT: All right. The request for unshackling is

denied. ER 5-7; RT 1-3)

(See Doc. 12-1, 2-3.) 

Mr. Evans entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to (six)

months of unsupervised probation, service of two days in custody

with credit for two days served, and ordered to pay a fine of

$480 and a special assessment of $20. (Id.) His interaction

with the court has ended.

3. Defendant Carr’s Arrest History.

On May 11, 2006, an indictment was returned by the Grand

Jury charging Ms. Carr with four counts of false claims to a

federal agency and four counts of mail fraud. (Carr Doc. 15-1 at

2.) The charges arose from allegations that Ms. Carr made false

FEMA claims relating to Hurricane Katrina. (Id. at 3.) A

warrant had been issued for her arrest. (Id. at 2.) The

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 17 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Brandau also cites 28 U.S.C. § 292(b)(permitting the 2

designation of any district judge in a circuit to hold district

court in any district within the circuit) and § 296(providing

18

investigating FBI agent informed Ms. Carr that she would be

permitted to self-surrender at the Fresno courthouse on May 17,

2006, the date of her initial appearance. On the morning of May

17, 2006, instead of going to the courtroom or the Pretrial

Service’s Office, Ms. Carr went to the United States Marshal’s

Office. (Id. at 4.) The Marshals took Ms. Carr into custody and

shackled her over her street clothes. (Id.) Counsel for Ms.

Carr requested that Ms. Carr be unshackled for her initial

appearance in the Fresno magistrate judge court. Id. This

request was denied. Id. Ms. Carr entered pleas of not guilty to

the indictment and was then ordered released on her own

recognizance with a pretrial services interview to follow. Id.

Ms. Carr was awaiting trial at the time of this motion.

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Recusal Motion.

Defendants advance the theory that GO 441 was promulgated

and enforced in a manner that violates Brandau’s procedural and

substantive due process rights. The Defendants move to recuse

all District Court Judges within the Eastern District of

California. (The initial recusal motion was filed in the Brandau

case, 1:06-cr-131, Doc. 9, as was the government’s opposition,

Doc. 18, but the reply brief was filed in the Carr case, 1:06-cr175.) Their recusal motion is based largely on two statutes, 28

U.S.C. § 47 and § 455.2

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 18 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that a judge “shall have all the powers of a judge of the court,

circuit or district to which he is designated and assigned”), not

as bases for requiring recusal but presumably as sources of

authority for designating another district judge within this

circuit to hear this case should the recusal motion be granted.

19

1. 28 U.S.C. § 47.

28 U.S.C. § 47 provides that “[n]o judge shall hear or

determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by

him.” This statute is not the primary focus of the Recusal

motion and its application here is supported by little authority

or argument. Brandau cites Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender

Co., 228 U.S. 339 (1913) and Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153

(1899), both of which construed § 47's predecessor statute, for

the unremarkable proposition that “a judge who has once heard [a

case] upon its merits in the court of first instance is certainly

disqualified from sitting in the circuit court of appeals on the

hearing and decision of any question, in the same [case], which

involves in any degree [a] matter upon which he had occasion to

pass in the lower court.” Moran, 174 U.S. at 157.

Brandau also cites a more recent Fourth Circuit case, Swann

v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.

1970), in which a Fourth Circuit Judge recused himself from the

appeal of a desegregation order because, as a District Judge, he

decided similar cases involving the same ultimate question. 

There is no authority, however, that directly supports

application of § 47 here. The undersigned judge has not been

presented with an unshackling request and has not yet decided

whether the shackling order as applied was lawful and/or

constitutional; was promulgated correctly; or should be subject

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 19 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

to any exceptions. 

2. 28 U.S.C. § 455.

Defendants’ second argument for recusal is based upon, 28

U.S.C. § 455 which provides in pertinent part that:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the

United States shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following

circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding;

(2) Where ...the judge ...has been a material

witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental

employment and in such capacity participated

as counsel, adviser or material witness

concerning the proceeding or expressed an

opinion concerning the merits of the

particular case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he...has...any...interest that

could be substantially affected by the

outcome of the proceeding....

Under § 455, a judge “does not have to be subjectively

biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.” Liteky v.

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994). The test is

“whether or not given all of the facts of the case there are

reasonable grounds for finding that the judge could not try the

case fairly, either because of the appearance or the fact of bias

or prejudice.” United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th

Cir. 1980). 

Defendants’ rely explicitly on the so called “extrajudicial

source” doctrine, which the Supreme Court explored in great

detail in Liteky. The doctrine finds its origins in earlier

recusal cases, including United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 20 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Nor is the presence of information from an 3

extrajudicial source a necessary condition for recusal because

bias could also exist “in the rarest of circumstances” where no

extrajudicial source is involved if the judge displayed “deepseated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment

impossible.” Litkey, 510 U.S. at 554. This basis for recusal

based upon extreme personal bias is not asserted here. 

21

U.S. 563, 583 (1966), which involved 28 U.S.C. § 144 (recusal

upon motion for bias or prejudice of judge). Grinnell held

“[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem

from an extra judicial source and result in an opinion on the

merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his

participation in the case.” Id. See also United States v.

$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“[r]ecusal is required only if the bias or prejudice stems from

an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or rulings made

during the course of proceedings.”). 

Liteky applied the extrajudicial source doctrine to § 455,

but clarified that the existence of an “extrajudicial source” was

neither a necessary or sufficient condition for “bias or

prejudice” recusal. The presence of an extrajudicial source is

not sufficient on its own, because “some opinions acquired

outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the

judge's view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not

warrant recusal.” 510 U.S. at 554. Litkey, however, does not 3

further distinguish between the types of extrajudicial

information that would demand recusal and those that would be

unoffensive. Nor could any other cases be located that provide

further clarification. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 21 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

The Defendants submit that each of the District Judges in

the Eastern District of California possesses two types of

extrajudicial information that warrant their recusal: 

(1) knowledge of the procedural history of the promulgation of GO

441; and (2) knowledge of the substantive necessity of the

shackling order beyond that set forth in the written record. 

Even if any or all of the District Judges in the Eastern

District possessed information falling into the first category -

knowledge of the procedural history of GO 441's promulgation -

the import of any such knowledge is significantly diminished by

the fact that there was no notice and comment process (or any

other public notice process) implemented when GO 441 was

promulgated. The legal inquiry is significantly narrowed by this

fact, as any “extrajudicial” information about the process used

to generate and issue GO 441 would no longer have any relevance

to the recusal inquiry. (The question remains whether

promulgation of GO 441 without any notice/comment runs afoul of

the requirements of procedural due process. This merits issue is

discussed below.)

The focus of the recusal inquiry turns to any extrajudicial

knowledge the judges of this district might have possessed

regarding the substantive basis for GO 441, and whether

possession of such information warrants recusal. The caselaw is

not particularly instructive on this issue. The Defendants cite

a number of cases in which judges (or adjudicators) were required

to recuse themselves from hearing cases in which they previously

participated in the same case in a different capacity. E.g.,

United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994) (judge

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 22 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

who previously served as United States Attorney in charge of the

office that investigated defendant, must recuse himself from

hearing case brought against defendant under both 455(a) and

455(b)(3), even though, as United States Attorney, he had no

direct involvement in the investigation); Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377

F.3d 322 (3d. Cir. 2004) (holding that a federal district judge

should have recused himself under 455(a) from presiding over the

adjudication of a habeas-corpus petition challenging a statecourt trial and conviction over which he presided in his former

capacity as a state-court judge). 

But, in those cases, the recused judge was previously

involved in the individualized application of the law to a

particular defendant. Here, no district judge in the Eastern

District of California has yet heard an individualized challenge

to GO 441. During oral argument, Defendants attempted to frame

this purported conflict in various ways, analogizing the

promulgation of GO 441 to a legislator casting a vote on a bill. 

Defendants inquired whether, if that legislator was later

elevated to the bench, would she be forced to recuse herself from

hearing challenges to the constitutionality of the bill on which

she cast a vote.

The circumstances here are not precisely parallel to the

legislator-turned-judge example. The judges of this district

were called upon to approve a security recommendation of the

United States Marshal as a matter of internal court

administration. In so doing, they came to the conclusion that

the policy should be otherwise approved with certain adjustments. 

Although the text of GO 441 does not discuss Howard, the attached

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 23 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

letter from the United States Marshal supporting the policy does. 

This underscores that the District Judges considered GO 441 in

light of and in compliance with Howard. The Eastern District

Judges were presented with a court administration security rule

and determined it was necessary and should be promulgated. Now,

defendants Brandau, Carr, and Evans seek review of GO 441 as it

has been applied in the context of their individualized cases. 

This is an as-applied challenge to the law. There is no

authority that disqualifies a judge, who previously presided over

a facial challenge to a law and rendered a decision on its

validity/lawfulness, from hearing an as-applied challenge to that

law on the ground that she would be inclined to follow the prior

holding. 

Defendants have not provided any authority that squarely

indicates the legislator-turned-judge would be required to recuse

him or herself, let alone any authority that squarely requires

recusal in this case. Part of judges’ responsibilities are to

adopt internal administrative rules for the effective functioning

of the court. The fact that judges adopted a rule concerning the

restraint of first-appearing detainees does not mean that any

such judge is incapable of impartiality when applying that rule

to the facts and circumstances of a particular case to determine

the lawfulness of the rule. 

In addition to the abstract argument that it is improper for

a judge who participated in promulgating a rule to sit in

judgment over the validity of that rule as applied in a specific

case after the rule was adopted, the Defendants also allege that

all of the judges in the Eastern District were privy to certain

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 24 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

ex parte communications with court security personnel. 

Defendants assert that these purported communications demand

recusal, citing a number of other cases that involve the recusal

of judges (or quasi-judicial officials) who had substantive ex

parte communications about a case with parties or experts. E.g.,

In Re: Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (a special master,

appointed in connection with litigation concerning the

mismanagement of Indian trust accounts, should have been recused

from contempt proceedings brought against various government

employees involved in the litigation, because the special master

was party to numerous ex parte communications with witnesses and

third parties); Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(individual who previously served as Court Monitor should have

been recused from services as a Special Master-Monitor; as Court

Monitor, he had numerous ex parte communications with the parties

and significant prior knowledge of the subject matter of the

litigation, on the basis of which he had formed and expressed

opinions of continuing relevance to the litigation). 

The Defendants place particular weight on two cases: In Re:

Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d. Cir. 2004); and Edgar

v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996). Kensington involved United

States District Judge Wolin, who was presiding over five

asbestos-related Chapter 11 cases. Judge Wolin appointed five

“neutral” advisors to inform him about asbestos issues. However,

two of those advisors, Gross and Hamlin, were simultaneously

representing potential asbestos personal injury claimants in an

unconnected asbestos-related bankruptcy proceeding. The Third

Circuit concluded that Gross and Hamlin’s outside advocacy

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 25 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

activities created a “clear structural conflict of interest,”

raising a question as to whether this conflict “irreversibly

tainted Judge Wolin,” demanding recusal under § 455(a). Id. at

304. The Third Circuit noted that Judge Wolin met with the

Advisors as a group on a number of occasions over a 22 month

period. Id. at 309. In addition, Judge Wolin conducted numerous

ex-parte meetings and conversations with the attorneys “in order

to effectively case manage complex litigation...without

permission of adversary attorneys.” Id. at 312. The Third

Circuit found that Judge Wolin’s ex parte meetings with the

tainted Advisors required his recusal.

Kensington held: “The primary concern..is that a party

which held a special position of trust and influence over the

judge was found to be not truly disinterested in the outcome of

the proceedings.” 

Given the unique level of access and influence that

Gross and Hamlin had, the length of their appointment,

and the overlapping issues and clients, we find that

the reasonable person, with familiarity of these

circumstances, would conclude that their conflict of

interest tainted Judge Wolin.

368 F.3d at 309. 

In Edgar, class action plaintiffs contended that the mental

health care system in Illinois was operated in an

unconstitutional manner. 93 F.3d 256. The presiding district

court judge met, ex parte, with a panel of experts that he had

appointed to investigate Illinois’s mental-health institutions

and programs, during which meeting the judge received a preview

of the panel’s conclusions and the panel was afforded an

opportunity to persuade the judge that their methodology was

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 26 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

sound. These ex parte communications required disqualification,

particularly in light of the fact that the judge refused any

attempt to reconstruct the content of the meeting:

Off-the-record briefings in chambers...leave no trace

in the record-and in this case the judge has forbidden

any attempt at reconstruction. What information passed

to the judge, and how reliable it may have been, are

now unknowable. This is “personal” knowledge no less

than if the judge had decided to take an undercover

tour of a mental institution to see how the patients

were treated. Instead of going himself, this judge

appointed agents, who made a private report of how they

investigated and what they had learned. Mandatory

disqualification under § 455(b)(1) follows.

Id. at 259. See also Kensington, 368 F.3d at 309 (noting that

“ex parte meetings are often, as they were here, unrecorded.

Consequently, there is no official record of what was said during

those meetings.”). 

Edgar cited two cases that are also informative: In re

School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992); Hatcheck

v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 41 &

n.4 (4th Cir. 1995). The Judge in Asbestos Litigation attended a

partisan workshop covering material that was the subject of a key

merits issue in an ongoing litigation, while the Judge in

Hatcheck made a speech to a Trial Lawyer’s Association seminar

where he made remarks that were “pointedly hostile toward

defendants” while a jury trial on the issue of damages was still

pending. Even though the seminar and the speech were not

directly connected with the ongoing litigation, the events were

open to the public, and evidence could be taken about the

proceedings, they were still grounds for mandatory recusal as

they indicated the judge’s bias or inclination for or against a

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 27 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The government relies upon Ignacio v. Judges of the 4

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, --- F.3d 

---, 2006 WL 1897117 (9th Cir.), to support its position that

recusal is not necessary here. This case is not relevant. In

Ignacio, the defendant indiscriminately sued all of the Ninth

Circuit Judges, along with numerous other government officials. 

Although noting that, in a typical situation “a federal judge

‘shall’ disqualify him or herself when ‘a party to the

proceeding’” under 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(5)(i), this rule is subject

to a rule of necessity, carving out an exception for cases in

which a plaintiff has sued all the members of an appellate panel. 

This exception serves the purpose of “not permitting a litigant

to ‘destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises’” and

applies “where a litigant has named uncritically all the judges

of this circuit.” Id. at *3. Here, the Defendants have not

directly sued the Judges of the Eastern District, so recusal is

not required under the “parties to the proceeding” provision. 

However, had the judges been sued, it is likely that the naming

of the district court judges would not have been “indiscriminate”

and would have been based on the fact that the judges voted en

banc to promulgate GO 441. 

28

particular party on substantive legal issues.4

Some of the circumstances found problematic in Edgar,

Kensington, Asbestos Litigation, and Hatcheck are arguably

present here. It is essentially undisputable that “ex parte”

communications between the District Judges and the United States

Marshal for the Eastern District of California occur on a

continuing basis, and that such communications did precede the

passage of GO 441, as is evidenced by the letter attached

thereto. However, this type of communication between trial

judges and security staff is a regular part of court business. 

Security is a universal concern (and a very serious one) for all

judges, parties, and the public present in courtrooms at first

appearances, in all districts, in all courtrooms. Judges and

court staff must be permitted to communicate with security

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 28 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

personnel freely. That security concerns must be evaluated and

addressed does not predispose a judge to rule one way or another

about the lawfulness of particular security measures and whether

court security measures comport with due process under the facts

and circumstances of a particular case. Under Plaintiffs’

approach, no court could hear and decide the lawfulness of any

court rules it is authorized to and does promulgate.

The recusal motions are DENIED.

B. Merits Issues.

The only appeal ripe for review at this time, Brandau’s,

raises the following questions.

(a) Was the issuance of GO 441 beyond the rule-making

authority conferred upon the District Court by Fed. R.

Crim. Pro. 57 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071?

(b) Was GO 441 issued in violation of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 57

and 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and the procedural requirements of

the Due Process Clause when it was promulgated without

prior notice and an opportunity to be heard at an

evidentiary hearing to all affected parties?

(c) Was GO 441 issued in violation of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 57

and 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and the procedural requirements of

the Due Process Clause when it was promulgated without

a sufficient showing of its necessity?

(d) Does the application of GO 441 to Mr. Brandau, and

other similarly situated in-custody defendants in

Yosemite National park, violate the procedural and

substantive requirements of the Due Process clause when

shackling was ordered solely on the basis of the GO,

with no individualized showing of need either for Mr.

Brandau to be shackled personally or for the

application of the district-wide shackling policy in

the park?

(Doc. 7-1 at 1.) 

//

//

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 29 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

1. Was the Issuance of General Order 441 Beyond the

Court’s Rulemaking Authority?

The authority of the United States District Courts to adopt

and promulgate local rules emanates from three sources. First,

Congress has vested the Supreme Court with the authority to

prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts. 

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). Pursuant to that authority, the Supreme

Court has adopted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57. Rule 57

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent

part: 

Each district court acting by a majority of its

district judges may, after giving appropriate public

notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend

rules governing its practice. A local rule must be

consistent with--but not duplicative of--federal

statutes and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and

must conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed

by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 57(a)(1). Second, Congress has vested federal

district and circuit courts with the independent authority to

prescribe local rules of practice consistent with Acts of

Congress and the rules of practice and procedure promulgated by

the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of

Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the

conduct of their business. Such rules shall be

consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice

and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this

title.

28 U.S.C. § 2071(a). 

Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that district

courts have certain inherent rule-making powers arising from the

nature of the judicial process. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501

U.S. 32, 43 (1991). These inherent powers include, the “power to

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 30 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and

submission to their lawful mandates,” “the power to control

admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear

before it,” “the power to punish for contempts”, “the inherent

power...to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has

been perpetrated upon the court.” Id. at 43-44. A “court may

bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a

trial,” “dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens,”

and “it may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to

prosecute.” Id. at 44. 

Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has

upheld the authority of district courts to promulgate local rules

unless 1) the rule conflicts with an Act of Congress; 2) the rule

conflicts with the rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme

Court; 3) the rule is constitutionally infirm; or 4) the subject

matter governed by the rule is not within the power of the

district court to regulate. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641,

654, (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Colgrove v.

Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60, 162-64, (1973); Miner v. Atlass,

363 U.S. 641, 651-52, (1960); Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359,

368 (1839)). Also, the Supreme Court has struck down a local

rule which it deemed "unnecessary and irrational." Id. at 646

(majority opinion). It follows that “Local Rules are

presumptively valid unless they contravene one of the five

principles mentioned above.” Whitehouse v. United States Dist.

Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1356 (1st Cir. 1995). 

Defendants argue that the subject matter of GO 441 is beyond

the rulemaking authority of the district court. Courts in other

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 31 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

districts have used local rules or general orders in order to

provide security within the courtroom. In United States v.

Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 526 (8th Cir. 1977), a general order

authorized maximum security measures in any case that was likely

to be widely publicized. These maximum security measures

included “the presence of five plain clothes United States

Marshals in the courtroom, the posting of several Marshals

outside the front doors of the courtroom and the use of an

electronic metal detecting device on all spectators entering the

courtroom.” Id. The court found that “the security measures

utilized here [were] appropriate under the circumstances and well

within the discretion of the trial court.” Id.; see also United

States v. Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000) (for

safety and security reasons, local rule allows for all exhibits

to be placed within the custody of the clerk, except weapons and

other sensitive material).

A court has the ability to promulgate rules regarding

security within the courtrooms. 

2. Was Notice and Comment Required?

Even though the subject matter of GO 441 was appropriate for

rulemaking by the Eastern District, it does not necessarily

follow that it was appropriate to pass such a rule in the form of

a General Order, without the notice and comment required under

the Local Rules, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, or 28

U.S.C. § 2071(a). 

In the Eastern District, Local Rule 1-102(a) defines the

scope of local rules, and explains that only matters that do not

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 32 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

fall within the scope of the Local Rules may be promulgated via a

General Order:

These rules govern all litigation in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California,

the boundaries of which are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

84. Outside the scope of these Rules are matters

relating to internal court administration that, in the

discretion of the Court en banc, may be accomplished

through the use of General Orders, provided, however,

that no matter appropriate for inclusion in these Rules

shall be treated by General Order. No litigant shall

be bound by any General Order.

Local Rule 1-102(a)(emphasis in added). However, no Local Rule

specifically defines those topics which properly fall within the

“scope” of “litigation” under of Local Rule 1-102(a). Both Rule

83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 57 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit each district court to

promulgate local rules governing “practice” after “appropriate

public notice and an opportunity to comment.” These rules limit

the scope of rules promulgated under either authority to rules

concerning “practice.” 

There is sparse authority addressing when it is appropriate

to issue rules without any notice and comment. One Ninth Circuit

case is arguably on point: United States v. Terry, 11 F.3d 110

(9th Cir. 1993), where a single judge issued a general order

regarding the procedures for filing declarations in support of

certain criminal motions. Terry filed a criminal motion in

violation of that general order, but asserted that he had no

notice (actual or constructive) of the order. The Ninth Circuit

found that general order was subject to the notice and comment

provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, which

“provides for the making of local rules in criminal cases” and

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 33 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

requires “that newly adopted district rules should be made

available to the public.” 

While we do not doubt the district court's power to

regulate its practice in criminal cases in a manner

consistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

and Local Rules, we find the notice of G.O. 384 was

inadequate. In Wardlow, we held that the district court

properly denied a request for an evidentiary hearing on

a motion to suppress evidence because Wardlow forfeited

his right to an evidentiary hearing by not properly

submitting a declaration pursuant to a local rule.

However, Wardlow is distinguishable in that, in this

case, the court relied on a General Order of which

neither the defendant nor his attorney had notice. We

recognize that, in promulgating local rules, a district

court has “considerable latitude” in calibrating its

public notice method to the individual needs of its

jurisdiction. 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra, ¶ 83.02 at

83-5. However, G.O. 384, which was used as a basis to

deny Terry an evidentiary hearing, is a one-judge order

posted on the courthouse bulletin board and published

in a local legal newspaper. Terry and his attorney

received no actual notice of G.O. 384. Therefore, the

district court abused its discretion in denying the

motion to suppress without allowing Terry an

opportunity to present evidence

11 F.3d at 113. 

Although the general order at issue in Terry, issued by a

single judge and concerning administrative filing requirements,

is not precisely equivalent to GO 441, Terry is the only case

that discusses the procedural requirements applicable to a

General Order. Terry appears to require at least some procedural

due process protections when promulgating a general order that

concerns practice requirements. 

Two other cases provide guidance. In Truesdale v. Moore,

142 F.3d 749, 760-61 (4th Cir. 1998.), the Fourth Circuit

considered a challenge to an order adopted by the Fourth

Circuit’s Judicial Council. That order, which governed death

penalty representation within the Fourth Circuit, had several

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 34 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

purposes, the second of which was challenged in Truesdale:

...Order No. 113 imposes on district courts and the

circuit court a timetable for deciding petitions

brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 by defendants

who are under sentence of death. District courts are

instructed to render a decision and enter final

judgment within 180 days of the date on which the

petition is filed, subject to an extension of up to

thirty days if the court determines that justice so

requires. The court of appeals is directed to render a

decision within 120 days of the date on which

petitioner's reply brief is filed. The court of appeals

is also to rule on any petition for rehearing or

suggestion for rehearing en banc within thirty days of

the date the petition or suggestion is filed or the

date a response thereto is filed, whichever is later.

And if rehearing is granted, any hearing must be

conducted and a final decision rendered within 120 days

of the entry of the order granting rehearing. If a case

is not timely decided the Circuit Executive may seek an

explanation of the reasons why the court has not

complied with the time limitations. One reasonable

explanation, for example, would be that a court needed

to hold a case for a critical decision of the Supreme

Court or the Fourth Circuit.

Id. at 758. Truesdale argued that the Judicial Council of the

Fourth Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1), which contains a

notice and comment provision similar to that contained in Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure 57 and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 83. Specifically, § 322(d)(1) requires that any rule

or order “relating to practice and procedure shall be made or

amended only after giving appropriate public notice and

opportunity for comment.” Id. at 760. The Truesdale court

rejected the argument that Order No. 113 was invalid for failing

to comply with the notice and comment requirement, reasoning: 

In drafting and considering Order No. 113, the Judicial

Council addressed a simple, internal problem: the delay

within the Fourth Circuit in cases involving collateral

review of capital sentences. The Council selected an

internal solution to that problem and determined that

no public notice and comment period were necessary.

Order No. 113 imposes requirements on judges and courts

within the Fourth Circuit. The order is not addressed

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 35 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

to litigants or litigators, the usual focus of

procedural rules. Nothing in the order alters any

briefing or other deadlines placed on counsel. Nothing

creates a right in any party to enforce the court's

internal deadlines. Thus Order No. 113 is not a rule of

practice or procedure for which notice and comment are

required. 

Id. In applying notice and comment language that is distinctly

similar to that applicable here, Truesdale distinguishes between

purely internal, administrative rules and rules that “impact”

upon litigants or litigators. This same distinction is echoed in

the Eastern District of California’s Local Rule 1-102(a)

These rules govern all litigation in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California,

the boundaries of which are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

84. Outside the scope of these Rules are matters

relating to internal court administration that, in the

discretion of the Court en banc, may be accomplished

through the use of General Orders, provided, however,

that no matter appropriate for inclusion in these Rules

shall be treated by General Order. No litigant shall

be bound by any General Order.

(emphasis in original)

The Eastern District of California has passed other general

orders that relate to security matters within the courthouse. 

For example, General Order 249 prohibits the introduction of

firearms or other dangerous weapons into the courtrooms, except

by duly authorized security personnel. However, this same

provision was later authorized by Local Rule 83-103, which

provides in relevant part that the use of unauthorized weapons in

the courthouses is prohibited. Also, rules regarding weapons in

United States Courthouses are explicitly authorized by a separate

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 930. 

GO 441 affects practice within the district and magistrate

courts and impacts and affects litigants and litigators, as they

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 36 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

appear in court, communicate, and conduct business concerning

their rights and liberty. Demeanor, decorum, and the appearance

of fairness in the administration of criminal justice are all

implicated. GO 441 should have been promulgated as a local rule

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 with

appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment. The

order is remanded to the district court judges for repromulgation in accordance with the notice and comment

requirements and for development of a complete record as Howard

requires. 

C. Vacatur on Remand.

The Defendants argue that the GO 441 should be invalidated

and rescinded pending re-promulgation. At first glance, Howard

appears to support Defendants’ position. In Howard, after

finding the shackling policy unjustified by the record, the Ninth

Circuit rescinded the rule without “preclud[ing] reinstatement of

a similar policy upon a showing of adequate justification.” 429

F.3d at 852.

However, there are some parallel circumstances in which

courts have allowed rules to remain in place pending the

completion of remand. For example, in Administrative Procedure

Act (“APA”) cases, where an agency rule is found to be unlawful,

the rule is normally vacated. Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dept. of

Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.2004). However, where

equity demands, a rule may remain in force pending the completion

of a remand. This occurs frequently in endangered species act

cases, where vacating a rule would eliminate protection for a

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 37 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

It is appropriate to borrow the vacatur factors from 5

the civil context. In Howard, the court observed that the case

should not proceed as a civil case because the parties in

interest were represented by Federal Public Defenders, limited by

statute from appearing in a civil action (other than habeas

38

species that is on the brink of extinction. See Idaho Farm

Bureau v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995). Some

courts have examined the following factors when deciding whether

to vacate or retain a defective rule during remand:

(1) the consequences of invalidating or enjoining the

agency action.

(2) potential prejudice to those who will be affected

by maintaining the status quo.

(3) the magnitude of the administrative error and how

extensive and substantive it was.

(4) the purposes of the substantive statute under

which the agency was acting.

See e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Dept. of Interior, 275 F.

Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citations omitted); see

also Endangered Species Committee of Building Industry Assn. of

S. Cal. v. Babbit, 852 F. Supp. 32, 41 (D.D.C. 1994)(citing

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 

Here, in a criminal case, the circumstances suggest a

slightly modified analysis that considers: (1) the consequences

for court security that would result from invalidating the rule,

(2) the potential prejudice to individual defendants who would be

shackled during the interim period, and (3) the magnitude of the

procedural failure. (There is no statute that directly governs

the subject matter of GO 441, eliminating the fourth factor.)5

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 38 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

corpus), and prohibited form initiating any action on their own. 

Howard, 429 F.3d at 849. However, that court referred by analogy

to civil class actions in deciding mootness. Id. at 848-49.

39

Here, the magnitude of the procedural failure does not weigh

heavily in either direction. Although, on balance, the law

requires notice and comment here for the shackling policy, it

does not contain such a clear command so as to indicate a gross

procedural oversight in adopting GO 441.

The other two factors have arguably been balanced by the

Ninth Circuit in Howard, which took into consideration both

security needs and the due process rights of the individual

defendant. Howard rescinded the Central District’s shackling

policy, reasoning that there had been no “showing of adequate

justification.” 429 F.3d at 852. At a minimum, the Ninth

Circuit required “a showing sufficient to support a reasoned

determination that the policy is justified on the basis of past

experiences or present circumstances in the Central District.” 

Id.

First, there is no record evidence that directly addresses

the security situation in either the Yosemite, Bakersfield, or

Redding magistrate judge courts. The imposition of the shackling

policy on an interim basis cannot be justified in those

courtrooms. 

There is considerably more evidence regarding security

issues in courtrooms in Fresno and Sacramento and the adverse

consequences of invalidating GO 441 on security operations in

those courthouses. The Amador letter attached to GO 441

specifically indicates that “Restraints in court have been a

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 39 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

common practice in the Fresno office since 1997 and in Sacramento

since 2001.” (Amador Letter at 3.) According to Amador, “the

use of restraints has greatly reduced, not eliminated, prisoner

violence and incidents.” (Id.) The letter also lists numerous

security incidents that have taken place in recent years in

Fresno and Sacramento:

[FN2] December 2004 (Fresno), a razor blade was

discovered in the pocket of an arrestee just prior to

their initial appearance. 

[FN3] In February 2004 (Fresno), prior to initial

appearance a USMS guard was assaulted in the cellblock

booking area when a detainee’s restraints were removed.

[FN4] In 2002 (Sacramento), two spectators/family

members were removed from court following a disturbance

during a D’Angelo Davis proceeding.

[FN5] In 1993 (Sacramento), an summoned individual

attempted to flee by running from Magistrate court when

he was unexpectedly remanded. He was subdued by a

deputy and Court Security Officer (CSO). 

[FN6] In February 2004 (Sacramento), Vincent Jackson

was able to remove his waist chain while handcuffed to

it and beat another prisoner in the holding cell behind

Judge Levi’s courtroom.

[FN7] In August 2005 (Fresno), a prisoner in a holding

cell had his handcuffs and waist chain removed to use

the toilet. The prisoner then assaulted another

prisoner who had slipped one hand out of his handcuff. 

They were physically restrained and separated. 

[FN8] In mid 1990 (Sacramento), an argument broke out

among ten prisoners in the holding cell behind Judge

Burrell’s courtroom. Prisoner Gallant was pepper

sprayed by deputies because he continued to attack and

head butt other prisoners. 

[FN9] In 2003, Dwane Mallet spit on his attorney, Kevin

Clymo, in court and stood before the jury and told the

members he would kill them. 

//

//

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 40 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

[FN10] In October 2005 (Sacramento), Charles White was

removed from Judge Damrell’s courtroom after verbally

threatening the judge and a testifying witness. White

violently pulled on his restraints and indicated he

would fight the deputies if he did not have the

restraints on. 

In 2005 (Sacramento), Charles White reportedly

took a swing with his elbow at his attorney as he was

being taken out of the courtroom, and told a deputy in

the cell block that he would get the judge if not

restrained. 

[FN11] In September 2003, Antelmo Ontiveros was found

to have a shank in his shoe while being transferred to

court from the county jail. 

In January 2005 (Fresno), two co-defendants were

found with shanks in their possession at the county

jail. One was a pencil with a sharp metal object

affixed to the end, wrapped with plastic. The other

was made from a disposable razor. 

In October 2005 (Fresno), a detainee was found in

possession of a shank made from the blade of a pencil

sharpener attached to a spoon handle with a string. 

While not all of these incidents are directly connected with

initial appearances, Amador indicates why initial appearances

present particularly acute security issues in this district. 

The prisoner population has increased by 40 percent in

the Sacramento and Fresno offices, respectively since

2001. The district’s resources and budget have

remained flat over the same period. As of January 2006

our staffing will be 11 percent under our current

authorized level. The budget is important because it

enables us to hire additional independent contract

guards to augment our work force. However, this

funding has become limited because of the cost of other

services. As the prisoner count and judicial caseload

increase, our responsibilities for service of process

and fugitive enforcement increases, drawing on our

already limited manpower. This begins to create a

safety issue for our deputies in court and in the

detention area.

The courtroom design, particularly the Magistrates’

courtrooms, is not conducive to safely securing

detainees without additional restraints. Federal

courts in the Central District of California and some

local courts have hold[ing] areas or barriers in the

courts to restrain detainees with limited use of

individual restrains. [FN5] We do not have such

facilities. 

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 41 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

(Id. at 2.)

Admittedly, Howard precludes consideration of budgetary

constraints in the due process calculus. 429 F.3d at 852.

However, the physical design of the magistrate judges’

courtrooms, proximity of the public to defendants and attorneys, 

in combination with the ever-increasing criminal caseload and

daily calendar length are relevant to the inquiry. 

The Amador letter provides a greater degree of justification

for shackling in Sacramento and Fresno than was present in the

record before the Ninth Circuit in Howard. The Howard court

described that record as follows:

The record does not indicate whether any other district

in this or other circuits has a similar policy. This

record contains the declaration of Robert Masaitis,

Chief Deputy United States Marshal for the Central

District of California. He states that “it is not

possible to conduct an individualized analysis of a

defendant at the time of the initial appearance,” and

further states that the shackling policy is necessary

to ensure safety and order in the courtroom. He also

states that the need for full restraints is enhanced by

the current staffing shortages in the Marshals Service.

The declaration does not discuss any more specific

security problems that the policy was intended to

address, or any incidents that preceded the enactment

of the policy.

We also have a memorandum from Adam N. Torres, United

States Marshal for the Central District of California,

to the district court judges detailing an incident in

one district court judge's courtroom in June of 2003.

That incident did not relate to a first appearance, but

involved conduct of a defendant who was restrained

during the reading of his jury verdict of conviction

after he verbally attacked Assistant United States

Attorneys and an FBI Agent.

429 F.3d at 847-48. 

Here, the Amador letter provides a number of examples of

dangerous security breaches in Sacramento and Fresno, and

describes practical and logistical reasons, including size and

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 42 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The district court on remand may re-promulgate a rule 6

on a temporary basis, without notice and comment, if the court

determines that there is an immediate need for such a rule. 28

U.S.C. § 2071(e). But, “such court shall promptly thereafter

afford such notice and opportunity for comment.” Id.

It is acknowledged that Ms. Carr mounted such a 7

challenge here. She has prevailed on the ground that the rule

was promulgated incorrectly. 

43

configuration of the courtrooms, why security is of great concern

during initial appearances in those courthouses. There is

sufficient justification in the record to keep GO 441 in force in

these two courthouses until a new rule can be promulgated by the

court on remand. This conclusion does not preclude a future 6

challenge to any re-promulgated rule or its implementation in

Sacramento and Fresno.7

D. Injunction Pending Appeal.

Plaintiffs also requested an injunction barring enforcement

of GO 441 pending the completion of these appeals. As GO 441 was

promulgated without notice and comment and there are strong

reasons to allow the rule to remain in effect in Sacramento and

Fresno pending re-promulgation, the request for injunctive relief

is DENIED AS MOOT, except as to Yosemite, Bakersfield and

Redding. In those courthouses, the rule shall not be applied

before it is re-promulgated. However, this does not prevent the

United States Marshal’s Service or any agency then providing

courtroom security from utilizing such lawful and reasonable

security procedures as are necessary to protect the public,

defendants, court officers and staff, and appearing attorneys.

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 43 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, General Order 441 is

remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California for re-promulgation with appropriate

public notice and opportunity to comment. The rule is rescinded

with respect to its operation in Bakersfield, Redding, and

Yosemite, but shall remain in force during remand for the

Sacramento and Fresno courthouses. 

SO ORDERED

Dated: August 10, 2006

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

Case 1:06-cr-00051-OWW Document 20 Filed 08/10/06 Page 44 of 44