Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01365/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01365-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deborah Blanco
Plaintiff
Nicholas John Clerico
Defendant
County of Kern
Defendant
Mark McGowan
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK McGOWAN, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-01365-DAD-SKO

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

COUNTY OF KERN’S MOTION TO 

TERMINATE DEPOSITION OF KERN 

COUNTY SHERIFF DEPUTY JOHN 

SWEARENGIN

(Doc. 62)

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 27, 2016, Defendant County of Kern (the “County”) filed a “Notice of Motion 

and Motion [] for Order Terminating the Deposition of Kern County Sheriff Deputy John 

Swearengin” (the “Motion”). (Doc. 62.) On November 16, 2016, Plaintiffs Mark McGowan and 

Deborah Blanco (“Plaintiffs”) filed their opposition (Doc. 68), and the County filed its reply brief 

on November 23, 2016 (Doc. 70).

After having reviewed the parties’ papers, the matter was deemed suitable for decision 

without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and the Court vacated the hearing set for 

November 30, 2016. (Doc. 71.) For the reasons set forth below, the County’s Motion is 

DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

On September 28, 2014, at approximately 1:40 a.m., Defendant Kern County Sherriff’s

Deputy Nicholas Clerico (“Clerico”) stopped to assist another deputy on a subject stop at West 

 

1 The factual background summarizes Plaintiffs’ allegations as set forth in the First Amended Complaint, which is 

currently the operative pleading. (Doc. 29.)

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Day Avenue and North Chester Avenue in Bakersfield, California. (Doc. 29 at ¶ 23.) Defendant

Clerico was then notified by a third deputy over his radio of a fight at the Long Branch Saloon, 

located at 907 Chester Avenue in Bakersfield. (Id.) At 1:44 a.m., approximately four minutes 

after stopping to assist with the subject stop, Defendant Clerico responded to the bar fight call. 

(Id. at ¶ 24.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Clerico had been notified that another deputy was 

already at the scene of the fight and that other deputies were responding to that location as well, 

and also knew that he did not need to respond “Code 3.”

2

(Id. at ¶ 32.)

At approximately 1:45 a.m., Plaintiffs’ mother Nancy Garrett lawfully drove into the 

intersection of China Grade Loop and North Chester Avenue. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Defendant Clerico, en 

route to the Long Branch Saloon, ran a red light without first “pre-clearing each lane of the 

intersection and without yielding the right of way to oncoming traffic,” and his patrol car struck 

Ms. Garrett’s car. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24, 36.) Ms. Garrett suffered severe injuries and ultimately died. 

(Id. at ¶ 22.) A California Highway Patrol investigation later determined that Defendant Clerico’s 

patrol car had been traveling at eighty-five miles per hour .02 seconds before impact. (Id.)

B. Procedural Background

1. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims Without Prejudice

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint in Kern County Superior Court on July 14, 2015. 

(Doc. 1.) On September 3, 2015, Defendants County of Kern and Nicholas John Clerico (“Deputy 

Clerico”) (collectively “Defendants”) removed the case to federal court. Id. On January 13, 2016, 

the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice and granted leave to 

amend with respect to the remaining claims. (Doc. No. 27.) On February 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed 

their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 29.) The FAC includes five claims: a claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth 

Amendment against Defendant Clerico (first claim); claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for municipal 

liability against the County (second, third, and fourth claims); and a claim under California law for 

negligence and wrongful death against both Defendants (fifth claim). (See id.)

On February 17, 2016, Defendants Clerico and the County moved to dismiss the first four 

 

2 The term “Code 3” refers to driving a patrol car with lights and sirens initiated. (Doc. 62, at 3:18-24.)

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claims of Plaintiffs’ FAC pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(d). (Docs. 

30 & 32.) On May 13, 2016, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ first four claims without prejudice but without leave to amend. (Doc. 41.) In its Order,

the Court found that “granting further leave to amend at this time would be futile,” in view of 

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representation at the hearing on the motion that “without discovery, he had 

alleged all relevant and available facts” in the FAC. (Doc. 41 at p. 10 n.6.) However, the Court 

noted that the Order “is specifically without prejudice and does not preclude a future motion to 

amend the complaint based upon factual information uncovered during discovery.” Id. 

Currently, the only remaining claim against Defendants is Plaintiffs’ state law negligence 

and wrongful claim (fifth claim). Any motions or stipulations requesting leave to amend the 

pleadings must be filed no later than February 17, 2017. (Doc. 69.)

2. Deposition of Deputy John Swearengin

On August 24, 2016, Plaintiffs took the deposition of Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy John 

Swearengin (“Swearengin”). Deputy Swearengin, who was not involved in the auto accident at 

issue in the present case, was involved in a fatal accident in December 2011. (Doc. 29, ¶ 3.) On 

that date, Deputy Swearengin was responding to an emergency call at high speeds when he 

collided with two pedestrians, resulting in their death. (Doc. 62, at 2:21-22.) Unlike Defendant 

Clerico, Deputy Swearengin was not driving while “Code 3” (with lights and sirens) at the time of 

his accident.

Neil Gehlawat, attorney for Plaintiffs, conducted the questioning of Deputy Swearengin, 

and Kathleen Rivera of the County Counsel’s Office represented Deputy Swearengin for the 

purposes of his deposition. (See Doc. 62-1.) Also present at the deposition were Plaintiffs’

counsel Tom Seabaugh, Matt Clark, and David Cohn,

3

and Defendant Clerico’s counsel Leslie 

Dillahunty. According to Plaintiffs, the “primary purpose” of taking the deposition of Deputy 

 

3 According to the County, Attorney Cohn previously questioned Deputy Swearingen at his deposition in a prior civil 

lawsuit arising out of the December 2011 auto accident referenced above (the “Hiler/Jolley” matter). (Doc. 62, at 

2:25-3:2; 3:15-17.)

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Swearengin was “to gather evidence regarding the municipal liability claims.”

4

During the deposition, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Deputy Swearengin the following 

question: “At that [additional training in approximately May of this year with respect to operating 

a patrol vehicle], were you trained that when you’re going Code 3 that you have to yield the rightof-way if you enter the intersection against a red light?” (Doc. 62-1, at 104:24-105:2.) Counsel 

for the County objected:

This line of questioning, these questions, are not calculated, they’re not 

like1y to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. I will if you have 

nothing further in terms of topics, I will suspend this deposition, and we 

will seek a protective order from the court. And my offer of proof in my 

effort to meet and confer before getting such a protective order is that the 

training he received in approximately May of 2016 is irrelevant to the 

Clerico matter. So if you want to proceed, we’ll leave, if you have 

nothing else.

(Doc. 62-1, at 105:3-14.) 

The deposition continued for another ninety (90) minutes, after which the following 

exchange occurred between counsel:

MR. GEHLAWAT: Okay. Ms. Rivera, I understand that earlier in the 

deposition there was a line of questioning that I asked the deputy about 

with respect to his training in 2016, and your position was that you felt 

that it was not a proper line of questioning and that your inclination was to 

terminate the deposition. I don’t remember under which rule it is, but

MS. RIVERA: 30(d).

MR. GEHLAWAT: 30(d). Okay. And is that your intention still?

MS. RIVERA: Yes.

MR. GEHLAWAT: Okay. And I -- I don’t want this to be confrontational, 

but I disagree. I think that those questions are relevant to our Monell 

claims with respect to inadequate training, and we’re entitled to discover 

information as to what training he had before the Hiler/Jolley incident 

versus what training he’s had subsequent to the Hiler/Jolley incident. So I 

intend to ask those questions, and then if you would like to exercise your 

right to adjourn the deposition, that’s fine; but I just want to give you fair 

warning that I am going to ask them and whenever you choose to adjourn

the deposition

 

4 On June 22, 2016, following the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court held a telephonic 

conference with the parties, and thereafter entered a Minute Order “permitt[ing] Plaintiffs to conduct discovery on the 

issue of municipal liability.” (Doc. 54.)

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MS. RIVERA: Okay.

MR. GEHLAWAT: you can do that.

MS. RIVERA: I’m not going to instruct him not to answer, so we’ll like1y 

leave after the first question. But I will point out to you -- and maybe it 

will make you change your mind -- that subsequent remedial measures are 

inadmissible at trial. So whether there was training in 2016 that widely 

differed from what the training was before the Clerico matter is irrelevant; 

it’s inadmissíb1e. So I don’t-- it doesn’t go to your Monel1 claim. But 

having said that, if you wish to ask your first question, and if it appears to 

me that you’re asking questions about subsequent remedial measures or 

his understanding, his opinion on policy in 2016, then we’ll move to 

terminate the deposition, and I’ll seek a protective order.

MR. GEHLAWAT: I disagree. I think that the policies that he would be 

trained on with respect to emergency driving at any time following the 

incident or following being placed on paid administrative leave, up to and 

including the present, would be relevant within the scope of discovery 

from Monel1. So I’ll ask my question.

(Doc. 62-1, at 141:9-143:7.) When Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Deputy Swearengin, “And during 

that training [in 2016 with respect to operating a patrol vehicle], were you trained that you could 

enter an intersection against a red light without pre-clearing each lane of the intersection?”, the 

County suspended the deposition and expressed its intent to move for a protective order. (Doc. 

62-1, at 143:9-21 (“MS. RIVERA: So with that, I will suspend the deposition. Clearly, you know, 

you think this is relevant and admissible, and I disagree. So I will move for a protective order, and 

we’ll go from there.”).) In total, the deposition of Deputy Swearengin lasted approximately three

hours.

3. Motion for Order Terminating the Deposition of Deputy Swearengin

On October 27, 2016, over two months after it suspended the deposition of Deputy 

Swearengin, the County filed the Motion. (Doc. 62.) The parties appeared for an informal 

discovery dispute conference with the Court On November 4, 2016, regarding Plaintiffs’ request 

to enlarge the number of allowed depositions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2). (Doc. 65.) At that 

conference, the parties discussed the Motion, including the parties’ apparent failure to meet and 

confer. On November 7, 2016, Court ordered the parties to meet and confer in an effort to agree 

upon resolution of the Motion. (Doc. 66.) The Order invited the parties, if they still required the 

Court’s assistance after adequately meeting and conferring, to submit to the Court a 2- to 3-page 

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summary of any remaining dispute pursuant to the Court’s informal discovery dispute procedure.

On November 14, 2016, the parties submitted their summaries to the Court, in which they 

indicated they were unable to resolve the dispute on their own. In its summary, the County 

expressed its intention to proceed “by noticed motion, rather than the court’s informal discovery 

dispute procedure.” Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the Motion on November 16, 2016 (Doc. 

68), and the County filed its reply on November 23, 2016 (Doc. 70).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3) allows a party or deponent to move to terminate or limit a 

deposition. The only ground to move to terminate or limit a deposition under Rule 30(d)(3) is if 

“it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or 

oppresses the deponent or party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A); Whiting v. Hogan, No. 12-CV08039-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 1047012, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 14, 2013); Biovail Labs., Inc. v. 

Anchen Pharm., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 648 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (internal citation omitted). The motion 

may be filed in the court where the action is pending or the deposition is being taken and if the 

opposing party so demands, the deposition must be suspended for the time necessary to obtain an 

order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A).5 The court may then order that the deposition be terminated or 

limit its scope and manner. Id. 30(d)(3)(B). If terminated, the deposition may be resumed only by 

order of the court where the action is pending. Id.

While the issuance of an order terminating a deposition is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the court, “the power to halt or limit examination is sparingly used.” Smith v. 

 

5 Although Plaintiffs do not challenge the timeliness of the Motion – made over two months after the suspension of 

the deposition of Deputy Swearengin – the Court notes that the provisions of Rule 30(d)(3) envision a timely motion 

for a protective order under such circumstances. See Holmes v. North Texas Healthcare Laundry Coop. Assoc., No. 

3:156-CV-2117-L, 2016 WL 2609995 at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2016) (“Rule 30(d)(3)(A) expressly limits the timing 

of a motion under Rule 30(d) to be made during a deposition.”) (citing Mashiri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 

12cv2838-L (MDD), 2014 WL 4608718, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014)); Allred v. Maroni Feed Co., No. 2:14-CV00405 at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2015); McClelland v. Blazin-Wings, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1082 (D. Colo. 2009) 

(The motion for protective order should be promptly filed after the deposition is terminated.); Allred v. Maroni Feed 

Co., No. 2:14-CV-00405 at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2015); Thomas v. Rockin D Marine Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. 12-

1315, 2013 WL 2459217, at *3 (E.D. La. June 6, 2013) (observing that “over a month” between the time of initial 

deposition termination and seeking relief was “clearly in excess of any time ‘necessary’ for [the party resisting 

discovery] to consider the outcome of the deposition, compile his arguments, and present a written motion to the 

Court pursuant to Rule 30(d)(3).”); F.C.C. v. Mizuho Medy Co., 257 F.R.D. 679, 683 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (“FCC should 

have immediately moved for a protective order to comply with Rule 30(d)(3), and continued to carry out its meet and 

confer efforts to attempt to resolve the dispute.”) (emphasis added).

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Logansport Cmty. Sch. Corp., 139 F.R.D. 637, 640 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (quoting 4A J. Moore, J. 

Lucas, MOORE’S FED. PRAC. ¶ 40.61 (2d ed. 1991)). “It is not the embarrassment or annoyance 

caused by unfavorable answers that is the controlling criterion under 30(d)(3), but ‘the manner in 

which the interrogation is conducted that is the basis for refusing to proceed, followed by the 

required motion to seek relief.’” Whiting, 2013 WL 1047012, at *5 (quoting In re Stratosphere 

Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 619 (D. Nev. 1998)). “Likewise, the mere fact that more than 

one irrelevant question is asked, or even that a series of irrelevant questions is asked does not, by 

itself, constitute annoyance or oppression contemplated by (30)(d)(3). In re Stratosphere Corp. 

Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 619.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The County Has Not Shown that Plaintiffs’ Deposition of Deputy Swearengin 

Was Conducted in Bad Faith or in a Manner that Unreasonably Annoyed, 

Embarrassed, or Oppressed Him.

The County contends that an order terminating the deposition of Deputy Swearengin under 

Rule 30(d) is warranted with respect to inquiries regarding his understanding of the current 

County driving policies because Plaintiffs’ counsel “had no good faith basis to believe that Deputy 

Swearengin’s understanding of current driving policies would have any relevance in the instant

action to the plaintiff’s [sic] anticipated Monell claim of inadequate training.”

6

 (Doc. 62, at 13:4-

9.) In support of its argument, the County points to Deputy Swearengin’s testimony that, other

than in training, he has not had the use of a patrol vehicle since January 2015 (see Doc. 62-1, at 

71:6-14) as reason why “his testimony based on current driver’s training has no foundation and 

questions on this topic are not likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.” (Doc. 62, 

13:8-9.) In its reply brief, the County further asserts that “because Deputy Swearengin had 

 

6 The County also argues that questioning Deputy Swearengin regarding his understanding at the time of his 2011 

accident, based on training and County policies relating to “whether a deputy must ask permission before going Code 

3, and whether a deputy may exceed the speed limits without activating his lights and sirens,” was “conducted in bad 

faith” because Plaintiffs’ counsel were “aware that the driving issues in the Hiler/Jolley matter were not at all the same 

driving issues in the current litigation.” (Doc. 62, 4:24-5:1.) This argument is equally unpersuasive, as the County 

did not purport to suspend the deposition of Deputy Swearengin as a result of Plaintiffs’ questioning regarding Deputy 

Swearengin’s training and policies in 2011. Instead, the reason for the deposition’s suspension, as stated on the 

record, was the County’s view that questioning regarding the County’s current training and policies was irrelevant to 

the lawsuit (see Doc. 62-1, at 105:3-14; 141:9-143: 21), and it is this issue to which Plaintiffs’ opposition brief – and 

the County’s reply brief – are directed. (See Docs. 68 & 70.) 

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testified that he did not remember further details about his 2016 training, and . . . Deputy 

Swearengin’s understanding of that training with regard to proceedings Code 3 through an 

intersection was not likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence . . . . it was clear that the 

deposition was no longer being pursued for proper reasons.” (Doc. 70, 5:12-16.)

The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The County raised no objection to Plaintiffs’

counsel’s questions regarding Deputy Swearengin’s 2016 training based on harassment or bad 

faith. Instead, it objected solely on the ground that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions were not 

relevant to this lawsuit. (See Doc. 62-1.) Rule 30(d)(3) states that a party may limit deposition 

testimony only because the examination is being conducted in bad faith or unreasonably annoys or 

embarrasses the witness. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A). “The relevance of deposition questions ‘is 

an improper ground for a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).’” NDK Crystal, Inc. v. Nipponkoa Ins. Co., 

No. 10 CV 1824, 2011 WL 43093, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2011); (quoting Medline Inds. v. Lizzo, 

No. 08 C 5867, 2009 WL 3242299, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.6, 2009)); see also Whiting, 2013 WL 

1047012, at *6; In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 619; Int’l Union of Elec., Radio 

and Mack Workers, AFL-CIO v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 277, 279 (D.D.C. 1981).

Nothing in the deposition transcript supports a finding that Plaintiffs’ counsel met the level 

of abusive conduct required under Rule 30(d)(3)(A): “bad faith or [conduct] that unreasonably 

annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A). After the 

County posed its relevance objection to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questioning of Deputy Swearengin

regarding his 2016 training, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “I don’t want this to be confrontational, 

but I disagree. I think that those questions are relevant to our Monell claims with respect to 

inadequate training, and we’re entitled to discover information as to what training he had before 

the Hiler/Jolley incident versus what training he’s had subsequent to the Hiler/Jolley incident. So 

I intend to ask those questions, and then if you would like to exercise your right to adjourn the 

deposition, that’s fine; but I just want to give you fair warning that I am going to ask them and 

whenever you choose to adjourn the deposition . . . you can do that.” (Doc. 62-1, at 141:22-

142:10.) The deposition continued for almost ninety more minutes without incident, at which 

point Plaintiffs’ counsel revisited the topic of Deputy Swearengin’s 2016 training. Plaintiffs’

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counsel’s question that prompted the County to suspend the deposition (“And during that training, 

were you trained that you could enter an intersection against a red light without pre-clearing each 

lane of the intersection?”) did not bear any indication of harassment or bad faith. Again, the 

County’s sole objection to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions regarding Deputy Swearengin’s 2016 

training was limited to relevance, and Plaintiffs’ counsel did not threaten the witness, did not 

encourage him to disregard his counsel’s instructions, or engage in any behavior that the Court 

finds to be abusive. Cf. United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 302 F.R.D. 256, 258 (N.D. Ill. 

2014) (granting the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order under Rule 30(d) where defendant’s 

deposition questions were improper, irrelevant, utterly distasteful, and disrespectful, where the 

tone of the deposition was hostile and confrontational from the beginning, and where the intent of 

the questioning was to accuse the plaintiff of lying despite knowledge to the contrary.). The Court 

therefore finds no basis for granting the Motion, and it shall be denied.

B. Plaintiffs Shall Be Permitted to Depose Deputy Swearengin for an Additional Thirty 

(30) Minutes Regarding His 2016 Training Relating to Driving a Patrol Car With 

Lights and Sirens Initiated (“Code 3”).

This does not mean, however, that the County’s relevancy objection was necessarily 

misplaced. The scope of discovery is governed by Rule 26, which allows “discovery regarding 

any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). Relevance is construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 

reasonably could lead to other matter that bears on, any issue that is or may be in the case. See 

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (internal citation omitted). See also 

Whiting, 2013 WL 1047012, at *1-2. “Information within this scope of discovery need not be 

admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery must be limited, 

however, if:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 

expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain 

the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is 

outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

Plaintiffs argue that “the fact that Deputy Swearengin received training after the Clerico 

wreck is highly significant from the standpoint of what differences there may be between the 

current training and the training before the Clerico wreck” and that Plaintiffs “intend to discover 

whether the deputies’ current understanding of the written policy differs from the text of the 

written policy.”

7

 (Doc. 68, 7:12-13; 10:16-18.) While Plaintiffs’ identified remaining area of 

inquiry, namely Deputy Swearengin’s 2016 training, is within the scope of discovery, such area 

shall be restricted pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to training pertaining to driving a patrol car with 

lights and sirens initiated (“Code 3”), as is at issue in the current litigation. Further, while it was 

undoubtedly improper for the County to instruct Deputy Swearengin not to answer questions about 

his current understanding of County policies on the basis that such testimony is “improper opinion 

from a lay witness,”

8

see In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 619, the Court 

cautions Plaintiffs that municipal liability predicated on inadequate training is based on the 

substance of the training, not the on the trainee’s understanding of the training. See, e.g., Connick 

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 68 (2011) (“[F]ailure-to-train liability is concerned with the substance 

of the training . . . . The statute does not provide plaintiffs or courts carte blanche to micromanage 

local governments throughout the United States.”)

In view of the liberal discovery standard under Rule 26(b)(1), but with the abovementioned limitation and warning, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to continue Deputy 

Swearengin’s deposition for an additional 30 minutes so that Plaintiffs may ask their “limited 

number of questions” relating to Deputy Swearengin’s training in 2016 relating to the driving of a 

patrol car while “Code 3.” (Doc. 68, at 11:5-7; see also id. at 2:28-3:1.)

//

 

7 The County counters, correctly, that it is at a “curious disadvantage” of being subject to criticism by Plaintiffs of 

“misstat[ing] Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims” when such claims are not part of the case, having been dismissed

without prejudice but without leave to amend. (Doc. 70, 2:14-23.) The County (and the Court, for that matter) is

therefore left to speculate as to the precise nature of Plaintiffs’ yet-unpled municipal liability claims.

8 The County also instructed Deputy Swearengin not to answer questions based on the “federal deliberative process 

privilege.” While presumptively a proper ground on which to instruct a deponent not to answer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

30(c)(2), the application of the privilege is not before the Court, and the Court therefore takes no position as to the 

propriety of the instruction.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant County of Kern’s Motion for Order Terminating the 

Deposition of Kern County Sheriff Deputy John Swearengin (Doc. 62) is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs are permitted to continue the deposition of Deputy 

Swearengin for no longer than thirty (30) minutes. The area of inquiry will be restricted to Deputy 

Swearengin’s 2016 training relating to driving while “Code 3.” If Plaintiffs exceed this area of 

inquiry, the County may suspend the deposition to move for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P 30(d)(3). If the motion is granted, the deposition will be terminated and Plaintiffs will be 

subject to sanctions pursuant to Fed .R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01365-DAD-SKO Document 72 Filed 12/05/16 Page 11 of 11