Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00963/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00963-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John W. Parisi
Appellant
Melody Parisi

United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

_______________

August Term, 2015

(Submitted: March 2, 2016               Decided: May 3, 2016)

Docket No. 15‐963

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Appellee,

—v.—

JOHN W. PARISI, A/K/A SEALED DEFENDANT, A/K/A JOHN PARISI,

        Defendant‐Appellant,  

MELODY PARISI,

   

                  Defendant.

_______________        

Before:

KATZMANN, Chief Judge,

SACK and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

_______________  

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Appeal from a decision of the District Court for the Northern District of

New York, granting a request of the United States Probation and Pretrial Services

to modify the conditions of Defendant‐Appellant John Parisi’s supervised

release. Affirmed.

_______________        

Kofi Sansculotte and Paul D. Silver, Assistant

United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian,

United States Attorney for the Northern District

of New York, Albany, NY, for Appellee.

Timothy Austin, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, and Melissa A. Tuohey, Appellate

Attorney, for Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public

Defender, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant.

_______________        

        

PER CURIAM:

Defendant‐Appellant John Parisi appeals a March 23, 2015 decision of the

District Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.) modifying the

special conditions of supervised release that had been imposed on Parisi at the

time of his sentencing in 2004 to include what are now standard conditions of

supervision for individuals convicted of sex offenses. Parisi contends that the

modification was improper because there are no new or changed circumstances

relating directly to his case that warrant the imposition of these conditions.

However, even though new or changed circumstances may justify a modification,

see United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997), they are not a

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prerequisite to a district court’s decision to modify the conditions of release.

Therefore, the modification was not improper on that basis.  

Parisi also argues that the new conditions are improper because they are

not reasonably related to his underlying offense conduct and involve a greater

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. And he challenges the

modifications on procedural grounds, arguing that he did not receive an

adequate modification hearing pursuant to Rule 32.1(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. These arguments also lack merit. Accordingly, the district

court’s decision modifying the conditions of Parisi’s supervised release is

AFFIRMED.

I

In 2003, Parisi pled guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (d), and to one count of witness tampering under

18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and 2. Parisi had operated an adult pornographic website

since about 1997. In August 1996, he videotaped two 15‐year‐old females (“Jane

Doe #1” and “Jane Doe #2”) posing in a number of sexually explicit positions and

then modified the images to make it appear that he was engaging in sexual acts

with them. On three occasions, all in 1997, he videotaped a third female (“Jane

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Doe #3”), then 17 years old, posing in a number of sexually explicit positions. In

1998, he again videotaped Jane Doe #1 and altered the images. A number of these

images were made available on his website. Shortly after her third video

modeling session, Jane Doe #3 asked Parisi to delete photos of her from the

website. Although he said he would, he never did.  

A federal search warrant was executed at Parisi’s residence in May 2000,

resulting in the seizure of business records, modeling contracts, videotapes,

computer discs, and a computer containing explicit images of Jane Doe #1, Jane

Doe #2, and Jane Doe #3. Included in these seized materials was a modeling

contract with Jane Doe #3 that was dated on her eighteenth birthday, but she

denied ever having signed the agreement. Officials executed a second search

warrant at Parisi’s residence in June 2000, because his website was active, had

been updated since the first search, and continued to offer images of Jane Doe #1.

Later, a third search warrant was executed after officials learned the website was

still operating through a different internet service provider and still offering

images of Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, and Jane Doe #3. During the investigation,

Parisi persuaded Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 to sign false affidavits stating that

they were 18 years old when they were videotaped by him.  

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On February 11, 2004, Parisi was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment

and 3 years’ supervised release. He served his prison term and was released on

supervision on December 24, 2014. In January 2015, the United States Probation

and Pretrial Services (“Probation Services”) petitioned to modify the special

conditions of his supervised release to include, inter alia, the following two

conditions:  

1) You shall submit your person, and any property, house,

residence, vehicle, papers, effects, computer, electronic

communications devices, and any data storage devices or media, to

search at any time, with or without a warrant, by any federal

probation officer, or any other law enforcement officer from whom

the Probation Office has requested assistance, with reasonable

suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of probation or

supervised release or unlawful conduct by you. Any items seized

may be removed to the Probation Office or to the office of their

designee for a more thorough examination.

2) Your supervision may include examinations using a polygraph,

computerized voice stress analyzer [(“CVSA”)], or other similar

device to obtain information necessary for supervision, case

monitoring, and treatment. You shall answer the questions posed

during the examination, subject to your right to challenge in a court

of law the use of such statements as violations of your Fifth

Amendment rights. In this regard, you shall be deemed to have not

waived your Fifth Amendment rights. The results of any

examinations shall be disclosed to the United States Probation Office

and the Court, but shall not be further disclosed without the

approval of the Court.

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App. at 38. Probation Services explained that these conditions are now standard

conditions for the supervision of individuals convicted of sex offenses.  

On February 27, 2015, the district court held a hearing on Probation

Services’ request. Just prior to the hearing, Parisi submitted a letter to the court

through counsel objecting to the modified conditions. At the hearing, the court

heard brief arguments by each party and requested supplemental briefing with

respect to Parisi’s objections. On March 23, 2015, having considered the

additional briefing and without holding another hearing, the court issued an

order granting Probation Services’ request. Parisi filed a notice of appeal on

March 31, 2015.

II

We first consider Parisi’s arguments that the court erred in modifying the

conditions of his release because (1) there were no new or unforeseen

circumstances relating specifically to Parisi’s conduct that warranted the

modification, and (2) the new conditions are not reasonably related to the

statutory purpose of supervision and result in a greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary. “We review the propriety of a supervised release

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condition,” and modifications to the condition, “for abuse of discretion.” See

United States v. Brown, 402 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2005).

A

A court “may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised

release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of

supervised release” after considering certain sentencing factors outlined in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). Parisi contends, however, that a court

may modify conditions of release under this provision only where new or

unforeseen circumstances specifically relating to the defendant justify the

modification. Because there are no such circumstances here, he argues that the

modification was improper.

As an initial matter, the government contends that Parisi waived this

argument before the district court and, therefore, cannot raise it on appeal. See

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22,

24 (2d Cir. 2003). We disagree. Although Parisi conceded below that a violation of

a condition of supervised release is not a prerequisite to modifying conditions of

release, he argued before the district court and again on appeal that in order to

justify a modification, Probation Services must present some new fact or

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circumstance that relates specifically to the defendant. See App. at 69 n.1. In other

words, his position was and is that the court cannot base its modification

determination solely on the same set of facts that it considered at the initial

sentencing hearing. Because he did not waive this position below, we consider

the argument on appeal.  

Nonetheless, Parisi’s position is without merit. He relies primarily on our

decision in United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1997), where we noted that

a district court may modify conditions of supervised release “in order to account

for new or unforeseen circumstances.” Id. at 36. He contends that Lussier suggests

that a modification of supervised release conditions cannot take place without

some action by the defendant or a new circumstance in the defendant’s life that

arises after the original sentence was imposed. However, this reasoning is

contrary to the plain language of Lussier, which does not require new or changed

circumstances relating to the defendant in order to modify conditions of release,

but simply recognizes that changed circumstances may in some instances justify

a modification. See id. So long as the court, when modifying supervised release

conditions, considers the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, there is

no additional requirement that it make a finding of new or changed

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circumstances with respect to the defendant. Cf. United States v. Vargas, 564 F.3d

618, 623–24 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a district court may extend a term of

supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) at any time prior to its expiration,

even in the absence of new circumstances); see also United States v. Bainbridge, 746

F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] district court can modify a defendant’s

conditions of supervised release . . . even absent a showing of changed

circumstances.”); United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011)

(holding that a district court is not “require[d] . . . to find changed circumstances

in order to modify conditions of supervised release”); United States v. Davies, 380

F.3d 329, 332 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he statute that authorizes district courts to

modify the conditions of supervised release does not require new evidence, nor

even changed circumstances in the defendant’s life.”). Accordingly, because a

change in Parisi’s circumstances is not a prerequisite to a modification under 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e), we decline to reverse the district court on that basis.  

B

Parisi next argues that, even if new or changed circumstances are not

required, the district court improperly imposed the new conditions because they

do not satisfy the substantive requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and (e).

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Again, we disagree. A court may order special conditions of supervised release

in addition to the usual general conditions, so long as they are “reasonably

related” to:

(A) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant”; (B) “the need for the sentence

imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; (C) the

protection of the public; and (D) the rehabilitative and medical care

needs of the defendant.  

Brown, 402 F.3d at 136–37 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 5D1.3(b)). The condition “must also involve ‘no greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary for the purposes’ of sentencing, and it must be

‘consistent with any pertinent policy statements’ in the Guidelines.” Id. at 137

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).  

The district court found that the new search condition is reasonably related

to the nature of Parisi’s offense conduct and to the broader goals of public safety.

In particular, it found that changes in technology since Parisi was originally

sentenced justify a broader search condition, because Parisi could commit similar

conduct using new technology that would not fit within the scope of the original

search condition. Furthermore, the new search condition includes an outside

constraint—Probation Services must have a reasonable suspicion that Parisi has

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violated a condition of his release or engaged in unlawful conduct before it

engages in a search.

The new search condition is also consistent with the pertinent policy

statement in the Guidelines, which recommends including the following

“special” supervised release condition in cases involving sex offenses:  

A condition requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any

time, with or without a warrant, and by any law enforcement or

probation officer, of the defendant’s person and any property,

house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic

communication or data storage devices or media, and effects upon

reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of

supervised release or unlawful conduct by the defendant, or by any

probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer’s supervision

functions.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). This Guidelines provision is

actually broader than the condition applied to Parisi in that it allows a search by

a probation officer “in the lawful discharge of the officer’s supervision

functions,” even without reasonable suspicion.  

Reviewing the new search condition in light of the facts of Parisi’s case, we

cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the

condition was reasonably related to the offense conduct and purposes of the

sentence or that it was a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.

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Parisi similarly fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in

imposing the new polygraph/CVSA condition. In United States v. Johnson, 446

F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2006), we held that “polygraph testing can . . . further

sentencing goals without excessive deprivations of liberty.” Id. at 278.

Specifically, it can “further sentencing objectives such as rehabilitation and

deterrence.” Id. Parisi argues that his case is distinguishable from the facts of

Johnson, because the defendant there was a “serial offender who apparently

resisted honest self‐assessment” and was not “adequately engaged in the

recovery process.” Id. However, the district court could properly conclude that

Parisi’s deceptive behavior during the course of the investigation similarly

warranted the imposition of the modified condition here. Accordingly, we find

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying Parisi’s conditions

of supervised release to include the new polygraph/CVSA condition.

III

We turn next to Parisi’s argument that the district court failed to hold a

hearing in accordance with Rule 32.1(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Because he failed to raise this issue before the district court, we

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review the adequacy of the hearing for plain error. See Puckett v. United States,

556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).   

Rule 32.1(c)(1) requires that “[b]efore modifying the conditions of

probation or supervised release, the court must hold a hearing, at which the

person has the right to counsel and an opportunity to make a statement and

present any information in mitigation.” Parisi argues that the modification

hearing that the district court held on February 27, 2015, was inadequate because

the merits of his objections were not reached and he was not given an

opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation. We

conclude that Parisi’s arguments on this point are without merit. The district

court heard arguments from Parisi’s counsel and the government on the merits

of Parisi’s objections, and received additional briefing from the parties on its

authority to order the proposed modifications. There is no requirement that the

district court resolve the modification request at the time of the Rule 32.1

hearing. Furthermore, although the court did not specifically invite Parisi to

make a statement on his own behalf, we cannot conclude that he did not have the

opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the district court did not err by not holding a

second hearing on Probation Services’ modification request.

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IV

We have considered all of Parisi’s remaining arguments on this appeal and

do not find them persuasive. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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