Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00672/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00672-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Alexander Finklea
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALEXANDER FINKLEA, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION No.04-00672-CB-B

 *

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's "Application For

Attorney's Fees Under The Equal Access To Justice Act" (Doc. 12).

This action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report

and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule

72.2(c)(3). Upon consideration of the pertinent pleadings, it is the

recommendation of the undersigned that Plaintiff should receive a

reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of $1,687.50.

I. Findings Of Fact

1. Plaintiff commenced this action on October 21, 2004. (Doc.

1). On April 13, 2005, the Court entered Judgment pursuant to sentence

four of § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and

reversed and remanded this cause to the Commissioner of Social Security

for further proceedings. (Doc. 11).

2. Plaintiff's application for attorney's fees was filed on July

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1

“[A] party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing

party.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 

2

The EAJA requires a prevailing party to file an application for

attorney’s fees within thirty (30) days of final judgment in the action. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The thirty (30) day clock did not begin to run in

this action until this Court’s Order of Judgment dated April 13, 2005 (Doc.

11) became final, which would have occurred at the end of the sixty (60) days

for appeal provided under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). See Shalala, 509 U.S. at

302. Because Plaintiff’s application was filed on July 8, 2005 (Doc. 12), it

is found to be timely filed.

8, 2005. (Doc. 12). In the application, Plaintiff requests an

attorney's fee award of $1,687.50. (Id.) The attorney's fee award

represents a total of 13.50 hours, at an hourly rate of $125.00 per

hour, for attorney time spent representing Plaintiff in this Court.

(Id.)

3. The Commissioner of Social Security has filed a Response, and

states that it has no objection to Plaintiff's motion. (Doc. 14).

II. Conclusions Of Law

1. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires a district

court to “award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses .

. . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . , including

proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against

the United States . . . , unless the court finds that the position of

the United States was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The

Commissioner does not dispute the issues of prevailing party status,1

timeliness,2 or substantial justification. 

2. With regard to a determination of the hourly rate to apply

in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act, as recently

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3

On March 29, 1996, the EAJA was amended so as to increase the statutory

cap on EAJA fees from $75.00 per hour to $125.00 per hour. See, e.g, Ikner v.

Apfel, 2000 WL 1844704, *2 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov 9, 2000). These amendments

apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of enactment; therefore,

the statutory cap of $125.00 per hour applies in this present action.

amended,3 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be

based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality

of the services furnished, except that . . . attorneys fees

shall not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour unless

the court determines that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies

a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

3. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Court determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step analysis for

determining the appropriate hourly rate to be applied in calculating

attorneys fees under the Act: 

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine the

market rate for “similar services [provided] by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.”

. . . The second step, which is needed only if the market

rate is greater than [$125.00] per hour, is to determine

whether the court should adjust the hourly fee upward from

[$125.00] to take into account an increase in the cost of

living, or a special factor. 

Id. at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).

4. The prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama has been previously determined to be $125.00 per hour. See

Boggs v. Massanari, C.A. 00-0408-P-C (S.D. Ala. (Jun. 13, 2001)); Boone

v. Apfel, C.A. 99-0965-CB-L (S.D. Ala. (Aug. 30, 2001)). Because the

market rate is not greater than the statutory rate of $125.00 per hour,

this Court need not reach the second step of the Meyer analysis.

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5. With regard to the reasonableness of the hours claimed by

Plaintiff’s attorney, “[t]he fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and

hourly rates.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d

1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). “[T]he measure of reasonable hours is

determined by the profession’s judgment of the time that may be

conscionably billed and not the least time in which it might

theoretically have been done.” Id. at 1306. 

6. In the case sub judice, attached to Plaintiff’s application

is a time sheet detailing the description of work performed, the time

expended and the date on which the work was performed. (Doc. 12 at

Attachment 1). The undersigned has reviewed this document and

Defendant's response, and finds that, under the circumstances, and

given the usual number of hours billed by attorneys in similar actions,

Plaintiff is entitled to 13.50 hours of attorney time expended

representing Plaintiff in federal court. See, e.g., Coleman v. Apfel,

2000 WL 1367992 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2000).

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, upon consideration of the pertinent pleadings, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s "Application

For Attorney Fees Under The Equal Access To Justice Act" be GRANTED,

and that the award be limited to the EAJA rate of $125.00 per hour,

thereby resulting in an award of $1,687.50 for 13.50 attorney hours

spent representing Plaintiff in connection with this action.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

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objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this 27th day of July 2005.

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge

of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of

the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The

procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the

magistrate judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1,

1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter

excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement

of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within

ten days after being served with a copy of the

recommendation, unless a different time is established by

order. The statement of objection shall specify those

portions of the recommendation to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall

submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the

objection, a brief setting forth the party’s arguments that

the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient

to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the

magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may

be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in

support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court

of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be

appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party

may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being

served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised

that a judicial determination that transcription is necessary is

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required before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /s / SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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