Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05261/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05261-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence M. Small
Appellee
Carolyn Taylor
Appellant

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2003 Decided December 12, 2003

No. 02-5261

CAROLYN TAYLOR,

APPELLANT

v.

LAWRENCE M. SMALL,

SECRETARY OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02035)

Barbara B. Hutchinson argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellant.

Madelyn E. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. On the brief were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Edith M. Shine,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5261 Document #791009 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 1 of 14
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Carolyn Taylor brought suit

against her employer, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, alleging the Smithsonian discriminated against her

upon the bases of her race, in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and

2000e–16, and of her ‘‘excessive weight,’’ in violation of § 504

of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 794. On cross motions for summary judgment, the

district court dismissed Taylor’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act and granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendant on the Title VII claims. Taylor appeals the judgment of the district court and challenges certain of its procedural orders.

We conclude that (1) Taylor failed to establish a prima facie

case of race discrimination under Title VII; (2) a federal

employee may not bring a claim of employment discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and (3) the

district court did not abuse its discretion in making the

procedural rulings under review. We therefore affirm the

judgment of the district court in all respects.

I. Background

We recount the facts before the district court in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Taylor, who is an African–

American, began to work at the Office of Smithsonian Institution Archives (OSIA) in January 1989 as an Administrative

Assistant (GS–7). By May 1994 she was the GS–11 supervisor of the Administrative Services Division of the OSIA.

Shortly thereafter, having served approximately six months

in her GS–11 position, Taylor orally asked Edith Hedlin, who

had recently become the Director of the OSIA, to promote

her to GS–12. Hedlin declined. Taylor claims she sought the

same promotion in July and November 1995.

As the supervisor of the Administrative Services Division,

one of Taylor’s main responsibilities was balancing the budget

USCA Case #02-5261 Document #791009 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 2 of 14
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of the OSIA. When Taylor failed to balance the budget for

FY 1996, Hedlin rated her overall performance in 1996 ‘‘unacceptable.’’ Hedlin nevertheless awarded Taylor a bonus of

$500 for her performance that year. Hedlin also placed

Taylor on a 90–day Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).

On May 3, Hedlin informed Taylor she had successfully

completed the PIP. Three months later Hedlin revised Taylor’s 1996 performance appraisal to reflect that she had met

her responsibility for balancing the budget and had earned an

overall rating of ‘‘fully successful’’.

Because Taylor had now met or exceeded both her critical

responsibilities (budget and procurement), she should have

been rated ‘‘highly successful’’ rather than ‘‘fully successful’’

overall. Taylor so informed Hedlin, but Hedlin did not

attempt at that time to determine whether she had erred.

Taylor received the same overall rating for 1997.*

Taylor filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming she had been the victim of

discrimination based upon her race and her weight. Thereafter Hedlin, who was aware of Taylor’s EEOC complaint,

informed Taylor that Ms. Fynette Eaton would be Taylor’s

new first-line supervisor; Hedlin would assume the role of

second-line supervisor. Hedlin concedes she mentioned Taylor’s EEOC complaint when meeting with Taylor to discuss

the supervisory change; Taylor concedes she had no problem

with the change. Hedlin also modified Taylor’s Performance

Plan to drop ‘‘procurement of supplies and services’’ and to

add ‘‘Human Resources Management’’ as a ‘‘critical’’ responsibility. In addition, the number of elements for which her

performance would be rated was reduced to four from seven.

In July 1999 Hedlin became aware that Taylor was indeed

entitled to an overall rating of ‘‘highly successful’’ for both

1996 and 1997 and changed Taylor’s performance evaluations

accordingly. Hedlin also awarded Taylor an additional $500

* Hedlin rated Taylor ‘‘fully successful’’ in 1996, and ‘‘fully satisfactory’’ in 1997, but the two were equivalent ratings; only the

nomenclature used on the rating form changed.

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for her performance in 1996, thus bringing Taylor’s total

bonus for 1996 to the same $1000 Hedlin had given the other

employee whom she had rated ‘‘highly successful’’ that year.

(Hedlin did not award a bonus to any employee who had

earned a ‘‘highly successful’’ rating for 1997.)

Taylor sued the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution in

July 1999, alleging race discrimination in the form of erroneously low performance evaluations for 1996 and 1997, placement in the PIP, failure to promote, hostile work environment, and retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC,

all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Taylor also alleged discrimination on the basis of her weight,

which she claimed was a violation of § 504 of the Vocational

Rehabilitation Act.

After discovery, the Smithsonian filed a motion for summary judgment in which it did not address Taylor’s claim of

retaliation. In her opposition to that motion, Taylor argued

the Smithsonian had conceded the retaliation claim should go

to trial. The Smithsonian then sought leave to file an untimely second motion for summary judgment, claiming it had not

understood Taylor to have pleaded a claim of retaliation

because the complaint was poorly drafted. The district court

granted the motion, noting that — although Count III could

be construed to state such a claim — the word ‘‘retaliation’’

did not appear anywhere in Taylor’s complaint.

On cross motions, the district court dismissed Taylor’s

Rehabilitation Act claim, holding that an employee of the

Smithsonian Institution may not bring a claim of employment

discrimination pursuant to § 504 of the Act. Turning to her

Title VII claims, the district court held Taylor had not made

out a prima facie case of discrimination because she had not

alleged an adverse employment action, she was not eligible

for a promotion at the time she sought it, and she failed to

identify any similarly situated individual who sought and

received a promotion at the relevant time.

II. Analysis

We review de novo both the district court’s dismissal of

Taylor’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act and its grant of

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summary judgment on Taylor’s claims under Title VII. Summary judgment is appropriate if ‘‘there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and TTT the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.’’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There

is a ‘‘genuine issue’’ only if ‘‘a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.’’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). ‘‘A moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law [against] a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.’’ Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A. The Rehabilitation Act

Taylor argues the district court erred in dismissing her

Rehabilitation Act claim upon the ground that an employee of

the federal government may not bring a claim of employment

discrimination under § 504.* Although this Court has not

definitively resolved the question whether a federal employee

may proceed under § 504, we have twice ‘‘ ‘strongly suggest[ed]’ that litigants proceed under section 501.’’ Barth v.

Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1993), quoting Milbert v.

Koop, 830 F.2d 354, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1987).*

* Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability TTT shall,

solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, of be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted

by any Executive agencyTTTT

* Section 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 791(b), provides:

Each department, agency, and instrumentality TTT in the executive branch and the Smithsonian Institution shall TTT submit

TTT an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities in such

department, agency, instrumentality, or Institution.

 Section 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1), makes Title VII remedies

available to an employee ‘‘with respect to any complaint under

section 791 of this titleTTTT’’

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Section 504 does not on its face apply to federal employees;

rather, it prohibits ‘‘discrimination under any program or

activity receiving federal financial assistance or under any

program or activity conducted by any Executive agencyTTTT’’

29 U.S.C. § 794. Employees of the Smithsonian Institution

are not participants in or beneficiaries of a ‘‘program or

activity conducted by any Executive agency’’; they are Government employees. Moreover, because the Congress addressed discrimination against Government employees, including specifically employees of the Smithsonian Institution,

in § 501, it is highly unlikely the Congress meant to address

the subject again in § 504. See McGuinness v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 744 F.2d 1318, 1321 (7th Cir. 1984). Both in its own

terms and in the context of the statutory scheme, therefore, it

is unreasonable to interpret § 504’s prohibition of ‘‘discrimination under any program or activity conducted by any

Executive agency’’ as a prohibition of discrimination in employment by the Government.

We now hold, therefore, in conformity with the majority of

courts to have addressed the issue, that § 504 does not

provide federal employees an ‘‘alternative route for relief

under the Rehabilitation Act.’’ Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d

101, 104 (2nd Cir. 1998) (so holding where, as here, plaintiff

was employee of Smithsonian Institution); see Johnson v.

U.S. Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 1989) (‘‘only

section 501 provides a private cause of action for federal

employees TTT alleging employment discrimination based on

handicap’’) (emphasis in original); Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

752 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1985) (‘‘section 501 is the exclusive

remedy for discrimination in employment by [a federal agency] on the basis of handicap’’); McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1321.

But see Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir.

1985) (recognizing cause of action for employment discrimination against federal employer under both §§ 501 and 504);

Smith v. U.S. Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1984)

(same); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.

1981) (same).

Taylor also argues that dismissal of her claim was inappropriate, notwithstanding her failure to invoke the correct secUSCA Case #02-5261 Document #791009 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 6 of 14
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tion of the Act, because she had set forth all the elements of a

claim under § 501. Taylor’s argument is unavailing, at least

in the circumstances of this case. The Smithsonian’s motion

for summary judgment put Taylor on notice of her error.

Taylor’s only response was that she had inadvertently cited

§ 505(1) rather than § 505(a)(1) as the source of the district

court’s jurisdiction. As the Smithsonian had argued in its

motion, however, the problem is that she premised her claim

upon § 504 rather than § 501. Taylor could have sought

leave to amend her complaint but instead she staked her all

on § 504, and the district court properly concluded that she

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Even if Taylor had pleaded her claim under § 501, we

doubt the district court would have had jurisdiction to entertain it because she failed to exhaust her administrative appeal

rights. See, e.g., Downey v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 139, 145 (2d

Cir. 1998) (exhaustion required before federal court can hear

claim under § 501); Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 200 (3d

Cir. 1995) (exhaustion required for claims under both §§ 501

and 504); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459–60 (11th Cir.

1990) (exhaustion required under § 501); Boyd v. United

States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 412–13 (1st Cir. 1985)

(same); McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1320 (same); Gardner v.

Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1279 (8th Cir. 1985) (exhaustion

required for claims under both §§ 501 and 504).

B. Title VII

Title VII provides that ‘‘[a]ll personnel actions affecting

employees TTT in the Smithsonian Institution TTT shall be

made free from any discrimination based on race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16.

Because Title VII does not proscribe discrimination based

upon an employee’s excessive weight, the district court properly considered only Taylor’s claim of race discrimination

under Title VII.

Where, as here, a plaintiff proffers only indirect evidence of

unlawful discrimination, her case is subject to the three-part

test the Supreme Court set forth in McDonnell Douglas

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Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). As we recently

reiterated:

Under McDonnell Douglas, it is the plaintiff’s burden to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If the plaintiff establishes a

prima facie case, the employer must then articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The

plaintiff must then demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that the true reason was

discriminatory.

Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted).

In order to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, Taylor must demonstrate: (1) she suffered an ‘‘adverse employment action’’; and (2) the adverse action occurred in circumstances that give rise to an inference of racial

discrimination. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). In order to make out a prima facie case of

retaliation, Taylor must show: (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment

action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two.

See Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,

328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

As detailed below, Taylor failed to make out a prima facie

case for any count of her complaint. The district court

therefore properly entered summary judgment in favor of the

Smithsonian on all Taylor’s Title VII claims.

1. Count I: Low Performance Evaluations

Taylor first argues both her being made subject to a PIP

and Hedlin’s failure to complete her performance appraisals

in a timely manner were adverse employment actions and

were based upon her race. An ‘‘adverse employment action’’

within the meaning of McDonnell Douglas is ‘‘a significant

change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to

promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’’

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). As

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we have noted before, ‘‘formal criticism or poor performance

evaluations are [not] necessarily adverse actions’’ and they

should not be considered such if they did not ‘‘affect[ ] the

[employee’s] grade or salary.’’ Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d

446, 457–58 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Taylor did not present any evidence to the effect that

either her being put on the PIP or the delay in receiving her

1996 and 1997 performance evaluations affected her grade or

salary. Indeed, Taylor did not present evidence suggesting

she suffered any ‘‘significant change in [her] employment

status.’’ Taylor alleges only that Hedlin improperly ‘‘placed

[her] on a ninety day [PIP]’’; Hedlin ‘‘refused to terminate

the plan, even though [Hedlin] had orally informed [her] that

[she] had successfully completed the plan’’; Hedlin did not

execute a 1996 performance evaluation for Taylor until September 1997; and, due to the delay in removing Taylor from

the PIP, Taylor ‘‘did not receive performance standards’’ and

an evaluation for 1997 until May 1998. Taylor does not

dispute, however, that Hedlin removed her from the PIP just

two weeks after the plan was scheduled to end. In fact,

Taylor’s affidavit indicates that Hedlin informed Taylor she

had successfully completed the PIP ‘‘on May 3, 1997,’’ the

date on which the plan was scheduled to end. Even assuming

there was a brief delay in removing Taylor from the PIP, she

does not explain why we should consider that an adverse

employment action. Nor did she claim any adverse effect

caused by the delay in receiving her performance evaluations.

We therefore conclude that neither Taylor’s placement in the

PIP nor the delay of her performance evaluations was an

adverse employment action upon which Taylor may base a

claim of discrimination.

Taylor next argues the district court erred in holding her

erroneous performance rating — with its concomitant effect

upon her bonus — was not an adverse employment action

because Hedlin corrected the evaluation and paid the proper

bonus before Taylor brought this suit. To be sure, loss of

bonus money because of an improperly low performance

rating may constitute an adverse employment action for the

purposes of Title VII. See Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815,

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819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (contrasting performance evaluations

with bonuses). The issue whether an employer can cure a

violation of Title VII and thereby avoid liability for the

violation, however, is one of first impression in this circuit.

We agree with the four other circuits to have addressed the

question: An employer may cure an adverse employment

action — at least one of the sort here alleged — before that

action is the subject of litigation. See White v. Burlington

Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 310 F.3d 443, 452 (6th

Cir. 2002) (reinstatement that ‘‘puts the plaintiff in the same

position she would have been in absent the suspension constitutes the ‘ultimate employment decision,’ thereby negating a

potentially adverse intermediate employment decision’’), reh’g

en banc granted and judgment vacated, 321 F.3d 1203 (2003);

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267–68

(11th Cir. 2001) (no adverse employment action where plaintiff initially denied but shortly thereafter received promotion);

Brooks v. San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2000)

(retaliatory lowering of performance evaluation not adverse

employment action where evaluation was ‘‘on appeal’’ and

might have been corrected if plaintiff had not quit her job

while appeal was pending); Benningfield v. City of Houston,

157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998) (‘‘We need not address

whether a mere delay in promotion constitutes an adverse

employment action because [plaintiff] received the promotion

with retroactive pay and seniority’’); cf. Page v. Bolger, 645

F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (‘‘there are many

interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect

upon employment conditions which were not intended to fall

within the direct proscriptions of TTT Title VII’’).

As the district court reasoned:

Permitting employers the opportunity to correct workplace wrongs prior to litigation is the objective of the

EEO process. If a plaintiff were permitted a right to

sue even if his or her employer had corrected the grievance, there would be absolutely no incentive for employers to make adjustments for past conduct during the

EEO process.

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Mem. Op. at JA 60, citing Martini v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage

Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding to

district court with instructions to dismiss plaintiff’s suit as

untimely because ‘‘Title VII requires complainants to wait 180

days before suing in federal court so that the Commission

may informally resolve as many charges as possible’’). Because Hedlin corrected her error in rating Taylor and increased Taylor’s bonus accordingly before Taylor filed suit,

there was no unremedied adverse employment action when

the suit was filed and the district court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of the Smithsonian on Count I.

2. Count II: Failure to Promote

In Count II of her complaint Taylor claimed she was denied

a promotion because of her race. Taylor does not claim she

sought promotion into a vacant position. Rather, she claims,

with her current responsibilities, she should have received an

increase in grade and salary. Because ‘‘the traditional

McDonnell Douglas test does not fit’’ such a case, we ‘‘adjust

the McDonnell formula to ask whether a similarly situated

person TTT requested and received the benefit she sought.’’

Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In

order to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory refusal

to promote, therefore, the plaintiff must show that she sought

and was denied a promotion for which she was qualified, and

that ‘‘other employees of similar qualifications TTT were indeed promoted at the time the plaintiff’s request for promotion was denied.’’ Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951

(D.C. Cir. 1981).

At the time Taylor requested a promotion to GS–12, she

had spent less than eight months as a GS–11 employee.

Under the applicable personnel regulation, an employee must

have spent at least one year in grade GS–11 before she may

be considered for promotion to a GS–12 or higher position.

See 5 C.F.R. § 300.604(a). The district court therefore properly found Taylor was not eligible for promotion at the time

she sought it.

Taylor argues the district court erred in failing to consider

requests for promotion she claims to have made in July and

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November 1995. Although a district court should consider on

a motion for summary judgment whether ‘‘postpleading material’’ suggests there are triable issues of material fact, WRIGHT

ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 2721, at

366, the motion cannot ‘‘be defeated by factual assertions in a

brief by the party opposing it,’’ id. § 2723, at 389–90. Because mention of these purported requests and denials appear

only in Taylor’s memorandum in opposition to the Smithsonian’s motion for summary judgment, and not in her complaint

or other verified pleading, the district court properly concluded it was not obliged to deal with them at all. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment ‘‘shall be rendered forthwith

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issueTTTT’’).

In any event, Taylor’s present claim to have sought promotion in July and November 1995 finds scant support in the

record. As support for the alleged request of July 1995,

Taylor cites a memorandum dated July 7 from herself and

Hedlin to two other employees of the OSIA. The subject of

the memorandum is ‘‘Agenda,’’ and the relevant portion

reads:

Promotion for Carolyn [Taylor] beyond the GS–11 will be

dependent upon her budget responsibilities. Julie indicated that OSIA may not have a large enough budget to

warrant further grade increases for Carolyn, but they

would do comparisons and give her the info.

The memorandum does not indicate that Taylor requested

promotion in July 1995. It contains a statement, albeit an

ambiguous one, about the possibility of a promotion, but it

does not indicate she requested a promotion. The alleged

November 1995 request is nowhere even mentioned in the

record. Indeed, as the Smithsonian points out, the only

document Taylor cites as support for her claim that she

sought promotion in November is dated September 1995.

Finally, and most important, Taylor’s claim to have sought

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promotion in July and November 1995 is contradicted by her

own earlier deposition, in which she testified only that she

requested promotion within a month or two after Hedlin

became Director of the SIA. Clearly, therefore, Taylor failed

to provide sufficient evidence she sought promotion in July or

November to withstand a motion for summary judgment.

See Ben–Kotel v. Howard Univ., 319 F.3d 532, 536 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (‘‘A party opposing a motion for summary judgment

must point to more than just ‘a scintilla of evidence’ supporting [her] position; ‘there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the plaintiff’ ’’) (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252).

Not only did Taylor fail to raise a genuine issue with

regard to her eligibility for promotion, she also failed to point

to any circumstance giving rise to the inference she was

denied the promotion because of her race. Taylor’s claim

rests solely upon Hedlin’s having promoted four ‘‘Caucasian’’

employees from GS–11 to GS–12. The undisputed facts show,

however, that those individuals were not situated similarly to

Taylor. Three were archivists who had spent over ten years

in grade GS–11 before Hedlin promoted them; the other was

a supervisory archivist ‘‘in a career ladder position GS–

11/GS–12.’’ Because Taylor falls far short of showing that

Hedlin promoted ‘‘other employees of similar qualifications,’’

Bundy, 641 F.2d at 951, the district court properly held her

claim fails as a matter of law, irrespective of her eleventhhour allegation that she sought promotion after she had spent

sufficient time in grade.

3. Count III: Retaliation

Taylor claims Hedlin changed her first-line supervisor and

modified her Performance Plan in retaliation for her having

filed a complaint with the EEOC. Relying upon the lack of

evidence of any ‘‘substantive change’’ or of an increase in

Taylor’s workload as a result of these arrangements, the

district court concluded that neither constituted an adverse

employment action.

Taylor argues the district court erred in failing to consider

evidence demonstrating that the changes of which she comUSCA Case #02-5261 Document #791009 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 13 of 14
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plains were retaliatory. Whether they were retaliatory is

immaterial, however, if they were not adverse employment

actions. Taylor does not point to a scintilla of evidence

suggesting these changes had a material adverse effect upon

the terms or conditions of her employment. See Freedman v.

MCI Telecomm. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Because Taylor did not present any evidence upon which one

could reasonably find she suffered an adverse employment

action, the district court properly granted summary judgment

in favor of her employer on Count III.

III. Conclusion

Taylor also raises various procedural objections, none of

which merits treatment in a published opinion. For the

foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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