Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03031/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03031-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corey Spigner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3031

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal From the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Corey Spigner, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 16, 2005

Filed: August 1, 2005

___________

Before BYE, HEANEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Corey Spigner pleaded guilty to and was convicted of conspiring to distribute

50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.

His offense subjected him to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), but Spigner received a sentence fifteen months greater than the

mandatory minimum due to the district court’s use of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (Guidelines). On appeal, Spigner challenges the sentence imposed by the

district court because it was based on an erroneous (yet understandable) belief that

the Guidelines were mandatory. We remand for resentencing.

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BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2004, Spigner was indicted for engaging in a conspiracy to

distribute 50 grams or more of crack from on or about January 1, 2000, to July 19,

2003. He was arrested for this offense on January 30, 2004, and granted conditional

release that same day. On March 30, 2004, he entered into a plea agreement, whereby

he agreed to plead guilty to the offense contained in the indictment. In that

agreement, he admitted responsibility for between 150 and 500 grams of crack, which

carried a Guidelines base offense level of 34. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(3). The parties

also agreed that “no motions for upward or downward departure will be filed.” (Plea

Agreement at ¶ 9.)

At some point during the pendency of this action in district court, it became

clear that Spigner was suffering from serious chronic health problems. During the

April 14, 2004, change of plea hearing, Spigner informed the district court that he

was on a daily regimen of the medications Lotensin and Norvasc to control his high

blood pressure, and Renagel for his kidney problems. The court ordered a

presentence investigation report (PSR) to be prepared, and allowed Spigner to remain

on pretrial release until sentencing. 

The PSR confirmed that Spigner was plagued by serious ailments:

Mr. Spigner reported he suffers from health problems related to anemia

and high blood pressure. He stated that due to his high blood pressure

going undetected for a long period of time, his kidneys have failed. He

reported he needs a kidney transplant and is on the donation list. He is

also on three medications for the condition: norvasc, lotisen [sic], and

renagel.

(PSR at ¶ 61.) The PSR also remarked that Spigner had been unemployed since 1991

due to his health problems.

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On July 12, 2004, the district court held Spigner’s sentencing hearing. Spigner,

through his lawyer, informed the court that he required additional treatment for his

health problems. Spigner was forced to perform dialysis for his kidney failure, and

had a catheter surgically placed in his chest so that he could do so. He was scheduled

for surgery that week to insert a catheter in his arm that was expected to eventually

replace the one in his chest. The following week, he was scheduled for another

surgery to remove his thyroid. Based on these circumstances, Spigner asked that the

court either reschedule the sentencing hearing after his surgeries, or allow him to selfreport to serve his sentence at a later date. The government stated that it had no

objection to allowing Spigner to self-report, and the court granted the request. The

district court then informed Spigner that “I think the low end [of the Guidelines] is

a sufficient sentence so you don’t need to argue for that; but if there’s anything else

that you’d care to say, be my guest.” (Sentencing Tr. at 7.) Because the parties had

stipulated in the plea agreement that they would not request a departure from

Spigner’s Guidelines range, Spigner’s only request was that the court recommend that

the Bureau of Prisons place him somewhere he could get the medical treatment he

needed. The court then imposed a 135-month sentence, the lowest allowed under the

Guidelines. In its oral pronouncement of sentence and its written judgment, the

district court stressed that the Bureau of Prisons should take note of Spigner’s

medical condition, as well as the possibility of an upcoming transplant, and provide

him necessary treatment. The court then reiterated that it was granting Spigner’s

request to self-report, and gave him a report date of September 13, 2004.

On September 8, 2004, Spigner filed a motion to extend the time for selfsurrender to November 12, 2004. His motion stated:

The Defendant’s medical condition has been well known to the court

and he requires regular dialysis treatment. Previously, the Defendant

has undergone surgery for placement of a dialysis catheter in his chest.

Approximately three weeks ago, he underwent another surgery for

placement of a substitute catheter in his arm. He is scheduled to be seen

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by his doctor on September 16, 2004 at which time the doctor will

evaluate the status of the new arm catheter, and assuming the new arm

catheter is functioning, the doctor will then authorize use of the arm

catheter for dialysis for a trial period of two weeks. Should the arm

catheter continue to function properly for those two weeks, the doctor

will then schedule a general anesthesia surgery for removal of the chest

catheter. Such procedure would likely take place in the time frame of

October 11, 2004 to October 22, 2004.

(Mot. to Extend Time for Self Surrender at ¶ 2.)

The district court granted Spigner’s motion the next day, finding good cause

for the time extension. On November 15, 2004, Spigner reported to Devins Chronic

Care Federal Medical Center in Ayer to begin serving his sentence.

ANALYSIS

Spigner claims that his sentence cannot stand because it was imposed by way

of an unconstitutional mandatory Guidelines scheme. He is correct in this assertion;

sentencing under the mandatory Guidelines regime has been held unconstitutional by

the Supreme Court. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755-56 (2005). Because

Spigner did not raise this claim in the district court, however, we review for plain

error. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549-50 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under

our circuit’s plain error standard, Spigner is only entitled to a remand for resentencing

if he can show that there is a “‘reasonable probability,’ based on the appellate record

as a whole, that but for the [Booker] error he would have received a more favorable

sentence,” Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552; see also id. at 551 (noting a defendant may

establish prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability that he would have

received a more favorable sentence with the Booker error eliminated by making the

Guidelines advisory”), and that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

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public reputation of judicial proceedings,” id. at 553 (quoting Johnson v. United

States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).

In the wake of Booker, the district court’s duty at sentencing is not merely to

calculate the appropriate Guidelines range and then determine if a departure is

appropriate. Rather, Booker “requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines

ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory

concerns as well.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757 (citations omitted); accord United States

v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the appropriate

review of a sentence post-Booker is first to determine if the sentencing court correctly

calculated the Guidelines range, and then to consider whether the ultimate sentence

is reasonable in light of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).

Under § 3553(a), “[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than

necessary,” to account for the nature and seriousness of the offense, provide just

punishment, deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and avoid sentencing

disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court must also, however, fashion a sentence

that “provide[s] the defendant with needed . . . medical care . . . in the most effective

manner.” § 3553(a)(2)(D). 

A number of decisions from this circuit have remanded for resentencing after

conducting plain error review of a Booker claim. In United States v. Whipple, 2005

WL 1630946, at *1-*2, (8th Cir. July 13, 2005), a remand was appropriate because

the district court stated its displeasure with the Guidelines sentence due to the

defendant’s health and age, yet felt constrained to impose the sentence because “its

hands were tied by the mandatory character of the Guidelines.” United States v.

Aldridge, 2005 WL 1630935 (8th Cir. July 13, 2005), involved a defendant who had

been convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine and a firearms violation. The court

of appeals remanded for resentencing because of the district court’s stated displeasure

with sentencing the defendant to a higher term than another coconspirator. Aldridge,

2005 WL 1630935, at *5. In United States v. Fleck, 2005 WL 1522738, at *9 (8th

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Cir. June 29, 2005), our court remanded where the district court noted at sentencing

that it wished there was some way it could give one defendant a lower sentence. See

also United States v. Valdivia-Perez, 2005 WL 1324020 (8th Cir. June 6, 2005)

(unpublished decision) (same). In United States v. Plumman, 409 F.3d 919, 931 (8th

Cir. 2005), the district court explicitly stated that it would not impose a life sentence

but for the Guidelines, and our circuit remanded because there was a reasonable

likelihood the defendant would receive a lesser sentence under the advisory

Guidelines. In United States v. Rodriguez-Ceballos, 407 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2005),

we found the district court’s discontent with the Guidelines sentence to be a sufficient

reason to remand, although the opinion did not state what specific comments by the

sentencing court drove the decision. 

Many of the above decisions included a transcribed, explicit statement from the

district court noting its displeasure with the sentence, but that is not the sole ground

for remand when faced with plain error review of a Booker claim. Rather, our court

is charged with the duty to review the “appellate record as a whole” to determine

whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would receive a different

sentence absent the Booker error. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 552. The Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure clearly state that the appellate record includes all district court

filings and exhibits as well as transcripts of district court proceedings. Fed. R. App.

P. 10(a). So while we agree with the statement of our en banc court in Pirani that a

sentencing judge’s comments about the propriety of a Guidelines sentence is

“relevant to plain error prejudice,” Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553 n.6, and indeed may be the

lodestar in some cases, it is not the only factor for our consideration.

This principle has particular application in Spigner’s case. The sentencing

transcript itself contains no express statement from the district court that it wished the

Guidelines did not bind its discretion. Spigner received the lowest sentence permitted

by the Guidelines, and the district court indicated it expected to give that lowest

sentence before even hearing argument. While we recognize that “this fact alone does

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Spigner agreed that he would not seek a downward departure on the basis of

his health, see USSG § 5H1.4, p.s., but that does not foreclose the argument that the

district court could impose a sentence lower than the suggested Guidelines range, see

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 750-51, 756-57 (recognizing that the availability of a downward

departure under the Guidelines was limited to prescribed circumstances, whereas the

new advisory sentencing scheme permits broader considerations of sentencing

implications). For this reason, we find United States v. Robinson, 409 F.3d 979 (8th

Cir. 2005), to be distinguishable. In Robinson, a panel found no error in the district

court’s refusal to depart downward based on extraordinary physical impairment.

Spigner is not asking for a Guidelines departure, but rather a sentence outside the

Guidelines (with no departures). See United States v. Ryder, 2005 WL 1639460, at

*9 (8th Cir. July 14, 2005) (“The prior mandatory nature of the Guidelines deprived

the district court of the opportunity to consider age and physical condition in any

manner other than as a basis for a Guidelines departure. Now coupled with the

requirements in § 3553(a) that a district court consider a defendant’s characteristics

and the need to provide medical care in the most effective manner when sentencing

a defendant, the district court would be well within its discretion to at least consider

[the defendants’] ages and medical conditions as non-Guideline factors on remand.”).

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not give rise to a ‘reasonable probability’ that his sentence would have been shorter”

absent the Booker error, United States v. Whipple, 2005WL 1630946, at *2 (quoting

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553) (8th Cir. July 13, 2005), it does lend support to that

supposition. More important, though, is the record on Spigner’s health.1

 The district

court was required to impose a sentence reflective of Spigner’s need for medical care,

see Whipple, 2005 WL 1630946, at *2 (noting that, pursuant to § 3553(a), the district

court must consider the defendant’s health in fashioning an appropriate sentence

under the post-Booker regime); see also United States v. Ryder, 2005 WL 1639460,

at *8-*9 (8th Cir. July 14, 2005) (recognizing that the district court must consider a

defendant’s physical condition and medical needs when imposing a sentence under

the advisory guidelines), which in Spigner’s case was atypical due to his high blood

pressure and kidney ailments. Although he was only thirty-three years old at the time

of sentencing, he suffered from high blood pressure so severe it resulted in the failure

of his kidneys. He was on a daily prescription regimen requiring two drugs to control

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his blood pressure and a third for his kidney ailment. His condition demanded regular

dialysis treatment, and he has been subject to surgeries for the insertions of two

different catheters for dialysis. At the time of sentencing, Spigner was on a waiting

list for a kidney transplant, but presumably must continue his dialysis indefinitely

unless a donor is found. 

The record shows that the district court was cognizant of and sensitive to the

grave condition of Spigner’s health. The court went to extraordinary efforts to ensure

that Spigner’s medical needs would be met by allowing him to remain free during his

case, and granting him the privilege of self-reporting months after the imposition of

his sentence. Indeed, due to his offense of conviction, Spigner could not remain free

unless the district court found “exceptional reasons” why his detention would not be

appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3143. When these factors are

combined with the court’s stated predisposition to give a sentence at the low end of

the Guidelines (which it did) and insistence that the Bureau of Prisons take note of

Spigner’s condition, there is a reasonable probability that the district court would

have given Spigner a lower sentence.

Having found that Spigner has established that he was prejudiced by the district

court’s Booker error, we have no trouble in concluding that the error would result in

a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 726, 736

(1993). Spigner has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he was sentenced to

serve more time in prison than he would have received if the district court treated the

Guidelines as advisory only. Allowing Spigner to serve a sentence longer than he

would be required to had he been sentenced under the appropriate scheme seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings that led to that

result. Whipple, 2005 WL 1630946 at *2; Plumman, 409 F.3d at 931. We thus

exercise our discretion to correct the error.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we hold that Spigner has established that he is

entitled to plain error relief for the district court’s sentencing error. We thus

remand for resentencing.

______________________________

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