Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-02009/USCOURTS-ca10-19-02009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cirilo Orozco-Sanchez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

CIRILO OROZCO-SANCHEZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-2009 

(D.C. Nos. 2:16-CV-00762-WJ-KBM & 

2:15-CR-01557-WJ-1) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

In 2015 Cirilo Orozco-Sanchez accepted a plea agreement and pleaded guilty 

to one count of illegally reentering the United States after having been deported, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 claiming that his attorney was ineffective in counseling him about the plea 

agreement and in failing to file an appeal. The district court denied relief, but it 

granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on whether Mr. Orozco’s counsel was 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 6, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 1
2 

ineffective and whether he suffered prejudice with regard to either the plea agreement 

or the appeal. We affirm the district court’s denial of relief. 

BACKGROUND

I. Prior Conviction and Underlying Conduct 

 In 2011 Mr. Orozco pleaded guilty to violating § 1326(a) & (b). Having 

served the imprisonment portion of his sentence, he was released on March 12, 2015, 

and removed to Mexico. Just two weeks later, however, on March 25, he was 

apprehended in New Mexico. Mr. Orozco states that drug traffickers had kidnapped 

him a few days after his return to Mexico and had threatened to kill him if he did not 

recross the border, when and how they directed, to distract border officers from a 

drug-smuggling operation. 

II. Plea Proceedings 

 After charging Mr. Orozco with another violation of § 1326(a) and (b), the 

government offered him a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11(c)(1)(C). The proposed agreement did not establish an exact sentencing range, 

but instead provided for a downward departure or adjustment in offense level that 

partially depended on Mr. Orozco’s criminal-history category. Mr. Orozco would 

see a greater benefit from the plea agreement if he were in criminal-history categories 

I-V, rather than in category VI. The agreement limited the parties’ sentencing 

arguments, including precluding Mr. Orozco from arguing for any other departure or 

variance, and it contained an appeal waiver. 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 2
3 

 Mr. Orozco’s counsel, Margaret Strickland, thought Mr. Orozco would be in 

criminal-history category V. She advised him that his Guidelines range with the 

agreement would be 30 to 37 months, while without the agreement it would be 63 to 

78 months. And at the plea hearing, both Ms. Strickland and the magistrate judge 

made statements indicating that Mr. Orozco’s Guidelines range would be 30 to 37 

months: 

 MS. STRICKLAND: . . . Because of Mr. Orozco’s prior criminal 

history, he’s in Category V and it carries an enhancement for a very old 

trafficking case which would put him beginning at Level 20. 

 He is going to receive a seven-level reduction under this offer down 

to a Level 13. That puts his range down from 63 to 78 months down to 30 

to 37 months. So it’s a significant reduction. On his last prior reentry, he 

received 63 months. So he’d be receiving quite a reduction in the 

sentencing range. 

 THE COURT: That’s not a bad deal given your criminal history. 

. . . [W]ithout your plea agreement, you’d be looking at 63 to 78 months, 

with this plea agreement, 30 to 37 months. Do you understand? 

R. at 103-04. Mr. Orozco accepted the agreement and pleaded guilty. 

 As it turned out, however, Ms. Strickland was wrong about the applicable 

Guidelines range. When she received Mr. Orozco’s presentence report, she 

discovered she had miscalculated the impact of a prior conviction. Mr. Orozco was 

not in criminal-history category V, but in category VI. And instead of being at 

offense level 13, as Ms. Strickland had thought, he was at offense level 19, facing a 

Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. Without the agreement the offense level would 

have been 21 and the range would have been 77 to 96 months. 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 3
4 

 Ms. Strickland called Mr. Orozco and told him about the increased sentencing 

range. She mentioned the possibility of continuing the case to try to get a lesser 

sentence, but Mr. Orozco did not request her to seek a continuance. 

 At sentencing, the government conceded that “a low-end sentence would be 

sufficient but not greater than necessary in these circumstances.” Id. at 58. The 

district court responded that “on individuals who are in Category 6, the highest 

Criminal History Category, I am generally not inclined to go with the low end of the 

guideline sentence,” but it invited Ms. Strickland to advocate for her client. Id. 

 Ms. Strickland requested a sentence of 63 months, at the low end of the 

Guidelines range. She stated that Mr. Orozco “does have an imperfect duress defense 

that I know he wants to discuss with the Court. . . . I have discussed that with my 

client extensively and we still decided to enter into a plea agreement even with that 

sort of imperfect duress defense.” Id. at 59. Mr. Orozco then informed the court, 

“I’m here because I was kidnapped and they obligated me to do this. . . . I’m here 

because I was threatened by death. They were going to kill me. I had just gotten out 

of prison 12 days before.” Id. The district court responded, “I can’t control the 

circumstances in Mexico but you’ve been deported numerous times. You keep 

illegally reentering the United States. Your conduct shows that you have no respect 

for the laws of the United States.” Id. at 63. The district court sentenced Mr. Orozco 

to 72 months’ imprisonment. 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 4
5 

III. The § 2255 Motion 

 Mr. Orozco did not appeal. But acting pro se, he filed a § 2255 motion raising 

several challenges to his conviction and sentence. After receiving appointed counsel, 

he narrowed his claims to two allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel—that 

Ms. Strickland was ineffective in (1) not counseling him properly regarding his plea 

agreement and (2) failing to file a notice of appeal or consult with him about filing an 

appeal. 

 A. Proceedings Before the Magistrate Judge 

 The magistrate judge held a hearing at which both Mr. Orozco and 

Ms. Strickland testified. Mr. Orozco testified that Ms. Strickland told him his 

sentence would be between 30 and 37 months. He learned he was facing a range of 

63 to 78 months only when she called him after he had pleaded guilty. She 

mentioned continuing the case to try to get a lesser sentence, but Mr. Orozco did not 

request her to seek a continuance. As he put it, “I just wanted her to finish this 

because I just wanted to get out of this.” Id. at 291. Even so, Mr. Orozco believed 

that he could seek a sentence of less than 63 months by telling the sentencing judge 

about his kidnapping, because Ms. Strickland did not tell him that the plea agreement 

prohibited a sentence of less than 63 months. If he had understood that limitation 

originally, he would not have accepted the plea agreement, and having accepted it, he 

would have requested to withdraw from it. He further testified that at the end of the 

sentencing hearing, he asked Ms. Strickland “if she would be able to . . . appeal for 

me,” but he did not know whether or not she heard him, because she was taking the 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 5
6 

interpreter headsets off him at the time. Id. at 296. He had no other communications 

with Ms. Strickland. 

 Ms. Strickland admitted that she had misestimated the sentencing range to be 

30 to 37 months. She denied assuring Mr. Orozco that would be his sentencing 

range, indicating her statements during the plea colloquy were just an estimate. She 

conceded, however, that it is a “fair reading of the transcript” that she was informing 

the magistrate judge of specific details of the plea agreement. Id. at 339. And 

ultimately she agreed that her “advice did not adequately advise him of the 

consequences of the plea before he entered the plea.” Id. at 372. She confirmed 

Mr. Orozco’s testimony that she had brought up moving for a continuance and 

possibly trying to withdraw the plea, but that he was not interested. But she 

contradicted his testimony about believing he could argue for a sentence of less than 

63 months, stating that she advised him that the plea agreement was binding. 

Regarding whether Mr. Orozco requested her to appeal, she testified that she did not 

recall his asking to appeal at sentencing. And she received no communications from 

him after sentencing, asking her to appeal. If he had asked her to appeal, she would 

have filed a notice of appeal. 

 Applying the two-prong ineffective-assistance test set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the magistrate judge issued proposed findings 

and a recommended disposition concluding that Ms. Strickland had performed 

deficiently in counseling Mr. Orozco about the plea agreement, but that Mr. Orozco 

had failed to show he suffered prejudice because (1) he failed to show a reasonable 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 6
7 

probability that he would have chosen to forgo the plea agreement, and (2) he failed 

to show a reasonable probability that the end result of entering an open plea would 

have been more favorable to him. The magistrate judge further concluded that 

Ms. Strickland had not performed deficiently by not filing an appeal. She found that 

Ms. Strickland had not heard Mr. Orozco request an appeal and that under the 

circumstances, she did not have a duty to consult with him about an appeal. The 

magistrate judge therefore recommended that the district court deny the § 2255 

motion. 

B. Proceedings Before the District Court 

 Both parties objected and responded to each other’s objections. Mr. Orozco 

asserted that he had established a reasonable probability that he would have entered 

an open plea had he been competently advised. He argued that the magistrate judge 

had underestimated the strength of his arguments in support of a downward departure 

or variance and failed to account for the fact that Ms. Strickland’s incompetent 

advice had conflicted her from adequately advising whether Mr. Orozco should 

withdraw his plea. He further asserted that the decision to reject the plea agreement 

would have been rational. Regarding the failure to appeal, Mr. Orozco objected to 

the magistrate judge’s determinations that he did not adequately request an appeal 

and that Ms. Strickland did not have a duty to consult with him about an appeal. For 

its part, the government objected to the conclusion that Ms. Strickland performed 

deficiently in counseling Mr. Orozco about the plea. 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 7
8 

 The district court declined to determine whether Ms. Strickland performed 

deficiently in counseling Mr. Orozco about the plea agreement, instead deciding the 

plea-agreement claim on the prejudice prong. It noted that Mr. Orozco’s position—

that he need show only that he would have entered an open plea and that such a 

decision would have been rational—differed from the magistrate judge’s prejudice 

test, which required Mr. Orozco to show not only that he would have entered an open 

plea, but also that the result of the proceeding would have been more favorable to 

him. Ultimately, the district court was more persuaded by the magistrate judge’s test, 

holding that Mr. Orozco was required to show “(1) that in the absence of ineffective 

assistance he would have pursued a different plea option and (2) that there was a 

reasonable probability that the ultimate outcome—the length of his sentence—would 

have been more favorable.” R. at 632. It skipped the first part of this test, focusing 

on the second. It concluded that Mr. Orozco “failed to establish a reasonable 

probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more 

favorable for him absent ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 633. 

 As for the failure to file an appeal, the district court agreed with the magistrate 

judge that Mr. Orozco had failed to show that Ms. Strickland performed deficiently. 

It adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that Mr. Orozco did not adequately advise 

Ms. Strickland that he wished to appeal. And like the magistrate judge, it concluded 

that Mr. Orozco had failed to establish that the circumstances obligated 

Ms. Strickland to consult with him about an appeal. 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 8
9 

 Accordingly, the district court denied the § 2255 motion, but it granted a COA 

on four issues: 

1) whether representation by Petitioner’s counsel at the time Petitioner 

entered into his Plea Agreement and pled guilty was constitutionally 

ineffective; 2) whether Petitioner suffered prejudice due to constitutionally 

deficient representation at the time he entered into his Plea Agreement and 

pled guilty; 3) whether Petitioner’s counsel failed to adequately advise him 

of his right to appeal; and 4) whether there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he 

would have timely appealed. 

Supp. R. at 21. 

DISCUSSION 

 “We review the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion de novo and 

its findings of fact for clear error. A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 

presents a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo.” United States 

v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “In other words, 

this Court accepts the District Court’s factual findings so long as they are not clearly 

erroneous and reviews de novo whether [counsel’s] assistance was ineffective as a 

matter of law.” Boltz v. Mullin, 415 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005). 

Strickland v. Washington’s two-prong test applies to both of Mr. Orozco’s 

ineffective-assistance claims. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-77 

(2000) (failure to file appeal); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (guilty plea). 

Under Strickland, Mr. Orozco “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” 

meaning that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687, 688. He must further “show that the deficient 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 9
10 

performance prejudiced the defense,” meaning that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id. at 687, 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. “[T]he ultimate focus of 

inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being 

challenged.” Id. at 696. 

I. Counsel’s Plea-Related Conduct 

 Mr. Orozco first argues that Ms. Strickland was ineffective in counseling him 

about the plea agreement. He asserts that her performance was deficient and that he 

was prejudiced because he agreed to a binding plea agreement that he would not 

otherwise have accepted.1

 Like the district court, we focus on Strickland’s prejudice 

prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (noting that a court may focus first on either 

prong and need not examine both if one is not satisfied). 

A. Legal Background 

 To place Mr. Orozco’s argument in context, we survey relevant decisions 

regarding prejudice in the guilty-plea context. We start with Hill. There, after 

establishing that Strickland applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective 

 

1

 Mr. Orozco also suggests he suffered prejudice from Ms. Strickland’s failure to 

negotiate a better plea agreement. But he neither identifies where he made this 

argument in the district court nor explains why this court should entertain an 

argument made for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Moya, 676 F.3d 

1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012) (defendant “did not raise these matters in district court 

and has not provided a reason to deviate from the general rule that we do not address 

arguments presented for the first time on appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 10
11 

assistance of counsel, Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, the Court held that the prejudice prong 

“focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the 

outcome of the plea process,” id. at 59. Thus, when the defendant asserts he would 

not have pleaded guilty if counsel had advised him correctly, “to satisfy the 

‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial.” Id. 

 In Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 474, counsel failed to file a notice of appeal. 

Consistent with Hill, because “counsel’s alleged deficient performance arguably led 

not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a 

proceeding itself,” the Court imposed a presumption of prejudice. Id. at 483. “[W]e 

cannot accord any presumption of reliability . . . to judicial proceedings that never 

took place.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To perfect a showing of 

prejudice in this context, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, 

had counsel not performed deficiently, he would have timely appealed. See id. at 

484, 486. 

 Next, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010), defense counsel 

incorrectly advised a lawful permanent resident regarding the immigration 

consequences of a guilty plea. The Court noted that as part of establishing prejudice 

in these circumstances, a defendant “must convince the court that a decision to reject 

the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Id. at 372. 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 11
12 

 Two years later, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 139 (2012), presented the 

opposite circumstances to Mr. Orozco’s case—there, counsel failed to communicate a 

plea offer to the defendant, who later entered an open plea and received a higher 

sentence. After holding that defense counsel has the duty to communicate plea offers 

to the client, id. at 145, the Court directed that, to show prejudice where a plea offer 

lapsed or was rejected, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability that 

(1) they would have accepted the earlier offer had they been afforded effective 

assistance, (2) the prosecution would not have canceled the plea and the court would 

have accepted it, and (3) “the end result of the criminal process would have been 

more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison 

time.” Id. at 147. 

 In Frye’s companion case, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 160 (2012), a 

defendant rejected a plea offer on the inaccurate advice of counsel, was convicted at 

trial, and received a higher sentence than he would have under the plea agreement. 

Thus, “[h]aving to stand trial, not choosing to waive it, [was] the prejudice alleged.” 

Id. at 163-64. The Court rejected the idea that a constitutionally adequate trial 

necessarily resulted in a lack of prejudice: “Even if the trial itself is free from 

constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a more favorable 

plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious counts or the 

imposition of a more severe sentence.” Id. at 166. As in Frye, therefore, Lafler held 

that to establish prejudice in those circumstances, defendants must show a reasonable 

probability that they would have accepted the plea agreement, the prosecution would 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 12
13 

not have withdrawn it and the court would have accepted it, “and that the conviction 

or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under 

the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” Id. at 164. 

 In Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1963 (2017), the defendant’s primary 

concern was avoiding deportation, and he pleaded guilty based on counsel’s 

erroneous advice that the conviction would not support deportation. Looking to Hill, 

the Court emphasized that where a defendant is entirely deprived of a judicial 

proceeding, the prejudice inquiry “focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which 

may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial.” Id. at 1966. “In the 

unusual circumstances” before the Court, Mr. Lee established prejudice by 

demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea, even 

though his chances of acquittal were slim. Id. at 1967. “The decision whether to 

plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction after 

trial and by plea. When those consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, 

similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial may look attractive.” Id. at 

1966 (citation omitted). “[W]here we are . . . asking what an individual defendant 

would have done, the possibility of even a highly improbable result may be pertinent 

to the extent it would have affected his decisionmaking.” Id. at 1967. 

 Most recently, in Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 742, 747 (2019), the Court 

held that the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice applies even where a defendant 

has signed an appeal waiver as part of his plea agreement. “[T]his Court has made 

clear that when deficient counsel causes the loss of an entire proceeding, it will not 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 13
14 

bend the presumption-of-prejudice rule simply because a particular defendant seems 

to have had poor prospects.” Id. at 747 (citing Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966-67). 

B. Discussion 

 1. Frye is the more applicable precedent. 

 Mr. Orozco relies on Lee, asserting that he need show only a reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s errors he would not have entered the same plea and 

that such a decision would have been rational. Thus, he faults the district court for 

relying on Frye and requiring him to show a reasonable probability that entering an 

open plea would have resulted in a lower sentence. But we agree with the district 

court that Frye is the more applicable precedent in these circumstances. 

Lee, like Hill, Flores-Ortega, and Garza, addresses circumstances in which a 

defendant was entirely deprived of a proceeding—the defendants in Lee and Hill of a 

trial, and the defendants in Flores-Ortega and Garza of an appeal. But Mr. Ortega 

does not claim that he would have proceeded to trial had he been counseled 

accurately; instead, he asserts that he would have entered an open guilty plea rather 

than accepting the government’s plea offer. Based on Mr. Orozco’s own description 

of what he would have done, he was not entirely deprived of a proceeding. Either 

way, he would have entered a guilty plea. Thus, this case is more like one “involving 

mere attorney error,” in which “we require the defendant to demonstrate that the 

errors actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“Even if a 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 14
15 

defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, . . . the 

defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.”). 

 Analogizing to Mr. Lee’s primary interest in avoiding deportation, see Lee, 

137 U.S. at 1963, Mr. Orozco submits that he had a primary interest in having his 

imperfect duress defense adequately presented to the court. The record, however, 

does not support an inference that Mr. Orozco had an interest in presenting the duress 

argument for its own sake. Rather, the argument was merely a means of achieving 

his ultimate goal of the lowest possible sentence. This ultimate goal—lowering the 

sentence—distinguishes Mr. Orozco’s circumstances from Lee, where the length of 

the sentence was collateral to Mr. Lee’s primary goal of avoiding deportation. 

See id. at 1967. 

 In these circumstances, Frye is the more analogous precedent. Like this case, 

Frye involved two competing guilty pleas, one under a plea offer and the other an 

open plea. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 139. Consistent with Hill, the Frye Court could 

have required the defendant to show nothing more than a reasonable probability that 

he would have accepted the earlier-offered plea agreement instead of entering an 

open plea. But it chose to go beyond that requirement, also specifically making it 

“necessary to show a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal 

process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a 

sentence of less prison time.” Id. at 147. Although Mr. Orozco’s circumstances are 

the inverse of those in Frye, the Court’s determination that a more favorable outcome 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 15
16 

is a necessary component of the analysis logically extends to this competing-plea 

scenario as well. 

 For these reasons, we agree with the district court that to establish prejudice, 

Mr. Orozco must show a reasonable probability that entering an open guilty plea 

would have been more favorable to him than continuing with the plea agreement. 

 2. Mr. Orozco has failed to establish prejudice. 

 Under the plea agreement, Mr. Orozco faced a sentence of 63 to 78 months. 

He was sentenced to 72 months. Without the plea agreement, he would have faced a 

sentence of 77 to 96 months. So to satisfy the more-favorable-result requirement, he 

must show a reasonable probability that the district court would have departed or 

varied downward had he entered an open plea. As stated above, “[a] reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In determining whether he made this showing, we 

consider all the circumstances of the case. Id. at 695. And we recognize that the 

evaluation “should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, 

conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision” and 

“should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as 

unusual propensities toward harshness or leniency.” Id. 

 But Mr. Orozco discusses his various grounds for a downward departure or 

variance only with regard to whether he would have entered an open plea, how the 

district court erred in considering its own subjective views, and how the arguments 

would have altered his decision-making. He does not argue how these grounds 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 16
17 

establish a reasonable probability that he would have received a lower sentence had 

he entered an open plea. His failure to adequately address this issue in his opening 

brief results in a waiver on appeal. See Baca v. Berry, 806 F.3d 1262, 1276 

(10th Cir. 2015). 

 Even if Mr. Orozco had adequately briefed this issue, however, we would 

conclude that he did not establish prejudice. He identifies the following grounds for 

a downward departure or variance: (1) the “outsized impact” a 17-year-old prior 

conviction had on the offense level and criminal-history category, Opening Br. at 

58-59; (2) his nonviolent criminal history, which distinguishes him from others in 

criminal-history category VI; (3) the unfairness of adding points for committing the 

instant offense while under supervised release from the prior conviction, because 

after his sentencing the relevant Guideline was amended to suggest that a defendant 

subject to deportation not be sentenced to supervised release; and (4) his 

imperfect-duress defense. 

 With respect to the first two grounds, we agree with the district court that “the 

totality of Mr. Orozco-Sanchez’s criminal history,” particularly his repeated illegal 

entries into the United States, would “weigh[] against granting a significant departure 

or variance.” R. at 634. Notwithstanding their nonviolent nature, Mr. Orozco’s 

violations were numerous: in addition to the 17-year-old 1998 conviction for alien 

smuggling, he accrued convictions for illegal reentry in 2000, 2005, and 2011. Of 

particular importance, the sentence in his 2011 case was 63 months, and that was not 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 17
18 

sufficient to deter him from illegally reentering two weeks after he was released from 

prison in 2015. 

 We also strongly doubt that the supervised-release argument would have been 

persuasive at sentencing. As Mr. Orozco acknowledges, the Guideline was amended 

after he was sentenced. Thus, he had been properly subjected to a term of supervised 

release, which he did in fact violate. 

 And finally, we agree with the district court that there is no reasonable 

probability that the imperfect-duress defense would have resulted in a sentence lower 

than the 72 months Mr. Orozco received. The defense was implausible (he asserted 

in 2011 as an excuse for his reentry that drug cartels wanted to kill him, and in 1998 

he gave the excuse that he was forced at knifepoint to transport aliens). And it was 

contradicted by Mr. Orozco’s admission under oath that he had knowingly and 

voluntarily reentered the United States. 

 We therefore affirm the denial of relief on this ineffective-assistance claim. 

II. Counsel’s Failure to Pursue an Appeal 

 Mr. Orozco further alleges that Ms. Strickland was ineffective (1) in failing to 

fulfill Mr. Orozco’s request to appeal, and (2) in failing to consult with him about an 

appeal. 

A. Failure to File an Appeal 

 If Ms. Strickland heard Mr. Orozco’s request for an appeal, it would be 

professionally unreasonable for her not to file a notice of appeal. See Garza, 

139 S. Ct. at 746; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. The district court, however, made 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 18
19 

a factual finding that Mr. Orozco did not adequately communicate a request for an 

appeal. That finding is reviewable only for clear error, see Orange, 447 F.3d at 796, 

and “[a] district court’s factual finding is clear error only if it is simply not plausible 

or permissible in light of the entire record on appeal,” United States v. Gould, 

672 F.3d 930, 935 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 During the hearing, Mr. Orozco acknowledged that Ms. Strickland might not 

have heard him ask about an appeal, as she was taking off his interpreter headphones. 

Further, he testified that he made no effort to communicate with her after the 

sentencing. In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude the district court clearly 

erred in finding that Mr. Orozco did not adequately convey a request to appeal to 

Ms. Strickland. Because Mr. Orozco has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by 

Strickland, we affirm the denial of relief on this portion of this claim. 

B. Failure to Consult 

 “Reject[ing] a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the 

defendant regarding an appeal,” Flores-Ortega held that counsel must consult “when 

there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for 

example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this 

particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in 

appealing.” 528 U.S. at 480. “In making this determination, courts must take into 

account all the information counsel knew or should have known.” Id. “Although not 

determinative, a highly relevant factor in this inquiry will be whether the conviction 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 19
20 

follows a trial or a guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of 

potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant 

seeks an end to judicial proceedings.” Id.

 Mr. Orozco argues that a rational defendant would want to appeal based on a 

nonfrivolous issue (here, whether the plea was unknowing and involuntary). The 

district court, however, agreed with the magistrate judge that “the risk of receiving a 

higher sentence [if the plea agreement were overturned on appeal] outweighed the 

slim chance of receiving a more favorable result through resentencing.” R. at 641. 

“Given that the Plea Agreement reduced sentencing exposure, the Court cannot say 

that a rational defendant would have sought to invalidate it on appeal.” Id. 

Given his original understanding that he would serve no more than 37 months, 

Mr. Orozco understandably was unhappy with a 72-month sentence. 

See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480 (“the court must consider such factors as whether 

the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea”). Nevertheless, 

we agree with the district court that he failed to establish that a rational defendant 

would want to appeal in the circumstances of this case. If the plea agreement were 

overturned on appeal and Mr. Orozco permitted to enter an open guilty plea, he 

would almost certainly have received a higher sentence. 

 Mr. Orozco further argues that he reasonably demonstrated to Ms. Strickland 

that he was interested in appealing. The district rejected this premise because 

Mr. Orozco had rejected Ms. Strickland’s offer to try to withdraw the plea, telling her 

that he just wanted to finish the proceedings; his sentence was within the terms of the 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 20
21 

plea agreement, even though it was higher than he originally anticipated; and “he did 

not communicate any desire to appeal his sentence following sentencing so far as 

[Ms.] Strickland knew.” R. at 640. We cannot conclude that any of these factual 

findings is clearly erroneous, and thus we agree with the district court that 

Ms. Strickland did not have a duty to consult on the ground that Mr. Orozco had 

reasonably demonstrated he was interested in appealing. 

 Because Mr. Orozco has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by Strickland, we affirm 

the denial of relief on this portion of this claim. 

CONCLUSION

 We grant Mr. Orozco’s motion for an expedited decision and to withdraw his 

request for oral argument, and we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Orozco’s 

§ 2255 motion. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 19-2009 Document: 010110314967 Date Filed: 03/06/2020 Page: 21