Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07034/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07034-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Matthew T. Reinhard
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Christine A. Tate
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2010 Decided December 17, 2010

No. 09-7034

CHRISTINE A. TATE,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:02-cv-02216)

Jeffrey M. Hahn, appointed by the court, argued the cause

as amicus curiae in support of the appellant. Matthew T.

Reinhard, appointed by the court, was on brief.

Christine A. Tate, pro se, filed a brief.

Sonia Ignatova, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

cause for the appellee. Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General,

District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna

M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, District of Columbia,

were on brief. Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, District of Columbia, entered an appearance.

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2

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and ROGERS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Christine A.

Tate appeals the district court’s summary judgment on each of

her four constitutional and five common-law tort claims arising

from the 2002 impoundment and sale of her automobile by the

District of Columbia (District or D.C.) resulting from her unpaid

traffic fines and related fees. Tate v. District of Columbia, 601

F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2009). For the reasons set out below,

we affirm the judgment on her constitutional claims and remand

her D.C. common law claims, which the district court

mistakenly dismissed as “conceded.”

I.

On March 12, 2002, the D.C. Department of Public Works

(DPW) “booted”1

 Tate’s automobile pursuant to D.C. Code

§ 50-2201.03(k)(1), which then provided that “[a]ny unattended

motor vehicle found parked at any time upon any public

highway of the District of Columbia against which there are 2 or

more outstanding or otherwise unsettled traffic violation notices

or notices of infraction . . . may . . . be . . . immobilized in such

manner as to prevent its operation . . . by the use of a device or

other mechanism which will cause no damage to such vehicle

unless it is moved while such device or mechanism is in place,”

i.e., by a boot. See also D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(d)(1) (“A

person to whom a notice of infraction has been issued must

answer within 30 calendar days of date the notice was issued

1

The “Denver boot” is a large clamp which, when applied to a

wheel, renders a vehicle immobile. It is used by municipalities,

including the District, to make drivers “pay attention to parking

tickets.” Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171, 1172 (7th Cir.

1991).

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. . . .”).2

 Tate does not dispute that as of the booting date she had

outstanding at least three unpaid tickets issued in January 2002,

one on January 10 and two on January 29. See Appellant’s Br.

5.3

 At a March 15, 2002 hearing, a hearing examiner waived the

late penalty for the January 10, 2002 violation, finding

“credible” Tate’s explanation she was not aware of the ticket.

The hearing examiner nonetheless held Tate liable on the

underlying citation and upheld the booting because “[m]ore than

2 tickets relating to the boot remain[ed].” Claytor Decl. Ex. H

(Hr’g R. dated March 2002). DPW towed Tate’s vehicle to its

Addison Road Impound Lot in Maryland on March 26, 2002. 

On April 9, 2002, DPW moved the vehicle to its Blue Plains

Storage Facility for abandoned and junk vehicles (Blue Plains)

in Southwest D.C. because the vehicle had remained unclaimed

for 15 days. 

DPW mailed Tate a written notice on April 12, 2002

advising her that failure to claim her vehicle within 45 days

would constitute a “waiver of all right title, and interest” in the

vehicle and “consent to the sale of the vehicle at public auction.” 

D.C. Opp’n to Pl’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Attach. E, Tate, C.A.

2

The statute has since been amended to require that two or more

tickets be “deemed . . . admitted or . . . sustained after a hearing” in

order to trigger the booting. D.C. Code § 50-2201.03(k)(1) (2010). 

A ticket “shall be deemed admitted” “[i]f a person fails to answer

within 60 days.” D.C. Code § 50-2303.05(d)(2) (2010). 

3

As of March 14, 2002 the D.C. Department of Motor Vehicles

(DMV) records showed Tate had two additional tickets issued in

December 2001. Decl. of DMV Chief Hearing Examiner Cassandra

Claytor (Claytor Decl.) ¶ 8, Tate v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 02-

2216 (filed Apr. 17, 2008). Tate asserts one of these was “not fully

adjudicated” because she was appealing it at the time of the boot and

the other suffered from “issues with regard to the application and

timeliness of application of payment.” Appellant’s Br. 5. 

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No. 02-2216 (filed Jan. 23, 2003). Because Tate’s address had

been misentered into the DPW computer records, however, the

notice was mailed to an incorrect address and was returned

undelivered. Id. Attach. I. 

On April 19, 2002, Tate went to Blue Plains and retrieved

a suitcase from her vehicle. According to DPW, Tate “would

have been informed of th[e] date [of the auction] when she

visited the Lot,” Decl. of DPW Parking Services

Administration’s Abandoned Vehicle Operations Program

Manager Cynthia Jones ¶ 9, but Tate claimed she did not learn

of the impending auction until “[s]ometime in May 2002” when

she “visited DMV to inquire about the status of the application

of payments for the outstanding tickets and storage fees.” First

Amended Complaint ¶ 14, Tate, C.A. No. 02-2216 (filed July

13, 2004) (Complaint). She then requested an administrative

hearing to stop the sale of her vehicle. 

At the hearing on May 29, 2002, the hearing examiner

dismissed a contested ticket Tate received on November 19,

2001 because it had been tardily entered into the DMV computer

system but, according to the hearing record, upheld “the boot,

tow and storage fees” because Tate still had “two delinquent

remaining” tickets. Claytor Decl. Ex. I, J (Hr’g R. dated May

29, 2002). According to Tate, however, “a stay of the auction

was granted” at the hearing, the hearing examiner waived “some

of the Blue Plains storage fees and other fees levied on [her]

car” and, “[f]ollowing the May 29, 2002 hearing, agents or

employees of the District notified [Tate] that she had until June

7, 2002 to reclaim her vehicle.” Complaint ¶¶ 14-15 (filed July

13, 2004); Pl’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 10, Tate

v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 02-2216 (filed June 30, 2008)

(Second Opposition); Pl’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,

Attach. 1, Ex. K (filed May 19, 2008) (First Opposition)

(9/23/2002 computer screen printout stating: “All Tow &

Storage Fees Release Per HR 778/5/29/02”). She further

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asserted that when she again visited Blue Plains on June 7, 2002,

she was informed her vehicle had been sold at public auction on

June 4, 2002. District records confirm Tate’s vehicle was sold

at auction on that date for $4,000.

On November 12, 2002, Tate filed this action in district

court. Her complaint alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for depriving her of rights guaranteed by the Fourth and

Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution (Counts IIV) and under D.C. law for various common law torts (Counts

VI-X).4

 On February 27, 2009, the district court granted D.C.’s

summary judgment motion on all 9 counts. Tate filed a timely

notice of appeal. 

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Porter

v. Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Summary

judgment is appropriate “ ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (other internal quotation omitted). “In assessing

whether a genuine issue exists, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). Applying this standard to each of Tate’s claims, we

conclude the District was entitled to summary judgment on each

of the four section 1983 counts. The five pendent counts under

D.C. law should be remanded for further consideration. 

A. Section 1983 Claims

Tate contends that the District’s actions in booting,

impounding and selling her vehicle deprived her of her rights

under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Takings

4

The complaint contains no Count V.

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Clause and Equal Protection guarantee and the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizure. We

address each in turn. 

We first consider Tate’s due process claim. See U.S. Const.

amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person ]be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law . . . .”). Tate asserts the

District deprived her of property—her vehicle—without due

process of law because, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to her, the District told her it would auction the vehicle

on June 7, 2002 but in fact did so on June 4, 2002 and, further,

the District auctioned the vehicle without the requisite 45-day

notice to her of the sale. See D.C. Code § 50-2623(a) (2001)

(“If an abandoned vehicle has not been reclaimed, the

Abandoned and Junk Vehicle Division shall sell the vehicle at

public auction.”); id. § 50-2602(6)(E) (2001) (“[T]he term

‘[a]bandoned vehicle’ means any motor vehicle . . . [t]hat has

remained unclaimed for 45 days after proper notice.”). That the

District may have misstated the auction date or violated its own

statutory notice requirement does not mean that it deprived Tate

of the process due under the Fifth Amendment. “[T]he fact of

a state law violation does not resolve whether a plaintiff has

been deprived of due process.” Barwood, Inc. v. District of

Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Comm.

of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,

944 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). “The fundamental requirement of due

process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552

(1965)). Tate had meaningful notice of her infractions and a

series of hearings to contest them, culminating in the hearing on

May 29, 2002, which she requested for the specific purpose of

challenging the sale of her vehicle at auction. If the District

subsequently sold it prematurely, that fact may well give rise to

a common law tort under D.C. law but it did not deprive her of

the only process due—namely, timely notice and a hearing. 

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Tate does not challenge the adequacy of the administrative

hearings themselves. Moreover, she offers no competent

evidence that the hearing officer or any other District employee

told her the June 4, 2002 sale was stayed but relies solely on the

allegations of her complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (2008)

(“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and

supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations

or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must—by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set out specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party

does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate,

be entered against that party.”); Bush v. District of Columbia,

595 F.3d 384, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“In opposing the District’s

motion, plaintiffs relied upon several paragraphs in their second

amended complaint. This of course did not satisfy their burden.

Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure barred them

from resting upon ‘mere allegations.’ ”) (quoting pre-2007

amendments version of rule).5

Nor did the impoundment and subsequent sale of Tate’s

booted vehicle constitute a taking for a public use for which she

was entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s

Takings Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private

property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).

In Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996), the United

States Supreme Court rejected a similar Takings Clause

argument advanced by a spouse whose interest in a jointly

owned automobile was forfeited pursuant to a state indecency

statute after her husband engaged in sexual activity with a

prostitute inside the vehicle. After first determining the

forfeiture did not violate the wife’s Fourteenth Amendment due

process right, the Court explained: 

5

The district court expressly advised Tate of her evidentiary

burden. See Order, Tate, C.A. No. 02-2216 (filed Apr. 25, 2008).

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[I]f the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not

violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the

automobile was transferred by virtue of that proceeding

from petitioner to the State. The government may not

be required to compensate an owner for property which

it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of

governmental authority other than the power of

eminent domain.

Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452. The Court concluded that cases

authorizing such forfeitures were “ ‘too firmly fixed in the

punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now

displaced.’ ” Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith,

Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)). Here

too, if the District’s impoundment of Tate’s vehicle did not

deprive her of due process—and we have already concluded it

did not—then there was no unlawful taking and no

compensation is due for the lawful taking that did occur, which,

as in Bennis, was effected through “the exercise of governmental

authority other than the power of eminent domain.” The

District’s practice of auctioning a vehicle when tickets go

unpaid is the culmination of a sort of graduated forfeiture

process. Under the statutory process as in effect in 2001-02

when Tate received the tickets at issue, a car is first ticketed for

a parking or traffic infraction, then if the ticket goes unpaid for

30 days, the vehicle may be booted or towed to an impound lot,

and, if unclaimed after 45 days, it may be declared abandoned

and sold at auction. D.C. Code § 50-2201.03(k)(1) (2001); id.

§ 50-2302.05(d)(1) (2001); id. § 50-2623(a) (2001); id.

§ 50-2602(6)(E) (2001). This procedure—which both deters

drivers from committing traffic and parking infractions in the

first instance and induces delinquents to pay penalties once

incurred—is, like the Bennis forfeiture process, “firmly fixed in

the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country.” We

therefore conclude the practice does not constitute a taking

without compensation violative of the Fifth Amendment.

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Third, we consider and reject Tate’s Fifth Amendment

equal protection argument. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.

497, 499-500 (1954) (finding equal protection component to

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause notwithstanding

absence of express equal protection guarantee). Tate contends

the District violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection

guarantee in two respects. She first claims she was singled out

for harsh treatment because of her complaints to and about the

D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. But she has not

identified any similarly situated person (with a comparable

ticket record) who was treated differently. See Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (recognizing

that “successful equal protection claims [may be] brought by a

‘class of one’ ” but only “where the plaintiff alleges that she has

been intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment”). 

Tate also claims she was treated differently from other

offenders who benefitted from a ticket amnesty program

enacted by the D.C. City Council in 2002 for tickets issued

before January 1, 1997. See Motor Vehicle Registration and

Operator’s Permit Issuance Enhancement Emergency

Amendment Act of 2002 (amending D.C. Code § 50-1501.02

to forgive pre-January 1, 1997 tickets and allow offenders to

obtain registration certificate or license tag notwithstanding

outstanding ticket fines). Because the date-based classification

in the statute “neither involv[es] fundamental rights nor

proceed[s] along suspect lines,” rational basis review applies.

Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)

(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)). “The

government, ‘moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence

to sustain the rationality of a [regulatory] classification’ ”;

instead, the classification “ ‘is accorded a strong presumption of

validity,’ ” and “ ‘[t]he burden is on the one attacking the

[governmental] arrangement to negative every conceivable basis

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which might support it,’ whether or not the basis has a

foundation in the record.’ ” Id. (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-

21) (internal citations omitted). Tate has not carried her heavy

burden. We upheld a similar date-based classification in Luck

v. D.C. Parole Bd., 996 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1993). There,

we found no equal protection violation in D.C. legislation that

allowed time on parole to be credited as time served but only for

parole time occurring after the legislation’s effective date.

Observing that “[i]n its efforts to reduce prison overcrowding,

the District of Columbia could properly draw a line at some

point in the process,” we concluded that “the fact the line might

have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for

legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.” Id. 375; see also

U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“The task

of classifying persons for . . . benefits . . . inevitably requires

that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to

favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and

the fact the line might have been drawn differently at some

points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,

consideration.”) (internal quotation omitted). So too, in

reducing the ticket backlog and the number of unregistered or

unlicensed vehicles on its streets, the District was entitled to

draw the eligibility line somewhere or incur a substantial loss of

revenue. Tate has not offered any reason to believe that the line

drawn (at five years) was “irrational.” See Luck, 996 F.2d at

374.

Finally, Tate argues the booting, towing and sale of her

vehicle constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

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violated . . . .”). We reject her Fourth Amendment challenge for

the following reasons.6

 

First, Tate asserts there are genuine issues of disputed fact

precluding the district court’s determination that the warrantless

seizure of Tate’s vehicle was reasonable.7 We disagree. As we

have explained, the District’s statutory impoundment provisions

constitute the equivalent of a graduated forfeiture procedure. 

See supra p. 8. Like other forefeiture statutes, the District’s

booting and towing provisions can be effected by the

warrantless seizure of a vehicle subject to impoundment

thereunder.

In Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999), the Supreme Court

upheld the warrantless seizure of an automobile because the

police had probable cause to believe the vehicle was contraband

subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture

6

For our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that booting

constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. But see Grant v. City of

Chicago, 594 F. Supp.1441, 1451 (E.D. Ill. 1984) (concluding

otherwise).

7

Tate objects in particular to the district court’s reliance on the

“community caretaking doctrine,” see 601 F. Supp. 2d at 136 (citing

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976), because when

it was booted and towed, her vehicle “was LEGALLY parked and

NOT impeding traffic or a threat to public safety or convenience.”

Appellant’s Br. 25 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,

369 (1976)) (upper case by Appellant). Tate is correct that booting is

not about caretaking: it “does not promote the flow of traffic.”

Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991).

Rather, as noted earlier, booting and subsequent impoundment, like

other ticketing measures, have a deterrent and remedial purpose—they 

deter and punish delinquent payment of fines. See supra p. 8; Bennis,

516 U.S. at 451-52.

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Act.8

 The Court based its holding on two principles: (1) the

historically rooted “[r]ecognition of the need to seize readily

movable contraband”—a need that is “equally weighty when the

automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the

police seek to secure”—and (2) the “greater latitude” that

“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently accorded law

enforcement officials . . . in exercising their duties in public

places.” 526 U.S. at 565. Other circuits have applied these

principles to uphold the warrantless seizures of contraband

vehicles. See United States v. Gaskins, 364 F.3d. 438, 458-59

(2d Cir. 2004) (upholding warrantless search of vehicle

forfeitable under 21 U.S.C. § 881 because used to carry

contraband); United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 650-51 (6th

Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Alvarez-Tejeda, 491 F.3d

1013, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). We do so here as well. On

March 12, 2002, when it booted Tate’s vehicle, DPW had

probable cause to believe that Tate’s vehicle was subject to

booting and/or towing under D.C. Code §§ 50-2201.03(k)(1) and

50-2302.05(d)(1) (2001) because there were then at least two

tickets (issued January 29, 2002) that had been outstanding for

more than 30 days and remained unpaid or otherwise resolved.

Although these cases involved a criminal prosecution following

8

When White was decided, the Florida Act’s forfeiture provision

stated: “Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other

personal property, or real property used in violation of any provision

of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of

which any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has

taken or is taking place, may be seized and shall be forfeited.” Fla.

Stat. § 932.703(1)(a) (1997). The Act defined “contraband” to include

any “vehicle of any kind, . . . which was used . . . as an instrumentality

in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of,

any felony.” Id. § 932.701(2)(a)(5). Before White’s vehicle was

seized, police observed him using it to deliver cocaine on three

occasions, giving the police probable cause to believe it was

contraband under the Act. White, 526 U.S. at 561-62.

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the arrest of the owner or occupant of the vehicle, their reasoning

applies to the District’s progressive forefeiture regime. Although

a parking violation is a civil infraction, D.C. Code § 50-2301.01,

the auction sale for delayed payment is comparable to a

forfeiture that occurs as a result of a criminal and to a forfeiture 

under the Internal Revenue Code. See C.I.R. v. Shapiro, 424

U.S. 614, 616-17 (1976); c.f. United States v. James Daniel

Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 60-61 (1993 (citing cases).

Next, Tate makes both a “facial” and an “as applied”

argument that auctioning a vehicle is a disproportionate response

to two outstanding tickets. Appellant’s Br. 28-29. This

challenge does not make out a claim under the Fourth

Amendment which by its plain terms applies to “unreasonable

. . . seizures.” The sale itself was not a “seizure” of Tate’s

vehicle which was already in the District’s lawful possession and

control. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)

(“From the time of the founding to the present, the word

‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking possession.’ ” (citing 2 N. Webster,

An American Dictionary of the English Language 67 (1828); 2

J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 510 (6th ed. 1856); Webster's

Third New International Dictionary 2057 (1981)). The sale of

the vehicle is properly subject to constitutional challenge, if at

all, under the Fifth Amendment as an unlawful taking or a

violation of due process and we have already rejected Tate’s

challenges on these grounds. 

B. Common Law Claims

Tate’s complaint also alleges causes of action under D.C.

law for conversion, promissory estoppel, negligent

misrepresentation, unjust enrichment and intentional and reckless

infliction of emotional distress. Tate contends the district court

erred when it dismissed these claims as “conceded” on the

ground Tate had “not addressed in her opposition brief the

defendant’s valid arguments against her common law claims.”

601 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (citing Local Civil Rule (LCvR) 7(b) (if

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party fails to file timely “memorandum of points and authorities

in opposition to [a] motion,” “Court may treat the motion as

conceded”). We agree. 

Tate filed two pleadings opposing the District’s summary

judgment motion, the First Opposition on May 19, 2008 and the

Second Opposition on June 30, 2008. Our review of pleadings

drafted by a pro se plaintiff like Tate is “subject to ‘less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ” Gray v.

Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Under this standard, we find

Tate’s First Opposition did indeed “address” the District’s

arguments on the common law claims, albeit without specifically

mentioning the claims. In her First Opposition, Tate asserted

that, at the May 29, 2002 hearing, the Blue Plains towing and

storage fees were waived and she was led to believe “the sale of

her car had been stopped,” First Opposition at 5, 6, 8, and she

argued in particular that the District sold her vehicle “for

thousands of dollars and . . . kept all of the proceeds from the

sale,” id. at 8. These factual allegations, if proved, contradict the

District’s defense that the June 4, 2002 sale complied with

District law and that Tate had notice of the sale date, thereby

bolstering her common law claims for conversion, promissory

estoppel, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment and infliction of

emotional distress. Moreover, in her Second Opposition, Tate

made it clear she opposed the District’s arguments on the

common law, as well as the federal, claims. See Second

Opposition at 1 (“The District of Columbia . . . violated

Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,

common law and District of Columbia Code.”). We therefore

conclude that the district court erroneously failed to consider the

merits of Tate’s arguments regarding her common law claims.

See Malik v. District of Columbia, 574 F.3d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir.

2009). Accordingly, we remand Tate’s five state law causes of

action to the district court. On remand, the court is free to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the common

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law claims inasmuch as we have upheld its summary judgment

grant on all of the claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l., 409 F.3d

414, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

summary judgment grant to the District on Counts I-IV of the

First Amended Complaint and remand Counts VI-X for the

district court to determine in its discretion whether to decide

their merits or to dismiss them without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

So ordered.

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