Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01646/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01646-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Bakker
Appellant
Eagle Technology
Appellant
Expander Americas
Appellee
Expander System Global
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1646

___________________________

Eagle Technology; William Bakker

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Expander Americas, Inc.; Expander System Global, AB

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: January 14, 2015

 Filed: April 22, 2015

____________

Before SMITH, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Eagle Technology, Inc. ("Eagle") and its sole owner, Willem F. Bakker,

brought suit against Expander Americas, Inc. ("Expander Americas") and its parent

company, Expander System Global, AB ("Expander Global"), after each company

terminated contracts with Eagle and Bakker respectively. As to Expander Global, the

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district court concluded that it could not assert personal jurisdiction because 1

Expander Global is a Swedish corporation without sufficient contacts with the State

of Missouri. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Expander Americas on

the remaining contract claims based on the statute of frauds. Eagle and Bakker appeal

both rulings. We affirm.

I. Background

Expander Global conducts no business and functions merely as a holding

company for its wholly owned subsidiary, Expander SystemSweden, AB ("Expander

Sweden"), another Swedish corporation. Expander Sweden, in turn, wholly owns

Expander Americas as its subsidiary. As their names suggest, Expander Sweden and

Expander Americas primarily conduct their businessin Europe and the United States

respectively, manufacturing industrial pins used in heavy machinery.

On February 18, 2010, Eagle entered into an Independent Contractor

Agreement (the "Agreement") with Expander Americas to provide consulting

services. The Agreement contained the following relevant provisions:

4. Term and Termination

A. The Term of this Agreement shall begin this 1st day of January,

2010, and shall continue for a period of one (1) year; thereafter,

this Agreement shall be automatically renewed for successive

periods of one (1) year each, unless terminated as provided

herein. 

B. Either party may terminate this Agreement at any time by mutual

agreement of the parties hereto or providing the other party with

ninety (90) days prior written notice . . . .

The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Missouri. 

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* * *

13. Governing Law. The construction and interpretation of this Agreement

shall at all times and in all respects be governed by the laws of the State

of Arizona.

* * *

15. Miscellaneous. No amendment or modification of this Agreement shall

be effective unless executed in writing by the parties hereto. . . . This

Agreement constitutes the entire agreement ofthe parties and isintended

as a complete agreement of the promises, representations, negotiations,

discussions, and agreements that may have been made in connection

with the subject matter hereof, and supersedes any prior oral or written

agreement. . . .

A document entitled Exhibit A was attached to the Agreement. It provided that

Expander Americas would compensate Bakker at a rate of $4,583.33 per month. 

These consulting services soon increased, and Expander Americas requested

that Eagle become its Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Financial Officer

(CFO) in March 2010. On May 10, 2010, Bakker sent an email to Expander

Americas's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Ron Randen, negotiating modifications

to the existing Agreement in light of Eagle's new position. In pertinent part, Bakker's

email stated "[a]ttached the first draft of half of the Plan. . . . Resume and Exhibit B

of our service agreement to continue the dialogue on me joining Expander fulltime."

Exhibit B stated that it "replace[d] Exhibit A" and would become effective on

"6/1/2010."

Also, as part of the new arrangement, Exhibit B provided that Expander

Americas was to raise Eagle's compensation rate to $7,500 per month. Exhibit B also

stated that "[t]he term of this agreement is 24 months (5/31/2012)." Randen

responded the next day, asking if Bakker could "focus more on CFO and CIO

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functions and activities in the 'Professional Experience'? All is good but this focus

will help with the board for global responsibilities." Randen's electronic signature,

which included his title as CEO of Expander Americas, ended the email. Bakker

concedes that the parties never executed Exhibit B. Randen later admitted in a

deposition, however, that he believed that ExhibitB became operational and replaced

Exhibit A's terms. Further, Expander Americas paid Eagle $7,500 every month

pursuant to Exhibit B until the contract was terminated. 

The Agreement soon led to a relationship between Expander Global—parent

of Expander America—and Bakker. In November 2010, after working together for

several months, Expander Global's CEO, Roger Svensson, sent an email to all

employees of the Expander companies announcing that Bakker had been appointed

as Expander Global's CIO and CFO. There was never any written employment

agreement memorializing this relationship. Bakker performed several of his duties

from his home near St. Louis, Missouri. These duties included acting as a manager

on projects to improve the financial and information technology systems of the

Expander companies and serving as the secretary of the Expander Global Board of

Directors and the Expander executive team. As to contacts between the foreign

companies and the State of Missouri, Bakker specifically contends that he attended

a planning meeting in St. Louis with representatives fromboth Expander Sweden and

Expander Americas. He also assertsthat he participated in telephone conference calls

and had several hundred contacts via phone and email with employees of the

Expander companies and outside consultants. 

On June 19, 2011, Expander Global terminated Bakker from his position as

CIO and CFO. Less than a week later, Expander Americas also terminated its

agreement with Eagle in writing. The termination letter, signed by Randen, stated that

Bakker had "indicated that if [he] did not receive higher compensation from

Expander, [he] would go elsewhere and no longer provide the services as set forth in

[the Agreement]." Based upon "an email from Roger Svensson to [Bakker],

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confirming that there would not be an increase in compensation[] . . . [Expander

Americas] . . . decided to accept [Bakker's] decision to terminate the agreement

between [the] companies." The next month, in July 2011, Randen himself was let go

from his CEO position at Expander Americas. 

Eagle then filed the instant suit against Expander Americas seeking damages

alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel; Bakker filed suit against

Expander Global for quantummeruit. The district court dismissed the quantummeruit

action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of

personal jurisdiction. Expander Global argued that it did not have the requisite

minimum contacts with Missouri to be subject to the Missouri Long-Arm Statute or

to satisfy due process. While Bakker had alleged various facts in his complaint, such

as Expander Global sending employees to Missouri, the district court found that

Bakker had not met his burden of rebutting Expander Global's claims by "'proving

facts supporting personal jurisdiction'" with "'affidavits and exhibits presented with

the motions and in opposition thereto.'" (Quoting Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers

Int'l, Inc., 607 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2010).) Withoutsuch evidence, the court found

that it could not assert personal jurisdiction over Expander Global because it did not

have any contacts with Missouri. "It was not licensed to do businessin the state; it did

not advertise within the state; it did not send employees to the state; no money was

received or sent to the state; it quite frankly had no presence within the State of

Missouri."

The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Expander

Americas on the remaining claims. Following the parties' choice-of-law provision in

the Agreement, the court analyzed whether Exhibit B satisfied the Arizona statute of

frauds. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the statute of frauds applied

under Arizona case law because Exhibit B's 24-month term meant that this contract

modification could not be performed within one year. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-101.5.

In doing so, the court rejected Eagle's only argument on this matter—that Randen's

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deposition admission should be treated as a judicial admission to prove there was a

contract and that consequently, the statute offraudsshould not apply because Randen

admitted that Exhibit B constituted an operative modification to the Agreement. The

court rejected this argument pursuant to Arizona law because only attorneys or parties

can make such judicial admissions. At the time of Randen's deposition, he was no

longer an employee of Expander Americas, and thus, he was never a party in the

litigation. As a result, the court found Exhibit B was covered by the statute of frauds.

Next, the court found that Exhibit B did not satisfy the statute of frauds's writing

requirement because Expander Americas, as party to be charged, did not sign the

document. The court rejected Eagle's argument that Randen's electronic signature on

his responding email constituted the necessary execution of Exhibit B, which was

attached to Bakker's email. To the contrary, the district court found that the email

exchange showed that Randen and Bakker were still in negotiation and that Exhibit

B had yet to be accepted by the parties. 

II. Discussion

On appeal, Eagle and Bakker argue that the district court erred by finding it

could not assert personal jurisdiction over Expander Global and by granting summary

judgment in favor of Expander Americas on the remaining claims. 

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over Expander Global

We review a district court's decision finding lack of personal jurisdiction de

novo. Romak USA, Inc. v. Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004). "We approach our

analysis of personal jurisdiction on two levels, first examining whether the exercise

of jurisdiction is proper under the forum state's long-arm statute. If the activities of

the non-resident defendantsatisfy the statute'srequirements, we then address whether

the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process." Dakota Indus., Inc.

v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations

omitted); see also Romak, 384 F.3d at 984. Relevant to this appeal, the Missouri long-

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arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over parties who transact business and

make contracts within Missouri. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 506.500(1)–(2). 

"Because 'the Missouri long-arm statute authorizesthe exercise of jurisdiction

over non-residents to the extent permissible under the due process clause, we turn

immediately to the question whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would

violate the due process clause.'" Romak, 384 F.3d at 984 (quoting Porter v. Berall,

293 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2002)). We employ a five-factor test to determine

whether asserting personal jurisdiction over a party comports with due process: "(1)

the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of those

contacts; (3) the relationship of those contacts with the cause of action; (4) Missouri's

interest in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience or

inconvenience to the parties." Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 911 (8th

Cir. 2012). 

Expander Global argues that it lacks the requisite contacts with Missouri to

fulfill factors (1)–(3). It contends that its only contact with the state of Missouri is its

business relationship with Bakker; it argues thatsuch a relationship, on its own, fails

to justify imposing personal jurisdiction. We agree. In Scullin Steel Co. v. National

Railway Utilization Corp., we affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action for

lack of jurisdiction over a South Carolina corporation even though the corporation

contracted with a St. Louis factory to manufacture products in Missouri, delivered

products to the St. Louis factory, and sent payment for services to the factory. 676

F.2d 309, 313–14 (8th Cir. 1982). Like the present case, the non-resident corporation

in Scullin Steel was "not authorized to do business in Missouri, [had] no office . . . in

Missouri, own[ed] no real property in Missouri, and [had] no agent for service of

process or for any other purpose in Missouri." Id. at 310; see also Austad Co. v.

Pennie &Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226–27 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that South Dakota

courts could not assert personal jurisdiction over a New York law firm that did not

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have any employees that resided in South Dakota or were licenced to practice law in

South Dakota, did not advertise there, and did not actively seek out clients there). 

Bakker points to the daily emails, phone calls, and other communications that

he had with personnel from all Expander companies that were directed to his

residence in Missouri to argue that Expander Global did have minimumcontacts with

the state. This argument is unavailing because telephone calls, written

communications, and even wire-transfers to and from a forum state do not create

sufficient contacts to comport with due process such that a foreign corporation could

"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst

St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation

omitted); see also Porter, 293 F.3d at 1076 ("Contact by phone or mail isinsufficient

to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction under the due process clause." (citation

omitted)); Burlington Indus. v. Maples Indus., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1996)

(holding that 100 telephone calls by the defendant to the plaintiff were "insufficient,

alone, to confer personal jurisdiction" (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Bakker has

not carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case that federal courts in

Missouri can assert personal jurisdiction over Expander Global. 

B. Exhibit B's Enforceability Under the Arizona Statute of Frauds

"We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, affirming if

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer,

742 F.3d 845, 849–50 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted). We give the

non-moving party "the benefit of all reasonable inferences supported by the

evidence," but the non-moving party "has the obligation to come forward with

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 850 (quotation

omitted).

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"Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum

state. Under Missouri law, a choice-of-law clause in a contract generally is

enforceable unless application of the agreed-to law is contrary to a fundamental

policy of Missouri." Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quotations and citations omitted). Because the parties contracted to have Arizona law

control, we analyze the Arizona statute of frauds to determine whether Exhibit B

modified the operative terms of the Agreement. 

The Arizona statute of frauds, in relevant part, provides the following:

No action shall be brought in any court in the following cases unless the

promise or agreement upon which the action is brought, or some

memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be

charged, or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized:

* * *

5. Upon an agreement which is not to be performed within one year from the

making thereof.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-101. 

Eagle first argues that the statute of frauds should not apply because the

Agreement's termination provision (paragraph 4.B) created a possibility that the

contract could have been completed in one year. Eagle did not raise this argument

2

before the district court. It is wellsettled that we will not consider an argument raised

for the first time on appeal. See Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558

Ironically, Eagle did not raise its original argument before the district court on 2

appeal: that the statute of frauds does not apply because of the judicial admission

exception. Because Eagle has not raised this argument before this court, we consider

the argument waived.

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F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[F]ailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment

constitutes waiver of that argument."); Smith v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 99 F.3d

1466, 1473 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We will not reverse a grant ofsummary judgment on the

basis of an argument not presented below." (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we

decline to consider Eagle's new argument.3

Eagle next argues that Exhibit B satisfies the writing requirement of the statute

of frauds. Eagle contends that Randen's email, stating that "All is good" and signed

with his electronic signature, is enough to satisfy the writing requirement. Eagle is

correct when asserting that emailsthat contain the material terms of an agreement that

are signed with electronic signaturessimilar to Randen's have been held to satisfy the

statute of frauds. In such cases, however, the statements in the emails were not

ambiguous as to their application to an attached agreement. See, e.g., Cloud Corp. v.

Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 295–96 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that emails with the

sender's name was enough to satisfy the statute of frauds in a UCC case); Lamle v.

Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that an email signature

satisfied the California statute of frauds in an email that only contained the material

terms of a proposed agreement).

In its Reply Brief, Eagle argues that this new argument should be considered 3

on appeal because the district court's reasoning that the statute of frauds

applied—because Exhibit B's 24-month term meant that it could not be performed

within one year—had not been raised by the parties in their motion papers. Upon

review of the record, the Expander defendants argued that the statute of fraudsshould

apply for this very reason in their Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment; Eagle simply chose not to reply to this argument in

its opposition. In any case, if Eagle was truly concerned about having an opportunity

to contest the district court's reasoning, it could have done so in a Rule 59(e) or Rule

60(b) motion to correct what Eagle perceived was a misapplication of the law. Had

it done so, Eagle could have contested the district court'sreasoning and preserved this

argument for appeal.

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This case, however, contains an additional element because Randen's "All is

good" comment is ambiguous as to which of the several documents attached to

Bakker's email he was referring: (1) "the first draft of half of the Plan"; (2) Bakker's

resume; or (3) "Exhibit B of our service agreement to continue the dialogue on me

joining Expander fulltime." (Emphasis added.) Further, Randen's "All is good"

4

statement occurred as he commented on Bakker's resume. Therefore, Randen's

statement does not provide a sufficiently clear declaration of approval of the proposed

agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds. Thus, we find that Randen's "All is good"

statement is ambiguous as to whether it specifically acts as a stamp of approval on

Exhibit B.5

In an attempt to get over this hurdle, Eagle again raises a new argument on

appeal. Eagle argues that Randen's deposition testimony—in which he admitted that

he believed Exhibit B became the operative terms of the Agreement—should be used

to show he had the requisite intent to be bound. Thus, relying on this admission,

Eagle argues that the writing requirement of the statute of frauds is satisfied with his

email and electronic signature block. 

Below, Eagle did not use Randen's deposition testimony to show intent in order

to show that his email satisfies the statute of frauds. Rather, Eagle used Randen's

deposition testimony to seek a judicial admission to show that the statute of frauds

did not apply at all. As noted above, the inquiry into the statute of fraud's application

Bakker's own language showsthat his initial email was not an offer, but rather

4

an invitation to continue negotiations. Thus, Randen's response could not be

considered a binding acceptance because Bakker's email was not a formal offer. 

While it is a general rule that ambiguous language in an agreement should be 5

construed against the drafter and in favor ofthe other party, Mastrobuono v. Shearson

Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1995), Randen's language is not a part of

the agreement at issue; instead, it is a statement that is ambiguous as to whether it

applies to the agreement at issue.

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is a preliminary question that is separate and apart from the inquiry into whether the

statute of frauds has been satisfied. Therefore, Eagle's usage and argument of

Randen's deposition testimony in the court below—to argue the preliminary

application question—is materially different from their usage and argument of

Randen's deposition testimony before this court—to make an "intent to be bound"

argument that the statute of frauds's writing requirement is satisfied. We decline to

consider this new argument not presented to the district court. 

Alternatively, Eagle also argues that Expander America's partial performance

satisfies the writing requirement. Eagle highlights Randen's approval and signatures

on Eagle's invoices that billed for $7,500 every month for nearly a year before the

Agreement was ultimately terminated. Eagle argues that Randen's approval of such

invoices shows intent to be bound by the terms of Exhibit B, which modified the

original payment terms in Exhibit A from $4,583.33 to $7,500 per month. This

argument is unavailing under Arizona law because partial performance can only be

utilized when seeking an equitable remedy. "[W]here a party attempting to enforce

an oral agreement seeks an equitable remedy, such as specific performance, the

equitable doctrines of estoppel and part performance are available to him. Where he

seeks only a legal remedy, such as money damagesfor breach, they are not." William

Henry Brophy Coll. v. Tovar, 619 P.2d 19, 23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); see also

Rudinsky v. Harris, 290 P.3d 1218, 1224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Tovar in

rejecting the plaintiff's argument that partial performance should satisfy the Arizona

statute of frauds). Therefore, Eagle's exclusive request for legal damages forecloses

its partial performance argument. Consequently, Eagle has failed, as a matter of law,

to show that Randen's email and subsequentsigning of checks and invoices in partial

performance satisfies the writing requirement of the statute of frauds. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

______________________________

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