Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01516/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01516-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathleen Allison
Respondent
Theo L. Simmons
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THEO L. SIMMONS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

KATHLEEN ALLISON, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:22-cv-1516 TLN AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Petitioner is a California state prisoner proceeding with an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The action proceeds on the basis of a pro se petition which 

challenges petitioner’s 2019 conviction for four counts of robbery with firearms enhancements. 

ECF No. 1. Respondent has answered. ECF No. 19. Petitioner filed a traverse through counsel. 

ECF No. 23.1

 

BACKGROUND 

I. Proceedings in the Trial Court 

A. Preliminary Proceedings 

Petitioner and co-defendant D.C. were charged in Sacramento County with four counts of 

robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211) arising from two separate robberies of the same pharmacy. Two 

1

 As discussed more fully below, the petition presents an issue that was exhausted on direct 

appeal in state court. Petitioner’s appellate counsel submitted the traverse on his behalf. 

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counts related to a robbery in December 2015, and two counts related to another robbery in 

February 2016. It was further alleged pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d) that petitioner 

personally used a firearm in the first robbery. D.C. ultimately pled guilty, and petitioner went to 

trial. 

B. The Evidence Presented at Trial2

1. Prosecution Case 

a. The First Robbery 

One afternoon in December 2015, petitioner and D.C. entered a pharmacy and jumped 

over the pharmacy counter. Petitioner thrust a gun into the pharmacy technician’s side and 

pushed her around the pharmacy, demanding certain drugs. The gun was silver, appeared to be 

metal, and looked real. Because the technician thought the gun was real, she felt afraid. She gave 

petitioner and D.C. the medicine and they left in a waiting vehicle. 

D.C. told law enforcement that petitioner had used a small, silver semiautomatic handgun 

during the robbery, which the driver of the getaway car had handed to petitioner prior to the 

robbery. Although D.C. did not touch the gun, hear it cocked, or see it loaded, he believed 

defendant’s gun was real based on the size of the gun’s barrel and his familiarity with real 

firearms and BB guns. It appeared to him to be a .25- or .22-caliber handgun. 

While discussing this case on a recorded jail phone call, a visitor asked petitioner if he had 

a gun, and petitioner responded, “Yup.” The detective could not determine from the surveillance 

footage of the robbery whether the gun was real or fake. The pharmacist and pharmacist 

technician said the gun appeared real but could not tell whether it was a real gun or a BB gun. 

b. The Second Robbery 

Two months later, in February 2016, petitioner and D.C. robbed the same pharmacy by 

again jumping over the counter and demanding drugs. Although the other males in their getaway 

car provided defendant and D.C. with a black BB gun prior to the robbery, petitioner and D.C. did 

not use any gun during the crime. The police found their abandoned getaway car with an 

2

 This factual summary is adapted from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, ECF No. 

18-8 at 2-3. 

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imitation firearm or BB gun inside. 

c. Uncharged Robberies 

In the two months after the February robbery, petitioner and D.C. robbed two more 

pharmacies, with a fake gun in the first instance and with no weapon in the second. The police 

apprehended D.C. after their last robbery and he confessed to all four robberies and named 

petitioner as the other individual who committed the December and February robberies. 

2. Defense Case 

Petitioner’s defense was that the gun used in the first robbery was not a firearm as defined 

by Cal. Penal Code § 16520(a). The defense firearms expert testified that it could not be 

determined from the surveillance footage of the first robbery whether the gun was real or was a 

fake gun, such as an airsoft, BB, or pellet gun. 

C. Outcome 

 The jury found petitioner guilty on all counts and found the firearm allegations true. The 

court sentenced petitioner to an aggregate term of 14 years in prison, 

II. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

Petitioner timely appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of 

conviction on February 24, 2021. ECF No. 18-8. The California Supreme Court denied review 

on May 12, 2021. ECF No. 18-10. Petitioner filed no applications for collateral relief in state 

court. 

STANDARDS GOVERNING HABEAS RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), provides in relevant part as follows: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 The statute applies whenever the state court has denied a federal claim on its merits, 

whether or not the state court explained its reasons. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 

(2011). State court rejection of a federal claim will be presumed to have been on the merits 

absent any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. Id. (citing Harris v. Reed, 

489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is unclear whether a 

decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis)). “The presumption 

may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's 

decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100. 

 The phrase “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the “governing legal 

principle or principles” previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Only Supreme Court precedent may constitute “clearly established 

Federal law,” but courts may look to circuit law “to ascertain whether...the particular point in 

issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 

(2013). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the decision 

“contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision “unreasonably applies” federal law “if the state 

court identifies the correct rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to 

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407-08. It is not enough that the state court 

was incorrect in the view of the federal habeas court; the state court decision must be objectively 

unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). 

Review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-181 (2011). The question at this stage is whether the state court 

reasonably applied clearly established federal law to the facts before it. Id. at 181-182. In other 

words, the focus of the § 2254(d) inquiry is “on what a state court knew and did.” Id. at 182. 

Where the state court’s adjudication is set forth in a reasoned opinion, §2254(d)(1) review is 

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confined to “the state court’s actual reasoning” and “actual analysis.” Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 

724, 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). A different rule applies where the state court rejects claims 

summarily, without a reasoned opinion. In Richter, supra, the Supreme Court held that when a 

state court denies a claim on the merits but without a reasoned opinion, the federal habeas court 

must determine what arguments or theories may have supported the state court’s decision, and 

subject those arguments or theories to § 2254(d) scrutiny. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

Petitioner presents a single claim for relief: that his trial lawyer rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser included enhancement of personal 

use of a deadly or dangerous weapon.3

 Petitioner alleges in essence that because the evidence 

was equivocal as to whether the weapon used in the first robbery was a firearm, the jury would 

likely have found only the lesser enhancement to be true. This would have resulted in a lower 

sentence. 

II. The Clearly Established Federal Law 

 To establish a constitutional violation based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 694 (1984). Prejudice means that the error actually had an 

adverse effect on the defense. There must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 693-94. The court need not 

address both prongs of the Strickland test if the petitioner's showing is insufficient as to one 

prong. Id. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. 

//// 

//// 

3

 See Cal. Penal Code § 12022(d). This is a lesser included enhancement of personal use of a 

firearm, § 12022.53(b). 

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III. The State Court’s Ruling 

 This claim was raised on direct appeal. Because the California Supreme Court denied 

discretionary review, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal constitutes the last reasoned 

decision on the merits and is the subject of habeas review in this court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797 (1991); Ortiz v. Yates, 704 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The state appellate court ruled as follows: 

Defendant next argues that his attorney’s failure to request a jury 

instruction on the personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon 

enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)), a lesser included 

enhancement of personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, 

subd. (b)), constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. [Footnote 

omitted.] He contends that defense counsel’s failure to request the 

lesser included enhancement had no rational tactical purpose and 

prejudiced defendant. We disagree. 

“ ‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we 

consider whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and 

whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable 

probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome. [Citations.] A reviewing court will indulge in a 

presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range 

of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions 

can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus 

bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate 

assistance of counsel. [Citations.] If the record on appeal sheds no 

light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner 

challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and 

failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory 

explanation. [Citation.]’ [Citation].” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 

Cal.4th 347, 391.) 

With respect to enhancements, an all-or-nothing choice on 

enhancements as opposed to offenses, does not distort the 

factfinding process, because the jury will only consider the 

enhancement allegations once the defendant is found guilty of the 

underlying offense. (People v Majors, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 410.) 

Thus, there is no risk the jury will convict solely to avoid letting the 

defendant go free. (Ibid.) 

In this case, defendant did not dispute that he had a gun. Rather, he 

argued the People failed to meet their burden to prove the gun was a 

firearm, rather than a BB gun or pellet gun, beyond a reasonable 

doubt. A pellet gun or BB gun is not a firearm, but is a deadly or 

dangerous weapon within the meaning of Penal Code section 

12022, subdivision (b). (People v. Montalvo (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 

790, 797.) Thus, it is possible that counsel made a tactical decision 

to pursue an all-or-nothing” strategy, hoping the jury would find the 

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People failed to prove that the gun was a firearm. Given the choice 

between a one-year enhancement or no enhancement if the People 

did not prove their case, counsel may have reasonably opted for the 

latter. 

Consequently, while defense counsel’s gamble may not have 

ultimately paid off, we cannot find that this approach defies 

satisfactory explanation. 

ECF No. 18-8 at 7-8. 

IV. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d) 

The California Court of Appeal applied the standard required by Strickland, supra, and its 

analysis of the prejudice prong was not objectively unreasonable. As the Supreme Court 

emphasized in Strickland itself, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.” 466 U.S. at 694. 

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 

be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and 

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a 

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; 

that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered 

sound trial strategy.” 

Id. at 694-95 (citation omitted). 

 In his traverse petitioner argues that while an “all or nothing” strategy may be reasonable 

in some cases, it was not reasonable here. ECF No. 23 at 4-6. The undersigned is mindful of the 

fact that the respective punishments for the greater and lesser included enhancements are 

significantly different: ten years for personal use of a firearm, and only one year for personal use 

of a deadly weapon. However, it is not enough in the post-conviction context to argue the merits 

of the choice that counsel did not make. Trial counsel is presumed to have weighed the pros and 

cons attendant to his options. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. In this case, precisely because the 

evidence was equivocal on the question whether the gun was a real firearm, reasonable counsel 

may well have liked the odds of a not true finding on the § 12022.53 allegation. See Butcher v. 

Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1985) (counsel’s strategic choice to forgo a lesser included 

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instruction for voluntary manslaughter was reasonable because there was good cause to believe 

that doing so would be counter-productive). 

Absent facts that rebut Strickland’s presumption of a strategic decision—such as 

affirmative evidence that counsel misunderstood the law, or that there no strategic choice because 

counsel was unaware of the existence of alternatives, see Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d 840, 852 

(2015)4—the appellate court was required to apply that presumption. It is petitioner’s burden to 

rebut the presumption with evidence, Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009), 

and he has not done so. 

Moreover, review of a Strickland claim under the AEDPA requires a double dose of 

deference. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that 

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Under this doubly deferential standard, it 

was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that counsel’s performance fell 

within the “wide range of reasonable performance” that Strickland contemplates, and that the 

challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” See Strickland, 466 at 694-95. 

Relief on this claim is therefore unavailable. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the reasons explained above, the state courts’ denial of petitioner’s claims was not 

objectively unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, IT IS 

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

4

 Crace involved an attorney’s failure to seek instructions on a lesser included substantive offense 

that could have avoided a three-strikes life sentence without the possibility of parole. Counsel 

acknowledged in an affidavit that he had been completely unaware of this option. The ineffective 

assistance claim was reviewed de novo rather than under AEDPA standards, because the 

Washington state court had conducted an objectively unreasonable prejudice analysis. In 

evaluating counsel’s performance, the court relied heavily on the principle, inapplicable here, that 

counsel should be aware of the risk that a jury faced with an all or nothing choice as to conviction

may reach a guilty verdict to avoid letting the defendant go free on what some might consider a 

technicality. Each of these points distinguishes Crace from the case at bar. 

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 19, 2024 

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