Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03874/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03874-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Catherine Lynn Arce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3753

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Bernice Enriquez Luna, *

*

Appellant. *

Appeals from the United States

__________ District Court for the Southern

District of Iowa.

No. 03-3874

__________ 

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Catherine Lynn Arce, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 11, 2004

Filed: May 17, 2004

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Appellate Case: 03-3874 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/17/2004 Entry ID: 1767656 
*

The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

**The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa. 

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Before MURPHY and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,*

 Judge of the United

States Court of International Trade.

___________

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Iowa State troopers saw a Ford Explorer and a motor home traveling together

on Interstate 80. When the Explorer was stopped for speeding, the motor home failed

to move out of the lane next to the stopped vehicles, even though the passing lane was

open. A trooper stopped the motor home. Bernice Enriquez Luna was driving, and

Catherine Lynn Arce was a passenger. The women gave different stories about their

travel plans and the amount of time they had known each other. After issuing Luna

a warning ticket and informing her she was free to leave, the trooper asked Luna to

consent to a search of the motor home. She said, “Okay,” and signed a written

consent to search form. Troopers found methamphetamine in the motor home, and

arrested Luna and Arce. The search of the motor home continued at the Iowa State

Patrol Post. Officers discovered a suspicious panel on the vehicle’s undercarriage,

removed it, and found 954 pounds of marijuana. Luna and Arce made incriminating

statements captured on videotape while the troopers were searching the motor home

by the Interstate, and directly to officers after they found the marijuana. 

The Government charged Luna and Arce with conspiracy to distribute

marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession of

methamphetamine. After the district court** denied their motion to suppress, Luna

and Arce conditionally pleaded guilty. In this consolidated appeal, Luna and Arce

challenge the denial of their motion to suppress. Reviewing the district court’s

Appellate Case: 03-3874 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/17/2004 Entry ID: 1767656 
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factual findings for clear error and reviewing de novo the questions of law regarding

probable cause and reasonable suspicion to stop the motor home, we affirm. See

United States v. Mallari, 334 F.3d 765, 766 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review). 

 Luna and Arce contend the troopers did not have probable cause or a

reasonable suspicion to believe Luna had committed a traffic violation. An officer’s

observation of a traffic violation, however minor, gives the officer probable cause to

stop a vehicle, even if the officer would have ignored the violation but for a suspicion

that greater crimes are afoot. United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir.

2004). Here, a trooper saw the motor home driven by Luna fail to slow down or to

move into the open passing lane when it passed the trooper’s vehicle, which had

stopped the Ford Explorer. The trooper believed the driver of the motor home had

violated Iowa law, and wrote a warning ticket for the violation of Iowa Code §

321.323A (unsafe approach to emergency auto). Section 321.323A requires that

1. The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary authorized

emergency vehicle that is displaying flashing yellow, amber, white, red,

or red and blue lights shall approach the authorized emergency vehicle

with due caution and shall proceed in one of the following manners,

absent any other direction by a peace officer:

a. Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized

emergency vehicle if possible in the existing safety and traffic

conditions.

b. If a lane change under paragraph “a” would be impossible, prohibited

by law, or unsafe, reduce the speed of the motor vehicle to a reasonable

and proper speed for the existing road and traffic conditions, which

speed shall be less than the posted speed limit, and be prepared to stop.

The district court found the trooper had a reasonable basis for believing the

driver of the motor home had violated the statute. It was clear from the trooper’s

videotape that there was no vehicle in the left hand lane, and there was no indication

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that there were any other road or traffic conditions that would have interfered with the

motor home’s ability to make the lane change. We conclude the trooper’s decision

to stop the motor home was reasonable because the circumstances, viewed

objectively, justified the conclusion by a law enforcement officer that a traffic law

had been violated. Mallari, 334 F.3d at 766-67. 

Luna and Arce also assert Luna’s consent to the search was not voluntary and

was tainted by the stop’s illegality. We have already decided the traffic stop was

legal. To determine whether consent to search is voluntary, courts consider the

totality of the circumstances, including characteristics of the accused and details of

the interrogation, to decide whether the consent was the product of a free and

unconstrained choice or the product of duress or coercion, express or implied. See

United States v. Mancias, 350 F.3d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir. 2003). Law enforcement

officers may ask a person for consent to search or other types of cooperation without

violating the Fourth Amendment as long as they do not induce cooperation by

coercive means. United States v. Yang, 345 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he

time it takes for an officer to find out if consent will be given cannot be an unlawful

detention in the absence of coercive or otherwise unusual circumstances.” Id. 

After examining the totality of the circumstances, the district court found Luna

voluntarily consented to the search. The district court observed Luna was a middleaged woman who appeared to be of average or above average intelligence; there was

no indication she was intoxicated or otherwise under the influence of drugs when she

consented to the search; Luna did not assert she was threatened, physically

intimidated, or punished by police; she did not assert she relied on any promises or

misrepresentations by the trooper; she was detained for about twenty-five minutes

after the motor home was stopped before she consented; she was not under arrest or

in custody while the search took place; the search occurred alongside Interstate 80;

and there was no indication Luna voiced any objections to the troopers about the

search as it took place. See Mancias, 350 F.3d at 805 (listing relevant characteristics

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of consenting person and environment in which consent is given). The district court

also observed the questions asked of Luna while she was seated in the patrol vehicle

were reasonable and related to the traffic stop, and the questions about whether she

had any illegal substances in her possession did not create a coercive environment.

See United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir. 2001). Under the

circumstances, we conclude the district court’s finding that Luna’s consent was

voluntary is not clearly erroneous. Martinez, 358 F.3d at 1009. 

We thus affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. 

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