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Parties Involved:
Maurice Leo Stewart
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 16, 2001 Decided May 1, 2001

No. 00-3033

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Maurice Leo Stewart,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00593-03)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Jennifer M. Blunt,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, at the time the brief was filed, John R.

Fisher and Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Maurice Leo Stewart

pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams

of cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii),

846, and conspiring to obtain firearms during and in relation

to a drug trafficking offense, see 18 U.S.C. ss 371, 924(c). In

light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United

States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), Stewart filed a collateral review

motion challenging his conviction on the ground that his

receipt of firearms was not a "use" under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c).

The district court denied Stewart's motion, holding that a

person who receives a gun in exchange for drugs "uses" the

gun within s 924(c)'s meaning. For the reasons set forth

below, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In the Spring of 1991, Maurice Stewart, Richard Shorter,

and Damon Edwards sold crack cocaine to undercover police

officers on a number of occasions. During one of those sales,

Stewart and Shorter asked the officers about their plans for

the weekend. When the officers told the suspects that they

were "running guns," Stewart asked if he "could also get him

an AK-47." One of the officers said that he would have to

check with his cousin, who actually ran the guns.

Several weeks later, during another drug sale, Stewart and

Shorter "again brought up the possible purchase of the guns,"

asking the officers if they could buy two nine-millimeter guns

for $500. Over the next week, the defendants finalized a deal

with the officers. On May 10, Stewart and Shorter accompanied the officers to a house in Northwest Washington, D.C.,

where the officers gave Gary Stewart, another of Maurice

Stewart's co-conspirators, $7,000 in exchange for 250 grams

of crack. At the time, the officers also agreed to give

Maurice Stewart and the others a bag of guns as part of the

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transaction. Maurice Stewart and Shorter then accompanied

the officers to another location, where the officers gave the

guns to Stewart. Immediately, Stewart and Shorter were

arrested. See United States v. (Gary) Stewart, 104 F.3d

1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

After a grand jury issued a seventeen count indictment

against Stewart and his three co-conspirators, Stewart pleaded guilty to two counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute fifty or

more grams of cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1),

841(b)(a)(A)(iii), 846, and (2) conspiracy to obtain one or more

firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,

see 18 U.S.C. ss 371, 924(c). The district court sentenced

Stewart to 188 months imprisonment on the first count and 60

months imprisonment on the second count. The court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently and

followed by five years of supervised release. On direct

appeal, this Court affirmed Stewart's sentence. See United

States v. (Maurice) Stewart, 36 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(unpublished table decision).

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United

States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), Stewart filed a collateral review

motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 challenging his conviction on

the ground that his passive receipt of the guns was not a

"use" under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c). The district court denied

this motion, holding that "selling drugs in exchange for guns

clearly constitutes 'use' within the meaning of s 924(c)."

United States v. Stewart, Crim. No. 91-593, mem. at 4

(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2000). Stewart appeals from that decision.

II. ANALYSIS

By failing to challenge the validity of his plea in his direct

appeal, Stewart procedurally defaulted the claim he now

makes. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622

(1998). Stewart can raise his claim on collateral review only

if he "can first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice

or that he is actually innocent." Id. (citations and internal

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quotations omitted).1 We begin by noting that the district

court did not consider whether Stewart's procedural default

could be excused. Rather, it held that Stewart was not

entitled to relief because his claim was "meritless." Stewart,

mem. at 3. We therefore limit our review to the legal

question presented in Stewart's habeas corpus motion, setting

aside the questions of whether his procedural default may be

excused and whether Stewart should ultimately obtain relief.

At the time of Stewart's arrest, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1)

provided: "Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drug

trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in

addition to the punishment provided for such crime ..., be

sentenced to imprisonment for five years." Several months

after Stewart pleaded guilty, this Court issued its decision in

United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per

curiam). The Harris defendants had been convicted of violating s 924(c)(1) by receiving guns in exchange for drugs. The

defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the guns

were not used "in relation to" a drug crime because they were

used as "a medium of exchange in a trade for drugs and not

as offensive or defensive weapons." Id. at 261. We rejected

this argument and held that s 924(c) "requires no more than

that the guns facilitate the predicate offense in some way."

Id. Specifically, we explained that "this requirement is met

'[i]f the firearm is within the possession or control of a person

who commits an underlying crime ..., and the circumstances

of the case show that the firearm facilitated or had a role in

the crime.' " Id. (quoting United States v. (Richard) Stewart,

779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985)). We concluded that "once

the [firearm] passed into appellants' hands the facilitative

nexus was satisfied." Id.

The following year, in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223

(1993), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a defen-

__________

1 Although the motion we review in this case is Stewart's second

motion for collateral review, the limitations established by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-132, s 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220, do not apply because Stewart

filed the present motion two days before the Act's effective date.

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dant who had traded a gun for drugs. Id. at 225. The Smith

Court held that "one who transports, exports, sells, or trades

a firearm 'uses' it" in violation of s 924(c)(1). Id. at 234-35.

In arriving at this holding, the Court described a number of

different "everyday meaning[s]" for "use," including: "to

employ," "to avail oneself of," and "to derive service from."

Id. at 228-29 (internal quotes omitted). In light of these

definitions, the Court explained that the Smith defendant had

used a gun as "an item of barter ... to bring him the very

drugs he sought." Id. at 229. Echoing our decision in

Harris, the Court noted that "the gun at least must 'facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating,' the drug trafficking offense." Id. at 238 (quoting (Richard) Stewart, 779 F.2d

at 540).

Two years later, the Supreme Court issued its Bailey

decision, which "clarif[ied] the meaning of 'use' under

s 924(c)(1)." 516 U.S. at 142. In Bailey, the Court held that

"s 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active

employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that

makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the

predicate offense." Id. at 143. In its discussion, the Court

again emphasized that "use" should be "given its 'ordinary

and natural' meaning." Id. at 145 (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at

228). Distinguishing between the terms "use" and "carry" in

s 924(c)(1), the Court explained that "a firearm can be used

without being carried, e.g., when an offender ... barters with

a firearm without handling it." Id. at 146. The Court

underscored that its decision "is not inconsistent with Smith,"

explicitly recognizing that the "active-employment understanding of 'use' certainly includes ... bartering." Id. at 148.

In Bailey's wake, five of our sister circuits have considered

whether a person who receives a gun in exchange for drugs

"uses" the gun within the meaning of s 924(c). Three of

those circuits have held that a receiving defendant uses the

gun, see United States v. Ramirez-Rangle, 103 F.3d 1501,

1506 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 956

(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1509

(8th Cir. 1996), while two have held that he does not, see

United States v. Warwick, 167 F.3d 965, 975-76 (6th Cir.

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1999); United States v. Westmoreland, 122 F.3d 431, 435 (7th

Cir. 1997).

Consistent with the "ordinary meaning" approach employed

by the Supreme Court in Smith and Bailey, we cannot see

how a defendant "uses" a gun when he receives it during a

drug transaction. The recipient has not employed the gun,

availed himself of the gun, or derived any service from the

gun by simply trading his drugs for it. Cf. Smith, 508 U.S. at

229. Indeed, nothing in a person's acceptance of a gun

embodies the active employment demanded by the Court in

Bailey. See 516 U.S. at 142. We therefore agree with the

Sixth and Seventh Circuits that a person who receives a gun

in a trade for drugs has not used the gun in violation of

s 924(c).

As the Seventh Circuit succinctly stated in United States v.

Westmoreland, "there is no grammatically correct way to

express that a person receiving a payment is thereby 'using'

the payment." 122 F.3d at 435. Quite simply, a "seller does

not 'use' a buyer's consideration." Id. at 436. For example,

when a person pays a cashier a dollar for a cup of coffee in

the courthouse cafeteria, the customer has not used the

coffee. He has only used the dollar bill. We see no difference when a person pays for a gun with drugs.

In response to Stewart's motion, the Government contends

that Harris is still the law of this Circuit. This contention is

based on the Supreme Court's statement that our Harris

decision came to the "same conclusion" as the Eleventh

Circuit decision the Court affirmed in Smith. 508 U.S. at

227. While the Government's suggestion may be alluring, the

interpretation of "use" we employed in Harris does not

survive after Bailey.

In making this argument, the Government essentially asks

us to interpret Smith more broadly than the Court itself did

in Bailey. The Bailey Court carefully noted that its holding

was "not inconsistent" with the interpretation it announced in

Smith. 516 U.S. at 148. The Court, however, explained that

the Smith decision addressed only "whether that particular

use (bartering) came within the meaning of s 924(c)(1)." Id.

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(emphasis added). Indeed, the Smith Court only "conclude[d] that using a firearm in a guns-for-drugs trade may

constitute 'us[ing] a firearm' within the meaning of

s 924(c)(1)." 508 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added). The Bailey

Court explained that this conclusion "adhered to an active

meaning" of the word "use" because "it was clear that the

defendant had 'used' the gun." 516 U.S. at 148. In fact, the

Smith Court made clear that the defendant had " 'used' his

MAC-10 in an attempt to obtain drugs by offering to trade it

for cocaine." 508 U.S. at 228. There is no similar way to say

that the recipient of a gun has "used" the gun when he offers

to trade his drugs for it. Neither Smith nor Bailey concluded that receiving a firearm in a drugs-for-guns trade constitutes using a firearm. In this case, Stewart bartered for a

firearm, he did not barter with a firearm like the Smith

defendant. See United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 958 (5th

Cir. 1996) (Politz, J., dissenting). Accordingly, neither Bailey

nor Smith foreclose Stewart's claim, and, read together, those

decisions foreclose the possibility that Harris is still viable.

As the Government correctly notes, the Bailey Court did

list "bartering" as an example of an activity that "fall[s]

within 'active employment.' " 516 U.S. at 148. But that

language by the Supreme Court must be taken in context.

The Supreme Court included "bartering" in a list of examples

of active employments that might fall within the s 924(c)(1)

definitions of "use." The Supreme Court did not purport to

be encompassing every possible situation involving barter as a

violation of that statute. Significantly, that discussion followed the Court's analysis of Smith, in which the defendant's

use of a firearm had been the trading of it for drugs. In

context, therefore, the Supreme Court's understanding of

Congress's intent to afford the term "use" its "active connotation," id. at 148, includes situations in which a defendant

barters a firearm in return for drugs. The Supreme Court's

inclusion of the word "bartering" in the list of active uses

implies no more than that. It does not compel a conclusion

that a person who barters drugs to acquire a firearm has

used the firearm, as opposed to using the drugs. As we

explained above, a person who receives a gun has not actively

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employed the gun--that is, he has not "used" it within any

ordinary understanding of the word "use."

The Government next argues that the reasoning in Warwick and Westmoreland is unpersuasive because those cases

presented "very different factual situations" than the one

before us. Appellee's Br. at 17. The Government suggests

that both cases turned on conclusions that the defendants

merely acquiesced to receiving guns as payment for drugs.

See id. (citing Warwick, 167 F.3d at 975-76, and Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 435-36). In contrast, the Government

claims that Stewart initiated and negotiated the exchange of

drugs for guns. We do not understand why this supposed

factual distinction should affect the purely legal question

presented in this case. It does not matter whether a drug

dealer initiates a drugs-for-guns transaction or simply agrees

to (and does) trade drugs for guns in lieu of money (or some

other consideration). Under either scenario, the drug dealer

has not used the gun within the meaning of s 924(c).

In any case, nothing in the record shows that Stewart or

any of his co-conspirators initiated the idea of trading their

drugs for guns. Indeed, the officers first injected guns into

their discussions by stating that they were "running guns."

The record reflects that Stewart wanted to obtain guns, but it

only states that he and his co-conspirators asked to purchase

the guns for money. While the defendants and the officers

discussed "the gun transactions" and "finalized the transaction of guns for drugs," nothing in the record shows that the

defendants asked to trade drugs for the guns. Certainly, the

defendants agreed to such a transaction, but there is no more

evidence that they initiated the exchange of drugs (as opposed to money) for guns than there was in Westmoreland or

Warwick.

Finally, the Government argues that even under the interpretation of "use" we adopt today Stewart's conviction should

be upheld because he pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate

s 924(c)(1). In other words, the Government believes that

Stewart acknowledged he conspired to use a gun in relation

to a later drug trafficking crime. To buttress this belief, the

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Government cites Stewart's plea colloquy, during which the

prosecutor claimed that the Government could have proven

that Stewart "conspired to obtain firearms to use and carry

them during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense."

Yet, the Government proffered no facts to support a conviction on this ground. See In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 771

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the signed plea agreement

does not allude to such a theory. Instead, it merely states

that Stewart engaged in a "Conspiracy to Obtain One or

More Firearms During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking

Crime."

III. CONCLUSION

Although our discussion makes clear that a person who

receives a gun in exchange for drugs is not using the gun

under s 924(c), we must remand this case to the district court

to afford Stewart an opportunity to establish that his procedural default should be excused. As the district court properly recognized, Stewart's default is excused if he can demonstrate cause and prejudice, or his actual innocence. See

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622. " 'Actual innocence' means factual

innocence"; it does not mean "mere legal insufficiency." Id. at

623. Accordingly, to establish actual innocence, Stewart must

demonstrate that " 'in light of all the evidence,' 'it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

him.' " Id. at 623 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-

28 (1995) (internal quotation omitted)).

In Bousely, a case whose procedural posture is substantially similar to the one now before us, the Supreme Court

provided explicit instructions for how a case such as this one

should proceed on remand:

[T]he Government is not limited to the existing record to

rebut any showing that the petitioner might make.

Rather, on remand, the Government should be permitted

to present any admissible evidence of petitioner's guilt

even if that evidence was not presented during petitioner's plea colloquy and would not normally have been

offered before [the Court's] decision in Bailey. In cases

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where the Government has forgone more serious charges

in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of

actual innocence must also extend to those charges.

Id. at 624 (footnote omitted). For the reasons stated above,

the district court's judgment is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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