Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08009/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Alan Carr
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White united states courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, co 80257 

April 19, 1996 

Elisabeth Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 95-8009, USA v. Carr 

Filed March 25, 1996 by Judge Kern, u.s. District Judge 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned decision: 

Page 13, line 12, "cert.denied, 498 u.s. 1122 

(1991))" has been deleted. The complete reference now reads 

"United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 498 u.s. 1122 (1991) (quoting United States v. 

Laycock, 880 F.2d 1184, 1186 (lOth Cir. 1989);". 

Please make this correction to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-8009 Document: 01019284197 Date Filed: 03/25/1996 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

_. i~·ILEv -zuted States Court of A pi)e.aJ_, 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 25 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

r''nrl.( 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 95-8009 

vs. 

WESLEY ALAN CARR, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-46) 

Donald L. Fuller, Krampner & Fuller, Casper, Wyoming, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Patrick J. Crank, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. 

Freudenthal, United States Attorney; David A. Kubichek, Assistant 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and KERN, 

Appellate Case: 95-8009 Document: 01019284197 Date Filed: 03/25/1996 Page: 2 
District Judge.* 

KERN, District Judge. 

Appellant Wesley Alan Carr appeals the District Court's denial 

of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Appellant contends 

that his plea was not voluntary, that he did not receive effective 

assistance of counsel, and that the District Court's denial of his 

withdrawal motion was improper. 

I. FACTS 

On March 24, 1994, a grand jury returned an indictment against 

Appellant Wesley Alan Carr and four codefendants 1 for their alleged 

participation in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana, 

methamphetamine, and cocaine in Colorado and Wyoming. Appellant 

was charged in five counts for his alleged role in heading the 

criminal organization that distributed the drugs. Two of the 

codefendants, Sivertson and Iverson, pleaded guilty and were 

sent.enced in August 1994. To the three remaining defendants, 

• The Honorable Terry C. Kern, United States District Judge 

for :he Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

1 The codefendants were Lance J. Sivertson, Joseph Anthony 

Contreras·, Robert C. Cunningham, and Amy L. Iverson. 

2 

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including Appellant, the government proposed a "package deal" plea 

bargain: in exchange for all three defendants pleading guilty to 

the conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment, 2 Contreras 

would receive a ten-year sentence, Cunningham would receive a fiveyear sentence, and Appellant would receive a twenty-year sentence. 

Both Contreras and Cunningham immediately pleaded guilty. 

Appellant filed a signed plea agreement with the court in 

which he agreed to plead guilty to Count I of the indictment. At 

Appellant's change of plea hearing on June 13, 1994, District Judge 

Brimmer scrupulously administered a Rule 11 protocol, 

Fed.R.Crim.P., which included the following exchanges: 

THE COURT: Have you had a full and ample opportunity to 

discuss these matters with Mr. O'Donnell as 

your court-appointed defense counsel? 

THE DEFENDANT [Appellant]: Yes, I have. 

THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied with the services of 

Mr. O'Donnell? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

Appellant App. Vol. I. at 159-60. 

THE COURT: All right. Now, tell me this: Is this plea of 

guilty a voluntary plea? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 

THE COURT: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Is Mr. O'Donnell forcing you to plead guilty? 

2 Count One of the indictment charged conspiracy to distribute 

and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, 

and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

3 

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THE DEFENDANT: 

THE COURT: 

THE DEFENDANT: 

THE COURT: 

THE DEFENDANT: 

THE COURT: 

No, he's not. 

Is it your own idea? 

Yes. 

Is it a free act on your part? 

Yes, it is. 

Are any circumstances of any kind, economic or 

otherwise, forcing your guilty plea? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, they're not, Your Honor. 

Appellant App. Vol. I at 161. Despite Appellant's apparent desire 

to enter a guilty plea at the June 13th hearing, Judge Brimmer · 

rejected Appellant's plea because of Appellant's reluctance to 

admit to stipulated factual bases for the plea. 

However, upon motion by Appellant to reopen the proceedings, 

the court gave Appellant another chance the following day. This 

time, Appellant was more forthcoming in admitting his involvement 

in a conspiracy to deliver controlled substances, and he executed 

a successful guilty plea to Count One of the indictment. At this 

second hearing, Judge Brimmer again inquired into the voluntariness 

of the plea: 

THE COURT: 

THE DEFENDANT: 

THE COURT: 

THE DEFENDANT: 

THE COURT: 

. You're still guilty today? 

Yes, sir. 

And it is voluntary? 

Yes, sir. 

And nobody has forced you in the meantime to 

plead guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: And you're still pleading guilty because you 

are? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: All right. Court finds that the plea of 

guilty is a voluntary plea and that there is a 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-8009 Document: 01019284197 Date Filed: 03/25/1996 Page: 5 
factual basis for the plea of guilty. 

Appellant App. Vol. I at 175. 

Three months after he entered his guilty plea, Appellant filed 

a motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that it was entered as a 

result of coercion and duress. The alleged sources of this 

coercion and duress were Appellant's own counsel as well as 

codefendants and their counsel. The court denied the motion. 

Appellant later filed another motion to withdraw his plea, 

alleging, in addition to the previous claims, ineffective 

assistance of counsel during his first attempt to withdraw his 

plea. The court denied this motion as well. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Appellant now appeals the District Court's denial of his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant contends that his 

plea was not voluntary, that he did not receive effective 

assistance of counsel, 3 and that the District Court's denial of his 

3 We have recently held that "ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on 

direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal are 

presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed." 

United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (lOth Cir. 1995) (en 

bane). This case involves a direct appeal from the district 

court's refusal to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, 

but it stands in a different posture than most direct appeals. 

5 

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withdrawal motion was improper. 

A. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea 

We review the voluntariness of Appellant 1 s guilty plea de 

novo. United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 523, 529 (lOth Cir. 

19 9 4 ) , a f f 1 d, 116 S . Ct . 3 56 ( 19 9 5 ) . "The longstanding test for 

determining the validity of a guilty plea is 1 whether the plea 

represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 

courses of action open to the defendant. 111 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 

31 (1970)). A guilty plea entered upon the advice of counsel is 

invalid if the plea was coerced, Osborn v. Shillinger, 997 F.2d 

1324, 1327 (lOth Cir. 1993) , or if the advice of defendant 1 s 

counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56; 

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 

Here, defendant based his motion to withdraw his plea in part on an 

allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district 

court held a lengthy hearing on the issue and then made a specific 

finding that defendant's counsel provided effective assistance. 

Thus, our concern in Galloway that " [a] factual record must be 

developed in and addressed by the district court in the first 

instance for effective review," id. at 1240, has been satisfied. 

This case therefore presents one of those rare circumstances in 

which an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim can be assessed on 

direct appeal. 

6 

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Appellant advances several reasons why his guilty plea was not 

voluntary: (1) the structure and application of the plea bargain 

was coercive; (2) Appellant's attorney, codefendants and their 

attorneys coerced Appellant into agreeing to the plea bargain; and 

(3) Appellant's attorney rendered ineffective assistance in the 

context of the plea process. 

1. Structure and Application of Plea Bargain 

Appellant asserts that the "package deal" plea bargain offered 

by the government was inherently coercive. We have recognized 

"that threats to prosecute or promises of leniency to third persons 

to induce guilty pleas can pose a danger of coercion" and therefore 

require special care "to insure that the plea was in fact entered 

voluntarily and was not the product of coercion." Mosier v. 

Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988 

(1986). Moreover, we have noted that "the inclusion of such third 

persons can increase the leverage possessed by prosecutors and 

therefore imposes upon them a high standard of good faith." .l.Q..._ 

(citing United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 

1979)). Nevertheless, we have insisted that an accused's choice be 

respected, and if he "'elects to sacrifice himself for such 

motives, that is his choice.'" Mosier, 790 F.2d at 66 (citing .Ksillt. 

v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798 (1st Cir. 1959)). 

7 

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The package deal in the instant case survives this standard of 

11 special care. 11 In contrast to the instant case, the previously 

cited line of cases involved third persons who had particularly 

close bonds to the accused: either related by marriage or affianced 

to the accused. 4 The record in the instant case does not indicate 

any comparable bonds between Appellant and the codefendants offered 

the package deal. Rather, it appears that Appellant's ultimate 

acceptance of the plea bargain was not an act of 11 sacrifice, 11 but 

rather an attempt to avoid a harsher sentence. Further, there is 

no claim or indication that the prosecutors in the instant case did 

not act in good faith in securing Appellant's plea bargain. 

Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that the structure or 

application of the package deal was improperly coercive. 

2. Alleged Coercion by Attorneys and Codefendants 

Appellant alleges that despite his explicit desire not to 

enter a guilty plea, his attorney, Michael O'Donnell, together with 

codefendants and their attorneys, pressured Appellant into 

accepting the package deal. Appellant claims that he was 11 hounded, 

browbeaten and yelled at 11 by O'Donnell to accept the plea; that 

4 In Mosier the third parties were accused's wife and motherin-law; in Nuckols the third party was accused's wife; in~ the 

third party was accused's fiancee.· 

8 

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O'Donnell collaborated with codefendants' attorneys to force 

Appellant to accept the plea; and that when Appellant initially 

refused to acquiesce, O'Donnell called him "stupid" and "a fucking 

idiot." While these pressures might have been palpable to 

Appellant, they do not vitiate the voluntariness of his plea; it 

was still his choice to make. Indeed, the thorough exchange 

between the court and Appellant during administration of the Rule 

11 protocol, quoted supra, clearly demonstrates that Appellant 

entered his plea willingly and voluntarily at the time he made it. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

In support of his claim that his plea was not voluntary, 

Appellant also contends that his counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. This claim presents a mixed question of law and fact 

that we review de novo; nevertheless, we accept the district 

court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. United States 

v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323, 326 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 576 

(1995). 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme 

Court established a two-pronged test for evaluating claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52 (1985), the Court held that the Strickland test also applies to 

challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of 

9 

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counsel, as in the instant case. .I.d.... at 58. To prevail under 

Strickland, an appellant must show both (1) that counsel's 

performance was deficient and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced 

appellant's defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Gillette v. 

Tansy, 17 F.3d 308, 310 (lOth Cir. 1994). An appellant can 

establish the first prong of the Strickland test by showing that 

the attorney• s conduct did not fall within the wide range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Gillette, 17 

F.3d at 310. ~ Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56. A court's 

review of the attorney's performance must be highly deferential. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action 11 might be considered sound trial strategy ... 

~ (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). The 

second, or 11 prejudice, 11 requirement focuses on whether counsel's 

constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of 

the plea process. ~Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. 

Appellant contends that his attorney failed to investigate 

leads on potentially exculpatory evidence and incorrectly told 

Appellant that he faced a mandatory life sentence if convicted 

following. a trial, thereby leaving him effectively no choice but to 

10 

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plead guilty in the hope of a reduced sentence. We will analyze 

this argument in two parts. First, O'Donnell's decision not to 

pursue every lead provided by Appellant was within 0' Donnell's 

sphere of decision making as an attorney. The Supreme Court has 

explained, 

[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 

make a reasonable decision that makes particular · 

investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a 

particular decision not to investigate must be directly 

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying 

a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). The District 

Court found, "Mr. 0' Donnell's professional decisions during the 

investigation and defense of Mr. Carr were well-grounded," United 

States v. Wesley Alan Carr, "Carr I", No. 94-CR-46, slip op. at 14-

15 (D. Wyo Nov. 22, 1994), and that O'Donnell's assistance was 

"thorough," id. at 19. The District Court also found O'Donnell to 

be "one of the most qualified criminal defense attorneys to 

practice before th[e] Court." .I.d....... at 14. ~Gillette v. Tansy, 17 

F.3d 308, 311 (lOth Cir. 1994) (noting relevance of counsel's 

experience in determining effectiveness of counsel's assistance). 

O'Donnell testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the 

plea that he did prepare an adequate defense in anticipation of 

trial, but decided that to follow up on all of Appellant's supposed 

11 

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leads was not a prudent use of his office's resources and was 

unlikely to counter the strong evidence against his client. ~ 

.l, slip op. at 10. The District Court found Mr. 0' Donnell's 

testimony more reliable than Appellant's, which the court found 

"evasive and perjurious," ii;L_ at 13-14. The trial court was in a 

superior position to judge the witnesses' credibility and the 

weight to be given their testimony, since the court could see the 

witnesses when they testified and observe their demeanor on the 

witness stand. ~ Dorton v. United States, 447 F.2d 401, 412 

(lOth Cir. 1971) . As there is no evidence in the record that 

contradicts the District Court's factual findings regarding the 

adequacy of O'Donnell's preparation of his client's defense, we 

accept those findings and hold that O'Donnell's preparation was 

within the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases. Appellant therefore fails to make a sufficient 

showing on the first Strickland prong, and his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel on this ground fails. ~ Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (explaining that "there is no 

reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . 

to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an 

insufficient showing on one."). 

Second, Appellant claims that O'Donnell told him that if he 

12 

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insisted on going to trial, he would almost certainly be convicted 

and face a mandatory life sentence, when, in fact, Appellant may 

not have been subject to a mandatory life sente::1ce due to an 

infirmity in a prior conviction. Given the weight of the 

government's evidence against Appellant, it was perfectly 

appropriate for 0' Donnell to inform his client about the great 

likelihood of conviction. This Court has held that a plea may be 

involuntary if the attorney "'materially misinforms the defendant 

of the consequences of the plea,'" United States v. Rhodes, 913 

F.2d 839, 843 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991) 

(quoting United States v. Laycock, 880 F.2d 1184, 1186 (lOth Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991)); however, in the instant 

case, Appellant has shown no prejudice from O'Donnell's alleged 

failure to inform him about the possible infirmity in the prior 

conviction. In order to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant "must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Laycock 

v. State of New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Here, the information that 0' Donnell allegedly withheld from 

Appellant was clearly contained in the plea letter: 

The United States will file a motion to modify its Notice of 

13 

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Enhanced Penalty pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 8441(b) (1) (A) as one 

of the predicate felony offenses noticed by the Goverr.ment in 

that pleading may be legally insufficient to support the 

enhancement. Thus, the Defendant is no longer subject to the 

minimum mandatory life sentence within 21 U.S. C. § 

841 (b) (1) (A), rather is subject to the minimum 20 year 

sentence, in that the Defendant has one prior drug felony 

offense that qualifies for enhancement pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841 (b) (1) (A) . 

Plea Letter at ~ 8, Appellant App. Vol. I at 79-80 (emphasis 

added). Given the District Court's finding that Appellant was 

intelligent and experienced with the criminal justice system, Carr 

~, slip op. at 18, 20, and that Appellant said he had reviewed the 

plea letter before signing it, Appellant App. Vol. I at 156, we may 

reasonably infer that Appellant knew about the infirmity in his 

prior conviction and its consequences for sentencing. ~herefore, 

Appellant has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability 

that but for 0' Donnell's failure to tell him about a possible 

infirmity in a prior conviction, Appellant would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Since Appellant 

fails to show prejudice, this claim fails Strickland. ~ 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("[A] court need not determine whether 

counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 

suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 

deficiencies."). 

Finally, Appellant contends that O'Donnell breached his duty 

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of loyalty to his client by pursuing a plea bargain against 

Appellant's wishes and thereafter coercing Appellant to accept the 

plea bargain. ~ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 

(1984) (noting "counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty 

to avoid conflicts of interest."). Appellant implies that 

O'Donnell, by forcefully advocating that Appellant accept the plea 

bargain, was working on behalf of the government, not his client. 

The District Court's factual findings contradict this claim: "Mr. 

O'Donnell's assistance to Mr. Carr was thorough, dedicated and 

served the defendant's best interest." Carr I, slip op. at 19. We 

find nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Regarding 

O'Donnell's attempts to convince his client to agree to the plea 

bargain rather than go to trial, the court noted, "0' Donnell 

investigated the case and concluded that there was a high 

possibility that Carr would be convicted and that it was 

therefore best to investigate a plea bargain." United States v. 

Wesley Alan Carr, "Carr II", No. 94-CR-46, slip op. at 2 (D. Wyo 

Feb. 8, 1995). Given the weight of evidence against Appellant and 

the high probability of a lengthy sentence, it was perfectly 

reasonable for 0' Donnell to discuss a plea bargain with the 

government and his client--and even to attempt to convince his 

client that accepting the plea bargain was in his best interest--

15 

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while simultaneously preparing a defense for trial. We therefore 

hold that Appellant has not satisfied the first Strickland prong 

with respect to his "duty of loyalty" claim. In conclusion, we 

hold that Appellant entered the guilty plea voluntarily. 

B. Propriety of Court's Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea 

We review the District Court's denial of Appellant's motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

~' 940 F.2d 1375, 1376 (lOth Cir. 1991). We will not reverse 

unless Appellant can show that the trial court acted unjustly or 

unfairly. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1573 (lOth Cir 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994). Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32(d) states that if a motion to withdraw is 

made before sentencing, a district court "may permit withdrawal of 

the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just 

reason." Although the burden is on the defendant to show such a 

reason, we have held that motions to withdraw guilty pleas before 

sentencing are to be freely allowed, viewed with favor, treated 

with liberality, and given a great deal of latitude. United States 

v. Wade, 940 F.2d 1375, 1377 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States v. 

Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 845 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 u.s. 

1122 ( 199.1) . 

16 

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This Court has enumerated the following factors to consider in 

determining whether an accused has met the burden of establishing 

that there is a fair and just reason for allowing withdrawal of a 

guilty plea: 

(1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; 

(2) prejudice to the government; 

(3) delay in filing defendant's motion; 

(4) inconvenience to the court; 

(5) defendant's assistance of counsel; 

(6) whether the plea is knowing and voluntary; and 

(7) waste of judicial resources. 

United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994). We will take up each of these 

fact:ors in turn. 

1. Assertion of Innocence: The District Court, although 

highly skeptical of Appellant's assertion of innocence, held that 

"this factor only requires that Mr. Carr assert his innocence, 

which he has done." Carr I, slip op. at 17-18. We agree with the 

District Court's conclusion. This factor weighs in Appellant's 

favor. 

2. Prejudice to government: Allowing Appellant to withdraw 

his guilty plea would prejudice the government in several ways. At 

the t:ime of the motion to withdraw the plea, three of the 

codefendants had already been sentenced and apparently had already 

received . the benefit of government motions for substantial 

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• 

assistance. Consequently, their incentive to provide truthful and 

complete testimony in a future trial of Appellant is now greatly 

reduced. The government also states that it cannot now locate 

several original witnesses. Further, if Appellant is allowed to 

withdraw his plea and go to trial, the government will have to 

expend resources re-issuing approximately seventy subpoenas, and 

government personnel will have to disrupt work on current cases in 

order to revisit this case. Some degree of prejudice to the 

government is, of course, inevitable from a plea withdrawal; 

however, in this case the prejudice is substantial. 

3. Delay in filing motion to withdraw plea. Appellant 

delayed three months in filing his motion to withdraw his plea. 

Such extended delays weigh against granting a withdrawal motion 

because they often result in substantial prejudice to the 

government and may suggest manipulation by the defendant. 

[I]f the defendant has long delayed his withdrawal motion, and 

has had the full benefit of competent counsel at all times, 

the reasons given to support withdrawal must have 

considerab[le] . force. The movant•s reasons must meet 

exceptionally high standards where the delay between the plea 

and the withdrawal motion has substantially prejudiced the 

Government•s ability to prosecute the case. 

United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439-40 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991) (delay of five months). 

Indeed, in the instant case, the District Court found that 

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• 

Appellant was "engaging in a manipulative course of conduct 

designed to avoid the consequences of his guilt," and that the 

delay between the plea and the withdrawal motion had substantially 

prejudiced the Government's ability to prosecute the case. Carr I, 

slip. op. at 13. While it appears from Appellant's pleadings that 

he may not have had the full benefit of his counsel for part of the 

three-month period of delay, he does not present forceful reasons 

to explain the entire period of delay. The total length of the 

delay along with its resulting prejudice to the government weigh 

heavily against Appellant's motion. 

4. Inconvenience to the court. As with the prejudice factor, 

some degree of inconvenience to the court from a plea withdrawal is 

inevitable. In the instant case, the government alleges 

significant inconvenience, noting that it anticipates a four-week 

trial with seventy witnesses, should the Appellant's motion be 

granted~ The anticipated length and complexity of the government's 

case against the Appellant should not necessarily weigh against the 

Appellant since he originally had a right to a jury trial. 

Nevertheless, inconvenience to the court, including the significant 

disruption of its docket and consequent delays in other pending 

cases, is a factor that must weigh against the Appellant. 

5. Defendant's assistance of counsel. For the reasons 

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discussed in Part A, supra, we hold that counsel's conduct was 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases. This factor does not weigh in Appellant's favor. 

6. Voluntariness of guilty plea. For the reasons discussed 

in Part A, supra, we hold that the plea was voluntary. This 

factor does not weigh in Appellant's favor. 

7. Waste of judicial resources. Again, some waste of 

judicial resources from a plea withdrawal is inevitable. Though 

there does not appear to be an inordinate waste in the instant 

case, this consequence must be taken into account and does weigh 

against the Appellant. 5 

Conclusion: Taken together, the above factors weigh decidedly 

against Appellant. The Appellant has failed to show that the trial 

5 In United States v. Glover, 911 F.2d 419 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

this Court suggested an additional factor to consider: the 

likelihood of conviction. In that case, this Court concluded, "In 

the face of [defendant's] admitted and palpable guilt, permitting 

the defendant to withdraw his plea would only result in a 

postponement of the inevitable." Id. at 421 (denying withdrawal 

motion) . The District Court in the instant case made a similar 

finding: 

The Court . . . finds . . . that the factual basis of the plea 

was detailed and corroborated by the testimony of his codefendants who also pled guilty, and that the defendant knew 

the consequences of his plea. The Court is therefore 

convinced, without the slightest shadow of a doubt, of the 

guilt of Defendant Carr. 

Carr I, slip op. at 15. These findings militate against the 

Appellant.'s motion. 

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court acted unjustly or unfairly in denying his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. Consequently, we hold that the District Court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We hold that Appellant Carr's guilty plea was voluntary and 

that the District Court's denial of Appellant's withdrawal motion 

was proper. The District Court's denial of Appellant's motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea is therefore AFFIRMED. 

21 

Appellate Case: 95-8009 Document: 01019284197 Date Filed: 03/25/1996 Page: 22