Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00480/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00480-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Audrey McKenzie
Plaintiff
Truckee Tahoe Airport District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AUDREY McKENZIE,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TRUCKEE TAHOE AIRPORT 

DISTRICT, a public entity, 

and DOES 1-20, inclusive, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-00480 JAM DAD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

 Defendant Truckee Tahoe Airport District’s (“Defendant”) 

seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Audrey McKenzie’s (“Plaintiff”) 

second cause of action in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is 

GRANTED. 1

 

/// 

/// 

 

1

 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for August 20, 2014. 

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is a resident of Nevada. FAC ¶ 3. Defendant is a 

public entity, organized and operating under the constitution and 

laws of the State of California. FAC ¶ 2. On July 6, 2013, 

Plaintiff was attending the Truckee Tahoe Air Show with her son 

and fiancé. FAC ¶ 9. This event occurred on the premises of the 

Truckee Tahoe Airport, which was owned and controlled by 

Defendant. FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that she was injured 

when she tripped over “airplane chocks (wheel blocks tied 

together with rope) and she fell backwards[.]” FAC ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff alleges that this constituted a “dangerous condition” 

and Defendant is liable for her injuries. FAC ¶ 18. 

On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed her original complaint 

and four months later filed her FAC. The FAC includes two causes 

of action: (1) “Dangerous Condition of Public Property – 

Government Code § 835;” and (2) “Vicarious Liability of Public 

Employees – Gov. Code §815.2”). 

II. OPINION 

 Plaintiff’s second cause of action should be dismissed, 

according to Defendant, because “the general rule of vicarious 

liability of public entities for employee negligence (Government 

Code section 815.2) does not apply in dangerous condition cases.” 

Mot. at 2. Defendant contends that it is well-settled California 

law that a public entity’s liability in a dangerous condition 

case is exclusively governed by Government Code §§ 830 – 835.4. 

Mot. at 4 (citing Longfellow v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 144 

Cal.App.3d 379 (1983) and Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc. 

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Dist., 23 Cal.App.3d 822 (1972)). Plaintiff responds in her 

opposition to this motion that Longfellow has been criticized as 

“anomalous” and “internally inconsistent” and should not be 

followed by this Court Opp. at 3 (citing Paterno v. State of 

California, 74 Cal.App.4th 68 (1999) and Pfleger v. Superior 

Court, 172 Cal.App.3d 421 (1985)). 

Section 815 of the California Government Code provides: 

“Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity 

is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an 

act or omission of the public entity or a public employee[.]” 

Gov’t. Code § 815(a). In California, governmental tort liability 

must be based on a statutory provision. Fox v. Cnty. of Fresno, 

170 Cal.App.3d 1238, 1241 (1985). Section 815.2 is the general 

statutory authority for the vicarious liability of a public 

entity, for the negligence of one of its employees. 

Specifically, section 815.2 provides: “A public entity is liable 

for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an 

employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment 

if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given 

rise to a cause of action against that employee[.]” Gov’t. Code 

§ 815.2(a). By its plain terms, section 815.2 dictates that a 

public entity cannot be found vicariously liable for the acts of 

its employee, unless that employee could be found individually 

liable for those acts. 

Importantly, section 840 limits the liability of public 

employees in “dangerous condition” cases. Specifically, section 

840 states: “Except as provided in this article, a public 

employee is not liable for injury caused by a condition of public 

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property where such condition exists because of any act or 

omission of such employee within the scope of his employment.” 

Gov’t. Code § 840. The general rule of vicarious liability – as 

set out in section 815.2(a) –therefore does not apply in 

“dangerous condition” cases. See Longfellow v. Cnty. of San Luis 

Obispo, 144 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 (1983); Van Kempen v. Hayward 

Area Park etc. Dist., 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 825 (1972). Rather, the 

liability of a public entity and a public employee in dangerous 

condition cases is governed, respectively, by section 835 and 

section 840.2. This means that in this “dangerous condition” 

case, plaintiff may not bring her vicarious liability claim 

against Defendant pursuant to section 815.2 because such a cause 

of action may only be brought pursuant to section 835, which 

“sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is 

liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public 

property.” Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal.4th 820, 829 

(1993). For this reason, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

second cause of action for vicarious liability, pursuant to 

section 815.2, does not state a viable claim for relief. 

This is consistent with well-settled California case law. 

In Longfellow, a California appellate court held that the 

plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under section 815.2 

for vicarious liability of a public entity in a dangerous 

condition case. Longfellow, 144 Cal.App.3d at 383. The 

Longfellow court specifically noted that “public entity liability 

for property defects is not governed by the general rule of 

vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but rather by the 

provisions in sections 830 to 835.4 of the Government Code.” 

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Longfellow, 144 Cal.App.3d at 383; see also, Van Kempen, 23 

Cal.App.3d at 825 (noting that “public entity liability for 

property defects is not governed by the general rule of vicarious 

liability provided in section 815.2, but instead by the specific 

provisions set forth in sections 830-835.4”). 

Plaintiff’s criticism of Longfellow is unpersuasive. Opp. 

at 1. Plaintiff notes that several California courts have 

characterized Longfellow as “anomalous” and “internally 

inconsistent.” Opp. at 1 (citing Paterno v. State of California, 

74 Cal.App.4th 68 (1999) and Pfleger v. Superior Court, 172 

Cal.App.3d 421 (1985)). This criticism that has been leveled at 

Longfellow is irrelevant to the present case, as it concerns the 

Longfellow court’s dismissal of a separate cause of action for 

nuisance. Paterno, 74 Cal.App.4th at 103-04; Pfleger, 172 

Cal.App.3d at 429-30. In the present case, nuisance is not at 

issue. Also, as discussed above, Longfellow’s analysis of the 

relationship between sections 815.2 and 830 - 835.4 is supported 

by the text of those statutes. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument regarding the “general rule 

permitting pleading of causes of action in the alternative”, 

Opp. at 3 (citing Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 575 

(1970)), necessarily assumes that a claim for vicarious liability 

of a public entity in a “dangerous condition” case, brought 

pursuant to section 815.2, is a legally viable cause of action. 

As discussed above, that is not the case and so the general rule 

that a party may plead alternative theories of relief does not 

help Plaintiff in opposing this motion. 

For all of these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 

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Plaintiff’s second cause of action is GRANTED. As amendment of 

the complaint would be futile, the motion is GRANTED WITH 

PREJUDICE. Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. ORDER 

 The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action. Plaintiff’s action 

will proceed consistent with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 7, 2014 

 

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