Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-14-02193/USCOURTS-ca10-14-02193-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernest Joe Marquez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ERNEST JOE MARQUEZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 14-2193 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 2:12-CR-01167-RB-4)

_________________________________ 

Todd A. Coberly, Coberly & Martinez, LLLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellant. 

Richard C. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney (Damon P. Martinez, United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Las Cruces, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Defendant-Appellant Ernest Marquez challenges the two-level sentence 

enhancement imposed under United States Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(c) for his 

role as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in criminal activity. We affirm. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 12, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 1 
2 

I. BACKGROUND 

A jury convicted Marquez of three drug charges, including, as relevant to this 

appeal, possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine 

(“meth”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The testimony and 

evidence at trial showed that Marquez obtained the meth in question by arranging for 

two women—Veronica Hernandez and Belinda Galvan—to drive from Las Cruces, 

New Mexico, to the vicinity of Tucson, Arizona, exchange money he had provided 

them for a brick of meth, and deliver the meth to him back in Las Cruces. 

Specifically, Hernandez testified that Marquez asked her to go to Arizona with 

Galvan and “pick something up” for him. Supp. R. vol. VI at 106. Hernandez agreed 

that she “should have known” that Marquez was referring to drugs. Id. After all, 

Marquez had previously asked her to take a trip to Arizona with Galvan, during 

which trip the two women knowingly obtained cocaine in Arizona and transported it 

to Michigan.

In addition, Hernandez and Scott Wetherholt—a drug dealer who often bought 

meth from Marquez—testified about a series of phone calls and text messages made 

by Marquez regarding the trip. Marquez discussed with Wetherholt his plans to buy 

one pound of meth from Arizona for $3000. The morning of Hernandez’s trip, 

Marquez sent a series of text messages to Wetherholt attempting to raise funds for the 

purchase. Around noon that day, Marquez called the supplier in Arizona from whom 

he had arranged to purchase the meth. That same supplier had provided Hernandez 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 2 
3 

and Galvan the cocaine to transport on their previous trip. Marquez told the supplier 

that he was “going to get the girls ready” for their trip. Hernandez testified that by 

“the girls” Marquez meant her and Galvan. Id. at 75. 

That afternoon, Marquez and Hernandez discussed her upcoming trip to 

Tucson. Shortly thereafter, Hernandez called Marquez to tell him that she was 

leaving to pick up Galvan in her car. That evening, Marquez told Hernandez that he 

was “getting the rest of the money together” so that she and Galvan could leave for 

Tucson. Id. at 71. 

Later that night, Galvan called Marquez to tell him that on the way to Arizona 

she and Hernandez had been stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint. Marquez asked 

if Hernandez’s car had been searched. Although it had been searched, the Border 

Patrol agents had allowed the women to keep the $2300 they were transporting. 

Marquez told the women that they should take a different route on their return trip to 

Las Cruces, presumably to avoid further Border Patrol checkpoints.

In Arizona, Hernandez and Galvan met with the supplier, who gave them a 

container holding a one-pound brick of meth. Hernandez and Galvan drove the meth 

back to Las Cruces, dropped it off at Hernandez’s apartment, and then drove to meet 

Marquez at his home. On their way, they stopped at a fast-food restaurant because 

Marquez had told them to buy him something to eat. At the meeting, Marquez and 

the two women discussed what had happened during the trip. After the meeting, 

Galvan returned to Hernandez’s apartment and retrieved the brick of meth to deliver 

to Marquez at his home. 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 3 
4 

At sentencing, the government requested a two-level enhancement pursuant to 

Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(c) for Marquez’s role as an organizer, leader, manager, 

or supervisor of the two women couriers who purchased and delivered the meth. 

After hearing argument on the matter, the district court ruled 

I’ve—as I’ve indicated, I’ve read all the materials and [defense counsel], on 

the legal issue, I think that there is significant evidence for me to find that 

Mr. Marquez was, in fact, a leader/organizer, at the two-level—at the twolevel level. So I think that probation has gotten that right. 

Supp. R. vol. VIII at 15-16. Marquez’s counsel did not object to the procedural 

adequacy of that explanation at the time. The district court then proceeded to impose 

a below-Guidelines sentence of 130 months. Before adjourning the hearing, the 

district court inquired whether either counsel had “[a]nything else this morning?” to 

discuss. Id. at 25. Marquez’s counsel again failed to raise a procedural objection to 

the district court’s explanation concerning the § 3B1.1 enhancement. Marquez now 

appeals that enhancement. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Marquez challenges the procedural reasonableness of his § 3B1.1 

enhancement. He argues, first, that the district court did not clearly articulate the 

reasons for imposing the enhancement, and, second, that the enhancement is not 

supported by sufficient evidence. He cannot prevail on either ground. 

A. Procedural challenge 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 4 
5 

Because Marquez’s counsel did not raise a procedural objection at the 

sentencing hearing, his procedural challenge is reviewed for plain error.1

 See United 

States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1293 (10th Cir. 2009) (reviewing a 

procedural challenge to a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement for plain error because “we have 

consistently held plain error review obtains when counsel fails to render a 

contemporaneous objection to the procedural adequacy of a district court’s statement 

of reasons at sentencing”). “Our plain error standard is satisfied when there is (1) 

error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 

1295 (quotation omitted). 

 1

 Marquez contends plain error review is inapplicable because his counsel was 

not given an opportunity to raise a procedural objection. See United States v. 

Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he federal rules provide 

for plain error review only when counsel has been given, but has not taken advantage 

of, an opportunity to voice his or her objection . . . .”). The district court, however, 

specifically inquired before adjourning the hearing whether counsel had “[a]nything 

else this morning” to address. Supp. R. vol. VIII at 25. That inquiry provided 

Marquez’s counsel a sufficient opportunity to register an objection. See United 

States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a trial judge is not 

required to specifically elicit objections after announcing a sentence,” and finding 

that a judge’s closing question of whether there was “anything further” to address 

constituted the requisite “fair opportunity to register an objection”). 

Furthermore, contrary to Marquez’s contention, the fact that the district court’s 

inquiry came after Marquez’s sentence had been pronounced did not render it any 

less of an opportunity to object; after all, the district court still could have remedied 

any procedural defect identified at that time. See United States v. Luna-Acosta, 715 

F.3d 860, 865-66 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that district courts can freely correct their 

initial oral sentencings at any point before the sentencing hearing is adjourned); see 

also United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

procedural challenges “ordinarily would require an objection after the court had 

rendered sentence”). 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 5 
6 

As to the first two prongs, it is well-settled that a district court “‘must make 

specific findings and advance a factual basis to support an enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.’” United States v. Chisum, 502 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2007)

(quoting United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1292 (10th Cir. 1996)). “‘[E]ven if the 

record overwhelmingly supports the enhancement, appellate fact-finding cannot 

substitute for the district court’s duty to articulate clearly the reasons for the 

enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1292). 

In this case, the district court put forth no factual basis or reasoning for enhancing 

Marquez’s sentence pursuant to § 3B1.1, but rather offered only the conclusory statement 

that “I think that there is significant evidence for me to find that Mr. Marquez was, in 

fact, a leader/organizer.” Supp. Rec. vol. VIII at 15-16. Under our caselaw, that was 

error, and it was plain. See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1477 (10th Cir. 

1995) (“Our cases require the district court to make findings, not conclusions.”). 

As to the third prong, “[t]o show that an error affected his substantial rights, 

Mr. [Marquez] must establish a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 

1295 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of sentencing enhancements, 

if “[t]he defendant . . . received a sentence merited by the evidence . . . we cannot say 

. . . that, but for the claimed error, the defendant’s sentence would have been any 

different.” Id. (affirming a § 3B1.1 enhancement because “[w]hatever the perceived 

inadequacy of the district court’s recitation of its reasons, the district court’s sentencing 

decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing”). 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 6 
7 

A defendant such as Marquez qualifies for a two-level enhancement under 

§ 3B1.1(c) if he “was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal 

activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). To determine whether a defendant was an organizer or 

leader, the court may consider several factors, including “the exercise of decision 

making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the 

recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the 

crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature 

and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised 

over others.” Id. cmt. n.4. However, “[t]he gravamen of the enhancement is either 

the exercise of control over other participants or the organization of others for the 

purpose of carrying out the crime.” United States v. Tagore, 158 F.3d 1124, 1130-31 

(10th Cir. 1998). 

The evidence and testimony at trial showed that Marquez orchestrated the sale 

and transfer of one pound of meth from Arizona to New Mexico: He arranged the 

sale with his supplier in Arizona; he collected the money for the sale; he recruited 

Hernandez to drive her car to Arizona to pick up the meth; he assured his supplier 

that he was “going to get the girls ready” for the trip, and Hernandez explained that, 

by “the girls” he meant her and Galvan; he maintained phone contact with Hernandez 

and Galvan during their trip, including advising them how to avoid further Border 

Patrol searches; he debriefed Hernandez and Galvan at his home immediately after 

they returned from their trip; and he later had Galvan deliver the meth to him at his 

home. Supp. R. vol. VI at 75. 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 7 
8 

Although the district court did not make factual findings at the sentencing 

hearing, it did appropriately focus on the facts pertaining to the two woman couriers 

as the basis for the § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., Supp. R. vol. VIII at 8-9 (“[O]n 

the issue of leader/organizer, remind me about the facts relating to the two women 

that went to somewhere in Arizona to bring back—I think they went to bring back 

meth. And it seemed to me that Mr. Marquez was—they did that at his instance [sic]; 

they did that in phone contact with him throughout the trip. Am I remembering this 

correctly?”); id. at 10 (“But didn’t they go at his behest? Whether he was a boss or 

that’s how she characterized it, it seemed to me that they were going at his behest and 

he made the connection. Am I not remembering this correctly?”).2

 

Accordingly, we conclude that Marquez’s § 3B1.1 enhancement for his role as an 

organizer or leader in criminal activity was amply supported by the evidence. See 

Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1295. 

Marquez’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Marquez contends he did 

not exercise control over Hernandez and Galvan because Hernandez testified that he 

was not “in charge of” her, and that she and Galvan did not follow his instructions to 

take a different route on the return trip. But even assuming, arguendo, that such 

 2

 We note that probation, in responding to Marquez’s objections to the 

presentence report, based its recommendation for the enhancement on Marquez’s 

drug sales to Wetherholt. That was error. It is well-established that buyer/seller and 

wholesaler/retailer relationships cannot provide the basis for a § 3B1.1 enhancement. 

See United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. 

Sallis, 533 F.3d 1218, 1224 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[S]upplying drugs on credit, or 

fronting, without more, is not a basis for the enhancement.”). The district court was 

correct to focus instead on the two women couriers. 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 8 
9 

testimony would preclude a finding that Marquez exercised some control over the 

two women couriers, it would not preclude a § 3B1.1 enhancement. “To qualify as 

an organizer . . . no control is necessary.” United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 

1304 (10th Cir. 2009). “Instead, a defendant may be deemed an organizer under 

§ 3B1.1 for ‘devising a criminal scheme, providing the wherewithal to accomplish 

the criminal objective, and coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the 

conspiracy even though the defendant may not have any hierarchical control over the 

other participants.’” Id. (quotation omitted). The evidence at trial supports the 

conclusion that Marquez—at the very least—coordinated and oversaw the meth 

purchase and transfer from Arizona, and therefore qualifies as an organizer under 

§ 3B1.1. 

Marquez also contends that the meth purchase cannot form the basis for a 

§ 3B1.1 enhancement because it was a “one-off” incident. The idea that a single 

criminal endeavor does not trigger § 3B1.1 finds no support in our caselaw, and 

contradicts the plain language of that section, which applies to “any criminal activity,” 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) (emphasis added). We hold that sustained criminal conduct is not 

necessary for the enhancement to apply. 

Because Marquez “received a sentence merited by the evidence,” we cannot say—

as we would have to in order to reverse his sentence for plain error—that his substantial 

rights were violated. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1295. Therefore, our inquiry into 

Marquez’s procedural challenge ends here, and we need not reach the fourth prong of 

plain error review. 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 9 
10 

B. Sufficiency of the evidence challenge 

We next turn to Marquez’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge. The 

question of whether a defendant is a leader or organizer is a mixed question of law 

and fact that is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. 

Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir. 2008). “If the district court’s 

account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court 

of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of 

fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1296 

(quotation omitted). 

For the reasons we have already detailed above, see supra § II.A, we cannot 

say that the district court’s determination that Marquez was an “organizer, leader, 

manager, or supervisor” was based on insufficient evidence. See United States v. 

Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n reviewing the court’s decision 

to apply an enhancement, we view the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the district court’s determination.”) (quotation omitted). Because 

the evidence supports the district court’s determination, Marquez’s challenge must 

fail. See Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1296-97. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s imposition of the twolevel § 3B1.1 sentencing enhancement. 

Appellate Case: 14-2193 Document: 01019671318 Date Filed: 08/12/2016 Page: 10