Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50018/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50018-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jose Valencia-Barragan
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-50018

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v. 3:08-CR-01188-W-1 

JOSE VALENCIA-BARRAGAN, ORDER AND

Defendant-Appellant. AMENDED

OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 13, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed April 6, 2010

Amended June 22, 2010

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, William C. Canby, Jr. and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Goodwin

9117

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 1 of 10
COUNSEL

Steven F. Hubachek, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,

San Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.

David P. Curnow, Steve Miller (argued), Assistant United

States Attorneys, San Diego, California, for the plaintiffappellee.

UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN 9119

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 2 of 10
ORDER

The opinion filed April 6, 2010, is amended, and the

amended opinion is filed concurrently with this order. 

With the filing of the amended opinion, the panel has voted

unanimously to deny both petitions for rehearing. Judge

Fisher voted to deny the appellant’s petition for rehearing en

banc, and Judges Goodwin and Canby recommended denial.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing

en banc and no active judge has requested a vote on whether

to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petitions for rehearing are DENIED and the petition

for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

Pursuant to General Order 5.3(a), subsequent petitions for

rehearing or rehearing en banc may be filed concerning this

amendment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

GOODWIN, Senior Circuit Judge:

The opinion filed April 6, 2010, and appearing at 600 F.3d

1132 (9th Cir. 2010), is ordered amended, and the amended

opinion is filed herewith.

Jose Valencia-Barragan appeals his forty-one month sentence for attempted reentry into the United States after

removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. That sentence

includes a sixteen-level increase in offense level for a prior

conviction under Revised Code of Washington section

9120 UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 3 of 10
9A.44.076(1) (“section 9A.44.076(1)”), which criminalizes

the rape of a child who is twelve or thirteen years old. Wash.

Rev. Code § 9A.44.076(1). Valencia-Barragan argues, first,

that a conviction under section 9A.44.076(1) does not constitute a “crime of violence” warranting a sixteen-level increase

under United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”)

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). He also argues that the district court erred

procedurally in failing to explain and apply the sentencing

factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence in violation of United States v.

Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2009). 

We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We hold that a conviction under section 9A.44.076(1)

categorically constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor” and is

therefore a crime of violence warranting a sixteen-level

increase. We also hold that the district court did not impose

a procedurally or substantively unreasonable sentence. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 18, 2008, a United States Border Patrol agent,

responding to information from a seismic intrusion device,

found Valencia-Barragan hiding in brush north of the United

States-Mexico border. Valencia-Barragan, a citizen of Mexico, had previously been deported after pleading guilty to

second-degree rape of a child under fourteen, a felony under

Washington law. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.076(2).

According to his presentence report, Valencia-Barragan

expressed no remorse and stated that he believed he had done

nothing wrong. He also allegedly kissed, touched, and

exposed himself to a second child, an eleven-year-old girl,

although he was not charged for that incident. He was sentenced to sixty-eight months in prison and was deported in

1999 following his release. 

On June 30, 2008, Valencia-Barragan pleaded guilty to

being a deported alien found in the United States in violation

UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN 9121

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 4 of 10
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. At sentencing, the district court ruled that

Valencia-Barragan’s prior conviction under section

9A.44.076(1) qualified as “statutory rape” and was therefore

a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing enhancement.

The court found a base offense level of eight, U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(a); a sixteen-level increase based on a prior conviction for a crime of violence, id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); and a

three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, id.

§ 3E1.1. Noting that the applicable Guidelines range was

forty-one to fifty-one months, the court concluded, “Mindful

of the fact the statutory maximum for this offense is up to 20

years in custody, and reviewing the criteria set forth in [18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)], I find that the low end of the adjusted

Guideline range would be a sufficient sentence but not greater

than necessary,” and imposed a sentence of forty-one months.

Valencia-Barragan timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Sixteen-Level Increase Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)

[1] Valencia-Barragan argues, first, that his prior conviction under section 9A.44.076(1) constitutes neither “statutory

rape” nor “sexual abuse of a minor” and therefore is not a

crime of violence warranting a sixteen-level increase under

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). For a violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326, the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a base offense

level of eight with an increase of sixteen levels “[i]f the

defendant previously was deported . . . after . . . a conviction

for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). “Crime of violence” includes, inter alia,

“sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory rape.” Id. at cmt.

n.1(B)(iii). On de novo review, United States v. Medina-Villa,

567 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 2009), we conclude that a conviction under section 9A.44.076(1) categorically constitutes sexual abuse of a minor, and that the sixteen-level increase

therefore applies. 

9122 UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 5 of 10
[2] Section 9A.44.076(1) provides that “[a] person is guilty

of rape of a child in the second degree when the person has

sexual intercourse with another who is at least twelve years

old but less than fourteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older

than the victim.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.076(1). To determine whether a prior conviction under section 9A.44.076(1)

constitutes either “sexual abuse of a minor” or “statutory

rape” for purposes of sentencing enhancement, we apply the

categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495

U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). “Under the categorical approach, we

‘compare the elements of the statute of conviction with a federal definition of the crime to determine whether conduct proscribed by the statute is broader than the generic federal

definition.’ ” Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d

688, 692 (9th Cir. 2007)). “We do not examine the facts

underlying the offense, but ‘look only to the fact of conviction

and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’ ” EstradaEspinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). 

[3] Our case law recognizes two different generic federal

definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor.” Pelayo-Garcia v.

Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009).1 The first

generic definition contains three elements: (1) sexual conduct;

(2) with a minor; (3) that constitutes abuse. Medina-Villa, 567

F.3d at 513. We define the first two elements—(1) sexual

conduct; (2) with a minor—by “employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the words that Congress

used.” United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice,

1Although Pelayo-Garcia addressed whether a statute of conviction

constituted an “aggravated felony” in the immigration context, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43), that distinction is immaterial. The analysis is the same for

a “crime of violence” in the sentencing context, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See

Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1013 n.1; Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 511-12.

UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN 9123

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 6 of 10
170 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). We define the third element—abuse—as “ ‘physical or psychological harm’ in light of the age of the victim in

question.” Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 513. Sexual conduct

with younger children is per se abusive. Id. at 514-15. The

second generic definition, derived from 18 U.S.C. § 2243 and

set out in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, contains four elements: “(1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act;

(3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an

age difference of at least four years between the defendant

and the minor.”

2

 546 F.3d at 1152. 

[4] We conclude that a conviction under section

9A.44.076(1) categorically constitutes sexual abuse of a

minor under the first generic definition. Section 9A.44.076(1)

contains the first two elements of the generic crime because

it prohibits (1) sexual conduct (2) with a minor. It contains the

final element, abuse, because it applies to sexual conduct with

children younger than fourteen years, and therefore prohibits

conduct that is per se abusive. See, e.g., Baron-Medina, 187

F.3d at 1147 (concluding that the use of children under fourteen for the gratification of sexual desire necessarily constitutes abuse). 

[5] Because we conclude that Valencia-Barragan’s conviction under section 9A.44.076(1) criminalizes conduct that satisfies the first federal generic definition of “sexual abuse of a

minor,” we do not address whether his conviction also satisfies the second generic federal definition or whether it constitutes “statutory rape.” Valencia-Barragan’s prior conviction

constitutes a crime of violence and the district court did not

2Although Estrada-Espinoza referred to those elements as defining

“sexual abuse of a minor” generally, we subsequently clarified that the

Estrada-Espinoza definition “encompassed statutory rape crimes only.”

Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 514; accord Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1013-

14. Rather than defining the universe of crimes constituting “sexual abuse

of a minor,” therefore, Estrada-Espinoza set forth a second generic definition. 

9124 UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 7 of 10
err in imposing a sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

B. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness

Valencia-Barragan also contends that the district court

failed to adequately address and apply the sentencing factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“the § 3553(a) factors”) and

imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We review

sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Where,

as here, a defendant failed to object on the ground that the district court erred procedurally in explaining and applying the

§ 3553(a) factors, we review only for plain error.3 United

States v. Sylvester Norman Knows His Gun, III, 438 F.3d 913,

918 (9th Cir. 2006).

[6] The district court did not plainly err in its explanation

and application of the § 3553(a) factors. Under the sentencing

statute, the district court was required to “state in open court

the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(c). “Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply

to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not

necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Accordingly, “a sentencing

judge does not abuse his discretion when he listens to the

defendant’s arguments and then ‘simply [finds the] circumstances insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the

Guidelines range.’ ” Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d at 1053-54

3Valencia-Barragan argues that, although he did not object on procedural grounds before the district court, presenting arguments relevant to

mitigation should be sufficient to invoke the abuse of discretion standard.

However, to the extent that Valencia-Barragan raised the issue of the

§ 3553(a) factors before the district court, he did so in challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the court should consider various factors in mitigation. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51 (2007). Because he raised no issue of procedural error by the district

court, plain error review applies. 

UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN 9125

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 8 of 10
(quoting Carty, 520 F.3d at 995) (alteration in AmezcuaVasquez). Here, the district court listened to ValenciaBarragan’s arguments, stated that it had reviewed the criteria

set forth in § 3553(a), and imposed a sentence within the

Guidelines range. Its failure to do more does not constitute

plain error. 

Moreover, contrary to Valencia-Barragan’s contention, his

sentence is not substantively unreasonable under AmezcuaVasquez. In Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d at 1052, the defendant was convicted of assault with great bodily injury and

attempted voluntary manslaughter after a stabbing during a

gang-related bar fight. He was deported more than twenty

years after completing a four-year prison sentence for that

crime and nearly fifty years after becoming a permanent resident, and was apprehended entering the United States shortly

thereafter. Id. at 1051-52. In those circumstances, we held that

a fifty-two month sentence that was largely predetermined by

a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement was substantively

unreasonable. Id. at 1056. We emphasized that “[t]he scope of

our decision is limited . . . . We make no pronouncement as

to the reasonableness of a comparable sentence were [the

defendant’s] conviction more recent, the sentence resulting

from the prior conviction more severe or ‘the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant’ otherwise

greater.” Id. at 1058 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)). 

[7] Given the limited scope of Amezcua-Vasquez’s holding, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying

a sixteen-level enhancement for Valencia-Barragan’s prior

conviction. Unlike the defendant in Amezcua-Vasquez,

Valencia-Barragan was deported immediately after serving

his sentence, and Valencia-Barragan’s conviction was comparatively more recent. Moreover, given the nature of

Valencia-Barragan’s crime, and the fact that he allegedly also

kissed, touched, and exposed himself to an eleven-year-old

girl, “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes

of the defendant” might logically be greater. 18 U.S.C.

9126 UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 9 of 10
§ 3553(a)(2)(C). The district court therefore did not abuse its

discretion in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. The sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

AFFIRMED. 

UNITED STATES v. VALENCIA-BARRAGAN 9127

Case: 09-50018 06/22/2010 ID: 7380231 DktEntry: 40 Page: 10 of 10