Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05093/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05093-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kenneth L. Cones
Appellant
Donna E. Shalala
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 5, 1999 Decided January 4, 2000

No. 97-5093

Kenneth L. Cones,

Appellant

v.

Donna E. Shalala, Secretary,

Department of Health & Human Services,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv00701)

Roland G. Schroeder argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was William D. Hopkins.

Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Kimberly

N. Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Williams, Ginsburg and Tatel, Circuit Judges.*

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: In this case, we consider a federal

government employee's complaint that his agency denied him

a promotion on the basis of race and then retaliated against

him when he complained. Because we disagree with the

district court's conclusion that appellant failed to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation, and because

the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury

could infer that the agency's stated reason for selecting a

white person was pretext for racial discrimination, we reverse

the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government.

I

Appellant Kenneth Cones, an African American, began

working for the federal government in 1970 as a GS-1.

Advancing up the career ladder during the next two decades,

Cones eventually became a GS-14 Special Assistant to the

Director of the Division of Buildings Management and Telecommunications, part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary

for Management and Budget ("ASMB") at the Department of

Health and Human Services. At ASMB, Cones received

uniformly excellent evaluations and applied for several promotions but was never selected. Each time HHS filled the

position with a white person.

In 1992, the head of ASMB, Assistant Secretary Arnold

Tompkins, also an African American, reorganized ASMB,

dissolving the Office of Management and Acquisition where

Cones was working and dividing its functions between two

newly created entities. One of the new entities, the Administrative Service Center ("ASC"), was given responsibility for

day to day physical operations of HHS, including building

maintenance, management of the wellness center, and special

program coordination. Tompkins detailed Cones to serve as

__________

* Circuit Judge Ginsburg was present for oral argument but took

no part in either the consideration or the decision of this case.

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Acting Director of ASC. Although the new position was

rated GS-15 and Cones was still a GS-14, personnel regulations permitted Tompkins to detail Cones to the position for

up to 120 days without using the competitive selection process. See 5 C.F.R. s 335.103(c)(1)(ii). Tompkins testified

that he detailed Cones to the Acting Director position because ASMB had been criticized for having a poor EEO

record and also because he thought Cones deserved an opportunity to enhance his skills.

A month and a half into Cones' detail, the 1992 Presidential

election occurred. An appointee of President Bush, Tompkins knew that his tenure as Assistant Secretary would soon

end, so he decided that it would be "inappropriate" to advertise or permanently fill the ASC Director position before he

left office. After President Clinton's inauguration, and after

Elizabeth James, a white female and ASMB's highest ranking

career employee, became Acting Assistant Secretary, Cones

requested that the ASC Director position be competitively

advertised so that he could remain in it either permanently or

at least for an extended period of time. James refused,

instead detailing a white female GS-14, Rosalie Reggetz, to

the position for 120 days. In response, Cones filed an

informal complaint of discrimination with HHS's Equal Employment Opportunity Office. Although the EEO Counselor

recommended reinstating Cones to the ASC Director position,

HHS refused. Cones then filed a formal complaint of discrimination, to which he later added a retaliation claim based

on the Department's failure to consider him for a different

acting director position.

During this entire period, ASMB was operating under an

"informal" hiring freeze, meaning that senior management

made every effort to avoid hiring new personnel. On February 10, President Clinton issued an Executive Order establishing a goal of eliminating 100,000 federal government positions. See Executive Order No. 12,839, 58 Fed. Reg. 8515

(1993). In relevant part, the Executive Order reads as

follows:

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Each executive department or agency with over 100

employees shall eliminate not less than 4 percent of its

civilian personnel positions ... over the next 3 fiscal

years. The positions shall be vacated through attrition

or early out programs established at the discretion of the

department and agency heads. At least 10 percent of

the reductions shall come from the Senior Executive

Service, GS-15 and GS-14 levels or equivalent.

Id.

Several months later, President Clinton's nominee for Assistant Secretary, Kenneth Apfel, was confirmed and took

office. Because Reggetz's 120 day detail was about to end,

and because her appointment, like Cones', could not be renewed, another ASMB employee, Peggy Dodd, also a white

female, was selected to serve as Acting Director for 120 days.

Unlike Cones and Reggetz, Dodd was a GS-15 and had been

transferred laterally rather than promoted to the position.

As a result, personnel regulations permitted HHS to appoint

her as permanent ASC Director without competitively advertising the position. See 5 C.F.R. s 335.103(c)(3)(v). This

HHS did on December 12.

Cones then amended his still-pending EEO complaint, adding an allegation that HHS had discriminated and retaliated

against him by failing to consider and hire him for the

permanent ASC Director position. After his EEO complaint

had been pending for well over a year, Cones filed suit in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

charging race discrimination and retaliation with respect to

the permanent position. He also charged discrimination in

connection with the Department's failure to hire him for other

positions dating back to 1989.

Granting summary judgment for the Department, the district court found that Cones had failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination with respect to the ASC Director

position because Dodd, the white person selected to fill the

position, had been laterally transferred rather than promoted.

See Cones v. Shalala, 945 F. Supp. 342, 349 (D.D.C. 1996).

Alternatively, the district court found, HHS had articulated a

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non-discriminatory reason for selecting Dodd--that it was in

the midst of downsizing--and Cones had failed to present

sufficient evidence to establish that this reason was pretext

for discrimination. Id. The district court dismissed Cones'

retaliation claim, again concluding that Cones had established

neither a prima facie case nor pretext. Id. at 350. As to the

pre-1993 claims of discrimination, the district court found

that Cones had failed timely to file an EEO complaint. Id. at

346-47. Cones moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of

his claims related to the ASC Director position. The district

court denied the motion.

Cones appeals only the district court's grant of summary

judgment with respect to the ASC Director position. Our

review is de novo. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) ("Our review of the grant of summary judgment is

de novo, applying the same standards as the district court").

II

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

makes it unlawful for the federal government to discriminate

in employment on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-16.

Where, as here, the record contains no direct evidence of

discrimination, we employ the familiar burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973). See Brown v. Brody, No. 97-5347, slip op. at 8-9

(D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1999) (McDonnell Douglas test applies to

federal employees' Title VII claims). To establish a prima

facie case, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a

protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for an

available position; (3) despite his qualifications he was rejected; and (4) either someone not of his protected class filled the

position or the position remained vacant and the employer

continued to seek applicants. See McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802; Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 108

F.3d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd in part on other

grounds en banc, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), en banc

opinion vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999). Of particular significance to this case, the burden of establishing a prima facie

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case "is not onerous." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Its function is limited to

eliminating the two most common nondiscriminatory reasons

for a plaintiff's rejection: "an absolute or relative lack of

qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought."

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.

324, 358 n.44 (1977). "Elimination of these reasons for the

refusal to hire," the Supreme Court has explained, "is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that

the decision was a discriminatory one." Id. With this standard in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.

In granting summary judgment for HHS, the district court

held that in order to establish a prima facie case, it was not

sufficient for Cones to have demonstrated that a white person

had been selected for the position. The district court required Cones to show that a white person had been promoted

to the position. Cones, 945 F. Supp. at 349. Because Dodd

had been laterally transferred into the position--i.e., not

promoted--the district court concluded that Cones had failed

to establish a prima facie case. Id. We agree with Cones

that this ruling adds undue weight to his relatively light

prima facie burden.

The district court, as well as HHS in defending the district

court's action, seems to have conflated two different types of

promotion cases. One concerns employees like Cones who

claim to have been denied promotions to vacant positions. In

such cases, the relevant inquiry is controlled by the precise

terms of McDonnell Douglas: Was the plaintiff rejected for

the position and a person outside of his protected class

selected? As we said in Kolstad, "[w]here sex discrimination

in promotion is alleged, a plaintiff proves her prima facie case

by showing that she is female, that she was refused a position

for which she applied and was qualified, and that the employer filled the position with a male." 108 F.3d at 1436. See

also Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The other type of promotion case involves employees denied increases in pay or grade. In such cases, the traditional

McDonnell Douglas test does not fit. As we explained in

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Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981), a case

in which the plaintiff sought an increase in her grade based

on years of employment, "the literal McDonnell formula ...

designed for a claim of discriminatory refusal to hire ... does

not precisely apply to a claim, like Bundy's, of discriminatory

refusal to promote." Id. We therefore "adjust[ed] the

McDonnell formula" to ask whether a similarly situated

person outside of Bundy's protected class requested and

received the benefit she sought. Id.

In this case, the district court erred by applying the Bundy

test, designed expressly for denials of pay or grade increases,

to Cones' McDonnell Douglas-controlled non-selection claim,

where the only relevant question is whether Cones was

rejected for the position and a white person selected. It

matters not whether the person ultimately selected was promoted to that position, hired from a pool of outside candidates, or, as in this case, laterally transferred. Requiring

plaintiffs like Cones to establish that a similarly situated

person had been promoted into the position would create a

truly anomalous situation. An agency hiring an external

candidate would be liable under Title VII only to other

external candidates that it failed to hire. An internal candidate seeking a promotion to that position could never establish a prima facie case because the person selected would not

have been promoted to the position. Surely the McDonnell

Douglas prima facie showing was not intended to create this

absurd outcome.

Nothing in Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

requires a different result. Although Johnson, a nonselection case, did include a citation to Bundy, the only part

of the prima facie case the Court discussed was whether the

plaintiff had "applied" for the position, an element of both the

Bundy and McDonnell Douglas formulations. Id. at 225.

Johnson, moreover, predates our clear statements in Kolstad

and Barbour that plaintiffs in non-selection cases need show

only that they applied for the vacant position and that a

person not of their protected class was selected.

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Having concluded that the district court erred in requiring

Cones to show that a similarly situated white person had been

promoted to the position, we consider whether Cones has

established the elements of a prima facie case. It is undisputed that Cones is African American and that a white person

was selected for the ASC Director position. HHS argues

that because it never opened the ASC Director position for

competition, Cones cannot establish either that he was qualified for the position or that he applied for it. We disagree on

both counts.

First the qualification issue. Cones complains that HHS

refused to consider him for the position despite his substantive qualifications. HHS does not challenge Cones' substantive qualifications, and for good reason: Cones served in the

position for four months, received positive evaluations, and,

according to abundant record evidence, was familiar with the

job's duties. Indeed, at oral argument, HHS's counsel conceded that the testimony of every witness "is that [Cones]

was substantively qualified had the position been advertised."

Instead, HHS maintains, Cones cannot establish a prima facie

case because he was not "technically" qualified insofar as he

was not a GS-15.

If accepted, HHS's theory of "qualification" would open a

potential loophole in Title VII. Agencies seeking to prevent

minority employees from advancing to higher level positions

could simply refuse to open those positions to competition and

instead laterally transfer non-minorities. Agency employees

would be unable to mount Title VII cases because none would

be "technically" qualified. Nothing in Title VII or McDonnell Douglas supports such a counterintuitive result.

This does not mean that the relative qualifications of Cones

and Dodd are irrelevant. To the contrary, their qualifications

and the role those qualifications played in HHS's decision to

select Dodd over Cones relate quite directly to the ultimate

question that a jury will face: whether HHS discriminated

against Cones when it selected Dodd for the position. For

purposes of the prima facie case, however, it is sufficient that

Cones has established that he was substantively qualified and

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that HHS selected a white person. See St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993) (if "reasonable

minds could differ as to whether a preponderance of the

evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie case, then a

question of fact does remain, which the trier of fact will be

called upon to answer"); Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1276 (issue of

qualification was question of fact for jury where "the jury

reasonably could have determined, from the evidence before

it ... that Barbour was qualified and that private sector

experience was not an absolute prerequisite"); Mitchell v.

Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 85 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("the initial

responsibility of explaining the relative qualifications of the

plaintiff and the selectee" lies with the defendant, not with

the plaintiff as part of his prima facie case).

The Department's second argument--that Cones failed to

apply for the job--requires little discussion. According to

HHS, Cones cannot establish that he applied for the position

because ASMB never opened the position to competition.

Yet HHS concedes that Cones "applied" for the position in

precisely the same way as did Margaret Dodd: he expressed

his interest to Elizabeth James, the Deputy Assistant Secretary who assisted Apfel with management of ASC. If Margaret Dodd could get the position by expressing her interest to

Elizabeth James, Cones can certainly establish a prima facie

case by demonstrating that he did precisely the same thing.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Metal Service Co., 892 F.2d 341, 348 (3d

Cir. 1990) ("Courts have generally held that the failure to

formally apply for a job opening will not bar a Title VII

plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory

hiring, as long as the plaintiff made every reasonable attempt

to convey his interest in the job to the employer."); Holsey v.

Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 208-09 (4th Cir. 1984); Grant v.

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2nd Cir. 1980).

III

Turning to the remaining steps of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis, we ask first whether HHS has rebutted the prima

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facie case's inference of discrimination by producing evidence

of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not selecting

Cones. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. We agree

with the district court that HHS met its burden. The agency

offered evidence that it selected Dodd to serve as ASC

Director because it was in the midst of downsizing, at least

partially in response to Executive Order 12,839.

The only remaining issue, then, is whether Cones produced

sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that HHS's

downsizing rationale was actually pretext for discrimination.

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Aka v. Washington

Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en

banc). We think that he has.

As an initial matter we must deal with the government's

argument that Cones cannot establish discriminatory motivation because, although Apfel made the final decision to transfer Dodd, Cones alleged that it was James who harbored

discriminatory intent. The government relies on Hall v.

Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but then

ignores several key distinctions between that case and this

one. See also Holbrook v. Reno, Case No. 98-5462, 1999 WL

1065159 at *4-5 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 1999). For one thing,

unlike in both Hall and Holbrook, where the plaintiffs had

offered "no evidence" to establish that the person with the

alleged discriminatory animus "was even involved in the

decisionmaking process," Hall, 175 F.3d at 1079, or "participated in" the adverse decision, Holbrook, 1999 WL 1065159 at

*4, the record here is replete with evidence of James' involvement in the hiring decision. Asked about this at oral argument, HHS's counsel conceded, "[a]bsolutely, no question

about it" that James was "actively involved" in the decision to

transfer Dodd. More fundamentally, the plaintiff in Hall

offered no evidence of pretext--his entire case rested on a

single allegedly discriminatory comment by a person unconnected to the challenged employment decision. In contrast,

Cones has offered sufficient evidence of pretext.

To begin with, as Cones points out, Apfel never asserted

that Dodd was selected for the position because of downsizing

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or because she was a GS-15. Although Apfel testified that

laterally transferring Dodd "was certainly consistent with the

overall philosophy of hire from within, try to keep as few new

GS-14s or 15s in the organization" and that downsizing

"permeated how we did everything in the organization," he

recalled no conversation in which downsizing was discussed as

a reason to hire Dodd. Nor can we find any evidence in the

record that Apfel considered whether laterally transferring

Dodd would result in the elimination of her former position.

If HHS really selected Dodd because it was downsizing and

seeking to eliminate a GS-15 position, wouldn't Apfel have

wanted to know whether the position that Dodd was vacating

would be eliminated or whether he would have to hire another

GS-15 to fill that position?

To be sure, were this Cones' only evidence, it might well be

insufficient for a jury to conclude that HHS's downsizing

rationale was not just pretext, but pretext for discrimination.

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291 ("in some instances ... the fact that

there are material questions as to whether the employer has

given the real explanation will not suffice to support an

inference of discrimination"). Cones, however, has provided

more. During the ten months immediately following the

issuance of the Executive Order and preceding Dodd's transfer, the record shows that ASMB promoted three white

GS-14s to GS-15. From this evidence, a jury could conclude

that downsizing did not prevent HHS from promoting white

GS-14s and that the Department's assertion that downsizing

was the reason it did not consider Cones was a lie. As we

said in Aka: "If the jury can infer that the employer's

explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts,

but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence of

discrimination.... The jury can conclude that an employer

who fabricates a false explanation has something to hide; that

'something' may well be discriminatory intent." Id. at 1293.

HHS argues that the three white GS-14s were not similarly situated to Cones because they had been serving in acting

capacities in the positions to which they were promoted.

Perhaps so, but this explanation is hardly conclusive at this

stage of the litigation. Although the evidence could well

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persuade a jury that no discrimination had occurred, a jury

could just as easily infer that the alleged differences between

Cones and the white GS-14s were irrelevant, or that they

were themselves the product of discrimination since the Department had failed to permanently promote Cones to ASC

Director when he was serving in an acting capacity.

The text of the Executive Order may also provide a jury

with a basis for concluding that HHS's asserted concern with

downsizing was pretext for discrimination, particularly when

considered in combination with the promotion of the three

white GS-14s. Although the Executive Order clearly requires HHS to reduce the number of upper-level positions, it

does not differentiate between eliminating GS-14 and GS-15

positions. See Executive Order 12,839, 58 Fed. Reg. 8515. It

provides only that "[a]t least 10 percent of the reductions

shall come from the Senior Executive Service, GS-15 and GS14 levels or equivalent." Id. HHS says it selected Dodd

because by laterally transferring her and eliminating her

former GS-15 position, the agency would be contributing to

the Executive Order's downsizing goal. Possibly, but the

agency could also have complied with the Executive Order by

promoting Cones and leaving his former GS-14 position vacant. HHS may well be able to convince a jury, as it did the

district court, that it reasonably interpreted the Executive

Order to require it to reduce the number of GS-15s. The

availability of a textually obvious alternative interpretation,

however, is evidence from which a jury could infer that HHS

deliberately misread the Executive Order to favor Dodd

because it preferred not to promote an African American.

HHS points to evidence of actual downsizing, including that

it promoted far greater numbers of employees prior to the

issuance of the Executive Order. But Cones does not dispute

that the agency was downsizing; the critical question is what

motivated the Department's decision not to promote Cones--

downsizing or discrimination. Because the record contains

evidence that downsizing had not prevented the Department

from promoting white GS-14s, a jury could conclude that

downsizing was pretext for discrimination.

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In the "Statement of Facts" portion of its brief, HHS

mentions that in 1993 it selected three African Americans for

GS-15 positions, two by promotion and one through initial

hire. Yet HHS neither explains the significance of these

personnel actions to its theory of the case nor refers to them

anywhere else in its brief. Asked about this at oral argument, HHS counsel said, "I think this might be in error....because my recollection does not comport with that

being a 1993 date." As HHS's post-hearing submission indicates, its brief in fact was mistaken. Only one African

American was promoted or hired as a GS-15 in 1993, and, as

Cones' counsel points out, that one African American was

promoted by the Undersecretary of HHS, not by ASMB.

This is not a case in which the plaintiff "has created only a

weak issue of material fact as to whether the employer's

explanation is untrue, and there is abundant independent

evidence in the record that no discrimination has occurred."

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. Not only has Cones provided evidence that raises serious questions about the role of downsizing, but the Department has provided little if any record

evidence that no discrimination occurred. As in Aka, this

case ultimately turns on witness credibility. HHS's downsizing explanation presents a question of fact that is as "quintessentially one for the finder of fact" as was the employer's

claim in Aka that the plaintiff was not "enthusiastic." Id. at

1298-99.

IV

This brings us finally to Cones' retaliation claim. He

alleges that HHS refused to allow him to compete for the

ASC Director position as retaliation for his having filed EEO

complaints. In evaluating this claim, we again apply a

burden-shifting mechanism: the plaintiff must first establish

a prima facie case; if he meets that burden, the employer

must articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its

action; finally, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of establishing that the reason asserted by the employer is pretext

for retaliation. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The

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district court concluded that Cones had failed to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation and that, even if he had, he

failed to establish that HHS's non-retaliatory reason for

laterally transferring Dodd was pretext for retaliation. Again

we disagree.

We have described the elements of a prima facie case of

retaliation as follows: the plaintiff must establish that he

engaged in activity protected by Title VII, that the employer

took an adverse employment action against him, and that the

adverse action was causally related to the exercise of his

rights. See Paquin v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 119

F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1997). HHS concedes that Cones

engaged in protected activity when he filed informal and

formal discrimination complaints, but it disputes Cones' assertion that he has established the other two elements.

As to the first element--whether HHS took an adverse

employment action against Cones--it is undisputed that the

Department refused to allow Cones to compete for the ASC

Director position. HHS argues that only employment actions

of "some significance," such as hiring, firing, or promotion,

are actionable under Title VII. A decision not to competitively advertise a position, it asserts, is not actionable. But even

assuming that only hiring, firing, and promotion decisions can

give rise to Title VII liability, the crux of Cones' complaint is

that refusing to allow him to compete for the promotion was

tantamount to refusing to promote him. Furthermore,

HHS's narrow definition of adverse employment action conflicts with our precedent. As we just recently recognized, "no

particular type of personnel action [is] automatically excluded

from serving as the basis of a cause of action" under Title

VII, as long as the plaintiff is "aggrieved" by the action.

Brown, slip op. at 13-14; see also Passer v. American

Chemical Society, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (action

for retaliation under parallel retaliation provision of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act is not limited "only to acts

of retaliation that take the form of cognizable employment

actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion"). Unable to

dispute that its refusal to compete the position adversely

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affected Cones, HHS cannot legitimately contend that it took

no adverse personnel action against him.

The Department next argues that Cones failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the filing of his discrimination complaint and the refusal to consider him for the ASC

Director position. We agree with Cones, however, that given

the circumstances of this case the close temporal proximity of

his discrimination complaints to the refusal to consider him

for the ASC Director position is sufficient to establish a

causal connection. See Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86 ("The causal

connection component of the prima facie case may be established by showing that the employer had knowledge of the

employee's protected activity, and that the adverse personnel

action took place shortly after that activity."). Elizabeth

James, the Deputy Assistant Secretary who actively participated in the decision to fill the position non-competitively,

knew that Cones had filed a discrimination complaint. Moreover, at the same time HHS was deciding not to open the

ASC Director position for competitive promotion, an EEO

counselor was investigating Cones' informal discrimination

complaint, and Cones was filing formal complaints of both

discrimination and retaliation.

Having determined that Cones has established a prima

facie case of retaliation, we again consider HHS's evidence of

a legitimate reason for transferring Dodd into the position--

downsizing--and conclude that HHS has met its burden of

production. But for the reasons stated above, we also conclude that Cones has produced evidence from which a jury

could conclude that downsizing was pretext for retaliation.

Like Cones' discrimination claim, his retaliation claim raises

genuine issues of material fact that on this record may not be

resolved on summary judgment.

V

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #97-5093 Document #487735 Filed: 01/04/2000 Page 15 of 15