Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04169/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Don Galloway
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH - F~ 1 IJ E D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United StaVis Couit Qf .t\Pwa.ls 

Tenth Circuit · · 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG f i 1-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 93-4169 

GEORGE DON GALLOWAY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-973-S) 

Submitted on the Briefs. 

George Don Galloway, Defendant-Appellant, pro se. 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney; and Tena Campbell, 

Assistant United States Attorney, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

' ' 

Appellate Case: 93-4169 Document: 01019291562 Date Filed: 05/26/1995 Page: 1 
Appellant George Don Galloway appeals from the district 

court's order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 2255. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.l 

I. BACKGROUND 

Appellant was convicted of kidnapping in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 120l(a) (1) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The facts 

concerning his conviction, which are not relevant to this appeal, 

are set out in United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 

1991), and United States v. Galloway, 963 F.2d 1388 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 418 (1992). Mr. Galloway appealed his 

kidnapping conviction on several grounds, and this court affirmed 

in part and remanded the case to the district court for 

resentencing. Galloway, 937 F.2d at 542. After the district 

court made specific findings and resentenced appellant, he again 

appealed, and this court affirmed the district court in full. 

Galloway, 963 F.2d at 1388. Appellant then petitioned the 

district court for relief from his conviction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §2255. The district court denied Mr. Galloway's petition, 

and this pro se appeal followed. 

Appellant presents four arguments on appeal: (1) that his 

counsel at trial was constitutionally deficient; (2) that the jury 

was improperly impaneled because it lacked any African Americans; 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4169 Document: 01019291562 Date Filed: 05/26/1995 Page: 2 
(3) that three members of the jury were unfairly biased; and (4) 

that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain 

his conviction. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We address appellant's last three claims first. Appellant 

acknowledges that he did not raise these claims -- that the jury 

was improperly impaneled, that some of the jurors were biased, or 

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction -- on 

direct appeal. This court will therefore review these claims in a 

collateral action under section 2255 only if the appellant 

demonstrates either (a) cause for his failure to present the claim 

on appeal and prejudice suffered therefrom, or (b) that our 

failure to review the claim will result in a "fundamental 

miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 

2565 (1991); United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312, 1320 (lOth Cir. 

1993) . 

Appellant presents no cause for his failure to assert these 

claims on direct appeal. Rather, he contends that the errors in 

his trial present "a fundamental defect which inherently results 

in a complete miscarriage of justice" and are "inconsistent with 

the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." 

The standard for demonstrating a "fundamental miscarriage of 

justice" is, as the words connote, quite stringent. It is not 

enough for appellant merely to establish that, absent the error, 

he would have been acquitted (i.e., his "legal innocence"). 

Rather, appellant must make a colorable showing of factual 

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innocence. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 s. Ct. 2514, 2519 (1992) 

(" [T]he miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with actual 

as compared to legal innocence."); Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 

1522 & n.8 (lOth Cir. 1993). In the context of a noncapital case, 

this means appellant must make a colorable demonstration that he 

is factually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted. 

United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

In this case, appellant has not met this exacting burden. 

While it is conceivable that the alleged errors asserted by 

appellant may have affected the outcome of his trial, such a 

claim, without more, does not demonstrate a "fundamental 

miscarriage of justice." Because appellant has failed to make a 

colorable showing of his factual innocence, he is barred from 

making these claims in a collateral attack on his conviction 

pursuant to section 2255. 

We next turn to appellant's claim that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Appellant contends 

that defense counsel was constitutionally deficient in nine 

respects, namely by: (1) failing to protect appellant's right to 

trial by an impartial jury; (2) failing to challenge the racial 

composition of the jury; (3) failing to exclude potentially biased 

jurors; (4) failing to confer with appellant concerning 

appellant's testimony at trial; (5) failing to confer with 

appellant as to defense's stipulation of prior crime evidence; (6) 

failing to object to the admission of medical evidence; (7) 

failing to object to the admission of witness testimony; (8) 

failing to object to the jury's potential use of books regarding 

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rape and kidnapping; and (9) failing to properly investigate the 

case. 

Appellant has already once claimed that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, but he did so on 

different grounds than those asserted here. On direct appeal, 

appellant argued that his counsel was constitutionally deficient 

because counsel informed the jury of his numerous prior 

convictions. See Galloway, 937 F.2d at 544. This court rejected 

that claim, finding that the counsel's actions "did not undermine 

the proper functioning of the adversary process; on the contrary, 

they were informed strategic choices." Id. at 545. 

In Beaulieu v. United States, 930 F.2d 805 (lOth Cir. 1991), 

this court established that "[t]he preferred avenue for 

challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a federal 

criminal trial is by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." 

Id. at 806; see also Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1413 (lOth Cir. 

1993) ("[T)he preferred procedure for reviewing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims is to bring them by way of habeas 

corpus or other supplemental proceedings in the trial court rather 

than as a part of the direct appeal."). There are two reasons for 

the Beaulieu rule. First, "ineffectiveness claims frequently 

require consideration of evidence not contained in the record on 

direct appeal." Beaulieu, 930 F.2d at 807. Postponement of 

ineffectiveness claims until collateral proceedings thus 

encourages the development of a factual record concerning the 

requisite elements of the claim, such as "the tactical reasons for 

trial counsel's decisions, the extent of trial counsel's alleged 

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Appellate Case: 93-4169 Document: 01019291562 Date Filed: 05/26/1995 Page: 5 
deficiencies, and the asserted prejudicial impact on the outcome 

of the trial." Id. The second reason is that a defendant cannot 

be expected to effectively assert an ineffectiveness claim on 

direct appeal where he is represented on appeal by the very 

counsel he claims was ineffective at trial. See Guinan v. United 

States, 6 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 1993) (Where defendant "was 

represented on appeal by the very lawyer who he now claims did not 

represent him effectively at the trial, then he could not as a 

practical matter have raised the ineffective assistance claim on 

direct appeal."). 

This preference for reviewing ineffective assistance claims 

on collateral attack, however, does not necessarily require us to 

review appellant's claim here. As we stated in Beaulieu, a 

defendant may be barred from bringing an ineffective assistance 

claim in a section 2255 action "where the defendant [was] no 

longer represented by trial counsel [on direct appeal] and it 

[was] evident that resolution of the ineffectiveness claim would 

not be substantially aided by further development of the record." 

930 F.2d at 807. A defendant is required to assert his 

ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal where the reasons for 

postponing the claim until collateral proceedings are not present. 

Id. at 807-08 ("[T]he bar applies to claims that clearly should 

have been brought on direct appeal."). 

In this case, appellant was represented by different counsel 

on direct appeal than at trial. He decided to go forward with an 

ineffectiveness claim in his direct appeal based on the factual 

record developed at that time. Appellant's claim was fully and 

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fairly litigated, and he lost on the merits. Galloway, 937 F.2d 

at 542. 

If a defendant is represented by different counsel on appeal 

than at trial, and he makes an ineffectiveness claim on direct 

appeal that is fully and fairly litigated, then the preference 

announced in Beaulieu favoring the hearing of ineffectiveness 

claims in a collateral proceeding no longer applies. A defendant 

deciding to go forward with an ineffectiveness claim on direct 

appeal must assert in that appeal all grounds for claiming 

ineffectiveness that could reasonably have been raised at that 

time. A defendant who has lost an ineffectiveness claim on direct 

appeal may not raise a second ineffectiveness claim in a section 

2255 action unless he can show cause for having failed to include 

the grounds for the new ineffectiveness claim in his direct 

appeal. See United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 418 (7th Cir.) 

(defendant who "already has presented a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel to the court of appeals unsuccessfully" 

cannot present an ineffectiveness claim on collateral attack 

"'unless there is some good reason for reexamining it'") (quoting 

United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1986)), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 2040 (1991). 

Of course, the standard for a defendant to be able to present 

an ineffectiveness claim in a section 2255 action based on the 

same grounds as those asserted in an unsuccessful direct appeal is 

much higher. "Absent an intervening change in the law of a 

circuit, issues disposed of on direct appeal generally will not be 

considered on a collateral attack by a motion pursuant to§ 2255." 

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Appellate Case: 93-4169 Document: 01019291562 Date Filed: 05/26/1995 Page: 7 
United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (lOth Cir. 1989); see 

also United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 n.2 (lOth Cir. 

1993) ("[B)ecause we address Defendant's ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims on direct appeal, Defendant is foreclosed from 

pursuing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 review of these same issues in the 

future."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994). 

Appellant's ineffectiveness claim is based on grounds 

different than those alleged in his ineffectiveness claim on 

direct appeal. He has made no showing of cause, however, for his 

failure to include these nine new allegations of ineffectiveness 

in his direct appeal. Moreover, each of the nine grounds on which 

he asserts his trial counsel was ineffective reasonably could have 

been raised at that time. Having obtained new counsel on direct 

appeal and having brought and lost an ineffective assistance claim 

in that appeal, appellant is now barred from asserting it here. 

For these reasons, the ruling of the district court denying 

appellant's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is AFFIRMED. 

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