Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04077/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary W. Deland
Appellee
Richard Lynn Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unit.ed Stat.ea Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 2 71993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT, Clerk 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v . 

GARY W. DELAND, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No . 92-4077 

(D. C. No. 90-C- 829-J) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 . 9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Wright was convicted of aggravated robbery in state court 

and subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal 

court. The district court in a twenty-two-page opinion denied 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 1 
relief. Mr. Wright appeals and we affirm. 

We attach hereto a copy of the district court's thorough and 

well written Opinion and Order dated October 31, 1991. 

Mr. Wright appeals this order asserting: (1) "the district 

court failed to properly consider the facts surrounding the 1976 

charges brought against Petitioner in evaluating Petitioner's 

claim of speedy trial violations"; and (2) the informations filed 

in 1985 constituted preindictment delay which prejudiced 

petitioner and gave a tactical advantage to the prosecution. Mr. 

Wright, now acting prose, filed an amended brief asserting: (1) 

his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; 

delay deprived him of a fair trial and due process; and 

confession produced at trial was involuntary. 

{2) the 

(3) the 

The facts of this case are unusual and complex and will not 

be set forth . We summarize by stating Mr. Wright committed two 

felonies in Utah in 1976 and a complaint was issued for his 

arrest . A different Mr. Wright was arrested shortly thereafter 

and the complaint was amended to reflect the name of the Mr. 

Wright who was arrested. The prosecution subsequently learned 

they had the wrong Mr . Wright and the charges were dismissed . 

Obviously, no right to a speedy trial attached because once the 

Utah authorities amended the complaint, there were no charges 

pending against the petitioner. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 2 
In the meantime, Mr. Wright was arrested in Canada for an 

unrelated crime and was sentenced to twenty-five years in a 

Canadian prison. 

transfered to a 

program. 

Five years later, in 

Utah prison pursuant 

1982, Mr. Wright was 

to a prisoner exchange 

In 1985, new charges were filed by Utah against Mr. Wright 

for his 1976 actions. The 1976 complaint charged Mr. Wright with 

two counts of kidnapping . The 1985 counts charged two counts of 

aggravated robbery and kidnapping. In 1985 , some five months 

after filing of the new charges, the jury convicted Mr. Wright of 

the robbery charges and acquitted him of kidnapping. The Utah 

sentences of five years to life are concurrent and concurrent to 

the Canadian sentence. 

It serves no purpose for this court to restate that which the 

district court has stated so well. We have considered the 

arguments advanced by and on behalf of Mr. Wright and can find no 

error in the district court's disposition. The judgment of the 

district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the same reasons set 

forth by the district court. 

Mr. Wright has asked that we certify certain questions to the 

Utah Supreme Court. Our decision in this case renders such action 

unnecessary and the moti on is denied . 

-3-

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 3 
Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

-4-

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 4 
~~ .: :: .. 

. ·- :: ·. ~ : . ':' 

D('

·:!-~ , I • .,. • ' 

I • ' ' 

' :, ! .• . r..' . • I • ,... 

L' f !, V , , .... :"I ., I " , ! ' ' -

. . : . r _...., '-- • ••• I FY · . / 

-;-:-t ·- -- - : .. : - ~: i ' ~!....~;. ;. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

GARY W. DELAND, Director, 

Department of Corrections, 

State of Utah, 

Respondent. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

case No. 90-C-829 

OPINION AND 

ORDER 

I. Introduction 

Petitioner Richard Lynn Wright ("Wright") was convicted of 

aggravated robbery in a Utah state court. Su,bsequently, he .t:iJ.ed • • I 

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with thi"s court pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Wright's petition raised four 

constitutional claims. First, Wright contended that his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. Second, Wright 

claimed that his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment were violated due to pre-indictment delay. Third, 

Wright alleged that the voluntariness of his confession was not 

established in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the 

1 

·' 

{.l 

\ 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 5 
Fourteenth Amendment. Fourth, Wright argued that he was not 

afforded effective appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment. 

The court referred the matter to the magistrate pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 636(b} (l} (B}. After considering Wright's claims, the 

magistrate recommended that Wright's petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied. Subsequently, Wright filed, obje~tions 

to the magistrate's Report and Recommendation and ·t-ru:s · court 

heard oral argument on these objections. After reviewing the 

file and memoranda submitted in this matter and carefully 

considering the arguments of counsel, the court issu~ 

£ollewina opinion. 

II. Facts 

on September 8, 1976, two Weber County deputies stopped to 

investigate an orange Corvette parked off the road near a 

riverbank outside of Ogden, Utah. The officers discovered a man 

asleep in the Corvette. During the course of investigation, the 

man pulled a gun on the officers, took their service revolvers, 

hand-cuffed them and ordered them to walk away. When the man 

turned to get the shotgun from the police car, the officers 

escaped, running along the riverbank until they came to a train 

trestle. The officers then stopped a passing train and climbed 

on board. During the escape, one of the officers, Deputy Bruce 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 6 
Hartman ("Hartman"), fell and hit his head. After boarding the 

train, Hartman passed out due to a severe concussion he sustained 

when he fell. Hartman subsequently was taken to a hospital where 

he was treated and released the following day. 

Later on September a, 1976, a complaint was filed against 

Wright, charging him with two counts of aggravated kidnapping. 

Several days later at a photo line-up, Hartman identified Leonard 

Eugene Wright as the perpetrator of the September a, 1976 crimes. 

Five days later, Hartman was taken to a police station in Salt 

Lake City in which Leonard Eugene Wright was being held. Hartman 

again identified Leonard Eugene Wright as the individual 

responsible for the crimes of September 8, 1976. On that same 

day at another photo line-up, the other police officer present at 

the crime scene, Deputy Schlosser, tentatively identified Leonard 

Eugene Wright as the perpetrator. Schlosser, however, did not 

ever identify Leonard Eugene Wright in person. 

At the initial appearance before the magistrate on September 

13, 1976, the individual identified by Hartman assert, i that his 

name was not Richard Lynn Wright but Leonard Eugene l,i ight. The 

magistrate, therefore, ordered the complaint amended to reflect 

the defendant's true name. Accordingly, the name Richard Lynn 

Wright typed on the complaint was crossed out and the name of 

Leonard Eugene Wright was typed in. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 7 
The preliminary hearing was held on September 24, 1976. 

Convinced that Leonard Eugene Wright was not the actual 

perpetrator, the county attorney moved for dismissal of the 

charges against Leonard Eugene Wright. This motion was granted, 

Leonard Eugene Wright was released and the prosecution against 

him was dropped. 

Shortly after midnight on September 28, 1976, petitioner 

Richard Lynn Wright was arrested in Kamloops, British Columbia 

for possession of a restricted weapon. At the time of the 

arrest, Wright was driving an orange corvette and had two 

revolvers in his possession. Later at trial, Hartman and 

Schlosser identified these revolvers as the weapons taken from 

them on September 8, 1976. 

According to the account of the arrest given by Corporal 

Brian Beason ("Beason") of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at 

the trial, Wright resisted arrest and a struggle ensued. 

Consequently, Beason choked Wright unconscious in order to subdue 

him. Wright subsequently was taken to a hospital and when he 

regained consciousness, he was taken to the police station. Upon 

arrival at the station at about 4:00 a.m., Wright resisted having 

his fingerprints taken. He taunted four officers standing in the 

station, saying there was nobody there big enough to take his 

prints. During the ensuing struggle, a shot was fired. Wright's 

fingerprints eventually were taken forcibly. When Wright was 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 8 
asked to sign the fingerprint card, however, he signed the name 

"John F. Kennedy." Angered at Wright's refusal to cooperate, 

Beason apparently then kneed Wright in the stomach and put him in 

a holding cell. Wright alleges that Beason threw him into the 

cell without any clothes on. 

At about 9:00 a.m. that same day, Wright was taken from the 

holding cell to an interrogation room. Wright refused to talk to 

Beason, however, and was taken back to the c e1 l block area. At 

so p.m., Wright was again taken to the inte.rogation room. At 

=ial, Beason testified that he informed Wright that he had the 

right to remain silent and that anything he said would be offered 

as evidence against him. Although Beason testified that Wright 

indicated he understood the warning, Wright denies that he was 

ever apprised of his rights. 

During Beason•s interrogation of Wright, Beason wrote down 

~ e questions Wright was asked and Wright's answers. Wright 

• _gned this longhand statement. Subsequently, the longhand 

statement was typed. Wright did not sign the typewritten 

statement. At trial, however, Beason read a statement allegedly 

made by Wright from a copy of the typewritten version. In this 

statement allegedly made by Wright in response to a question 

asked by Beason, Wright admitted that he had taken guns from two 

police officers in Ogden, Utah. 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 9 
In January of 1977, Wright was convicted of crimes committed 

in Canada and was sentenced to a 25-year prison term. Wright 

commenced his sentence in a Canadian penitentiary. on October 

13, 1978, Wright was transferred to a federal prison in Marion, 

Illinois pursuant to a Canadian-AlDerican prisoner exchange 

program. In June of 1982, Wright was transferred at his own 

request to the Utah State Prison pursuant to a federal-state 

prisoner exchange program. 

On August 31, 1983, a federal probation officer from the 

Probation Office in the Northern District of California wrote to 

the Weber County District Attorney, inquiring whether Weber 

County intended to prosecute Wright for the 1976 crimes in Weber 

County. There is no evidence that the Weber County Attorney's 

Office ever responded to the letter. 

New informations were filed against Wright on January 10, 

1985, and amended on January 28, 1985. The new informations 

contained counts of aggravated robbery as well as kidnapping. 

Trial was held on June 14th and 17th, 1985, almost nine years 

after the crimes allegedly were committed. The jury found Wright 

guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery and not guilty of 

kidnapping. On June 18, 1985, Wright was sentenced to two 

concurrent prison terms of five years to life. Although the 

judge did not order the sentences to run concurrently with 

Wright's existing sentence, the Utah Board of Pardons appears to 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 10 
be treating the Utah sentence as concurrent with the Canadian 

sentence. 

on June 9, 1987, the Utah supreme Court affirmed Wright's 

conviction on direct appeal. 1 The Court held that Wright's right 

to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment had not attached, 

that prosecution of Wright was not barred by the statute of 

limitations, that the letter from the federal probation officer 

to the Weber County Attorney did not constitute request for 

disposition of charges under Utah Code Ann §77-29-l (1953), that 

the statutory right to demand trial had not been triggered since 

no untried indictment or information was pending against Wright 

and that the trial court's determination that Wright's confession 

was voluntary was not an abuse of discretion. Although Wright 

had not raised a due process claim, the court considered it 

anyway and found no evidence in the record to support such a 

claim. 

Wright had been represented at the trial and on direct 

appeal by Bernard Allen. After the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 

his conviction, Wright was appointed new counsel, Kevin Sullivan, 

to help him file a petition for rehearing. Sullivan filed a 

petition for rehearing asserting that the Court had 

misapprehended the facts of the case due to the ineffectiveness 

of Wright's counsel on appeal. Wright then filed a~ ll 

1

~ State Y, Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987). 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 11 
supplemental brief claiming that both of his attorneys were 

ineffective. on November 30, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court 

swnmarily denied Wright's motion for a rehearing. 

On July 26, 1989, Wright petitioned the Utah Supreme Court 

for a writ of habeas corpus. The supreme court referred the 

petition to the Third District Court which granted the State's 

motion for summary judgment after a non-evidentiary hearing held 

January 10, 1990. On January 29, 1990, Judge Pat B. Brian 

entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judge Brian 

held that Wright had failed to establish a violation of his Sixth 

Amendlllent right to speedy trial, that Wright had failed to 

establish a violation of the Fifth Amendlllent due to preindictment delay and that Wright's confession was voluntarily 

given. Judge Brian also concluded that Wright had not 

established ineffective assistance of counsel at either the trial 

court or appellate court level and that even if counsel had been 

ineffective, Wright had not established actual prejudice as a 

result. 

On September 19, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 

the district court's dismissal of Wright's petition for postconviction relief. Wright did not petition the Utah Supreme 

Court for certiorari. It is undisputed that the time has passed 

for filing the petition for certiorari and the parties agree that 

this procedure is no longer available. Wright, therefore, filed 

8 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 12 
this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 

District Court District of Utah on October 12, 1990. 

III. J>i cu■■ion 

A. Speedy Trial Claia 

I. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 

jury •••• " 2 The right to a speedy trial attaches at the time 

of arrest, indictment, the filing of an information or the filing 

of other formal charges, which ever is earlier.3 In the instant 

case, the parties dispute when Wright's right to a speedy trial 

attached. Wright contends this right attached in 1976 when the 

original charges were filed against him because the original 

complaint was never dismissed. As support for this contention, 

Wright notes that there is no record of an order of dismissal 

entered in the minutes setting forth the reasons for dismissal as 

2

u.s. CONST. amend. VI. The Utah Constitution also confers 

the right to a speedy trial. ~ UTAH CONST. art I, §12 ("In 

criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ••• to 

have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury •••• "). 

Additionally, the Utah Code guarantees the right to a speedy 

trial. ~ UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6(1) (f) (1990) ("In criminal 

prosecutions the defendant is entitled ••• (t]o a speedy public 

trial by an impartial jury •••• "). 

3

Dillinqham Y, United States. 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). 

9 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 13 
required by former UTAH CODE ANN. §77-51-4, now UTAH R. CRIM. P. 

25(c). Additionally, Wright claims that the city court judge, 

acting as a magistrate, had no power to dismiss the complaint. 

Wright contends, therefore, that the complaint filed against him 

in 1976 has been pending since that time. 

Conversely, the State contends that the original complaint 

filed against Wright was effectively dismissed on September 13, 

1976 when, pursuant to the magistrate's order, the name Richard 

Lynn Wright was crossed out and the name of Leonard Eugene Wright 

typed in. Accordingly, the State contends that Richard Lynn 

Wright's right to a speedy trial attached in 1985 when new 

charges were filed against him. 

Although the question of whether one is "accused" for 

purposes of the Sixth Amendment is one of federal law, the issue 

of whether charges were pending against Wright since 1976 is 

ultimately a question of state law. The views of a state's 

highest court with respect to state law are binding on the 

federal courts. 4 If, however, the issue is characterized as one 

of historical fact rather than a matter of state law, the federal 

court can overturn a factual conclusion of a state court if the 

conclusion is not fairly supported by the record. Under either 

analysis, Wright's speedy trial claim must be denied. 

'"wainwright v. Goode, 464 u.s. 78, 84, reh'q denied, 465 

U.S. 1014 (1983). 

10 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 14 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Wright's speedy trial claim 

on the grounds that the speedy trial guarantee had not attached 

until the filing of the information in 1985. 5 In so holding, the 

court apparently concluded that the original complaint, naming 

Richard Lynn Wright, had been effectively dismissed under Utah 

state law and that no charges against Wright were pending until 

1985. This conclusion is binding on the federal courts. 

Additionally, the magistrate found support in the record for 

the Utah Supreme Court's apparent determination that the 1976 

complaint was validly dismissed as to both Richard Lynn Wright 

and Leonard Eugene Wright. This court agrees. The name on the 

original complaint had been obtained from a driver's license the 

perpetrator had shown the police officers at the scene of the 

crime. Based on this information, the caption of the complaint 

contained the name "Richard Lynn Wright" as the name of the 

defendant. At the first appearance before Justice E. F. Ziegler, 

the complaint was amended to reflect the correct name of the 

individual standing before the judge. Accordingly, "Richard 

Lynn" was crossed out and "Leonard Eugene" was typed just above 

the name "Richard Lynn." The minute entry of September 13, 1976, 

plainly states that the reason the complaint was amended was to 

reflect the true name of the defendant. Ordering the complaint 

amended to reflect the true name of the defendant is clearly 

5state y, Wright. 745 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1987). 

11 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 15 
within the authority of the magistrate. 6 Once the complaint was 

amended to reflect the name of "Leonard Eugene Wright," the 

prosecution against "Richard Lynn Wright" effectively terminated 

and .Richard Lynn Wright no longer stood accused. 

Furthermore, this court agrees with the magistrate's finding 

that the original magistrate properly exercised his authority to 

dismiss the complaint and discharge Leonard Eugene Wright. At 

the preliminary examination, the magistrate has the power to 

either dismiss the charges and discharge the defendant or bind 

the defendant over to the district court if there appears to be 

probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the 

crime. 7 At the preliminary examination, the prosecution 

requested that the complaint be dismissed and the defendant 

discharged because there was no probable cause to believe that 

Leonard Eugene Wright had committed the crimes charged. In 

granting this requrest, the magistrate was acting within his 

authority. 

Wright cites Van Dam v Morris8 as authority for his 

position. Van Dam, however, is not applicable to the instant 

case. In Van Dam. the magistrate dismissed a misdemeanor 

complaint for the second time on the grounds that the first 

6See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4(c), (d) & (f). 

7UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(8)(b) & (c). 

8571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977). 

12 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 16 
dismissal constituted a bar to further prosecution. The Utah 

Supreme Court held that although the magistrate had statutory 

authority to discharge the defendant or hold him or her for 

proceedings in the district court, he did not have the authority 

to dismiss the action the second time because only the court 

could dismiss an action based on the statutory bar. The Utah 

Supreme Court did not say the magistrate lacked authority to 

dismiss the complaint in the first place if he did not have 

sufficient cause to believe the defendant committed the crime. 

Similarly, Salt Lake city v Hanson, 9 cited by Wright, is not 

applicable to the circumstances of the instant case. In Hanson, 

the district court had improperly dismissed a number of 

misdemeanor cases on appeal from the city court. The Utah 

Supreme Court admonished the district court to follow former UTAH 

CODE ANN. § 77-51-4410, now UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25(C), which 

required the court to set forth its reasons for dismissing a 

criminal action. This provision, however, applies to the 

district court, not to the magistrate at a preliminary hearing 

9

19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (Utah 1967). 

1

°This provision provided that "[t]he court may, either of 

its own motion or upon the application of the county attorney, in 

furtherance of justice order an action, information or indictment 

to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth 

in an order entered upon the minutes." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-4 

(1978) (emphasis added). 

13 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 17 
for a felony charge. Consequently, Hanson has no application in 

this action. 

II. 

The magistrate found that the issue of whether the charges 

against Wright were properly dismissed was not germane to his 

claim of a violation of his right to a speedy trial because 

Wright did not know that charges against him were pending during 

the eight years he was incarcerated before 1985. This court 

agrees. The right to a speedy trial protects the interest of an 

accused in being free from anxiety and concern about the pending 

trial. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the right to 

a speedy trial protects the individual's right to go about his or 

her business and family life unfettered by physical restraints 

and to be free from the stigma of public accusation. 11 When an 

individual is not aware that he or she has been accused, he or 

she cannot be suffering anxiety and concern stemming from the 

accusation. 

The right to a speedy trial does apply to accused persons 

already incarcerated for a different crime. 12 Delay in 

11~ united states v. Marion. 404 u.s 307, 320-21 (1971). 

~~Barker y Wingo, 407 u.s. 514, 532 (1972) (identifying 

minimization of accused's anxiety and concern as one of the main 

functions of the right to a speedy trial). 

12Dickey Y Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1971). 

14 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 18 
prosecuting charges against a prisoner can cause the prisoner as 

much anxiety and depression as a person who is at large, thereby 

reducing the prisoner's motivation for rehabilitation. 13 

Additionally, the existence of untried charges affects the 

conditions and duration of the accused's imprisonment on the 

unrelated charges. 14 As noted above, however, a prisoner who is 

unaware of any detainers or untried charges against him cannot be 

suffering depression and anxiety as a result of the untried 

charges. 15 Moreover, the State cannot withhold privileges, 

programs, or parole to a prisoner on the basis of untried charges 

if prison officials and the Board of Pardons are unaware of the 

charges. Furthermore, during the hearing before the magistrate, 

Wright testified that he first learned of the charges against him 

in 1985. No evidence was presented that a detainer had ever been 

filed against Wright that Wright had been specifically informed 

of any pending complaint or information against him prior to 

1985. Additionally, section 77-29-2 of the Utah Code provides 

that the warden of the prison shall promptly inform a prisoner in 

writing of any untried indictments or informations of which the 

13smith v Hooey, 393 u.s. 374, 379 (1968). 

141.Q. at 378. 

15~ united states y, Ramirez. 524 F.2d 283, 286 (10th cir. 

1975) (no prejudice to defendant resulting in speedy trial 

violation where defendant was unaware of charges against him 

until six weeks before trial). 

15 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 19 
warden has knowledge and of the prisoner's right to request final 

disposition of the charges. 16 At the hearing on Wright's motion 

to dismiss the criminal charges in the state trial court, the 

State presented evidence that Wright had participated in an 

orientation program when he arrived at the Utah State Prison, and 

that part of the standard orientation program included a general 

lecture on prisoners' rights regarding detainers. From the 

record herein, it is clear that if Wright had inquired as to 

whether there were any untried informations filed against him, he 

would not have been told of any charges filed against him by the 

Weber county attorney. The magistrate concluded, therefore, and 

this court agrees, that in the instant case, where neither the 

prisoner nor the State was aware of any untried informations or 

complaints against Wright, the petitioner's interest in the right 

to a speedy trial was not implicated. 

B. Due Proc••• Claia 

Having determined that Wright's speedy trial claim is 

' without merit, the court now turns to his due process claim. 

Although the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not 

attach until a person is formally arrested or charged with a 

1

6This provision states that "(t)he warden, sheriff or 

custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in writing of 

the source and contents of any untried indictments or 

informations against that prisoner concerning which he has 

knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request for a 

final disposition thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-2 (1990). 

16 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 20 
crime, a substantial delay in b ·.~ging charges may yet deprive a 

federal defendant of his right to a fair trial and due process 

under the Fifth Amendment. 17 The applicable statute of 

limitations is the primary mechanism for protecting individuals 

against the prejudice resulting from the bringing of stale 

criminal charges. 18 The United states supreme Court has stated, 

however, that "the •statute of limitations does not fully define 

[a defendant's] rights with respect to the events occurring prior 

to indictment, ' "19 adding that "the Due Process Clause has a 

limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. 1120 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 

adopted a stringent two-pronged test to evaluate due process 

claims based on alleged pre-indictment delay. First, the 

defendant must prove that he or she suffered actual and 

substantial prejudice to his or her defense. Second, the 

defendant must also prove that the Government purposefully 

designed the delay to gain a tactical advantage or to harass the 

17Marion, 404 u.s. at 322. 

18.Ig. at 322. 

19Qnited states v. Lovasco, 431 u.s. 783, 789 (1976), reh'q 

denied. 434 u.s. 881 (1977) (quoting Marion, 404 u.s. at 324). 

201g. 

17 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 21 
defendant. 21 Prevailing on a due process claim under this test 

is difficult. Even assuming that a defendant can overcome the 

first prong by showing actual and substantial prejudice, no due 

pr·ocess violation has occurred unless the def end ant can prove 

that the prosecution intentionally designed the delay to gain a 

tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass the 

defendant.~ Indeed, the magistrate found no cases in the Tenth 

Circuit in which a defendant prevailed on a claim of 

unconstitutional pre-accusation delay. Similarly, successful due 

process claims based on pre-accusation delay are rare cases in 

the other Circuits. 

In the instant case, the magistrate found that Wright was 

prejudiced by the state's delay in filing charges because he was 

unable to present an alibi defense: the witnesses who could have 

21See United States v. Vap. 852 F.2d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 

1988): Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 259 (10th cir.), cert. 

denied. 479 u.s. 936 (1986). 

~see,~, United states v, Hoo, 825 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 

1987) (delay in filing indictment until two weeks after 

defendant's twenty-first birthday deprived defendant of 

protections of Juvenile Delinquency Act, but was not 

unconstitutional absent proof that delay was an intentional 

device to gain a tactical advantage), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1035 

(1988); united states y. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338 (11th cir. 1988) 

(At least half of an eight-year delay was admittedly caused by 

pure negligence, however the delay was not unconstitutional 

absent a showing the government deliberately delayed to gain a 

tactical advantage): stoner v. Graddick. 751 F.2d 1535 (11th cir. 

1985) (Although the Government offered no reason or justification 

for 19-year delay between crime and indictment, defendant's due 

process rights were not violated because defendant failed to show 

intentional delay to gain a tactical advantage). 

18 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 22 
provid~ ! an alibi were dead or incompetent due to Alzheimer's 

disease. This court agrees. The unavailability of witnesses who 

would have provided a definite alibi is prejudicial to a 

defendant's right to a fair trial.D Additionally, the court 

agrees with the magistrate that the loss of the photos of Leonard 

Eugene Wright and Leonard Eugene Wright's unavailability for 

trial also prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. 

However, although Wright has established that the State's 

delay in prosecuting him, there is no evidence that the State 

deliberately delayed prosecution in order to gain a tactical 

advantage over the Wright. At the hearing before the magistrate, 

William Daines, the Weber County attorney, testified that he did 

not know why Wr- ~ht was not prosecuted sooner. Daines testified 

that in September of 1976, he learned from the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police that Richard Wright was in custody in Canada, that 

he was found with two service revolvers and that he had admitted 

to taking the guns from two Weber County deputies. Daines 

further testified that in January of 1977, he learned that Wright 

had been sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five years in a 

canadian penitentiary. Daines testified that when he learned of 

this sentence, he simply decided to let Wright serve his prison 

sentence in Canada instead of attempting to extradite Wright from 

21fowe11 y. Baker, 904 F.2d 889 (4th cir.), cert, denied. __ u.s. _, 111 s.ct. 590 (1990). 

19 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 23 
Canada. The magistrate determined that this evidence failed to 

establish that the long delay in prosecuting Wright was a 

deliberate tactic to gain an advantage over Wright or harass 

Wright. This court agrees. 

Applying the two-pronged test discussed above to the instant 

cas~, Wright's due process claim must fail. Although Wright 

established that he was actually prejudiced by the State's delay 

in prosecuting him, he was unable to demonstrate that this delay 

was deliberately designed for an improper purpose. Accordingly, 

the court holds that petitioner's due process rights have not be 

violated. 

c. Voluntarin••• of the Confession 

The use of an involuntary confession at trial violates a 

defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 

as well as the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.24 In determining whether a confession was given 

voluntarily, the court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances.~ After examining the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding Wright's confession, the magistrate 

found that the confession was voluntarily given. This court 

agrees and, therefore, adopts the magistrates report and 

24colorado v. Connelly. 479 u.s. 157, 163 (1986). 

~Fikes v. Alabama, 352 u.s. 191 (1956), reh'g denied, 352 

U.S. 1019 (1957). 

20 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 24 
recommendation with regards to the voluntariness of Wright's 

confession. 

D. Xneffectiv• Aaaiatano• of counsel 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a petitioner must show that his attorney's performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that DUt 

for the counsel's inadequacies, the result of the proceedings 

would have been different. 26 Applying this test to the facts of 

the instant case, the magistrate concluded that Wright's counsel 

provided effective assistance both at trial and on appeal and 

that failure to consider this claim would not prejudice Wright or 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. This court 

agrees and, therefore, adopts the magistrates report and 

recommendation regarding Wright's ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. 

xv. conclusion 

Except as modified herein, the court hereby adopts the 

magistrate's proposed findings. For the reasons set forth above, 

the court DENIES plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

and dismisses the same. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

26 Tapia y. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (10th cir. 1991), 

petition for cert, filed. No. 90-8152, 1991 WL 96388 cu.s. oct. 

7, 1991). 

21 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 25 
DATED this '-=s \ day of October, 19 91. 

States 

22 

Appellate Case: 92-4077 Document: 010110159296 Date Filed: 01/27/1993 Page: 26