Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03034/USCOURTS-caDC-13-03034-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Maurice Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2014 Decided December 2, 2014

No. 13-3034

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MAURICE WILLIAMS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cr-00022-2)

Gregory S. Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant. 

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and John P.

Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, PILLARD, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Chief Judge: A jury convicted Maurice Williams

on four counts related to his role in a conspiracy to distribute

narcotics. On appeal, Williams challenges the constitutionality

of searches that uncovered the drug evidence the government

used against him at trial, the propriety of part of the prosecutor’s

closing argument, and the district court’s refusal to accept an

argument Williams advanced at sentencing. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

In September 2011, the Metropolitan Police Department

(MPD) began an investigation of suspected narcotics activity in

a house on Ninth Street, N.W. in Washington, D.C. On

September 16, an undercover officer saw three different

individuals approach a man -- later identified as appellant

Maurice Williams’ brother -- sitting on the house’s front porch. 

Each individual engaged in brief conversation with the man,

went into the house with him for about a minute, and then left. 

Officer Kenneth Thompkins and other MPD officers stopped

each of the three individuals: two possessed cocaine; the third

swallowed what the officers suspected were narcotics before

they were able to reach him.

On October 21, Officer Thompkins and his partner were

watching the Ninth Street house from their unmarked police car

when they saw appellant Williams leave the house. According

to Thompkins’ subsequent testimony, Williams then got into a

white Chevrolet parked nearby and drove off without putting on

his seatbelt. Suspecting that Williams was another drug

customer, Thompkins and his partner followed in their car,

intending to conduct a traffic stop. Repeatedly looking in his

rearview mirror, Williams stayed in the right lane and paused

behind a double-parked car on Georgia Avenue to let the

officers pass. The officers drove past in the left lane and,

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according to Thompkins’ testimony, he saw that Williams still

had not put on his seatbelt. They then pulled over to the side

and waited until Williams began driving again. When he passed

them, the officers stopped the Chevrolet.

As the officers approached Williams’ car, Officer

Thompkins saw Williams watch them in his rearview mirror,

twice remove items from his jacket, and put the items in the

car’s center console. Thompkins, who smelled a “strong scent

of fresh marijuana” coming from the car, Suppression Hr’g Tr.

15, asked Williams for his driver’s license and registration. 

Williams said he did not have his license with him and did not

have the registration because the car was rented. Thompkins

made an inquiry with MPD and learned that Williams’ license

had expired. After arresting Williams for driving without a

permit, Thompkins searched the center console, where he found

four grams of fresh marijuana and 125 grams of powder cocaine.

Armed with this evidence, the police obtained a search

warrant and searched the Ninth Street house the same day. 

There they found crack cocaine, additional powder cocaine, drug

paraphernalia, and a recent letter addressed to Williams at that

address. Eventually, prosecutors filed drug charges against

Williams and his brother. As Williams was no longer in custody

on the driving-without-a-permit charge, prosecutors obtained

bench warrants for the arrests of both men.

On February 1, 2012, Thompkins arrested Williams’

brother. Thompkins then called Williams’ cell phone, told

Williams of his brother’s arrest, and -- as a ruse -- asked

Williams to come to the police station to pick up his brother’s

property. Williams was arrested when he arrived at the station. 

In a search incident to that arrest, the police found, among other

things, a set of car keys on Williams’ person.

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At some point that evening, Officer Thompkins asked

Williams how he got to the police station; Williams responded

that he had been dropped off. Later, Thompkins pressed a

button on the key fob attached to the car keys, which caused the

lights on a blue sedan parked outside the police station to flash. 

When he approached the car, Thompkins again smelled a strong

odor of fresh marijuana through a partially open car window. 

Thompkins called for a drug-sniffing dog, which “hit” on the

vehicle, indicating that narcotics were inside. Officers opened

the driver’s side door and saw a clear, plastic-wrapped package

of crack cocaine on the inside handle. They also found 21.9

grams of marijuana inside the center console and paperwork

with Williams’ name on it under the sun visor. In a videotaped

interview later that evening, Williams told an officer that he had

obtained the crack from “some guy that he had just met from

southeast” and that it was worth $3500. 2 Trial Tr. 217.

On January 26, 2012, a grand jury indicted Williams on four

counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute marijuana, crack cocaine, and powder cocaine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(C); (3) possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or

more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(B)(iii); and (4) simple possession of marijuana, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). All of the counts were based on

the evidence obtained during the October 21, 2011 searches of

the white Chevrolet and Ninth Street house. The drugs seized

from the blue sedan on February 1, 2012 were admitted only as

“other acts” evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 

Williams moved to suppress the evidence the police seized

on October 21, 2011 and February 1, 2012. The district court

denied the motion, and a jury convicted Williams on all counts. 

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On April 11, 2013, the court sentenced Williams to 63 months’

imprisonment. 

On appeal, Williams argues that the district court should

have suppressed the evidence the police seized on both days

because the seizures violated the Fourth Amendment, that the

prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of police

witnesses during closing argument at trial, and that the court

erred in refusing to consider sentencing disparities between

federal and District of Columbia sentencing guidelines as a

ground for a downward sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(6). We address these arguments below.

II

Williams’ first contention is that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress the drug evidence arising out of

the October 21 car stop. As noted above, Officer Thompkins

testified he twice saw that Williams was driving without a

buckled seatbelt in violation of a District of Columbia

ordinance: when Williams first drove away from the Ninth

Street house, and when Thompkins’ car passed Williams’ on

Georgia Avenue. For his part, Williams testified he was

wearing his seatbelt from the get-go. He was wearing it, he said,

because a seatbelt had saved his life in a serious car accident the

year before. From then on, he explained, he always buckled up.

The district court concluded that Williams’ testimony was

credible. United States v. Williams, 878 F. Supp. 2d 190, 201

(D.D.C. 2012). From this, Williams deduces that the court

found he was in fact wearing a seatbelt. As a consequence, he

maintains that Thompkins could not have had probable cause to

stop him for not wearing one, and that Thompkins therefore

violated the Fourth Amendment by doing so. In addition,

Williams argues that, because the items of evidence seized in the

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subsequent car search were the proceeds of the unlawful stop,

the court should have excluded them from the trial. He further

contends that the court should have suppressed the evidence

seized from the Ninth Street house as well, because the warrant

that justified that search and seizure was premised on the

evidence Thompkins obtained from the search of the car. 

Williams does not dispute that an officer may

constitutionally stop an automobile if he has probable cause to

believe that the driver has committed a motor vehicle violation. 

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). Nor does

he dispute that, if the stop of the car was lawful, the search of

the car was justified by the officers’ subsequent observation of

Williams twice taking things from his jacket and putting them

in the center console, combined with the strong smell of

marijuana coming from the car. See United States v. Jackson,

167 F. App’x 812, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that “the smell

of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle provided

probable cause to justify the agents’ search of the vehicle”); see

also United States v. Washington, 670 F.3d 1321, 1323 (D.C.

Cir. 2012). He maintains, however, that the district court’s

finding that Thompkins had probable cause to stop the white

Chevrolet cannot be squared with the court’s acceptance of

Williams’ testimony that he was wearing his seatbelt all along. 

But the circle is readily squared in the way the district court

squared it. It is true that the court found that Williams credibly

testified that he buckled his seatbelt. The court also found,

however, that Thompkins credibly testified that he saw what he

thought was an unbuckled seatbelt. In short, it “found them both

to be credible.” Williams, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 202. Moreover,

the court further found that, “even if Maurice Williams were

wearing his seatbelt, . . . Thompkins was objectively reasonable

in his belief that the defendant committed a traffic violation by

driving without a seatbelt.” Id. Thompkins’ belief was

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“objectively reasonable,” the court said, in light of his credible

testimony that “he had a clear view, could see through the tinted

window of defendant Maurice Williams’ vehicle because it was

a sunny day, and [had an] opportunity to confirm his belief that

the defendant was not wearing a seatbelt when the defendant

was stopped at the side of Georgia Avenue.” Id.

1

In so holding, the district court followed this circuit’s

decision in United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir.

1997). In that case, the police had stopped the defendant’s car

for allegedly failing to display a Vehicle Identification Number

(“VIN number”) on his temporary tags. The defendant testified

that the tags had a VIN number on the night of the arrest. An

officer testified that they did not. As was the case here, although

the district court could not “say whether the tags had a VIN

number on them or not,” it credited the officer as truthfully

testifying “that he believed that the car did not have a VIN

number.” Id. at 1060.

In Hill, we reversed the district court’s denial of the

defendant’s suppression motion and remanded “for a

determination of whether it was objectively reasonable for the

officer that observed Hill’s car to conclude that a traffic

violation had occurred.” 131 F.3d at 1060. Probable cause

required, we said, that the officer’s conclusion be “objectively

reasonable,” id. at 1061 n.3; see Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,

802, 804 (1971), and the district court had “never explicitly

stated whether or not this belief was objectively reasonable,”

1

At oral argument, Williams’ counsel stated that he did not

challenge as clearly erroneous the district court’s factual findings

regarding what the officer had perceived. Oral Arg. Recording 6:27-

7:05; see United States v. Holmes, 505 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (noting that an appellate court reviews a district court’s “factual

findings” on a suppression motion “for clear error”).

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Hill, 131 F.3d at 1060. In particular, we noted that “the record

before us contain[ed] no information regarding the conditions

under which the officer first observed Hill’s car -- e.g., how far

away the police cruiser was from Hill’s car at the time the

officer first observed the tags, the quality of the lighting, how

quickly Hill’s car was moving, etc.” Id.

Here, by contrast, the district court took care both to

expressly state that it found the officer’s belief objectively

reasonable, and to make the factual findings necessary to

establish that the officer was able to make his observations

under conditions that rendered his belief reasonable. See

Williams, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 202. As we said in Hill, “[i]t was

not necessary for the court to determine whether or not a VIN

actually appeared on Hill’s temporary tags at the time of the

traffic stop. Even if the court assumed that, contrary to the

testimony of the police officer, the tags contained a VIN at the

time of the stop, the stop was still permissible as long as the

officer’s belief that the VIN was missing was objectively

reasonable.” 131 F.3d at 1061 n.3. In support, we cited

controlling precedent holding that an officer’s reasonable

mistake of fact can provide probable cause for a stop.2

 Because

2

See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. at 802 (“[W]hen the police have

probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake

a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is

a valid arrest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.

Glover, 725 F.2d 120, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); see also Illinois

v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding that there is no

constitutional violation “when officers enter without a warrant because

they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has

consented to their entry is a resident of the premises”). Williams

maintains that the “reasonable mistake of fact” line of cases should be

limited to mistakes made by someone other than the arresting officer,

and should not excuse mistakes in the officer’s own observations. 

Williams Br. 23-25; Reply Br. 6. All of the cases cited in this

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Officer Thompkins’ belief that the seatbelt was unbuckled was

reasonable, whether or not it was erroneous, he had the probable

cause necessary to conduct the October 21 stop.

III

Williams’ second challenge concerns the district court’s

refusal to suppress the drug evidence that the police recovered

during the February 1 search of his blue sedan outside the police

station. According to Williams, when Officer Thompkins

activated Williams’ key fob, Thompkins conducted a search

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. That search,

Williams argues, was neither supported by probable cause nor

authorized by a warrant (nor subject to an exception to the

warrant requirement) and was therefore unconstitutional. 

Williams further contends that the subsequent search and seizure

of drugs from his car constituted a separate Fourth Amendment

violation, as it was also undertaken without a warrant. 

1. There is no dispute that the officers’ search of Williams’

person and their seizure of the keys and key fob were lawful as

part of a search incident to his arrest. See United States v.

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); United States v. Riley, 351

F.3d 1265, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2003); cf. Riley v. California, 134 S.

Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (reaffirming Robinson’s categorical rule

with respect to the search and seizure of a physical object). 

Whatever the merits of Williams’ claim that the warrantless

activation of his key fob constituted a separate, unlawful search,

we do not reach them here. At the suppression hearing,

Williams did not claim that the activation of the key fob

constituted a search at all, let alone an unconstitutional search. 

See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Suppress at 2-3. 

Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

footnote, however, involved mistakes made by officers themselves.

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12, Williams’ claim is waived. See FED. R. CRIM. P.

12(b)(3)(C), (e); United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 551

(D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291,

1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991).3

Even if we were to treat Williams’ failure to raise this claim

as a forfeiture rather than waiver, we would still not be able to

adjudicate its merits de novo. We may review an argument that

a defendant forfeits by failing to raise it in district court only for

plain error. United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1183

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Under that standard: “‘[T]here must be (1)

error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. 

If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4)

the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v.

United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted)); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). In most

cases, to affect the defendant’s substantial rights, “‘the error

must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome

of the district court proceedings.’” Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1184

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). 

If there were an error here, it would still falter at the second

requirement. As we have explained, “[a]bsent controlling

precedent on the issue or some other ‘absolutely clear’ legal

norm, the district court commit[s] no plain error.” United States

v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re

Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). There is no

controlling precedent or clear legal norm regarding the

activation of key fobs. Neither this circuit nor any other has

3

Although a court may grant relief from waiver “[f]or good

cause,” FED.R.CRIM. P. 12(e), Williams makes no argument for such

relief.

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held that an officer’s warrantless activation of a key fob to

locate the vehicle to which it corresponds constitutes a search,

let alone an unconstitutional one. Cf. United States v. Cowan,

674 F.3d 947, 955-57 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the use of a

key fob to locate a car is not a search or seizure because, inter

alia, “the fob merely would identify the vehicle” and the

defendant “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

the identity of his car”). Accordingly, the district court did not

commit plain error -- if it committed error at all -- by failing to

rule that the manipulation of the key fob constituted an unlawful

search. 

2. Williams’ challenge to the subsequent, warrantless search

of his car fares no better. Williams does not dispute that, “once

[the officers] smelled the marijuana and got the service dog

there they had probable cause.” Suppression Hr’g Tr. 117

(acknowledgment by defense counsel); see Florida v. Harris,

133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (holding that a drug-sniffing dog’s

detection of drugs constitutes probable cause absent a showing

of the dog’s unreliability); see also Jackson, 167 F. App’x at

813. And under the “automobile exception” to the warrant

requirement, “‘[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause

exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth

Amendment . . . permits the police to search the vehicle without

more.’” United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 567 (D.C. Cir.

2010) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940

(1996)), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones,

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 

Williams does dispute that his car was “readily mobile,”

noting that it was parked and inaccessible to him. But all that is

required for an automobile to be “readily mobile” within the

meaning of the automobile exception is that it is “used on the

highways, or . . . is readily capable of such use.” California v.

Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985); see Michigan v. Thomas,

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458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (holding that “the justification to

conduct such a warrantless search does not . . . depend upon a

reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular

case that the car would have been driven away”). Williams’ car,

which he had driven to the police station and parked outside,

was clearly subject to the exception.4 The police could therefore

search it without a warrant if they had probable cause to do so --

which they did.

IV

Williams next argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument

“improperly vouched for the credibility of [the government’s]

law enforcement witnesses.” Williams Br. 46. In his closing

argument to the jury, Williams’ attorney challenged Officer

Thompkins’ account of his stop of the white Chevrolet,

maintaining that Thompkins “ma[d]e up the statement that [he]

saw [Williams] get in the car without putting on a seat belt,” 4

Trial Tr. 66, and declaring that Thompkins’ testimony “defie[d]

common sense,” id. at 65, and “lack[ed] any credibility,” id. at

66. Williams also attacked the credibility of other police

witnesses who had testified during the trial. Id. at 69-70. 

During her rebuttal, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the

officers’ credibility by noting that: (1) “there is absolutely no

evidence here that these officers all somehow came together to

railroad Maurice Williams,” id. at 76; and (2) there is “no

indication at all that any of the officers involved in this case

4

See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985) (holding

that a “vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on the basis

of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband”); Michigan,

458 U.S. at 260 (affirming the warrantless search of an automobile, in

which officer had probable cause to believe there was contraband,

notwithstanding that “both the car and its occupants were already in

police custody”).

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have ever met these defendants, that there’s any personal

vendetta against them,” id. at 79. The prosecutor then

rhetorically asked, (3) “why would these officers jeopardize

lengthy careers and lie about individuals they don’t know?” Id.

at 80. 

Williams did not object to any of the prosecutor’s

statements. As he acknowledges, we therefore may review them

only for plain error. Williams Br. 47 n.20; see United States v.

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14 (1985) (holding that “the dispositive

issue . . . is not whether the prosecutor’s [unobjected-to] remarks

amounted to error, but whether they rose to the level of ‘plain

error’” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)); see

also United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1022 (D.C. Cir.

2010); United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

As we noted above, this means that we may reverse the

conviction only if: there was error; the error was plain; the error

was prejudicial; and the error seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. 

Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1183. 

This circuit has repeatedly held that it is error for a

prosecutor to “vouch” for the credibility of a witness, whether

based on evidence outside the trial record or on the prosecutor’s

word (which is itself presumably based on evidence outside the

record). See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 62 (D.C.

Cir. 2011); Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1021-22; United States v. Brown,

508 F.3d 1066, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Boyd, 54 F.3d at 871-

72. Neither of the first two comments identified above fit that

description. Neither relied on the prosecutor’s word or on

evidence outside the record. To the contrary, each called the

jury’s attention to the trial record, noting the absence of the kind

of evidence that might support defense counsel’s claim that the

officers were lying about what they saw.

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The prosecutor’s third comment -- asking why the officers

“would . . . jeopardize lengthy careers and lie about individuals

they don’t know” -- is a different matter. Indeed, it is virtually

identical to the prosecutor’s comment that we held was error in

United States v. Boyd. See 54 F.3d at 870 (“Does it make sense

that they are going to get on the stand and perjure themselves to

get Jannazzo Boyd? Does it make sense that they are going to

put their careers . . . on the line for Jannazzo Boyd, someone that

they don’t even know . . . ?”). In Boyd, we found the comment

to be “clearly improper” because it constituted “‘vouching’ for

the police witnesses’ credibility,” based “on evidence not in the

record” regarding the effect the testimony might have on the

witnesses’ careers. Id. at 871. We have repeated Boyd’s

holding at least twice. See United States v. Reed, 522 F.3d 354,

360 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Hall, 370 F.3d

1204, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the prosecutor’s

error was not just error; it was also plain.

It is no answer to argue, as the government does, that the

prosecutor’s statement was justified by the defense counsel’s

attacks on the police witnesses’ credibility during his own

closing argument. See Young, 470 U.S. at 14 (holding that a

prosecutor’s statement in rebuttal argument constituted error,

notwithstanding that it was a response to an improper argument

by defense counsel). Indeed, the D.C. Circuit case that the

government cites for this proposition, United States v. Hall, does

not support it. See 370 F.3d at 1209 n.5 (“We do not mean to

say that the . . . prosecutor’s reply . . . was proper.”). Moreover,

the prosecutor’s justification in this case was even weaker than

it was in Hall. In Hall, the prosecutor was responding directly

to defense counsel’s suggestion “that the officers’ desire not to

jeopardize their careers gave them a motive to commit perjury.” 

370 F.3d at 1209. Here, defense counsel had said nothing about

the officers’ career interests, arguing only that the testimony

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must have been “made up” because it defied “common sense.” 

4 Trial Tr. 65-66. 

Nonetheless, as in Boyd (and Hall), although the

prosecutor’s statement was error, it did not constitute prejudicial

error. See Boyd, 54 F.3d at 872; see also Hall, 370 F.3d at 1209. 

Rather, it was an isolated remark of little import, the impact of

which the district court mitigated by giving appropriate jury

instructions. The court instructed the jurors that the “statements

and arguments” and “questions of the lawyers are not evidence,” 

4 Trial Tr. 86, 89; that they “alone determine whether to believe

any witnesses,” id. at 94; and that a “police officer’s testimony

should be evaluated . . . just as any other evidence in the case”

and should not be given “either greater or lesser weight” merely

because the witness is a police officer, id. at 96. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that the appellant did not suffer

prejudice from the prosecutor’s improper statement and that

therefore there was no plain error. See Boyd, 54 F.3d at 872;

Moore, 651 F.3d at 62-63. 

V

Finally, we address Williams’ challenge to his sentence. In

United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the United

States Sentencing Guidelines are no longer binding on district

courts, but rather are advisory only. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005);

see Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2079-80 (2013). 

After Booker, “a district court should begin all sentencing

proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines

range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). But the

court must then consider the arguments of the parties and the

seven sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to

determine the appropriate sentence, including whether a

variance from the advisory Guidelines range is warranted. Id.

at 49-50; see Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083; Kimbrough v. United

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States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007); see also Pepper v. United

States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1245 n.12 (2011) (explaining that “a

‘variance’ refers to a non-Guidelines sentence outside the

Guidelines framework”). Following this regime, the district

court first calculated Williams’ Guidelines range as 63-78

months’ imprisonment. Thereafter, the court considered the

§ 3553(a) factors and rejected Williams’ request for a threemonth downward variance from the Guidelines range.

On appeal, Williams objects only to the district court’s

refusal to grant a downward variance based upon an argument

he made regarding § 3553(a)(6), which directs the court to

consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among defendants with similar records who have been found

guilty of similar conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The

sentence disparities upon which Williams relied were those

between defendants tried in federal district court and sentenced

under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and those tried in the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia and sentenced under

the District’s own guidelines. Williams maintained that his

sentence under the latter would have been lower, and that a

variance was therefore justified.

The district court rejected Williams’ requested variance,

concluding that the only provision upon which he had based that

request, § 3553(a)(6), addresses unwarranted disparities only at

the federal level, rather than disparities between federal and state

sentences. The only question that Williams raises on appeal is

whether the district court’s construction of § 3553(a)(6)

constitutes legal error. See Reply Br. 24. Because the district

court construed that statutory provision the same way this circuit

USCA Case #13-3034 Document #1524894 Filed: 12/02/2014 Page 16 of 18
17

did in United States v. Washington, the answer must be no. See

670 F.3d at 1326-27.5

Although Washington held that sentence disparities between

the U.S. and D.C. guidelines are insufficient to support a

variance under § 3553(a)(6), id. at 1326-27, it further held that

“post-Booker nothing necessarily precludes consideration of the

D.C. Guidelines in the district court’s exercise of discretion in

determining a particular sentence,” id. at 1327. Contrary to a

suggestion in Williams’ post-argument letter, in this case the

district court made clear it understood that, post-Booker, the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only. See Sentencing

Hr’g Tr. 13-24, 32, 46-47. But Williams offered no argument

that the D.C. Guidelines were relevant to his request for a

variance in any way other than under § 3553(a)(6). Def.’s

Sentencing Mem. at 22-23; see Williams Br. 50-52. And

Washington precludes his contention that the court misconstrued

that provision.

5

See also, e.g., United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir.

2012) (“‘Section 3553(a)(6) addresses unwarranted sentence

disparities among federal defendants who are similarly situated instead

of disparate federal and state sentences.’” (quoting United States v.

Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009))); United States v.

Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 807-08 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Unwarranted

sentencing disparities among federal defendants remains the only

consideration under § 3553(a)(6) -- both before and after Booker.”);

United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 687 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The sole

concern of section 3553(a)(6) is with sentencing disparities among

federal defendants.” (emphasis omitted)).

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VI

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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