Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01701/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01701-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christin Kay Baer
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTIN KAY BAER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

Case No. 1:21-cv-01701-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docs. 15, 17)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Christin Kay Baer (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disabled 

widow’s benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and for supplemental security income 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the 

parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. 

McAuliffe.2 

Having considered the briefing and record in this matter, the Court finds that the decision 

1 Carolyn Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on November 30, 2024. Pursuant to 

Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn Colvin is substituted as the defendant in this 

suit. 

2 The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, 

including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 9, 12, 13.) 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s request to affirm the agency’s 

determination to deny benefits. 

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed an application for widow’s disability benefits and an application for 

supplemental security income on July 7, 2020. AR 320-30, 331-34.

3

 Plaintiff alleged she became 

disabled on June 3, 2011, due to bipolar, depression with anxiety, fibromyalgia, peripheral 

neuropathy, scoliosis with mild curvature, degenerative disc low back and neck, chronic fatigue 

syndrome, diabetes, carpal tunnel both hands/wrists, sleep apnea, IBS, GERD, COPD, arthritis, 

A-fib, and chronic hemorrhoids. AR 344. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on 

reconsideration. AR 212-16, 217-20, 227-32. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before 

an ALJ, and following a hearing, ALJ Deborah Foresman issued an order denying benefits on 

May 5, 2021. AR 7-29, 35-82. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the decision, which the 

Appeals Council denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR 1-5. 

This appeal followed. 

Relevant Hearing Testimony

ALJ Foresman held a telephonic hearing on April 13, 2021. Plaintiff appeared with her 

attorney, Robert Ishikawa. Marilyn J. Stroud, an impartial vocational expert, also appeared. AR 

37. At the outset of the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to January 16, 2019, the 

date of her spouse’s death. AR 44. 

When asked if any doctors limited her activities, Plaintiff reported that she recently went 

to urgent care for a meniscus tear in her knee. She was told to stay off of it until they determine if 

she needs surgery. To her knowledge, no one else has ever given her any limitations. AR 47-48. 

Plaintiff testified that the heaviest weight she can lift or carry is three to five pounds. She 

can stand about five minutes at a time without issue. Depending on the day, she can walk with 

3 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 

number. 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

her “rollator probably up to a quarter of a block.” AR 48. She has been using the rollator daily 

for about seven years. It was prescribed by a doctor. If she does not have the rollator, then she 

uses a cane. She can sit approximately 20 or 25 minutes before changing positions. AR 48-49. 

Plaintiff testified that since the last decision on her Title XVI claim, she has been 

“diagnosed with neuropathy and it is quite severe.” AR 50. Her legs are weak, and she has 

trembling in both of her arms and her legs. She has been falling and is awaiting CT scans on her 

neck, low back, and brain. The neuropathy started a couple of years before the hearing, but the 

shaking, weakness, and falling started in the last six months. AR 50.

When asked to identify the diagnoses having an impact on her ability to work, Plaintiff 

testified: her bipolar, social anxiety, and depression, which make it hard for her to be in public or 

around others; her neuropathy, with the pain and the numbness in her arms and the inability to sit 

for an extended length of time or type for extended length of time without her hands in severe 

pain or numbness; her fibromyalgia with constant pain; and her medications with side effects 

make it hard for her to function on an hourly basis, let alone a daily basis. AR 52. Plaintiff 

explained that with her fibromyalgia, she has pain from her neck through her whole body. AR 

52. 

Plaintiff confirmed that she also has been diagnosed with scoliosis and degenerative disc 

disease. The pain with her fibromyalgia differs from that of her scoliosis or degenerative disc 

disease. The fibromyalgia is more of the joint and muscular. Her joints swell and put pressure on 

her body, making it feel like having a 104° fever. The pain from her degenerative disc disease is 

a stabbing, burning feeling in the neck and low back. To treat her fibromyalgia, she is on 

Oxycodone and Hydrocodone with Tylenol for pain. AR 52-53. 

When asked about her chronic fatigue syndrome, Plaintiff testified that it comes with the 

fibromyalgia. She only sleeps two or three hour a night. She also has sleep apnea. She wears a 

CPAP machine, but wakes up every two to three hours. She is constantly tired and sleeps on and 

off throughout the day. AR 54. Between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff probably sleeps about 

three hours. AR 54.

Plaintiff also testified that her diabetes plays a role in what she can do. She has a lot of 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

hypoglycemic episodes. AR 54. She cannot drive now because she is afraid of what is going to 

happen. She has not had to go to the emergency room because of the decreases in blood sugar. 

They just tell her to drink juice. AR 54-55. 

Plaintiff confirmed that she has issues with IBS. On an almost daily basis, she has 

diarrhea. She has accidents once or twice a week. She has no warning that she is about to have a 

bowel movement or diarrhea. AR 55. 

Plaintiff testified that her atrial fibrillation and her gastric reflux (GERD) do not cause her 

problems. AR 55-56. 

Plaintiff also testified that she has gout, which flares up and makes it hard for her to walk. 

The flare ups happen about every four to six weeks and will last a couple of weeks to a month. 

AR 56.

When asked about her mental health conditions, Plaintiff testified that she started having 

problems in September 2011. She was taken off of work after having a nervous breakdown. She 

was sent to Fresno Community Behavioral Health. They diagnosed her with bipolar, depression, 

and anxiety. She is on medication and has an appointment with her psychiatrist every four to six 

weeks. The medication helps her bipolar, but makes her sleepy. AR 56-57. Her bipolar is 

“pretty much controlled” as long as she is not in a crowd or around people. If she has to “get into 

public with a lot of people around,” then her anxiety kicks up and she feels like she is “being 

stared at and judged and people are . . constantly looking at [her] weight and then [she gets] 

anxious and then [she’ll] start crying.” AR 57. She considers more than ten people a crowd. AR 

57. She has not been hospitalized because of her mental health issues. AR 59.

On a typical day, she watches TV with her mom. On a good day, they will go to the 

grocery store for about 15 minutes. She also will go to doctor appointments. AR 59-60. She can 

drive short distances, up to five miles. She does not do any chores around the house. AR 60.

Plaintiff testified that she has problems with her memory. She needs a reminder for her 

medication and has a checklist for every day. She also has difficulty concentrating and caring for 

herself. Her friend helps her shower. Although she has a shower chair in the bathtub, she cannot 

wash her hair because of the carpal tunnel. Her hands go numb, and she sometimes needs help 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

dressing. AR 61. 

When asked about medical records from the cardiovascular consultant’s heart center, 

which included a review of systems indicating that Plaintiff had no anxiety, no depression, and no 

sleep disturbances, Plaintiff testified that the record was not correct or accurate. If asked, she 

would have told them she was having problems. The same medical records saying she was not 

having muscle aches, localized joint pain, or numbness and tingling, also would not have been 

correct. AR 58-59. 

In response to questions from her attorney, Plaintiff testified that she has lost weight 

mostly from stress and trying to be able to exercise, walking with her rollator. Prior to her 

rollator prescription in May 2018, she was prescribed a walker. AR 62-63.

Plaintiff clarified that Dr. Kirby, her industrial injury doctor, gave her limitations. He said 

that she could only use her hands and grasp and reach 12% of an eight-hour workday because of 

the carpal tunnel, numbness and pain from her epicondylitis, and swelling. Since her husband 

died, she can use her mobile phone minimally. She does not have a computer or a 10-key 

because she can longer use them. AR 63. Plaintiff further testified that she has problems 

reaching in front of her or reaching above her head. She has pain in her right elbow, which limits 

how far she can push her elbow out. If she puts her arms above her head, then they go numb. 

She can reach out in front of her, but not for a third of the day. AR 63-64. 

Plaintiff testified that she sleeps during the daytime, and uses her CPAP machine. She 

sometimes will lie down just to relieve her pain during the day. She will switch positions from 

her recliner. She will lie on the daybed in the living room and watch TV with her mom. AR 64.

Plaintiff also testified that she drops things constantly. She will drop her cup, her pill 

bottles, her utensils, and her toothbrush. She drops things because her hands get weak. Her 

neurologist said it was from the neuropathy. AR 64-65.

With regard to her mental health, Plaintiff testified that she has been going to Fresno 

County Mental Health every four to six weeks since 2011. She has panic or anxiety attacks a 

couple of times a week, which last fifteen minutes to half-an-hour. When she has an attack, she 

gets dizzy, her heart starts racing, she gets sweaty and nauseous, and her whole body starts 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

trembling. It takes her about an hour or two to recover after the attacks. AR 65-66.

When asked about her depression, Plaintiff reported that she quite often gets so depressed 

that she does not want to do anything or get out of bed. It happens about once a week, up to three 

days a week. AR 66. She does not hallucinate or have delusions. AR 67.

When asked about her medications, Plaintiff testified that she has been taking opioids for 

about nine years. She has had changes in her personality and physical being because of the 

narcotics. She knows it has something to do with her IBS, constipation, and not being able to 

lose weight. The narcotics make her sleepy. Plaintiff’s mom also has noticed that she gets angry 

easier. AR 67. 

Medical Record

The medical record was reviewed by the Court and will be referenced below as necessary 

to this Court’s decision. 

The ALJ’s Decision

On May 5, 2021, using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security 

Act. AR 10-29. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since her alleged onset date. AR 14. The ALJ identified the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease, obstructive sleep apnea, fibromyalgia, tennis elbow, and 

obesity. AR 14-16. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any of the listed impairments. AR 16-

18.

Based on a review the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except that she could lift and carry 20 pounds 

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She could stand and walk six out of eight hours, and 

could sit for six out of eight hours. Her ability to push and pull was only limited by her ability to 

lift and carry. She could only occasionally use ramps and stairs. She should never be required to 

use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could occasionally balance, stoop, and kneel. She should 

never be required to crouch or crawl. She was limited to no more than frequent handling 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

bilaterally. She should never be required to walk on uneven terrain. She was limited to no more 

than occasional exposure to workplace hazards such as dangerous machinery. AR 18-26. With 

this RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work, but 

there were jobs in the national economy that she could perform, such as routing clerk, marker, 

and order caller. AR 26-28. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a 

disability from January 1, 2009, through the date of the decision. AR 28. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, 

this Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. 

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. 

The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 

(9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the 

proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This 

Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the 

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage 

in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental 

impairment of such severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

cannot, considering his or her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 

F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). 

DISCUSSION4

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments and 

carpal tunnel syndrome were non-severe impairments. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed 

to provide valid explanations supported by substantial evidence for discounting the opinion of Dr. 

Michael Rabinoff, Plaintiff psychiatrist, and for discounting the upper extremity limitations 

assessed by Dr. John Kirby. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her pain and 

physical dysfunction. (Doc. 15 at 12.) 

A. Step Two Severity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two by concluding that Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments and her carpal tunnel syndrome were non-severe.

An impairment, or combination of impairments, can be found non-severe if the evidence 

establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability 

to work. See SSR 85–28, 1985 WL 56856 (Jan. 1, 1985); see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 

303, 306 (9th Cir.1988) (adopting SSR 85–28). “The mere existence of an impairment is 

insufficient proof of a disability.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir.1993). A 

claimant bears the burden of proving that an impairment is disabling. Id. (citation omitted). 

“Step two is merely a threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims.” Buck v. 

Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146–47 

(1987). “It is not meant to identify the impairments that should be taken into account when 

determining the RFC . . . . The RFC . . . should be exactly the same regardless of whether certain 

4 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any 

specific argument or brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

impairments are considered ‘severe’ or not.” Id. (emphasis in original). Any error in failing to 

include an impairment at step two is harmless if the ALJ considered any limitations imposed by 

the impairment in subsequent steps of the sequential evaluation. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 

911 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The decision reflects that the ALJ considered any limitations posed by the 

bursitis at Step 4. As such, any error that the ALJ made in failing to include the bursitis at Step 2 

was harmless.”); Morrison v. O’Malley, No. 1:22-CV-01559-SKO, 2024 WL 21558, at *6 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 2, 2024) (explaining failure to include an impairment in the step two analysis is harmless 

if the ALJ considers the functional limitations that flow from said impairment in subsequent steps 

of sequential evaluation).

Mental Impairments

At step two of the five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, obstructive sleep apnea, 

fibromyalgia, tennis elbow, and obesity. AR 14-16. Plaintiff now contends that the ALJ erred by 

failing to find her mental impairments severe. (Doc. 15 at 13-16.)

According to the record, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments, including 

depression, anxiety, social anxiety, and bipolar disorder, at step two of the sequential evaluation. 

AR 14. In evaluating the severity those mental impairments, the ALJ assessed the degree of 

limitation in the four broad paragraph B areas of mental functioning set out in the regulations for 

evaluating mental disorders. The ALJ found a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or 

applying information; a mild limitation in interacting with others; a mild limitation in 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in adapting or managing 

oneself. AR 14-16. The ALJ based these findings on (1) Plaintiff’s multiple living arrangements 

since her alleged onset date, including living with friends at one point; (2) her activities, which 

included preparing meals, driving a car, going out in public, shopping in stores, paying bills, 

counting change, and talking and texting with others; (3) her ability to perform basic, reading, 

writing, and math; (4) detailed IQ and memory testing, which revealed that Plaintiff had a FSIQ 

of 97, a processing speed score of 111, and memory scores of 100 or higher, with the memory 

scores all noted in the average range; (5) the medical record, which showed that Plaintiff was 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

repeatedly found to be alert and oriented, well groomed, cooperative, with normal speech and 

behavior, with linear, relevant and goal-directed thought processes, and with normal insight and 

judgment; and (6) a consultative examiner’s finding that Plaintiff’s social skills and concentration 

were adequate for work adjustment. AR 14-15.

Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more than mild 

limitation in any of the functional areas, the ALJ concluded that they were non-severe. AR 16. 

Even if the Court were to assume arguendo that the ALJ erred at step two by concluding that 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe, any such error was harmless as the ALJ 

considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments at subsequent steps of the analysis. Monique A. v. 

Colvin, No. 23cv1981-LR, 2024 WL 5059153, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2024) (“If the ALJ errs 

at step two, but considers the claimant’s impairments at the subsequent steps of the analysis, the 

error is harmless.”). 

In this case, the ALJ continued the sequential evaluation past step two and considered 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments in the RFC analysis. Indeed, the ALJ confirmed that the RFC 

assessment “reflects the degree of limitation . . . found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function 

analysis.” AR 16. Further, when developing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ specifically considered the 

medical record, which included not only Plaintiff’s diagnosed depressive disorder, bipolar 

disorder, anxiety disorder, and social anxiety disorder, but also her complaints of depressive 

symptoms and anxiety, AR 18-21. For instance, the ALJ first reviewed treatment records from 

March 2019, which included complaints of depressive symptoms with anxiety and a diagnosis of 

depression. AR 18-19, 1003-1005. The ALJ additionally considered medical records from 

November 2018, which included findings of a depressed, irritable, and anxious mood, along with 

a bipolar diagnosis. AR 19, 1006-1008. 

Similarly, the ALJ reviewed medical records from May 2019, which included a diagnosis 

of depression and findings of a depressed and anxious mood (AR 1000-02); treatment notes from 

August 2019, which included symptoms of depressive disorder, recurrent, with anxious distress

(AR 998-99); medical records from October 2019 reflecting symptoms and diagnoses of major 

depressive disorder, recurrent, with anxious distress (AR 995-97); treatment records from 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

December 2019, identifying a depressed and anxious mood and a diagnosis of depression (AR 

504-050; a psychiatric evaluation completed in March 2020 (AR 495-99); treatment records from 

May 2020, which noted a depressed and anxious mood and diagnoses of bipolar disorder and 

anxiety disorder (AR 500-01); treatment records from July and September 2020, identifying an 

anxious mood and a diagnosis of major depression recurrent with anxious distress (AR 857-61); 

and mental health treatment records from November 2020 (AR 1032-34). AR 19-21.

Additionally, the ALJ considered the prior administrative medical findings of the state 

agency consultants, who found that Plaintiff had no severe mental impairments. AR 24, 140-41, 

158-60, 178-79, 199-200. The ALJ found these opinions persuasive. AR 24. Plaintiff contends 

that these “opinions did not align with the medical evidence contained in the treatment notes, 

which documents Plaintiff’s sleep disturbance, her impaired memory, negative thought content, 

her tearful affect, and her anxious, depressed, and/or irritable mood.” (Doc. 18 at 2-3, citing AR 

498, 504, 857, 860, 995, 998, 1000, 1004, 1006-07, 1009-10, 1012, 1035, 1039.) However, the 

record reflects that the state agency consultants considered similar medical evidence contained in 

the treatment notes of sleep disturbance, impaired memory, depressed mood, symptoms of 

“anxious distress,” and irritability. AR 138-40, 178-79. Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide 

substantive argument challenging the ALJ’s evaluation of the persuasiveness of the consultants’

prior administrative medical findings. 

The ALJ also took into account the opinion of the psychological consultative examiner, 

who found in October 2017 that verbally, cognitively, and socially Plaintiff was capable of job 

adjustment. The examiner further found that Plaintiff’s concentration and social skills were 

adequate for work adjustment, and any restrictions would primarily be medical-physical in nature. 

AR 24-25, 486-91. The ALJ acknowledged that the examination was conducted about a year 

prior to Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, but still found the opinion to be generally, but not 

completely persuasive. AR 25. 

Further, the ALJ considered the “checkbox form” opinion of Dr. Michael Rabinoff,

Plaintiff’s psychiatrist, who identified diagnoses of bipolar disorder, anxiety, social anxiety, and 

bereavement. AR 26, 1050-51. The ALJ found the opinion partly persuasive. AR 25. As 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

discussed below, the ALJ did not err in the evaluation of Dr. Rabinoff’s opinion. 

Given that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments at subsequent steps of the 

sequential evaluation, any error in finding them non-severe was harmless. Monique A., 2024 WL 

5059153, at *11 (“The Court finds that the ALJ erred at step two of his sequential evaluation 

process by not considering Plaintiff's radiculopathy symptoms. Nevertheless, because the ALJ 

considered Plaintiff's cervical radiculopathy symptoms in the RFC analysis, the error at step two 

was harmless.”); Oudree E-S. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-1655-W-KSC, 2024 WL 3458411, at *2 

(S.D. Cal. July 18, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 23-cv-1655 W (KSC), 2024 

WL 3799441 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) (determining ALJ’s conclusion that mental impairments 

were non-severe at step two inconsequential to the outcome and, even if erroneous, not grounds 

for reversal where ALJ fully considered mental impairments in the RFC analysis and step four). 

Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding her carpal tunnel syndrome non-severe. 

(Doc. 15 at 19.) As with her mental impairments, the Court finds that even if the ALJ erred in 

concluding that her carpal tunnel syndrome was non-severe, any such error is harmless as the ALJ 

considered the limiting of effects of her carpal tunnel syndrome at subsequent steps of the 

sequential evaluation. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 911; Morrison, 2024 WL 21558, at *6. In particular, 

the ALJ considered medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome when 

developing Plaintiff’s RFC. For instance, the ALJ noted that on June 19, 2019, Plaintiff was 

diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and advised to wear carpal tunnel splints. AR 19, 531-34. 

The ALJ further noted that on September 18, 2019, Plaintiff again was diagnosed with carpal 

tunnel syndrome and was to continue with her bilateral carpal tunnel splints. AR 19, 525-28. 

Thereafter, on September 26, 2019, she received injections to treat her carpal tunnel symptoms. 

AR 19, 524-25. The ALJ also acknowledged that on December 5, 2019, Plaintiff complained of 

carpal tunnel syndrome, and although surgery was suggested, Plaintiff desired to continue 

conservative treatment. She was advised to wear wrist splints at night. AR 20, 521-23. The ALJ 

observed that in January 2020, Plaintiff again was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel 

syndrome and her doctor recommended occupational therapy and wrist braces. AR 20, 516. 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

In addition to the medical record, the ALJ also considered the prior administrative medical 

findings of the state agency medical consultants. AR 24. The state agency consultants reviewed 

evidence of Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome and limited her to no more than frequent handling 

in both upper extremities to account for that diagnosis. AR 24, 144-45, 162-63, 183-84, 204-05. 

The ALJ found the prior administrative medical findings of the state agency consultants 

persuasive, adopted their opined manipulative limitations, and included no more than frequent 

handling bilaterally in Plaintiff’s RFC. AR 18, 24.

Given that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome and any impact that 

impairment would have when determining an appropriate RFC, the Court concludes that any error 

in failing to identify Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome as severe at step two is harmless. See 

Kessler v. O’Malley, No. 2:23-cv-01416 AC, 2024 WL 1908078, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2024) 

(finding any error in failing to identify hip impairment as severe at step two to be harmless where 

ALJ considered the impact the impairment would have when determining an appropriate RFC and 

considered the recommendations by doctors, the testimony of plaintiff, and the medical records 

that pertained to the impairment and the impact it caused); Teague v. Astrue, No. CV 09-8848 

JCG, 2010 WL 5094252, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (“Second, even assuming the ALJ erred 

in overlooking to list prostatitis at step two, any error was harmless because the ALJ, in fact, 

considered Plaintiff's prostatitis while assessing his limitations,” by noting “Plaintiff was ‘treated 

for chronic prostatitis’ and ‘underwent a cystoscopy and bladder wash in September 2006[,]’ ... 

[and by] further not[ing] that Plaintiff's ‘symptoms included chronic pelvic discomfort, post void 

fullness and straining to urinate.’”).

B. Physician Opinions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide valid explanations supported by substantial 

evidence for discounting the medical source opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Michael 

Rabinoff, and for discounting the upper extremity limitations assessed by Dr. John Kirby. (Doc. 

15 at 16, 21.) 

Because Plaintiff applied for benefits after March 27, 2017, her claims are governed by 

the agency’s new regulations concerning how an ALJ must evaluate medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

§§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. Under these regulations, the Commissioner does “not defer or give any 

specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior 

administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). As previously explained, the Commissioner evaluates the 

persuasiveness of the medical opinions based on the following factors: (1) supportability; (2) 

consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors, such as 

“evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an 

understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). Supportability and consistency are the most important 

factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). 

The Ninth Circuit has clarified that “under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an 

examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an 

explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 “The agency must 

‘articulate ... how persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other 

source, . . . and ‘explain how [it] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in 

reaching these findings.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Dr. Rabinoff’s Opinion

On March 17, 2021, Dr. Rabinoff completed a Mental Disorder Questionnaire for 

Evaluation of Ability to Work form. AR 1050-51. Dr. Rabinoff opined that Plaintiff’s diagnoses 

of bipolar disorder, anxiety, social anxiety, bereavement, diabetes mellitus, and chronic pain 

would affect her ability to work, but determined that she had no abnormalities or significant 

impairment in orientation, memory, concentration, intelligence, or judgment. AR 1050. She also 

had no hallucinations, no delusional or paranoid thoughts, no confusion, no social isolation, no 

catatonic or disorganized behavior, no loosening of associations, and no other disorganization of 

thought. AR 1050. Dr. Rabinoff indicated that Plaintiff had mood swings that would impair her 

ability to perform full-time work, but she was currently stable, with a history of impairing mood 

episodes. AR 1050. Dr. Rabinoff additionally opined that Plaintiff’s ability to perform activities 

of daily living had not become impaired to the point that she needed assistance from others. 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

However, her social function had become deficient to the point that it would impair her ability to 

work with supervisors, co-workers, or the public. Dr. Rabinoff explained that Plaintiff’s anxiety 

and social anxiety “may affect social interactions,” but her “mood was stable now,” with a history 

of mood episodes. AR 1051. Dr. Rabinoff further opined that Plaintiff’s mental illness impaired 

her ability to adapt to stresses common to the normal work environment, noting that her anxiety 

and social anxiety “may impair her ability to adapt to stresses.” AR 1051.

The ALJ considered Dr. Rabinoff’s opinion, reasoning as follows:

On March 17, 2021, the doctor completed a checkbox form. In the form, he 

indicated that the claimant [had] diagnoses of bipolar disorder, anxiety, social 

anxiety, bereavement, diabetes mellitus, and chronic pain. He indicated (by 

checking a box) that those impairments affected the claimant’s ability to work. 

However, he did not indicate how or to what extent they affectated that ability. 

Therefore, that assertion is vague. In addition, the doctor found that the claimant 

had no abnormalities with her orientation, memory, concentration, intelligence or 

judgment that would affect her ability to work. The doctor also indicated that the 

claimant had no hallucinations, no delusional thoughts, no confusion, no social 

isolation, no disorganized behavior and no loosing of associations that would 

impair her ability to work. He did indicate that the claimant had mood swings in 

the past but noted that she was currently stable. The doctor also found that the 

claimant’s mental impairments may impair her ability to handle stress and may 

affect her social interactions. However, the doctor did not indicate that those 

areas were actually affected and did not indicate the probability that they may be 

affected. Therefore, those portions of the opinion are also vague. The doctor’s 

conclusions are partly supported by his own findings and are somewhat consistent 

with the record as a whole. Therefore, the undersigned finds this opinion to be 

partly persuasive.

AR 26.

Plaintiff faults the ALJ for finding the doctor’s opinion vague, arguing that “Dr. 

Rabinoff’s opinion was unequivocal in assessing that Plaintiff had mood swings that would 

cause significant impairment in her ability to work (Tr. 1050), and that her impairments may 

cause deficits in social functioning and her ability to adapt to stress (Tr. 1051).” (Doc. 15 at 18.) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Dr. Rubinoff’s opinion was not “unequivocal.” Rather, Dr. 

Rabinoff indicated only that Plaintiff’s anxiety and social anxiety “may affect social interactions” 

and “may impair her ability to adapt to stresses.” As the ALJ noted, Dr. Rabinoff failed to 

indicate that those areas were actually affected, and he failed to indicate the probability that they 

may be affected. AR 26, 1051. And, as the ALJ acknowledged, Dr. Rabinoff identified only 

that Plaintiff had mood swings in the past, but she was currently stable. AR 26, 1050. 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Plaintiff further argues that “[t]o the extent the ALJ found that Dr. Rabinoff did not 

provide sufficient information regarding the frequency or extent of Plaintiff’s mental limitations, 

the ALJ should have recontacted the doctor or otherwise developed the record by ordering a 

consultative psychological examination.” (Doc. 15 at 18.) However, an ALJ’s duty to develop 

the record further is triggered only where there is an inadequacy or ambiguity. Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is 

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the 

evidence.”). In this instance, there is no indication that the record was ambiguous or inadequate 

to allow for proper evaluation. The record included Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her mental 

impairments, the prior administrative medical findings of the state agency consultants regarding 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments, and the opinion of a consultative examiner, all of which were 

summarized by the ALJ. AR 22-23, 24. And, there was no indication by Plaintiff's counsel that 

the record failed to include Plaintiff's complete mental health treatment records. AR 40-41 

(counsel confirmed no additional evidence other than testimonial statements from Plaintiff’s 

mother and one of Plaintiff’s good friends, which would be admitted once dated copies were 

received by the ALJ). Absent any inadequacy or ambiguity in the record, the ALJ had no duty to 

further develop the record. See, e.g., Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(concluding the ALJ had no duty to recontact a medical source where the record was adequate to 

allow the ALJ to evaluate the evidence); Gonzalez v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-01676-SKO, 2023 

WL 6164086, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2023) (finding ALJ had no duty to develop the record 

further where record contained what appeared to be plaintiff's complete treatment records and no 

gaps or inconsistencies were noted).

Dr. Kirby’s Opinion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide specific or well-supported reasons for 

discounting Dr. Kirby’s assessment of upper extremity limitations. (Doc. 15 at 21.) 

Dr. Kirby completed a Physical RFC medical source opinion on March 24, 2021. AR 

1052-55. Dr. Kirby diagnosed Plaintiff with bilateral epicondylitis, with symptoms of severe 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

bilateral elbow pain, and clinical findings of bilateral “marked tenderness of lateral epicondyles.” 

AR 1052. Dr. Kirby opined that Plaintiff could rarely lift or carry less than five pounds. AR 

1052-53. He further opined that Plaintiff could use her hands to grasp, turn and twist objects 

12% of an 8-hour workday, could use her fingers for fine manipulations 12% of an 8-hour 

workday, and could reach with her right arm 12% of an 8-hour workday. AR 1054. 

The ALJ considered Dr. Kirby’s multiple form opinions, including those regarding the 

opined upper extremity limitations. The ALJ reasoned, in relevant part, as follows:

The undersigned has evaluated the multiple form opinion of John F. Kirby, M.D. 

(Exhibits C5F, C6F, C18F and C19F). On June 18, 2020, the doctor indicated 

that the claimant had an injury that occurred a decade prior and opined that the 

claimant was unable to do an illegible activity. However, he indicated that her 

ability to type was limited. The doctor failed to check the boxes in the form 

indicating the claimant’s work status. In addition, other than indicating that her 

ability to type was limited he offered no other restrictions. Therefore, his opinion 

is vague. The doctor filled out more similar forms on May 7, April 9, and January 

30, 2020. He also filled out more similar forms in 2018, 2019 and 2021. In those 

forms, the doctor also failed to check any boxes regarding the claimant’s work 

status and offered no restrictions at all. Therefore, those opinions are even more 

vague than the June 8, 2020 opinion. As the doctor’s opinions are vague and, in 

part, illegible, the undersigned finds them not be persuasive. In addition, the 

doctor completed another form on March 24, 2021 (Exhibit C18F). He noted that 

the claimant’s only diagnosis was tennis elbow. The doctor opined that the 

claimant could only lift and carry less than five pounds rarely. This assertion is 

not well supported by his own findings and is not consistent with the record as a 

whole. Therefore, the undersigned finds that portion of the opinion not to be 

persuasive. [ ] The doctor also opined that the claimant could only grasp, turn and 

twist objects and perform fine manipulation 12% of an eight-hour day. He opined 

that the claimant could only reach overhead with her right upper extremity 12% of 

the day. These assertions are only partly supported by the doctor’s own findings 

and have only limited [consistency] with the record as a whole, which shows that 

the claimant is less limited than the doctor opined. Therefore, the undersigned 

finds this portion of the doctor’s opinion not to be persuasive.

AR 25-26. 

The Court finds that the ALJ appropriately evaluated the persuasiveness of Dr. Kirby’s 

March 2021 opinion considering the factors of supportability and consistency. As to 

supportability, the ALJ found the opinion that Plaintiff could only lift and carry less than five 

pounds rarely was not supported by Dr. Kirby’s own findings. AR 25. As pointed out by the 

ALJ, Dr. Kirby diagnosed only tennis elbow. AR 25, 1052. However, Dr. Kirby included 

limited clinical findings and objective signs to support the opinion, identifying only tenderness of 

the lateral epicondyles, but no objective measures of strength, range of motion, or function. The 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

form also did not explain how tenderness and elbow pain supported severe limitations in lifting 

and carrying. Further, as the ALJ indicated, Dr. Kirby’s prior opinions included no relevant 

lifting or carrying restrictions, only a limitation regarding Plaintiff’s ability to type. AR 25. 

As to consistency, the ALJ found that Dr. Kirby’s lifting and carrying restrictions were 

inconsistent with the record as a whole. AR 25. In summarizing the medical evidence, the ALJ 

observed that in September 2019, despite complaints of bilateral arm pain, Plaintiff was found to 

have 5/5 muscle strength in her upper extremities. AR 19, 526-27. Additionally, the ALJ 

acknowledged that while Plaintiff had been diagnosed with tennis elbow, x-rays of her left elbow 

conducted in October 2019 revealed no significant findings. While she also had pain with range 

of motion in her left elbow, there was no indication of any reduction in her range of motion. AR 

19-20, 914 (left elbow “moderate pain w/motion;” left elbow x-ray “showed no significant 

finding”). 

Additionally, the ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of Dr. Kirby’s opinion that Plaintiff 

could only grasp, turn and twist objects and perform fine manipulation 12% of an eight-hour day

and could only reach overhead with her right upper extremity 12% of the day. AR 25-26. As to 

supportability, the ALJ found those limitations “only partly supported by the doctor’s own 

findings.” AR 26. As noted above, Dr. Kirby diagnosed only tennis elbow with objective 

findings of tenderness of the lateral epicondyles. The completed form did not include any 

diagnoses related to Plaintiff’s hands, wrists, or shoulders, and no clinical or objective findings 

related to grasping, turning, or twisting of objects, performing fine manipulations, or reaching. 

Additionally, in prior opinions, Dr. Kirby identified only a typing restriction. 

As to consistency, the ALJ found Dr. Kirby’s opinion to have “only limited” consistency 

with the record as a whole, which “shows that the claimant is less limited than the doctor 

opined.” AR 26. As indicated, the ALJ cited evidence of Plaintiff’s normal upper extremity 

strength and lack of significant x-ray findings or limited range of motion related to the left 

elbow, which are not consistent with Dr. Kirby’s reaching limitations. Notwithstanding, the ALJ 

developed an RFC that included limitations in lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, and not more 

than frequent handling bilaterally. AR 18. 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

Plaintiff argues that “Dr. Kirby’s assessment of upper extremity limitations was 

consistent with his own examination findings” that Plaintiff “had severe or marked tenderness in 

her elbows during examination.” (Doc. 15 at 22.) This argument is not persuasive for several 

reasons. First, it appears to conflate the supportability of Dr. Kirby’s opinion with consistency. 

Second, in the form, Dr. Kirby supported his opinion solely with a diagnosis of bilateral lateral 

epicondylitis and clinical findings of tenderness of the lateral epicondyles. AR 1052. Dr. Kirby 

did not identify any objective or clinical findings of reduced range of motion or reduced strength. 

Dr. Kirby also did not provide any objective findings (or even diagnoses) related to Plaintiff’s 

shoulders, wrists, hands, or fingers. AR 1052-55. Likewise, Plaintiff does not identify treatment 

records from Dr. Kirby with examination findings beyond those related to her elbows. Third, 

Plaintiff appears to seek a different interpretation of the medical evidence considered by the ALJ. 

However, “[w]here evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the 

ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” See Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 

2018).

Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. Kirby’s opinion is consistent with other evidence of record 

showing that Plaintiff had severe dysfunction in her upper extremities. To that end, Plaintiff 

cites to evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, including an electrodiagnostic study showing 

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and examination findings showing decreased sensation in her 

upper extremities, positive Tinel sign, worsened pain with wrist extension, decreased finger 

flexion, positive Phalen’s sign, and pain and tingling along the median nerve distribution (doc. 

15 at 22, citing AR 515, 522, 531, 535.) However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how these 

records are consistent with Dr. Kirby’s extreme limitations, particularly with respect to lifting, 

carrying, or reaching. Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate how those records are inconsistent with 

the ALJ’s RFC for limited lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling, and no more than frequent 

handling bilaterally. AR 18. 

Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ’s broad finding that Dr. Kirby’s opinion was not 

supported by his own findings and not consistent with the evidence as a whole does not provide 

the required specificity. (Doc. 15 at 21-22.) However, the ALJ’s reasoning is readily apparent 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

and reasonably discernable. As discussed, Dr. Kirby failed to identify objective or clinical 

findings supporting his opined physical limitations, and instead identified only a diagnosis of 

tennis elbow, findings of tenderness of the lateral epicondyles, and left elbow pain. AR 1052. 

Dr. Kirby provided no objective or clinical findings related to Plaintiff’s strength, range of 

motion, hands, wrists, or shoulders. The ALJ also clearly identified objective findings in the 

record related to Plaintiff’s upper extremities that were inconsistent with Dr. Kirby’s severe 

limitations, including normal strength in her upper extremities and no reduction in range of 

motion in her elbows. Even when an agency “explains its decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’” 

the Court must uphold it “if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” See Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)

B. Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting her symptom allegations were 

not clear and convincing. (Doc. 15 at 24.) 

In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must engage in a 

two-step analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014); Batson v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the claimant must produce objective 

medical evidence of her impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of 

the symptom or pain alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. If the claimant satisfies the first step 

and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. 

Id. at 1015. 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could cause 

some of the alleged symptoms, but discounted her statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms. AR 22. The ALJ was therefore required to 

provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

The ALJ generally discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because they were not 

consistent with her daily activities. AR 23. Relevant here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s 

assertion that her various alleged impairments affected her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

walk, sit, kneel, talk, use her hands, and climb stairs. AR 22. The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s 

allegations that her impairments affected her memory, concentration, and understanding, as well 

as her ability to follow instructions, complete tasks, get along with others, and care for her 

personal needs. AR 22-23. However, the ALJ appropriately determined that Plaintiff’s level of 

activity, which included living with others, preparing meals for herself, driving a car, going out in 

public three to four times a week, shopping in stores, going to the store one to three times week, 

shopping by phone, using electronic devices, and talking and texting others, was not congruent

with her allegations regarding her physical and mental limitations, lessening the persuasiveness of 

her claims. AR 14-15, 23 (referring to discussion at AR 14-15). An ALJ can properly discount a 

claimant’s subjective complaints when the daily activities demonstrate an inconsistency between 

what the claimant can do and the degree that disability is alleged. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112–1113; 

See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding ALJ was permitted to 

consider daily living activities in analysis of claimant’s allegations). Even where a claimant’s 

activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 

testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment. Molina, 

674 F.3d at 1113. 

The ALJ also considered that Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with the medical 

evidence. AR 23. While a lack of objective medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for 

discounting testimony, inconsistency with the medical evidence or medical opinions can be 

sufficient. See Woods v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-01110-SAB, 2022 WL 1524772, at 

*10 n.4 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2022) (citing Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161); see also Smartt v. 

Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When objective medical evidence in the record is 

inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as 

undercutting such testimony.”); accord Dittmer v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-01378-

SAB, 2024 WL 967439, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2024) (“Ninth Circuit caselaw has distinguished 

testimony that is ‘uncorroborated’ by the medical evidence from testimony that is ‘contradicted’ 

by the medical records, deeming the latter sufficient on its own to meet the clear and convincing 

standard.”). For instance, the ALJ indicated that despite her impairments, Plaintiff was repeatedly 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

found to be in no acute distress or to be in no distress at all. AR 23, see also AR 527, 533, 540, 

928. Further, the ALJ noted the inconsistency between Plaintiff’s assertions that she uses a 

walker or cane at all times and the records indicating that she had a normal gait on multiple 

occasions, no assistive device use was noted in those exams, and she was negative for gait 

disturbance in multiple review of symptoms notations. AR 19-22, 23, 511-12 (podiatric office 

visit, “ambulating in stiff soled shoes”), 512-13 (same), 517 (negative for gait problem), 532-33, 

540 (normal gait), 878 (negative for gait disturbance), 884 (same), 890 (same), 928 (normal gait). 

Further, the ALJ also found Plaintiff’s allegations inconsistent with her doctor’s August 2019 

advice to engage in brisk walking for 30 minutes a day at least five days a week. AR 19, 23, 929. 

The ALJ also pointed out that while Plaintiff was prescribed a rolling walker, there were multiple 

treatment visits where no assistive device use was noted. The ALJ further observed that as 

recently as March 24, 2021, Dr. Kirby indicated that Plaintiff did not need to use a cane, a walker, 

or any other assistive device. AR 23, 1054. 

The ALJ also acknowledged that while Plaintiff had been diagnosed with tennis elbow, xrays of her left elbow conducted in October 2019 revealed no significant findings. AR 19-20, 23, 

914. Also, on October 18, 2019, while Plaintiff was found to have some tenderness in her left 

elbow and it was noted that she had some pain with range of motion, there was no indication of 

any reduction in range of motion. AR 20, 23, 914. Additionally, the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff 

was found to have 5/5 muscle strength in both her upper and lower extremities. AR 19, 23, 527, 

533, 541. An ALJ may consider a lack of supporting medical evidence to discount subjective 

complaints provided it is not the only reason, as is the case here. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Bunnell

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991).

In addition, the ALJ considered that while Plaintiff had been diagnosed with obstructive 

sleep apnea, it was treated with a continuous positive airway pressure device. AR 21, 23, 847. 

The effectiveness of medication or treatment is a relevant factor in determining the severity of a 

claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3); Wellington v. Berryhill, 

878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical treatment successfully relieving 

symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”). Further, the ALJ considered that on repeated 

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

respiratory exams, Plaintiff’s lungs were noted to be clear to auscultation and her oxygen 

saturation level was repeatedly found to be above 95%. AR 19-20, 23, 458, 465, 914, 928, 943.

Based on the above, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing 

reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) is denied.

2. The Commissioner’s request to affirm the agency’s determination (Doc. 17) is 

granted.

3. The Clerk of this Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant 

Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Christin Kay Baer, 

and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:21-cv-01701-BAM Document 20 Filed 01/13/25 Page 23 of 23