Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02102/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02102-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Moore
Defendant
Darryl Walker
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL WALKER,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

D. MOORE,

 Defendant.

1:13-cv-02102-DAD-EPG-PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATRIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT 

MOORE‟S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT BE DENIED

(ECF No. 34)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

TWENTY DAYS

Plaintiff Darryl Walker, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the Sierra Conservation Center in Jamestown, has 

alleged a claim under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Correctional Officer (C/O) Moore 

for use of excessive physical force. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on June 20, 2011, C/O 

Moore came to Plaintiff‟s cell, placed him in handcuffs and slammed him into the wall of Unit D-3. 

He alleges that C/O Moore “bent back plaintiff‟s wrist causing extreme pain.” Complaint, p. 3 ¶IV; 

ECF No. 1.

Defendant Moore has moved for summary judgment. He claims that (1) he did not utilize 

any force against Plaintiff, much less excessive force; (2) any alleged injury suffered by Plaintiff 

was de minimis in nature; and (3) Defendant Moore is entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court finds that Defendant Moore has presented undisputed evidence that he did 

not place Plaintiff in handcuffs. However, Defendant Moore does not specifically address the 

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allegation that he also used excessive force to slam Plaintiff into a wall, and Plaintiff has 

submitted evidence supporting his allegations that Defendant Moore did so. Moreover, while 

Plaintiff‟s injuries may be de minimis, it is not clear that the force used was also de minimis and 

Defendant Moore does not present any evidence to refute Plaintiff‟s allegations on that point. 

While the ultimate factfinder may very well find that Defendant Moore‟s use of force was 

reasonable, the Court finds that it cannot come to that conclusion drawing all inferences in 

favor of Plaintiff based on the evidence presented. Summary judgment is thus denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Walker filed his complaint in this Court on December 19, 2013. He alleges the 

following:

June 20, 2011, CDC Officer Moore, Defendant John Doe #1, #2, #3, and #4 

came to Plaintiff‟s cell at Pleasant Valley State Prison, at 10:15 pm handcuffed 

Plaintiff and slammed into wall of the D-3 unit Bldg. Officer Moore and 

Defendant John Doe #1 bend back Plaintiff‟s wrist causing extreme pain while 

John Doe #2, 3, and 4 stood by without intervention. Plaintiff then placed in a 

medical center “holding cage” until 11:15 pm, where he was released and 

returned unescorted to his cell. Plaintiff later treated by medical staff for 

sprained wrist and mental health staff for mental distress June 22, 2011.

Complaint, p. 3, ECF No. 1.

The Court1screened Plaintiff‟s complaint and held that Plaintiff had stated a claim 

against Defendant Moore for use of excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. (ECF No. 8) Specifically, the Court held that “liberally construed, Plaintiff has 

stated a claim for relief against Defendant Moore for excessive force. Plaintiff has alleged facts 

indicating that Defendant Moore, while Plaintiff was restrained and offering no resistance

slammed Plaintiff into a wall.” (ECF No. 8, p. 2) The Court went on to dismiss claims against 

the Doe Defendants, while giving leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiff decided to stand on 

his original complaint. 

Defendant Moore filed the instant motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2015. 

Defendant claims that undisputed facts establish that Defendant Moore “neither handcuffed, 

 

1 Magistrate Judge Gary Austin presided over the case at that time and issued this decision. 

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escorted, nor used any force against Walker,” that Plaintiff‟s injury was de minimus, and that 

Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 34, p. 1) Plaintiff opposed the motion 

on August 5, 2015, and included a declaration by himself and also one from another prisoner, 

Jelani King. (ECF No. 35). Defendant did not file any reply, and the matter is now before the 

Court. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks 

omitted); Washington Mutual Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party‟s 

position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to 

particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, 

declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence 

or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence 

to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may 

consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 

(9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

Defendant does not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for summary 

judgment, he need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff‟s case. In re Oracle 

Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986)). If Defendant meets his initial burden, the burden 

then shifts to Plaintiff “to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues 

for trial.” In re Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). This 

requires Plaintiff to “show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)).

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In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 

509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine 

issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. 

City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1566 (2012). The Court determines only whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial and in doing so, it must liberally construe Plaintiff‟s filings because he is 

a pro se prisoner. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

B. Excessive Force

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends on the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is 

. . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is 

evidence. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth 

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 

cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical 

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort „repugnant to the conscience of mankind.‟” 

Id. at 9-10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in 

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and 

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unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the 

responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant 

to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id.

C. Legal Standards for Qualified Immunity

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct 

violates Aclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.@ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 

(1982). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public 

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials 

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id.

In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must 

decide (1) whether facts alleged or shown by plaintiff make out a violation of constitutional 

right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer's alleged 

misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of 

the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the 

particular case at hand.” Id. at 236. In resolving these issues, the Court must view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of 

plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. ANALYSIS

In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that “Walker was handcuffed 

and escorted from his cell to the Medical Clinic holding cell by Sergeant Pease. Defendant 

Moore took no part in these actions, and had no physical contact with Walker on June 20, 

2011.” Motion at 6:16-22, ECF No. 34-1. In support, Defendant submits declarations from 

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Defendant Moore and B. Pease, supporting this version of events under penalty of perjury. 

(ECF No. 34-4 and 34-5). 

In response, Plaintiff submits two declarations, from Plaintiff Walker and fellow 

prisoner Jelani King. Plaintiff‟s declaration states in relevant part, “I was pushed forcefully 

against the outter [sic] wall of Building 3 left of the unit entrence [sic].” (ECF No. 35, p. 2) 

King‟s declaration states in relevant part “from my vantage point I was able to see the building 

c/o Moore have his hands in the middle of walker‟s wrist by the links of the cuffs forcefully 

propelling him forward out of the building.” (ECF No. 35, p. 5) 

These conflicting declarations present a dispute of fact that cannot be resolved on 

summary judgment. To do so would require credibility determinations that would be improper 

at this stage. Plaintiff has presented evidence in the form of a declaration that supports his 

complaint at least regarding the force used against the wall. Thus, the Court cannot grant 

Defendant‟s summary judgment based on the evidence Defendant has presented denying any 

use of force against Plaintiff. 

Defendant next argues that summary judgment is appropriate because “Walker suffered 

only a very minor injury from Defendant Moore‟s alleged use of excessive force.” (ECF No. 

34-1, at 6:23-24) In support, Defendant includes a declaration of B. Pease stating under penalty 

of perjury that “At no point during, or following this incident, did I observe any injury to 

Plaintiff, nor did Plaintiff make any complaints to me regarding any injuries suffered as a result 

of this incident.” (ECF No. 34-5 at 3:9-11) Defendant also attaches the video interview of 

Plaintiff, in which plaintiff describes his injury as “twisted, bent up on my wrist” and “I still got 

pain in my wrist and my thumb.” (ECF 34-6, pp. 4, 5) Plaintiff does not address this issue in 

his response, so the Court takes as undisputed that the only injuries Plaintiff suffered were 

twisted bent wrist that cause him pain in his wrist and thumb. 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff‟s physical injury is de minimis. However, that alone is 

insufficient to find in favor of Defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Wilkins v. 

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1176-77, 175 L. Ed. 2d 995 (2010) “the use of 

excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] 

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when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Id. at 34 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 4 (1992)). The Wilkins Court went on to reverse a district court‟s dismissal of an 

excessive force claim “[b]ecause the District Court's approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds 

with Hudson's direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather 

than the extent of the injury . . . .” Id. at 38. The Ninth Circuit has applied Wilkins to reverse a 

district court‟s grant of summary judgment based purely on the de minimis nature of the injury. 

Holland v. Bach, 408 F. App'x 69, 70 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating and remanding the district 

court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on excessive force claim, stating 

“[t]he district court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

defendants inflicted more than „de minimis‟ injury upon Holland. However, the Supreme Court 

recently emphasized that the „core judicial inquiry‟ is „not whether a certain quantum of injury 

was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm‟”). Wilkins 559 U.S. at 37.

Thus, the relevant question is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” This is a very 

difficult question to resolve based on the facts presented by the parties because Defendant 

Moore denies using any force at all, and Plaintiff‟s description of the force used is very 

minimal. Ultimately, the Court finds that it cannot grant summary judgment in favor of 

Defendant Moore based on the facts presented. While it appears very possible the force at 

issue, if any was used at all, was de minimis, there are also sufficient facts to indicate that force 

at that time would not have been a good-faith effort to restore discipline. First, Plaintiff would 

have been handcuffed at the time of the alleged force. Second, the declaration of witness King 

states “C/O Moore responds „you don‟t want to fuck with me I‟ll make your fucken [sic] life 

miserable‟” immediately before the incident in question. (ECF No. 35, p. 4) These alleged 

facts indicate that if Defendant Moore truly slammed Plaintiff against the wall, as Plaintiff 

claims, it may have been in order to maliciously and sadistically cause harm, rather than for 

good faith purposes. 

The Court thus denies Defendant Moore‟s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff 

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Walker‟s excessive force claim.

Finally, Defendant Moore argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity “because he 

violated no constitutional right.” Motion at 8:4-7, ECF No. 34-1. This argument is based on 

the same analysis as the excessive force claim, i.e. that “Moore did not use excessive force 

against Walker, and was neither involved in his handcuffing or escort, and therefore did not 

violate Walker‟s Eighth Amendment rights.” Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has 

presented evidence to contradict Defendant‟s version of events, as described above, 

Defendant‟s related request for a grant of qualified immunity is also denied.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds disputed questions of fact that preclude 

summary judgment on Plaintiff‟s claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment against Defendant Moore. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that Defendant Moore‟s motion for summary judgment, filed on June 29, 2015, be DENIED.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within twenty 

(20) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 

written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to 

Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be 

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2015 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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