Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00530/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00530-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marion Chillis
Plaintiff
Scott Kernan
Defendant
Robert Neuschmid
Defendant
Brian D. Oliver
Defendant
A. Petty
Defendant
M. Voong
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARION CHILLIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROBERT NEUSCHMID, et al. 

Defendants. 

No. 2:19-cv-0530-KJM-EFB P 

ORDER 

Plaintiff proceeds without counsel in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The court previously dismissed plaintiff’s initial complaint with leave to amend, finding that it 

failed, for screening purposes, to state a valid claim. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint, ECF No. 13, and for the reasons stated below, it also fails to state a cognizable claim. 

Screening 

 I. Legal Standards 

 Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the 

allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it 

fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 

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(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of 

his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

a cause of action's elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are 

true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable 

legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations 

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in 

the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must 

satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 

8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-563 (2007). 

II. Analysis 

 Plaintiff alleges that an arrangement between the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and a contracting corporation, Global Tel*Link Corporation 

(“GTC”), have frustrated his ability to make collect phone calls to his mother in Alabama. ECF 

No. 13 at 5. Specifically, he claims that GTC encouraged inmates to make their calls by way of 

prepaid calling plans (offered, naturally, through GTC). Id. Plaintiff argues that this practice – 

and the CDCR’s acceptance of the same – violates state law, the federal Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), and his constitutional rights. Id. at 5-7. Over the course of his 

complaint, he alleges that he filed numerous administrative appeals which alerted the CDCR 

officials named as defendants1 (Robert Neuschmid, Scott Kernan, M. Voong, and A. Petty) to the 

violations alleged above. Plaintiff alleges that no action was taken. 

1

 Plaintiff has also named Brian D. Oliver, the CEO of GTC, as a defendant. ECF No. 13 

at 15. 

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 As an initial matter, plaintiff may not pursue an action based solely on the theory that 

CDCR and GTL’s action violate state law. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 

F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1998) (“state law violations do not, on their own, give rise to liability 

under § 1983”). 

And the TCPA does nothing to avail him. The TCPA provides that it shall be “unlawful 

for any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for 

emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any 

automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone 

number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service . . . for which the called party is charged for 

the call.” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii). But plaintiff does nothing to explain how GTC’s actions 

violated his rights under the TCPA. Rather, he appears to allege that the corporation’s actions 

may have violated his mother’s rights under the TCPA. ECF No. 13 at 5 (“The [TCPA] forbids 

GTL from using the prison phone system to contact anyone (including my mother) in such a 

manner without their prior express consent.”). His mother is not, however, a party to this suit and 

plaintiff offers no argument as to why he has standing to bring a TCPA claim on her behalf. 

Next, plaintiff may not pursue any claim based on defendants’ denial or cancellation of his 

prison grievances. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 

district court correctly found that “because inmates have no constitutional right to a prison 

grievance system, the actions of the prison officials in reviewing his internal appeal cannot create 

liability under § 1983”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also 

Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.2011) (“[T]he alleged mishandling of [a prisoner's] 

grievance by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states 

no claim.”). 

 The only question that remains is whether GTC’s alleged interference with plaintiff’s 

collect calls states a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that “[a]lthough prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, this right 

is subject to reasonable limitations arising from the legitimate penological and administrative 

interests of the prison system.” Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000). In 

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Johnson, the court held that “[t]here is no authority for the proposition that prisoners are entitled 

to a specific rate for their telephone calls . . . .” Id.; see also Strandberg v. Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 

747 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If the limitations on [phone] access are reasonable, there is no first 

amendment violation.”). Here plaintiff appears to indicate that inmates who purchase the prepaid 

calling plans which he finds objectionable (rather than using collect calls) can make phone calls. 

ECF No. 13 at 5. Plaintiff does not allege that those prepaid calling plans are exorbitantly 

expensive or otherwise impossible to acquire. Thus, the court concludes that he has failed to state 

a viable claim based on a violation of his First Amendment rights. 

The court will offer plaintiff one final opportunity to amend. 

III. Leave to Amend 

 Plaintiff is cautioned that any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only 

persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of his constitutional 

rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to 

perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). Plaintiff may also 

include any allegations based on state law that are so closely related to his federal allegations that 

“they form the same case or controversy.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

 The amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Nor may he bring unrelated claims against 

multiple defendants. Id. 

 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 

without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

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being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967)). 

 Any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in fulfilling the above 

requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of procedural or factual 

background which has no bearing on his legal claims. He should also take pains to ensure that his 

amended complaint is as legible as possible. This refers not only to penmanship, but also spacing 

and organization. Plaintiff should carefully consider whether each of the defendants he names 

actually had involvement in the constitutional violations he alleges. A “scattershot” approach in 

which plaintiff names dozens of defendants will not be looked upon favorably by the court. 

Conclusion 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 13) is dismissed with leave to amend 

within 30 days from the date of service of this order; and 

 2. Failure to file an amended complaint that complies with this order may result in 

the dismissal of this action without further leave to amend for the reasons stated herein. 

DATED: April 22, 2020. 

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