Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02049/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02049-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Arnold
Respondent
Darryl Davonn John Newton
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARRYL DAVONN JOHN NEWTON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-2049-EFB P 

ORDER 

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254.1 He has paid the filing fee. 

 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief. See Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983) (Rule 4 “explicitly 

allows a district court to summarily dismiss the petition on the merits when no claim for relief is 

stated”). Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus on its own 

motion under Rule 4. However, the court should not dismiss a petition without leave to amend 

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 This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) and is before the undersigned pursuant to petitioner’s consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; 

see also E.D. Cal. Local Rules, Appx. A, at (k)(4). 

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unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. 

Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). For the reasons explained below, the petition is 

dismissed, without leave to amend, on the ground that the claims raised therein are neither 

cognizable nor exhausted.2 

Petitioner claims that he has accumulated nine rule violation reports and eleven custodial 

counseling reports since being incarcerated. He seeks habeas relief to have his disciplinary 

record expunged because the Board of Parole Hearings repeatedly cites his institutional behavior 

as a reason to deny him parole. Petitioner claims that he received a rules violation report after his 

last parole suitability hearing in 2013. He fears that this disciplinary infraction will prevent him 

from advancing the hearing date for his next parole suitability hearing, which is not set to occur 

until the year 2020. He argues that if the Board were to exclude his institutional behavior in 

considering him for parole, it is more likely that he would be found suitable, thereby affecting the 

duration of his confinement. He also complains that his disciplinary record will “come back to 

haunt” him at future hearings and will make it “very hard” to get out of prison. 

The fact that the Board has and will consider petitioner’s disciplinary record in 

determining his suitability for parole is not a proper basis for federal habeas relief. As petitioner 

acknowledges throughout his petition, institutional behavior is an appropriate factor for the Board 

to consider in determining an inmate’s suitability for parole. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 2402(c)(6) (listing “serious misconduct in prison or jail” as “circumstance tending to show 

unsuitability”). Thus, it is entirely proper for the Board to consider petitioner’s pattern of 

misconduct in determining whether he is suitable for parole. “Habeas relief is appropriate if, and 

only if, the adverse disciplinary finding — the decision with nexus to the duration of petitioner’s 

confinement, and thus the only decision reviewable in habeas — is itself constitutionally infirm.” 

Alcala v. Martel, No. 2:10-cv-3448-KJM-AC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145515, at *16 (E.D. Cal. 

Oct. 9, 2014). Petitioner does not claim that any of his nine rule violation reports and eleven 

custodial counseling reports is constitutionally infirm, and thus, fails to state a cognizable claim 

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 The court may raise the failure to exhaust issue sua sponte and may summarily dismiss 

on that ground. See Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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for federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus available for violations of the 

Constitution or federal law.) 

Petitioner also claims that he was “not required to exhaust the claims raised” in his 

petition and that he “is eligible to file . . . in the United States District Court which is the only 

available corrective process open to [him].” ECF No. 1 at 3. Petitioner is mistaken. 

A district court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless “the applicant 

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless there is no State 

corrective process or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights 

of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by 

presenting the “substance of his federal habeas corpus claim” to the state courts. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). For a 

California prisoner to exhaust, he must present his claims to the California Supreme Court on 

appeal in a petition for review or on post-conviction in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 223, 239-40 (2002) (describing California’s habeas corpus procedure); 

Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (to exhaust, prisoner must present claims on 

appeal to California Supreme Court in a petition for review). Unless the respondent specifically 

consents to the court entertaining unexhausted claims, a petition containing such claims must be 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3); Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. 

Here, petitioner concedes he has not exhausted his claim and does not purport to have 

obtained from the respondent an express waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Thus, petitioner 

has failed to exhaust state court remedies, as the California Supreme Court has not yet had the 

opportunity to resolve petitioner’s claim on its merits. See Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 

1086 (9th Cir. 2002). This action must therefore be summarily dismissed. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is dismissed without leave to 

amend and the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

DATED: April 27, 2015. 

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