Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10277/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10277-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Xiaoying Tang Dowai
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

XIAOYING TANG DOWAI,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10277

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00014-RVM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands

Ramona V. Manglona, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 15, 2016

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed October 17, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Consuelo M.

Callahan and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

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2 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions in a case in which the

defendant asserted that she was deprived of her constitutional

right to an independent judiciary because the Northern

Mariana Islands District Court – which was created by statute

and whose judges lack the secure tenure required by Article

III of the Constitution – is not properly established under the

Constitution.

The panel explained that the language of 48 U.S.C.

§§ 1821 and 1822 shows that Congress intentionally created

the NMI District Court and gave it criminal jurisdiction over

criminal prosecutions; that Congress did so based on the

authority conferred on it by Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of

the Constitution; and that this maywell be sufficient to defeat

the defendant’s heavy burden of showing that Congress

exceeded its constitutional bounds. 

The panel wrote that the defendant’s challenge to the

NMI District Court’s authority fails completely in light of

Supreme Court precedent that has rejected challenges similar

to hers.

The panel rejected the defendant’s other challenges to her

conviction in a memorandum disposition.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 3

COUNSEL

Joseph E. Horey (argued), O’Connor Berman Dotts & Banes,

Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Garth R. Backe (argued) and Ross K. Naughton, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Alicia A.G. Limtiaco, United States

Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Saipan,

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Xiaoying Tang Dowai (“Tang”), a native of China,

appeals her convictions for visa fraud, making a false

statement, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. On

appeal, she asserts she has been deprived of her constitutional

right to an independent federal judiciary because the Northern

Mariana Islands District Court (“NMI District Court”) is not

properly established under the Constitution. We hold that

Tang was properly tried in the NMI District Court and affirm

her conviction.1

I

Tang came to Saipan from China in 2002 and worked in

several garment factories. When her employment contract

1 We reject Tang’s other challenges to her conviction in a

memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

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4 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

expired in 2009, Tang was unable to find another contract

employer. In order for Tang to remain in Saipan, her

boyfriend, Shahadat Hossain (known as Chico), approached

Jesse Dowai, a native of Saipan, and asked him if he would

help out by marrying a Chinese woman. Chico told Dowai he

would pay him $500. Dowai agreed to the proposition and

married Tang in September 2009. Chico was present at the

marriage and gave Dowai $500.

Following the marriage ceremony, Tang and Dowai never

lived together and never spent any time together in the

absence of Chico. Tang’s marriage to Dowai made her

eligible for an “immediate relative” (“IR”) entry permit under

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”)

law, pursuant to which she could reside and work on Saipan

without a contract. Tang secured work as a cashier in a poker

room through November 2011.

At that time there was a change in the law and Tang’s IR

status no longer allowed her to work. She was advised that if

she wanted to keep working she would have to apply for

lawful permanent resident status. Accordingly, she applied

for a green card. Tang’s application asserted that she was

married to Dowai and that they had lived together since

October 2009.

Tang was initially indicted in October 2013 in the NMI

District Court. Her motion to dismiss the indictment on

constitutional grounds was denied and a superseding

indictment issued on January 21, 2014, charging her with

conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371),

visa fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)), and making a false

statement (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)). The jury found Tang

guilty on all three charges.

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 5

After the NMI District Court denied Tang’s post-trial

motion for judgment of acquittal and arrest of judgment, she

was sentenced to a term of two years’ probation. Tang filed

a timely notice of appeal.

II

Tang’s most serious contention on appeal, at least in

terms of its potential consequences, is that because the judges

of the NMI District Court lack the secure tenure required by

Article III of the Constitution, her trial for violations of

Title 18 in that court violates Article III.

2

In support of her

position, Tang notes that the NMI District Court is created by

statute, 48 U.S.C. § 1821(b), and objects that NMI District

Court judges serve ten-year terms and can be removed by the

President alone.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that

we review de novo. United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d

1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Harris, 185 F.3d

999, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999). However, Tang has the

considerable burden of making a plain showing that Congress

exceeded its constitutional bounds in creating the NMI

District Court. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607

(2000) (“Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch

of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional

enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has

exceeded its constitutional bounds.”).

Tang is correct that the NMI District Court is not an

Article III court and its judges are not Article III judges. 

2 Tang does not allege that being tried in the NMI District Court

otherwise violated any of her constitutional rights.

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6 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

Indeed, the Supreme Court in Nguyen v. United States,

539 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2003), stated that the NMI District Court

“is not an Article III court but an Article IV territorial court

with subject matter substantially similar to the jurisdiction of

the District Court of Guam.” But it does not follow that the

NMI District Court lacked authority to try Tang.

A. The NMI District Court was established by

Congress pursuant to its authority under Article

IV of the Constitution.

Despite the Supreme Court’s statement, Tang asserts that

the NMI District Court is not a territorial court created

pursuant to Congress’ authority under Article IV of the

Constitution, but an Article I treaty court. Tang explains that

Article II of the Constitution gives the President the power to

make treaties, and the terms of a treaty are implemented by

Congress under its Article I powers, including its power

under the Necessary and Proper Clause and its power to

“constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” See

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). Article IV,

Section 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “to

dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations

respecting the territory or other property belonging to the

United States.” (emphasis added).

We have recognized the “unique political relationship

between the [Northern Mariana Islands] and the United

States.” Com. of N. Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682,

684 (9th Cir. 1984). From 1947 until 1975, the United States

exercised “powers of administration, legislation, and

jurisdiction” over the CNMI under a United Nations

Trusteeship. Id. However, in 1975, the people of the CNMI

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 7

chose to become a self-governing commonwealth under

United States sovereignty. Id. at 685.

Whatever the initial authority for the United States

exercising authority over the CNMI, the Covenant to

Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

in Political Union with the United States, coupled with

Congress’ approval of the Covenant in Joint Resolution of

March 24, 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263, reprinted

in 48 U.S.C. § 1681), established Congress’ authority over

the CNMI under Article IV of the Constitution. The

Covenant states that the people of the CNMI, exercising

“their inalienable right of self-determination, . . . have clearly

expressed their desire for political union with the United

States.”3 The United States, in return, while recognizing that

the people of the CNMI “have the right of local selfgovernment,” agreed to “have complete responsibility for and

3

 Section 105 of the Covenant further states:

The United States may enact legislation in accordance

with its constitutional processes which will be

applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands, but if such

legislation cannot also be made applicable to the

several States the Northern Mariana Islands must be

specifically named therein for it to become effective in

the Northern Mariana Islands. In order to respect the

right of self-government guaranteed by this Covenant

the United States agrees to limit the exercise of that

authority so that the fundamental provisions of this

Covenant, namely Articles I II and III and Section 501

and 805, may be modified only with the consent of the

Government of the United States and the Government

of the Northern Mariana Islands.

Reprinted in Pub. L. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976). Title 48 U.S.C. § 1821

specifically names the CNMI as required by Section 105.

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8 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

authority with respect to matters relating to foreign affairs

and defense affecting the Northern Mariana Islands.” Pub. L.

No. 94-241 (Sections 103 and 104).

In conjunction with the Covenant to Establish a

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political

Union with the United States of America, Congress, in

November 1977, passed legislation that has been codified in

Title 48 U.S.C. § 1821. See Pub. L. 95-157, 91 Stat. 1265

(1977). Title 48 U.S.C. § 1821(a) establishes “for and within

the Northern Mariana Islands a court of record to be known

as the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands.” 

Subsection (b) provides for the President to appoint, with the

advice and consent of the Senate, a judge for the NMI District

Court “who shall hold office for a term of ten years and until

his successor is chosen and qualified, unless sooner removed

by the President for cause.” Section 1822 states that:

The district court shall have original

jurisdiction in all causes in the Northern

Mariana Islands not described in subsection

(a) of this section jurisdiction over which is

not vested by the Constitution or laws of the

Northern Mariana Islands in a court or courts

of the Northern Mariana Islands.

Moreover, Congress clearly intended that the NMI District

Court have jurisdiction over criminal cases as the legislation

provided that “[i]n causes brought in the district court solely

on the basis of this subsection, the district court shall be

considered a court of the Northern Mariana Islands for the

purposes of determining the requirements of indictment by

grand jury or trial by jury.” See id.

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 9

The language of 48 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1822 clearly

shows that Congress intentionally created the NMI District

Court and gave it jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions. 

Congress did so based on the authority conferred on it by

Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution.4 This,

indeed, may well be sufficient in itself to defeat Tang’s heavy

burden of showing that Congress “exceeded its constitutional

bounds.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.5 However, Tang’s

challenge to the NMI District Court’s authority fails

completely in light of Supreme Court precedent that has

rejected challenges similar to hers.

4 None of the cases cited by Tang compels a different conclusion. In

Atalig, we implied that Congress administers the CNMI under Article IV. 

723 F.2d at 689 (noting that the doctrine of incorporation “is designed to

limit the power of Congress to administer territories under Article VI of

the Constitution”). In Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 858 F.2d 1369, 1371 n.1.

(9th Cir. 1988), we noted that the “CNMI has a unique relationship with

the United States” and commented on the relationship under the

Trusteeship, but not under the Joint Resolution. In Morgan Guaranty

Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1244 (2d Cir. 1991), the

Second Circuit, after describing the unique nature of a trust territory, took

“judicial notice of the fact that the United Nations Security Council has

approved the termination ofthe trusteeship arrangement as to the Northern

Mariana Islands, which has acquired the status of commonwealth.”

5 Moreover, Tang has failed to show that it makes any difference

whether Congress’ creation of the NMI District Court derives from its

authority under Article IV or Article I of the Constitution. The grounds

for holding that the NMI District Court has authority to convict Tang as

an Article IV court also support its authority to convict Tang as an Article

I court.

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10 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

B. The Supreme Court has rejected similar

challenges to non-Article III courts.

In Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973),

Palmore challenged his conviction of a felony under the

District of Columbia Code because the District of Columbia

judge did “not have protection with respect to tenure and

salary under Art. III of the Constitution.” Id. at 390. Writing

for the Court, Justice White described Palmore’s position as

being “that an Art. III judge must preside over every

proceeding in which a charge, claim or defense is based on an

Act of Congress or a law made under its authority.” Id. at

400. “At the very least, [Palmore] asserts that criminal

offenses under the laws passed by Congress may not be

prosecuted except in courts established pursuant to Art. III.” 

Id. This is precisely Tang’s position.

But the Supreme Court was not impressed. It held that

Congress “was not constitutionally required to create inferior

Art. III courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial

power of the United States, including those criminal cases

arising under the laws of the United States.”6Id. at 401. The

6

 The Supreme Court continued:

Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it

required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was

authorized to bestow under Art. III. “[T]he judicial

power of the United States . . . is (except in enumerated

instances, applicable exclusively to this court)

dependent for its distribution and organization, and for

the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of

Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the

tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) . . . and of

investing them with jurisdiction either limited,

concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 11

Court further commented “[n]or, more particularly has the

enforcement of federal criminal law been deemed the

exclusive province of federal Art. III courts.” Id. at 402. The

Supreme Court then specifically addressed Article IV courts:

It is also true that throughout our history,

Congress has exercised its power under Art.

IV to ‘make all needful Rules and Regulations

respecting the Territory or other Property

belonging to the United States’ by creating

territorial courts and manning them with

judges appointed for a term of years. These

courts have not been deemed subject to the

strictures of Art. III, even though they

characteristically enforced not only the civil

and criminal laws of Congress applicable

throughout the United States, but also the laws

applicable only within the boundaries of the

particular territory.

Id. at 402–03. The Court noted that “[t]erritorial courts,

therefore, have regularlytried criminal cases arising under the

general laws of Congress, as well as those brought under

territorial laws.” Id. at 403 (footnotes omitted).

In the final section of its opinion, the Supreme Court

reiterated that neither it nor Congress had read the

jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and

character which to Congress may seem proper for the

public good.” Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245,

11 L.Ed. 576 (1845).

411 U.S. at 401.

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12 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

Constitution to require “every criminal prosecution . . . to be

tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime

tenure and protection against salary reduction.” Id. at 407. 

Rather, the requirements of Art. III “must in proper

circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of

power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized

areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive

treatment.” Id. at 408.

C. Tang’s challenge to the NMI District Court

misreads Supreme Court precedent.

In response to this approach, Tang argues that Article IV

does not apply because the “CNMI is not so remote and its

relation to the United States is not so impermanent that an

exception to the requirements of Article III is justified.” She

appears to extract this suggested limitation on Congressional

authority under Article IV from an observation in Justice

Harlan’s opinion in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962),

and possibly O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516

(1933). However, this argument fails for three reasons. First,

Justice Harlan’s opinion was not an opinion joined by a

majority of the justices.7 Second, Glidden precedes and thus

is superseded by Palmore, 411 U.S. 389, which, as noted,

expressly affirms Congress’ authority to create and maintain

Article IV courts. Third, and dispositive, the Court in

Glidden was concerned with defining an Article III court, not

with limiting the authority of an Article IV court.

7 Only Justices Brennan and Stewart joined Justice Harlan’s opinion. 

Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion which was joined by Chief

Justice Warren. Justice Douglas wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice

Black. Justice Frankfurter and Justice White took no part in the decision

in the case.

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 13

The issue in Glidden was whether the United States Court

of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court

of Claims were Article III courts or “had been created by

virtue of other substantive powers possessed by Congress.” 

Glidden, 370 U.S. at 531. The Court held that the courts were

created under Article III and that their judges “have been

constitutionally protected in tenure and compensation.” Id.

at 584. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Harlan noted that

Congress had declared that the courts were Article III courts.8

Id. at 540–43.

In the course of his opinion, Justice Harlan endorsed

Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in American Insurance

Company v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L. Ed. 242 (1828). In

Canter, the Court rejected a challenge to the Superior Courts

of Florida based on the fact that their judges were appointed

for only four years. The Court concluded that Article III did

not apply in the territories because they were “legislative

Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty

which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause

which enables Congress to make all needful rules and

regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United

States.” 1 Pet. at 546. In Glidden, Justice Harlan explained

that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion established “that in the

territories cases and controversies falling within the

enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts

constituted without regard to the limitations of that article;

that is, having judges of limited tenure and entertaining

8

Justices Clark and Douglas agreed that the Court of Claims and the

Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were Article III courts. 370 U.S. at

586–87.

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14 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

business beyond the range of conventional cases and

controversies.” Glidden, 370 U.S. at 545.9

Justice Harlan noted that “Article III has been viewed as

inapplicable to courts created in unincorporated territories

outside the mainland” as well as “to the consular courts

established by concessions from foreign countries.” Id. at

547. While discussing these courts, Justice Harlan did

observe that when “the peculiar reasons justifying investiture

of judges with limited tenure have not been present, the

Canter holding has not been deemed controlling.” Id. at 548

(citing O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 536–39). However, this

observation was made in support of the determination that the

Court of Claims and Court of Custom and Patent Appeals

were Article III courts. In context, Justice Harlan’s

observation cannot be read as suggesting that the authority of

a non-Article III court established by Congress might

somehow erode with the passage of time or because of

changes in the local setting. Indeed, in Glidden, Justice

9

 Justice Harlan further noted:

It would have been doctrinaire in the extreme to deny

the right of Congress to invest judges of its creation

with authority to dispose of the judicial business of the

territories. It would have been at least as dogmatic,

having recognized the right, to fasten on those judges a

guarantee of tenure that Congress could not put to use

and that the exigencies of the territories did not require. 

Marshall chose neither course; conscious as ever of his

responsibility to see the Constitution work, he

recognized a greater flexibility in Congress to deal with

problems arising outside the normal context of a federal

system.

370 U.S. at 546–47.

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 15

Harlan noted that it was not necessary to “explore the extent

to which Congress may commit the execution of even

‘inherently’ judicial business to tribunals other than Article

III courts.” Id. at 549. Thus, Glidden offers no support for

Tang’s suggestion that an Article IV court may somehow,

over the passage of time, lose its authority.

O’Donoghue, like Glidden, was concerned with defining

an Article III court, not with limiting the authority of an

Article IV court, and thus does not apply to the NMI District

Court. O’Donoghue addressed an effort by Congress to

reduce the salary of the judges of the Court of Appeals and

the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. O’Donoghue,

289 U.S. at 525. The Court held that the judges had been

appointed under Article III of the Constitution and therefore

their remuneration could not be diminished. In doing so, the

Court took pains to distinguish the District of Columbia from

territories of the United States, noting that Congress’

authority over the District is set forth in a separate clause of

the Constitution (Article 1, section 8, clause 17), and that the

District “is as lasting as the states from which it was carved

or the union whose permanent capital it became.” Id. at 538. 

Here, there is no contention that the judges of the NMI

District Court are Article III judges. Rather, Tang’s

contention is that because the judges of the NMI District

Court are not Article III judges—serving for good behavior

and without diminution of compensation—the NMI District

Court lacks jurisdiction to try her. However, as noted, the

Supreme Court rejected such an argument in Palmore,

411 U.S. at 401–02, which, having been decided some forty

years after O’Donoghue, implicitly limits the Court’s prior

opinion.

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16 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

Even if O’Donoghue or Glidden were read to suggest that

contingencies or the passage of time might somehow affect

the authority of an Article IV court, there has been no change

with regard to the NMI District Court. Indeed, O’Donoghue

seems to envision that the operative change is becoming a

state. 289 U.S. at 537. However, the CNMI’s relationship

with the United States continues to evolve and the CNMI

remains geographically remote. Despite the fact that the

United States has exercised control over the CNMI since

World War II, the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of

the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the

United States of America was not approved until 1976. We

know of nothing subsequent that might have eroded the

authority of the NMI District Court.

D. Nothing in Commodity Futures Trading

Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986),

undermines the authority of the NMI District

Court.

Our recognition of the NMI District Court as a nonArticle III court does not implicate the concerns expressed by

the Supreme Court in Commodity Futures Trading

Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). There, in holding

that Congress could constitutionally give the Commodity

Futures TradingCommission authorityto adjudicate state law

counterclaims in reparation proceedings, the Court set forth

the broad standard that “the constitutionality of a given

congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a nonArticle III bodymust be assessed by reference to the purposes

underlying the requirements of Article III” and this inquiry

“is guided by the principle that ‘practical attention to

substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal

categories should inform application of Article III.’” Id. at

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UNITED STATES V. DOWAI 17

847–48 (quotingThomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,

473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985)).

Schor concerned legislation that gave an agency authority

over matters that would otherwise have been adjudicated in

state court or an Article III court. Here, however, we address

Congress’ creation of a United States judicial forum where

none had previously existed. As noted, Congress’ authority

to do so is clearly set forth in Article IV. Moreover, there is

no danger of encroachment on the judicial power by the

executive or legislative branch, see 478 U.S. at 853–54, as

decisions by the NMI District Court are reviewed by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an

Article III court. Furthermore, we note that in Schor, the

Supreme Court rejected Schor’s “novel theory” that “Article

III should be read to absolutely preclude any adjudication of

state law claims by federal decisionmakers that do not enjoy

the Article III salary and tenure protections.” Id. at 858. In

sum, the creation of the NMI District Court as a non-Article

III court is “purposed” by Article IV of the Constitution and

Tang has not shown that any constitutional interest has been

improperly infringed by it exercising jurisdiction over her

criminal trial.

III

In Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 72–73, the Supreme Court stated

that the NMI District Court “is not an Article III court but an

Article IV territorial court.” In light of the Covenant to

Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

in Political Union with the United States, coupled with

Congress’ approval of the Covenant in Joint Resolution of

March 24, 1976, we agree. Reviewing the guidance provided

by the Supreme Court in Palmore and Glidden, we affirm

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18 UNITED STATES V. DOWAI

what we previously stated in an unpublished memorandum:

the NMI District Court was properly established by Congress

under Article IV and is empowered to hear federal criminal

cases. See United States v. Wei Qin Sun, 399 F. App’x 319,

320 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

Accordingly, we reject Tang’s challenge to the authority

of the NMI District Court to try her for violations of United

States Code Title 18. In conjunction with our concurrently

filed memorandum disposition, Tang’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.

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