Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02042-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rulon Frederick DeYoung
Petitioner
On Habeas Corpus
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The instant petition was filed on December 17, 2012, and 

challenges Petitioner’s conviction and sentence as illegal. (Doc. 1). On December 28, 2012, 

Petitioner filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge for all 

purposes. (Doc. 4). 

The petition and attached documents indicate that on August 25, 2010, Petitioner pleaded 

guilty and was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, of four counts of 

violating 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (attempt to evade or defeat tax) and one count of violating 26 U.S.C. §

7212(a)(corrupt or forcible attempts to interfere with administration). (Doc. 1, p. 12). Petitioner was 

sentenced to a term of thirty-six months. (Id. at p. 13). 

RULON FREDERICK DeYOUNG,

 Petitioner,

v.

ON HABEAS CORPUS,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-02042-JLT

ORDER TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY 

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Petitioner now brings this habeas petition, in which he is clearly challenging the legality of his 

conviction.1 Indeed, the bulk of the argument in the petition is comprised of a complicated argument 

that the legal underpinnings of § 7201 have been repealed by federal statute. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-8). The 

only purpose of such an argument, in the Court’s view, is to challenge the legality of Petitioner’s 

conviction. However, as discussed below, such a challenge must be brought in a motion to vacate, set 

aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not in a habeas corpus petition pursuant to §

2241.

DISCUSSION

A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. Hernandez v. 

Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity 

or constitutionality of his conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or 

correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988); 

Thompson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd 1997); 

Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing court 

has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal 

conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see also United 

States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's 

execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Capaldi v. 

Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 

1994); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 

F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3rd Cir. 1991); United 

States v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1987); Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 

(9th Cir. 1990). 

Petitioner’s argument that his conviction is illegal is obviously an attack on that conviction. 

 

1

Petitioner takes pains in his petition to note that he is not challenging his sentence. (Doc. 1, p. 3).

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However, the proper vehicle for challenging such a mistake is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 

the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not a habeas corpus petition. Apparently in an oblique 

acknowledgement of this legal reality, Petitioner contends that he has no other legal avenue than §

2241 since § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Although Petitioner does not explain 

in any detail why § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective, he alludes to the fact that the one-year filing 

deadline for a § 2255 petition has passed. (Doc. 1, p. 3). The Court, however, disagrees with 

Petitioner’s conclusion that this circumstance would make a § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective.

A federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief under § 2241 if he can 

show that the remedy available under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his 

detention." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-5 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Pirro, 104 

F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting § 2255). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that this is a very 

narrow exception. Id; Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (a petitioner must show actual 

innocence and that he never had the opportunity to raise it by motion to demonstrate that § 2255 is 

inadequate or ineffective); Holland v. Pontesso, 234 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 2255 not inadequate 

or ineffective because Petitioner misses statute of limitations); Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a 

court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); Lorentsen v. 

Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a 

petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams v. 

Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956); see United 

States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) (procedural requirements of § 2255 may not 

be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651). The burden is on the petitioner to 

show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 

1963). 

In Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that the remedy under 

a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” if a petitioner is actually innocent, but 

procedurally barred from filing a second or successive motion under § 2255. Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060-

1061. That is, relief pursuant to § 2241 is available when the petitioner’s claim satisfies the following 

two-pronged test: “(1) [the petitioner is] factually innocent of the crime for which he has been 

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convicted and, (2) [the petitioner] has never had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting this 

claim.” Id. at 1060. 

“In determining whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to pursue his claim, 

we ask whether petitioner’s claim ‘did not become available’ until after a federal court decision.” 

Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 254 (2008). 

“In other words, we consider: (1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim ‘did not arise until after 

he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and (2) whether the law changed ‘in any 

way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Id., citing Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060-

1061. 

In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the petition, the Ninth Circuit employed the twopart test discussed above, i.e., that petitioner must show he is factually innocent of the crime for which 

he had been convicted and that he has never had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting this 

claim. Id. at 1059. In explaining that standard, the Ninth Circuit stated:

In other words, it is not enough that the petitioner is presently barred from raising his claim of 

innocence by motion under § 2255. He must never have had the opportunity to raise it by 

motion.

Id. at 1060 (emphasis supplied). Applying that standard, the Ninth Circuit rejected Ivy’s claims, 

holding that the law under which he was convicted had not changed subsequent to his conviction and 

that he had indeed had an opportunity to raise such a claim in the past. Id. at 1061. 

The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield 

v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). This Petitioner has failed to do. As in Ivy, Petitioner 

cannot establish any relevant intervening change in the law since his 2010 conviction that would 

trigger the savings clause, nor has he established that he could not have raise these claims in his 

original appeal or, at the very least, in a proper motion pursuant to § 2255 in the sentencing court. 

In other words, all of the alleged illegalities in the instant conviction existed prior to the trial 

and subsequent appeal, if any, and thus could have been raised at the very least in a motion pursuant to 

§ 2255. Petitioner does not allege that he has ever filed a § 2255 petition in the sentencing court, 

despite having the very same legal landscape he now has in which to make his arguments. Petitioner, 

therefore, cannot seriously contend that he has never had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting 

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these claims in the trial court. Accordingly, he has failed to establish that § 2255 is either inadequate 

or ineffective for purposes of invoking the savings clause, and the fact that he may now be 

procedurally barred by the AEDPA from obtaining relief does not alter that conclusion. Ivy, 328 F.3d 

1059-1061 (§ 2255 not inadequate or ineffective because Petitioner misses statute of limitations); 

Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to 

render § 2255 inadequate.); Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 

F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 

petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 

F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956); see United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(procedural requirements of § 2255 may not be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1651). 

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show he is actually innocent of the charges against him. “To 

establish actual innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 

U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (1998)(quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851 

(1995)); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th cir. 2008). “[A]ctual innocence means factual 

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency,” and “in cases where the Government has forgone more 

serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also 

extend to those charges.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-624. 

Although the United States Supreme Court has not provided much guidance regarding the 

nature of an “actual innocence” claim, the standards announced by the various circuit courts contain 

two basic features: actual innocence and retroactivity. E.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 

893, 903 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th

Cir. 1998); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2nd Cir. 1997); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922 (6th

Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). 

The “core idea” expressed in these cases is that the petitioner may have been imprisoned for 

conduct that was not prohibited by law. Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903. Such a situation is most 

likely to occur in a case that relies on a Supreme Court decision interpreting the reach of a federal 

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statute, where that decision is announced after the petitioner has already filed a § 2255 motion. This is 

so because a second or successive § 2255 motion is available only when newly discovered evidence is 

shown or a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Because § 2255 limits a 

second or successive petition to Supreme Court cases announcing a new rule of constitutional law, it 

provides no avenue through which a petitioner could rely on an intervening Court decision based on 

the substantive reach of a federal statute under which he has been convicted. Id.; see Lorentsen, 223 

F.3d at 953 (“Congress has determined that second or successive [§ 2255] motions may not contain 

statutory claims.”); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2000)(“The savings 

clause has most often been used as a vehicle to present an argument that, under a Supreme Court 

decision overruling the circuit courts as to the meaning of a statute, a prisoner is not guilty...The 

savings clause has to be resorted to for [statutory claims] because Congress restricted second or 

successive petitions to constitutional claims.”). Obviously, “decisions of [the Supreme Court] holding 

that a substantive federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct...necessarily carry a 

significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make criminal.’” 

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. To incarcerate one whose conduct is not criminal “inherently results in a 

complete miscarriage of justice.” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (1974). 

Here, Petitioner has not alleged, much less established, that some intervening decision by the 

United States Supreme Court, made retroactive to Petitioner’s case, has rendered him imprisoned for 

conduct that is not illegal. Instead, Petitioner argues that changes in United States statutes prior to his 

conviction render § 7201 invalid. That contention would not suffice to show that a second or 

successive § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective; unquestionably, it does not establish that § 2255 is 

inadequate or ineffective where Petitioner has never filed such a petition in the first instance. For 

these reasons, the Court concludes that § 2255 is neither inadequate nor ineffective. Thus, the issues 

in the instant petition must be presented to the sentencing court in a motion pursuant to § 2255. 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(a); Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-865. 

Because this Court is only the custodial court and construes the petition as a § 2255 motion, 

this Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-865. Accordingly, the 

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petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Should Petitioner wish to pursue his claims in 

federal court, he must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court.

1

 

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit 

in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged 

with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's 

detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not 

be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

(Emphasis supplied).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 

 

1A petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2255 must be filed in the court where petitioner was originally 

sentenced. In this case, Petitioner challenges a sentence adjudicated in the United States District Court for the District of 

Utah. Thus, that court is the proper venue for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2255.

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manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

For the following reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file; and,

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2013 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

9j7khijed

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