Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08162/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08162-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric John Meisner
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

 Briefing of Movant’s appeal has been delayed by multiple changes of appellate

counsel.

2

 “Crim. Doc.” refers to the docket number of filings in the criminal case. “Doc.”

refers to the docket number of filings in the civil case. 

SC

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Eric John Meisner, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 04-1073-PCT-DGC

No. CV 07-8162-PCT-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

Movant Eric John Meisner, who was then-confined in FCI Fairton, in Fairton, New

Jersey, filed a pro se “Motion Under 28 USC § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody,” which the Court dismissed as premature because

his direct criminal appeal was then, and remains, pending.1

 (Doc. 2.)2 The Court

subsequently denied various miscellaneous motions. (Doc. 5-7, 8-9, 10.) Movant filed a

notice of appeal from the denial of those motions in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, No.

08-17724. (Doc. 11.) On December 18, 2009, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal

pursuant to Movant’s motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeal. Meisner, No. 08-17724

(9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2009) (Order granting appellant’s motion to dismiss appeal). 

On March 25, 2011, Movant filed a document in this case captioned as “Addendum

to the Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) and Motion to Recuse Pursuant to

Case 3:07-cv-08162-DGC--ECV Document 19 Filed 05/23/11 Page 1 of 4
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 Other grounds for recusal, such as prior representation for or against a litigant, or

financial interest in the subject matter, do not apply as to this case.

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Supreme Law and 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Rule 57 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201.” (Doc. 17.) In this document, Movant seeks recusal of the Court and

reconsideration of the dismissal of his § 2255 motion as premature. To the extent that any

relief is sought in the Addendum, such relief will be denied.

I. Recusal Request

Under federal law, a United States judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Further, a

judge “shall disqualify himself” where he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a

party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]”3

28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Recusal pursuant to § 455(b) is required only if the bias or prejudice

stems from an extra-judicial source rather than from conduct or rulings during the course of

the proceedings. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d,

496 U.S. 543 (1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (judge’s

prior adverse rulings are insufficient cause for recusal). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost

never constitute [a] valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 114

S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). Adverse rulings should be appealed; they do not form the basis for

a recusal motion. Further, where the judge forms opinions in the courtroom, either in the

current proceeding or in a prior proceeding, these opinions “do not constitute a basis for a

bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id.

Movant fails to allege or show any basis for recusal under § 455 other than this

Court’s rulings in this and his criminal case. That is not a basis upon which the Court’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned for purposes of § 455(a). Movant also has not

alleged or shown that the Court has a personal bias or prejudice concerning Movant or other

potential parties to this action or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning

this proceeding. The Court therefore finds that recusal is not warranted pursuant to § 455.

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 Further, the second or successive bar will not apply to a new § 2255 motion filed

by Movant where his first motion was dismissed as prematurely filed. 

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II. Reconsideration

Movant seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of his § 2255 motion as premature and

other rulings in this civil and criminal case. Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate

only if the Court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error

or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in

controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,

1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to

rethink what the court had already thought through, rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc.

v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). Rather, such arguments

should be directed to the court of appeals. Sullivan v. Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F. Supp.

305, 309 (D. Ariz. 1992). 

Movant in part seeks reconsideration on the grounds that the Court previously

construed various motions filed by him as motions for reconsideration in the criminal case,

Crim. Doc. 121, 126, 129, 130, 139, or the civil case, Doc. 7, 10, in violation of Castro v.

United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003). Castro holds that when a district court recharacterizes

a pro se litigant’s filings as a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court must

“notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that

this recharacterization means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the

restrictions on ‘second and successive’ motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to

withdraw the [filing] or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims he believes he

has.” Castro, 540 U.S. at 383. Castro does not apply to the construction of filings as motions

for reconsideration.4 Accordingly, this affords no basis for reconsideration.

Movant otherwise essentially seeks to challenge the dismissal of his § 2255 motion

as premature while his appeal is pending. Movant asserts that extraordinary grounds make

this Court’s reconsideration of that dismissal appropriate. Movant is mistaken. As the Court

previously stated, and as is still the case, his § 2255 motion was premature and such motion

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remains premature while his appeal is pending. Movant has not otherwise shown newly

discovered evidence, that the Court committed clear error, that its previous decision was

manifestly unjust, or that there has been an intervening change in controlling law in

connection with those orders. To the extent that Movant seeks any relief in his Addendum,

such relief will be denied. 

IT IS ORDERED that to the extent that any relief is sought in Movant’s Addendum,

doc. 17, such relief is denied.

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2011.

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