Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01304/USCOURTS-ca13-13-01304-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Giorgio Foods, Inc.
Appellant
L.K. Bowman Company
Not party
Monterey Mushrooms, Inc.
Appellee
Mushroom Canning Company
Not party
United States
Appellee
United States International Trade Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GIORGIO FOODS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee

MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

L.K. BOWMAN COMPANY, MUSHROOM CANNING 

COMPANY,

Defendants

______________________ 

2013-1304

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 03-CV-0286, Chief Judge Timothy C. 

Stanceu.

______________________ 

Decided: April 24, 2015 

______________________ 

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2 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

MICHAEL TOD SHOR, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented 

by SARAH BRACKNEY ARNI. 

MARTIN M. TOMLINSON, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee

United States. Also represented by STUART F. DELERY,

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR. 

PATRICK VINCENT GALLAGHER, JR., Office of the General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee 

United States International Trade Commission. Also 

represented by NEAL J. REYNOLDS, ROBIN LYNN TURNER,

DOMINIC L. BIANCHI. 

MICHAEL J. COURSEY, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee Monterey 

Mushrooms, Inc. Also represented by ROBERT ALAN 

LUBERDA. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Giorgio Foods, Inc. (“Giorgio”) appeals a judgment of 

the Court of International Trade (“Trade Court”) dismissing its claims for compensation under the Continued 

Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“the Byrd Amendment”). Because Giorgio failed to indicate support for the 

antidumping petition as required by the Byrd Amendment, we affirm.

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 3

BACKGROUND

We limit the description in the background section to 

the claims currently on appeal. On January 6, 1998, the 

Coalition for Fair Preserved Mushroom Trade (“the Coalition”) filed an antidumping petition (“the petition”) alleging that domestic producers of preserved mushrooms were 

being injured by imports of certain preserved mushrooms 

from Chile, China, Indonesia, and India (collectively, “the 

subject countries”) that were being sold in the United 

States at less than fair value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673. At 

the time of the petition, Giorgio was the largest domestic 

producer of preserved mushrooms, accounting for approximately one half of total United States production, but 

was neither a member of the Coalition nor a petitioner.

On January 16, 1998, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) initiated a material injury investigation

concerning imports from the subject countries. See Certain Preserved Mushrooms From Chile, China, India, and 

Indonesia; Institution of Antidumping Investigations and 

Scheduling of Preliminary Phase Investigations, 63 Fed. 

Reg. 2693 (USITC Jan. 16, 1998). As part of that investigation, the ITC issued questionnaires to domestic producers of preserved mushrooms, including Giorgio. Giorgio 

filed its preliminary response on January 22, 1998.1 The 

second page of the ITC questionnaire asked, “Do you 

support or oppose the petition? Please explain” (the 

“support question”). J.A. 152. It contained three checkboxes for responses: “Support,” “Oppose,” and “Take no 

position.” Id. Giorgio’s response to the support question 

1 Giorgio’s preliminary and final responses to the 

questionnaire are substantively identical. Compare J.A. 

151–87 (preliminary), with J.A. 188–227 (final). Citations 

in this opinion will be to Giorgio’s preliminary questionnaire.

 

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4 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

did not check any of the boxes, but responded in narrative 

form as follows: “We take no position on Chile, China and 

Indonesia[.] We oppose the petition against India.” Id.

In response to the petition, on February 2, 1998, the 

Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) initiated an 

antidumping investigation, “determin[ing] that the petition [wa]s filed on behalf of the domestic industry.” 

Initiation of Antidumping Investigations: Certain Preserved Mushrooms From Chile, India, Indonesia, and the 

People’s Republic of China, 63 Fed. Reg. 5360, 5361 (Dep’t 

of Commerce Feb. 2, 1998) (citing 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673a(b)(1)). A petition is only filed 

on behalf of the industry, if— 

(i) the domestic producers or workers who 

support the petition account for at least 25 

percent of the total production of the domestic like product, and 

(ii) the domestic producers or workers who 

support the petition account for more than 

50 percent of the production of the domestic like product produced by that portion of 

the industry expressing support for or opposition to the petition.

19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). Commerce noted that 

“supporters of the petition account[ed] for over 50 percent 

of production of the domestic producers who ha[d] expressed an opinion even if Giorgio’s position [was] not 

disregard[ed],” i.e., even if Giorgio were included in the 

category of domestic producers not supporting the petition. 63 Fed. Reg. at 5362. 

On October 22, 1998, and December 31, 1998, Commerce published final determinations in the four preserved mushroom antidumping investigations, finding 

that dumping had occurred with respect to each of the 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 5

subject countries.2 Between December 1998 and February 1999, the ITC determined that the domestic mushroom industry was materially injured by the import of 

mushrooms from the subject countries,3 and Commerce 

issued corresponding antidumping orders.4 Pursuant to 

2 See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less 

Than Fair Value: Certain Preserved Mushrooms from 

Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,613 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 22, 

1998); Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less 

Than Fair Value: Certain Preserved Mushrooms from 

India, 63 Fed. Reg. 72,246 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 31, 

1998); Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less 

Than Fair Value: Certain Preserved Mushrooms from the 

People’s Republic of China, 63 Fed. Reg. 72,255 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Dec. 31, 1998); Notice of Final Determination 

of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Preserved 

Mushrooms from Indonesia, 63 Fed Reg. 72,268 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Dec. 31, 1998).

3 See Certain Preserved Mushrooms from Chile, 63 

Fed. Reg. 66,575 (USITC Dec. 2, 1998); Certain Preserved 

Mushrooms from China, India, and Indonesia, 64 Fed. 

Reg. 9,178 (USITC Feb. 24, 1999).

4 See Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Preserved Mushrooms from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,529 (Dep’t 

of Commerce Dec. 2, 1998); Notice of Amendment of Final 

Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and 

Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Preserved Mushrooms 

from the People’s Republic of China, 64 Fed. Reg. 8308 

(Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 19, 1999); Notice of Antidumping 

Duty Order: Certain Preserved Mushrooms from Indonesia, 64 Fed. Reg. 8310 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 19, 1999); 

Notice of Amendment of Final Determination of Sales at 

Less than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: 

Certain Preserved Mushrooms from India, 64 Fed. Reg. 

8311 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 19, 1999).

 

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6 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

these antidumping orders, the U.S. Customs and Border 

Patrol (“Customs”) collected final antidumping duties for 

imports from the subject countries. See, e.g., Distribution 

of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset to Affected 

Domestic Producers, 66 Fed. Reg. 40,782 (Customs Aug. 

3, 2001). 

For entries filed between October 1, 2000, and October 1, 2007, the Byrd Amendment required that Customs 

collect final duties under antidumping duty orders for 

distribution to “affected domestic producers.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1675c(a) (2000).5 To qualify as an affected domestic 

producer under the Byrd Amendment, an entity was 

required to demonstrate that it “was a petitioner or 

interested party in support of the petition with respect to 

which an antidumping duty order . . . has been entered.” 

Id. § 1675c(b)(1)(A) (hereinafter, “the support requirement”). The Byrd Amendment directed the ITC to provide Customs with a list of affected domestic producers, 

which includes “a list of petitioners” and “a list of persons 

that indicate support of the petition by letter or through 

questionnaire response.” Id. § 1675c(d)(1). Those entities 

would receive Byrd Amendment distributions.

On October 2, 2001, Giorgio requested that the ITC 

place it on the list of affected domestic producers.6 The 

5 The Byrd Amendment was repealed in February 

2006, but the repeal did not affect duties on entries of 

goods made prior to October 1, 2007. Deficit Reduction 

Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154 

(2006).

6 Giorgio’s initial request was limited to Chile, China, 

and Indonesia, and did not include India. According to 

Giorgio’s second amended complaint, it did not file for 

Byrd Amendment distributions with respect to India for 

2001 “because it would have been futile for it to do so.” 

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 7

ITC denied Giorgio’s request on the basis that “Giorgio’s 

questionnaire responses in the original investigations do 

not indicate support for the petition . . . .” J.A. 244. 

Because Giorgio was not on the ITC list, Customs denied 

Giorgio’s claims for Byrd Amendment distributions.

Giorgio brought suit in the Trade Court on May 23, 

2003, challenging the ITC’s refusal to include it on the list 

of affected domestic producers for the preserved mushroom antidumping orders and alleging that the ITC’s 

refusal to include it on the list violated the First Amendment. The case was stayed pending this court’s decisions 

in SKF USA, Inc. v. United States Customs & Border 

Protection, 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and PS Chez 

Sidney, L.L.C. v. United States International Trade Commission, 684 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Thereafter, in SKF, we upheld the Byrd Amendment 

against a facial First Amendment challenge. 556 F.3d at 

1349, 1360. We employed a saving construction to the 

Byrd Amendment to avoid constitutional questions by

construing it to provide “distributions to those who actively supported the petition (i.e., a party that did no more 

than submit a bare statement that it was a supporter 

without answering questionnaires or otherwise actively 

participating would not receive distributions).” Id. at 

1353 n.26. Under this construction, the court found the 

support requirement constitutional under the standards 

governing commercial speech because it directly advanced 

the government’s substantial interest in preventing 

dumping by rewarding parties who assist in trade law 

enforcement. Id. at 1354–55. We analogized the Byrd 

Amendment to qui tam actions and attorney’s fee-shifting 

statutes. Id. at 1359. 

J.A. 84. Beginning in 2003, however, Giorgio sought 

distributions for India as well.

 

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8 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

On June 7, 2011, following our decision in SKF, Giorgio moved to file a second amended complaint, seeking to 

add a statutory claim that the ITC had violated the Byrd 

Amendment by relying solely on Giorgio’s response to the 

support question in determining whether to include 

Giorgio on the list of affected domestic producers. According to the second amended complaint, Giorgio “agreed 

[with the petitioners] to provide support for [the antidumping petition] without publicly identifying itself as a 

petitioner.” J.A. 73. Instead, the complaint alleged that 

Giorgio supported petitioners’ efforts in other ways, 

including responding to the ITC questionnaire, contributing to petitioners’ legal fees, providing confidential 

commercial information to petitioners, and accompanying 

ITC investigators and petitioners’ counsel on a site visit of 

Giorgio’s facilities. Giorgio continued to assert an asapplied First Amendment challenge, alleging that denial 

of payments under the circumstances violated the First 

Amendment. 

On November 17, 2011, the Trade Court denied Giorgio’s motion to add its statutory claim as futile because it 

failed to state a claim in light of SKF. Giorgio Foods, Inc. 

v. United States, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321–22 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2011). And on March 6, 2013, the Trade Court 

granted motions to dismiss all of Giorgio’s claims. Giorgio 

Foods, Inc. v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1382 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). If Giorgio lost this case, its share of 

Byrd Amendment distributions would go to other domestic producers. Giorgio appeals the denial of its motion for 

leave to amend its complaint to add its statutory claim 

and the dismissal of its second amended complaint, alleging a First Amendment violation. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5). We review de novo both the Trade Court’s 

dismissal for failure to state a claim and its denial of 

leave to amend on grounds of futility. See Ashley FurniCase: 13-1304 Document: 85-2 Page: 8 Filed: 04/24/2015
GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 9

ture Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306, 1309 

(Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 72 (2014). We 

also exercise de novo review over questions of statutory or 

constitutional interpretation. Id. 

DISCUSSION 

I 

Giorgio argues that, although it stated in its questionnaire response that it opposed the petition against 

India and took no position with respect to Chile, China, 

and Indonesia, its petition response “as a whole,” combined with its other actions in support of the petition, 

satisfied the Byrd Amendment’s support requirement. 

Appellant’s Br. 31–33. Giorgio argues that because it 

provided support for the petition “behind the scenes,” it 

should be treated as a “latent petitioner.” Appellant’s Br. 

5. Thus, the question here is whether a statement of 

support is necessary to secure compensation under the 

Byrd Amendment. On that question, we do not write on a 

blank slate; three prior decisions of this court have addressed the support requirement.

In SKF, SKF USA (“SKF”), a domestic producer of 

goods that were subject to an antidumping duty order, 

was denied distributions under the Byrd Amendment 

because the ITC and Customs determined that SKF had 

neither been a petitioner nor supported the petition at 

issue. 556 F.3d at 1340. In response to the ITC’s questionnaire, SKF had stated that it opposed the petition. Id.

at 1343. Under these circumstances, we found that SKF 

had not met the support requirement and was therefore 

not entitled to Byrd Amendment distributions because 

“Congress could permissibly conclude that it is not required to reward an opposing party.” Id. at 1358. We 

found that the Byrd Amendment “did not compensate all 

injured domestic producers, but only those who filed an 

antidumping petition and those who supported it.” Id. at 

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10 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

1351. We made clear that merely responding to a questionnaire did not constitute the necessary support: “At 

best the role of parties opposing (or not supporting) the 

petition in responding to questionnaires is similar to the 

role of opposing or neutral parties in litigation who must 

reluctantly respond to interrogatories or other discovery.” 

Id. at 1359. Indeed, under ITC regulations, “[a]ny questionnaire issued by the Commission in connection with 

any investigation . . . may be issued as a subpoena . . . .” 

19 C.F.R. § 207.8. This provision further allows the ITC 

to—among other things—pursue judicial enforcement, if 

the ITC determines that a party has failed to “respond 

adequately.” Id. 

In Chez Sidney, the plaintiff checked the “support” 

box in its preliminary response, which Commerce may

rely on in order to determine whether the requirements of 

19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) are satisfied for purposes of initiating an investigation, but checked the “take no position” 

box in its final response. See 684 F.3d at 1377, 1382. The 

ITC denied a distribution, id. at 1377–78, but we held 

that the producer qualified for distributions because it 

“indicat[ed] in its preliminary questionnaire response that 

it supported the petition . . . .” Id. at 1379. In holding 

that the producer had satisfied the support requirement, 

we specifically relied on the fact that it “expressed abstract support in the preliminary response” and “never 

expressed that it opposed the petition.” Id. at 1383. We 

found that checking the “support” box in the preliminary 

questionnaire was sufficient to constitute “active support” 

under SKF. Id. at 1381 (citing SKF, 556 F.3d at 1353 

n.26). 

Finally, in Ashley, Ashley Furniture, Inc. (“Ashley

Furniture”) checked the “oppose” box on its questionnaire 

response, whereas Ethan Allen Global, Inc. and Ethan 

Allen Operations, Inc. (collectively, “Ethan Allen”)

checked the “take no position” box. 734 F.3d at 1308. The 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 11

ITC denied distributions. Id. at 1309. We held that

neither producer satisfied the support requirement. With 

respect to Ashley Furniture, we explained that a finding 

that a producer that checked “oppose” was an affected 

domestic producer would “lead to the incongruous conclusion that a producer who indicates only opposition to the 

petition in questionnaires—the polar opposite of support—is nevertheless a supporter.” Id. at 1311. And with 

respect to Ethan Allen, we explained that “[t]he conclusion that a producer who indicates that it ‘takes no position’ in a questionnaire is a supporter is also incongruous 

because such a producer has not ‘indicated support.’” Id.

We held that “a producer who never indicates support 

for the petition by letter or through questionnaire response cannot be an [affected domestic producer]” because 

“a producer’s ‘bare statement that it was a supporter’ is a 

necessary (though not a sufficient) condition to obtain 

[affected domestic producer] status.” Id. (quoting SKF, 

556 F.3d at 1353 n.26). Notably, both producers in Ashley

failed to satisfy the support requirement despite the fact 

that they too assisted the ITC investigation by providing 

information. See id. at 1314 (Clevenger, J., dissenting) 

(“Ethan Allen provided supporting data to the ITC in the 

form of sales and production data . . . . Ashley Furniture 

provided important sales and production data to the ITC, 

assisting the ITC in determining if the wooden bedroom 

furniture industry was injured by dumping.”).

In this case, Giorgio’s arguments are foreclosed by 

Ashley, because Giorgio failed to satisfy the statutory 

support requirement by indicating support “by letter or 

through questionnaire response.” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1). 

There are no statements of explicit support in Giorgio’s 

responses, but Giorgio argues that its answers to the 

questions concerning injury “are not statements that 

would be made by one opposing a petition.” Appellant’s 

Br. 9 (quoting J.A. 78). In this connection, Giorgio points 

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12 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

to statements in its responses such as, “[d]ue to the extremely low and prevailing depressed prices for preserved 

mushrooms caused by imported preserved mushrooms, 

[Giorgio] was forced to discontinue production of its line of 

68 oz. preserved mushrooms,” J.A. 154, and that “eroding 

profits due to extremely low and depressed prices caused 

by imported mushrooms[] will make future plans for 

expansion and banking requests more difficult to obtain,” 

J.A. 163. But those statements do not indicate support. 

Factual statements that indicate injury, helpful as those 

may be in making the final dumping determination, are 

not the same as statements that indicate support for the 

petition. See SKF, 556 F.3d at 1351 & n.22. 

Although the statute focuses exclusively on parties 

who “indicate support of the petition by letter or through

questionnaire response,” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1), Giorgio 

further relies on “other actions it took during the ITC’s 

underlying investigation,” including the payment of 

petitioners’ legal fees and providing confidential information to petitioners, to satisfy the support requirement. 

Appellant’s Br. 31. Even accepting Giorgio’s allegations 

in the complaint as true, financial and other forms of 

support for the petitioners are not the same as “indicat[ing] support of the petition by letter or through 

questionnaire response.” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1) (emphasis added). As Ashley held, forms of support other than 

explicit statements of support in the petition are irrelevant in determining whether a producer satisfied the 

support requirement. See Ashley, 734 F.3d at 1311. 

There is nothing in the Byrd Amendment, or its legislative history, that indicates congressional intent to compensate all parties, including those who did not make an 

explicit statement of support for the petition. See SKF, 

556 F.3d at 1350–51. 

Unlike the producer in Chez Sidney, 684 F.3d at 1383, 

Giorgio never expressed affirmative support for the petiCase: 13-1304 Document: 85-2 Page: 12 Filed: 04/24/2015
GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 13

tion. See Ashley, 734 F.3d at 1311–12 (“Chez Sidney

repeatedly referred to the fact that the producer expressed affirmative support for the petition at one point—

i.e., in the preliminary questionnaire.”). With respect to 

India, Giorgio’s position is the same as that of Ashley

Furniture, which also answered “oppose” on its response 

to the ITC questionnaire. Id. at 1308. With respect to 

Chile, China, and Indonesia, Giorgio’s position is the 

same as that of Ethan Allen, which also answered “take 

no position” in its response to the ITC questionnaire. Id. 

Ashley held that neither position taken by Giorgio in this 

case—opposition or the lack of a position—satisfied the 

support requirement for Byrd Amendment distributions. 

Id. at 1311. 

II

Giorgio also argues that requiring a statement of support violates the First Amendment as applied to Giorgio. 

This argument is also foreclosed by Ashley, which correctly held that such a requirement does not violate the First 

Amendment as applied to a producer that failed to indicate support. 734 F.3d at 1310–11. A statement of support is not an abstract statement of viewpoint, but rather 

one that has consequences. Those consequences are of 

two types.

First, statements of support for the petition or the 

lack of such statements can be, and in this case were, 

taken into account by Commerce in determining whether 

the statutory support requirements for the petition were 

satisfied. The statute imposes a requirement of statements of industry support amounting to 25% of the domestic producers in the relevant industry before 

Commerce can initiate an antidumping investigation. See

19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). Here, Giorgio filed its 

preliminary response to the ITC questionnaire on January 22, 1998, prior to Commerce’s February 2, 1998, 

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14 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

industry support determination. Commerce considered 

Giorgio’s questionnaire response in determining that a 

sufficient percentage of the domestic industry nevertheless supported the petition. 63 Fed. Reg. at 5362.

Second, in applying the threat of material injury 

standard, the ITC is required in every case to take account of the publicly stated support, opposition, or no 

position responses in the ITC questionnaire, as we explicitly held in Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. 

United States, 44 F.3d 978, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1994).7 In 

Suramerica, none of the industry members checked the 

support box, one industry member expressed opposition, 

and the rest did not take a position. Id. at 981. We held 

that “domestic industry support for the petitions” was a 

factor “required by the statute” in determining whether 

there was a threat of material injury to the industry. Id.

at 984. We explained that “[t]he industry best knows its 

own economic interests and, therefore, its views can be 

considered an economic factor. Indeed an industry’s 

failure to acknowledge an affirmative threat has direct 

7 As the dissent points out, in making a “material 

injury” determination as opposed to a “threat of material 

injury” determination, the statute provides only that the 

ITC “may consider such other economic factors as are 

relevant to the determination.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(ii). 

The fact that the ITC might not consider the questionnaire responses in making a material injury determination hardly diminishes their significance to the threat of 

material injury determination. Here, as in Suramerica, 

44 F.3d at 981, the ITC was asked to consider both possibilities, “whether there is a reasonable indication that 

imports” from each of the subject countries “are causing 

material injury, or threatening to cause material injury, 

to a U.S. industry.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 5363.

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 15

significance.” Id. “Moreover, publicly expressed industry 

support for the petition, or lack of it, is probative evidence 

of those views.” Id. Thus, “[i]n making a determination 

of threat of material injury, ITC must weigh industry 

views and views of other interested parties . . . .” Id.

Significantly, in Suramerica, “[s]ome industry members expressed additional views on the petitions in private 

statements,” which in some instances “clarified a producer’s reasons for withholding support from the petitions.” 

Id. at 982. These private indications that may contradict 

the public position do not eliminate the significance of the 

public position. As we said, “[t]hat the industry is not 

willing to express public support is evidence that it does 

not perceive a real threat of immediate harm. Private 

statements of support, but for other interests, can diminish but not eliminate the probative value of this relevant 

evidence.” Id. at 984 n.2.

Given the real world consequences of a statement of 

public support (or the lack thereof) Congress is clearly not 

relying on an abstract expression of views.8 Here, as in 

8 See Ashley, 734 F.3d at 1311 (“As SKF explained, 

the Byrd Amendment does not reward neutral or opposing 

parties because filling out the questionnaire without 

indicating support for the petition can contribute to the 

petition’s defeat. Indeed, the ITC takes the level of support of the petition into account in its determination of 

material injury, and the petition cannot be considered as 

filed ‘on behalf of the industry’ unless at least 25% of the 

domestic producers in the relevant industry sector indicate support.” (citations omitted)); Chez Sidney, 684 F.3d 

at 1382 (“[A] producer’s expression of support in the 

response to the preliminary questionnaire is critical to the 

determination of whether to commence an investigation of 

an antidumping petition.”); SKF, 556 F.3d at 1340 n.1. 

 

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16 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

Ashley, Giorgio’s as-applied First Amendment challenge 

fails because “the government did not deny Byrd Amendment distributions to [Giorgio] solely on the basis of 

abstract expression.” 734 F.3d at 1310. 

In an analogous context, it could hardly be contended 

that False Claims Act payments and attorney’s fees (31 

U.S.C. § 3730(d)) would be available to a party, such as 

Giorgio, that sat on the sidelines and refused to take an 

open and active role in support of the government. See 

SKF, 556 F.3d at 1356–57 (“[T]he Byrd Amendment—like 

qui tam proceedings, monetary awards of a portion of the 

government’s recovery, and awards of attorney’s fees—

shifts money to parties who successfully enforce government policy.”). There is nothing in the First Amendment 

that requires the government to accommodate Giorgio’s 

“business reasons” for not making a public statement in 

support of the petition. Appellant’s Br. 10.

For these reasons, we affirm both the denial-in-part of 

Giorgio’s motion to amend the complaint and the dismissal of Giorgio’s complaint for failure to state a claim.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs to appellees.

Case: 13-1304 Document: 85-2 Page: 16 Filed: 04/24/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GIORGIO FOODS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee

MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

L.K. BOWMAN COMPANY, MUSHROOM CANNING 

COMPANY,

Defendants

______________________ 

2013-1304

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 03-CV-0286, Chief Judge Timothy C. 

Stanceu.

______________________ 

Case: 13-1304 Document: 85-2 Page: 17 Filed: 04/24/2015
2 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

Appellant appeals the decision of the Court of International Trade that found it ineligible to qualify for a 

distribution share under the Continued Dumping and 

Subsidy Offset Act. The majority affirms the trial court 

while I conclude that Appellant has established a plausible claim that it is an affected domestic producer eligible 

to receive such a distribution. The majority’s approach 

evidences a fundamental misunderstanding concerning 

initiation of antidumping investigations and improperly 

rewrites the statute to reach an outcome that is contrary 

to the Congressional purpose of the Continued Dumping 

and Subsidy Offset Act, the precedent of this court, and 

the freedoms of expression guaranteed under the First 

Amendment. 

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s statutory and 

First Amendment claims for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules of the Court of International Trade. At this stage, Giorgio is only required to 

allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim that it 

is an ADP under the CDSOA. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). A significant problem is that the majority 

consistently seeks to address the merits of the case, i.e., 

whether Giorgio is entitled to disbursements, not whether 

Giorgio makes a plausible claim for relief. As I describe 

below, I conclude that Giorgio has established a plausible 

claim for relief, not that Giorgio is necessarily entitled to 

disbursements. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

I. INDICATING INDUSTRY SUPPORT

Congress enacted the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act1 (“CDSOA” or the “Byrd Amendment”) to 

1 See Pub.L. No. 106–387, §§ 1001–1003, 114 Stat. 

1549, 1549A–72 to –75 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675c 

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 3 

ameliorate the injurious effects of dumping and illegal 

subsidies by distributing portions of collected antidumping and countervailing duties to U.S. producers of the 

affected industry. See Pub. L. No. 106-387, § 1002. To be 

sure, Congress intended that the remedial effect of 

CDSOA distributions would be distinct from the remedial 

trade relief afforded under U.S. trade laws.2 The former 

provides company-specific relief by assisting U.S. producers affected by dumping to rebuild, while the latter provides relief to the affected industry as a whole by raising 

the price of imports found to have been dumped. 

Specifically, the CDSOA provides that “[d]uties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order, an antidumping duty order, or a finding under the Antidumping 

Act of 1921 shall be distributed on an annual basis under 

this section to the affected domestic producers for qualifying expenditures.” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a). The statute is 

clear on its face that to receive distributions, a producer 

must first be an “affected domestic producer” and must 

certify that it desires to receive distributions, that it has 

not previously requested distributions for the qualifying 

expenditures it now seeks, and that it is eligible to receive 

distributions as an “affected domestic producer.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(2). This case, like its predecessors, 

focuses on the interpretation of “affected domestic producer” (ADP). The precise question on appeal is whether 

Giorgio has established a plausible claim that it is an 

ADP under the CDSOA 

(2000)), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub.L. 

No. 109–171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154 (Feb. 8, 2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2007).

2 The CDSOA addresses antidumping and countervailing investigations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673. For the 

most part, this opinion refers to both by its reference to 

“antidumping.” 

 

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4 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

To qualify as an ADP, a producer must have been a 

“petitioner or interested party in support of the petition.” 

19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1)(A). The CDSOA directs the United 

States International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”) to forward to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) a list of ADPs. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1). 

Customs then distributes the collected antidumping

duties to listed ADPs who have provided the requisite 

certifications. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(3). For non-petitioners 

to be on this list, the CDSOA requires that the producer

be an interested party and “indicate support of the petition” by letter or, as is relevant here, “through questionnaire response.” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1). 

The generality of this provision is notable; Congress 

only required that an interested party “indicate” support.3

During an antidumping investigation, both the ITC and 

the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) send questionnaires to domestic producers at the preliminary and 

final stages of their respective investigations. The CDSOA 

does not specify which agency’s questionnaire responses 

must include the indication of support. Nor does it specify 

whether the questionnaire is the preliminary questionnaire or the final questionnaire. Most important, the 

CDSOA does not specify how a producer must indicate

support—it only requires that the producer “indicate” 

support through the questionnaire response. 4 

3 An interested party is, for the purposes of this appeal, a U.S. producer of the like product subject to the 

antidumping investigation. 19 U.S.C. §1677c. There is no 

dispute that Giorgio is an “interested party.”

4 “Indicate” means to “point out,” “show indirectly,” 

or “state briefly.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 386 

(2004).

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 5 

For decades, the ITC’s questionnaires have contained 

a petition support question that asks “Do you support or 

oppose the petition? Please explain.” See J.A. 152, 189 

(Giorgio’s ITC questionnaire responses). The questionnaire provides boxes next to “Support,” “Oppose,” or “Take 

no position,” as well as three lines where a producer can 

provide statement(s). To provide an example, I set out 

below the petition support question from Giorgio’s response to the preliminary questionnaire.5

In passing the CDSOA, Congress did not refer to the 

ITC questionnaire, much less the ITC support boxes. Nor 

did Congress provide any guidance, for example, as to 

what happens if a U.S. producer checks the take no position box and then writes “please issue an antidumping 

order.” This is important because the majority opinion 

focuses on whether a box was checked or not. It is clear, 

however, that Congress could not have intended that the 

petition support requirement would hinge one way or 

another on the boxes. The ITC has used generally the 

same questionnaires at least as far back as the 1980s, 

well before the passage of the CDSOA in 2000. SKF USA, 

Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 556 F.3d 1337, 1357–

58 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Stated differently, the support boxes 

5 Giorgio’s answer to the petition support question 

in the final questionnaire was identical. J.A. 189. Giorgio 

did not check any of the boxes.

 

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6 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

existed over 15 years before the passage of the CDSOA. 

The boxes were not created for or by the CDSOA, nor did 

Congress designate the boxes as the place for indication of 

support of a petition. Indeed, the boxes are but a small, 

insignificant part of what is otherwise a questionnaire 

that calls for highly technical, complex, company-specific

data that is often business proprietary information, as 

well as general industry, publically-available trade data

and private market research data. 

On the other hand, the boxes alone provide no meaningful data or measurement towards a finding of material 

injury, the goal of any worthy antidumping petition. Had 

Congress wanted to make the ITC petition support question determinative of support for CDSOA purposes, it 

would have explicitly done so. But it did not. There is no 

indication in the statute or the legislative history that 

Congress intended that checking a box would determine 

whether one was an ADP. 

It is unjust to penalize a U.S. producer like Giorgio

who submitted its questionnaire response two years 

before the CDSOA was enacted and had no clue that its 

answer to that one question would cost it CDSOA distributions.6 Congress could not have intended such a result.7

Yet, that is the result mandated by the majority.

6 In a trade case, there are a number of factors that 

U.S. producers consider as to whether they should publically or privately express support for a dumping petition. 

Thus, while a producer can lend economic and evidentiary 

support for the petition, it may choose, for commercial 

purposes having nothing to do with its support, not to 

publically support the petition out of fear of losing U.S., 

foreign, or downstream customers. See e.g., Oral Argument at 5:20–6:10. Stated differently, the answer to the 

ITC support question may be based entirely on business 

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 7 

II. REWRITING THE STATUTE

The majority holds that to meet the support requirement, a producer’s ITC questionnaire responses must 

include a statement of “explicit” support. Maj. Op. at p. 

11. The majority is careful not to hinge support on whether a specific box is checked or to explain what constitutes 

a statement of explicit support. The explicit support rule 

instead suggests that statements of explicit support may 

be found somewhere in the ITC questionnaire responses. 

I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ rewriting of 

the statute to require a statement of “explicit” support. 

The statute does not contain such a requirement, just as 

the statute does not mandate that a specific box be 

checked. To the contrary, the plain language of the statute on its face requires the producer to “indicate” support 

through questionnaire response. The Supreme Court has 

repeatedly cautioned against departing from the plain 

language of a statute. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex 

rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011); Tennessee Valley 

Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193–94 (1978). Under the 

majority opinion, the legal issue of whether a U.S. producer has indicated support through a questionnaire 

or litigation strategy and have nothing to do with whether 

a company supports the petition.

7 Indeed, Congress’s findings included in the statute strongly suggest that Congress intended that U.S. 

producers like Giorgio would receive distributions. Congress feared that domestic producers would lay off workers and would be reluctant to reinvest or rehire. See Pub. 

L. No. 106-387, §§ 1002. As described below, that is precisely what Giorgio alleges occurred here: the dumped 

imports forced it to lay off workers and threatened to put 

it out of business. 

 

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8 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

turns on whether a statement of support is “explicit.” 

This new rule is nowhere in the statute. 

III. EVIDENCE INDICATING SUPPORT

The question here is whether Giorgio indicates support for the petition through its questionnaire response(s). 

The answer is yes. As this Court noted in PS Chez Sidney, 

whether a questionnaire response indicates support is 

determined by the substance of the response as a whole, 

i.e., through the questionnaire. PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. 

U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 684 F.3d 1374, 1379, 1382–83 

(Fed. Cir. 2012).

Giorgio’s questionnaire responses provide data and 

argument that supports a finding of material injury, or 

threat thereof, which leads to the issuance of an antidumping duty order. Giorgio submitted detailed, company-specific financial data concretely showing the 

decreasing value of its shipments, decreased wages, 

increased inventories, and decreased net income and 

profits. J.A. 155, 162, 165–66, 194, 200, 204–06. Giorgio 

explained that its net sales decreased from about $ 74.9 

million in fiscal year (FY) 1995 to about $ 48 million in FY 

1997, a decrease of $ 26.9 million or about thirty-six 

percent (36%). J.A. 162, 200. During this time, its total 

cost of goods sold fell from about $ 60.5 million to about 

$ 40 million and gross profits shrunk from about $ 14.4 

million to about $ 8 million, or a loss of about forty-four 

percent (44 %). J.A. 162, 200. These are precisely the type 

of data that prove material injury during an investigation. 

The majority dismisses these data as being merely 

“factual statements,” and not statements that indicate 

support for the petition. Maj. Op. at pp. 11–12. However, 

there is no reason why empirical data, factual information, and legal argument cannot indicate support. This 

remarkable position defies a fundamental tenet of U.S. 

law that recognizes that facts speak louder than words. 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 9 

Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In 

trade law, the game is in the data. Factual statements 

corroborated by data are evidence that carry determinative weight. One could even say that the data in a producer’s questionnaire responses speaks so loud, one 

cannot hear what the producer is saying. 

The majority is incorrect that Giorgio’s questionnaire 

response does not indicate support. Indeed, Giorgio’s 

questionnaire response can reasonably and fairly be said 

to constitute, in its entirety, a statement of “explicit 

support” for the petition. Giorgio states that the investigated imports “diminish or extinguish our ability to 

remain in business.” J.A. 164, 202. Giorgio was forced to 

discontinue a product line and decrease production at 

numerous facilities because of the “extremely low” and 

“prevailing depressed” prices caused by the subject imports, thereby forcing Giorgio to “layoff numerous employees.” J.A. 154, 191. These layoffs were needed in light of 

the “depressed times in the domestic preserved mushroom 

industry” caused by the dumped imports. J.A. 154, 191. 

Even after layoffs, “if the downward trend [in net sales] 

continues or does not show any improvement Giorgio 

Foods, Inc. could be forced to close its operations.” J.A. 

154, 191. 

These are explicit statements of material injury and 

demonstrate open, explicit support of the petition by a 

domestic producer of the like product. When one considers 

that the statements were made two years prior to the 

enactment of the CDSOA, logic dictates that these substantive statements constitute a plausible indication of 

support. That the majority turns a blind eye to these 

explicit statements shows that it focused exclusively on 

the petition support question boxes. The majority’s approach, relying on abstract expressions of support, is 

contrary to our precedent. 

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10 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

IV. IGNORING PRECEDENT

Our precedent emphasizes an inclusive reading of the 

petition support requirement that assesses support based 

on actions, not specific words. In SKF, we considered a 

First Amendment constitutional challenge to the 

CDSOA’s support requirement. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. 

Customs & Border Protection, 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 

2009). We recognized that a statute is likely unconstitutional if its purpose is to penalize viewpoint expression. 

As a result, we held that the CDSOA rewards actions in 

support of litigation, not “abstract expression of support”—essentially focusing on the substance of the producer’s responses, not their form. Id. at 1353. Thus, the 

Court in SKF sidestepped the constitutional issues concerning requiring viewpoint expression by focusing on 

action in support of litigation. SKF, 556 F.3d at 1353. Yet, 

in this case, the majority sidesteps “action in support of 

litigation,” and instead imposes a viewpoint-based expression of support requirement. 

The majority’s opinion prizes form over substance; it

prefers nonfactual (i.e., abstract) expressions of support 

over actions that support litigation. Whether to label a 

statement as explicit support or as a statement that 

indicates support is immaterial where both depend entirely on the abstract form of the expression. Here, the majority determines that action that supports litigation is not 

an explicit statement of support. As a result, the SKF

case and the majority opinion are in direct conflict and 

irreconcilable. 

Today’s “statement of explicit support” holding also 

contravenes this Court’s holding in PS Chez Sidney. In PS 

Chez Sidney, we held that a producer may qualify as an 

ADP even though it answered “Take no position” to the 

petition support question in its final ITC questionnaire

response. PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 11

Comm’n, 684 F.3d 1374, 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To 

ensure that the CSDOA furthered its goal of “assist[ing] 

domestic producers,” we stressed an “inclusive reading” of 

the statute. Id. at 1382. We explained in PS Chez Sidney

that “it is the surrounding circumstances, not abstract 

statements of support alone, upon which an appropriate 

support determination depends.” Id. at 1382–83. Here, 

the majority ignores the significant evidence of Giorgio’s 

actions that supported the petition and instead seeks out

explicit statements of support.8 As a result, the majority 

opinion is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with this 

Court’s decision in PS Chez Sidney. 

In Ashley Furniture, we considered statutory and constitutional challenges by two domestic producers, Ashley 

and Ethan Allen, which answered the petition support 

question “Take no position” and “Oppose,” respectively. 

Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 

1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 72 

(2014). Upon noting that the producer in PS Chez Sidney

checked the support box in its preliminary questionnaire

response (but not in the final questionnaire), this Court in 

Ashley Furniture held that a producer who “never indicates support for the petition by letter or through questionnaire response cannot be an ADP.” Id. at 1311–12 

(internal citations omitted). 

8 Giorgio’s support of the petition is further confirmed by other supporting actions, including contributing 

legal fees incurred by the petitioners in the antidumping 

proceedings (J.A. 74, ¶ 34); providing confidential business information that was included in the petition (J.A. 

76, ¶ 42); participating in pre-initiation meetings with the 

petitioners (J.A. 76, ¶ 41); and hosting ITC staffers for a 

plant field visit and tour (J.A. 77, ¶ 43). 

 

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12 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

The majority bases much of its holding on Ashley 

Furniture, concluding that it “foreclose[es]” Giorgio’s 

arguments. Maj. Op. 11. Ashley Furniture, however, 

presented wholly different facts than those of this case. 

Notably, there was no showing in Ashley Furniture of 

actions taken in support of the petition. Nor did the Court

provide any analysis of Ashley’s and Ethan Allen’s questionnaire responses beyond the petition support question. 

Instead, Ashely Furniture concluded that the questionnaire response must at least include “a bare statement” of 

support. Ashley Furniture, 734 F.3d at 1311. Here, the 

majority alters the “bare statement of support” requirement to achieve statement of “explicit support,” thereby 

rendering the holding in this case inconsistent with 

Ashley Furniture. 

In sum, the explicit support rule is contrary to our 

precedent, and, as I describe below, renders the CDSOA 

unconstitutional. These constitutional concerns bolster 

my conclusion that the majority’s interpretation of the 

CDSOA is incorrect. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 

568, 575 (1988) (“where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 

problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to 

the intent of Congress.”) (internal citations omitted).

V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDSOA

In SKF, we held that the constitutionality of the 

CDSOA’s petition support requirement under the First 

Amendment is assessed under the commercial speech 

doctrine. SKF, 447 F.3d at 1355.9 Under this doctrine, the 

9 Being bound by precedent, I accept this holding, 

but for the reasons that Judge Linn provided in his 

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 13

regulation must “directly advance[]” a substantial government interest. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 

Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 

(1980)). In SKF, we held that the petition support requirement directly advances the government interest in 

preventing dumping by rewarding parties who assist in 

antidumping enforcement. SKF, 447 F.3d at 1355. To

avoid the constitutional challenge, the Court in SKF

focused on whether a party “assists,” or takes action in 

support of the petition, not whether a party “expresses 

support” for the petition. See SKF, 556 F.3d at 1353.

Giorgio argues that this case presents a related, but 

different constitutional question: whether it is constitutional to determine petition support entirely on the presence of a statement of explicit support. See Appellant’s Br. 

57. The majority rejects this challenge on the basis that a 

statement of explicit support “has consequences” that are 

of “two types” that furthers the Government’s interest in 

enforcing the antidumping laws. Maj. Op. at 13. First, it 

influences Commerce’s decision as to whether the petition 

has the requisite industry support. Id. Second, it influences the ITC’s material injury determination. Id. These

assertions reflect a fundamental misunderstanding on 

how antidumping investigations are conducted.

The ITC questionnaire response does not affect 

whether Commerce initiates an investigation.10 First, it 

thoughtful dissent, I believe that the CDSOA should be 

subjected to strict scrutiny, not evaluated under the 

commercial speech doctrine. SKF, 556 F.3d at 1370 (Linn, 

J., dissenting). 

10 The majority fails to explain what “consequences” 

resulted from Giorgio’s answer to the petition support 

question. Importantly, it is not explained what difference, 

if any, Giorgio’s response had on the investigation. 

 

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14 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

is Commerce, not the ITC, that makes the industry support (standing) determination. Commerce provides information to the ITC after an affirmative industry support 

determination is made. Id. § 1673a(d). Second, the ITC 

producer questionnaire is typically issued after Commerce

initiates its investigation. Once Commerce makes its 

industry support determination, it cannot be changed. 19 

U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4). 

Thus, it is not the ITC’s task to determine if a petition 

has requisite industry support; Congress assigned that 

task to Commerce. Id. § 1673a(c)(1)(A)(ii). Congress 

provided Commerce with its own tools for making that 

determination: the petition and, if necessary, a poll of the 

domestic producers. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(D). 

During Oral Argument, counsel for the ITC confirmed 

that Commerce determines industry support and that the 

ITC has no role in the determination. 

 Court: 

“As I understand it, there’s a 

bright line rule for the initiation of 

these proceedings, which says 

there has to be 25 % support, correct? And that’s not something the 

ITC administers . . . that’s a bright 

line rule at Commerce . . . and it’s 

based on the questionnaire” 

Counsel for the Commission interjects: 

“No sir, it is not based on the questionnaire . . . that’s where the confusion enters in. . . . It’s

Commerce’s obligation under the 

statute to initiate the investigation. On the face of the petition 

there must be at least 25 % of inCase: 13-1304 Document: 85-2 Page: 30 Filed: 04/24/2015
GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 15

dustry support, the industry must 

have supported that, or Commerce 

will reject the petition.” 

Oral argument at 23:40–24:40 available at 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2

013-1304.mp3. 

Court: 

“So someone who checked oppose 

or don’t support isn’t counted in 

arriving at the 25 %?” 

Counsel for the Commission responded: 

“That is not part . . . they do their 

exercise separately from what the 

Commission does. The Commission sends out its questionnaires 

after initiation.” 

Oral Argument at 24:44–25:00. 

The above demonstrates that petition support expressions, in ITC questionnaire responses, do not further the 

enforcement of antidumping laws. 

The majority solely relies on Commerce’s Notice of 

Initiation issued in the underlying investigation for its 

assertion that statements of “explicit” support in an ITC 

questionnaire response impact Commerce’s industry 

support determination. Maj. Op. at 13–14. There is, 

however, no showing precisely how Giorgio’s ITC questionnaire impacted Commerce’s initial industry support 

determination. The majority apparently believes that the 

Notice of Initiation evidences that Commerce considered 

Giorgio’s preliminary questionnaire response, and specifically points to certain comments made to Commerce 

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16 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

ed parties to “submit comments or information on the 

issue of industry support.” 

The Notice states that Commerce received two “comments regarding industry support” on January 22, 1998.

63 Fed. Reg. 5361–62. The first was filed by a Chilean

exporter asserting that the petitioners are not members of 

the applicable U.S. industry. Id. The second, an “expression of opposition,” was filed by Giorgio with respect to 

the investigation (petition) involving imports from India. 

63 Fed. Reg. 5362. The majority speculates that this 

“expression of opposition” has to be Giorgio’s preliminary 

ITC questionnaire response. See Maj. Op. at 13–14. 

Giorgio’s comment was made pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 

1673a(c)(4)(E), which permits voluntary comments from 

interested parties concerning any aspect of an initiation, 

including industry support. It is unreasonable to conclude that Giorgio submitted its ITC questionnaire response for purposes of this comment period. Nor is there 

any evidence that Commerce consulted Giorgio’s ITC 

questionnaire response for purposes of this comment 

period. Conversely, the Notice makes no mention of 

opposition by Giorgio in connection with the Chile, China, 

and Indonesia petitions. 63 Fed. Reg. 5362. Borrowing the 

majority’s view, since the Notice states no opposition from 

Giorgio with respect to those investigations, one is forced 

to conclude that Giorgio supported those investigations. 

But this, too, would be speculation primarily because 

Commerce, by law, bases its industry support decision on 

the information provided in the petition. If the petition 

does not demonstrate the required industry support, the 

investigation is not initiated. 

The majority concludes that Giorgio’s “expression of 

opposition” and its preliminary ITC questionnaire response are the same document because they were filed on 

the same day. See Maj. Op. at 13–14. There are a number 

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of plausible reasons that could explain the coincidence, 

such as parallel due dates for receipt of factual submissions. Indeed, the Chilean comment was also filed on the 

same day. 63 Fed. Reg. 5361. This does not mean that the 

Chilean exporter filed its comments via an ITC questionnaire response. It did not. 

The majority’s second “consequence” is an impact on 

the ITC’s material injury determination. Maj. Op. at 14–

15. Specifically, the majority asserts that Suramerica de 

Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 

984 (Fed. Cir. 1994) requires that the ITC, “in every case,” 

take into account a producer’s publicly stated position in 

its ITC questionnaire response for the purpose of making 

injury determinations. Maj. Op. at 14. This assertion is 

not correct, and it ignores the facts of the case. First, this 

Court noted the difference between a threat of injury case 

(where views of the industry must be considered) and a 

material injury case.11 Thus, we held that “the breadth of 

relevant factors in Trent Tube, a material injury case, 

does not govern in this threat of material injury case.” 

Suramerica, 44 F.3d at 984 (citing Trent Tube Div., Crucible Materials Corp. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube AB, 975 

F.2d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Here, the ITC case is not a 

threat of injury case so the relevant factors relied on in 

Suramerica have no application. One needs look no 

further than this case as an example where the answer to 

the ITC industry support question has no impact on the 

merits determination. Unlike Suramerica, there is no 

11 For “material” injury cases, the ITC “may” consider factors beyond those listed in the statute. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677(7)(B). In “threat” cases, the ITC “shall” consider all 

relevant economic factors, including publicly declared 

industry support. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i). See also 

Suramerica, 44 F.3d at 984 (describing statutory differences for material and threat cases). 

 

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18 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

indication that the ITC relied on Giorgio’s answers to the 

support question while there is significant evidence that 

the ITC relied on the trade data provided in the responses 

to support a finding of material injury in this case. In this 

regard, Suramerica supports Giorgio’s assertion of a 

plausible claim.

Having acknowledged that Suramerica did not compel 

the ITC to consider publicly declared support, the majority instead asserts that the ITC might consider it. Maj. Op. 

14, n. 7. This assertion does not salvage the petition 

support requirement’s constitutionality. Under the commercial speech doctrine, a regulation “may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for 

the government’s purpose.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 

Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. The Supreme Court has further 

explained that “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere 

speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body 

seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech 

must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and 

that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material 

degree.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993). 

It is irrelevant whether the ITC might consider publicly declared support because Giorgio has raised an asapplied, not facial, challenge. Appellant’s Br. at 52. The 

question is not whether the ITC may, hypothetically, 

consider a producer’s publicly declared support; it is 

whether the ITC considered Giorgio’s support answers in 

this case. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 

U.S. 282, 289 (1921) (“A statute may be invalid as applied 

to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”). 

The majority offers no evidence that the ITC considered 

Giorgio’s support answer, or that the support answer 

otherwise alleviated any harm to a material degree. 

In sum, the majority bases its reasoning on the assertion that the ITC questionnaire industry support question 

has “two types” of consequences that directly advance a 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 19

substantial government interest. Neither of these consequences is based in agency practice, agency regulations, 

or the trade statutes. Because neither Commerce nor the 

ITC rely on a producer’s answer to the petition support 

question to respectively establish industry support under 

19 U.S.C. §1673a(c)(4)(A), or otherwise to affect the 

outcome of a material injury case, the petition support 

requirement does not “directly advance” a substantial 

government interest.12 As such, the majority opinion 

renders the CDSOA petition support requirement unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Cent. Hudson 

Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. 

The majority also supports its holding by comparing 

the CDSOA to the False Claims Act, arguing that payments and attorney’s fees under the latter would not be 

available to a party like Giorgio who “sat on the sidelines 

and refused to take an open and active role in support of 

the government.” Maj. Op. at 16 (citation omitted). Such

reliance is misplaced because the qui tam provision of the 

False Claims Act rewards parties that file an action. 31 

U.S.C. § 3730(d). The CDSOA does not require that only 

petitioners may receive a distribution. Conversely, the

eligibility of a qui tam plaintiff to qualify for proceeds 

does not hinge on a statement of “explicit support” for the 

action. 

In any event, the facts in this case show that Giorgio 

did not sit on the sidelines but rather took significant 

action and played an important role towards the issuance 

of the antidumping order. Giorgio’s second amended 

12 Further, I have serious concerns regarding, but do 

not address, the constitutionality of the retroactive application of a statement of “explicit support” requirement to 

actions taken by U.S. producers two years prior to the 

enactment of the CDSOA.

 

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20 GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US

complaint, which we accept as true at this stage, states 

that Giorgio supported the preparation of the petition. It 

contributed over one million dollars ($ 1,000,000) for legal 

fees towards preparation of the petition and participation 

in proceedings before Commerce and the ITC—an amount 

greater than contributed by any of the petitioners.13 J.A. 

74, ¶ 34. Prior to filing the petition, Giorgio provided the 

petitioner with confidential information regarding its 

capacity, production, sales, pricing, and profitability. J.A. 

75, ¶ 37. The petition incorporated much of the information that Giorgio provided, e.g., Giorgio’s closing of a 

production line for its largest can size due to the imports. 

J.A. 76, ¶ 41. After the petition was filed, Giorgio hosted 

two ITC staffers for a day-long field visit of the closed 

production line and reiterated its belief that the lowpriced imports caused its closure. J.A. 77, ¶ 43. This type 

of “plant visit” is distinct from a verification visit under 19 

C.F.R. § 353.36(c). A plant visit is conducted to educate

Commerce and ITC personnel on production processes 

and overall relevant industry practices. 

13 Counsel for one of the petitioners appeared and 

argued that Giorgio’s lack of support for the India petition 

undermined the petitions involving imports from other 

countries. Counsel’s appearance and argument can best 

be understood in the context of CDSOA distributions. To 

the extent that Giorgio does not qualify for a distribution 

(at least $9 million), petitioners share of CDSOA money is 

significantly increased. This is an absurd result. Congress 

could not have contemplated a result where a U.S. producer submits a questionnaire response that details 

evidence of material injury and establishes in clear terms 

that it is a domestic producer of the like product that is 

adversely affected by virtue of dumped imports should not 

be entitled to a share of CDSOA money. 

 

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GIORGIO FOODS, INC. v. US 21

In sum, Giorgio establishes a plausible claim that it is 

an ADP. For these reasons, I dissent. 

Case: 13-1304 Document: 85-2 Page: 37 Filed: 04/24/2015