Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03242/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03242-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marzell Deshond Turnbough
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3242

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Marzell Deshond Turnbough,

 Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court, District of

Minnesota.

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Submitted: September 16, 2005 

 Filed: October 11, 2005

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Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Marzell Deshond Turnbough (“Turnbough”) pled guilty to one count of

knowingly and intentionally distributing five grams or more of a mixture or substance

containing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The

district court sentenced him to 110 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised

release. Turnbough appeals his sentence on the ground that the district court erred

in finding one of his prior convictions to be a crime of violence for purposes of the

Sentencing Guidelines and on the ground that he should be resentenced in light of

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United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For the reasons discussed below, we

vacate Turnbough’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

By statute, Turnbough’s guilty plea to one count of distribution of five grams

or more of cocaine base carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months and a

maximum sentence of 480 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). As part of his plea

agreement, Turnbough agreed to be sentenced according to the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. The presentence report calculated his guidelines sentencing

range to be 188-235 months.

Prior to his pre-Booker sentencing hearing, Turnbough raised Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), to argue that a jury must determine whether his

prior conviction for escape was a crime of violence for purposes of his careeroffender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. At the sentencing hearing, the district court

overruled this objection and found Turnbough to be a career offender. The district

court also denied his motion for a downward departure for overstated criminal history

under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, but granted the Government’s motion for a downward

departure for substantial assistance under § 5K1.1. Applying the guidelines in a

mandatory fashion, the district court imposed a sentence of 110 months’

imprisonment. 

 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Turnbough first challenges his status as a career offender under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the

guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Mashek,

406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005).

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 Turnbough fled from custody after having signed out as part of a volunteer

work crew.

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“A defendant is a career offender if . . . the instant offense of conviction is a

felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense [and] the

defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Turnbough challenges only one

of his felony convictions upon which the district court relied: a 1995 conviction for

escape.1

Turnbough does not dispute that his conviction for escape qualifies as a crime

of violence, see United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001)

(categorizing all walkaway escapes as crimes of violence), but instead argues that

Booker requires that a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether his prior

conviction may be categorized as a crime of violence. We have consistently rejected

the applicability of Booker to the legal determination of whether a prior conviction

may be categorized as a crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Marcussen, 403

F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005). The categorization of an offense as a crime of violence

is a legal question outside the purview of the Sixth Amendment. United States v.

Camp, 410 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2005). The sentencing court has the duty to

take notice of a defendant’s criminal history and, as a matter of law, determine

whether any prior conviction is properly categorized as a crime of violence.

Marcussen, 403 F.3d at 984. Accordingly, the district court properly found facts

relating to Turnbough’s criminal history and properly categorized his walkaway

escape as a crime of violence. Nation, 243 F.3d at 472.

Turnbough then argues that his sentence, pronounced under a mandatory

application of the Sentencing Guidelines, is erroneous under Booker. Turnbough

preserved this issue by making a Blakely objection prior to his sentencing hearing.

United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, No.

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05-5547 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005). Therefore, we review his sentence for harmless error.

Id. at 548-49.

As the beneficiary of a non-constitutional Booker error, “[t]he government is

required to establish that we do not have ‘grave doubt’ as to whether the error

substantially influenced the outcome of the proceedings.” United States v.

Mendoza-Mesa, 421 F.3d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Although it is

a close call, we do not believe the Government satisfied its burden in this case. See

United States v. Love, 419 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Just as we decline to

speculate in the defendant’s favor when conducting plain error review under Booker,

we likewise decline to speculate in the government’s favor when conducting harmless

error review.”) (citation omitted). 

The Government first contends that the district court complied with Booker by

granting the § 5K1.1 motion and departing downward to only 110 months when it

knew it could depart to as few as 60 months. Cf. United States v. Sayre, 400 F.3d

599, 601 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the futility of remanding a sentence for the

application of advisory guidelines where the district court had previously departed

upward); United States v. Brooks, 417 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding Booker

error harmless because the defendant was sentenced in the middle of his guidelines

range). We agree with the Eleventh Circuit, however, that granting a § 5K1.1 motion

does not render a Booker error harmless because a sentencing court is limited by the

factors identified in § 5K1.1 when determining the extent of the downward departure.

United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United States

v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he extent of a downward departure

made pursuant to § 5K1.1 can be based only on assistance-related considerations.”).

The Government also argues that any Booker error was harmless because the

district court, in determining the extent of the § 5K1.1 departure, considered

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 At Turnbough’s sentencing hearing, the district court explained: “[I]n

determining the extent of the downward departure, I admit to being influenced by the

fact that this criminal history is a bit light on the grand scheme of criminal career

offenders. I’m taking that into account.” 

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Turnbough’s criminal history,2 an 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor not identified in §

5K1.1. The Government contends that the district court’s explicit consideration of

this § 3553(a) factor demonstrates that the district court considered many § 3553(a)

factors. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65 (holding that district courts must sentence

in accordance with the § 3553(a) factors). While consideration of factors beyond

those identified in § 5K1.1 is improper in assessing the extent of a § 5K1.1 departure,

Pepper, 412 F.3d at 998, we are not convinced that the district court’s improper

consideration of Turnbough’s criminal history in departing under § 5K1.1 proves that

the district court would have imposed the same sentence if it had been free to

consider the full range of § 3553(a) factors. Cf. United States v. Bassett, 406 F.3d

526, 527 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that Booker error was harmless

because sentencing court announced an identical alternative sentence based on “the

use of its discretion after ‘considering all of the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C.§

3553(a)’”) (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that the Government has not

carried its burden. See, e.g., United States v. Storer, 413 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir.

2005) (holding that a Booker error was not harmless because the Government failed

to point to anything in the record that showed the district court would have imposed

the same sentence under an advisory system).

Accordingly, we vacate Turnbough’s sentence and remand to the district court

for resentencing. However, nothing in this opinion should be construed as an

indication that we think a more lenient sentence is necessary. Based on the record

before us, we simply decline to speculate that the district court would have imposed

the same sentence under an advisory guidelines scheme considering the full range of

§ 3553(a) factors. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we vacate Turnbough’s sentence and remand

to the district court for resentencing under an advisory guidelines regime.

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