Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-12398/USCOURTS-ca11-14-12398-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandon Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-12398

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60284-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

BRANDON ROBINSON, 

a.k.a. Ace, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 19, 2015)

Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Brandon Robinson appeals his convictions for conspiracy to commit sex 

trafficking of a minor, and sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1591(a) and 1594(c). At his plea hearing, he made a factual proffer admitting 

the crimes. Although the Government presented evidence that Robinson’s acts 

were in, or affected, interstate commerce, neither the court nor the parties 

referenced Robinson’s knowledge of this jurisdictional hook. Robinson argues, for 

the first time on appeal, that the district court erred by accepting his guilty plea 

because there was no evidence that he knew that his actions affected interstate 

commerce.

When appropriate, we review issues that are raised for the first time on 

appeal for plain error only. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir. 

2006). Under plain error review, the defendant must show: “(1) error, (2) that is 

plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 

1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We may then exercise our 

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error seriously “affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). Error is not plain unless it is clear or obvious under current law. United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a),

Whoever knowingly—

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(1) in or affecting interstate . . . commerce, entices . . . a person; or

(2) benefits . . . from participation in a venture which has engaged 

in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or in 

reckless disregard of the fact, that . . . the person has not attained 

the age of 18 years, and will be caused to engage in a commercial 

sex act, shall be punished . . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added). Under 18 U.S.C § 1594(c), “[w]hoever 

conspires with another to violate section 1591 shall be fined under this title, 

imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both.”

“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that 

there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3). A defendant who 

seeks reversal of a conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district 

court committed plain error under Rule 11, however, must show that the error 

affected substantial rights. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-

82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2339-40, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). Namely, a defendant must 

“show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered 

the plea.” Id. at 83, 124 S.Ct at 2340.

In United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007), we held that the 

term “knowingly” in § 1591(a) did not apply to the interstate commerce element, 

because “the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one 

in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the 

federal statute.” Evans, 476 F.3d at 1180 n.2 (quotation omitted). This case

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forecloses the issue. The Government did not need to present any evidence of 

Robinson’s knowledge of the interstate commerce element at the time he 

committed his crimes. The district court made no error.

Robinson tries to explain away Evans by contending that the Supreme Court 

overruled the case in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 129 S.Ct. 

1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). The Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A, which punishes anyone who “knowingly transfers, possesses, 

or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The Supreme Court, noting that an adverb that modifies a 

transitive verb generally describes “how the subject performed the entire action, 

including the object as set forth in the sentence,” held that the word “knowingly” in 

that statute applied to the phrase “of another person.” Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. 

at 650, 129 S.Ct. at 1890. 

Flores-Figueroa does not overrule Evans. Flores-Figueroa applies only to 

an adverb modifying a substantive element of an offense, not a jurisdictional 

element. Furthermore, Flores-Figueroa mentions neither Evans nor 18 U.S.C. § 

1591.

AFFIRMED.

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