Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01329/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01329-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert James Ritchie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 8£P 2 119M 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 93-1329 

ROBERT JAMES RITCHIE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-149) 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Stephanie B. Boyer, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, and Kyra Jenner, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MCKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 93-1329 Document: 01019306451 Date Filed: 09/21/1994 Page: 1 
Defendant Robert James Ritchie was convicted on four counts 

resulting from an armed robbery of cash from an army base in 

Colorado. A jury convicted Mr. Ritchie of robbery within a 

special territorial jurisdiction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2111, 

use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), assaulting, resisting, or 

impeding a military law enforcement officer in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 111(a) (1), (b) and 1114, and theft of a motor vehicle in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Mr. Ritchie asserts on appeal that 

the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 

evidence and by imposing restitution as a part of his sentence. 

We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress, and we remand to 

the district court with instructions to vacate the restitution 

order.1 

I. 

Most of the facts surrounding the seizure of Mr. Ritchie are 

not in dispute. Important differences in the parties' versions of 

events are noted where relevant. On March 29, 1993, an assailant 

matching the description of Mr. Ritchie and later identified as 

Mr. Ritchie, robbed Private Rodney Stevens, an army cashier, of 

1 The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted for 

decision on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34{f); lOth Cir. R. 

34.1.2. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral 

argument. 

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$36,000 in cash as Stevens was taking the money from the Army 

Finance Command Center to another building on the Fort Carson 

Military Reservation in Fort Carson, Colorado. Wearing the 

military uniform of a staff-sergeant, grade E-6,2 and wielding a 

short-barreled shotgun, the assailant ordered Stevens and his 

military police escort, Private David Blonke, to hand over the 

cash box. Along with the $36,000, the cash box contained ten 

twenty-dollar bait bills that were paper-clipped together and kept 

in the side of the cashier's box. The Army had previously 

recorded the serial number of these bait bills to aid in tracing 

the bills in the event of robbery or theft. 

At gunpoint, the robber ordered Stevens and Blonke to 

Blanke's nearby police car, obtained the keys, and fled in the 

car. He then drove a short distance before leaving the police car 

and entering a two-door gray Datsun with distinctive markings. 

Blonke ran after the gunman as he fled and was able to identify 

the license plate number of the Datsun when the robber switched 

cars. Within hours of the incident, the FBI traced the getaway 

car through the department of motor vehicles and learned it was a 

Datsun 240-Z registered to Mr. Ritchie of nearby Colorado Springs. 

The FBI immediately began their investigation of Mr. Ritchie, 

and later that afternoon several agents stopped Mr. Ritchie, 

2 Mr. Ritchie was a former military policeman at Fort Carson 

with the rank of staff-sergeant, grade E-6. 

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driving a different vehicle, in a mall parking lot to ask him some 

questions.3 Mr. Ritchie admitted owning the identified Datsun but 

denied having used it that day. Driving his own vehicle, Mr. 

Ritchie led the agents back to his residence and showed them his 

Datsun. It matched the description and the license plate of the 

getaway car used by the assailant. The FBI agents did not arrest 

Mr. Ritchie at that time. 

The next day FBI Agent Benedict Cruise drove to Denver to 

obtain search warrants for Mr. Ritchie's residence and car while 

other agents kept Mr. Ritchie and his house under surveillance. 

In possession of warrants issued by a u.s. Magistrate Judge in 

Denver, Agent Cruise drove toward Colorado Springs to execute the 

warrants. A few minutes prior to Agent Cruise's actual arrival at 

Mr. Ritchie's home, the agents surveilling the house contacted 

Agent Cruise by radio and told him that Mr. Ritchie had begun 

backing out of his garage.4 Agent Cruise advised them to tell Mr. 

Ritchie that he was en route with search warrants and to ask Mr. 

Ritchie to wait there so he could be present during the search. 

Before Mr. Ritchie left his premises, several FBI agents blocked 

his path with their vehicles. Without any guns drawn, the agents 

asked Mr. Ritchie to exit his vehicle. They performed a quick 

3 Mr. Ritchie does not contest on appeal the validity of this 

stop. 

4 The record is not perfectly clear, but it appears that 

Ritchie was not driving the Datsun 240-Z at this time. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1329 Document: 01019306451 Date Filed: 09/21/1994 Page: 4 
pat-down search and explained the purpose of the stop. The agents 

did not formally arrest Mr. Ritchie, and it is undisputed that 

they did not administer Miranda warnings at this time. Mr. 

Ritchie testified at the suppression hearing that he felt "under 

apprehension." Rec., supp. vol. I, at 116. He also testified 

that, when informed that Agent Cruise was en route with search 

warrants, "I suggested that I would go ahead and sign a waiver, 

stating that they could search me, the house, my storage area, 

anything they wanted .... " Id. Mr. Ritchie did sign a consent 

to search form. 

Agent Cruise arrived on the scene approximately five to ten 

minutes after the initial detention to find Mr. Ritchie sitting in 

a lawn chair in his front yard and three or four agents standing 

in the yard talking. Agent Cruise introduced himself, informed 

Mr. Ritchie that he had warrants to search the house and car, and 

told him that the other agents were going to begin the search. He 

asked Mr. Ritchie if he would come inside the house because Agent 

Cruise and another agent wanted to talk to him. Agent Cruise 

testified that Mr. Ritchie's demeanor was "[r]eserved, calm, 

almost as if he found it kind of humorous." Rec., supp. vol. I, 

at 85. According to Agent Cruise, Mr. Ritchie said "he'd be happy 

to" go inside and talk. Id. 

Once inside, Agent Cruise and Mr. Ritchie sat in lawn chairs 

facing each other, and another agent sat against the wall to take 

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notes. The other FBI agents searched the house and car. There is 

some debate as to the exact conversation that followed. Agent 

Cruise testified that he intended to do a pat-down search for 

weapons and asked Mr. Ritchie, "What do you have in your 

pockets?", to see if Mr. Ritchie had any weapons. Id. at 87. 

According to Agent Cruise, before he could do the pat-down Mr. 

Ritchie pulled some U.S. currency out of his front pants pocket 

and handed it directly to him. Agent Cruise had not expected to 

receive any currency. He placed the money on his briefcase, which 

was on the floor, and proceeded to ask Mr. Ritchie some questions. 

Agent Cruise told Mr. Ritchie about the robbery at Fort Carson, 

that a person meeting the description of Mr. Ritchie had been 

identified as the assailant, and that Mr. Ritchie's Datsun had 

been identified as the getaway car. He asked Mr. Ritchie where he 

was and what he was doing on the day of the robbery. 

Mr. Ritchie's testimony is slightly different. He stated 

that Agent Cruise "accused [him] of robbing Fort Carson." Id. at 

117. Mr. Ritchie also testified that Agent Cruise asked him 

several other questions prior to directly asking, "Do you have any 

money in your pockets?". Id. at 117. Mr. Ritchie testified that 

when he pulled the money out of his pocket, Agent Cruise took it 

from him. Id. at 118. On cross-examination, however, Mr. Ritchie 

contradicted himself by agreeing that he gave the money to Agent 

Cruise "on [his] own free will." Id. at 122. It is not disputed 

that Mr. Ritchie denied involvement in the robbery. 

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When Agent Cruise asked Mr. Ritchie if he would stand for a 

physical lineup, he replied that he would not unless he had an 

attorney present. At that point, Agent Cruise suspected that Mr. 

Ritchie wanted an attorney and told him the interview was over. 

Agent Cruise then reached down for the money Mr. Ritchie had given 

him earlier and compared the serial numbers of the five twentydollar bills to the serial numbers of the bait bills from the 

robbery cash box. The serial numbers of all five bills matched 

the bait bills. Agent Cruise then formally arrested Mr. Ritchie 

and gave him verbal Miranda warnings. The agents handcuffed Mr. 

Ritchie and took him into official custody. 

II. 

The district court found no Fourth Amendment or Miranda 

violation. It credited the testimony of Agent Cruise and, 

apparently assuming no arrest occurred until Mr. Ritchie was 

handcuffed, decided that discovery of the bait bills created 

probable cause justifying Mr. Ritchie's arrest. Mr. Ritchie 

contends the FBI violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his 

rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He contends 

his initial detention in the driveway constituted an arrest, the 

agents lacked probable cause to make this arrest, and the agents 

failed to give him the required Miranda warnings. Mr. Ritchie 

argues that Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), is 

inapplicable on these facts and that, to the extent his actions or 

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statements were voluntary or consensual, exploitation of his prior 

illegal arrest tainted any consent. 

The government maintains that Mr. Ritchie was not 11 arrested11 

for Fourth Amendment purposes until after the agents discovered 

the bait bills. It does not argue that probable cause to arrest 

existed at the time the agents first detained Mr. Ritchie in his 

driveway. Rather, the government contends that (1) agents legally 

detained Mr. Ritchie pursuant to their valid search warrant under 

the rule in Michigan v. Summers, 452 u.s. 692 (1981), (2) Mr. 

Ritchie was not subject to custodial interrogation for the 

purposes of Miranda until after he was formally arrested by Agent 

Cruise, (3) Mr. Ritchie's statements were voluntary regardless of 

the applicability of Miranda, and (4) any error committed below is 

harmless. 

We review the district court's factual findings under the 

clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 

874, 876 (lOth Cir. 1994). 11 The ultimate legal determination of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is subject to de novo 

review. 11 United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (lOth Cir. 

1993). After reviewing the record and the parties' arguments, we 

conclude the FBI detained but did not arrest Mr. Ritchie pursuant 

to Summers, 452 U.S. 692, and that Mr. Ritchie was not subject to 

custodial interrogation requiring that he be advised of his rights 

under Miranda, 384 u.s. 436. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1329 Document: 01019306451 Date Filed: 09/21/1994 Page: 8 
A. 

Initially we address Mr. Ritchie's claim that he was arrested 

without probable cause when FBI agents first detained him in his 

driveway. While it is true that "every arrest, and every seizure 

having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is 

unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause," Summers, 

452 U.S. at 700, some seizures can be reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment without probable cause where the seizure is inherently 

less intrusive than an arrest, is justified by substantial law 

enforcement interests, and the police have reasonable articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 697-701 (citing Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (frisk for weapons); United States v. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrols)). We 

reiterated in United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (lOth Cir. 

1989), those types of situations which amount to an arrest: 

An arrest or seizure occurs "when the officer, by means 

of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 

restrained the liberty of a citizen .... " Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). See also Dunaway v. 

New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 n. 6 (1979). A show "of 

official authority such that 'a reasonable person would 

have believed he was not free to leave'" indicates that 

an arrest has occurred. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 

502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. 

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Justice 

Stewart joined by Justice Rehnquist)). "Examples of 

circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even when 

the person did not attempt to leave, would be the 

threatening presence of several officers, the display of 

a weapon by an officer . . . or the use of language or 

tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 

officer's request might be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 

U.S. at 554. "[T]he determination of whether an arrest 

has occurred is not dependent on whether the citizen is 

formally placed under arrest. " United States v. 

Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting 

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United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 

1986)). 

Id. at 1450 (citations omitted) . 

The facts here show that the agents never held Mr. Ritchie at 

gunpoint, that they handcuffed him only after formal arrest, that 

no agents used physical force in his detention apart from the patdown search for weapons, and that they did not otherwise engage in 

strong arm tactics. While the agents did block his exit from the 

driveway, they did so to inform him that a warrant to search his 

house was on the way and to ask him if he would stay while the 

search was conducted. Nothing in the facts suggests the FBI 

agents acted improperly, abusively, coercively, or in an overtly 

threatening manner. On the contrary, Mr. Ritchie himself admits 

that he suggested he sign a consent to search form at the very 

inception of the detention. Agent Cruise introduced himself when 

he arrived on the scene, and Mr. Ritchie appeared "[r]eserved, 

calm, almost as if he found it kind of humorous." Rec., supp. 

val. I, at 85. When Agent Cruise asked if they could go inside to 

talk, Mr. Ritchie said "he'd be happy to." Id. As for the 

conversation once Mr. Ritchie and Agent Cruise were inside the 

house, the district court specifically found Agent Cruise's 

version of events more credible. We are especially deferential to 

findings of fact based on credibility, Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 

1488, 1496 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Bessamer City, 470 

U.S. 564, 575 (1985)), and we find no basis for accepting Mr. 

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Ritchie's version of events over that of Agent Cruise. Thus, even 

though the agents detained Mr. Ritchie at his premises while 

conducting the search, the facts before us do not show that they 

restrained him to a degree associated with formal arrest, 

especially when we consider Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692. 

Faced with a factual situation comparable to ours today, the 

Supreme Court in Summers expanded the realm of detentions short of 

arrest that may be based on less than probable cause. There, the 

Detroit police detained an individual as he was descending the 

front steps of a house for which they had a warrant to search for 

narcotics. The police found contraband during the search of the 

house. After ascertaining that the individual owned the house, 

they arrested him and found heroin in his pocket upon a search of 

his person. The State charged the suspect with possession of the 

heroin found on his person, and he moved to suppress the evidence, 

claiming the search of the house and his person violated the 

Fourth Amendment. 

In deciding whether an arrest had occurred, the Court 

examined both the character of the intrusion and its 

justifications. The Court held that the detention during the 

search of the premises was certainly less intrusive than the 

search itself, and "that most citizens -- unless they intend 

flight to avoid arrest -- would elect to remain in order to 

observe the search of their possessions." Id. at 701. The Court 

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stated that because the detention occurred in respondents' own 

residence, "it could add only minimally to the public stigma 

associated with the search itself and would involve neither the 

inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit 

to the police station." Id. at 702. Finally, the Court suggested 

that "the type of detention imposed here is not likely to be 

exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more 

information, because the information the officers seek normally 

will be obtained through the search and not through the 

detention." Id. 

Assessing the justifications for detention of an occupant of 

premises being searched pursuant to a valid warrant, the Court 

held that both law enforcement interests and the nature of the 

articulable facts supporting the detention are relevant. The 

Court found that such detentions further three law enforcement 

interests: 1) preventing flight of the individual if 

incriminating evidence is fou~d; 2) minimizing the risk of harm to 

the police; and 3) facilitating orderly completion of the search. 

Id. at 702-03. The Court held that the existence of a search 

warrant for contraband, issued by a neutral magistrate and based 

on probable cause, creates articulable and individualized 

suspicion of criminal activity, and "[t]he connection of an 

occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily 

identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of 

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criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant." Id. at 

703-04. 

The Court concluded by creating a standardized rule that "a 

warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 

implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 

occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." 

Id. at 705 (footnote omitted). The Court's holding in Summers 

does not require the police to evaluate on an ad hoc basis the 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant each and 

every time they wish to detain an occupant of the place to be 

searched. Id. at 705 n.19. Rather, the "police may always detain 

persons found at the premises named in a search warrant, provided 

(i) the warrant authorizes a 'search for contraband' and (ii) the 

persons detained are 'occupants.'" 2 W. LaFave, Search and 

Seizure§ 4.9(e), at 309 (2d ed 1987) (emphasis in original) 

(hereinafter LaFave, Search & Seizure) .5 

Attempting to avoid the application of Summers to this case, 

Mr. Ritchie argues that 1) the FBI agents were not in physical 

possession of the warrant at the time they first detained him, 2) 

the warrant authorized a search for evidence, not "contraband" as 

required by Summers, and 3) the specific facts of this case make 

5 The Court did state in a footnote, without elaborating, that 

"special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention" might 

take a particular detention outside the scope of a valid Summerstype detention. 

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the law enforcement interests and the character of the detention 

distinguishable from the situation in Summers. We address each of 

these arguments in turn. 

First, while it is true that the FBI agents who first 

detained Mr. Ritchie in his driveway did not have actual physical 

possession of the warrant, they were aware that a magistrate had 

issued a warrant and that Agent Cruise was en route to the 

premises with that warrant. It is undisputed that Agent Cruise 

arrived only five to ten minutes after the agents first detained 

Mr. Ritchie. As the Court noted in Summers, the significance of 

the search warrant in these cases is that it gives "the police 

officer[s] an easily identifiable and certain basis for 

determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a 

detention of that occupant." Id. at 704. The detaining agents 

here knew that a neutral party had issued a search warrant for Mr. 

Ritchie's premises, thus giving them reasonable suspicion to 

detain him. The fact that they did not yet have actual possession 

of the warrant is not enough to defeat the application of Summers, 

especially where another agent was only minutes away, en route 

with the warrant.6 

6 Generally, requirements imposed by statute or court rule 

concerning the execution of search warrants, such as exhibiting a 

copy of the warrant at the premises, are considered ministerial 

and "are not deemed to flow so directly from the Fourth 

Amendment's proscription upon unreasonable searches that failure 

to abide by them compels exclusion of evidence obtained in 

execution of a search warrant." LaFave, Search & Seizure§ 4.12, 

at 358-59. See also United States v. Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 839 

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Second, Mr. Ritchie argues that Summers is only applicable to 

search warrants for "contraband," and that because the warrant in 

this case authorized a search for evidence, such as clothing, 

stolen currency, and the cash box, Summers does not apply. We 

disagree. In a footnote to its general rule, the Court expressly 

declined to decide whether a detention pursuant to a search 

warrant "would be justified if the search warrant merely 

authorized a search for evidence." 452 U.S. at 705 n.20. The 

Court referenced its decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 

U.S. 547 (1978). Zurcher involved the validity of third-party 

searches, where there is "probable cause to believe that fruits, 

instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located on 

identified property but [there is no] probable cause to believe 

that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated 

in the crime." Id. at 553 (student newspaper offices contained 

photographs, taken by newspaper staffers, that implicated other 

individuals in assault on police at student demonstration). Thus, 

footnote 20 in Summers stems from a concern that in some instances 

the existence of a warrant based on probable cause would not give 

(8th Cir. 1987) ("[L]aw enforcement officials are not 

constitutionally required to present a copy of the search warrant 

prior to commencing a search, so long as the previously issued 

warrant is presented before the officers vacate the premises."); 

United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 869 (1st Cir. 1986) (even 

though officers not in actual physical possession of warrant at 

commencement of search, search still valid as neither Fourth 

Amendment nor federal rule 4l(d) requires exhibition of warrant at 

outset of warrant execution) . 

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the police "an easily identifiable basis for determining that 

suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of [the] 

occupant." Summers, 452 U.S. at 704. 

This concern is not present here. Our facts do not involve a 

third-party search, and Mr. Ritchie was directly implicated in the 

crime being investigated. Indeed, only hours after the robbery, 

the FBI had traced the getaway car to Mr. Ritchie and had actually 

seen the car in Mr. Ritchie's garage. Under these circumstances, 

the existence of the warrant to search Mr. Ritchie's house and car 

for evidence, such as the stolen cash, clothes, and the cash box, 

gave the FBI ample reason to suspect Mr. Ritchie of criminal 

activity, thereby justifying the detention under the Summers 

rationale. To the extent the Summers Court restricted its holding 

to warrants authorizing the search for "contraband," we think the 

term "contraband" is broad enough to encompass stolen property. 

See LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 4.9(e), at 310. "Thus Summers 

covers, for example, a search warrant for proscribed drugs or a 

search warrant for stolen property." Id. We hold that Mr. 

Ritchie cannot escape the application of Summers solely because 

the warrant authorized a search for property stolen in a robbery 

in which he was directly implicated. 

Finally, Mr. Ritchie attempts to avoid the application of 

Summers by asserting that this case does not invoke the law 

enforcement interests stressed in Summers and that his detention 

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was more intrusive than in Summers. As we noted above, Summers 

announced a general rule that applies absent "special 

circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, [that] might 

lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case." 452 U.S. at 

705 n.21. Under the Court's general rule, "the officer is not 

required to evaluate either the quantum of proof justifying 

detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the 

seizure." Id. at 705 n.19. Accordingly, the absence of a 

particular law enforcement interest in a given situation will not 

automatically defeat the application of Summers. See, ~, id. 

at 702 (noting that "no special danger to the police is suggested 

by the evidence in this record," but recognizing that narcotics 

arrests generally are prone to "sudden violence or frantic efforts 

to conceal or destroy evidence"). However, to the extent Mr. 

Ritchie is arguing that the facts surrounding his detention 

transform this into a "unusual case" beyond the reach of Summers, 

we examine his claims. 

Mr. Ritchie suggests the law enforcement interests announced 

in Summers are somehow less important here, but we are not 

convinced. Indeed, given the intense scrutiny of Mr. Ritchie as a 

suspect and his possession of a short-barrelled shotgun during the 

robbery, we think the law enforcement interest in preventing both 

flight of the suspect and the threat of harm to officers is as 

great here as in Summers. The fact that Mr. Ritchie was leaving 

the scene when stopped does not mean he posed no threat to 

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officers executing a warrant. The suspect in Summers was also 

leaving the scene, and the Court upheld his detention and broadly 

stated that the risk of harm to both occupants and police "is 

minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command 

of the situation." Id. at 702-03. Preventing a suspect from 

leaving the premises of a place to be searched reduces the 

potential for harm because it ensures that a suspect will not 

return to the premises later "and try to forcibly thwart execution 

of the warrant." LaFave, Search & Seizure§ 4.9(e), at 306. 

Similarly, we find no special circumstances showing that the 

intrusiveness of Mr. Ritchie's detention was sufficiently severe 

to preclude application of Summers. Mr. Ritchie does not argue 

that the agents unduly prolonged his detention, and the record 

shows that the agents never drew their guns and did not handcuff 

Mr. Ritchie until after they discovered the bait bills. In 

addition, the detention of Mr. Ritchie for approximately five to 

ten minutes in his yard and then for some minutes inside his home? 

"involve[d] neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated 

with a compelled visit to the police station." Summers, 452 U.S. 

at 702. Mr. Ritchie suggests that his seizure as he was backing 

out his driveway is sufficient to distinguish this from Summers, 

where the police detained the suspect as he was walking down the 

7 The record does not clearly reveal the duration of the 

detention inside Mr. Ritchie's house, but Mr. Ritchie does not 

argue that was excessive. 

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front steps of his house. We do not find this distinction 

significant where, as here, Mr. Ritchie had not left his premises 

when stopped. 

Mr. Ritchie also points to the statement in Summers that "the 

type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by 

the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, 

because the information the officers seek normally will be 

obtained through the search and not through the detention." 

Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-02. We are not persuaded that the 

circumstances of this case show any exploitation, much less the 

degree of exploitation that would be necessary to place this case 

beyond the reach of Summers. After hearing testimony, the 

district court chose to credit Agent Cruise's version of events, 

i.e., that the agent asked Mr. Ritchie what he had in his pockets 

as a precursor to doing a pat-down search and that Mr. Ritchie 

surprised him by pulling out the money. Supp. Aplt. App., vol. 

II, at 26. As we have pointed out, the agents did not hold Mr. 

Ritchie at gunpoint or handcuff him until after the discovery of 

the baited bills. 

In summary, the rule announced in Summers and the rationale 

behind that rule apply to Mr. Ritchie's detention, and he has not 

persuaded us that the circumstances surrounding his detention make 

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Summers inapplicable.8 Mr. Ritchie was not arrested, but was 

properly detained pursuant to a valid warrant to search his 

premises. 

B. 

Mr. Ritchie claims the FBI agents violated his rights under 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by questioning him 

without giving the requisite warnings. The district court found 

no violation of Miranda because Mr. Ritchie received Miranda 

warnings as soon as Agent Cruise discovered the bait bills and 

formally arrested him. While the district court did "suggest that 

the better practice is to give Miranda warnings right away, .. supp. 

aplt. app., vol. II, at 27, it made no explicit findings of fact 

concerning whether the agents subjected Mr. Ritchie to "custodial 

interrogation" for the purposes of Miranda. Nevertheless, we will 

"uphold the trial court's ruling insofar as it applies to the 

facts if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support 

it." United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1516 (lOth Cir. 

1993). We "review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government." United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1449 

(lOth Cir. 1991). 

8 Because we hold that the agents legally detained Mr. Ritchie 

under Summers, we need not address his claim that his prior 

illegal arrest tainted his voluntary actions. 

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"[T)wo requirements must be met before Miranda is applicable; 

the suspect must be in 'custody,' and the questioning must meet 

the legal definition of 'interrogation.'" Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463. 

We can dispose of Mr. Ritchie's Miranda claim on the first element 

alone. A person is "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda if he 

"hasbeen deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 

way," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or his freedom of action has been 

curtailed to a "degree associated with a formal arrest," 

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). 

There are some instances where police detention and questioning of 

criminal suspects do not amount to custodial interrogation 

requiring Miranda warnings. Traditionally Miranda warnings are 

not required in stops pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968), because "the typical police-citizen encounter envisioned 

by the Court in Terry usually involves no more than a very brief 

detention without the aid of weapons or handcuffs." Perdue, 8 

F.3d at 1464. However, where the police find it necessary to 

employ an amount of force in a Terry stop that is beyond the 

ordinary, they can create "the 'custodial' situation envisioned by 

Miranda and its progeny." Id. We thus clarified in Perdue that 

Miranda warnings may be required before a suspect is actually 

arrested. 

Examining the totality of the circumstances here, we are not 

convinced that Mr. Ritchie was "in custody" for the purposes of 

Miranda. It is true that the agents detained Mr. Ritchie pursuant 

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to Summers, but as we noted above, they never held him at 

gunpoint, handcuffed him, or otherwise used force or threat of 

force. Compare Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464 (suspect in "custody" and 

Miranda warnings required in Terry stop where police forced 

suspect out of car at gunpoint and held him and his pregnant 

fiance at gunpoint face-down on ground during questioning while 

police helicopters hovered overhead). Significantly, Mr. 

Ritchie's detention occurred on his own premises, primarily inside 

the living room of his own home. "[C]ourts are much less likely 

to find the circumstances custodial when the interrogation occurs 

in familiar or at least neutral surroundings," such as the 

suspect's home. 1 W. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(e), at 496 

{1984 & 1991 Supp.) (citing cases) {emphasis added); see Beckwith 

v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 {1976) (although suspect was 

"focus" of IRS investigation, questioning of suspect in his home 

did not amount to "custody" for purposes of Miranda). 

While there were several FBI agents at Mr. Ritchie's home, 

only Agent Cruise and one other agent stayed with Mr. Ritchie in 

the living room while the other agents conducted the search. 

Agent Cruise, whom the court chose to believe, testified that Mr. 

Ritchie willingly entered the house to talk to the agent during 

the search. Nothing in the record indicates that the agents 

threatened or coerced Mr. Ritchie during the discussion. As soon 

as Mr. Ritchie referred to a lawyer, Agent Cruise ceased 

questioning him. 

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In addition to these facts strongly suggesting Mr. Ritchie 

was not "in custody," the Court's decision in Summers supports the 

conclusion we reach. The Court explicitly recognized the 

distinction between traditional arrests and detentions pursuant to 

valid search warrants. The Miranda "in custody" question was not 

directly before the Court in Summers, but in addressing the Fourth 

Amendment issue the Court did state: "In sharp contrast to the 

custodial interrogation in Dunaway, the detention of this 

respondent was 'substantially less intrusive' than an arrest." 

Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added). The facts of the 

present case are materially indistinguishable from those in 

Summers, and we are therefore not persuaded that Mr. Ritchie was 

"in custody" for Miranda purposes. 

"The determination of custody, from an examination of the 

totality of the circumstances, is necessarily fact intensive. In 

the past, we have avoided hard line rules to govern this analysis, 

and our opinion today should not be interpreted as an exhaustive 

pronouncement," Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1518, that the procedural 

protections required by Miranda are never implicated when a person 

is detained pursuant to Summers. While we hold that Mr. Ritchie 

was not "in custody" on these facts, we agree with the district 

court that the better practice is to give Miranda warnings 

immediately. 

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III. 

The last issue in the case is the district court's order that 

Mr. Ritchie pay $36,000 in restitution. Mr. Ritchie argues that 

the imposition of restitution was clearly erroneous because the 

record demonstrated he had no ability to pay. We need not address 

the merits of Mr. Ritchie's claim because, due to developments 

subsequent to the date of Mr. Ritchie's sentencing, the government 

no longer objects to vacating the restitution order. Because both 

parties agree, we remand this case for the sole purpose of 

vacating the restitution order. 

The district court's denial of the motion to suppress is 

AFFIRMED, and the case is remanded to the district court to VACATE 

the restitution order. 

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