Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01169/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Prisua Engineering Corp.
Cross-Appellant
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Appellant

v.

PRISUA ENGINEERING CORP.,

Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2019-1169, 2019-1260

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2017-

01188.

______________________ 

Decided: February 4, 2020

______________________ 

RICHARD L. RAINEY, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

KRISTIN COBB, ROBERT JASON FOWLER. 

 JOHN C. CAREY, Carey, Rodriguez, Greenberg & Paul, 

LLP, Miami, FL, argued for cross-appellant. 

 ______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and BRYSON, Circuit 

Judges.

 

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BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., appeals from a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter 

partes review proceeding. Samsung petitioned the Board 

to rule that certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,650,591

(“the ’591 patent”), owned by cross-appellant Prisua Engineering Corp. (“Prisua”), were unpatentable. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the Board held that claim 11 of 

the ’591 patent was unpatentable based on obviousness. 

However, the Board declined to analyze whether claims 1–

4 and 8 were unpatentable as anticipated or obvious, because it concluded that those claims were indefinite. 

On appeal, Samsung contends that the Board should 

have canceled claims 1–4 and 8 for indefiniteness. In the 

alternative, Samsung argues that even if the Board was 

not statutorily authorized to cancel those claims for indefiniteness, it should have assessed whether they would have 

been anticipated or obvious in view of the cited prior art. 

Prisua cross-appeals from the Board’s ruling that claim 11 

was unpatentable for obviousness. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I 

A 

Congress has long permitted parties accused of patent 

infringement in federal court to challenge the validity of

the asserted patent claims on any ground specified in part 

II of the Patent Act as a condition for patentability and for 

failure to comply with any requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. 

See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3). Over the last few decades, 

Congress has supplemented federal court litigation by creating several administrative processes that authorize the 

Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to reconsider and 

cancel wrongly issued claims in some circumstances. 

In 1980, Congress established a regime known as “ex 

parte reexamination.” See Act to Amend the Patent and 

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Trademark Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980), 

codified at 35 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. Ex parte reexamination 

gives “[a]ny person at any time” the right to “file a request 

for reexamination” based on certain prior art “bearing on 

the patentability” of an already-issued patent. 35 U.S.C. 

§§ 301(a)(1), 302. After institution, an ex parte reexamination follows essentially the same back and forth process between the patent owner and the examiner as in the initial 

PTO examination. 35 U.S.C. § 305. 

Congress subsequently created a procedure known as 

“inter partes reexamination.” See Optional Inter Partes 

Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 

113 Stat. 1501A-567, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq. 

(2006 ed.) (superseded). Inter partes reexamination gave 

third parties greater opportunities to participate in the 

reexamination process, but otherwise proceeded much like

an ex parte reexamination. 

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L.

No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), replaced inter partes

reexamination with “inter partes review,” the procedure at 

issue in this case. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19. Inter partes 

review, commonly referred to as IPR, provides patent challengers with even broader rights to participate in the process of re-evaluating patents, but it also sets limits on the 

process. A petition for inter partes review, for example, can 

request cancellation of claims “only on a ground that could 

be raised under section 102 or 103 [of the Patent Act] and 

only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or 

printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 

The AIA also created another administrative process 

called “post-grant review.” See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29. Unlike a petition for inter partes review, a petition for postgrant review can request cancellation of patent claims “on 

any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) 

of section 282(b) [of the Patent Act] (relating to invalidity 

of the patent or any claim),” the same invalidity defenses 

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long available to defendants accused of patent infringement in federal district court. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b). 

Although a petition for inter partes review is limited to 

a narrow set of grounds, it can be requested at any time 

during a patent’s enforceability period, with certain restrictions. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(c), 315(b). By contrast, the 

broad range of grounds that may be raised in a post-grant 

review petition are available only for a limited time after 

the patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). 

B 

In 2010, Dr. Yolanda Prieto applied for a patent aimed 

at providing a “new and unique form of enhancing” a user’s 

multimedia entertainment experience. ’591 patent, Abstract. The PTO granted the application in 2014. The issued patent, entitled “Video Enabled Digital Devices for

Embedding User Data in Interactive Applications,” is directed to “generating an edited video data stream from an

original video stream” by “substituting at least one object 

. . . in said original video stream by at least a different object.” ’591 patent, col. 1, ll. 43–47. Figure 3 illustrates the 

operation of the video image substitution according to one 

embodiment: 

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As illustrated, a user can insert a selected image, such as 

a face of the user’s choosing, in place of the face of the figure 

in the original video. Id. at col. 3, line 66, through col. 4, 

line 2.

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Claims 1–4, 8, and 11 of the ’591 patent are at issue in 

this appeal. The claims are directed to methods and apparatuses for “generating a displayable edited video data 

stream from an original video data stream.” ’591 patent, 

col. 7, ll. 14–16; id. at col. 8, ll. 28–29. Independent claim 

1 reads in full as follows: 

1. An interactive media apparatus for generating a displayable edited video data stream from an 

original video data stream, wherein at least one 

pixel in a frame of said original video data stream 

is digitally extracted to form a first image, said first

image then replaced by a second image resulting 

from a digital extraction of at least one pixel in a 

frame of a user input video data stream, said apparatus comprising:

an image capture device capturing the user input 

video data stream;

an image display device displaying the original 

video stream;

a data entry device, operably coupled with the image capture device and the image display device, 

operated by a user to select the at least one pixel in 

the frame of the user input video data stream to use 

as the second image, and further operated by the 

user to select the at least one pixel to use as the 

first image;

wherein said data entry device is selected from a 

group of devices consisting of: a keyboard, a display, a wireless communication capability device, 

and an external memory device; 

a digital processing unit operably coupled with the 

data entry device, said digital processing unit performing: 

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identifying the selected at least one pixel in the

frame of the user input video data stream;

extracting the identified at least one pixel as the

second image;

storing the second image in a memory device operably coupled with the interactive media apparatus;

receiving a selection of the first image from the

original video data stream;

extracting the first image;

spatially matching an area of the second image to 

an area of the first image in the original video data 

stream, wherein spatially matching the areas results in equal spatial lengths and widths between 

said two spatially matched areas; and

performing a substitution of the spatially matched

first image with the spatially matched second image to generate the displayable edited video data 

stream from the original video data stream.

’591 patent, cl. 1. Claims 2–4 and 8 depend from claim 1 

and add several limitations that are not pertinent to the 

resolution of this appeal. Independent claim 11 is a method 

claim that tracks the limitations of apparatus claim 1, with 

some minor differences. In particular, claim 11 does not 

have a limitation corresponding to claim 1’s requirement of 

“an image display device displaying the original video

stream.” Id. On the other hand, claim 11 adds limitations 

that require the computation of “motion vectors associated 

with the first image” and the application of those motion 

vectors “to the second image, wherein the generated displayable edited video data stream resulting from the substitution maintains an overall motion of the original video 

data stream.” Id. 

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C 

After the ’591 patent issued, Dr. Prieto formed Prisua 

to commercialize the invention claimed in the patent. In 

2016, Prisua sued Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and 

several other Samsung entities for patent infringement. 

Prisua alleged that the “Best Face” feature on several Samsung devices, including cell phones, infringed claims 1, 3, 

4, and 8 of the ’591 patent. The “Best Face” feature, according to Prisua, allowed the accused devices to capture a 

burst of images and then replace unwanted facial images, 

such as images captured when someone was blinking, with 

better images from other frames in the same burst.1 

After being sued, Samsung petitioned for inter partes 

review of claims 1–4, 8, and 11 of the ’591 patent on four 

separate grounds. The Board initially determined that it 

would review only whether a U.S. patent application publication known as Sitrick rendered claim 11 obvious. The 

Board declined to institute review of claims 1–4 and 8 on 

any ground, because it concluded that it could not determine the scope of those claims. 

The Board concluded that there were two impediments 

to determining the scope of claim 1. First, the Board found 

that it was “unclear whether claim 1 covers, for example, 

an apparatus that includes a data entry device capable of 

being operated by a user to select the at least one pixel, or

covers only the user actually operating the data entry device to select the at least one pixel.” Samsung Elecs. Am., 

Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., No. IPR2017-01188, 2017 WL 

1 After a trial in the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of Florida, the jury found that Samsung willfully infringed the asserted claims and awarded 

Prisua $4.3 million in damages. That action has been 

stayed pending this proceeding; the verdict in that case is 

not at issue in this appeal.

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4570373, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 11, 2017) (“Institution Decision”) (emphasis in original). For that reason, the Board 

concluded that claim 1 was indefinite under this court’s decision in IPXL Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 

F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Institution Decision, 2017 

WL 4570373, at *5-6. The Board also concluded that the 

“digital processing unit” limitation in claim 1 “invoke[d]

§ 112, sixth paragraph” and that the petition failed to identify any corresponding structure, as required by section 112 

and the pertinent PTO regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). 

Institution Decision, 2017 WL 4570373 at *6 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (en banc)). The Board found that claims 2–4 and 

8, which depend from claim 1, were indefinite for the same 

reasons. Because the Board determined that it was unable 

to construe claim 1 or dependent claims 2–4 and 8, it concluded that the petitioner had not “established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 1–4, and 

8 are unpatentable under any of the asserted grounds.” Id.

As the IPR briefing was drawing to a close, the Supreme Court decided SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 

1348 (2018), in which the Court held that when the Board 

institutes an IPR, it may not pick and choose which claims 

it will address, but must address the patentability of every 

claim challenged by the petitioner. Accordingly, the Board

modified its institution decision to include all the challenged claims and all the grounds presented in the petition. 

The Board also allowed the parties to file supplemental 

briefs and evidence, but only to address the newly added 

claims and grounds.

In its supplemental briefing, Prisua stated that it did 

not agree with the Board’s indefiniteness determinations. 

Despite that, Prisua argued that because Samsung had 

failed to prove the claims were definite, the Board should 

not apply the prior art to the claims. Prisua also contended 

that the Board did not have the statutory authority to cancel claims for indefiniteness during an IPR. 

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In response, Samsung urged the Board to cancel claims 

1–4 and 8 based on the Board’s determination that those 

claims were indefinite under this court’s analysis in IPXL. 

In the alternative, Samsung argued that even if the Board 

could not cancel the claims for indefiniteness, it could still 

apply the prior art to the claims despite the IPXL issue. In 

support of that contention, Samsung argued that because 

the uncertainty regarding claim scope resulted from the 

combination of two statutory classes of invention, a manufacturer or seller of the claimed device would not know 

when infringement occurred. But that, according to Samsung, would not pose an obstacle to determining whether 

those claims could be measured against the prior art. Samsung also argued that the term “digital processing unit” 

constituted a sufficient recitation of structure and did not 

invoke means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112

¶ 6. 

In its final written decision, the Board repeated its conclusion that claims 1–4 and 8 were indefinite under IPXL. 

Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., No. 

IPR2017-01188, 2018 WL 5274000, at *7–8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 

2, 2018) (“Final Written Decision”). In addition, the Board 

again held that claim 1 and its dependent claims invoked 

section 112, paragraph 6, for the “digital processing unit” 

element, and that because there was no corresponding 

structure in the specification, the Board could not apply the 

prior art to the claims. Id. at *9. The Board therefore held 

that Samsung had not established that claims 1–4 and 8 

were unpatentable under any of the asserted grounds. Id. 

With respect to claim 11, the Board analyzed whether 

that claim would have been obvious in view of Sitrick, the 

sole originally instituted ground of review. After reviewing 

various record materials, including competing expert testimony, the Board found that all of the limitations of claim 

11 would have been obvious in light of Sitrick, including 

the “digital processing unit” limitation. Id. at *11-19. The 

Board therefore held claim 11 to be unpatentable.

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II

On appeal, Samsung challenges the Board’s decision 

not to cancel the claims it found indefinite. In the alternative, Samsung contends that the Board should have applied the cited prior art to those claims.

A 

We reject Samsung’s contention that the IPR statute 

authorizes the Board to cancel challenged claims for indefiniteness. In Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court said the Patent Office would be acting 

“outside its statutory limits” by “canceling a patent claim 

for ‘indefiniteness under § 112’ in inter partes review.” 136 

S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016). This court subsequently echoed that view, stating—albeit in a non-precedential opinion—that “[i]n an IPR, the Board cannot declare claims 

indefinite.” Google LLC v. Network-1 Techs., Inc., 726 F. 

App’x 779, 782 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 35 U.S.C. 

§ 311(b)); see also Neptune Generics, LLC v. Eli Lilly & Co., 

921 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed Cir. 2019) (holding that the Board 

is not authorized to address challenges to patent eligibility 

under 35 U.S.C. §101 in an IPR proceeding: “Congress expressly limited the scope of inter parties review to a subset 

of grounds that can be raised under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 &

103.”). 

Samsung asks us to reject those statements as dicta 

and to hold that even though the Board may not institute 

inter partes review based on a claim’s indefiniteness, it 

may cancel such a claim on indefiniteness grounds once it 

has instituted review on statutorily authorized grounds. 

We are not persuaded by Samsung’s arguments; we hold 

that the Board may not cancel claims for indefiniteness in 

an IPR proceeding.

The statutory provisions governing the inter partes review process do not permit the Board to institute inter 

partes review of claims for indefiniteness. Section 311(b), 

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entitled “Scope,” states that “[a] petitioner in an inter 

partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or 

more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be 

raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of 

prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 

U.S.C. § 311(b). Samsung, the petitioner in the IPR proceeding below, was thus not permitted to request that the 

Board cancel claims 1–4 and 8 on the ground that they were 

indefinite. 

Nor could the Board cancel those claims as indefinite 

on its own accord. As the Supreme Court explained in SAS, 

Congress “chose to structure a process in which it’s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours” 

of an IPR proceeding. 138 S. Ct. at 1355. “[T]he statute 

envisions that a petitioner will seek an inter partes review 

of a particular kind—one guided by a petition describing 

‘each claim challenged’ and ‘the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based.’” Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. 

§ 312(a)(3)). After analyzing the IPR statute and its predecessors, the Supreme Court concluded that it was clear that 

“the petitioner’s contentions, not the Director’s discretion, 

define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.” Id. at 1357. The petition, that 

is, defines the scope of an IPR proceeding, and nothing in 

the IPR statute permits the Board to expand that scope in 

its final written decision. 

1 

Notwithstanding the foregoing authority, Samsung 

points to several provisions in the IPR statute in an effort 

to show that Congress authorized the Board to cancel 

claims for indefiniteness after an IPR has been instituted. 

None of those provisions, however, supports Samsung’s argument.

First, while section 311(b) limits the scope of an IPR

petition to certain grounds that could be raised under sections 102 and 103, Samsung argues that section 318(a), 

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which relates to the Board’s final written decision, is not so 

limited. Section 318(a) directs the Board to “issue a final 

written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim 

added under section 316(d).” 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Samsung 

contends that the word “patentability” in section 318(a) is 

broader than the phrase “a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103” in section 311(b). The difference, 

according to Samsung, indicates that the permissible scope 

of the Board’s final written decision is broader than the 

permissible scope of the petition and the institution decision. 

The problem with that argument is that it divorces the 

final written decision provision, section 318(a), from the 

rest of the inter partes review statute. Section 311(b) says 

that a petitioner may ask the Board “to cancel [challenged 

claims] as unpatentable” on certain 102 and 103 grounds. 

In context, it is clear that section 318(a)’s directive to the 

Board to issue a final written decision on the “patentability” of a challenged claim refers back to the grounds on 

which, under section 311(b), the petitioner may request the 

Board to “cancel as unpatentable” claims of the challenged 

patent, i.e., the designated section 102 and 103 grounds.2 

Second, Samsung notes that the word “patentability” 

in section 318(a) modifies both “challenged” claims and 

“new” claims that are proposed during the inter partes proceeding. For that reason, Samsung suggests, the scope of 

the Board’s review must be the same for both. And because 

2 The Director’s certificate under section 318(b) “confirming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable” does not indicate that the Board has analyzed and 

confirmed the patentability of the subject claims against 

any possible ground of invalidity, as Samsung suggests. 

The certificate is merely a reflection of the analysis that 

the Board performed in response to the petition.

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it is undisputed that the Board may review newly added 

claims for compliance with section 112, Samsung argues 

that the Board must likewise be authorized to review challenged claims for unpatentability on section 112 grounds, 

including indefiniteness.

That argument overlooks the distinction the inter 

partes review statute draws between challenged claims 

and new claims that are added in the IPR proceeding. Section 316(d) allows patent owners to move to amend a patent 

during an IPR proceeding by substituting new or amended 

claims. Unlike section 311(b), section 316(d) does not limit 

the grounds for considering the unpatentability of those 

new claims under provisions other than sections 102 and 

103. 

Because the Board is charged with the responsibility 

under section 318(b) of “incorporating in the patent by operation of the certificate any new or amended claim determined to be patentable,” the Board’s authority with respect 

to new and amended claims necessarily extends to other 

possible grounds of unpatentability, in particular, a failure 

to comply with section 112. Because the statutory provisions governing challenged claims in an IPR differ importantly from those governing substitute claims, the term

“unpatentability” necessarily has a different scope as to 

each.

Samsung next points to the post-grant review statute 

to support its argument that claims can be cancelled as indefinite at the conclusion of an IPR proceeding. Unlike a 

petition for inter partes review, a petition for post-grant review may be based on “any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to 

invalidity of the patent or any claim).” 35 U.S.C. § 321. 

Despite the difference in scope regarding what may be requested in post-grant review as opposed to inter partes review, the final written decision provision of the post-grant 

review statute mirrors the final written decision provision 

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of the inter partes review statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 328

(“[T]he Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final 

written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim 

added under section 326(d).”) (emphasis added). Because 

there can be no dispute that review of “patentability” in the 

post-grant review statute encompasses indefiniteness, 

Samsung contends that when Congress used the same 

word in the inter partes review statute, it must have meant 

to authorize the Board to consider grounds of unpatentability other than those raised in the petition, such as indefiniteness. 

To the contrary, the term “patentability” takes its 

meaning in each of the two statutory provisions from its 

particular context. Congress laid out the scope of inter 

partes review in section 311(b), at the beginning of Chapter 

31 of Title 35. It laid out the scope of post-grant review in 

section 321(b), at the beginning of Chapter 32. Congress’s 

use of the word “patentability” in the final written decision 

provision of each chapter—in sections 318(a) and 328(a), 

respectively—most naturally refers to the previously defined scope of the particular review in question. Patentability for purposes of section 318(a) thus refers to the 

limited grounds of unpatentability described in section 

311(b), and patentability for purposes of section 328(a) refers to the broader grounds of unpatentability described in 

section 321(b). 

2 

We also do not agree with Samsung’s contention that 

the Board’s inherent authority to perform claim construction during an inter partes review means that the Board 

can cancel the claims as indefinite. Although “indefiniteness analysis involves general claim construction principles,” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 

1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017), it does not follow that the 

Board may exceed its statutorily limited authority simply 

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because an indefiniteness issue arises during claim construction. Instead, as discussed above, Congress viewed a 

challenge based on indefiniteness to be distinct from a challenge based on sections 102 and 103. As such, the proper 

course for the Board to follow, if it cannot ascertain the 

scope of a claim with reasonable certainty for purposes of 

assessing patentability, is to decline to institute the IPR or, 

if the indefiniteness issue affects only certain claims, to 

conclude that it could not reach a decision on the merits 

with respect to whether petitioner had established the unpatentability of those claims under sections 102 or103.3 It 

would not be proper for the Board to cancel claims on a 

ground that is unavailable in an IPR. 

3 

In essence, Samsung’s argument is that there is no 

limit to the Board’s authority to make unpatentability determinations at the conclusion of an IPR proceeding. That 

position is at odds with both the statutory language and 

the case law, and we reject it. 

B 

Having rejected Samsung’s argument that the Board 

may cancel challenged claims for indefiniteness during an 

IPR, we next address Samsung’s secondary argument that 

the Board should have assessed the patentability of claims 

1 and 4–8 under sections 102 or 103.

As noted, even though neither party raised the issue of 

indefiniteness below, the Board raised two indefiniteness 

3 To be clear, in cases in which the Board cannot

reach a final decision as to the patentability of certain 

claims because it cannot ascertain the scope of those claims 

with reasonable certainty, the petitioner would not be estopped by 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) from challenging those claims 

under sections 102 or 103 in other proceedings.

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concerns sua sponte. First, the Board concluded that claim 

1 was indefinite under IPXL, because the claim recited 

both an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus. 

Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 5274000 at *6. Second, 

the Board concluded that the “digital processing unit” limitation of claim 1 invoked “means-plus-function” claiming 

under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and that because Samsung did 

not identify any corresponding structure in the specification, the Board could not apply the prior art to claim 1 or 

its dependent claims. Id. Samsung contends that the 

Board’s analysis of the “digital processing unit” limitation 

was incorrect and that the IPXL issue did not prevent the 

Board from assessing the patentability of claims 1 and 4–8 

under sections 102 or 103.

1 

We agree with Samsung that the term “digital processing unit” is not a “means-plus-function” limitation subject to analysis under section 112, paragraph 6. Because 

the reference to the digital processing unit does not contain 

the words “means for,” there is a rebuttable presumption 

that section 112, paragraph 6, does not apply to that limitation. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. That presumption 

can be overcome, but only “if the challenger demonstrates 

that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite 

structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. at 1349.

The question whether the term “digital processing 

unit” invokes section 112, paragraph 6, depends on 

whether persons skilled in the art would understand the 

claim language to refer to structure, assessed in light of the 

presumption that flows from the drafter’s choice not to employ the word “means.” The Board pointed to no evidence 

that a person skilled in the relevant art would regard the 

term “digital processing unit” as purely functional. In fact, 

Prisua argued to the Board, based on testimony from its 

expert (the inventor), that the digital processing unit

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recited in the claims is “an image processing device that 

people in the art are generally familiar with.” J.A. 896.

As used in the claims of the ’591 patent, the term “digital processing unit” clearly serves as a stand-in for a “general purpose computer” or a “central processing unit,” each 

of which would be understood as a reference to structure in 

this case, not simply any device that can perform a particular function. See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., 

Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d on other 

grounds, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 

617 (2008); Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams.

Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

Significantly, that is what the Board found with respect to the use of the term “digital processing unit” in 

claim 11. Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 5274000, at *14

(“As a result, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that ‘digital processing unit’ has a narrower definition than CPU. Sitrick discloses a general purpose 

computer with a CPU that is capable of performing all of 

the functions recited in claim 11. As a result, we are persuaded that Sitrick’s CPU teaches the recited ‘digital processing unit.’”). Moreover, claim 1 requires that the 

“digital processing unit” be operably connected to a “data 

entry device” such as a keyboard, which in turn is connected to other components. That portion of claim 1 constitutes further evidence of the structural nature of the 

term “digital processing unit,” as used in the claim.

The Board did not treat claim 11’s “digital processing 

unit” as simply a black box recitation of any structure capable of providing certain functions. Instead, the Board

equated the term to a class of known structures—central 

processing units—that could be found in any general-purpose computer. See Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 

5274000, at *14. The Board’s treatment of the “digital processing unit” limitation in claim 11 as structural in nature 

undermines its conclusion that the same term in claim 1 

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was functional and thus subject to analysis under section 

112, paragraph 6.

Given the Board’s findings with respect to claim 11, the 

context of the term in the claim at issue, and the presumption arising from the patentee’s failure to use the “means 

for” formulation, unrebutted by any evidence before the 

Board, we conclude that the Board erred in ruling that the 

term “digital processing unit” does not recite structure and 

instead is a purely functional term. We therefore reject the 

Board’s conclusion that the term “digital processing unit,” 

as used in claim 1, invoked means-plus-function claiming, 

and that for that reason claims 1 and 4–8 cannot be analyzed for anticipation or obviousness.4

2 

The Board also concluded that claim 1 was indefinite 

because of an IPXL issue—a finding that neither party disputes. However, the Board did not address Samsung’s argument that the Board could nonetheless apply the prior 

art to claim 1 and its dependent claims for purposes of anticipation or obviousness analysis. In light of our decision 

to reverse the Board’s decision as to the “digital processing 

unit” term, we believe the Board ended its analysis with 

respect to the IPXL issue prematurely. We therefore remand for further consideration of that issue. 

4 Pointing to the Board’s reference to 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.104(b)(3), Prisua argues that Samsung’s petition 

failed to present a proper claim construction for claim 1, 

and that the Board’s decision is supportable on that 

ground. The Board, however, referred to the regulation 

only “if one were to contend that claim 1 is an apparatus 

claim whose limitations are merely written in functional 

language.” Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 5274000, at 

*9. Samsung has not made such a contention, and we have 

rejected it. 

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On remand, the Board should address Samsung’s argument that the Board may analyze the patentability of a 

claim even if that claim is indefinite under the reasoning 

of IPXL. The rationale of IPXL is that the claim conflates 

elements of both an apparatus and a method, rendering the 

claim indefinite for purposes of determining when infringement occurs. But that merely says that the claim is subject 

to invalidation on the ground of indefiniteness. It does not 

speak to whether the claim is also invalid for obviousness, 

regardless of whether it is treated as being directed to an 

apparatus or a method. 

Even though the validity of the challenged claims may 

be subject to question for IPXL-type indefiniteness, that is 

simply another ground on which the claims might be challenged in an appropriate forum (other than the Board). See

Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453–

55 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding decision that patent was invalid for both indefiniteness and obviousness); In re Collier, 

397 F.2d 1003, 1004–06 (CCPA 1968) (rejecting claim on 

grounds of indefiniteness and obviousness). It does not 

necessarily preclude the Board from addressing the patentability of the claims on section 102 and 103 grounds. In the 

remand proceedings, the Board should determine whether 

claim 1 and its dependent claims are unpatentable as anticipated or obvious based on the instituted grounds.5

5 The Board has previously held that IPXL-type indefiniteness does not prevent the Board from addressing 

patentability. See Vibrant Media, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 

IPR2013-00172, 2014 WL 3749773 (P.T.A.B. July 28, 

2014), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Although 

the Board in this case suggested that its decision in Vibrant 

Media might be inconsistent with this court’s decision in 

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 

(Fed. Cir. 2010), the statement in the Enzo case quoted by 

the Board—that “a claim cannot be both indefinite and 

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III

In its cross-appeal, Prisua challenges the Board’s order 

holding claim 11 of the ’591 patent invalid for obviousness

over the Sitrick prior art reference. We affirm the Board’s 

order with respect to that claim. 

A 

Prisua contends that Sitrick did not disclose the “capturing a user input video data stream” limitation, and that 

the Board ignored Prisua’s argument with respect to that 

limitation. Samsung responds that Prisua did not properly 

raise that issue before the Board, and we agree. None of 

the documents Prisua cites establish that Prisua timely 

presented any argument to the Board regarding the “capturing” limitation. 

The documents Prisua points to as evidence that it presented an argument regarding that limitation to the Board 

consist mainly of material submitted during the supplemental briefing. When the Board, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS, modified its original 

institution decision to include all the claims and grounds 

raised in the petition, the Board authorized the parties to 

file supplemental briefs. The Board ordered that those 

briefs address only the newly added claims and grounds, 

not any issues that were already under review. Because 

the issue of the obviousness of claim 11 in view of Sitrick 

was part of the original institution decision, Prisua’s 

anticipated”—did not involve IPXL-type indefiniteness and 

therefore did not resolve the question presented to the 

Board in this case. Our decision here is limited to IPXLtype indefiniteness and does not affect claims that are indefinite for other reasons. Moreover, our ruling in this case 

does not affect the disposition of cases in forums that are 

authorized to consider indefiniteness as a basis for invalidating a claim. 

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supplemental briefing did not pertain to that issue. The

supplemental briefing thus did not bear on the issues in 

Prisua’s cross-appeal, which involves only the obviousness 

of claim 11 in view of Sitrick.6 

B 

Prisua next argues that Sitrick does not disclose a 

“data entry device,” as recited in claim 11, and that the 

Board failed to analyze whether the alleged data entry device of Sitrick is “operably coupled with the digital video 

capture device,” as claim 11 requires. We conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that 

Sitrick disclosed the “data entry device,” and that Prisua 

waived any argument regarding the “operably coupled” aspect of the limitation. 

With respect to the “data entry device” limitation, the 

Board found that “a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would have understood Sitrick’s disclosure of a ‘general 

purpose computer’ to include a keyboard,” and that in any 

event it was not necessary for Samsung to establish that 

the general purpose computer disclosed in Sitrick necessarily has a keyboard. Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 

5274000, at *13.

Prisua contends that Sitrick does not inherently disclose a keyboard, but Samsung did not argue to the contrary. Instead, Samsung argued only that Sitrick’s general 

purpose computer would necessarily include some type of 

data entry device, a keyboard being one example. After 

6 Prisua made a cursory reference to the “capturing 

a user input video data stream” limitation in the background section of its patent owner response, but did not 

discuss that limitation in its nonobviousness argument. 

The Board was therefore correct in stating that Prisua did 

not argue that limitation.

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considering extensive record materials besides the Sitrick

reference, including deposition testimony and competing 

expert declarations, the Board agreed with Samsung that 

Sitrick taught a data entry device.

That conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. In particular, it was reasonable for the Board to

conclude that Prisua’s expert, Dr. Prieto, conceded in deposition that the general-purpose computer disclosed in Sitrick would have a data entry device such as a keyboard. 

Although Dr. Prieto went on to explain that other special 

purpose hardware and software combinations disclosed in 

Sitrick might not always include a data entry device, that

does not undermine the Board’s conclusion that the disclosed general-purpose computer would include a data entry device. We see no reason to disturb the Board’s 

evaluation and weighing of the evidence on that score. 

We also do not believe the Board improperly skipped 

over the “operably coupled” aspect of the “using a data entry device” limitation, as Prisua suggests. In its preliminary patent owner response, prior to the institution of the 

IPR, Prisua argued that a video camera can serve as the 

source of image data, but need not be “operably coupled” to 

a general purpose computer to do so. However, after the 

Board rejected Prisua’s argument in its institution decision, Prisua focused on the absence of a “data entry device” 

in Sitrick and did not address the “operably coupled” portion of that limitation. It was therefore reasonable for the 

Board to conclude that Prisua was no longer pressing any 

argument based on the “operably coupled” language, and 

to focus only on the arguments Prisua was continuing to 

make. 

C 

Prisua next argues that Sitrick does not teach or suggest the claimed step of “spatially matching an area of the 

second image to an area of the first image in the original 

video data stream, wherein spatially matching the areas 

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results in equal lengths and widths between said two spatially matched areas.” That step would, for example, require a user replacing an actor’s face with the user’s own to 

make sure the image of the user’s face was modified so that 

it matched the length and width of the image it was replacing. The Board found that Sitrick taught the use of image 

transformation techniques that met the “spatially matching” limitation recited in claim 11. The Board’s finding on 

that issue was supported by substantial evidence.

Prisua contends that although Sitrick discloses several 

image transformation techniques, none of them requires 

that the original and matched areas be of equal lengths and 

widths. Instead, Prisua says that one of the available techniques is chosen to “obtain the best” results, which is not 

the same as achieving “equal lengths and widths” for the 

original and matched areas. In the Sitrick reference, according to Prisua, achieving “equal lengths and widths” is 

merely a possibility, and thus that limitation is not disclosed sufficiently to establish obviousness.

In making its findings, the Board weighed both experts’ 

testimony regarding the “equal lengths and widths” limitation, and chose to credit Samsung’s expert’s testimony that 

the “morphing” technique disclosed in Sitrick involves an 

“exact one to one relationship between the first array of coordinates and the second array of coordinates—to align the 

points of the first image into the points of the second image, 

which would result in equal length and width.” Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 5274000, at *17 (internal quotations 

omitted). That assessment, the Board found, was enough 

to establish that Sitrick discloses the “equal lengths and 

widths” limitation. Prisua does not provide a convincing 

response to that evidence, and we see no reason to disturb 

the Board’s conclusion based on that evidence. 

In an attempt to avoid that natural reading of Sitrick, 

Prisua contends that Sitrick specifically excludes the 

morphing technique, and that the Board therefore should 

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not have relied on the testimony of Samsung’s expert. We 

disagree. Although Sitrick discloses other transformation

techniques that, unlike morphing, may not necessarily 

have resulted in equal lengths and widths, Sitrick undeniably discloses using morphing as one option. And the 

Board reasonably concluded that the morphing technique 

results in equal lengths and widths, thus satisfying the 

limitation at issue. 

D 

Prisua next contends that Sitrick does not teach or suggest the claimed requirements of selecting, identifying, and 

extracting at least one pixel from the user input video data 

stream to be used as the second image. In the claim, a spatially matched second image is what ultimately replaces 

the first image in the original video stream.

Prisua complains that the second image in Sitrick is 

modified before it is inserted in the substitution step, 

whereas the claim, according to Prisua, does not allow the 

second image to be modified before being inserted in the 

substitution step. We do not see how Prisua’s argument 

has any bearing on the claimed requirements of selecting, 

identifying, and extracting at least one pixel from the user 

input video data stream. 

The Board agreed with Samsung’s argument that a 

user operating the Sitrick system would have to select at 

least one pixel in the user input video data stream in order 

for the system to analyze the user selected image.7 It is 

clear from Sitrick that the selection, identification, and extraction of at least one pixel in the disclosed system occurs 

before any alleged modification, and those steps are thus

unaffected by whether there is a subsequent modification. 

7 Contrary to Prisua’s contention, Samsung’s argument was not based on inherency, but merely recognized 

that the image to be analyzed consists of one or more pixels.

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Moreover, even if the inputs in the substitution step are 

modifications of the second image, that is consistent with 

the language of claim 11, which requires that the second 

image be “spatially matched” with the first image. Claim 

11’s “spatially matching” requirement specifically contemplates modifying the second image so that it will have equal 

lengths and widths as the first image it is replacing.

Prisua also contends that the Board misunderstood the 

pertinent language of claim 11. In its final written decision, the Board stated, with respect to Sitrick, that “even 

assuming that user-specified image 137 is a texture map 

by the time it is an input 570 into subsystem 500, that is 

not sufficient to show that an image was not originally selected, as the claim [of the ’591 patent] requires.” Final 

Written Decision, 2018 WL 5274000, at *13 (emphasis 

added). Prisua argues that the emphasized language indicates that the Board misunderstood claim 11, because the 

claim recites that “at least one pixel” is selected, not that 

“an image” is selected. The Board, however, had previously 

credited Samsung’s explanation that Sitrick’s “user selected image” required the selection of at least one pixel. 

The Board’s finding in that regard, which was consistent 

with the testimony of Samsung’s expert, was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

E 

Lastly, Prisua contends that Sitrick does not teach or 

suggest the limitation of claim 11 that requires applying 

“motion vectors” so that the edited video data stream resulting from the substitution maintains the overall appearance of motion produced by the original video data stream.

That part of claim 11 recognizes that if an original 

video includes motion, one might want the user image that 

is being substituted into the original video to track that 

motion. For example, if the user wanted to replace an actress’s face with her own, the user would likely want to 

make sure the actress’s body did not move in a way that 

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left the substituted face behind. In order to accomplish 

that objective, claim 11 requires that the motion vectors of 

the first image be computed and applied to the second image.

In concluding that the limitation providing for “applying the motion vectors in the second image” was taught in 

Sitrick, the Board reasonably credited Samsung’s expert

testimony that motion vector information associated with 

the first image in Sitrick would be applied to the second 

image in order to maintain the placement and orientation 

of the second image in relation to the first image. 

The Board found that testimony to be consistent with 

Sitrick’s disclosure that an “association means” would use 

computed motion vector information from a first audiovisual presentation to associate one or more replacement objects (i.e., second images) with a detected reference object 

(i.e., the first image). We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the “applying motion vectors to the second image” limitation of claim 

11 was taught by Sitrick.

Because none of Prisua’s challenges to the Board’s 

analysis with respect to claim 11 have merit, the Board’s 

order that claim 11 is unpatentable for obviousness is affirmed.

Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal and 

cross-appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED

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