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Parties Involved:
Department of Labor
Petitioner
Goltra Castings
Not Party
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 

Petitioner, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 111991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 90-9517 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW 

COMMISSION, 

Respondent, 

GOLTRA CASTINGS, INC., 

Real Party in Interest. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER 

OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

(OSHRC No. 89-0015) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Robert P. Davis, Solicitor of Labor, Cynthia L. Attwood, Associate 

Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health, Barbara Werthmann, 

Counsel for Appellate Litigation, Charles F. James, Attorney, u.s. 

Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. 

Victor F. Boog, Bradley, Campbell, Carney & Madsen, Golden, 

Colorado, for Respondent and Real Party in Interest. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner seeks review of an administrative law judge's 

(ALJ) decision vacating a citation petitioner issued to Goltra 

Castings, Inc. (Goltra), asserting a violation of 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1910.133(a)(l) in the operation of Goltra's steel foundry for 

failure to require its employees to wear face shields when pouring 

molten metal. 1 The ALJ's decision became the final order of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) when 

the Commission declined to review the ALJ's determination. 

Section 1910.133(a)(l) requires that "[p]rotective eye and 

face equipment shall be required where there is a reasonable 

probability of injury that can be prevented by such equipment." 

In order to establish a violation of section 1910.133(a)(l) which 

satisfies due process, petitioner bore the burden, see Mountain 

States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 

Review Commission, 623 F.2d 155, 157-58 (lOth Cir. 

1980)(addressing citation issued under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a)), 

of establishing that Goltra had either actual or constructive 

knowledge of "a reasonable probability of injury that can be 

prevented" by use of face shields. See, ~' Donovan v. General 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate 

has determined unanimously that oral argument 

assist the determination of this petition for 

App. P. 34(a)f lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

record, this panel 

would not materially 

review. See Fed. R. 

is therefore ordered 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 2 
Motors Corp., 764 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1985)(addressing citation 

issued under section 1910.132(a)). 2 

The question of whether Goltra had actual or constructive 

knowledge of the probability of injury is a factual determination. 

See General Motors, 764 F.2d at 35. The Commission's findings of 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record 

considered as a whole, will be conclusive. 29 u.s.c. § 660(a). 

This court, therefore, will set aside the ALJ's decision only if 

it is unsupported by substantial evidence or is "arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(E); see Wilder v. Prokop, 846 

F.2d 613, 619 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Petitioner asserts that it established Goltra's actual 

knowledge of the probability of injury in light of a previous 

citation petitioner issued Goltra under section 1910.132(a) for 

failure to require its employees to wear protective equipment, 

including face shields. The Commission vacated this citation 

pursuant to a settlement agreement between petitioner and Goltra. 

Settlement of a citation, like an uncontested citation, does 

not necessarily establish actual knowledge of the probability of 

injury. See S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety 

& Health Review Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1273, 1284-85 (5th Cir. 

2 The analysis of violations asserted under 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1910.132 is analogous to the application of section 1910.133, 

see Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England Railroad, 11 OSH Cas. 

(BNA) 1345, 1347 (1983), as well as 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a), see, ~' Corbesco, Inc. v. Dole, 926 F.2d 422, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 

1991) and 29 u.s.c. § 654(a)(l), see, ~' Cape & Vineyard 

Division of New Bedford Gas v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 

Commission, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 and n.5 (1st Cir. 1975). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 3 
1981)(uncontested citation issued under section 1926.28(a)). 

Rather, a previous, uncontested citation establishes only that 

petitioner believes that a probability of injury exists. Id. 

Further, substantial evidence established that, in over 

twenty years of operation, none of Goltra's employees had suffered 

the type of injury which would have been prevented by the use of 

face shields. Although the goal of the Occupational Health and 

Safety Act is to prevent the first injury, "a very low injury rate 

has a definite bearing on the question whether an employer has 

notice that personal protective equipment is necessary . . " 

Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Donovan, 659 F.2d 1285, 1290 

(5th Cir. 1981)(citations omitted)(section 1910.132(a)); see also 

Cotter & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 598 

F.2d 911, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1979)(section 1910.132(a)). The record 

thus supported the ALJ's determination that Goltra did not have 

actual knowledge of the probability of injury which would warrant 

requiring its employees to wear face shields. 

Where there is insufficient evidence to establish the 

employer's actual knowledge of the probability of injury, see 

General Motors, 764 F.2d at 36-37; Cape & Vineyard, 512 F.2d at 

1152, "it is appropriate to apply the reasonable person test in 

assessing compliance with" section 1910.133(a)(1). Philadelphia, 

Bethlehem, 11 OSH Cas. at 1347. Application of the reasonable 

person test to determine an employer's constructive knowledge 

ensures that this broad regulation satisfies due process by being 

"sufficiently clear to give persons of ordinary intelligence a 

reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited or demanded so 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 4 
that they may act accordingly." Lukens Steel Co., 10 OSH Cas. 

(BNA) 1115, 1123 (1981). 

The ALJ determined that petitioner failed to establish "that 

there was a reasonable probability of facial injury which might be 

avoided by the use of face shields." Petitioner first argues 

that, in making this determination, the ALJ applied the wrong 

legal standard by focusing on the probability of injury rather 

than applying the reasonable person test. Petitioner contends 

that application of the probability of injury standard rather than 

the reasonable person test was arbitrary and capricious and not in 

accordance with law, both because the ALJ disregarded binding 

Commission precedent established in Philadelphia, Bethlehem, 11 

OSH Cas. 1345, and because the ALJ failed to give appropriate 

deference to petitioner's interpretation of its own regulation. 

The clear language of the regulation, however, requires the 

ALJ to determine whether there is a "reasonable probability of 

injury." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.133(a)(l). The Commission, in 

Philadelphia, Bethlehem, did not replace this determination, but 

rather restricted its application to those situations where a 

reasonable person would deem there to be "a reasonable probability 

of injury." 11 OSH Cas. at 1347; cf. Lukens Steel, 10 OSH Cas. at 

1123 (limiting scope of section 1910.132(a) by applying objective 

reasonable person standard). Further, although an agency's 

reasonable interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to 

deference, see Dole v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 

Commission, 891 F.2d 1495, 1496-97 (lOth Cir. 1989), rev'd on 

other grounds, 111 s. Ct. 1171 (1991), petitioner's interpretation 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 5 
asserted here, that the reasonable person standard replaced 

consideration of whether the probability of injury existed, is not 

reasonable in light of the express language of section 

1910.133(a)(1). 

The issue presented, then, in determining whether Goltra had 

constructive knowledge of circumstances requiring its employees to 

use face shields, is whether a reasonable person familiar with 

the circumstances surrounding the allegedly hazardous conditions 

at Goltra's foundry, including facts unique to that particular 

industry, would recognize a reasonable probability of injury that 

could be prevented by use of face shields. See Philadelphia, 

Bethlehem, 11 OSH Cas. at 1346-47. The ALJ, therefore, did not 

err in addressing Goltra's purported violation of section 

1910.133(a)(1) by determining whether there existed a "reasonable 

probability of injury that can be prevented by" use of face 

shields. Further, although the ALJ did not explicitly refer to 

the reasonable person standard in making this determination, there 

is no indication that the ALJ did otherwise, particularly in light 

of the ALJ's application of that same standard to the second 

citation before him. 3 

Petitioner next asserts that it presented sufficient evidence 

to meet its burden, under the reasonable person standard, of 

establishing a violation of section 1910.133(a)(1), relying on its 

3 The hearing before the ALJ involved two citations which 

petitioner issued to Goltra. In addition to the citation at issue 

in this petition for review, petitioner cited Goltra for violating 

29 C.F.R. S 1910.132(a) by failing to require its employees to 

wear protective clothing. The ALJ upheld the section 1910.132(a) 

citation. That citation is not currently before this court. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 6 
evidence of industry practice and 4 custom. Petitioner's expert 

testified that face shields are "widely used throughout the molten 

metal industry, and it's generally accepted by knowledgeable 

people that when you're pouring molten metal you should protect 

your face with a face shield." Transcript, Hearing before ALJ, 

102-03. Although petitioner's expert testified that Goltra's 

operation was fairly typical of the molten metal industry, tr. at 

81-82, he admitted that he had never before observed a foundry 

operation which relies on hand pouring occurring below the waist, 

as Goltra's operation does, tr. at 122. Further, petitioner's 

expert stated that he was unfamiliar with operations in the die 

cast industry, a related molten metal industry whose practice, 

Goltra asserted, was not to have employees wear face shields. Tr. 

136-39; see generally Hamilton Die Cast Inc., 13 OSH Cas. (BNA) 

1317, 1318 (1987). Petitioner's expert could not testify if, and 

in what manner, Goltra's operation was similar to or distinct from 

operations employed by the die cast industry. Tr. at 138. 

Goltra presented evidence, through the testimony of several 

of its employees, that its operation was the only hand pouring 

steel foundry in the nation, tr. at 209, and that hand pouring was 

4 While the Fifth Circuit has equated the reasonable person 

standard to industry custom and practice, see, ~' S & H 

Riggers, 659 F.2d at 1278-81 (section 1926.28(a)), other circuits 

have determined that, while ordinarily application of the 

reasonable person test will refer to industry practice and custom, 

industry standards will not necessarily be dispositive. See, ~' Voegele Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 

625 F.2d 1075, 1078 (3d Cir. 1980)(section 1926.28(a)); Bristol 

Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 

Comm'n, 601 F.2d 717, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1979)(section 1926.28(a)). 

It is unnecessary to the resolution of this petition for review, 

however, for this court to determine whether industry standards 

will be conclusive under the reasonable person standard. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 7 
distinguishable from operations generally employed by the molten 

metal industry, upon which petitioner's expert had based his 

testimony. See tr. at 181-83, 208-11, 224, 231-33. These 

employees further testified that use of face shields while hand 

pouring molten metal created additional hazards to workers. Tr. 

at 154-55, 172-75, 182-83, 192-93, 199, 219-21. Further, none of 

the employees had experienced facial burns during Goltra's pouring 

process, nor were these employees aware of any such incidents 

involving other employees. Tr. at 151, 181, 197, 217; ~General 

Motors, 764 F.2d at 37 (considering evidence establishing low 

incidence of injury in determining, under section 1910.132(a), 

whether reasonable person would recognize hazard warranting use of 

protective equipment). Goltra's records, which concerned the two 

years prior to issuance of this citation, corroborated the lack of 

facial injuries. Rec. Vol. I, exh. C-16. 

Petitioner argues that the ALJ erred by crediting the 

testimony of Goltra's employees, who did not testify as experts, 

over the testimony of petitioner's expert, whose testimony the ALJ 

credited in affirming the protective clothing citation issued 

under section 1910.132(a). Testimony concerning general industry 

practices is not entitled to great weight, however, where the 

situation at issue differs, or is in some way unique, from the 

operations generally employed by that industry. See General 

Motors, 764 F.2d at 37; Voegele, 625 F.2d at 1079; cf. Magma 

Copper Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1979)(in 

distinguishing permanent oxygen supply systems used in smelting or 

refining industries from portable oxygen supply systems used in 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 8 
hospitals and welding work, court determined conduct at issue must 

be judged by standards of relevant industry). Because Goltra 

presented sufficient evidence to distinguish, where use of face 

shields was concerned, hand pouring operations from other 

operations employed in the molten metal industry generally, the 

ALJ did not err in crediting the testimony of Goltra's employees 

over that of petitioner's expert. See General Motors, 764 F.2d at 

37 (where Secretary's expert testified concerning the practices 

employed by general warehousing industry, no error to accord 

greater weight to testimony of alleged violator's employees, who 

were only witnesses familiar with operations particular to 

warehousing of automotive parts). 

Review of the record indicates that petitioner failed to meet 

its burden of establishing that Goltra had either actual or 

constructive knowledge of the probability of injury which could be 

prevented by requiring its employees to wear face shields. The 

decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 

therefore, is AFFIRMED. 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-9517 Document: 01019293863 Date Filed: 07/11/1991 Page: 9