Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00340/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00340-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis L. Parker
Plaintiff
Yuba County Water District
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS L. PARKER, )

) 02:06-cv-0340-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

YUBA COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, ) 

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal

claims and moves to dismiss his remaining state claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dennis Parker (“Plaintiff”) worked as the General

Manager of the Yuba County Water District (“the District”) from

approximately 1984 until his employment was terminated in late 2005. 

(Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 3-4.) After his

termination, he brought this action against the District asserting

claims for disability discrimination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., retaliation under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff does not specify whether his hostile work 1

environment claim is brought under Title VII, the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act, or some other state statute. (See Pl.’s

First Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Since the parties treat the hostile work

environment claim as a state claim, it is assumed for the purposes of

this motion that this claim is based on state law. 

 The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment 2

are well known and need not be repeated here. 

2

§§ 2000e, et seq., and denial of procedural due process under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). (Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15-17.) 

Plaintiff also asserts state claims for disability discrimination

under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California

Government Code § 12940, breach of contract, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, hostile work environment, and wrongful termination

in violation of public policy. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 18-23.) 1

DISCUSSION2

I. ADA

The District argues Plaintiff cannot maintain an ADA

discrimination claim because the District “did not have the statutory

minimum number of employees required to qualify as a covered employer

under the ADA.” (Def.’s Mot. at 3.) Under the ADA, a “covered

entity” cannot discriminate against an individual with a disability on

the basis of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term “covered

entity” includes an “employer.” Id. § 12111(2). The ADA defines an

employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who

has [fifteen] or more employees for each working day in each of

[twenty] or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar

year,” and defines an employee as “an individual employed by an

employer.” Id. § 12111(4), (5)(A). Consequently, Plaintiff may

maintain an ADA discrimination claim against the District only if the

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In 2004, the District employed seven individuals on either a 3

full or part-time basis in twenty or more weeks; the District and

Plaintiff agree these individuals are “employees” for purposes of the

ADA. (SUF ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff also asserts the Recording Secretary

and the five members of the Board of Directors should be considered

employees under the ADA, (SUF ¶¶ 16, 19), but since addition of these

six individuals would not equal fifteen employees, this issue need not

be reached.

Plaintiff also contends two other individuals should be 4

considered employees, (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2), but since addition of

these two individuals would not equal fifteen employees, this issue

need not be reached. 

3

District employed fifteen or more employees in 2005, the year the

alleged discrimination took place, or in 2004, the preceding year. 

Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 441-42

(2003). Since Plaintiff concedes the District employed a maximum of

thirteen individuals in 2004, (SUF ¶¶ 13-14, 16, 19), the District

must have employed fifteen or more individuals in 2005 for the ADA to

be applicable. 

3

In 2005, the District employed ten individuals on either a

full or part-time basis during twenty or more weeks. (SUF ¶¶ 7-8.) 

The District and Plaintiff agree these ten individuals should be

considered employees for purposes of the ADA. (Def.’s Mot. at 9-10; 4

Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.) However, the parties disagree as to whether the

five members of the Yuba County Water District Board of Directors

(“Board of Directors”) should be considered “employees” as that term

is defined under the ADA. (Def.’s Mot. at 7; Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) The

District argues the Board of Directors are not employees because these

individuals “did not have an employment relationship with [the

District].” (Def.’s Mot. at 9.) Plaintiff rejoins that the members

of the Board of Directors are employees based on their duties at the

District. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) The District contends that whether the

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The six factors articulated by the Supreme Court are: 5

[1] Whether the organization can hire or

fire the individual or set the rules and

regulations of the individual’s work[,]

[2] Whether and, if so, to what extent

the organization supervises the

individual’s work[,]

[3] Whether the individual reports to

someone higher in the organization[,]

[4] Whether and, if so, to what extent

(continued...)

4

members of the Board of Directors are employees for purposes of the

ADA, and whether these members are employees or employers, should be

determined under “the [g]eneral law of agency . . . .” (Def.’s Reply

at 1-2, 5.) 

In Clackamas, the Supreme Court observed that the definition

of an employee under the ADA “qualifies as a nominal definition that

is completely circular and explains nothing.” 538 U.S. at 444

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court stated

“that when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it,

we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional

master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency

doctrine.” Id. at 445 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court found

that the common law “definition of the master-servant relationship”

provides “helpful guidance” in the context of the ADA, and that the

“relevant factors defining the master-servant relationship focus on

the master’s control over the servant.” Id. The Supreme Court

articulated six factors that are helpful for determining whether a

director should be considered an employer or an employee for purposes

of the ADA, but emphasized “that the common law element of control is

the principal guidepost that should be followed” when making this

determination. Id. at 449-50. 5

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(...continued) 5

the individual is able to influence the

organization[,]

[5] Whether the parties intended that

the individual be an employee, as

expressed in written agreements or

contracts[,]

[6] Whether the individual shares in the

profits, losses, and liabilities of the

organization. 

Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-450.

In a footnote, the District moves “in the alternative” to 6

dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “because Plaintiff’s Complaint is

devoid of any allegation regarding the number of employees he claims

[the District] had.” (Def.’s Mot. at 4 n.1.) Since the motion for

summary judgment has been granted, this argument need not be reached. 

5

Although the parties dispute the exact role of the members

of the Board of Directors and what influence, if any, they had over

the day-to-day activities of the District, both parties agree that the

five members of the Board of Directors did not respond to anyone

higher in the District hierarchy or to any superior body. (SUF ¶ 27.) 

The relevant inquiry is whether the members of the Board of

“[D]irectors operate independently and manage the business or instead

are subject to the [District’s] control.” Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448. 

The members of the Board of Directors did not report to a higher

authority within the business; therefore, they were not subject to the

District’s control. Consequently, the five members of the Board of

Directors were not employees for the purposes of the ADA and the

District did not employ fifteen or more employees in 2005.

Since no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether

the District employed fifteen or more employees in 2005, the motion

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim is

granted.6

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 An examination of the legislative history surrounding the 7

enactment of the ADA reveals that Congress adopted or incorporated by

reference several definitions contained in Title VII into the ADA, but

deliberately chose not to include the elected official exception

contained in Title VII. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II) at 336 (1990)

(reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 336) (observing “[t]he exception

set out in Title VII . . . for elected officials . . . has been

deleted”); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), at 455 (1990) (reprinted in

1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 455) (stating “[t]he exception set out in Title

VII for elected officials . . . is not incorporated in the ADA”).

6

II. Title VII

The District argues Plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII

retaliation claim because the District did not employ the statutory

minimum number of employees required to qualify as a covered employer

under Title VII. (Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Like the ADA, the retaliation

provisions of Title VII “appl[y] to an employer only if that employer

employs [fifteen] or more employees.” Anderson v. Pacific Maritime

Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),

and Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 441 n.1). Title VII also defines an

employee as “an individual employed by an employer,” but unlike the

ADA, Title VII excludes from that definition any individual who is

“elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any

State by the qualified voters thereof . . . or an appointee on the

policy making level . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f); see also

Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.10 (11th Cir. 1993)

(noting the definition of “employee” under Title VII excludes elected

and appointed officials); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th

Cir. 1989) (same); Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 151 (5th

Cir. 1985) (same).7

The parties agree all five members of the Board of Directors

were either appointed or elected to their positions. (SUF ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff concedes the five board members cannot be considered

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff requests that the citation to Title VII in his 8

Complaint be deemed “amended to refer instead to [the ADA],” or

alternatively “requests leave to file an Amended Complaint with that

change pursuant to Rule 15(a).” (Id.) However, the Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order (“Status Order”) issued May 24, 2006, stated “[n]o

further . . . amendments to pleadings is permitted . . . .” (Status

Order at 1.) Once a scheduling order establishes a deadline for

amendment of the pleadings, modification of that deadline is governed

by the “good cause” standard of Rule 16(b). Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Since Plaintiff

has not demonstrated that modification of the Scheduling Order is

proper under Rule 16, his request to deem his Complaint amended and

his request for leave to file an amended complaint are denied. 

7

employees under the definitions set forth in Title VII, and

acknowledges that when these individuals are excluded from the total

number of persons who worked for the District during the relevant time

period, the District employed less than fifteen employees. (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 20.) Since Plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII claim

against the District, its motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim is granted.8

III. Section 1983

The District argues Plaintiff cannot maintain a section 1983

claim because “a cause of action under the ADA itself does not exist”

and “Plaintiff cannot use [section] 1983 as a conduit to the ADA”

under such circumstances. (Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Defendant

misconstrues the nature of the section 1983 claim; the claim is not

predicated upon a violation of the disability discrimination

provisions of the ADA, but rather upon a violation of the procedural

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for “firing [Plaintiff]

without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard . . . .” 

(Pl.’s First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.) When conduct violates both the ADA

as well as rights derived from another source, such as the

Constitution, a plaintiff may maintain a claim under both the ADA and

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

section 1983. See Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir.

1989) (stating that if “a plaintiff can show a constitutional

violation by someone acting under color of state law, then the

plaintiff has a cause of action under section 1983, regardless of

Title VII’s concurrent application”); Day v. Wayne County Bd. of

Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[w]here

an employee establishes employer conduct which violates both Title VII

and rights derived from another source-the Constitution or a federal

statute . . . the claim based on the other source is independent of

the Title VII claim, and the plaintiff may seek the remedies provided

by [section] 1983 in addition to those created by Title VII”); cf.

Meade v. Merchants Fast Motorline, Inc., 820 F.2d 1124, 1127 (10th

Cir. 1987) (stating a “plaintiff may properly pursue his cause of

action under [section] 1981 for private employment discrimination

despite the applicability of Title VII to the same conduct”). 

Therefore, the District’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

section 1983 claim is denied. 

IV. State Claims

The District argues that Plaintiff’s remaining state claims

must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because

“with all [federal] claims failing, so does this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction.” (Def.’s Mot. at 12.) However, a federal claim

remains and supplemental jurisdiction exists over the state claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, the District’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA and Title VII claims are granted, but its

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is

denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 13, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-00340-GEB -KJM Document 65 Filed 09/14/06 Page 9 of 9