Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73587/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73587-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sung Kil Jang
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUNG KIL JANG,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 11-73587

Agency No.

A099-065-047

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

November 6, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed December 22, 2015

Before: Susan P. Graber and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit

Judges, and Wiley Y. Daniel,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber

* The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, Senior United States District Judge

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.

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2 JANG V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, under the firm

resettlement doctrine, to a native of North Korea, who

relocated to South Korea. 

The panel held that section 302 of the North Korean

Human Rights Act of 2004, 22 U.S.C. § 7842, which states

that a North Korean national “shall not be considered” a

South Korean national for refugee and asylum purposes, does

not preclude a finding, under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi)

and 8 C.F.R. § 208.15, that a North Korean has “firmly

resettled” in South Korea.

COUNSEL

Judith L. Wood (argued), Law Offices of Judith L. Wood,

Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Alexander J. Lutz (argued) and Dara S. Smith, Trial

Attorneys, and David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Office of

Immigration Litigation, and Stuart F. Delery, Principal

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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JANG V. LYNCH 3

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

This case presents a single legal issue of first impression: 

Does section 302 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of

2004 (“the Act”), 22 U.S.C. § 7842, preclude a finding that a

North Korean has “firmly resettled” in South Korea, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 C.F.R. § 208.15, even though he

otherwise meets the requirements of firm resettlement? We

answer that question “no.” Accordingly, we deny the petition

for asylum.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Sung Kil Jang was born in North Korea in 1977

and is a citizen of North Korea. It is undisputed that

Petitioner testified credibly and that he suffered persecution

in North Korea. Petitioner fled North Korea in 1998 by

swimming across a river into China. He resided in China for

more than a year, and then traveled briefly to Vietnam and

Cambodia, before arriving in South Korea in 2000.

Once relocated in South Korea, Petitioner settled in. He

attended and completed a two-year college, where he studied

engineering, after which he obtained work. Petitioner

remained in South Korea for more than four years and is also

a citizen of South Korea. After a waiting period, South Korea

issued him a passport, thus allowing him to travel. In

addition, he had the right to hold property, receive education,

and get public relief in South Korea. Petitioner’s older sister

lives in South Korea, with her husband and children, as does

one of Petitioner’s brothers. When asked whether he feared

returning to South Korea, Petitioner responded candidly: 

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“It’s not that I fear going back to South Korea. I do not like

it. . . . I don’t have fear. I don’t have fear, but I hate it.”

Petitioner entered the United States in 2004. The

government issued him a Notice to Appear, charging him

with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an

alien present in the United States without being admitted or

paroled. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied relief and ordered

Petitioner removed to South Korea because Petitioner “has in

fact been firmly resettled in South Korea.” The Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal

which, as relevant here, argued that the Act prevents the firm

resettlement bar from applying to asylum claims by North

Koreans who have relocated to South Korea. The IJ and the

BIA relied on the published decision in In re K-R-Y-, 24 I. &

N. Dec. 133 (B.I.A. 2007).1 Petitioner timely seeks review.

 

1 To the BIA, Petitioner also argued, unsuccessfully, that North Korea

and South Korea are a single country for immigration purposes; that

Petitioner did not, in fact, firmly resettle in South Korea because he was

forced to accept citizenship there and reasonably fears to return; and that

the IJ failed to consider certain claims. In addition, Petitioner argued to

the IJ and BIA that he was entitled to withholding of removal and CAT

protection. Petitioner does not renew any of those arguments here, so we

do not consider them. See, e.g., Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause [the petitioner] did not raise [certain

arguments] in his opening brief, we deem those issues waived.”); Smith v.

Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that arguments not

raised in a party’s opening brief generally are waived).

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JANG V. LYNCH 5

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because the BIA issued a published, precedential decision

in In re K-R-Y-, we must defer to its interpretation of the

relevant immigration statute if that statute is ambiguous and

if the agency’s interpretation of it is a permissible one. Toor 

v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). At step one of

the familiar Chevron analysis, we ask whether, “applying the

normal tools of statutory construction,” the statute is

ambiguous, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 n.45 (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted); we consider this question

de novo, New Edge Network, Inc. v. FCC, 461 F.3d 1105,

1110 n.30 (9th Cir. 2006). “If the intent of Congress is clear,

that is the end of the matter . . . .” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). But if the

statute is ambiguous, we move to step two of the Chevron

inquiry and consider whether the agency’s interpretation

permissibly construes the statute. Blandino-Medina v.

Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner sought asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), which

provides in relevant part:

(1) In general

(A) Eligibility

The Secretary of Homeland Security or

the Attorney General may grant asylum to an

alien . . . if the Secretary of Homeland

Security or the Attorney General determines

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that such alien is a refugee within the meaning

of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.

. . . .

(2) Exceptions

(A) In general

Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if

the Attorney General determines that–

. . . .

(vi) the alien was firmly resettled in

another country prior to arriving in the

United States.

(Emphases added.) “The term ‘refugee’ means (A) any

person who is outside any country of such person’s

nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to,

and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the

protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of [a protected

ground].” Id. § 1101(a)(42). Thus, even a person who

otherwise meets the definition of “refugee” is not permitted

to obtain asylum in the United States if “firmly resettled” in

a non-persecuting country. The firm resettlement bar furthers

“the core regulatory purpose of asylum, which is not to

provide applicants with a broader choice of safe homelands,

but rather, to protect refugees with nowhere else to turn.” 

Tchitchui v. Holder, 657 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

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JANG V. LYNCH 7

Congress has not defined firm resettlement, but a

regulation explains the concept:

An alien is considered to be firmly

resettled if, prior to arrival in the United

States, he or she entered into another country

with, or while in that country received, an

offer of permanent resident status, citizenship,

or some other type of permanent resettlement

unless he or she establishes:

(a) That his or her entry into that country

was a necessary consequence of his or her

flight from persecution, that he or she

remained in that country only as long as was

necessary to arrange onward travel, and that

he or she did not establish significant ties in

that country; or

(b) That the conditions of his or her

residence in that country were so substantially

and consciously restricted by the authority of

the country of refuge that he or she was not in

fact resettled. In making his or her

determination, the asylum officer or

immigration judge shall consider the

conditions under which other residents of the

country live; the type of housing, whether

permanent or temporary, made available to

the refugee; the types and extent of

employment available to the refugee; and the

extent to which the refugee received

permission to hold property and to enjoy other

rights and privileges, such as travel

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documentation that includes a right of entry or

reentry, education, public relief, or

naturalization, ordinarily available to others

resident in the country.

8 C.F.R. § 208.15. As will become important to our analysis

below, neither the statute nor the regulation pegs the doctrine

of firm resettlement to a finding of nationality. Rather, the

considerations are practical ones designed to test whether the

alien was in fact living safely, with an offer of some type of

permanent resident status, and with the ability to enjoy a

variety of rights and privileges in another country.

For the purpose of our review, Petitioner concedes—as

the agency found—that he has “firmly resettled” in South

Korea within the meaning of the statute and the regulation. 

He became a citizen of South Korea, remained there for more

than four years—by which time his ability to travel was no

longer restricted—enjoyed a wide range of rights, went to

college, got a job, and had family ties. Indeed, Petitioner

concedes that he would be “firmly resettled” on these facts

were the country in which he resided before coming to the

United States any country except South Korea. Petitioner

argues that section 302 of the North Korean Human Rights

Act of 2004 changes the analysis for a North Korean who

flees to South Korea.

Section 302 of the Act, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7842,

provides in full:

(a) Purpose

The purpose of this section is to clarify

that North Koreans are not barred from

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JANG V. LYNCH 9

eligibility for refugee status or asylum in the

United States on account of any legal right to

citizenship they may enjoy under the

Constitution of the Republic of Korea. It is

not intended in any way to prejudice whatever

rights to citizenship North Koreans may enjoy

under the Constitution of the Republic of

Korea, or to apply to former North Korean

nationals who have availed themselves of

those rights.

(b) Treatment of nationals of North Korea

For purposes of eligibility for refugee

status under section 1157 of Title 8, or for

asylum under section 1158 of Title 8, a

national of the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea [North Korea] shall not be

considered a national of the Republic of

Korea [South Korea].

At step one of the Chevron analysis, we conclude that the

statute is clear and that it does not affect the analysis of firm

resettlement for a North Korean who flees to South Korea. 

We therefore do not reach step two.2

2 As will become clear in our discussion, we rely on subsection (b),

whereas the BIA relied on subsection (a), a hortatory description of

congressional purpose. In re K-R-Y-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 135–36. In our

view, that methodology is flawed. See District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 577–78 (2008) (holding that, “apart from that clarifying

function” of “resolv[ing] an ambiguity in the operative clause,” “a

prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative

clause”). But we arrive at the same result the BIA reached, and our

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The operative subsection is (b), which prescribes the

treatment of nationals of North Korea. Importantly,

subsection (b) limits its application: “For purposes of

eligibility for refugee status under section 1157 of Title 8, or

for asylum under section 1158 of Title 8.” (Emphases added.) 

Section 1158(b)(1)(A) makes an alien eligible for asylum

only if “such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section

1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.” To the same effect, under

§ 1157(c)(4), refugee status also depends on that definition.

In other words, operation of the Act depends on the

definition of “refugee.” To reiterate, a “refugee” is defined

as “any person who is outside any country of such person’s

nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to”

that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution. 

Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphases added). “The term ‘national’

means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.” Id.

§ 1101(a)(21). With respect to a person of dual nationality,

it is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of

persecution in only one of the two countries. In re B-R-, 26

I. & N. Dec. 119, 122 (B.I.A. 2013). In other words, to

receive asylum, a person of dual nationalitymust demonstrate

a well-founded fear of persecution in both countries;

otherwise, eligibility for asylum cannot be demonstrated

because removal to the non-feared country is an available

option. Id.

As noted earlier, the Act provides that, for purposes of

asylum, “a national of [North Korea] shall not be considered

a national of [South Korea].” This provision simply

eliminates a potential dual-nationality barrier to asylum. A

holding is consistent with the purpose set out in subsection (a) of the

statute.

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House Report explained that 22 U.S.C. § 7842 was “meant to

put to rest the erroneous opinion (proposed by some State

Department personnel) that, because North Koreans may be

able to claim citizenship if and when they relocate to South

Korea, they must be regarded as South Koreans for U.S.

refugee and asylum purposes, irrespective of whether they are

able or willing to relocate to South Korea.” H.R. Rep. No.

108-478(I) (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1186,

2004 WL 960518, at *22. The text of § 7842(b) clearly

achieves Congress’ aim: Because a North Korean national

“shall not be considered” a South Korean national for refugee

and asylum purposes, the potential dual-nationality problem

cannot arise.

By contrast, the Act has no effect on the analysis of

whether a North Korean has “firmly resettled” in South Korea

(or anywhere else). Indeed, the House Report noted that

South Korea was, and was likely to remain, “the destination

of choice for most escaping North Koreans” because of

shared language, ethnicity, and history, as well as family ties

in many cases. H.R. Rep. No. 108-478(I), 2004 WL 960518,

at *16. Nothing in the history of the Act suggests that it is

meant to disturb such voluntary resettlement. More

importantly for our Chevron step-one consideration, the text

of the Act contains no reference to firm resettlement. And

conversely, the firm resettlement statute and regulation do not

refer to nationality or require an analysis of the asylum

applicant’s nationality. When determining whether a person

has firmly resettled, it does not matter whether the person is

or is not a national of the country where resettlement is

alleged to have occurred. Instead, the regulation asks only

whether the person has received “an offer” of some type of

permanent status. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15; see Maharaj v.

Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)

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(holding that, in determining whether a petitioner has firmly

resettled, “[t]he focus . . . remains on receipt of an offer of

permanent resettlement”). It is irrelevant whether the person

has accepted the offer; it is irrelevant whether acceptance of

the offer would constitute the acquisition of nationality.

We hold, in summary, that 22 U.S.C. § 7842 is clear. It

does not affect the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner has firmly

resettled in South Korea.

Petition DENIED.

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