Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01197/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dover Energy, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 2015 Decided March 22, 2016

No. 14–1197

DOVER ENERGY, INC., BLACKMER DIVISION,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 14–1221

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of

the National Labor Relations Board

Keith E. Eastland argued the cause for the petitioner. 

William H. Fallon was with him on brief.

Marni L. von Wilpert, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for the respondent. Richard F. 

Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate 

General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General 

Counsel, and Kira Dellinger, Supervisory Attorney were with 

her on brief.

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 1 of 16
2

Before: HENDERSON, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In a twoto-one decision, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) 

held that Dover Energy, Inc., Blackmer Division (Blackmer) 

committed an unfair labor practice when it warned one of its 

employees, Tom Kaanta, to stop submitting “frivolous” 

information requests that his union, the United Auto Workers 

Union, Local 828 (Union), had not authorized. Because the 

record—viewed with the deference due the Board—lacks 

substantial evidence in support of the Board’s decision, we 

grant Blackmer’s petition and deny the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement.

I.

Blackmer is a Michigan industrial-pump manufacturer. 

For decades, Blackmer had a collective bargaining agreement 

(CBA) with the Union. To monitor adherence to the CBA on 

a day-to-day basis, the Union elected certain Blackmer 

employees to serve as stewards, who acted as liaisons 

between the Union and Blackmer and were responsible for 

investigating and settling employee grievances.

During the summer of 2012, Blackmer and the Union 

began to negotiate a new contract to replace the then-current 

CBA, which was set to expire in September 2012. John 

Kaminski (Kaminski), Blackmer’s Director of Human 

Resources, served as the company’s lead negotiator. A 

bargaining committee consisting of Union president Dennis 

Raymond (Raymond) and several other Union representatives 

conducted negotiations on behalf of the Union.

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 2 of 16
3

Enter Tom Kaanta. Kaanta, a long-time Blackmer 

employee with past service as a Union steward, was elected in 

June 2012 to serve again as a steward, representing skilledservices employees on the second shift—a group of four 

employees. Notably, Kaanta was not a member of the Union 

bargaining committee and did not participate in any CBA 

negotiations.

As CBA negotiations progressed, Kaanta apparently grew 

suspicious that members of the Union bargaining committee 

had conflicts of interest that could compromise their ability to 

effectively represent Union members at the negotiating table. 

Thus, on June 12, 2012, Kaanta submitted a handwritten 

“Information Request” to Kaminski. The request read:

I[,] Tom Kaanta, steward of Local 828 request 

any and all financial information (names, 

dates, amounts, etc.) pertaining to any and all 

financial relationships outside the collective 

bargaining agreement (employee/subcontractors, 

employee liasions to subcontractors, 

employee/company investigators, monies, 

benefits, gifts, side deals, etc.) between 

Blackmer PSG (Dover) and Local 828 

members, reps, pensioners, spouses, and 

immediate children. I request this information 

for the purpose of future bargaining.

Deferred Appendix (D.A.) 91 (errors in original). 

After receiving the request, Kaminski contacted 

Raymond to determine if the Union had authorized Kaanta’s 

inquiry. Raymond told Kaminski that the Union had not 

authorized the request and that the request was not within the 

scope of Kaanta’s role as Union steward. On June 19, 2012, 

Kaminski sent Kaanta a letter denying his request. The letter 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 3 of 16
4

stated that “[a]ny requests must be processed through the 

normal bargaining committee process . . . . You are not part 

of the negotiation committee and your request is outside your 

scope.” D.A. 92. After his response, Kaminski had no further 

contact with Kaanta about the matter.

On August 10, 2012, however, Kaanta submitted a 

second written “Information Request” to Kaminski. This 

request stated:

Union officer requests photocopy of all

employee paychecks for the payperiod ending 

Dec. 1 2007 and payperiod ending Aug. 5 

2012. Also I request a spreadsheet printout 

representing all employee total hours and pay 

for each payperiod, starting with Aug. 12 2012, 

and every payperiod thereafter, until the 

contract is ratified.

I believe the company is manipulating wage 

rates for the purpose of influencing the union 

vote! I request this information for labor board 

investigation.

D.A. 93 (errors in original). As he later confirmed in his 

testimony before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Kaanta 

submitted this request because he believed Blackmer was 

offering various wage increases to employees in order to 

shore up employee support for the new CBA once it was 

finalized and before the Union membership voted on it.

Kaminski again contacted Raymond, as well as the chair 

of the Union bargaining committee, to determine if the Union 

had authorized Kaanta’s request. The Union officials again 

told Kaminski that the Union had not authorized the request 

and that he should not honor it.

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 4 of 16
5

On August 23, 2012, Kaminski responded to Kaanta’s 

second request by issuing a “verbal” warning, albeit in written 

form.1 See D.A. 94. Kaminski and three other members of 

Blackmer management met with Kaanta to deliver the 

warning and to explain that Blackmer did not intend to 

bargain with him individually. See D.A. 188, ALJ Hr’g 

Tr. 86:15–20 (Kaminski: “I basically stated to him that he was 

again outside of his scope, that anything relating to the 

collective bargaining process had to go through the bargaining 

committee, that I would not individually bargain with him . . . 

or supply any information that would be considered 

individually bargaining for him . . . .”).

The warning stated in toto:

This is to serve as a verbal warning for 

continued frivolous requests for information 

(photo copies of all employee paychecks for a 

period ending December 1, 2007 and pay 

period August 5, 2012, and spreadsheets for 

total hours and pay for each pay period starting 

with August 12, 2012, and every pay period 

thereafter, until the contract is ratified) and 

interfering with the operation of the business. 

You are not on the Bargaining Committee and 

fail to work within the parameters of such to 

 1

 The Blackmer Code of Employee Conduct does not include 

a “verbal” warning as recognized official discipline. Rather, 

official discipline begins with a “[w]arning in writing.” See D.A. 

161. Kaminski issued a verbal warning because he thought 

Kaanta’s conduct did “not necessarily [warrant] a written warning” 

and hoped that “a verbal warning[] would stop the activity.” D.A. 

188, ALJ Hr’g Tr. 89:1–3. Kaminski put the verbal warning in 

writing so there would be no question that Kaanta understood that 

his requests had to stop.

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 5 of 16
6

bring matters to the Bargaining Committee. 

We are not individually bargaining with you or 

any other individual. 

Similar requests such as this will result in 

further discipline up to and including 

discharge.

D.A. 94.

On December 11, 2012, Kaanta filed an unfair labor 

practice charge with the Board’s Office of the General 

Counsel (OGC). He amended the charge on September 11, 

2013,2 and the OGC issued a complaint on September 13, 

2013, alleging that Blackmer’s “verbal” warning violated 

sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations 

Act (NLRA or Act) by interfering with Kaanta’s right to 

engage in protected concerted activity.

Subsequently, the ALJ conducted a hearing, at which 

Kaanta, Kaminski and Raymond testified. The ALJ 

concluded that Blackmer had not committed an unfair labor 

practice in issuing the verbal warning. Specifically, the ALJ 

found that Kaanta’s requests did not constitute “union activity 

or other protected concerted activity”: instead, they “burdened 

 2

 The nine-month delay resulted from the OGC Regional 

Director’s decision to defer the case to the Union’s internal 

grievance procedure. Kaanta appealed that decision to the Board 

General Counsel but the General Counsel upheld the deferral. In 

late February 2013, Kaanta filed a grievance with Blackmer, which 

Blackmer denied on March 5, 2013. The Union membership then 

voted on whether to refer the grievance to arbitration; the 

membership voted not to do so, thereby ending the internal 

grievance process. Thus, it was not until September 2013—after 

the internal grievance process had run its course—that Kaanta filed 

his amended charge. 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 6 of 16
7

respondent, potentially intruded upon the privacy of 

bargaining unit members, and potentially interfered with 

negotiations between management and the Union for a new 

collective-bargaining agreement.” Dover Energy, Inc., 

Blackmer Div., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 4659319, at 

*6, *9 (Sept. 17, 2014).

The OGC filed exceptions to the ALJ’s rulings, focusing 

on the ALJ’s “failure to make findings of facts and 

conclusions of law as to whether [Blackmer] independently 

violated . . . the Act by threatening . . . Kaanta with discipline, 

up to and including discharge, if he makes ‘frivolous’ 

information requests in the future.” Gen. Counsel’s 

Exceptions to ALJ’s Bench Decision ¶ 1, D.A. 11. The OGC 

contended that, even if Blackmer’s warning responding to 

Kaanta’s two requests did not violate the NLRA, its threat of 

discipline for similar requests in the future constituted an 

independent violation. See id. ¶¶ 1–3, D.A. 11.

The Board majority agreed with the OGC. See Dover 

Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 4659319, at *1, *3 

n.4. It held that Blackmer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the 

NLRA by threatening Kaanta with discipline for future 

activity. See id. at *3. Member Miscimarra dissented. See 

id. at *4 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting). Although he 

agreed that the case turned on whether Kaanta “would have 

reasonably understood that [the verbal warning] threatened 

discipline for future information requests that were within the 

scope of his duties,” he believed “a reasonable employee in 

Kaanta’s situation would have understood perfectly well that 

the warning did not threaten future discipline over legitimate 

information requests,” concluding that “the record is devoid 

of evidence that [Blackmer] has ever warned Kaanta that 

requesting information to investigate a potential grievance 

could result in discipline or discharge.” Id. (emphasis in 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 7 of 16
8

original). Blackmer timely petitioned for review and the 

Board cross-applied for enforcement of its order.

II.

We “will not disturb an order of the NLRB unless, 

reviewing the record as a whole, it appears that the Board’s 

factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence or 

that the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying 

established law to the facts at issue.” Synergy Gas Corp. v. 

NLRB, 19 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994). And we will 

uphold a Board decision supported by substantial evidence 

“even if we would have reached a different result had we 

considered the question de novo.” Id. That said, “our review 

‘must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts 

from the weight’ of the evidence cited by the Board to support 

its conclusions,” id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Universal 

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)), and we 

do not “merely rubber-stamp NLRB decisions,” Tradesmen 

Int’l, Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Douglas Foods Corp. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1056, 1062 

(D.C. Cir. 2001)). As we have said repeatedly, “this court is a 

reviewing court and does not function simply as the Board’s 

enforcement arm. It is our responsibility to examine carefully 

both the Board’s findings and its reasoning, to assure that the 

Board has considered the factors which are relevant to its 

choice of remedy . . . .” Id. (quoting Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. 

NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 

The general principles governing this case are wellsettled. “Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits an 

employer’s interference with, or restraint or coercion of, the 

rights of employees to organize and join unions, bargain 

collectively, and engage in certain other ‘concerted 

activities.’ ” Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 715 F.3d 928, 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 8 of 16
9

930 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)). 

The test for interference, restraint and coercion under section 

8(a)(1) is an objective one; an employer violates section 

8(a)(1) “if, considering the totality of the circumstances, [the 

employer’s conduct] has a reasonable tendency to coerce or 

interfere with [employee] rights.” Id. at 930–31 (emphases 

added) (quoting Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 124 

(D.C. Cir. 2001)); accord DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. NLRB, 

288 F.3d 434, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, “coercive statements that threaten 

retaliation against employees” for lawfully exercising their 

rights violate the Act. Tasty Baking, 254 F.3d at 124. The 

same is true if an employer threatens discipline for engaging 

in protected activity in the future. See DaimlerChrysler, 288 

F.3d at 444 (memo to employee that could be read as 

threatening “discipline for any future request for information” 

violates Act (emphasis added)); Parexel Int’l, LLC, 356 

N.L.R.B. No. 82, 2011 WL 288784, at *5 (Jan. 28, 2011) 

(“[T]he Board has often held that an employer violates the 

Act when it acts to prevent future protected activity.”). Thus, 

if an employer makes a statement that an employee 

reasonably understands to threaten discipline for future 

protected activity, the employer violates the Act. See 

DaimlerChrysler, 288 F.3d at 444; see also Exxel/Atmos, Inc. 

v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 972, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The 

employer’s motive and the actual effect of its statements are 

irrelevant. Instead, the test is whether the employer’s 

statements may reasonably be said to have tended to interfere 

with employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights.” (citation 

and quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the Board accurately framed the issue in 

accordance with these well-settled principles: “The question 

of whether [Blackmer’s] warning to Kaanta violated Section 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 9 of 16
10

8(a)(1) . . . turns on whether the warning would reasonably be 

understood to proscribe future protected activity.” Dover 

Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 4659319, at *2. The 

Board answered this question in the affirmative, concluding 

that Kaanta “would reasonably conclude . . . that [future 

information requests], though protected, could trigger the 

warning’s threat of discipline or discharge.” Id. at *3. Its 

rationale proceeded as follows: (1) the warning referred to 

Kaanta’s August 10th request for employee wage-and-hour 

information; (2) it cautioned that “[s]imilar requests such as 

this” would result in discipline or discharge; (3) Kaanta qua 

Union steward was authorized to make employee wage-andhour information requests, which requests constitute protected 

activity; ergo (4) Kaanta “would reasonably conclude” that 

the “[s]imilar requests” triggering discipline or discharge 

included protected wage-and-hour information requests he 

might later submit in his role as Union steward. See id. at *3.

The Board’s conclusion is not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. Although required to consider the 

“totality of the circumstances,” see Flagstaff Med. Ctr., 715 

F.3d at 930, the Board failed to do so. As the Board dissent 

makes clear, “no employee in Kaanta’s position would have 

reasonably believed that he or she risked discipline by 

submitting legitimate future information requests for wage 

and hour information.” See Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 

48, 2014 WL 4659319, at *4 (Member Miscimarra, 

dissenting) (emphasis added).

That the record belies the Board’s reading of the verbal 

warning is plain from the warning’s language and the 

circumstances surrounding its issuance, neither of which the 

Board adequately considered. The Board gave a selective 

reading to the warning’s language. Indeed, it considered only 

two portions: the parenthetical reference to Kaanta’s August 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 10 of 16
11

10th request for employee wage-and-hour information and the 

statement that “[s]imilar requests such as this will result in 

further discipline up to and including discharge.” See id. at 

*3. Interpreting the two statements in light of the undisputed 

fact that Kaanta was authorized—and likely—to request 

employee wage-and-hour information in the future as Union 

steward, the Board concluded that a reasonable employee in 

Kaanta’s position would read the redundant phrase “[s]imilar 

requests such as this” to mean all requests for wage-and-hour 

information, including authorized requests. Id. According to 

the Board, Blackmer’s warning was that type of “overly broad 

. . . blanket threat,” DaimlerChrysler, 288 F.3d at 444, the Act 

prohibits. See Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 

4659319, at *3.

Even with all deference due the Board, we cannot find 

substantial support for its decision in the evidence. First, the 

warning targeted specific, unprotected conduct. The language 

the Board did not discuss makes this plain. It was issued “for 

continued frivolous requests for information.” D.A. 94 

(emphasis added). A reasonable person in Kaanta’s position

would understand from this language that he was not to 

“continue[]” making requests like the two he had just made—

a reference that could only include his June 12th and August

10th requests because he had never submitted any other 

information requests, despite his off-and-on service in various 

Union roles—including steward—for nearly twenty years. 

The meaning of “frivolous” is equally plain as shorthand for 

“not authorized by the Union.” Indeed, responding to 

Kaanta’s June 12th request, Blackmer rejected it as “outside 

[Kaanta’s] scope.” D.A. 92.

The Board makes hay of the warning’s parenthetical 

reference to the wage-and-hour information Kaanta requested 

on August 10th, see D.A. 94 (“photo copies of all employee 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 11 of 16
12

paychecks for a period ending December 1, 2007 and pay 

period August 5, 2012, and spreadsheets for total hours and 

pay for each pay period starting with August 12, 2012, and 

every pay period thereafter, until the contract is ratified”), 

concluding that Kaanta would understand it to potentially

proscribe an authorized request for similar information in the 

future. See Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 

4659319, at *3. But read in proper context, the reference is to 

the precise—and frivolous—request Kaanta made. Indeed, 

the parenthetical recites—almost verbatim—Kaanta’s August 

10th request. In other words, the warning does not address 

requests for a particular type of information; it addresses a 

particular type of request—namely, continued requests 

outside the scope of Kaanta’s role as Union steward.3

 

The warning also again reminded Kaanta that he was “not 

on the [Union] Bargaining Committee,” that he had “fail[ed] 

to work within the parameters of such to bring matters to the 

 3 Perhaps the Board’s focus on the type of information 

requested, rather than on the request itself, is what ultimately led it 

astray. The Board noted that “the August 23 warning referred to 

Kaanta’s August 10 request for information about unit employees’ 

hours and pay and specifically informed Kaanta that ‘[s]imilar 

requests such as this will result in further discipline up to and 

including discharge.’ ” Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 

WL 4659319, at *3. It then noted that “future requests for such 

information could well be protected” and that Kaanta could thus 

reasonably read the warning to prohibit future protected activity. 

Id. (emphasis added). No one disputes the Board’s conclusion that 

future requests for employee wage-and-hour information “could 

well be protected,” id., but this conclusion is beside the point. The 

warning targeted the type of request—“continued[,] frivolous”

ones—not the type of information. D.A. 94. The Board’s analysis

might have been sound had the warning said—as the Board 

apparently read it—“future requests for such information will result 

in further discipline up to and including discharge.” But it does not. 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 12 of 16
13

Bargaining Committee” and that Blackmer was “not 

individually bargaining with [him] or any other individual.” 

D.A. 94. This language immediately precedes “[s]imilar 

requests,” see id., and repeats the point Blackmer made to 

Kaanta after he submitted his June 12th request (which 

request had nothing to do with wage-and-hour information); 

that is, Blackmer told him then, “You are not part of the 

negotiation committee and your request is outside your 

scope.” D.A. 92; see also Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 

48, 2014 WL 4659319, at *4 (Member Miscimarra, 

dissenting). This language makes the admonition against 

“[s]imilar requests such as this” unambiguous: the earlier 

requests were problematic because they were outside the 

scope of Kaanta’s responsibilities as a steward. See D.A. 94

(emphasis added). The outside-the-scope conclusion was not 

one Blackmer reached on its own—Blackmer twice contacted 

the Union to determine if it had authorized the requests and 

both times the Union stated it had not done so and suggested 

the requests be denied.

Moreover, fear of Blackmer’s invoking the warning’s 

disciplinary threat willy-nilly is particularly unreasonable 

here. Nothing in the record suggests Blackmer prevented 

Kaanta or anyone else from making legitimate information 

requests; indeed, Blackmer did not take any disciplinary 

action after Kaanta’s first frivolous request and it gave 

Kaanta, in effect, a second warning as opposed to actual 

discipline. See supra note 1. In sum, the company did not act

in a reckless or retaliatory fashion towards Kaanta. This is a 

relevant consideration. See Aroostook Cnty. Reg’l 

Ophthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209, 213–14 (D.C. Cir. 

1996) (company’s enforcement history relevant consideration 

in whether rule interfered with employee rights); Dover 

Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 4659319, at *4 

(Member Miscimarra, dissenting) (“[T]he record is devoid of 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 13 of 16
14

evidence that [Blackmer] has ever warned Kaanta that 

requesting information to investigate a potential grievance 

could result in discipline or discharge.”).

When viewed in its entirety, as we must view it, the 

record supports only one reasonable interpretation of the 

verbal warning: Kaanta would be disciplined if in the future 

he continued to do what he had done twice before—namely, 

make an unauthorized information request unrelated to his 

duties as Union steward. In our view, the dissent (and, 

earlier, the ALJ) got it right: under the objective test used to 

determine a section 8(a)(1) violation vel non, no reasonable 

employee in Kaanta’s position would have understood the 

warning to threaten discipline for engaging in future protected 

activity. See Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 

4659319, at *4.

Contrary to the Board’s suggestion, our DaimlerChrysler

decision is not at odds with this result. See 288 F.3d at 444. 

There, we found that an employer violated the Act because its 

warning “could be read to threaten discipline for any future 

request for information,” including a protected request. Id. 

And we found that the request to which the warning 

responded itself constituted protected activity. See id. at 443–

44. Not so here. As discussed, the warning did not threaten 

discipline for “any” future request for information, id. at 444 

(emphasis added), only “[s]imilar” ones, D.A. 94. The other 

cases the Board relies upon, see Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. 

No. 48, 2014 WL 4659319, at *2–3 & n.4, are likewise 

distinguishable: all involved a threat made in response to 

protected activity, see, e.g., Ellison Media Co., 344 N.L.R.B. 

1112, 1113–14 (2005) (threat unlawful because it could be 

construed to apply to “protected” conduct of employees’ 

discussion of their supervisor’s conduct); ITT Fed. Servs. 

Corp., 335 N.L.R.B. 998, 1003 (2001) (threat in response to 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 14 of 16
15

“the protected activity of posting union signs”); Yale Univ., 

330 N.L.R.B. 246, 248–50 (1999) (unlawful threat made in 

response to and directed toward “protected conduct”). In all 

of these cases, protected conduct had occurred, to which 

conduct the employee would reasonably connect the threat of 

future discipline; he could have reasonably understood that he 

was inviting discipline if he engaged in similar conduct in the 

future notwithstanding that conduct was protected. Here, 

neither the ALJ nor the Board found that Kaanta’s June 12th 

and August 10th requests were protected. On the contrary, 

the ALJ expressly found that they were not protected, see 

Dover Energy, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 2014 WL 4659319, at 

*9–10, and the Board expressly declined to conclude 

otherwise, id. at *3 n.4 (“We find it unnecessary to decide 

whether Kaanta’s June 12 and August 10 information 

requests, which occasioned the warning, were themselves 

protected activity . . . .”). Reading the warning to cover future 

protected activity requires an inferential leap the record does 

not support and the precedent the Board offers in support of 

its conclusion falls well short of the mark. 

In this case, an employer gave a specific person a specific 

warning after he engaged in specific inappropriate conduct. 

There is no substantial evidence to support the Board’s 

conclusion that a reasonable person would view the warning 

as applying more broadly to appropriate, legally protected 

conduct carried out in entirely different circumstances. We 

recognize that an employer’s genuine “blanket” threat to 

discipline for future protected activity would violate the Act, 

even if, as here, the warning responded to unprotected

activity. See DaimlerChrysler, 288 F.3d at 444. But that is 

not this case. Here, the warning made plain it sought one 

thing—to stop Kaanta’s “continued,” “frivolous” information 

requests that the Board does not dispute were outside the 

scope of his steward duties and that his Union had expressly 

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 15 of 16
16

disapproved. See D.A. 94. No reasonable employee in 

Kaanta’s position could read it otherwise.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for 

review and deny the cross-application for enforcement.

So ordered.

USCA Case #14-1197 Document #1605032 Filed: 03/22/2016 Page 16 of 16