Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06164/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06164-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Wynnewood
Appellant
Kenneth D. Moore
Appellee
David Sanders
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

KENNETH D. MOORE, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CITY OF WYNNEWOOD, a municipal 

corporation; DAVID SANDERS, 

individually and in his official 

capacity as Chief of Police for 

the city, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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JUN 1 ~{ i995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-"6164 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-547-T) 

Michael A. Taylor of Taylor, Moore & Plater, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Andrew W. Lester of Lester, Bryant, Ganz & Beech, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, (Laura L. Holmgren-Ganz with him on the briefs) for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Before EBEL, KELLY, Circuit Judges and BROWN,* District Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-6164 Document: 01019279298 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 1 
EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-Appellee Kenneth Moore ("Moore") claims in this 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 action against Defendants-Appellants the City of 

Wynnewood (the "City") .and Wynnewood Chief of Police David Sanders 

("Sanders") (collectively "Defendants 11 ) that he was demoted from 

his position as Deputy Chief of the Wynnewood, Oklahoma Police 

Department in violation of the First Amendment because of public 

statements he made at a Wynnewood City Council meeting. Moore 

also brought pendent state claims for wrongful demotion against 

Defendants, claiming that the adverse employment decisions taken 

against him violated Oklahoma tort law. Defendants moved for 

summary judgment on all claims, asserting that they did not 

violate Moore's First Amendment or state law rights and that 

Sanders is protected against suit by qualified immunity. The 

district court denied Defendants' motion except as to Moore's 

state tort claim against Sanders. Defendants now appeal. 

In exercising our jurisdiction over Sanders' interlocutory 

appeal of the district court's denial of qualified immunity, we 

conclude that Moore has failed to show that his First Amendment 

rights were violated, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of 

the district court. We also exercise pendent appellate 

jurisdiction over the City's interlocutory appeal because our 

ruling that Moore has failed to establish a First Amendment claim 

disposes of Moore's claims against the City, both as to Moore's 

§ 1983 cause of action and as to his wrongful demotion claim, to 

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the extent that it is premised on the claimed violation of Moore's 

First Amendment rights. 

I. FACTS 

Defendants do not dispute that they demoted Moore from his 

position as Deputy Chief of the Wynnewood Police Department, at 

least in significant part, because of statements he made at a 

Wynnewood City Council meeting on June_ 8, 1992. The statements 

related to events that had taken place about two weeks earlier in 

Wynnewood when two police officers -- Officers Boucher and Bishop 

-- responded to a shooting incident in a predominantly black 

neighborhood. A potentially riotlike situation developed when the 

officers arrived, with individuals throwing rocks at the police 

and another vehicle speeding at the officers when they exited 

their patrol car, and Boucher and Bishop had to call for back-up. 

As a result of the incident, members of the black community 

requested a meeting with Wynnewood officials to address the events 

and the police officers' actions. First, the police department 

conducted an investigation that concluded that proper procedures 

had been followed. Then, the City Manager, a council member, 

Police Chief Sanders, and Officers Moore, Boucher, and Bishop held 

a meeting with members of the community. 

Following that first meeting, the incident came up again at a 

regularly scheduled city council meeting. Moore attended the 

meeting and addressed the incident, purporting to speak for the 

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police department.1 Moore was in the middle of his scheduled 

patrol shift when he went to the meeting, and he had not been 

authorized to leave his shift duties in order to attend the 

meeting or to speak on behalf of the department. Moore did not 

inform his supervisors or dispatcher that he was leaving his 

patrol for over three hours to attend the meeting, and he was the 

only officer scheduled for patrol during that shift. 

At the meeting Moore stated that the officers had followed 

department procedures during the relevant incident. However, 

Moore also stated that the incident was the culmination of prior 

problems created by a particular officer. Specifically, Moore 

explained that 

I don't think we've got a police department problem. A 

police department community problem. I think we have a 

police officer and community problem. . . . This thing 

that happened the other night . . . was the culmination 

of an attitude and a theme that's been going on for 

quite awhile. 

Appellant App. at 108. Moore concluded that "we do have a police 

officer image .problem. Now I don't like to stand here and slam a 

fellow officer but that's the way it is."· Id. Moore did not name 

the particular officer, but later stated that he was referring to 

Boucher. 

Defendants claim that Moore's statements angered other 

officers and disrupted the small police department. The Wynnewood 

Police Department had only six officers at the time, including 

1 Moore stated that "You say you can't speak for the police 

department, but I can." Appellant App. at 107. When Moore asked 

that his comments be "off the record," he was told that he could 

be given no promises. Id. 

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Moore and Chief Sanders. Moore denies that his comments were 

disruptive. Nonetheless, Chief Sanders demoted Moore from deputy 

chief to patrol officer on June 15, 1992. Defendants maintain 

that Moore was demoted because he left his scheduled patrol, 

criticized a fellow officer in public without authorization, and 

significantly disrupted the functioning of the department.2 The 

city manager approved Sanders' decision, and Moore then appealed 

to a city personnel board pursuant to the City's charter. The 

board upheld the demotion, finding that 11 there are serious 

disagreements with Chief Sanders and Assistant Chief Moore, which 

make it impossible [for them] to work together in this capacity ... 

Id. at 166. 

Moore maintains that he was demoted because he exercised his 

First Amendment rights in stating that the department had an image 

problem with one of its officers, whereas Chief Sanders 

interpreted those remarks as criticism of his handling of the 

department. Moore further claims that Defendants harassed him 

after he spoke at the city council meeting, by issuing him letters 

of reprimand, suspending him, and setting his shift schedules to 

conflict with his extracurricular duties as a minister. As a 

result of this purported harassment, Moore subsequently resigned 

as a patrol officer, but continued to serve as a Drug Abuse 

Resistance Education ( 11 D.A.R.E. 11 ) officer. 

2 There had been previous difficulties between Moore and Chief 

Sanders, including incidents relating to allegedly discriminatory 

actions taken by Boucher. 

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After his resignation, Moore brought this action for 

deprivation of his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and for the pendent state tort of wrongful demotion.3 Defendants 

moved for summary judgment on both causes of action, stating that 

Moore was not entitled to any relief because his statements were 

not protected by the First Amendment, and because he was demoted 

for his job performance and not the exercise of his First 

Amendment rights. Defendants argued further that they were immune 

from liability on the state law claim under Oklahoma's 

Governmental Tort Claims Act. Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 153. 

Sanders also raised a qualified immunity defense to Moore's § 1983 

claim against him in his individual capacity. The district court 

ruled that Sanders was not entitled to qualified immunity and 

denied summary judgment as to Defendants on Moore's First 

Amendment claim. On the state wrongful demotion cause of action, 

the court granted Sanders' motion for summary judgment based on 

state immunity, but found that the City was not entitled to 

immunity and denied its motion for summary judgment. Defendants 

now bring this timely appeal. Sanders appeals the district 

court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the grounds 

of qualified immunity. The City appeals the court's denial of its 

motion for summary judgment on both Moore's § 1983 and wrongful 

demotion claims. 

3 Moore also brought a state law claim for the intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted 

summary judgment for Defendants on that claim, and Moore does not 

appeal that ruling at this time. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction 

As a threshold matter, we first address our jurisdiction to 

consider these appeals. Although our jurisdiction over Sanders' 

appeal on his defense of qualified immunity is well established, 

the district court's denial of the City's motion for summary 

judgment is not a final decision and does not fit into those 

category of orders that are interlocutorily appealable. 

Nevertheless, as explained below, we conclude that we can consider 

this appeal under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction. 

As a general rule, the denial of summary judgment is not a 

final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and is, 

therefore, not appealable. However, an individual defendant, like 

Sanders, who is entitled to raise the defense of qualified 

immunity, may appeal the denial of summary judgment on the grounds 

of qualified immunity even though the denial is not a final 

decision. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Salmon 

v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1135-36 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

In contrast, the City is not entitled to qualified immunity, 

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980), and cannot 

invoke the collateral order doctrine to justify appeal of an 

otherwise nonappealable decision, Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 

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115 s. Ct. 1203, 1207-08 (1995) .4 Nevertheless, the City asks 

this Court to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over its 

appeal because it is interrelated with Sanders' permissible 

appeal. Such an extension of our jurisdiction is generally 

disfavored; nevertheless, we conclude that it is appropriate in 

this case because our disposition of Sanders' appeal fully 

resolves the issues presented in the City's appeal.5 

We have previously recognized the doctrine of pendent 

appellate jurisdiction, under which we exercise jurisdiction over 

an otherwise nonfinal and nonappealable lower court decision that 

overlaps with an appealable decision. See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 

F.2d 673, 676 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 976 (1991); 

see also Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 478 (stating 

that the court has "discretion to exercise appellate jurisdiction 

over a nonfinal order when it is sufficiently related to another 

appeal before the court"). Pendent appellate jurisdiction has 

4 Similarly, Sanders cannot appeal the denial of summary 

judgment on Moore's claims against him in his official capacity 

pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, because the defense of 

qualified immunity only applies to Sanders in his individual 

capacity. "[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other 

than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky 

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Monell v. Department 

of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (" [0] fficialcapacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an 

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent 

• • • • II ) • 

5 On the.record before us, Moore's state law wrongful demotion 

claim appears to rest solely on his contention that the demotion 

violated his First Amendment rights. As such, our rejection of 

his First Amendment claim fully disposes of his state law claim. 

To the extent his state law claim rests on other grounds, the 

district court can address it on remand. 

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been exercised at the discretion of the court. Walter v. Morton, 

33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (lOth Cir. 1994) (declining to exercise pendent 

appellate jurisdiction over municipality when an employee brought 

interlocutory appeal raising individual claim of qualified 

immunity, because 11 the factual issues [needed] to resolve the 

Town's liability are not fully developed ... and are not closely 

related to the officer's claim of qualified immunity 11 ). In 

exercising that discretion, we have considered whether (1) an 

adequate record has been developed for review; (2) the pendent 

appeal involves questions of fact and law that are closely related 

to an appealable issue; and (3) exercising pendent jurisdiction 

would promote judicial economy. Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 

940 F.2d 1369, 1374 (lOth Cir. 1991) (citing Colorado v. Idarado 

Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1491 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

499 U.S. 960 (1991)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992). We have 

extended jurisdiction to otherwise nonappealable claims in few 

situations. See. e.g., Lankford, 27 F.3d at 478-79 .(involving a 

cross-appeal related to a valid appeal); Primas v. City of 

Oklahoma City, 958 F.2d 1506, 1512 (lOth Cir. 1992) (same); TriState Generation and Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power. 

Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1352 (lOth Cir. 1989) (exercising 

jurisdiction over otherwise nonappealable issues connected to the 

interlocutory appeal of the denial of an injunction) . 

The proprietary of exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction 

under any circumstances -- particularly over pendent parties --

has been seriously called into question by the Supreme Court's 

recent decision of Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n. In that case, 

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the Court unanimously held that the Eleventh Circuit lacked 

jurisdiction to rule on a county's interlocutory appeal of a 

§ 1983 claim related to an individual police officer's collateral 

appeal of the denial of his summary judgment motion based on 

qualified immunity. Swint, 115 S. Ct. at 1206. The Court 

explained that interlocutory appeals should be limited to those 

expressly provided for by Congress, including (1) under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b) where a district court certifies an issue for immediate 

appeal; and (2) pursuant to rules created by the Supreme Court 

according to its authority from the Rules Enabling Act, codified 

at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077. Id. at 1209-11. The rule announced in 

Swint is based at least in part on a concern that, even if 

pragmatic considerations of judicial economy point toward 

accepting jurisdiction, "a rule loosely allowing pendent appellate 

jurisdiction would encourage parties to parlay . . . collateral 

orders into multi-issue interlocutory appeal tickets." Id. at 

1211. 

However, despite its suggestion that appellate jurisdiction 

should never be exercised over nonfinal appeals that do not fall 

under the collateral order doctrine -- unless they are certified 

or specially permitted by judicial rulemaking -- Swint does not 

completely foreclose the use of pendent appellate jurisdiction. 

Id. at 1212 ("We need not definitively or preemptively settle here 

whether or when it may be proper for a court of appeals with 

jurisdiction over one ruling to review, conjunctively, related 

rulings that are not themselves independently appealable."). 

Specifically, the Court suggested that pendent appellate 

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jurisdiction might still be appropriate where the otherwise 

nonappealable decision is 11 inextricably intertwined11 with the 

appealable decision, or where review of the nonappealable decision 

is 11 necessary to ensure meaningful review11 of the appealable one. 

Id. 

In the instant case, we conclude that the City's appeal is 

11 inextricably intertwined11 with Sanders' appeal and, thus, falls 

into one of the narrow exceptions left open by Swint. As we read 

Swint, a pendent appellate claim can be regarded as inextricably 

intertwined with a properly reviewable claim on collateral appeal 

only if the pendent claim is coterminous with, or subsumed in, the 

claim before the court on interlocutory appeal that is, when 

the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily 

resolves the pendent claim as well. Here, we conclude that the 

two appeals are coterminous because Moore's federal and state law 

claims against the City -- to the extent the state law claim 

references the alleged constitutional violation -- are both 

premised on his claim that Defendants violated his First Amendment 

rights and because we hold that no such First Amendment violation 

occurred. As such, the issues presented in the City's appeal are 

no broader than those in Sanders' permissible collateral appeal, 

and our disposition of Sanders' appeal fully disposes of his 

claims against the City. 

This narrow avenue for the continued use of pendent appellate 

jurisdiction left open by Swint would not apply to the instant 

case if our ruling on the merits of the collateral qualified 

immunity appeal did not resolve all of the remaining issues 

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presented by the pendent appeal. As the Swint Court itself 

pointed out, a municipality's appeal of a § 1983 claim is not 

necessarily inextricably intertwined with an appeal of the denial 

of qualified immunity, and need not be resolved to ensure full 

review of the qualified immunity appeal. Swint, 115 S. Ct. at 

1212; see also Walter, 33 F.3d at 1242 (holding that the issue of 

municipal liability in that § 1983 action did not present the same 

questions as an individual defendant's appeal of qualified 

immunity and could not support pendent appellate jurisdiction) . 

For example, were we to hold that Moore's First Amendment rights 

were violated, the City's liability might turn on whether Sanders, 

or the city manager who ratified Sanders' decision to demote 

Moore, were 11 final policymakers 11 for § 1983 purposes. See City of 

St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123-27 (1988). Similarly, 

the City's appeal might present different issues than Sanders' 

appeal if we concluded that Defendants violated Moore's First 

Amendment rights, but Sanders was protected by qualified immunity 

because those rights were not clearly established. See infra. 

However, in contrast to these hypothetical scenarios, our holding 

that Defendants did not violate Moore's First Amendment rights 

settles Moore's federal claim against the City, as well as his 

state claim, insofar as it is based on Moore's First Amendment 

claim. Thus, extending jurisdiction to the City's appeal does not 

allow the City to parlay Sanders' permissible collateral appeal of 

the denial of qualified immunity into its own appeal in 

contravention of Swint. 

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Having established our jurisdiction, we now proceed to the 

merits of Moore's First Amendment claim and Sanders' qualified 

immunity defense. 

B. § 1983, Qualified Immunity, and the First Amendment 

Rights of Public Employees 

This Court reviews the district court's denial of summary 

judgment on Sanders' qualified immunity defense de novo. Langley 

v. Adams County. Colo., 987 F.2d 1473, 1476 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Qualified immunity shields Sanders from liability and the burden 

of having to go to trial unless he violated 11 clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known. 11 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 

(1987). Following the approach specified by Siegert v. Gilley, 

500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991), we must first assess whether Moore 11 has 

asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all, 11 and then 

evaluate whether any legitimately asserted rights implicated by 

Moore's demotion were clearly established. If a plaintiff fails 

to state a valid claim, we need not even reach the issue of the 

qualified immunity defense. Primas, 958 F.2d at 1511; Hill v. 

Department of Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990). Moreover, if Moore 

fails to state a valid First Amendment claim against Sanders, 

there would also be no basis for holding the City liable under 

§ 1983. 

The First Amendment rights of public employees like Moore are 

judged according to the framework established by the Supreme Court 

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in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), and its 

progeny. Applying that framework and viewing the factual record 

and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 

favorable to Moore, we conclude that he has failed to establish a 

First Amendment violation. 

Defining the free speech rights of public employees involves 

a balancing between the needs of government as an employer to 

maintain an efficient workplace and the typical concerns that 

arise from any attempts by the government as sovereign to limit 

free expression. As the Supreme Court stated in Pickering, 

The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 

between the interests of the [employee] , as a citizen, 

in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 

interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 

efficiency of the public services it performs through 

its employees. 

391 U.S. at 568. The Supreme Court has established a two-part 

inquiry to evaluate the free speech claims of public employees and 

to strike an appropriate balance between these competing concerns. 

First, a plaintiff must establish that the speech for which the 

employee alleges he or she was retaliated against is 11 protected 

speech. 11 To establish that the speech is protected, the employee 

must show that: (1) the speech involves a matter of public 

concern and not merely a personal issue internal to the workplace, 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983); and (2) the 

employee's interest in the particular expression outweighs the 

government's interest in regulating such expression to maintain an 

efficient and effective workplace, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 

378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). Second, if 

the speech is protected, the plaintiff must also show that the 

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speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged 

governmental action(s), and the employer must be given an 

opportunity to show that it would have taken the same actions in 

the absence of the protected expression. Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). We address each element of this twopronged inquiry in turn. 

A statement is characterized as a matter of public concern 

and not merely a personal employment grievance if it can be 

"fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, 

or other concern to the corrununity." Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 

When an employee speaks "as an employee upon matters only of 

personal interest" the speech is not protected. Id. at 147. To 

judge whether particular speech relates merely to internal 

workplace issues, courts must conduct a case by case inquiry, 

looking to the "content, form, and context" of the speech, 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, which includes scrutinizing whether 

the speaker's purpose was to bring an issue to the public's 

attention or to air a personal grievance, McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 

F.2d 463, 466 (lOth Cir. 1989). An employee's speech must not 

merely relate generally to a subject matter that is of public 

interest, but must "sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful 

to the public in evaluating the conduct of government." Wilson v. 

City of Littleton, Colo., 732 F.2d 765, 768 (lOth Cir. 1984); see 

also Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445-47 (lOth 

Cir.) (en bane) (reaffirming Wilson), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 

(1988). That is, we look beyond the general topic of the speech 

to evaluate more specifically what was said on the topic. 

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In the present action, the relevant speech consists of 

Moore's statements at the city council meeting regarding the role 

of an "image problem" of an officer in causing or exacerbating the 

riotlike incident that occurred in Wynnewood. Looking at the 

circumstances surrounding Moore's statements, we concur with the 

district court's conclusion that they clearly involved matters of 

public concern. Moore's statements were uttered in a public forum 

and related to an issue of pressing concern to the community that 

had been raised at the meeting by citizens other than Moore. See 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8 (describing an employee's protests 

about racial discrimination as "a matter inherently of public 

concern"). Moreover, Moore's opinion about the police department 

and its relations with the community provided the public with a 

useful perspective of the incident from a senior member of the 

department. As such, Moore's speech did not merely relate to a 

matter of general public interest, but helped inform the public on 

an important subject that was of heightened concern in the 

community. 

Defendants characterize Moore's statements as an internal 

grievance related to a personal dispute with Officer Boucher 

and/or Chief Sanders. However, the mere fact that Moore's 

statements related to a general grievance he had with Boucher or 

Chief Sanders does not transform the statements into a matter 

solely of internal significance. The statements were made in 

relation to and in the context of an important community 

discussion and not as part of any particular employment practice 

or decision involving Moore. Thus, this case is distinguishable 

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from the case of McEvoy v. Shoemaker, for example, where the court 

ruled that a letter written by a police officer to the city 

council complaining about mismanagement in the police department 

after he had been denied a promotion was not of public concern. 

882 F.2d at 465. The McEvoy court held that while the operation 

of the department might be of general concern, McEvoy's principal 

purpose was to air his personal dispute about not receiving a 

promotion. Id. at 467. Rather, this case resembles Wulf v. City 

of Wichita, where the court ruled that a letter written by a 

police officer to the state attorney general complaining about a 

police chief's interference with the activities of a police union 

were of public concern, even though the letter also related to 

personal problems and tension between the officer and police 

chief. 883 F.2d 842, 857-59 (lOth Cir. 1989); see also Conaway v. 

Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796 (lOth Cir. 1988) (analyzing an employee's 

purpose in speaking as one factor in the public concern 

determination and highlighting that the speaker was not motivated 

"solely" by personal grievances or interest) . Therefore, we 

conclude that Moore's statements were of public concern. 

Defendants' claim that Moore's accusations were false does 

not alter our conclusion that his speech was of public concern. 

We may assume that deliberately or recklessly false statements by 

public employees are either unprotected by the First Amendment or, 

at least, that such intentional falsity would weigh heavily 

against protection. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (suggesting 

that a public employee might lose the protection of the First 

Amendment for knowingly or recklessly making false statements); 

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Wulf, 883 F.2d at 858 & n.24 (suggesting that malicious or 

reckless false statements would receive less protection) . 

However, here Defendants have failed to show either that Moore's 

statements were false or that Moore made them knowing that they 

were false or with reckless disregard for their veracity. 

Defendants claim'that since the official investigation of the 

incident concluded that Boucher and the other officer followed 

appropriate procedures, Moore could not have been disclosing any 

wrongdoing, and thus he was merely making false accusations 

against Boucher. However, Moore's declaration that a particular 

officer had an image problem in the community is a matter of 

opinion and, in any event, is not negated by the fact that Boucher 

may have followed proper procedures in the incident. Even if the 

statement could be shown to be false, Defendants have offered no 

evidence that Moore knew it was false or acted recklessly with 

regard to its truth or falsity. See Wulf, 883 F.2d at 858-59. 

Moore was careful to state that the police followed proper 

procedures during the incident in question, and only explained 

that the incident would not have occurred in the first place if it 

were not for a particular officer's negative image in the 

community. 

Although we conclude that Moore has satisfied the threshold 

requirement that his statements were of public concern, he must 

still show that his interest in the speech outweighed the 

government's countervailing interest in regulating the speech to 

maintain an effective working environment. Moore's interest in 

commenting on racial discrimination and the race relations of the 

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police with the corrununity is "self-evident." Patrick v. Miller, 

953 F.2d 1240, 1247 (lOth Cir. 1992). As we stated above, Moore's 

perspective as a senior officer in the police department made his 

perspective sufficiently informative to the public to qualify his 

speech as on a matter of public concern. See Waters v. Churchill, 

114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994) ("Government employees are often in 

the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they 

work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions."). 

Nevertheless, Moore's speech is less important and less valuable 

to the public than is the speech often at issue in public employee 

speech cases. In particular, although providing an insider's 

perspective on an important issue, Moore did not reveal any new 

information to the public about the operation of the police 

department. For example, Moore did not disclose any "wrongdoing 

or inefficiency or other malfeasance on the part of the 

government[]," which we have previously recognized as particularly 

important matters of public concern. Koch, 847 F.2d at 1445; see 

also Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1423 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[A]n 

employee's first amendment interest is entitled to more weight 

where he is acting as a whistleblower exposing government 

corruption."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984). 

Whistleblowing, of course, is not the only form of public employee 

speech that is protected, but "the State's burden in justifying a 

particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the 

employee's expression." Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. 

Balanced against the importance of Moore's speech are 

powerful governmental concerns that support the City's ability to 

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take disciplinary measures in response to Moore's speech. As a 

starting matter, the government has a strong interest in 

controlling the speech of its employees when they purport to speak 

for the city or one of its departments. An employee's speech is 

not exempted from First Amendment protection just because it 

occurred on the job or as part of an employee's official 

functions, Koch, 847 F.2d at 1441-42; nevertheless, we acknowledge 

a city's special interest in controlling its own speech by taking 

action against employees who purport to speak for the government. 

In Koch we stated that 

[t]he fact that the speech at issue occurred during or 

as a part of an Employee's official duties is but one 

consideration in the Connick-Pickering inquiry. 

Nonetheless, it is a significant factor .... 

Id. at 1442 (emphasis in original). 

In the present action, there are some indications that Moore 

was speaking for the police department. For example, he stated at 

the city council meeting that "You say you can't speak for the 

police department, but I can.". Appellant App. at 107. Moreover, 

Moore was in uniform and on duty at the time of the meeting, and 

he might have appeared to citizens to be speaking in an official 

capacity, particularly given that Moore was the deputy chief of 

police and had other public relations duties as part of his job. 

However, Moore phrased his statements in terms of his personal 

opinion by stating "I think" and not "the Department thinks," and 

he attempted to have his comments be "off the record." Id. 

Nevertheless, we treat the close nexus between Moore's comments 

and his official duties and responsibilities as a factor (although 

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not a conclusive one) weighing on the side of the City's ability 

to regulate such speech. 

In addition, Defendants articulate other strong reasons for 

demoting Moore as a result of the incident. In particular, Moore 

left his scheduled patrol shift without authorization to attend 

the city council meeting and make his statements, despite being 

the only officer on duty to provide the town with protection at 

the time. As the Supreme Court stated in Connick v. Myers, the 

11 manner, time, and place 11 in which expression takes place is 

relevant to the Pickering balancing calculus. 461 U.S. at 152-53. 

Looking to those factors in the instant case, we consider the fact 

that Moore essentially went 11 AWOL 11 and left Wynnewood without 

protection for the three hours he attended the city council 

meeting as strong support for the City's actions. 

Furthermore, the government needs to maintain 11 discipline by 

superiors [and] harmony among co-workers, 11 especially where 11 close 

working relationships [exist] for which personal loyalty and 

confidence are necessary. 11 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. That need is 

particularly acute in the context of law enforcement, where there 

is a 11 heightened interest . . . in maintaining discipline and 

harmony among employees. 11 Wulf, 883 F.2d at 861; see also Kelly 

v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-47 (1976) (recognizing the need to 

accord police departments wide latitude in decisions that impact 

11 discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity 11 ). In the present 

case, Moore's statements threatened both the department's morale 

and chain of command. Working relations could not get much closer 

than in the six-person Wynnewood Police Department, and Moore's 

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position as the second in command might have caused his statements 

to reverberate with special force. "The burden of caution 

employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary with 

the extent of authority and public accountability the employee's 

role entails." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390. 

Moore maintains that Defendants have not shown that Moore's 

statements actually caused any disruption in the Wynnewood Police 

Department. The government cannot rely on purely speculative 

allegations that certain statements caused or will cause 

disruption to justify the regulation of employee speech. Wulf, 

883 F.2d at· 862. Furthermore, the government's concerns about the 

impact of speech must be reasonable and formed in good faith. 

Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889. However, neither does the government, 

or a police department in particular, have to wait for speech 

actually to disrupt core operations before taking action. "[W]e 

have consistently given greater deference to government 

predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech 

than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the 

speech of the public at large." Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887. In 

the present case, Defendants have articulated specific concerns 

about the impact of Moore's statements criticizing Officer Boucher 

at the Wynnewood City Council meeting. First, the small size of 

the department increased the likelihood and severity of 

disruption. Second, Moore's leadership position also increased 

the chance that his statements would impact the department and 

would reasonably threaten his close working relations both with 

the ordinary patrol officers and with Chief Sanders. See Wulf, 

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883 F.2d at 861 (noting that the government's justifications for 

regulating speech were weaker when an officer's critical 

statements did not relate to someone with whom the officer had to 

work closely); Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir.) 

(rejecting the First Amendment claims of a discharged captain in 

the sheriff's department in part because he was "a highly placed 

official in a para-military unit," and because" [h]e had an 

important role in the implementation of the sheriff's policies, 

and he was an essential link between the sheriff and the deputies 

whom he supervised"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). 

Moreover, Defendants need not justify their predictions of 

department disruption with a formal evidentiary showing. 

Governmental employers should be allowed to "rely on hearsay, on 

past similar conduct, on ... personal knowledge of people's 

credibility, and on other factors that the judicial process 

ignores." Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888. Thus, although government 

employers do not have a blanket license to retaliate against 

employees based on unfounded fears or speculation about the 

harmful effects of employee speech, Defendants have identified a 

reasonable basis for their actions. 

We conclude that the Pickering balance clearly tips in favor 

of Defendants. Even viewing the factual record in the light most 

favorable to Moore, we conclude that Moore has failed to show that 

his interest in voicing his opinion about Officer Boucher and the 

police department's race relations problem as he did, while on 

duty and in uniform, outweighed Defendants' interest in 

controlling who purports to speak on the City's behalf and in 

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safeguarding the operation of the department. Accordingly, 

Moore's speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection, and 

Moore's § 1983 claims against both Sanders and the City must 

fail.6 Given our conclusion that Moore's speech was not 

protected, we need not reach the issue of whether Moore's speech 

was a substantial or motivating factor in his demotion. 

C. Moore's Wrongful Demotion Claim 

Our conclusion that Moore has not shown a constitutional 

violation also defeats his wrongful demotion tort claim against 

the City insofar as it relies on his constitutional claim. 

Moore's state action for wrongful demotion is based on Burk v. KMart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989). Burk provides that an 

employer can be liable for discharging even an at-will employee if 

"the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as 

articulated by constitutional, statutory, or decisional law." Id. 

at 28. Moore's Burk claim appears to be based solely on his 

6 Even if Moore had shown that the Pickering balance tipped in 

his favor, he would be hard pressed to establish that his First 

Amendment rights were clearly established, and Sanders, therefore, 

would be entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. As we 

have stated: 

In the First Amendment context, the Harlow inquiry must 

focus on whether, at the time the actions adverse to the 

employee-speaker were taken, the defendants would have 

been reasonably on notice that the speech at issue 

addressed a matter of public concern and that their 

interest in the effective functioning of their 

governmental enterprise would be insufficient for 

purposes of Pickering balancing to outweigh the 

employee's free speech interest. 

Considine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695, 702 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (emphasis in original). 

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contention that he was demoted in contravention of his 

constitutional rights. However, as explained above, we conclude 

that Defendants did not abridge Moore's First Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, Moore has failed to establish a basis upon which to 

claim that he was wrongfully demoted.? 

III. CONCLUSION 

In reviewing Sanders' interlocutory appeal of the district 

court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the ground of 

qualified immunity, we conclude that Moore has failed to show that 

Defendants violated his First Amendment rights. As such, we need 

not reach Sanders' qualified immunity defense. Furthermore, our 

judgment fully forecloses both Moore's federal and state claims 

against the City and allows us to exercise jurisdiction over the 

City's otherwise premature appeal. For the reasons stated above, 

the decision of the district court is REVERSED as to both 

defendants, and the matter is REMANDED to the district court. 

7 The City also argues that Oklahoma does not recognize a tort 

for wrongful demotion and that Burk actions are limited to 

wrongful discharges. Because we reject Moore's claim on other 

grounds, we do not decide whether Oklahoma would extend Burk 

actions to wrongful demotions. Similarly, we do not reach the 

issue of whether the City is entitled to immunity under Oklahoma's 

Governmental Tort Claims Act. 

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