Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06062/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alvin Parker
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

ALVIN PARKER,

Movant.

No. 15-6062

(D.C. Nos. 5:96-CV-00335-T,

5:05-CV-01252-T, 5:13-CV-1365-D)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER

Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

Alvin Parker is a state prisoner and frequent habeas filer appearing pro se. On 

March 31, 2015, he submitted a motion for authorization to file a successive habeas 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was filed in this court on April 3. On 

April 3, Mr. Parker submitted an amended motion for authorization to replace the 

March 31 motion, and the amended motion was filed on April 15. The amended 

motion for authorization is denied because (1) Mr. Parker has presented the same 

claim of key prosecution witness Glenn Briggs’ perjury and recantation in a prior 

application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and (2) this court is statutorily barred under 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) and (2) from authorizing a successive application for a claim 

that has been presented in a prior § 2254 application. In addition, Mr. Parker is 

ordered to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for continuing to file motions 

for authorization to raise the same claim he has raised before.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 17, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

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A. BACKGROUND and DECISION

Mr. Parker was convicted in May 1990 by a state-court jury of second-degree 

murder and sentenced to 199 years. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. A 

key prosecution witness named Glenn Briggs identified Mr. Parker as the murderer at 

trial. Mr. Parker asserts in his amended motion for authorization that Mr. Briggs has 

recanted his testimony and admitted that he committed perjury and has attached a 

sworn, typed declaration to that effect ostensibly from Mr. Briggs. Mr. Parker has 

already presented his claim that the prosecutor knowingly used Mr. Briggs’ perjured 

testimony. This court authorized Mr. Parker to raise this claim in a successive 

§ 2254 petition in December 2013, and he was denied relief in the district court and 

on appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) and (2), this court may not authorize 

another successive petition on the same claim. The amended motion for 

authorization is therefore denied. This denial of authorization “shall not be 

appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of 

certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

B. SANCTIONS

Our March 20, 2015, order in No. 15-6035 warned Mr. Parker that he might be 

sanctioned if he returned with his claim that Briggs committed perjury and the 

prosecutor knew it. In re Parker, No. 15-6035, Unpublished Order at 3. “Courts

have inherent powers to protect themselves from vexatious litigation.” Alexander v. 

United States, 121 F.3d 312, 316 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

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501 U.S. 32 (1991)). And courts have a “‘responsibility . . . to see that [our limited] 

resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.’” 

Montgomery v. Davis, 362 F.3d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)

(quoting In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989)); see also Alexander, 121 F.3d 

at 315 (addressing what sanction to impose on a frequent filer, with a goal to “reduce 

the burden of paper-moving and explanation-writing, conserving a little judicial time 

for litigants who deserve attention”). 

Mr. Parker is ordered to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The 

sanction we intend to impose is that any further applications filed by Mr. Parker for 

leave to file additional collateral attacks on his 1990 Oklahoma conviction for 

second-degree murder will be deemed denied on the thirtieth day without a court 

order, unless this court orders otherwise. See Berryhill v. Evans, 466 F.3d 934, 936 

(10th Cir. 2006). Mr. Parker’s response to this show-cause order shall be filed within 

twenty-one days of the date of this order.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 15-6062 Document: 01019417580 Date Filed: 04/17/2015 Page: 3