Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01481/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01481-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy Joe Huff
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

• I 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

BILLY JOE HUFF, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before MCKAY, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 1 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1481 

( D. C. Kan.) 

(86-20073-01) 

Billy Joe Huff appeals his conviction on ten counts of an 

indictment which charged fifteen counts of willfully concealing 

material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1001 (1982). 

Each count alleged that while acting as an F.B.I. informant in an 

investigation of kickbacks paid to an employee of a Shawnee 

Mission School District, Huff concealed checks and kept part of 

the proceeds when he was under a duty to notify the F.B.I. of the 

transaction and turn over evidence to that agency. 

stated herein, we AFFIRM the convictions. 

For reasons 

Between January 1984 and August 1985, Huff worked as an 

informant for the F.B.I. Financed by the F.B.I., Huff purchased 

and operated a bar, obtained information regarding criminal 

acti vities, and related this information to the F.B.I. During the 

course of Huff's informant activities, he was approached by Walter 

Appellate Case: 87-1481 Document: 01019962721 Date Filed: 02/14/1989 Page: 1 
Ferguson, the Associate Superintendent of Management Services, 

Shawnee Mission School District. According to Huff, Ferguson 

indicated his willingness to hire Huff as a painting contractor, 

inflate the charges to the school district, and split the 

overcharged amount between themselves. The F.B.I. approved of 

Huff becoming involved, but instructed him to advise a certain 

F.B.I. agent whenever he had contact with Walter Ferguson or any 

other individuals employed by the school district, and to 

photocopy any documents that came into his possession. 

According to the trial testimony of Walter Ferguson, Huff was 

placed on the vendor list of the school district. Subsequently, 

Huff and Ferguson inflated a $1,720 invoice to $2,220, with 

Ferguson receiving the difference of $500. Huff and Ferguson then 

came to an agreement that Huff, as an independent contractor, but 

using Shawnee Mission School District employees, would install 

ceiling fans owned by the school district for $95.00 per fan. The 

two agreed to pay Shawnee Mission School District employees for 

their labor and then share the "profits." Huff was not involved 

personally in the fan installations, but simply submitted invoices 

to the school district based upon information provided by 

Ferguson. When Huff received checks from the school district, he 

cashed them and divided the money into separate envelopes that 

were delivered to the various school district employees and to 

Ferguson. 

At the conclusion of the investigation, the F.B.I. documented 

nineteen fan installation transactions. Huff had turned over his 

share of "profits" to the F.B.I. on four occasions, although the 

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F . B.I. had instructed him to report every contact with Ferguson 

and the school district. Huff admitted to agents of the F.B.I. 

that he had received proceeds from the fifteen checks for which he 

had not accounted and that he had utilized the proceeds for his 

own purposes. Thereafter, Huff appeared before a federal grand 

jury, waived his Fifth Amendment privilege, and admitted that he 

had not turned over some of the money received from the invoices 

and did not inform an F.B.I. agent about the transactions. 

The fifteen-count indictment charged a separate violation for 

each of the fan installation transactions in which no cash was 

turned over to the F.B.I. The jury convicted Huff of ten of the 

charged violations. 

I. 

Huff asserts numerous errors. He first argues that the trial 

court erred in determining the issue of materiality as a matter of 

law rather than submitting it as an issue to be determined by the 

jury. The elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, as charged in this 

indictment, are as follows: (1) the defendant; (2) on or about 

date x; (3) in the District of Kansas and elsewhere; (4) willfully 

and knowingly concealed or covered up by any trick, scheme, or 

device; (5) a material fact; (6) in relation to a matter within 

the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States. 

Instruction No. 11 reads as follows: 

You are instructed that with respect to the 

offenses charged in the Indictment, the alleged 

concealment and coverup by trick, scheme or device must 

pertain to a material fact. The question of materiality 

is not submitted to you for decision, but rather is a 

matter for decision of the court. You are instructed 

that the matter referred to and as charged in the 

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Indictment constitutes a "material fact" within the 

meaning of the statute. 

Thus, the trial court determined materiality as a matter of law. 

Under ordinary circumstances, this instruction would be 

problematic. The circuits are split on whether materiality under 

18 u.s.c. § 1001 is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury 

or whether it is a question of law to be decided by the court. 

The Tenth Circuit is one of two circuits holding that materiality 

in this context is a question of fact. United States v. Irwin, 

654 F.2d 671, 677 n.8 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 

1016 (1982); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 

1979). Circuits holding that materiality is a question of law 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 include the following: United States v. 

Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. 

Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72-73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 

(1985); Nilson Van & Storage Co. v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 362, 367 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); United States v. 

McIntosh, 655 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 

948 (1982); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983}; United States v. Clancy, 276 

F.2d 617, 635 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 

312 (1961); United States v. Alder, 623 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 

1980); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 

1956). 

During closing argument and prior to the court giving 

Instruction No. 11, counsel for Huff admitted that the facts 

charged constitute material facts under law. The closing argument 

of Huff's counsel reads in part as follows: 

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The indictment in this case charges nine to 15 times 

that Huff did as follows: that he concealed material 

facts in a manner within the jurisdiction of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. I admit that if he did what 

they said that that's a concealment. 

That he got the money is a material fact. That he 

got the money and spent it instead of giving it to him, 

he concealed it, that is a material fact. I admit that 

the agency is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It's 

a United States Government agency, although sometimes 

I'm not too proud of it. I admit that the F.B.I. was 

involved in an investigation of kickbacks paid to and 

received by the employee of the Shawnee Mission Unified 

School District and that that kickback scheme had to do 

with ceiling fans in schools and the defendant was an 

informant. 

In his capacity as an F.B.I. informant, then he was 

to inform the F.B.I. when he received and cashed School 

District checks. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Although counsel took issue with the government's proof of 

intent, he conceded that the receipt and concealment of money by 

his client constituted material facts under the law. Counsel is 

entitled to concede proof, and such concession or admission has 

been held to eliminate the need for further proof on a given 

element of an offense. United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30 

(2d Cir. 1984) (citing Dick v. United States, 40 F.2d 609, 611 

(8th Cir. 1930)). Although Instruction No. 11 erroneously stated 

that materiality was an issue for the court to determine, the 

court's factual finding and legal conclusion of materiality was 

consistent with the admission of defense counsel, the 

uncontroverted evidence, and the theory of defense. 

Not only did counsel for Huff make multiple binding 

admissions in closing argument, he failed to object to the 

instruction now under review. Counsel's failure to object 

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constitutes failure to preserve the issue under Fed. R. Crim. P. 

30, and we are precluded from finding error unless the error is 

plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). United States v. 

Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1987). Thus, the issue is 

whether it was plain error for the court to give the instruction 

on the conceded element where a party admitted to an element of 

proof and failed to object to the jury instruction given on that 

element. The determination of plain error concerns whether the 

giving of the instruction "misled the jury or prejudiced the 

defendant by placing a greater burden upon him." Id. at 305-06. 

In the case before us we see no possibility that the jury could 

have been misled on an element the defendant admitted. Likewise, 

the defendant had no greater burden placed upon him. The 

defendant could not have been prejudiced or misled by the giving 

of Instruction No. 11, following his admission of this fact to the 

jury. 

II. 

Huff argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence 

the defendant's grand jury testimony wherein the defendant made 

admissions and in permitting the transcript to be viewed as an 

exhibit in the jury room. Huff appeared before the grand jury, 

was advised of his constitutional rights, waived them, and then 

under oath admitted acts which formed the bases of these charges. 

The transcript of the defendant's grand jury testimony was read to 

the jury and then admitted into evidence as part of the 

government's case-in-chief. The trial court permitted this 

exhibit, the transcribed grand jury testimony, to be taken with 

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the jury into the jury room during its deliberations. The record 

reveals that Huff objected to the admissibility and use of Huff's 

grand jury test imony. 

Huff now argues that under Fed. R. Evid. 804, former 

testimony is admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as 

a witness. Unavailability, however, has no bearing on the use of 

the statement in this context. Any and all statements of an 

accused person not excluded by the doctrine of confessions or the 

privilege against self-incrimination may be used against a 

defendant as an admission and are not hearsay. United States v. 

Meyer, 733 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1984). Admissions include the 

defendant's relevant grand jury testimony offered by the 

government during its case-in-chief. Id. at 363. Huff's argument 

that Rule 804 limits the admissibility of his prior grand jury 

testimony in this case is without merit. 

As to the question regarding the court allowing the 

transcript to go to the jury room, we cannot say the trial court 

abused its discretion. The trial court has considerable 

discretion in deciding whether to send exhibits to the jury room. 

Jurors are entitled to examine documents properly admitted into 

evidence and the decision to send such exhibits to the jury room 

during deliberation is within the discretion of the trial court. 

United States v. DeCoito, 764 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(citing United States v. Jackson, 477 F.2d 879, 880 (8th Cir. 

1973)). 

III. 

Huff asserts the trial court erred in permitting the 

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government to question him regarding a prior conviction. During 

trial the government filed a motion to introduce, apparently under 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of a prior conviction in its casein-chief. The trial judge excluded the evidence from the 

government's case-in-chief on the grounds that the prejudicial 

effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. He stated, 

however, "later on it may be admissible." 

During cross-examination of the defendant, the government 

sought, under Fed. R. Evid. 609, to impeach the defendant with the 

prior misdemeanor conviction involving dishonesty. The trial 

court allowed the government to question the defendant whether he 

had been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty. Huff 

responded: "I know I cashed a couple $50 checks that didn't 

belong to me and drank on them " The prosecutor then 

attempted to have Huff identify the record of the conviction to 

refresh his recollection. After several questions relating to the 

identification, the exhibit was admitted into evidence. Huff was 

asked questions concerning the exhibit including: the identity of 

the crime (29 U.S.C. § 430(a)); the nature of the crime (false 

entry in required records); the fact Huff pled guilty; the date of 

the crime (1977); and the date of the guilty plea (1979). 

Huff presents three contentions arising from the use of this 

evidence: ( 1) that he was "duped" into testifying by the court 

changing its mind as to the admissibility of the prior conviction; 

(2) that the court should have excluded the evidence under the 

balancing test set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 403; and (3) that Fed. 

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R. Evid. 609 does not permit counsel to inquire into the factual 

basis of the prior conviction. We review rulings on evidentiary 

matters under the abuse of discretion standard, and find no abuse 

of the trial court's discretion. United States v. Halbert, 668 

F.2d 489, 493 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982). 

Huff's first contention is without merit. From a legal 

standpoint, the trial court's ruling on the use of the evidence in 

the government's case-in-chief does not render erroneous the 

ruling on the use of the evidence for impeachment purposes. From 

a factual standpoint, the trial judge clearly stated that although 

he would not permit the government to use the evidence in its 

case-in-chief, "later on it may be admissible." Huff cannot 

credibly argue that he was "duped'' into testifying by these 

rulings of the court, particularly where defendant's counsel 

stated in opening statements that defendant would testify. 

Huff's second contention is that the evidence of a prior 

conviction should not have been permitted under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides, in part, as follows: "Although 

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... " 

Huff argues the trial court's finding in the government's case-inchief that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by 

the prejudicial effect for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b} must 

carry over to exclude the evidence of the prior conviction for 

impeachment purposes. He reasons that, once excluded, the 

evidence fails to survive the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403 

for any other purpose. Huff's theory, however, does not persuade 

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us that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting 

impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction. The trial court's 

ruling on the admissibility of evidence in the government's casein-chief does not render erroneous the ruling as to admissibility 

of the evidence for impeachment purposes. 

Huff's third contention deals with the scope of permissible 

inquiry under Fed. R. Evid. 609. Huff argues that as soon as the 

defendant answered affirmatively to the question of having been 

convicted of a crime, the impeachment was complete and the court 

erred in allowing the government to elicit information about the 

crime. Ordinarily, it is improper for the prosecution to examine 

the details of a prior crime under Fed. R. Evid. 609. "[C]rossexamination should be confined to a showing of the essential facts 

of convictions, the nature of the crimes, and the punishment." 

United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977). 

However, in Wolf, this court differentiated the situation wherein 

a defendant attempts to minimize his guilt. "A different 

situation is presented when an accused, on direct examination, 

attempts to explain away the effect of the conviction or to 

minimize his guilt. In such cases, the defendant may be crossexamined on any facts which are relevant to the direct 

examination." Id. at 1381. In the instant case, Huff apparently 

did not know the nature of the previous conviction. The 

government merely cross-examined on the facts of the conviction 

and the nature of the crime as is proper under Wolf. Furthermore, 

even if the examination exceeded the Wolf criteria, the scope 

would be proper due to Huff's rather vague testimony. We perceive 

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no abuse of discretion in the court's evidentiary rulings on the 

impeachment evidence. 

IV. 

Huff asserts as error the trial court's refusal to instruct 

the jury on diminished capacity. An instruction that intoxication 

could negate the specific intent essential to a finding of guilt 

is proper where sufficient evidence of intoxication is adduced. 

United States v. Larsen, 525 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. 

denied, 423 U.S. 1075 (1976); United States v. Moore, 435 F.2d 

113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). 

In this case, the evidence indicates that Huff drank heavily 

and consumed prescribed medications throughout his tenure as an 

informant. The trial court did not view the evidence presented as 

sufficient to raise the issue of intoxication. We have carefully 

examined the record and agree with the trial court's decision. 

There is no evidence showing Huff was so affected by the alleged 

intoxication or excessive medication that he could not form the 

requisite intent for the crimes. Although Huff did not object to 

the trial court's refusal to give such an instruction, he now 

urges us to require the trial court to give a diminished capacity 

instruction in a case wherein the evidence reveals only that Huff 

pursued an unhealthy lifestyle. We will not require the trial 

court to instruct on intoxication based on the shallow evidence in 

the record. 

v. 

Huff asserts the trial court erred in failing to give a 

cautionary instruction limiting the consideration of a guilty plea 

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of a former co-defendant. Originally Huff and Walter Ferguson 

were co-defendants charged with conspiracy arising from the facts 

investigated in this case. Subsequently, Ferguson pled guilty to 

conspiracy to take money from the school district. 1 The 

government dismissed the conspiracy charge against Huff. Ferguson 

testified against Huff in the trial of the 18 u.s.c. § 1001 

charges herein. 

At trial, Ferguson testified that formerly he was the 

Associate Superintendent of Management Services, Shawnee Mission 

School District. Ferguson had been charged with a felony, pled 

guilty, and was awaiting sentencing. He testified that he had 

placed Huff on the school district vendor list and that he had 

participated with Huff in the ceiling fan installation scheme. In 

his testimony, Ferguson described the scheme, stating that 

repeatedly he supplied Huff with information as to how many fans 

were to be installed and the number of hours the jobs would take. 

He telephoned Huff and told him the amount in which to prepare the 

invoices. Huff then brought the invoices to Ferguson's office. 

Ferguson advised Huff when the checks were ready, Huff cashed the 

checks, and then the two divided the money. Ferguson testified 

that on each job he and Huff split anywhere from $1,200.00 to 

$50.00, and he estimated that the total he received personally 

from the nineteen projects was $6,000.00. He further identified 

relevant documentary evidence. In sum, Ferguson testified to the 

1 The record is unclear regarding the precise violation to which 

Ferguson pled guilty. 

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underlying transactions for which Huff allegedly was obligated to 

produce evidence to the F.B.I. 

At trial, Huff loosely requested a cautionary instruction 

limiting the jury's consideration of Ferguson's guilty plea. 

Although in his brief Huff seems to advise the court that he made 

no request for a cautionary instruction at trial, the government 

refers to portions of the record wherein Huff apparently made a 

request for such an instruction. The record is not altogether 

clear in this regard, but we shall give Huff the benefit of the 

doubt and address the issue as though preserved for appeal. In 

any event, at no time did Huff present a proposed instruction to 

the court or argue the propriety of giving such an instruction 

based upon the authority he now argues. At trial, Huff stated his 

request as follows: 

I would suggest to the Court that since Mr. 

Ferguson was a codefendant at the time he pleaded 

guilty, although he pleaded guilty to an indictment that 

was subsequently dismissed against Mr. Huff, that at one 

time he and Huff were codefendants named in the s 9,e indictment that he pleaded guilty to, [a limiting]l J 

instruction as to his testimony might also be 

appropriate in this case. 

Before this case was submitted to the jury, Huff restated his 

objection in the following exchange: 

THE COURT: Do you have any -- all the things you 

commented on the instructions heretofore are made of 

record; there's no reason to repeat them. Do you have 

any other objections to the instructions? 

MR. GILMAN: No other except the ones we've already 

made about the limiting instruction and the --

2 In its brief, the government states that even though the 

transcript reads "eliminating the instruction," opposing counsel 

actually said "a limiting instruction." 

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MR. BURGESS: No other objections, Your Honor, than 

previously noted. 

THE COURT: We'll send the original and five copies 

of the instructions to the jury -- and the verdict form 

to the jury with all the exhibits that have been 

admitted. Any objections? 

MR. GILMAN: No objection. 

The court did not give such an instruction. 

The appellate standard of review of jury instructions is 

clear. "'[A]n error in jury instructions will mandate reversal of 

a judgment only if the error is determined to have been 

prejudicial, based on a review of the record as a whole. 111 Big 

Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 n.19 

(10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 895 

(10th Cir. 1984)). 

Huff claims he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to 

give a cautionary instruction for two reasons. First, he argues 

the judgment could have been affected by the jury improperly 

addressing Huff's receipt of money from the school district. 

Second, he argues the jury improperly could have inferred Huff's 

guilt due to Ferguson's admission of guilt. In support of his 

position, Huff cites United States v. Smith, 806 F.2d 971 (10th 

Cir. 1986), and United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 

1983). Under the facts of this case, however, we are not 

persuaded that either case requires us to find prejudicial error 

in the trial proceedings. 

In Smith, this court held that it was plain3 and prejudicial 

3 Although Appellant argues the existence of plain error at 

length, we do not discuss his contentions in this regard. Based 

upon Appellee's citations to the record we address the issue as 

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error for the prosecutor to argue the guilty pleas of codefendants as substantive evidence against the defendant. Several 

factors considered by the court in Smith made the argument 

particularly egregious. As the court observed: 

In view of the nature of a conspiracy trial, with the 

government's case in chief coming from co-conspirators 

who had pled guilty, and considering the nature of the 

prosecutor's arguments and comments to the jury which 

were directed to the theme that "birds of a feather 

flock together," we find also plain error which 

adversely affected Smith's right to a fair trial. 

Smith, 806 F.2d at 975. The facts of the instant case are clearly 

distinguishable. First, Huff was tried on a charge which was 

different from the charge to which Ferguson pled guilty. 4 The 

parties, elements, and tenor of the crimes differed one from 

another. Second, the government established its case-in-chief 

through witnesses in addition to Ferguson rather than through him 

exclusively. Third, the prosecutor did not argue to the jury that 

Ferguson's guilty plea had any significance. Consequently, we do 

not find prejudicial error based upon Smith. 

Similarly, the facts presented in Baez are clearly 

distinguishable. In Baez, the trial court referred during voir 

dire to co-defendants' guilty pleas, and no instruction was given 

to inform the jury that it could consider the pleas only as 

evidence relating to credibility. The court's reference to the 

guilty plea of a second co-defendant involved a person who did not 

though preserved for appeal. Plain error goes to reviewability 

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. Prejudicial error goes to whether the 

court may consider reversal. 

4 The parties did not raise the co-defendant/co-participant 

"distinction.'' We do not address the issue for that reason and 

for the reason that our opinion does not turn on that matter. 

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even testify at trial. After reviewing the record, this court 

concluded "the evidence was so far from overwhelming that the 

judge's prejudicial remarks could well have affected the outcome 

of the trial." Baez, 703 F.2d at 456. Consequently, the court 

held that the prejudicial error warranted a new trial. 

In the instant case, no one but the witness commented about 

the guilty plea. Ferguson testified to his guilty plea as part of 

the plea agreement under which he testified. Although the 

substance of Ferguson's testimony and plea related to elements of 

the charge against Huff, the record is absolutely devoid of any 

"birds of a feather" argument or innuendo. Consequently, neither 

of Huff's assertions of prejudice are well-founded. 

Even if the trial court erred in refusing to give a 

cautionary instruction, in light of the overwhelming evidence of 

guilt we are convinced that the refusal did not substantially sway 

the judgment. In Baez we stated: 

"'[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after 

pondering all that happened without stripping the 

erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was 

not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible 

to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.'" 

[United States v. Williams, 445 F.2d 421, 424 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 ( 1971)] ( quoting 

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 

1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). See also United 

States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (lOth~i"r:"}; cert. 

denied, 396 u.s. 912, 90 s.ct. 227, 24 L.Ed.2d 187 

(1969); Wright v. United States, 301 F.2d 412, 414 (10th 

Cir. 1962). 

Id. at 455-56. The record as a whole reveals overwhelming 

evidence of guilt. Huff admitted twice to the criminal activities 

charged. He admitted first to the F.B.I. and then later in sworn 

testimony before the grand jury. At trial the government 

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introduced into evidence the checks cashed by Huff and presented 

the testimony of two F.B.I. agents involved in the case. This 

evidence was in addition to the testimony of Ferguson and Huff's 

admissions. 

In United States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 736 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985), we held that given 

overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error complained of did not 

contribute to the verdict obtained. Under the Remigio standard, 

the evidence of the co-defendant's guilty plea in this case was 

harmless beyond any doubt and did not contribute to the verdict 

obtained. 

In addition to those issues discussed herein, Huff raised the 

following issues: the sufficiency of the evidence; the trial 

court's failure to grant the defendant's Motion for Judgment of 

Acquittal; and the trial court's grant of the government's Motion 

in Limine. We have carefully reviewed the arguments of counsel 

and the record and find these issues to be without merit. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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• & 

No. 87-1481, UNITED STATES v. BILLY JOE HUFF 

MCKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I agree with all of the court's opinion except part V. 

Because of that disagreement, I must respectfully dissent from the 

judgment. In United States v. Smith, 806 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 

1986), and United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983), 

we made clear how serious an error it is to use the pleas of other 

defendants as substantive evidence against the defendant on trial. 

In both cases we held it was both ''plain" and "prejudicial" error 

to use such evidence without a limiting instruction. Those cases 

were both reversed even though there was no objection or request 

for limiting instruction. Indeed, the standard quoted by the 

court from Baez at page 15 of its opinion is the standard to be 

used in judging plain error, not error over objection. 

As the court points out, the use of the evidence in this case 

was not as egregious as in the two precedents. Had the trial 

court not rejected a proper instruction solidly founded on those 

two cases, I could join the court's disposition of this issue. 

However, I consider the failure serious enough that only a 

harmless error standard would persuade me to affirm. In those 

circumstances the burden is on the government to persuade us the 

error was harmless. Although the evidence in this case is strong, 

the government has not persuaded me that the failure to give the 

requested instruction was harmless. I therefor would reverse and 

remand for a new trial. 

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