Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06400/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06400-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Southwestern Bell Telephone
Appellee
Kenneth W. Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

KENNETH W. WRIGHT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, 

a Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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FEB 1 31991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6400 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-2272-R) 

Kenneth w. Wright, of Midwest City, Oklahoma, pro se. 

Nancy L. Coats, of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, of 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the brief for the Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACBA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of 

plaintiff-appellant Kenneth Wright's claim for relief against 

Southwestern Bell {SWB) under the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act), 29 u.s.c. §§ 1132, 1140-41, 

and a grant of summary judgment on Wright's claim under Title VII, 

1 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981, 1988, 2000(e) et seq. On appeal, Wright 

argues the district court erred by: (1) finding the ERISA claim 

is barred by the statute of limitations and (2) granting SWB's 

motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim because Wright 

knowingly and voluntarily released all claims against his former 

employer. We affirm the summary judgment decision and reverse and 

remand the ERISA claim for further proceedings in accordance with 

this opinion. 

Kenneth Wright was employed by SWB from February 19, 1972 

until May 23, 1985. During that time, he was a member of the 

Communications Workers of America (CWA) and was covered by the 

collective bargaining agreement between the union and SWB. The 

union contract provides sick leave and short- and long-term 

disability benefits. From 1981 to 1985, Wright drew sick leave 

and short-term disability on several occasions. Wright testified 

he requested long-term disability benefits during the early part 

of 1985. SWB informed him he was not eligible for long-term 

disability benefits without the company doctor's recommendation. 

Wright claims he was given the choice of either returning to work 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 2 
or being terminated. After exhausting his vacation benefits, 

Wright returned to work in February 1985. 

In April 1985, Wright was suspended for misconduct. On May 

23, 1985, Wright was discharged for "misconduct, poor quality of 

work, and for refusing to do a job. " 

Wright twice filed written charges of discrimination against 

SWB with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission and the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the first 

charge on the day he was suspended and the second on the day he 

was terminated. In both complaints, Wright claimed SWB had 

discriminated against him based on his race. 

In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, 

Wright presented his claims against SWB for discrimination in a 

grievance hearing. Before the grievance procedure was complete, 

the parties negotiated a settlement whereby SWB agreed to change 

the reason for Wright's dismissal from "misconduct" to 

"unsatisfactory service." SWB also agreed to pay Wright $13,902. 

On November 1, 1985 SWB issued a check for $9,513 ($13,902 

less federal and state witholdings) to Wright. The following 

statement was typed on the back of the check above the line for 

endorsement: 

RELEASE 

By endorsing and/or negotiating this instrument, 

employee covenants not to sue or arbitrate, and releases 

from all claims and/or demands of whatever kind or 

nature, the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. and the 

Communications Workers of America. 

Wright endorsed the check and deposited it in his bank account in 

early November 1985. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 3 
In September 1988, the EEOC concluded SWB had not engaged in 

an discriminatory employment practices. The El.::OC issued Wright a 

right to sue letter, advising him he had until December 28, 19BB 

to file any Title VII claims in federal district court. Wright 

filed a complaint on December 28, 1988, alleging violations of 

ERISA and Title VII. The district court dismissed Wright's ERISA 

claim and granted SWB's motion for summary judgment on the Title 

VII claim. The court held Wright's ERISA claim was barred by the 

statute of limitations. It found that under section 1113 of 

ERISA, an action must be commenced within three years of the 

earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 

breach or violation. The court granted SWB's motion for summary 

judgment based on a finding that Wright had released "all claims 

... for relief under Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 

1988, and 2000(e) et ~, and all common law claims for breach of 

contract." 

Wright contends the district court did not apply the proper 

statute of limitations when dismissing the ERISA claim. We review 

a district court's ruling on the applicability of a statute of 

limitations de novo. Pierce County Hotel Employees ~ Restaurant 

Employees Health Trust ~Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. No. 1450, 827 F.2d 

1324, 1328 (9th Cir. 1987). We hold the district court erred when 

it concluded that section 1113 was applicable to an action brought 

under section 1132. Section 1113 is, in fact, only applicable to 

actions arising out of violations of the portion of the Act 

addressing fiduciary responsibilities, 29 u.s.c. S§ 1101-12. See 

Wyoming Laborers Health i_ Welfare Plan Y.!.. J1grgen i_ Oswood Constr. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 4 
Co., 850 F.2d 613, 618 n.8 (lOth Cir. 1988). Wright's claim does 

not involve fiduciary responsibilities regarding financial 

solvency or accountability as contemplated by section 1113. The 

focus of his complaint is on SWB's administration of the plan's 

benefits, specifically, the denial of his long-term disability 

benefits. 

ERISA plan administration and enforcement are governed by 

sections 1131 to 1145 of the Act. Wright's claim was brought 

under section 1132, which authorizes private civil enforcement 

actions. This provision allows a plan beneficiary or participant 

to bring a civil action: (1) for the relief provided in section 

1132(c) of the Act,§ 1132(a)(l)(A); (2) to recover benefits due 

under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms 

of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the 

terms of the plan, S 1132(a)(l)(B); (3) to obtain appropriate 

relief under section 1109 of the Act, § 1132(a)(2); (4) to enjoin 

any act or practice that violates any portion of the Act 

concerning plan administration and enforcement or to obtain other 

appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or enforce 

the Act's provisions or the terms of the plan, S 1132(a}(3); and 

(5) to obtain appropriate relief for violations of section 1025(c) 

of the Act, S 1132(a)(4). 

Section 1132 does not contain a statute of limitations. A 

recent decision of this circuit, Held v. Manufacturers Hanover 

Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (lOth Cir. 1990), addresses the 

appropriate limitations period for actions brought under this 

provision. In a private civil action brought pursuant to section 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 5 
1132, Held asserted his former employer had violated section 1140, 

which proscribes interference with protected rights. Id. at 1198. 

We noted in Held that because section 1132 does not contain a 

statute of limitations, we first must determine whether an 

analogous state statute or a statute of limitations from another 

portion of ERISA, such as section 1113, should apply. Id. at 1203 

(citing Reed~ United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989)). 

To resolve this question, we turned to another recent 

decision in this circuit, Wyoming Laborers Health ~ Welfare Plan 

~Morgen~ Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Morgen ~ Oswood addressed the question of what limitations period 

is applicable to an action under section 1132(a)(3) by trustees of 

employee benefit pensions and insurance funds against an employer 

for delinquent contributions. In Morgen ~ Oswood, we had 

considered several arguably applicable statutes of limitations, 

including the limitations period in section 1113 of ERISA. We 

concluded in Morgen ~ Oswood that "the Wyoming ten-year statute of 

limitations for actions based on written contracts is the statute 

of limitations 'most analogous' to the Trustees' ERISA action." 

See Held, 912 F.2d at 1201 (quoting Morgen k Oswood, 850 F.2d at 

612). Following Morgen k Oswood, we decided in Held to apply an 

analogous state statute rather than an ERISA statute of 

limitations to ERISA claims for which there was no express 

limitation period. Held, 912 F.2d at 1201-02. 

This court in Held next sought to determine the most 

analogous state statute. As a preliminary matter, the court 

characterized the appellant's claim. It found that the appellant 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 6 
had two distinct causes of action. His first action was brought 

under section 1132(a)(3) for decl a ratory and injunctive relief 

from his former employer's alleged violation of section 1140. 

Plaintiff also had claimed under section 1132(a)(1)(B) for 

benefits due under the plan. 

After concluding that the appellant had two distinct claims 

for relief, the court next determined the most analogous state 

statute for each of these claims. Id. at 1204. We first 

concluded the limitation period for state employment 

discrimination actions should apply to the appellant's claim for 

injunctive relief under section 1132(a)(3) for his former 

employer's alleged violation of section 1140. Id. at 1205. The 

court then held the statute· of limitations for claims on a written 

contract should be applied to the section 1132(a)(l)(B) claim for 

benefits due under the plan. Id. at 1206-07. 

To determine the applicable statute of limitations in the 

present case, we first must characterize Wright's claim. Although 

Wright's amended complaint claims his action is based on sections 

1132, 1140, and 1141, he does not ask for the declaratory and 

injunctive relief available under section 1132(a)(3). A review of 

the record reveals that Wright has never asked for declaratory or 

injunctive relief. In his prayer for relief, he seeks recovery of 

short- and long-term disability benefits that he claims were 

wrongfully denied. Such recovery is authorized under section 

1132(a)(l)(B). Based on Held, we conclude Oklahoma's five-year 

statute of limitations on written contracts, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

12, § 95, applies to this claim. We hold the ERISA claim is not 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 7 
time-barred because Wright filed his c l aim long before the proper 

statute of limitations had run. 

Wright also contends the release on the back of the check 

that he endorsed did not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver 

of his right to sue SWB for racial discr~ination under Title VII. 

We review a summary judgment order de novo and apply the same 

legal standard used by the district court under Rule 56(c) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Osgood v. State Far.m Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). Under Rule 56(c), 

summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and . the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In applying 

this standard, we examine "the factual record and reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment." Abercrombie Y...=.. City of Catoosa, 896 

F.2d 1228, 1230 (lOth Cir. 1990)·. 

Title VII claims may be waived by agreement, Torrez ~ Public 

Serv. ~, 908 F.2d 687, 689 (lOth Cir. 1990), but the waiver must 

be knowing and voluntary, Alexander~ Gardener-Denver Co., 415 

U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974); Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689. After the 

district court entered its order denying summary judgment, this 

court decided Torrez. In Torrez, we held the totality of the 

circumstances under which a release is signed determines whether 

it is knowing and voluntary. We pointed out that courts have 

considered the following factors in evaluating whether the 

totality of the circumstances indicates a release is knowing and 

voluntary: 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 8 
(1) the clarity and specificity of the release language; 

(2) the plaintiff's education and business experience; 

(3) the amount of time plaintiff had for deliberation 

about the release before signing it; (4) whether 

plaintiff knew or should have known his rights upon 

execution of the release; (5) whether plaintiff was 

encouraged to seek, or in fact received benefit of 

counsel; (6) whether there was an opportunity for 

negotiation of the terms of the Agreement; and (7) 

whether the consideration given in exchange for the 

waiver and accepted by the employee exceeds the benefits 

to which the employee was already entitled by contract 

or law. 

Id. at 689-90 (quoting Cirillo~ Area Chern. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 

451 (3d Cir. 1988)). 

Evaluating the totality of the circumstances in this case, we 

are convinced Wright's waiver was knowing and voluntary based on 

the factors listed in Torrez. The record indicates the language 

on the check clearly and specifically released "all claims and/or 

demands of whatever kind or nature." Because this language was 

labeled "RELEASE'' and typewritten on the back of the check 

directly above the place for endorsement, a reasonable person 

should have seen the release when endorsing the check. Because 

all of Wright's claims against SWB were based on discrimination, 

we are convinced no reasonable person reading this language could 

have believed he was releasing one but not all the discrimination 

claims. Based on the constructive knowledge standard of Torrez, 

we find no issue of material fact remaining on whether Wright 

should have known he was waiving all his related discrimination 

claims pending with the EEOC when he endorsed the check. 

Additionally, we fail to find any genuine issues of fact 

based on other factors enumerated in Torrez. There is no 

indication in the record, nor does Wright allege, his education 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 9 
and business experience are below average. In fact, Wright's 

letter of complaint to the EEOC and his pro se brief demonstrate a 

notable degree of sophistication regarding discrimination and 

retaliation claims in the employment context. Further, the record 

indicates Wright was represented by union representatives 

throughout the negotiation process and had sufficient opportunity 

to negotiate the terms of the settlement. The record also 

indicates Wright endorsed the check at his prerogative and SWB in 

no way limited the amount of time he had to deliberate about the 

release before signing. Finally, the record shows SWB gave Wright 

a check for $13,902 less deductions and changed the basis of his 

dismissal from "misconduct" to "unsatisfactory service." This 

consideration clearly exceeds the benefits to which Wright was 

entitled by contract or law at the time he signed the release of 

his pending claims against SWB. 

The fact situtation we faced in Torrez is distinguishable 

from the present case. In Torrez we held that language stating "I 

. . • hereby release and discharge . . • any or all claims I have 

Q!: might have" raised a material question of fact about whether 

the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily prospectively released a 

racial discrimination claim he commenced after signing the waiver. 

908 F.2d at 688 (emphasis added). Unlike Torrez, however, Wright 

signed the release after he already had filed with the EEOC 

alleging discrimination by SWB. Both SWB and Wright knew of these 

claims when the release was executed. In contrast, the release 

language in Torrez purported to cover all future claims including 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 10 
claims of which neither party was aware when executing the 

release. 

We consider the present case more similar to Stroman ~ West 

Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 111 s. Ct. 151 (1990). In Stroman, the Ninth Circuit held 

an intent to waive all discrimination claims can be inferred from 

the fact the plaintiff signed a release waiving "any and all 

claims" against his employer after he had filed employment 

discrimination claims with the EEOC. Id. Thus, depending on the 

rest of the circumstances, a release waiving "all claims" against 

an employer may be sufficiently clear and specific to release 

pending claims when a plaintiff already has filed discrimination 

claims as Wright had done. . Considering the record in light of the 

factors outlined in Torrez, we hold as a matter of law that no 

material issue of fact remains concerning Wright's knowing and 

voluntary waiver of the pending discrimination claims brought 

under Title VII. 

Finally, Wright contends the release on the back of the check 

could not have constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 

right to sue SWB under ERISA. We agree. The release was signed 

in November 1985. Because Wright did not assert his ERISA claim 

until this lawsuit was filed in December 1988, it was impossible 

for either SWB or Wright to know of this claim when the release 

was signed. Although we agree the language of the release is 

sufficiently clear to release the pending discrimination claims, 

~ Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689; Stroman, 884 F.2d at 461, we hold it 

is insufficient to release future claims against SWB about which 

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Appellate Case: 89-6400 Document: 01019726082 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 11 
neither party knew. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's 

grant of summary judgment in favor of SWB, REVERSE the district 

court's dismissal of Wright's ERISA claim, and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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