Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_06-cv-00014/USCOURTS-ared-2_06-cv-00014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eduardo Lara-Valdez
Plaintiff
Linda Sanders
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

 HELENA DIVISION

EDUARDO LARA-VALDEZ PETITIONER

v. NO. 2:06CV00014 JFF

LINDA SANDERS, 

Warden, FCI-Forrest City RESPONDENT

 

 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses the petition with

prejudice.

Petitioner was arrested by Nebraska state authorities on April 18, 2002, on a

state drug conspiracy charge. On May 22, 2002, Petitioner was indicted in the United

States District Court for the District of Nebraska on the charges of conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine. The conduct forming the basis of the state and federal charges

occurred on April 18, 2002. On May 28, 2002, Petitioner made his initial appearance

in federal district court. On June 6, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to a two to four year

term of imprisonment on the Nebraska state drug conspiracy charge. Subsequently,

Petitioner was transferred to the custody of the United States Marshals Service

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pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. On November 15, 2002,

Petitioner plead guilty in federal district court to conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine. On February 7, 2003, the district court sentenced Petitioner to 121

months’ imprisonment. During the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that

Petitioner “shall be given credit for the time he has already served from at least April

18, 2002.” The court did not mention the issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence would

run concurrently or consecutively with his state sentence. After sentencing, Petitioner

was returned to Nebraska state custody. On February 18, 2003, the district court

entered judgment. In the judgment, the district court recommended that Petitioner be

given credit for time served from at least April 18, 2002. The judgment is silent as to

whether Petitioner’s federal sentence was to run concurrently or consecutively with his

state sentence. On April 24, 2003, Petitioner was paroled from his Nebraska state

sentence and released to federal custody to serve the remainder of his federal

sentence. On October 14, 2003, Petitioner was transferred to the Federal Correctional

Complex in Forrest City, Arkansas, for service of his federal sentence. 

Based on its mistaken belief that the district court recommended that Petitioner’s

federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentence, the Federal Bureau of

Prisons (“BOP”) subsequently awarded Petitioner pre-sentence credit on his federal

sentence pursuant to Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971), from the date

of his arrest on April 18, 2002, through June 5, 2002, the day before his state sentence

was imposed. The BOP designated, nunc pro tunc, that Petitioner’s federal sentence

should commence on the date of its imposition, February 7, 2003.

On January 9, 2006, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition in this Court. Petitioner

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contends that he is entitled under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) and § 5G1.3 of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines to have time he spent in prison on the state charge credited

against his federal sentence. Petitioner also contends that his federal sentence began

running on April 18, 2002, and that the BOP erred in failing to consider his request for

presentence credit toward his federal sentence, “for the time spent in service” of his

state sentence, as “a request for nunc pro nunc designation.” Petitioner also asserts

that his “sentence computation” should be adjusted to commence on the date of his

arrest, April 18, 2002, “by way of concurrent designation.” He requests that “his federal

sentence be served concurrently with his state sentence” and that “the District Court

issue an order directing the BOP to designate the Mississippi Department of

Corrections facility for service of his federal sentence nunc pro tunc to April 18, 2002.”

Petitioner first contends that he is entitled under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) and §

5G1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to have time he spent in prison on

the state charges credited against his federal sentence. Specifically, he alleges that the

BOP has failed to credit him with (1) the time between the date of his arrest (April 18,

2002), and the date he was sentenced by the state court (June 6, 2002), and (2) the

time between the date he was sentenced by the federal court (February 7, 2003), and

the date he was paroled from his state sentence and released to federal custody to

serve the remainder of his federal sentence (April 24, 2003). He requests that he be

awarded the credit for this time. 

The evidence submitted by Respondent Sanders demonstrates that Petitioner

has received prior custody credit towards service of his federal sentence for the time

period from April 18, 2002, the date he was arrested by Nebraska state authorities,

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through June 5, 2002, the day before his Nebraska sentence was imposed. Thus,

Petitioner’s request for credit for the time between April 18, 2002, and June 6, 2002,

is moot. 

Petitioner also requests credit for the time period between February 7, 2003, the

date he was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment on the federal drug conspiracy

conviction, and April 24, 2003, the date he was paroled from his Nebraska State

sentence and released to federal custody to serve the remainder of his federal

sentence. According to Petitioner’s sentencing monitoring computation data, the date

computation began on his federal sentence was February 7, 2003. Petitioner has been

given 49 days jail credit for the time period from April 18, 2002, through June 5, 2002.

Petitioner’s expiration full term date is January 16, 2013, which is 121 months less 50

days from February 7, 2003. The Court finds that based on Petitioner’s sentence

monitoring computation data, he has been given credit on his federal sentence for the

time period between February 7, 2003, and April 24, 2003. Therefore, his request for

credit for this time period is moot. 

Petitioner also contends that his federal sentence began running on the date of

his arrest, April 18, 2002. “A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the

date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives

voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which

the sentence is to be served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Coloma v. Holder, 2006 U.S. App.

LEXIS 8800 at 6 (11th Cir. April 11, 2006); Weekes v. Fleming, 301 F.3d 1175, 1181-82

(10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1146 (2003); Lerario v. United States, 371 F.

Supp. 2d 633, 635 (M.D. Pa. 2005). “A federal sentence cannot commence prior to the

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date it is pronounced . . . .” Coloma, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8800 at 6 (quoting United

States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1980)). Petitioner was not even sentenced

on his federal conviction until February 7, 2003. Thus, his federal sentence could not

have commenced prior to February 7, 2003. Petitioner’s contention that his federal

sentence began running on April 18, 2002, is legally baseless. 

Petitioner contends that the BOP erred in failing to consider his request for

presentence credit toward his federal sentence, “for the time spent in service” of his

state sentence, as “a request for nunc pro nunc designation.” Petitioner asserts that

his “sentence computation” should be adjusted to commence on April 18, 2002, “by way

of concurrent designation.” He requests that “his federal sentence be served

concurrently with his state sentence” and that “the District Court issue an order directing

the BOP to designate the Mississippi Department of Corrections facility for service of

his federal sentence nunc pro tunc to April 18, 2002.” 

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) provides:

Imposition of concurrent or consecutive terms. If multiple terms of

imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term

of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an

undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or

consecutively, except that the terms may not run consecutively for an

attempt and for another offense that was the sole objective of the

attempt. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run

concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the

terms are to run consecutively. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed

at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms

are to run concurrently.

Under § 3584(a), “[t]here is a presumption that a federal sentence imposed after

a prior state sentence will be served consecutively to the state sentence.” Weekes, 301

F.3d at 1179. 

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The version of United States Sentencing Guideline § 5G1.3 in effect at the time

of Petitioner’s sentencing on his federal drug conspiracy conviction provided:

(a) If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was

serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or

escape status) or after sentencing for, but before commencing service

of, such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense

shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.

(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of

imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into

account in the determination of the offense level for the instant

offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run

concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.

(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for the instant

offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or

consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to

achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (2002).

Pursuant to § 5G1.3(b), the sentencing court has the authority to adjust a

defendant’s federal sentence by reducing it to account for time already served on a

preexisting sentence. Coloma, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8800 at 5; Ruggiano v. Reish,

307 F.3d 121, 128 (3rd Cir. 2002); Bailey v. Nash, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8954 at 4 (3rd

Cir. May 18, 2005). 

Whether a prisoner who committed a federal offense after November 1, 1987,

receives “credit” for time spent in custody is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585. Kendrick

v. Carlson, 995 F.2d 1440, 1444 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1993). Section 3585 provides:

Calculation of term of imprisonment

(a) Commencement of sentence. A sentence to a term of imprisonment

commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting

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transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence

at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.

(b) Credit for prior custody. A defendant shall be given credit toward the

service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official

detention prior to the date the sentence commences - -

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; 

or

 

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was

arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence

was imposed; 

that has not been credited against another sentence. 

Section 3585 does not authorize a district court to award “credit” at sentencing.

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-335 (1992). The issue of crediting is the

responsibility of the Attorney General, through the BOP. Id. at 335. 

There is absolutely no indication from the judgment or the transcript of the

sentencing hearing that the district court intended to run Petitioner’s federal sentence

concurrently with his state sentence. The term “concurrent” was not mentioned at the

hearing or in the judgment. Furthermore, Petitioner does not allege, and it is not readily

apparent from the record, that the requirements of § 5G1.3(b) were met, that is, “the

undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken

into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense.” There is

no evidence suggesting that the district court was applying § 5G1.3(b). Although the

district court stated that Petitioner should receive “credit for the time he has already

served from at least April 18, 2002,” and recommended in its judgment that Petitioner

received such credit, the Court finds that this was a non-binding recommendation to the

BOP to award credit for time served under §3585(b). See Bailey v. Nash, 2005 U.S.

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 Even if the district court had run Petitioner’s federal sentence concurrently with

his state sentence, Petitioner would not be entitled to the relief he requests. As held by

the Eleventh Circuit in its well-reasoned decision in Coloma v. Holder, the term

“concurrently,” as used in § 5G1.3(b), does not mean retroactive to the beginning of the

first sentence (in this case June 6, 2002). Coloma v. Holder, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS

8800 at 5-6 (finding that this interpretation keeps § 5G1.3(b) consistent with 18 U.S.C. §

3585, which states that service of the sentence commences when the defendant arrives

in prison). See also Button v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8670 at 2 (5th Cir.

2004) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that a concurrent sentence under § 5G1.3(b) is

retroactively concurrent with the full term of his undischarged sentence). Contra

Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d at 128 (concurrently, as used in § 5G1.3(b), “means fully

or retroactively currently, not simply concurrently with the remainder of the defendant’s

undischarged sentence”). Accordingly, “concurrently” certainly does not mean

retroactive to the date of arrest (in this case April 18, 2002). As previously noted, the

BOP already has given Petitioner credit for (1) the time between the date of his arrest

and the date he was sentenced by the state court (June 6, 2002), and (2) the time

between the date he was sentenced by the federal court (February 7, 2003), and the

date he was paroled from his state sentence and released to federal custody to serve

the remainder of his federal sentence (April 24, 2003). While the BOP apparently has

not given Petitioner’s credit for the time period between the date he was sentenced by

the state court and the date he was sentenced by the federal court, Petitioner has not

specifically requested this credit in his petition. Furthermore, to the extent the state

court has credited him with this time, he is not entitled to credit for this time on his

federal sentence. Under § 3585(b), a defendant cannot receive credit on his federal

sentence when he received credit toward his state sentence for the same time period.

United States v. Kramer, 12 F.3d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1059

(1994). See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 (1992) (in enacting 3585(b),

“Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his

detention time”). 

-8-

App. LEXIS 8954 at 5; Torres v. Brooks, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2220 at 3-4 (10th Cir.

Feb. 15, 2000). Absent some indication from the district court that Petitioner’s federal

sentence was to run concurrently with his state sentence, the BOP has no obligation

to (1) adjust Petitioner’s “sentence computation” to commence on April 18, 2002, “by

way of concurrent designation,” (2) allow him to serve his federal sentence

concurrently with his state sentence, or (3) “designate the Mississippi Department of

Corrections facility for service of his federal sentence nunc pro tunc to April 18, 2002.”1

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See Carroll v. Peterson, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16175 at 3 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 2004). To

the extent Petitioner is asking this Court to review the federal district court’s sentence,

including the court’s failure to run his federal sentence concurrently to his state

sentence, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not § 2241, provides the appropriate

remedy. Coloma, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8800 at 5 n. 5; Wilson v. Reese, 2004 U.S.

App. LEXIS 5071 at 2 (5th Cir. 2004).

THEREFORE, the Court dismisses Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of May, 2006.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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