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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Michael Jabaar Wilkins
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-3051 September Term, 2024 FILED ON: NOVEMBER 27, 2024 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

MICHAEL JABAAR WILKINS, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cr-00390-1) 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and GARCIA, Circuit Judges

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. 

R. 34(j). The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not 

warrant a published opinion. See D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated in the memorandum 

accompanying this judgment, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to 

withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for 

rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41. 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

BY: /s/

 Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk 

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M E M O R A N D U M

In July 2021, Michael Jabaar Wilkins pleaded guilty to one count of sex trafficking in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Before sentencing, Wilkins moved to withdraw his plea, arguing 

that he had a legally cognizable defense and that the plea was tainted by the ineffective assistance 

of counsel. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Wilkins to 240 months of 

imprisonment. On appeal, Wilkins contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to withdraw the plea. We disagree and accordingly affirm. 

I 

On December 9, 2020, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Michael 

Jabaar Wilkins, charging him with ten criminal counts related to the trafficking of three female 

victims—identified as J.J., O.R. and L.H.—between 2011 and 2019. The government alleged that 

Wilkins trafficked these women from Norfolk, Virginia, to the District of Columbia, where he 

coerced them into engaging in commercial sexual acts under violent and exploitative conditions. 

According to the government, Wilkins used threats and force to control the victims, subjecting 

them to frequent and severe physical violence. 

Wilkins’ trial was scheduled for April 2021 but, at Wilkins’ request, it was postponed to 

July 26, 2021. On July 13, 2021, Wilkins’ counsel, Joseph Caleb, moved to withdraw. According 

to Caleb, the attorney-client relationship had “broken down and [could not] be repaired” and 

Wilkins had “demanded” that Caleb withdraw from the case. The government opposed the motion, 

viewing it as a delay tactic. After an ex parte discussion with Wilkins and Caleb, the district court 

denied the motion. 

Days before the trial was to begin, the parties reached a plea agreement. On July 20, 2021, 

Wilkins agreed to plead guilty to one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1). In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the 

remaining nine counts of the indictment. The plea agreement also outlined an estimated sentencing 

guidelines range of 324 to 405 months of imprisonment. It noted that the government, in its sole 

discretion, could determine whether Wilkins provided “substantial assistance” to law enforcement, 

potentially permitting him to escape the 180-month mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by 

§ 1591(b)(1). Wilkins signed the agreement, acknowledging that he had read it, discussed it with 

Caleb, understood it and that he was “satisfied” with Caleb’s representation. 

At the July 21, 2021 plea hearing, during his colloquy with the district court, Wilkins 

confirmed under oath that he understood the terms of the plea agreement. He also confirmed that 

he had sufficient time to discuss the agreement with Caleb, although he initially expressed concern 

about the short time he had to consult with him about the case generally. Wilkins affirmed that he 

was satisfied with Caleb’s representation regarding the plea agreement and acknowledged that he 

had reviewed and understood the charges and potential penalties, including the minimum and 

maximum sentences. He also stated that no one had forced him to plead guilty, that he was doing 

so voluntarily and that he was not under the influence of any substance. Caleb also confirmed that 

he had no reservations about Wilkins’ competency to plead guilty and that he had sufficient time 

to investigate the law and facts of the case.

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During the hearing, the government provided a detailed proffer of the evidence that it would 

have presented at trial, including Wilkins’ use of violence to control J.J., O.R. and L.H., his role 

in transporting the victims across state lines and his involvement in creating online advertisements 

for prostitution. Wilkins admitted that he had engaged in the conduct described by the government, 

affirming that he did what the government said it could prove at trial. The district court accepted 

the guilty plea and scheduled sentencing for December 2, 2021.

On August 12, 2021, Caleb again moved to withdraw as counsel, citing “irreconcilable 

differences” and Wilkins’ renewed request for his withdrawal. The district court granted the

motion on August 31, 2021. Wilkins then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that Caleb’s 

assistance was ineffective. He alleged that Caleb had failed to adequately prepare for trial and had 

pressured him into accepting the plea agreement. Wilkins’ motion centered on two claims: (1) 

Caleb’s ineffective assistance rendered his plea involuntary, and (2) he had a viable statute-oflimitations defense that Caleb failed to assert. Specifically, Wilkins argued that the five-year 

statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) barred his prosecution because his last interaction 

with J.J. (the victim identified in Count 1) occurred in early 2015, more than five years before the 

December 2020 superseding indictment. The government opposed the motion.

On July 8, 2022, the district court denied Wilkins’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea without 

a hearing. It found that Wilkins’ plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, with no credible 

evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. It noted that, although Wilkins expressed 

dissatisfaction with his original counsel, Caleb had filed multiple pretrial motions, demonstrated 

reasonable diligence in preparing for trial and provided competent legal advice. Further, the court 

rejected Wilkins’ statute-of-limitations defense, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3299 applied—a 

provision which permits prosecution “at any time” for § 1591 offenses. The court also concluded 

that withdrawing the plea would unfairly prejudice the government by forcing the victims to 

endure the stress of preparing for trial a second time.

Several months later, the district court sentenced Wilkins to 240 months of imprisonment, 

followed by 10 years of supervised release. That sentence was below the plea agreement’s 

estimated guidelines range of 324 to 405 months but above the 180-month mandatory minimum.

II

We review for abuse of its discretion the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea. United States v. Leyva, 916 F.3d 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Wilkins’ appeal poses a single question for our review: whether the district court abused its 

discretion by denying Wilkins’ motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may withdraw a previously accepted guilty plea if “the defendant can 

show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” In deciding whether such a reason 

exists, a court analyzes three factors: “(1) whether the defendant has asserted a viable claim of 

innocence, (2) whether the delay between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has 

substantially prejudiced the Government’s ability to prosecute the case, and (3) whether the guilty 

plea was somehow tainted by a violation of Rule 11.” Leyva, 916 F.3d at 22 (quoting United States 

v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We consider 

each factor in turn.

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Viable claim of innocence

The first factor requires the defendant to offer a viable claim of innocence, which this court 

has sometimes characterized as requiring, at a minimum, a “legally cognizable defense” that 

effectively denies a defendant’s culpability. See id. at 24 (citing United States v. Curry, 494 F.3d 

1124, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Wilkins exclusively relies on a theory that offenses under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591 are governed by the five-year statute of limitations found in 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Appellant

Br. 9-10. He is mistaken. As the district court correctly held, that statute of limitations does not 

apply here because, under 18 U.S.C. § 3299, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, an indictment may 

be found or an information instituted at any time without limitation . . . for any felony under . . . 

section 1591” (emphasis added). See also United States v. Briggs, 592 U.S. 69, 77 (2020) (noting 

that § 3299 “permit[s] prosecution at any time” for other felonies enumerated in the statute).*

Wilkins does not claim actual innocence. Because Wilkins’ only defense rests on a faulty 

understanding of the law, this factor favored denying his motion.

Government prejudice

As to the second factor, Wilkins asserts with threadbare support that the government would 

not have been substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal of the plea. Appellant Br. 15-17. Wilkins

contends that because some circumstances that other courts have found amounted to substantial 

prejudice were not present here, there was no substantial prejudice. Id. at 16. That is plainly 

incorrect. The district court acted well within its discretion in finding that the government would 

be substantially prejudiced by the need to again prepare and gather victims and witnesses, 

particularly in view of the traumatic events they would have been expected to relive. App. 257-

58. This factor, then, also favored denying Wilkins’ motion.

Tainted plea

On the third and most important factor, Wilkins appears to argue that his guilty plea was 

tainted because the colloquy with the district court did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11 and because of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant Br. 11-14.

In reviewing the plea colloquy, we look at the entire record, see United States v. Lee, 888 F.3d 

503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and assess the voluntariness de novo, see Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 

U.S. 422, 431 (1983). Wilkins does not identify any specific error committed by the district court. 

Instead, he asserts that he misunderstood the terms of the plea agreement and was “regularly 

smoking synthetic marijuana, or K2 . . . including right before he left” to enter his guilty plea. 

Appellant Br. 14. He also asserts, apparently for the first time, that he was “worried about COVID” 

and thus “not in the right state of mind to plead” guilty. Id. Even crediting Wilkins’ assertions, 

each one is categorically refuted by his own sworn statements. App. 60 (affirming that he 

understood the plea agreement); id. 43-44 (denying that he was under the influence of any narcotic 

drugs); id. (denying that he was sick in any way such that he would be unable to understand the 

proceedings). See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (“[T]he representations of the 

* Wilkins points to an unpublished out-of-circuit district court decision finding that the § 3282 five-year 

limitations period applies to offenses under § 1591. See United States v. Pittman, No. 13-cr-4510, 2015 WL 4772731, 

at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Brown, 800 F. App’x 455 (9th Cir. 2020). As the 

district court noted, whether § 3299 should have applied in that case was not litigated either at the trial level or on 

appeal. App. 255-56 & n.6. At any rate, we are not bound by that decision.

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defendant . . . [at the plea hearing] . . . constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 

proceeding. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); United 

States v. Jones, 642 F.3d 1151, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (A “motion that can succeed only if the 

defendant committed perjury at the plea proceedings may be rejected out of hand unless the 

defendant has a compelling explanation for the contradiction.” (quoting United States v. Shah, 453 

F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The record establishes that the district court’s colloquy was errorfree.

The crux of Wilkins’ appeal is his contention that the guilty plea was tainted by the ineffective 

assistance of Caleb, his original counsel. Whether alleged ineffective assistance of counsel tainted 

a guilty plea is evaluated under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). That test requires Wilkins to show that (1) Caleb’s 

performance was deficient; and (2) but for Caleb’s deficiency, Wilkins would have proceeded to 

trial. See Curry, 494 F.3d at 1129, 1131.

Wilkins does not come close to meeting his burden on either prong of the standard. The 

district court reasonably considered and rejected each of Wilkins’ alleged instances of 

ineffectiveness. App. 248-51. Each is also controverted by Wilkins’ own statements at the changeof-plea hearing, during which he affirmed that he was satisfied with Caleb’s representation. Id. 

Wilkins was ultimately dissatisfied with Caleb’s performance because Caleb urged him to plead 

guilty based on the enormity of the evidence against him. See Appellant Br. 12. But giving that 

advice in these circumstances does not approach the level of constitutionally deficient 

performance. See Curry, 494 F.3d at 1130 (no deficient performance after counsel told the 

defendant his case was “hopeless” and advised him to plead guilty).

In addition, Wilkins cannot establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s [purported] errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 

to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The evidence against Wilkins was overwhelming, he gained a 

substantial benefit by pleading guilty—the dismissal of nine counts—and the penalties he would 

have faced had he been convicted at trial might have been considerably more severe than the 

twenty years of imprisonment to which he was eventually sentenced. See Appellee Br. 30-32. 

Indeed, Wilkins does not expressly assert that he would have proceeded to trial absent Caleb’s 

purportedly deficient representation.

Because Wilkins’ guilty plea was tainted neither by Rule 11 error nor ineffective assistance 

of counsel, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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