Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01176/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01176-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kane
Respondent
Juan Villa
Petitioner

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 As Respondent sets forth in his motion to dismiss, Petitioner was paroled to Region I on September 19, 1

2005, and was subsequently deported to Mexico on September 21, 2005. (Lodged Doc. 1.) Thus, as Petitioner was

deported, he is no longer under the day-to-day control of the named Respondent, Anthony Kane, nor any other law

enforcement officials. 

 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN VILLA,

Petitioner,

v.

KANE, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-1176 REC DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 14, 2001, Petitioner was convicted in the Tulare County Superior Court, of

assault (Ca. Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1)), with great bodily injury (Pen. Code § 12022.7, subd. 2

(a)). Petitioner received a determinate state prison term of five years. (Lodged Doc. 2.) 

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction.

Petitioner did, however, file four state post-conviction collateral challenges to his

conviction, the first three of which were petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The first petition

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was filed in the Tulare County Superior Court, case number VHC120840 on July 21, 2004, and

was denied on July 23, 2004. (Lodged Docs. 3-4.) The second petition was filed in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District case number F046513 on October 15, 2004,

and was denied on March 10, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The third petition was filed in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District case number F046844 on December 3, 2004,

and was denied on March 10, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 7-8.) The fourth petition, a petition for

review in case number F046844, was filed in the California Supreme Court case number

S132296 on March 18, 2005, and was denied on June 8, 2005. (Lodged Docs. 9-10.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that "an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground." The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

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provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on November 14, 2001. Pursuant to Rule

31(a) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty (60) days in which to file a notice of

appeal. Cal.R.Ct. 31(a); People v. Mendez, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d, 301, 19 Cal.4th 1084, 969 P.2d 146

(1999). Because Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal his direct review concluded on January

13, 2002, sixty (60) days after the time for filing an appeal expired. Thus, Petitioner had one

year from January 13, 2002, in which to file his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See

Kelly, 127 F.3d at 784; see also Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) th

(holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the calculation of

statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations period.) Therefore, the statute was set to

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 As Respondent correctly states, the petition was initially filed in the United States District Court, Central 3

District of California on August 15, 2005; however, the petition was subsequently transferred and filed with this

Court on September 14, 2005. 

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expire on January 13, 2003. Petitioner did not file the instant petition until August 15, 2005.3

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas

petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final challenge, Nino

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), so long as the subsequent filings occurred within th

a reasonable time. Evans v. Chavis, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 846, 853-54 (2006); Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214 (2002). The limitations period, however, will not toll for the time a petition for

writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

In order for a state post-conviction collateral action to provide for tolling, it needed to

have been filed within the one-year pendency of the statute of limitations. Here, the earliest of

the applications, which contained no proof of service, but was dated July 16, 2004, was not filed

until July 21, 2004, over one year after the statute of limitations expired. (Lodged Doc. 3.) 

Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral challenge had no tolling

consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to

tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256

(11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Accordingly, the first

petition, as well as the second through fourth petitions, do not serve to toll the statute of

limitations and, consequently, the statute of limitations expired, as indicated above, on January

13, 2003. 

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D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60

(1997); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most

cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time”). “When external forces, rather

than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

In this case, Petitioner did not oppose the motion and thus, raises no assertion of

entitlement to equitable tolling. Accordingly, as the instant federal petition was filed after the

statute of limitations expired, it must be dismissed. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be GRANTED, and the instant petition be DISMISSED, and the Clerk of Court

be DIRECTED to enter judgment in the case. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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"Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations." Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 20, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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