Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50355/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50355-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rogelio Lemus
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROGELIO LEMUS, AKA Sky,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50355

D.C. No. 

2:13-cr-00825-BRO-1

ORDER AND

AMENDED OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 2, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed March 2, 2016

Amended June 28, 2016

Before: STEPHEN R. REINHARDT, RICHARD A.

PAEZ, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 1 of 17
2 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel replaced an opinion filed March 2, 2016, with

an amended opinion affirming in part, vacating in part and

remanding for resentencing in a case in which the defendant

was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more

than 50 grams of methamphetamine; and otherwise denied a

petition for panel rehearing and, on behalf of the court, a

petition for rehearing en banc.

In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed in part,

vacated in part, and reversed in part, and remanded for

resentencing. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, the panel held that a rational

trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent to sell

it, but that no reasonable factfinder could have determined

beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed more than 50

grams of methamphetamine. The panel wrote that it would

be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate from

comparison drugs that were not from activity related to the

defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is involved. 

The panel explained that a 90% level of purity would more

than suffice to support the jury’s quantity determination, if

adequately connected to the drugs concerning which the

defendant had constructive possession, but that the

government failed to include evidence connecting that purity

level to the defendant. The panel remanded for resentencing

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 2 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 3

pursuant to the statutory range set forth in 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(C).

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in deciding not to declare a mistrial due to an FBI

agent mentioning the name of the defendant’s gang, where

the district court immediately sustained the defendant’s

objection and ordered the jury to disregard it, carefully

examined a juror to ensure that she could disregard the

information, and gave a closing instruction limiting the jury’s

use of the gang information.

COUNSEL

Michael Tanaka (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender,

Hillary Potashner, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Stephen G. Wolfe (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Sheila Nagaraj, Assistant United States Attorney, Lawrence

S. Middleton, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,

Criminal Division, Eileen M. Decker, United States Attorney,

Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 3 of 17
4 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

ORDER

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. 

The Opinion filed on March 2, 2016 is replaced with the

concurrently filed amended opinion. 

The petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc are

otherwise DENIED. No further petitions for rehearingwill be

accepted.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Rogelio Lemus appeals his conviction for

possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of

methamphetamine. Because we conclude that insufficient

evidence supported the jury’s quantity determination, we

reverse in part and remand for resentencing pursuant to the

statutory range set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In early May of 2011, FBI informant Ana Montano was

dispatched to a bar to meet with Defendant Rogelio Lemus.

Lemus, seeing Montano’s gang tattoo, volunteered that he

was a member of the same gang, and asked Montano if she

knew the clique to which he belonged. Montano told him that

she was looking for somebody who could supply ounce-

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 4 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 5

quantities of methamphetamine. Lemus responded that he had

a pound for sale.

On May 16, 2011, Montano made a recorded call to

Lemus. She stated that she wanted to buy two ounces. Lemus

responded: “Just two? . . . I’m going to tell the guy,

because, well, you know, the bags have to be torn up, you

understand?” On May 18, 2011, Montano and Lemus

arranged to meet to carry out the sale and agreed to a price for

the two ounces, but Lemus was delayed by the absence of his

associate. When he finally arrived, Lemus, consistent with his

initial offer of a pound and his earlier hesitancy to “tear up”

the bags, but contrary to his agreement earlier that day to sell

a smaller quantity, stated that he was unable to sell the

methamphetamine in ounce quantities because they only sold

it by the pound. Lemus offered to give Montano a sample, but

Montano demurred, saying that her buyer would not trust that

the sample was the same quality as the pound.

After the meeting, FBI agents followed Lemus to his

house, and were able to identify him from the motor vehicle

records for his truck. The agents did not conduct a traffic

stop, and did not obtain a search warrant to search for drugs.

No drugs were seen or observed on the date of the meeting,

and Montano did not believe that Lemus had the pound of

methamphetamine in his truck during the meeting, although

she believed that he had it that day.

At his post-arrest interview, Lemus denied involvement

in drug trafficking, and claimed that he often joked on the

phone about drugs. At trial, the government did not produce

the drugs or present any testimony that someone saw Lemus

in possession of a substance that appeared to be

methamphetamine.

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 5 of 17
6 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence,

we ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158,

1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Under this two-step inquiry, we

therefore first consider the evidence presented at trial in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, and second,

determine whether the evidence so viewed is adequate to

allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1164.

B. The Elements of the Offense

Lemus was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

which prohibits, inter alia, possession of a controlled

substance with intent to distribute. The jury found that he

possessed at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, subjecting

him to the penalty specified in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).

To violate this statute, actual possession is not required:

constructive possession also suffices. “The term‘constructive

possession’ does not connote a legal fiction. Rather, the term

simply reflects the common sense notion that an individual

maypossess a controlled substance even though the substance

is not on his person at the time of arrest.” United States v.

Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 6 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 7

Constructive possession means “the exercise of‘dominion

and control,’” and “may be demonstrated by direct or

circumstantial evidence that the defendant had the power to

dispose of the drug.” Id. (citing United States v. Amaro,

422 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1970); Arellanes v. United

States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1962)). 

[O]ne having a working relationship or a

sufficient association with those having

physical custody of the drugs so as to enable

him to assure their production, without

difficulty, to a customer as a matter of course

may be held to have constructive possession.

But a casual facilitator of a sale, who knows a

given principal possesses and trades in

narcotics but who lacks the working

relationship with that principal that enables an

assurance of delivery, may not be held to have

dominion and control over the drug delivered

and cannot be said to have possession of it.

Hill v. United States, 379 F.2d 811, 814 (1967) (quoting

United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 30–31 (2d Cir. 1962)). 

“Constructive possession may also be proven by the

defendant’s participation in a ‘joint venture’ to possess a

controlled substance.” Disla, 805 F.2d at 1350 (citing United

States v. Valentin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1978)).

“[C]oordinated activity among the defendants raises a

reasonable inference of a joint venture.” United States v.

Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 930 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United

States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1989)

(alteration in original)). “In addition to association, the

government must also establish that the defendant had a role

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 7 of 17
8 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

in directing or planning the acquisition or transportation of

the drugs.” Id.

C. Reliance on Lemus’s Statements

Lemus argues that without corroboration, his own

inculpatory statements made during the offense cannot

support a conviction. Lemus relies upon United States v.

Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d 906, 922 (9th Cir. 2014). However,

Valdez-Novoa involved a defendant’s confession, not

contemporaneous statements. Id. And, Valdez-Novoa framed

the rule as directed to confessions: “the contemporary

iteration of the common law corpus delicti rule” is that

“[a]lthough the government may rely on a defendant’s

confession to meet its burden of proof . . . in order to serve as

the basis for conviction, the government must also adduce

some independent corroborating evidence.” Id. 

Lemus relies on out-of-circuit authority to argue that we

should extend the corroboration requirement from statements

made during a confession to those made during the

commission of the crime, citing among others United States

v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1999) and United States

v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095-97 (10th Cir. 1989). We need not

address this contention, however, because the conviction here

does not rest solely on a bald statement by Lemus that he had

methamphetamine to sell. He also took steps consistent with

that statement, including agreeing on price, arranging a sale

date, collaborating with his associate, and, especially,

offering a sample. These actions would sufficiently

corroborate Lemus’ initial incriminatory statements, even if

we were to extend the rule. 

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 8 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 9

D. The Sufficiency of the Statements to Support the 

Conviction

The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the

conviction under a constructive possession theory because a

reasonable jury could have concluded that Lemus (1) had “a

working relationship or a sufficient association with those

having physical custody of the drugs so as to enable him to

assure their production, without difficulty, to a customer as a

matter of course,” Hill, 379 F.2d at 814, or (2) that he

engaged in a joint venture, with a “role in directing or

planning the acquisition or transportation of the drugs.”

Smith, 962 F.2d at 930. 

At the first meeting between Lemus and Montano at the

bar, Lemus said that he had one pound of “crystal”

(methamphetamine) that he was willing to sell. On the day of

the intended sale, Montano and Lemus arranged to meet, and

Lemus instructed Montano that the price would be $1,100 for

each ounce. Lemus had to delay the meeting because his

associate, someone who has never been identified, was not

yet in the area. 

In a phone call explaining why it was taking so long to

arrive, Lemus told Montano that the methamphetamine was

“in a city nearby.” When he finally arrived, he instructed

Montano to come down, but without the money, because “we

are going to explain something here.” Montano asked: “Do

you have it or don’t you?” Lemus responded that “[t]here was

a misunderstanding, I will explain it to you.”

When Montano reached the car, Lemus stated that he

could only sell by the pound, not by the ounce, but that

Lemus had a sample to give Montano if she wanted. Lemus

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 9 of 17
10 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

instructed Montano to tell her buyer that he dealt in “a pound

and up,” that Lemus had “a picture” he could show and that

he would bring a “sample” of “what I have in pounds” that

Montano could assess for quality. Montano declined the

sample, explaining that her buyer did not want a sample

because of the concern that the pound would not be of the

same quality. The meeting then ended.

After his arrest, Lemus told the interviewing FBI agent

that remarks he made over the phone about drugs were jokes.

Given the content and context of the recorded calls

introduced as evidence, a reasonable jury would have no

difficulty rejecting that explanation. These were not offhand,

playful remarks made and received in jest. Instead, they

appear to be a continuous and serious attempt to arrange a

drug transaction.

Lemus had constructive possession via “the power to

dispose of” a pound of methamphetamine, Disla, 805 F.2d at

1350, although due to the policies of his distribution

structure, he lacked the power to dispose of the drug in

smaller, ounce-sized quantities. While this limitation shows

that Lemus lacked unfettered discretion to dispose of the

drugs, that is consistent with his participation in a joint

venture in which he lacked sole decision-making authority,

but in which he played a role directing the transportation of

the drugs. “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution,” Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164, a rational trier

of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Lemus possessed methamphetamine with intent to sell it.

However, Lemus was convicted of possessing more than 50

grams of methamphetamine, which affects the applicable

penalty. We turn now to an assessment of the evidence

introduced concerning that quantity determination. 

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 10 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 11

E. The 50 Gram Quantity

Lemus argues that the quantity finding is unsupported by

the evidence because there was no drug seized that could be

tested for purity to determine whether it contained at least 50

grams of methamphetamine. To prove that the unobserved

pound of substance at issue contained at least 50 grams of

methamphetamine, the government offered an FBI agent’s

testimony concerning the range of purity of

methamphetamine previously purchased by the FBI. The

agent testified that only four of the approximately 30

controlled purchases made in the Los Angeles area by the FBI

from 2008 to 2014 were of below 90% purity.

A pound contains approximately 453 grams. Thus, for

there to be 50 grams of methamphetamine in a pound of

material, it would need to be slightly over 11% pure. We have

previously upheld convictions requiring proof of at least 50

grams of methamphetamine in the absence of the drugs

themselves, and hence, in the absence of purity testing, where

the jury could infer that the methamphetamine was at least as

pure as some actual methamphetamine that could be used

for comparison. Thus, United States v. Maciel upheld a

conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

50 grams or more of methamphetamine in the absence of the

actual drugs. 461 Fed. App’x 610, 615–16 (9th Cir. 2011).1

The defendant in Maciel offered to supply a pound, and the

lowest purity of methamphetamine that had been seized from

the stash house involved in the conspiracy was 12%, a pound

of which would exceed 50 grams. Id. This case differs

significantly from Maciel, however, because the drugs used

1 The parties discussed Maciel, an unpublished disposition. We consider

it for its persuasive value only.

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 11 of 17
12 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

for comparison here were not connected to Lemus, but

instead were from other purchases in the Los Angeles area.

We find analogous authority in the sentencing context,

where courts are often called upon to estimate drug quantities.

The standards applicable to such estimates are not identical

to those applicable to jury findings; they are in some ways

more flexible, and in other ways, more restrictive. For

purposes of sentencing, quantity need only be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence, but “the information which

supports an approximation must possess sufficient indicia of

reliability to support its probable accuracy,” and the district

court must err on the side of underestimating the quantity.

United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th

Cir. 2002)).

In Kilby, the district court based its approximation on

tablets of “Foxy” “seized in two unrelated cases from

different parts of the country,” with no evidence of a common

supplier or evidence that Foxy tablets are always the same

approximate size, and where the two samples had quite

different weights. Id. at 1142. While noting that we have

repeatedly approved approximations “based on facts specific

to the defendant’s case,” Kilby held that the district court’s

approximation was insufficiently reliable. Id. at 1141–42. By

contrast, United States v. Flores, 725 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.

2013) approved an estimate employing an average pill size

consistent with those typically sold by the conspiracy at issue

and by the defendant. Id. at 1035–37.

This case is similar to Kilby in that the comparison

methamphetamine came from cases that were not tied to

Lemus, but different in that the comparison

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 12 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 13

methamphetamine came from Los Angeles, not elsewhere in

the country. Unlike in Flores, here, there was no evidence of

actual drug quantity from other arms of a conspiracy, and

indeed, Lemus was not charged with conspiracy. 

These sentencing determination cases are instructive in a

general sense, but this case involves a factual determination

reached by the jury. In that sense, Maciel, although nonprecedential, remains the closest case, and again, unlike here,

the comparison drugs in Maciel were from the conspiracy at

issue. 

It would be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate

from comparison drugs that were not from activity related to

the defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is

involved. A 90% level of purity would more than suffice to

support the jury’s quantity determination, if adequately

connected to the drugs concerning which Lemus had

constructive possession. However, the government failed to

include evidence connecting that purity level to Lemus.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, no reasonable factfinder could have determined

beyond a reasonable doubt that Lemus possessed more than

50 grams of methamphetamine.

Because the drug quantity finding fails based on

insufficient evidence, the government may not retry that

issue, and instead must seek resentencing based solely on the

basic possession conviction, i.e., pursuant to the statutory

range set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). “The Double

Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of

affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply

evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.”

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978);see also United

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 13 of 17
14 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding

that retrial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause where

reversal based on trial error, distinguishing reversal for

insufficient evidence). 

II. The District Court’s Decision Not to Declare a

Mistrial

A. Legal Standard

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a

mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dorsey,

677 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2012). A cautionary instruction

from the judge is generally sufficient to cure any prejudice

from the introduction of inadmissible evidence, and “is the

preferred alternative to declaring mistrial when a witness

makes inappropriate or prejudicial remarks; mistrial is

appropriate only where there has been so much prejudice that

an instruction is unlikely to cure it.” United States v.

Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1980). A

decision to not declare a mistrial will be reversed only if the

improper comment, viewed in the context of the entire trial,

more likely than not materially affected the verdict. Dorsey,

677 F.3d at 954. 

B. The Remark and the District Court’s Response

Before trial, Lemus moved to exclude any evidence of his

membership in MS-13 or any other gang. The district court

granted the motion in part, ruling that while evidence of gang

membership would be somewhat prejudicial, the prejudice

did not outweigh the evidence’s probative value, specifically,

as to why “the two parties engaged in a drug transaction, not

knowing each other very well at all.” However, the court

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 14 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 15

excluded the name of Lemus’s claimed gang as irrelevant.

The district court made clear that because “gang membership

is incredibly prejudicial,” its use at trial would be limited to

a particular purpose, and that trial would not be opened up to

examine the acts of the MS-13 gang.

Despite that ruling, and despite the prosecutor asking

“[w]ithout telling us the name of the gang, for how long had

the informant been a member of the gang before she began

cooperating with the FBI?”, the agent responded “Um, I don’t

know the exact number of years, but, um, the informant

became a member of MS-13 –,” whereupon the defense

immediately objected. The court sustained the objection,

instructed the jury to disregard the answer, and directed the

prosecutor to ask another question. At the break, the defense

moved for a mistrial, arguing that a curative instruction

would only highlight the issue.

The government argued that the testimony was “an

altogether unfortunate habitual reference . . . by someone who

makes the reference day in and day out in his work and

slipped into it when made.” The government opposed a

mistrial, but acknowledged that granting one was within the

court’s discretion, and that the court was in a position to

assess what remedy was required. The court ruled that its

immediate instruction to disregard the testimony, and the

instruction it would provide after closing arguments

concerning the limited relevance of the gang evidence, were

sufficient to cure any prejudice.2

2 That instruction was: “You have heard evidence that the defendant

was a member of a gang. I instruct you that this evidence is admitted only

for the limited purpose of . . . providing context for the relationship

between the Government’s confidential informant and the defendant and,

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 15 of 17
16 UNITED STATES V. LEMUS

Later, one juror informed the court clerk that while she

understood the court’s instruction to disregard the testimony,

she started thinking about it, and believed that she had read

about the case, and knew “all about it.” Counsel discussed

with the court that there may have been press about the

takedown that occurred in this case, and the defense stated

that one of the articles referred to Lemus with his gang

moniker. The court questioned the juror outside of the

presence of the other jurors, and the juror reported that she

had seen reports covering the sting operation which discussed

the global nature of this gang and “the sort of violence”

attached to it.

The juror confirmed that she would be able to follow the

court’s previous instruction to disregard information about

the particular gang, and would be able to follow the

forthcoming limiting instruction. The juror confirmed that she

did not think that the press reports were relevant to anything,

but felt compelled to inform the court that she remembered

them. The juror stated that the press reports would not affect

her view of the case at all, and that she would disregard them

and base her verdict only on the law and the court’s

instructions. Based on that discussion, the court was satisfied

that the juror would disregard anything she had read about the

gang.

“When the court strikes testimony and gives . . . an

instruction [to disregard it], there is a strong presumption that

the jury has followed the court’s instruction.” United States

v. Pavon, 561 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1977). “The trial court

is in the best position to determine whether an incident merits

therefore, you must consider it only for that limited purpose and not for

any other purpose.”

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 16 of 17
UNITED STATES V. LEMUS 17

a mistrial.” United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 777 (9th

Cir. 1980). That is because “the district court had the

opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and to weigh their

testimony. It was in a far better position than we to judge the

effects of the incidents.” United States v. Love, 535 F.2d

1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1976).

Here, the district court was well aware of the prejudicial

impact that disclosure of the particular gang could have, and

previously determined that the risk of prejudice outweighed

any probative value of that information. When the FBI agent

nonetheless mentioned the name of the gang, the district court

immediately sustained the objection and ordered the jury to

disregard it. When one juror reported that she had read

something about the gang in question, the district court

carefully examined the juror to ensure that she could

disregard that information in reaching a verdict. Finally, the

court gave a closing instruction limiting the jury’s use of the

gang information solely to understand the relationship

between Lemus and Montano. 

Having observed the jury and all of the testimony, and

having given considered thought to this issue in light of the

entire proceeding, the district court determined that a mistrial

was not necessary. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in so determining.

CONCLUSION

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED. We VACATE the 50 gram finding and the

sentence, which was entered pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). We REMAND for resentencing for

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) only.

 Case: 14-50355, 06/28/2016, ID: 10031319, DktEntry: 59, Page 17 of 17