Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01496/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01496-16/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R. Baker
Defendant
Nguyen
Defendant
Thon Ngot Sang
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THON NGOT SANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. BAKER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01496-AWI-YNP PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN 30 DAYS

(Doc. 50)

Plaintiff Thon Ngot Sang (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was in the custody of the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility

and State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSATF-CSP”) at the time of the events described in his

complaint. Plaintiff is suing under section 1983 for the violation of his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff names R. E. Baker (chief dental officer), A.K. Scribner (warden), T.P. Wan

(associate warden), P. McGuinnes (chief medical officer), G. Martinez (correctional health

administrator II), Dr. Nguyen (physician), Dela Rosa (registered nurse), Tanner (registered nurse),

James A. S. (registered nurse), and multiple Doe’s as defendants. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims upon

which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint will be

dismissed with leave to file a third amended complaint within 30 days.

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I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Background

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on October 5, 2006. (Doc. #1.) The Court

found that Plaintiff’s original complaint stated a cognizable claim against R. Baker. The Court

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ordered the U.S. Marshal to serve Baker with a copy of Plaintiff’s complaint on May 14, 2008. 

(Doc. #18.) Baker submitted a waiver of service on July 11, 2008. (Doc. #31.)

On June 30, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint. 

(Doc. #26.) On August 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed another motion requesting to amend his complaint. 

(Doc. #36.) Plaintiff’s motion was granted on September 3, 2008. (Doc. #40.) Plaintiff filed his

first amended complaint on September 29, 2008. (Doc. #41.) On January 26, 2009, Plaintiff filed

another motion to amend his complaint. (Doc. #44.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion on May

1, 2009. (Doc. #49.) Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on June 4, 2009. (Doc. #50.) 

This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care. On

January 7, 2006, Plaintiff was attacked by two other inmates in the prison yard. Officers responded

to the incident, and Plaintiff was struck with an officer’s baton in the lower jaw.

Only two medical personnel (MTA Jane Doe and Defendant James A. S.) were available

because the incident occurred late Saturday afternoon. Defendant Tanner stated that he would send

an order for Motrin. However, Plaintiff never received any pain medication. Plaintiff was only

given an ice pack and gauze for the bleeding. Plaintiff also claims he as given “a liquid placebo

solution” that did nothing to alleviate the pain.

Plaintiff was unable to eat dinner that night as a result of the pain. Plaintiff felt a sharp pain

on the right side of his jaw. Plaintiff reached in his mouth and pulled out a “broken piece of molar.” 

Plaintiff requested pain medication and complained that he was unable to eat but his requests for

treatment were denied.

Plaintiff claims that “review of recorded phone statements” revealed that Defendant Dela

Rosa contacted a doctor, Defendant Nguyen, and scheduled Plaintiff to be seen in the morning. 

Plaintiff complains that he should have been given immediate emergency treatment.

Some time later, Plaintiff was escorted from his cell and placed in administrative segregation.

Plaintiff was not seen bymedical personnel or given treatment for the next two days, despite making

numerous pleas for attention. Plaintiff was taken to the Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”) on

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Tuesday, three days after the incident. Plaintiff was seen by Defendant R. E. Baker, chief oral

surgeon. Baker ordered x-rays and noted a “greenstick fracture to the right upper mid mandible jaw

area, chipped upper right rear molar, and wide visible splitting gap between the lower left teeth area

which included also frontal and back gum lacerations slanting vertically downwards.” Plaintiff was

told that his injuries were not sufficiently serious to warrant prescribing treatment and medication

and that Plaintiff would be referred to the prison yard’s dentist for repair. When Plaintiff complained

about being unable to eat, Baker said “you’ll eat when hungry enough.”

On January 11, 2006, Plaintiff was seen by a committee consisting of numerous prison

officials, none of which are named as defendants. Plaintiff complained about the lack of care and

his desperate need for medical treatment, but the committee ignored Plaintiff’s complaints.

Plaintiff did not receive his scheduled appointment with the prison yard’s dentist until

January 18, 2006, eight days after being scheduled by Defendant Baker. During the appointment,

Plaintiff received more x-rays. Plaintiff was told that an extraction for his upper right rear chipped

molar was not possible until Plaintiff could open his jaw wide enough without pain. Plaintiff was

given ibuprofen and a referral back to Defendant Baker.

On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff was brought to Defendant Nguyen in response to Plaintiff’s

complaints about not being able to eat. The pain had gotten much worse in the past few days,

making it difficult for Plaintiff to talk. Plaintiff’s garbled speech was deciphered by a correctional

officer. Nguyen asked why Plaintiff had not been treated yet, and Plaintiff reported that Baker did

not believe that the pain and injury was serious enough. Nguyen examined Plaintiff and prescribed

more pain medication and a liquid diet. Plaintiff was given another referral back to Defendant

Baker. However, Plaintiff was never given a liquid diet despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests to

unidentified administrative segregation officials.

On January 25, 2006, Plaintiff was escorted to see Defendant Baker. Plaintiff complains that

he was treated with “contempt and disregard.” Plaintiff requested for more thorough treatment but

Baker responded by asking Plaintiff whether he had ever studied medicine or possessed any type of

degree. Plaintiff said that he did not and Baker told Plaintiff to “go back to your cell and write a

book on it.” Plaintiff complained about not receiving a liquid diet, and Baker placed a call for the

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order, but Plaintiff still did not receive a liquid diet. Plaintiff was told later by a MTA or RN that

liquid diets are only served within the infirmary. Plaintiff claims that her statements “thus made it

clear that why one particular MTA nurse whom did chance the risk once to provide Plaintiff with

a single serving was likely reprimanded and thus never attempted to do so again.”

Plaintiff claims that the physicians and doctors prescribed a liquid diet for Plaintiff, but when

the liquid food arrived, it was “undoubtedly being interferred[sic] and purposefully denied by

[CSATF-CSP’s] medical staff members.” Plaintiff claims that Defendants A.K. Scribner, T.P. Wan,

P. McGuinnes, and G. Martinez implemented the policy of not allowing liquid diets to be distributed

to prisoners outside the infirmary.

On February 6, 2006, Plaintiff was escorted to see Defendant Baker. Baker was not there that

day and another woman took x-rays of Plaintiff’s jaw. The woman told Plaintiff that she was not

authorized to evaluate the x-rays and that the x-rays would be given to the regular dental care

providers for evaluation. On February 8, 2006, Plaintiff was taken to the dental care center. Doctor

Fishback told Plaintiff “that they ‘don’t fix jaws only teeth . . .’” Plaintiff was also told that it was

the chief oral surgeon’s responsibility to provide such treatment.

Plaintiff claims that he never received treatment for his jaw injuries while at CSATF-CSP. 

On February 22, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison. Shortly after the

transfer, Plaintiff was seen for a dental examination. Plaintiff was told that “because the jaw had

began to heal without treatment . . . dental staff[] determined that they could do nothing about the

injury.” Plaintiff claims that because he did not receive treatment, his “jaw has healed wrong” and

he “continues to suffer in pain and discomfort.” Plaintiff claims that “due also to sustained infection,

an abstraction was performed on April 21, 2008 to one of the teeth belonging to lower[sic] left

injured jaw area.”

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standards for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs in

Violation of the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff claims that Defendants actedwith deliberate indifference toward his serious medical

needs, violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the

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imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of

dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)

(quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the objective requirement that the deprivation

is “sufficientlyserious”, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quotingWilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991), and (2) the subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind”, Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). The objective requirement that the

deprivation be “sufficiently serious” is met where the prison official’s act or omission results in the

denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”. Id. (quotingRhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind” is met where the prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate

health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate

indifference when he/she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”. 

Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action

under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on

deficient medical treatment, a plaintiff must show: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) a deliberately

indifferent response by the defendant. Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). A serious medical need is shown by

alleging that the failure to treat the plaintiff’s condition could result in further significant injury, or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. A deliberately indifferent response by the

defendant is shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical

need and harm caused by the indifference. Id. In order to constitute deliberate indifference, there

must be an objective risk of harm and the defendant must have subjective awareness of that harm. 

Id. However, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. 

Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

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prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Isolated occurrences of neglect do not

constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920

F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Claims Against Defendant R. E. Baker

Plaintiff claims that Defendant R. E. Baker exhibited deliberate indifference toward

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Baker was the chief dental officer and oral surgeon at CSATFCSP. Plaintiff was seen by Baker on two separate occasions. Three days after suffering the injury

to his jaw, Baker, x-rayed Plaintiff’s jaw, diagnosed Plaintiff’s injury, and told Plaintiff that the

injury was not serious enough to warrant any further treatment or medication beyond being referred

to the prison yard dentist for repair. Baker dismissed Plaintiff’s complaints about being unable to

eat by telling Plaintiff that Plaintiff would eat when he was hungry enough. Plaintiff saw Baker

again a few weeks later. Baker denied Plaintiff’s request for more thorough treatment and treated

Plaintiff with “contempt and disregard.” Baker ordered a liquid diet for Plaintiff after Plaintiff

complained about being unable to eat for the second time.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Baker. Plaintiff’s conclusion that Baker

acted with deliberate indifference is not supported by the facts alleged. Plaintiff fails to specifically

identify how the treatment provided by Baker was deficient. Baker examined Plaintiff and

concluded that Plaintiff did not require any further treatment. Plaintiff disagreed with Baker’s

assessment but fails to specify what further treatment he should have received. Plaintiff’s blank

conclusion that he should have received some unidentified treatment or surgery that would have

minimized the pain and effects of his jaw injury is not sufficient to support a cognizable claim. In

order state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege that Baker purposefully

withheld some form of treatment from Plaintiff with deliberate disregard to a serious risk of further

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Baker did not act with deliberate

indifference if the failure to provide treatment resulted from a negligent mis-diagnosis, or from being

unaware that a more effective treatment was available. Even if Baker’s diagnosis was erroneous,

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Plaintiff fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that Baker deliberately made an erroneous

diagnoses for the purpose of causing Plaintiff further pain or injury. 

Finally, the facts alleged by Plaintiff demonstrate that Baker was not responsible for the fact

that Plaintiff did not receive a liquid diet. During Plaintiff’s first visit, Baker concluded that Plaintiff

did not need a liquid diet. Baker’s conclusion, even if erroneous, does not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference. During Plaintiff’s second visit, Baker ordered a liquid diet for Plaintiff. 

Although Plaintiff never received the liquid diet, Plaintiff does not allege that it was not by any fault

of Baker. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendant Baker.

C. Claims Against Defendants A.K. Scribner, T.P. Wan, P. McGuinnes, and G.

Martinez

Plaintiff claims that Defendants A.K. Scribner, T.P. Wan, P. McGuinnes, and G. Martinez

violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment by implementing a policy that prevented

inmates outside of the infirmaryfrom receiving liquid diets. Supervisory personnel are generally not

liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior

and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him

and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d

858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory

liability, plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants

either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendants Scribner, Wan, McGuinnes,

or Martinez. Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendants liable for implementing a policy so deficient that

the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and was the moving force of the

constitutional violation. Plaintiff offers no facts that support the conclusion that the policy of only

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providing liquid diets to inmates in the infirmary was “so deficient that the policy itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights.” Nor could it be said that the policy was “the moving force of

the constitutional violation.” There is nothing obviously malicious or reprehensible about a prison

policy that provides that liquid diets are only provided for inmates in the infirmary. Plaintiff alleges

no facts that suggest that Scribner, Wan, McGuinnes, or Martinez implemented the policy with

actual awareness of and deliberate indifference toward the risk that it would result in Plaintiff being

unable to receive a liquid diet and suffer pain and weakness from malnutrition. Plaintiff fails to state

any cognizable claims against Defendants Scribner, Wan, McGuinnes, or Martinez.

D. Claims Against Defendant Dr. Nguyen

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. Nguyen was contacted to see Plaintiff the morning after

his injury. Plaintiff alleges that he was not seen by Nguyen the day after his injury, but Plaintiff does

not allege that it was due to any action or inaction by Nguyen. Plaintiff also alleges that Nguyen saw

Plaintiff on January 20, 2006. Nguyen examined Plaintiff, provided pain medication, ordered a

liquid diet, and referred Plaintiff back to Defendant Baker.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest that Nguyen was deliberately indifferent

toward Plaintiff’s medical needs. Nguyen diagnosed and treated Plaintiff. Plaintiff offers no

explanation as to how Nguyen’s diagnosis or treatment was deficient, and there is no suggestion that

any deficiency resulted from Nguyen’s conscious disregard toward a risk of serious injury or

unnecessary pain. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendant Nguyen.

E. Claims Against Defendant Dela Rosa

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dela Rosa contacted a doctor, Defendant Nguyen, the same

day Plaintiff injured his jaw and scheduled Plaintiff to be seen in the morning. Plaintiff complains

that he neversaw Nguyen the next morning, but there is no suggestion that the failure to be seen was

caused by Dela Rosa. Plaintiff also complains that he should have been seen immediately because

his condition was an emergency. However, Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest that Dela Rosa

knew that Plaintiff needed emergency treatment but purposefully delayed treatment in deliberate

disregard to a serious risk of further injury or unnecessary pain. Plaintiff does not claim that Dela

Rosa actually saw Plaintiff and diagnosed his condition as an emergency, nor does Plaintiff provide

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any other explanation as to how Dela Rosa would have known that Plaintiff needed emergency

treatment immediately. Plaintiff fails to allege any cognizable claims against Defendant Dela Rosa.

F. Claims Against Defendant Tanner

Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Tanner is that he stated that “he would send an

order over for Motrin.” Plaintiff did not receive the motrin. Plaintiff does not explain why he did

not receive the Motrin and there is no suggestion that Tanner did anything prevented Plaintiff from

receiving the Motrin. Nor is there any suggestion that Tanner acted or failed to act with deliberate

disregard to a known risk to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against

Defendant Tanner.

G. Claims Against Defendant James A.S.

Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant James A.S. is that he was one of only two

medical personnel available the afternoon that Plaintiff suffered his jaw injury. Plaintiff does not

make any other allegations as to what James A.S. did or failed to do that caused Plaintiff to suffer

further injury or unnecessary pain. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendant

James A.S.

H. Claims Against Does

Plaintiff asserts claims against various Doe Defendants. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John

Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 

However, in situations where the identity of the alleged defendants will not be known prior to the

filing of a complaint, a plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the

unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the

complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Id. (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152

(4th Cir. 1978)). 

While Plaintiff’s use of the “Doe” moniker to sue unidentified prison officials is permissible,

Plaintiff’s ambiguous use of the fictitious name is improper. Regardless of whether the identity of

a particular prison official is known or not, Plaintiff is still obligated to allege facts that demonstrate

a causal link between that unidentified official’s actions and an alleged constitutional violation. See

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be

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individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts

or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”). Thus, Plaintiff must make

individualized allegations about each “Doe” defendant. Plaintiff maynot refer to a single ambiguous

set of multiple “Doe” defendants. Plaintiff appears to use fictitious names to refer to a hypothetical

set of individuals who may or may not be liable for actions they may or may not have done that may

or may not have resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

1

For example, Plaintiff claims that unidentified RNs and MTAs were “undoubtedly” and

“purposefully” withholding Plaintiff’s liquid meals. Plaintiff makes this inference based on a

nurse’s statement that liquid diets are only served within the infirmary. Plaintiff also infers that a

nurse “did chance the risk once to provide Plaintiff with a single serving [but] was likely

reprimanded and thus never attempted to do so again.” Plaintiff’s inferences about the conduct of

these unidentified prison officials appears to be speculative. Nothing from the nurse’s statement

implies that unidentified RNs and MTAs were purposefully withholding meals from Plaintiff. Nor

is it clear how Plaintiff inferred from the nurse’s “revelatory statement” that a lone registered nurse

was reprimanded for attempting to provide a single serving to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege that

the “revelatorystatement” contained anyreference to anynurse trying to provide Plaintiff with liquid

food or any nurse being reprimanded.

In order to sue a defendant using a fictitious name, Plaintiff is advised that he is still

obligated to allege facts against each individual unidentified defendant that demonstrates exactly

what that individual did and what that individual’s subjective state of mind was. This can be done

by referring to each individual unidentified defendant by a separate fictitious name, such as “John

Doe #1,” “John Doe #2,” and so on. Plaintiff may not sue Doe defendants collectively based on

speculative beliefs as to whether they exist, or hypothetical allegations of what they may have done

that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

For example, Plaintiff refers to “Doe[s] SATF CSP’s high ranking official[s] (any and all 1-5 inclusive) . . .

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(includes health directors and administrators)” and “Does SATF CSP’s registered nurses[s] (1-6 inclusive)” and

“Doe[s] SATF CSP’s medical technical assistant[s] (1-6 inclusive).” Plaintiff’s use of “any and all 1-5 inclusive”

implies Plaintiff does not know how many Doe defendants exist. If Plaintiff is unsure of how many exist, it raises

questions about the basis of Plaintiff’s factual allegations against them and the plausibility of Plaintiff’s conclusions

that they acted with deliberate indifference.

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IV. Conclusion and Order

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and finds that it does not state

any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff

with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff is cautioned that he

may not add unrelated claims involving different defendants in his amended complaint. George v.

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Plaintiff must identify how each individual defendant caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional or other federal rights: “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus

on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged

to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

With respect to exhibits, while they are permissible if incorporated by reference, Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(c), they are not necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other

words, it is not necessary at this stage to submit evidence to prove the allegations in Plaintiff’s

complaint because at this stage Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true.

However, although Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true and that “the

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations’”, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). (quotingBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing

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London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at

1474. In other words, even the claims that were properly stated in the original complaint must be

completely stated again in the amended complaint.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint;

4. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended

complaint; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will recommend that this

action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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