Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01110/USCOURTS-caDC-13-01110-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mehmet Ege
Petitioner
Transportation Security Administration
Respondent
United States Department of Homeland Security
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2014 Decided April 28, 2015

No. 13-1110

MEHMET EGE,

PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Transportation Security Administration

Charles A. Zdebski argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for the petitioner.

Sharon Swingle, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the respondents. Stuart F. 

Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen, Jr., 

United States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, were 

with her on brief. Catherine H. Dorsey, Attorney, United 

States Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

USCA Case #13-1110 Document #1549403 Filed: 04/28/2015 Page 1 of 13
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit 

Judge KAVANAUGH.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Mehmet 

Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, petitions for review of an 

order of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

that prohibits him from flying to, from or over the United 

States. Ege believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his

alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to 

“deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft 

operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United 

States.” Resp’t’s Br. 7.

1 He seeks removal from the No-Fly 

List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be 

heard.” Pet’r’s Br. 23. 

The problem, however, is that neither the TSA nor the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—the only two 

respondent agencies—has “authority to decide whose name 

goes on the No-Fly List.” Ibrahim v. DHS, 538 F.3d 1250, 

1254 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC), which is administered by the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), see About the Terrorist Screening Center, 

FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terroristscreening-center (last visited Apr. 26, 2015), is “the sole 

entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege 

 1

 “As a matter of policy, the federal government does not confirm 

or deny whether any particular individual is included in the TSDB 

or on any of its subset lists,” including the No-Fly List. Resp’t’s 

Br. 8. Nothing herein should be construed as indicating whether 

Ege is, in fact, on any list or in any database maintained by the 

Government. 

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wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly 

List/TSDB. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 

2012). And because we have no jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46110 to issue an order binding the TSC, we ipso facto 

cannot redress Ege’s injury even if we were inclined to agree 

with him. For this reason, we must dismiss his petition for 

lack of standing.

After experiencing unspecified travel issues in 2009,

2

Ege submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler 

Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), the administrative 

review mechanism that allows an individual to seek assistance 

if he believes he has “been improperly or unfairly delayed or 

prohibited from boarding an aircraft.” 49 C.F.R. 

§ 1560.205(a).3

 Ege’s DHS TRIP inquiry was reviewed by 

 2

 Although Ege refers to his 2006 removal from the Master Crew 

List, a manifest that must be submitted to the TSA by every foreign

air carrier operating flights over the United States and that contains 

identifying information for “all crew members . . . operating and 

servicing” such flights, 19 C.F.R. § 122.49c(a), he never petitioned 

for review of the administrative denial of that removal, which 

denial occurred in 2008. We therefore limit our review to the 

unspecified travel difficulty Ege experienced in 2009 that led him 

to seek redress through DHS TRIP and that culminated in the 2013 

TSA order, which he petitions that this Court review. We note, 

however, that Ege believes his removal from the Master Crew List 

also resulted from his alleged inclusion in the TSDB. See Pet’r’s 

Br. 9 (“The Master Crew List operates similar to the Do-Not Fly 

list. The TSA makes its determination of whether a pilot should 

stay on the master crew list by cross-checking the information 

with” the TSC). For that reason, our analysis would not change had 

he challenged his Master Crew List removal in his petition for 

review. 

3

 As our concurring colleague observes, see Concur. Op. 2, DHS 

TRIP was created in response to a congressional directive that it 

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the TSA, which responded by letter on March 24, 2011, 

informing him that his record had been reviewed and that any 

appropriate changes or corrections had been made. 

Apparently, Ege’s travel woes persisted and he subsequently

contacted the TSA to complain. On February 6, 2012, the 

TSA sent Ege another letter, stating that it had “conducted a 

review of any applicable records in consultation with other 

federal agencies, as appropriate” and “determined that no 

changes or corrections [were] warranted at th[at] time.” 

Resp’t’s Br. 15. The TSA’s February 6 letter also informed 

Ege that he could administratively appeal its initial 

determination. 

Ege did so on February 25, 2012, submitting a letter that 

expressed his belief that he had been placed on the No-Fly 

List and that his alleged inclusion was hampering his 

employment as an international pilot. On January 22, 2013, 

the TSA issued its final order, which upheld the initial agency 

decision and told Ege that he could seek review “by a United 

States Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. § 46110.” 

 

“establish a timely and fair process for individuals who believe they 

have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial 

aircraft because they were wrongly identified as a threat.” 49 

U.S.C. § 44926(a). But it is axiomatic that the DHS’s attempt to 

comply with the Congress’s mandate in a manner consistent with 

the “constitutional elements of jurisdiction,” which jurisdiction is 

the “essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers,” 

does not affect our independent obligation to determine whether a 

redressable case or controversy exists. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). And based on the interplay 

among the DHS, the TSA and the TSC in the context of No-Fly 

List/TSDB challenges, a petitioner cannot, consistent with 

constitutional standing principles, raise a No-Fly List/TSDB 

challenge through review pursuant to section 46110, 

notwithstanding his compliance with the DHS TRIP process. 

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Pet’r’s Br. Ex. A. On April 4, 2013,4 Ege petitioned this 

Court for review under section 46110, which provides this 

Court with jurisdiction to review orders issued by the DHS, 

the TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 49

U.S.C. § 46110(a). 

Uncertain about our power to adjudicate Ege’s petition, 

we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing 

whether this Court has jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 

to hear Ege’s challenge to his alleged inclusion in the TSDB 

and on the No-Fly List. The parties complied, both assuring 

us that Ege’s injury is redressable on section 46110 review. 

Despite their agreement, “[w]hen there is doubt about a 

party’s constitutional standing,” we must “resolve the doubt, 

sua sponte if need be.” Lee’s Summit, Mo. v. Surface Transp. 

Bd., 231 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Steel Co., 523 

U.S. at 95 (“ ‘[E]very federal appellate court has a special 

obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction . . . ’ even 

though the parties are prepared to concede it.” (quoting 

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (quotation mark 

omitted))). Based on our independent assessment, we 

conclude that we do not have the requisite Article III 

jurisdiction to allow Ege’s case to proceed. 

 4

 Our concurring colleague correctly observes that Ege filed his 

petition for review after expiration of the 60-day time limit 

prescribed by 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). See Concur. Op. 2. Because 

we lack Article III jurisdiction, our “only function . . . is that of 

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. 

at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). 

Accordingly, we take no position on whether Ege demonstrated 

“reasonable grounds” to excuse his untimely filing. 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46110; see also Avia Dynamics, Inc. v. FAA, 641 F.3d 515, 519

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (section 46110 filing deadline not jurisdictional).

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“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 

contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, Ege must have suffered an 

“injury in fact.” Id. Second, his injury must be “fairly 

traceable to the challenged action[s] of the [TSA or DHS], 

and not the result of the independent action of some third 

party not before the court.” Id. (alterations omitted). And 

third, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, 

that [his] injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Id. at 561 (quotation marks omitted).

The jurisdictional deficiency dooming Ege’s petition lies 

in his failure to satisfy the second and third standing elements, 

as articulated in Lujan. See 504 U.S. at 560–61. His failure is 

due, in turn, to the relief he seeks. True, Ege would like to 

“board . . . a plane” and to fly “to, from, or over the United 

States.” Concur. Op. 1. But Ege makes plain, and the TSA 

agrees, that his injury is his alleged inclusion on the No-Fly 

List and in the TSDB and the precise relief he seeks is either 

removal from them or an opportunity to more effectively 

argue for removal. See Pet’r’s Reply Br. 9 (arguing that DHS 

and TSA erred “when they included Mr. Ege on Terrorist 

Screening Database” and “No-Fly List”); see also Resp’t’s 

Br. 8 (Ege “appears to argue that he has been wrongfully 

placed in the TSDB and on the No-Fly List”).5

 

Section 46110 gives us authority to review orders from 

the TSA, DHS and FAA. 49 U.S.C. § 46110. “[T]he sole 

entity with . . . the authority to remove” names from the No-

 5

 Indeed, even after we requested the parties to submit 

supplemental briefing regarding this Court’s jurisdiction under 

section 46110, Ege made no attempt to recast the No-Fly 

List/TSDB relief he seeks. See Pet’r’s Supp. Br. 1; see also 

Resp’t’s Supp. Br. 2. 

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Fly List/TSDB, however, is the TSC. See Latif, 686 F.3d at 

1129. Because the “ ‘case or controversy’ limitation” of 

Article III requires that we “act only to redress injury that 

fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the” agencies 

before us (i.e., DHS and TSA), “and not injury that results 

from the independent action of some third party not before the 

court” (i.e., the TSC), Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 

426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976), we have no power to redress 

Ege’s No-Fly List/TSDB-related injury. See also Fulani v. 

Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[T]his Court 

has denied standing where the plaintiff seeks to change the 

defendant’s behavior only as a means to alter the conduct of a 

third party, not before the court, who is the direct source of 

the plaintiff’s injury.” (quotation marks and emphasis

omitted)). See generally Common Cause v. Biden, 748 F.3d 

1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“To invoke the jurisdiction of 

the federal courts, . . . a proper defendant [must] be sued.”). 

The Ninth Circuit is in accord.6

 It has observed that the 

“TSA is merely a conduit for a traveler’s challenge to 

inclusion on the” No-Fly List and in the TSDB, “simply 

pass[ing] grievances along to TSC and inform[ing] travelers 

 6

 The Ninth Circuit characterized the difficulty inherent in 

mounting a No-Fly List/TSDB challenge under section 46110 as 

one of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than Article III standing 

because the TSC was named as a defendant/respondent in each case 

in which the issue arose. See Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1253; Latif, 686 

F.3d at 1127; Arjmand v. DHS, 745 F.3d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 

2014). Because the TSC was before the court in those cases, the 

question was whether the court had “original jurisdiction” under 

section 46110 to enjoin it. Arjmand, 745 F.3d at 1302. Ege, 

however, did not name the TSC as a respondent and, accordingly, 

the jurisdictional deficiency in his petition is better understood as 

no Article III standing because the sole entity with the authority to 

redress his injury is missing.

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when TSC has made a final determination.” Latif, 686 F.3d at 

1128. Because “TSC—not TSA—actually reviews the 

classified intelligence information about travelers and decides 

whether to remove them from the List” and “established the 

policies governing that stage of the redress process,” id., we 

agree that we cannot, on section 46110 review, provide relief 

to an individual included on the No-Fly List or in the TSDB 

by “simply amending, modifying, or setting aside TSA’s 

orders or by directing TSA to conduct further proceedings.” 

Id. at 1129 (emphases in original); see also Arjmand, 745 

F.3d at 1302 (“[S]ince § 46110 does not grant circuit courts 

jurisdiction to review TSC orders, the statute cannot grant 

jurisdiction over claims seeking removal from the TSDB.”). 

Both Ege and the TSA argue that the Ninth Circuit got it 

wrong but we are not persuaded. They insist that Ege’s 

challenge to his alleged No-Fly List/TSDB status is 

“inescapably intertwined” with the TSA order of which he 

seeks review. Cf. Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 245 F.3d 182, 187 

(2d Cir. 2001) (“statutes such as Section 46110(c)” include 

“claims that are ‘inescapably intertwined’ with review of such 

orders”). Although courts use the “inescapably intertwined” 

doctrine to review a claim not expressly included in a 

jurisdictional grant, we are aware of no case—and neither 

party cites one—in which a court has used the “inescapably 

intertwined” doctrine to enjoin a party not so included. This 

is unsurprising; were we able to use the “inescapably 

intertwined” doctrine to redress injuries caused by absent 

parties, we would routinely “offend[] fundamental principles 

of separation of powers.” See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94. 

The TSA suggests we could simply issue an injunction 

requiring it to allow Ege to board an airplane, leaving 

unaffected his status regarding the TSDB. Resp’t’s Supp. 

Br. 9. Our concurring colleague agrees. See Concur. Op. 1–

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2. But the TSA’s proposal falls short for at least two reasons. 

First, as a threshold matter, merely “boarding” a plane is not 

the relief Ege seeks—rather, he wants off the No-Fly List and 

removed from the TSDB. See supra p. 6 & n.5. Second, as a 

practical matter, the TSA’s proposal would do Ege no good. 

Ege can board and pilot an airplane and, as a commercial pilot 

for Emirates Airlines, he has boarded and piloted airplanes as 

recently as October 2013. See Pet’r’s Br. Ex. H (Ege’s flight 

logs). The problem is that Ege cannot board or pilot flights 

destined for the United States. If his alleged TSDB status 

remains unchanged, it is possible that one of “several” other 

federal agencies could use the TSDB to prevent Ege from 

crossing the U.S. border. See Resp’t’s Br. 7. For example, 

the Department of State—an entity, like the FBI and the TSC, 

that is not included in section 46110’s grant of jurisdiction—

uses the TSDB to screen individuals who “apply for . . . 

visa[s].” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, FOLLOW-UP 

AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER (2007), 

available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0741/

intro.htm; see also Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 989 (State 

Department “uses a subset of the TSDB to screen visa 

applicants”). 

Because Ege’s alleged TSDB status would prevent him 

from flying “to, from, or over the United States” even if the 

TSA allowed him “to board or pilot a plane,” Concur. Op. 1, 2

(emphasis added), it is “merely speculative” at best that the 

TSA’s proposal would remedy Ege’s purported injury. Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 561 (quotation marks omitted). We plainly need 

more than the TSA’s assurance—first given at oral 

argument—that the entire Executive Branch would allow Ege 

to board or pilot a plane and cross into the United States

before we can conclude that Ege’s alleged injury is 

redressable. Cf. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 

(2011) (generally, “a court’s judgment binds only the parties 

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to a suit”). Instead, Ege would need to add the TSC as a 

respondent—something he cannot do under section 46110.

Relying on section 46110 as the jurisdictional basis of 

our review, Ege seeks removal of his alleged inclusion on the 

No-Fly List and in the TSDB. The agencies whose actions 

are reviewable under section 46110, however, have no 

“authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” 

Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1254 n.6; see also Arjmand, 745 F.3d at 

1303. Because we cannot redress Ege’s injury, we dismiss his 

petition for lack of standing. 

So ordered.

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 

Mehmet Ege is a pilot who flies for Emirates Airline, which is 

headquartered in Dubai. Ege is a dual citizen of Canada and 

Turkey. The Transportation Security Administration, 

commonly known as TSA, has barred Ege from piloting a 

plane to, from, or over the United States. Ege also claims that 

TSA has barred him from even boarding a plane to, from, or 

over the United States. 

Ege asks this Court to review TSA’s January 22, 2013,

final order that allegedly bars him from boarding a plane to, 

from, or over the United States. Ege also complains about

TSA’s 2008 final order barring him from piloting a plane to, 

from, or over the United States. 

To begin with, both Ege and the Government agree that 

Ege has standing to bring this suit against TSA. I likewise 

agree. The majority opinion nonetheless has sua sponte 

denied standing to Ege. According to the majority opinion,

Ege’s complaint is not redressable by the Court because TSA 

could not comply with a court order that directed the agency

to allow Ege to board or pilot a plane. I frankly do not 

understand that. 

Under federal law, TSA controls access to planes. TSA 

barred Ege from piloting planes and allegedly barred Ege 

from boarding planes. Congress has mandated that TSA 

“shall establish a timely and fair process for individuals” who 

are delayed or prohibited from boarding planes to “appeal to 

the Transportation Security Administration the determination 

and correct any erroneous information.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44903(j)(2)(G)(i); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44926(a). Ege 

invoked that appeals process. Following that appeals process, 

TSA issued an order affirming its decision that allegedly bars

Ege from boarding planes. Ege asks us to review that order, 

and a similar order barring Ege from piloting planes. Under 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a), Ege properly 

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named TSA as respondent in his petition for review filed in 

this Court. And TSA, represented by the Department of 

Justice, says it could and would, if ordered by a final court 

decision, allow Ege to board or pilot a plane. See Tr. of Oral 

Arg. at 12:51-13:43. What more do we need? In my view, 

this case readily meets the injury in fact, causation, and 

redressability prongs of the standing doctrine. The majority 

opinion does not cite any case of the Supreme Court or this 

Court suggesting that the redressability prong of standing is a 

barrier to suit where an individual follows an agency review 

process mandated by Congress and then appeals the agency’s 

final order. 

That said, the problem for Ege here is that his petition for 

review is untimely. Under Section 46110(a), a petitioner 

must file a request for review of a TSA order “not later than 

60 days after the order is issued.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). This 

Court may excuse a late filing “only if there are reasonable 

grounds for not filing by the 60th day.” Id.

On January 22, 2013, TSA issued the final order that 

allegedly bars Ege from boarding a plane to, from, or over the 

United States. But Ege’s petition for review of that TSA 

order was not filed until April 4, 2013. Ege’s petition was 

thus filed 10 days after the 60-day period for seeking review

had expired. Moreover, TSA’s final order barring Ege from 

piloting a plane to, from, or over the United States was issued

in 2008. So Ege is long past the time to challenge that order

as well.

Under this Court’s precedent, we must dismiss an 

untimely petition for review under Section 46110(a) unless 

there are reasonable grounds for delay. See Avia Dynamics, 

Inc. v. FAA, 641 F.3d 515, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In this case, 

the record does not disclose any reasonable grounds for delay. 

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As to TSA’s 2008 order, Ege has offered no explanation for 

his several-year delay in seeking review. As to TSA’s 2013 

order, Ege claims that the date he received TSA’s order, his 

geographic location, and his employment excuse his failure to 

file his petition on time. It is true that Ege is an international 

pilot living in Dubai, and that he allegedly became aware of

TSA’s January 22, 2013, order just 12 days before the 60-day 

period for seeking review of that order expired. But that still 

gave him 12 days to file a timely petition for review. He did 

not do so.

I would therefore dismiss Ege’s petition as untimely. If 

Ege seeks to travel on a plane flying to, from, or over the 

United States, and TSA prevents him from doing so, the 

Government has stated to the Court that Ege may bring a new 

challenge at that time. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 19:29-19:51. 

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