Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-01774/USCOURTS-ca2-15-01774-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Broadway

Michael Chaney

William Cole

Yvonne Daniels

Claude Davis

Lorraine Garcia

Sharieff Grant

Tracy Harris

Troy Harris
Appellant
Samuel Henley

Karen Martinez

Tony McAfee

Louis Nieves

United States of America
Appellee USA
Bobby Wainwright

Document Text:

1

15‐1774‐cr   

United States v. Harris                  

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit ________________

August Term, 2016

(Argued:  August 29, 2016      Decided:  September 22, 2016)

Docket No. 15‐1774‐cr

________________                                   

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

—v.—  

TROY HARRIS, AKA GUNNY,

    Defendant‐Appellant,

TRACY HARRIS, AKA SHORTY, AKA TRAY, YVONNE DANIELS, AKA ZIP, SAMUEL

HENLEY, AKA POP, AKA SAM, WILLIAM COLE, AKA WILL, MICHAEL CHANEY,

AKA MIKE, AKA MICK, JAMES BROADWAY, AKA PORK, CLAUDE DAVIS, AKA

CAHUNA, BOBBY WAINWRIGHT, SHARIEFF GRANT, LOUIS NIEVES, AKA LOUIS

RAMOS, KAREN MARTINEZ, AKA JAZZ TORRES, TONY MCAFEE, AKA TR, AKA LT,

AND LORRAINE GARCIA, AKA CHULA,

   

    Defendants.

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________________                                  

Before:

NEWMAN, CALABRESI, RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

________________                                  

On appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Preska, C.J.) revoking supervised release,

defendant challenges (1) the district court’s statutory authority under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e) to revoke supervision based on conduct that had already prompted a

modification in the conditions of his supervision; and (2) its decision, pursuant to

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), to consider victim hearsay statements in  

adjudicating a violation charge of new criminal conduct.

AFFIRMED.

________________                                  

MATTHEW W. BRISSENDEN, Matthew W. Brissenden, P.C., Garden

City, New York, for Defendant‐Appellant.

         

JENNIFER L. GACHIRI, Assistant United States Attorney (Thomas

McKay, Karl N. Metzner, Assistant United States Attorneys,

on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the

Southern District of New York, New York, New York, for

Appellee.

________________                                 

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REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

Following a guilty plea, defendant Troy Harris was convicted in 2001 in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert P.

Patterson, Judge) of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),

846, for which crime he was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment and five

years’ supervised release.    See United States v. Harris, No. 00‐CR‐00105 (RPP)

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2001), ECF No. 191.1  Harris now appeals from a judgment of

the same court (Loretta A. Preska, Chief Judge) entered on May 14, 2015, revoking

his supervised release and imposing an additional prison term of 27 months

based on a finding that he had engaged in new criminal conduct while on federal

supervision, specifically, assault, as proscribed by New York Penal Law

§ 120.00(1), and narcotics distribution, in violation of New York Penal Law

§ 220.39.  Harris challenges both grounds for revocation.   

As to narcotics trafficking, Harris does not dispute the alleged conduct.  

Instead, for the first time on appeal, he challenges the district court’s statutory

authority to revoke supervision based on conduct that had already prompted it

                                              

1 The district court subsequently reduced Harris’s prison term to 151 months

pursuant to Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which provided for

retroactive reduction of certain crack cocaine sentences.

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to modify the terms of his supervision.    Harris argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

confers modification and revocation authority in the disjunctive, so that once a

court exercises one (here, modification) in response to particular conduct, it

cannot exercise the other (revocation) with respect to that same conduct.

As to assault, Harris argues that the district court impermissibly

considered victim hearsay in making its preponderance finding that he engaged

in such new criminal conduct while on federal supervision.

Because we conclude that both arguments fail on the merits, we affirm the

challenged revocation judgment.

I. Background

Harris began serving the five‐year supervision component of his 2001

federal sentence on March 18, 2011.    That supervision was subject to certain

conditions, three of which are relevant here: that Harris (1) not commit another

federal, state, or local crime; (2) truthfully answer all probation inquiries; and

(3) notify his probation officer ten days prior to any change in residence.  

A. Initial Noncompliance Report: Assault

On August 26, 2014, three years into Harris’s supervision term, the United

States Probation Department for the Southern District of New York (“Probation”)

filed a report notifying Judge Patterson that Harris had been arrested by the New

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York City Police Department (“NYPD”) based on a recent complaint filed by a

woman who stated that Harris had “struck her in the face with a closed fist after

she confronted him for smacking her on her buttocks during an event they were

attending.”    App’x 26.2    Probation reported that the offense—third‐degree

assault, see N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1)—represented a Class A misdemeanor and

a Grade C violation of supervised release.  Nevertheless, because the state case

had been dismissed when the complainant declined to press criminal charges,

Probation recommended that no action be taken with respect to Harris’s federal

supervision.  The district court accepted the recommendation the following day,

August 27, 2014.

B. Second Noncompliance Report: Narcotics Trafficking

Less than three weeks later, on September 11, 2014, Probation filed a

second noncompliance report notifying Judge Patterson of Harris’s September 2,

2014 NYPD arrest, this time for third‐degree criminal sale of a controlled

substance, see N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39, based on police observations of Harris

exchanging crack cocaine for money.    Probation recommended, and Harris

                                              

2 Probation later clarified that the assault took place on July 25, 2014, and that the

complaint was filed that same day.

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agreed to, a modification of supervision to add a search condition, which the

district court ordered on September 15, 2014.

C. Violation Warrant and Revocation Petition

Two months later, on November 14, 2014, Probation determined that

Harris was in violation of the supervision condition requiring that he provide

advance notice of any change in residence.  On that day, Probation conducted an

unannounced visit to Harris’s reported residence, the apartment of his maternal

aunt.  Not only was Harris not present, but a search also revealed that he had

“little to no belongings in the apartment.”  App’x 57.  When Probation reached

Harris by phone, he stated that he was at his uncle’s apartment.    After some

initial hesitation, he provided the building’s address but refused to identify the

apartment number.

Judge Patterson was advised of these facts the same day, and promptly

issued an arrest warrant based on four alleged violations of supervised release:

(1) failure truthfully to answer Probation inquiries, (2) failure to notify Probation

of a change in residence, (3) selling narcotics in violation of state law, and

(4) committing third‐degree assault in violation of state law.  The United States

Marshal executed the warrant and produced Harris in court later that day.  On

consent, Harris was released pending a hearing on the violation charges, subject

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to additional supervision conditions of home detention and electronic

monitoring.

On November 17, 2014, Probation formally petitioned for revocation of

Harris’s supervised release based on the four alleged violations.    The petition

advised that, insofar as one of the violations involved possession of narcotics,

revocation was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).  Further, because (1) Harris

had pleaded guilty to a Class A felony, (2) the alleged narcotics offense

constituted a Grade A supervision violation, and (3) Harris had a Criminal

History Category of II, his recommended Guidelines sentencing range for that

violation was 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4—

approximately half the statutory 5‐year maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  

Probation explained that the other three allegations pertained to Grade C

violations of supervision, which—given Harris’s Criminal History Category of

II—corresponded to a recommended Guidelines sentencing range of 4 to 10

months’ imprisonment.    See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4.    Probation recommended that

Harris be sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment, the low end of this lesser range,

to be followed by an additional one‐year term of supervised release.

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D. Revocation Hearing

In February 2015, Harris’s case was reassigned to Chief Judge Preska, who

conducted a revocation hearing on the narcotics‐  and assault‐based charges on

April 2, 2015.3

1. Government’s Motion To Admit Victim Hearsay Statements

At the outset, the government moved to allow out‐of‐court statements by

the victim of the alleged assault to be admitted through three law enforcement

witnesses: (1) NYPD Officer Efrain Ayala, who first responded to the victim’s 911

call on the night of the assault; (2) NYPD Detective Jose Chevere, who

interviewed the victim two weeks later; and (3) United States Attorney’s Office

Criminal Investigator Antoinette Guzman, who interviewed the victim six

months after the incident.  The government stated that the victim herself refused

to testify—notwithstanding receipt of a subpoena and an offer of appointed

counsel and immunity—based on her professed fear of retaliation by Harris or

his associates, all of whom continued to live in the victim’s neighborhood.   It

argued that this fear, coupled with the reliability of the victim’s statements,

                                              

3 The government had requested that, “in the interests of judicial economy,” the

court rule on violations (3) and (4) before the government presented evidence on

violations (1) and (2).   App’x 64.

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constituted good cause to conclude that the interest of justice did not require the

victim’s appearance at the hearing.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).

The district court agreed.    It credited the proffered fear based on the

victim’s consistent expression of it, and concluded that Harris’s confrontation

interest was entitled to little weight by comparison.  Further, it found the hearsay

statements reliable because they bore overall consistency, the first one was made

near the time of the assault following a 911 call, and the account was

corroborated by the responding officer’s observations of physical injuries

consistent with the reported assault.

2. Violation Findings

    a. Narcotics Trafficking While on Supervision

In support of the narcotics trafficking violation, two police officers testified

to witnessing Harris exchange drugs for money, and to recovering the exchanged

drug packet, the contents of which tested positive for cocaine.  The district court

deemed this testimony credible and sufficient, by itself, to establish the charged

violation.   It also found the conclusion corroborated by further credited police

and physician testimony establishing that, after arrest, Harris attempted to

conceal another packet of cocaine still in his possession by ingesting it.

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b. Assault While on Supervision

In support of the assault‐based violation, law enforcement officials

testified that on three occasions—the day of the assault, two weeks later, and six

months thereafter—the victim recounted how, in the early morning hours of July

25, 2014, while she was dancing with a group of people, Harris smacked her hard

on the buttocks.  See App’x 209–10.  When she verbally confronted Harris about

that conduct, “he punched her in the mouth with a closed fist.”  Id. at 210.  The

district court credited the victim’s hearsay accounts not only because of (1) their

overall consistency, but also because (2) the victim, having called 911, had an

incentive to be truthful; (3) responding Officer Ayala had personally observed

the victim’s “swollen and bruised lip with [a] laceration on the inside”; and

(4) all three officers who spoke with the victim reported finding her credible.  Id.

at 211.    Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that Harris’s

commission of the assault while on supervision was proved by more than a

“preponderance”; rather, the proof was “overwhelming.”  Id. at 209.

In light of the district court’s findings that Harris had committed the

crimes of narcotics trafficking and assault while on supervision, the government

moved to dismiss the remaining two violation charges, which motion the court

granted at the conclusion of the hearing.

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E. Revocation Judgment

On May 12, 2015, the district court revoked Harris’s supervised release and

sentenced him to a total of 27 months’ imprisonment to be followed by an

additional one year of supervised release.  Harris, who is currently serving that

prison sentence, timely filed this appeal.

II. Discussion

A. Challenge to Court’s Statutory Authority  

1. Standard of Review

Harris submits that, because the actions a court may take under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e) are stated in the disjunctive “or,” the district court was not statutorily

authorized to revoke his supervision based on the same conduct—narcotics

trafficking—that had earlier prompted it to modify the conditions of his

supervision by adding a search condition.4    While ordinarily we review

                                              

4 Section 3583(e) states as follows:

The court may, after considering the factors set forth in

section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4),

(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)—

(1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge

the defendant released at any time after the expiration

of one year of supervised release, pursuant to the

provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

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questions of statutory interpretation de novo, see United States v. Cassesse, 685

                                                                                                                                                  

relating to the modification of probation, if it is satisfied

that such action is warranted by the conduct of the

defendant released and the interest of justice;

(2) extend a term of supervised release if less than the

maximum authorized term was previously imposed,

and may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of

supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or

termination of the term of supervised release, pursuant

to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure relating to the modification of probation and

the provisions applicable to the initial setting of the

terms and conditions of post‐release supervision;

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the

defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of

supervised release authorized by statute for the offense

that resulted in such term of supervised release without

credit for time previously served on postrelease

supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of

probation or supervised release, finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

violated a condition of supervised release . . . ; or

(4) order the defendant to remain at his place of

residence during nonworking hours and, if the court so

directs, to have compliance monitored by telephone or

electronic signaling devices, except that an order under

this paragraph may be imposed only as an alternative to

incarceration.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

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F.3d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2012), our review here is for plain error because Harris

failed to assert the challenge in the district court, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);

United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (holding that plain error will be

identified only if (1) there is error; (2) that is clear or obvious, rather than subject

to reasonable dispute; (3) that affects defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that

seriously impugns fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings); accord United States v. Rodriguez, 775 F.3d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 2014).

In urging otherwise, Harris maintains that the error was preserved when,

at the conclusion of sentencing, he told the district court, “I would like to state,

for the record, this is double jeopardy.  I’m being punished twice for the same

crime.”  App’x 230.  The argument fails because Harris now expressly disavows

any double jeopardy claim, mounting a purely statutory challenge not raised

below.    See Appellant’s Br. 26.    Further, he concedes that, if the statutory

challenge was not preserved, plain error review applies.  See id. at 17 n.7.

  While we conclude that Harris’s statutory challenge was not preserved,

the matter is of no import because, in any event, the claim fails at the first step of

plain error analysis—that is, Harris fails to demonstrate error.    Thus, his

challenge fails even de novo review.

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2. The Statutory Text and Context Do Not Support Construing

Modification and Revocation as Mutually Exclusive Actions

In considering de novo whether § 3583(e) authorizes a district court that

has already modified supervision conditions in response to certain conduct to

revoke supervised release based on the same conduct, we begin with the statute’s

text because “we assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language

accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”  Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133

S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see

United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2016) (“If the [statute’s]

meaning is plain, the inquiry ends there.”).  As Harris implicitly acknowledges,

nothing in the text of § 3583(e) states that revocation following modification must

be based on different conduct.  See Appellant’s Br. 21–22 (noting issue “appears

to remain an open question”).  Instead, he urges us to infer such a requirement

from the statute’s use of the word “or” in § 3583(e)(3).  He argues that the actions

authorized in § 3583(e) thus operate only in the disjunctive, so that once a court

modifies supervision conditions in response to certain conduct, it cannot then

revoke supervised release based on the same conduct.  We are not persuaded.

Established canons of statutory construction “ordinarily suggest that terms

connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings.”    Reiter v. Sonotone

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Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); see Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384,

2390 (2014) (observing that disjunctive “or” signals that “words it connects are to

be given separate meanings” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  This “serves to

avoid interpretations that render statutory terms superfluous.”    Mizrahi v.

Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2007).  Superfluity, however, is not a concern

here because the words “modify” and “revoke,” as used in § 3583(e), bear plainly

different meanings—with quite different effects on liberty.    Moreover, the

different meanings obtain whether the actions are taken in response to the same

or distinct conduct.

In any event, even when striving to ensure separate meanings, the

disjunctive canon does not apply absolutely, particularly where “the context

dictates otherwise.”    Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. at 339; see Mizrahi v.

Gonzales, 492 F.3d at 164 (refusing to conclude “simply from the use of the word

‘or’ that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” because

“rule that disjunctive phrases bear different meanings is general, not absolute”

and, thus, courts should “consider how a disjunctive or conjunctive form fits into

the statutory scheme as a whole” (internal quotation marks omitted)).    The

statutory context for use of the word “or” in § 3583(e) does not indicate

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Congress’s intent to preclude revocation based on conduct that earlier prompted

modification of supervision conditions.

This conclusion is evident from the fact that § 3583(e)(2) modification does

not require that a defendant be charged with a violation of—much less be found

to have violated—any particular supervision condition.  Compare Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32.1(b) (requiring probable cause finding of supervision violation to pursue

revocation of supervised release), with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c) (requiring

hearing, but no specific violation charge, to pursue modification of supervision);

see United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Rule

32.1(b) revocation proceeding from Rule 32.1(c) modification proceeding based

on, inter alia, former’s violation‐finding requirement).    Rather, § 3583(e)(2)

authorizes district courts to modify supervision conditions “at any time prior to

the expiration or termination” of supervised release as warranted by the

circumstances generally.    18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).    By contrast, revocation can

occur only upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a charged

condition of supervision has, in fact, been violated.    See id. § 3583(e)(3).    This

statutory structure strongly signals Congress’s intent to distinguish the two

actions—revocation and modification—not by demanding that they respond to

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different conduct, as Harris here urges, but rather, by the different charge and

proof burdens assigned to each.  See generally Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534

U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (stating that, “when ‘Congress includes particular language

in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the

disparate inclusion or exclusion’” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,

23 (1983))).  Such a structure signals Congress’s intent that the action causing a

greater loss of liberty—revocation—cannot be taken unless and until a higher

burden of proof is satisfied.    But it does not signal Congress’s intent for

modification and revocation to be mutually exclusive in responding to the same

conduct.

Indeed, such a construction could render other provisions of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583 inoperative or at least insignificant, contrary to the rule that courts must

give effect to all of a statute’s provisions “so that no part will be inoperative or

superfluous, void or insignificant.”    Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).    Specifically, Harris’s urged

construction, insofar as it would prohibit revocation in his case, would run afoul

of § 3583(g)(1), which mandates revocation where, as here, a supervised

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defendant is found to have possessed a controlled substance.    See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(g)(1).    It would also undermine factors properly informing supervised

release, such as deterrence of criminal activity and protection of the public from

such activity by the defendant.    See id. § 3583(c) (citing id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C)

among factors relevant to determining conditions of supervised release); see also

id. § 3583(e) (providing for same factors to be considered in modifying or

revoking supervised release).   

Pursuant to these statutory obligations, a district court advised of a

supervised defendant’s possible drug possession might well immediately modify

supervision to impose additional conditions to increase both deterrence and

protection.    Then, upon actual proof of the prohibited possession, the district

court would order the statutorily mandated revocation.  Indeed, that is exactly

what happened in this case, insofar as the district court first modified Harris’s

supervision to add a search condition in response to the narcotics arrest, and

then revoked supervision upon actual proof of narcotics distribution.    For the

district court, upon learning of Harris’s drug arrest, not to have modified

Harris’s supervision with the added search condition would have compromised

deterrence and protection.  Had the court, after ordering modification, failed to

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revoke supervision upon actual proof of Harris’s narcotics distribution, it would

have defied the statutory mandate of § 3583(g)(1).   

Thus, when we consider § 3583(e)’s use of the disjunctive in the statutory

context as a whole, we conclude that it cannot reasonably be construed, as Harris

urges, to preclude district courts from revoking supervised release following

modification whenever both actions are informed by the same conduct.     

That conclusion finds further support in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S.

694 (2000).    There, the Supreme Court held that, before § 3583(h) specifically

codified the authority, § 3583(e)(3) effectively allowed a district court to impose

an additional supervision term on a defendant following his completion of a

prison term imposed on revocation.    See id. at 712–13.5    Recognizing that

§ 3583(e)(3) limited any prison term to the maximum period of supervision

                                              

5 Johnson explicitly abrogated this court’s contrary conclusion in United States v.

Koehler, 973 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1992).    See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. at

698–99 & n.2.    Harris nonetheless maintains that Koehler’s underlying

rationale—that § 3583(e) applies disjunctively—survives Johnson.  That reading

does not accurately characterize the basis for our decision in Koehler.  See United

States v. Koehler, 973 F.2d at 135 (reasoning that, because “‘[r]evoke generally

means to cancel or rescind,’” revoked supervision term “‘no longer exists’” and,

therefore, “‘revocation and extension options are by their very nature mutually

exclusive’” (quoting United States v. Holmes, 954 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1992))).  

In any event, modification and revocation are not “by their very nature mutually

exclusive.”  Id.

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originally imposed, the Court observed that, “[i]f less than the maximum has

been imposed, a court presumably may, before revoking the term, extend it

pursuant to § 3583(e)(2).”    Id. at 712 (emphasis added).    In short, by thus

recognizing the possibility for both extension and revocation, the Supreme Court

did not construe the numbered subsections of § 3583(e) as mutually exclusive.   

Harris characterizes this part of Johnson as dictum and emphasizes that

Justices Kennedy and Thomas objected to this language in brief concurrences.  

See id. at 713–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 715 (Thomas, J., concurring).  

The observation, however, only underscores that a six‐justice majority (excluding

Justice Scalia, who dissented from this aspect of the decision, see id. at 715–27

(Scalia, J., dissenting)) deliberately chose to retain it.  Thus, even if the statement

is fairly characterized as dictum, we are obligated “‘to accord great deference to

Supreme Court dicta,’ absent a change in the legal landscape.”    Newdow v.

Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.

Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164, 179 (2d Cir. 2012)).

Harris has demonstrated no such change, and certainly none warranting a

plain error conclusion.    See United States v. Wagner‐Dano, 679 F.3d 83, 94 (2d

Cir. 2012) (“‘The burden of establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on

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the defendant claiming it.’” (brackets omitted) (quoting United States v.

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004))).    If anything, the post‐Johnson

landscape in this circuit suggests the contrary.  See, e.g., United States v. Parisi,

821 F.3d 343, 347–48 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that change of circumstances is not

prerequisite to additional § 3583(e)(2) modification); United States v. Vargas, 564

F.3d 618, 623–24 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that, “even in the absence of a new

violation,” district court may extend supervised release after prior revocation);

see also id. at 624 n.6 (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to post‐revocation

extension of supervision on ground that “‘imposition of a term of supervised

release is not necessarily final,’ partly because a court ‘may lengthen a term up to

the maximum authorized amount’” (quoting United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d

480, 483 (2d Cir. 2002))).

In sum, on de novo review, we conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) does not

preclude revocation of supervised release on the basis of conduct that earlier

prompted a modification of supervision conditions.    Accordingly, Harris’s

argument that the district court was not authorized to revoke his supervised

release based on his proved narcotics trafficking violation fails on the merits.

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C. Hearsay Challenge

Harris argues that the district court erroneously relied on victim hearsay

statements in finding that, while on federal supervision, he committed the New

York state crime of assault.  Because revocation proceedings are not deemed part

of a criminal prosecution, neither the Confrontation Clause nor the Federal Rules

of Evidence strictly apply to out‐of‐court statements.    See United States v.

Carthen, 681 F.3d 94, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2012).  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that, in such proceedings, a defendant has “the right to confront and cross‐

examine adverse witnesses (unless the [court] specifically finds good cause for

not allowing confrontation).”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).  That

right is protected by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which state that, at

a revocation hearing, a defendant is entitled to “an opportunity to . . . question

any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does

not require the witness to appear.”    Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).    We have

explained that the “good cause” determination underlying an interest‐of‐justice

analysis “requires the court to balance the defendant’s interest in confronting the

declarant against the government’s reasons for not producing the [declarant] and

the reliability of the proffered hearsay.”  United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d at 100

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We review a district court’s

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Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) ruling for abuse of discretion, which encompasses both

“clearly erroneous findings of fact and misapplications of the law.”    United

States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2006).  Neither is evident here.

The district court found good cause for not allowing confrontation in

(1) the assault victim’s professed fear of retaliation, and (2) the reliability of her

statements to law enforcement officers.  As to the first finding, Harris argues that

the court initially misunderstood the government’s submission to indicate that

Harris had threatened the witness.  Any such concern, however, was alleviated

by the prosecutor’s clarification that the victim felt threatened by Harris, not that

he had explicitly issued threats.    Harris further speculates that the victim’s

refusal to appear was animated more by her own criminal conduct than her fear

of retaliation by him.  But that conjecture is belied by record evidence that the

government offered the witness full immunity for self‐disclosed criminal

conduct, as well as the assistance of counsel.  Indeed, the victim’s professed fear

of retaliation by Harris was reasonable given that (1) part of the alleged assault—

the punch in the face—could itself be viewed as retaliation for the victim’s

complaint about the preceding smack to her buttocks, (2) the victim lived in the

same neighborhood as Harris, and (3) none of their mutual neighbors had come

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to her assistance after the assault.  This was sufficient to allow the district court to

conclude that there was “a possibility” of reprisal if the victim were to testify

against Harris.   United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2002); accord

United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d at 101 (recognizing that history of domestic

violence provides good cause for declarant’s absence).

The district court’s finding that reliability was convincingly demonstrated

here is supported by evidence that (1) the victim reported the assault in a 911

call, see Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689–90 (2014) (recognizing that

possibility of tracing and identifying 911 callers provides “some safeguards

against making false reports with immunity”); (2) Officer Ayala observed the

victim’s lacerated lip within 24 hours of the assault; and (3) the victim relayed

consistent accounts of the assault—as well as her fear of reprisal—to each of the

three testifying law enforcement officers, all of whom deemed her credible.  See

generally United States v. Jackson, 347 F. App’x 701, 703 (2d Cir. 2009) (reasoning

that “reliability of both victims’ hearsay accounts . . . was so convincingly

demonstrated as to preclude a finding of abuse in the decision to admit their

statements” despite lack of domestic violence history and one victim’s

recantation), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 963 (2010).  In challenging reliability, Harris

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points to the victim’s consumption of alcohol in the hours prior to the assault.  

He was free to argue that the district court should consider this factor in

weighing her assault account, and fails to show that his ability to do so was

meaningfully undermined by the victim’s failure to appear.   In any event, the

record indicates that the court considered the victim’s consumption of alcohol in

adjudicating the merits of the violation charge and explained why that factor did

not undermine the reliability of her account.

Because Harris thus fails to show any abuse of discretion in the district

court’s Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) ruling, his hearsay challenge fails on the merits.

III. Conclusion

To summarize, we conclude as follows:

1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)’s use of the disjunctive in identifying the

actions a district court may take with respect to defendants serving terms of

supervised release does not limit a court’s authority so as to preclude it from

revoking supervised release after conduct is proved that, when reported, had  

prompted modification of supervision conditions.    Thus, the court here was

authorized to revoke Harris’s supervised release for proved drug trafficking

pursuant to § 3583(e)(3), and as mandated by § 3583(g)(1), even though it had

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previously modified Harris’s supervision—upon first being advised of such

possible trafficking—pursuant to § 3583(e)(2).

2. Because the district court properly balanced Harris’s confrontation

interest against the assault victim’s reasons for refusing to testify and the

reliability of her statements, as required for an interest‐of‐justice finding under

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), the court acted within its discretion in admitting

the victim’s hearsay statements in determining that Harris, while on federal

supervision, had committed a new state crime of assault.

The judgment of the district court revoking supervised release is,

therefore, AFFIRMED.

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