Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-71583/USCOURTS-ca9-13-71583-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rigoberto Vladimir Del Cid Marroquin
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RIGOBERTO VLADIMIR DEL CID

MARROQUIN, AKA Rigoberto De Cid,

AKA Rigo Del Cid, AKA Rigoberto

Del Cid,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 13-71583

Agency No.

A029-558-661

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed May 18, 2016

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit

Judges, and Frederic Block, District Judge.*

Per Curiam Opinion

* The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior U.S. District Judge for the

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of protection under the

Convention Against Torture to a citizen of El Salvador who

fears torture due to his former gang affiliation and gangrelated tattoos.

The panel first held that petitioner’s removal from the

United States did not moot his petition for review. The panel

explained that while granting the petition would not guarantee

petitioner’s return to the United States, because the

government has acknowledged that the Department of

Homeland Security has a policy facilitating the return, in

certain circumstances, of removed aliens whose petitions for

review are granted, it will at least increase his chances of

being allowed to do so. The panel concluded that it could

therefore provide effective relief and petitioner’s removal to

El Salvador did not render the petition moot.

The panel held that substantial evidence supported the

Board’s determination that it is not more likely than not that

petitioner will be tortured in El Salvador. The panel

explained that although gang membership is illegal under

Salvadoran law, petitioner did not establish that the

government tortures former gang members or those with

gang-related tattoos. In addition, the panel noted that

Salvadoran law prohibits extrajudicial killings and violence,

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DEL CID MARROQUIN V. LYNCH 3

and concluded that there is substantial evidence that the

government enforces those laws—albeit imperfectly—

against both gang members and rogue police officers.

COUNSEL

Leon B. Hazany (argued), Law Firm of Leon Hazany &

Associates, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Richard Zanfardino (argued) and Karen Stewart, United

States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of

Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Rigoberto Vladimir Del Cid Marroquin petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) denying his application for protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Garcia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 876,

880 (9th Cir. 2015), and deny the petition. We write

principally to elucidate our conclusion that Del Cid

Marroquin’s removal from the United States did not moot his

petition.

I

Del Cid Marroquin, a native of El Salvador, illegally

entered the United States with his family in 1983, when he

was eight years old. Ten years later, he was convicted of two

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counts of attempted first-degree murder under California law. 

He served eighteen and a half years of two consecutive life

sentences.

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated

expedited removal proceedings when Del Cid Marroquin was

released from prison in 2011. Because of his convictions, Del

Cid Marroquin was ineligible for all forms of relief except

deferral of removal under CAT. Although an immigration

officer concluded that Del Cid Marroquin did not have a

reasonable fear of being tortured in El Salvador, an

immigration judge (“IJ”) reversed that determination and

placed him in “withholding-only” proceedings to adjudicate

his CAT claim.

Del Cid Marroquin’s claim was based on his status as a

former gang member. During his time in the United States,

he had joined a predominantly Mexican gang operating in his

neighborhood and acquired at least one gang-related tattoo. 

Although he had renounced his gang affiliation while in

prison, he testified that if he returned to El Salvador, he

feared being tortured by the national police (“PNC”) or

vigilante groups as part of a nationwide crackdown on gang

activity. He further testified that he feared harm from

powerful gangs in El Salvador, who might view him as a

“traitor” because of his former membership in a rival gang,

his presumed status as a prison informant, or his efforts to

convince other gang members to change their ways. He

described three interactions with Salvadoran gang members

during his incarceration that he perceived as threats on his life

should he return to El Salvador.

In support of Del Cid Marroquin’s claim, Dr. Thomas W.

Ward testified as an expert on social and political conditions

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in El Salvador, particularly with respect to gang activity. He

explained that the Salvadoran government has enacted

legislation—known generally as the Mano Dura (“firm

hand”) initiative— granting PNC officers broad powers to

search for, arrest, and detain possible gang members. Dr.

Ward testified that he had heard accounts of officers beating

detainees, although he did not know the details of any

specific incidents. He further conceded that not all officers

engage in such conduct: “[A]s in any organization, there are

some who follow the rules and some who don’t.”

Dr. Ward testified that in the 1980s and 1990s, manyPNC

officers who didn’t “follow the rules” joined “death squads”

that abducted, tortured and killed gang members. He claimed

to have seen reports that these vigilante groups were

resurfacing, but could not “speak to how they determine who

a potential victim is.” Dr. Ward opined that there was a

“distinct possibility” that Del Cid Marroquin could be

tortured by either PNC officers or a death squad, but was

unable to say that it was more likely than not.

Dr. Ward further opined that Del Cid Marroquin had “an

over 50 percent chance [of] being beaten, physically

assaulted, tortured or killed by enemy gang members because

of his past affiliation with what they consider to be an enemy

gang.” He stated that PNC would be unable to protect him

from gang violence because it is “understaffed, inefficient

and corrupt,” and because “the general attitude of law

enforcement to people who have gang tattoos is that they are

members of a gang and, therefore, they get what they

deserve.”

The IJ denied Del Cid Marroquin’s application for CAT

relief. Although he considered Dr. Ward’s testimony, he

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found it too anecdotal to support the conclusion that Del Cid

Marroquin would more likely than not be tortured in El

Salvador. He further found that the Salvadoran government

did not acquiesce in violence by either vigilante groups or

gangs because it was “taking steps to correct the situation.”

The BIA affirmed in a reasoned decision. It concluded

that Del Cid Marroquin had “not presented sufficient

evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that he

would be subject to torture upon return to El Salvador, at the

instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, the

government.” It cited a State Department issue paper

introduced before the IJ for the propositions that (1) it is not

the policy of the Salvadoran police to arrest or abuse someone

for having a tattoo, (2) there have been no reports of police

carrying out extrajudicial killings of gang members, and

(3) any police involvement in such killings would violate

Salvadoran law-enforcement policy. See Bureau of

Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, U.S. Department of

State, Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations in El Salvador

(2007), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/ 706271/download. 

It agreed with the IJ that “[a] government does not

‘acquiesce’ to torture where the government actively, albeit

not entirely successfully, combats the illegal activities.”

Del Cid Marroquin petitioned for review on May 3, 2013. 

After another panel of this Court denied his request for a stay,

he was removed to El Salvador on November 19, 2013.

II

Del Cid Marroquin’s removal requires us to ask whether

his petition is moot. As the Supreme Court recently

reiterated, “[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the

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DEL CID MARROQUIN V. LYNCH 7

plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at

any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed

and must be dismissed as moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v.

Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). “A case becomes moot, however,

only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual

relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

In the immigration context, we have held that a petition

for review is mooted by the petitioner’s removal from the

United States unless there is “some remaining ‘collateral

consequence’ that may be redressed by success on the

petition.” Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.

2007). In Kaur v. Holder, 561 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009), we

rejected an argument that a ten-year ban on reentry into the

United States constituted a collateral consequence because

the petition for review did not challenge the basis for the ban. 

See id. at 959. By contrast, in Blandino-Medina v. Holder,

712 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 2013), we held that the petitioner’s

removal did not moot his petition because a favorable ruling

would have made it possible—at least hypothetically—for

him to obtain a waiver of the ban on reentry. See id. at 1342.

Del Cid Marroquin’s removal subjects him to the ban on

reentry for removed aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(ii). 

However, he is also inadmissible by virtue of his convictions,

which resulted in two life sentences. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 

He is not eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. See id.

§ 1182(h). Thus, success on his petition would have no effect

on his future admissibility to the United States.

We directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs

identifying any other possible collateral consequences. In

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response, the government asserted that DHS might “parole”

Del Cid Marroquin into the United States if he prevailed on

his CAT claim. Although the regulation it cited, 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.17, does not specifically deal with removed aliens,

DHS does have a policy facilitating the return, in certain

circumstances, of removed aliens whose petitions for review

are granted. See ICE Policy Directive 11061.1 (Feb. 24,

2012), https://www.ice.gov/ doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/

11061.1_current_policy_facilitating_return.pdf.1 Pursuant to

the policy, the government will, “[a]bsent extraordinary

circumstances,” facilitate the return of a removed alien whose

petition for review is granted “if either the [circuit] court’s

decision restores the alien to lawful permanent resident (LPR)

status, or the alien’s presence is necessary for continued

administrative removal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 2. In addition, it

will facilitate the return of a removed alien “whose PFR was

granted [and who] is granted relief by [the Executive Office

for Immigration Review] or [DHS] allowing him or her to

reside in the United States lawfully.” Id.

We solicited a second round of supplemental briefing to

ascertain how ICE Policy Directive 11061.1 would apply to

Del Cid Marroquin. In a letter brief dated April 5, 2016, the

government stated that “ICE ordinarily would facilitate the

return of an alien who prevailed on a petition for review

challenging the denial of CAT protection if the court of

appeals directed an outright grant of CAT protection.” In

further explaining this policy, the government stated that

“[t]he caveat ‘ordinarily’ is needed in light of the possibility

of intervening factual developments which would counsel

against return of a CAT deferral grantee, such as the alien’s

1

ICE—Immigration and Customs Enforcement—is an agency within

DHS.

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DEL CID MARROQUIN V. LYNCH 9

firm resettlement in a third country.” The government also

stated that if the BIA were to “reverse the Immigration

Judge’s decision and find, in light of the overlooked

evidence, that Petitioner is entitled to CAT deferral

protection,” or if the BIA remanded for further proceedings

before the IJ, “ICE ordinarily would facilitate Petitioner’s

return.” We append the government’s full letter brief to this

opinion.

In sum, while granting Del Cid Marroquin’s petition will

not guarantee his return to the United States, it will at least

increase his chances of being allowed to do so. Thus, we can

provide effective relief and his removal to El Salvador does

not render the petition moot.

III

Although the BIA rendered a reasoned decision, it made

repeated references to its agreement with the IJ. “In such

situations, we review the decision of the BIA and look to the

IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s

conclusion.” Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We

review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo. See Edu v.

Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010). We review its

factual findings for substantial evidence, see id., and may not

reverse unless “the evidence not only supports [a contrary]

conclusion, but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 481 n.1 (1992).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that it is

not more likely than not that Del Cid Marroquin will be

tortured in El Salvador. Although gang membership is illegal

under Salvadoran law, Del Cid Marroquin did not establish

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that the government tortures former gang members or those

with gang-related tattoos. In addition, Salvadoran law

prohibits extrajudicial killings and violence, and there is

substantial evidence that the government enforces those

laws—albeit imperfectly—against both gang members and

rogue police officers.

With respect to private violence, the BIA’s decision rests

on a correct understanding of government “acquiescence” in

torture. It cited Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.

2003), in which we explained that the proper inquiry is

whether “public officials demonstrate willful blindness to the

torture of their citizens by third parties.” Id. at 1196 (internal

quotation marks omitted). In addition, the BIA’s statement

that “[a] government does not ‘acquiesce’ to torture where the

government actively, albeit not entirelysuccessfully, combats

the illegal activities” is consistent with our statement in

Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2013), that

a government “does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens

merely because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it.” 

Id. at 1034 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Division

TJS:RMZ:rmz 

DJ 39-12C-42746.03 5 April 2016

________________________________________________________________________

Washington, DC 20530

Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of Court

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

95 Seventh Street

San Francisco, CA 94103-1526

TRANSMITTED VIA CM/ECF

RE: Marroquin v. Lynch

13-71583 (9th Cir.); A029-558-661

Respondent hereby responds to this Court’s Order dated March 22, 2016, 

which directs the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing the 

following two issues: (1) whether, pursuant to the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (“DHS”) “facilitation of return” policy, ICE Policy Directive 11061.1

(Feb. 24, 2012),1 DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) would 

facilitate Petitioner’s return to the United States, if his petition for review were

granted; and (2) “whether deferral of removal under the Convention Against 

Torture is relief ‘allowing [the petitioner] to reside in the United States lawfully,’ 

within the meaning of the policy.” Order (March 22, 2016). Both questions bear 

1 Available at: 

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/11061.1_current_policy_facilit

ating_return.pdf

DEL CID MARROQUIN V. LYNCH 11

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on whether the petition for review is moot, in light of Petitioner’s removal to El 

Salvador. As explained below, ICE’s facilitation of return policy provides an 

avenue for meaningful redress, should the Court rule in Petitioner’s favor on his 

challenge to the agency’s denial of deferral of removal under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). The possibility of such redress counsels against a 

finding of mootness.

I. Possibility of Parole Pursuant to ICE Policy Directive 11061.1

The ICE policy provides, in pertinent part:

Absent extraordinary circumstances, if an alien who prevails 

before the U.S. Supreme Court or a U.S. court of appeals was 

removed while his or her PFR [petition for review] was pending, 

ICE will facilitate the alien’s return to the United States if either 

the court’s decision restores the alien to lawful permanent 

resident status (LPR) status, or the alien’s presence is necessary 

for continued administrative removal proceedings. ICE will 

regard the returned alien as having reverted to the immigration

status he or she held, if any, prior to the entry of the removal 

order and may detain the alien upon his or her return to the 

United States. If the presence of the alien who prevails on his or 

her PFR is not necessary to resolve the administrative 

proceedings, ICE will not facilitate the alien’s return. However, 

if, following remand by the court to the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR), an alien whose PFR was granted 

and who was not returned to the United States is granted relief by 

EOIR or [DHS] allowing him or her to reside in the United States 

lawfully, ICE will facilitate the alien’s return to the United 

States.

See ICE Policy Directive 11061.1 (Feb. 24, 2012).

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Petitioner has never held lawful permanent resident status, and therefore, the

provisions in the policy requiring facilitation of return following restoration of that 

status are inapplicable to his case. However, ICE officials have informed 

undersigned counsel of several scenarios whereby ICE potentially would facilitate 

his return. First, ICE ordinarily would facilitate the return of an alien who 

prevailed on a petition for review challenging the denial of CAT protection if the 

court of appeals directed an outright grant of CAT protection. The caveat 

“ordinarily” is needed in light of the possibility of intervening factual 

developments which would counsel against return of a CAT deferral grantee, such 

as the alien’s firm resettlement in a third country.2 A decision not to facilitate 

return in those circumstances would be consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f), 

which permits removal of an alien “to a third country other than the country to 

which removal has been withheld or deferred.” The Government’s treaty 

obligations under CAT do not require return of Petitioner to the United States if he 

has already obtained a safe haven from torture in a third country. However, we 

have no reason to believe in this case that Petitioner has resettled in a country other 

2 Firm resettlement in a third country is only one of many possible factual 

developments which could lead ICE to decline to facilitate the return of an alien 

who was granted CAT deferral protection. As a general matter, ICE’s decision 

whether to facilitate the return of any alien is heavily dependent on the facts of the 

case.

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than El Salvador, and his counsel represented at oral argument that he has 

remained in that country.

Second, as stated by the policy, ICE would facilitate Petitioner’s return “if 

his presence is necessary for continued administrative proceedings.” Return under 

that provision is heavily dependent on the precise contours of the Court’s remand 

order, and the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) upon 

remand. If, for example, the Court remands the case because it finds that the 

Board failed to address certain evidence in the record, ICE likely would not 

facilitate Petitioner’s return before the Board acted, because, as the policy 

indicates, his presence would not be “necessary to resolve the administrative 

proceedings.” Rather, ICE would wait to see how the Board ruled on remand: (1) 

the Board could again affirm the denial of CAT deferral protection; (2) it could 

reverse the Immigration Judge’s decision and find, in light of the overlooked 

evidence, that Petitioner is entitled to CAT deferral protection; or (3) it could 

remand for further proceedings before the Immigration Judge. ICE ordinarily 

would facilitate Petitioner’s return, pursuant to its return policy under scenarios (2) 

or (3). If, however, the Board again found Petitioner ineligible for CAT protection, 

ICE would not facilitate his return.

At bottom, ICE’s decision whether to facilitate Petitioner’s return to the 

United States hinges on whether the Court’s decision, and any subsequent Board 

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decision upon remand, resolves the issue of his eligibility for CAT deferral 

protection in his favor, or requires his presence for further evidentiary proceedings 

before the Immigration Judge. Either way, the substantive content of the Court’s 

decision will have a real and immediate impact on Petitioner’s ability to return to 

the United States, which signals that the case is not moot.3 In this regard, we note 

that in Kaur v. Holder, 561 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009), the Court did not have 

occasion to consider the possibility of the alien’s return to the United States 

through parole or other means, because ICE had not yet promulgated its return 

policy in ICE Directive 11061.1. Thus, in finding the petition filed by petitioner 

Cheema (Kaur’s husband) moot, the Court looked only to the permanent bar to 

reentry rising from the agency’s unchallenged finding that Cheema was an alien 

3

 Even if ICE determined that Petitioner’s return was not required by Directive 

11061.1 because, for example, the problem identified by the Court could be 

remedied through issuance of a new Board decision, the Court’s decision would 

have a real and substantive impact on Petitioner, as his position before the Board 

on remand would be different than it was, prior to the petition for review. In this 

respect, the mootness question arguably could be analogized to the assessment of 

prevailing party status, for purposes of attorney fees under the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). That is, if Petitioner succeeded on his

petition for review and sought attorney’s fees under the EAJA, Respondent would

be hard-pressed to argue that Petitioner was not a “prevailing party,” as there 

would be a material change in the parties’ positions. See Buckhannon Bd. And 

Care Home, Inc.v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 532 U.S. 598, 

604-06 (2001) (to qualify as a “prevailing party,” the claimant must achieve a 

“material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” and that alteration must 

be “judicially sanctioned.”); see also Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 

2005). It would be anomalous to hold that a case was moot as to an alien who had 

achieved a material alteration in his position before the agency.

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who had engaged in terrorist activities. Id. at 959-60, citing 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). The possibility of parole pursuant to ICE Directive 11061.1 

puts this case on a different footing than Kaur.

II. Deferral Of Removal Provides Country-Specific Protection From 

Removal And, As Such, Is Covered By ICE Policy Directive 11061.1

The Court has also asked whether CAT deferral would constitute “relief 

‘allowing [the petitioner] to reside in the United States lawfully,” for purposes of

ICE Policy Directive 11061.1. As a threshold matter, even had Petitioner not been 

removed to El Salvador, a grant of CAT deferral would not constitute immigration 

“relief,” in the sense of a conferral of status in the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.17(b)(1) (requiring an Immigration Judge to advise a successful CAT deferral 

applicant that deferral protection “[d]oes not confer upon the alien any lawful or 

permanent immigration status in the United States”). When an alien prevails on a 

CAT application, he or she is accorded only protection from removal to the 

country to which removal has been withheld or deferred. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f). 

The removal order remains intact, and the alien may be removed to a third country 

which is willing to accept him. So too, the alien may be removed to the country to 

which removal has been deferred if the Secretary of State obtains diplomatic 

assurances that the alien will not be tortured in that country. 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.18(c). Thus, it would be inaccurate to characterize a grant of CAT deferral 

protection as “relief,” or a form of lawful residence. 

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This much said, undersigned counsel has been informed by ICE that an alien 

with a grant of CAT deferral protection is permitted to be present in the United 

States pursuant to the regulations implementing the CAT, see generally Huang v. 

Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004), and, as such, would be eligible for 

return under ICE Policy Directive 11061.1. This would be the case, regardless of 

whether ICE decided to detain the alien following his parole. Moreover, a 

nondetained alien who has been granted CAT deferral protection can seek 

employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18).4 Such authorization 

obviously is not akin to legal status in the United States, but it does signal that the 

alien is authorized to be present in the country.

4

 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18) permits employment authorization for aliens who are 

subject to a final order of removal and have been released on an order of 

supervision, where the removal order cannot be executed for a variety of reasons. 

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CONCLUSION

Respondent continues to maintain that this petition for review is not moot, 

notwithstanding Petitioner’s removal to El Salvador. Petitioner continues to have a

real and substantial stake in the outcome of the Court’s decision on the merits of 

his challenge to the agency’s denial of CAT deferral protection, as ICE’s Policy 

Directive 11061.1 may result in ICE facilitating his return to the United States, 

depending on the substantive content of the Court’s decision, and any decision by 

the Board upon remand. As Respondent has previously argued, any other 

approach would frustrate Congress’s intent in amending the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”) to eliminate automatic stays of removal, pending judicial 

review. See Zazueto-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003). 

IIRIRA contemplates that ICE will remove aliens without delay after an 

unfavorable Board decision, and allows aliens to continue to litigate their cases 

from abroad. If such removals divested the Court of jurisdiction, the Court would 

need to decide the merits of each petition for review challenging a CAT denial 

when resolving a motion to stay removal – a shift that would mark a significant 

departure from this Court’s current approach to stay litigation, and which would 

abrogate the stay standard announced by the Supreme Court in Nken v. Holder, 556 

U.S. 418 (2009), which requires the alien to make a strong showing of likelihood 

of success on the merits, but does not require him to actually win his case at the 

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stay litigation phase. Such a dramatic change in Ninth Circuit stay litigation is 

unnecessary, however, because the possibility of the alien’s parole into the United 

States pursuant to ICE Policy Directive 11061.1 defeats any claim of mootness. 

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Zanfardino 

RICHARD ZANFARDINO

Trial Attorney

Office of Immigration Litigation

Civil Division

U.S. Department of Justice

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

(202) 305-0489

DEL CID MARROQUIN V. LYNCH 19

 Case: 13-71583, 05/18/2016, ID: 9980801, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 19 of 19