Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-01974/USCOURTS-ca4-08-01974-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Octavia Johnson
Appellant
Lespia King
Appellee
George M. McMillan

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LESPIA KING, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEORGE M. MCMILLAN,

 No. 08-1667

Defendant-Appellant,

and

OCTAVIA JOHNSON,

Defendant. 

LESPIA KING, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

OCTAVIA JOHNSON, in her official

capacity as Sheriff of the City of  No. 08-1713 Roanoke,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

GEORGE M. MCMILLAN,

Defendant. 

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LESPIA KING, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

OCTAVIA JOHNSON, in her official

capacity as Sheriff of the City of  No. 08-1974 Roanoke,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

GEORGE M. MCMILLAN,

Defendant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge.

(7:05-cv-00521-sgw-mfu)

Argued: October 30, 2009

Decided: February 3, 2010

Before MICHAEL, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the

opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Adrian Gibney, Jr., THOMPSON MCMULLAN, PC, Richmond, Virginia; Elizabeth Kay Dillon,

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GUYNN, MEMMER & DILLON, PC, Salem, Virginia, for

Appellants. Terry Neill Grimes, GRIMES & WILLIAMS,

PC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Melvin E.

Williams, GRIMES & WILLIAMS, PC, Roanoke, Virginia,

for Appellee.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

Lespia King, a former deputy in the sheriff’s office for the

City of Roanoke, Virginia, sued Sheriff George McMillan in

his official capacity under Title VII for sexual harassment and

in his individual capacity under Virginia law for battery.

While King’s suit was pending, Octavia Johnson replaced

McMillan as sheriff, and the district court substituted Johnson

as the defendant in her official capacity in King’s Title VII

claim. The jury found for King on both claims. On appeal

Sheriff Johnson argues that because each sheriff in Virginia

is by state law a singular entity with an independent tenure,

she could not be substituted in her official capacity as the successor to McMillan in the Title VII claim. Because acceptance

of this argument would allow state law to override Title VII

in violation of the Supremacy Clause, we conclude that Johnson’s substitution was proper. Both Johnson and McMillan

challenge the district court’s rulings on the admission of certain evidence and the court’s denial of their motions regarding

liability and damages allowable. For the reasons explained

below, we also reject these challenges. Accordingly, the judgments against both Johnson and McMillan are affirmed.

I.

A.

In August 2005 Lespia King, who had served as a deputy

in the Roanoke sheriff’s office, sued Sheriff George McMilKING v. MCMILLAN 3

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lan in the Western District of Virginia. King sued McMillan

in his official capacity for sexual harassment in her employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and in his individual

capacity for battery under Virginia state law. While the suit

was pending, Sheriff McMillan lost a reelection bid to Sheriff

Octavia Johnson. Thereafter, the district court, invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), substituted Johnson in her

official capacity as the defendant in King’s Title VII claim.

Because King prevailed at trial, we recite the facts in the light

most favorable to her. ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. Nat’l Union

Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 113 (4th Cir. 2006).

B.

In the summer of 2000, when she was twenty-two years

old, King started her first full-time job as a jail deputy, working for Sheriff McMillan. Although Sheriff McMillan told his

employees that he did not tolerate sexual harassment, he qualified this avowal by informing them that he was a "touchyfeely person" and that he liked touching people when he

talked with them. J.A. 141. This self-characterization was an

understatement when it came to McMillan’s interactions with

King during the four years she worked as one of McMillan’s

deputies. 

Every six or eight weeks, on average, King had an encounter with McMillan during which McMillan made her uncomfortable by touching her in sexually aggressive ways and by

making inappropriate (or suggestive) comments. The offensive remarks began during King’s job interview with McMillan, when he told her that she was an attractive woman who

would be "hit[ ] on" by male police officers. J.A. 266. Thereafter, when King encountered McMillan at work, he insisted

on hugging her. King responded by "tens[ing] up" and trying

to hug McMillan from the side to avoid frontal contact, but

McMillan would grab her for a more invasive hug, slide his

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arms down her back, and place them around her buttocks. J.A.

263. McMillan also told King that he liked her hair long.

About a month after King started her job, McMillan was at

the shooting range and happened to notice that King was having difficulty putting on her new leather gun belt. Unsolicited,

McMillan stepped in to assist, touching King repeatedly in the

waist area as he inserted the fasteners around her inner belt.

This incident embarrassed King and made her "very uncomfortable." J.A. 267. McMillan’s recurring harassment caused

King to dread having contact with him; when she could, she

would hide to avoid him.

King was especially intimidated by McMillan for two reasons. First, he controlled her job and working conditions, and

there was no one superior to him in the chain of command.

Second, he was "physically overwhelming" — six feet four

inches tall, weighing 270 pounds. J.A. 323. King, on the other

hand, was five feet four inches tall and weighed about 120

pounds when she began working for McMillan.

In 2003 King met privately with McMillan to request a

shift transfer. Several times during the meeting McMillan patted King’s knee or touched her leg. He also asked her to sit

on his lap and told her that she would have to choose him

over her boyfriend (also a sheriff’s office employee) if she

wanted a transfer or promotion. Worried that McMillan would

not approve the shift transfer otherwise, King sat on McMillan’s lap and gave him a hug. McMillan then asked for a kiss.

To get out of the situation, King tried to give McMillan a "dry

peck" on the cheek, but he turned his head so that the kiss

landed on his lips. J.A. 272.

Sometime later, at a regional jail association dinner,

McMillan seized the opportunity to take further liberties with

King. McMillan greeted King by hugging her, sliding his

hands downward, and placing them around her buttocks.

McMillan then told King that he would hold her until her boyKING v. MCMILLAN 5

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friend noticed and became jealous. As word of the incident

spread, several of King’s coworkers commented to her that

she had been "struck by the gropealope," a phrase used by

some to describe McMillan and his harassment. J.A. 275.

King was "very embarrass[ed]" because "[i]t seemed like

everybody knew that [she] had been pawed at [and] grabbed

in public at a dinner." J.A. 276. After these incidents King

suffered health problems, including weight gain, temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ), sleeplessness, and nightmares about McMillan.

By early 2004 King had concluded that working under

McMillan was intolerable, and she applied for another job.

McMillan learned of this development, and on March 10,

2004, he called King into a conference room and shut the

door. He urged her not to quit. He told her that she "could

have a great career" in his office and gain an immediate promotion to the "position that [she] wanted" (working in the

courtroom), if she would just choose him over her boyfriend.

J.A. 278. McMillan also told King that she was very attractive, that he liked her longer hair style, that her "legs looked

really, really good" in the skirt she had worn to the jail association dinner, and that she would be dating him if he were

younger. J.A. 279. At the end of the meeting McMillan asked

King for a hug, grabbed her around her waist, and pulled her

down to sit on his lap. McMillan told King that he would not

let her go until she gave him a kiss. King tried to give him a

peck on the cheek, but McMillan insisted upon a "real kiss."

J.A. 280. After McMillan forced a full kiss on King’s lips, she

ran out of the room into a restroom, where she cried for about

ten minutes. King submitted a letter of resignation several

days later.

The district court admitted testimony, over objection from

McMillan and Johnson, from other women who worked for

McMillan, either as employees or providers of contractual

services, and who were sexually harassed by him. The women

testified that McMillan made inappropriate sexual remarks to

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them, asked them for kisses and hugs, and touched them in

ways that made them feel uncomfortable. 

C.

The jury returned liability verdicts for King on both the

Title VII and battery claims. The jury awarded King $50,000

in compensatory damages on the Title VII claim, $175,000 in

compensatory damages on the battery claim, and $100,000 in

punitive damages on the battery claim. The court remitted the

compensatory damages on the battery claim to $50,000, and

the judgment order provided that there could be only one

recovery for compensatory damages, not to exceed $50,000.

Johnson and McMillan both appeal. Johnson argues that the

district court improperly substituted her under Rule 25(d) as

a defendant, in her official capacity, in King’s Title VII claim.

Both Johnson and McMillan challenge the district court’s

admission of the testimony from other women, who described

McMillan’s harassment of them. McMillan challenges the

court’s denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law

on the battery claim, its allowance of punitive damages on

that claim, and its denial of his motion for a new trial. Johnson also claims that the district court’s evidentiary rulings

entitle her to a new trial.

II.

A.

Sheriff Johnson contends that the district court erred in substituting her, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), as

the defendant in place of McMillan in King’s Title VII claim,

which was filed against McMillan in his official capacity.

Johnson argues that she, in her official capacity, cannot be

substituted as McMillan’s successor because under Virginia

law "her service as Sheriff beg[an] an entire new office, unrelated to McMillan’s regime." Appellant’s Br. at 13. We reject

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Johnson’s argument because the Supremacy Clause does not

permit the use of state law to cut off — through denial of Rule

25(d) substitution — a Title VII (official capacity) claim

brought against a state official who leaves office while the

claim is pending.

The Constitution of Virginia requires "the qualified voters

of each county and city" to elect a sheriff. Va. Const. art. VII,

§ 4; see also Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1600 (repeating the constitutional requirement). Sheriffs appoint their own deputies,

Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1603, and a deputy’s term extends for

the term of the appointing sheriff, see id. (providing that deputy may perform duties "during [appointing sheriff’s] continuance in office"); Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 663

(W.D. Va. 1977), rev’d in part on other grounds, 589 F.2d

753 (4th Cir. 1978). These provisions, Johnson maintains,

confirm that Virginia law does not create an institutional

"sheriff’s office." Rather, she claims that each sheriff is a

"singular entity," circumscribed by his or her term of office,

who is "legally independent" of predecessors and successors.

Appellant’s Br. at 14. Because Virginia law creates each sheriff as a separate and independent entity, Johnson claims that

she cannot be substituted under Rule 25(d) in her official

capacity in King’s Title VII claim to be liable for McMillan’s

conduct during his term. 

If we accepted Johnson’s argument, it would permit states

to draft laws defining state and local offices in such a way as

to limit the liability of their occupants under federal law.

Regardless of whether Johnson reads Virginia law correctly

with respect to the circumscribed authority of an individual

sheriff, Virginia law cannot override Title VII employer liability. The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution,

and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .

any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus,

"[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution,"

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the "relative importance to the State of its own law is not

material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for

any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged

power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law,

must yield." Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The 1972 amendments

to Title VII expanded the statute "to bring the States [and their

political subdivisions] within its purview," and the Supreme

Court has held that these amendments are an express abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427

U.S. 445, 448-49 & n.2, 457 (1976). In sum, state law demarcations of particular offices cannot be used to cut off the (federal) Title VII rights of state and local employees. 

The district court properly concluded that Virginia law

could not bar Sheriff Johnson’s substitution, in her official

capacity, as the defendant in King’s Title VII claim when

Johnson succeeded McMillan as sheriff. Rule 25(d) provides

that an "action does not abate when a public officer who is a

party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases

to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party." The advisory

committee notes confirm that the rule is "merely a procedural

device for substituting a successor for a past officeholder."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) advisory committee’s note (1961

amendment). The rule "does not affect any substantive issues

which may be involved in the action." Id.

Sheriff Johnson argues that because she is a singular and

independent entity under Virginia law, she cannot be a successor under Rule 25(d). Johnson misunderstands what it

means to be a successor under the rule. It simply means that

she followed Sheriff McMillan as sheriff of the City of Roanoke and that King’s Title VII claim against Sheriff McMillan

in his official capacity did not abate when he left office.

Rather, the official capacity claim continues in the name of

Sheriff Johnson, who is not personally liable for Title VII violations committed during Sheriff McMillan’s term. Rule 25(d)

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thus protects the public employee who may need more than

the original Title VII defendant’s term of office to litigate her

official capacity claim. 

Our court has not allowed the argument that each Virginia

sheriff is a legally separate entity to interfere with the determination of an appropriate remedy under Title VII. In United

States v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239, 1246 (4th Cir. 1989), we

rejected a Virginia sheriff’s assertion that his separate and

independent status under state law precluded an award of

injunctive relief against him under Title VII for the discriminatory practices of a prior sheriff. As we noted, "[u]nder federal law, Title VII remedies have not been limited to

correcting only ongoing discriminatory policies." Id. "District

courts clearly have the authority and should exercise the

power to grant injunctive relief even after apparent discontinuance of unlawful practices." Id. (emphasis added). Although

Gregory addressed injunctive relief, its reasoning applies to

monetary relief: this relief should not be denied because the

discriminatory acts were committed by a prior sheriff. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b), 2000e-5(g)(1) (providing for both injunctive and monetary relief). 

We affirm the district court’s decision to substitute, pursuant to Rule 25(d), Sheriff Johnson in her official capacity as

defendant in place of Sheriff McMillan with respect to King’s

Title VII claim.

B.

McMillan and Johnson argue that the district court erred in

admitting the testimony of other women who said they were

sexually harassed by McMillan while they worked for him in

the sheriff’s office. We review a district court’s rulings on the

admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2006). The district

court ruled that the testimony of other victims was admissible

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because it was relevant to King’s Title VII claim and because

its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice. 

Testimony from other employees describing their own

experiences of harassment by the defendant is often relevant

to a plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. Fox v. GMC,

247 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (pointing to testimony of

other employees regarding supervisors’ treatment in concluding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of hostile work

environment under the Americans with Disabilities Act).

Here, the district court properly determined that the testimony of the other women was relevant to two elements of

King’s hostile work environment claim: (1) whether McMillan’s unwelcome conduct was because of King’s sex, and (2)

whether the unwelcome conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create a hostile work environment. See Ziskie v.

Minetta, 547 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2008) (detailing elements of hostile work environment claim). Further, the court

took the precaution of instructing the jury that the testimony

of others was relevant to the "severe or pervasive" element

only if King "was aware of [the harassment described in the

testimony] during the course of her employment." J.A. 490S.

As for testimony about incidents of harassment that King was

not aware of, the court correctly instructed the jury that this

testimony was relevant to the element of whether McMillan’s

unwelcome conduct toward King was because of her sex. See,

e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110

(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that "plaintiff’s knowledge of harassment or pervasively sexist attitudes is not . . . a requirement

for admitting testimony on those subjects" because testimony

is probative of discriminatory intent). In an effort to prevent

the introduction of testimony about McMillan’s harassment

that King was unaware of, Johnson’s counsel offered to stipulate that if there was sexual harassment, it was because of

King’s sex. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

rejecting the stipulation on the ground that the testimony was

relevant to prove an element of the Title VII claim, even

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though the existence of the element (because of sex) was

fairly obvious. Further, the court conducted a Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 analysis and concluded that the probative value

of the testimony concerning conduct that King was unaware

of was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice. The court further concluded that it could avoid

unfair prejudice by only admitting testimony of harassment

that occurred during "the same timeframe" of King’s employment. J.A. 158. "Rule 403 judgments are preeminently the

province of the trial courts," United States v. Love, 134 F.3d

595, 603 (4th Cir. 1998), and the district court’s careful analysis in this case merits our deference.

McMillan argues that the district court erred by not

expressly instructing the jury that the testimony of female

employees was relevant only to the Title VII claim and that

it could not be considered in the state-law battery claim

against McMillan. The prejudice caused by the court’s failure

to give this specific instruction, McMillan contends, is evidenced by the fact that the jury awarded King significantly

more damages on the battery claim ($175,000 compensatory

and $100,000 punitive) than the damages on the Title VII

claim ($50,000 compensatory). McMillan maintains that the

punitive aspect that the district court believed was included in

the compensatory damages for battery stemmed from the jury

hearing the testimony of other female employees. 

We review the district court’s decisions on jury instructions

for abuse of discretion. Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340

F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2003). "Instructions will be considered

adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the whole

record, [they] adequately [informed] the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury

to the prejudice of the existing party." Id. (internal quotations

omitted). "If we find the instructions flawed, we will not

reverse unless the error seriously prejudiced the challenging

party’s case." Id.

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The instructions regarding the testimony of the other

female employees were adequately keyed to the elements of

King’s Title VII hostile work environment claim. The district

court’s refusal to give McMillan’s instruction with respect to

limiting this testimony to the Title VII claim did not amount

to an abuse of discretion. Taken as a whole, the instructions

correctly explained the law and did not comingle King’s two

claims. The interrogatories provided to the jury separated

King’s two claims into (1) whether "sexual harassment in her

work place was so pervasive or severe as to alter the terms of

her employment and create a hostile work environment" and

(2) whether "McMillan battered King." J.A. 490D. The

instructions regarding the testimony of other female employees referred to these employees’ "alleged incidents of sexual

harassment by George McMillan." J.A. 490S. The instructions

then said that the evidence was received as evidence of

whether McMillan’s harassment of King was based on her sex

and whether it was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Id. The

clear implication of the instructions was that the testimony of

the other women was relevant only to King’s Title VII claim.

Further, the court reduced the risk of confusion by instructing

the jury that the testimony was not character evidence.

Finally, even if we assume that there was some prejudice to

McMillan on the battery claim as a result of the testimony of

the other women and the instructions, the court took sufficient

curative measures by remitting the compensatory damages for

battery to $50,000 — a $125,000 reduction. 

C.

McMillan argues that the district court erred in denying his

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 50 motion for judgment

as a matter of law on King’s battery claim because the evidence established that King consented to McMillan’s touching at the March 10, 2004, meeting. We review de novo a

district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion. ABT Bldg. Prods.

Corp., 472 F.3d at 113. "[T]he issue for assessment on appeal

is whether there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for

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a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party, to find for that party." Id. "If

reasonable minds could differ about the verdict, we are

obliged to affirm." Id.

"The tort of battery is an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified." Koffman v. Garnett,

574 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va. 2003). The question of whether a

touching was consented to is for the jury. Here, a reasonable

jury could easily decide that King’s compliance with Sheriff

McMillan’s request for a kiss in March 2004 was motivated

by fear and did not amount to consent. The facts, viewed in

the light most favorable to King, establish that she was alone

and behind closed doors with a man who controlled her job

and who was physically overpowering. McMillan forced the

one-on-one meeting with King to persuade her — against her

will — to remain in his employment, a circumstance that

amplified her anxiety and fear. Part of her fear of McMillan

stemmed from his ultimate authority, including his ability,

through unfavorable recommendations, to make it difficult for

her to work in her chosen field (law enforcement). McMillan’s request for a kiss came after he commented on King’s

physical attractiveness, after he suggested that the two of

them would be dating were it not for King’s boyfriend, and

most important, after he grabbed her around the waist and

pulled her down onto his lap. McMillan kept his arms around

King’s waist and said he would not let her go until she kissed

him. King tried to mitigate the offensiveness of this inescapable, uninvited contact by giving McMillan a "peck on the

cheek." J.A. 280. Unsatisfied, McMillan demanded a "real

kiss." Id. King reluctantly complied by pursing her lips, but

McMillan, ever-determined, turned the kiss into an invasive

one. Thereafter, King fled the room and cried for about ten

minutes. There was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury

to conclude that King did not consent to the physical maltreatment she suffered at the hands of McMillan on March 10,

2004. McMillan’s Rule 50(b) motion was properly denied.

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D.

McMillan argues that the district court committed further

error in handling the state-law battery claim against him,

asserting that the court (1) should not have given a punitive

damages instruction, (2) should have further remitted King’s

compensatory damages, and (3) should have remitted the

punitive damages award. 

When there is no constitutional challenge to a jury’s award

of punitive damages, a "federal district court reviews such an

award by applying the state’s substantive law of punitive

damages under standards imposed by federal procedural law."

Atlas Food Sys. & Servs. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, 99 F.3d

587, 593 (4th Cir. 1996). "Thus, the district court is to determine whether the jury’s verdict is within the confines set by

state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards

developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur

should be ordered." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). We review the district court’s determination under these

standards for an abuse of discretion. Defender Indus. v. Nw.

Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 506 (4th Cir. 1991).

Virginia law authorizes punitive damages not only for malicious conduct but also for "negligence which is so willful or

wanton as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others." Etherton v. Doe, 597 S.E.2d 87, 90 (Va. 2004). "[A]

jury’s award of damages may not be set aside by a trial court

. . . unless the damages are so excessive" as to "create the

impression that the jury has been influenced by passion or

prejudice or has in some way misconceived or misunderstood

the facts or the law." Downer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 507 S.E.2d

612, 614 (Va. 1998).

The March 10, 2004, incident amounted to malicious conduct on McMillan’s part toward King or at least evinced

McMillan’s conscious disregard of King’s rights. The incident

was the immediate by-product of King’s wrenching decision

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to seek another job in order to free herself from McMillan’s

oppressive harassment. McMillan forced King to submit to

his harassing comments and physical contact. McMillan inappropriately commented on King’s long hair, legs, and overall

attractiveness. When King acknowledged that she was "seriously considering" quitting her job with McMillan, he said

that she could have a "great career" in his office, and a better

position immediately, if she would only "choose him" over

her boyfriend. J.A. 279. He pulled her down and held her

around the waist until she agreed to kiss him. This conduct

evinced nothing short of a conscious disregard of King’s

rights to be free from harassment and to make uncoerced

career choices. McMillan’s battery of King warranted the

imposition of punitive damages.

McMillan contends that, even if punitive damages were

justified, the $100,000 amount was excessive because it

reflected the jury’s passion and prejudice upon hearing the

testimony of other female employees — testimony that did

not pertain to the March 2004 incident that formed the basis

of the battery claim. The district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the punitive damages award. The court

properly instructed the jury that its punitive damages award,

if any, should be fixed "using calm discretion and sound reason," uninfluenced by "sympathy or dislike." J.A. 490C.

McMillan’s conduct during the March 2004 meeting was

beyond egregious. The district court properly concluded that

the jury, in compliance with the court’s instructions, based its

punitive award on McMillan’s treatment of King during the

relevant incident, not McMillan’s behavior towards other

female employees. 

We also reject McMillan’s contention that the amount of

damages (as remitted) on the battery claim was excessive. A

trial court’s evaluation of an award of compensatory damages

is less searching than its evaluation of an award of punitive

damages. A "trial judge’s determination that a jury’s award of

compensatory damages is not excessive will not be set aside

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unless the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence,

or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a

miscarriage of justice." Johnson v. Hugo’s Skateway, 974

F.2d 1408, 1414 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).

For punitive damages, however, the trial court "must compare

its own independent judgment on the appropriate amount with

the jury’s award to determine whether the jury’s award is so

excessive as to work an injustice." Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med.

Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548 (4th Cir. 2003). We review the

district court’s determinations for abuse of discretion. Id.

The district court reasoned that the jury’s compensatory

damages award of $175,000 on King’s battery claim was

excessive because it significantly exceeded the compensatory

award on her Title VII claim, which encompassed far more of

McMillan’s unlawful conduct. The court believed that the

compensatory damages award for battery "appear[ed] to

include a punitive element." J.A. 512. The court accordingly

remitted the compensatory damages to $50,000 — the same

amount awarded on the Title VII claim. We agree with the

court’s reasoning and conclude that it acted well within its

discretion by choosing to remit the compensatory damages for

battery. The resulting $50,000 award was not excessive. The

jury’s verdict that McMillan committed battery against King

was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and the ultimate damages award is reasonable given the harm that King

suffered, including her weight gain, TMJ, sleeplessness, and

nightmares.

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by declining

to remit the punitive damages on the battery claim after remitting the compensatory damages. As discussed above, the evidence supported a punitive damages instruction under

Virginia law. That the district court found an apparent punitive element in the compensatory award — and corrected for

that by remittitur — does not mean it was also obliged to

remit the punitive award. The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the injured plaintiff whole for losses actually

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suffered, whereas punitive damages serve to "punish the

defendant for malicious conduct or to display to others an

example of the consequences they may expect if they engage

in similar conduct." F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d

595, 599 (Va. 1973). In light of these objectives, we cannot

say that the district court abused its discretion by leaving the

jury’s punitive award for battery undisturbed. An award of

punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, Little v. Cooke, 652 S.E.2d 129, 142 (Va.

2007), and the district court acted within its discretion by

independently determining that the $100,000 punitive award

was not disproportionate to the compensatory award, remitted

to $50,000.

E.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

McMillan’s and Johnson’s motions for a new trial under Rule

59. "In considering a motion for a new trial, a trial judge may

weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses,

and if he finds the verdict is against the clear weight of the

evidence, is based on false evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice, he must set aside the verdict, even if supported by substantial evidence, and grant a new trial."

Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g

Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal citations

omitted). "The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new

trial is within the sound discretion of the district court and

will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Id. As our previous discussion establishes, the jury’s

verdicts on liability and the ultimate damages assessments are

not against the clear weight of the evidence, nor do they in

any way perpetuate a miscarriage of justice. In particular, the

district court acted within its discretion by remitting the compensatory damages on the battery claim rather than granting

a new trial.

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III.

The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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