Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-08073/USCOURTS-ca10-16-08073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Pearson Thain
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

In re: JAMES PEARSON THAIN, 

 Movant.

No. 16-8073

(D.C. Nos. 1:15-CV-00086-NDF,

2:14-CR-00066-NDF-1 &

2:14-CR-00179-NDF-1)

(D. Wyo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BRISCOE and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

James Pearson Thain pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery, one count of 

using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and one count of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm. He also agreed to plead guilty to nine counts of bank 

robbery set forth in an information filed in the District of Utah. He was sentenced to 

twenty-seven years in prison. He did not file a direct appeal. 

Mr. Thain subsequently filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside 

or correct his sentence. During those proceedings, he filed a motion for leave to amend 

his § 2255 motion to add a claim based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The district court denied the motion to amend and 

denied the § 2255 motion on the merits. Mr. Thain did not seek to appeal from the 

district court’s decision. 

Mr. Thain now seeks authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, 

relying on the Johnson decision. For the reasons that follow, we deny the motion. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 19, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 16-8073 Document: 01019659415 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 1 
2

The Johnson decision voided in part the definition of a qualifying “violent felony” 

used for sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The 

problematic part of the definition is known as the “residual clause” and covers any crime 

that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that “imposing an 

increased sentence under the residual clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution’s 

guarantee of due process.” 135 S. Ct. at 2563. And in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

1257, 1268 (2016), the Court held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that 

applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

We may authorize the filing of a second or successive § 2255 motion if it relies on 

“a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2); see also id. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(C). Mr. Thain asserts that his “sentence is based on an application of the 

ACCA’s residual clause” and that “[Johnson] renders [his] sentence as without sufficient 

basis to remain standing.” Mot. for Auth. at 6. 

In his initial § 2255 proceedings, the district court rejected Mr. Thain’s attempt to 

amend his § 2255 motion to add a Johnson claim. In doing so, the district court 

explained that “Johnson is inapplicable to Thain’s case . . . because Thain’s sentence was 

not enhanced under the residual clause. Therefore, Thain cannot rely on Johnson to 

vacate his sentence.” United States v. Thain, No. 2:14-CR-00066-NDF, Doc. 81 at 4 

(D. Wyo. Aug. 11, 2015). The court further explained that “Johnson is inapplicable to 

Thain, because he was convicted of crimes not falling under the residual clause.” Id. at 5. 

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Instead, the court noted that Mr. Thain’s prior convictions for bank robbery fell under the 

elements clause in the ACCA. See id. (“His bank robberies ‘ha[ve] as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’” 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). 

Given these circumstances, Mr. Thain has failed to make a prima facie showing 

that he is entitled to authorization based on Johnson. The district court—the same court 

that sentenced Mr. Thain—held that his prior bank robbery convictions made him an 

armed career criminal under language in the ACCA that Johnson did not call into 

question. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563 (“Today’s decision does not call into question 

application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s 

definition of a violent felony.”). A challenge to a sentence enhancement predicated on 

application of the elements clause of the ACCA is not based on the holding in Johnson.

Accordingly, we deny Mr. Thain’s motion for authorization. This denial of 

authorization “shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for 

rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Appellate Case: 16-8073 Document: 01019659415 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 3