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Parties Involved:
Jesus Ochoa-Fabian
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

~niteo ~tates <1lourt of J\ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

June 28, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 89-2283 - USA v. Ochoa-Fabian 

Filed June 10, 1991 by Judge Sherman G. Finesilver 

TELEPHONE 

!303) 844·3157 

!FTS) 564·3157 

Attached is a new page 8 to be substituted for page 8 in the original 

opinion which was sent to you on June 10, 1991. In the fourth line from 

the bottom of the first paragraph, the last word, "departure", has been 

changed to "adjustment". 

RLH:kc 

enclosure 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 1 
1990). The Sentencing Commission recognized that this guideline 

was not intended to apply to a defendant that puts the prosecution 

to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential elements 

of the offense, is convicted, and post-trial admits guilt and 

expresses remorse. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l comment. (n.2). In fact, the 

sentencing judge recognized this premise when he indicated that 

"I'm troubled that defense counsel seems to suggest that somebody 

can go to trial, put the government to the expense of trial and 

then somehow or other contend that they're admitting 

responsibility." Transcript at 195. Appellant's eleventh hour 

attempt to accept responsibility brought into question whether he 

manifested a true remorse for his criminal conduct. United States 

v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1040 (lOth Cir. 1990). We cannot say that 

the sentencing court's decision to decline appellant's late 

acceptance of responsibility and afford him a downward adjustment 

was clearly erroneous. Id. That court is in a better position 

than the appellate court to weigh the defendant's sincerity of 

remorse and contrition. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence and judgment 

of the district court. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

FILEDuaitd States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 0 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

C!erk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JESUS OCHOA-FABIAN, 

afk/a JOSE JESUS FABIAN-OCHOA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 89-2283 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 89-169-JB-01) 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

James Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney, (Rhonda P. 

Backinoff, Assistant United States Attorney and William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and FINESILVER, District 

Judge. 1 

FINESILVER, Chief District Judge. 

The appellant, Jesus Ochoa-Fabian, appeals his conviction and 

prison sentence on a one-count indictment for unlawfully and 

1 The Honorable Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 3 
intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute more than 

100 kilograms of marijuana, a schedule I controlled substance, in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (B) and 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2. Appellant argues that his conviction was the result of an 

improper jury instruction. He also takes exception to the district 

court's application of the United States Sentencing Commission 

Guidelines relating to the acceptance of responsibility of a 

convicted offender. We AFFIRM. 

I. 

Appellant was charged in a one-count indictment together with 

two codefendants, Jose Daniel Gazes-Grajales and Victoriano DiazOlivas, with violations of the noted federal drug statutes. We 

are solely concerned with the disposition of appellant's case. 

At a jury trial, four witnesses were called by the government. 

Of current import was the testimony of Agent Michael Dalton of the 

United States Border Patrol, Agent Charles Justice of the United 

States Border Patrol, and Agent Richard Sanders of the United 

States Drug Enforcement Agency. Agent Dalton testified that on 

March 3, 1989, appellant entered the Border Patrol checkpoint 

located on Interstate 10 at approximately 7:35 p.m. He was driving 

a 1979 Ford pickup truck with a camper shell attached. The 

codefendants were passengers in the vehicle. 

Agent Dalton detected a strong odor of perfume or deodorant 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 4 
which he believed was used to mask the odor of marijuana. Upon 

questioning, appellant stated that he was coming from El Paso, 

Texas, and going to California to seek employment. Agent Dalton 

noted that the bed of the pickup was freshly carpeted, containing 

only a spare tire and a six-pack of beer. When he saw no luggage 

in the vehicle and realized that Gazes-Grajales did not have a 

permit to travel more than twenty-five miles from the border, he 

became "very suspicious." Agent Dalton asked for and received 

permission to walk a drug-sniffing dog around the vehicle. 

Agent Justice, a trained dog handler, testified that he 

brought a drug-sniffing dog to the pickup. Through appropriate 

activity, the dog indicated to Agent Justice that illicit drugs 

were hidden in the vehicle. After peeling back a bit of the 

carpet, Agent Justice found a compartment which contained 

marijuana. The three occupants of the vehicle were formally 

arrested. 

Agent Sanders testified that he interviewed the three 

individuals at the scene. They indicated that they had met at a 

bar in Juarez, Mexico, and decided appellant and Diaz-Olivas would 

travel with Gazes-Grajales to Arizona. Gazes-Grajales would stay 

in Arizona while the others would proceed to California. Agent 

Sanders stated that appellant's lack of nervousness at the 

checkpoint was suspicious. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 5 
At the close of testimony, the government submitted a 

"deliberate ignorance" instruction. Despite appellant's objection, 

the instruction was read to the jury. It stated, 

"[t]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences 

drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes 

to what would otherwise be obvious to him. A finding beyond 

a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid 

enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated 

another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred 

from willful blindness to the existence of the fact. The 

required knowledge is established if the defendant is aware of 

a high probability of the existence of the fact in question 

unless he actually believes it does not exist. It is entirely 

up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing of the 

eyes, and the inference to be drawn from any such evidence. 

A showing of negligence or mistake is not sufficient to 

support a finding of willfulness or knowledge." 

The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Ochoa-Fabian. 

Appellant had maintained his innocence throughout the trial 

preparation and immediately after his conviction. He ultimately 

wrote a letter to the trial judge admitting his guilt. The United 

States Probation Department stated in the Presentence Report that 

appellant had not accepted responsibility for the offense and was 

not entitled to a downward departure under § 3El.l of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. Based upon an offense level of twenty-six, 

the applicable guideline range was sixty-three to seventy-eight 

months. 

The court declined to grant the appellant a downward departure 

for acceptance of responsibility. Appellant was sentenced to 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 6 
sixty-three months in prison, followed by four years of supervised 

release. 

II. 

The purpose of a deliberate ignorance instruction is to alert 

the jury that the avoidance of knowledge of particular facts may 

circumstantially show that the avoidance was motivated by 

sufficient guilty knowledge to satisfy the specific criminal 

statute. United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248 

(lOth Cir. 1987). This type of instruction may be given when the 

evidence points to deliberate ignorance and conscious avoidance of 

actual knowledge. United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 642 (lOth 

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 u.s. 1005 (1984). 

Sufficient evidence was offered at trial to support the 

court's instruction. While a deliberate ignorance instruction is 

not appropriate when the evidence points solely to direct 

knowledge, where, as here, the evidence supports both actual 

knowledge and deliberate ignorance, the instruction is properly 

given. Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 249. Our opinion in United States v. 

Ashby, 864 F.2d 690 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 1793 

( 1990), a case remarkably similar to the instant one, offers 

guidance on this issue. In Ashby, we held that the smell of 

marijuana in a car and the recovery of marijuana from the trunk of 

the automobile created sufficient belief that the lack of knowledge 

may have been deliberate. Ashby, 864 F.2d at 694. Considering the 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 7 
strong similiarity between these cases, we believe that the trial 

court did not err in giving this instruction. 

The preferable form of such instruction informs the jury that 

the required knowledge is established if the accused is aware of a 

high probability of the existence of the fact in question, unless 

he actually believes it does not exist. Id. at 643. The tendered 

instruction satisfies this standard. The actual verbiage of this 

standard was included directly in the text. Furthermore, the 

instruction appropriately prevented the conviction of a defendant 

that did not have guilty knowledge. Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 248. We 

are persuaded that reading this instruction to the jury was 

appropriate. 

III. 

Construction of the United States Sentencing Guidelines is a 

question of law subject to plenary review. United States v. 

Walker, No. 90-6115, slip op. at 7 (lOth Cir. Apr. 22, 1991); 

United states v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

111 s. Ct. 190 (1990). Under United States Sentencing Guideline § 

3El.l, a defendant may receive an offense level reduction of two 

levels if he "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative 

acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." 

The Sentencing Guidelines Commission has recognized that the 

sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's 

acceptance of responsibility, necessitating that his determination 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 8 
be entitled to great deference on review. u.s.s.G. S 3El.l., 

comment. (n.5). Hence, in reviewing the trial court's decision not 

to grant the defendant a downward departure under this guideline, 

we apply the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Ross, 

920 F.2d 1530, 1537 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Spedalieri, 

910 F.2d 707, 712 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance 

of the evidence that he is entitled to a reduction of the offense 

level for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. 

Whitehead, 912 F.2d 448, 450 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1040 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1460 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 

396 (1990); United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 924 (lOth Cir,), 

cert. denied, 111 s. ct. 113 (1990). Combining this burden with 

the application of the clearly erroneous standard, the trial 

court's assessment is entitled to deference by the appellate court 

and will generally be sustained. Whitehead, 912 F. 2d at 451; 

Trujillo, 906 F.2d at 1460; see United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 

1394, 1402 (lOth cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. ct. 761 (1991). 

The district court has substantial discretion on the issue of 

timeliness of the acceptance of responsibility. Trujillo, 906 F. 2d 

at 1461. The trial court's decision that appellant's effort to 

accept responsibility after trial was untimely is well-founded. 

United States v. Pelayo-Munoz, 905 F.2d 1429, 1431 (lOth Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2283 Document: 01019297889 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 9 
1990). The Sentencing Commission recognized that this guideline 

was not intended to apply to a defendant that puts the prosecution 

to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential elements 

of the offense, is convicted, and post-trial admits guilt and 

expresses remorse. u.s.s.G. § 3El.l comment. (n.2). In fact, the 

sentencing judge recognized this premise when he indicated that 

"I'm troubled that defense counsel seems to suggest that somebody 

can go to trial, put the government to the expense of trial and 

then somehow or other contend that they're admitting 

responsibility." Transcript at 195. Appellant's eleventh hour 

attempt to accept responsibility brought into question whether he 

manifested a true remorse for his criminal conduct. United states 

v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1040 {lOth Cir. 1990). We cannot say that 

the sentencing court's decision to decline appellant's late 

acceptance of responsibility and afford him a downward departure 

was clearly erroneous. Id. That court is in a better position 

than the appellate court to weigh the defendant's sincerity of 

remorse and contrition. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence and judgment 

of the district court. 

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