Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06188/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06188-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald G. Hargis
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

United Staten Co!!rt ?f Appeals Tenth mrcUlt 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD G. HARGIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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OCTO 41991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6188 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-2024-H) 

Eric G. Melders, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Rodney A. Johnson, Assistant Regional Counsel, u. S. Department of 

Health and Human Services, Dallas, Texas (Timothy D. Leonard, 

United States Attorney, and Eleanor Darden Thompson, Assistant 

u.s. Attorney, Western District of Oklahoma; Gayla Fuller, Chief 

Counsel, and Karen J. Sharp, Chief, Social Security Branch, Office 

of the General Counsel, U. S. Department of Health and Human 

Services, Dallas, Texas, with him on the brief), for DefendantAppellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, ALDISERT1 and McWILLIAMS, Circuit 

Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

1 Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, United States Senior Circuit 

Judge for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-6188 Document: 01019290917 Date Filed: 10/04/1991 Page: 1 
Mr. Donald G. Hargis appeals from an order of the district 

court affirming the denial of his application for disability 

insurance and supplemental security income benefits by the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services under Title II and XVI of 

the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381. 

Mr. Hargis complains that the decision of the Secretary is not 

supported by substantial evidence. 

I. 

Mr. Hargis suffered a back injury on April 30, 1985, while he 

was employed as a long-haul truck driver. He was hospitalized and 

received treatment for his injury around that time. On April 27, 

1987, he complained of an increase in back pain and sought further 

treatment. Dr. Stan Pelofsky, a neurosurgeon and the appellant's 

treating physician, noted that Mr. Hargis stated he experienced a 

"great degree of back pain and lower extremity radicular pain." 

Record, vol. 2, at 161. Dr. Pelofsky believed Mr. Hargis was a 

candidate for hospitalization and a lumbar myelography. 

Mr. Hargis then was admitted into St .• Anthony Hospital through the 

emergency room on May 18, 1987, upon his complaints of excruciating back pain radiating to his left leg and numbness. At that 

time, Dr. Pelofsky recommended that Mr. Hargis undergo a myelography, to which the patient agreed. Mr. Hargis also underwent 

post-myelographic CT scanning and evaluation of cerebrospinal 

fluid. The results, in Dr. Pelofsky's opinion, did not reveal 

evidence of a surgical lesion. Dr. Pelofsky concluded that 

Mr. Hargis suffered from degenerative lumbar disc disease made 

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symptomatic or aggravated by his employment as a truck driver and 

discharged petitioner to a regimen of conservative therapy. The 

treating physician noted that because his job was the source of 

his medical problems, Mr. Hargis would have to change his employment. 

Mr. Hargis nevertheless attempted to return to his previous 

job as a long-haul truck driver. He hitched a ride as a passenger 

in a tractor-trailer rig to determine whether his back could 

sustain the stress placed on it by the rigors of travel. He was 

forced to terminate the trip before he reached his destination and 

flew home. On November 19, 1987, Dr. Pelofsky reported that 

Mr. Hargis had exacerbated his cervical pain and left arm 

radicular pain syndrome. Dr. Pelofsky once again recommended that 

Mr. Hargis not continue his employment as a truck driver. He 

nevertheless felt that the patient would be an excellent candidate 

for vocational rehabilitation. 

Mr. Hargis filed applications for disability and supplemental 

social security benefits on September 18, 1987. The claimant 

alleged disability since May 18, 1987, due to pain in his lumbar 

back region. After his applications were denied initially and on 

reconsideration, Mr. Hargis requested a hearing de novo before an 

administrative law judge. With the aid of counsel, Mr. Hargis, an 

examining psychiatrist, and a vocational expert testified at the 

administrative hearing on June 30, 1988. 

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At the time of his disability hearing, Mr. Hargis was fortysix years old and had obtained a high school education. His past 

relevant work was as a truck driver and farmer. Mr. Hargis testified that in addition to his back problems, he has had two neck 

surgeries, one in 1980 in which a 9isc was removed, and another in 

1983. He underwent physical therapy for over a year, and was 

treated with a TENS unit for approximately three months. 

Mr. Hargis also participated in an exercise program at a local 

hospital for approximately seven months, until he could no longer 

afford it. He now walks to a convenience store that is around 200 

yards from his home twice a day. He testified that he could lift 

approximately five pounds and drives his pickup into town twice a 

week. Although Mr. Hargis was able to sit throughout his testimony at the proceeding, at one point his arm began to quiver due 

to the pain in his back. When asked whether he had attempted to 

find lighter work, the claimant replied: "Sir, I'm in so much 

pain, I don't know what I could concentrate on doing." Record, 

vol. 2, at 41. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the administrative law judge referred the claimant for further psychological 

and psychiatric testing. 

After considering the testimony and evidence submitted by 

Mr. Hargis and the reports supplied after Mr. Hargis underwent 

further psychological evaluation, the administrative law judge 

found that the claimant suffered from chronic lumbosacral strain 

and depression. The administrative law judge nevertheless found 

that those ailments did not render Mr. Hargis so disabled that he 

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could not engage in substantial gainful activity and denied his 

application for social security disability payments. 

The Appeals Council denied Mr. Hargis' request for review, 

rendering the decision of the administrative law judge the final 

decision of the Secretary. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (1989). 

The district court found that the Secretary's findings were supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Hargis now brings this 

appeal. 

To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must establish a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death 

or last for a continuous period of twelve months which prevents 

the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 42 

u.s.c. § 423(c)(1)(A) (1988). The Secretary has established a 

five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1990). The first 

two steps, that the claimant is not presently engaged in substantial gainful activity and that he suffers from a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments, are not at issue. 

Mr. Hargis' complaint is with the Secretary's findings in the 

third and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process. The 

Secretary found that Mr. Hargis' impairments are not found on or 

medically equal to the Secretary's list of impairments conclusively presumed to be disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 

1 (1989). While the Secretary found that Mr. Hargis is unable to 

I 

return to his past relevant work as a truck driver, the fourth 

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step in the sequential evaluation process, he determined that the 

claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform other 

work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and 

work experience. He therefore denied the claimant's application 

for social security disability. See generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 

482 u.s. 137 (1987). 

Mr. Hargis complains that the Secretary erred when he did not 

find that his mental impairments precluded him from performing 

even sedentary work. He also takes exception to the Secretary's 

finding that, despite his impairments, Mr. Hargis could perform 

work in the national economy other than his previous employment. 

Mr. Hargis asserts that, due to his back ailments and attendant 

pain along with his psychological impairment, the Secretary's 

finding is not supported by substantial evidence. He finally 

proffers medical evidence not available at the earlier proceedings 

and asks this court to remand the cause for further proceedings in 

light of this new evidence. We address, in turn, each of 

Mr. Hargis' claims. 

This court reviews the Secretary's decision to determine 

only whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence 

and whether the Secretary applied correct legal standards when 

making his decision. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748 (lOth Cir. 

1988); Turner v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 328 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Teter v. 

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Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1105 (lOth Cir. 1985). We cannot reweigh 

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary. 

Jordan v. Heckler, 835 F.2d 1314, 1316 (lOth Cir. 1987); Brown v. 

Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

II. 

The Secretary has promulgated a special technique to ensure 

that all evidence needed for the evaluation of a claim which 

involves a mental impairment is obtained and evaluated. This 

technique was designed to work in conjunction with the sequential 

evaluation process set out for the evaluation of physical impair2 ments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a (1990). Mr. Hargis 

challenges the Secretary's use of that procedure when finding that 

he does not suffer from an affective mental disorder that preeludes him from performing even sedentary work. He submits that 

the severity of his depression meets the Secretary's listings 

under section 12.04. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04 

(1990). Such a finding would establish that the claimant is presumptively disabled without consideration of the vocational 

factors relevant to the claimant's other arguments. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (1990). 

Section 12.04 sets out a two-part test that must be met 

before a claimant may be found to suffer from a disabling mental 

2 For an overview of the history of the-Social Security 

Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-460, 98 

Stat. 1801, see Shepard v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 

1990). 

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disorder. The administrative law judge found that the claimant 

met the first prong of the test, which establishes a loss of specific cognitive abilities or affective changes: depressive syndrome characterized by sleep disturbance, decreased energy, feelings of guilt or worthlessness, and thoughts of suicide. The 

second prong requires that the condition result in at least two of 

the following: 

1. Marked3 restriction of activities of daily living; or 

2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or 

3. Deficiencies of concentration, persistence or 

pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in 

a timely manner (in work settings or elsewhere); or 

4. Repeated episodes in work or work=like settings 

which cause the individual to withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms 

(which may include deterioration of adaptive behaviors). 

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04B. The first two categories are rated on a five-point scale: none, slight, moderate, 

marked, and extreme. The third category is rated: never, seldom, 

often, frequent, and constant. Finally, the fourth category is 

scaled: never, once or twice, repeated, and continual. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520a(b)(3) (1989). 

3 "Where 'marked' is used as a standard for measuring the 

degree of limitation, it means more than moderate, but less than 

extreme. A marked limitation may arise when several activities or 

functions are impaired or even when only one is impaired, so long 

as the degree of limitation is such as to seriously interfere with 

the ability to function independently, appropriately and 

effectively." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(C) 

(1989). 

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According to the evaluation filled out by the administrative 

law judge, the claimant did not meet the required level of severity for any of the four criteria in the listings. 4 Mr. Hargis 

argues that the evidence of record overwhelmingly contradicts the 

administrative law judge's finding. 

At the hearing, the administrative law judge heard testimony 

from Dr. Vinekar, a psychiatrist who examined Mr. Hargis. 

Dr. Vinekar diagnosed the claimant as suffering from moderate 

depression. The psychiatrist noted that Mr. Hargis exhibited a 

moderate degree of restriction of activities of daily living and 

in maintaining social functioning. He concluded that appellant 

suffered from frequent deficiencies of concentration, persistence, 

or pace and repeated episodes of deterioration in work or worklike settings. The psychiatrist finally ventured that the 

claimant's symptoms met the requirements of section 12.04. The 

record includes a Psychiatric Review Technique Form filled out by 

Dr. Vinekar reflecting his position. Record, vol. 2 at 214. 

At the request of the Secretary, appellant underwent further 

psychological and psychiatric testing after the administrative 

4 The administrative law judge evaluated the claimant's 

restrictions of activities of daily living and difficulties in 

maintaining social functioning as "moderate." He found that the 

claimant "seldom" suffered from deficiencies of concentration or 

persistence of pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a 

timely manner. Finally, the administrative law judge found that 

the claimant "never" suffered episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings which caused him to withdraw from the situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and 

symptoms. Record, vol. 2, at 21. 

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hearing. Elizabeth R. Rasmussen, Ph.D., a psychologist, interviewed Mr. Hargis and administered to him the Wechsler Adult 

Intelligence Scale, Revised. Mr. Hargis also was evaluated by 

Marcus S. Barker, M.D., a psychiatrist. Unfortunately for purposes of our review, however, the forms Dr. Rasmussen and 

Dr. Barker filled out in Mr. Hargis' behalf do not match the four 

requirements of section 12.04B. 

Dr. Rasmussen diagnosed the claimant as suffering from moderate depression bordering on severe depression. He received scores 

placing him in the "low average" range of intelligence. The 

psychologist determined that Mr. Hargis had the capacity to make 

personal and social adjustments, although he had difficulty with 

concentration due to his physical discomfort. On a scale of one 

to four, the psychologist rated the claimant's ability to maintain 

attention and concentration as only a two. His ability to relate 

to coworkers, deal with the public, and deal with work stresses, 

however, were rated as a three. 

Dr. Barker believed Mr. Hargis suffered from a rather severe 

neurotic depression. The psychiatrist noted that the claimant 

could follow simple job instructions, but believed that he could 

not behave in an emotionally stable manner. While he concurred in 

Dr. Rasmussen's conclusion that the claimant could relate with 

others well, Dr. Barker found that his ability to deal with work 

stresses and maintain attention and concentration was only "fair." 

Record, vol. 2, at 236. He also found that the claimant had no 

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ability to carry out detailed instructions and had only a "fair" 

ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions. 

Needless to say, each specialist painted quite a different 

picture of Mr. Hargis' emotional impairment. Given the remarks of 

the two psychiatrists and one psychologist, it is clear that 

Mr. Hargis suffers some emotional impairment. The evaluations 

submitted by the three experts, moreover, gravely call into 

question the administrative law judge's ratings of the four 

elements listed in the provision. Because each expert felt 

Mr. Hargis' deficiencies resulted in behavior reflecting different 

elements listed in section 12.04B, however, we must conclude, 

given our very limited scope of review, that the administrative 

law judge's conclusion that Mr. Hargis does not meet the listing 

requirement is supported by substantial evidence. 

That Mr. Hargis' psychological impairment did not meet the 

Secretary's listing, however, should not have ended the 

Secretary's inquiry. The "pertinent findings and conclusions" 

based on the evaluation of the claimant's mental impairments must 

be incorporated into each adjudicative level. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520a(c)(4). Particularly, once a mental impairment is considered to be severe, it must be included in the residual functional capacity assessment, the fifth step in the sequential evaluation process.

5 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). We therefore turn 

5 The Secretary's regulations indicate: 

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now to the claimant's exceptions to the Secretary's finding in 

this stage of the evaluation process. 

III. 

The burden of proving a disability within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act rests with the claimant. 42 u.s.c. § 

423(d)(5) (1988). "Once the claimant makes a prima facie showing 

of disability that prevents his engaging in his prior work activity, however, the burden of going forward shifts to the Secretary, 

who must show that the claimant retains the capacity to perform an 

alternative work activity and that this specific type of job 

exists in the national economy." Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 

577, 579 (lOth Cir. 1984). Mr. Hargis takes exception with the 

Secretary's finding that his back ailment does not preclude him 

from performing sedentary work. He submits that the pain he 

suffers, alone and in combination with his depression, renders his 

back ailment disabling. 

If the four areas considered by us as essential to 

work have been rated to indicate a degree of limitation 

as ~ or slight in the first and second areas, never 

or seldom in the third area, and never in the fourth 

area, we can generally conclude that the impairment is 

not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates 

there is significant limitation of your mental ability 

to do basic work activities. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (c)(l). Though the regulations do not indicate that a rating higher than those listed are to be considered 

severe, we believe that such an inference must be drawn absent any 

indication to the contrary. 

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A. 

"[P]ain testimony should be consistent with the degree of 

pain that could be reasonably expected from a determinable medical 

abnormality." Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1129 (lOth Cir. 

1988); 42 u.s.c.A. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1988). "[I]f an impairment is 

reasonably expected to produce some pain, allegations of disability pain emanating from that impairment are sufficiently consistent to require consideration of all relevant evidence." Luna v. 

Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 164 (lOth Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). 

Mr. Hargis points to the consistent notations of his reported pain 

on almost every medical review contained in the record. At the 

hearing, Dr. Vinekar testified that he believed Mr. Hargis' 

reports of pain were genuine. 

The administrative law judge concluded that Mr. Hargis' complaints of pain were indeed valid. He nevertheless found that in 

light of all of the other relevant evidence, Mr. Hargis' complaints of disabling pain were not credible. In his evaluation, 

the administrative law judge relied heavily on a report submitted 

by Mr. Hargis dated November 19, 1987, from Dr. Stan Pelofsky, his 

treating physician. Dr. Pelofsky stated that Mr. Hargis' chronic 

cervical strain syndrome was exacerbated by his recent attempt to 

return to work. He recommended that the patient continue a conservative therapy program. Dr. Pelofsky felt that Mr. Hargis 

would not be able to return to his previous employment as a truck 

driver, but felt that his patient would make an "excellent candidate for vocational rehabilitation." Record, vol. 2, at 213. The 

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administrative law judge read the report of the claimant's treating physician as demonstrating that the pain he suffered was not 

disabling. 

This court, in Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125 (lOth Cir. 

1988), set out certain factors an administrative law judge should 

take into consideration when considering the credibility of pain 

testimony. 

Some of the possible factors include: the levels of 

medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of 

the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, 

the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily 

activities, subjective measures of credibility that are 

peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other 

witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence. 

Id. at 1132. 

A review of the administrative law judge's opinion confirms 

that the Secretary took into account many of these factors when 

evaluating Mr. Hargis' claim. The medical reports, while evidencing some narrowing of the LS-Sl disc space and some degenerative 

disc changes associated with aging, did not reveal any evidence of 

a herniated disc. Although the record evidences the claimant's 

repeated attempts to undergo treatment to rid himself of pain, the 

claimant's testimony appears to support a conclusion that he had 

not regularly taken the pain medication prescribed by his 

physician. In addition, the assessment by the claimant's treating 

physician that he was an excellent candidate for rehabilitation 

does support an inference that the claimant does not suffer from 

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completely disabling pain. "Unless good cause is shown to the 

contrary, the Secretary must give substantial weight to the testimony of the claimant's treating physician." Byron v. Heckler, 742 

F.2d 1232, 1235 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

Despite the repeated notations demonstrating that the claimant suffers from pain, we nevertheless find that the opinion of 

the administrative law judge, after giving full consideration to 

all relevant facts, is supported by substantial evidence. We note 

that we base this conclusion only from the evidence that was 

before the administrative law judge at the time he made his decision. 

B. 

Our review does not end, however, with our determination that 

the administrative law judge's decision that the claimant does not 

suffer from disabling pain is supported by substantial evidence. 

The Secretary must demonstrate that sufficient jobs exist in the 

national economy that the claimant may perform given the level of 

pain he suffers. 

The Secretary has promulgated medical-vocational guidelines 

(the grids), see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (1990), to help 

evaluate whether there exist sufficient jobs that can be performed 

given the claimant's age, education, and physical limitations. 

The grids should not be applied conclusively in a particular case, 

however, unless the claimant could perform the full range of work 

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required of that category on a daily basis and unless the claimant 

possesses the physical capacities to perform most of the jobs in 

that range. Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 580 (lOth Cir. 

1984). Moreover, resort to the grids is particularly inappropriate when evaluating nonexertional limitations such as pain and 

mental impairments. 6 Id. at 580-81. The grids may serve only as 

a framework to determine whether sufficient jobs remain within a 

claimant's range of residual functional capacity. Huston, 838 

F.2d at 1131. 

The administrative law judge, therefore, instead relied on 

the testimony of the vocational consultant who appeared at the 

administrative hearing. She testified that the claimant acquired 

skills in his prior work as a truck driver that would transfer to 

a dispatcher position. The vocational consultant also offered her 

opinion that the claimant's prior skills as a farmer could be 

transferred to a position as an animal shelter clerk. Both jobs 

identified by the vocational consultant are classified as semiskilled, sedentary work. The following colloquy was the only 

mention in the vocational expert's testimony of nonexertional 

impairments: 

Q. [Claimant's Attorney] If we were to again look 

at this man, say the way he appeared here, that he's got 

pain when he sits for any length of time, and if I were 

to say that just two hours was the maximum he could sit, 

6 Though pain may reflect exertional limitations, the claimant's irritation while riding in or driving a truck could be 

characterized as non-exertional. See Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 

1125, 1131 (lOth Cir. 1988) (testimony that claimant experienced 

pain while riding on a tractor evidenced nonexertional 

impairment). 

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then he'd have to either lay down or leave the work situation, would that make it difficult or impossible for 

him to actually perform either of these occupations? 

A. If he had to -- to lie down or leave, yes, it 

could interfere with his work performance. 

Q. Okay. Pain would be -- if he genuinely had 

pain, would be an obstacle to the performance of either 

these occupations; pain the way I've described it? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Okay. I have no further questions, Judge. 

ALJ: What if he could stand up? 

VE: If he could stand up and move around at the 

job, and circulate a little bit, and then continue the 

job, it wouldn't interfere with the -- I was responding 

to the having to leave.the work place 

Record, vol. 2, at 86. 

Though this inquiry is limited, we believe the Secretary sufficiently took into account the claimant's complaints of pain when 

evaluating whether there existed sufficient jobs in the national 

economy in which the claimant could work. 

c. 

The claimant next asserts error because the administrative 

law judge did not correctly evaluate his mental impairment in combination with the effects of the pain he suffers. We agree and 

reverse on this ground. 

We begin with the administrative law judge's finding regarding the claimant's mental impairment: 

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The Administrative Law Judge has considered not only the 

claimant's exertional limitations, but also the depression secondary to his physical impairment. Signs and 

symptoms of depression would be expected to exacerbate 

if the claimant was forced to return to his past work or 

otherwise exceed his exertional capacity. However, so 

long as the claimant does not exceed exertional requirements for sedentary work, his ability to perform such 

jobs would not be significantly affected by nonexertional limitations. The vocational expert's testimony 

revealed, for example, that although mental demands on a 

dispatcher were somewhat greater than mental demands on 

a trucker, the claimant has operated in a job with 

transferable skills to that of a dispatcher, and only 

moderate adjustment would be required. The medical 

assessment of ability to perform work-related activities 

forms prepared by Dr. Rasmussen and·or. Barker show the 

claimant has retained at least "fair" ability in all 

measured areas and "good" ability in most. 

Record, vol. 2, at 17. 

Pursuant to Congress' mandate, the Secretary must consider 

the combined effects of impairments that may not be severe individually, but which in combination may constitute a severe medical 

disability. 42 u.s.c. § 423(d)(2)(C) (1988). The Secretary's 

regulations indicate that "[t]he determination of mental RFC is 

crucial to the evaluation of an individual's capacity to engage in 

substantial gainful work activity when the criteria of the listings for mental disorders are not met or equaled but the impairmentis nevertheless severe." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 

1, §12.00(A). The Secretary, pursuant to his own regulations, 

cannot therefore dismiss a claimant's mental impairment once there 

is a finding that the claimant does not meet the listings. A 

claimant's mental impairment must also be evaluated in combination 

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with the effects of other impairments. 7 

Whenever a claimant's residual functional capacity is diminished by both exertional and nonexertional impairments, the 

Secretary must produce expert vocational testimony or other similar evidence to establish the existence of jobs in the national 

economy. Channel, 747 F.2d at 580. A severe mental impairment is 

such a nonexertional impairment. Wheeler v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 

1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1989). Yet the administrative law judge did 

not present to the vocational expert any difficulties manifested 

by the claimant's mental impairment. Nor did the administrative 

law judge's questions relating to the claimant's ability to transfer skills include the possibility of problems arising from his 

existing mental impairment--comparison of mental demands required 

for a job does not effectively aid evaluation of a claimant's 

depressive disorder absent evidence that the disorder is caused or 

exacerbated by increased mental demands. Finally, the vocational 

expert was not even apprised of the claimant's depression to 

determine whether his ailment would affect his performance in the 

two jobs proffered by the vocational expert regardless of whether 

the claimant would suffer transitional problems. "[T]estimony 

7 The comment by the treating physician that the claimant would 

be a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation provides us no 

support for the Secretary's conclusion in this area. Medical 

reports which consider only physical impairments cannot amount to 

substantial evidence that the claimant can perform sedentary work 

when the claimant is found to suffer from both physical and 

psychological impairments. Beecher v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 693, 694-

95 (9th Cir. 1985); Dressel v. Califano, 558 F.2d 504, 508 (8th 

Cir. 1977). 

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elicited by hypothetical questions that do not relate with precision all of a claimant's impairments cannot constitute substantial 

evidence to support the Secretary's decision." Ekeland v. Bowen, 

899 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1990). 

We nevertheless have held previously that a vocational expert 

may be called for the limited purpose of determining whether the 

claimant's skills acquired during past work would transfer to a 

category containing the exertional level the administrative law 

judge has concluded the claimant could perform. Jordan v. 

Heckler, 835 F.2d 1314, 1316 (lOth Cir. 1987). The administrative 

law judge found that Rule 201.22 of the grids, which assesses jobs 

in the national economy available to a claimant whose exertional 

limitations allow the claimant to perform sedentary work, most 

closely coincides with the claimant's residual functional capacity. Formal application of this rule is possible, however, only 

when the full range of activity for the rule is not limited by the 

combined effects of the claimant's nonexertional impairments. See 

Channel, 747 F.2d at 582 n.6. 

The administrative law judge's failure to recognize any 

mental impairment affecting the claimant's ability to perform 

sedentary work is, in our estimation, not supported by substantial 

evidence or correct legal standards. In assessing the claimant's 

residual functional capacity, the administrative law judge did not 

sufficiently take into account the claimant's depression once he 

found that the claimant did not meet the listings criteria for 

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mental disorders. For example, the administrative law judge's 

conclusion that the claimant's depression would only be exacerbated if the claimant exceeded exertional limitations did not 

acknowledge the claimant's current level of depression. That the 

claimant did not meet the listing requirement under section 12.04 

does not preclude the possibility that his existing impairment was 

so severe that the claimant could not effectively perform the 

proffered employment. See supra at n.4. Moreover, that the 

claimant quit his past employment as a truck driver because of the 

pain he suffered due to injury does not discount the impact of the 

claimant's depression on his ability to perform other work. The 

psychological and psychiatric evaluations evidence the claimant's 

deficiency in concentration and performance in a social setting, 

and the psychologist to which the administrative law judge 

referred the claimant indicated that he could not even behave in 

an emotionally stable manner. These evaluations were conducted 

not while the claimant was employed as a truck driver but at a 

time when his exertional activities were extremely limited. Any 

supposition that claimant could engage in the full range of occupations represented by the applicable grid, therefore, is not 

supported by substantial evidence. 

We therefore must conclude that the Secretary's conclusion 

that the claimant retains the ability to perform the jobs of dispatcher and animal shelter clerk is not sufficiently supported by 

the record. Because the administrative law judge apparently 

relied on his assessment that the claimant could perform the full 

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range of sedentary work, he did not present claimant's mental 

impairment to the vocational expert. We remand the case to the 

Secretary for a determination whether the combined effects of 

Mr. Hargis' nonexertional impairments warrant a finding of 

disability. Such a finding would require support from a 

vocational expert. See Wheeler, 902 F.2d at 1238 (once claimant 

establishes existence of severe mental impairment that does not 

meet the listings, Secretary must use vocational expert testimony 

or other similar evidence to meet his burden of showing claimant 

can perform jobs available in the national economy); compare Ortiz 

v. Secretary of Services, 890 F.2d 520, 526-28 (1st Cir. 1989) 

(Secretary's exclusive reliance on grid supportable on limited 

facts, but Secretary generally should rely on testimony of 

vocational expert when claimant suffers from mental impairment). 

IV. 

Mr. Hargis finally submits additional medical evidence to 

this court that was not available at the administrative hearing or 

before the district court. He argues that, in light of this new 

evidence, the cause should be remanded to the Secretary for a new 

determination. 42 u.s.c. § 405(g) (1988). Section 205(g) of the 

Social Security Act states: 

' The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a 

showing that there is good cause for the failure to 

incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior 

proceeding • . . . 

42 u.s.c. § 405(g) (1988). 

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In order to find a remand appropriate, we normally must 

determine that the new evidence would have changed the Secretary's 

decision had it been before him. Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 219, 

221 (lOth Cir. 1981). Implicit in this requirement is that the 

proffered evidence relate to the time period for which the 

benefits were denied. Johnson v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 183 (5th 

Cir. 1985). Because we remand this case for further evaluation of 

the claimant's combined nonexertional impairments, however, we 

believe it appropriate that the Secretary initially determine 

whether these additional medical evaluations significantly alter 

his initial determination. 

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the 

proceedings REMANDED with a direction that the district court 

remand the cause to the Secretary for review of the combined 

effect of Mr. Hargis' nonexertional impairment and further 

evaluation after consideration of the additional medical evidence 

submitted on appeal. 

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