Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02273/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02273-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BMW AG
Appellee
BMW North America
Appellee
Regions Bank
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2273

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Regions Bank, Guardian of the

Estate of Kimberly Renea Smith,

Appellant,

v.

BMW North America, Inc.; BMW

AG,

Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: January 12, 2005

 Filed: May 9, 2005

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Kimberly Renea Smith was rendered a quadriplegic after she lost control of her

BMW 318i on a downhill curve. The car struck the hillside, rolled over onto its roof,

and eventually came to rest. The driver’s-side frontal-impact airbag did not deploy.

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1

 In this opinion, we will refer to Smith and Regions Bank, the legal guardian

of her estate, collectively as “Smith.” We will refer to BMW North America and

BMW AG collectively as “BMW.”

2

 The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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Smith1 sued BMW, alleging that the airbag’s failure to deploy was the result of a

defect or BMW’s negligence, that she suffered enhanced injuries during the collision

with the hillside as a consequence of the airbag’s failure to deploy, and that BMW

was liable for these enhanced injuries. After a trial, a jury rendered a general verdict

in favor of BMW, and the district court2

 entered judgment on the jury verdict.

Smith appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by permitting

BMW to introduce evidence at trial relating to her blood alcohol level at the time of

the car accident. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I.

Prior to trial, Smith moved in limine to exclude evidence relating to her blood

alcohol content at the time of the car accident. (D. Ct. Docket #245.) After a hearing,

the district court denied Smith’s motion, concluding that the evidence was relevant

to BMW’s theory “that it was the collision itself and the subsequent rollover of the

vehicle that caused the injury.” (Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 28-30.)

At trial, the parties stipulated that when Smith’s blood was tested

approximately two hours after the accident, her blood serum alcohol level was .136

percent. (Trial Tr. at 98.) BMW called Dr. Henry Simmons to testify. He noted that

Smith’s blood was tested a second time approximately four hours after the accident,

and her blood serum alcohol level at that time was .096 percent. Based on this data,

he estimated that Smith’s blood serum alcohol level was .176 percent at the time of

the accident. Dr. Simmons described a typical person with that level of alcohol in her

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blood as being emotionally unstable, having decreased inhibitions, having reduced

ability to make critical judgments, having impaired memory, having impaired ability

to understand information, and having decreased response time and muscular

coordination. He opined that a typical person would have to drink at least four-and-athird twelve-ounce cans of beer or six-and-a-half ounces of eighty-proof liquor to

achieve that blood alcohol level. (Id. at 961-75.)

Dr. Simmons was the only defense witness who testified about Smith’s blood

alcohol content. BMW’s remaining witnesses, two engineers and a doctor, testified

about the car’s impact with the hillside and subsequent rollover, the design of the

car’s airbag, and how Smith’s injuries occurred.

At the jury instructions conference, Smith stated that she had no objections to

the instructions or verdict forms prepared by the district court. (Id. at 1393.) In

relevant part, the district court instructed the jury as follows.

The jury was instructed that Smith had asserted two separate grounds for

recovery of damages. First, she should recover if she proved that BMW supplied the

airbag in her car in a defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous,

and that the defective condition was a proximate cause of her injuries. Second, Smith

could recover if she proved that BMW was negligent and that its negligence was a

proximate cause of her injuries. Proximate cause was defined for the jury, and the

jury was instructed that there could be more than one proximate cause of Smith’s

injuries. (Id. at 1415-16, 1418-19.)

The district court instructed the jury that, if it determined that Smith was

without fault for the proximate cause of her injuries, she was entitled to recover

damages in full. If the jury determined that both Smith and BMW were at fault, but

that Smith’s fault was less than BMW’s fault, Smith was entitled to recover reduced

damages. If the jury determined that BMW was without fault, or that Smith’s fault

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was greater than or equal to BMW’s fault, Smith was not entitled to recover any

damages. (Id. at 1422.)

Regarding intoxication, the district court instructed the jury that it was

unlawful under Arkansas law for a driver with a blood alcohol level of .10 percent or

greater to operate a motor vehicle. A violation of this statute did not necessarily

constitute negligence, the jury was instructed, but did constitute evidence of

negligence to be considered along with all of the other evidence in the case. An

intoxicated person is held to the same standard of care as a sober person, the jury was

told, and intoxication does not excuse the failure to exercise ordinary care. (Id. at

1417-18.)

Finally, the district court explained to the jury how it should fill out the general

verdict forms. If the jury found for Smith under either of her two theories of liability,

then it should return the form reading, “We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and fix her

damages at __ dollars.” If the jury found that Smith had failed to prove either of her

two theories of liability, or that her fault was equal to or greater than BMW’s fault,

then it should return the form reading, “We, the jury, find for the defendants.” (Id.

at 1424.) The jury returned the latter verdict form. (Appellees’ App. at A.)

II.

Smith argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred

by admitting evidence relating to her blood alcohol level at the time of the accident.

We will only grant a new trial if the district court clearly abused its discretion by

admitting the evidence, which requires a showing that the error prejudicially

influenced the outcome of the trial. See Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 201 F.3d

1074, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000). In this case, as in Lovett, we do not reach the question

whether the district court properly applied Arkansas law by admitting the evidence

because Smith has failed to prove that the outcome of the trial was prejudiced by the

admission of the evidence. See id.

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To determine whether evidence of Smith’s blood alcohol level prejudicially

influenced the outcome of the trial, we look to the jury’s verdict. See id. As noted

above, the verdict reads in its entirety: “We, the jury, find for the defendants.”

“We have no way of determining from this general verdict why the jury found

[BMW] not liable.” Id. It is possible, as Smith argues, that the jury reached this

verdict by assigning fault to Smith on the basis of her alcohol consumption,

comparing her fault to BMW’s fault, and concluding that Smith’s fault was equal to

or greater than BMW’s fault. However, there are two other possibilities that are at

least as likely, neither of which rests on the evidence of Smith’s blood alcohol

content. First, BMW put on evidence at trial from which the jury could reasonably

conclude that there was no defect or negligence because the force and direction of the

car’s impact into the hillside were insufficient to trigger deployment of a properly

operating driver’s-side frontal-impact airbag. Second, BMW put on evidence at trial

from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Smith’s injuries occurred during

the rollover–when deployment of the airbag would not have helped, as Smith

conceded–rather than during the impact of the car into the hillside.

Evidence of Smith’s blood alcohol level was by no means the centerpiece of

BMW’s defense. In the eight-day jury trial, Dr. Simmons’ entire time on the witness

stand was approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. “[T]he case was submitted

on a general verdict form, so we can only speculate whether [Smith] was prejudiced.

Speculation, however, is not a sufficient basis for finding a plaintiff’s substantial

rights were affected, and we will not set aside the jury’s verdict in this case.” Id.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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