Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01354/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01354-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles A. McBurney
Appellant
Stew Hansen's Dodge City
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1354

___________

Charles A. McBurney, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Stew Hansen's Dodge City, Inc., * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 15, 2004

Filed: February 16, 2005 

___________

Before SMITH, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Charles A. McBurney filed suit against Stew Hansen's Dodge City, Inc., (Stew

Hansen's) alleging a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991 (FMLA),

29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The district court1

 granted summary judgment in favor of

Stew Hansen's and McBurney appealed. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
-2-

I. Background 

In May 1998, Stew Hansen's hired McBurney as a Night Service Manger.

McBurney regularly worked from 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. five nights a week. On

some occasions, McBurney would work past 12:00 a.m. As part of his job, McBurney

supervised a number of mechanics, aided in hiring mechanics, helped repair vehicles,

and helped customers who dropped their vehicles off after regular business hours. In

addition, McBurney prepared billing reports, retrieved parts from inventory, moved

vehicles into service work bays, and closed the shop at the end of each night shift by

locking doors and setting the security alarm. In April 2000, McBurney underwent an

emergency appendectomy and, due to complications, was forced to undergo a second

abdominal surgery within twenty-four hours. The recovery from the second surgery

required McBurney to be hospitalized for several weeks. McBurney's wife, Patricia

McBurney, called Stew Hansen's on April 25 and informed them that McBurney

would remain in the hospital for two to three days and would then be on doctor's

orders to rest at home for six weeks.

Unfortunately, McBurney's hospital recovery was longer than anticipated,

lasting several additional weeks. During that time, Patricia again called Stew

Hansen's to advise the dealership of McBurney's delayed recovery. On June 27, 2000,

after his discharge and convalescence, McBurney called Stew Hansen's and told them

that he had been cleared by the doctor to resume work. Tom Sherwood, Stew

Hansen's service manager, invited McBurney to have lunch and explained to

McBurney that another person, Greg Brimeyer, had filled in as Night Service

Manager in his absence and would assume the full-time position permanently.

Sherwood explained that McBurney would be shifted to Quality Control

Supervisor, a position created to meet the quality control requirements of the

Chrysler Corporation. As a Quality Control Supervisor, McBurney was scheduled to

receive the same pay and benefits that he received as Night Service Manager.

McBurney requested that he return to his position as Night Service Manager and

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
-3-

explained that he would rather not work during the day. Stew Hansen's denied

McBurney's request and he returned to work as the new Quality Control Supervisor.

As Quality Control Supervisor, McBurney test drove repaired vehicles and

answered telephones. During the test drives, McBurney would record any unusual

sounds or observations. Stew Hansen's never advised McBurney of his specific job

duties and he was often idle. After serving as Quality Control Supervisor, for the

remainder of 2000, McBurney began experiencing symptoms of depression, fatigue,

and anxiety.

In January 2001, Stew Hansen's discontinued the Quality Control Supervisor

position and made McBurney a daytime "Service Advisor." McBurney told Stew

Hansen's that he did not want to be a Service Advisor, but was told that he could take

the position or quit. McBurney did not receive any training for the Service Advisor

position and found the 55-65 hour workweeks to be stressful. In contrast, when he

was a Night Service Manager, McBurney routinely worked only 40 hour workweeks.

His new duties as Service Advisor included scheduling service appointments and

managing service work to be performed, ensuring maintenance and repairs were

sufficiently completed, and calculating service costs. The transfer to Service Advisor

also brought a salary change. As Night Service Manger and Quality Control

Supervisor, McBurney received a salary of $660 per week. As a Service Advisor,

McBurney received a lower salary, but an additional part of his pay was commission

based and provided the opportunity for McBurney to earn more money than the

straight salary position of either Night Service Manager or Quality Control

Supervisor.

While Service Advisor, McBurney's depression, fatigue, and anxiety continued

to worsen until he suffered a mental breakdown on April 16, 2001. McBurney's

psychiatrist, Dr. Richards, diagnosed McBurney with onset of panic disorder coupled

with agoraphobia. Dr. Richards had treated McBurney for a panic disorder McBurney

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
-4-

experienced several years earlier. Dr. Richards opined that the change in McBurney's

work aggravated his preexisting mental health problems. According to Dr. Richards,

the mere anticipation of dealing with unhappy strangers was sufficient to trigger or

exacerbate McBurney's panic attacks.

McBurney was placed on Family and Medical Leave for twelve weeks. At the

expiration of the twelve weeks, McBurney failed to return to work and Stew Hansen's

discharged him. McBurney then filed an action in the district court alleging a

violation of the FMLA. The district court granted Stew Hansen's summary judgment

motion and McBurney filed the instant appeal.

II. Discussion

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. N. Natural Gas Co. v.

Iowa Util. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate

if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, contains no

questions of material fact and demonstrates that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 378 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.

2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In viewing the evidence, the non-moving party

is entitled to all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record. Tlamka v. Serrell,

244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2001). The moving party bears the burden of showing

both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and an entitlement to judgment

as a matter of law. Kincaid, 378 F.3d at 803–04 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not

rest on the allegations of his or her pleadings, but must set forth specific facts, by

affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.

Kincaid, 378 F.3d at 804 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Relief Available Under the FMLA

McBurney argues that the district court erred in concluding that he lacked

standing under the FMLA for failing to produce evidence of damages. McBurney

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
2

The FMLA clearly provides for equitable relief. The pertinent statute states

that any employer who violates the FMLA "shall be liable to any eligible employee

affected . . . for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment,

reinstatement, and promotion." 29 U.S.C.A. § 2617(a)(1)(B). Front pay is designed

to provide an equitable remedy when it is impractical to order the employee's

reinstatement to his or her previous job. See Williams v. Pharmacia, 137 F. 3d 944,

952 (7th Cir. 1998); Kelly v. Airborne Freight, 140 F.3d 335, 354 (10th Cir. 1998).

-5-

contends that he maintained a right "to injunctive or other equitable relief."2

McBurney argues that he is entitled to front pay as an equitable form of damages

under the FMLA and therefore does have standing contrary to the conclusion of the

district court. McBurney contends that Stew Hansen's failure to reinstate him to the

same or equivalent position as Night Service Manager caused him to be mentally

incapacitated such that he can no longer work. As such, he seeks compensation for

financial losses after trial due to Stew Hansen's allegedly unlawful actions; that is, the

loss of future wages.

We note that McBurney argues entitlement to front pay for the first time on

appeal. The district court never considered the issue. Indeed, McBurney failed to

argue a claim for front pay in response to Stew Hansen's motion for summary

judgment. Furthermore, in discovery, McBurney specifically asserted that he was not

seeking front pay.

Absent exceptional circumstances we will not consider arguments raised for

the first time on appeal. Daisy Mfg. v. NCR Corp., 29 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir.1994).

We have held that a plaintiff waives the issue of front pay by first raising it in a

motion to alter or amend the judgment. Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 829

(8th Cir. 2002) (citing Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th

Cir.1996)). Likewise, we hold that McBurney has waived any claim to front pay by

asserting it for the first time on appeal.

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
-6-

McBurney concedes that he received the same pay and benefits after his return

to Stew Hansen's as Quality Control Supervisor. He also concedes that he cannot

return to work due to his condition, and, therefore, did not seek employment,

reinstatement, or promotion from Stew Hansen's. His entire damage claim rests upon

the recovery of front pay, a claim that he has waived. In an action brought under the

FMLA, "a plaintiff must be able to show a reasonable likelihood that a rational trier

of fact would award . . . damages or find [an entitlement] to injunctive relief to avoid

the entry of summary judgment." Dawson v. Leewood Nursing Home, Inc., 14 F.

Supp.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Va. 1998). In this case, McBurney failed to produce evidence

of damages. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment.

Retaliation

As a separate claim, McBurney contended that Stew Hansen's transferred him

from Quality Control Supervisor to Service Advisor to retaliate for his using FMLA

related leave. On appeal, McBurney argues that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment based on his failure to establish a causal connection between his

secondary transfer to Service Advisor and his FMLA related leave. Retaliation

through an adverse employment action based on an employee's exercise of FMLA

rights is actionable. Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002). An

employee can prove FMLA retaliation circumstantially, using a variant of the burden

shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03

(1973). Id.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, McBurney must show that he

exercised rights afforded by the Act, that he suffered an adverse employment action,

and that there was a causal connection between his exercise of rights and the adverse

employment action. Id.; Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2002). At issue in

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
3

Stew Hansen's concedes that McBurney exercised his rights under the FMLA

and that his approximate $1500 loss in income stemming from his shift to Service

Advisor constitutes an adverse employment action. 

-7-

this case is whether McBurney can show a causal connection between his FMLA

leave and his transfer from Quality Control Supervisor to Service Advisor.3

 Although not dispositive, the time lapse between an employee's protected

activity and the employer's adverse action is an important factor when evaluating

whether a casual connection has been established. Smith, 302 F.3d at 833. We have

held that a two-month interval between protected activity and termination diluted any

inference of causation such that the temporal connection could not justify a causal

link as a matter of law. Id. (citing Kipp v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n,

280 F.3d 893 (8th Cir.2002)). In Kipp we held that the kind of causal connection

required for a prima facie case is not "but for" causation, but rather, a showing that

an employer's "retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action."

Kipp, 280 F.3d at 897 (internal quotation omitted).

In this case, six months passed between McBurney's return from FMLA leave

and his transfer to Service Advisor. In addition, McBurney was not discharged;

rather, he was laterally transferred after Stew Hansen's made the business decision to

eliminate the Quality Control Supervisor position. McBurney's transfer to Service

Advisor actually afforded him the opportunity to make more money. Moreover, Stew

Hansen's honored McBurney's request for FMLA leave. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to McBurney, we hold that the evidence does not establish a sufficient

causal link. Neither time nor discriminatory actions link his secondary transfer to

Service Advisor with his FMLA related leave. Accordingly, McBurney failed to make

a prima facie case of retaliation.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
4

I concur with the majority on several important points: First, McBurney has

waived his ability to obtain front pay damages by failing to raise it below; second,

damages for emotional distress and lost future wages are not available under the

-8-

LAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides employees with a private

right of action, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2), to recover damages when an employer

interferes with an employee's exercise of FMLA rights, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). To

prevail on an interference claim, the employee must establish that the employer

interfered with a right to medical leave or failed to reinstate the employee to the same

or an equivalent position upon return to work. Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384

F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 2004). The employer's intentions are irrelevant. Id. The

employer is required to restore the employee to the same position, or "to an equivalent

position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions

of employment." § 2614(a)(1)(B). "An equivalent position is one that is virtually

identical to the employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits and working

conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status. It must involve the same or

substantially similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially

equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority." 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a).

"[U]pon return from FMLA leave, employees are entitled to reinstatement to the same

or an equivalent position without the loss of benefits . . . ." Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d

673, 679 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). A position that offers comparable pay,

but has fewer opportunities for advancement or future increases in salary does not

offer the same benefits. Id. at 679-80. 

I conclude that there is a dispute of material fact regarding the equivalency of

the Night Service Manager position and the Quality Control position. While

McBurney may concede that the rate of pay and structure of standard benefits

between the two positions were the same, this is not tantamount to conceding

equivalency under the FMLA.4

 The record shows that McBurney's former position

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and third, McBurney has failed to identify any

evidence of a retaliatory animus on the part of Stew Hansen's necessary to sustain his

retaliation claim. However, I dissent from the majority's opinion that McBurney has

not identified damages for his remaining claim of interference with his FMLA rights.

I conclude that McBurney has identified compensable damages in the amount of

$1,561.81 and that a genuine dispute of material fact regarding equivalency of the

Night Service Manager position and the Quality Control position prevents summary

judgment on McBurney's interference claim.

-9-

of Night Service Manager was a managerial job supervising six mechanics, retrieving

parts, ensuring service was done correctly, discussing repairs with customers, and

calculating bills. The Night Service Manager job was an established position in the

organization, and was sought after by other employees, had a recognized and

respected title, and occupied a permanent office. The newly-created Quality Control

position was not managerial, lacked recognition and respect internally, played an illdefined role in the organization's operations, and lacked an office. 

While the pay was the same, the Quality Control position had non-equivalent

working conditions, privileges, perquisites, and status, and thus was not equivalent

under the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). Moreover, the new position was so

utterly lacking in value to the organization that it offered virtually no job security.

An employee who valued his employment would be ill-advised to choose this new

Quality Control position with no job description and little responsibility over the

established Night Service Manager position, which was important to the

organization's success. At the very least, McBurney has presented a dispute of

material fact whether these two positions were equivalent.

I suggest the real issue before us in assessing McBurney's interference claim

on summary judgment is whether McBurney can prove damages flowing from this

violation of the FMLA. The majority ends its inquiry into McBurney's interference

claim after it concludes, incorrectly in my view, that McBurney's entire interference

claim rests on the non-compensable damages of emotional distress and lost future

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281 
-10-

wages. To the contrary, the record shows a monetary loss of $1,561.81 in reduced

wages in the Service Advisor position. I believe that, if McBurney can prove

causation, the subsequent loss is compensable under the FMLA. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to McBurney, as we must on

summary judgment, we are presented with the following facts: Stew Hansen's gave

McBurney's job to another employee while he was on FMLA leave; Stew Hansen's

concocted the Quality Control position at the last minute upon McBurney's return

from leave to avoid liability under the FMLA; the Quality Control position was

purely a sham position that lacked any job description or defined duties; Stew

Hansen's quickly eliminated the Quality Control position because it served no real

business purpose; upon eliminating the Quality Control position, Stew Hansen's

abruptly transferred McBurney to yet another non-equivalent position; and in this last

position McBurney experienced reduced wages in the sum of $1,561.81. The key

question on summary judgment for McBurney's interference claim is whether he can

prove the loss of $1,561.81 was caused by Stew Hansen's violation.

McBurney has a tough case to prove under an interference theory, but it is his

case to prove. I respectfully disagree with the majority and would hold that summary

judgment is not appropriate on McBurney's interference claim. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-1354 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/16/2005 Entry ID: 1868281