Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_20-cv-00387/USCOURTS-cand-3_20-cv-00387-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maria Asela Caces-Tiamson
Plaintiff
Equifax
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA ASELA CACES-TIAMSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

EQUIFAX,

Defendant.

Case No. 20-cv-00387-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Docket No. 7

Plaintiff Maria Asela Caces-Tiamson, proceeding pro se, has filed suit against Defendant 

Equifax. The suit is related to a data breach that occurred at Equifax and that the company 

announced in September 2017. Currently pending before the Court is Equifax’s motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief.

Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court finds this 

matter suitable for resolution without oral argument and thus VACATES the hearing on the 

motion. Equifax’s motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Although Ms. Caces-Tiamson’s complaint is not a model of clarity, it appears that her 

position is as follows. 

In November 2019, Ms. Caces-Tiamson sent a letter to Equifax, stating that she was “a 

victim of the fraudulent data breach that occurred at your company and [that] was reported” in 

September 2017. See Compl., Ex. 1 (letter). In the same letter, Ms. Caces-Tiamson asked Equifax 

to provide “proofs of claim” on, inter alia, the following issues: (1) that, in September 2017, it did 

not announce the data breach; (2) that it did not know of the data breach for many months before 

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announcing it; (3) that it did not intentionally try to cover up the data breach; (4) that it protected 

her personal data and did not allow it to be stolen; (5) that it is not liable to her for damages; etc. 

Ms. Caces-Tiamson asked Equifax to respond within ten days and then concluded her letter by 

stating:

A non-response and[/]or failure to provide Proof of Claim will 

constitute agreement by you, and that the undersigned can exercise 

the remedy provided by all applicable laws, federal, state and local. 

Your non-response will equate to commercial acquiescence to the 

terms outlined by the undersigned in a final Affidavit and Notice of 

Default.

Compl., Ex. 1.

Apparently, Equifax did not respond to Ms. Caces-Tiamson’s letter. Accordingly, in 

January 2020, she filed the instant action in federal court. In the complaint, Ms. Caces-Tiamson 

states that she has exhausted her remedies with Equifax; that she gave Equifax an opportunity to 

provide “proofs of claim”; that Equifax was “sent a Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure [but] 

failed to respond”

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; and that, “[t]hrough [the] non-response and silence, [Equifax has] quietly 

agreed to all of the facts as outlined in the Notice of Default.[2] Therefore the Plaintiff states a 

superior claim upon which relief can be granted.” Compl. at 4, 6.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 

1 Equifax has provided to the Court a copy of Ms. Caces-Tiamson’s “Notice of Fault and 

Opportunity to Cure” document. See Morris Decl., Ex. 3 (notice). The notice is dated November 

18, 2019. In the notice, Ms. Caces-Tiamson states, inter alia, that Equifax failed to provide the 

proofs of claim that she requested; that Equifax was, as a result, “in fault”; that Equifax had “the 

right to cure this fault”; and that, if it did not cure the fault, “I will establish an affidavit of 

default.” Morris Decl., Ex. 3.

2 Equifax has also provided to the Court a copy of the Ms. Caces-Tiamson’s “Affidavit and Notice 

of Default” document. See Morris Decl., Ex. 3 (notice). In the affidavit and notice, dated 

December 2, 2019, Ms. Caces-Tiamson states, inter alia, that she sent to Equifax “a Conditional 

Acceptance requesting Proofs of Claim” and that Equifax “has willingly, knowingly, intentionally, 

or voluntarily agreed and acquiesced through its non-response to the facts stated herein” – e.g., 

that Equifax knew of the data breach many months before announcing it, that Equifax tried to 

cover up the data breach, that Equifax is liable for the data breach, etc. 

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In opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 

jurisdiction is proper. Where, as here, the defendant’s motion is 

based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the 

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 

facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff cannot 

“simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,” but 

uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.

Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Data Disc, 

Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that “[t]he limits 

which the district judge imposes on the pre-trial proceedings will affect the burden which the 

plaintiff is required to meet”). In addition, all disputed facts are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. 

See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Freestream 

Aircraft (Berm.) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that 

“[u]ncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and factual disputes are 

construed in the plaintiff’s favor”).

The test for personal jurisdiction of this Court is clear: 

Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, 

the district court applies the law of the state in which the court sits. 

California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, is 

coextensive with federal due process requirements, so the 

jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are 

the same. For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant consistent with due process, that defendant 

must have “certain minimum contacts” with the relevant forum 

“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223. 

B. General Jurisdiction

“There are two categories of personal jurisdiction: (1) general jurisdiction and (2) specific 

jurisdiction.” Freestream, 905 F.3d at 602. The Court addresses first whether it has general 

jurisdiction over Equifax.

Where there is general jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff can bring any claim 

against the defendant in the forum state. Thus, in order for general jurisdiction to obtain, the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be so continuous and systematic as to render the 

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defendant essentially at home in the forum State. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122, 

128 (2014); see also Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 

2004) (asking whether the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts that approximate 

physical presence in the forum state). “With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation 

and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’” Daimler, 571 

U.S. at 137. Although the Supreme Court has not held that “a corporation may be subject to 

general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business,”

the Court has also rejected the proposition that there is general jurisdiction over a corporation “in 

every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of 

business.’ That formulation . . . is unacceptably grasping.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also id.

at 139 (stating that the inquiry is “not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be 

said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic’” but rather “whether that corporation’s 

‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home 

in the forum State’”).

In the instant case, Ms. Caces-Tiamson has failed to make out a prima facie case of general 

jurisdiction. Equifax is a Georgia corporation; it also has its principal place of business there. See

Morris Decl., Exs. 1-2 (business information for Equifax as provided by the Georgia Corporations 

Division). There is nothing to indicate that Equifax has affiliations with California that are so 

continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in California. In her opposition brief, 

Ms. Caces-Tiamson cites to a non-Equifax website (called “craft.co”) indicating that Equifax has 

two offices in California: one in Escalon and the other in Concord. See Opp’n at 2 & Ex. 2 

(information on Equifax locations as provided by www.craft.co/equifax/locations). But even 

accepting that evidence as true, that does not establish that Equifax’s affiliations with California 

are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the state. Indeed, Equifax 

has submitted evidence as part of its reply brief, reflecting that (1) it “has never maintained a site 

located in Escalon” and that (2) it previously “maintained an operations site in Concord . . . to 

handle unemployment compensation claims concerning customers of [Equifax Workforce 

Solutions’s] Unemployment Cost Management product. This location served no function related 

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to the network which was impacted in the data security incident announced publicly by Equifax 

Inc. in September 2017” and the site “closed in Q2 2018.” Bekaert Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.”). That does not 

come close to satisfying the Daimler test.

C. Specific Jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit has a three-part test to determine whether there is specific jurisdiction 

over a claim.

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.

Freestream, 905 F.3d at 603.

In the instant case, the critical issue is (1) above. As to whether the purposeful 

availment/purposeful direction requirement has been met, the Court must first ask what exactly is 

the nature of the claim that Ms. Caces-Tiamson is bringing.

If Ms. Caces-Tiamson were bringing some kind of tort claim against Equifax for not 

preventing the data breach, then the Court would apply a purposeful direction analysis. See In re 

Boon Glob., Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 651 (9th Cir. 2019) (“‘The exact form of our jurisdictional inquiry 

depends on the nature of the claim at issue.’ For claims sounding in contract, a purposeful 

availment test is used; for claims sounding in tort a purposeful direction test is used.”). Under that 

analysis, Ms. Caces-Tiamson cannot establish even a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction 

because, as Equifax argues, “any and all actions which Equifax did or allegedly did not take with 

respect to its data security systems” would presumably have occurred in Georgia, where Equifax 

has its principal place of business. Mot. at 2. The fact that Ms. Caces-Tiamson suffered injury in 

California (i.e., where she resides) as a result of Equifax’s actions or omissions is not enough to 

support specific jurisdiction. See In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 

1118, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“As the Supreme Court made clear in Walden v. Fiore [571 U.S. 277 

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(2014)], something more is required than ‘imposition of an injury . . . to be suffered by the 

plaintiff while she is residing in the forum state.’”). 

A plaintiff’s “residency in the forum state is not the sine qua non of 

specific jurisdiction.” Neither is where the Plaintiff experienced her 

injury. Rather, the Supreme Court has instructed [in Walden] that 

“t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a 

particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct 

connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”

Dubose v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 17-cv-00244-JST, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99504, at *6 

(N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017).

Nor can specific jurisdiction be based on the mere fact that Equifax provides services to 

customers nationwide, including but not limited to California. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 

Sup. Ct. of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (stating that “[t]he ‘substantial 

connection’ between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum 

contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum 

State” and that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an 

act the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state”) (emphasis in original). 

In her opposition brief, Ms. Caces-Tiamson’s tries to link the data breach to California 

because Equifax purportedly has two California offices and “[t]he computer systems in these 

locations are networked . . . to the computer at Equifax’s Headquarters in Georgia, sharing data.” 

Opp’n at 3. Ms. Caces-Tiamson, however, has not shown that data breach or the failure to prevent 

the data breach is tied to the California offices specifically. See pages 4-5, supra (discussing 

evidence provided by Equifax as part of its reply brief regarding the alleged Escalon office and the 

Concord office).

The only wrinkle here is that Ms. Caces-Tiamson has framed her complaint in an odd way. 

Based on the allegations in her complaint, she does not purport to be bringing a direct tort claim 

based on Equifax’s failure to prevent the data breach. Rather, she asserts in the complaint that (1) 

she gave Equifax an opportunity to provide proof that it was not at fault, (2) Equifax failed to 

respond, and (3) thus Equifax should be deemed to have admitted to liability (i.e., is in some kind 

of default). Even as framed, Equifax’s liability turns on its responsibility for the breach. Hence,

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the problematic nature of personal jurisdiction still obtains. In any event, there is nothing to 

indicate that Equifax’s failure to respond to Ms. Caces-Tiamson’s notice occurred in California, 

rather than Georgia. Again, specific jurisdiction must be based on “contacts that the ‘defendant 

himself’ creates with the forum state.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (emphasis in original). The

“‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the 

defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 285. 

Finally, even if the Court were to apply a purposeful availment analysis, “[t]he purposeful 

availment standard requires more than foreseeability of causing injury in another state.” Terracom 

v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995) (adding that “‘the foreseeability that is 

critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 

State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’”). Ms. CacesTiamson has not made a sufficient showing of specific jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Equifax’s motion to dismiss based on lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Because the Court is granting the motion to dismiss based on lack of 

personal jurisdiction, it need not address Equifax’s secondary argument in support of dismissal, 

i.e., failure to state a claim for relief.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file in this case.

This order disposes of Docket No. 7.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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