Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02094/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Beverly C. Ryan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

Uniced Stares Co~rr of Appeals 

Temh C!rt:t·i~ 

JAN 16 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2094 

BEVERLY C. RYAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 88-20018-01) 

David J. Phillips, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of 

Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas (Charles D. Anderson, Federal Public 

Defender, District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas) for DefendantAppellant 

Robert s. Streepy, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, 

Kansas 66101 (Benj~min L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, 

and Leon J. Patton, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, 

Kansas, were also on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH and TACHA, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 1 
Appellant Beverly Ryan was charged by indictment on two 

counts of unlawful use of credit cards, stolen or obtained with 

intent to defraud, in transactions affecting interstate commerce 

and obtaining goods of an aggregate value of $1,000 or more in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1029(a)(2) and 2. Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss, "for the reason that this Court lacks 

jurisdiction of the subject matter and venue is improperly placed 

in Kansas." I R. Item 11 at 1. After hearing argument, the 

district court denied the motion. Defendant then entered a 

conditional plea of guilty to one of the counts against her, 

preserving, under Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(a)(2), for appeal the issue 

of aggregation of amounts from transactions in different states to 

satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Following conviction and 

sentence, defendant filed a timely appeal. We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

The facts, for purposes of this appeal, are undisputed. On 

February 24, 1988, defendant Ryan was indicted on two counts of 

violating 18 U.S.C. S 1029(a)(2). 1 Count One stated that "in the 

1 

Iri relevant part, 18 U.S.C. S 1029 provides: 

(a) Whoever -

(2) knowingly and with intent to defraud 

traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access 

devices during any one-year period, and by such 

conduct obtains anything of value aggregating 

$1,000 or more during that period; 

shall, if the offense affects interstate or foreign 

commerce, be punished as provided in subsection (c) 

of this section. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 2 
District of Kansas, and elsewhere, .•• in transactions affecting 

interstate commerce," Ms. Ryan "did knowingly and with intent to 

defraud, traffic in or use one or more unauthorized access 

devices, namely Mastercard credit cards, • that were stolen or 

obtained with the intent to defraud, and by such conduct obtained 

goods of an aggregate value of $1,000.00 or more." Count Two was 

identical, except that it referred to a VISA card. 

At the motion to dismiss and plea hearing, the 

stated that it had evidence of the following facts: 

government 

In March and 

April, 1987, Beverly Ryan, an employee of the United Missouri Bank 

in Kansas City, Missouri, took credit cards which had been 

returned by their holders to the bank. Ms. Ryan used these cards, 

presumably to make purchases, in Missouri and Kansas. In 

addition, she gave one of the cards to her ex-husband to use. III 

R. 13-14. 

The total amount charged was over $1000, but the government 

concedes that less than $1000 was charged in Kansas. Brief of 

Appellee at 2. Ms. Ryan was apprehended after a store clerk in 

Olathe, Kansas, called for authorization on the VISA card which 

she was attempting to use. III R. 14. Ms. Ryan moved to dismiss, 

because she asserted that in order to be prosecuted in the United 

States District Court of Kansas, at least $1000 worth of value 

must have been obtained in Kansas alone. I R. Item 11. She 

asserted, and continues to assert, that amounts charged in 

different states cannot be aggregated to reach the $1000 

jurisdictional amount. 

The district court denied the motion and accepted Ms. Ryan's 

conditional plea of guilty to Count One. III R. 16. The other 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 3 
count was dismissed. Ms. Ryan was sentenced to a three-year 

suspended prison sentence with three years of probation. She was 

also ordered to make restitution and pay an assessment to the 

Crime Victims Fund. II R. 5-6. 

The issues raised on appeal are: l) can the jurisdictional 

amount for prosecution under 18 u.s.c. S 1029 be satisfied by 

aggregating amounts from different districts? 2) was venue 

. properly placed in the District of Kansas for prosecution? 3) if 

aggregation is proper, do amounts charged to credit cards in 

Missouri affect only intrastate commerce, thus making them 

unavailable for aggregation? 

II. AGGREGATION OF AMOUNTS 

Defendant Ryan first asserts that amounts of value of things 

obtained in different districts cannot be aggregated in order to 

reach the jurisdictional amount. We disagree. 

The broad wording of the statute itself indicates that 

aggregation should be allowed between districts. The statute 

provides that anyone who knowingly "uses one or more unauthorized 

access devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct 

obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more" is guilty of 

the offense if the action affects interstate or foreign commerce. 

18 u.s.c. S l029(a) (emphasis added). This wording is broad and 

there is no mention of geographical limitations. We believe that 

the statute means what it says, and we. are unwilling to read into 

it a requirement which would undermine the statute's clear 

purpose. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 4 
In order to be convicted of a violation of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 1029(a)(2), three elements must be satisfied: First, the person 

must have knowingly and with intent to defraud trafficked in, or 

used, one or more access devices (such as credit cards) without 

authorization. Second, the person must, as a result, have 

obtained anything of value aggregating $1000 or more during a 

year-long period. Finally, the offense must have affected 

interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a). 

Section 1029 was enacted in 1984 as a response to the growing 

importance of credit cards and other "access devices" in our 

society and to increasingly sophisticated criminal activity in 

this area. H.R. Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 

1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3689-3690. One of its 

purposes was to close the loopholes of already existing 

legislation under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1644, and 

the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1693n(b). Those 

statutes prohibit fraudulent use of credit cards and debit 

instruments. However, 

[b]oth of these statutes use a jurisdictional 

amount of $1,000 of activity in each instrument 

within 1 year; industry representatives state that 

the organized groups generally stay just under this 

amount but use many different counterfeit or stolen 

cards or debit instruments. 

H.R. Rep. No. 894, 98th Con~., 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

at 3691. See also United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 120 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 3250 (1989); United States v. 

Brewer, 835 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. 

Newman, 701 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Nev. 1988). 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 5 
Congress stressed that neglect of white collar crimes such as 

credit card fraud "is a great mistake and in fact an attack on 

white collar crime can often be much more productive, 

economically, to this country than the more publicized emphasis on 

violent crime." H.R. Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 1984 u.s. Code 

Cong. & Admin. News at 3690. The House Committee on the Judiciary 

found evidence of the deterrent power of the law when enforced in 

the area of white collar crime. By using the phrase "affects 

interstate· or foreign commerce," the Committee intended to 

establish "a broad jurisdictional basis." See H.R. Rep. No. 894, 

98th Cong., 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3702; Newman, 

701 F. Supp. at 186-87. 

At the same time, Congress recognized that not every credit 

card crime warrants federal attention. For example, the use of 

counterfeit cards is considered more serious than the misuse of 

genuine cards; there is therefore no threshold dollar amount for 

producing or trafficking in counterfeit cards. H.R. Rep. No. 894, 

98th Cong., 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3699. For 

misuse of genuine credit cards, "certain thresholds contained in 

the bill, such as the dollar amount threshold on trafficking in or 

using unauthorized devices ~ will insure that Federal 

involvement is concentrated on those situations where they can 

best supplement the efforts of State and local governments." Id. 

at 3702. It is this fact to which defendant Ryan points in her 

assertion that amounts should not be aggregated from different 

districts in order to meet the jurisdictional amount. She argues 

that small amounts from different districts are better left to the 

States to handle. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 6 
However, Congress 

additional constraint: 

·foreign commerce. 18 

also limited federal jurisdiction with an 

the offense must affect· interstate or 

U.S.C. § l029(a). Thus in order to be 

convicted of violating the statute, one must obtain value of at 

least $1000 and the offense must affect interstate or foreign 

commerce. This second requirement, in addition to the threshold 

amount, ensures that the federal government will involve itself in 

those cases which it is best able to handle and in which it has 

the most interest. Cf. United States v. Mikelberg, 517 F.2d 246, 

252 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976) (for 

purposes of 15 UiS.C. § 1644, "Congress intended to confine the 

aggregating of purchases only to those purchases made 'in a 

transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce.'"). Here 

both elements were alleged -- the amount of goods obtained was 

charged to be of an aggregate value of $li000 or more, and the 

offense was allegedly committed "in transactions affecting 

interstate commerce." 

We are not persuaded by defendant's arguments based on Travis 

v. United States, 364 u.s. 631 (1961). She argues under Travis 

that here there was an offense committed only where goods of a 

value of at least $1,000 were obtained. She says that Travis held 

that the offense of filing a false affidavit was committed only 

where the filing of the affidavit was completed -- in the District 

of Columbia in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and that here the 

offense had to be completed by obtaining $1,000 of goods in Kansas 

for the offense to be committed there. In Travis, however, the 

only place where a false affidavit was "on file" with the Board 

and in a matter"within [its] jurisdiction," 18 u.s.c. § 1001, was 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 7 
in the District. The broad terms of S 1029(a} show a very 

different intention on the part of Congress here and the special 

statutory limitations of Travis are lacking. 2 

We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant's contention resting 

on Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 517 (1960), that there 

the transactions had to have enough relationship to be properly 

charged as one offense (transporting stolen goods in interstate or 

foreign commerce) and that the Schaffer opinion did not suggest 

that the case could have been tried anywhere except in New York 

where the value of the stolen goods aggregated the required $5,000 

amount. 18 u.s.c. S 2314. Schaffer makes no holding on venue 

limitations and the theory of aggregation under S 2314 in Schaffer 

for its transportation offense is based on wording that is again 

materially different~ Here S 1029(a) broadly prohibits using one 

or more unauthorized access devices during any one year period to 

obtain anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during the 

period -- which logically combines the wrongful use of one or more 

access devices in difference places, with no geographical 

limitation, the only requirement being that the offense affects 

interstate or foreign commerce. 

Defendant Ryan protests that under our interpretation a 

person can be prosecuted if she charges only $20 in each of the 

fifty states. However, if each of those fifty transactions 

2 

The broad scope of the statute becomes even more apparent 

when one considers that in 1974, the Truth in Lending Act was 

amended to reduce the jurisdictional amount from $5000 to $1000, 

15 u.s.c. S 1644, as amended by Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 

93-495, so th~t the federal government would have more power to 

prosecute credit card crimes. United States v. Abod, 770 F.2d 

1293, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985). 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 8 
affects interstate commerce, there is no reason why the statute 

should not apply. In fact, as the government pointed out at the 

time Ms. Ryan made her motion to dismiss, III R. 5-6, States might 

be hesitant to prosecute for such small amounts; thus under 

defendant Ryan's interpretation, persons might be free to steal 

small amounts with impunity if the federal government does not 

prosecute. Moreover, Ms. Ryan's argument "cuts both ways," for 

her interpretation would leave persons free to charge $999.99 in 

each State for a total of $49,999.50 with no federal prosecution. 

Given that Congress intended to close similar loopholes in 

predecessor statutes, it seems illogical that Congress intended to 

leave such a loophole. 

As pointed out, Congress meant to establish broad authority 

to punish credit card crime. This is true not only in the case of 

§ 1029, but also in the case of its predecessor statute, 15 u.s.c. 

§ 1644. See United.States v. Lomax, 598 F.2d 582, 584 {lOth Cir. 

1979); United States v. Abed, 770 F.2d 1293, 1296-1297 {5th Cir. 

1985); United States v. De Biasi, 712 F.2d 785, 790 {2d Cir.), 

cert. denied sub nom. Eboli v. United States, 464 u.s. 962 

{1983). 3 It is true that "[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary 

the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity 

should be resolved in favor of lenity." Bell v. United States, 

349 u.s. 81, 83 (1955). Moreover, "unless Congress conveys its 

3 

The board scope of the statute becomes even more apparent 

when one considers that in 1974, the Truth in Lending Act was 

amended to reduce the jurisdictional amount from $5000 to $1000,. 

15 u.s.c. § 1644, as amended by Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 

93-495, so that the federal government would have more power to 

prosecute credit card crimes. United States v. Abod, 770 F.2d 

1293, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985). 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 9 
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 

changed the federal-state balance. " United States v. 

Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (quoting United States v. Bass, 

404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). Nevertheless, these maxims only apply 

when we are uncertain about the statute's meaning and they are 

"not to be used 'in complete disregard of the purpose of the 

legislature.'" Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 

(1977) (quoting United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 510 

(1955)). Here we are satisfied that the meaning of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 1029(a) is clear from the broad and forceful terms used: 

"anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during [a one-year 

period] . . " 

We hold that the amounts may be aggregated from different 

districts to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in 

circumstances such as are alleged in the indictment. 

III. VENUE 

Ms. Ryan also asserts that venue was improper in the District 

of Kansas. This argument is closely related to the contention 

discussed and rejected in Part II, supra. 

The issue of venue is more than a procedural one. It has 

constitutional and public policy dimensions. U.S. Const., art. 

III, § 2, cl. 3; u.s. Const., amend. VI; United States v. Johnson, 

323 u.s. 273, 275-276 (1944); United States v. Jackson, 482 F.2d 

1167, 1178 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159 (1974}. 

The crucial inquiry for venue analysis is to determine where the 

crime alleged was committed. United States v. Cores, 356 u.s. 

405, 407 (1958}. When Congress does not specify the place where 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 10 
the crime was committed, it "must be determined from the nature of 

the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting 

it." United States v. Anderson, 328 u.s. 699, 703 (1946); see 

also United States v. Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d 874, 876 (lOth Cir. 

1987); United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 164 (2d Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213 (1985); Jackson, 482 F.2d at 1178; 

United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 332 (4th Cir. 1982); cert. 

denied, 464 u.s. 820 (1983); United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 

629, 632 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 u.s. 1150 (1982). 

Courts usually examine the verbs employed in the statute to define 

the offense. Medina-Ramos; 834 F.2d at 876; Mendel, 746 F.2d at 

164; Billups, 692 F.2d at 332; Blecker, 657 F.2d at 632. 

In essence, we performed this analysis when we examined the 

wording of the statute to determine that the jurisdictional amount 

can be aggregated from different districts. The operative words 

in § 1029 which are of concern to us here are "uses," "obtains," 

"affects" (.!_.~. affects interstate commerce), and "aggregating." 

There is no dispute that defendant Ryan pled guilty to such acts 

in Kansas. From this basic fact it follows that venue was 

properly laid in the District of Kansas. Since § 1029 does not 

specify venue, the general venue statute applies: 

Except as otherwise expressly provided by 

enactment of Congress, any offense against the 

United States begun in one district and completed 

in another, or committed in more than one district, 

may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district 

in which such offense was begun, continued, or 

completed. 

18 U.S.C.§ 3237(a); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. Defendant's 

venue argument is without merit. 

ll 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 11 
IV. INTERSTATE COMMERCE 

Finally, defendant Ryan argues that the showing as to 

interstate commerce, which was based on Missouri transactions, was 

improper under § 1029. She argues that Congress intended that 

only transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce be 

aggregated, citing United States v. Mikelberg, 517 F.2d at 252. 

Defendant says that the government prosecutor stated that the 

credit card (Mastercard) involved in Count One had been returned 

to a Missouri bank, and there came into defendant's possession. 

Tnus those charges sought to be aggregated by the government from 

Missouri would have been from intrastate transactions, and they 

were therefore not proper for aggregation under the statute with 

the charges in Kansas. Brief for Appellant at 19. 

We must reject this contention. Rule ll(a)(2) governing 

conditional pleas provides that such pleas may be made with 

approval of the court and consent of the government. The 

defendant may in such cases enter a conditional plea of guilty or 

nolo contendere "reserving in writing the right, on appeal from 

the judgment, to review of the adverse determination of any 

specified pretrial motion." 

Here the issue concerning interstate commerce was not 

reserved. We note that in the petition to enter the plea of 

guilty, I R. Item 16 at 1, the defendant represented to the court 

that she did the following acts in connection with the charges 

made against her: 

That on or about March 9, 1987, and 

continuing on or about April 24, 1987, in the 

district of Kansas and elsewhere, I, in 

transactions affecting interstate commerce, did 

knowingly and with intent to defraud, traffic in or 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 12 
that: 

use one or more unauthorized access 

described in the indictment that were 

obtained with intent to defraud, and 

conduct obtained goods in an aggregate 

$1000 or more, in vi6lation of 18 U.S.C. 

1029(a)(2). The amount charged in Kansas 

than $1000. (Emphasi~ added). 

devices 

stolen or 

by such 

value of 

Section 

was less 

Further, the petition to enter the plea, id. at 3, stated 

"The Government also agrees to permit me to enter a 

conditional plea of guilty, pursuant to Rule ll(a)(2), reserving 

the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review the adverse 

determination of my motion to dismiss the indictment." The 

defendant's Motion to Dismiss specified the grounds of the motion 

by stating that defense counsel and government counsel "agree that 

neither access device specified in the Indictment was trafficked 

in or used to obtain goods of an aggregate value of $1,000.00 or 

more in the state of Kansas. For this reason, this Court is 

without subject matter jurisdiction of the case, and venue is 

improper in Kansas." I R. Item 11 at 2 (emphasis in original). 

Further, the motion argued that "[b]y mandating that goods 

obtained must equal or exceed $1,000.00, but without specifying a 

defendant could be charged in districts wherein goods valued at 

less than $1,000.00 were obtained, Congress, in effect mandated 

such charges may only be tried in districts where goods valued at 

$1,000.00 or more were obtained.'' Id. 

The motion alleged further that "the instant case can be 

tried in any district wherein goods in excess of $1,000.00 were 

obtained. Kansas is not one of those districts concerning either 

count charged in the Indictment in this case." Id. Thus the 

motion of the defendant concerned the basic objection to 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 13 
aggregation of amounts from different states. Nowhere did the 

motion argue that interstate commerce as such was not affected. 

We have examined the transcript of the hearing on the motion 

and the acceptance of the conditional plea. III R. 2-18. There 

it is again made clear that the defendant was making her objection 

to aggregation. Defense counsel said that the motion referred to 

a "continuing crime" but defendant argued that aggregation could 

not be used to show a violation in a given district to support 

venue there. Defense counsel stated: "It is a continuing crime of 

permitting the charges to reach the total of $1,000, but we don't 

believe and our whole argument is that you cannot charge in any 

district unless the $1,000 amount is met in each district." III 

R. 3 (emphasis added). After the argument of counsel on the 

motion to dismiss, stating that they would like to preserve the 

''legal issue on appeal," III R. at 6, the trial judge stated that 

he agreed they had the right to appeal "that issue even though you 

enter a plea on behalf of your client of guilty." III R. at 7. 

The motion, the argument, the petition to enter the guilty 

plea and the trial judge's approval of the conditional plea failed 

to make any reference to interstate commerce as being at issue. 

Since the interstate commerce issue was not properly reserved in 

accordance with Rule ll(a)(2), the plea of guilty and the ensuing 

conviction comprehended all of the factual and legal elements 

necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a 

lawful sentence. See United States v. Broce, 109 S. Ct. 757, 762 

(1989). 

We conclude that no error has been demonstrated in the 

judgment and sentence and they are accordingly 

AFFIRMED. 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2094 Document: 01019297300 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 14