Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-02138/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-02138-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andreana Michael
Defendant
Tri-Dam
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRI-DAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREANA MICHAEL,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

1:11-cv-2138-AWI-SMS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 26)

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff, Tri-Dam, filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On September 16, 2013, Defendant, Andreana Michael, 

filed an opposition. On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed its reply. For the following reasons 

Plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment shall be denied.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tri-Dam, a joint venture between the South San Joaquin Irrigation District and Oakdale 

Irrigation District, owns and operates the Tulloch Hydroelectric Project No. 2067 located near 

the city of Copperopolis, California, pursuant to a license issued by the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). Complaint at ¶¶ 3-4. The Tulloch Project boundary extends 

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approximately 1,619 acres and includes all the land within the 515-foot elevation contour 

surrounding the Tulloch Reservoir. Complaint at ¶ 5. FERC first granted Tri-Dam a license to 

operate the Tri-Dam Project on January 1, 1955, for a term ending December 31, 2004. 

Complaint at ¶ 8. Article 39 of the license granted Tri-Dam the authority to grant permission for 

use of lands within the Tulloch Project boundary without prior approval of FERC. Complaint at 

¶ 8; Tulloch Reservoir Shoreline Management Plan, December 2002, (“SMP”) at p. 1-1.

FERC requires that each licensee (Tri-Dam) obtain control of all lands needed for 

operation and maintenance of the project. FERC License at p. 35, 114 FERC ¶ 62, 162 (2006). 

Sixty-one percent of the land within the FERC Project Boundary is privately owned, twenty-six 

percent of the land is owned by the Oakdale and South San Joaquin Irrigation Districts and 

twelve percent is owned by either the state or federal governments. SMP at p. 6. Tri-Dam claims 

to have obtained a flowage easement for relating to Defendant‟s land within the FERC Project

boundary in 1957. Plaintiff disputes whether the deed, creating the easement, granted by Joe 

Sanguinetti on May 9th, 1957 applies to their home at 194 Sanguinetti Court. Defendant‟s 

Response to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact (“SSF”), Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 11-12. The 

easement to Oakdale and South San Joaquin Irrigation Districts, granted the following uses and 

purposes:

(a) The right to permanently overflow, flood and cover [the FERC Project Boundary] 

land with flood, slack, or back water created by the erection and operation of the 

Tulloch Dam across the Stanislaus River; 

(b) The right to enter upon said land from time to time to clear, destroy, or dispose of any 

timber or other natural growth, any obstructions, accumulations, trash, filth and any 

other thing which would in any way interfere with the use of said reservoir, or the 

waters therein, or tend to render unsafe or unsanitary either the reservoir created by 

said dam or the margin thereof;

(c) The right to ingress to and egress from said lands for the purposes aforesaid. 

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit A, Conveyance of Easement, Doc. 27-1 at p. 4; SSF 

at ¶ 12; SMP at p. 6. This easement applied to nine parcels owned by Mr. Sanguinetti and 

described in a lengthy description of meets and bounds, all within the 515-foot elevation contour

elevation of the Tulloch Reservior. Id.

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In 2002, Tri-Dam developed Tulloch Reservoir‟s current SMP1in anticipation of 

obtaining a new license for the Tulloch Project. Observing the FERC license required Tri-Dam 

to obtain FERC approval for (1) actions that would in any way reduce the storage capacity of 

Tulloch Reservoir and (2) use of lands within the FERC Project Boundary, the SMP recognized 

there was considerable public interest for development of the Tulloch Reservoir shoreline and 

that some of this development could conceivably have only minor impacts on reservoir storage 

or project operations. Accordingly, the SMP expressed Tri-Dam‟s need to approach FERC for 

general approval of minor development activities to facilitate such activities within the Project 

Boundary and avoid the need to obtain FERC approval for every individual development 

activity.

The SMP described the minor development activities for which Tri-Dam had requested 

FERC‟s approval. Such minor development activities include the erection of a retaining wall or 

construction of a dock. The SMP also outlined an “encroachment” permitting scheme through 

which parties could apply for – and Tri-Dam would issue – permits authorizing a particular use 

or facility within the FERC Project Boundary. According to the SMP, all proposed development 

activities are subject to requirements of applying for and obtaining a Tri-Dam encroachment 

permit.

On December 23, 2002, Tri-Dam filed an application with FERC for a new license, 

pursuant to sections 4(e) and 15 of the Federal Power Act (FPA, 16 U.S.C §§ 791 et seq.), to 

continue operation and maintenance of the Tulloch Project; the SMP was included as an exhibit 

to the new license application. On February 16, 2006, FERC issued a new license to Tri-Dam 

for a period of 39 years, 11 months subject to the terms and conditions of the FPA, which was 

incorporated into the license by reference. (Between 2004 and 2006, Tri-Dam operated the 

Tulloch Project under an annual license pending the disposition of its new license application.) 

Article 411 of this license approves the SMP. Article 413 gives Tri-Dam the authority to grant 

permission for certain uses and occupancies of project lands and waters, including non-

 

1 The SMP was submitted by Tri-Dam with its license application in 2002 and remained in effect until FERC 

approved the revised Reservoir Management Plan as directed by the 2006 FERC license. FAC ¶ 11. Thus, the SMP 

was in effect at all times relevant to this action.

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commercial piers, landings and boat docks, without prior FERC approval. Article 413 also 

imposes a continuing responsibility upon Tri-Dam to supervise and control the uses and 

occupancies for which it grants permission. If a permitted use or occupancy violates any 

condition imposed by the license or by Tri-Dam, article 413 further gives Tri-Dam authority to 

take any lawful action necessary to correct the violation, including canceling the permission to 

use and occupy the project lands and waters and requiring the removal of any non-complying 

structures and facilities.

On April 13, 2005, Tri-Dam issued a permit to the previous owners of Defendant‟s 

property for construction of a retaining wall and dock. Decl. of Dan Pope, Doc. 30 at ¶ 12.

In 2010, Defendant purchased the real property at 194 Sanguinetti Court, Copperopolis, 

California (“Subject Property”), waterfront property located at Tulloch Reservoir, more 

particularly known as Calaveras County Assessor‟s Parcel No. 053-018-051. Decl. of Andreana 

Michael, Doc. 33-1 at ¶ 2. When Defendant took possession of the property a retaining wall was 

in place. Decl. of Andreana Michael at ¶ 3. Defendant had seen pictures of the property that 

depicted a dock but when she took possession of the property no dock existed. Id. Defendant‟s 

husband installed a dock that Defendant claims to be identical to the prior dock. Id.

Defendant did not seek a permit prior to construction of the new dock nor was one issued. 

Decl. of Dan Pope at ¶ 11. Tri-Dam claims that the retaining wall presently existing on 

Defendant‟s property is not the same size, shape or configuration as the wall approved in the 

2005 permit. Id. at ¶ 12. The retaining wall on Defendant‟s property is constructed with its base 

at the 510-foot contour line; the high water level for the Tulloch Reservoir. Decl. of Dan Pope at 

¶ 10; Decl. of Andreana Michael at ¶ 6. Defendant contends that she has never seen water close 

to or touching the retaining wall. Decl. of Andreana Michael at ¶ 6.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the 

part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 

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party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of „the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,‟ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). To overcome summary judgment, the opposing party must 

demonstrate a factual dispute that is both material, i.e. it affects the outcome of the claim under 

the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 

Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem 

Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1987). In order to demonstrate a genuine issue, 

the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 

find for the nonmoving party, there is no „genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must construe all facts and inferences 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing 

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 

898, 902 (9th Cir.1987). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Tri-Dam seeks an order enjoining Ms. Michael from maintaining the retaining wall and 

dock presently existing on her property. Tri-Dam articulates two bases for the granting of the 

requested injunctive relief on summary judgment. First, Tri-Dam asserts that its FERC license 

grants it regulatory authority over all of the land within the Project Boundary. It claims that this 

regulatory authority permits Tri-Dam to enforce the SMP independently of the flowage 

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easement. Second, Tri-Dam asserts that Ms. Michael‟s property is in violation of the flowage 

easement.

A. Tri-Dam’s FERC license does not grant it any property rights over any property in the 

Project Boundary.

As this Court held in Tri-Dam v. Keller and Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, Tri-Dam‟s FERC 

license imposes upon Tri-Dam a duty to comply with and enforce the terms of the FERC license 

– including creation and enforcement of a SMP - but does not grant the Tri-Dam the property 

rights to do so.2Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, 1:11-cv-1141-AWI-MJS, 2014 WL 897337 at *7 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); Tri-Dam v. Keller, 1:11-cv-1304-AWI-SAB, 2013 WL 2474692 at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. June 7, 2013). The mere inclusion of lands within a project boundary will not restrict 

landowner uses, since such inclusion does not itself create or alter property rights. See, e.g., 

PacifiCorp, order on rehearing, 80 FERC ¶ 61,334, at 62,113 (1997). Rather, Tri–Dam's right to 

enforce the SMP is restricted by the scope of Tri–Dam's property interest, in this case an 

easement (which Defendant disputes), in the Subject Property. Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, 2014 WL 

897337 at *9; see PacifiCorp, 80 FERC at ¶ 62,113.

Tri-Dam‟s first argument, that it has the right to enforce its SMP based on the FERC 

license, is again rejected for the same reasons articulated in Keller and Schediwy.

B. Plaintiff has not proven absence of disputed fact such that a jury could only find that the 

retaining wall and/or dock on the Subject Property violate the easement.

As discussed above, any action taken by Tri-Dam to enforce its SMP is valid only to the 

extent that it is coextensive with its flowage easement.

1. Plaintiff has proven that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 

Sanguinetti Deed burdens the Subject Property.

 

2 A mechanism is provided for a licensee to obtain via eminent domain all of the property rights necessary to the 

construction, maintenance, or operation of any dam, reservoir, diversion structure, or the works appurtenant or 

accessory thereto when such right could not be otherwise obtained by contract or pledge. Tri-Dam could attempt to 

exercise such a right to secure the property rights necessary to enforce its SMP provided that it first attempts to 

obtain such rights by contract or pledge and such rights are necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation 

of the dam or reservoir.

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As a preliminary matter, Defendant alleges that Tri-Dam‟s flowage easement does not 

burden her property. Defendant alleges that some of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff to 

support the claim that the easement burdens the Subject Property is not properly before the court. 

Specifically, Defendant alleges that the Preliminary Title Report - that Defendant has requested 

that this Court take judicial notice of – is not suitable for judicial notice because it is not a public 

record or otherwise beyond reasonable dispute. Defendant is correct that the privately-obtained 

title report is not judicially noticeable. Time Warner Entm't-Advance/Newhouse P'ship v. 

Steadfast Orchard Park, L.P., 2008 WL 4350054 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2008) (A privately 

obtained “title report document is not suitable for judicial notice as it is not a public record or 

otherwise beyond reasonable dispute.”). 

In addition to seeking judicial notice of the preliminary title report, Defendant submitted 

the report as Exhibit O to the Declaration of Thomas Marrs, indicating that it is a true and correct 

copy of a document provided by Defendant during discovery. It is well settled that 

unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Canada v. 

Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the title report in question 

was provided by Defendant to Plaintiff in discovery. Accordingly, it is presumed to be authentic 

when offered against Defendant. See Maljack Productions, Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video 

Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 at n. 12 (9th Cir. 1996). The court has reviewed the title report in 

question. The title report does not indicate that the property is necessarily encumbered by the 

Sanguinetti easement, only that the title insurer would except from the title insurance any 

protection against “an easement for ingress, egress, reservoir and incidental purposes in the 

document recorded November 18, 1957, in Book 112, Page 220, Calaveras County records.” 

Decl. of Thomas Marrs, Exhibit O, Doc. 29-15 at p. 6.3The Sanguinetti Deed, standing alone, 

gives the Court only a recitation of meets and bounds. A recitation of meets and bounds without 

production of documentation explaining that Defendant‟s land falls within the description is 

 

3 The title report makes specific reference to the fact that “the exceptions and exclusion are meant to provide [the 

purchaser] with notice of matter which are not covered under the terms of title insurance policy...” Decl. of Marrs, 

Exhibit O at p 2. The title report does not indicate, as Plaintiff claims, “exceptions to Defendant‟s title”. Plaintiff‟s 

Reply at p. 7.

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inadequate to prove to this Court that the Subject Property is burdened by the easement. Plaintiff 

further proffers deposition testimony from Defendant‟s husband indicating his awareness that the 

Subject Property is burdened by the easement. Although any one of the documents, standing 

alone, may be inadequate to prove the non-existence of a genuine issue of material fact, taken 

together no reasonable trier of fact could find that the Sanguinetti Deed did not burden the 

Subject Property.

Plaintiff‟s proffered evidence is such that no reasonable jury could to make the 

determination that the Subject Property is not burdened by the easement. 

In an effort to show a genuine dispute as to whether the easement burdens her land, 

Defendant relies on the facts that 1) the Sanguinetti Deed does not contain a description by street 

address or Assessor‟s Parcel Number (“APN”), and 2) her deed does not contain reference to the 

Sanguinetti easement.

Defendant is correct that the Sanguinetti Deed does not contain a description by street 

address or APN. However, as Plaintiff points out, it comes as no surprise that the deed which 

predated construction on the subject property does not contain street addresses or APNs. The 

absence of street address and APN are by no means an indication that the easement does not 

burden the Subject Property. Accordingly, Defendant‟s first assertion does not create a genuine 

dispute of material fact. Defendant is also correct that her deed does not make reference to the 

Sanguinetti easement. This fact in not in dispute but is also not material to this action.4 Whether 

Defendant‟s deed provided actual notice of the easement is not probative of whether the 

easement burdens the Subject Property.

 

4

Plaintiff opposes Defendant‟s reliance on her grant deed on the grounds that it was not produced in discovery 

despite Plaintiff‟s request for production of all documents related to the purchase of the Subject Property. This Court 

is unable to determine what was produced in discovery but is able, based on a review of the deed, to make the 

determination that its contents are not material to the issue before the Court; the Subject Property could be burdened 

by the easement regardless of what Defendant‟s deed reflects.

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Defendant has failed to produce sufficient evidence overcome Plaintiff‟s proof of absence 

of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Sanguinetti easement burdens the Subject 

Property.5

In any event, whether or not the easement burdens the Subject Property, there is genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant‟s improvements violate Plaintiff‟s easement as 

discussed below.

2. Plaintiff has not proven that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the

Dock and Retaining Wall violate the easement.

The extent of an easement “is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the 

enjoyment by which it was acquired.” Cal. Civ. Code, §806. With an express easement, as in this 

case, the only interests that are transferred from the grantor to the grantee are the interests 

expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident to the interests. Pasadena v. CaliforniaMichigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal.2d 576, 579 (1941). An easement, “unless it is ambiguous, 

must be construed by a consideration of its own terms. The meaning and intent thereof is a 

question of law ....” Gray v. McCormick, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1019, 1024 (2008) (citation 

omitted).

The relevant text of the Sanguinetti Deed grants to Plaintiff “[t]he right to overflow the ... 

land, ... enter upon said land ... to clear, destroy, or dispose ... any obstructions ... and any other 

thing which would in any way interfere with the use of said reservoir, or the waters therein, or 

tend to render unsafe or unsanitary either the reservoir created by said dam or the margin 

thereof.” RJN, Exhibit A, Doc. 27-1 at p. 4 (emphasis added). As discussed in Tri-Dam v. 

Schediwy, “[t]his language is onerous but unambiguous. Tri–Dam has the right to destroy, clear 

or dispose of anything that in any way interferes with Tri–Dam's use of the reservoir or with the 

waters [or that tends to render unsafe the reservoir].... Accordingly, in order for Tri–Dam to 

prove a violation of its easement it must adduce some evidence that the encroachment 

 

5 This is consistent with this Court‟s prior findings that the Sanguinetti and Mitchell deeds granted express flowage

easements for all of the land within the FERC Project Boundary. See Tri-Dam v. Keller 2013 WL 2474692; Tri-Dam 

v. Yick, 2013 WL 2474689. 

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complained of actually interferes with one of the aforementioned items.” Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, 

2014 WL 897337 at * 9-10. 

Tri-Dam has consistently indicated that the Tulloch Reservoir has a normal maximum 

water surface elevation of 510 feet. Decl. of Dan Pope at ¶ 10; see Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, 2014 

WL 897337 at *9-10; Tri-Dam v. Keller, 2013 WL 2474692 at *1. Ms. Michael has indicated 

that since she took possession of the property she has never seen the reservoir‟s waters touch the 

retaining wall on the Subject Property. Decl. of Andreana Michael at ¶ 6. Plaintiff has submitted

nothing to contradict Defendant‟s assertion. In fact, all that Plaintiff has asserted to support the 

claim that the retaining wall and dock violate the easement is conclusory assertion that “[t]here 

can be no dispute that the retaining wall and dock at issue here, like any physical structure that 

affects shore contour, interfere with use of the reservoir in some way.”

In Tri-Dam v. Schediwy this Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of Tri-Dam, 

indicated:

Tri–Dam has submitted undisputed evidence that indicates that the retaining wall 

was built at or below the 506–foot contour line. Accordingly, the wall intrudes 

several feet below 510–foot contour level; the normal high water level of the 

Tulloch Reservoir. In doing so, the [Defendants‟] structure, in some way, 

interferes with the waters within the reservoir by displacing the normal flow of 

the waters.

Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, 2014 WL 897337 at * 10. In Schediwy, Tri-Dam specifically argued that 

“Defendants‟ wall intrudes below the normal high water level and therefore interferes with the 

reservoir‟s storage capacity, albeit to a relatively small degree.” Tri-Dam v. Schediwy, 1:11-cv1141-AWI-SMS, Plaintiff‟s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 68 at p. 23 (emphasis added).

Here, the retaining wall is at the 510-foot contour level; the normal high water level. 

Accordingly, it is not clear, as Plaintiff claims, whether the retaining wall interferes in any way 

with use of the reservoir or its waters. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

the retaining wall in any interferes with the reservoir or its waters. 

In Tri-Dam v. Keller this Court, in denying summary judgment, indicated: 

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[I]t is not clear that the [Defendants‟] dock improvements interfere with the 

safety, sanitation, or use of the Tulloch Reservoir or its margins.... Consequently, 

a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the scope of the easements grant 

Tri–Dam the right to remove the [Defendants‟] dock improvements.

Tri-Dam v. Keller, 2013 WL 2474692 at * 4. Tri-Dam has presented nothing to this Court to 

distinguish the present case from Keller. In both instances Tri-Dam alleges that a violation has 

occurred because the dock was constructed below the 515-foot contour elevation without permit.

In Keller this argument failed and the Court has been provided with no reason to depart from that 

ruling.

Tri-Dam further argues that the Michael dock should be removed because it tends to 

render unsafe the reservoir and impede navigation as evidence by the complaint submitted by an 

adjacent homeowner. The complaint, in relevant part, reads:

[T]he entrance and exit orientation for boats and wave runners from this dock is 

gravely dangerous to swimmers and kayakers in our swimming area.... We are 

requesting a different orientation for that dock as there have been several close 

calls to anyone swimming and playing in the water at our place. If the dock were 

to be placed with the entrance and exit facing directly out into the lake it would 

make everything much safer.

Decl. of Dan Pope, Exhibit D, Doc. 30-4 at p. 2. Defendant does not dispute that the letter was 

submitted however she does appear to dispute the accuracy of the claim. In Defendant‟s 

opposition, she notes that the letter was authored over three years ago and that its primary 

complaint is the orientation of the dock. Doc. 33 at p. 8. Defendant also declares that she has 

“never been informed that the dock or wall on [her] property constitute a safety issue, except that 

[she] was made aware of the letter written three years ago by [her] neighbor which indicated that 

a chance (sic) in the dock‟s orientation could make it more safe.” Decl. of Andreana Michael, 

Doc. 33-1 at ¶ 7. Further, Defendant declares that “[t]he dock and wall on [her] property do not 

interfere with the use of the reservoir or its waters, nor (sic) with Tri-Dam‟s ability to operate the 

dam and provide electricity, water and recreation.” Decl. of Andreana Michael, Doc. 33-1 at ¶ 5. 

The letter submitted by Tri-Dam, standing alone, is inadequate to convince this Court that no 

reasonable jury could find that Defendant‟s dock in no way tended to render unsafe the reservoir 

or impair navigation. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden on this question. 

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Since Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute of any material 

fact relating to whether Defendant‟s retaining wall and dock violate the Sanguinetti easement,

summary judgment for Tri-Dam cannot be granted.

V. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26) is DENIED.

2. The case is referred to the Magistrate Judge for a trial-setting conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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