Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50125/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50125-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adam Gardenhire
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ADAM GARDENHIRE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50125

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00345-SVW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 18, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed April 30, 2015

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Richard A. Paez,

Circuit Judges and Michael A. Ponsor,* Senior District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

 

* The Honorable Michael A. Ponsor, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a sentence imposed for knowingly

aiming the beam of a laser pointer at an aircraft in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 39A, and remanded for resentencing, in a case

in which the district court applied an enhancement for

reckless endangerment under U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(2)(A).

The panel held that the district court erred in concluding

that the defendant acted recklessly when he aimed his laser

beam at the aircraft, where the record is devoid of evidence,

let alone clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant

was aware of the risk created by his conduct.

The panel could not say that the error was harmless, and

instructed that the matter be assigned to a different district

judge on remand. The panel observed that the district court’s

statements show its commitment to the idea that, regardless

of the evidence presented, the defendant’s conduct was

reckless, and that it would likely impose the same sentence on

remand, regardless of this court’s rulings.

In light of the extremely steep sentencing regime dictated

by the recklessness enhancement for wide-ranging conduct

covered by § 2A5.2, the panel wrote that it is particularly

important that the government is held to its burden of proof

and that the enhancements are supported by clear and

convincing evidence.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 3

COUNSEL

Matthew Brady Larsen (argued), Deputy Federal Public

Defender; Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kerry C. O’Neill (argued) and Melissa Mills, Assistant

United States Attorneys; Robert E. Dugdale, Chief Assistant

United States Attorney; André Birotte Jr., United States

Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the district court correctly found

that Adam Gardenhire recklessly endangered an aircraft

within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(2)(A) when he

pointed a laser beam at a Cessna Citation jet, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 39A.

I.

On March 29, 2012, Adam Gardenhire, age eighteen,

aimed a green laser pointer at an incoming seven-passenger

Cessna Citation jet as it approached the Burbank Airport near

his home. The captain and pilot were onboard the private jet

when the laser struck the pilot’s eye. Although momentarily

blinded and distracted by the laser, the pilot was able to safely

land the aircraft. Gardenhire also aimed the laser pointer at

a police helicopter that was dispatched to determine the

laser’s source. Having located the source of the laser, the

police arrived at Gardenhire’s home. FollowingGardenhire’s

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4 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

admission that “[i]t was me with the laser,” the officers

located the laser pointer in his grandfather’s bedroom and

arrested Gardenhire.

Gardenhire, a high school student, explained to the FBI

that he had borrowed the laser from a friend. Gardenhire and

his friend had been using the laser to play around in their

neighborhood, pointing it at parked cars, stop signs, and other

objects. Gardenhire’s friend warned him against shining the

laser directly at anyone’s eyes because it could blind

someone. Though Gardenhire intentionally tried to hit the

aircraft, he never saw the laser actually reach it. He later

learned that he “struck two planes with the laser.” At the

time, Gardenhire did not think about the dangers of pointing

the laser at an aircraft and was simply bored.

The government charged Gardenhire with two counts of

knowingly aiming the beam of a laser pointer at an aircraft in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 39A—one count each for the Cessna

Citation jet and the police helicopter. The parties entered into

a plea agreement, in which Gardenhire agreed to plead guilty

to aiming the laser pointer at the Cessna Citation jet, and the

government agreed to dismiss the police helicopter count. 

The government also agreed to recommend a two-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility at sentencing

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and, if available, an additional

one-level reduction. On October 29, 2012, Gardenhire

entered a plea of guilty to aiming a laser at the Cessna

Citation jet. Despite the government’s agreement with

Gardenhire that he was an appropriate candidate for the

Conviction and Sentence Alternatives program (“CASA”), a

post-guilty plea diversionary program, the district court

denied a CASA referral.

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 5

On December 21, 2012, the U.S. Probation Office issued

its Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and a

recommendation letter. Presumably because the statutory

offense to which Gardenhire pleaded guilty had been enacted

just six weeks before the date of his offense conduct, no

sentencing Guideline expressly corresponded to its violation. 

See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L.

No. 112-95, § 311, 126 Stat. 11, 65-66 (Feb. 14, 2012). 

Therefore, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, the Probation Office

used the most analogous Guideline, which it concluded was

U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2, “Interference with Flight Crew Member or

Flight Attendant; Interference with Dispatch, Navigation,

Operation, or Maintenance of Mass Transportation Vehicle.”1

The Probation Office recommended a recklessness

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(2)(A), which

doubled Gardenhire’s base offense level, increasing it to

eighteen.

The only issue at sentencing was whether Gardenhire

“recklessly endangered” the safety of an aircraft within the

meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(2). The Probation Office

concluded that he did because he “knowingly and

intentionally aim[ed] a laser pointer at both the airplane and

helicopter.” The Probation Office then recommended a threelevel reduction of the offense level for acceptance of

responsibility, found one criminal history point for a prior

juvenile adjudication, and recommended a Guidelines

sentencing range of eighteen to twenty-four months.

1 The Guidelines have since been amended to expressly list U.S.S.G.

§ 2A5.2 as the applicable Guideline section for 18 U.S.C. § 39A. 

Appendix A, United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual

(2013) (incorporatingGuideline amendments effective November 1, 2013,

and earlier).

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6 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

The district court concluded that the Probation Office

properly calculated the Guidelines range, finding by clear and

convincing evidence that Gardenhire was aware of the

dangers of pointing the laser at the Cessna Citation jet. It

imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of thirty months’

imprisonment plus three years of supervised release, after

taking into account the factors provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). The district court placed particular emphasis on

the “need for deterrence” and expressed the hope that the

sentence would be publicized so that “young people” would

know this sort of “prank” cannot be tolerated. Gardenhire

timely appeals.2

II.

We have jurisdiction to review Gardenhire’s sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

the district court’s findings of fact underlying its sentencing

decision for clear error. United States v. Naghani, 361 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 2004). Clear error requires a “definite

and firm conviction that a mistake” occurred. United States

v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

We will reverse only when a district court’s factual findings

are “illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” 

United States v. Fitch, 659 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2011).

2 A two-judge panel of our court granted Gardenhire’s motion for release

pending appeal on July 9, 2013, finding, inter alia, that his appeal raises

a substantial question of law or fact that is fairly debatable.

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 7

III.

A.

The district court correctly noted that the government

bore the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence

that Gardenhire recklessly endangered the aircraft.3 United

States v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007). The

district court also correctly set forth the definition of

“reckless” provided in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G.

§ 2A1.4. Naghani, 361 F.3d at 1263 (noting that Application

Note 1’s definition of “reckless” for involuntary

manslaughter applies in this context). Section 2A1.4 defines

“reckless” as “a situation in which the defendant was aware

of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a

nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a

gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable

person would exercise in such a situation.” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4

cmt. n.1; see also United States v. Rodriguez-Cruz, 255 F.3d

1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining reckless). However, the

district court erred in concluding that Gardenhire acted

recklessly when he aimed his laser beam at the aircraft. The

record is devoid of evidence, let alone clear and convincing

evidence, that Gardenhire was aware of the risk created by his

conduct.

3 Generally, the party seeking to adjust an offense level must establish

that the adjustment is merited by a preponderance of the evidence, but the

burden increases to clear and convincing evidence if the adjustment will

“have a disproportionate impact on the ultimate sentence imposed.” 

United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 720 (9th Cir. 2006); see Gonzalez,

492 F.3d 1031 at 1039. In Gonzalez, we concluded that the heightened

standard was appropriate for the nine-level recklessness enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2(a)(2)(A). 492 F.3d 1031 at 1039–40.

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8 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

The district court relied on Gardenhire’s statement to the

FBI that he intentionally tried to hit the aircraft with his laser

beam. But this fact does nothing to show that Gardenhire was

aware that if he hit the jet, as intended, he could blind or

distract the pilot. In finding recklessness, the district court

also relied on the “fact” that Gardenhire knew his laser was

powerful enough to reach the aircraft. The district court

found, incorrectly, that it was “uncontroverted” that

Gardenhire stated he “hit the helicopter ‘two to three times’

and he hit the two different planes two times.” From that

“fact” the court concluded that Gardenhire knew “as soon as

he actually observed his laser strike the aircraft” that the

beam could travel such a distance. But whether Gardenhire

saw his laser beam strike an airplane is controverted—in the

very next paragraph of the same FBI report, by Gardenhire’s

statement that “he never saw the laser hit the planes but he

pointed the laser at the airplanes.” And even if Gardenhire

knew that the beam struck the aircraft, at most that evidences

knowledge that he could succeed in striking the jet, not

awareness of the consequences of the beam strike—the risk

that the pilot could be blinded or distracted or the aircraft

otherwise endangered.

Our conclusion is in accord with the First Circuit, which

has made clear that deliberate and intentional acts that happen

to result in endangering the safety of an aircraft are

insufficient to prove willfulness. In United States v. Sasso,

the defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5), which

makes it a crime to “willfully . . . interfere[ ] with or disable[

], with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a

reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone

engaged in the authorized operation of [an] aircraft or any air

navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such

aircraft.” 695 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2012) (alterations in

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 9

original). In Sasso, the jury was instructed, “If a person’s

actions interfere with an aircraft operator, you may infer that

the person acted willfully if his actions were deliberate and

intentional and had the natural and probable effect of

interfering with the aircraft operator.” Id. The defendant

argued that this instruction “erroneously diluted the mens rea

requirement” of the statute, and the First Circuit agreed. Id. 

The First Circuit held that this “instructional error may have

influenced the verdict,” and therefore vacated the conviction

and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 31.

As in Sasso, the district court here made the unsupported

leap from deliberate and intentional action to consciousness

of risk. In concluding Gardenhire was aware of the risk

caused by his actions simply because he deliberately aimed

at the aircraft, and purportedly knew the beam could reach the

aircraft, the district court significantly and erroneously

diluted the mens rea required for application of the

recklessness enhancement. See id. at 30.

The district court’s finding that Gardenhire was aware of

the risk created by his conduct lastly rests on the fact that

Gardenhire’s high school friend who lent him the laser told

him “not to shine the laser at anyone’s eyes because it would

blind people.” But knowing that a laser beam can cause

blindness when pointed directly at a person’s eyes is very

different than knowing that a laser beam can be distracting to

pilots who are both enclosed in a cockpit and at least 2,640

feet away. Nor did the government submit any evidence of

what even an average person would know about the effects of

aiming a laser beam at an aircraft. According to one of the

lead investigators in this case, an officer pilot, the beam of a

laser pointer that is “only the size of a pencil on the ground”

can intensify to “12 inches in diameter depending on the

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10 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

distance.” In other words, “the farther away it gets from the

point of origin, the beam spreads out,” thus increasing its

hazardousness, a notion that is counterintuitive, especially

when one considers that an ordinary light beam would grow

fainter. Additionally, the laser pointer is particularly

hazardous to an aircraft when the beam is refracted off the

cockpit glass, which intensifies the light even more, resulting

in a “bright, dazzling beam” that lights up the entire cockpit. 

That one knows that the laser is dangerous when pointed

directly in a person’s eyes does not mean that one knows

about the beam’s ability to expand and refract, rendering it

particularly hazardous for pilots in an aircraft miles away, or

that the danger is heightened at nighttime because the pilot’s

eyes have adjusted to the dark.

Citing Naghani, the district court concluded that

Gardenhire “reasonably knew or should have known that his

laser strikes would distract the jet pilot and interfere with the

pilot’s operation of the aircraft, thereby endangering the

aircraft.” See 361 F.3d at 1263. But by not examining the

facts of Naghani and quoting one sentence out of context

from that decision, the district court conflated the subjective,

“defendant was aware of the risk,” and the objective,

“standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in

such a situation,” prongs of the standard for recklessness. 

The government provided no evidence, let alone clear and

convincing evidence, that Gardenhire was aware of the risks

created by aiming the beam at the aircraft. And the district

court failed to address Gardenhire’s awareness of risk,

focusing exclusively on the nature and degree of the risk that

a reasonable person would not disregard. Naghani acted in

verydifferent circumstances, where the average person would

be immediately aware of the consequences of his actions.

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 11

In Naghani, an airplane passenger lit a cigarette in the

lavatory, set off the smoke alarm, and failed to respond to a

flight attendant’s knock on the lavatory door. Id. at 1258. 

Naghani refused to admit he had been smoking and refused

to reveal the location of his cigarette. Id. The situation

continued to escalate and a “verbal confrontation ensued,” in

which Naghani threatened to “kill all Americans.” Id.

Because of Naghani’s aggressive and confrontational

behavior, flight attendants forced Naghani to sit in a jump

seat near the lavatory and informed him the plane might have

to turn around and return to its originating location. Id. at

1259. In upholding the recklessness enhancement, we

emphasized that “[t]he district court properly found that

Naghani was aware of the risk created by his smoking,

obstreperous behavior and threats.” Id. at 1263. Naghani’s

conduct and the immediate consequences of his conduct

provide bountiful circumstantial evidence from which to infer

Naghani was subjectively aware of the risk created by his

conduct. Naghani had clear safety warnings not to smoke on

the airplane—the very action he performed despite the

warnings. Furthermore, Naghani’s refusal to cooperate with

flight attendants and his threatening behavior obviously and

immediately caused the flight staff to attend to him to

mitigate the danger in which he had put the aircraft by

smoking. The immediate reaction to Naghani’s behavior

made it clear to Naghani that he was dangerously interfering

with the normal operations of the aircraft, and yet his

disruptive behavior only escalated. By contrast, Gardenhire

heeded the only warning he was given—not to shine the laser

directly in anyone’s eyes—and he was not immediately

alerted to any additional risks he was creating by aiming the

beam at an aircraft.

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12 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

In United States v. Gonzalez, we also drew a clear and

logical inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of

the risk created by similarly disruptive conduct. 492 F.3d

1031. There, a passenger on a Southwest Airlines flight

complained of heart problems, refused to sit down, demanded

that the airplane land, opened overhead bins and attempted to

remove passengers’ luggage, ultimately threatening that he

had a bomb on the airplane. Id. at 1032–33. The flight

attendants heard Gonzalez say “I have [a] bomb” and “I’m

blowing the plane up.” Id. at 1033 (alteration in original). A

hysterical Gonzalez then began to kick and hit passengers

until flight attendants and other passengers eventuallytackled

and held him down. Id. at 1033–34. Gonzalez’s actions

caused “total chaos” onboard, supporting the logical inference

that he was subjectively aware of the risks of his threatening

and violent conduct. Id. at 1032. As we concluded in

Gonzalez, “It doesn’t take an aeronautical engineer to

recognize that a threat of a bomb in that environment and the

havoc that such a threat might cause is a threat to the safety

of the aircraft.” Id. at 1038.

Unlike in Naghani and Gonzalez, here the government

introduced no evidence that supported a subjective awareness

of the consequences of aiming a laser beam at an aircraft, and

the bare admission that Gardenhire intentionally aimed the

laser, knowing that it was dangerous to shine the laser in

someone’s eyes, does not support the inference the district

court drew—that he was aware of the dangers to the aircraft

from doing so. Had the government submitted circumstantial

or direct evidence that Gardenhire was aware of the laser’s

long-distance power, expansion capabilities, and ability to

refract off the cockpit glass, the district court could have

found subjective awareness. But it did not; nor did it

demonstrate that as of six weeks after the effective date of

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 13

18 U.S.C. § 39A, “Aiming a laser pointer at an aircraft,” the

dangers of shining a laser at an aircraft were of general

knowledge to the average person, or of specific knowledge to

teens.

At the first sentencing hearing on February 25, 2013, the

district court understood that the evidence in the record at that

time supported no more than intentional aiming and that the

government needed to submit evidence as to Gardenhire’s

knowledge of the danger, which the government had not

“established.” Expressing its frustration with the

government’s failure to submit evidence that Gardenhire was

aware that aiming a laser beam at an aircraft would endanger

it, or linking his knowledge that the laser should not be

pointed at a person’s eye to a supposed intentional effort to

aim it at the pilot’s eye, the district court continued the

hearing so that the government could get him the FBI reports

that it represented contained the critical evidence. However,

the reports did not evidence that Gardenhire was subjectively

aware of the risks; rather they indicated that Gardenhire told

the FBI agents that “he didn’t think about the dangers of what

he was doing” and “was just bored.” The only other relevant

evidence submitted was the defense expert’s testimony that

there have been “literally thousands” of laser incidents over

the last decade, and none resulted in a crash. Finally

Gardenhire himself told the judge, “[I] would just like to say

that I’m sorry; I didn’t know the risks of this laser pointer. In

this trial, I learned that—it’s not going to happen again, and

I’ve learned so much.” Thus the government never met its

burden of establishing that Gardenhire was aware of the risk

created by his conduct.

Because the government failed to show by clear and

convincing evidence that Gardenhire met the first prong of

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14 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

the recklessness enhancement test, we need not address the

second prong. The district court procedurally erred by

enhancing Gardenhire’s offense level for recklessness.

B.

We cannot say that the district court’s error was harmless. 

The district court’s post-hoc statement that it would impose

the same sentence even if reversed by the Ninth Circuit does

not render the procedural error harmless. United States v.

Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (holding that a “district court’s mere statement that

it would impose the same above-Guidelines sentence no

matter what the correct calculation cannot, without more,

insulate the sentence from remand”). After Gardenhire filed

his notice of appeal, Gardenhire moved the district court for

release pending appeal. It was undisputed that Gardenhire

was not a flight risk and that his purpose in bringing the

motion was not for delay, the first two prongs of the standard

for granting release. United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 1279,

1283 (9th Cir. 1985); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). The

district court denied the motion for failure to satisfy the third

prong: whether the defendant raised a substantial question,

which, if favorably ruled upon, would result in a reduced

sentence. The district court reasoned that “even if the Ninth

Circuit rules that the sentencing guideline should not

incorporate the recklessness enhancement, the Court would

find that the revised guideline would not adequately account

for the seriousness of the offense, or the need to deter such

reckless conduct.” Further, the court indicated it “likely

would impose the same above-guidelines sentence to meet

those demands under § 3553(a).” These statements,

indicating the district court’s reasoning for denying bail, do

not render its procedural error harmless.

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 15

They do, however, suggest that the district court judge

would be unable to set aside the nine-level enhancement for

recklessness, and would simply impose the same aboveGuidelines sentence upon remand. The district court’s

statements show its commitment to the idea that, regardless

of the evidence presented, Gardenhire’s conduct was reckless

and the above-Guidelines sentence was needed to deter

others. It thus appears the district court judge “would

reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial

difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously

expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous.”

Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court (In re Ellis), 356 F.3d 1198, 1211

(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting United Nat’l Ins. Co. v.

R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001)). The

district court has informed the parties that it would likely

impose the same sentence on remand, regardless of our

ruling. See United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 609

(9th Cir. 2012). Taking the court at its word, we vacate

Gardenhire’s sentence and ask the Clerk of the Court for the

Central District of California to assign this matter to a

different district court judge on remand.4 Id.

IV.

The significant error caused by the district court’s

misapplication of the recklessness enhancement raises

broader concerns regarding U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2. This section

4 Having found a procedural error in the Guidelines calculation, we need

not address Gardenhire’s allegation that his sentence was also

substantively unreasonable. United States v. Flores, 725 F.3d 1028, 1035

(9th Cir. 2013) (“If we find a material error in the Guidelines calculation,

‘we will remand for resentencing, without reaching the question of

whether the sentence as a whole is reasonable.’” (quoting United States v.

Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2006))).

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16 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

provides the Guidelines range for eleven U.S. Code sections

and subsections.5 The conduct criminalized by these eleven

provisions is wide-ranging. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1)

(willfully setting fire to an aircraft), 18 U.S.C. § 37

(intentionally performing an act of violence against a person

at an airport), 18 U.S.C. § 39A (aiming a laser pointer at an

aircraft), 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(6) (incapacitating the operator

of a mass transportation vehicle with intent to endanger

safety), 49 U.S.C. § 46503 (assaulting an airport employee),

49 U.S.C. § 46504 (assaulting a flight crew member or flight

attendant), 49 U.S.C. § 46308(2) (continuing to maintain a

misleading light after a warning). The statutory maximum

for the statute criminalizing Gardenhire’s conduct is five

years. 18 U.S.C. § 39A. Other statutes with sentencing

ranges guided byU.S.S.G. § 2A5.2 have statutorymaximums

of twenty years, life imprisonment, or even death. See, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. § 37. The Guidelines range for Gardenhire’s

misguided, teenage prank, which at least he no doubt now

understands has serious consequences for others, as well as

for himself, and the Guidelines range for “[t]errorist attacks

and other violence against . . . mass transportation systems”

are determined under the very same Guidelines section. See

18 U.S.C. § 1992.

Certain conduct with a Guidelines range dictated by

U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2 is truly abhorrent. Accordingly, it is not

surprising that the offense levels and corresponding

Guidelines ranges ratchet up very quickly under this

Guideline. Under U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2, the recklessness

5 Appendix A of the U.S.S.G. indicates that the following statutes

correspond to U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2: 18 U.S.C. § 32(a), (b); 18 U.S.C. § 37;

18 U.S.C. § 39A; 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6); 49 U.S.C.

§ 46308; 49 U.S.C. § 46503; 49 U.S.C. § 46504.

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UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE 17

enhancement doubles the base offense level, and an

enhancement for intentionally endangering the safety of an

aircraft more than triples the base offense level. In light of

this extremely steep sentencing regime, it is particularly

important that the government is held to its burden of proof

and that the enhancements are supported by clear and

convincing evidence.6

Through the erroneous application of the recklessness

enhancement, Gardenhire’s base offense level jumped from

nine to eighteen. Considering Gardenhire’s criminal history

category of I, a base offense level of nine would have resulted

in a Guidelines range of four to ten months, whereas a base

offense level of eighteen resulted in a Guidelines range of

twenty-seven to thirty-three months.7 The district court’s

6 Considering the wide range of conduct that results in Guidelines ranges

dictated by U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2 and the steep corresponding sentencing

regime, the U.S. Sentencing Commission may wish to consider different

sentencing Guidelines for certain crimes currently being funneled into

U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2. An offense such as Gardenhire’s seems to be different

in both kind and degree from many other offenses with Guidelines ranges

calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2.

7 This calculation does not take into account the reductions

recommended by the government and suggested in the PSR. Under

Gardenhire’s plea agreement, the government agreed to recommend a twolevel reduction at sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. This would

reduce Gardenhire’s correct offense level from nine to seven. An offense

level of seven corresponds to a Guidelines range of zero to six months,

considering Gardenhire’s criminal history category of I. Comparing this

Guidelines range to Gardenhire’s thirty-month term of imprisonment

highlights the severity of the district court’s error and the sentence

imposed. The district court imposed a prison term five times greater than

the high-end of the correctly calculated Guidelines range, taking into

account the reduction under the plea agreement. The unfairness in this

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18 UNITED STATES V. GARDENHIRE

error in finding recklessness minimized, and indeed

potentially eliminated, the critical distinction between these

separate Guidelines ranges.

V.

The government did not show by clear and convincing

evidence that Gardenhire was aware of the risks created by

his conduct. In applying the recklessness enhancement, the

district court materially erred, resulting in a miscalculated

Guidelines range. We vacate Gardenhire’s sentence and

remand for resentencing.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to the

Clerk to assign to a different district court judge.

sentencing regime is only highlighted by the government’s willingness to

place Gardenhire in CASA at the outset.

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