Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08036/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger Smythe
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ualeld Sflfll Court of Appula Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 1 7 1996 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff- Appellee, 

vs. 

ROGER SMYTHE, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-8036 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-139) 

Laurence P. Van Court, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Appellant. 

David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney, Casper, Wyoming (David D. 

Freudenthal, United States Attorney and Patrick J. Crank, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Casper, Wyoming, with him on the brief), for Appellee. 

Before EBEL, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Mr. Smythe entered a conditional plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute, to distribute, and to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S. C. § 846, and 

carrying and using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S. C. § 924(c). He 

Appellate Case: 95-8036 Document: 01019277477 Date Filed: 05/17/1996 Page: 1 
now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S. C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Background 

In October 1994, Mr. McCartney, manager of the Powder River Bus Station in 

Sheridan, Wyoming, received a package from two men, one of whom was Mr. Smythe, 

requesting that the package be shipped via bus to California. Prior to approaching Mr. 

McCartney, one of the men repeatedly exited and reentered the building. 9 R 45-46. 

Mr. McCartney also noticed that the name of the sender was printed on the package as 

"Jack A. Lope." Id. at 42. Aware that a 'jackal ope" is a fictitious creature resembling a 

rabbit with antlers, Mr. McCartney laughed out loud and attempted to joke about it with 

the senders. The senders did not appreciate Mr. McCartney's attempted humor but 

remained serious, retorting "is there a problem with that?" Id. at 43-44. Also, the 

package was heavily taped, with all of the seams of the box completely sealed. !d. at 4 7. 

After the men left the station, Mr. McCartney became concerned about the 

contents of the box, due to the potential threat to passengers on the bus on which the 

package was to be shipped. I d. at 51. Mr. McCartney looked through his employee's 

manual and spoke with fellow employees in a futile attempt to discover information 

regarding his right to search the package. Id. at 53-56. He then telephoned the Sheridan 

Police Department ("SPD") to inquire whether "they may have some law that they would 

let me know about whether it is legal for me to open a package or not," id. at 57; he spoke 

with Sergeant Walker of the SPD, who arrived at the bus station shortly after the call. 

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Once at the bus station, Sergeant Walker informed Mr. McCartney that he, Sergeant 

Walker, believed that Mr. McCartney could open the package but that he, Sergeant 

Walker, could not. lit. at 58, 102. Sergeant Walker never touched the package, did not 

assist, ask or otherwise encourage Mr. McCartney to open the package and stepped away 

as Mr. McCartney opened the package. Mr. McCartney testified that the decision to open 

the package was entirely his, id. at 59, that he was not acting at the request or as an agent 

of the police in opening the package, i.d.. at 60-62, and that he would have opened the 

package regardless of whether the police responded to his call, til. at 96. 

Mr. McCartney opened the box in the presence of Sergeant Walker and discovered 

a number of plastic containers containing thousands of pills. Sergeant Walker then 

contacted Mr. Hughes, an agent with the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 

with many years of experience investigating narcotics violations. Based upon his 

observation, Mr. Hughes concluded that the package contained ephedrine tablets. A field 

drug test conducted at that time confirmed Mr. Hughes' suspicion. hl at 130-31. 

Discussion 

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we apply the 

clearly erroneous standard of review to the district court's findings of fact and view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Lewis, 71 F. 3d 

358, 360 (lOth Cir. 1995). The reasonableness of a search and seizure is a question of 

law we review de novo. United States v. Martinez-Cigaorroa, 44 F.3d 908, 910 (lOth 

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Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1386 (1995). 

B. Private Searches 

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures 

by government actors. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). However, 

Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures "is wholly 

inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 

individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or 

knowledge of any governmental official.'" United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 

(1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 

dissenting)); see also United States v. Leffall, 1996 WL 194437, at *3 {lOth Cir. April23, 

1996). However, in some cases a search by a private citizen may be transformed into a 

governmental search implicating the Fourth Amendment "if the government coerces, 

dominates or directs the actions of a private person" conducting the search or seizure. 

Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 {1Oth Cir. 1989). In such a case, the private citizen 

may be regarded as an agent or instrumentality of the police and the fruits of the search 

may be suppressed. 

In Pleasant, we observed that two important inquiries to aid in the determination of 

whether a private person becomes an agent or instrumentality of the police are whether 

"the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and ... [whether] the 

party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his 

own ends." Id. at 797 (quoting United States v. Miller, 668 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 

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1982)). We are satisfied that knowledge and acquiescence, as those terms are used in 

Pleasant and the cases cited therein, encompass the requirement that the government 

agent must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action. ~til at 

797-98. The totality of the circumstances guides the court's determination as to whether 

"the government coerces, dominates or directs the actions of a private person." Id. at 796 

(citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 

It is clear that if a government agent is involved "merely as a witness," the 

requisite government action implicating Fourth Amendment concerns is absent. Leffall, 

1996 WL 194437, at *4; accord United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 

1980) (requiring more than the mere presence of a police officer to implicate the Fourth 

Amendment). In some affirmative way, the police must instigate, orchestrate, encourage 

or exceed the scope of the private search to trigger application of the Fourth Amendment. 

~United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1034 

(1985). As stated by the Ninth Circuit: 

While a certain degree of governmental participation is 

necessary before a private citizen is transformed into an agent 

of the state, de minimis or incidental contacts between the 

citizen and law enforcement agents prior to or during the 

course of a search or seizure will not subject the search to 

fourth amendment scrutiny. 

United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981). Fourth Amendment 

concerns simply are not implicated "when a private person voluntarily turns over property 

belonging to another and the government's direct or indirect participation is nonexistent 

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or minor." Pleasant, 876 F.2d at 797. While government agents may not circumvent the 

Fourth Amendment by acting through private citizens, they need not discourage private 

citizens from doing that which is not unlawful. Leffall, 1996 WL 194437, at *4. 

Here, the search in question is not a governmental search implicating the Fourth 

Amendment because Mr. McCartney had a "legitimate, independent motivation" to 

search the package, Walther, 652 F.2d at 792; see also United States y. Reed, 15 F.3d. 

928, 932 (9th Cir. 1993), namely, his independently formed belief that something was 

dangerous about the package, 9 R. 95-96, and his concern for the passengers on the bus 

on which the package was to be shipped, id. at 59-60. The police in no way instigated, 

orchestrated or encouraged the search. The district court so found. Mr. McCartney 

testified that the police neither told nor encouraged him to search the package, id. at 95-

96, and the district court further concluded that Mr. McCartney "would have opened the 

package even if the police had not responded to his call," 3 R. doc. 145 at 7. Fourth 

Amendment protection does not apply to the de minimis police involvement in the search 

of Mr. Smythe's package; the search remained a private one. Leffall, No. 95-2074, slip 

op. at 7. 

We finally note that the drug field test conducted by Agent Hughes of the contents 

of Mr. Smythe's package did not offend the Fourth Amendment because field tests are 

not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122-

23. Such tests determine only whether or not a substance is a controlled substance, a fact 

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that is not the source of a legitimate expectation of privacy. !d. 

AFFIRMED. 

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