Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02214/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James A. Mincks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2214

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

James A. Mincks, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 17, 2005

Filed: June 1, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

James A. Mincks (Mincks) pled guilty to one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After finding Mincks’s

prior Missouri convictions for two second-degree burglaries and for second-degree

statutory rape and second-degree statutory sodomy constituted violent felonies, the

district court1

 sentenced Mincks to 180 months’ imprisonment, the mandatory

minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Mincks appeals his sentence, contending the district court (1) erred in classifying

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The PSR also reported Mincks had other adult convictions from 1987 to 1994,

including resisting arrest, driving while intoxicated, driving with excessive blood

alcohol content, driving while his license was revoked, possession of an open alcohol

container in a vehicle, failure to appear in court, and leaving the scene of a motor

vehicle accident. Since 1994, Mincks has spent a substantial part of his time in

custody.

3

The PSR indicated Missouri court records reflect Mincks, at age 32, and

another man had sexual and oral intercourse with a sixteen-year old. 

-2-

Mincks’s prior Missouri convictions for second-degree statutory rape and seconddegree statutory sodomy as violent felonies, and (2) violated Mincks’s Sixth

Amendment rights under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), by failing

to require a jury to decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether his prior convictions

were violent felonies. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

After Mincks pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the United

States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR

reported Mincks had two prior Missouri convictions for second-degree burglary,2

 as

well as Missouri convictions for second-degree statutory rape and second-degree

statutory sodomy (statutory sexual offenses).3

 The PSR concluded each of these

offenses constituted violent felonies. Because Mincks had three prior convictions for

violent felonies, the PSR recommended classifying Mincks as an armed career

criminal under the ACCA.

Mincks objected to the PSR’s recommendation to the extent his statutory

sexual offenses were considered violent felonies. Over Mincks’s objection, the

district court decided Mincks’s statutory sexual offenses were violent felonies for

purposes of the ACCA, and applied the armed career criminal sentencing

enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.4. 

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On appeal, Mincks concedes his burglary convictions qualify as violent

felonies under the ACCA. However, he contends his statutory sexual offenses are not

violent felonies, because the elements of the crimes do not include physical force or

threats of force, and because “[s]tatutory sexual offenses are not, inherently, the type

of offenses that present a serious risk of harm to others.” Mincks also argues the

district court violated his constitutional rights by failing to submit to a jury the

question of whether his prior statutory sexual offenses qualify as violent felonies. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. ACCA Violent Felonies

We first consider whether the district court erred in enhancing Mincks’s

sentence under the ACCA based on his prior statutory sexual offenses. Mincks

maintains these prior convictions are not violent felonies, because (1) neither of the

Missouri statutes under which Mincks was convicted requires physical force or

threats of force, and (2) the statutory sexual offenses do not present serious risks of

harm to others.

We review de novo whether a prior offense constitutes a violent felony under

the ACCA. United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 2005). The ACCA

imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence for a defendant who (1) is

convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and (2) has three prior violent

felony convictions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A violent felony under the ACCA

includes “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, . . .

that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

In determining whether a prior offense is a violent felony for purposes of

sentence enhancement under the ACCA, the Supreme Court has adopted “a formal

categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses,

and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Taylor v. United States,

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495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). Accordingly, we look to the Missouri statutes which

Mincks violated. In Missouri, a person commits second-degree statutory rape “if

being twenty-one years of age or older, he has sexual intercourse with another person

who is less than seventeen years of age.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.034(1). A person

commits second-degree statutory sodomy “if being twenty-one years of age or older,

he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen

years of age.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.064(1). 

Even though physical force, or the threatened use of such force, is not an

element of second-degree statutory rape or sodomy under Missouri law, we conclude

categorically that the statutory sexual offenses present a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another, because “this type of contact between parties of differing

physical and emotional maturity carries ‘a substantial risk that physical force . . . may

be used in the course of committing the offense.’” United States v. Alas-Castro, 184

F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)) (holding

sexual assault of a child is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); United States

v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding statutory rape

is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which uses the same language as the

ACCA, notwithstanding the fact that sexual intercourse may have been consensual);

United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding offense of

lascivious acts with a child, by its nature, poses a substantial risk of physical force,

and, therefore, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). Whether physical

injury is intended when an adult engages in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a

minor, physical injury is a serious potential risk arising from either of the assaults,

and is logically foreseeable. We conclude the district court correctly determined

Mincks’s second-degree statutory rape and second-degree statutory sodomy

convictions constitute violent felonies for purposes of sentence enhancement under

the ACCA. Thus, the district court correctly sentenced Mincks to the mandatory

minimum under the ACCA.

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B. Sixth Amendment Rights

Citing Blakely, Mincks next argues the district court violated his Sixth

Amendment rights by enhancing his sentence under the ACCA without a jury

determination that his statutory sexual offenses were violent felonies. In Blakely, the

Supreme Court held the State of Washington’s sentencing system was

unconstitutional. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38. In United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005), the Court extended Blakely to the mandatory Federal

Sentencing Guidelines, holding the Sixth Amendment requires “[a]ny fact (other than

a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum

authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be

admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” The

Supreme Court severed two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18

U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and § 3742(e), effectively creating an advisory Guidelines

system. Id. at 765. Sentencing judges still take account of the Guidelines together

with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) goals. Id. at 764-66. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d

543, 548 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

In United States v. Nolan, 397 F.3d 665, 667 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005), we stated,

“the fact of a prior conviction is for the court to determine, not a jury.” Similarly,

whether the prior conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA is distinctly a

question of law for the court, not a jury. Therefore, we conclude Mincks’s sentence

does not invoke a Blakely or Booker error. 

III. CONCLUSION

We therefore affirm Mincks’s sentence. 

______________________________

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