Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01382/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01382-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chevron Mining, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
United Mine Workers of America
Amicus Curiae for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2011 Decided July 3, 2012

No. 10-1382

CHEVRON MINING, INC., FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE 

PITTSBURGH & MIDWAY COAL MINING COMPANY,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 11-1006

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order 

of the National Labor Relations Board

Eugene Scalia argued the cause for petitioner. With him 

on the briefs were Olusola Ayanbule and Amir C. Tayrani.

MacKenzie Fillow, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief 

were David S. Habenstreit, Assistant General Counsel, and 

Usha Dheenan, Supervisory Attorney. Jeffrey J. Barham, 

Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #10-1382 Document #1381773 Filed: 07/03/2012 Page 1 of 23
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Deborah Stern argued the cause and filed the brief for 

amicus curiae United Mine Workers of America in support of 

respondent. 

Before: TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: In 2005, Chevron Mining, Inc. 

amended its employee bonus plan in response to the decision 

of the United Mine Workers of America to call “memorial 

period” work stoppages. The National Labor Relations Board 

concluded that the amendment was an unfair labor practice, 

and we agree. 

I

Before the Board, the parties agreed on a set of facts, 

exhibits, and issues presented. We rely on those stipulations. 

The United Mine Workers of America (the Union) and 

Chevron Mining, Inc. (CMI) are parties to separate collective 

bargaining agreements (CBAs) at four mines, including the 

North River Mine in Alabama where this dispute arose. Since 

1978, the CBAs have included a clause that gives the Union 

the ability to call “memorial periods.”1

 1 The agreements are substantially identical to the National 

Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA), which serves as a 

model for the industry and is negotiated periodically between the 

Union and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association. The 

A memorial period, 

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which may last one or more days at one or more mines, is an 

unpaid work stoppage.

In 1995, the Union and CMI executed a Letter of 

Agreement allowing Union-represented employees to 

participate in CMI’s employee bonus plan. The plan provides 

bonus payouts based on financial and safety achievements at 

an employee’s mine. The Agreement gives CMI the authority 

to change the bonus plan unilaterally and provides that 

disputes over such changes are not arbitrable. If the Union 

objects, its sole recourse is to quit the Agreement.

In February and July of 2004, the Union, after providing 

proper notice, called six memorial days at the North River 

Mine to place economic pressure on CMI over ongoing 

grievances that were being arbitrated. Stipulation of Facts

¶ 31 [hereinafter “Stip.”]. (The record does not reveal the 

nature of those grievances.) The work stoppages cost CMI

$1.5 to $2.5 million in pre-tax profit, but CMI took no 

immediate action in response.

On February 3, 2005, CMI amended the bonus plan to 

provide that no financial achievement bonus would be paid to 

Union-represented employees at any mine where the Union 

calls a memorial day that doesn’t cover all mines in the same 

district,

2

 

NBCWA has contained an identical “memorial periods” provision 

since 1971.

“regardless of whether that mine has met all of its 

financial targets under the Plan in that year.” Id. ¶ 33. At the 

same time, citing its parent company’s “best year ever in 

2004,” CMI offered a one-time 6% bonus that paid $700,000 

to Union-represented employees at the North River Mine. Id.

2 “Districts are part of the Union’s organizational structure that 

have geographic boundaries, although the boundaries are not 

related to the location of a single employer’s mines.” Stip. ¶ 16.

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¶ 30. Since then, the Union has called only district-wide 

memorial days, so no bonuses have gone unpaid because of 

the amendment.

In April 2005, the Union filed charges with the NLRB 

alleging that CMI’s amendment to the bonus plan was

retaliation for the Union’s exercise of its contractual right to 

call memorial day work stoppages at the North River Mine. 

The General Counsel issued a complaint in October 2005, and 

the parties stipulated to the following issue presented:

Whether, under Wright Line, [252 N.L.R.B. 1083 

(1980),] the Employer violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) 

of the Act by amending its collectively-bargained bonus 

plan, which generally permits unilateral Employer 

amendment or modification of the plan, to deny a mine’s 

Union-represented employees financial bonuses under the 

plan if the Union called a Memorial Day at that mine, 

pursuant to the “Memorial Periods” provision of the 

parties’ underlying collective bargaining agreement, on a 

non-UMWA District wide basis. 

Parties’ Stmt. of Issues Presented.

In a decision issued in September 2010, the Board 

concluded that the amendment to the bonus plan was an unfair 

labor practice. The Board determined that the Union’s use of 

memorial periods to place economic pressure on CMI in 

support of pending grievances was protected activity. The 

Board then found a violation under Wright Line and rejected 

CMI’s defenses as either unconvincing or barred by the 

stipulation. CMI filed a petition for review in this Court, and 

the Board filed a cross-application for enforcement. We take

jurisdiction over the application and petition under 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 160(e) and (f), respectively.

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II

We must first determine whether the employees’ 

participation in the 2004 memorial days was protected under 

the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. It is 

well-established that the exercise of a right grounded in a 

CBA is protected by the Act. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 

Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (reaching this conclusion 

based on section 7 of the Act’s protection of “the right to . . . 

bargain collectively”). Action taken to discourage the exercise 

of such a right violates section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), 

which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to 

discourage” participation in protected union activities by 

“discriminat[ing] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or 

any term or condition of employment,” see Radio Officers’ 

Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954), and also violates 

section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which makes it 

unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or 

coerce employees in the exercise of” protected rights, see 

Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983). 

The question before us is whether the CBA permits these 

memorial period work stoppages, which were called to 

pressure CMI about arbitrable Union grievances.

It is also well-established that an agreement to arbitrate 

labor disputes “gives rise to an implied obligation not to strike 

over such disputes.” Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine 

Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974); see also Boys 

Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 248 

(1970) (“[A] no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the 

quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit 

grievance disputes to the process of arbitration.”). This rule 

reflects the policy favoring “the arbitral process as a substitute 

for economic warfare.” Teamsters’ Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 

369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962). The parties remain free, of course, to 

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“expressly negate any implied no-strike obligation” through 

an “explicit expression” of their intent to do so. Gateway 

Coal, 414 U.S. at 382. The Union argues that the memorial 

period clause does just that. 

The clause reads: “The [Union] may designate memorial 

periods not exceeding a total of ten (10) days during the term 

of this agreement at any mine or operation provided it shall 

give reasonable notice to the Employer.” On the one hand, the 

text does not, by its terms, limit the purposes for which 

memorial periods may be called. The sole limits on their use 

are procedural: only ten days of work stoppage may be called 

during the contract term, and reasonable notice of each must 

be given. On the other hand, CMI argues that the term

“memorial period” itself implies a limitation. Relying on the

dictionary definition of “memorial,” CMI urges that a 

memorial period can only be called “to commemorate the 

death of a miner or a mining disaster.” Pet’r’s Br. 26; see 

WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 700 (3d ed. 2005) 

(defining “memorial” as “[s]omething, as a monument or a 

holiday, designed or established to preserve the memory of a 

person or event”). CMI also notes that the memorial periods 

clause appears in the CBA just before a provision for plant 

“closing following fatal accident.”3

 3 That provision reads, “In addition to the memorial period 

provisions to be designated under section (j) work shall cease at any 

mine on any shift during which a fatal accident occurs.” Joint 

Motion for Submission of Case Ex. C, at 191.

To CMI, this placement 

reinforces the idea that both provisions are meant to 

commemorate death and disasters. But these are also the only 

two provisions in the CBA that expressly allow work 

stoppages. Thus, the placement might only reflect that both

provisions permit work stoppages, not that they allow work 

stoppages for the same purpose. Because the text does not 

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speak directly to the question of the purposes for which a 

memorial period may be called, we must turn to extrinsic 

evidence of the parties’ intent. See Wilson & Sons Heating & 

Plumbing v. NLRB, 971 F.2d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Local 

Union 1395, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 797 F.2d 

1027, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he words parties use in 

drafting contracts are only evidence of their intent; the words 

are not themselves the parties’ intent.”).

Before the Board, the parties stipulated that “[t]he history 

and purpose of the Memorial Periods Clause was addressed 

in” a district court opinion, two arbitration decisions, and a 

memorandum from the Board’s Division of Advice, each of 

which the parties incorporated into their Stipulation of Facts. 

Stip. ¶ 17. Both parties used these materials in making their 

arguments, and the Board relied upon them to conclude the 

CBA authorized the Union to use memorial periods to strike.

See Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. (P&M), 355 

N.L.R.B. 1210, 1213 (2010).

Each of the materials addresses the history and purpose 

of the NBCWA’s identical memorial periods clause. Most 

relevant is the district court decision, Arch of W. Va. v. Mine 

Workers Local Union 5958, C.A. No. 2:96-2008 (S.D. W. Va. 

Nov. 25, 1996), which addressed the very question before us. 

Arch involved a dispute over whether employees could miss 

work at the start of deer hunting season despite a company 

policy that prohibited more than 15% of the workforce from 

taking off the same day. Even though the dispute was subject 

to arbitration, “Union representatives threatened to call a 

‘memorial period’ [on four days] if [the company] did not 

make concessions on the deer hunting issue.” Id. at *4 ¶ 8. 

When the employer did not concede, the Union notified the 

employer it was calling the memorial days. Id. at *4 ¶¶ 9-10. 

The employer sought injunctive relief establishing that 

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memorial days could not be called in connection with 

arbitrable disputes, but the court held that they could even 

though the CBA contained an implied no-strike obligation 

under Gateway Coal. In so holding, the court explained that:

[The CBA] gives the Union a unilateral right to call a 

memorial period, which should be untrammeled and 

uninfringed by court scrutiny, as has been shown by the 

lengthy history of memorial periods’ inclusion in 

NBCWA contracts, case authority, and arbitration 

decisions. . . . It is not the Court’s role to scrutinize the 

motivation for calling memorial periods. . . . [T]he 

unilateral right to call memorial periods is a bargaining 

chip that the Union can use in an often ‘fractious’ 

relationship that exists between labor and management in

the coal industry.

Id. at *5-6 (emphasis added).

4

All the other stipulated materials also cut against CMI’s 

reading of the clause, but none contradicts Arch. CMI 

repeatedly quoted to us language from one of the arbitration 

decisions indicating that a “memorial period is commonly 

understood to be a time set aside to observe the memory of a 

particular event or person,” but consistently omitted the rest 

of the paragraph, which reads:

[B]ut in recent years, memorial periods under this 

provision have been used to provide Employees with 

 4 The memorial days in Arch were ultimately used to bypass 

arbitration altogether rather than to apply pressure in an ongoing 

dispute. But the real power of memorial periods as interpreted by 

Arch and the Board is the threat to use them to apply pressure in an 

ongoing dispute, see NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 291 

(1957), as was done by the Union in Arch.

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time off work to participate in certain activities deemed 

important by the International Union, and have also been 

used to provide a cooling off period in the course of a 

work stoppage in the coal fields. There is no limitation in 

the contract which restricts the purpose for which a 

memorial period may be used, just as long as reasonable 

notice of the designation is given to the Employer.

Peabody Coal Co., Arb. No. 88-23-91-72, *7 (Nov. 8, 1991) 

(emphasis added). And in the other arbitration decision the 

employer and union agreed and the arbitrator concluded that 

“[c]ontractually, the union has the right to call memorial days 

without giving a reason for the call.” United Mine Workers 

Dist. 17, Local 781 v. E. Associated Coal Corp., Arb. No. 02-

17-04-176, *16 (Feb. 28, 2005).

The memorandum from the Board’s Division of Advice 

took the view that “the Union has called memorial periods for 

a wide range of purposes: to mourn the death of miners and to 

commemorate mining disasters as well as to obtain unpaid 

leave for unit employees during negotiations for a new 

contract or close to the expiration of an existing contract.” 

Joint Motion for Submission of Case Ex. L, at 2. The 

memorandum also noted that other regional divisions of the 

Board had concluded that the Union does not violate its duty 

to bargain in good faith by using memorial days to “apply[] 

economic pressure in support of its bargaining position.” Id.

at 2 n.2. The memorandum again indicates that memorial days 

can be used for more than memorializing: they are a 

permissible means to apply economic pressure against the 

company during bargaining.

Read together, the materials that the parties agreed

“address” the “history and purpose of the clause” show 

unambiguously that a memorial period may be called to strike 

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over an arbitrable dispute. As counsel for the Union explained 

at oral argument, the NBCWA’s memorial period clause was 

negotiated in 1971 in response to the problem of debilitating 

wildcat strikes.5 The clause gives the Union a contractually 

limited and controlled method to channel employee 

displeasure and thereby avoid such disruption, to the benefit 

of both the Union and employers. Oral Arg. Tr. 30-32.

CMI now argues that little or no weight should be given

to these materials because the stipulation itself “does not state 

that the decisions correctly ‘addressed’ the clause’s history or 

purpose.” See Pet’r’s Reply Br. 6 (emphasis in original). This 

argument is too clever by half and fails to account for the only 

credible explanation for the stipulation: that the parties meant 

that these materials should be used as reliable extrinsic 

evidence of their intent. “[S]tipulations, like other contracts, 

must be interpreted in light of the circumstances under which 

the agreement was made.” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Watt, 

678 F.2d 299, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1982).6

 5 See Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure 

by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L.

REV. 1195, 1244 n.197 (1967) (“‘Wildcat’ is a vague concept 

which is used primarily to describe strikes in breach of a no-strike 

clause or strikes to which the union is opposed.”).

6 Our dissenting colleague thinks the parties’ stipulation is 

meaningless. To make that point, he creates a hypothetical in which 

unnamed parties for unknown reasons agree that “the history and 

purpose of the United States Constitution is addressed in Max 

Farrand’s THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 

STATES (1913).” He thinks that such an agreement is “parallel” to 

the stipulation we must construe. The only “parallel” we can see is 

the use of the phrase “the history and purpose is addressed in.” The

dissent overlooks the circumstances of the stipulation in this case 

and who made it. The hypothetical would be more “parallel” to the 

stipulation in our case if one could imagine that those who drafted 

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CMI also argues that the materials referenced in the 

stipulation should be disregarded because each lacks 

precedential effect in this court. It is no doubt true that we 

would not rely as heavily on these materials if the parties had 

not agreed that we must. The issue is not a question of 

precedence but of the parties’ intent, and the stipulation was 

designed to answer that question of fact. Even if the dissent 

were right that Arch’s broad view of the proper use of 

memorial periods is dicta (and we disagree that it is), the 

parties have agreed that Arch addresses the meaning of their 

clause. That fact gives the discussion in Arch authority, not its 

legal reasoning or precedential weight.

It is significant as well that when the Union called 

memorial days in support of pending grievances in this case, 

CMI did not even suggest that the CBA had been breached or 

that the Union had committed an unfair labor practice. CMI 

sought neither injunctive relief (as the employer did in Arch) 

nor damages for the losses it sustained. Instead, CMI 

amended the bonus plan to deter the exercise of the Union’s 

right to call memorial days in the future. Nothing in CMI’s 

reaction at the time indicates it thought the Union’s calling for 

memorial day work stoppages was not authorized by the 

CBA.

 

and ratified the Fourth Amendment stipulated that controversies 

over the meaning of “seizure” should be resolved by resort to four 

specific documents that discussed the term’s “history and purpose.” 

In this unlikely scenario, we imagine our dissenting colleague 

would agree that the referenced materials would be due 

considerable weight. And if one of them provided a clear answer to 

the question at hand and was not contradicted by any other, it 

would be quite helpful. That is how we view Arch on the question 

of the meaning of “memorial periods.”

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Although the text of the CBA may be inconclusive, the 

discussion of the memorial periods clause in the stipulated 

materials and CMI’s response to the work stoppages “make[]

clear the meaning of the contract.” See Whiting v. AARP, 637 

F.3d 355, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This extrinsic evidence shows 

that, in this contract, “memorial periods” is a term of art with 

a specific meaning: a contractually authorized work stoppage 

that can be called for any reason, no reason, or for the specific 

reason of placing economic pressure on an employer in 

connection with an arbitrable dispute. CMI presented no 

extrinsic evidence showing a contrary meaning. The clause is 

a clear expression that the parties agreed the Union could call 

a limited number of work stoppages in connection with 

arbitrable disputes. It is “a limited exception to [the] . . . 

implied no-strike obligation.” Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 385.

Finally, CMI raises the strained argument that the work 

stoppages were not protected because the Union’s designation 

of memorial days is not really employee activity. CMI relies 

on Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), which held 

that certain actions by union organizers who were not 

employees were not protected. That principle does not apply, 

however, to action by a union selected to represent 

employees. See Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. NLRB, 484 

F.3d 601, 609 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[I]t would be a curious 

and myopic reading of the Act’s core provisions to hold that, 

although employees are free to join unions and to work 

through unions for purposes of ‘other mutual aid or 

protection,’ the conduct of the unions they form and join for 

those purposes is not protected by the Act.” (quoting

Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB, 240 F.3d 26, 29 (D.C. 

Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, 

as the Board pointed out, here the CMI employees themselves 

urged the Union to call the memorial days and decided 

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individually whether to participate. Their participation in the 

2004 memorial days was protected by the Act.

III

The parties also stipulated that we use the test set forth by 

the Board in Wright Line to determine whether CMI’s 

amendment to the bonus plan violates sections 8(a)(3) and (1)

of the Act. These sections ban “adverse employment action 

[taken] to discourage union activity,” Ark Las Vegas Rest. 

Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and 

motive is our chief inquiry, Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 

U.S. 300, 311 (1965) (“It has long been established that a 

finding of violation under [section 8(a)(3)] will normally turn 

on the employer’s motivation.”). The Wright Line test 

determines whether an employer’s motive for adverse action 

is unlawful. See Wright Line, 252 N.L.R.B. at 1089; see also

NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) 

(approving the Wright Line test). Under Wright Line, the 

General Counsel is required to “make a prima facie showing 

sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was 

a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer’s decision” to take 

adverse action. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. The

burden then shifts to the employer to show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that it would have taken the 

same action even if the employees had not engaged in 

protected activity. Id. We uphold a Board finding supported 

by “substantial evidence on the record considered as a 

whole.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 820 F.2d 

453, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The Board found that the General Counsel had met his 

initial burden because “it is undisputed that the employees’ 

memorial day work stoppages were a motivating factor in 

[CMI’s] decision to modify its bonus plan.” P&M, 355 

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N.L.R.B. at 1211. Indeed, the parties stipulated that the 

amendment to the bonus plan “was implemented in response 

to the Memorial Days called by the Union at the North River 

Mine in 2004,” and that the amendment “was intended to 

communicate to the Union that because such Memorial Days 

imposed financial consequences on the Employer, the Unionrepresented employees would also be required to bear 

financial consequences in the form of the loss of the bonus 

they might otherwise expect.” Stip. ¶¶ 34, 36.

CMI argues that it would have amended the bonus plan 

even had the Union never called the memorial days. CMI was 

not looking backward when it amended the plan, but forward, 

so the explanation goes. Memorial days cost everyone dearly. 

Decreased productivity decreases revenue which decreases 

profits. Discouraging these work stoppages would increase 

profits and bonuses for the employees. The Board rejected the 

claim that CMI was motivated only by these business 

concerns because, “[s]imply put, [CMI] acknowledges 

modifying the employees’ bonus plan, in a restrictive manner, 

as a result of the North River employees’ protected activity.” 

P&M, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1214. CMI was, in fact, looking 

backward, and there is no doubt the Board was correct on this 

score. The question under Wright Line is not just whether the 

employer’s action also served some legitimate business 

purpose, but whether the legitimate business motive would 

have moved the employer to take the challenged action absent 

the protected conduct. Sw. Merch. Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 

1334, 1339 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining that in “dual 

motive” cases, “in which the employer acts with a legitimate 

and an illegitimate motive[,] the purpose is to determine 

whether the legitimate motive would have caused the action 

on its own”). Given CMI’s concession, the Board reasonably 

concluded that CMI did not make that showing.

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Because CMI admitted that the amendment to the bonus 

plan was motivated by protected activity, the Board also 

reasonably discounted CMI’s reliance upon evidence that it 

was not generally hostile to the Union, such as the one-time 

6% bonus and CMI’s longstanding relationship with the 

Union. Some Wright Line cases consider such circumstantial 

evidence, but it can never trump a showing that a particular 

action was taken because of protected activity. Where that is 

established — and here it is conceded by CMI — evidence 

that the employer is not generally hostile to the union is of 

little avail. The emphasis is always on the employer’s 

motivation for the particular act that discouraged union 

activity. The ultimate inquiry is whether there is a “link, or 

nexus, between the employees’ protected activity and the 

adverse employment action.” Tracker Marine, LLC, 337 

N.L.R.B. 644, 646 (2002); see also Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. 

Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (assessing 

evidence of general anti-union animus to conclude that a 

particular employee was discharged “because of his union 

activity”). Although it is unusual for an employer to directly 

acknowledge taking adverse action because of protected 

activity, CMI did so here. Cf. E.C. Waste, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B.

565, 574 (2006) (finding a section 8(a)(3) violation where the 

employer changed its annual bonus practice and specifically 

admitted that its motivation for the change was that the 

affected employees had voted to be represented by a union).

Even so, CMI argues that amending the plan was a 

permissible economic weapon to counter the employees’ 

protected activity, much like a lockout in response to a strike. 

This economic weapon defense has been developed in 

bargaining cases applying the framework set out in NLRB v. 

Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). The Board

“decline[d] to consider this argument,” however, stating that 

“the alternative Great Dane analysis” was “inconsistent with 

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the terms of the stipulation” that the case be decided under 

Wright Line. P&M, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1214. In any event, the 

Board held, CMI could not benefit from the economic weapon 

defense because its amendment to the plan was “precisely” 

the type of “selective sanction” directed “only [at] those 

employees who engage in protected conduct” that the Board 

forbids. Id. at 1214 n.11 (citing Schenk Packing Co., 301 

N.L.R.B. 487, 490-91 (1991) (finding the grant of bonuses 

only to employees who chose not to engage in protected strike 

activity unlawful)).

CMI objects to the Board’s “selective sanction” holding 

in its brief to this court, but did not do so before the Board. It 

thus runs headlong into section 10(e) of the Act, which 

provides that “[n]o objection that has not been urged before 

the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, unless the 

failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused 

because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 

Although the Board raised the selectivity theory on its own, 

CMI was obliged to seek reconsideration or rehearing before 

the Board if it wished to challenge that ruling on appeal. See 

Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-

66 (1982); Flying Food Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.3d 178, 

185 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Where, as here, a petitioner objects to 

a finding on an issue first raised in the decision of the 

Board . . . the petitioners must file a petition for 

reconsideration with the Board to permit it to correct the error 

(if there was one).”).

But the Board, curiously, failed to raise the section 10(e) 

argument before us, and so we must ask whether its limitation 

is “jurisdictional.” The Supreme Court has recently cautioned 

courts to distinguish carefully between jurisdictional 

conditions, which cannot be waived or forfeited by the 

parties, and mere claim-processing rules or elements of a 

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cause of action, which can. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 

Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243-44 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y &

H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-14 (2006). An examination of the 

“condition’s text, context, and relevant historical treatment,” 

Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1246, makes it clear that section 

10(e) falls on the jurisdictional side of the divide. 

First, section 10(e)’s text is virtually identical to section 

313 of the Federal Power Act, which we have held is a model 

of the “clear and unequivocal statement” required to make 

exhaustion a jurisdictional prerequisite. EEOC v. Lutheran 

Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see Platte 

River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. 

FERC, 876 F.2d 109, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Neither FERC 

nor this court has authority to waive these statutory 

requirements.”).7

 7 Section 313 provides that “[n]o objection to the order of the 

[Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission shall be considered by 

the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the 

Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is 

reasonable ground for failure so to do.” 16 U.S.C. § 825l.

And although we have not previously been 

presented with this precise question, we have repeatedly 

indicated that section 10(e) is jurisdictional in the true sense 

of the word. See, e.g., W&M Props. of Conn., Inc. v. NLRB, 

514 F.3d 1341, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing section 

10(e) as a “jurisdictional bar” in the face of which we are 

“powerless . . . to consider arguments not made to the 

Board”); Parkwood Developmental Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 521 

F.3d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that section 10(e) 

meant “we have no jurisdiction to entertain [a] claim”); Alwin 

Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A 

court of appeals altogether ‘lacks jurisdiction to review 

objections that were not urged before the Board.’” (quoting 

Woelke, 456 U.S. at 666)). By “speak[ing] to the power of the 

court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties,”

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the text displays the hallmark of a true jurisdiction-limiting 

provision. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 

274 (1994).

Looking next to the statutory context, the Court in Reed 

Elsevier and Arbaugh found it significant that the 

requirements at issue there were “located in . . . provision[s]

‘separate’ from those granting federal courts subject-matter 

jurisdiction.” Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1245-46. By 

contrast, section 10(e) not only bars arguments not made to 

the Board but also grants and defines the jurisdiction of courts 

of appeals over petitions for enforcement of Board orders. See 

W&M Props., 514 F.3d at 1345 (“Section 10 . . . creates and 

limits our jurisdiction to review the Board’s orders.”). 

Finally, section 10(e)’s purpose also indicates it is 

jurisdictional. It “is intended to further ‘the salutary 

policy . . . of affording the Board [the] opportunity to consider 

on the merits questions to be urged upon review of its order,’” 

Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard Indus. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 

1275, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. 

NLRB, 318 U.S. 253, 256 (1943)), and “is an example of 

Congress’s recognition that ‘. . . courts should not topple over 

administrative decisions unless the administrative body has 

not only erred but has erred against objection made at the time

appropriate under its practice,’” id. (quoting United States v. 

L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)). See 

also Cast N. Am. (Trucking) Ltd. v. NLRB, 207 F.3d 994, 

1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (“This is a jurisdictional bar, designed to 

allow the NLRB the first opportunity to consider objections 

and to ensure that reviewing courts receive the full benefit of 

the NLRB’s expertise.”). Section 10(e)’s bar is far from mere 

“claim-processing rules” such as most statutes of limitation. 

See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510. 

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The text, context, and purpose of section 10(e), as well as 

our precedent addressing both it and similar statutes, 

demonstrate that it is an unavoidable limitation on our 

jurisdiction. We are thus powerless to consider CMI’s 

objections to the Board’s selective sanction holding despite 

the Board’s failure to raise section 10(e).

IV

CMI raises two more defenses to the section 8(a)(3) 

charge and objects to the Board’s chosen remedy. First, CMI 

argues that the Union waived its ability to bring an unfair 

labor practice charge by giving CMI the unilateral right to 

modify the bonus plan in the Letter of Agreement. However, 

the Board was correct that the unilateral right to amend the 

plan was not a license to amend the plan for unlawful reasons. 

P&M, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1214 (citing Reno Hilton Resorts v. 

NLRB, 196 F.3d 1275, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). There is no 

indication in the record that the Union intended to waive its 

section 8(a)(3) rights by entering into the Agreement, and a 

waiver of statutory rights must be “clear and unmistakable.” 

Gannett Rochester Newspapers v. NLRB, 988 F.2d 198, 203 

(D.C. Cir. 1993). “[C]ourts may ‘not infer from a general 

contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a 

statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is explicitly 

stated.’” Id. (quoting Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 708). 

CMI had no right to amend the plan with the intent to 

discourage future protected activity. See Reno Hilton, 196 

F.3d at 1281 (“[T]he record is devoid of evidence to infer, 

much less show, that the Union waived its § 8(a)(3) rights by 

entering into the agreement.”).

Second, according to CMI, the fact that no employee was 

denied a bonus under the amendment shows that it did not 

“actually affect the terms or conditions of employment” as 

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20

required to find a section 8(a)(3) violation. Pet’r’s Br. 41-42 

(quoting NLRB v. Air Contact Transp. Inc., 403 F.3d 206, 212 

(4th Cir. 2005), which found that a mere counseling letter 

advising an employee to change his behavior was not a 

change in a term or condition of employment). The Board 

rejected that argument, and so do we. The plan amendment 

altered terms governing employee bonus eligibility by placing 

a financial penalty on the future exercise of protected activity. 

Indeed, as the Board noted, the Union’s decision not to call 

memorial days that were not district-wide likely demonstrates

the chilling effect of this new term of employment. P&M, 355 

N.L.R.B. at 1214 n.8.; see also Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B.

1462, 1487 (1961) (“It is not necessary . . . for the employee 

to have an actual monetary loss.”). 

Lastly, CMI objects to the Board’s backpay remedy

because no employee was denied a bonus. This objection, 

however, is premature. Although CMI is correct that the 

Board must tailor remedies to actual losses, it is wellestablished that “compliance proceedings provide the 

appropriate forum” to consider objections to the relief 

ordered. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984); 

see also Ark Las Vegas, 334 F.3d at 107 (“[W]e ‘leav[e] until 

the compliance proceedings more specific calculations as to 

the [relief], if any, due.’” (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 902)

(alterations in original)). 

V

For the foregoing reasons, CMI’s petition for review is 

denied and the Board’s cross-application for enforcement is 

granted.

So ordered.

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: Collective 

Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) between the United Mine 

Workers of America (“UMWA”) and Chevron Mining allow 

the union, on reasonable notice to the employer, to “designate 

memorial periods not exceeding a total of ten (10) days during 

the term of this Agreement.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 96. The 

CBAs also contain provisions requiring arbitration of 

disputes. Under established authority, see Gateway Coal Co. 

v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974), 

such provisions forbid strikes, as the court recognizes, see 

Maj. Op. at 5. The NLRB nonetheless construed the 

memorial-period clauses to create a de facto exception to the 

strike ban, and the court affirms. The conclusions of both the 

agency and the court violate the established principle (most 

familiar to us from anti-discrimination laws) that a right to do 

a thing at will, or for no reason at all, does not normally 

encompass a right to do it for reasons that contradict rights 

reserved to another party (here, the employer’s right not to be 

subject to strikes while the CBAs are in effect). See WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011) 

(“[I]f the employer can show that it took an adverse 

employment action against an employee for any reason other 

than discrimination, the court cannot order the hiring, 

reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, 

or the payment to him of any backpay.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 

F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that an employer’s 

“blunt” and even “unfair” behavior does not in itself support 

“an actionable claim of discrimination”). 

To reach its conclusion, the court makes a rather odd use 

of a stipulation that the parties agreed on before the Board, 

namely, that “[t]he history and purpose of the Memorial 

Periods Clause was addressed” in various named documents. 

J.A. 12-13 ¶ 17. The court (1) gives this provision a far more 

powerful meaning than its text will bear; (2) selects one 

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2

document from among the four for a wholly dominant role, 

namely one district court decision, Arch of W. Va. v. Mine 

Workers Local Union 5958, C.A. No. 2:96-2008 (S.D. W. Va. 

Nov. 25, 1996) (“Arch”); and (3) misreads that one document. 

First, the stipulation appears to mean no more than would a 

parallel statement about Farrand’s: “The history and purpose 

of the United States Constitution is addressed in Max 

Farrand’s THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 

STATES (1913).” This would not license a constitutional 

interpreter to exalt one passage in Farrand’s above all others, 

or to disregard ordinary principles of law such as the one 

noted above—that a right to do something for no reason 

commonly doesn’t entail a right to do it in ways or for 

purposes that frustrate another party’s established rights. The 

parties’ stipulation did not require the Board (or us) to pitch 

such principles overboard. Second, while the court says that 

the other three documents don’t contradict its reading of Arch, 

it is equally true that none of them hints at anything like the 

view the court here ascribes to Arch. 

Third and most important, the court’s preferred item, the 

district court decision in Arch, provides only the most dubious 

support for the court’s conclusion. The union there sought 

employer permission “to allow any individuals employed at 

[specified plants] to go deer hunting during the first week of 

the deer hunting season.” Id. at *3-4 ¶ 6. When it did not 

receive this permission, the union first “threatened to call a 

‘memorial period,’” on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and 

Saturday, November 25, 26, 27, and 30, 1996, if the employer 

did not make concessions on the deer hunting issue. When it 

did not, the union called a memorial period for those days. Id. 

at *4 ¶¶ 8-10. The Arch decision does not specify this, but it 

strongly suggests that the union members used the memorial 

days simply as an alternate means to take the deer hunting 

leave that their employer had refused. Indeed, the Board, in 

the decision under review in this case (which bears Chevron’s 

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3

prior name, see Petitioner’s Br. i), recognized this aspect of 

Arch, saying that the union there used memorial periods to 

“take advantage of the opening of hunting season.” 

Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 355 NLRB 1210, 

1213 (2010); but cf. id. at 1213 (saying that the union’s 

purpose was “to further its position in a dispute over a 

contractual attendance rule”). (In 2011 the deer hunting 

season opened November 21 and closed December 3, see 

WEST VIRGINIA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., HUNTING AND TRAPPING: 

JULY 2011 - JUNE 2012 REGULATIONS SUMMARY (2011), 

available at http://www.wvdnr.gov/hunting/Regs1112/2011_

Hunting_Regs.pdf). Thus the union members in Arch seem to 

have used the memorials for sport rather than for a strike. 

The Arch decision contains, to be sure, far broader 

language than the case warranted. Having said that the clause 

entitled the union to exercise its right to memorial days for 

“good or bad reasons,” it simply leapt to a characterization of 

the right as “a bargaining chip that the Union can use in an 

often ‘fractious’ relationship . . . between labor and 

management.” Arch, at *6 ¶ 6. It never considered or alluded 

to the principle that prevents a party from using broadly 

formulated rights to sweep aside rights held by others. The 

upshot, then, of the court’s opinion here is to subordinate that 

principle to a district court’s dictum. 

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