Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35054/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35054-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BNSF Railway Company
Appellee
Scott R. Wolfe
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT R. WOLFE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, A

Delaware corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-35054

D.C. No.

1:09-cv-00166-

RFC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Richard F. Cebull, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 11, 2013—Portland, Oregon

Filed April 23, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson, Mary H. Murguia,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

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2 WOLFE V. BNSF

SUMMARY*

Preemption / Railway Labor Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment entered in favor of the BNSF

Railway Company in a diversity action brought by a railway

employee alleging railway mismanagement and misconduct.

The plaintiff-employee was working as a track inspector

when his hi-rail truck collided head-on with a freight train. 

After disciplinary proceedings, BNSF dismissed the

employee. The employee brought this action after he was

reinstated without backpay.

The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling that the

employee’s state law claim—alleging injury caused by

BNSF’s misconduct in employee disciplinary proceedings

under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)—was

preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act. The panel

reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the

employee’s state law claim against BNSF concerningBNSF’s

alleged negligent mismanagement that resulted in a headon collision. The panel held that the employee’s claim

concerning BNSF’s conduct leading to the collision was

independent of the CBA and did not require interpretation of

the CBA, and therefore the claim was not preempted by the

Railway Labor Act. Finally, the panel reversed the district

court’s ruling dismissing Wolfe’s punitive damages claim.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WOLFE V. BNSF 3

COUNSEL

Sharon L. Van Dyck (argued), Van Dyck Law Firm, PLLC,

St. Louis Park, Minnesota, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Donald J. Munro (argued), Jones Day, Washington, D.C.;

Michelle T. Friend, Hedger Friend, PLLC, Billings, Montana,

for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Scott Wolfe (“Wolfe”) appeals the

district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of

Defendant-Appellee BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) on

Wolfe’s claims under Montana Code Annotated (“MCA”)

§ 39-2-703. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for

further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Wolfe is a longtime employee of BNSF. In December

2008, Wolfe worked in Shelby, Montana, as a track inspector

for the first time. Before then, he worked primarily as a

foreman and a machine operator at BNSF. BNSF mechanic

Robert Flesche provided Wolfe with a hi-rail truck, which can

be driven along rails. Flesche had previously complained

about the hi-rail truck’s poor condition to BNSF. Flesche

stated that “nobodywanted to be assigned that truck, certainly

nobody like[d] it for a h[i-]rail truck.” Flesche said

“[e]verything was just more difficult with that truck. . . . [I]t

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4 WOLFE V. BNSF

was a rough riding truck, very rough riding.” Flesche had

“told the railroad, it was a bad [truck], [and that] it sure was

not suited for track inspection.” Nevertheless, Flesche gave

Wolfe the truck because it was the only one available.

Flesche quickly showed Wolfe how to use the hi-rail

attachments on the truck. The hi-rail attachments were four

heavy mechanical assemblies, two in front and two in back,

that were supposed to drop the truck’s wheels onto the rail

and lock them in place, keeping the truck on the rails like a

standard railroad car. Flesche also “showed [Wolfe] a little

about” the truck’s Hi-rail Limits Compliance System

(“HLCS”). The HLCS is a GPS system that identifies where

vehicles are on the tracks, interfaces with BNSF’s computer

system, and ensures that employees stay within their railroad

track authorities (the boundaries of the areas to which they

have been assigned). Wolfe previously had attended

mandatory training on using the HLCS. At that training,

managers read material on the HLCS to the employees, but

there was no demonstration on how to work the system. 

Flesche concluded after observing Wolfe that “[Wolfe] had

not ever been trained on using [the HLCS].”

On the morning of December 18, 2008, Wolfe requested

track authority from the dispatcher, James Trotchie, to go east

on a particular stretch of track. Trotchie misheard Wolfe’s

request for permission to go “east” and, assuming that he

wanted to go west, verbally approved Wolfe’s request while

assigning him track authority in the HLCS to go west. Wolfe

proceeded to go east on the rails in his hi-rail truck.

Approximately four miles from where Wolfe began to

travel on the rails, Wolfe encountered a freight train head on. 

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WOLFE V. BNSF 5

Wolfe jumped off the truck before it was hit by the train. The

truck was damaged, but Wolfe was not physically injured.

Wolfe is a member of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of

Way Employes union (the “Union”). The Union has a

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with BNSF. Under

Rule 40 of the CBA, an employee who has worked 60 days or

more, such as Wolfe, “will not be disciplined or dismissed

until after a fair and impartial investigation has been held.” 

BNSF conducted two formal investigations of Wolfe’s

accident pursuant to Rule 40 to determine (1) whether Wolfe

failed to activate the HLCS on his truck and (2) whether

Wolfe failed to operate within the limits of his track authority

at the time of the accident. After the investigations, BNSF

determined that Wolfe committed the alleged misconduct. 

Wolfe received a 30-day suspension for his failure to activate

the HLCS and was dismissed for his failure to have main

track authority.

Wolfe challenged his dismissal. On Wolfe’s behalf, the

Union referred the grievance to the National Railroad

Adjustment Board (the “Adjustment Board”). The

Adjustment Board was created under the Railway Labor Act

to resolve disputes between carriers and their employees. 45

U.S.C. § 153. The Adjustment Board (1) determined that

BNSF proved that Wolfe failed to engage his HLCS and

violated his track authority, (2) affirmed Wolfe’s 30-day

suspension for the HLCS violation as reasonable, and

(3) reduced Wolfe’s dismissal to a long-term suspension

because it found that “dismissal was too severe a penalty” for

the track authority violation. The Adjustment Board ordered

that Wolfe be reinstated with his seniority unimpaired, but

decided that he was not entitled to backpay.

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6 WOLFE V. BNSF

Wolfe filed a complaint in Montana state court asserting

claims under MCA § 39-2-703, which governs the liability of

railways for negligent mismanagement. BNSF removed the

claims to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. 

Wolfe’s amended complaint states two claims under MCA

§ 39-2-703: (1) that BNSF’s mismanagement and the

negligence of its employees caused the train collision; and

(2) that BNSF mismanaged the subsequent investigation and

disciplinary proceedings.

BNSF filed a motion for summary judgment on the

ground that Wolfe’s state-law claims were preempted by the

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-88. The district court

granted the motion. The district court found that Wolfe’s

claims were preempted because “[t]he facts surrounding

[Wolfe’s] claim[s] appear to be inextricably intertwined with

the grievance procedures controlled by the CBA.” On appeal,

Wolfe concedes that his claim challenging the BNSF’s

investigation and disciplinary proceedings, which were

governed by the CBA, is preempted, but contends that the

district court erred in granting summary judgment on Wolfe’s

Montana-law claim against BNSF concerning the alleged

negligent mismanagement that resulted in the head-on

collision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s ruling regarding preemption

de novo. Espinal v. Nw. Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1455 (9th

Cir. 1996). We review a grant of summary judgment de

novo. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097,

1103 (9th Cir. 1998).

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WOLFE V. BNSF 7

DISCUSSION

A. Preemption Under the Railway Labor Act (RLA)

“[T]o promote stability in labor-management relations,”

the RLA requires arbitration for two classes of disputes

concerning “rates of pay, rules or working conditions.” 

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).1 The first

class—major disputes—concerns the formation or negotiation

of collective bargaining agreements. Id. The second

class—minor disputes—concerns “‘controversies over the

meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a

particular fact situation.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Bhd. of R.R.

Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33

(1957)). The parties agree that the only way Wolfe’s claim

is preempted is if the conflict over the collision constitutes a

minor dispute. BNSF “bears the burden of proof on its

preemption defense.” Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d

1514, 1526 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995).

Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Norris, “this

circuit considered the scope of minor disputes under the RLA

to be quite expansive.” Espinal, 90 F.3d at 1456. But Norris

“substantially narrowed the scope of RLA preemption.” Id.

In Norris, the Supreme Court observed that a state-law claim

is preempted by the RLA only when the state claim

“involve[s] duties and rights created or defined by [a] CBA”

and is therefore “dependent on the interpretation of a CBA.” 

512 U.S. at 258, 262. In contrast, “a state-law cause of action

1 The RLA “was extended in 1936 to cover the airline industry.” Norris,

512 U.S. at 248.

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8 WOLFE V. BNSF

is not pre-empted by the RLA if it involves rights and

obligations that exist independent of the CBA.” Id. at 260.

Applying the Norris framework, we conclude that

Wolfe’s state claim concerning the collision is not preempted.

B. Montana’s Broad Statutory Protection of Railway

Employees

Under MCA § 39-2-703(1), a

corporation operating a railway or railroad in

[Montana] is liable for all damages sustained

by any employee of the . . . corporation in

consequence of the neglect of any other

employee of the . . . corporation or by the

mismanagement of any other employee . . .

when the neglect, mismanagement, or wrongs

are in any manner connected with the use and

operation of a railway or railroad on or about

which the employee is employed.

The purpose of the statute is twofold. First, the statute

“eliminate[s] the fellow-servant defense to common-law

causes of action,” enabling a railroad employee to recover

from an employer for the negligent acts of his co-workers. 

Haux v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., 97 P.3d 540, 543 (Mont. 2004);

see also Dillon v. Great N. Ry. Co., 100 P. 960, 961–62

(Mont. 1909). Second, the statute “provides for a cause of

action for mismanagement.” Haux, 97 P.3d at 543. The

language of the statute, though expansive, “is clear,

unambiguous, direct and certain. . . . The plain meaning of the

language . . . requires that a railroad be held liable for

mismanagement.” Id.

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WOLFE V. BNSF 9

In Winslow v. Montana Rail Link, Inc., the Montana

Supreme Court recognized that MCA § 39-2-703 employs

“very broad language” in defining the right of railway

employees to sue for “all damages” resulting from a railway’s

negligence or mismanagement, including when that conduct

results in the employee’s discharge from employment. 

16 P.3d 992, 996 (Mont. 2000) (“Winslow I”); 121 P.3d 506,

511–12 (Mont. 2005) (“Winslow II”). The right of railway

employees to sue on the basis of negligence or

mismanagement resulting in termination may be unusual in

other jurisdictions, but such a right is undoubtedly recognized

in Montana.

C. Wolfe’s Claim Concerning the Collision is Not

Preempted Under the RLA.

1. Wolfe’s Claim Does Not Require Interpretation of

the CBA.

Under Norris, the crucial inquiry in determining whether

a cause of action under state law is preempted by the RLA is

whether the “state-law claim is dependent on the

interpretation of a CBA.” Norris, 512 U.S. at 262. If the

cause of action requires interpretation of a CBA, then the

claim is preempted. Id. at 262–63. “The plaintiff’s claim is

the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA

must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff’s claim.” Cramer v.

Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“As long as the state-law claim can be resolved without

interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’

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10 WOLFE V. BNSF

of the [CBA] for . . . pre-emption purposes.” Lingle v. Norge

Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 (1988).2

In Winslow, the Montana Supreme Court held that a claim

for negligent mismanagement under MCA § 39-2-703 was

not preempted by the RLA. Winslow I, 16 P.3d at 996–97;

Winslow II, 121 P.3d at 513. In that case, an employee was

diagnosed with a hernia in 1992, and in 1995 it was severely

aggravated while he performed his duties. Winslow II,

121 P.3d at 509. Pursuant to a CBA, the employer conducted

a hearing to determine if the employee had fraudulently

withheld information regarding his 1992 injury. Id. at 510. 

As a result of the hearing, the employee was terminated. Id. 

A special board of adjustment3affirmed that the railroad had

the right under the CBA to terminate the employee for his

dishonesty. Id.

The employee sued under MCA § 39-2-703, alleging that

the railroad had “negligentlymismanaged its investigation [of

his injuries] and that he was wrongfully discharged.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). At trial, the jury found

that each party was negligent, allocating 61.25% liability to

2 The standard for preemption under the RLA is “virtually identical to

the pre-emption standard” under § 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act established by Lingle. Norris, 512 U.S. at 260.

3 Under the RLA, union grievances may be referred to “a special board

of adjustment” to resolve the dispute that would “otherwise [be] referable

to the Adjustment Board.” 45 U.S.C. § 153(x). A decision by a special

board of adjustment is enforceable “in the same manner and subject to the

same provisions that apply to proceedings for enforcement of compliance

with awards of the Adjustment Board.” Id. Winslow’s CBA provided for

the arbitration of his case before a special adjustment board. Winslow II,

121 P.3d at 510.

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WOLFE V. BNSF 11

the railroad, 38.75% to the employee, and awarding the

employee compensatory damages. Id.

The railroad appealed, arguing that Winslow’s claim was

preempted by the RLA because “his state-law claim of

negligent mismanagement . . . required the court or jury to

interpret existing provisions of his CBA.” Id. at 512. The

Montana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Winslow’s

claim was not preempted because it was “premised upon . . .

a state law claim” which was “independent of whatever labor

agreement might govern.” Id. at 513 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Winslow I, 16 P.3d at 996–97.

Similarly, applying the rule set forth in Norris and Lingle,

we have consistently held that claims for employer

negligence are not preempted by the RLA when the right

involved is independent of a CBA. See Wharf v. Burlington

N. R.R. Co., 60 F.3d 631, 635-636 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding

that employee’s claim for damages for personal injury caused

by the railroad’s negligence was not preempted because

“[t]he [RLA] . . . has no application to a claim for damages to

the employee resulting from the negligence of an employer

railroad” (omission in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.,

473 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that employees’

state claims against their employer for negligently hiring and

supervising its security guards were not preempted by § 301

of the Labor Management Relations Act because they “d[id]

not require interpretation of [a] CBA”). In contrast, when a

duty of care owed to the employee derives solely from a

CBA, the claim is preempted. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers

v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 860–62 (1987) (holding that

employee’s negligence claim against her union was

preempted because, unlike an employer, the union owed

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12 WOLFE V. BNSF

plaintiff a duty only by “accepting a duty of care through

[the] contractual arrangement” of a CBA).

Wolfe asserts BNSF negligently mismanaged him in the

following respects: (1) BNSF failed to properly train him on

how to use the HLCS and provided him with a hi-rail truck

that was in poor operating condition, and (2) the dispatcher

failed to provide him with proper track authority and failed to

warn him of the oncoming freight train. Wolfe argues that

this negligent misconduct caused the accident that led to his

termination, and that he has suffered damages as a result of

this termination. Here, as in Winslow, Wolfe’s cause of

action for negligent mismanagement does not arise out of a

CBA.

To determine whether a claim arises out of a CBA, we

first “determine ‘whether the CBA must serve as the

measuring rod in determining whether [the defendant] acted

reasonably.’” Espinal, 90 F.3d at 1457 (alteration in original)

(quoting Jimeno, 66 F.3d at 1524). A claim does not involve

interpretation of a CBA where the CBA is “silent” on how the

employer may address the issues raised by an employee’s

claim. See Jimeno, 66 F.3d at 1524 (holding that employee’s

disability claim did not require interpretation of the CBA

where the CBA was “silent regarding the ways that

management may either restructure positions to modify

workload or design special arrangements . . . to accommodate

employees”). Further, where a CBA contains general

provisions involving the same subject matter as an

employee’s claim but does not provide a “framework” for

how the employer may address the issue in dispute, that claim

does not require interpretation of the CBA. See Espinal,

90 F.3d at 1457 (holding that employee’s state disability

claim was not preempted where the CBA contained general

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WOLFE V. BNSF 13

provisions on physical fitness but “d[id] not provide a

framework for challenging determinations that an employee

is not physically fit” or “a mechanism to accommodate

disabled workers”).

As in Jimeno, BNSF has not identified any provision in

the CBA that would require interpretation of the CBA to

resolve Wolfe’s negligent mismanagement claim. There are

no provisions in the CBA regarding (1) how BNSF should

have managed training employees for the HLCS, (2) how

BNSF should maintain hi-rail trucks to ensure that they are in

safe operating condition, (3) how BNSF should handle claims

for co-worker negligence, or (4) how BNSF should handle

claims that it mismanaged its employees. Further, as in

Espinal, although the CBA generally provides that an

employee may complain of unjust treatment to BNSF, it does

not provide a framework for resolving challenges involving

negligence or mismanagement. Thus, the CBA does not

govern Wolfe’s claim.

Wolfe’s claim that BNSF mismanaged the employees

who negligently provided him with faulty equipment, failed

to train him properly on how to use the HLCS, and provided

him with incorrect track authority “can be analyzed entirely

apart from the CBA.” Espinal, 90 F.3d at 1457. In other

words, Wolfe’s “right to be free from mismanagement . . . is

independent of any negotiated labor agreement.” Winslow I,

16 P.3d at 997.

We therefore conclude that Wolfe’s claim concerning the

conduct leading to the collision is independent of the CBA

and does not require interpretation of the CBA. Thus,

Wolfe’s claim is not preempted by the RLA.

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14 WOLFE V. BNSF

2. BNSF’s Disciplinary Proceedings Are Not the

Legal Cause of Wolfe’s Suspension and

Termination.

BNSF argues that Wolfe’s claim is preempted on the

ground that “[t]he only injury asserted by Mr. Wolfe is

dismissal from employment,” rather than personal injury

arising from the accident. Thus, because the collision led to

the CBA proceedings, which then led to Wolfe’s firing,

Wolfe’s claim would require a court to evaluate whether

Wolfe was properlydisciplined under the CBA. We disagree.

First, we note again that MCA § 39-2-703, while perhaps

unusual in its breadth, is exceedingly clear. Montana law

confers on Wolfe, independently of the CBA, the right not to

be negligently injured by his coworkers or employer. This

right protects Wolfe not only from personal injuries, but also

from negligent firing. Winslow I, 16 P.3d at 995–96;

Winslow II, 121 P.3d at 511–12. Thus, under Montana law,

Wolfe has sufficiently alleged an injury that was suffered as

a result of BNSF’s negligence (the actions leading up to the

collision). This causal inquiry does not require interpretation

of the CBA.

Further, it is well-established law that, when an employee

has been terminated pursuant to the CBA’s provisions, that

employee may assert a separate and independent state claim

challenging his termination. See Norris, 512 U.S. at 249–51,

266 (holding that employee who was terminated after a

grievance hearing under the CBA could bring a state-law

claim for wrongful discharge); Saridakis v. United Airlines,

166 F.3d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Supreme

Court has rejected the argument that a state-law claim is

preempted because it “involve[s] the question whether [the

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WOLFE V. BNSF 15

employee] was fired pursuant to the CBA’s provisions”);

Winslow II, 121 P.3d at 510, 513 (holding that employee

whose termination under the CBA was affirmed by a special

adjustment board could bring a claim under MCA § 39-2-703

challenging his termination). If disciplinary proceedings

pursuant to aCBA and resulting in an employee’s termination

constituted the legal cause of that termination for all

purposes, the employee could never assert an independent

state-law claim.

When an employee is terminated following proceedings

conducted in accordance with a CBA, there are two distinct

inquiries: (1) whether the “discharge [was] in violation of the

CBA”; and (2) “the purely factual inquiry” into the

circumstances underlying the termination. Norris, 512 U.S.

at 266. The first inquiry requires interpretation of the CBA. 

Id. But the second inquiry into “‘purely factual questions’

about an employee’s conduct or an employer’s conduct and

motives do[es] not ‘requir[e] a court to interpret any term of

a collective-bargaining agreement.’” Id. at 261–62 (quoting

Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 (second alteration in original)). This

is so even if the two inquiries “would require addressing

precisely the same set of facts.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410

(emphasis added); see Wharf, 60 F.3d at 636 (holding that

plaintiff’s state claim for damages was not preempted “even

if a new trial on damages would require the court to examine

facts that would also be relevant to a wrongful discharge

claim under the RLA”). Thus, resolving an independent

state-law claim does not require a court to “resort to the CBA

. . . to determine whether [the employee], in fact, was

discharged” or to determine whether the employee’s

termination was justified by the CBA. Norris, 512 U.S. at

266.

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16 WOLFE V. BNSF

Fennessy v. Southwest Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir.

1996), illustrates these two distinct inquiries. There, we held

that an employee whose termination for violations of a CBA

was upheld by an Adjustment Board could bring an

independent claim challenging his termination. Id. at 1362. 

In Fennessy, an airline employee hit an aircraft with a cart

that he was driving, scratching the plane. Id. at 1361. The

employee was terminated after the airline “held a factfinding

session” in accordance with the CBA and determined the

employee damaged the aircraft. Id. “After a hearing, a

Systems Board of Adjustment . . . upheld [the employee’s]

termination.” Id.

The employee then filed a lawsuit in federal court,

asserting a claim under 45 U.S.C. § 152, on the ground that

he was terminated in retaliation for engaging in union

activities. Id. Under § 152, an employee has a private right

of action for wrongful discharge. Id. at 1362–65. The airline

contended that the employee’s claim constituted a minor

dispute under the RLA. We disagreed.

We acknowledged that the grievance before “the

Adjustment Board [was] unquestionably . . . a minor dispute.” 

Id at 1361. We held that “[t]he Adjustment Board’s decision

is binding on [the employee] with regard to what it decided:

that his discharge did not violate the [CBA].” Id. at 1361–62. 

But “[the employee] did not seek review of the Board’s

decision.” Id. at 1362. “Instead, he brought []his action in

district court, alleging that his discharge . . . gave rise to an

independent statutory claim under 45 U.S.C. § 152.” Id. We

held that “the mere fact that [the employee’s] discharge could

be grieved on contractual grounds under the CBA does not

mean that his statutory claim under the RLA is a minor

dispute.” Id.

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WOLFE V. BNSF 17

As in Fennessy, Wolfe had a related minor dispute that

was submitted to arbitration before the Adjustment Board;

similarly, the Adjustment Board’s decision here binds Wolfe

with regard to its finding that Wolfe’s suspension and

withholding of back pay did not violate the CBA. But Wolfe

does not seek judicial review of the Adjustment Board’s

decision. He brought suit under MCA § 39-2-703 alleging

that he suffered damages because of the negligence and

mismanagement of BNSF’s employees, a state claim

independent of the CBA. The issue to be decided here is

whether BNSF’s and its employees’ conduct constitutes

negligence and mismanagement under Montana law. See

Norris, 512 U.S. at 266 (holding that the “issue to be decided

in this [non-preempted] action [is] whether the employer’s

actions make out the element of [wrongful] discharge under

Hawaii law”). Wolfe’s state claim will require a factual

inquiry into Wolfe’s conduct, the dispatcher’s conduct, and

BNSF’s conduct leading up to the head-on collision. But that

is not sufficient to establish preemption. Id. at 261–62. To

do that, BNSF would have to have shown that Wolfe’s claim

depended on an interpretation of the CBA. However, BNSF

is unable to make such a showing.

D. Wolfe’s Punitive Damages Claim is Reinstated.

The parties agree that Wolfe’s claim for punitive damages

rises and falls with his underlying claim. Accordingly,

because we find that Wolfe’s claim based on conduct relating

to the collision be reinstated, we find that Wolfe’s punitive

damages claim should be reinstated.

 Case: 12-35054, 04/23/2014, ID: 9068806, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 17 of 18
18 WOLFE V. BNSF

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse

in part the district court’s order granting BNSF summary

judgment. We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that

Wolfe’s claim alleging injury caused by BNSF’s misconduct

in proceedings pursuant to the CBA is preempted, as Wolfe

concedes. We REVERSE the district court’s ruling that

Wolfe’s claim that he suffered injury as a result of BNSF’s

and its employees’ alleged negligence and mismanagement

leading up to the collision is preempted and REVERSE the

district court’s ruling dismissing Wolfe’s punitive damages

claim. WeREMANDfor further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. Costs awarded to Appellant.

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.

 Case: 12-35054, 04/23/2014, ID: 9068806, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 18 of 18