Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01444/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01444-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ann Garcia
Plaintiff
Salvation Army
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ann Garcia, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Salvation Army, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02225-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint and Defendant asks 

the Court to transfer this case to Judge Logan and consolidate it with Garcia v. Salvation 

Army, 2:15-cv-01444-SPL (D. Ariz. Jul. 28, 2015). Doc. 46, 44. The motions are fully 

briefed, and no party has requested oral argument. The Court will deny the motion to 

amend, transfer Judge Logan’s case to the undersigned, and consolidate the actions. 

I. Background. 

Garcia was an employee of the Salvation Army for more than a decade. Doc. 58 

at 8. In November 2013, she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that certain actions taken by 

the Salvation Army related to her performance evaluation constituted discrimination 

based on religion and age, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964. Doc. 44, at 12-13. In May 2014, the Salvation Army notified Garcia that her 

position had been eliminated. Doc. 58 at 8. Thereafter, in July 2015, the EEOC issued a 

Notice of Suit Rights with respect to Garcia’s Charge. Doc. 1. at 4-5. 

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 In October 2014, Garcia filed suit for religious discrimination, retaliation, hostile 

work environment, and retaliatory discharge. Doc. 1. On March 20, 2015, the Court 

entered a Case Management Order which established a May 19, 2015 deadline for 

amending pleadings. Doc. 29. The day before the deadlines, Garcia filed an amended 

complaint.1

 Doc. 31. On August 18, 2015, Garcia filed a motion for leave to amend her 

complaint to add a claim for constructive discharge. See Doc. 46. 

 Meanwhile, Garcia was also seeking relief against the Salvation Army on a theory 

of disability discrimination. In July 2014, shortly after her position was terminated, 

Garcia filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against the Salvation Army alleging 

disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 

Doc. 44 at 15-16. The EEOC issued a Notice of Suit Rights with respect to this charge 

on April 29, 2015. Id. at 10. On July 28, 2015, Garcia filed a new lawsuit in this Court, 

alleging failure to accommodate and retaliation in violation of the ADA. See Garcia v. 

Salvation Army, 2:15-cv-01444-SPL (D. Ariz. Jul. 28, 2015). 

II. Motion for Leave to Amend. 

 Plaintiff filed her motion for leave to amend on August 18, 2015, more than 90 

days after the deadline for amendment of pleadings established by the Court’s Case 

Management Order. Doc. 29, ¶ 2. “[W]hen a party seeks to amend a pleading after the 

pretrial scheduling order’s deadline for amending the pleadings has expired, the moving 

party must satisfy the ‘good cause’ standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4).” 

In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The primary consideration under this good cause standard is whether the moving party 

acted with reasonable diligence. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreation, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 

609 (9th Cir. 1992). If the deadline could have been satisfied through reasonable 

diligence, good cause has not been shown. See id.

 

1

 Plaintiff did not seek leave to file the amended complaint as required by Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the Court will overlook this 

error in light of Defendant’s failure to object and Plaintiff’s pro se status. 

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 Plaintiff has not acted with reasonable diligence in raising her constructive 

discharge claim and has not identified any other good cause for modifying the scheduling 

order’s deadline. Plaintiff asserts that her amendment is justified by “newly discovered 

evidence” (Doc. 58 at 2), namely, a May 27, 2014, letter from the Salvation Army to 

Plaintiff explaining the organization’s decision to terminate her employment. But 

Plaintiff does not rely on this letter to support the constructive discharge claim she seeks 

to add to her complaint, and appears to have had access to the letter from the inception of 

this case. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. 

III. Motion to Consolidate. 

 Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the Court to 

consolidate cases which, in the Court’s judgment, involve common questions of law or 

fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). The Court has “broad discretion” under Rule 42(a) “to 

consolidate cases pending in the same district.” Inv’rs Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for 

Cent. Dist. of Cal., 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989). In exercising this discretion, the 

Court “balance[s] the interest of judicial convenience against the potential for delay, 

confusion and prejudice that may result from such consolidation.” Sapiro v. Sunstone 

Hotel Inv’rs, L.L.C., No. CV-03-1555-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 898155, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 

4, 2006) (citations omitted). 

 Upon consideration of these factors and independent review of the two complaints, 

the Court concludes that the cases should be consolidated. The cases raise common 

questions of fact related to a single course of events – Plaintiff’s employment and 

subsequent termination by Defendant. Moreover, the cases can be consolidated without 

giving rise to delay, confusion, or prejudice.2

 

IV. Motion to Transfer. 

Rule 42.1(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure provides that judges should 

consider four factors in determining whether to grant a motion to transfer. These factors 

2

 Plaintiff indicates that she is “willing to consolidate both cases if Judge Campbell is assigned to both cases.” Doc. 48 at 5. 

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include: “(1) whether substantive matters have been considered in a case; (2) which 

Judge has the most familiarity with the issues involved in the cases; (3) whether a case is 

reasonably viewed as the lead or principal case; or (4) any other factor serving the 

interest of judicial economy.” LRCiv. 42.1(d). The cases should be assigned to this 

Court because the undersigned judge has developed familiarity with the issues involved 

in the cases and because case 14-2225 is reasonably viewed as Plaintiff’s lead or 

principal case. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 46) is denied. 

 2. Defendant’s motion to transfer and consolidate (Doc. 44) is granted. Case 

No. CV15-0144-PHX-SPL will be transferred to the undersigned and 

consolidated with this case. 

 3. The parties shall, on or before within 20 days of this order, submit a 

proposed revised case management order for the consolidated case. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2015. 

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