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Parties Involved:
Board for Correction of Naval Records
Appellee
Arthur Brennan Malloy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15298

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-01777-SLB-TMP

ARTHUR BRENNAN MALLOY, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF NAVAL RECORDS, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(July 9, 2015)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Arthur Malloy, an Alabama prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition related to his other 

than honorable discharge from the military in 1965. Malloy asserts the district

court erred in dismissing his § 2241 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

because he did not meet the “in custody” definition of § 2241. 

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition for lack 

of jurisdiction. Taylor v. United States, 396 F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). To 

bring a federal habeas action, a petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The 

Supreme Court has interpreted § 2241 as requiring that a habeas petitioner be “in 

custody” under the conviction or sentence that he seeks to attack at the time when 

his petition is filed. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). The Supreme

Court has also recognized habeas actions brought pursuant to § 2241 may be 

appropriate where “members of the armed services . . . have been unlawfully 

detained, restrained, or confined” by the military. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 

487, 489 (1971). Although a petitioner can challenge his other than honorable 

discharge from the military in district court and seek declaratory judgment, § 2241 

is not the proper vehicle for bringing such a claim. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 

U.S. 579, 580-83 (1958) (finding the district court had jurisdiction to review 

petitioners’ actions seeking declaratory judgments that the Secretary of Army’s 

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issuance of other than honorable discharge certificates were void and in excess of 

his powers). 

The district court did not err in dismissing Malloy’s claim for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Malloy is not challenging his conviction or sentence related to 

his confinement in Alabama state prison, and he is not detained, restrained, or 

confined by the military. Thus, he does not meet the “in custody” definition of 

§ 2241. Accordingly, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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