Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03362/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03362-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pat Garrett
Appellee
Bob Parish
Appellee
Frank Robinson
Appellant
White County
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3362

___________

Frank Robinson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

White County, Arkansas; Bob Parish, *

individually and in his official capacity *

as County Judge of White County, *

Arkansas; Pat Garrett, individually and *

in his official capacity as Sheriff of *

White County, Arkansas, *

*

Appellees. *

__________

Submitted: March 17, 2006

Filed: July 3, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM,1

 District

Judge.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Frank Robinson (Robinson) appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to White County Judge Bob Parish (Judge Parish) and Sheriff Pat Garrett

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(Sheriff Garrett) (collectively, the appellees) in Robinson’s action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for unlawful arrest following the collapse of a bridge Robinson drove across in

a loaded eighteen-wheel truck. Robinson alleged claims against the appellees in their

individual and official capacities, a civil conspiracy claim, and several state law

claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the appellees based on

qualified immunity. Robinson appeals. We reverse the district court’s order with

respect to the individual capacity and state law claims against Sheriff Garrett, and we

otherwise affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2003, Robinson was driving a loaded Home Depot truck en route

to a delivery when he encountered an old single lane steel framed wooden topped

bridge in White County, Arkansas. Ordinarily a weight limit sign was posted at the

bridge, but on that day the sign was missing. Robinson was unfamiliar with this

stretch of road and with this bridge. As Robinson drove across, the bridge collapsed,

with the truck and bridge falling into the creek, injuring Robinson.

White County Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Terry Sablotny (Sergeant

Sablotny) and Deputy Andres Mariani (Deputy Mariani), among others, responded to

the accident. Deputy Mariani found the weight limit sign lying obscured in the grass.

At some point, Judge Parish was notified of the accident. Judge Parish, having not

visited the accident scene, concluded Robinson “either broke [the] weight limit law

or . . . [did] something reckless to cause that bridge to fall.” Judge Parish spoke to the

White County Sheriff’s Department dispatcher and told the dispatcher to ask Sheriff

Garrett to issue Robinson a citation. Judge Parish also called Sheriff Garrett directly,

telling Sheriff Garrett to “[p]ut [Robinson] in jail.”

Sheriff Garrett telephoned Sergeant Sablotny and informed him Judge Parish

was mad and wanted Robinson put in jail and to post bond. Not having visited the

accident scene, Sheriff Garrett instructed Sergeant Sablotny to issue a citation. When

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Sergeant Sablotny told Sheriff Garrett the weight limit posting was missing (so he did

not know what Robinson should be cited for), Sheriff Garrett did not change his

instruction to issue a citation. In a subsequent telephone conversation, after checking

with a state trooper, Sergeant Sablotny told Sheriff Garrett the “closest thing” he could

find to a statute Robinson violated was Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104, which prohibits

“careless driving.” Sheriff Garrett responded to Sergeant Sablotny, “Works for me.”

Robinson was arrested for careless driving and released after posting a $150

bond. In June 2003, Robinson was acquitted on the careless driving charge. The

presiding district court judge of Searcy County, Missouri, testified, by affidavit, the

only witness at the citation hearing, Deputy Mariani, testified: “[T]he weight limit

sign for the bridge was not up at the time of the accident, [Deputy] Mariani did not

believe that Robinson had broken any law, and [Deputy] Mariani issued a citation to

Robinson only because he had been instructed to do so.”

Robinson later sued White County, Judge Parish, and Sheriff Garrett under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, alleging the appellees conspired to violate Robinson’s right to be free

from unlawful arrest, and alleging various state law claims. The appellees moved for

summary judgment based on the “objective reasonableness” arrest standard under the

Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The appellees then moved

for reconsideration and filed an amended summary judgment motion based on

qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment on all of

Robinson’s claims. Robinson appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the

same standards as the district court. McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d

507, 510 (8th Cir. 1995). We will affirm the summary judgment if the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to Robinson, demonstrates there is no genuine issue

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as to any material fact and the appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id. There is no genuine issue of material fact if the evidence is such that no

reasonable jury could return a verdict for Robinson. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A. Sheriff Garrett’s Qualified Immunity for Individual Capacity Claim

We first address Robinson’s individual capacity claim against Sheriff Garrett.

As recited in Wright v. Rolette County, 417 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1338 (2006), the test for

qualified immunity is:

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled

to qualified immunity unless their alleged conduct violated clearly

established federal constitutional or statutory rights of which a

reasonable person in their positions would have known. We analyze

qualified immunity issue [sic] in two steps. First, we ask whether the

facts as asserted by the plaintiff show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right. If the answer is no, we grant qualified immunity.

If the answer is yes, we go on to determine whether the right was clearly

established. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right

The appellees argue Sheriff Garrett’s conduct did not violate Robinson’s

constitutional right because a reasonable officer at the scene would have believed he

had probable cause to arrest Robinson. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45

(1986); Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989). In determining whether

there was arguable probable cause to arrest Robinson, we start at square one: the

statute cited for Robinson’s arrest. Sheriff Garrett ordered Robinson arrested for

violating Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104, the Arkansas “careless driving” statute, which

states in relevant part, 

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(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any vehicle in

such a careless manner as to evidence . . . a failure to maintain proper

control.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or drive any vehicle . . .

in violation of the following prohibited acts:

. . . .

(4) Driving too close to, or colliding with . . . fixtures, . . . or

objects adjacent to the public thoroughfares;

. . . .

(6) To operate any vehicle in such a manner which would cause

a failure to maintain control;

. . . . 

(8) To operate a vehicle in any manner, when the driver is

inattentive, and such inattention is not reasonable and prudent in

maintaining vehicular control.

The appellees first argue a reasonable officer would have had probable cause

to believe Robinson “collided with . . . objects adjacent” to the road because

Robinson’s truck was lying among the bridge’s remains, thus (1) “colliding” with the

bridge after the collapse, or (2) evidencing a collision causing the collapse. See id.

§ (b)(4). We disagree and find the appellees’ proposed statutory reading does not

square with common sense traffic law enforcement practice. First, under the

appellees’ proposed statutory reading, Arkansas drivers had best beware, for an

innocent victim could be cited for careless driving if, as the result of another driver

negligently colliding with the victim’s car, the victim’s car careens into another

object. This is obviously an absurd result. No reasonable officer would cite such a

victim for careless driving, just as no reasonable officer would view the “careless

driving” statute as prohibiting collision with a bridge that has just collapsed from

underneath the vehicle. Second, no evidence, or reasonable inference from the

evidence, indicates Robinson’s truck struck the bridge and caused the collapse.

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The appellees alternatively argue a reasonable officer, given the results of the

bridge collapse, would have had probable cause to believe Robinson was inattentive.

See id. § (b)(8). We again disagree, as the officers had no evidence Robinson was

inattentive.

Finally, the appellees argue a reasonable officer would have had probable cause

to believe Robinson failed to maintain proper control or operated his truck in a manner

causing a failure to maintain proper control. See id. § (a), (b)(6). The appellees’

purported ratiocination is that Robinson operated a very heavy vehicle, the sheer

weight of which caused the bridge collapse, which in turn caused Robinson to lose

control of the vehicle, hence Robinson operated the truck in a manner causing a loss

of control. We have no difficulty rejecting the appellees’ circuitous argument

foursquare. Again, under the appellees’ construction, innocent Arkansas drivers could

be cited for loss of control following a collision caused by persons or events other

than the driver. No reasonable officer would apply the statute in that manner. Finally,

our conclusion is further supported by the event chronology preceding Robinson’s

arrest, which evidences Sheriff Garrett’s unwavering order to arrest Robinson for

something, despite Sheriff Garrett having not visited the accident scene and not being

advised by his officers at the scene that any evidence supported a traffic citation.

We recognize at the time of the arrest the Arkansas courts had not yet fully

defined the conduct that would violate Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104, thus one might

argue “[i]n the absence of any judicial interpretation to the contrary, a reasonable

officer could have concluded” Robinson’s actions warranted arrest for careless

driving. Cf. Gorra, 880 F.2d at 98. Such an argument would fail. First, the Arkansas

decision closest on point supports our conclusion. See Barrientos v. State, 39 S.W.3d

17, 22 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (holding Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104(b)(6) did not

support a finding of probable cause to stop a vehicle for weaving within own lane).

Second, we do not believe the absence of interpretation by state courts grants

imprimatur to a statutory reading so contrary to common sense.

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Because no reasonable police officer would have read the Arkansas “careless

driving” statute in a manner to believe probable cause arguably existed to arrest

Robinson, we hold, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Robinson,

Sheriff Garrett, who ordered Robinson’s arrest, violated Robinson’s constitutional

right to be free from unlawful arrest.

2. Clearly Established Right

Because we have concluded Sheriff Garrett violated Robinson’s constitutional

right to be free from unlawful arrest, we next determine whether the right was clearly

established. “For a right to be considered clearly established, the ‘contours of the

right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.’” Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099,

1103 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

The appellees argue Robinson’s right was not clearly established because the

interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104 we recognized supra was not

sufficiently clear at the time of Robinson’s arrest. We disagree. Given the record

before us, we conclude a reasonable officer would have known arresting Robinson for

careless driving after a bridge, missing its weight limit posting, fell out from under

Robinson’s truck constituted a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In sum, we hold, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Robinson,

Sheriff Garrett violated Robinson’s constitutional right to be free from unlawful arrest,

and that right was clearly established at the time of Robinson’s arrest. We therefore

reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Sheriff Garrett on

Robinson’s individual capacity § 1983 claim against Sheriff Garrett.

B. Judge Parish’s Qualified Immunity for Individual Capacity Claim

We next address Robinson’s individual capacity claim against Judge Parish.

Robinson claims Judge Parish directly participated in the constitutional violation

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against Robinson, thus Judge Parish is liable just as Sheriff Garrett, who actually

ordered Robinson’s arrest.

As White County Judge, Judge Parish served as the “principal executive officer

of the county.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-14-703(a)(1). His powers included

“operat[ing] the system of county roads,” see Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 3, and

presiding over (but not voting in) the body that fixes the compensation of White

County officers, including Sheriff Garrett, see Ark. Const. Amend. 55, §§ 3, 5; Ark.

Code Ann. § 14-14-502(b)(2)(A)(i). However, while titled Judge, Judge Parish had

no judicial duties, see Ark. Code Ann. § 14-14-703(a)(1), and in particular, he had no

authority, discretionary or otherwise, to order Robinson arrested, see Ark. Const.

Amend. 55, § 3. Without that authority, we hold as a matter of law Judge Parish could

not have directly participated, under color of state law, in Robinson’s unlawful arrest.

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991). Because Judge Parish could not have

violated Robinson’s constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified immunity. See

Wright, 417 F.3d at 884.

Although Judge Parish could not, within the scope of his authority, violate

Robinson’s right, “[w]hen government officials engage in consci[ence]-shocking,

egregious behavior that is clearly outside the scope of their discretionary authority,

they are not entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983.” Moran v. Clarke, 359

F.3d 1058, 1060 (8th Cir. 2004). The evidence against Judge Parish–that he requested

Robinson be cited without visiting the accident scene or fully investigating the

facts–does not rise to the level of conscience-shocking. It is understandable the

official overseeing county roads would want the individual who may have caused a

bridge collapse in his county to be held accountable.

We therefore affirm the district court with respect to Robinson’s individual

capacity claim against Judge Parish.

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C. Conspiracy Claim

Robinson alleges Judge Parish and Sheriff Garrett entered into a civil

conspiracy to violate Robinson’s right to be free from unlawful arrest. Namely, Judge

Parish asked Sheriff Garrett to issue Robinson a citation and “[p]ut him in jail,” and

Sheriff Garrett did so.

To establish a civil conspiracy, Robinson “must show five elements: (1) two or

more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the

object or course of action to be taken; (4) the commission of one or more unlawful

overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result of the conspiracy.” In re

Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1498

(8th Cir. 1997). The issue here is the fourth element: whether Judge Parish’s act of

requesting Sheriff Garrett to arrest Robinson constitutes an overt act or participation

in an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate Robinson’s right.

We hold as a matter of law no reasonable jury could find the existence of a

civil conspiracy here because Judge Parish’s request, backed by no actual authority

and which Sheriff Garrett was not required to follow, does not constitute an overt act

for which Judge Parish could be liable. The unlawful overt act, an unconstitutional

arrest, was solely within Sheriff Garrett’s authority and was his decision alone. As we

stated in Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), “[a] private

person does not conspire with a state official merely by invoking an exercise of the

state official’s authority.” Id. at 870 (quoting Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co.,

644 F.2d 1204, 1208 (7th Cir. 1980)). While Judge Parish is not truly a “private

person” in this case, his lack of authority over Sheriff Garrett, just like a private

person’s lack of authority over the police, makes Young persuasive. Furthermore,

Robinson offers no evidence Judge Parish’s request was “tantamount to substituting

the judgment of [Judge Parish] for that of the police.” Cf. id. (quoting Alexis v.

McDonald’s Rest., 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir. 1995)).

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We therefore affirm the district court with respect to Robinson’s civil

conspiracy claim against the appellees.

D. Official Capacity Claims

We next address Robinson’s official capacity claims. Robinson claims his

arrest amounted to an “official policy” by the White County Sheriff’s Department and

therefore White County is liable under § 1983 for the official acts of Judge Parish and

Sheriff Garrett. Robinson’s claims are tantamount to claims against White County.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). A municipality may be liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of its employees if some “municipal

‘policy’ or ‘custom’” was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See

Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997).

1. Judge Parish

Because Judge Parish did not undertake any unlawful acts toward Robinson,

White County cannot be held liable under § 1983 for any acts taken by Judge Parish.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); McCoy v. City of

Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n order for municipal liability to

attach, individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.”).

2. Sheriff Garrett

Robinson argues Sheriff Garrett’s single act of having Robinson arrested

constitutes an “official policy” of White County. Although the Supreme Court has

stated “municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal

policymakers under appropriate circumstances,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 480 (1986), those unique circumstances do not exist here. There is no

evidence in the record, beyond Robinson’s isolated arrest, White County had any

policy, official or otherwise, of unlawfully arresting persons for careless driving. Cf.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738, 748 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam);

Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 481 (“[N]ot every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects

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the municipality to § 1983 liability.”). “We cannot infer the existence of an

unconstitutional [county] policy . . . from this single occurrence.” Wedemeier v. City

of Ballwin, 931 F.2d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,

471 U.S. 808, 821 (plurality), 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring) (1985)) (involving

claim of municipal liability for single incident of unlawful arrest).

We therefore affirm the district court with respect to Robinson’s official

capacity claims against the appellees.

E. State Law Claims

Finally, we address Robinson’s state law claims. The appellees moved for

summary judgment on Robinson’s state law claims, only arguing the claims were

“irrelevant” because the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. The appellees

made no alternative argument in support of summary judgment based on the merits

of the state law claims.

Under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), “[t]he party seeking

summary judgment must first identify grounds demonstrating the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Uhiren v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Inc., 346 F.3d 824, 827

(8th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Only when the movant makes such

a showing does the burden shift to the non-movant to “present affirmative evidence

showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 256-57).

In this case, the appellees failed to identify any grounds beyond qualified

immunity demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact regarding

Robinson’s state law claims. But as we held supra, Sheriff Garrett is not entitled to

qualified immunity for Robinson’s unlawful arrest. Thus, the appellees have

presented no valid grounds upon which summary judgment can be granted on

Robinson’s state law claims against Sheriff Garrett. We therefore reverse the district

court’s order granting summary judgment to Sheriff Garrett on Robinson’s state law

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claims. However, because Judge Parish did not undertake any unlawful acts toward

Robinson, we affirm the district court’s order granting Judge Parish summary

judgment on Robinson’s state law claims. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court’s order granting summary

judgment to Sheriff Garrett on Robinson’s individual capacity and state law claims.

We affirm the district court with respect to the remaining claims against Sheriff

Garrett and all claims against Judge Parish.

______________________________

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