Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00518/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00518-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Dickerson
Plaintiff
Jackson
Defendant
Montgomery
Defendant
Whinely
Defendant
Donny Youngblood
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN DICKERSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:15-cv-00518-EPG-PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Brian Dickerson (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing 

this action on April 3, 2015. (ECF No. 1.)1 In Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he 

was sexually assaulted by Deputies employed by the Kern County Sheriff’s Department. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to investigate charges filed against the deputies in the Bakersfield 

Police Department.

This Court has screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that it does not provide 

sufficient details to state a claim as to any defendants. Plaintiff fails to describe who did what 

 

1 On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. (ECF No. 8.) Therefore, pursuant to 

Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of California, the undersigned shall conduct any and 

all proceedings in the case until such time as reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix 

A(k)(3).

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to him in a way that would state a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Moreover, the Court is unable to provide the relief requested by Plaintiff, which is investigation 

into charges filed with the Police Department. 

The Court is giving Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint if he chooses. This 

order provides an explanation of the relevant law to inform the Plaintiff should he desire to file 

an amended complaint. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint attempting to state a claim 

within thirty days. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

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(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id. 

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently unincarcerated. Plaintiff names as defendants Officer Montgomery, 

Officer Whinely, Donny Youngblood, and Sergeant Jackson, employees of the Kern County 

Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that in 2012 he was sexually assaulted 

by three deputies at Booking and Receiving at the Kern County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that 

Patrick Jackson, President of the NAACP, accompanied him to the Bakersfield Police 

Department to file a complaint. The Sheriff’s Department conducted an interview. The 

Department refused to investigate, and authorities have harassed, discriminated, and retaliated. 

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a habeas corpus case requesting the Kern County court to 

investigate, but authorities refuse to give Plaintiff any assistance. 

Plaintiff requests this Court to investigate the matter of sexual assault charges filed 

against the Deputies.

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Legal Standards

1. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697

///

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F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)); “The requisite causal 

connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which 

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” 

Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. Civil Detainee or Prisoner

Plaintiff has not informed the Court whether he was a pretrial detainee or a prisoner 

serving a sentence at the time the events at issue occurred. This distinction affects how 

Plaintiff’s rights are determined.

Pretrial Detainee

“[P]retrial detainees . . . possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.” Stone v. 

City of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom,

831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). A pretrial detainee’s right to be free from punishment is 

grounded in the Due Process Clause, but Courts borrow from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 

when analyzing the rights of pre-trial detainees. See Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 

1205 (9th Cir. 2008); Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003); Or. 

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Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 

F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Carnell 

v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996); Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 

(9th Cir. 1995); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986). For 

example, where the pretrial detainee is claiming that prison officials are liable for a breach of 

the duty to protect the detainee from attack by other inmates and detainees, the Court should 

utilize Eighth Amendment standards. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 

(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Order and security are legitimate penological interests. See White v. 

Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Prisoner

“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions 

of confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “[W]hile 

conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they ‘must not involve 

the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 

337, 347 (1981)). “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue ....“ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] 

conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). “Because routine discomfort is 

part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those 

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave 

to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Prison officials may be held liable for violations under the Eighth Amendment only if they 

acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost, 152 F.3d at

1128.

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, 

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 

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Second, the prison official must “know [ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health 

or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the 

Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement if he knows that inmates 

face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

abate it. Id. at 837–45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they 

lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, 

response to the risk. Id. at 844–45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not 

sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 

835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.

Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation of the 

Eighth Amendment.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations 

omitted). However, “not ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause 

of action.’” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. 

at 9. “In evaluating a prisoner’s claim, courts consider whether the officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful 

enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Wood, 692 F.3d at 1046 (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). Watison found no sexual harassment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment where a plaintiff alleged a correctional officer entered the plaintiff’s cell while the 

plaintiff was on the toilet, began to search the cell, ignored the plaintiff's request that he leave, 

rubbed his thigh against the plaintiff’s thigh while sexually smiling, and left the cell laughing. 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112. Watison reasoned the officer’s “alleged wrongdoing was [not] 

objectively ‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1114 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see Palmer v. O'Connor, No. 2:11–CV–2927–KJN (P), 2013 WL 

1326207, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (“Inmate sexual harassment claims that allege brief 

inappropriate touching by a correctional official are generally found to be noncognizable, 

particularly if the alleged touching occurred pursuant to an authorized search. ‘Even if plaintiff 

believed that there was a sexual aspect to the search, more is needed.’”).

///

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B. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims in Light of Legal Standards

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under these legal standards because 

Plaintiff does not state any specific facts demonstrating how any particular defendant acted 

against him for the Court to determine whether there has been a violation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. It is not sufficient to allege that “the defendants” sexually abused 

Plaintiff, without explaining what each defendant did, or failed to do, which resulted in the 

violation of Plaintiff’s rights. 

Additionally, the only relief requested by Plaintiff is not available in this case. Plaintiff 

requests the Court to conduct an investigation into the complaint that he filed in Kern County. 

The Court is not authorized to direct or conduct investigations on Plaintiff=s behalf. The fact 

that Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis does not authorize the expenditure of public funds 

for the appointment of an investigator. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.2 Moreover, requests for prospective 

relief are limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which 

requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than 

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary 

to correct the violation of the Federal right.”

If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff should describe all of the 

circumstances of the assault against him, i.e., when it happened, where it happened, and how 

each defendant personally acted against him. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff=s Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim upon 

which relief may be granted under § 1983. The Court will dismiss this Complaint and give 

Plaintiff leave to amend to file an amended complaint addressing the issues described above. 

This amended complaint should only name as defendants any individuals who directly caused 

Plaintiff harm and explain what those defendants did or failed to do which violated Plaintiff’s

 

2

“‘[T]he expenditure of public funds [on behalf of an indigent litigant] is proper only when 

authorized by Congress . . . .’” Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. 

MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976)). 

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rights. Plaintiff should also describe any injuries he suffered as a result of the attack against 

him. 

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “leave to amend shall be 

freely given when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff with time 

to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint 

within thirty days if he chooses to do so.

The amended complaint must allege constitutional violations under the law as discussed 

above. Specifically, Plaintiff must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no respondeat 

superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676. Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights by acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health or safety, 

which is sufficiently serious. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 

titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original 

signed under penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

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by the Court in this order if he believes additional true factual allegations would 

state a claim, within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order;

3. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 

1:15-cv-00518-EPG-PC; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s case for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with a 

Court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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