Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02722/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02722-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Appellee
Nary Kheng
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit 

 Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 12, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2722

NARY KHENG,

          Plaintiff‐Appellant,

          v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

          Defendant‐Appellee.

   

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 08 C 3786

Susan E. Cox, Magistrate Judge.

   

Upon consideration of the governmentʹs petition for panel rehearing in this case (which

was consolidated with No. 09–2270), the slip opinion issued on March 12, 2010, is amended as

follows. The sentence on page 10 of the slip opinion stating (citations omitted) that ʺthe admin‐

istrative law judge should have determined whether the plaintiffʹs ailments are at present to‐

tally disabling, and, if so, he should have retained a medical expert to estimate how grave her

condition was in March 2004ʺ is deleted and is replaced with the following sentence:

The administrative law judge should either have determined whether the plaintiff’s

ailments are at present totally disabling, and, if so (see Sam v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 808,

810 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)), have retained a medical expert to estimate how

grave her condition was in March 2004, the last date before her coverage expired,

Case: 09-2722 Document: 30 Filed: 05/12/2010 Pages: 2
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); Grebenick v.

Chater, 121 F.3d 1193 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 666–67

(7th Cir. 2008); Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2006); or the judge

should have determined directly whether the plaintiff was totally disabled by then—

but in making that determination he must (as under the first approach) consider all

relevant evidence, including the evidence regarding the plaintiffʹs condition at pre‐

sent. See, e.g., id.; Anderson v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 220, 222 (7th Cir. 1991); Ray v. Bowen,

843 F.2d 998, 1005 (7th Cir. 1988).

The petition for rehearing is granted to the extent that the panel has made the above

change, but is otherwise denied.

Case: 09-2722 Document: 30 Filed: 05/12/2010 Pages: 2