Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01387/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01387-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 728
Intervenor
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Overnite Transportation Company
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 1998 Decided April 7, 1998

No. 97-1387

Overnite Transportation Company,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 728

Intervenor

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

John N. Raudabaugh argued the cause for petitioner, with

whom Christopher A. Johlie and Kenneth F. Sparks were on

the briefs.

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Jill A. Griffin, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent, with whom Linda Sher,

Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy

Associate General Counsel, and Frederick L. Cornnell, Jr.,

Supervisory Attorney, were on the brief.

James D. Fagan, Jr., and Robert S. Giolito were on the

brief for intervenor International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Local 728.

Before: Wald, Silberman and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: This dispute arose out of a union

election conducted at the Atlanta Service Center of Overnite

Transportation Company ("Overnite") on April 17, 1995, by

the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board").

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 728 ("union") won the election by a wide margin. Nonetheless, Overnite refused to bargain with the union on the grounds that the

union had engaged in unlawful pre-election and election day

video and photographic surveillance of employees and unlawful electioneering, thereby destroying the conditions required

for a free and fair election. In Overnite's final appeal before

the Board, the Board granted the NLRB's motion for summary judgment, holding that the union was the properly

elected bargaining agent for employees at Overnite's Atlanta

facility and that Overnite violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of

the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") when it refused to

bargain with the union. Overnite filed a petition for review

with this court, arguing for a remand to the Board with

instructions to decide the case in light of its forthcoming

decision in two consolidated cases, Flamingo Hilton-Reno,

Case No. 32-CA-14378 and Randell Warehouse of Arizona,

Inc., Case No. 28-RC-5274, which Overnite claims address

issues substantially similar to the case at hand. Alternatively, Overnite asks this court to deny enforcement of the

Board's order, thus permitting a new election. We hold that

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lance sufficient to invalidate the union election, that there was

no unlawful electioneering by the union, and that the Board

reasonably refused to delay certification of the union. Accordingly, we deny Overnite's petition for review and grant

the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Overnite points to four separate instances in which it

argues agents of the union engaged in impermissible conduct.

The first incident occurred approximately two weeks before

the election. John Blow, an Overnite employee, attended a

meeting at Local 728's union hall. Blow, who was procompany, testified that he saw Local 728's Secretary videotaping employees as they left the union hall. See Transcript

at 377-79, 405-06 (May 9, 1996) (testimony of John Blow).

He also testified that no one explained why the Secretary was

videotaping the attendees. See id. at 378.

A second incident occurred on Tuesday, April 11. Employee Parker Roberts testified that Overnite President Jim

Douglas and Overnite Vice President Paul Heaton visited the

Atlanta Service Center. See Transcript at 466-67 (May 9,

1996) (testimony of Parker Roberts). During the visit, union

supporters took photographs of Douglas, Heaton, and employees with whom they spoke, including Roberts. See id. at

467. Roberts testified that he believed that the photographs

would be used to intimidate employees who supported the

company. See id. at 467-68.

A third incident occurred in the late afternoon and early

evening of Friday, April 14, 1995. Three employees testified

that when they arrived for work at the Atlanta facility, they

saw a crowd of union supporters gathered in the driveway

area, a few of whom were taking pictures and one of whom

was using a videocamera. That same day, several employees

gathered in the break room of Overnite's Atlanta facility to

discuss an upcoming union election. After a "heated argument," employee Dennis McConley, a member of the Union

Organizing Committee who had actively campaigned for the

union and who was later elected a union steward, left the

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break room and returned with a video camera. McConley did

not explain the purpose of the videotaping, and there is no

evidence that anyone asked why he was videotaping. Two

pro-company employees, John Sibley and Tim Carter, left the

room soon after McConley entered with the videocamera

because they were concerned that the videotape would be

used to retaliate against them for taking an anti-Teamster

position. See Transcript at 273-79 (May 9, 1996) (testimony

of John Sibley); Transcript at 518-23 (May 9, 1996) (testimony of Tim Carter).

Finally, Overnite claims that on the day of the union

election, there was a crowd of about 100 union supporters,

including International Organizer Keith Maddox, Teamster

President Ron Carey, and the President of Local 728, gathered in the facility's driveway area. See Brief of the Petitioner at 13-14. Overnite charges that employees were subjected

to intimidation, coercion, surveillance, and electioneering by a

group of supporters who held a "raucous" rally within earshot

of the polling station and within sight of employees waiting to

vote. See id. at 14-15. Members of the pro-union crowd

were seen taking videos and photographs, while Maddox was

present. See id. at 16-17. At least one employee was

concerned that the union would use the video and photographs to retaliate against pro-company employees. See id.

at 17. At no time, Overnite argues, did the union provide an

explanation to employees for the videotaping and photography. See id. at 18.

In the April 17, 1995 election, 136 employees voted for

union representation, and 100 voted against; there were only

four challenged ballots. See Tally of Ballots at Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 6-7. Overnite filed 12 objections to the election.

See Employer's Objections to Conduct Affecting the Results

of the Election (April 22, 1995). The objections included

allegations that the union had engaged in unlawful surveillance, coercion, intimidation, and harassment by videotaping

employees known to be company supporters in the break

room on April 14, 1995 (Objection 1), had engaged in similar

conduct on election day by photographing employees as they

entered and exited the company's premises (Objection 4), and

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electioneering zone (Objection 5). See id. The Regional

Director conducted an administrative investigation of the

objections pursuant to which he issued a Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representative overruling all of the

objections and certifying the union as the employees' collective-bargaining representative. Soon thereafter, Overnite

filed a request for review of the decision with the Board. By

order dated March 20, 1996, the Board remanded Objections

1, 4, and 5 for a hearing, but denied the request for review in

all other respects.

On May 31, 1996, the Hearing Officer issued his Report and

Recommendations on Objections, in which he found that the

objections were without merit and recommended that the

Board dismiss them and certify the election results. Overnite

filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Report. Nonetheless, on February 7, 1997, the Board adopted the Hearing

Officer's findings and recommendations and certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for Overnite's

Atlanta employees. Overnite filed a Motion for Reconsideration in light of the Board's pending consideration of two cases,

Flamingo Hilton-Reno, Case No. 32-CA-14378 and Randell

Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., Case No. 28-RC-5274 (June 12,

1996), in which it claimed the Board was expected to clarify

the standards for videotaping and photography during union

elections. The Board denied the motion on March 20, 1997.

By letter dated February 12, 1997, Overnite notified the

union that it would not recognize or bargain with it. See J.A.

122A. The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice

charge alleging that the company's refusal to bargain violated

sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ss 158(a)(1) and

(5). See J.A. 123. One month later, the Board issued a

complaint alleging that Overnite violated sections 8(a)(1) and

(5) of the Act. Overnite answered and the General Counsel

moved for summary judgment. On May 30, 1997, a threemember panel of the Board issued its Decision and Order

concluding that Overnite's refusal to bargain with the union

violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Accordingly, it

ordered Overnite to bargain with the union upon request,

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embody an understanding in a signed agreement, and post an

appropriate notice. See Overnite Transp. Co., 323 N.L.R.B.

No. 145 (May 30, 1997). Overnite filed its Petition for Review

of the Board's Decision and Order on June 10, 1997. The

Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order.

II. Discussion

A.The Board Reasonably Determined that Videotaping

and Photographing of Employees Did Not Constitute

Surveillance Sufficient to Invalidate the Election

Overnite claims that the bargaining order issued by the

Board should not be enforced because pre-election and election day video and photographic surveillance destroyed the

conditions required for a free and fair election. Overnite

argues that the Board was incorrect to conclude that the

videotaping and photography by McConley and others was

not fairly attributable to the union. Accordingly, because

McConley and the others were union representatives, Overnite contends, the election must be set aside if their conduct

" 'reasonably tends to interfere with employees' free and

uncoerced choice in the election.' " See Brief of the Petitioner at 29 (quoting Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 736,

736 (1988) (emphasis added by Petitioner)). Even if the

Board were correct to conclude that all but one of the videos

and photographs were taken by third parties, Overnite continues, the election should still be set aside because the

surveillance created " 'an atmosphere of fear and reprisal

such as to render a free expression of choice impossible.' "

Id. at 29-30 (quoting Millard Processing Serv., Inc., v.

NLRB, 2 F.3d 258, 261 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

1092 (1994) (emphasis added by Petitioner)). The NLRB, in

turn, argues that the Board's finding that the videotaping and

photography was not attributable to the union (except for the

union meeting incident) was reasonable and supported by the

evidence and thus it was reasonable for the Board to apply

the less stringent third-party standard to evaluate the legality

of the election. The NLRB further says that the Board's

conclusion that the videotaping and photography by the third

parties (and in one instance by a union representative) did not

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constitute surveillance sufficient to invalidate the election was

also reasonable and supported by the evidence. We affirm

the Board's decision.

1.Pro-union employees were third parties, not union

agents

We begin by resolving a threshold issue: whether those

who engaged in videotaping and photographing did so as

agents of the union or whether they were simply third

parties, albeit enthusiastic pro-union supporters. In considering claims of election misconduct, the Board and the courts

have long recognized a distinction between actions of a party

to the election and those of employees or other third parties.

See, e.g., NLRB v. Herbert Halperin Distributing Corp., 826

F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1987). This distinction is based on a

recognition that "[n]ot every employee who supports the

union or speaks in its favor is a union agent" and "neither the

union nor the employer can control everything these employees say or do." Id. at 291 (citations omitted). Where election

misconduct is attributable to one of the parties, the Board will

overturn the election if the misconduct "created such an

environment of tension and coercion ' "as to have had a

probable effect upon the employees' actions at the polls" ' and

to have ' "materially affected the results of the election." ' "

Swing Staging Inc. v. NLRB, 994 F.2d 859, 861-62 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 424

F.2d 818, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citation omitted)). Where

misconduct is attributable to third parties, however, the

Board will overturn an election only if the misconduct is "so

aggravated as to create a general atmosphere of fear and

reprisal rendering a free election impossible." Westwood

Horizons Hotel, 270 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1984).

In considering questions of agency under the National

Labor Relations Act (NLRA), we turn to section 2(13) of the

Act, which provides as follows: "In determining whether any

person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make

such other person responsible for his acts, the question of

whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized

or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C.

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s 152(13) (1994). The Board applies ordinary common law

principles of agency in deciding issues of agency under section 2(13). See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.

NLRB, 56 F.3d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1158 (1996) ("the legislative history of that statute makes

clear that it was designed to render 'both employers and

labor organizations ... responsible for the acts of their

agents in accordance with the ordinary common law rules of

agency' ") (citations omitted); Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 1384, 1394, cert. denied, 469

U.S. 1072 (1984) ("Beyond doubt, the legislative intent of this

provision was to make the ordinary law of agency applicable

to the attribution of individual acts to both employers and

unions."); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 80-510 at 36 (1947),

reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1142 ("[B]oth employers

and labor organizations will be responsible for the acts of

their agents in accordance with the ordinary common law

rules of agency."). Thus, the Board must apply the common

law meaning of the terms "agency" and "apparent authority"

in determining whether the union will be held responsible for

the acts of one of its members.

Since Congress did not delegate to the Board the power to

interpret section 2(13) of the NLRA, the Board's determination of whether a particular actor is properly considered an

agent or was acting with apparent authority is granted only

limited deference. In other words, the court "need not defer

to the agency's judgment as we normally might under the

doctrine of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.

Ed. 2d 694 (1984)." 56 F.3d at 212. However, the standard

of review is not de novo. We have previously held that "the

existence of an agency relationship is a factual matter ...

which cannot be disturbed if supported by 'substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.' " Local 1814,

Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 735 F.2d at 1394. Elsewhere, we

have explained that common law agency questions are " 'permeated at the fringes by conclusions drawn from the factual

setting of the particular industrial dispute,' " and therefore

"we must give due weight to the Board's judgment to the

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extent that 'it made a choice between two fairly conflicting

views.' " International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 56 F.3d at

212 (citation omitted); see C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60

F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that in resolving issues

requiring reference to the common law of agency, the court

does not review the Board's determination de novo, but

instead will "uphold the Board if it can be said to have 'made

a choice between two fairly conflicting views' ") (citation

omitted). Read together, these cases stand for the proposition that we review the Board's agency law decisions to

determine whether its decision is reasonable, consistent with

its prior decisions, supported by substantial evidence, and

consistent with common law determinations on similar facts.

In doing so, we must bear in mind that "[t]ransplantation of

ordinary agency law, which arises out of ordinary contract

and tort disputes, into the NLRA context necessarily requires

sensitivity to the particular circumstances of industrial labor

relations." Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 735 F.2d

at 1394.

Both parties acknowledge that Dennis McConley and the

other union supporters' conduct was not expressly authorized

by the union. However, Overnite argues that they had

apparent authority to act on behalf of the union because

McConley was a member of the Union Organizing Committee

and campaigned aggressively for the union, McConley stood

on the podium with union officers during a union meeting,

McConley was in a photograph with the Union International

President placed on a union flyer, and at least some of the

"surveillance" took place in the presence of union officials.

"Apparent authority" exists where the principal engages in

conduct that "reasonably interpreted, causes the third person

to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on

his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Restatement (Second) of Agency s 27 (1992). For there to be

apparent authority, however, the third party must not only

believe that the individual acts on behalf of the principal but,

in addition, "either the principal must intend to cause the

third person to believe that the agent is authorized to act for

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him, or he should realize that his conduct is likely to create

such belief." Id. at cmt. a.

The fact that McConley and Reeves were members of the

Union Organizing Committee, alone, is not sufficient to confer

apparent authority on them. The Hearing Officer found that

the Union Organizing Committee was not a formally structured organization formed by the union; the Committee was

entirely voluntary and members were not paid. Although the

Hearing Officer found that International Organizer Keith

Maddox visited the Atlanta facility, there was no evidence

that he gave any specific directives to employees on the

Committee. In Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers

Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we said mere

membership in an in-plant organizing committee is not sufficient, by itself, to make the actions of an individual attributable to the union. See id. at 1565 (holding that members of

in-plant organizing committee, which supported the organizing campaign, drafted, endorsed and distributed leaflets, solicited employees to join the union, wore pro-union insignia,

and made visits to the homes of fellow employees to urge

them to support the union, were not agents of the union, in

part because "none of the IPOC members held official positions with the union, received formal training or instruction

from the union, or were paid by the union for their work on

the campaign"); see also Kux Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 890 F.2d

804 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding conduct of members of in-plant

organizing committee not attributable to union); Uniroyal

Technology Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 1996)

(upholding Board's determination that member of in-plant

organizing committee was not an agent of the union where he

did not have substantial union responsibilities); NLRB v.

Herbert Halperin Distributing Corp., 826 F.2d 287, 290-91

(4th Cir. 1987) (upholding Board's determination that employees were not agents of the union where the union's professional staff was heavily involved in the campaign and where

union did not rely primarily on employees to organize the

other workers). Overnite presented no evidence that the

union encouraged any belief among employees that McConley

had union allowance to engage in videotaping in the break

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room. Nor was there evidence that the union ratified

McConley's videotaping activity by viewing or distributing it,

or by showing it to employees. Thus, while it may be the

case that several employees did in fact believe that McConley

acted on behalf of the union, the union cannot be held

responsible for McConley's conduct because it did nothing to

confer apparent authority upon him.

The same is true of the other union supporters who photographed and took videotapes of various Overnite employees.

The only evidence that Overnite offers in support of its case

for apparent authority is the fact that union officials were

present when these unidentified employees took photographs

and videotapes 1; in essence, Overnite argues that the union

__________

1 Overnite argues that it was entitled to inferences that the

unidentified employees were authorized or encouraged to engage in

surveillance by union officials and that the "surveillance" was

intended to be used for purposes of intimidation and retaliation

because the union failed to present testimony denying those propositions. We explained the adverse inference rule in International

Union (UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (1972) as follows:

The theory behind the rule is that, all other things being equal,

a party will of his own volition introduce the strongest evidence

available to prove his case. If evidence within the party's

control would in fact strengthen his case, he can be expected to

introduce it even if it is not subpoenaed. Conversely, if such

evidence is not introduced, it may be inferred that the evidence

is unfavorable to the party suppressing it.

Id. at 1338. Although the courts can reverse the Board for an

unexplained failure to draw the inference, see, e.g., NLRB v. Selwyn

Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 225 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Ford

Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1958), the decision

of whether to draw an adverse inference has generally been held to

be within the discretion of the fact finder. See, e.g., International

Union, 459 F.2d at 1339. Here, there was good reason for the

union to believe that Overnite had failed to meet its burden of proof,

therefore the decision of the Board not to draw an adverse inference against the union was rational and consistent with this court's

and the Board's previous decisions. See, e.g, id. at 1338 ("Of

course, if a party has good reason to believe his opponent has failed

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officials should have realized that their failure to take action

to prevent pro-union employees from photographing and videotaping other employees would foster the belief the picturetakers were authorized to act on behalf of the union. The

Hearing Officer said "no" to this proposition. Indeed, he

labeled the evidence "grossly insufficient" to support that

notion, noting that Overnite had "presented no evidence that

any of the union officials engaged in, condoned, or ratified any

of the conduct presented by testimonial evidence." J.A. 53

n.18. Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that the

Hearing Officer was right. The simple fact that a union

official stood nearby while a pro-union employee took pictures

is not enough to confer apparent authority on the employee,

particularly where there was no evidence that union officials

made or attempted to make use of the photographs or

videotapes or even viewed the tapes and photographs.

Evidence that the union supporters who participated in the

pro-union gathering outside the Atlanta facility on election

day had apparent authority to act on behalf of the union is

also lacking. Overnite claims that the union supporters

yelled loudly, leafleted individuals entering the voting place,

operated a large cookout, and engaged in excessive horn

blowing easily heard inside the polling place, as well as

photographed and videotaped employees around the election

facility. In support of its claim that these union supporters

were agents of the union Overnite offers the fact that several

union officials were present and observed these activities.

Overnite also claims that the election day gathering was a

"picket line," and that the union was therefore responsible for

keeping the gathering under control and can be held responsible for the actions of those in attendance.2

__________

to meet his burden of proof, he may find no need to introduce his

strong evidence.") (citation omitted).

2 It is well-settled that when a union pickets an employer, it

empowers picketers to act on behalf of the union, see, e.g., Dairy

Employees, Local 695, 221 N.L.R.B. 647, 653 (1975), and that if the

union fails to control the line, it can be held responsible for those in

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Again, however, this evidence is insufficient to show apparent authority to act on behalf of the union. The mere

presence of union officials at a gathering is insufficient to

grant all participants apparent authority to act on behalf of

the union. Moreover, the gathering clearly was not a picket

line. Not every gathering arranged by the union can be

called a picket line; in order for there to be a picket line

there must be some evidence that the union organized a

picket line and exercised control over it. See, e.g., Dairy

Employees Local 695, 221 N.L.R.B. 647, 653 (1975) (holding

that picket line existed where pickers were paid by union and

received instructions from picket captains who attended daily

union meetings); Boilermakers Local 696, 196 N.L.R.B. 645,

646 (1972) (holding that picket line existed where union

assigned picket captains and individual pickets to shifts).

Here, there was no evidence that a union official directed the

activities of or assigned responsibilities to those who attended

the gathering and engaged in the complained of activity.

Faced with a somewhat parallel situation and similar arguments, the Seventh Circuit recently held: "In our view, the

union's efforts to pump up the electorate and inspire enthusiasm for the union cause did not transform the assorted

supporters and revelers who spent all or part of the day in

front of Overnite's terminal into union agents. The union's

actions were notable not for their express direction of those

persons' actions, but for their passivity." Overnite Transp.

Co. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 109, 114 (7th Cir. 1997). Similarly,

here, the existence of the pro-union gathering outside the

polling place did not transform participants into agents of the

union.

2.The Board reasonably determined that third-party

misconduct did not create an atmosphere of fear and

reprisal

Concluding, then, that all but one of the union supporters

who engaged in the activity complained about were not union

agents but instead third parties, we turn to the second step of

the analysis: Was the misconduct nonetheless "so aggravated

__________

attendance, see, e.g., United Tel. Answering and Communications

Serv. Union, Local 780, 276 N.L.R.B. 507, 510 (1985).

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as to create a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal rendering a free election impossible?" Westwood Horizons Hotel,

270 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1984). We affirm the Board's negative

answer to that question.

The videotaping in the break room by McConley was

insufficient to create an atmosphere of fear and reprisal.

Although a few employees may have feared that the videotape

could be used to retaliate against them, there is no evidence

that McConley suggested any such use. Moreover, the Hearing Officer found no evidence that information about the

break room incident was widely disseminated among employees at the Atlanta Service Center. Thus Overnite has not

demonstrated that the videotaping, without more, interfered

with employee free choice, and the Board's conclusion that it

was not sufficient grounds for overturning the union election

was entirely reasonable.

The other incidents of videotaping and photography of

Overnite employees by unidentified union supporters--considered both individually and cumulatively (as well as in

conjunction with the other misconduct alleged)--did not create an atmosphere of fear and reprisal either. Only one

employee, Parker Roberts, asserted any concern that the

election day videotaping would be used to intimidate him, see

Transcript at 465-66 (May 9, 1996) (testimony of Parker

Roberts), and he admitted that he did not personally receive

any threats, see id. at 469. Here again there was no evidence

that any incidents of photography and videotaping were widely discussed by the employees at the facility or that other

employees felt intimidated. The election day gathering at

which the photography and videotaping took place was described by Roberts himself as having a "sort of a party

attitude," id. at 489, and by another pro-company employee

as "friendly." Transcript at 428-29 (May 9, 1996) (testimony

of Albert Williams). Thus, the Board could reasonably conclude that the photography and videotaping by unidentified

pro-union employees on election day did not create an atmosphere of fear and reprisal so as to render a free election

impossible. See, e.g., Nu Skin Int'l, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 223,

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graphed employees at union-sponsored picnic); Friendly Ice

Cream Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1033, enforced, 503 F.2d

1396 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding photography by pro-union employees at a company dinner did not create an atmosphere of

fear and coercion rendering a free election impossible). The

Board could also reasonably conclude that the impact of the

election day conduct in conjunction with prior videotaping and

photography incidents was insufficient to warrant overturning

the election. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting

that the cumulative impact of allegedly objectionable conduct

" 'may not be used to turn a number of insubstantial objections to an election into serious challenge' ") (citation omitted).

3.The Board reasonably determined that the union hall

videotaping by Local 728's Secretary did not materially affect the results of the election

Both parties agree that Local 728's Secretary was a union

agent. In this one instance, therefore, the court must determine whether it was reasonable for the Board to conclude

that her actions did not "create[ ] such an environment of

tension and coercion ' "as to have had a probable effect upon

the employees' actions at the polls" ' and to have ' "materially

affected the results of the election." ' " Swing Staging Inc. v.

NLRB, 994 F.2d 859, 861-62 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 827 (D.C.

Cir. 1970) (citation omitted)). We hold that it was.

Although the videotaping may have made some employees

uncomfortable, the record does not support a finding that the

incident created such an environment of tension and coercion

as to have had a probable effect upon the employees' actions

at the polls or to have materially affected the results of the

election. The Board has previously found, in Nu-Skin Int'l,

Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 223 (1992), that it is permissible for the

union to take pictures of employees who voluntarily attend a

union-sponsored picnic. See id. at 224-25. Here, as in NuSkin, the employees voluntarily attended the union meeting,

which was held off-premises. And, again as in Nu-Skin, no

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evidence was presented that any threats of retaliation were

made in conjunction with the videotaping by any union official

at any time. Indeed, no individual or group of individuals

were ever singled out to be videotaped. Thus, we affirm the

Board's holding that the offsite incident of union videotaping

of employees who attended a union hall meeting did not rise

to the level of unlawful surveillance or misconduct sufficient

to set the election aside.

B.The Board Reasonably Found That There Was No Unlawful Electioneering

Overnite claims finally that there was unlawful electioneering by the union and its supporters in front of the voting

place on election day. Union supporters not only engaged in

surveillance of employees entering the polling center, but

they also held a "raucous" rally near the polling center, which

was attended by International Organizer Maddox, Teamsters

International President Carey, and the President of Local

728. According to the company, union supporters who ran

the gathering held a cookout, which Overnite estimates included 100 employees at various points, and dispensed free

food and drink. The crowd engaged in constant "hooting and

hollering" and chanted slogans, and Teamster drivers from

other trucking companies honked their horns as they drove

by the gathering. The effect of this activity, Overnite argues,

was to destroy the "laboratory conditions," General Shoe

Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), that must be present on

election day to ensure a free and fair election. Therefore this

court should refuse to enforce the bargaining order issued by

the Board.

The Hearing Officer, however, found that Overnite "presented no evidence that any union supporter approached any

employee while that person was waiting in line to vote," or

that there was even "an established 'no-electioneering zone' at

the polling place." Hearing Officer's Report and Recommendations on Objections (May 31, 1996) at 22. The Hearing

Officer also found that Overnite had presented no evidence of

any campaign rhetoric or appeals for votes from union supporters as employees waited in line to vote. Finally, the

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Hearing Officer found that the company had presented no

evidence that union officials encouraged the horn blowing by

Teamster truckers or that employees complained about it.

See id. at 22-23. Thus, the Hearing Officer concluded that

there was no unlawful electioneering, and the Board adopted

his findings. We affirm the Board's holding.

The Board does not prohibit all electioneering in the vicinity of the polling place on election day. Indeed, the Board has

recognized that "it is unrealistic to expect parties or employees to refrain totally from any and all types of electioneering

in the vicinity of the polls." Boston Insulated Wire & Cable

Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118 (1982), enforced, 703 F.2d 876

(5th Cir. 1983); see also NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy

Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the

Board permits legitimate 'electioneering' subject to specific

regulations"). Instead, the Board considers a range of factors and circumstances in determining whether electioneering

activity is sufficient to justify overturning an election. First,

it determines whether the activity violates the Milchem rule

prohibiting "prolonged conversations between representatives

of any party to the election and voters waiting to cast

ballots." Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362-63 (1968).

Here, that rule is not implicated at all because Overnite

presented no evidence that any union supporter approached

any employee while she was waiting in line to vote. Moreover, Milchem applies only to conduct by agents of the

parties to the election, see NLRB v. Hood Furniture Mfg.

Co., 941 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1991), and there was no

evidence indicating that the truckers who blew their horns

while passing the facility or the union supporters who chanted

slogans at the gathering were union agents clothed with

actual or apparent authority to act on behalf of the union.3

__________

3 This finding is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's decision in

Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 109 (7th Cir. 1997), which

involved a fact situation almost identical to the case at hand.

There, the court affirmed the Board's conclusion that "the group

were [sic] nothing more than boisterous union supporters and

sympathizers." Id. at 114.

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Where an employer objects to electioneering not encompassed within the Milchem rule, the Board will overturn the

election only if the electioneering " 'substantially impaired the

exercise of free choice.' " NLRB v. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc.,

823 F.2d 1135, 1140 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The

Board generally considers the nature and extent of the electioneering, whether it happened within a designated "no

electioneering" area, whether it was contrary to the instructions of the Board's election agent, whether a party to the

election objected to it, and whether a party to the election

engaged in it. See id. In the case at hand, Overnite has

failed to demonstrate that there was any designated "no

electioneering" area, that there were any instructions issued

by a Board agent, that any party objected to the activities of

the union supporters prior to or during the election, or that

the union was responsible for directing or participating in the

objectionable activity. Under these circumstances, it was

entirely reasonable for the Board to refuse to overturn the

results of the election.

C.The Board Reasonably Refused to Delay Certification of

the Union Pending Its Decisions in Flamingo HiltonReno and Randell Warehouse

Overnite sought rehearing of the Board's decision in this

case based upon the pendency of the full Board's decision in

two forthcoming cases. A panel of the Board denied the

motion "as raising nothing not previously considered." Order

Denying Motion for Reconsideration (March 20, 1997). Overnite asks for a remand of this case to the Board for further

proceedings because the Hearing Officer and the Board relied

on case law that the Board has indicated may no longer be

valid. In particular, Overnite argues that this case should be

decided in light of the Board's forthcoming decisions in

the consolidated cases, Flamingo Hilton-Reno, Case No.

92-CA-14378, which involved videotaping employees for a

pro-company video to be shown to all the employees prior to a

union election, and Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., Case

No. 28-RC-5274, which involved photography of employees

by union officials for use in campaign propaganda. Overnite

points to Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354,

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1363 (D.C. Cir. 1997), as support that this court should

remand cases to the Board when the Board has failed to

provide "some clear guidelines" regarding the critical issues

in the case.

The NLRB contends that the Board's denial of the motion

for reconsideration was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.

The issues in this case, it claims, are substantially different

from the issues presented in Flamingo Hilton-Reno and

Randell Warehouse. In those two cases, the NLRB explains,

the parties to the election were responsible for the videotaping and photographing of employees. Here, however, all but

one of the incidents of videotaping and photography were not

attributable to the union but instead to third-party union

supporters. Contrary to Overnite's assertion that the legal

standards in this area are unclear, the NLRB claims that the

standard for assessing the legality of third-party conduct has

been both clear and consistent. Moreover, the NLRB claims

that Overnite's reliance on Allegheny Ludlum is misplaced

because that case involved videotaping and photography by

an employer, not a third party.

We affirm the Board's decision because the pending cases

involve issues that are substantially different from those

posed by the case at hand. On June 12, 1996, the Board

issued a Notice of Hearing scheduling oral argument in

Flamingo Hilton-Reno and Randell Warehouse for August 7,

1996, and directing the parties to prepare to argue five

questions, including: "What standard should the Board apply

to determine whether photographing or videotaping of employees is an unfair labor practice or objectionable conduct?";

"What weight, if any, should the Board give to evidence that

the purpose of the photographing or videotaping was explained to employees?"; and "Are there other factors that the

Board should consider in determining whether photographing

or videotaping is coercive and/or objectionable conduct?"

Notice of Hearing, Case No. 32-CA-14378 and Case No.

28-RC-5274 (June 12, 1996) (quoted in Brief of the Petitioner

at 23). Although the questions, read broadly, could overlap

with the issues presented in this case, it appears to us that

the context in which the issues will be examined is quite

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different. The pending cases involve incidents of surveillance

attributable to a party to the election, not to third parties.

With one limited exception, the case at hand involves conduct

by third parties. Moreover, the pending cases center on

whether use of videotape and photography in campaign literature is an unfair labor practice or constitutes objectionable

conduct and on the tension between protecting the free

speech interests of the parties and providing a free and fair

election. These issues are not directly implicated in this case,

and therefore their resolution is unlikely to have much if any

effect on the outcome. In addition, the single incidence of

videotaping by the union of workers who voluntarily attended

a union meeting was so clearly insufficient to warrant overturning the election that it is unnecessary to await the

Board's decision in the pending case. Thus, the Board was

well within its province in concluding that Overnite's motion

for reconsideration raises "nothing not previously considered"

and therefore lacked merit. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Overnite engaged

in unfair labor practices within the meaning of sections 8(a)(1)

and (5) when it refused to bargain with the union as the

exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Overnite's

employees. We therefore deny Overnite's petition for review

and grant the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.

So ordered.

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