Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01196/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01196-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J.S. III
Plaintiff
The Houston County Board of Education
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

J.S., III, a minor, by and through J.S., Jr. ) 

and M.S., his parents and next friends, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:14cv1196-WHA 

) 

THE HOUSTON COUNTY BOARD OF, ) 

EDUCATION, ) (wo) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #16), filed by the 

Defendant, the Houston County Board of Education. 

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case in December of 2014. The Plaintiff, J.S., III, is 

a minor child who brings claims through his parents and next friends (“the Plaintiff” or “J.S.”). 

The Plaintiff originally filed a case in 2012 which brought claims for violations of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and other federal state law 

claims. Several of the claims in that case were resolved, but the ADA and §504 claim were 

dismissed without prejudice so that the Plaintiff could exhaust his administrative remedies. An 

administrative due process claim was filed and resolved. The Plaintiff then filed the Complaint in 

this case bringing two claims for damages under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 

For the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be 

GRANTED. 

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986). 

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion,@ relying on submissions Awhich it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. Once the moving party 

has met its burden, the nonmoving party must Ago beyond the pleadings@ and show that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. 

Both the party Aasserting that a fact cannot be,@ and a party asserting that a fact is genuinely 

disputed, must support their assertions by Aciting to particular parts of materials in the record,@ or 

by Ashowing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, 

or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56 (c)(1)(A),(B). Acceptable materials under Rule 56(c)(1)(A) include Adepositions, documents, 

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.@ 

 To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be 

believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court 

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

III. FACTS

The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, construed in a light most 

favorable to the non-movant: 

The Houston County Board of Education (“the Board”) is the entity that has responsibility 

for the control of the Houston County School System. The Superintendent of the Houston County 

School System is Tim Pitchford (“Pitchford”). The Principal of Wicksburg High School in the 

Houston County School System, which is a kindergarten through twelfth grade school, is Cheryl 

Smith (“Smith”). The School System has a Code of Conduct, which the Plaintiff states in 

2011-2012 did not set forth any policies against teacher-on-student disability harassment. 

J.S. began attending Wicksburg High School in kindergarten. J.S. has physical 

disabilities and cognitive impairments. J.S. has cerebral palsy and needs a walker and 

wheelchair. When J.S. began kindergarten, he received an Individual Education Program (IEP) to 

provide him a free, appropriate public education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Act. His IEPs required that he attend classes with students in the regular classroom 

and also receive personal tutoring and assistance in a special-education classroom or resource 

room. 

In the 2010-2011 school year, which was third-grade for J.S., Drew Faircloth (“Faircloth”) 

was assigned to J.S. as a teacher’s aide. Alicia Brown (“Brown”) was J.S.’s special-education 

teacher in the third and fourth grades. J.S.’s IEP did not specify that he had any discipline or 

behavior problems and his third and fourth-grade IEP’s did not contain a behavior modification 

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plan. 

 Faircloth helped J.S. with going to the restroom, getting from place to place, getting his 

lunch, participating in physical education, and helped him to do assigned classwork. During 

September and October of 2011, and in January through March of 2012, Faircloth would take J.S. 

to the weight room to do his classwork. Matt Barton (“Barton”), the elementary p.e. teacher and a 

coach observed J.S. and Faircloth in the weight room and saw J.S. doing worksheets. Brandon 

Sunday (“Sunday”) was also an elementary p.e. teacher and coach who observed J.S. doing 

worksheets in the weight room. 

 Smith, the principal, was informed that Faircloth was taking J.S. to the weight room. When 

Smith asked Faircloth about taking J.S. to the weight room, he told her that it was a more private 

area for J.S. to go to the restroom and it was a quieter area to work. (Doc. #15-15 at p.72: 5-10). 

Smith testified in her deposition that these reasons seemed reasonable to her. (Doc. #15-15 at p.74: 

14-20). 

In March of 2012, one of J.S.’s classmates reported behavior by Faircloth to her parents. 

The behavior she reported included that while in Angie Boatright’s (“Boatright”) regular 

classroom, Faircloth kicked J.S.’s wheelchair and Faircloth failed to get a pencil which J.S. 

dropped and could not pick up. The classmate’s parents reported what the classmate had said to 

J.S.’s parents. J.S.’s mother spoke to J.S. who confirmed what the classmate had said. J.S.’s 

parents then placed digital recorders on J.S.’s wheelchair and recorded his school days on March 

15 and 19. 

J.S.’s parents listened to the recordings and became upset by the recordings which 

indicated that Faircloth and Brown yelled at J.S. They have also proffered expert testimony, 

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which is the subject of a Motion to Exclude, that there are sounds on the recording which are 

consistent with J.S. being slapped or hit. The Plaintiff contends that long periods of silence in the 

recordings means that objectionable behavior on the part of Faircloth occurred while J.S. was in 

the weight room. 

J.S.’s parents contacted the Board’s Special-Education Coordinator Denise Whitfield 

(“Whitfield”). J.S. parents expressed that they did not want J.S. with Brown and Faircloth. They 

met with Whitfield and the reporting classmate’s parents on March 20, 2012. They played 

portions of the recordings for Whitfield. Pitchford then directed Whitfield to assign J.S. a new 

teacher and aid, which Whitfield did that same morning, Tuesday March 20. 

On March 21, J.S.’s IEP team met and changed his IEP to reflect a new special-education 

teacher and aid, and additional services. Pitchford called Smith and instructed her to put Faircloth 

and Brown on administrative leave. 

Pitchford decided to bring Brown and Faircloth off of administrative leave, but gave 

Whitfield and Smith directions for Brown and Faircloth not to interact with J.S. Smith met with 

Faircloth and Brown on the day they returned to work. She instructed Faircloth to work on the 

high school hallway and instructed Brown to have another adult employee with her if she 

interacted with a student. Brown and Faircloth were off of administrative leave for one day. 

Faircloth resigned and Pitchford recommended to the Board, and the Board voted, to non-renew 

Brown’s contract. 

The Plaintiff has presented expert evidence that the principal and teachers acted 

negligently in preventing Faircloth from taking J.S. out of the classroom and to the weight room. 

(Doc. #28-24 at p.22-23). The expert offers the opinion that due to “the negligence of the 

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Wicksburg school officials and the Houston County Board of Education,” J.S. did not receive the 

care he should have received while at school. (Doc. #28-24 at p.24).

IV. DISCUSSION

 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 

of such disability, ... be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

Similarly, § 504(a) provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 

United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, ... be subjected to discrimination 

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 

 Because under both the ADA and §504 a plaintiff must show that he is disabled, was 

subjected to discrimination or harassment on the basis of his disability, actual knowledge, and 

deliberate indifference, the court will analyze the claims together as the parties have done. See 

Moore v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 

The Eleventh Circuit has held that intentional discrimination under §504 can be proven by 

a showing of deliberate indifference. Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334 (11th 

Cir. 2012). Deliberate indifference requires a showing of more than gross negligence, and 

requires a showing that the indifference was a deliberate choice, which is an exacting standard. 

Id. at 344. A separate standard governs whether deliberate indifference of employees can be 

attributed to an organization. Liese, 701 at 349. Under that standard, for the organization to be 

held liable, there must be deliberate indifference of “an official who at a minimum has authority to 

address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the [organization’s] 

behalf, [and who] has actual knowledge of discrimination . . . and fails adequately to respond.” Id.

(emphasis and alterations in original)(quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 

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(1988)). The Liese court emphasized that the requirement that there be an “official” is distinct 

from the requirement that the official have knowledge of and authority to correct a discriminatory 

practice. Id. An “official” is someone who enjoys substantial supervisory authority within an 

organization’s chain of command so that when dealing with the complainant, the official had 

complete discretion at a key decision point in the administrative process. Id. at 350. 

There is apparently no dispute that J.S. is disabled and qualified for special education 

services. The Board argues, however, that J.S. cannot show intentional discrimination by the 

Board and that at most J.S. has presented evidence of negligent acts or omissions. The Board also 

argues that J.S. cannot show that an appropriate person with the Board had actual knowledge that 

Faircloth was physically and verbally abusing J.S. and had actual knowledge that Brown was 

verbally abusing J.S. Finally, the Board argues that J.S. cannot show that an appropriate person 

with the Board acted with deliberate indifference to the alleged harassment or abuse upon 

receiving actual notice of it. 

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff’s brief states that under the 

“ADA and §504, the most obvious form of discrimination” which J.S. suffered was “his removal 

from the regular classroom to the weight room, his exclusion from the resource room, his isolation 

in the weight room, his involuntary separation from his regular classroom peers, his separation 

from his special-education peers, and his inability to obtain the general education services from 

Ms. Boatright that he was supposed to receive in the environment where he was to receive them.” 

(Doc. #29 at p. 57). 

 Plaintiff brief’s characterization of his claims, therefore, appears to identify two separate 

theories of liability: one, that placement of J.S. in the weight room was actually known by school 

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officials and therefore gave actual notice of the possibility of discrimination, and two, that 

placement of J.S. in the weight room itself constituted a violation of law of which school officials 

had actual knowledge. The court will address each theory in turn. 

 Liability Based on Actual Notice of the Possibility of Discrimination 

 The Plaintiff’s claim regarding the “possibility of discrimination” derives from Doe v. 

School Bd. of Broward Cnty., Florida, 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010). The Plaintiff’s brief 

points out that in Broward Cnty., the court concluded that knowledge of lesser harassment may 

provide actual notice of sexually violent conduct. 604 F.3d at 1258. In that case, a student was 

sexually assaulted by a teacher. Although the assault was the first of that student by the teacher, 

there had been previous complaints by two other students against the same teacher of sexual 

harassment and misconduct. Id. at 1250. The court compared the case to one in which an 

assault occurred after the defendant institution had knowledge of previous “lesser sexual 

harassment,” which constituted a claim under Title IX, and concluded that harassment which 

“resembled [the plaintiff’s] assault in significant respects” could provide actual notice to the 

school board. Id. at 1259. 

 The Plaintiff’s reliance on Broward Cnty. in this case requires too broad a reading of that 

decision because the Plaintiff seems to interpret the court’s consideration of “lesser” acts as 

meaning that any act which might be deemed inappropriate, no matter how unrelated to acts 

ultimately complained of by the plaintiff, can be evidence of actual notice. Courts, however, 

consistently acknowledge that “complaints that are ‘too general’ are insufficient to provide actual 

notice.” Moore, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1300 (quoting Hawkins, 322 F.3d at 1285). In Broward Cnty., 

the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Gebser held that some prior allegations of 

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harassment may be sufficiently minimal and “far afield” from the conduct underlying the claim 

that they would not alert a school district official of a risk of sexual harassment. 604 F.3d at 1258. 

In a case decided before Broward Cnty., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a complaint of 

incidental touching during an athletic event and a “perceived imminent” touching of a student 

could not, as a matter of law, give a school board knowledge of a possibility that the teacher was 

molesting other students. See Davis v. DeKalb Cnty. School Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 

2000). In J.F.K. v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist., 678 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012), a case applying 

both Broward Cnty. and Davis, the court concluded that conduct which “contains no sexual 

harassment or gender discrimination component” was not sufficient to create a question of fact as 

to actual notice sufficient to alert the appropriate official to the possibility of sexual harassment. 

The court explained that although a school official knew of the teacher’s conduct that “was 

inappropriate, devoid of professionalism, and reeked of immaturity,” the known conduct was not 

of a sexual nature, and therefore did not fall within the reasoning of Broward Cnty. and establish 

actual notice. Id. at 1261. 

 While the instant case is a case of verbal and physical abuse of a student by a teacher’s aide 

and teacher on the basis of disability, the framework for analysis for Title IX and §504/ADA is the 

same. See Moore, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1292 (applying student against student sexual harassment cases 

to student against student disability harassment claim). Therefore, the court will apply the 

guidance of Davis, Broward Cnty., and J.F.K. that the “lesser acts” actually known must be 

sufficiently related to the conduct which forms the basis of a plaintiff’s claim to create a question 

of fact as to actual notice. 

The evidence of actual knowledge of disability discrimination, as characterized by the 

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Plaintiff’s brief, is evidence of knowledge by school employees that J.S. was not being educated in 

the correct setting, but was instead being removed to the weight room. The Plaintiff’s theory in 

brief appears to be that because employees knew that J.S. was being taken to the weight room, they 

had actual notice that verbal and physical abuse were also occurring. The Plaintiff has not 

pointed to evidence of known lesser acts of verbal or physical abuse of J.S. which would have 

given the Defendant actual notice of the abuse documented in the recordings.1

 Furthermore, 

unlike in the cases discussed above, there is no evidence before the court of any known abusive 

behavior toward other students by Faircloth or Brown. In fact, the court notes that J.S.’s mother 

testified in her deposition that she had no evidence or information that Faircloth or any other 

Defendant employee hit or verbally abused any other special education student. (Doc. #15-5 at p. 

279:18-81:21). Placement in the weight room under the facts as presented to the court bears no 

similarity to verbally abusing or physically striking a child. Without evidence of actual 

knowledge of any conduct on the part of Faircloth, Brown, or any other Defendant employee that 

is similar to, although not necessarily rising to the level of, the verbal or physical abuse J.S. 

ultimately reported, the court cannot conclude that a question of fact has been raised as to actual 

notice on the part of the Board of a possibility of verbal or physical harassment of J.S. on the basis 

of his disability. See Moore, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (finding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that 

 

1 It does not appear that the Plaintiff intends to rely on the report of J.S.’s classmate of Faircloth’s 

actions in the regular classroom as a basis for a claim, because that report was to the classmate’s 

parents, not school officials, and prompted the recordings which were made known to the 

Defendant. The court also has not been pointed to evidence that any appropriate person had 

knowledge of the conduct by Faircloth which J.S.’s classmate reported. To the extent that the 

Plaintiff relies on a theory that Faircloth had knowledge of his own actions, that theory is 

foreclosed. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291 (stating “Where a school district's liability rests on actual 

notice principles, however, the knowledge of the wrongdoer himself is not pertinent to the 

analysis.”). 

 

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the substance of the notice to a school employee was sufficient to alert her to the possibility of 

disability harassment where employee knew only that a student was teasing another student, but 

did not know the nature of the teasing). Summary judgment is, therefore, due to be granted as to 

this aspect of the Plaintiff’s claims. 

Liability Based on Actual Knowledge of Discrimination 

 The Plaintiff’s brief states that taking J.S. to the weight room and removing him from his 

regular classroom “is a clear violation of his IEP that amounts to discrimination.” (Doc. #29 at 

p.58).2 

 Section 504 and the ADA prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.3 For purposes 

 

2 With respect to any claim based on the response to the report of the recordings made known to 

the Board, the Board points to evidence that J.S.’s parents met with Whitfield and then the decision 

was made to replace Faircloth and Brown as service providers for J.S. Faircloth and Brown were 

placed on administrative leave. They returned from leave for one day, but were instructed not to 

be located within the school near J.S. The Plaintiff does not contest this evidence, and presents no 

argument of deliberate indifference in the Defendant’s response to the report to Whitfield of 

Faircloth and Brown’s actions. Therefore, it appears that the Plaintiff no longer asserts a separate 

claim of deliberate indifference once the conduct at issue was reported by J.S.’s parents. 

3 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A) states that discrimination includes 

(i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an 

individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally 

enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such 

criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 

advantages, or accommodations being offered; 

(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such 

modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making 

such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations; 

(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is 

excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals 

because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking 

such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, 

or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden; 

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of the claim earlier discussed, namely, that the Defendant had actual notice of physical and verbal 

abuse, this court examined what was known to school officials and assumed for purposes of 

analysis that the conduct identified was intentional discrimination on the basis of disability. The 

Plaintiff’s second claim in this case is a claim of deliberate indifference in failing to stop Faircloth 

from removing J.S. from the regular classroom to the weight room. While the first-discussed 

claim involved application of the deliberate indifference standard to the issue of “whose

discriminatory intent may be attributed,” the second claim also presents the issue of “what

constitutes discriminatory intent.” Liese, 701 F.3d at 349 (emphasis in original). 

Deliberate indifference requires a showing of more than gross negligence, and requires a 

showing that the indifference was a deliberate choice. Id. at 344. The deliberate indifference 

standard requires a plaintiff to “prove that the defendant knew that harm to a federally protected 

right was substantially likely and that the defendant failed to act on that likelihood.” Id.

Therefore, for the removal to the weight room claim, the court must determine whether there is a 

question of fact that allows for the conclusion that failure to prevent removal to the weight room, 

separate and apart from disability verbal and physical abuse, constituted deliberate indifference. 

The Plaintiff’s brief points to evidence of what J.S.’s teachers knew about his Individual 

Education Plan (“IEP”). For example, the brief states that Smith’s response to reports that J.S. 

was being taken to the weight room was unreasonable in part because there is evidence that she did 

not review his IEP (Doc. #29 at p.58) and that Faircloth removed J.S. from the regular classroom 

 

(iv) a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are structural in 

nature, in existing facilities, and transportation barriers in existing vehicles and rail passenger cars 

used by an establishment for transporting individuals (not including barriers that can only be 

removed through the retrofitting of vehicles or rail passenger cars by the installation of a hydraulic 

or other lift), where such removal is readily achievable; 

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even though he was generally unaware of the requirement of J.S.’s IEP (Doc #29 at p. 59). The 

Plaintiff’s brief also states the Brown was deliberately indifferent because she had the 

responsibility to enforce J.S.’s IEP, which required him to be in his regular classroom. (Doc. #29 

at p. 59). The Plaintiff does not cite authority for the proposition that this conduct is 

discrimination under §504/ADA. 

 The Board has argued that the Plaintiff has not brought a count for violation of the 

Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) , and that any such claims were resolved 

or settled through the administrative due process procedure. The Board argues that Section 504 

does not create general tort liability for educational malpractice, but instead a claim must be based 

on bad faith or gross misjudgment, and not a mere failure to provide a free and appropriate public 

education (“FAPE”), citing Mrs. H. v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1263 

(M.D. Ala. 2011). 

To prove discrimination in the education context, courts have held that something more 

than a simple failure to provide a FAPE under the IDEA must be shown. N.L. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. 

Knox Cnty. Sch., 315 F.3d 688, 695 (6th Cir. 2003); Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 

743 F.3d 982, 992 (5th Cir. 2014). “A plaintiff must also demonstrate some bad faith or gross 

misjudgment by the school or that he was discriminated against solely because of his disability.” 

K.I. ex rel. Jennie I. v. Montgomery Pub. Sch., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2011) 

(quoting W.C. ex rel. Sue C. v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 407 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1363–64 (N.D. Ga. 

2005)). A plaintiff must prove that her or she has either been subjected to discrimination or 

excluded from a program or denied benefits by reason of their disability. Sellers by Sellers v. Sch. 

Bd. of City of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 528-29 (4th Cir. 1998). A school does not violate 

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§504 “by merely failing to provide a FAPE, by providing an incorrect evaluation, by providing a 

substantially faulty individualized education plan, or merely because the court would have 

evaluated a child differently.” Mrs. H., 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (citation and quotation omitted). 

The deliberate indifference standard “is a very high standard to meet.” Id.at 1268. 

The Plaintiff’s brief does not compare J.S.’s situation to any other student to show that he 

was treated differently or excluded from something that other students received. See Estate of 

Lance, 743 F.3d at 993 (explaining that if IDEA requirements are satisfied, for §504 liability, a 

plaintiff could demonstrate that a state benefit was being denied which is given to non-disabled 

peers). The Plaintiff’s brief also has not attempted to present evidence to support a finding that 

the departure from the IEP in this case was gross misjudgment,4

 but instead has characterized the 

claim as being that because J.S. was excluded from his regular classroom which violated the IEP, 

he suffered intentional discrimination in violation of § 504/ADA. (Doc. #29 at p.58). In light of 

persuasive authority which counsels against a finding of intentional discrimination where there 

merely is failure to follow an IEP, the court cannot conclude that there is a claim of intentional 

discrimination under §504/ADA based merely on the fact that J.S. was taken to the weight room 

rather than being educated in the regular classroom or resource room as directed by his IEP. 

Liability Based on Policies 

Finally, the Board has moved for summary judgment as to allegations within the 

Complaint that the Board has failed to make certain policies, define procedures and words, and 

 

4 The Plaintiff’s expert has provided the opinion that “[d]ue to the negligence of the 

Wicksburg school officials and the Houston County Board of Education, J.S. III was placed in a 

situation where he did not receive the care and nurturing that he should have while attending 

Wicksburg School.” (Doc. #28-24 at p.24). Negligence is not sufficient to support a claim of 

gross misjudgment. J.D.P. v. Cherokee Cnty., Ga. Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp.2d 1348, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 

2010. 

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explain disabled students’ rights. It does not appear, however, that the Plaintiff intended to base a 

separate intentional discrimination claim on the failure to provide certain policies because, 

although the Plaintiff has set forth evidence regarding the lack of policies in the fact section of his 

brief, the Plaintiff has not argued that summary judgment is due to be denied on the basis of such a 

separately-stated claim. If such a claim is asserted, however, summary judgment is due to be 

granted as to it. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92 (holding that an alleged failure to promulgate an 

effective policy and grievance procedure for harassment claims does not establish actual notice 

and deliberate indifference or constitute discrimination). 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be and is hereby 

ORDERED GRANTED. 

All other pending motions (Doc. #14, 18, 20) are ORDERED DENIED as moot. 

A separate Judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and 

Order. 

Done this 3rd day of August, 2015. 

/s/ W. Harold Albritton________________ 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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