Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-05-02007/USCOURTS-ca7-05-02007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Styles Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STYLES TAYLOR AND KEON THOMAS,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:01-cr-00073-CRN—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.

____________

ARGUED MARCH 26, 2007—DECIDED DECEMBER 7, 2007

____________

Before ROVNER, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Styles Taylor and Keon Thomas,

both African-American, were jointly tried for the armed

robbery of a gun store and the murder of its elderly owner,

who was Caucasian. The government sought the death

penalty for both men, but ultimately they were sentenced

to life imprisonment after the jury found them guilty.

Taylor and Thomas contend that their convictions are

tainted by the government’s use of peremptory challenges

to strike African Americans from the jury pool, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Additionally, Taylor alone argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated at trial. For the reasons

Case: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20
2 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

set forth in the following opinion, we conclude that the district court did not commit clear error in resolving the

bulk of the defendants’ challenges under Batson. However,

we are unable to draw this conclusion with respect to

potential juror Heshla Watson because the district court

did not put factual findings on the record regarding the

credibility of the government’s reason for striking her. For

that reason we will remand to the district court for

supplemental factfinding on this point. Finally, we reject Taylor’s Confrontation Clause argument because it

does not implicate the improper admission of testimonial

evidence.

I.

In April 2001 a grand jury returned a seven-count

indictment against Taylor and Keon Thomas, as well as

Damione Thomas and Adam Williams, Jr. As relevant

here, Taylor and Keon Thomas (“the defendants”) were

charged with conspiracy to commit robbery and murder,

18 U.S.C. § 1951, robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, id.,

and murder committed during the course of a robbery, id.

§ 924(c) & (j). Damione Thomas and Williams pleaded

guilty to various charges; Taylor and Keon Thomas

pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. On November 19,

2003, Judge Sharp, who was then presiding, denied the

defendants’ motion for severed trials, but granted severance for the penalty phases.

Jury selection for the joint trial began before Judge

Sharp on July 6, 2004. Beforehand the entire jury pool

had filled out a lengthy questionnaire that included

questions probing the potential jurors’ views on the death

penalty. Question 133 would become a major part of the

parties’ selection decisions. The question asked each

potential juror to circle the letter corresponding to the

statement that best expressed his or her view on the

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 3

1 Both fatal shots apparently were fired from the same gun by

the same defendant. In support of its proffered question, the

government cited an Eighth Circuit decision in which the court

held that it was not error to exclude for cause a potential juror

who stated that she could not impose a death sentence on a

defendant who was not the shooter. See United States v. Moore,

149 F.3d 773, 780 (8th Cir. 1998).

death penalty. The responses ranged from “A,” the most

anti-death penalty stance, to “I,” which represented the

view that the juror would always vote for the death

penalty where requested. Generally, “E” represented the

most neutral stance, with A through D representing

varying degrees of opposition to the death penalty and F

through I including a range of pro-death penalty views.

Under the district judge’s rules, all the voir dire was

conducted by the court, and the parties could exercise

peremptory challenges only at the end of each day. The

voir dire consisted first of questioning the potential

jurors as a group, and then following up with each individual potential juror, in particular about his or her views

on the death penalty. The government, which sought the

death penalty for both defendants despite forensic evidence that only one had committed the murder, requested

that Judge Sharp ask each potential juror whether he or

she would consider imposing the death penalty on a “nonshooter.”1

 Judge Sharp refused to ask the question because he did not “want to wade into who is the triggerman

and who is not a triggerman.” That first day, three

jurors were empaneled. The following day, Judge Sharp

recused himself due to illness. Eventually the case was

reassigned to Judge Norgle.

Jury selection resumed on July 29, 2004, before Judge

Norgle, who imposed a different set of procedures. Judge

Norgle began with a group voir dire and then individually

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4 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

examined each potential juror, but he also allowed the

parties to follow up with their own questions. Additionally, Judge Norgle decided that challenges should be

raised as they arose, rather than at the end of the day.

Over the defendants’ objection, the government was

permitted to ask potential jurors whether they could

impose the death penalty on a non-shooter. It posed the

question to most, but not all, potential jurors, and the

parties followed up to varying degrees on this point.

As jury selection progressed, the government used

peremptory challenges to exclude seven African Americans—five from the pool of regular jurors and two potential alternates. All told, of the 94 potential jurors interviewed by the court, 16 were African-American. Three

were dismissed at the outset due to family or health

concerns, seven were dismissed for cause, and five were

dismissed upon the government’s peremptory challenges.

That left one African American on the jury. Five of the 21

potential alternates questioned by the court were AfricanAmerican; of these, two were dismissed on the government’s peremptory challenges, and three were seated

as alternates.

The first peremptory strike of an African-American

potential juror met with no objection. The government

soon exercised a peremptory strike against another

African American, Heshla Watson, and the defendants

did not object immediately. However, the defendants

raised a Batson objection after a third African-American

potential juror, Jamie Golliday, was dismissed based on

the government’s peremptory challenge. That challenge

applied to the dismissals of both Watson and Golliday.

From that point on, the defense raised a Batson objection

every time the government exercised a peremptory challenge against an African-American member of the venire.

In each case, Judge Norgle found that a prima facie case

had been established and required the government to

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 5

supply a race-neutral explanation for the strike. In all

but one case, the district court concluded that the government’s reasons were not pretext for racially motivated

strikes. The district court apparently overlooked this

last step with respect to one potential juror.

After the five-week guilt phase of the trial, the jury

found both defendants guilty on all counts. Taylor’s sentencing phase came first, after which the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The government

then withdrew its notice of intent to seek the death

penalty as to defendant Thomas. The district court imposed sentences of life imprisonment on both defendants.

II.

We begin with the defendants’ joint argument that the

government engaged in unlawful discrimination during

jury selection. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court

reaffirmed that the government violates the Equal Protection Clause when it exercises peremptory challenges

based on race. 476 U.S. at 93. To resolve claims about

the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the

Court set out a three-part process requiring: (1) that the

defendant make a prima facie case of discrimination;

(2) that the government provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges; and (3) that the trial

court decide whether the defendant established that the

government’s stated reason is pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 94-98; United States v. McMahon, 495 F.3d

410, 420 (7th Cir. 2007).

Only the third part of the inquiry is at issue in this

case, and it involves a credibility determination by the

district court to which we owe substantial deference.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. We will reverse only in the

case of clear error; that is, if we are left with the firm and

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6 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

definite conviction that a mistake was made. United States

v. White, 416 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2005); United States

v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2004). We decline

the defendants’ invitation to apply de novo review because of what it characterizes as the district court’s

misapprehension of the Batson procedure. After reviewing the transcripts, we are convinced that the defendant’s claims of legal error are overstated. More importantly, the level of scrutiny the defendants seek is inherent

in the clear-error standard. See Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d

946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hile factual findings are

usually reviewed for clear error, findings which are

bound up with the application of an inapposite legal

standard are subject to closer review”); Maynard v.

Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2003) (same). In Koon

v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), when addressing

another deferential standard of review, abuse of discretion,

the Court held that a “unitary” standard applies even to

legal issues because the abuse-of-discretion standard

“includes review to determine that the discretion was not

guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Id. at 100. Likewise, any misapprehension of the law in this case would

simply inform our analysis of whether the district court

clearly erred.

We turn now to the defendants’ particular Batson

arguments, and we will recount the additional relevant

facts as they enter our analysis. The defendants first

contend that two African American potential jurors

were struck by the government for reasons that it did not

find disqualifying with respect to Caucasian venire

persons. Indeed, one way for a defendant to establish

that the government’s stated reasons for a peremptory

challenge are pretextual is to compare the African Americans who were struck to Caucasians who were empaneled. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 7

2 The defendants also cited juror Brand as a comparator, but the

government has asserted, and the defendants now appear to

agree, that juror Brand is in fact an African American who

was selected as an alternate juror.

(“Miller-El II”). “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for

striking a black panelist applies just as well to an

otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve,

that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Id.

The defendants first compare potential juror Watson, an

African American, to Caucasian jurors Wills, Evans

and Nowak.2

 When called upon to provide a race-neutral

explanation for excluding Watson (whom the government

had unsuccessfully challenged for cause), the government

cited her statement that she would not consider imposing

the death penalty on a non-shooter. When asked by the

government whether she could consider doing so, Watson

in fact had replied, “No.” The government did not follow up, but after questioning by the defense, Watson

stated that she would want to hear evidence about the

level of the suspect’s participation and planning, and

that she would “follow the Court’s instructions on that

question and consider[ ] that information before [determining] whether or not the death penalty would be imposed.”

The defendants point to three Caucasian jurors who

expressed similar reservations about executing a nonshooter but were not challenged by the government. We

find their argument persuasive, particularly the comparison between Watson and Nowak. Both unequivocally

answered “no” when first asked if they could impose

the death penalty on a non-shooter. The government, in

contrast to its practice with most other potential jurors,

did not follow up with either of these potential jurors

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8 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

3 When prosecutor Philip Benson began his questions, Nowak

stated that she was having trouble hearing him, and he began

using a microphone. Throughout voir dire Nowak did not

hesitate to ask to have questions repeated when needed, yet

when Benson asked if she would consider imposing the death

penalty on a non-shooter, she answered a clear “No.” Benson then

asked, “Under no circumstances?” Nowak replied, “I don’t . . .

I don’t think so.” Prosecutor David Vandercoy was the next

questioner. He asked if Nowak had heard “all Mr. Benson’s

questions,” and she replied, “Yeah.” Thus there is no evidence

that Nowak did not hear the non-shooter question.

for a more detailed explanation of the “no” answer. The

defense, however, elicited responses from both Watson and

Nowak revealing a willingness to consider the nonshooter’s level of participation and follow the law.

We can discern no material difference between Watson

and Nowak with respect to their views on the non-shooter

issue—the sole reason the government supplied for its

use of a peremptory strike against Watson. The government now distinguishes Nowak by asserting that she

had difficulty hearing; although this is true, the transcript confirms that she heard the non-shooter question.3

Because the answer that was disqualifying for Watson

was not also disqualifying for Nowak, we are inclined to

view with skepticism the government’s rationale for

exercising a peremptory challenge against Watson. Comparing Watson to Wills and Evans compounds that skepticism. Wills in particular expressed views akin to Watson’s:

general but not forceful opposition to the death penalty

(expressed on the questionnaire and during voir dire) and

initial resistance to the idea of executing a non-shooter

later tempered in responses to follow-up questions. Yet the

government challenged only Watson.

Despite these troubling comparisons, we are not unmindful of the standard of review; it is the district court’s job,

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 9

not ours, to weigh the credibility of the government’s

reason for the peremptory challenge and decide whether

the defendants met their burden of establishing discrimination. And upon close examination we find ourselves

with a record that is silent as to the district court’s

rationale for denying defendants’ Batson challenge with

respect to Watson. As we have stated, the defendants

simultaneously raised Batson challenges to “two peremptory challenges in a row” after the government excluded

Watson and Jamie Golliday in quick succession. The

district court ruled that a prima facie case was established, and the government offered race-neutral reasons

for excluding both Watson and Golliday: Watson had

answered “no” to the non-shooter question and Golliday

had stated that she would “go for life” instead of imposing the death penalty. In ruling on whether pretext had

been established, however, the district court addressed

only Golliday, stating that the government’s reason, “that

the prospective juror would always use the term choice

always for life,” was not “a cover-up for racial discrimination or . . . subterfuge.” Nothing in this ruling can be

read to apply to Watson. Without the court’s explanation

for upholding the strike (we say this because the peremptory strike stood despite the lack of a clear ruling), we

have nothing to review. The third step of Batson is a

credibility determination—a question of fact. See George,

363 F.3d at 673. Only the district judge, who observed

the voir dire firsthand, can make that determination in

the first instance.

Accordingly, even though the defendants have made a

strong case that the government removed Watson for

discriminatory reasons, we must find out what the district court perceived before we can decide that issue. In

this case, unlike many others, all the necessary information was put before the district court at the time, and

there is no need for a further Batson hearing. We simply

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10 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

need to learn the district court’s assessment of the challenge in light the record made during voir dire. Therefore,

we will retain jurisdiction over this case but remand to

the district court for the limited purpose of supplementing the record with its findings about whether the government’s stated reason for exercising a peremptory

challenge against Watson is credible, or whether the

defendants met their burden of demonstrating discrimination.

Moving on, the defendants next contend that the government excluded potential juror Golliday for reasons

that it did not find prohibitive for white jurors Duggins,

Stachura, Kasch, and Blaszak. When the district court

asked the government for a race-neutral explanation for

excluding Golliday, the prosecutor stated: “[H]er views

indicate that death would be a problem, can’t be sure if

she could follow the law, think I could go—think I would

go for life when presented with the choice between life

and death, and then later on she answered, ‘would go for

life.’ ” Despite the defendants’ protestations that other

jurors with reservations about the gravity of their sentencing decision had been seated, the district court determined that “there is not enough to support an argument

that [the challenge] is race-based.”

The defendants cite a number of white jurors who

expressed reservations comparable to Golliday’s. During

voir dire, Golliday stated, “when it comes to making

[the decision to impose the death penalty], I think it

would be a problem for me.” She also stated that, although

she “would like” to say that her opinion about the death

penalty would not impair her performance as a juror,

she “really can’t be sure about that.” When asked if her

views would allow her to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty, Golliday said, “I think

I would live with life better than I could the death part,”

and “If there were some other sentence, I [sic] probably go

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 11

with the other than the death penalty.” Golliday also

stated that she had an open mind, that she would try

her best to follow the law, and that she would make her

decisions based on the evidence. On her questionnaire,

Golliday had circled “C” when asked to select the statement that best expressed her view on the death penalty.

Answer “C” states: “I am philosophically, morally, or

religiously opposed to the death penalty. Nonetheless

I believe that I can vote to impose the death penalty if it

is called for by the facts and the law in the case.”

For comparison the defendants first point to juror

Duggins, who stated in regard to the death penalty:

“I would have to see the evidence, but it would be an awful tough thing.” She said it would be “easier” to impose a

sentence of life in prison without parole. However, she

also stated that her opinion on the death penalty would

not impair her ability to follow the court’s instructions

and her oath as a juror. Because Duggins was interviewed by Judge Sharp, the parties had no opportunity

to delve further into her views. The defendants next

point to juror Kasch, who stated that she believed in the

death penalty in principle but she didn’t “like to be

responsible for being the one imposing it.” She discussed

misgivings based on what she had heard about Illinois

death sentences “they had to undo.” Kasch opined that

her views on the death penalty would not impair her

performance as a juror and that it was her duty to follow the law. She, too, suggested that it would be easier

to impose a life sentence, saying “I would think you

might consider that you’d go on the side of caution and

maybe not go with the death penalty.” Finally, the defendants compare Golliday with juror Blaszak, who also

expressed misgivings about death sentences that had

been overturned in Illinois. Blaszak swore that her

opinions on the death penalty would not prevent her

from imposing either the death penalty or life imprisonCase: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20
12 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

ment. She also stated, however, that during the guilt

phase of trial it would be difficult to “block out” the

fact that “the end result could be if someone was found

guilty that the death penalty was a potential end result.”

In order to try to focus only on the guilt phase, she “would

hope that in the sentencing phase, maybe the death

penalty wouldn’t be [her] only option.” However, she

had no “moral or religious reservations” about imposing

a death sentence. Finally, the defendants cite alternate

juror Stachura, who stated that he would have “more of a

problem signing a death sentence” than imposing a

sentence of life imprisonment. Stachura had described

his view of the death penalty as “neutral.”

The defendants contend that there is no material

difference between Golliday and these white venirepersons who were seated as jurors or alternates, and

the degree of similarity suggests purposeful discrimination as the real reason underlying the exclusion of

Golliday. But the defendants’ side-by-side comparisons

do not convince us that the government excluded Golliday

for a reason other than her inclination to “go for life” if

given the choice. First, although most of the jurors the

defendants cite expressed reservations about the difficulty of being responsible for choosing between life and

death, Golliday alone questioned her own ability to be fair

and stated that she would pick the life sentence if given

the choice. The next strongest answer was Katsch’s, but

even she stated only that she would “consider” erring on

the side of caution. Second, only Golliday expressed

opposition to the death penalty on her juror questionnaire;

she selected “C” whereas Duggins, Blaszak, and Stachura

picked “E” and Kasch circled “J.” Response “E” reflects a

neutral stance on the death penalty, and “J” is simply

“None of the above.” These distinctions are minor but

not trivial, and we cannot say that it was clear error to

accept the government’s stated reason for excluding

Golliday.

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 13

The defendants next argue the government struck

potential juror Washington, an African American, for

discriminatory reasons, as evidenced by his exclusion

based on what they characterize as one anomalous

answer. According to the government at the time it was

asked for a reason for its peremptory challenge, Washington was not suitable because he answered “yes” to the

question of whether his views on the death penalty

would prevent him from imposing a death sentence

regardless of the law. The defendants contend, however,

that this answer was so out of line with Washington’s

other statements about the death penalty that the government’s reliance on it must be pretext for discrimination.

The defendants point to Washington’s questionnaire,

where he indicated that “it is important that we have the

death penalty as punishment” and that his support of the

death penalty would make it difficult to be fair and

impartial during the guilt phase. Washington did not

answer the question asking him to circle the statement

that best expressed his views on the death penalty; instead he wrote, “The death penalty has been here for

years. If you try to live right and work hard in life there

[sic] no need for crime. Most of all pray. Do the right thing.

Count on God.”

During voir dire, Washington elaborated on his views.

He began by responding that he had no opinion on the

death penalty other than that it was “the truth,” and that

it was for the jurors to decide. When asked to further

explain his views, he spoke at length about his parents

and his strict upbringing but did not address the death

penalty. When questioned about how religious beliefs

influenced his views, he stated, “I feel that everybody

should pay for what they do.” He said he would still

be able to weigh all the appropriate factors and consider

imposing the death penalty on a non-shooter. He said

“I wouldn’t want to be the one to take somebody’s life,”

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14 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

but added that he would be able to fairly consider the

evidence and return whatever decision was appropriate

under the facts and the court’s instructions.

The defendants insist that Washington’s support for

the death penalty is evident and that his one statement

that his views might prevent him from imposing it was

an anomaly, but the government maintains that “one

cannot possibly determine Washington’s views on the

death penalty.” We are inclined to agree that Washington’s

position is difficult to decipher based on his responses

at voir dire, and his questionnaire is similarly unilluminating. Moreover, while the defendants portray the

isolated answer as the government’s sole reason for the

challenge, the government also highlighted the overall

ambiguity of Washington’s answers. The government

noted that it could not decipher which of Washington’s

expressed views was “right in his view as he sits

here today,” and further stated, “[T]he ambiguity in his

answers gives the government the right to exercise its

peremptory challenge.” In fact, the government cited the

ambiguity as the reason it had not challenged Washington

for cause; it simply could not tell whether he held strong

views that would prevent him from serving. We find

this situation not unlike the White case, in which the

challenged juror “singled herself out with a cryptic

answer that called into question her ability to fulfill her

obligations as a juror.” 416 F.3d at 641. Likewise, Washington responded cryptically to questions that directly

implicated his ability to be impartial, and it was not

clear error for the district court to accept the government’s explanations for the strike.

The defendants next argue that the government gave

an “explicitly race-based” reason for striking potential

juror Hicks and that the district court therefore was

required to uphold their Batson challenge. Hicks was a coparishioner with and a member of the same Masonic

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 15

lodge as a potential witness for defendant Thomas, and

he expressed his inclination to give more weight to the

testimony of “a fellow Mason.” Additionally, ten years

before the defendants’ trial Hicks was an alternate on a

jury that acquitted an African-American defendant of

the murders of seven Caucasian individuals. He had

been present for the jury’s deliberations. The government challenged Hicks for cause based on his relationship with the prospective witness, and after the district

court denied the challenge, the government exercised a

peremptory strike. When called upon to provide a raceneutral reason for striking Hicks, the government stated

that it was exercising the challenge “based upon the

previous arguments,” that is, the relationship with the

witness. It said Hicks’ prior service on a jury was another reason. The prosecutor, familiar with the earlier

case, described the acquittal as a “shocking” result in a

“highly volatile murder case” that “involved racial issues.”

He noted that evidence had been presented at trial that

the defendant committed the murders “because he didn’t

like white individuals.”

The defendants argue that “there was no reason to

describe in detail the racial aspects of the previous case”

unless the prosecutor “thought those aspects relevant to

his decision.” We are not convinced. First, the government’s primary motivation for excusing Hicks was his

relationship with a witness—a drug abuse counselor

who had treated defendant Thomas. His jury service was

a secondary reason. We do not know why the prosecutor

shared his knowledge of the prior case, but, unlike the

defendants, we do not see his description as amounting

to an explicitly race-based reason for the peremptory

challenge. The government did not rely on the unfounded

assumption of racial solidarity that Batson intends to

mitigate. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (explaining that

assumption of partiality toward defendant based on

Case: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20
16 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

shared race is impermissible). Rather, the strike was

based on a specific occurrence unique to Hicks that the

government found troubling. Hicks had been present

during the prior jury’s deliberations, and there is nothing

implausible about the government’s concern that it

could not know whether and how he was influenced by that

experience. See Jones, 224 F.3d at 621 (explaining that

“intuitive assumptions” are permissible basis for peremptory challenges so long as they are race-neutral). This is

particularly true where the government was prevented—as

a result of the defendants’ successful objection—from

obtaining more information from Hicks about the jury

deliberations in the prior trial and his impressions about

the process.

The defendants turn next to potential alternate juror

Cole, whom the government stated it was challenging

because she circled “B” on the questionnaire that probed

her views on the death penalty. Choice “B” signifies:

“I am strongly opposed to the death penalty, and I will

have a difficult time voting to impose it.” But the prosecutor did not stop there; he further represented that he

was “absolutely certain” that the government had not

accepted any jurors who had answered “C,” and that the

jury “might have had one ‘D.’ ” Although at the time the

defense did not fact-check the government’s statement,

it now asserts, and the government agrees, that the

representation was inaccurate. In fact the government

(at that point) had not allowed any juror who had answered “B” to be empaneled, but one juror who had

answered “C” and four who had answered “D” had been

seated. But, as we have said, the defendants did not

scrutinize the government’s representation at the time,

and it admits that “the district judge was unaware of

this misstatement.” The burden was on the defendants to

establish pretext, see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768

(1995), but they concede that they did not do so because

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Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 17

they were “lulled” by the government’s expression of

certainty. The government was correct in stating that

theretofore it had rejected all jurors like Cole who had

selected “B.” We cannot fault the district court for not

realizing spontaneously what we recognize in hindsight,

that the government was mistaken about the jurors

who answered “C” or “D.”

Finally, the defendants raise a confusing argument that

they were denied the opportunity to raise a Batson challenge with respect to one African-American potential

juror because she was excused for cause on the government’s motion. Potential juror Artis was dismissed after

she explained that she was against the death penalty and

that she could not recommend a death sentence. The

defendants’ argument rests on pure speculation—they

merely suspect that the government would have exercised

a peremptory challenge against Artis had its challenge

for cause been denied. Moreover, Batson prohibits the use

of peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion; it

does not require a district court to deny challenges for

cause with respect to African-American potential jurors

just to guarantee the defendants the opportunity to raise

a Batson challenge. The defendants also fault the district

court for supplying reasons for the dismissal for cause

beyond those given by the government. But dismissals

for cause are distinct from peremptory challenges in

that the district court may exclude any juror who appears unable to render impartial service; no motion by

counsel is even required. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2); see Hughes

v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 464 (6th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d. Cir. 1997). There is

nothing improper about a district court articulating

its own reasons for a dismissal for cause. The defendants

do not argue that cause was lacking, and so we find no

error with respect to Artis.

Case: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20
18 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

4 Styles is Taylor’s first name.

Having addressed the defendants’ Batson arguments,

we turn now to defendant Taylor’s somewhat cursory

argument that his rights under the Confrontation Clause

were violated when Thomas’s counsel, during closing

argument, used Taylor’s name when referencing a written statement from which the judge had ordered it redacted. The statement in question was given to police by

Thomas. He told police that on the day of the murder,

“Styles4

 and Bud” had borrowed his car (which was

spotted at the crime scene) from Damione Thomas, who

had the keys at the time. In order to avoid a Confrontation Clause problem, the district court redacted Taylor’s

name from the statement, which was admitted into

evidence during the testimony of an ATF agent. See Bruton

v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); United States v.

Souffrant, 338 F.3d 809, 828-29 (7th. Cir. 2003). The jury

heard only that Thomas told police that he lent his car

to “Bud and another person.” But during closing argument, Thomas’s attorney mentioned Taylor, apparently

accidentally. Counsel stated that Thomas told police that

“Damione told them he gave the keys to another person

and to Styles—I’m sorry, another person and Bud.” The

context suggests that counsel verbally redacted the

wrong name. Taylor did not object. However, he later

moved for a new trial in part on the basis of this incident,

and he now contends that the attorney’s comment violated his right to confront the witnesses against him.

Taylor’s argument fails because the attorney’s remark

he challenges is not “testimonial evidence” covered by

the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington,

542 U.S. 36 (2004); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920,

923-24 (7th Cir. 2006). Taylor does not quarrel with

the district court’s ruling that Thomas’s statement could

Case: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20
Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008 19

5 This is true despite Taylor’s mischaracterization of his

argument in his brief as a challenge to “the admission of his nontestifying co-defendant’s statement implicating him.”

be admitted only in redacted form. Instead he is complaining about a comment made by Thomas’s attorney

during closing argument.5

 As every jury is instructed,

lawyers’ statements are not evidence. To the extent that

Taylor has a valid complaint, it has to do with an improper

remark or characterization of the evidence by Thomas’s

counsel that implicates the fairness of the joint trial. See,

e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993);

United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 778-79 (7th Cir.

2006); United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir.

2001). Taylor, however, raises no such argument. We

certainly do not endorse what happened here, but it

does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

III.

Defendant Taylor has not established a violation of the

Confrontation Clause nor presented any alternate basis

for challenging the remark of Thomas’s attorney during

closing argument. Additionally, we conclude that the

district court did not clearly err in its handling of the

defendants’ objections with respect to the dismissals of

potential jurors Golliday, Washington, Hicks, Artis, and

Cole. The defendants have not demonstrated that the

reasons given by the government for using peremptory

challenges against these potential jurors were pretext

for unlawful discrimination. However, we are unable to

come to any conclusion with respect to potential juror

Watson because the district court did not make a record of

its credibility determination at the third stage of the

Batson inquiry. Accordingly, we order a LIMITED REMAND

Case: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20
20 Nos. 05-2007 & 05-2008

so that the district court has the opportunity to supplement the record with its reasons for denying the Batson

challenge with respect to Heshla Watson. Because the

scope of our remand is so narrow, we anticipate an expeditious response from the district court. In all other

respects, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—12-7-07

Case: 05-2007 Document: 39 Filed: 12/07/2007 Pages: 20