Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00217/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00217-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathryn Louise Jones
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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 The latter three motions are for the most part nonsensical. For example, defendant’s

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motion to dismiss states that the government is a “pretended, and ostensibly non-existent

plaintiff,” and that district courts are not constitutional courts of the United States. MTD at 2, 4. 

In her motion for more definite statement, defendant requests the court to provide her with a

more definite statement because a U.S. Magistrate Judge has no power or authority to overthrow

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CIV S-06-0217 FCD GGH PS

vs.

KATHRYN LOUISE JONES,

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

_______________________________/ 

BACKGROUND

Previously pending on this court’s law and motion calendar for June 22, 2006,

were the government’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s motion to strike it,

defendant’s motion to dismiss, defendant’s request for default judgment, and defendant’s motion

for more definite statement. 

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all the provisions of Title 28 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant’s request for

default judgment seeks default of G. Patrick Jennings for failing to validate his presentments in

that he produced no evidence of a valid contract or evidence to support his “putative ‘claim’

imposing presumption of suretyship in the above-referenced matter.” Because they are patently

frivolous, defendant’s motions will not be addressed

 Jones did file documents which were non-responsive to the government’s motion, such 2

as a motion to strike and a motion for more definite statement.

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The government filed this complaint to nullify and enjoin false lien filings by pro

se defendant Kathryn Jones. Because Jones did not appear at two court directed hearings,

violating two orders without excuse for her failures, this court issued findings and

recommendations re: contempt on August 1, 2006, and an amended findings on August 2, 2006. 

Defendant’s actions and failures to act are fully set forth therein. The certification of facts will

be repeated here as background: 

Certified Facts

This action commenced with the United States’ complaint to

expunge and nullify UCC liens filed by Jones in California and

with the County Recorder, Pima County, Arizona; default

judgments also filed with the County Recorder were sought to be

nullified. Appearing “on the soil, all rights reserved,” Jones

brought a motion to dismiss the complaint based on such frivolous

theories as “Notice of Counterfeit Securities, Notice of Holder in

Due Course Fraud.” 

The motion to dismiss was not properly noticed but was set for

hearing by the court on May 4, 2006 to be heard on June 22, 2006. 

That order directed Jones to personally appear at the June 22, 2006

hearing. Having invoked the Rule 12 procedure, the undersigned

desired a full explanation of defendant Jones’ motion. In the

interim, the government filed a motion for summary judgment also

set for June 22, 2006.

Jones did not file opposition or a non-opposition to the

government’s motion, nor was there an appearance by Jones at

hearing of the motions. Accordingly, by order filed June 27, 2006, 2

the court issued an order to show cause requiring Jones to

personally appear on July 20, 2006 to explain why the court should

not certify facts to the district judge and recommend that Jones be

held in contempt of court for failing to obey the May 4, 2006 order. 

Jones was warned that a finding of contempt might result in a fine

or incarceration or both, and might include an award of attorney’s

fees. Jones was also ordered to file a response to the order to show

cause. Jones was cautioned that failure to comply with the June

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27, 2006 order would result in a recommendation to the district

judge that she be held in contempt of court. Jones filed a response

to the order to show cause which was unintelligible, and also filed

a copy of the order to show cause with language printed over the

top page which states:

This ‘order’ failing to conform with any applicable published and

promulgated law(s) or rule(s) for its issuance, and manifesting

dishonor and violation of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) and (3), F.R.C.P.

Rules 53(b), 73(a) and (b) and 83(1) and (2), and 28 U.S.C. §§

2072(a) and (b), is hereby returned to its maker, ‘Refused for cause

without dishonor and, without recourse to me’ pursuant to U.C.C.

§ 3-501(b)(3)(ii) nunc pro tunc ‘6/27/06.’

See Response, filed July 12, 2006; Reply, filed July 14, 2006. This

response is typical of the type of language used in Jones’ pleadings.

At hearing on July 20, 2006, attorney Yoshinori Himel appeared

for the United States. Kathryn Jones did not appear at the hearing. 

At that time, the court stated its intent to certify facts and

recommend contempt to the district judge.

Amended Order and Findings and Recommendations, filed August 2, 2006, at 2-3.

 According to the government, Jones filed a UCC financing statement on May 5,

2005, with the Secretary of State of California, falsely describing as debtors ten IRS employees

who had been involved in determination or collection of unpaid tax from defendant. Jones has

also filed false documents entitled “default judgment” against three of the IRS employees in

Pima County, Arizona. The government seeks a declaration that the financing statement and

default judgments are null, void and of no legal effect. It also seeks to enjoin Jones from filing

such nonconsensual lien, encumbrance or default judgment against officers of the United States

in the future. The government additionally seeks attorney’s fees. The only document filed by

defendant which might be construed as an opposition is Jones’ motion to strike summary

judgment motion, filed May 4, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standards Under Rule 56

The “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the

proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

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 “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 3

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee note to 1963 amendment). Summary judgment is appropriate “if . . .

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c). Disputed facts must be material (affecting the outcome of the

suit under the governing law), and genuine (supported by evidence permitting a reasonable jury

to return a favorable verdict). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 2510 (1986).

The moving party: 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Rule 56(c)). 

The moving party without the burden of proof at trial may rely “solely on the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. (citations

omitted.) That party need only point to the absence of a genuine material factual issue, and is not

required to produce evidence negating the opponent’s claim. Id. at 323-24; Lujan v. National

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187 (1990). 

When the moving party meets its responsibility, the burden shifts to the opposing

party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. The opposing party then must submit

“significant probative evidence” on each element of his claims on which he bears the burden at

 trial. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994). Unverified denials in pleadings are 3

insufficient. Neither can conclusory statements defeat a properly supported motion. Scott v.

Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983). Rather, specific facts in the form of

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affidavits or admissible discovery material must be submitted. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 586 n.11, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 n.11. 

The opposing party need not conclusively establish any fact. To demonstrate a

genuine dispute, however, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead

a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted). In other words, the evidence

must demonstrate that a trial is required to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth. 

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

The court believes the evidence of the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

106 S. Ct. at 2513, and draws all reasonable inferences in its favor, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587,

106 S. Ct. at1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and the opposing party

must produce a factual predicate from which to draw an inference. Richards v. Nielsen Freight

Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

II. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

District courts have jurisdiction to “render such judgments and decrees as may be

necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). 

This authority “empowers the district court to void common-law liens imposed by taxpayers on

the property of government officials assigned to collect delinquent taxes.” Ryan v. Bilby, 764

F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985); see also, Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035

(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986) (affirming district court’s release of liens

imposed by taxpayers on the property of government officials); U.S. v. Van Dyke, 568 F. Supp.

820 (D.Or.1983) (enjoining the filing of common-law liens to harass IRS employees and deter

tax law enforcement); accord, U.S. v. Ekblad, 732 F.2d 562, 563 (7th Cir.1984) (U.S. has

standing under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 “to seek relief from actual or

threatened interference with the performance of its proper governmental functions”); U.S. v.

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 Jones has submitted a purported “declaration;” however, it is not only not signed, it is

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not signed under penalty of perjury. It makes statements which are either false or nonsensical. 

For example, Jones states that the complaint is fatally deficient because it lacks: “plaintiff and/or

identity and disclosure of real party(ies) in/of interest thereof; verified complaint under penalty of

perjury; justifiable controversy evidencing this Court’s ability to acquire jurisdiction and subject

matter jurisdiction; valid service of process; Evidence of G. Patrick Jennings’ legal and/or lawful

authority ...; evidence of any valid law, whatsoever, duly published in the Federal Register with

applicable and attendant implementing regulations evidencing this declarant’s violation and/or

trespass .....” Mtn. to Strike, at 2.

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Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir.1983) (finding jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) and 28

U.S.C. § 1340, 1345 and 1357); U.S. v Andra, 923 F. Supp.157, 159-160 (D. Idaho 1996)

(granting declaratory and injunctive relief against tax protesters who filed real property liens

against IRS agents).

Jones’ motion to strike, construed as an opposition to plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment, fails to demonstrate a material factual dispute. Jones has not set forth a

statement of facts as required by the local rules. Jones has neither complied with E. D. Cal. L. 4

R. 56-260(b) (requiring that the party opposing a summary judgment motion admit or deny the

moving party’s statement of undisputed facts and submit supporting evidence), nor has defendant

submitted any material facts or evidence responsive to the government’s supported allegations

that the lien is invalid. Significantly, Jones has produced no evidence demonstrating that the

challenged UCC Financing Statement is supported by any legitimate debt.

Accordingly, this court finds that UCC Financing Statement No. 05-702535214,

filed by Jones on May 5, 2005, as well as the purported default judgments, filed September 21,

2004, and containing docket number 12391, at pages 757, 755, and 753, filed with the County

Recorder of Pima County Arizona, are frivolous devices intended to harass the named IRS

officials and employees. Therefore, it is recommended that they be declared null, void, and

without legal effect. 

The government also seeks a permanent injunction enjoining Jones from filing

any document or instrument which purports to create a non-consensual lien or encumbrance of

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any kind against any employee of the federal government. 

“[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before

a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an

irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate

to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff

and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be

disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (May

15, 2006), citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-313, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982)

and Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987). “Permanent

injunctive relief is warranted where . . . defendant’s past and present misconduct indicates a

strong likelihood of future violations.” Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 564

(9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). “In seeking a permanent injunction, the moving party must

convince the court that relief is needed: ‘The necessary determination is that there exists some

cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves

to keep the case alive.’” Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). In making this determination, the

court may consider “the degree of scienter involved; the isolated or recurrent nature of the

infraction; the defendant’s recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct; the extent to which

the defendant’s professional and personal characteristics might enable or tempt him to commit

future violations; and the sincerity of any assurances against future violations.” United States v.

Laerdal Mfg. Corp., 73 F.3d 852, 854-855 (9th Cir. 1995).

These factors are met. The government’s injuries are significant, both presently

and prospectively: to the IRS employees’ reputations, credit ratings, titles to personal property,

and the performance of their official duties. While declaratory relief will stem temporarily, the

injuries created by Jones’ current filings, Jones’ demonstrated propensity to file unsubstantiated

“official” documents can be halted only by an equitable remedy. Jones’ documents filed

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subsequent to her “motion to strike” the motion for summary judgment, including her “motion

for more definite statement” and “notice of request for withdrawal of application of SS-5,”

demonstrate a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation” in filing unsupported “official”

documents comparable to the fraudulent UCC Financing Statement and default judgment that

underlie this action. A permanent injunction will result in no bonafide hardship to Jones because

her filings are unsubstantiated; however, significant and continuing hardship will beset the

government, its employees, and others similarly situated if an injunction does not issue. 

Additionally, the public interest is served by protecting private individuals in the exercise of their

official duties.

III. Attorney’s Fees

The government also seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,812, under 28

U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent power, for thirty hours at $160.40 per hour. Jennings

Decl.

Section 1927 permits recovery of excess costs, including attorney’s fees, against

an attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings. A § 1927 award requires

a finding that the attorney to be assessed not only multiplied the proceedings but did so recklessly

or in bad faith. Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1306 (9th Cir.1996); Kanarek v. Hatch, 827

F.2d 1389, 1391 (9th Cir.1987). An attorney who knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous

argument, or makes a meritorious assertion merely to harass an opponent, is guilty of bad faith. 

Trulis v. Barton, 67 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir.1995), as amended, 107 F.3d 685 (9th Cir.1995). 

Section 1927 sanctions also may be imposed against pro se litigants. Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d

1230, 1235-36 (9 Cir. 1990). The standard is subjective bad faith, and the court need not find th

objectively unreasonable behavior as well. Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 74 F.3d

183, 184 (9th Cir.1996).

Jones’ filings since the filing of the instant complaint have served to multiply the

proceedings in this case, as have her actions resulting in a criminal contempt finding. Therefore,

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 Judicial notice may be taken of court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 5

F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126

(1981).

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the court will recommend an award of sanctions under section 1927 based on Jones’ actions as

described herein, and as further detailed in this court’s findings and recommendations re:

contempt, filed August 1, 2006.5

Attorney Jennings has devoted thirty hours of time in prosecuting this case. At a

rate of $160.40 per hour, his request for $4,812 is reasonable. However, government counsel is

not entitled to fees associated with the filing of the complaint. Although Jones’ actions

underlying the reasons why the government had to file this action may have been vexatious,

section 1927 is not a statute designed to compensate for pre-litigation activities. See Matter of

Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986 ), amended 803 F.2d 1085(section 1927 does not

apply to filing of the complaint). Mr. Jennings must therefore file a declaration within ten days

of today’s date deleting the amount of time expended in drafting the complaint and any time

expended prior to the first appearance of defendant Jones in this case.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed April 21, 2006, be granted.

2. UCC Financing Statement Number No. 05-702535214, filed by defendant on

May 5, 2005, as well as the purported default judgments, filed September 21, 2004, and

containing docket number 12391, at pages 757, 755, and 753, filed with the County Recorder of

Pima County Arizona, be adjudged and declared null, void, and without legal effect. 

3. Leave be granted for plaintiff to file the judgment and order of this court with

the California Secretary of State and in the public records of any other jurisdiction where

documents identical to UCC Financing Statement, Document Number 05-702535214, or the

aforementioned default judgments, have been filed by defendant.

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4. Defendant Kathryn Louise Jones, her agents, employees and any other

participants, be permanently enjoined from filing or attempting to file any document or

instrument which purports to create any nonconsensual lien or encumbrance against the person or

property of any employee or officer of the United States.

5. Plaintiff United States be awarded its costs and reasonable attorney’s fees

incurred in this action; attorney Jennings shall submit a recalculated fees amount within ten days.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 8/8/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH/076

USJones0217.msj.wpd

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