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Parties Involved:
Jose Guadalupe Gutierrez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAiftaitedStatesCourtof Appenls 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JOSE GUADALUPE GUTIERREZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

JAN 1 9 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerlt 

No. 93-1296 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-273) 

Brian K. Holland, Holland, Seelen & Pagliuca, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney (Henry L. 

Solano, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District 

Judge. 

BROWN, District Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 1 
Appellant Jose Gutierrez was convicted by a jury of one count 

of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (21 

u.s.c. §§ 846, 84l(b) (1) (A)) and one count of money laundering (18 

U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1)). He was one of eleven individuals named in a 

second superseding indictment. Appellant and a co-defendant, Laina 

Young, were the only two defendants to proceed to trial. Ms. 

Young's appeal is decided in a companion case, United States v. 

Young, No. 93-1243 (lOth Cir. Dec. , 1994). 

The evidence at trial showed a large scale conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine headed by a man named Ernest Evans. The 

government presented evidence showing that appellant was a part of 

the conspiracy and that he was involved with Evans in the 

distribution of cocaine. There was also evidence that appellant 

received a wire transfer of $9,000 at Western Union in Los Angeles 

on June 29, 1989, which was part of a total transfer of $45,000 

representing payment for cocaine. Appellant raises several issues 

on appeal. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment 

of the district court. 

Speedy Trial Act 

Appellant first contends that his rights under the Speedy 

Trial Act were violated and that the indictment against him should 

have been dismissed. The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that 

a criminal trial must commence within 70 days of the latest of a 

defendant's indictment, information, or appearance. 18 u.s.c. § 

316l(c) (1). Certain periods of delay are excluded, however, in 

computing the time within which a trial must commence. See § 

2 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 2 
3161 (h). 

We have addressed a similar claim raised by one of Mr. 

Gutierrez' co-defendants in United States v. Young, No. 93-1343 

(lOth Cir. Dec. , 1994). For the same reasons set forth in Young we 

conclude that Mr. Gutierrez has failed to meet his· burden of 

showing that the speedy trial clock was running prior to November 

2, 1992. We thus turn to the remaining period -- from November 2, 

1992 to the date of trial, June 7, 1993, for the purpose of 

determining whether more than seventy days of non-excludable delay 

elapsed in that period. 

Based on the record before us, it appears that only fourteen 

days of non-excludable delay elapsed between November 2, 1992, and 

June 7, 1993. Delays resulting from pretrial motions are generally 

excluded from the speedy trial seventy day time limit, as are 

reasonable periods of delay pertaining to co-defendants joined for 

trial. See § 3161(h) subs. (1) (F), (7). on July 6, 1992, Mr. 

Gutierrez filed a motion asking the district court to hold a James 

hearing for the purpose of determining the admissibility of alleged 

co-conspirators' statements. Vol. 1, Doc. 10. The trial court heard 

the parties' arguments concerning the need for a James hearing on 

November 4, 1992, and granted the request on November 10, 1992. 

Vol. 1, Doc. 46. The court initially set the James hearing for 

February 25, 1993, but it was later moved up to February 11, 1993, 

at which time the court heard evidence and issued its ruling. Vol. 

9. We conclude that this period -- from the filing of the motion 

through the time of the actual James hearing -- is excludable delay 

3 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 3 
under § 3161(h) (1) (F). We reject appellant's argument that the 

period of exclusion caused by the motion ended on November 10, 

1992, when the court granted appellant's request for a hearing. The 

James hearing on February 11, 1993 was clearly a "hearing . on 

such motion" within the meaning of subsection (h) (1) (F) and all of 

the time between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the 

hearing is excludable under (h) (1) (F). See United States v. Bermea, 

30 F.3d 1539, 1568 (5th Cir. 1994) (Defendants' James motions 

tolled the speedy trial clock.) 

Another motion resulting in excludable delay was filed by 

Keith Rutherford, a co-defendant of Mr. Gutierrez. The record 

before us does not show the date this motion was filed, but it does 

show that the motion was pending and came on for a hearing on 

February 11, 1993. Due to a request to withdraw by one of Mr. 

Rutherford's attorneys, however, his motion to suppress was 

continued. Vol. 8 at 35-40. Although the motion was initially set 

for hearing in December 1992, that hearing was continued and the 

motion remained pending until May 6, 1993, when Rutherford entered 

a guilty plea. See Vol. 16 at 30. Under § 3161(h) (7), we conclude 

that this period of delay (from prior to February 11, 1993, up to 

the disposition of the motion on May 6, 1993) is excludable time as 

to Mr. Gutierrez. 

In addition to the foregoing, the record shows that Mr. 

Gutierrez filed a motion for a continuance on May 12, 1993, which 

was ruled on by the court on May 17, 1993, and a motion to dismiss 

filed May 27, 1993, and ruled on by the court on June 7, 1993. Each 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 4 
of these periods is excludable under § 3161(h) (1) (F). Thus, taking 

into account all of the excludable delay shown by the record, only 

fourteen days ran on the speedy trial clock between November 2, 

1992, and the date of trial. Accordingly, we find that the district 

court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment against the 

defendant. 

Admission of Statements of Alleged Co-Conspirators 

Appellant's next argument is that the district court erred in 

admitting into evidence hearsay statements of an alleged coconspirator. Appellant objected when Phil Evans, who pleaded guilty 

to being a member of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, 

testified that his brother Ernest Evans had told him that Jose 

Gutierrez had a Mexican connection that supplied Ernest with drugs 

to keep his business going. Vol. 21 at 745-46. 1 The trial court 

permitted the statements into evidence. Appellant contends that 

these statements were hearsay because they were not "in furtherance 

of" the alleged conspiracy as required by Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E). 

Our review of a district court's finding that a statement was 

in furtherance of a conspiracy is limited; we may set aside such a 

finding only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Perez, 

1 Appellant also contends that the court erroneously admitted 

hearsay statements concerning "identification of an alleged 

partner, " Apl t. Br. at 3 2 , but he does not identify any such 

objectionable statements. Of course, testimony by Phil Evans that 

he saw appellant and Ernest Evans counting large amounts of cash 

does not constitute hearsay. See Vol. 21 at 747. Moreover, contrary 

to appellant's assertion that this was the only such testimony 

against him, the record shows that Stephanie Howard also testified 

that Ernest Evans told her that appellant was his partner in the 

drug business. Vol. 20 at 510. No objection was raised to Ms. 

Howard's testimony on this point. 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 5 
989 F.2d 1574, 1580 (lOth Cir. 1993) (en bane). When determining 

whether a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy we 

focus on the declarant's intent in making the statement. United 

States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 515 (lOth Cir. 1993). The 

determination must be made by examining the context in which the 

statement was made. Id. In general, mere narratives between 

coconspirators or narrative declarations of past events are not 11 in 

furtherance, 11 while statements of future intent that set 

transactions to the conspiracy in motion and maintain the 

information flow among coconspirators meet the 11 in furtherance" 

requirement. Id. 

We cannot say that the district court's finding that this 

statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy was clearly 

erroneous. Taken as a whole, the record contains sufficient 

circumstantial evidence from which one could reasonably conclude 

that Ernest Evans made the statement to Phil Evans with the 

intention of furthering conspiratorial objectives. "Statements made 

to keep coconspirators abreast of an ongoing conspiracy's 

activities satisfy the 'in furtherance of' requirement." United 

States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 

488 U.s. 866 ( 1988) , (cited in Roberts, supra) . A permissible 

inference may be drawn that Ernest Evans informed Phil Evans of 

Gutierrez's role in the conspiracy to keep Phil, whom Ernest hired 

on several occasions to make deliveries of cocaine (Vol. 21 at 

739), informed of the ongoing activities of the conspiracy. Phil 

Evans had knowledge that Ernest was having problems with suppliers, 

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Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 6 
id. at 746, and the evidence would support a conclusion that the 

statement was made to indicate to Phil that the deliveries of 

cocaine would continue. Appellant's extended argument that Ernest 

Evans did not consider his brother trustworthy does nothing to 

change this result. Regardless of whether Ernest Evans trusted Phil 

to transport cocaine by himself, he nevertheless hired Phil to 

transport shipments with other people and kept him informed of 

certain material aspects of the conspiracy. We find no error in the 

trial court's ruling. 

Similarly misguided is appellant's argument that his sixth 

amendment rights were violated by the failure of the government to 

show that the declarant of the statement, Ernest Evans, was 

unavailable. The Supreme Court rejected such a requirement in 

United States v. Inadi, 475 u.s. 387, 106 s.ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 

390 (1986). 

Motion for a Continuance 

Appellant next argues that the district court erred in denying 

a motion for continuance filed May 12, 1993. He contends that the 

court's refusal to postpone the trial adversely affected defense 

counsel's ability to render effective assistance. Appellant points 

out that Keith Rutherford and Phil Evans entered guilty pleas 

approximately one month before trial and agreed to testify on 

behalf of the government. Appellant contends that the trial court's 

denial of his motion for a continuance left his attorney 

insufficient time to investigate impeachment of these witnesses. 

Appellant recognizes that we will reverse the trial court's 

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Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 7 
ruling only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion resulting 

in manifest injustice. United States v. Pearson, 789 F.2d 385, 388 

(lOth Cir. 1986). It can always be argued that more time to prepare 

would have aided the defense, but appellant has identified no 

specific reason why a period of nearly one month was inadequate to 

prepare for the testimony of these witnesses. We see no indication 

that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the request 

for a continuance. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the guilty verdicts. In reviewing such a claim, "we are bound to 

view the proof presented in the light most favorable to the 

government to ascertain if there is sufficient substantial proof, 

direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to 

be drawn therefrom, from which a jury might find a defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 

1403, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Having reviewed the entire record, we find that the evidence 

is sufficient to support the verdicts. The testimony of Keith 

Rutherford, Stephanie Howard, and Phil and Sam Evans, among other 

evidence, clearly provided a sufficient basis for the jury to 

conclude that appellant knowingly conspired with several others to 

possess with intent to distribute cocaine. For example, Rutherford 

testified that he saw appellant swap money for cocaine with Ernest 

Evans and that appellant brought bricks of cocaine to Rutherford's 

house. Vol. 19 at 290; 293. Several witnesses testified that they 

8 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 8 
saw appellant counting large amounts of cash with Ernest Evans. 

Apparently recognizing that this evidence is sufficient, appellant 

resorts to arguing that "had he been provided with the continuance 

requested, the testimony of Keith Rutherford and Phil Evans would 

not have been accepted by the jury. " Apl t. Br. at 4 6. This is sheer 

conjecture, however, and provides no cause for disturbing the 

jury's verdict. Similarly unpersuasive is appellant's contention 

that the evidence was insufficient to support the money laundering 

conviction. Evidence of appellant's involvement in the drug 

conspiracy together with the circumstances surrounding his receipt 

of a wire transfer for Ernest Evans provided a sufficient basis for 

the jury to conclude that appellant knew the wire transfer 

represented the proceeds of some form of illegal activity and that 

he engaged in the transaction with the intent to promote the 

carrying on of the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956 (a) (1) (A). 

Calculation of Offense Level 

Appellant's final argument is that the trial court erred in 

determining his offense level under the sentencing guidelines. The 

court found that appellant's base offense level was 34, which was 

based on a determination that appellant was responsible for a 

conspiracy to possess at least 15 but less than 50 kilograms of 

cocaine. Vol. 25 at 12. Appellant argues that he should only be 

held responsible for a conspiracy involving 5 kilograms of cocaine. 

Appellant's argument is based upon USSG 1B1.3(a) (1) (B), which 

requires that in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 

9 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 9 
activity, the base offense level shall be determined on the basis 

of "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 

furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, " 

Appellant does not specifically challenge the trial court's finding 

that the scope of the conspiracy in this case involved more than 15 

kilograms of cocaine (an amount clearly supported by the evidence 

at trial), but he maintains that he played a minor role in the 

conspiracy and that there was no evidence from which the court 

could properly conclude that he could have reasonably foreseen the 

possession of such quantities by other conspirators. 

The trial court's calculation of appellant's offense level is 

supported by the evidence. As an initial matter, appellant ignores 

the evidence at trial that he personally possessed large amounts of 

cocaine. See USSG § 1Bl.3 (a) (1) (A) (offense level is determined 

based on all acts committed by defendant). Moreover, in arguing 

that he could not have foreseen the distribution of more than 15 

kilos of cocaine by Ernest Evans, appellant simply disregards the 

government's evidence of his substantial involvement in the 

conspiracy. For example, Keith Rutherford testified that he saw 

appellant swap money for drugs with Ernest Evans (Vol. 19 at 290), 

that he saw appellant count large amounts of cash with Evans -

including over $700,000 on one occasion (id. at 290-91), and that 

he saw appellant bring bricks of cocaine to his house -- six kilos 

on one occasion. Stephanie Howard testified that appellant and 

Ernest Evans counted money she had picked up at Western Union and 

that appellant commented that he had to get the money together so 

10 

Appellate Case: 93-1296 Document: 01019290241 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 10 
they could make their next deal. Vol. 20 at 508-09. She also heard 

Ernest Evans say that appellant and he were partners in the drug 

business. Id. at 510. Sam Evans testified that when he delivered 

$9,000 to Ernest Evans, Evans said that he had to give the money to 

Jose, id. at 645, and that he couldn't give Sam any money because 

he had to give the money to Jose Gutierrez to pay off people for 

the drugs. Id. at 646. There was testimony that Ernest also told 

Sam that the reason for a delay in a shipment of cocaine that Sam 

had agreed to deliver was that Jose hadn't gotten back in touch 

with him. Vol. 20 at 669. 

There is other evidence in the record supporting the trial 

court's determination, but the foregoing is sufficient to show that 

the court's determination of the base offense level was not clearly 

erroneous. For the same reasons, appellant's argument that the 

trial court erred in refusing to award him a four level decrease as 

a "minimal participant" is without merit. 

Conclusion 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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