Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-06-06124/USCOURTS-ca6-06-06124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frances Darlene Dedman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0203p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCES DARLENE DEDMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 06-6124

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.

No. 06-00032—Karl S. Forester, District Judge.

Argued: November 1, 2007

Decided and Filed: May 29, 2008 

Before: SILER, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gregory A. Woosley, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Andrew Sparks,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Gregory A. Woosley, Lexington, Kentucky, Roy Burl McCoy, Jr., STOLL KEENON OGDEN,

Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., ASSISTANT UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Lexington, Kentucky, Elaine K. Leonhard, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Fort Mitchell, Kentucky, for Appellee.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SILER, J., joined. GILMAN, J. (pp.

21-23), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION _________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This unusual case arises from the marriage

between defendant Darlene Dedman’s (“Dedman”) adopted daughter (who was actually Dedman’s

cousin) and Dedman’s adoptive father. Dedman appeals her conviction on the counts of conspiracy

to defraud the United States Department of Defense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, and making

material false statements to a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. For these offenses she

was sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay over $200,000 in restitution. The

government alleged that Dedman orchestrated the marriage as part of a plan to collect her adoptive

father’s, John Watson’s (“Watson”), military pension. Dedman argues that she could not be guilty

of conspiracy because the marriage between her adopted daughter and her adoptive father was valid

1

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and, therefore, there was no false claim. Furthermore, Dedman asserts that if the marriage was

statutorily invalid, then the marriage law is unconstitutional. Dedman also contends that the

government failed to produce evidence sufficient to support her convictions. In addition, she

maintains that the jury instructions regarding the marriage amounted to a directed verdict against

her. Lastly, Dedman avers that the district court miscalculated the government’s loss during her

sentencing. Although both the government and the district court made some mistakes in their

handling of this case, we conclude that none of the mistakes amount to reversible error. We

therefore AFFIRM Dedman’s convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case revolves around the disposition of Watson’s annuity under the Survivor Benefit

Program (“SBP”), a lifetime pension for “military members who have reached at least 20 years of

full military service.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 107 (May 11, 2006, Trial Tr., Timothy Zelenak

Test. at 25:20-21). As a veteran of three wars over twenty years, Watson was eligible for the SBP.

When a pensioner dies, the funds are payable to a surviving spouse only if the spouse was married

to the beneficiary for a year or longer. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447(7), (9) (defining “surviving spouse”

as a widow who was married for a year or more immediately before the pensioner’s death); 1450(a)

(providing annuity benefits to eligible surviving spouses). In order to qualify for the annuity, the

marriage between the military member and the spouse must have been valid in the state where the

marriage took place. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (defining marriage as “only a legal union” (emphasis added));

Bishop v. Oklahoma, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1250 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (applying state law to determine

whether a marriage satisfies 1 U.S.C. § 7).

Dedman had a traumatic childhood, but in 1983, at age eighteen, she agreed to let Watson,

a fifty-six-year-old family friend, adopt her as his daughter. In the early Nineties, Dedman first met

her cousin Nelva Holland (“Holland”) at Dedman’s birth-father’s funeral. The two women became

friendly, and Holland moved in with Dedman’s family with the understanding that Holland would

help with the family’s household chores while Dedman would help Holland with nursing-school

expenses. It was around this time that Holland first got to know Watson, who was living with the

Dedmans. According to Holland, it was also around this time that Dedman first mentioned to her

Watson’s pension.

At age nineteen, Holland tried to enroll in nursing school, but she discovered that the school

required her to obtain health-insurance coverage. In order to help her enroll in school, the Dedmans

adopted her so that she would be covered under Dedman’s husband’s health-care plan. In July 1996,

Holland and Dedman had a dispute, resulting in the Dedmans kicking Holland out of their home.

According to Holland’s testimony, Dedman approached her after a short period of time with an

offer: Holland would be allowed to return to the Dedman home but only if she agreed to marry

Watson, who was then approximately sixty-nine years old. Holland agreed to the deal; Holland,

Dedman, and Watson drove to Arkansas where Holland and Watson married. According to

Holland’s testimony, the fact that she was now married to Watson had no impact on her relationship

with Watson; the two remained friendly but there was no romantic or sexual involvement. One of

Dedman’s sons, however, testified that there was affection between Holland and Watson.

During Dedman’s trial, the jury heard conflicting testimony regarding whether Holland and

Watson were public with their relationship. Holland testified that after the wedding, Dedman told

her to keep the marriage a secret, and Holland said that she and Watson never held themselves out

as married. Two of Dedman’s neighbors testified that Watson and Holland never appeared to be

married. One of those neighbors testified that she learned about the marriage only when Dedman

told her that she had “solved the situation with the annuity.” J.A. at 172 (May 11, 2006, Trial Tr.,

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Mary Beth Green Test. at 171:13-22). In contrast, although Dedman’s husband claimed that he

never knew why Holland and Watson were married, he thought that Holland and Watson were

public about their marriage. However, Dedman’s husband was not surprised to learn during his

testimony that the neighbors were not aware of the marriage.

On December 28, 1997, Watson died. Shortly thereafter, Dedman and Holland applied for

Watson’s SBP benefits. Once the government started paying the annuity, the funds went straight

to Dedman, who gave Holland some of the money. This system worked well until Dedman and

Holland had another dispute in 2005. At the end of this dispute, Dedman accused Holland of having

molested one of Dedman’s children. Dedman proceeded to call government agencies to tell them

that Holland was committing fraud. These calls prompted the investigation that concluded with the

indictment incident to this appeal.

During the course of the government’s investigation, Dedman told a federal investigator that

she learned of the Holland-Watson marriage only in 2004. The investigator did not believe Dedman,

in part because Dedman provided Watson’s death certificate, which listed Holland as the spouse.

The investigator was also suspicious of Dedman’s defensive reaction to questions about the

marriage. Upon cross-examination at trial, the investigator conceded that it was possible that

Dedman meant that she first realized that the marriage was illegal in 2004, not that she first learned

about the marriage at that time.

B. Procedural Background

On February 3, 2006, the government indicted Dedman for conspiracy to defraud the

government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286. In March 2006, the government added an additional

count for making material false statements to a government agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

The government also charged Holland with the same conspiracy charge, but Holland pleaded guilty

and testified in the hopes of getting probation.

On February 17, 2006, Dedman pleaded not guilty to both charges, and the trial began on

May 11, 2006. During Dedman’s trial, the government asked the district court to “take judicial

notice of Arkansas law to the effect that marriage between a grandfather and a granddaughter, even

if that relationship is created by adoption, is prohibited.” J.A. at 234 (May 12, 2006 Trial Tr. at

131:20-24). Dedman’s attorney objected to the request, but the district court took the requested

judicial notice.

After both the government and Dedman presented their cases, the judge instructed the jury.

The district court gave the jury the elements of the conspiracy offense:

What the evidence in this case must show beyond a reasonable doubt is:

First: That two or more persons in some way or manner, came to a mutual

understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as charged in the

indictment;

Second: That the Defendant, knowing the unlawful purpose of the plan, willfully

joined in it; and

Third: That the object of the unlawful plan was to defraud the government by

obtaining the payment or allowance of a claim which is based on a false or fraudulent

material fact.

J.A. at 52-53 (Instruction No. 11). The district court further explained the mental state that the jury

was required to find in order to convict Dedman of conspiracy to defraud the government: “If you

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are convinced that there was a criminal agreement, then you must decide whether the government

has proved that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined that agreement. To convict the

defendant, the government must prove that she knew the conspiracy’s main purpose, and that she

voluntarily joined it intending to help advance or achieve its goals.” J.A. at 55 (Instruction No. 13).

In accordance with the district court’s earlier ruling that it would take judicial notice of the

law of Arkansas, the district court instructed the jury that “I also have decided to accept as proved

that a marriage between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter is prohibited by Arkansas state

law. You may accept these facts as true, but you are not required to do so.” J.A. at 66 (Instruction

No. 23).

On May 15, 2006, after over an hour of deliberation, the jury found Dedman guilty on both

counts. On August 18, 2006, the district court sentenced Dedman. The district court concluded that

Dedman owed to the government $230,990.93, but credited her with $21,760.00 as already returned.

The court required Dedman to pay the difference, a total of $209,230.93. The district court also used

that amount as the government’s loss for enhancing Dedman’s sentence under the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2B1.1. Dedman’s counsel objected to the district court’s use of

the $209,230.93 figure because it included withheld taxes, and he argued that the government never

lost the money that it withheld. The district court disagreed with Dedman’s counsel and concluded

that the loss was greater than $200,000 for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, and the district court

therefore increased Dedman’s base offense level by 12. The district court sentenced Dedman to 27

months of imprisonment for each of the counts, with the terms to run concurrently.

On August 25, 2006, Dedman filed a timely appeal. The district court had jurisdiction over

the case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have proper jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

II. THE MARRIAGE

A. Standard of Review

When a district court interprets state law, “a court of appeals should review de novo a district

court’s determination of state law.” Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)

(declaring the standard of review in a diversity case); see also Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel,

L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 413 (6th Cir. 2006). “A matter requiring statutory interpretation is a question

of law requiring de novo review, and the ‘starting point’ for interpretation ‘is the language of the

statute itself.’” United States v. Caldwell, 49 F.3d 251, 251 (6th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

(quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).

Similarly, “[w]here, in formulating instructions, the ‘district court engages in statutory construction

as a matter of law, . . . [the Sixth Circuit] review[s] [the] conclusions de novo.’” United States v.

Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 87-88 (6th Cir. 1991) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)

(quoting United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1990)).

B. The Significance of the Marriage

The government’s primary argument at trial was that the marriage between Holland and

Watson was prohibited by Arkansas law, and thus the marriage was void. See Ragan v. Cox, 187

S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ark. 1945) (interpreting the predecessor provision to Arkansas’s current marriage

statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106, which declared marriage between grandparents and

grandchildren “absolutely void” just as the current statute does, and concluding that “[s]uch

marriages are not merely voidable, but void ab initio”). Dedman and Holland’s SBP claims made

on the basis of a void marriage were, therefore, the foundation of the false claim that the government

alleged.

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1

We are skeptical as to the validity of the government’s sham-marriage theory, and as we will discuss later on,

we believe that 18 U.S.C. § 286 requires a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim—the invalid marriage, in this case—in

addition to knowledge of the falsity of the claim. The evidence that would support the government’s sham-marriage

theory might support a finding that Dedman believed her claims were false, but it says nothing about whether the claims

were actually false. Regardless, at no point has the government identified a single case or statutory provision that

supports its sham-marriage theory that a marriage entered into for improper motives would somehow, by itself, create

a false claim under the SBP. The statute regulating the disbursement of the SBP requires only that a couple be validly

married according to the state administering the marriage and that the marriage have lasted at least one year immediately

before the pensioner’s death; the statute says nothing about the couple’s motives. See 10 U.S.C. § 1447(7); § 1450(a).

Similarly, the Social Security Act defines “wife” and “husband,” at least in part, as those married for “not less than one

year immediately preceding [the application date].” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(b) and (f). In the context of Social Security

benefits, the Supreme Court has concluded that the time limit itself serves to deter sham marriages, see Weinberger v.

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-85 (1975), and at least one court has refused to add to the Social Security Act an unstated goodfaith requirement. See Eisenhauer v. Mathews, 535 F.2d 681, 684 (2d Cir. 1976). Although Congress has chosen to

deter sham marriages through a good-faith test in the immigration context, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154, for Social Security and

military-pension benefits Congress has instead opted to use a length-of-marriage requirement. Given that the SBP statute

requires a year of marriage immediately before death to deter sham marriages, it seems wholly inappropriate to

supplement Congress’s sham-marriage deterrent with our own judicially created deterrent of a good-faith standard.

The SBP statute does not provide a basis for the sham-marriage theory, and no courts have ever indicated that

such a sham-marriage theory would support a conviction under § 286. We could find only dicta (and in only one case)

that even suggests that the motive for a marriage might be a factor in determining eligibility for the SBP. See Munson

v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 830, 834 (1994). Without grounding in either statute or caselaw, we are reluctant to

conclude that there is any basis for the government’s sham-marriage argument; under these circumstances, we believe

that the government was required to establish that Holland and Watson’s marriage was invalid.

2

For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the Holland-Watson marriage as one between a grandfather and his adopted

granddaughter. More specifically, however, what is in question is Watson’s marriage to his adopted daughter’s adopted

daughter. Both parties and the district court have used this same shorthand, and we adopt it here as well.

On appeal, however, the United States repeatedly asserts that the validity of the marriage

does not actually matter because the government would still prevail even if the marriage was valid.

The government claims that the marriage was a sham marriage; thus, the claims would be false even

if the marriage was valid. This sham-marriage theory was not presented to the jury via instructions

and the government cannot now use it to support the conviction.1

“A crucial assumption underlying th[e] system [of trial by jury] is that juries will follow the

instructions given them by the trial judge.” United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 592 (6th Cir.)

(alterations in original) (quoting Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,

plurality)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1012 (2004). Even if the jury believed the government’s

references to its sham-marriage theory during closing argument, that could not have served as a basis

for the verdict if there were no corresponding instructions. “To the contrary, the jury might well

have concluded that counsel’s hollow argument . . . was contrary to, and precluded by, the judge’s

statement of the law.” United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1118 (6th Cir. 1988), overruled on

other grounds by Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991). Therefore, we must assume that the jury

did not apply the sham-marriage theory in reaching their verdict, and the government cannot invoke

that theory to preserve the verdict. For that reason, we must now address the validity of the

marriage.

C. Judicial Notice

Dedman first challenges her conviction by claiming that the district court erred when it took

judicial notice of Arkansas law to conclude that state law forbids a marriage between a grandfather

and his adopted granddaughter.2

 Although we hold that the district court did not err in its

interpretation of Arkansas law, we determine that the district court erred in its use of judicial notice.

When the government requested judicial notice, and when the district court obliged, it

appears that a subtle distinction in the law confused them. For over one hundred years, it was quite

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natural for judges to take judicial notice of statutes: “The law of any state of the Union, whether

depending upon statutes or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the courts of the United

States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.” Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223

(1885) (emphasis added). This was an evidentiary shortcut whereby courts could rely upon the law

of other states without jumping through the evidentiary hoops of bringing the bound volumes into

court and establishing their validity. We certainly followed that rule and took judicial notice of state

statutes when necessary. See, e.g., Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Prods. Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850,

852 (6th Cir. 1969) (“The Court was required to determine which statute was applicable. Having

made that determination and dismissed the complaint, its judgment is subject to appellate review,

and we have the right to consider all of the statutes and to apply the one which in our judgment is

required under Ohio law. We may take judicial notice of the state statutes . . . .” (citing Lamar)).

What perhaps confused the district court and the parties in the instant case is that in recent

years the terminology of “judicial notice” has shifted. In several modern opinions, we have cabined

the concept of “judicial notice” to facts alone. The effect of such a semantic move is largely

minimal because judges are still entitled—and indeed required—to determine the applicable law,

even if that law is the law of other states. See United States v. Wynn, 987 F.2d 354, 358 (6th Cir.

1993) (“Our judicial system requires the prosecution to prove facts, not laws. Regarding the

presentation of evidence, the phrase ‘judicial notice’ applies to facts, not laws. On the other hand,

judges, not juries, determine what is the law.” (citations omitted)); see also Toth v. Grand Trunk

R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 349 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Thus, judicial notice is generally not the appropriate means

to establish the legal principles governing the case.”). Although we used to allow judicial notice of

state law, now we consider that state law is simply a matter for the judge to determine.

The semantic adjustment is usually of little consequence, leaving judges with the same

powers that they always had to determine and instruct the jury on the content of the applicable law.

Nonetheless, in this case the shift in language appears to have had a detrimental impact. Had the

district court properly applied our modern precedent, the court would have first determined the

applicable law and then instructed the jury as to that law. See Wynn, 987 F.2d at 358 (“In contrast,

legal elements, even when required for culpability, may properly be part of the district court’s

statement of the law when it instructs the jury.”). Although the district court did determine and

instruct the jury that “a marriage between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter is prohibited

by Arkansas state law,” because the district court was confused with regards to judicial notice, the

court also added to jury instruction number twenty-three the directive: “You may accept these facts

as true, but you are not required to do so.” J.A. at 66 (Instruction No. 23). Thus, the district court

impermissibly gave the jury permission to ignore the court’s determination of the applicable law.

Such a mistake, however, was not reversible error in the circumstances of this case. The

legal determination that the district court empowered the jury to disregard—that Arkansas law

forbids a marriage of the type at issue in her case—was a legal determination that went against

Dedman. Had a juror disregarded the district court’s conclusion of law, then the juror would not

have voted to convict Dedman. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s error in taking

judicial notice of Arkansas state law and then permitting the jury to reject “th[is] fact” was harmless.

The district court gave the jury the power to reject its determination of law in an apparent

misapprehension of our Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions. According to the United States, the

district court’s instruction empowering the jury to reject its determination of state law was copied

from Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.19 (“I have decided to accept as proved the

fact that _____, even though no evidence was presented on this point. You may accept this fact as

true, but you are not required to do so.”). There is little doubt in our minds that the district court

selected that instruction because it was the only pattern instruction applicable to judicial notice. The

Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.19, however, is based upon Federal Rule of

Evidence 201(g) (“In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required

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3

Outside of our circuit, a leading treatise suggests that judicial notice of law is the appropriate semantic term

for describing a court’s determination of law, but even the treatise acknowledges that Federal Rule of Evidence 201 does

not explicitly address judicial notice of law. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5102.1 at 73 (2d ed. 2005). Wright and Graham’s treatise suggests that Rule 201 should

apply “where the ‘fact’ noticed is an element of the offense or cause of action. Where an element of a federal offense

is a violation of state law, the court could properly notice that law for the purpose of instructing the jury what they must

find to satisfy the element.” WRIGHT & GRAHAM § 5103.1 at 109 (footnote omitted). Although judges are obligated

to instruct the jury as to the applicable law, we disagree with the assertion that Rule 201 governs the instruction in the

case at bar. The only case that Wright and Graham cite for their proposition says nothing about Rule 201 and instead

is entirely consistent with our approach. See United States v. Clements, 588 F.2d 1030, 1037 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The

determination of the applicable state law is a question of law to be determined by the court. A court may properly take

notice of a state law. The court properly instructed the jury on the applicable law. No error has been shown.” (citation

and footnote omitted)).

4

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “consanguinity” is a blood relationship. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

303 (6th ed. 1990).

to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.”), which is a rule that applies only to

adjudicative facts and does not cover a court’s determination of law.3 Indeed, the official

commentary for the instruction states that the instruction “should be given whenever the court has

taken judicial notice of a fact.” Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 7.19, 1991

Commentary (emphasis added). If Rule 201 is inapplicable, then its associated Criminal Pattern

Jury Instruction is also inapplicable. The improper use of Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.19

when there is a conclusion of law rather than an acknowledgment of fact might erroneously lead a

juror to disregard an important legal determination by the district court. Accordingly, judges should

take care to limit judicial notice and use of Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 7.19 to matters of fact.

D. The District Court’s Determination of Arkansas Law

Having concluded that it was entirely within the province of the district court to determine

whether Arkansas law forbids a marriage between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter, we

must address whether the district court correctly concluded that such a marriage is indeed forbidden.

Dedman argues that the district court misstated Arkansas law when it concluded that such a marriage

is void, but we disagree. Although there is considerable ambiguity, the best reading of Arkansas law

confirms the district court’s interpretation. When courts interpret statutes, “[t]he statute is read as

a whole and construed to give each word operative effect.” Caldwell, 49 F.3d at 251 (reading

several related statutes in conjunction to find a consistent meaning).

The Arkansas marriage statute states:

All marriages between parents and children, including grandparents and

grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the

whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, and between aunts and nephews, and

between first cousins are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void. This section

shall extend to illegitimate children and relations.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106(a). Dedman claims that this statute, despite including grandparents

and grandchildren, is not applicable to the instant case, because it uses the term “of every degree,”

which she asserts is a term of consanguinity.4

 The United States responds by pointing to the

Arkansas incest statute, which explicitly includes adopted grandchildren:

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5

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “affinity” is a “connection existing, in consequence of marriage between

each of the married persons and the kindred of the other.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59. A relationship of affinity is

no more of a blood relation than that of adoption. In addition, “[d]egrees of relationship by affinity are computed as are

degrees of relationship by consanguinity.” Id.

A person commits incest if the person, being sixteen (16) years of age or older,

purports to marry, has sexual intercourse with, or engages in deviate sexual activity

with another person sixteen (16) years of age or older whom the actor knows to be: . . .

(5) A stepgrandchild or adopted grandchild.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-202(a). According to the United States, if Arkansas considers a

relationship between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter to be incestuous, then a marriage

between the two must be void. The United States’s interpretation, however, appears to be strained.

For the United States to be correct, we would need to read the Arkansas marriage statute as saying

that such a relationship is “incestuous and therefore absolutely void.” Such an interpretation is

certainly plausible. Equally plausible, however, is that the “and” in § 9-11-106(a) does not mean

“therefore” but instead simply serves as a cross-reference to signify that the marriage statute does

not preclude enforcement of the incest statute, should it apply.

We need not resolve this dispute regarding the intersection of the marriage and incest statutes

because we hold that the Arkansas marriage statute, on its face, forbids a marriage between a

grandfather and his adopted granddaughter. We base our conclusion on the use of the phrase “of

every degree.” We conclude, contrary to Dedman’s assertion, that the use of the phrase “of every

degree” does not limit the marriage ban to only those grandparents and grandchildren who are in a

consanguineous relationship. The Arkansas legislature frequently uses “degree” with respect to

relationships that are not consanguineous. For instance, several times the Arkansas legislature has

referred to adopted relatives of different degrees. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201(11) (defining

“relative” in a fraudulent-transfer statute as “an individual related by consanguinity within the third

degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the

third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third

degree” (emphasis added)); 9-27-355(a) (defining “relative” for the purpose of placing juveniles as

“a person within the fifth degree of kinship by virtue of blood or adoption”); 9-28-402(18) (defining

“relative” for the purpose of child-welfare-agency licensing as “a person within the fifth degree of

kinship by virtue of blood or adoption”). Furthermore, there are numerous instances where the

Arkansas legislature specifically references relationships of various degrees that are not

consanguineous, often doing so alongside references to relationships of consanguinity. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. XXIX, § 2 (“Husbands and wives of such officers, and relatives of such

officers, or of their husbands and wives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,

5

 shall

likewise be ineligible.” (emphasis added)); ARK.CONST. amend. LXXX, § 12 (“No Justice or Judge

shall preside or participate in any case . . . in which any party is related to him or her by

consanguinity or affinity within such degree as prescribed by law . . . .”); ARK.CODE ANN. §§ 5-71-

229(d)(3) (defining “immediate family” for purposes of a stalking statute as one of several things

including “any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree”); 6-11-

102(c)(2) (barring any “person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity

to any member of the board” from serving as Commissioner of Education); 6-15-102(d)(3) (barring

any “person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to any member of

the State Board of Education or to the commissioner” from serving as assistant commissioner); 6-21-

112(c)(3) (barring any “person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity

to any member of the commission” from serving as the Director of the Division of Public School

Academic Facilities and Transportation); 10-4-404(b) (barring the confirmation of a Legislative

Auditor nominee if the nominee is “related in the second degree of consanguinity or affinity to any

member of the General Assembly or a constitutional officer”); 10-4-409(c)(1) (barring any “person

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related to any member of the General Assembly or to the Legislative Auditor in the first degree of

consanguinity or affinity” from employment in the Division of Legislative Audit); 14-47-135

(barring from city employment any person who “is related by blood or marriage in the third degree

either to a member of the board of directors or to the city manager”); 16-11-108 (disqualifying any

justice of the Supreme Court who “is related to any party within the third degree of consanguinity

or affinity”); 16-31-102(b) (barring anyone who “[i]s related to any party or attorney in the cause

within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity” from serving as a petit juror); 25-30-106(h)

(barring any “person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to any

member of the board” from serving as the director of the Department of Workforce Education). The

most that can be said in response is that occasionally the Arkansas legislature and courts have used

“degree” in a manner that is ambiguous but does not contradict the conclusion that it is not a term

of consanguinity. See ARK.CODE ANN. §§ 9-4-102(4); 9-9-211(b); 28-9-212(b); Ark. Code Judicial

Conduct, Terminology (defining “third degree of relationship”). It is, therefore, eminently clear that

the use of the phrase “of every degree” is not a term of consanguinity; instead, the Arkansas

legislature has frequently used “degree” when discussing a variety of relationships, including

adoptive ones.

Because we conclude that “of every degree” is not a term of consanguinity, Dedman has

failed to establish that “of every degree” does not include adopted grandchildren. We conclude that

the best interpretation of ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106(a) is that “of every degree” bars marriage

between grandparents and grandchildren of any kind, including those related by adoption. As the

above discussion has shown, the Arkansas legislature is plainly aware of the variety of relationships

that may exist in degrees, and in this case the legislature chose to include within the statute

“grandparents and grandchildren of every degree.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106(a) (emphasis

added). Thus, the legislature has used the most expansive language possible. Furthermore, by

default Arkansas treats adoption as creating a relationship that is “as if the adopted individual were

a legitimate blood descendant . . . for all purposes including inheritance and applicability of statutes

. . . .” ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215(a)(2). The Arkansas marriage statute includes no language that

overturns that default. In the absence of any contrary evidence, the plain reading of § 9-11-106(a)

bars a marriage between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err when it determined that Arkansas

law forbids such a marriage.

E. Dedman’s Constitutional Challenge

Dedman contends that if Arkansas law forbids a marriage between a grandfather and his

adopted granddaughter, then the Arkansas marriage statute is unconstitutional. Dedman bases her

claim on the Supreme Court’s precedent establishing the “fundamental importance” of the right to

marry. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (striking down as unconstitutional a

Wisconsin statute that barred those paying child support from getting married without court

approval). The government responds by arguing that Dedman has no standing to challenge

Arkansas’s marriage statute.

We need not resolve such difficult questions; Dedman raises this constitutional challenge for

the first time on appeal. At trial, Dedman’s counsel objected only to the interpretation of the

Arkansas marriage statute, not to its constitutionality. J.A. at 237 (Tr. at 134:8-10) (“And just so

the record is clear, I would object to the Court taking judicial notice because that statute doesn’t

address a second generation adoption.”). Because Dedman raises her objections on constitutional

grounds only now on appeal, we review simply for plain error. Under that standard, we conclude

that the district court did not commit plain error.

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While constitutional challenges are typically reviewed de novo, when the argument was not

raised at the district court “Sixth Circuit precedent requires application of the plain error standard.”

United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 652 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 748

(2006). Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we may consider “a plain

error that affects substantial rights . . . even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). In applying this rule:

First, we are to consider whether an error occurred in the district court. Absent any

error, our inquiry is at an end. However, if an error occurred, we then consider if the

error was plain. If it is, then we proceed to inquire whether the plain error affects

substantial rights. Finally, even if all three factors exist, . . . we must decide whether

the plain error affecting substantial rights seriously affected the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.

United States v. Martin, 438 F.3d 621, 628 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 11

F.3d 620, 630 (6th Cir. 1993)). We will, therefore, apply plain-error review to Dedman’s

constitutional argument.

We assume arguendo that Dedman has standing to advance her constitutional claims.

Similarly, we also assume for purposes of this case that Arkansas’s marriage statute is

unconstitutional. If the statute were unconstitutional, then the district court would have committed

error when it applied the statute; but even so, we could reverse only if the error were plain. In

establishing whether an error is plain, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]t a minimum, [a] court

of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law.”

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

467 (1997); United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 630 (6th Cir. 1993). The question before us then

becomes whether any such error is plain under current law.

We conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in applying the Arkansas

marriage statute even assuming that the statute is unconstitutional. Although the Colorado Supreme

Court has overturned a marriage statute that forbade a marriage between two adopted siblings not

related by blood on the grounds that “prohibiting marriage between adopted children fails even to

satisfy minimum rationality requirements,” Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978), there

have been hardly any other suggestions that such statutes are unconstitutional. In fact, the Arkansas

Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of its incest statute on the basis that sexual relations

between adopted family members are just as damaging to the family as sexual relations between

those related by blood. Heikkila v. State, 98 S.W.3d 805, 807-08 (Ark. 2003) (stating that the

protection of the incest law “extends to step-relationships as well as blood relationships because

sexual activity in step-relationships is equally disruptive of the family as would be sexual activity

between blood relations”); Camp v. State, 704 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ark. 1986) (“[S]tepchildren and

adopted children have been added to the crime of incest because society is as concerned with the

integrity of the family, including step and adoptive relationships as well as those of blood

relationships, and sexual activity is equally disruptive, whatever the makeup of the family.”). Such

arguments upholding the constitutionality of Arkansas’s incest statute would be equally applicable

to marriage statutes; if a sexual relationship between adopted family members would threaten the

family, so too must marriage.

Any possible unconstitutionality of Arkansas’s marriage statute is not “clear under current

law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. To be explicit, nothing we say today should foreclose any later court

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6

We recognize that some of the rationales used to defend such laws have come under fire recently. For a

general discussion of potential problems with laws that restrict relationships between consenting adults, even those that

are related, see Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 HARV. L.

REV. 2464 (2006).

from determining the constitutionality of Arkansas’s marriage statute,6 but today we hold only that

a ruling of unconstitutionality would not be clear from the precedent that exists today. Therefore,

we hold that even if Dedman has standing to bring this constitutional challenge, and even if the

district court committed error, any such error was not plain error. Dedman’s constitutional challenge

thus fails.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A. Standard of Review

“We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found

that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1033 (1999); see also Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “A defendant making such a

challenge bears a very heavy burden.” Spearman, 186 F.3d at 746. “[I]t is well-settled that

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may support a conviction in federal court.” Id.

B. Sufficiency of the § 286 Evidence

Dedman claims that the government did not present sufficient evidence so that a rational trier

of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements for a conviction under

18 U.S.C. § 286. We disagree.

Section 286 provides: “Whoever enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to

defraud the United States, or any department or agency thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the

payment or allowance of any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim, shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 286. We have never before fully

elaborated upon the elements of a violation of § 286. Our only attempt at identifying the elements

that the government must prove was in an unpublished order one decade ago. In that case, we said

that “[t]o sustain the conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 286, the government must prove that:

1) there was a conspiracy to defraud the United States; 2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and

intended to join it; and 3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States

v. Franklin, No. 97-6137, 1998 WL 808253, *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1998) (unpublished order) (citing

United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1995)). We believe that our attempt in

Franklin was not sufficient because the first element tautologically restates the crime rather than

separating out any individual elements. It was perhaps for that same reason that the Fifth Circuit,

the circuit upon which we relied in Franklin, subsequently expanded upon the set of elements

necessary to support a conviction under § 286. In United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 633 (5th Cir.

1996), the Fifth Circuit held that “[t]o obtain a conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States

under § 286, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered into

a conspiracy to obtain payment or allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United

States; that the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; and that the defendant knew at the time that

the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent.”

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7

The government does not need to prove an overt act under 18 U.S.C. § 286. Although an overt act is required

under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, the language of that statute specifically requires that “one or more

of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 371. In contrast, when a statute does not

require an overt act, we do not read that requirement into the statute. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997)

(holding there is no overt-act requirement for the RICO conspiracy statute because “[t]here is no requirement of some

overt act or specific act in the statute before us, unlike the general conspiracy provision”). Section 286, like the RICO

conspiracy provision, does not require an overt act.

The Fifth Circuit’s Leahy approach is not the only one available. The Eleventh Circuit has

also offered its interpretation: “This court will sustain a conviction for conspiracy to submit false

claims to the United States, if the government proved the existence of an agreement to achieve an

unlawful objective, the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy, and the

commission of an overt act in furtherance of it.” United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1194 (11th

Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.

Ct. 2446 (2007). With the exception of the addition of an overt-act requirement, the Eleventh

Circuit’s approach strikes us as suffering from the same malady of vagueness as our approach in

Franklin.

After considering our sister circuits’ efforts, we conclude that best approach is a hybrid of

the Franklin and Leahy approaches. Accordingly, we clarify that the elements necessary for a

conviction under § 286 are: (1) the defendant entered into a conspiracy to obtain payment or

allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United States; (2) the claim was false,

fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew or was deliberately ignorant of the claim’s falsity,

fictitiousness, or fraudulence; (4) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and intended to join it; and

(5) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.7

 Because the district court’s

instructions to the jury were not in contradiction with our clarification of the elements necessary to

convict under § 286, we proceed to address Dedman’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.

There is no doubt that the government introduced sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction

as to elements one, four, and five. The invalidity of the marriage satisfies the second element. As

to element three, however, Dedman contends that the government failed to introduce sufficient

evidence because it did not establish that she knew that the marriage was illegal and, therefore, she

could have not known that the claim was false. The logical puzzle that Dedman provides us is this:

if she knew that the marriage was illegal in Arkansas, why did she travel to Arkansas in the first

place, if the marriage would have been legal in her home state of Kentucky? See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.010(1) (prohibiting marriage “between persons who are nearer of kin to each other by

consanguinity, whether of the whole or half-blood, than second cousins”).

Dedman’s argument, while certainly creative, does not establish that the government failed

to produce sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. What Dedman’s challenge asks us to

determine is whether knowledge that a claim is false, fictitious, or fraudulent requires evidence

establishing that Dedman knew that the claim was illegal. We conclude that actual knowledge of

the illegality of a claim is not required; deliberate ignorance of the falsity of the claim is sufficient

to establish knowledge of the false, fictitious, or fraudulent nature of the claim.

While the government was not required to produce evidence establishing that Dedman knew

that the law forbade the type of claim she was making, the government was required to introduce

evidence that she suspected that her claims were false yet did nothing to investigate the legality of

her actions. Although it may seem contradictory that a defendant could not know that a claim was

illegal but still believe it was likely she was violating the law, the scienter requirement for a

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8

That statutory provision directs that: “Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military,

or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States,

or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not

more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 287.

9

The circuits, however, do not have unanimous agreement as to the appropriate standard. For instance, the

Ninth Circuit sets quite a high standard and states that “[t]o be false, a claim must not only be inaccurate but consciously

so.” United States v. Barker, 967 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991). In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has used the seemingly

lesser standard of whether the defendant had the “intent to deceive.” United States v. Martin, 772 F.2d 1442, 1444 (8th

Cir. 1985).

conviction under the similar 18 U.S.C. § 2878 demonstrates that such a state of knowledge is indeed

possible. For instance, we have upheld convictions under § 287 where knowledge of falsity was

not established at all, but where the government instead established deliberate ignorance. United

States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]his circuit has repeatedly upheld the

district court’s knowledge instruction on the basis that it prevents a criminal defendant from

escaping conviction merely by deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging

in unlawful conduct. Accordingly, we hold that the instruction on deliberate ignorance was not

erroneous.” (citations omitted)). Other circuits have adopted a similar standard. United States v.

Patient Transfer Serv., Inc., 413 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) (“There was evidence at trial that

Wise actually knew that the billing practice being used at PTS was not proper or deliberately

avoided investigating whether it was.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255,

258-59 (7th Cir. 1991) (“You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and indifference

to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed

or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn,

you may conclude that he acted ‘knowingly’ . . . .” (quoting approvingly from the district court’s

instructions)); United States v. Precision Med. Labs., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1978)

(“‘(Y)ou may find Mr. Gall acted willfully and knowingly if you find that the claim was false and

that Mr. Gall knew that the claims were false, or that he acted with a deliberate disregard of whether

the claims were true or false; in other words, that he closed his eyes to the truth here . . . .’” (quoting

approvingly from the district court’s instructions yet noting that the “willfully” language only

increased the burden for the government even though it was perhaps unnecessary)).9

Although the cases regarding § 287 are only instructive to us when considering the requisite

scienter for § 286, these § 287 cases demonstrate that deliberate ignorance can establish knowledge

of falsity. In such cases, the defendant certainly does not know that what she is doing is illegal, but

the defendant still has some sense that what she is doing is wrong and makes no effort to determine

the propriety of her actions. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we

believe that the totality of Dedman’s actions—a pattern of skulking and scheming—establish that

she had a sense that what she was doing was wrong, yet closed her eyes to that fact and proceeded

with her plan. Accordingly, the government adduced sufficient evidence to show that Dedman knew

or was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claims.

The government presented evidence sufficient that a rational factfinder could conclude that

Dedman was at least deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claim, if not possessing actual

knowledge of the falsity. Although the reasons for holding the wedding in Arkansas, as opposed

to Kentucky, might not be immediately clear, we disagree with the dissent’s view that “[t]he

likelihood that Dedman picked Arkansas knowing or even suspecting that the marriage would be

void simply defies common sense.” Dissenting Op. at 21. In fact, we believe that the trip to

Arkansas is the government’s strongest evidence in support of the conclusion that Dedman was

deliberately ignorant of the falsity of her claims. Holding the marriage in Arkansas was plainly done

to hide the existence of the marriage from those in Kentucky who might know them. It is likely that,

recognizing the absurdity and likely illegality of her claims, Dedman assumed that the marriage

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would be equally void and equally false in Arkansas as in Kentucky. Thus, Dedman likely viewed

the choice between Arkansas and Kentucky as a choice between two locations in which the marriage

would be illegal, and she picked the location that was farther from her home and her neighbors. In

that case, a rational juror could believe that Dedman suspected the falsity of her claims and could

view the trip as an attempt to assure secrecy for the relationship by procuring the illicit nuptials far

from home, where the participants would not be known.

In addition to the location of the marriage, the government presented additional evidence that

would support a finding of deliberate ignorance on the part of Dedman. For instance, the

government presented testimony from both Holland and a family friend that suggested that Dedman

carefully orchestrated the marriage in order to obtain money from the SBP, including a statement

from a family friend about Dedman’s comment that she had “solved the situation with the annuity.”

J.A. at 172 (Green at 171:13-22). Nothing presented during the trial controverted this damaging

testimony. A rational juror could conclude that, because the marriage was Dedman’s idea, she at

least possessed some knowledge of the rules governing the SBP and thus understood the fraudulent

nature of what she was trying to accomplish. Furthermore, the government provided uncontradicted

evidence to establish that once Dedman turned on Holland, Dedman called various government

agencies to inform them that Holland was defrauding the government. A rational juror could easily

conclude that this indicates that if Dedman did not know that her SBP claim was false, she was at

least pretty sure that it was false. In addition, when the government began to investigate the claims,

Dedman invoked the phrase “a person of insurable interest,” which is a term taken right out of the

statute governing the SBP. J.A. at 189 (Quellhorst at 27:8-14); 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b). From that fact,

a rational juror could certainly conclude that Dedman had more than a passing familiarity with the

SBP’s legal regime. It is, therefore, apparent to us, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the government, that a rational juror could certainly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the

evidence presented that Dedman did possess knowledge of the falsity of the SBP claims.

The heart of the dissent’s disagreement with our holding today is not over a question of law

but of fact. The dissent claims that “there is no evidence that the defendant knew or was deliberately

ignorant of what made her claim legally false.” Dissenting Op. at 23. We disagree. As we have just

indicated, there is no shortage of proof supporting a finding that Dedman was deliberately ignorant

of the falsity of her claims, particularly when we take the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as we are bound to do. Furthermore, the dissent errs when it claims that Dedman’s bad

intent “provides no proof” supporting her conviction, id., because her bad intent is probative as to

whether she acted in deliberate ignorance of the falsity of her claims. That she intended to collect

the SBP funds and did so suspecting that her claims were false—what could collectively be called

her bad intent—is what triggers the finding of deliberate ignorance and satisfies the third element

of a § 286 offense.

Before moving on, it is worth clarifying the distinction between our holding here and the

government’s sham-marriage argument that we previously discussed. The government, in its shammarriage theory, claimed that a jury could convict Dedman for a violation of § 286 solely on the

basis of her nefarious intent. In other words, the government claimed that she was guilty simply

because Holland and Watson did not enter their marriage out of love; the government’s argument

did not depend upon a court finding the marriage invalid. Our conclusion in this section that there

was sufficient evidence to establish that Dedman knew or was deliberately ignorant of the falsity

of the claim—and therefore sufficient evidence to convict Dedman—does not rely on the

government’s theory. As we stated at the beginning of this section, a conviction under § 286

requires that the government prove five elements: (1) the defendant entered into a conspiracy to

obtain payment or allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United States; (2) the

claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew or was deliberately ignorant of the

claim’s falsity, fictitiousness, or fraudulence; (4) the defendant knew of the conspiracy and intended

to join it; and (5) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Our focus in this section

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has been the third element; in contrast, the purpose of the government’s sham-marriage theory was

to make element two unnecessary. Our interpretation of the elements of § 286 requires both actual

fraud (satisfied by the invalidity of the marriage) and knowledge or deliberate ignorance of the

falsity or fraudulent nature of the claim (which we have discussed in this section). Dedman’s intent

to create a sham marriage helps to establish that she knew or was deliberately ignorant of the falsity

of the claim. The government’s sham-marriage theory, however, addresses only Dedman’s intent,

making it necessary for us to consider whether the marriage was valid. Accordingly, the fact that

the marriage was a sham (i.e., the couple did not live or act as a married couple) might be probative

of the knowledge or deliberate ignorance component of § 286 but would not be sufficient for us to

uphold this conviction.

It should, therefore, be apparent that Dedman’s conviction is in part the result of bad luck.

Had Dedman, with the same intent, taken Holland and Watson to marry in Kentucky instead of

Arkansas, the marriage would have been valid and there would have been no false claim. In fact,

under the law we apply in this case, any person with nothing but the worst motives could enter into

a marriage that lasts for over a year immediately preceding death and qualify for the SBP without

triggering a violation of § 286; there could be no false claim as long as the marriage was valid. Such

a hypothetical case, however, is not before us. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to support Dedman’s conviction under § 286.

C. The Sufficiency of the § 1001 Evidence

Dedman also alleges that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. That statute provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the

jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the

United States, knowingly and willfully—

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a

material fact;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or

representation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to

contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). “A violation of § 1001 is comprised of five elements: (1) the defendant made

a statement; (2) the statement is false or fraudulent; (3) the statement is material; (4) the defendant

made the statement knowingly and willfully; and (5) the statement pertained to an activity within

the jurisdiction of a federal agency.” United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1998).

In order to convict Dedman, the government provided evidence of three different statements

that Dedman made: (1) a statement about Holland’s location, (2) a statement about Holland’s

disability, and (3) a statement about when Dedman first learned about the marriage between Holland

and Watson. When instructing the jury on the § 1001 claim, the district court told the jury that “[t]he

government does not have to prove all three of these for you to return a guilty verdict on this charge.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any one of these ways is enough. In order to return a guilty

verdict, all twelve of you must agree that at least one, and the same one, of these has been proved.”

J.A. at 70 (Instruction No. 27). Dedman now challenges the sufficiency of the government’s

evidence, claiming that the statement about Holland’s location was not material, the statement about

Holland’s disability was not proved to be false, and the statement about when Dedman first learned

about the marriage may have been a misunderstanding on Dedman’s part. Even if Dedman is correct

as to the comments regarding Holland’s location and Holland’s disability, we conclude that there

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was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict Dedman for false statements regarding when she first

learned of the marriage.

If the government alleged three false statements but two lacked sufficient evidence, how do

we know which false statement the unanimous jury used? We are certainly concerned that the jury

may have relied upon an unsupported statement, but our precedent requires that we presume that the

jury used the false statement that was supported by sufficient evidence, and that we uphold a

conviction where there was sufficient evidence for at least one of the alleged false statements. In

1953, we addressed a similar issue when we concluded that when “[t]he indictment charged that the

statement was false in five different respects,” then “[i]f the Government’s evidence proved that it

was false in only one of the respects charged, it was nevertheless a false statement, and such proof

would have sustained a verdict of guilty.” Stevens v. United States, 206 F.2d 64, 66 (6th Cir. 1953)

(upholding a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001). Stevens, however, did not resolve the issue at

hand because it dealt with one statement that was in false in several different ways, while the instant

case deals with several different allegedly false statements that were grouped into one count of the

indictment. In 1970, the Supreme Court suggested that courts should uphold verdicts when multiple

acts are alleged in one count and there is sufficient evidence as to one of the acts. Turner v. United

States, 396 U.S. 398, 419-21 (1970) (“The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict

on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is

sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” (footnote omitted)). Turner, however, was

not dispositive of the issue before us, because the statute at issue, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a), covered

multiple forms of behavior that would trigger a violation (purchasing, selling, dispensing, or

distributing narcotics), and the indictment alleged acts under each; in contrast, in the case at hand,

only one form of a violation was alleged under § 1001, but the indictment identified many possible

false statements. Thus, Turner left open the exact question before us. In 1989, in United States v.

Naserkhaki, 722 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Va. 1989), the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that a

general verdict under § 1001 must be reversed if there is a chance that the jury may have relied upon

insufficient factual grounds:

Since only one of defendant’s misstatements satisfies Section 1001’s

materiality requirement, and since the jury rendered a general verdict, it is not

possible to determine whether the verdict rests in whole, or in part, on the immaterial

misstatement. Accordingly defendant’s conviction is infected with error and cannot

stand. Abundant authority requires that “a general verdict must be set aside if the

jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and

one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively

on the insufficient ground.”

Id. at 249 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881 (1983)). The Supreme Court, however,

disagreed. In 1991, citing the same cases that Naserkhaki called its “abundant authority,” compare

id. with Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 54-57 (1991), all eight participating Justices agreed

that there was no basis for “set[ting] aside a general verdict because one of the possible bases of

conviction was neither unconstitutional as in Stromberg [v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931),] nor

even illegal as in Yates [v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957),] but merely unsupported by sufficient

evidence.” Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56; id. at 60-61 (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment). The

reason that the Supreme Court found this untroubling was that, although jurors would not be well

equipped to identify a legally deficient argument, “when they have been left the option of relying

upon a factually inadequate theory,” there is little danger, “since jurors are well equipped to analyze

the evidence.” Id. at 59. “[J]urors can rely on their own intelligence and experience to save them

from relying upon a factually inadequate theory.” United States v. Henning, 286 F.3d 914, 921 (6th

Cir. 2002). Thus, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary, we are to “presum[e] that jurors

convicted on the factually sufficient theory.” Id. at 922.

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10Dedman, however, may have had grounds for claiming that the second count of the indictment was

duplicitous.

A duplicitous indictment is one that charges separate offenses in a single count. The overall vice of

duplicity is that the jury cannot in a general verdict render its finding on each offense, making it

difficult to determine whether a conviction rests on only one of the offenses or on both. Adverse

effects on a defendant may include improper notice of the charges against him, prejudice in the

shaping of evidentiary rulings, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, in exposure to double

jeopardy, and of course the danger that a conviction will result from a less than unanimous verdict as

to each separate offense.

Duncan, 850 F.2d at 1108 n.4. We held in 1993 that “‘Congress, in enumerating several different types of fraudulent

conduct in Section 1001, did not create separate and distinct offenses,’” United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1265

(6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Uco Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 1976)), and, thus, “it becomes proper

to charge the different means, denounced disjunctively in the statute, conjunctively in each count of the indictment.”

Id. This meant not that multiple false statements could be alleged in a single count, but that the government could say

within the same count that a particular statement was both a false statement and concealment by scheme, because either

is a violation of § 1001. See id. Thus, we were too broad and misinterpreted Hixon when we later said that “multiple

factual predicates for violation of a statute do[] not render the indictment duplicitous.” United States v. Washington, 127

F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 940 (1998). Separate allegedly false statements, as we have in the

instant case, are not mere “multiple factual predicates” but rather are entirely separate offenses; even in Hixon, with

statements made on four separate occasions, the government had the good sense to charge each statement as a separate

violation of § 1001 in its own count. Hixon, 987 F.2d at 1264 n.3. The government’s indictment may have been

duplicitous, but unfortunately for Dedman, “[f]ailure . . . to raise the question prior to trial and verdict waived the vice

of duplicity,” United States v. Costner, 359 F.2d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1966), and we cannot now reverse on that ground.

See also United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a duplicitous indictment can be

dismissed only if the error is raised prior to trial; otherwise an instruction that requires unanimity among the jurors cures

the error).

According to our precedent, if there was sufficient evidence to support one of the false

statements that the government alleged, then we must presume that the jury relied on that false

statement, and we must uphold the conviction. We conclude that there was ample evidence for a

rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Dedman was lying when she said

that she found out about the marriage only in 2004. The testimony of Holland, Green, and the

federal investigator all suggested that Dedman knew about the marriage from the moment of the

nuptials, and that evidence was never controverted. Although the government investigator conceded

that it was possible Dedman misunderstood the question and meant only that she first learned about

the illegality of the marriage in 2004, the jury could have decided easily that Dedman understood

the question. We, therefore, reject Dedman’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her

conviction under § 1001.10

IV. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

A. Standard of Review

“‘The standard on appeal for a court’s charge to the jury is whether the charge, taken as a

whole, fairly and adequately submits the issues and applicable law to the jury.’” Buckley, 934 F.2d

at 87 (quoting United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir. 1984)). A party must object

to an instruction “before the jury retires to deliberate.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(d). If the party fails to

object, the instruction is reviewed only for plain error. United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 540

(6th Cir. 2004). “Where, in formulating instructions, the ‘district court engages in statutory

construction as a matter of law, . . . [the Sixth Circuit] review[s] [the] conclusions de novo.’”

Buckley, 934 F.2d at 87-88 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219,

223 (6th Cir. 1990)).

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No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 18

B. Analysis

Dedman asserts that the district court improperly instructed the jury on its determination of

Arkansas law and claims that the instruction amounted to a directed verdict against her. We find

this argument to be without merit.

The very case that Dedman cites as support for her directed-verdict argument stated in no

uncertain terms that “[t]he trial judge instructs the jury on the law applicable to the issues raised and,

in appropriate circumstances, may comment on the evidence.” United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315,

319 (6th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted) (holding that a trial court judge can instruct the jury on the

law but must leave findings of fact to the jury). In the instant case, the district court did not decide

facts for the jury but merely stated the law of Arkansas. That Arkansas law forbids such a marriage

may have made it likely that a jury would convict Dedman, but it was not, as Dedman argues,

equivalent to a judicial ruling that Dedman violated § 286. As we have already discussed, in order

to obtain a conviction the government still needed to establish that: (1) the defendant entered into

a conspiracy to obtain payment or allowance of a claim against a department or agency of the United

States; (2) the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew or was deliberately

ignorant of the claim’s falsity, fictitiousness, or fraudulence; (4) the defendant knew of the

conspiracy and intended to join it; and (5) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.

This jury instruction, which stated that “I also have decided to accept as proved that a marriage

between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter is prohibited by Arkansas state law,” J.A. at

66 (Instruction No. 23), established only that the marriage in question was void. The natural

consequence of the district court’s determination of Arkansas law was that Dedman’s claim was

false, but the instruction did not establish any of the other necessary elements of the offense.

Because Dedman did not object to the instruction at trial, we review for plain error and we conclude

that the district court did not plainly err when it properly instructed the jury as to the applicable law.

V. THE LOSS CALCULATION

A. Standard of Review

Whether to apply a particular guideline provision is a legal question reviewed de novo.

United States v. Triana, 468 F.3d 308, 321 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Comer, 93 F.3d 1271,

1278 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1033 (1996).

B. Analysis

Dedman contends that the district court erred when it calculated the government’s loss by

including the income taxes that were withheld from the SBP payments in addition to the net-of-tax

payments actually received. The resolution of this question is important because if withheld taxes

are not included, then the government’s total loss would be below $200,000, and Dedman would

receive an offense level addition of only ten levels. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(F). If, however,

withheld taxes are included, then the total loss would exceed $200,000, and Dedman would receive

an offense level addition of twelve levels. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). Whether withheld taxes can

be considered part of the government’s loss in calculating a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1 is a question that neither this court, nor any other, appears to have addressed. As a matter

of first impression, we conclude that the withheld taxes were properly included in the loss

determination.

In resolving this novel issue, we construe the Guidelines. According to an application note

to the 2005 Guidelines, “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt.

3(A). An application note defines “actual loss” as the “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that

resulted from the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(i). In contrast, “intended loss” is the

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“pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense” and it includes “intended pecuniary

harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(ii).

The Guidelines’ comments on government benefits provide some further guidance. When

addressing government benefits, an application note states that “loss shall be considered to be not

less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted to unintended uses,

as the case may be.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(F)(ii) (emphasis added). This provision is helpful in

two ways. First, by saying “not less than the value of benefits obtained,” the Guidelines suggest that

the dollar amount that the defendant receives serves as a minimum value for the government’s loss,

but that the government’s loss can exceed that value. In this case, that permits the court to consider

the withheld taxes. The government-benefits commentary also suggests that the “value of the

benefits obtained” is inclusive of more than simply the sum added to the defendant’s bank account.

Because the SBP payments may be subject to income taxation, the only way a defendant could

receive in excess of $200,000 is to file a claim for significantly more money. Thus, it can be said

that Dedman received $230,000 worth of value even if she received only slightly more than

$200,000 in checks; using the amount of the claim, rather than simply the net amount paid to her,

reflects a better measure of the value of her true benefit. Cf. Triana, 468 F.3d at 323 (“[C]ourts have

consistently held that in calculating loss, ‘substitution of defendants’ gain is not the preferred

method because it ordinarily underestimates the loss.’” (quoting United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d

1291, 1295 (11th Cir.2002))).

That the amount pocketed by Dedman underestimates the government’s true loss is further

confirmed by considering the SBP’s gross payments. The SBP may have only paid to Dedman an

amount less than $200,000, but it also paid a considerable sum to state and federal tax agencies on

Dedman’s behalf. Dedman claims that withheld taxes should not be included in the government’s

loss calculation as though the withheld funds simply stayed with the SBP, ignoring the fact that the

SBP paid the withheld taxes to the appropriate taxing agencies. Thus, the withheld taxes should be

considered part of the government’s loss. This analysis applies equally to Dedman if the withheld

taxes were paid on Holland’s behalf for any payments attributed as income to Holland.

To exclude the withheld taxes from the calculations of loss would create unfairness under

the Guidelines. The Guidelines tie culpability to the length of punishment, and exclusion of

withheld taxes would create the possibility that less culpable defendants would be punished more.

See United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 375 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1). If

withheld taxes were not included in the loss calculation, then someone who filed a false claim for

$200,000.01 for some non-taxable benefit would be punished more than someone who filed a false

claim for $230,000 that was subject to $30,000 in withheld taxes. Thus, not to include withheld

taxes would be to break the Guidelines’ intended correlation between intended loss and the amount

of punishment.

Recently, in United States v. Coker, 514 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2008), we dealt with a case where

government prosecutors allowed the government loss attributed to one defendant to be reduced by

the amount that the defendant paid in taxes on the fraudulent payments. That case does not alter our

analysis in this case. In Coker, the government volunteered to reduce its loss by the amount of taxes

that the defendant paid, so the loss calculation was never at issue in that case. Furthermore, Coker

dealt with another defendant in the same scheme, not the defendant who received a favorable loss

calculation, so the validity of the loss calculation was not before the court. Most importantly, we

acknowledged in that case that “[t]he prosecutor’s decision to give Walsh a credit for the taxes he

paid as ‘money returned to the victim’ under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment (n.2(E)(i)) was not required

by the Guidelines.” Coker, 514 F.3d at 569 (emphasis added).

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For all of these reasons, we therefore hold that withheld taxes are properly considered part

of the government’s loss under § 2B1.1. We affirm the district court’s calculations of the amount

of loss.

VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, we conclude that the government cannot rely on its sham-marriage theory

because the district court did not instruct the jury as to that argument, and that necessitates that we

determine the validity of the marriage between Watson and Holland. We determine that the district

court correctly decided that the marriage was void under Arkansas state law. We further conclude

that even if the Arkansas marriage statute were unconstitutional, it was not plain error for the district

court to apply it. We also determine that there is sufficient evidence to support Dedman’s

convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 286 and 1001. We conclude that the district court’s jury instruction

regarding Arkansas law is not plainly erroneous. And finally, we hold that withheld taxes are

properly considered part of the government’s loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. For all of these reasons,

we AFFIRM Dedman’s convictions and sentence.

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_________________

DISSENT _________________

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The arranged marriage of Dedman’s

adoptive father to her adopted daughter was a sham if ever there was one. And because the marriage

was void under Arkansas law, Holland (the adopted daughter) is obligated to repay the SBP benefits

to which she was not entitled. In sum, the scheme cooked up by Dedman and Holland to continue

receiving Watson’s military pension benefits after his death carries the pungent aroma of “fraud”

in the general sense of the word.

But the “ickiness” of the scheme (i.e., that a grandfather would marry his granddaughter)

does not answer the question of whether Dedman violated 18 U.S.C. § 286. The fact that she

“gamed the system,” in other words, does not necessarily make her guilty of violating the statute.

We first need to be clear about what § 286 makes illegal. The majority has accurately set

out the elements of the offense. (Maj. Op. at 12) I disagree, however, with the majority’s

conclusion that the government proved the third element of the offense—that Dedman either knew

or was deliberately ignorant of the fact that the claim for benefits was false, fictitious, or fraudulent.

In particular, I focus on the relationship between the second element of the offense—that the claim

for benefits was in fact false, fictitious, or fraudulent—and the knowledge component of the third

element. To sustain a conviction under § 286, the government must produce sufficient evidence to

prove that Dedman had knowledge (or was deliberately ignorant) of the very thing that made the

claim false, fraudulent, or fictitious.

The majority explicitly states that the second element of the offense is “satisfied by the

invalidity of the marriage” under Arkansas law, and I agree. (Maj. Op. at 15) But the majority’s

contention that Dedman either knew or was deliberately ignorant of the fact that the claim was false

is based on nothing more than evidence indicating that the marriage between Holland and Watson

was in fact a “sham,” entered into solely for the purpose of obtaining Watson’s SBP benefits. As

the majority explains, “the totality of Dedman’s actions—a pattern of skulking and

scheming—establish that she had a sense that what she was doing was wrong, yet closed her eyes

to that fact and proceeded with her plan.” (Maj. Op. at 13) This evidence indeed suggests that

Dedman was intent on perpetrating a “fraud,” but it has no probative force regarding whether

Dedman knew that the marriage was illegal under Arkansas law. With no evidence indicating that

Dedman knew or was deliberately ignorant of the fact that her claim for benefits was fraudulent

because the marriage was illegal—as opposed to being fraudulent because the marriage was a

sham—her conviction cannot be sustained.

One has to wonder why Dedman would take Holland and Watson to Arkansas to enter a

marriage that she allegedly either knew or suspected was illegal in that state. As the majority

acknowledges, Dedman would not have violated § 286 if Holland had been married in Kentucky,

where such a marriage of those related only by adoption is legal. (Maj. Op. at 15) The likelihood

that Dedman picked Arkansas knowing or even suspecting that the marriage would be void simply

defies common sense. Instead, her most likely motive was to have the ceremony far away from

home so that her neighbors would not learn of the marriage.

Dedman’s ex-husband in fact testified at the trial that the wedding took place in Arkansas

when Dedman went to pick up her ailing mother, who lived there. Holland also testified that

Dedman had told her to keep the marriage secret “because [Dedman] didn’t want [Watson] to look

like a cradle robber and she didn’t want me to look like a golddigger.” As the only person present

at the wedding who testified at trial, Holland said that she did not know that there was anything

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No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 22

legally wrong with the marriage. Any suggestion that Dedman was deliberately ignorant of

Arkansas law thus lacks evidentiary support and is a far cry from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

This leaves only the question of whether proof of procuring a “sham” marriage can violate

§ 286 even if the marriage is otherwise legal. The Supreme Court answered that question in the

negative in the analogous context of Social Security survivor benefits in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422

U.S. 749 (1975). Weinberger involved a class-action challenge to the constitutionality of the Social

Security Act’s nine-month duration-of-relationship requirement for a widow to receive survivor

benefits. Salfi had been married for only six months when her husband died, but she claimed that

her marriage was otherwise valid and should entitle her to her deceased husband’s Social Security

benefits. A three-judge panel of the district court declared the nine-month requirement

unconstitutional on the basis that the requirement “constitutes a presumption that marriages

. . . which did not precede the wage earner’s death by at least nine months were entered into for the

purpose of securing Social Security benefits.” Id. at 767-68 (quoting Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F.

Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974).

In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court focused on Congress’s intent to impose a

prophylactic duration-of-relationship requirement as opposed to individual determinations regarding

the good-faith intentions of purported “widows.” The Court stated that the duration-of-relationship

requirement “operates to lessen the likelihood of abuse through sham relationships entered in

contemplation of imminent death.” Id. at 780. It also noted that individual determinations are often

flawed because of uncertainty that they “could effectively filter out sham arrangements, since neither

marital intent, life expectancy, nor knowledge of terminal illness has been shown . . . to be reliabl[y]

determinable.” Id. at 782-83. Ultimately, the Court rejected the call for individual determinations

of the validity of marriages and the good-faith intentions of the spouses, explaining as follows:

[T]he duration-of-relationship requirement represents not merely a

substantive policy determination that benefits should be awarded only

on the basis of genuine marital relationships, but also a substantive

policy determination that limited resources would not be well spent

in making individual determinations. It is an expression of

Congress’[s] policy choice that the Social Security system, and its

millions of beneficiaries, would be best served by a prophylactic rule

which bars claims arising from the bulk of sham marriages which are

actually entered, which discourages such marriages from ever taking

place, and which is also objective and easily administered.

Id. at 784-85. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court would reach a different

conclusion in the analogous context of SBP benefits. I thus agree with the majority that Dedman’s

improper motives are irrelevant in proving that the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent.

But this inexorably leads me to the heart of the problem with the majority’s analysis.

Because there is no good-faith marriage requirement under the SBP, there are only two

circumstances under which a surviving spouse such as Holland would not be entitled to SBP

benefits: (1) where the marriage is invalid under state law, or (2) where a valid marriage does not

meet the one-year durational requirement. Dedman’s conviction is unsustainable because her

intended fraud—the arrangement of a sham marriage between her adoptive father and her adopted

daughter—did not disqualify Holland for SBP benefits. The only thing that would have made

Dedman’s conduct false, fraudulent, or fictitious under the SBP is proof beyond a reasonable doubt

that she either knew or was deliberately ignorant of the fact that the marriage was invalid under

Arkansas law.

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No. 06-6124 United States v. Dedman Page 23

Despite the majority’s conclusion “that Dedman was deliberately ignorant of the falsity of

her claims” (Maj. Op. at 14), it is unable to point to any evidence that Dedman suspected that the

marriage in Arkansas would be invalid. The majority’s statement that “[i]t is likely that . . . Dedman

assumed that the marriage would be equally void and equally false in Arkansas as in Kentucky,” id.

at 13-14, finds no support in the record and is in fact contrary to the evidence that exists on this key

issue. First of all, the majority itself acknowledges that the marriage would have been perfectly

legal in Kentucky. (Maj. Op. at 15) Second, Holland testified that she had no reason to believe that

her marriage to Watson in Arkansas was invalid. There is no evidence to the contrary.

I am thus unpersuaded by the majority’s ultimate conclusion that Dedman’s “bad intent . . . is

what triggers the finding of deliberate ignorance and satisfies the third element of a § 286 offense.”

(Maj. Op. at 14) Dedman’s “bad intent” was simply to orchestrate a sham marriage, but this

provides no proof that she had any reason to believe that the marriage in Arkansas was invalid. In

fact, her bad intent would have been the same regardless of whether the marriage took place in

Kentucky (where it would have been valid) or Arkansas. Moreover, Dedman had every reason to

want the marriage to be valid in order for her to continue reaping the benefits of her adoptive

father’s military pension after he died.

The majority’s conjecture, therefore, about Dedman’s state of mind regarding the validity

of the marriage is insufficient to support her conviction. In the end, my disagreement with the

majority is fundamentally a dispute about what evidence is legally required to establish the third

element of a § 286 offense where, as in the present case, there is no evidence that the defendant

knew or was deliberately ignorant of what made her claim legally false. Although we are required

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, I find the record bereft of such

evidence here. Accordingly, I believe that Dedman has been wrongly convicted of this offense.

I now turn to another issue in this case—the amount of loss attributed to Dedman. On this

question I agree with the result reached by the majority, but not with its reasoning. Including

withheld taxes in the government’s loss calculation will generally lead to punishing a defendant for

a nonexistent loss because taxes that are withheld from a government payment are simply redirected

to the United States Treasury. In Dedman’s case, however, the money she obtained was from a

specific program administered by an agency that undoubtedly has an annual budget appropriated by

Congress. Paying SBP benefits to an improper recipient thus has a detrimental effect on the funds

allotted to the SBP. Although the withheld taxes were redirected from the SBP to the Tresaury, we

have no way of knowing what happened to the money subsequently. The withheld taxes from the

benefits received by Dedman and Holland were therefore “diverted to unintended uses” despite

remaining under the control of the government. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(F)(ii) (explaining that

in the context of a loss calculation for government benefits, “loss shall be considered to be not less

than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted to unintended uses, as

the case may be”).

In my opinion, of course, we should not even reach the amount-of-loss issue. We should

instead reverse Dedman’s conviction due to the government’s failure to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that she either knew or was deliberately ignorant of the fact that Holland’s marriage was

illegal under Arkansas law. I therefore respectfully dissent.

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