Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01208/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01208-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
General Teamsters Union Local No. 439
Petitioner
Sunrise Sanitation Services, Inc.
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL

NO. 439,

NO. CIV. S-05-1208 WBS JFM

Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 

AND CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

SUNRISE SANITATION SERVICES,

INC.,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185, petitioner General

Teamsters Union Local No. 439 filed this petition to compel

respondent Sunrise Sanitation Services, Inc. to arbitrate a labor

grievance. Petitioner bases its request on the terms of a

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) entered into between

respondent and the bargaining representative that preceded

petitioner. Currently before the court are (1) petitioner’s

motion to compel arbitration and (2) respondent’s motion for

summary judgment. 

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Although not required, a certification petition is 1

routinely filed with the Board to prevent the employer from

resisting a newly affiliated union’s efforts to bargain. See

Seattle-First, 475 U.S. at 200 n.8.

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts of this dispute are largely uncontested. 

Respondent, a waste collection and disposal company located in

Stockton, California, had a longstanding collective bargaining

relationship with an independent union known as the

Sunrise/Sunset Employees Association (“the Association”). 

(Resp’t Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) No. 2.) However,

on October 28, 2004, members of the Association voted, by a show

of hands, to merge their existing bargaining representative with

petitioner’s international organization. (Id. Nos. 15-17.) The

merger agreement provided that, “effective October 28, 2004, the

Association ‘will cease to exist as an independent entity and

shall be consolidated into’ Local 439.” (Id. No. 19.) 

Typically, when members of an existing union vote to

affiliate or merge with another union, the National Labor

Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) willingly grants the

concomitant petition to amend certification, which establishes 1

the recently elected union as the employees’ labor

representative. NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Employees of Am., 475 U.S.

192, 199 (1986) (hereinafter “Seattle-First”). However, when

“the organizational changes accompanying affiliation [are]

substantial enough to create a different entity, the affiliation

raise[s] a ‘question concerning representation’ which [can] only

be resolved through the Board’s election procedure.” Id. Here,

the parties stipulated on November 5, 2004 “that a valid question

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concerning representation (‘QCR’) existed and consented to a

representation election to be conducted by the NLRB . . . .” 

(SUF No. 43.) The Board conducted this election on December 3,

2004 and certified petitioner “as the bargaining agent for ‘all

full-time and regular part-time drivers at [respondent’s]

facility located [in Stockton]” on December 14, 2004. (Id. No.

44.)

Concurrent with these events, Shane Thomasson, a refuse

truck driver for respondent, “was involved in his second on-thejob vehicular accident in less than a month” on December 1, 2004. 

(Basso Decl. ¶ 3.) He was suspended and later terminated on

December 13, 2004 following a determination by respondent that

his accidents were preventable. (Id.) 

The instant dispute arises out of petitioner’s desire

to submit for arbitration a grievance pertaining to Thomasson’s

discharge, pursuant to the terms of the CBA entered into by

respondent and the Association. This agreement was intended to

be in effect from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004 and

thereafter subject to termination or renegotiation upon 60 days

notice “by either party to the other party prior to December 31,

2004.” (Palacio Decl. Ex. A at TEMO024.) On October 27, 2004,

the day before the Association members undertook their first vote

on the merger with petitioner, the Association’s leadership

signed a letter which purported “to terminate the current

collective bargaining agreement effective December 31, 2004 . . .

.” (Id. Ex. B.) Pablo Barrera, petitioner’s business

representative, forwarded this letter to Don Gomez, one of

respondent’s representatives. (Id. ¶ 12.) However, regardless

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On March 24, 2006, the court held a hearing to address 2

respondent’s 27 objections to the declarations of Pablo Barrera,

Humberto Palacio, and Edward Speckman. It became increasingly

clear in those proceedings that many of respondent’s objections

were needless and consequently, several were withdrawn pursuant

to a stipulated order submitted by the parties. (Mar. 29, 2006

Order.) Additionally, petitioner submitted revised declarations

from Barrera, Palacio, and Speckman on April 3, 2006 to address

the objections that did have merit and were relevant to a motion

for summary judgment. The court has relied on these revised

declarations, to which no objections are made, in considering

these motions.

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of this alleged arrangement, respondent has resisted petitioner’s

efforts to enforce Thomasson’s rights pursuant to the terms of

the CBA and primarily argues that the existing CBA terminated

once the Association ceased to exist. (Resp’t Cross-Mot. for

Summ. J. 11.)2

II. Discussion

In opposition to petitioner’s motion to compel

arbitration, respondent submitted a cross-motion for summary

judgment. Because petitioner “[is] seeking by [its] motion to

have the [c]ourt award the ultimate relief sought,” it is

appropriate to, as the parties have done, treat petitioner’s

motion to compel arbitration and respondent’s motion for summary

judgment as cross-motions for summary judgment. Teamster

Automotive Employees Local Union No. 665 v. Ampco Parking, No.

C93-4577, 1994 WL 72209, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1994); see

also Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. Cincinnati Enquirer,

Inc., 863 F.2d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The Guild’s motion to

compel arbitration was a motion for summary judgment, in effect,

as the Enquirer recognized when it styled its own subsequent

motion a ‘cross-motion’ for summary judgment.”).

///

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A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 

Although both sides must argue that there are no

uncontested issues of material fact in filing cross-motions for

summary judgment, this “does not vitiate the court’s

responsibility to determine whether disputed issues of material

fact are present.” United States v. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573

F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1978). The court “must review the

evidence submitted in support of each cross-motion [in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party] and consider each party’s

motions on their own merits.” Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (emphasis added).

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B. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, respondent argues that this court

lacks jurisdiction to rule in favor of petitioner because this

outcome necessarily depends on a determination that petitioner

was a “successor union.” Such matters, respondent contends, are

within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, pursuant to

section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 159(b), the Board has “exclusive jurisdiction to determine

questions of representation in the context of collective

bargaining.” Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l v. Standard Oil

Co. of Ind., 529 F. Supp. 184, 185 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing West

Point-Pepperell v. Textile Workers Union of Am., 559 F.2d 304,

307 (5th Cir. 1977)). Consequently, district courts may not

initially “consider and pass upon questions of representation and

determination of appropriate bargaining units.” United Ass’n of

Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v.

Valley Eng’rs, 975 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Local

3-193 v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 611 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir.

1980)). 

In the context of a merger, whether the subsequent

union merely continues to represent employees as a “successor

union” or constitutes a new bargaining representative altogether

presents a representation question. West Point-Pepperell, 559

F.2d at 307; Carpinteria Lemon Ass’n v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554, 557

(9th Cir. 1957). Therefore, it appears that questions regarding

whether petitioner succeeded the Association as the bargaining

representative for respondent’s truck drivers are beyond the

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The Fifth Circuit has further noted that although 3

district courts “have concurrent jurisdiction over questions of

employer successorship,” they lack “concurrent jurisdiction over

questions of union successorship.” Point-Pepperell, 559 F.2d at

307.

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scope of this court’s authority. Nw. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Con 3

Iverson Trucking, Inc., 749 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984)

(“Usually district courts have no jurisdiction to decide

representational issues and must leave them for decision by the

NLRB.”); Point-Pepperell, 559 F.2d at 307 (“[W]herever there is a

change in the representation of a union, the board, and not the

courts, is the proper body to reassess the change.”). However,

respondent’s arguments place too much weight on the importance of

petitioner’s status as a successor union. 

The court’s apparent inability to decide this issue

does not require that the court rule in favor of respondent. The

successor organization doctrine is frequently addressed in cases

where an original party to the CBA seeks to hold a subsequent

organization to the terms agreed to by a predecessor entity. 

Under such circumstances, an organization that merely stepped

into the predecessor’s shoes, (i.e., a successor organization)

can be bound to arbitrate with the original parties to the CBA. 

NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972). 

The successor can also be held to the substantive terms of the

agreement--but only if it expressly or implicitly adopted the

agreement and/or its terms. Id. 

The need to apply the successor doctrine in a case such

as this, where the potential successor organization seeks to

enforce the CBA, is questionable. The requirements that a

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subsequent organization (1) share substantial continuity of

identity with the predecessor and (2) agree to be bound by the

CBA before it can be held to its terms were established because

of a concern that non-signatories might be saddled with terms and

conditions of employment to which they never agreed. Id. at 287-

88. Such concerns are not present when a new representative

seeks to enforce the terms of a CBA that the entity resisting

enforcement was actually a party to. See Cincinnati Newspaper,

863 F.2d at 445 (observing that allowing a new union to enforce

an existing CBA would not “saddle[ the employer] with substantive

contract provisions that it had neither agreed to nor assumed

because the [employer] had in fact agreed to all of the

provisions of the contract, including the arbitration provisions”

(citation omitted)). 

Moreover, the court need not rely on this doctrine, an

admitted distortion of ordinary contract law, when regular

contract principles can resolve this dispute. See John Wiley &

Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) (recognizing

that allowing courts to enforce a labor agreement to arbitrate

against “an unconsenting successor to a contracting party”

constitutes an exception to ordinary contract law); see also S.

Cal. Painters & Allied Trade Dist. Council No. 36 v. Best

Interiors, Inc., 359 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have

long recognized that general principles of contract law apply to

the formation of collective bargaining agreements.” (quotation

omitted)). As petitioner correctly points out, successorship is

not the only grounds upon which this court can rule that

petitioner has standing to enforce the CBA. Consequently, the

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Furthermore, some support exists for the argument that 4

a successorship inquiry is completely unnecessary where, as here,

a new union expressly agreed to adopt the CBA or “act[ed] in a

way that is consistent with an intent to be bound.” New Eng.

Mech., Inc. v. Laborers Local Union 294, 909 F.2d 1339, 1342-43

(9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has suggested that even when

an organization undergoes “an almost complete change in ownership

and management,” it can still be bound to the terms of a

predecessor’s CBA if it affirmatively adopts the agreement. Id. 

Significantly then, in addition to petitioner’s efforts to

arbitrate Thomasson’s discharge pursuant to the CBA, the

declaration of Pablo Barrera, a business representative for

petitioner, provides further evidence that the Teamsters intended

to be bound by the Association’s CBA. (See Barrera Decl. ¶¶ 8,

13 (“It was the understanding of the Union that the Union would

enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement through

its expiration on December 31, 2004 . . . .”)); see also S. Cal.

Painters, 359 F.3d at 1134 (“The Union’s sworn testimony that it

intended to be bound by an oral agreement sufficiently

establishes, for summary judgment purposes, the Union’s intent to

be bound.”).

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court need not engage in a substantial continuity, or

successorship, analysis.4

C. State of the CBA After the Merger

Under ordinary rules of contract law, a contractual

right is assignable unless assignment to another would materially

change the terms of the contract or the contract validly

precludes assignment by its terms. Restatement (Second) of

Contracts § 317(2)(a)-(c) (1981). Similarly, a contracting party

can delegate its performance of the contract as long as

“delegation is [not] contrary to public policy or the terms of

[the] promise” and the performance guaranteed by the contract

need not be personal. Id. § 318.

The CBA entered into by the Association and respondent

does not contain provisions that limit either party’s ability to

assign the agreement to another organization. Additionally,

public policy constrains a “certified representative’s” power to

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delegate its responsibilities only when the new and old

representatives are attempting to use delegation of the CBA to

effectively substitute representatives without having to secure

the Board’s approval. Nev. Sec. Innovations, Ltd., 341 NLRB No.

126, 2004 WL 1131249, at *5-6 (May 18, 2004) (“[A] certified

representative may delegate its duties under a contract,

[however,] it cannot delegate its responsibilities.”). Because

petitioner has already been certified as the appropriate

bargaining representative for respondent’s truck drivers, the

court need not be concerned that assignment of the CBA was

undertaken here as part of an end-run around the Board’s

procedural requirements. Finally, labor contracts are not

generally of a personal nature, and consequently their assignment

to a third party is not prohibited on these grounds. Cincinnati

Newspaper, 863 F.2d at 445.

In response to petitioner’s argument that it willingly

adopted the rights and obligations of the Association when it

became the Board certified representative, respondent argues that

no agreement existed for petitioner to assume. Relying on Sun

Oil Co. of Pennsylvania v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1978),

respondent posits that “[a] merger which creates a new bargaining

representative terminates the old bargaining agreement.” (Resp’t

Reply 3.) Indeed, respondent’s characterization of the holding

in Sun Oil is accurate. However, the reasoning in that case was

undermined in significant respects by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Seattle-First, 475 U.S. at 199 n.5, where the Court

abrogated cases that placed too much emphasis on the impact that

affiliation with a larger, stronger union would have on the

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bargaining position of the employer. See CPS Chem. Co., Inc. v.

NLRB, 160 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 1998). Although the holding of

Sun Oil regarding the post-merger viability of a CBA has not been

expressly overruled, because the outcome was likely colored by

excessive concern about the employer’s bargaining position, its

value is questionable.

Moreover, Sun Oil is at odds with decisions in other

circuits and, by analogy, the Supreme Court’s decision in Wiley. 

Significantly, the Court held in Wiley that “the disappearance by

merger of a corporate employer . . . does not automatically

terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement .

. . .” 376 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Second

Circuit has noted in dicta that when the bargaining relationship

between the parties to a CBA dissolves, termination of the

agreement is “at the prerogative of the incoming union”--it does

not happen automatically. Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal

Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 38, 288 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2002),

vacated 538 U.S. 918, aff’d on remand 351 F.3d 43 (2003); see

also United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.

Telex Computer Prods., Inc., 816 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1987)

(“Events which may change relations between and among employer,

union, and employees may impact but do not destroy the right to

redress arising under and relating to a valid preexisting

contract.”).

Of particular note, the Sixth Circuit has held, in a

case with many factual similarities, that “the right of the

employees to have their grievances arbitrated in accordance with

procedures hammered out between the employer and a properly

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The idea that the representative is the agent of the 5

employees who are principals to the CBA was implicitly rejected

by the Board in American Seating Co., 106 NLRB 250, 251, 255

(1953). However, in American Seating, the Board worried that if

it defined employees as principals, employers could argue that

the existing CBA was still binding between employers and

employees, despite the election by the employees of a new

bargaining representative, chosen expressly for the purpose of

negotiating new terms. Id. at 255. The rule in American Seating

was specifically tailored to prevent the emasculation of newly

chosen representatives. Moreover, it was established in a case

where a signatory to the agreement sought to hold a non-signatory

to its terms. Id. These same concerns are not at issue in this

case, where a non-signatory seeks to hold a signatory to terms

that it already agreed to. 

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recognized bargaining agent may not be abrogated by the employer

merely because the employees subsequently see fit to change their

agent.” Cincinnati Newspaper, 863 F.2d at 445-46. In Cincinnati

Newspaper, one union replaced another pursuant to a

representation election conducted after the employer questioned

the subsequent union’s continuity of representation. Id. at 445. 

When the new representative sought to arbitrate a dispute about

overtime payment, pursuant to the terms of a preexisting CBA that

was still in effect, the employer refused, arguing that a nonsignatory could not enforce the agreement. Id. at 442, 445. 

Reasoning that the employees, who are the actual principals to a

labor agreement, should be able to change their bargaining agent

without impacting the existence of the agreement itself, the

court remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration.5

Id. at 445-46. 

The Sixth Circuit’s rule that election of a new

bargaining representative does not terminate an agreement between

an employer and a preexisting union and that this agreement can

be voluntarily assumed by the new representative is simply better

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The court notes that the preexisting CBA in this case 6

described the Association in detail--specifically the agreement

described the preceding union’s structure and operating

procedures. (Resp’t Reply 6 n.1.) As respondent rightly notes,

the structure of the new bargaining representative and its

operating procedures are inconsistent with these terms. However,

even if these changes alter the agreement to such a degree that

it is either no longer enforceable or is at least voidable by

respondent, this is a matter for the arbitrator. See Howsam v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (holding that

defenses to enforcement are a matter for the arbitrator; district

courts only handle “questions of arbitrability”--the “gateway

dispute[s] about whether the parties are bound by a given

arbitration clause”).

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reasoned than the questionable holding in Sun Oil. Because an

existing CBA “may not be abrogated by the employer merely because

the employees subsequently see fit to change their agent,”

petitioner’s election as the new representative of respondent’s

truck divers did not terminate the existing CBA. See id. at 

446. Moreover, through this action to compel respondent to

arbitrate Thomasson’s discharge grievance and through

declarations attesting to the Association’s and petitioner’s

intent to have the Union enforce the terms of the collective

bargaining agreement through its expiration on December 31, 2004,

petitioner has demonstrated its intent to assume the CBA. (See,

e.g., Palacio Decl. ¶¶ 11, 15.) Consequently, petitioner has

standing to seek arbitration pursuant to the terms of the

agreement.6

D. Attorneys’ Fees

 As a final matter, both parties have requested

attorneys’ fees. However, petitioner cites no legal authority

for an award, and respondent provides only its conclusion that

fees are warranted because this petition was frivolous and filed

in bad faith, based on the Board’s prior decision not to hear

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petitioner’s unfair labor practices claim. 

“[A]bsent contractual or statutory authorization, a

prevailing litigant ordinarily may not collect attorneys’ fees.” 

Int’l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers v. W. Indus. Maint.,

Inc., 707 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1983). Still, the court may

award fees “when the losing party has acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Additionally, because federal policy favors

arbitration, a less demanding “without justification” standard

applies in cases involving refusals to arbitrate. United Food &

Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371,

1382-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an “award of fees is

appropriate when a party frivolously or in bad faith refuses to

submit a dispute to arbitration or appeals from an order

compelling arbitration”).

Given these standards, attorneys’ fees are not

warranted in this case. Petitioner, who will be awarded the

relief sought by this motion, has failed to identify a

contractual or statutory source for an award of attorneys’ fees. 

Further, given the Board’s prior decision in respondent’s favor,

the court fails to see how respondent’s opposition to

petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration can be labeled as “in

bad faith” or “without justification.”

III. Conclusion

At no time has respondent argued that the dispute over

Thomasson’s discharge is not a matter for arbitration pursuant to

the terms of the CBA that it entered into with the Association. 

(See Resp’t Reply 2 (conceding that “[t]here is no dispute that

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if the Union is the Association’s successor, then the greivance

would be arbitrable under the CBA”).) Instead, respondent has

only argued that the terms of the CBA cannot be enforced by

petitioner. Because the court has rejected this proposition and

herein holds that petitioner can enforce the agreement, an order

compelling respondent to arbitrate the matter is warranted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner’s motion to

compel arbitration be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both petitioner and

respondent’s motions for attorneys’ fees be, and the same hereby

are, DENIED.

DATED: April 25, 2006

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