Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02188/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02188-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joanina Lata
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2186

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Mark Salamasina, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Appeals from the United States

No. 09-2188 District Court for the

___________ Western District of Missouri.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Joanina Lata, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 15, 2010

Filed: August 6, 2010

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Appellate Case: 09-2188 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/06/2010 Entry ID: 3691017
1

The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation. 

2

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Sarah

W. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

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Before GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and LANGE,1

 District Judge.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Reserving their right to appeal the district court’s2

 adverse ruling on their joint

motion to suppress evidence, Mark Salamasina and Joanina Lata conditionally pled

guilty to charges of cocaine possession and distribution, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846, 856(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In this appeal,

Salamasina and Lata challenge the denial of their motion to suppress. We affirm. 

I.

In early 2008, law enforcement officers in Texas arrested Juan Portugal when

he attempted to buy 50 kilograms of cocaine from undercover officers. Portugal

began cooperating with the government and identified Salamasina, of Independence,

Missouri, as a frequent purchaser of cocaine and marijuana. According to Portugal,

Salamasina owed him approximately $60,000 for cocaine and marijuana that Portugal

had previously fronted Salamasina. In phone calls monitored by law enforcement

authorities, Salamasina acknowledged his debt and arranged travel to Texas to pay

part of the debt. Salamasina made the trip and paid $32,200 of the debt to Portugal.

This meeting was recorded by law enforcement. Salamasina then requested up to five

kilograms of cocaine. Portugal responded that Salamasina would have to pay $1,000

per kilogram to cover the cost of transporting the cocaine from Texas to Missouri.

Salamasina sent $5,000 through postal money orders to an address provided by

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Portugal, and in the weeks following this transfer of money, Salamasina and Portugal

regularly communicated about the status of the drug delivery. 

In August 2008, Detective Aaron Gietzen of the Independence Police

Department received information that Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

officers in Texas had secured an arrest warrant for Salamasina. DEA Special Agent

John Hover traveled from San Antonio, Texas, to Independence, Missouri, to serve

the arrest warrant on Salamasina. Officers conducted surveillance of the house where

they suspected Salamasina was residing. As a white Ford Expedition that matched the

description of Salamasina’s suspected vehicle approached, the garage door at the

residence opened, and the vehicle neared the garage entry. Officers approached the

vehicle, identified Salamasina, took him into custody, and moved him to a location

next to a patrol car and away from the vehicle. Joanina Lata, Salamasina’s fiancée,

and her two minor children were also in the vehicle. 

Officers asked Salamasina for permission to search his residence, and

Salamasina refused. Detective Gietzen then identified himself to Lata and asked her

for permission to search the residence she shared with Salamasina. Lata asked if

Detective Gietzen had a search warrant, and when he responded that he did not, Lata

refused consent to search the residence. Following her refusal, Lata stated that she

was going to close the garage door and took a few steps towards the garage door.

Detective Gietzen directed Lata to leave the door open and to remain away from the

residence until officers determined whether they would seek a search warrant. Lata

then sought to reenter the vehicle from the driver’s side. Believing that she might

attempt to activate the remote control for the garage door, Detective Gietzen forbade

Lata from entering the vehicle from the driver’s side. Lata was allowed to enter the

vehicle from the passenger side to tend to the children in the backseat. During this

time, Salamasina shouted at Lata to not let the officers into the house and, over orders

from the officers not to communicate with one another, Salamasina and Lata shouted

to one another in a foreign language that the officers did not understand. 

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Detective Gietzen then conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, looking

for concealed weapons. He testified at the suppression hearing that he performed this

search because Lata was unrestrained and was sitting in the vehicle to tend to her

children who were in the backseat. During the search, Detective Gietzen recovered

six bottles of inositol powder, a dietary supplement that is often used as a cutting

agent for cocaine. The amount of inositol powder found constituted a six-year supply

of the dietary supplement. Officers also found acetone in the vehicle. Acetone is used

to give cocaine that has been mixed with inositol powder a more authentic cocaine

smell. 

Based on these findings, the officers summoned a canine unit to search the

vehicle. The canine alerted to three areas in the vehicle, however no narcotics were

located in any of these locations. The canine’s handling officer testified at the

suppression hearing that the odor of narcotics could remain for hours or days after the

narcotics are removed and that the canine would continue to alert to the odor of the

drugs. 

Using the information collected in the searches of the vehicle, along with the

information from the Texas investigation, Detective Gietzen applied for a search

warrant of the residence. After securing the warrant, officers searched the residence

and found cocaine, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and cash. In a joint motion,

Salamasina and Lata sought to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle and the

house. After the district court denied the suppression motion, Salamasina and Lata

each entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving their rights to appeal the denial of the

suppression motion. 

II.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district

court’s factual findings for clear error and the legal question of whether the Fourth

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Amendment was violated de novo. United States v. Williams, 577 F.3d 878, 880 (8th

Cir. 2009). We will reverse the district court’s decision only if it “is unsupported by

substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based

on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.” United States v. Harper, 466

F.3d 634, 643 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

A.

The first issue raised by Salamasina—and the only issue raised by Lata—is

whether Detective Gietzen’s warrantless search of the vehicle violated the Fourth

Amendment. This question is relevant because the discovery of the inositol powder

and acetone found during the search of the vehicle was included in the application for

the search warrant of the residence. Appellants argue that the Supreme Court’s recent

ruling in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), controls and invalidates the

warrantless search because Salamasina was immediately restrained and removed from

the vehicle, and officers, finding Lata to not be a threat, gave her permission to

repeatedly access the vehicle to tend to her children. 

In Gant, the Supreme Court rejected the broad interpretation of its prior rulings

in search-incident-to-arrest cases that would authorize “a vehicle search . . . incident

to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s

passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the

search.” 129 S. Ct. at 1719. Rather, the Court held vehicle searches incident to arrest

are justified under the Fourth Amendment “only when the arrestee is unsecured and

within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Id.

The Supreme Court noted that a factual situation that would justify a search incident

to an arrest on this ground “will be the rare case.” Id. at 1719 n.4. The Court further

noted that a vehicle search incident to arrest is justified “when it is reasonable to

believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Id. at

1719 (quotation omitted). 

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In addition to the two grounds for justifying a search incident to arrest discussed

above, the Court stated:

Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a

vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety . . . concerns

demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), permits

an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has

reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is

“dangerous” and might access the vehicle to “gain immediate control of

weapons.” Id. at 1049 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721. 

Since Gant, we have decided two cases which present facts analogous to those

presented by this case: United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2009) and

United States v. Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.

1563 (2010). In Davis, we found that a search incident to arrest was permissible under

Gant where the driver had been arrested for possession of marijuana and restrained in

a patrol car, the odor of marijuana from the car was noticeable, there were beer bottles

in the back seat of the car, and “[t]hree passengers, all of whom had been drinking,

were not in secure custody and outnumbered the two officers at the scene.” Davis,

569 F.3d at 817. We held that these facts were “textbook examples of ‘[t]he safety

and evidentiary justifications’” justifying a search incident to arrest. Id. (quoting

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714). 

In Goodwin-Bey, an officer stopped a vehicle driven by Goodwin-Bey, a

convicted felon, for running a red light. 584 F.3d at 1118. The car contained three

other occupants. Id. During the stop, the officer received a report of an earlier

incident where a firearm had been displayed by passengers in a vehicle matching the

description of Goodwin-Bey’s automobile. Id. The officer also learned that one of

the occupants had an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. That occupant was arrested, and

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the others were patted-down but not restrained or otherwise secured. Id. The officer

conducted a search of the vehicle and located a handgun that belong to Goodwin-Bey

in the locked glove compartment. Id. Goodwin-Bey moved to suppress the evidence

from the search, arguing the search incident to the arrest of one of the occupants was

impermissible under Gant. Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d at 1118-1119. Recognizing that,

while the other “occupants were outside of the vehicle at the time of the search, but

absent an arrest, . . . would have been free to reenter the vehicle and pose a danger to

the officers,” we held “that a reasonably prudent officer on the scene would be

warranted in believing that Goodwin-Bey and his unsecured passengers were

dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons.” Id.

at 1120-21 (quotations omitted). We held the search was valid either as a search

incident to arrest under Gant or as a matter of safety for the officers under Long.

Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d at 1121.

Davis and Goodwin-Bey control our decision here. Even assuming that

Salamasina had been secured by the arresting officers, Lata was not secured. Rather,

Lata repeatedly entered and exited the vehicle to tend to her children, she spoke to

Salamasina in a foreign language despite officers’ directions to not communicate with

Salamasina, and she attempted to close the garage door after officers instructed her to

keep the door open. An objective officer considering these facts, in conjunction with

the fact that officers had just executed an arrest warrant on Lata’s fiancé on drug

charges, would be warranted in conducting a search of the vehicle incident to

Salamasina’s arrest under Gant’s officer-safety consideration. We note that, while

certain facts of this case such as ratio of officers to vehicle occupants, are not

comparable to Davis or Goodwin-Bey, here Lata was repeatedly entering and exiting

the vehicle, whereas in Davis and Goodwin-Bey the unsecured individuals were

merely in the vicinity of the vehicle. Furthermore, even if Gant’s search-incident-toarrest exception did not apply, the search would have been warranted under Long’s

reasonable suspicion of dangerousness exception. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. 

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In addition to these officer safety concerns, Lata’s actions–attempting to close

the garage, opening the car doors, and speaking to Salamasina in a foreign

language–suggest an attempt by her to hide potential evidence from officers. Thus,

the officers would be justified in conducting the warrantless search of the vehicle to

“prevent [the] concealment or destruction” of evidence. See Chimel v. California, 395

U.S. 752, 763 (1969); see also Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d at 1120 n.5 (“Neither Chimel

nor Gant require both safety and evidentiary concerns to exist to justify a search

incident to arrest. Either concern standing alone may trigger the exception to the

warrant requirement.”). Accordingly, we reject appellants’ argument that Detective

Gietzen’s warrantless search of the vehicle was unconstitutional. 

B.

Salamasina also challenges the search warrant application, claiming that there

was no probable cause for issuance of the warrant because: (1) the information

provided in the search warrant about his drug activities was stale because it was five

to six months old, (2) the drug activities referenced in the search warrant application

occurred in Texas, not Missouri, (3) officers had no evidence of drugs or drug activity

at Salamasina’s residence in Missouri, and (4) officers did not locate any narcotics on

Salamasina’s person or in his vehicle, despite a canine’s false alert to the presence of

drugs. 

“To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must be supported

by a showing of probable cause.” United States v. Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1077

(8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1104 (2008). “Whether probable cause exists

depends upon the totality of the circumstances, but it requires a showing of facts

sufficient to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place

to be searched.” United States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d 880, 882-83 (8th Cir. 2002)

(quotation and citations omitted). Judges “may draw reasonable inferences from the

totality of the circumstances in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a

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warrant.” United States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2000). Though the

issue is reviewed de novo, we accord great deference to the issuing judge’s

determination that Detective Gietzen’s affidavit established probable cause. See

United States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2005).

After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of

the search warrant, we agree with the district court’s determination that the magistrate

who issued the search warrant had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause

existed. Although the information about Salamasina’s drug activities in Texas was

months old, information gleaned during the execution of the arrest warrant buttressed

the application for a search warrant. Not only did officers have information

connecting Salamasina to the distribution of significant quantities of cocaine and

marijuana, but officers located a six-year supply of inositol powder, a known agent

for use in cutting cocaine, and acetone, a chemical that is combined with cocaine and

inositol powder to give the mixture a more authentic cocaine smell, in Salamasina’s

vehicle. In addition to these findings, the drug canine alerted to the apparent recent

presence of narcotics in the vehicle. Also, the affidavit contained a description of

Salamasina and Lata’s activities during the arrest, including Lata’s attempt to close

the garage door and Salamasina’s shouting to Lata in a foreign language after being

advised to remain quiet for officer safety purposes. The totality of these

circumstances established probable cause to conclude that narcotics or evidence of

Salamasina’s illegal drug activities would be found in his home. 

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of appellants’ joint motion to

suppress. 

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