Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04056/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darian Lyons
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FILbD 

United 8¥';,~~~ Appeals 

APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 2 7 1993 

----------_,,E.,....,~OBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

DARIAN LYONS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92-4056 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-175J) 

Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Tiffany Romney, Assistant United States Attorney (Tena Campbell, 

Assistant United States Attorney and Daniel Jordan, United States 

Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, KELLY, and GODBOLD, t Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Darian Lyons was convicted of two counts 

of transporting stolen property in connection with the theft of 

computer equipment from the UNISYS corporation. He appeals his 

conviction and sentence on various grounds. Our jurisdiction 

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and we affirm. 

t The Honorable John C. Godbold, Senior United States Circuit 

Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 

Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4056 Document: 010110220148 Date Filed: 04/27/1993 Page: 1 
Background 

UNISYS, a computer and information technology company, 

employed Mr. Lyons from 1987 to 1990. While working at the UNISYS 

facility in Uxbridge, England, Mr. Lyons stole a UNISYS U6000/50 

computer and associated components, which he later sent to a post 

office box in Utah. Mr . Lyons returned to the United States, 

retrieved the equipment, and began working for UNISYS at its Salt 

Lake City office. That office then experienced a series of thefts 

of equipment compatible with the U6000. After quitting his job 

with UNISYS, Mr. Lyons transported the stolen equipment to his new 

address in Massachusetts. 

An FBI investigation resulted in execution of a warrant to 

search Mr. Lyons' Massachusetts home, where agents found most of 

the stolen equipment, including hard disks belonging to UNISYS. 

Some time after seizing the equipment, and without first obtaining 

a separate warrant, FBI agents supervised a UNISYS technician who 

searched the contents of the hard disks. The technician 

discovered several valuable proprietary programs, apparently also 

stolen from UNISYS, stored on the disks. 

A grand jury returned an indictment on one count of 

transporting stolen property across international borders and one 

count of transporting stolen equipment across state lines. See 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2314. A jury convicted Mr. Lyons on both counts, and 

the district court imposed a sentence of thirty-nine months under 

the Sentencing Guidelines. 

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Discussion 

Mr. Lyons' appeal raises numerous issues, many of them 

frivolous. However, two issues merit discussion: (1) whether the 

discovery of the software on one of the stolen hard drives was the 

product of a Fourth Amendment violation, and (2) whether the val ue 

of stolen computer software may be included in calculating a 

sentence under U. S.S.G. §§ lBl.3 & 2Bl.2. 

I. Discovery of Stolen Computer Software 

During The Search Of The Hard Drive 

Mr . Lyons claims that the discovery of the computer software 

was the product of an unreasonable search. Our analysis of this 

question raises but one issue: whether Mr. Lyons had an 

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 

the hard drive. Although the district court did not base its 

denial of the motion to suppress on this ground, the facts as they 

pertain to this inquiry are uncontroverted and we consider this 

threshold inquiry de novo. See United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 

F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1990). 

After being seized by law enforcement authorities, the stolen 

hard d i sks along with other items of seized personal property were 

taken to the FBI evidence room. A few days later, a UNISYS 

employee, while performing an inventory of the items seized, 

searched the contents of the disks and discovered proprietary 

software. 

Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal, Mr. Lyons, as 

the proponent of the motion to suppress, had the burden of proving 

that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search 

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in question. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131-34 (1978) ; 

United States v. Soto, 1993 WL 77475, * 3 (10th Cir. 1993 ) . A 

search only violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights if a 

defendant demonstrates that he or she had an actual, subjective 

expectation of privacy in the property searched, and if the 

defendant establishes that society would recognize that subjective 

expectation as objectively reasonable. Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. 

Ct. 1684, 1687 (1990); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 

(1979). Because expectations of privacy derive in part from the 

right ·to exclude others from the property in question, lawful 

possession is an important consideration in determining whether a 

defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 

searched, i.e. the hard disks. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 

U.S. 83, 91 (1980); Rakas, 439 U. S. at 143 n.12; United States v, 

Abreu, 935 F.2d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 

271 (1991). 

Those portions of the record furnished by the parties in 

their appendices reflect that no attempt was made to show that Mr. 

Lyons had any rightful claim to the hard disks that were seized 

pursuant to the warrant. See United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 

441, 445 (1 0th Cir. 1990) (although legal documentation of lawful 

possession not always required, proponent of motion to suppress 

"must at least state that he gained possession from the owner or 

someone with the authority to grant possession"), cert . denied, 

111 s. Ct. 1318 (1991) . In the absence of any evidence of any 

right or interest in these items, Mr. Lyons has failed to meet the 

threshold requirement of demonstrating an expectation of privacy 

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in the property searched. Under the circumstances presented, Mr. 

Lyons demonstrated no actual, subjective expectation of privacy 

and, in the absence of such a showing, we do not reach the issue 

of whether an expectation of privacy in the hard disks would have 

been objectively reasonable. See United States v. Rascon, 922 

F.2d 584, 587 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2037 

(1991); United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 791 (10th Cir. 

1984) . We affirm the district court's denial of the motion to 

suppress. 

II. Stolen Computer Software And The Sentencing Guidelines 

Mr. Lyons asserts that he was convicted of transporting only 

stolen computer hardware, and that our decision in United States 

v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991), precludes consideration 

of the value of stolen computer software in calculating his 

sentence. We disagree. 

Sentencing on a charge of transporting stolen property 

requires calculation of the total value of the property stolen. 

U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.2(b) (1). The district court calculated the total 

value of the stolen property at $292,000: $27,000 for the value 

of the hardware and $265,000 for the software. We review the 

court's factual findings supporting calculation of loss under the 

clearly erroneous standard, but review de nova questions of law 

regarding the application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United 

States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991). 

As an initial matter, we question Mr. Lyons' assertion that 

he was not convicted for the theft of software. The court granted 

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Mr. Lyons' motion to strike the phrase "and computer software" 

from the indictment as surplus language. The remaining words of 

the indictment charged Mr. Lyons with transportation of stolen 

"computer components and computer equipment." During the hearing 

on the motion to strike, the parties discussed how the changes 

would affect the remaining charges, which concluded: 

The Court: And I say, well, why are [the words "and 

computer software"] surplus language? And the only 

argument it seems to me is they're surplus language 

because all of these are computer components or computer 

equipment . They're embraced by the larger term, and thus 

we don't need the lesser, more specific term. 

Defense Counsel: Your honor, I've consulted with my 

client, and we accept the court's interpretation. 

The Court: But namely, when we're talking about computer 

software, that that's embraced within the larger terms of 

"computer components" and "computer equipment"? 

Defense Counsel: That's correct . . .. 

Aplee. App. at 26-27. Given this concession by defense counsel, we 

find that the language of the modified indictment included software 

offenses. Convicted of transporting both stolen hardware and 

software, Mr. Lyons' sentence properly aggregated the total value 

of these items. 

We believe that the verbal exchange between defense counsel 

and the court demonstrates that all parties accepted that the 

software offenses would still remain in the indictment, arguments 

to the contrary notwi thstanding. We nonetheless recognize that the 

district court's written order striking the language from the 

indictment did not specify that the remaining language included 

software. Therefore, we hold in the alternative that even if the 

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charges of conviction did not include transportation of stolen 

software, consideration of unconvicted software offenses would 

still have been appropriate at sentencing . 

The Guidelines permit the sentencing court to look beyond the 

charges of conviction in computing a sentence . United States v. 

Underwood, 982 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 1992). Guideline§ lBl.3 

broadly defines relevant conduct, permitting consideration of 

dismissed charges. United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518-

19 (10th Cir. 1991). A court should consider defendant's acts 

beyond · the charges of conviction if those acts were part of the 

same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 

conviction. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.3(a) (2) & comment. (n.2 & backg'd) . 

culpability for relevant conduct need only be shown by a 

preponderance of evidence. United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d 

490, 491-93 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990) . Our 

review of the record satisfies us that the preponderance of the 

evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Lyons was 

criminally culpable for offenses related to the software. 

Mr. Lyons contends that even if he stole the software, our 

decision in Brown precludes consideration of its value. In Brown, 

we applied the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United 

States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) to computer software, and held that the 

intangible intellectual property of a computer program standing 

alone cannot constitute goods, wares or merchandise within the 

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 . Brown, 925 F.2d at 1308. The fact 

that Mr. Lyons stole the software in conjunction with the theft of 

tangible hardware distinguishes this case from Brown. Brown 

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recognizes that the theft of intangible intellectual property in 

conjunction with the theft of tangible property falls within the 

ambit of§ 2314. Id. at 1307-08 n.14. Unlike the present case, 

there was no evidence in Brown that defendant was involved in the 

physical theft or transportation of stolen tangible property. 

In an age where the intangible intellectual property value of 

goods may vastly exceed the intrinsic worth of accompanying 

tangible goods, application of the letter and intent of the 

Sentencing Guidelines mandates that courts include intangible value 

when thefts of tangible objects occur. For example, the Guidelines 

assess value for criminal copyright infringement on the basis of 

the market value of the infringing items, even though that value 

arises from its worth as intangible intellectual property. 

U.S.S.G. § 2BS.3. This market value may far exceed the loss or 

gain due to the offense. Id. The same approach is used for 

calculating the value of intercepted transmissions prosecuted under 

the Electronic Communications Act of 1986, in which case the 

intercepted transmissions are completely intangible. Id. comment. 

We also reject Mr. Lyons' contention that the court 

overestimated the value of the software . Testimony at the 

sentencing hearing indicated that $265,000 would have been the cost 

of a single sublicensed copy of the items stolen. The court's 

calculation of value was not clearly erroneous. 

III. The Validity Of The Warrant 

Mr. Lyons also challenges the validity and scope of the 

warrant and subsequent search. Contrary to Mr. Lyons' 

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allegations, the government presented the magistrate with probable 

cause to issue the warrant, the warrant was not the product of 

material misrepresentations of fact, the warrant specifically 

identified the evidence sought, and the scope of the search did 

not exceed the scope of the warrant. We therefore reject Mr. 

Lyons' challenges to the warrant and the subsequent search. 

AFFIRMED . 

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