Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03608/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03608-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3608

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Michael Miller, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 13, 2007

Filed: May 2, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Michael Miller pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, and the district

court1

 sentenced him to 120 months in prison, the statutory maximum. Miller appeals,

contending that the district court erred in departing upward under the advisory

guidelines. He also challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 06-3608 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/02/2007 Entry ID: 3304933
2

Since Miller did not object to the specific factual allegations in the presentence

report, the district court could accept them as established. See United States v.

Sorrells, 432 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 2005).

-2-

In February 2003 Miller broke into a truck in a mall parking lot in Rapid City

and stole a rifle. Miller, who was 22 years old at the time, had previously been

convicted of two crimes of violence. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count

of being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(1), and one count of possessing a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(j). Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Miller pled guilty to a superseding

information charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The presentence report calculated Miller’s total offense level to be 23 with a

criminal history category of VI . In addition to two previous crimes of violence, his

criminal history score of 18 included 2 points for being on probation at the time of the

instant offense, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), 1 point for committing the offense less than

two years following his release from custody, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), and 4 points

for six convictions which had resulted in terms of imprisonment for less than 60 days,

see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c). The advisory guideline range was 92 to 115 months. 

The presentence report suggested that an upward departure might be warranted

under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) due to Miller’s extensive criminal history and the

likelihood of recidivism. The report noted that Miller had not received any criminal

history points for a number of juvenile and adult convictions including attempted

burglary at age 14, malicious mischief, twice taking or riding in a motor vehicle

without permission, felony harassment, reckless endangerment, assault, driving with

a suspended license, and violation of a civil antiharassment order.2

 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court departed upward on the ground that

Miller’s criminal history category of VI underrepresented his actual criminal history

Appellate Case: 06-3608 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/02/2007 Entry ID: 3304933
-3-

and his likelihood to recidivate. See § 4A1.3(a)(1). The court pointed out that much

of Miller’s extensive criminal history had not been scored, and that his “utter

disrespect for the law and violent behavior” and multiple convictions for the same

type of offenses he had committed as a juvenile were aggravating circumstances not

accounted for in the sentencing guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In addition the

district court stated that the facts and circumstances of Miller’s case were “outside of

the heartland” of cases involving a felon in possession of a firearm because Miller

“has made part of his regular routine to steal cars or other items in vehicles.”

According to the district court, an increased sentence would serve the sentencing

objectives of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. It therefore departed upward

under § 4A1.3, but it indicated that it would alternatively have reached the same

sentence by considering the § 3553(a) factors and varying from the guidelines. Miller

acknowledged in allocution that he had never received “stiff punishments” for his past

crimes. 

The district court sentenced Miller to the statutory maximum of 120 months in

prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). His sentence also included three years of

supervised release, which the district court deemed necessary “in order to protect the

public and rehabilitate the defendant.” Miller appeals from the judgment, challenging

the district court’s upward departure and his sentence. 

Miller first argues that the district court abused its discretion by departing

upward from his advisory guideline range pursuant to § 4A1.3. He contends that his

criminal history was not underrepresented and that the district court improperly

considered the number of his convictions but not their nature, citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3,

cmt. n. 2B (“In determining whether an upward departure from Criminal History

Category VI is warranted, the court should consider that the nature of the prior

offenses rather than simply their number is often more indicative of the seriousness

of the defendant’s criminal record.”). 

Appellate Case: 06-3608 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/02/2007 Entry ID: 3304933
-4-

A district court’s departure from the advisory guidelines is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005). Section

4A1.3(a)(1) of the advisory guidelines permits an upward departure “[i]f reliable

information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially

under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood

that the defendant will commit other crimes.” An upward departure pursuant to §

4A1.3 may be particularly appropriate in the context of “defendants in their early

twenties or younger” who repeatedly have received lenient sentences, yet who may

pose a significant risk of serious recidivism. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, cmt. background.

“When contemplating and structuring such a departure, the district court should

consider both the nature and extent of a defendant’s criminal history.” United States

v. Hacker, 450 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 2006).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward based on its

finding that criminal history category VI substantially underrepresented the

seriousness of Miller’s criminal history and risk of recidivism. Here, the 18 criminal

history points calculated in the presentence report were 5 more than the 13 required

for category VI, see generally U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, and they only reflected a portion

of Miller’s past criminal conduct. Miller had been a recidivist criminal since age 14

and had several juvenile adjudications for which he had not received any criminal

history points, but which can be a basis for departure under U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.3(a)(2)(A). Miller also had received relatively lenient sentences despite having

been convicted of several serious criminal offenses, namely motor vehicle theft. See

United States v. Headbird, 461 F.3d 1074, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2006) (theft of vehicle

qualifies as crime of violence for sentencing enhancement purposes). The district

court sufficiently considered the nature of Miller’s convictions when it remarked that

its departure was based not only on the length of Miller’s criminal record, but on his

recurring pattern of violent behavior. Cf. United States v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622, 633

(8th Cir.) (defendant’s consistent pattern of sexual misconduct, rather than low

Appellate Case: 06-3608 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/02/2007 Entry ID: 3304933
-5-

number of prior offenses, indicated likelihood of future sexual abuse not reflected in

criminal history category), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 191 (2006).

Miller next asserts that his sentence was unreasonable and that the district court

erred in its written order of judgment and commitment by failing to state with

specificity its reasons for the sentence imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).

In sentencing a defendant, the district court should determine first the appropriate

guideline range, then consider whether a traditional departure is appropriate, and

finally decide whether or not to impose a guideline sentence. The latter decision is

made after considering all of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). United States v.

Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 276 (2005). We

review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2006). A sentencing court abuses its discretion

if it “fails to consider a relevant factor . . . gives significant weight to an improper or

irrelevant factor, or . . . commits a clear error of judgment.” Haack, 403 F.3d at 1004.

When the sentencing court fails to state the reasons for the sentence in the written

judgment, we affirm if the sentence itself is reasonable. United States v. Little Hawk,

449 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2006).

Although the district court did not specifically address the § 3553(a) factors at

the same time it imposed the 120 month sentence, it referenced them in departing

upward, and in providing an alternate basis for the enhanced sentence and for the

conditions of supervised release. See Mugan, 441 F.3d at 634 (upholding

reasonableness of sentence where district court considered § 3553(a) factors when

setting conditions for supervised release, but not when imposing term of

imprisonment). Notably, the court considered the seriousness of Miller’s offense, the

Appellate Case: 06-3608 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/02/2007 Entry ID: 3304933
-6-

need to punish and deter his criminal conduct, and the need for rehabilitation and

incapacitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(C). For these reasons we

conclude that Miller’s sentence was not unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3608 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/02/2007 Entry ID: 3304933