Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01208/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01208-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
General Teamsters Union Local No. 439
Petitioner
Sunrise Sanitation Services, Inc.
Respondent

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL

NO. 439,

NO. CIV. S-05-1208 WBS JFM

Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO STAY

ARBITRATION AND PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO HOLD RESPONDENT IN

CONTEMPT

SUNRISE SANITATION SERVICES,

INC.,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185, petitioner General

Teamsters Union Local No. 439 filed a petition to compel

respondent Sunrise Sanitation Services, Inc. to arbitrate a labor

grievance. On April 25, 2006, the court granted petitioner’s

motion to compel arbitration and denied respondent’s motion for

summary judgment. Soon thereafter, respondent lodged an appeal

of that judgment with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and now

seeks a stay of the arbitration proceedings pending appeal. 

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Petitioner has responded with a motion to hold respondent in

contempt for its failure to proceed to arbitration in a timely

manner. For the following reasons, both motions will be denied.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts underlying this dispute are largely

uncontested. Respondent, a waste collection and disposal company

located in Stockton, California, had a longstanding collective

bargaining relationship with an independent union known as the

Sunrise/Sunset Employees Association (“the Association”). 

(Resp’t Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) No. 2.) However,

on October 28, 2004, members of the Association voted, by a show

of hands, to merge their existing bargaining representative with

petitioner’s international organization. (Id. Nos. 15-17.) The

merger agreement provided that, “effective October 28, 2004, the

Association ‘will cease to exist as an independent entity and

shall be consolidated into’ Local 439.” (Id. No. 19.) 

Concurrent with these events, Shane Thomasson, a refuse

truck driver for respondent, “was involved in his second on-thejob vehicular accident in less than a month.” (Basso Decl. ¶ 3.) 

He was suspended and later terminated on December 13, 2004,

following a determination by respondent that his accidents were

preventable. (Id.) 

Subsequently, petitioner attempted to submit for

arbitration a grievance pertaining to Thomasson’s discharge,

pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement

(“CBA”) entered into by respondent and the Association. This

agreement was intended to be in effect from January 1, 2002

through December 31, 2004 and thereafter subject to termination

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or renegotiation upon 60 days notice “by either party to the

other party prior to December 31, 2004.” (Palacio Decl. Ex. A at

TEMO024.) Respondent refused petitioner’s request to arbitrate,

reasoning that the existing CBA terminated once the Association

ceased to exist and respondent was therefore no longer bound by

the terms of the agreement. (Resp’t Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 11.)

This litigation ensued, and the court granted

petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration on April 25, 2006. 

Respondent filed a notice of appeal regarding that judgment on

May 11, 2006 and sought to stay the court’s order compelling

arbitration on June 13, 2006 (after attempts to persuade

petitioner to stipulate to a stay failed). (Resp’t Mot. to Stay

1.) Respondent’s motion to stay is now before the court, in

addition to petitioner’s motion to hold respondent in contempt

for its failure to move forward with the ordered arbitration. 

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Stay

A notice of appeal divests the district court “of

jurisdiction over the matters being appealed.” Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.

2001). However, “[t]he principle of exclusive appellate

jurisdiction is not . . . absolute.” Id. Rather, the trial

court retains the inherent power “during the pendency of an

appeal to act to preserve the status quo”, id., “and to ensure

the effectiveness of the eventual judgment”, Tribal Vill. of

Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 11

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §

2904, at 315 (1973)). Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil

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The Ninth Circuit has been careful to point out that 1

Rule 62(c) simply codifies the exception to the general rule of

exclusive appellate jurisdiction and “does not restore

jurisdiction to the district court to adjudicate anew the merits

of the case.” McClatchy Newspapers v. Cent. Valley Typographical

Union No. 46, 686 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982).

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Procedure 62(c) permits a district court to “in its discretion .

. . suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the

pendency of the appeal upon such terms as . . . it considers

proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party . . .

.” See also Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1) (noting that “[a] party 1

must ordinarily move first in the district” to obtain “a stay of

the judgment or order of a district court pending appeal”).

In deciding whether to grant an injunction pending

appeal, courts apply the standard employed when considering a

motion for a preliminary injunction. Akutan, 859 F.2d at 663;

Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Accordingly, respondent here must demonstrate “either (1) a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility

of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised

and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Akutan,

859 F.2d at 663 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, under either test, the court must separately

consider the public interest, if one is at stake, when

determining whether to grant equitable relief. Sammartano v.

First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“If the public interest is involved, the district court must

also determine whether the public interest favors the [movant].”

(quoting Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 43

F.3d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added)). 

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The Ninth Circuit has explained that the two aspects of

each test are inversely correlated. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1310 (9th Cir. 2003). For example,

“the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the

probability of success decreases.” W. Land Exch. Project v.

Dombeck, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1217 (D. Or. 1999) (quoting Oakland

Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, they are considered to be

“interrelated” and therefore their application need not be

independent of one another. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435; Sammartano,

303 F.3d at 965 (recognizing as proper analysis the consideration

of success on the merits and balance of the hardships); Protect

Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 882, 884 (E.D. Cal. 2004)

(treating success on the merits and a serious legal question as

one consideration and irreparable harm/balance of the hardships

as another). 

1. Success on Merits/Serious Legal Question

As this court has previously noted, the “‘success on

the merits factor cannot be rigidly applied,’ because if it were,

an injunction would seldom, if ever, be granted . . . .” Protect

Our Water, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (quoting Or. Natural Res.

Council v. Marsh, Civ. No. 85-6433-E, 1986 WL 13440, at *1 (D.

Or. Apr. 3, 1986)). A rigid application would require the

district court “‘to conclude that it was probably incorrect in

its determination on the merits.’” Id. Accordingly, “district

courts properly ‘stay their own orders when they have ruled on an

admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities of the

case suggest that the status quo should be maintained.’” Id. 

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Injunctions are thus “frequently issued where the trial court is

charting new and unexplored ground and the court determines that

a novel interpretation of the law may succumb to appellate

review.” Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D. Haw.

1972).

In this case, respondent’s chances of succeeding on the

merits of its appeal are entirely speculative. In opposition to

petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration, respondent argued that

a Third Circuit case, the underpinnings of which have been

overruled by the Supreme Court, should guide this court’s

analysis. See Sun Oil Co. of Penn. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 553 (3d

Cir. 1978), abrogated in part by NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Employees of

Am., 475 U.S. 192, 199 n.5 (1986). The court rejected this

proposition, however, and instead relied on a decision from the

Sixth Circuit which, when applied to the facts of this case, led

the court to grant petitioner’s motion. See Cincinnati Newspaper

Guild, Local 9 v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 863 F.2d 439, 445

(6th Cir. 1988). Respondent’s appeal, as described in its motion

to stay arbitration, rests on, inter alia, an argument that

Cincinnati Newspaper is both factually distinguishable and

contrary to Supreme Court guidance. While the Court of Appeals

may eventually find respondent’s, and not the court’s, analysis

more persuasive, the court can only hazard a guess as to the

probability that respondent will succeed.

Weighing decidedly in respondent’s favor, however, is

the fact that the parties have raised what appears to be a matter

of first impression in this circuit. The Ninth Circuit has not

yet considered whether presenting employees with a Hobson’s

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The parties appear to dispute whether the court’s April 2

25, 2006 order compelling arbitration is even appealable. (See

July 7, 2006 Grajski Decl. Exs. B-C.) The Ninth Circuit has held

that “an order compelling arbitration may be immediately appealed

[where, as here,] it is the complete relief sought.” Abernathy

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choice between their interest in securing new representation and

preserving their existing CBA is consistent with national labor

policy. As the court has previously noted, while an abundance of

authority addresses the implications of an existing CBA for

successor employers, a paltry amount of analysis has been

dedicated to the status of an existing CBA when the union is the

successor. (Apr. 25, 2006 Order 7-8.) The courts of this

circuit would benefit from a decision that clarifies the

viability of an existing CBA in the aftermath of a change in

representation and outlines what, if anything, a successor union

can do to preserve the terms of an existing CBA while negotiating

a CBA of its own. 

Petitioner cites the lack of previous litigation on

this issue as evidence that the circumstances of this case are

unique and argues that “the legal question raised in this case

will not be repeated.” (Pet.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Stay 7.) From

this, petitioner concludes that this case does not present a

serious legal question. (Id.) However, petitioner cites no

authority for this proposition. Moreover, courts have recognized

that “novel” legal issues may support injunctive relief. See,

e.g., Beaumont, Sour Lake & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.

74, 91 (1930); Stop H-3 Ass’n, 353 F. Supp. at 16. Consequently,

because this case presents a novel legal question that may

succumb to appellate review, respondent has satisfied the first 2

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v. S. Cal. Edison, 885 F.2d 525, 528 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989); see

also Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of Am.,

A.F.L. Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550, 551-52 (1957) (“A decree under §

301(a) ordering enforcement of an arbitration provision in a

collective bargaining agreement is . . . a ‘final decision’

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”). However, other courts

have questioned the finality of orders to arbitrate under § 301

when the trial court does not concurrently order that the

arbitrator’s decision will be final and binding (thereby

surrendering “jurisdiction to confirm the arbitrator’s

decision”). Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local

Lodge 2121 AFL-CIO v. Goodrich Corp., 410 F.3d 204, 209 (5th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, because the parties did

not brief this issue, the court will leave the appealability of

its order for the Court of Appeals to decide.

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half of the preliminary injunction test.

2. Irreparable Harm/Balance of Hardships

However, a serious legal question, standing alone,

cannot justify a stay. See PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d

1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[E]ven a strong likelihood of

reversal is not enough to get a stay of arbitration pending

appeal.”). As noted above, respondent also must show that

requiring it to proceed with the ordered arbitration while an

appeal is pending will cause it irreparable harm or a hardship

that outweighs the burden that further delay will visit on

petitioner. In support of this requirement, respondent argues

that if this court denies a stay, the parties might needlessly

waste time and incur expenses in pursuit of an arbitration that

could later be deemed invalid. (Resp’t Mot. to Stay Arbitration

9.)

The Ninth Circuit has made clear “that unnecessarily

undergoing arbitration proceedings [does not] constitute[]

irreparable injury” and consequently, respondent’s success hinges

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Respondent attempts to distinguish Camping 3

Construction, reasoning that the cited language is inapplicable

here because the discussion in that case focused on the arguably

more stringent standards for injunctive relief required by the

Norris-LaGuardia Act. It urges the court to instead rely on

cases holding that irreparable harm would result from requiring

an employer to arbitrate a dispute prior to determining the

dispute at issue was arbitrable. McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v.

Terminix Int’l Co., 105 F.3d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir. 1997). Such

cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant litigation,

given that the court has already determined that this dispute is

arbitrable. See McLaughlin, 105 F.3d at 1194 (distinguishing

cases “in which irreparable was discussed only after the court

concluded that the dispute was, in fact, arbitrable”); see also

Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs. v. Diversified Pharm. Servs., Inc.,

40 F. Supp. 2d 987, 996 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (opining that “forcing a

party to arbitrate a dispute that it did not agree to arbitrate

constitutes per se irreparable harm” in an order holding that the

parties had not agreed to arbitrate). Moreover, the discussion

of irreparable harm in Camping Construction speaks generally of

what constitutes irreparable harm and respondent cites no

authority for applying a different definition of “irreparable” in

the context of a Rule 62 analysis. 

9

on whether the balance of hardships tips in its favor. Camping 3

Constr. Co. v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers, 915 F.2d 1333, 1349

(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “the party objecting to arbitration

might well suffer no harm at all, irreparable or otherwise, for

the arbitration panel might decide in its favor”); see also

Graphic Commc’ns Union v. Chi. Tribune Co., 779 F.2d 13, 15 (7th

Cir. 1986) (holding that even where the appellate court might

determine that the trial court erroneously ordered the parties

arbitrate a dispute they had not agreed to arbitrate (because the

CBA had expired), “the cost of the arbitration, whether it is an

opportunity cost of time or an out-of-pocket expense . . . does

not show irreparable harm”). Accordingly, the court must

consider the impact that granting or denying respondent’s motion

will have on the respective parties. Int’l Jensen, Inc. v.

Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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As noted, the only harm that respondent faces if its

motion is denied is the expense of a potentially uncalled for

arbitration proceeding. At oral argument, the court learned that

such proceedings might cost respondent as little as $750. 

Meanwhile, petitioner describes a hardship consisting of Mr.

Thomasson having to wait for arbitration “to return himself to

his former position” and “ensure that any other or further

employment is not denied or tarnished by an unjustified

termination . . . .” (Pet.’s Opp’n to Resp’t Mot. to Stay 6.)

In the context of a due process challenge to the

allegedly wrongful discharge of public employees, Justice

Marshall discussed at length the plight of a wrongfully

terminated employee, observing that while an employee awaits the

proper grievance procedures, he

is left in limbo, deprived of his livelihood and of

wages on which he may well depend for basic sustenance. 

In that time, his ability to secure another job might

be hindered, either because of the nature of the

charges against him, or because of the prospect that he

will return to his prior . . . employment if permitted.

. . . [T]he personal trauma experienced during the long

months in which the employee awaits decision, during

which he suffers doubt, humiliation, and the loss of an

opportunity to perform work, will never be recompensed,

and indeed probably could not be with dollars alone.

 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 549 (1985)

(Marshall, J., concurring in part). Although the Third Circuit

has stated that such injuries “ordinarily will not [per se]

warrant injunctive relief”, Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 373

n.14 (3d Cir. 1987), they nonetheless are “very real”, id., and

in this court’s opinion, more significant than “the short time

and slight expense involved in the typical arbitration”, Camping

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Furthermore, arbitration of Mr. Thomasson’s grievance, 4

which will either (1) ensure that petitioner receives prompt

relief after enduring delay while this matter is on appeal or (2)

bring this matter to a close, is worth a mere $1,500 ($750 per

party).

11

Constr. Co., 915 F.2d at 1349. Therefore, although it appears 4

that neither side will clearly suffer irreparable harm if the

court grants or denies a stay, the balance of hardships favors

petitioner’s, and not respondent’s, position. Consequently,

because respondent has failed to satisfy the second prong of

either test, a stay is not warranted in this case.

3. Public Interest

Consideration of the public interest will not change

this outcome. Even if, as respondent argues, the public interest

favoring arbitration should not apply in this case, this fact

does not prove the converse--that the public has an important

interest in not arbitrating this matter. 

The court seriously doubts that the public has any

interest in whether respondent is required, justifiably or not,

to arbitrate this matter. See Tribal Vill. of Akutan, 859 F.2d

at 663 (suggesting that the public interest consideration is only

applicable “in certain cases”). This is not a case where shared

natural resources are threatened. See id. Nor does this case

involve an alleged infringement of important constitutional

rights which will continue to afflict the masses unless the court

intervenes. See Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 974 (public interest in

upholding First Amendment principles). At most, the public has

only a generic interest in seeing that federal law is properly

applied–-which is true of any case and thus cannot justify the

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extraordinary remedy sought by respondent. Mazurek v. Armstrong,

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (“[A] preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . .” (quotation omitted));

Reading & Bates Petroleum Co. v. Musslewhite, 14 F.3d 271, 275

(5th Cir. 1994) (“Stays pending appeal constitute extraordinary

relief . . . .”). Moreover, because this court’s orders are not

binding on other courts, including this one, the court’s order

granting petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration, whether or

not erroneous, has not created a practice that threatens to deny

others the protections of labor laws intended by Congress. See

id. (“The public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on

non-parties . . . .”). Consequently, the public interest does

not favor a stay of the court’s order regarding arbitration.

The court recognizes that further developments in this

case might alter the balance of hardships to favor a stay. As

respondent noted in its brief, “[i]f arbitration is resolved in

Thomasson’s favor before the Ninth Circuit reaches its decision,

then Sunrise [might] suffer . . . irreparable injury by having to

re-employ a driver who has [allegedly] demonstrated that he

cannot operate a multi-ton refuse truck safely.” (Resp’t Mot. to

Stay Arbitration 9.) Under such circumstances, the public

interest might also come into play. Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Esso

Worker's Union, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 58, 60 (D. Mass. 1997)

(granting a stay of an award that reinstated a truck driver who

used cocaine while off duty because the petitioner’s “drug

problem . . . might seriously endanger the public”). 

However, at this time, respondent’s arguments are both

conjectural and beyond the scope of this court’s jurisdiction. 

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Whether Mr. Thomasson was properly discharged is a matter for the

arbitrator to decide at the impending arbitration proceedings. 

AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650

(1986) (opining that the merits of the underlying claims and

whether language in the written agreement supports the claim are

matters for the arbitrator). If and when respondent’s feared

outcome comes to pass, it can petition the court to stay

enforcement of the arbitrator’s judgement. See Sheet Metal

Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 206 v. R.K. Burner Sheet Metal Inc.,

859 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The district court has

jurisdiction under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act . . . to vacate or enforce a final labor arbitration

award.”); see also S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Utility Workers Union of

Am., Local 132, AFL-CIO, 265 F.3d 787, 796 (9th Cir. 2001)

(noting that regardless of whether reinstatement is required by

the terms of a CBA, courts can vacate an arbitration award

directing reinstatement if reinstatement would violate public

policy). Granting a stay now would be premature, given that the

court will have other opportunities to control the impact of the

arbitrator’s decision.

B. Motion to Hold Respondent in Contempt

Also before the court is petitioner’s motion to hold

respondent in criminal and/or civil contempt for failing to meet

its “demand[]”, made on May 22, 2006, “that [respondent] agree

immediately to arbitration . . . .” (July 7, 2006 Grajski Decl.

Ex. A (Letter from David A. Rosenfeld, counsel for petitioner).) 

However, petitioner’s motion is premature. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 62(c) explicitly affords the losing party an

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opportunity to seek a stay pending appeal. This rule would be

meaningless if, as here, parties could be held in contempt before

the trial court was given an opportunity to consider such

motions. See Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1240 (9th Cir.

1983) (noting that established law requires only that “[a]bsent a

stay, ‘all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with

promptly.’” (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975))

(emphasis added)); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,

959 F.2d 1468, 1473 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the court

had previously “held that a district court cannot find a party in

contempt because it has not complied with an order until all

attempts to stay that order have been exhausted”).

Moreover, the sequence of events following the court’s

April 25, 2006 order compelling arbitration do not establish

grounds for holding respondent in contempt--criminal or civil. 

“To sustain a judgment of criminal contempt, willful disobedience

must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clemente v. United

States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the party

seeking contempt sanctions cannot make such a showing “when a

stay has been immediately sought . . . .” Id. Petitioner

attempts to distinguish this case from Clemente, where appellants

filed their motion to stay concurrently with their notice of

appeal, by focusing on the month-long gap between respondent’s

filing of a notice of appeal on May 11, 2006 and its filing of a

motion to stay on June 13, 2006. However, respondent has a

laudable excuse for its delay--it was attempting to secure from

petitioner a stipulation to stay arbitration pending appeal. 

(July 7, 2006 Grajski Decl. Exs. A-C.) On June 5, 2006, when

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Moreover, aside from its citations to 18 U.S.C. § 5

401(3) (empowering courts to punish contempt of their authority),

petitioner has not actually requested relief in the form of

criminal contempt sanctions. Petitioner requests that the court

order respondent “to pay a compliance fine of $1000 per day until

Respondent and Petitioner agree upon an arbitrator.” (Pet.’s

Mot. to Hold Resp’t in Contempt 3.) This proposal appears to be

more akin to a civil contempt sanction, which is designed to

either “coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s

order, [or] . . . compensate the complainant for losses

sustained.” United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04

(1947). The proposed sanction lacks a retroactive aspect and is

not based on a completed act of disobedience--two of the telltale

signs of a criminal contempt sanction. Int’l Union, United Mine

Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828-29 (1994). 

Moreover, it can be avoided through immediate compliance, which

is indicative of a civil contempt sanction. Id. at 829.

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respondent refused to further discuss this possibility,

respondent’s counsel “completed [respondent’s] pending motion to

stay as promptly as [he] could.” (Id. ¶ 4.) The court can

hardly fault respondent for attempting to first resolve the issue

of a stay before troubling the court with a motion for an order

of the same. Its failure thus far to proceed with arbitration

was not in willful and deliberate defiance of this court’s order

and therefore criminal contempt sanctions are not warranted.5

Likewise, the circumstances of this case do not support

civil contempt sanctions. Civil contempt “consists of a party’s

disobedience to a specific and definite court order by failure

to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.” 

In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 695

(9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 70

(allowing courts to hold parties in contempt when “a judgment

directs a party . . . to perform any . . . specific act and the

party fails to comply within the time specified”). As respondent

astutely points out, “the Order granting the Union’s motion to

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compel arbitration did not specify a time for compliance.” 

(Resp’t Opp’n to Pet. Mot. to Hold Resp’t in Contempt 2.) 

Petitioner failed to request that the court include a deadline

for the commencement of arbitration and consequently, the fact

that arbitration is still not underway nearly three months later

is not in violation of a specific and definite court order. Cf. 

Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., No. C-00-4472,

2001 WL 590011, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2001) (noting that

petitioner could seek to hold respondent in contempt if and when

respondent failed to “submit to arbitration within the 90 day

deadline”). To prevent this situation from barring future

contempt proceedings, the court will herein establish a firm

deadline for arbitration. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 

(1) respondent’s motion to stay arbitration be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED. 

(2) petitioner’s motion to hold respondent in contempt

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

(3) unless and until, upon further application by

respondent, the court orders otherwise, the parties shall submit

their dispute to an arbitrator within 60 days of the date of this

order. 

DATED: July 25, 2006

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