Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03106/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03106-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Floyd Bruce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 1996 Decided July 26, 1996

No. 95-3106

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FLOYD BRUCE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00488-01)

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause and filed the briefsfor appellant, and Sandra

G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered appearances.

Mark J. Ehlers, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H.

Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, ThomasC. Black andKristan L. Peters-Hamlin,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

WALD, Circuit Judge: In February 1995, a jury convicted Floyd Bruce of two criminal counts

stemming from his participation in a scheme to defraud Signet Bank. The defendant now raises two

challengesto his conviction, claiming first that the bank fraud count in the indictment was duplicitous,

and second, that his attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest which rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair.

We reject both arguments. With respect to the defendant's first challenge, we find that Bruce's

indictment correctly charged him with a single execution of a scheme to defraud the bank and

therefore was not duplicitous. With respect to the second charge, we find no conflict of interest even

though we agree with the defendant that his attorney in one instance exercised poor judgment and

possibly violated the rules of professional conduct. Nevertheless, we do not believe either that the

attorney'simproper action constituted a "conflict ofinterest," or, even ifit could be so construed, that

it adversely affected his representation of Bruce. We therefore affirm the convictions.

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I. BACKGROUND

The government charged Bruce with one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1344, alleging that he committed four separate fraudulent acts in furtherance of a single overall

scheme to defraud Signet Bank. According to the indictment, Bruce carried out his scheme by way

offour loan applications made over the course of a three-month period. Bruce made each application

by telephone, through Signet's phone banking operation in Richmond, and scheduled the settlements

at different Signet branch offices. The first three loans were scheduled to be settled in Maryland

branch offices of the bank, but the fourth loan, which provides the act necessary to establish venue

in the District of Columbia (D.C.) on the § 1344 count, was scheduled for settlement in D.C.

Testimony at trial established that Bruce, using false identification, took out a loan for $7500

in the name of George Brown. A discrepancy between the social security number on "Brown's" loan

application and the number on the savings account card he filled out the day of the loan tipped off the

bank manager that the loan might be fraudulent. Signet security officers launched an investigation

that uncovered two other pending loan applications (also phoned into the telebanking center) which

contained similar background information to the Brown loan. Because of the overwhelming

similarities among the three applications, the bank concluded that they were fraudulent and that the

same person or group might be responsible for all three of them.

Investigators set up a surveillance team at the Signet branch office on Reisterstown Road in

Pikesville, Maryland, where one of the suspicious loans was scheduled for a September 1 settlement

by a "Richard Lawson." But on that date, before showing up at the bank and presenting himself as

Lawson, Bruce visited another Signet office in Pikesville and attempted to settle a loan there in the

name of Michael Grand. The Grand loan had originally been scheduled for settlement on the

following day, September 2. When the Signet employee processing the Grand loan on September 1

found a glitch in the application which required follow-up, Bruce became "antsy" and said he had an

appointment at another bank. Shortly thereafter, Bruce was arrested at the original Pikesville branch

for presenting false identification in the name ofRichard Lawson and attempting to close the Lawson

loan.

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Following his arrest, investigators searched Bruce's car and found several forms of

identification bearing his picture and the name Michael Grand, along with several other documents

in the name of Floyd Bruce.

Two months later, a similar suspicious loan application was made to the telebanking center

in Richmond, by a man identifying himself as "David Greene." Greene, whom witnesses at trial

identified as speaking with an accent similar to the defendant's, provided Signet with some of the

same phone numbers and employment information that had been used in the earlier fraudulent loans.

Bank officials again became suspicious and set up surveillance at the Signet office in D.C. where the

Greene loan wasscheduled for settlement. On November 18, Bruce stood outside the bank while an

accomplice, Victor Dede, entered the bank posing as David Greene. After Dede attempted to close

the loan, both he and Bruce were arrested. Investigators found on Dede several forms of ID with

Dede's picture and Greene's name, as well as a handwritten note with the name David Greene and the

numbers and information included in the Greene loan application. On Bruce's person, investigators

found an ID with Bruce's photo and the name "Cosmos Phillips," a ticket stub in Phillips' name, and

a business card with credit card numbers and expiration dates on the back.

Shortly after his arrest, Bruce confessed to Secret Service Agents that he had been involved

with a group of people who made false identification cards and that he had been approached by a

friend about setting up fraudulent loans with Signet Bank. According to Bruce's statement, the friend

asked him specifically if he wanted to do the David Greene loan in D.C., but Bruce claimed that he

had declined and had explained to the friend that his prior arrest in Maryland made him "too hot" to

do the D.C. loan. Victor Dede, who was also present during this conversation, apparently offered

to do the Greene loan, and Bruce agreed to help him out by "school[ing]" him on it and driving him

to D.C. on the scheduled day. Appellee's Brief at 14.

Bruce was indicted on, and convicted of, one charge of knowingly executing and attempting

to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud Signet Bank (Count One), and one count of possessing

a forged security (Count Two).

II. DISCUSSION

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1

In all cites to record material, the letter preceding the page number indicates the tab behind

which the information is located. 

A. The Duplicity Challenge

The first count, which Bruce challenges as duplicitous, alleges one "scheme" to defraud

Signet, and embraces the four separate loan applications each as one "part" of that overall scheme.

Arguing that each application constituted a separate "scheme" and therefore had to be charged in an

individual count, Bruce moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court denied the motion,

finding that Bruce's activities evidenced a single scheme to defraud, "because the same victim was

involved, the same bank, because the same methods were used...." Record Material Relied Upon By

Appellee ("R.M.") A24.1

The bank fraud statute makes each "execution" of a fraudulent scheme punishable as a

separate count. See United States v. Pless, 79 F.3d 1217, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he unit of

prosecution is not the scheme but the execution. If appellant did not execute the scheme, he would

not be guilty."). It is settled law that acts in furtherance of the scheme cannot be charged as separate

counts unless they constitute separate executions of the scheme, e.g., United States v. Lemons, 941

F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the movement of one sum of money in several separate

stages constituted only one "execution" and therefore could not support separate counts), and that

acts which do constitute individual executions may be charged separately, e.g., United States v.

Poliak, 823 F.2d 371, 372 (9thCir. 1987) (holding that § 1344 "unambiguously allows charging each

execution of the scheme to defraud as a separate act") (emphasis added). What is less clear is

whether the two situations are mutually exclusive; in other words, whether an act which can be

viewed as an independent execution of a scheme must be charged in a separate count in order for the

charge not to be duplicitous.

We think the sensible answer, and the one dictated by the most persuasive precedent, is that

the two are not mutually exclusive; certain situations would justify indictment either in one count or

in separate counts. Caselaw supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Pless, 79 F.3d at 1220 ("[I]t is not

necessary for the government to charge every single act of execution of the scheme in order to prove

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the whole scheme."); United States v. Longfellow, 43 F.3d 318, 323 (7thCir. 1994) ("While for each

count of conviction there must be an execution, each execution need not give rise to a charge in the

indictment." (internal quotations omitted)). The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Hammen, 977

F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992), stated this proposition and explained the rationale justifying it:

[E]ach execution need not give rise to a charge in the indictment. The indictment in

this case sets forth the existence of a scheme and allegesthe scheme was executed on

at least one occasion. The allegations tending to demonstrate the existence of the

scheme do appear to be allegations that, if worded and structured differently, might

constitute additional executions. This is hardly surprising; the actions that tend to

prove the existence of the scheme will often be the actions actually taken to execute

the scheme.

Id. at 383.

Following Hammen 'slead, the question in this case is whetherBruce'sindictment was written

so as "to allege only one execution of an ongoing scheme." Id. Bruce's indictment charges him with

having "knowinglyexecuted and attempted to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud Signet Bank,"

and alleges that "it was part of the scheme to defraud" that he engaged in each act required for each

of the loan transactions. In paragraph 16, however, the indictment alleges that "On or about

November 18, 1994, within the District of Columbia, for the purpose of executing and attempting

to execute the above-described scheme to defraud Signet Bank, N.A., the defendant, FLOYD

BRUCE, and Victor Dede received cashier's check number 00140330 ... made payable to "David

Green' in the amount of $8,000.00." Appendix of Appellant ("A.A.") 13 (emphasis added). Thus,

the prosecution "has carefully crafted the indictment to allege only one execution of an ongoing

scheme that was executed numerous times." Hammen, 977 F.2d at 383.

In a case involving tax evasion rather than bank fraud, this court directly addressed the

propriety of charging "in one count what could be several independent charges." United States v.

Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 58 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In such a case, according to Shorter,

the Court must measure th[e] indictment against the purposes of the prohibition

against duplicity. These purposes include generally: (1) the prevention of double

jeopardy, (2) an assurance of adequate notice to the defendant, (3) the provision of

a basisfor appropriate sentencing, and (4) the danger that a conviction was produced

by a verdict that may not have been unanimous as to any one of the crimes charged.

Id.; accord, United States v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 609 (5th Cir. 1991). The court concluded

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2

In the instructions to the jury, the district court explained: "The government must prove the

scheme to defraud and it must prove that one or more acts in furtherance of the scheme to

defraud were done by the defendant. And it must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one

or more acts in furtherance of the scheme to defraud were committed by one or more participants

in the scheme in the District of Columbia." A.A. D36-D37. (As noted in the government's brief,

the only "act in furtherance of the scheme" that was alleged to have occurred in D.C. was the

Greene transaction. The court can therefore conclude from the guilty verdict that the jury

unanimously agreed that one of the participants in the overall scheme executed the Greene loan. 

Brief at 30.) With respect to unanimity, the judge instructed the jury that "in order to return a

guilty verdict on [count one], all jurors must unanimously agree as to at least one of [the

specified] acts [in furtherance of the scheme]." R.M. I45.

During jury deliberations, the jury wrote a note to the judge asking the "significance of

"District of Columbia' " with respect to count one. In response, the judge reiterated that the jury

must find that one or more acts in furtherance of the scheme to defraud must be found to have

been performed by one or more participants in the scheme in the District of Columbia. 

in Shorter that the defendant had been properly charged with one count of tax evasion over a twelve

year period, since his actions could legitimately be regarded as a single course of conduct and the

purposes of the bar against duplicity had been met. 809 F.2d at 58.

Similarly, in Bruce's case, the fraudulent loans could properly be viewed as parts of a single

course of conduct and the purposes of the duplicity prohibition met. Because the specific acts in

furtherance of the scheme are specified in the indictment, Bruce was on notice of the charge against

him and need not worry about later being charged for the same acts. Moreover, the judge carefully

instructed the jury that they must unanimously agree on the overall scheme and at least one of the

specified acts in furtherance of the scheme (as well as the only act that occurred in D.C.), thereby

eliminating the possibility of a nonunanimous verdict.2

B. The Conflict of Interest Challenge

Next, Bruce claims that his attorney created an actual conflict of interest when, in the middle

of trial, he divulged to the court in an ex parte hearing that Bruce had insisted that the attorney lie

to the court onBruce's behalf. We surmise from the trial transcripts that Bruce was an uncooperative

and manipulative client who put his attorney in a very difficult situation, but we conclude that the

attorneyexhibited an error in judgment when he decided to revealhis client's confidencesto the court.

Nevertheless, we reject Bruce's claim that the attorney labored under a conflict of interest that

adversely affected the defense.

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During the trial, Bruce decided that he was dissatisfied with the performance of his

court-appointed attorney, Mr. Rudasill. Bruce demanded that Rudasill (who had been appointed to

his case earlier in the proceedings when the defendant dismissed his first court-appointed attorney)

seek leave to withdraw from his representation. A.A. A1. After a lengthy (and remarkably patient)

discussion with the attorney and the defendant, the judge explained that he was not going to appoint

another attorney to represent Bruce and that he was not going to delay the trial. In denying Bruce's

request for new counsel, the district judge noted that the attorney was "a very competent lawyer ...

who, in my judgment, is doing a good job." A.A. A15-A16; see also A.A. A26 ("I don't think that

Mr. Rudasill has been ineffective. I think he has been quite effective."). The judge then went through

each of the defendant's complaints regarding Rudasill's representation of Bruce and noted that most

of Bruce's objections pertained to decisions the court had made rather than the lawyer. "[L]et me

phrase it this way," the court told the defendant:

On the pretrial motions, I can't think of a lawyer who would have done a better job

than Mr. Rudasill in presenting the arguments in the duplicity of the indictment and

the double jeopardy and the prosecution by two sovereigns. I thought it was a first

rate motion. 

And he made all of the arguments that could have been made on your behalf. And he

made itand he made me read all of the cases that might havethat might have

helped you on that score. 

I ruled against you. But it was not because you had an ineffective lawyer. And once

I made that ruling, the evidence [you object to] came in.

A.A. A14. The court addressed each of the defendant's concerns in this fashion, explaining that the

attorney had been fully effective, and then gave Bruce the option of proceeding pro se or continuing

with Mr. Rudasill's representation. Bruce then announced that he wanted to be removed from the

proceedings, apparently believing that the trial would have to be delayed if he were not present. The

judge (again, very patiently) explained that Bruce had a right to be present, but that he could waive

that right if he wished. A.A. A24-A38. If he remained in the courtroom, he would have to refrain

from disrupting the proceedings, or the court would hold him in contempt; if he opted to have the

marshals remove him from the courtroom, the trial would continue in his absence. The court then

recessed for an hour and a half and instructed Bruce to discuss his options with counsel and advise

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3RUDASILL: Mr. Bruce has been unresponsive to my attempts to communicate with him. 

And I have grave concerns that he has done what he said he would do, which is, you know, unless

I pass this litmus test of allegiance to him, that essentially he would view me as not being his

counsel and would not cooperate.

the court after lunch which option he was electing.

The alleged conflict arose after the break, when the attorney announced to the court his belief

that during the recess, "an irreconcilable difference ha[d] developed" between himand Bruce, and he

requested an ex parte hearing. A.A. A39. According to Rudasill, Bruce had insisted during his

lunchtime conference with his attorney that it was the attorney's responsibility "to do anything to

pursue or advance" the client's interests. A.A. A43. Because Bruce believed his interests would be

served by new counsel, he believed the attorney should do whatever was necessary to force the judge

to alter his earlier decision not to remove Rudasill from the case. A.A. A43-A44. Apparently Bruce

then demanded that Rudasill lie to the court "concerning the status of[the lawyer's] relationship with

Mr. Bruce," A.A. A47, presumably by falsely informing the court that he was incapable for some

reason of representing the defendant.

In his talk with Bruce, Rudasill explained that he "could not in good conscience" lie to the

court, A.A. A43, and that he "could not compromise [his] own personal integrity to pursue [Bruce's]

aims." A.A. A44. Nevertheless, Bruce continued to insist that it was a "requirement of his counsel,"

id., to do as he requested. Rudasill informed the court that he and his client had reached an impasse:

I have refused to make those representations. I believe it is inconsistent with my

ethical obligations to the Court and I will not do so. And my client's insistence that

my failure to do so is somehowis demonstrative of a lack of zeal in his

representation is the basis of my request [to be removed from the case].

A.A. A46. The court then asked if Rudasill had discussed with Bruce whether the defendant wished

to represent himself. A.A. A47. The attorney replied that Bruce had "indicated that he does not

believe that at this point he's adequately prepared to represent himself." Id.

During this ex parte discussion, Bruce became angry and for a while refused to answer any

questions posed to him by the attorney or the judge. Apparently Rudasill had not warned Bruce that

he intended to inform on him to the judge, even though he had made it very clear to Bruce that he

would not complywith the defendant's unethicalrequest.3 The court invited the prosecutor back into

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...

I am troubled. Not that in my experience I have not proceeded in trials where my client

has even not been present in the courtroom; I have. It is something that I have experience with

and I believe that I am capable of representing his interests if he so desires.

I think his interests obviously could be best protected if he had counsel with whom he was

willing to communicate or had a belief in that counsel's good faith.

I can understand Mr. Bruce's hostility toward counsel. I did not tell him what I was going

to do with his suggestion to me prior to relating it to the Court.

But as I stated to the Court, I have to exercise a degree of independent judgment with

regard to where my ethical responsibilities lie....

I believe it was my legal obligation and ethical obligation [to relate this to the Court].

THE COURT: Your ethical obligation is to zealously represent your client within the

bounds of the law. That's what the rules say. And to be loyal to your client and his interests

within the bounds of the law.

A.A. A50-A51. 

4The defendant appeared to believe that he should not be forced to stand trial at all:

All I'm saying is let me be, please. Let me be. I don't want no problems. I don't

want no problems. When the jurors come in, I'm going to disrupt the court.... I

have tried everything. I'veI've never seen a man so helpless in a court today in

my life. I've never been through anything as such. I've never seen such

wickedness in the hearts of mankind.... I can't keep sitting in here seeing my life

the room and addressed the issue in open court. Refusing to reward Bruce's manipulative effort to

receive a third court-appointed attorney, the court once again explained Bruce's options to him: he

could proceed pro se; he could continue with Rudasill representing him (acting as co-counsel to

Rudasill, if he wished); or he could let Rudasill represent him and choose to absent himself from the

courtroom. A.A. A48.

At first, Bruce refused to respond to the judge. When he did speak, he issued the following

monologue:

THE DEFENDANT: Let the record show that they tried to entrap me.... I will not

sit here calm in front of the jurors. I will not be convicted of nothing that I ain't done

in D.C., nothing of it. I will not be tried for something I ain't done and let it show,

please, I do not want no problems. I have maintained all day today everything is

wrong.... Why should I be subjected to this? I shouldn't go through this. What did

I do? I shouldn't go through this. Why do I have to be forced to go through this?

A.A. A55-A56.4 Rudasill then jumped in and requested a competency examination for his client, to

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go down before my own eyes. I'd rather be dead.

A.A. A61. 

which the prosecutor responded that she believed the problem was belligerence rather than

competency. A.A. A56. The court agreed with the prosecutor and announced his determination to

proceed with the trial. The court again explained Bruce's options to him, and noted:

[T]he Court has made a finding that Mr. Rudasill is competent and very professional

in this matter and isrepresenting your interests. It appears to the Court that all of this

is an effort to delay these proceedings, to obstruct these proceedings and to abort

these proceedings because you don't want to be on trial.

Well, you're on trial. You've been indicted by a grand jury.... And if you're not going

to decide for yourself whether you want Mr. Rudasill to represent you or whether you

want to represent yourself, I'm deciding for you.

A.A. A64.

The trial continued and Bruce made good on histhreatsto disrupt the proceedings. Because

the defendant would not exercise hisright to be removed from the courtroom, the judge ordered him

shackled for part ofthe trial. See A.A. B7-B8. Eventually, however, the defendant settled down and

the court observed that Bruce and Rudasill "seemed to the court to have reestablished a level of

communication that has made it possible for them to consult with each other and to work together

in presenting a defense." A.A. B11. The court also noted that Bruce had participated with Rudasill

in the defense, and had asked constructive questions of witnesses. Id.

At the end of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.

1. The legal standard

The government correctly classifies Bruce's "conflict ofinterest" challenge as a specific genre

of "ineffective assistance of counsel" claims. Appellee's Brief at 31. Under usual circumstances, a

successful "ineffective assistance" claim requires a defendant to show (1) that counsel's performance

was deficient, falling "below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant, depriving him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 688 (1984).

The defendant in this case makes no effort to make the difficult Strickland showing of

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prejudice, arguing instead that this case fitsinto a subset of "ineffective assistance" cases which does

not require the defendant to meet such a strict standard. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980),

the Supreme Court explained that if a defendant can show that "a conflict of interest actually affected

the adequacy of [the attorney's] representation[,] [the defendant] need not demonstrate prejudice in

order to obtain relief." Id. at 349-50. Thus, if Bruce can show that "an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected [Rudasill's] performance," the court will presume prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 692, citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.

2. No actual conflict

In two recent cases, we have rejected the defendants' attempts to force their ineffective

assistance claimsinto the "actual conflict ofinterest" framework efforts and therebysupplant the strict

Strickland standard with the far more lenient Cuylertest. United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 227

(D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[W]e are unpersuaded by Leggett'sfurther attempt to style his disagreement with

counsel over trial tactics as a[n actual] "conflict of interest.' "); United States v. Farley, 72 F.3d 158,

166 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Farley attempts to repackage the ineffective assistance claim into an "actual

conflict of interest' claim.").

Several cases discussing Cuyler claims have required defendants claiming an actual conflict

to show as a "threshold matter" that the defense attorney "was required to make a choice advancing

his own intereststo the detriment of his client'sinterest." United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514,

1518 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Acevedo, 891 F.2d 607, 610

(7th Cir. 1989). It is the competition between these interests, rather than some independent failure

of the attorney, that gives rise to the "conflict." Thus, not every shortcoming of counsel can be

classified as a "conflict of interest." In this case, Bruce has failed to demonstrate that Rudasill ever

advanced his own, or another client's, interests to the detriment of his client and we therefore reject

his Cuyler claim.

In holding that Bruce has failed to show a conflict of interest, we in no way mean to indicate

our approval of Mr. Rudasill's decision to divulge his client's confidences to the court. In fact, our

review of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggests that the

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attorney might indeed have violated ethical standards in doing so. But a violation of an ethical

obligation does not in itself give rise to a conflict of interest, unless it involves the attorney putting

his own interests (or, of course, another client's interests) in conflict with his client's. See, e.g.,

Acevedo, 891 F.2d at 610 ("[The attorney's] alleged breach of ethics, however, does not automatically

establish that [the defendant] was denied effective assistance of counsel.").

Chapter 1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct governs the "Client-Lawyer

Relationship." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1-1.17 (1995). Rule 1.6, entitled

"Confidentiality of Information" requires an attorney to guard a client's confidences under virtually

all circumstances. The text of the rule reads as follows:

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless

the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly

authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph

(b).

(b) A lawyer may revealsuch information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes

necessary:

(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer

believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or

(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy

between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil

claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to

respond to allegationsin any proceeding concerning the lawyer'srepresentation ofthe

client.

MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONALCONDUCTRULE 1.6 (1995). In this case, neither of the exceptions

listed in part (b) would excuse Rudasill's disclosure; Bruce had not threatened to maim or kill

anybody, and no charges had been brought against Rudasill which required the attorney to defend

himself.

The next three rules in the Model Rules directly address "conflict of interest" situations, but,

significantly, none of them mentions the kind of "conflict" created by an attorney's revelation of the

client's suggestion that the lawyer commit an illegal act. Rather, the rules deal with more traditional

conflicts of interest: representation of multiple parties, id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. [12]; representation of

opposing parties, id. at cmt. [7]; a lawyer's implication in the same conduct as the client, id. at cmt.

[6]; representation of a client with whom the attorney has business transactions, id. at Rule 1.8(a);

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representation by an attorney with pecuniary interests adverse to the client, id.; representation that

would be adverse to a former client, id. at Rule 1.9.

The "conflict" between an attorney's duty to safeguard a client's confidentiality and her duty

to be truthful to the court is addressed in a different section of the rules. Rule 3.3, entitled "Candor

Toward the Tribunal," explains that an advocate's duty of candor to the court applies "even if

compliance requires disclosure ofinformation otherwise protected byRule 1.6." Id. at Rule 3.3. This

duty includes the obligation to avoid making a false statement to the tribunal, and to avoid assisting

a criminal or fraudulent act by the client. Id. Thus, under the Model Rules, if disclosure of a client

confidence is necessary to avoid assisting such an act, the attorneymust disclose that fact, even if the

disclosure would conflict with the lawyer's obligations under Rule 1.6. Id.

The D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct are even more protective of a client's privacy. Rule

3.3 of the local rules prohibits a lawyer from knowingly "offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows

to be false," D.C. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 3.3(a)(4), but contains an exception and a qualification that

weaken the prohibition. In the case of a criminal defendant who intends to give false evidence, an

attorney "shallfirst make a good-faith effort to dissuade the client frompresenting the false evidence"

and then, if the client refuses and the lawyer cannot withdraw, "the lawyer may put the client on the

stand to testify in a narrative fashion." Id. at 3.3(b). The last section of the rule contains the further

qualification that

[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that a fraud has been

perpetrated upon the tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal unless

compliance with this duty would require disclosure of information otherwise

protected by rule 1.6, in which case the lawyer shall promptly call upon the client to

rectify the fraud.

Id. at 3.3(d) (emphasis added).

Although we need not decide whether Rudasill violated the code of ethics, we think his

conduct highly problematic. Even given the uncomfortable position in which Bruce left him, Rudasill

most likely could have honored his obligations under both Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3. When Bruce

demanded that Rudasill lie to the court, Rudasill correctly advised his client that he would not honor

the request. Bruce's persistence created a dilemma for Rudasill, but not one which required him to

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5Significantly, there is no evidence in the record even remotely challenging the correctness of

the court's warning regarding the admissibility of Bruce's prior conviction. Bruce's naked

assertion that Rudasill should have attempted to keep the criminal history out of evidence,

without an accompanying allegation that such a motion would have been legitimate, could not in

any event meet his burden of showing that the alleged conflict had an adverse effect. For

example, if the prior conviction were for a crime of dishonesty (such as, say, bank fraud), the

Rules of Evidence would allow the information in, and a motion to the contrary would have been

frivolous. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 

request an ex parte hearing.

The wiser course of action, we think, would have been for Rudasill to tell the judge, as he did,

that he and his client had reached an impasse and that he would like to be removed from the case.

In describing the "impasse," however, the lawyer should have avoided any mention of the fact that

his client had asked him to lie to the court. The judge, having explained an hour before that he

absolutely would not derail this trial, would likely have asked the defendant whether he agreed that

he and his attorney had reached an impasse, and if so, whether he would rather proceed alone. The

same result would have been reached, but without the disclosure of damaging information.

3. No adverse effect

Even under Cuyler's lenient actual conflict of interest standard, a defendant must show not

only that the attorney faced a conflict, but also that the conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's

performance." Farley, 72 F.3d at 166, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; accord Leggett, 81 F.3d

at 227. As noted above, the trial judge in this case repeatedly complimented Rudasill's representation

ofBruce. The court's factual finding that the representation was effective should govern this question

unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Defendant has not begun to make that showing.

Most of the examples of ineffectiveness Bruce offersto demonstrate the adverse effect of the

"conflict" on Rudasill's performance occurred prior to the ex parte hearing (and for that reason

cannot be factored into the analysis of whether the conflict itself adversely affected the

representation); the remaining examples simply lack merit. Specifically, Bruce challenges the

following three alleged shortcomings of his attorney: (1) Rudasill's failure to object when the court

informed Bruce that his prior conviction would be brought out at trial if he decided to testify;5(2)

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6Rudasill proffered that his investigator had discovered that Victor Dede, Bruce's accomplice

in this case, had attempted to take out a loan in the name of George Brown, in whose name Bruce

had also taken out a fraudulent loan. A.A. C102. The potential benefit of this information would

be to show that Dede had the ability to execute the scheme independent of any involvement by

Bruce. Id. At the time Rudasill addressed the court, however, the defense witness was

unavailable to testify, and Rudasill told the judge:

I feel that it is my obligation if my client wants to testify, we may be able to put on

a case and produce this additional evidence tomorrow. If he does not seek to

testify, I can understand how the court might exclude it, given the lateness that it

was brought to even counsel's attention.

Note 6Continued

A.A. C101. During the discussion regarding the proffer, Rudasill represented that he (Rudasill)

had only known about the additional evidence for two days and therefore could not have obtained

it earlier. Bruce points out that, according to the trial transcripts, Rudasill had obtained a

subpoena for the evidence six days previously. Bruce concludes that "Once again, defense

counsel was in a conflict of interest situation, because by blaming the failure to obtain the material

on defendant [because he failed to inform the attorney of its existence until mid-trial], counsel's

interests were opposed to those of defendant." Brief of Appellant at 38.

Although Bruce attempts to paint a picture of a defense attorney who messed up and then

unjustifiably pointed a finger at his client to explain the error, we do not necessarily find his

picture convincing. First we note that Rudasill's claim that he had only known about the evidence

for two days is not necessarily inconsistent with him having gotten the subpoena six days before; 

he wouldn't know that there was evidence to present until his investigator, armed with the

subpoena, discovered the sought-after documents.

Next we note that the government argued that even if Bruce could prove that Dede had

taken out another fraudulent loan, evidence of Dede's crime "would reinforce the argument that

[Bruce and Dede] worked together as part of a team for a scheme." A.A. C103. In excluding the

evidence (by refusing to delay the trial), the district court agreed with the prosecution and noted

that the proffered evidence and testimony would likely be "more helpful to the government" than

to the defense, as it would be "more probative of further evidence of a scheme between Bruce and

Dede." A.A. C106. The court concluded: "I am not inclined to postpone the conclusion of the

trial to await this evidence ... in light of the fact that on the basis of the proffer it seems to me that

it's at least as helpful to the government, if not more so, this evidence, than it is to the defense." 

Id.

If it were necessary to decide whether Rudasill acted ineffectively in this instance, we

could not conclude on the basis of this record that the attorney erred when he failed to push

adamantly for the introduction of evidence that was likely to harm, rather than help, his client. 

Throughout the trial, Bruce had taken an active role in his defense and had insisted that Rudasill

make motions that the attorney felt were ill-advised (for example, Bruce insisted that Rudasill

object to a jury instruction which the attorney knew to state the law correctly: "I've tried to

explain [the law] to him.... I don't know if he fully understands, but I'm making this objection

because he asked." A.A. C89). Without more, we cannot conclude that Rudasill acted

irresponsibly here. 

Rudasill's "invitation" for the court to exclude the only defense evidence available;6and (3) Rudasill's

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7Rudasill apparently mistook the juror for a law clerk, and spoke to her one morning as the

two of them entered the courthouse. The juror classified the accidental exchange between her and

the attorney as "just passing comments as we went in [to the courthouse]." A.A. B26. In an ex

parte hearing, the court fully satisfied itself that the conversation would have no impact on the

juror's impartiality, id., but Bruce nevertheless claims that this episode "put [Rudasill] in a conflict

of interest situation" where the attorney had "an interest in refuting the juror's testimony" in order

to "minimize counsel's misconduct." Appellant's Brief at 37. Significantly, however, the court

expressly found that Rudasill's version of the exchange that took place was not inconsistent with

the juror's version. A.A. B28-B29 ("[I]n terms of what was said, I think that the court can credit

both what [the juror] said and what Mr. Rudasill has said."). If the versions were consistent,

Rudasill could not have been in a position where he needed to "refute" the juror's testimony. 

improper verbal exchange with one of the jurors.7

In response to these allegations, we simply note that the defendant has neither demonstrated,

nor even suggested, a nexus between the alleged conflict and these examples of claimed

ineffectiveness. If an attorney fails to make a legitimate argument because of the attorney's

conflicting interest (for example, counsel fails to raise a misidentification defense because to do so

might implicate himself or another client), then the Cuyler standard has been met. But if the

attorney's alleged shortcoming is utterly unrelated to the conflict, the defendant cannot make use of

the Cuyler presumption of prejudice and must instead proceed under Strickland. See, e.g., Lopez v.

Scully, 58 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We also believe that the second prong of the test for adverse

effectthat trial counsel refrained from making an argument for leniency because of the actual

conflict of interesthas been met." (emphasis added)).

In sum, we hold that the indictment in this case wassound, and that Bruce hasfailed to make

out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, the defendant's convictions are

Affirmed.

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