Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02655/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02655-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2655

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Robert Thomas, also known *

as Christian Tadlock * [PUBLISHED]

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2010

Filed: August 4, 2010

___________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Robert Thomas was convicted following an unconditional guilty plea of being

a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and receipt

of an unregistered machine gun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Thomas was

sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Thomas argues the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In addition,

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Thomas contends that the district court1

 violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) by

failing to make rulings on two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements. We affirm.

I

On August 5, 1976, Robert Thomas was convicted of delivery of LSD, a

controlled substance, in the Circuit Court for St. Clair County, Illinois, and was

sentenced to four to six years in prison. Thomas appealed his conviction, but began

serving his sentence on August 6, 1976. On December 22, 1977, Thomas was

released on bond. On August 14, 1978, while Thomas was still free on bond, the

Appellate Court of Illinois reversed his conviction and remanded the case to the circuit

court for dismissal on the theory that Thomas had been entrapped as a matter of law. 

People v. Thomas, 381 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. App. 1978). The State of Illinois then

appealed the case to the Illinois Supreme Court, which, on October 19, 1979, reversed

the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed Thomas’s conviction and sentence. 

People v. Cross, 396 N.E.2d 812, 820 (Ill. 1979). Thomas’s petition for a writ of

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied on March 17, 1980. Thomas

v. Illinois, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).

On April 16, 1980, Thomas faked his own death by staging a suicide. He left

his vehicle abandoned on a bridge in Ballard County, Kentucky. A supposed suicide

note addressed to his wife was left on the seat inside the vehicle. After faking his

death, Thomas traveled throughout the United States and eventually settled in

Farmington, Arkansas, in 1984, where he began living as “Christian Tadlock” with

his girlfriend.

1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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In late September 2007, Special Agent Wes Patterson of the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) was contacted by a confidential informant

who advised Patterson that a person known to him as “Chris” had asked the informant

where he might obtain an MG-42 machine gun. Agent Patterson told the informant

to provide Chris with his cellular telephone number so Chris could contact Agent

Patterson. Shortly thereafter, an individual identifying himself as Chris contacted

Agent Patterson and stated that he was interested in purchasing an MG-42 machine

gun. Agent Patterson informed Chris that he had an MG-42 to sell and arrangements

were made to consummate the transaction. On October 16, 2007, Agent Patterson

made contact with Chris at a prearranged site in Joplin, Missouri. Chris arrived at the

appointed location and introduced himself. After Patterson showed Chris an MG-42

firearm, Chris produced $1,200 in United States currency which he handed to Agent

Patterson in payment for the firearm. In return, Patterson handed the firearm to Chris,

who then placed the machine gun in the bed of his pickup truck. As Chris attempted

to enter his vehicle he was apprehended by assisting law enforcement officers. Chris

identified himself as “Christian Tadlock” to the officers and was carrying a valid

Arkansas driver’s license in that name. Shortly thereafter, Christian Tadlock was

determined to be Robert Thomas.

A search warrant was obtained for Thomas’s residence. During the course of

the search, investigators recovered multiple machine guns, 21 rifles, 35 handguns, 3

shotguns, 45,000 rounds of ammunition, 57 hand grenades, pipe bombs, and an

assortment of gun parts. A search of the National Firearms Registration and Transfer

Record revealed that there were no firearms registered to either Christian Tadlock or

Robert Thomas. The machine gun sold to Thomas by Agent Patterson was fully

operational and had traveled in interstate commerce.

A federal grand jury returned a four-count superceding indictment against

Thomas charging him with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1), receipt of an unregistered machine gun, in violation

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of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871, and possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(m).

On February 12, 2009, Thomas filed a motion to quash the indictment and

dismiss the case, arguing (1) he was not a convicted felon, and (2) he was unaware

that he had sustained a prior felony conviction. The district court denied the motion.

On February 19, 2009, Thomas pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, and receipt of an unregistered machine gun. There was

neither a plea agreement nor a conditional plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). 

The district court accepted Thomas’s guilty plea. A preliminary presentence

investigation report (PSR) was subsequently prepared by the United States Probation

Department and provided to the parties for comment. On May 15, 2009, Thomas

submitted thirteen written objections to the preliminary PSR. Two of the objections

related to factual findings made by the probation department that impacted his

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of punishment. Specifically, Thomas

contended that the number of firearms attributed to him should be reduced by fortyfour because “the 44 hand grenades were not ‘live grenades’ they contained gun

powdered [sic] for use in reenactments [sic].” Thomas also objected to receiving “a

two level enhancement because he did not steal a firearm.”

The final PSR was prepared and disseminated to the parties and the district

court on May 28, 2009. The PSR maintained that the contested portions of the

preliminary report were correct and calculated Thomas’s total offense level at 32,

including enhancements for both the number of firearms attributable to Thomas, see

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C), and the fact that one of the firearms was determined to

have been stolen, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4). The probation officer, in addressing

Thomas’s objections, noted that the grenades, even emptied of the original explosive

charge, contained “gun powder and can explode” and were determined to be

explosives by the ATF. With respect to Thomas’s claim that he should not receive a

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two-level increase to his base offense level for possessing a stolen firearm, the

probation officer replied that the firearm had been reported stolen and was located in

Thomas’s possession.

On July 7, 2009, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing. After hearing

from the Government regarding its objections to the PSR, the district court asked

Thomas’s counsel if he had “any other objections.” Thomas’s attorney replied: “No,

sir, Your Honor. I voiced our objections. In talking to the probation officer and

looking at her responses, I’m satisfied with it.”

The district court then followed the PSR’s recommendation and sentenced

Thomas to 120 months’ imprisonment as to Count One and 31 months’ imprisonment

as to Count Two, to run consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 151 months,

followed by three years’ supervised release. Thomas appeals.

II

Thomas argues there was an insufficient factual basis to convict him of being

a felon in possession of a firearm. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). A guilty plea is

supported by an adequate factual basis when the record contains “sufficient evidence

at the time of the plea upon which a court may reasonably determine that the

defendant likely committed the offense.” United States v. Gamble, 327 F.3d 662, 664

(8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).

As a preliminary matter, the government argues Thomas waived his right to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions because he

pleaded guilty unconditionally.

As this court pointed out in United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 768 (8th

Cir. 2009), “[t]he law is unsettled about whether a defendant can appeal the adequacy

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of a factual basis after entering an unconditional guilty plea.” Id. We explained that

while

in United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir. 2001), we held

that a defendant, by entering a guilty plea that was not conditional,

waived his right to appeal the sufficiency of the factual basis for one

element of the offense of conviction, . . . in United States v. Marks, 38

F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (8th Cir. 1994), we reviewed the adequacy of a

factual basis under Rule 11 despite an unconditional guilty plea.

Cheney, 571 F.3d at 768. The Cheney court declined to resolve the split of authority,

instead assuming the factual basis of the plea was reviewable and ruling against the

defendant-appellant on the merits. We likewise assume here, without deciding, that

the district court’s determination of a factual basis for Thomas’ unconditional guilty

plea is reviewable on appeal.2

Thomas argues the factual basis underpinning his guilty plea was deficient in

two ways. First, Thomas alleges he is not a felon because he was never resentenced

following the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision. Second, Thomas argues he did not

know he was a felon when he possessed the firearms.

Whether a particular conviction qualifies as a predicate felony for the purpose

of § 922(g) is a question of law for the district court. United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d

800, 805 (8th Cir. 2009). We agree with the district court that Thomas is a felon. 

Although Thomas’s conviction was reversed by the Illinois Court of Appeals, the

2

We also decline to decide whether we review the district court’s decision under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) in these circumstances through the lens

of plain error, see United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002), or harmless error,

see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h), because we ultimately conclude the district court did not

err in determining that a factual basis existed in this case to support Thomas’s guilty

plea.

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Illinois Supreme Court reinstated Thomas’s conviction. Cross, 396 N.E.2d at 820. 

We fail to see how the issue of resentencing is relevant to Thomas’s status as a felon

in light of the conviction itself, but note that Thomas was not resentenced because the

Illinois Supreme Court reinstated his original sentence. Id. We therefore conclude

the district court did not err in determining Thomas is a felon.

Turning to the evidence of Thomas’s knowledge of his status as a convicted

felon, Thomas argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a

defendant knew of his status as a felon, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove

he knew of his status.

Thomas’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Kind, 194 F.3d 900, 907

(8th Cir. 1999). There, this court stated that in a prosecution under § 922(g)(1), “it is

well settled in this circuit that the government need only prove defendant’s status as

a convicted felon and knowing possession of the firearm.” See also United States v.

Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (“[T]he ‘knowingly’ element of section

922(g) applies only to the defendant’s underlying conduct, not to his knowledge of the

illegality of his actions.”).

We therefore conclude that Thomas’s guilty plea was supported by sufficient

evidence to support the conclusion that Thomas likely committed the offense.

III

Thomas next argues that the district court failed to comply with Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32(i)(3)(B). The relevant portion of the rule states that “[a]t sentencing, the court

. . . must–for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted

matter–rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the

matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in

sentencing.” We have stated that if a defendant disputes material facts in the PSR, the

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court must “refuse to take those facts into account or hold an evidentiary hearing.” 

United States v. Morehead, 375 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2004).

On the record before us, we agree with the government that counsel for Thomas

withdrew his objections to the PSR at the sentencing proceeding. When the district

court asked defense counsel if he had any objections to the PSR, counsel stated, “No,

sir, Your Honor. I voiced our objections. In talking to the probation officer and

looking at her responses, I’m satisfied with it.” We take this to mean defense counsel

agreed with the probation officer’s defense of the enhancements recommended by the

PSR. We therefore conclude the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(i)(3)(B).

IV

We affirm.

______________________________

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