Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02374/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02374-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gilberto Moya-Vega
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

__________

No. 03-2308

__________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Martha Alvarado-Rivera, *

also known as Rosa Ontiveros Aranda, *

*

Defendant – Appellant. *

__________ 

 Appeals from the United States

No. 03-2374 District Court for the 

__________ District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Gilberto Moya-Vega, *

also known as Jorge Salinas, *

*

Defendant – Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 15, 2004

 Filed: October 26, 2004

___________

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1

It is undisputed that each appellant satisfied the other requirements of the

safety valve. The safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) mandates a sentence

under the federal sentencing guidelines, without regard to any mandatory minimum,

if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded

the opportunity to make a recommendation, that—

(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point,

as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence

or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another

participant to do so) in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any

person;

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or

supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the

sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal

-2-

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

____________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Martha Alvarado-Rivera and Gilberto Moya-Vega each appeal the district

court’s denial, at sentencing, of the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f),

which would, if applicable, mandate a sentence under the federal sentencing

guidelines, without respect to any mandatory minimum sentence. Appellants each

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500

grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Appellants were each subject to a mandatory minimum

sentence of a term of incarceration of ten years, unless the safety valve provision

applied to them. At separate sentencing hearings, the district court denied application

of the safety valve to each appellant because it found that they did not, as required by

the safety valve provision, provide the government a full and truthful account of their

knowledge concerning the offense.1

 

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enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances

Act; and

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant

has truthfully provided to the Government all information and

evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that

were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or

plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other

information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the

information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the

defendant has complied with this requirement.

-3-

The court sentenced Alvarado-Rivera to 120 months and Moya-Vega to 135

months.

Because each appellant carried their burden of affirmatively demonstrating the

completeness and truthfulness of their proffers, and the government made no showing

to negate the completeness and truthfulness of the proffers, beyond the improbability

of the accounts given, we hold that the district court clearly erred by not finding that

each appellant had made the requisite proffer. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence

as to each appellant and remand for resentencing pursuant to the federal sentencing

guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence.

I.

Alvarado-Rivera and Moya-Vega came to the attention of the authorities

because of a controlled drug buy on August 13, 2002. The Ramsey County Sheriff’s

Office had arranged the buy through an informant. Based on his prior dealings with

appellants, the informant had advised officers that Moya-Vega would be driven to the

scene by his wife, Alvarado-Rivera, in a champagne-colored vehicle and that he

would have three ounces of cocaine hidden in his crotch. After officers observed the

car arrive as the informant had predicted, police arrested appellants and found the

cocaine as described. 

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2

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has lodged detainers as to each

appellant with the United States Marshals Service and has advised that each appellant

will be deported following their terms of incarceration.

- 4 -

Appellants, who are illegal aliens,2

 spoke little English, so police officers held

them in the apartment’s parking lot until a Spanish-speaking agent from the Drug

Enforcement Task Force arrived to question them. The agent discerned from talking

to both appellants that they were married and lived in a trailer home in Blaine,

Minnesota. Alvarado-Rivera took officers to the trailer home, opened it with a key

on her key ring, and consented to a search of the trailer.

Upon entry to the trailer, the officers observed that the trailer home was nearly

empty, containing little more than a baby’s washtub inside the bathroom. The

officers doubted Alvarado-Rivera’s prior statement that she and her husband lived in

the trailer home. Officers questioned her about their suspicions and she insisted that

she and Moya-Vega lived there together. After an initial search of the trailer, the

officers did not discover any narcotics. The officers brought a narcotics dog to the

trailer to conduct a more thorough search. The dog alerted officers to approximately

twenty-seven pounds of methamphetamine hidden in a large paper bag behind a

cupboard in the kitchen. Alvarado-Rivera denied any knowledge of the drugs found

in the trailer.

The following day, while taking inventory of documents seized from AlvaradoRivera, officers found a receipt from a management company for the rental of an

apartment. The officers determined that Moya-Vega and Alvarado-Rivera rented the

apartment under the aliases Jorge Salinas and Rosa Ontiveros-Aranda, and that

appellants lived in that apartment. The officers obtained a warrant to search the

apartment and found approximately one pound of methamphetamine hidden in the

dishwasher, which bore the same distinctive appearance as that found in the trailer

home, and other small amounts of cocaine and marijuana hidden throughout the

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3

Gustavo Moya-Alvarado was not charged in connection with this offense, and

he voluntarily deported to Mexico. Gilberto Moya-Alvarado was charged with First

Degree Controlled Substance Crime (Possession of Methamphetamine) and was

sentenced on January 7, 2003, to serve a term of incarceration of 200 days, thereafter

to be placed on probation for a term of ten years. The Immigration and Naturalization

Service placed a hold on his case for deportation following his term of incarceration.

- 5 -

apartment. The officers found $3,875 in cash hidden in the bedroom closet and a

digital scale which could be used to measure cocaine. The officers found receipts for

two wire transfers of money to individuals in Mexico–one transfer in the amount of

$5,000 and one for $1,000. The officers also found notes which they suspected

pertained to drug sales and which they believed to indicate wire transfers totaling

approximately $99,000 to various individuals in Mexico, sent over a two-month

period in the summer of 2002.

Gilberto Moya-Alvarado, one of appellants’ sons, lived in an adjoining

apartment. Officers spoke to him, and he consented to a search of a storage locker

associated with his apartment. Officers found in the locker 281.5 grams of

methamphetamine, 43.5 grams of cocaine, and 85.2 grams of marijuana. The son told

the officers that he had removed the drugs from his parents’ apartment at the direction

of his brother, Gustavo Moya-Alvarado, after their parents failed to return home on

the day of their arrest.3

 In all, appellants were responsible for 127.1 grams of cocaine,

12,147.7 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, and 85.2 grams of

marijuana.

The grand jury returned a six-count indictment against each appellant, alleging

a drug conspiracy between appellants and several other drug-related offenses. On

December 5, 2002, appellants each pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy, and the

other charges were dismissed. The conspiracy charge carried a ten-year mandatory

minimum sentence. After entry of the pleas, the government interviewed each

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appellant separately to facilitate their attempts to qualify for the safety valve

provision.

In her interview, Alvarado-Rivera stated that she and her husband had sublet

the trailer home to someone else in July 2002, and that she retained a key in order to

make some repairs in the trailer. (The record indicates no inquiry into the details of

this alleged arrangement.) Alvarado-Rivera denied knowledge of the drugs in the

trailer but admitted having known of the drugs in the apartment. She explained that

she had lied about living in the trailer because she knew of the drugs in the apartment

and did not want to lead the police to them. She admitted that the drugs recovered

from the storage locker associated with her son’s apartment had been in her and her

husband’s apartment, in a closet, and that her son had moved them, as he had told the

police. While admitting to having known of drugs in the apartment generally, she

said she had not known of the drugs recovered from the dishwasher. She explained

that she is a traditional person, that she did not know how to use a dishwasher and

had never used one. She said that she had never sold drugs, though she had driven

her husband on some occasions on which he sold drugs. She said that the informant

was the only customer she had knowledge of. She said that the only money she knew

of was money she made selling food. (The record indicates no inquiry into the details

of such sales.) She said that she had used the measuring scale only once, to weigh a

bracelet.

The prosecutor advised the district court by letter that he believed AlvaradoRivera had not made a complete and truthful proffer. The government identified no

questions it had put to appellant which she refused to answer. Nor did the

government produce any evidence contradicting any statement she had made. Nor

did the government identify any internal inconsistency or contradiction in appellant’s

account. The prosecutor simply stated that he did not believe appellant’s account was

truthful and complete. The government offered to interview Alvarado-Rivera a

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- 7 -

second time, but no second interview was conducted, because appellant said she had

no additional or different information to offer.

At Alvarado-Rivera’s sentencing hearing, the government added little to its

simple declaration of disbelief: The government said that it would not be unusual,

assuming—as there was no evidence on the point—that Alvarado-Rivera had

personally sold drugs, if the government were unable to find anyone to testify to such

sales. The government asserted that “two people with this quantity of drugs are

obviously not the small-time dealers that they would portray themselves as.” The

government speculated that appellant might have led the police to the trailer, even

knowing of the drugs there, thinking the drugs were too well hidden to be found.

And the government noted that the methamphetamine found at the trailer was

distinctive in its appearance and consistency and was similar to that found at

appellants’ apartment. Again the government provided no evidence contradicting any

statement appellant made and identified no internal contradictions in the statements.

Nor did the government even specify which statements by Alvarado-Rivera were false

in the government’s view. On the basis of these brief remarks, the prosecutor stated,

“I just simply can’t suggest to this Court that she has told the complete truth. And

that’s why I’m opposing the safety valve here.”

The district court’s consideration of appellant’s statement was similarly brief.

The court stated,

There’s no ring of truth to this. Everything that I see tells me that for

reasons either you’re scared of what’s going to happen to your family or

you’re scared for yourself, I don’t believe that you’ve substantially told

the truth. None of this makes sense to me. Apart from going to the

trailer and apart from what [the prosecutor] said, whether it’s using the

scale, wearing a bracelet or an informant being absolutely certain, well,

I’ll tell you exactly how the deal is going to go, it’s going to be his wife

driving the car, and apart from what the husband has said or not said, the

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- 8 -

idea that, well, I only know of one person that we’ve ever sold drugs to

and any money I’ve gotten I’ve gotten from selling food. None of it

makes any sense the way some of these items were moved by sons. All

of it points to me that you weren’t substantially truthful.

. . . .

Is it possible that I’ve made a mistake? 

Yes. 

But then it’s my responsibility.

Sent. Tr. at 37-38.

The court denied the safety valve and sentenced Alvarado-Rivera to serve a

term of incarceration of 120 months (10 years).

The government interviewed Moya-Vega twice. He claimed that his only drug

customer was the informant. Moya-Vega said he usually sold the informant a halfounce of cocaine, and that he made from fifty to one hundred dollars per ounce in

profit. (The record does not indicate appellant’s gross revenue per ounce.) He said

that the $3,875 in cash recovered from the bedroom closet was all from drug sales to

the informant. (The record does not indicate how much of that money constituted

profit.) Moya-Vega initially said he had sold drugs to the informant about fifteen

times. When the government said that would not account for the drug proceeds

Moya-Vega had already admitted to, appellant increased his estimate, saying he had

sold to the informant two or three times a week for about six months. Moya-Vega

said he had sold only cocaine, that he had recently received his first supply of

methamphetamine and had intended to sell it, but had not yet sold any of it. He

denied that the drugs found in the trailer were his but admitted that the drugs

recovered from his apartment and from the storage locker associated with his son’s

apartment were all his. (The record is silent as to any inquiry or statements

concerning the marijuana, concerning the identities and activities of the lessor of the

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- 9 -

trailer to appellants and of the alleged sublessee, and concerning the extent of

appellant’s presence at and control of the trailer.) 

Moya-Vega said that his source for the drugs was someone he knew only as

“Coyote” and met in the street or at McDonalds Restaurant. Moya-Vega initially said

he obtained the methamphetamine (as well as the cocaine) from Coyote. Moya-Vega

later said the source of the methamphetamine was named Carlos or Andres. MoyaVega said that the notes which the police believed indicated wire transfers of drug

money were written by his wife, but that the amounts (totaling 99,000) indicated

Mexican pesos rather than United States dollars. The prosecutor estimated that

99,000 pesos was then equivalent to $11,000. Moya-Vega said he got the money

from working and selling drugs. He said, at the sentencing hearing, that he had

accumulated the money from the time he arrived in the United States, over a year or

a year and a half, and that he had wired it to Mexico later, over a couple months.

(The Pre-Sentence Report indicates that Moya-Vega worked a construction job from

February, 2002, until August, 2002, making twelve dollars per hour. The record is

otherwise silent concerning Moya-Vega’s work and income history and the likelihood

that appellants could have saved $11,000 without more drug sales than Moya-Vega

admitted to. The record indicates no inquiry concerning the details of appellants’

income.)

In its letter to the district court concerning Moya-Vega’s statements, the

government identified no questions it had put to appellant and which he refused to

answer, produced no evidence contradicting any statement he had made, and

identified no internal contradictions in appellant’s account. The prosecutor simply

stated that he did not believe appellant’s account was truthful and complete. At the

sentencing hearing, the government added very little to its conclusory statement in

the letter. The prosecutor said he believed the notes indicating wire transfers referred

to 99,000 dollars, not 99,000 pesos. The sole evidence the government relied on for

this conclusion was that the two wire transfer receipts that were recovered stated

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- 10 -

dollar, not peso, amounts. The government said that even if the entries were for

pesos, it was “not credible under these circumstances” that appellant could have

accumulated the money from his employment and drug sales over a very extended

period of time. Additionally, the government said that appellant’s statement that he

had not yet sold methamphetamine was “just not credible,” since appellant had over

a pound of it in his apartment.

The district court’s consideration of Moya-Vega’s statement was brief. The

court stated,

None of this makes any sense to me.

. . . .

And so, in this case is it possible [that Moya-Vega’s statement is

truthful and complete]? I’d say one out of a thousand is generous that

I’m wrong, I guess so, and if that’s the case I take responsibility. But I

respectfully deny the safety valve. I believe that whether it’s out of fear

for yourself or your family or to protect other people, the information

isn’t coming forward . . . .

Sent. Tr. at 11-12.

The court sentenced Moya-Vega to a term of incarceration of 135 months (11

years and 3 months).

II.

We review for clear error a district court’s finding as to the completeness and

truthfulness of a defendant’s safety-valve proffer. See United States v. Romo, 81 F.3d

84, 86 (8th Cir. 1996). The district court’s findings in these cases were based on a

credibility determination–on the court’s view that the accounts were too improbable

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4

While the district court was able to observe the appellants at their sentencing

hearings, the court was not present at the interviews of appellants, nor did the court

engage in its own inquiry of appellants with respect to the statements the court found

incredible.

- 11 -

to be believed.4

 Ordinarily, of course, a trial court’s findings as to the credibility of

a witness, reviewed for clear error, are virtually irreversible on appeal. See United

States v. Eis, 322 F.3d 1023, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003). A credibility determination based

on the improbability of a safety valve proffer, however, presents a special case.

A defendant has the burden to show, through affirmative conduct, that she has

made the required statement. See United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 864 (8th

Cir. 1998). We have affirmed denials of the safety valve benefit to defendants who

have failed to make the requisite effort to demonstrate that they have provided the

government a full and true statement of their knowledge of the criminal enterprise.

E.g., id. at 864 (defendant made no effort); United States v. Velasquez, 141 F.3d

1280, 1283 (8th Cir. 1998)(defendant made no effort until the day of sentencing, when

he produced an affidavit the trial court believed to be inconsistent with the evidence

produced at trial); Romo, 81 F.3d at 86 (defendant failed to respond to government

requests for specific information).

The appellants in the present cases have met their burden of affirmatively

demonstrating that they have told the government what they know of the criminal

enterprise at issue. Each appellant participated in at least one interview with the

government, provided an account of their involvement in the offense which addressed

all essential points, indicated a willingness to answer all questions, and did so answer.

In neither case did the government identify any question it asked that was not

answered. Nothing more can be asked of a defendant to demonstrate the

completeness and truthfulness of a safety valve statement than to give as full a

statement as the government requests, and that the statement be consistent and that

it comport with the evidence.

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5

While improbable, appellants’ accounts are certainly not impossible or in the

realm of fantasy. Nor is the improbability of the accounts easily assessed here. The

record does not reflect a probing inquiry into the statements of appellants and the

circumstances and events relevant to appellants’ accounts.

- 12 -

This court has held that after a defendant has made a safety valve proffer, if the

government disputes the truthfulness or completeness of the defendant’s proffer, the

government then has the burden to present evidence on the point, and that the

adequacy of the proffer cannot be negated by the government’s mere conclusory

assertion that the proffer is not truthful or complete. See United States v. Kang, 143

F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1998)(“Whether defendant truthfully denied involvement with

more than 6.84 grams is a question of fact. The government cannot by its mere ipse

dixit establish that defendant has been untruthful. The issue requires evidence . . . .”).

The government did not present evidence that appellants’ proffers were incomplete

or untruthful. The government merely asserted that they were.

The completeness or truthfulness of a defendant’s proffer may be negated by

evidence newly presented after the proffer is made, or by evidence otherwise

presented (e.g., at trial) or by facts agreed to (e.g., in guilty-plea proceedings). A

safety valve proffer may also be found incomplete or untruthful on the basis of

internal contradictions within the proffer itself. See, e.g., Velasquez, 141 F.3d at

1283; United States v. Weekly, 118 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1997). In the present cases,

appellants’ proffers are not contradicted by evidence, nor are they internally

inconsistent.

The district court found the appellants’ accounts incredible because they are

improbable. We agree that both accounts could be considered improbable–MoyaVega’s more so than Alvarado-Rivera’s.5

 We hold, however, that this is an

inadequate basis for declining to find a defendant’s statement truthful and complete

for purposes of the safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).

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6

The sentencing judge in these cases expressed his sense, particularly as to

Alvarado-Rivera, that the mandatory minimum was excessively harsh:

[I]n many cases, one just like this, . . . under any set of facts 120 months

or this 10-year mandatory minimum is a lot of time and represents —

could represent a harsh sentence . . . . Miss Alverado-Rivera [sic], I look

at you and I see basically a decent woman, someone with no criminal

record, someone who I would, frankly, have a better day today if I could

leave and give you the 47 months.

Sent. Tr. at 36-37.

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The safety valve may remedy the potential disparities in the sentencing of highlevel and low-level drug defendants. In general, high-level drug defendants can

qualify for substantial assistance reductions because their greater participation in

criminal activity resulted in their having more information to offer the government.

However, low-level drug defendants often have no new or useful information to trade

and thus cannot qualify for substantial assistance departures. Thus, the safety valve

allows low-level defendants who meet the criteria to avoid the often harsh statutory

minimum sentences. See United States v. Rojas Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir.

2003).6

 The safety valve ought not to be denied solely on the basis of the

prosecutor’s skepticism, adopted by the district court, where defendant has given a

full, internally consistent account, uncontradicted by any evidence. To deny the

safety valve in these circumstances would thwart the purpose of the safety valve

provision to mitigate, at times, the unduly harsh and often unfair mandatory minimum

sentences imposed on first-time offenders.

The rule of preclusion-by-skepticism would frustrate the purposes of the

federal sentencing regime more generally, as well. The safety valve is an integral part

of that regime, which was enacted to promote uniformity and consistency in

sentencing. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES

MANUAL § 1A.1. To deny the safety valve because of a perceived improbability of

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a defendant’s proffer–perceptions which may vary greatly from prosecutor to

prosecutor and judge to judge would introduce a degree of arbitrariness that is

inconsistent with the federal sentencing regime. 

Denying application of the safety valve because of the possible improbability

of a defendant’s proffer creates substantive, as well as procedural, arbitrariness and

unfairness: The necessary effect of such a denial is to make subjective improbability,

rather than untruthfulness, a disqualification for the safety valve. The safety valve

provision of § 3553(f) requires a true proffer, not a probable proffer. Denial for a

reason not salient under the statute is arbitrary and contrary to the mandate of the

statute and is at odds with traditional notions of fairness under the law.

Where the government thinks it has not received the full story from a

defendant, it has the power and facilities to prove the inadequacy of the proffer. The

government is free to request, and the trial court is free to grant, a continuance to

allow investigation of facts asserted in a defendant’s proffer. Even the mere threat

of contradiction by evidence the defendant is unaware of–a threat made openly during

a safety valve proffer, perhaps–is a substantial deterrent to false safety valve proffers.

Thorough probing into the details of a defendant’s story–which was not conducted

here–may also expose falsehoods or material gaps in a story. Substantial and

effective safeguards do exist against the wrongful application of the safety valve to

defendants who have not given the full and true statement required by 18 U.S.C. §

3553(f). By contrast, there is little to safeguard against the wrongful denial of the

safety valve to defendants who have, in fact, given a full and true statement, where

without contradictory facts or other indicia of untruthfulness, the government and the

judge say “no.” The perceived improbability alone is not enough to turn down the

safety valve. 

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- 15 -

III.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we vacate the sentence of each

appellant-defendant and direct that the safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)

apply to each guideline sentence imposed by the district court. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

In this case the majority has shifted the safety valve burden of proof to the

government in disregard of clear statutory language to the contrary, and I dissent.

When Congress created the safety valve to give certain nonviolent drug offenders an

opportunity to escape the full force of the mandatory minimum sentencing statutes,

it restricted eligibility for this relief to individuals who have "truthfully provided to

the Government all information and evidence" they have about their offenses or

course of conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The district court carefully considered the

safety valve proffers made by the appellants and found they were not credible. In

light of the record before the district court, its findings that appellants had not

satisfied their burden were not clearly erroneous.

Appellants faced mandatory minimum sentences of 10 years when they pled

guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over 500 grams

of methamphetamine. Their only hope for a lower sentence was to qualify for the

safety valve, for the government had not moved for a substantial assistance departure

below the statutory mandatory minimum. 

The proffer statements made by appellants must be examined in the context of

the government's evidence. This evidence included the very large amount of drugs

found in their trailer (27 pounds of methamphetamine), in their apartment (1 pound

of methamphetamine of the same unusual doughy consistency and disc shape as that

in the trailer, plus cocaine and marijuana), and in the storage locker to which their son

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moved drugs from the apartment (281.5 grams of methamphetamine, 43.5 grams of

cocaine, and 82.5 grams of marijuana). In addition, $3,875 in cash was hidden in

their closet, they had receipts in the apartment for $6,000 wired to Mexico, and notes

indicated they had recently made up to $99,000 in wire transfers to Mexico. Despite

this evidence, Moya-Vega claimed to have had only one drug customer, who

happened to be the informant, and to have sold no other drugs than cocaine. His

explanation for the large amount of methamphetamine in the apartment was that his

supplier, whom he really did not know, had offered him an opportunity to sell it. That

so much methamphetamine would be fronted to an inexperienced dealer could be

found both improbable and not credible, and appellants both denied any knowledge

of the 27 pounds of similarly distinctive methamphetamine hidden in their trailer.

During Moya-Vega's proffer interview he stated that he had sold cocaine to the

informant approximately fifteen times and that he usually sold him half an ounce for

a profit of $50 to $100. When it was pointed out that these transactions would not

account for the amount of money he attributed to his drug deals, he adjusted his

estimate up to two or three transactions every week for six months. Moya-Vega also

changed his story about who supplied him with cocaine and methamphetamine, first

stating that he did not know the source's name but that he was called Coyote, and then

on the morning of his sentencing hearing saying that the source was named Andres

or Carlos. After considering all of the evidence implicating Moya-Vega in major

drug activity and hearing his very limited admissions, the experienced trial judge

stated, "None of this makes any sense to me." 

 In Alvarado-Rivera's one hour sentencing hearing, the district judge indicated

he would prefer to give her a lighter sentence but that he could not because "[t]here's

no ring of truth to this." He told Alvarado-Rivera that "I don't believe that you've

substantially told the truth." He found her statements not credible, including

comments that she had only used the digital scale to weigh a bracelet, that the only

money she knew about came from her homemade food sales, and that she had never

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7

The only support cited by the majority for its novel burden shifting approach

is United States v. Kang, 143 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1998). The central issue there was

whether the defendant had stipulated in his plea agreement to the quantity of crack

claimed by the government. The court found he had not and remanded for a factual

- 17 -

used the apartment dishwasher (and was thus unaware of the methamphetamine

hidden in it). The court expressed its concern for the integrity of the system and said,

"I don't believe that it's even a close call on how I evaluate the record." In summing

up his evaluation, the district judge told Alvarado-Rivera, "I have found that you're

not eligible for the safety valve because I found that the proffer was not substantially

truthful based upon all the record that I have in front of me and the circumstantial

inferences." 

The district court's safety valve findings can be overturned only if they were

clearly erroneous. Romo, 81 F.3d at 86. When the record supports these findings,

affirmance is required regardless of which party is favored. See United States v.

Tournier, 171 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999). The test is not whether we "agree with

the district court's findings of disputed fact," but whether the record supports them.

Id. at 648. The standard is no less deferential when the finding concerns credibility.

See United States v. O'Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Surratt, 172 F.3d 559, 566 (8th Cir. 1999). 

The safety valve provision is an exceptional one, designed to benefit "a narrow

class of defendants," H.R. Rep. No. 103-460 (1994), and appellants have the burden

of showing affirmatively that they have satisfied the final criterion in the statutory test

by giving the government truthful information and evidence. See United States v.

Romo, 81 F.3d 84, 85-86 (8th Cir. 1996). The majority purports to acknowledge that

the burden belongs to appellants, but it then turns the standard upside down. It

departs from governing precedent to require the prosecution not only to produce

evidence to establish the offenses of conviction, but also to prove the negative of

individual statements in safety valve proffers, no matter how unlikely they might be.7

Appellate Case: 03-2374 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/26/2004 Entry ID: 1826244 
finding on quantity, an issue on which the government bore the burden of proof, but

it did not shift the safety valve burden to the government.

- 18 -

The transcripts reveal that although the district judge sympathized with

appellants, he could not find that they had been truthful. The majority examines the

proffers de novo, however, and finds that they were "not contradicted by evidence"

even though "improbable" and concludes that they were "an inadequate basis" for

withholding safety valve relief. It fails to apply the correct standard of review, and

it places a new burden of proof on the government in conflict with the governing

statute and the case law. 

The judgments should be affirmed because the district court did not clearly err

when it found that appellants had not truthfully supplied all information about their

offenses and therefore had not satisfied their burden to show they had fulfilled the

statutory conditions for obtaining safety valve relief. 

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Appellate Case: 03-2374 Page: 18 Date Filed: 10/26/2004 Entry ID: 1826244