Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00858/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00858-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Foulk
Respondent
Monty Allen Mullins
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONTY ALLEN MULLINS,

Petitioner,

v.

FOULK,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-00858-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent 

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits

with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

In October 2011, Mullins pled no contest in Sonoma County Superior Court to four counts 

of burglary, four counts of receiving stolen property, one count of attempted burglary, and one 

count of receiving a stolen vehicle. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 1050-51. Mullins admitted that 

he was out on bail at the time he committed some of the offenses and that he had one prior felony 

strike. Id. He was sentenced to 31 years in state prison. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1093-95. 

Mullins appealed his sentence but abandoned his appeal and requested a dismissal, which was 

granted by the California Court of Appeal. Answer, Ex. 5. He later filed state habeas petitions to 

the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court, both of which were denied. 

Answer, Exs. 6, 7. 

The following summary of the facts underlying the convictions is taken from the probation 

report (“Report,” Docket No. 14):

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On September 19, 2009, victim Selma Sklar reported that she came home to find her home 

ransacked and determined that her purse, including wallet and credit cards, all her jewelry, a 

camera, binoculars and some silverware were missing. Fingerprints taken from the front door 

were determined to belong to Mullins. Report at 2-3. 

On October 8, 2009, petitioner was arrested during a traffic stop. Inside the vehicle he was 

driving, police found items that had been taken during an automobile burglary earlier that day, 

plus a spring-loaded window punch. Petitioner admitted the tool was his, but stated that his 

female passenger brought the other items into the car. The passenger denied knowledge of the 

items. Id. at 3. 

On August 29, 2010, victim Lauren Couture was home watching TV when her doorbell 

rang. She did not answer the door but observed two males outside, one wearing a red t-shirt and 

the other wearing a black t-shirt. When she did not answer the door, the men appeared to walk 

away. A short time later, Couture heard noises from the front of the house and she observed the 

man wearing the red t-shirt, later identified as petitioner’s co-defendant, taking the screen off the 

window. When the man saw Couture, he fled. Couture’s brother arrived a short time later, 

pursued the suspects and obtained a license plate number. Mullins was later identified to be the 

man in the black t-shirt. Id. at 4-5. 

On September 3, 2010, deputies responded to a burglary alarm at the residence of Carol 

Ferrari and Michael Tuck. The residence had previously been burglarized on August 11, 2010. 

One of the deputies saw a Toyota 4Runner heading towards him and he pursued it. The vehicle 

eventually stopped and the suspects inside fled. Mullins was tackled by the deputy and 

subsequently arrested. Id. at 5. 

The Toyota 4Runner had been reported stolen two days earlier, on September 1, 2010. 

The Toyota’s owners, Christie and Heidi Young of Novato, had recently been the victims of a 

residential burglary during which firearms, and jewelry, including a necklace, purses, a gold clock,

a gold coin had been stolen. A search of the Toyota 4Runner revealed three garage door openers, 

including one that had been taken during the August 11, 2010 burglary of the Tuck/Ferrari 

residence. Id. at 6.

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During a phone call from jail, Mullins asked his girlfriend to go get another coin 

collection, sell the coins, and bail him out. On September 10, 2010, an officer obtained the coins 

from petitioner’s girlfriend and determined that the coin collection had been taken during the 

Young burglary. Id. at 7-8. 

On February 8, 2011, Mullins was identified by members of the Deaton family as having 

been caught inside their house with a black bag under his arm. Id. at 8. 

Later on February 8, 2011, Sharlien Hinton noticed that someone had entered her home 

and taken items, including credit cards, jewelry and personal papers. Mullins was arrested in the 

neighborhood shortly afterwards. He admitted participating in the Deaton and Hinton burglaries. 

Id. at 9-10.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

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court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard of review 

under AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its 

decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim. 

In such a case, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court’s 

decision was objectively reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2000). When confronted with such a decision,

as with all the claims in this petition, a federal court should conduct an independent review of the 

record to determine whether the state court’s decision was an objectively unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Mullins asserts that: (1) he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel; (2) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; (3) there was a violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (4) there were sentencing errors.

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I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Mullins argues that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to investigate and speak to 

witnesses who could have testified at the preliminary hearing; (2) failing to make a successful

argument at the preliminary hearing to allow impeachment evidence to be heard; (3) failing to file 

a motion to dismiss; (4) failing to pursue discoverable information from the prosecutor; (5) 

advising Mullins to waive a preliminary hearing on two counts; (6) failing to pursue a psychiatric 

defense; (7) improperly advising Mullins to plead no contest; (8) not pointing out errors during 

sentencing; and (9) not including certain claims on appeal.

Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any 

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must 

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

A defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings independent 

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty. 

Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (holding that guilty plea forecloses consideration 

of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1973) 

(same). Claims that defense counsel failed to investigate and develop a defense are precluded by a 

guilty plea under Tollett. Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 2011). Under this 

authority, therefore, a petitioner’s claims that prior to his no contest plea defense counsel did not 

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adequately investigate and develop defenses are precluded by his plea. See Moran v. Godinez, 57 

F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) (plea foreclosed claim that prior to plea defense counsel failed to 

prevent admission of his confession) (superseded on other grounds). The only challenges left 

open for federal habeas corpus review after a defendant’s guilty plea are the voluntary and 

intelligent character of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985).

Discussion

Mullins’ first six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable on federal 

habeas review because of his plea of no contest.1 But even if considered, he has failed to show 

that counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Mullins offers only conclusory allegations 

and fails to describe what evidence trial counsel could have discovered and how it would have 

benefited his case. These barebones allegations are insufficient to warrant habeas relief. See 

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Nor is Mullins entitled to relief on his claim regarding sentencing. The Supreme Court has 

not decided what standard should apply to counsel’s performance in non-capital sentencing 

proceedings. Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005). Strickland

declined to “‘consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which . . . may require a 

different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance,’” and no later Supreme 

Court decision has done so, either. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Strickland at 686). 

Consequently, there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims in the noncapital sentencing context. See Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 

1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006); Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1244-45. Mullins also alleges that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to raise the Brady claim presented in this petition on appeal. As 

discussed below, the Brady claim is meritless; therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

raise it.

 

1 Under California law, a “plea of nolo contendere ‘is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.’” 

United States v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 1219, 1220 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting People v. Whitfield, 54 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).

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Mullin’s claim that trial counsel improperly advised him to plead no contest is appropriate 

for federal habeas review. Mullins argues that counsel advised him to plead guilty in order to be 

sentenced to a drug and alcohol program instead of a lengthy sentence. Mullins also states that at 

the time he entered his open plea there was still a plea offer for 18 years from the prosecutor.

The following occurred at Mullins’ change of plea hearing where he was present with trial

counsel:

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your honor, Mr. Mullins wishes the Court 

and People to know that he would enter this plea. He does not wish 

the victims to have to go to trial on this.

[MULLINS]: Thank you. I apologize for the Court’s time to this 

point.

THE COURT: Well, let’s have you look at this document first. Let 

say, I see that the agreement is for what? There’s nothing on here.

[TRAL COUNSEL]: There is no agreement, Your Honor. Mr. 

Mullins is pleading open. He is throwing himself at the mercy of 

the Court.

. . . 

THE COURT: So I will just note on the Tahl waiver that this is an 

open plea.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: I believe that’s reflected –I think it’s exactly 

where the Court’s at on the Tahl waiver, two or three lines up, 

should be initialed by Mr. Mullins.

THE COURT: Okay. The initials are a little difficult to read.

[MULLINS]: My apologies. I don’t have my glasses.

THE COURT: No worries. I’m just clarifying. So basically, it 

looks like you’re going to plead to at least 10 counts, admit a bunch 

of things, and that you’re going to leave it to my discretion sentence 

you appropriately. Right?

[MULLINS]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So did you fill out the four-page document –this is a 

Tahl waiver –that I’m holding up in front of you?

[MULLINS]: Yes, I did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you place your initials in the left column of each 

of these four pages.

[MULLINS]: I did, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Did you place your signature at the top of page four?

[MULLINS]: I did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you have enough time to talk to your lawyer 

about the rights you have, the rights you’re giving up, and the legal 

consequence of the plea?

[MULLINS]: I did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you entering into this agreement freely and 

voluntarily?

[MULLINS]: I am, Your Honor.

. . . 

THE COURT: So do you understand that the maximum exposure 

for the offenses that you’re pleading guilty is a determinate state 

prison term of up to 47 years?

[MULLINS]: Yes, Your Honor.

. . . 

THE COURT: Do you understand that the presumption is

mandatory prison for these offenses?

[MULLINS]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that, because these are strike 

offenses that you’re pleading to, and you’re admitting prior strike 

offenses, that you’re going to be serving time with reduced conduct 

credits?

[MULLINS]: Yes, Your Honor.

RT at 1064-66.

Mullins later stated, “I understand what I’m giving up. I understand that I’m giving up my 

right to trial, my legal rights. I just, I’m throwing myself at the mercy of the Court at this point. I 

plead no contest to all the charges.” RT at 1068. Mullins also signed and initialed the waiver of 

his constitutional rights for the open plea. CT at 1051-54.

The plea hearing transcript and the signed plea form contradict Mullins’ contention that he 

would be avoiding a lengthy sentence and be eligible for a drug and alcohol program by entering a 

plea of no contest. The trial court was clear that he faced a sentence of up to 47 years and that 

there was a presumption of mandatory prison time. Mullins stated that he understood and threw 

himself on the mercy of the court, ultimately receiving a sentence of 31 years. His statements now

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asserting that he had believed he would be sentenced to a drug and alcohol program are 

inconsistent with the plea hearing and plea form, which show the trial had clearly explained to him 

that there would be a prison term. Mullins also admitted at the hearing that he had a prior strike 

conviction for first degree burglary and that he was out on bail when he committed these crimes. 

RT at 1070-71.

Mullins argues that the prosecutor offered him a plea deal for 18 years, but during 

discussions his trial counsel stated, “[t]hen plea no contest to all charges now at this time and in 

front of this Judge because it’s the only way you will get a drug and alcohol program in [lieu] of a 

lengthy sentence!” Petition at 125. Mullins states that by pleading no contest he was sentenced to 

31 years and that he should have taken the 18-year offer. Mullins presents no evidence to support 

his assertion that the prosecutor offered a plea deal for 18 years. He states he signed an 

acknowledgement of the 18-year offer, but he has not presented it with the petition. Nor has 

Mullins presented any affidavit or statement from trial counsel.

Mullins cites nothing in the record supporting his allegation that the prosecutor ever 

offered him a plea bargain or that trial counsel advised him to reject such an offer if it had been 

made, and Mullins’ own self-serving statements are insufficient to establish his allegations. See 

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim when “[o]ther than Womack’s own self-serving statement, there is no evidence” to 

support the claim); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘[S]elf-serving 

statements by a defendant that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to 

overcome the presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.’” (alteration in original)).

Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Mullins’ ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 

F.3d 884, 900 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because ‘counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 

assistance,’” it was not unreasonable for state court to reject petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim when petitioner provided no evidence to support the claim (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690)); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 379 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of 

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim when petitioner presented no evidence in support of claim); 

United States v. Ross, 584 F. App’x 502, 503-04 (9th Cir. 2014) (Ross’ claim that defense counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to reject a pretrial plea agreement “fails because 

there is no evidence in the record that Ross would have considered or accepted any pretrial plea.”).

Even assuming that such an offer was made by the prosecutor and that trial counsel made 

the statements attributed to him, Mullins has still not demonstrated that the denial of this claim 

was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority or an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. According to Mullins’ statements in the petition, trial counsel told him that he was 

going to receive a lengthy prison sentence and that his only chance of receiving a drug and alcohol 

program was to throw himself on the mercy of the court. Petition at 125. Mullins alleges that trial 

counsel told him that the particular judge hearing his case would be his only hope to receive a drug 

and alcohol program. Petition at 13. Based on these statements, trial counsel conveyed the offer

from the prosecution and discussed with Mullins his options. Trial counsel did not guarantee that 

Mullins would receive a drug and alcohol program with the particular trial judge; rather, he 

conveyed it as a chance to avoid a lengthy sentence. Based on the overwhelming evidence against 

Mullins and his criminal history, Mullins has not shown that trial counsel’s statement was 

deficient performance. 

A defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea 

offer, and trial counsel must give the defendant sufficient information regarding a plea offer to 

make an intelligent decision. See Turner, at 880-81. Mullins has not established that counsel’s 

advice was deficient, meaning the advice was “‘within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.’” Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 

771 (1970)). Erroneous advice regarding the consequences of a guilty plea is insufficient to 

establish ineffective assistance; petitioner must establish a “‘gross mischaracterization of the likely 

outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . . erroneous advice on the probable effects of going 

to trial.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (omission in original)

(citing United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990)). Mullins’ trial counsel 

provided him with the relevant information regarding the plea offer and consequences for 

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proceeding to trial, and Mullins chose to throw himself on the mercy of the court. Trial counsel 

was not ineffective in presenting all this information, and this claim is denied.2

II. GUILTY PLEA

Mullins next argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty because he was 

not mentally competent, he was not wearing his prescription glasses, trial counsel was ineffective, 

and there were mistakes at sentencing.

Legal Standard

A defendant who pleads guilty may not collaterally challenge a voluntary and intelligent 

guilty plea entered into with the advice of competent counsel. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 

563, 574 (1989). Nor may he collaterally attack his plea’s validity merely because he made what 

turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005). The 

only challenges left open in federal habeas corpus after a guilty plea is the voluntary and 

intelligent character of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

Due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and voluntary because it 

constitutes the waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront 

one’s accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 

242-43 (1969). It does not, however, require a state court to enumerate all the rights a defendant 

waives when he enters a guilty plea as long as the record indicates that the plea was entered 

voluntarily and understandingly. See Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1986); 

Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974).

The competency standard to plead guilty is the same as that to stand trial. Doe v. 

Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding insufficient evidence of mental illness to 

establish defendant’s incompetence). A petitioner was competent to plead guilty and stand trial if 

he had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 

 

2 Nor has Mullins demonstrated prejudice that even if he had accepted the plea offer that the trial 

court would have accepted it in light of the crimes and criminal history.

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Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-98 (1993); Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2013).

Discussion

The Court has already summarized the change of plea hearing and the exchange between 

Mullins and the trial court. Mullins now argues that he was not mentally competent at the change 

of plea hearing in October 2011. He relies on several exhibits that demonstrate how shortly after 

the guilty plea Mullins was diagnosed as being on the “bipolar spectrum.” Petition, Ex. K. The 

same mental health report also described Mullins as only somewhat depressed, alert, and 

cooperative with good eye contact and clear speech. Id. The follow-up mental health 

appointments also reflect that Mullins was alert and cooperative and, other than being treated for 

depression, there were no indications that he was incompetent. Id. He was prescribed Depakote 

and reported that he was feeling better and was no longer depressed in December 2011. Petition at 

84. Shortly after Mullins was sentenced on February 9, 2012, he was reported to be “alert, clear, 

talkative, seems pretty calm . . . coping pretty well.” Id. 

Mullins’ conclusory allegations that he was incompetent do not warrant habeas relief. See 

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor does a review of the transcripts of the plea 

hearing or his exhibits indicate that he was not competent. He has failed to demonstrate that he 

lacked the ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or 

that he lacked a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. He has 

failed to demonstrate that the state court’s denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court authority. This claim is denied.

Mullins’ remaining contentions are also meritless. His argument that there were errors in

his sentencing is not relevant to whether his plea was knowing and voluntary. His argument that 

trial counsel was ineffective was discussed in the previous section. His argument that he was not 

wearing his prescription eyeglasses is also void of merit. At the change of plea hearing Mullins 

stated on the record that he understood the consequences of his plea and that he could be 

sentenced for up to 47 years and that he was facing a mandatory prison sentence. He also stated 

that he had signed and initialed the plea form. Mullins has not shown that he is entitled to relief.

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III. BRADY CLAIM

Mullins argues that there was a Brady violation because the prosecutor failed to produce 

evidence that a detective who testified at the preliminary hearing allegedly had an affair with 

Mullins’ ex-wife.

Legal Standard

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that “the suppression 

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 

of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. The Supreme Court has since made clear that the duty to disclose 

such evidence applies even when there has been no request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 

427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as 

exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Evidence is material if 

“there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed [to the defense], the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009). “A 

reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant ‘would more likely than not have received 

a different verdict with the evidence,’ only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough 

to ‘undermine [] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 

(2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “[E]vidence 

impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to 

sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630-31 (finding impeachment evidence of 

prosecution’s sole witness material); accord Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13 & n.21. And the mere 

possibility that undisclosed information might have been helpful to the defense or might have 

affected the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality under Brady. United States v. 

Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In sum, for a Brady claim to succeed, petitioner must show: (1) that the evidence at issue is 

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that it was suppressed 

by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that it was material (or, put 

differently, that prejudice ensued). Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Strickler v. 

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Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Cf. Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 309-10 (9th Cir. 

2010) (no habeas relief on Brady claim under § 2254 where state court reasonably determined 

“beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s misconduct did not affect the verdict”).

Discussion

At the preliminary hearing, Mullins’ trial counsel cross-examined a detective about a 

possible relationship with someone Mullins knew. RT at 559. The prosecutor objected and trial 

counsel indicated that he had a witness who could testify that the detective had had an affair with

Mullins’ ex-wife and that the detective had shown aggression towards Mullins. RT at 559-63. 

The trial court refused to allow the questions but told trial counsel that if a competent witness was 

produced, the court would consider the questions at a later date. RT at 561. Trial counsel also 

requested a protective order to limit the prosecutor from discovering the offer of proof. RT at 562. 

The prosecutor responded that a protective order would make it difficult to identify potential 

Brady information. Id. Mullins cites to this exchange as the basis for his Brady claim.

Mullins points to no specific evidence that was suppressed by the prosecutor either 

willfully or inadvertently. In addition, trial counsel knew of the possible connection between the 

detective and Mullins. Where the defendant is aware of the facts, the prosecutor does not commit 

a Brady violation. Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006). Since Mullins pled guilty to 

the charges so there was no opportunity for the prosecutor to further investigate the claim.3 

Mullins has failed to show that state court denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court authority. The claim is denied.

IV. SENTENCING

Mullins argues that the trial court illegally sentenced him by imposing consecutive rather 

than concurrent terms and by using his prior strike as an enhancement.

 

3

The Ninth Circuit has held that, notwithstanding Tollett’s bar on independent claims of 

constitutional violations preceding a guilty plea, a defendant can argue that his guilty plea was not 

voluntary and intelligent because it was made in the absence of withheld Brady material. Sanchez 

v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995). As discussed above, Mullins was aware of the 

impeachment evidence, therefore it did not constitute Brady material.

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Discussion

State sentencing courts must be accorded wide latitude in their decisions as to punishment. 

See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987). Generally, therefore, a federal court may 

not review a state sentence that is within statutory limits. See id. To the extent that Mullins

argues that state law was incorrectly applied, any such claim is denied. See Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is 

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States.”); see also Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal habeas courts must

defer to state courts’ interpretations of their own state laws, including state sentencing laws). This 

Court must defer to the state court’s interpretation of its own sentencing law.

Even if considered, Mullins is not entitled to relief. He provides no specific arguments 

why his terms should have been concurrent, and a review of the transcripts and relevant state law 

does not show any error. He also states that his sentence was doubled for a prior strike in addition 

to receiving an additional five-year enhancement for committing the prior strike pursuant to Cal. 

Penal Code § 667(a)(1). Petition at 24. California law specifically authorizes Mullins’

punishment under the Three Strikes law and section 667(a)(1). People v. Acosta, 29 Cal. 4th 105, 

131 (2002) (“[U]sing one of [defendant’s] prior convictions first as a strike . . . and then under 

section 667, subdivision (a), to impose a five-year enhancement, conforms to the language of the 

Three Strikes law. . . .”). This claim is denied.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

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is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONTY ALLEN MULLINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

FOULK,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00858-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 13, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Monty Allen Mullins ID: AL 1169

Pleasant Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 8500

Coalinga, CA 93210 

Dated: October 13, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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