Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-22-30210/USCOURTS-ca9-22-30210-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joshua Adam Shuemake
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v.

JOSHUA ADAM SHUEMAKE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-30210 

D.C. No. 

2:21-cr-00194-

RAJ-1 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2024*

Seattle, Washington

Filed December 26, 2024

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Ronald M. Gould, and 

Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Lee

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 USA V. SHUEMAKE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed Joshua Shuemake’s conviction for 

obstruction of justice in a case in which the district court 

admitted his friend Luke Ulavale’s grand jury testimony 

implicating Shuemake after Ulavale tried to backtrack at trial 

claiming memory loss.

Under the prior inconsistent statement rule, Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(1)(A), a district court can admit an earlier sworn 

statement if a witness on the stand contradicts that statement.

Rejecting Shuemake’s argument that the district court 

erred in admitting Ulavale’s grand jury testimony, the panel 

held that dubious claims of memory loss—as shown by 

inexplicable claims of faulty memory, evasive testimony, or 

similar red flags—may be enough to be treated as an 

inconsistency under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).

The panel explained that a court cannot admit earlier 

sworn testimony as a prior inconsistent statement merely 

because a witness asserts that he cannot recall that prior 

statement. The dispositive inquiry is whether both the trial 

testimony and the prior testimony could be equally truthful 

when asserted. Courts must engage in a fact-intensive 

inquiry to smoke out a witness’ attempt to walk away from 

prior sworn testimony by asserting a lack of memory.

The panel concluded that Uvalale feigned memory loss 

on the stand, making Rule 801(d)(1)(A) applicable. Telltale 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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USA V. SHUEMAKE 3

signs of insincerity were plentiful. Uvalale was an 

uncooperative witness who did not appear to suffer genuine 

memory loss, and his statements on the stand and his 

testimony before the grand jury could not be found equally 

truthful.

COUNSEL

Tania M. Culbertson and Jonas B. Lerman, Assistant United 

States Attorney; Jessica Manca, Special Assistant United 

States Attorney; Tessa M. Gorman, Acting United States 

Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Office of the 

United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington; for PlaintiffAppellee.

Casey M. Arbenz and John A. Sheeran, Puget Law Group 

LLP, Tacoma, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.

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4 USA V. SHUEMAKE

OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

Under the prior inconsistent statement rule of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence, a district court can admit an earlier sworn 

statement if a witness on the stand contradicts that statement.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). But can a court admit a prior 

statement if a witness claims at trial that he does not 

remember saying it? We hold that a feigned lack of 

recollection may fall within Rule 801’s prior inconsistent 

statement provision. We thus reject Joshua Shuemake’s 

argument that the district court erred in admitting his friend’s 

grand jury testimony implicating Shuemake after he tried to 

backtrack at trial by claiming memory loss. Shuemake’s 

conviction for obstruction of justice is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

I. Shuemake borrows a handgun from his friend, 

despite a court order preventing him from having 

firearms.

Joshua Shuemake served as a correctional officer at a

federal detention center in SeaTac. He became entangled 

with the criminal justice system—outside of his 

workplace—in April 2021 when he was arrested for 

allegedly assaulting his former girlfriend. A Washington 

state court issued a no-contact order against him, which 

prohibited him from possessing firearms. The state court 

also ordered Shuemake to surrender any firearms he may 

have. 

Shuemake, however, wanted to continue his private 

security side hustle at a local restaurant and bar. He asked 

to borrow a handgun from his close friend and co-worker, 

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USA V. SHUEMAKE 5

Luke Ulavale, who knew him for years and considered 

Shuemake to be his best friend. Being a loyal friend but not 

a model citizen, Ulavale agreed and lent Shuemake his gun. 

But unbeknownst to Shuemake, the local police feared

he would not comply with the order to surrender firearms

and had reached out to the FBI. The FBI executed a search 

warrant for his (new) girlfriend’s apartment, where 

Shuemake lived. The FBI found two firearms in the

apartment’s bedroom—one registered to Shuemake’s 

girlfriend, and one registered to his friend, Luke Ulavale. 

Shuemake’s DNA was found on Ulavale’s gun. 

II. Shuemake and Ulavale concoct a story about the 

borrowed gun. 

A few months after the raid, Shawna McCann, an FBI 

agent, served Ulavale with a grand jury subpoena and asked 

to interview him beforehand. Ulavale agreed. 

For the first portion of the interview, Ulavale offered the

“Dale Story”—that Ulavale loaned his gun to Nicholas Dale, 

another friend and coworker, several months before the 

FBI’s search of the apartment. Ulavale explained Shuemake 

and Dale were drinking at the apartment the night before the 

FBI’s search, and Dale accidentally left the gun behind. But 

McCann did not buy it. McCann informed Ulavale that “the 

only way that he would get in trouble during the interview 

was if he didn’t tell the truth” and gave him a chance to

amend his statement.

Ulavale changed his tune. Ulavale told Agent 

McCann—and later testified under oath before the grand 

jury—that Shuemake asked Ulavale to lend him a gun.

Ulavale also testified to the grand jury that Shuemake

approached him with the “Dale Story” and encouraged 

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6 USA V. SHUEMAKE

Ulavale to lie to the FBI. Ulavale explained he met with

Shuemake the night before his interview with McCann. At 

that meeting, Shuemake tried to dissuade Ulavale from 

going to the interview and encouraged him to “remember 

what [they] discussed about the gun.”

But Ulavale’s newfound honesty was fleeting. Despite 

being a government witness, Ulavale did not appear on the 

day of his testimony, and FBI agents had to escort him to the

courthouse. The government received permission to treat 

Ulavale as a hostile witness before calling him to the stand. 

Just after the government’s questioning began, Ulavale’s 

memory inexplicably began to falter. Ulavale claimed he 

could not remember over a dozen times in response to the 

government’s questions. To refresh his memory, the 

government handed Ulavale a transcript of his grand jury

testimony. Ulavale asserted that the transcript did not 

refresh his memory or otherwise refused to answer the 

government’s questions.

Ulavale at times made statements that directly conflicted 

with his grand jury testimony but then retreated to his claim 

of memory loss. For example, he first asserted he did not 

discuss the grand jury subpoena with Shuemake and then, 

when asked again, replied he did not remember if he 

discussed it with Shuemake. In response, the government 

read in his grand jury testimony where he stated that he did 

discuss the subpoena with Shuemake. Similarly, Ulavale 

testified at trial that he came up with the “Dale Story” to tell 

the FBI, but then said he could not recall who came up with 

the story. The government then read in Ulavale’s grand jury 

testimony where he stated Shuemake came up with the “Dale 

Story.” 

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USA V. SHUEMAKE 7

The government also asked Ulavale about the timing of 

when he and Shuemake discussed the “Dale Story.” Ulavale 

again refused to answer, and the government read in his

grand jury testimony in which Ulavale said, “it took a while 

to agree on a specific story, . . . [Shuemake] would come 

bounce an idea off me . . . . And then, you know, it was a 

series of bounce ideas, and then, ‘Okay, let's agree on this.’”

Shuemake objected to the admission of only some parts 

of Ulavale’s grand jury testimony, and only on foundation or 

relevance grounds. 

Shuemake was convicted of unlawful possession of a 

firearm and obstruction of justice. He now challenges his 

obstruction of justice conviction, contending that the district 

court erred in admitting Ulavale’s grand jury testimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review unpreserved challenges to the admission of 

evidence for plain error. See United States v. GomezNorena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1990). To merit 

reversal, there must be a plain error that affects Shuemake’s 

substantial rights and seriously affects “the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (citation 

omitted).

DISCUSSION

The district court admitted Ulavale’s grand jury 

testimony as a recorded recollection, but this court can 

“affirm on any basis supported by the record.” Hall v. N. 

Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2007). The

recorded recollection hearsay exception does not apply here 

because the government did not lay the proper foundation. 

Instead, we affirm the admission of Luke Ulavale’s prior 

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8 USA V. SHUEMAKE

grand jury testimony under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as a “prior 

inconsistent statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 

We hold that dubious claims of memory loss—as shown

by inexplicable claims of faulty memory, evasive testimony, 

or similar red flags—may be enough to be treated as an 

inconsistency under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 

A. Feigned memory loss may be a prior inconsistent 

statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 

Under Rule 801, a declarant’s prior inconsistent 

statement is admissible non-hearsay if (1) the declarant 

testifies and is subject to cross-examination about the prior

statement; (2) the prior statement is inconsistent with the 

declarant’s current testimony; and (3) the prior statement 

“was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or 

other proceeding or in a deposition.” FED. R. EVID.

801(d)(1)(A). It is undisputed that the first and third 

requirements have been met: Ulavale was subject to crossexamination at trial, and his earlier grand jury testimony was

given under penalty of perjury. 18 U.S.C. § 1623; see, e.g.,

United States v. Champion Int’l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 

(9th Cir. 1977). The key question is whether his grand jury 

testimony is inconsistent with his assertions at trial that he 

does not remember his earlier testimony. 

The trial court judge has “a high degree of flexibility in 

deciding the exact point at which a prior statement is 

sufficiently inconsistent with a witness’s trial testimony to 

permit its use in evidence.” United States v. Morgan, 555 

F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977). As leading treatises have 

pointed out, an “inconsistent statement” can include vague 

or evasive answers, claims of memory loss, and explicit 

refusals to answer. See 5 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 

§ 801.21[b] (2024 ed.); 30B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 

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USA V. SHUEMAKE 9

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6744 (2024 ed.). The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), quoting 

observations about California’s similar provision, state that 

admitting these statements guards against the turncoat 

witness who changes his story on the stand and deprives the 

party calling him of essential evidence. FED. R. EVID. 

801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed 

rules; see also WRIGHT & MILLER at § 6744. Cf. California 

v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151–52 (1970) (upholding 

constitutionality of California Evidence Code Section 1235, 

a parallel to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), when preliminary hearing 

testimony was introduced at trial after witness claimed he 

could not remember).

The “ultimate test is whether one could reasonably 

maintain that both the witness’ testimony and the witness’

prior statement were equally truthful when uttered.” 

WRIGHT & MILLER at § 6744. “It would seem strange . . . to 

assert that a witness can avoid introduction of testimony 

from a prior proceeding that is inconsistent with his trial 

testimony . . . by simply asserting lack of memory of the facts 

to which the prior testimony related.” United States v. 

Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 563 (1988) (citing United States v. 

Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 283–84 (4th Cir. 1982), where grand 

jury testimony was held properly introduced under Rule 

801(d)(1) when a witness claimed memory loss). Simply 

put, a witness cannot have it both ways: a witness cannot 

make a sworn statement and then attempt to wiggle out from 

it by refusing to answer or falsely asserting he cannot recall 

it.

Our court has not delineated the precise boundaries of 

Rule 801(d)(1)(A), but we have suggested that claims of 

memory loss may conflict with earlier testimony—at least 

when coupled with somewhat varying testimony on the 

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10 USA V. SHUEMAKE

stand. See United States v. Tory, 52 F.3d 207, 209 n.2, 210 

(9th Cir. 1995) (prior inconsistent statement admitted for 

impeachment when witness claimed memory loss and gave 

somewhat different testimony of suspect wearing “white 

type of pant” versus “sweatpants”); United States v. Tran, 

568 F.3d 1156, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2009) (Rule 801(d)(1)(A)

applies when witness’ testimony was “vague and evasive,” 

including claim of lack of memory and slightly varying 

details in testimony). Cf. also Morgan, 555 F.2d 242–42 

(admitting grand jury testimony as direct evidence under 

Rule 801(d)(1)(A) where government witnesses were 

“indefinite and uncertain” when examined at trial).

We affirm these prior decisions and are aligned with our 

sister circuits in holding that a district court may find that 

dubious claims of memory loss satisfy Rule 801(d)(1)(A)’s 

inconsistency requirement.

1 To be clear, we do not hold that 

a court can admit earlier sworn testimony as a prior 

inconsistent statement merely because a witness asserts that

he cannot recall that prior statement. After all, a witness 

genuinely may not remember his earlier testimony; in that 

case, a lawyer can rely on other evidentiary rules such as 

refreshing the witness’ recollection (Rule 612) or using the 

recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule (Rule 

1 See United States v. Truman, 688 F.3d 129, 142 (2d Cir. 2012) (“the 

refusal to answer” may be “inconsistent with his prior testimony”); 

United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2008); United States 

v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] witness’s 

‘feigned’ memory loss can be considered inconsistent under the Rule, for 

‘the unwilling witness often takes refuge in a failure to remember’”); 

United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 512 (6th Cir. 2005) (“limited and 

vague recall of events, equivocation, and claims of memory loss satisfy 

the requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)”); United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 

922, 931 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 796 (8th 

Cir. 1980).

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USA V. SHUEMAKE 11

803(5)). Under the prior inconsistent statement rule, the 

dispositive inquiry is whether both the trial testimony and 

the prior testimony could be equally truthful when asserted. 

In making this assessment, trial courts can consider various 

factors—such as (i) inexplicable or questionable

explanations for the lack of recollection, (ii) vague and 

evasive responses suggesting a refusal to answer truthfully, 

and (iii) potentially conflicting testimony—as signs that a 

witness is feigning memory loss. Courts must engage in this 

fact-intensive inquiry to smoke out a witness’ attempt to 

walk away from prior sworn testimony by asserting a lack of 

memory. 

B. Luke Ulavale feigned memory loss on the stand, 

making Rule 801(d)(1)(A) applicable. 

Ulavale’s questionable assertions that he could not recall 

his grand jury testimony fall within the boundaries of

Rule 801(d)(1)(A). See Tran, 568 F.3d at 1162–63; Tory, 52 

F.3d at 209–10. 

Telltale signs of insincerity were plentiful. For example, 

Ulavale twice gave responses inconsistent with his grand 

jury testimony and then tried to walk back his responses by 

feigning memory loss. Ulavale first asserted he did not 

discuss the grand jury subpoena with Shuemake and then, 

when asked again, replied he did not remember. In the 

second instance, Ulavale initially said he came up with the 

“Dale Story” to tell the FBI, then replied he could not recall 

who came up with the story. What’s more, Ulavale over a 

dozen times asserted that he could not recall, despite reading 

his grand jury testimony from only about a year prior. 

In sum, Ulavale’s statements on the stand and his 

testimony before the grand jury could not be found equally 

truthful. Ulavale was an uncooperative witness who did not 

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12 USA V. SHUEMAKE

appear to suffer genuine memory loss. His testimony on the 

stand, while not always categorically contradictory, was still

inconsistent with his grand jury testimony under Rule 

801(d)(1)(A). 

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM Shuemake’s obstruction of justice 

conviction. 

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