Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02300/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02300-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Soheir A. Abu Nahia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Theodore McMillian died on January 18, 2006. This opinion

is being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and

8th Cir. R. 47E. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2300

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Soheir A. Abu Nahia, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2006

Filed: February 3, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and McMILLIAN,1

 Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, we reverse this case and

remand for resentencing. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A more thorough review of the underlying facts and initial arguments raised

on appeal in this matter may be found at United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769 (8th

Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 1080 (2005), and cert. granted, judgment vacated

by, Abu Nahia v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 300 (2005) (hereinafter Rashid I). This

case is now before us on remand from the Supreme Court for limited review in light

of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). No sentencing issues were initially

raised on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. Rashid, 383 F.3d at 772. 

A jury convicted Nahia of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and bank fraud.

The pre-sentence investigation report calculated Nahia's total offense level at twentysix and her criminal history category as one, resulting in a sentencing range of sixtythree to seventy-eight months. Nahia requested a downward departure, representing

to the court that she would waive deportation proceedings. The government objected

to her request and the court agreed that no departure was warranted. However, the

court did note its uncertainty that the circumstances of the case warranted a sixtythree-month sentence stating, "I don't know that this circumstance, quite frankly,

warrants a 63 month term of imprisonment."

 

The district court sentenced Nahia to sixty-three months' imprisonment, three

years supervised release, and a special assessment of $200.00. In Rashid I, we

affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that the government had

established "materiality" as a matter of law. Id. at 778-79. Nahia then filed a writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court claiming, for the first time, that she

should be resentenced in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The

Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded to this court for consideration. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Nahia receives the benefit of Booker in this case. Because she failed

(understandably) to raise any challenge to the constitutionality of the mandatory

guidelines at the time of sentencing as she was sentenced prior to such jurisprudence,

we review the sentence imposed for plain error. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d

543, 549-50 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (2005). Plain error is

governed by the four-part test of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Nahia

bears the burden of proving plain error and must establish the following: (1) error,

(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three of these conditions

are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,

but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)

(interpreting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35). 

Under Pirani, mandatory use of the guidelines constitutes "error" that is "plain."

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. The government concedes that the district court applied the

guidelines as mandatory and that this constituted an "error" that was "plain."

Therefore, we turn to the third element of the Olano plain-error test. Here, Nahia

must show a reasonable probability, based on the record as a whole, that but for the

error of applying the guidelines mandatorily she would have received a more

favorable sentence. Id. at 553. In its supplemental brief, the government truthfully

points out that resolution of Nahia's burden is a close issue and felt "duty-bound" to

bring the district court's comments at sentencing to our attention. We acknowledge

the government's role in this instance as an officer of the court and agree with its

assessment. The district court's expression of uncertainty that a sixty-three month

sentence was appropriate establishes a reasonable probability that Nahia would have

received a more favorable sentence under an advisory guidelines scheme. 

Because there is a reasonable probability that Nahia would have received a

lesser sentence under an advisory regime, we must determine whether the fourth

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Nahia's tendered pro se supplemental brief is accepted. No further briefing is

necessary given the approach the government has taken in its briefing to the court.

Accordingly, we deny the pending Motion of Appellant for Leave to Withdraw

Anders Brief, deny Ms. Hunt's pending Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Nahia and

deny Nahia's Motions to Substitute Counsel. We additionally note that if and when

Nahia chooses to appeal after resentencing, she may renew her motion for substitute

counsel. 

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Olano factor is satisfied, i.e., whether the error seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. 466-67.

This court has repeatedly chosen to exercise its discretion under the fourth factor to

vacate the defendant's sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 425

F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2005) (Colloton, J., concurring); United States v. Betterton,

417 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2005) (Hansen, J., concurring). And, while we reiterate

our colleagues' concerns that a conclusory analysis of the fourth Olano factor violates

Olano's admonition that "a plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without

more, satisfy the [plain-error] standard, for otherwise the discretion afforded by [Fed.

R. Crim. P.] 52(b) would be illusory," 507 U.S. at 737, we nevertheless feel

compelled to follow prior circuit precedent. Cf. Betterton, 417 F.3d at 833-36.

We therefore exercise our discretion to vacate Nahia's sentence and remand to

the district court for resentencing. "'However, nothing in this opinion should be

construed as suggesting [a] more lenient sentence[] . . . [is] necessarily warranted or

would be reasonable. The district court must conduct its resentencing analyses in the

first instance.'" Id. at 833 (quoting United States v. Plumman, 409 F.3d 919, 932 (8th

Cir. 2005)). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein we reverse the sentence and remand to the district

court for resentencing. Our hope is that this may be done expeditiously.2

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