Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05333/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05333-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald W. Clause
Appellee
John H. Dalton
Appellee
Luria N. Greene
Appellant
Daniel G. Jarcho
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 1998 Decided January 19, 1999

No. 97-5333

Luria N. Greene,

Appellant

v.

John H. Dalton, Secretary,

Department of the Navy and

Donald W. Clause,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02161)

Kurt J. Hamrock argued the cause as amicus curiae on

behalf of appellant. With him on the briefs was Daniel G.

Jarcho, appointed by the court.

Luria N. Greene, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for

appellant.

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Brian J. Sonfield, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: Silberman, Ginsburg, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Luria N. Greene sued the Navy

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-2(a)(1), and her former supervisor under the common law, claiming that (1) her supervisor had sexually harassed her while she was employed by the Navy as a summer

intern and (2) in retaliation for her complaining about the

harassment the Navy refused to rehire her the following

summer. The district court, concluding that Greene had

failed to present sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict

against the Navy, granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claim against the supervisor for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Upon Greene's

appeal, we hold that a reasonable jury could find that Greene

was sexually harassed by her Navy supervisor, but not that

the Navy retaliated against her because of her complaints

about him. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

reversed in part and affirmed in part.

I. Background

Greene started work for the Navy as a temporary engineering technician on June 19, 1995; she was a 22-year-old

graduate student at the time. According to her affidavit,

which we credit in view of the procedural posture of the case,

that same day "and virtually every day thereafter," her

immediate supervisor, Lieutenant Commander Donald

Clause, subjected her to "unwelcome discussions concerning

sexual matters" and to amorous advances. Clause's campaign

of harassment, she says, culminated on June 29 in his raping

her. On August 2, when Clause allegedly propositioned her

again, she reported the rape to a Navy EEO counselor.

In October, 1995 Greene filed a formal sexual harassment

complaint with the Navy's Equal Employment Office. As a

result of her allegations the Navy initiated a court martial

proceeding against Clause, charging him with rape, sexual

harassment, adultery, and conduct unbecoming an officer.

Clause admitted having sex with Greene but claimed that it

was consensual. In support of this defense he introduced

evidence suggesting that Greene had in the past filed a

number of frivolous sexual harassment complaints. He also

introduced a diary, purportedly written by Greene, that confirmed his account of the June 29 incident. The military

court found Clause guilty of adultery and conduct unbecoming an officer, but not guilty of rape or sexual harassment.

In 1996 Greene again applied for a summer position with

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the Navy. Another, allegedly less qualified, candidate was

hired for the position. Greene asserts that the Navy refused

to hire her because of the charges she had made against

Clause.

Greene filed this suit in September, 1996. Her complaint

includes claims against the Navy for sexual harassment and

retaliation and against Clause for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, as well as a demand for a jury trial.

Instead of answering the complaint, both defendants moved

to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

The district court granted the Navy's motion for summary

judgment and dismissed the case against Clause. First, in

view of Greene's history of questionable complaints and the

exculpatory contents of her supposed diary, the court reasoned that her allegations of sexual harassment "may have

been fabricated for purposes of personal advantage or revenge"; although Greene had submitted an affidavit to the

court in which she denied writing the diary, the court faulted

her for not making a "definitive repudiation" of its authenticity. Turning next to Greene's claim of retaliation, which it

mistakenly understood to rest solely upon the Navy's decision

not to hire her for a permanent position, the court observed

that she had failed to present evidence that she had ever

applied for such a position, wherefore no reasonable jury

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could find that the Navy had wrongfully denied it to her.

Finally, the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Greene's claim against Clause for intentional infliction

of emotional distress. Greene contends that the court erred

in making each of these rulings.

II. Analysis

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,

that is, applying the same standard that governed the district

court's decision. See Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277,

281 (1997). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment

is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." In deciding whether there is a genuine issue

of fact before it, the court must assume the truth of all

statements proffered by the party opposing summary judgment--subject to an exception discussed below. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

This is the standard even when the court entertains grave

doubts about such a statement; like the weighing of evidence

generally, the task of determining the credibility of a witness

is the exclusive domain of the finder of fact. See id.; Bayer

v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C.

Cir. 1992).

In granting summary judgment for the Navy on Greene's

claim for sexual harassment, the district court quite clearly

invaded the province of the jury. Greene submitted a sworn

affidavit stating that Clause had harassed and raped her, and

that the proffered diary suggesting otherwise was a forgery.

If true, these allegations are indisputably sufficient to support

a verdict against the Navy under Title VII. See Gary v.

Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The allegations

may, of course, be false. That is a question not for the court,

however, but for the jury.

Recognizing, one suspects, the inevitability of this conclusion, the Navy argues that the district court's decision can be

upheld upon an alternative ground, namely, that the Navy has

made out the affirmative defense recognized by the Supreme

Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275

(1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.

2257 (1998). In those cases the Court held that when a

supervisor creates a hostile work environment for a subordinate, their mutual employer can avoid or decrease its

liability for the supervisor's acts by showing that (1) it took

reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassment, but

(2) the subordinate "unreasonably failed to avail herself of the

employer's preventive or remedial apparatus." Faragher, 118

S. Ct. at 2292. Because the rigor with which the Navy

enforces its strict anti-harassment policy is unquestioned, and

because Greene admittedly waited more than a month to

disclose the alleged rape, the Navy contends that it has made

out this defense as a matter of law.

Even if the Navy can satisfy the first element of the

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Faragher test, however, it plainly has not met the second.

The "failure to avail" standard is not intended to punish the

plaintiff merely for being dilatory. Rather, it "reflects an ...

obvious policy imported from the general theory of damages,"

namely, that the victim has a duty to mitigate her damages.

118 S. Ct. at 2292. "If the victim could have avoided harm,

no liability should be found against the employer who had

taken reasonable care, and ... no award against a liable

employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts

could have avoided." Id.

In a suit for sexual harassment, the actionable harm is

caused by "harassment ... sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the terms and conditions of [the victim's] employment

and create an abusive working environment." Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). In order for the

Navy to avoid all liability based upon its Faragher defense,

therefore, it must show not merely that Greene inexcusably

delayed reporting the alleged rape--which is what it emphasizes on brief--but that, as a matter of law, a reasonable

person in Greene's place would have come forward early

enough to prevent Clause's harassment from becoming "severe or pervasive." This the Navy has not done; too little is

known about Clause's behavior in the first ten days of

Greene's employment. The only evidence on the subject is

Greene's rather general assertion that Clause repeatedly

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initiated inappropriate sexual conversations with, and made

inappropriate advances toward, her during that period. As

the party moving for summary judgment, the Navy bears the

initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On the record

before us, however, we can determine neither the point at

which Clause's harassment became severe or pervasive nor

when a reasonable person would have reported his behavior.

A jury may resolve both these issues in favor of the Navy, but

without improperly resolving disputed issues of fact, we cannot.

Greene's claim of retaliation is an altogether different

matter. As she correctly observes, the district court focused

exclusively upon her charge, now effectively abandoned, that

the Navy retaliated against her by failing to give her a

permanent position, and ignored her contention that the

service also refused to hire her for a second summer job.

The latter allegation deserved more attention than the district

court gave it, but not much more.

The only evidence Greene proffered that even conceivably

suggests a retaliatory animus on the part of the Navy consists

of the representation in her affidavit that she applied for

summer jobs in 1996 and 1997 and was not hired although

"another student, who had less experience and education was

hired back" in 1996.1 See Paquin v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage

Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (otherwise inexplicable

hiring decision can support inference of discriminatory animus). Although, as a rule, statements made by the party

opposing a motion for summary judgment must be accepted

as true for the purpose of ruling on that motion, some

statements are so conclusory as to come within an exception

__________

1 We need not address Greene's objection that the district court

failed to rule on her motion to compel the Navy to produce her

employment records. She sought those documents only to show

that "she did indeed apply for the positions in controversy in this

case"--a fact which, for the purpose of this appeal, we assume to be

true.

to that rule. See, e.g., Delange v. Dutra Constr. Co., 153 F.3d

1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group,

Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1998); Huckabay v. Moore,

142 F.3d 233, 240 (5th Cir. 1998).

Greene's statement here is of just that conclusory sort.

See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(plaintiff "must support his allegations of superior qualifications with facts in the record; a mere unsubstantiated allegation of superior qualifications creates no genuine issue of fact

and will not withstand summary judgment"). Absent supporting facts--and Greene provided none--a jury would be in

no position to assess her claim of superiority. Accepting such

conclusory allegations as true, therefore, would defeat the

central purpose of the summary judgment device, which is to

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weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant the

expense of a jury trial. Because Greene's claim of retaliation

rests entirely upon a conclusory representation, the district

court was right to dismiss it.

III. Conclusion

There is evidence in the record from which a reasonable

juror could conclude that Clause harassed Greene. Furthermore, Greene's failure to seek assistance promptly after

Clause allegedly raped her is not causally related to the harm

for which she is suing and hence does not preclude her

recovery as a matter of law. The district court therefore

erred in granting summary judgment for the Navy on

Greene's claim of sexual harassment and, as a consequence

thereof, in dismissing her pendent common law claim against

Clause.

On the other hand, there is not sufficient evidence in the

record for a jury to conclude that the Navy's failure to rehire

Greene was retaliatory. We have considered Greene's other

arguments and find them to be without sufficient merit to

warrant explication in a published opinion. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed

in part.

So ordered.

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