Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01374/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01374-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond Carman
Plaintiff
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RAYMOND CARMAN,

NO. CIV. S-06-1374 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOLO COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL AND

WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Raymond Carman (“Carman” or “plaintiff”) brings

this action against defendant Yolo County Flood Control and Water

Conservation District (the “District”), claiming violations of

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.). 

Specifically, plaintiff seeks damages, in the form of allegedly

unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, for his work as a

damtender at the Cache Creek Dam. Plaintiff also seeks equitable

remedies and unpaid benefits based upon the allegedly

uncompensated work hours, which would have increased plaintiff’s

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Stmt. of

Uncontroverted Material Facts (“PUF”), filed Jan. 11, 2008). 

Where the facts are disputed, the court recounts plaintiff’s

version of the facts. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Disputed Facts (“SDF”),

filed Jan. 3, 2008).

Plaintiff asks this court to take judicial notice of a

declaration filed by Raymond Carman in a related action

previously heard by this court, Watson v. Yolo County Flood

Control and Water Conservation District, No. 06-cv-01549. 

However, plaintiff’s deposition testimony, given after the

declaration was filed with this court, reveals that Carman had

never before seen the declaration. (Dep. of Raymond Carman

(“Carman Dep.”), filed Dec. 13, 2007, at 233:13-15; 234:4-6). As

such, the court cannot accept plaintiff’s prior assertion that

the declaration was true and correct and based upon plaintiff’s

personal knowledge, nor can the court rely on the contents of

this declaration as admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

56(d) (requiring that supporting affidavits be made on personal

knowledge by an affiant that is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein). However, the court does consider

plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of this motion,

which contains many of the same or similar assertions.

Both plaintiff and defendant file numerous objections to

each other’s evidence. Unless otherwise addressed, such evidence

is immaterial to the court’s analysis or the objections are

otherwise without merit. 

2

benefits under the District’s Money Purchase Pension Plan. This

matter comes before the court on defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiff

opposes the motion. For the reasons discussed below,1

defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Carman has been employed as a damtender by

defendant District at the Cache Creek Dam (the “Dam”) from

approximately 1984 through March 17, 2006, and has resided at the

Dam since 1984. (PUF ¶ 53; Decl. of Raymond Carman (“Carman

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Decl.”), filed Jan. 3, 2008, ¶ 1; PUF ¶ 87). The District was

created by the Legislature in 1951 for the purpose of

controlling, managing, and distributing water. (PUF ¶ 27). The

District is a political subdivision and public agency of the

State of California. (PUF ¶ 28). In 1967, the voters in the

District authorized the purchase of the privately owned Clear

Lake Water Company and the Dam. (PUF ¶ 30). The District then

began operating the enterprise, which included the right to store

water in Clear Lake. (PUF ¶ 30). 

The Dam is located approximately five miles downstream of

Clear Lake, and the waters from that lake are controlled by the

dam. (SDF ¶ 3). Clear Lake is the largest lake that supplies

Cache Creek and is the primary water source for the Dam. (SDF ¶

7). Clear Lake is used for recreational purposes, including

boating and fishing, and Cache Creek is also open to the public

for recreational purposes. (SDF ¶¶ 20-21). The Dam and the two

mile long access road to the dam is not open to the public and

has not public campgrounds, boat ramps, day use amenities, or

other recreational facilities. (PUF ¶¶ 31, 52). 

The District actively manages the Dam to provide deliveries

of water to agricultural users and, in the average year, provides

approximately 150,000 acre-feet of irrigation water to more that

55,000 acres of agricultural fields. (PUF ¶¶ 33; 49). The

District receives orders for deliveries of water from

agricultural users, and only delivers water when there is a

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3 Plaintiff objects to this fact and other similar facts

on the grounds that the statements made by Christy Barton

(“Barton”), Assistant General Manager of the District, lack

foundation. Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED. Barton

declared that she is directly involved in the District’s

deliveries of water and the management its dams. This lays the

requisite foundation for her to make declarations with respect to

the water delivered to agricultural users, the water used by

other companies, and the level of water in the Dam and Clear

Lake. Plaintiff contends that these statements are in

contradiction to deposition testimony that she does not know the

duties of damtenders. The court finds that these statements are

not contradictory. Barton may be knowledgeable of the amount of

water delivered and the general management of the dams without

knowing the precise duties of damtenders.

4

demand or order. (PUF ¶ 35).3

 Such deliveries typically occur

during “irrigation season” which begins in March or April and

continues through September or October in any given year. (PUF ¶

35). There may be deliveries in other months and, whether

deliveries take place in “irrigation season” or otherwise, the

District maintains records of these deliveries. (PUF ¶ 35). 

Pursuant to contract, the District also provides water to public

and private water companies in Lake County for domestic and

potable uses. (PUF ¶ 33). These companies draw water from the

lake using their own infrastructure and report their water usage

to the District. (PUF ¶ 33). The District measures and controls

deliveries of water and accounts for usage by others who utilize

a portion of the District’s water rights pursuant to contract. 

(PUF ¶ 34). 

Throughout the year, the District is required to comply with

decrees respecting the limits on the District’s storage rights in

Clear Lake, and must operate the Dam within parameters dictated

by state and federal laws. (Am. Decl. of Christy Barton (“Barton

Decl.”), filed Dec. 17, 2007, ¶ 4). The District asserts that

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its rights in regard to Clear Lake extend only to the supply and

storage of water between zero and 7.56 feet on the Rumsey Gauge

and that it has no responsibility for, authority over, or ability

to control activities that take place on the lake. (PUF ¶ 32;

Barton Decl. ¶ 4). The District also contends that it has no

right to utilize water below zero or to store water in excess of

7.56 feet on the Rumsey Gauge, and must operate the Dam to

release waters in excess of 7.56 feet. (Barton Decl. ¶ 4). 

Moreover, the District asserts that it does not use the dam to

facilitate any activities that may take place on the lake. (PUF

¶ 32). Plaintiff asserts that the District uses the dam to

control the levels of Clear Lake to facilitate recreational use

in the summer and to prevent flooding in the winter. (PUF ¶ 32). 

Carman’s duties as a damtender included performing routine

maintenance for the Dam and related facilities, inspecting dam

facilities and reporting current status, maintaining water

releases related to the Dam, reading meters and logging water

releases, maintaining batteries, maintaining the auxiliary

generators, operating road graders, backhoes, and front end

loaders, repairing plumbing, preparing data reports each month on

weather conditions at the dam site, performing tasks in the

maintenance of dam facilities, hand cranking to open and close

water spillways, and reading and recording lake levels and

discharge and precipitation readings. (PUF ¶ 1). The damtender

is responsible for making sure adjustments are timely and

accurate and for monitoring levels to assist the District in the

proper distribution of water to end users. (PUF ¶ 42). However,

Carman’s most important job as damtender was to make sure that he

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is releasing the waters in accordance with the District’s

instructions. (PUF ¶ 7).

Carman generally inspected the gauges in the morning, and

the District would call him at approximately 11:00 a.m. if

adjustments to the dam gates were necessary to facilitate

deliveries of water. (PUF ¶ 8). The physical act of adjusting

the gate could take as little as ten minutes or up to three

hours, depending upon how many times a gate needed further

adjustments to come into specification. (PUF ¶ 10; Carman Decl.

¶ 18). The time it takes to confirm whether the adjustment was

correct depends upon how much water is released. (PUF ¶ 11). It

may take as little as one hour for the adjustment to register on

the gauges when large amounts of water are released or as much as

five hours when smaller amounts of water are released. (PUF ¶

11). Carman would also make entries in the Clear Lake Dam Record

of Operations on a daily basis. (PUF ¶ 12). These entries

reflected the dam level, the flow, the lake level, whether it was

raining, the temperature, what gates were in operation, and other

significant events; these records served the purpose of

demonstrating the daily operation of the dam, compliance with

applicable rules and regulations, and plaintiff’s performance of

expected duties. (PUF ¶ 13). On some days, the entries

indicated one reading per day. (See PUF ¶ 20). However, Carman

contends that the number of entries does not reflect the number

of occasions that he took readings; he would take readings to

ensure the flow was right and not log it because it was for his

own information in maintaining the facility at the District’s

standards. (See PUF ¶ 20; SDF ¶ 58). Plaintiff estimates that

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he made readings five to six times a day, especially when there

was a change. (SDF ¶ 61). Carman contends that to read and

record all monitors on a daily basis took several hours a day

during irrigation season and took about an hour and a half during

non-irrigation season. (SDF ¶ 63). Carman also asserts that

during flood season, it can take 24 hours a day to read and

record all monitors on the dam log. (SDF ¶ 75).

After the hydroelectric facility went off-line, Carman spent

between one and three hours per day maintaining the facility. 

(SDF ¶ 50). He was responsible for, among other things, removing

debris, keeping trespassers off the property, replacing spillway

beams, keeping lights workings, weed spraying, keeping sliding

rocks down, maintaining the septic, electrical, and plumbing

system, painting, maintaining the lawns and grounds, maintaining

tools and equipment, and replacing things that broke. (SDF ¶¶

49, 52). The damtender has discretion to determine how and when

to perform these duties and when to take breaks. (PUF ¶ 88). 

Carman also performed work on the water system at the Indian

Valley Reservoir (the “Reservoir”) starting in approximately

1994. (PUF ¶ 23; Carman Decl. ¶ 22). The amount of work

performed by plaintiff varied over the years, but he generally

went to the Reservoir once or twice a week, sometimes biweekly,

and for emergencies. (Carman Decl. ¶ 22). When Carman performed

work at the Reservoir, it would take from five to seven hours per

day. (SDF ¶ 51). He would also attempt to solve problems over

the phone with the Reservoir’s damtender if called for advice. 

(Carman Decl. ¶ 22).

/////

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Carman contends that he was on the job and available at all

times. (SDF ¶ 107). He asserts that he carried a mobile phone

and pager, issued by defendant, at all times. (Carman Decl. ¶

33). He received between 10 and 20 notification a year. (PUF ¶

125). Carman also asserts that he understood that he needed to

be able to respond and be ready to work within thirty minutes of

receiving notice. (Carman Decl. ¶ 33). Plaintiff contends that

because it took eighteen minutes to go from the damtender

residence to the last gate, he could only go twelve minutes from

the last gate into town. (Id.) He went out to a meal with his

wife approximately once a month, but they always traveled in two

different cars in case he was called to return to the dam. (Id.

¶ 34). During flood season, there were times where plaintiff did

not leave the Dam for up to two weeks at a time because of the

weather and risk of flooding. (Id. ¶ 35). 

The District contends that plaintiff was able to engage in a

variety of personal activities in his free time. Carman

installed a deck, pool, hot tub, and several workshops at the

residence at the Dam. (PUF ¶ 89). Over the years Carman has

made other improvements to the residence, including repainting it

and replacing the refrigerator, water heaters, and swamp coolers. 

(PUF ¶ 90). Carman was free to have visitors, and his grandson

stayed on the property approximately fifteen to twenty times over

the past five years. (PUF ¶ 112). Carman could also spend his

free time watching television. (PUF ¶ 116). Moreover, Carman

has been a member of the Masonic Lodge for fifteen years. (PUF ¶

118). Plaintiff attended one meeting per month, if the season

and weather permitted, and spent from two to eight hours per

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month performing duties associated with the lodge. (PUF ¶ 118). 

Further, Carman took classes offsite at Yuba College or in

Sacramento to maintain his water license. (PUF ¶ 117). 

Plaintiff considered these classes to be part of his job. (PUF ¶

117). 

Prior to accepting the position of damtender, Carman met

with the District’s General Manager to discuss the position,

including its duties and compensation. (PUF ¶ 54). Carman’s

employment began with his written acceptance of the District’s

offer of employment, and thereafter was governed by a series of

written contracts, the last of which was signed in 1992. (PUF ¶

54). These agreements set forth the terms and conditions of

plaintiff’s employment, and provided that he would be responsible

for the operation and maintenance of the dam on a daily basis. 

(PUF ¶ 58). However, plaintiff contends that the terms of the

agreement expired in 1995. (PUF ¶ 58). 

Plaintiff understood that he would receive the same salary

amount, regardless of the number of hours he worked. (Dep. of

Raymond Carman, Ex. A to Decl. of Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr., at

255:8-11). However, plaintiff contends that there was no

discussion regarding the number of hours he was required to be

working and that the District never told him to keep a timecard. 

(Id. at 255:2-7; SDF ¶ 80). Plaintiff also contends that the

General Manager of the District, Tim O’Halloran, never told

plaintiff that he expected plaintiff to complete his job in 40

hours per week. (SDF ¶ 82). The District contends that in 1995,

in response to plaintiff’s request for higher wages and better

living and working conditions, it tasked a personnel committee

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with the duty to review the damtenders’ duties and compensation

and to provide him with wage and salary information to consider. 

(PUF ¶¶ 66-67). The committee recommended that Carman’s salary

be increased by $419.38, which was given effect by the District

and accepted by Carman. (PUF ¶ 70). 

In the fall of 2001, Carman went directly to the District’s

Board of Directors to request that the District provide

additional holiday compensation for damtenders. (PUF ¶ 73). On

February 2002, the District issued a memorandum with respect to

holiday pay, providing that it would pay additional pay for work

actually performed. (PUF ¶ 75). The District expressly stated

its anticipation that during a year when there are no water

releases being made and there are no storms occurring on the

watershed, plaintiff should normally be able to take the holiday

off. (PUF ¶ 75). To claim holiday pay, Carman was to seek prior

authorization, except for in an emergency, and was required to

provide documentation of the hours worked, an explanation of the

work and why it was required, and who authorized the work. (PUF

¶¶ 60, 76). After receiving the memo, Carman never sought

holiday pay. (PUF ¶ 77). 

Defendant asserts that after O’Halloran became general

manager in 2003, he and Carman discussed the damtender duties on

several occasions. (PUF ¶ 79). Defendant contends that Carman

expressed his satisfaction with the status quo. (PUF ¶ 82). 

Plaintiff contends that he never expressed satisfaction with his

working conditions or wages. (PUF ¶ 82). Plaintiff told

O’Halloran that he worked twenty four hours a day, seven days a

week. (PUF ¶ 84). O’Halloran took this as a figure of speech. 

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(PUF ¶ 84). 

In November 2003, the District hired a consultant, CPS Human

Resource Services, to evaluate its employment practices and

personnel operations and to prepare a report. (SDF ¶ 121). 

Barton and O’Halloran received copies of the report. (SDF ¶

123). The report states, “I have a concern about the two

contract staff and whether they are truly FLSA exempt.” (SDF ¶

125). The report further provides under “Section VIII – Contract

Employees”:

The District currently has two employees who typically

work under contract. One employee is currently without

a contract. Further, both employees are stationed at

remote sites, without regular supervision, work long

hours during the season, receive District provided

housing and vehicle, have considerable flexibility

regarding scheduling of work, and employ their spouses

to assist with work. Both positions need to be

evaluated closely for FLSA exemptions and

appropriateness of total compensation and overtime

liability. The employment contract was not provided

for review, and legal review is advisable prior to

entering into a new contract.

Req. for Judicial Notice No. 2, Ex. A to Decl. of Karen Tynan

(“Tynan Decl.”), filed Jan. 3, 2008, at 16; SDF ¶ 126). The

District never adopted any of the recommendations. (SDF ¶ 128). 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

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that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. 

ANALYSIS

On June 21, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages in

this action, alleging (1) failure to pay overtime in violation of

the FLSA; (2) failure to pay minimum wage in violation of the

FLSA; (3) restitution of unpaid overtime wages in violation of

California’s Unfair Trade Practices Act; (4) restitution of

unpaid minimum wage in violation of California’s Unfair Trade

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Practices Act; (5) failure to provide meal and rest periods in

violation of Labor Code § 226.7; and (6) equitable remedies and

unpaid benefits. (Compl. [Docket #1], filed June 21, 2006). The

parties stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiff’s Third and

Fourth claims for relief. (Stipulation of Dismissal [Docket #8],

filed Sept. 11, 2006). In his opposition, plaintiff concedes

that he does not have a claim for meal or rest periods pursuant

to Labor Code § 226.7, the basis for his Fifth claim for relief. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s Fifth claim for relief GRANTED. Thus, the remaining

claims at issue in this motion are plaintiff’s claims based upon

failure to pay overtime and minimum wage in violation of the FLSA

and for equitable remedies and unpaid benefits.

A. Irrigation Exemption to the FLSA

Defendant contends that plaintiff is not entitled to the

payment of overtime wages as set forth in the FLSA because

plaintiff’s employment falls within the “irrigation” exemption to

the FLSA. “The FLSA is construed liberally in favor of

employees; exemptions ‘are to be narrowly construed against the

employers seeking to assert them.” Cleveland v. City of Los

Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Arnold v. Ben

Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)); Dole v. West Extension

Irrigation Dist., 909 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1990). An FLSA

exemption will only be found to apply in contexts that are

“plainly and unmistakably within the given exemption’s terms and

spirit.” Id. Therefore, the District has the burden to

demonstrate that plaintiff meets each element of the irrigation 

/////

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4 Plaintiff asserts that there are triable issues of fact

as to all four of the elements that defendant must satisfy. 

Based upon the court’s finding, infra, with respect to this

element, the court need not reach the merits of the others.

15

exemption and that plaintiff fits “plainly and unmistakably”

within the terms and spirit of the exemption. See id. 

The irrigation exemption to the FLSA provides that the

maximum hour requirements of the FLSA shall not apply to

any employee employed in agriculture or in connection

with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways, not owned or operated for

profit, . . . and which are used exclusively for

supply and storing of water, at least 90 percent of

which was ultimately delivered for agricultural

purposes during the preceding calendar year.

29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (West 2007). In order to carry their

burden on summary judgment, the District must show that there are

no disputed issues of material fact that: (1) plaintiff is

employed in connection with the operation or maintenance of

ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways; (2) the ditches,

canals, reservoirs, or waterways are not owned or operated for

profit; (3) the ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways are

used exclusively for supply and storing of water; and (4) at

least 90 percent of that water was ultimately delivered for

agricultural purposes during the preceding year.

Plaintiff contends that the irrigation exemption to the FLSA

does not apply because the Dam is not used exclusively for the

storage and supply of water.4 Plaintiff argues that the court

must consider Clear Lake and Cache Creek, both of which are used

for recreational facilities, in its determination of the

applicability of the irrigation exemption. Plaintiff also 

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contends that, in addition to the supply and storing of water,

the Dam is used for flood control purposes. 

Prior to 1997, the irrigation exemption to the FLSA provided

that:

Any employee employed in agriculture or in connection

with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways, not owned or operated for

profit, or operated on a sharecrop basis and which are

used exclusively for supply and storing of water

ultimately delivered for agricultural purposes. 

The 1997 amendment to § 213(b)(12) added the phrase “at least 90

percent of which was ultimately delivered for agricultural

purposes during the preceding calendar year.” 29 U.S.C. §

213(b)(12). This court has recently interpreted the post 1997

irrigation exemption and noted that in amending section

213(b)(12), Congress did not remove the term “exclusively” from

the language of the statute. Watson v. Yolo County Flood Control

and Water Conservation Dist., No. Civ 06-1549, 2007 WL 3034267,

at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2007). As such, the court determined

that it must give that term “force.” Id. at *6; Dole, 909 F.2d

at 351 (noting that Congress used the term “exclusively” in

defining the exemption and that the Ninth Circuit must give that

term “force”); see also Sanders v. Elephant Butte Irrigation

Dist. of New Mexico, 112 F.3d 468 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting the

Ninth Circuit’s rationale and holding that the irrigation

exemption did not apply to a ditchrider employed by the defendant

District whose water was used for lawns, shrubbery, gardens, and

orchards despite the District’s operating practices that

purportedly prohibited such non-agricultural use). By its

definition, the term “exclusively” cannot and does not mean 90

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5 The court notes that its interpretation conflicts with

the only other federal district court case to address the

interpretation of the irrigation exemption to the FLSA after the

1997 amendment, Avila v. Turlock Irrigation District, 2006 WL

3437549 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2006). In Avila, the court found

that the 1997 amendment expanded the term “exclusively” to mean

that 90 percent, rather than 100 percent, of the water must be

delivered for agricultural purposes. Id. at *14. As such, the

court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the exemption could only

be applied in circumstances where the ditches, canals,

reservoirs, or waterways were used exclusively for the supply and

storing of water and not for operation or maintenance of water

delivered or managed for other purposes. Id. at *13. In light

of the intra-district split created by this court’s decision in

Watson, the court stayed the Watson case and certified the issue

for interlocutory appeal.

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percent. Id. Thus, the two statutory terms, “exclusively” and

“90 percent,” cannot be conflated. Id. A plain reading of the

statute, giving force to each of the terms set forth by Congress,

demonstrates that the term “exclusively” applies to the supply

and storing component while the “90 percent” applies to the

delivery component. Id. Furthermore, this court’s

interpretation of the function of the term “exclusively” in §

213(b)(12) narrowly construes the section against defendant

District. Id.; see Arnold, 361 U.S. 388 at 392; Cleveland, 420

F.3d at 988; Dole, 909 F.2d at 352.5

It is undisputed that the Dam was not open to the public and

was not used for any type of recreational activities. However,

plaintiff asserts that the Dam is not used exclusively for the

supply and storing of water as required by the irrigation

exemption because it is also used for flood control purposes. 

The court disagrees.

The District has rights to supply and store water in Clear

Lake between zero and 7.56 feet on Rumsey Gauge. The District

must release waters in excess of 7.56 feet because it has no

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rights to store such water in Clear Lake. As plaintiff himself

points out, these releases and maintenance of levels are by court

decree. (See Pl.’s Req. for Jud. Notice No. 3, filed Jan. 3,

2008 (“Under the Gopcevic Decree, damtenders were perpetually

enjoined and restrained from at any time, or in any way, raising

the level of said lake in excess of 7.56 feet above zero on said

Rumsey Gauge and from lowering the level of said lake below zero

on said Rumsey Gauge.”). Plaintiff also contends that the

District is charged with operating the Dam to maintain the water

in Clear Lake to provide sufficient water for recreational

purposes. However, limitations on the District’s ability to

supply and store water in the Dam does not change the use of the

water. The court decrees, storage rights, and other obligations

regarding requisite minimum and maximum water levels may have

been imposed to serve purposes such as controlling floods in

surrounding areas and retaining sufficient water for recreational

use. However, the purposes of the limitations imposed on the

supply and storing of water in the Dam do not change the actual

function and use of the Dam. Plaintiff was required to operate

the Dam in compliance with all the applicable laws and

regulations and thus, releases had to be made to ensure certain

water levels. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Dam

maintained and operated by plaintiff was used for anything but

the supply and storing of water.

The facts relating to Carman’s employment at the Dam are

distinguishable from the facts of this court’s prior decision in

Watson, 2007 WL 3034267. In Watson, it was undisputed that the

Indian Valley Reservoir (the “Reservoir”), where the plaintiff

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6 Because these facts were undisputed, the court did not

undertake a detailed analysis with respect to the assertion that

the reservoir was used for flood control purposes. 

7 The court takes judicial notice of its Memorandum and

Order in the related case of Watson v. Yolo County Flood Control

& Water Conservation District. Neither plaintiff nor defendant

raise arguments or present evidence that would affect this

court’s prior analysis regarding whether the Reservoir was used

exclusively for the supply and storing of water.

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served as a damtender, was open to the public and used for

recreational purposes. Id. at *5. Further, it was also

undisputed that the plaintiff’s employment duties included

functions related to the recreational activities that took place

in the Reservoir and on the campgrounds. Id. at *2.6 In this

case, plaintiff cannot point to any such undisputed evidence

regarding alternate uses of the Dam and related duties assigned

to him as a damtender at the Dam.

Plaintiff also argues that the irrigation exemption to the

FLSA does not apply because part of his job duties included

periodic work at the Reservoir. Plaintiff asserts that, in

Watson, this court determined that the Reservoir is not used

exclusively for the supply and storage of water; thus, the

irrigation exemption is similarly inapplicable to his case. The

court agrees.7

It is undisputed that Carman’s employment duties with the

District included periodic maintenance of the potable water

system at the Reservoir. Plaintiff went to the Reservoir once or

twice a week at most, sometimes biweekly, and for emergencies. 

(Carman Decl. ¶ 22). Plaintiff also addressed problems by

telephone with the Reservoir’s damtender. (Id.) Because

plaintiff’s employment responsibilities included work at the

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8 To the extent defendant seeks to rely on Wright v. Salt

River Valley Water Users’ Association, 94 Ariz. 318 (1963), the

facts in this case are distinguishable. In Wright, the court

declined to find that the defendant employer and owner of the

waterway was the alter ego of the power plant that was using the

waterway to generate electricity. Id. at 324. In this case, it

is undisputed that defendant employer, the District, was using

the Reservoir for recreational purposes. Moreover, in Wright, the court relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff’s duties

were solely concerned with impounding and distributing irrigation

water to farmers. Id. at 324-25. In this case, Carman’s work at

the Reservoir included maintenance of the potable water system,

work that is not necessarily tied to the impounding and delivery

of irrigation water to farmers and may be used for the benefit of

the Reservoir’s recreational use. 

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Reservoir, which the court has already determined was not used

exclusively for the supply and storage of water, the irrigation

exemption does not apply.

Defendant fails to offer any argument with respect to

plaintiff’s employment responsibilities at the Reservoir. 

Rather, defendant attempts to distinguish the use of the Dam from

the uses of the Reservoir. The court agrees with these

distinctions. However, the court cannot ignore that part of

Carman’s employment with the District involved maintenance of the

potable water system at the Reservoir. Moreover, the court must

narrowly construe exemptions to the FLSA “against the employers

seeking to assert them.” Cleveland, 420 F.3d at 988; Dole, 909

F.2d at 352. Therefore, because plaintiff’s employment included

work at a waterway that was not used exclusively for the supply

and storing of water, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

the basis that the irrigation exemption to the FLSA applies is

DENIED.8

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B. “Home Worker Exception” to the FLSA

Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s FLSA claims for

overtime and minimum wage are precluded by the “home worker

exception” set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 785.23. This section

provides, in relevant part

An employee who resides on his employer’s premises on a

permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not

considered as working all the time he is on the

premises. . . . It is, of course, difficult to

determine the exact hours worked under these

circumstances and any reasonable agreement of the

parties which takes into account all of the pertinent

facts will be accepted.

29 C.F.R. § 785.23. This section does not provide employers with

an exception to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA, but

“simply offers a sound methodology of calculating how many hours

the employees actually worked within the meaning of the FLSA.” 

Brigham v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir.

2004) (finding that the agreement between the parties was

reasonable, but remanding to the district court to determine how

much overtime each of the employees was owed for hours exceeding

40 in a given workweek); see Leever v. Carson, 360 F.3d 1014,

1017 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the parties’ nomenclature in

stating that the regulation provides an exemption from the

overtime pay requirement, but recognizing that it simply offers a

methodology for calculating hours). In order for this section to

be applicable, the District has the burden of proving, “‘plainly

and unmistakably,’ that (1) there was an agreement to compensate

plaintiff for his overtime work; and (2) the agreement was

‘reasonable,’ having taken into account ‘all of the pertinent 

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facts.’” Leever, 360 F.3d at 1018 (citing Brigham v. Eugene

Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

1. Existence of an Agreement 

Defendant contends that during the time period for which

plaintiff is suing for unpaid overtime and minimum wages, there

was a constructive agreement between the parties. “A

constructive agreement may arise if employees have been informed

of the overtime compensation policy and continue to work under

the disclosed terms of the policy.” Berry v. County of Sonoma,

30 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the existence of

an agreement in the inquiry into whether on-call hours were

compensable under the FLSA); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of W.

Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992); see

also Brigham, 357 F.3d at 938.

The parties do not dispute that Carman’s initial employment

with the District was pursuant to written contracts and that the

last written contract was signed in 1992 and terminated in 1995. 

Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he understood

that, pursuant to the written contracts, he would receive the

same salary amount, regardless of the number of hours he worked. 

Although plaintiff also testified that there was no discussion

about the number of hours he was required to work, his testimony

reflect an understanding that his only means of monetary

compensation would be through his set salary and that he would

not be paid separately for overtime. After the expiration of the

last written contract, plaintiff continued to work for the

District under this same compensation structure.

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9 See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s

Opp’n”), filed Jan. 3, 2008, at 19) (stating that plaintiff is

making a wage claim for the years June 2003 through March 2006).

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Defendant also points to a memo dated February 8, 2002,

addressing “Holiday Pay and Reporting Requirements.” (Ex. E to

Barton Decl.). This memo pertains to the District’s policies

relating to overtime pay on holidays and provides that during the

year when there are no water releases being made and there are no

storms occurring in the watershed, plaintiff should be able to

take the day off. (Id.) The memo also directs plaintiff to call

for authorization if work must be performed on a holiday, unless

it is an emergency. (Id.) Further, the memo instructs that for

any holiday worked, plaintiff must follow-up with written

documentation providing the number of hours worked, why it was

required, and who authorized it. (Id.) In the absence of this

information, the District would presume that plaintiff did not

work on a holiday and no additional compensation would be

provided. (Id.) After receipt of this memo, plaintiff continued

to work for the District and never sought holiday pay pursuant to

this policy. 

Therefore, prior to the relevant period at issue, which

plaintiff identifies as June 2003 through March 2006,9 plaintiff

was aware of the District’s policies regarding compensation both

generally and with respect to holidays. Subsequently, plaintiff

continued to work for defendant. As such, there was a

constructive agreement between plaintiff and defendant regarding

his hours and compensation. See Berry, 30 F.3d at 1180; see also

Braziel v. Tobosa Dev. Servs., 166 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir.

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1999) (“Although it is clear from the record and appellants’

pleading that they became unhappy with the policy[,] it is

equally clear that appellants understood and acquiesced to the

policy when they were hired.”); Bodie v. City of Columbia, 934

F.2d 561, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[C]ontinuance in the job and

acceptance under the new plan of payment was sufficient to create

a valid agreement, even though the agreement was implied and not

in writing.”).

2. Reasonableness of the Agreement

While defendant has demonstrated that there was a

constructive agreement with plaintiff regarding overtime

compensation, defendant must also demonstrate that the agreement

was reasonable under § 785.23. Leever, 360 F.3d at 1018. The

Ninth Circuit has recognized that apart from stating that “all

pertinent facts” should be taken into consideration, § 785.23

does not specify what facts are pertinent to the reasonableness

inquiry. Id. at 1019. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that,

“at a minimum, an agreement must take into account some

approximation of the number of hours actually worked by the

employee or that the employee could reasonably be required to

work.” Id.

Where an agreement explicitly instructs the employee not to

exceed a set amount of hours without prior approval, such an

agreement may be deemed reasonable as a matter of law. Rudolph

v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 103 F.3d 677, 684 (8th Cir.

1996); Leever, 360 F.3d at 1019 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s

decision in Rudolph with approval). In Rudolph v. Metropolitan

Airports Commission, the Eighth Circuit held that the agreement

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between the plaintiff employees and the defendant was reasonable,

despite the fact that the employees claimed to have regularly

worked in excess of the time for which they were paid. 103 F.3d

at 684. The parties’ agreement explicitly dictated the amount of

time the plaintiffs were to spend on their job duties and

specified that the plaintiff needed to obtain prior approval for

any additional time they thought necessary. Id. at 683. The

court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to rely on the

plaintiff to follow the clear terms of the agreement by not

performing additional work without prior approval. Id. at 684. 

Therefore, the court found the agreement reasonable as a matter

of law pursuant to § 785.23. Id. 

With respect to the constructive agreement relating to

defendant’s policy for hours and compensation on holidays, the

agreement was reasonable as a matter of law because defendant was

entitled to rely on the clear terms of the 2002 memo. The 2002

memo provides that plaintiff needed to obtain prior approval for

any work performed on holidays that he thought was necessary. 

(Ex. E to Barton Decl.). Like the defendant in Rudolph,

defendant District was entitled to rely on its explicit direction

that plaintiff was not to work on holidays without prior

authorization. As such, the constructive agreement with respect

to holiday hours was reasonable. Therefore, plaintiff is not

entitled to back-pay for work that was not pre-approved by the

District on holidays. 

However, with respect to the constructive agreement relating

to defendant’s general policy for hours and compensation, there

is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the District took

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10 Both Exhibit B and D are memos to Jim Eagan, the

General Manager of the District at the time. There is no

evidence that these memos were sent to or received by plaintiff.

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into account the actual numbers of hours worked by plaintiff. 

Defendant District contends that in 1995, a personnel committee

reviewed the damtenders’ duties and compensation. (PUF ¶¶ 67-

69). The committee determined that plaintiff should average less

than 8 hours per day annually, except in flood years. (Ex. B to

Barton Decl.).10 However, while the memo implicitly contemplates

that plaintiff might work more than eight hours per day in flood

years, it does not address how many more hours the District

anticipated plaintiff would work or how many more hours plaintiff

actually worked. The committee also could not identify why

plaintiff was working long hours during nonrelease periods and

recommended that plaintiff keep a detailed time card. (Ex. D to

Barton Decl.). However, there is no evidence that plaintiff was

ever instructed to keep or submit time cards to the District. 

Rather, plaintiff declares that he was never asked or told to

keep a timecard. (Carman Decl. ¶ 6). 

Further, defendant has failed to present evidence that it

made any inquiry into the number of hours actually spent by

plaintiff in the performance of his duties. See id. (“[T]he

number of hours actually worked is clearly ‘pertinent’ to the

question of how much compensation ought to be paid for that

work.”). O’Halloran states that he had conversations with Carman

regarding the duties of his job and learned that the duties for

the position are fairly light and limited. (Decl. of Tim

O’Halloran (“O’Halloran Decl”), filed Dec. 13, 2007, ¶ 1). 

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However, the declaration is silent regarding any inquiry of

plaintiff regarding the numbers of hours he was actually working. 

Plaintiff contends that he never described his duties as light or

limited, and that he told O’Halloran that he worked twenty-four

days, seven days per week. (Carman Decl. ¶ 5). O’Halloran took

this as a joke, stating that he knew Carman was not working

“24/7.” (O’Halloran Decl. ¶ 7). Moreover, defendant did not

require pre-approval for hours exceeding a certain threshold. 

Cf. Rudolph, 103 F.3d 677. 

Therefore, there is a triable issue of fact regarding

whether the parties’ constructive agreement as to non-holiday

hours was reasonable. See Chao v. Jasmine Hall Care Homes, Inc.,

No. 05-1306, 2007 WL 2069932, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2007)

(denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment based in part on

§ 785.23 because there were genuine issues of material fact

concerning, inter alia, how many hours the employees actually

worked, what was expected of them under the agreement, and how

much knowledge the defendants had of any alleged overtime). 

Furthermore, pursuant to the 1995 memo cited by defendant,

plaintiff was expected to work an average of less than 8 hours

per day annually. Section 785.23 merely offers a methodology for

calculating how many hours plaintiff actually worked. If that

number exceeds 40 (and in this case, the average anticipated

hours would exceed 40 if plaintiff worked 6 hours per day 7 days

a week), “the additional hours must be paid at the time-and-ahalf rate demanded by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).” Brigham, 357 F.3d at

942. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, even if the agreement is 

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11 For the reasons set forth infra, plaintiff’s claim for

back-pay for hours that he was on-call, but not actively working

are not compensable.

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reasonable, a determination of the overtime payment owed is still

required. 

Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for back-pay for overtime hours worked on

holidays is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

based on the applicability of § 785.23 regarding plaintiff’s

claim for back-pay for overtime hours actually worked11 on nonholidays is DENIED.

C. Compensability of “On-Call” Time

Defendant further contends that plaintiff’s claims for

overtime and minimum wage fail because his time spent “on-call,”

when he was not actively engaged in duties for the District, is

not compensable under the FLSA. Whether an employee was “engaged

to wait,” which is compensable, or “waiting to be engaged,” which

is not compensable, must be determined by the circumstances in a

given case. Brigham, 357 F.3d at 935 (quoting Owens, 971 F.2d at

350). The two predominant factors in deciding whether on-call

waiting time is compensable overtime are (1) the agreements

between the parties; and (2) the degree to which the employee is

free to engage in personal activities. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1180

(citing Owens, 971 F.2d at 350). Whether there is an agreement

between the parties that employees would receive compensation for

on-call waiting time is a question of fact. Id. “[W]hether the

limitations on the employees’ personal activities while on-call

are such that on-call waiting time would be considered

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compensable overtime under the FLSA is a question of law.” Id.

(citing Birdwell v. City of Gadsen, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 807 (11th

Cir. 1992)). 

The inquiry regarding the first predominant factor, the

agreement between the parties, is significant to the extent that

the terms of the agreement may assist the trier of fact in

determining whether the parties characterized the time spent

waiting on-call as actual work. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1181. 

However, such agreements are not controlling as to the character

of the uncompensated time at issue. Id. 

In this case, as set forth above, the undisputed evidence

demonstrates that there was a constructive agreement between

plaintiff and defendant regarding compensation. However, nothing

in the agreement plainly addresses on-call waiting time or

whether such time was compensable. Therefore, the constructive

agreement between the parties does not weigh in favor or against

the conclusion that on-call waiting time is compensable.

The proper inquiry regarding the second predominant factor,

the degree to which an employee is free to engage in personal

activities, is “whether an employee is so restricted during oncall hours as to be effectively engaged to wait.” Berry, 30 F.3d

at 1182. In Owens, the Ninth Circuit “enumerated an illustrative

list of factors to consider in gauging the extent to which

employees could pursue personal activities during the course of

their on-call shifts.” Brigham, 357 F.3d at 936 (quoting Owens,

971 F.2d at 351). Such factors include:

(1) whether there was an on-premises living

requirement; (2) whether there were excessive

geographical restrictions on employee’s movements; (3)

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whether the frequency of calls was unduly restrictive;

(4) whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly

restrictive; (5) whether the on-call employee could

easily trade on-call responsibilities; (6) whether the

use of a pager could ease restrictions; and (7) whether

the employee had actually engaged in personal

activities during call-in time. 

Id. at 936. No one factor is dispositive, and the court “should

balance the factors permitting personal pursuits against the

factors restricting personal pursuits to determine whether the

employee is so restricted” that waiting time should be

compensated. Id. Although the limitations on personal

activities inquiry is a question of law, on a motion for summary

judgment, where there is a genuine dispute relating to the facts

relevant to these factors, the court will accept plaintiff’s

version of the facts.

Plaintiff was required to be on the Dam premises every day,

unless he took vacation or sick leave (factor 1). Plaintiff was

subject to some geographic constraints (factor 2); he had to

respond within thirty minutes of receiving notice to carry out

water releases. (Carman Decl. ¶ 33). Further, during flood

season, plaintiff had to remain on the premises for up to two

weeks at a time because of the weather and risk of flooding

(factor 4). (Carman Decl. ¶ 35). There is no evidence that,

during the applicable period, Carman traded or could trade oncall responsibilities (factor 5). 

Plaintiff contends that the mobile phone and pager would do

little to lessen the burdens of his duties because of the remote

location of the Dam (factor 6). However, it is undisputed that,

although plaintiff carried a pager, he received only between 10

and 20 notifications per year (factor 3). (PUF ¶ 125). 

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Plaintiff was free to leave the premises to attend personal

matters, such as having dinner with his wife, with the use of the

pager and mobile phone (factor 6). The sounding of the alarms

for the hydro facility or Copsey Creek were also infrequent, and

neither plaintiff nor his wife could remember the number of times

plaintiff responded to the alarm since 2002. (PUF ¶ 109). It

was also relatively rare that plaintiff read the gauges outside

of normal hours. (PUF ¶ 106). 

Furthermore, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that

plaintiff was able to engage in personal activities when he was

on call (factor 7). Over the years, plaintiff made many

improvements to the home at the Dam, including installing a deck,

pool, hot tub, and workshops, repainting the residence, and

replacing the refrigerator, water heaters, and swamp coolers. 

(PUF ¶¶ 89-90). Plaintiff was free to have visitors, and his

grandson visited quite often and stayed with Carman; over the

past five years, Carman’s grandson stayed on the property

approximately fifteen to twenty times. (PUF ¶ 112). Plaintiff

could spend his free time watching television. (PUF ¶ 116). 

Plaintiff has also been a member of the Masonic Lodge for fifteen

years. (PUF ¶ 118). He has held a variety of positions in the

lodge, including Steward, Junior and Senior Deacon, Junior and

Senior Warden, and Master. (PUF ¶ 119). He attended one meeting

a month, if the season and weather permitted, and spent from two

to eight hours per month performing duties associated with the

lodge. (PUF ¶ 118).

On balance, the Owens factors weigh against finding that

plaintiff’s on-call time was compensable. The response-time

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restrictions placed on plaintiff were not particularly severe;

plaintiff received only between ten and twenty pages per year and

the alarms sounded infrequently. Plaintiff also had a half hour

to respond to notifications from the District. See Berry, 30

F.3d at 1184 (finding on-call time not compensable where

employees required to remain in the county and to respond to

calls within fifteen minutes); Owens, 971 F.2d at 349 (finding

on-call time not compensable where employees required to reply

within ten minutes of receiving a call or page). Further, while

release of water from the Dam was important to prevent flooding,

there is no evidence that plaintiff’s duties put him in the

position of being responsible for the safety of thousands of

people and thus, required him to be both immediate and absolutely

prepared in his responses. Cf. Brigham, 357 F.3d at 938 (finding

that the Owens factors weighted narrowly in favor of the

employees were they were subject to the constant pressures of

being absolutely prepared to respond to emergencies where the

safety of thousands was at stake). Moreover, while plaintiff was

required to live at the facility and was subject to geographic

constraints, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that he engaged

in a variety of personal pursuits including home improvement,

construction projects, having visitors, watching television, and

participating at the Masonic Lodge. As such the record does not

demonstrate that plaintiff’s on-call time “was so restricted that

it could not be used for personal activities.” Serv. Employees

Int’l Union Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1355

(9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that requiring a park ranger to be

on-call at night to respond to inquiries and enforce park rules

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was not so restrictive that on-call time could not be used for

personal activities).

Based upon the foregoing analysis of the Owens factors,

plaintiff was not “so restricted during on-call hours as to be

effectively engaged to wait.” Berry, 30 F.3d at 1182. 

Therefore, and because the constructive agreement between the

parties holds no weight in this analysis, plaintiff’s time spent

“on-call” is not compensable under the FLSA. As such,

defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on this issue is

GRANTED. 

However, although plaintiff’s time not spent actively

working is not compensable under the FLSA, there is a genuine

issue of fact regarding how many hours plaintiff was on-call and

how many hours plaintiff actually worked. Therefore, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s 

FLSA overtime claims based on non-holiday hours actually worked

by plaintiff is DENIED.

D. Minimum Wage

Defendant contends that summary judgment should be granted

as to plaintiff’s minimum wage claim because, even assuming

plaintiff worked 17 hours a days for seven days a week or 24

hours a day for three days a week, his hourly wage is still in

excess of the applicable federally mandated minimum wage of

$5.15. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2004). 

One effect of the FLSA was “to raise substandard wages first

by a minimum wage.” Hodgson v. Baker, 544 F.2d 429, 432 (9th

Cir. 1976) (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel,

316 U.S. 572, 577 (1942)). An employee’s regular rate of pay is

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12 In 2006, plaintiff made his highest wage of $3414.40

per month. Therefore, he was making $787.94 per week.

($3414.40/month x 12 months/year ÷ 52 weeks/year = $787.94/week). 

If plaintiff worked 160 hours per week, he made $4.92 per hour.

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calculated by dividing the employee’s salary by the number of

hours worked. Id. at 433; see 29 C.F.R. § 548.3 (West 2008). 

The workweek is the applicable standard in determining whether an

employer has complied with minimum wage requirements. 29 C.F.R.

§ 776.4 (West 2008); 29 C.F.R. § 778.104 (West 2008) (“The Act 

takes a single workweek at its standard and does not permit

averaging of hours over 2 or more weeks.”). 

As set forth above, plaintiff’s on-call time is not

compensable. However, plaintiff presents evidence that during

flood season, he worked up to 24 hours straight for up to three

days at a time. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, he may have worked up to six 24 hour days in

one week. Plaintiff also presents evidence that we worked a

minimum of twelve hours per day, but worked sixteen hours per day

more than half the time. Assuming that defendant did not pay

overtime, and assuming that plaintiff worked six days at 24 hours

per day and one day at 16 hours per day, this equates to an

hourly wage of approximately $4.92 per hour, when plaintiff was

being paid at his highest rate of $3,414.40 per month.12 This is

below the applicable federally mandated minimum wage of $5.15. 

Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s Second claim relief that defendant failed to pay

minimum wage in violation of the FLSA is DENIED.

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E. Additional Retirement Benefits

Finally, defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

equitable claim that he is entitled to additional retirement

benefits. The District contends that because Carman is not

entitled to additional compensation, his claim for additional

benefits must also be denied. However, because plaintiff has

raised triable issues of fact regarding whether he is entitled to

additional overtime and minimum wage compensation, defendant’s

motion on plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief must similarly

be DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part: 

(1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for meal and rest periods is GRANTED.

(2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for back-pay for overtime hours

worked on holidays is GRANTED.

(3) Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on the

issue of whether plaintiff’s on-call time is

compensable is GRANTED.

(4) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s FLSA overtime claims based on non-holiday

hours actually worked by plaintiff is DENIED.

(5) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for minimum wage violations is

DENIED.

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13 In his opposition, plaintiff asserted arguments

relating to a three year statute of limitations based upon

willful conduct. However, defendant did not move for summary

judgment on this issue and thus, it is not presently before the

court.

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(6) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s claim for equitable remedies pertaining to

his retirement benefits is DENIED.13 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2008

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