Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-03-20059/USCOURTS-ca5-03-20059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Leland Everist
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 27, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 03-20059

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

JOSEPH LELAND EVERIST,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

m H-00-CR-689-ALL

_________________________

Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and

SMITH, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Joseph Everist was charged with being a

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful, inter alia,

for a person who has been convicted of a

crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment to “ship or transport in interstate

or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or

to receive any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has

been shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce.”

Everist was a felon, having been convicted

and sentenced to more than a year’s imprisonment for bank robberies. He possessed five

firearms, several of which moved in interstate

commerce in satisfaction of § 922(g)(1)’s jur-

 Case: 03-20059 Document: 005136311 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/27/2004
2

isdictionalrequirement. He was convicted and

sentenced to 180 months in prison. 

Everist requested that this sentence be

served wholly concurrently with a standing

300-month sentence for the bank robberies.

The district court allowed 60 months of the

sentence to be served concurrently, the remaining 120 consecutively. Everist challenges

his conviction under § 992(g)(1) and the

district court’smanner of applying his partially

concurrent sentence.

I.

Everist makes a facial constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), arguing that the felon

firearm possession statute deprives him of the

constitutional right to keep and bear arms. In

United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260

(5th Cir. 2001), we held that the Second

Amendment “protectsthe rights ofindividuals,

including those not then actually a member of

anymilitia or engaged in active military service

or training, to privately possess and bear their

own firearms . . . .”

The Second Amendment right is subject to

“limited narrowly tailored specific exceptions

or restrictionsfor particular casesthat are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of

Americans generally to individually keep and

bear their private arms as historically understood in this country.” Id. at 261. It is not inconsistent with theSecond Amendment to limit the ability of convicted felons to keep and

possess firearms. 

Irrespective of whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not

justly complain of the limitation on his liberty

when his possession of firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fellow citizens. See id. (noting that “it is clear that felons, infants and those of unsound mind may be

prohibited from possessing firearms”). Accordingly, § 922(g)(1) represents a limited and

narrowly tailored exception to the freedom to

possess firearms, reasonable in its purposes

and consistent with the right to bear arms protected under the Second Amendment.1

 Everist’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)

fails.2

Everist asserts other constitutional theories

respecting § 922(g)(1). He argues that the

provision was enacted in excess of Congress’s

power under the Commerce Clause. That theory is foreclosed under Fifth Circuit precedent

but is preserved for further review.3 Everist’s

other theories, resting variously on the Tenth

Amendment and EqualProtectionClauses, are

meritless.

1 We need not decide whether the Second

Amendment’s boundaries are properly defined

through strict scrutiny analysis, though it remains

certain that the federal government may not restrain the freedom to bear arms based on mere

whimsy or convenience. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at

261.

2 Other circuits, as well, have rejected constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir.

2003); United States v. Boer, 235 F.3d 561, 564

(10thCir. 2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,

185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); United States

v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974).

3 See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d

513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 973 (5th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th

Cir. 1996).

 Case: 03-20059 Document: 005136311 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/27/2004
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II.

Everist contends that the district court acted improperly in sentencing him to a partially

concurrent sentence of 180 monthsfor his violation of the felon firearm possession statute.

At the sentencing hearing, Everist requested

that his sentence run concurrently with the

300-month sentence he was serving for bank

robbery. After hearing Everist’s reason, the

district court allowed only 60 months to run

concurrently. Everist does not dispute the

calculation of the 180-month sentence––the

court properly relied on the sentencing

guidelines and the presentence report. Rather,

Everist assertsthat the court failed to abide by

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)’srequirement that a court

weigh appropriate factors and explain its reasoning in open court when a defendant requests a concurrent sentence.

We generally review the imposition of a

consecutive sentence only for abuse of discretion, if the court relied on permissible factors.

We review de novo the court’s obedience to

the sentencing guidelines and § 3553(c). Because Everist did not object to the court’s implementation of § 3553(c) during the sentencing proceeding, we review this discrete issue

for plain error. See United States v. Henry,

288 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2002); United

States v. Londono, 285 F.3d 348, 355 (5thCir.

2002). We will correct plain error only if it

seriously affectsthe fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United

States v. Ravitch, 128 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.

1997).

Section3553(c) governs a court’s consideration of the sentence and explanation for its

reasoning. With respect to the imposition of

concurrent or consecutive sentences, the statute requires the court to rely on allowable factors enumerated in § 3553(a).4

 Section

4

 At all times pertinent to this case, § 3553(a)

provided:

The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall considerSS

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposedSS

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and

to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further

crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical

care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available; 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing

range established for -

(A) the applicable category of offense

committed by the applicable category of

defendant as set forth in the guidelines. . .;

or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation

orsupervised release, the applicable guidelines . . .

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

(continued...)

 Case: 03-20059 Document: 005136311 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/27/2004
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3553(c) requires the court to state in open

court the reasonsfor itsimposition of a particular sentence.

The district court amply fulfilled its obligations under § 3553(c) with respect to the calculation of the 180-month sentence. It relied

on and explained the presentence report and

why it believe the 180-month sentence was appropriate, given the magnitude of the offense.

The court gave a much more truncated explanation, however, when, after hearing arguments from both sides, it denied Everist’s request for a wholly concurrent sentence. The

court revealed its reasoning only via a statement duringEverist’s attorney’s argumentsfor

a fully concurrent sentence. When counsel

said that Everist had acquired his collection of

guns because he “loves to hunt,” the court interjected that “[h]e also loves to commit robberies.” Nonetheless, we are confident that

the court did not commit plain error either by

failing to consider appropriate factors for the

imposition of a partially concurrent sentence

under § 3553(c) or by failing to communicate

its reasoning in open court. 

As this court has noted, other circuits require “little more” than “that the record merely

not evidence a disregard for the § 3553(a)

factors.” United States v. Izaguirre-Losoya,

219 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2000). It is sufficient that “the proceedingsimply consideration

of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. The court

already had made plain its view of the severity

ofEverist’s conduct when it discussed the presentence report and the manner ofthe sentence

calculation. Because the seriousness of the offense was an important and allowable element

under § 3553(a), the court’s statements imply

consideration of relevant factors under the

statute. Nothing in the record indicates disregard for the permissible factors under

§ 3553(a), so there is no plain error.

Nor did the court commit plain error in failing to state its reasons for assigning Everist a

partially concurrent sentence. Although it

would have been better, given the purposes of

§ 3553(c), if the court had carefully explained

its full reasoning, the court already, and at

length, had explained its displeasure with the

severity of Everist’s conduct and had noted

especially his recidivism as respects bank robberies. 

Everist and his counsel, when presented

with the fact that only sixty months of his sentence were designated as concurrent, should

have been neither surprised nor puzzled. In

fact, the court was more lenient than it wasrequired to be, by assigning any amount of the

sentence as concurrent. And again, neither

Everist nor his counsel had questions concerning the imposition of the partially consecutive

sentence. There was no plain error.

Even if there were plain error, the sentence

does not undermine the fairness, integrity, or

reputation of judicial proceedings. Because

Everist had a chance to inquire further of the

court’s reasoning, we cannot say that his opportunity to understand his sentence was

4

(...continued)

994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the

defendant is sentenced;

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records

who have been found guilty of similar conduct;

and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims

of the offense.

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5

otherwise diminished by the manner in which

the court conducted the proceedings.

AFFIRMED.

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