Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05143/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05143-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Copenhagen Arctic A/S
Not party
Exelis Services A/S
Appellant
Greenland Contractors I/S
Cross-Appellant
Per Aarsleff A/S
Not party
United States
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PER AARSLEFF A/S,

Plaintiff-Appellee

COPENHAGEN ARCTIC A/S, GREENLAND 

CONTRACTORS I/S, 

Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES, EXELIS SERVICES A/S,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-5111, 2015-5112, 2015-5135, 2015-5143

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Nos. 1:15-cv-00215-CFL, 1:15-cv-00272-CFL, 

1:15-cv-00330-CFL, Judge Charles F. Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: June 23, 2016

______________________ 

 JAMES Y. BOLAND, Venable LLP, Tysons Corner, VA, 

argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by PAUL A.

DEBOLT, Washington, DC.

 KEVIN JOSEPH COSGROVE, Hunton & Williams LLP, 

Norfolk, VA, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant Copenhagen Arctic A/S. 

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2 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

 MICHAEL J. ANSTETT, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & 

Jacobson LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-crossappellant Greenland Contractors I/S. Also represented by 

JAMES J. MCCULLOUGH, AARON T. TUCKER. 

 WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant 

United States. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER,

ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D. AUSTIN. 

 KEVIN P. CONNELLY, Vedder Price P.C., Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-appellant Exelis Services A/S. 

Also represented by KELLY E. BUROKER; CAROLINE A.

KELLER, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

In this government contract bid protest appeal, three 

unsuccessful bidders challenged the decision of the United 

States Department of the Air Force Space Command (“Air

Force”) to award a contract to the successful bidder, 

Exelis Services A/S (“Exelis”), for the operation and 

maintenance of an Air Force base in Greenland. The 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) 

granted the challengers’ motions for judgment on the 

administrative record and enjoined the Air Force from 

proceeding under the contract with Exelis. The Claims 

Court found the award to Exelis—a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S.-based company—was contrary to the terms 

of the bid solicitation, which required that bidders “not be 

registered as a subsidiary of [a] foreign [i.e., non-Danish] 

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PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 3

company.” Per Aarsleff A/S v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 

603, 612 (2015) (capitalization omitted). Because we 

conclude Exelis satisfied the disputed eligibility term of 

the bid solicitation, as properly interpreted, we reverse. 

BACKGROUND

Thule Air Base is a United States Air Force base situated in a remote area of northwestern Greenland, a 

largely self-governing entity of the Kingdom of Denmark 

(“Denmark”). Exceptions to Greenland’s self-governance 

include foreign policy and defense, which remain under 

the control of the Danish government. In 1951, the United States and Denmark entered into an agreement that 

led to the establishment of the Thule Air Base and provided the United States rent-free use of the land on which 

the base is situated. A 1991 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Denmark, as 

amended following discussions in 2008 and 2009, provides 

that “either [p]arty may award contracts to commercial 

enterprises for goods and services, including construction

projects, in Greenland, and shall procure directly from 

Danish/Greenlandic sources” whenever “feasible.” Id. at 

609 (citation omitted). 

In 2013, the Air Force and United States Department 

of State (“State Department”) entered into negotiations 

with the Danish Ministry of Finance to consider what 

criteria would be used to appropriately classify an entity 

as “Danish/Greenlandic” for the Thule Air Base bid solicitation. Following an expression of concern by the Danish 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs that an eligibility determination by the Danish government could be problematic 

under European Union procurement regulations,1 it was 

 

1 The Air Force’s Contracting Officer explained, in 

his Statement of Facts, his understanding that [[confidential information redacted]]. J.A. 100673. 

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suggested that Greenland, which was not a European 

Union member, take the lead in eligibility criteria formulation. However, because the government of Greenland 

was a partial owner of Greenland Contractors I/S (“Greenland Contractors”), the incumbent contractor supporting 

Thule Air Base, an eligibility determination by the government of Greenland would create a conflict of interest. 

Id. The State Department therefore decided to itself 

establish a “simple, transparent checklist of requirements” to determine eligibility. Id. at 610 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

During the course of this effort, [[name redacted]], a 

State Department employee stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Denmark, informed the Air Force contracting officer 

by email that “[i]n the searchable part of the CVR [Det 

Central Virksomhedsregister, i.e., the Danish central 

business register] there is an information point called 

‘type of company/virksomhedsform’ that [has] ‘subsidiary 

of foreign company’ as a possibility, so there is a way to 

see if the company is fully registered as Danish or acting 

as a foreign subsidiary in Denmark.” J.A. 25, 128251. As 

a result, the Air Force was under the belief, later shown 

to be mistaken, that the CVR provided a ready means for 

determining whether a company was a subsidiary of a 

foreign company. According to Copenhagen Arctic A/S 

(“Copenhagen Arctic”), one of the three unsuccessful 

bidders, the CVR contained an option to indicate whether 

a firm was registering as “[f]ilialer af udenlandske aktieselskaber (in English: [b]ranch of a foreign owned public 

limited company).” Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 610 n.8 

(emphasis added). Greenland Contractors asserts the 

State Department employee, [[name redacted]], “appears 

to have mistranslated the word ‘filial’ in Danish to mean 

‘subsidiary,’ when that word in fact means ‘branch’ or 

‘branch office.’” Corrected Confidential Opening and 

Response Brief of Cross-Appellant Greenland Contractors 

I/S (“Greenland Contractors Br.”) 10 (footnote omitted). 

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PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 5

The Air Force issued a draft solicitation specifying, as 

a condition of eligibility, that bidders provide a

[c]orporation certificate (Selskabscertifikat m. oblat) verifying that your company is registered as a 

business in the Kingdom of Denmark. (Det Central Virksomhedsregister (CVR); Det Grønlandske 

Erhervsregister (GER); Skráseting Føroya (Skrás.

Nr.)) NOTE: THE REGISTERED OFFICE OF 

THE ENTERPRISE SHALL BE IN THE 

KINGDOM OF DENMARK AND SHALL NOT 

BE REGISTERED AS A SUBSIDIARY OF 

FOREIGN COMPANY. 

Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 611–12. The draft solicitation 

further required a “[s]igned letter from an officer of a 

bank within the Kingdom of Denmark verifying that your 

company conducts business with that institution.” Id. at 

612. 

When a potential bidder asked “[w]hat do you mean 

by ‘not be registered’?,” id., the Air Force posted the 

following answer, which echoed the email of the State 

Department employee, [[name redacted]]: “In the searchable part of the CVR [] there is an information point

called ‘type of company/virksomhedsform’ that has ‘subsidiary of foreign company’ as a possibility, so there is a 

way to see if the company is fully registered as Danish or 

acting as a foreign subsidiary in Denmark.” Per Aarsleff

A/S (Per Aarsleff (GAO)), B-41 0782 et al., 2015 WL

1004252, at *8 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 18, 2015). When an 

Exelis partner asked whether a company would be eligible 

to bid if it is a “Danish registered company . . . owned by a 

foreign company but” can show “[i]n the CVR register [it] 

is registered as a[n] A/S[2] (limited company),” the Air 

 

2 “A/S” is an abbreviation for “Aktieselskab,” or 

Danish limited company. J.A. 32. 

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6 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

Force replied by copying the eligibility requirements set 

forth in the draft solicitation and did not answer the 

question directly. Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 612 (footnoted added). The final solicitation contained the same 

requirements set forth in the draft solicitation. 

Four bidders—Per Aarsleff A/S (“Per Aarsleff”), Copenhagen Arctic, Exelis, and incumbent Greenland Contractors—each submitted a bid in response to the final 

solicitation. Exelis, a wholly-owned Danish subsidiary of 

United States-based Vectrus Systems Corporation (“Vectrus”), submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the 

contract. The three unsuccessful bidders each filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), 

asserting Exelis “was incorporated in Denmark only 

shortly before proposal submission and is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Excelis Systems Corporation [now known as 

Vectrus], a United States based company.” Per Aarsleff

(GAO), 2015 WL 1004252, at *6. The GAO denied the 

protests, id. at *16, concluding the solicitation “was clear 

on its face as to the issue of registration” and that “nothing in the solicitation provides for consideration of [ownership or control],” id. at *8. It noted the Air Force’s 

answers to the questions posed by prospective bidders 

made clear “that the Air Force believed that there was 

within the CVR a place for a firm to indicate that a firm 

was a subsidiary of a foreign firm.” Id. The GAO further 

stated that “[e]ven if the solicitation was ambiguous as to 

the registration requirement” it would have had to have 

been challenged “prior to the solicitation of bids,” and the 

protesters challenge was therefore untimely. Id. at *9 

n.11. 

Following the GAO decision, the three unsuccessful 

bidders filed separate complaints in the Claims Court, 

challenging the Air Force’s award of the contract to Exelis. Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 620. The Claims Court 

granted the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment on the administrative record. Id. at 636. It found the eligibility criteCase: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 6 Filed: 06/23/2016
PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 7

ria specified in the final solicitation “defect[ive]” and 

further found the GAO’s interpretation contrary to the 

“evident intent of the procuring agency.” Id. at 625. The 

Claims Court concluded that “[s]ome recasting of the 

[solicitation] language” was “necessary” in order to avoid 

an interpretation that would allow a foreign company to 

qualify by creating a Danish subsidiary. Id. Such an 

outcome, the Claims Court found, would render the 

registration provision “illusory” and was therefore unreasonable. Id. To the extent the provision was ambiguous 

or reflected a lack of clarity, the Claims Court noted, the 

doctrine of contra proferentem (“against the offeror”) 

places the risk of such drafting errors on the drafter and 

“‘saves contractors from hidden traps not of their own 

making.’” Id. at 628 (quoting Metcalf Const. Co. v. United 

States, 53 Fed. Cl. 617, 629 (2002)). The Claims Court 

concluded the only reasonable interpretation of the solicitation language was “that Danish subsidiaries of foreign 

entities did not qualify as eligible.” Id. at 627. Accordingly, the Claims Court set aside the contract with Exelis

and enjoined the Air Force from “proceeding with th[e] 

contract.” Id. at 636. 

On appeal, Exelis argues the Air Force “rationally determined that Exelis [] was eligible for award of the Thule 

[Air Base contract] under the [solicitation’s] plain and 

unambiguous eligibility requirements,” and that the 

Claims Court erred in concluding otherwise. NonConfidential Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant Exelis 

Services A/S 33 (capitalization omitted). The United 

States takes a similar position, arguing the Claims Court 

“erred by re-writing the unambiguous language of the 

solicitation to add a non-existent ownership requirement.” 

Brief for Defendant-Appellant United States (“United 

States Br.”) 24 (capitalization omitted). By contrast, the 

three unsuccessful bidders argue the Claims Court correctly interpreted the solicitation language and found that 

Exelis did not meet the eligibility requirements. See, e.g.,

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Greenland Contractors Br. 24 (“The trial court properly 

determined that the Air Force failed to comply with the 

[solicitation’s] eligibility requirement.” (capitalization 

omitted)); Copenhagen Arctic A/S’ Confidential Principal 

Cross-Appeal and Response to Defendants-Appellants’ 

Opening Briefs (“Copenhagen Arctic Br.”) 20 (“The trial 

court’s decision to excise the ‘registered as’ language from 

the solicitation was not only correct—it was required.” 

(capitalization omitted)); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Per 

Aarsleff (“Per Aarsleff Br.”) 19 (“The Claims Court correctly interpreted [the solicitation] and properly held that 

the Air Force’s award violated the eligibility restriction.” 

(capitalization modified)). This court has jurisdiction over 

final decisions of the Claims Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Standards of Review

Protests of agency procurement decisions are reviewed under the standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4)

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706), “by which an agency’s decision is to 

be set aside only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” NVT 

Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (A court “must sustain an agency action unless the 

action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)). “This court reviews the 

trial court’s determination on the legal issue of the government’s conduct, in a grant of judgment upon the 

administrative record, without deference.” Bannum, Inc. 

v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

That is, we review anew the question of whether the 

procurement decision of the Air Force was arbitrary and 

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PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 9

capricious under the APA. See PAI Corp., 614 F.3d at 

1351. “Interpretation of [a bid] solicitation is a question 

of law” that is reviewed de novo. Banknote Corp. of Am. v. 

United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

II. The Claims Court Erred in Its Interpretation of the 

Solicitation Language

The Air Force issued a final solicitation, including an 

eligibility provision which stated:

L–3. OFFEROR ELIGIBILITY

Participation in this acquisition is limited to Danish/Greenlandic enterprises. Enterprises must 

possess a corporation certificate (Selskabscertifikat m. oblat) verifying the company is registered 

as a business in the Kingdom of Denmark . . . . 

NOTE: THE REGISTERED OFFICE OF THE 

ENTERPRISE SHALL BE IN THE KINGDOM 

OF DENMARK AND SHALL NOT BE 

REGISTERED AS A SUBSIDIARY OF FOREIGN 

COMPANY. . . . 

Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 613–14. The Claims Court 

interpreted this language to mean “that Danish subsidiaries of foreign entities did not qualify as eligible.” Id. at 

627. It noted the acknowledgment by the Air Force that 

“there is not, in fact, a way to register as a subsidiary of 

[a] foreign company in the CVR,” id. at 625 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), and reasoned 

that because “it was impossible to register as a foreignowned subsidiary in the CVR,” id. at 629, the eligibility 

provision would lack “any significant meaning” if it were 

interpreted to allow “foreign entities [to] create Danish 

subsidiaries prior to submission of a proposal and then 

qualify for an award,” id. at 625. 

We have previously explained the legal framework 

when interpretation of a term in a bid solicitation is 

contested: 

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We begin with the plain language of the document. The solicitation is ambiguous only if its 

language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. If the provisions of the solicitation are clear and unambiguous, they must be 

given their plain and ordinary meaning; we may 

not resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret them. 

Finally, we must consider the solicitation as a 

whole, interpreting it in a manner that harmonizes and gives reasonable meaning to all of its provisions.

Banknote Corp. of Am., 365 F.3d at 1353 (emphases 

added) (citations and footnote omitted). It is to this 

framework that we now turn. 

A. The Eligibility Provision Itself Is Ambiguous 

Solicitation language “is ambiguous . . . if its language 

is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. Here, the phrase “shall not be registered as a 

subsidiary of a foreign company,” Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed.

Cl. at 614 (capitalization omitted), could reasonably be 

interpreted to have at least two meanings. First, it could 

mean that bidders are ineligible if the registration in the 

CVR facially indicates that the business is a subsidiary of 

a foreign company. Under this interpretation, “registered 

as” indicates the registrant actively indicated, such as by 

checking a box in the CVR, that it was a subsidiary of a 

foreign company. Second, a company could be “registered 

as a subsidiary of a foreign company” if it is registered in 

the CVR and also a subsidiary of a foreign company, 

whether or not subsidiary status was affirmatively indicated at the time of registration and whether or not that 

status is apparent from inspecting the CVR after registration. 

The presence of ambiguity is demonstrated by the 

inquiries received during the solicitation process. See Per

Aarsleff (GAO), 2015 WL 1004252, at *8 (“What do you 

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PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 11

mean by ‘not be registered’?”); id. (“Please provide further 

clarification as to what a ‘Danish Enterprise’ is as will be 

interpreted by the US Air Force?”). These inquiries show 

that potential bidders were uncertain as to how the Air 

Force intended to interpret the eligibility language. Both 

the GAO and the Claims Court concluded, incorrectly, the 

eligibility provision was not ambiguous, but each recognized the language was problematic. See id. (concluding 

“the [solicitation] was clear on its face as to the issue of 

registration in the CVR” but noting that “[e]ven if there 

was some doubt as to the meaning of this [solicitation] 

provision . . . , the Air Force provided two Q & As that 

removed all doubt as to how the agency interpreted the 

provision”); Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 628 & n.35 (finding “[t]he language in the [s]olicitation was not ambiguous but rather was defective,” but also discussing the 

doctrines of patent ambiguity and contra proferentem, 

which address situations where ambiguity is present). To 

the extent the Claims Court concluded the language of the 

eligibility provision itself was not ambiguous, it erred.3

 

3 In reaching its decision, the Claims Court considered two documents that were not before the Air Force 

when it awarded the contract to Exelis on October 31, 

2014: (1) the declaration of Ambassador Jonas Bering 

Liisberg, Danish Under–Secretary for Legal Affairs (Mar. 

2, 2015) (“Liisberg Declaration”) (J.A. 220–31); and (2) 

and the Joint Statement of the United States and the 

Kingdom of Denmark on the Resolution of the Thule Base 

Maintenance Contract Acquisition Matter (Mar. 2015) 

(“Joint Statement”) (J.A. 690). See, e.g., Per Aarsleff, 121 

Fed. Cl. at 611, 618, 626 (citing the Liisberg Declaration); 

id. at 608–09 & n.6, 618, 626 n.32 (citing the Joint Statement). Notably, the Claims Court considered these documents without first “determin[ing] whether 

supplementation of the record was necessary in order not 

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B. A Question and Answer Clarified the Meaning of the 

Eligibility Provision

One question and answer removed the ambiguity 

present in the eligibility provision of the solicitation 

agreement. When the Air Force was asked “‘What do you 

mean by ‘not be registered’?,” it posted a response stating 

“[i]n the searchable part of the CVR there is an information point called ‘type of company/virksomhedsform’ 

that has ‘subsidiary of foreign company’ as a possibility, 

so there is a way to see if the company is fully registered 

as Danish or acting as a foreign subsidiary in Denmark.” 

Id. at 612. This answer directly resolved the ambiguity, 

clarifying that the provision refers to whether the CVR 

facially indicates the company is a subsidiary of a foreign 

company. See J.A. 101535 (showing a drop-down menu in 

the CVR where registrants could select from among, e.g., 

“A.M.B.A.” (share company with limited liability), “Interessentskab” (partnership) or “Filial af udenlandsk virksomhed” (branch of a foreign company)). Because the 

relevant question and answer was incorporated into the 

final March 2014 solicitation, it is part of the final solici-

 

‘to frustrate effective judicial review.’” Axiom Res. Mgmt., 

Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973)); see 

also id. at 1380 (“The purpose of limiting review to the 

record actually before the agency is to guard against 

courts using new evidence to ‘convert the “arbitrary and 

capricious” standard into effectively de novo review.’” 

(quoting Murakami v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 731, 735 

(2000))). Although we reverse the Claims Court based 

upon its erroneous interpretation of the contract language, we note this court has previously found abuse of 

discretion where a trial court allowed supplementation of 

the record without first making the required determination. Id. at 1381.

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tation.4 See BayFirst Sols., LLC v. United States, 102 

Fed. Cl. 677, 689 n.15 (2012) (“[A]nswers [to bidder’s 

questions], when circulated to all [bidders] as an attachment to an amendment signed by the contracting officer, 

constitute an amendment of the solicitation.”). 

We have stated that “where a government solicitation 

contains a patent ambiguity, the government contractor 

has a duty to seek clarification from the government, and 

its failure to do so precludes acceptance of its interpretation in a subsequent action against the government.” 

Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 

1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Under Blue & Gold Fleet, the questions 

and answers posed during an agency solicitation therefore 

play a central role in the interpretation of the solicitation 

provisions. In the present matter, they are controlling. 

We hold the disputed eligibility provision, when properly 

interpreted, refers to whether the CVR facially indicates 

the company is a subsidiary of a foreign company.

III. Exelis Was Eligible Under the Terms of the Solicitation 

Given that the eligibility provision, as clarified in 

the Air Force’s answer to a potential bidder’s question, 

refers to whether the CVR facially indicates the company 

is a subsidiary of a foreign company, Exelis was eligible. 

 

4 There appears to be no dispute that the question 

and answer were incorporated into the final solicitation. 

See, e.g., United States Br. 11 (“These questions and 

answers were included verbatim in the March 2014 

solicitation.” (citing J.A. 105469.38–.39)); Greenland 

Contractors Br. 9 (“The Q&A response was also published 

as part of the [solicitation] and, thereby, incorporated into 

the [solicitation].” (citing J.A. 105469.38)). 

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The Claims Court found, and the unsuccessful bidders do 

not contest, that Exelis’s 

proposal included: (1) a certificate from the Danish Business Authority certifying Exelis Services 

as a legally registered public limited company in 

Denmark with a report documenting its registration; and (2) a letter signed by a Danish bank confirming a business relationship with Exelis 

Services and stating that the account was satisfactorily maintained. 

Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 617 n.21. These are the 

documents required under the eligibility provisions. See 

id. at 614. As the GAO correctly noted, although the 

unsuccessful bidders seek “to add the issue of ownership 

or control to the [solicitation], nothing in the solicitation 

provides for consideration of these criteria.” Per Aarsleff

(GAO), 2015 WL 1004252, at *8. Critically, there is 

nothing in the CVR that facially indicates Exelis is a 

subsidiary of a foreign company because, as the three 

unsuccessful bidders concede, it was impossible for the

CVR to facially indicate such status. See Copenhagen 

Arctic Br. 30–31; Greenland Contractors Br. 9; Per 

Aarsleff Br. 14.

While it is true that any company could meet the eligibility criterion by simply registering in Denmark, the 

record indicates the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

was aware of the relative ease of corporate registration. 

According to an email by [[name redacted]], a State Department employee, [[the Danish government was aware 

of the ease of corporate registration and its relevance to

the bidder eligibility criteria]]. J.A. 111631. The unsuccessful bidders cite no authority suggesting that if eligibility criteria are easily met they are invalid. Accordingly, 

Exelis met the disputed eligibility criterion. 

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IV. Copenhagen Arctic and Greenland Contractors 

Waived Their Objections to the Eligibility Provision 

“[A] party who has the opportunity to object to the 

terms of a government solicitation containing a patent

error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding 

process waives its ability to raise the same objection 

subsequently in a [§ 1491(b)] bid protest action in the 

[Claims Court].” Blue & Gold Fleet, 492 F.3d at 1313 

(emphasis added). The present matter is a bid protest 

action under § 1491(b), and it is undisputed that the 

parties did not object to the eligibility provision prior to 

the close of bidding. See, e.g., Copehagen Arctic Br. 40

(Copenhagen Arctic “was not required to file a pre-award 

protest . . . .”); Greenland Contractors Br. 39–44 (failing to 

argue that a pre-award protest was made). Per Aarsleff 

asserts that it “did not object to the terms of the [solicitation]” and instead challenged the Air Force’s award as 

“inconsistent with the [solicitation].” Per Aarsleff Br. 35

(second emphasis added). 

Greenland Contractors and Copenhagen Arctic argue 

they did not waive their objections to the eligibility provision because any ambiguity or defect in the provision was 

latent rather than patent. See Copenhagen Arctic Br. 36

(“The trial court’s decision that the mistake in the solicitation was latent was correct.” (capitalization omitted)); 

Greenland Contractors Br. 39 (“The [solicitation] defect 

was not patent . . . .” (capitalization omitted)); see also Per 

Aarsleff Br. 35 (“The CVR’s inability to register subsidiaries was not patent.”). Whether an ambiguity or defect is 

patent is an issue of law reviewed de novo. Stratos Mobile 

Networks USA, LLC v. United States, 213 F.3d 1375, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). A defect is patent if it is “an obvious 

omission, inconsistency or discrepancy of significance.” 

E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc. v. England, 379 F.3d 1334, 

1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Stratos, 213 F.3d at 1381 

(“A patent ambiguity is present when the contract contains facially inconsistent provisions that would place a 

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16 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

reasonable contractor on notice and prompt the contractor 

to rectify the inconsistency by inquiring of the appropriate 

parties.”). By contrast, “[a] latent ambiguity is a hidden 

or concealed defect which is not apparent on the face of 

the document, could not be discovered by reasonable and 

customary care, and is not so patent and glaring as to 

impose an affirmative duty on plaintiff to seek clarification.” Analytical & Research Tech., Inc. v. United States, 

39 Fed. Cl. 34, 46 (1997) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

Here, the ambiguity in the solicitation was patent, as 

reflected in the questions received by the Air Force and 

the two plausible interpretations indicated above. Following clarification during the question and answer period, 

the ambiguity was removed, and so there was at that time 

neither a patent nor a latent ambiguity. 

The question then becomes whether the solicitation 

language, as properly interpreted in light of the questions 

and answers, contained a possible defect, and if so, 

whether the possible defect was patent or latent. A 

patent defect triggers the obligation to challenge the 

solicitation language and failure to do so generally constitutes waiver. See Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 

1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A bidder that challenges the 

terms of a solicitation in the [Claims Court] generally 

must demonstrate that it objected to those terms prior to 

the close of the bidding process” or it “waives its ability to 

raise the same objection afterwards in a § 1491(b) action.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); E.L. 

Hamm & Assocs., 379 F.3d at 1339 (“[W]hen a contractor 

is faced with an obvious omission, inconsistency or discrepancy of significance, he is obligated to bring the 

situation to the government’s attention if he intends 

subsequently to resolve the issue in his own favor.”). 

Without resolving the issue of whether the eligibility 

provision is defective, we conclude any purported defect is 

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PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 17

patent, and that the failure of the unsuccessful bidders to 

challenge the potentially defective provision prior to the 

close of bidding prevents them from doing so now. See 

E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 379 F.3d at 1339. To the extent 

there is a defect, it is a patent one because it could have 

been “discovered by reasonable and customary care,” 

Analytical & Research Tech., 39 Fed. Cl. at 46, such as by 

examining the CVR to determine whether one could 

facially indicate status as a subsidiary of a foreign company when registering, see J.A. 101535. Such an effort is 

particularly reasonable in light of the attention drawn to 

the registration issue during the question and answer 

period. Moreover, by the terms of the solicitation, each 

eligible bidder had to be registered as a business in Denmark, Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 611–12, and so would 

have had to proceed through the registration process. 

Even if this were not the case, “[t]he parties are charged 

with knowledge of law and fact appropriate to the subject 

matter . . . .” Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 367 

F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, knowledge of the 

CVR is appropriate to the subject matter of the solicitation, which requires registration in the CVR as a condition of eligibility. 

Furthermore, the record demonstrates that whether 

the CVR facially indicated foreign subsidiary status could 

have been “discovered by reasonable and customary care.” 

Analytical & Research Tech., 39 Fed. Cl. at 46. When Per 

Aarsleff sought to challenge the bid award to Exelis, its 

own declarant noted the CVR is “made publicly available,” 

J.A. 100441, and that it is “evident from the attached 

screenshot” that “‘subsidiary of a foreign company’” is not 

an option, J.A. 100442. An associate of the same declarant telephoned the Danish Business Authority, which 

confirmed the CVR does not have an option for registering 

as a foreign subsidiary. J.A. 100442–43. This testimony 

suggests no great effort was required to determine whether it was possible to register as a subsidiary of a foreign 

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18 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

company, and that Per Aarsleff did in fact make such a 

determination after the bid protest was initiated. 

The purpose of the waiver rule is to avoid just such after-the-fact litigation, where the issue could have been 

raised prior to the close of bidding. As we explained in 

Blue & Gold Fleet:

In the absence of a waiver rule, a contractor with 

knowledge of a solicitation defect could choose to 

stay silent when submitting its first proposal. If 

its first proposal loses to another bidder, the contractor could then come forward with the defect to 

restart the bidding process, perhaps with increased knowledge of its competitors. A waiver 

rule thus prevents contractors from taking advantage of the government and other bidders, and 

avoids costly after-the-fact litigation. 

492 F.3d at 1314. Although the record does not indicate 

that the unsuccessful bidders knew it was impossible to 

register as a subsidiary of a foreign company, they could 

reasonably have known and in any event are “charged 

with knowledge of law and fact appropriate to the subject 

matter . . . .” Turner Constr. Co., 367 F.3d at 1321. 

Greenland Contractors and Copenhagen Arctic therefore 

waived any objection that the eligibility provision of the 

contract was defective. 

V. Cross-Appeals by Greenland Contractors and Copenhagen Arctic

In Greenland Contractors’ cross-appeal, it argues that

“[e]ven if this [c]ourt were to find Exelis eligible to compete in this procurement, there is another basis for setting aside the award to Exelis.” Greenland Contractors 

Br. 56. That basis, Greenland Contractors explains, is 

that “the Air Force unreasonably failed to evaluate the 

[other bidders’] compliance with the [solicitation] requirement to maximize subcontracts from Danish and 

Case: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 18 Filed: 06/23/2016
PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 19

Greenlandic sources.” Id. (capitalization omitted); see also 

id. (citing J.A. 105279, ¶ 3.1.16). 

Greenland Contractors notes that bidders were required to “‘[d]ocument and justify any exceptions’” to the 

requirement of maximizing procurement from Danish and 

Greenlandic sources. Id. at 57 (quoting J.A. 105279, 

¶ 3.1.16)). It further notes that under section H-6 of the 

solicitation, the obligations to maximize contract-related 

purchases and subcontracts from Danish and Greenlandic 

sources and justify any exceptions were to “‘take[] precedence in the performance of th[e] contract.’” Id. (quoting 

J.A. 105227, sec. H-6). 

According to Greenland Contractors, the proposals of 

Exelis, Copenhagen Arctic, and Per Aarsleff “made clear” 

these bidders “would not maximize subcontracts from 

Danish and Greenlandic sources,” id. at 58 (capitalization 

omitted), and the Air Force’s failure to evaluate compliance with the solicitation requirement constitutes an 

arbitrary action requiring reversal, id. at 56–57. Specifically, Greenland Contractors asserts the other bidders 

“made clear in their proposals that they intended to rely

heavily on their respective U.S.-based partners to perform 

significant portions of th[e] contract” and that “[n]one of 

these [bidders] made any effort to document or justify 

their use of primarily non-Danish and non-Greenlandic 

sources.” Id. at 58. 

Copenhagen Arctic also cross-appeals, similarly asserting the Claims Court erred in failing to evaluate 

whether Per Aarsleff’s bid proposal satisfied the material 

terms of the solicitation. See Copenhagen Arctic Br. 47; 

see also id. at 54 (“[Per] Aarsleff’s proposal flouted the 

material terms of the [s]olicitation . . . .”). Copenhagen 

Arctic limits its cross-appeal to Per Aarsleff and does not 

extend its argument to the remaining two bidders. See id.

at 47, 50–54. 

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20 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

According to Copenhagen Arctic, sections L and M of 

the solicitation “conditioned the acceptability of a proposal

[on] demonstrating the ability to comply with the terms of 

the [Performance Work Statement].” Id. at 49. Specifically, it notes that “Section 3.1.16 of the [Performance Work 

Statement] required all [bidders] to ‘maximize and document contract-related purchases and subcontracts from 

Danish and Greenlandic sources.’” Id.; see J.A. 105279. It 

argues Per Aarsleff’s proposal “clearly did not,” Copenhagen Arctic Br. 50, meet this requirement because “[Per] 

Aarsleff teamed up with . . . an American company,” id.

(footnote omitted), which would “perform every single one 

of the performance obligations of Section 3 of the [Performance Work Statement],” id. at 50–51. 

The Claims Court correctly rejected the arguments of 

Greenland Contractors and Copenhagen Arctic. See Per 

Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 634. By their own terms, the 

statements in section H-6 of the solicitation and paragraph 3.1.16 of the Performance Work Statement refer to 

contract performance, not eligibility criteria. See J.A. 

105227 (“H-6. Statutory Restrictions on Foreign Acquisitions. The requirements at [Performance Work Statement] [section] 3.1.16 to maximize and document contract 

related purchases and subcontracts for Danish and 

Greenlandic sources . . . take precedence in the performance of this contract.” (emphasis added) (capitalization 

omitted)); J.A. 105279 (“3.1.16 Maximize and document 

contract-related purchases and subcontracts from Danish 

and Greenlandic sources. . . . Performance Standards[:] 

a) . . . Compliance with clause H-6 . . . . b) . . . Purchases 

made from the [U.S.] will comply with [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 52.223-2 . . . .” (emphases added)). 

The Air Force did not act arbitrarily in declining to 

evaluate, as a condition of eligibility, whether each bidder 

would during the course of performance comply with these 

Danish/Greenlandic sourcing requirements. Each bidder 

agreed to comply with the requirements of paraCase: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 20 Filed: 06/23/2016
PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 21

graph 3.1.16. See Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 632. 

Exelis, for example, stated it “will comply with all of the 

Performance Work Statement [] requirements and takes 

no exception to any of the terms, conditions, representations, certifications or provisions in this solicitation.” J.A. 

55, 106314. As we have explained: 

Where a[] [bidder] has certified that it meets the 

technical requirements of a proposal, the Contracting Officer is entitled to rely on such certification in determining whether to accept a bid, and 

the [bidder’s] potential failure to comply with the 

proposal requirements is ordinarily “a matter of 

contract administration,” which does not go to the 

propriety of accepting the bid. 

Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 649 F.3d 1320, 

1330 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

Allied sets forth an exception to the general rule that 

an agency may rely upon an offeror’s certification of 

compliance with a solicitation’s technical requirements. 

The exception states that “‘where a proposal, on its face, 

should lead an agency to the conclusion that [a bidder] 

could not and would not comply with the [applicable 

requirement],’” it “affect[s] the propriety of accepting the 

[bidder’s] offer.” Id. (quoting Centech Grp., Inc. v. United 

States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Here, the 

requirement to “[m]aximize and document contractrelated purchases and subcontracts from Danish and 

Greenlandic sources,” J.A. 105279, is not so inflexible that 

proposals contemplating the involvement of United States 

“teaming partner[s],” Per Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 631, see 

also Copenhagen Arctic Br. 50–51, should have necessarily led the Air Force to the conclusion that the bidders 

“could not and would not comply” with paragraph 3.1.16

of the Performance Work Statement or section H-6 of the 

solicitation, Allied, 649 F.3d at 1330, contrary to those 

bidders’ express certifications. The Claims Court noted, 

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22 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

for example, that Exelis and Per Aarsleff “appear to have 

been planning to” [[perform the agreement in a manner 

consistent with the solicitation requirements]]. Per 

Aarsleff, 121 Fed. Cl. at 633. Indeed, Greenland Contractors concedes that bidders were not “per se prohibited 

from using any U.S. subcontractors.” Greenland Contractors Br. 69. 

Moreover, paragraph 3.1.16 of the solicitation contemplates exceptions to the requirement to maximize and 

document contract-related purchases and subcontracts 

from Danish and Greenlandic sources, so long as those 

exceptions are “document[ed] and justif[ied].” J.A. 

105279. Greenland Contractors fails to explain how the 

face of Exelis’s proposal (or those of the other bidders) 

establishes that it will be unable to “document and justify” any exceptions that might arise during performance, 

asserting only that Exelis has not yet offered any justifications. See, e.g., Greenland Contractors Br. 58 (“None of 

[the other bidders] made any effort to document or justify 

their use of primarily non-Danish and non-Greenlandic 

sources.”). 

In short, Greenland Contractors has failed to establish that the decision of the Air Force to award the contract to Exelis “‘lacked a rational basis,’” which is the 

relevant showing when seeking to set aside a procurement decision as arbitrary or capricious under section 

706(2)(A) of the APA. Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037 (quoting 

Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United 

States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also id.

(noting a procurement decision may also be set aside 

“‘if . . . the procurement procedure involved a violation of 

regulation or procedure’” (quoting Garufi, 238 F.3d at 

1332)). 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Claims Court erred in 

“recasting” an eligibility provision for which the meaning 

Case: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 22 Filed: 06/23/2016
PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 23

was clarified during the question and answer period, and 

erred in its conclusion that any defect was latent. Because Exelis satisfied the terms of the eligibility provision 

as properly construed, and because Greenland Contractors has not established that Exelis’s proposal on its face

should have led the Air Force to conclude Exelis could not 

and would not comply with the obligation to maximize 

subcontracts from Danish and Greenlandic sources, the 

Air Force did not act arbitrarily in its award of the contract to Exelis. The decision of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims is

REVERSED

Case: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 23 Filed: 06/23/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PER AARSLEFF A/S,

Plaintiff-Appellee

COPENHAGEN ARCTIC A/S, GREENLAND 

CONTRACTORS I/S,

Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES, EXELIS SERVICES A/S,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-5111, 2015-5112, 2015-5135, 2015-5143

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00215-CFL, 1:15-cv-00272-CFL, 

1:15-cv-00330-CFL, Judge Charles F. Lettow.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring.

This case is the culmination of three post-award bid 

protests of a solicitation’s eligibility requirements, all of 

which should have been dismissed as untimely by the 

Court of Federal Claims. There is no need for this Court 

to make determinations of patency, latency, and ambiguity. 

Per Aarsleff, Greenland, and Copenhagen knew there 

were unresolved questions about the solicitation’s eligibilCase: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 24 Filed: 06/23/2016
2 PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US

ity requirements well before they submitted their proposals. Offerors questioned the Air Force about eligibility 

of competitors owned by non-Danish entities during the 

Question and Answer session, specifically raising the 

issue of whether a foreign-owned company could be eligible for award. The Air Force’s response did not answer 

this question, it merely restated the same language that 

question sought to have clarified. 

Despite notice of uncertainty as to whether competitors owned by a Non-Danish entity would be eligible for 

award, none of the prospective bidders filed a bid protest 

before submitting their proposals. Instead, they waited 

until they learned that they lost the competition to an 

American-owned company to protest the eligibility criteria. 

This Court’s decision in Blue & Gold mandates dismissal of protests like these. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. 

United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

When a prospective offeror knows about problems in a 

solicitation before proposals are due, any protest of those 

solicitation provisions must be dismissed as untimely, 

unless it is filed before the close of the bidding process. 

Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015). Dismissal is mandatory, not discretionary. 

Contract Services, Inc., v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 261, 

272 (2012); Unisys Corp. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 126, 

139 (2009).

This rule furthers the Tucker Act’s statutory mandate 

to give due regard to the need for expeditious resolution of 

legal actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(3); Blue & Gold, 492 

F.3d at 1313. Without such a timeliness bar, a contractor 

with knowledge of a solicitation defect could choose to

stay silent when submitting its proposal only to protest an 

award to its competitors, perhaps allowing the disappointed offeror to restart the competition with increased 

Case: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 25 Filed: 06/23/2016
PER AARSLEFF A/S v. US 3

knowledge of its competitors’ proposals. See Blue & Gold, 

492 F.3d at 1314. 

The disappointed bidders in this case knew there were 

unresolved questions about the solicitation’s eligibility 

requirement prior to submitting their proposals, but they 

failed to protest that issue until after award. As such, 

their protests of the eligibility requirement were untimely 

and should have been dismissed by the Court of Federal 

Claims. 

We need not determine whether the solicitation was 

in fact ambiguous or defective. Nor is there need to 

determine whether any defect or ambiguity was patent or 

latent, because the offerors in this case knew about the 

unresolved questions regarding eligibility of competitors 

owned by non-Danish entities prior to submitting their 

proposals.1 Given the purpose of the timeliness bar to 

solicitation protests, a protester with actual knowledge of 

a defective solicitation provision cannot sidestep the Blue 

& Gold timeliness bar by asserting that the defect is 

latent. 

By analyzing ambiguity, latency, and patency, the 

majority unnecessarily creates precedential analysis that 

is likely to cause unpredictable second and third order 

effects in future bid protest timeliness determinations and 

contract interpretations. While I concur with the Majority’s decision to reverse, I do so for a different reason. 

 

1 See Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1314 (foregoing determination of whether the protested solicitation defect 

was patent or latent when it was established that the 

protester knew of the defect prior to submitting its proposal); Bannum, 779 F.3d at 1380−81 (foregoing determination of patency and latency where protester had 

informally voiced its dissatisfaction with the protested 

solicitation terms prior to submitting its proposal). 

Case: 15-5143 Document: 3-1 Page: 26 Filed: 06/23/2016