Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01964/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01964-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lozaro Corral
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 27, 2015

Decided February 5, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14-1964

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LOZARO CORRAL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 440-1

Virginia M. Kendall,

Judge.

O R D E R

Lozaro Corral was prosecuted in federal court after selling several guns to an 

informant. He pled guilty to two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, Corral’s lawyer argued for a below-guideline prison 

sentence based on extraordinary family circumstances and a criminal history score that 

overrepresented the seriousness of Corral’s prior convictions. The district court rejected 

these contentions and sentenced Corral to two consecutive terms of 70 months each, for a 

total sentence of 140 months in prison, which was within the sentencing guideline range 

determined by the district court. Corral has appealed. We affirm his sentence.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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After Corral pled guilty, a probation officer calculated a total offense level of 29 

and criminal history category of IV, yielding a guideline imprisonment range of 121 to 

151 months. Corral’s criminal history includes an Illinois conviction for second-degree 

murder, as well as convictions for domestic battery, possession of cannabis, and 

contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He committed the federal gun crimes while 

on court supervision for the domestic battery. The probation officer noted that Corral 

had been caring for his son, then six years old, and for his father, who was in poor 

health. Corral had informed the probation officer, however, that he and the boy’s mother 

also had a two-year-old daughter and that soon the woman and both children would be 

sharing a house with his father.

Through his counsel in a written submission and again at the sentencing hearing, 

Corral argued for a prison term below the guideline range. He first asserted that his

criminal history score was exaggerated by the points assessed on his convictions for

possession of cannabis and delinquency of a minor (characterized as a drinking offense). 

Corral also asserted that his “minor” domestic battery had significantly increased his 

criminal history score because two additional points were added for committing the gun 

crimes while on supervision for that offense. Corral tried to minimize the second-degree 

murder conviction by explaining that he had not himself killed the victim but was only 

involved in a fight during which someone else’s gun accidentally discharged and killed 

the victim.

Corral also asserted that he was the sole caretaker of his father and son, who both 

lived with him. Corral’s father had suffered a heart attack two years earlier, he said, and 

also had seizures, diabetes, and difficulty administering his insulin shots. Corral

submitted a letter from his father’s doctor stating that the father was on insulin, had

diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, and did not take his medications as 

prescribed. Corral did not contradict (or even acknowledge) his statement to the 

probation officer that his father and son were “in the process of relocating” to a home 

with the boy’s mother and sister. Corral also did not mention any of this during his brief 

allocution, and he did not testify at the sentencing hearing.

The district court adopted the probation officer’s proposed findings and rejected 

as grounds for mitigation Corral’s contentions about his criminal history score and 

caretaking responsibilities. The court noted that Corral’s criminal history had started at a 

young age and escalated, showing that he has trouble with authority. The court found 

that Corral’s father’s health conditions were not severe and that his son could live with 

the boy’s mother. The court also discussed how crimes like Corral’s fueled increasing 

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gun violence in Chicago and reasoned that a guideline-range sentence was needed to 

deter other young men from committing similar gun crimes. The judge concluded that a 

sentence of 140 months was appropriate.

On appeal, Corral challenges his sentence. His arguments are a little confused, but 

the basic dissatisfaction with the sentence is clear. Corral contends that the district court 

“miscalculated” the guideline range “by not granting the request for a downward 

departure” premised on Corral’s family circumstances and the overrepresentation of his 

criminal history. This argument confuses the operation of the sentencing guidelines both 

before and after the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), 

that the sentencing guidelines must be treated as advisory rather than binding.

Before Booker a sentencing court could grant an upward or downward departure 

and impose a prison sentence above or below the calculated guideline range. But a 

departure within the overall framework of the guidelines did not alter the guideline 

range itself. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega-Galvan, 682 F.3d 558, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Guyton, 636 F.3d 316, 319–20 (7th Cir. 2011). That was true even though 

sentencing judges sometimes spoke of adding or subtracting offense levels or criminal 

history points in crafting a hypothetical “departure range” to guide the degree of a 

departure from a calculated range. See United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 

2005); United States v. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433, 445 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sarna, 28 

F.3d 657, 658-60, 663 (7th Cir. 1994).

After Booker the concept of “departures” has been supplemented by aggravating 

and mitigating factors that, in applying the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), may 

lead to a variance from the guideline range regardless of whether the case fits the criteria 

for a departure within the framework of the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 (method for 

applying guidelines after Booker); United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2013);

United States v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2012). Yet post-Booker variances, like 

pre-Booker departures, leave the guideline range itself unchanged. See United States v. 

Munoz, 610 F.3d 989, 994–95 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 791 

(7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Simmons, 485 F.3d 951, 954–55 (7th Cir. 2007). In other 

words, the score remains the score even if a sentencing judge concludes that an 

aggravating or mitigating circumstance warrants a sentence outside the actual guideline 

range.

Corral has not identified, either in the district court or this court, an arguable error 

in the calculation of the guideline range. His appellate claim is thus not really about the 

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calculation of the guideline range. Nor does he contend that the district court failed to 

consider his arguments in mitigation. Corral therefore has not identified any procedural 

error in his sentencing. His arguments on appeal amount to a disagreement with the 

district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, which is an issue of substantive 

reasonableness. 

To rebut the presumption that his within-guideline sentence is reasonable, Corral 

must show that the district court’s reasoning was not consistent with the § 3553(a) 

factors. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Banks, 764 F.3d 

686, 690 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 767, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the court weighed the § 3553(a) factors, including Corral’s family circumstances, 

his criminal history, and the seriousness of the firearms crimes. The court explained that

Corral’s circumstances did not warrant a lighter sentence, especially when weighed 

against his violent history and the effect of gun crimes on communities. Weighing 

aggravating and mitigating factors is the heart of the district judge’s heavy responsibility 

in deciding criminal sentences. The record here shows that Judge Kendall gave this case 

thoughtful consideration, calculated the guideline range correctly, weighed the 

appropriate factors, and reached a reasonable conclusion. Accordingly, the sentence 

imposed on defendant Corral is

AFFIRMED.

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