Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-02-01775/USCOURTS-ca8-02-01775-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kerry L. Baker
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-1775

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the District 

* of Nebraska.

Kerry L. Baker, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 21, 2003

 Filed: May 11, 2004 

___________

Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals from the district court’s post-verdict grant of Kerry

L. Baker’s motion for acquittal on a crack cocaine conspiracy charge. Because the

district court’s ruling involved credibility determinations, and because substantial

evidence supported the jury’s verdict, we reverse. 

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I.

The government charged Baker under a three count, superceding indictment.

Count I alleged conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more

than fifty grams of cocaine base (crack cocaine). Count II alleged possession of a

firearm in furtherance of the cocaine conspiracy. Count III alleged possession of a

firearm by a felon. 

The original indictment did not contain Count III. Count I of the original

indictment specifically alleged a drug conspiracy that involved Baker and a suspected

Omaha-area drug dealer named Gary Johnson. The original indictment listed Johnson

as a co-defendant with Baker. In the superceding indictment, the government

dropped Johnson as a defendant and removed reference to Johnson, charging instead

that Baker was involved in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine from February 1,

2000, through June 30, 2001, with “other persons, both known and unknown.”

Notwithstanding the fact that Count I of the superceding indictment contained

no reference to Johnson, the government presented a case against Baker that involved

extensive physical evidence and testimony regarding Johnson’s activities as the local

leader of a crack cocaine conspiracy. The government presented evidence to show

that Johnson brought in powdered cocaine from outside the Omaha area, primarily

from a source in Phoenix, Arizona. The government also presented evidence to

demonstrate that Johnson distributed this cocaine, in both powdered and crack form,

through various dealers below him in the Omaha distribution chain. Based on the

evidence presented, it is fair to characterize the government’s theory of the case as a

large conspiracy–the Johnson conspiracy–with Baker as conspirator who received

powdered and crack cocaine from Johnson for resale in Omaha. 

The evidence against Baker showed the following. Omaha police and an FBI

agent (collectively the “Officers”) conducted a trash pull at Baker’s residence. In his

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trash, they found marijuana seeds, clear plastic bags, and materials that identified the

garbage as Baker’s. The clear plastic bags were torn and their tops were tied off.

Officers testified that small quantities of drugs are often sold in bags that are ripped

and tied-off. The clear plastic bags found in Baker’s trash tested positive for cocaine

residue. One of the Officers testified that, in his experience, it was common for drug

dealers to deal in more than one type of drug.

Officers obtained a search warrant for Baker’s home. There they found an

unlocked safe under a bathroom vanity off the master bedroom. The safe contained

four hundred thirty-six dollars, mostly in one-dollar bills. The safe also contained

eleven gold-colored coins. Behind the safe, Officers found a brown paper bag that

contained twenty-two individually wrapped bags of marijuana. In the adjacent

bedroom, Officers found a small bag of marijuana in the pocket of a pair of men’s

jeans. On a shelf in the bathroom, Officers found an unregistered .380 automatic

pistol that was loaded with a magazine that contained six rounds. In Baker’s garage,

Officers found several plastic grocery bags that contained cellophane wrap strapped

with duct tape. Officers testified that this material was typical wrapping for

kilogram-sized bricks of powdered cocaine. This material later tested positive for

cocaine residue. Still in the garage, Officers found a marijuana cigarette and a gallonsize zip-lock bag with marijuana residue. Finally, Officers noted that there was a

large, older, white, American convertible in the garage. 

Officers attempted a controlled buy from Baker using a confidential informant,

but Baker did not sell any drugs to the confidential informant.

Cooperating witness Cherie Carter testified that on two occasions she went

with Johnson to the barber shop where Baker worked so that Johnson could deliver

cocaine to Baker. She stated that on one of these occasions, she handed Johnson two

ounces of crack cocaine and watched and waited as Johnson went inside to drop it off.

Carter reported that Johnson also identified Baker and Roscoe Wallace as people who

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dealt cocaine with Johnson. She specifically stated that Johnson said it was safe to

deal with Baker. 

Baker objected to the admission of Carter’s account of Johnson’s statements

as hearsay. The government argued that Johnson’s statements were not hearsay, but

rather were statements against Baker by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the

conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The district court conditionally allowed

the statements under the procedure outlined in United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040,

1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (permitting the district court to conditionally allow testimony

concerning a statement of an alleged co-conspirator subject to later proof, by a

preponderance of independent evidence, that the declarant was a coconspirator).

 

Cooperating witness Roscoe Wallace testified that, on one occasion in the fall

of 2000, he paid Baker cash for four and one half ounces of crack cocaine in the

parking lot of an ice cream shop. Wallace stated that Baker drove an older, white,

Cutlass convertible. Wallace stated that before he bought crack from Baker, he had

been dealing with a man named Darrell Howard and a man named Ron Hoskins, but

that Howard had been arrested, which forced Wallace to find other sources of drugs.

Wallace explained that he tried to buy crack from Hoskins when Hoskins had no

crack to sell, so Hoskins set up the meeting between Wallace and Baker. According

to Wallace, Hoskins told him that Baker would be selling “the same thing that he

[Hoskins] had.” According to Wallace, Hoskins called Baker a business partner.

Finally, Wallace reported that he also dealt with Johnson and that Johnson claimed

to be the source of drugs for Baker and Hoskins. Again, Baker objected to the report

of Johnson’s statements as hearsay, and the district court conditionally allowed the

report of Johnson’s statements under the Bell procedure.

Although an initial police report described the sale from Baker to Wallace as

a sale of powdered cocaine on credit, Wallace insisted that he paid cash and that the

purchase involved crack cocaine. The officer who prepared the initial report

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regarding Wallace also testified. He explained that the initial report with the

reference to powder cocaine resulted from information Wallace volunteered

informally at the end of a first interview. This reporting officer said that he took

notes of Wallace’s ending comments so that he could question Wallace further during

a second interview, but that, before he prepared his initial report, he did not fully

explore the issues Wallace raised. Finally, the reporting officer testified that when

he prepared the initial report, he wrote powder because Wallace initially said only

“cocaine,” and he assumed Wallace meant powdered cocaine. The reporting officer

explained that, in his experience, drug dealers usually use a more specific term if they

mean crack cocaine. 

The officer’s second report–prepared one week after the first report and

following a second interview with Wallace–clarified that Wallace described the

transaction with Baker as a crack cocaine purchase. 

Cooperating witness Darrell Howard testified that he dealt with Baker and

Hoskins on multiple occasions between January and June of 2000. He described

repeated sales between himself and Baker and Hoskins as “accommodation” sales

between dealers. He explained that, when he was out of cocaine, he purchased from

Baker and Hoskins, and that when Baker and Hoskins were out, they purchased from

him. He described a meeting in his truck when he purchased one half kilogram of

powdered cocaine from Baker and Hoskins for resale as powdered cocaine. Howard

explained that he handed money to Hoskins and Hoskins handed the money to Baker.

Howard then described a second sale of one half kilogram of powdered cocaine to

Baker and Hoskins at Hoskins's home. In addition, Howard described two purchases

of powdered cocaine from Baker and Hoskins. The first purchase occurred at

Hoskins's home and involved one half kilogram. Howard specifically stated that

Baker was merely present for this sale and did not handle the money or the cocaine.

Howard’s second purchase of powdered cocaine from Hoskins and Baker involved

the purchase of a full kilogram of powdered cocaine for twenty-five thousand dollars.

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Howard claimed that this second purchase took place in a car, in a parking lot.

Hoskins could not identify the location of the parking lot with certainty. Finally,

Howard testified that he purchased powdered cocaine from Hoskins when Baker was

not present, but that he never dealt solely with Baker.

Cooperating witness Adrian Murphy testified that he purchased powdered

cocaine from Baker for the eight to nine month period immediately preceding

Murphy’s arrest and incarceration on March 10, 2000. Murphy claimed that he met

with Baker a couple of times a week during this period and purchased about two or

three ounces of powdered cocaine at each meeting. Murphy testified that he met with

Baker at car washes and at the barber shop where Baker worked. Murphy further

testified that Baker drove an older-model, white, convertible Oldsmobile. Murphy

testified that he paid Baker cash, originally nine hundred dollars per ounce, but that

Baker eventually lowered the price to eight hundred and fifty dollars per ounce.

Murphy testified that he cooked the powdered cocaine he purchased from Baker into

crack cocaine for resale and that Baker knew this fact. Murphy testified that on “one

occasion” the powdered cocaine he received from Baker did not produce the expected

amount of crack cocaine and, when he complained to Baker, Baker gave him extra

powdered cocaine for free to make up for the shortage. Murphy stated that Baker was

a good supplier and that he would have continued to rely on Baker but for the March

10, 2000 arrest. Finally, Murphy testified that he also dealt with Wallace.

Regarding the price quoted above, Officers testified generally about cocaine

prices and weight conversions. In particular, one of the Officers noted that price

adjustments often reflect the nature of the relationship between a buyer and a seller,

such as history, reliability, quantity, etc. 

Baker’s attorney aggressively attacked the credibility of each of the

cooperating witnesses. The jury received the witnesses’ plea agreements and heard

of their incentives to testify and their hopes for reduced sentences. In addition,

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Baker’s attorney identified numerous instances of inconsistencies between the

cooperating witnesses’ testimony and their earlier statements to police, as well as

numerous instances of witness confusion regarding the dates of certain events.

Cherie Carter admitted that she had been described as a crack fiend, that she worked

as a prostitute for Gary Johnson, had a child with Johnson, sold crack cocaine for

Johnson, and used her own teenage son to sell crack cocaine. The jury heard, as

explained above, that an early police report described Roscoe Wallace’s drug

purchase from Baker as involving powdered cocaine on credit rather than crack

cocaine for cash. In addition, the jury heard that most of the cooperating witnesses

had committed crimes while on parole or supervised release and had lied to their

parole officers. 

The jury also heard Adrian Murphy describe confusing and contradictory

versions of the time line for his dealings with Baker. On direct examination, Murphy

stated that he was serving a 235 month sentence on an arrest that occurred in 1999.

Murphy later acknowledged that he was mistaken and that the arrest occurred on

March 10, 2000. In fact, the arrest did occur on March 10, 2000. Murphy claimed

that he met Baker in prison, in Yankton, South Dakota, in 1996. He then stated that

he started dealing with Baker in the time frame of 1998-1999 when Baker stopped

him on the street in Omaha. Next, he stated that he stopped dealing with Baker in

October of 1999. However, he later contradicted himself and claimed that his dealing

with Baker occurred in the eight to nine months prior to his March 10, 2000 arrest.

On cross examination, Baker’s attorney pressed Murphy for specific dates and

explored a possible inconsistency in Murphy’s claims regarding how often powdered

cocaine from Baker did not cook-up as expected. In addition, he emphasized the fact

that Murphy hoped to gain a reduced sentence by testifying against Baker. Regarding

specific dates, Baker’s attorney explored Murphy’s statement that dealings with

Baker ended in October of 1999 and that dealings with Baker occurred between the

summer of 1998 and the summer of 1999. Finally, Baker’s attorney challenged

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Murphy’s recollection of dates by pointing out dates when Baker was in prison and

unavailable to sell to Murphy.

Regarding Murphy’s claims that Baker supplemented Murphy’s powdered

cocaine supply for free when it failed to produce the expected amount of crack

cocaine, Baker’s attorney pointed out that Murphy claimed both that it occurred on

“one occasion” and that it occurred more than one time. Murphy explained that,

although he testified that this happened on one occasion, he did not mean it only

occurred one isolated time. Instead, Murphy explained, he meant it occurred in one

general window of time. Finally, Baker’s attorney emphasized for the jury the fact

that Murphy was serving a sentence of nearly twenty years and that by testifying for

the government, Murphy hoped the government would recommend a sentence

reduction.

At the close of the government’s case, Baker made a motion for directed

verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Ultimately, the district court reserved

ruling on the Rule 29 motion until after the jury returned a verdict. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 29(b) (“The court may reserve decision on the motion, . . ., submit the case to the

jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns

a verdict of guilty . . .”). As part of the discussion of the Rule 29 motion, the district

court also discussed at some length the issue of whether the statements conditionally

allowed under Bell would be admitted. 

The district court ruled that the government failed to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that there was a conspiracy between Johnson, Carter, Wallace and

Baker. Consequently, any testimony by Wallace and Carter concerning statements

made by Gary Johnson was stricken. The government does not appeal those

evidentiary rulings.

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The court went on to rule that the government had shown by a preponderance

of the evidence that there was a conspiracy between Baker, Wallace, and Howard.

Accordingly, the objection to co-conspirator testimony, as it related to this particular

conspiracy, was overruled. Wallace’s statements linking Baker, Wallace, Howard,

and Hoskins were not stricken. 

Finally, although the district court had not conditionally allowed any

statements by Murphy under the Bell procedure, the district court stated that the

government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a

conspiracy between Murphy and Baker. 

The jury found Baker guilty under Counts I and III (conspiracy and felon-inpossession of a firearm), but not guilty under Count II (use of a firearm in furtherance

of the conspiracy). The jurors were not asked to specify who they determined to be

Baker’s co-conspirators. The district court refused to accept the verdict as to Count

I, but accepted the verdicts as to Counts II and III. The district court declared its

decision rested on credibility determinations and specifically held that certain

testimony from cooperating witnesses was infirm as a matter of law and could not be

accepted by reasonable jurors absent corroboration. 

The district court stated:

With respect to count one, there was only a certain amount of testimony

that was relevant to whether this was a conspiracy for crack cocaine.

There was no baking soda found, no baggies, no great amount of money

that was found with respect to the defendant. The testimony of Cheri

Carter lacks credibility in all respects, until and unless is was expressly

corroborated by law enforcement. And those facts only corroborated

her relationship with Gary Johnson and his participation at some level

in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. The extent of her dealings is

doubtful, even with Gary Johnson. And the extent of her dealings with

the defendant, Mr. Baker, in this matter is without merit. 

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With respect to Roscoe Wallace, Roscoe Wallace’s credibility

concerning crack cocaine versus powder cocaine, in my opinion, is not

reliable and could not be relied on by the jury, specifically as it relates

to the difference between crack cocaine and powder cocaine in that he

hasn’t been able to keep his story straight concerning that with the

police officers. He specifically retold the police, reporting officer, that

he made a deal with Baker at Mary Queen for cocaine. The exact date

is not clear. Apparently it’s during the conspiracy. The officer indicated

that most informants specifically identify if a drug transaction has to do

with crack cocaine or not and Wallace specifically said it involved

cocaine; the officer therefore believed that it was powder cocaine, which

is appropriate under the circumstances. It was only later that Mr.

Wallace said that it was crack cocaine, and given the huge motivation to

fabricate such testimony that results from motions for downward

departure and Rule 35 by the government I think his testimony is

unreliable as a matter of law. 

With respect to Darrell Howard, Darrell Howard never bought any

cocaine from Mr. Baker. He bought cocaine from Mr. Hoskins, and the

only testimony was that he bought powder cocaine, not crack cocaine.

There very well may be another conspiracy, but its not for crack cocaine.

With respect to Adrian Murphy, Adrian Murphy, based on my

recollection of the testimony, has no idea when he was dealing with the

defendant as far as the time of this conspiracy. In fact, the time of the

conspiracy, he was thrown in jail in March of 2000, which is the very

beginning of the conspiracy that’s alleged in the government’s

superceding indictment, and it’s unlikely that it occurred during that

time frame. So I don’t think that a reasonable jury under the

circumstances could find that Adrian Murphy’s dealings with Mr. Baker

had anything to do with the conspiracy alleged herein. 

For the record, it appears that the government’s entire theory of the case

has to do with Mr. Johnson, and no one else, and all the rest of the

testimony was basically collateral to show that Mr. Baker was involved

in a conspiracy with Mr. Johnson. Mr. Murphy was basically an

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1

Although the issue of a new trial is not presently before the court, we note that

after the district court entered its judgment of acquittal, Baker’s attorney advised the

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afterthought, and given the nature of the conspiracy indictment, as it’s

drawn, it is so indefinite as to render it nearly unconstitutional with

respect to specificity. 

The government never put any evidence on that showed Mr. Baker was

in possession of any crack cocaine. The only cocaine that was found

was in the trash of a home in which he lived, and that was powder

cocaine; not crack cocaine. The cocaine found in the garage was

powder cocaine and not crack cocaine. There is no credible evidence

that Mr. Baker ever participated in a crack cocaine conspiracy. I’ll

grant there is evidence he participated in cocaine conspiracy, and the

difference between the two is critical in any analysis in this case. Given

the tenor of the prosecution, especially in closing argument, and given

the confusion with respect to what is powder and what is crack

throughout the government’s case, it is not unlikely that a jury would

confuse the two and not understand the significance of a conspiracy to

distribute crack cocaine as opposed to a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

For that reason I’m dismissing count one of the indictment.

(Emphasis added).

The government objected and shortly thereafter appealed to this court. We

remanded for sentencing on Count III and for other proceedings that the district court

might conduct as to the remaining counts. On remand, the district court requested

briefing on various issues including: (1) whether it should grant a new trial on Count

I in lieu of its judgment of acquittal, (2) whether it could decide witness credibility

as a matter of law as to either competence or reliability, (3) whether corroboration is

required to accept as credible the testimony of confidential informants or coconspirators, and (4) whether reliance on hearsay statements related to co-conspirator

conversations that the witnesses heard regarding Baker’s culpability raised

Confrontation Clause concerns. On reconsideration, after submission of the parties’

post-trial briefs, the district court allowed its earlier judgment to stand.1

 

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court that a new trial could not be granted because of double jeopardy concerns. The

government agreed and also advised the district court that the time period for granting

a new trial had passed. Had the district court entered a judgment of acquittal prior to

the jury’s return of a guilty verdict, these positions clearly would have been correct.

It is not clear to us, however, that double jeopardy concerns would have prevented a

grant of new trial when Baker still faced the risk that we might reinstate the jury’s

verdict. Nevertheless, because Baker did not request a new trial below nor raise this

issue on appeal, we cannot now address this issue. 

2

Since the court did not grant the Rule 29 motion before return of the verdict,

and because the district court’s ruling as to the existence of certain conspiracies

related only to its evidentiary rulings, we may review the entire scope of the

conspiracy, including the allegations of a conspiracy between Baker and Johnson or

Baker and Murphy. However, even limiting the conspiracy to one between Baker,

Wallace, Howard, and Hoskins, there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a conspiracy existed and that it involved

more than fifty grams of crack cocaine. 

-12-

The government appeals, arguing that the district court conducted

impermissible credibility determinations when it rejected the jury verdict as to Count

I. Baker, in turn, argues that the district court correctly rejected the jury verdict as to

Count I because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, culpability rested

on hearsay statements, and any credibility determinations by the district court were

permissible because the particular witnesses were so unreliable as to be infirm as a

matter of law. Because the evidence taken in a light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as to Count I based on a conspiracy

between Baker and Murphy, or a conspiracy between Hoskins, Wallace, Baker, and

Howard, we reverse.2

III.

A district court has very limited latitude in ruling upon a motion for

judgment of acquittal. A motion for judgment of acquittal should be

granted only where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to

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the government, is such that a reasonably minded jury must have a

reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of

the crime charged. “The evidence need not exclude every reasonable

hypothesis except guilt; the essential elements of the crime may be

proven by circumstantial as well as direct evidence.” This standard of

review applies both to appeals from the denial and the grant of a motion

for judgment of acquittal. In ruling upon a motion for judgment of

acquittal, the district court is not to weigh the evidence or assess the

credibility of witnesses. This narrowly-constricted power of review is

in contrast to the district court’s broad discretion in ruling upon a

motion for new trial.

United States v. Bennett, 956 F.2d 1476, 1481 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States

v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642, 653 (8th Cir. 1985)). Applying this standard, we find that

the district court made impermissible credibility determinations and that a reasonable

jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Baker conspired to distribute

fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. 

Regarding the issue of credibility, the district court improperly discounted the

testimony of Cheri Carter, Roscoe Wallace, Darrell Howard, and Adrian Murphy.

The fact that these witnesses testified in exchange for the possibility of reduced

sentences does not categorically make their testimony infirm or require that their

testimony be corroborated in order to support a conviction. See United States v.

Maggard, 156 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing cooperating witnesses who

testified under plea agreements, and stating, “The jury’s choice to credit the testimony

of those witnesses was within its province, and we uphold the conviction if

substantial evidence supports it.”); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217, 218 (8th

Cir. 1992) (“The jury was aware of [the witness’s] cooperation with the government,

of the potential for a reduction of his sentence in exchange for his assistance, and of

his extensive criminal record. They were free to give whatever weight they chose to

his testimony. It is the sole province of the jury to weigh the credibility of a

witness.”).

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Regarding these witnesses, an Officer did corroborate Wallace’s testimony;

Darrel Howard did testify that he purchased powdered cocaine from Baker; and Cheri

Carter specifically described how she assisted in a sale of crack cocaine from Johnson

to Baker. Baker’s counsel repeatedly made these witnesses’ potential infirmities

clear. It was the jury’s job to determine whether these witnesses could be trusted.

Similarly, the jury was free to accept Murphy’s testimony notwithstanding his

apparent confusion regarding dates. Murphy’s testimony did contain inconsistencies.

However, the government rehabilitated Murphy on the initial direct examination

when Murphy made clear that his dealings with Baker went on for eight to nine

months and ended with Murphy’s arrest. The jury heard that Baker was released from

a half-way house approximately nine months prior to Murphy’s arrest.

Inconsistencies in Murphy’s recollection of dates did not make his testimony wholly

incredible. His testimony simply did not contain the type of claims that take factfinding outside the province of the jury and permit factual determinations as a matter

of law. See United States v. Hernandez, 13 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding

testimony incredible as a matter of law where the testimony described an actual

physical impossibility under the laws of nature); United States v. Blas, 947 F.2d 1320

(7th Cir. 1991) (holding testimony incredible as a matter of law where it was

physically impossible for the witness to have observed what he or she claims to have

witnessed). 

Finally, the jury was free to accept Murphy’s testimony even though he was

arrested less than two months after the start of the period charged in Baker’s

indictment. The indictment charged a conspiracy “on or about February 1, 2000,

through on or about June 30, 2001.” Acts that occur shortly before the beginning of

the charged period are relevant. See United States v. Harris, 344 F.3d 803, 804 (8th

Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the “on or about” language in an indictment put

a defendant on notice that evidence of his commission of a crime shortly before the

time stated in the indictment could be used to support a conviction). This is

especially true when the acts continue into the period charged. Further, the

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government was not required to prove that Baker was involved in a conspiracy that

filled the entire period charged. See id. (“a variance between the date set forth in the

indictment and the proof at trial is not fatal as long as the acts alleged were committed

within the statute of limitations and before the date of the indictment.” (citing United

States v. Stuckey, 220 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2000))); see also United States v.

Heimann, 705 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Since the fraudulent scheme that the

government proved against Heimann fell within the period charged in the indictment,

we conclude that there was no fatal variance.”); United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845,

852 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Neither is time an essential element so long as the time frame

proved was within the period alleged in the indictment.”). 

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we must take the evidence in a light

most favorable to the verdict. Accordingly, we must assume that the jury chose to

accept Murphy’s claim that he dealt with Baker through March 10, 2000. Murphy

also made clear that Baker knew the repeated sales of powdered cocaine were for

cooking and redistribution as crack cocaine. In fact, Murphy made clear that Baker

accommodated Murphy, a buyer of substantial quantities, by discounting his price

and by giving additional powdered cocaine to make up for a shortage in the quantity

of crack cocaine produced.

Other testimony, accepted as credible and viewed in a light most favorable to

the jury’s verdict, showed that Baker, with Hoskins, was involved in the sale and

purchase of one half kilogram quantities of powdered cocaine to and from Howard,

that Baker sold a resale quantity of crack cocaine to Wallace, that Hoskins cooperated

with Baker to facilitate the sale to Wallace, and that Baker, on at least one occasion,

received two ounces–more than fifty grams–of crack cocaine from Johnson. Finally,

the discovery of baggies with cocaine residue and wrappers for kilogram bricks of

cocaine in Baker’s garage reinforce this testimony. 

As the foregoing makes clear, this is not the case of an isolated sale or isolated,

uncorroborated testimony about a defendant’s association with substantial quantities

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of drugs or particular co-conspirators. The jury easily could have found that the

evidence of powdered cocaine sales, the cocaine packaging found in Baker’s garage,

and evidence of a crack cocaine sale to Wallace, tended to make each cooperating

witness’s testimony more credible than it might have been had any one of the

witness’s testimony been the only evidence against Baker.

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for reinstatement of

the jury’s verdict on Count I and for sentencing on Count I.

______________________________

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