Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01970/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01970-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmy Dale Barrett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

JIMMY DALE BARRETT, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci~uit 

JAN 2 7 1988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

86-1970 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 86-CR-24-B) 

Phil Frazier of Frazier, Smith & Phillips, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Susan w. Pennington, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. 

Graham, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1970 Document: 01019290420 Date Filed: 01/27/1988 Page: 1 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a defendant who 

forges an endorsement on a treasury check written for $500 or less 

must be prosecuted for a misdemeanor under 18 u.s.c. § 510, or may 

be prosecuted for a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 495, which by longstanding judicial construction proscribes the same conduct. 

Defendant, Jimmy Dale Barrett, was convicted of forging and 

uttering (using as a medium of payment) a treasury check in the 

amount of $236.38, in violation of § 495, and was sentenced to six 

years in prison. Defendant then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 

correct this sentence. The district court denied the motion. 

On appeal defendant contends that the later and more specific 

enactment of 18 u.s.c. § 510, 1 which treats the forgery of a 

1 Section 510 provides: 

"(a) Whoever, with intent to defraud--

(1) falsely makes or forges any endorsement or 

signature on a Treasury check or bond or security 

of the United States; or 

(2) passes, utters, or publishes, or attempts 

to pass, utter, or publish, any Treasury check or 

bond or security of the United States bearing a 

falsely made or forged endorsement or signature 

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 

not more than ten years, or both. 

(b) Whoever, with knowledge that such Treasury 

check or bond or security of the United States is stolen 

or bears a falsely made or forged endorsement or 

signature buys, sells, exchanges, receives, delivers, 

retains, or conceals any such Treasury check or bond or 

security of the United States that in fact is stolen or 

bears a forged or falsely made endorsement or signature 

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not 

more than ten years, or both. 

(C) If 

or security 

value, if 

the face value of the Treasury check or bond 

of the United States or the aggregate face 

more than one Treasury check or bond or 

Continued to next 

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page 

Appellate Case: 86-1970 Document: 01019290420 Date Filed: 01/27/1988 Page: 2 
treasury check written for $500 or less as a misdemeanor, 

supersedes and, insofar as it applies to treasury checks, repeals 

by implication the earlier and more general provisions of 18 

U.S.C. § 495, 2 which treats all forgeries of written instruments 

as felonies.3 Foflowing the lead of four other circuits, we 

reject defendant's argument and affirm. See United States v. 

Cavada, 821 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 304 

(1987); Edwards v. United States, 814 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1986); 

United States v. Jackson, 805 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting 

claim of implied repeal of § 495 by 18 U.S.C. § 641 and discussing 

extensively the relationship between §§ 495 and 510), cert. 

denied, 107 S. Ct. 1384 (1987); United States v. Edmonson, 792 

F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 s. Ct. 892 (1987). 

Courts are reluctant to find repeal by implication even when 

a later statute is not entirely harmonious with an earlier one. 

Watts v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1981). If two statutes 

Continued from previous page 

2 

security of the United States, does not exceed $500, in 

any of the above-mentioned offenses, the penalty shall 

be a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for 

not more than one year, or both." 

Section 495 states: 

"Whoever falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits 

any deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, 

receipt, contract, or other writing, for the purpose of 

obtaining or receiving, or of enabling any other person, 

either directly or indirectly, to obtain or receive from 

the United States or any officers or agents thereof, any 

sum of money ... [s]hall be fined not more than $1,000 

or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 

3 The statutory predecessor to § 495 was construed to apply to 

the forgery of an endorsement on a treasury check. Prussian v. 

United States, 282 U.S. 675, 679-80 (1931). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1970 Document: 01019290420 Date Filed: 01/27/1988 Page: 3 
conflict somewhat, a court must if possible read them so as to 

give effect to both, unless the text or legislative history of the 

later statute shows that Congress intended to repeal the earlier 

and simply failed to do so expressly. Id. at 267. 

The leading Cdse discussing repeal by implication is United 

States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). There the defendant 

was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), a statute which carried a 

maximum five-year prison term and prohibited receipt by convicted 

felons of firearms that had traveled in interstate commerce. A 

later-enacted statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), prohibited the same 

conduct but permitted only a maximum two-year term. The Supreme 

Court affirmed the conviction under the more stringent statute, 

holding that the two statutes could coexist: 

"[I]t is 'not enough to show that the two statutes 

produce differing results when applied to the same 

factual situation.' Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 

426 u.s. 148, 155 (1976). Rather, the legislative 

intent to repeal must be manifest in the 'positive 

repugnancy between the provisions.' United States v. 

Borden Co., 308 u.s. 188, 199 (1934)." 

442 u.s. at 122. 

In the instant case, no such positive repugnancy exists. 

Many other cases have held that a prosecutor may act under either 

of two overlapping statutes so long as there is no express 

congressional intent to the contrary. This is so, as here, even 

when the later statute is specific and the earlier a general 

criminal statute. See Jackson, 805 F.2d at 460; United States v. 

Largo, 775 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (lOth Cir. 1985) (per curiam) 

(upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 641 for embezzling Indian 

Self-Determination and Education Assistance Funds despite more 

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Appellate Case: 86-1970 Document: 01019290420 Date Filed: 01/27/1988 Page: 4 
specific prohibition in 28 u.s.c. § 450(d) against same act), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986); United States v. Fern, 696 

F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding conviction under 18 

U.S.C. § 1001 for false statement to revenue agent despite 

specific prohibition of false statement to Internal Revenue 

Service in 26 u.s.c. § 7207); United States v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 

1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding convictions under Migratory 

Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 and 707(b) despite laterenacted, more specific provision in Bald and Golden Eagle 

Protection Act, 16 u.s.c. § 668(a)); United States v. Radetsky, 

535 F.2d 556, 567-68 (lOth Cir.) (upholding convictions under 18 

U.S.C. § 1001 for false statement in Medicare claims despite more 

specific later-enacted prohibitions in 42 u.s.c. § 408), cert. 

denied, 429 u.s. 820 (1976). 

The legislative history of § 510 does not disclose any 

congressional intent to repeal the overlapping provisions of 

§ 495. The history shows that Congress' purpose in enacting § 510 

was to close a loophole in § 495 inapplicable to our case. The 

Senate Report states: 

"Because section 495 was not drafted to deal with 

obligations of the United States, many of the variations 

of offenses involved with the forgery of obligations are 

not included within that section and cannot otherwise be 

prosecuted under Federal law. For example, it is 

currently possible for a thief to steal a Treasury check 

endorsed by a payee, endorse his own name and obtain the 

proceeds, and not violate section 495. In addition, it 

is possible for a thief to steal one or more government 

checks or bonds from the rightful owner and sell them to 

a middle man and not violation [sic] section 495. 

Section 

penalize whoever 

511 [renumbered 510(b)] would also 

buys, sells, exchanges, receives, 

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Appellate Case: 86-1970 Document: 01019290420 Date Filed: 01/27/1988 Page: 5 
' i 

delivers, retains, or conceals a stolen United States 

security or one that bears a forged endorsement or 

signature knowing that the security is stolen or bears 

such an endorsement." 

s. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-72 (1983), reprinted in 

1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3512-13. This statement 

shows that Congress was aware of § 495 when enacting § 510; it 

discloses no congressional purpose to repeal all or part of § 495. 

Further, to give full effect to both statutes and to allow 

prosecution under the one imposing the stiffer penalty does not 

violate the so-called rule of lenity. That rule states that when 

there is ambiguity in a criminal statute requiring judicial 

interpretation, a court must resolve that ambiguity in favor of 

lenity. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 121. No such ambiguity exists 

here concerning either § 495 or § 510. Each statute plainly 

applies to defendants• criminal acts. See Cavada, 821 F.2d at 

1048 (finding rule of lenity inapplicable); Jackson, 805 F.2d at 

465 (same); Edmonson, 792 F.2d at 1498 (same). 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the ruling of the 

district court. 

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