Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02174/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02174-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom L. Carey
Respondent
Kenneth Cray
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH CRAY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-2174 FCD GGH P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden, ORDER &

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, represented by appointed counsel, is proceeding on a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 18, 2006, respondent’s April 19, 2006

motion to dismiss the first amended petition came on for hearing. In the opposition to the motion

to dismiss, petitioner did not oppose respondent’s motion to stay discovery, pending resolution of

the motion to dismiss, and the filing of an answer, if it is thereafter ordered. At the hearing,

Heather MacKay appeared for petitioner, and Heather Heckler represented respondent. 

First Amended Petition

Petitioner was convicted of first degree felony murder, following a jury trial in

1977, for which he was sentenced, on January 16, 1998, to an indeterminate life sentence of

seven years to life. First Amended Petition (FAP), pp. 2, 9-10. In petitioner’s first amended

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 This was the second time Governor Davis reversed the BPT’s decision to parole 1

petitioner, the earlier BPT decision having occurred at the tenth suitability hearing in September,

2001. FAP, pp. 15-16. 

2

petition, filed on March 23, 2006, he challenges the governor’s March 20, 2003, administrative

decision, reversing the California Board of Prison Terms (BPT) October 21, 2002, decision to

grant petitioner parole at his eleventh subsequent parole suitability hearing. Petitioner sets forth 1

the following as the grounds for his challenge to the governor’s decision: 1) California life

prisoners have a liberty interest in parole protected by due process under clearly established

United States Supreme Court decisions; 2) petitioner was denied due process because the

governor failed to conduct an unbiased, individualized, non-arbitrary review; 3) petitioner was

denied due process because the criteria for determining whether a commitment offense is

“particularly egregious” are so vague as to allow meaningless and arbitrary determinations, and

there is not some reliable evidence that petitioner’s commitment offense currently makes him a

risk to public safety if released; 4) petitioner was denied due process because there is not some

reliable evidence that his juvenile history currently makes a risk to public safety if released; 5)

petitioner was denied due process because there is not some reliable evidence that his behavior

while in prison currently makes him a risk to public safety if released; 6) petitioner was denied

due process because there is not some reliable evidence that petitioner will pose a risk to public

safety unless he participates in further therapeutic programs; 7) petitioner was not afforded due

process because there is not some reliable evidence that petitioner’s parole plans are so

insufficient as to make him currently a risk to public safety if released; 8) the retroactive

application by the governor to petitioner of determinate sentencing law policies, criteria and

philosophy violates the prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws. FAP, pp. 21-48.

Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that this court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction because the state supreme court has made clear that California’s parole

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

scheme does not give rise to a federally protected liberty interest in parole. Motion to Dismiss

(MTD), pp. 1, 3-4. Respondent further argues that even if the court finds that a liberty interest

exists that petitioner does not contest that he has received all the process due him under clearly

established Supreme Court authority. MTD, p. 4.

Discussion

At the outset, it must be pointed out that respondent confuses the subject matter

jurisdiction of the court with failure to state a cognizable claim. Clearly, the court has subject

matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s habeas corpus claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal

question jurisdiction exists if a complaint (or petition) purports to state a claim under federal law,

regardless of the validity of the claim. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 83 S. Ct. 1441, 1444

(1963). Only if the stated federal claim is so wholly insubstantial that even a preliminary review

of the merits is not required does the federal court not have jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 66 S. Ct. 773 (1946). It is not every arguably failed claim that deprives the district court of

jurisdiction. Here, petitioner properly invoked § 2254 for the basis of his habeas claim. His

contentions that he was denied due process by Governor Davis’ reversal of the BPT’s finding of

his suitability for parole is not so insubstantial as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. 

Respondent contends that California’s parole statute, Cal. Penal Code § 3041,

does not give rise to a federal liberty interest. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) provides that an

application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless adjudication of the claim in state

court resulted in a decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court authority. 

For the following reasons, the court finds that petitioner has a clearly established

liberty interest in parole. Although due process does not require the existence of a parole

scheme, California has established one. Not all of the myriad procedures of the parole setting

system are pertinent here. The court sets forth that part of the statutory section that is pertinent:

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

(a) In the case of any prisoner sentenced pursuant to any provision of law, other

than Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, the Board 

of Prison Terms shall meet with each inmate during the third year of 

incarceration for the purposes of reviewing the inmate’s file, making 

recommendations, and documenting activities and conduct pertinent to granting 

or withholding postconviction credit. One year prior to the inmate’s minimum 

eligible parole release date a panel consisting of at least two commissioners of

the Board of Prison Terms shall again meet with the inmate and shall normally 

set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5. The panel shall consist 

solely of commissioners or deputy commissioners from the Board of Prison

Terms.

The release date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform terms for 

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public, 

and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial Council may 

issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates. The board shall establish criteria for the setting of parole release dates and 

in doing so shall consider the number of victims of the crime for which the 

prisoner was sentenced and other factors in mitigation or aggravation of the 

crime. 

Cal. Penal Code § 3041.

In compliance with the statutory mandate, the Board of Prison Terms issued

regulations which guide it in finding prisoners convicted of life offenses with parole eligibility

for parole setting. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402 sets forth the criteria for determining whether

an inmate is suitable for parole. Section 2402(a) provides that regardless of the length of time

served, a prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel

the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. 

Section 2402(c) sets forth the circumstances tending to show unsuitability. The

court lists those of significance here:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style manner.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or 

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted 

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental 

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in 

prison or jail.

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to indicate suitability:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to the victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for the Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome . . .

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Both parties have noted that Sass was argued before the Ninth Circuit on March 16, 2

2006. 

 In Board of Pardons v. Allen, supra, at 373, 107 S. Ct at 2418, the Supreme Court noted 3

the “two major holdings” of Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 11, 99 S. Ct.

2100. 2106 (1979), “that the presence of a parole system itself does not give rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release” but that the Nebraska statute at issue

“did create ‘an expectation of parole’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” In Greenholtz, “the

mandatory language and the structure of the Nebraska statute ....created an ‘expectancy of

release,’ which is a liberty interest entitled to such [due process] protection.” Allen, at 372, 107

S. Ct. at 2417.

6

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.

The Ninth Circuit has held that California’s parole scheme gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir.

2003). The California Supreme Court more recently found that Cal. Penal Code 

§ 3041 is not mandatory and does not create a presumption that parole will be granted. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1084, 1087-88 (2005). 

Respondent relies in part on a decision by a district judge of this court finding that

the California parole scheme for indeterminate sentences does not create a federal liberty interest. 

Sass v. Cal. Board of Prison Terms, supra, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975. In Sass, Judge England found 2

that no federal liberty interest was created because the wording of the parole statute, Cal. Penal

Code 3041(a) (“a panel shall normally set a release date..) and § 3041(b) (“the panel...shall set a

release date....”) was insufficiently mandatory. Judge England relied heavily on In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1098, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 443 (2005). However, even assuming

that the “old” Supreme Court paradigm regarding creation of a liberty interest (mandatory act and

underlying factual predicates) remains the analytical framework in which to judge the creation of

right-to-parole liberty interests, see e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378, 107 S.Ct. 3

2415, 2421(1987) (mandatory language in a parole statute creates a “presumption of release” and

gives rise to a liberty interest), California law, both before and after Dannenberg finds that the

California parole scheme for indeterminate offenses does create a liberty interest. 

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Dannenberg did find that California prisoners had no liberty interest in a uniform parole 4

date, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098 (n.18), 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 443 (citing Rosenkrantz); however, this is a

7

In sum, the governing statute provides that the Board must grant

parole unless it determines that public safety requires a lengthier

period of incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of

the offense underlying the conviction. (Pen.Code, § 3041, subd.

(b).) And as set forth in the governing regulations, the Board must

set a parole date for a prisoner unless it finds, in the exercise of its

judgment after considering the circumstances enumerated in

section 2402 of the regulations, that the prisoner is unsuitable for

parole. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2401.) Accordingly, parole

applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be

granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its

discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the

circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.

In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 654, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 138 (2002) (emphasis added).

Respondent argues that in Rosenkrantz, the state supreme court’s holding is

limited to a finding that parole decisions are “‘a protected liberty interest in the California due

process clause’”; thereby contending that the protected liberty interest identified therein is not

one that arises under the federal constitution. MTD, p. 8; id., at 660. It is difficult to conceive of

words which mirror the requirements of the Allen mandatory-act-in light-of-satisfied-factualpredicates paradigm more than the emphasized words of Rosenkrantz. Indeed, Allen, speaking

explicitly to federal Due Process Clause protections, and Rosenkrantz use the same terminology,

i.e. “presumption” of release and “expectation” of release. These are the words of federal liberty

interest creation. It is not material that great discretion is vested within the administrative agency

granting parole. Allen supra. See also the post-Dannenberg case of In re DeLuna,126 Cal. App.

4th 585, 591, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643, 647 (2005): 

Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (b) requires the Board to “set

a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for

this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at

this meeting.” This statute creates a conditional liberty interest for

a prospective parolee. (Cf. Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.

661, 128 Cal. Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174; McQuillion v. Duncan

(9th Cir.2002) 306 F.3d 895, 901-902.) (emphasis added)4

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

far cry from holding that the parole scheme as a whole does not create a conditional liberty

interest. Petitioner argues that Dannenberg is not inconsistent with Rosenkrantz, contending that

the Dannenberg court dealt with a discrete issue and “was not faced with any dispute regarding

the existence of a due process liberty interest[]” under the state or federal constitutions. Opp., p.

6.

8

The undersigned can only find that California law is in disarray on the subject of

liberty interest created by the California parole statutes. Dannenberg did not overrule

Rosenkrantz, and implied overrulings are extremely disfavored. Scheiding v. Gen. Motors, 22

Cal. 4th 471, 478, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 346 (2000). Indeed, as the undersigned noted at the

hearing, California appellate court cases post- Dannenberg continue to find a liberty interest in

California’s state parole scheme, citing Rosenkrantz. See e.g., In re DeLuna, supra, 126 Cal.

App.4th 585, 24 Cal. Rptr. 643; see also, In re Scott, 133 Cal. App.4th 573, 590, 34 Cal. Rptr.

905 (Cal. App.1st Dist. 2005) (noting, inter alia, that the governor’s decision reversing a BPT

decision in favor of parole “is subject to judicial review pursuant to the ‘some evidence’ standard

set forth in Rosenkrantz....”). Therefore, Biggs should not, and cannot, be cast aside based on the

ambiguities in California law unless the Ninth Circuit so holds. Accordingly, respondent’s

motion to dismiss on grounds that petitioner does not have a liberty interest parole should be

denied. 

Respondent also argues that the California parole scheme does not give rise to a

federal liberty interest under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-85, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). 

MTD, pp. 17-19. Sandin requires a determination of whether there is a state-created liberty

interest giving rise to federal due process protections by evaluating whether an action imposes a

“significant and atypical hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin, at 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293. Respondent correctly observes that the Ninth Circuit has

rejected the Sandin analysis in the parole context, limiting its applicability to cases that involve

internal prison disciplinary regulations, citing McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (2002),

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 However, in the recent Supreme Court decision respondent cites as a signal of the 5

possibility of an expansion of the application of a Sandin analysis to a parole context, Wilkinson

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394 (2005), respondent concedes that the case

involves a conditions of confinement issue and does not address parole release. MTD, p. 18. 

 Petitioner also made this observation. Opp., p. 27. 6

9

arguing that, nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not so delimited Sandin; that the Ninth Circuit 5

has “seemed to consider” both Greenholtz and Sandin, in the context of a review of federal

prisoners’ applications for a discretionary one-year sentence reduction, citing Jacks v. Crabtree,

114 F.3d 983, 986 n.4 (9 Cir. 1997); and that other circuits have applied Sandin in different th

types of release decisions. 

None of this, however, mitigates this court’s obligation to follow the binding

authority of the Ninth Circuit which, as respondent has noted, has explicitly rejected a Sandin

analysis in the parole context. (The undersigned notes, further, that in Sass, a case on which

respondent relies, the court explicitly found that Sandin was not applicable in the context of

considering a liberty interest in parole. See Sass, supra, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 980). 

6

Finally, respondent contends that the only clearly established Supreme Court

authority speaking to the process to which a petitioner is due when there is a federal liberty

interest in parole is an opportunity to be heard be afforded that a petitioner be advised of the

reasons for his or her not having been found suitable for parole. MTD, p. 21, citing Greenholtz,

442 U.S. 1, 16, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2108 (1979). Petitioner responds that such an argument

misconstrues the basis of his challenge which is that the contention that the governor violated his

constitutional rights by basing his decision on unchangeable facts with regard to the offense for

which petitioner was convicted, his pre-offense history, and disciplinary violations in the distant

past. Opp., p. 30. He contends, moreover, that the governor was not unbiased in his decision

making and does not provide some evidence that petitioner is currently dangerous. Petitioner

argues that the Ninth Circuit addressed similar issues in Biggs, wherein, although the court found

the reliance by the BPT on the gravity of the offense and pre-imprisonment conduct could

initially justify a denial of parole, a repeated denial on only those same grounds, in the case of a

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

petitioner with continuing “exemplary behavior” and “evidence of rehabilitation,” could

implicate due process: “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the

circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment...could result in a due process

violation.” Biggs v. Terhune, supra, 334 F.3d at 916-917. Petitioner also quotes the

undersigned at length in an excerpt from Irons v. Warden, 358 F. Supp.2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal.

2005). Opp., p. 31. In that instance, the court granted petitioner’s application where the BPT

continued to deny parole based on factors that could never change, effectively transmuting the

sentence into one of life without the possibility of parole. Whether petitioner herein has been

denied due process or not cannot yet be determined, but respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the issues raised herein do not implicate due process should be denied.

Respondent should be directed to file an answer addressing the merits of

petitioner’s claims. Respondent’s motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to

dismiss and the filing of an answer, if required, a motion expressly unopposed by petitioner, will

be granted.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s April 19, 2006 motion to stay discovery pending resolution of

the motion to dismiss and, if thereafter required, the filing of an answer, which petitioner did not

oppose, is granted;

2. Upon adoption of these Findings and Recommendations, should that occur,

and after the filing of an answer by respondent, petitioner may re-notice the motion for discovery,

originally filed on March 9, 2006, within ten (10) days of the filing of an answer.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss, filed on April 19,

2006, be denied and respondent be directed to file an answer within thirty days of adoption of

these Findings and Recommendations, should that occur.

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 6/26/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

cray2174.mtd

Case 2:05-cv-02174-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 06/26/06 Page 11 of 11