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Parties Involved:
B B & L, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 3, 1995 Decided April 25, 1995

No. 93-1479

B B & L, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Petition for Review of an Decision of the

National Labor Relations Board

-

Patrick W. Ritchey argued the cause for the petitioner. On brief was Brooke Bashore-Smith. Peter

D. Post entered an appearance.

Joseph J. Jablonski, Jr., Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for the

respondent. On brief were Linda R. Sher, Acting Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Howard E. Perlstein, Deputy Assistant General Counsel,

National Labor Relations Board.

Before WILLIAMS, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Circuit Judge TATEL filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

PER CURIAM: B B & L, Inc. (B B & L) petitions for review of an order of the National Labor

Relations Board (NLRB or Board) holding that B B & L violated sections 8(a)(1), (5) and 2(6), (7)

of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5) and 152(6), (7), by refusing to

bargain with the Drivers and Employees of the Petroleum Industry, Local Union No. 273 a/w

InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (Union) after the Union had been certified asthe

exclusive bargaining representative of B B & L's full-time and regular part-time truck drivers at its

Coraopolis, Pennsylvania terminal. Specifically, B B & L objects to the Board's conclusion that a

part-time, on-call truck driver wasineligible to vote in the union certification election because he had

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not worked an average of four hours per week during the quarter preceding the election eligibility

date. The Board has cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. As more fully set out below, we

conclude that the Board did notand cannotjustify its rigid adherence to the "four-hour rule" in

light of its past flexible treatment ofsimilarly situated employees. Accordingly, we grant the Union's

petition for review and deny the Board's cross-petition for enforcement.

I.

In early May 1992, B B & L and the Union entered into a stipulated election agreement to

determine whether the Union would represent B B & L's full-time and regular part-time Coraopolis

truck drivers. The agreement provided for mail-in voting by eligible drivers employed during the

payroll period ending May 2, 1992. Twelve ballots were cast and of the eleven counted six favored

Union representation, while five opposed it. The twelfth ballot, submitted by Kenneth Musgrave, B

B & L's sole part-time driver, was challenged by the Union on the ground that he worked so few

hours in the quarter preceding the election that he lacked sufficient interest in the bargaining unit to

vote in the representation election. Because Musgrave's vote could determine the election's outcome,

the Board's regional director began an investigation of Musgrave's eligibility and referred the matter

for hearing.

A hearing was held on July 28, 1992 and on September 10, 1992 the hearing officer issued

a report finding that Musgrave was an on-call employee and that he failed to satisfy the Board's

eligibility test under which " "on-call' employees are eligible to vote if they share a community of

interest with the other bargaining unit employees and average four hours of work per week in the

quarter preceding the election." Joint Appendix (JA) 291 (citations omitted). While assuming that

Musgrave otherwise shared a community ofinterest, the hearing officerrecommended that the Board

sustain the Union's challenge to Musgrave's ballot and certify the Union because Musgrave had

averaged fewer than four hours of work per week in the first quarter of 1992, the last full quarter

before the election.

By order dated March 1, 1993, the Board adopted the hearing officer'srecommendations and

findings, while noting she had mischaracterized Board precedent asrequiring that Musgrave average

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1The Board determined that "[t]his inadvertent error does not affect the result." JA 330 n.1. 

2Refusing to bargain and thereby engendering an unfair labor practice complaint is the standard

route to challenge a certification order, which is not subject to direct review. See, e.g., St.

Margaret Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1151 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993); Pony Express

Courier, Corp. v. NLRB, 981 F.2d 358, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2441

(1993); Twin City Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 1557, 1559 n.2 (6th Cir. 1989); Friendly Ice

Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 574 n.3 (1st Cir. 1983). 

four hours of work per week in the quarter preceding the election rather than in the quarter preceding

the eligibility date.1

Despite the certification order, B B & L refused to bargain with the Union, claiming the

certification wasinvalid because Musgrave's ballot should have been counted. As a result, the Union

filed an unfair labor practice charge against B B & L.2In an order dated July 19, 1993 the Board

granted summary judgment in the Union's favor, concluding that B B & L raised no new ground or

special circumstance that warranted reexamination of the certification decision and that, because the

Union had been properly certified, B B & L committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain

with it. B B & L admits its refusal to bargain but petitions for review of the summary judgment on

the ground that Musgrave's disqualification was arbitrary.

II.

The court has jurisdiction over B B & L's petition for review under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) and

over the Board's cross-application for enforcement under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Board exercises

broad discretion when determining the composition of the bargaining unit under 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).

See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947). We will uphold the Board's

exercise of discretion unless its action is unreasonable, arbitrary or unsupported by the evidence.

NLRB v. Mar Salle, Inc., 425 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1970); NLRB v. L & B Cooling, Inc., 757

F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1985); Justak Bros. & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1079 (7th Cir. 1981);

Kendall College v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 216, 219 (7th Cir. 1978). We must therefore uphold a Board

decision if it is rational and in accord with past precedent. International Union of Elec., Radio &

Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 604 F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, the Board cannot

ignore its own relevant precedent but must explain why it is not controlling. Cleveland Constr. Co.

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3Continuity and regularity of employment are two of the factors considered in determining

community of interest; others include the employee's duties, supervision and pay. See Tri-State

Transp. Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 356, 356-57 (1988); Pat's Blue Ribbons & Trophies, 286 N.L.R.B.

918, 918-19 (1987). In this regard, the hearing officer misstated the formula by requiring that the

challenged employee "share a community of interest with the other bargaining unit employees and

average four hours of work per week in the quarter preceding the election." JA 291 (emphasis

added). The Board's statement is different, with the four-hour requirement used to demonstrate

the employee's community of interest. 

v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The Board has long applied a general rule that temporary, seasonal or contingent employees

are not part of a unit comprised of regular and part-time employees, and therefore are not eligible to

vote in a representation election, unless they average four or more hours of work per week during

the quarter preceding the election eligibility date. See Saratoga County Chapter NYSARC, Inc., 314

N.L.R.B. 609, 609 (1994); Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 306 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1992), enforced, 2

F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1993); V.I.P. Movers, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 14, 14-15 (1977); Davison-Paxon Co.,

185 N.L.R.B. 21 (1970); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 966, 969 (1969); May Dep't

Stores Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 514, 517 (1969). The parties agree that if the Board's four-hour formula

is strictly applied, Musgrave's vote must be discounted. Nevertheless, B B & L maintains the

mechanical application of the formula here was inconsistent with the agency's own precedent and

must therefore be reversed. We agree.

The four-hour formula is based on the rational premise that employees who work fewer than

four hours per week generally lack sufficient continuity and regularity of employment to establish

community of interest with other unit employees. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 306 N.L.R.B. at 296;

Saratoga, 314 N.L.R.B. at 609.3 Further, by circumscribing the period relevant to eligibility (namely,

the last full quarter before the eligibility date), the formula makes a Board's eligibility determinations

more predictable. On the other hand, while the Board has expressly found the formula a reliable test

for on- call employees, Trump Taj Mahal, 306 N.L.R.B. at 295, it has also emphasized that "no single

eligibility formula must be used in all cases, [although] the [four-hour] formula is the one most

frequently used, absent a showing of special circumstances." Saratoga, 314 N.L.R.B. at 609.

Accordingly, the Board has "devised an inclusivenot exclusiveeligibility formula to permit

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optimum employee enfranchisement and free choice, without enfranchising individuals with no real

continuing interest in the terms and conditions of employment offered by the employer." Trump Taj

Mahal, 306 N.L.R.B. at 296. Pursuing its goal of reasonable inclusiveness, the Board has

acknowledged an "obligation to tailor [its] general eligibility formulas to the particular facts of the

case," American Zoetrope Prods., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1973), and has done so repeatedly

with the four-hour formula.

For example, in Medion, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1972), when confronted with an irregular

pattern of employment, the Board formulated special eligibility requirements for film production

employees. The Board declined to apply the four-hour rule and instead found eligible "all employees

who were employed by the Employer on at least two productions for a minimum of 5 working days

during the year preceding the [election decision]." Id. at 1014. The following year, the Board found

even the Medion standard too rigorous for a unit of employees working primarily in television

commercial production and modified it to require only that an employee had worked on two

productions, regardless of the actual number of days worked. American Zoetrope Prods., Inc., 207

N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1973). In both cases, the Board recognized its "responsibility to devise an

eligibility formula which will protect and give full effect to the voting rights of those employees who

have a reasonable expectancy of further employment with the Employer." Id. at 622; Medion, 200

N.L.R.B. at 1014.

More instructive here are Board decisions addressing the eligibility of newly hired employees

and those on leave during the quarter preceding the eligibility date. In Stockham Valve & Fittings,

Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 217, 218-19 (1976), the Board found that employees hired less than one month

before the election were eligible to vote based on the number of hoursthey had worked between their

dates of hire and the election. Later, in Pat's Blue Ribbons & Trophies, 286 N.L.R.B. 918 (1987),

the Board found two employees eligible to vote despite not having averaged four hours of work per

week during the quarter preceding the election. One employee, hired approximately one month

before the end of the relevant quarter, was found eligible based in part on the fact that she worked

73 hours during that month. Id. at 918-19. The second employee, who was hired long before the

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4No one disputes the adequacy here of other factors considered in determining community of

interest. See supra note 3. 

election but was on an extended maternity leave until the last month of the relevant quarter, was also

found eligible, based on her 43 hours' work during the final month of the quarter and on the hours

she had worked in the two months before her leave. Id. at 919 & n.9. Similarly, when faced with an

employee who was on leave on both the eligibility date and the election date, the Board found "that

the appropriate standard is whether [the employee] regularly averaged 4 hours or more of work per

week during the quarter prior to her leave." Northern California Visiting Nurses Ass'n., 299

N.L.R.B. 980, 980 (1990). Finally, and perhaps most telling here, in Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 310

N.L.R.B. 538 (1993), the Board found an on-call employee eligible to vote in a union election

because she worked "11.5 hours in the week prior to the eligibility date and averaged over 7 hours

weekly between the eligibility and election dates," yielding a "projected average[ ] of more than 4

hours per week during the calendar quarter prior to the eligibility date." Id. at 538 n.3.

Here, Musgrave was hired in August 1991 to replace Charles Troutman who had earlier

announced his intent to retire before April 1, 1992 and who in fact retired on March 31, 1992.

Troutman, an on-call driver, worked more than the requisite four-hour weekly average during each

of the last two quarters before hisretirement, including the first quarter of 1992. In the quarter after

Troutman retiredthe quarter during which the election took placeMusgrave too averaged more

than four hours per week. In other words, Musgrave was hired to fill a position that consistently

required more than the minimum four-hour weekly average during a given quarter and he met that

minimum once his predecessor retired and he became, as intended, the terminal's sole on-call driver.

Thus, there can be little question that Musgrave's employment was continuous and regular, in that

it required more than four hours of work per week on average, and that Musgrave therefore shared

a community of interest with the other Coraopolis drivers.4It is only because he was hired in

anticipation of Troutman's retirementand consequently worked alongside Troutman until April

1that he averaged fewer than four hours during the first quarter of 1992, the only period examined

by the Board. This is precisely the kind of "special circumstance" that the Board has previously found

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5Given the Board's insistence on "inclusive" eligibility criteria, its refusal in Trump Taj Mahal

to determine community of interest by percentage of days or weeks, rather than average hours,

worked and its focus in Beverly Enters. and Stockham Valve on the period between the eligibility

date and the election, the Board could not, as the dissent suggests, find Musgrave ineligible on the

ground that he worked only one day between Troutman's retirement on April 1 and the eligibility

date of May 2. The employee found eligible in Beverly Enters. worked 11.5 hours in the week

before the eligibility date and an average of 7 hours weekly between the eligibility date and the

election; Musgrave worked 10 hours in the week before the eligibility date and an average of

about 9 hours weekly between the eligibility date and the election. That Musgrave worked only

one day between April 1 and the eligibility date is of no significance as the Board appears never to

have used the period between a relevant change of circumstance and the eligibility date as a basis

for excluding workers. 

6

In its brief, the Board was not responsive on this issue. Regarding new hires, the Board

stated: "The Court should also reject the Company's implicit attempt to have this Court measure

Musgrave's voter eligibility as if he were a newly hired employee. Simply put, as the Company

concedes, Musgrave was not a newly hired employeehe became an on-call employee in August

requiresflexible application of the four-hour formula, consistent with its stated goal of "permit[ting]

optimum employee enfranchisement and free choice, without enfranchising individuals with no real

continuing interest in the terms and conditions of employment offered by the employer." Trump Taj

Mahal, 306 N.L.R.B. at 296. Had the Board followed precedent and projected Musgrave's quarterly

work record based on the hours worked from that time until the election, as it has for other

employees prevented from working their full normal hours during the relevant quarter, Musgrave

would have been deemed eligible to vote under the Board's four-hour formula. The Board's failure

to do so is inexplicable.5

In sum, the Board has deviated from its usualformula, which focuses on the employee's work

pattern in the quarter preceding the eligibility date, in cases involving pregnant workers on leave,

newly hired workers and workersin an industrywith irregular employment patterns. While the Board

is entitled to make such exceptions, it cannot do so arbitrarily. The Board is required to explain the

principle or principlessupporting its exceptions and it has: In each instance, the Board has suggested

that special circumstances made its usual formula an inaccurate indicator of the employee's

"expectancy of" or "continuing" or "projected" community of interest with other employees. Based

on this principlethe only principle we can find motivating the exceptionswe do not see any

rational basis for treating Musgrave differently from new hires and the temporarily separated

employee in Beverly Enters.6 We therefore conclude that the decision to set aside Musgrave's vote

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1991...." NLRB Brief at 20 (footnote omitted). The Board was no more expansive in discussing

temporary, laid-off or seasonal employees: "Musgrave was neither a temporary, nor a laid-off,

nor a seasonal employee. Rather, he was a casual or on-call driver who had worked for a

non-seasonal employer since August 1991." Id. at 22. In each case, the Board simply noted that

Musgrave's status differs from that of other employees who have been treated differently, without

explaining why the difference is significant. 

was arbitrary. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, reversing that decision, and deny the

cross-petition for enforcement.

So ordered.

TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that the Board failed

to explain its decision adequately, and thus concur with the majority's denial of the Board's petition

for enforcement. But because I think it is possible for the Board to set forth a rational and consistent

explanation for not counting Musgrave's ballot, I would remand to the Board for further explanation.

The Board's main flaw was not that it improperly applied the law, but that it failed to explain

why it did not follow the flexible approach it hastaken in some past cases. As I read those cases, the

Board has deviated from the four-hour rule in three specific circumstances: 1) where employment

in the particular industry is by its nature sporadic, see Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 306 N.L.R.B. 294,

296 ("Finally, the Board has been flexible in carrying out its responsibility to devise formulas suited

to unique conditions in the entertainment industry, as in other specialized industries, to afford

employees... the optimumopportunity for meaningfulrepresentation."), enforced, 2 F.3d 35 (3d Cir.

1993); American Zoetrope Prods., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 621 (1973); Medion, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B.

1013 (1972); 2) where individual employees have reduced their workload for personal reasons, e.g.

maternity and other personal leave, and where those employees worked on a sufficientlyregular basis

both before and after their leave, see Northern Calif. Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 299 N.L.R.B. 980, 980-

81 (1990) (personal leave/vacation); Pat's Blue Ribbons, 286 N.L.R.B. 918, 919 (1987) (maternity

leave), and; 3) where the employees were new hires who began work prior to the eligibility date and

where their work since being hired has been sufficientlyregular. See Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 310

N.L.R.B. 538, 538 n.3 (1993); Pat's Blue Ribbons, 286 N.L.R.B. at 919; Stockham Valve &

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Fittings, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 217, 218-19 (1976).

The responsibility for deciding whether one of these exceptions applies, or a more general

exception implicit in them, is the Board's, not ours. We should take that responsibility from the

Boardthat is, reverse without remandingonly if we are sure that no wayexistsfor it to reasonably

articulate a basis for excluding Musgrave's ballot. This is not such a case.

The Board could reasonably find, for example, that the first two exceptions do not apply

because B B & L's business is not sporadic, and because Musgrave's irregular work was not due to

personal circumstances. As for the third exception, the Board could conclude that Musgrave was

clearly not a "new hire" in the sense of Stockham Valve or Pat's Blue Ribbons since he was working

for B B & L on a casual basis for seven months prior to the eligibility date. The Board is not

necessarily required to apply its more flexible "new hire" analysis to this case merely because

Troutman, who Musgrave was hired to replace, retired onMarch 31. Nothing happened between that

day and the eligibility date, May 2, that would force the Board to conclude that Musgrave suddenly

joined the community of interest of the regular employees. Given the Board's emphasis on hours as

a proxy for "community of interest," it could reasonably consider it significant that Musgrave only

worked one daythe Saturday after the union filed its certification petitionbetween April 1 and

the eligibility date. It could thus conclude that Musgrave was not a new hire for purposes of

votingthat his "casual" status effectively continued through the eligibility datebecause the most

important factor defining his association with the employee communityhis scheduleremained

sporadic through that date. See Pat's Blue Ribbons, 286 N.L.R.B. at 919 n.6.

The majority points out that the Board "appears never to have used the period between a

relevant change of circumstance and the eligibility date as a basis for excluding workers." Maj. Op.

at 9 n.5 (emphasis omitted). This is true, but only because the "relevant change of circumstance" in

Stockham Valve, Beverly Enterprises, and other "new hire" decisions has alwaysinvolved an entirely

new hire, never, as here, the evolution of a "casual" into a "part-time" employee. In these

circumstances, the Board could reasonably conclude that it will not consider a continuing "casual"

employee eligible to participate in the election, even if he has ostensibly changed jobs, unless a change

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in the hours or duties of that employee demonstrates that the employee has come to share the

community of interest enjoyed by regular employees. This is at least one explanation that the Board

could articulate on remand which would support its decision to exclude Musgrave's ballot and to

which we could defer. By reversing without remanding, the majority precludes the Board from

articulating this or other plausible explanations and substitutes the court's own judgment for the

Board's expertise in the arena of representation. I think the better routeand one that best ensures

that national labor policies and the certainty of the four-hour rule are advancedis to remand this

case to the Board so that it can better articulate how its eligibility rules apply to the unique

circumstances of this case.

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