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Parties Involved:
Bonnie Hooks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

BONNIE HOOKS, 

Defendant~Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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FILED .. ·~ United States Co~t ~~ Appa;..., Tenth C1rcuat 

SEP 12 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-6137 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-92-31-T) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Kim Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney (Patrick M. Ryan, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for ~laintiff-Appellee. 

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Bonnie Hooks appeals asserting the district court 

erred in calculating her sentence under the sentencing guidelines. 

We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 1 
In January 1992, a confidential informant told investigators 

with the Oklahoma County Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force that 

Sylvester Hutchinson, a known crack cocaine dealer, wanted to 

purchase a large quantity of cocaine. Task Force agents posed as 

drug dealers and arranged to meet with Hutchinson and Cheryl 

Williams in an Oklahoma City restaurant. During the meeting, 

Hutchinson told the agents that he dealt only in crack cocaine 

that he obtained from a source in Houston, Texas. Hutchinson 

explained that he had been traveling to Houston every five days to 

purchase crack for distribution in the Oklahoma City area, but 

needed a new source because his Houston source had been arrested. 

Hutchinson indicated he wanted to purchase up to two kilograms of 

cocaine. 

The agents arranged to meet Hutchinson later that evening at 

an Oklahoma City motel. The agents advised Hutchinson that they 

had powder cocaine for sale and would sell him one pound for 

$8,000, provided he made an initial $4,000 payment that night. 

Hutchinson agreed and said he would bring someone to cook the 

powder cocaine into crack. 

Later that evening, the agents met with Hutchinson, Williams, 

and Defendant at the designated motel in a room monitored by video 

surveillance. A co-conspirator, Terry Hooks,1 waited outside in a 

car. Hutchinson handed the agents $4,000. The agents placed a 

package containing 446.2 grams of powder cocaine on a countertop. 

Defendant and Williams prepared a five-gram sample of the powder 

1 Defendant and Terry Hooks are not related. Defendant Bonnie 

Hooks will hereinafter be referred to as "Defendant" and Terry 

Hooks will be referred to as "Terry Hooks" or simply "Hooks." 

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that Defendant proceeded to cook into crack. The agents asked 

Defendant about her experience and Defendant indicated she had 

cooked powder cocaine into crack before. When she was finished, 

Defendant and Williams smoked a portion of the cooked sample to 

test its quality. Hutchinson advised agents he wanted to purchase 

additional cocaine from them in the future. The agents g~ve the 

arrest signal to surveillance officers and the officers arrested 

all of the suspects, including Terry Hooks. 

Following his arrest, Terry Hooks agreed to cooperate with 

government agents regarding the drug distribution activities. 

Hooks told agents he met Hutchinson and Williams in the summer of 

1991 and drove Hutchinson to Houston every week to purchase eight 

ounce quantities of crack cocaine until the source in Houston was 

arrested. Hooks told agents he witnessed Defendant cook an ounce 

of powder cocaine into crack on two occasions at Hutchinson's 

residence. 

In March 1992, Defendant was charged by superseding 

indictment with one count of conspiring to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine and/or cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), one 

count of possession with intent to distribute 446.8 grams of 

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and one count of manufacturing 

approximately two grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). 

In May 1992, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 

manufacturing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). 

The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence 

report ("PSR"). To compute Defendant's base offense level, the 

PSR referenced the Drug Equivalency Tables following U.S.S.G. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 3 
§ 2D1.1 and converted the cocaine attributable to Defendant into 

marijuana equivalencies. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 

10. Applying the pertinent equivalencies,2 the PSR converted the 

446 grams of cocaine purchased by Hutchinson into 89.24 kilograms 

of marijuana (446.2 grams of cocaine x 200 grams of 

marijuana=89,240 grams marijuana or 89.24 kilograms of ma~ijuana). 

The PSR converted the five grams of cocaine base3 Defendant cooked 

at the hotel into 100 kilograms of marijuana (5 grams cocaine base 

x 20 kilograms marijuana=100 kilograms of marijuana). Finally, 

the PSR converted the two ounces of cocaine base Defendant cooked 

at Hutchinson's residence into 1,134 kilograms of marijuana (56.7 

grams cocaine base x 20 kilograms marijuana=1,134 kilograms of 

marijuana). Adding these amounts together, the PSR determined 

Defendant was responsible for 1,323 kilograms of marijuana for 

sentencing purposes under § 2D1.1. As a result, the PSR concluded 

Defendant's base offense level was thirty-two. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(c) (6) (1991 version) (providing a base offense level of 

thirty-two for offenses involving between 1000 and 3000 kilograms 

of marijuana) . 

Additionally, the PSR determined Defendant should be assigned 

a criminal history category of III, based upon four criminal 

history points. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A (defendant assigned 

criminal history category III if he has four, five, or six 

criminal history points) . Included within the four points was a 

2 The Drug Equivalency Tables provide: (1) 1 gram of cocaine = 

200 grams of marijuana, and (2) 1 gram of cocaine base (crack) = 

20 kilograms of marijuana. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 10. 

3 "Cocaine base" is crack cocaine. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 4 
one-point addition for Defendant's January 1990 plea of guilty in 

Oklahoma City Municipal Court to larceny of merchandise, whereby 

she was convicted for shoplifting two packs of cigarettes from a 

grocery store. Defendant was not imprisoned or placed on 

probation for this offense, but was fined $175. Finally, the PSR 

determined Defendant was not entitled to a three-level requction 

in her base offense level for acceptance of responsibility because 

she had been untruthful about her involvement with Hutchinson 

during interviews with government officials. Based upon an 

offense level of 32 and a Criminal History Category of III, the 

PSR concluded the guideline imprisonment range was 151 to 188 

months. See .id. 

Defendant filed objections to the PSR. Defendant disputed 

the factual basis for the PSR's determination that the two ounces 

of cocaine base she allegedly cooked at Hutchinson's residence 

should be used in the calculation of her base offense level. 

Defendant also objected to the PSR's: (1) addition of one 

criminal history point for her 1990 larceny of merchandise 

conviction; and (2) failure to grant her a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. The district court convened an 

evidentiary hearing in July 1992. 

At the hearing, the probation officer who prepared the PSR 

testified regarding the factual basis underlying the use of the 

two ounces in calculating Defendant's base offense level. The 

probation officer specified that the information regarding the two 

ounces of cocaine base was gleaned from an investigative report 

filed by Officer Danner, one of the undercover agents that 

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Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 5 
investigated the case. Officer Danner testified that he 

interviewed Terry Hooks about his knowledge of Defendant's 

involvement in Hutchinson's drug activities. Officer Danner 

testified that Hooks told him he observed Defendant cook crack 

cocaine at Hutchinson's residence. Officer Danner testified he 

verified several aspects of Terry Hooks story and conclud~d he was 

reliable and truthful. Vol. III at 14. 

On cross-examination, Defendant's trial counsel asked Officer 

Danner if he had any information, other than Terry Hooks' 

testimony, to verify that Defendant cooked two ounces of crack 

cocaine at Hutchinson's residence. Officer Danner replied that he 

could not specifically verify that information but did verify 

other aspects of Hooks' statement, including that Hutchinson's 

Houston source was arrested. Officer Danner further stated that 

he had "innumerable reasons" to believe what Hooks said, and that 

Hooks had been "truthful about everything he's told me." Id. at 

17-18. 

Finally, Terry Hooks testified that he had been completely 

truthful in providing information to the government and at no time 

had given false information. Hooks testified that he told Officer 

Danner he observed Defendant cook an ounce of crack cocaine on two 

occasions at Hutchinson's residence, or a total of two ounces of 

crack. Hooks testified he knew the quantity totaled two ounces 

because "[t]he guy in Houston" weighed the crack. On 

cross-examination, defense counsel demonstrated that Hooks could 

not precisely pin down the dates he observed Defendant cook the 

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Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 6 
crack and that he received a favorable plea agreement from the 

government in exchange for his testimony. 

Based upon the testimony, the court overruled Defendant's 

objection to the factual basis underlying the use of the two 

ounces of cocaine base in computing her base offense level. 

Specifically, the court ruled: 

I have evaluated Mr. Terry Hooks credibility on the 

basis of the information that he gave Officer Danner in 

the course of the investigation, much of which was 

verified as true. There is no basis for not believing 

Hooks and his testimony regarding the cooking of the 

cocaine. It was as credible as any other testimony that 

he gave, much of which was corroborated and verified. 

He has no--he had nothing to gain in revealing that with 

regard to Bonnie Hooks participation. He's under a very 

serious obligation to be entirely truthful .... 

But the most important thing, I think, is that 

he--he has a history of being credible as a witness, 

because his testimony has been verified and 

corroborated, and there's no reason to doubt his 

testimony as to this. He has nothing to gain in making 

such a thing up. He convinced me that he simply 

described what he saw. 

Id. at 42-43. 

In addition, the court overruled Defendant's objection to the 

use of the larceny of merchandise conviction in calculating her 

criminal history score. The court concluded that the guidelines 

specify municipal convictions can be counted and Defendant 

identified no contrary authority. Finally, the court overruled 

Defendant's objection to the PSR's denial of reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. As a result, the court adopted the 

calculations of the PSR and sentenced Defendant at the low end of 

the guideline range to 151 months imprisonment. 

Defendant's trial counsel failed to perfect an appeal. In 

November 1994, Defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set 

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Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 7 
aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging 

counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect a direct appeal. 

The court granted Defendant's motion to allow her to be 

resentenced and to perfect an appeal. 

The court held the resentencing hearing in March 1995. 

Defendant, represented by new counsel, asserted the same . 

objections to the PSR. The court again overruled Defendant's 

objections to her base offense level and criminal history 

calculations. The court amplified upon its reasoning for 

rejecting Defendant's challenge to the use of her larceny 

conviction in calculating her criminal history: 

I find that a reading of the Application note, Note 12 

under [U.S.S.G.] section 4A1.2, that it is simply 

inescapable, that that conviction must be included 

because petty larceny, that is larceny of 50 dollars are 

[sic] under--or under 50 dollars is indeed an offense in 

the State of Oklahoma under Title 21 of the Oklahoma 

statutes of section 1704, and that it being so must be 

included [under] ... the application note .. 

Vol. IV at 5-6. Based upon an agreement reached by the parties, 

the court granted Defendant a three-level reduction in her base 

offense level for acceptance of responsibility, reducing the 

guideline imprisonment range to 108-135 months. The court 

sentenced Defendant to 108 months imprisonment. This appeal 

followed. 

I. 

On appeal, Defendant first contends the district court erred 

in using the two additional ounces of cocaine base to compute her 

base offense level. Specifically, Defendant contends the court 

clearly erred in finding reliable Terry Hooks' testimony that 

Defendant cooked two ounces of powder cocaine into cocaine base. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6137 Document: 01019276915 Date Filed: 09/12/1995 Page: 8 
Defendant contends Terry Hooks' testimony lacked "sufficient 

indicia of reliability" because Hooks was not specific as to the 

dates he observed Defendant cook the crack cocaine and was 

motivated by a favorable plea agreement to give such testimony. 

We review the district court's factual findings regarding the 

quantity of drugs for which a defendant is held responsib~e for 

clear error. United States v. Richards, 27 F.3d 465, 468 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). "We will not disturb a district court's factual 

finding 'unless it has no support in the record or, after 

reviewing all the evidence, we are firmly convinced that an error 

has been made.'" United States v. Reyes, 979 F.2d 1406, 1410 

(lOth Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Bernaugh, 969 F.2d 858, 

864 (lOth Cir. 1992). "[C]redibility determinations are for the 

district court," Richards, 27 F.3d at 469, and we will therefore 

"not reexamine the credibility of a witness' testimony" on appeal. 

United States v. Mcintyre, 997 F.2d 687, 709 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 736 (1994). 

For purposes of the base offense level calculation under 

§ 2Dl.l, a defendant is responsible for "all quantities of 

contraband with which he was directly involved and . . . all 

reasonably foreseeable quantities . . . that were within the scope 

of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook." U.S.S.G. 

§ 1Bl.3 application note 2; see also United States v. Ortiz, 993 

F.2d 204, 207 (lOth Cir. 1993). "The government has the burden of 

proving the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Id. The district court may 

estimate the quantity of drugs involved provided the information 

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underlying the estimate possesses "'sufficient indicia of 

reliability to support its probable accuracy.'" Id. (quoting 

U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). 

Applying these principles, we conclude the district court did 

not err in using the two ounce estimate of cocaine base cooked by 

Defendant to compute her base offense level. Specifically, we 

conclude the court did not clearly err in finding the factual 

basis underlying the estimate, that is, Terry Hooks' testimony, 

had "sufficient indicia of reliability." Id. at 207; U.S.S.G. 

§ 6A1.3(a). Defendant contends Terry Hooks testimony lacked 

"sufficient indicia of reliability" because Hooks was not specific 

as to the dates he observed her cook the crack and was motivated 

by a favorable plea agreement to give his testimony. In essence, 

Defendant requests we reverse the district court because Terry 

Hooks was not a believable witness. This we will not do. 

The court observed Hooks' testimony and demeanor during 

direct and cross-examination. After observing Hooks' testimony, 

the court specifically determined that he was a credible witness. 

Consequently, the court accepted his testimony that Defendant 

cooked two ounces of powder cocaine into crack at Hutchinson's 

residence. Based upon our careful review of the record, we are 

not "firmly convinced that an error has been made," Reyes, 979 at 

1410, and we will not reexamine the district court's credibility 

determination at this stage of the proceedings. See Richards, 27 

F.3d at 469; Mcintyre, 997 F.2d at 709. We conclude the court did 

not err in including the two ounces of cocaine base cooked by 

Defendant at Hutchinson's residence in the calculation of her base 

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offense level. 

II. 

Defendant next contends the court erred in assigning her one 

criminal history point for a prior municipal conviction involving 

larceny of merchandise. Specifically, Defendant contends that her 

larceny of merchandise conviction does not qualify to be included 

under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2(c) (1) in her criminal history score because 

she was neither sentenced to at least one year of probation nor to 

imprisonment for at least thirty days. We review the district 

court's interpretation and application of the guidelines de novo. 

United States v. McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 487-88 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). 

To calculate a defendant's criminal history category, a 

district court assigns a defendant criminal history points for 

each of his prior sentences of imprisonment and adds the points 

together. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l. The total of the criminal history 

points determines the defendant's criminal history category. See 

U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l commentary; U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A, Sentencing 

Table. Section 4A1.2(c) (1) explains which prior sentences of 

imprisonment are counted by the court. Section 4A1.2(c) (1) 

specifies that misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted in 

computing a criminal history score, except as follows: 

(1) Sentences for the following prior offenses and 

offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are 

known, are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term 

of probation of at least one year or a term of 

imprisonment for at least thirty days, or (B) the prior 

offense was similar to an instant offense: 

Careless or reckless driving 

Contempt of court 

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Disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace 

Driving without a license or with a revoked or 

suspended license 

False information to a police officer 

Fish and game violations 

Gambling 

Hindering or failing to obey a police officer 

Insufficient funds check 

Leaving the scene of an accident 

Local ordinance violations (excluding local 

ordinance violations that are also criminal 

offenses under state law) 

Non-support 

Prostitution 

Resisting arrest 

Trespassing 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (1) (emphasis added). Thus, the above-listed 

offenses and offenses similar to them are not counted in computing 

a defendant's criminal history score unless: (1) the defendant 

was sentenced to the requisite term of probation or imprisonment, 

or (2) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense. Id. 

Local ordinance violations are one of the listed offenses in 

§ 4A1.2(c) (1). Thus, local ordinance violations are not counted 

unless one of the two above-exceptions is present. There is an 

added wrinkle, however, with local ordinance violations. Section 

4A1.2(c) (1) excludes "local ordinance violations that are also 

criminal offenses under state law" from "local ordinance 

violations." Thus, local ordinance violations that are also 

criminal offenses under state law are counted in computing a 

defendant's criminal history score. Application note 12 to 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (1) confirms this: 

Local Ordinance Violations. A number of local 

jurisdictions have enacted ordinances covering certain 

offenses (~, larceny and assault misdemeanors) that 

are also violations of state criminal law. This enables 

a local court (~, a municipal court) to exercise 

jurisdiction over such offenses. Such offenses are 

excluded from the definition of local ordinance 

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violations in§ 4A1.2(c} (1} and, therefore, sentences 

for such offenses are to be treated as if the defendant 

had been convicted under state law. 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application note 12 (emphasis added). In sum, 

therefore, local ordinance violations and offenses similar to them 

are counted in computing a defendant's criminal history score only 

if: (1) the local ordinance violation results in the re~isite 

sentence of probation or imprisonment; (2) the prior local 

ordinance violation is similar to an instant offense; or (3) the 

local ordinance violation also constitutes a criminal offense 

under state law. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (1) & application note 

12; United States v. Mondaine, 956 F.2d 939, 942 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

Applying § 4A1.2 to the instant case, Defendant's larceny of 

merchandise conviction constitutes a local ordinance violation and 

therefore is counted only if one of the three above-stated 

exceptions is present. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (1); Mondaine, 956 F.2d 

at 942. Defendant did not receive a sentence of at least one year 

of probation or thirty days of imprisonment and her prior local 

ordinance violation is not similar to an instant offense. The 

district court determined, however, that Defendant's conviction 

for larceny of merchandise should be counted in computing her 

criminal history score because it also constitutes a criminal 

offense under Oklahoma state law. We agree. Defendant's larceny 

of merchandise conviction would also constitute petty larceny 

under Oklahoma state law. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1704. Thus, 

Defendant's larceny of merchandise conviction can properly be 

counted in calculating her criminal history score. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 4A1.2(c) {1) & application note 12; Mondaine, 956 F.2d at 942. 

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As a result, we conclude the district court did not err in 

assigning Defendant one criminal history point for her larceny of 

merchandise conviction. 

AFFIRMED. 

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