Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03402/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03402-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Lawan Postley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3402

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Timothy Lawan Postley, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 13, 2006

Filed: June 6, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Timothy Postley appeals the sentence imposed upon him following his

conviction on a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of 50 grams or more

of cocaine base with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841. Postley was sentenced to

156 months' imprisonment and five years' supervised release. He contends that he

should not have been assessed a criminal history point for an earlier conviction in

Iowa for interference with official acts with injury, Iowa Code § 719, and that the

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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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imposition of the term of supervised release violates 18 U.S.C. § 3559. We affirm the

sentence imposed by the district court.1

Postley contends that his 1999 conviction for interference with official acts with

injury under Iowa Code § 719.1 should not have been counted as a criminal history

point under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). We review a district court's interpretation of the

Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its application of the Guidelines to the facts for

clear error. United States v. Borer, 412 F.3d 987, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2005). Section

4A1.2(c) governs which prior sentences are counted as criminal history points. The

first sentence of the section states flatly: "Sentences for all felony offenses are

counted." The section continues on to discuss which misdemeanor sentences are

counted. Postley argues that his conviction of interference with official acts with

injury is similar to the misdemeanor of "resisting arrest," which the section says

should not always be counted. 

We need not decide whether interference with official acts with injury is similar

to or distinguishable from resisting arrest because in any case it is a felony under the

Sentencing Guidelines. Iowa Code § 719.1 provides that interference with official

acts with injury is an aggravated misdemeanor. The punishment for aggravated

misdemeanors under Iowa law is imprisonment for up to two years. Iowa Code §

903.1. Although the crime is called an "aggravated misdemeanor" under Iowa law,

under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, it falls within the definition of a felony.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(o) ("For the purposes of § 4A1.2(c), a 'felony offense' means any

federal, state, or local offense punishable by death or a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed."); United States v.

Jenkins, 989 F.2d 979, 979 (8th Cir. 1993) (state's characterization of offense as

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"infraction" not determinative on whether it counts as a criminal history point).

Therefore, the Iowa sentence must be counted as a criminal history point.

Postley raises a complex of arguments, all attempting to show that the district

court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that 21

U.S.C. § 841(b) violates various federal statutory and constitutional provisions by

authorizing a term of supervised release as part of the sentence. We review de novo

the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment. United States v. Two

Eagle, 318 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2003). 

The statute under which Postley was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, provides that

possessing 50 grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute carries a penalty of

imprisonment of ten years to life, plus a fine, plus a term of supervised release of at

least five years. Postley argues that § 841 violates 18 U.S.C. § 3559(b), of which the

relevant part provides :

[A]n offense classified under subsection (a) carries all the incidents

assigned to the applicable letter designation [of subsection (a), which

classifies felonies and misdemeanors according to the severity of the

maximum penalties attached] except that the maximum term of

imprisonment is the term authorized by the law describing the offense.

Thus, § 3559 addresses only the maximum term of imprisonment; it does not address

supervised release and so cannot be violated by § 841(b)'s authorization of a term of

supervised release. Further, § 3559 states that the maximum term of imprisonment is

governed by the law describing the offense--here, § 841(b). Postley argues that by

authorizing a sentence of a term of years plus five years of supervised release, §

841(b) authorizes a sentence in excess of what it authorizes. Postley's argument is

illogical.

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Nor does Postley's argument improve upon practical application. First, under

§ 841(b), the maximum term of imprisonment for possessing 50 grams of cocaine base

with intent to distribute would be imprisonment for life, as provided by the law

describing the offense. A term of imprisonment for years followed by a term of

supervised release does not exceed a term of imprisonment for life. United States v.

Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Second, the statutory

authorization for a term of supervised release is distinct from the authorization for a

prison term, so the supervised release term does not have to come out of the maximum

prison sentence. United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The

supervised release period is an independent element of the sentence. It is not carved

out of the maximum permissible time allotted for incarceration under some other

criminal statute."). Even where the substantive statute describing the crime authorizes

only imprisonment, supervised release may nevertheless be authorized by 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583 in addition to the maximum prison term. United States v. Engelhorn, 122 F.3d

508, 510 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he total time involved in a term of imprisonment and

supervised release may exceed the maximum term of incarceration authorized by the

substantive federal statute under which a defendant is convicted."); United States v.

Watkins, 14 F.3d 414, 415 (8th Cir. 1994) (supervised release term properly imposed

in addition to statutory maximum term of imprisonment); United States v. Colt, 126

F.3d 981, 982-83 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendant who had served seven months in prison

was properly sentenced to additional nine months upon revocation of supervised

release, even though substantive statute creating crime only authorized one-year

prison term). Postley's argument is far weaker than that rejected in Watkins and Colt

because his crime was defined by section 841, which authorizes both a term of

imprisonment and a term of supervised release. 

Postley makes a related argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3583 only authorizes

supervised release as a component of the maximum term of imprisonment. This

argument has been rejected generally, see Engelhorn, 122 F.3d at 510; Watkins, 14

F.3d at 415; Colt, 126 F.3d at 983, and even if it were a tenable reading of § 3583,

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Postley's particular crime is governed by § 841(b), which requires both imprisonment

and supervised release and dictates separate terms for each. The argument fails.

Postley relies on Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980), but it defeats,

rather than bolsters his argument, because it concludes that an earlier version of the

drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, failed to authorize a special parole term

because it did not specifically authorize it, in contrast to the earlier version of § 841,

which did specifically authorize such a term. Postley was convicted under § 841, not

the conspiracy statute.

Finally, Postley argues, "Section 841(b)'s imposition of an additional term of

imprisonment by way of supervised release increases the maximum penalty without

such being in the indictment or submitted to the jury. As such, § 841 is

unconstitutional." He cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

As is apparent from the argument above, the imposition of the term of supervised

release was within the statutory maximum penalty, not in excess of it. Postley's

argument is not valid.

We affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

______________________________

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