Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03585/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03585-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathon M. Sainz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3585

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JONATHON M. SAINZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 CR 707 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 20, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 27, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Jonathon M. Sainz appeals from his sentence for transporting and possessing child 

pornography. Sainz presents two arguments on appeal. First, 

he argues that the district court ordered him to pay too much 

restitution to one victim of his possession crime. Second, he 

argues that the district court erred by imposing three special 

conditions of supervised release. We affirm the restitution order, but we order a limited remand to correct some issues of 

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vagueness and overbreadth in the conditions of supervised 

release.

I. Restitution Order

By pleading guilty, Sainz confessed to possessing thousands of child pornography images. Six images were of a victim known as “Cindy,” unlawful images of whom have circulated widely on the internet. The government argued in presentence filings and during the sentencing hearing that Sainz 

should pay restitution to Cindy because she was a victim of 

his crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4) (mandating restitution to 

victims of child sexual exploitation). Cindy has incurred financial losses such as future lost earnings, attorney fees, and 

medical and psychiatric expenses.

In the district court, Sainz argued that restitution to Cindy 

was not appropriate because he did not cause her losses. He 

possessed images of Cindy but had no role in creating or distributing them. Sainz claimed that he was not a legal cause of 

Cindy’s harm because hundreds or thousands of others also 

possessed the images, so she would have been harmed by others even if he had never possessed the images of her. The court 

rejected this argument because the government had shown 

that Sainz proximately caused harm to Cindy by viewing the 

images, which Cindy said re-victimized her and made her feel 

that the abuse was continuing. 

The district court’s approach to causation was confirmed 

as correct by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). The 

Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2259, the statute governing restitution for child sexual exploitation offenses, to require the 

government to show the defendant’s offense proximately 

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caused a victim’s losses. Id. at 1722. In Paroline the Court held 

that the defendant was required to pay restitution to the victim depicted in images he possessed because he caused some 

portion of her losses: “While it is not possible to identify a discrete, readily definable incremental loss [the defendant] 

caused, it is indisputable that he was a part of the overall phenomenon that caused her general losses.” Id. at 1726. The 

Court recognized the ongoing harm possession inflicts on the 

victim because “every viewing of child pornography is a repetition of the victim’s abuse.” Id. at 1727.

In light of Paroline, Sainz does not challenge on appeal the 

district court’s ruling that he caused harm to Cindy and must 

pay her some amount of restitution. Instead, he challenges 

only the amount he was ordered to pay, which he argues is 

disproportionate to his relative role in causing Cindy’s losses. 

We review the calculation of restitution for abuse of discretion and will set aside an order of restitution only if the 

district court used inappropriate factors or did not exercise 

discretion at all. United States v. Stein, 756 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th 

Cir. 2014), citing United States v. Frith, 461 F.3d 914, 919 (7th 

Cir. 2006). We may find an abuse of discretion, though, where 

a district court “based its ruling on an erroneous view of the 

law.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); 

see also United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(de novo review of legality of restitution order). 

The government argued to the district court that Sainz 

should pay $8,387.43 in restitution, which is 1/136 of Cindy’s 

total loss for the relevant time period. The government divided the total loss by 136 because Sainz is the 136th offender 

who has been prosecuted and ordered to pay Cindy restitution. This calculation is known as the 1/n method, where n 

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represents the number of defendants who have paid the victim restitution plus 1 (to count the defendant being sentenced). See United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 554 (6th Cir. 

2013) (approving a pre-Paroline restitution order using the 1/n 

method, calling the method a “pragmatic solution that district 

courts may use as a framework”).1

The district court agreed with the government and ordered Sainz to pay Cindy $8,387.43 in restitution, citing Gamble and using the 1/n method. Sainz contends that attributing 

1/136 of the total loss to him was an error under Paroline.

Paroline addressed a difficult, nearly intractable problem. 

The Supreme Court’s decision avoided rigid or mechanical 

rules, leaving district courts considerable discretion in deciding the extent of a defendant’s restitution in such cases. The 

Court instructed broadly that “a court applying § 2259 should 

order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.” 134 S. Ct. at 1727. The amount of restitution for a possessor of child pornography like Paroline or 

Sainz should be neither “severe” nor a “token or nominal 

amount.” Id. “The required restitution would be a reasonable 

and circumscribed award imposed in recognition of the indisputable role of the offender in the causal process underlying 

the victim’s losses and suited to the relative size of that causal 

role.” Id.

 1 Cindy’s total loss amounted to a little more than $1.1 million, most 

of which is future lost earnings. This total includes only expenses incurred 

after the defendant’s offense conduct. Sainz does not dispute the government’s calculation of the total loss, which is both conservative and welldocumented.

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The Court then discussed “a variety of factors district 

courts might consider in determining a proper amount of restitution”:

[D]istrict courts might, as a starting point, determine the amount of the victim’s losses caused by 

the continuing traffic in the victim’s images ... 

then set an award of restitution in consideration 

of factors that bear on the relative causal significance of the defendant’s conduct in producing 

those losses. These could include the number of 

past criminal defendants found to have contributed to the victim’s general losses; reasonable 

predictions of the number of future offenders 

likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the victim’s general losses; any 

available and reasonably reliable estimate of the 

broader number of offenders involved (most of 

whom will, of course, never be caught or convicted); whether the defendant reproduced or 

distributed images of the victim; whether the 

defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images; how many images of the 

victim the defendant possessed; and other facts 

relevant to the defendant’s relative causal role. 

Id. at 1728. 

We find no legal error or abuse of discretion in the district 

court’s order that Sainz pay Cindy $8,387.43 in restitution. 

Though the district court sentenced Sainz before Paroline was 

decided, its ruling followed the same procedure of first calculating total loss and then determining what fraction of that 

loss should be attributed to the defendant. The district court 

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did not explicitly discuss all of the factors that Paroline said 

may be relevant in determining the defendant’s relative role. 

The district court’s use of the 1/n method took into account

the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed to Cindy’s total loss, which is one of the Paroline factors that was ascertainable in this case.

While a district court could consider additional factors, the 

bottom line here is that the amount of the award is substantively reasonable. It is neither severe nor trivial. It is a reasonable and circumscribed award for Sainz’s relative role in causing Cindy’s harm. Though he neither produced nor distributed her images, he possessed them and in doing so re-victimized her and contributed significantly to her harm. The 

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

roughly $8,400 in restitution was fair for this defendant. 

Sainz argues that the 1/n method treats all defendants convicted of possessing or distributing any images of Cindy as 

equals. When the 1/n method, and only that method, is used, 

the restitution amount for each offender does not account for 

the offender’s relative role or other individualized factors. The 

result depends only on the total loss and the sequence in 

which multiple offenders are sentenced. For example, if the 

method were strictly applied to all offenders who distributed 

or received images of Cindy, the third offender sentenced 

would owe a restitution amount of roughly $366,000 to Cindy 

(1/3 of her total losses) while the 3000th offender sentenced 

would owe about $366 (1/3000 of her total losses). 

Sainz argues that use of the 1/n method is contrary to the 

instruction in Paroline to award restitution that comports with 

the individual defendant’s relative role in causing the harm. 

The method does not incorporate any of the offender-specific 

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factors discussed in Paroline, such as whether the offender reproduced or distributed images of the victim, whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the 

images, and how many images of the victim the defendant 

possessed. Sainz believes those factors weigh in favor of lower 

restitution in his case because he did not produce or distribute 

the images and because he possessed only six images of 

Cindy.

Sainz also argues that the district court erred by failing to 

consider other factors suggested in Paroline. The government 

did not present the district court with either a prediction 

about the number of offenders likely to be convicted in the 

future for contributing to Cindy’s losses or an estimate of the 

broader number of offenders who were involved but are unlikely to be caught. Sainz believes that accounting for these 

factors would lead to a lower restitution order in his case because his role was small as compared to the hundreds or thousands of others who may have also possessed the images.

We do not read Paroline as requiring district courts to consider in every case every factor mentioned. The Supreme 

Court made clear that the Paroline factors were permissive, not 

mandatory, and were provided as “rough guideposts” that 

“district courts might consider in determining a proper 

amount of restitution.” Id. at 1728. The Court explained that 

“it is neither necessary nor appropriate to prescribe a precise 

algorithm for determining the proper restitution amount at 

this point in the law’s development,” adding: “These factors 

need not be converted into a rigid formula.” Id. 

Many of the factors discussed in Paroline refer to information that may not even be reliably known. For example, the 

government may not be able to produce evidence that would 

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provide reasonable predictions about the number of offenders likely to be convicted in the future or the broader number 

of offenders who were involved but are unlikely to be caught. 

See 134 S. Ct. at 1728. Such predictions might well be mere 

guesses. But the Supreme Court made clear in Parolinethat the 

difficulty of coming up with reasonable estimates for an indeterminate number of other offenders should not be a barrier 

to all compensation for victims of child pornography. Id. at 

1727 (discussing “Congress’ clear intent that victims of child 

pornography be compensated by the perpetrators who contributed to their anguish”). As difficult as the problem is, the 

Paroline Court left no doubt that “a court must assess as best 

it can from available evidence the significance of the individual 

defendant’s conduct in light of the broader causal process that 

produced the victim’s losses.” Id. at 1727–28 (emphasis 

added).

The district court here considered the available evidence, 

exercised its discretion, and arrived at a reasonable restitution 

award. The court did not err by not addressing every Paroline

factor. Sainz may be correct that the 1/n method is not appropriate for all cases because the restitution amount depends so 

heavily on the number of offenders previously sentenced. 

Where n is very small or very large, a more nuanced method 

may be required. But the application of that method to this 

case resulted in a reasonable restitution order of $8,400 for an 

offender who possessed six images of the victim and indisputably contributed to her harm. That amount was not an 

abuse of discretion. We affirm the restitution order.

II. Special Conditions of Supervised Release

Sainz’s sentence included several special conditions of supervised release. All were recommended in the presentence 

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report, so there was no surprise at sentencing in this respect. 

See United States v. Lewis, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 3004435, at *5

(7th Cir. 2016). Sainz did not raise any objections before they 

were imposed or address them in his arguments about sentencing. Nor did he assert any (unnecessary) exceptions after 

they were imposed. On appeal, however, he challenges three

conditions based on recent decisions of this court. See generally United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015); United 

States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014); and their numerous progeny.

The challenged conditions will restrict Sainz’s future access to sexually explicit material (including material concerning adults), his contact with children, and his use of computers and the internet. The district court did not take steps that 

could, as in Lewis, have resulted in a waiver by the defense of 

the issues raised on appeal. United States v. Lewis, — F.3d at —

(finding waiver, or at least forfeiture, where defendant had 

advance notice of the conditions to be imposed and declined 

the express invitation of the judge—before sentence was imposed—to voice objections or “requests for further findings or 

elaboration”). The government agrees that a limited remand 

is needed to modify these conditions. We do too. 

A. General Appropriateness of Conditions

First, though, we reject Sainz’s challenge to the need for 

and sufficiency of the district court’s findings for all three 

challenged conditions. Given the nature of Sainz’s crimes of 

transporting and possessing child pornography through use 

of a computer and the internet, the general need for restrictions on access to sexually explicit materials, contact with 

minors, and internet and computer use is so obvious that the 

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district judge did not need to explain further than he did. See 

United States v. Jones, 798 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2015) (determining that conditions of supervised release are “appropriately tailored ... so long as they are warranted by the defendant’s history and characteristics”); United States v. Castaldi, 743 

F.3d 589, 594-95 (7th Cir. 2014) (in reviewing sufficiency of 

findings and explanations in sentencing, “we try to take careful note of context and the practical realities of a sentencing 

hearing”), quoting United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 709 (7th 

Cir. 2010) (sentencing judge “need not belabor the obvious”).

At Sainz’s sentencing hearing, the district judge reviewed 

the relevant factors in great detail, including his crimes and 

his history and characteristics, and thus satisfied the explanation and consideration requirements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)—

(c). Sentencing Tr. at 39-46. Most of those reasons given for the 

prison portion of the sentence, including the defendant’s 

“grooming” of children in his extended family, obviously extended to the challenged conditions of supervised release. 

The district judge was not required to repeat himself or to belabor the obvious.

B. Access to Sexually Explicit Material

One condition will prohibit the defendant from possessing 

or controlling “any pornography, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials including visual, auditory, telephonic, or electronic media, computer programs or services” 

and from patronizing places “where such material or entertainment is available.” The parties agree that this provision 

needs to be narrowed for reasons explained at length in Siegel, 

753 F.3d 705, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2015). A limited remand will be 

sufficient to accomplish the required tailoring consistent with 

Siegel.

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C. Contact With Children

Another condition will prohibit the defendant from having “contact with any person under the age of 18 except in the 

presence of a responsible adult who is aware of the nature of 

[Sainz’s] background and current offense and who has been 

approved by the probation officer and treatment provider.” 

Such conditions that “bar nearly all contact with minors may 

be appropriate in certain circumstances.” United States v. 

Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 524 (7th Cir. 2013). But the parties agree 

that this provision needs to be modified to make clear that it 

does not prohibit incidental contact with children such as in 

ordinary commercial settings. For example, suppose Sainz 

wants to buy a hamburger at a restaurant that employs a few 

sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. Doing so could violate this 

condition as written. We agree that this provision needs to be 

narrowed along the lines we have drawn in other cases, such 

as by adding exceptions for commercial business and cases of 

incidental or unintentional conduct with minors in general. 

Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2014). We therefore vacate 

this condition of Sainz’s supervised release and remand to 

modify it consistent with Baker.

D. Paying for Computer Monitoring

The last challenged condition will require the defendant 

to comply with a computer and internet monitoring program 

administered by the probation office. The court ordered as 

part of that condition: “The costs of monitoring shall be paid 

by the defendant at the monthly contractual rate.” We said in 

Siegel that such a provision should specify that the defendant’s supervised release could not be revoked for mere inability to pay since that would amount to imprisonment for debt. 

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We told the district court in Siegel to make that explicit on remand. United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d at 714; see also Baker, 755 

F.3d at 529.

If we examine conditions of supervised release in the abstract, years before they will take effect, we can imagine many 

possible misunderstandings or mistakes that might be made 

in administering them. One such mistake would be revocation for mere inability to pay, as mentioned in Siegel and Baker. 

The speculative possibility that such an issue would arise 

would not justify a remand at this time. See, e.g., United States 

v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370-71 (7th Cir. 2008) (error in supervised release condition was not plain error because 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) provides means to modify conditions after release). 

Since the case must go back to modify the other two conditions, however, the district court should, consistent with Siegel

and Baker, add the caution to this condition on remand.

The district court’s restitution order is AFFIRMED. The 

special conditions of supervised release addressing access to 

sexually explicit materials, contact with children, and use of 

computers and the internet are VACATED and the case is 

REMANDED to the district court for the limited purpose of 

modifying those conditions in a manner consistent with this 

opinion.

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