Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01690/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01690-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmy Albern Boyster
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Theodore McMillian died January 18, 2006. This opinion is

being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 8th Cir. Rule 47E.

2

 The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1690

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas. 

*

Jimmy Albern Boyster, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2005

Filed: February 10, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN1

, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After Jimmy Boyster was indicted for possessing and manufacturing marijuana,

he moved to suppress the evidence seized during a search of his property and

statements he made to officials at the scene. The district court2

 denied the motion, and

Boyster subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 42

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months imprisonment. Boyster appeals, arguing that the use of the Arkansas National

Guard to aid local law enforcement in the aerial surveillance of his property was

unlawful and that the evidence resulting from the subsequent search of the premises

should be suppressed. We affirm. 

On July 17, 2002, the Arkansas State Police (ASP) and the Arkansas National

Guard (the Guard) conducted aerial surveillance over portions of southern Arkansas.

The operation was conducted pursuant to the Arkansas National Guard FY 2002

Counterdrug Support Plan. Both the Governor of Arkansas and the Attorney General

of Arkansas had certified that the plan complied with federal and state law. Under the

plan the Guard provides support to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

in targeting and eliminating illicit drug operations. 

The two helicopters involved in this surveillance were flown by Guard pilots,

and spotters from the Guard and the ASP observed quantities of marijuana growing

around Boyster's residence and notified authorities on the ground. Based upon this

information, law enforcement officers from the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) and ASP, as well as Guard personnel proceeded to Boyster's residence. They

told Boyster what the aerial surveillance had uncovered and asked for his consent to

search the premises. He acquiesced, and the search revealed over 2400 marijuana

plants growing on his property. The officers also discovered an eighteen wheel box

trailer with an electric cord running to Boyster's residence. The trailer contained

suspended fluorescent lights and bags of potting soil, and underneath it marijuana

plants were growing in plain view. 

Boyster was indicted on March 11, 2003 for possessing and manufacturing

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). He

moved to suppress all evidence gathered as a result of the aerial surveillance, arguing

that the use of the Guard in a drug eradication flight was unlawful under Arkansas law

without a written proclamation from the governor calling up the Guard and

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 A bush hog is a large rotary cutter that is pulled behind a tractor to mow land

and to cut trails. 

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authorizing it to participate in local law enforcement operations. Boyster further

argued that the aerial surveillance violated his fourth amendment rights because local

law enforcement had received unlawful assistance from the Guard. He asked that all

evidence from the subsequent search be suppressed, including the incriminating

statements he made to investigators.

The district court held a suppression hearing on March 22, 2004 and heard from

ASP special agent Dennis Roberts, lieutenant colonels Richard Moore and Ray House

from the Guard, and Boyster. Agent Roberts testified that there were bush hogged3

trails visible from the air which led from Boyster's residence to other large plots of

land. He also described the amount and location of marijuana found on Boyster's

property and testified that Boyster had signed a consent form authorizing a search of

the property.

Lieutenant Colonel Moore testified that, as the Counterdrug Coordinator for

Arkansas, he provided support to local law enforcement during this operation. He was

responsible for ensuring that the National Guard was acting in compliance with

federal and state law pursuant to a valid state plan signed by the governor. On cross

examination he testified that the plan for the current year would not be released to the

public until after the end of the year, in order to protect the service members involved,

and that he was unaware of any written order by the governor calling up the Guard for

drug eradication purposes. Although House could recall instances in which the Guard

had been mobilized without a signed proclamation from the governor, none were part

of a law enforcement operation. 

Boyster testified that two Guard helicopters were flying no more than one

hundred feet above his property and that one landed on adjacent property. The first

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individuals who came to his residence were in army fatigues he said, and local law

enforcement arrived some 30 - 45 minutes later. He admitted that he gave the

government agents permission to "look around" and that he signed a consent to search

form, but he claimed that he only signed it after being told they "weren't after me."

He affirmed on cross examination that he had also signed a statement admitting he

grew marijuana on his land, but he denied knowing what was in the statement when

he signed it. 

The district court denied Boyster's motion to suppress after hearing testimony

and receiving various exhibits, including a video of the aerial surveillance. The court

determined that 32 U.S.C. § 112 allows the use of the Guard in drug interdiction if it

is pursuant to a state plan and consistent with Arkansas law. The court concluded that

Arkansas law gives the governor the authority to utilize the Guard for this purpose and

does not require a specific proclamation in each instance in which the Guard is called

up by the state. The district court also found that Boyster did not have an expectation

of privacy in the land surveyed by the helicopters and that there was probable cause

for the DEA and ASP to go to Boyster's residence and continue their investigation

once the spotters identified marijuana in the field adjacent to his residence. When the

officers who approached his residence on the ground saw that there was marijuana in

plain view on his property, there was additional probable cause for the search.

Finally, the court found that Boyster's statements to investigators were voluntary and

admissible. 

Boyster complains that the Guard's participation in the aerial surveillance of his

property was unlawful because the governor had not issued a proclamation

authorizing participation by the militia as required by Arkansas law. He argues that

he had an expectation of privacy in the absence of such a proclamation, that the search

therefore violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence obtained as a result

must be excluded for that reason and as fruit of the poisonous tree. The United States

responds that Arkansas law does not require a written or public gubernatorial

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proclamation for the state to use the Guard and that the Fourth Amendment was not

implicated by the search because Boyster had no expectation of privacy. We review

de novo the district court's legal conclusions on a motion to suppress and its factual

findings for clear error. United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2005).

An aerial surveillance by helicopter was held not to violate the Fourth

Amendment in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445(1989), because the defendant had had

no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court also pointed out that it was

of "obvious importance" that the helicopter had been violating no law and that the

situation would have been different "if flying at that altitude [400 feet] had been

contrary to law or regulation." 488 U.S. at 451. Boyster seeks to distinguish Riley on

the basis that the aerial surveillance here was unlawful because it had not been

authorized by a proclamation from the governor. 

Federal law authorizes funding for the use of the National Guard in drug

interdiction efforts, 32 U.S.C. § 112(b)(1), and the Arkansas Constitution authorizes

the governor to call up the Guard "in such manner as may be authorized by law." Ark.

Const. § 4. The Arkansas legislature has in turn spelled out this authority in several

statutory provisions. The governor may call up the Guard for "active service of the

state for such a period, to such extent, and in such manner as he may deem necessary"

in order to "preserve the public health and security and maintain law and order."

A.C.A. § 12-61-111(a)(1) (emphasis added). Whenever any part of the Guard is

called to aid civilian authorities, 

the Governor, if in his judgment the maintenance of law and order or

preservation of the public health or security will thereby be promoted,

may by proclamation declare the county, city, zone, or sector in which

the troops are serving, or any specified portion thereof, to be in a state of

insurrection or emergency. 

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A.C.A. § 12-61-115(a) (emphasis added). Boyster concedes that these provisions

authorize the governor to call up the Guard for drug interdiction efforts for the benefit

of public welfare and security, but he claims that § 12-61-115(a) requires issuance of

a proclamation from the governor in every instance in which the Guard aids local law

enforcement. 

We begin with the plain language of § 12-61-115, and our inquiry ends if the

provision is unambiguous. United States v. Maswai, 419 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.

2005); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Releford v.

Pine Bluff School Dist. No. 3, 140 S.W.3d 483, 485-86 (Ark. 2004). The language

of this provision should also be examined in a way to prevent other parts of the

Arkansas Code from being meaningless, inconsistent, or superfluous. Cody v. Hillard,

304 F.3d 767, 776 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Locke v. Cook, 434 S.W.2d 598, 601

(Ark. 1968). 

Section 12-61-115(a) uses permissive rather than mandatory language. It

provides that if the governor "in his judgment" believes the Guard needs to be called

up in the interest of protecting health and security, he "may by proclamation" declare

a state of insurrection or emergency. It does not say that the governor can only call

up the Guard by means of a proclamation or that a proclamation is necessary. Other

provisions of the Arkansas Code also support this reading and demonstrate precision

in the drafting language. Section 12-61-111(a)(1) provides that the governor can call

up the Guard for the same purposes "in such manner as he may deem necessary" and

does not indicate that a proclamation is required. Sections 12-61-115(a) and 12-61-

111(a)(1) are thus consistent with each other. Section 12-61-115(b) in contrast

provides that the "enforcement of the civil laws of the state shall be performed by the

militia" if the courts or law enforcement cannot function. (emphasis added). The

Arkansas courts have long presumed that when "shall" is used in the state statutes,

"the legislature intended mandatory compliance ... unless such an interpretation would

lead to absurdity." Fulmer v. State, 987 S.W.2d 700, 703 (1999); Hattison v. State,

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920 S.W.2d 849 (1996); Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987); Loyd

v. Knight, 706 S.W.2d 393 (1986). The converse must also be true – that the use of

"may" signifies the legislature's intent to establish discretionary authority unless that

result would be absurd. See, e.g., John T. v. Marion Independent School Dist., 173

F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1999). We conclude that the statutory scheme leaves the

decision whether to issue a proclamation to the discretion of the governor and that the

lack of such a proclamation here does not mean that the Guard's involvement in the

counterdrug surveillance was unlawful, particularly when the governor has

specifically certified that the counterdrug plan complies with state law.

Boyster also complains that the aerial surveillance infringed upon his privacy

rights in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The government responds that there is

no constitutional issue here because the initial discovery of marijuana was outside the

curtilage of Boyster's residence in an unprotected open field and that any expectation

of privacy would be unreasonable under the circumstances even if the land had been

in his curtilage. Boyster disputes this claim, referring to a statement in DEA Agent

Hydron's investigative report that the seized marijuana had been located "in an area

of and on the curtilage of" Boyster's residence. Boyster bears the burden to prove that

he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing being searched or surveyed.

United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Riley, 488 U.S.

at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 

The Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of an individual's residence, but

not surrounding open fields. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).

Curtilage is "the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the

sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.

170, 180 (1984) (internal citations omitted), and is typically comprised of land

adjoining a house, often within some type of enclosure such as a fence. See Black's

Law Dictionary 411 (8th ed. 1999); see also United States v. Gerard, 362 F.3d 484,

487-88 (8th Cir. 2004) (presence of a fence between the primary residence and

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another area typically means that area is outside the curtilage). Determining whether

a particular area is part of the curtilage of an individual's residence requires

consideration of "factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect

that the area in question should be treated as the home itself." United States v. Dunn,

480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. Although every curtilage

determination grows out of its own set of facts, Gerard, 362 F.3d at 487, four factors

are particularly significant: "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the

home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the

nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to

protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301; see

also Gerard, 362 F.3d at 487; United States v. Mooring, 137 F.3d 595, 596 (8th Cir.

1998). 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not err by

determining that the aerial surveillance had not occurred within the curtilage of

Boyster's residence. The statement by agent Hydron that marijuana was located on

the curtilage of his property is only one of the facts in the record, and we must

examine their totality in light of Dunn. The observed field was located over 100 yards

from the residence, and it was not enclosed by a fence. It does not appear that Boyster

took any ordinary precautions to keep the marijuana from being visible to onlookers,

and nothing in the record indicates that the land was used for any legitimate purpose

associated with a residence. The land in question is more properly considered an

unprotected open field with marijuana plants in plain view. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59;

see also United States v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2002) (field outside

the curtilage of defendant's residence was an open field that could be entered without

a warrant and everything in plain view could be searched).

Even if the land in question were within the curtilage, Boyster would still have

to demonstrate that he maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy which was

infringed by the aerial surveillance. An expectation of privacy is only legitimate if the

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individual challenging the search had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy

in the thing searched and demonstrated that his belief is objectively reasonable. Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). We assume

without deciding that Boyster had a subjective expectation of privacy and focus on

whether such an expectation could be objectively reasonable. So long as the aerial

surveillance took place in an area where the public could legally fly and at an altitude

generally used by the public, there would be no reasonable expectation of privacy and

thus no offense to the Fourth Amendment. Riley, 488 U.S. at 455 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring); see also United States v. Clark, 980 F.2d 11431146 (8th Cir. 1992);

United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1991). 

Boyster has made no allegation that the Guard pilots offended any federal

aviation regulation, and under existing federal law "[a]ny member of the public could

legally have been flying over [Boyster's] property in a helicopter" and could have

observed the marijuana plants growing in the open field. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451; see

also 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (helicopters may be operated below the minimums set for

aircraft if done without hazard to persons or property below). Boyster has failed to

establish the altitude of the flight in question, and even if it were at an altitude of

around one hundred feet as he alleges, he has not shown that flights at this altitude are

so rare as to make aerial surveillance at that level unreasonable. Riley, 488 U.S. at 455

(O'Connor, J., concurring). 

We conclude that Boyster's asserted expectation of privacy is not one "that

society is prepared to accept" as reasonable. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214

(1984) (finding that defendant's expectation that his garden was protected from lawful

aerial surveillance by law enforcement was unreasonable); Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52

(upholding the aerial surveillance of greenhouse by law enforcement flying at an

altitude of 400 feet since there was no reasonable expectation of privacy). The aerial

surveillance in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

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For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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