Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01560/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01560-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott M. Kernan
Respondent
Dao Van Vy
Petitioner

Document Text:

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Vy was in the Young Asians gang and the victim, Nguyen, was in the Kings of the Night gang.

A third gang, Viet Killers, was a rival of the former and friendly with the latter gang. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAO VAN VY,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT M. KERNAN, Warden,

Respondents. /

No. C 05-1560 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

This matter is now before the court for consideration of the merits of Dao Van Vy’s pro

se petition for writ of habeas corpus concerning his 2002 conviction. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion: 

Petitioner Dao Van Vy was a 16-year old member of a small Vietnamese gang in San

Jose.1

 Kiet Nguyen, the 20-year old victim, was a member of a rival gang. Problems between

the two gangs became apparent approximately one month prior to the stabbing incident. Two

weeks prior to the incident, a confrontation occurred between the members of the rival gangs.

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On May 27, 2000, Nguyen was at a coffee shop with his friends. Nguyen noticed that

several males, sitting at another table, were staring at him. Eventually, the group of males left

the coffee shop. Nguyen’s friend approached him and informed him that someone outside

wanted to talk to him, but warned Nguyen not to go outside. Nguyen disregarded the advice,

went outside, and noticed seven young Vietnamese males waiting for him. Nguyen was asked

whether he was a member of a rival gang and he confirmed his membership. The seven males

then attacked him. Nguyen was unarmed. 

Vy was among the seven attackers. In an attempt to disguise his identity, he pulled a

stocking over his face. Nguyen testified that when he saw Vy pull the stocking over his face,

“I knew I was gone . . . Because I knew he was going to kill me.” Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 5.

He saw a “shiny object,” which he believed was metal, “pull[ed] out from [defendant’s] pocket

or something, just to the right of . . . where his waist [was].” Id. (brackets in source.) Vy was

the only armed attacker. Nguyen observed Vy lunging toward him but did not see Vy hit him.

Nguyen did not feel himself being stabbed and only realized he had been stabbed when he

“looked down and saw [his] guts falling out.” Id. (brackets in source.) The attack ended when

Nguyen started running toward the entrance to the coffee shop, holding his wounds. The

attackers, including Vy, ran in the opposite direction. Nguyen was taken to the hospital where

he remained for several weeks. 

In a separate incident, Vy attacked Nguyen Nguyen at juvenile hall. The details of that

crime are not described because Vy has not challenged the resulting conviction. 

B. Case History

Vy was charged with attempted murder for the attack on Kiet Nguyen. See Cal. Penal

Code §§ 187, 664(a). It was alleged that the crime was committed willfully, deliberately, and

with premeditation. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 664, 187, 189. It was further alleged that Vy

committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal

street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang

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members. See Cal. Penal Code §186.22(b)(1). 

Vy was also charged with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon for the February 16,

2001 assault upon Nguyen Nguyen at juvenile hall. Sentence enhancements for personal use of

a weapon and for a crime committed for a gang were alleged for this crime. See Cal. Penal Code

§§ 186.22, 667, 1192.7. 

The jury found Vy guilty of attempted murder, with true findings as to both special

allegations. Vy was found not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon , but guilty of the lesser

included misdemeanor offense of assault. The court sentenced Vy to 15 years to life in prison

with a concurrent 6-month sentence

Vy appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Vy’s conviction in a partially

published opinion. The California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. Vy then filed

this habeas action. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over Vy’s habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

conviction occurred in Santa Clara County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 84, 2241(d). 

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 b), (c). State judicial remedies have

been exhausted for the claims presented in the petition. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

DISCUSSION

Vy asserts four claims in his habeas petition. First, he contends that the trial court

violated his right to due process when it failed to instruct the jury on assault with a deadly

weapon as a lesser related offense to attempted murder. Second, he argues that his right to due

process was violated by the jury instruction on motive. Third, Vy contends that the cumulative

impact of the instructional errors violated his due process right to a fair trial, even if they did not

do so individually. Fourth, Vy argues that his right to due process was violated because there

was insufficient evidence of the “primary activities” for the gang sentencing enhancement.

A. Failure to instruct on assault with a deadly weapon

At his trial, Vy requested an instruction on assault with a deadly weapon as an uncharged

lesser related offense to attempted murder. The prosecutor opposed Vy’s request, arguing that

California law does not permit the court to instruct the jury on uncharged related offenses, absent

the stipulation of the prosecution. The trial court agreed with the prosecution and denied Vy’s

request. Vy argues that the court’s decision to not instruct on the related offense violated his due

process rights because the jury was given an “all or nothing” choice of finding him guilty of

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attempted murder or attempted voluntary manslaughter, on the one hand, or acquittal, on the

other hand. 

On appeal, Vy recognized that under California law, a defendant is not entitled as a matter

of right to instructions on an uncharged lesser related offense. People v. Birks 19 Cal.4th 108

(1998). Vy argued that, because he did not intend to kill the victim, the jury could have found

him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and therefore, should have been instructed on it. Vy

further contended that the rationale of Birks did not apply because, even before the trial, the

prosecution knew that evidence supported the lesser related charge of assault with a deadly

weapon. Vy also argued that the prosecution consented to the related offense instruction because

it requested that the court instruct the jury that it could find Vy guilty of attempted murder

“based on his guilt of ‘the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.’” Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p.

27. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Vy’s claim:

In Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th 108, the Supreme Court reexamined the correctness of its prior

holding in People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510 (Geiger). The court in Geiger had held

that “a defendant has a state constitutional right to instructions on uncharged lesser

offenses, supported by the evidence, which are not necessarily included in the charged

offense but merely bear some relationship thereto.” (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 119.)

Fourteen years later in Birks, the Supreme Court overruled Geiger, concluding that it had

“represent[ed] an unwarranted extension of the right to instructions on lesser offenses.”

(Birks, supra, at p. 112.) 

As noted, defendant argues against application of Birks because its rationale -- potential

unfairness to the prosecution from a requirement that the court instruct, upon a defense

request, on lesser related, uncharged offenses -- is not present here. We reject this

position.

The court’s holding in Birks was broad-based. The Supreme Court’s reasons were not

limited to the “fairness to prosecution” ground selected here by defendant. Other rationale

for the Birks court overruling its prior decision were that Geiger: (1) caused uncertainty

in its implementation by the courts, particularly in determining whether a particular

uncharged offense was “related” to the crime actually charged under the facts of the

particular case (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 130-131 & p. 131, fn. 16); (2) “afford[ed]

the defense a superior right at trial to determine whether the jury will consider a lesser

offense alternative, or instead will face an all-or-nothing choice between conviction of

the stated charge and complete acquittal” (id. at p. 128); (3) “interfere[d] in particular

with a role traditionally accorded to the People alone, the responsibility to determine the

charges” (id. at p. 130); (4) was not followed in most jurisdictions (id. at p. 133, fn. 17);

and (5) presented “a serious question . . . whether such a right [of the defense to require

instruction for an uncharged related offense] can be reconciled with the separation of

powers clause” in the California Constitution. (Id. at p. 134.)

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We conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing defendant’s request for an

instruction concerning the uncharged offense of assault with a deadly weapon. The

prosecution did not agree that the instruction would be given, and there is no basis for

concluding that it consented to it implicitly and/or was estopped from objecting to the

instruction. Birks is plainly applicable to the circumstances presented in this case.

Defendant’s argument – that we read Birks as proscribing a related-offense instruction

requested by defendant and objected to by the prosecution only where giving it would be

unfair to the prosecution – is untenable. There is no basis for construing Birks in the

narrow manner that defendant suggests. 

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion pp. 28-29. 

The California Court of Appeal also rejected the federal constitutional claim based on the

rejection of the related offense instruction. The court explained that the U. S. Supreme Court

held that a state did not violate due process when it denied instructions requested by a capital

defendant on a lesser non-included offense in Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998). The court

noted that the California Supreme Court had determined that Reeves had acknowledged that the

Constitution did not require anything more than instruction on lesser included offenses. Order

Modifying Opinion And Denying Rehearing, pp. 2-3. 

The California Court of Appeal's holding was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. There is no clearly established law that a trial

court must instruct on lesser related offenses. The Supreme Court held in Beck v. Alabama, 447

U.S. 625 (1980), that an instruction on a lesser included offense must be given in a capital case;

however, the law is unsettled as to whether such an instruction must be given in noncapital cases.

The Ninth Circuit has declined to find constitutional error arising from the failure to instruct on

a lesser included offense in a noncapital case. Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Importantly, Vy’s claim here concerns the duty to give an instruction on a lesser related

offense. The law on such duty is even more unsettled. Federal law does not support Vy’s claim

that under this set of facts, a court must instruct on lesser related offenses. To grant Vy’s claim,

therefore, this court would have to create a new rule. In Teague v. Lane 489 U.S. 288 (1989),

the United States Supreme Court held that, with a few exceptions not relevant here, a federal

court may not grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after his

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conviction and sentence became final. Here, Vy’s conviction and sentence have become final

and this court may not create a new rule requiring that an instruction on lesser related offenses

must be given. 

Notwithstanding the lack of a specific rule requiring the court to instruct on lesser

included and lesser related offenses, there is authority that habeas relief is available when the

failure to instruct results in a failure to instruct on defendant’s theory of the case or so infects

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d

734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (error to deny defendant’s request for instruction on simple kidnaping

where such instruction was supported by the evidence). This principle stems from the general

rule from the Supreme Court that habeas relief is available when an erroneous jury instruction

so infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Even assuming that the Supreme Court

source of this rule would make it clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), it would not support relief in this case. A defendant does not have a right to have

the jury hear his specific proposed instruction on his theory of the case if other instructions, in

their entirety, adequately cover the defense theory. Cf. Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 743

(9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the instructions given did require the finding of a specific intent to kill; thus, Vy

was able to and did argue that the element had not been proven and he was therefore entitled to

acquittal. The jury instruction on attempted murder identified the elements to include specific

intent, i.e., “[t]he person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a

specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” CT 894; see also CT 897 (if jurors “are

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that when he did this act he had the specific intent to

kill, [jurors] must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of attempted murder and/or

attempted voluntary manslaughter”); CT 875 (there must be a union of act and specific intent

for attempted murder). Vy was able to and did argue that he was not guilty of the charged crime.

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During his closing statements to the jury, Vy’s attorney reiterated that if the evidence of specific

intent permitted two reasonable interpretations, one of which pointed to Vy having the specific

intent to kill and the other pointing to Vy not having the specific intent to kill, the jury then had

to adopt the latter. RT 1109-1110. 

Vy had no constitutional right to have the jury instructed in a way that was more likely

to be helpful to him when the instructions given did allow him to argue his defense theory. He

had no right to have the jury given a compromise option (of assault with a deadly weapon) rather

than the all-or-nothing choice it had under the instructions given. The instructions allowed him

to argue he did not act with the requisite specific intent. Furthermore, the record also does not

indicate that the absence of the instruction had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Vy is not entitled to writ on this claim.

B. Jury instruction on motive

Vy also argues that the standard motive instruction given to the jury was erroneous

because it reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof. The motive instruction read as follows:

“Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. However, you may

consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend

to establish the defendant is guilty. Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not

guilty.” CT 852 (CALJIC No. 2.51 (2004 ed.).) Vy contends that CALJIC No. 2.51 implied to

the jury that it could infer guilt simply from a finding of motive. 

Vy argued in the California Court of Appeal that the motive instruction – unlike the

instructions about the significance of other circumstantial evidence, such as association with

coconspirators, flight after the crime, and mere presence at the crime scene – did not instruct that

this circumstance alone was not sufficient to establish guilt. The California Court of Appeal

rejected Vy’s argument. It noted that the California Supreme Court rejected a challenge to

CALJIC No. 2.51 in People v. Snow, 30 Cal.4th 43 (2003). Snow held that the instruction

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specifically advised the jury that motive was not “an element of the crime charged (murder) and

need not be shown, which leaves little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish

all the elements of murder.’" Id. at 98. 

In rejecting Vy's claim, the court relied on an earlier California appellate court decision

that had considered CALJIC No. 2.51. CALJIC No. 2.51 was 

given for the additional purpose of clarifying that motive is not an element of a crime .

. . CALJIC No. 2.51 points out that motive (unlike intent) need not be proved.

Considering that the instruction is different in this way from the instructions to which

defendant refers, there is nothing particularly startling or anomalous about the fact that

it is phrased differently than the others. Although the instruction informs the jury that

motive could tend to show that defendant was guilty, the balance of the instructions made

it clear that in order to prove the crime charged all of the elements of each crime must be

proved. Since CALJIC No. 2.51 very plainly establishes that motive is not an element of

the crimes, it is hard to imagine how a jury might conclude that motive alone would be

sufficient to establish guilt. In light of the instructions as a whole it is not reasonably

probable the jury would have understood the instruction as defendant urges. 

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 32 (quoting People v. Petznick, 114 Cal. App. 4th 663, 685 (Cal. App.

2003). The state court of appeal determined that CALJIC No. 2.51 could not reasonably be

construed as having misled the jury to believe that guilt could be inferred from the mere presence

of motive. 

The only way for Vy to obtain federal collateral relief here is by a showing that an

instructional error was committed and that such error, by itself, so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violated due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).

Furthermore, he must demonstrte that such instructional error had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637

(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. at 776). Vy has not met these burdens.

The California Court of Appeal’s adjudication of the claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. The court reasonably held that the

instruction on motive did not imply to the jury that it could find Vy guilty based solely on the

finding of motive. The instruction was a standard motive instruction, unambiguously stating that

motive was not an element of the crime and that it need not be shown. Therefore, irrespective

of whether or not it found motive, the jury still had to be convinced that all of the elements of

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attempted murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that CALJIC No. 2.51 did

not parallel instructions on other circumstances did not make it deficient. The instructions as

a whole clearly required the jury to find that each element of attempted murder was proven to

return a guilty verdict. Vy is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

C. Cumulative impact of the jury instructions

Vy contends that the refusal to give an instruction on assault with a deadly weapon and

the use of the standard motive instruction cumulatively had the effect of denying him a fair trial.

The California Court of Appeal dismissed this claim, stating that it had previously rejected each

of petitioner’s three claims of instructional error. Since no error occurred, there was no

prejudice, cumulative or otherwise. 

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal,

the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much that his

conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003)

(reversing conviction where multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to

challenge every important element of proof offered by prosecution). However, where there is

no single constitutional error, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation.

See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704

(9th Cir. 1999); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The state appellate court’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. The California Court of Appeal reasonably found

that there was no single error and, therefore, no cumulative error. Vy is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief on this claim. 

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D. Sufficiency of the evidence for the gang enhancement 

Vy contends that his right to due process was violated because there was insufficient

evidence to support the sentence enhancement he received for committing a crime for the benefit

of a criminal street gang. Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence that the

commission of one or more enumerated crimes was one of his gang's primary activities. Vy does

not challenge the evidence that he was in a criminal street gang known as the Young Asians

("YA"). 

California law provides for a sentence enhancement for crimes committed "for the benefit

of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang." Cal. Penal Code §

186.22(b)(1). A criminal street gang is defined as "any ongoing organization, association, or

group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary

activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated [in § 186(e)(1) - (25)],

having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually

or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity." Cal. Penal

Code § 186.22(f) (emphasis added). The focus in Vy's case is on the "primary activities" part

of the definition.

The California Court of Appeal explained that the "primary activities" phrase had been

construed by the California Supreme Court to imply that the commission of one or more of the

enumerated crimes "'is one of the group's "chief" or "principal" occupations. That definition

would necessarily exclude the occasional commission of those crimes by the group's members'"

and the commission of crimes not enumerated. Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 14 (citations omitted).

The element may be shown by "'evidence that the group's members consistently and repeatedly

have committed'" the enumerated crimes or by expert testimony that the gang "'was primarily

engaged'" in the enumerated crimes. Id. at 14-15 (citation omitted). The evidence must,

however, show more than a single instance of one of the enumerated crimes. See id. at 15. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Vy's claim on appeal that there was insufficient

evidence that his gang had as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the

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criminal acts enumerated in California Penal Code § 186(e)(1) - (25). 

The prosecution identified a felony assault occurring on March 4, 2000 (i.e., stabbing of

VK member by a YA member), as one criminal act. Detective Ta--who was highly

qualified as an expert on the subject of Vietnamese gangs--testified that YA (Kim)

committed another assault with a deadly weapon in May 2000. The third YA criminal

act was the attempted murder of Kiet by defendant charged as count 1. While defendant

challenges the inclusion of attempted murder as a predicate crime, we disagree.

[Footnote omitted.] Furthermore, even were defendant's argument to have merit, it would

be of no consequence; plainly, [fellow YA gang member Tai N's felony assault] in the

same attack upon the victim, Kiet, is an enumerated offense which can be considered for

a "primary activities" element of the gang enhancement statute. . . .

Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” (Jackson v.

Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319), we find that it is sufficient to satisfy the “primary

activities” prong of section 186.22(f). The evidence here shows the existence of three

serious, violent crimes by YA gang members that took place over a period of less than

three months. Significantly, two YA stabbings of rival gang members preceded the

charged crime by only 12 weeks. 

Defendant urges us to look at the entire two-year period of YA’s existence in order to

conclude that the gang did not “consistently and repeatedly” engage in predicate criminal

acts. [Citation.] Under the circumstances presented here, however, we reject defendant’s

invitation to essentially “spread out” the predicate crimes over YA’s entire existence.

Instead, we, find the existence of three violent felonies by a gang as small as YA over

less than three months to be sufficient to satisfy the “primary activities” element. Stated

otherwise, the fact that YA’s level of criminal activity lay dormant for most of its

existence does not preclude a finding that it was a gang under the enhancement statute,

where there was evidence of consistent and repeated criminal activity during a short

period before the subject crime. Moreover, the fact that there was evidence elicited from

Tai during cross-examination by defense counsel that the YA members did “stuff that 16-

year-olds do” does not negate other evidence that YA committed crimes sufficient to

satisfy the “primary activities” prong of section 186.22(f).”

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 18-19. The appellate court also noted that the police gang expert had

provided "significant expert testimony that YA was engaged in criminal actions that constituted

predicate crimes under the gang statute," which established the primary activities element. Id.

at 19. 

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether

it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982

F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 US 843 (1993). Rather, the federal court

“determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” See id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The writ

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may be granted only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.3d at 338.

The California Court of Appeal's rejection of Vy's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. The court identified the correct

legal standard for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, and reasonably applied that

standard in Vy's case. See Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 16-19. The evidence at trial showed that

a YA member stabbed a rival gang member twelve weeks before Vy stabbed Kiet Nguyen,

another YA member committed an assault with a deadly weapon less than month before Vy

stabbed Kiet Nguyen, and another YA member committed a felony assault during the same

attack in which Vy stabbed Kiet Nguyen. Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force

likely to produce great bodily injury is one of the enumerated offenses. See Cal. Penal Code §

186.22(e)(1). The evidence showing three felony assaults in three months by a gang of five

people was sufficient to establish the primary activities element of the gang enhancement.

Although there also was evidence showing that YA may have been dormant until three months

before Vy stabbed Nguyen and that YA's members did "stuff that 16-year-olds do" over the

course of its two-year existence, that evidence did not undermine the evidence that YA members

committed three enumerated crimes in less than three months. The evidence was sufficient to

support the sentence enhancement. Vy is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk

shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 18, 2006 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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