Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03818/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03818-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guillermo C. Gonzalez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3818

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Guillermo C. Gonzalez, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 13, 2007

Filed: July 30, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Guillermo C. Gonzalez was convicted of escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751 twenty

years after he walked away from a prison camp in Duluth, Minnesota, and fled to the

Dominican Republic. On appeal, Gonzalez challenges the district court’s1

 refusal to

submit three proposed instructions to the jury regarding the application of the statute

of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. We affirm.

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Gonzalez, born a Dominican citizen, became a naturalized United States citizen

between 1961 and 1962. In 1985, he was convicted of bank larceny in the Southern

District of New York. Prior to his conviction, while out on bond, he impermissibly

returned to the Dominican Republic. He was re-arrested and ultimately sentenced to

eight years of imprisonment—three years for his failure to appear and five years for

the underlying offense. On October 17, 1985, he began his sentence at the Federal

Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, and on June 1, 1986, was transferred

to the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota. On June 27, 1985, after learning

his mother was ill, he walked away from the camp and fled to the Dominican

Republic.

Gonzalez testified, once back in the Dominican Republic, he contacted his

attorney, Morel Cerda. He claims Cerda “notified the American Embassy that [he]

was in the Dominican Republic, and that [he] wanted to have [his] case heard in the

Dominican Court,” because he had “lost all faith in the American justice system.”

According to Gonzalez, the embassy arranged a meeting between Cerda and two

unnamed FBI agents at his attorney’s office. While not present at the meeting,

Gonzalez testified he believed, after talking with Cerda about the meeting, he would

not be arrested so long as he stayed in the Dominican Republic.

Over the next twenty years, Gonzalez, a Vietnam War veteran, returned

periodically to the United States to receive medical treatment at Veterans

Administration hospitals. During those trips, he used his name and naturalization

papers to cross the border into the United States. For a short period of time, he was

in Atlanta, Georgia, to receive medical treatment. In Atlanta, he obtained a job using

his name and Social Security number. In 2005, upon returning to the Dominican

Republic, he went to the American Embassy to enroll his children as United States

citizens. He was asked to return multiple times to fill out forms. During his final visit

to the embassy on November 2, 2005, nearly twenty years after his escape from

federal custody, he was arrested.

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On November 10, 2005, Gonzalez was charged with escape in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 751. At trial, he sought three jury instructions supporting a statute of

limitations defense. The district court rejected these instructions, concluding

Gonzalez had submitted insufficient factual support for the defense. The jury returned

a guilty verdict, and on October 30, 2006, he was sentenced to one year and one day

imprisonment, to be served consecutively with the remainder of his previously

imposed sentences. On appeal, he argues the district court erred by failing to instruct

the jury on the scope of escape and the application of the five-year statute of

limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282.

II

“Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a decision to submit an

instruction to the jury is a question of law to be determined de novo by the court.”

United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 816 (8th Cir. 2006). “[T]he trial court has

broad discretion in choosing the form and language of jury instructions.” United

States v. Westbrook, 896 F.2d 330, 337 (8th Cir. 1990). A defendant, however, “has

a right to have an instruction read reflecting his or her theory of the case, provided that

the request is made in time and that the instruction is supported by the evidence and

correctly states the law.” Id. When an instruction concerns an available defense, the

defendant must show “an underlying evidentiary foundation as to each element of the

defense, regardless of how weak, inconsistent or dubious the evidence on a given

point may seem.” United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1986)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “We have never held, however, that a defense

must be submitted to the jury even when it cannot be said that a reasonable person

might conclude the evidence supports the defendant’s position.” Id. at 591 (internal

quotations marks omitted).

Gonzalez argues, based on the evidence presented at trial, he was entitled to

have the jury instructed regarding the statute of limitations. We disagree. This case

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In Bailey, although the Supreme Court acknowledged an escapee might assert

a duress or necessity defense to escape, it also held this defense requires “a bona fide

effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity

[loses] its coercive force.” Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415.

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presents an issue of first impression for the court. We have never before determined

what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a statute of limitations instruction in

an escape case. Not surprisingly, there is very little case law on the crime of escape.

This is likely because, to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), the government need

only show “an escapee knew his actions would result in his leaving physical

confinement without permission.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980).

There is even less case law regarding potential affirmative defenses to escape.2

 As for

the statute of limitations, we have found no cases addressing the application of the

five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282 in escape cases. This is also

unsurprising as Congress has specifically indicated: “No statute of limitations shall

extend to any person fleeing from justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3290; see also Bailey, 444

U.S. at 414 n.10 (citing § 3290 and noting “[b]ecause an escaped prisoner is, by

definition, a fugitive from justice, the statute of limitations normally applicable to

federal offenses would be tolled while he remained at large”). It is difficult to

envision a factual scenario where an escapee is not, as a matter of law, fleeing from

justice. For the reasons discussed below, even if an escapee could assert such a

defense, Gonzalez failed to submit sufficient evidence at trial to support the defense.

Typically, “[a]n offense is committed when it is completed, that is, when each

element of that offense has occurred.” United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875

(7th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). There is a recognized exception to this rule

for so-called continuing offenses. Id. “For those crimes, the statute of limitations

does not begin to run when all elements are first present, but rather begins when the

offense expires.” Id. at 875-76. The Supreme Court in Bailey unequivocally defined

escape as a continuing offense:

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Gonzalez attempts to analogize the crime of escape with the continuing crime

of conspiracy. We have held the crime of conspiracy expires, and the statute of

limitations is triggered, if and when the conspirator withdraws from the conspiracy.

United States v. Grimmett, 236 F.3d 452, 453 (8th Cir. 2001). Even if we accept

Gonzalez’s analogy, however, his conduct does not meet the high standard for

withdrawal. We have held withdrawal from conspiracy requires distinct affirmative

action to defeat the conspiracy. Id. at 456. Here, Gonzalez did not affirmatively act

to terminate or defeat his escape. Unlike the conspirator who ostracizes her former

compatriots, goes to law enforcement, and fully confesses and cooperates, Gonzalez

never surrendered or put himself at risk of recapture.

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[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody

as defined in [18 U.S.C.] § 751(a) is a continuing offense and that an

escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for

his initial departure. Given the continuing threat to society posed by an

escaped prisoner, the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress

must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.

Id. at 413. The Bailey Court went on to dictate “the statute of limitations is tolled for

the period that the escapee remains at large.” Id. at 414. See also United States v.

Elliott, 467 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Likewise the crime of escape, complete

when the prisoner leaves custody, continues until he turns himself in or is nabbed.”).

Here, Gonzalez argues he presented enough evidence to support his proposed

jury instructions on the statute of limitations. We disagree. Although Bailey concerns

a defendant’s assertion of a necessity or duress defense rather than a statute of

limitations defense, it is instructive. The Bailey Court explicitly included the failure

to return to custody as part of the escape offense, id. at 413, and noted the statute of

limitations is tolled while an escapee “remains at large.” Id. at 414. It would follow

that to end the crime of escape and trigger the statute of limitations, an escapee must

return to custody, or, at the very least, must make a bona fide attempt to surrender.3

See United States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding the

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statute of limitations period under 18 U.S.C. § 3282 is not tolled when a fugitive “is

making a good faith effort to surrender”).

At trial, Gonzalez testified, after he escaped and fled to the Dominican

Republic, his attorney notified the American Embassy about his presence in the

Dominican Republic, and further met with two unnamed FBI agents who allegedly

told the attorney that Gonzalez would not be arrested so long as he remained in the

Dominican Republic. Any issues of hearsay aside, we cannot conclude this

constitutes a bona fide attempt to surrender. Even if we assume Gonzalez’s testimony

is true, it establishes only that he contacted United States officials through an

intermediary. There is no evidence he personally met with officials to arrange his

surrender. Because he never presented himself to officials, he was never at any real

risk of recapture. One wonders what his response would have been had the FBI

agents directed him, via Cerda, to report to the American Embassy for extradition.

Furthermore, the Bailey Court cautioned “[v]ague and necessarily self-serving

statements of defendants or witnesses as to future good intentions or ambiguous

conduct” are insufficient to support a finding the defendant made a bona fide effort

to surrender. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415. The testimony presented here seems precisely

of the type the Bailey Court cautioned against.

Gonzalez also claims his several trips into United States to receive medical

treatment, because he presented his identification documents to border officials, also

constitute bona fide attempts to return to custody sufficient to trigger the statute of

limitations. We disagree and hold such trips are insufficient to constitute attempts to

surrender. There is no evidence he told border officials he was on the lam. In fact,

there is no evidence he told anyone he encountered in the United States about his

status. By his testimony, he engaged in no affirmative conduct other than presenting

his passport and papers to border officials. While Gonzalez successfully entered the

United States without arrest does not indicate he was attempting to surrender or had

any intent to return to federal custody.

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On these facts, we conclude Gonzalez did not return to custody or make a bona

fide attempt to surrender. He presented no evidence he terminated his escape, thus

triggering the statute of limitations. As such, the district court was under no

obligation to submit to the jury his proposed instructions on the statute of limitations.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.

______________________________

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