Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02979/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02979-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Curtis R. Mack
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS R. MACK,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-02979 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S

DECISION

Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions forsummary judgment on plaintiff’s complaintseeking

judicialreview ofdefendant’s denial of plaintiff’s claim for Social Security disability benefits. Having carefully

considered the parties’ arguments,the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion, DENIES plaintiff’smotion,

and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision that plaintiff is not disabled and has the capacity to performa full

range of light work.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural background

On July 11, 2001, plaintiff filed an application forSocialSecurity disability insurance benefits alleging

a disability as of March 10, 1998, see Administrative Record 48-50 (hereinafter “AR”), due to lower back

pain, a sciatic nerve condition, and gout. AR 68. On October 18, 2001, the Commissioner denied plaintiff’s

application. AR 33-36. Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration on December 10, 2001, which was denied

on July 22, 2002. AR 37-41. Plaintiffthen requested an administrative hearing. AR 42. At the hearing, both

plaintiff and a Social Security Administration vocational expert testified before the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). AR 138-170. On August 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff had the capacity

to perform a full range of light work. AR 17-22. Plaintifffiled a request with the Appeals Council to have the

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decision reviewed. AR 8-12. The Appeals Council denied review and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. AR 5-8.

On July 22, 2004, plaintiff filed this action requesting judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision.

B. Factual background

1. Plaintiff’s medical history

Plaintiff was born on September 22, 1947. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. He completed high schooland two years

of college education in 1965. AR 61. Plaintiff was employed at General Motors as a truck driver and forklift

operatorin a warehouse and as a shipping and receiving clerk from 1970 to 1992. AR 83. His job included

loading and unloading parts and materials frequently weighing more than fifty pounds. AR 146-150. Plaintiff

held similarjobs at various places of employment through 1998. AR 83. Plaintiff stopped working on March

10, 1998 due to problems with his back and gout. AR 150.

Plaintiff was transported to Highland Hospital’s emergency room on June 25, 1999, fortreatment for

a right knee effusion. AR 96. F.C. Barnett, M.D., plaintiff’s treating physician at the Eastmont Wellness

Center, saw plaintiff on April 13, 2000 and diagnosed him with possible cirrhosis of the liver, a history of

Hepatitis C, and gout. AR 93-94. Plaintiff returned to the center on May 22, 2001 for reevaluation of his

hepatitis and gout conditions. AR 90. 

On September 18, 2001, plaintiff had a consultative examination by Calvin Pon, M.D. AR 84-86.

Dr. Pon diagnosed plaintiff with chronic lower back pain, symptoms ofleft sciatica, some sensory impairment

of his left foot and disuse atrophy ofthe left thigh. AR 85. The examination report indicated that plaintiff told

Dr. Pon that he had “no problems standing or walking” and that he is able to walk up and down stairs without

assistance. AR 84. Dr. Pon held the opinion that plaintiff was able to stand/walk or sit for a total of six out

of eight hours of a work day and lift and carry up to twenty pounds frequently, consistent with plaintiff being

able to do work of a light exertional level. Id.

Plaintiffreturned to Eastmont Wellness Center on September 27, 2001 with complaints ofback pain.

AR 88. On October 25, 2001, plaintiff saw Steven Stepto, M.D., M.P.H. about his sciatica and left leg

numbness. AR 136. Dr. Stepto reccommended streteching and yoga exercises and prescribed Naproxen and

Robaxin. Id. Plaintiff’s medical records through May 5, 2003 reflect no indications of prescriptions,

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treatments, or diagnostics for back pain prior to September 27, 2001, or after October 25, 2001. 

On May 5, 2003, plaintiff’streatingphysicianDr. Barnett completed a MedicalSource Statement with

the opinion that plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. AR 118. Dr. Barnett determined that plaintiff could

sit or stand/walk three to four hours out of an eight hour work day. AR 118.

2. Administrative hearing

At the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that his back pain allows him to sit comfortably for only

one hour, after which he needs to stand and walk or lie down. AR 155. Plaintiff testified that he can take care

ofhimself on a daily basis and can walk at least six blocks at a slow pace to the grocery store and carry at least

a gallon of milk home. AR 157-59. However, plaintiff also testified that he could not work for eight hours a

day for five days a week even if he were able to alternate standing and sitting positions. AR 155. 

A SocialSecurity Administrationvocationalexpert, Mr. John Velton, testified about the exertion level

ofplaintiff’s past work, transferable skills, and jobs available in the regionaland nationaleconomy. Mr. Velton

determined that, although plaintiff would not be able to return to employment similar to his previous occupation,

plaintiff had transferrable skills. AR 162, 165. The ALJ asked Mr. Velton if there were any jobs in the light

levelcategory to which a person with plaintiff’s skills could transfer. AR 165. Mr. Velton identified truck load

checker and shipping checker as potential light level jobs. Id. The ALJ then asked Mr. Velton if these jobs

were viable options ifthe person with plaintiff’sskills could either (1) only stand or walk forfour hours per day,

or (2) stand/sit at will. AR 167. Mr. Velton answered that those jobs required almost constant standing and

walking and would be eliminated in the case of a person who could only stand or walk four hours per day or

was required to stand/sit at will. Id. The ALJ then questioned Mr. Velton about unskilled jobs for a person

with such requirements. Id. Mr. Velton indicated that there might be a limited number of cashier jobs available.

AR 168. Mr. Velton also testified that there were no sedentary jobs to which plaintiff’s skills could transfer.

Id. 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff suffered from chronic lower back pain with some symptoms of

sciatica. Relying on the consultative examination of Dr. Pon, the ALJ determined that plaintiff retained the

“residual functional capacity to perform light work.” AR 18. The ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Barnett’s

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medicalsource statement limiting plaintiffto sedentary work because he did not find that Dr. Barnett’s opinion

was wellsupported by treatment records or other clinicalfindings. AR 19. The ALJ also considered plaintiff’s

testimony. However, the ALJ determined that, in light of the lack of medical evidence ofback pain treatment

or therapy, and plaintiff’s own testimony about his daily activities, there was no indicationthat plaintiff was not

capable of performing the “full range of light exertional activity.” AR 20. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of final decisions made by the Commissioner. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The court may enter a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Id.

The factualfindings of the Commissioner are conclusive if supported by substantialevidence. Id. The

court may set aside the Commissioner's final decision when that decision is based on legal error or where the

findings offact are not supported by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1999). Even if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual

findings, the decision must be set aside if improper legal standards were applied in weighing the evidence and

reaching the decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Legal errorliesif an ALJ

rejects a treatingphysician'suncontradicted opinionwithout providing "clear and convincing"reasons supported

by the record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the ALJ fails to provide

adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of a treating or examining physician, a reviewing court will credit the

physician's opinion as a matter of law. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The ALJ may also reject subjective complaints from plaintiff if the ALJ provides clear and convincing

reasons for rejecting such testimony. Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). In

considering subjective testimony about pain, the Commissioner must consider the entire record, including

objective medical evidence, the individual’s testimony about daily activities, statements from treating or

examining physicians, and any other relevant evidence. Social Security Rule 96-7p (hereinafter “SSR”). Lack

of objective medical evidence and treatment or therapy along with consideration of the individual’s testimony

of his daily activities has been sufficient reasoning for the ALJ to reject subjective testimony of pain. See

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Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly denied disability benefits because his findings were not

supported by substantial evidence, and committed legal error by using incorrect legal standards in the

determination of disability. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ incorrectly disregarded the opinion of the treating

physician, Dr. Barnett, without giving specific and legitimate reasons, and thus committed an outcomedeterminative legal error. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not consider plaintiff’s subjective testimony of

pain, and that the rejection of his testimony was unsubstantiated. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly rejected the treating physician’s opinion and relied on the

consultative examining physician’s opinion in finding that plaintiff had the capacity to do light work. According

to defendant, the ALJ correctly rejected Dr. Barnett’s opinion because it was not well-supported bymedical

treatment records orobjective medicalevidence. In addition, defendant argues that the ALJ properly assessed

and rejected plaintiff’s subjective testimony about his pain. 

This Court finds that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Barnett’s opinion and relied on Dr. Pon’s opinion

in determining that plaintiff retained residualfunctionalcapacity to do light work. Evidence submitted included

plaintiff’s medicalrecords from the Eastmont Wellness Center forthe period between June 21, 1999 and May

5, 2003, mainly for treatment of his liver condition and prescription refills unrelated to back pain. Allegations

of back pain were reported in September 2001, AR 137, and in October 2001, at which point plaintiff was

assessed with sciatica and occasional left leg numbness. AR 136. None of the medical records prior to

September 2001, or after October 2001, contain allegations of back pain or treatments for back pain. Both

Dr. Barnett and Dr. Pon diagnosed plaintiff with chronic back pain and sciatica, but differed on the conclusion

of the extent of exertional activity of which plaintiff was capable. The ALJ determined that Dr. Barnett’s

medical opinion was not well-supported by the records and was therefore not entitled to significant weight.

Relying on Dr. Pon’s opinion, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of light work. 

Social Security Ruling (hereinafter “SSR”) 96-2p sets out the policy for whether a treating source’s

medical opinion should be given controlling weight, e.g., must be adopted, or is just entitled to deference.

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1The factors are: (1) Examining Relationship; (2) Treatment Relationship; (3) Supportability; (4)

Consistency; (5) Specialization; and (6) Other factors which may support or contradict the opinion.

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“Controllingweightmay not be givento a treating source’s medicalopinion unlessthe opinion iswell-supported

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques . . . and it also is ‘not inconsistent’ with

the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Id. In the case where a treating source’s medical opinion

is not given controlling weight it may still be entitled to deference and is weighed using factors set forth in 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2004).1 Although treating sources are generally entitled to greater weight, the ALJ may

disregard a treating source’s opinion if clear and convincing reasons for doing so are presented. Magallanes

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). In such a case, the ALJ must provided a detailed summary

of the facts and conflicting evidence in making his findings. Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.

1986). The ALJ does not have to accept the treating physician’s opinion when he finds that it is “brief and

conclusory in formwith little in the way of clinical findings to support [it].” Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963,

968 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, plaintiff claims that his situation is similarto Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1997).

In Sprague, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ improperly rejected the treating physician’s testimony because

no specific reasons were given. Id. at 1230. Two examining sources and a treating source testified to plaintiff’s

impairments, but differed in their evaluations ofthe severity ofthe impairment–whether plaintiff was capable of

sedentary work or was completely disabled. Id. The ALJ disregarded the treating physician’s opinion solely

because his diagnosis additionally made reference to arthritis, which was not supported by the examining

physician’s testimony. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that this was an inadequate reason for disregarding the

treating physician’s opinion, “especially when . . . all the physicians diagnosed [the same impairment].” Id.

This case differs from Sprague. The ALJ clearly stated that he did not find the treating physician’s

opinion well-supported by clinical evidence. AR 19. The ALJ points out that the medical records consist

primarily of routine outpatient care and prescription refills unrelated to back pain, and indicate no related

treatment, therapy, or surgery for back pain. AR 19-20. The Court concludes that the ALJ did not

misconstrue the medicalrecords and gave clear reasons for not giving the treating physician’s medical source

opinion controlling or significant weight.

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In addition, the Court findsthat the ALJ did consider plaintiff’ssubjective testimony in his decisionand

it was notimproperly rejected. The ALJ states that he rejected plaintiff’s subjective testimony based on limited

medical evidence, lack of related treatment or therapy, testimony about his daily activities, testimony from

plaintiff that his doctor told him to walk daily, and no evidence of significant injuries or disease progress. AR

20. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings. The medical records between

June 1999 and May 2003 indicate that plaintiff alleged problems with back pain on only a couple of occasions

in 2001. There was no follow-up treatment, prescriptions or therapy, and no indication of disease progress.

Several progress notes between June 1999 and May 2003 not only do not mention back pain but actually

indicate the plaintiff reported zero pain level on a scale of zero to ten. Plaintiff testified that his doctor told him

to walk daily, and that he is able to walk to the grocery store. AR 158. Plaintiff also told Dr. Pon during the

consultative examinationthat he has no problems standing or walking, and is able to walk up stairs without aid.

AR 84. The Court concludes that the ALJ not only considered plaintiff’s subjective testimony of pain but

properly rejected it by considering it along with all other evidence on the record. 

CONCLUSION

This Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the evidence on the record and stated clear and

substantial reasons for both rejecting the treating physician’s medical opinion about the exertional level of work

plaintiff was capable ofperformingand plaintiff’ssubjective testimonyofpain. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision

is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2005 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS R. MACK,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-02979 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S

DECISION

Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions forsummary judgment on plaintiff’s complaintseeking

judicialreview ofdefendant’s denial of plaintiff’s claim for Social Security disability benefits. Having carefully

considered the parties’ arguments,the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion, DENIES plaintiff’smotion,

and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision that plaintiff is not disabled and has the capacity to performa full

range of light work.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural background

On July 11, 2001, plaintiff filed an application forSocialSecurity disability insurance benefits alleging

a disability as of March 10, 1998, see Administrative Record 48-50 (hereinafter “AR”), due to lower back

pain, a sciatic nerve condition, and gout. AR 68. On October 18, 2001, the Commissioner denied plaintiff’s

application. AR 33-36. Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration on December 10, 2001, which was denied

on July 22, 2002. AR 37-41. Plaintiffthen requested an administrative hearing. AR 42. At the hearing, both

plaintiff and a Social Security Administration vocational expert testified before the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). AR 138-170. On August 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff had the capacity

to perform a full range of light work. AR 17-22. Plaintifffiled a request with the Appeals Council to have the

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decision reviewed. AR 8-12. The Appeals Council denied review and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. AR 5-8.

On July 22, 2004, plaintiff filed this action requesting judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision.

B. Factual background

1. Plaintiff’s medical history

Plaintiff was born on September 22, 1947. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. He completed high schooland two years

of college education in 1965. AR 61. Plaintiff was employed at General Motors as a truck driver and forklift

operatorin a warehouse and as a shipping and receiving clerk from 1970 to 1992. AR 83. His job included

loading and unloading parts and materials frequently weighing more than fifty pounds. AR 146-150. Plaintiff

held similarjobs at various places of employment through 1998. AR 83. Plaintiff stopped working on March

10, 1998 due to problems with his back and gout. AR 150.

Plaintiff was transported to Highland Hospital’s emergency room on June 25, 1999, fortreatment for

a right knee effusion. AR 96. F.C. Barnett, M.D., plaintiff’s treating physician at the Eastmont Wellness

Center, saw plaintiff on April 13, 2000 and diagnosed him with possible cirrhosis of the liver, a history of

Hepatitis C, and gout. AR 93-94. Plaintiff returned to the center on May 22, 2001 for reevaluation of his

hepatitis and gout conditions. AR 90. 

On September 18, 2001, plaintiff had a consultative examination by Calvin Pon, M.D. AR 84-86.

Dr. Pon diagnosed plaintiff with chronic lower back pain, symptoms ofleft sciatica, some sensory impairment

of his left foot and disuse atrophy ofthe left thigh. AR 85. The examination report indicated that plaintiff told

Dr. Pon that he had “no problems standing or walking” and that he is able to walk up and down stairs without

assistance. AR 84. Dr. Pon held the opinion that plaintiff was able to stand/walk or sit for a total of six out

of eight hours of a work day and lift and carry up to twenty pounds frequently, consistent with plaintiff being

able to do work of a light exertional level. Id.

Plaintiffreturned to Eastmont Wellness Center on September 27, 2001 with complaints ofback pain.

AR 88. On October 25, 2001, plaintiff saw Steven Stepto, M.D., M.P.H. about his sciatica and left leg

numbness. AR 136. Dr. Stepto reccommended streteching and yoga exercises and prescribed Naproxen and

Robaxin. Id. Plaintiff’s medical records through May 5, 2003 reflect no indications of prescriptions,

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treatments, or diagnostics for back pain prior to September 27, 2001, or after October 25, 2001. 

On May 5, 2003, plaintiff’streatingphysicianDr. Barnett completed a MedicalSource Statement with

the opinion that plaintiff was limited to sedentary work. AR 118. Dr. Barnett determined that plaintiff could

sit or stand/walk three to four hours out of an eight hour work day. AR 118.

2. Administrative hearing

At the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that his back pain allows him to sit comfortably for only

one hour, after which he needs to stand and walk or lie down. AR 155. Plaintiff testified that he can take care

ofhimself on a daily basis and can walk at least six blocks at a slow pace to the grocery store and carry at least

a gallon of milk home. AR 157-59. However, plaintiff also testified that he could not work for eight hours a

day for five days a week even if he were able to alternate standing and sitting positions. AR 155. 

A SocialSecurity Administrationvocationalexpert, Mr. John Velton, testified about the exertion level

ofplaintiff’s past work, transferable skills, and jobs available in the regionaland nationaleconomy. Mr. Velton

determined that, although plaintiff would not be able to return to employment similar to his previous occupation,

plaintiff had transferrable skills. AR 162, 165. The ALJ asked Mr. Velton if there were any jobs in the light

levelcategory to which a person with plaintiff’s skills could transfer. AR 165. Mr. Velton identified truck load

checker and shipping checker as potential light level jobs. Id. The ALJ then asked Mr. Velton if these jobs

were viable options ifthe person with plaintiff’sskills could either (1) only stand or walk forfour hours per day,

or (2) stand/sit at will. AR 167. Mr. Velton answered that those jobs required almost constant standing and

walking and would be eliminated in the case of a person who could only stand or walk four hours per day or

was required to stand/sit at will. Id. The ALJ then questioned Mr. Velton about unskilled jobs for a person

with such requirements. Id. Mr. Velton indicated that there might be a limited number of cashier jobs available.

AR 168. Mr. Velton also testified that there were no sedentary jobs to which plaintiff’s skills could transfer.

Id. 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff suffered from chronic lower back pain with some symptoms of

sciatica. Relying on the consultative examination of Dr. Pon, the ALJ determined that plaintiff retained the

“residual functional capacity to perform light work.” AR 18. The ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Barnett’s

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medicalsource statement limiting plaintiffto sedentary work because he did not find that Dr. Barnett’s opinion

was wellsupported by treatment records or other clinicalfindings. AR 19. The ALJ also considered plaintiff’s

testimony. However, the ALJ determined that, in light of the lack of medical evidence ofback pain treatment

or therapy, and plaintiff’s own testimony about his daily activities, there was no indicationthat plaintiff was not

capable of performing the “full range of light exertional activity.” AR 20. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of final decisions made by the Commissioner. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The court may enter a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Id.

The factualfindings of the Commissioner are conclusive if supported by substantialevidence. Id. The

court may set aside the Commissioner's final decision when that decision is based on legal error or where the

findings offact are not supported by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1999). Even if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual

findings, the decision must be set aside if improper legal standards were applied in weighing the evidence and

reaching the decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Legal errorliesif an ALJ

rejects a treatingphysician'suncontradicted opinionwithout providing "clear and convincing"reasons supported

by the record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the ALJ fails to provide

adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of a treating or examining physician, a reviewing court will credit the

physician's opinion as a matter of law. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The ALJ may also reject subjective complaints from plaintiff if the ALJ provides clear and convincing

reasons for rejecting such testimony. Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). In

considering subjective testimony about pain, the Commissioner must consider the entire record, including

objective medical evidence, the individual’s testimony about daily activities, statements from treating or

examining physicians, and any other relevant evidence. Social Security Rule 96-7p (hereinafter “SSR”). Lack

of objective medical evidence and treatment or therapy along with consideration of the individual’s testimony

of his daily activities has been sufficient reasoning for the ALJ to reject subjective testimony of pain. See

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Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly denied disability benefits because his findings were not

supported by substantial evidence, and committed legal error by using incorrect legal standards in the

determination of disability. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ incorrectly disregarded the opinion of the treating

physician, Dr. Barnett, without giving specific and legitimate reasons, and thus committed an outcomedeterminative legal error. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not consider plaintiff’s subjective testimony of

pain, and that the rejection of his testimony was unsubstantiated. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly rejected the treating physician’s opinion and relied on the

consultative examining physician’s opinion in finding that plaintiff had the capacity to do light work. According

to defendant, the ALJ correctly rejected Dr. Barnett’s opinion because it was not well-supported bymedical

treatment records orobjective medicalevidence. In addition, defendant argues that the ALJ properly assessed

and rejected plaintiff’s subjective testimony about his pain. 

This Court finds that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Barnett’s opinion and relied on Dr. Pon’s opinion

in determining that plaintiff retained residualfunctionalcapacity to do light work. Evidence submitted included

plaintiff’s medicalrecords from the Eastmont Wellness Center forthe period between June 21, 1999 and May

5, 2003, mainly for treatment of his liver condition and prescription refills unrelated to back pain. Allegations

of back pain were reported in September 2001, AR 137, and in October 2001, at which point plaintiff was

assessed with sciatica and occasional left leg numbness. AR 136. None of the medical records prior to

September 2001, or after October 2001, contain allegations of back pain or treatments for back pain. Both

Dr. Barnett and Dr. Pon diagnosed plaintiff with chronic back pain and sciatica, but differed on the conclusion

of the extent of exertional activity of which plaintiff was capable. The ALJ determined that Dr. Barnett’s

medical opinion was not well-supported by the records and was therefore not entitled to significant weight.

Relying on Dr. Pon’s opinion, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of light work. 

Social Security Ruling (hereinafter “SSR”) 96-2p sets out the policy for whether a treating source’s

medical opinion should be given controlling weight, e.g., must be adopted, or is just entitled to deference.

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“Controllingweightmay not be givento a treating source’s medicalopinion unlessthe opinion iswell-supported

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques . . . and it also is ‘not inconsistent’ with

the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Id. In the case where a treating source’s medical opinion

is not given controlling weight it may still be entitled to deference and is weighed using factors set forth in 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2004).1 Although treating sources are generally entitled to greater weight, the ALJ may

disregard a treating source’s opinion if clear and convincing reasons for doing so are presented. Magallanes

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). In such a case, the ALJ must provided a detailed summary

of the facts and conflicting evidence in making his findings. Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.

1986). The ALJ does not have to accept the treating physician’s opinion when he finds that it is “brief and

conclusory in formwith little in the way of clinical findings to support [it].” Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963,

968 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, plaintiff claims that his situation is similarto Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1997).

In Sprague, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ improperly rejected the treating physician’s testimony because

no specific reasons were given. Id. at 1230. Two examining sources and a treating source testified to plaintiff’s

impairments, but differed in their evaluations ofthe severity ofthe impairment–whether plaintiff was capable of

sedentary work or was completely disabled. Id. The ALJ disregarded the treating physician’s opinion solely

because his diagnosis additionally made reference to arthritis, which was not supported by the examining

physician’s testimony. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that this was an inadequate reason for disregarding the

treating physician’s opinion, “especially when . . . all the physicians diagnosed [the same impairment].” Id.

This case differs from Sprague. The ALJ clearly stated that he did not find the treating physician’s

opinion well-supported by clinical evidence. AR 19. The ALJ points out that the medical records consist

primarily of routine outpatient care and prescription refills unrelated to back pain, and indicate no related

treatment, therapy, or surgery for back pain. AR 19-20. The Court concludes that the ALJ did not

misconstrue the medicalrecords and gave clear reasons for not giving the treating physician’s medical source

opinion controlling or significant weight.

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In addition, the Court findsthat the ALJ did consider plaintiff’ssubjective testimony in his decisionand

it was notimproperly rejected. The ALJ states that he rejected plaintiff’s subjective testimony based on limited

medical evidence, lack of related treatment or therapy, testimony about his daily activities, testimony from

plaintiff that his doctor told him to walk daily, and no evidence of significant injuries or disease progress. AR

20. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings. The medical records between

June 1999 and May 2003 indicate that plaintiff alleged problems with back pain on only a couple of occasions

in 2001. There was no follow-up treatment, prescriptions or therapy, and no indication of disease progress.

Several progress notes between June 1999 and May 2003 not only do not mention back pain but actually

indicate the plaintiff reported zero pain level on a scale of zero to ten. Plaintiff testified that his doctor told him

to walk daily, and that he is able to walk to the grocery store. AR 158. Plaintiff also told Dr. Pon during the

consultative examinationthat he has no problems standing or walking, and is able to walk up stairs without aid.

AR 84. The Court concludes that the ALJ not only considered plaintiff’s subjective testimony of pain but

properly rejected it by considering it along with all other evidence on the record. 

CONCLUSION

This Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the evidence on the record and stated clear and

substantial reasons for both rejecting the treating physician’s medical opinion about the exertional level of work

plaintiff was capable ofperformingand plaintiff’ssubjective testimonyofpain. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision

is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2005 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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