Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01836/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01836-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Unis Bah
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-1836

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Unis Bah,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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Submitted: December 13, 2005

 Filed: March 3, 2006 

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Before BYE, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Unis Bah pled guilty to one count of making a false, fraudulent and

fictitious material statement and representation within the jurisdiction of the

Department of Homeland Security, a department and agency of the United States, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The district court determined an advisory United States

Sentencing Guidelines range of 10 to16 months and imposed a sentence of 30 months’

imprisonment. Bah appeals his sentence. For the reasons discussed below, we

remand to the district court for resentencing.

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I. BACKGROUND

Bah was charged in a 5-count indictment with crimes related to a scheme to

obtain visas from foreign consulates and embassies in the United States by using false

immigration documents. Bah and his co-defendant, Abdulaziz Bah (“Abdulaziz”),

were arrested by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents

after driving from Maryland to a Cedar Rapids, Iowa, post office to pick up a package.

The package contained immigration documents that had been submitted to the Irish

Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, in support of three applications for Irish visitor visas.

The documents included successively numbered, purportedly valid passports from the

Republic of Guinea and visa applications supported by fraudulent I-551 cards (Alien

Registration Cards). Bah pled guilty to Count 4 of the indictment, charging him with

making a material false statement in violation of § 1001 when he told an ICE agent

that he did not know the purpose of the trip to Cedar Rapids. The remaining counts

were dismissed at sentencing.

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) indicated that the proper offense

guideline for a violation of § 1001 was U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (the guideline for sentencing

for fraud and deceit). However, the PSR also recommended that the district court

apply the cross-reference available in subsection (c)(3) of § 2B1.1, which provides

that “[i]f . . . the defendant was convicted under a statute proscribing false, fictitious,

or fraudulent statements or representations generally . . . and . . . the conduct set forth

in the count of conviction establishes an offense specifically covered by another

guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct), apply that other guideline.” The PSR

advised that the cross-reference is available if “the defendant was convicted under

[certain] statute[s],” including § 1001, but neglected to identify the cross-reference’s

second requirement: that the conduct that establishes the offense covered by another

guideline must be set forth in the count of conviction.

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1

Bah also argues that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by making

findings of fact utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard when imposing

sentence. However, judicial fact-finding using a preponderance of the evidence

standard is permitted provided that the guidelines are applied in an advisory manner.

United States v. Wade, 435 F.3d 829, 831 (8th Cir. Jan. 13, 2006) (citing United States

v. Vaughn, 410 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)). Because the record establishes that

the guidelines were applied in an advisory manner, the district court did not err on this

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After hearing testimony from an ICE agent regarding Bah’s involvement in the

fraudulent immigration document scheme, the district court sentenced Bah pursuant

to the more punitive guideline of § 2L2.1 (the sentencing guideline for trafficking in

immigration documents or making a false statement with respect to the immigration

status of another). Without specifically identifying the § 2B1.1 cross-reference, the

district court utilized § 2L2.1 and calculated a base offense level of 11 and a criminal

history category of I. The district court then made a 3-level upward adjustment

pursuant to § 2L2.1(b)(2) (for an offense involving 6 to 24 documents) and a 2-level

downward adjustment for Bah’s acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1(a),

but denied Bah’s request for a minimal-participant downward adjustment pursuant to

§ 3B1.2(a). As a result, the district court determined a total offense level of 12 and

a guidelines range of 10 to 16 months. However, the district court sentenced Bah to

30 months’ imprisonment after considering the facts in light of the 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a) factors and determining that an upward variance was appropriate. 

 On appeal, Bah argues that the district court’s application of the crossreference was erroneous because the language of § 2B1.1(c)(3) specifically limits the

evidence that the court may consider for purposes of § 2B1.1(c)(3) to “the conduct set

forth in the count of conviction” and that–regardless of other evidence or

stipulations–the count of conviction did not establish that Bah committed a crime

covered under another guideline. In addition, Bah argues that he should have received

a reduction in his total offense level pursuant to § 3B1.2(a) as a minimal- participant

and that his sentence is unreasonable under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005).1

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point.

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II. DISCUSSION 

The first step in reviewing Bah’s sentence is to determine whether the district

court’s interpretation and application of the guidelines was correct. United States v.

Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the issue of whether the

district court erred in applying the guidelines de novo. United States v. Mark, 425

F.3d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 2005). “If the sentence was imposed as the result of an

incorrect application of the guidelines, we will remand for resentencing as required

by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) without reaching the reasonableness of the resulting

sentence in light of § 3553(a).” Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017. 

In this case, we must determine whether the district court was correct in

applying § 2L2.1 to Bah. Although the district court heard evidence and argument at

sentencing on the applicability of the § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference, it did not state on

the record or in its written order the basis for its decision to sentence under § 2L2.1.

We note that the § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference is not the only mechanism available

under the guidelines upon which the district court could have relied when sentencing

Bah under § 2L2.1. The district court also could have relied on the cross-reference

under § 1B1.2(a). Therefore, we will consider whether either cross-reference allows

Bah to be sentenced under § 2L2.1.

A. The § 2B1.1(c)(3) Cross-Reference 

Bah argues that if the district court applied the § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference to

sentence him under § 2L2.1, the court erred because there was insufficient evidence

to establish that Bah committed an offense punishable under § 2L2.1. If the district

court sentenced Bah pursuant to § 2L2.1, the court must have determined that the

evidence established that Bah had violated either 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (misuse of a

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2

The applicability of any other offense punishable under § 2L2.1 is not

supported by the facts of this case. See U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1, cmt. statutory provisions;

U.S.S.G. Appx. A.

3

Our understanding of the plain meaning of § 2B1.1(c)(3) also is supported by

the language that the United States Sentencing Commission chose to exclude from the

current version of the section. Under the prior version of the guidelines, sentencing

for a violation of § 1001 was governed by the former § 2F1.1, which contained a

similar cross-reference provision that allowed the district court to consider not only

the indictment or information setting forth the count of conviction but also “(a

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passport) or 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (fraud and misuse of visas, permits and other

documents), or that he had conspired to commit a violation of § 1544 or § 1546 in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.2

 However, Bah maintains that the district court could

not have properly found that Bah committed a violation of § 371, § 1544, or § 1546

because the language of § 2B1.1(c)(3) specifically limits the district court to

considering only the conduct set forth in the count of conviction when determining

whether to apply the cross-reference. 

“When construing the Guidelines, we look first to the plain language, and where

that is unambiguous we need look no further.” United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d

859, 865 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.

2003)). Section 2B1.1(c)(3) provides that “[i]f . . . the defendant was convicted under

a statute proscribing false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations

generally . . . and . . . the conduct set forth in the count of conviction establishes an

offense specifically covered by another guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct),

apply that other guideline.” (emphasis added). A plain reading of this unambiguous

language establishes that the district court may look only to “the conduct set forth in

the count of conviction” when determining whether the cross-reference applies. As

such, this cross-reference is applicable “only if the conduct alleged in the count of the

indictment of which the defendant is convicted establishes the elements of another

offense.” United States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 2003).3

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stipulation described in § 1B1.2(a)).” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (deleted), cmt. n.14 (1998).

However, when § 2F1.1 and § 2B1.1 were consolidated, this parenthetical phrase in

§ 2F1.1 was not adopted. Clearly, the Sentencing Commission intended to limit the

application of the cross-reference to situations in which the conduct set forth solely

in the count of conviction establishes another offense.

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In this case, the count of conviction provides that

On or about June 17, 2004, in the Northern District of

Iowa, in a matter within the jurisdiction of Department of

Homeland Security, United States Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, a department and agency of the

United States, the Defendant UNIS BAH, did knowingly

and willfully make a false, fraudulent, and fictitious

material statement and representation; that is, defendant

told an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent that

he did not know the purpose of his and Abdulaziz Bah’s

overnight trip to Iowa from Maryland, when in truth and in

fact, defendant knew the purpose of the trip was to pick up

a package at the Post Office in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

This in violation of title 18, United States Code, Section

1001.

Nothing in the count of conviction establishes that Bah’s conduct involved a visa,

passport or other document related to naturalization, citizenship or legal resident

status, a material element necessary to prove a violation of either § 1544 or § 1546.

Nor does the count of conviction establish requisite elements of conspiracy, such as

the existence of a conspiracy or the intent to join a conspiracy under § 371. United

States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lucht,

18 F.3d 541, 552 (8th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that to establish a defendant’s

participation in a conspiracy, the evidence must show that there was an agreement to

achieve some illegal purpose, that the defendant knew of the agreement and that the

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defendant knowingly became a party to the conspiracy). Thus, while the ICE agent’s

testimony may have established Bah’s violation of a more serious offense than a

violation of § 1001, the conduct set forth in the count of conviction does not establish

that Bah committed an offense punishable pursuant to § 2L2.1. If the district court

relied on the § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference, it erred in sentencing Bah under § 2L2.1.

B. The § 1B1.2(a) Cross-Reference

Bah assumes on appeal that the district court determined that § 2L2.1 was the

appropriate offense guideline by applying the § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference.

However, as the Government argues, it is possible that the district court made this

determination pursuant instead to the cross-reference in § 1B1.2(a), the first section

to which the district court must turn in applying the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a).

Section 1B1.2(a) provides that the district court must “determine the offense guideline

section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction,”

but contains a cross-reference that allows the district court, under certain

circumstances, to sentence a defendant pursuant to a more severe guideline: “in the

case of a plea agreement (written or made orally on the record) containing a

stipulation that specifically establishes a more serious offense than the offense of

conviction, determine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two applicable to the

stipulated offense.” Id. Thus, the district court could have sentenced Bah under

another offense guideline if Bah stipulated in his plea agreement to facts specifically

establishing a more serious offense and Bah and the Government explicitly agreed that

such stipulation was a stipulation for purposes of § 1B1.2(a). 

 Because Bah did not make any additional, relevant stipulations at the

sentencing hearing, we limit our review to the contents of the written stipulation in the

plea agreement. Bah acknowledged in the stipulation in his plea agreement that three

visa applications, supported by the Republic of Guinea passports, were submitted by

an unnamed person to the Irish Consulate in Chicago and that “someone” spoke

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several times by telephone with the consulate about the status of those applications.

He also acknowledged that the visa application in the name of “Unis Conte” was

supported by an altered copy of Bah’s I-551 card and contained Bah’s photograph and

resident alien number. However, in the stipulation Bah specifically disavowed any

personal knowledge as to these facts, agreeing only that they were established by the

evidence.

Bah further stipulated that he traveled from Maryland to Iowa with Abdulaziz

in a rental car to pick up a package at a post office. He also stipulated that he waited

in the car while Abdulaziz picked up the package containing passports and that law

enforcement found a fraudulent I-551 card on Abdulaziz and a false social security

card in the car, although Bah expressly denied any personal knowledge regarding

these cards. Last, Bah admitted that he gave ICE officers false information about his

knowledge of the purpose of his trip to Iowa and that he knew the purpose of the trip

was to pick up a package that he knew “was to contain immigration documents.”

However, Bah did not admit to knowing that the immigration documents were

fraudulent. While Bah stipulated that “Abdulaziz asked defendant to travel to Iowa

to pick up a package...”, he struck from the stipulation, without objection from the

Government, the modifying phrase “containing documents defendant knew were

connected to immigration fraud.”

We decline the Government’s invitation to infer Bah’s knowledge or intent with

respect to these stipulated facts, beyond that knowledge or intent to which Bah

admitted in the stipulation. The language of § 1B1.2(a) is clear. The stipulation

purporting to establish a more serious offense than the offense of conviction must

“specifically establish[]” a more serious offense than the offense of conviction.

Moreover, a stipulation which supports two reasonable readings–one reading that

indicates that the defendant committed the more serious offense and one reading that

does not–is not a stipulation which specifically establishes that the defendant 

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committed the more serious offense for purposes of § 1B1.2(a). See Braxton v. United

States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 (1991).

To establish that Bah misused a passport in violation of § 1544, the stipulation

must specifically establish that Bah either used or attempted to use a passport in

violation of the law, or that he furnished, disposed of or delivered a passport to any

person for use by another, other than the person for whose use it was originally issued.

In addition to not specifically establishing that Bah knew of the fraudulent nature of

the passports, the stipulation does not specifically establish any use or attempted use

of the passports. Nor does it specifically establish that either Abdulaziz or Bah gave

the passports to another person. Rather, it appears that Abdulaziz picked up the

passports and shortly thereafter was stopped by law enforcement, who confiscated the

documents.

Similarly, to establish that Bah committed fraud or misuse related to an

immigration document in violation of § 1546, the stipulation must specifically

establish that Bah possessed, obtained, accepted or received an immigration

document, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered or falsely made. However,

Bah did not admit to knowing that the immigration documents were fraudulent. In

fact, he specifically denied in the stipulation personal knowledge of facts from which

one might be able to infer that the immigration documents were, in fact, fraudulent.

Moreover, Bah deleted from the stipulation the key assertion that he knew that the

documents were connected to immigration fraud. The Government apparently

acquiesced to these disavowals and submitted the stipulation to the district court in

support of the plea agreement. Given this, even though there are facts in the

stipulation that might support the inference of Bah’s knowledge of the fraudulent

nature of the immigration documents, we do not believe that such knowledge has been

specifically established. See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 351 (recognizing that a disavowal

of intent may affect whether a stipulation specifically establishes the commission of

a more serious offense under § 1B1.1(a)). 

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Likewise, the stipulation does not specifically establish the existence of a

conspiracy or that Bah knowingly became a party to any conspiracy. In addition, any

inference that could be drawn to establish these elements would not be the only

reasonable interpretation of the stipulation. As such, the stipulation does not

specifically establish that Bah participated in a conspiracy in violation of § 371 to

commit an offense in violation of § 1544 or § 1546.

Accordingly, because neither the § 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference nor the §

1B1.2(a) cross-reference could have been properly utilized to sentence Bah pursuant

to § 2L2.1, we find that the district court erred in determining the sentencing range

under the guidelines. Bah’s sentencing guideline range should have been calculated

using § 2B1.1. 

C. Harmless Error

We next consider whether the district court’s use of § 2L2.1 constitutes

harmless error. “The party benefitting from the error has the burden to prove that it

was harmless.” United States v. Gutierrez, Nos. 04-4069 and 05-1068, slip op. at 4

(8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2006) (citing United States v. Red Elk, 426 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir.

2005) and United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 2005)). We conclude

that the Government cannot meet this burden and that the error was not harmless. 

The PSR presented an alternative guidelines calculation utilizing § 2B1.1,

which resulted in the same total offense level, 12, as the district court calculated

utilizing only § 2L2.1. However, in reaching this total offense level under § 2B1.1,

the PSR included a 6-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(9) and a 2-level

enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(10). Perhaps because the district court did not use §

2B1.1 to sentence Bah, it never ruled on his objections to the § 2B1.1 enhancements

recommended by the PSR. As such, there are insufficient findings on which to

determine a sentencing range under § 2B1.1. As Bah correctly argues, without these

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The error in this case may have been harmless had the district court overruled

Bah’s objections to the § 2B1.1(b)(9) and (b)(10) enhancements. Assuming that there

would have been no error in overruling the objections–an issue that is not before the

Court–the guidelines range calculated under § 2B1.1 would have been identical to that

calculated under § 2L2.1. Had this been the scenario, we would proceed to determine

the reasonableness of the ultimate sentence, including the district court’s decision to

vary upward, in light of the correctly calculated guidelines range and the § 3553(a)

factors.

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enhancements, the guidelines range would have been 0 to 6 months, rather than 10 to

16 months. Therefore, this is not a situation where the error in calculating the

guidelines range is harmless. See, e.g., Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017 (noting that “there

may be situations where an error in calculating the appropriate guidelines range is

harmless . . . [for example] where the resulting sentence lies in the overlap between

the correct and incorrect guidelines ranges”).4

We next consider whether the district court’s pronouncement of an identical

alternative sentence renders the advisory guidelines calculation error harmless. The

district court stated that “if [I] am wrong about the application of [the guidelines]

. . . and the guidelines would advise a sentence that was higher or a sentence that was

lower, this is still my sentence based on all the factors set forth at . . . § 3553(a)(1)

through (7).” We have stated that “[w]hen the guidelines are incorrectly applied, we

remand for resentencing unless the error was harmless, such as when the district court

would have imposed the same sentence absent the error.” United States v. Idriss, No.

04-3886, slip op. at 8 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2006). For instance, we have found harmless

error under this rule in a case where the sentencing court determined an identical

alternative guidelines range to be effective in the event its finding on a particular

guidelines adjustment was overruled on appeal. See United States v. Hadash, 408

F.3d 1080, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding the erroneous application of a 6-level

downward adjustment under § 2K2.1(b)(2) to be harmless because the sentencing

court stated that if that adjustment did not apply, it would depart downward an

identical six levels under § 5K2.0). We also have cited the rule but found the standard

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unsatisfied where the sentencing court did not pronounce an identical alternative

sentence in the event its ruling on a particular guidelines adjustment was overruled.

See, e.g., Idriss, slip op. at 8; United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir.

2005). We have yet to apply such a harmless error rule where the sentencing court

pronounced a blanket identical alternative sentence to cover any potential guidelines

calculation error asserted on appeal without also basing that sentence on an alternative

guidelines calculation.

Applying the rule to find harmless error in the instant case would create a direct

conflict with our firmly established precedent that “the sentencing court must first

determine the appropriate guidelines sentencing range, since that range does remain

an important factor to be considered in the imposition of a sentence.” United States

v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-1003 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Mashek, 406 F.3d at

1016 (“The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory

system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under §

3553(a).”). Where the sentencing court determines an identical alternative guidelines

range in the event its ruling on a particular adjustment is erroneous, as in Hadash, the

sentencing court has calculated the advisory guidelines range underlying the

alternative sentence—it is the original calculated guidelines range without the

challenged enhancement. In such a case, a finding of harmless error based on an

identical alternative sentence presents no conflict with Haack. However, where, as

here, the sentencing court pronounces an identical alternative sentence, not based on

any alternative guidelines calculation but instead intended to cover any and all

potential guidelines calculation errors, the sentencing court effectively has ignored the

requirement of Haack to “first determine the appropriate guidelines sentencing range”

for the alternative sentence. 403 F.3d at 1002-1003. We cannot make a finding of

harmless error where the identical alternative sentence was not based on a correctly

calculated advisory guidelines range. See Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1016 (noting that 18

U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) requires remand of a sentence based on an incorrectly calculated

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advisory guidelines range regardless of whether the sentence would otherwise be

deemed reasonable).

Our conclusion is supported by the fact that the absence of an identifiable

advisory guidelines range for the alternative sentence thwarts our review of the

sentence for reasonableness. Because a sentence within the properly calculated

guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716,

717 (8th Cir. 2005), a correctly calculated guidelines range is the necessary starting

point for assessing the reasonableness of a variance. See United States v. Larrabee,

No. 05-1143, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 2006) (holding that “an extraordinary

upward variance [must] be supported by extraordinary circumstances,” and quoting

United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2005), for the proposition

that “[h]ow compelling that justification must be is proportional to the extent of the

difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.”). Therefore, the

district court cannot preemptively announce an alternative sentence under the §

3553(a) factors without first having determined the correct advisory guidelines range.

Finally, we also do not reach the minimal-participant issue, as any such request

by Bah on remand will have to be evaluated by the district court in light of the offense

of conviction, § 1001, and the applicable offense guideline, § 2B1.1.

III. CONCLUSION

 We therefore vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for

resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Although I agree the district court miscalculated the guidelines, I write

separately because I believe the district court's error in calculating the guidelines was

harmless. "An error is harmless if it is clear from the record that the district court

would have given the defendant the same sentence regardless of which guideline

range applied." United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir. 2005). The

nature of the harmless error test does not depend on whether the district court

correctly calculated the guidelines; thus, I disagree with the majority that the harmless

error analysis should only be employed after the district court correctly calculates the

guideline range. If the district court had correctly calculated the guideline range, there

would be no need to engage in this analysis in the first place. See United States v.

Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting although "the sentencing court

must first determine the appropriate guidelines sentencing range," cases may exist

"where sentencing factors [are] so complex, or other [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors

may so predominate, that the determination of a precise sentencing range may not be

necessary or practical."). Additionally, I believe our decision in United States v.

Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2005), supports, rather than contradicts, the

application of the harmless-error analysis in this case. In Mashek, we analyzed the

defendant's sentence for harmless error despite the district court's incorrect calculation

of the guidelines. Id. at 1020. Unlike the case here, the district court in Mashek did

not announce an identical alternative sentence. Id. The error in Mashek was, thus, not

harmless because we could not say the defendant would have received the same

sentence despite the error. Id.

In the case at hand, the district court noted it would have sentenced Bah to the

same sentence even if it were "wrong about the application" of the guidelines, and the

"guidelines would advise a sentence that was higher or a sentence that was lower."

Because the district court would have sentenced Bah to thirty months of imprisonment

no matter how his guideline range should have been computed, the error in the initial

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guideline calculation is harmless. See United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622,

633 (8th Cir. 2006) (Loken, C.J., concurring) (noting the harmless-error analysis

should be utilized to prevent otherwise "meaningless remands").

Despite the presence of a harmless error, I nevertheless concur in the result of

this case as I believe a sentence of thirty months of imprisonment is unreasonable

under the circumstances. Bah's guideline range was calculated, albeit incorrectly, at

ten to sixteen months of imprisonment. This is the exact same range recommended

by the PSR under its alternative calculation. However, even the district court

acknowledged Bah's sentence could be calculated in the zero to six-month range, thus

making him eligible for probation. Even if Bah's correct guideline range should be

ten to sixteen months, I believe a sentence of thirty months is unreasonable because

it represents an upward departure of between 180 percent and 300 percent.

An extraordinary departure "must be supported by extraordinary

circumstances." United States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting

United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005)) (reversing a sixty-eight

percent downward departure). A review of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

demonstrate no such extraordinary circumstances exist here. This case is unlike

United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 2005), in which we upheld a

sentence of fifty-eight months when the defendant had an advisory guideline range of

six to twelve months because the defendant in Shannon, unlike Bah, possessed a

seriously under-represented criminal history. Because neither the "nature and

circumstances of the offense" nor Bah's personal and criminal history warranted such

an extreme upward departure, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), I believe Bah's sentence is

unreasonable. Additionally, I find such an extreme departure does not further the

other Section 3553(a) factors. Thus, I concur. 

______________________________ 

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