Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10557/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10557-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Annette Nakatsukasa Basa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANNETTE NAKATSUKASA BASA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-10557

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00007-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern Mariana Islands

Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 12, 2016—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed March 28, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber, Jay S. Bybee,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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2 UNITED STATES V. BASA

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for sex trafficking, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).

The panel held that the enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(A), for an offense that “involved the

commission” of a sex act with a child, applies whether or not

the defendant herself engaged in that act.

The panel held that the district court did not engage in

impermissible double-counting by applying both the

§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement and an enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), which applies when a defendant

unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual

conduct. The panel wrote that neither provision repeats a

required element of a conviction under § 1591(a), and the two

enhancements take account of separate offense

characteristics. 

The panel held that the district court permissibly declined

to depart downward for reduced mental capacity under

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. BASA 3

COUNSEL

Steven P. Pixley (argued), Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands,

for Defendant-Appellant.

Garth R. Backe (argued) and Ross K. Naughton, Assistant

United States Attorneys, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

In exchange for money and drugs, Defendant Annette

Nakatsukasa Basa provided housing for two 15-year-old girls

and facilitated their having sex with adult men. Defendant

pleaded guilty to sex trafficking of children, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).1 The district court sentenced

Defendant to a term of 210 months in prison; she appeals that

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and 1294. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the spring of 2013, two homeless 15-year-old girls,

V.R. and A.J., moved into Defendant’s home on Saipan. 

Defendant gave them methamphetamine. She also introduced

1 Title 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly—in

or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors,

transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits

by any means a person . . . knowing . . . that the person has not attained

the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act”

is guilty of a crime.

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4 UNITED STATES V. BASA

the girls to several adult men and encouraged them to have

sex with the men. In return for facilitating these sexual

encounters with the girls, the men gave Defendant money or

methamphetamine. The girls were sometimes compensated

in food and sometimes not compensated at all.

In June, a concerned citizen contacted the local police

about alleged sexual abuse of V.R. and A.J., later supplying

video footage showing an adult man engaged in sexual

intercourse with two underage girls. The police interviewed

V.R. and A.J. The girls reported that Defendant arranged for

them to have sex with adult men, gave them

methamphetamine, told them to denybeing underage or being

sold for sexual purposes, drove them to some of the sexual

encounters, and sometimes demanded that they have sex with

the men while threatening to throw them out of the house if

they refused. The local police referred the matter to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. Defendant’s arrest followed. 

Defendant admitted that she had provided underage girls to

adult men on many occasions; admitted that she had

facilitated the sexual encounters by, among other things,

driving A.J. to a secluded beach where an adult man had sex

with A.J.; and admitted that she had received money and

methamphetamine for facilitating the sexual encounters.

A grand jury indicted Defendant on two counts of sex

trafficking of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1),

(b)(2), and (c). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant

pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a)(1).2 At sentencing, Defendant presented evidence

2 The appeal waiver in the plea agreement does not bar this appeal

because the waiver applies only to the conviction, not to the sentence. 

United States v. Spear, 753 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2014).

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UNITED STATES V. BASA 5

that she suffers from significantly reduced mental capacity

because of her intellectual disability, exacerbated by posttraumatic stress disorder resulting from her own history of

sexual abuse.

The court sentenced Defendant to a term of 210 months’

imprisonment. It applied sentencing enhancements under

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) and (b)(2)(B). The district court

also denied Defendant’s motion, premised on U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.13, for a reduction in her sentence, reasoning that

Defendant had failed to demonstrate that her diminished

capacity substantially contributed to the commission of the

offense. She brings this timely appeal, challenging her

sentence.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“There is an intracircuit split as to whether the standard of

review for application of the Guidelines to the facts is de

novo or abuse of discretion.” United States v. Tanke,

743 F.3d 1296, 1306 (9th Cir. 2014). “There is no need to

resolve this split where, as here, the choice of the standard

does not affect the outcome of the case.” Id. We review for

clear error a district court’s factual findings. United States v.

Laurienti, 731 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues, first, that U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A)

does not apply because she did not, herself, commit a sex act

with either victim. This is an issue of first impression in the

Ninth Circuit. Second, Defendant asserts that it was

impermissible double counting to apply that enhancement

and the one embodied in U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). Finally,

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6 UNITED STATES V. BASA

Defendant disputes the district court’s rejection of her request

for a downward departure on account of reduced mental

capacity.

A. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) applies even though

Defendant did not engage in a sex act with a minor

victim.

Section 2G1.3(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines lists

specific offense characteristics that increase the offense level

for various crimes, including the crime of which Defendant

stands convicted. One such class of cases is described in

subsection (b)(4)(A): If “the offense involved the

commission of a sex act or sexual contact . . . , increase by 2

levels.” As noted, Defendant argues that, because she did not

commit a sex act herself, the enhancement does not apply. 

We disagree.

The text of the Guideline is clear. It requires only that the

offense as a whole “involved the commission” of a sex act; it

does not specify that the defendant must have committed the

sex act himself or herself. When the specific offense

characteristics require an act or status on the part of the

defendant himself or herself, the Guidelines plainly so state. 

For example, U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(A) applies only when

“the defendant was a parent, relative, or legal guardian of the

minor.” (Emphasis added.) By contrast, subsection (b)(4)(A)

contains no requirement for the defendant to have committed

a sex act. We must give effect to that textual distinction. 

See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)

(when Congress uses particular text in one section of a statute

but omits it in another section of the same statute, courts

presume that Congress intended a different meaning); see

also United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th

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UNITED STATES V. BASA 7

Cir. 2013) (applying interpretive canon to the Sentencing

Guidelines).

The Guidelines also specify that “specific offense

characteristics . . . shall be determined on the basis of . . . all

acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the

defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). In the present case,

Defendant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,

procured, or willfully caused the commission of a sex act

with the minor victims. Defendant aided and abetted the sex

acts in which the child victims engaged; she knew that her

actions of encouraging, transporting, or coercing the victims

would lead to sex acts and received payment for enabling the

sex acts to occur. For that reason, her offense “involved the

commission” of sex acts, and the district court properly

applied U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A).

This reading of the Guideline is logical and is supported

by our decision in United States v. Hornbuckle, 784 F.3d 549,

553–54 (9th Cir. 2015). Hornbuckle confronted a slightly

different issue than the one that we address here, but it is

nevertheless instructive. The Hornbuckle defendants ran a

prostitution ring and pimped out (among others) three

homeless minors who lived with the defendants for a time. 

Id. at 551. As here, the defendants did not themselves engage

in sex acts with the minors; rather, they caused the minors to

engage in sex acts with others. Id. The defendants argued

that applying the § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement constituted

double counting because, according to the defendants,

18 U.S.C. § 1591 required the commission of a sex act. Id. at

553. We disagreed and held that a conviction under § 1591

does not require that a sex act take place. Id. at 554. One can

commit the crime of sex trafficking of a child even if the

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8 UNITED STATES V. BASA

child never engages in a sex act. For example, had the

defendant here transported A.J. to an intended sexual

encounter, but been intercepted before sex took place,

Defendant still would have violated § 1591(a)(1) because

Defendant would have, at a minimum, “transport[ed] . . . a

person . . . knowing . . . that the person has not attained the

age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial

sex act.” Thus, the specific offense characteristic covered by

the Guidelines applies only to a subset of § 1591 offenses,

those in which the aggravating factor—sex with the

child—actually occurred. Although Hornbuckle addressed

the issue presented here only obliquely, the pertinent facts of

Hornbuckle and this case are the same: namely, the

defendants themselves did not engage in sex acts with minors,

but only caused those acts to occur. We upheld the

application of the § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement in

Hornbuckle, and we do so again today.

Similarly, in United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229,

241 (6th Cir. 2014), the Sixth Circuit held that a conviction

under § 1591 did not require the commission of a sex act, a

holding that is consistent with our decision in Hornbuckle. 

Significantly for our purposes, the Willoughby court stated

that the § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement did not require the

defendant himself to be involved in a sex act in order for the

enhancement to apply. In Willoughby, the defendant had sex

with a minor whom he sheltered, and he then solicited money

in return for the child’s having sex with other men. Id. at

232–33. A jury convicted Willoughby under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a) and (b). Id. at 233. The court applied the

§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) sentencing enhancement. Id. at 241. 

Willoughby argued that the sentencing enhancement was

improper because his conviction already took his sex act into

account. Id.

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UNITED STATES V. BASA 9

The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded. It wrote: 

“Willoughby’s offense was complete when he acted with the

requisite knowledge—when he dropped SW off at Tusin’s

residence, for example—and not at the moment of

penetration. His § 2G1.3(b)(4) enhancement was proper.” 

Id. (citations omitted). In other words, the enhancement did

not constitute double counting and was proper where (1) the

defendant need not have engaged in a sexual act to be

convicted under § 1591(a), and (2) the defendant caused a sex

act to occur—for example, when he dropped the minor off at

another man’s residence to engage in sex acts. To satisfy the

enhancement, it was not necessary that the defendant himself

engage in sex acts with the minor, so long as the minor

engaged in sex acts with someone as a result of the

defendant’s conduct.

To the extent then that we were not clear in Hornbuckle: 

The § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement requires only that a sex

act with a child occur—whether or not the defendant himself

or herself engaged in that act. For that reason, the U.S.S.G.

§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement properly applied in

Hornbuckle and properly applied to Defendant in this case.

B. The district court permissibly applied U.S.S.G.

§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) as well.

Defendant claims that the district court engaged in

impermissible double counting when it applied both the

(b)(4)(A) enhancement and the (b)(2)(B) enhancement. 

Impermissible double counting occurs when a court applies

an enhancement that duplicates a necessary element of the

underlying conviction, or when a court applies two

enhancements that the Guidelines intend to make non-

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10 UNITED STATES V. BASA

cumulative. United States v. Smith, 719 F.3d 1120, 1123–25

(9th Cir. 2013). Neither situation is present here.

Section 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) applies when a defendant “unduly

influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.” 

Section 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) applies when an offense “involved

the commission” of a sex act. Neither repeats a required

element of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Undue

influence of a minor is not a necessary element of this crime. 

See United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir.

2010) (describing intent requirement of § 1591(a)). For

example, a defendant could be convicted for transporting a

minor to sexual encounters, knowing that they would occur,

even if someone else influenced the minor to participate. 

And as discussed above, a violation of § 1591(a) can be

complete even if no sex act occurs. See Hornbuckle,

784 F.3d at 553–54 (holding that the district court’s

application of a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2G1.3(b)(4) “was not double counting because ‘commission

of a sex act or sexual contact’ is not an element of the

[defendants’] convictions for sex trafficking of children under

18 U.S.C. § 1591”).

Similarly, the two enhancements take account of separate

offense characteristics. Here, for instance, the undue

influence enhancement accounts for Defendant’s providing

shelter to homeless runaways and threatening to throw them

out on the street if they did not engage in sex acts in

exchange. By contrast, the other enhancement accounts for

the fact that the minor victims actually engaged in sex acts.

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UNITED STATES V. BASA 11

C. The district court permissibly declined to depart

downward for reduced mental capacity.

Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, a downward departure may be

warranted if “(1) the defendant committed the offense while

suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and

(2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed

substantially to the commission of the offense.” Defendant

presented expert evidence tending to show that she had a

significantly reduced mental capacity. The district court held,

though, that she failed to meet the second prong of the

Guideline because she did not show that her reduced mental

capacity contributed significantly to the commission of the

offense of conviction.

The district court relied on several factors to reach that

conclusion. Among other things, the court found that

Defendant’s reduced mental capacityresulted in part from the

voluntary use of illegal drugs. That finding is not clearly

erroneous. Section 5K2.13 provides that “the court may not

depart below the applicable guideline range if . . . the

significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the

voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants.” In addition, the

court found that Defendant could “maintain her composure

and be acute in . . . formulating her intentions.” Defendant

used deliberate and intelligent methods of carrying out the

offense—such as using fake names and ages for the

victims—which negated the inference that diminished

capacity caused her to commit the offense. Again, those

findings are not clearly erroneous. Because the court came to

a reasonable conclusion, supported by evidence, it

permissibly denied the motion for a downward departure.

AFFIRMED.

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