Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03033/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03033-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antoine Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 10, 2004 Decided January 18, 2005

No. 04-3033

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTOINE MILLER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00161-01)

Jensen E. Barber, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant. 

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and GARLAND,

Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In November 2003 a

jury convicted Antoine Miller of (1) possession of a firearm

and ammunition by a person convicted of a crime punishable

by imprisonment for one year or more, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) possession with intent to

distribute cannabis, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(D). The main issue on appeal is Miller’s claim that

the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by

allowing the government’s drug expert to testify whether an

individual’s role in a particular hypothetical scenario—one

closely matching Miller’s activities as depicted to the

jury—was consistent with that person’s being “in the business

of selling drugs.” As the defendant made no objection, we

review for plain error; we find none. We also reject Miller’s

other claims.

* * *

According to the government’s evidence, police

officers conducting an undercover drug operation at the 1200

block of Valley Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C., approached

Miller in their car. Miller asked one officer “what did [he]

need?” and the officer replied, “I need a dub”—a term the

government’s expert witness later explained meant a $20 bag

of marijuana. As Miller approached the car, someone in a

nearby building yelled “five-oh, five-oh”—also explained by

the expert, who said it derived from the television program

“Hawaii Five-O” and was commonly used to alert drug trade

participants to the arrival of the police. Miller ran, and the

officers gave chase. As he ran, Miller removed items from his

pocket and dropped them to the ground, and then shed his

jacket and dropped it. Catching him after a brief foot chase,

the officers recovered his jacket and found in it ten small

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ziploc bags containing marijuana and a .22 caliber revolver

loaded with six rounds of ammunition. 

Metropolitan Police Department Detective Tyrone

Thomas testified as an expert drug witness for the

government. After saying that he was not familiar with the

investigation and had not taken part in it, he explained various

items in the non-experts’ testimony. Besides addressing the

items mentioned above, he said that the 1200 block of Valley

Avenue, S.E. was a well-known area for marijuana sales; that

people will often make drug purchases while remaining in

their cars; that marijuana is usually sold in clear ziploc bags;

that drug dealers often discard outer clothing, so as to mislead

officers who have joined the chase in response to calls for

help that describe the quarry’s clothing; and that drug dealers

often carry guns but commonly have no money on them.

After this testimony, the following exchange took place with

the prosecutor:

Q: Detective Thomas, based on the

scenarios that you just discussed where

you have a person who engages in a

conversation with another to transfer a

dub to that other individual and that

person is later found to have

approximately ten Ziploc bags of the

size that you saw in Government

Exhibit Number 2, based on those facts,

do you have an opinion as to whether or

not those drugs that were found on that

individual, whether or not it’s

consistent with an intent to distribute?

A: Yes. Based on the scenario that I was

given and the fact that the quantity that

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he had in that scenario, that would [b]e

consistent with someone I believe is in

the business of selling drugs on the

streets of the District of Columbia for a

profit.

The question’s reference to “the scenarios you have just

discussed” would naturally have been understood by jurors to

encompass all the details Thomas had previously explained. 

* * *

Miller first claims that the district court abused its

discretion in finding that Thomas’s testimony met the

standards of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence for

admission of expert testimony; he particularly denies that

evidence about the modus operandi of drug dealers in the

Washington, D.C. area would help the jury understand other

evidence. But we’ve repeatedly found the operations of

narcotics dealers a suitable topic for expert testimony

“because they are not within the common knowledge of the

average juror.” United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 628

(D.C. Cir. 1992). We see no abuse of discretion on that score

here.

Miller also objects that Thomas’s testimony violates

Rule 704(b)’s ban on an expert witness’s giving an opinion as

to “whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state

or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or

of a defense thereto.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). The district

court’s admission of expert testimony is subject to reversal

only for abuse of discretion. See Boney, 977 F.2d at 628. 

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Because Miller failed to object at trial we review for

plain error. For Miller to prevail (1) the error must have been

obvious; (2) Miller must carry the burden of showing that the

error was likely to have affected the outcome of the trial; and

(3) the appellate court must be persuaded that the error

“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Young,

470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted);

see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993);

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

In this case we get off at the first stop; we find no obvious

error. 

We have previously said “that testimony should not be

excluded under Rule 704(b) as long as it is clear that the

expert is testifying on the basis of his knowledge of general

criminal practices and not on some special knowledge of the

defendant’s mental processes.” United States v. Bailey, 319

F.3d 514, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2003). We said that this inquiry

required consideration of

(1) the language used by the questioner and/or

the expert, including use of the actual word

“intent”; and (2) whether the context of the

testimony makes clear to the jury that the

opinion is based on knowledge of general

criminal practices, rather than “some special

knowledge of the defendant’s mental

processes.”

United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

see also Bailey, 319 F.3d at 521.

In this case, Thomas made clear that he had no

personal knowledge of the case against Miller. Although the

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prosecutor asked Thomas whether the described “scenario”

suggested an “intent” to distribute, the witness avoided the

word in his answer, moving the colloquy somewhat towards

modus operandi evidence. Further, we have previously held

that even when the prosecutor uses the “i” word in

formulating a question, there is no Rule 704(b) violation if it

is made clear that the expert had no knowledge of the actual

case before the jury. See United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d

1463, 1465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

At the same time, the hypothetical question posed to

Thomas, viewed in light of his entire testimony, approaches

the type that is “a carbon copy of the matter before the jury,”

which we have found to violate Rule 704(b), United States v.

Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1995), at least where the

expert has failed to explain his complete lack of information

about the defendant himself, id. at 672. “[W]hat is proscribed

is questioning that produces responses suggesting some

special knowledge of the defendant’s mental processes,”

including testimony that “the hypothetical individual’s

possession was ‘consistent with intent to distribute.’” United

States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1999). At

some point, plainly, the pile-up of data in the mirroring

hypothetical may undercut the witness’s disclaimer of any

direct knowledge of the specific case. Not only have we

disapproved of the method, but government counsel in an

earlier case gave its assurance that it “no longer asks

mirroring hypotheticals of its expert witnesses in drug cases.”

United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 185 n.14 (D.C. Cir.

1998). Perhaps government counsel have launched an

avoidance strategy: asking a succession of questions about

individual details of the crime scene, and then, referring (as

they did here) to “the scenarios that you just discussed” and to

some additional details, asking the witness’s view of the

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(hypothetical) participant’s intent. If intended to circumvent

Boyd, the device is far too transparent. 

Nonetheless, the obviousness requirement for plain

error adds some leeway for the district court to that already

afforded by the abuse of discretion standard—though exactly

how much, we cannot say. See United States v. Sumlin, 271

F.3d 274, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (contrasting the two

standards). The extra leeway is enough, however, to say that,

in the light of our holding in Bailey and Detective Thomas’s

repeated assertions that he had no personal knowledge of the

case against Miller, any abuse of discretion wasn’t obvious

enough to qualify as “plain error.” 

Miller also asserts a number of sentencing errors.

First, he suggests that the district court “misunderstood its

legal authority” to depart downward. But he points to nothing

that might overcome the presumption that “the district court

kn[ew] and applie[d] the law correctly.” See United States v.

Pinnick, 47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal citation

omitted). 

Second, Miller claims that the court mistakenly treated

his drug trafficking conviction here as “another felony

offense” within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(5). That section

calls for a four-level upward bump in base offense level for

firearms violations committed “in connection with another

felony offense.” True, Application Note 18 explicitly

excludes some “trafficking offenses” from “another felony

offense,” but the exclusions mentioned are only “explosives

or firearms possession or trafficking offenses,” not drug

trafficking ones. See United States v. Gomez-Arellano, 5 F.3d

464, 466 (10th Cir. 1993). 

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Miller makes a confusing argument that the district

court wrongly placed him in criminal history Category VI

under § 4B1.1. Although he concedes that he was properly

classified as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a), he apparently

believes that the guideline placing career offenders in

Category VI was inapplicable because his base offense level

was determined by the firearms conviction, rather than by the

career offender provision. (Whichever calculation yields the

higher base level offense controls.) But § 4B1.1(b) says that

“[a] career offender’s criminal history category in every case

under this subsection shall be Category VI” (emphasis added),

not merely in cases in which the career offender classification

accounted for the base offense level. See United States v.

Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Finally, Miller argues that when the district court

considered his prior convictions in computing his sentencing

range under the Guidelines, it could, under Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), take into account the

“timing” or “nature” of the relevant offenses only if supported

by admissions by Miller or by jury findings. By “nature,”

Miller refers to whether the prior convictions were for

“violent” felonies; by “timing,” he refers to whether the

offenses or convictions (Miller’s wording is obscure)

“happen[ed] prior to the commission of the instant offense.”

We assume for purposes of this argument only that Blakely

will be held to cover Guidelines mandates as well as statutory

ones–an issue pending before the Court in United States v.

Booker, No. 04-104, and United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105

(argued Oct. 4, 2004). 

Blakely, of course, was an application of Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and quoted Apprendi’s own

statement of its holding: “Other than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

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beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely,

124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490

(emphasis added)). Apprendi in turn had noted the Court’s

prior decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523

U.S. 224 (1998), upholding use of a prior conviction that had

not been charged in the indictment, and “treat[ed] the case as

a narrow exception to the general rule” requiring charge in an

indictment, submission to the jury, and proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Thus, Apprendi

and Blakely leave no room for us to alter the “narrow

exception” for sentence enhancements based on prior

convictions (whether mandated by a statute or the

Guidelines). Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.

Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of

this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest

on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court

of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,

leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own

decisions.”).

Miller’s argument, of course, would preserve the form

of the exception. As he would have it, the sentencing court

could, in applying a statute or Guidelines, rely on a prior

conviction—excepting only the parts that matter: the nature of

the offense and the timing. Indeed, Miller never explicitly

challenges the continued validity of Almendarez-Torres.

Moreover, the claim that Apprendi and Blakely justify a

radical re-interpretation of Almendarez-Torres is undermined

by Apprendi’s own characterization of the case as having

“turned heavily upon the fact that the [sentence-increasing

factor] was ‘the prior commission of a serious crime.’”

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added) (quoting

Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230).

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Apart from gutting the exception, Miller’s position

overlooks what a prior conviction actually means. In the

normal case under the Guidelines, the only “nature” of a prior

crime that would concern a sentencing court would have been

the nature constituted by the elements of the crime charged,

which would already, in the initial trial, have been charged

and found by a jury (or judge in the event of waiver) beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,

599-602 (1990); see also United States v. Gabriel, 365 F.3d

29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recounting application of Taylor to

Guidelines treatment of prior convictions generally).

Alternatively they would have been formally admitted by the

defendant by pleading guilty. Even Taylor’s own exception

for a “narrow range of cases” where the jury was “actually

required to find” additional facts, see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602,

would involve prior proceedings meeting Apprendi’s

standards. To the extent that the lower courts have allowed

the use of facts that had not been established under Taylor’s

requirements, see discussion in Gabriel, 365 F.3d at 32, the

Court’s concerns in Apprendi and Blakely might require

retrenchment; but Miller makes no claim that any such use

occurred here. 

As for the timing of the prior offenses and convictions,

it seems highly improbable that the Court (assuming the

continued validity of Almendarez-Torres) would apply

Blakely to require an entire retrial to pin down an offense

date, which is normally uncontroversial and unlikely to have

been at issue in the initial trial, or a conviction date, which is

usually manifested in a formal court record. At least in the

absence of a claim that the dates of offense or conviction used

by the district court for sentencing erred by a relevant

margin—and Miller makes no such claim—we have no reason

to regard the issue as distinct from the Almendarez-Torres

exception. 

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The judgment of conviction and sentence are

Affirmed.

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