Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04045/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Luis Llamas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 09-4045

JUAN LUIS LLAMAS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Frank D. Whitney, District Judge.

(3:05-cr-00400-FDW-4)

Argued: January 26, 2010

Decided: March 17, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published

opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz

and Judge Agee joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Matthew Segal, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF

WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North

Carolina, for Appellant. Ellen Ruth Meltzer, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,

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for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Claire J. Rauscher, Executive

Director, Kevin Tate, Cecilia Oseguera, FEDERAL

DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC.,

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan,

Acting United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina;

Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Patrick M. Donley, Peter B. Loewenberg, Fraud Section,

Criminal Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

In late 2007, Juan Luis Llamas was convicted in the Western District of North Carolina for multiple offenses arising

from his role in a fraudulent sweepstakes scheme centered in

Costa Rica. Llamas was then sentenced to 132 months of

imprisonment and ordered to make restitution in a sum

exceeding $4.2 million. On appeal, Llamas raises three primary contentions of error. First, he maintains that the district

court erred in applying a Sentencing Guidelines adjustment

for preying on unusually vulnerable victims. Second, he contends that the court erred in applying an adjustment for his

supervisory role in the fraud scheme. Third, Llamas contends

that the court erred in calculating the restitution order. As

explained below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and

remand. 

I.

A.

Llamas’s various fraud and money laundering convictions

arose from his participation in an elaborate sweepstakes

scheme, which operated from approximately 2003 to 2006 out

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of San Jose, Costa Rica.1

 The basic fraud scheme operated

essentially as follows: Using lists purchased from "list brokers," operators placed telephone calls to persons in the

United States, falsely claiming to represent organizations,

such as the "Global Sweepstakes Authority" or the "United

States Sweepstakes Security Commission," that did not exist.

The initial phone calls were placed by operators called "openers," who would advise potential victims that they had won a

cash prize. The openers would explain, however, that a winner was required to pay an up-front fee, typically between

$1500 and $3000, to assure safe delivery of the prize money

from outside the country. If the scheme worked, the victim

would wire the fee to the call center through a moneytransferring service such as Western Union. After the fee was

transferred, another operator at the call center — referred to

as a "loader" — would call the victim again, seeking to

extract an additional payment. In their efforts to "reload" victims, the loaders would often resort to more devious tricks,

asserting that they represented insurance or government agencies and occasionally threatening their victims with prosecution. No prize money was ever paid, of course, and the fraud

scheme continued in this manner until the victims were no

longer willing to cough up additional funds.2

The call center at issue in this appeal was operated by

Michael Kearns, one of appellant Llamas’s codefendants.

Kearns moved to Costa Rica in 2002 and, with the assistance

of Joshua Grimes (another codefendant), began operating his

call center (the "Kearns Call Center" or "Center") in 2003. In

1The facts spelled out herein are drawn from the final Presentence

Investigation Report adopted by the sentencing court, as well as from

other relevant aspects of the record. 

2Several call centers throughout Costa Rica were engaged in similar

schemes, resulting in multiple federal prosecutions. See, e.g., United

States v. Pileggi, No. 08-4237 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2010). The investigators

estimated that, at one point, there were more than fifteen call centers operating such schemes in San Jose alone. Llamas and his coconspirators

worked at only one of the centers. 

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November 2003, Kearns hired Charles Cummins — a childhood friend of Llamas — to work at the Center. With

Kearns’s approval, Cummins invited Llamas to Costa Rica to

participate in the fraud scheme. In March 2004, Llamas

moved from California to San Jose, Costa Rica, and began

working for Kearns at the Center.

When Llamas first arrived in Costa Rica, he played a relatively minor role at the Kearns Call Center, serving as a translator and security guard and earning between 400 and 600

U.S. dollars per week. Although Llamas eventually trained to

become an "opener," he was not particularly successful in that

endeavor. After just a few months, Kearns reassigned Llamas

to other roles in the sweepstakes scheme. By August 2004,

Llamas was serving as the Center’s "room boss" or "office

manager," and his weekly earnings had jumped to approximately $800. As office manager, Llamas passed out "leads"

(a victim’s name and phone number) to the various operators,

maintained a board listing the operators’ successful pitches,

and provided technical support for the Center’s computers and

telephones. Llamas was also responsible for personnel matters, including the calculation of employees’ weekly earnings

and enforcement of Kearns’s operational rules at the Center.

For example, Grimes testified that Llamas once sent him

home because he arrived late for work. 

Llamas continued in his role as the Kearns Call Center’s

office manager until December 2004, when he withdrew from

the fraudulent sweepstakes scheme and returned to California.

Although Kearns continued to operate the Center after Llamas’s departure, the fraud scheme eventually unraveled. In

April 2006, an operator from the Center, attempting to "reload" a victim, instead reached the victim’s son (who, unfortunately for the Center, was a judicial officer). The federal

authorities were promptly notified of the scheme and, on May

16, 2006, Llamas was apprehended in California.

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B.

On December 5, 2006, Llamas was one of twelve defendants charged in an eighty-six count superseding indictment

returned in the Western District of North Carolina.3 The

indictment charged Llamas with conspiracy to defraud the

United States, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 371; forty-two

counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; conspiracy to commit money laundering, in contravention of 18

U.S.C. § 1956(h); and nineteen counts of money laundering,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). On November 26,

2007, Llamas pleaded guilty straight up, without a plea agreement, to all sixty-three of the offenses lodged against him by

the indictment.

On August 29, 2008, following Llamas’s guilty pleas, the

probation office prepared and submitted his final Presentence

Investigation Report (the "PSR"). The PSR estimated that the

Kearns Call Center had defrauded approximately five hundred

victims of more than $1.1 million between March 2004 and

December 2004, the time frame when Llamas worked there.

Using the 2007 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR

recommended a base offense level of 7, with a sixteen-level

increase based on a loss exceeding $1 million, see USSG

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), and a six-level increase for an offense

involving more than 250 victims, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).

The PSR then added two levels because the conspirators had

misrepresented that they were acting on behalf of a government agency, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(8), and two more levels

because a substantial part of the fraud scheme was committed

outside of the United States, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(9), resulting

in an adjusted offense level of 33. 

3Llamas and his coconspirators were prosecuted in the Western District

of North Carolina because Western Union, the money-transferring service

they used to facilitate the fraud scheme, processed funds through Charlotte. 

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The PSR recommended two additional upward adjustments

to which Llamas objected at his sentencing hearing. First, it

recommended a two-level adjustment, pursuant to Guidelines

section 3A1.1(b)(1), because the majority of the fraud

scheme’s victims were unusually vulnerable (the "vulnerable

victim adjustment"). The PSR emphasized that the Kearns

Call Center’s victims were elderly and that the "[e]vidence

indicates that [Llamas] knew, or should have known, that the

victims of this scheme were unusually vulnerable due to age,

physical or mental condition, or that they were otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct." J.A. 564.4

 Second, the PSR recommended a three-level adjustment under

Guidelines section 3B1.1(b) due to Llamas’s managerial or

supervisory role in the scheme (the "aggravating role adjustment"). After applying a three-level reduction for acceptance

of responsibility, see USSG § 3E1.1, the PSR recommended

a total offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of

II, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 188 to 235

months.

On October 29 and December 8, 2008, the district court

conducted a two-part sentencing hearing. As pertinent here,

Llamas first objected to the PSR’s recommendation of the

vulnerable victim adjustment. Llamas stressed that the Kearns

Call Center identified its potential victims by purchasing

names from "list brokers," meaning that it essentially targeted

the public at large, rather than any particular vulnerable

group. In an effort to show that Llamas’s victims were unusually vulnerable, the Government presented the testimony of

two of the fraud scheme’s victims: (1) Lawrence Story, a

seventy-nine-year-old pecan broker, and (2) Tammy Hart, a

thirty-nine-year-old nursing assistant. Story testified that he

had been taking medication for Alzheimer’s disease for four

or five years, and Hart testified that, on one occasion when

she was contacted by the Center, she had been expecting a

4Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 

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call from a doctor regarding her daughter’s health. Notably,

neither witness attested that any of the Center’s employees

were aware of these facts. For example, Story made clear that

he never discussed his medical situation with anyone from the

Center. And although Hart explained to the Center’s operator

that she was expecting a phone call, she never said that the

call related to her daughter’s medical care. 

The sentencing court thereafter found the vulnerable victim

adjustment applicable to Llamas. In assessing Story’s contact

with the Kearns Call Center, the court observed that "age

alone might be sufficient, but also the fact that he’s on a drug

that can only be prescribed because you have some mental

condition." J.A. 429. The court then turned to Hart’s testimony, emphasizing that she "was vulnerable because she was

awaiting a phone call with regard to her daughter’s doctor.

Vulnerability is not limited only to age. It can be a physical

or mental condition such as a stress like Ms. Hart had." Id. at

430. The court also recognized that "[n]umerous other victims

have testified in this courtroom in one or more of the trials or

hearings related to this Costa Rican fraud scam, and many of

those victims were vulnerable in one way or the other." Id. at

429. The court then found that Llamas "should have known

that some of the victims were vulnerable," id. at 431, and concluded that application of the vulnerable victim adjustment

was warranted.

Turning to the aggravating role adjustment, Llamas and the

prosecution disagreed on the nature of his employment at the

Kearns Call Center. Llamas conceded that he distributed

"leads," collected completed deals, tracked the callers’ earnings, and enforced office rules regarding, inter alia, dress code

and arrival times. Llamas sought, however, to minimize his

role in the fraud scheme, contending that he was merely

Kearns’s administrative assistant and lacked any authority to

make managerial decisions. The court nevertheless determined that the aggravating role adjustment was warranted,

explaining that Llamas, "whether you want to call him a manUNITED STATES v. LLAMAS 7

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ager or not[,] clearly was a supervisor. He clearly was giving

instructions and supervising people at that call center." Id. at

432–33. 

The district court thereafter adopted the PSR in pertinent part.5

The court calculated Llamas’s advisory sentencing range as

151 to 188 months and imposed a below-Guidelines sentence

of 132 months. The court also ordered Llamas to pay more

than $4.27 million in restitution, finding that, although the

Kearns Call Center caused losses totalling only $1.7 million,

Llamas was jointly and severally liable for other losses caused

by Costa Rican call centers that were carrying out similar

sweepstakes schemes. Llamas timely noticed this appeal, and

we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review a sentence imposed by a district court for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The

first step in our review of a sentence mandates that we "ensure

that the district court committed no significant procedural

error, such as . . . improperly calculating[ ] the Guidelines

range . . . [or] selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous

facts." Id. In assessing whether a sentencing court has properly applied the Guidelines, we review factual findings for

clear error and legal conclusions de novo. See United States

v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008). We review a

5

In assessing the PSR, the district court rejected only its recommendation for a sixteen-level enhancement predicated on the Kearns Call Center

causing more than $1 million in losses. The court found that Llamas had

participated in the fraud scheme only between March and December 2004,

during which time the scheme caused approximately $931,326.20 in

losses. Accordingly, the court adopted a fourteen-level enhancement,

predicated on a loss of between $400,000 and $1 million. See USSG

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). 

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restitution order for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 339 (4th Cir. 2008).

III.

Llamas presents three primary contentions on appeal. First,

he contends that the district court erred in applying the vulnerable victim adjustment, failing to sufficiently explain its finding that Llamas should have known of his victims’ unusual

vulnerabilities. Although the Government concedes that the

court erred in this respect, it nevertheless asks us to rely on

other aspects of the record to affirm the court’s application of

the vulnerable victim adjustment. Second, Llamas maintains

that, because he lacked supervisory authority over his coconspirators, the court improperly applied the aggravating role

adjustment. Third, Llamas challenges the restitution order,

asserting that the court erred in finding him jointly and severally liable for financial losses caused by other Costa Rican

fraud schemes. Notably, the Government also concedes that

the court erred in calculating the amount of loss underlying

the restitution order. We assess these sentencing contentions

in turn.6

A.

First, Llamas challenges the district court’s application of

6Llamas also contends on appeal that his 132-month sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to consider the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that it was substantively unreasonable as

compared to his codefendants’ sentences. As explained below, the court

procedurally erred in applying the vulnerable victim adjustment. Accordingly, we need not reach Llamas’s alternative sentencing contentions. See

Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50 (observing that sentencing court should "consider

all of the § 3553(a) factors" only after "correctly calculating the applicable

Guidelines range"); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.

2009) ("If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally reasonable can

we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under

an abuse-of-discretion standard." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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the vulnerable victim adjustment under Guidelines section

3A1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase in a

defendant’s offense level "[i]f the defendant knew or should

have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim." Section 3A1.1(b)(1) thus creates a two-prong test for

assessing the application of the vulnerable victim adjustment.

See United States v. Stella, 591 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).

First, a sentencing court must determine that a victim was

unusually vulnerable. See USSG § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2. Second,

the court must then assess whether the defendant knew or

should have known of such unusual vulnerability. See id.

(explaining that vulnerable victim adjustment "would not

apply in a case in which the defendant sold fraudulent securities by mail to the general public and one of the victims happened to be senile"). In other words, applying the vulnerable

victim adjustment "requires a fact-based explanation of why

advanced age or some other characteristic made one or more

victims unusually vulnerable to the offense conduct, and why

the defendant knew or should have known of this unusual vulnerability." United States v. Vega-Iturrino, 565 F.3d 430, 434

(8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

At Llamas’s sentencing hearing, the district court found

that at least two of the Kearns Call Center’s victims were

unusually vulnerable. In particular, the court discussed the

vulnerabilities of victims Lawrence Story and Tammy Hart,

who testified at the sentencing hearing. The court emphasized

that Story — the elderly pecan broker — was unusually vulnerable due to his age and mental condition. The court found

that Hart was unusually vulnerable because, when she was

contacted by the Center, she was stressed about her daughter’s

medical condition. Having found both Story and Hart to be

vulnerable victims, the court observed that the vulnerable victim adjustment would apply only if Llamas knew or should

have known of their vulnerabilities. Without further explanation or analysis, however, the court then concluded that "the

defendant should have known that some of the victims were

vulnerable" and applied the two-level adjustment. J.A. 431. 

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In applying the vulnerable victim adjustment, the district

court simply made a generalized finding that Llamas should

have known of his victims’ vulnerabilities. This finding, however, as the Government concedes on appeal, does not sufficiently support application of the adjustment. Indeed, our

precedent stresses the importance of an adequate explanation

for such sentencing decisions. In United States v. Carter, we

held that a sentencing court is obliged to "place on the record

an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of

the case before it." 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). And, in United States v. Wilkinson,

we observed that a sentencing court must provide "a sufficient

explanation of its rationale" in making factual findings to support its calculation of a defendant’s Guidelines range. See __

F.3d __, No. 09-4018, slip op. at 17 (4th Cir. Jan. 4, 2010).

An adequate explanation of such a rationale not only "allows

for meaningful appellate review," it also "promotes the perception of fair sentencing." Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Thus, in Wilkinson,

we remanded for resentencing because the sentencing court’s

findings "did not provide us anything close to a sufficient

explanation of its rationale in making its loss finding . . . that

would enable us to review such finding under the clearly erroneous standard." Wilkinson, slip op. at 17. Because the court

had not explained such finding, we were unable to hold that

the sentence was procedurally reasonable, and we thus

remanded "with instructions that the [sentencing] court

explain in detail" its loss finding. Id. at 18. 

Here, the district court likewise failed to provide a sufficient explanation of its finding that Llamas should have

known that his victims were unusually vulnerable. Although

the Government used the Story and Hart evidence to support

its contention that Llamas and his coconspirators directed

their fraud scheme at unusually vulnerable targets, it produced

no evidence concerning Llamas’s knowledge of the victims’

vulnerabilities. Though the court found that Llamas should

have known that his victims were unusually vulnerable, it

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offered no explanation or basis therefor. More specifically, it

did not explain how Llamas should have known that Story

suffered from a mental condition, or how Llamas should have

known that Hart was stressed about her daughter’s medical

situation. Such explanations were crucial, because the record

suggests that the Kearns Call Center chose its potential victims at random by purchasing lists of names and phone numbers from "list brokers." That those lists may have included

individuals with unusual vulnerabilities does not alone support application of the adjustment. Put simply, the conclusory

assertion that Llamas "should have known that some of the

victims were vulnerable," J.A. 431, does not warrant application of the vulnerable victim adjustment. 

Despite conceding error on this point, the Government

seeks to salvage the district court’s application of the vulnerable victim adjustment by relying on other aspects of the

record — which the court did not discuss. For example, the

Government maintains that, by attempting to "reload" persons

who had already fallen victim to the sweepstakes scheme,

Llamas and his coconspirators preyed on individuals they

knew to be "particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct,"

thereby supporting application of the vulnerable victim

adjustment. See USSG § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2. The court, however,

did not adopt such a theory as its rationale for finding that

Llamas should have known of the victims’ unusual vulnerabilities. And our Carter decision explained that "an appellate

court may not guess at the district court’s rationale, searching

the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues that might explain a sentence." 564

F.3d at 329–30; see also Wilkinson, slip op. at 18 ("[W]e are

prohibited from presuming the sentencing court has silently

adopted arguments presented by a party." (internal quotation

marks omitted)). In these circumstances, application of the

vulnerable victim adjustment cannot be justified simply

because there might be some evidence in the record — not

addressed by the sentencing court — supporting the proposition that Llamas should have known that his victims were

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unusually vulnerable. Thus, we are unable to conclude that

the court’s application of the vulnerable victim adjustment

was procedurally reasonable. See Wilkinson, slip op. at 18.

B.

Next, Llamas challenges the district court’s application of

the aggravating role adjustment. In this regard, the court

assigned Llamas a three-level adjustment, pursuant to Guidelines section 3B1.1(b). Such an adjustment is warranted only

"[i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an

organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or

more participants or was otherwise extensive." USSG

§ 3B1.1(b). A sentencing court’s ruling on the aggravating

role adjustment "is a factual determination reviewed for clear

error." United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147–48 (4th

Cir. 2009).7

In finding that Llamas had a supervisory role in the fraudulent sweepstakes scheme carried out at the Kearns Call Center, the district court relied primarily on the evidence of

coconspirator Joshua Grimes, who confirmed that Llamas

served as the Center’s "office manager." J.A. 364. Reciting

Grimes’s testimony, the court found that, as office manager,

Llamas was responsible for passing out "leads," tracking the

operators’ earnings, calculating their weekly wages, and col7The Sentencing Commission has identified seven factors for a sentencing court to consider in assessing whether an aggravating role adjustment

is warranted: 

[(1)] the exercise of decision making authority, [(2)] the nature

of participation in the commission of the offense, [(3)] the

recruitment of accomplices, [(4)] the claimed right to a larger

share of the fruits of the crime, [(5)] the degree of participation

in planning or organizing the offense, [(6)] the nature and scope

of the illegal activity, and [(7)] the degree of control and authority exercised over others. 

USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. 

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lecting victims’ payments from Western Union. The court

thus concluded that Llamas "clearly was a supervisor" and

"clearly was giving instructions and supervising people" at the

Center, thereby warranting application of the aggravating role

adjustment. Id. at 432–33. 

In United States v. Cameron, we recently explained that, in

assessing whether a defendant played an aggravating role in

the offense of conviction, the key inquiry is whether the

defendant’s role was that of "an organizer or leader of people," as opposed to that of a manager over the property,

assets, or activities of a criminal organization. 573 F.3d 179,

185 (4th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d

219, 226 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that aggravating role

adjustment is proper "only . . . if it [was] demonstrated that

[the defendant] was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of people"). Thus, the aggravating role adjustment is

appropriate where the evidence demonstrates that the defendant "controlled the activities of other participants" or "exercised management responsibility." United States v. Bartley,

230 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2000). 

The evidence in the sentencing proceedings supports the

proposition that Llamas exercised supervisory responsibility

over the activities of the Kearns Call Center by controlling its

operators. Llamas enforced the Center’s rules, and even punished employees who failed to abide thereby. In passing out

"leads," Llamas coordinated the operators’ activities, determining which of the so-called "openers" and "loaders" were

to make contact with which victims. And Llamas was responsible for calculating each employee’s earnings, effectively

deciding monetary shares of the fraud scheme’s proceeds. In

sum, the district court did not clearly err in relying on this evidence to find that Llamas was a supervisor of the Center’s

employees, rendering the three-level adjustment appropriate.

C.

Finally, Llamas challenges the district court’s restitution

order of more than $4.2 million, contending that the court

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erred in finding him jointly and severally liable for losses

caused by other Costa Rican fraud schemes. Importantly, the

Government concedes on appeal that the court erred in that

respect.

In pertinent part, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of

1996 (the "MVRA") directs a sentencing court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense involving, inter alia,

fraud or deceit, to order "that the defendant make restitution

to the victim of the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).

Because the MVRA focuses on the offense of conviction

rather than on relevant conduct, "the focus of [a sentencing]

court in applying the MVRA must be on the losses to the victim caused by the offense." United States v. Newsome, 322

F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, in the

context of a conspiracy, a restitution award under the MVRA

is limited to the losses attributable to the specific conspiracy

offenses for which the defendant was convicted. See id.

At the sentencing hearing, investigators testified that the

Kearns Call Center caused approximately $1.7 million in

losses between March 2004 and April 2006. Yet, in applying

the MVRA, the district court ordered Llamas to make restitution of more than $4.2 million, concluding that he was jointly

and severally liable for losses caused not only by the Center,

but also by other Costa Rican call centers utilizing similar

sweepstakes schemes. See J.A. 468 ("All those that were

involved in any call center are subject, under the [MVRA],

[to] the same joint and several liability."). Because the restitution order was not limited to losses attributable to the Center,

the Government has properly recognized — and conceded —

the legal error underlying the restitution order. See United

States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007) ("A district court abuses its discretion when it . . . commits an error

of law."). Thus, the district court abused its discretion with

respect to the restitution order, and we vacate it as well.

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IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand for such other and further proceedings as may be

appropriate.

AFFIRMED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

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