Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01115/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard W. Laboy
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

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.. PUBLISH FILL j) 

UNITED STATES COURT 

United Ste.tel C,oμrt r!,t Appea1' 

OF APPEALS Tenth Ctrcu1 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

RICHARD W. LABOY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 9 1992 

OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-1115 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-65) 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney, (Michael J. 

Norton, United States Attorney, Kathleen M. Tafoya, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Guy Till, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Mountain States Drug Task Force, 

Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Charles Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, MCWILLIAMS, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

The government appeals from the district court's suppression 

of physical evidence. Defendant-Appellee Laboy was indicted for 

possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and carrying a 

firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime. 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841(a) (1), (b) (1) (C); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c). Following a 

hearing, the district court suppressed evidence seized at an 

initial sidewalk arrest and at the follow-up arrest at the high 

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school Mr. Laboy attended. The district court concluded that the 

initial encounter between Mr. Laboy and the police constituted a 

"seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, since a reasonable person 

would not have felt free to leave. The district court further 

found that this seizure was unreasonable since it was unsupported 

by any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore 

ordered suppression of the immediate fruits of that arrest (a 

small amount of crack cocaine and a nine millimeter handgun). 

According to the district court, the subsequent federal arrest 

warrant and the evidence seized under that arrest warrant (a 

notebook containing allegedly gang- and drug-related notations) 

were the tainted product of the initial unreasonable seizure. Our 

jurisdiction to review the district court's suppression order 

arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We hold that the initial arrest 

did not constitute a "seizure" that implicates the Fourth 

Amendment and reverse. 

Background 

In February 1992, Detective Jesus Quinones was part of a 

support team for an undercover narcotics operation at an apartment 

house in Denver, Colorado. He was dressed in plain clothes and 

waited outside of the building in an unmarked car with another 

officer, who was wearing a raid vest bearing the police logo and 

carried a submachine gun. Four other undercover officers 

assisted. 

Following a distress signal from the undercover officer 

making the buy inside the building, Detective Quinones ran into 

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the building and assisted two other officers in escorting three 

prisoners to the rear of the building, where they were lined up 

against a wall. Two of these prisoners were handcuffed with their 

backs to the wall so that the handcuffs were not visible to 

passersby on the street. The third prisoner was facing the street 

and was not handcuffed. Detective Quinones was the only officer 

standing next to the three prisoners and his service revolver was 

out of sight. 

Mr. Laboy was walking on the other side of the street. 

Detective Quinones and Mr. Laboy made eye contact, and 

acknowledged each other with nods. Detective Quinones then waved 

at Laboy, signalling him to come over. Mr. Laboy did so. 

Detective Quinones testified: 

I asked him, I said, "You got any stuff?" And then he 

[Mr. Laboy] told me, "Yeah, what are you looking for?" 

That's when I told him [Mr. Laboy] a "twenty." 

He [Mr. Laboy] said yeah, I do, or "Yeah, I do have some 

stuff, . " 

II R. 14-15. Mr. Laboy testified that he knew that he was 

watching an arrest in progress, and he interpreted Detective 

Quinones' gestures to him as a sign that he was being arrested, 

and felt that he might be shot if he tried to run away. Mr. Laboy 

indicated that Detective Quinones asked him if he had any stuff, 

to which Mr. Laboy responded yes, and thereafter Mr. Laboy was 

arrested. 

The district court framed the inquiry as "whether under the 

totality of the circumstances a reasonable person in the position 

of Richard Laboy would believe that he was not free to leave the 

area and ignore the detective's questions." IR. doc. 9 at 2-3 . 

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The court then ruled that "the defendant perceived that he was 

being arrested and that his perception was reasonable." Id. at 3. 

Although the district court found that the neighborhood was known 

for street-level drug dealing, the district court found Detective 

Quinones' testimony was implausible because" [i]t is difficult to 

believe that anyone would voluntarily engage in a drug transaction 

with another person in the immediate presence of three other 

people." Id. In supplemental findings, the district court 

emphasized that Detective Quinones had no reasonable suspicion to 

stop Mr. Laboy. 

Discussion 

We accept the district court's factual findings unless 

clearly erroneous, but the ultimate determination of the 

reasonableness of any search or seizure is a question of law 

reviewed de novo by this court. United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 

1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1992). We have recognized three basic types 

of encounters with police officers: voluntary cooperation, Tercy 

investigative stops, and arrests. A voluntary encounter involves 

the voluntary cooperation of a citizen with noncoercive 

questioning. Voluntary encounters are not considered seizures 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and do not raise any 

constitutional issues. United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 

1566 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Santillanes, 848 

F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1190 

(1992). A Tercy investigative stop is a brief, nonintrusive 

detention during preliminary questioning or a frisk for weapons. 

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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Terry stops are 

considered seizures, which must be supported by a reasonable 

suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime. 

Id. The final category is an arrest, which is characterized as 

highly intrusive and involves detention. Arrests must be 

supported by probable cause to believe that a person has committed 

or is committing a crime. Morgan, 936 F.2d at 1566. 

We resolve this case on one question: whether, given all the 

surrounding circumstances, the wave of the detective's hand and 

subsequent questioning constituted a show of authority sufficient 

to make a reasonable person believe that he or she was not free to 

leave. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991); 

Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988); United States 

v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); United States v. Bloom, 

1992 WL 228798, *3 (10th Cir. 1992). To constitute a seizure, 

there must be some show of authority and a submission to that 

authority. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). 

11 [A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer 

approaches an individual and asks a few questions." Bostick, 111 

S. Ct. at 2386. As long as a reasonable innocent person, as 

opposed to a person knowingly carrying contraband, would feel free 

to leave, such encounters are consensual and need not be supported 

by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. 

Courts have identified several factors to assist in the 

analysis of whether a reasonable person would believe the police 

officer's actions to be coercive, and that he or she was not free 

to disregard the officers. A nonexclusive list of some of these 

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factors includes: the threatening presence of several officers; a 

display of a weapon by an officer; some physical touching by an 

officer; use of language or tone of voice indicating that 

compliance with officer was compulsory; prolonged retention of a 

person's personal effects such as plane tickets, identification or 

luggage; a request to accompany the officer to the station; 

whether the encounter occurred in a nonpublic place; and whether 

the encounter took place in a small, enclosed space. See 

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 

438 (1984); Bloom, 1992 WL 228798, *5-*6; United States v. Ward, 

961 F.2d 1526, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Springer, 

946 F.2d 1012, 1016 (2d Cir. 1991). 

The undisputed facts of this case reveal that none of these 

factors were perceived by Mr. Laboy, nor would they have been 

perceived by a reasonable person in his position. The police, in 

the middle of an undercover operation, had taken every possible 

precaution to ensure that there were no outward signs of police 

presence. Although six officers participated in the operation, 

only Detective Quinones was visible to Mr. Laboy. Even had the 

other officers been visible to Mr. Laboy, only one officer was 

wearing anything that would have identified him as a law 

enforcement official, and that officer was inside an unmarked 

police car, not visible to Mr. Laboy at the time of the encounter. 

No firearms were visible to Mr. Laboy. Not only was Mr. Laboy not 

touched by the officers, he was, even by his own estimate, at 

least twenty-five yards from Detective Quinones at the time he 

claims to have been compelled to cross the street. There is no 

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claim that Detective Quinones used an intimidating tone of voice 

or language to compel Mr. Laboy to cross the street. In fact, the 

detective's verbal communication with Mr. Laboy began only after 

Mr. Laboy had crossed the street. The encounter occurred on a 

public street, fully exposed to public view . Moreover, merely 

motioning a person to approach a police officer, unaccompanied by 

verbal communication or show of force, is not inherently 

coercive. 1 Although Detective Quinones never explicitly told Mr. 

Laboy he did not have to cooperate, such advice was unnecessary. 

See INS V. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("While most citizens 

will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and 

do so without being told that they are free not to respond, hardly 

eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Unless 

the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to 

demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was 

not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the 

questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment."); 

Bloom, 1992 WL 228798, *7; Ward, 961 F.2d at 1533; United States 

v. Lloyd, 868 F.2d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1989). We conclude as a 

matter of law that a reasonable person would have felt free not to 

cross the street and encounter Detective Quinones. Just as "a 

seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches 

1 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not ignore the 

fact that Detective Quinones signalled to Mr. Laboy. Our analysis 

focuses on whether the Detective's actions, when viewed in light 

of all the surrounding circumstances and the controlling law of 

Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386, constituted a show of 

authority sufficient to make a reasonable person believe that he 

or she was not free to leave. 

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an individual and asks a few questions," Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 

2386, a seizure does not occur simply because an officer waves at 

a person, signalling him to come over, and then asks a few 

questions. 

The district court placed too much emphasis on Mr. Laboy's 

subjective state of mind. The appropriate inquiry is an objective 

one: whether a reasonable innocent person would have felt free to 

leave. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574; Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388, 

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519, n.4 (1983). Thus, we have no 

difficulty in reconciling our holding that the reasonable person 

would feel free to disregard Detective Quinones' actions with the 

district court's determination that Mr. Laboy thought that he was 

being arrested. 

Because we conclude that the initial encounter between Mr. 

Laboy and Detective Quinones was not a seizure, and did not offend 

the Fourth Amendment, the evidence seized during that arrest 

should not have been suppressed. Similarly, the subsequent 

federal warrant, and the evidence seized under that warrant, are 

free from taint and should not have been suppressed. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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No. 92-1115 -- UNITED STATES V. LABOY 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I dissent. 

The district court's factual findings can only be reversed if 

they are found to be clearly erroneous. United States v. Ibarra, 

955 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1992). The evidence on appeal must 

be viewed in the light most favorable to the district court 

findings. Id. Nothing in the record persuasively suggests the 

district court's findings of fact are in error. 

The district court, in its factual findings, stated as 

follows: 

Richard W. Laboy, an 18 year old black man, was 

walking northward on the west side of Washington Street. 

Mr. Laboy looked over to the parking lot behind the 

apartment complex and saw the three black men against 

the wall with Detective Quinones standing out in front 

of them and looking across Washington Street. Mr. Laboy 

and Detective Quinones made eye contact and acknowledged 

each other's presence with head nods. Detective 

Quinones then waived [sic] to signal Mr. Laboy that he 

should come over to Detective Quinones. Mr. Laboy 

walked across the street and came up to within about ten 

feet of Detective Quinones, a total distance of about 

100 feet. 

Mr. Laboy testified that it was obvious to him 

that the three black men lined up against the wall were 

under arrest and that he, too, was being arrested when 

Detective Quinones waved him over. 

Findings, Conclusions and Order at 1-2 (emphasis added). 

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The majority set forth the controlling law when it cited 

Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), and framed the inquiry 

as whether the totality of the circumstances constituted a show of 

authority sufficient to make a reasonable person believe that she 

or he was not free to leave. 1 

The majority sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors courts 

have used in conducting their analysis of whether or not the 

police officer's actions were inherently coercive and found none 

of the factors present. The majority ignores the fact that the 

police officer demonstratively signaled Mr. Laboy to come to his 

presence. Given our society's propensity to obey the reasonable 

requests of police officers, I believe common sense is ignored by 

holding the actions of the police officer in signaling Mr. Laboy 

to cross the street and appear in front of the officer were not 

inherently coercive. 

A nonverbal hand signal ordering a person to cross a street 

and travel 100 feet to the police officer's presence would not 

lead a reasonable person to believe he or she was free to ignore 

the police officer's directives and questions. 

I would add to the list of factors to be utilized in 

1 I disagree with the majority's classification of the Bostick 

inquiry as to whether a reasonable person feels free to leave . 

More accurately, the Supreme Court frames the standard as whether 

a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's 

request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Bostick, 111 s. Ct. 

at 2384. In this case, however, the distinction is irrelevant. 

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analyzing the question of whether or not a police officer's 

actions are coercive, the conduct of the police officer including 

the nonverbal commands issued by the police officer. Applying 

this factor to the analysis, I would affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

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