Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03279/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03279-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Forrest
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3279

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

John Forrest, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 16, 2010

Filed: July 13, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, BRIGHT and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

John Forrest pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 determined that he has four

prior violent felony convictions -- Colorado convictions for second degree burglary

in 1986, robbery in 1988, and menacing in 1995, and a 2004 Kansas conviction for

attempted burglary. The court sentenced Forrest to the mandatory minimum fifteenyear prison sentence prescribed if a defendant “has three previous convictions . . . for

a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Forrest appeals,

1

The HONORABLE RICHARD G. KOPF, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

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arguing that none of the four convictions was for a violent felony as that term is

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B):

 

 any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year

. . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or

extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

Concluding that all four convictions were for violent felony offenses, we affirm. 

In determining whether a state-law offense is a violent felony, “we apply the

‘formal categorical approach’ adopted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, an analysis that focuses on the statutory elements of the

offense rather than the particular facts underlying the defendant’s prior conviction.” 

United States v. Reliford, 471 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S.

938 (2007). When the statute in question proscribed “discrete, alternative sets of

elements, one or more of which was not, generically, a violent felony . . . we apply a

modified categorical approach that reviews the charging document, jury instructions,

plea agreement or plea hearing transcript, and comparable judicial records to

determine whether the defendant was in fact convicted of a violent felony alternative.” 

United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1061 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 1566 (2010). At the outset, we reject Forrest’s repeated contention

that statutes which have a mens rea element of “knowingly” do not meet the

“purposeful” behavior requirement of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-45

(2008), a contention foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Wilson, 568

F.3d 670, 674 (8th Cir. 2009).

1. Felony Menacing. Forrest first argues that his 1995 Colorado conviction

for felony menacing was not a violent felony offense. At that time, the Colorado

statute provided: “A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or

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physical action, he knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of

imminent serious bodily injury. . . . [I]f committed by the use of a deadly weapon

[menacing] is a class 5 felony.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-206. 

In United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

547 U.S. 1104 (2006), the Tenth Circuit held that this offense -- knowingly placing

or attempting to place someone in fear of imminent serious bodily injury by the use

of a deadly weapon -- “easily satisfies” the requirement of “the threatened use of

physical force against the person of another” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Forrest urges us

instead to follow United States v. Perez-Veleta, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1179 (D.N.M.

2008), which held that the modified categorical approach must be used in determining

whether a Colorado felony menacing offense was a “crime of violence” under

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1) because the statutory definition of deadly weapon includes

“materials and substances,” see Col. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901, and the use of substances

such as smoke or poison would “not necessarily include the threatened, attempted, or

actual use of physical force.” 

We reject the analysis in Perez-Veleta because it fails to focus on whether the

element of the felony menacing offense, “use of a deadly weapon,” includes the

requisite use of force. As the Supreme Court explained in James v. United States, 550

U.S. 192, 208 (2007):

the proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements

of the offense, in the ordinary case, [involves the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another]. One can

always hypothesize unusual cases in which even a prototypically violent

crime might not present a genuine risk of injury -- for example, an

attempted murder where the gun, unbeknownst to the shooter, had no

bullets. (Citation omitted.)

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The phrase “physical force” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) “means violent force -- that is, force

capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United

States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1271 (2010). We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the

elements of the Colorado felony menacing offense “in the ordinary case” easily satisfy

this requirement. A threat that creates a fear “of imminent serious bodily injury” is

a threat of physical force. Thus, a felony menacing conviction under this statute is

categorically a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).2

 

2. Robbery. Forrest next argues that his 1988 Colorado robbery conviction 

was not a violent felony conviction. The statute provided that “[a] person who

knowingly takes anything of value from the person or presence of another by the use

of force, threats, or intimidation commits robbery.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-4-301. 

Forrest argues that “an infinite number of factual scenarios could be contemplated”

that would violate this statute and not qualify as a violent felony, and the government

failed to introduce a charging document describing the facts underlying his guilty

plea. But this contention is contrary to the categorical approach. The question is not

how Forrest committed the offense, but whether the offense, categorically, “has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 

The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently held that “the gravamen of the

offense of robbery is the violent nature of the taking.” People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d

93, 100 (Colo. 2003); see People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 244 (Colo. 1983)

(“robbery is the application of physical force or intimidation against the victim . . . in

the taking of property”); People v. Jenkins, 599 P.2d 912, 914 (Colo. 1979) (robbery

whether committed by force, threats, or intimidation is a crime involving the use of

2

We note that, even if the modified categorical approach applied, the relevant

charging document alleged that Forrest used an automobile as a deadly weapon to

place a law enforcement officer in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

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force or violence); People v. Thomas, 509 P.2d 592, 594 (Colo. 1973). We are bound

by Colorado’s interpretation of the substantive offense. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at

1269. 

The Tenth Circuit has held that this Colorado robbery offense is a crime of

violence under the comparable Guidelines provision because “[t]he statute requires

the use of force, threat or intimidation, which all involve an element of violence.” 

United States v. Futrell, 83 F.3d 434, 1996 WL 200602, at *1 (10th Cir. April 25,

1996) (unpublished); accord United States v. Sawyer, 588 F.3d 548, 555-56 (8th Cir.

2009) (applying an Arkansas robbery statute). We agree and therefore conclude that

this robbery offense was a violent felony conviction under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 

Therefore, we need not consider whether the offense also qualifies as a violent felony

under the “otherwise involves” clause in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See United States v.

Hennecke, 590 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2010). 

3. Attempted Burglary. Forrest next argues that the district court erred in

concluding that his 2004 Kansas conviction for attempted burglary was a violent

felony conviction. “Burglary” is one of the offenses specifically enumerated in 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court held in Taylor that the enumeration

includes only “generic” burglary offenses, that is,“an unlawful or unprivileged entry

into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” 

495 U.S. at 598. In James, the Court held that, while attempted burglary is not an

enumerated offense, a Florida conviction for attempted burglary of a structure was a

violent felony offense under the residual “otherwise involves” clause in

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because, so long as state law “requires an overt act directed toward

the entry of a structure,” attempted burglary “poses the same kind of risk” as its

closest analog among the enumerated offenses, completed burglary. 550 U.S. at 203,

206. The Kansas statutes here at issue defined attempt as “any overt act toward the

perpetration of a crime done by a person who intends to commit such crime.” Kan.

Stat. Ann. § 21-3301. To prove an overt act under Kansas law, “[i]t must be shown

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the defendant took a step beyond mere preparation so that some appreciable fragment

of the crime was committed.” State v. Chism, 759 P.2d 105, 110 (Kan. 1988).

At Forrest’s sentencing hearing, the government introduced judicial records of

the Kansas state court conviction. Count I of the three-count Information charged that

Forrest unlawfully and knowingly entered “into a building, to-wit: the building at 129

S. First, Osborne, Kansas, Osborne Lumber Company . . . with the intent to commit

a theft therein” in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3715(b). After Forrest pleaded not

guilty, a Journal Entry of Change of Plea recorded that, pursuant to a plea agreement,

the State moved to “amend Count I, Burglary, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3715(b) . . . to

Attempted Burglary, in violation o[f] K.S.A. 21-3715 and K.S.A. 21-3301” and to

dismiss the remaining counts; Forrest entered a plea of guilty to Count I as amended;

and the Court found him guilty of “Count I as amended, Attempted Burglary, in

violation o[f] K.S.A. 21-3715 and K.S.A. 21-3301.” 

On appeal, Forrest correctly notes that the modified categorical approach

applies because the Kansas burglary statute includes unlawfully entering into a motor

vehicle and is therefore broader than generic burglary. See § 21-3715(c); United

States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 768 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2364

(2010). He argues that the government failed to prove the violent felony upheld in

James -- attempted burglary of a structure -- because the change-of-plea journal entry

and the judgment did not specify which subsection of § 21-3715 he violated, and the

government introduced “no amended charging document containing the amended

language to which [he] pled.” 

The argument is creative, but like the district court we reject it. Count I of the

Information charged Forrest with burglary of a building. The change-of-plea journal

entry described the amendment to Count I and recited that Forrest pleaded guilty to

the amended charge, attempted burglary, with “full restitution to the victim, Osborne

Lumber Company,” the victim identified in Count I. The judgment document, though

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it mistakenly recites that Forrest was convicted of Count V rather than Count I, listed

the offense (attempted burglary); the offense level; the date of the offense; the

sentencing judge; and the case number, all of which corresponded to the Information

and the change-of-plea journal entry. In these circumstances, the district court did not

clearly err in finding that the description of the premises allegedly burgled in the

Information described the premises Forrest later pleaded guilty to attempting to

burgle. See United States v. Perry, 437 F.3d 782, 786-87 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of

review). Therefore, this was a violent felony conviction under the “otherwise

involves” clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as construed in James and in our pre-James

decisions such as United States v. Strong, 415 F.3d 902, 907-08 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 1130 (2006), and United States v. McKinney, 328 F.3d 993, 995 (8th

Cir. 2003). 

4. Second Degree Burglary. Finally, Forrest argues that the government failed

to prove that his 1986 Colorado conviction for second degree burglary was a violent

felony conviction. At the time of Forrest’s offense, the burglary statute, Colo. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 18-4-203, provided that a defendant “commits second degree burglary,

if he knowingly breaks an entrance into, or enters, or remains unlawfully in a building

or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or

property.” Because “building” was broadly defined to include vehicles “adapted for

overnight accommodations,” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-4-101(1), the statute was

potentially over-inclusive under Taylor. Thus, the issue is whether the government

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Forrest pleaded guilty to a qualifying

generic burglary offense with judicial records permitted under the modified

categorical approach of Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).

The government introduced the charging document, a criminal complaint

alleging that Forrest committed second degree burglary in that he did “unlawfully,

feloniously and knowingly break an entrance into and enter and remain unlawfully in

the building and occupied structure of Kimmickinnic Realty . . . known as ‘Birch

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Apartments Office.’” This document clearly charged a generic burglary offense. But

Forrest argues it is nonetheless inconclusive because (i) the complaint was captioned

in the “County Court” of Boulder, Colorado, whereas the minute order recording

Forrest’s guilty plea and the judgment reflected that he was convicted in the “District

Court” of Boulder County; (ii) the complaint has a different case number than the

minute order and the judgment; and (iii) the minute order and the judgment simply

recited that Forrest pleaded guilty to and was convicted of second degree burglary. 

Whether Forrest pleaded guilty to the same generic burglary offense that was

charged in the criminal complaint is a question of fact. Though the government did

not produce documents or statutory authority conclusively establishing that criminal

actions charged in Boulder County Court are then transferred to or disposed of in

Boulder County District Court, we think the evidence was sufficient to permit the

district court to find that the judgment reflecting Forrest’s second degree burglary

conviction was in fact a conviction for the generic burglary offense charged in the

criminal complaint. All these court documents referred to Forrest by name and were

created in 1986. The complaint charged Forrest with second degree burglary and

conspiracy, and the judgment reflected that he was convicted of both charges. 

Moreover, Forrest was initially sentenced to a community treatment center. Later

documents reflect that sentence was revoked when he was convicted of a robbery in

1988. Significantly, the later judgment described the burglary conviction that gave

rise to the revocation proceeding as an offense that took place on the two days in 1986

alleged in the county court criminal complaint here at issue. The district court did not

err in concluding that Forrest’s second degree burglary conviction was for a violent

felony offense enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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