Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02288/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02288-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

·ED F 1 3⁄4urtof Appcalo 

United S~~~h Circuit 

PUBLISH NOV 18 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

DAVID 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) No. 90-2288 

) 

JACKSON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 90-210-JB-2) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Charles S. Aspinwall, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the DefendantAppellant~ 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Presiliano A. Torrez, 

Assistant United States Attorney, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 1 
On September 17, 1990, defendant-appellant David Jackson 

entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than five grams of 

cocaine base. The plea agreement specified that Jackson was in 

possession of 11.2 grams of cocaine at the time of his arrest. 

The presentence report, on the other hand, also took into account 

98.1 grams of cocaine base seized from several motel rooms used in 

appellant's operation. Therefore, the report stated that the 

offense involved an aggregate amount of 109.3 grams of cocaine. 

Jackson objected to the aggregate amount and advised that he would 

withdraw his plea of guilty if the aggregate amount was used in 

determining his sentence. 1 

At the sentencing hearing on December 5, 1990, the district 

court informed Jackson that it would follow the presentence 

report. Jackson subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 

The district court promptly denied the motion and sentenced 

Jackson to one hundred and thirty-six months in prison and three 

years' supervised release. 

On December 11, 1990, Jackson filed a motion requesting that 

the district court reconsider its denial of the motion to withdraw 

the guilty plea. Jackson also filed a notice of appeal from the 

judgment and conviction on December 14, 1990. On February 21, 

1991, Jackson's motion to reconsider was denied by order of the 

district court. A new notice of appeal was not filed. The 

government contends that we are without jurisdiction in this 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 2 
matter because Jackson's December 14, 1990 notice of appeal was 

premature. Because we disagree with the government, we exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291, we remand this case to the 

district court for the ministerial task of appending its findings 

to the presentence report, and we affirm in all other respects. 

JURISDICTION 

Rule 4(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure governs 

criminal appeals. Rule 4(b) provides in part: 

In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a 

defendant shall be filed in the district court 

within 10 days after the entry of (i) the 

judgment or order appealed from or (ii) a 

notice of appeal by the government •••• If 

a timely motion in arrest of judgment or for a 

new trial on any ground other than newly 

discovered evidence has been made, an appeal 

from a judgment of conviction may be taken 

within 10 days after the entry of an order 

denying the motion. 

Rule 4(b) does not address motions to reconsider and, therefore, 

does not directly apply to this situation. The civil counterpart 

to Rule 4(b), Rule 4(a)(4), supplies more specific guidance when 

this type of situation arises in a civil action. Rule 4(a)(4) 

provides that the filing of certain post-trial motions 

including a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment tolls 

the time for filing a notice of appeal from the judgment until the 

district court decides the motion. It also specifies that a 

notice of appeal filed before the district court rules on a Rule 

59(e) motion is premature and does not confer jurisdiction on the 

appellate court. 

In Martinez Y..!.. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 1989), 

we held that a motion questioning the correctness of a judgment 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 3 
was a Rule 59(e) motion. Thus, if Rule 4(a)(4) applied to this 

situation, Jackson's notice of appeal clearly would be premature. 

The Seventh Circuit and the Eighth Circuit have interpreted 

Rule 4(b) to conform to the provisions of Rule 4(a)(4) in 

situations similar to this case. See United States Y.!... Gargano, 

826 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1987); United States Y.!... Jones, 669 F.2d 559 

(8th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit held that a criminal 

defendant's notice of appeal is premature and must be dismissed 

when it is followed by a motion to reconsider. Gargano, 826 F.2d 

at 611. The Eighth Circuit also held that such an appeal was 

premature, but directed the clerk of the court to notify criminal 

defendants when the notice of appeal became moot in order to avoid 

unfairly depriving the defendant of his right to appeal. Jones, 

669 F.2d at 561. 

The Ninth Circuit recently reached the opposite conclusion in 

United States Y.!... Cortes, 895 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 

110 S. Ct. 2191 (1990), and found that the Seventh Circuit 

approach created a procedural trap for the unwary defendant. The 

court noted that "[c]ivil litigants who file a premature notice of 

appeal are warned by the clear words of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) 

that their notice of appeal is a nullity and that they must file a 

new one." Id. at 1247. The Cortes court also criticized the 

Eighth Circuit approach "because it depends upon the exercise of a 

duty by the clerk of the district court or of this court to advise 

appellants that their notices of appeal are premature and 

ineffective." Id. After rejecting these two approaches, the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 4 
Ninth Circuit decided to retain jurisdiction and reach the merits 

of the appeal. 

To hold that a post-trial motion nullifies a notice of appeal 

under Rule 4(b) unquestionably creates a potential trap for the 

unwary criminal defendant -- a trap that could not have been 

foreseen under the existing law of this circuit. Rule 4(b), 

unlike Rule 4(a)(4), does not warn the criminal defendant that his 

notice of appeal could be nullified by a post-trial motion. If 

the criminal defendant fails to file a new notice of appeal, then 

the defendant could lose the right to appeal. On the other hand, 

if the criminal defendant concludes that his motion tolls the time 

for appeal and waits to file a notice of appeal, he risks having 

the court of appeals declare that the post-trial motion did not 

toll the time for appeal. The appellate court then could hold 

that the notice was untimely and dismiss the defendant's appeal. 

In this case, Jackson was faced with precisely this 

situation. He could have either filed his notice of appeal and 

risked having it declared premature or waited to file his notice 

of appeal and risked having it declared untimely. The only way 

Jackson could have ensured that he retained his right to appeal 

would have been to file two notices of appeal -- one before the 

motion and one after. Although Jackson failed to file the second 

notice, we conclude that a criminal defendant should not lose his 

right to appeal because of an ambiguous rule. Instead, we find 

that when a defendant files a motion that tolls the time for 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 5 
appeal, the motion holds the notice of appeal in abeyance and the 

notice becomes effective upon the disposition of the motion. 2 

The Supreme Court has held that a motion for rehearing tolls 

the time for filing a notice of appeal. See United States Y..!.. 

Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976); United States Y..!.. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 

(1964). In United States Y..!.. Ibarra, 60 U.S.L.W. 3290 (1991), the 

Supreme Court extended Healy and Dieter and held that a motion to 

reconsider also tolls the time for filing. However, the Court did 

not consider "whether it is appropriate to refuse to extend the 

time to appeal in cases in which successive motions for 

reconsideration are submitted." Id. at 3291 n.3. In United 

States Y..!.. Marsh, 700 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), we did reach the 

issue of successive motions and held that a motion to reconsider a 

denial of a motion for new trial did not toll the time for appeal. 

We reasoned that because a motion for new trial is itself a motion 

for rehearing, a motion to reconsider the denial of a new trial 

motion was a successive motion for rehearing and would not toll 

the time for appeal. We concluded that one party could not be 

permitted to delay the appeal indefinitely through successive 

motions for reconsideration. Id. at 1326. Therefore, we must 

address whether Jackson's motion for reconsideration was 

successive. 

2 We note that this holding conforms to the proposed amendments 

to Rule 4(b). These amendments provide that "[a] notice of appeal 

filed after announcement of a decision, sentence, or order but 

before disposition of any of the above motions shall be in 

abeyance and shall become effective upon the date of the entry of 

an order that disposes of the last of all such motions, or upon 

the date of the entry of the judgment of conviction, whichever is 

later." 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 6 
Unlike the situation in Marsh, Jackson's motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea cannot be considered a motion for rehearing. 

Jackson's motion to withdraw challenged his guilty plea for the 

first time. Further, Jackson's motion was oral and was made 

without the benefit of written support. Because Jackson's motion 

to withdraw was not a motion for rehearing, we conclude that his 

motion to reconsider was not a successive motion for rehearing. 

Thus, under Dieter, Jackson's motion for reconsideration tolled 

the time for appeal. 

Rules governing the timing of appeals ensure that the 

district court and the court of appeals do not exercise 

jurisdiction over the same action at the same time. See United 

States Y.!.. Green, 847 F.2d 622, 624 (10th Cir. 1988). By holding 

the notice of appeal in abeyance, we ensure that the district 

court retains jurisdiction until the judgment becomes truly final. 

Such a rule allows a district court to correct any alleged errors 

and also conserves judicial resources by ensuring that an 

appellate court does not hear an appeal that could be mooted by 

the district court's reconsideration of its judgment. 

Thus, we hold that when Jackson's motion to reconsider tolled 

the time for appeal, it also held the notice of appeal in 

abeyance. The notice of appeal became effective after the 

district court ruled on the Jackson's motion, and jurisdiction was 

established in this court. Therefore, we address the merits of 

Jackson's appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 7 
THE MERITS 

Jackson raises six arguments on appeal. First, Jackson 

contends that the district court failed to comply with Rule 

ll(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Second, 

appellant argues that the district court's refusal to be bound by 

the plea agreement rendered the plea of guilty involuntary. 

Third, Jackson contends that the district court did not comply 

with§ 6Bl.l(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines when it failed to 

advise the defendant that the court is not bound by sentencing 

recommendations and that the defendant has no right to withdraw a 

guilty plea if the court decides not to accept plea 

recommendations. Fourth, appellant contends that he was denied 

due process when he was charged in federal rather than state 

court. Fifth, Jackson argues that the court's actions resulted in 

an impermissible disparity in that Jackson was sentenced more 

severely than his codefendants. Finally, appellant asserts that 

the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(D) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

We first address whether the district court failed to comply 

with Rule ll(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Jackson contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because he 

was not advised that he could not withdraw his plea if the court 

decided to disregard the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 

Guilty Plea ("Memorandum of Understanding"). Rule ll(e)(2) 

provides that "[i]f the agreement is of the type specified in 

subdivision (e)(l)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that 

if the court does not accept the recommendation or request the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 8 
defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea." 

Therefore, Jackson's claim turns on whether the plea agreement is 

a Rule ll(e)(l)(B) agreement. Rule ll(e)(l)(B) allows an attorney 

for the government to "make a recommendation, or agree not to 

oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with 

the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be 

binding upon the court." 

The Memorandum of Understanding in this case reveals that the 

government only moved to dismiss other charges and did not make a 

recommendation or agree not to oppose the defendant's request for 

a particular sentence. 3 The Memorandum of Understanding did 

specify "that the amount of cocaine base found on the defendant's 

person was 11.2 grams." However, this statement can in no way be 

construed to be the government's sentencing recommendation. The 

statement is only one fact -- among many -- that the district 

court could take into consideration in sentencing the defendant. 

The specification of a particular amount of drugs in the 

defendant's possession simply cannot change this agreement into a 

Rule ll(e)(l)(B) agreement. Indeed, the Memorandum specifically 

states that "the United States has made NO AGREEMENT to approve, 

to oppose, or not to oppose pursuant to pursuant to Rule 

ll(e)(l)(b)." Therefore, we must conclude that the district court 

was not required to inform Jackson that it could reject the 

3 This type of agreement is governed by Rule ll(e)(l)(A), which 

provides that the government may "move for dismissal of other 

charges." Rule 11 does not require a district court to advise the 

defendant that he cannot withdraw a guilty plea if that plea is 

made pursuant to the type of plea agreement specified in Rule 

ll(e)(l)(A). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 9 
Memorandum and that Jackson subsequently would not be allowed to 

withdraw his plea of guilty. 

Jackson asserts that the court's failure to warn Jackson that 

he would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea rendered the 

plea involuntary. Essentially, Jackson claims that he did not 

understand his plea and the sentencing consequences that would 

follow. The district court directly inquired whether Jackson 

understood that he could be sentenced to a maximum term of twenty 

years or a minimum sentence of five years. Jackson responded that 

he understood. Given this record, it is clear that Jackson was 

informed of and comprehended both the nature and the consequences 

of his plea of guilty. 

Appellant argues that the district court failed to comply 

with§ 6B1.l(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines. This section only 

applies to plea agreements under Rule ll(e)(l)(B). Because we 

hold that the plea agreement in this case is not a Rule 

ll(e)(l)(B) plea agreement, this claim also must fail. 

Jackson asserts that he was denied due process because state 

law enforcement officers arbitrarily charged him in federal court 

without written policy guidelines, without procedural review, and 

without constitutionally permissive standards. Jackson failed to 

raise this argument below. Failure to raise an error at the 

district court level precludes review of the issue by this court. 

See United States Y..!.. Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 494 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 171 (1990); United States Y..!.. Mitchell, 

783 F.2d 971, 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860 (1986). 

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Jackson contends that the district court's sentence was 

impermissibly disparate when compared to Jackson's codefendants. 

In United States Y..!.. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 396 (1990), we rejected a claim of disparate 

sentences when that claim was "based solely on the lesser sentence 

imposed on [a] co-defendant" and the sentence "did not exceed that 

mandated by statute and the Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at 1465. 

Because Jackson's claim is based solely on the lesser sentence 

imposed on his codefendant and because his sentence falls within 

the range established by the Sentencing Guidelines, we must reject 

this claim as well. Our conclusion is further supported by the 

fact that Jackson's conduct was disparate from his codefendants' 

conduct. The arresting officers found 11.2 grams of cocaine on 

his person, and he obstructed justice by giving a false name. 

Finally, Jackson asserts that the district court failed to 

comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. Rule 32(c)(3)(D) provides that if a defendant or his 

counsel allege a factual inaccuracy in the presentence report, 

then the district court "shall as to each matter controverted, 

make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination 

that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted 

will not be taken into account in sentencing." Jackson's attorney 

objected to the presentence report's statement regarding the total 

amount of drugs involved in the offense. 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district 

court clearly explained why it was not bound by the total amount 

in the plea agreement. The district court considered "all of the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2288 Document: 010110097375 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 11 
facts and the course of conduct," the defendant's own statements, 

and the "total amount that was recovered from both of the rooms 

that were used in the commission of the offense." All of these 

considerations are appropriate in determining a defendant's 

sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Y.:.. 

Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1483 (10th Cir. 1991); United States Y.:.. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1562 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 

88 (1990). However, the district court failed to attach a written 

copy of its factual findings to the presentence investigation 

report as required by Rule 32(c)(3)(D). Therefore, we REMAND to 

the district court for the ministerial task of appending its 

determinations regarding disputed matters in the presentence 

report. See United States Y..!.. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1080 

(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 2066 (1991); United 

States Y..!.. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1990). In all 

other respects, the district court is- AFFIRMED. The mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

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