Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02589/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02589-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Midcontinent Media
Appellee
Otter Tail Corporation
Appellee
Gregory Taylor
Appellant

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2589

___________

Gregory Taylor, * 

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Otter Tail Corporation, et al. *

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 12, 2007

Filed: April 10, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,1

 District

Judge.

___________

NANGLE, District Judge.

This appeal arises from the district court’s reduction of a jury verdict in a

personal injury case. While the district court’s order is unclear as to the procedural

vehicle it used to reduce the award, we conclude that the court remitted past and

future economic damages. In accordance with the remittitur standard, we hold that

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
2

 The jury determined that Appellee Midcontinent Media, Inc. bore no direct

liability to Taylor; however, Midcontinent remains an interested party due to a

defense agreement requiring Midcontintent to contribute to any judgment against

Otter Tail.

-2-

the past and future economic damages awards were not so excessive as to shock the

conscience, and reinstate the jury’s original awards. 

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Gregory Taylor brought this suit against Appellees Otter Tail

Corporation and Midcontinent Media, Inc. (“Appellees”),2

seekingcompensation for

injuries he sustained during an on-the-job fall. Taylor was a lineman employed by

Cable System Services (“CSS”), a contractor hired by Midcontinent Media, Inc., to

rebuild the cable television system in Cooperstown, North Dakota. While working

on this project, on August 19, 1998, Appellant, who was thirty-five years of age at

the time, was seriously injured when the utility pole he was strapped onto broke.

Appellant fell to the ground, and the pole fell on top of him; the pole then bounced

up and landed on him again. 

Appellant suffered severe injuries as a result of the fall, and was hospitalized

for two weeks. He broke both his pelvis and sacrum ,had an epidural hematoma, and

suffered damaged nerves and two dislocated discs; he also suffers from chronic hip

and leg pain, and his bladder does not function properly. By the end of 1998,

because Taylor could no longer climb poles, he went to work as a supervisor for CSS

in Langdon, North Dakota. In 2002, CSS was no longer engaged in any ongoing

projects in North Dakota. Therefore, continued employment with the company

required extensive travel. Taylor was experiencing difficulty traveling long

distances due to his chronic pain, and therefore felt he could not remain employed

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
3 The case was removed from North Dakota state court to the United States

District Court for the District of North Dakota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441.

4 See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-03.2-01, 32-03.2-02 (1987). 

5

 The district court assumed that CSS constituted the “other” because of the

company’s inadequate training of its lineman employees. 

-3-

with CSS. In 2002, Taylor received a $42,000.00 Worker’s Compensation

settlement, which he used to start an unsuccessful snow-blowing business.

In 2004, Taylor brought this suit against Appellees, which was properly

removed to the court below,3 and proceeded to jury trial. At the close of the

evidence, Appellees argued that no evidence was adduced at trial in support of an

award for future economic damages, and that, consequently, the court should not

instruct the jury regarding future economic damages. The court took the arguments

under advisement, and submitted the case to the jury with a future damages

instruction. In accordance with North Dakota’s law of comparative fault,4 the jury

determined the percentage of fault attributable to each of the parties, assessing fault

as follows: (1) Appellee Otter Tail, the owner of the pole, forty-nine percent; (2)

Appellant, thirty-one percent, presumably for climbing the pole without performing

the precautionary safety tests recommended by the Occupational Safety and Hazard

Administration guidelines; and (3) twenty percent to “other.”5 The jury awarded

Appellant the following damages: (1) $190,523.00 for past economic damages; (2)

$893,200.00 for future economic damages; and (3) $564,000.00 in non-economic

damages.

Thereafter, the district court instructed the parties to submit post-verdict letter

briefs regarding the motions made at trial and at the close of the evidence. In the

letters, Appellees asked that the court grant judgment as a matter of law in their

favor, or remit the past and future economic damages. After receipt of the letters, the

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
6

 Table I illustrates the amount of the jury award, the amount of the district

court’s award, and the difference between the two.

-4-

court issued an order reducing the award as set forth in Table I, and entered

judgment accordingly. Taylor then filed this appeal seeking to reinstate the jury

verdict.

Table I6

Jury Award

District

Court Award Difference

Past Economic

 Damages $190,523.00 $30,523.56 $159,899.44

Future economic

 Damages $893,200.00 $27,440.00 $865,760.00

Non-economic

 Damages $564,000.00 $564,000.00 0

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the applicable standard of review in this case is one of

rigorous review. He bases his discussion of the standard of review, however, on the

erroneous assumption that the trial court granted judgment as a matter of law.

Contrary to Appellant’s view, the procedural history indicates that the district court

employed the mechanism of remittitur to reduce the amount of the jury award, and

did not grant judgment as a matter of law. The district court did not hold that, as a

matter of law, there was no evidence to support an award of past and future

economic damages. Rather, the court found that the evidence supported an award

of economic damages for medical expenses, and remitted the jury’s awards for past

and future economic damages from $190,523.00 to $30,523.56 and $893,000.00 to

$27,440.00, respectively.

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
-5-

The fact that the district court reduced the damages via remittitur rather than

by entering judgment as a matter of law is relevant because it impacts the governing

law and standard of review. A decision to grant remittitur “is a procedural matter

governed by federal, rather than state law.” Parsons v. First Investors Corp., 122

F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted). The scope of review of a

district court’s damage award “is extremely narrow” and the district court’s award

may not be reversed “except for a manifest abuse of discretion.” Peoples Bank and

Trust Company of Mountain Home v. Glove Int’l Publishing, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065,

1070 (8th Cir. 1992). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering a remittitur, we analyze “whether the remittitur was ordered for an amount

less than the jury could reasonably find.” Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc.,

506 F.2d 505, 508-09 (8th Cir. 1974) (internal citations omitted). 

“A verdict is not excessive unless the result is monstrous or shocking.”

Thorne v. Welk Investment, Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1212 (8th Cir. 1999). “We are

guided by the law of the forum state in weighing the excessiveness of a verdict.”

Globe Int’l Publishing, Inc., 978 F.2d at 1070. The definition of excessiveness

stated in Thorne mirrors the North Dakota law on the issue, which holds that a

verdict is excessive when “the amount is so unreasonable and extreme as to indicate

passion or prejudice on the part of the jury; the award is so excessive as to be

without support in the evidence; or the jury verdict is so excessive as to appear

clearly arbitrary, unjust, or such as to shock the judicial conscience.” Dahlen v.

Landis, 314 N.W.3d 63, 67 (N.D. 1981) (internal citation omitted). 

In its order remitting the damages, the district court ultimately concluded that,

beyond some allowance for medical expenses, “the award for future economic

damages is not supported by any evidence . . .” and “the evidence [is] insufficient to

support any award for future loss of earnings or diminution of earning capacity.”

The district court stated that it was viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
-6-

the verdict, a standard that is in accord with the general principle that “the matter of

damages rests largely in the sound discretion of the jury.” Stoner v. Nash Finch,

Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 753 (N.D. 1989). However, the court made several findings

of fact which deviated from this standard. Both Taylor and his mother provided

testimony which contradicted the court’s findings that: (1) Taylor “voluntarily” left

CSS; (2) CSS would have arranged for airline travel for Taylor if he wished to

remain employed with the company after its departure from North Dakota; and (3)

Taylor was physically capable of performing all the duties required of his supervisor

position at CSS. After a careful review of the record, viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the jury’s assessment of damages, we find that the jury’s verdict

was reasonable and was not excessive. 

“Future damages must be proved with reasonable certainty; they cannot be

awarded on the basis of speculative possibilities or conjecture.” Olmstead v. Miller,

383 N.W. 2d 817, 822 (N.D. 1986). Although, ideally, Appellant would have

introduced more evidence as to the exact occupational impediments caused by his

injuries, he did not, as the court held and Appellees argue, fail to introduce sufficient

evidence to support the jury’s findings. The trial court and Appellees have

emphasized the fact that Taylor “voluntarily” quit his employment with CSS, and

therefore should not be entitled to economic damages based on diminished earning

capacity. While Taylor did “voluntarily” leave his job in the sense that he was not

terminated, he made that choice because he was compelled to do so by the

circumstances. He testified that he had difficulty traveling. The court found that

CSS would have provided airline travel for Taylor had he wished to remain

employed with them, but Taylor testified that this was never communicated to him.

Taylor further testified that he often has to lay down during the day because of the

drowsiness caused by his medication and the pressure and pain caused from his

injuries. This testimony was corroborated by Taylor’s mother. 

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
7

 Appellant was forty-two years of age at the time of trial. According to the

National Vital Statistics Reports, United States Life Tables, Taylor had a life

expectancy of 39.2 years. The court took judicial notice of Taylor’s life expectancy

and instructed the jury accordingly. 

-7-

The court found that Taylor was physically capable of performing all of the

duties required of the supervisor position. This finding fails to account for the fact

that the supervisor position included a duty to travel. Although the inability to travel

long distances is a different type of limitation than, for instance, the inability to

climb poles, it is a limitation nonetheless, and one the jury rightfully considered.

Taylor’s testimony was further supported by the nature of his injuries in and

of themselves, which the district court acknowledged were “severe and permanent.”

Again, although more extensive expert testimony would have been ideal, from a

layperson’s perspective, it is reasonable to conclude that suffering multiple fractures

of the pelvis and sacrum, a severe hip injury, damaged nerves, and dislocated discs,

would result in chronic pain and the need to adjust one’s occupational activities.

Additionally, his bladder function was dramatically affected. 

Taylor’s ability to mitigate his damages by performing at least some work

tasks was also considered by the jury, as evidenced by the fact that the award for

future economic damages encompasses an amount of approximately $25,000.00 a

year for his life expectancy,7

 rather than $75,000.00 a year, an amount that he could

have been making had he been able to continue his work as a supervisor. While the

annual rate is slightly higher for past economic damages, the jury likely considered

Taylor’s failed attempts to mitigate damages during the period between when he quit

work and when he brought this action, and the amount granted for that period is not

manifestly unreasonable.

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129
-8-

The jury was within its purview when it credited Taylor’s testimony and found

that his ability to work was impeded, at least somewhat, by his injuries. When the

jury hears conflicting testimony, it is for the jury to resolve such conflicts in the

evidence. Thorne, 197 F.3d at 1210-11. Only if damages are so excessive as to be

without the support of the evidence should the court disturb a jury’s verdict of

damages. Nesseth v. Omlid, 574 N.W.2d 848, 852 (N.D. 1998). In analyzing

whether a verdict is supported by the evidence, the trial court may not “substitute its

judgment for that of the jurors. The determination of the amount of damages is

peculiarly within the province of the jury. Such determination rests largely in its

discretion.” Dahlen, 314 N.W.3d at 67-68 (internal citation omitted). The verdict

in this case was not unsupported by the evidence; rather, it was supported by

evidence that, although challenged by Appellees, the jury accepted.

We conclude that the jury’s verdict was not “monstrous or shocking” and that

the amount of the remitted damages was for “an amount less than the jury could

reasonably find.” Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in disturbing the

jury’s verdict. 

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s order to remit damages is reversed, and the court is

directed to reinstate the jury’s verdict.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2589 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297129