Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01039/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01039-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Pacific Bell
Petitioner
Telecommunications International Union, California Local 103
Intervenor

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 2000 Decided August 10, 2001

No. 00-1039

Pacific Bell,

Petitioner

v.

National Labor Relations Board,

Respondent

Telecommunications International Union,

California Local 103 IFPTE, AFL-CIO,

Intervenor

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

William Gaus argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs was Craig E. Stewart.

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 1 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

David A. Seid, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Leonard R. Page, General Counsel, and Aileen A. Armstrong,

Deputy Associate General Counsel. David S. Habenstreit,

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Intervenor Telecommunications International Union, California Local 103, filed a notice of adoption of respondent's

brief. M. Jane Lawhon and James E. Eggleston entered

appearances for intervenor.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Williams and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Pacific Bell petitions for review of

an order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),

which found that the company committed an unfair labor

practice by refusing to bargain with the Telecommunications

International Union, California Local 103 IFPTE, AFL-CIO

(TIU). Pacific Bell contends that its refusal to bargain was

justified by a good faith reasonable doubt regarding TIU's

authority to represent the bargaining unit's members in

negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. Because

we find substantial evidence to support the NLRB's conclusion that Pacific Bell's doubt was not reasonable, the petition

for review is denied, and the Board's cross-application for

enforcement is granted.

I

Pacific Bell provides telephone services in the State of

California. TIU has been the bargaining representative for a

unit of Pacific Bell service representatives located in northern

California for approximately twenty years. During the time

period at issue here, TIU and Pacific Bell were operating

under a collective bargaining agreement that ran through

August 8, 1998. Another union, the Communications Workers of America (CWA), represents other units of Pacific Bell

employees, including another bargaining unit of service representatives.

On May 30, 1997, TIU and CWA drafted a Memorandum of

Understanding prescribing a two-step process by which the

TIU unit could merge with CWA. Memorandum of Understanding p 2 [hereinafter MOU]. Step one involved a vote by

the TIU unit to ratify the Memorandum itself. This occurred

in June of 1997. The second step was to have been a final

vote by the unit ratifying or rejecting the merger. The

Memorandum scheduled this second vote for "July 31, 1998 or

as soon as practicable after a CWA determination that acceding to a Pacific Bell request for early bargaining is in the best

interests of Union members." MOU p 2.1

The Memorandum provided that upon the first ratification

vote, CWA would issue TIU a temporary charter to operate

as a CWA affiliate in accordance with the terms of the

Memorandum. Id. p 3. The temporary charter would last

either until TIU's current collective bargaining agreement

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 2 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

expired on August 8, 1998,2 or until the second ratification

vote, whichever occurred first. Id. pp 3, 5. The Memorandum also outlined certain "transitional provisions" to govern

TIU and CWA during the term of the temporary charter.

Those provisions allowed TIU to participate in CWA leadership activities, required TIU to pay dues to CWA, and, most

significant here, affirmed TIU's continued authority to represent its members: "During the term of the CWA temporary

charter, .... TIU shall be solely responsible for representing

TIU bargaining unit employees in collective bargaining matters." Id. p 4. The Memorandum declared that if the TIU

membership approved the merger in the second ratification

vote, the temporary charter would be recalled, TIU would

cease to exist, and CWA would become the exclusive bargaining representative for the unit. Id. p 5. Finally, the Memorandum provided: "In the event the TIU membership rejects

__________

1 The record is devoid of any indication that Pacific Bell ever

made a request for early bargaining.

2 The Memorandum stated: "[T]he temporary charter will extend

through the August 31, 1998 expiration date of the current TIU

collective bargaining agreement...." Id. (emphasis added). But

both parties to this appeal agree that the August 31 date was an

error, and that the authors of the Memorandum intended to specify

August 8, 1998--the actual expiration date of TIU's bargaining

agreement.

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 3 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

completion of the TIU/CWA merger in the second ratification

vote, .... TIU shall then remain in and continue its status

as the exclusive bargaining representative for the TIU bargaining unit." Id. p 6.

In March of 1998, CWA began bargaining with Pacific Bell

for a successor to the CWA unit's collective bargaining agreement, which was also set to expire in August. Although

TIU's president had initially planned to attend these negotiations, she told Pacific Bell that difficulties had arisen between

TIU and CWA, and that CWA had removed her from CWA's

bargaining committee. CWA ratified a successor agreement

for its bargaining unit in May of 1998, without the participation of TIU.

On May 14, 1998, TIU requested that Pacific Bell begin

negotiating a successor to the TIU unit's collective bargaining

agreement. TIU further requested certain information in

preparation for bargaining, including the unit members' payroll records. In a letter dated June 3, 1998, Pacific Bell

refused TIU's requests, citing the Memorandum of Understanding between TIU and CWA and noting that a final vote

on whether to approve the merger with CWA had not yet

occurred:

The [Memorandum] ... clearly contemplates that the

issue of representation would be resolved by a second

vote of the TIU membership prior to final agreement on

a 1998 contract. On the basis of what we now know, we

believe there is clearly a question concerning representation that must be resolved. It would be inappropriate to

begin bargaining with TIU while this question concerning representation is pending. We believe this matter

must be resolved without delay and if there is no immediate prospect of its being resolved by the two unions, we

believe it should be resolved by the National Labor

Relations Board.

Letter from Pacific Bell to TIU, June 3, 1998.

On June 5, 1998, TIU again asked Pacific Bell to begin

negotiating the 1998 successor agreement. That same day,

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 4 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Pacific Bell petitioned the NLRB for a Board-conducted

election to determine the TIU unit's proper bargaining representative. A letter from Pacific Bell to the TIU unit's

members explained that Pacific Bell would not bargain with

TIU until the employer's petition was resolved. When the

NLRB denied Pacific Bell's petition on August 7, 1998, Pacific

Bell began to negotiate with TIU, and the two signed a

collective bargaining agreement on September 8, 1998.

TIU filed an unfair labor practice charge against Pacific

Bell on June 9, 1998, alleging that the employer had wrongfully refused to bargain and to provide TIU with bargainingrelated information. The NLRB's General Counsel issued a

complaint. Pacific Bell defended on the ground that, based

on the Memorandum of Understanding, it had a good faith

reasonable doubt regarding which labor organization represented the unit's employees. On June 11, 1999, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Pacific Bell had failed in

its burden of establishing reasonable doubt, and concluded

that the employer had committed unfair labor practices in

violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. s 158(a)(1) & (5). Pacific

Bell, No. 32-CA-16810, slip op. at 9 (N.L.R.B. June 11,

1999).3 On November 30, 1999, the Board affirmed the

decision of the ALJ. Pacific Bell, 330 N.L.R.B. 31, 1999 WL

1100443 (Nov. 30, 1999).

II

There is no dispute between the parties regarding the law

applicable to this case. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it

an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain

collectively with the representatives of his employees," 29

__________

3 See 29 U.S.C. s 158(a) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for

an employer--(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in

the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; ...

[or] (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of

his employees...."); see also 29 U.S.C. s 157 (providing, inter alia,

that "[e]mployees shall have the right ... to bargain collectively

through representatives of their own choosing").

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 5 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

U.S.C. s 158(a)(1), a duty which includes providing such

representatives with relevant bargaining-related information.

See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979);

Country Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1191

(D.C. Cir. 2000).4 As the Supreme Court explained in Allentown Mack, an employer that believes an incumbent union no

longer enjoys the support of the majority of its employees

may refuse to bargain with the union only if "the employer

can show that it had a 'good faith reasonable doubt' about the

union's majority support." Allentown Mack Sales & Serv.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361 (1998); see NLRB v. Curtin

Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990). To

satisfy that requirement, the employer's doubt must "be

based on 'objective' considerations ... supported by evidence

external to the employer's own (subjective) impressions."

Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 368 n.2 (emphasis omitted); see

Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 778.

Allentown Mack also sets forth the standard of review

appellate courts must apply when, as was the case here, the

NLRB concludes that an employer has not demonstrated that

it held a good faith reasonable doubt about the continuing

authority of a union.5 In such cases, the court "must decide

whether that conclusion is supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole." Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 366.

Put differently, the Court said, the question presented for

review is "whether, on the evidence presented to the Board, a

reasonable jury could have found that [the employer] lacked a

__________

4 Pacific Bell does not dispute that, if it committed an unfair labor

practice by refusing to bargain with TIU, it also committed an

unfair labor practice by refusing to provide TIU with the requested

information.

5 Pacific Bell asserts that the ALJ did not apply the "good faith

reasonable doubt" standard, but rather required the employer to

show that the union no longer actually represented a majority of the

unit's employees. We disagree. The ALJ's decision is clearly

based upon his conclusion that neither the Memorandum, nor the

unions' conduct, created any objective grounds for doubting that

TIU remained the authorized bargaining representative for the

unit. See Pacific Bell, 330 N.L.R.B. at 31.

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 6 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

genuine, reasonable uncertainty about whether [the union]

enjoyed the continuing support of a majority of unit employees." Id. at 367.

III

Pacific Bell does not assert that its good faith reasonable

doubt about TIU arose from statements by employees that

they no longer supported the union. Cf. Allentown Mack, 522

U.S. at 367-71. Instead, Pacific Bell's asserted basis for

doubting TIU's authority was the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by TIU and CWA, and the conduct of

the two unions under that Memorandum. According to Pacific Bell, those factors left it "in the position of not knowing

which union [was] the appropriate representative for bargaining." Pacific Bell Reply Br. at 10 (quoting Representation

Petition filed by Pacific Bell with the NLRB). However, we

see nothing in either the Memorandum or the unions' conduct

that would have caused an employer to have a good faith

reasonable doubt about TIU's authority, let alone anything

that would cause us to doubt whether the NLRB's conclusion--that Pacific Bell's alleged uncertainty was not reasonably based--was supported by substantial evidence.

Pacific Bell contends that, although TIU clearly retained

authority to represent the unit with respect to the existing

labor contract, the Memorandum left uncertain TIU's authority to negotiate a new contract. Once the first ratification

vote (on the Memorandum) was taken, Pacific Bell asserts,

the employer "was understandably uncertain as to which

union should be its bargaining partner for a [contract] that

would begin and remain in effect after the proposed merger."

Pacific Bell Br. at 10. This was so, Pacific Bell argues,

because it read the Memorandum as requiring that the

second vote take place before the new contract was bargained. Pacific Bell Br. at 10; see Pacific Bell Reply Br. at 2,

7.

But there was nothing "understandabl[e]" about Pacific

Bell's uncertainty, because there was nothing in the Memorandum to support the distinction Pacific Bell draws between

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 7 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

TIU's authority with respect to the existing contract and its

authority with respect to the new one. To the contrary,

paragraph 4(C) of the Memorandum declared, without qualification, that during the term of the CWA temporary charter,

"TIU shall be solely responsible for representing TIU bargaining unit employees in collective bargaining matters."

MOU p 4(C) (emphasis added). And, concomitantly, it declared that "CWA is not authorized to serve as collective

bargaining representative for TIU bargaining unit employees

during the term of the temporary charter and will not enter

any agreement or take any action under color of such

authority without the express written agreement of TIU."

Id. (emphasis added).

Nor was there any reason to doubt, at the time Pacific Bell

refused to bargain with TIU, that the temporary charter--

with its designation of TIU as exclusive bargaining representative--was in effect. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum provided that the term of the temporary charter would

extend through the August 8, 1998 expiration date of the

current TIU collective bargaining agreement, or through the

date of the second ratification vote, whichever occurred first.

Id. pp 3, 5. Pacific Bell refused to bargain on June 3, 1998, at

which time the current contract was still in effect and the

second ratification vote had not yet occurred.

Pacific Bell further contends that, although the Memorandum made clear that TIU would remain as the exclusive

representative if the second ratification vote resulted in rejection of the merger, id. p 6, the Memorandum did not set forth

TIU's status in the event the second vote never occurred at

all. The employer also contends that by May of 1998, it had

learned of "friction" developing between the unions, and that

"a date for the second vote still had not been scheduled."

Pacific Bell Br. at 18. All of this, the employer argues,

provided "substantial objective evidence" that called "into

question which union would be the appropriate bargaining

partner." Id.

Again, we are hard pressed to see how any of these facts

could have led to reasonable uncertainty about TIU's status

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 8 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

on June 3, 1998, the date that Pacific Bell refused to bargain.

The Memorandum itself contemplated that the second ratification vote would occur "on or about July 31, 1998," MOU p 2,

a date still almost two months in the future. Even if there

were uncertainty as to TIU's status if a second vote never

occurred,6 June 8 was far too early for that uncertainty to

have cast any doubt upon TIU's current authority.

Nor did "friction" between the two unions provide any

objective basis for Pacific Bell to doubt TIU's authority.

Pacific Bell contends that it was "faced with a dispute between the unions," and that it was "understandably uncertain

as to how it should proceed." Pacific Bell Reply Br. at 1.

But there never was any such "dispute" about which union

had authority to bargain for the unit. TIU told Pacific Bell in

no uncertain terms that it alone had bargaining authority, see

Letter from TIU to CWA, June 5, 1998, and CWA never told

the employer anything to the contrary: CWA neither claimed

that it had authority to bargain for the unit, nor questioned

TIU's exclusive authority to do so. ALJ Hr'g Tr. at 119, 146,

153. Indeed, in purporting to rely on an interunion dispute,

and in suggesting that TIU was violating its agreement with

CWA--an agreement to which Pacific Bell was not a party--

by failing to schedule the second ratification vote, the employer was acting at its peril. Cf. Davenport v. Int'l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Management

should neither be allowed nor required to scrutinize internal

union policies and practices too closely, and, indeed, it may

commit an unfair labor practice if it delves too deeply into the

union's affairs.") (quoting Moreau v. James River-Otis, Inc.,

767 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1985)).

__________

6 We find this proposition itself to be dubious. The Memorandum

provided that the temporary charter would expire upon the earlier

of the second ratification vote or the expiration of the current

collective bargaining agreement on August 8, 1998. Hence, if

August 8 passed without a second vote, the temporary charter

would run out, and the parties would be left with the situation that

existed prior to the charter: i.e., with TIU as the unit representative.

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 9 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Finally, Pacific Bell insists that it did not act wrongfully

because, by petitioning the NLRB to resolve the issue, it

"placed the outcome, and the timetable for the outcome,

completely out of its hands and into the hands of the NLRB."

Pacific Bell Br. at 21. But although Pacific Bell may have

had the right to file a representation petition, the law is clear

that without a good faith reasonable doubt about the union's

majority support, the employer did not have the right to

refuse to bargain while waiting for the NLRB to respond.

See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 361; CPS Chemical Co. v.

NLRB, 160 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1998). By refusing to

bargain in the interim, Pacific Bell deprived its employees of

the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of

their own choosing" during that period, 29 U.S.C. s 157, and

in so doing committed an unfair labor practice, see 29 U.S.C.

s 158(a)(1), (5).

IV

On "the evidence presented to the Board, a reasonable jury

could have found that [Pacific Bell] lacked a genuine, reasonable uncertainty about whether [TIU] enjoyed the continuing

support of a majority of unit employees." Allentown Mack,

522 U.S. at 367. Indeed, there is nothing in the record that

would have given rise to such a reasonable uncertainty.

Accordingly, Pacific Bell's petition for review is denied, and

the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement is granted.

USCA Case #00-1039 Document #616677 Filed: 08/10/2001 Page 10 of 10