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Parties Involved:
Larry Cottam
Appellant
Melanie Cottam
Appellant
First Baptist Church of Boulder
Appellee

Document Text:

LARRY 

v. 

FIRST 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT A?R 2 9 1992 

ROB11:R.T L. HOECKEE 

Cle!'!: 

COTTAM and MELANIE COTTAM, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appallants, ) 

) 

) No. 91-1071 

) (D.C. No. 88-S-873) 

) (D. Colorado) BAPTIST CHURCH OF BOULDER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appel lee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BRORBY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge**· 

The present action comes before this Court on an appeal from 

an order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in favor of 

defendant First Baptist Church of Boulder ( "First Baptist") and 

against plaintiffs Larry Cottam and his wife Melanie Cottam. 

Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in rendering 

judgment in favor of defendant when the evidence was sufficient 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

** Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-1071 Document: 010110246206 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 1
to support the verdict of the jury. 

First Baptist owned a church camp site in the James Park area 

west of Boulder, Colorado. The site was usually used for church 

activities; however, First Baptist allowed some individuals to use 

the site for a nominal fee. Robert Chambers had been a member of 

First Baptist before relocating to Texas and had used First 

Baptist's camp as a summer vacation site for himself and his family 

for many years. During these visits, he had contributed time and 

effort to the maintenance and improvement of the church camp. 

In 1982, Mr. Chambers obtained permission from First Baptist 

to invite a group from Texas1 to join him on his summer vacation 

trips to the church camp for the same nominal fee. 2 Dr. Cottam, 

his wife, and his family were members of the Texas group, and 

accompanied Mr. Chambers to the church camp for family vacations 

for several years prior to the incident now at issue. Mr. Chambers 

made the arrangements with First Baptist for the annual summer 

vacations of the Texas group. He also continued to perform 

volunteer maintenance and improvement projects with the assistance 

of the Texas group. Although Mr. Chambers had performed 

improvements in the past with the help of the Texas group, it had 

never been mandatory for vacationers in the Texas group to assist 

him in his performance of the these improvements. 

1 Mr. Chamber's group from Texas was his Sunday School class 

from the United Methodist Church of Richardson Texas. We will 

hereinafter refer to this group as "the Texas group." 

2 A four (4) dollar per person fee was charged by First 

Baptist for the use of the church camp the year in question. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1071 Document: 010110246206 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 2
After the 1987 trip was organized, Mr. Chambers discussed with 

James Bradfield, the First Baptist member who was responsible for 

its church camp, what projects would be appropriate for 

accomplishment that sum.mer. Mr. Bradfield suggested that Mr. 

Chambers either build a new foot bridge or dismantle an old house 

trailer. Mr. Chambers, after consulting with several members of 

the Texas group, elected to build the foot bridge. Mr. Bradfield 

suggested that the construction commence by felling a dead tree 

across the creek as a base for the bridge. Beyond this suggestion, 

no one in First Baptist controlled the specifics of the project, 

nor exercised any supervision over the project once it was 

commenced. 

On the morning of July 21, 1987, Dr. Cottam elected to cancel 

previous plans for that day and participate in the project because 

he wanted to help the Texas group complete it. The members of the 

Texas group who undertook the project decided to follow the 

suggestion of using the dead tree located on the south shore of the 

creek as a base for the foot bridge. Using a personal chain saw 

furnished by Mr. Bradfield, Dr. Cottam volunteered to be one of the 

members of the Texas group who would cut the dead tree down. While 

he was operating the chain saw near the base of the tree, the trunk 

unexpectedly broke approximately twenty-three (23) feet above the 

ground. After the trunk broke in two, the upper part of the tree, 

was thrown back across the creek and struck Dr. Cottam on the head, 

shoulder, and upper body. Dr. Cottam was unable to retreat because 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1071 Document: 010110246206 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 3
he had not secured an adequate escape route. This impact caused 

Dr. Cottam to suffer severe permanent injuries. 

The Cottams alleged two theories for recovery in their 

complaint. The first claimed Larry Cottam was an "gratuitous 

employee" of First Baptist who had not been afforded reasonable 

supervision, and the second was that the members of the Texas group 

were independent contractors who were negligently hired by First 

Baptist to complete the project. At the close of evidence in the 

jury trial, First Baptist moved for a directed verdict on both 

theories of recovery. 

The district court granted a directed verdict on the 

independent contractor claim (a ruling not at issue on appeal), 

while specifically reserving the right to enter judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on the "gratuitous employee" claim 

after it had been submitted to the jury. The jury returned a 

verdict in favor of the Cottams on the "gratuitous employee" claim. 

Thereafter, the distri ct court indeed granted the defense motion 

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This appeal followed. 

I. 

standard of Review 

We review a grant or denial of a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict de novo, applying the same standard as 

did the trial court. Rajala v. Allied Corp . , 919 F.2d 610, 615 

(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 111 s.ct. 1685, 114 

L.Ed.2d 80 (1991); Suggs v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 833 

F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S . 1007, 108 

4 

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s.ct. 1732, 100 L.Ed.2d 196 (1988). The appropriate inquiry under 

this standard is whether the evidence is sufficient for a 

reasonable jury properly to find a verdict in favor of the party 

against whom the motion is directed. Rajala, 919 F.2d at 615 

(citing Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 498-99 

(10th Cir. 1984)). In making this determination, we must view the 

evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Rajala, 919 F.2d at 615. However, the nonmovant's 

argument must be supported by more than a mere scintilla of 

evidence. Meyers v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 940 F.2d 1379, 1383 

(10th Cir. 1991) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503, 

507 (10th Cir.1988)). 

II. 

Duty owed As Gratuitous Employee 

Plaintiffs' "employee without reasonable supervision" claim 

hinges on the existence of a duty owed by First Baptist to Dr. 

Cottam. A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction over 

this issue must "ascertain and apply Colorado law [with the 

objective] that the result obtained in federal court [should be] 

the result that would be reached ..• in a Colorado court.". Lutz 

Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 641 (10th Cir. 1991); Erie 

R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-3 (1938). In the absence of 

authority from Colorado's highest court, a federal court must, in 

essence, sit as a state court and predict how the Colorado Supreme 

Court would rule. Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 

1574 (10th Cir. 1984). 

5 

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sitting en bane, the Supreme Court of Colorado has stated that 

- the question of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty is a 

question of law to be determined by the Court, as opposed to a jury 

question. Taco Bell. Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987) 

(citing Smith v. City & County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 

(Colo. 1986)(;] accord Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. 

Kulik, 621 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. 1980); Restatement (Second) of 

Torts§ 328B (1965)). 

In urging the existence of a duty owed to Dr. Cottam, 

plaintiffs propose that Dr. Cottam was a "gratuitous employee" of 

First Baptist at the time of his injury. The "gratuitous 

employment" doctrine has never been directly addressed in Colorado 

case law; however, plaintiffs offer authority from other 

jurisdictions in support of their position. 

The Arizona Supreme Court recognized that al though someone 

acts gratuitously, he may be considered an employee within the 

master servant doctrine. Bond v. Cartwright Little League. Inc., 

536 P.2d 697 (1975) (citing Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court, 

17 Ariz.App. 571, 499 P.2d 185 (1972); Restatement (Second) of 

Agency, § 225 (1958)). The two key elements to the determination 

of whether a gratuitous undertaking is deemed as employment are 

whether the primary purpose of the act was to serve another 

regarded as "employer," and whether the actor has submitted himself 

to the directions and control of the one for whom the service is 

performed. Bond, 536 P.2d at 702. 

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Applying these principles to the case at hand, we conclude 

that Dr. Cottam failed even to raise an issue for jury decision 

whether he was acting as a "gratuitous employee" of First 

Baptist. On the first prong of the inquiry, it is conceded that 

Dr. Cottam's actions were for the benefit of a group. However, 

there was a failure of proof that the church was the group he 

intended to benefit. Dr. Cottam stated that he changed his 

previous plans so that he could help the Texas group complete the 

project. The "gratuitous employment" doctrine looks to whether the 

primary purpose underlying the act was to serve the employer 

directly. Id. 

The second and more important factor indicating the existence 

of a "gratuitous employment" relationship has been the posture of 

the employer to control the actions of the prospective employee. Id 

at 702-3; Vickers v. Gercke, 86 Ariz. 75, 340 P.2d 987 (1959). In 

each case "gratuitous employment" cited to us, the "employer" had 

the ability to control the actions of the "employee." For example, 

in Bond, the Cartwright Little League Inc., planned to remove some 

stadium lights they had purchased. Bond, 536 P. 2d at 699. A member 

of the Cartwright Little League personally solicited volunteers at 

a general meetings to perform the task. Id at 700. After declining 

to volunteer, Mr. Bond, a parent of one of the league members, was 

directly approached by the Little League President. Id. He agreed 

to remove the lights and was later injured in his attempt to climb 

a 100 foot light pole. The court noted that although Mr. Bond was 

free to refuse to do what he was told, at all times he was working 

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Appellate Case: 91-1071 Document: 010110246206 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 7
under the direct request and control of the Cartwright Little 

League. Id at 703. 

Dr. Cottam was acting under his own control, and not under any 

church supervision. Where no supervision is reasonably to be 

anticipated and none is done, negligent supervision as a concept is 

paradoxical. First Baptist did not control the specific design of 

the project, nor did it exercise any supervision over the project 

once it was commenced. The record reveals that Dr. Cottam was the 

likely candidate for handling the chain saw since he had previous 

experience. He and the members of the Texas group alone made 

decisions about the operation of the felling. First Baptist played 

no part in the undertaking beyond suggesting the general nature of 

the project. First Baptist had no part in selecting the specific 

members of the group who participated in the project, nor did First 

Baptist participate in the least in the undertaking. 

First Baptist assumed no duty toward Dr. Cottam, and in the 

absence of such a duty, no evidence could support the jury's 

verdict. Plaintiffs' claim must fail. The district court's grant 

of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed. 

III. 

Motion For A New Trial 

In light of our decision affirming the district court's grant 

of First Baptist's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 

the new trial issue is now moot, as are the arguments relating 

thereto. 5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, para . 

50.14 (2d ed. 1991). 

8 

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Conclusion 

For the aforementioned reasons we AFFIRM the decision of the 

district court in all respects. 

9 

Entered by the Court 

WAYNE E. ALLEY 

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