Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00311/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00311-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Gregory Occhionero
Plaintiff
Richard Salinas
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY OCCHIONERO,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD SALINAS,

Defendant.

No. 1:16-cv-00311-DAD-SAB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR A MORE 

DEFINITE STATEMENT; GRANTING 

MOTION TO STRIKE

(Doc. No. 9)

This matter came before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint for failure to state a claim, motion for a more definite statement, and motion 

to strike portions of the first amended complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) A hearing on these motions was 

held on May 17, 2016. Attorney Joseph D. Rubin appeared on behalf of defendant. Attorney 

Bryan C. Leighton appeared on behalf of plaintiff. The court has considered the parties’ briefs 

and oral arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, denies defendant’s motion to dismiss and 

motion for a more definite statement, and grants defendant’s motion to strike.

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BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This action arises from defendant’s declaration allegedly submitted in support of an 

inspection and abatement warrant and execution thereof. According to his first amended 

complaint, plaintiff Gregory Occhionero operated a storage facility, owned by his parents, for 

recyclable material in the City of Fresno. (Doc. No. 7 ¶¶ 5–6.) Pursuant to a revised site plan 

approved by the city’s planning commission in October 2011, plaintiff was subject to several 

requirements relating to the operation of and storage of materials at his storage facility site. (Id.

¶¶ 6–11.) 

1. The Inspection and Abatement Warrant

On December 5, 2013, defendant Richard Salinas, a specialist with the city’s code 

enforcement division, submitted a declaration in support of a request for an inspection and 

abatement warrant to the Fresno County Superior Court. Therein, defendant allegedly stated that 

materials were improperly stored in violation of the revised site plan and also made false 

statements about the condition of materials stored at the site. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) That same day, the 

state court issued the inspection and abatement warrant, authorizing defendant

[t]o enter and (1) inspect the premises of the Subject Property 

including an area enclosed by a locked fence; (2) abate the 

conditions constituting the violations listed above, including 

removal of any rubbish or junk located throughout the property; and 

(3) situate and store the commodities currently on the Subject 

Property that do not comply with the approved Site Plans S-96-76 

and S-11-057 in a similar manner as they are stored on the Subject 

Project including, but not limited to, containers and bins for a 

period of up to ninety days.

(Id. ¶¶ 12, 16.) 

From December 16 to 18, 2013, defendant Salinas, and others under his supervision, 

executed the inspection and abatement warrant. Defendant removed over seventy percent of the 

material located on plaintiff’s property. Defendant and others also allegedly transported and 

stored the materials in a manner that rendered them useless for recycling purposes. (Id. ¶¶ 17–

18.)

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2. The August 2014 Mandamus Action

On August 15, 2014, plaintiff and his parents filed a state court petition for mandamus 

relief, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1094.5 and 1094.6, against the City of 

Fresno (“City”) and its planning commission. (Doc. No. 9-3.) Petitioners challenged the 

planning commission’s procedures and actions taken thereunder regarding their storage facility. 

(Id. at 1.) Specifically, petitioners challenged two notices issued by the City: (1) an October 24, 

2013 notice and order stating that materials stored on the property were out of compliance with 

the applicable site plan, and (2) a January 2, 2014 notice seeking costs of the abatement of 

materials from the property during the December 16–18, 2013 period. (Id. at 2–4.) Petitioners 

asserted that the December 5, 2013 inspection and abatement warrant amounted to a general 

warrant prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 17–18.) Regarding the December 5, 2013 

inspection and abatement warrant, petitioners alleged that the warrant issued by the state court 

was drafted by the City, and that the City failed to comply with the court’s order in executing the 

warrant. (Id.)

On August 7, 2015, the state court issued an order granting in part the mandamus petition. 

Regarding petitioners’ Fourth Amendment cause of action, however, the state court declined to 

grant relief and noted “petitioners never raised this issue before the hearing officer” when they 

appealed the City’s notices to the City’s hearing officer. (Doc. No. 9-6 at 53–54.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action in state court on December 17, 2015. (See Doc. No. 1-1.) 

On March 7, 2016, defendant removed the action to this court. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 29, 

2016, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging two claims against defendant Salinas 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 7.) First, plaintiff alleges defendant Salinas violated the 

Fourth Amendment in making false statements to secure the inspection and abatement warrant 

from the state court. Second, plaintiff alleges defendant Salinas violated the Fourth Amendment 

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in failing to properly execute the state court warrant.1 On April 11, 2016, defendant filed the 

instant motions to dismiss, for a more definite statement, and to strike the first amended 

complaint. (Doc. No. 9.) On April 29, 2016, plaintiff filed his opposition. (Doc. No. 10.) On 

May 9, 2016, defendant filed his reply. (Doc. No. 11.)

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, the court grants defendant’s request for judicial notice of state court 

records. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(on a motion to dismiss, court may consider matters of public record); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. 

Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (on a motion to dismiss, the court may take judicial 

notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings). Accordingly, as discussed further 

below, the court will take judicial notice of Exhibits A and G to defendant’s request (Doc. Nos. 9-

3; 9-6 at 39–59) as the only documents relevant and necessary to this court’s resolution of the 

pending motions. 

B. Motion to Dismiss on Preclusion, Comity, and Abatement Grounds

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

 

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In each claim, plaintiff alleges a violation of § 1983 under both the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. As plaintiff admits in his opposition, his claims under the Fourth Amendment are 

not separate from those under the Fourteenth Amendment; rather, the rights he asserts under the 

Fourth Amendment are made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 

10 at 7.) While reference to the Fourteenth Amendment in this regard is not necessary, it is also 

not improper. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968). 

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff 

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways 

that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted 

to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not 

physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s 

complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001).

1. Preclusion

Defendant argues that both claim preclusion and issue preclusion serve to bar plaintiff 

from bringing his § 1983 claims under the Fourth Amendment. 

“The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit generally 

is determined by the full faith and credit statute.” Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic 

Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). By statute, a state’s judicial proceedings “shall have the 

same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage 

in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The federal court 

must look to the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was rendered in order to decide 

whether preclusion applies in the federal action. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380; see also Brodheim v. 

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the court looks to California law 

concerning whether issue preclusion applies in this case. 

Under California law, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a second lawsuit between the 

same parties on the same cause of action. People v. Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th 236, 252 (2004); 

Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896 (2002). Collateral estoppel, or issue 

preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and determined in the first 

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action. Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th at 252–53; Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 (1990). 

The elements for applying either claim preclusion or issue preclusion to a second action are the 

same: “(1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in 

a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the 

party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 

proceeding.” Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th at 253.

California law also provides that a final judgment of a state court “precludes further 

proceedings if they are based on the same cause of action.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 

952 (9th Cir. 2004). Unlike the federal courts, which apply a “transactional nucleus of facts” test, 

“California courts employ the ‘primary rights’ theory to determine what constitutes the same 

cause of action for claim preclusion purposes.” Id. Under this theory, “a cause of action is (1) a 

primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the 

defendant, and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right 

and duty.” City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 

1065 (1998)). “[I]f two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the 

defendant, then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads 

different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting 

recovery.” Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (1983). So long as the same 

primary right is involved in the two actions, judgment in the first bars subsequent consideration of 

all matters that were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Id. at 1175.

Here, defendant contends that plaintiff raises the same primary right in this action as he 

did in his first action before the state court. Indeed, plaintiff alleges the same harm in the present 

case as in the prior one. In the state mandamus action, plaintiff alleged that the City drafted the 

inspection and abatement warrant, which the state court granted, but subsequently failed to 

comply with the terms of the warrant. Plaintiff’s primary right being asserted was the right to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment—the same right 

being asserted here. Similarly, plaintiff inferred a corresponding duty of the City (and here, 

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defendant) not to wrongfully deprive plaintiff of this right. Finally, plaintiff alleges that both the 

City in the prior action and the defendant here acted to deprive him of his rights in a similar 

manner. Therefore, the court finds plaintiff is asserting the same primary right in both suits. 

However, defendant fails to establish that the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment 

on the merits as to plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment cause of action. In the prior mandamus 

proceeding, the state court concluded, 

Petitioners cite to no legal authority in support of their contention 

that the warrant violated their constitutional rights. Furthermore, 

petitioners never raised this issue before the hearing officer. The 

issue has therefore been waived on mandamus. Accordingly, the 

motion is denied as to [petitioners’ Fourth Amendment cause of 

action]. 

(Doc. No. 9-6 at 53–54) (citations omitted). In denying relief as to petitioners’ Fourth 

Amendment cause of action, the state court plainly avoided addressing the merits of that claim as 

well as the allegations that supported it. Instead, the court observed that the allegations were 

being raised for the first time on review of a hearing officer’s findings. Because the state court 

declined to reach the merits of plaintiff’s allegations and claim, plaintiff cannot be precluded from 

raising the same issue or claim here. See 7 Witkin, California Procedure, Judgment § 343 (5th ed. 

2008) (“[Claim preclusion] only protects a final determination of the controversy on the merits of 

the claims and defenses. If the judgment is on procedural or other grounds unrelated to the 

merits, it is not res judicata.”). 

2. Comity and Abatement

Alternatively, defendant argues that principles of comity and abatement favor dismissal of 

plaintiff’s claims in this action because his appeal of the state court’s judgment in the prior 

mandamus proceedings is pending. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 14–15.) The court is not persuaded by this 

argument.

First, defendant urges the court to dismiss this action under the “first-to-file” rule and a 

similar state court rule, known as a rule of abatement, discouraging the filing of parallel actions in 

multiple state courts. (Id. (citing Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94–95 (9th 

Cir. 1982) and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10).) That rule, however, does not require dismissal of 

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federal proceedings because the first suit was filed in state court, as is the case here. See 

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (“Generally, 

as between state and federal courts, the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is 

no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.”) 

(citation and internal quotations omitted); Kohn Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787 

F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The first-to-file rule allows a district court to stay proceedings 

if a similar case with substantially similar issues and parties was previously filed in another 

district court.”) (emphasis added). 

Second, defendant requests this court dismiss plaintiff’s claims under the Colorado River

doctrine. However, that doctrine is a limited one:

Colorado River does not say that every time it is possible for a state 

court to obviate the need for federal review by deciding factual 

issues in a particular way, the federal court should abstain. As the 

Supreme Court has observed, such a holding would “make a 

mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a 

federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States.” 

Rather, Colorado River stands for the proposition that when 

Congress has passed a law expressing a preference for unified state 

adjudication, courts should respect that preference. 

United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, there is no preference or 

local interest in state courts adjudication of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. Moreover, a 

district court’s obligation to exercise its jurisdiction 

is particularly weighty when those seeking a hearing in federal 

court are asserting, as the appellants are here, their right to relief 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under such circumstances conflicting 

results, piecemeal litigation, and some duplication of judicial effort 

is the unavoidable price of preserving access to the federal relief 

which section 1983 assures. 

Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Pue v. Sillas, 632 F.2d 74, 77 

n.4 (9th Cir. 1980); Unverferth v. Liberty Union High School Dist., No. C-15-1721 EMC, 2015 

WL 5012931, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015); Hudson v. Bigney, No.2:11-cv-3052 LKK AC P, 

2012 WL 6203055, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2012). Thus, the Colorado River doctrine does not 

support defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

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Even if this court were to dismiss or stay this action, it is unclear whether the state court 

cause of action purportedly on appeal would ultimately be resolved on the merits. As noted 

above, the state court denied the petitioners relief with respect to his Fourth Amendment claim on 

waiver grounds. Thus, an appeal of the mandamus action would presumably address this 

procedural issue but would not necessarily result in examination of the merits of that Fourth 

Amendment cause of action. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss on preclusion, comity, and abatement grounds 

is denied. 

C. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides:

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to 

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. 

The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and 

must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If 

the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not 

obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time 

the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other 

appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“If a 

pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant 

can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding.”); C.B. v. Sonora 

Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1190–91 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only 

if the complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being 

asserted, i.e., so vague that the defendant cannot begin to frame a response.”). A court should 

deny a motion for a more definite statement “if the complaint is specific enough to notify [a] 

defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted” or “if the detail sought by a motion for 

more definite statement is obtainable through discovery.” C.B., 691 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. A Rule 

12(e) motion “is likely to be denied where the substance of the claim has been alleged, even 

though some of the details are omitted.” Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 

(E.D. Cal. 2005). This liberal pleading standard is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 8(a), which only requires pleadings contain a “short and plain statement of the claim.” 

Id.

As noted, defendant moves for a more definite statement. (See Doc. No. 9-1 at 15.) Apart 

from this request, however, defendant fails to identify any specific portions of the first amended 

complaint which are vague or ambiguous. Having reviewed the first amended complaint, the 

court finds the pleading alleges facts with sufficient specificity to put defendant on notice of the 

substance of his claims. Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is therefore denied.

D. Motion to Dismiss or Strike Plaintiff’s “New” Claims

Finally, defendant argues that paragraphs 24 and 32 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint 

state a new claim under the Fourth Amendment based on defendant’s testimony before the City’s 

planning commission. For several reasons, defendant argues plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 

claim separate from the claim relating to the acquisition and execution of the inspection and 

abatement warrant. (See Doc. No. 9-1 at 6–12.) Alternatively, defendant requests the court strike 

these paragraphs of the first amended complaint. (Id. at 15.) In opposition and at the hearing, 

plaintiff has clarified he is not seeking relief under a separate theory based on defendant’s 

testimony to the planning commission. (Doc. No. 10 at 7.) Plaintiff further agrees that these

objected-to paragraphs may be stricken from his first amended complaint. (Id.) Accordingly, the 

court grants defendant’s motion to strike and denies defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to 

these paragraphs as having been rendered moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 9) is denied;

2. Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement (Doc. No. 9) is denied;

3. Defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. No. 9) is granted; and 

4. Paragraphs 24 and 32 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint (Doc. No. 7) are stricken.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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