Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01446/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01446-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 14, AFL-CIO
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 19, 1996 Decided June 7, 1996

No. 95-1446

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION,

LOCAL 14, AFL-CIO,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Richard S. Zuckerman argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner.

Meredith L. Jason, Attorney, NationalLabor Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent, with

whom Linda R. Sher, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General

Counsel, and Linda Dreeben, Supervisory Attorney, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, BUCKLEY and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Following a section 10(k) hearing on an alleged work "jurisdictional

dispute," see 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1994), the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")

found that the assignment of certain "chip-loading" work by Sierra Pacific Industries ("SPI") to its

unrepresented employees was an original assignment of new work. Pursuant to this finding, the

Board further found reasonable cause to believe that Local 14 of the International Longshoremen's

and Warehousemen's Union ("Local 14" or "Union") had violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the National

Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1994), by picketing to force the

assignment of the disputed SPI work to its members. When the Union refused to refrain from

picketing, the Board then took action on an unfair labor practice complaint, and determined that the

actions of Local 14 violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act.

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The Union petitions for review of the Board's finding that it engaged in an unfair labor

practice by picketing a dock and harbor used by SPI for wood chip-loading operations. The Union

contends that, because there was no "jurisdictional dispute," the Board had no authority to act

pursuant to section 10(k); alternatively, the Union claims that, even if there was a jurisdictional

dispute to be resolved, the Board's decision that the wood chip-loading work should be allocated to

SPI's own employees instead of Union members was arbitrary and capricious. Because the Board

retains broad discretion in defining what constitutes a jurisdictionaldispute undersection 10(k) ofthe

NLRA, and is afforded considerable leeway in resolving an underlying work dispute, we can find no

valid ground to overturn the judgment of the Board in this case. Accordingly, the petition for review

is denied, and the Board's cross-petition for enforcement of its Order is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Dispute

Local14 representslongshore workers who performwork under the PacificCoast Longshore

Contract Document ("PCLCD"), a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement between the

Pacific Maritime Association ("PMA") and affiliated local unions, including Local 14. Under the

PCLCD, Local 14 members obtain work through a dispatch hall on a rotational basis. When a ship

or barge arrives in port, a longshore workforce is dispatched through the hall to perform the

stevedoring operation at a dock, after which the force returnsto the hallfor future dispatches. Under

the rotational system, work opportunities are shared by all members of Local 14.

Local 14's work has traditionally consisted of the loading of logs, lumber, pulp, and wood

chips aboard ships and barges in the Port of Eureka, California. Virtually all of the Union's

stevedoring work has been performed through the Westfall Stevedore Company ("Westfall"). From

about 1973 to October 1993, all wood chips loaded in Eureka were loaded at the dock of North

Coast Exports("North Coast"), apparently because it wasthen the only facility suited forsuch work.

Whenever vessels were to be loaded withwood chips at NorthCoast, Westfall hired workersthrough

Local 14 to perform the loading.

SPI, a privately-held corporation engaged in the manufacture of lumber and other wood

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products in northern California, was one of the companies that regularly delivered wood chips to

NorthCoast. Although SPI itself is not covered by the PCLCD, it was SPI's practice to deliver wood

chipsto the dock, where Union members working under Westfall would then load them onto barges.

Around January 1993, Louisiana-Pacific ("L-P") purchased the North Coast facility. After

the purchase, L-P continued to use Westfall and Local 14 to load wood chips, and SPI continued to

sell wood chips to L-P, dropping them at the dock to be loaded by Union members. This

arrangement continued until the fall of 1993, when SPI decided that it would be more economically

advantageous for it to sell its wood chips directly to a pulp manufacturer under a long-term

agreement than to continue to sell its chips to a middleman, such as L-P. To this end, SPI leased a

dock, known as the "14th Street Dock," across the bay from L-P's site.

The 14th Street Dock had been used for loading and discharging logs and lumber (with such

work performed by Westfall using Local 14 workers), but wood chips had never been processed at

the 14th Street Dock until SPI invested significant capital to install wood chip-loading machinery

there in late 1993. Once SPI's operations were up and running at the 14th Street Dock, logs and

lumber continued to be loaded by Union members, but SPI began using its own, unrepresented

employees to load the wood chips.

Under the system installed by SPI, the chip-loading process begins when trucks from SPI's

sawmills dump their loads in the yard at the 14th Street Dock, at which point employees sort and

stockpile the chips. When a barge arrives to transport the chips, employees use front-end loaders to

push the chips onto a conveyor belt in a pit, and the chips are then moved along a series of conveyor

beltsto the dock, where they are downloaded onto the barge. The speed of the conveyor system and

the number of chips moving through the system are controlled by a "button man" sitting in a control

booth approximately 60 feet above the conveyor system. SPI employees perform all of the labor

required in this process as well as some related welding and electrical work. The SPI employees are

also skilled in repairing and maintaining the chip-loading system and the loading equipment.

On several occasions after SPI leased the 14th Street Dock, an owner of Westfall approached

SPI and asked for a contract to run SPI's wood chip conveyor system. He put forth proposals under

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1

29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1994) provides:

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice

within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this title, the Board is

which SPI would have subcontracted the chip-loading work to Westfall, whichwould then have hired

Local 14 members under the PCLCD to performthe button-man work. He also stated that Local 14's

members were demanding SPI's chip-loading work. SPI management refused to subcontract the chip

loading to Westfall on the ground that it would result in added costs.

On November 29, when the first barge arrived at the 14th Street Dock, the Union picketed

outside the gate to the dock, carrying signs that read, "Unfair to the ILWU." Later that day, SPI's

human resources manager and manager of corporate affairs, Ed Bond, met with Westfall and Union

officials. The Union officials said that the chip-loading work was within their jurisdiction and they

wanted it. Throughout December, January, and February, on the twelve occasions when barges were

loaded, the Union picketed outside the gate to the dock.

On February 10, 1994, about 30 or 40 pickets were at the gate, some carrying signs saying,

"Sierra Pacific unfair to ILWU." There were also four or five boats in the harbor, with signs and

pickets aboard, that interfered with tugboat and barge activity in the harbor. Later that day, Bond

met with Westfall and Union officials again. While waiting for the meeting to begin, Union officials

handed Bond a press release that stated, in part, "[T]he work of loading the Barges is ours." See

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 202.

B. Proceedings Before the Board

SPI filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the Union had violated section 8(b)(4)(D)

of the Act, which prohibits "coerc[ing]" any person engaged in commerce, where an object thereof

is

forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a

particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to

employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless

such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board.

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1994). Thereafter, pursuant to section 10(k) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §

160(k) (1994), the Board held a hearing to resolve the underlying work-assignment issue.1 The

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empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such

unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such

charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory

evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary

adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the

decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such

charge shall be dismissed. 

Union and SPI appeared at the hearing and addressed the issues asto whether a jurisdictional dispute

existed and to whom the disputed work should be assigned.

On August 24, 1994, the Board issued a decision on the basis of the record made before the

hearing officer. See International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 14, 314

N.L.R.B. 834 (1994). The Board found that SPI's "assignment of the chip-loading work to its

unrepresented employees was an original assignment of new work," and, thus, the Union's actions

could not be considered efforts to preserve work. Id. at 836. The Board also held that it had

jurisdiction to consider the work assignment issue under section 10(k). Finally, the Board found

reasonable cause to believe that the Union had violated section 8(b)(4)(D) ofthe NLRA by picketing

to force the assignment of SPI's button-man work to its members. Because the parties stipulated that

they had not agreed on a voluntarymethod for resolving the dispute, id. at 835, the Board determined

that it had jurisdiction to assign the disputed work. Based on the factors of employer preference and

practice, and economy and efficiency of operations, the Board awarded the work to SPI's employees.

The Board declared that the Union was not to use means proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(D) to force

SPI to assign the disputed work to Union members and directed the Union to notify the Board's

Regional Director within ten days as to whether it would refrain from such conduct. Id. at 837.

The Union's failure to submit the requested assurance led to the issuance of a complaint by

the Board's GeneralCounsel, alleging that the Union had violated section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(D) ofthe

Act. In response, the Union admitted its failure to notify the Regional Director of its intention to

comply with the Board's determination, but asserted that it had refused to do so in order to obtain

judicial review of the Board's decision.

The parties entered a stipulation and moved to transfer the proceeding to the Board. It was

agreed that the record would consist of exhibits attached to the stipulation, and that there would be

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no further hearing or involvement of an Administrative Law Judge. Thus, with the Board's approval,

the case proceeded directly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and issuance of an

order.

In briefs submitted to the Board, the Union once again argued that it had engaged in lawful

picketing in furtherance of a work preservation claim, and asserted that the Board's assignment of the

button-manwork to SPI's employees was arbitraryand capricious. The Board found "no merit in [the

Union's] contentions because they raise[d] arguments previously considered and rejected by the

Board." International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 14, 318 N.L.R.B. No. 55

at 3 (1995) ("Order"), reprinted in J.A. 179, 181. Thus, the Board found "no matters outstanding

for resolution," and concluded that the Union violated section 8(b)(4)(D) ofthe Act by picketing SPI

to force it to assign its button-man work to Union members. Id. The Union was ordered to cease

and desist from such actions.

In its petition for review, the Union contendsthat this case has neverinvolved a "jurisdictional

dispute," because the Union has acted solely to preserve work. Thus, according to the Union, the

Board lacked statutory authority to treat this matter asifit involved a section 10(k) issue. The Union

also asserts that, even if the Board had jurisdiction, its award of the button-man work to SPI

employees was arbitrary and capricious. The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of its Order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Work-Assignment Awards Under Section 10(k)

Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1994), makes it unlawful for a

union to act to "coerce" an employer with an object to force the employer to assign work to

employees in a particular labor organization rather than to another group of employees. Upon a

charge of a violation of this section, the Board is to suspend proceedings on the charge pending its

consideration of the underlying dispute under section 10(k) of the Act. See NLRB v. Plasterers'

Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1971). When the Board is faced with a dispute "between

two or more groups of employees over which is entitled to do certain work for an employer," it is a

dispute within the Board's jurisdiction under section 10(k). NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast

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Engineers Union, Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573, 579 (1961) ("CBS").

The Board exercisesits authority over "jurisdictional disputes" by determining whether there

is reasonable cause to believe (1) that section 8(b)(4)(D) has been violated and (2) that the parties

are unable to settle the dispute voluntarily. See International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's

Union v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 1407, 1409 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Sea-Land"). Once these elements are

established, the Board holds a hearing to determine which group of employeesis entitled to perform

the disputed work. See CBS, 364 U.S. at 586. However, the Board's resolution of this question does

not immediately result in a reviewable order. Instead, the Board issues a request that the competing

employee groups comply with its work-assignment award. If a rival employee group does not

comply, its actions may then become the subject of an unfair labor practice proceeding under section

8(b)(4)(D), through which the Board's section 10(k) award may be reviewed. See International

Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 62-B v. NLRB, 781 F.2d 919, 923 (D.C. Cir.

1986) ("Alaska Timber").

The scope of our review of the Board's section 10(k) orders is limited. As this court

explained in Alaska Timber,

[i]n reviewing § 10(k) orders, as implemented by § 8(b)(4)(D) proceedings, we

perform a limited inquiry. To the extent that the Board decisions reflect conclusions

asto factualmatters, for which there is "substantial evidence on the record considered

as a whole," we must defer to the Board's conclusion. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).

To the extent that the Board decisions reflect a legal conclusion, however, we must

determine whether the decisions were "arbitrary and capricious."

781 F.2d at 923.

B. The Definition of a Jurisdictional Dispute

The critical issue in this case is whether the dispute between Local 14 and the SPI employees

wasjurisdictional. In Alaska Timber, we indicated that, as a general matter, there is no jurisdictional

dispute when (1) one of two potentially competing employee groups explicitly disclaims a demand

for the work, (2) one of the competing employee groups renounces its claim to the work, or (3) the

competing claims have been resolved. Id. Further, we noted that the quintessential jurisdictional

dispute involves a conflict "between rival groups of employee[s]" where "the employer ordinarily

stands aloof," with no particular interest in the outcome. Id. at 923-24; see also CBS, 364 U.S. at

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579 ("[I]n most instances, [the quarrel] is ofso little interest to the employer that he seems perfectly

willing to assign work to either [group of employees] if the other will just let him alone."). Thus, we

summarized the model jurisdictional dispute as one "embod[ying] two characteristics: first, the

employer faces a jurisdictional dispute that is not of his own making and in which he has no interest;

second, the dispute is between two employee groups." Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 924.

Local14 arguesfor a veryrigid application ofthe two-prong model laid out in Alaska Timber.

According to the Union, theBoard had no authority to award the button-man work to SPI employees

because, far from being disinterested, SPI actually instigated this dispute by moving its wood-chip

operationsto the 14th Street Dock, and because the SPI employees themselves were not in a dispute

with the Union employees over the work. Indeed, the Union asserted that the SPI employees would

lose nothing (at least not in the short-term) if the Union took over the button-man work.

The problem with the Union's position is that it reads too much into Alaska Timber. That

decision does not, as the Union would have it, set an absolute standard or state the final word on

when disputes qualify as jurisdictional. Rather, as the court makes clear, the "Board must decide

whether cases that do not precisely fit the model ... are nevertheless sufficiently like that two-part

model to warrant intervention by the Board." Id.; see also Highway Truckdrivers &Helpers, Local

107 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1323 (1961) (The Board noted that the "normal"

section 10(k) situation was one where "the employer is willing to assign the work to either group if

the other will just let him alone," but noted that it did "not mean to suggest that this is the only kind

of situation where Section 10(k) is applicable."). Thus, this issue, like a number of others arising

under the NLRA, is one in which the Board must use its expertise to determine, on a case-by-case

basis, how to apply the law. And, pursuant to the precepts of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources DefenseCouncil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), we must defer to the Board'sreasonable

judgments regarding applications of the NLRA.

Given this deference, we have no difficulty upholding the Board's determination in this case.

The Board rightly recognized that, as Alaska Timber itself acknowledged, there is no absolute

requirement that a jurisdictional dispute involve two competing unions. See 781 F.2d at 924 (citing

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Millwrights, Piledrivers, Divers, Highway Construction, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 1026, 266

N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1983)); see also CBS, 364 U.S. at 584 (The Court acknowledged "the fact

that § 10(k), like § 8(b)(4)(D), extends to jurisdictional disputes between unions and unorganized

groups."). Moreover, the fact that one group of employees is actually doing the work in question can

reasonably be considered evidence of their claim to that work. See Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 924

(citing International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 926, 254 N.L.R.B. 994, 996 (1981)).

Further, just because SPI employees may not have voiced a concern about keeping the button-man

work does not indicate that they would not protest if that work were actually taken from them. In

the instant case, if "the origins of the dispute" are considered, see Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 925,

it is clear that there was sufficient evidence for the Board to conclude that Local 14 and SPI

employees were rivalsfor the button-man work. The Board was not required to elicit testimony from

SPI employees (as suggested by the Union) to prove more.

Consideration ofthe origins ofthis dispute not onlybolsterstheBoard'sfinding that there was

a de facto dispute between employee groups, but also demonstrates that the Board reasonably

concluded that the conflict was not truly instigated by SPI, as that concept has evolved in the case

law. The reason why there is any concern over employer "instigation" is because, in instances where

a union's claim really isfocused on "work preservation" (and not a "jurisdictional dispute"), it would

be unfair to allow an employer to seek redress under sections 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D), and thus deny

the union a right to use economic weapons otherwise available to it. But this concern can be carried

too far, for it is often the case that an employer has an interest in the outcome of a jurisdictional

dispute. So if the notion of "instigation" is somehow construed to be coterminous with an employer's

interest in the outcome, the Board would be hard-pressed to find any jurisdictional disputes except

in those rare cases in which the employer truly had not one iota of preference as to the outcome.

Such a result would be absurd and analytically dissatisfying.

Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has recognized that an employer's interest

in the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute varies in every case. See Plasterers', 404 U.S. at 124 ("It

may be that in some cases employers have no stake in how a jurisdictional dispute issettled.... Other

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2

See also Sea-Land, 884 F.2d at 1412 n.7 ("That the employer may prefer one group of

employees over another ... does not render a dispute non-jurisdictional. Indeed, in deciding

Section 10(k) proceedings, the Board gives weight to employer preference."). 

employers ... are not neutral and have substantial economic interests in the outcome of the § 10(k)

proceeding."). According to the Court, sections 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D) "were enacted to protect

employers who are partisan in a jurisdictional dispute as well as those who are neutral." Id. at 130.2

A necessary corollary is that an employer need not be indifferent to the outcome of a labor dispute

in order for the dispute to be deemed jurisdictional.

In this case, SPI admitsthat it would prefer for its own employeesto perform the button-man

work, noting that allocation of that task to Union members would be less efficient and more costly.

Its move to the 14th Street Dock was driven by similar concerns, because, by eliminating the

middleman in marketing its wood chips, SPI could realize substantialsavings. The fact that SPI made

a business decision to expand its operations in a search for profits, and thereby prompted a labor

dispute, does not mean that SPI cannot be afforded the protection of the Act. As this court stated

in Sea-Land, "if every action taken, no matter how natural or inevitable a business step, which gives

rise to a dispute between rivalgroups of employees, disqualified an employer fromsection 8(b)(4)(D)

relief, that section would become a dead letter." 884 F.2d at 1412.

SPI's move to the 14th Street Dock is no different from the employer's decision in Sea-Land

to move to a new dock in order to eliminate inefficiencies due to overcrowding. See id. Just as the

employer in Sea-Land was free to choose between its own Teamster employees and the

Longshoremen's union when staffing its new dock, SPI was also free to choose either its own

employees or Local 14 members to operate the chip loading machinery once it made the unassailable

decision to relocate. SPI's decision to use its own employees was a logical extension of its previous

decision to avoid the middleman in its chip business. SPI was not looking to do battle with Local 14;

rather, it sought to improve its operations and save money by creating a new position. Local 14 was

not "supplanted," because the work it sought was not work that it had ever done before.

Although the facts presented in this case also bear some resemblance to those presented in

Alaska Timber, where this court overruled the Board's finding of a jurisdictional dispute, there is at

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3SPI's action is also markedly different from a situation in which the employer has control over

one group of employees, and then replaces them with other employees. See, e.g., USPC-Wesco,

Inc. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1987) (There was no jurisdictional dispute when an

employer subcontracted work away from its own represented employees to the rival employees of

another contractor.); Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 925-26 (There was no jurisdictional dispute

when an employer usurped and reassigned work previously performed by union members in order

to avoid dealing with the union and to protect its own employees.); Safeway Stores, Inc., 134

N.L.R.B. at 1323 (There was no jurisdictional dispute when Safeway reassigned work from union

drivers, who had performed the work for over ten years, to members of other unions.). 

4The Union argues that the Supreme Court's decisions in National Woodwork Manufacturers

Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 635 (1967), NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447

U.S. 490, 506-08 (1980), and NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 77

(1985), support its claims that the picketing involved an effort to preserve work. These cases are

plainly distinguishable because they involved disputes between employers and unions regarding

the proper interpretation of existing collective bargaining agreements. In this case, SPI has never

been party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Union; indeed, when SPI wood chips

were formerly handled at the North Coast/L-P dock, it was never at the direction or for the direct

benefit of SPI. 

least one critical difference. In Alaska Timber, the employer unilaterally changed the long-standing

loading practices at its own dock, thereby replacing longshoremen with its own employees. See 781

F.2d at 920-21. As this court subsequently explained, "[t]he Alaska employer's shift in business

practice seemsto have been designed totally to supplant the Longshoremen with its own employees."

Sea-Land, 884 F.2d at 1411. Here, there is no evidence that SPI changed its operations in order to

avoid the Union. Indeed, SPI had no direct relationship with the Union in this case.3

Finally, we also reject the contention that Local 14's picketing wassomehow protected by the

Act as a work preservation effort. Although Union members loaded chips dropped off by SPI at LP's dock, they had never loaded chips at the 14th Street Dock. Further, SPI is not a member of the

PMA, nor is it a party to the PCLCD. Thus, the button-man work at issue was new work that did

not "belong" to the Union by prior practice or contract. See, e.g., Bloomsburg Graphic

Communications Union, Local 732-C, 308 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1192 n.4 (1992) (The Board found that,

when an employer moved bookbinding work to a new location, the assignment of related work was

"an original assignment of new work.").4

C. The Board's Allocation of the Disputed Work

Local 14 also asserts that the Board erred in assigning the work to SPI's employees. In

deciding section 10(k) work-assignment disputes, the Board routinely considers:

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the skills and work involved, certifications by the Board, company and industry

practice, agreements between unions and between employers and unions, awards of

arbitrators, joint boards, and [unions] in the same or related cases, the assignment

made by the employer, and the efficient operation of the employer's business.

International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1743 (Jones Construction Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410-

11 (1962).

In this case, the Board considered the factors of certification and collective bargaining

agreement, company preference and practice, area and industry practice, relative skills, and economy

and efficiency of operations. The Board found that, although area and industry practice generally

favored the Union, company preference and practice and economy and efficiency of operations

favored an award to SPI's employees. The other factors did not favor either employee group. The

Board concluded that, after considering allrelevant factors, the work in dispute should be performed

by SPI's employees. The Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, and it does

not appear that the Board overlooked any critical factors. Thus, its award to SPI's employees was

neither arbitrary nor capricious, and the Union's petition for review of the award is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

The Union's petition for review of the Board's Order is denied, and the Board's cross-petition

for enforcement is granted.

So ordered.

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