Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05701/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05701-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Ann Penny-Baten
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANN PENNY-BATEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-05701-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING IN 

PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Docket Nos. 20-21

In February 2015, Plaintiff Ann Penny-Batten filed both a Title II application for disability 

insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). See AR 

527-28, 529-37 (applications). Her applications were initially denied in August 2015, see AR 

484-87 (notice), and then, upon reconsideration, in January 2016. See AR 489-93 (notice). Ms. 

Penny-Batten subsequently requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). See

AR 499-500 (request). A hearing was held before ALJ David LaBarre in June 2017. See AR 365-

435 (ALJ hearing transcript). On November 15, 2017, ALJ LaBarre issued his decision, 

concluding that Ms. Penny-Batten was not disabled from November 19, 2003, through the date of 

his decision.1 See AR 38 (ALJ decision). Ms. Penny-Batten asked that the Appeals Council for 

the Social Security Administration review the ALJ’s decision. See AR 524-26 (request). On July 

 

1

In her initial applications, Ms. Penny-Batten claimed that her disability onset date was November 

19, 20013. However, at the hearing before the ALJ, Ms. Penny-Batten indicated that she was 

amending the alleged onset date to January 11, 2008. See AR 372 (ALJ hearing transcript); see 

also Mot. at 1 (noting amended onset date). In spite of this, ALJ LaBarre still addressed the onset 

date as originally claimed.

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20, 2018, the Appeals Council held that there was no basis to change the ALJ’s decision – even 

taking into account new evidence submitted by Ms. Penny-Batten – and therefore denied the 

request for review. See AR 1-2 (notice) (stating, inter alia, that the new evidence “does not show 

a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the decision”). Ms. Penny-Batten 

then initiated the instant action.

Ms. Penny-Batten has exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her claims for 

disability insurance benefits and SSI. This Court has jurisdiction to review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Ms. Penny-Batten has moved for summary judgment, seeking a reversal of the ALJ and 

Appeals Council’s decisions. The Commissioner has cross-moved for summary judgment. 

Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, including but not limited to 

the administrative record, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby GRANTS in part 

and DENIES in part Ms. Penny-Batten’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

When Ms. Penny-Batten initially applied for disability insurance benefits and SSI in 2015, 

she primarily claimed that she suffered from back pain. See, e.g., AR 484 (notice). However, by 

the time of the hearing before the ALJ in 2017, Ms. Penny-Batten put at issue not only her back 

pain but also her vertigo/dizziness, which she stated was a result of kidney problems related to her 

diabetes. See AR 404-05 (AL hearing transcript).

ALJ LaBarre rejected Ms. Penny-Batten’s claims for disability insurance benefits and SSI, 

applying the five-step sequential evaluation process provided for by the relevant regulations.

“Step one disqualifies claimants who are engaged in substantial 

gainful activity from being considered disabled under the 

regulations. Step two disqualifies those claimants who do not have 

one or more severe impairments that significantly limit their 

physical or mental ability to conduct basic work activities. Step 

three automatically labels as disabled those claimants whose 

impairment or impairments meet the duration requirement and are 

listed or equal to those listed in a given appendix. Benefits are 

awarded at step three if claimants are disabled. Step four 

disqualifies those remaining claimants whose impairments do not 

prevent them from doing past relevant work. Step five disqualifies 

those claimants whose impairments do not prevent them from doing 

other work, but at this last step the burden of proof shifts from the 

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claimant to the government. Claimants not disqualified by step five 

are eligible for benefits.”

Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003).

In the instant case, ALJ LaBarre made the following rulings regarding the five steps.

At step one, the ALJ found that Ms. Penny-Batten had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since November 19, 2003 (the original alleged onset date). See AR 39 (ALJ decision).

At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Penny-Batten suffered from only one severe 

impairment, i.e., low back myalgia. See AR 41. The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Penny-Batten 

suffered from other impairments as well – including diabetes and vertigo/dizziness – but found 

that they were not severe. See AR 41. The ALJ noted, inter alia, that Ms. Penny-Batten’s treating 

doctors had not “diagnosed any of the syndromes that can sometimes be associated with diabetes 

(for example, chronic kidney disease . . . ).” AR 41. 

At step three, the ALJ stated that Ms. Penny-Batten did not have an impairment, or a 

combination of impairments, that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in the appendix. See AR 43.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Penny-Batten had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform light work, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b), 

except she is able to frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds, can 

occasionally lift and/or carry twenty pounds, can sit for up to six 

hours although she must be permitted to stand for five minutes after 

sitting two hours, can stand or walk a total of six hours, one hour at 

a time, in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks, should never 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, is able to frequently climb ramps 

or stairs, can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, and can 

occasionally balance when on narrow, slippery, or erratically 

moving services.

AR 43. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found that Ms. Penny-Batten was capable of performing her 

past relevant work as a security guard as generally performed and as a ball sorter as actually 

performed. See AR 50. Accordingly, the ALJ held that Ms. Penny-Batten was not disabled and 

therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits or SSI.

Thereafter, Ms. Penny-Batten asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision, 

submitting in support of her request additional evidence related to dizziness, diabetes, and kidney 

problems. The Appeals Council denied her request for review, stating, inter alia, that the bulk of 

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the new evidence did “not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the 

decision.” AR 2 (Appeals Council decision).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

After a final decision on a claim for benefits by the Commissioner, the claimant may seek 

judicial review of that decision by a district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner’s 

decision will be disturbed only if the ALJ has committed legal error or if the ALJ’s findings are 

not supported by substantial evidence. See Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s denial of benefits if the Commissioner 

applied the correct legal standards and substantial evidence supports the decision.”). Substantial 

evidence is relevant evidence – “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance” – that a 

reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2007). A court evaluates “the record as a whole, . . . weighing both the evidence that 

supports and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion” to determine if substantial evidence supports a 

finding. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence supports “more 

than one rational interpretation,” the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005).

In the instant case, Ms. Penny-Batten makes several arguments – e.g., that the ALJ erred at 

step two in failing to find that she suffered from another severe impairment, i.e., kidney disease; 

that the ALJ’s assessment of her credibility was flawed because it was not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence; and that the ALJ erred at step four in failing to credit the opinions of her 

treating physician, Dr. Blackwell, as well as those of an examining physician, Dr. Cohen. For 

purposes of the pending summary judgment motions, the Court does not address these arguments 

per se as presented in Ms. Penny-Batten’s papers but rather takes a different approach, one 

focused on Ms. Penny-Batten’s condition during two different periods: (1) on or before December 

31, 2008, and (2) between January 1, 2009, and November 15, 2017. 

B. Ms. Penny-Batten’s Condition on or Before December 31, 2008

Ms. Penny-Batten’s condition on or before December 31, 2008, is important because, as 

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the ALJ noted (and no party disputes), she had acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain 

insured through that date only. That is, Ms. Penny-Batten had to “establish disability on or before 

[December 31, 2008,] in order to be entitled to . . . disability insurance benefits” (but not SSI). 

AR 38 (ALJ decision).

Although Ms. Penny-Batten appears to have been diagnosed with diabetes by 2008, see, 

e.g., AR 700 (medical record from treating physician Dr. Small, dated May 2004) (indicating that 

Ms. Penny-Batten “declined diabetes meds”), the record does not suggest that her diabetes 

materially impacted her ability to function at that point in time; rather, her primary complaint at 

that time concerned back pain. Indeed, it appears that Ms. Penny-Batten amended her alleged 

onset date from November 19, 2003, to January 11, 2008, because, on the latter date, one of her 

treating physicians, Dr. Blackwell, issued a work status report in which he indicated that she was 

“[u]nable to [r]eturn to [w]ork” because of, specifically, back problems. See AR 654 (work status 

report from Dr. Blackwell).

To the extent Ms. Penny-Batten claims that the ALJ erred by failing to find that she was 

disabled as of January 11, 2008, the Court does not agree. As an initial matter, the Court notes 

that Dr. Blackwell’s opinion on January 11, 2008, that Ms. Penny-Batten was unable to work 

(permanently) as a result of her back issues is not entitled to any special consideration. That 

opinion is not a medical opinion. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (stating that “[w]e will not 

give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the 

Commissioner”); id. § 404.1527(d)(1) (noting that “[o]pinions on some issues . . . are not medical 

opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are 

administrative findings that are dispositive of a case[,] i.e., that would direct the determination or 

decision of disability”; this includes “[o]pinions that you are disabled,” and “[a] statement by a 

medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine 

that you are disabled”). Moreover, in and of itself, Dr. Blackwell’s work status report finding Ms. 

Penny-Batten disabled was totally conclusory. In the work status report, Dr. Blackwell made no 

specific assessment of her limitations and ability to work. 

Dr. Blackwell did issue a medical report on January 11, 2008 (to a claims examiner), 

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apparently in support of his work status report of the same date.

2

 See AR 652-54 (medical report). 

In his medical report, Dr. Blackwell noted that he had treated Ms. Penny-Batten after an injury to 

her lower back from April 4, 2003, to July 26, 2005. See AR 652. Evidently, Dr. Blackwell did 

not examine Ms. Penny-Batten again until shortly before he prepared the medical report (i.e., some 

two and a half years later). Dr. Blackwell noted that he was examining Ms. Penny-Batten because 

she was experiencing an increase in her lower back pain. He stated as follows:

Physical Examination

By clinical examination, I find that she has irritability to her lower 

back, showing a nearly full range of motion, but all associated with 

pain. Heel and toe lifts were performed satisfactorily. The sitting 

straight leg raise test is positive for lower back pain. The straight 

leg raise recumbent is to 45 degrees bilaterally. The patient has no 

motor or sensory deficits. She is tender in the region of the 

iliolumbar ligaments bilaterally.

Impression 

Chronic musculoligamentous strain and sprain lumbosacral spine 

with acute exacerbation.

Comments

At this time, it appears that Ms. Batten is having a flare up of her 

chronic pain problem.

I prescribed Norco 10 mg and Benalg lotion to help gain control of 

her symptoms.

She may require a brief trial of physical therapy depending upon her 

response to the prescription medications.

She is due to return here in approximately two weeks . . . .

AR 653.

Dr. Blackwell’s medical opinion above appears to be uncontroverted. While other doctors 

did provide medical opinions about Ms. Penny-Batten’s condition – e.g., examining physicians Dr. 

 

2 On an earlier date – December 5, 2003 – Dr. Blackwell issued a different medical report. In his 

report, he noted, inter alia, with respect to Ms. Penny-Batten’s back pain that “she had slight 

diminished range of motion with poor mobility, evidence of a positive Waddell’s sign on femoral 

stretch testing,” and “negative” MRI results. AR 666 (medical report). At that time, Dr. 

Blackwell opined that Ms. Penny-Batten’s limitations only precluded her from “heavy work.” AR 

668. There is no subsequent MRI or similar test result in the record which document any 

deterioration or worsening of her condition.

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Pon and Dr. Cohen – their opinions were rendered in 2015 and 2016, and it is not clear that they 

were expressing any views about Ms. Penny-Batten’s condition as far back in 2008. Where a 

treating physician’s medical opinion is not contradicted, an ALJ may reject that opinion only upon 

“‘clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.’” Ghanim v. Colvin, 

763 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2014). Although this is a high standard, it does not present an 

issue in the instant case because the ALJ did not reject Dr. Blackwell’s medical opinion here but 

rather simply found that it was not enough to support her claim that she was disabled.3 This was 

not an unreasonable conclusion. 

Per the medical report, Ms. Penny-Batten demonstrated a full range of motion in her lower 

back, albeit with pain. Dr. Blackwell characterized the increase in pain as a “flare up,” which 

suggested that the increase in pain could subside, particularly as Ms. Penny-Batten reported to him 

that “[m]ost of the time . . . she is able to gain relief with pain medication.” AR 653. In fact, Dr. 

Blackwell took a conservative approach to the treatment of the flare up, simply prescribing pain 

medication and identifying physical therapy as a possibility “depending upon her response to the 

prescription medications.” AR 653. And although Dr. Blackwell stated that Ms. Penny-Batten 

was to return to his office in two weeks, there is nothing in the record to indicate that she did in 

fact return, from which one could infer that the pain had been resolved satisfactorily. Finally, it is 

worth noting that, other than Dr. Blackwell’s January 11, 2018, medical report, there is nothing in 

the record that addresses her inability to work prior to December 31, 2008. 

Accordingly, the Court finds no error with respect to the ALJ’s finding that Ms. PennyBatten was not disabled on or before December 31, 2008. That being the case, Ms. Penny-Batten 

is not entitled to disability insurance benefits, although she is not thereby precluded from seeking 

SSI for a later period.

C. Ms. Penny-Batten’s Condition Between January 1, 2009, and November 15, 2017

As for Ms. Penny-Batten’s condition after December 31, 2008 – more specifically, 

between January 1, 2009, and November 15, 2017 (the latter being the date of the ALJ’s decision) 

 

3 Because the ALJ did not reject this medical opinion, there is no need here to evaluate whether 

the ALJ properly discounted Ms. Penny-Batten’s credibility.

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– the analysis is different. 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that, within this period, there is a substantial amount of 

time for which there appears to be no medical records – roughly 2009 through 2014. Although the 

record does not precisely identify why, it appears that this is related to the fact that Ms. PennyBatten was living in Trinidad during this time and did not return to the United States until 2014. 

See AR 45 (ALJ decision) (noting that, based on hearing testimony, Ms. Penny-Batten lived in 

Trinidad from July 2008 until July 2014); AR 377-78 (ALJ hearing transcript). Given the lack of 

any medical record or evidence of disability, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in finding 

Ms. Penny-Batten not disabled for this period of time.

The Court, however, does find an error warranting a remand with respect to the period 

2015 through November 15, 2017 – although that error is attributable to the Appeals Council 

rather than the ALJ. At the time that the ALJ rendered his decision, he was presented with 

evidence related to Ms. Penny-Batten’s back pain as well as diabetes and vertigo/dizziness. With 

respect to diabetes and vertigo/dizziness, Ms. Penny-Batten asserted that they were related, in 

particular, that the vertigo/dizziness was a result of kidney problems related to her diabetes. See

AR 404-05 (ALJ hearing transcript). The evidence concerning kidney problems, however, was 

limited. See, e.g., AR 764 (medical record from September 2016) (“Mild fat stranding around the 

kidneys. This could represent acute pyelonepthritis in appropriate clinical situation.”) (emphasis 

added). Based on the limited evidence, the ALJ found that the diabetes and vertigo/dizziness were 

not severe impairments. See, e.g., AR 41 (ALJ decision) (noting that “treating physicians have not 

diagnosed any of the syndromes that can sometimes be associated with diabetes (for example, 

chronic kidney disease . . . )”; also noting that “[t]here is no evidence of . . . any other 

complication requiring hospitalization”). 

At the time Ms. Penny-Batten sought relief from the Appeals Council, however, she 

presented additional evidence related to her diabetes, vertigo/dizziness, and (especially notable) 

kidney problems. The bulk of the medical evidence was dated prior to the date of the ALJ’s 

decision of November 15, 2017, decision, but there is no dispute that the ALJ was not given the 

vast majority of the documents, including, most significantly, evidence that Ms. Penny-Batten had 

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been hospitalized between October 1 and November 3, 2017, for septic shock due to a severe 

kidney infection requiring removal of her left kidney and, subsequently, temporary dialysis. See

AR 113 (medical record, dated November 3, 2017) (describing “prolonged hospitalization for 

septic shock due to emphysematous pyelonephritis with e.coli bacteremia of kidney requiring a L 

nephrectomy on 10/7 now requiring temporary dialysis”); see also AR 112 (referring to a 

diagnosis of “[u]ncontrolled type 2 diabetes mellitus with stage 3 chronic kidney disease”). A 

medical record from December 2017 confirmed that Ms. Penny-Batten had been “started on 

temporary dialysis” and was “[s]till having dialysis 3x/week.” AR 106 (medical record).

The Appeals Council acknowledged the new evidence presented by Ms. Penny-Batten but 

stated that the hospitalization evidence “does not show a reasonable probability that it would 

change the outcome of the decision.” AR 2 (Appeals Council decision). The Appeals Council 

added that the December 2017 medical record “does not relate to the period at issue” and therefore 

“does not affect the decision about whether you were disabled beginning on or before November 

15, 2017.” AR 2. 

In so holding, the Appeals Council erred. The hospitalization evidence was material, as it 

shed light on Ms. Penny-Batten’s diabetes condition and related kidney issues. “Remand is 

necessary where the material evidence gives rise to a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the new 

evidence might change the outcome of the administrative hearing.” Borrelli v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec’y, 570 Fed. Appx. 651, 652 (9th Cir. 2014); cf. Taylor v. Comm’r, 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (holding that court could consider evidence rejected by Appeals Council to determine 

whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free of legal error); 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1030 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Appeals Council 

considered additional medical evidence and therefore, on appeal, both the ALJ’s decision and the 

additional material submitted to the Appeals Council would be considered). Here, there is a 

“reasonable probability” that the hospitalization evidence might change the outcome of the 

administrative hearing. The evidence indicated that Ms. Penny-Batten was in fact having 

significant kidney problems that required hospitalization for approximately a month and the 

removal of her left kidney. Although not necessarily conclusive of disability, the evidence could 

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have had an impact on the ALJ’s assessment that Ms. Penny-Batten’s diabetes was not severe 

because she had not been diagnosed with a chronic kidney disease. See AR 41-42 (ALJ decision).

As for the December 2017 medical evidence, here, the Appeals Council erred as well. The 

Appeals Council discounted this evidence on the basis that it did “not relate to the period at issue” 

(i.e., disability prior to November 15, 2017) but, the evidence was in fact related to Ms. PennyBatten’s hospitalization in October and November 2017, which was prior to the date of the ALJ’s 

decision. See Baccari v. Colvin, No. EDCV 13-2393 RNB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159963, at *6 

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) (noting that medical evidence “generated after the ALJ’s decision” is 

still “chronologically relevant if it [is] related to a claimant’s condition on or before the date of the 

ALJ’s decision”).

Implicitly recognizing the problematic nature of the Appeals Council’s analysis (both with 

respect to the hospitalization evidence and the December 2017 medical evidence), the 

Commissioner argues that the Court should still deny Ms. Penny-Batten summary judgment 

because there is no indication that her kidney issues met the durational requirement for disability. 

See Opp’n at 10 (noting that “an impairment ‘must have lasted or must be expected to last for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months’ in order to be considered a severe impairment”). But the 

hospital’s discharge summary stated that “[i]t is not likely her renal function will recover and will 

thus continue dialysis [3 times a week].” AR 113. At the very least, this evidence should have 

triggered a duty on the part of the Appeals Council to further develop the record. Cf. Mayes v. 

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is 

triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for 

proper evaluation of the evidence.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Appeals Council erred in denying Ms. PennyBatten’s request for review. The Court, however, finds that a remand is appropriate rather than an 

immediate award of benefits, precisely because a more developed record on Ms. Penny-Batten’s 

kidney problems is warranted. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Ms. Penny-Batten’s kidney 

problems were related to her refusal or reluctance to take diabetes medication and, if so, whether 

that affects her ability to claim disability. 

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On remand, the Social Security Administration should consider not only Ms. PennyBatten’s condition with respect to her kidney problems but also to her back pain. Although the 

Court finds no error in the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Penny-Batten was not disabled through 2008 

based on her back pain, that does not foreclose a disability finding during a later period in time 

when both her kidney problems and back pain are taken into account in combination.4 See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2) (stating that “[w]e will consider all of your medically determinable 

impairments of which we are aware, including your medically determinable impairments that are 

not ‘severe’ . . . when we assess your residual functional capacity”); id. § 404.1523(c) (stating that, 

“[i]n determining whether your physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a sufficient 

medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under the 

law, we will consider the combined effect of all of your impairments without regard to whether 

any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity”). 

The Social Security Administration should also reassess Ms. Penny-Batten’s credibility in 

light of the new evidence that Ms. Penny-Batten presented to the Appeals Council. The Court 

notes, however, that it does not make any ruling here that the ALJ erred in rejecting Ms. PennyBatten’s credibility based on the evidence that was presented before him. See AR 47 (ALJ 

decision) (discounting Ms. Penny-Batten’s credibility regarding her back pain for a variety of 

reasons, including the fact that treatment was “conservative and routine at most, with extended 

periods for which there are no treatment records at all”); cf. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “several of our cases have held that an ALJ's error was harmless where 

the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a claimant's testimony, but also 

provided valid reasons that were supported by the record”); Carmickle v. Comm'r, SSA, 533 F.3d 

1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that, “[s]o long as there remains ‘substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ's conclusions on . . . credibility’ and the error ‘does not negate the validity of 

the ALJ's ultimate [credibility] conclusion,’ such is deemed harmless and does not warrant 

 

4 The Court does not address whether Ms. Penny-Batten was disabled in the 2015-2017 timeframe 

based solely on her back pain. However, it does note that, in August 2017, there was a medical 

record stating that recent x-rays of Ms. Penny-Batten were within normal limits. See AR 339 

(medical record).

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reversal”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part both 

parties’ motions for summary judgment. The Court remands so that the Social Security 

Administration may consider whether Ms. Penny-Batten was disabled at any point from 2015 to 

November 15, 2017, based on, e.g., her diabetes, related kidney issues, and/or back problems.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 21 and 22.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-05701-EMC Document 23 Filed 07/02/19 Page 12 of 12