Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-00657/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-00657-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sharon Finkelstein
Plaintiff
Prudential Financial Incorporated
Defendant
Prudential Insurance Company of America
Defendant

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sharon Finkelstein,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Prudential Financial Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-21-00657-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Before the Court are both parties’ motions to strike and/or exclude or limit the 

opinions and testimony of each other’s expert witnesses. The motions are fully briefed, and 

the Court held oral argument on August 28, 2023.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sharon Finkelstein (“Plaintiff”) brought this lawsuit against Defendant 

Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Defendant”) for breach of contract and bad 

faith arising out of an insurance claim. Plaintiff purchased a long-term care insurance 

policy with Prudential in 1993. Under the policy, an insured may be entitled to $298 per 

day in benefits, subject to periodic increases for inflation.

Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to benefits under the policy since 2008 because 

she has Arnold-Chiari malformation (hereinafter “Chiari malformation”),1 Meniere’s 

1 Chiari malformations are congenital and occur when part of the cerebellum “slips into the 

foramen magnum at the upper cervical spine,” restricting flow of cerebral spinal fluid 

between the spinal cord and the brain. 4 Attorneys Textbook of Medicine (Third Edition)

§ 11.03 (2023). At least three types of Chiari malformations exist: Chiari I, Chiari II (also 

known as Arnold-Chiari malformation), and Chiari III. Id.; see also Chiari Malformations, 

Am. Ass’n. of Neurological Surgeons, https://www.aans.org/Patients/NeurosurgicalCase 2:21-cv-00657-MTL Document 328 Filed 10/23/23 Page 1 of 35
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disease,2and vertigo.

3

(Doc. 1 at 9, 21). Plaintiff claims these conditions leave her unable

to perform two or more activities of daily living, as described in the policy. Defendant

provided Plaintiff with benefits under the policy for twelve years before her claim was 

terminated. After an investigation, Defendant’s in-house medical director, Dr. John Nye, 

found that she did not need substantial assistance with her activities of daily living for a 

recent period of 90 days, so she no longer qualified for benefits under the policy. As a 

result, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s benefits because this meant that she did not meet

the eligibility definition under the policy for “chronic illness or disability,” which is now

at issue in this case. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated her benefits without 

reasonable investigation and in breach of the policy. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant

has an “institutional scheme” to eliminate its now-discontinued long-term care insurance 

plans. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages that she alleges are owed under the policy, 

punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Plaintiff engaged several experts to help prove 

her case. Defendants also retained its own experts to rebut Plaintiff’s case. Both parties 

now move to exclude or limit each other’s experts’ opinions and testimony.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Disclosure Requirements

Rule 26(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires that parties promptly disclose the identity of 

Conditions-and-Treatments/Chiari-Malformation (last visited Oct. 19, 2023). Symptoms

from Chiari malformations include headache, neck pain, dizziness, incoordination, and 

sensory and hearing loss. The severity of the symptoms increase based on the type of 

malformation, with Type I being the least severe. Id. Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that 

she has “Arnold-Chiari malformation.” (Doc. 1) Both Plaintiff and Defendant, however, 

use Chiari malformation Type I and Arnold-Chiari malformation interchangeably 

throughout the briefing even though the literature suggests that these are two different types 

of Chiari malformation. (See, e.g., Docs. 259 (Plaintiff using “Arnold-Chiari

malformation”), 262 (Defendant using “Chiari malformation type I”), 268 (Plaintiff using 

“Arnold Chiari malformation” and “Arnold Chiari Type I malformation”), 285 (Defendant 

using “Arnold Chiari malformation”), 291 at 2 (Plaintiff stating “Mrs. Finkelstein suffers 

from Chiari Malformation Type I.”).)

2 Meniere’s disease “presents with paroxysmal symptoms of tinnitus, monaural fullness, 

fluctuating hearing, and episodic vertigo . . . . Meniere disease is diagnosed only if there is 

both episodic vertigo and sensorineural hearing loss.” 11 Attorneys Textbook of Medicine 

(Third Edition) § 84.07 (2023).

3 Throughout the briefing, the parties also refer to other conditions that Plaintiff may have, 

such as hypertension, thyroid disease, obesity, and others, but these conditions are not why

Plaintiff alleges she qualifies for long-term care insurance.

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lay witnesses and a copy of documents that may be used to support their claims or defenses. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Rule 26(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires parties to disclose the 

identity of each expert witness, “accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by 

the witness,” by a date set by the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(C). Rule 37(c)(1) 

“gives teeth to these requirements” by forbidding the use of any improperly disclosed 

information in a motion, at a hearing, or at trial. Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor 

Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (“[i]f a party 

fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) . . . the party is 

not allowed to use that information”). Courts have excluded evidence, including witness 

testimony, under Rule 37(c)(1) “even when a litigant’s entire cause of action or defense 

has been precluded.” Yeti by Molly, Ltd., 259 F.3d at 1106.

Two exceptions “ameliorate the harshness of Rule 37(c)(1).” Id. The material may 

be used if the party’s failure to properly disclose was “substantially justified” or 

“harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The party making the late disclosure bears the burden 

of establishing that the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. See Torres 

v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he burden is on the party 

facing the sanction . . . to demonstrate that the failure to comply with Rule 26(a) is 

substantially justified or harmless.”). Rule 37(c) is intended to be a “self-executing, 

automatic sanction to provide [] a strong inducement for disclosure of material.” Yeti by 

Molly, Ltd., 259 F.3d at 1106 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1993

amendment) (quotations omitted).

B. Daubert

A party offering expert testimony must establish that the testimony satisfies Rule 

702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or to determine a fact in issue;

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(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 

methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods 

to the facts of the case..

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

As gatekeepers, trial judges make a preliminary assessment about the admissibility 

of expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597 (1993). 

Specifically, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 

admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589. To meet the requirements of Rule 

702, an expert must be qualified, his opinion must be based on sufficient facts or data and 

is the product of reliable principles and methods, and his testimony must fit the case such 

that the expert’s opinion is relevant. Id. at 589-95.

The Rule 702 inquiry is “flexible.” Id. at 594. The focus “must be solely on 

principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595. Because 

the requirements of Rule 702 are conditions for determining whether expert testimony is 

admissible, a party offering expert testimony must show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the expert’s testimony satisfies Rule 702. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a); see also Lust 

v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike three items from Plaintiff’s evidence, arguing that 

Plaintiff improperly disclosed these only days prior to the close of fact discovery: (1) Laura 

Parker’s supplemental report, (2) lay witnesses Tom Finkelstein, Karin Finkelstein, and 

Bill Mayes, and (3) deposition transcripts from Turley v. Prudential. (Doc. 259 at 1-3.) The 

Court addresses each in turn.

1. Laura Parker’s Supplemental Report

Plaintiff argues that Laura Parker’s supplemental report was necessary because 

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Defendant expanded the subject of Ms. Parker’s opinion during her deposition and because 

Defendant failed to produce Nurse Acosta for deposition in a timely manner. (Doc. 295 at 

10-12.) Moreover, Plaintiff believed she was obligated to supplement the report in good 

faith under the rules, especially because her counsel stated on the record during the 

deposition that they would do so. (Id.) Defendant contends that the late disclosure of the 

supplemental report is neither substantially justified nor harmless because the Nurse 

Arroyo deposition was taken in February 2023 whereas Laura Parker’s deposition was in 

March 2023, and Plaintiff did not provide the supplemental report until May 9, 2023. (Doc. 

259 at 10.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s disclosure of Ms. Parker’s supplemental report was 

substantially justified. Plaintiff submitted the report before the close of discovery, and only 

supplemented the report because Defendant questioned Ms. Parker for over seven hours 

and introduced Nurse Arroyo’s deposition as an exhibit during the deposition. (Doc. 295-

6 at 1, 3.) Thus, Defendant’s questioning expanded Ms. Parker’s conclusions and Plaintiff 

was required under Rule 26(e)(2) to supplement them. The Court also credits Plaintiff’s 

argument that she had an unusually difficult time scheduling Nurse Arroyo’s deposition 

because Defendant did not produce Nurse Arroyo for deposition. Had Defendant facilitated 

Plaintiff’s deposition of Nurse Arroyo in a timely manner, the deposition may have been 

available before Ms. Parker’s original expert report was prepared and submitted. Moreover, 

that Defendant deposed Ms. Parker in such a manner that caused an expansion of her 

opinions, including about Nurse Arroyo’s competing opinion, weighs in favor of allowing 

the supplemental report. (See Doc. 23 at 3-4¶ 4(g) (“The Court notes, however, that it may 

permit parties to present opinions of their experts that were elicited by opposing counsel 

during depositions of the experts. Counsel should depose experts with this fact in mind.”).)

2. Lay Witnesses

Defendant asks the Court to preclude Plaintiff from calling Tom and Karin 

Finkelstein and Bill Mayes to testify at trial because Plaintiff did not disclose them as 

witnesses until one day before the close of discovery. As stated on the record at oral 

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argument, the Court will allow Tom and Karin Finkelstein and Bill Mayes to testify and 

will allow Defendant to depose these witnesses, should this case proceed to trial. (See Doc. 

321.) Defendant may raise this issue at the trial-setting conference, if necessary.

3. Turley Depositions

Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiff from using deposition transcripts taken during 

the pendency of Turley v. Prudential, a similar breach of contract case against Defendant 

in California, arguing that Plaintiff improperly disclosed them just one day before the close 

of fact discovery. Plaintiff argues that its late disclosure of these documents is substantially 

justified and harmless because Plaintiff originally requested these documents from 

Defendant during discovery, but Defendant refused to produce them. Plaintiff only 

disclosed these documents in support of her case after she received them from a third party. 

Because Defendant was a party to these depositions, Plaintiff contends that there is no harm 

to Defendant by their disclosure in this case. Plaintiff also argues that any motion to strike 

these deposition transcripts is premature, and Defendant should assert its objections as to 

their admissibility as this case gets closer to trial.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff and will deny Defendant’s motion as to the Turley 

depositions. The deponents in the disclosed depositions are Defendant’s corporate 

representatives that sat for a 30(b)(6) deposition in another case. Thus, Defendant has 

independent knowledge of these depositions and their disclosure late in discovery is 

harmless. Should Defendant seek to argue that these documents are irrelevant or 

inadmissible at trial, Defendant is free to re-assert those arguments in a motion in limine 

or when Plaintiff seeks to introduce them at trial.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 259) in all 

respects.

B. Daubert Motions

Both parties have moved to exclude one another’s experts. Plaintiff moves to 

exclude or limit the opinions of Defendant’s experts: Drs. Lorne Label and Abraham Jacob. 

Defendant opposes each motion. Defendant, in turn, moves to exclude or limit the opinions

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of Plaintiff’s experts: Drs. Michael D. Freeman, Mark Reiser, Dan Heffez, Kamran 

Samakar, and Constantine Moschonas, and Elliott Flood and Laura Parker. Like Defendant, 

Plaintiff opposes each motion.

1. Dr. Lorne Label

Defendant retained Dr. Lorne Label, a neurologist, to rebut the conclusions of many 

of Plaintiff’s experts and offer opinions on various topics related to the case. Plaintiff seeks 

to preclude Dr. Label’s opinion and testimony on: (1) Meniere’s disease; (2) Chiari 

malformation; (3) somatization disorders; (4) life expectancy and co-morbidity; (5) the 

qualifications of a general surgeon; and (6) long-term care insurance policy interpretations. 

(Docs. 266, 267, 268, 269.) The Court will first address Plaintiff’s motion to exclude 

testimony related to Meniere’s Disease, Chiari malformation, and somatization disorders, 

and then will address the remainder of the motions separately.

a. Meniere’s Disease

Plaintiff does not contest that Dr. Label is knowledgeable and an expert in his field 

of neurology. Instead, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Label is unqualified to opine on Meniere’s 

disease. (Doc. 266 at 2.) Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Label’s testimony about Meniere’s 

disease would be cumulative if Dr. Jacob also opines on the same issue, and as such, should 

be excluded. (Id.)

Courts typically do not require that an expert be a specialist, but instead require that 

the expert “be of a certain profession, such as a doctor.” Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 

F.2d 375, 385 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, lack of specialized knowledge impacts the weight 

of the expert’s testimony, not the admissibility of the testimony. United States v. Garcia, 

7 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1993); see also In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. 

Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 899 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“A court abuses its discretion when it 

excludes expert testimony solely on the ground that the witness’s qualifications are not 

sufficiently specific if the witness is generally qualified. A lack of specialization affects 

the weight of the expert’s testimony, not its admissibility.” (internal citations omitted)).

Dr. Label meets the requirement to opine as a medical expert and to discuss his 

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experience with Meniere’s disease. In his practice as a neurologist, Dr. Label has treated 

hundreds of patients with Meniere’s disease. (Doc. 285-1 at 8.) Plaintiff, however, claims 

that Dr. Label stated in his deposition that he is not an expert in Meniere’s disease. (Doc. 

266 at 1-2.) The Court finds that Plaintiff mischaracterizes Dr. Label’s testimony. Dr. Label 

said he is not an expert in Meniere’s disease in the context that he is not a neurosurgeon 

and does not specialize in that disease. (Doc. 266-1 at 6.) Dr. Label further clarifies that he 

can care for and treat patients with Meniere’s disease. (Id.) Plaintiff’s arguments ultimately 

go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See Abarca v. Franklin Cnty. Water 

Dist., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1028 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“Gaps in an expert witness’s 

qualifications or knowledge generally go to the weight of the witness’s testimony, not its 

admissibility” (quoting Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 477 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 

2006)).

If Dr. Jacob testifies about Meniere’s disease, however, Dr. Label will be precluded 

from also doing so. (See Doc. 23 at 4 ¶ 4(h) (stating that “[e]ach side shall be limited to 

one retained or specifically employed expert witness per issue”).) Dr. Label testifies that 

he would “defer” to Dr. Jacob about Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease diagnosis because Dr. 

Jacob performs surgery on patients with Meniere’s disease. (Docs. 266 at 2, 266-1 at 6.)

This is an issue for motions in limine and not appropriate at this stage. The Court therefore 

denies Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Label with respect to Meniere’s disease (Doc. 266 

at 1- 2).

b. Chiari Malformation

Plaintiff similarly argues that Dr. Label claims he is not an expert in Chiari 

malformations. (Doc. 266 at 3.) Defendant argues that Dr. Label is an expert with relevant 

experience with Chiari malformations. (Doc. 285 at 2-3.)

As discussed, Dr. Label need not be a specialist to qualify an expert. See Doe, 971

F.2d at 385. Defendants established that Dr. Label is knowledgeable and an expert in his 

field. In addition, Dr. Label has reviewed hundreds of MRIs with Chiari malformations. 

(Doc. 285-1 at 11.) Plaintiff claims that Dr. Label said he is not an expert in Chiari 

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malformations. (Doc. 266 at 1-4.). But Dr. Label said he is not an expert in Chiari 

malformations in the context that he is not a neurosurgeon and does not specialize in that 

disease. (Doc. 266-1 at 1, 3-4.) Dr. Label explains that he has had patients with Chiari 

malformations and referred many of them to neurosurgeons for treatment. (Doc. 285-1 at 

11.) Therefore, as a neurologist, Dr. Label may opine on Chiari malformations, subject to 

the proper foundation and any cross-examination or impeachment at trial. Defendant can 

address its concerns with the weight of the testimony through cross-examination. See 

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. 

Label with respect to Chiari malformation (Doc. 266 at 2-4).

c. Somatization Disorders

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Label is not an expert in somatization disorder because he 

admitted that he is not, and he has not published about or researched this condition. (Doc. 

266 at 4.) Plaintiff also argues that the Court should prohibit Dr. Label from testifying 

about somatization disorders under Rule 403 because it will confuse and mislead the jury. 

(Id. at 5.) Defendant claims that Dr. Label is an expert because he has treated and diagnosed 

patients with somatization disorder. (Doc. 285 at 3.)

Dr. Label has diagnosed hundreds of patients with somatization disorder. (Doc. 285-

1 at 10.) The Court, however, cannot find a basis in the record for Dr. Label’s opinions 

related to whether Plaintiff has somatization disorder. Dr. Label has not examined Plaintiff 

for this disorder, nor has another physician diagnosed her with this condition. As such, the 

Court agrees that Dr. Label’s testimony would mislead a jury and that this evidence should 

be excluded. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of 

expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable 

rules.”); Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence.”). The Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion to exclude

Dr. Label’s testimony with respect to somatization disorders (Doc. 266 at 4-5).

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2. Dr. Abraham Jacob

Defendant also retained Dr. Abraham Jacob, a neurotologist with a subspecialty in 

otolaryngology, to rebut the conclusions of many of Plaintiff’s experts and offer opinions 

on various topics related to the case. Plaintiff seeks to preclude Dr. Jacob’s opinion and 

testimony on: (1) life expectancy and co-morbidity; (2) the standard qualifications of a 

general surgeon; (3) long-term care insurance policy interpretations; and (4) Chiari 

malformations and “any topics outside the bounds of his expertise on Meniere’s disease.” 

(Docs. 267, 268, 269, 270.) The Court will address Dr. Jacob’s opinions on Chiari 

malformations and “any topics outside the bounds of his expertise on Meniere’s disease”

first, (see Doc. 270 at 1), and then, will address the remainder of the motions separately 

with reference to Dr. Label below.

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Jacob does not have experience treating Chiari 

malformations. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also argues his report is unreliable and 

incomprehensible, making it difficult to differentiate between Dr. Jacob’s opinions and 

others’ opinions. (Id. at 1-5.) Defendant contends that Dr. Jacob is qualified to testify 

because he is a neurotologist and is not required to be a specialist. (Doc. 286 at 3- 4.) 

Defendant maintains that Dr. Jacob’s report is well-organized with headings and 

subheadings differentiating between Dr. Jacob’s opinion from others. (Id. at 2-3.)

Plaintiff bases her complaints about Dr. Jacob’s specialized expertise in Chiari 

malformations on cases outside the Ninth Circuit that require physicians to be a specialist 

in performing the medical care at issue. (Dofc. 270 at 8.) For example, Plaintiff cites 

Tanner v. Westbrook, 174 F.3d 542, 528 (5th Cir. 1999), which held the testimony 

unreliable when the physician “did not have the kind of specialized knowledge required to 

testify” regarding an issue in a case. (Doc. 270 at 8.) Plaintiff also cites Kallassy v. Cirrus 

Design Corp., No. Civ.A. 3:04-CV-0727N, 2006 WL 1489248, at *7 (N.D. Tex. 2006), 

which held that an orthopedic surgeon did not qualify as an expert to determine the cause 

of Plaintiff’s nervous system disorder. (Id.) These examples, however, do not apply here. 

As discussed, courts in this Circuit do not require that an expert be a specialist, but instead 

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require that the “expert be of a certain profession.” Doe, 971 F.2d at 385. Further, lack of 

specialized knowledge impacts the weight of the expert’s testimony, not the admissibility 

of the testimony. Garcia, 7 F.3d at 890; BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP v. Cent. Coast Agric. 

Inc., 615 F. Supp. 3d 982, 1005-06 (D. Ariz. 2022).

Defendants established that Dr. Jacob is knowledgeable and experienced in his field 

of neurotology. Dr. Jacob is board certified in both otolaryngology and neurotology 

cranial-based surgery, and currently serves as the medical director of otology, neurotology, 

and audiology for Tucson Medical Center. (Doc. 267-7 at 2; Doc. 270-1 at 1; Doc. 286-1 

at 6.) In addition, Dr. Jacob has reviewed imaging for patients with Chiari malformation. 

(Doc. 286-1 at 9.) Thus, Dr. Jacob may offer opinions about Plaintiff’s medical conditions 

based on that medical experience and knowledge. See, e.g., Doe, 971 F.2d at 385 

(concluding that “[t]he fact that the [virologist and infectious disease specialists] were not 

licensed hematologists does not mean that they were testifying beyond their area of 

expertise”); Fowler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-450-JCM-GWF, 2017 WL 

8682353, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (holding that a neurologist “need not be an expert 

specifically in orthopedic surgery in order to be of assistance to a jury as to the medical 

issues presented”).

Moreover, Dr. Jacob’s report does not appear incomprehensible and unreliable. 

Dr. Jacob’s opinions are labeled throughout the 40-page report. (See Doc. 270-1.) In the 

records review section, Dr. Jacob labels his own opinion in capital letters and bold text 

with the word “OPINION.” (Id. at 16-29.) With each expert he reviews, Dr. Jacob 

identifies his opinion with the statement “I reviewed the transcript and exhibits in their 

entirety and have the following comments and opinions.” (Id. at 29-41.) Plaintiff’s 

arguments ultimately go to the weight of the opinions, not its admissibility. See Daubert,

509 U.S. at 596. As such, Plaintiff may test the limitations of Dr. Jacob’s opinions and 

attempt to discredit them at trial. See id. To the extent that Plaintiff argues Dr. Jacob 

provided new opinions during deposition, Plaintiff elicited that testimony so the Court will 

not exclude it merely because it is not in Dr. Jacob’s report. (See Doc. 23 at 3-4 ¶ 4(g).)

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The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Jacob’s testimony with 

respect to Chiari malformations and “any topics outside the bounds of his expertise on 

Meniere’s disease” (Doc. 270).

3. Life Expectancy and Co-Morbidity 

Plaintiff retained Dr. Michael D. Freeman, a forensic medicine and forensic 

epidemiology expert, to opine about Plaintiff’s life expectancy. Defendant offers Drs. 

Label and Jacob to rebut Dr. Freeman’s testimony. Plaintiff argues that neither Dr. Label 

nor Dr. Jacob should opine as to Plaintiff’s life expectancy or co-morbidities under Rule 

702 because neither are qualified to discuss these issues. (Doc. 267.) Plaintiff claims that 

Drs. Label and Jacob are not experts in forensic medicine or epidemiology, and as such, 

have improperly offered opinions criticizing Dr. Freeman’s opinions. (Doc. 267 at 1, 5-6.) 

Plaintiff also argues that, even if both physicians are qualified, both cannot testify because 

the Scheduling Order limits each party to only one independent expert per issue. (Doc. 267 

at 6.) Defendant argues that these experts may properly criticize Dr. Freeman’s opinions 

by showing that he failed to account for certain risk factors. (Doc. 287 at 1-2.) Defendant 

also argues that Plaintiff’s concerns address the weight of the testimony, not admissibility. 

(Id. at 4.) Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s cumulative testimony argument is 

premature. (Id.)

Under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), Fed. R. Civ. P., parties may offer testimony “intended 

solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another 

party.” Id. A rebuttal expert critiques methodologies and opinion of the other party’s expert

to identify flaws in that expert’s opinion. Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., 

829 F. Supp. 2d 802, 834-35 (D. Minn. 2011). As such, a rebuttal expert’s report and 

testimony “are subject to exclusion if they are not proper rebuttal.” People v. Kinder 

Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1191 (S.D. Cal. 2016).

Here, as explained later in Part III.B.6 of this Order, Dr. Freeman is excluded as an 

expert because his report is unreliable. Therefore, the need for Drs. Label’s and Jacob’s 

rebuttal of Dr. Freeman’s life expectancy and co-morbidity testimony no longer exists. The 

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Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion to exclude life expectancy and co-morbidity 

testimony (Doc. 267).

4. General Surgeon Qualifications

Plaintiff retained Dr. Kamran Samakar, a general surgeon, to rebut Dr. John David 

Nye, a general surgeon retained by Defendant. Defendant attempts to use Drs. Label and 

Jacob to rebut Dr. Samakar’s testimony. Plaintiff seeks to exclude Dr. Label and Dr. Jacob 

from opining about the general qualifications of a surgeon under Rule 702. (Doc. 268.) 

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Label, a neurologist, and Dr. Jacob, an otolaryngologist, are not 

qualified to counter Dr. Samakar’s opinions about Dr. Nye’s testimony because they lack 

the training and knowledge of general surgeons’ standards of care. (Id.) Defendant argues 

that Drs. Label and Jacob are qualified to offer opinions about the general capabilities of 

other doctors. (Doc. 284 at 2.) Specifically, Drs. Label and Jacob do not opine about 

general surgery, but instead about the qualifications of all physicians to review and 

understand a patient’s medical records, evaluate a patient’s physical functioning, and 

research medical conditions. (Id. at 2-3.)

The Court agrees that Drs. Label and Jacob, as physicians, are qualified to opine 

about the medical field and the qualifications of another physician. See Doe, 971 F.2d at

385. Drs. Label and Jacob, however, are not qualified to opine about Dr. Samakar’s 

opinions as to Dr. Nye’s qualifications because they did not review any of Dr. Nye’s 

testimony. To critique Dr. Samakar’s opinion, Drs. Label and Jacob must also be familiar 

with Dr. Nye’s testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (“the testimony is based on sufficient facts 

or data”). In Drs. Label’s and Jacob’s deposition, they both admit to (1) not having any

knowledge about Dr. Nye’s particular qualifications, (2) not reading Dr. Nye’s deposition, 

and (3) not knowing the standards of general surgeons. (Doc. 268-2 at 4-8; Doc. 268-4 at 

3-7.) The Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion to exclude testimony on standards of a 

general surgeon (Doc. 268).

5. Insurance Policy Interpretations

Plaintiff seeks to exclude Drs. Label and Jacob from opining about what the 

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insurance policy requires. (Doc. 269.) Plaintiff argues that, because interpretation of the 

insurance policy is the crux of whether Plaintiff qualifies for the long-term care insurance, 

Drs. Label and Jacob as non-insurance policy experts should not opine on this legal issue. 

(Doc. 269 at 1-2.) Defendant claims that Drs. Label and Jacob will not offer legal opinions 

about insurance policies, but instead, offer testimony about whether Plaintiff can perform 

activities of daily living (“ADLs”). (Doc 283.)

Expert witnesses cannot give opinions about their legal conclusions because 

“instructing the jury as to the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the 

court.” Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys. Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir.

2004)). Courts typically prohibit experts from interpreting the law and advising how the 

law should apply to the facts of a case because this testimony can circumvent the factfinder’s decision-making capability. Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 352 F. 

Supp. 2d. 1037, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2005). Insurance policy interpretation is a matter of law for 

the Court, meaning that expert “testimony cannot be used to provide legal meaning or 

interpret the policies as written.” McHugh v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 164 F.3d 451, 454 

(9th Cir. 1999).

Both physicians used the insurance policy to arrive at their conclusions. In his 

report, Dr. Label used the insurance policy handbook to define ADLs and identify the types 

of activities he believed fell under that definition. (Doc. 269-1 at 4, 9, 11.) In his deposition, 

Dr. Label opines that, under the policy, Plaintiff would “require assistance with two of her 

ADLs for at least three months in order to qualify.” (Doc. 269-2 at 7.) He also states that 

Plaintiff does not qualify in part “because she didn’t need any assistance with any of the 

six ADLs[,] . . . [and] there were no consistent days.” (Id. at 8-9.)

Dr. Jacob refers to the long-term care policy to develop a definition of “substantial 

assistance” and explains what he thinks falls under that definition. (Doc. 269-4 at 4, 7, 35, 

38, 40-41.) In his report, Dr. Jacob opines that “[Plaintiff’s] level of function on 

asymptomatic or hypo-symptomatic days does not require her to have ‘substantial 

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assistance’ whether ‘hands-on assistance’ or ‘stand-by assistance’ to perform [her ADLs].” 

(Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original).) Dr. Jacob further opines that “needing assistance from a 

walker does not make her eligible for benefits under her long-term care policy. The 

assistance needed is ‘substantial assistance’ either ‘hands-on’ or ‘stand-by,’ from a person 

[and] not a device.” (Id. at 35.) In his deposition, Dr. Jacob further explains that “his 

understanding is that she needs to have —needs that assistance for 90 days” and that “she 

did not need a 90-day consecutive hands-on or standby assistance for that ADL, and, 

therefore, she would not qualify for benefits.” (Doc. 269-5 at 5.)

The Court precludes Drs. Label and Jacob from offering any expert opinions that 

interpret the Plaintiff’s insurance policy or that her health conditions do not qualify her for 

benefits under the policy. See Maffei v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 12 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding exclusion of insurance expert’s interpretation of “hostile fire” under the insurance 

policy was proper because the testimony was an unsupported legal conclusion); see also 

Chale v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although testimony 

from medical experts can help inform the legal decision maker about the nature of these 

afflictions, it does not dictate the proper legal interpretation of this policy term.”). 

Drs. Label’s and Jacob’s testimony shall be limited to Plaintiff’s medical conditions and 

how these affect her abilities, but they must omit discussion about how this affects her 

ability to secure insurance benefits or relay their opinions using policy terms.

The Court therefore grants in part, as discussed herein, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude 

this testimony on policy interpretations (Doc 269).

6. Dr. Michael D. Freeman

Plaintiff retained Dr. Michael D. Freeman, an epidemiology expert, to opine about 

Plaintiff’s life expectancy. Defendant moves to exclude his opinions and testimony for 

three reasons. (Doc. 260.) First, Dr. Freeman “relies on insufficient data and ignores 

[Plaintiff’s] specific health conditions and risk factors that impact her life expectancy.” (Id.

at 2.) Second, Dr. Freeman based his opinion on outdated life tables from 2019. (Id.) And 

finally, his testimony would not help a trier of fact because it simply restates verbatim the 

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average life expectancy shown in the 2019 CDC life table. (Id.)

Defendant does not dispute Dr. Freeman’s qualifications as an expert, but disputes 

the methodology used in his report. Courts find expert testimony admissible when the 

witness employs reliable principles and methods and applies those principles and methods

to the facts of the case. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see also Fed. R. Evid. 702. In his report, 

Dr. Freeman opines that Plaintiff is expected to live to be 85.4 years old because she does 

not have any co-morbidities that would affect her life expectancy outside of what an 

average person faces. (Doc. 260-1 at 1, 3-5.) Defendant argues that Dr. Freeman’s report 

is unreliable because he failed to address Plaintiff’s artery disease, hypertension, obesity, 

opioid use disorder, and other risk factors that would affect her life expectancy. (Doc. 260 

at 8-9.) Defendant also argues that Dr. Freeman materially changed his opinion from 

“Plaintiff has no co-morbidities” to “Plaintiff has no co-morbidities that would affect her 

life expectancy.” (Doc. 307 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that Dr. Freeman addressed in his 

deposition how these other chronic conditions impact life expectancy. (Doc. 292 at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Freeman is the only expert able to opine about life 

expectancy to the jury. (Id. at 9-10.)

The Court finds Dr. Freeman’s report unreliable because it fails to explain in detail 

his methodology for including Plaintiff’s various conditions into the calculation for 

Plaintiff’s life expectancy. See, e.g., Noon v. Carnival Corp., No. 18-23181-CIV, 2019 WL 

5784689, at *4-*5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2019) (excluding expert’s life expectancy calculation 

based on government life expectancy tables when the report failed to explain how it 

accounted for patient’s COPD and not her “tobacco abuse, hyperlipidemia, Type 2 

diabetes, migraines, and asthma”); Rinker v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-23154-CIV, 2012 WL 

37381, at *1-*2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2012) (excluding expert’s life expectancy calculation that 

concluded 62-year-old patient’s life expectancy would be equal to that of a health 62-yearold woman when the report failed to explain how it accounted for her stage three colon 

cancer diagnosis).

Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement “ensures the reliability and relevancy of expert 

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testimony” by “mak[ing] certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon 

professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of 

intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho 

Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Dr. Freeman’s report does not 

satisfy this standard. Like the expert reports in Noon and Rinker, Dr. Freeman’s report does 

not provide a detailed description of his methodology to explain how his calculation of 

Plaintiff’s life expectancy differs from the average life expectancy from the 2019 CDC life 

tables. In his report, Dr. Freeman concludes that Plaintiff’s life expectancy is 85.4 years 

old, which is “equivalent to the national average, and is likely conservative given the lack 

of significant comorbidities associated with decreased life expectancy” and “despite her 

Meinere’s disease.” (Doc. 260-1 at 1.) His report identifies Meniere’s disease, Chiari 

malformation, hearing loss, tinnitus, decreased range of motion in her cervical spine, and 

ulnar neuropathy as “potentially relevant diagnoses, with regard to [Plaintiff’s] life 

expectancy.” (Id. at 3). Dr. Freeman’s report, however, only explains how Meniere’s 

disease affects her life expectancy and does not detail any others. (See id. at 1-6.)

Not until his deposition does Dr. Freeman provide detail about his methodology. He 

explains that he used Plaintiff’s medical records to identify Plaintiff’s diagnosed diseases 

and the lack of chronic conditions factored into his assessment. (Doc 292-4 at 10-11.) He 

also explains that Plaintiff’s hypertension does not impact life expectancy because it is 

controlled (rather than uncontrolled), which is why he excluded it from the calculation. (Id.

at 3-4.) In addition, Dr. Freeman opines that large proportions of the population in 

Plaintiff’s age group already have conditions such as obesity, so he did not reduce the life 

expectancy from that of the general tables because the general calculation accounts for this. 

(Id.) Parties, however, under Rule 26(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., may not “cure deficient expert 

reports by supplementing them with later deposition testimony.” Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, 

Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Goodman v. Staples The Off. Superstore, 

LLC 644 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]ermitting treating physicians to testify in all 

circumstances without providing expert reports would circumvent the policies underlying 

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Rule 26(a)(2)(B)” (citing Fielden v. CSX Transp., Inc., 482 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2007))). 

Even though Dr. Freeman is the only expert with the expertise to opine about life 

expectancy, his report fails to meet to reliability standards under Daubert.

The Court therefore grants Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. Freeman (Doc. 260).

7. Mark Reiser, PhD

Plaintiff engaged Dr. Mark Reiser to opine about the damages owed to Plaintiff. 

Defendant moves to exclude Dr. Reiser’s opinions and testimony in its entirety. (Doc. 260.) 

First, Defendant argues that Dr. Reiser’s report fails to meet the requirements of Rule 26 

because his report does not provide a “standard formula” nor a basis for his opinions. (Doc. 

260 at 11-12.) Second, Defendant argues that Dr. Reiser’s calculation is unreliable because 

it is based off Dr. Freeman’s life expectancy calculation. (Id. at 13.) Finally, Defendant 

argues that Dr. Reiser’s opinions are independently inadmissible because his alternative 

future benefit calculations from ages 85.4 to 95 are arbitrary and speculative. (Id. at 13-

14.) Plaintiff responds that no prejudice exists for any Rule 26 violations because 

Defendant failed to raise the issue sooner. (Doc. 292 at 12-13.) Plaintiff, however, agrees 

to withdraw the projections from ages 85.4 to 90. (Id. at 13-14.).

The Court agrees that Dr. Reiser’s two-page report fails to provide the detail 

required for a reliable report. Plaintiff admits that she failed to include Dr. Reiser’s 

schedule for past-due benefits and schedule for future benefit calculations to the original 

two-page report. As such, the late disclosure of the scheduling tables, violating Rule 26, 

means that these tables shall be excluded. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (“[i]f a party fails to 

provide information or identify a witness as required under Rule 26(a) . . . the party is not 

allowed to use that information”). Even though Dr. Reiser’s report does not contain the 

schedule tables, his report explains his calculation by identifying the different variables 

and adjustments. (Id.) Nonetheless, because Dr. Reiser’s calculations rely on Dr. 

Freeman’s unreliable life-expectancy calculation, the Court finds Dr. Reiser’s report also 

unreliable. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152 (stating that Daubert’s gatekeeping 

requirement “ensure[s] the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony” by “mak[ing] 

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certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 

experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes 

the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”) 

The Court therefore grants Defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Reiser’s opinion 

(Doc. 260.).

8. Dan Heffez, M.D.

Plaintiff retained Dr. Dan Heffez, an expert in neurosurgery, to rebut to Defendant’s 

Drs. Lorne Label’s and Abraham Jacob’s conclusions and provide his own opinion about 

the cause of Plaintiff’s medical symptoms. (Doc. 291.) Defendant seeks to exclude Dr. 

Heffez’s opinions and testimony because (1) his report contains speculative opinions and 

vague statements, (2) he does not follow his own prescribed methodologies, and (3) he 

improperly discloses a new opinion about Plaintiff’s cervical stenosis. (Doc. 261.) Plaintiff 

argues that Dr. Heffez’s expert opinions fall within the type of medical opinions routinely 

admitted in federal court. (Doc. 291.)

a. Report’s Reliability

Defendant does not dispute that Dr. Heffez is qualified as a medical expert. Instead, 

Defendant argues that Dr. Heffez’s report and testimony are unreliable. Specifically, 

Defendant claims that Dr. Heffez’s opinion about Plaintiff’s Chiari malformation diagnosis 

is speculative because he fails to rely on his own published methodology and uses “vague 

and speculative opinions.” (Doc. 261 at 4-7.) 

When an expert’s testimony relies heavily on the expert’s knowledge and 

experience, rather than scientific methodology, the Daubert factors are not applicable. 

United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000). “Despite the importance of 

evidence-based medicine, much of medical decision-making relies on judgment—a 

process that is difficult to quantify or even to assess qualitatively.” Primiano v. Cook, 598 

F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine 3 (Dennis 

L. Kasper et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005)). A court therefore may admit medical expert testimony 

“if physicians would accept it as useful and reliable” and the medical knowledge provides 

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a “reasonable opinion.” United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 

2006).

Defendant’s argument that Dr. Heffez failed to use his own “methodology” to 

evaluate Plaintiff is misguided. Dr. Heffez previously conducted a peer-reviewed study 

where he talked to and physically examined the patients, in addition to reviewing their 

medical records. (Doc. 291-3 at 6-7.) Dr. Heffez is not required to replicate this 

methodology. Medical experts may rely on their own clinical expertise to draw conclusions 

after reviewing a patient’s medical records. See McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 710 F.Supp. 

2d 1092, 1137-38 (D. Or. 2010). Dr. Heffez report explains that he reviewed Plaintiff’s 

medical records, Drs. Label’s and Jacob’s reports, and identified a number of other expert 

reports, declarations, and depositions before drafting his report. (Doc. 261-1 at 2.) He states

that he formulated his opinions using his “education, training, and experience as a boardcertified neurological surgeon with specific expertise with Chiari [m]alformations.” (Id.) 

Using his experience and knowledge as a physician, Dr. Heffez provides detailed 

explanations in the report and during the deposition for his findings. For example, he opines

that the MRI imaging of the “axial view through the plane of the foramen magnum” shows 

brain stem compression and “[b]ased on the brain stem compression evident on her MRI 

imaging studies, [Plaintiff’s] Chiari malformation” can explain her symptoms. (Id. at 2, 5.) 

In the deposition, Dr. Heffez states again that “[t]he only images that can show [brain stem 

compression] are the axial images through the plan of the foramen magum, both T1 and 

T2.” (Doc. 291-3 at 2.) The Court therefore finds Dr. Heffez’s opinion reliable.

b. Cervical Stenosis

Defendant claims that Dr. Heffez offers a new opinion, rather than a rebuttal 

opinion, that Plaintiff has cervical stenosis. (Doc. 261 at 7-8.) Defendant also argues that 

this new opinion is an untimely disclosure, violating the initial expert disclosure deadline 

of November 18, 2022. (Id.)

Defendant misconstrues Dr. Heffez’s explanation for providing the cervical stenosis 

opinion. Dr. Heffez’s report is a rebuttal to Drs. Label and Jacob. Dr. Label’s report from 

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December 21, 2022, which states, “Based on my review of the materials provided, 

[Plaintiff] shows symptoms of . . . [d]egenerative cervical spine disease with foraminal 

stenosis without myelopathy” that does not require the need for assistance with ADLs. 

(Doc. 291-5 at 7-8.) Dr. Heffez’s rebuttal report from February 22, 2023, provides a 

contrary opinion that Plaintiff “has cervical stenosis, which can contribute to vertigo and 

balance disturbances in conjunction with the Chiarai Malformation,” which together the 

“impact [to the Plaintiff] can be additive.” (Doc. 261-1 at 5.) Dr. Heffez states that his 

opinion regarding cervical stenosis his own opinion but that it “is completely contrary to 

[Drs. Label and Jacob].” (Id.) In addition, Defendant had an opportunity to respond to 

Dr. Heffez’s opinion. Dr. Label testifies that he read Dr. Heffez’s report and could have 

replied to Dr. Heffez’s cervical stenosis conclusion then but did not do so. (Doc. 291-2 at 

4, 6-10.) The Court finds that because Dr. Heffez’s opinion rebuts Dr. Label’s opinion, it 

is not an untimely expert disclosure.

The Court therefore denies Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. Heffez (Doc. 261).

9. Dr. Constantine Moschonas

Plaintiff disclosed Dr. Constantine Moschonas, her treating neurologist, as a nonretained expert witness. Defendant seeks to exclude the opinions and testimony of Dr. 

Moschonas. (Doc. 262.) At the time of the declaration, Dr. Moschonas had been treating 

Plaintiff with respect to her Meniere’s disease for almost fourteen years. (Doc. 262-1 at 3.) 

Defendant does not contest that Dr. Moschonas is a qualified expert. Instead, Defendant 

argues Dr. Moschonas’ opinions about (1) Plaintiff’s ability to perform ADLs, (2) the 

Plaintiff’s treatment, and (3) Plaintiff’s Chiari malformation exacerbating the effects of her 

other health conditions are speculative, unsupported, and contradicted by his own medical 

records and deposition testimony. (Doc. 262 at 4, 5, 7.)

a. Performing ADLs

Defendant argues that Dr. Moschonas’ opinion that Plaintiff’s fear prevents her 

from performing her ADLs is speculative and contradicted by evidence. (Id. at 4-5.) 

Defendant claims that these conclusions are speculative because (1) Dr. Moschonas’ 

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treatment records do not discuss Plaintiff’s fear of falling, and (2) a video surveillance 

shows that Plaintiff can lift cases of soda without holding onto her walker. (Id. at 5.) 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant mischaracterizes Dr. Moschonas’ testimony about 

Plaintiff’s fear of falling. (Doc. 293 at 5.)

“Despite the importance of evidence-based medicine, much of decision-making 

relies on judgment—a process that is difficult to quantify or even assess qualitatively.” 

Primiano, 598 F.3d at 565 (quoting Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine 3 (Dennis 

L. Kasper et al. eds., 16th ed. 2005)). Physicians are expected to use their knowledge and 

experience to evaluate a patient’s symptoms along with uncertainties inherent in medicine 

to “make a sound judgment.” Id. Therefore, medical expert testimony should be admitted 

if other physicians would find it “useful and reliable but it need not be conclusive because 

medical knowledge is often uncertain.” Id. at 566 (quoting Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 

at 655). When the foundation is sufficient, a jury, rather than a judge, decides the expert’s 

credibility. Id. at 566.

Dr. Moschonas clearly opines in his declaration and deposition that Plaintiff needs 

substantial assistance with ADLs when she experiences vertigo. (Doc. 262-1 at 2-3; Doc. 

293-1 at 2-3.) In his declaration, he also states that Plaintiff “does need hands-on assistance 

with bathing and dressing, and she needs stand-by assistance (which will become handson assistance depending on her symptoms that day) with continence, toileting, and 

transferring.” (Doc. 262-1 at 3.) Dr. Moschonas supports these conclusions. He bases his 

conclusions on his personal observations from treating Plaintiff and experience treating 

other patients with Meniere’s disease. (Id. at 1, 3.) Dr. Moschonas opines that these patients 

struggle with ADLs because of either a conscious or subconscious fear of falling. 

(Doc. 293-1 at 4.) He explains that on asymptomatic days that Plaintiff can “mechanically” 

dress herself but that “cognitively” she may struggle because “her brain won’t allow her 

to” as she may be afraid to fall. (Doc. 262-2 at 12-13.) He relied on his experience as a 

neurologist to reach this conclusion. (Doc. 293-1 at 4.)

Altogether, Dr. Moschonas’ declaration and deposition testimony are reliable and 

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relevant because he relies on his professional experience and treatment of Plaintiff to 

determine her ability to perform ADLs. See, e.g., McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 

(holding physician may draw inferences regarding causes of a condition “such as patient 

age and surgical error from the medical literature and his extensive experience”). A court’s 

gatekeeping function under Daubert is to ensure the reliability and relevance of expert 

testimony, “whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience.” 

Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.

Defendant’s argument about the video surveillance ultimately challenges the 

credibility of Dr. Moschonas conclusions, rather than the reliability of his expertise. See 

Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2014)

(“Remaining issues regarding the correctness of [an expert’s] opinion, as opposed to its 

relevancy and reliability, are a matter of weight, not admissibility.”). “Shaky but admissible 

evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the 

burden of proof, not exclusion.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 564.

b. Treatment

Defendant argues that Dr. Moschonas “provides the baseless opinion that Plaintiff’s 

‘chronic dizziness and vertigo’ are ‘incurable’ symptoms.” (Doc. 262 at 5.) Defendant 

contends that Dr. Moschonas’ opinion is contradicted by medical records and Plaintiff’s 

own expert, neurologist Dr. Heffez, that a treatment to cure Plaintiff’s disorders exists. (Id.) 

Defendant uses Dr. Moschonas statement that “we try noninvasive things to help people to 

cure and stay stable” to claim that his testimony is contradictory, false, and misleading. 

(Doc. 262 at 6 (emphasis added).)

As discussed, physicians are expected to use their knowledge and experience to 

evaluate a patient’s symptoms and conditions to reach their conclusions. Primiano, 598 

F.3d at 565. Dr. Moschonas states that since 2008, Plaintiff’s conditions are only able to

be managed, because “they are incurable.” (Doc. 262-1 at 3.) In other words, for this 

specific patient the conditions are incurable. During the deposition, Dr. Moschonas 

explains that he prefers noninvasive treatment methodologies. (Doc. 262-2 at 7-9.) 

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Specifically, he avoids using a middle ear neurotoxin injection because that kills the nerve

and explains that some treatments like surgery may cure but also make symptoms worse. 

(Doc. 262-2 at 7-9.) Dr. Heffez does state that Plaintiff would be a good candidate for 

surgery, but he also does not guarantee a cure. (Doc. 262-3 at 3-4.)

“[M]uch of medical decision-making relies on judgment.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 

565. Courts admit medical expert testimony if other physicians would find it “useful and 

reliable.” Id. Dr. Moschonas’ declaration and deposition testimony are reliable and relevant 

because he relies on his professional experience and treatment of Plaintiff’s conditions. 

Defendant may instead critique Dr. Moschonas’ treatment of Plaintiff through “vigorous 

cross-examination” and “presentation of contrary evidence.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

c. Chiari Malformation

Defendant argues that Dr. Moschonas changed his opinion from Plaintiff’s Chiari 

malformation has “no clinical significance” to Plaintiff’s Chiari malformation does impact 

Plaintiff’s symptoms. (Doc. 262 at 7-8.) Defendant argues that Dr. Moschonas’ testimony 

is unsupported by his medical records, claiming that Dr. Moschonas should have produced 

a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report because his opinions did not form during his course of treatment 

of Plaintiff. (Id.)

Rule 26(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires parties to disclose expert witnesses and, for 

retained or specially employed experts, further disclose the expert’s written report, which

must conform to the requirements under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Treating physicians, unlike 

retained medical experts, are not bound by the written expert report requirements under 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B), but only if their testimony is limited to the opinions formed during 

treatment of their patient. Goodman, 644 F.3d at 826.

Dr. Moschonas’ declaration states that Plaintiff’s symptoms of “vertigo, dizziness, 

loss of balance, nausea, and vomiting” are “likely roughly double of what a typical 

Meniere’s-only patient would experience” because she also has Chiari malformation. (Doc 

262-1 at 3.) Dr. Moschonas documented that Plaintiff’s Chiari malformation was 

“clinically insignificant” in 2008, when she first became his patient. (See Doc. 293-1 at 9.) 

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During his deposition, Dr. Moschonas explains that in 2008, after Plaintiff had surgery, her 

Chiari malformation symptoms were “clinically insignificant” because she was 

asymptomatic at that time. (Id. at 14-15.) Defendant claims that Dr. Moschonas offers new 

opinions for the purpose of litigation. (Doc. 262 at 8.) However, in the deposition after 

reading aloud one of his treatment notes, Dr. Moschonas further explains that when 

Plaintiff experiences symptoms from Chiari malformation these can impact her Meiner’s 

disease-related symptoms. (Id. at 7-9, 14-16.) 

Dr. Moschonas took what he personally observed during Plaintiff’s course of 

treatment and drew on his knowledge and experience as a neurologist to reach his 

conclusion that Plaintiff’s health is also impacted by her Chiari malformation. See, e.g., 

Alsadi v. Intel Corp., No. CV-16-03738-PHX-DGC, 2019 WL 4849482 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 

2019) (permitting a treating physician to only opinions he formed during his course of the 

patient’s treatment and not to outside scientific conclusions about what caused Plaintiff’s 

injuries). Defendant may test the sufficiency of these opinions and attempt to discredit them 

at trial using its own evidence and expert witnesses. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

Plaintiff also objects to Defense Counsel Raina Shipman’s declaration in support of 

Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Moschonas’ opinions as inadmissible. (Doc. 293 at 10-

12.) Plaintiff argues Ms. Shipman does not have personal medical knowledge or experience 

to interpret the medical records and reach conclusions. (Id.) An attorney may submit a 

declaration as evidence to support a motion but it “must be made upon personal knowledge 

and sets forth fact[s] that would [be] admissible in evidence if the attorney were testifying 

at trial.” Clark v. Cnty. of Tulare, 755 F.Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Ms. 

Shipman declares that “nothing in these treatment records indicat[e] that Plaintiff is unable 

to perform any ADLs due to a ‘fear’ of falling.” (Doc 265-5 at 2.) Given that Ms. Shipman 

is neither a physician nor does not have any medical experience, the Court agrees that Ms. 

Shipman’s declaration is inadmissible. The Court did not consider Ms. Shipman’s 

declaration in its determination.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. 

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Constantine Moschonas (Doc. 262).

10. Elliott Flood

Plaintiff engaged Elliott Flood to opine about Defendant’s background information 

and financial health, its compliance with generally accepted industry customs, standards, 

and practices, its own employees’ and expert’s testimony related to industry standards, and 

the institutional root causes of Defendant’s alleged noncompliance with claims handling

industry practices. (Doc. 263.) Defendant moves to exclude Mr. Flood’s opinions for 

offering (1) improper legal conclusions, (2) Defendant’s and its employees’ state of mind 

conclusions, (3) irrelevant opinions, (4) Defendant’s financial incentives, financial 

reserves, and net worth, (5) root cause analysis, and (6) claims handling practices. (Id.)

a. Legal Conclusions

Expert witnesses cannot give opinions in the form of legal conclusions. See 

Nationwide Transp. Fin., 523 F.3d at 1058. Courts prohibit experts from interpreting the 

law and advising how the law should apply to the facts of a case because this testimony 

can circumvent the fact-finder’s decision-making capability. Pinal Creek Grp., 352 F. 

Supp. 2d. at 1042. Mr. Flood offers several opinions that constitute legal conclusions: (1) 

“Prudential lacked a good faith belief that [Plaintiff] committed fraud” (Doc. 263-1 at 20); 

(2) “[I]t would be futile for [Plaintiff] to file a new claim” (id. at 21); and (3) Defendant 

engaged in “a severe form of cherry picking, which is a severe form of misrepresentation 

because it creates a false impression” (Doc. 263-2 at 17). The Court agrees that these 

statements amount to legal conclusions. As an expert, Mr. Flood may address the factual 

question of whether an insurer deviated from the customs, practices, and standards of the 

insurance industry, but not the ultimate legal issue of whether Defendant breached the 

insurance agreement or acted in bad faith. See Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1016-17 (concluding 

that an expert witness was permitted to testify about insurance industry standards and not 

directly about legal conclusions was proper).

b. State of Mind

Defendant argues that Mr. Flood offers multiple opinions regarding Defendant and 

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Defendant’s employees’ state of mind. (Doc. 263 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that the Court need 

not rule on these statements now but instead reserve this issue for trial. (Doc. 290 at 8.)

Defendant identifies the following statements made by Mr. Flood either in his report 

or deposition testimony as improper state of mind conclusions: 

(1) “[D]eviations from industry practices for good faith claim 

handling are institutionalized at Prudential as a company 

strategy to address the unprofitability of the abandoned line of 

business” (Doc. 263-1 at 17); 

(2) “The likelihood of future reserve increases is high. This will 

further add to the incentive for management at Prudential to 

push the [Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (“FWA”)] strategy” (id. at 

19); 

(3) Prudential attempted to “intimidate” Mrs. Finkelstein 

through its [Corporate Investigation Department] investigation 

and referral to the [Department of Insurance] (See Doc. 263-2 

at 22-26); 

(4) Prudential demonstrated “utter indifference” to the effect 

the referral to the [Department of Insurance] could have, 

instead caring about its financial objectives (See id. at 29-30);

(5) FWA personnel “are looking at their mission is to get just 

the biggest dollar claims they can” (id. at 32); 

(6) Prudential “consciously designed [the] FWA initiative to 

focus on the biggest saving possible” (id. at 33);

(7)“And all the evidence points in the direction of what they 

care about is the bottom line. They’re indifferent to the rights 

of the insureds” (id.);

(8) Prudential “knew or should have known” the fraud referral 

to the [Department of Insurance] was “sloppy, unsupported, 

[and would not] go anywhere” (id. at 34); 

(9) The director of Prudential’s FWA program was “looking 

for a profit center” and “looking to run this [] profitably” (id.

at 35); 

(10) Prudential is “indifferent to the normal standards for 

fraud” and “the strategy is to make money in the line of 

business that they abandoned in 2012” (id.);

(11) “[T]he company has this very strong emphasis on profits 

with no regard for the interest of the insured and not being 

falsely accused of fraud” (id. at 41); 

(12) The director of Prudential’s FWA program is “perceiving 

his job as what’s important about his job is how much money 

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he saves on claims” (id. at 43); 

(13) The director of the FWA program “understands his 

mission . . . is to deny as many claims as possible” (id. at 45);

(14) “[I]f [Prudential] had a good faith belief she was a fraud, 

they would not have put her on waiver [of] premium.” (id. at 

48.).

(See Doc. 263 at 5-6.)

“Courts routinely exclude as impermissible expert testimony as to intent, motive or 

state of mind.” McGee v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. CV-17-04024-PHX-DGC, 2021 WL 

6070590, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2021) (quoting Siring v. Oregon State Bd. Of Higher 

Edu., 927 F.Supp. 2d 1069, 1077 (D. Or. 2013)). Permitting such expert testimony about 

state of mind “would be merely substituting the expert’s judgment for the jury’s and would 

not be helpful.” Id. The Court agrees that these conclusions from Mr. Flood amount to 

improper state of mind testimony that experts are precluded from opining. See, e.g., Barten 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CV-12-00399-TUC-CKJ, 2015 WL 11111309, at 

*3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2015) (prohibiting expert from “testify[ing] as to common sense, state

of mind, narrative facts of which he has no personal knowledge, or credibility”). Thus, 

these statements and similar state of mind conclusions made by Mr. Flood shall be 

excluded.4

c. Irrelevant Opinions

Defendant argues that Mr. Flood’s opinion that Defendant should not have reported 

Plaintiff’s claim to the Arizona Department of Insurance is irrelevant and should be 

excluded. (Doc. 263 at 7.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s claim regarding relevance is 

better served for a motion in limine rather than a Daubert motion. (Doc. 290 at 10.) Here, 

Defendant’s arguments do not challenge the expertise and reliability of Mr. Flood but the 

relevancy of this specific testimony. The Court declines to address the relevance of Mr. 

Flood’s testimony about the Department of Insurance claim at this juncture. Defendant may 

4

In her response to this motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s insurance expert Ms. 

Mueller “made several missteps” and similar improper state of mind conclusions. 

(Doc. 290 at 7-8.) Plaintiff did not move to exclude Ms. Muller’s testimony, so the Court 

will not address these claims here.

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assert its objection as to its relevance as this case gets closer to trial.

d. Financial Incentives and Reserves 

Defendant argues that Mr. Flood’s testimony regarding financial incentives and 

reserves is irrelevant and based on insufficient facts and data. (Doc. 263 at 11- 12.) Plaintiff 

argues that the financial incentives and reserves are relevant because these will show that 

the financial pressure changed how Defendant managed long-term care claims. (Doc. 290 

at 10-11.)

To meet the requirements of Rule 702, an expert opinion must rely on sufficient 

facts or data and result from the application of reliable principles and methods. The expert’s 

opinion must fit the case such that it is relevant. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-95. The Court 

agrees that Mr. Flood does not provide sufficient facts and data to support his testimony 

about Defendant’s financial incentives and reserves. Mr. Flood opines that he reviewed the 

performance evaluations of Stephen Dube and Geoffrey Camlin, members of Defendant’s 

fraud, waste, and abuse team, and that it is not industry practice to offer raises or bonuses 

to reduce claims payments. (Doc. 263-1 at 14-15.) In his report, instead of providing 

specific examples tying raises and bonus payment to reduced claims payment, Mr. Flood 

provides only examples of Mr. Dube and Mr. Camlin performing their jobs. (Id.) Nothing 

in Mr. Flood’s report or testimony provides specific examples of financial incentives given 

to Mr. Dube and Mr. Camlin, meaning that Mr. Flood’s testimony that financial incentives 

exist is speculative. In addition, Mr. Flood opines that he does not know the actual reserve 

for any claims because none has been produced in this case. (See Doc. 263-2 at 54; Doc. 

78 at 2.) Thus, Mr. Flood’s testimony about Defendant providing financial incentives and 

its financial reserves is precluded because it relies on insufficient facts and data. See Friend 

v. Tim Mfg. Co., 422 F.Supp. 2d 1079, 1081 (D. Ariz. 2005) (“An expert’s testimony may

be excluded where it is based on subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation which is no 

more than unreliable ipse dixit guesswork.”).

e. Net Worth

Defendant argues that Mr. Flood intends to offer an outdated, unauthenticated 

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financial statement to opine on Defendant’s net worth with a “simple mathematical 

calculation that anyone with basic knowledge of arithmetic can make.” (Doc. 263. at 16.) 

Plaintiff claims that these are statutory financial statements that Mr. Flood will use “to 

inform the jury what this document is, what it shows, and how it leads to [Defendant’s]

reported net worth.” (Doc. 290 at 17.) The Court agrees that an expert is not required to 

opine about the net worth calculation, as “[a] jury does not need help with simple 

mathematics as to which there is no dispute.” See United States v. Colorado City, Arizona, 

No. 3:12-cv-8123-HRH, 2015 WL 11163601, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2015). Thus, Mr. Flood is 

precluded from opining about the net worth of Defendant.

f. Root Cause Analysis

Defendant argues that the root cause opinion in Mr. Flood’s report should be 

excluded because it is vague, confusing, and unhelpful. (Doc. 263 at 13.) Plaintiff claims 

that Mr. Flood cites “The Institute of Internal Auditors” as the source for the methodology. 

(Doc. 290 at 13.)

The Court finds the “root cause” opinion in Mr. Flood’s report vague and without 

any methodology, analysis, or even a coherent reason for the “cause” of “defects in insurer 

internal controls.” (Doc. 263-1 at 9.) Mr. Flood does footnote that “[t]he Institute of 

Internal Auditors has a discussion of root cause analysis at IIA Practice Advisory 2320-2: 

Root Cause Analysis.” (Id.) However, he does not explain how he applies that methodology 

to reach his conclusion. The only “root cause” Mr. Flood identifies is “the root cause of the 

problem is excessive focus of company strategy on termination of claims in the LTC 

Legacy Business, impacting claims like [Plaintiff’s].” (Id. at 17.) As gatekeepers, trial 

judges make a preliminary assessment about the admissibility of expert testimony, which 

requires them to assess the reliability of the evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. Given the 

lack of explanation about how Mr. Flood reached his root cause conclusion, this evidence 

shall be excluded.

g. Claims Handling Procedures and Practices

Defendant argues that Mr. Flood should not be permitted to discuss four exhibits 

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attached to his expert report, specifically Exhibits 4 through 7, claiming that it cannot 

ascertain what opinions Mr. Flood will offer based of these exhibits. (Doc. 263 at 14-15.) 

Plaintiff claims that Mr. Flood used these exhibits to support his opinion about insurance 

industry standards. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff argues that these exhibits were submitted to comply 

with Rule 23(a)(2)(B) to provide any “facts or data considered by the witness” and “any 

exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them.” (Doc. 290 at 15.)

Rule 26(a)(2)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires that the expert report include “facts or 

data considered by the witness” and “any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support 

them.” The exhibits define and outline insurance industry terms, roles, and processes. (See 

Doc. 263-1 at 24-98.) Mr. Flood includes these to provide a “basic understanding of the 

insurance business.” (Id. at 6-7.) These exhibits support Mr. Flood’s testimony about 

insurance claims handing and industry practices. Exhibit 4 gives a brief overview defining 

key terms and flow charts and diagrams that Mr. Flood may use during his testimony. (Id.

at 24-34.) Exhibit 5 provides peer-reviewed excerpts from a textbook that summarizes

claims handling customs, practices, and standards. (Id.at 36-63.) With Exhibit 6, Mr. Flood 

identifies examples of good faith use of independent medical examinations from a 

textbook. (Id. 64-78.) Exhibit 7 offers background information about special investigation 

units and is cited as support in Mr. Flood’s report. (See id. 6-7, 11, 79-98.) As an insurance 

industry expert, Mr. Flood may address the factual question of whether an insurer deviated 

from the industry standard, but not the ultimate legal issues of whether the Defendant

breached the insurance contract or acted in bad faith. See Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1016-17 

(concluding that an expert witness was permitted to testify about insurance industry 

standards and not directly about legal conclusions was proper). Thus, Mr. Flood may use 

the exhibits to opine about the customs, practices, and standards of the insurance industry.

The Court therefore grants in part, as discussed herein, Defendant’s motion to 

exclude Elliot Flood (Doc. 263). 

11. Laura Parker

Plaintiff engaged Laura Parker to offer opinions about Defendant’s claims handling 

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practices. Defendant seeks to exclude Ms. Parker’s opinions and testimony regarding 

insurance claims handling in long-term care situations because her proffered opinions are

impermissible legal conclusions and medical opinions. (Doc. 264 at 2.)

Ms. Parker has over twenty-five years of experience in the insurance industry and 

has specific experience with processing insurance claims and long-term care insurance 

industry practices. (Doc. 264-1 at 3.) The Court finds her to be an expert. Ms. Parker, 

however, offered legal conclusions including that Defendant failed to comply with its duty 

of good faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 264-1 at 26.) She dedicates multiple pages of her report 

for practices that violate the NAIC Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and the 

Arizona Unfair Claims Settlement Practice Act. (Id. at 19-23.) Similarly, Ms. Parker opines

about how to interpret “substantial assistance,” an insurance policy term at dispute in this 

case (Doc. 264-1 at 27-28). See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 544 F.Supp.3d 879, 884 (D. 

Ariz. 2021) (“The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law.”). Ms. Parker 

also opines about legal conclusions when she reported that Defendant inappropriately 

shifted the burden to prove eligibility on the insured (Doc. 264-1 at 20, 27). See id. at 885. 

Ms. Parker also concludes that Defendant’s decisions were financially motivated—opining 

about Defendant’s state of mind. (Id. at 26-27.) As an expert, Ms. Parker may address the 

factual question of whether an insurer deviated from the industry standard, but not the 

interpretation of legal issues. See Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1016-17. Nor can she offer 

opinions of Defendant’s or its agents’ state of mind. Regarding Ms. Parker’s “medical 

opinions,” Plaintiff agrees that Ms. Parker is not a medical expert and shall not be used to 

provide medical opinions. (Doc. 289 at 9.) Thus, Ms. Parker may only opine about the 

customs, practices, and standards of the insurance industry.

The Court therefore grants in part, as discussed herein, Defendant’s motion to 

exclude Laura Parker (Doc. 264).

12. Dr. Kamran Samakar

Plaintiff engaged Dr. Kamran Samakar to respond to the conclusions of Dr. John 

Nye, Defendant’s third-party administrator CHCS Services, Inc.’s medical director. 

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Dr. Samakar opines that as a general surgeon, Dr. Nye is not qualified to opine about how 

Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease and Chiari malformation affected her capacity to perform 

activities of daily living. (Doc. 265-1 at 2.) Dr. Samakar, like Dr. Nye, is a board-certified 

general surgeon. (Id.) Defendant seeks to exclude Dr. Samakar’s opinion claiming it is not 

based on any specialized knowledge, skill, training, education, or experience pertaining to 

the long-term care insurance industry. (Doc. 265 at 2.) Defendant also argues that Dr. 

Samakar’s opinion is speculative and contrary to applicable law. (Id. at 4-9.)

As discussed, an expert need not be a specialist, but instead “be of a certain 

profession, such as a doctor.” Doe, 971 F.2d at 385. Further, lack of specialized knowledge 

impacts the weight of the expert’s testimony, not the admissibility of the testimony. Garcia, 

7 F.3d at 890. Therefore, as a general surgeon, Dr. Samakar possesses the expertise to opine 

about general surgeons and their education and medical expertise. Presumably, 

Dr. Samakar will use his experience as a general surgeon to offer testimony about the 

veracity of Dr. Nye’s conclusions. See Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d at 655; see also Fed. 

R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“Some types of expert 

testimony will be more objectively verifiable, and subject to the expectations of 

falsifiability, peer review, and publication, than others. Some types of expert testimony 

will not rely on anything like a scientific method, and so will have to be evaluated by 

reference to other standard principles attendant to the particular area of expertise.”).

Defendant argues that Dr. Samakar’s opinion disregards 26 U.S.C. § 7702(B)(c)(4) 

and Arizona Administrative Code § R20-6-1002(A), which broadly permit a general 

surgeon to make eligibility determinations under a long-term care policy. (Doc. 265 at 7-

8.) This argument, however, amounts to Defendant disagreeing with Dr. Samakar’s 

conclusions, not his expertise. Defendant can test the sufficiency of these opinions and 

attempt to discredit them at trial using its own evidence and expert witnesses. See Daubert, 

509 U.S. at 596. Indeed, Defendant’s knowledge of Dr. Nye’s qualifications and underlying 

analysis of the medical record helps ameliorate concerns regarding the admissibility of Dr. 

Samakar’s opinions. To the extent Defendant believes the record does not support Dr. 

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Samakar’s conclusions, it is uniquely positioned—having ordered Dr. Nye’s report and 

supplying him with the insurance claim file—to expose any inadequacies or inconsistencies 

in Dr. Samakar's opinions. There is no reason to believe a jury would not understand or 

give weight to Defendant’s arguments.

The Court therefore denies Defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. Samakar (Doc. 265).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Strike Untimely Disclosed 

Witnesses, Documents and “Supplemental” Expert Report (Doc. 259).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony from Dr. Lorne Label on Meniere’s Disease, Chiari 

malformations, and Somatization Disorders (Doc. 266), as described herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Expert 

Testimony from Dr. Abraham Jacob (Doc. 270).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Expert 

Testimony from Defendant on Life Expectancy and Co-Morbidities (Doc. 267).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Expert 

Testimony from Defendant on the Standards of a General Surgeon (Doc. 268).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony from Drs. Label and Jacob on Policy Interpretations 

(Doc. 269), as described herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the 

Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Experts Dr. Michael D. Freeman and Mark Reiser, 

PhD. (Doc. 260).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the 

Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Dr. Dan Heffez. (Doc. 261).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the 

Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Non-Retained Expert Constantine Moschonas 

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(Doc. 262).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s 

Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Elliot Flood 

(Doc. 263), as described herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s 

Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Laura Parker 

(Doc. 264), as described herein.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the 

Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Dr. Kamran Samakar (Doc. 265).

Dated this 23rd day of October, 2023.

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