Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03568/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03568-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Walter Bartlett
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER BARTLETT,

 Plaintiff,

 v

MICHAEL J ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

 Defendant.

 

No C 05-03568 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Walter Bartlett brings this action under 42 USC

section 405(g), challenging the final decision of the Social

Security Administration (SSA) denying him disability insurance

benefits (DIB) from June 23, 1998 through September 30, 2001. 

Plaintiff claims disability based on a lower back condition. The

court now considers cross-motions for summary judgment. Pl Mot

(Doc #9); Def Mot (Doc #10). Because the court concludes that

plaintiff did not overcome the presumption of non-disability that

resulted from a previous final decision by the SSA, the court

DENIES plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS defendant’s motion.

//

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United States District Court

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I

Plaintiff was born on July 25, 1952 and is a high school

graduate. Administrative Record (AR), Doc #8 at 453, 484. He

worked for eleven years as a basement attendant, crane operator and

tractor driver at a steel mill before suffering a lower back injury

on the job in May 1985. AR 37, 479. As a result, plaintiff

experienced lower back and leg pain. AR 69. On January 21, 1987

he filed for DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). 

Id. Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbar spinal stenosis with a

ruptured disc and nerve root damage. AR 229-33. An Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) found plaintiff “disabled” within the meaning of

the Act because his impairment prevented him from “[performing]

basic work activities at any exertional level.” Id.

Dr Kenneth Light, an orthopedic surgeon, treated 

plaintiff beginning in September 1992. AR 314-58. On April 20,

1993, Dr Light performed spinal fusion surgery and repair of the

pelvis using a graft of plaintiff’s thigh bone. AR 349. Plaintiff

improved initially, but fusion of the spine remained incomplete and

there was breakage of one of the small rods placed to align his

spine. AR 328. Dr Light performed another surgery to repair the

fusion and reinsert rods and screws on December 6, 1994. Id. 

A year following the last surgery, Dr Light noted that 

x-rays showed a healed spine and solid fusion, and that

“[plaintiff] walks on a regular basis * * * [without] relief [from]

pain medication to date.” AR 321. Plaintiff continued to complain

//

//

//

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of pain and intermittent collapsing of his right leg, but on March

13, 1996 Dr Light wrote:

there is no patient who has reconstruction of

the spine and is perfectly asymptomatic. * * *

This man is willing to return to work at the

steel mill in a job that does not require heavy

bending and lifting. I think his spine is

strong enough to accept this level of physical

activity. * * * He would not be able to lift

more than 30 lbs and should avoid frequent

bending. Other than that, I think he is capable

of driving a variety of vehicles at the mill and

should be capable of returning to work in some

capacity.

AR 314.

Dr Light’s conclusion prompted the SSA to issue a

Continuing Disability Review decision to discontinue plaintiff’s

disability insurance because his condition had improved and because

based on his age, education and past work experience, he could

perform light work. AR 245-47. Plaintiff requested

reconsideration which included a hearing before a disability

hearing officer. AR 248. After taking testimony and receiving

medical records, the hearing officer found that plaintiff’s

condition did not meet any listing in the Listing of Impairments in

the Social Security regulations and that plaintiff was able to

perform light work not requiring frequent stooping and crouching. 

AR 260-66. 

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ which took

place on March 19, 1998. AR 26-68, 272. At the ALJ’s directive,

plaintiff saw orthopedic surgeon Dr Lisa Sandusky on April 18, 1998

for a consulting evaluation. AR 65, 374-76. Although plaintiff

described “some right lower extremity weakness,” Dr Sandusky

determined, inter alia, that plaintiff could “stand for [up to] 2

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hours at a time without a break”; “walk on an occasional basis at

work”; “sit up to 4 hours without a break”; “lift, pull and push up

to 40 lbs on an occasional basis and may lift, pull and push 25 lbs

on a frequent basis”; and that “[he has] no limitations on tasks

that require fine motor skills.” Id. 

On June 29, 1998, the ALJ issued a decision stating that

plaintiff’s condition had improved and that he could engage in

substantial gainful activity. AR 11-24. The SSA Appeals Council

denied review. AR 5-6. Plaintiff then sought judicial review in

the United States district court for the Northern District of

California. Bartlett v Barnhart, #C 00-02541 MJJ. On February 13,

2002, the court upheld the ALJ’s decision. AR 420. Plaintiff did

not appeal that decision to the court of appeals. 

On March 22, 2002, plaintiff applied for another period

of DIB ending September 30, 2001, his date last insured. AR 453-

57. Plaintiff initially alleged disability beginning on May 29,

1985, but later amended his alleged onset date to June 23, 1998. 

Id. Plaintiff added knee pain as an impairment because he

underwent right knee surgery in December 2000 to treat a staph

infection. AR 453-57, 602-04. The SSA denied plaintiff’s request

on May 29, 2002 and again on September 10, 2002. AR 437-40, 442-

45. 

Plaintiff then timely requested a hearing before an ALJ

which took place on August 21, 2003. The ALJ took testimony from

plaintiff and from vocational expert (VE) John Velton. AR 446,

712-98. At the hearing, plaintiff testified to the medical

treatment and medication he received. In an attempt to explain the

sparse medical evidence showing he was taking pain medication,

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plaintiff testified that his brother-in-law, allegedly a doctor,

gave him medication. AR 748-49. He described his life as “boring”

and testified that he “hurts so bad [he] can’t do anything” with

his days except eat and prepare meals and watch television. AR

768-80.

The VE determined that jobs existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform

consistent with his medically determinable impairments, functional

limitations, age, education and work experience. AR 394-95. Based

on plaintiff’s testimony and the hypothetical limitations provided

by the ALJ, the VE testified to several jobs plaintiff could

perform. AR 786-88. Specifically, with plaintiff’s ability to

perform only light work with alternate sitting and standing, and

without frequent bending or stooping, the VE responded with three

possible vocations with the sit/stand at will option required by

plaintiff’s condition: (1) cashier II, of which there were 130,000

nationally and 3,000 locally; (2) survey worker, with 22,000

nationally and 500 locally; and (3) gate guard, with 36,000

nationally and 800 locally. AR 394, 786-88. 

 On October 30, 2003, the ALJ issued an eight-page ruling

concluding that plaintiff had not demonstrated “changed

circumstances” arising during the period from June 23, 1998 (the

date of the first ALJ’s decision) through September 30, 2001, the

date plaintiff was last eligible for disability benefits under

Title II. AR 389-96. The ALJ noted that the denial of benefits

through June 23, 1998 was binding and the judgment entered against

plaintiff in the district court barred consideration of claims of

disability prior to that date and created “an ongoing presumption

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that [plaintiff] was able to work beyond the date of that

decision.” AR 391. To warrant a new finding of disability, the

ALJ explained, plaintiff had the burden of showing that his

condition had deteriorated from June 23, 1998 forward. Id. 

Specifically, the ALJ concluded that although plaintiff

suffered from “severe” medically determinable impairments

(degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine status post back

surgery and status post staphylococcus aureus infection in the

right knee), these did not meet or equal a listing in the Listing

of Impairments found at 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1,

because plaintiff’s medical records did not “describe limitation of

motion in the spine with motor loss and sensory or reflex loss, as

required by [listing 1.04].” Id. The ALJ also found no evidence

in plaintiff’s medical records of an inability to ambulate

effectively as required by listing 1.02 and concluded that “the

medical findings * * * [were] not equal in severity and duration to

any Listed findings.” AR 392. 

The ALJ underscored the fact that plaintiff sought

minimal medical treatment for his back pain during the relevant

time period. Id. He noted that plaintiff’s fourth back surgery in

March 2003, occurred nearly eighteen months after the last date of

Title II eligibility and plaintiff had sought no medical treatment

regarding his spine between February 1999 and October 2002. AR

393. The ALJ deemed significant that although a computed

tomography (CT) scan in February 1999 showed spinal stenosis and

some degeneration of the L3-4 disc, it also showed that the fusion

at L4-S1 was solid and neurological reports showed plaintiff’s

//

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neurological status as normal and unchanged since August 1998. AR

392. 

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff was alleging he

could not perform light work, the ALJ rejected plaintiff’s alleged

subjective disabling symptoms because of, inter alia: (1) the

minimal amount of treatment received for his back and knee

conditions between February 1999 and October 2002; (2) his ability

to do work around the house and to hunt and fish on occasion; (3)

his participation in 4-H club meetings; (4) his ability to drive

short distances; and (5) the lack of evidence showing he was taking

pain medication. AR 393, 792. The ALJ also noted inconsistencies

in the record regarding plaintiff’s knee condition. AR 392. 

Plaintiff initially reported to the emergency room physician that

he did not recall a “precipitating traumatic event” giving rise to

his knee swelling, but later stated that his injury was due to a

fall. Id. In fact, laboratory testing showed that the swelling

and pain in his knee stemmed from a staph infection. Id. X-rays

and a physical examination showed only “minimal degenerative

changes” and “unimpaired functioning in the legs with no

neurological deficits” and after a procedure in December 2000 to

remove the infection, plaintiff received no additional treatment

for his knee. Id. Consequently, the ALJ found plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (RFC) unchanged since the prior final

decision. AR 395. 

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s condition

had not substantially deteriorated so as to prevent him from

working for any twelve-month period during the period June 23, 1998

through September 30, 2001. AR 392. The SSA’s Appeals Council

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denied plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision

final. AR 380-83. On September 6, 2005, plaintiff commenced the

instant action for judicial review of the final decision. 

II

The court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining

whether the SSA’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial

evidence in the administrative record. 42 USC § 405(g). A

district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the

decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on

legal error. Thomas v Barnhart, 278 F3d 947, 954 (9th Cir 2002). 

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The ALJ’s

decision must be upheld where it is free of legal error, even if

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation. Id. The court reviews the administrative record

as a whole. Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir 1995). 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical

testimony and all other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. 

Id. 

To be eligible for SSA disability benefits, plaintiff

must demonstrate that he was "unable to do any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 20 CFR § 404.1527.

//

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9

To determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled

to benefits, the SSA conducts a five-step sequential inquiry. 20

CFR § 404.1520. Under the first step, the ALJ considers whether

the claimant is currently employed in substantial gainful activity. 

If not, the second step examines whether the claimant has a "severe

impairment" that significantly affects his or her ability to

conduct basic work activities. In step three, the ALJ determines

whether the claimant has a condition which meets or equals the

conditions outlined in the Listing of Impairments in 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and if so, the claimant is presumed

disabled. 20 CFR § 404.1520. If the claimant does not have such a

condition, step four asks whether the claimant can perform his past

relevant work. If not, in step five, the ALJ considers whether the

claimant has the ability to perform other work which exists in

substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 CFR §§

404.1520(b)-(f); §§ 404.920(b)-(f). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one

through four. Bustamante v Massanari, 262 F3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir

2001). At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the SSA to show

there are jobs in the national economy that the claimant is capable

of performing. Id. When there has been a denial of disability

benefits in a prior final decision, there is a presumption of nondisability in subsequent proceedings. See Miller v Heckler, 770

F2d 845, 848 (9th Cir 1985). Accordingly, the burden continues to

be on the claimant who must make a showing of “changed

circumstances” since the date of the prior final decision. See

Booz v Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F2d 1378, 1379

(9th Cir 1983).

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Pursuant to 42 USC § 405(h), the findings and decision of

the SSA after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who

were parties to such a hearing. Under 42 USC § 405(g), a claimant

can request judicial review of a decision by the SSA and the

judgment of a United States district court shall be final except

that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment

in other civil actions. 

III

In support of his motion, plaintiff contends that: (1)

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that

plaintiff’s alleged impairments did not meet or equal any listings

in the Listing of Impairments; (2) the ALJ did not fully and fairly

develop the record; (3) substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ’s evaluation of plaintiff’s subjective reports of disabling

symptoms; (4) the ALJ improperly failed to consider lay witness

testimony; and (5) the ALJ improperly determined that plaintiff

could perform other work. The court addresses each of these

contentions in turn. The court, however, notes that a consistent

motif in plaintiff’s briefs is his attempt to introduce medical

evidence from before 1998. The court disregards this irrelevant

evidence and accompanying arguments because plaintiff did not

appeal the district court’s adverse judgment in Bartlett v Apfel,

#C 00-2541 MJJ, affirming the ALJ’s June 23, 1998 decision denying

disability benefits to plaintiff and therefore creating a

presumption of non-disability from that date through September 30,

2001, plaintiff’s date last insured.

//

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A

Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not

support the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s impairments do not

meet or equal various musculoskeletal listings in the Listing of

Impairments as set forth at 20 CFR Pt 404, Subpt P, App 1. Doc #9

at 6; Doc #13 at 2. The court disagrees.

To establish presumptive disability under the Listing at

step three of the sequential evaluation process, a claimant must

prove that his impairment (or combination of impairments) satisfies

all of the medical criteria. See Sullivan v Zebley, 493 US 521,

530 (1990); see also Tackett v Apfel, 180 F3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir

1999). “An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria,

no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan, 493 US at

530. In order to “meet” a listed impairment the claimant must

establish each characteristic listed, while to “equal” a listed

impairment the claimant must establish symptoms, signs and

laboratory findings at least equal in severity and duration to the

characteristics of a relevant listed impairment. See 20 CFR §

404.1526; Tackett, 180 F3d at 1099. Equivalence must be based on

medical findings that are supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See CFR §

404.1526(b); Tackett, 180 F3d at 1100. The ALJ must review a

claimant’s symptoms and make specific findings essential to a

conclusion of an impairment not meeting or equaling a listing. See

Gonzalez v Sullivan, 914 F2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir 1990). If there

is an adequate basis from which to draw such a conclusion, the ALJ

is not required to “state why a claimant failed to satisfy every

different section of the listing of impairments.” See id at 1201.

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In order to meet Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine), a

claimant must demonstrate:

(A) Evidence of nerve root compression characterized

by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation

of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy

associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness)

accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there

is involvement of the lower back, positive straightleg raising test (sitting and supine); or 

(B) Spinal arachnoiditis, confirmed by an operative

note or pathology report of tissue biopsy, or by

appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested

by severe burning or painful dysesthesia, resulting

in the need for changes in position or posture more

than once every 2 hours; or

(C) Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in

pseudoclaudication, established by findings on

appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested

by chronic nonradicular pain and weakness, and

resulting in inability to ambulate effectively

* * *.

20 CFR Pt 404, Subpt P, App 1, § 1.04.

Plaintiff maintains that “the record is clear that [he]

has established all aspects of this listing.” Doc #13 at 3. In

support of this contention, however, plaintiff cites evidence

reviewed and rejected by the court in Bartlett v Apfel, #C 00-02541

MJJ, as well as evidence of medical treatment sought after his last

date insured. Both types of evidence are irrelevant to the time

period at issue on this appeal. Doc #9 at 6-7. The scant evidence

plaintiff cites that does involve the period at issue is not

relevant to his spinal condition or consists of his own reports of

disabling pain symptoms which cannot be used to establish a listed

impairment. Id; AR 36-79, 504-27, 598-600, 606, 608, 610. General

assertions of functional disability are not enough to establish

disability at step three. Tackett, 180 F3d at 1100.

//

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Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the record contains

substantial evidence from which the ALJ could conclude that

plaintiff did not satisfy listing 1.04. The ALJ documented the

absence of evidence of limitation of motion in the spine combined

with motor loss and sensory or reflex loss and/or of inability to

ambulate effectively. AR 391-92. The Listing of Impairments

defines “ineffective ambulation” as “having insufficient lower

extremity functioning to permit independent ambulation without the

use of a hand-held assistive device.” 20 CFR Pt 404, Subpt P, App

1, § 1.00B2b. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff

required the use of a hand-held assistive device. Moreover,

plaintiff sought no treatment for his spine between February 17,

1999 and his date last insured. AR 474, 593-600, 606, 648-49.

Even though plaintiff is represented by counsel,

plaintiff’s briefs demonstrate significant confusion regarding

basic social security law concepts. For example, plaintiff asserts

– not once but several times – that the ALJ contradicted himself

and committed legal error by finding that plaintiff had a “severe

impairment” at step two, then denying plaintiff disability benefits

at step three. Doc #9 at 8-9. Satisfying step two, however, is

merely a prerequisite for the inquiry to proceed to step three;

“disability” within the meaning of the SSA can never be found

before step three. See 20 CFR § 404.1520. Many claimants found to

have “severe” impairments at step two are nonetheless unable to

establish disability in subsequent steps. 

Next, plaintiff cites Young v Sullivan, 911 F2d 180 (9th

Cir 1990) and Orteza v Shalala, 50 F3d 748 (9th Cir 1995), perhaps

thinking they somehow support his position. In doing so, plaintiff

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makes critical mistakes of fact and law. Doc #9 at 6-7. Plaintiff

seems to argue that he should have been found disabled because the

impairments the claimants suffered from in Young and Orteza, both

of which were found insufficient to support an award of benefits,

were less severe than his. They could do household chores and

drive, while plaintiff purportedly could not. Id. 

The court does not follow plaintiff’s logic in citing

Young and Orteza. The claimants in those cases suffered from

different impairments and set forth different arguments from

plaintiff and were ultimately denied benefits. Moreover, these

cases stand for little more than the bedrock principle of social

security benefits law that an ALJ’s determination need only be

supported by substantial evidence to be upheld on judicial review. 

Even the factual comparison plaintiff makes between his case and

Young and Orteza does not support his argument; ironically, the

evidence before the court shows that plaintiff engaged in a wide

range of similar activities, including household chores, walking,

driving and even fishing and hunting on occasion. AR 514-17. 

Defendant notes that while plaintiff alleges that he

meets or equals listing 1.04, and purports to quote from that

listing at length, the language he quotes is actually from an

abrogated listing, 1.05C, which no longer exists. Doc #10 at 4. 

This listing, which concerned spinal conditions, was removed from

the Listing of Impairments in 2002. Doc #10 at 4. After defendant

pointed this out, plaintiff responded that his spinal disorder

meets or equals listing 1.05C and asserts – without citing legal

authority - that defendant “must follow the listings of impairments

as they were when [plaintiff’s] impairment began * * *.” Doc #13

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at 3. The court has found no legal authority supporting

plaintiff’s argument. Moreover, even if listing 1.05C were still

part of the Listing of Impairments, the record plainly indicates

that plaintiff did not satisfy 1.05C when plaintiff received a 

favorable decision in 1988 or when the court denied his claim in

Bartlett v Apfel, #C 00-02541 MJJ. AR 229-34, 422-32.

Plaintiff also baldly asserts that his knee impairment

meets or equals listings 1.02 or 1.03. Doc #9 at 6. But nowhere

in the record is there evidence that the incision in plaintiff’s

right knee in December of 2000 prevented him from ambulating

effectively for a continuous period of 12 months. In fact, as

defendant correctly points out, “plaintiff has not articulated any

facts to support these assertions.” Doc #10 at 4. Accordingly,

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff

did not meet or equal a listing in the Listing of Impairments.

B

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not fully and fairly

develop the record, but offers no details of this alleged lapse. 

See Doc #9 at 7. Given that plaintiff’s brief is peppered with

record citations from time periods and medical conditions not at

issue on this appeal, the court surmises that plaintiff intends to

challenge the ALJ’s omission of this irrelevant evidence.

It would, of course, be error for the ALJ to decline to

consider evidence relating to plaintiff's date of disability onset

merely because that evidence dated from after plaintiff's date last

insured. Lester v Chater, 81 F3d 821, 832 (9th Cir 1995); see also

Smith v Bowen, 849 F2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir 1988). After all, "[i]t

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is obvious that medical reports are inevitably rendered

retrospectively * * *." Smith, 849 F2d at 1225. The court also

recognizes, however, that any "deterioration in [plaintiff's]

condition subsequent to [his date last insured] is, of course,

irrelevant." Waters v Gardner, 452 F2d 855, 858 (9th Cir 1971). 

Likewise, evidence based on observations and medical reports made

prior to a previous final decision to deny benefits is also

irrelevant. See Miller v Heckler, 770 F2d 845, 848 (9th Cir 1985). 

Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date is June 23,

1998, the date of the SSA’s original decision denying him

disability benefits. Plaintiff’s date last insured was September

30, 2001. AR 629. The ALJ noted that although plaintiff

experienced some back pain in August 1998, X-rays showed solid

fusion in the lower back. AR 651. In February 1999, tests

revealed spinal stenosis and narrowing of the spinal canal. AR

649. Plaintiff’s treating orthopedist noted that plaintiff’s

“neurological examination has been normal” and that his pain “is

not sharp all the time and for this reason we have suggested that

nothing be done about it at present.” Id. Plaintiff did not seek

further treatment for his spine until October 22, 2002, more than

three and a half years later. AR 648. Plaintiff’s fourth back

surgery took place nearly eighteen months after his date last

insured. AR 638-39. There is no evidence that plaintiff received

pain medication for his spinal condition during the relevant time

period. AR 647-49. Moreover, after the surgery to plaintiff’s

right knee in December 2000, the treating physician noted that

plaintiff was “discharged home in satisfactory condition.” AR 602. 

//

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Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ fully and

fairly developed the record by properly considering the relevant

evidence in making his determination.

C

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected

plaintiff’s testimony alleging disabling pain symptoms. See Doc #9

at 10; Doc #13 at 3-5. Once a claimant has established an

underlying medical impairment which could be reasonably expected to

produce some subjective symptoms, an ALJ must give specific, clear

and convincing reasons to reject allegations of subjectively

disabling symptoms to allow a reviewing court to determine whether

the ALJ did so on permissible grounds. See Bunnell v Sullivan, 947

F2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir 1991); Thomas v Barnhart, 278 F3d 947,

959-60 (9th Cir 2002). An ALJ may consider various factors in

assessing the credibility of the allegedly disabling subjective

symptoms. See 20 CFR § 404.1529. Such factors include: a

claimant’s ability to perform numerous daily activities; a failure

to seek treatment; the nature, location, onset, duration,

frequency, radiation, and intensity of the alleged disabling pain;

and ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation. See id;

Bunnell, 947 F2d at 346-47. 

The ALJ thoroughly and specifically documented his

reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s allegations of subjective

disabling symptoms. AR 389-96. Plaintiff’s medical treatment

between June 23, 1998 through September 30, 2001 was minimal. AR

393, 648-51. After his alleged onset date, plaintiff sought

medical treatment for his spine on three occasions between August

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1998 and February 1999 and did not seek treatment again until

October of 2002. AR 648-52. The ALJ also noted that there was no

evidence that plaintiff received pain medication for his spine

during this time period. AR 389-96, 647-49. 

Plaintiff forcefully contends that he sought medical

treatment and was on pain medication; in doing so, however, he

ignores the relevance of both the time period in which he sought

medical treatment and of the conditions he sought it for. Doc #9

at 10-11; Doc #13 at 3-4. It is true that plaintiff did seek

medical treatment from February 1999 through his last date insured. 

Plaintiff, however, sought treatment for a minor finger injury,

vertigo, ear congestion, blood pressure and a knee infection that

healed soon after treatment. AR 593-610. Although plaintiff

sought treatment for his spine, he did not do so until nearly

eighteen months after his date last insured. AR 648. 

The medical records from plaintiff’s doctor visits during

the relevant time period further undermine his contention that he

was disabled: they show that he was not taking pain medication. AR

593. For example, plaintiff took Keflex for a short time after his

right knee incision, but Keflex is an antibiotic that is unrelated

to the treatment of spinal conditions and does not relieve pain. 

AR 595-98. Moreover, no medical records support plaintiff’s

dubious assertion that he received pain medication from his

brother-in-law, an alleged doctor. Doc #9 at 11; AR 748. In fact,

plaintiff’s orthopedist noted in December 2002 that plaintiff was

“currently off all medications.” AR 647. 

The ALJ also relied on inconsistencies in plaintiff’s

testimony with other evidence in the record to discount plaintiff’s

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credibility. See Johnson v Shalala, 60 F3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir

1995) (ALJ may use inconsistencies within cumulative record to

discount claimant’s credibility). For example, plaintiff contends

that he injured his knee in December 2000 after falling because of

pain in his lower back. Doc #9 at 16. Plaintiff’s own statements

and medical reports later contradicted his story. AR 393, 585. He

told the emergency room physician that he did not recall a

“precipitating traumatic event” which gave rise to his knee

problems; soon thereafter, plaintiff was diagnosed with a staph

infection. AR 393, 579, 585. 

The ALJ also considered the activities plaintiff could

perform despite the extent of his alleged disabling pain. AR 393. 

He noted that plaintiff did household chores such as cooking,

laundry and mowing the lawn. AR 393, 515, 761-62, 766. At least

four times a week, plaintiff drove fourteen miles to meet his wife

for lunch at her office. AR 515-16, 520. The record further shows

that plaintiff hunted and fished on occasion, served as a 4-H club

leader and raised beef cattle. AR 515, 517, 758. 

Plaintiff correctly asserts that trivial discrepancies

should not be relied upon to discredit a claimant’s credibility. 

Doc #13 at 3. Nonetheless, the inconsistencies in plaintiff’s

testimony with other evidence in the record can hardly be

characterized as trivial. The ALJ needs only substantial evidence

on which to base his conclusion and the ALJ’s interpretation of

plaintiff’s testimony need not be the only reasonable one. See

Rollins v Massanari, 261 F3d 853, 857 (9th Cir 2001). The court

disagrees with plaintiff’s assertion that “the only conclusion one

can come to is * * * favorable to [plaintiff],” Doc #13 at 5, and

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accordingly finds that the ALJ properly made specific and

convincing findings in rejecting plaintiff’s reports of disabling

pain symptoms.

D

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to

consider lay witness evidence in the form of statements made by 

plaintiff’s sister and parents. He perfunctorily cites Howard v

Barnhart, 341 F3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir 2003), and Vincent v Heckler,

739 F2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir 1984) for the proposition that “under

prevailing case law,” not addressing statements by plaintiff’s

sister and parents was harmful error. This argument is without

merit.

The ALJ is not required to address every piece of

evidence so long as the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence. See Howard, 341 F3d at 1012; Vincent, 739 F2d at 1395. 

While the ALJ did not address the written statements made by

plaintiff’s sister and parents, AR 552, 555, the unaddressed

statements did not substantiate any of plaintiff’s claims during

the relevant time period and the limited insight they appear to

offer is, at best, cumulative. Accordingly, because there was

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision, the court

concludes that not addressing all the lay witness testimony was not

error. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1513(d)(4) & (e); see also Burch v

Barnhart, 400 F3d 676, 679 (9th Cir 2005) (recognizing the concept

of harmless error within the Social Security context). 

//

//

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E

Plaintiff contests the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

(RFC) finding and asserts that the ALJ improperly determined that

plaintiff could perform other work. Doc #9 at 16-17.

As noted above, the final decision denying plaintiff

disability benefits on June 23, 1998, together with the judgment in

Bartlett v Apfel, #C 00-0254 MJJ affirming that decision, created a

presumption of non-disability. See 42 USC § 405(g)-(h); Miller v

Heckler, 770 F2d 845, 848 (9th Cir 1985). A claimant’s RFC

describes the most an individual can do despite his or her

limitations. 20 CFR § 404.1545. In the prior decision, the ALJ

determined that plaintiff retained the RFC for “light work” as

defined by 20 CFR 404.1567(b), with alternate sitting and standing

and without frequent bending or stooping. AR 392. Accordingly,

the burden continued to rest with plaintiff to demonstrate “changed

circumstances” since the date of that decision. See Booz v

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F2d 1378, 1379 (9th Cir

1983). Because the court has already determined that the record

contains substantial evidence from which the ALJ could reasonably

conclude that plaintiff’s condition had not deteriorated between

June 23, 1998 through September 30, 2001, the ALJ’s RFC finding is

supported by substantial evidence. AR 393-95. 

Since plaintiff did not meet his burden, the ALJ could

have made a determination of non-disability without having to show

that other jobs exist in the national economy which plaintiff could

perform. See Booz, 734 F2d at 1379-80. Nonetheless, the ALJ

presented a hypothetical to the VE correctly summarizing

plaintiff’s limitations and the VE testified that plaintiff was

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still capable of performing other jobs in the light work category,

including a cashier and a survey worker. AR 393-95, 786-87. 

IV

The ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence

in the record as a whole and was based on correct legal principles. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the ALJ's decision to

deny benefits. Accordingly, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion

for summary judgment (Doc #9) and GRANTS defendant's motion for

summary judgment (Doc #10). 

The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the

defendant and against plaintiff, to close the file and to terminate

all pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

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