Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01022/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Google Inc.
Appellant
Yochai Konig
Cross-Appellant
Personalized User Model, LLP
Cross-Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

YOCHAI KONIG,

Counterclaim Defendant-Cross-Appellant

v.

GOOGLE INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1841, 2015-1022

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:09-cv-00525-LPS, Chief 

Judge Leonard P. Stark.

______________________ 

Decided: August 18, 2015

______________________ 

 RICHARD SALGADO, Dentons US LLP, Dallas, TX, 

argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant, counterclaim defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by MARC S.

FRIEDMAN, New York, NY. Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant also 

represented by MARK CHRISTOPHER NELSON, Dallas, TX.

 DAVID ANDREW PERLSON, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 

Sullivan, LLP, San Francisco, CA, argued for defendantappellant. Also represented by CHARLES KRAMER 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/18/2015
2 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

VERHOEVEN; JOSHUA L. SOHN, Washington, DC; ANDREA 

PALLIOS ROBERTS, Redwood Shores, CA.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, 

LOURIE and REYNA, Circuit Judges. 

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

Google Inc. (“Google”) appeals from the decision of the 

United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Personalized User Model, LLP (“PUM”) and Yochai Konig (“Konig”) (collectively, “Appellees”) on Google’s breach of 

contract counterclaim. Order, Personalized User Model 

LLP v. Google Inc., C.A. No. 09-525-LPS (D. Del. Sept. 17, 

2014), ECF No. 724. PUM cross-appeals from the district 

court’s decision construing the claims of U.S. Patents 

6,981,040 (“the ’040 patent”) and 7,685,276 (“the ’276 

patent”). Personalized User Model LLP v. Google Inc., 

C.A. No. 09-525-LPS, 2012 WL 295048, at *15–16 (D. Del. 

Jan. 25, 2012). Because the district court did not err in 

granting judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the 

district court’s decision appealed by Google. Moreover, we

dismiss the cross-appeal because we lack jurisdiction over 

the issue as raised. 

BACKGROUND

Konig was employed by SRI International (“SRI”)

from April 1996 to August 1999. At the beginning of his 

employment, Konig signed an Employment Agreement, 

which stated: 

In consideration of my employment at SRI International, I agree:

. . .

3. To promptly disclose to SRI all discoveries, improvements, and inventions, including software, 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 3

conceived or made by me during the period of my 

employment, and I agree to execute such documents, disclose and deliver all information and 

data, and to do all things which may be necessary 

or in the opinion of SRI reasonably desirable, in 

order to effect transfer of ownership in or to impart a full understanding of such discoveries, improvements and inventions to SRI . . . . I 

understand that termination of this employment 

shall not release me from my obligations hereunder . . . .

J.A. 1417 (emphases added). 

In May 1999, while still employed by SRI, Konig and 

a friend who was not employed by SRI started generating 

documents marked confidential, relating to a personalized 

information services idea that they called “Personal Web.” 

J.A. 1281–1302, 1303–08. Konig and his friend then 

formed a company named Utopy, incorporated in Delaware on July 22, 1999, and Konig left SRI two weeks 

later, on August 5, 1999. In 2001, while Konig was developing the Personal Web products at Utopy, he asked a 

research scientist still at SRI to test the products. Appellant’s Br. 15.

Meanwhile, Konig filed a provisional patent application on December 28, 1999. On June 20, 2000, Konig filed 

an application based on the provisional, which issued as 

the ’040 patent on December 27, 2005, and listed Utopy, 

Inc. as the assignee. Utopy then assigned the ’040 patent 

to another party, who in turn assigned the patent to 

PUM. Konig filed another patent application in 2008, 

naming PUM as the assignee, and that application issued 

as the ’276 patent on March 23, 2010.

In July 2009, PUM sued Google in the District Court 

for the District of Delaware, asserting infringement of the 

’040 and ’276 patents. During discovery, PUM provided

interrogatory responses that asserted that the conception 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/18/2015
4 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

date for the invention claimed in the asserted patents was 

in July 1999, while Konig was still at SRI, and produced 

documents to prove that. Google subsequently contacted 

SRI and acquired “any rights” that SRI had in the asserted patents, J.A. 1410–11, and brought a counterclaim for 

breach of contract in February 2011. Google asserted that 

Konig owed a duty to transfer ownership to SRI of any 

inventions conceived during his employment with SRI; 

that Konig breached the employment agreement by 

failing to assign his interest in the related patents to SRI; 

and that Google (by way of SRI) therefore was a rightful 

co-owner. J.A. 504–20. PUM and Konig responded that 

the counterclaim was time-barred as filed more than 

three years after the claim first accrued. J.A. 728, 740; 

see 10 Del. C. § 8106. Before trial, the court construed 

several claim terms in the ’040 and ’276 patents, including the term “document.” Personalized User Model v. 

Google, 2012 WL 295048, at *15–16.

The district court then presided over a jury trial on

the issues of infringement, validity, and breach of contract. The jury found that Google did not infringe any 

asserted claim of the ’040 and ’276 patents and that all 

asserted claims were invalid. The jury was also instructed concerning two means by which the three-year statute 

of limitations could have been tolled, such that Google’s 

claim would not be time-barred: the discovery rule and 

the Delaware tolling statute, 10 Del. C. § 8117. The jury 

then found that the three-year statute of limitations for 

Google’s breach of contract claim was tolled, and that 

Konig breached the employment contract. J.A. 1482.

After the court entered judgment on the verdict, PUM

and Konig moved for judgment as a matter of law 

(“JMOL”) on the breach of contract counterclaim. The 

district court issued a letter with preliminary thoughts, 

informing the parties that the court was inclined to grant 

PUM’s and Konig’s motion on Google’s contract counterclaim on the basis that the claim was time-barred. Letter, 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 4 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 5

Apr. 7, 2014, ECF No. 677. The court stated that the 

statute of limitations was not extended beyond three 

years because, in its view, no reasonable jury could have 

found that the injury was “inherently unknowable.” Id. at 

6–7. The court noted that the evidence at trial showed 

that SRI had reason to investigate Konig’s potential 

breach of contract. Id. at 7.

The district court then held a hearing on PUM’s and 

Konig’s JMOL motion on the breach of contract counterclaim. J.A. 9–31 (transcript). The court again stated its 

determination that no reasonable juror could have found 

that the injury, the basis for the counterclaim, was “inherently unknowable” and that SRI was not on inquiry 

notice. J.A. 30. The court also noted that there was no 

evidence that SRI exercised any diligence, finding that, 

had SRI undertaken any reasonable investigation, it 

would have discovered that the invention was conceived 

during Konig’s employment at SRI. J.A. 30. The court 

concluded that no reasonable juror could find that SRI 

was “blamelessly ignorant.” J.A. 30.

The district court also rejected Google’s argument 

that § 8117 allows “an action that had no connection to 

Delaware [to be brought], as long as no more than three

years have passed since the time that the defendant . . . 

became subject to service of process.” J.A. 31. The court 

expressed its concern that such an interpretation would 

“permit any party sued in Delaware to respond with 

counterclaims having no connection to Delaware, no 

matter how stale those claims are, no matter that the 

statute of limitations in the state in which those claims 

arose had expired long ago.” J.A. 31. The court therefore 

granted JMOL in favor of PUM and Konig on the breach 

of contract counterclaim. J.A. 31; J.A. 47.

Google timely appealed from the district court’s grant 

of JMOL on the counterclaim, and PUM cross-appealed 

from the district court’s claim construction. PUM did not 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 5 Filed: 08/18/2015
6 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

appeal from the district court’s judgment of invalidity and 

noninfringement. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

In an appeal of a case that has been tried to a jury, we 

review the district court’s grant of JMOL under the law of 

the regional circuit. Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Mfg. Co., 398 F.3d 

1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Applying the law of the 

Third Circuit, we review the court’s grant of JMOL de

novo. Pitts v. Delaware, 646 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2011); 

LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en 

banc). In reviewing the grant of JMOL after a jury trial, 

the relevant question is “whether there is evidence upon 

which a reasonable jury could properly have found its 

verdict.” Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 

1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)

(JMOL is appropriate when “a reasonable jury would not 

have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the 

[prevailing] party on that issue.”). We must view the 

record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, 

drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Sheridan v. 

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d 

Cir. 1996) (en banc), but JMOL “must be sustained if the 

record is critically deficient of the minimum quantum of 

evidence from which the jury might reasonably afford 

relief,” Gomez, 71 F.3d at 1083.

I. Discovery Rule Tolling

We first address the district court’s holding that the 

discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations period, because if the limitations period was not tolled, then 

Google’s suit is time-barred. “Application of the ‘time of 

discovery’ rule is limited, and each case must stand or fall 

on its own facts.” Isaacson, Stolper & Co. v. Artisans’ Sav. 

Bank, 330 A.2d 130, 133–34 (Del. 1974). The discovery 

rule in Delaware provides that the statute of limitations

period is tolled while “the injury is inherently unknowaCase: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 6 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 7

ble” and “the claimant is blamelessly ignorant of the 

wrongful act and the injury complained of.” Coleman v. 

PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLC, 854 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 

2004). Even if an injury is inherently unknowable, the 

discovery rule does not toll the limitations period unless

the claimant is blamelessly ignorant. See Kaufman v. 

C.L. McCabe & Sons, Inc., 603 A.2d 831, 835 (Del. 1992) 

(stating that discovery rule requires both elements to toll 

statute of limitations); accord David B. Lilly Co. v. Fisher, 

18 F.3d 1112, 1117 (3d Cir. 1994). A claimant can show

blameless ignorance with evidence that its reasonably 

diligent investigation would not have uncovered facts 

sufficient to enable it to discover the basis for its claim. 

Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842–43; Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 

794 (Del. 1968) (finding plaintiff to be blamelessly ignorant “before she knew, or by reasonable diligence could 

know” of her claims); cf. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, mbH 

v. Hercules, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 247, 252–53 (D. Del. 1990) 

(finding claimant not blamelessly ignorant where it had a

right of inspection, was entitled to hire an independent 

accountant, and was an experienced business entity).

Google argues that the breach of contract injury that 

SRI suffered was inherently unknowable, and therefore 

that SRI was not on inquiry notice to investigate a possible claim. According to Google, Delaware precedent 

requires a “red flag” that “clearly and unmistakably” 

should have led a party to investigate a potential claim. 

Because there were competing inferences that could have 

been drawn from the evidence provided at trial, Google 

asserts that a reasonable jury could have found that none 

of the information available to SRI would have made SRI 

suspicious of a breach of contract. Alternatively, Google 

argues that SRI was blamelessly ignorant because a jury 

could have reasonably inferred that any investigation that 

SRI could have done would not have uncovered the conception of the invention at SRI, which provides the basis 

for the claim. Google contends that under Delaware law, 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 7 Filed: 08/18/2015
8 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

reasonable diligence does not require that an investigation be conducted if such an effort would have been futile.

Appellees respond that Google bore the burden of 

proving that both elements of the discovery rule were 

satisfied to toll the statute of limitations. Even if SRI 

would not have uncovered the conception during the 

period of employment, Appellees assert that SRI had 

sufficient cause to investigate even after Konig was no 

longer employed by SRI. Appellees argue that the extremely high bar for establishing that an injury was

“inherently unknowable” was not met because Google 

failed to show that it was “practically impossible” for SRI 

to discover the injury. Appellees also claim that proof of

“blameless ignorance” is independently essential for

tolling under the discovery rule to apply, and counters

that Google presented no evidence to show that SRI tried 

to protect its rights or otherwise exercised reasonable 

diligence. Because Google failed to meet its burden on 

either element, Appellees maintain, the district court did 

not err in concluding that no reasonable jury could have

found that the discovery rule tolled the limitations period.

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to 

Google and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, 

we agree with the district court that Google did not provide legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the 

injury was inherently unknowable or that SRI was blamelessly ignorant, and therefore could not invoke the discovery rule to toll the limitations period. 

First, Google failed to prove that the injury was inherently unknowable. Unlike a situation in which a 

patient after surgery has virtually no way of knowing that 

a surgical instrument was negligently left inside, cf.

Layton, 246 A.2d at 796, SRI knew that Konig was leaving to immediately work at a start-up technology company. Considering the competitiveness of companies and 

institutes in the technical world and, as Google has arCase: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 8 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 9

gued, that the technology was related to Konig’s work at 

SRI, his departure and new venture could well have been 

a “red flag” that should have generated an inquiry whether Konig had conceived an invention during his employment with SRI that he might intend to develop and 

commercialize with his new company.

More importantly, Google failed to show that SRI was 

blamelessly ignorant of Konig’s alleged breach of contract. 

Google’s attempts to dispense with its burden of proof for

the blamelessly ignorant element of the discovery rule by 

arguing the futility of any inquiry do not compensate for 

its failure of proof. Despite the opportunities for SRI to

have inquired about Konig’s departure and his new venture—the obvious one being an exit interview, at which 

an inquiry might have been made regarding whether 

Konig had made any inventions at SRI that had not been 

reported to SRI—the record is critically deficient on the 

minimum quantum of evidence necessary to show that 

SRI did anything to protect its interests. One might have 

asked, even if an answer might not have been forthcoming, what was Konig going to do in his new company? SRI 

might have learned of the Personal Web products by 

asking other SRI employees, such as the scientist who 

tested the products in 2001, or by monitoring the new 

start-up for a period of time after Konig’s departure. 

Companies can also watch competitive patent filings. 

Even if a reasonable investigation might not have given 

SRI definitive proof of a breach of contract, we agree with 

the district court that such actions could have uncovered 

clues as to a potential claim. In fact, neither party presented any evidence about whether a reasonable investigation would have revealed that Konig invented the 

Personal Web products during his employment at SRI.

We therefore agree with the district court that there

is insufficient evidence in the record to support findings 

that any breach was inherently unknowable and that SRI 

was blamelessly ignorant. Employers do not need to track 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 9 Filed: 08/18/2015
10 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

a former employee’s every movement for an indefinite 

period of time to look for potential claims, but there 

should be some basic level of diligence in looking after 

one’s interests. Cf. Layton, 246 A.2d at 799; Coleman, 854 

A.2d at 842. Whether that is satisfied by evidence of a 

standard exit interview wherein the departing employee 

is asked if all contractual obligations have been met, or of 

inquiring unobtrusively about the employee’s new startup 

company, should be determined on a fact-specific basis. 

See Isaacson, 330 A.2d at 133–34; Brown v. E.I. duPont de 

Nemours & Co., 820 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 2003) (“To apply 

the discovery exception, the court must conduct a factintensive inquiry to determine whether a plaintiff was 

blamelessly ignorant of a potential claim or dilatory in 

pursuing the action.”); Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (“The 

application of [the discovery] rule is necessarily based on 

the facts of each case.”).

We thus see no error in the district court’s findings 

that Google failed to prove that any breach of Konig’s 

employment agreement was inherently unknowable or 

that SRI was blamelessly ignorant, and we therefore 

agree with the district court that the discovery rule did 

not toll the statute of limitations period.

II. Statutory Tolling

We next address the district court’s holding that the

Delaware tolling statute also did not toll the statute of 

limitations period. Section 8117 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code, titled “Defendant’s absence from State,” reads 

as follows:

If at the time when a cause of action accrues 

against any person, such person is out of the State, 

the action may be commenced, within the time 

limited therefor in this chapter, after such person 

comes into the State in such manner that by reasonable diligence, such person may be served with 

process. If, after a cause of action shall have acCase: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 10 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 11

crued against any person, such person departs 

from and resides or remains out of the State, the 

time of such person’s absence until such person 

shall have returned into the State in the manner 

provided in this section, shall not be taken as any 

part of the time limited for the commencement of 

the action.

10 Del. C. § 8117 (emphases added). The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that “the purpose and effect of 

Section 8117 is to toll the statute of limitations as to 

defendants who, at the time the cause of action accrues, 

are outside the state and are not otherwise subject to 

service of process in the state.” Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 

v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochem. Co., 866 A.2d 1, 18 (Del. 2005)

(citing Hurwitch v. Adams, 155 A.2d 591, 594 (Del. 1959)). 

At the JMOL hearing, as indicated, the district court

briefly addressed the issue of statutory tolling. The court

rejected Google’s proffered interpretation of § 8117, stating that it did not understand the statute to mean that

any party sued in Delaware could assert stale counterclaims with no connection to Delaware. 

Google argues that because the plain language of 

§ 8117 does not restrict its application to claims with a 

connection to Delaware, the limitations period was tolled 

for claims against Konig, who was not physically in or 

subject to service of process in Delaware before PUM’s 

infringement suit. Google relies on Saudi Basic for the 

propositions that the claims need not be under Delaware 

law and that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant needs 

a connection to Delaware. Even so, Google asserts that 

the claim does have ties to Delaware and therefore that 

the district court’s public policy concern was inapt in this 

case. Google also insists that SRI’s rights could not have 

been vindicated anywhere else at an earlier time.

Appellees respond that § 8117 is meant to protect 

Delaware residents who have a cause of action against a 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 11 Filed: 08/18/2015
12 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

potential defendant who has evaded Delaware’s jurisdiction. Appellees counter that Google’s interpretation of the 

statute would effectively abolish the statute of limitations 

for claims against non-Delaware residents, which would 

be an absurd result. Appellees maintain that the breach 

of contract counterclaim had no connection to Delaware,

and that neither SRI nor Konig were Delaware residents. 

We have not found a Delaware Supreme Court decision explicitly holding that § 8117 requires a particular 

connection to Delaware, but our understanding of the 

statute’s meaning in light of Delaware case law supports 

the district court’s decision. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. 

v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 165 (Fed. Cir. 

1985) (noting that when there is no decision by the highest state court on a specific state law issue, the Federal 

Circuit must decide whether the district court properly 

predicted applicable state law).

We agree with the district court that § 8117 should 

not apply to toll the statute of limitations period in this 

case. Although the statute on its face does not require 

any connection to Delaware, we agree with the district 

court’s disinclination to interpret the statute so broadly as 

to apply to any claim, claimant, or defendant. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that the tolling statute does 

not necessarily apply “in any action in which the defendant is a non-resident”; such an application “would result 

in the abolition of the defense of statutes of limitation in 

actions involving non-residents.” Hurwitch, 155 A.2d at 

593–94 (citing Lewis v. Pawnee Bill’s Wild West Co., 66 A. 

471 (Del. 1907) as rejecting such an interpretation). 

Accordingly, to read § 8117 as granting Delaware courts 

the ability to hear cases with no ties to Delaware whatsoever, without any limits in time, as long as the defendant 

at some point enters the state of Delaware or otherwise 

becomes subject to service of process, and the plaintiff 

brings suit within the associated statute of limitations 

period, would result in untoward results. See, e.g., City of 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 12 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 13

Tacoma v. Richardson, 163 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (“When a statute suggests an absurd result, however, we must look beyond its plain meaning.”); accord

United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 

(1940) (rejecting “plain meaning” interpretation that

would lead to “absurd or futile results” or “an unreasonable result” clearly at odds with legislative policy). 

Saudi Basic involved a foreign claim and a foreign 

counterclaim-defendant who was not amenable to service 

of process in the United States, but it also involved claimants who were residents of Delaware at the time the cause 

of action originally accrued. Saudi Basic, 866 A.2d at 16. 

That is not true in this case.

Other cases that discuss § 8117 and its previous incarnations also have some connection to Delaware, as 

would be logical for the application of a Delaware law. 

See, e.g., Brossman v. FDIC, 510 A.2d 471, 473 (Del. 1986) 

(cause of action originally arose in favor of Delaware 

resident); D’Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 398 F. Supp. 

72, 80 (D. Del. 1975) (plaintiff and predecessor were 

Delaware residents); United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. 

of Am., 237 F. Supp. 971, 973 (D. Del. 1964) (plaintiff was 

Delaware corporation); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 130 F. Supp. 

725, 726 (D. Del. 1955) (plaintiff was Delaware retail 

merchant); Glassberg v. Boyd, 116 A.2d 711, 712 (Del. Ch. 

1955) (derivative action brought by stockholder of Delaware corporation); Hurwitch, 155 A.2d at 592 (accident 

occurred in Delaware); Pawnee Bill’s, 66 A. at 472 (injury

occurred in Delaware). 

Unlike Saudi Basic and the rest of the case law in 

which § 8117 is applied or otherwise discussed, here there 

was no tie to Delaware at the time the cause of action 

accrued. While Google is incorporated in Delaware, and 

hence is a Delaware resident, this cause of action accrued 

in California, with a California claimant and a California 

defendant. The employment agreement was executed in 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 13 Filed: 08/18/2015
14 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

California by two California residents, SRI and Konig. 

The alleged breach occurred in California, during Konig’s 

employment. Google’s argument that SRI’s contract 

rights could not have been effectively vindicated earlier is 

unpersuasive. This was not a situation in which Konig 

was beyond the jurisdiction of California courts or otherwise not amenable to service of process. SRI could have 

brought suit against Konig in California. Google being a 

Delaware resident is insufficient to bootstrap its claim 

into having a Delaware connection; SRI was not a Delaware resident at the time of the alleged breach, and 

Google acquired the rights to the claim years later, well 

after the limitations period had run. We thus find that 

Google failed to prove that § 8117 should apply to its 

counterclaim.

We therefore conclude that the district court reached 

the correct result in finding that the statute of limitations 

period for Google’s breach of contract counterclaim was 

not tolled by § 8117 and affirm its conclusion that § 8117 

did not toll the statute of limitations period.

III. Cross-Appeal

Finally, we address PUM’s cross-appeal regarding the 

district court’s construction of the claim term “document.” 

PUM has not challenged the jury’s verdict of noninfringement on appeal. 

PUM argues that the district court erred in construing the term by inserting the requirement of an “electronic file” into the term “document” as used in the 

specification and claims of the ’040 and ’276 patents. 

PUM insists that the issue is not moot because that 

construction may affect any future litigation involving the 

claims that were not invalidated in this case, and claims 

in related patents, and asserts that this court may rectify 

that by vacating the district court’s claim construction. 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 14 Filed: 08/18/2015
PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 15

Google responds that there is no longer a live infringement controversy between the parties because the 

district court found the claims not infringed, PUM did not 

seek any further district court proceedings on infringement, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office cancelled all asserted claims in inter partes reexamination. 

Google asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to issue a 

claim construction opinion to ensure the proper construction of PUM’s patents in the future, where such an opinion would not resolve a present infringement controversy.

We agree with Google that we lack jurisdiction over 

PUM’s cross-appeal. Article III of the U.S. Constitution 

limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and 

“controversies,” neither of which is presented by PUM’s 

cross-appeal relating to the district court’s alleged error in 

claim construction. See Jang v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 532 

F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (declining to render 

advisory opinion as to claim construction issues that “do 

not actually affect the infringement controversy between 

the parties”). PUM in fact admitted that there is no live 

controversy presented here and that modifying the claim 

construction has no effect on the outcome of this case. 

E.g., Oral Arg. at 28:40–42, 29:02–29:09, Personalized 

User Model, LLP v. Google Inc., Nos. 2014-1841, 2015-

1022, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/

default.aspx?fl=2014-1841.mp3. Despite PUM’s concerns 

that the construction might be given preclusive effect in 

future litigation involving its related patents, we may not

provide an advisory opinion on the meaning of a claim 

term that does not affect the merits of this appeal and 

thus is not properly before us. We therefore decline to 

review the district court’s claim construction.

CONCLUSION

Because neither the discovery rule nor § 8117 tolled 

the statute of limitations period in this case, the district 

court’s decision granting judgment as a matter of law in 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 15 Filed: 08/18/2015
16 PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, LLP v. GOOGLE INC. 

favor of PUM and Konig on the breach of contract counterclaim is affirmed. The cross-appeal relating to the 

claim construction issue is dismissed.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART

COSTS

No costs. 

Case: 15-1022 Document: 5-2 Page: 16 Filed: 08/18/2015