Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04426/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04426-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas N. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4426

___________ 

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Thomas N. Johnson,

Appellant.

___________

No. 05-4444

___________ 

United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Lamell T. Jones, also known as

Larry Story, also known as Larry

Gunn, also known as Lamel Jones,

Appellant.

 

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeals from the United States

District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri.

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

-2-

________________

 Submitted: September 26, 2006 

 Filed: December 7, 2006 

________________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Thomas N. Johnson and Lamell T. Jones on several criminal

counts including conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district

court1

 sentenced each of them to life in prison. Both Johnson and Jones appeal their

respective convictions, primarily challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

At around 1:30 a.m. on December 7, 2003, Kansas City police received

complaints about loud music in the area of 36th Street and Bellaire Avenue. They

dispatched Officers Thomas Miles and Andrew Ritchie to investigate. Officers Miles

and Ritchie approached the area with their vehicle’s windows rolled down in order to

listen for noises. As they drove down Bellaire Avenue, they observed several people

standing near two cars. The officers stopped briefly to tell the group to turn down

their music, then proceeded further down the block. When they reached the end of the

block, Officer Miles observed in his rear-view mirror the headlights of one of

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
-3-

the cars move, and both officers heard a loud crash come from the area. Officer Miles

made a U-turn to investigate.

Upon returning to the scene, Officers Miles and Ritchie observed three men exit

from a green Kia, one of the vehicles apparently involved in the crash that they had

heard. They observed Johnson exit from the driver’s seat of the Kia, Jones exit from

the front passenger area, and a third, unidentified man exit from the rear passenger

door. Officers Miles and Ritchie exited from their vehicle as well. As they

approached on foot, Johnson began to run and did not respond to the officers’ requests

to stop. They pursued Johnson, caught him and subdued him. Officer Miles then

observed Jones reaching into the front passenger area of the Kia. Fearing that he was

reaching for a gun, Officer Miles drew his weapon and instructed Jones to stop. As

Officer Miles approached him, Jones threw a plastic baggie to the ground near Officer

Miles and ran down the street. After a significant foot chase, Officer Miles eventually

caught Jones. The third individual who exited the Kia was never identified or located.

After learning the identities of Johnson and Jones and discovering outstanding

Kansas City warrants for them, the officers arrested and searched them. On Johnson,

they found a Crown Royal bag containing 37 baggies of marijuana, but he had no

cash. On the other hand, Jones had no drugs on him but carried $3,149.00, mostly in

ten and twenty dollar denominations. The officers also conducted an inventory search

of the Kia before having it towed. In it, they found a plastic bag under the driver’s

seat containing 57.30 grams of crack cocaine and more than sixty .22 caliber bullets

in the trunk. The baggie that Jones had thrown to the ground prior to fleeing from

Officer Miles was later found to contain 4.46 grams of crack cocaine wrapped in eight

plastic baggies. 

At trial, the Government presented expert testimony about street-level narcotics

dealing from an experienced undercover Kansas City police officer. Among other

things, he testified that it is common for street-level dealers to operate in teams of two

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
2

Jones was also convicted for possession with intent to distribute five grams or

more of crack cocaine stemming from an August 20, 2003 traffic stop. Jones does not

challenge his conviction on that count.

3

In their motions for judgments of acquittal, both Johnson and Jones

alternatively moved for new trials. Neither appeals the denial of his respective motion

for a new trial.

-4-

or three, with one person handling the drugs, another the cash, and a third a weapon.

In addition to the expert’s testimony, the Government introduced evidence that each

defendant had prior convictions for selling crack cocaine.

Johnson and Jones each made a motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R.

Crim. P. 29 at the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, and the district court

denied both motions. A jury convicted Johnson on three counts: conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, possession with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and possession with intent to

distribute marijuana. Johnson does not challenge his conviction on the marijuana

charge. The jury also convicted Jones on three counts stemming from the events of

December 7, 2003: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more

of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base

for the 57.30 grams of crack cocaine found under the driver’s seat of the car and

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base for the 4.46 grams of crack cocaine

that he threw to the ground.2

 After trial, both Johnson and Jones filed written motions

for judgments of acquittal which the district court denied. The district court sentenced

both Johnson and Jones to life in prison pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and

851. 

Johnson and Jones appeal the denials of their motions for judgments of

acquittal.3

 Johnson asserts that the evidence presented by the Government at trial was

insufficient to support his convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Jones similarly challenges the

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
-5-

sufficiency of the evidence for his conspiracy conviction. In addition, Jones argues

that the charge against him for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute

50 grams or more of cocaine base was improper. We address each of these issues in

turn. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de

novo. United States v. Winston, 456 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2006). In doing so, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, accepting all

reasonable inferences from the evidence that support the jury’s verdict. Id. We will

uphold the conviction “as long as there is an interpretation of the evidence that would

allow a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

and alterations omitted). 

A. Conspiracy

In order to convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the Government must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “(1) had an agreement to achieve

an illegal purpose, (2) knew of the agreement, and (3) knowingly became part of the

agreement.” Winston, 456 F.3d at 866 (quotation omitted). Either direct or

circumstantial evidence may be used to prove a conspiracy. United States v. Lopez,

443 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Parra v. United

States, 127 S. Ct. 214 (2006). 

Ample evidence presented in the Government’s case-in-chief supports the

conspiracy convictions against both Johnson and Jones. The arresting officers

observed Johnson in the driver’s seat and Jones in the passenger’s seat of the vehicle

in which the officers later found 57.30 grams of crack cocaine under the driver’s seat.

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
-6-

The officers also observed a third person in the vehicle at the same time who later left

the scene and was never apprehended. Both Johnson and Jones fled from the police.

See United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 731 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Flight from law

enforcement officers can be probative of consciousness of guilt and may further a

conspiracy.”). Before he fled, Jones loitered around the car and attempted to reach

into the front passenger-side area. When Officer Miles ordered Jones to move away

from the vehicle, he saw Jones throw a baggie to the ground. The baggie was later

found to contain 4.46 grams of crack cocaine packaged in eight smaller baggies. In

addition to this evidence, Johnson and Jones had each been convicted before on crackrelated offenses. The Government introduced these convictions pursuant to Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b), an issue not challenged here, and they are probative of knowledge of the

conspiracy and intent. See United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 894 (8th Cir. 2005)

(noting that prior convictions for possessing or distributing drugs are relevant to show

knowledge and intent in a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs), cert. denied sub

nom. Parker v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 492 (2005).

A search revealed that Johnson carried distribution-quantities of marijuana on

him, packaged for resale, but he had no cash. On Jones, the police found $3,149.00

in mostly ten and twenty dollar bills, but he had no drugs. To explain this evidence,

the Government presented expert testimony, the admissibility of which is not

challenged here, establishing that it is common for street-level drug dealing operations

to use three-man teams where one handles the drugs, one handles the money, and one

carries a gun. The expert accounted for this separation of functions in street-level

drug dealing by identifying a popular misconception among drug dealers that as long

as the same individual does not handle both the drugs and the money in a drug

transaction, then no prosecutable drug sale has occurred. The expert also testified that

street-level dealers commonly make ten and twenty dollar transactions and, as a result,

carry large quantities of ten and twenty dollar bills. He went on to explain that the

large amounts of cash carried by drug dealers often require the presence of weapons

for security purposes. 

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
-7-

In sum, the evidence presented by the Government, construed in its favor,

supports a reasonable inference that Johnson, Jones and the unidentified third

individual were acting as a street-level drug-dealing team as described by the

Government’s expert. Consequently, the evidence presented by the Government is

sufficient for a reasonable jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that

Johnson and Jones conspired to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams

of crack cocaine. 

B. Possession with Intent to Distribute

1. Johnson

This evidence is also sufficient to prove that Johnson possessed with intent to

distribute the 57.30 grams of crack cocaine. Johnson only challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence with respect to the possession element of this charge. To prove

possession, the Government may show that Johnson constructively possessed the

57.30 grams of crack cocaine. United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir.

2004). To prove constructive possession, the Government must show that Johnson

had “knowledge and ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself, or

dominion over the vehicle in which the contraband is concealed.” Id. (internal

quotation and alterations omitted). Johnson’s presence in the driver’s seat of the car

is probative of his control over the crack cocaine found under that seat. See id. It is

also a reasonable inference, favorable to the jury’s verdict, that Johnson fled from the

police in order to physically distance himself from the crack cocaine under the driver’s

seat; thus, his flight is probative of his knowledge. In light of the expert’s testimony

about street-level drug dealing arrangements, it was reasonable for the jury to find that

Johnson knew of and controlled the crack cocaine since he had marijuana on him and

no cash, yet Jones had a significant amount of cash on him and no drugs. From all of

this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
-8-

Johnson possessed the 57.30 grams of crack cocaine found beneath the driver’s seat

of the Kia. 

Alternatively, the jury could have reasonably determined that Johnson and

Jones jointly possessed the 57.30 grams of crack cocaine. United States v. Cawthorn,

429 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ossession need not be exclusive, but may be

joint.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 25, 2006) (No. 05-11273). As discussed, the

Government presented evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred

that Johnson and Jones were operating as a street-level drug dealing team. The 57.30

grams of crack cocaine under Johnson’s seat was reasonably accessible to both men,

and both ultimately fled from the area of the vehicle. On this evidence, a reasonable

jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson and Jones jointly

had knowledge, ownership, dominion and control over the 57.30 grams of crack

cocaine in the car. 

2. Jones

Next, Jones argues that his conviction for aiding and abetting possession with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base is improper for two reasons.

First, Jones asserts that Johnson was not charged as a principal in the underlying

offense. This argument is factually wrong. In Count III of the superseding

indictment, both Johnson and Jones were charged with the principal offense of

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base as well as aiding

and abetting each other. Second, Jones argues that he was convicted in Count IV for

the same offense as in Count III: possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or

more of crack cocaine. Jones is incorrect here as well. The superseding indictment,

jury instructions, verdict form and criminal judgment all show that Count IV charged

Jones with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, with no reference to

quantity. As the Government argued at trial, this charge was based on Jones’s

possession of the 4.46 grams of crack cocaine that he discarded in front of Officer

Miles. Jones’s second argument therefore also fails for want of a correct premise. 

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472
-9-

Jones also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction

on Count IV. The 4.46 grams of crack cocaine packaged in eight smaller baggies that

Officer Miles saw Jones throw down, his flight from Officer Miles and the large sum

of small bills found on him at the time of his arrest on December 7, 2003 is more than

sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could have found Jones guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt for possession with intent to distribute the 4.46 grams of crack

cocaine. See, e.g., United States v. White, 969 F.2d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding

similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine). 

Finally, it is Eighth Circuit policy not to address issues raised by a defendant

in pro se filings with this Court when he is represented by counsel. United States v.

Halverson, 973 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Nevertheless, we have

reviewed Jones’s pro se filing and find his additional arguments unpersuasive. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of Johnson and Jones.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-4426 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/07/2006 Entry ID: 2116472