Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01042/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01042-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randolph R. McNeal
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 88-1042 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RANDOLPH R. McNEAL, a/k/a ) 

BOBBY McNEAL, 

} 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

· FILED 

United S;,atoa Court of Appeals fenth Circl.~jl 

JAN ~ 0 19a9 

RO~ERrr L. HOEC.KE.R 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

{D.C. No. 87-20076-02) 

David J. Phillips, Branch Chief, Federal Public Defender (Charles 

D. Anderson, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), 

District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Julie A. Robinson, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, 

Kansas (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., u.s. Attorney, District of 

Kansas, with her on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, TACHA, and McWILLIAMS; Circuit Judges. 

· McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 1 
On September 6, 1985, two persons held up a credit union in 

Kansas City,. Kansas, and escaped with $4,966 . 09. During the ~ 

course of the robbery one of the robbers took a Colt Diamondback 

.38 caliber revolver from the security guard at the credit union. 

On July 11, 1986, Jockenna O'Neal was arrested on a disturbance 

charge and at the time of her arrest she had in her possession a 

Colt Diamondback .38 caliber revolver. O'Neal _stated that she had 

purchased the revolver from Terry McNeal in April 1986. A checK 

of the serial number revealed that the weapon recovered from 

O'Neal was the weapon taken in the credit union robbery. The 

investigating officers then showed O'Neal a series of surveillance 

photos taken during the course of the robbery, and she identified 

Terry McNeal and his brother, Bobby McNeal, as the two robbers. 

By a second superseding indictment filed on October 27, 1987, 

Randolph R. McNeal, also known as Bobby McNeal, and Terry Lee 

McNeal were charged in the first count of a three-count indictment 

with taking by force and violence from the persons of Pamela 

Hecht, Gloria Oliver, and Paulette Reyes on September 6, 1985, 

$4,966.09 in coin and currency belonging to the Mid-American 

Credit Union, Challenger, K.C. office loca ted at 720 Simpson 

Street, Kansas City, Kansas, whose ~deposits" were insured by the 

National Credit Union Administration. In that same count it was 

further alleged that during the course of the robbery the McNeal 

brothers assaulted and put in jeopardy the lives of named credit 

union employees by the use of a handgun, all in violation of 1 8 

U. S.C. § 2113{a) and (d) {198 4). 

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In Count 2 of the indictment, Bobby McNeal was ,charged with 

using a · chrome .22 caliber automatic handgun in the robbery of t he 

credit union, in violation of 18 O.S.C. S 924(c) (1976). 

In Count 3, Terry McNeal was charged -with using a Col t 

Diamondback revolver in the robbery of the credit union, in violation of 18 O.S.C. § 924 {c) {1976). 

In a joint trial, a jury convicted the McNeals on all three 

counts. Bobby McNeal was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment on Count 1, and to five years on Count 2, the two sentences 

to be served consecutively. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1985), 

Bobby McNeal was ordered to make restitution in the amount of 

$2,483.04 and, pursuant to 18 u.s.c . § 3013 (1985), he was assessed $50 on each count, payable to the Crime Victim•s Fund. 

Terry McNeal was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on 

Count l, and five years on Count 3, the two sentences to be 

served consecutively . He was also ordered to make restitution to 

the credit union in the amount of $2,483.04 and to pay to the 

Crime Victim's Fund $50 per counto 

By separate appeals with different counsel, the McNeals seek 

reversal on several grounds, some of which, though not all, 

overlap. The appeals were not consolidated and will be disposed 

of in separate opinions. The background facts will be set forth 

in this opinion and will not be repeated in the opinion in Terry 

McNeal's appeal. 

The two suspects who robbed the credit union wore disguises 

and large dark sunglasses. One wore a striped shirt and a fishing· 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 3 
hat. The other wore an Afro wig, was dressed in a blue jogging 

suit and had a woman's facial ma~e-up. 

As indicated, the robbers made a successful escape from the 

scene of the robbery. Apparently the "break" in the case occurre d 

some ten months later when Jockenna O'Neal was arrested and the 

revolver taken from her at the time of her arrest was determined, 

through a check of the serial number, to be the revolver taken 

from the guard in the robbery of the credit union. O'Neal told 

the pol ice investigating the case, and later so testified at 

trial, that she bought the revolver from Terry McNeal in April 

1986. She also identified the robbers in the surveillance photos 

taken during the robbery as Terry and Bobby McNeal. 

It was established at t rial, at least prima facie, that the 

robber, who assaulted the security guard and knocked the guard 

down three times during the assault, stole his gun and pistolwhipped him was the person wearing the fishing hat, and that the 

robber wearing the Afro wig was the person who went behind the 

teller's cage, fired his pistol at the security guard, and 

demanded money from the tellers. The government's theory of the 

case was that Terry McNeal was the robber in the fishing hat who 

assaulted the security guard, and Bobby McNeal was the robber who 

collected the money in the teller's cage. 

The testimony of the eye witnesses to the robbery, however, 

was not uniform. The security guard who was assaulted, and from 

whom the Colt Diamondback revolver was taken, could not identify 

either of the defendants as being one of t he robbers. A custome r 

who was in the credit union at the time of the robbery identified 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 4 
Terry McNeal as being the one who assaulted the guard, hut he was 

unable to identify Bobby McNeal as the other robber. Paulette 

Reyes, a teller, incorrectly identified Terry McNeal as the robber 

who went behind the teller•s- cage and collected the money. 

However, Pamela Hecht, an assistant manager, testified that it was 

Terry McNeal who assaulted the guard and ident ified Bobby McNeal 

as the robber who went behind the teller's cage and obtained the 

money. 

Defense counsel called another customer and another teller 

who could not identify either of the defendants as the robbers. 

Terry McNeal called several witnesses in an attempt to establish 

his alibi. However, neither Terry nor Bobby McNeal testified. 

I. ''Accounts" vis-a-vis "Deposits" 

Count 1 charged a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a) and (d). 

Section (a) provides that whoever by force takes money belonging 

to a "bank" or "credit uni on" shall be fined not more than $5 , 000 

or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. Section (d) 

provides that whoever violates section (a) and in so doing assaults a person by use of a dangerous weapon shall be fined not 

more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both. 

Sec t ion (f) provides that the term "bank" includes "any bank the 

deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation" (emphasis added). Section (h) states that the term 

"credit union" includes a "[~]tate-chartered credit union the accounts of which are insured by the Administrator of. the National 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 5 
Credit Union Administration" (emphasis added). 18 u.s.c. § 2113 

(1984). 

The credit union in the instant case was a state-chartered 

credit union. The · government alleged in each of the three coun ts 

that the "deposits of Mid-Amer ican Credi t Union, Challenger, K.C. 

office were insured by the National Credit Union Administration•• 

(emphasis added). Why the government eschewed the use of the term 

"accounts," and used the term "deposits," is not clear. In drawing an indictment, the safer course is to use the language of the 

statute. In any event, according to appellant, the use of the 

term "deposit" is appropriate where a bank is involved, but inappropriate where a credit union is involved and, therefore, is 

fatal to the indictment. In other words, appellant argues that 

referring to "deposits" of the credit union, instead of "accounts," which is the statutory language, renders the entire 

indictment subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state an 

offense. Appellant further contends that this error was 

compounded by the court's instructions, which also referred to the 

credit union's ••deposits," as oppos ed to "accounts." 

Appellant has not drawn our attention to any case holding 

that an allegation in an indictment that a state-chartered credit 

union had its "deposits"--as opposed to " accounts"--insur ed by the 

National Credit Uni on Administration is such a departure from t he 

statute as to render an indictment subject to a motion to dismiss 

for failing to charge a crime. An indictment is sufficient if it 

contains the elements of the offense charged- and fairly informs 

the defendant of the . charge against which he must defend , and, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 6 
secondly, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar 

of future prosecut ions for the same offense. United States v. 

Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647 (lOth Cir. 1987) (citing United States 

v. Rudetsky, 535 - F.2d 556, 562 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 u.s. 

820 {1976)); United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482 (lOth Cir. 

1983), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1110 (1985). Although it is quite 

true that the statute refers to a bank's ''deposits," and a credit 

union's "accounts," we decline to hold that referring to a ciedit 

union's •• deposits," instead of "accounts," is fa tal . 

In United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156 (lOth Cir. 1983), 

cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036 (1984), the indictment alleged that 

the insuring agency was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(FDIC), when it should have been described as the Federal Savings 

and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Id. at 1158-61. There we 

held that notwithstanding the erroneous reference to FDIC, the 

indictment specifically informed the defendant of the nature of 

the alleged offense and the statutory violation charged, and that 

the erroneous reference did not subject the defendant to the possibility of double jeopardy. Id. at 1159 . In the instant case, 

although there is a technical difference between a bank ''deposit" 

and a credit union "account," each represents money given by one 

to another, for the benefit and use of the former at his 

direction. Therefore, the indi ctment in the present case was 

sufficient. 

Additionally, in line with the foregoing discussion, it was 

not error for the district court to instruct the jury that an es-

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 7 
sential element of Count 1 was that the credit union' s "deposi ts " 

were insured by the National Credit Union Administration. 

II. Federal Insurance 

An essential element in each of the three counts was that the 

"Mid-American Credit Union, Challenger , K.C. office 11 had its 

11 deposits, 11 or accounts, regardless of how such be char~ct eri zed , 

insured by the National Credit Union Administration. Absent 

federal insurance there would be no federal jurisdiction and, in 

such circumstance, the McNeals would have been prosecuted in the 

state courts of Kansas. Appellant, however, contends that the 

evidence in the instant case was insufficient to establish that 

the credit union carried federal insurance. Such is not our reading of the record. 

In the present case, exhibit 26 is a certificate from the 

National Credit Union Administration showing that a predecessor 

credit union to Mid-American was federally insured. There was 

testimony that Mid-American did not receive a yearly updated 

certificate , even though insurance premiums were pa i d by wire 

transfer the first of each year for the preceding year . Mary 

Pope, a senior vice president of Mid-American , testified that the 

deposits of Mid-American were federally insured on the date of the 

robbery and exhibits 27 and 28 were offered and received into 

evidence in support of her testimony regarding federal insurance . 

In aid of our analysis is United States v. Bolt, 776 F.2d 

1463 (lOth Cir. 1985). In Bo~t, we held that an FDIC certificate, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 8 
a cancelled premium check, and testimony 

preside~t that bank deposits were federally 

sufficient proof of federal insurance. 

from a bank's vice 

insured constituted 

Id. at 471. Bolt is 

distinguished from United States v. Platenberg, 657 F.2d 797 (5th 

Cir. 1981), where a seven-year old certificate, and nothing more, 

was he l d to be insufficient to show federal insurance on the date 

of a robbery. All things considered, there was sufficient 

evidence to show that Mid-American had federal insurance. 

III. Instruction No. 13 

By Instruction No. 13 the jury was first advised that Counts 

2 a nd 3 were distinct offenses from the offense charged in Count 

1. In that connection, the jury was then instructed as concerns 

both defendants that if the jury found the defendants not guilty 

under Count 1, then the jury must find the defendants not gu i lty 

under Counts 2 and 3, and, conversely, if the jury found the 

defendants guilty under Count 1, then the jury must find the 

defendants guilty under Counts 2 and 3. 

On appeal, Bobby McNeal objects to that part of the foregoing 

instruction which states that if the jury finds him guilty under 

Count 1, it must find him guilty under Count 2. He, of course, 

has no objection to the first part of that same instruction whi ch 

instructed the jury that if it finds him not guilty under Count 1, 

it must find him not guilty under Count 2. Nevertheless, his 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 9 
argument is that the instruction invades the province of the jury 

and, in effect, instructs the jury to find him guilty under Count 

2, ·no matter what~ We are not in accord with that argument. 

In the first place, our study of the record indicates that no 

such objection to Instruction No. 13 was voiced in the district 

court. Accordingly, it will not be considered by us for the first 

time on appeal unless it be plain error; which it is not. Big 

Horn C9al Company v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 852 F.2d 1259, 

1274 {lOth Cir. 1988) (citing Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 

1412 , 1427-48 (lOth Cir. 1987}; ~also EEOC v . Prudential Fed. 

Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1174 n.S (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). 

Bobby McNeal's argument relates only to his conviction under 

Count 2, and has no effect on his conviction under Count 1. The 

instruction advises the jury that if it convicts Bobby McNeal 

under Count 1, then, and only then, it must convict Bobby McNeal 

under Count 2. The purpose behind this instruction is to head off 

a possible post-trial motion of inconsistent verdicts, for 

example, the jury might find Bobby McNeal not guilty under Count 

1, but guilty under Count 2, or vice versa. The instruction is 

conditional, that is, the jury must first determine whether Bobby 

McNeal is, or is not, guilty under Count 1. 

The one case relied on by appellant, United States v. Mentz, 

840 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1988), is inapposite. There a divided 

panel, in the Sixth Circuit, held that it was reversible error for 

a district ju~ge to instruct a ju~y in a bank robbery case that· 

the bank was a national bank and that its deposits were insured by 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 10 
FDIC. In t'he present case, the jury was not instructed on which 

result it should reach on any element of the crime. 

Rather, the present case is more like United States. v. 

Harvey, 756 F.2d 636 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, Harvey v. United 

States, 474 u.s. 831 (1985). In that case the · defendant was 

charged in separate counts with kidnapping and use of a firearm in 

the kidnapping. in this regard, the jury was instructed that if 

they found the defendant not guilty of kidnapping, they must find 

him not guilty on the firearm charge, and, conversely, if they 

found the defendant guilty of kidnapping, they should find him 

guilty of the firearm charge. In Harvey, as in the instant case, 

no objection was made in the trial court to the instruction. on 

appeal when the instruction was challenged, the Eighth Circuit 

held that any arguable error was not plain error. Id. at 645-46. 

Consequently, we find no plain error in the trial court's 

Instruction No. 13. 

IV. Eyewitness Testimony 

Appellant tendered an instruction which would caution the 

jury in its handling of an identification made by an eyewitness to 

a crime. The instruction paralleled an instruction set out in the 

appendix to United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. 

Cir. 1972). Appellant's instruction was rejected by the district 

court, and this ruling is now urged as reversible error. We do 

not agree. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 11 
This Circuit addressed Telfaire in United States v. Cueto, 

628 F.2d 1272 (lOth Cir. 1980), where we held that it was not error for a district court to refuse to give a Telfai re instruction 

when the government's case did not hang on the identification made 

by a single eyewitness and where there was other corroborating 

evidence. Id. at 1276. Further, in United States v. Thoma, 713 

F.2d 604, 608 (lOth Cir;), cert . denied, 464 u.s. 1047 (1984), we 

spoke as follows: 

When a cautionary instruction on the possible 

infirmities of eyewitness testimony is requested and not 

given, on appeal we will focus on the facts of each case 

to determine whether the instruction was required to 

fairly present the case to the jury. In particular, we 

will consider whether identification was the sole or 

primary issue in the case, whether the evidence 

consisted mainly of eyewitness identification testimony, 

and whether that testimony was uncertain, qual ified, or 

suggested a serious quest ion whether the witnesses had 

an adequate opportunity to observe. In the instant 

case, the government's case d i d not depend upon a single 

eyewitness, but upon several witnesses whose identifications were not shaken despite some uncertainties and 

disparities in their testimony and whose testimony was 

partially supported by the testimony of the defendant's 

common-law wife. 

Thus, under t he facts in Thoma, we held that the failure to give a 

cautionary instruction was not reversible error. 

In th~ instant case, Pamela Hecht, an assistant manager, 

identified Bobby McNeal as one of the robbers. Jockenna O'Neal, 

who testified that she had purchased the Colt Diamondback revolver 

from Terry McNeal, was shown a series of surveillance photos taken 

during the robbery, and at trial she identified both Terry McNeal 

and Bobby McNeal as the robbers. She was a long-time friend of 

the McNeal brothers a nd had on prior occasions even seen Bobby 

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Appellate Case: 88-1042 Document: 01019703029 Date Filed: 01/20/1989 Page: 12 
McNeal in the Afro wig like the one he was wearing during the robbery. Applying the analysis from Cueto and Thoma, we find no 

error in denying the Telefaire instruction. 

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

As stated above, Paulette Reyes, a teller, testified at trial 

that Terry McNeal was the robber who came behind the teller's cage 

and obtained the money. Other witnesses, however, testified that 

Terry McNeal was the individual who assaulted the guard, and that 

it was Bobby McNeal in the Afro wig who collected the money. In 

this setting, the following colloquy between government counsel 

and Paulette Reyes took place: 

Government: Okay. Now the robber that you did see, you 

v i ewed a video lineup and do you recall picking someone 

in that lineup? 

Reyes: Yes. 

Government: But you picked the wrong person, correct? 

Reyes: Yes. 

Government: And would it surprise you if you learned 

that you picked the wrong person here in the courtroom 

today? 

At which time appellant immediately objected, and the objection 

was sustained. Appellant then moved for a mistri al, but that 

motion was denied. 

On appeal, the appellant argues that the comment of the 

government attorney constitutes prosecutorial misconduct which 

requires reversal. We disagree. In United States v. Alexander, 

849 F.2d 1293, 1297 (lOth Cir. 1988), we stated that prosecutorial 

misconduct is not ~ ~ reversible error, and that we should 

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first determine whether the prosecutor ' s conduct was improper, 

and, if improper, whether such requires a reversal or is harmless 

error . Id. at 1297 (citing United States v. Hastings, 461 u.s. 

499T 510 (1983)). In Alexander we concluded that prosecutorial 

error in that case, "if present, was harmless." 

In the present case, by the time the government questioned 

Ms. Reyes,· there had already been an eyewitness identification of 

Terry McNeal as the robber who remained in the lobby during t he 

robbery . Additionally, Jockenna O'Neal had already testified, and 

the surveillance photos of the robbery had been admitted into 

evidence. ThusT if there was any prosecutorial misconduct in the 

present case, it was minuscule, and all things considered, harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt . 

Judgment affirmed. 

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