Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01507/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01507-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Jane F. Garvey
Respondent
Town of Stratford, Connecticut
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 2000 Decided April 9, 2002

No. 99-1507

Town of Stratford, Connecticut,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Aviation Administration and

Jane F. Garvey,

Administrator,

Respondents

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Federal Aviation Administration

William A. Butler argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Robert H. Oakley, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and

Ellen Durkee, Attorney.

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Before: Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: The Town of Stratford

petitions for review of the Federal Aviation Administration's

Decision concerning the Bridgeport-Sikorsky Memorial Airport and disposal of land from the Stratford Army Engine

Plant. We conclude that Stratford lacks prudential standing

to pursue its claims that the FAA's Environmental Impact

Statement (EIS) was inadequate under the National Environmental Policy Act1 and that its remaining claims are without

merit. Stratford's petition is therefore denied.

I.

The Bridgeport-Sikorsky Memorial Airport (BDR) belongs

to Bridgeport, Connecticut, but actually sits in the neighboring town of Stratford. The airport is bounded by wetlands

and the Stewart B. McKinney National Wildlife Refuge,

Great Meadows Marsh to the southwest, by the Lordship

township to the south and east, by Connecticut State Highway 113 (Stratford's "Main Street") to the northeast, and by

the residential township to the northwest. Across Main

Street from the airport is the Stratford Army Engine Plant

(SAEP), which has closed. Stratford and Bridgeport have

had a number of disputes over the airport, some of which

focused on the property tax revenues Stratford loses because

of the airport's municipal status. In 1978, the disputes

resulted in a court-approved settlement that required Bridgeport to obtain Stratford's permission for "the acquisition of

land for the purposes of extension of the airport runways, and

... for the extension of any of the airport runways." The

__________

1 42 U.S.C. ss 4321-4370e. Stratford also invokes two sets of

NEPA implementing regulations--those of the Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. 1500-17, and the Airport Environmental

Handbook, FAA Order 5050.4A for implementation of NEPA.

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airport has two runways currently in use: Runway 6-24,

which is the primary one, and Runway 11-29.2

Bridgeport has filed an "Airport Master Plan" with the

FAA that calls for the renovation of the two runways, beginning with Runway 6-24, and the addition of several safety

enhancements. Bridgeport asserts that the concrete on Runway 6-24 needs replacement to make the airport safer. Replacing the concrete is a "reconstruction ... of a runway,"

which requires the city to construct "a [runway] safety area

that conforms to the dimensions acceptable to the [FAA]" at

the time of reconstruction. 14 C.F.R. 139.309(a)(2).

The length of a runway safety area is determined by an

airport's "design classification," a description of the largest

class of aircraft that uses the runway for 500 or more

operations per year. The category is determined by the

design aircraft's landing-approach speed and the group by the

design aircraft's wingspan. The recommended safety area

for a C-II airport is 1000 feet long by 500 feet wide at either

end of the runway. (By contrast, a B-II airport has a

recommended safety area of only 600 feet by 300 feet.) BDR

is currently a C-II airport, the safety areas for which would

require expansion of the airport (although not the runways

themselves) into the space currently occupied by Main Street

and beyond.

After receiving Bridgeport's Airport Plan, the FAA prepared an EIS evaluating various possible safety measures at

the airport. The EIS' Statement of Purpose and Need

outlined its general objective of increasing safety for general/corporate and commercial aviation services. The EIS considered three groups of alternatives. The Preferred Alternative shifted runway 6-24 to the northeast, provided for a new

taxiway area (which encroaches on the SAEP), provided for

safety areas of 1000 feet on either end of the runway, placed a

light system on a catwalk through wetlands, required the

rerouting of Main Street through the SAEP, recommended

__________

2 Runways are named for their headings, to the nearest 10ø.

Runway 6-24 runs 60ø and 240ø, depending on which way a plane

comes in. Runway 11-29 runs 110ø and 290ø.

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annexation of four SAEP acres and placing "avigation restrictions covering height and electromagnetic, smoke, and light

emissions," on an additional five,3 and created wetland impacts which would require mitigation. Importantly, the Preferred Alternative did not contemplate extending the runway

itself.

The FAA then issued its Decision, which followed the EIS,

approving in most part the Airport Master Plan, including

expanded safety areas. Stratford petitions for review of that

Decision on three grounds: first, that the FAA's Environmental Impact Statement was inadequate under NEPA, the

CEQ regulations and Airport Handbook; second, the FAA

violated the Airports and Airways Improvement Act;4 and

third, subsequent events require preparation of a Supplemental EIS.

While the FAA was considering the Airport Master Plan,

the SAEP was scheduled for closure under the Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510

(1990), and the recommendations of the 1995 Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Commission (collectively "BRAC"),

and the Army was considering how to dispose of that land.

BRAC sets forth the federal policy preference of returning

the land of closing bases to the host community-in this case,

Stratford. As part of the base closure process, the Army also

prepared an EIS. Its Preferred Alternative was the "Encumbered Disposal Alternative," which would transfer the

SAEP land to Stratford subject to restrictions preventing

redevelopment of the property from interfering with BDR

and from producing excessive wetland or other environmental

impacts. In its EIS, the Army discussed the economic effects

of the proposed safety enhancements as well as the potential

conflict between protecting BDR's operations and Stratford's

__________

3 These avigation restrictions create an imaginary geometric

plane above which structures cannot be built for fear of interfering

with aircraft in flight. This plane begins at the edge of the airport

and moves gradually upward, since the farther from the airport the

less the chance a low-flying plane would collide with a building.

4 49 U.S.C. ss 47101 et seq.

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redevelopment plans. The Army ultimately concluded that

its Preferred Alternative would not be expected to cause "any

serious disruption or impairment to redevelopment of the

site," in part because the encumbered parcel was at the fringe

of the SAEP in the area most prone to airport noise, which

made it the least desirable parcel for development. As for

moving Main Street, the Army concluded that it would entail

minor long term adverse impacts but would also produce

minor beneficial effects on air quality. The Army issued two

decisions concerning disposal of the disputed land, one in

January 2001, the other in November 2001. The FAA now

purports to rely on the Army's consideration of certain factors.

At oral argument, we sua sponte raised the question of

whether Stratford had been injured so that standing existed,

and whether the case was ripe for decision. We had two

primary concerns: first, the Army had not yet issued its

decision concerning disposal of the SAEP land. Second,

Stratford claimed that it exercised veto power over a potential movement of Main Street, which called into question the

likelihood of the FAA's Preferred Alternative ever being

implemented. After the Army issued its decision, the parties

submitted supplemental briefing concerning standing and

ripeness. The FAA told us "that the Administrator ... has

concluded that the FAA will seek to condemn the road so that

the airport enhancements needed for safety reasons can be

constructed at BDR." Stratford, therefore, will no longer be

able to exercise veto power over a movement of Main Street.

With the issuance of the Army's decision and FAA counsel's

representation as to condemnation, Stratford's petition is ripe

for review.5 We are also satisfied that Stratford meets the

requirements for Article III standing because its developmental prospects are clearly impaired.

__________

5 Although the City of Bridgeport must still obtain certain

permits in order for the airport redevelopment to progress, the

Decision itself is ripe for review even if the sponsor has yet to get

all of the permits required for construction. See City of Bridgeton

v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448, 436 n.6 (8th Cir. 2000).

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II.

Although we conclude that Stratford has suffered an injury-in-fact, there still remains the question whether it has

prudential standing to raise its NEPA, CEQ, and Airport

Handbook claims. Stratford does assert that relocating Main

Street will add almost a minute of travel time to automobile

users of Main Street--including its emergency personnel--

but the Town does not claim that it (or anyone else) will

suffer any environmental injury because of that delay. Nor

does Stratford claim that its other injury-in-fact--that but for

the FAA's decision nine additional acres would be available

for development--has any negative environmental consequences.

Since NEPA does not create a private right of action,

petitioner relies on the APA, which limits prudential standing

to an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of the substantive

statute upon which the claim is based. 5 U.S.C. s 702; see

also Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.

Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). But we have squarely held that a

NEPA claim may not be raised by a party with no claimed or

apparent environmental interest. See, e.g., ANR Pipeline Co.

v. FERC, 205 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2000). It cannot be

used as a handy stick by a party with no interest in protecting against an environmental injury to attack a defendant.

To be sure, the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154 (1997), in reversing the Ninth Circuit, not surprisingly recognized that the Endangered Species Act did allow a

petitioner with only economic interests to challenge an action

of the Fish and Wildlife Service. That was because the

specific section of the statute upon which the petitioners

(irrigation districts and ranchers) relied was drafted at least

in part to avoid needless economic dislocation. The Court

emphasized that a court must examine--not just the general

aims of a statute--but the specific provision in question to

determine whether a plaintiff or petitioner has prudential

standing.

Although petitioner in our case does not even suggest a

real basis for prudential standing, the government points us

to an Eighth Circuit case, Friends of the Boundary Waters

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Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999), reasoning that a CEQ regulation implementing NEPA can confer

prudential standing on a petitioner asserting an economic

injury even if the statute does not. The regulation provides

that "human environment" as used in the statute "shall be

interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that

environment." 40 C.F.R. 1508.14. And the regulation further states that:

This means that economic and social effects are not

intended by themselves to require preparation of an

environmental impact statement. When an environmental impact statement is prepared and economic or social

and natural or physical environmental effects are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement will discuss all of these effects on the human environment.

Id. The Eighth Circuit read the Bennett reference to "the

particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies" to

include a provision of an implementing regulation--even

though the Supreme Court quite clearly in Bennett was

referring to a particular section of a statute.

We do not see how any agency regulation implementing a

statute could extend prudential standing beyond the class of

persons Congress intends, but, in any event, we do not read

the CEQ regulation as purporting to extend prudential standing. It does indicate that when economic and social effects

are interrelated with natural and physical environmental effects the EIS will "discuss" all of these effects, but it does not

require government agencies to take economic effects into

account. Moreover, the Town of Stratford is not even claiming, as did the ranchers in Bennett, that the government's

actions calculated to protect the environment directly harm

its economic interests, nor does it claim that those interests

are in any other manner interrelated with the environmental

effects. Instead, petitioner's assertion that the FAA's EIS is

defective because not sufficiently sensitive to environmental

concerns is truly unrelated--or at most "marginally related"--to the injury it asserts, except insofar as it argues that

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the entire Airport Plan should not go forward. Clarke v.

Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). In other

words, petitioner has not connected its claimed economic

injury to any environmental effects caused by the allegedly

defective EIS. Instead, its EIS claim is simply the "handy

stick" with which to attack the FAA.6

III.

In its remaining set of challenges, Stratford argues that the

FAA failed to comply with the Airports & Airways Improvement Act (AAIA) in various ways. It is claimed that the

Decision does not comply with 49 U.S.C. s 47106(a)(1), which

provides that a grant may be given to finance airport projects

only if the Secretary is satisfied that "the project is consistent

with plans (existing at the time the project is approved) of

public agencies authorized by the State in which the airport is

located to plan for the development of the area surrounding

the airport." The FAA responds that it is not clear that

Stratford is a "public agency" with planning authority as that

term is used in the statute. And the record indicates that

BDR has yet to apply for federal funding, making it unlikely

that this provision has been triggered. In any event, Stratford has not shown that the Decision is not "reasonably

consistent" with its planned redevelopment. See Suburban

O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

479 U.S. 847 (1986). According to "Stratford Visions: 2001--

__________

6 Stratford brings several other claims under an additional

CEQ regulation and several provisions of the FAA's Airport Environmental Handbook, each of which implement NEPA. These

include the Town's claims that the FAA's decision is arbitrary

because it fails to consider cumulative effects, alternative safety

measures, and potential conflicts with federal, state, and local land

use policies, among them BRAC and the settlement between Stratford and Bridgeport. Since Stratford does not have prudential

standing under 40 C.F.R. 1508.14, it follows that it does not have

prudential standing under the other CEQ regulation or Airport

Handbook provisions either. Nor does Stratford have prudential

standing to request preparation of a Supplemental EIS based on

intervening events.

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The Town's Plan of Development," Stratford seeks to "[e]ncourage land use management strategies which recognize the

airport as a legitimate use at its current location [and d]iscourage placement of structures and objects in the vicinity of

the airport, which would create hazards to air traffic and/or

create risks to property and life." Because the FAA conditioned the proposed safety enhancement on Bridgeport obtaining the necessary federal, state, and local permits, the

permitting process will ensure that the Airport Plan is consistent with local planning.

Stratford also asserts that the FAA failed to comply with

49 U.S.C. s 47106(b), which provides that before the FAA

approves a grant for airport development, the Secretary of

Transportation must be satisfied that "the sponsor, a public

agency, or the Government holds good title to the areas of the

airport used or intended to be used ... or that good title will

be acquired." As noted above, the record does not indicate

that Bridgeport has applied for funding yet. Moreover,

counsel for FAA has represented to us that the agency will

exercise its condemnation power to eliminate any issues over

title to the land under Main Street. Stratford's claim that

the FAA failed to comply with 49 U.S.C. s 47106(b)(2), which

requires that the Secretary be satisfied that the "interests of

the community in or near which the project may be located

have been given fair consideration" is also without merit.

The record reflects Stratford's self-described "extensive" involvement in the decisionmaking process.

Stratford's remaining two AAIA claims are based on 49

U.S.C. s 47106(c), which applies to "an airport development

project involving the location of an airport or runway or a

major runway extension." Under that section, the Secretary

must obtain a certification from the Governor of Connecticut

that the project will meet applicable air and water quality

standards, and if the Plan is found to have a significant

adverse effect on natural resources, the Secretary must also

determine that "no possible and prudent alternative to the

project exists and that every reasonable step has been taken

to minimize the adverse effect." The government maintains

that the section only applies to the location of a new runway,

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or a major expansion of an existing runway, and the Airport

Plan does not contemplate either.

Stratford argues that the shifting of the runway 700 feet to

the northeast, while maintaining the same compass headings,

is a "location of [a] runway." We are not persuaded by

Stratford's argument that the term "location" must include

any relocation--no matter how minor. It seems apparent to

us that the statutory term "location" is ambiguous. That

being so, the only question for us is whether, under Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837 (1984), the FAA's interpretation is based on a

reasonable construction, and we think that it is.

In the alternative, the Town argues that the renovation

must be a "major" runway extension. The FAA has keyed

the definition of "major" to noise impacts, defining a major

runway expansion as one that will permit the accommodation

of aircraft that would result in an increase in noise of three

decibels, an interpretation the Seventh Circuit concluded was

reasonable in Suburban O'Hare Commission, 787 F.2d at

199-200. As the Secretary points out, Stratford's suggestion,

that even if the renovation was not a "major" runway extension it was a runway location, would lead to the odd result

that a runway extension, no matter what length, would not

trigger AAIA's requirement unless it resulted in a significant

increase in noise, yet any partial relocation, no matter how

minor, would trigger section (c). But both new runways and

major runway extensions potentially allow more aircraft and

exposure of the surrounding areas to additional noise. Because the Airport Plan does not contemplate either a "location

of a runway" or a "major runway extension," section (c) does

not apply, and Stratford's argument founders on a threshold

reef.

Accordingly, Stratford's petition for review is denied.

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