Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06122/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James D. Bednar
Appellant
Sara W. McFall
Appellee
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System
Not Party
The State of Oklahoma
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 19 2005 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

PATRICK FISHER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

SARA W. McFALL, J.D., 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

V. 

JAMES D. BEDNAR, J.D., in his 

individual capacity; 

Defendant - Appellant, 

and 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

ex rel., THE OKLAHOMA 

INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM, a 

state agency, 

Defendants. 

No. 04-6122 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-03-0351-T) 

Robert M. Anthony, (Robert S. Lafferrandre with him on the briefs) Pierce, 

Couch, Hendrickson, Baysinger & Green, L.L.P ., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for 

De fcndant-Appellant. 

Scott F. Brockman, (Stanley M. Ward and Woodrow K. Glass with him on the 

brief) Ward & Glass, L.L.P., Norman, Oklahoma for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

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Before SEYMOUR and HARTZ, Circuit Judges, and BRACK, District Judge.• 

BRACK, District Judge. 

Defendant-Appellant, Executive Director of the Oklahoma Indigent 

Defense System ("OIDS"), appeals from the district court's order denying: 1) his 

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff-Appellee's claim of wrongful 

termination in violation of her First Amendment freedom of speech rights; and 2) 

his claim of qualified immunity. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and we AFFIRM. 

Background 

OIDS provides representation to indigent criminal defendants. OIDS 

implemented a new procedure for the selection and retention of expert witnesses 

shortly before Plaintiff-Appellee Sara McFall ("Ms. McFall") began working 

there. Under the new procedure, either the Chief of Psychological Services, Dr. 

Kathy LaFortune ("Dr. LaFortune"), or the Chief of Forensic Services, Laura 

Schilc ("Ms. Schile"), had to approve requests for experts. Dr. LaFortune was 

married to a prosecutor and was herself an attorney. Ms. Schile had previously 

*The Honorable Robert C. Brack, United States District Judge for the District of 

New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

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worked in law enforcement and was not an attorney. James Bednar ("Mr. 

Bednar"), Executive Director at OIDS, had final approval of the expert requests. 

OIDS implemented the new procedure to upgrade the quality of expert services 

for clients and reduce costs in the wake of state-wide budget cuts. Under the 

previous system, any Chief could approve the retention of an expert for up to 

$5,000. 

On July 1, 2002, Ms. McFall began her six-week employment with OIDS. 

Ms. McFall served as Chief of the Capital Trials Norman Division and supervised 

a group of attorneys in their handling of the defense in capital cases. 

On July 3, 2002, after meeting with her staff, Ms. McFall met with Mr. 

Bednar to discuss the new expert approval process. Ms. McFall expressed to Mr. 

Bednar concerns about: the amount of time it took to respond to requests for 

experts; the potential for conflicts of interest with Dr. LaFortune; and the 

competency of Dr. LaFortune and Ms. Schile to make trial strategy decisions and 

evaluate the need for experts. 

On July 10, 2002, Jim Rowan ("Mr. Rowan"), one of the attorneys under 

Ms. McFall 's supervision, submitted a request to Ms. Schile for approval of 

expert witnesses in one of his cases (the Jackson case). Both Ms. Schile and Mr. 

Bednar knew that Mr. Rowan had to disclose his list of witnesses to the court by 

August 7, 2002. On July 31, 2002, Mr. Rowan and his co-counsel met with Ms. 

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Schile to discuss the pending request. After the meeting, Ms. Schile complained 

to Mr. Bednar that Mr. Rowan had been rude to her and Mr. Bednar sent an email 

to Mr. Rowan stating that "your continued lack of cooperation and refusal to 

follow agency procedures will only result in a delay of your request for experts." 

On August 5, 2002, Ms. McFall and Mr. Rowan decided that Mr. Rowan 

should approach the court in the Jackson case and make a record in order to 

preserve the issue on appeal that an expert had not been retained in time to meet 

the court imposed deadline due to a delay in OIDS' s internal expert witness 

request process. On August 13, 2002, Ms. McFall and the other Chiefs met with 

Mr. Bednar. Ms. McFall again raised the issue of making a record for appeal in 

the Jackson case. Mr. Bednar prohibited Ms. McFall and all other attorneys from 

making such a record despite Ms. McFall' s concerns that the quality of the legal 

services OIDS provided to clients and the attorneys' effectiveness would be 

scrutinized on appeal in that case. 

In another instance regarding the Jackson case, Ms. McFall and Mr. Rowan 

expressed to Dr. LaFortune their concerns about a possible conflict of interest Dr. 

Lafortune had in the approval of expert witnesses because her husband was the 

prosecutor who filed the original charges against Defendant Jackson. Thereafter, 

in a separate matter (the Dobbs case), Ms. McFall and another attorney she 

supervised expressed a conflict of interest concern with Dr. LaFortune because 

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the court listed Dr. LaFortune as a witness at the preliminary hearing for Mr. 

Dobbs's co-defendant. Dr. Lafortune later complained that Mr. Rowan was rude 

to her in expressing his conflict of interest concerns. Mr. Bednar told the 

attorneys that if they did not follow the appropriate procedure and seek approval 

for their expert requests from Dr. LaFortune, he would deny their requests for 

funding. 

On August 14, 2002, Mr. Bednar met with Ms. McFall and Mr. Rowan. At 

that meeting, Mr. Bednar terminated Mr. Rowan. One of the reasons he gave for 

Mr. Rowan's termination was Mr. Rowan's alleged rudeness to Dr. Lafortune. 

Mr. Bednar also told Ms. McFall "you didn't rein him in." He then offered her an 

alternative position as a capital trial lawyer at a reduced salary. Ms. McFall 

subsequently removed her personal belongings and received a letter of termination 

shortly thereafter. 

Ms. McFall sued Mr. Bednar and OIDS under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 alleging 

violations of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech and freedom of 

association. Mr. Bednar moved for summary judgment on both claims and 

asserted a defense of qualified immunity. On March 3, 2004, the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted Mr. Bednar' s 

summary judgment motion with respect to Ms. McFall 's freedom of association 

claim, but denied his motion on her free speech claim and rejected his assertion of 

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qualified immunity. Mr. Bednar appeals the district court's ruling that Ms. 

McFall' s speech was constitutionally protected and that he is not entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

Discussion 

A. Standard of review 

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only when "there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. C1v. P. 56(c). This Court has held that: 

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.' "Munoz v. St. Mary Corwin 

Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). 

When applying this standard, the Court examines the record and makes all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 

A district court's "denial of a summary judgment motion ordinarily is not 

an appealable final order." Bass v. Richards, 308 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 

2002). The denial of a summary judgment motion is subject to appeal, however, 

when the defendant is a public official asserting a qualified immunity defense and 

the issue on appeal is whether the defendant violated clearly established law. Id. 

In other words, "the scope of interlocutory appeals to denials of qualified 

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immunity is limited to 'purely legal' challenges to the denial." Id. (internal 

citations omitted). 

On appeal in this case, Mr. Bednar raises the issue of whether it was clearly 

established that Ms. McFall' s speech constituted protected speech on a matter of 

public concern. This is a "purely legal" issue and we have jurisdiction to address 

it. Id. We, therefore, review the district court's denial of summary judgment on 

the free speech claim and the rejection of Mr. Bednar's qualified immunity 

defense de nova. Finn v. New Mexico, 249 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) 

( citations omitted). 

B. Ms. McFall's free speech claim 

The Supreme Court outlined the test for a 42 U .S.C. § 1983 free speech 

claim in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and its progeny. The 

Court must first determine whether the employee's speech touches on a matter of 

public concern. Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998). If 

it does, the Court must balance the employee's interest, as a citizen, in 

commenting upon matters of public concern against "the interest of the State, as 

an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through ifs employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 

If the first two prerequisites are met, the speech is protected and the 

plaintiff must show that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor behind 

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the adverse employment decision. See Belcher v. City of McAlester, Oklahoma, 

324 F .3d 1203, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2003 ); Gardetto v. Mason, l 00 F .3d 803, 811 

(10th Cir. 1996). If the plaintiff satisfies all these factors then the burden shifts 

to the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have 

acted in the same way toward the employee in the absence of the protected 

speech. Belcher v. City of lvfcAlester, Oklahoma, 324 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (10th 

Cir. 2003); Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803,811 (10th Cir. 1996). 

We have previously held that: "Whether speech involves a matter of public 

concern and whether the employee's interest outweighs the employer's are 

questions of law for the court; whether speech was a substantial motivating factor 

and whether the employer would have made the same employment decision in the 

absence of the speech are questions of fact for the jury." Bass, 308 F.3d at 1088. 

Mr. Bednar' s appeal relating to Ms. McFall' s Pickering claim raises two issues: 

whether Ms. McFall spoke on a matter of public concern and whether OIDS's 

interest in maintaining an efficient work environment outweighs Ms. McFall's 

interest in commenting on matters of public concern. Therefore, we will address 

only these questions with respect to the Pickering analysis. Bass, 308 F.3d at 

l 088. 

First, Ms. McFall must establish that she engaged in protected speech on a 

matter of public concern. The threshold inquiry "in assessing the free speech 

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claim of a discharged government employee," therefore, is "whether the employee 

has spoken 'as a citizen upon matters of public concern' or merely 'as an 

employee upon matters only of personal interest."' Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 

(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). Whether an employee's 

speech addresses a matter of public concern depends on the content, form, and 

context of the statements and whether the speech can "be fairly considered as 

relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community." 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983); see also Belcher, 324 F.3d at 

1207-08 (finding that firefighter's expression of concern to city council members 

over the purchase of a new fire truck with city tax dollars involved a matter of 

public concern); Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202 (finding police officer's comments that 

exculpatory evidence was withheld in a murder investigation involved a matter of 

public concern); but see Koch v. City of Huchinson, 847 F.3d 1436, 1443-44 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (holding that fire marshal's report concerning the cause of a fire did 

not involve a matter of public concern). 

The district court held that Ms. McFall 's speech touched on a matter of 

public concern because it dealt with "the proper investigation of criminal cases 

and provision of effective assistance of counsel to indigent defendants accused of 

capital crimes." McFall v. Bednar, et al., No. 03-351, slip op. at 12 (W.D. Okla. 

Mar. 3, 2004). Mr. Bednar correctly argues that "speech pertaining to internal 

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personnel disputes and working conditions ordinarily will not involve public 

concern." Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247; see also Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202. The district 

court, however, correctly reasoned that Ms. McFall 's speech about the expert 

approval process "went beyond her concern that the process was internally 

cumbersome and time consuming ... [r]ather, Plaintiff's expressed concern 

centered on the fact that the inability to secure the services of expert witnesses in 

death penalty cases could deprive the indigent defendants of their constitutionally 

guaranteed right to effective assistance of trial counsel." McFall v. Bednar, et 

al., No. 03-351, slip op. at 11-12 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2004). 

Ms. McFall's speech did not involve mere internal personnel disputes over 

OIDS 's procedures for approving experts. Indeed, there is no indication that Ms. 

McFall refused to follow the appropriate procedures in requesting experts on 

behalf of the attorneys she supervised or in any way attempted to subvert the 

expert approval process. Rather, her speech related to the qualifications of Dr. 

LaFortune and Ms. Schile to approve experts in capital cases and her concerns 

about the inability to get timely decisions. Ms. McFall expressed her concerns 

that under the new expert approval system, the indigent defendants OIDS 

represented were not receiving effective assistance of counsel, which prevented 

them from receiving a fair trial. The right to effective assistance of counsel and 

the right to a fair trial are rights granted to all criminal defendants by the Sixth 

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Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

686 (1984); Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2002). 

A government employee's "[s]peech that seeks to expose improper 

operations of the government or questions the integrity of government officials 

clearly concerns vital public interests." Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Conaway 

v. Smith, 853 F .2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202 

(internal citations omitted) (holding that "speech which discloses any evidence of 

corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of city officials ... 

clearly concerns matters of public import.") Because Ms. McFall' s speech related 

to matters of "political, social, or other concern to the community," that is, the 

integrity and qualifications of public officials, the operations of government, and 

the right of a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel, it touched on 

matters of public concern. Conaway, 853 F.3d at 797. Viewing the facts in the 

light most favorable to Ms. McFall, she has satisfied the first prong of the 

Pickering analysis. 

Under the second prong of the Pickering test, the Court must weigh Ms. 

McFall's interest in commenting on matters of public concern against OIDS's 

interest in maintaining an efficient work environment. We "balance the 

employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern 'against the 

interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 

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services it performs through its employees."' Dill, 15 5 F .3d at 1201 ( quoting 

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)). We have previously held that: "In evaluating the 

employer's interest, we consider 'whether the statement impairs discipline by 

superiors or harmony among co-workers ... or impedes the performance of the 

speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise."' Finn, 

249 F.3d at 1249 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). In 

other words, the employer must show that the employee's speech caused some 

disruption in the workplace. Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1208-09 (holding that although 

the government employer need not "wait for speech actually to disrupt core 

operations before taking action," it can not restrict the employee's speech unless 

it shows the restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official 

functions); see also Dill, 155 F.3d at 1203. In determining whether an employee 

disrupted the workplace, the Court can consider whether the employee used 

internal rather than external channels to exercise their free speech rights. 

Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1208. 

In this case. Mr. Bednar concedes that Ms. McFall 's speech did not cause 

any actual disruption at OIDS. Mr. Bednar never argues that Ms. McFall refused 

to follow the new expert approval procedure or that she could have expressed 

herself through less disruptive internal channels. Viewing the facts in the light 

most favorable to Ms. McFall, she expressed concerns over the qualifications of 

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the reviewers to make trial strategy decisions and how the new expert approval 

system affected the trial rights of capital defendants. Ms. McFall, therefore, has 

satisfied this prong of the analysis for purposes of Mr. Bednar' s summary 

judgment motion. 

The third and fourth prongs of the Pickering analysis involve questions of 

fact for the jury so we do not have jurisdiction to address these issues on appeal. 

See Bass, 308 F.3d at 1086, I 088. 

C. Qualified immunity 

Our courts recognize two kinds of immunity defenses: absolute immunity 

and qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 ( 1982). 

The defense of absolute immunity is available to "officials whose special 

functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit .... " Id. 

For instance, legislators are entitled to absolute immunity in their legislative 

functions and judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their 

judicial capacity. Id. For other government officials, however, "our cases make 

plain that qualified immunity represents the norm." Id. 

The qualified immunity defense attempts to strike a balance between "'the 

importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, [and] 'the need 

to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related 

public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.'" Id. 

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(internal citations omitted). Without the qualified immunity defense, courts 

would struggle to curtail the substantial social costs associated with harassing 

litigation involving government officials, including the fear that personal 

monetary liability would "unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 

The doctrine of qualified immunity, therefore, shields government officials 

performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages arising from 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities. 

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Moreover, the courts draw no distinction between 42 

U .S.C. § 1983 suits against state officials and suits against federal officials under 

the Constitution. Id. Because Mr. Bednar is a state official being sued in his 

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his assertion of the qualified 

immunity defense is proper. 

Individual government actors retain their immunity unless the plaintiff can 

show that they violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The 

Court in this case could not hold Mr. Bednar liable unless he violated a clearly 

cstabl ished constitutional right. The Supreme Court has reasoned that: "If the 

law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be 

expected to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as 

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unlawful." Id. at 819. 

The Court, therefore, must first determine "whether the plaintiff has alleged 

a deprivation of a [statutory or] constitutional right at all" and only if the answer 

to that question is yes does the Court consider whether that right was clearly 

established at the time so that reasonable officials would have understood that 

their conduct violated that right. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 

841, n.5 ( 1998); Trotter v. The Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 219 F .3d 

11 79, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000). We have previously held that: "When a 

government official raises the defense of qualified immunity in a motion for 

summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce facts sufficient to show both that 

the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that [the] law was clearly 

established when the alleged violation occurred." Bruning,·. Pixler, 949 F .2d 

352,356 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). We noted that: "Only 

after the plaintiff has met this burden must the defendant bear the usual summary 

judgment movant's burden of showing that no material issues of fact remain that 

would defeat his or her claim of qualified immunity." Id. 

In order for the law to be clearly established there must have been a 

Supreme Court or other Tenth Circuit decision on point so that "the contours of 

the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right." Finn, 249 F .3d at 1250 ( quoting Anderson v. 

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Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 ( 1987)). In this case, the law must have been 

clearly established on or about August 14, 2002, when Ms. McFall was 

terminated. Our decision in Finn v. New Mexico is directly on point and was 

issued in May 2001, before Ms. McFall was terminated. In Finn, we held that: 

"we are convinced that pre-September 1995 case law clearly established that the 

defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff in retaliation for his protected speech 

was actionable. Hence the district court properly rejected the qualified immunity 

defense .... " Id. We have previously held that: "A public employer cannot 

retaliate against an employee for exercising his constitutionally protected right of 

free speech." See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1201 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 142). 

In this case, it was clearly established on and before August 14, 2002, that 

a government employee could not be terminated for speaking out on matters of 

public concern. Mr. Bednar, himself an attorney and former judge, and any other 

reasonable official, would understand that firing an employee for exercising her 

free speech rights violated clearly established law and that such a termination was 

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court, therefore, properly rejected 

Mr. Bednar's qualified immunity defense. 

Conclusion 

Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. McFall, her speech touched on a 

matter of public concern and we, therefore, uphold the district court's denial of 

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Mr. Bednar's motion for summary judgment with respect to Ms. McFall's free 

speech claim. Because it was clearly established during Ms. McFall' s 

employment with OIDS that a government employee cannot be terminated for 

exercising her free speech rights, the district court properly rejected Mr. Bednar's 

qualified immunity defense. Accordingly, the district court's order denying 

summary judgment on Ms. McFall's free speech claim and rejecting Mr. Bednar's 

assertion of qualified immunity is hereby AFFIRMED. 

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