Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-22-70029/USCOURTS-ca9-22-70029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited
Petitioner
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) 

OPERATIONS LIMITED, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION; UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA, 

Respondents.

No. 22-70029 

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2023

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed December 24, 2024

Before: Carlos T. Bea, Daniel P. Collins, and Kenneth K. 

Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Collins;

Dissent by Judge Bea

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2 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

SUMMARY*

Communications Act of 1934 

The panel denied a petition for review brought by China 

Unicorn (Americas) Operations Limited (“CUA”) 

challenging the Federal Communications Commission’s 

(“FCC”) revocation of certificates authorizing CUA to 

provide domestic and international telecommunications 

services.

In revoking the certificates, which were issued pursuant 

to § 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC found 

that CUA had failed to dispel the national security concerns 

arising from its ultimate Chinese government ownership and 

that CUA had demonstrated a lack of candor and 

trustworthiness in its representations to the FCC. 

Applying Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. 

Ct. 2244 (2024), the panel reviewed de novo whether the 

FCC correctly interpreted its authority under the 

Communications Act. The panel held that the statute’s grant 

of authority to “issue” certificates to telecommunications 

carriers must be understood as carrying with it an implied 

incidental authority to revoke such certificates. Also, there 

was no indication in the statutory text or structure that 

Congress denied the FCC any relevant authority to revoke a 

carrier’s § 214 certificate.

CUA contended that the revocation order should be set 

aside under the Administrative Procedure Act. The panel 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 3 

held that the FCC’s decision to revoke CUA’s certificates 

based on national security concerns was reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary and 

capricious. In addition, the FCC’s alternative ground for 

revoking CUA’s certificates—that it had exhibited a lack of 

candor and trustworthiness with the FCC—was also amply 

supported and was not arbitrary and capricious. The panel 

also rejected CUA’s contention that the FCC failed to follow 

the requisite procedures prior to revoking CUA’s § 214 

certificates.

Judge Bea dissented. He disagreed with the majority’s 

view that the FCC’s statutory power to grant § 214 

certificates under the Communications Act of 1934 

necessarily implied the power to revoke such certificates 

solely upon its own volition. He would grant CUA’s 

petition, vacate the FCC’s order, and remand with 

instruction for the FCC to reinstate CUA’s § 214 certificates.

COUNSEL

Keith Bradley (argued), Squire Patton Boggs LLP, Denver, 

Colorado; Jeffrey M. Walker, Squire Patton Boggs LLP, 

Columbus, Ohio; Robert E. Stup Jr. and Paul C. Besozzi, 

Squire Patton Boggs LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Petitioner.

Matthew J. Dunne (argued), Counsel; Jacob M. Lewis, 

Deputy General Counsel; P. Michele Ellison, General 

Counsel; Federal Communications Commission, Public 

Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Washington, D.C.; 

Casen B. Ross and Sharon Swingle, Attorneys, Appellate 

Staff; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General; Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondents. 

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4 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited 

(“CUA”), a California corporation ultimately owned by the 

Chinese government, was authorized to provide domestic 

and international telecommunications services pursuant to 

certificates granted to it many years ago by the Federal 

Communications Commission (“the Commission” or 

“FCC”) under § 214 of the Communications Act of 1934. In 

May 2019, however, the FCC denied an application for 

§ 214 authorization submitted by a different Chinese

government-owned carrier, China Mobile. The latter denial 

relied significantly on the views submitted by a number of 

Executive Branch agencies, which concluded that Chinese

government control of a telecommunications carrier 

presented significant national security concerns. Thereafter, 

in April 2020, the FCC issued an order directing CUA to 

show cause why the FCC should not revoke its § 214 

certificates in light of the national security concerns

articulated during the proceedings involving China Mobile. 

After receiving CUA’s response, the FCC solicited input on 

the matter from a committee composed of the relevant

Executive Branch agencies. That committee identified 

several concerns regarding CUA’s continued ownership of a 

U.S. telecommunications carrier, and CUA thereafter 

submitted a further response to the committee’s letter. 

Finding CUA’s responses inadequate to resolve the 

Executive Branch committee’s concerns, the FCC instituted

proceedings to revoke CUA’s § 214 certificates. Ultimately, 

after further input from CUA, the FCC issued an order 

revoking the certificates on the groundsthat CUA’s retention 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 5

of them presented an unreasonable nationalsecurity risk and, 

separately, that CUA had exhibited a lack of candor and 

trustworthiness over the course of the proceedings.

CUA filed a petition for review of the FCC’s revocation 

order in this court, arguing that the Commission lacked 

statutory authority to revoke CUA’s certificates, that its 

decision to do so was arbitrary and capricious, and that it

revoked the certificates without following proper 

procedures. We reject CUA’s arguments on each of these 

points and, accordingly, deny its petition.

I

To set the factual history in its proper context, we begin 

with an overview of the relevant authorities governing the 

FCC’s power to regulate telecommunications services. We 

then summarize the relevant factual and procedural history 

concerning the issuance and revocation of CUA’s

certificates.

A

The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC

as an agency and granted it centralized authority over 

“interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio 

communication.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. The Act states that 

Congress conferred these powers on the FCC for the purpose 

of “mak[ing] available,” on a non-discriminatory basis, “a 

rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 

communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 

charges”; “for the purpose of the national defense”; and “for 

the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through 

the use of wire and radio communications.” Id.

As relevant here, the Communications Act regulates the 

activities of any “carrier,” which is generally defined to be 

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6 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

“any person,” other than a radio broadcaster, who is 

“engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or 

foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or 

foreign radio transmission of energy.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(11). 

Section 214(a) of the Act requires any “carrier” to obtain a 

“certificate” from the FCC before it may construct, operate, 

or acquire any “lines” used for telecommunications services. 

Specifically, the Act provides:

No carrier shall undertake the 

construction of a new line or of an extension 

of any line, or shall acquire or operate any 

line, or extension thereof, or shall engage in 

transmission over or by means of such 

additional or extended line, unless and until 

there shall first have been obtained from the 

Commission a certificate that the present or 

future public convenience and necessity 

require or will require the construction, or 

operation, or construction and operation, of 

such additional or extended line . . . .

Id. § 214(a) (emphasis added).

1 For purposes of this 

provision, a “line” is generally defined to mean “any channel 

1 There is arguably a literal mismatch between the sweep of § 214(a)’s 

general prohibition and § 214(a)’s description of the permission granted 

by the certificate. The prohibitory clause expressly covers both 

“construction of a new line or of an extension of any line” as well as

“acquir[ing] or operat[ing] any line,” thereby prohibiting, absent a 

certificate, any acquisition or operation of telecommunications lines by 

a carrier (even without undertaking construction of a new or extended 

line). 47 U.S.C. § 214(a). The clause describing the object of the 

certificate, however, refers only to the “operation[] of such additional or 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 7

of communication established by the use of appropriate 

equipment.” Id. Section 214(a) further states that “[n]o 

carrier shall discontinue, reduce, or impair service to a 

community, or part of a community, unless and until there 

shall first have been obtained from the Commission a 

certificate that neither the present nor future public 

convenience and necessity will be adversely affected 

thereby.” Id. The Act, however, exempts from these 

certificate requirements “any installation, replacement, or 

other changes in plant, operation, or equipment, other than 

new construction, which will not impair the adequacy or 

quality of service provided.” Id. Thus, as a general matter, 

authorization from the FCC is required for any carrier to

build, acquire, or operate any telecommunications lines and

for any carrier to discontinue, impair, or reduce services. 

Notably, the Act further authorizes the FCC to “attach to the 

issuance” of any such certificate “such terms and conditions 

as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may 

require.” Id. § 214(c).

In furtherance of the Act’s purpose of supporting “the 

national defense,” 47 U.S.C. § 151, the FCC must provide 

notice and a copy of all applications for telecommunications 

certificates to the Secretary of Defense and, if such 

applications involve the provision of international services,

extended line,” rather than “any line” generally. Id. But it would be 

absurd to read the statute as failing to allow the issuance of certificates 

that authorize activities that are coextensive with the full range of 

activities covered by the prohibitory clause. Neither party advocates 

such a mismatched reading here. On the contrary, CUA expressly agrees 

that § 214 controls any entry into the telecommunications market.

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8 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

to the Secretary of State as well, id. § 214(b).2 The 

Departments of Defense and State have the right “to be 

heard” by the FCC on any such application. See id. Finally, 

the FCC has ancillary authority to “perform any and all acts, 

make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not 

inconsistent with [the Act], as may be necessary in the 

execution of its functions.” Id. § 154(i). This provision is, 

in effect, a “necessary and proper” clause that enables the 

FCC to carry out its statutory authorities; it “is not a standalone basis of authority.” Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc.

v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

As we will discuss further below, § 214 does not

explicitly address the subject of revoking certificates after 

they have been granted. However, the FCC has construed

its authority to grant, refuse, and condition § 214 certificates 

as including the power to revoke a common carrier’s 

certificate either when the carrier has violated the 

Commission’s rules or when the Commission concludes 

that, for other reasons, the public interest so requires. 47 

U.S.C. §§ 151, 214(a), (c); see, e.g., Pacific Networks Corp. 

& ComNet (USA) LLC, 36 FCC Rcd. 6368, 6370 ¶ 3 (2021).

In the late 1990s, as the telecommunications industry 

underwent substantial changes, the FCC decided to 

significantly alter the process by which it grants § 214 

certificates. With respect to applications seeking certificates 

relating to domestic telecommunications lines and services, 

the FCC replaced its prior practice of evaluating each 

2 Section 214(b) also provides that the FCC must likewise supply notice 

and a copy to the Governor of any affected State, but that notification 

requirement would appear to be tied primarily to the declared purposes 

of the Act other than the protection of the national defense.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 9

application individually with a general grant of blanket 

authority for any common carrier to operate or transmit over 

domestic lines. See Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) 

of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 11364, 11365 

¶ 2 (1999) (hereinafter “Domestic Blanket Order”); see also 

47 C.F.R. § 63.01(a). The agency stated that it had 

considered adopting a policy of “forbearance”—i.e., 

abstention from enforcement of § 214’s certification 

requirement altogether—but rejected that option as “not in 

the public interest” because the statutory certification 

requirement remained an important “enforcement tool” that 

was necessary to prevent “abusive practices” and to protect 

consumers.3 Domestic Blanket Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 

11373 ¶ 14. The FCC instead opted to grant, on a blanket 

basis, certification for domestic construction and operation 

of telecommunications lines. Id. at 11374 ¶ 16. The FCC 

based this blanket granting of certification on its general 

determination that “the present and future public 

convenience and necessity require the construction and 

operation of all domestic new lines.” Id. However, in 

adopting this approach, the FCC specifically stated that it 

reserved the authority “to revoke a carrier’s section 214 

authority when warranted in the relatively rare instances in 

which carriers may abuse their market power or their 

common carrier obligations.”4 Id.

3 Under § 10 of the Communications Act, as added in 1996, the FCC is 

specifically authorized to “forbear from applying any regulation or any 

provision” of the Act if specified conditions are met, including that such 

forbearance “is consistent with the public interest.” 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).

4 Although the general authority conferred under the Domestic Blanket 

Order does not take the form of an individual “certificate” in the 

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10 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

A few years prior to this modification of the domestic 

authorization process, the FCC had also simplified its

process for reviewing applications from foreign carriers. In 

1997, the FCC adopted a “presumption in favor of foreign 

participation” in telecommunications services and “open 

entry policies” for foreign-owned companies from countries 

that are members of the World Trade Organization. Rules &

Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomms.

Mkt., 12 FCC Rcd. 23891, 23897 ¶ 13 (1997) (hereinafter 

“Foreign Participation Order”). Given its “statutory 

obligation to ensure that [a] grant of Section 214 authority is 

consistent with the public convenience and necessity,” the 

FCC stated that it would continue to “consider[] the overall 

impact of the grant of authority on the public interest” when 

assessing “all applications, from both foreign and domestic 

applicants,” as it had since the enactment of the 

Communications Act. Id. at 23910 ¶ 44.

The public interest factors that the FCC assesses relative

to foreign carriers include “national security, law 

enforcement, foreign policy and trade policy concerns 

brought to [the Commission’s] attention by the [relevant] 

Executive Branch [agencies].” Foreign Participation 

Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23917 ¶ 59. Recognizing that 

“foreign participation in the U.S. telecommunications 

market may implicate significant national security or law 

enforcement issues uniquely within the expertise of the 

Executive Branch,” id. at 23919 ¶ 62, the FCC has long 

“worked closely with Executive Branch agencies to ensure 

traditional sense, see 47 C.F.R. § 63.01, we will continue to refer to the 

resulting authorization of service, in the context of a specific company 

such as CUA, as that company’s “certificate,” because that is the 

statutory term for the requisite authorization. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a).

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 11

that [its] actions and policies affecting international 

telecommunications do not impede or thwart [those] of the 

Executive Branch,” id. at 23917 ¶ 59. The Foreign 

Participation Order affirmed that the FCC would continue 

this longstanding practice. See id. at 23918 ¶ 61. While 

national security concerns related to foreign carriers are 

“quite rare,” the FCC stated that any input regarding them

“would . . . be important to [the Commission’s] public 

interest analysis of a particular application” and affirmed 

that it would “continue to accord deference to the expertise 

of Executive Branch agencies in identifying and interpreting 

issues of concern related to national security, law 

enforcement, and foreign policy.” Id. at 23919 ¶ 63. In this 

manner, the FCC has continued to evaluate whether a 

carrier’s provision of telecommunications services in the 

United States implicates national-security-related risks due 

to the carrier’s foreign ownership. See id. at 23918 ¶ 61. In 

the Foreign Participation Order, the FCC explicitly 

“emphasize[d] that [it] ha[s] authority to enforce [its] 

safeguards through fines, conditional grants of authority and 

the revocation of authorizations.” Id. at 23900 ¶ 19; see also 

id. at 24022 ¶ 295.

B

CUA is incorporated in California and headquartered in 

Virginia. It is wholly owned by China Unicom Global 

Limited (“CUG”), a Hong Kong company, which is in turn 

wholly owned by China Unicom (Hong Kong) Limited 

(“CUHK”), a company publicly traded on the Hong Kong 

Stock Exchange. CUHK’s ultimate parent is China United 

Network Communications Group Company Limited 

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12 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

(“CU”), which is wholly owned by the Chinese 

government.

5

In 2002, the FCC issued international § 214 certificates 

to CUA’s predecessor entities, China Netcom USA 

Operations Limited and China Unicom USA LLC. These 

certificates were subject to the general conditions that the 

FCC imposes on all international certificates. CUA, through 

its predecessor entities, also began domestic 

telecommunications operations in 2002 under the general 

authorization that the FCC has provided to common carriers 

since the 1999 Domestic Blanket Order. See 47 C.F.R. 

§ 63.01. As noted earlier, we will continue to use the 

statutory term “certificate” to refer to the authorization 

provided to CUA under the Domestic Blanket Order, even 

though no individualized formal certificate is issued under 

that order. See supra note 4.

C

1

In recent years, the FCC, in consultation with other 

Executive Branch agencies, has undertaken a reassessment 

of the national security and law enforcement risks posed by 

Chinese government-owned telecommunications companies 

operating in the United States. For example, in May 2019, 

the FCC denied an application for § 214 authorization 

submitted by China Mobile, a different carrier that is also 

owned by the Chinese government. See China Mobile Int’l

(USA) Inc., 34 FCC Rcd. 3361 (2019) (hereinafter “China 

Mobile Order”).

5 A complete accounting of CUA’s ownership chain is outlined below. 

See infra Section I(C)(1).

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 13

In April 2020, President Trump signed Executive Order 

No. 13913, which formally established an Executive Branch 

committee, comprised of members from the Departments of 

Defense, State, Justice, and Commerce, as well as other 

relevant agencies, “to assist the FCC in its public interest 

review of national security and law enforcement concerns 

that may be raised by foreign participation in the United 

States telecommunications services sector.” See Exec.

Order No. 13,913, 85 Fed. Reg. 19643, 19643 ¶ 3 (Apr. 8, 

2020). Specifically, the Order authorizes the Committee for 

the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States 

Telecommunications Services Sector (“the Committee”) to 

make recommendations to the FCC about whether to grant 

or deny § 214 applications and whether to revoke existing 

authorizations. See id. at 19645 ¶ 6, 19646 ¶ 9(b).

Shortly after the formal establishment of the Committee, 

the FCC’s International, Wireline Competition, and 

Enforcement Bureaus jointly ordered CUA on April 24, 

2020 to show cause why the FCC should not initiate 

proceedings to revoke its § 214 certificates. China Unicom 

(Ams.) Operations Ltd., 35 FCC Rcd. 3721 (2020)

(hereinafter “Order to Show Cause”). The Order to Show 

Cause explained that the FCC’s findingsin the China Mobile 

matter concerning the susceptibility of Chinese state-owned 

enterprises, including subsidiaries, to Chinese government 

influence, control, and exploitation raised questions about 

CUA’s “ongoing qualifications to hold domestic and 

international section 214 authorizations.” Id. at 3724 ¶ 7. 

The order gave CUA the opportunity to file a written 

response providing evidence as to its ongoing qualifications 

to hold § 214 certificates and to explain why the FCC should 

not initiate proceedings to revoke them. Id. at 3724–25 ¶ 8. 

It also directed CUA to respond to specific questions about 

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14 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

its ownership, operations, and corporate governance. Id. at 

3725 ¶ 9. Specifically, the Order to Show Cause requested 

that CUA include the following information in its response: 

(1) “a detailed description of the current ownership and 

control (direct and indirect) of the company and the place of 

organization of each entity in the ownership structure”; 

(2) an “identification of [CUA’s] officers, directors, and 

senior management officials, their employment history 

(including prior employment with the Chinese government), 

and their affiliations with the Chinese Communist Party 

[(‘CCP’)] and the Chinese government”; (3) “an 

identification of all officers, directors, and other senior 

management of entities that hold ten percent or greater 

ownership interest in [CUA], their employment history 

(including prior employment with the Chinese government), 

and their affiliations with the [CCP] and the Chinese 

government”; and (4) “a description of the extent to which 

[CUA] is or is not otherwise subject to the exploitation, 

influence and control of the Chinese government.” Id. at 

3725–26 ¶ 9.

The FCC had also discovered that when an internal 

reorganization transferred control of CUA from CUHK to 

one of CUHK’s wholly owned subsidiaries, CUA failed to 

file the required pro forma notification of this transfer in 

compliance with FCC rules. See Order to Show Cause, 35 

FCC Rcd. at 3726 ¶ 9 & n.31. The FCC requested in the 

Order to Show Cause that CUA confirm whether there had 

been an internal transfer of control and whether the FCC had 

been properly notified. See id.

In its response to the Order to Show Cause, CUA argued 

that revocation of § 214 certificates is a limited 

“enforcement remedy” for serious misconduct, which it 

claimed had not been alleged against CUA, and that the FCC 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 15

could not initiate revocation proceedings on the basis of 

unsubstantiated concerns about national security risks posed 

by CUA’s ownership structure. CUA stated that, if such 

proceedings were instituted, “the Commission was required 

to conduct a full hearing under its formal adjudication rules 

before taking any action.” CUA also provided its responses

to the FCC’s specific questions regarding its ownership, 

corporate governance, and susceptibility to Chinese

government influence.

With regard to CUA’s ownership structure, the FCC’s 

Order to Show Cause had specifically asked about direct and 

indirect “control” of CUA. In response, CUA provided an 

exhibit that outlined its ownership structure and purported to 

explain the ownership percentages held by each entity as 

follows:

 CUA is 100% owned by CUG, a 

registered Hong Kong company, which in 

turn is 100% owned by CUHK;

 CUHK, a registered Hong Kong 

company listed on the New York and 

Hong Kong Stock Exchanges, is 26.4% 

owned by China Unicom Group 

Corporation (BVI) Limited (“CUG 

BVI”), 53.5% owned by China Unicom 

(BVI) Limited (“CU BVI”), and 20.1% 

owned by public shareholders;

 CUG BVI, a registered British Virgin 

Islands company, is 100% owned by CU;

 CU BVI, also a registered British Virgin 

Islands company, is 17.9% owned by CU 

and 82.1% owned by China United 

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16 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

Network Communications Limited (“CU 

A-Share”);6

 CU A-Share, a registered Beijing 

company listed on the Shanghai Stock 

Exchange is 36.7% owned by CU, 35.2% 

owned by “a group of strategic 

investors,” 25.5% owned by public 

shareholders, and 2.6% owned by 

employees; and 

 CU, a registered Beijing company, is 

98.45% owned by the State-owned Asset 

Supervision and Administration 

Commission of the State Council, a 

Chinese government entity. 

This exhibit, along with CUA’s statements, represented that 

CU, “through its ownership in CU A-Share, CU BVI, and 

CUG BVI[,] ha[d] an effective interest of approximately 

52.1% of [CUHK’s] equity” (emphasis added).7 Again, 

CUHK wholly owns CUA through CUG.

Regarding corporate governance, CUA explained that, 

as a California corporation, it is managed and controlled by 

its board of directors. CUA’s bylaws provide that the 

number of directors is fixed by CUG, which “appoints the 

board members and management team, and approves the 

annual business plan and budget of CUA.” CUA further 

explained that CUHK, which wholly owns CUG, is 

responsible for establishing and maintaining both CUG and 

6 We adopt the abbreviation both parties use for this entity. 

7 CUHK’s 2020 Form 20-F filing with the SEC, by contrast, stated that 

CU indirectly owned 79.9% of CUHK. See infra at 46.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 17

CUA’s risk management and internal control systems, which 

include financial, operational, and compliance controls.

As to the identities and government affiliations of the 

officers and directors of CUA and its parent entities, CUA’s 

response listed only the officers, directors, and senior 

management for CUA and CUG, rather than for all entities 

with more than a 10% indirect interest in CUA, as the FCC 

had requested. CUA noted in its response that “certain 

directors of CUG are [CCP] members,” but otherwise did

not identify the specific individuals, nor indicate whether 

other parent entity officers and directors had government 

affiliations.

With respect to the FCC’s inquiry about CUA’s apparent 

failure to file a required notice of transfer of control, CUA 

confirmed that it had indeed failed to notify the FCC of the 

internal reorganization. It did not, however, retroactively 

file the requisite notification at the same time it filed its 

response.

Finally, regarding the FCC’s inquiry into the extent to 

which CUA may be subject to exploitation, influence, and 

control by the Chinese government, CUA argued that the 

FCC had unfairly alleged “unspecified national security 

concerns about ‘exploitation’ and ‘influence’” and did not 

set out “specific facts or parameters” regarding Chinese

government “control” to which CUA could respond. CUA 

represented that “none of the company’s senior management 

or board members was appointed by the Chinese 

government,” that CUA is required to operate in compliance 

with U.S. laws and regulations, and that CUA “has never 

received, and would not accept, any instructions on 

regarding how to run its operations from the Chinese 

government.”

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18 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

After CUA filed its response, the FCC International 

Bureau requested that the Committee give its own response 

to CUA’s arguments against revocation. The Committee 

provided that response in the form of a letter submitted to the 

FCC on November 16, 2020.8 The Committee’s letter did 

not make a formal recommendation regarding revocation of 

CUA’s § 214 certificates, in part because of the “limited 

time” the Committee had to offer a response. However, the 

Committee’s letter explained that “changes in [Chinese] law 

have resulted in [Chinese government]-owned 

and -controlled companies presenting significant national 

security and law enforcement risks that are difficult to 

mitigate.” As a result, it said, “[t]he national security 

environment has changed significantly since 2002,” when 

CUA’s § 214 certificates were initially granted. The 

Committee’s letter described assessments by several of its

agencies regarding the national security threats posed by 

China, including economic espionage, threats to critical 

infrastructure, and cyberattacks. With regard to 

telecommunications specifically, the Committee’s letter 

highlighted federal legislation enacted in 2017 that prohibits 

the spending of loans or grants on telecommunications 

equipment from entities connected to the Chinese 

government. See National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1656, 131 Stat. 

1283, 1762 (2017).

The Committee’s letter then addressed evidence that 

CUA’s parent entities are led by board directors and 

8 Throughout its letter, the Committee repeatedly referenced a June 9, 

2020 report regarding threats posed by Chinese government-owned 

carriers, which was prepared by the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations (“PSI”) of the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs (“the PSI Report”).

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 19

executive officers who are members of the CCP, arguing that 

this made CUA “vulnerable to direct exploitation” by the 

Chinese government, including through CCP directives. It 

asserted that CUA’s ultimate parent company, CU, has 

already demonstrated compliance with CCP and Chinese 

government requests, including, notably, by providing 

material assistance to the CCP’s mass surveillance initiatives 

against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. The letter also 

discussed recent Chinese laws, including the 2017 

Cybersecurity Law and the 2017 National Intelligence Law, 

which “impose affirmative legal responsibilities on Chinese 

and foreign citizens, companies, and organizations operating 

in China to provide access, cooperation, and support for 

Beijing’s intelligence gathering activities.” The Committee 

noted that CUA’s corporate parents, CU and CUHK, “have 

acknowledged being subject to” these laws.

The Committee letter described CUA as providing

global “telecommunications and [i]nternet services,” as well 

as “data center and cloud-based services.” The Committee 

expressed concerns that CUA’s capabilities, physical U.S. 

infrastructure, and U.S. operations “provide opportunities 

for [Chinese] state actors to engage in economic espionage, 

to collect, disrupt, or misroute U.S. communications, and to 

access U.S. customer data.” It claimed that such risks are 

heightened by CUG’s management and storage of CUA’s 

American customer records in Hong Kong, by CUA’s 

various parent entities’ compliance with Chinese 

cybersecurity and intelligence laws, and by CUG’s ability to 

remotely configure CUA’s network.

Finally, the Committee letter stated that, based on the 

above concerns, “as well as those identified in the 

[Committee’s] recommendations for [other] . . . similarly 

situated companies, it does not appear that a mitigation 

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20 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

agreement with CUA would be feasible” to assuage the

national security risks associated with CUA’s ongoing 

retention of its § 214 certificates.

The FCC afforded CUA an opportunity to respond to the 

Committee’s letter. CUA filed a response, noting that the 

letter did not specifically recommend revoking CUA’s § 214 

certificates and contending that the letter only offered 

general observations about Chinese law and policies, the 

conduct of other Chinese government-owned companies, 

and U.S. policy toward China. Furthermore, CUA argued, 

the letter did not allege any specific misconduct by CUA and 

therefore could not serve as the basis for revoking its § 214 

certificates.

2

After assessing the responses received as a result of the 

Order to Show Cause, the FCC on March 19, 2021 issued an 

order instituting proceedings to determine whether to revoke 

CUA’s § 214 certificates. See China Unicom (Ams.) 

Operations Ltd., 36 FCC Rcd. 6319 (2021) (hereinafter 

“Institution Order”). 

In its order, the FCC stated that CUA’s responses thus 

far had been insufficient to demonstrate that it was “not 

susceptible to the exploitation, influence, or control of the 

Chinese government.” Institution Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at 

6335 ¶ 26. The FCC also stated that CUA’s “representations 

to the Commission and to other U.S. government agencies” 

raised additional concerns about its candor because CUA 

had “omitted crucial information” in its responses to the 

FCC “that was disclosed to the Senate [PSI] and published 

in the PSI Report” and CUA had “failed to fully respond to 

several questions posed by the Order to Show Cause.” Id. at 

6353 ¶ 49; see also supra note 8. In light of these asserted 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 21

discrepancies, the Institution Order specifically requested 

descriptions of “policies or agreements concerning [CUA’s] 

corporate governance,” information on the storage and 

accessibility of U.S. customer records, descriptions of 

policies to protect such information, and explanations of the 

discrepancies and omissions in CUA’s statements. 

Institution Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at App’x A. The Institution 

Order also noted that, while CUA admitted in its response to 

the Order to Show Cause that it had not filed the missing

transfer-of-control notification, CUA still had not yet taken 

any steps to correct its error by retroactively filing the 

notification.9 See Institution Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at 6356

¶ 55.

The Institution Order set forth the following procedures

for the proceeding: (1) the FCC afforded CUA 40 days to 

answer 13 additional questions the Commission asked, as 

well as to provide arguments and evidence in written 

submissions supporting its position that the § 214 

certificates should not be revoked; (2) the Executive Branch 

agencies and the public would have 40 days to respond to 

CUA’s response; and (3) CUA would have an additional 20 

days to provide further evidence or arguments in support of

its position. See 36 FCC Rcd. at 6320 ¶ 1. The order went 

on to outline the FCC’s asserted grounds for revoking 

CUA’s § 214 certificates, including national security 

concerns specific to CUA as well as CUA’s alleged lack of 

candor and trustworthiness before the Commission. See id. 

at 6321–23 ¶¶ 3–4, 6334–57 ¶¶ 24–56. The FCC also 

9 Indeed, even after the Institution Order again pointed out this omission, 

it would take CUA until September 8, 2021—nearly a year and a half 

after the FCC first informed CUA of the problem—to retroactively file 

the necessary paperwork. 

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22 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

explained that the procedures it was adopting complied with 

due process and FCC regulations and that a formal hearing 

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) was not

necessary and would not be helpful to the resolution of the

matter. See id. at 6328–33 ¶¶ 16–23.

CUA filed a 49-page response, in which it again 

reiterated its arguments that the FCC lacked the authority to 

revoke its § 214 certificates absent a demonstration of 

serious misconduct and that CUA was entitled to a formal 

hearing as to whether its certificates should be revoked. 

Regarding the allegations that CUA had not been 

forthcoming in its responses to certain questions posed in the 

Order to Show Cause and that it had provided different

information regarding its ownership and management to the

Senate PSI, CUA argued that any discrepancies did not 

reflect an intent to mislead the FCC, but were instead

attributable to the FCC assertedly having asked for—or 

CUA having understood the FCC as asking for—different 

information than what the Senate PSI had requested. Of 

particular interest to the FCC was CUA’s failure to disclose 

the existence of a confidentiality agreement between CUA 

and CUG that governed access to American records and 

network information. See Institution Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 

6354 ¶ 51. CUA, for its part, argued that it had not 

understood the FCC’s questions regarding ownership and 

corporate governance to be soliciting information about this 

agreement, which CUA had previously provided to the 

Senate PSI during the drafting of the PSI Report.

3

In February 2022, the FCC issued an order revoking 

CUA’s § 214 domestic and international certificates. See

China Unicom (Ams.) Operations Ltd., 37 FCC Rcd. 1480 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 23

(2022) (hereinafter “Revocation Order”). The FCC found

that CUA had failed to dispel the national security concerns 

arising from its ultimate Chinese government ownership and 

that CUA had demonstrated a lack of candor and 

trustworthiness in its representations to the Commission. Id. 

at 1481 ¶ 2. The FCC therefore concluded that revocation 

was warranted. See id. at 1480–81 ¶¶ 1–2, 1508–09 ¶ 49.

First, the Revocation Order affirmed that one of the 

purposes of the Communications Act is to help protect “the 

national defense,” and that therefore, as part of the “public 

interest analysis” that the FCC undertakes to ensure that 

§ 214 certificates comport with “the present or future public 

convenience and necessity,” the FCC has long considered 

“national security” and “foreign policy concerns” related to 

a carrier’s foreign ownership. 37 FCC Rcd. at 1481–83, 

¶¶ 3–5 (emphasis omitted). The FCC determined that

revocation of CUA’s § 214 certificates on the basis of 

national security concerns was amply supported by the 

record. See id. at 1494–95 ¶¶ 25–26, 1508–33 ¶¶ 49–77.

The FCC also “reject[ed] CUA’s various procedural 

arguments,” finding that its approach was “consistent with 

principles of due process and applicable law and provided 

CUA with sufficient notice and several opportunities to be 

heard.” Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1497 ¶ 29. 

Specifically, the FCC determined that neither its own 

regulations and precedent nor the dictates of due process 

under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),

required a formal evidentiary hearing and that a written 

evidentiary record was sufficient to decide the case. See 

Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1497–1500 ¶¶ 31–36.

The Revocation Order then discussed CUA’s ownership 

and management in detail, ultimately concluding that CUA 

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24 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

is indirectly owned by the Chinese government. See 37 FCC 

Rcd. at 1484–86 ¶ 7, 1509 ¶ 50.

Next, the FCC summarized how the Executive Branch 

agencies’ national security concerns regarding CUA’s 

Chinese government ownership were amplified by certain 

Chinese intelligence and cybersecurity laws10 that 

potentially could be used to obtain CUA’s compliance with 

Chinese government requests for information, such as 

communication intercepts and identifying information about 

U.S. customers. See Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 

1521–22 ¶ 64, 1539–40 ¶¶ 83–85. Thus, the FCC concluded 

“that CUA’s retention of section 214 authority presents 

national security and law enforcement risks that warrant 

revocation.” Id. at 1530 ¶ 74.

The FCC also revoked the certificates on the alternative 

ground that CUA’s responses to the Commission throughout 

the proceedings had demonstrated a lack of candor and 

trustworthiness. See Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 

1555 ¶ 111. The FCC determined that, among other things,

“CUA failed to provide the Commission with crucial 

information” regarding its ownership structure, board of 

directors’ CCP membership, the involvement of its parent 

and other related entities in its management and operations, 

and the existence of a relevant confidentiality agreement, 

despite specific requests for such information. Id. On the 

record, the FCC concluded that “CUA cannot be trusted to 

cooperate with the Commission or the Executive Branch 

agencies, to comply with the Commission’s rules, and, 

importantly, to assist with the Commission’s statutory 

10 These laws included the 2017 Cybersecurity Law, the 2017 National 

Intelligence Law, the 2018 Cybersecurity Regulation, and the 2019 

Cryptography Law. Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1524 ¶ 67.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 25

obligations to act ‘for the purpose of the national defense 

[and] for the purpose of promoting safety of life and 

property.’” Id. at 1556 ¶ 111 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151).

Finally, the FCC found that mitigation measures, 

including those proposed by CUA in its responses, “would 

not address the significant national security and law 

enforcement concerns present in this case.” Revocation 

Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1563 ¶ 124. The FCC again noted its 

“longstanding policy of according deference to the 

Executive Branch agencies’ expertise in identifying and 

mitigating risks to national security” and “in monitoring 

carriers’ compliance with risk mitigation agreements.” Id. 

The Revocation Order then explained that the FCC agreed 

with the Committee’s assessment that, “given CUA’s 

relationship with the [Chinese] government and the 

significant national security and law enforcement concerns 

resulting from that relationship,” “the underlying foundation 

of trust that is needed for a mitigation agreement of this type 

to adequately address national security and law enforcement 

concerns is not present,” and so “the opportunity for 

effective mitigation with CUA is illusory at best in the 

current national security environment.” Id.

In light of the foregoing, the FCC ordered that CUA’s 

domestic and international § 214 certificates be revoked and 

that CUA discontinue all services provided pursuant to § 214 

within 60 days. See Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1568 

¶¶ 135–36.

D

CUA timely filed its petition for review of the FCC’s 

revocation order, naming as respondents both the FCC and 

the United States. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2342(1) and 2343. CUA subsequently filed an 

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26 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

emergency request for a temporary stay and a motion to stay. 

This court denied both the request and the motion on March 

4, 2022.

II

At the outset, CUA argues that, as a matter of law, the 

FCC lacks any statutory authority to revoke a § 214 

certificate, except as a penalty imposed in connection with 

adjudicated violations of applicable law. On that basis, CUA 

asks us to set aside the FCC’s revocation order as being “not 

in accordance with law” and “in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), (C). In its answering brief, the FCC asked us, 

in reviewing this issue, to defer to the FCC’s interpretation 

of the Communications Act under Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984). However, the Supreme Court recently overruled 

Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 

S. Ct. 2244, 2272–73 (2024), and we therefore “must 

exercise [our] independent judgment in deciding whether 

[the] agency has acted within its statutory authority.” Id. at 

2273. Accordingly, we review de novo whether the FCC 

correctly interpreted the scope of its authority under the 

Communications Act. Id. at 2261.

A

As noted earlier, § 214 of the Communications Act 

provides that no common carrier “shall acquire or operate” 

or “construct[]” any telecommunications line without first 

obtaining the necessary certificate from the FCC authorizing 

the carrier to engage in such acquisition, operation, or 

construction. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a). The FCC’s power to grant 

such certificates is set forth in § 214(c), which provides, in 

relevant part, as follows:

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The Commission shall have power to 

issue such certificate as applied for, or to 

refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or 

portions of a line, or extension thereof, or 

discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of 

service, described in the application, or for 

the partial exercise only of such right or 

privilege, and may attach to the issuance of 

the certificate such terms and conditions as in 

its judgment the public convenience and 

necessity may require.

Id. § 214(c). In addition to this and other specific authorities, 

the FCC has been given, in § 4(i) of the Act, a general 

ancillary authority to “perform any and all acts, make such 

rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent 

with [the Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its 

functions.” Id. § 154(i). 

CUA argues that, because § 214 expressly refers only to 

a power to “issue” a certificate, to “refuse to issue” a 

certificate, or to “attach” conditions to “the issuance of the 

certificate,” the FCC has not been granted the power to 

revoke a certificate. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(c). For multiple 

reasons, we do not believe that this is a reasonable reading 

of the statute. Rather, as we shall explain, the statute’s grant 

of authority to “issue” certificates to telecommunications 

carriers must be understood as carrying with it an implied 

incidental authority to revoke such documents. See Haig v. 

Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 290–91 (1981) (holding that the State 

Department’s statutory authority to “grant and issue 

passports” included an implied authority to revoke passports

(citation omitted)); cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 

164 (1926) (stating that “the President’s power of removal is 

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28 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

further established as an incident to his specifically 

enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice 

of the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication 

extend to removals the Senate’s power of checking 

appointments”).

As an initial matter, CUA’s argument—that a power to 

revoke certificates cannot be found to exist unless it is

specifically and expressly recited in the statute—completely 

ignores the concept of implied ancillary authorities and, in 

doing so, ultimately proves too much. If Congress’s failure 

to include an express power to “revoke” a certificate truly 

means that the agency lacks such a power, the result would 

be that once a certificate is issued, it would be like the 

proverbial edict under “the law of the Medes and the 

Persians, which cannot be revoked.” Daniel 6:8 (RSV). 

Even CUA does not endorse this extreme position, because 

it acknowledges that the agency can revoke a certificate as 

“an enforcement penalty for misconduct.” However, this is 

a larger concession than CUA appears to realize, because 

CUA does not identify any provision of the Act that 

expressly allows revocation of certificates as a punishment 

for misconduct. Section 214 contains provisions allowing 

for judicial injunctive relief against violations of the Act and 

for administrative imposition of monetary penalties, but it 

says nothing about revoking a certificate as a penalty. See 

47 U.S.C. § 214(c), (d). Indeed, when the FCC has had 

occasion to explain the source of its authority to revoke a 

certificate as a penalty, it has identified its general authority 

under § 4(i) of the Communications Act. See CCN, Inc., 13 

FCC Rcd. 13599, 13607 ¶ 12 (1998) (invoking its “authority 

under Section 4(i) of the Act” in revoking the certificate of 

carriers who engaged in “egregious actions and blatant 

violation[s] of [FCC] rules and the Act”). But if the FCC’s 

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power to revoke certificates as a penalty rests on its ancillary 

authority to “perform any and all acts,” and “issue such 

orders, . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its 

functions,” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i), then it is hard to see why the 

agency’s exercise of an ancillary revocation authority would 

be strictly limited to only the penalty context. Nothing in the 

language of the statute supports such a limitation, and, as a 

result, CUA’s argument itself becomes atextual.

More generally, CUA errs to the extent that it attaches 

talismanic significance to Congress’s omission of an express 

power to revoke a certificate. The point is illustrated by 

Haig v. Agee, in which the Supreme Court faced a 

comparable interpretive issue. Specifically, the Court there 

addressed whether the State Department “has authority to 

revoke a passport on the ground that the holder’s activities 

in foreign countries are causing or are likely to cause serious 

damage to the national security or foreign policy of the 

United States.” 453 U.S. at 282. After Agee, a former covert 

CIA operative, engaged in a variety of activities overseas 

that publicly opposed the CIA and that sought to “expose 

CIA officers and agents,” id. at 283, the State Department 

revoked his passport on the ground that Agee’s “activities 

abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to 

the national security or the foreign policy of the United 

States,” id. at 286. Agee sued the Secretary of State, and the 

district court granted him summary judgment, ordering his 

passport to be restored. Id. at 287–88. A divided panel of 

the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that there was “no express 

statutory authorization for the revocation,” nor any 

“‘substantial and consistent’ administrative practice” of such 

revocations. Id. at 288 (citation omitted). The Supreme 

Court reversed. Id. at 310.

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The Court noted that the language of the Passport Act, 

which had been unchanged since 1926 and materially 

unchanged since 1874, Agee, 453 U.S. at 290 n.18, stated, in 

relevant part, that the “Secretary of State may grant and 

issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall 

designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United 

States,” id. at 290 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 211a (emphasis 

added)). Because the relevant language only referred to 

“grant[ing] and issu[ing] passports,” the Court 

acknowledged that the “Passport Act does not in so many 

words confer upon the Secretary a power to revoke a 

passport.” Id. (emphasis added). However, contrary to the 

sort of simplistic argument that CUA makes here, the Court 

concluded that this omission did not preclude recognition of 

a revocation power generally or of a specific revocation 

power based on national security concerns. Id. at 290–91. 

For one thing, neither the Passport Act nor any other statute 

“expressly limit[s]” the exercise of a power to revoke a 

passport. Id. at 290. Moreover, giving decisive weight to 

the statute’s omission of any express revocation power 

would prove too much, the Court held, because the statutory 

language also did not “expressly authorize denials of 

passport applications.” Id. (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted). The Court stated that it had already “recognized 

congressional acquiescence in Executive policies of refusing

passports to applicants” participating in a variety of illegal 

conduct, and the Court perceived no basis for concluding 

that a comparable revocation authority did not exist. Id. 

Indeed, the Court noted that Agee ultimately “concede[d] 

that if the Secretary may deny a passport application for a 

certain reason, he may revoke a passport on the same 

ground.” Id. at 291.

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Having thus recognized that the Secretary possessed 

some measure of revocation authority, the Court turned to 

the question whether the Secretary could exercise that 

authority based specifically on national security grounds. 

See Agee, 453 U.S. at 291–306. Exhaustively surveying the 

administrative practices and policies on this point over many 

decades, the Court held that the State Department’s assertion 

that it possessed regulatory power to revoke passports based 

on national security concerns had been “‘sufficiently 

substantial and consistent’ to compel the conclusion that 

Congress ha[d] approved it.” Id. at 306 (citation omitted). 

That was true, the Court held, even though there were very 

few examples that such a power had actually been exercised. 

Id. at 301–03. The Court then proceeded to reject all of 

Agee’s constitutional challenges to the revocation and to the 

procedures by which it was accomplished. Id. at 306–10. 

The Court therefore reversed the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. 

Id. at 310.

Agee further confirms what common sense already 

suggests, which is that a statutory grant of agency authority 

to “issue” an authorizing document may carry with it an 

implied ancillary grant of authority to “deny” and to 

“revoke” such documents. Whether such an authority has 

been granted generally, and if so whether it may be exercised 

on particular grounds, will turn, as in Agee, on the details of 

the statutory scheme and, perhaps, the relevant 

administrative practice. See Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 

1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“The formula the 

government urges, that what one can do, one can undo, is 

sometimes true, sometimes not.”). But the mere fact that the 

Communications Act here refers only to an express power to 

“issue” or to “refuse to issue” a certificate is not dispositive.

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B

We turn, then, to whether there is any other indication in 

the statutory text or structure that Congress denied the FCC 

any relevant authority to revoke a carrier’s § 214 certificate. 

We find none.

1

Relying on United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 

U.S. 424 (1947), which held that the Interstate Commerce 

Commission (“ICC”) lacked the authority to partially revoke 

a certificate issued to a “water carrier” under Part III of the 

Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”), id. at 426–28, CUA 

argues that the FCC’s authority under § 214 should similarly 

be construed as lacking a general authority to revoke 

certificates after they have been issued. The analogy is 

unpersuasive, because the distinctive features of the ICA that 

led to the Court’s holding in Seatrain are absent from the 

Communications Act.

a

In Seatrain, a company (Seatrain) that “long ha[d] been 

a common carrier of goods by water” applied for, and 

received from the ICC, the “certificate” required under 

§ 309(a) of Part III of the ICA to authorize the company to 

carry commodities along specified shipping routes. 329 U.S. 

at 425–27. Some 20 months later, in January 1944, the ICC 

sua sponte reopened the proceedings concerning Seatrain’s 

certificate in order to determine whether Seatrain’s 

authorization to carry commodities along those routes 

should be narrowed. Id. at 427. Seatrain took the position 

that the ICC “was without statutory authority to make the 

alteration proposed,” and it therefore “declined to offer 

evidence” concerning the ICC’s inquiry into altering the 

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certificate. Id. The ICC “entered an order canceling the 

former certificate and directing that a different one be 

issued.” Id. The new certificate “in effect deprived Seatrain 

of the right to carry goods generally between the ports it 

served” and instead “limited it[s] . . . operations” to only 

certain specified types of carriage of goods. Id. A threejudge district court held that the ICC lacked the authority to 

alter the certificate and that, even if it did have such 

authority, the ICC “should not have done so in this case 

where, as the [district] [c]ourt found from evidence before it 

but which had not been before the [ICC], Seatrain had 

expended large sums of money in reliance upon the complete 

validity of its certificate.” Id. at 427–28. The Supreme 

Court affirmed, agreeing that the ICC “was without authority 

to cancel this certificate.” Id. at 428.

As an initial matter, the Court rejected the ICC’s 

argument that the alteration of Seatrain’s certificate fell 

within the scope of a permissible exercise of a “power to 

correct clerical mistakes.” Seatrain, 329 U.S. at 428. 

Reviewing the relevant circumstances, the Court concluded 

that “it seems apparent that the Seatrain proceedings were 

reopened not to correct a mere clerical error, but to execute 

[a] new policy” concerning the “carriage of . . . freight cars” 

announced by the ICC in a December 1943 decision in 

another case. Id. at 429. 

Turning to the question of the ICC’s statutory authority 

to cancel a certificate, the Court noted that the “water carrier 

provisions are part of the general pattern of the [ICA] which 

grants the [ICC] power to regulate railroads and motor 

carriers as well as water carriers.” Seatrain, 329 U.S. at 429–

30 (footnote omitted). The Court found it significant that, 

although the ICA authorized the ICC “to issue certificates to 

all three types of carriers,” the ICC was “specifically 

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empowered to revoke only the certificates of motor carriers.” 

Id. at 430 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, this

notable difference in the statutory language governing the 

three types of carriers appears to have been intentional:

In fact, when the water carrier provisions 

were pending in Congress, the Commission’s 

spokesman, Commissioner Eastman, seems 

specifically to have requested the Congress to 

include no power to revoke a certificate. The 

Commissioner explained that while the 

power to revoke motor carriers’ certificates 

was essential as an effective means of 

enforcement of the motor carrier section, it 

was not necessary to use such sanctions in the 

regulation of water carriers.

Id. In a footnote, the Court quoted Commissioner Eastman’s 

express statement that the ICC did not believe that it needed 

a similar revocation authority with respect to water carriers:

While there is room for argument, we are 

inclined to believe that provision for the 

revocation or suspension of water carrier 

certificates or permits is not essential, if 

adequate penalty provisions are provided for 

violations of part III. Revocation or 

suspension, in the case of motor carriers, is 

believed to be the most effective means of 

enforcement, since there are so many such 

carriers, and the operations of the great 

majority are so small, that enforcement 

through penal actions in courts presents many 

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practical difficulties; but this is not true of 

water carriers.

Id. at 430 n.4 (citation omitted). The Court further noted that 

the ICC itself had taken the view that, apart from the express 

statutory revocation authority granted with respect to motor 

carriers, the ICC lacked any authority to revoke motorcarrier certificates under its “general statutory power[s].” Id. 

at 430–31.

The Court next addressed, and rejected, the argument 

that the ICC’s “statutory power under § 309(d)” of the ICA 

“to fix ‘terms, conditions, and limitations’ for water carrier 

certificate holders” allowed it to narrow the terms of 

Seatrain’s certificate. Seatrain, 329 U.S. at 431. This 

argument failed, the Court concluded, because any such 

authority to impose terms and conditions after a certificate 

had been granted “is certainly no greater than the 

Commission’s authority to limit the type of service when 

issuing the original certificate.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Again comparing the notable differences in the respective 

provisions of the ICA governing motor carriers and water 

carriers, the Court held that the provisions governing water 

carriers appeared affirmatively to “preclude” the ICC from 

attaching to a certificate the sort of limitations at issue in 

Seatrain. Id. Given that the ICC apparently lacked the 

authority to impose such limitations as an exercise of its 

power to impose terms and conditions “when issuing the 

original certificate,” any authority to amend those terms and 

conditions could not justify the ICC’s narrowing of 

Seatrain’s certificate. Id. at 431–32.

Finally, the Court rejected the ICC’s argument that its 

statutory authority to “suspend, modify, or set aside its 

orders” under Part III allowed it to alter Seatrain’s 

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36 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

certificate. Seatrain, 329 U.S. at 432 (citation omitted). The 

Court held that this argument failed because the statutory 

context made clear that a “certificate” was not an “order” 

within the meaning of that provision. Id. Accordingly, the 

Court held that a water-carrier certificate under the ICA was 

“not subject to revocation in whole or in part except as 

specifically authorized by Congress.” Id. at 432–33.

b

None of the arguments that led the Seatrain Court to 

reject the ICC’s asserted power to cancel a water-carrier 

certificate apply here.

Unlike in Seatrain, there is no suggestion in the text of 

the Communications Act that Congress intentionally 

withheld revocation authority from one type of comparable 

common-carrier certificate while expressly granting it with 

respect to another. In arguing to the contrary, CUA points 

to the fact that the separate title of the Communications Act

dealing with radio licensing (Title III) contains a provision

expressly empowering the FCC to “revoke any station 

license” for a variety of reasons, including “because of 

conditions coming to the attention of the [FCC] which would 

warrant it in refusing to grant a license . . . on an original 

application.” 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). We reject CUA’s 

proffered analogy between the referenced provisions of the 

Communications Act and the distinct provisions of the ICA 

cited in Seatrain.

In our view, no negative inference can be drawn from the 

fact that the “radio” licensing provisions in Title III of the 

Communications Act contain an express revocation 

provision, while the common-carrier certificate provisions in 

Title II do not. As the Supreme Court has noted, the two 

distinct regulatory systems established under Title II and 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 37

Title III are very different, because, in “contradistinction” to 

wire-telecommunications carriers, the Act recognizes that 

“broadcasters are not common carriers and are not to be dealt 

with as such.” FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 

470, 474 (1940) (footnote omitted). In sharp contrast to the 

otherwise similar common-carrier regimes created for water 

carriers and motor carriers under the ICA at issue in 

Seatrain, there is no basis for concluding that the very 

different systems reflected in Title II and Title III of the 

Communications Act should comparably be read in pari 

materia. Indeed, given that broadcast licenses are generally 

issued for fixed, renewable terms of up to eight years, see 47 

U.S.C. § 307(c)(1), the statute reflects a clear temporal 

expectation that, absent contrary indication in the statutory 

text, such a license will endure for the length of that term. 

The use of a fixed term is thus affirmatively inconsistent 

with positing an implied power to revoke a license at any 

time, and it is therefore unsurprising that Title III contains a 

provision expressly recognizing an agency power of 

revocation. By contrast, as noted earlier, Title II’s silence 

on the temporal duration of common-carrier certificates, 

which have traditionally been open-ended in length, is a 

factor that weighs in favor of an implied power of 

revocation.

Moreover, unlike in Seatrain, the FCC’s authority in 

“issuing the original certificate” does include the authority 

to deny it on the grounds invoked by the agency here. The 

Communications Act identifies the “national defense” as one 

of the objectives of the Act that the FCC should consider in 

evaluating the public interest, see 47 U.S.C. § 151, and § 214 

underscores the point by stating that applications for 

certificates must be shared with the Defense and State 

Departments and that the views of those additional agencies 

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38 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

must be considered, id. § 214(b). Unlike Seatrain, in which 

the ICC sought to use its general conditioning authority to 

limit certificates on grounds it could not have invoked “when 

issuing the original certificate,” 329 U.S. at 431, this is not a 

situation in which the agency is attempting to use a general 

authority to smuggle into the regulatory scheme a nonstatutory factor that is at odds with Congress’s crafting of 

that scheme. See Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, 

Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 333 n.15 (1961) (noting that Seatrain’s 

“holding may rest on an alternate ground—viz.: that the 

[ICC] had no power to impose the conditions it did in the 

first instance”);11 Murphy Oil Corp. v. FERC, 589 F.2d 944, 

947 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating that Seatrain “rested heavily on 

the Court’s doubt that the ICC would have had, in the first 

instance, statutory authority to take the action it did” 

(citation omitted)).

CUA’s analogy to Title III of the Communications Act 

presents other interpretive difficulties. The revocation 

provision in Title III authorizes revocation, not only on 

grounds that would warrant denial of an original application, 

but also upon a half-dozen other grounds, including “willful 

or repeated” violations of the FCC’s rules. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 312(a)(4). If, as CUA contends, the textual distinctions 

between Title III and Title II mean that the express 

revocation authority set forth in Title III must be understood 

as having been affirmatively withheld from Title II, then the 

FCC would be unable to exercise revocation authority under 

Title II even based on repeated rules violations. As noted 

11 In noting that this alternative ground for Seatrain’s holding is also

inapplicable here, we do not, as the dissent wrongly contends, conclude 

that Seatrain’s holding is “limited” to this “alternate holding.” See

Dissent at 82–83. Rather, our point is that both of the rationales 

discussed in Seatrain are inapplicable here.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 39

earlier, CUA itself is unwilling to embrace that extreme 

position, even if it is the logical consequence of its simplistic 

approach to the Communications Act’s text.

CUA alternatively argues that, because the Title II 

common-carrier regulations were themselves crafted by 

“analogy to the regulation of rail and other carriers” in the 

ICA, see Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 474, we should attach 

controlling weight to the contrast between the motor-carrier

provisions of Part II of the ICA and the wiretelecommunications-carrier provisions of the 

Communications Act. But as we have explained, Seatrain’s 

conclusion that the water-carrier provisions of the ICA did 

not include a revocation power rested dispositively on the 

facts that (1) the textual distinction drawn within the ICA 

between the motor-carrier provisions and the water-carrier 

provisions was intentional; and (2) the ICC had 

affirmatively informed Congress that it did not need 

revocation authority in the water-carrier context. The mere 

fact that, when enacted in 1934, the Communication Act’s 

provisions governing wire-telecommunications-carrier 

certificates were modeled on the ICA’s 1920 railroadcertificate provisions does not support transposing 

Seatrain’s highly context-specific reading of the watercarrier provisions of the ICA to the very different context of

Title II of the Communications Act. The specific reasons 

Seatrain gave for that reading of the ICA’s water-carrier 

provisions simply do not apply to § 214.

2

An agency’s assertion of an implied general revocation 

authority may also be sharply limited, or even foreclosed, 

when the statutory structure negates that assertion of implied 

authority. See American Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 

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40 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That may be the case, for example, 

when there is a specific statutory process for altering an 

agency’s grant of a certificate, waiver, or other 

authorization. See id. Where Congress has provided a 

particular mechanism, with specified procedures, for an 

agency to make such alterations, “it is not reasonable to 

infer” an implied authority that would allow an agency to 

circumvent those statutory procedural protections. Ivy 

Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted); see also Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 

at 334 (holding that “agencies desiring to change existing 

certificates must follow the procedures ‘specifically 

authorized’ by Congress and cannot rely on their own 

notions of implied powers in the enabling act” (quoting 

Seatrain, 329 U.S. at 433)).12

But CUA neither contends that the Communications Act 

sets forth any such specific statutory procedures for revoking 

a certificate, nor has it pointed to any such procedural 

12 In a footnote, Delta Air Lines suggested in dicta that the agency in 

Seatrain actually “could have reached with impunity the result it wanted 

to reach by following the procedures set out by Congress.” 367 U.S. at 

333 n.15. Under this further alternative reading of Seatrain, the ICC

assertedly did have implied revocation authority (pursuant to its general 

powers of reconsideration), but it simply failed to follow the proper 

statutory procedures to invoke that authority. Contrary to what the 

dissent posits, see Dissent at 83–85 & n.17, this reading of Seatrain does 

not support CUA’s position. As we explain later, the FCC here properly 

followed the procedures that are applicable to its exercise of its 

revocation authority, see infra Section IV, and so this is not a situation 

in which the agency has sought to invoke implied authority in order to 

evade the procedural protections applicable to such action. Indeed, 

CUA’s position is that the FCC simply lacks the substantive authority to 

revoke its certificates on national security grounds, regardless of what 

procedures are used.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 41

provision in the Act that the FCC would supposedly evade if 

it were held to have implied revocation authority here. On 

the contrary, CUA’s procedural arguments are based on the 

assertion that, if the FCC has implied revocation authority 

under the Communications Act, then any given exercise of 

that authority must comply with (1) the particular FCC 

regulations that CUA contends would then be applicable; 

and (2) the provision of the APA that generally applies to 

any decision to revoke a license, see 5 U.S.C. § 558. See 

infra Section IV. Because the procedural provisions invoked 

by CUA are generic ones that only come into play if there is 

already an independent source of revocation authority, they 

do not constitute the sort of specific statutory mechanism for 

revocation that might preclude recognition of an implied 

revocation power. Put simply, if there is no statutory 

procedure for revocation that the agency could be said to be 

evading by relying on implied authority, then the entire 

predicate for the sort of statutory-structure argument 

referenced in American Methyl is lacking.

3

Examining the relevant provisions of the 

Communications Act for any other pertinent textual clues, 

we are further reinforced in the correctness of our view that 

the FCC has the authority to revoke a § 214 certificate based 

upon national security grounds.

As noted above, the statute instructs the FCC, in 

evaluating an initial application for a § 214 certificate, to 

consider the “national defense” and to consult with the 

Departments of Defense and State. That national defense 

factor would be considered as part of the FCC’s statutory 

directive to determine whether “the present or future public 

convenience and necessity [may] require” the requested 

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42 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

authorization. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (emphasis added). It 

would be a strange reading of this provision to conclude that, 

while the agency must, in issuing certificates, consider 

expectations concerning the “future” public convenience 

and necessity, it may never consider subsequent changes in 

such circumstances as that “future” plays out. The 

conditions surrounding the telecommunications industry,

and the various players within it, can be expected to change, 

including with respect to national security considerations, 

and a sclerotic view of the agency’s authority is 

affirmatively inconsistent with the statute’s declared 

purpose. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 33, 

63 (2012) (explaining that a “textually permissible 

interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the 

document’s purpose”—which is “to be gathered only from 

the text itself”—“should be favored”).13

* * *

Accordingly, we hold that the FCC possesses statutory 

authority to revoke a § 214(a) certificate by invoking

grounds that it may properly consider in denying issuance of 

such a certificate as an original matter. Of course, any actual 

exercise of such authority must consider the relevant 

constraints that may be placed upon that action by the 

Constitution, other statutes, or applicable principles of 

13 Finally, although it is not necessary to our holding, the FCC’s authority 

to attach appropriate “terms and conditions” to § 214 certificates, see 47 

U.S.C. § 214(c), provides further support for recognizing such a 

revocation authority here. Both the Domestic Blanket Order and the 

Foreign Participation Order that underlie CUA’s certificates explicitly 

mention and assert a revocation authority on the part of the FCC. See

Domestic Blanket Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 11372 ¶ 12, 11374 ¶ 16; 

Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23900 ¶ 19, 24022 ¶ 295.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 43

administrative law. In some cases, such as ones involving 

substantial reliance interests, those constraints may be 

significant and may preclude a particular exercise of such 

authority.

III

Here, CUA argues that the FCC’s case-specific exercise 

of revocation authority does in fact violate various other 

provisions of law. In addressing these challenges, we first 

consider CUA’s contention that the revocation order here 

should be set aside under the APA on the grounds that it was 

arbitrary and capricious and that its factual conclusions were 

not supported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A).

Our review under these APA standards “is deferential,” 

and we “may not substitute [our] own policy judgment for 

that of the agency.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 

U.S. 414, 423 (2021). The “arbitrary and capricious” 

standard limits us to “ensur[ing] that the agency has acted 

within a zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has 

reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably 

explained the decision.” Id.; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. 

Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 

(1983) (“Our only task is to determine whether the 

Commission has considered the relevant factors and 

articulated a rational connection between the facts found and 

the choice made.”). We review the factual findings 

underlying the agency’s decision for substantial evidence, 

see Center for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. FAA, 18 F.4th 

592, 598 (9th Cir. 2021), and we must uphold them if “a 

reasonable mind might accept [this] particular evidentiary 

record as adequate to support [the agency’s] conclusion,” 

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (simplified). 

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44 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

Applying these standards to the FCC’s two alternative 

grounds for revoking CUA’s certificates, we reject CUA’s 

contentions.

A

The FCC’s decision to revoke CUA’s certificates based 

on national security concerns was reasonable and supported 

by substantial evidence.

The FCC’s revocation order lays out in detail the 

particular national security risks and threats posed by CUA’s 

continued retention of its § 214 certificates. The relevant 

Executive Branch agencies explained how the national

security situation has changed over the last two decades visà-vis China, which now represents an increased threat to the 

United States in terms of potential economic espionage, 

cyberattacks, and intelligence-gathering efforts. Revocation 

Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1530–33 ¶¶ 74–76. Substantial 

evidence supports the FCC’s conclusion that CUA’s 

ultimate Chinese government ownership as well as the 

significant overlap among its board members with those of 

its parent entities and the CCP itself leave it particularly 

vulnerable to Chinese government influence, exploitation, 

and control. See id. at 1510–12 ¶¶ 52–53, 1518–21 ¶¶ 61–

62.

Furthermore, the FCC properly concluded that there are 

“significant concerns” that recently enacted Chinese 

cybersecurity and intelligence laws could require Chinese 

companies, including CUA’s indirect parents, to assist the 

Chinese government’s intelligence-collection efforts. 

Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1521–29 ¶¶ 64–72. 

Although CUA insists that it is not itself directly subject to 

these laws, the agency permissibly concluded that CUA’s 

ownership by entities that indisputably are subject to such 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 45

laws presents a material national security risk to the United 

States. Id. at 1523–28 ¶¶ 66–70. The FCC explained that 

CUA’s infrastructure and capabilities provide “CUA, its 

controlling parent entities, and therefore the Chinese 

government, with numerous opportunities to access, 

monitor, store, disrupt, and/or misroute U.S. 

communications in ways that are not authorized and that can 

facilitate espionage and other activities harmful to U.S. 

national security and law enforcement interests.” Id. at 1530 

¶ 74. As the FCC noted, the record indicates that this could 

include the collection or disruption of even some U.S. 

government communications to international destinations. 

See id. at 1534–35 ¶ 78, 1551 ¶ 102.

Moreover, the record supports the FCC’s conclusion that 

CUA’s U.S. customer records are held overseas in Hong 

Kong and can be accessed by its direct parent, CUG. See 

Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1513 ¶ 55. The FCC 

further noted that at least one other affiliated Hong Kong 

company, China Unicom (Hong Kong) Operations Limited 

(“CUHK Operations”), also has access to these U.S. 

customer records, and CUA failed to explain its relationship 

with CUHK Operations or why it has access to CUA’s 

records. See id. at 1514–16 ¶¶ 57–58. CUA’s network 

infrastructure also provides it with the capability and 

opportunity “to access, monitor, store, disrupt, and/or 

misroute U.S. communications,” id. at 1551 ¶ 102, including 

U.S. government communications, id. at 1535 ¶ 78, “in ways 

that are not authorized and that can facilitate espionage and 

other activities harmful to U.S. national security and law 

enforcement interests,” id. at 1530 ¶ 74. This risk is not 

theoretical; CUA relies on the network operation center of 

its parent entities in Hong Kong for technical support, and 

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46 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

its network can be reconfigured remotely from Hong Kong. 

See id. at 1513 ¶ 55.

CUA failed to adequately address the fact that its indirect 

parent entities were required to comply with Chinese laws 

and government directives, including certain Chinese 

cybersecurity and intelligence laws. Further, CUA 

represented that “none of CUG’s senior management or 

members of its board of directors are affiliated with or 

appointed by the Chinese government” (emphasis added),

but that statement is misleading. CUA disclosed elsewhere 

in its response to the Order to Show Cause that CUG board 

directors were members of the CCP, which the agency 

reasonably construed to be an “affiliation” with the Chinese 

government. See Institution Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at 6337–

39 ¶ 28. And although CUA argued that its and its parents’ 

compliance with U.S. and Hong Kong laws, respectively, 

along with recently increased private investment in CUHK,

demonstrate “independent governance,” CUA never refuted

the claim that its ultimate parent, CU, was owned and 

controlled by the Chinese government.

Regarding the FCC’s request for clarification as to the 

difference between CUA’s representation that CU indirectly 

held only a 52.1% equity interest in CUHK and CUHK’s 

2020 SEC filing stating that CU indirectly owned 79.9% of 

CUHK, CUA provided a revised chart of its ownership 

chain. Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1485 n.22, 1560–

61 ¶¶ 119–20. However, CUA offered no satisfactory 

explanation for this discrepancy and failed to provide a clear 

breakdown of the ownership percentages that illustrate CU’s 

ultimate ownership percentage of CUHK. See id. And while 

CUA now argues that the ownership chart it provided in 

response to the Institution Order clearly showed that CU 

actually owned 79.9% of CUHK, the agency properly 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 47

concluded that this was not in fact clear, as the chart depicted 

intermediate ownership steps between CUHK and CU 

without identifying the percentages ultimately controlled by 

CU. See id. 

Further, on this record, the FCC permissibly concluded 

that, “[c]ontrary to CUA’s claims, CUG does not simply 

provide input on ‘major decisions’; rather, CUG’s control is 

much broader due to its role in CUA’s decision making, 

provision of services, and access to and maintenance of U.S. 

customer records.” Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1510 

¶ 52 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, as noted, CUA was not 

initially candid about the extensive overlap among its 

directors and management and those of CUG, CUHK, and 

CU, the vast majority of whom are CCP members. Id. at 

1511–12 ¶ 53, 1520–21 ¶ 62. Finally, CUHK’s SEC filings 

reported that CU “is effectively able to control [CUHK’s] 

management, policies and business by controlling the 

composition of [CUHK’s] board of directors and, in turn, 

indirectly controlling the selection of [its] senior 

management.” Id. at 1485 n.22.

This extensive “integrated presence” of the CCP in 

CUA’s ownership and management made concrete the 

FCC’s “concerns with CUA’s ownership and control by the 

Chinese government,” concerns it had similarly articulated 

in its order revoking the § 214 certificate of another Chinese 

carrier, China Telecom. Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 

1518 ¶ 61 (citing China Telecom (Ams.) Corp., 36 FCC Rcd. 

15966, 16002 ¶ 59 (2021) (hereinafter “China Telecom 

Order”)). There, the FCC noted that “[t]he U.S. 

[G]overnment has found that the Chinese government exerts 

influence over state-owned enterprises through the [CCP],” 

China Telecom Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at 16002 ¶ 59, including 

by “establish[ing] its branches in companies to carry out 

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48 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

activities of the [CCP],” id. at 16000 n.235. Regarding

CUA’s arguments here that its U.S. incorporation made it 

sufficiently independent from its parent entities and the 

Chinese government, the FCC explained that it had 

previously “addressed and rejected” similar arguments “in 

both the [China Mobile Order] and the [China Telecom 

Order], finding that an entity’s incorporation in the United 

States does not prevent that entity from being forced to 

comply with Chinese government requests.” Revocation 

Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1513 ¶ 54. Based on this evidence, 

the FCC “agree[d] with the Executive Branch agencies’ 

statement that the potential for [CCP] influence ‘is not 

theoretical.’” Id. at 1520 ¶ 62 (footnote omitted). As a 

result, the Commission concluded that “CUA’s assertion 

that it is ‘an independent corporation’ that is ‘sufficiently 

separate from the [Chinese] government,’ is contradicted by 

the record evidence.” Id. at 1510 ¶ 52 (footnote omitted).

In holding that the FCC’s determinations were

reasonable, we agree with the comparable unanimous,

separate decisions of the D.C. Circuit in two parallel cases. 

In China Telecom (Americas) Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.4th 256 

(D.C. Cir. 2022), the relevant Executive Branch agencies

presented similar evidence and articulated similar national 

security concerns with regard to China Telecom’s ultimate 

Chinese government ownership and its susceptibility to 

Chinese government influence, exploitation, and control for 

intelligence and espionage purposes. See China Telecom 

Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at 15998–16008 ¶¶ 52–65; China 

Telecom, 57 F.4th at 265–66. The FCC revoked China 

Telecom’s § 214 certificate on the basis of national security 

concerns and, on review under the APA, the D.C. Circuit 

held the FCC’s determination to have been reasonable and 

substantially supported by the record. See China Telecom, 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 49

57 F.4th at 265–67. The court emphasized that it could not 

“interfere with the agency’s latitude not merely to find facts 

and make judgments, but also to select the policies deemed 

in the public interest,” id. at 267 (quoting United States v. 

FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), particularly “when 

national security is implicated,” id. (citing Agee, 453 U.S. at

292 (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and 

national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial 

intervention.”)). Because the record substantially supported 

“the Commission and the Executive Branch agencies’ policy 

judgment regarding the national security risk posed by China 

Telecom,” the D.C. Circuit determined that it had “no basis 

upon which to question the propriety of the Revocation 

Order.” Id.; see also Pacific Networks Corp. v. FCC, 77

F.4th 1160, 1164–66 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (unanimously 

rejecting a similar APA challenge to the FCC’s revocation 

of § 214 certificates based on concerns that the carriers, who 

were ultimately owned by the Chinese government, posed 

national security risks and had proved themselves 

untrustworthy).

Given the substantial evidence supporting the FCC’s 

conclusions that CUA’s retention of its § 214 certificates 

presents serious, particular national security risks, we

conclude that the FCC’s revocation of CUA’s § 214 

certificates was not arbitrary and capricious and that the 

factual determinations underlying its decision were 

supported by substantial evidence.

B

The FCC’s alternative ground for revoking CUA’s 

certificates was that it had exhibited a lack of candor and 

trustworthiness with the FCC during its interactions with the 

agency. See Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1555–56 

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50 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

¶ 111. This conclusion was also amply supported and was 

not arbitrary and capricious.

Honesty and transparency with government agencies are 

important to assessing “an authorization holder’s ability to 

comply with the [FCC’s] statutory authority and 

implementing rules.” Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 

1562 ¶ 123. Such considerations take on an additional 

dimension when the subject matter giving rise to the 

agency’s concern about a company’s trustworthiness 

involve that company’s connections to a foreign power 

whose activities raise grave national security concerns. See 

id. at 1563 ¶ 125. As detailed above, substantial evidence 

supports the FCC’s determination that CUA had 

demonstrated a serious lack of candor and trustworthiness in 

its responses to the FCC’s inquiries. See id. at 1555–63

¶¶ 111–23. CUA’s answers regarding its chain of 

ownership, its board of directors’ CCP membership, its 

parent entities’ control over its management and operations, 

and access to its U.S. customer records by non-U.S. parent 

and affiliate companies contained significant omissions and 

incorrect information, and they failed to fully answer the 

FCC’s inquires. See id. at 1556–61 ¶¶ 112–20.

Deeming CUA’s initial responses incomplete, the FCC’s 

Institution Order had reiterated the following requests, 

which tracked the earlier requests made in the Order to Show 

Cause: (1) “a complete and detailed description of the 

current ownership and control of [CUA], including a 

description of the equity interest and voting interest for any 

entity that holds a ten percent or greater direct or indirect 

interest in and/or controls [CUA]”; (2) “a detailed 

description of the management and oversight of [CUA] by 

[CUG] and any entity that holds a ten percent or greater 

direct or indirect ownership interest in and/or controls 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 51

[CUA]”; and (3) “an identification of all officers, directors, 

and other senior management of all entities that hold a ten 

percent or greater direct or indirect ownership interest in 

and/or control [CUA], their employment history (including 

prior employment with the Chinese government), and their 

affiliations with the [CCP] and the Chinese government.” 

Institution Order, 36 FCC Rcd. at App’x A (emphasis 

omitted).

Nevertheless, knowing again exactly what information 

the FCC sought, CUA failed to clarify or even acknowledge 

the significant degree of management and control CUG 

appears to exercise over CUA’s operations and U.S. 

customer records. Regarding the repeated inquiry about 

CUA’s direct and indirect ownership and management, 

CUA offered a circumspect response, stating:

CUG provides shared services to CUA, as 

well as all of its international subsidiaries, for 

product development, technical solutions, 

network monitoring and planning, order 

implementation, project management, and 

customer services. Other than CUG, no other

entity that holds a ten percent or greater direct 

or indirect ownership interest in and/or 

controls CUA . . . has management and 

oversight of CUA’s operations.

Underscoring CUA’s lack of forthrightness, the 

confidentiality agreement governing storage of and access to 

U.S. customer records that CUA had initially failed to 

disclose provided a different, previously unmentioned 

entity—CUHK Operations—with access to CUA’s U.S. 

customer records. See Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 

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52 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

1515–16 ¶¶ 57–58. And contrary to CUA’s representations, 

the confidentiality agreement was not signed between CUA 

and CUG, but between CUA and CUHK Operations, and did

not mention CUG at all. See id. at 1515–16 ¶ 58, 1542 ¶ 88. 

CUA did not acknowledge this discrepancy, leaving the FCC 

with “no explanation as to [CUA’s] or CUG’s relation to 

[CUHK Operations], or how CUG can be considered a party 

to and legally bound by [the confidentiality] agreement.” Id.

at 1516 ¶ 58.

Most importantly, the FCC found that this revelation 

flatly contradicted CUA’s prior representation that it 

“strictly limits access to the U.S. customer records solely to 

CUA and CUG.” Revocation Order, 37 FCC Rcd. at 1542 

¶ 87. Further, the confidentiality agreement mentioned an 

additional document, the “Account and Passcode Security 

Policy,” which CUA claimed “governs access to U.S. 

customer records.” Id. at 1558 ¶ 116. While CUA informed 

the FCC that the policy was only available in Chinese and 

that CUA was working to translate and provide an English 

copy to the Commission, it never did so. See id. On this 

basis, the FCC determined that it could not be certain that 

CUA would not provide access to U.S. customer records to 

other entities not disclosed in the proceedings. Id. at 1541–

42 ¶ 87. All these considerations together provide sufficient 

grounds to find that CUA did not exhibit candor and 

trustworthiness in its dealings with the FCC.

The FCC has previously considered trustworthiness an 

important factor in two recent decisions concerning other 

Chinese state-owned carriers. In denying § 214 

authorization to China Mobile, the FCC explained that the 

company’s lack of trustworthiness in its dealings with the 

U.S. Government—specifically, the U.S. Government’s 

inability to trust China Mobile’s representations regarding

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 53

compliance with potential mitigation measures to address 

national security concerns—was one of the animating 

reasons behind its decision. See China Mobile Order, 34 

FCC Rcd. at 3379 ¶ 36. In China Telecom, the FCC found 

that revocation of China Telecom’s § 214 authorizations was 

warranted by the fact that China Telecom had failed to 

provide certain required notifications regarding overseas 

access to and storage of U.S. records and by the fact that it 

had made “inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading 

representations to government agencies” about “the 

potential disruption or misrouting of U.S. communications.” 

China Telecom, 57 F.4th at 267–68. The D.C. Circuit 

agreed, holding that the FCC’s decision was based on 

substantial evidence in the record. See id. at 268. Our 

decision in this case aligns with our sister circuit’s decision.

IV

CUA also asserts that the FCC failed to follow the 

requisite procedures prior to revoking CUA’s § 214 

certificates. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). Consistent with the 

decisions of the D.C. Circuit in China Telecom and Pacific 

Networks, we reject these contentions.

The Communications Act gives the FCC authority to 

“conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best 

conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of 

justice,” 47 U.S.C. § 154(j), and also gives the agency broad 

discretion to craft its own rules “of procedure and to pursue 

methods of inquiry capable of permitting [it] to discharge 

[its] multitudinous duties,” FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 

290 (1965); see also China Telecom, 57 F.4th at 268–69. 

The FCC has generally chosen to exercise this discretion to 

“resolve disputes of fact in an informal hearing proceeding 

on a written record.” China Telecom, 57 F.4th at 268–69

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54 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

(quoting Procedural Streamlining of Admin. Hearings, 35 

FCC Rcd. 10729, 10732 ¶ 11 (2020)). Here, as in China 

Telecom, the FCC “reasonably determined that the issues 

raised in this case could be properly resolved through the 

presentation and exchange of full written submissions before 

the [FCC] itself.” Id. at 269.

CUA argues that, under 47 C.F.R. § 1.91(b) and (d), the 

FCC was required to conduct a hearing under the FCC’s 

“subpart B” rules, which mandate an evidentiary hearing 

before an ALJ prior to the issuance of a revocation order.

See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201–.377.14 But as the D.C. Circuit 

noted, these rules “implement Title III of the 

Communications Act and pertain to proceedings regarding 

station licenses and construction permits, which are not at 

issue here.” China Telecom, 57 F.4th at 269. Although the 

FCC has occasionally “borrowed these procedures” in the 

context of a revocation of a § 214 certificate, this “past 

practice” is insufficiently consistent to support the 

conclusion that the FCC “erred in law or judgment” in 

declining to borrow those procedures here. Id.

We also reject CUA’s argument that, in violation of the 

APA’s provisions concerning license revocation, CUA was 

deprived of the “opportunity to demonstrate or achieve 

compliance with all lawful requirements.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 558(c)(2). Considering the multiple opportunities that 

CUA had, over the course of its interactions with the FCC, 

to explain its position concerning the points of concern 

raised by the agency, and the lack of cooperation and 

forthrightness reflected in CUA’s overall course of conduct, 

14 The FCC argues that CUA failed to raise this argument during the 

agency proceedings and therefore waived it, but CUA did raise this 

argument in its response to the Institution Order.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 55

we conclude that CUA did not need to be afforded yet 

another opportunity to try to unring the bell of its ongoing 

lack of trustworthiness, particularly with respect to issues 

that involve serious national security concerns. See China 

Telecom, 57 F.4th at 269; see also Pacific Networks, 77 F.4th 

at 1165. 

V

For the foregoing reasons, we deny CUA’s petition for 

review. 

PETITION DENIED.

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56 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

“The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. Blessed be 

the Lord.” See Job 1:21 (King James). Today, the majority 

declares that the Federal Communications Commission 

(“FCC”) may act as the Lord in cancelling 

telecommunications certificates. In its view, the FCC’s 

statutory power to grant § 214 certificates under the 

Communications Act of 1934 (the “Act”) necessarily 

implies the power to revoke such certificates of, and solely 

upon its own volition. I disagree. Unlike the majority, I find 

myself constrained by the text of the statute and a regard to 

separation of powers principles of our Constitution to 

resolve this case otherwise. 

Congress has stated the particular powers that the FCC 

possesses under the Act. Revocation authority of previously 

issued telecommunications certificates upon the sole 

initiative and action of the Commission, but without judicial 

proceedings and authorization, is not one of them. No proper 

statutory construction can make that so. That reason should 

dispose of the matter before us. The FCC’s attempted 

revocation of the validly granted § 214 certificates 

authorizing China Unicom (Americas) Operations, Ltd. 

(“CUA”) to provide domestic and international 

telecommunications services was ultra vires—without 

lawful authority. CUA is entitled to have these certificates 

reinstated. Thus, I would grant CUA’s petition for review, 

vacate the FCC’s order, and remand with instructions for the 

FCC to reinstate CUA’s § 214 certificates.

Because the majority instead denies CUA’s petition, I 

respectfully dissent.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 57

I. THE TEXT 

The touchstone of all questions of statutory 

interpretation is the text of the particular statute at issue. Van 

Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 381 (2021).

A. The Communications Act and 47 U.S.C. § 214

While perhaps not a paragon of good drafting, a detailed 

review of § 214 reveals the full extent of the authorities 

Congress granted to the FCC with respect to § 214 

certificates. Section 214(a) provides as follows1:

[T]he construction of a new line or [] an 

extension of any line2 . . . [requires the carrier 

to] obtain[] from the Commission a 

certificate that the present or future public 

convenience and necessity require or will 

require the [new line or its extension]: 

. . .

[But lines that are wholly intrastate or 

otherwise excepted by the Act do not need 

certificates.]

. . .

1

 I have made some edits to improve the reader’s ability to analyze the 

relevant provisions at issue in this case. The text of the provision is 

reformatted to separate relevant clauses. I have also provided summaries 

of excerpted clauses that are not relevant to the statutory interpretation 

question before the panel.

2 “As used in this section the term ‘line’ means any channel of 

communication established by the use of appropriate equipment, other 

than a channel of communication established by the interconnection of 

two or more existing channels. . .” 47 U.S.C. § 214(a). No parties 

dispute that CUA’s use of the “lines” falls within the statutory meaning. 

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58 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

[The FCC, upon request, has temporary 

emergency power to authorize new lines 

without issuing a certificate if the proposed 

lines are necessitated by the emergency.]

. . .

[A carrier’s] discontinu[ance], reduc[tion], or 

impair[ment of] service . . . [requires it to 

obtain the prior approval of] the Commission 

[via] a certificate that [affirms that] neither 

the present nor future public convenience and 

necessity will be adversely affected[—again, 

subject to an exception that a carrier can 

request the FCC to authorize the cessation of 

services without issuing a certificate if an 

emergency situation necessitates such 

cessation.] 

. . . 

[This provision applies to all communication 

lines except for those lines which have the 

sole purpose of connecting already existing, 

approved telecommunications lines. 

Telecommunications companies do not need 

pre-approval to perform regular maintenance 

to ensure that their existing lines are properly 

functioning.]

47 U.S.C. § 214(a). The statute makes clear that a 

telecommunications carrier’s ability to begin or to end its 

provision of telecommunications services requires the 

FCC’s prior approval. It establishes that the FCC’s authority 

to act in issuing a certificate to start or to end service is 

granted only upon a telecommunications company’s request 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 59

or filing of an application with the agency. There is no 

general provision authorizing the FCC to act of its own 

accord (sua sponte) to grant or to revoke a certificate for a 

company to operate a telecommunications line, absent that 

company’s request or application for such a certificate. 

Indeed, revocation of permission to commence, to 

change, or to abandon service sua sponte on the 

Commission’s initiative is not mentioned once in subsection 

(a) of § 214—only application for such actions by applicants 

and certificate holders is mentioned. The standard canon of 

construction that courts apply to a statute’s provision of 

powers is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Longview 

Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1312–13 (9th Cir. 

1992). Namely, the specificity of § 214’s provision of 

authority to the FCC to grant a certificate to start, to modify, 

to change, or to end services only upon a 

telecommunications carrier’s application would normally 

imply Congress intended not to grant the FCC the authority 

to take a different course of action with respect to such 

certificates such as the present sua sponte action of the 

Commission. See id. at 1313 (dismissing a petition for 

review for a want of subject matter jurisdiction after 

applying expressio unius to a statute governing the EPA’s 

ability to set water quality standards for specific pollutants 

because the rule the petitioners challenged was issued 

pursuant to a section of the Clean Water Act not specifically

listed in the provision providing for judicial review). Here, 

the majority permits the FCC to act according to authority 

that is not expressly authorized in the Act. The majority 

holds that the FCC properly revoked CUA’s certificates, 

even though the Act permits the FCC to authorize CUA’s 

cessation of its telecommunications operations only when a 

certificate holder, such as CUA, applies for such a 

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60 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

cessation.3 47 U.S.C. § 214(a). Under the expressio unius 

canon, the Act’s failure to grant the FCC the revocation 

3

 Section 214 makes clear that the FCC’s only authority to initiate 

proceedings of its own accord relating to the provision of 

telecommunications services pursuant to a § 214 certificate is limited to 

scenarios where a telecommunications carrier is purportedly slacking in 

its provision of telecommunications services—a subsection not 

applicable to CUA’s case because it was not the basis for the FCC’s 

actions. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(d). 

But even in those subsection (d) proceedings, the FCC is not given any

revocation authority. Rather Congress authorized the FCC to take three 

specific actions to incentivize a derelict company: the FCC can either 

“require by order any carrier, party to such proceeding, [(1)] to provide 

itself with adequate facilities for the expeditious and efficient 

performance of its service as a common carrier[,] [(2)] to extend its line 

or [(3)] to establish a public office.” Id. Thus, the FCC is given the 

authority to assess deficient performance sua sponte. But to remedy any 

such deficiency, the FCC is limited to ordering the carrier to fortify and 

to upgrade its services. This express listing of ways the FCC can 

mandate compliance with the demand for exceptional service does not 

permit us to imply that the FCC also has the authority to revoke the 

wastrel company’s license. 

This textual analysis is bolstered by the fact that in subsection (d) 

proceedings, the only penalty that a noncompliant carrier can be assessed 

is a fine of “$1,200 for each day . . . such refusal or neglect continues.” 

47 U.S.C. § 214(d). The FCC could likely also sue to enjoin the carrier’s 

continued provision of inadequate service, which would constitute a 

“reduction[] or impairment of service contrary to” the duly authorized 

subsection (d) order. See infra note 4 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 214(c)). 

Notice, however, that an action to so enjoin would take place in a U.S. 

district court subject to the normal rules of litigation, and the case would 

be decided by an Article III judge. This scenario is not quite the same as 

a Commission proceeding. But even in this, subsection (d), the only 

subsection of § 214 that grants the FCC the authority to act sua sponte, 

the terms ‘revocation’ and ‘cancellation’ are noticeably absent. As the 

Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, under the expressio unius canon of 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 61

authority it demands means the FCC was not permitted to 

revoke CUA’s certificates below.

I would end my analysis there if I could. The statute 

plainly forecloses the FCC’s revocation of CUA’s § 214 

certificates because no such power is expressly listed. But 

because the majority does not adhere to the plain text of the 

Act, I must explain why the majority’s arguments to the 

contrary fail to persuade. As explained below, subsection 

(a) of § 214 is not the only textual clue in § 214 supporting 

the statutory interpretation which leads to the conclusion that 

the FCC here lacks revocation authority, where revocation is 

initiated solely by the FCC and adjudicated solely in the 

FCC. 

Continue to subsection (b). Although the FCC must 

consult with the Department of Defense and the Department 

of State regarding national security concerns, see Maj. Op. 

42-43, this obligation is triggered only upon the FCC’s 

“receipt of an application for a[] [] certificate” from a 

telecommunications company that seeks authorization to 

initiate a new line or to terminate an existing one. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 214(b). Thus, rather than permitting the FCC to engage in 

a freewheeling analysis prompted by its own, unilateral, 

unchallenged, and unexplained notions of changes to the 

national security landscape, the FCC’s § 214 authority to 

review national security concerns with other executive 

statutory construction, the express listing of the actions the FCC can take 

strongly implies that the FCC is not authorized to take actions that are 

not listed. Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023). Were the 

FCC authorized sua sponte to revoke a duly granted certificate, such as 

those CUA holds, as the majority concludes it can, I would expect to find 

such an express grant of authority in the text of § 214 given the Act’s 

level of detail in specifying what powers the FCC has. The majority has 

not identified any such textual basis for the power it gives the FCC today.

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62 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

agencies is limited to scenarios where a carrier requests

authorization to modify its existing telecommunications 

services or to provide new services. Petitioner has not 

requested any such modification of its services, so 

subsection (b) is of no aid to the Commission. 

Subsection (c) expresses—in no uncertain terms—that 

the FCC’s authority over these certificates is limited only to 

its power “to issue . . . or to refuse to issue” such certificates 

“as applied for” by a candidate telecommunications carrier. 

Id. § 214(c) (emphasis added).4 These provisions make 

4

 At oral argument, the FCC’s counsel conceded that its claim of sua 

sponte revocation authority could not be found in the final clause of 

§ 214(c), which clause authorizes the FCC to file a lawsuit to “enjoin[]” 

any unauthorized telecommunications services. As counsel correctly 

explained, the FCC does not here seek to exercise revocation authority 

because CUA’s operations are unauthorized. Rather, the FCC sought to 

revoke CUA’s licenses because CUA’s provision of telecommunications 

services is authorized and can continue unless and until its certificates 

are revoked.

Although this authority in the final clause of section 214(c) does not 

permit the FCC to terminate CUA’s operations solely through agency 

action commenced by the agency sua sponte, the ability to enjoin 

unauthorized service would likely be a tool the FCC could use to enforce 

valid conditions attached to § 214 certificates. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(c). 

Namely, if a telecommunications carrier continues to provide services 

without complying with valid conditions in its certificate related to the 

security of its telecommunications network, the carrier’s services would 

no longer be authorized by the terms of its certificate. Thus, the FCC 

could likely bring a suit to enjoin that carrier’s unauthorized operations. 

Similarly, if a carrier committed fraud on the FCC in its initial 

application for a § 214 certificate, the FCC would likely be able to enjoin 

that carrier’s operations given the certificate issued was not valid in the 

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clear that the FCC’s claimed authority to ‘cancel’ or to 

‘revoke’ § 214 certificates of its own accord is nowhere to 

be found in the text of § 214. Expressio unius is again 

applicable here because the FCC is permitted to act pursuant 

to § 214(c) to issue or to refuse to issue a certificate 

authorizing initiation or cessation of services upon 

application by a company—full stop. It stretches the English 

language to suggest that the failure of Congress to prohibit 

the FCC from taking other actions is tacit permission from 

Congress for the FCC to act beyond that authority granted to 

it. Congress wields the constitutional power to shape an 

agency’s authority—agencies have no power save that 

which they are granted by their constituent statutes. Am. 

Libr. Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(“[T]he FCC’s power to [take certain actions] . . . is limited 

to the scope of the authority Congress has delegated to it.”). 

In reviewing FCC actions, courts must hew to that statutory 

grant of authority and proceed no further. Id. Thus, the 

majority oversteps when it holds that the FCC has sua sponte 

certificate revocation authority solely initiated by agency 

action when the Act expressly provides for no such thing. 

Where does the majority find a basis for such revocation 

first instance account the fraud. Notice again, such suits would not lie in 

the Commission’s offices but in U.S. District Courts. 

But, of course, none of this is applicable to CUA. The FCC has not 

charged CUA with violating any conditions on its certificates, and the 

FCC has not sued to enjoin CUA’s services. The only “condition” the 

FCC cites in this case to justify the agency proceedings below is its own 

reservation of revocation power. But as explained below, see infra

Section I.B.i, this reservation of revocation authority constitutes a valid 

condition only if the Act grants the FCC power to exercise revocation 

authority, absent an application and on its own initiative, in the first 

instance. Because the Act does not give the FCC that power, this 

“condition” does not permit the FCC to take the actions that it did below.

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authority? Not in the statute itself, but as we shall see, in 

some extra-statutory notion.

The majority avoids this plain meaning of the text of the 

statute by contending that there is no material difference 

between the refusal to grant a certificate and the revocation 

of such a certificate. Maj. Op. 32. Put another way, the 

majority believes that the FCC’s power to refuse to grant a 

certificate in the first instance implies that it also has the 

power to initiate revocation of the certificate after issuance. 

Id. For the majority, it is as simple as that. 

Let us start with the premise that the power to refuse 

certification is the functional equivalent of the power to 

revoke certification. That position is untenable because it 

ignores the reliance interests carriers may develop in their 

§ 214 certificates. 

A business that is refused a certificate can decide to 

expend no further capital—money—for its proposed 

enterprise. But a business that has been granted a certificate 

is likely to have invested further capital, time, and resources 

into existing infrastructure in reasonable reliance on the 

vested right to build a telecommunications line pursuant to 

its duly granted § 214 certificate.

5 Simply put, there is a 

material difference between the power to refuse and the 

power to revoke. It is not reasonable to assume that the 

power to grant, to refuse, or to condition a grant also 

encapsulates the power to revoke. Gorbach v. Reno, 219 

F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (refusing Chevron

5

 Although the question is not before us, it is not surprising that CUA 

had raised a takings claim before the agency given the FCC’s revocation 

of CUA’s § 214 certificates was bound to interfere with CUA’s 

“investment-backed expectations.” See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City 

of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

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deference and rejecting the Attorney General’s contention 

“that the power to denaturalize is ‘inherent’ in the power to 

naturalize” citizens by explaining that “[t]here is no general 

principle that what one can do, one can undo” and by 

identifying obvious examples of the difference between the 

power to grant and the power to revoke: “A person can give 

a gift, but cannot take it back. A minister, priest, or rabbi 

can marry people, but cannot grant divorces and annulments 

for civil purposes. A jury can acquit, but cannot revoke its 

acquittal and convict.”). For this reason, the majority’s 

argument that the general power to grant is the functional 

equivalent of the general power to revoke does not support 

its holding.

To escape this textual conclusion that the power to deny 

does not equal the power to revoke, the majority cites Haig 

v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), a Passport Act case concerning 

the State Department’s revocation authority of passports. 

Maj. Op. 30-32. But the majority’s reliance on Agee is 

misplaced. Agee was a former CIA operative who engaged 

in various overseas activities that sought to threaten national 

security, specifically, “expos[ing] CIA officers and agents.” 

Agee, 453 U.S. at 283. The Secretary of State revoked his 

passport because Agee’s “activities abroad [were] causing or 

[were] likely to cause serious damage to the national security 

or the foreign policy of the United States.” Id. at 286. Agee 

sued the Secretary of State demanding he return Agee’s 

passport. Id. at 287. The district court ordered Agee’s 

passport returned, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding 

there was “no express statutory authorization for the 

revocation.” Id. at 288. The Supreme Court reversed, but 

with reasoning that has no application to this case. 

The Supreme Court noted that the “Passport Act does not 

in so many words confer upon the Secretary a power to 

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66 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

revoke a passport. Nor, for that matter, does it expressly 

authorize denials of passport applications.” Id. at 290. The 

relevant language, unchanged since 1926, provided:

“The Secretary of State may grant and issue 

passports, and cause passports to be granted, 

issued, and verified in foreign countries by 

diplomatic representatives of the United 

States . . . under such rules as the President 

shall designate and prescribe for and on 

behalf of the United States, and no other 

person shall grant, issue, or verify such 

passports.” 

22 U.S.C. § 211a (1981). Reading this provision in line with 

the entire Passport Act, the Court observed that the Passport 

Act did not “expressly limit those powers,” nor did it 

“expressly authorize denials of passport applications.” 

Agee, 453 U.S. at 290. Because the Supreme Court had 

already “recognized congressional acquiescence in 

Executive policies of refusing passports to applicants,” see 

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958), the Court 

recognized that the Secretary of State had some form of 

revocation authority. Agee, 453 U.S. at 291-306. The Court 

then surveyed the State Department’s past administrative 

practices and policies. On national security grounds, the 

Court found there was a “sufficiently substantial and 

consistent [practice] to compel the conclusion that Congress 

approved” of the State Department’s power to revoke 

passports, even though the State Department rarely exercised 

this power. Id. at 301-03, 306 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 

U.S. 1, 12 (1965)). 

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On this reasoning, the majority writes that “Agee further 

confirms what common sense already suggests, which is that 

a statutory grant of agency authority to ‘issue’ an authorizing 

document may carry with it an implied ancillary grant of 

authority to ‘deny’ and to ‘revoke’ such documents.” Maj. 

Op. 32. But a closer look at the Passport Act reveals that the 

majority’s common sense reasoning may not be so common 

as to apply in all cases. The Communications Act—the 

statute this Court is tasked with interpreting—has few 

textual similarities to the Passport Act at issue in Agee and 

some important dissimilarities.

The Agee Court relied heavily on the fact that the 

Passport Act did not expressly limit the “denial of [a] 

passport application,” nor did it “limit” the power to revoke 

a passport. Agee, 453 U.S. at 290. The Communications 

Act of 1934, unlike the Passport Act, specifically provides 

the FCC the “power to refuse [a certificate].” 47 

U.S.C. § 214(c). And the Communications Act, unlike the 

Passport Act, contains other statutory provisions wherein 

Congress expressly provides the FCC with the power to 

revoke a license. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 312. Simply put, the 

statutory schemes between the two Acts differ significantly. 

While it may be true that Congress did not expressly limit 

the FCC’s power to revoke a § 214 certificate, Congress 

clearly understood it could and did authorize the FCC to 

have such a revocation power in certain circumstances. 

Section 312 expressly authorized the FCC to revoke a radio 

station license according to specific procedures. 47 

U.S.C. § 312(a). But section 214, a provision enacted at the 

same time in the same Act, has no such express 

authorization. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. 

No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1075-76, 1087 (1934). 

Accordingly, Agee cannot support the atextual conclusion 

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68 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

that Congress invested the FCC with implied authority to 

revoke a § 214 certificate sua sponte and solely by agency 

action, no matter how much the majority thinks the common 

sense surmised in Agee’s Passport Act case should be 

transferable to CUA’s Communications Act case.6

6 The majority, perhaps realizing that Agee cannot independently support 

its reading of § 214, also cites Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 

(1926), for the proposition that “the grant of authority to issue a 

certificate must be understood as carrying with it an implied incidental 

authority to revoke [a certificate].” Maj. Op. 28-29. But this citation is 

inapt, and Myers cannot support the majority’s atextual conclusion here. 

Myers is a case cut from wholly different cloth. There, the Supreme 

Court resolved whether the President had the power to remove an 

Executive Officer as incident to his power of appointment under Article 

II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. 272 U.S. at 164. In so doing, 

the Supreme Court relied on history and separation of powers principles 

from the famous Decision of 1789, a series of statutes embodying the 

position that “all top executive officials . . . would serve at the 

[P]resident’s pleasure per the Constitution itself,” see Akhil Reed Amar, 

The Words That Made Us: America’s Constitutional Conversation, 

1760-1840, at 358-60, (2021), when holding that the President had the 

incidental and inherent power bestowed by Article II of the Constitution 

to remove an Executive Officer. Myers, 272 U.S. at 145-46, 163-64. In 

the case before us today, we do not deal with the inherent powers 

bestowed by the Constitution to an administrative agency such as the 

FCC for the simple reason that there are none. An administrative agency 

simply has no inherent power. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 

355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless 

and until Congress confers power upon it.”). The FCC, unlike the 

President, is a creature of statute, not the Constitution. Id. Thus, the 

FCC can exercise only the delegated powers that Congress has granted 

it. Id.; see Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 698 (“The Commission ‘has 

no constitutional or common law existence or authority, but only those 

authorities conferred upon it by Congress.’” (citing Michigan v. EPA, 

268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, the holding in 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 69

In a footnote, the majority next cites the FCC’s power to 

condition the issuance of certificates as textual support for 

its holding that the Act grants the FCC its claimed revocation 

power. Maj. Op. 43 n.13. But again, the power to condition 

a certificate does not support the construction the majority 

wishes to give the Act. Even when an agency can limit the 

scope of a telecommunications company’s operations 

through the imposition of conditions, the company may still 

operate a telecommunications line in some condition. A flatout revocation would still interfere with the (albeit more 

limited) vested rights and reliance interests of a company 

that was granted a certificate that contains conditions. 

Additionally, the Communication Act’s provisions other 

than § 214 treat the power to condition a certificate as 

materially different from the power to revoke a certificate. 

See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (“Context is a 

primary determinant of meaning. A legal instrument[, like a 

statute,] typically contains many interrelated parts that make 

up the whole. The entirety of the [statute] thus provides the 

context for each of its parts.”). This is clear from a 

comparison of § 214 and other provisions of the Act relating 

to the FCC’s issuance of radio broadcast licenses. 47 U.S.C. 

§§ 307, 312. Although radio stations are subject to a 

different licensing regime than are telecommunications 

lines, both statutory grants of licensing authority were 

Myers, a separation of powers case based on its Founding Era pedigree 

reading of the Constitution and limited to the question whether any 

President, under the Decision of 1789, could fire Officers he has 

appointed, should not be imported to this case for the general proposition 

that a power to grant necessarily implies a power to revoke, no more than 

could the Biblical phrase with which the Dissent commences imply such 

power.

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passed in the same act, see Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 

1075-76, 1087 (1934), and we must read the two statutory 

provisions in concert.7 As with companies seeking § 214 

certificates, commercial entities operating radio stations 

must apply for a broadcast license, which application the 

FCC may grant or refuse “if public convenience, interest, or 

necessity will be served thereby.” 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). The 

FCC is authorized to place terms and conditions on such 

licenses governing how the recipient operates its radio 

station. Id. § 301.

But unlike the lack of the FCC’s authority to revoke 

telecommunications § 214 certificates, the FCC is 

specifically authorized to revoke radio licenses according to 

specified procedures outlined in the Act. Id. § 312(a). As 

has long been recognized as a rule of statutory construction, 

“where Congress includes particular language in one section 

of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 

is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 

7

 The majority suggests that we cannot read Title II and Title III in pari 

materia because the nature of a telecommunications certificate is 

different than a radio license given that broadcast licenses are issued for 

fixed, renewable terms, whereas telecommunications certificates are not. 

Maj. Op. 37-38. But that would discount well-established rules of 

statutory construction. “We do not, however, limit this inquiry to the 

text of [one statutory section] in isolation. Interpretation of a phrase of 

uncertain reach is not confined to a single sentence when the text of the 

whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning. We thus look to the 

provisions of the whole law to determine [the statute]’s meaning.” Star 

Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. 405, 414-16 (2017) 

(citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted) 

(interpreting one section of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, in light 

of “[t]he statute as a whole”—that is to say, with reference to other 

sections of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 113).

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 71

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”8 Russello 

v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotations 

omitted) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the 

“interest” he had to forfeit to the government for violating 

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was 

limited to his ownership interest in the racketeering 

enterprise because Congress had made that exact limitation 

express in another subsection of the same act by modifying 

the word “interest” with the clause “in . . . any enterprise” 

but had omitted such limiting language in the subsection 

applicable to the defendant). Here, the obvious implication 

of the Act’s grant of revocation authority to the FCC in one 

8

 This rule is well-established in our statutory interpretation caselaw: the 

Supreme Court applied it in three different cases during the 2023 term. 

Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Centro de Periodismo 

Investigativo, Inc., 598 U.S. 339, 348–49 (2023) (holding that 

Congress’s decision in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and 

Economic Stability Act of 2016 expressly to abrogate the sovereign 

immunity of Puerto Rico and its governmental units in debt-restructuring 

proceedings but “not to adopt similar language to govern other kinds of 

litigation” necessarily implied that Congress did not abrogate any 

sovereign immunity Puerto Rico or its governmental units enjoyed from 

other legal claims); Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023) 

(holding that when Congress expressly attached penalties to a 

defendant’s failure to report foreign bank accounts on a per-account 

basis for willful violations of his reporting obligations, the failure to use 

per-account language to describe the penalties for non-willful violations 

meant that Congress intended not to penalize non-willful violations on a 

per-account basis); Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 77–78 (2023) 

(holding that Congress’s decision to use the word “debtor” in bankruptcy 

provisions that bar the discharge of debts arising from false statements 

published by the debtor himself implied that Congress’s use of the 

passive voice in a provision precluding the discharge of debts obtained 

by fraud implied Congress also intended the obtained-by-fraud provision 

to bar the discharge of debts arising from fraud for which the debtor is 

liable, even were he not the fraudster). 

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licensing regime (radio) but not in another 

(telecommunications) supports this reading of the statute. 

Had Congress given the FCC revocation authority over 

§ 214 certificates, such as CUA’s here, it would have 

expressly detailed the procedures for such revocations just 

as it did for the FCC’s revocation authority over radio station 

licenses.9 

These statutory clues treat revocation as a distinct grant 

of power that is not akin to the FCC’s power to refuse or to 

9 The majority’s primary reason for rejecting the differences between 

§ 214 and the provisions governing radio station licenses as textual 

support for the holding that the FCC cannot revoke CUA’s certificates 

fails to persuade. The majority contends that Congress needed to detail 

how to revoke radio station licenses because they expire after a set time 

period. Maj. Op. 38. In contrast, so says the majority, Congress did not 

need to specify how the FCC could revoke § 214 certificates for the 

revocation power to exist because § 214 certificates can last indefinitely. 

Id. 

But the majority’s reasoning actually supports quite a contrary inference. 

The time-limited licensing regime for radio stations has its own natural 

expiration date. Why would Congress need to detail specific 

mechanisms for revocation of the licenses if the FCC could just wait out 

the deadline? Presidents do this all the time with pocket vetoes—they 

wait for Congress to wrap up its most recent session without deciding 

whether or not to sign a law they are disinclined to give the force of law. 

See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). If there ever were a 

need to detail the procedures for revocation, it would be to explain how 

the FCC can revoke the indefinite § 214 certificates—not the timelimited radio station licenses, which are naturally revoked after the 

statutory expiration date passes. Indeed, though it is perhaps axiomatic 

that “the greater includes the lesser,” the contrary would make no sense 

at all. As Congress has declined to enact the procedures for sua sponte 

FCC revocation of the § 214 certificates, such as those possessed by 

CUA, we must leave it at that: the FCC presently has none.

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 73

condition the grant of a certificate. The majority’s attempts 

to discount these contextual clues are unpersuasive. 

As stated at the commencement of this dissent, while the 

Anglicans intone that “The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh 

away,” the FCC is not the Lord, even of telecommunications 

certificates. Nor, like the Lord, is the FCC the fount of its 

own power. Congress is. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. 

at 374 (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless 

and until Congress confers power upon it. . . . [W]e simply 

cannot accept an argument that the FCC may nevertheless 

take action which it thinks will best effectuate a federal 

policy. An agency may not confer power upon itself.”). By 

its silence, Congress has expressly told us that no sua sponte

revocation authority is granted to the FCC. This lack of a 

textual foundation for the FCC’s claimed power to revoke 

§ 214 certificates should end the inquiry.10

10 Possibly because it realized its textual analysis lacked merit, the FCC 

also argued that its revocation authority stemmed from the Act’s socalled necessary and proper clause. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (grants the FCC 

ancillary authority to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and 

regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as 

may be necessary in the execution of its functions”). The FCC has had 

little success with this argument in the past. Courts have consistently 

rejected its prior attempts to validate this purported theory of 

administrative law. Section 154(i) is “not an independent source of 

regulatory authority; rather, it confers on the FCC only such power as is 

ancillary to the Commissions specific statutory responsibilities.” 

California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1240 n.35 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis 

added); accord Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (“The [FCC]’s ancillary authority is really incidental to, and 

contingent upon, specifically delegated powers under the Act.” (cleaned 

up) (emphasis added)). For this reason, I agree with the majority insofar 

as it declines to adopt the FCC’s reasoning on this point. But the 

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74 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

B. The FCC’s Blanket Orders and Past Practice

The majority, perhaps realizing that its textual analysis 

could not support revocation authority, places in a footnote 

that the FCC’s “blanket” orders asserting its revocation 

authority support the existence of a sua sponte revocation 

power of § 214 certificates. Maj. Op. 43 n.13.11 Yet, this 

cannot support the majority’s position. 

i. Blanket Orders

Start with the FCC’s blanket orders. This creative (but 

ultimately flawed) argument proceeds as follows: Because 

CUA’s § 214 certificates were issued after the FCC 

promulgated two “blanket” orders that govern the issuance 

of domestic and international § 214 certificates, 

Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the 

majority’s reliance on § 154(i) to bolster the rest of its analysis is 

unpersuasive. Because § 154(i) is not an independent source of power, 

it can support the majority’s analysis only if one were to agree with the 

majority that § 214 grants the FCC sua sponte revocation authority. As 

I have attempted to demonstrate, the plain text of § 214 lacks such grant. 

Thus, that the FCC has ancillary powers under § 154(i) says nothing 

about whether the majority is correct that § 214 contains revocation 

authority. As a result, the majority’s citation to the provision fails to 

support its atextual holding. 

11 The majority correctly declines to afford the FCC Chevron-like

deference in name. Maj. Op. 27. But what omnipotence other than 

Chevron-like deference can bottom the majority’s conclusion? Consider 

Chevron deference to an agency interpretation of a comparable act when 

that act created an ambiguity “or a gap.” See generally GarfiasRodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 

(interpreting statutory gaps in the Immigration and Nationality Act). 

Here, the “gap” is the lack of statutory language which provides for 

agency revocation of a certificate where no application therefore has 

been made. Let us not give succor to Chevron resurrectionists. See 

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024). 

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Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd 11364, 

11365–66, ¶ 2 (1999); Rules & Policies on Foreign 

Participation in the U.S. Telecomms. Mkt., 12 FCC Rcd 

23891, 23893, 23897–98 ¶¶ 2, 13 (1997), CUA’s certificates 

are bound by those blanket orders. And because those 

blanket orders purported to reserve for the FCC the authority 

to initiate revocation and to revoke any future certificate that 

it authorized, CUA’s § 214 certificates are therefore subject 

to the FCC’s power to revoke the certificates for any reason 

the FCC deems proper. Namely, the majority seems to agree 

with the FCC that because CUA accepted its § 214 

certificates with notice of the FCC’s blanket orders, CUA 

should be bound to those orders just as a train passenger is 

bound to the terms written on the back of his ticket. 

But not so fast; step back. Relying on the orders’ 

reservation of revocation authority simply puts the question 

whether such reservation was valid in the first place. As the 

FCC is not a legislative body, it cannot reserve for itself 

power it has not been granted by Congress, the legislative 

body. Thus, its attempt to reserve the power to revoke § 214 

certificates at its pleasure is without legal force.12 The 

12 In constitutional law, this is called the doctrine of unconstitutional 

conditions. As we previously explained, the doctrine 

limits the government’s ability to exact waivers of rights 

as a condition of benefits, even when those benefits are 

fully discretionary. Government is a monopoly provider 

of countless services, notably law enforcement, and we 

live in an age when government influence and control are 

pervasive in many aspects of our daily lives. Giving the 

government free rein to grant conditional benefits creates 

the risk that the government will abuse its power by 

attaching strings strategically, striking lopsided deals and 

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FCC’s argument is a bootstrap argument, plain and simple: 

it is a claim that an actor can give himself a power by his 

own action.

I do not write on a blank state when I object to the 

majority’s reliance on this argument. To begin with, an 

agency’s attempt to arrogate to itself blanket authority to do 

what Congress has not authorized is a ploy to exercise 

legislative authority that courts have routinely rejected. Cf. 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 

(1952) (holding that the President lacked the authority to 

enforce a seizure order to prevent a labor dispute based on 

the President’s own assertion of his power to implement a 

policy that was not expressly authorized by Congress). 

While the majority approves of the FCC’s search for another 

way to implement its policy goals when Congress has closed 

the front door, the age-old legal maxim admonishes that 

“what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.” 

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866); 

accord Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & 

Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 230-31 (2023).

Even were we to view the FCC’s arrogation of “blanket” 

revocation authority to itself as a condition that the FCC, 

gradually eroding constitutional protections. Where a 

constitutional right “functions to preserve spheres of 

autonomy . . . [u]nconstitutional conditions doctrine 

protects that [sphere] by preventing governmental endruns around the barriers to direct commands.”

United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 

1413, 1492 (1989)) (applying the doctrine to a Fourth Amendment 

claim); see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 

595, 604–05 (2013) (takings claim); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 

597–98 (1972) (collecting free speech cases).

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pursuant to § 214(c), attached to the certificates CUA 

received, the Supreme Court rejected the same argument 

when it was raised by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Civil 

Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (CAB v. Delta), 367 

U.S. 316 (1961). In CAB v. Delta, the Civil Aeronautics 

Board argued that its reevaluation of a duly issued certificate 

authorizing Delta to offer air service along specified routes 

was permissible because it had reserved for itself the power 

to reconsider the certificate in the terms of the certificate 

itself. Id. at 317–20. Given the Board’s constituent statute 

did not authorize its actions, the Supreme Court posited, 

“should it make any difference that the Board has purported 

to reserve jurisdiction prior to certification to make summary 

modifications pursuant to petitions for reconsideration?” Id.

at 321. The Court’s resounding conclusion was that “th[is] 

question[] must be answered in the negative.” Id. That is to 

say, the Court held in no uncertain terms that an agency that 

lacks a statutory grant of revocation authority cannot 

construct such authority impliedly by requiring an applicant 

to agree to conditions it imposes to issuance of certificates—

even when the conditions purport to empower the agency to 

revoke the certificates. Id. at 328–29. The same rule applies 

here: the FCC’s attempt to reserve revocation authority it 

does not have by its assertion of that authority through a 

blanket order is an impermissible attempt to create an end 

run around the statute’s failure to accord the FCC such 

power.

In contravention of CAB v. Delta, the FCC again pulls 

itself up by its bootstraps—an impossibility save for the 

majority’s assistance—to create revocation authority based 

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78 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

solely on its own assertion of that power.13 Contrary to the 

majority, I would apply CAB v. Delta and hold that the FCC 

cannot do what the Act does not authorize. These 

‘conditions’ are invalid because there is no statutory basis 

for the FCC’s claimed authority to revoke CUA’s § 214 

certificates in the first instance.

ii. Past Revocations

The FCC then argues that the FCC’s past orders revoking 

§ 214 certificates define the scope of the FCC’s authority. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[p]ast practice does 

not, by itself, create power.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 

U.S. 654, 686 (1981). Past agency practice may be relevant 

evidence that suggests (but does not compel the conclusion) 

that Congress has acceded to the agency’s interpretation of 

its own authority. But caselaw demands that Congress have 

actively legislated in the area with full awareness of the 

agency’s behavior before a court will rely on its inaction to 

support an already reasonable interpretation of an agency’s 

enabling statute. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 

574, 599–602 (1983) (explaining that “[n]on-action by 

Congress is not often a useful guide” but holding that the 

numerous congressional debates over whether to grant tax 

exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools 

combined with the fact that Congress failed to pass over a 

dozen bills aimed at overturning the Internal Revenue 

Service’s determination that such schools cannot be given 

13 Forgive a repeated reference to divinity. But the only entity of which 

I am aware that can generate something out of nothing on its own 

authority is the Creator. See Genesis 1:1–31. Yet, the majority’s atextual 

holding allows the FCC to determine its own authority in manner that is 

reserved solely for the divine: the FCC would now be empowered to 

create its own authority from nothing by simply asserting that it 

possesses such authority in a blanket order.

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tax exempt status under the tax code implied that Congress’s 

“non-action” had ratified the agency’s reasonable 

interpretation of its own authority). 

Section 214 was last amended in 1997 to expand the 

definition of common carriers.14 Pub. L. No. 105–125, 111 

Stat. 2540 (1997). This was approximately half a year before

the FCC first exercised its self-proclaimed authority to 

revoke a company’s § 214 certificates.15 CCN, Inc. et al., 13 

FCC Rcd 13599, 13607 (1998). The FCC’s actions after

Congress last amended the Act do not constitute evidence 

that Congress had knowledge of, let alone ratified, the 

agency’s practice. See Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651, 682-

83 (2023) (holding that Congress’s use of the term “waters 

of the United States” in the Clean Water Act was not a 

ratification of the definition promulgated by the Army Corps 

of Engineers because the Corps published its definition 

14 The FCC promulgated its blanket order that purported to reserve for 

itself revocation authority over all international § 214 certificates—

authority it was not given by statute—in late 1997, Rules & Policies on 

Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomms. Mkt., 12 FCC Rcd 23891, 

23893, 23897–98 ¶¶ 2, 13 (1997). But, this blanket order was published 

a week after the last bill amending § 214 was presented by Congress to 

the President for his signature. See Actions – S.1354, 

https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-bill/1354/actions 

(last visited Dec. 12, 2024). Congress could not have been aware of the 

FCC’s attempt to claim that it possessed revocation authority before the 

FCC publicly asserted it.

15 FCC’s counsel conceded at oral argument that he was aware of no 

earlier attempt by the FCC to revoke a § 214 certificate. Oral Arg. 

30:30–31:02. This is not surprising given the Bell System held a 

monopoly over the telecommunications markets for most of the FCC’s 

history and given Congress did not express an interest in lowering the 

barriers to entry or opening up telecommunications markets to all 

manner of companies until it passed the Telecommunications Act of 

1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).

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“mere months before the [Clean Water Act] became law,” 

which means its definition could not be deemed 

authoritative).

Caselaw treats past practice as mere bolstering evidence 

of an already reasonable textual interpretation put forward 

by the agency. Compare Young v. Comm. Nutrition Inst., 

476 U.S. 974, 980–83 (1986) (explaining that the Food and 

Drug Administration’s reading of its enabling statute as 

affording it the discretion whether to promulgate regulations 

setting forth the maximum level of adulterating substances 

created by manufacturing processes permitted in food was 

reasonably supported by the text of the statute and bolstering 

this reasonable interpretation with the agency’s past practice 

complying with that interpretation) with SEC v. Sloan, 436 

U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (rejecting the Securities and Exchange 

Commission’s reliance on its consistent past practice of 

summarily suspending trading of specific securities by 

issuing suspension orders every ten days to justify its 

atextual construction of the Securities Exchange Act because 

the plain text permitted the agency to issue only one order 

summarily suspending trading for a maximum of ten days). 

Under this caselaw, the FCC’s past revocations do not 

displace the plain meaning of the text of § 214: the agency 

lacks such sua sponte revocation authority. Because the 

majority alludes to agency practice to substantiate its reading 

of § 214—basically, another and similar bootstrap 

argument—the previous revocation decisions fail to support 

its atextual interpretation of the Act.

* * *

The FCC’s atextual arguments are an attempt by the FCC 

to increase its power; understandable and perhaps common 

for an agency, but still improper. The Act’s clear text 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 81

compels me to conclude that the FCC does not have the 

power through mere agency action to sua sponte initiate inhouse revocation proceedings and then revoke duly 

authorized § 214 certificates, like those that it had issued to 

CUA. It appears the FCC could seek an injunction against 

CUA’s use of its certificates before an Article III court. See 

47 U.S.C. § 214(c). But the FCC has not sought such relief 

yet and instead revoked CUA’s certificates through sua 

sponte in-house proceedings without an application before 

it. The FCC’s arrogation of power and ultra vires revocation 

of those duly issued certificates should be set aside, and the 

certificates reinstated.

II. CASELAW

While it is not necessary to inquire beyond § 214’s text, 

the majority’s atextual analysis should require that it 

confront binding caselaw that forecloses its interpretation. 

Start with the Supreme Court’s analysis in United States 

v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., which dispels any doubt as to the 

invalidity of this dissent’s textual analysis set out above. 329 

U.S. 424 (1947). Seatrain analyzed whether the Interstate 

Commerce Commission (“ICC”) had the authority to revoke 

a certificate granted to Seatrain to operate as a water

carrier.16 Id. at 425–27. In Seatrain, a water carrier had been 

issued a certificate to ferry goods along two pre-specified 

routes for which it had applied. Id. at 426–27. Despite the 

duly granted certificate, the ICC sua sponte reopened the 

16 The Supreme Court has deemed the FCC’s § 214 telecommunications 

certificates as materially similar to the certificates issued by the ICC that 

were at issue in Seatrain. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 

470, 474 (1940). This factual similarity thus renders Seatrain a valid 

comparator for our evaluation of the FCC’s authority over § 214 

certificates.

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proceedings and cancelled the certificate it had previously 

issued. Id. at 427. The Supreme Court recognized that the 

reopening of the proceedings amounted to a revocation of 

Seatrain’s certificate and held that the ICC was without 

authority to make such a revocation. Citing statutory 

language authorizing the ICC to revoke only motor carrier 

licenses, the Supreme Court explained that “th[e] difference 

between the statutory authority of the [ICC] to prescribe the 

service of water carriers and of motor carriers” meant that 

the judicial “decisions relating to the [ICC]’s power [] to 

[revoke the licenses of] motor carriers” were inapposite. Id.

at 431–32. As a result, it held that absent an express 

statutory grant of the authority to revoke water-carrier 

licenses, the ICC “was without authority to revoke Seatrain’s 

certificate.” Id. at 432–33.

The parallels between Seatrain and CUA’s petition for 

review are clear. The FCC is authorized to issue similar 

certificates to enable telecommunications carriers to operate 

telecommunications lines (akin to the certificate authorizing 

Seatrain to carry goods along specified water routes). The 

FCC may also issue radio station licenses and is specifically 

authorized to revoke such licenses in specified scenarios 

(akin to the ICC’s motor carrier authority outlined in 

Seatrain’s analysis of the ICC’s organic statute). Under 

Seatrain, the lack of a similar grant of revocation authority 

to the FCC with respect to telecommunications lines under 

§ 214 when Congress authorized such revocation authority 

over broadcast licenses compels the conclusion that the FCC 

was without authority to strip CUA of its § 214 certificates.

The majority disputes the application of Seatrain to the 

facts before us and instead embraces the FCC’s theory that 

Seatrain is limited to a purported alternate holding. Per the 

majority, the Supreme Court purportedly held that the 

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revocation of Seatrain’s certificate was problematic because 

the revocation amounted to the ICC’s attempt to limit what 

services Seatrain provided even though the ICC lacked the 

authority to “specify ‘the service to be rendered’” (i.e., the 

ferrying of commodities versus the ferrying of equipment) 

when delimiting the terms of a water carrier certificate. Maj. 

Op. 37-40 (quoting Seatrain, 329 U.S. at 431). There are 

two reasons why distinguishing Seatrain in this manner 

lacks merit. 

First, the purported alternate holding the majority adopts 

is foreclosed by the language in Seatrain itself. Rather than 

hold that the ICC could not limit water carrier services, the 

Seatrain Court asserted only that whether such goods-related 

limitations were permitted “[wa]s by no means free from 

doubt” because the statute’s text did not state what 

conditions the ICC could impose. 329 U.S. at 431. This is 

hardly a Court holding that the ICC’s yet untaken actions 

were impermissible only because the ICC’s constituent 

statute did not permit it to limit the kind of water carrier 

services provided. But more importantly, the Court 

expressly held that “certificate[s issued by an agency], when 

finally granted . . . [are] not subject to revocation in whole 

or in part except as specifically authorized by Congress.” Id.

at 432–33 (emphasis added). Rather than rely on what the 

Supreme Court might have implicitly held, I would simply 

apply the unambiguous holding as stated by the Court. 

Second, the Supreme Court’s subsequent application of 

Seatrain to the dispute in CAB v. Delta forecloses the 

majority’s mistaken understanding of Seatrain. 367 U.S. at 

328–29, 333–34. As the Supreme Court explained in CAB 

v. Delta, the Seatrain Court held that “supervising agencies 

desiring to change existing certificates must follow the 

procedures ‘specifically authorized’ by Congress and cannot 

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84 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

rely on their own notions of implied powers in the enabling 

act.” Id. at 334.17 Thus, contrary to the majority’s 

17 The majority quotes from a portion of a footnote in CAB v. Delta to 

contend that the Supreme Court adopted its narrow—but mistaken—

reading of Seatrain. Maj. Op. 39. However, the full footnote makes 

clear that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the majority’s 

interpretation of Seatrain’s holding:

The potentially distinguishing feature about Seatrain is 

that the Court’s holding may rest on an alternate 

ground—viz.: that the [ICC] had no power to impose the 

conditions it did in the first instance. However, Seatrain

cannot be distinguished on the grounds that the Court 

said ‘the certificate, when finally granted, and the time 

fixed for rehearing has passed, is not subject to revocation 

in whole or in part except as specifically authorized . . . .’ 

The point is that, under the Water Carrier Act, the [ICC] 

had express authority to entertain petitions for 

reconsideration at any time. See 49 U.S.C. § 916(a). 

Therefore, it is clear that the [ICC] in Seatrain could have 

reached with impunity the result it wanted to reach by 

following the procedures set out by Congress. The force 

of the Seatrain decision is, then, that the commissions 

and boards must follow scrupulously the statutory 

procedures before they can alter existing operations 

and that arguments to the effect that ‘this is just 

another way of doing it’ will not prevail. 

CAB v. Delta, 367 U.S. at 333 n.15 (emphasis added). And setting aside 

the fact that the out-of-circuit case the majority cites contains ambiguous 

language that implies that those courts may have misread the Supreme 

Court’s own analysis of Seatrain, Maj. Op. 39, neither apply to the case 

at hand. Unlike the dearth of sua sponte revocation authority granted to 

the FCC under § 214, the case involved statutes that expressly authorized 

the actions the agency had taken. Murphy Oil Corp. v. FERC, 589 F.2d 

944, 947 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that there was no “doubt . . .the 

[Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission[’s] rate-making powers” 

under the Natural Gas Act authorized it to determine the proper price for 

natural gas sold by petitioner).

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characterization, the Supreme Court itself in CAB v. Delta

understood Seatrain to apply to a challenge like CUA’s 

before us. The Court’s own analysis of Seatrain in CAB v. 

Delta forecloses the FCC’s reliance on its own assertion of 

some inherent administrative authority to revoke a certificate 

when the plain terms of its enabling statute do not grant it 

such power. 

Simply, the majority’s explanation of Seatrain fails to 

support its atextual analysis.18 Under Seatrain, the FCC was 

without authority to revoke CUA’s § 214 certificates. Its 

ultra vires order attempting to do so cannot stand. CUA’s 

petition for review ought to be granted, and its unlawfully 

revoked certificates reinstated. 

18 The majority also cites the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in China 

Telecom (Americas) Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.4th 256 (D.C. Cir. 2022), as 

further support for its mistaken interpretation of § 214. Maj. Op. 49-50. 

While the D.C. Circuit in China Telecom summarized the FCC’s 

assertion of its own revocation authority, it was tasked with evaluating 

only two quite different questions: whether substantial evidence 

supported the reasoning behind the FCC’s decision to revoke China 

Telecom’s certificates and whether due process required more 

procedures than were afforded to China Telecom before the agency. 57 

F.4th at 256, 261, 265, 268. Whether the FCC had authority to revoke 

the certificates at all was not a litigated issue. This limited review of the 

agency decision in China Telecom evinces the D.C. Circuit’s adherence 

to the rule of party presentation (deciding only the issues the parties 

present) and therefore says nothing about how our sister circuit would 

rule were it presented with a challenge to the FCC’s authority to sua 

sponte revoke § 214 certificates, akin to what CUA raises here. See 

generally United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020). Thus, 

it is not clear that we can deem China Telecom as persuasive authority 

because the D.C. Circuit simply did not analyze the text of § 214 as to 

the issue whether the FCC has the authority sua sponte to revoke § 214 

certificates solely through agency action.

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86 CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC

III. “REASONABLENESS” AND POLICY

It is not difficult to see why one might be misled into 

agreeing with the majority’s atextual interpretation of § 214. 

The FCC’s decision to revoke CUA’s § 214 certificates 

appears motivated by quite serious national security 

concerns. I do not doubt that the policymakers in 

Washington sincerely believe that CUA’s continued 

operation on American telecommunications networks is a 

great threat to our nation’s national security. I respect that 

determination. I defer, as I must, to the Executive’s 

assessments of such matters of national security. See 

Twitter, Inc. v. Garland, 61 F.4th 686, 698–99 (9th Cir. 

2023). In fact, if asked for my opinion, I would be inclined 

to agree with the Executive Branch’s views regarding the 

risks posed by the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to 

operate American telecommunications networks. But I am 

not asked to opine on that issue; I am required to apply the 

text of the Act. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, 

we do not adopt an interpretation just because the 

“interpretation . . . does more to advance a statute’s putative 

goal.” Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 150 (2023). 

“No law ‘pursues its purposes at all costs.’” Id. (cleaned up) 

(quoting Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 

79, 89 (2017)). The majority’s implicit reliance on the 

FCC’s national security concerns to justify its atextual 

interpretation of the Act is misplaced: it concludes § 214 

contains an implied grant of sua sponte revocation authority 

solely through agency action even though the plain text of 

§ 214 makes clear that Congress omitted to give the FCC 

that power. Congress can authorize the FCC’s sua sponte 

revocation of CUA’s certificates if it wishes. The courts of 

the United States are open to claims to enjoin and prohibit 

the use of such certificates. Without that case or controversy 

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CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPS. V. FCC 87

before us, we judges, however, cannot authorize the FCC’s 

revocation of CUA’s certificates.

The majority also questions this interpretation of § 214 

because its practical impact would be shocking. 

Surprising—let alone seemingly unreasonable—results do 

not permit us to rewrite the statute for Congress. As the 

Supreme Court has cautioned, courts “do[] not revise 

legislation . . . just because the text as written creates an 

apparent anomaly” that makes “not a whit of sense.” 

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Comm., 572 U.S. 782, 794 

(2014) (quoting CSX Transp. Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 

562 U.S. 277, 295–96 (2011)). We are in the business of 

applying the words of a statute. As the Supreme Court 

recently reiterated, our judicial oath does not permit us to 

“replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ 

intent,” nor to speculate whether Congress made a rational 

policy choice when it enacted a particular statute.19 Perez, 

598 U.S. at 150 (quoting Henson, 582 U.S. at 89).

For this reason, the majority’s reliance on its own notion 

of the reasonableness of its interpretation does not resolve 

19 It may well be that the Executive Branch has other powers under other 

national security statutes that enable it to revoke CUA’s certificates. 

CUA’s counsel hinted at other mechanisms that the FCC (as well as the 

federal government writ large) could employ to effectuate its policy 

goals and to protect against foreign influence over our 

telecommunications networks. Those mechanisms include FCC cease 

and desist orders or the President’s powers under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act. While the FCC’s attorney contended 

that those mechanisms are not as effective as sua sponte revocation, that 

argument is a policy-based consideration the attorney should direct to 

Congress, or perhaps the Executive, but not to the courts. Whatever 

those other powers may be, they are not before us. What is before us is 

solely the FCC’s claim of authority it was not granted by statute. On that 

basis, the FCC’s actions cannot stand.

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this case.20 Maj. Op. 32. An inquiry into the reasonableness 

of one’s interpretation of the statute is ineluctably dependent 

on policy considerations. One can construct a ‘reasonable’ 

policy argument to explain why Congress may choose to 

give the FCC sua sponte revocation authority solely by 

agency action in light of its statutory mandate. One can 

conceive of a ‘reasonable’ policy argument to justify 

requiring the FCC to consider national security issues when 

it revokes a certificate—should Congress eventually 

authorize the FCC to terminate a telecommunications 

company’s operations sua sponte by its own agency action. 

One can even foresee that there is a ‘reasonable’ policy 

argument for why the FCC needs revocation authority to 

curtail the Chinese Communist Party’s influence over 

American telecommunications networks. 

But the reasonableness of a policy Congress could have 

implemented is not relevant to our legal analysis. Whatever 

reason—if any—Congress had for setting up the 

certification system upon application by private 

telecommunications companies is simply not a part of this 

court’s inquiry. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly 

“explained, ‘even the most formidable policy arguments 

cannot overcome a clear’ textual directive.” Helix Energy 

Sols. Grp., Inc. v. Hewitt, 598 U.S. 39, 59 (2023) (quoting 

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 141 S. Ct. 1532, 

1541–42 (2021)). This rule has its roots in decisions almost 

as old as the Supreme Court itself. As Chief Justice 

Ellsworth succinctly stated when he rejected a petitioner’s 

argument that policy counseled against finding that a prize’s

20 As explained above, see supra Section I.A, it is not reasonable to 

presume, as the majority does, that in all cases, what one gives, one can 

take away.

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capture was lawful, “[s]uggestions of policy and 

conveniency cannot be considered in the judicial 

determination of a question of right.” Moodie v. The Ship 

Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319, 319 (1796). 

The same is true here. When we apply the tools of 

statutory construction, the text of § 214 is clear: the FCC 

lacks sua sponte revocation authority exercised solely by 

FCC agency action. This conclusion is supported by the 

applicable administrative caselaw. CUA was dispossessed 

of its duly granted § 214 certificates under an order that 

lacked proper authorization.21 

21 Because § 214 contains no revocation authority, I do not reach the 

question of whether the FCC’s revocation of CUA’s certificates was 

arbitrary or capricious. The FCC lacked the authority to take the action 

that it did, which means CUA is entitled to have its § 214 certificates 

reinstated. 

But one observation is in order. Because the FCC lacks such revocation 

authority, it necessarily follows that Congress did not provide any 

standards in the text of the Act for assessing whether the FCC’s 

revocation of a § 214 certificate satisfies or fails arbitrary and capricious 

review. The lack of a textual standard is clear from the fact that at oral 

argument, the FCC could not provide any concrete metrics or standards 

for the majority to employ in its arbitrary and capricious analysis. Oral 

Arg. 24:30–27:04, 28:00–29:20. The FCC argued only that courts 

should review whether the FCC’s actions were in the “public interest.” 

Oral Arg. 24:33–:40, 31:40–32:07. But this is too malleable a standard 

to check agency overreach: what is in the public’s interest is necessarily 

in the eye of the beholder. Besides, § 214 prescribes different standards 

for the grant of certificates—“public convenience and necessity.” 47 

U.S.C. § 214(a). As a result, the majority cannot identify the textual 

basis for the test it adopts today. I admit that its arbitrary and capricious 

analysis seems reasonable, if not unassailable. But because the majority 

authorizes the FCC to exercise revocation authority it was not granted by 

statute, I simply note that ex falso sequitur quodlibet—from falsehood, 

anything follows. 

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* * *

For all these reasons, the FCC’s actions were unlawful. 

Until Congress decides to give the FCC sua sponte

revocation authority solely by its own agency action over 

§ 214 certificates, CUA has a right to provide 

telecommunications services pursuant to its duly issued 

§ 214 certificates. Therefore, rather than deny CUA’s 

petition for review as the majority does today, I would grant 

the petition, vacate the FCC’s ultra vires order, and remand 

with instructions for the FCC to reinstate CUA’s § 214 

certificates. Judges must apply the plain terms of the statute 

as they are written—leaving to the other branches all other 

policy considerations.

I respectfully dissent.

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