Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-00063/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-00063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Auburn University
Defendant
Samantha Johnson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

SAMANTHA JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 3:04cv63-T

AUBURN UNIVERSITY, etc., ) (WO)

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Samantha Johnson, an American of African

descent, brings this action under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.

§§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, against defendant

Auburn University. She claims that Auburn failed to

reclassify her position to a higher pay grade because

of her race; she further claims that Auburn failed to

reclassify her to a higher pay grade in retaliation for

previous allegations of racial discrimination.

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 37
2

Jurisdiction over Johnson’s claims is proper under 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

This case is currently before the court on Auburn’s

motion for summary judgment. The motion will be

granted.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule

56, the party seeking summary judgment must first

inform the court of the basis for the motion, and the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

demonstrate why summary judgment would not be proper.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see

also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-

17 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing burden-shifting under

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 2 of 37
3

Rule 56). The non-moving party must affirmatively set

forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial

and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials

in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is

not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of

the matter, but rather to determine only whether a

genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so,

the court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are construed in Johnson’s

favor as the non-moving party: Johnson began working at

Auburn in 1979 as a Staff Clerk in the Financial Aid

Office. In 1987, she was promoted to Administrative

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 3 of 37
1. Defendant’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18), Ex. 1,

Declaration of Lynne Hammond (“Hammond declaration”),

¶¶ 3-4, 20.

4

Clerk, and, in 1990, her position was reclassified to

Supervisor Records Student Financial Aid. 

In 1997, the Financial Aid Office established a

career-ladder system, and Johnson’s position changed to

Student Affairs Specialist, Financial Aid-Records, a

grade-eight position. In July 2002, her position was

reclassified to Administrative Support Associate II,

also a grade-eight position. In May 2003, Johnson’s

job was eliminated due to technological improvements;

she was transferred to the Admissions and Records

Office and, in this position, received the same salary

and benefits. Johnson was consistently among the

highest paid grade-eight employees in the Financial Aid

Office, and received a greater than average merit

increase in 2002.1

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 4 of 37
2. Id., ¶¶ 5-6.

5

A. Johnson’s Requests for 

Reclassification or Promotion

Beginning in 1986, Johnson made numerous requests

for reclassification and promotion. In response to

such a request in 1987, she was promoted;2

 in response

to a request for reclassification in the early 1990s,

Auburn conducted a job analysis, which revealed that

Johnson’s position was properly classified; and, in

response to a letter by Johnson in 1997 complaining

that positions held by white employees were being

upgraded while her position and the position of other

minority employees were not, Auburn conducted a job

review and informed Johnson that her job was properly

classified and no data supported the contention there

was inequity in minority advancement opportunities.

In 1998, Johnson was offered additional duties that

might have justified a higher classification. Johnson

declined the offer, stating that she did not find the

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 5 of 37
3. Id., Exs. 5-6, 8.

4. Id., Exs. 9-15.

6

10 % raise adequate to compensate her for the

additional duties.3

In October 1999, Auburn conducted another job

analysis of Johnson’s position in response to a request

from her supervisor. Johnson and her supervisor were

advised that her position was properly classified, and

she was encouraged to work with the Human Resources

Department to pursue positions in other departments

that had higher grade classifications. Instead, in

late 1999, Johnson presented her concerns about the

classification of her job and possible racial bias to

the Provost and the President of Auburn. Both advised

her that her job was properly classified, that her

salary was above the midpoint for similar positions,

and that she should work with Human Resources to

identify advancement opportunities for which she was

qualified.4

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 6 of 37
5. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), Affidavit of

Samantha Johnson (“Johnson affidavit”), ¶ 10 & Ex. 8.

6. Defendant’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18), Ex. 2,

Declaration of Chuck Gerards (“Gerards declaration”), ¶

9.

7

In the fall of 2000, Johnson met with the

affirmative action/equal employment opportunity (EEO)

officer for Auburn to express concerns that Auburn’s

decision not to promote or reclassify her was

influenced by her race.5 In 2001, Johnson requested

that her position be reclassified, and, in response,

Auburn again conducted an audit of her position, which

indicated that her position was properly classified as

a grade eight position.6

In 2002, Auburn conducted a job study of all

clerical and administrative positions in the Office of

Student Affairs to ensure that all positions were

properly graded. The 2002 study focused solely on the

duties and responsibilities of the position rather than

the employee’s characteristics. It was conducted in

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 7 of 37
7. Id., ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 11.

8

accordance with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee

Selection published by the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC). The study included 50 positions, of

which 17 were held by black employees and 33 by white

employees. As a result of the study, eight black

employees (approximately 47 %) received an increase in

grade, six black employees (approximately 35 %),

including Johnson, had no change, and three

(approximately 18 %) were decreased. Thirteen white

employees (approximately 30 %) received an increase in

grade, 17 (approximately 52 %) had no change, and three

(approximately 18 %) were decreased.7

 

The protocol for the 2002 study required that the

results be independently reviewed and verified. In

some instances, the analyst entered the scores on the

incorrect line, and the scores were manually adjusted

during the review process. In other cases, arithmetic

errors in calculating the total score were corrected.

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 8 of 37
8. Id., ¶ 10. Auburn maintains that Johnson’s score

was adjusted because several of her scores had been

entered on the wrong line, and that her score actually

increased during the verification process. Id. Johnson

maintains that her score was lowered during the

verification process. Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 25), p.

22 n.58. 

9. Gerards declaration, ¶ 9.

10. Id., ¶ 15 & Ex. 13.

9

Johnson’s score was adjusted in the verification

process.8

 

The 2002 study protocol also required that the

employees fill out a four-page questionnaire describing

their duties and the skill-set necessary for their job.

Johnson had previously completed a ten-page

questionnaire during the audit of her position

conducted in 2001. In response to the 2002 study, she

elected to submit the ten-page questionnaire,

supplemented by the first page of the four-page

questionnaire.9

On July 9, 2002, Johnson was advised that, based on

the 2002 study, her position was properly classified as

grade eight.10 The next day Johnson sent an email to

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 9 of 37
11. Id., ¶ 17.

12. Id., ¶ 18.

13. Although the record is not entirely clear who

Mrs. Hallaway is, she appears to be an EEOC employee in

the Birmingham office. See Johnson affidavit, Ex. 9.

14. Johnson affidavit, ¶¶ 11 & 19; Stipulation (Doc.

No. 36), dated October 6, 2005.

15. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), Ex. 5, EEOC

Determination letter.

10

her supervisor reminding him that she had supervisory

experience and noting that white employees had been

upgraded while she had not.11

On July 15, 2002, Johnson filed a complaint with

the EEOC claiming discrimination and retaliation.12 In

August 2002, Johnson wrote two letters to an EEOC

employee, a “Mrs. Hallaway,”13 complaining that white

employees were being upgraded while she was not.14 In

August 2003, the EEOC issued a determination in

Johnson’s favor.15

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 10 of 37
16. Gerards declaration, ¶ 18. Auburn relies on

Pennington v. Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir.

2001), and Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services Inc., 161 F.3d

1318, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 1998), to support its contention

that Johnson’s characterization of her duties is

irrelevant on summary judgment. This argument is

misplaced: both Pennington and Standard involved a

plaintiff’s unsubstantiated personal opinion that the

defendant’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason was pretext. The dispute here involves a matter

critical to the prima-facie case: the scope of Johnson’s

duties. Her testimony about the duties she performed is

clearly relevant in determining whether her job is

sufficiently similar to another employee’s for that

employee to serve as a valid comparator.

11

B. Johnson’s Duties

The parties dispute the scope of Johnson’s duties.

Auburn characterizes Johnson’s duties as primarily

clerical, including data entry, creating paper files

for students, ensuring that financial aid files

contained all pertinent information, ordering supplies

for the office, and maintaining the files securely.16

Johnson contends she had non-clerical responsibilities,

exercised substantial discretion, and supervised

others. 

The March 2002 job review completed by Johnson’s

supervisor indicates that she “serve[d] a lead role to

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 11 of 37
17. Johnson affidavit, Ex. 10.

18. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), Ex. 12, Job

Description of Student Affairs Specialist, Financial AidRecords.

12

train and to assign and check the work of others.”17

The job description of Student Affairs Specialist,

Financial Aid-Records, dated March 7, 2002, reflects

that the job “requires the frequent interpretation of

written policies, procedures, and guidelines for

moderately complex situations [and] requires knowledge

of procedures in a technical field requiring a

combination of training and experience.” It also

indicates that Johnson “supervise[d] student workers

and coordinate[d] their work schedule and timesheets.”

The job description also states that “the person in

this position impacts the perception that an individual

would have of the department, enrollment management

services, and the student affairs division.”18

Johnson’s affidavit indicates that she spent two to

three hours a day on phone duty answering questions

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 12 of 37
19. Johnson affidavit, ¶ 29.

20. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), Ex. 8, Selfassessment of Samantha Johnson.

13

about financial aid posed by students and parents.19

Finally, the ten-page questionnaire Johnson completed

corroborates that she supervised the records office,

advised other personnel on records information, and

supervised student workers.20

Thus, the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to Johnson reveals that, in addition to the

clerical duties described by Auburn, she also performed

the following duties:

• Supervise records office, serving a lead role

to train and to assign and check the work of

others.

• Interpret written policies, procedures, and

guidelines for moderately complex situations. 

• Perform three hours of phone duty to advise

parents and students on financial aid rules and

regulations.

• Advise other personnel on records information.

• Supervise student workers.

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 13 of 37
21. Although Johnson may have supervised a full-time

employee in the past, see Johnson affidavit, Ex. 15, no

evidence suggests that she supervised full-time employees

at the time of the 2002 study.

22. The summary of these duties is taken from Gerards

declaration, ¶ 18.

14

The record does not support Johnson’s contention that

she supervised other full-time employees at the time of

the 2002 study.21

C. Duties of Alleged Comparators

The name, title, and duties of four other employees

in the Financial Aid office whom Johnson has identified

as alleged comparators are summarized below.22 Gayle

Segrest, Student Affairs Specialist-Athletics,

performed the following duties:

• Maintain squad lists for student athletes.

• Determine if athletes are eligible for

aid/scholarships based on National Collegiate

Athletic Association (NCAA) and Southeastern

Athletic Conference (SEC) regulations.

• Ensure that sport teams do not exceed amount of

aid allowed under NCAA and SEC regulations.

• Serve as liaison between student athletes and

donors to ensure eligibility based on NCAA and

SEC regulations.

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 14 of 37
15

• Ensure student athletes maintain minimum GPA

and credit hours to receive

scholarships/financial aid.

Tammy Funderburk, Student Affairs Specialist-Direct

Lending, had the following duties:

• Perform the same duties as Segrest.

• Assist with loading and verification of tax

documents.

• Monitor transfer lists for students.

• Process corrections.

Debbie Allen, Student Affairs Specialist-Data Support,

performed these duties: 

• Interpret scholarship agreements.

• Select recipients based on criteria.

• Maintain databases for scholarships.

• Prepare award letters and letters to donors.

• Verify student eligibility for scholarships.

• Create and print reports.

• Verify account balances.

And Stan Fuller, Student Affairs Specialist-Financial

Aid, had the following responsibilities: 

• Review verification forms required by the

Department of Education and FAFSA applications

for accuracy.

• Determine when changes are necessary based on

verification documents.

• Contact parents and students to address

discrepancies. 

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 15 of 37
23. Hammond declaration, ¶ 20.

16

• Advise students on Department of Education

rules that regulate how much aid students can

receive.

• Determine how financial aid monies can be

spent.

• Make budgetary projections for Financial Aid

Division.

• Ensure students are enrolled in enough credit

hours to receive financial aid.

Johnson has also identified Mary Turner as an alleged

comparator. Turner was reclassified to grade ten in

1990, was not subject to the 2002 study, and worked in

a different division under a different supervisor.23

III. DISCUSSION 

Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer “to

fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

race....” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 16 of 37
17

Both parties acknowledge that, because Johnson

relies on circumstantial evidence, this case is

governed by the familiar burden-shifting analysis of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, an employee has

the initial burden of establishing a prima-facie case

of unlawful employment discrimination by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 802; Young v.

General Food Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988).

If the employee establishes a prima-facie case, the

burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the

presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.

2000). The employer has the burden of production, not

of persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade a

court that it was actually motivated by the reason

advanced. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 247, 253-55, 258 (1981); McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 17 of 37
18

Once the employer satisfies this burden of

production, “the presumption of discrimination is

eliminated and ‘the [employee] has the opportunity to

come forward with evidence, including the previously

produced evidence establishing the prima facie case,

sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that the reasons given by the employer were

not the real reasons for the adverse employment

decision.’” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024 (citations

omitted). The employee may meet this burden by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more

than likely motivated the employer or by demonstrating

that the proffered reason for the employment decision

is not worthy of belief. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see

also Young, 840 F.2d at 828.

A. Failure-to-Reclassify Claim

1. Prima-Facie Case

In order to prove a prima-facie case for failure to

reclassify, the employee may prove that: (1) positions

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 18 of 37
19

held by comparable white employees were reclassified

and upgraded; or (2) the difference in the grades was

the result of racial considerations. Moore v. Devine,

767 F.2d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985). “The plaintiff

and the employee she identifies as a comparator must be

similarly situated in all relevant respects. The

comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to

prevent courts from second-guessing a reasonable

decision by the employer.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace,

Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004).

Johnson identifies five individuals who were white

and were reclassified to a higher grade as a result of

the 2002 job audit: Gayle Segrest, Tammy Funderburk,

Debbie Allen, Stan Fuller, and Mary Turner. Turner is

not a valid comparator because she was not subject to

the 2002 study, she worked in a different division, and

a supervisor, different from Johnson’s, made employment

decisions for her. See Silvera v. Orange County Sch.

Board, 244 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“[D]ifferences in treatment by different supervisors

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 19 of 37
20

or decision makers can seldom be the basis for a viable

claim of discrimination.”). Because Johnson and the

four remaining alleged comparators all performed

clerical duties and reviewed documents for accuracy,

the following comparison focuses on the non-clerical

duties performed by each. 

Funderburk interpreted SEC and NCAA regulations to

ensure that Auburn did not violate those rules in

awarding scholarships to its student athletes. This

required her to analyze the regulatory framework

governing athletic scholarships, discern the principles

at work, and then apply them to university-wide data.

Funderburk also regularly interacted with donors to

ensure that they did not undermine student-athletes’

eligibility. In contrast, during her three-hour phone

duty, Johnson merely referenced already-completed

analyses of financial aid regulations to answer

questions posed to her by parents and students.

Moreover, Johnson’s counseling sessions impacted only

the image of the Financial Aid Office held by the

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 20 of 37
24. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s

motion summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), Ex. 5, Johnson’s

self-evaluation, P0088.

21

individuals she counseled. If Funderburk made a

mistake, Auburn could suffer sanctions for violating

SEC or NCAA rules, which would be public and

potentially have a broad impact on Auburn’s image.

Because the scope and consequences of their duties

differed, Johnson and Funderburk are not similarly

situated, and Funderburk is not a valid comparator.

Segrest performed the same duties as Funderburk,

les certain clerical duties. Thus, she also was not

similarly situated to Johnson and is not a valid

comparator.

Allen selected scholarship recipients based on

scholarship criteria, which requires considerable

independent judgment and discretion. Johnson

acknowledges that she did not have the authority in her

position to award financial aid to students.24 Thus,

these positions are not nearly identical, and Allen is

not a valid comparator.

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 21 of 37
25. Johnson affidavit, Ex. 17.

22

Fuller was responsible for making budgetary

projections for the Financial Aid Division based on

changes in workforce or supplies. In contrast, Johnson

ordered supplies for her office after checking to see

if funds were available. Because Fuller’s job required

substantially greater expertise and judgment than

Johnson’s, he was not similarly situated to Johnson and

is not a valid comparator. 

The court’s conclusion that Johnson has not

identified valid comparators is corroborated by

Johnson’s own admission at the time of the 2002 study

that the duties of Funderburk, Segrest, Allen, and

Fuller differed substantially from hers. In an August

22, 2002, letter to Hallaway, Johnson stated, “I

reiterate, I was not given any of the duties that [the

alleged comparators] were given that warranted them the

upgrade....”25

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 22 of 37
26. Although it remains unclear why these employees,

who are white, received more substantive duties than

Johnson, Johnson advances no evidence that demonstrates

such assignments were made because of race. Also,

Johnson’s refusal in 1998 to accept additional duties

that might have warranted an upgrade under the 2002

study, see Hammond declaration, Ex. 8, undermine any

inference that Johnson was discriminated against in the

assignment of duties. 

23

Johnson also fails as to the alternative method of

establishing a prima-facie case: that any difference in

treatment was because of her race.26 Even if these four

employees were valid comparators, no evidence in the

record suggests that their reclassification to a higher

grade, as a result of the 2002 study, was due to race.

In fact, the evidence proves the exact opposite,

because the 2002 study was more favorable to blacks

than to whites. Nearly 50 % of black employees were

upgraded, while approximately 37 % of white employees

were upgraded, and the same percentage of blacks and

whites were downgraded as a result of the 2002 study.

Contrary to Johnson’s assertion, the 2002 study was not

discriminatory simply because she was not among the

many black employees upgraded. 

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 23 of 37
24

2. Pretext

Even assuming that Johnson could state a primafacie case, she would still have to show that Auburn’s

proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not

reclassifying her is pretextual. Auburn contends that

it did not reclassify Johnson to a higher pay grade

because her position did not merit a higher grade

within the parameters of the 2002 job study. Auburn

claims that race did not factor into the 2002 study

because it complied with the Uniform Guidelines

published by the EEOC and was based solely on job

duties, not incumbent characteristics. Also, the study

was overall more favorable to blacks than whites.

Johnson offers several theories why Auburn’s proffered

non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. 

First, Johnson argues that the 2002 study was

racially discriminatory because she submitted a tenpage questionnaire, while everyone else filled out a

four-page survey. However, it was Johnson who elected

to submit the ten-page questionnaire instead of the

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 24 of 37
27. Gerards declaration, Ex. 2, Study protocol,

0326.

25

four-page questionnaire. Every other aspect of the

process in the 2002 study was the same for Johnson as

ti was for every other employee. Therefore, any

difference in procedure was of her own choosing and

cannot support an inference of pretext. Moreover, no

reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Johnson’s

race was the reason she filled out the ten-page

questionnaire, given that not only whites but all other

black employees subject to the 2002 study filled out

the four-page questionnaire. 

Second, Johnson complains that she received a lower

score for “public image” than did her alleged

comparators. The 2002 study protocol required

supervisors to assign a score for public image to each

position. Public image was defined as the effect the

person might have on Auburn’s public image if she

excels, or fails, at her job.27 Johnson suggests that,

because she was popular on campus and had good customer

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26

relations, her low public-image score can be explained

by only her race. Funderburk, Segrest, and Allen all

interfaced with donors, and all four alleged

comparators were responsible for ensuring that Auburn

was in compliance with regulations imposed by outside

entities. The court will not second-guess Auburn’s

determination that Johnson, whose duties affected only

the attitudes of individual people toward the Financial

Aid Department, was less important to Auburn’s public

image than employees whose actions affected the

attitudes of donors and might cause Auburn to violate

regulations. See Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207

F.3d 1303, 1341 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Moreover, the relevant inquiry is how the employer

values the employee, not the employee’s subjective view

of her value. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services Inc., 161

F.3d 1318, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The heart of the

pretext inquiry is not whether the employee agrees with

the reasons that the employer gives for the [adverse

action], but whether the employer really was motivated

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 26 of 37
27

by those reasons.”). Johnson has presented no evidence

to prove that Auburn disregarded the 2002 study

protocol in assigning her public-image score.

Third, Johnson notes that her supervisor

recommended her for an upgrade in 1999 and that she

held a higher grade than all her comparators did in the

late 1990s. According to Johnson, this suggests that,

in 1999, Auburn valued her more highly than it did her

comparators. Although she does not complete the

argument, presumably she means to suggest that the

increased value placed on the comparators in 2003 was

because of their race. This is not a reasonable

inference because Johnson’s job was eliminated a year

after the 2002 study when technological changes made it

obsolete, while the jobs of her alleged comparators

were not eliminated. Johnson’s mere speculation and

conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence are

not sufficient to support an inference of pretext,

especially when Auburn has presented substantial

evidence that the 2002 study was not influenced by

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 27 of 37
28

race. See Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of County

Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073-74 (11 Cir. 1995). Also,

those employees were white in 1999, just as they were

in 2002. Johnson’s argument would require a factfinder to believe that Auburn only began valuing white

employees over black employees after 1999. Such an

inference would be unreasonable based on the evidence

advanced by Johnson.

Next, Johnson argues in her brief that Auburn’s

stated reason for not reclassifying her is pretextual

because the reasons given to her in 2002 differ from

those offered by Auburn on summary judgment. Simply

put, the record does not support Johnson’s contention

that Auburn told her that the only reason she was not

reclassified was her lack of supervision of full-time

employees. Her affidavit, which is the only testimony

from her submitted to the court, makes no mention of

such a conversation. The only reference to supervision

in the record comes in an email exchange between

Johnson and Mike Reynolds, her supervisor, on July 10,

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 28 of 37
28. Johnson affidavit, Ex. 15.

29

2002.28 In that email, Johnson indicates that she

contacted the Vice President of Human Resources, who

told her that Mary Turner, an employee in Human

Resources, supervised one full-time employee. Johnson

then tells Reynolds that she would be willing to

supervise a full-time employee. If this exchange

proves anything, it is that Johnson raised the

supervision issue, not Auburn. Johnson bears the

burden of coming forward with evidence of pretext,

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, and she has not met that

burden.

Finally, Johnson contends that the fact that her

score on the 2002 study was lowered suggests she was

targeted. The study protocol required Human Resources

to verify independently the scores for accuracy and

make necessary changes. The scores of employees other

than Johnson were changed, and these changes equally

affected both white and black employees. Because

Case 3:04-cv-00063-MHT-DRB Document 40 Filed 11/17/05 Page 29 of 37
29. Theoretically, Johnson’s score sheet, see

Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission on defendant’s motion

summary judgment (Doc. No. 26), Ex. 8, Self-assessment of

Samantha Johnson, P0087, could itself create a genuine

issue of material fact that her score was lowered. A

review of Johnson’s score sheet, however, reveals the

opposite. The original reviewer entered several scores

on the wrong lines, requiring the scores for

“Complexity,” “Work Reviewed,” “Supv Received,” and

“Public Image” to be scratched out and reentered on the

line above. Although it appears that her score for “Work

Reviewed” was lowered from 145 to 130, her “Budgeting”

score was raised from 0 to 138, as were the “Budgeting”

scores of Allen, Funderburk, and Segrest, see Gerards

declaration, Exs., 3, 5-6, pp. 0351, 0438, 0481. The net

effect was to raise Johnson’s total score, which could

only have raised her classification level, see Gerards

declaration, Ex. 2, Study protocol, p. 0240.

30

employees of both races had their scores changed, an

inference that the verification process of the 2002

study was racially biased would be unreasonable.

Moreover, Classification and Compensation Director

Chuck Gerards indicated that Johnson’s score actually

increased during the review process. Johnson offers

nothing more than mere assertion in her brief to rebut

Gerards’s testimony.29 Because Johnson advances no

evidence to support her assertion that her scores were

lowered, Johnson’s allegations cannot support an

inference that Auburn’s legitimate reason is

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31

pretextual. See Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals, Co., 821

F.2d 590, 597 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Where the defendant’s

justification evidence completely overcomes any

inference to be drawn from the evidence submitted by

the plaintiff, the district court may properly

acknowledge that fact and award summary judgment to the

employer”).

Two broader observations further support Auburn’s

proffered non-discriminatory reason and dispel any

concern that reason might be pretextual. First,

Johnson’s job was eliminated a year after the 2002

study, and the jobs of her comparators were not. The

2002 study was an objective study that apportioned

scores based on various duties performed by the

employee in each position. Essentially, the weight

given to each duty reflects the value Auburn placed on

that job. It is not hard to imagine that the final

score for Johnson’s job, which became irrelevant due to

improved technology one year later, was lower than the

scores for her comparators, whose jobs were not

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32

eliminated. Second, Johnson’s suggestion that the 2002

study was used to discriminate against her because she

was a black woman cannot withstand scrutiny because the

2002 study was more favorable, overall, to black

employees than white employees.

Johnson obviously feels wronged by Auburn’s

decision not to promote or reclassify her for the last

decade. Even though Johnson was highly proficient at

her job, proficiency was irrelevant under the 2002

study. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained, an “employer may fire an employee for a good

reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous

facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action

is not for a discriminatory reason.” Nix v. WLCY

Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th

Cir. 1984). Johnson’s alleged comparators performed

substantially different duties, which warranted higher

scores and a higher classification than Johnson’s under

the 2002 study protocol. Johnson has not established

discriminatory intent because she has produced neither

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33

direct nor circumstantial evidence sufficient to

support a finding that Auburn failed to reclassify her

because of her race. Accordingly, the court will grant

summary judgment on her race-discrimination claim. 

B. Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima-facie case of retaliation,

Johnson must show (1) a statutorily protected

expression; (2) an adverse-employment action; and (3) a

causal link between the protected expression and the

adverse action. Raney v. Vinson Guard Service Inc.,

120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997). In order for the

employee to prove a causal link, the employer must, at

a minimum, be aware of the protected expression when it

takes the adverse action. Id. at 1197. If the

employer is aware of the protected expression, the

employee may prove the causal connection by showing a

close time-link between the adverse-employment action

and the protected activity. The shorter the period

between the two events, the stronger the inference that

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34

the adverse action was improperly motivated;

conversely, a long period of time between the protected

conduct and adverse-employment action will negate an

inference that the adverse action was caused by the

protected expression.

Auburn concedes, for the purposes of summary

judgment, that Johnson engaged in protected expression

and that the failure to reclassify was an adverseemployment action. However, neither party identifies

the specific instances of protected expression in which

Johnson engaged. Although Johnson repeatedly

complained that race played a factor in Auburn’s

decision not to promote or reclassify her, the court

need consider only Johnson’s protected expressions that

occurred before July 9, 2002, when she was informed

that she had not been reclassified under the 2002

study. See Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279,

1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “the adverse

employment action must follow the statutorily protected

conduct” to state a prima-facie case of retaliation).

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30. The EEOC complaint and both letters to Hallaway

need not be considered because they occurred after the

2002 study had been completed and Johnson had been

notified that her position was not reclassified. The

2002 study could not have been retaliatory for protected

expression that had not yet occurred.

35

These include the 1997 letter complaining that whites

were bring promoted while she was not; the 1999

discussions with Auburn’s Provost and President about

racial disparities in promotions; and the 2000

complaint to Auburn’s EEO officer.30 

Johnson cannot prove a causal link between her 1997

letter or her complaints to senior administration

officials in 1999 or the 2000 letter to the EEO officer

and the failure to reclassify her position in 2002,

because they are all too far removed temporally from

the adverse action to support an inference of causal

connection. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty,

145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a

three-year gap between protected conduct and an

adverse-employment action negates any inference of

causal connection); Sims v. Sauer-Sundstrand Co., 130

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36

F.3d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that employer’s

awareness of protected activity is insufficient to

prove causal link if two-year gap existed between

protected expression and adverse action).

Also, while Auburn had ample opportunity to

retaliate against Johnson after these protected

expressions, she continued to receive positive job

evaluations and merit increases, and was among the

highest paid employees in the Financial Aid Office

prior to the 2002 study. Auburn’s failure to retaliate

in the interim between her complaints and the 2002

study, along with the award of significant merit-pay

increases during that time, greatly undermines any

inference that the 2002 study was retaliatory. 

Even if Johnson could state a prima-facie case for

retaliation, she has failed to show that the

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason advanced by

Auburn for its failure to reclassify her is pretext.

For the reasons outlined at length in the discussion of

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her discrimination claim, none of the bases Johnson

advances to prove pretext withstands scrutiny. 

Because Johnson has not proven a prima-facie case

of retaliation or advanced any evidence that would

allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that

Auburn’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for not

reclassifying her was pretextual, Auburn is entitled to

summary judgment on Johnson’s retaliation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that

Auburn is entitled to summary judgment on both

Johnson’s discrimination and retaliation claims. 

An appropriate judgment will be entered. 

DONE, this the 17th day of November, 2005.

_____________________________ /s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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