Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01196/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01196-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Adame
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐1196

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JUAN ADAME,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 192 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 5, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 28, 2016

BeforeWOOD,ChiefJudge, andBAUER andWILLIAMS,Circuit

Judges.

BAUER,CircuitJudge.  Ajury convicteddefendant‐appellant,

Juan Adame, of one count of arson affecting interstate com‐

merce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Adame appeals on two

grounds: that there was insufficient evidence to uphold his

conviction and that the government introduced inadmissible

evidence against him during trial. We find against both

arguments and affirm Adame’s conviction.

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2 No. 15‐1196

I.  BACKGROUND

A. The Fire

Around 4:30 a.m. on January 14, 2012, the Chicago Fire

Department responded to a fire reported at a two‐story

building located at 4246 West 63rd Street. The building’s first

floor was vacant commercial space and the second floor was

splitinto two apartments.One apartment was leased by Blanca

Ortiz, and the other by Jimmy Maca. When the Fire Depart‐

ment personnel arrived, they saw smoke coming from the

second floor of the building. The crew entered and discovered

a fire in Ortiz’s apartment. No one was present in the apart‐

ment. The crew extinguished the fire and searched the other

apartment, where they found Maca dead from smoke inhala‐

tion.

On March 21, 2012, the Chicago Police Department,

working jointly with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms

andExplosives (“ATF”), arrestedAdame,Ortiz’s ex‐boyfriend.

A grand jury indicted Adame on August 15, 2012, for one

count of maliciously causing damage by fire to a building used

in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The

case proceeded to a jury trial, which began on October 7, 2013,

and concluded on October 11, 2013.

B. Evidence Presented at Trial

At trial, Ortiz testified that she and Adame began dating in

August 2011, but broke up on January 13, 2012, following a

fight. Ortiz described how, during their relationship, Adame

frequently stayed at her apartment and kept his clothes and

belongings there, even though she had never given him

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No. 15‐1196 3

permission to do so. He also broke into her apartment on two

occasions, and had driven her Ford Mustang without her

permission. In addition, he had taken several video recordings

on his cell phone of Ortiz without her knowledge. She stated

that he was “very controlling” of her, which was a source of

several fights during their relationship.

Ortiz testified that on the evening of January 13, 2012, she

and Adame were at her home in Indiana, which she owned in

addition to the Chicago apartment. At around 8:30 p.m., she

and Adame got into a heated verbal fight that culminated in

Ortiz leaving the house andAdame pulling the door handle off

the car as she drove away. After she left, Adame took several

bags full of clothes and other possessions from Ortiz’s Indiana

house and placed them in garbage bags. He then took Ortiz’s

2007 Ford Mustang and left with the garbage bags. He ex‐

changed text messages with Ortiz throughout the evening.

Ortiz accusedAdame of stealingherpossessions andinformed

him that she did not want “anything at all to do with you.”

Maria Navarette testified that she had previously dated

Adame, and the two had remained friends. She said that on the

evening of January 13, 2012, after Adame had left Ortiz’s

Indiana residence, he called and texted Navarette to ask her to

go dancing, to which she agreed. He arrived at her house in

Chicago driving Ortiz’s Mustang. Navarette noticed the

backseat of the Mustang contained several full garbage bags.

Adame told Navarette that they should drive a different car

because something was wrong with the Mustang. Navarette

called a friend and asked to borrow her car. The friend agreed,

so Adame and Navarette drove to Navarette’s friend’s house

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and borrowed the car. Adame grabbed his backpack from the

Mustang and brought it with him.

Navarette testified that once they got into her friend’s car,

Adame told her to stop for gas. Navarette thought the car had

enough gas, but Adame insisted they stop for gas anyway. She

drove to a gas station and Adame told Navarette to go inside

and pay for $10 worth of gas. She did so, while Adame got out

of the car and went to the gas pump. She stated that after she

paid the cashier, she went back to the car and saw numbers

going up on the machine, but did not see the gas nozzle

inserted into the car’s gas tank. Once the pump reached $10,

Adame returned the nozzle and washed the car’s windshield

with his bare hands (despite the fact that it was winter), and

dried his hands with the gas station towel. He then got in the

car and put on his gloves.

Navarette testified that when they left the gas station,

Adame told her he wanted to “pick up some things of his”

before going dancing. He directed her down different streets,

and eventually into an alley. He then had her park in the side

parking lot of 4258 West 63rd Street. The parking lot was four

buildings down from Ortiz’s apartment.

Adame told Navarette to wait in the car while he went

inside to change clothes. At that time, he was wearing a dark

hoodie, dark pants, gloves, and sunglasses, even though it was

“pitch black” at the time. He left with his backpack and walked

into the alley towards Ortiz’s apartment. Navarette waited in

the car for two hours, and eventually fell asleep. When she

awoke, she texted Adame asking where he was. He came back

to the car 15 to 20 minutes later, still wearing the same outfit,

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No. 15‐1196 5

but he had two full garbage bags with him. He told Navarette

to “start driving” and did not answer her when she asked

where he had been. They decided it was too late for dancing,

and so Adame had Navarette drive him home.

At trial, the government presented the items recovered

from the garbage bags, which Ortiz identified as her posses‐

sions from both her home in Indiana and her apartment in

Chicago.

In addition, the government presented testimony from the

law enforcement personnel who investigated the arson. John

Gamboa, an ATF Certified Fire Inspector, testified that he

investigated Ortiz’s apartment on January 14, 2012. He

discovered thatthe fire originated atthree different points; one

in the living room, and two separate areas in the bedroom.

Kevin Smith, an Arson Investigator for the Illinois State Fire

Marshall, testified that he inspected the apartment on

January 14, 2012, and found that an “accelerant” was poured

in three areas; one in the living room and two in the bedroom.

The Illinois State Police Forensic Science Centerthen tested the

samples from those three areas. Several samples came back

“inconclusive” (meaning there may have been an ignitable

liquid present), but one sample was determined within a

“reasonable degree of scientific certainty” to contain gasoline.

The government also introduced statements that Adame

made during his interrogations by the ATF and Chicago Police.

ATF Agent Anthony Zito interviewed Adame on January 31,

2012. Adame initially told AgentZito that on the evening ofthe

fire he called his uncle after he left Ortiz’s house, and his uncle

picked him up and brought him back to the area near the

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6 No. 15‐1196

intersection of North Avenue and Keeler Avenue in Chicago,

where the uncle resided. Following the interview, Agent Zito

discovered that Adame’s uncle did not live at that location. He

called the uncle’s phone numberthatAdame provided, butthe

phone was disconnected. Finally, he reviewed Adame’s cell

phone records, which indicated that Adame did not call his

uncle on the evening of the fire.

Sergeant Jose Garcia of the Chicago Police Department’s

Arson Section also interviewed Adame. Adame initially told

Sergeant Garcia that he was at his uncle’s residence on the

evening of the fire, but he recanted this story when confronted

with the evidence to the contrary. Adame then admitted he

was at Navarette’s residence that evening.Adame also claimed

that he drove to Navarette’s residence in a truck, but later

admitted he drove a Mustang. He admitted directing

Navarette to the gas station and that he pumped the gas. When

Sergeant Garcia asked Adame, “you really didn’t pump gas

into the car, did you?” Adame looked down and shook his

head from side to side. When Sergeant Garcia asked him why

he directed Navarette to the gas station, Adame replied, “I

can’t tell you why.” When Sergeant Garcia asked him why he

went into Ortiz’s apartment that night, Adame responded, “I

can’t tell you why, I can’t tell you why.” When Sergeant Garcia

asked him what items he took from Ortiz’s apartment, Adame

initially denied taking anything, but after Sergeant Garcia

confronted him with the evidence, Adame said, “I can’t tell

you what I did.” Finally, Sergeant Garcia asked whether

Adame “set the fire to try and hurt Jimmy [Maca],” to which

Adame stated, “I didn’t mean to hurt Jimmy.”

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No. 15‐1196 7

The government calledSpecialAgentJosephRaschke ofthe

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to testify regarding

historical cell site analysis. Agent Raschke described how cell

phones interact with cell towers. Basically, whenever a cell

phone makes a call, it sends the information to a cell tower,

which transmits the information to the phone being called.

Agent Raschke created a map of all the eligible cell towers in

the Chicago area. He testified that cell phones generally send

information to whichever cell tower is closest, but not always

because different factors can affect the signal. By using

historical cell site analysis, he could determine “the approxi‐

mate area where a phone would have had to have been when

it placed or received the call in the records.”

Agent Raschke then testified regarding his analysis of

Adame’s and Navarette’s cell phone data from the evening of

January 13, 2012, through the morning of January 14, 2012. He

cautioned that the records are not precise enough to state

whether a phone “was absolutely at a specific address,” but

that he could determine whether “it was in [a general] area.”

Agent Raschke testified that the cell phone data was “consis‐

tent with” Adame’s phone traveling from Indiana to Chicago

on January 14, 2012, from 12:21 a.m. to 12:48 a.m. He stated

that Adame’s cell phone records were also “consistent with”

Adame being at or near Navarette’s residence on January 14,

2012, from 1:08 a.m. to 1:15 a.m.; and Navarette’s friend’s

residence around 2:05 a.m.

Agent Raschke also testified that he has an FBI software

package that allows him to determine what cell tower a cell

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8 No. 15‐1196

phone is currentlyusing.1AgentRaschke hadgone to the crime

scene with a cell phone and used the software to determine

what cell tower the cell phone communicated with while he

was in the area. He tested different locations near the crime

scene, such as the alley behind the building, and inside Ortiz’s

apartment. Based on the cell towers that Agent Raschke’s

cell phone communicated with while at those locations,

he concluded that Adame’s cell phone records were “consis‐

tent with” Adame being in or near Ortiz’s apartment on the

evening of the fire because the cell towerthat Agent Raschke’s

cell phone utilized when he was inside the apartment matched

the cell towerthat Adame’s cell phone utilized forthe calls that

he made on January 14, 2012, between 2:47 a.m. and 3:12 a.m.

Further, Agent Raschke testified that Adame’s cell phone data

did notindicate that Adame’s cell phone utilized any ofthe cell

towers near the intersection of North Avenue and Keeler

Avenue at any point during the evening of the fire. While

Agent Raschke stated that he could not “say that a phone was

at a specific address,” he could confidently say that a phone

“wasn’t at this specific address.”

1

   As to any concern with whether Agent Raschke’s testimony regarding

the software established a proper foundation of reliability: Agent Raschke

never testified who developed the software, what company furnished the

software (if the software was even proprietary), and whether the software

operated the same way for every model and type of cell phone. Agent

Raschke also testified that he did not think any law enforcement group,

other than the FBI, utilized the software. But Adame never objected to the

software’s reliability, so the district court did not inquire further. Neverthe‐

less, any deficiencies in this evidence are at most harmless error.

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No. 15‐1196 9

AgentRaschke testified that Navarette’s cell phone records

were “consistent with” Navarette being at or near her resi‐

dence and her friend’s residence during the evening of the fire

and that the data was “consistent with” her being at or near

the parking spot near Ortiz’s apartment on January 14, 2012,

from 3:02 a.m. to 3:16 a.m. Agent Raschke concluded that

Navarette’s cell phone records were “inconsistent” with

Navarette being inside Ortiz’s apartment at that time. He also

found that Adame’s cell phone records were “inconsistent”

with Adame being in the parking spot with Navarette during

that time frame. This was because the cell towers that Agent

Raschke’s phone communicated with when he examined the

software inside the apartment were different from the cell

towers his phone communicated with when he was outside the

apartment at the alley parking spot. The cell phone records

showed that Navarette’s phone connected with the towers that

Agent Raschke’s phone connected with when he was in the

parking spot; and Adame’s phone connected with the towers

that Agent Raschke’s phone connected with when he was in

the apartment.

C. Jury Deliberations

After closing arguments, the district court went through

the exhibits that had been entered into evidence and allowed

the parties to object to any of them going back into jury

deliberations. Adame objected to several items, including a

video from Adame’s cell phone. The video was recorded by

Adame and shows Ortiz lying in bed while Adame films her

and remarks that the sun on her skin made it look red, like

she was “on fire.” Adame did not object to the government

introducing the video into evidence during trial, but argued

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10 No. 15‐1196

that it was improper to allow it to go back to the jury now

because they could “view it over and over again to an incorrect

result.” Specifically, he argued the word “fire” was prejudicial

because the video was taken almost three weeks before the

arson and he believed the word “fire” clearly had other

meanings in this context. The district court allowed the video

to go back into the jury room along with most of the other

exhibits that were admitted during trial.

The jury returned a guilty verdict against Adame on

October 11, 2013. On January 8, 2015, the district court sen‐

tenced Adame to 40 years’ imprisonment.

II.  DISCUSSION

Adame appeals on two major grounds. First, he claims that

there was insufficient evidence to convict him under 18 U.S.C.

§ 844(i). Second, he argues that evidence was admitted impro‐

perly, which substantially prejudiced him and prevented a fair

trial. We address each separately.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We will only overturn the jury’s verdict if, in viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, “the

record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury

could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Stevenson, 680 F.3d 854, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit‐

ted). Adame raises two issues to support his sufficiency of the

evidence argument. First, Adame claims that the government

failed to prove that Adame poured gasoline in Ortiz’s apart‐

ment and then ignited the fire. Although Navarette testified

that Adame was atthe gas station and pumped the gas, Adame

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No. 15‐1196 11

argues that since she did not see Adame pump gas into a

container or smell gasoline, there was insufficient evidence

connecting him to the fire.

Arson can be proven by circumstantial evidence. E.g.,

United States v. Thompson, 523 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). As detailed above, there is a considerable

amount of circumstantial evidence indicating that Adame

caused the fire. The jury could have reasonably inferred that

Adame pumped the gasoline into a container, since Navarette

testified that she did not see the gas nozzle while Adame was

pumping gasoline. Further, the jury could have reasonably

inferred that Adame put the container in his backpack, which

he carried with him as he left the car after he had Navarette

park near Ortiz’s apartment. Finally, the jury could have

reasonably inferredthatAdame pouredthe gasoline inthe area

inside Ortiz’s apartment where gasoline was later detected,

and that these events occurred during the two hour time

period in which Navarette waited for Adame, before he

returned with garbage bags full of items from Ortiz’s apart‐

ment. So, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the

jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Adame started the

fire.

Second, Adame claims that there was insufficient evidence

to convict him because the government did not show that the

building atissue substantially affectedinterstate commerce. 18

U.S.C. § 844(i) states that:

Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or

attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire

or an explosive, any building ... used in inter‐

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12 No. 15‐1196

state or foreign commerce or in any activity

affecting interstate orforeign commerce shall be

imprisoned.

If the government presents evidence that the building at

issue is used as rental property, then the government satisfies

its evidentiary burden for the interstate commerce element

under § 844(i). United States v. Soy, 413 F.3d 594, 602–03 (7th

Cir. 2005) (discussing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862

(1985) and its progeny); see also Taylor v. United States, _ S. Ct.

_, 2016WL 3369420, at*6 (June 20, 2016) (holding that to satisfy

the commerce element underthe Hobbs Act forthe robbery or

attempted robbery of a drug dealer, the government did not

have to show that the drugs at issue traveled interstate, but

rather “it is enough that a defendant knowingly stole or

attempted to steal drugs or drug proceeds, for, as a matter of

law, the market for illegal drugs is ‘commerce over which the

United States has jurisdiction.’”).

At trial, the owner of the building testified that the first

floor was used for office space that was available for lease at

the time of the fire. He also stated that the second floor was

split into two residential apartments, both of which were

leased at the time of the fire. Further, the landlord said he had

never lived in the building. The government met its eviden‐

tiary burden to establish the interstate commerce element

under § 844(i).

B. Improperly Admitted Evidence

Adame also argues that several pieces of evidence were

improperly admitted at trial. Specifically: (1) Agent Raschke’s

expert testimony regarding historical cell site analysis; (2) an

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No. 15‐1196 13

incriminating statement Adame made during interrogation

that he “didn’t mean to hurt Jimmy”; and (3) the cell phone

video of Adame remarking that Ortiz’s skin looked like it was

“on fire” that went back to the jury room during deliberations.

We address each separately.

1. Expert Testimony Regarding Historical Cell Site

Analysis

Adame challenges the admissibility of Agent Raschke’s

historical cell site analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702

and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

The government argues that Adame’s Daubert challenge was

waived because Adame did not file a motion to suppress prior

to trial.

In United States v. Acox, we stated that parties must file a

pretrial motion to exclude evidence if there is an applicable

constitutional or statutory rule “outsidethe Rules of Evidence”

that justifies the exclusion; for example, the Miranda doctrine.

595 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (cita‐

tions omitted). But parties may move to exclude evidence

during trial if the Federal Rules of Evidence justify the exclu‐

sion. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)). Daubert objections are

synonymous with objections based on Federal Rule of Evi‐

dence 702. Therefore, Adame did not have to file a pretrial

motion to suppress, and could have raised the issue during

trial. Adame timely raised a Daubert objection, and we turn to

the merits of his argument.

We review de novo whether adistrict court properly applied

the Daubert analysis. E.g., Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 809

(7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). If the district court properly

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14 No. 15‐1196

applied the Daubert analysis, then “we will not disturb the

district court’s findings unless they are manifestly erroneous.”

Id. (citation omitted). But, if the district court failed to conduct

a Daubert analysis, then we review de novo whetherthe expert’s

testimony was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th

Cir. 2010). In this case, the district court did not conduct a

Daubert analysis.2 So, we examine de novo whether Agent

Raschke’s testimony regarding historical cell site analysis was

admissible.

We recently examinedthe admissibility of historical cell site

analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See United States

v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2016). In Hill, we noted that

“historical cell‐site analysis can show with sufficientreliability

that a phone was in a general area, especially in a well‐popu‐

lated one. It shows the cell sites with which the person’s cell

phone connected, and the science is well understood.” Id. at

298. But we noted that the expert witness should include a

“disclaimer” regarding the accuracy of the analysis, and that

the witness should not “overpromise[] on the technique’s

2

   While the district court did acknowledge Adame’s Daubert objection, it

overruled the objection on the ground that since other federal courts have

allowed testimony on historical cell site analysis, “that’s the end of it.” This

is an insufficient analysis to warrant any deference. See Naeem v. McKesson

Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the district court’s one sentence,

stating that Prof. Anthony has sufficient expertise, is not enough to show

that the district court applied the Daubert standard”); see also Chapman v.

Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court’s

admission of expert testimony when the court “conducted virtually no

Daubert analysis”).

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No. 15‐1196 15

precision—or fail[] to account adequately for its potential

flaws.” Id. at 298‐99.

In this case, Agent Raschke acknowledged that he was

unable to tell from his historical cell site analysis whether

Adame was at a “specific address” at any point during the

evening of the fire. Rather, his testimony was that the data was

“consistent with” Adame being present at different locations

from January 13, 2012, to January 14, 2012. This testimony

adheres to our opinion in Hill regarding the proper use of

historical cell site analysis in trials. Further, Agent Raschke’s

specificity in his testimony that the data was consistent with

Adame being present in Ortiz’s apartment while Navarette

was in the parking spot (and inconsistent with Adame being in

the parking spot and Navarette being in the apartment) was

adequately supported by his observations that cell phones at

those two different locations utilized different cell towers,

despite their close proximity.

However, we need not engage in a Daubert analysis to

resolve this case. Even assuming Agent Raschke’s historical

cell site analysis testimony was inadmissible, any error was

harmless. If an error occurred in a jury trial, the government’s

burden is to persuade us that “the jury would have convicted

even absent the error.” United States v. Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 982

(7th Cir. 2007). We are persuaded that the jury would have still

convicted Adame absent the historical cell site analysis

testimony because Agent Raschke’s testimony was corrobo‐

rated by other witnesses and evidence presented at trial. See

Naeem, 444 F.3d at 609 (finding improperly admitted expert

testimony did not violate appellant’s “substantial rights”

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16 No. 15‐1196

because all of the expert’s objectionable statements were

corroborated by other witnesses).

The crux of Agent Raschke’s testimony was that on the

night of the fire, Adame drove from Indiana to Chicago; was

in the general area of Navarette’s residence; was in the general

area of Navarette’s friend’s residence; was in the general area

of Ortiz’s apartment; and was not in the general area of the

intersection of North Avenue and Keeler Avenue. He also

testified that Navarette’s cell phone data indicated that she

was in the general area of herresidence, herfriend’s residence,

and the parking spot near Ortiz’s apartment.

All of Agent Raschke’s testimony was cumulative; it was

corroborated by other witnesses at trial. Ortiz testified that

Adame was at her residence in Indiana earlier that evening,

and Navarette testified that Adame picked her up in Chicago

later that evening. These statements corroborate Agent

Raschke’s testimony that Adame drove from Indiana to

Chicago on the night of the fire. Navarette also testified that

Adame came to her residence and that they went to her

friend’s house to pick up a car. Further, Navarette testified that

she parked the car in an area a few buildings down from

Ortiz’s apartment, and that Adame left the vehicle and started

walking towards the alley in thedirection ofOrtiz’s apartment.

Adame returned with garbage bags full of items, which Ortiz

identified during trial as being from her home in Indiana and

her apartment in Chicago. This corroborates Agent Raschke’s

testimony that Adame’s cell phone data was consistent with

him being at Navarette’s house, herfriend’s house, and Ortiz’s

apartment on the evening of the fire. Finally, the government

introduced Adame’s statement to investigators in which he

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acknowledged that he was not at the intersection of North

Avenue and Keeler Avenue on the evening of the fire.

Therefore, since all ofAgentRaschke’s testimony regarding

Adame’s locations throughout the evening was cumulative,

any possible error in admitting his historical cell site analysis

was harmless.  

2. Incriminating Statements

Adame also challenges the government’s admission of his

statement, “I didn’t mean to hurt Jimmy.” He claims that it was

elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

But Adame did not file a pretrial motion to suppress this

statement, nor did he file a motion for relief in the district

court. If a defendant fails to file a pretrial motion to suppress,

then he or she must file a motion for relief in the district court

showing “good cause” for why the district court should excuse

the timeliness issue. See United States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335,

351–52 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3). If the

defendant also fails to file a motion for relief showing good

cause before the district court, then we apply a hyper‐deferen‐

tial standard of review in which we examine “whether, if a

motion for relief had been made and denied, the district court

would have abused its discretion in concluding that the defense

lacked good cause.” Acox, 595 F.3d at 732 (emphasis added).

Adame argues if he made a motion forrelief and the district

court denied it for lack of good cause, then the district court

wouldhave abuseditsdiscretion because the phrase presented

at trial (“I didn’t mean to hurt Jimmy”) materially differed

from the statements disclosed to Adame prior to trial (“[I] had

no problems with Jimmy” and “[I] was not trying to hurt

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18 No. 15‐1196

Jimmy”). Thus, he essentially claims he was blind‐sided by

Sergeant Garcia’s altered testimony during trial, which

prevented him from filing a pretrial motion to suppress. In

addition, he argues the phrase presented at trial is materially

differentfrom the phrases previouslydisclosedto him because

the phrase “I didn’t mean to hurt Jimmy” contains an implicit

acknowledgment of causing the fire and not intending the

consequences that ultimately resulted.

The fatal flaw in Adame’s argument is that the statements

he claims were previously disclosed to him before trial are not

contained in the record. Adame also did not file a motion to

modify the record pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 10(e). “A court of appeals is limited to the record

built in the district court, so arguments that depend on extra‐

record information have no prospect of success.” Acox, 595

F.3d at 731. Absent a complete record containing the previ‐

ously disclosed statements that Adame relies on, we cannot

consider this argument.

Further, Adame’s argument fails on its merits. If there is

any meaningful difference between the phrases “I didn’t mean

to hurt Jimmy” and “I was not trying to hurt Jimmy,” it is not

clearto us. So we cannot say that the district court, had it failed

to grasp the difference, would have abused its discretion.

3. Cell Phone Video

Adame’s final argument is that the district court erred in

allowing the cell phone video to go back to the jury room.

Adame claims that the video was unfairly prejudicial under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because his statement that the

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No. 15‐1196 19

sunlight on Ortiz’s skin made it look like it was “on fire” could

have been misinterpreted by the jury.

We review a district court’s decision to allow exhibits into

the jury room during deliberations for a “clear abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Loughry, 738 F.3d 166, 169–70 (7th

Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, “[i]f a party argues that

properly admitted exhibits had some sort of improper influ‐

ence on the jury,reversal also requires a showing of prejudice.”

Id.(citation omitted). Generally,the district courtis well within

its discretion to allow properly admitted evidence to go back

into jury deliberations; but it should prohibit exhibits that

“neither party has relied on, that have no relevance to any of

the issues central to the case, or that are cumulative, prejudi‐

cial, confusing, or misleading.” Deicher v. City of Evansville,

Wis., 545 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 and United States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th

Cir. 1971)).

Both parties agree that the cell phone video was properly

admitted into evidence and that Adame did not object to its

introduction. Thus, it is normally proper for a district court to

allow the exhibit to go into the jury deliberation room.

But Adame raised a proper objection under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 that the video’s unfair prejudice substantially

outweighed its probative value. He claims that any reference

to “fire” by an arson defendant is inherently prejudicial. We

disagree. It would be unnecessarily stringent to hold that the

prosecution can never introduce evidence of an arson defen‐

dant saying the word “fire” without unfairly prejudicing the

defendant and requiring a new trial. Adame also speculates

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20 No. 15‐1196

that the jury could have replayed the video over and over

again until it was given too much credence. That risk alone is

not enough to require us to reverse the verdict; there was an

overwhelming amount of other evidence introduced against

Adame in this case. Thus, any error was harmless and did not

prejudice Adame.

III.  CONCLUSION

Therefore,forthe foregoing reasons, Adame’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.

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