Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01278/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01278-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BNSF Railway Company
Defendant
Charles Lawrence
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHARLES LAWRENCE, an 

individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a 

Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 

through 100, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

1 This matter is before the court on the plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 

2 the case to the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 3. 

3 Defendant opposes the motion. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 8. The court decides 

4 the motion after a hearing on September 2, 2016. As explained below, the 

5 court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to remand in full. 

6 I. BACKGROUND 

7 Plaintiff worked for defendant as a train conductor in Stockton, Cali8 fornia. Compl. ¶ 4 (exhibit one, attached to Decl. of Brian Plummer, ECF 

9 No. 3). On April 18, 2013 and February 28, 2014, plaintiff suffered on-the10 job injuries, which he reported to defendant with a claim for damages. Id. ¶¶ 

11 4-5, 21-26. On March 28, 2014, defendant fired plaintiff, citing plaintiff’s al12 leged violations of BNSF rules as the reason. Id. ¶¶ 22-25. 

13 On October 26, 2015, plaintiff filed this suit against defendant in state 

14 court, alleging four state law causes of action: 

Case 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 11/30/16 Page 1 of 6
2 

1 (1) Personal injury claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 

2 (FELA), for his April 18, 2013 on-the-job injury; 

3 (2) Personal injury claim under FELA, for his February 28, 2014 on4 the-job injury; 

5 (3) A wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim; 

6 (4) An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 

7 On June 10, 2016, defendant removed this case to federal court. No8 tice of Removal, ECF No. 1. On July 7, 2016, plaintiff moved to remand the 

9 case back to state court. Pl.’s Mot. Remand, ECF No. 3. On August 12, 

10 2016, defendant opposed. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 8. On August 19, 2016, 

11 plaintiff replied. Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 9. 

12 In essence, plaintiff argues the federal court lacks jurisdiction over his 

13 case. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 3. There was some confusion in the removal pa14 pers about the basis for federal jurisdiction, but both party’s briefs indicate 

15 federal question jurisdiction is the only potential federal jurisdictional hook in 

16 this case. See ECF Nos. 3, 8, 9. Defendant does not argue diversity jurisdic17 tion. As such, the court considers only whether plaintiff’s case invokes feder18 al question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 

20 A. Removal and Remand 

21 A defendant may remove a case from state court to the federal district 

22 court embracing the same location if that district court has original subject 

23 matter jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There are two prima24 ry bases for a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question 

25 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 

26 U.S.C. § 1332. “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the dis27 trict court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded” to the 

28 state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

29 B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 

30 A claim invokes federal question jurisdiction when it falls within the 

31 categories of cases identified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 vests federal 

32 district courts with jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Consti33 tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In other 

34 words, when a claim is based on federal law, section 1331 “arising under” 

Case 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 11/30/16 Page 2 of 6
3 

1 jurisdiction attaches. This federal jurisdictional hook, however, must be con2 tained in the complaint itself. This longstanding principle is known as the 

3 well-pleaded complaint rule. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 

4 149, 152 (1908). Defendants cannot rely on anticipated federal defenses or 

5 counterclaims to establish federal question jurisdiction. See Vaden v. Discover 

6 Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vaca7 tion Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). 

8 In rare instances, federal “arising under” jurisdiction may adhere in 

9 an action in which the plaintiff does not rely on federal law on the face of his 

10 complaint. This alternative invocation of federal jurisdiction occurs only 

11 when a “substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element 

12 of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. at 

13 13. The mere existence of a federal element is not, on its own, enough “to 

14 open the ‘arising under’ door.” Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 

15 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 

16 Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005)). The purpose of this federal question 

17 doctrine is to allow “[federal courts] to hear claims recognized under state 

18 law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus 

19 justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a fed20 eral forum offers on federal issues[.]” Grable, 545 U.S. at 312. 

21 The burden of establishing federal question jurisdiction lies with the 

22 party that sought removal to the federal court in the first instance. Gaus v. 

23 Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Where doubt regarding the 

24 right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court,” because “it 

25 is well established that the plaintiff is master of her complaint and can plead 

26 to avoid federal jurisdiction.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 

27 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnotes omitted). 

28 III. DISCUSSION 

29 Here, plaintiff argues his state law claims do not arise under federal 

30 law. Defendant contends plaintiff’s third claim asserting state common law 

31 wrongful termination raises the type of federal question that does invoke this 

32 court’s jurisdiction under section 1331. Specifically, defendant argues federal 

33 courts have a vested interest in hearing this claim because the ultimate result 

34 could expand the reach of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) beyond 

35 what Congress intended. See generally Def.’s Opp’n, EFC No. 8. The court 

36 first explains why plaintiff’s citation to the FRSA in his complaint alone does 

Case 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 11/30/16 Page 3 of 6
4 

1 not invoke this court’s jurisdiction, and then addresses why defendant’s 

2 broader argument of a vested federal interest in the outcome of this case is 

3 effectively a defense and thus does not confer federal question jurisdiction. 

4 A. Plaintiff’s Citation to Federal Policy as the Basis for 

5 a State Tameny Claim Does Not Invoke Federal Question 

6 Jurisdiction. 

7 Basing a state law claim on a federal public policy does not by itself 

8 invoke federal question jurisdiction. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, 

9 when state and not federal law underlies a claim, referencing federal policy in 

10 the complaint does not transform the state claim into a federal claim for re11 lief. Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346-47 (1996) (plaintiff’s reliance 

12 on the federal policy embodied in Title VII as a basis for a state wrongful dis13 charge claim did not create federal-question jurisdiction); see also Campbell v. 

14 Aerospace Corp., 123 F.3d 1308, 1315 (9th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s reliance on 

15 federal False Claims Act as basis for a state wrongful termination claim did 

16 not raise federal question jurisdiction). 

17 Here, plaintiff’s citation to the FRSA in his wrongful termination 

18 claim does not give this court jurisdiction over the claim. Plaintiff’s wrongful 

19 termination allegations, stating what is known as a Tameny claim, articulate a 

20 state common law claim that requires plaintiff to prove his employer fired 

21 him for a reason that violates some well-established “public policy.” See 

22 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172 (1980); Foley v. Interactive 

23 Data Corp, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 668 (1988). As such, one of the elements of the 

24 claim requires plaintiff identify the particular public policy his employer vio25 lated. See Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 164. In his complaint, plaintiff bases his 

26 Tameny claim on three sources of public policy: that embodied in California 

Labor Code section 132(a); “the public policy of the state of California”1 27 ; and 

28 the federal public policy contained in the FRSA, 49 U.S.C. § 20109. Compl. 

29 ¶ 28. As in Rains, 80 F.3d at 343-44, 347, and Campbell, 123 F.3d at 1315, in 

30 which the plaintiffs’ citation to federal public policy for their state wrongful 

31 termination claims did not invoke federal question jurisdiction, here plain-

 

1

 Plaintiff’s complaint does not clarify what specific policy “the public policy 

of California” encompasses. Compl. ¶ 28. In reply, plaintiff alludes to the 

public policies contained in “Labor Code sections 98.6, 6400 et seq., and California Constitution, Article XIV,” Reply at 4 n.2, but because this additional 

information is not pled in plaintiff’s complaint, the court does not consider it 

here. 

Case 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 11/30/16 Page 4 of 6
5 

1 tiff’s citation to the FRSA to support his Tameny claim does not render the 

2 claim a federal claim for relief. 

3 At hearing, defendant conceded as much, that a mere citation to the 

4 FRSA as one of several bases for a Tameny claim is insufficient to invoke fed5 eral jurisdiction. See also Def.’s Opp’n at 4-5. Defendant argues, however, 

6 the state law bases on which plaintiff relies are inadequate under California 

7 law, and their inclusion in the complaint was merely plaintiff’s artful attempt 

8 to plead around the claim’s exclusive reliance on federal policy. See Def.’s 

9 Opp’n at 4-5. As discussed below, defendant’s argument effectively raises a 

10 defense, and the court does not entertain defenses at this stage of the proceed11 ings. Plaintiff’s citation to the FRSA as one basis for his Tameny claim is not 

12 sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction. 

13 B. Defendant’s Potential Defenses Do Not Confer on 

14 this Court Federal Question Jurisdiction. 

15 At this jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, the court limits itself to 

16 the face of plaintiff’s complaint, and does not examine potential defenses to 

17 establish jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 

18 U.S. at 10. This is because the plaintiff is the master of his complaint and he 

19 may “avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading solely state-law claims.” Valles v. 

20 Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). Although jurisdiction 

21 may not always be clear from the face of a complaint, “[w]here doubt regard22 ing the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.” 

23 Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. 

24 Here, the federal questions defendant poses as creating a jurisdictional 

25 hook are in effect legal defenses and cannot serve as the basis for this court’s 

26 jurisdiction. The first federal question defendant poses asks whether allowing 

27 plaintiff to tie his Tameny claim to FRSA’s public policy would extend the 

28 FRSA beyond the scope Congress intended. Def.’s Opp’n at 3-6. In posing 

29 this question, defendant attacks the state bases for plaintiff’s Tameny claim 

30 under California law and declares the only true basis lies in the FRSA. Id. 

31 Defendant then points out the procedural and remedial limits in the FRSA 

32 that plaintiff could circumvent by tethering his Tameny claim to it. Id. This 

33 circumvention of Congress’s carefully crafted statutory limitations, defendant 

34 asserts, raises an important question a federal court has a vested interest in 

35 deciding. Id. The second federal question defendant poses is whether courts 

36 should even allow the FRSA to be identified as a “public policy” in the pleadCase 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 11/30/16 Page 5 of 6
6 

1 ing of a Tameny claim, because the FRSA applies only to “common carriers” 

2 and therefore is not truly a “public” policy. Id. at 7. 

3 Examined closely, defendant’s federal questions are in fact veiled de4 fenses. To arrive at the questions defendant poses, this court would first need 

5 to find plaintiff’s state law bases for his Tameny claim inadequate under Cali6 fornia law. Making that determination would require the court to interpret 

7 the California Court of Appeals’ decision in Dutra v. Mercy Medical Center Mt. 

8 Shasta, 209 Cal.App.4th 750, 755 (2012). In Dutra, plaintiff Michelle Dutra 

9 brought a Tameny action against her former employer, alleging her termina10 tion was in retaliation for her decision to file a worker’s compensation claim. 

11 Id. at 753. Dutra tethered her Tameny claim to the public policy codified 

12 at Labor Code section 132(a). Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial 

13 court’s dismissal of Dutra’s Tameny claim on the basis that the Workers’ 

14 Compensation Appeals Board has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims 

15 based on Labor Code section 132(a). Id. 

16 Defendant argues Dutra forbids plaintiff from relying on California 

17 Labor Code section 132(a) as the basis for a Tameny claim, but plaintiff dis18 tinguishes his case from that of the plaintiff in Dutra, and contends the prece19 dent does not apply. See Pl.’s Mot. at 3-4, Def.’s Opp’n at 4-5. Although de20 fendant raises a plausible argument, a motion to remand is not an appropriate 

21 forum for such substantive legal analysis. 

22 Defendant has failed to meet his burden to establish federal question 

23 jurisdiction. Both parties agree federal jurisdiction over plaintiff’s third claim 

24 is a predicate to federal jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law 

25 claims. See Pl.’s Mot. at 3-4; Def.’s Opp’n at 1-2. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

26 motion to remand will be granted. 

27 IV. CONCLUSION 

28 Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. This order resolves ECF 

29 No. 3. CASE CLOSED. 

30 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

31 DATED: November 30, 2016. 

Case 2:16-cv-01278-KJM-EFB Document 19 Filed 11/30/16 Page 6 of 6