Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00270/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00270-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Byron Chapman
Plaintiff
City of Lincoln
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYRON CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF LINCOLN, 

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-00270-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Byron Chapman (“Plaintiff”), a person with physical disabilities, brought 

this action based on barriers to access he encountered at the Pavilion Building owned by 

Defendant City of Lincoln (“Defendant”). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Leave to Amend the Complaint (“Motion”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a)(2).

1 ECF No. 24. Defendant timely opposed the Motion, and Plaintiff replied. 

Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 26; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 29. For the reasons described below, 

Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

2

 1 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. 

2 Also before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 25. That motion 

pertains to Plaintiff’s original complaint, which will be superseded by the amended pleading Plaintiff will be 

filing pursuant to this Memorandum and Order. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED without 

prejudice to refiling after the First Amended Complaint is docketed.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s original Complaint asserts that Defendant violated the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California Civil Code sections 54, 54.1, and 54.3, California 

Health and Safety Code section 19955, et seq., and California Civil Code section 51 by 

way of architectural barriers encountered at Defendant’s Pavilion Building that interfered 

with Plaintiff’s ability to attend City Council meetings. Plaintiff now moves to amend his 

Complaint to include allegations supporting his claim for violation of Title II of the ADA. 

While the original Complaint references Title II, Plaintiff primarily set forth Title III factual 

allegations, which are similar but not identical to those necessary under Title II. 

Plaintiff previously moved for leave to amend, but his motion was denied by 

Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr., for failure to address the proper standard under Rule 16. 

ECF No. 21. After reassignment to this Court, a minute order was issued vacating all

dates in this matter and indicating that a new pretrial scheduling order (“PTSO”) would 

issue. ECF Nos. 22–23. Plaintiff then filed a new Motion for Leave to Amend on the 

basis that leave to amend is proper under Rule 15. Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s 

Motion, arguing in pertinent part that Plaintiff has not shown good cause for the 

amendment and that Defendant will be prejudiced if amendment is permitted.

ANALYSIS

Rule 15(a)(2) states that courts should “freely give leave when justice so 

requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and the Ninth Circuit has noted that the policy is one 

“to be applied with extreme liberality,” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 

F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990).3 In exercising its discretion to permit or deny a party to 

 3 The parties disagree as to whether the Court should apply Rule 16, which requires a showing of 

good cause, or the more liberal Rule 15, to Plaintiff’s Motion. By vacating all dates set by the previous 

court and indicating that a new PTSO would issue, this Court intended to vacate the prior PTSO in its 

entirety. Since no PTSO is in place, this Motion is governed by Rule 15. 

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amend its pleading, this Court considers five factors: (1) whether the amendment was 

filed with undue delay; (2) whether the movant has requested the amendment in bad 

faith or as a dilatory tactic; (3) whether the movant was allowed to make previous 

amendments which failed to correct deficiencies of the complaint; (4) whether the 

amendment will unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (5) whether the amendment 

would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Whether amendment will 

unduly prejudice the opposing party is the most important consideration in a court’s 

analysis under Rule 15(a). Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2003). On balance, these factors favor Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has not previously been granted leave to amend, and, while Plaintiff 

acknowledges that he delayed in seeking the proposed relief, “‘[u]ndue delay by 

itself . . . is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.’” Owens v. Kaiser Found. 

Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, nothing in the record 

supports the conclusion that Plaintiff acted in bad faith in filing the instant Motion. Nor 

does it appear to the Court that amendment will necessarily be futile. 

Defendant’s argument that it will suffer undue prejudice if the Court grants 

Plaintiff’s Motion is similarly misplaced. Specifically, Defendant argues that granting 

leave to amend will require it to attack the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and 

amend its pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant contends that it will suffer 

prejudice as a result of these additional litigation expenses and concomitant delay. 

Undue prejudice has been found where the “parties have engaged in voluminous and 

protracted discovery prior to amendment” and where filing an amended complaint would 

have led to “the nullification of prior discovery, increase the burden of necessary future 

discovery,” or required the re-litigation of a previous suit. Utterkar v. Ebix, Inc., No. 14-

CV-02250-LHK, 2015 WL 5027986, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing Jackson v. 

Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990)). Defendant has not pointed to any 

of these potentially deleterious effects in this case where Plaintiff’s proposed 

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amendment does not add any new claims and instead includes additional allegations 

supporting Plaintiff’s original Title II cause of action. Defendant has thus failed to 

establish that granting Plaintiff’s Motion will result in undue prejudice, and, consistent 

with the foregoing, amendment shall be granted. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED. 

Not later than five (5) days following the date this Memorandum and Order is 

electronically filed, Plaintiff is directed to file his First Amended Complaint. Defendant’s 

pending Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) is accordingly DENIED without 

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 27, 2016

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