Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02302/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02302-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramon Rubio-Rivera
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) No. 

) 

RAMON RUBIO-RIVERA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

. FILED 

Unued Scaca Court of A peak 

Tenth Circuit p 

ocr 2 6 1aao 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

89-2302 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

D.C. No. 89-0252 

David N. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, (Rhonda P. 

Backinoff, Assistant United States Attorney and William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico for Defendant-Appel.lant. 

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN * , District Judge. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Ramon Rubio-Rivera appeals from a 

judgment of conviction on one count of possession with intent to 

* The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2302 Document: 01019311064 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 1 
distribute less than fifty kilograms of marijuana. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(a)(l), 841(b)(l)(D). Defendant's motion to suppress 

forty-four pounds of marijuana was denied by the district court 

and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sentenced to prison for 

twenty-five months and supervised release for three years 

thereafter, defendant appeals challenging the denial of his motion 

to suppress. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 

we affirm. 

I. 

On June 3, 1989, at 8:20p.m., defendant drove a 1978 Ford 

LTD into the border patrol checkpoint north of Las Cruces, New 

Mexico. At the primary checkpoint, the border patrol agent 

inquired about defendant's citizenship. The defendant handed the 

agent a temporary resident alien card, which the agent thought to 

be valid. The agent testified that during this time the defendant 

failed to make eye contact and defendant's hand was shaking. The 

agent began questioning the defendant about where the defendant 

came from. Defendant explained that he was returning from Juarez, 

Mexico, where he had spent five days with friends. No luggage or 

personal belongings were visible. Ownership of the car was 

discussed. The agent became suspicious when the defendant claimed 

that the car had been purchased in El Paso two days earlier by a 

friend. The car had a temporary sticker from Colorado affixed to 

the rear window. On the floor on the back seat of the car was a 

one-gallon plastic milk jug partially filled with gas. The agent 

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viewed this as consistent with a reduced capacity gas tank. 

According to the agent, such specially fabricated gas tanks 

frequently contain two compartments, one for gas and another for 

concealing contraband. 

The agent asked the defendant about the contents of the 

trunk. Defendant got out of the car and opened the trunk which 

was empty. While the agent conducted his inquiry, traffic was 

backing up on I-25, the highway on which the border checkpoint is 

located. After closing the trunk lid, the agent told the 

defendant to pull over into the secondary checkpoint. While a 

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check was made on the 

vehicle, defendant consented to a search of the vehicle. The 

agent discovered a gas tank with a concealed compartment 

containing marijuana. 

II. 

Defendant contends that directing defendant to the secondary 

checkpoint exceeded the legitimate scope of the initial stop and 

violated the fourth amendment. According to the defendant, he was 

directed to that checkpoint in the absence of a reasonable 

suspicion that a crime had been committed in violation of the 

fourth amendment. Though the subsequent search was undertaken 

with his consent, defendant argues that search was tainted by the 

constitutional violation and the product of the search must be 

suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963). 

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In the district court, the government argued that defendant 

lacked standing to challenge the search of the car. Rec. vol. I, 

doc. 11 at 2, vol. III at 8. At the suppression hearing, 

defendant testified that he came into possession of the car after 

he met one Alesandro-Castro in a Juarez bar. Id. vol. III at 

12-14. Defendant had never met Alesandro-Castro previously, but 

agreed to transport the car to the United States because 

Alesandro-Castro lacked immigration documents. Id. at 14-15. 

Defendant did not obtain Alesandro-Castro's first name, address or 

telephone number and no arrangements were made for the car's 

return or delivery to another person. Id. at 15-16. Defendant 

also testified that he attempted to buy the car, but that 

Alesandro-Castro told him that he should just take the car and see 

if he liked it. Id. at 15. The district judge rejected the 

defendant's contention that the car was a gift, id. at 41, but did 

not decide the standing issue. At trial, the defendant disclaimed 

any knowledge or interest in the marijuana. 

Given the personal nature of interest protected, standing is 

a matter of substantive fourth amendment law. Rakas v. Illinois, 

439 u.s. 128, 139-40 (1978). A defendant may not challenge an 

allegedly unlawful search or seizure unless he demonstrates that 

his own constitutional rights have been violated. United States 

v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1990). Standing is not 

conferred vicariously; even if the fourth amendment rights of a 

third party have been violated, a district court may not suppress 

evidence unless the defendant has met his burden of proving that 

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Appellate Case: 89-2302 Document: 01019311064 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 4 
the challenged search or seizure infringed on his personal fourth 

amendment interests. United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 

(lOth Cir. 1989). Standing is analyzed based upon two factors: 

"whether the individual, by his conduct has 'exhibited an actual 

(subjective) expectation of privacy,'" and "whether the 

individual's subjective expectation of privacy is 'one that 

society is prepared to recognize as '"reasonable."''" Smith v. 

Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United States, 

389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); United States 

v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (lOth Cir. 1990); Erwin, 875 F.2d at 

270. When the facts are uncontroverted, we review the standing 

issue de novo. United States v. Kuespert, 773 F.2d 1066, 1067 

(9th Cir. 1985). When the facts are controverted, the factual 

findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, but 

legal issues are reviewed de DQYQ. 

Here, the district court found that the car was not a gift to 

the defendant, but did not make further findings on the standing 

issue. We need not remand this case for further findings, 

however, because the legally operative facts on the standing issue 

are uncontroverted. Defendant testified that Alesandro-Castro, 

the apparent owner of the car, loaned him the vehicle. He later 

testified that Alesandro-Castro directed him to papers in the 

glove box indicating ownership. Rec. vol. IV at 134. Thus, this 

case is unlike Erwin and Arango in which the defendants lacked 

standing because they "failed to introduce any evidence to show 

legitimate ownership or possession of the automobile, which might 

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establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular 

area searched." Erwin, 875 F.2d at 271; Arango, 912 F.2d at 446 

n.2. 

The standing inquiry focuses on reasonable expectations, 

hence, a defendant is not required "to produce legal documentation 

showing a chain of lawful custody from the registered owner" to 

himself. Arango, 912 F.2d at 446 n.2. Defendant satisfied the 

requirement that he "must at least state that he gained possession 

from the owner or someone with the authority to grant possession." 

Id. at 445. Where the defendant offers sufficient evidence 

indicating that he has permission of the owner to use the vehicle, 

the defendant plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle and standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. 

United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418 (7th Cir. 1990) 

(where defendant claimed to have borrowed truck under vague 

arrangement, he had standing given that government failed to 

disprove that the truck "was not being used with the permission of 

the owner"); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548-49 (11th 

Cir. 1987) (defendant had standing to challenge search of car 

borrowed from a friend); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 

1317 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 450 u.s. 1043 (1980); see 

also United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1343 (8th Cir.) (same, 

car borrowed from sister), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 931 (1984); 

United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 (7th Cir.) (same, car 

borrowed from brother), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 830 (1984); United 

States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) (same, 

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car borrowed from nephew's girlfriend); United States v. Posey, 

663 F.2d 37, 40-41 (7th Cir. 1981) (same, car borrowed from wife), 

cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959 (1982). 

II. 

Defendant contends that once the agent was satisfied that his 

immigration card was valid, defendant should have been released 

rather than required to proceed to the secondary checkpoint. Cf. 

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (lOth Cir. 1988); 

United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (lOth Cir. 

1985); United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1455 (lOth Cir. 

1985). Application of the fourth amendment in this context 

requires a balancing between the government's interest in 

monitoring its borders and the level of intrusiveness occasioned 

by a primary and secondary checkpoint stop. Michigan v. Sitz, 110 

S. Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990). That balance was struck as a matter of 

law in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), 

which held that no individualized suspicion is necessary to stop, 

question, and then selectively refer motorists to a secondary 

immigration checkpoint. Id. at 562-63. Border patrol agents have 

"virtually unlimited discretion to refer cars to the secondary 

inspection area." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221, 224 n.6 

(1986)(Powell, J. concurring). On similar facts, the Fifth 

Circuit has held that border patrol agents need no probable cause 

or reasonable suspicion to stop, question and selectively refer 

motorists to a secondary checkpoint. United States v. Price, 869 

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F.2d 801, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1989) (concealed compartment containing 

cocaine); United States v. Garcia, 616 F.2d 210, 211-12 (5th Cir. 

1980) (concealed compartment containing marijuana). 

The rationale of Martinez-Fuerte is grounded in the 

government's legitimate concerns about citizenship and immigration 

status of those entering into the United States and the detection 

of unlawful entry. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. at 545, 557; see 

also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 u.s. 656, 

___ , 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1392 (1989) (discussing Martinez-Fuerte); 

United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 u.s. 579, 587 (1983) 

(same); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 648, 655-56 (1978) (same); 

United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 883-84 (1975) 

(precursor of Martinez-Fuerte). Notwithstanding, we have held 

that border patrol agents may "question individuals regarding 

suspicious circumstances, in addition to citizenship matters, when 

those individuals are stopped at a permanent checkpoint." United 

States v. Benitez, 899 F.2d 995, 998 (lOth Cir. 1990). In United 

States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888 (lOth Cir. 1986), we stated: 

The border agent may question the driver and passengers 

about their citizenship and immigration status, and ask 

them to explain suspicious circumstances. Any further 

detention must be based on consent or probable cause. 

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 881-82, 

95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1985). 

Id. at 891. Thus, even when the questions asked at the primary 

checkpoint allay all concerns about citizenship and immigration 

status, an agent still may direct a vehicle to a secondary 

checkpoint and further question the occupants on the basis of 

reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. United 

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States v. Johnson, 895 F.2d 693, 696, 698 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Border patrol agents are not required to ignore suspicious 

circumstances, even if such circumstances may not be pertinent to 

citizenship and immigration status. Johnson, 895 F.2d at 696; 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 891. Given "'the veritable national crisis 

in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics,'" Von 

Raab, 489 u.s. at ___ , 109 s. Ct. at 1392 (quoting United States 

v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), border patrol 

agents, within constitutional limits, may assist in defeating "the 

traffickers seemingly inexhaustable repertoire of deceptive 

practices and elaborate schemes for importing narcotics." Von 

Raab, 489 u.s. at ___ , 109 s. Ct. at 1392. 

Merely because the agent was satisfied that defendant had a 

valid immigration card, however, does not mean that the agent 

required reasonable suspicion to have defendant proceed to the 

secondary checkpoint. The agent ran an NCIC check on the vehicle 

at the secondary checkpoint, rather than letting traffic back up 

at the primary checkpoint. To the extent that the agent had not 

resolved all immigration concerns about the defendant and the 

vehicle, the agent did not require reasonable suspicion to 

complete his normal inquiry under these circumstances, including 

the NCIC check, at the secondary checkpoint. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 

U.S. at 563; Johnson, 895 F.2d at 698. 

In any event, the referral to the secondary checkpoint is 

acceptable under the standards applicable to investigative 

detentions. Under the fourth amendment, a valid investigative 

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detention may occur when "specific and articulable facts and 

rational inferences from those facts give rise to reasonable 

suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime." 

Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 890 (relying on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968))· In deciding the validity of an investigative detention, 

we take a common-sense approach based upon ordinary human 

experience. United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 975 (lOth 

Cir. 1989). 

The district court determined that referral to the secondary 

checkpoint was reasonable given the circumstances. At the primary 

checkpoint, the defendant was apprehensive and would not establish 

eye contact when questioned. Although the defendant indicated 

that he had been on a trip for several days, the car contained no 

luggage or personal belongings. The car had a temporary Colorado 

sticker, yet defendant claimed that the car had been purchased in 

El Paso. Finally, the car had a container of gas on the rear 

floor which the agent testified was consistent with a concealed 

compartment. These facts, together with their reasonable 

inferences in light of the agent's experience concerning unlawful 

immigration and drug interdiction, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 

27, support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 

transporting contraband. 

Because we hold that the referral to the secondary checkpoint 

did not violate the fourth amendment, we need not address the 

defendant's argument that his consent to search the vehicle was 

tainted by an earlier fourth amendment violation. Defendant did 

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not challenge the voluntariness of his consent on other grounds 

and when valid consent is obtained, the fourth amendment is not 

violated, United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 965 (lOth Cir. 

1989), cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 2618 (1990). 

AFFIRMED. 

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