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Parties Involved:
Louise M. Riedle
Appellant
Louis W. Sullivan
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

J JL 2 5 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk LOUISE M. RIEDLE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-7087 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-25-S) 

( E . D . Okla . ) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Claimant Louise M. Riedle appeals a district court order 

affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services to deny her application for disability insurance 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7087 Document: 010110129478 Date Filed: 07/25/1991 Page: 1 
benefits, see 42 u.s.c. § 423. For the reasons set forth below, 

we affirm. 

I. 

Riedle, a forty-nine year-old woman, filed her current 

application on July 22, 1988, alleging disability since 1985 due 

to back surgery and arthritis in her knees, hips and back. The 

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Riedle 

then requested and received, a hearing before an administrative 

law judge (ALJ). The ALJ issued a written decision on June 29, 

1989. In this decision the ALJ determined, as a threshold matter, 

that the question of Riedle's disability on or before May 16, 

1988, was res judicata due to the denial of an earlier application 

for benefits which Riedle had filed. The ALJ then concluded that, 

as for the period after May 16, 1988, Riedle has had the residual 

functional capacity to perform a full range of sedentary work and, 

therefore, was not disabled. The appeals council denied Riedle's 

motion for reconsideration, and the Secretary's decision then 

became final. Riedle filed a timely motion for review of the 

Secretary's decision in accordance with 42 u.s.c. § 405(g). The 

district court affirmed the Secretary's decision, and this appeal 

followed. 

On appeal we consider whether the Secretary's decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 

299 (10th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is evidence a 

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). We also consider 

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whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standard. Bernal, 

851 F.2d at 299. Riedle has raised a number of challenges to the 

Secretary's decision. We will address each of Riedle's arguments 

in turn. 

II. 

First, Riedle contends that the ALJ implicitly reopened the 

May 16, 1988, decision denying her benefits by considering 

evidence which was addressed in that prior determination. 

However, our review of the record discloses nothing to indicate 

that the ALJ actually reopened the prior case. Cf. Taylor ex. 

rel. Peck v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1984)(ALJ de 

facto reopened prior decision by reviewing case on merits and 

considering additional evidence). The ALJ, in his written 

decision, explicitly stated that res judicata precluded 

consideration of whether Riedle was disabled prior to May 16, 

1988. The ALJ considered exhibits dating from the period covered 

by the May 16, 1988, decision only to the extent that they might 

warrant reopening of that decision and concluded that reopening 

was not justified. Because the ALJ expressly refused to reopen by 

invoking the doctrine of res judicata, there was no reopening in 

fact. See id. at 1115 n.6; see also Krumpelman v. Heckler, 767 

F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1025 (1986). 

In connection with her first argument, Riedle also contends 

that even if there was not a de facto reopening of her previously 

adjudicated application, then the ALJ erred in not expressly 

reopening the application. We do not have jurisdiction to address 

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Appellate Case: 90-7087 Document: 010110129478 Date Filed: 07/25/1991 Page: 3 
this claim. "The Secretary's decision not to reopen a previously 

adjudicated claim for benefits is discretionary and, therefore, is 

not a final decision reviewable under 42 u.s.c. § 405(g)." Brown 

v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990). 1 

III. 

As we understand her appellate brief, Riedle's second 

argument on appeal raises three separate issues. First, Riedle 

contends that the ALJ erred in relying on testimony provided by a 

vocational expert because the ALJ failed to include Riedle's 

reduced IQ in hypothetical questions posed to the vocational 

expert. Riedle, however, overlooks that the vocational expert 

reviewed Riedle's benefits application file prior to the hearing. 

See Rec. Vol. II at 62. This file contained evidence of Riedle's 

mental functioning. Moreover, the vocational expert, in assessing 

Riedle's vocational capacity at the hearing, specifically referred 

to Riedle's mental abilities. Id. at 64. The fact that the 

vocational expert was familiar with Riedle's file and commented on 

her mental abilities, indicates, in our view, that the vocational 

expert was cognizant of Riedle's reduced IQ and was making an 

individualized assessment. Therefore, the effect of the error, if 

any, in the ALJ's hypothetical was minimal. See,~, Diaz v. 

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 

1 There may be federal judicial review when the Secretary's 

decision not to reopen is itself challenged on constitutional 

grounds. Dozier v. Bowen, 891 F.2d 769, 771 (10th Cir. 1989). In 

this case, however, Riedle did not raise any constitutional issue 

before the Secretary which is reviewable by this court. See 

Dominick v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 90-7087 Document: 010110129478 Date Filed: 07/25/1991 Page: 4 
1990)(ALJ's failure to include some of claimant's impairments in 

hypothetical question to vocational expert was of no consequence 

where the vocational expert was present at the hearing and heard 

testimony concerning claimant's impairments). 

In connection with her second argument on appeal, Riedle also 

contends that the ALJ and the vocational expert mischaracterized 

her education level as "limited." However, the evidence before 

the ALJ clearly indicated that Riedle had a tenth-grade education. 

See Rec. Vol. II at 45. The Secretary's regulations classify a 

tenth-grade education as a "limited" education. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1564(b)(3). Thus, Riedle was properly evaluated as having a 

limited education. 

The final issue raised by Riedle in connection with her 

second argument on appeal is that her IQ of seventy-three 

constitutes a significant nonexertional limitation which precluded 

use of the medical-vocational guidelines--the "grids." We 

disagree. Automatic application of the grids is appropriate when 

a claimant's residual functional capacity, age, 

and education precisely match a grid category. 

862 F.2d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 1988). The 

work experience, 

Gossett v. Bowen, 

presence of a 

nonexertional impairment which limits a claimant's capacity for 

work may preclude application of the grids and dictate their use 

only as a framework to determine disability. Id. However, "'the 

mere presence of a nonexertional impairment does not automatically 

preclude reliance on the grids.'" Id. at 807 (quoting Channel v. 

Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 582 n.6 (10th Cir. 1984). Rather, a 

nonexertional impairment precludes application of the grids only 

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when the nonexertional impairment significantly restricts the full 

range of work the claimant may perform in his or her exertional 

category. See Gossett, 862 F.2d at 807-08. 

In this case, the ALJ, in effect, concluded that Riedle could 

still perform sedentary work despite her reduced IQ. The record, 

which contains no evidence that Riedle was ever prevented from 

performing her prior work because of her reduced IQ, supports this 

finding. Thus, the ALJ properly relied on the grids to determine 

the existence of substantial gainful work which Riedle could 

perform. 

IV. 

As her third argument, Riedle contends that the ALJ did not 

properly consider her complaints of pain. This court has set 

forth a three-step approach for evaluating pain. Luna v. Bowen, 

834 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1987). First, the claimant must have 

an objective medical impairment capable of producing pain. 

Second, there must be a loose nexus between the impairment and the 

alleged pain. Finally, considering all the evidence, the ALJ must 

assess the credibility of the claimant. 

In this case, the ALJ evaluated Riedle's complaints of pain 

in accordance with the foregoing framework. 2 The ALJ resolved the 

pain question at the third prong of the analysis concluding that 

2 The ALJ, in evaluating Riedle's complaints of pain, did not 

cite Luna. However, the ALJ, in his opinion, did state that he 

evaluated Riedle's pain in accordance with Social Security Ruling 

88-13. This ruling is fully consistent with Luna. 

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Riedle's complaints of pain were not credible. The only issue we 

need address is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's 

finding on Riedle's credibility. See,~, Talley v. Sullivan, 

908 F.2d 585, 586-87 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Riedle contends that the ALJ erroneously relied on her 

failure to take pain medication as indicating that her complaints 

of pain were not credible. According to Riedle, evidence 

presented to the ALJ established that she did not take pain 

medication because of severe side effects. See Frey v. Bowen, 816 

F.2d 508, 517 (10th Cir. 1987)(determination of disability cannot 

be precluded by claimant's failure to take pain medication when 

unrefuted testimony indicated that pain medication was 

"contraindicated because of the side effect of stomach 

irritation"). However, the ALJ also treated Riedle's complaints 

of pain as not credible because she did not see her physician more 

than once every six months. See Rec. Vol. II at 12. Moreover, 

Riedle's complaints of pain are contradicted by evidence of her 

activities in the record which included shopping, housework, 

running errands, and going to the library. Id. at 54, 224-25, 

227, 237. In our view, the evidence of Riedle's infrequent visits 

to her physician and her activities is sufficient to support the 

ALJ's determination that she does not suffer disabling pain. See 

Talley, 908 F.2d at 587; Luna, 834 F.2d at 165-66; . 

v. 

As her fourth argument on appeal, Riedle contends that the 

ALJ's decision that she could perform sedentary work is not 

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supported by substantial evidence. However, the only specific 

evidence cited by Riedle to undermine the ALJ's conclusion is 

evidence which was considered in the May 16, 1988 denial of 

benefits. As indicated above, this evidence is barred from 

consideration. See Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1200 (8th 

Cir. 1987)(ALJ could not reevaluate evidence from a 

determination). 

prior 

In connection with her fourth argument, Riedle also cites 20 

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(h), which provides in 

pertinent part as follows: 

[A] finding of disabled is not precluded for those 

individuals under age 45 who do not meet all the 

criteria of a specific rule and who do not have the 

ability to perform a full range of sedentary work. The 

following examples are illustrative: ... Example 2: 

An illiterate 41 year old individual with mild mental 

retardation (IQ of 78) is restricted to unskilled 

sedentary work and cannot perform vocationally relevant 

past work, which had consisted of unskilled agricultural 

field work; his or her particular characteristics do not 

specifically meet any of the rules in Appendix 2, 

because this individual cannot perform the full range of 

work defined as sedentary. In light of the adverse 

factors which further narrow the range of sedentary work 

for which this individual is qualified, a finding of 

disabled is appropriate. 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(h). Apparently, 

Riedle believes that even if she could perform sedentary work, she 

still fits the above description and a finding of disabled is, 

therefore, compelled. 

However, Riedle fails to match the example in two critical 

ways. First, the record contains no evidence that Riedle is 

illiterate. 3 Indeed, Riedle testified in English at the hearing 

3 Illiteracy is defined in the regulations as: " ... the 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-7087 Document: 010110129478 Date Filed: 07/25/1991 Page: 8 
before the ALJ. Moreover, Riedle stated in her disability report 

that her hobby was reading magazines and newspapers, see Rec. Vol. 

II at 226, 237, and she testified before the ALJ that she paid all 

her bills, see id. at 54. Second, the record indicates that 

Riedle's past work as a nurse's aid, hospital housekeeper, and 

central supply ward clerk is semi-skilled work. See id. at 65 

(testimony of vocational expert). This work is distinguishable 

from the unskilled work of the claimant in the example. 

Therefore, because Riedle fails to match the example in two 

critical respects, a finding of disabled is not required by the 

regulations. 

VI. 

As her final argument on appeal, Riedle contends that the ALJ 

improperly rejected the opinions of her treating physicians. 

However, the only medical opinion relied on by Riedle that is not 

barred from consideration by res judicata is a medical report from 

Dr. Leroy M. Milton dated June 16, 1988. Riedle specifically 

cites to the following statement in Dr. Milton's report as a 

medical opinion which the ALJ improperly rejected: " [Riedle] is 

not able to participate in activities requiring prolonged 

standing, bending, stooping or lifting." Id. at 320. 

An ALJ is required to give substantial weight to the opinion 

evidence of treating physicians, unless good cause is shown to the 

(continued from previous page) 

inability to read or write. We consider someone illiterate if the 

person cannot read or write a simple message such as instructions 

or inventory lists even though the person can sign his or her 

(continued on next page) 

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contrary, Bernal, 851 F.2d at 301. In this case, the ALJ, 

contrary to Riedle's assertion, did not reject Dr. Milton's 

analysis of her ability to engage in prolonged standing, bending, 

or lifting. Instead, the ALJ, in finding that Riedle could 

perform a full range of sedentary work, also explicitly found that 

Riedle could not "stand or walk for prolonged periods of time or 

repetitively bend, stoop or squat." Rec. Vol. II at 13. The 

ALJ's conclusions that Riedle could engage in sedentary work and 

yet not engage in prolonged standing, walking, or bending were not 

inconsistent. 4 Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the 

ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Dr. Milton. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

(continued from previous page) 

name. Generally, an illiterate is a person who has had little or 

no formal schooling." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(l). 

4 Sedentary work is defined in the regulations as: 

[involving) lifting no more then 10 pounds at a time and 

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket 

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary 

job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain 

amount of walking and standing is often necessary to 

carry out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and 

standing are required occasionally and other sedentary 

criteria are met. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). 

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