Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02991/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02991-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
AutoNation, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
Village Motors, LLC
Petitioner

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 14-2991 & 14-3361 

AUTONATION, INC., and VILLAGE MOTORS, LLC, 

Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, 

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. 

____________________ 

Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of a Decision and Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board. 

No. 13-CA-063676 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 21, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 4, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges. 

WOOD, Chief Judge. Union activity was afoot at Libertyville Toyota late in the summer of 2011. When rumors to 

this effect reached it, Libertyville’s owner, a company called 

AutoNation, held a series of meetings with the affected staff. 

An employee surreptitiously recorded the last of these meetings, a lengthy affair conducted largely by two AutoNation 

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2 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

executives. Around the same time, Libertyville suspended 

one of its employees, an automotive painter named Jose 

Huerta. The dealership’s manager had received an anonymous voicemail accusing Huerta of promoting the union 

cause and of receiving a charge of driving under the influence. Once suspended, Huerta did not return to Libertyville. 

It ultimately fired him, but the parties disagree on when that 

happened and for what reasons. Both sides concur, however, 

that Huerta received a computer-generated letter from a 

third party vendor to AutoNation indicating that Huerta’s 

employment would not be continued. 

A local chapter of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union) filed charges 

against AutoNation and Village Motors, LLC (which did 

business as Libertyville Toyota—we refer to them in the singular as AutoNation) with the National Labor Relations 

Board in 2011. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded 

that certain comments by the AutoNation executives at the 

recorded meeting violated the National Labor Relations Act 

(the Act) in multiple ways. He did not, however, uphold the 

accusation that AutoNation had unlawfully suspended and 

discharged Huerta because of his union activity. A threemember panel of the Board, with one member dissenting on 

two points, affirmed the judge’s conclusions about the meeting but reversed as to Huerta’s discharge. AutoNation has 

filed a petition for review of the Board’s rulings, and the 

Board has cross-applied for enforcement. Although we do 

not endorse all of the Board’s language in its opinion, we 

conclude that substantial evidence supports its findings and 

that its decision is entitled to enforcement. 

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Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 3

I 

Libertyville Toyota is a 140-employee car dealership in 

the Village of Libertyville, Illinois. Its service department has 

80 employees engaged in tasks such as fixing vehicles, painting them, and performing shipping and receiving. In August 

2011, dealership management learned of discussions among 

technicians about unionizing. Not long afterward, Libertyville’s general manager, Taso Theodorou, held a few brief 

meetings with workers in the service department to discuss 

the topic of unionization. On August 23, two members of 

AutoNation’s corporate team joined Theodorou for another 

such meeting. We know what was said at this last meeting 

because a dealership employee secretly recorded it; the tape 

was subsequently transcribed; and the ALJ relied on it. 

Theodorou opened the August 23 meeting and then 

turned it over to AutoNation vice president and associate 

general counsel Brian Davis. Davis was joined by Jonathan 

Andrews, one of the company’s regional human resources 

directors. The transcript of the discussion among these men 

and the dealership’s workers runs 111 pages; we focus here 

on those excerpts that concerned the Board and that are pertinent to the petitions before us. 

On the same day as the meeting among Davis, Andrews, 

Theodorou, and the Libertyville employees, Theodorou received a voicemail at the dealership. The caller stated that 

she was “calling on behalf of the spouse of one of your employees,” but she refused to identify herself because her 

husband was “afraid that if they find out that we’re the ones 

who said anything, that they will retaliate.” The caller accused two employees, Jose Huerta and Hermenegildo Tellez, 

of “trying to stir up this whole union and create issues.” 

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4 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

Tellez and Huerta were having arguments with other employees, she said, and worse, they had “questionable” moral 

standards. In particular, she noted that Huerta “doesn’t even 

have a license” and “had a DUI.” The caller finished by 

opining that the situation with Huerta and Tellez was “definitely something that needs to be addressed.” 

After receiving the voicemail, Theodorou contacted Andrews to acquire a motor vehicle report on Huerta. When it 

arrived, the report showed that Huerta had a suspended 

driver’s license. This was a problem, because Huerta was 

classified as a driving employee at Libertyville. He had 

signed copies of a dealership policy that required employees 

both to possess a valid license and to inform superiors of 

changes to their driving privileges. Davis admitted that Theodorou consulted him on how to proceed with Huerta. The 

ALJ found that Davis “advised Theodorou how to proceed, 

with a view toward protecting both Huerta and the Company.” Theodorou told Huerta’s immediate supervisor, service 

department director David Borre, to suspend Huerta. On 

August 26, 2011, Borre called Huerta in for a meeting during 

which Huerta admitted that he had received the DUI charge 

and that his driver’s license was suspended. Borre told Huerta he was suspended until September 14 and asked him “to 

try to get his driver’s license situation corrected.” (Huerta’s 

court hearing on his DUI charge was scheduled for September 13.) 

One day after meeting with Borre, Huerta received a letter signed “2280-Libertyville Toyota.” The letter informed 

Huerta “that information contained in a consumer report, if 

accurate, would prevent 2280-Libertyville Toyota from extending an employment offer, continuing your current emCase: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19
Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 5

ployment or granting a promotion to you at this time” (emphasis added). The letter, dated August 25, 2011, invited 

Huerta to “contact Sterling within 5 business days” if he 

thought the attached background screening report was inaccurate. Although the letter itself gave no indication of who 

“Sterling” was, the attached report indicated that it had been 

prepared by a company called Sterling Infosystems. AutoNation contracted with Sterling to furnish motor vehicle reports on its employees, and Sterling automatically sent a letter when it found an adverse notation in an employee’s driving record. On September 3, Huerta received another letter 

(dated September 1), also signed by “2280-Libertyville Toyota” but prepared by Sterling. This letter told Huerta “that an 

offer of employment, a continuation of current employment or 

the granting of a promotion will not be made at this time” (emphasis added). Not long after receiving this letter, Huerta 

applied for unemployment benefits with the State of Illinois. 

The Illinois Department of Employment Security promptly 

informed AutoNation about Huerta’s filing, and Theodorou 

responded that Huerta had been suspended and not terminated. (There is no indication that he ever passed this news 

along to Huerta.) Huerta did not return to work, and Theodorou sacked him on September 21 for “job abandonment.” 

At the end of August 2011, the Union filed an unfair labor charge against AutoNation with the Board alleging that 

Libertyville had suspended Huerta because of his union activity. Three months later, the Union amended this charge to 

add a claim about Huerta’s firing and to raise several new 

unfair labor claims against AutoNation. In December 2011, 

the Board’s general counsel filed a complaint against Village 

Motors (later adding AutoNation) raising claims about AutoNation employees’ statements at the August 23, 2011, 

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6 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

meeting and about Huerta’s suspension and firing. An ALJ 

agreed that comments by Davis and Andrews violated the 

Act in multiple ways: (1) threatening that unionizing would 

be futile; (2) threatening demotion of unionizing employees; 

(3) threatening blacklisting of union supporters; and (4) impliedly promising salary increases if dealership employees 

did not vote in the union. The judge decided, however, that 

AutoNation had not committed an unfair labor practice in 

either firing or suspending Huerta. 

After both the Board’s general counsel and AutoNation 

filed exceptions to the judge’s ruling, a three-member panel 

of the Board issued its decision. The Board affirmed the 

ALJ’s findings that the AutoNation employees’ comments at 

the August 23 meeting were unfair labor practices and that 

Huerta’s suspension was not; it reversed the judge’s finding 

on Huerta’s discharge. One member of the panel dissented 

because he did not agree that AutoNation had made an implied promise of wage increases or that it had violated the 

Act by discharging Huerta. 

AutoNation filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision in September 2014. One month later, the Board filed a 

cross-application for enforcement of the panel’s order. We 

have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). 

II 

We begin with the heart of the case: the Board’s finding 

that AutoNation and Village Motors violated Section 8(a)(1) 

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), in four ways. The Act makes 

it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, 

restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their guaranteed rights to organize and bargain collectively. We apply 

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Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 7

a deferential standard of review to the Board’s findings, 

looking only to see whether they are supported by substantial evidence. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). This means “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusions of the Board.” NLRB v. 

Teamsters Gen. Local Union No. 200, 723 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 

2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our “task is not to 

reweigh the evidence; it is only to determine whether there 

is evidence in the record supporting the Board’s outcome 

that could satisfy a reasonable fact finder.” NLRB v. KSM Indus., Inc., 682 F.3d 537, 543–44 (7th Cir. 2012). We review the 

Board’s applications of the law to the facts and its interpretations of the Act deferentially as well, taking care to ensure 

that “its legal conclusions have a reasonable basis in law.” 

Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). 

The Board first determined that Davis through his comments at the August 23 meeting implicitly conveyed the 

message that it would be futile for the Libertyville employees to unionize. It supported that conclusion with substantial 

evidence. At one point shortly after the start of the meeting, 

an employee asked whether every technician at the dealership would get to vote on unionization. This prompted Davis to launch into a lengthy monologue about unionizing in 

general, in which he warned the employees to be “very careful” when listening to the union’s “sales pitch.” Davis continued: “[I]n many cases, when you enter these negotiations, 

if you ever get there, employees tend to lose things. Okay?” 

He went on to describe potential negotiations as “a wide 

open game of uncertainty” in which “nothing is guaranteed 

even if you win the election. All right?” Later in the meeting, 

an employee asked if the wage for the dealership’s workers 

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8 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

would be less than $10.50 per hour if they unionized. Davis’s 

response: “It’s possible. ... [W]hen I say that we sit down 

and we start from scratch, we start from scratch. We don’t 

start with what you guys are making today. Everything goes 

to zero.” Later still, Davis told the employees about “your 

brothers and sisters from other dealerships who deal with 

[union issues] on a daily basis,” describing in particular a 

unionized workplace at an Orlando AutoNation dealership. 

There, Davis said, the unionized employees “have been living that nightmare for almost three years now with not one 

bargaining session, not one contract negotiation.” 

It was reasonable for the Board to conclude that Davis’s 

message was that unionizing would cut off hope of negotiating for better working conditions, or, put otherwise, that it 

would be futile. As AutoNation points out, Davis said later 

in the meeting that if the workers were to unionize, “eventually the bargaining process will begin.” But he promptly 

threw cold water on that thought by telling the employees 

that “[t]he bargaining process is—is never automatic” and 

that the workers “may never see ... in your lifetime at the 

dealership” benefits that they think they “may be entitled 

to.” Davis drove this point home with his allusion to the 

hardships that befell AutoNation workers in Orlando. AutoNation concedes that it held no negotiations with a unionized group of its employees in Orlando. But it attempts to 

turn this fact to its advantage by arguing that “truthful” examples of activity elsewhere simply illustrate the advantages 

and disadvantages of collective bargaining. That may be one 

reading, but another is that Davis’s “truthful” example—

indeed, the only example he offered—was an implied threat. 

The workers in Davis’s example were AutoNation employees, not characters from a morality play about the pitfalls of 

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Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 9

unionizing. And the Orlando example must be read in connection with the other two comments. Together, they supported a reasonable inference that Davis was telling the Libertyville employees that unionizing would likely not produce the benefits they were seeking. 

The Board concluded next that Davis and Andrews made 

implied promises of wage increases to deter workers from 

supporting the Union. During the meeting, Theodorou had 

read aloud a question a worker had submitted previously on 

the topic of worker pay. The worker wanted to know if it was 

“possible without voting the union into the dealership that 

the dealers’ [sic] current pay plan can be evaluated or updated more for progressing technicians whose current pay plan 

has a low pay ceiling.” Andrews responded that such a thing 

was “absolutely possible,” then added, “it’s something we 

try to do every year,” and that “the first thing we need to 

do” is to “look at that.” Later, Davis said that “if we’re not 

being fair or we’re not being competitive to what you guys 

could get on the open marketplace on your own, I think 

there would be a definite willingness to consider making adjustments for those of you who are negatively impacted by 

that,” adding, “we want a chance to address them [your concerns] before you pay somebody else to address them.” 

Although not everyone would understand these comments as implicitly interfering with the unionization effort 

or coercing employees, that is one interpretation, and the 

Board was authorized to adopt it. AutoNation contends that 

the statements were merely conditional, and that the Board’s 

view leaves employers in the bind of not even being able to 

answer “maybe” when employees ask whether they will get 

a raise without a union. Yet AutoNation fails to acknowledge 

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10 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

the context that convinced the Board that these comments 

were implied promises. As we have noted, Davis said elsewhere in the meeting that the dealership’s employees would 

probably not get to negotiate for better pay if they chose to 

bargain collectively. Yet when an employee asked whether 

better pay was possible without unionizing, Andrews’s response was overwhelmingly positive. The Board reasonably 

saw Davis’s subsequent comment (that he and Andrews 

wanted to address the employees’ concerns about pay “before you pay somebody else”—the “somebody else” clearly 

referring to the Union) as a direct link between helping the 

employees and their rejection of the Union. The contrast, the 

Board thought, was sharp enough to imply to dealership 

workers that unionizing or not unionizing could mean the 

difference in positive consideration of a pay increase. As we 

said long ago, such implied promises “have a tendency to 

discourage employees from joining a union or engaging in 

union activities.” NLRB v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, Inc., 

542 F.2d 691, 700 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Beverly Enters., Inc. 

v. NLRB, 139 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A finding of an actual or express promise is not necessary as an implied promise can suffice to establish the necessary element of an unfair 

labor practice.”). 

The Board’s third conclusion was that Davis threatened 

the dealership’s workers with demotions if they chose to 

pursue union activities. A worker asked whether the employees would “get demoted if we become a union shop.” 

Davis first responded “I don’t know,” explaining that there 

was no way to predict the result of theoretical future negotiations with the union. An employee then surmised that under union rules, those workers who are not “journeymen” 

would be “dropped down or demoted” to “apprentice” staCase: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19
Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 11

tus. Davis responded, “That’s exactly how it would be negotiated.” Andrews appeared to cut Davis off and attempt to 

qualify this statement by telling the workers, “That’s how a 

lot of them are.” Davis then said, “[Y]ou need that structure. 

If not that identical structure, something similar to that 

would be negotiated ... .” 

The Board’s finding that Davis threatened the workers 

with demotions reflected a permissible view of this evidence. His comments reasonably can be viewed as promising demotion for certain workers (those classified as journeymen) if the employees voted for the union. AutoNation 

argues that Davis and Andrews never guaranteed that an 

apprentice/journeyman classification system would be part 

of any eventual collective bargaining agreement between 

AutoNation and the union. It also argues that the apprentice/journeyman distinction was suggested by an employee, 

not by Davis or Andrews. Yet this is what the employee in 

question asked: “[I]sn’t it also true that in the union, you 

have basically apprentices and journeymen?” Davis responded, “Yeah, that’s basically how it works.” Thus Davis 

more or less confirmed the employee’s assumption that the 

union had exactly this system. The fact that Davis did so after Andrews injected some ambiguity into the discussion 

provides further support for the Board’s conclusion. 

Finally, the Board affirmed in a footnote the conclusion of 

the ALJ that AutoNation threatened employees with blacklisting if they supported the union. Toward the end of the 

meeting, Davis responded to an employee who asked if unionization of the Libertyville dealership would be “something that’s going to follow you through your lifetime if you 

transfer to another store.” Davis began inauspiciously by 

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12 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

telling the workers that “[t]he union will tell me that I’m 

threatening you by bringing this up. The bottom line is, 

that’s the reality.” He then said that other employers would 

likely be suspicious of job applicants who had worked in union shops, and that such employers could “be inclined to 

pass on you ... because of that badge or that scarlet letter” of 

prior union membership, or even having “gone through” a 

campaign to enter a workplace that the union loses. The employee followed up by asking if “certain people’s careers 

may be affected by this.” Davis responded, “Absolutely.” 

The Board’s finding that these comments amounted to a 

threat of blacklisting, far from being unreasonable, strikes us 

as the most natural understanding. Davis’s statements were 

fairly unequivocal. He also told the workers, for example, 

that “[e]mployers don’t want unions in their shops. ...

[T]hey’re going to think twice about hiring you, even if they 

think you’re a superstar. ... If you commit yourself to [union 

representation], you’ve got to commit yourself to all of it, including those consequences.” AutoNation’s argument to the 

contrary turns on a distinction between threatening to blacklist employees for their union activity and warning of the 

“possible negative outcome” that other companies may not 

hire them for the same reason. That hair-splitting reading, 

however, was far from the only reasonable one. The ALJ addressed this criticism in noting that although Davis did not 

directly threaten anyone, he described the dim future career 

problems for unionized AutoNation employees as a certainty, not a possibility. 

AutoNation’s fixation on what it depicts as the tentative 

or merely factual nature of Davis’s comments fails to take 

into account the applicable standard of review. The Act is 

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Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 13

especially concerned with the economic power that an employer has over employees. The underlying message of Section 8(a)(1) is that an employer such as AutoNation needs to 

take care in the rhetoric it uses when discussing union issues 

with its workers. The standard of review makes irrelevant 

the question whether an employer’s comments might have 

been viewed in a manner different from the way the Board 

understood them. We have often remarked on our deference 

to “the Board’s expertise in matters of labor relations.” See, 

e.g., Lineback v. Spurlino Materials, LLC, 546 F.3d 491, 502 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We need evaluate only whether substantial evidence supported the 

Board’s finding—here, that Davis and Andrews’s comments 

left the dealership’s employees with the impression that they 

would experience a series of setbacks if they chose to vote 

for the Union. It was reasonable to believe that management’s comments produced this impression. We therefore 

conclude that the Board’s decision that the comments of Davis and Andrews at the August 23, 2011, meeting violated 

Section 8(a)(1) of the Act must be enforced.

III 

The remaining question is whether the Board’s decision 

that AutoNation fired former dealership employee Jose 

Huerta because of his union activity is also entitled to enforcement. The Board concluded that Huerta’s termination 

violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. The latter 

provision forbids “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure 

of employment or any term or condition of employment to 

encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). AutoNation’s challenge to this 

finding was the only point it addressed at oral argument. It 

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14 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

contends that the Board misconstrued its own test for determining whether an employer’s action violated Section 

8(a)(3). Although there are isolated bits of language in the 

Board’s opinion that could be clearer, we conclude that taken 

as a whole the Board applied the correct legal standard and 

that substantial evidence supported its conclusion. 

In order to assert a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 8(a)(3), there must first be a “showing sufficient 

to support the inference that protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer's decision.” Wright Line, 

251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980); see also Teamsters Gen. Local 

Union No. 200, 723 F.3d at 786. There must be “a causal connection between the animus and the implementation of the 

adverse employment action.” See, e.g., Huck Store Fixture Co. 

v. NLRB, 327 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 2003); Carry Cos. of Ill., 

Inc. v. NLRB, 30 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 1994). Once the Board 

makes such a showing, the burden under Wright Line “shifts 

to the employer to prove that it had a legitimate business 

reason for making its decision.” Loparex, LLC v. NLRB, 

591 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). At each step, the Board may 

rely upon circumstantial evidence. Id. 

In this case, the Board said that the elements required to 

support a showing that an employee’s union activity was a 

“motivating factor” for an adverse employment action are 

“[1] union or protected concerted activity, [2] employer 

knowledge of that activity, and [3] union animus on the part 

of the employer.” The confusion on which AutoNation has 

seized comes from footnote 10 in the Board’s opinion, where 

it said that Wright Line “does not require the General Counsel to make some additional showing of particularized motivating animus towards the employee’s own protected activiCase: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19
Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 15

ty or to further demonstrate some additional, undefined 

‘nexus’ between the employee’s protected activity and the 

adverse action.” The Board then found “that Huerta’s union 

activity was a motivating factor in his discharge,” citing two 

reasons: first, that comments by Andrews and Davis at the 

August 23 meeting established AutoNation’s anti-union animus, and second that AutoNation’s proffered reason for firing Huerta was pretextual. 

AutoNation contends that the Board misconstrued its 

own Wright Line test in finding that anti-union animus motivated the termination decision. This court has held, correctly 

in AutoNation’s view, that there must be a showing of a 

causal connection between the employer’s anti-union animus 

and the specific adverse employment action on the part of 

the decisionmaker. We have no quarrel with that abstract 

proposition. See also Nichols Aluminum, LLC v. NLRB, Nos. 

14-3001, 14-3202, 2015 WL 4760303, at *5 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 

2015). Where we part company with AutoNation is with its 

insistence that the Board failed to find that precisely this 

causal connection existed here, or that any such finding was 

not supported by substantial evidence. 

The rule that union activities must motivate a particular 

adverse employment action in order to make out a Section 

8(a)(3) violation is well established; an abstract dislike of unions is insufficient. What the Board was saying in footnote 10 

was that there was no need to prove additional animus beyond whatever animus lay behind the contested action. 

Thus, for example, if the company took the position that it 

would fire all union organizers, and then it fired Union Organizer A, there would be no need to show that it had an extra grudge against A related to union activity. In that examCase: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19
16 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

ple, there is a clear nexus between the employer’s anti-union 

animus and the particular action it took. 

Even if one thought that evidence of additional particularized animus is necessary in every case, the result here 

would be the same. The Board pointed to circumstantial evidence that AutoNation’s anti-union views played a central 

role in its decision to fire Huerta. This evidence began with 

the anonymous voicemail to Theodorou singling out Huerta 

for his pro-union activity and then accusing him of bad moral character because of his driving infraction. This call 

prompted Theodorou to act against Huerta. AutoNation argues repeatedly that Theodorou himself betrayed no antiunion animus, but that fails to take account of the whole story. The Board analyzed in detail Davis’s comments at the 

August 23 meeting; it was well within its rights to conclude 

that Davis displayed his hostility toward union activity at 

this particular dealership, activity of which Huerta was an 

essential part. If Davis had not been involved, perhaps this 

would be a different case. But as Theodorou’s consultation 

with Davis on the Huerta matter shows, Davis was Theodorou’s superior—a person Theodorou turned to before 

taking adverse action against Huerta, whom Theodorou 

knew from the voicemail to be involved in union activity. 

The Board was not required to accept AutoNation’s position 

that Theodorou’s action to terminate Huerta was untainted 

by Davis’s anti-union bias. Davis’s involvement and the nature of the initial accusation against Huerta were such that 

we cannot disturb as unreasonable the Board’s finding that 

Huerta’s “protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the 

employer's decision.” Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. The 

Board also found that the pretextual nature of Theodorou’s 

termination of Huerta established animus; we likewise deCase: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19
Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 17

cline to disturb this conclusion, as we will discuss momentarily. See Suburban Elec. Eng’rs/Contractors, Inc., 351 NLRB 1, 

5 (2007) (“It is axiomatic that findings of antiunion animus 

and discriminatory motive may be predicated on pretextual 

reasons advanced for a personnel action.”). 

Despite its discourse on the Wright Line factors in footnote 10 of its decision, the Board referred repeatedly in the 

text of its opinion to the correct “motivating factor” requirement of Wright Line. It opened its analysis of AutoNation’s actions toward Huerta by stating that under Wright 

Line “the General Counsel must prove that an employee’s 

union or other protected activity was a motivating factor in the 

employer’s action against the employee” (emphasis added). It 

later found that “the General Counsel met his burden of 

showing that Huerta’s union activity was a motivating factor 

in his discharge” (emphasis again added). To the extent that 

the footnote may have deviated from Wright Line or introduced imprecision, that is regrettable but not fatal to the 

outcome in this case. We have no need to wade into an intramural dispute between Board members if it makes no difference to the outcome. 

The next question that we must address is whether, applying Wright Line, substantial evidence supported the 

Board’s finding that AutoNation’s proffered reason for discharging Huerta was pretextual. AutoNation asserted that 

Huerta was fired for “job abandonment” when it terminated 

his employment on September 21, 2011. The Board thought 

this was pretext given the events that led Huerta reasonably 

to believe that he had been fired before that date. Huerta 

understood that he had been fired no later than September 3, 

when he received the second letter prepared by Sterling on 

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18 Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 

behalf of Libertyville Toyota (whose name appeared in the 

signature block). The letter said that “a continuation of current employment ... will not be made at this time.” This is 

not an exemplar of clear prose, but it is not surprising that 

an auto technician understood it to mean that Libertyville 

(the signer of the letter and the only entity for which he 

worked) had fired him as of “this time.” The fact that Huerta 

applied for unemployment benefits right after he received 

that letter and stated in the application that he had been discharged is also good evidence that Huerta thought he no 

longer had his job. There was reason to believe that AutoNation, through Theodorou and Davis, knew of Huerta’s filing, 

as the State of Illinois contacted it to inquire about that 

claim. “Thus, before terminating Huerta on September 21 

(effective September 15) purportedly for abandoning his 

job,” the Board found, “the Respondent knew that Huerta 

believed he had already been discharged, and the Respondent should have known why.” 

Substantial evidence supports this finding. AutoNation’s 

argument to the contrary does not undermine the Board’s 

reasoning. AutoNation insists that Theodorou could not 

have known about Huerta’s belief that he was fired because 

Theodorou was not aware of the Sterling letters. This ignores 

the fact that Theodorou did know that Huerta had filed for 

unemployment, a fairly obvious indicator of Huerta’s 

thoughts on whether he still had a job. This fact was central 

to the Board’s finding: it stated that even if Theodorou did 

not know of the Sterling letters, he knew of Huerta’s unemployment claim. It was therefore reasonable for the Board to 

find that Theodorou’s subsequent firing of Huerta for “job 

abandonment” was pretextual. One does not abandon a job 

from which he already has been fired. 

Case: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19
Nos. 14-2991, 14-3361 19

Finally, AutoNation challenges the remedy of reinstatement and back pay that the Board awarded to Huerta. This is 

because, AutoNation argues, “it is uncontested that [Huerta] 

would have been discharged for legitimate reasons.” Nothing in the record supports such a flat assertion. AutoNation’s 

argument is based on the fact that Huerta’s failure to obtain 

a valid driver’s license by the time he lost his job would inevitably have resulted in his firing. That is not so clear. If Huerta had not thought he was already out of work, he may have 

prevailed at his September 13 hearing to the extent of having 

even a limited driver’s license for work purposes. The record 

also does not show how consistently AutoNation fired people who had a temporary problem with their license. Our 

consideration of this point is hampered by the fact that the 

parties did not develop the argument. It may, however, be 

raised at the compliance stage, as recommended in a case on 

which AutoNation is relying. See Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs. 

for Youth, 333 N.L.R.B. 367, 367 (2001) (leaving issue of reinstatement and back pay to compliance hearing, where respondent “will have the burden of establishing that [an employee] engaged in misconduct for which it would have discharged any employee”). 

IV 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the findings of the Board that AutoNation challenges here: that its 

comments through Davis and Andrews at the August 23, 

2011, meeting violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that 

Huerta’s termination violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1). We 

therefore ENFORCE the decision of the Board. 

Case: 14-2991 Document: 49 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 19