Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-03007/USCOURTS-ca10-96-03007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricky L. Hampshire
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

llnitecl States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

SEP 11 1996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

RICKY L. HAMPSHIRE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 96-3007 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 95-CR-10026) 

Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. Phillips, Federal Public 

Defender, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

DavidS. Kris, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jackie N. 

Williams, United States Attorney, and Brian R. Johnson, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, Wichita, Kansas), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before KELLY, LOGAN and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Ricky L. Hampshire entered a conditional plea of guilty based 

upon the failure to pay child support obligations in violation of the Child Support 

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 1 
Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 228, after the district court rejected his 

challenges to the CSRA and its application. See United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp 

1327 (D. Kan. 1995). He was sentenced to two years' probation and ordered to pay 

$38,804 in restitution. He now challenges his conviction on the basis that (1) the CSRA 

violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment; (2) the state court order upon 

which his federal conviction is predicated violates his rights under both the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 

("SSCRA"); and (3) the order of restitution, which includes amounts of child support 

incurred prior to the enactment of the CSRA, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. We 

exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S. C. § 3742(a), and affirm. 

Back &round 

In September 1985, Defendant Ricky Hampshire went "absent without leave" 

("AWOL") from the military. In October 1985, his wife filed for divorce in Kansas. In 

November 1985, Mr. Hampshire was apprehended, held in a civilian jail pending transfer 

to military custody, and served with a summons to answer the divorce petition. He never 

responded. The court granted the divorce, awarded custody to the mother of the couple's 

two children and ordered Mr. Hampshire to pay $350 per month in child support. After 

his release from military prison, Mr. Hampshire moved from Kansas to New Mexico, 

refused to make any payments and eventually was charged with violating the CSRA. 

- 2-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 2 
Discussion 

I. Commerce Clause 

We review de novo challenges to the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. 

Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 398 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996). The 

Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate 

Commerce ... among the several States .... " U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "A court may 

invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is 

no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate 

commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means 

selected and the asserted ends." Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 

U.S. 742,754 (1982) (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,323-24 (1981)). 

The CSRA makes it a federal criminal offense for a person to "willfully fail[] to 

pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State." 18 

U.S.C. § 228(a). "Past due support obligation" is defined as "any amount determined 

under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State 

to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child ... that has remained 

unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000." 18 U.S.C. § 

228(d)(1). 

The constitutionality of the CSRA presents a question of first impression in this 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 3 
circuit. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate three aspects of interstate 

commerce: (1) "the use ofthe channels of interstate commerce[;]" (2) "the 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce[;]" 

and (3) activities that have a substantial relation to or substantially affect interstate 

commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995); see also Perez v. 

United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). In Lopez, relied upon in large part by Mr. 

Hampshire, the Court struck down 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), part ofthe Gun-Free School Zones 

Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"), which made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly 

to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to 

believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). In Lopez, the Court dismissed as 

inapplicable the first two categories of permissible interstate commerce regulation and 

held that § 922( q) failed to satisfy the prerequisites of the third category because it 

regulated an activity that did not "substantially affect[] interstate commerce." 115 S. Ct. 

at 1630-31. Of particular importance to the Court's analysis was the fact that§ 922(q) 

was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of 

economic enterprise" and "contain[ ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure ... 

that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce." ld.. 

The Second Circuit recently held that the CSRA was a proper exercise of 

Congress's power to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 

because the Act "regulates the flow of payments on unfulfilled child support orders where 

- 4-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 4 
the child and parent reside in separate States." United States v. Sa~e, 1996 WL 450640, 

*7 (2d Cir. 1996). Because the CSRA "addresses an obligation to make payments in 

interstate commerce," it regulates more than local activity and is constitutional. ld. The 

Ninth Circuit also recently upheld the CSRA on a similar rationale: 

The obligation of a parent in one state to provide support for a child in a 

different state is an obligation to be met by a payment that will normally 

move in interstate commerce--by mail, by wire, or by the electronic transfer 

of funds. That obligation is, therefore, a thing in interstate commerce and 

falls within the power of Congress to regulate. The frustration of 

satisfaction of the obligation by the failure of the debtors to pay is an 

impediment to interstate commerce that Congress can criminalize ... 

United States v. Mussari, 1996 WL 499163, *3 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Numerous district courts have addressed the constitutionality of the CSRA. 

Several have found it to be constitutional. See United States v. Ganaposki, 1996 WL 

376351 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302 

(S.D.N.Y.1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y.1996) {opinion 

by magistrate judge); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Fla.1996) 

(opinion by magistrate judge); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn.1995), 

affd, 1996 WL 450640 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. 

Ind.1995) (opinion by magistrate judge); Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327. These courts 

generally upheld the constitutionality ofthe CSRA on the basis that (1) nonpayment of 

child support involves payment of a debt and therefore constitutes economic activity or 

commerce, Ganaposki, 1996 WL 376351, *7; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 310-11; (2) 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 5 
nonpayment of child support in the aggregate has a substantial impact on commerce, 

Ganaposki, 1996 WL 376351, *7; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 311-12, ~, 906 F. Supp. at 

90; Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329-30; and (3) the CSRA's requirement that the 

delinquent parent and child reside in two different states constitutes the jurisdictional 

requirement of an interstate nexus ensuring that the federal government will not intrude 

upon matters with no relation to interstate commerce, ~' 906 F. Supp. at 91-92; 

Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330. 

By contrast, several other district courts have held the CSRA unconstitutional. ~ 

United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.l995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. 

Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex.l995); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 

reconsideration denied by, 912 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 1996 WL 499163 

(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, reconsideration denied by, 

912 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 1996 WL 499163 (9th Cir. 1996). These courts 

struck down the CSRA on the basis that (1) nonpayment of child support fails to 

constitute an activity that substantially affects commerce or bears a substantial 

relationship to commerce, Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 840-41; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 

365-66; Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1255-56; (2) the CSRA's requirement that the 

delinquent parent and child reside in two different states does not satisfy the 

constitutionally required jurisdictional requirement of an interstate nexus because the 

delinquent parent often does not involve himself in any interstate activity that 

- 6-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 6 
constitutionally confers jurisdiction, Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 842-43; Mussari, 912 F. 

Supp. at 1251-52; (3) nonpayment of child support inherently is a state criminal issue in 

which intervention by the federal government violates notions of comity and federalism, 

Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367-68; and (4) the definitional 

requirements of the CSRA force federal courts to interpret and possibly modify state 

court ordered decrees, Schroeder, 912 F. Supp. at 1246; Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1254-

55; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367-68. 

In this case, Mr. Hampshire argues that Congress exceeded its authority under the 

Commerce Clause because the CSRA: (1) regulates an activity that neither constitutes 

nor involves commerce; (2) lacks the prerequisite interstate nexus sufficient to confer 

federal jurisdiction: (3) is overbroad; and ( 4) represents an unconstitutional foray by the 

federal government into domestic relations, a power traditionally reserved to states. The 

government responds that the CSRA: ( 1) regulates both the channels of interstate 

commerce as well as an economic activity bearing a substantial relation to interstate 

commerce, and (2) requires that the delinquent parent reside in a different state from the 

child, thus fulfilling the jurisdictional prerequisite of an interstate nexus. Because the 

CSRA regulates a court-ordered obligation to pay money in interstate commerce, and 

deals with an activity that is substantially related to and substantially affects interstate 

commerce, we conclude that Congress constitutionally exercised the power bestowed 

upon it by the Commerce Clause in enacting the CSRA. 

- 7-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 7 
Notwithstanding that state regulation is substantial or even predominant, it is wellsettled that Congress may regulate interstate aspects of economic transactions. United 

States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 551-52 (1944). We agree with 

the Second Circuit that "[i]fCongress can take measures under the Commerce Clause to 

foster potential interstate commerce, it surely has the power to prevent the frustration of 

an obligation to engage in interstate commerce." Sage, 1996 WL 450640, at *5 (2d Cir. 

1996). Accord Mussari, 1996 WL 499163, at *3. Regarding the latter, the Court has 

invalidated application of state laws that prevented enforcement of contracts in interstate 

commerce. See Allenberg Cotton Co .. Inc. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974); DahnkeWalker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 292-93 (1921). Likewise, Congress may prevent 

the circumvention of child support obligations by regulating what is essentially 

nonpayment of a debt where the judgment creditor and judgment debtor are in different 

states. See Mussari, 1996 WL 499163, at *3. 

The CSRA also may be upheld because it regulates activities that are substantially 

related to and substantially affect interstate commerce. See Lo_pez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. 

In enacting the CSRA, Congress made explicit findings concerning the impact of 

delinquent parents on interstate commerce. In 1989, approximately $5 billion of$16 

billion in child support obligations were not honored. H.R.Rep. No. 771, 1 02d Cong., 2d 

Sess. 5 (1992) (Judiciary Committee). See also Statement by President Upon Signing S. 

1002, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2908 (Nov. 2, 1992). About one-third of the unpaid child 

- 8-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 8 
support obligations involved a delinquent father who lived in a different state than his 

children. Delinquent parents used the multistate system to evade enforcement efforts by 

individual states. H.R.Rep. No. 771 at 5-6; see also 138 Cong. Rec. H7326 (daily ed. 

Aug. 4, 1992) (statement ofCong. Hyde). Accordingly, in enacting the CSRA, Congress 

sought "to strengthen, not to supplant, State enforcement." ld. 

In order to conclude that Congress acted within the confines of the Commerce 

Clause, all we must find is a rational basis for Congress' finding that the regulated 

activity substantially affects interstate commerce. See Federal Energy Re~latozy 

Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 754. Congress clearly considered the economic impact of 

delinquent parents and, in its discretion, concluded that the impact substantially affects 

interstate commerce. Congress had a rational basis for so concluding and, as a result, 

acted within the power bestowed upon it under the Commerce Clause in enacting the 

CSRA. 

II. Tenth Amendment 

The Tenth Amendment provides that "the powers not delegated to the United 

States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 

respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. "'In a case ... involving the 

division of authority between federal and state governments,' the inquiries under the 

Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment 'are mirror images of each other."' 

- 9-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 9 
Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1509 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

1566 (1996) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). "If a power 

is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims 

any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty 

reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not 

conferred on Congress." New York, 505 U.S. at 156. To successfully demonstrate a 

violation of the Tenth Amendment, a claimant must show that the challenged statute or 

regulation regulates "states as states;" it addresses matters that are indisputably attributes 

of state sovereignty; and compliance with it would directly impair the State's ability to 

structure integral operations in areas of traditional state functions. Hodel v. Vir~inia 

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981). 

In light of our holding that congressional enactment of the CSRA does not violate 

the Commerce Clause, Mr. Hampshire's Tenth Amendment argument fails. ~ Mussari, 

1996 WL 499163, * 5 ("If ... Congress acts under one of its enumerated powers--here its 

power under the Commerce Clause--there can be no violation of the Tenth 

Amendment."). Moreover, the CSRA does not displace any approach taken by the state 

in addressing the problem of delinquent parents but rather supplements such state 

initiatives by fortifying law enforcement efforts and existing state penalties. ~. 1996 

WL 450640, * 8. 

- 10-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 10 
III. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and Due Process 

Mr. Hampshire claims that the state court's refusal to appoint counsel for his 

defense in the underlying divorce action violated both the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil 

Relief Act ("SSCRA") as well as his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

by denying him meaningful access to the court to challenge the child support order. Both 

claims present questions oflaw that we review de novo. See Patton v. TIC United Corp., 

77 F.3d 1235, 1243 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2525 (1996). 

The SSCRA temporarily suspends enforcement of civil liabilities against people on 

active duty in the military "until after the court shall have appointed an attorney to 

represent the defendant and protect his interest." 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 510, 520(1 ). The 

district court found that the state court did violate the SSCRA by failing to appoint 

counsel for Mr. Hampshire but that such failure did not rise to the level of a due process 

violation. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1332. 

We cannot agree that Mr. Hampshire was entitled to an attorney under the SSCRA. 

The language of the SSCRA is clear. "Military Service" is defined as "Federal service on 

active duty," and "active duty" is defined as including "the period during which a person 

in military service is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds, leave, or other 

lawful cause." 50 U.S.C. App. § 511(1); see also Betha v. Martin, 188 F. Supp. 133, 134-

35 (E.D. Penn. 1960) ("military service" means active duty in the federal armed services). 

An AWOL soldier is not absent due to "sickness, wounds, leave, or other lawful cause" 

- 11 -

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 11 
and may not avail himself of the benefits under SSCRA. Harriott v. Harriott, 511 A.2d 

1264, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986). Mr. Hampshire's child support liability results from 

divorce proceedings filed against him in October 1986; he concedes that he was AWOL 

from the military at this time. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331. Because he was AWOL 

at the time of filing and throughout the divorce proceedings, Mr. Hampshire was not on 

"active duty" and is definitionally precluded by the plain language of the SSCRA from 

availing himself of its benefits. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 511(1). Because the state court did 

not violate Mr. Hampshire's rights under the SSCRA, we need not reach Mr. Hampshire's 

due process claim predicated on such a violation. 

Mr. Hampshire also argues that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights 

were violated because he had no meaningful opportunity as an AWOL soldier in a 

civilian prison to be heard in state court to challenge the divorce and child support actions 

that form the basis of his CSRA conviction. The Due Process clause, incorporated by the 

Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states, only "applies when government action 

deprives a person of liberty or property." Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal 

and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Mr. Hampshire fails to articulate how 

the government prevented him from meaningfully defending himself while in prison or to 

identify a state law that prevented him from doing so. See Lynk v. LaPorte Superior 

Court No.2, 789 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1986) (state law required physical presence, even of 

incarcerated person, to obtain divorce). The district court properly rejected this claim. 

- 12-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 12 
IV. Ex Post Facto 

Mr. Hampshire asserts that his restitution order, which includes amounts accrued 

prior to the passage of the CSRA, runs afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause by punishing 

him for conduct that occurred prior to the passage of the CSRA. An ex post facto law is 

one that (1) criminalizes conduct that was legal when done; (2) inflicts greater 

punishment for an offense than was inflicted by the law in existence at the time the 

offense was committed; or (3) eliminates a defense available according to law at the time 

the offense was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,42 (1990); see also 

United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (lOth Cir. 1994). Mr. Hampshire's ex post facto 

challenge to the restitution order presents a question of law that we review de novo. 

United States v. Guthrie, 64 F.3d 1510, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

The CSRA provides that "the court shall order restitution under section 3663 in an 

amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing." 18 

U.S.C. § 228(c). "Past due support obligation" is defined as "any amount ... determined 

under a court order ... that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is 

greater than $5,000." 18 U.S.C. § 228(d)(l). The district court invoked 18 U.S.C. § 

3663, the Victim Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), to order Mr. Hampshire to pay 

restitution in an amount of approximately $38,000, of which approximately $25,000 

accrued prior to the passage of the CSRA. 

- 13 -

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 13 
Although Mr. Hampshire's restitution order takes into account amounts resulting 

from his failure to pay before the passage of the CSRA, he has not been charged or 

sentenced under the CSRA for any acts or omissions that occurred prior to its passage. 

Rather, Mr. Hampshire was indicted and convicted for his willful failure to pay past due 

child support from January 1993 until December 1994, i.e., for his conduct after the 

passage of the CSRA. I R. at 1. The restitution ordered pursuant to the VWPA covered 

the amount ofback child support owed on the date of sentencing. The fact that a 

component of that amount accrued prior to the enactment of the statute is not 

determinative. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1966) (considering past 

criminal conduct in determining the sentence for the otTense of conviction); United States 

v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1001 (lOth Cir.) (same), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 

16, 1996) (No. 96-5205); United States v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1990). What 

is determinative is whether the defendant was given fair notice of what his potential 

punishment would be for a violation of the statute in question. Weaver v. Graham, 450 

U.S. 24, 30 (1981). Thus, even if we consider restitution to be punishment, there is no ex 

post facto problem. 

Moveover, under the clear import of the CSRA, restitution is not a "punishment," 

although it is hardly surprising that a recalcitrant parent would so consider it.· We have 

previously indicated in other contexts that restitution orders issued pursuant to the VWP A 

are predominantly compensatory in nature, the purpose of which "is not to punish 

- 14-

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 14 
defendants ... but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made 

whole for their losses." See United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied sub nom. DeVries v. United States, 510 U.S. 1017 (1993); see also United 

States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1990). Unlike a forfeiture statute, the 

VWPA seeks to compensate victims rather than punish defendants. ~United States v. 

Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir.1984). The Constitution's explicit prohibition against 

ex post facto laws applies only to those laws that inflict criminal punishment. United 

States Trust Co. ofNew York v. New Jersey. 431 U.S. 1, 17 n. 13 (1977); see also United 

States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 

(1989). Mr. Hampshire's restitution order does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause 

because it does not inflict punishment upon him but rather seeks to compensate his child 

for his failure to pay his past due support obligation. 

AFFIRMED. 

- 15 -

Appellate Case: 96-3007 Document: 01019279340 Date Filed: 09/11/1996 Page: 15