Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02682/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02682-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mindy Bloom
Appellant
Metro Heart Group
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2682

___________

Mindy Bloom, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Metro Heart Group of *

St. Louis, Inc., *

*

Appellee. ___________

Submitted: December 14, 2005

Filed: March 16, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Mindy Leigh Bloom sued her former employer, Metro Heart Group of St.

Louis, Inc., claiming retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under the Missouri

Workers' Compensation Act, as well as violations of the Family and Medical Leave

Act (FMLA). The district court1

 granted summary judgment to Metro. Bloom

appeals. Jurisdiction being proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

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I.

In 1999, Bloom was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. In March 2000,

Metro hired her as an ultrasound sonographer, requiring her to grip an ultrasound

machine for 95 percent of the work day. Within three months, the carpal tunnel

symptoms recurred, and Bloom sought treatment for tingling and numbness in her

hands. Her physician said the symptoms were work-related, but at that time placed

no restrictions on her ability to function. 

In March 2002, Bloom reported to Metro that she was experiencing pain.

Metro filed a Report of Injury with the Division of Workers' Compensation. On

March 21, 2002, Bloom filed a workers' compensation claim against Metro. Metro

then sent her to its doctor who also diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome. This doctor

cautioned Bloom about "gripping" and put limitations on her ability to work, pending

further tests and "possible surgery." The doctor then reported to Metro that "it is

suggested" that Bloom limit her activity to "light gripping only" and "no gripping with

either hand for greater than 15 minutes" per patient. Bloom testified that for the

majority of patients, she had to grip the machine for more than 15 minutes. These

restrictions significantly limited Bloom's ability to operate the ultrasound machine.

Before the doctor's report arrived, Bloom informed Metro about the

suggestions. Metro placed Bloom on FMLA leave until she had medical clearance to

return to work. Metro sent Bloom an FMLA form stating she was on leave due to "a

serious health condition that makes you unable to perform the essential functions of

your job." The form required a "fitness-for-duty certificate" before she could return

to work. The form also informed Bloom that her leave counted against her annual

FMLA entitlement but that she could substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave.

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Bloom was absent from work from May 2, 2002 to July 30, 2002, the date when

Metro discharged her. The district court ruled that Bloom used her full 12 weeks of

FMLA leave, and, because her physical condition and inability to do her job had not

changed, Metro could discharge her.

II.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Laughlin v.

Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 928 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper if there are

no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Research

Group/U.S., 416 F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2005); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234,

1237 (8th Cir. 1997). This Court examines the record in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d 617, 619 (8th

Cir. 2006).

A. 

In Missouri, no employer shall discharge an employee for exercising any rights

under the Workers' Compensation Act. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780. However, the

Act was enacted into law against the backdrop of the "at will" doctrine. See Crabtree

v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 1998). "Absent a contrary statutory

provision, an at will employee cannot maintain an action for wrongful discharge

against his employer." Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. banc 1985). "In the

absence of a contract for employment for a definite term or a contrary statutory

provision, an employer may discharge an employee at any time, without cause or

reason, or for any reason, and in such cases no action can be obtained for wrongful

discharge.'" Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. banc 1981). The

Workers' Compensation Act did not abolish the at will doctrine, but rather "provided

a limited exception which allows an action where there was an exclusive causal

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relationship between the discharge and the employee's exercise of rights granted under

chapter 287 RSMo 1978." Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 70. "If the evidence demonstrates

that the employer had just cause for terminating the employment, other than for the

employee's exercise of her rights under the Act, then the employee cannot recover

under section 287.780." St. Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 143,

150 (Mo. App. 1999).

To establish a claim for retaliatory discharge, Bloom must prove: (1) she was

employed by Metro before the injury; (2) she filed a workers' compensation claim; (3)

Metro discharged her; and (4) there is an exclusive causal relationship between her

filing and her discharge. See Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 70; Hansome v. Nw.

Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. banc 1984). "Causality does not exist if

the basis for discharge is valid and nonpretextual." Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275 n.2.

The only element in dispute is whether there is an exclusive causal relationship

between Bloom's filing of the claim and Metro's discharge of her.

The district court found that Metro's discharge of Bloom was "legitimate in that

it recognized plaintiff had a condition which would be affected by her employment

with defendant." Because Bloom's job at Metro required her to grip for extended

periods of time, the district court concluded that she "could not perform the essential

functions of her job."

Bloom believes that Metro intended from May 2 – the date its doctor mentioned

"surgery" – to discharge her for filing a workers' compensation claim. She outlines

19 paragraphs, which mix factual disputes with conclusory allegations and

speculation. Bloom's speculation and conjecture are insufficient to defeat summary

judgment. See Moody v. St. Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994).

Moreover, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will

not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1985) (emphasis in original). Bloom must

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, that is a dispute that might "affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law," so that "a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party," Bloom. See id. at 248.

Even if the 19 paragraphs are interpreted favorably to Bloom, Metro

consistently followed the doctor's restrictions, which prevented her from performing

the essential functions of her job. "A plaintiff's inability to do the job would seem to

be fatal to any claim that the exercise of a workers' compensation right was the sole

reason for the discharge." 37 William C. Martucci, Missouri Practice § 12.22, at

435 (2005) (summarizing cases). This proposition is clearly the law in Missouri. See

Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275 n.2, approving three cases: Mitchell v. St. Louis

County, 575 S.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Mo. App. 1978) (employer may fire employee for

excessive absenteeism, even if absenteeism is caused by compensable injury);

Rodriguez v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 582 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Mo. App. 1979) (the

Compensation Act does not guarantee an employee who is unwilling or unable to

work will be able to return to old job); and Davis v. Richmond Special Road Dist.,

649 S.W.2d 252, 255-56 (Mo. App. 1983) (approving directed verdict where, after

suffering compensable injury, employee returned to work on a trial basis, but was

fired for being unable to perform job). See generally Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72

("The purpose of the workers' compensation law, including the rule of liberal

construction, is to compensate workers for job-related injuries; it is not to insure job

security."). 

Bloom objects that Metro did not follow the most relevant medical opinion

because it ignored the "Discussion" in a report by another physician (Dr. Henry G.

Ollinger) it paid to examine Bloom. Concluding his four-page report, Dr. Ollinger

states:

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Whatever direction or energies her previous treating physicians think

best for her, it should be carried on by them in her behalf.

If she were working, I would not be able to determine any medical basis

to restrict work activities as a sonographer/electrocardiographer/

ultrasound technician. 

Bloom believes that this means that the original medical restrictions were lifted

and she could work, so that Metro's cause is pretextual. The quoted Discussion is too

vague to rescind the original restrictions and too conditional to contradict Metro's

doctor.

 Because Metro had a valid, non-pretextual reason to discharge her, Bloom

cannot prove that the workers' compensation claim was the exclusive cause of her

termination. No genuine issues of material fact exist as to the workers' compensation

claim, and Metro is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 B. 

Upon return from FMLA leave, an employee is entitled to be restored to the

same position held prior to the beginning of the leave, or its equivalent, in terms of

benefits, pay and other terms and conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). "However, an

employee is not entitled to restoration if, at the end of the FMLA leave period, the

employee is still unable to perform an essential function of the job." Hatchett v.

Philander Smith Coll., 251 F.3d 670, 677 (8th Cir. 2001), citing 29 C.F.R. §

825.214(b); see also Reynolds v. Phillips & Temro Indus., Inc., 195 F.3d 411, 414

(8th Cir. 1999).

Although Bloom has continually maintained that she was able to perform the

essential functions of her job, the record refutes this. Dr. Tucker restricted her to

"light gripping," and no gripping for more than 15 minutes per patient. Because

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gripping is required to operate the ultrasound machine, Bloom's restrictions prevented

her from performing this essential function. Bloom emphasizes that she has always

believed she was able to work. The district court countered, "To do so, however,

plaintiff would have to ignore Dr. Tucker's restrictions." See Duty v. Norton-Alcoa

Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 495 (8th Cir. 2002) (medical release qualifies employee for

job restoration under FMLA). 

When Bloom's condition did not change during her FMLA leave, Metro was not

required to reinstate her. "As long as an employer can show a lawful reason, i.e., a

reason unrelated to an employee's exercise of FMLA rights, for not restoring an

employee on FMLA leave to her position, the employer will be justified to interfere

with an employee's FMLA leave rights." Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County

Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 979 (8th. Cir. 2005).

Bloom also contends that Metro's requirement for a fitness-for-duty certificate

violates the FMLA. An employer may require medical certification demonstrating

fitness-for-duty, as long as this policy or practice is uniformly applied to all similarlysituated employees who take leave for serious health conditions. See 29 U.S.C. §

2614(a)(4); 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(a). Shortly after beginning FMLA leave, Bloom

received the FMLA form stating that she was required:

"to present a fitness-for-duty certificate prior to being restored to

employment. If such certification is required but not received, your

return to work may be delayed until certification is provided." 

Bloom never returned such a certificate (or any equivalent statement).

Although she presented a certificate to two of her physicians, neither completed and

returned the form. Bloom emphasizes the Discussion in Dr. Ollinger's report (quoted

above), which she argues is equivalent to a fitness-for-duty certificate. As noted, it

is too vague and conditional to constitute a statement that Bloom was fit-for-duty. 

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In a different attack, Bloom claims that Metro's certificate policy is not

"uniformly applied" because it treats similarly-situated employees differently. The

parties agree that Metro uniformly required all employees on FMLA leave to provide

a medical certificate before returning to work. However, Metro does not require a

certificate from employees on non-FMLA leave. 

Bloom ignores the clear language of the FMLA:

As a condition of restoration under paragraph (1) for an employee who

has taken leave under section 2612(a)(1)(D) of this title [FMLA leave],

the employer may have a uniformly applied practice or policy that

requires each such employee to receive certification from the health care

provider of the employee that the employee is able to resume work.... 

29 U.S.C. 2614(a)(4) (emphasis added). 

The "employee" who must receive certification is an employee who has taken

FMLA leave. Thus, Bloom need only be treated similarly to other employees on

FMLA leave at Metro. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(a). Metro's practice and policy on

FMLA fitness-for-duty certificates comply with federal law.

Finally, Bloom claims that her FMLA leave did not start until May 16, the day

she began paid leave, so that Metro did not provide the 12 weeks required by 28

U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D). Metro's policy is that FMLA leave is generally unpaid. Metro

did not require Bloom first to exhaust paid leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A).

When her paid leave began is irrelevant. Her FMLA leave began on May 2, the date

she qualified for a serious health condition, making her unable to perform the

functions of her position. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).

Alternatively, Bloom claims that her FMLA leave began July 1, the day her

paid leave ended. To the contrary, Bloom's leave began the day she qualified for a

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In her brief, Bloom asks in passing that if this court affirms summary judgment

on the FMLA claim, it remand the workers' compensation claim to state court, citing

28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). Bloom waived this argument when she did not timely move for

remand in the district court, on this ground. See Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., 83 F.3d

235, 236 n.3, 237 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996), following Williams v. AC Spark Plugs, 985

F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1993). Because the district court had federal question

jurisdiction of the FMLA claim, it properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over

the workers' compensation claim. See Alternative Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, 435 F.3d

855, 857 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006). See generally Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405

U.S. 699, 702 (1971) (where after removal a case is tried on the merits without

objection and the federal court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings

on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal

district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that

court). 

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serious health condition. See id. Although Bloom elected to substitute unpaid FMLA

leave for paid leave, this substitution does not entitle her to additional leave. See 29

U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A). "Paid vacation or personal leave, including leave earned or

accrued under plans allowing 'paid time off,' may be substituted, at either the

employee's or the employer's option, for any qualified FMLA leave." 29 C.F.R. §

825.207(e). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Metro because Bloom

could not perform the essential functions of her job after the FMLA leave.2

 "The

FMLA does not require an employer to allow an employee to stay in a position that

the employee cannot perform." Hatchett, 251 F.3d at 677. 

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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