Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04050/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04050-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fernando Antonio Largo-Montenegro
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

FILED 

United States Co~rt (?f Appeals 'tenth C1rcu1t 

SEP O 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) 

) 

) 

FERNANDO ANTONIO LARGO-MONTENEGRO, ) 

a/k/a/ Nicolas Beccera-Lopez, ) 

) 

No. 90-4050 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-191W) 

(D. Utah) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

We address three issues: (1) whether the police officer 

committed a pretextual stop when he pulled the defendant-appellant 

over for weaving into the emergency and oncoming traffic lanes; 

(2) whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to 

give the jury a "mere-presence" instruction; and (3) whether the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-4050 Document: 010110084289 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 1 
defendant-appellant's sentence was proper under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. We hold that a reasonable Utah county 

sheriff would have pulled over the defendant-appellant for weaving 

into the oncoming traffic and emergency lanes, and, therefore, we 

agree with the district court that -the stop was not pretextual. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to give the jury a "mere-presence" instruction. Finally, 

on the record before us, we are unable to hold that the defendantappellant was improperly sentenced under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. The United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

FACTS 

On October 2, 1989, Emery County Sheriff Richard Graham was 

patrolling Interstate 70. Graham, who had just finished issuing a 

warning ticket to a motorist for speeding, was waiting to pull off 

from the shoulder into the eastbound flow of traffic proceeding 

along Interstate 70 when Fernando Antonio Largo-Montenegro, the 

defendant-appellant, drove by him in a Volkswagen Camper-Van. 

Graham entered the eastbound flow of traffic and followed the 

defendant for approximately two and one-half miles. During that 

time, Graham witnessed the defendant cross the center line to the 

left three times and wander across the emergency line to the right 

once. Graham, suspecting that the defendant may have been 

intoxicated, pulled the defendant over. The defendant's 

registration papers and license appeared to be in order, and the 

district court found that the officer returned them to the 

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defendant. Graham thereafter asked the defendant whether he was 

carrying any controlled substances. The defendant indicated that 

he was not, and Graham asked him for permission to search the van. 

The defendant consented, and Graham discovered ninety-nine 

kilograms of cocaine hidden in the roof of the van. The defendant 

was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for violating 21 u.s.c. § 

84l(a)(l), was found guilty, and was then sentenced to a 235 month 

term pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines on March 

14, 1990. The defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 26, 

1990. 

DISCUSSION 

The defendant raises three issues on appeal. The first issue 

he raises is whether the district court erred in holding that 

Graham's decision to stop the defendant was not pretextual. The 

objective test is used to determine whether a stop is pretextual: 

"[A] court should ask 'not whether the officer could validly have 

made the stop, but whether under the same circumstances a 

reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the 

invalid purpose.'" United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 

(10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 

(11th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis in the original). 

Graham testified that he witnessed the defendant weaving 

across the both the center line to the left and the emergency lane 

line to the right. R. Vol. I at 13 & 46. Although the defendant 

disputed Graham's testimony, Id. at 92, the district court found 

Graham's testimony to be credible. We cannot on this record 

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reject the district court's decision to find Graham's testimony to 

be the more credible. 

Once we accept the district court's finding that the 

defendant was weaving, we must determine whether a reasonable 

officer would have stopped the defendant on the basis of the 

weaving alone. We have once before visited this issue and have 

held that where a motorist is weaving, the officer is justified in 

stopping the car. See United States v. Cheatwood, 575 F.2d 821, 

826 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978). 

Therefore, under the facts of this case, Graham's stopping of the 

defendant was not pretextual. 

The second issue the defendant raises is whether the district 

court erred in refusing to give the jury a "mere presence" 

1.ns . t t' l rue 1.on. We review the district court's decision under an 

abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Suntar 

Roofing, 897 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1990). Where the 

instructions "as a whole adequately state[] the law, the refusal 

to give a particular instruction is not an abuse of discretion. 

Id. Instruction seventeen in particular made it clear that in 

order to find the •defendant guilty of possessing the cocaine, the 

1 Defendant's proposed instruction read as follows: 

"You are instructed that there must be some 

evidence which connects the Defendant to the prohibited 

substance. Proof as to the physical proximity to the 

controlled substances in and of itself is not sufficient 

to establish either actual or constructive possession. 

Presence in the area where the narcotic drug is 

discovered, in and of itself, is not sufficient to 

support a finding of possession. Also, association with 

the person who does control the drug or property in and 

of itself is not sufficient to support a finding of 

possession." 

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jury had to find "beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

knew that he possessed the narcotics, and that his possession was 

not due to carelessness, negligence, or mistake." (emphasis 

added). Further, instruction eighteen explained that "[the jury] 

may find that the defendant acted knowingly if [the jury] find[s] 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high 

probability that [e.g., drugs were in his automobile] and 

deliberately avoided learning the truth." While we agree with the 

defendant that his proposed instruction would have accurately 

described the law to the jury, we cannot say that on a whole that 

the instructions as given did not. 

The last issue the defendant raises is whether the district 

court applied the guidelines improperly in sentencing him to a 

term of 235 months. The defendant's appellate counsel admits in 

his brief that the defendant's trial counsel did not argue to the 

district court that the defendant's sentence was calculated 

incorrectly pursuant to the guidelines. Instead, the defendant's 

trial counsel merely complained that the imposition of the 

guidelines led to too harsh a sentence. As the defendant's 

appellate counsel admits in his brief, this court is not in a 

position to adjust the sentences imposed pursuant to the 

guidelines simply because they may seem unduly harsh. Therefore, 

in the absence of a specific complaint regarding the calculation 

of the defendant's sentence pursuant to the guidelines, we must 

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.. 

AFFIRM the district court. In all respects, the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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