Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05009/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rose C. Lake
Appellant
Thomas Harold Lake
Appellant
Robert E. Rubin
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 1998 Decided December 11, 1998

No. 98-5009

Thomas Harold Lake and Rose C. Lake,

Appellants

v.

Robert E. Rubin,

Secretary of the Treasury of the United States,

Appellee

Consolidated with Nos.

98-5184, 98-5185, 98-5186, 98-5187, 98-5188, 98-5189,

98-5190, 98-5191, 98-5192, 98-5193, 98-5194, 98-5195,

98-5196, 98-5197, 98-5198, 98-5199, 98-5200, 98-5201,

98-5202, 98-5203, 98-5204, 98-5205, 98-5206, 98-5207,

98-5208, 98-5209, 98-5210, 98-5211, 98-5212, 98-5213,

98-5214, 98-5215, 98-5216, 98-5217, 98-5218, 98-5219,

98-5220, 98-5221, 98-5222, 98-5223, 98-5266, 98-5267,

98-5268, 98-5269, 98-5270, 98-5271, 98-5272, 98-5273,

98-5274, 98-5275, 98-5276, 98-5277, 98-5278, 98-5279,

98-5280, 98-5281, 98-5282, 98-5283, 98-5284, 98-5285,

98-5286, 98-5287, 98-5288, 98-5289, 98-5290, 98-5291,

98-5292, 98-5293, 98-5294, 98-5295, 98-5296, 98-5297,

98-5298, 98-5299, 98-5300, 98-5301, 98-5302, 98-5303,

98-5304, 98-5305, 98-5306, 98-5307, 98-5308, 98-5309,

98-5310, 98-5311, 98-5312, 98-5313, 98-5314, 98-5315,

USCA Case #98-5009 Document #402434 Filed: 12/11/1998 Page 1 of 8
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98-5316, 98-5356, 98-5357, 98-5359, 98-5359, 98-5360,

98-5369, 98-5370, 98-5371, 98-5372, 98-5373, 98-5374,

98-5375, 98-5376, 98-5377, 98-5378, 98-5379, 98-5380,

98-5381, 98-5382, 98-5383, 98-5384, 98-5385, 98-5386,

98-5387, 98-5388, 98-5389, 98-5390, 98-5391,

98-5392, 98-5393, 98-5394, 98-5395, 98-5396,

98-5397, 98-5398, 98-5411, 98-5412, 98-5413,

98-5414, 98-5415, 98-5416, 98-5417, 98-5418,

98-5419, 98-5420

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia

(97cv02767) (98cv00331)

(97cv02768) (98cv00332)

(97cv02769) (98cv00333)

(97cv02770) (98cv00421)

(98cv00264) (98cv00422)

(98cv00265) (98cv00423)

(98cv00266) (98cv00424)

(98cv00267) (98cv00425)

(98cv0026 ) (98cv00426)

(98cv00269) (98cv00473)

(98cv00328) (98cv00474)

(98cv00329) (98cv00475)

(98cv00330) (98cv00476)

(98cv00477) (98cv01367)

(98cv00478) (98cv01368)

(98cv00720) (98cv01390)

(98cv0072) (98cv01391)

(98cv00722) (98cv01393)

(98cv00723) (98cv01394)

(98cv00752) (98cv01395)

(98cv00753) (98cv01511)

(98cv00754) (98cv01512)

(98cv00849) (98cv01513)

(98cv00850) (98cv01514)

(98cv00851) (98cv01515)

(98cv00975) (98cv01526)

(98cv00976) (98cv01527)

(98cv00994) (98cv01528)

(98cv01293) (98cv01529)

(98cv01294) (98cv01530)

(98cv01295) (98cv01546)

(98cv01296) (98cv01547)

(98cv01297) (98cv01548)

(98cv01321) (98cv01549)

(98cv01323) (98cv01550)

(98cv01327) (98cv01609)

(98cv01328) (98cv01611)

(98cv01329) (98cv01612)

(98cv01332) (98cv01615)

(98cv01337) (98cv01617)

(98cv01339) (98cv01620)

(98cv01340) (98cv01621)

USCA Case #98-5009 Document #402434 Filed: 12/11/1998 Page 2 of 8
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(98cv01341) (98cv01622)

(98cv01343) (98cv01631)

(98cv01344) (98cv01632)

(98cv01345) (98cv01683)

(98cv01346) (98cv01684)

(98cv01347) (98cv01685)

(98cv01348) (98cv01686)

(98cv01364) (98cv01687)

(98cv01365) (98cv01705)

(98cv01366) (98cv01706)

(98cv01707) (98cv01755)

(98cv01708) (98cv01762)

(98cv01709) (98cv01763)

(98cv01717) (98cv01764)

(98cv01718) (98cv01765)

(98cv01719) (98cv01766)

(98cv01720) (98cv01885)

(98cv01721) (98cv01888)

(98cv01723) (98cv01890)

(98cv01724) (98cv01891)

(98cv01725) (98cv01893)

(98cv01726) (98cv01900)

(98cv01728) (98cv01903)

(98cv01751) (98cv01905)

(98cv01752) (98cv01907)

(98cv01753) (98cv01908)

(98cv01754)

Fred A. Ohlinger argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was J. Hamilton McMenamy.

Murray S. Horwitz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Loretta C. Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and Jonathan S. Cohen, Attorney, U.S.

Department of Justice. Curtis C. Pett and Gary W. Allen,

Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: Henderson, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: These are consolidated appeals

from district court judgments dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, one hundred and thirty-eight complaints. Though filed

by different individuals, each complaint contained the same

cause of action. The action filed by Thomas H. and Rose C.

Lake is typical. The Lakes sought injunctive and declaratory

relief, and damages. The Internal Revenue Service, their

complaint alleged, failed to comply with the Lakes' written

request, "[p]ursuant to the requirements of the Privacy Act at

5 USC 552a(d)(1)," for the disclosure of information explaining "adverse determinations" made by the IRS regarding

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their tax liability. According to the government, the IRS has

received hundreds of identical, or nearly identical, requests

from individuals around the country.

The Lakes relied on a section of the Privacy Act requiring

federal agencies, upon the request of an individual, to furnish

such information "pertaining" to that individual as is contained in the agency's "system of records." 5 U.S.C.

s 552a(d)(1). If not satisfied with the agency's response, the

requester may bring a civil action against the agency for

injunctive relief and damages. See 5 U.S.C. s 552a(g)(1)(B),

(3)(A) & (4).

The judgments dismissing the complaints for lack of jurisdiction rested on a provision of the Internal Revenue Code--

26 U.S.C. s 7852(e)--which states as follows:

The provisions of subsections (d)(2), (3) and (4), and (g) of

section 552a of title 5, United States Code, shall not be

applied, directly or indirectly, to the determination of the

existence or possible existence of liability (or the amount

thereof) of any person for any tax, penalty, interest, fine,

forfeiture, or other imposition or offense to which the

provisions of this title apply.

Both of the two district court opinions in these cases took

s 7852(e) to mean that "the provision of the Privacy Act

providing the federal district courts with jurisdiction over civil

actions to enforce the Privacy Act 'shall not be applied' to the

IRS." Maxwell v. Rubin, 3 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D.D.C. 1998).

In other words, although subsection (d)(1) of the Privacy Act

may require the IRS to furnish copies of records to an

individual, s 7852(e)'s withdrawal of the subsection (g) jurisdictional grant leaves the federal courts with no power or

authority to force the IRS to comply.

One of the district court's opinions relied on England v.

Commissioner, 798 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1986), a case differing

from those before us in one important respect. The taxpayer's Privacy Act suit in England sought, not a disclosure of

IRS records under subsection (d)(1), but an amendment of

them pursuant to subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3). These proviUSCA Case #98-5009 Document #402434 Filed: 12/11/1998 Page 4 of 8
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sions permit an "individual to request amendment of a record

pertaining to him," and require the agency either to make the

correction or explain why it will not. 5 U.S.C. s 552a(d)(2),

(3). As with a request for disclosure, subsection (g) gives the

individual a right to sue in district court for an injunction and

damages if the agency refuses to amend the records. See 5

U.S.C. s 552a(g)(1)(A). The England court put its decision in

terms of lack of "jurisdiction." But it is also clear that

England had no cause of action. Section 7852(e) explicitly

deprives taxpayers of any right under the Privacy Act amendment provisions--subsections (d)(2), (d)(3) and (d)(4)--to

force the IRS to respond to requests for the correction of tax

records relating to the determination of their tax liability. In

contrast, s 7852(e) does not mention the Privacy Act's disclosure provision (subsection (d)(1)). This leads to a textual

argument in favor of the plaintiffs: s 7852(e)'s reference to

subsection (g), they contend, must be limited to suits dealing

with the amendment of tax records because only the Privacy

Act's amendment provisions are expressly made inapplicable

to tax records.

There is a related point in plaintiffs' favor. To the extent

that subsection (g) of the Privacy Act allows individuals to sue

agencies for damages, it represents a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity. See McMillen v. United States

Dep't of Treasury, 960 F.2d 187, 188 (1st Cir. 1991) (per

curiam). Without subsection (g), plaintiffs seeking disclosure

of tax records could never recover damages for Privacy Act

violations. But general federal question jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. s 1331 would allow an injunction action against a

government official for violating the Privacy Act even if

Congress had never enacted subsection (g). Congress years

ago abolished the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement and waived sovereign immunity in all cases seeking

relief "other than money damages." 5 U.S.C. s 702; see

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 897 (1988); Hubbard

v. Administrator, Envtl. Protection Agency, 982 F.2d 531, 533

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). On this view of the interplay of

the statutes, if s 7852(e) rendered subsection (g) inapplicable

to Privacy Act disclosure suits regarding tax determinations,

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plaintiffs could not recover damages. But under 28 U.S.C.

s 1331,1 the district court still had jurisdiction over their

claims for injunctive relief resulting from the IRS's alleged

failure to disclose the records in violation of subsection (d)(1).

There are two problems with the analysis in the last

paragraph. The first is that it embodies an argument the

plaintiffs never made. The second is that it ignores another

provision, revised in the same legislation containing s 7852(e),

a provision meant to deal very precisely and comprehensively

with the IRS's disclosure of tax return information. In the

Tax Reform Act of 1976, passed in the wake of Watergate and

White House efforts to harass those on its "enemies list," see

Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1997),

Congress amended s 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code to

protect the privacy of tax return information and to regulate

in minute detail the disclosure of this material.2 See Church

of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); Tax Analysts,

117 F.3d at 611, 615. As amended, s 6103 now prohibits the

IRS from revealing a taxpayer's return information to the

public, but requires the IRS to disclose the information to the

taxpayer if this "would not seriously impair Federal tax

administration." 26 U.S.C. s 6103(e)(7). The Seventh Circuit has decided that s 6103, although not framed as an

exception to the Privacy Act, overrides any inconsistent provisions of prior statutes, including the Privacy Act, and represents the exclusive statutory route for taxpayers to gain

access to their return information. See Cheek v. IRS, 703

F.2d 271, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1983). The Senate report accompa-

__________

1 The Lakes' complaint invoked jurisdiction not only under subsection (g) of the Privacy Act, but also under 28 U.S.C. s 1331; and

it named the Secretary of the Treasury, in his official capacity, as a

defendant.

2 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. s 6103(a) (stating that "[r]eturns and return

information shall be confidential" and not subject to disclosure

"except as authorized by this title"); s 6103(c) (permitting, subject

to requirements and conditions prescribed by the Secretary of

Treasury, disclosure of taxpayer's return or return information to

taxpayer's designee); s 6103(e) (requiring the IRS to disclose an

individual's return to the individual "upon written request").

nying the 1976 revision of s 6103 supports this view.3 Other

considerations do as well. The condition on disclosure of

return information in s 6103(e)(7)--"would not seriously impair Federal tax administration"--has no counterpart in the

Privacy Act. This strongly suggests that Congress intended

s 6103 to be the exclusive means by which individuals may

obtain tax records relating to them. A comparison of the

precise treatment of return information in s 6103 and the

imprecise regulation of agency records in the Privacy Act

reveals many other differences. In analogous circumstances,

we have held that the Freedom of Information Act does not

govern the disclosure of information when, in another statute,

Congress has dealt with disclosure of the same information

through "comprehensive, carefully tailored and detailed" provisions "designed to protect both the interest of" those seekUSCA Case #98-5009 Document #402434 Filed: 12/11/1998 Page 6 of 8
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ing the information and the interest in "confidentiality." Ricchio v. Kline, 773 F.2d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also

Essential Info., Inc. v. United States Info. Agency, 134 F.3d

1165, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Henderson, J., concurring). On

the same basis, we believe that the specific provisions of

s 6103 rather than the general provisions of the Privacy Act

govern the disclosure of the sort of tax information requested

here. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482

U.S. 437, 445 (1987); Colorado Nurses Ass'n v. Federal Labor

__________

3Recent Congressional action with respect to privacy in general

has had an impact on the disclosure of tax information [citing

the Privacy Act]. However, the Congress did not specifically

focus on the unique aspects of tax returns in the Privacy Act.

The committee has reviewed each of the areas in which returns

and return information are now subject to disclosure. Although present law describes income tax returns as "public

records," open to inspection under regulations approved by the

President, or under Presidential order, the committee felt that

returns and return information should generally be treated as

confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103

where the committee decided that disclosure was warranted.

S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 318 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2897, 3747 (paragraph breaks and footnote omitted).

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Relations Auth., 851 F.2d 1486, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see

also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction s 51.05 (Norman J. Singer ed., 4th ed. 1984).

The plaintiffs in these cases were fully aware of their rights

under s 6103. They "elected" not to follow s 6103, fearing

an IRS decision that compliance with their requests would

seriously undermine administration of the tax laws. Appellants' Reply Brief at 16. Whether the IRS would be warranted in coming to that conclusion is not for us to say at this

point. Our decision, like that of the Seventh Circuit in Cheek,

is that individuals seeking "return information" (26 U.S.C.

s 6103(b)), must do so pursuant to s 6103 of the Internal

Revenue Code, rather than the Privacy Act. We therefore

affirm the judgments of the district court, although not on the

jurisdictional rationale contained in its opinions.

So ordered.

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