Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01775/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01775-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Greenly
Plaintiff
Sara Lee
Defendant
Gordon Mayberry
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JOHN GREENLY,

NO. CIV. S-06-1775 WBS EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS

SARA LEE CORPORATION; GORDON

MAYBERRY; and Does 1 through

10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff John Greenly brought this action against his

former employer, defendant Sara Lee Corporation (“Sara Lee”), as

well as his former supervisor, defendant Gordon Mayberry,

alleging harassment and rights violations under state and federal

statutes and common law. Defendants move to dismiss various

claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

///

///

///

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff John

Greenly was employed by defendant Sara Lee as a Foreman in Bun

Production. (Compl. ¶ 10; Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 1 (“EEOC

Complaint”).) Plaintiff worked under the supervision of

Production Manager defendant Gordon Mayberry. (Compl. ¶ 12.) 

Throughout the course of his employment, plaintiff was a member

of the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers’

International Union, Local Union No. 85 (“Union”). (First Mot.

to Dismiss Ex. 1.) At all times, plaintiff’s employment was

governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), negotiated

between the Union and Sara Lee. (Id.) 

According to plaintiff, beginning in 1990, he was

subjected to a pattern of sexual and physical harassment, denial

of promotions, retaliation, and discrimination on the basis of a

work-induced disability. (Compl. ¶ 14; EEOC Complaint.) Based

on this conduct, plaintiff filed a complaint on May 19, 2005,

against Sara Lee with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) alleging sexual harassment by Mayberry. (EEOC

Complaint.) On June 19, 2006, the EEOC indicated that it was

terminating its processing of the complaint, and issued to

plaintiff a “right to sue” letter. (Req. for Judicial Notice Ex.

3.) 

On July 13, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint in state

court, which defendants removed to this court because it involved

various questions of federal law. (Compl.) The complaint

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All causes of action are asserted against both 1

defendants, except where otherwise noted.

3

alleges twenty-three causes of action: 1) battery, against 1

Mayberry; 2) assault, against Mayberry; 3) sexual battery,

against Mayberry; 4) retaliation in violation of the Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code

§§ 12900 et seq; 5) sexual harassment and a hostile work

environment in violation of FEHA; 6) disability discrimination in

violation of FEHA; 7) failure to prevent discrimination in

violation of FEHA; 8) failure to accommodate for disability in

violation of FEHA, against Sara Lee; 9) intentional infliction of

emotional distress, against Mayberry; 10) negligent infliction of

emotional distress; 11) negligence; 12) negligence per se; 13)

negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention, against

Sara Lee; 14) invasion of privacy; 15) defamation, against

Mayberry; 16) intentional and/or negligent interference with

existing contractual relationships; 17) intentional and/or

negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; 18)

wrongful termination in violation of FEHA, or in the alternative

constructive discharge; 19) wrongful termination in violation of

public policy; 20) breach of contract; 21) breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 22) breach of duty to

pay wages and provide rest breaks; and 23) retaliation for filing

a workers compensation claim in violation of California Labor

Code § 123a. (Compl.)

On August 17, 2006, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (First Mot. to Dismiss.) 

Before a hearing was held on that motion, however, plaintiff

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Plaintiff objects to the filing of this motion on the 2

ground that no proof of service was filed therewith. (Opp’n to

Mot. to Dismiss 11.) Plaintiff’s objection is without merit,

however, because the notice of electronic filing contains an

electronic proof of service, indicating that the motion was

served at 8:02pm on October 4, 2006, to, among others,

plaintiff’s counsel Nathaniel Dale Potratz. See L.R. 5-135(g).

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filed a First Amended Complaint on September 20, 2006 (“FAC”),

which mooted the motion to dismiss. (September 26, 2006 Minute

Order.) The amended complaint indicated that plaintiff filed an

additional complaint with the EEOC on July 17, 2006, alleging a

variety of claims, and that a right to sue letter was then

subsequently issued. (FAC ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also amended his

fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and twenty-second causes of

action, pleading in the alternative that a claim was stated for

violation of the collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“LMRA”). 

(FAC ¶¶ 111, 120, 126, 144.) Finally, plaintiff asserted that he

had “exhausted all appropriate grievance procedures” as required

by the CBA, or in the alternative that he was excused from such a

requirement because the “union breached its duty of fair

representation.” (Id.) Defendants again move to dismiss based

on plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). (Second Mot. to Dismiss.)2

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The

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court may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless “it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to

state a claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)

(complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”).

In general, the court may not consider material other

than the facts alleged in the complaint when deciding a motion to

dismiss. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“A motion to dismiss . . . must be treated as a motion for

summary judgment . . . if either party . . . submits materials

outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and

if the district court relies on those materials.”). However, the

court may consider materials of which it may take judicial

notice, including matters of public record. Mir v. Little Co. of

Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Evid.

201(b) (defining the scope of judicial notice); see also Mack v.

S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)

(noting that reliance on matters of public record “does not

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment”),

abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.

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Plaintiff objects to defendants’ failure to attach the 3

exhibits to defendants’ second Request for Judicial Notice. 

Defendants, however, filed an Amended Request for Judicial

Notice, containing the relevant exhibits. (Am. Req. for Judicial

Notice Exs. 1-3.) The court will therefore consider these

documents. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889 n.2

(9th Cir. 1969) (taking judicial notice of an EEOC decision).

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Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).3

Additionally, “a district judge may generally consider

a document outside the complaint when deciding a motion to

dismiss if the complaint specifically refers to the document and

if its authenticity is not questioned.” Inlandboatmens Union of

Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Townsend v. Columbia Operations, 667 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir.

1982)) (upholding a District Court’s consideration of a

collective bargaining agreement, referred to in the complaint, on

a motion to dismiss). When claims in a complaint require

consideration of a collective bargaining agreement, a plaintiff

cannot artfully plead so as to avoid mentioning the agreement,

thereby avoiding federal preemption issues. Inlandboatmens

Union, 279 F.3d at 1083; Young v. Anthony’s Grottos, Inc., 830

F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The district court, however,

properly looked beyond the face of the complaint to determine

whether the contract claim was in fact a section 301 claim for

breach of a collective bargaining agreement . . .”). 

In this case, plaintiff concedes that a collective

bargaining agreement was in place. (FAC ¶¶ 111, 120, 126, 136,

144.) Thus, this court may properly consider the CBA, submitted

as an exhibit to defendants’ first motion to dismiss, without

converting this motion into a motion for summary judgment. 

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Section 301 of the LMRA states that, “Suits for 4

violation of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization representing employees in an industry affecting

commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor

organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United

States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §

185(a).

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(First Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1.)

B. Labor Management Relations Act

1. Preemption under § 301

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s ninth, tenth,

eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, sixteenth,

seventeenth, twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second claims

are all preempted under the LMRA. (Second Mot. to Dismiss 4-9.) 

It is well established that § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §

185(a), allows for preemption of state law claims which are

“dependent upon” or “inextricably intertwined with” a collective

bargaining agreement. ; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 4

202, 213 (1985). The Supreme Court has articulated two general

instances when this may occur: 1) when the “claims [are] founded

directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements”

and 2) “where the right is created by state law . . . [but the

application of state law] requires the interpretation of a

collective bargaining agreement.” Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d

1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic

Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1988)). 

However, not all claims stemming from conduct in the

workplace are necessarily preempted by the LMRA. See AllisChalmers, 471 U.S. at 211-212 (noting that “not every dispute

concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a

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collective-bargaining agreement is pre-empted by § 301”). In

particular, if a dispute can be resolved without the court being

required to consider the CBA, preemption will not be implicated. 

Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 (noting that a claim “may depend for its

resolution upon both the interpretation of a collective

bargaining agreement and a separate state-law analysis that does

not turn on the agreement. In such a case, federal law would

govern the interpretation of the agreement, but the separate

state-law analysis would not be thereby pre-empted.”). 

2. State Law Claims

a. Claims Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two

Claims twenty and twenty-one are for breach of contract

and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

respectively. Both of these claims directly relate to an

interpretation of the CBA contract, for that is what was

purportedly breached. Claim twenty-two is for failure to pay

wages and provide rest breaks, which is founded on rights created

by, and only by, the CBA. (CBA Section 4 (“hours”), Section 7

(“wages”).) Analysis of these claims cannot be accomplished

without looking to the CBA, therefore these four claims are

preempted by the LMRA. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.

b. Claims Sixteen and Seventeen

Claims sixteen and seventeen are for negligent and/or

intentional interference with existing contractual relationships

and negligent and/or intentional interference with prospective

economic advantage, respectively. Both of these theories are

state common law causes of action based on protecting

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Technically, these claims constitute four theories of 5

recovery: negligent interference with existing contractual

relationships; intentional interference with existing contractual

relationships; negligent interference with prospective economic

advantage; and intentional interference with prospective economic

advantage.

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“contractual rights or expectancies.” Woods v. Fox Broadcasting 5

Sub., Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 344, 350 (2005). Because the

contractual rights at issue necessarily arise out of the CBA,

these claims against Mayberry are preempted. 

As against Sara Lee, it is well established that a

party to a contract cannot be found liable under either of these

theories of law. Id. (“[A] party to the plaintiff’s contract

cannot be liable under any of the four theories. If the

defendant is a party to the contract, the plaintiff is relegated

to a cause of action for breach of that contract.”) (citing

Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.4th

503, 514 (1994). Indeed, these causes of action must be

reconciled with the longstanding “prohibition against liability

of contracting parties.” Allied Equipment, 7 Cal.4th at 513-514. 

Therefore, the court will dismiss these claims as against Sara

Lee. 

c. Claims Nine and Ten

Claims nine and ten are for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, respectively. The claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress is brought solely

against Mayberry, based on his “harassing, hostile, and

discriminatory treatment” of plaintiff, while the negligence

claim is brought against both defendants based on the failure to

provide a non-hostile, non-harassing, and non-discriminatory work

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environment. To support a claim for emotional distress under

California law, conduct must be “so extreme and outrageous ‘as to

go beyond all possible bounds of decency.’” Cook v. Lindsay

Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 239 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Alcorn

v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 499 n. 5 (1970)).

Plaintiff’s allegations in claims nine and ten include

accusations that Greenly was “denied Saturday shift differential

pay and work breaks, denied promotions,” and that he was “demoted

in retaliation for [his] complaints.” (FAC ¶ 14.) From this, as

well as other “harassment,” plaintiff asserts he was harmed. 

(FAC ¶¶ 83, 93, 98, 101.) All of these accusations, however,

involve work conditions explicitly covered by the CBA. (CBA

Sections 3 (seniority in promotions), 4 (hours), 7 (wages).) 

Therefore, in order to assess whether defendants’ conduct in this

regard was “outrageous,” the court must consider the CBA. Miller

v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d at 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“Actions that the collective bargaining agreement permits might

be deemed reasonable in virtue of the fact that the CBA permits

them.”). Claims nine and ten are therefore preempted.

d. Claims Eleven and Twelve

Claims eleven and twelve are for negligence and

negligence per se. These two claims are brought against both

defendants, and like claim ten, are based on the failure to

provide a non-hostile, non-harassing, and non-discriminatory work

environment. A claim based on negligence requires an inquiry

into the reasonableness of defendants’ conduct, within the

context of duties owed plaintiff. See e.g., Gdowski v. Louie, 84

Cal.App.4th 1395 (2000) (“reasonableness is . . . at the heart of

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a negligence claim”). As with the analysis above regarding a

claim for emotional distress, in order for the court to assess

the “reasonableness” of defendants’ conduct, it must consider the

conduct within the context of the duties created by the CBA. 

Indeed, the CBA is the source of those duties which defendants

purportedly violated. Claims eleven and twelve are therefore

preempted.

e. Claim Thirteen

Claim thirteen is brought against Sara Lee, alleging

negligence in the hiring, training, supervision, and retention of

Mayberry. (FAC ¶¶ 104-107.) Any decision to hire, discipline,

or ultimately fire an employee is clearly one which is governed

by the provisions and procedures of the CBA. (CBA Section 3

(dismissals).) Thus, any inquiry into the reasonableness of Sara

Lee’s conduct regarding such decisions would necessitate an

interpretation of the CBA. Therefore, this claim is preempted.

f. Claim Fourteen

Claim fourteen is for invasion of privacy, and is based

on Mayberry’s supposed disclosure of private facts about Greenly

as well as Mayberry’s “intrusion into plaintiff’s home.” 

California’s right to privacy requires both that an individual

have a “personal and objectively reasonable expectation of

privacy” and that the expectation “has been infringed by an

unreasonable . . . intrusion.” Alarcon v. Murphy, 201 Cal.App.3d

1, 5 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that for a privacy

right to be so inextricably intertwined with a collective

bargaining agreement so as to result in preemption, the agreement

must contain a waiver or some other explicit mention of those

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privacy rights affected. Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc.,

255 F.3d 683, 693 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing to find preemption

for invasion of privacy claims where conduct was not covered by a

collective bargaining agreement). 

By contrast, in this situation there is nothing in the

CBA that acts to affect plaintiff’s right to privacy or to be

free from intrusion. Indeed, there is nothing in the CBA even

arguably related to this claim. It is not enough that such

topics might be the subject of a provision in the CBA--an actual

provision must exist. Id. (preemption is proper where an

“existing provision of a CBA . . . can reasonably be said to be

relevant to the resolution of the dispute”) (emphasis added). 

Nor is it sufficient that the invasions of privacy happened to

take place in the work context. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407

(“[T]hese purely factual questions pertain[] to the conduct of

the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer. 

Neither . . . requires a court to interpret any term of a

collective-bargaining agreement.”) (emphasis added). Because, in

this context, plaintiff’s right to privacy is a “nonnegotiable

state law right,” this claim is not preempted. Id. at 697.

2. Exhaustion under § 301

When the LMRA preempts a state law claim, that claim

may be effectively re-characterized as one brought under § 301

for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Young, 830

F.2d at 997. Finding a state-law claim completely pre-empted

effectively “supplants it with a federal claim.” Id. at 998. 

All of the state-law claims preempted above by the LMRA will

therefore be considered by this court as a claim under § 301. 

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The one exception to the exhaustion requirement excuses 6

plaintiff from pursuing all grievance procedures where the union

breached its duty of fair representation. See generally Clayton,

451 U.S. 679.

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The basis of a claim under § 301 is founded on an allegation that

there has been a breach of contract between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 185. 

It is well established, however, that an “employee

seeking a remedy for an alleged breach of the collective

bargaining agreement between his union and employer must attempt

to exhaust any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures

established by that agreement before he may maintain a suit

against his union or employer under § 301(a) of the Labor

Management Relations Act.” Clayton v. Int’l Union, United Auto.,

Aerospace, and Agr. Implement Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679, 681

(1981) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650,

652-653 (1965)). Moreover, because the grievance procedures 6

contained in most collective bargaining agreements mandate that

any decisions are final and binding, in order for an employee to

recover under § 301 he must also show that his union breached its

duty of representation. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local

No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990); DelCostello v. Int’l

Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-164 (1983). 

In this case, the CBA at issue contains detailed

procedures to be pursued in the case of an employee grievance,

and provides that any decisions by the Board are “final and

binding on all parties.” (CBA Section 25 (“Adjustment Board and

Procedure”).) When plaintiff filed his original complaint in

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this action, there was no mention made of any effort on his part

to pursue any of the remedies outlined in the CBA. (Compl.) In

plaintiff’s amended complaint, in an apparent effort to cure this

deficiency, plaintiff summarily asserts that he “pursued and

exhausted all appropriate grievance procedures pursuant to the

Sara Lee collective bargaining agreement and/or Plaintiff is

excused from the exhaustion requirement on the grounds that the

union breached its duty of fair representation.” (FAC ¶¶ 111,

120, 126, 144.)

Under the liberal federal standards, these general

allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to allow the

recharacterized § 301 claim to go forward. See Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 515 (2002) (unanimous Court

holding that “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to

all civil actions, with limited exceptions” and “[a] requirement

of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that

must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules,

and not by judicial interpretation”); see also Karam v. City of

Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (the court is

required to accept all allegations as true). Because the court

finds ten of the claims above to be preempted, these claims will

be recharacterized as a claim for violation of the collective

bargaining agreement arising under § 301. Young, 830 F.2d at

997.

3. Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend that, even if plaintiff’s claims are

recharacterized under federal law, plaintiff would be time-barred

from bringing a § 301 claim. (Mot. to Dismiss 10.) The Supreme

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Court has held that actions under the LMRA are governed by the

six-month statute of limitations set out in § 10(b) of the

National Labor Relations Act. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 154

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)). Claims outside of that six-month

period are subject to dismissal. Id. at 155. Defendant, citing

the EEOC complaint filed on May 19, 2005, argues that the last

noted incident of improper conduct by Sara Lee or Mayberry

occurred on April 15, 2005. (Mot. to Dismiss 10.) 

The FAC, however, states that plaintiff filed a second

complaint with the EEOC on July 17, 2006, alleging additional and

more recent violations. Moreover, plaintiff does not

specifically confine his factual allegations in the FAC to any

particular time period, but instead contends that the hostile

behavior continued up until his August, 2006, dismissal. (FAC ¶

14; Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 5.) For the purposes of this

motion, the court accepts these assertions as true. Balistreri,

901 F.2d at 699.; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery

Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 502 n.15 (1968). The simple fact that

incidents of harassment also occurred outside of the six-month

period does not bar suit for continuing violations. See e.g.,

Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1443 (E.D.

Cal. 1995) (“hostile environment harassment . . . by its nature

involves an ongoing course of conduct rather than a single

discrete act”). Therefore, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged

that defendants’ conduct occurred within the six-month period

prior to filing the complaint.

4. Section 301 Claims Against Mayberry

By definition, a suit by an employee under § 301 can be

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Claim Four for retaliation; claim six for disability 7

discrimination; claim seven for failure to prevent; and claim

eight for unlawful failure to accommodate. (FAC ¶¶ 40-45, 53-59,

60-67, 68-76.)

As a result of a work-sharing agreement between the 8

EEOC and the DFEH, each agency is designated as the agent of the

other for the purposes of processing FEHA complaints. 29 C.F.R.

1626.10(c). Thus, while plaintiff’s first administrative

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brought only against an “employer,” who is party to the

collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (granting

jurisdiction to the District Courts over suits “between an

employer and a labor organization representing employees”). In

an effort to maintain a § 301 claim against Mayberry, plaintiff

summarily “alleges that Mayberry is a party to the collective

bargaining agreement.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 4.) This

unsupported assertion is directly contradicted by the CBA, which

contains as signatories only Sara Lee and the Union. (First Mot.

to Dismiss Ex. 1 at 40.) The court will therefore dismiss all

preempted state-law claims, re-characterized as a claim under §

301, as against Mayberry.

C. FEHA Claims

Plaintiff brings four claims under FEHA. FEHA 7

prohibits unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of sex,

disability, and other protected classifications. California

Government Code §§ 12900 et seq. In order for a federal court to

exercise jurisdiction over a FEHA claim, however, a plaintiff

must first timely file an administrative complaint with the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), and then

receive from the DFEH a notice of a “right to sue.” Cal. Gov.

Code § 12965.8

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complaint was filed with the EEOC, this is sufficient to satisfy

the exhaustion requirement.

Plaintiff did file a previous complaint with the EEOC 9

on May 19, 2005. However, the scope of a federal action brought

under FEHA is defined by the scope of the claims contained in the

original administrative complaint. Green v. L.A. County

Superintendant of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir.

1989). Plaintiff’s first “right-to-sue” letter, in response to

his 2005 EEOC complaint, was only for a charge of sexual

harassment. While administrative charges are to be liberally

construed, so as to allow plaintiffs to proceed on claims that

are “like or reasonably related to” the EEOC charges, see Sosa v.

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In order for an administrative complaint to be timely,

it must be filed within “one year from the date upon which the

alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.” 

Cal. Gov. Code § 12960; Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14

Cal.4th 479, 492 (1996). Under California law, failure to

exhaust these remedies generally precludes a party from bringing

a valid federal claim. Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916,

921 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); Romano, 14 Cal.4th at

492. 

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that all four FEHA claims must be

dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies in a timely manner, based on the fact that: 1)

plaintiff’s second FEHA complaint was filed four days after the

instant lawsuit; 2) plaintiff fails to allege that this second

FEHA complaint was timely; and 3) plaintiff fails to allege

against whom the second FEHA complaint, and subsequent “right-tosue” notice, were directed. (Mot. to Dismiss 10-13.)

Defendants are correct that a “right to sue” notice

must be received before a lawsuit may be filed. Indeed, 9

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Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1990), this court would

find it hard to reason that charges of disability discrimination

are “reasonably related” to charges of sexual discrimination.

Defendants, in the present motion, contend that this 10

July 17, 2006, EEOC complaint and subsequent “right-to-sue”

letter are a sham, because plaintiff has not produced these

documents. At this stage of litigation, however, plaintiff is

not required to produce evidence--mere factual allegation is

sufficient. However, it goes without saying that, should

plaintiff be unable to eventually produce the “right-to-sue”

letter, all FEHA claims will fail.

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plaintiff filed this lawsuit four days before filing his second

EEOC complaint on July 17, 2006. The Supreme Court has firmly 10

established, however, that the requirement of a “right-to-sue”

letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but merely a

condition precedent that is subject to waiver, estoppel, and

equitable tolling. Wrighten v. Metro. Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d

1346, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Zipes v. TWI, Inc., 455 U.S.

385, 393 (1982)). California courts therefore allow plaintiffs

to “cure” a premature suit, with the subsequent receipt of a

“right to sue” letter after a complaint has been filed, “provided

there is not evidence showing that the premature filing precluded

the state from performing its administrative duties or that the

defendant was prejudiced by such filing.” Edwards v. Occidental

Chemical Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1351.). 

In this case there is nothing to indicate that the EEOC

was precluded from performing its administrative functions as a

result of the premature suit. Because a premature lawsuit is

always subject to a motion to dismiss at any time before a “right

to sue” letter is received, it is unlikely that allowing

plaintiff to “cure” a premature filing will encourage parties to

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Defendants also argue that claim eight (failure to 11

provide reasonable accommodations) is similarly inappropriate

against Mayberry. Plaintiff, however, only brings claim eight

against Sara Lee. (FAC 10.)

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bypass the administrative procedures of the EEOC. Wrighten, 726

F.2d at 1351 (citing Pinkard v. Pullman-Stanrdard, 678 F.2d 1211,

1218 (5th Cir. 1982)). Moreover, defendants have not shown any

way in which they would be prejudiced by allowing plaintiff to

proceed. The fact that plaintiff filed an earlier EEOC charge in

2005 effectively put defendants on notice as to at least a

portion of the offending conduct, as well as plaintiff’s interest

in seeking relief for defendant Mayberry’s conduct. Accordingly,

plaintiff may proceed with his FEHA claims.

2. Claim Seven as Against Mayberry

Defendants additionally contend that, as a matter of

law, claim seven (failure to prevent unlawful sexual

discrimination) cannot be brought against Mayberry, because he

was the actual perpetrator of the harassment at issue.11

The “failure to prevent” cause of action originates in

California Government Code § 12940(j)(1), which makes it

“unlawful if the [company], or its agents or supervisors, knows

or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate

and appropriate corrective action.” This provision is, by

definition, a means of imposing vicarious liability on the

employer for the actions of its employees. State Dept. Of Health

Svcs. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1040-1042 (2003); Hope

v. Cal. Youth Auth., 134 Cal.App.4th 577, 593 (2005). It is not

a catch-all cause of action that can be brought against any and

all employees in the company who failed to prevent the harassment

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California Labor Code 5300 provides that proceedings 12

“[f]or the recovery of compensation, or concerning any right or

liability arising out of or incidental thereto” “shall be

instituted before the [Workers’ Compensation] [A]ppeals [B]oard

and not elsewhere . . . .” (emphasis added).

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from occurring, least of all against the actual harassing

employee. 

Plaintiff’s reasoning would extend liability under FEHA

to an illogical conclusion, whereby an individual could be found

directly liable for harassing an employee as well as for the

failure to prevent his own harassing conduct. Plaintiff may, of

course, bring a direct action against Mayberry for harassment,

which he successfully alleges in claim five, but the present

claim is improper. The court will therefore dismiss claim seven

against Mayberry.

D. California Labor Code § 132a

California Labor Code § 132a(1) makes it unlawful for

any employer to discriminate against any employee in retaliation

for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Defendants argue that,

based on California Labor Code § 5300, plaintiff’s twenty-third

claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”) is the exclusive

forum for claims under § 132a. (Mot. to Dismiss 14.) 12

Plaintiff, on the other hand, cites to City of Moorpark v.

Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1155 (1998), for the proposition

that “workers’ compensation is not the exclusive remedy for

violations of . . . 132a.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 10.) 

In fact, the California Supreme Court in Moorpark

clarified that for a plaintiff alleging disability

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discrimination, § 132a was not the exclusive remedy--a plaintiff

could also look to FEHA or common law principles for relief. 

Moorpark, 18 Cal.4th at 1158 (holding that for disability

discrimination, “section 132a does not provide an exclusive

remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and

common law wrongful discharge remedies”). Nonetheless, for

claims that are brought under § 132a, “the Workers Compensation

Appeals Board [is] the exclusive forum . . . .” Id. at 1156. 

Thus, while plaintiff has various alternative means of recovery

based on his allegation of disability discrimination, a claim

under § 132a is only proper before the WCAB. Accordingly, the

court will dismiss this claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendants’ motion to dismiss claim seven as

against defendant Mayberry, and claims sixteen and seventeen as

against defendant Sara Lee be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(2) defendants’ motion to dismiss claim twenty-three

be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(3) defendants’ motion to dismiss claims nine, ten,

eleven, twelve, thirteen, sixteen (as against defendant

Mayberry), seventeen (as against defendant Mayberry), twenty,

twenty-one, and twenty-two be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

Plaintiff is hereby given thirty days from the date of service of

this order to amend his complaint eliminating these preempted

claims and stating instead a claim against defendant Sara Lee

under § 301 of the LMRA, consistent with the requirements set

forth herein.

///

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in all other respects,

defendants’ motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: December 13, 2006

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