Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02579/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02579-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sergio Santamaria
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

__________

No. 05-4071

__________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Isabel Ramon-Rodriguez, also *

known as Ramon Herrera-Cisneros, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

__________

No. 06-1339

__________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Felipe Mendez, Jr., *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

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__________

No. 06-1572

__________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Cesar Daniel Gascon-Guerrero, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

__________

No. 06-2579

__________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Sergio Santamaria, *

*

Defendant-Appellant. *

Submitted: March 14, 2007

 Filed: July 5, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

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The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Four defendants in a drug distribution conspiracy appeal their convictions and

sentences resulting from a joint trial. Arguments on appeal include claims that: there

was insufficient evidence to support the convictions; an attorney labored under a

conflict-of-interest; a Terry stop was constitutionally unreasonable and evidence

found as a result of the stop should have been suppressed; drug quantity calculations

at sentencing were clearly erroneous; prior convictions were improperly used to

enhance sentences; and a “willful blindness” instruction was improperly submitted to

the jury while a “single vs. multiple conspiracy” instruction was not. We affirm the

judgment of the district court.1

I. Background

We present the facts in a light most favorable to the verdicts, drawing all

reasonable inferences from the evidence that support the jury’s verdicts. United States

v. Cannon, 475 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2007). Details surrounding the investigation

and events leading to the defendants’ arrests were introduced at the joint trial of the

four defendants largely through the testimony of officers engaged in investigation of

the conspiracy. Co-conspirators who pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the

government testified as to their respective roles and provided details about the

workings of the conspiracy and the roles of the present four defendants within the

conspiracy. In addition, defendant Felipe Mendez, Jr. (“Mendez”), testified, and a

number of inmates housed with the defendants relayed statements the defendants had

made while incarcerated.

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Officers began investigating a suspected drug distribution conspiracy in

December 2001. On January 2, 2003, officers stopped a white BMW containing

twenty-two pounds of methamphetamine wrapped in eighteen packages. Walter Cruz

DeJesus (“DeJesus”) was driving the BMW, and his girlfriend, Jessica Johnson

(“Johnson”) was the passenger. DeJesus and Johnson were traveling from California

to Iowa, and the BMW was registered in the name of DeJesus’s mother-in-law. It was

discovered that the registration for the BMW had only recently been transferred to

DeJesus’s mother-in-law and that it previously had been registered in another

woman’s name. The other woman was the wife of Mendez. DeJesus and Johnson

stated that Mendez had enlisted the two of them to drive methamphetamine from

California to Iowa and that they had made three to five prior deliveries with loads

weighing between fifteen and twenty-five pounds each.

Later, in summer 2004, officers learned from confidential informants that a

woman in Des Moines, Kathleen Boatwright (“Boatwright”), was a supplier of

methamphetamine. Officers used the confidential informants to make a series of

controlled purchases of methamphetamine from Boatwright and her boyfriend, Cody

Cannon (“Cannon”), using money with recorded serial numbers. After the controlled

purchases, officers obtained a search warrant for Boatwright’s home. Before officers

executed the search warrant, one of the confidential informants encountered

Boatwright at a store where she was seen purchasing a suitcase and where she told the

confidential informant she would be traveling to California. The confidential

informant believed the trip to California was for the purpose of obtaining

methamphetamine. Officers decided to wait to execute the warrant.

On July 8, 2004, still within the permissible window of time for executing the

warrant, the confidential informant told officers that Boatwright had returned from

California with a Hispanic male the informant believed to be Boatwright’s source.

Officers then conducted surveillance of Boatwright’s home in preparation for

execution of the warrant. Officers observed a Hispanic male on the front porch of

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Boatwright’s home and saw this man and a second Hispanic male leave Boatwright’s

home in a red Volkswagen Jetta. Officers then stopped the red Jetta and questioned

and eventually arrested the two occupants of the car. While officers were processing

the men from the Jetta, other officers executed the search warrant at Boatwright’s

home.

Mendez was the driver of the red Jetta, and defendant Sergio Santamaria

(“Santamaria”) was the passenger. Mendez told the officers he had a valid driver’s

license, but proceeded to hand the officers a California identification card bearing the

name Anthony Gonzales. Officers saw a California driver’s license in Mendez’s

wallet. The driver’s license, like the identification card, had a picture of Mendez. The

driver’s license listed the name Felipe Mendez. Santamaria gave the officers an Iowa

driver’s license that bore his correct name. At the time of the traffic stop, officers

were not certain of Mendez’s and Santamaria’s true identities, so they placed a call to

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and obtained consent from Mendez

and Santamaria to move them and the Jetta to a nearby police station. A subsequent

criminal history check showed prior arrests and deportations for Santamaria in the

name of Jaime Cabrera. The car was not registered to either of the men, and both men

appeared to be in the United States illegally. Eventually, it was determined that

Mendez and Santamaria were present illegally, and ICE entered detainers against

them. The officers impounded the Jetta, conducted an inventory search of the Jetta,

and searched the two men. The search of the Jetta revealed $4,800 in cash, $740 of

which bore serial numbers used in the controlled purchases from Boatwright. It was

also discovered that Mendez had three cell phones and Santamaria had two cell

phones. Mendez also had the box top from a box of plastic baggies in his pants.

When officers executed the warrant at Boatwright’s home, Boatwright, Cannon,

and defendant Cesar Daniel Gascon-Guerrero (“Gascon-Guerrero”) were present.

Gascon-Guerrero was in a bathroom where officers found a small quantity of

methamphetamine hidden in a dollar bill behind the toilet and a cell phone hidden atop

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a cabinet. A search of the rest of home revealed five ounces of methamphetamine,

four grams of marijuana, two digital scales, drug notes, surveillance cameras, two

loaded handguns, and ammunition. Officers also found, in the living room of

Boatwright’s home, a cardboard box of plastic sandwich bags missing a box top that

matched the box top found in Mendez’s pants.

After agreeing to cooperate, Boatwright testified that she met defendant Isabel

Ramon Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) in late 2002 and soon began selling

methamphetamine that he supplied. Boatwright believed Rodriguez obtained his

methamphetamine from California because she observed on at least one occasion that

he traveled to California when he ran out of drugs, and when he returned, he was

again able to supply methamphetamine. 

In February 2003, Rodriguez was arrested in Des Moines on manslaughter

charges. At that time, Boatwright owed Rodriguez money for drugs she had received

from him on credit. After Rodriguez’s arrest, Boatwright received phone numbers for

Mendez and Santamaria through Rodriguez. The number for Santamaria did not

work, but the number for Mendez was accurate. Boatwright called Mendez to tell him

of the arrest, and Boatwright was present when a man that Rodriguez had brought to

Iowa from California used her phone to speak with Mendez. Boatwright then

maintained contact with Mendez.

Eventually, Mendez sent Santamaria to Iowa, Santamaria provided

methamphetamine to Boatwright, and Boatwright sold the methamphetamine. This

continued until Boatwright gambled with the proceeds of her sales and was unable to

pay Santamaria and Mendez. The two men cut off Boatwright’s supply for awhile,

but they eventually resumed their relationship with her. On at least two occasions,

Boatwright traveled to California at Mendez’s request and returned from California

in a black Blazer provided by Mendez. Both times, the Blazer carried

methamphetamine, and Mendez sent Gascon-Guerrero with Boatwright to ensure that

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the methamphetamine reached Des Moines. Both times, Mendez and Santamaria were

with Boatwright in California and traveled to Iowa separately from Boatwright and

the black Blazer. One of the trips to Iowa was the trip immediately preceding

execution of the search warrant at Boatwright’s home.

Ultimately, the government brought conspiracy charges against Rodriguez,

Mendez, Gascon-Guerrero, Santamaria, and others. These four defendants pleaded

not guilty and proceeded to a joint trial. Additional co-conspirators who testified at

trial included DeJesus, Johnson, Carlos Gil (“Gil”), Augustin Sandoval Rodriguez,

Jeffrey Robert Behle, and Philip Gatewood. These testifying co-conspirators

explained their relative roles and contacts within the conspiracy, the frequency and

quantity of drugs they had personally handled, the vehicles and locations used by the

conspirators, and their observations of the relationships between the conspirators. We

describe testimony from each below as relevant to the various defendants’ arguments

concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. In general, the witnesses all described the

conspiracy in a consistent manner: they placed Mendez at the center with Santamaria

also holding a key position. Rodriguez was a lower-level conspirator whose activities

were interrupted when he was arrested on manslaughter charges. Finally, GasconGuerrero’s role, as described by Boatwright, was as that of a trusted shepherd sent by

Mendez to ensure that shipments of drugs from California reached Iowa safely.

Mendez has been represented by several different attorneys in relation to this

matter. One of his attorneys was F. Montgomery Brown (“Attorney Brown”), who

entered an appearance on October 12, 2004. Another attorney entered an appearance

to represent Mendez on October 20, 2004. Attorney Brown moved to withdraw from

the case, and the court granted his motion on November 2, 2004. At the time of the

joint trial of the four present defendants, Attorney Brown was representing Gil, and

Gil testified against Mendez over the objection of Mendez’s trial counsel. Mendez

argues on appeal that the alleged conflict of interest surrounding Attorney Brown’s

representation of Gil and Mendez in the same matter should have precluded Gil from

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testifying. In particular, Mendez attacks his own trial counsel’s performance alleging

trial counsel should have pursued the issue of the possible conflict involving Gil and

Attorney Brown more vigorously. We discuss this issue in more detail below.

Finally, the jury instructions actually given to the jury included a willful

blindness instruction that did not reference any one of the four defendants in

particular. There were no objections to the use of this instruction. Also, the court did

not give the jury a “single vs. multiple” conspiracy instruction, and no party objected

at trial to the absence of such an instruction. On appeal, Santamaria challenges the

willful blindness instruction and Gascon-Guerrero challenges the absence of a single

vs. multiple conspiracy instruction. We address each defendant’s various arguments

in turn, with additional facts presented as relevant to the arguments.

II. Discussion

A. Santamaria

1. Santamaria: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Santamaria argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. To the

contrary, the evidence against him is very substantial. At least four witnesses testified

consistently as to Santamaria’s actions and role in the conspiracy. This testimony

established the elements necessary to prove the conspiracy charges, and the jury

accepted this testimony as credible. See Cannon, 475 F.3d at 1020 (“To convict . . .

of conspiracy, the government had to prove that there was an agreement . . . that [the

defendant] knew of this agreement, and that [he] intentionally joined this agreement.”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, officers stopped Santamaria

leaving Boatwright’s home in the red Jetta with the money from the controlled

purchases and a multitude of cell phones. To the extent Santamaria bases his

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on the jury’s assessment of the witnesses’

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credibility, such determinations are “virtually unreviewable” on appeal, and we will

not disturb the jury’s assessment in this case. United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938,

948 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and internal citation omitted).

The testimony regarding Santamaria was as follows. First, Boatwright testified

extensively as to her dealings with Santamaria. She identified Santamaria in court and

stated that she knew him as “Rudy.” She stated that, after Rodriguez was arrested for

manslaughter and after she contacted Mendez, Mendez arranged for her to meet

Santamaria at a restaurant in Des Moines. There, she met Santamaria for the first time

and gave him money that she had owed to Rodriguez. She also testified that

Rodriguez asked Mendez to supply her with methamphetamine to sell. When she

talked to Mendez about obtaining drugs for sale, Mendez sent Santamaria to her home

with two pounds of methamphetamine. Boatwright also testified that, after she

finished selling the methamphetamine that Mendez fronted her through Santamaria,

she paid to Santamaria the price quoted by Mendez. Boatwright described this

scenario as a repeated event and explained that she eventually became indebted to

Mendez and Santamaria because she gambled away the proceeds of her sales and

failed to pay for the fronted methamphetamine. Mendez then summoned her to

California where Santamaria met her at the airport, drove her to a hotel, and stayed

with her until she met with Mendez. On two separate California trips, she returned

to Iowa in a black Blazer accompanied by Gascon-Guerrero. Santamaria, whom she

had been with in California prior to driving to Iowa, then arrived in Des Moines.

Upon her return to Iowa after one trip, Boatwright met Santamaria at a Des Moines

hotel. After the other trip, Santamaria and Mendez came to her home.

Boatwright’s testimony places Santamaria in a pivotal role within the

conspiracy, helping to coordinate the trafficking and distribution of methamphetamine

between California and Iowa, traveling between the two states, and meeting with

Boatwright in both states. Cruz, Johnson, and Gatewood also testified against

Santamaria, describing a role for Santamaria in the conspiracy that was consistent with

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Boatwright’s testimony. This testimony, combined with the evidence collected from

Santamaria and the red Jetta, more than suffices to support the jury’s verdict.

2. Santamaria: Willful Blindness Instruction

The court submitted a willful blindness instruction to the jury without specific

reference to any one of the four defendants, and no defendant objected generally or

asked that the instruction be limited. Because there was no objection or request to

limit the instruction, we review only for plain error. United States v. Bamberg, 478

F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 2007). “Plain error only exists if (1) there was an error, (2) the

error was plain, (3) the error affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights, and (4) a

failure to grant relief would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Falcon, 477 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2007)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The willful blindness instruction in this case was appropriate because one of

Santamaria’s co-defendants, Gascon-Guerrero, claimed ignorance of the conspiracy.

As explained below, however, the evidence strongly demonstrated that GasconGuerrero would have to have been deliberately ignorant not to appreciate the existence

and activities of the conspiracy. See United States v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th

Cir. 2004) (“A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts

a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate

ignorance.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the government

did not argue at closing that willful blindness was applicable to Santamaria. Where

a willful blindness instruction is appropriate as to at least one of multiple codefendants, we do not believe that a trial court’s failure to sua sponte limit the willfulblindness instruction to a particular defendant generally rises to the level of plain

error. Further, even if we found error on the present facts, we would not find that any

such error affected Santamaria’s substantial rights given the overwhelming evidence

of his guilt. See United States v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding

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no prejudice to a defendant in the giving of a willful blindness instruction where the

instruction was appropriate as to another defendant, there was no request to limit the

instruction, and the evidence against the defendant was “overwhelming”). 

3. Santamaria: Sentence Enhancement/Predicate Felonies

The district court found that Santamaria had two prior felony drug convictions

and sentenced Santamaria to life imprisonment in accordance with 21 U.S.C. §§

841(b)(1)(A) and 851. The two prior felony drug convictions were a 1991 conviction

in San Jose, California, for felony possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and a

1999 conviction in Los Angeles for possession of cocaine base with intent to sell.

Santamaria argues that certified records used to prove these prior convictions fail to

show (1) that he was represented by, or waived his right to, counsel in relation to the

1991 conviction, or (2) that the 1999 conviction which resulted in probation rather

than imprisonment was, in fact, a “final” conviction as required under 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(A).

As to the first argument, 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) places a five-year limitation on a

defendant’s ability to collaterally challenge a prior conviction that the government

seeks to use for a federal sentencing enhancement. Id. (“No person who stands

convicted of an offense under this part may challenge the validity of any prior

conviction alleged under this section which occurred more than five years before the

date of the information alleging such prior conviction.”). This five-year limitation,

however, does not apply to claims that a defendant’s predicate conviction occurred in

violation of the defendant’s right to counsel. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,

494-96 (1994). Accordingly, even though the 1991 conviction was more than five

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As to the 1999 conviction, Santamaria does not present a collateral challenge.

Rather, he contests the very existence of a qualifying final conviction. Accordingly,

the five year limitation does not apply.

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years old, Santamaria is not time-barred from proving it infirm for use as predicate

felony.2

Santamaria’s challenge fails, instead, because he did not meet his burden of

proof. Congress clearly provided that a defendant may challenge a prior conviction

as “obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States,” but Congress chose

to place on the defendant rather than the government “the burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence on any issue of fact raised [in the challenge].” 21

U.S.C. § 851(c)(2). Santamaria was careful below, in his appellate brief, and in oral

argument to this panel, to avoid actually claiming that he was deprived of counsel in

1991. Rather, he argues only that the certified record of his conviction fails to show

that he was represented by counsel or that he waived his right to counsel. In fact, his

argument on this issue in his brief concludes, “If Santamaria was not represented by

counsel for the subject offense, the offense cannot be used to trigger the mandatory

life sentence.” (Emphasis added). Santamaria’s reluctance to actually claim there was

an absence of counsel in 1991 strongly suggests that this argument amounts to form

over substance. In any event, a complete failure to allege the absence of counsel falls

far short of meeting the factual burden of proof imposed on Santamaria by §

851(c)(2).

As to the 1999 conviction, Santamaria argues there was no final judgment under

state law because he received probation and a suspended sentence. As a result, he

argues, there was no “prior conviction[] for a felony drug offense.” 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(A). The facts surrounding the California proceedings were as follows.

Santamaria pleaded guilty to the California cocaine charge on June 14, 1999, and was

sentenced to thirty-six months of probation and ninety days of imprisonment. On

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October 10, 2001, his probation was modified and he was ordered to complete 80

hours of community service. On July 10, 2002, his probation was revoked, and on

July 14, 2002, he was arrested on a bench warrant and ordered to attend an anger

management meeting. On August 26, 2002, the court reinstated his probation. Based

on these facts, we believe that Santamaria’s 1999 guilty plea and subsequent

proceedings in California qualify as a final conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A). See

United States v. Slicer, 361 F.3d 1085, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying federal law

to find that probation and a state’s suspended imposition of sentence qualified as a

final conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A)); United States v. Maxon, 339 F.3d 656, 658-59

(8th Cir. 2003) (applying federal law to determine whether there was a qualifying

predicate); United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 665 (8th Cir. 2001) (same);

United States v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 948 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that federal rather

than state law determines whether a prior proceeding resulted in a qualifying predicate

under § 841(b)(1)(A)).

In a separate challenge also related to sentencing, Santamaria argues that the

district court impermissibly looked beyond the statutory elements of his prior

convictions to determine that the underlying crimes were “felony drug offense[s].”

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). This argument is without merit. Here, the information

necessary to determine the nature of the predicate offenses was contained in the

certified records of the convictions. Under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13

(2005), a sentencing court is not constrained to look only at the statutory elements of

the offense, but may look to the “terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea

agreement or transcript of colloquy between the judge and defendant . . . or to some

comparable judicial record of this information.” Id. at 26. The district court in this

case simply undertook no impermissible inquiries in the course of determining that

Santamaria’s prior convictions for possessing marijuana with the intent to sell and

possessing cocaine base with the intent to sell were qualifying prior “felony drug

offense[s].” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).

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B. Gascon-Guerrero

1. Gascon-Guerrero: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Gascon-Guerrero challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. In particular, he argues that the evidence proved merely that he was

present, not that he had knowledge of, or participated in, a conspiracy. His arguments

are without merit.

Gascon-Guerrero was arrested when found in the bathroom of Boatwright’s

residence during the officers’ execution of the search warrant. Hidden with him in the

bathroom were a cell phone and small quantity of methamphetamine wrapped in a

dollar bill. Boatwright testified that Mendez sent Gascon-Guerrero along to

accompany her on two separate trips from California to Iowa to make sure she and the

drugs that were hidden in the Blazer arrived safely. Upon arriving in Iowa on the first

trip, Gascon-Guerrero waited with Boatwright until instructed to meet with

Santamaria at a Des Moines-area motel. He then took the Blazer and Boatwright to the

motel to meet with Santamaria. Later, he drove the Blazer and Boatwright back to

Boatwright’s residence, left again with the Blazer, and returned a short time later with

two pounds of methamphetamine for Boatwright to sell. Following the second

California-to-Iowa trip that Gascon-Guerrero took with Boatwright, Mendez and

Santamaria took the Blazer from Boatwright’s home while Boatwright and GasconGuerrero waited. Mendez and Santamaria returned shortly thereafter with 1/4 pound

of high purity “ice” methamphetamine and 1/4 pound of lower purity Mexican

methamphetamine. 

The nature of Gascon-Guerrero’s actions, as described by Boatwright and as

corroborated by Gascon-Guerrero’s presence at the residence with the hidden phone

and methamphetamine when officers executed the search warrant, provide sufficient

support for the jury’s determination.

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2. Gascon-Guerrero: Multiple Conspiracy/Single Conspiracy

Instruction

Gascon-Guerrero challenges the district court’s failure to offer a “single

conspiracy vs. multiple conspiracy” jury instruction. Gascon-Guerrero neither

requested such an instruction nor objected to its absence, so our review is for plain

error. Bamberg, 478 F.3d at 939. Here, there was no error in the absence of such an

instruction.

We have said that:

A single conspiracy is composed of individuals sharing common

purposes or objectives under one general agreement. A single

conspiracy may exist even if the participants and their activities change

over time, and even if many participants are unaware of, or uninvolved

in, some of the transactions. Further, the agreement need not be explicit,

but may be tacit, based upon the actions of the defendant.

United States v. Smith, 450 F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). The government’s theory of the case was that Mendez and

Santamaria were at the center of a single, “wheel and spoke” conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine with the other co-conspirators involved to varying degrees in

different aspects of the transportation, delivery, and sale of the drugs. The evidence

presented against Gascon-Guerrero consistently described a conspiracy to deliver and

distribute methamphetamine from California to the Des Moines area. In United States

v. Cubillos, 474 F.3d 1114, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007), we stated that to determine whether

there is one or more conspiracies, “we consider factors such as ‘the nature of the

activities, the location where the alleged events of the conspiracy occurred, the

identity of the coconspirators, and the time frame.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Burns, 432 F.3d 856, 863 (8th Cir. 2005)). Here, there were no allegations of a

separate conspiracy with a separate purpose, separate activities, or separate locations,

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and the evidence supported the government’s single conspiracy theory. It is not

necessary that all co-conspirators know one another or collaborate with every other

member of a conspiracy for there to be a single conspiracy. See United States v,

Oseby,148 F.3d 1016, 1024 (8th Cir. 1998) (“‘[I]t is not necessary to show that all the

conspirators were involved in each transaction or that all the conspirators even knew

each other.’”) (quoting United States v. Rosnow, 977 F.2d 399, 405 (8th Cir.1992)).

3. Gascon-Guerrero: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Gascon-Guerrero’s trial counsel decided not to cross-examine Boatwright, and

Gascon-Guerrero alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on this decision. We

note initially that defense counsel for the other defendants cross-examined Boatwright

and brought issues relevant to her credibility to light for the jury. Gascon-Guerrero

does not suggest that cross-examination by the other attorneys was flawed or

ineffective or that there were additional areas of inquiry his own counsel could have

or should have pursued. Gascon-Guerrero also does not explain how he was

differently situated from the other defendants for the purpose of attacking

Boatwright’s credibility in a manner that would have been unique to GasconGuerrero’s case. That having been said, a claim of ineffective assistance is not

generally cognizable on direct appeal unless the record relevant to the claim of

ineffectiveness is fully developed “or where the result would otherwise be a plain

miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Lewis, 483 F.3d 871, 873 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No record has been developed in this

case to explain how the alleged ineffectiveness might have caused prejudice to

Gascon-Guerrero, we find no risk of a miscarriage of justice, and Gascon-Guerrero

largely appears to have raised this issue to ensure its preservation for a collateral

attack. As such, we will not address this issue further.

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4. Gascon-Guerrero: Drug Quantity Determination

The district court found Gascon-Guerrero responsible for at least fifteen

kilograms (slightly over thirty-three pounds) of methamphetamine and sentenced him

to 200 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 60 months of supervised release. As

a conspirator, Gascon-Guerrero is responsible for the quantity of drugs involved in the

conspiracy that was reasonably foreseeable in light of his agreement to participate in

the conspiracy:

In order to attribute a quantity of drugs to a defendant, the sentencing

court is required to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

activity involving those drugs was in furtherance of the conspiracy and

either known to that defendant or reasonably foreseeable to him. In a

drug conspiracy case, the district court may consider amounts from drug

transactions in which the defendant was not directly involved if those

dealings were part of the same course of conduct or scheme.

United States v. Rodriguez, 484 F.3d 1006, 1014 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and

internal citations omitted). Given this rule, it matters not that only a small quantity

of methamphetamine was found with Gascon-Guerrero in the bathroom when officers

executed the search warrant.

Gascon-Guerrero was well positioned within the conspiracy to appreciate the

scope of the conspiracy and the quantities involved. He was shown to be a trusted

shepherd who could be relied upon to ensure other conspirators made it securely to

their destinations. He was neither a one-time mule nor an ignorant patsy. Regarding

activities directly involving Gascon-Guerrero, there were repeated trips between

California and Iowa with Boatwright. In Iowa, Gascon-Guerrero left Boatwright’s

residence with Santamaria in the Blazer and returned with drugs. It is reasonable to

presume, as Boatwright presumed, that Gascon-Guerrero and Santamaria extracted the

drugs from their hiding place in the Blazer. These actions demonstrate a position

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within the conspiracy with adequate exposure to information about the conspiracy to

make more than Gascon-Guerrero’s own activities reasonably foreseeable to GasconGuerrero.

Other co-conspirators, including Cruz and Johnson, testified consistently as to

the quantities involved in their own cross-country trips (fifteen to twenty-five pounds

per trip for five trips). In addition, Jeff Behle and Philip Gatewood were testifying coconspirators who claimed to have been involved with the breaking-down of vehicles

and extraction of drugs from transport vehicles. These co-conspirators testified

consistently as to repeated shipments in the same weight range. Although much of

this testimony described shipments in a time frame preceding the evidence of GasconGuerrero’s involvement, the testimony clearly demonstrates shipment size and

transportation techniques consistent with Boatwright’s testimony. The witnesses’

testimony, taken together, is adequate to show that the conspiracy involved at least

fifteen kilograms and that this quantity was reasonably foreseeable to GasconGuerrero.

C. Rodriguez

Rodriguez argues only that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction. For the reasons explained above, including Boatwright’s testimony

regarding Rodriguez’s role in the conspiracy and his role in introducing her to Mendez

and facilitating her receipt of drugs from Mendez and Santamaria, his arguments are

without merit. The evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as

to Rodriguez.

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3

Mendez appears to challenge only the initial, investigatory stop, not the

expansion or duration of the stop. In fact, any such challenge would be wholly

without merit because suspicion of criminal activity grew rapidly from the initial stop

and because Mendez consented to the officer’s request to move the investigation to

a police station. See United States v. Gomez Serena, 368 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that the expansion or extension of stop may be permissible if

supported by developing or expanding level of suspicion).

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D. Mendez

1. Mendez: Reasonableness of the Terry Stop/Seizure 

Mendez first challenges the officers’ stop of the red Jetta. Mendez argues the

stop was based solely on race and, as such, was unreasonable and in violation of his

Fourth Amendment protections against an unreasonable seizure.3

Regarding the initial stop, we find that there was reasonable suspicion for an

investigatory stop as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See United

States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying the Terry standard of

reasonable suspicion to an investigatory traffic stop where the officer possessed

information from a reliable informant’s tip and where a detective had verified portions

of the tip through surveillance prior to the stop). In claiming that the stop was based

solely on race, Mendez mischaracterizes the scope of the information underlying the

officers’ reasonable suspicion. Officers possessed all the information that supported

the issuance of the search warrant for Boatwright’s residence, including the repeated

controlled purchases, Boatwright’s purchase of luggage and round-trip travel to

California, and the claim by the confidential informant that Boatwright had returned

from California with a Hispanic male believed to be her supplier. Armed with this

information, officers surveilled Boatwright’s home, observed a Hispanic male on the

front porch, and observed that man and another Hispanic male leave the residence in

the red Jetta. Based on the totality of this information, it cannot be said that officers

stopped the red Jetta merely because a Hispanic person was present, nor can it be said

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that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. Although race was an identifying

characteristic actually used by the officers, it was not the only factor officers relied

upon, and the present case is not an example of racial profiling, as suggested by

Mendez. See United States v. Thomas, 480 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 2007).

2. Conflict of Interest Regarding Attorney Brown

When the government offered Gil as a witness and commenced direct

examination, Mendez’s actual trial counsel, Timothy McCarthy (“Attorney

McCarthy”), objected at a sidebar. Attorney McCarthy challenged the use of Gil as

a witness, alleging that Attorney Brown’s temporary, pre-trial representation of

Mendez, coupled with Attorney Brown’s representation of Gil, created a conflict of

interest. The court determined during the sidebar that Gil could testify, subject to

possible exclusion, and that a record would be made after-the-fact to address the

possible conflict. 

In direct testimony and on cross-examination, Gil explained that he pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine without a written plea agreement.

He had been sentenced to the statutory minimum for his offenses, 120 months’

imprisonment, and was already serving his sentence by the time of Mendez’s trial. Gil

testified that he met Mendez in a Des Moines-area bar, began receiving one to two

pound packages of methamphetamine from Mendez, always met with Mendez on the

east side of Des Moines, saw Mendez in a black Mercedes but in no other vehicles,

and received the methamphetamine on credit with money due to Mendez after resale

of the drugs. Gil testified that he sold methamphetamine from Mendez for a three to

four month period after Christmas 2003.

When Gil was done testifying and the jury was excused for a break, Attorney

McCarthy was given the opportunity to question Gil. Attorney McCarthy quickly

focused on the interaction between Attorney Brown and Gil and asked Gil if he was

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willing to waive his attorney-client privilege and discuss information exchanged with

Attorney Brown. Attorney McCarthy explained to the district court that the potential

for prejudice to Mendez in this situation was the possibility that Attorney Brown had

obtained privileged, damaging information from Mendez and subsequently breached

his duty of confidentiality towards Mendez by sharing that information with Gil for

use in Gil’s testimony against Mendez. Attorney McCarthy, the prosecutors, and the

district court agreed that any further questioning along these lines and any waiver of

privilege by Gil could not take place without the presence of Attorney Brown and

without giving Gil the opportunity to discuss the possible waiver with Attorney

Brown. As a result, the district court decided to halt the offer of proof related to Gil

and resume at a later date when Attorney Brown could be made to appear.

At the appointed date and time, when the court asked Attorney McCarthy if he

wished to resume questioning Gil outside of the presence of the jury, the following

exchange took place:

THE COURT: Mr. McCarthy, my understanding was you didn’t

need to make any record with respect to either Mr. Brown or Mr. Gil, is

that correct?

MR. McCARTHY: That is correct, Your Honor. I’m going to let

the Carlos Gil issue go at this time.

Later, in a motion for new trial, Mendez argued that Attorney McCarthy

provided ineffective assistance by failing to make a proper record regarding the

possible conflict involving Attorney Brown’s representation of Mendez and Gil.

Mendez argued that Attorney Brown’s dual representation presented an actual conflict

of interest and required relief without a need to show prejudice. The district court

rejected Mendez’s arguments, finding that it was necessary to prove prejudice under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984), and that the presumed prejudice

rule of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980) (holding that a showing of

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Strickland-type prejudice is not required where a defendant demonstrates an actual

conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance), did not apply because there

was no actual conflict of interest. The district court’s finding was based on the fact

that Mendez’s own trial counsel, Attorney McCarthy, was not alleged to have labored

under any sort of conflict. Rather, the conflict related to Attorney Brown. Because

the presumed prejudice standard did not apply, relief was contingent upon a showing

of prejudice. As to the issue of prejudice, the district court ultimately concluded, “[a]s

shown by the . . . evidence . . . even if the Court disallowed Gil’s testimony, there is

no reasonable probability the jury verdict would have been different in this case.”

On appeal, Mendez renews his conflict of interest argument, placing it in the

context of an ineffective assistance argument directed towards Attorney McCarthy.

Although, we generally do not address such claims on direct appeal, Lewis, 483 F.3d

at 873 n.2, we find no further development of the record is necessary in this case to

resolve Mendez’s claim of ineffective assistance. Accordingly, we will address this

claim now, on direct appeal. In doing so, we affirm for the same reasons as the district

court, namely: (1) there was no actual conflict; (2) a showing of prejudice is therefore

necessary for any grant of relief; and (3) there was no prejudice in this case because

the evidence against Mendez was overwhelming and Gil was, at most, a minor witness

whose testimony was cumulative with that of more important witnesses.

There was no actual conflict in this case because Mendez received conflict-free

assistance from Attorney McCarthy. Mendez cites no authority, and we have found

none, in which the presumed prejudice rule of Cuyler is extended to a situation

involving a defendant’s prior attorney in the absence of any alleged conflict involving

actual trial counsel. There is, however, authority from another circuit that is

analogous to the present situation and that strongly suggests a showing of prejudice

is required in Mendez’s case. In English v. United States, 620 F.2d 150, 151-52 (7th

Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit gave short shrift to an argument similar to Mendez's.

There, a defendant initially was represented by two attorneys, counsel and co-counsel.

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Co-counsel ceased the representation and began representation of a co-defendant. The

defendant claimed a conflict based on the fact that co-counsel, who had actually

represented him in the same proceedings, switched and served the co-defendant. The

Seventh Circuit summarily dismissed the claim, finding that because the defendant

received conflict-free assistance from his own, actual trial counsel, any actions taken

by former co-counsel could not create a conflict. See id. at 151 (“English after all is

not impugning the effectiveness of his own counsel . . . but his former counsel. . . .”).

This is not a case like Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1990), in

which our court found an actual conflict and applied the Cuyler standard to examine

whether there was “an actual and demonstrable effect of the conflict . . . not merely

an abstract or theoretical one.” Simmons, 915 F.2d at 378. In Simmons, a

defendant’s actual trial counsel had previously represented one of the prosecution’s

witnesses. There, we stated that the actual conflict “fairly leaps off the page.” Id. at

377. We held, however, that it remained necessary to show “how [the] defense [was]

hurt by the fact that one of his trial lawyers had previously represented the witness

[involved in the alleged conflict.]” Id. at 378. We carefully reviewed the record of the

trial and determined that the attorney who labored under an actual conflict had made

no tactical decisions nor performed in any manner that suggested the conflict impaired

the defense. Id.

The present case, in contrast, involves absolutely no showing or suggestion of

a conflict on the part of the one attorney who actually represented Mendez at trial and

made all tactical decisions for Mendez at trial. As such, we conclude that the

presumed prejudice standard of Cuyler has no application to the present facts. Rather,

the traditional prejudice inquiry of Strickland applies, and it is necessary for Mendez

to “demonstrate a reasonable probability” that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different absent some ineffectiveness on the part of Attorney McCarthy.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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Here, as Mendez has consistently asserted to the district court and to our court,

the possibility of prejudice lies in the abstract possibility that Attorney Brown might

have obtained damaging privileged information from Mendez and the further abstract

possibility that Attorney Brown might have passed this information on to Gil.

Mendez argues Attorney McCarthy provided ineffective assistance by ceasing his

pursuit of this issue and that Attorney McCarthy’s ineffectiveness caused prejudice.

We disagree. We find that it was well within the bounds of professional judgment and

discretion for Attorney McCarthy to elect to stop his pursuit of this abstract chain of

potential prejudice, and as such, we find no ineffectiveness on McCarthy’s part. The

evidence against Mendez was overwhelming: six cooperating co-conspirators other

than Gil testified consistently as to Mendez’s role at the heart of the conspiracy. Four

inmates who had been confined with Mendez testified as to statements Mendez made

about his involvement with methamphetamine trafficking. In addition, Mendez was

stopped leaving Boatwright’s home shortly before execution of the search warrant,

and he was in the car that carried money used in the controlled buy. Further, he

carried in his pocket the box top from a box of baggies that was found in the

Boatwright residence with other drug paraphernalia. Finally, Mendez himself testified

and made many statements that a reasonable jury could disbelieve and which could

permit the jury to conclude Mendez was dissembling to cover his guilt. Given this

state of the record, we believe that Mendez has not satisfied either element of the

Strickland test. Not only did Mendez fail to show a level of prejudice that could

satisfy the “reasonable probability” standard of Strickland, he failed to show that

Attorney McCarthy performed in a deficient manner when deciding to let the conflict

issue go and cease his questioning of Gil.

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3. Denial of the Motion for a New Trial

Mendez’s motion for a new trial was based on his arguments concerning the

Terry stop and the alleged conflict. Given our resolution of these issues, we find no

error in the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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