Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01560/USCOURTS-caDC-94-01560-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
California Air Resources Board
Amicus Curiae for Respondent
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Equipment Manufacturers Institute
Petitioner
Ford New Holland, Inc.
Petitioner
Hertz Equipment Rental Corporation
Intervenor
Ingersoll-Rand
Intervenor

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 1995 Decided July 12, 1996

No. 94-1558

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, ON BEHALF OF

CERTAIN OF ITS MEMBERS,

PETITIONER

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND CAROL M.

BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

HERTZ EQUIPMENT RENTAL CORPORATION AND INGERSOLL-RAND,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

94-1559, 94-1560, 94-1561, 94-1564, 94-1566, 94-1567,

94-1568, 94-1569

-

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Environmental Protection Agency

-

David M. Friedland argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner National Mining Association.

Alan H. McConnell argued the cause for petitioners and intervenors Equipment Manufacturers

Institute, Ford New Holland, Inc., Hertz Equipment Rental Corporation, and Ingersoll-Rand, Portable

Compressor Division. Timothy A. French argued the cause for petitioner Engine Manufacturers

Association with whomGary H. Baise, Jed R. Mandel and Melissa M. Thompson were on the briefs.

Norman W. Fichthorn entered an appearance for petitioners Hertz Equipment Rental Corporation

and Ingersoll-Rand.

Naikang Tsao, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for respondents, with whom

Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental

Protection Agency, and Michael J. Horowitz, Attorney, were on the brief.

Michael L. Terris, Senior StaffCounsel, California Air Resources Board, was on the brieffor amicus

curiae.

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1

1967 Act, § 2 (CAA, § 108(c)(1)), 81 Stat. at 492. 

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Two different sets of consolidated petitions challenge two final rules

on emissions from nonroad engines and vehicles adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency

("EPA") to implement sections 209(e) and 213 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q

(1994) ("CAA"), as revised by the amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.

Nonroad engines are internal combustion engines that are used in a wide variety of off-highway

equipment including lawnmowers, bulldozers, and locomotives. In the first set of petitions, the

Engine Manufacturers Association and others ("EMA") challenge the EPA's determination of the

scope of preemption of state regulation under § 209(e). In the second set of petitions, the National

Mining Association and others("NMA") challenge the EPA's decision to regulate very large (greater

than 750 horsepower) engines used in mining equipment, as well as the EPA's decision to regulate

smoke, hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter emissions, under § 213. Finding the

EPA's interpretations of § 209(e) to be permissible with one exception, we grant the EMA petitions

only in part. Concluding that the EPA's regulatory actions under § 213 were within its discretion and

not arbitrary or capricious, we deny the NMA petitions.

I.

The Clean Air Act Statutory Scheme. The CAA makes "the States and the Federal

Government partners in the struggle against air pollution." General Motors Corp. v. United States,

496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990). The basic structure of this partnership has not changed since it was

established by the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 ("1967 Act"), and the

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 ("1970 amendments"). See

generally American Petrol. Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.

1034 (1982). The 1967 Act required the states to set ambient air quality standards for each air

quality control region, establishing permissible levels of concentration for various pollutants.1

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2

Id.

3

1970 amendments, § 4(a) (CAA, § 109), 84 Stat. at 1679-80 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 7409 (1994)). 

4

Id. (CAA, § 110), 84 Stat. at 1680-83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994)). 

5

Id. (CAA, § 107(a)), 84 Stat. at 1678 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1994)). 

6 E.g., 1970 amendments, § 4(a) (CAA, § 110(a)(2)(F)), 84 Stat. at 1681 (codified as amended

at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(F) (1994)); 1977 amendments, § 127(a) (CAA, § 165), 91 Stat. at

735-39 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1994)). 

7 E.g., 1977 amendments, § 108(a)(1) (CAA, § 110(a)(2)(I)), 91 Stat. at 694. See also

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 848-51 (1984); Citizens Against the

Refinery's Effects Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981). 

Congress also directed the statesto adopt implementation plans explaining how they would improve

the air quality to meet the standards they had established.2 The 1970 amendments transferred

authority to set the standards, now known as national ambient air quality standards(NAAQSs), from

the statesto the EPA.3 The states were to submit state implementation plans (SIPs) for achieving the

NAAQSs to the EPA for approval.4 Thus, the states had the "primary responsibility" for improving

air quality,5although the EPA significantly influenced the process by setting the NAAQSs and testing

proposed SIPs against detailed statutory criteria.

The CAA contemplated that the states would carry out their responsibility chiefly by

regulating stationary sources, such as factories and power plants. Both before and after the 1977

amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, many of the statutory requirements for SIPs related

to the regulation of stationary sources.6 Penalties for failing to attain air quality standards also

focused on stationary sources, for example by restricting construction of new stationary sources in

areas that failed to meet a NAAQS.7 When Congress considered the 1990 amendments, it did so

against a historyof detailed state regulation ofstationary sources, backed up by the threat of curtailed

construction of these economically important installations.

In contrast to federally encouraged state control over stationary sources, regulation of motor

vehicle emissions had been a principally federal project. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n v.

New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 17 F.3d 521, 524-27 (2d Cir. 1994) ("MVMA"); Motor &

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8 Section 209(a) provides:

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any

standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new

motor vehicle engines subject to this part [CAA Title II, Part A]. No State shall

require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of

emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition

precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor

vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1994). 

9 Section 209(b)(1) provides:

The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive

application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other than

crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State

determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective

of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver shall

be granted if the Administrator finds that

(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious,

(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and

extraordinary conditions, or

Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1101-03, 1108-11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("MEMA"), cert.

denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). The regulatory difference is explained in part by the difficulty of

subjecting motor vehicles, which readilymove acrossstate boundaries, to controlbyindividualstates.

Congress had another reason for asserting federal control in this area: the possibility of 50 different

state regulatory regimes "raised the spectre of an anarchic patchwork of federal and state regulatory

programs, a prospect which threatened to create nightmares for the manufacturers." MEMA, 627

F.2d at 1109. Two years after authorizing federal emissions regulations, therefore, Congress

preempted the statesfrom adopting their own emissionsstandards.8 The Second Circuit has referred

to this preemption as "the cornerstone" of Title II, the portion of the CAA that governs mobile

pollution sources. MVMA, 17 F.3d at 526.

In spite of Congress' determination to protect manufacturers from multiple emissions

standards, see MEMA, 627 F.2d at 1109 (citing S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967)),

California was granted an exemption from the § 209(a) preemption.9 Congress recognized that

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(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are

not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title [CAA § 202(a)].

42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (1994). California is the only state that qualifies for the waiver, because it

was the only state that had adopted emissions control standards prior to March 30, 1966. 

10 1977 amendments, § 129(b), 91 Stat. at 750 (CAA, § 177) (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 7507 (1994)). 

11 E.g., 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1568 §§ 33-34 (codified as amended at Cal. Health & Safety Code

§§ 43013, 43018 (West Supp. 1996)); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 19-0107(5) (McKinney

1984). 

California was already the "lead[er] in the establishment of standards for regulation of automotive

pollutant emissions" at a time when the federal government had yet to promulgate any regulations of

its own. MEMA, 627 F.2d at 1109 n.26 (quoting S. Rep. No. 192, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965)).

California's Senator Murphy convinced his colleagues that the entire country would benefit from his

state's continuing its pioneering efforts, California serving as "a kind of laboratory for innovation."

Id. at 1109, 1110 n.31, 1111. This function was enhanced by the 1977 amendments, which permitted

other states to "opt in" to the California standards by adopting identical standards as their own.10

Thus, motor vehicles must be either "federal cars" designed to meet the EPA's standards or

"California cars" designed to meet California's standards. MVMA, 17 F.3d at 526-27. Rather than

being faced with 51 different standards, as they had feared, or with only one, as they had sought,

manufacturers must cope with two regulatory standards under the legislative compromise embodied

in § 209(a).

The pre-1990 CAA, then, extensively treated both stationary sources, which were principally

a state responsibility, and motor vehicles, which were principally the shared responsibility ofthe EPA

and California. Nonroad sources were not expressly mentioned, although it appears that some large

states had started to regulate a few nonroad sources in their attempts to meet the NAAQSs.11 It was

not until the 1990 amendments that Congress chose to define and regulate nonroad sources, and it

is the EPA's interpretation and application of those amendments that are challenged here.

The several phrases on whose construction these petitionsturn are but tiny pieces ofthe 1990

amendments, a legislative feat whose massiveness and complexity "beggar[ ] description." MVMA,

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12 See, e.g., CAA, § 182, 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1994). 

13 CAA, §§ 501-507, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (1994). 

14 CAA, §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994). 

15 CAA, § 182(c)(4). 

16 Section 216(10) provides:

The term "nonroad engine" means an internal combustion engine (including the

fuel system) that is not used in a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for

competition, or that is not subject to standards promulgated under section 7411 of

this title or section 7521 of this title [CAA §§ 111, 202].

42 U.S.C. § 7550(10) (1994) (amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 223(a), 104 Stat. at 2503). 

17 Section 216(11) provides:

The term "nonroad vehicle" means a vehicle that is powered by a nonroad engine

and that is not a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition.

42 U.S.C. 7550(11) (1994) (amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 223(a), 104 Stat. at 2503). 

17 F.3d at 525. Congress did not, however, alter the basic structures of Titles I and II, governing

the federal-state partnership over attainment ofthe NAAQSs and control ofmotor vehicle emissions,

respectively. Title I continues to focus both state regulatory efforts and disincentives to

nonattainment on stationary sources.12 The new permitting regime of Title V13and the acid rain

provisions of Title IV14 also direct the states' attention to their traditional regulation of stationary

sources. Although the amendments require a clean fuel vehicles program in serious, severe and

extreme nonattainment areas,15 the thrust of state compliance efforts continues to be on stationary

sources.

The mobile source provisions of Title II also continue the basic pre-1990 regime, with the

amendments adding detail and refinements. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:

AIR AND WATER § 3.1D (Supp. 1995). For the first time, however, Congress extended federal

regula- tion under Title II to nonroad pollution sources. The amendments altered the definitional

section of Title II, add- ing definitions of "nonroad engine"16 and "nonroad vehi- cle"17 and changing

the definition of "manufacturer" to include the manufacturing or assembling of new nonroad vehicles

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18 CAA, § 216(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7550(1) (1994). 

19 We use the term "nonroad sources" to encompass both "nonroad engines" and "nonroad

vehicles" as they are defined in the CAA. 

20 Section 213(a)(1-4) provides:

(1) The Administrator shall conduct a study of emissions from nonroad engines

and nonroad vehicles (other than locomotives or engines used in locomotives) to

determine if such emissions cause, or significantly contribute to, air pollution

which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Such

study shall be completed within 12 months of the date of November 15, 1990.

(2) After notice and opportunity for public hearing, the Administrator shall

determine within 12 months after completion of the study under paragraph (1),

based upon the results of such study, whether emissions of carbon monoxide,

oxides of nitrogen, and volatile organic compounds from new and existing nonroad

engines or nonroad vehicles (other than locomotives or engines used in

locomotives) are significant contributors to

Note 20Continued

ozone or carbon monoxide concentrations in more than 1 area which has failed to

attain the national ambient air quality standards for ozone or carbon monoxide. 

Such determination shall be included in the regulations under paragraph (3).

(3) If the Administrator makes an affirmative determination under paragraph (2)

the Administrator shall, within 12 months after completion of the study under

paragraph (1), promulgate (and from time to time revise) regulations containing

standards applicable to emissions from those classes or categories of new nonroad

engines and new nonroad vehicles (other than locomotives or engines used in

locomotives) which in the Administrator's judgment cause, or contribute to, such

air pollution. Such standards shall achieve the greatest degree of emission

reduction achievable through the application of technology which the

Administrator determines will be available for the engines or vehicles to which

such standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of applying such

technology within the period of time available to manufacturers and to noise,

energy, and safety factors associated with the application of such technology. In

determining what degree of reduction will be available, the Administrator shall first

consider standards equivalent in stringency to standards for comparable motor

vehicles or engines (if any) regulated under section 7521 of this title [CAA § 202],

taking into account the technological feasibility, costs, safety, noise, and energy

factors associated with achieving, as appropriate, standards of such stringency and

lead time. The regulations shall apply to the useful life of the engines or vehicles

(as determined by the Administrator).

(4) If the Administrator determines that any emissions not referred to in paragraph

or new nonroad engines.18 Under § 213, the EPA was required to study emissions from nonroad

sources19 and, if statutory triggers were met, to promulgate standards for the emission of various

pollutants from new nonroad sources.20 As it had done with respect to motor vehicles, Congress not

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(2) from new nonroad engines or vehicles significantly contribute to air pollution

which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, the

Administrator may promulgate (and from time to time revise) such regulations as

the Administrator deems appropriate containing standards applicable to emissions

from those classes or categories of new nonroad engines and new nonroad vehicles

(other than locomotives or engines used in locomotives) which in the

Administrator's judgment cause, or contribute to, such air pollution, taking into

account costs, noise, safety, and energy factors associated with the application of

technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the engines

and vehicles to which such standards apply. The regulations shall apply to the

useful life of the engines or vehicles (as determined by the Administrator).

42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(1-4) (1994) (amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 222(a), 104 Stat. at 2500-

01). 

21 Section 209(e)(1) provides:

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any

standard or other requirement relating to the control of emissions from either of the

following new nonroad engines or nonroad vehicles subject to regulation under this

chapter

(A) New engines which are used in construction equipment or vehicles used in farm

equipment or vehicles and which are smaller than 175 horsepower.

(B) New locomotives or new engines used in locomotives.

Subsection (b) of this section shall not apply for purposes of this paragraph.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1) (1994) (amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 222(b), 104 Stat. at 2502). 

Subsection (b) is the California waiver provision for the motor vehicle preemption of § 209(a). 

22 Section 209(e)(2) provides:

(A) In the case of any nonroad vehicles or engines other than those referred to in

only authorized the EPA to regulate nonroad sources but also preempted state regulation. The 1990

amendments added § 209(e)(1), which expressly preempted the states from adopting standards or

other requirements relating to emissions from two specific categories of nonroad sources.21 "In the

case of any nonroad vehicles or engines other than those referred to in" § 209(e)(1), the EPA was

required in § 209(e)(2) to authorize California to adopt standards and other requirements relating to

emissions, under similar conditions to those governing the motor vehicle preemption waiver; again,

as with the motor vehicle preemption waiver, other states could then opt in to the California

standards.22

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subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the Administrator shall, after notice and

opportunity for public hearing, authorize California to adopt and enforce standards and

other requirements relating to the control of emissions from such vehicles or engines if

California determines that California standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as

protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such

authorization shall be granted if the Administrator finds that

(i) the determination of California is arbitrary and capricious,

(ii) California does not need such California standards to meet compelling and

extraordinary conditions, or

(iii) California standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent

with this section.

(B) Any State other than California which has plan provisions approved under part D of

subchapter I of this chapter [CAA Title I] may adopt and enforce after notice to the

Administrator, for any period, standards relating to control of emissions from nonroad

vehicles or engines (other than those referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph

(1)) and take such other actions as are referred to in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph

respecting such vehicles or engines if

(i) such standards and implementation and enforcement are identical, for the period

concerned, to the California standards authorized by the Administrator under

subparagraph (A), and

(ii) California and such State adopt such standards at least 2 years before commencement

of the period for which the standards take effect.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (1994) (amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 222(b), 104 Stat. at 2502). 

II.

EMA challenges three aspects of the EPA's § 209(e) rulemaking: (1) the adoption of a

"showroom-new" definition of "new" under § 209(e)(1), rather than a date-certain definition; (2) the

interpretation of § 209(e)(2) to preempt state regulation of only "new" nonroad engines and vehicles,

rather than to preempt state regulation of all nonroad engines and vehicles, "new" and non-"new,"

not covered in § 209(e)(1); and (3) the interpretation of § 209(e)'s ban on state "standards and other

requirements" not to reach the states' so-called "in-use" regulations.

A.

Background of the EMA petitions. In its notice of proposed rule making for § 209(e), the

EPA proposed to define "new" consistently with the statutory definition of "new motor vehicle" in

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23 56 Fed. Reg. 45,866, 45,867 (1991). 

24 Id. at 45,871. 

25 59 Fed Reg. 36,969, 36,971-73 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 85.1602 (1995)). 

26 Id. at 36,973 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 85.1603(d) (1995)). 

27 56 Fed. Reg. at 45,867. 

§ 216 of the CAA.23 Therefore, the preemption of § 209(e)(1) would be limited to vehicles and

engines for which the legal or equitable title had never been transferred to the ultimate purchaser.24

This definition was retained in the final rule, with an amendment to cover leased vehicles and

engines.25 The final rule also limited the § 209(e)(2) implied preemption to "new" sources.26In this

respect, the finalrule differed from the notice of proposed rulemaking, which would have preempted

state standards over new and non-new sources. Even though the NPRM proposed to extend the

implied preemption of § 209(e)(2) to non-new sources, however, the EPA said that "[f]or engines

which are no longer "new,' states will be able to adopt regulationssuch asfuel quality specifications,

operational mode limitations, and measures that limit the use of nonroad engines or equipment."27

Thisis the genesis of the dispute over "in-use" regulations. The final rule, which limited preemption

to new sources, necessarily continued to permit in-use regulations, which by definition apply only to

non-new sources.

Following publication ofthe NPRM, EMA and other commenters argued unsuccessfully that

"new" should mean either that the engine or vehicle was manufactured after the effective date of the

1990 amendments, or that the engine had yet to be rebuilt. EMA claimed that Allway Taxi Inc. v.

City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y.) (interpreting § 209(a) motor vehicle preemption),

aff'd, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972), showed that the states could not regulate new motor vehiclesthe

moment after they were purchasedeven though the statute explicitly limited the preemption to

showroom-new motor vehicles. Rather, state emissions controls must be sufficiently delayed from

the original sale that the burden of compliance would not fall on the manufacturer:

We do not say that a state or locality is free to impose its own emission control

standards the moment after a new car is bought and registered. That would be an

obvious circumvention of the Clean Air Act and would defeat the congressional

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28 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,973. 

29 The § 209(e) rulemaking is not governed by the special procedural standards of § 307(d). 

CAA, § 307(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1) (1994). Thus, we analyze EMA's procedural

challenge solely under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. 

purpose of preventing obstruction to interstate commerce. The preemption sections,

however, do not preclude a state or locality from imposing its own exhaust emission

control standards upon the resale or reregistration of the automobile. Nor do they

preclude a locality from setting its own standards for the licensing of vehicles for

commercial use within that locality. Such regulations would cause only minimal

interference with interstate commerce, since they would be directed primarily to

intrastate activities and the burden of compliance would be on individual owners and

not on manufacturers or distributors.

Id. at 1124. Therefore, EMA commented, even if the EPA wanted to create a parallel regime for

nonroad engines and vehicles, it should not adopt a definition of "new" that ended preemption at the

moment of title transfer. The EPA noted these concerns, which of course would apply equally to the

statutory definition of "new motor vehicle," and stated in the finalrule that it expected courtsto apply

Allway Taxi's reasoning to the EPA's definition of "new nonroad engine."28

B.

The EMA Petitions. Before addressing the merits of the EMA petitions, we must first

dispose of two procedural issues raised by the parties. First, EMA asks us to vacate the portion of

the finalrule limiting the implied preemption of § 209(e)(2) to new nonroad sourcessince the NPRM

did not propose such a limitation. However, the court has long recognized that a final rule that is a

"logical outgrowth" from the notice of proposed rulemaking does not violate the notice requirement

of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).29 See, e.g., Connecticut Light and

Power Co. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835

(1982), and cases cited; see also Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1237-38

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Here, the notice of proposed rulemaking announced that the preemption under §

209(e) was at issue. 56 Fed. Reg. at 45,866. It also announced that the EPA proposed to construe

§ 209(e) parallel to § 209(b) (motor vehicles). Id. at 45,869. This sufficed to imply an intention to

treat the scope of preemption similarly. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for vacating this

part of the rule.

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30 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,973-74. 

31 Although the EPA's actions regarding § 213 are subject to review under CAA § 307(d), 42

U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (1994), and action regarding the § 209(e) rule is subject to review only under

the usual APA standards, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994), see supra n.29, the court has concluded that the

The EPA, in contrast, requests that we dismiss EMA's challenge to the EPA's decision to

permit states to adopt in-use regulations. The NPRM contained a sentence, quoted above, in which

the EPA proposed to permit states to adopt such regulations in spite of the § 209(e)(2) preemption.

None of the EMA petitioners challenged this proposal during the notice and comment period. The

EPA argues that EMA is therefore precluded from challenging the in-use aspect of the final rule.

Congressmen Dingell andBruce, however, did challenge the proposalin a letter to the Administrator:

The fact that title is transferred to the ultimate purchaser and the vehicle or engine is

"in use" or used does not suddenly give the States a power to impose standards or

requirements relating to emission controls because of that transfer.... Ifsuch items as

"fuel quality specifications, operational mode limitations, and measures that limit the

use of nonroad engines or equipment" are in reality standards or requirements

controlling emissions, they are not allowed any more than they were before title

passed.

In the final rule, while not referring to the Congressmen's criticism on this point, the EPA discussed

at length why it believed § 209(e)(2) did not preempt in-use regulations.30

As noted previously, the § 209(e) rulemaking is not governed by the special standards of §

307(d) of the CAA. Under the common law doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, EMA may raise the

issue here, even if it did not raise it during the rulemaking itself, so long as the agency actually

considered the issue. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1150-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (in banc). Cf.

ASARCO, Inc. v. FERC, 777 F.2d 764, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Natural Gas Act). Because the

Congressmen directly challenged the agency on the very point that EMA raises in its petition for

review, and the EPA defended its position at some length in the final rule, EMA is not barred from

arguing the issue now. We therefore turn to the merits of the EMA petitions.

Ourstandard ofreview for both the EMA and the NMA petitionsfollows a familiar path. The

court will uphold the EPA's final rule "[i]f EPA acted within its delegated statutory authority,

considered all of the relevant factors, and demonstrated a reasonable connection between the facts

on the record and its decision." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995).31 On

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standards are essentially the same under either statute. Ethyl Corp., 51 F.3d at 1064. 

issues of statutory interpretation, "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;

for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But "if the statute

is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. Thus, the court

need only find "that the EPA's understanding of this very "complex statute' is a sufficiently rational

one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of EPA." Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v.

NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (Clean Water Act). See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 848 (1977

CAA amendments are "lengthy, detailed, technical, complex and comprehensive"). Because EMA

directs its arguments to Chevron step one, that also is the primary focus of our discussion.

1. The definition of "new." In the absence of a statutory definition, the EPA chose to

define "new" in § 209(e)(1) to mean that the engine or vehicle has not been sold to the ultimate

purchaser or put into use. EMA refers to this definition, which closely parallels the definition of "new

motor vehicle" in § 216(3), as a "showroom-new" definition because it defines an engine or vehicle

as no longer "new" once it has left the retail showroom. EMA maintains that Congress intended

"new" to mean that the engine or vehicle was not in existence on the effective date of the 1990

amendments. Any engine or vehicle manufactured after that date-certain would therefore always be

"new," even after it had been put into operation. In sum, the EPA decided that the states could not

regulate the categories of equipment defined in § 209(e)(1) until it had been sold to the ultimate user,

regardless ofwhen the equipment wasmanufactured, while EMA believes Congressintended that the

states could not ever regulate any such equipment, either before or after sale, so long as the

equipment was manufactured after 1990.

AlthoughEMApresents variousreasonswhytheEPA's definitionof "new" should notsurvive

Chevron review, none is convincing. EMA first maintains that Congress' failure to define "new

nonroad engine" and "new nonroad vehicle" compels the conclusion that these terms do not have a

meaning analogous to "new motor vehicle," and "new motor vehicle engine," which are statutorily

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32 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1994). 

33 42 U.S.C. § 7550(3) (1994). 

34 42 U.S.C. § 7550(1) (1994). 

defined. Section 209(a) preempts state standards for motor vehicles: "No State or any political

subdivision thereofshall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions

from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle enginessubject to this part."32 Section 216(3) defines

"new motor vehicle" as "a motor vehicle the equitable or legal title to which has never been

transferred to an ultimate purchaser" and "new motor vehicle engine" as "an engine in a new motor

vehicle or a motor vehicle engine the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred to

the ultimate purchaser."33 In the 1990 amendments, Congress added definitions of "nonroad engine"

and "nonroad vehicle" to § 216, but did not define "new nonroad engine" or "new nonroad vehicle"

in a provision analogous to § 216(3). EMA relies on this omission, contending that if Congress had

meant "new nonroad engine" in § 209(e) to have a parallel definition to "new motor vehicle" in §

209(a), it would have inserted that definition in § 216. The EPA uses the absence of any definition

of "new nonroad engine" to make the opposite point: because there was a statutory definition of

"new" implicit in the longstanding definition of "new motor vehicle," if Congress had meant some

other definition of "new" to apply to nonroad sources, it would have put that other definition into the

statute.

Congress did amend the definition of "manufacturer" in § 216(1) to mean "any person

engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, new

nonroad vehicles or new nonroad engines."34 Had Congress not intended "new nonroad vehicles" and

"new nonroad engines" to import a similar meaning to "new motor vehicles" and "new motor vehicle

engines," it would likely not have used the same modifier, especially one with a well-understood

preexisting meaning in Title II. At the very least, if it had wanted a different meaning of "new" to

apply within the very same phrase, it could have made its intention explicit, and it did not. See

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980); Brown v. National Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin.,

673 F.2d 544, 546 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Likewise, had Congress intended a date-certain definition,

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35 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994). 

36 42 U.S.C. § 7547(d) (1994). 

37 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (1994). 

it could have provided an explicit trigger date for the § 209(e)(1) preemption, as it did elsewhere in

Title II. E.g., CAA, § 218, 42 U.S.C. § 7553 (1994) ("The Administrator shall promulgate

regulations applicable to ... nonroad engines manufactured after model year 1992."). In any event,

the absence of a definition of "new nonroad engine" from § 216 does not satisfy Chevron step one

by foreclosing the possibility that in Title II of the CAA "new" meant the same thing in 1990 that it

always had in the past.

"New" is used in other parts of the CAA in the sense urged by EMA, most obviously in Title

I in connection with the states' obligation to regulate and review the construction of "new" stationary

sources. For example, § 111(a)(2) defines "new source" as "any stationary source, the construction

or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations... prescribing a standard

of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source."35 Thus, before 1990,

"new" meant one thing with respect to stationary sources and another thing with respect to motor

vehicles. By putting the regulation of nonroad sources together with motor vehicles in Title II,

Congress suggested that it meant the latter definition to apply when it used "new" in relation to

nonroad sources.

Nor is it mere textual proximity that leads to this conclusion. The CAA's treatment of

nonroad source regulation is almost identical to its treatment of motor vehicle regulation. For

instance, under § 213(d), the EPA's emissions standards for nonroad sources "shall be subject to

sections[206, 207, 208, and 209] ... and shall be enforced in the same manner asstandards prescribed

under section [202]."36 Section 202 authorizes the EPA to promulgate standards for motor vehicles,

and the other cited sections establish the details of the federal regulatory program over motor

vehicles, such astesting and certification. Section 213(a)(3) directs the EPA, when setting standards

for nonroad sources, first to "considerstandards equivalent in stringency to standardsfor comparable

motor vehicles or engines (if any) regulated under section [202]."37 Essentially, Congress regulated

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38 Section 111(a)(3) provides, in part, that "[n]othing in subchapter II of this chapter [CAA

Title II] relating to nonroad engines shall be construed to apply to stationary internal combustion

engines." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (1994). Section 302(z) defines "stationary source" as "any

source of an air pollutant except those emissions resulting directly from an internal combustion

engine for transportation purposes or from a nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle as defined in

section 7550 of this title [CAA § 216]." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(z) (1994). 

nonroad sources by giving the EPA the authority to set emissions standards, then simply

incorporating by reference the entire enforcement and testing regime applicable to motor vehicles.

This parallel treatment reinforcesthe EPA's conclusion that Congress meant the word "new" to mean

the same thing with respect to both nonroad sources and motor vehicles.

In addition, the structure of nonroad source regulation is similar to that for motor vehicle

regulation, and dissimilar to that for stationary source regulation, in that the EPA is given the

principal role in setting standards and the states are preempted from intruding too greatly. There are

also two explicit textual indications that Congress classified nonroad sources together with motor

vehicles and distinguished them from stationary sources.38 Thus, at best, the existence of differing

meanings of "new" in the CAA makes § 209(e)(1)'s use of that term ambiguous; there is certainly

no basis elsewhere in the Act for forcing the EPA to adopt EMA's preferred definition at Chevron

step one.

EMA also contends that the EPA's definition would render § 209(e)(1) a "nullity" because it

would apparently permit the statesto regulate emissionsfromthe moment a nonroad engine wasfirst

put into operation. The EPA correctly responds that if that were so, then the statutory definition of

"new motor vehicle" would render § 209(a) a "nullity." Not only has this not happenedthe

preemption scheme for motor vehicles has been working for almost thirty yearsbut the statute

cannot be said to speak to the issue involved here, and against the EPA's definition, when Congress,

operating under almost identicalstatutorylanguage inthemotor vehicle preemption regime, expressly

used a virtually identical definition of "new." The Allway Taxi interpretation, postponing state

regulation so that the burden of compliance will not fall on the manufacturer, has prevented the

definition of "new motor vehicle" from "nullifying" the motor vehicle preemption regime. EMA has

offered no reason to suspect an essentially identical definition of "new nonroad vehicle" will nullify

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39 EMA's final argument from the statutory language is that § 177 of the CAA, prohibiting

states from adopting regulations that would require a "third vehicle," shows that Allway Taxi was

wrongly decided and should not be used as a model for the nonroad source preemption rule. 

Putting to one side the fact that § 177 applies only to motor vehicles and not to nonroad sources,

this simply repeats EMA's argument that the EPA's definition will render the preemption a

"nullity." Moreover, as the Second Circuit has pointed out, the third vehicle prohibition in § 177

requires the courts to determine whether a purportedly proper state regulation actually has the

effect of requiring a third vehicleessentially the same analysis undertaken in Allway Taxi, and

the same analysis that the EPA says should be applied to state emissions standards for non-new

nonroad sources. MVMA, 17 F.3d at 537. Again, the statute does not foreclose the EPA's

interpretation. 

the nonroad preemption scheme either.39

EMA's reliance on the legislative history fares no better. The House bill contained a

preemption provision; the Senate bill did not. The conference produced a version of preemption that

was quite different from the one the House had passed. EMA's most promising reference is to an

excerpt from a House committee report on the House bill that reads:

Section 209 of the Act is amended to provide that no State or political subdivision

shall adopt or enforce standards relating to the control of emissions from new

nonroad vehicles subject to regulations under this Act. This preemption does not

apply to existing nonroad vehicles or engines.

H.R. Rep. No. 409, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 310 (1990). In this paragraph, the House

committee appears to consider "new" to be the opposite of "existing," which argues for EMA's

date-certain definition. Nor would this be unprecedented; as discussed, § 111 adopts the same

new/existing dichotomyregarding stationarysources. Nonetheless, this isolated pair of sentences out

of a mass oflegislative history isinsufficient to bar the EPA'sinterpretation, especially because it was

written before the conferees substantially altered the preemption language in the House bill as part

of a compromise with the Senate bill that contained no preemption. EMA also refers to letters from

Congressmen to the EPA Administrator during the rulemaking, in which the Congressmen purport

to explain Congress's intent at the time of the amendment. Even EMA concedes that such

post-enactment statements cannot be used to change Congressional intent that is not announced at

the time of enactment. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982);

Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974). At best, these are statements that the

EPA could take into account in deciding on a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and the EPA

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40 EMA also relies on an October 10, 1990, Joint House-Senate Staff Memorandum that

states:

States and local governments would be preempted from regulating new nonroad

engines which are smaller than 175 hp used in construction equipment or vehicles

or farm equipment or vehicles, as well as new locomotives or new engines used in

locomotives. With respect to other covered nonroad sources, California would be

permitted to set standards, and other States would be permitted to opt-in to the

California standard using new provisions analogous to sections 177 and 209 of the

current law.

Bypassing the question of what weight should be accorded a staff memorandum, it is unclear

precisely how EMA thinks this memorandum is relevant. The second sentence pertains to §

209(e)(2), not to the definition of "new" in § 209(e)(1). The first sentence, which pertains to §

209(e)(1), simply parrots the statute. 

explicitly addressed the Congressmen's comments in the final rule.40

For all of EMA's efforts, the statute does not foreclose the EPA at Chevron step one. At

Chevron step two, there may be room for differing views of the statutory language and legislative

history, but the EPA was within the bounds of permissible construction in analogizing § 209(e) on

nonroad sources to § 209(a) on motor vehicles. EMA cannot show that the EPA's decision to

harmonize §§ 209, 213, and 216 by interpreting "new" consistently throughout all three sections was

impermissible. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 45,867. Congress could have chosen a different scheme for

nonroad sources, but in the absence of any indication in the statute or the legislative history that it

did, EMA'sfailure to explain why nonroad engines are in some relevant respect different from motor

vehicles undercuts any claim that the EPA's interpretation of "new" is impermissible.

2. Implied preemption in § 209(e)(2). Section 209(e)(2) does not expressly preempt any

state regulation. The parties agree, however, that it does imply a preemption. Subsection (A) permits

the EPA to authorize California to adopt emissions standards and requirements for nonroad sources

not mentioned in § 209(e)(1). Subsection (B) permits other states to opt in to already approved

California regulations. Obviously, if no state regulation were preempted, California would have no

need to seek authorization for its regulations, and other states would not need to opt in to the

California rules. Thus, the California authorization provision assumes the existence of a category of

sourcesthat are subject to preemption. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605

(1991) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (state law impliedly

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preempted where obligations imposed by federal statute "reveal a purpose to preclude state

authority"). In other words, states must be preempted from adopting any regulation for which

California could receive authorization. The issue is whether, as the EPA decided, only new nonroad

sources are covered by § 209(e)(2), or, as EMA argues, both new and non-new sources are covered.

EMAcontendsthat by limiting the preemption to new nonroad engines and vehicles, the EPA

violated § 209(e)(2)'s plain statement that California mayseek authorization to regulate "any nonroad

vehicles or engines other than those referred to" in § 209(e)(1). In effect, EMA maintains, the EPA

has amended the statute to read: "any new nonroad vehicles or engines other than those referred to"

in § 209(e)(1). Section 209(e)(1) expressly preempts state standards for emissions "from either of

the following new nonroad engines or nonroad vehicles." EMA argues that Congress, after defining

the two categories in § 209(e)(1) as "new," must be presumed to have acted intentionally in omitting

"new" from § 209(e)(2).

The EPA first contends that because § 209(e)(2) does not mention preemption at all, it is

necessarily silent as to the scope of the implied preemption, and, therefore, the court must proceed

to Chevron step two. The question at step one, however, is whether "the intent of Congress is clear

... for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. To determine Congressional intent, we must use

"traditional tools of statutory construction." Id. at 843 n.9. The most traditional tool, of course, is

to read the text; if it clearly requires a particular outcome, then the mere fact that it does so implicitly

rather than expressly does not mean that it is "silent" in the Chevron sense. Ethyl Corp., 57 F.3d at

1060. That is the situation in the instant case. As all parties recognize, the authorization regime

makessense only if allstates are preempted from adopting regulationsfor which California may seek

authorization. It is clear from the text and structure of the statute, therefore, that Congress intended

to preempt state regulation, and it is equally clear that it intended the scope of preemption to be the

same as the scope of permissible authorization. The EPA's own analysis of the statute is that the

implied preemption must go "hand-in-hand" with the authorization scheme in § 209(e)(2). If the

scope of the authorization regime is clear in the statute, the scope of the implied preemption can be

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41 The EPA couches this analysis as a Chevron step two argument, but we it apply it here to

determine whether the statute is ambiguous at step one, for otherwise we need not reach step

two. 

resolved at Chevron step one. Hence, we must reject the EPA's argument that the statute is silent

on this issue and turn instead to its analysis of the oddity that would result from EMA's reading of

the statutory language.41

As we do so, it is important to understand the limitations of an argument based on the

supposed "oddity" of plain statutory language. "The plain meaning of legislation should be

conclusive, except in the "rare cases[in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result

demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' " United States v. Ron Pair Enterp., Inc.,

489 U.S. 234, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).

Thus, if apparently plain language compels an "odd result," the court may refer to evidence of

legislative intent other than the text itself, such as the legislative history. Public Citizen v.

Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490

U.S. 504, 509 (1989)). While literal interpretation need not rise to the level of "absurdity" before

recourse is taken to the legislative history, however, id. at 453 n.9, there must be evidence that

Congress meant something other than what it literally said before a court can depart from plain

meaning. In the absence of such evidence, the court cannot ignore the text by assuming that if the

statute seems odd to us, i.e., the statute is not as we would have predicted beforehand that Congress

would write it, it could be the product only of oversight, imprecision, or drafting error. Put

otherwise, the court's role is not to "correct" the text so that it better serves the statute's purposes,

for it isthe function of the political branches not only to define the goals but also to choose the means

for reaching them. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir.

1990). Nor, under Chevron, may an agency avoid the Congressional intent clearly expressed in the

text simply by asserting that its preferred approach would be better policy. Therefore, for the EPA

to avoid a literal interpretation at Chevron step one, it must show either that, as a matter of historical

fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as a matter of logic and statutory

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42 Unlike the dissent, see Diss. op. at 10, we see no inconsistency between the standard we

apply in the instant case and the result in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451,

467-69 (D.C. Cir. 1996). There, the court concluded that a literal application of the text would

actually "frustrate" the statute's very purpose, and thus deferred to the EPA's alternative

construction. Here, by contrast, the court is dealing with a provision that balances various

competing interestsfor example, the policy of locally appropriate regulation as against

manufacturers' economic interest in uniform regulationso it is impossible to say that the literal

text "frustrates" the purpose of § 209(e). The provision strikes a balance between competing

policies, and any adjustment of the balance to favor one policy would inevitably "frustrate"

another. 

43 EMA suggests that the EPA itself has adopted this position. In 1990, California sought

authorization for emissions standards for utility and lawn and garden equipment engines. The

EPA's notice of public hearing on the application proposed to grant authorization, even though

there were no federal standards for such engines. 56 Fed. Reg. 45,873, 45,875 (1991). However,

the EPA provided a second opportunity for public comment on California's authorization after the

EPA proposed federal standards for the same equipment. 59 Fed. Reg. 55,658 (1994). By the

structure, it almost surely could not have meant it.42

The EPA's strongest arguments arise from an apparent tension between two aspects of the

authorization regime. The Administrator may authorize California to adopt standards and other

requirements "if California determines that California standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as

protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards." CAA, § 209(e)(2)(A), 42

U.S.C. § 7543 (1994). Because § 213(a) authorizes the EPA to regulate only new nonroad engines

and vehicles, if California must seek EPA authorization when regulating non-new engines and

vehicles, there will apparently be no "applicable Federal standards" to compare with the California

regulations. From this the EPA makes two arguments: first, because there will be no federal

standards in such a case, the statute does not provide any basis for the EPA to determine whether to

authorize a proposed California regulation; and second, because the EPA cannot regulate non-new

engines and vehicles, Congress could not have intended also to preempt the states from regulating

such engines and vehicles, leaving major pollution sources unregulated by anyone.

As to the EPA's first argument, EMA points out that it is possible for the EPA to review

proposed California standards under the statutory criteria even when there are no comparable federal

regulations. EMA maintains that when there are no applicable federal standards, California's

regulation will necessarily be "as protective of public health and welfare," and therefore the first

requirement of § 209(e)(2)(A) will be satisfied.43 Further, the EPA's review will be more than pro

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time the EPA finally authorized the California standards, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,440 (1995), the EPA's

own standards had also been finalized. 60 Fed. Reg. 34,852 (1995). Thus, while the EPA's

preliminary proposal to grant California's application suggests that EMA's construction is feasible,

we cannot say that the EPA has improperly reversed course in adopting the position it has before

this court. 

44 A literal interpretation does not mean that § 209(e)(2)(A)(i) "serve[s] no purpose" or is

"superfluous." See Diss. op. at 4. The purpose of that provision is to ensure that California does

not undermine federal regulation by adopting more permissive standards. Where there are no

federal standards, there is nothing to be undermined. With respect to new nonroad sources,

however, the policy of § 209(e)(2)(A)(i) is implicated, and the provision will prevent California

from taking a more lax position than the EPA. 

forma because subsection (A) requires the Administrator to determine whether California needs to

adopt the regulation to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions and whether the California

regulation is consistent with § 209 of the CAA. The latter requirement in particular can be seen as

an important part ofthe overall preemption scheme. While § 209(e)(1) prevents any stateincluding

Californiafrom adopting standards relating to emissions from two categories of nonroad sources,

the EPA recognized in its rulemaking that standards purporting to apply only to non-new sources

might "relate back" to the originalmanufacturer and thus effectively apply to new sources. While the

EPA hopes that courts will apply the Allway Taxi rule to void such improper state regulation, the

statute gives EPA the chance to do so itself. If the EPA must review proposed California standards

for non-new sources in the two § 209(e)(1) categories for compliance with § 209, then the EPA can

apply its expertise to determine whether the standards violate Allway Taxi, rather than depending on

the courts to sort it out post hoc. It is therefore conceivable that Congress meant to require

California to come to the EPA before regulating sources not within the EPA's own regulatory

authority.

44

Nor does the "regulatory gap" cited by the EPA show that a literal reading of the statute is

"demonstrably at odds" with Congressional intent. First, the gap is illusory, for the statute does not

exempt any class of nonroad sources from regulation. The EPA has sole authority over the classes

of new nonroad sources defined in § 209(e)(1). The EPA and California have joint authority over

all other new nonroad sources. On this much, all parties agree. The dispute is whether all states have

independent authorityto regulate non-newsources, or whetherCalifornia hassole authorityoversuch

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45 Although, as the dissent points out, all states might prefer a completely free hand in

regulating emissions from non-new nonroad sources, see Diss. op. at 5-6, it is the nature of

federal preemption to restrict the tools available to the states in addressing a particular problem. 

If the text really created a legislative gap, in the sense of leaving a large class of pollution sources

unregulated by any jurisdiction, that might suggest that Congress did not intend a literal

interpretation, prohibiting state regulation without providing a regulatory scheme of its own. In §

209(e), however, Congress subjected all nonroad sources to potential emissions regulation by

either the EPA, California, or both. 

46 Senator Wilson, as had his predecessor Senator Murphy, expressed California's concern that

the federal government's new attention to the subject would jeopardize the state's more advanced

program, and he cited three particular California regulations that would be affected by § 209(e). 

136 Cong. Rec. S17,237 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990). 

47 See CAA, § 209(a) (preempting states from adopting emissions standards for new motor

vehicles); id., § 209(b) (providing California waiver from § 209(a) preemption); id., § 202(a)(1),

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing EPA to adopt emissions standards for new motor

sources, with other states permitted to opt in to California regulations. Thus, the question is not

whether the statute leavessome sources unregulated, but rather whether it permits up to 50 different

sets of regulation or requires uniformity. Moreover, under the EPA's interpretation, even if states

other than California are preempted from independently adopting emissions standards for non-new

sources, each state can still adopt its own in-use regulations. See infra Part II B 3. So far as we can

tell, the supposed "gap" created by a literal interpretation turns out to be not really a gap at all, and

in light of the permitted in-use regulations, not a particularly large one in any event.45

Given the indications before Congress that California's regulatory proposals for nonroad

sources were ahead of the EPA's development of its own proposals and the Congressional history of

permitting California to enjoy coordinate regulatory authority over mobile sources with the EPA, the

decision to identify California as the lead state is comprehensible. California has served for almost

30 years as a "laboratory" for motor vehicle regulation. See MEMA, 627 F.2d at 1110. Its severe

air pollution problems, diverse industrial and agricultural base, and variety of climatic and

geographical conditions suit it well for a similar role with respect to nonroad sources. As was the

case when Congress first regulated motor vehicle emissions, California was already in the lead on

nonroad sourcesin 1990.46 It is true that California has never enjoyed sole authority over any aspect

of motor vehicle emissions control. Instead, in any area in which other states are preempted from

acting, California and the EPA each have regulatory authority.

47 To that extent, § 209(e), read

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vehicles). 

48 We do not understand the dissent to suggest that § 209(e) permits California to "review," in

the sense of blocking or modifying, regulations adopted by other states. See Diss. op. at 9. 

49 S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,

3490; id. at 645. 

50 H. R. Rep. No. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1990). The House bill provided:

(e) State Standards.No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or

attempt to enforce any standard or other requirement relating to the control of

emissions from new nonroad engines or nonroad vehicles subject to regulation

under the Act. Subsection (b) shall not apply for purposes of this subsection. 

literally, is different.48 However, simply because Congress has addressed motor vehicle emissions in

one fashion does not mean that it could not address nonroad emissions in a slightly different manner.

It clearly did depart from the motor vehicle model in at least one respect by preempting even

California from adopting standards for particular categories of nonroad sources. Because the text

plainly creates another departure with respect to preemption ofstate regulation of non-new sources,

and because there is a plausible explanation for why Congress would have done so, the court cannot

assume that Congress really meant to duplicate the motor vehicle regime in all respects.

Assuming that the result apparently compelled by the text is sufficient to require recourse to

the legislative history, we find the historical record to be of little assistance. As we have previously

noted, the Senate bill did not contain any preemption, and this was done intentionally to protect

California's efforts to meet its own needs by developing nonroad emission standards, which were

already well ahead of the EPA's.49 The House bill, by contrast, preempted state regulation of all new

nonroad sources, with no provision for a California waiver.50 In conference, the House's express

preemption was narrowed to cover only the two categories of new nonroad engines defined in §

209(e)(1), and the California authorization provision was added. The EPA maintains that because

the House had limited preemption to new engines and vehicles, and the Senate did not want any

preemption at all, it would have been odd for the conference to have impliedly preempted state

regulation of non-new engines and vehicles, which neither bill had preempted, especially since the

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51 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 336-38 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3868-70. 

52 For an account of the circumstances surrounding the conference committee's work on the

1990 amendments and an analysis of the resulting ambiguities, see RODGERS, supra, § 3.1A, and

sources cited therein. 

53 136 Cong. Rec. at S16,933 (daily ed. October 27, 1990). 

54 See id. at S16,938. 

conference report does not mention the subject at all.51 However, given the clear statutory language,

the absence of explanation cuts against the EPA. With such a meager record of what happened in

conference, the court is unable to reconstruct the legislative compromises that were made. Even if

the final product might strike us as unexpected given the versions passed by each House, the court

could not make the leap from such an impression to the certainty that such a result was unintentional.

The competing interestsbetween the two Houses, between manufacturers, state regulators, and

environmentalgroups, and evenbetweenMembersfromdifferent regions and partiesare simplytoo

complex and multifariousto rule out the possibility that the conference settled on the result described

by the statutory text. Even this account oversimplifies the matter, as changes in § 209(e) could have

been traded for other changes elsewhere in the legislation. In the end, California was protected as

the Senate wanted and all other states were preempted in accord with the thrust of the House bill;

to say more about the conference is to speculate.

There are, in fact, only a few scattered pieces of evidence about what the confereesintended,

or what the members of both Houses thought they were voting for when the bill emerged from

conference. In the end-of-session haste in which this huge bill was passed,52the conference

committee did not produce a section-by-section analysis ofthe conference bill.53 Senators Chafee and

Baucus, who were among the Senate managers, placed their explanation of five titles of the 1990

Amendments in the Congressional Record, but it largely paraphrases the statutory language.54In

remarks on the Senate floor, both Senatorsstated that the onlyenginesthat the states were preempted

fromregulating were those covered by§ 209(e)(1). According to Senator Chafee, "States retain their

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55 136 Cong. Rec. S17,237 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990). 

56 136 Cong. Rec. S16,976 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 

existing authorityto regulate allremaining new nonroad engines or vehicles."55 Senator Baucus, after

describing the two categories preempted in § 209(e)(1), said: "The preemption is limited only to

these categories of nonroad vehicles; states retain all of their existing authority to fully regulate all

other types of new nonroad equipment."56 These statements could be viewed as consistent with the

EPA's position onlyifthe Senators are understood to be advising their colleaguesthat the preemption

for nonroad sources is no different, except for § 209(e)(1), than that for motor vehicles. A perhaps

more plausible reading, however, would contradict the EPA's position (without supporting EMA's

position) insofar as the Senators appeared to convey the impression that the only preemption in §

209(e) was the express preemption in § 209(e)(1).

The EPA also relies on a memorandum of the staff of the Conference Committee. See supra

n.40. The memorandum notes that all states are preempted from regulating new nonroad sources in

the two § 209(e)(1) categories. It goes on to say: "With respect to other covered nonroad sources,

California would be permitted to set standards, and other states would be permitted to opt-in to the

California standard." (emphasis added). The EPA contends that "covered" here is synonymous with

"new," for "covered" must refer to sources covered in § 213, which gives the EPA regulatory

authorityover only new nonroad sources. The memorandum cannot carry the day for the EPA. First,

a staff memorandum is hardly authoritative. Second, it is unclear that "covered" can only be

understood to mean "new" because it could just as easily refer to the scope of the bill's definition of

"nonroad engine" and "nonroad vehicle." Clear statutory text cannot be trumped by an ambiguous

phrase froma document that was not promulgated bya single Member ofCongress, let alone adopted

by a committee or Congress as a whole.

In sum, the legislative history is unhelpful. In determining what the members of Congress

intended to vote for, the legislative history provides no basisfor the court to conclude that they voted

for a regulatory scheme other than that provided by the wordsin the statute. The haste and confusion

attendant upon the passage of this massive bill do not license the court to rewrite it; rather, they are

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57 Even if the omission of "new" from § 209(e)(2)(A) were an oversight, the EPA's accident

theory of statutory interpretation requires elimination of a second oversight as well, in §

209(e)(2)(B), the opt-in provision. That provision permits other states to adopt California's

standards for "nonroad vehicles or engines (other than those referred to in [§ 209(e)(1)])." Again,

under the EPA's interpretation, the word "new" must be added to apparently plain text. 

all the more reason for us to hew to the statutory text because there is no coherent alternative

intention to be gleaned from the historical record. "In such a substantial overhaul of the system, it

is not appropriate or realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it

took. Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need

for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240-41

(construing Bankruptcy Code of 1978); see also id. at 243 n.6 (declining to depart from text where

legislative history was almost silent on provision at issue). Essentially, the EPA concludes that the

conferees inadvertently left out the word "new" in § 209(e)(2), and the EPA is, in fact, adhering to

what was intended.57 Without a showing that the text is "demonstrably at odds" with Congressional

intent, much less that the regulatory scheme is unworkable or absurd, however, the court must take

Congress at its word. We therefore conclude that the EPA's interpretation of § 209(e)(2) is forbidden

at Chevron step one.

3. In-use regulations. Once it has been established which nonroad sources the states are

preempted from regulating, the question remains what sorts of regulations the states are preempted

from adopting. The EMA petitions challenge the permissibility of the EPA's decision that in-use

regulations are neither "standards [nor] other requirements relating to the control of emissions."

CAA, § 209(e)(1), (e)(2)(A). Looking to the statutory language, EMA maintains that in-use

regulations are clearly "other requirements," and the statute neither modifiesthe term"requirements"

nor mentions anything about in-use regulations. The dispute largely concerns the relationship of the

preexisting subsections(a) through (d) of § 209 to new subsection (e). The phrase "standard or other

requirement" does not appear in the earlier subsections, but the words "standard" and "require" or

"requirement" do appear several times. The court has previously approved the EPA's interpretation

of "standard" in § 209(a) to mean quantitative levels of emissions, MEMA, 627 F.2d at 1112-13, and

EMA does not challenge that interpretation. Because in-use regulations are not "standards," the

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question is whether the EPA has properly determined that they are also not "other requirements."

Some form of the word "require" appears in both § 209(a) and § 209(c):

(a) Prohibition

... No state shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval

relating to the control of emissionsfrom any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle

engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration

of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.

* * *

(c) Certification of vehicle parts or engine parts

... no State or political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce

anystandard or anyrequirement of certification, inspection, or approvalwhich relates

to motor vehicle emissions.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), (c) (1994) (emphasis added). Also, § 209(d) preserves the right of states

"otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed

motor vehicles." 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (1994). The EPA contends that the term "requirement" in §

209 must mean "certification, inspection, or approval" requirements ofthe kind preempted in§ 209(a)

and (c), and that § 209(d) shows that "requirement" does not include use restrictions.

EMA responds that in subsections (a) and (c), Congress expressly modified "require[ment]"

with the phrase "certification, inspection, or [ ] approval." In § 209(e), by contrast, Congress referred

to "other requirements" without modification. Thus, to give effect to the different language,

"requirement" must include more than just certification, inspection, or approval requirements.

Subsections(a) and (c) apply only to particular types of requirements listed in the subsections, while

subsection (e), with no limiting language, pertains to all types of requirements. However, EMA's

argument overlooks another feature ofthe statutory language that supportsthe EPA'sinterpretation.

Section 209(e)(2)(A) requirestheAdministratorto authorizeCalifornia to adopt "standards and other

requirements relating to the control of emissions," but § 209(e)(2)(B) permits other states to adopt

"standards" if "suchstandards and implementation and enforcement are identical" toCalifornia's. This

suggests that the "other requirements" that states are preempted from adopting are, as in the motor

vehicle preemption regime, limited to ancillary enforcement mechanisms such as certificates and

inspections. Though the text does not compel the EPA's interpretation, it does not forbid it either.

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58 The EPA has two other supporting arguments. First, the EPA relies on the statements of

Senators Baucus and Chafee after the conference had amended the preemption provision of the

House bill. Senator Chafee said that states "can continue to require existing and in-use nonroad

engines to reduce emissions by setting fuel requirements, operational conditions or limits on the

use of such equipment." 136 Cong. Rec. at S17,237. Senator Baucus said: "States also fully

retain existing authority to regulate emissions from all types of existing or in-use nonroad engines

or vehicles by specifying fuel quality specifications, operational modes or characteristics or

The parties also wrangle over the significance of § 213(d). The 1990 amendment, while

giving the EPA the power to regulate emissions from new nonroad engines and vehicles, provided

that the enforcement provisions previously used for the EPA's motor vehicle emissions standards

would also be used for the nonroad engine standards:

(d) EnforcementThe standards under thissection shallbe subject to sections 7525,

7541, 7542 and 7543 of this title [CAA §§ 206, 207, 208, and 209], with such

modifications of the applicable regulations implementing such sections as the

Administrator deems appropriate, and shall be enforced in the same manner as

standards prescribed under section 7521 of this title [CAA § 202]....

42 U.S.C. § 7547(d) (1994). Neither party provides an entirely satisfactory explanation of how the

EPA's standards can be "subject to" § 209, which deals only with the preemption and permissibility

of state standards and other requirements. The EPA maintains that the preemption provisions in §

209(a), (c), and (d) apply to the preemption ofstate regulation of nonroad engines and vehicles. Yet

this approach does not explain how the inconsistent preemption regimes of § 209(a-d) and § 209(e)

are to be reconciled; it thus begs the question to be answered here. On the other hand, the EPA's

position is at least more comprehensible than EMA's, which is that § 213(d) applies § 209 to the

EPA's standards. This merely restates the problem, without suggesting a solution. In fact,

unfortunately, the statute is unclear with respect to how § 213(d) is supposed to interact with § 209

in general, or with § 209(e) preemption in particular. To give meaning to the § 213(d)'s reference

to § 209, there must be some connection, but it is far from apparent what the connection might be.

EMA, while criticizing the EPA's interpretation, fails to offer any coherent alternative. Under these

circumstances, Chevron deference permits the EPA's interpretation that § 213(d) incorporates into

the nonroad regime at least the reservation of the states' right to impose in-use regulations found in

§ 209(d). This appears to be a reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute, and one that is within the

EPA's power to adopt under Chevron.58

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measures that limit the use of nonroad engines or equipment." Id. at S16,976. These statements

support the EPA's position. Second, the EPA maintains that because in-use restrictions are

inherently local in character, in that their appropriateness depends on local conditions, it would

not make sense for Congress to require all states to follow California's lead on this issue. This,

too, tends to support the reasonableness of the EPA's interpretation. 

EMA contends that even if the standards of § 209(d) are incorporated by § 213(d), § 209(d)

permits only in-use regulation unrelated to emissions control. However, as the EPA points out, the

longstanding scheme of motor vehicle emissions control has always permitted the states to adopt

in-use regulationssuch as carpool lanes, restrictions on car use in downtown areas, and programs

to control extended idling of vehiclesthat are expressly intended to control emissions. See CAA,

§ 108(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (1994) (requiring administrator to make available to state and local

authoritiesinformationrelating to such strategies). Section 209(d) does, therefore, protect the power

of states to adopt such in-use regulations.

The preemptive language of § 209(e) is broad, but it does not speak directly to the question

at hand. The EPA could reasonably conclude that § 213(d) incorporated § 209(d) into the nonroad

regime, in which case the specific command of § 209(d) would limit the general language of § 209(e).

We therefore defer to the EPA's interpretation under Chevron. Accordingly, we grant the EMA

petitions insofar as they challenge the limitation of the implied § 209(e)(2) preemption to new

nonroad sources, and otherwise deny them.

III.

NMA challengesthree aspects of the EPA's § 213 rulemaking. First, NMA contends that the

EPA should have treated surface mining equipment greater than 750 hp as a separate regulatory

category, rather than including such equipment among the "construction equipment" or "large

compression-ignition engines" categories. Second, NMA contends that the EPA either failed to make

the necessary findings under § 213 to permit it to regulate smoke emissions, or that its findings were

unsupported by substantial evidence. Finally, NMA maintains that the EPA chose to regulate certain

pollutants for the improper purpose of harmonizing federal regulations with those of California and

the European Communities.

A.

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59 Ozone is formed from reactions among VOC and NOx

in the presence of sunlight, rather

than being directly emitted from engines. 

60 58 Fed. Reg. 28,809, 28,811-13 (1993). 

61 Engines emit particulate matter, mostly carbon, of various sizes. "Smoke" refers to the

particles that are large enough to be visible. Smoke reduces visibility and can soil buildings, cars,

and even human skin and clothing, although its effect on health is unclear. EPA Draft Reg.

Support Doc. at 19 (April 1993). 

62 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,813-14. 

63 Id. at 28,833-34. 

Background of the NMA Petitions. As required by § 213(a), the EPA undertook a study

of pollutant emissions from nonroad engines and vehicles. Although the statute directed the EPA's

attention to emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and carbon

monoxide (CO), the EPA also studied other pollutants. The EPA selected 19 ozone59and 16 CO

nonattainment areas for study. The study found that in the median nonattainment area, nonroad

engines produced between 7.3% and 12.6% of all VOC emissions, between 14.5% and 17.3% of all

NOx emissions, and between 5.2% and 9.4% of all CO emissions. Because the statute required the

EPA to determine whether nonroad engines significantly contributed to pollution in more than one

nonattainment area, the study also disclosed that in the area in which the nonroad contribution was

second highest, nonroad engines produced between 11.4% and 18.7% of allVOCemissions, between

29.3% and 31.1% of all NOx emissions, and between 8.5% and 14.2% of all CO emissions.

Based on thisstudy, the EPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking in which it proposed

to find that nonroad engines and vehicles contributed "significantly" to ozone and CO nonattainment

in more than one nonattainment area.60 The EPA therefore proposed to regulate NOx and smoke61

emissions from all nonroad compression-ignition (CI) engines greater than 50 horsepower.62 The

EPA set the proposed emissions limits based on its projections of manufacturers' costs of

compliance.63 Four categories of large CI engines would be exempt from the regulation, including

underground mining engines regulated by the Mining Safety and Health Administration, but not the

large surface mining engines at issue here. The EPA declined to propose emissions standards for

hydrocarbon (HC), CO, and particulate matter (PM), finding that the available proceduresfor testing

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64 Id. at 28,828-29. 

65 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306, 31,318-19 (1994). 

66 Id. at 31,319. In the nonroad study, the EPA had divided nonroad sources into ten

categories, placing surface mining equipment in the "construction equipment" category. The

study found that construction equipment contributed, in the median area, between 0.8% and 1.1%

of total VOC emissions (i.e., emissions from all sources, both nonroad and other), between 8.4%

and 9.7% of total NOx emissions, and between 0.4% and 0.6% of all CO emissions. Using two

different estimates of the number of construction engines in use, the study concluded that

construction engines contributed more than 1% of total VOC emissions in either 5 or 14 of the 19

ozone nonattainment areas, more than 1% of total NOx emissions in all 19 ozone nonattainment

areas under either estimate, and more than 1% of total CO emissions in either 0 or 4 of the 16 CO

nonattainment areas. Construction equipment was the single largest contributor of NOx emissions

in 17 of the 19 nonattainment areas. By contrast, CO emissions were relatively evenly distributed

across all categories of nonroad equipment. 

could not accurately predict HC, CO, and PM emissions.64

TheAmericanMiningCongress("AMC"), whichhassince mergedwithanother entityto form

NMA, filed written comments, supported by a study of mining engine emissions that it had

commissioned from the TRC Environmental Corporation. AMC challenged the proposed rule in

much the same terms as NMA now challenges the final rule on review. AMC argued that the EPA

should either exempt surface mining engines altogether or exempt all nonroad engines greater than

750 hp. Among other objections, AMC contended that the EPA had underestimated the cost of

compliance for manufacturers of engines greater than 750 hp, which, it explained, would be much

higher than the costsforsmaller engines. AMC presented the results of a survey of its members, who

predicted cost increases of between 3% and 12%, depending on the size and type of engine. At a

meeting in July1993, the EPArequested more detailed information on the technologicalsteps AMC's

members would take to bring mining engines into compliance.

In the final rule, the EPA discussed and rejected AMC's contention that surface mining

equipment or engines larger than 750 hp should be exempted.65 The EPA found that construction

and mining equipment were similar and could appropriately be considered one category.

66 As to

AMC's argument that very large mining engines were unique, both in design and in cost of

compliance, the EPA noted that AMC had failed to provide any of the information the EPA had

requested on these issues at the July 1993 meeting, and that the only detailed cost information

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67 Id. at 31,319, 31,332-33. 

68 Id. at 31,318. 

69 Id. at 31,317-18. 

70 Id. at 31,318. 

submitted by any manufacturer suggested that the price increase for engines over 750 hp would be

approximately one percent.67 Although the EPA's own analysis of cost and technological issues had

not addressed the very large engines, the EPA study had found that the proposed regulation,

measured in dollars per ton of reduced NOx emissions, would be more cost-effective across all

regulated nonroad sources than existing regulation of other pollution sources. The EPA also

discussed and rejected AMC's contention that it could not regulate smoke emissions, citing both

aesthetic harm and the possible harm to health caused by smoke.68

Although the notice of proposed rulemaking had proposed not to adopt HC, CO, or PM

standards because there was no adequate test for such emissions, the final rule included such

standards solely for harmonization with standards in California and the European Communities.69

Manycommenters, including health and environmental organizations,state regulatorybodies, engine

manufacturers, and equipment manufacturers, had urged the EPA to adopt California's HC, CO, and

PM standards, arguing that the "ISO 8178" test mandated by California was sufficiently accurate.

Industry representatives advised the EPA that it would lower their costs and improve their

competitive position ifthe EPA harmonized itsregulations with those ofCalifornia and the European

Communities, rather than leaving these pollutants unregulated. The European Communities also

requested the EPA to consider harmonization with its planned HC, CO, and PM standards. In the

finalrule, theEPAnoted the overwhelming volume of comments urging harmonizationand concluded

that although the unreliability of the test procedures meant that "it is technically incorrect to claim

emission reduction benefits for HC, CO, and PM emissions," the standards would not harm

environmental goals.70

B.

The NMA Petitions. NMA contends that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority in four

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71 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (1994). 

respects, two as a result of failing to treat very large engines used in mining equipment as a separate

category, one for having inadequate data to support the regulation of smoke emissions, and one for

improperly regulating HC, CO, and PM solely to harmonize its regulations with those in other

jurisdictions. The EPA contends, however, that NMA is barred from raising this last challenge

because neither it nor any other commenter challenged the legitimacy of considering harmonization

as a factor in deciding whether to regulate HC, CO, and PM during the notice and comment period.

NMA responds that because the EPA originally proposed not to regulate HC, CO, and PM, it had

no reason to comment on the EPA's authority to regulate those pollutants.

The § 213 rulemaking is governed by § 307(d) ("[o]nly an objection to a rule ... which was

raised with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment ... may be raised during

judicial review.").71 The EPA stated in the notice of proposed rulemaking that it did not propose to

promulgate standardsfor emissions of HC, CO, and PM fromlarge CI engines because ofits concern

about the adequacyoftest procedures, but requested comments on the issue. 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,829.

Many commenters, both in writing and at the public hearing (at which NMA also appeared), urged

the EPA to harmonize its HC, CO, and PM rule with California and Europe. NMA thus knew that

the issue was being debated and had an opportunity to argue that the EPAshould not accept the other

commenters' positions. Moreover, even if it was "impracticable" for NMA to oppose the other

commenters during the notice and comment period, it could have raised its objections in a petition

for reconsideration. CAA, § 307(d)(7)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (1994). NMA never gave the

EPA an opportunity to consider the argument that it advances here: because "harmonization" is not

one of the factors that the EPA must consider under § 213, the EPA was barred from regulating

emissions for the sole purpose of harmonization. Because no other commenter raised this objection

either, and the EPA did not consider the issue sua sponte, we need not decide whether § 307 imposes

more stringent requirements than the common law doctrine of administrative exhaustion. See supra

Part II B. Under any standard, NMA has failed to preserve this issue for review.

We therefore do not reach the merits of NMA's challenge to the HC, CO, and PM standards.

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As to the other issues raised by NMA, we find that the petitions fail to show that the EPA lacked

authority to promulgate the final § 213 rule. Ethyl Corp., 51 F.3d at 1064.

1. Whether mining engines cause or contribute to CO and ozone nonattainment. NMA

agrees with the EPA's reading of § 213(a)(3): in order to regulate a "class or category" of nonroad

engines and vehicles, the EPA must determine that the class or category "causes or contributes to"

ozone or CO levels in more than one nonattainment area. NMA challenges the EPA's power to

regulate nonroad engines greater than 750 hp that are used in surface mining equipment on two

grounds: (1) such engines should have been treated as a separate "class or category," rather than

being lumped together either with construction equipment or large compression-ignition ("CI")

engines generally; and (2) treating very large mining equipment as a separate category, that category

does not cause or contribute to ozone andCO nonattainment becausemines are located in rural areas,

whereas ozone and CO nonattainment are urban phenomena. The EPA need prevail on only one of

these two arguments; NMA does not dispute the EPA's findings that construction equipment, or

large CI engines generally, cause or contribute to CO and ozone levels in more than one

nonattainment area.

The EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in classifying the engines used in very large

mining equipment together with construction equipment (in the nonroad study) or large CI engines

generally (as a regulatory category in the final rule). NMA contends that nonroad engines greater

than 750 hp are used almost exclusively in mining equipment, and that such engines differ from

smaller nonroad engines in design and function. When the EPA challenges NMA to explain how the

very large engines differ, however, NMA fails to provide an adequate response. First, NMA asserts

that it will cost more to modify the very large engines to comply with emissions control regulations.

Under § 213(a)(3), however, the EPA must consider compliance costs when setting the level of

emissions control once it has made the "cause or contribute" finding, not in deciding whether to

regulate at all: "the Administrator shall ... promulgate regulations containing standards applicable

to emissions from those classes or categories of new nonroad engines and new nonroad vehicles ...

which in the Administrator'sjudgment cause, or contribute to, such air pollution." (emphasis added).

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72 59 Fed. Reg. at 31,319. 

See American Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

NMA also contendsthat while smaller engines are used in both urban and ruralsettings, very

large engines used in mining equipment are used almost exclusively in rural areas. However, the

study commissioned by NMA's predecessor AMC shows that mining equipment is used in 20

nonattainment areas. NMA can characterize the mines as being in "rural" parts of these areas, but

the fact remainsthat more than 6% of VOC and NOx emitted by mining equipment is discharged into

ozone nonattainment areas. Because the statute, on NMA's own reading, requires only that the EPA

determine whether a class or category causes or contributes to ozone levels in more than one

nonattainment area, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the agency to place very large mining

equipment in a category with equipment using similar but smaller engines; nor did the EPA go astray

in determining that the "cause or contribute" trigger had been met. NMA would require the EPA to

find that the engines cause or contribute to ozone or CO levelsin the urban portions of nonattainment

areas, but does not ground this requirement in the statutory text, structure, or history.

2. Adequacy of consideration of compliance costs. NMA maintains that the EPA grossly

underestimated the costs its regulations would impose on manufacturers and users of very large

mining engines and equipment. Emissions standards under § 213(a)(3) must

achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the application

of technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the engines or

vehicles to which such standards apply, giving appropriate consideration to the cost

of applying such technology within the period oftime available to manufacturers, and

to noise, energy, and safetyfactors associated with the application ofsuch technology.

42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (1994) (emphasis added). The EPA discussed the available technology and

estimated compliance costsin the notice of proposed rulemaking. The regulatory support document

published at the time of the finalrule contained a discussion of the expected technological responses

of manufacturers to the standards adopted and revised the cost estimates that had appeared in the

notice of proposed rulemaking. For CI engines greater than 750 hp, the EPA estimated that retail

prices would rise approximately $100 per 100 hp, and that the retail prices of the equipment in which

the engines were used would rise by about one percent.72

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73 Id.

74 Id. at 31,333. 

The EPA obviously "considered" costs of compliance; NMA simply maintains that the EPA

got its numbers wrong. The EPA gave NMA's predecessor AMC ample opportunity to substantiate

that claim during the comment period. AMC presented its members' estimates of much higher costs

in adopting the appropriate technologies. The EPA requested more detailed information, but neither

AMC nor any ofits members provided any.73 In light ofthe EPA's detailed analysis of the technology

its standards would require, NMA has failed to show that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in

not adopting AMC's estimates as fact.

NMA also maintains that the EPA failed to account adequately for the costs imposed by the

standardsin the form of increased fuel consumption. However, the EPA assumed that for marketing

reasons manufacturers would not only adopt emissions-reducing technology, but would also make

adjustments to offset the decreases in fuel economy such technology would cause. It then included

in its estimate of technology costs the costs of both the emissions-reducing technology and the

fuel-consumption-reducing technology.74 Again, the EPA adequately considered the costs of its

regulation.

3. Regulation of smoke emissions. Smokevisible particles emitted by enginesis not

mentioned in § 213(a)(3). The EPA therefore adopted smoke standards under § 213(a)(4). If the

agency finds that emissions from new nonroad engines and vehicles significantly contribute to air

pollution (other than ozone precursors and CO) that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger

public health or welfare," it may regulate classes and categories of new nonroad engines and vehicles

that cause or contribute to such emissions. NMA challenges the smoke regulations, arguing that the

EPA has inadequately supported its finding that smoke may reasonably be anticipated to endanger

public health and welfare.

The EPA cited two threatsto the public health or welfare from smoke. The first was damage

to health resulting from inhalation of particles. The second was smoke's tendency to soil property

and people and hamper visibility. For its conclusion regarding health, the EPA relied on Douglas W.

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75 NMA cites Suresh H. Moolgavkar et al., Particulate Air Pollution, Sulfur Dioxide, and

Daily Mortality: A Reanalysis of the Steubenville Data, 7 INHALATION TOXICOLOGY 35 (1995)

("the effect of particulates was substantially attenuated when sulfur dioxide was simultaneously

included in the regression, and was no longer statistically significant"); and Suresh H.

Moolgavkar et al., Air Pollution and Daily Mortality in Philadelphia, 6 EPIDEMIOLOGY 576

(1995). 

76 NMA also suggests that the EPA acted prematurely in promulgating smoke regulations

because the EPA is currently reassessing the particulate matter NAAQS. The EPA points out that

all NAAQSs are reevaluated every five years, so there is always one pending in the near future. 

Also, it does not appear that any commentator raised this issue during the rulemaking or that the

EPA considered it. Hence, NMA cannot raise it now. See supra p. 41. 

Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 1753 (1993). That article concluded that "fine-particulate air pollution, or a more

complex pollution mixture associated with fine particulate matter, contributes to excess mortality in

certain U.S. cities." Id. at 1753. NMA challenges this with two articles published after the

rulemaking that criticize the Dockery article.75 Because these articles were not part of the record

presented to the EPA during the rulemaking and NMA did not request reconsideration when the

articles had become available, it cannot rely on them here. NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 438

(D.C. Cir. 1986). Although none of the articles establishes as a certainty that smoke harms human

health, the statute requires only that the Administrator determine that smoke "may reasonably be

anticipated" to endanger public health. In light of the Dockery article, the EPA's conclusion was not

arbitrary or capricious. NMA also contends that EPA's reliance on "aesthetic" harms such as reduced

visibility and soiled property did not satisfy the statutory requirement of harm to public health and

welfare. Under the CAA, "welfare" is defined to include "effects on ... visibility, and ... damage to

and deterioration of property." CAA, § 302(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1994). The EPA was therefore

within its statutory authority in finding that smoke endangered the public health and welfare.76

Accordingly, we deny the NMA petitions in their entirety, while we grant the EMA petitions

only insofar as they challenge the limitation of the implied § 209(e)(2) preemption to new nonroad

sources.

TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in all of the court's

opinion except its discussion ofsection 209(e)(2)'simplied preemption ofstate regulatory authority.

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Because I do not believe that the record clearly establishes that Congress intended to take the

unprecedented step of making the State of California the only government in the nation that may

establish emission standards for used offroad equipment, I dissent from Part II B 2 of the court's

opinion.

I fully agree with the court regarding federal and state authority to establish emission

standardsfor newnon-road vehicles and enginesthat is, as we hold today, "showroomnew" offroad

equipment. See Majority op. at 16-22 (Part II B 1). As for non-newthat is, usedoffroad

equipment, I agree with my colleagues that the EPA lacks authority to establish emission standards.

See id. at 25. Our only area of disagreement is over who, if not the EPA, may set emission standards

for used offroad equipment. The key issue is whether section 209(e)(2) implicitly preempts states

from setting emission standards for used offroad equipment. As the court suggests, the question

whether Congress intended section 209(e)(2) to preempt states from setting emission standards for

used offroad engines turns onindeed, it is essentially the same aswhether Congress intended

section 209(e)(2) to apply to used offroad equipment. See Majority op. at 23.

The EPA interprets section 209(e)(2) as not reaching used offroad equipment at all. 59 Fed.

Reg. 36,969 at 36,973-74 (1994). According to the EPA, therefore, states retain their historic

authority to set emission standards for used offroad equipment. In contrast, the court finds that

section 209(e)(2) appliesto used offroad equipment, thereby preempting statesfromsetting emission

standards unless California and the EPA approve the standards under the two-stage review process

established by section 209(e)(2). Under the first stage, California may adopt the standards only if

they are "in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal

standards." 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (1994). To survive second stage review, the EPA must

determine that California's determination was not "arbitrary or capricious," that California needs the

proposed standards to meet "compelling and extraordinary conditions," and that the standards are

"consistent" with the other requirements ofsection209 ofthe Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).

California and otherstates maythen implement those standards undersection 209(e)(2)(B), provided

they wait at least two years before doing so. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(B).

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Although I agree with the court that we must review the agency's interpretation of section

209(e)(2) under the standards set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), I respectfully disagree with the court's approach to ascertaining

Congressional intent under Chevron step one. The court's approach in weighing the "plain meaning"

of a section of the statute against other evidence of Congressional intent, in my view, goes beyond

well-established standards ofstatutoryconstruction, placing undueweight onthe immediate language

of a statute to the exclusion of virtually all other evidence. The court dismisses all evidence

contradicting the "plain meaning" of statutory language unless each individual piece of evidence

demonstrates to a "certainty" that the result implied by a plain reading of the statute is

"[in]conceivable," "[in]comprehensible," or "unintentional." Majority op. at 26, 28, 30.

Neither the Supreme Court nor we have required that courts give such weight to a piece of

text alone. Rather, our overriding obligation under Chevron step one is to determine whether

Congress has clearly expressed its intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. In so doing, we must consider

the evidence " "holistic[ally]'." United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of

America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) (quoting United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of

Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). While the immediate statutory text is the most

persuasive evidence of that intent, United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,

543 (1940), "[o]ver and over" the Supreme Court has "stressed that ... [courts] "must not be guided

by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its

object and policy.' " United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 455 (quoting United States v.

Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 116, 125 (1850)). We may depart from the literal meaning if

it would produce either an "odd result," Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509

(1989), or "an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,' "

American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194

(1922)). Relying exclusively on a single piece of text is particularly inappropriate where, as here, we

inquire into the scope of an implied preemption, thus beginning from the proposition that the statute

on its face does not explicitly resolve the issue, see Barnett Bank, 116 S. Ct. at 1107-08. In such

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cases, courts have unhesitatingly given weight to the purpose,structure, and legislative history ofthe

statute. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606 (1991); California

Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 592 (1987); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v.

ICC, 879 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1989); California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515, 1519-20 (D.C.

Cir.1986). 

Applying these principles, I would defer to the EPA's interpretation of section 209(e)(2) as

not preempting state regulation of used offroad equipment. I begin with the text. The opening phrase

ofsection 209(e)(2)stating that the section appliesto "any nonroad vehicles or engines other than

those referred to in" section 209(e)(1)does indeed suggest that Congress intended section

209(e)(2) to apply not only to new offroad equipment not covered by section 209(e)(1), but also to

used offroad equipment. If this were all the statute said on the subject and if no countervailing

evidence existed, I would agree with the court that this language establishes that Congress intended

to preempt states from setting emission standards for used offroad equipment. But there is

considerable evidence to the contrary, evidence that I believe demonstrates that Congress did not

intend to preempt state authority to regulate used offroad equipment.

First, interpreting section 209(e)(2) to apply to used offroad equipment makes little sense in

light ofsection 209(e)(2)(A), which allows California to adopt emission standards only "if California

determines that California standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health

and welfare as applicable federal standards." 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A). Because the EPA lacks

authority to establish emission standardsfor used offroad equipment, there are no "applicable federal

standards."

In explaining why Congress would have required California to compare its standards to

non-existent federal standards, the court seems to rely on petitioner's argument that because the

California standards will "necessarily be "as protective of public health and welfare' " as the absent

federal standards, California can rationally compare the two. Majority op. at 26. While I suppose

California could theoretically compare its standards with nothing, the court's reading nonetheless

leaves us with a provision that has no practical effect in regard to used offroad equipment. Because

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California'sstandardsfor used offroad equipment will "necessarily be "as protective of public health

and welfare' " as the nonexistent federal standards, id. (emphasis added), California's review of

emission standardsand the EPA'ssubsequent review to determine whetherCalifornia's conclusions

were arbitrary and capricious, see 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A)(i)would serve no purpose at all in

regard to used offroad equipment. Cf. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994) (noting

that courts "should hesitate" to adopt interpretations that would render other provisions of a statute

superfluous or unnecessary).

Second, the court's interpretation leaves a regulatory gap that undermines the statute's

purpose of reducing air pollution. The court's interpretation of section 209(e)(2) indisuptably

deprivesforty-nine states of authorityto set their own emission standardsfor used offroad equipment.

If, for example, Florida wants to establish emission standards for air boats used in the Everglades, it

cannot do so itself. Nor can it ask the EPA to set emission standards. Instead, it must ask California

for assistance.

According to the court, any regulatory gap is "illusory" because California can still set

emission standards and allfiftystatesmayestablish"in-use" regulationsto controlpollution fromused

offroad equipment. See Majority op. at 27. Yet California standards hardly substitute for state

emission standards. California, for example, is under no legal obligation to adopt emission standards

to help Florida regulate airboats. Nor is California likely to have an interest in Florida's air quality.

Even if California decides to adopt emission standards for air boats, there is no assurance that its

standards would be appropriate for Florida or any other state. Moreover, California's authority to

set emission standards is limited: The EPA can only approve California emission standards if

"California ... need[s]such ...standardsto meet compelling and extraordinaryconditions," 42 U.S.C.

§ 7543(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). If a particular kind of used air boat is not found in California

(after all, California has no Everglades), or if California otherwise does not have a compelling need

to regulate that equipment, no federal or state agency in the nation may set emission standards for

it.

Asfor in-use regulations, the court apparently assumesthat such regulationswhich control

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the use, operation, or movement of offroad equipmentare as effective as emission standards in

reducing pollution from used offroad equipment. Compared to emission standards, however,

enforcing regulations restricting the actual use of offroad equipment would likely require more

extensive on-site monitoring to determine whether, for example, the public is using its airboats at the

proper times and places. In any event, Congress regards emission standards as an important weapon

in the arsenals of both the federal and state governments in reducing pollution from mobile sources.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1994) (requiring each state plan to "include enforceable emission

limitations and other control measures ... to meet" federal air quality standards); 42 U.S.C. §

7521(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing federal emission standards for new motor vehicles); § 7547

(authorizing federal emissionstandardsfor newoffroad equipment). Thus, by eliminating most states'

ability to set emission standards for used offroad equipment, the court creates a significant gap in

terms of the tools that states may use to control air pollution, a gap not compensated for by either

California's emission standards or the states' in-use regulations.

Third, the court'sreading ofsection 209(e)(2) isinconsistent with the Act'sstructure. As the

court acknowledges, Congress based its program for regulating offroad equipment on the existing

program for regulating motor vehicles, see Majority op. at 4-10, 18-19, explicitly linking the two

regimes together, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7547(d) (subjecting enforcement of federal emission

standards for offroad equipment to provisions governing motor vehicles, including 42 U.S.C. §§

7525, 7541-43). With respect to motor vehicles, the Clean Air Act generally preempts states from

setting emission standardsfor newvehicles,see 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), a preemption that is coextensive

with EPA authority to set emission standards for new vehicles. Yet with respect to offroad

equipment, the court's interpretation preempts states from establishing emission standards for both

new and used offroad equipment, a preemption that significantly exceeds EPA authority to set

standards for new equipment.

Under the court's interpretation, California's role under the two preemption schemes also

differs dramatically. For new motor vehicles (and new offroad equipment, for that matter), California

serves as a "laboratory for innovation," Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1111

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(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980), producing emission standards for new vehicles

as an alternative to federal standards. The court gives California a far greater role with respect to

used offroad equipment: not an auxiliary laboratory operating alongside the federal regime, but the

sole clearinghouse for the nation's emission standards for used offroad equipment. 

To be sure, Congress did not intend to duplicate exactly California's role under the motor

vehicle scheme. See Majority op. at 29. While California may establish emission standards for all

new motor vehicles subject to federal standards, see 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), section 209(e)(1) clearly

preempts even California from establishing its own emission standards for certain classes of new

offroad equipment subject to federalregulation, see § 7543(e)(1). But that single departure from the

motor vehicle model merely restricts California's authority to set emission standards for certain

identified classes of offroad equipment, including locomotives and small construction and farm

equipment. In contrast, the departure created by the court's interpretation today is different in both

type and magnitude, grantingCalifornia exclusive power to set emission standardsfor allused offroad

equipment.

Fourth, if Congress had intended to adopt such an unprecedented regulatory regime, one

would think that a Senator, Representative, staff member, agency official, or lobbyist would have

made note of the fact and explained what Congress was doing. But the legislative record is entirely

devoid of any evidence that Congress meant to preempt states from acting even where the EPA

cannot and to make California the national arbiter of emission standardsfor used offroad equipment.

Indeed, the legislative record points in the opposite direction.

As the court notes, section 209(e)(2) was hastily added in conference. See Majority op. at

29-32. The House bill preempted state emission standards for new offroad equipment; the Senate

bill contained no preemption at all. Thus, neither chamber addressed state regulation of used offroad

equipment. See id. at 29-30. As the EPA observes, the conferees were unlikely to have

compromised their views on the regulation of new offroad equipment by going beyond even the

House bill to preempt state regulation of used offroad equipment. 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,973.

Other evidence reinforcesthis conclusion. A joint House-Senate staff memorandum presented

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to the conferees explains that, under section 209(e)(1), "states and local governments would be

preempted from regulating new nonroad engines which are smaller than 175 hp used in construction

equipment or vehicles or farmequipment or vehicles, as well as new locomotives or new engines used

in locomotives." JOINTHOUSE-SENATESTAFF, SUMMARY AGREEMENTON TITLE II, Mobile Sources

at 3 (October 10, 1990). [JA at 5.] The memo then explains the scope of preemption under section

209(e)(2): "With respect to other covered nonroad sources, California would be permitted to set

standards, and other States would be permitted to opt-in to the California standard using new

provisions analogous to sections 177 and 209 of the current law." Id. (emphasis added). According

to the memo, therefore, section 209(e)(2) governs only "other covered" offroad equipment. While

"other covered" equipment could conceivably mean something besides "other new" equipment, see

Majority op. at 31-32, that seems the most natural reading. New offroad vehicles and engines, after

all, are the only equipment "covered" by federal emission standards; and the memo's analogy to the

regulation of motor vehicles bolsters the idea that the conferees intended to preempt only state

regulation of "new" offroad equipment. Of course, I agree that a staff memorandum alone cannot

trump clear statutory text, see id., but no one suggests that it carry such weight, only that it is

consistent with other evidence casting doubt on the court's interpretation. Finally, while Senators

Baucus and Chafee may have overstated the narrowness ofsection 209(e)'s preemption,see Maj. op.

at 30-31, their commentssuggest that the conferees were concerned onlywith newoffroad equipment

and had no intention of broadly preempting states from setting emission standards for used offroad

equipment.

Fifth, neither petitioner nor the legislative record offers a plausible explanation whyCongress

would have intentionally applied section 209(e)(2) to used offroad equipment. The court suggests

one of its own: Congress acted out of concern that states would otherwise violate the Allway Taxi

doctrinethat is, that states might adopt emission standardsfor used offroad equipment that would,

by imposing restrictions on equipment immediately after it is put into use, effectively undermine the

uniformity of federal emission standards for new offroad equipment. See Majority op. at 26-27;

Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y.) (determining whether

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section 209(e) preempted municipal regulations applying to motor vehicles used as taxi cabs), aff'd,

468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972). With all respect, I think the court is grasping at straws.

Not only isthe record barren of any evidence that Congress was concerned about preserving

the Allway Taxi rule, but there is not even a reasonable fit between the requirements of section

209(e)(2) and the goal of assuring that state emission standards comply with the Allway Taxi

doctrine. While it may make sense for a federal agency to review state emission standards to protect

federal turf, that does not explain why Congress would have required California to review and

approve state emission standards. Nor would EPA review under section 209(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii)

significantly advance the Allway Taxi doctrine. As demonstrated above, section 209(e)(2)(A)(i),

which requiresthe EPAto review California's determination thatstate emission standards are "at least

as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards," 42 U.S.C. §

7543(e)(2)(A)(i), is completely superfluous in the context of used offroad equipment. Section

209(e)(2)(A)(ii), requiring that emission standards be onesthat California needsto "meet compelling

and extraordinary conditions," has nothing to do with preventing states from adopting emission

standards that could interfere with federal standards for new offroad equipment. It would prevent

states from setting emission standards for used offroad equipment even when manufacturers had

completelyceased producing that particulartype of equipment, therebyposing no risk of undermining

federal standards. And even the provision that the court relies on, section 209(e)(2)(A)(iii), which

requires the EPA to review emission standardsto ensure that they are "consistent with" section 209,

bears at best a tenuous connection to the Allway Taxi doctrine. The EPA's review takes place only

if California has first reviewed the proposed state standards, either its own or another state's, and

passed them on to the federal government. Because only California's own regulations are likely to

reach the EPA, section 209(e)(2)(A)(iii)'s practical effect will be to allow the EPA to stop California

from violating the Allway Taxi doctrine. This marginal benefit hardly explains why Congress would

have adopted such an unprecedented regulatory regime.

Finally, the EPA offers an alternative interpretation of the statute that is simple and logical:

Congress intended section 209(e)(2) to apply only to new offroad equipment not covered by section

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209(e)(1), but made a clerical mistake in writing section 209(e)(2) to apply to "any" offroad

equipment. This view is consistent with the structure of the statute, harmonizing the regulation of

offroad equipment with that of motor vehicles. It advances the purpose of the statute, leaving no

regulatory gap and allowing states to establish emission standards for used offroad equipment to

accomplish their air quality goals. It is supported by the weight of legislative history; indeed, it is

perfectly understandable given the haste in which Congress acted.

Because the court'sreading of a portion ofthe statute establishes a bizarre and unprecedented

regulatory regime that conflicts with other provisions of the text, undermines the statute's purpose

and structure, finds no support in the legislative history, and produces a result that serves no apparent

legislative purpose, and because a perfectly plausible alternative explanation exists, I think thisis one

of those "unusual cases" in which we may reject the apparent plain meaning of one portion of the

statute'stext. Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 462 (determining that, because the apparently plain

meaning was "overwhelm[ed by] evidence from the structure, language, and subject matter of the"

statute, Congressmade a "scrivener's error"); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 82 F.3d

451, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting literal application of section 176(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act

because it would frustrate Congress' intent and "look[ing] to the EPA for an interpretation of the

statute more true to Congress' purpose"). At the very least, the evidence as a whole casts sufficient

doubt on Congress' intent that we must conclude that some ambiguity exists asto whether Congress

intended section 209(e)(2) to cover used offroad equipment.

Having thus found the statute ambiguous, I would consider whether the agency's

interpretation is permissible underChevron step two. As noted above, the EPA's interpretationthat

section 209(e)(2) does not preempt state regulation of used offroad equipmentis consistent with

the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the statute. Moreover, because we are dealing with

an implied preemption, we must " "assum[e] that the historic police powers of the States were not

to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' "

Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 605 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,

230 (1947)). Having concluded under Chevron step one that Congress failed to express clearly its

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intent that section 209(e)(2) reaches used offroad equipment, I think that the agency has adopted a

reasonableindeed, the only permissibleinterpretation of the statute.

One final note. The court explains its novel and narrow approach to statutory interpretation

by suggesting that if courts were released from the bonds of plain language, they might intrude upon

the policy choices properly left to the two political branches. Majority op. at 24-25. Relying on the

language of a statute to the practical exclusion of all other evidence may produce a more limited

judicial inquiry, but it will not necessarily result in a more deferential judiciary. In fact, it is the court,

relying on the supposed plain language of a statute, that today overrides a decision by one of the two

political branches and introduces its views into what would otherwise be an undisturbed dialogue

between the executive and legislative branches.

Dissenting from Part II B 2 of the court's opinion, I would deny all petitions for review.

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