Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02723/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02723-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ione E. Fogg
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2723

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of South Dakota.

*

Ione E. Fogg, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2005

Filed: May 20, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit

Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Ione E. Fogg pleaded guilty to two counts of misdemeanor larceny

after writing and cashing checks that she had stolen in blank form from her motherin-law. She appeals from the sentencing and restitution orders imposed by the

District Court. After reviewing the record, we affirm Fogg's sentence, and we vacate

the order of restitution and remand for reconsideration of the amount of restitution

ordered.

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Apparently, Hunkpati was part of the Lode Star facility and the two shared a

common surveillance system.

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I.

Fogg was indicted by a grand jury for felony larceny after cashing stolen

checks at three locations on the Crow Creek Indian Reservation in South Dakota. A

surveillance videotape showed Fogg writing and cashing checks at the Hunkpati Road

Stop Texaco (Hunkpati) and the Lode Star Casino (Lode Star).1

 In addition, a witness

was prepared to identify Fogg as having cashed stolen checks at Shelby's

Convenience Store (Shelby's).

As mentioned previously, the stolen checks belonged to Fogg's mother-in-law,

Ethel Miller, and they were drawn on Miller's checking account at Wells Fargo Bank

(WFB). After Fogg was indicted, Miller died and Lode Star destroyed the videotapes

from Lode Star and Hunkpati. As a result, the government allowed Fogg to plead

guilty to a superseding information charging Fogg with two counts of misdemeanor

larceny—one count for checks totaling $275.00 cashed at Shelby's and one count for

checks totaling $189.00 cashed at Hunkpati. Fogg waived her appeal rights in her

plea agreement, but she excepted from the appeal waiver the right to appeal any

upward departures from the sentencing guidelines and to appeal the amount of

restitution ordered.

At sentencing, the District Court reduced Fogg's base offense level by two

levels for acceptance of responsibility. The District Court then imposed a two-level

enhancement after finding that Miller had been a vulnerable victim. Determining that

Fogg's criminal history score underrepresented her actual history of criminal activity,

the District Court departed upward one criminal history category and two offense

levels to reflect Fogg's true criminal history and likelihood of committing further

offenses. These departures brought Fogg to an offense level of 8 and a criminal

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history category of VI, placing her within a sentencing range of 18–24 months.

Because the statutory maximum sentence for each of the two misdemeanor larceny

counts was twelve months, the District Court sentenced Fogg to twenty-four months,

which reflected the maximum sentence for each of the two counts, running

consecutively. In addition, the District Court entered an order requiring Fogg to pay

$1,517.00 in total restitution to Shelby's, Miller's estate, and WFB. Fogg appeals,

challenging her sentence and the amount of restitution ordered.

II.

We must first decide which of Fogg's claims were waived by her plea

agreement. Generally speaking, a defendant may waive her appeal rights in a valid

plea agreement. United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

540 U.S. 997 (2003). In her plea agreement, Fogg waived her appeal rights, but

excepted from the waiver the right to appeal an "upward departure" from the

guidelines range and "any finding regarding the amount of restitution." Plea

Agreement ¶ 11. The vulnerable victim enhancement Fogg received was pursuant to

§ 3A1.1(b) of the guidelines and was an "adjustment" rather than an "upward

departure." See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 3, pt. A (2003) (discussing

"adjustments"); cf. id. ch. 5, pt. K (discussing "departures"); see also United States

v. Walling, 982 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The guidelines differentiate between

departures and adjustments."). Thus, Fogg waived the right to appeal that

enhancement. See United States v. Gaitan, 171 F.3d 222, 223–24 (5th Cir. 1999)

(distinguishing an "adjustment" from a "departure" for purposes of an appeal waiver).

Fogg also claims the enhancement of her sentence based on judge-determined

facts violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington,

124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker

held that the reasoning of Blakely applied to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

See 125 S. Ct. 725, 746 (2005) (Stevens, J.). Unless expressly reserved, however, the

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Fogg does not argue that the plea agreement is in any way invalid.

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right to appellate relief under Booker is among the rights waived by a valid appeal

waiver, even if the parties did not anticipate the Blakely/Booker rulings. See United

States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628, 629 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005). Further, plea agreements are

contractual in nature and are to be interpreted according to the parties' intentions,

looking to what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms. See United States

v. Borer, 394 F.3d 569, 577 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91,

95 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005).

There is no indication that Fogg intended to except from her appeal waiver the

right to appeal her sentence or the application of the guidelines on Sixth Amendment

grounds. The fact that Fogg entered into her plea agreement before the Supreme

Court's decision in Blakely underscores our interpretation of the agreement. The plea

agreement reserved "the defendant's right to appeal an upward departure," Plea

Agreement ¶ 11, and there is simply no evidence that the parties intended those words

to have any meaning other than their usual and ordinary meaning prior to the

Blakely/Booker decisions. See Rubbo, 396 F.3d at 1334. Thus, Fogg's plea

agreement waived her right to assert a Blakely/Booker claim on appeal. Fogg's

raising of Blakely at her sentencing hearing could not and did not vitiate the

limitation on her right to appeal already agreed to as part of her plea agreement.2

Consequently, we have no occasion to discuss the merits of Fogg's Blakely/Booker

claims. By contrast, Fogg's waiver did reserve the right to appeal the upward

departure based on the District Court's determination that Fogg's criminal history

score failed to reflect the full extent of her criminality, as well as the right to appeal

the amount of restitution ordered. We therefore turn to those claims.

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A.

Fogg argues that the District Court erred by departing upward from her

criminal history score and offense level under § 4A1.3 of the guidelines. We review

de novo whether the sentence was imposed in violation of law or as the result of an

incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1);

United States v. Mashek, No. 04-2650, slip op. at 6–8 (8th Cir. May 10, 2005) (citing

United States v. Mathijssen, No. 04-1995, slip op. at 3–4 (8th Cir. May 2, 2005)). We

review for abuse of discretion the decision to depart upward from the guidelines, and

we review the extent of the departure for reasonableness. Id. at 6 n.5 (citing United

States v. Iron Cloud, 312 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Sample, 213

F.3d 1029, 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2000).

The District Court made the departure pursuant to § 4A1.3 after determining

that Fogg's prior criminal activity was not adequately reflected by her criminal history

score. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3(a)(1) (2003). The District

Court also determined that Fogg's numerous convictions—for petty theft, insufficientfunds checks, driving under the influence, and driving without a license—indicated

a high likelihood that Fogg would commit other crimes. See id. We note that these

bases for departure run parallel to two of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). See United States v.Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding

that the bases for a departure under § 4A1.3(a) correspond with the sentencing factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C)). We therefore conclude these were

permissible bases on which to make the upward departure.

After deciding a departure was warranted, the District Court exercised its

discretion by departing upward to a criminal history category of VI and to an offense

level of 8. This increased the applicable sentencing range of 9–15 months to a range

of 18–24 months. The District Court then sentenced Fogg to the statutory maximum

of twenty-four months for the two misdemeanor larceny convictions. Fogg could not

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have been surprised by this sentence, because the District Court had informed her

before she pleaded guilty that she might receive a two-year sentence. Plea Hr'g Tr.

at 12. Given Fogg's extensive history of criminal activity, the District Court did not

abuse its discretion by departing upward under § 4A1.3, and the extent of the

departure was reasonable.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that, insofar as Fogg's appeal

rights were not waived as part of her plea agreement (we do not consider any claims

that were waived), Fogg's sentence was not imposed in violation of law or as the

result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. Likewise, we conclude

that the resulting final sentence of twenty-four months is reasonable. Treating the

guidelines as advisory, as Booker requires, we are satisfied that Fogg's sentence is

supported by the District Court's guidelines calculations and by the sentencing factors

listed in § 3553(a). We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.

B.

Regarding Fogg's challenge to the amount of restitution ordered, a threshold

question is whether Fogg preserved this issue for appellate review. In her written

objections to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), Fogg objected to restitution

for any losses from the checks written to Lode Star because she had not admitted to

cashing any of those checks. Defendant's Written Objections (DWO) #1–4 (objecting

to PSR ¶¶ 8, 9, 11, and 12). She also objected that the PSR was "vague" as to the

number of Lode Star checks that were returned for insufficient funds once Miller's

account was depleted. Id. #5 (objecting to PSR ¶ 14). This objection implicitly

questioned the portion of the deficit in Miller's account to be attributed to the Lode

Star checks. See PSR ¶ 14; DWO # 5 (objecting to PSR ¶ 14); Addendum to PSR

(Addendum) at 2 (stating Probation Officer's Response to DWO #5).

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Counsel for Fogg stated she had not previously objected to restitution for

WFB in her written objections because WFB's losses had not been included in the

initial PSR. Sentencing Tr. at 24. In addition, Fogg's counsel clearly stated she did

not want to waive any objections to restitution that were not apparent prior to the

Addendum. Id. Notably, no mention of restitution for WFB was made in the initial

PSR.

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At sentencing, the District Court sustained Fogg's written objection to

restitution for checks cashed at Lode Star as "not part of the offense of conviction"

under 18 U.S.C. § 3663. Sentencing Tr. at 5, 19. The District Court then stated that

Fogg's vagueness objection as to Miller's account information was "immaterial."

Sentencing Tr. at 19. But this objection was not immaterial, because once the deficit

in Miller's account was reduced by the amount attributed to the Lode Star checks, the

restitution awarded to offset that reduced deficit would necessarily be reduced.

Accordingly, at sentencing Fogg made a new objection to "the count" of $742.00 in

restitution for Miller's estate, which was included for the first time in the Addendum.

Sentencing Tr. at 24; see Addendum at 2 (stating Probation Officer's Response to

DWO #5). Similarly, Fogg's objection to the restitution ordered for WFB was in

response to the Addendum, which for the first time stated that WFB had lost $500.00

as a result of honoring five checks cashed at Lode Star.3

 Addendum at 2 (stating

Probation Officer's Response to DWO #5). In making these objections to restitution

for Miller's estate and WFB, Fogg's counsel twice referenced her initial Lode Star

objection. Sentencing Tr. at 24.

The government argues that because the Addendum was released on June 22,

2004, and because Fogg did not make her objections to the Addendum until the

sentencing hearing on June 28, 2004, Fogg's objections to the Addendum were

untimely under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We disagree.

Rule 32 permits a court to "allow a party" to make a new objection at any time before

sentencing if "good cause" is shown. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(D). The inclusion of

the losses to WFB and Miller's estate for the first time in the Addendum, as new

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The point heading for the section of Fogg's brief that addresses the restitution

issue simply states that "THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING

FOGG'S RESTITUTION." Appellant's Br. at 17. In making her argument, Fogg

reiterates that "the superseding information did not charge that Fogg had stolen

money from [Lode Star]." Id. at 18. She argues that the District Court "clearly erred"

in awarding restitution to WFB and Miller's estate. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Fogg

also cites United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.

989 (1993), arguing that, given her sustained objection as to Lode Star, there was

insufficient factual support for the restitution ordered to WFB and Miller's estate. See

Appellant's Br. at 18–19. The government interprets this argument accordingly, and

rebuts in part by arguing that losses suffered by victims not named in the information,

i.e., losses from the Lode Star checks, could be compensated under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663

and 3663A. Appellee's Br. at 16–18. And although Fogg argues later in her brief that

the District Court "plainly erred" in awarding restitution based partially on the Lode

Star checks, Appellant's Br. at 20 (emphasis added), throughout her argument she

contends that she timely and properly made the relevant objections. Id. The record

supports our holding that she preserved her right to appellate review of her restitution

order for clear error, and Fogg's brief does not provide any persuasive reason to

conclude that she intended to concede or did concede to only plain-error review of

the amount of her restitution order.

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information, constituted good cause for making the objections, and the objections

were made before sentencing. After Fogg made these objections, the District Court

stated without explanation that "if that's an objection, it's overruled," Sentencing Tr.

at 25, which appears to have been a ruling on the merits. We therefore cannot say the

objections were untimely.

In summary, the District Court sustained Fogg's objection to restitution for any

losses from the Lode Star checks as not part of the charged offenses. Fogg also

objected to the impact of the Lode Star checks on the restitution ordered for WFB and

Miller's account. These latter objections implicitly and by reference objected to

restitution for losses not resulting from the charged offenses, and the District Court

rejected them on the merits. Therefore, we hold that Fogg preserved for appellate

review the issue regarding the amount of her restitution order.4

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The District Court denied restitution for Hunkpati in reliance on the PSR,

which stated that Hunkpati had suffered no financial losses as a result of the stolen

checks. See Sentencing Tr. at 24; PSR ¶ 14 ("[The Hunkpati manager] stated the

checks cashed at [Hunkpati] were not returned as insufficient; therefore, [Miller]

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Accordingly, we review the amount of the District Court's restitution order for

clear error. United States v. Simon, 376 F.3d 806, 809 (2004). A sentencing court

may order a defendant to make restitution under the Mandatory Victims Recovery

Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2000); see United States v. Ramirez, 196 F.3d 895,

899 (8th Cir. 1999). Unless the charged offense has a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern

of criminal activity as an element, however, the restitution order may only cover

losses from the specific offense for which the defendant was indicted and convicted.

Ramirez, 196 F.3d at 899–900. The offense of larceny does not have a scheme,

conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity as an element, see 18 U.S.C. § 661 (2000),

and therefore the District Court was limited to ordering restitution for the amount of

losses suffered by the victims of Fogg's larceny as charged in her superseding

information.

Fogg was charged with misdemeanor larceny for stolen checks cashed at

Shelby's and Hunkpati. The government dropped charges regarding checks cashed

at Lode Star from Fogg's superseding information. Again, the District Court denied

all restitution based on the Lode Star checks because those checks were not part of

the convicted offenses. The factual-basis statement accompanying Fogg's plea

agreement admitted a total loss of $464.00 from her offenses—$275.00 for checks

cashed at Shelby's and $189.00 for checks cashed at Hunkpati. The government

attested this factual-basis statement, thus signaling its agreement with Fogg's

admissions as to the total amount of stolen checks admitted by her plea.

The District Court ordered restitution in the amount of $1,517.00, which

corresponded to $275.00 for Shelby's, $500.00 for WFB, and $742.00 for Miller's

estate.5

 In reviewing the record, there appears to be a problem with each of these

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incurred the losses with those checks, not the store."). As if to add to the confusion

in this case, however, the Addendum conflicts with this PSR statement by

maintaining that Hunkpati suffered a $189.00 loss. See Addendum at 2 (stating that

"the Hunkpati Road Stop incurred a loss of $189.00"); see also Letter from WFB

dated June 8, 2004 (stating that check nos. 2993, 3020, and 3050, totaling $189.00,

were returned to Hunkpati because of insufficient funds in Miller's account).

6

Although the District Court overruled Fogg's objection to the inclusion of

penalty fees in the restitution ordered for Shelby's, see Sentencing Tr. at 19–20, the

court appears to have omitted those penalty fees from the restitution order.

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amounts. The $275.00 in restitution ordered for Shelby's was less than the $414.20

in total losses Shelby's suffered after penalty fees were assessed.6

 PSR ¶ 15. In

addition, the $500.00 in restitution ordered for WFB was clearly compensation for

checks cashed at Lode Star rather than Shelby's or Hunkpati. See Letter from WFB

dated June 8, 2004 (regarding check nos. 2980–84). Finally, the $742.00 in

restitution ordered for Miller's estate was for penalties on twelve insufficient-funds

checks, but five of those twelve checks were cashed at Lode Star. See id. (regarding

check nos. 2985, 2987–90). To summarize, not only was Shelby's undercompensated by the order, but it appears that none of the $500.00 ordered for WFB,

and only an unknown portion of the $742.00 ordered for the Miller estate, arose from

the charged offenses. The amount of the restitution order was therefore clear error.

Even though the amount of restitution at issue in this case is relatively small,

the calculation of that amount and the information supporting it are, at this point, both

confusing and conflicting. To wit, the PSR admits that "[i]t is unclear how much of

the [total losses] Mrs. Miller personally lost, before her funds were depleted, and the

amount of loss incurred by each business." PSR ¶ 12. Given the conflicting

information in the record and the resulting confusion at the sentencing hearing, we

must remand to ensure the restitution order covers only the losses from checks cashed

at Shelby's and Hunkpati.

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III.

For the reasons discussed herein, the sentence imposed by the District Court

is affirmed, and the restitution order is vacated and the matter remanded with

instructions to reconsider the amount of restitution to be made by Fogg and to enter

a new order of restitution consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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