Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00006/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00006-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Harry Steele
Petitioner
Willie Thomas
Respondent

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN HARRY STEELE, AIS 284155, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 16-0006-KD-C

WILLIE THOMAS, : 

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

John Harry Steele, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the respondent, has 

petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner is challenging the validity of his May 16, 2012 murder conviction in the Circuit 

Court of Choctaw County, Alabama; he was sentenced to a forty-year term of 

imprisonment on June 6, 2012. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Steele’s 

conviction and sentence by unpublished memorandum opinion issued on February 1, 

2013. See Steele v. State, 159 So.3d 794 (Ala.Crim.App. 2013) (table). Because Steele did not 

seek rehearing or petition the Alabama Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, the Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of final judgment of affirmance on 

February 20, 2013. (Compare Doc. 7, Exhibit A, at 2 with Doc. 10, Exhibit A.) Steele filed a 

Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, Alabama collaterally attacking 

his conviction and sentence on January 31, 2014. (Doc. 7, Exhibit H, PETITION FOR 

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 32 OF THE ALABAMA RULES OF 

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at 1.) The trial court denied Steele’s collateral petition 

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following a December 10, 2014 evidentiary hearing. (Compare Doc. 7, Exhibit H, March 5, 

2015 ORDER with id., Evidentiary Hearing Transcript.) The Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment by unpublished memorandum decision 

issued on September 25, 2015. (Doc. 7, Exhibit L.) Petitioner’s application for rehearing 

was overruled on October 16, 2015. (Doc. 7, Exhibit G, at 2.) Steele’s petition for writ of 

certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was denied on December 4, 2015, and the 

certificate of final judgment issued that same date. (Id.)

In his petition before this Court, filed December 22, 2015 (Doc. 1, at 13), Steele 

raises the following issues which he claims entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief: (1)

the record contains insufficient evidence to sustain his murder conviction; and (2) his trial 

counsel provided ineffective assistance. Respondent contends, for various reasons, that 

this Court is procedurally barred from reaching the merits of all of petitioner’s claims.

(Doc. 7, at 8-14).

This cause is before the Court on the petition (Doc. 1), respondent’s answer with 

attachments (see Doc. 7), and petitioner’s response (Doc. 10) to the undersigned’s April 5, 

2016 show cause order (Doc. 9). A careful review of the record has been completed and it 

is determined that it contains sufficient facts upon which the issues under consideration 

may be properly resolved. Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is required. Compare Means 

v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 433 Fed.Appx. 852, 855 (11th Cir. July 12, 2011) 

(“[W]here ‘the record refutes [a petitioner’s] factual allegations or otherwise precludes 

habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.’”) (citation 

omitted)), cert. denied, U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 1580, 182 L.Ed.2d 198 (2012) with Allen v. 

Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 611 F.3d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A district court is 

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not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the claims ‘are merely conclusory 

allegations unsupported by specifics,’ . . . or ‘if the record refutes the applicant’s factual 

allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief[.]’”), cert. denied, U.S. , 131 S.Ct. 

2898, 179 L.Ed.2d 1192 (2011). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 18, 2011, the Choctaw County 911 service received a call from Mary 

Leddon reporting the stabbing of a man she identified only as “B.J.” by her common-law 

husband, John, and requesting assistance. (Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. 40-41 & 69-70; see also id. 

at 41 (911 call was published to the jury by being played).) Sergeant Charles Breland of 

the Choctaw County Sheriff’s Office arrived first on the scene (T.T. 105-106 & 112); he 

observed a white male lying face-up on the ground, a man sitting cross-legged by the 

man lying on the ground, a woman sitting on the porch, a woman “behind the man that 

was laying on the ground[,]” and a large knife stuck in the ground near the body of the 

man lying on the ground (T.T. 107-108). Sergeant Breland identified the man sitting crosslegged as the defendant, John Steele, and State’s Exhibit 15 as the knife he saw stuck in 

the ground. (Id. at 108-109.) As Breland was walking up to the scene, Steele made 

comments to the effect that he “hate[d] it[]” and he “wish[ed] it hadn’t happened.” (Id. at 

109.) Breland then asked Steele if he “d[id] this[]” and Steele immediately responded in 

the affirmative. (Id.) Breland instructed Steele to stand up and put his hands on his head; 

Steele complied and he was placed under arrest. (Id. at 109-110 & 113.) 

When the Sheriff of Choctaw County, Tom Abate, arrived on the scene he began 

taking photographs and, as well, removed the knife from the crime scene. (T.T. 114-117.) 

Sheriff Abate gave the knife to his Chief Deputy (compare T.T. 117 with T.T. 120-121), who 

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took it to the county coroner, Rocky Bumpers, so that “it could be transported with the 

body to the crime lab in Mobile.” (T.T. 121). The parties stipulated that “Rocky Bumpers 

was in the chain of custody on this weapon, and that it is in the same or substantially the 

same condition as it was when he received it.” (Id. at 121-122.) Dr. Eugene Hart, a 

forensic pathologist/medical examiner with the Alabama Department of Forensic 

Sciences, performed an autopsy on the victim, William M. Aston, III, on March 21, 2011. 

(T.T. 79-81.) Dr. Hart determined that the manner of death was homicide and that the 

cause of death was a stab wound of the chest (id. at 81-82), more specifically, a stab 

wound that hit the heart and left lung (id. at 84-85; see also id. at 85 (“[T]ypically, with an 

injury to the heart as seen in this photograph, the victim would collapse within ten to 

fifteen seconds after the oxygen stored in the brain has been used[] and he . . . would die 

within minutes afterwards.”)). According to Hart, he examined the knife that 

accompanied the body and determined that it was the weapon that caused Aston’s death. 

(Id. at 85-86 & 89-90.) Hart also testified that the knife broke through Aston’s anterior left 

sixth rib, indicating that the knife was used with considerable force. (Id. at 87-88.) Hart’s 

autopsy report was admitted into evidence (T.T. 91) and because the forensic pathologist 

had ordered toxicological studies on blood, urine, and vitreous samples taken from the 

victim (T.T. 95) and discussed the toxicology report in his autopsy report (T.T. 96-98), the 

court allowed the defense to examine Hart regarding the substances found in each of the 

three specimens take from the victim’s body (T.T. 99-101). In the blood, ethanol (that is, 

drinking alcohol) was found at 0.189 grams per 100 milliliter, as was Cyclobenzaprine 

(that is, Flexeril, a muscle relaxant), and metabolites of cocaine and marijuana (T.T. 99-

101); in the urine, 0.254 per 100 milliliters of ethanol was found (see T.T. 101); and found 

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in the vitreous fluid was 0.212 grams per 100 milliliters of ethanol (id.). On re-direct 

examination, Hart testified that the ethanol was a sedative drug, as was the 

Cyclobenzaprine (T.T. 102); that he did know how to classify the marijuana (T.T. 103); 

and that the Benzoylecgonine (an inactive cocaine metabolite) “should have no effect.” 

(T.T. 102; see also id. at 100.) On re-cross examination, the witness “couldn’t say[]” 

whether the drinking of alcohol at the level indicated by the specimens could have an 

effect other than a calming effect. (T.T. 103; see also id. (“I mean, when I drink alcohol, I 

tend to become calm.”).) The trial court sustained objection to the following question and 

would not allow Hart to answer it: “So, you can’t sit here and say, on a specific 

individual, whether this variety of substance of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol would 

have a calming effect or not have a calming effect?” (T.T. 103-104.)

Because the foregoing evidence indisputably establishes that Steele killed Aston 

by stabbing him with a knife, the defendant and his attorneys early on determined to 

argue that the killing was justified under the theory of self-defense (see, e.g., T.T. 8 (“One 

of the issues is going to be self-defense in this case.”)), a defense which Steele to this day 

believes absolves him of Aston’s murder (compare, e.g., Doc. 10, at 4 (“[]Steele[] claims he 

Acted in Self-Defense[.]”) with Doc. 7, Exhibit B, June 6, 2012 Sentencing Transcript, at 168 

(“[M]e and my wife tried to do everything we could to avoid this. But, it just happened. I 

understand their pain. I do. But, we tried to do everything we could to try to follow the 

law from the first moment up until now. And nothing I say will take their pain away 

from them. But, I mean, I’m sorry that it had to happen. I wish it never did. I wish 

something else would have happened, or I would have just walked in my room, just 

something. I just don’t know what.”)). And, in order to place this defense before the jury, 

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the defense did not in any manner object to the State subpoenaing Steele’s common-law 

wife, Mary Leddon, the only other eyewitness to the events leading to the stabbing death 

of Aston.1 (See T.T. 42.) 

Leddon testified that Aston spent the night at the house she shared with Steele and 

their two sons on March 17, 2011, and that the victim and her husband spent the day 

together on March 18, 2011. (See id. at 46-47.) Leddon worked on March 18, 2011, arriving 

back home around 3:00 p.m. (Id. at 44-45.) When Leddon arrived home, her husband and 

Aston were watching television in the living room; however, they soon left to pick up 

Aston’s “check from Ezell’s.” (Id. at 47.) The two men arrived back at the house around 

7:00 p.m. (id. at 48); Leddon noted they had been drinking because she could tell when 

her husband drank, the men arrived at the house with an open case of beer, and Aston 

continued to drink (id. at 62). After the men got back to the house, Steele took a nap, 

Leddon walked to her mom’s nearby home, and Aston started grilling some meat. (See id. 

at 48-49.) Leddon arrived back from her mom’s house at 8:15 p.m. and, sometime 

thereafter, Steele was awaken, went outside and asked Aston why he woke him up. (Id. at 

49.) Aston denied waking Steele up and the two men argued about that issue. (Id. at 49 & 

 1 Steele has never suggested that he should have been called as a witness in his 

defense. (Compare Docs. 1 & 10 with Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. 129-130 (outside the presence of the 

jury, Steele was sworn and confirmed to the trial judge that he participated in discussions with 

his attorneys about whether he should testify and about not calling Kelly Wood, the person who 

completed the toxicology report, and that it was his decision to not testify and to not call Wood 

as a witness for the defense).) Accordingly, in order to have the jury “hear” his claim of selfdefense he necessarily needed his common-law wife to testify because she was the only other 

eyewitness to the stabbing. In other words, in order to be entitled to a self-defense charge the 

defendant had to offer some evidence supportive of this theory and since he chose not to testify 

the only manner in which he could offer successfully inject his self-defense theory was through 

the testimony of his common-law wife.

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54.) Leddon told both men that she thought her youngest son, Benjamin, was responsible 

for waking Steele (id. at 50-51), and, according to the witness, her husband was ready to

“drop” it and “finish having a good night” but that Aston “would not drop it.” (Id. at 

51.)2 At some point, Steele went back inside the house and when Leddon entered a 

minute later,3 with Aston behind her, her husband was walking down the hallway from 

the bedroom carrying a Bowie knife. (Id. at 54.) The two men started arguing again and 

though Leddon was situated between the two,4 she was ultimately pushed aside by Steele 

and fell against the couch (id. at 56-57); as she caught herself and looked back up, Aston 

was “right up against” her husband5 and then the victim “turned towards [her] and told 

[her] John did it, and walked out the door.” (Id. at 57 & 58.)6 Leddon saw blood on the 

 2 Leddon admitted that nowhere in her written statement on the night of the 

incident did she recount that her husband wanted to “drop it[.]” (Id. at 52; compare id. with State’s 

Exhibit 2 (Leddon’s handwritten statement).)

3 According to Leddon, before she entered the house with Aston behind her, Aston 

walked around her car and started beating on his chest. (Id. at 63.) The witness admitted that this 

information was not contained in her written statement completed at the request of Sheriff Abate 

on the night of March 18, 2011. (See id. at 72.)

4 Leddon’s trial testimony was that both she and her husband asked Aston to go 

back outside (id. at 55 & 66; see id. at 67 (Leddon’s testimony that when she asked Aston to leave 

he told her “he was not leaving[,] that he wanted some of the meat that was on the grill[]” and 

that, at some point, the victim saw the knife and told Steele he was not scared of the knife)); she 

admitted, however, that this information was not contained in her written statement (id. at 56; see 

also id. at 55 (“I know I left some stuff out of the statement.”); see id. at 77 (Leddon’s testimony 

that she was in shock and traumatized by the events of that night and, therefore, when she 

provided her written statement at 11:00 p.m., she did not remember everything at that time)).

5 According to Leddon, Steele was in the same spot he was standing when she first 

came in the home, whereas Aston traversed the entire living room in advancing towards her 

husband. (Id. at 68.)

6 Leddon never saw Aston with a weapon anytime that night. (Id. at 75.)

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floor, retrieved a towel from the bathroom, called 911, and, after requesting assistance, 

she went outside and utilized the towel to apply pressure to the wound. (Id. at 58-59.) At 

first, Steele stood “in shock[]” but eventually followed Leddon outside, stuck the knife in 

the ground, and, before any 911 responders arrived on the scene, performed CPR on 

Aston. (Id. at 69.)

Defense counsel twice moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had 

not proven all elements of the offense of murder (T.T. 126 & 131); each motion was denied 

(see id.). The trial court charged the jury on the elements of murder and the lesserincluded offense of manslaughter (T.T. 139-142), as well as self-defense (142-145 & 151).

Now, the defendant contends that he acted in self-defense. A 

person may use physical force upon another person in order to defend 

himself from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of 

unlawful physical force by that other person; and he may use the degree 

of force [that] he reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose.

A person may use deadly physical force in order to defend himself 

if he reasonably believes that the other person is either using or about to 

use unlawful deadly physical force, or is committing, or about to 

commit[,] an assault in the first or second degree.

For the defendant’s use of deadly physical force against another 

person to be justified, the deadly physical force must have been used 

under the following circumstances: The defendant, John Steele, must have 

reasonably believed that William Maxwell Aston, III, was using or about 

to use unlawful deadly physical force against him; or the defendant, John 

Steele, must have reasonably believed that William Maxwell Aston, III, 

was committing or about to commit an assault in the first or second 

degree.

Deadly physical force is force which, under the circumstances in 

which it is used, [] is readily capable of causing death or serious physical 

injury. A reasonable belief is a belief formed in reliance upon reasonable 

appearances. It is a belief not performed recklessly or negatively. The test 

of reasonableness is not whether the defendant was correct in his belief, 

but whether the belief was reasonable under the circumstances existing at 

the time.

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The defendant is not justified in using deadly physical force upon 

another person and cannot prevail on the issue of self-defense if it 

reasonably appears, or the defendant knows that he can avoid the 

necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating; except 

that the defendant is not required to retreat if he is in his dwelling or at his 

place of work, and was not the original aggressor.

The defendant does not have the burden of proving that he acted in 

self-defense[.] [T]o the contrary[,] [o]nce self-defense becomes an issue, the 

State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant did not act in self-defense. I charge you members of the jury 

that if you believe from the evidence that at the time of the killing, the 

deceased was under the influence of alcohol, you may consider such fact 

in determining whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.

I charge you members of the jury that if you believe from the 

evidence that the deceased, at the time of his death, was under the 

influence of alcohol[,] and that, as a result of being under such influence,

the deceased was aggressive, or belligerent, or quarrelsome, then you 

should consider such facts in determining whether or not the defendant 

acted in self-defense in killing the deceased, as I explain the law governing 

self-defense to you.

. . .

I want to give you this additional charge on self-defense, and I ask 

that you listen carefully.

A person who is justified in using physical force, including deadly 

physical force, and who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and is in 

any place where he . . . has the right to be, has no duty to retreat and has 

the right to stand his . . . ground.

(Id.)

On May 16, 2012, a jury of Steele’s peers found him guilty of the murder of 

William Maxwell Aston, III. (Id. at 153; see also id. at 154 (polling of the jury).). On June 6, 

2012, Steel was sentenced to a 40-year tem of imprisonment. (Id. at 169.) Steele entered 

oral notice of appeal. (Id. at 170.) On appeal, Steele raised four issues, including a 

contention that the jury’s verdict was due to be reversed as not being supported by the 

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evidence. (See Doc. 7, Exhibit C, at 3.) In affirming Steele’s conviction and sentence by 

unpublished memorandum opinion, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed 

his attack on the jury’s verdict, in relevant manner, as follows: 

IV.

Steele argues that the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict 

because he clearly acted in self-defense. The jury in this case was fully 

instructed as to self-defense. Moreover, this specific issue was not included 

in his motions for judgment of acquittal.

In the present case, the jury was presented with evidence that could 

reasonably have been determined to support a charge of murder. The jury, 

as finders of fact, properly weighed the evidence after making credibility 

choices and found that Steele murdered B.J.

Where, as here, the killing was admitted, the question 

of whether or not it was justified under the theory of selfdefense was for the jury. The issue of self-defense invariably 

presents a question for the jury, whose verdict will not be 

disturbed on appeal. Even if the evidence of self-defense is 

undisputed, the credibility of the defendant with respect to 

the evidence of self-defense is for the jury, and they may, in 

their discretion, accept it as true or reject it.

. . .

Here, the jury chose not to believe the testimony that indicated that 

Steele had acted in self-defense in causing the death of B.J. There was 

sufficient evidence that the two men argued, Steele went into the house 

and retrieved the Bowie knife from the closet[] and stabbed B.J. in the 

chest, intentionally causing his death.

Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is due to be affirmed.

(Doc. 7, Exhibit F, at 6-7 & 8 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted; brackets 

omitted).) Because Steele did not seek rehearing or petition the Alabama Supreme Court 

for writ of certiorari, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of final 

judgment of affirmance on February 20, 2013. (Compare Doc. 7, Exhibit A, at 2 with Doc. 

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10, Exhibit A.)

Steele filed a counseled Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, 

Alabama collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence on January 31, 2014 (Doc. 7, 

Exhibit H, PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 32 OF 

THE ALABAMA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at 1), and on February 11, 2014, 

filed an amended brief in support of his petition (Doc. 7, Exhibit H, AMENDED BRIEF 

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR RELIEF FROM CONVICTION OR 

SENTENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 32, ALA.R.CRIM.P.). In his Rule 32 petition, Steele 

raised the following five claims of alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) 

counsel’s failure to make a privilege objection to the testimony of the wife of a criminal 

defendant who was the only witness to an alleged murder constitutes ineffective 

assistance so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted; (2) counsel’s failure to advise the 

wife of a criminal defendant who was the only witness to an alleged murder that she 

could not be compelled to testify against her husband constitutes ineffective assistance 

so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted; (3) counsel erred in failing to adequately 

present expert testimony or seek the assistance of a toxicology expert; (4) counsel erred 

in failing to submit jury instructions on voluntary intoxication where there was evidence 

of the petitioner’s intoxication and erred further in failing to adequately challenge the 

court’s jury charge when the court failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; 

and (5) counsel erred in the penalty phase when he failed to present any mitigating 

evidence or call any witnesses on the defendant’s behalf. (Compare id. with Rule 32 

Petition.)

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An evidentiary hearing was conducted on December 10, 2014. (Doc. 7, Exhibit H, 

Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, at 1.) Kelly Wood, a forensic scientist working in the 

toxicology section in the Birmingham regional laboratory of the Alabama Department of 

Forensic Sciences, testified that, on July 29, 2011, she prepared a toxicological analysis 

report on William Maxwell Aston, III. (Id. at 3-4.) Wood testified that she had telephone 

contact with one of the attorneys for Steele, Blane Dolbare, beginning on May 14, 2012; in 

that initial conversation, she and Dolbare discussed the possibility of Wood appearing at 

trial to give testimony and, during another telephone call on May 15, 2016, she discussed 

with defense counsel the contents of her report. (Id. at 8-10; see id. at 11 (during Wood’s 

final telephone conversation with Dolbare on May 15, 2012, at 6:00 p.m., the defendant’s 

attorney told her that the defense had decided not to use her).) Had Wood been called as 

a defense witness, she would have given testimony regarding the results of her analysis, 

that is, the levels of ethanol and other drugs found in Aston’s body. (Id. at 13-16.)7 Wood 

testified that ethanol is a central nervous system depressant that depresses inhibitions, 

affects judgment (id. at 16) and could possibly cause aggression (id. at 17 (“The 

depression of inhibitions, the flip side of that can be aggressive behavior coming out.”)); 

therefore, if she learned that the victim had become aggressive at the time of his death, 

that “fact” would “not be inconsistent with [her] findings.” (Id.; see also id. (“I can’t 

predict behavior. It’s very individualistic. It cannot be predicted. That wouldn’t be 

inconsistent with this number.”); compare id. with id. at 31 (Wood’s testimony that it is 

 7 Of course, as reflected above, Wood’s results did come into evidence through Dr. 

Hart’s testimony. (See id. at 22-23 (Wood agreed that there would be no need for her to testify as 

to the results of her report if the report had been admitted into evidence).) 

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also possible that the alcohol, Flexeril and marijuana in Aston’s body could have had a 

mellowing effect).) However, Wood made clear that she could not testify regarding what 

effect the amount of alcohol in Aston’s body would have on that individual’s outward 

behaviors. (Id. at 25 (“Specific outward behaviors for an individual, I can’t testify to that. 

No, I wouldn’t know what sort of outward behavior there would be.”); see also id. at 26 

(“Impaired judgment would have to do with the mental functions of deciding what to do 

or risk-taking behaviors or things of that nature. That is a universal sign of intoxication 

with ethanol. The outward expression of that is very individualistic.”).)8

It was Mary Leddon’s Rule 32 hearing testimony that she testified during her 

common-law husband’s murder trial because she was subpoenaed by the State and 

thought she had to testify; however, she stated she was never told that she had a right 

not to testify and that knowing what she knew as of the Rule 32 hearing, she would not 

have testified at her husband’s murder trial. (See id. at 38.) Leddon admitted on crossexamination, however, that she and her husband wanted to pursue a defense of selfdefense and told his defense attorneys that the killing of Aston was self-defense; 

therefore, as the only other eyewitness to the events (besides her husband), she chose to 

testify in order to help Steele with respect to that defense, particularly after one of her 

husband’s attorneys told her it would help her husband to testify. (See id. at 40-41 & 45-

47.)9

 8 Wood stated that this would have been her testimony if called to trial. (Id.)

9 Collateral counsel for Steele simply made some post-hearing arguments on 

certain ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the Rule 32 petition. For instance, with 

respect to trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on voluntary intoxication, Rule 32 

(Continued)

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By order dated March 5, 2015, the trial court denied Steele’s Rule 32 petition. 

(Doc. 7, Exhibit H, March 5, 2015 ORDER.) 

First, the Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective in that 

his counsel did not make a privilege objection to the testimony of his wife. 

This ground is without merit for two reasons. First, in order for this 

privilege to apply there must have been some sort of communication 

between the spouses. During the trial of this case, there was no testimony 

from the witness that concerned any communication between the 

Petitioner and his wife; therefore, no objection was warranted. The Court 

is also aware that actions may sometimes be intended as communications 

and would thus be subject to this privilege. However, in this case there 

were no actions that could be intended as communications and thus no 

objection was warranted. Second, for this privilege to apply, any 

communication must have been confidential and not intended for 

disclosure. In this case, there was no confidentiality because of the 

 

counsel argued that such failure could have impacted the jury’s verdict as negating specific 

intent essential to a murder conviction and requiring conviction of a lesser-included offense, 

such as manslaughter. (See id. at 54-56.) The district attorney countered this argument in the 

following manner: “Is it self defense or is it manslaughter? You can’t have it both ways. It’s a 

self defense case and you intended to kill him, but I’m justified in killing him; or there are 

mitigating factors to where I didn’t have the intent and it’s manslaughter. It would be 

inconsistent for the defense to argue self defense and then argue manslaughter.” (Id. at 58.)

Following initial arguments by counsel, Steele’s Rule 32 counsel then made the 

following argument which is not contained in the four corners of his Rule 32 petition:

On the self defense statute, under [the] Alabama Code that’s been on the 

books since 2006, a person not only has a right to a defense for self defense, but a 

person has a strict immunity from being prosecuted in a case if they are claiming 

self defense. That’s a pre-trial hearing that would have to be brought up for that 

to happen. What we were saying was, counsel was, once again, ineffective 

because he never had what is known as a stand your ground hearing, which our 

law was modeled exactly after Florida law. Under Florida law -- Judge Tommy 

Nail presided over one in 2009 or 2010. I have two set right now. What I’m 

saying is, that was not brought up. . . . There was no motion filed for stand your 

ground immunity. That was not brought up. Once again, another level of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Id. at 63; compare id. with id. at 57 (“The self defense law has been on the books since 2006. Self 

defense, a person is entitled to immunity here. There was no stand your ground petition. No 

petition to say he could be immune. Claiming self defense. That wasn’t presented either.”).)

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presence of the decedent, Mr. Aston. For these reasons, the Petitioner’s 

trial counsel was not ineffective under the standards set out in Strickland v. 

Washington.

Second, the Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in that he 

did not advise his wife that she could not be compelled to testify against 

him. This ground is without sufficient merit. The Petitioner’s trial counsel 

had to make a calculated decision of what was in the best interest of the 

Petitioner. In this case, they decided that instead of subjecting the 

Petitioner to cross examination, that it would be in his best interest that his 

wife testify to the events necessary to establish self-defense. The 

Petitioner, his wife, and his trial counsel each had the same intention 

which was to help the Petitioner. Therefore, it was not ineffective for the 

Petitioner’s trial counsel to not advise his wife that she could not be 

compelled to testify against him. Further, the Petitioner’s trial counsel did 

not have a duty to advise the Petitioner’s wife of such privilege. Their 

duty was to the Petitioner, and him alone, and this duty was to undertake 

such actions as they believed were in his best interest under the 

circumstances.

Third, the Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in that they 

did not adequately present expert testimony or seek the assistance of a 

toxicology expert. This ground is also without sufficient merit. During the 

Rule 32 hearing in this cause, the toxicologist, Kelly Wood, testified that 

she had been contacted by Petitioner’s trial counsel and that she had 

discussed the results of the toxicology report with Petitioner’s trial 

counsel. Ms. Wood also testified that if called to testify by either the 

prosecution or the defense, it would have been her testimony that she 

could not say with any certainty whether the decedent would have been 

more aggressive or more sedate based solely on the drugs that were in his 

system. It was not, therefore, ineffective for Petitioner’s trial counsel to not 

present expert testimony because the substance of such testimony would 

not tend to make the fact that the decedent had been more aggressive 

more likely.

Next, the Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective by not 

challenging the jury instructions to include instructions on intoxication 

and manslaughter. This ground is also without sufficient merit. Based 

upon the facts of this case which were presented at trial, and the facts and 

arguments of counsel at the Rule 32 hearing in this cause, it appears to the 

Court that trial counsel had to make another calculated legal decision as to 

whether to present the affirmative defense of self-defense, or to present 

mitigating factors that may have caused the jury to return a verdict on a 

lesser included offense. In the instant case, trial counsel decided to 

proceed with the theory that it was an intentional killing justified by selfCase 1:16-cv-00006-KD-C Document 11 Filed 10/19/16 Page 15 of 56
16

defense. The purpose of ineffectiveness is not to grade counsel’s 

performance. Therefore, it cannot be said that presenting this defense to 

the exclusion of all others was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Finally, in addition to the grounds addressed above, the Petitioner 

included in his filings allegations that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not 

adequately challenge the State’s key witness and that Petitioner’s trial 

counsel was ineffective in that they did not present mitigating evidence or 

call witnesses on behalf of the Petitioner at the penalty phase. After 

reviewing the filings and considering the arguments presented at the 

hearing on this cause, this Court finds that these grounds are mere 

allegations and the Court is without evidence to prove these allegations. 

Further, without such evidence, this Court has no choice but to find that 

the Petitioner has not carried his burden of proof on these issues. 

Therefore, it is the finding of this Court that these arguments are without 

merit and the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of the 

abovementioned grounds.

(Id. at 86-88 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).) Steele filed written notice of 

appeal (id. at 89) and raised the following issues on appeal:

I. The Rule 32 Court Wholly Failed to Consider Appellant’s 

Argument That Trial Counsel Inadequately Presented SelfDefense At Trial. Self-Defense Law Changed Years Before Trial 

And [Petitioner’s] Trial Attorney Failed To Present The Actual 

Law To [The] Court. This Deprived John Steele Of A Legally 

Adequate Defense. John Steele Was Denied The Actual Law of 

Self-Defense; Denied The Jury To Receive Proper Instructions 

On Self-Defense; And Denied The Opportunity Of A Stand 

Your Ground Pre-Trial Hearing. []

a) Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Know The 

Current Law On Self-Defense. Knowledge Of The Current 

Law Would Have Fully Exonerated John Steele. []

b) The Rule 32 Court Erred In Denying John Steele’s Petition 

Where It Was Argued Trial Counsel Failed To Present A 

Proper Self-Defense Argument. []

c) The Rule 32 Court Erred In Not Considering That Had Trial 

Counsel Known Current Alabama Self-Defense Law, John 

Steele Would Have Been Afforded A Stand Your Ground 

Pre-Trial Hearing For An Application Of Immunity For SelfDefense. []

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17

II. The Rule 32 Court Erred In Deciding That Not Calling The 

Toxicologist Was A Calculated Decision Of The Trial Attorney. 

For Reasons Stated Above, Trial Counsel And The Trial Court 

Were Not Aware Of The Changes In Law Of Self-Defense. 

Reliance On Incorrect Law To Make Decisions Cannot Be 

Considered Calculated When Different Decisions Under 

Different Law Would Provide Different Results. []

III. Rule 32 Court Erred In Deciding Trial Counsel Not Making A 

Privilege Objection To The Testimony Of Wife Of Defendant 

Was Calculated. She Was The Only Witness And The 

Prosecution Could Not Have Moved Forward Without Her 

Testimony. Further, That Trial Counsel Failed To Know Current 

Self-Defense Law For A Case Solely Revolved Around That 

Issue Raises Reasonable Concerns That The Law On Privilege 

Was Not Known Or Thought About By The Trial Attorney. 

(Doc. 7, Exhibit I, at 3-5.) 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment by 

unpublished memorandum decision issued on September 25, 2015. (Doc. 7, Exhibit L.) 

On appeal, Steele raises three claims.10 Steele first argues that “[t]he 

Rule 32 Court wholly failed to consider [Steele’s] argument that trial 

counsel inadequately presented self-defense at trial.” Steele next argues 

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the toxicologist 

as an expert witness. Finally, Steele argues that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to advise Steele’s wife that she could not be 

compelled to testify against Steele under Rule 504, Ala.R.Evid., and for 

failing to object to her testimony on that basis.

As explained above, Steele’s petition was denied by the circuit 

court after Steele was afforded the opportunity to prove his claims at an 

evidentiary hearing. See Rule 32.9(a), Ala.R.Crim.P.

 10 “Steele does not pursue his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to adequately challenge jury instructions or the State’s key witness or for failing to present 

mitigating evidence or call any witnesses on behalf of Steele in the penalty phase; therefore, those 

claims are deemed abandoned. See, e.g., Brownlee v. State, 666 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995) 

(holding that ‘[w]e will not review issues not listed and argued in brief’).” (Doc. 7, Exhibit L, at 5 

n.2.) 

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When the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing “[t]he 

burden of proof in a Rule 32 proceeding rests solely with the petitioner, 

not the State.” Davis v. State, 9 So.3d 514, 519 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006), rev’d 

on other grounds, 9 So.3d 537 (Ala. 2007). “[I]n a Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., 

proceeding, the burden of proof is upon the petitioner seeking postconviction relief to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” Wilson v. State, 644 So.2d 1326, 1328 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). 

Rule 32.3, Ala.R.Crim.P., specifically provides that “[t]he petitioner shall 

have the burden of . . . proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 

facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.” “[W]hen the facts are 

undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of 

law, that court’s review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo.” Ex parte 

White, 792 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). “However, where there are 

disputed facts in a postconviction proceeding and the circuit court 

resolves those disputed facts, ‘[t]he standard of review on appeal . . . is 

whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the 

petition.’” Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113, 1122 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003) 

(quoting Elliott v. State, 601 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992)).

“[A] defendant may bring an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

in a timely Rule 32 petition.” Harris v. State, 814 So.2d 1003, 1006 

(Ala.Crim.App. 2001). In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated two criteria that must 

be satisfied to show ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant has the 

burden of showing (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient and 

(2) that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the defense. “To 

meet the first prong of the test, the petitioner must show that his counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The 

performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was 

reasonable, considering all the circumstances.” Ex parte Lawley, 512 So.2d 

1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987).

To prove prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” [Strickland v. 

Washington, supra,] at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “It is not enough 

for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 

the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693.

With these principles in mind, we now address Steele’s claims on 

appeal.

I.

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Steele argues that “[t]he Rule 32 Court wholly failed to consider 

[Steele’s] argument that trial counsel inadequately presented self-defense 

at trial.” (Steele’s brief, p. 8.) Beneath this argument in his brief, Steele lists 

three subparts: subpart (a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present a self-defense claim based on § 13A-3-23(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975; 

subpart (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury 

instruction on self-defense in accordance with § 13A-3-23; subpart (c) trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a pretrial determination of 

immunity for self-defense. (Steele’s brief, pp. 8-24.)

Initially, we note that these claims were not raised below and, thus, 

they may not be raised for the first time on appeal. “’”[A]n appellant 

cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a Rule 32 petition which 

was not raised in the Rule 32 petition.”’” Hooks v. State, 21 So.3d 772, 789 

(Ala.Crim.App. 2008) (quoting English v. State, 10 So.3d 620, 621 

(Ala.Crim.App. 2007), quoting in turn Arrington v. State, 716 So.2d 237, 

239 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997)).

In his brief, Steele asserts that “Rule 32 counsel argued at the 

hearing that the laws on self-defense were misapplied at John Steele’s trial 

because of the 2006 change in the law. R. 57; 63.” (Steele’s brief, p. 8.) In 

support of that argument, Steele points to two portions of the record, the 

first of which occurred during his argument regarding his amended claim 

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating 

evidence and was transcribed as follows:

“[Defense counsel]: I also cite to the Court, Helms vs. 

State, 254 Alabama 14, 1950 case and also Ivey vs. State, 237 

Alabama 344, which is a 1939 case. Also, as we state in our 

petition, defense counsel failed to produce mitigating 

evidence by calling any witnesses at the penalty phase of the 

case. That’s part of our job when we are fighting for our 

clients, especially when our client has been found guilty. At 

least at the penalty phase, put on witnesses to mitigate. Put 

on witnesses to show that this is a good guy and hasn’t been 

in trouble before and he don’t need to go to prison for all of 

these years. There is something else going on here. Once 

again, he was ineffective and failed to do that.

“In Wales vs. Taylor, 529, US District, the Court found 

counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation 

evidence. That was a 2000 case. Not to mention other areas 

of ineffectiveness. The self defense law has been on the 

books since 2006. Self defense, a person is entitled to 

Case 1:16-cv-00006-KD-C Document 11 Filed 10/19/16 Page 19 of 56
20

immunity here. There was no stand your ground petition. 

No petition to say he could be immune. Claiming self 

defense. That wasn’t presented either.

“The transcript speaks for itself. There are all various 

levels of ineffectiveness. Even if the Court feels I’m not 

convinced, maybe there is something there, but I don’t 

know, it’s not just on[]e incident. These are all of the 

incidents altogether that show this attorney—he is probably 

a great attorney. I don’t know him. He is probably a great 

guy but on this particular day, on this particular man’s life, 

he messed up. This man is paying the price for it.

“In sum, we are requesting for this Court to overturn 

the conviction of John Steele and allow them to have a trial 

where all the evidence can be heard and what evidence 

shouldn’t be heard, won’t be heard, so that he can have his 

fair day in court and have a trial where we can see justice 

being served. Thank you.”

(R. 56-58.) Later, in response to the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument 

regarding Steele’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing 

Steele’s wife to give testimony in an effort to establish his self-defense 

claim, defense counsel argued:

“[Defense counsel]: Can I just clarify what I was 

saying about the self defense?

“The Court: Sure.

“[Defense counsel]: On the self defense statute, under 

Alabama Code that’s been on the books since 2006, a person 

not only has a right to a defense for self defense, but a 

person has a strict immunity from being prosecuted in a case 

if they are claiming self defense. That’s a pre-trial hearing 

that would have to be brought up for that to happen. What 

we were saying was, counsel was, once again, ineffective 

because he never had what is known as a stand your ground 

hearing, which our law was modeled exactly after Florida 

law. Under Florida law -- Judge Tommy Nail presided over 

one in 2009 or 2010. I have two set right now. What I’m 

saying is, that was not brought up. . . . That was not--There 

was no motion filed for stand your ground immunity. That 

was not brought up. Once again, another level of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

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(R. 63.)

As indicated above, however, Steele failed to raise these claims in 

his Rule 32 petition, therefore, those claims cannot now be considered on 

appeal. Hooks, supra.

Moreover, with regard to Steele’s argument that his trial counsel 

failed to request a pretrial determination of immunity, Steele has failed to 

state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Here, 

Steele failed to show deficient performance. Indeed, it appears that 

Steele’s entire argument is grounded in the allegation that his trial counsel 

was unaware of the law on self defense but Steele does not offer specific 

facts to support that allegation. Also, there is no indication that the 

outcome of Steele’s trial would have been different had his trial counsel 

performed differently. Indeed, Steele did not show that he would have 

been granted a pretrial determination of immunity or that such a hearing 

is even required under § 13A-3-23(d), Ala.Code 1975. Accordingly, Steele 

is not entitled to relief on this claim.

II.

Steele argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present the toxicologist as an expert witness. (Steele’s brief, p. 25.)

First, we note that Steele’s argument in his Rule 32 petition and at 

his evidentiary hearing was that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 

calling as a witness the toxicologist, which, Steele argued, prevented him 

from introducing evidence that the victim was the aggressor. Steele now 

argues, however, that self defense could have been established if his trial 

counsel had called the toxicologist to testify, as she did at the Rule 32 

hearing, that the victim would have had impaired judgment and 

inhibitions. (Steele’s brief, pp. 26-27.) The State, in its brief, contends that 

because Steele failed to raise this particular ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim in his Rule 32 petition, it is barred from appellate review. 

We agree with the State. See Burgess v. State, 962 So.2d 272, 301 

(Ala.Crim.App. 2005).

Second, we question whether Steele’s brief complies with the 

provisions of Rule 28, Ala.R.App.P., as to this issue. Arguments that do 

not comply with this rule are deemed waived. . . . Furthermore, it is 

insufficient for an appellant to rely solely on general propositions of law 

in support of an appellant’s claims. . . . Although we recognize that 

Steele’s brief includes quotations and citations to a single statute and case, 

those quotations from and citations are merely broad propositions of law. 

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Because Steele’s brief fails to substantially comply with Rule 28(a)(10), 

Ala.R.[App.]P., his appellate arguments are deemed waived.

Moreover, Steele has failed to demonstrate that there is any merit to 

his claim, or to demonstrate that the circuit court improperly denied his 

petition. As we recognized above, we review the denial of Steele’s petition 

for an abuse of discretion. Strickland, supra. “On appeal, error is not 

presumed and the party claiming that a trial judge has abused his 

discretion has the burden of persuasion.” Gratton v. State, 456 So.2d 865, 

872 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984). Steele has not met his burden.

III.

Steele argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise Steele’s wife, Leddon, that she could not be compelled to testify 

against Steele under Rule 504, Ala.R.Evid., and for failing to object to her 

testimony on that basis. (Steele’s brief, p. 28.) Contrary to Steele’s 

assertion, Steele’s trial counsel did not have a duty to advise Leddon of 

the husband-wife privilege. Moreover, Steele’s argument is without merit 

for at least two reasons.

First, as indicated above, the circuit court, in its order denying 

Steele relief, concluded that Rule 504, Ala.R.Evid.—which provides that 

“[a] communication is ‘confidential’ if it is made during the marriage 

privately by any person to that person’s spouse and [[is]] not intended for 

disclosure to any other person”—did not apply. Here, Leddon testified 

regarding Steele’s actions in the course of his confrontation with the 

victim. Those actions, even if they were to be considered communications, 

were not confidential as they were made in the presence of the victim.

Second, the record shows that trial counsel’s decision to allow 

Leddon to testify was trial strategy. At the hearing, Leddon testified that 

trial counsel had communicated to Leddon that it would be in Steele’s best 

interests if she offered evidence in support of Steele’s self-defense claim. 

“The selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are questions 

of trial strategy and virtually unchallengeable.” Washington v. State, 95 

So.3d 26, 52 (Ala.Crim.App. 2012).

Because Steele’s argument is without merit, his counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to raise this argument at trial. . . .

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is 

affirmed.

(Id. at 5-12 (footnote in original).) 

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Petitioner’s application for rehearing (Doc. 7, Exhibit M)11 was overruled on 

October 16, 2015 (Doc. 7, Exhibit G, at 2), and his petition for writ of certiorari to the 

Alabama Supreme Court (Doc. 7, Exhibit N) was denied on December 4, 2015, with the 

certificate of final judgment being entered that same date (Doc. 7, Exhibit G, at 2). In the 

petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court, Steele maintained that the 

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals “failed to consider that the evidence presented in the 

Rule 32 hearing would have made a difference in John Steele’s trial” (Doc. 7, Exhibit N, at 

5) and, in support thereof, argued the following:

 11 In the application for rehearing, counsel for Steele cited to the self-defense jury 

instructions contained in the court’s oral charge to the jury and argued, for the first time, that 

those instructions did not “comply with the 2006 Amended use of force as codified in Code of 

Alabama 1975 13A-3-23.” (Doc. 7, Exhibit M, at 5, citing Williams v. State, 46 So.3d 970 

(Ala.Crim.App. 2010).) In addition, petitioner made the following arguments: 

5. Steele respectfully objects that the choices trial counsel made: the 

choice of whether to call the toxicologist or whether to compel Mary Leddon, 

Steele’s wife, were strategic choices where there was clear reliance on incorrect 

law.

6. Additionally, Steele respectfully objects that the failure to call the 

toxicologist is barred for review where Steele provided additional precise reasons 

of counsel’s deficient performance in not calling the toxicologist to help further the 

theory of self-defense.

(Id. at 6.) In his brief in support of the application for rehearing, Steele makes a general argument 

that trial counsel failed to present evidence of the theory of self-defense (see id. at 9 (“Trial 

counsel’s strategy of not presenting any evidence for the benefit of John Steele’s theory of selfdefense where ample evidence actually existed was deficient performance.”) & 12-13), he does not 

again attack the self-defense instructions (see id. at 8-21); instead, his brief centered on two 

arguments he “insinuates” into the foregoing general argument, namely, that “[t]he issue[] of not

calling the toxicologist to testify was properly preserved for review where the reasons and 

arguments were additional precise reasons in Appellant’s brief[,]” and “[t]he State Compelled 

and Trial Counsel Failed to Protect the Rights of [] John Steele’s Wife by Failing to Inform her of 

her Right Not To Testify. Trial Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance that Prejudiced Steele 

where there Existed No Strategic Value in Her Testimony for the Benefit of Steele.” (Id. at 10, 13 & 

18.)

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There is a conflict between the decision of the Court of Criminal 

Appeals in Mr. Steele’s case and with prior precedent and Federal and 

State law.

The central issue is whether evidence that was available at trial, if 

presented to the jury would have made a probable difference in the 

outcome of Mr. Steele’s case; second, is whether this difference should 

have taken place at Mr. Steele’s trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). If so, then Mr. Steele was denied effective assistance of counsel 

in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Alabama 

Constitution, and Alabama law. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 

(2000); Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In Mr. Steele’s case, expert testimony was absent in the case despite 

efforts by the expert to make herself available and had information 

important to the case that was crucial for a successful theory of selfdefense. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517 (counsel’s failure to retain forensic 

social worker unreasonable where funds were provided for that purpose). 

Further, the State did not offer any evidence against Mr. Steele that would 

negate the expert’s testimony or minimize its effect.

The theory of self-defense was the sole theory the defendant 

presented at trial. The trial attorney was prevented from introducing 

evidence about the decedent’s drug use, including cocaine, because no 

foundation could be laid to allow its introduction without the expert 

testimony of Kelly Wood, the toxicology expert. . . . This is despite the trial 

court telling defense counsel precisely what to do to introduce the 

evidence the defense attorney attempted to introduce. []

Further, the evidence of Kelly Wood, the toxicologist[,] provided at 

the Rule 32 hearing evidentiary hearing was exactly what she would have 

offered had she been called to testify by the defense at trial. . . . At no 

point was her testimony, or her findings, inconsistent with a theory of selfdefense, nor did she present any evidence or testimony that would have 

been the least bit detrimental to the defendant.

The failure to present evidence that was only beneficial to a 

defendant violates the first prong of Strickland – deficient performance 

through specific acts or omissions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is 

especially true where trial counsel attempted to introduce such evidence 

and was unable to do so, even after an explanation by the trial court and 

the expert requesting to be called to introduce the evidence.

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Further, the failure to introduce evidence the trial attorney 

attempted to introduce at trial, where the trial court outlined how to get 

that evidence introduced, and the toxicologist who could introduce that 

evidence requested to be subpoenaed to be able to introduce that 

evidence, prejudiced the defendant and shows it was unreasonable not to 

call the toxicologist.

The jury did not get to hear about the cocaine use of the victim, the 

specific levels of the different types of ethanol in the victim’s system, nor 

Kelly Wood’s conclusions based on the victim’s substance abuse. [] The 

trial attorney asked such questions to the state’s expert who could not 

answer such questions, but Kelly Wood could and would have answered.

The testimony [of] Mary Leddon, the wife of John Steele, should 

not have been presented at trial. The Criminal Court of Appeals in its 

memorandum decides the communications are not confidential, as the 

actions occurred in the presence of the victim, but fails to address 

Petitioner’s argument that the State compelled Mary Leddon to testify. . . . 

Further, absent her testimony, the State would have insufficient evidence 

to overcome the defendant’s theory of self-defense.

Without her testimony, the jury is provided evidence of a 

drunk[en] unwelcome man who entered into John Steele’s house.12 With 

the addition of the toxicologist, this unwelcome guest was highly 

intoxicated, over twice the legal limit, and had recently abused cocaine 

and other drugs. 

These differences, both individually (the introduction of the 

toxicologist and the removal of Mary Leddon’s testimony) and 

cumulatively affected the outcome of the trial. This is the type of case 

where the verdict was more likely to have been affected by counsel’s 

errors than the type of case where the verdict has overwhelming record 

 12 This is simply not true inasmuch as the only manner in which the jury heard 

anything about the victim and the actions of the victim was through the testimony of Mary 

Leddon. If Leddon had not testified, Steele necessarily would have had to testify about the 

events of that fateful evening in order to place self-defense in issue, and Rule 32 counsel has 

never suggested that Steele’s testimony was a possibility. Without the testimony of one of the 

two eyewitnesses referenced above, the State had sufficient evidence of murder through the 911 

call, the testimony of the first responder, who testified that Steele told him he stabbed the 

victim, and the testimony of the medical examiner, who testified that the victim died of a knife 

wound to the left lung and heart that was delivered with enough force to break a rib (and who 

also, by the way, testified about the levels of ethanol, etc., in the victim’s system).

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support. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-696. These specific acts or 

omissions would have made a difference at trial such that Mr. Steele 

would not be convicted and serving a 40-year sentence. 

Finally, the introduction of the toxicologist, Kelly Wood[,] would 

have provided the defense with the ability to request jury instructions on 

how to utilize the intoxication of the victim. Quinlivan v. State, 555 So.2d 

802, 805 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989) (Where case reversed and remanded 

because the jury should have been instructed on how to utilize the 

intoxication of the victim as evidence). In this case, no request was made, 

and the jury never heard the degree of the victim’s intoxication, nor what 

all illegal drugs he had taken earlier that day.13 Because this was never 

introduced, proper jury instructions about how to utilize the intoxication 

of the victim was never given and the jury failed to understand how to use 

the fact the victim was drunk and trespassing into the home of John Steele 

adequately.

Had these instructions been given, it is probable that the 

instructions could have weighed against the State’s burden of disproving 

self-defense. The jury would have been given instructions similar to what 

the defense in Quinlivan requested and the Court of Criminal Appeals 

agreed should have been given: “I charge you, members of the jury, that if 

you believe from the evidence that at the time of the killing the deceased 

was under the influence of alcohol, you may consider such fact in 

determining whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.” 555 

So.2d 804-805.14

The Criminal Court of Appeals has previously found the absence of 

those instructions where the victim’s high degree of intoxication is critical 

to a theory of self-defense, those instructions should be requested and 

given. Quinlivan, 555 So.2d 804-805; [s]ee also Ferguson v. State, 105 So. 

435 (1925).

 13 Again, this argument is without foundation inasmuch as defense counsel, through 

the testimony of the forensic pathologist, offered evidence about the levels of ethanol and other 

drugs in the victim’s body.

14 This was the exact charge/instruction given to the jury in this case by the trial 

court. (Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. at 144 (“I charge you members of the jury that if you believe from 

the evidence that at the time of the killing[] the deceased was under the influence of alcohol, you 

may consider such fact in determining whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.”).)

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27

Here, no request, nor any instruction of the victim’s intoxication 

was offered by trial counsel. This creates prejudice where this Court and 

the Court of Criminal Appeals have previously held this instruction 

should be given in cases similar to Mr. Steele’s and have remanded cases 

because of the absence of such instructions.

(Id. at 5-11 (footnotes omitted and supplied).)

As previously indicated, Steele filed his petition seeking habeas corpus relief in 

this Court on December 22, 2015 (Doc. 1, at 13), raising the following issues which he 

claims entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief: (1) the record contains insufficient 

evidence to sustain his murder conviction;15 and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance (see id. at 6-10 & 14-20). In his petition, Steele asserts the following “grounds” of 

alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) the expansive and encompassing claim 

that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (id. at 6), under the 

umbrella of which he places all five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in his 

 15 Steele’s argument in support of this claim reads, in relevant part, as follows:

There is insufficient evidence contained in the court record [] that the jury 

[] relied on for their determination that [Steele] had committed the crime of 

murder. [Steele] pleaded self-defense. So the question becomes was there any 

evidence showing [Steele] had the specific intent to cause the death of the victim? 

Self-defense is an intentional action[,] yet is not a plea to an intentional killing. 

One can kill another in self-defense without the expectation of killing him. The 

prosecution offered no evidence to dispute the only witness description of the 

circumstances. Instead prosecution brings doubt to the truth of his witness by 

showing her bias not wanting her husband convicted. Th[i]s prejudiced [Steele]. 

Even the law enforcement officer that charged [Steele] offered no conflicting 

evidence to dispute the circumstances[] described by the witness. The only 

essential element that was clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt is that 

[Steele] did cause the death of the victim.

(Doc. 1, at 20.)

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28

Rule 32 petition (compare id. with id. at 14-15) as well as the “modifications” made by Rule 

32 counsel (or petitioner himself) to those five grounds (see id. at 15-17)16; (2) the claim 

 16 Steele “throws” everything against the proverbial wall by “lifting” from the 

various appellate briefs and petition for writ of certiorari the following:

Regarding self-defense. Trial counsel and trial court were unaware of the 

changes [in the law]. John Steele did not get the benefit of the actual self-defense 

laws of Alabama, which undermine [] confidence in the outcome, where Mr. 

Steele’s sole defense was self-defense.

2. The Rule 32 court erred in not considering trial counsel ineffective 

for failing to request a stand your ground pretrial hearing that John Steele was 

entitled to have.

3. The Rule 32 court erred in determining a privileged objection was 

a calculated decision by trial counsel, when there is no evidence to suggest he 

thought about the possibility, and if it is was calculated, it is forfeit[ed] because 

the calculation was not based upon Alabama’s law on self-defense.

4. The Rule 32 court erred in determining the toxicologist could not 

provide any fact for self-defense more or less than already presented at trial, 

especially considering the trial court was not using Alabama’s law on selfdefense.

. . .

4. This Court has stated the [] jury instructions that occurred in 

[Steele’s] 2011 criminal case do not comply with the 2006 amended use of force as 

codified in Code of Alabama 1975 13A-2-23[.] Trial court’s self-defense 

instruction did not substantially cover the language set forth in the amended 

version of 13[A]-3-23(b) and that the instruction was an incorrect statement of 

law.

5. [Steele] objects that the choices trial counsel made[,] the choice of 

whether to call the toxicologist or whether to compel Mary Leddon, [Steele’s] 

wife, were strategic choices[] where there was clear reliance on incorrect law.

6. Additionally, [Steele] objects that the failure to call the toxicologist 

is barred for review where [Steele] provided additional precise reasons of 

counsel’s deficient performance in not calling the toxicologist to help further the 

theory of self-defense.

(Id. at 15, 16 & 17.)

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29

that trial counsel erred in failing to make a privilege objection to the testimony of his 

common-law wife at trial (Doc. 1, at 7), which he “expands” in his supporting facts by 

claiming that his trial counsel did not inform his wife of her right not to testify and did 

not object to the State calling Mrs. Leddon to testify (id. at 17; see also id. at 18 (“Trial 

counsel’s error was compounded by the fact that it was clearly within counsel’s right to 

object and assert spousal privilege[.]”); (3) the claim that trial counsel’s failure to advise 

the wife of a criminal defendant who was the only witness to an alleged murder that she 

could not be compelled to testify constitutes ineffective assistance so prejudicial that a 

new trial is warranted (see Doc. 1, at 8);17 and (4) the claim that trial counsel erred in 

failing to adequately present expert testimony or seek the assistance of a toxicology 

expert (Doc. 1, at 8). 

Because the respondent argued in his answer that Steele failed to fully exhaust his 

claims in state court and, as a consequence, this Court is prohibited by the procedural 

default doctrine from considering the merits of those claims (see Doc. 7), the undersigned 

explained the procedural default defense to Steele by order dated April 5, 2016, and 

 17 In support of this claim, Steele asserts the following: 

The law in Alabama is very clear that a witness cannot be compelled to 

testify against her husband. The marital privilege not to testify against one’s 

spouse belongs to the spouse whose testimony is sought. [H]ad trial counsel 

informed Mrs. Leddon that she did not have to testify against her husband[] she 

would not have testified.

(Id. at 8 & 18; see also id. at 18-19 (petitioner’s reference to an affidavit supplied by his wife which 

contain her statements that she was informed by no attorney that she had the right not to share 

confidential communications between herself and her husband and that had her husband’s trial 

attorney told her she did not have to testify then she would not have testified).

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30

extended to him the opportunity to establish cause and prejudice for any procedural 

defaults or extraordinary circumstances implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

(see Doc. 9). In response to this order, Steele simply states that he exhausted one complete 

round of Alabama appellate review with respect to his ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims (Doc. 10, at 2) and though he admits his sufficiency of the evidence claim 

was not fully exhausted in the state courts of Alabama, he lays blame for this deficiency 

at the feet of counsel who represented him on direct review of his conviction and 

additionally argues that this Court’s failure to consider the merits of this claim will result 

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice (id. at 2-4).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Procedural Default Doctrine.

In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the 

Supreme Court stated that it would “not review a question of federal law decided by a 

state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of 

the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2553-

2554. This rule applies whether the state law ground is procedural or substantive. Id. at 

729, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review when a state 

court declines to address a petitioner's federal claims because the petitioner fails to meet a 

state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-730, 111 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 

433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (federal courts must honor legitimate state 

trial and appellate procedural rules when enforced by state courts and must decline to 

review on the merits claims that the state treats as barred absent a showing of cause for 

non-compliance with such rules and resulting prejudice); Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 

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31

1549 (11th Cir.) (“Pursuant to the doctrine of procedural default, a state prisoner seeking 

federal habeas corpus relief, who fails to raise his federal constitution[al] claim in state 

court, or who attempts to raise it in a manner not permitted by state procedural rules is 

barred from pursuing the same claim in federal court absent a showing of cause for and 

actual prejudice from the default.”), cert. denied sub nom. Alderman v. Thomas, 513 U.S. 

1061, 115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994). “In these cases, the state judgment rests on 

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2554 (citations omitted).

The application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine in the 

habeas context is grounded in concerns of federalism and comity. Id.

Without the rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what 

this Court could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners 

whose custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds 

an end run around the limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to 

undermine the State's interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554.

An additional consideration comes to the fore when the independent and adequate 

state ground supporting a petitioner's custody is a state procedural default. Id. at 731, 111 

S.Ct. at 2554. The Supreme Court has long held

that a state prisoner's federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the 

prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal 

claims. (citations omitted) This exhaustion requirement is also grounded in 

principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the 

opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoners' 

federal rights.

 . . .

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[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s procedural 

requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance. A 

habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets 

the technical requirement for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any 

longer “available” to him. (citations omitted) In the absence of the 

independent and adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas, habeas 

petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaustion requirement by

defaulting their federal claims in state court. The independent and 

adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in 

correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.

Id. at 731, 732, 111 S.Ct. at 2554-2555, 2555.

In the habeas context, federal courts are to “presume that there is no independent 

and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the decision ‘fairly appears to 

rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the 

adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face 

of the opinion.’” Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 

1040-1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476-3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (“[A] procedural default does not 

bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last 

state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and expressly' states that its 

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”). In all other cases, the presumption is not 

applicable. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739, 111 S.Ct. at 2559. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Harris v. Reed

presumption is inapplicable to a claim that is never presented to the state courts. Id. at 

299, 109 S.Ct. at 1069 (“The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state court 

has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal habeas 

proceeding.”). Moreover, the presumption “looks through” unexplained orders to the 

last reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2595, 115 

L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).

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Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal 

claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion “fairly 

appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal law,” Coleman,[ U.S., at , 111 

S.Ct., at 2559], we will presume that no procedural default has been 

invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgment or 

its consequences in place. Similarly where . . . the last reasoned opinion 

on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that 

a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and 

consider the merits.

501 U.S. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at 2594. Also, the presumption may not be applied in cases in 

which the state court opinion did not, at a minimum, discuss the federal grounds at 

issue. Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 211 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Coleman and Ylst lead us to 

conclude that we may not assume that had the state court issued an opinion, it would 

have ignored its own procedural rules and reached the merits of this case. In fact, the 

most reasonable assumption is that had the state court ruled, it would have enforced 

the procedural bar.”). Finally, “where a state court has ruled in the alternative, 

addressing both the independent state procedural ground and the merits of the federal 

claim, the federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the 

merits of the claim.” Alderman v. Zant, supra, 22 F.3d at 1549.

When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal court is barred 

from reaching the merits of that claim unless the petitioner “can demonstrate cause for 

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 

demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice.” Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. at 2565. The cause and prejudice 

standard applies “uniformly to all independent and adequate state procedural 

defaults.” Id. at 750-751, 111 S.Ct. at 2565.

In procedural default cases, the cause standard requires the 

petitioner to show that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to raise the claim in state court. Objective factors 

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34

that constitute cause include interference by officials that makes 

compliance with the state’s procedural rule impracticable, and a showing 

that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 

counsel. In addition, constitutionally [i]neffective assistance of counsel is 

cause. Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, 

does not constitute cause and will not excuse a procedural default. Once 

the petitioner has established cause, he must show actual prejudice 

resulting from the errors of which he complains. 

Federal courts retain the authority to issue the writ of habeas 

corpus in a further, narrow class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to 

show cause for a procedural default. These are extraordinary instances 

when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one 

innocent of the crime. We have described this class of cases as implicating 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In his answer, respondent asserts that all of petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted under O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) 

due to Steele’s failure to “fairly present” these claims throughout “one complete round 

of the State’s established appellate review process[,]” id. at 845, 119 S.Ct. at 1732. (See

Doc. 7, at 8-13). 

Turning first to Steele’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, petitioner frankly 

admits that this claim has been defaulted. (Doc. 10, at 3.) Even if this Court was to agree 

with Steele that he has established cause for his procedural default of this claim, namely 

his appellate counsel’s failure to seek rehearing and to petition the Alabama Supreme 

Court for certiorari review or otherwise to advise him of the decision of the Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals so that he could have sought a rehearing and certiorari 

review (see id.), he cannot establish prejudice for his default of this claim for the simple 

fact that his sufficiency of the evidence claim lacks any merit. It is clear that evidence is 

sufficient to support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most 

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35

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 

99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 

Alabama’s murder statute provides that “[a] person commits the crime of murder if he . 

. . does any of the following: (1) With intent to cause the death of another person, he . . . 

causes the death of that person[.]” Ala. Code § 13A-6-2(a)(1). The evidence in this case 

was that Steele caused the death of William Aston by stabbing him with a Bowie knife 

with such force that he broke one of Aston’s ribs before the knife penetrated Aston’s left 

lung and heart and the victim bled out. As explained by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on direct review, self-defense is a jury question, and when this proposition is 

combined with Alabama case law providing that intent can be inferred from the use of a 

deadly weapon and other attendant circumstances, see, e.g., Benton v. State, 536 So.2d 

162, 164 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988) (“’Because the element of intent, being a state of mind or 

mental purpose, is usually incapable of direct proof, it may be inferred from the 

character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon and other attendant 

circumstances.’” (citation omitted)), it is clear to the undersigned that any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Therefore, Steele cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the procedural default of 

his sufficiency of the evidence claim because he cannot show that the result of his 

appeal would have been different had the claim been fully exhausted in Alabama’s 

appellate courts.

Turning to Steele’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the 

undersigned is not totally comfortable in finding that Steele did not “fairly present” the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims identified by respondent in his answer—

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that is, counsel’s failure to object to his wife’s testimony on the ground of spousal 

privilege, counsel’s failure to advise his wife that she could not be compelled to testify 

against him due to spousal privilege, and the failure to call the toxicologist as an expert 

witness (Doc. 7, at 8; compare id. with Doc. 1, at 7-8 & 17-19)—throughout one complete 

round of Alabama’s appellate review process inasmuch as while it is apparent that 

these claims certainly went through some “modifications” and “tweaking” at the hands 

of Rule 32 counsel, some form of these three claims was raised throughout the appellate 

review process (see Doc. 7, Exhibits H, I, M & N) and supply the foundation for 

petitioner’s consistent theme that his trial attorneys did not properly present his claim 

of self-defense (see, e.g., Doc. 7, Exhibit N). Accordingly, the undersigned will perform a 

“merits” review of these three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, all of 

which are separately set forth in Steele’s habeas corpus petition. (See Doc. 1, at 7-8 & 17-

19.)

However, the undersigned will not consider the merits of any claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel beyond these three just identified that Steele means 

to “raise” under the umbrella of his all-encompassing general claim that he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (See Doc. 1, at 6 & 14-17.) More specifically, the merits of the following 

additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that Steele raised at one time 

or another during the course of pursuing his Rule 32 rights in the state courts of 

Alabama will not be considered by the undersigned or, otherwise, will be considered 

only tangentially: (1) trial counsel erred in failing to submit jury instructions on 

voluntary intoxication and erred in failing to adequately challenge the trial court’s 

charge based on the failure to include instructions on voluntary intoxication (see Doc. 1, 

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37

at 14-15); (2) trial counsel erred in failing to present mitigating evidence or call any 

witnesses on Steele’s behalf at sentencing (see id. at 15); and (3) trial counsel erred in 

failing to request a stand your ground pretrial hearing and in otherwise failing to 

ensure that Steele received the benefit of the 2006 amendments to the use of force 

statute, Ala.Code § 13A-3-23, by, for example, making sure that the trial court’s 

instructions to the jury covered the language in the amended version of § 13A-3-23(b) 

(see id. at 15 & 16). Initially, the undersigned is barred from reviewing these claims 

because Steele abandoned the mitigating evidence and voluntary intoxication 

instructions on direct review (Doc. 7, Exhibit L, at 5 n.2) and failed to raise his “selfdefense statute” claims in his Rule 32 petition (id. at 7-9); therefore, this Court cannot 

find that Steele “fairly presented” these claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

throughout one complete of Alabama’s appellate review process and since the state 

court remedy is no longer available, his failure in this regard constitutes a procedural 

default. Compare McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 & 1305 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(“Habeas petitioners generally cannot raise claims in federal court if those claims were 

not first exhausted in state court. . . . In order to be exhausted, a federal claim must be 

fairly presented to the state courts. . . . [I]n order to ensure that state courts have the first 

opportunity to hear all claims, federal courts ‘have required a state prisoner to present 

the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.’ . . . It is well 

established that when a petitioner has failed to exhaust his claim by failing to fairly 

present it to the state courts and the state court remedy is no longer available, the failure 

also constitutes a procedural bar. . . . In such a situation, the Supreme Court has held 

that the petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his state court remedies and therefore 

has procedurally defaulted his claims. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848, 119 S.Ct. 

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38

1728, 1734, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).”), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 126 S.Ct. 1828, 164 L.Ed.2d 

522 (2006), with Kelley v. Secretary for the Dep’t of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 & 1351 

(11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he prohibition against raising nonexhausted claims in federal court 

extends not only to broad legal theories of relief, but also to the specific assertions of 

fact that might support relief. For example, habeas petitioners may not present 

particular factual instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in their federal petitions 

that were not first presented to the state courts. . . . Dismissing a mixed petition is of 

little utility [] when the claims raised for the first time at the federal level can no longer 

be litigated on the merits in state court because they are procedurally barred. In such a 

case, requiring the petitioner to return to state court only to make a futile application for 

relief simply delays the federal courts’ adjudication of his petition.”), cert. denied, 545 

U.S. 1149, 125 S.Ct. 2962, 162 L.Ed.2d 906 (2005). In addition, Steele’s “self-defense 

statute” and “mitigating evidence” ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not 

specifically and separately raised in his petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama 

Supreme Court, see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 

(1999) (“[I]n order to exhaust state remedies as to a federal constitutional issue a 

prisoner is required to file a petition for discretionary review in the state’s highest court 

raising that issue, if discretionary review is part of the appellate procedure in the 

state.”), and, therefore, are procedurally defaulted. Steele has utterly failed to establish 

cause and prejudice for his failure to “fairly present” the foregoing claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel throughout one full round of Alabama’s appellate review 

process (compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 10); therefore, it is found that the cause and prejudice 

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exception to the procedural default doctrine is not applicable in this case.18 See Macklin 

v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 1994) (in abuse of the writ case, appellate court 

suggests that habeas courts need perform no analysis when the petitioner fails to argue 

an exception to application of the doctrine), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160, 115 S.Ct. 1122, 130 

L.Ed.2d 1085 (1995); Tower v. Phillips, supra, 7 F.3d at 211 (court addressed only the 

single cause argument proffered by the petitioner).19

B. Merits Review of Some Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims 

Raised by Steele. 

 18 The undersigned would parenthetically note, however, that Steele is categorically 

incorrect in arguing that his trial attorneys did not ensure that the trial court’s oral charge to the 

jury contained language from the amended version of § 13A-3-23(b), see id. (“A person who is 

justified under subsection (a) in using physical force, including deadly physical force, and who is 

not engaged in an unlawful activity and is in any place where he . . . has the right to be has no 

duty to retreat and has the right to stand his . . . ground.”), inasmuch as the trial court 

specifically gave this exact charge to the jury (see Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. 151 (“THE COURT: . . . 

And I want to give you this additional charge on self-defense, and I ask that you listen carefully. 

A person who is justified in using physical force[,] including deadly physical force, and who is 

not engaged in an unlawful activity and is in any place where he . . . has the right to be, has no 

duty to retreat and has the right to stand his . . . ground.” (emphasis supplied)).)

19 The fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence exception does not 

apply in this case because petitioner has not satisfied the standard set forth in Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). That standard requires Steele to show that “a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” 

Id. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-2650. To be credible, a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner 

to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence--whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--

that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 

808 (1995); see also id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867 (“To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner 

must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in 

the light of the new evidence.”). “It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ 

means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 

118 S.Ct. 1604, 1611, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (citation omitted). Steele simply has not come 

forward with any new reliable evidence that establishes his actual factual innocence of the 

murder of William Aston for which he was convicted on May 16, 2012. Accordingly, this case is 

not one of those rare cases in which the actual innocence exception is applicable.

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In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”), a petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief “on any claim adjudicated on 

the merits in state court if that adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Cox v. McNeil, 638 F.3d 1356, 

1360 (11th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Tucker, 132 

S.Ct. 309, 181 L.Ed.2d 189 (2011); see also Jones v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 644

F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.) (“[U]nder AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief 

on a claim that has been considered and rejected by a state court unless it is shown that 

the state court’s decision was ‘contrary to’ federal law then clearly established in the 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); or that it ‘involved an 

unreasonable application’ of such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it was ‘based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts’ in the light of the record before the court, § 

2254(d)(2).”20), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Tucker, 132 S.Ct. 590, 181 L.Ed.2d 433 

(2011).21

 20 As amended, § 2254 now provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 

unless the adjudication of the claim— 

 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

(Continued)

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Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ 

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by th[e 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case 

differently than th[e Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a 

federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the 

correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see 

Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In addition, a state court decision 

involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court 

either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new 

context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a 

new context where it should apply.’”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357, 151 

L.Ed.2d 270 (2001). 

“A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law 

if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme 

Court cases or confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to the 

Court’s.” Windom v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1247 (11th Cir. 

2009) . . . . A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of 

federal law when “it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court 

case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s 

case. An unreasonable application may also occur if a state court 

unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal 

principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context.” Putnam v. Head, 

268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) . . . . The statutory phrase “clearly 

established Federal law” “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, 

of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-

 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2).

21 The Act presumes as correct all determinations of factual issues made by a State 

court and places the burden upon the petitioner of rebutting such a presumption of correctness 

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).

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42

court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Spencer v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corrections, 609 F.3d 1170, 1177-1178 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 

denied, 562 U.S. 1203, 131 S.Ct. 1049, 178 L.Ed.2d 869 (2011).

1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims. With respect to the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims identified above that are arguably not 

defaulted, the appropriate “inquiry turns upon whether the state decision was contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of Strickland.” See, e.g., Means v. Secretary, Dep’t of 

Corrections, 433 Fed.Appx. 852, 855 (11th Cir. Jul. 12, 2011) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 22, 24-25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 358-360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)), cert. denied, 132 

S.Ct. 1580, 182 L.Ed.2d 198 (2012).

22

First, under § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause, “a federal habeas court 

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of facts 

materially indistinguishable facts.”

Next, under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas 

court may “grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing 

legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts” of the case. “In other words, a federal 

court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a ‘governing 

legal principle’ to ‘a set of facts different from those of the case in which 

the principle was announced.’” Importantly, for a federal habeas court to 

find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent 

“unreasonable,” it is not enough that the state court’s adjudication be 

“incorrect or erroneous”; that application must have been “objectively 

unreasonable.”

Frazier v. Bouchard, 661 F.3d 519, 530-531 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and brackets 

omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Frazier v. Thomas, 133 S.Ct. 410, 184 L.Ed.2d 58 (2012); see 

 22 In other words, “[i]t is beyond question that, in addressing the relevant claim, we 

are dealing with an area of ‘clearly established Federal law [under Strickland].’” Frazier, supra, 661 

F.3d at 527 n.12 (citation omitted).

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also Pair v. Cummins, 373 Fed.Appx. 979, 981 (11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2010) (“Under the 

‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1), the habeas petitioner bears the burden 

‘to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner.’ ‘The question is not whether a federal court believes the state 

court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether, that 

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’” (internal citations 

omitted)). The foregoing makes clear that “’[i]n addition to the deference to counsel’s 

performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of deference—this 

one to a state court’s decision—when we are considering whether to grant federal 

habeas relief from a state court’s decision.’” Means, supra, 433 Fed.Appx. at 855 (citation 

omitted). 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner/defendant is 

required to show (1) that his attorney’s representation fell below “an objective standard 

of reasonableness” and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel’s 

unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see 

also Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The petitioner bears the 

burden of proof on the ‘performance’ prong as well as the ‘prejudice’ prong of a 

Strickland claim, and both prongs must be proved to prevail.”), cert. denied sub nom. 

Johnson v. Nagle, 535 U.S. 926, 122 S.Ct. 1295, 152 L.Ed.2d 208 (2002).23

 23 Given the two-prong nature of the test for adjudicating ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims, it can come as no surprise that “‘the cases in which habeas petitioners can 

properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.’” 

Johnson, supra, 256 F.3d at 1176 (citation omitted). When applying the Strickland standard, it is 

clear that courts “are free to dispose of ineffectiveness claims on either of its two grounds.” Oats 

v. Singletary, 141 F.3d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Oats v. 

(Continued)

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The performance prong of the ineffective assistance standard 

entails a deferential review of counsel’s conduct. In assessing the 

reasonableness of counsel’s performance, courts must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. Thus, the Sixth Amendment does not 

require criminal defense attorneys to take a nothing to lose approach and 

raise every conceivable nonfrivolous defense.

With respect to prejudice, courts ask whether there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. In the context of a claim that 

counsel was ineffective on appeal, the court must first perform a review of 

the merits of the omitted or poorly presented claim. The defendant carries 

his burden of establishing prejudice if the court finds that the neglected 

claim would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal.

Means, supra, 433 Fed.Appx. at 855-856 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 

see also Pair, supra, 373 Fed.Appx. at 981-982 & 982 (“The performance prong of an 

ineffective assistance claim requires the petitioner to show that, considering all the 

circumstances, his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. The standard is that of a reasonable attorney, not a paragon of the bar 

or an Aristotle or a Clarence Darrow. Moreover, judicial review of an attorney’s 

performance is highly deferential, and the court must eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight and evaluate performance from the attorney’s perspective at the time the 

challenged conduct occurred. In so doing, the court must indulge a strong presumption 

that the attorney’s conduct was objectively reasonable. A petitioner fails to overcome 

 

Moore, 527 U.S. 1008, 119 S.Ct. 2347, 144 L.Ed.2d 243 (1999); see also Adamson v. United States, 288 

Fed.Appx. 591, 594 (11th Cir. Jul. 29, 2008) (“The defendant must satisfy both prongs of this test 

to show a Sixth Amendment violation; if the defendant fails to demonstrate one of these prongs 

sufficiently, we do not need to address the other.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1010, 129 S.Ct. 526, 172 

L.Ed.2d 385 (2008); Butcher v. United States, 368 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a court 

decides that one of the requisite showings has not been made it need not decide whether the 

other one has been.”). 

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45

that presumption if the challenged conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. . . 

. Pair must [also] establish prejudice. It is not enough for him to show that his counsel’s 

deficient performance had some conceivable effect on the jury’s verdict. Instead, Pair 

must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted)).

As explained in more detail below, all of Steele’s arguably non-defaulted claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fail. Before looking at each individual claim, the 

undersigned would simply note that this is not a § 2254(d)(2) case because petitioner 

nowhere (see Docs. 1 & 10) shows by clear and convincing evidence that any of the state 

courts’ factual findings were unreasonable. See, e.g., Duran v. Walker, 223 Fed.Appx. 865, 

871 (11th Cir. Mar. 29, 2007) (“[A] state court’s factual findings are presumed correct, 

and the petitioner can rebut them only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1). As such, for a state court’s adjudication to result in an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, ‘[n]ot only must the factual 

determination have been unreasonable, but the state court’s factual findings must be 

shown unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence.’ Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 

897, 926 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 952, 127 S.Ct. 427, 166 L.Ed.2d 269 

(2006).”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 874, 128 S.Ct. 179, 169 L.Ed.2d 122 (2007). Accordingly, the 

undersigned considers solely whether the merits decisions of the Choctaw County 

Circuit Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals are contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Washington under § 2254(d)(1). 

a. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Advise Steele’s Wife of her Right not to 

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Testify on the Basis of the Spousal Privilege and Counsel’s Failure to Object to the 

Testimony of his Wife on the Ground of Spousal Privilege. For convenience sake, the 

undersigned considers these two “separate” claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel together because of their inherent “connectedness.” (See Doc. 7, Exhibit L, at 11 

(“Steele argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Steele’s wife, 

Leddon, that she could not be compelled to testify against Steele under Rule 504, 

Ala.R.Evid., and for failing to object to her testimony on that basis.”).) Petitioner 

contends that the record does not reflect that his wife, Mary Leddon, was informed by 

his defense counsel of her right not to testify because of spousal privilege and that had 

she been so informed, she would not have testified. In addition, Steele attacks his 

counsel’s failure to object to the testimony of his wife on the basis of spousal privilege 

when she appeared at trial based upon the State’s subpoena. 

As reflected above, the trial court found that trial counsel was not deficient in 

either regard. First, with respect to the failure to object, the trial court determined that 

there were no actions between the spouses intended as communications and no 

communications between the spouses and, therefore, no objection was warranted. (Doc. 

7, Exhibit H, March 5, 2015 ORDER, at 2.) In addition, the trial court noted that the 

privilege did not apply in any case because any communication that may have occurred 

was not confidential because of the presence of the decedent and, therefore, counsel was 

not deficient in failing to interpose an objection. (Id.) The Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals agreed with the trial court’s ruling in this regard. (Doc. 7, Exhibit L, at 11 

(“Those actions [of Steele about which Leddon testified], even if they were to be 

considered communications, were not confidential as they were made in the presence of 

the victim.”).) Second, regarding the lack of advice to Leddon that she could not be 

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compelled to testify, the trial court determined that trial counsel did not have a duty to 

advise Leddon of the spousal privilege and, further, that counsel made a strategic 

decision to allow Leddon to testify to the events necessary to establish self-defense. 

(Doc. 7, Exhibit H, March 5, 2015 ORDER, at 2.) The Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals also agreed with the trial court’s decision in this regard. (Doc. 7, Exhibit L, at 11 

(“Steele’s trial counsel did not have a duty to advise Leddon of the husband-wife 

privilege. . . . [T]he record shows that trial counsel’s decision to allow Leddon to testify 

was trial strategy. At the hearing, Leddon testified that trial counsel had communicated 

to Leddon that it would be in Steele’s best interests if she offered evidence in support of 

Steele’s self-defense claim. ‘The selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence 

are questions of trial strategy and virtually unchallengeable.’”).) 

Petitioner offers this Court no citation to case law which would establish that the 

Choctaw County Circuit Court and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals were incorrect 

in determining that the spousal privilege was inapplicable in this case since all relevant

actions of Steele (and any communications between Steele and Leddon24) occurred 

within the presence of the decedent. Without clear law establishing application of the 

spousal privilege to actions/communications occurring within the presence of a third 

party, trial counsel obviously would not be deficient in failing to advise Leddon of an 

inapplicable/non-existent privilege (even if such a duty to so advise existed, which 

Steele has not established by citation to appropriate case law) or in failing to object to 

Leddon’s testimony on this basis. And because petitioner has not established the 

 24 The only “communication” to which Leddon testified was her telling Steele that 

Aston did not wake him from his nap, that it was her belief that their youngest son had 

awakened Steele. 

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applicability of the spousal privilege, the Alabama courts’ determinations that trial 

counsel was not deficient in these regards are not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of Strickland v. Washington.

As well, the explicit determinations by the Alabama courts that trial counsel 

made a strategic decision to allow/encourage Leddon to testify is not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Washington. The record supports these 

determinations. Steele maintained at trial, and continues to maintain to this day, that he 

stabbed William Aston in self-defense. In order to inject the issue of self-defense, and 

necessitate instructions to the jury on this defense, evidence—namely, testimony—had 

to be offered in the defendant’s favor tending to establish self-defense. Compare Diggs v. 

State, 168 So.3d 156, 162 (Ala.Crim.App. 2014) (“Because Diggs presented evidence 

[specifically, testimony,] in support of his self-defense claim, the trial court erred when 

it refused to give the requested instructions to the jury.”) with Lemley v. State, 599 So.2d 

64, 72-73 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) (“The appellant was entitled to a charge on self-defense 

because he presented evidence that he believed one of the group of individuals outside 

his house was aiming a gun at him and was ‘about to use unlawful deadly physical 

force’ against him. He was not required to retreat from the perceived attack because one 

assaulted in his own dwelling is not bound to retreat before defending himself.” 

(citation omitted; emphasis added)). That is, there had to be evidence/testimony 

establishing Aston as the aggressor and/or evidence/testimony that Steele was justified 

in using physical force, including deadly physical force, to defend himself from what he 

reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful physical force by Aston. See 

Diggs, supra, 168 So.3d at 161 (“[T]he court should not instruct on the law of self-defense 

where there is no evidence to sustain the plea. In the absence of any evidence having a 

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tendency to show that at the time of the killing the accused was in imminent peril of 

life, or grievous bodily harm, or of the existence of circumstances creating in his mind a 

reasonable belief of such peril, these instructions are abstract. A trial judge may 

properly refused to charge the jury on self-defense where he determines that the 

defendant could not set up self-defense under the facts.” (internal citations, quotation 

marks, brackets and ellipses omitted; emphasis supplied).) Clearly, therefore, Steele or 

his wife, Leddon, had to testify because without such testimony—that is, without one of 

them testifying about the events of March 18, 2011—the record would be bereft of any 

evidence whatsoever that Aston continued an argument that Steele wanted to end and 

acted in an angry, threatening or aggressive manner by advancing on Steele in Steele’s 

house, thereby causing Steele to stab Aston to defend against what he believed to be the 

imminent use of unlawful physical force by Aston. In other words, without Leddon’s 

testimony (or the testimony of Steele himself25), there is no evidence that Aston was 

either unwelcomed or that he entered Steele’s house uninvited as argued in the petition 

for writ of certiorari submitted to the Alabama Supreme Court (Doc. 7, Exhibit N, at 9 & 

10); instead, the entirety of the evidence would be that Aston’s death was homicide and 

that the cause of death was a stab wound to the chest delivered by Steele with such 

force that a rib was broken before the knife hit the victim’s left lung and heart.26

 25 As noted by the trial court, and not challenged by petitioner, the defense team 

did not want to subject Steele to cross-examination. (Doc. 7, Exhibit H, March 5, 2015 ORDER, at 

2; compare id. with Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. 129-130 (following numerous meetings between Steele 

and defense counsel, Steele concurred in the decision that he should not take the stand in his 

defense, voluntarily chose not to testify, and informed the trial court at the close of all the 

evidence that it was his decision not to testify).)

26 Moreover, the victim was lying outside Steele’s house when Sgt. Breland arrived 

and though the murder weapon was confiscated, the victim (who had ethanol and other drugs in 

his system) was not holding or in possession of a weapon.

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Accordingly, the Choctaw County Circuit Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals were correct in finding that defense counsel made a strategic decision to not 

“object” to the State subpoenaing Leddon to testify in order to obtain her testimony 

regarding the events of March 18, 2011 and allow Steele to make a claim of self-defense. 

Indeed, Leddon admitted during the Rule 32 hearing that defense counsel informed her 

that it would be in Steele’s best interests if she offered evidence in support of his selfdefense claim and, as established above, her testimony was the lynchpin for this claim. 

Steele’s attorneys were in no manner deficient with respect to their use of Leddon 

during the course of Steele’s trial.

b. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Call the Toxicologist as an Expert 

Witness. In his habeas corpus petition, Steele simply argues in a very general manner 

that defense counsel erred in failing to call as an expert witness at his trial the 

toxicologist, Kelly Wood, who analyzed the samples (blood, urine, and vitreous fluid) 

taken from the victim’s body. (See Doc. 1, at 8 & 19.) In analyzing the issue as presented 

to the Alabama Supreme Court in Steele’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama 

Supreme Court, it is clear that petitioner means to argue that because Wood did not 

testify he was prevented from offering evidence of the decedent’s drug and alcohol 

use—that is, the different levels of these substances in the victim’s system—and Wood’s 

conclusions about those substances, which testimony would not have been detrimental 

to his theory of self-defense. (See Doc. 7, Exhibit N, at 5-11.)27

 27 Petitioner goes on to argue that, without Wood’s testimony, he was prevented 

from requesting jury instructions directed to utilization of the victim’s intoxication. (See Doc. 7, 

Exhibit N, at 9-11.) Steele specifically contends in the petition for writ of certiorari that because 

the jury never heard the degree of Aston’s intoxication (and that drugs were in his system) 

“proper jury instructions about how to utilize the intoxication of the victim was never given and 

the jury failed to understand how to use the fact the victim was drunk and trespassing into the 

(Continued)

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Initially, the undersigned finds significant, as just noted, that petitioner is 

incorrect in positing that the jury did not hear about the levels of ethanol and other 

drugs in the victim’s system inasmuch as, again, Dr. Hart testified about the various 

levels of ethanol and other drugs found in Aston’s bodily fluids. Moreover, the 

undersigned agrees with the Circuit Court of Choctaw County that Wood’s other 

putative trial testimony (based upon her Rule 32 testimony)—that with the level of 

alcohol in Aston’s system she could not definitively say that the victim would have 

been more aggressive or more sedate—“would not tend to make the fact that the 

decedent had been more aggressive more likely[,]” and, therefore, trial counsel was not 

 

home of John Steele adequately.” (Doc. 7, Exhibit N, at 10.) Steele also argues that had such 

instructions been given, they would have resembled those in Quinlivan v. State, 555 So.2d 802, 

804-805 & 805 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989) (“I charge you, members of the jury, that if you believe from 

the evidence that at the time of the killing the deceased was under the influence of alcohol, you 

may consider such fact in determining whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense. . . . I 

charge you, members of the jury, that if you believe from the evidence that the deceased at the 

time of his death was under the influence of alcohol, and that as a result of being under such 

influence, the deceased was aggressive, or belligerent, or quarrelsome, then you should consider 

such facts in determining whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense in killing the 

deceased, as I have explained the law governing self-defense to you.” (quotation marks 

omitted)), and since “it is probable that the instructions [w]ould have weighed against the State’s 

burden of disproving self-defense[,]” (Doc. 7, Exhibit N, at 10), prejudice accrued to petitioner 

because these instructions were not requested or given (see id. at 10-11). 

Steele’s “victim intoxication jury instructions” argument, however, suffers from two fatal 

infirmities. First, the jury most certainly learned of the levels of ethanol and other drugs in 

Aston’s blood, urine and vitreous fluid through the testimony of the forensic pathologist, Dr. 

Hart. (See Doc. 7, Exhibit B, T.T. 99-102.) More importantly, the instructions cited above from the 

Quinlivan case, which Steele contends were neither requested nor given, were, in fact, part and 

parcel of the trial court’s oral instructions to the jury. (See id., at 144-145 (“I charge you members 

of the jury that if you believe from the evidence that at the time of the killing[] the deceased was 

under the influence of alcohol, you may consider such fact in determining whether or not the 

defendant acted in self-defense. I charge you members of the jury that if you believe from the 

evidence that the deceased, at the time of his death, was under the influence of alcohol, and that, 

as a result of being under such influence, the deceased was aggressive, or belligerent, or 

quarrelsome, then you should consider such facts in determining whether or not the defendant 

acted in self-defense in killing the deceased, as I have explained the law governing self-defense 

to you.”).) Therefore, trial counsel was obviously not deficient in this regard because counsel 

acted in the exact manner that petitioner argues they should have acted.

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deficient in failing to call Wood as a witness. (Doc. 7, Exhibit H, March 5, 2015 ORDER, 

at 3.)28 In other words, the trial court’s finding in this regard is not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Washington. 

Finally, to the extent Steele would seem to suggest in his petition for writ of 

certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 

failure to call Wood as a witness, because her testimony would not have been 

inconsistent with the theory of self-defense, the undersigned rejects this suggestion 

because he further premises his prejudice argument on counsel’s error in utilizing 

Leddon’s testimony. (See Doc. 7, Exhibit N, at 6-9.) While the undersigned does not 

disagree with petitioner that nothing about Wood’s testimony would be detrimental to 

a claim of self-defense, it is also clear that absolutely nothing about that testimony sets 

forth the facts necessary for entitlement to claim self-defense or have the jury instructed 

on the law of self-defense. In other words, based on Steele’s “ideal” scenario—having 

the benefit of Wood’s testimony but not presenting Leddon’s testimony—this Court 

would have no basis to find that the result of petitioner’s trial would have been 

different for the simple fact that Steele would not have supplied the trial court with the 

necessary facts to allow a claim self-defense and charge the jury on that defense 

theory.29 Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel lacks merit. 

 28 Also relevant to a finding of no deficient performance by trial counsel in failing to 

call Wood as a witness during the trial is the fact that Steele specifically informed the trial court 

that he concurred in the decision not to call Wood as a witness in his case. (See Doc. 7, Exhibit B, 

T.T. 129-130.)

29 As set forth at more length supra, Wood could not place the admittedly drunk 

Aston in Steele’s house refusing to “end” a verbal argument and advancing on Steele in an 

angry, aggressive, belligerent or quarrelsome manner; only Leddon, or Steele himself, could 

supply such facts necessary for his claim of self-defense. 

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C. Certificate of Appealability. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases, the undersigned recommends that a certificate of appealability 

in this case be denied. 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 11(a) (“The district court must issue or 

deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.”). The habeas corpus statute makes clear that an applicant is entitled to 

appeal a district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition only where a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate of 

appealability may issue only where “the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(2). The instant habeas petition is 

being denied partly on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of certain 

constitutional claims, such that “a COA should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . 

. that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim 

of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling[,]” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), but also partially on the 

merits of underlying constitutional claims, such that a COA should issue only when the 

petitioner demonstrates “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong[,]” Slack v. McDaniel, supra,; 

see also id. at 483–484, 120 S.Ct. at 1603-1604 (“To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas 

prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a 

demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes showing that reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved 

in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.’”); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 

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1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must 

‘sho[w] that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the 

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”’”). With respect to

certain identified ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims discussed above (that is, 

the claims related to the trial testimony of Leddon and the failure to obtain the trial 

testimony of Wood), the undersigned recommends that the Court find that reasonable 

jurists could not debate whether his § 2254 habeas petition should be resolved in a 

different manner or that any of the remaining issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further. With respect to his sufficiency of the evidence claim 

and other claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel identified above, petitioner has 

defaulted these claims without fairly presenting (and exhausting) them to the state 

courts and those same courts would now find the claims procedurally barred, compare 

McNair, supra, 416 F.3d at 1302 & 1305 with Kelley, supra, 377 F.3d at 1344 & 1351; thus, a 

reasonable jurist could not conclude either that this Court is in error in dismissing the 

instant petition or that Steele should be allowed to proceed further, Slack, supra, 529 U.S. 

at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court 

is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either 

that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be 

allowed to proceed further.”). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of 

appealability as to any of the claims he has raised in his habeas corpus petition.

Rule 11(a) further provides: “Before entering the final order, the court may direct 

the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” If there is an 

objection to this recommendation by either party, that party may bring this argument to 

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the attention of the district judge in the objections permitted to this report and 

recommendation. Brightwell v. Patterson, CA 11-0165-WS-C, Doc. 14 (Eleventh Circuit 

order denying petitioner’s motions for a COA and to appeal IFP in a case in which this 

Court set out the foregoing procedure); see also Castrejon v. United States, 2011 WL 

3241817, *20 (S.D. Ala. June 28, 2011) (providing for the same procedure), report and

recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3241580 (S.D. Ala. July 29, 2011); Griffin v. DeRosa, 2010 

WL 3943702, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2010) (providing for same procedure), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Griffin v. Butterworth, 2010 WL 3943699 (N.D.Fla. Oct. 5, 

2010). 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge is of the opinion that petitioner’s rights were not violated in 

this cause and that his request for federal habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (Doc. 1), should be DENIED. Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of 

appealability and, therefore, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c)(1) & (2). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit 

Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based 

on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

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period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this the 19th day of October, 2016.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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