Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01709/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01709-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John E. Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-1709

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

John E. Davis,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of Nebraska.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: December 17, 2003

 Filed: February 2, 2004

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Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

John E. Davis was charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846; tampering with a

witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512; and use and discharge of a firearm during

a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). A jury

convicted Davis on all three counts, and the district court1

 sentenced him to life in

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prison. Davis appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the

convictions, that the district court abused its discretion in admitting prejudicial

evidence, and that the district court erred in imposing his sentence. We affirm his

convictions and his sentence.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In resolving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

 See Miller v. Lock, 108 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 1997). If "any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," we

must uphold the conviction. Id. Davis argues that the jury's verdict as to the

conspiracy charge was not supported by sufficient evidence because much of the

evidence came from cooperating witnesses. As we have held in similar cases, the

testimony of cooperating witnesses "more than suffices to sustain a conviction for

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine," United States v. Aguilar-Portillo, 334

F.3d 744, 747 (8th Cir. 2003), and any question as to the credibility of the

cooperating witnesses is for the jury alone to determine, United States v. Mangine,

302 F.3d 819, 823 (8th Cir. 2002). In this case, much of the physical and

documentary evidence presented to the jury corroborated the cooperating witnesses'

testimony. Thus, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict Davis on the

conspiracy charge. Furthermore, even if the evidence suggests that there were

multiple conspiracies – an argument Davis makes for the first time on appeal – Davis

could not have been prejudiced because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to

conclude that Davis was involved in all of the conspiracies. C.f. United States v.

Kamerud, 326 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 969 (2003).

Davis also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the tampering

with a witness charge because there was not a federal investigation pending at the

time he shot Mark Osborn. This argument fails because the statute does not require

proof that a federal case was pending at the time of the alleged tampering, see 18

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U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1), and there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that

Davis acted under a belief that Osborn was a potential witness against him. Finally,

because the physical and circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Davis shot

Osborn in order to keep him from testifying about Davis's role in the drug conspiracy,

there is also sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Davis fired a weapon

in furtherance of the conspiracy.

II. Admissibility of Evidence

Davis argues that the district court should not have admitted evidence relating

to Davis's alleged threats and beatings of women, including a young girl, because it

was highly prejudicial, and neither relevant nor probative. We review evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maynie, 257 F.3d 908, 915 (8th

Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1151, and cert. denied, 535 U.S. 944 (2002). The

prosecution presented evidence that Davis committed acts of violence and made

threats against Joanne Winter, Mark Osborn, and Osborn's children for the purpose

of silencing potential witnesses and furthering the drug conspiracy. We have upheld

the admission of similar evidence in other cases, see, e.g., id. at 916; United States

v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 730-31 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1054, and

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1066, and cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998), including

evidence of threats made to harm a potential witness's children, see United States v.

Montano-Gudino, 309 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2002). Because drug dealing is often

a violent vocation, and because the evidence of threats and violence was presented

to show the lengths that Davis would go to protect the conspiracy, its probative value

was substantial and far outweighed any prejudicial effect. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence. 

III. Sentencing Guidelines

Davis raises three arguments challenging the district court's determination of

his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, Davis argues that the district

court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant

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to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding

that Davis's threats and acts of violence against Mark Osborn, Margie Smith, James

Smith, and Joanne Winter were calculated to impede a criminal investigation and

therefore constituted an obstruction of justice. United States v. Swick, 334 F.3d 784,

787 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review). 

Second, Davis argues that the district court erred in imposing a four-level

aggravating role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Because the evidence

shows that Davis directed the activities of at least one other coconspirator, Mary

Negethon, c.f. United States v. Sarabia-Martinez, 276 F.3d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 2002),

and exercised control over other coconspirators through threats or violence, c.f.

United States v. Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.

1045 (2001), the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Davis was a

leader or organizer of the conspiracy. We affirm the district court's imposition of the

four-level enhancement. 

Third, Davis argues that the district court erred in relying upon the testimony

of cooperating witnesses to calculate the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy.

We give great deference to the district court's evaluation of witness credibility and its

calculation of drug quantity. See United States v. Quintana, 340 F.3d 700, 702 (8th

Cir. 2003). Because the testimony of the witnesses believed by the court to be

credible is sufficient to support the district court's determination that Davis was

responsible for a minimum of 10 kilograms of methamphetamine, we see no clear

error in the district court's findings, and we affirm its calculation of the base offense

level. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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