Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05074/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Contemporary Dialysis Incorporated
Not Party
Dimensional Stone Institute, Inc.
Not Party
Jerry Fisher
Appellant
Tile and Decorative Surfaces Magazine Publishing, Inc.
Not Party
Tulsa Litho Company
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILEDA c;.• .. United States Co~rt '!r PP ..., 1 e:lth Ctrcutt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

OCT 3 1 1995 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

TULSA LITHO COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TILE AND DECORATIVE SURFACES 

MAGAZINE PUBLISHING, INC., a 

California corporation; 

DIMENSIONAL STONE INSTITUTE, 

a California corporation; 

CONTEMPORARY DIALYSIS 

INCORPORATED, a California 

corporation, 

Defendants, 

and 

JERRY FISHER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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PATRICK FISHER Clerl~ 

No. 95-5074 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 93-C-470-E) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Eric M. Daffern of Sanders, Sanders & Daffern, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert G. Green, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

* The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted for 

decision on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 

34.1.2. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 95-5074 Document: 01019280685 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Jerry Fisher is President of three magazine publishing corporations: Contemporary Dialysis, Inc.; Tile & Decorative Surfaces Magazine Publishing, Inc.; and Dimensional Stone 

Institute, Inc. On January 6, 1989, he executed price schedules 

with Appellee Tulsa Litho to print the magazines for the three 

corporations for five years. In December 1992, the corporations 

terminated their relationship with Tulsa Litho. Based on that 

termination, Tulsa Litho filed suit in the Northern District of 

Oklahoma against the three corporations for breach of contract 

seeking damages of $326,204.1 It also joined Mr. Fisher as an 

additional defendant in the suit claiming he caused the breaches 

and was individually liable as the alter ego of the corporations. 

Mr. Fisher filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 

that he was a disclosed agent of the corporate defendants and that 

he signed the price schedules in his capacity as President. The 

district court granted Mr. Fisher summary judgment. 

After a jury trial, the court entered a judgment for $326,000 

in favor of Tulsa Litho against the corporate defendants. 

1 The district court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 1332. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5074 Document: 01019280685 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 2 
Mr. Fisher then filed a motion for attorney fees on the ground 

that by the court's grant of his summary judgment motion he became 

the prevailing party as between himself and Tulsa Litho. Tulsa 

Litho, also claiming to be a prevailing party, requested attorney 

fees against the corporate defendants. 

The district court denied Mr. Fisher's request for attorney 

fees on the ground that "'there can only be one prevailing party 

and one attorney's fee.'" Appellant Br., App., Order at 2 (March 

8, 1995 (quoting Quapaw Co. v. Varnell, 566 P.2d 164 (Okla. App. 

1977)). Instead, the court awarded Tulsa Litho attorney fees 

because it "received the greatest affirmative judgment." Id. at 

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On appellate review a district court's award of attorney fees 

is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, but any legal conelusions that provide a basis for the award are reviewable de 

novo. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (lOth Cir. 1986); see 

also Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Dev., 9 F.3d 855, 865 

(lOth Cir. 1993) (making a de novo review of the meaning of "prevailing party" under Oklahoma's § 936 attorney fee statute). 

The governing Oklahoma statute provides: 

In any civil action to recover on an open account, 

a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, 

negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for 

labor or services, unless otherwise provided by law or 

the contract which is the subject [of] the action, the 

prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney 

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Appellate Case: 95-5074 Document: 01019280685 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 3 
fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 

costs. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936. 

"[T]he general rule [is] that attorney fees and costs in 

multi-party cases as well as in certain consolidated cases are 

awarded to different parties on the basis of the separate judgments obtained, not the overall trial result." Christie-Lambert 

Van & Storage Co. v. McLeod, 693 P.2d 161, 166 (Wash. App. 1984) 

(citing Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 255 P. 939, 942 (Wash. 

1927)). 

Hardesty v. Andre Corp.-Webster Division, 555 P.2d 1030, 

1036-37 (Okla. 1976), makes it clear that Oklahoma follows this 

general rule. Hardesty was an apartment complex owner who sued 

both a subcontractor and an air conditioner manufacturer for 

breach of warranty. The defendant subcontractor cross-claimed 

against the defendant manufacturer. The trial court dismissed 

plaintiff Hardesty's claim against the defendant manufacturer, but 

plaintiff Hardesty did obtain a judgment against the defendant 

subcontractor. The cross-claimant subcontractor then obtained a 

judgment against the defendant manufacturer. The trial court held 

that under § 936 the defendant manufacturer was entitled to 

attorney fees as the prevailing party against plaintiff Hardesty, 

and that plaintiff Hardesty was entitled to § 936 attorney fees as 

the prevailing party against the defendant subcontractor. The 

court also held that the cross-claimant subcontractor was entitled 

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Appellate Case: 95-5074 Document: 01019280685 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 4 
to § 936 attorney fees as the prevailing party against the defendant manufacturer. Id. at 1032-33. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 

affirmed the attorney fee awards under § 936, holding that, like 

the parties here, each was entitled to an attorney fee award as a 

prevailing party. Id. at 1036-37; see also Sisney v. Smalley, 690 

P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okla. 1984) (proportioning attorney fees in 

multi-claim litigation under § 940). 

In holding that there could be only one prevailing party 

under § 936, the district court relied on the broad language in 

Quapaw Co. v. Varnell, 566 P.2d at 167, and Arkla Energy 

Resources, 9 F.3d at 866. Quapaw and Arkla are distinguishable 

from this case because they involved attorney fee disputes in 

actions pitting a single party against another single party. 

In this case, involving multiple parties, each defendant was 

a separate party. Mr. Fisher's interest in the defendant companies as their President does not make him personally liable. In 

granting Mr. Fisher summary judgment against Tulsa Litho, the 

district court held that he was not personally liable because he 

was not the alter ego of the corporations. The court found "no 

evidence that the corporations are shells or that they were used 

to perpetrate fraud." Appellant's Br. at 4 (quoting Order for 

Summary Judgment at 4 (Apr. 12, 1994}). Since the court granted 

Mr. Fisher summary judgment over Tulsa Litho, he was the prevailing party as between himself and Tulsa Litho. Tulsa Litho, on the 

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Appellate Case: 95-5074 Document: 01019280685 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 5 
other hand, was the prevailing party with respect to it against 

each of the corporate defendants. 

Accordingly, on remand the district court should determine 

and award a reasonable attorney fee to Mr. Fisher as permitted 

under Oklahoma law. 

REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for further 

proceedings in accordance with the above instructions. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5074 Document: 01019280685 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 6