Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-02092/USCOURTS-ca8-16-02092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Michelle Gray
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-2092

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lisa Michelle Gray

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

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 Submitted: January 9, 2017

Filed: January 13, 2017

[Unpublished]

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In July 2014, Lisa Gray went with her paramour Robert Thompson to Mexico,

knowing there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Thompson on federal

methamphetamine distribution charges. Gray asked family members for assistance

while in Mexico and refused to disclose Thompson’s whereabouts when she returned

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to Little Rock, Arkansas, in December. She was indicted for felony concealing a

person from arrest, see 18 U.S.C. § 1071, and released on pretrial supervision. 

Thompson was arrested in January 2015 and detained in a Pulaski County

facility. In April, county deputies were told that Thompson planned to introduce

contraband into the facility by having a package dropped off in a jailer’s parked car. 

Law enforcement surveillance units then observed Gray drop in the jailer’s car a

package that contained 7 grams of marijuana and 0.7 grams of methamphetamine. 

Gray admitted attempting to bring Thompson illegal drugs. Her bond was revoked,

and a superseding indictment charged her with attempting to provide marijuana and

methamphetamine to a prison inmate while on pretrial release in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(1) and 3147. She pleaded guilty to that charge; the government

dropped the prior § 1071 charge.

In Gray’s plea agreement, the parties stipulated that the base offense level was

13, see U.S.S.G. § 2P1.2(a)(2); she would receive a three level increase for

committing the offense while on pretrial release and a two level reduction for

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acceptance of responsibility; and neither party would seek a variance from the

recommended guidelines sentencing range. The Presentence Investigation Report,

adopted by the district court at sentencing, recommended a total offense level of 14

and criminal history category I, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 15 to 21

months in prison. Without the favorable sentencing stipulations in the plea

agreement, the range would have been 70 to 87 months.

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.3 providesthat, “[i]f a statutory sentencing enhancement under

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18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, increase the offense level by 3 levels.” Section 3147(1)

provides that a person convicted of an offense committed while on pretrial release

“shall be sentenced” to a consecutive term of up to ten years in prison if the

underlying offense is a felony, such as providing methamphetamine to an inmate. See

§ 1791(b)(1), (d)(1)(C).

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At sentencing, Gray urged a sentence at the bottom of the range, 15 months. 

Consistent with its plea agreement, the government urged a within-range sentence. 

The district court varied upward and sentenced Gray to 36 months in prison on the

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§ 1791 offense and a consecutive 12 months on the § 3147 offense. The court

explained:

When I have contraband cases in jail, normally I’m pretty tough on

defendants for that. And the reason why I am is because of what it takes

to get drugs into a jail or into a prison.

* * * * *

In this case . . . I have a person who was charged with a crime for

running down to Mexico with somebody, a fugitive from justice. When

they came back, she bonds out. He is still in jail. And while she’s out

on supervision, she’s bringing him drugs in the jail. . . . [I]nstead of just

going home, you’re running up to the jail taking drugs.

And, in fact, the guidelines actually take that into

consideration. . . . And . . . the statute says . . . not only can I give her

an extra ten years, but if I give her time, I’m to run it consecutively.

* * * * *

[T]hese types of crimes are serious. . . . And it shows a total lack of

respect for the law. . . . [U]nless people who communicate with guards

. . . start getting more severe penalties, we will always have jails that are

overrun with drugs. 

On appeal Gray argues her 48-month sentence is substantively unreasonable

because this “mine-run case” did not involve aggravating facts, “[a]ll criminal acts

The HonorableBrian S. Miller, Chief Judge ofthe United States DistrictCourt

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for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

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involve a disrespect of the law,” and the district court’s comment that it is generally

tough on these types of cases reflected the absence of individualized assessment.

Reviewing the substantive reasonableness of Gray’s sentence under a “highly

deferential” abuse-of-discretion standard, see United States v. Roberts, 747 F.3d 990,

992 (8th Cir. 2014), we affirm. The upward variance was quite modest. As the

district court noted, § 3147 expressly authorized the court to impose a substantial,

consecutive sentence because Gray committed a felony while on pretrial release. The

court’s additional explanation that offenders who smuggle drugs into jails and prisons

warrant substantial sentences, regardless of the advisory guidelines range, reflected

a rational, no doubt widely held sentencing policy. In any event, as we have

repeatedly stated, a district court may disregard a sentencing guideline on policy

grounds, but is not required to do so; “our appellate role is limited to determining the

substantive reasonableness of a specific sentence.” United States v. Burns, 834 F.3d

887, 889 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Having carefully reviewed the

sentencing record from this perspective, we cannot conclude thisis “the unusual case

when we reverse a district court sentence -- whether within, above, or below the

applicable Guidelines range -- as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see, e.g., Ferguson v. United

States, 623 F.3d 627, 631-32 (8th Cir. 2010).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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