Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01795/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01795-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Coca-Cola Company
Appellee
Does 1-10
Appellant
McDonald's Corporation
Appellee
Pepsico
Appellee
Please Don't Kill Your Baby
Appellant
William S. Purdy
Appellant
The Washington Post Company
Appellee
Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-2894

 No. 03-1795

 No. 03-1929 

___________

Coca-Cola Company; McDonald's *

Corporation; Pepsico, Inc.; *

The Washington Post Company; *

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive *

Company, LLC, *

* Appeals from the United States

Plaintiffs-Appellees, * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota. 

v. *

*

William S. Purdy, Sr.; Please Don't Kill *

Your Baby; Does 1-10, *

*

Defendants-Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2004

Filed: September 1, 2004

___________

Before MURPHY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

This case was brought under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection

Act by the Washington Post Company and its wholly owned subsidiary

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company, LLC (the Post entities), the

Coca-Cola Company, McDonald's Corporation, and PepsiCo, Inc. to stop William

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
1

Plaintiffs also named as defendants unknown individuals allied with Purdy,

Does 1-10, and an unincorporated organization founded by Purdy called "Please

Don't Kill Your Baby."

2

A domain name is the "address" at which a computer user accesses a

website on the Internet. A glossary of Internet terminology is available at

http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/glossary/. 

3

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota. 

-2-

S. Purdy1

 from appropriating Internet domain names2 that incorporate and are

confusingly similar to their trademarks and servicemarks. The district court3

granted preliminary injunctive relief enjoining defendants from registering or using

certain domain names and ordering them transferred to their proper owners. Purdy

was later found in contempt and fined for violating the injunctions. He appeals

from the preliminary injunctions and the contempt orders.

I.

Both the common law and Congress have provided protection to the holders

of recognized trademarks to prevent others from appropriating or copying them

and taking advantage of the owner's good will for their own benefit. See 1

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2:31 (4th ed.) (citing

Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142 (1895); Hugo Stein Cloak Co. v. S.

B. Stein & Son, 16 N.E.2d 609 (Lucas County 1937)). Congress enacted the

Lanham Act over fifty years ago to protect the value of trademarks by encouraging

their registration, see 3 McCarthy § 19:2, and to provide a federal cause of action

to prevent their misappropriation, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125. One legislative purpose

of that act was to ensure that "where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,

time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his

investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats." S. Rep. No. 1333, at

*3 (1946). 

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-3-

The development of the Internet created new areas of concern, and in 1999

Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in order

to prevent misappropriation of trademarks by stopping conduct known as

"cybersquatting." See ACPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999)

(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). In the ACPA Congress added section 43(d) to

the Lanham Act and defined cybersquatting as registering or using with a bad faith

intent to profit a domain name that is confusingly similar to a registered or

unregistered mark or dilutive of a famous mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). See

also 4 McCarthy § 25:78. A number of cybersquatting problems prompted

Congressional action. There was concern about individuals registering domain

names that are similar to famous marks for the purpose of profiting by selling them

to the legitimate owners of the marks. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain

Names, 302 F.3d 214, 238 (4th Cir. 2002). Congress was also aware of individuals

attaching obscene or pornographic material to an infringing domain name in order

to tarnish the mark. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at *6 (Aug. 5, 1999). Others attempted

to divert unsuspecting consumers to their sites in order to engage in unfair

competition. Id. Conduct of this sort has been described as the "Internet version of

a land grab." Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Ltd., 304 F.3d 936, 946 (9th

Cir. 2002).

The legislative history of the ACPA includes findings that cybersquatters

were engaging in consumer fraud and creating public confusion as to the true

source or sponsorship of goods and services in a way that would impair electronic

commerce, deprive trademark owners of substantial revenues and consumer

goodwill, and place overwhelming burdens on trademark owners in protecting their

valuable intellectual property. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at *2 (findings). The Senate

report included concerns about misleading users of the Internet: "[I]f someone is

operating a web site under another brand owner's trademark, such as a site called

"cocacola.com" or "levis.com," consumers bear a significant risk of being deceived

and defrauded, or at a minimum, confused." Id. at *5.

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-4-

Congress enacted the ACPA to provide legal clarity for trademark owners by

prohibiting bad faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet

domain names with the intent to profit from their goodwill. Id. at *4. The ACPA

was intended to balance the interests of trademark owners against the interests of

those who would make fair uses of a mark online, such as for comment, criticism,

parody, and news reporting. Id. at *8. Nevertheless, the use of a domain name "in

connection with a site that makes a noncommercial or fair use of the mark does not

necessarily mean that the domain name registrant lacked bad faith." Id. at *8-9.

See also H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at *11 (1999). To recognize such an exemption

would "eviscerate the protections of the bill by suggesting a blueprint for

cybersquatters who would simply create criticism sites in order to immunize

themselves from liability despite their bad-faith intentions." S. Rep. No. 106-140,

at *9. For these reasons Congress gave courts the charge to "weigh the facts of

each case and make a determination based on those facts whether or not the

defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the domain name with bad-faith intent

to profit from the goodwill of the mark of another." Id. at *10.

II.

In early July 2002 Purdy began registering Internet domain names which

incorporated distinctive, famous, and protected marks owned by the plaintiffs. The

domain names he registered included drinkcoke.org, mycoca-cola.com,

mymcdonalds.com, mypepsi.org, and my-washingtonpost.com. The latter name

was almost exactly identical to one which the Washington Post had used to operate

an interactive online news service (mywashingtonpost.com), the only

distinguishing detail being Purdy's addition of a hyphen. 

Purdy typically linked the domain names to the website

abortionismurder.com which contains antiabortion commentary and graphic

images of aborted and dismembered fetuses. It also contains multiple "What Can I

Do?" links to a website where a visitor can purchase hats, shirts, neckties, and

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4

At oral argument Purdy's counsel characterized this offer as simply "a

matter of free speech. . . . Newspapers always run op ed pieces by people, and one

of our complaints is that we never get our side heard in the op ed piece." 

-5-

license plates with antiabortion themes and make donations using a credit card or

bank account number. The content available at abortionismurder.com contained no

references to plaintiffs, their products, or their alleged positions on abortion. 

For several days in early July 2002 Purdy linked the domain names mywashingtonpost.com and drinkcoke.org to a website displaying what appeared to

be a front page originating from washingtonpost.com. The page with this format

featured the headline "The Washington Post proclaims 'Abortion is Murder'" and

contained graphic images of aborted fetuses next to Coca-Cola's trademark and the

words "Things Don't Always Go Better With Coke. Abortion is Murder — 'The

Real Thing.'" ("It's the Real Thing" is a registered trademark of the Coca-Cola

Company.) Sometime after this litigation began, Purdy also linked many of the

domain names to his own websites which contained references to a claim that

plaintiffs supported abortion, graphic photos of aborted fetuses, and links to

abortionismurder.com.

Counsel for the Washington Post entities sent a cease and desist letter to

Purdy on July 8, 2002, and it persuaded his Internet service provider (ISP) to stop

hosting the website at my-washingtonpost.com. Counsel for McDonald's and

Pepsi contacted Purdy and his domain name registrars with similar requests around

this time. During a telephone conversation with counsel for the Post entities on

July 8, Purdy acknowledged that he had published a counterfeit front page at mywashingtonpost.com and claimed that his actions were protected by the First

Amendment. The record indicates that Purdy offered to comply with the request of

the Post entities if they would publish something written by him on the

Washington Post editorial page, but they declined.4

 A few days later Purdy

reactivated my-washingtonpost.com with a new ISP and published another

counterfeit washingtonpost.com front page with antiabortion headlines and graphic

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
-6-

content. He also registered washingtonpost.cc and washingtonpost.ws, linked them

to abortionismurder.com, and began using the email address dontkillyourbaby@

washingtonpost.cc. 

Although Purdy now claims that he targeted all of the plaintiffs because of

stands they had taken in the abortion debate, it appears from the record that he

initially used many of the marks only because they would attract unwitting Internet

users to his antiabortion message. He wrote to a journalist in a July 16, 2002 email

message that the domain names drinkcoke.org, mycoca-cola.com,

mymcdonalds.com, mypepsi.org, and pepsisays.com were "abortion neutral names

being used but not because of any stand they have taken on abortion." He reported

that the domain names were then attached to the website abortionismurder.com. 

Plaintiffs filed this action on July 18, 2002 and moved for an emergency

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. A hearing was held on the

motion on July 22, at which Purdy appeared pro se and the plaintiffs were

represented by counsel. The district court issued an emergency temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction on July 23. The order prohibited

Purdy and those acting in concert with him from using nine specified domain

names: drinkcoke.org, mycoca-cola.com, mymcdonalds.com, mypepsi.org,

pepsisays.com, my-washingtonpost.com, washingtonpostsays.com,

washingtonpost.cc, and washingtonpost.ws. In addition, the court ordered Purdy

not to use

any domain name that both (1) incorporates, and is identical or

confusingly similar to, Plaintiffs' distinctive, famous and protected

marks Coca-Cola®, Coke®, McDonalds®, McDonalds.com®, PepsiCola®, Pepsi®, The Washington Post®, and WashingtonPost.com®,

and (2) does not alert the unwary Internet user to the protest or critical

commentary nature of the attached website within the language of the

domain name itself.

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
-7-

Purdy was also required to transfer ownership of the specified domain names to the

appropriate plaintiffs within three days of the order. 

After plaintiffs complained that Purdy was continuing to register infringing

domain names, the district court amended its order on September 5, 2002 to enjoin

him also from registering infringing names. Despite this amendment, Purdy wrote

to counsel for the Post entities on September 18 that he was "continuing to register

domain names at an exciting pace." Since the original preliminary injunction went

into effect on July 23, Purdy has registered at least 60 additional domain names

incorporating plaintiffs' marks, including lovemcdonalds.com, gopepsi.org,

thepepsichallenge.org, thewashingtonpostinternet.com, yourwashingtonpost.com,

and thewashingtonpostnews.com, and he has claimed to have registered as many as

200.

On September 26, 2002 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company,

LLC (WPNI), a subsidiary of the Washington Post companies, learned that Purdy

had registered the domain name wpni.org. Purdy also attached this domain name

to an antiabortion website. After he registered the domain name, he received a

number of misaddressed email messages intended for WPNI employees at

wpni.com, and he telephoned two WPNI employees and read to them contents of

their private emails. In addition, he told the two employees that he had received

other messages that contained "juicy" content and threatened to publish them on

the Internet and make them available to the New York Times unless this lawsuit

were dropped.

The Post entities sent Purdy another cease and desist letter and filed a

motion for a second emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction on October 1, 2002. Purdy told a journalist that he was unable to

comply with the cease and desist demands by the Post entities because he had

transferred wpni.org to a third party named Pablo Rubio Sanchez. See Declan

McCullagh, Washington Post Battles Domain Claim, CNET News.com, Sept. 27,

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
5

Among the domain names listed in the district court's January 28 order were

washingtonpoststates.com, washingtonposthealth.com, washingtonposteditorialpage.com, yourwashingtonpost.com, gopepsi.org, pepsiheaven.com,

pepsiright.com, thepepsichallenge.org, and lovemcdonalds.com. The court

amended the contempt order on January 29 to correct minor clerical errors. 

-8-

2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-959992.html. He also said that

he was "leaving town" on the day he expected to receive service of process. Id.

The district court issued a second temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction on October 3, 2002, finding that wpni.org was nearly identical to the

well known WPNI acronym, ordering Purdy to transfer it to the Post entities, and

repeating that Purdy was enjoined from registering or using such domain names.

The plaintiffs also moved on October 1 for an order to show cause why

Purdy should not be held in contempt for violating the earlier preliminary

injunction. The district court appointed a public defender to represent Purdy for

purposes of the contempt motion, and a hearing was held on it in January 2003.

The court found that Purdy still had not brought himself into compliance with its

injunction and issued an order on January 28, 2003 finding him in contempt. The

court listed more than 60 domain names that it found he had registered and/or used

in violation of its original injunction.5

 It again ordered Purdy immediately to cease

using the listed domain names and to transfer the names to the rightful owners

within three days. Purdy was also ordered to pay plaintiffs $500 per day from the

date of the order until he complied and to pay their fees, costs, and expenses.

The next week a status conference was held to assess Purdy's compliance

with the January 28 contempt order. At that time Purdy was still using many

domain names that had been specifically found to violate the court's injunctions.

Although the plaintiffs had succeeded in forcing the transfer of many domain

names registered in the United States, some registered in France had apparently not

been transferred and were still linked to content of his choice. Despite having been

found in contempt on January 28 for registering ilovethewashingtonpost.com,

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
-9-

Purdy registered two new domain names on the day of the February 4 status

conference: ilikethewashingtonpost.com and iadorethewashingtonpost.com. His

only apparent attempt to bring himself into compliance was to send a copy of the

district court's order to the French domain registrar by postal mail on Sunday,

February 3, 2003, although the company's website indicated that it was to be

contacted by email.

On March 10, 2003 the district court issued a supplemental contempt order.

"After assuring the Court on February 4, 2003, that he was taking prompt steps to

terminate the display of content via prohibited domain names, Defendant William

S. Purdy, Sr. . . . continued to display content using many prohibited domain

names, including washingtonposthealth.com, lovemcdonalds.com, and

thewashingtonpostshareholder.com for more than a week thereafter." The court

also found that Purdy had registered or used even more new domain names,

including washingtonpost.nu, thewashingtonpostjesus.com, and others which it

found violated its previous orders. Because Purdy had not purged his contempt

since the February 4, 2003 status conference, the court ordered him to pay the

plaintiffs $500 per day for 34 days for a total of $17,000. 

III.

Now before the court are three consolidated appeals filed by Purdy. In 02-

2894 he appeals from the district court's preliminary injunction (including its order

for relief on July 23 as amended on September 5, 2002). In 03-1795 he seeks to

appeal the district court's January 28, 2003 contempt order, and the March 10,

2003 supplemental contempt order and sanctions are the subject of his appeal in

03-1929.

Purdy argues that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the

preliminary injunctive relief. He contends that the plaintiffs are unlikely to

succeed on the merits of their ACPA claim because he did not have a bad faith

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-10-

intent to profit from his registration and use of the domain names and because the

First Amendment protects his conduct. He also contends that the plaintiffs would

not be irreparably harmed in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief, that his

interest in free expression outweighs their trademark rights, and that the public

interest is not served by the preliminary injunction. He argues that the district

court's injunction is vague and overbroad, and that the court exceeded its authority

by holding him in contempt and ordering him to pay sanctions to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs respond that Purdy has acted with a bad faith intent to profit as

defined by the ACPA, that the First Amendment does not protect the registration

and use of domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to their marks,

and that they are likely to succeed on the merits. They argue that the value of their

marks would be irreparably harmed in the absence of a preliminary injunction, that

Purdy retains ample channels for expression of his views without using confusing

domain names, and that the public interest in preventing confusion among Internet

users is served by the preliminary injunctive relief granted by the district court.

They contend that its orders were carefully tailored to protect their trademark rights

while preserving Purdy's right to express his views. As to the civil contempt orders

and sanctions, they argue that appellate jurisdiction is presently lacking. 

A.

 In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction a court considers

(1) the probability of the movant's success on the merits; (2) the threat of

irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the balance between this harm and the injury

that granting the injunction will inflict on other interested parties; and (4) whether

the issuance of the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. See Dataphase

Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). A district

court has broad discretion when ruling on preliminary injunction requests, and we

will reverse only for clearly erroneous factual determinations, an error of law, or an

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
-11-

abuse of discretion. United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th

Cir. 1998).

The district court found that plaintiffs had demonstrated a strong probability

of success on the merits of their claim under the Anticybersquatting Consumer

Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). The ACPA provides in relevant part that

A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark

. . . if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that

person (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark . . . and

(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that — 

(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of

registration of the domain name, is identical or

confusingly similar to that mark; [or]

(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the

time of registration of the domain name, is identical or

confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark . . .

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 

The district court found that plaintiffs' marks were both distinctive and

famous and that the domain names Purdy had registered and used were identical or

confusingly similar to those marks. It also found a strong likelihood that plaintiffs

would prove that Purdy and others acting in concert with him had registered the

domain names with a bad faith intent to profit by tarnishing and diluting plaintiffs'

trademarks and by relying on their good names and goodwill to achieve the

personal gain of promoting their messages, generating publicity, and raising money

for supported causes. There is no disagreement that plaintiffs' marks were

distinctive and famous at the time Purdy began registering and using the domain

names at issue. 

At oral argument Purdy's new counsel raised the argument that his domain

names are not confusingly similar to plaintiffs' marks because an Internet user

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-12-

trying to visit one of plaintiffs' websites would not likely reach one of the domains

created by Purdy. He claims that an Internet user would most likely use a search

engine to find the correct corporate website or would guess that the domain name

would be the company's name followed by .com. He points to no evidence in the

record supporting this claim, and plaintiffs respond that the district court's finding

that Purdy's domain names are identical or confusingly similar to their marks is

amply supported by the record.

The question under the ACPA is not whether the domain names which

Purdy registered are likely to be confused with a plaintiff's domain name, but

whether they are identical or confusingly similar to a plaintiff's mark. See 15

U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii). It is the challenged domain name and the plaintiff's

mark which are to be compared. See 4 McCarthy § 25:78. The inquiry under the

ACPA is thus narrower than the traditional multifactor likelihood of confusion test

for trademark infringement. Northern Lights Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club,

236 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). The fact that confusion about

a website's source or sponsorship could be resolved by visiting the website is not

relevant to whether the domain name itself is identical or confusingly similar to a

plaintiff's mark. An example of this distinction is shown in People for Ethical

Treatment of Animals v. Doughney [PETA], 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). There,

the Fourth Circuit found peta.org confusingly similar to PETA's mark even though

the attached website was a clear parody of the organization, for "an internet user

would not realize that they were not on an official PETA web site until after they

had used PETA's Mark to access the web page 'www.peta.org.'" Id. at 366-67. See

also Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir.

2001) (vw.net similar to Volkswagen's "VW" mark even though attached website

advertised ISP); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489,

497-98 (2d Cir. 2000) (sportys.com confusingly similar to aviation catalog

company's "Sporty's" mark even though attached website advertised a Christmas

tree farm).

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-13-

A domain name typically consists of a top level domain extension, such as

.com, .org, or .net, and a second level domain name, such as pepsi in pepsi.com.

See Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 266. Because all domain names end with a top

level domain suffix like .com or .org, and domain registrars no longer enforce

distinctions between the types of entities that may register names with these

extensions, courts generally look to the second level domain name to determine

whether it is identical or confusingly similar to a given mark. Id. at 271 (vw.net

confusingly similar to "VW" mark); Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-98

(sportys.com confusingly similar to "Sporty's" mark). See also S. Rep. No. 106-

140, at *10 (ACPA's definition of "domain name" essentially reaches second level

domain names).

Many of Purdy's domain names differ from plaintiffs' marks only by the

addition of generic terms like "my," "says," or "drink" or by the addition of a top

level domain suffix. Even if Internet users were seldom to come upon mywashingtonpost.com, mymcdonalds.com or drinkcoke.org, for example, we see no

error in the district court's findings that the relevant second level domains (mywashingtonpost, mymcdonalds, and drinkcoke) are confusingly similar to the

Washington Post, Coke, and McDonald's marks. See 4 McCarthy § 25:78

(fordtrucks.com would be confusingly similar to the "Ford" mark of Ford Motor

Co.). The washingtonpost.cc, washingtonpost.ws, and wpni.org domain names

differ from the Washington Post and WPNI marks only in that they include a top

level domain suffix. They are thus confusingly similar, if not identical, to the Post

entities' marks. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-98 (second level domain name

"sportys" in sportys.com indistinguishable from Sporty's mark). Moreover, the

record indicates that Purdy intended to capitalize on the similarity between his

domain names and plaintiffs' marks to attract unwitting Internet users to

antiabortion websites, and intentional infringers are likely to succeed in creating

confusion. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 466 (4th Cir.

1996); Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1991).

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
-14-

The record also contains evidence of actual confusion among Internet users.

While trying to reach a website of the Coca-Cola Company, one Internet user

visited Purdy's drinkcoke.org domain. At that time the domain was attached to the

same counterfeit front page featured at my-washingtonpost.com, which included

multiple images of aborted fetuses next to Coca-Cola's logo and slogans. CocaCola received an email from the visitor to that site on July 7, 2002. He reported

that he had been "checking out your web pages and I came by [drinkcoke.org]."

He complained that the website had Coca-Cola's logo "all over it" and the content

had shocked him. "I am a Coke drinker myself, a fan i may say . . . I always have

some in the fridge and I was drinking [one] right now! but I got to admit, I cant

finish it after i seen this page" [sic]. Another example of actual confusion was

demonstrated in connection with Purdy's use of the name wpni.org. Several

Internet users sent email intended for employees of WPNI to Purdy's wpni.org,

evidencing confusion from the similarity of the domain name to the WPNI mark.

On the record before us, we see no error in the district court's finding that the

domain names identified in its preliminary injunction were identical or confusingly

similar to plaintiffs' marks.

Purdy contends that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs were

likely to establish that he had registered and used the domain names with a bad

faith intent to profit. He argues that he used the domain names only to spread his

message so he could not have had the requisite bad faith intent to profit. Plaintiffs

argue that Purdy's conduct has met most of the statutory tests for bad faith intent,

including those which include a profit element, and that the district court's finding

is not erroneous. We review for clear error a district court's factual finding of bad

faith intent to profit under the ACPA. See Northern Lights, 236 F.3d at 64.

Cf. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. Williams, 88 F.3d 614, 616 (8th

Cir. 1996) (finding of bad faith is reviewed for clear error); Sweetarts v. Sunline,

Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 1967) (finding as to bad faith in trademark

infringement action is reviewed for clear error).

Appellate Case: 03-1795 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/01/2004 Entry ID: 1806000 
-15-

Our analysis begins with the statute itself, which provides nine nonexclusive

factors for courts to consider in determining whether a person has acted with bad

faith intent: 

(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if

any, in the domain name; 

(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of

the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that

person; 

(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection

with the bona fide offering of any goods or services; 

(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a

site accessible under the domain name; 

(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's

online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could

harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial

gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a

likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or

endorsement of the site;

(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain

name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without

having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona

fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct

indicating a pattern of such conduct; 

(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact

information when applying for the registration of the domain name,

the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact

information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such

conduct; 

(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain

names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to

marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such

domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous

at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the

goods or services of the parties; and 

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-16-

(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain

name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the

meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). The first four factors have been seen as reasons why

a defendant might in good faith have registered a domain name incorporating

someone else's mark, and the other five are indicia of bad faith intent. See Lucas

Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809-10 (6th Cir. 2004). 

The first four statutory factors do not appear to weigh against a finding that

Purdy had a bad faith intent. He has no legal rights in any of the marks that his

domain names incorporate. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). He is not known

by any of the names, and he has never previously used any of them in the offering

of goods or services. See id. at (II)-(III). While the evidence suggests that Purdy

has made some noncommercial or fair use of the plaintiffs' marks in critical

commentary sites accessible under the domain names, prior to the filing of this

lawsuit he principally attached the names to antiabortion websites that made no

mention of plaintiffs whatsoever. See id. at (IV). These websites can not be

considered to be completely noncommercial since they directly solicited monetary

contributions and offered various antiabortion merchandise for sale. See id. Even

after Purdy attached the domain names to his own critical commentary sites, he

continued to provide links to sites that solicit funds for the antiabortion movement

and sell merchandise. Such use of the domain names would apparently profit the

organizations of Purdy's choice, and nothing in the ACPA suggests that Congress

intended to allow cybersquatters to escape the reach of the act by channeling

profits to third parties. These factors support the district court's finding that

plaintiffs were likely to establish Purdy's bad faith intent to profit from the marks.

Many of the remaining statutory bad faith factors also weigh in favor of the

district court's finding that plaintiffs would likely prove that Purdy acted with a bad

faith intent to profit. The record contains evidence that Purdy registered multiple

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6

Plaintiffs have not argued on appeal that factor VII weighs against Purdy,

and we see nothing in the record to establish that he provided misleading or false

-17-

domain names knowing that they were identical or confusingly similar to plaintiffs'

indisputably famous and distinctive marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)

(VIII) & (IX). It appears that he registered many of these domain names not

because of stands the plaintiffs had taken on abortion, but rather to divert Internet

users to websites that could tarnish and disparage their marks by creating initial

confusion as to the sponsorship of the attached websites and implying that their

owners have taken positions on a hotly contested issue. See id. at (V).

Furthermore, the record shows that just days after Purdy began registering

and using the domain names at issue in this case, he apparently offered to stop

using the Washington Post domain names in exchange for space on the editorial

page in that newspaper. A proposal to exchange domain names for valuable

consideration is not insignificant in respect to the issue of bad faith intent to profit.

See id. at (VI); Lucas Nursery, 359 F.3d at 810 (principal harm targeted by ACPA

is practice of registering domain names and offering them to the legitimate owners

of the marks in exchange for consideration). Although nothing in the record places

a monetary value on access to space in a leading national newspaper like the

Washington Post, that value could be significant to an advocate. Profit includes an

attempt to procure an "advantageous gain or return." See American Heritage

College Dictionary 1092 (3d ed. 1993). See also PETA, 263 F.3d at 368

(defendant's suggestion that mark owner "make him a [settlement] offer" satisfied

the intent to profit requirement). The statutory factors are nonexclusive, and other

conduct of Purdy, such as trying to force a settlement of this action by threatening

to publish private emails of WPNI employees received at wpni.org, is also

suggestive of bad faith. 

At this stage it appears that at least eight of the nine statutory factors weigh

in favor of the district court's finding that plaintiffs would likely establish that

Purdy acted with a bad faith intent to profit.6

 This distinguishes his case from

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contact information when registering a domain name or that he failed to maintain

accurate contact information. 

-18-

Lucas Nursery, 359 F.3d 806, and TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir.

2004), each of which involved a disgruntled customer of the plaintiff company

who had purchased a domain name identical to that company's mark in order to

establish a website critical of its business practices. Neither customer in those

cases had registered multiple infringing domain names or offered to transfer the

names in exchange for valuable consideration. Neither had linked the names to

websites about issues other than the company's business or to websites that

solicited donations or sold merchandise. Although the defendants in Lucas

Nursery and TMI registered domain names that were identical or confusingly

similar to the plaintiff marks, neither exhibited a bad faith intent to profit from

their marks. In contrast, the district court did not err here in finding it likely that

plaintiffs would prove that Purdy and his associates had registered and used

domain names with a bad faith intent to profit from their marks in violation of the

ACPA. 

Purdy argues that the First Amendment entitles him to use the domain names

at issue to attract Internet users to websites containing political expression and

criticism of the plaintiffs. There is no dispute here about whether the First

Amendment protects Purdy's right to use the Internet to protest abortion and

criticize the plaintiffs or to use expressive domain names that are unlikely to cause

confusion. Cf. Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003)

(taubmansucks.com permissible because it removes any confusion as to source);

Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585-86 (2d Cir. 2000)

(domain names which themselves express a message might be protected). The

question raised in this case is whether the First Amendment protects a misleading

use of plaintiffs' marks in domain names to attract an unwitting and possibly

unwilling audience to Purdy's message. Use of a famous mark in this way could be

seen as the information superhighway equivalent of posting a large sign bearing a

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-19-

McDonald's logo before a freeway exit for the purpose of diverting unwitting

travelers to the site of an antiabortion rally. 

The use of trademarks has not been protected where it is likely to create

confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the speech or goods in question. In

San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541

(1987), for example, the Supreme Court held that organizers of the Gay Olympic

Games had no First Amendment right to use and appropriate the value of the

Olympics mark in spite of their having an expressive purpose. See also AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) ("A parody

creating a likelihood of confusion may be subject to a trademark infringement

action."); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)

(upholding injunction against sale of antiwar merchandise bearing words and

symbols likely to cause confusion with plaintiff's marks). The First Amendment

has also been held not to protect the use of a trademark in a domain name that

creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the attached

website. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at

*10-11 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1997) (First Amendment does not prevent injunctive

relief against use of plannedparenthood.com, a nonexpressive source identifier),

summarily aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished). Just because an

opponent of the war in Iraq might assert an expressive purpose in creating a

website with the name lockheedmartincorp.com, for example, the First

Amendment would not grant him the right to use a domain name confusingly

similar to Lockheed's mark. While Purdy has the right to express his message over

the Internet, he has not shown that the First Amendment protects his appropriation

of plaintiffs' marks in order to spread his protest message by confusing Internet

users into thinking that they are entering one of the plaintiffs' websites. See 4

McCarthy § 25:76. 

Purdy argues that his belief that his conduct was protected by the First

Amendment brings him within the ACPA "safe harbor" provision. Under that

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7

After the injunctions were issued in this case, Purdy registered and linked to

antiabortion websites multiple names related to Faegre & Benson (local counsel to

plaintiffs) and to the Minneapolis Star Tribune newspaper. These included faegrebenson.com, faegre-benson.org, faegre.biz, startribune-faegre-bensonlawfirm.com,

startribune-faegre.com, faegrebensonlawfirm.com, startribunenewspaper.com

startribunes.com, startribunesays.com, and startribuneknows.com. See Faegre &

Benson LLP v. Purdy, 2004 WL 167570 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (Davis, J.)

(ordering transfer of the Faegre domain names); McClatchy Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.

Please DON'T Kill Your Baby a/k/a William & Mark Purdy II, William S. Purdy,

FA0304000153541 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 28, 2003) (ordering transfer of Star

Tribune domain names). 

-20-

provision "[b]ad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case in which the court

determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the

use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful." 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). As plaintiffs point out, the record here contains considerable

evidence that Purdy lacked reasonable grounds to believe that his continued use of

the domain names in question was lawful. He continued to register and use

domain names in the face of repeated complaints and warnings from the plaintiffs

that such conduct was unlawful and even after the district court issued preliminary

injunctive relief. Moreover, Purdy had also been enjoined in a prior Internet case

where he had used the domain name bnsf.org to criticize his former employer, the

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, and to publish employee social security

numbers and salary information mistakenly emailed to bnsf.org. That injunction

was affirmed despite Purdy's claim that his actions were protected by the First

Amendment, and that appellate decision was filed before Purdy engaged in the

conduct at issue in this case. See Purdy v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 21

Fed.Appx. 518 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished).7

 Given the extensive

evidence of bad faith in the record, we conclude that Purdy lacked reasonable

grounds to believe that his conduct was lawful, and he is not entitled to benefit

from the safe harbor provision. See PETA, 263 F.3d at 369 (citing Virtual Works,

238 F.3d at 270) (a defendant "who acts even partially in bad faith in registering a

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-21-

domain name is not, as a matter of law, entitled to benefit from [the ACPA's] safe

harbor provision.")).

In sum, the record supports the district court's findings that Purdy registered

and used domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to plaintiffs' marks

with a bad faith intent to profit as defined by the ACPA. This conduct was not

protected by the First Amendment, and Purdy is not entitled to the benefit of the

safe harbor provision. The district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiffs

have demonstrated a strong probability of success on the merits of their ACPA

claim. See Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114.

Purdy also contends that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs

would be irreparably harmed by his conduct in the absence of a preliminary

injunction. Id. The district court found that Purdy's domain names were likely to

confuse the public as to the source and sponsorship of the attached websites and to

divert Internet users from their intended online destinations. The record supports

these findings. After this litigation began Purdy attached many of his domain

names to websites which contain multiple references to plaintiffs' names and

marks. As a result, an Internet search for a plaintiff's name would be likely to turn

up one or more of Purdy's domains. An unwary Internet user might anticipate that

the attached website would be sponsored by that plaintiff because of the similarity

of the domain name to the plaintiff's mark. The record also contains evidence of

actual confusion among Internet users. A showing that confusion is likely supports

a strong presumption of irreparable harm. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v.

Lenox Laboratories, Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1987). The district court did

not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed by Purdy's

continued registration and use of the domain names to display pictures of

dismembered aborted fetuses and by the links to fundraising appeals that did not

originate from the plaintiffs. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir.

2001) (affirming finding of irreparable harm from confusingly similar domain

names). Cf. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1335 (8th Cir.

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-22-

1997) ("An infringing mark, by its nature, detracts from the value of the mark with

which it is confused.").

The district court also found that the potential harm to the plaintiffs in the

absence of injunctive relief outweighed any harm to Purdy that might result from

its grant. See Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114. Purdy argues that the injunctions

stripped him of First Amendment rights and that the balance of harms therefore

tilts in his favor. As already discussed, Purdy has no First Amendment right to

appropriate plaintiffs' marks in confusing domain names. Purdy retains multiple

lawful avenues of expression, however, including publication of his ideas over the

Internet using nonconfusing domain names. Failure to protect plaintiffs' trademark

rights would "diminish [those] rights without significantly enhancing the asserted

right of free speech." Novak, 836 F.2d at 402. See also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.

Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989)

("[T]rademark protection is not lost simply because the allegedly infringing use is

in connection with a work of artistic expression."). The district court did not err in

determining that the balance of harms tilts in favor of the plaintiffs.

Finally, the district court found that the injunction was in the public interest

because Purdy's domain names were likely to confuse and divert Internet users

from their intended online destinations and to damage plaintiffs' good names and

goodwill. While the public interest is not ordinarily implicated by concerns related

to business reputation, Medicine Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. S.B.S. Pill Dr., Inc., 336 F.3d

801, 805 (8th Cir. 2003), here Purdy registered multiple domain names that are

identical or confusingly similar to marks belonging to the plaintiffs, at a time when

consumers increasingly turn to the Internet for information about companies with

which they do business. See S. Rep. No. 106-40, at *5. The danger of consumer

deception warrants some regulation of trademark usage, see Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d

at 494, and the public interest in free expression is adequately protected by leaving

open ample alternative avenues of communication. See Novak, 775 F.2d at 249.

As a leading treatise on trademark law explains, "[t]he right to disseminate

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8

Purdy also charges that the injunctions violate his rights under the Fifth

Amendment, but he does not state any basis for the claim. It does not appear that

he has property rights in the domain names since they are identical or confusingly

similar to plaintiffs' protected marks, nor has he shown that he did not receive due

process.

-23-

criticism on the Internet cannot trump the public's right not to be deceived by a

confusingly similar domain name." 4 McCarthy § 25:76. The district court did not

err in finding that the public interest is served by the preliminary injunctions in this

case.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing

preliminary injunctive relief in this case. Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood

of success on the merits of their ACPA claim. See Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114.

There is no error in the district court's determinations that plaintiffs would be

irreparably harmed in the absence of a preliminary injunction, that this harm

outweighs any potential harm to Purdy, and that the public interest supports an

injunction. See id.

B.

Purdy raises several arguments about the scope and language of the first

preliminary injunction as amended on September 5, 2002 and the second

preliminary injunction issued on October 1, 2002 (dealing with wpni.org). He

argues that the orders amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint on his speech

and that they are vague and overbroad.8

 Although a court may exercise its

discretion in fashioning injunctive relief, that discretion is not unlimited. See

EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 557 (8th Cir. 1998). Provisions of an

injunction may be set aside if they are broader than necessary to remedy the

underlying wrong. Id. An injunction must provide a person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what is prohibited. Schenck v.

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-24-

Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (citing Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).

Purdy's prior restraint argument warrants little discussion. As discussed

above, the First Amendment does not protect the deceptive use of domain names

that are identical or confusingly similar to another's trademarks, and Purdy's

conduct was shown to have likely violated the ACPA. There are many examples

where courts have enjoined the use of names that are confusingly similar to

protected trademarks. See, e.g., Novak, 775 F.2d at 249 (enjoining sale of

"Mutants of Omaha" antiwar merchandise that was likely to be confused with

Mutual of Omaha insurance). Injunctions of unlawful conduct that is not

constitutionally protected are not unconstitutional prior restraints. Cf. A&M

Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (First

Amendment does not prevent injunction against unlawful use of copyrighted

material); Dr. Seuss Enters., Inc. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,

1403 n.11 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that injunction would constitute a prior

restraint in violation of the First Amendment).

Purdy also complains that the court's requirement that his domain names put

an unwary Internet user on notice of the "protest or critical commentary nature of

the attached website" limits his universe of permissible domain names to those

expressing a protest or critical message. He claims this is a content based

restriction on his speech in violation of the First Amendment, but the injunctions

do not restrict expressive content. Rather, they simply require that Purdy not use a

domain name that is confusingly similar to plaintiffs' marks. Use of a trademark in

a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the

expression is not protected conduct. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S.

at 541 (no First Amendment right to use Olympic marks to promote Gay Olympic

Games); Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d at 776 (no First Amendment right to use beer

manufacturer's marks in parody that was likely to cause confusion); Novak, 836

F.2d at 402 (enjoining sale of "Mutants of Omaha" antiwar merchandise). Purdy

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-25-

has not shown that the preliminary injunction in this case actually restricts his

ability to express himself through domain names in nonconfusing ways. 

The district court enjoined Purdy's registration and use of domain names that

both (1) incorporate and are identical or confusingly similar to plaintiffs' marks,

and (2) do not alert the unwary Internet user to the protest or critical commentary

nature of the attached website within the language of the domain name itself. A

domain name would violate the district court orders only if were confusing and if it

failed to put Internet users on notice of the protest or critical commentary nature of

the attached website. Thus, Purdy could register and use domain names

incorporating plaintiffs' marks, such as PurdySupportsPepsi.com or

PurdysCokeSite.com, to publish complimentary or critical commentary because

neither name is identical or confusingly similar to any of plaintiffs' marks. See

Taubman, 319 F.3d at 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (taubmansucks.com permissible because

it removes any confusion as to source). Because the district court's orders restrict

only Purdy's ability to attract visitors with domain names that infringe plaintiffs'

rights in their marks, they do not impermissibly regulate the expressive content of

his domain names or websites in a way that would violate the First Amendment.

Purdy also argues that the preliminary injunctions are impermissibly vague

and overbroad. As noted above, the court preliminary enjoined Purdy's registration

and use of any domain name that incorporates and is identical or confusingly

similar to plaintiffs' marks and does not "alert the unwary Internet user to the

protest or critical commentary nature of the attached website within the language

of the domain name itself." He claims that the terms "unwary Internet user," "use,"

and "protest or critical nature" are so ambiguous as to make it impossible to know

what conduct is permissible and what is impermissible.

When the injunctions are read as a whole, however, we believe that a person

of ordinary intelligence could reasonably know what is prohibited, Schenck, 519

U.S. 357, 383 (1997), and there is nothing in the orders that a good faith reading

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9

Purdy complains that the district court has denied his requests for

clarification of its injunctions, but we note that it has repeatedly clarified the

coverage of its orders through amendments, the contempt proceedings, and status

conferences. It has also given Purdy many months to bring himself into

compliance.

-26-

would not make clear. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Council Bluffs v. First

Fed. Sav. & Loan of Lincoln, 929 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1991). Moreover, in

light of Purdy's deliberate and continuing unlawful appropriation of plaintiffs'

marks, it was not inappropriate for the district court to enjoin his further

registration and use of domain names that the unwary Internet user would find

identical or confusingly similar to those marks. Cf. Tonka Corp. v. Tonk-A-Phone,

Inc., 805 F.2d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1986) (injunction that broadly enjoined use of

Tonka name was necessary to prevent continued infringement of that mark). We

note that Purdy is free to request clarifications and adjustments to the scope of the

district court's orders to address any genuine ambiguity or overbreadth that may

come to light as this litigation proceeds.9

 On the current record we conclude that

the court's orders are neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad, and they do not

infringe Purdy's constitutional rights. 

C.

Purdy also attempts to appeal the district court's January 2003 contempt

order and its March 2003 supplemental order and sanctions. He argues that we

have jurisdiction to consider these orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but that statute

provides appellate jurisdiction over "all final decisions of the district courts of the

United States." The imposition of sanctions for civil contempt during the course of

a pending action is an appealable final order only if the person held in contempt is

not a party to the pending action. SEC v. Naftalin, 460 F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir.

1972) (citing 9 Moore's Federal Practice, § 110.13(4)). Because Purdy is a party to

a still pending action, the district court's contempt order and sanctions are

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-27-

nonappealable interlocutory orders. See id. See also Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S.

105, 107-09 (1936); In re Shalala, 996 F.2d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 1993); Omaha

Indem. Co. v. Wining, 949 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1991). Purdy must await a final

judgment to appeal the contempt order and sanctions. 

IV.

Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the district court granting preliminary

injunctive relief, dismiss the appeals of the contempt order and sanctions for lack

of jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings.

______________________________

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