Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01063/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01063-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vonetta LaBelle Benoit
Plaintiff
PNC Bank
Defendant
Quality Loan Service Corp.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VONETTA LaBELLE BENOIT,

Plaintiff,

v.

PNC BANK; QUALITY LOAN SERVICE 

CORP.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-1063 MCE DB PS

ORDER

Plaintiff Vonetta LaBelle Benoit is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was 

referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff’s amended 

complaint, and defendant PNC Bank’s motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 2, 8, 12.) For the reasons 

explained below, plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, plaintiff is granted leave to file a 

second amended complaint, and defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice as 

premature. 

I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 

pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 

complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 

1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 

Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 

IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 

or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 

District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 

whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 

the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 

Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 

poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 

arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 

complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 

true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 

Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 

(9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

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The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a 

short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 

jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to contain a short and plain statement of a claim

showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. In this regard, in the amended complaint plaintiff 

alleges:

The claim I am making is that I was denied assistance for reasons I 

was never made aware were stipulations to receiving assistance. I 

have been approved in the past for a loan modification in the past and 

upon accepting the offer for assistance I was never informed that if I 

accepted the help there is a timeframe in which I cannot request 

assistance again or I would not qualify and be denied, neither was 

there any disclaimer that states there is a maximum dollar amount 

that I cannot exceed being delinquent on my payments to receive 

assistance. 

(Am. Compl. (ECF No. 8) at 6.

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) The amended complaint goes on to allege that defendant sent 

plaintiff “a hardship application package,” which plaintiff completed. (Id.) Plaintiff later learned 

the “application package was not being reviewed,” which plaintiff believes “was unfair and 

deceptive[.]” (Id.)

It appears from the vague and conclusory allegations of the amended complaint that 

plaintiff is displeased with defendant’s failure to review plaintiff’s hardship application, possibly

because plaintiff had previously been granted a loan medication. However, the amended 

complaint fails to identify a claim, state the elements of that claim, or allege factual allegations is 

support of the claim. 

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a 

complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and must allege facts that 

state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. 

 

1 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers ‘labels 

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.’ Nor 

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancements.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,

557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which the 

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. 

It appears plaintiff may be attempting to allege a claim for wrongful foreclosure. 

The basic elements of a tort cause of action for wrongful foreclosure 

track the elements of an equitable cause of action to set aside a 

foreclosure sale. They are: “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an 

illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property 

pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the 

party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or 

mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the 

trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor 

tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused 

from tendering.” 

Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 625, 636 (2015) (quoting Lona v. 

Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104 (2011)).

Plaintiff is also advised that California Civil Code § 2924.18 provides, in relevant part:

(a)(1) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien 

loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage 

servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default, notice of sale, 

or conduct a trustee’s sale while the complete first lien loan 

modification is pending, and until the borrower has been provided 

with a written determination by the mortgage servicer regarding the 

borrower’s eligibility for the requested loan modification.

And California Civil Code § 2924.6(c)-(h) provides:

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan 

modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage 

servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default, notice of sale, 

or conduct a trustee’s sale while the complete first lien loan 

modification is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, 

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default 

or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until any of the following 

occurs:

////

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(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the 

borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any 

appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan 

modification within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification, but 

defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower’s obligations under, 

the first lien loan modification.

(d) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is 

denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from the date of the 

written denial to appeal the denial and to provide evidence that the 

mortgage servicer’s determination was in error.

(e) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is 

denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or, if a notice of 

default has already been recorded, record a notice of sale or conduct 

a trustee’s sale until the later of:

(1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of the 

denial.

(2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision (d), the 

later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days after a first 

lien loan modification is offered after appeal but declined by the 

borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is offered and accepted 

after appeal, the date on which the borrower fails to timely submit 

the first payment or otherwise breaches the terms of the offer.

(f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification application, 

the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the borrower 

identifying the reasons for denial, including the following:

(1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the 

borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien loan 

modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the denial.

(2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific 

reasons for the investor disallowance.

...

(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple 

applications for first lien loan modification for the purpose of delay, 

the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate applications 

from borrowers who have already been evaluated or afforded a fair 

opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan modification prior to 

January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated or afforded a fair 

opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the requirements of this 

section, unless there has been a material change in the borrower’s 

financial circumstances since the date of the borrower’s previous 

application and that change is documented by the borrower and 

submitted to the mortgage servicer.

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(h) For the purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed 

“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with 

all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the 

reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

III. Leave to Amend

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed. The 

undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff may further amend the complaint to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include 

undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan 

Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath 

Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall 

be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). 

However, when evaluating the failure to state a claim, the complaint of a pro se plaintiff 

may be dismissed “only where ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 

1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972)); see also Weilburg v. 

Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to 

amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 

cured by amendment.”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 

1988)).

Here, given the vague and conclusory nature of the amended complaint’s allegations, the 

undersigned cannot yet say that it appears beyond doubt that further leave to amend would be 

futile. Plaintiff’s amended complaint will therefore be dismissed, and plaintiff will be granted 

leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if plaintiff elects 

to file a second amended complaint “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they 

must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Those facts must be sufficient to push the 

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claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557).

Plaintiff is also reminded that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make an 

amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that any amended complaint be complete 

in itself without reference to prior pleadings. The second amended complaint will supersede the 

amended complaint just as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint. See Loux 

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, in a second amended complaint, just as if it were 

the initial complaint filed in the case, each defendant must be listed in the caption and identified 

in the body of the complaint, and each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. Any amended complaint which plaintiff may elect to file must also include 

concise but complete factual allegations describing the conduct and events which underlie 

plaintiff’s claims.

IV. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

As noted above, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on July 31, 2019. (ECF No. 12.) 

However, the court had not yet screened plaintiff’s amended complaint as required. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Above, the undersigned has found that the amended complaint is deficient, must be dismissed, 

and will grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. Because plaintiff’s amended 

complaint will be dismissed and the court must screen plaintiff’s second amended complaint

defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint will be denied without prejudice to renewal 

as premature.

If plaintiff elects to file a second amended complaint the court will have to again screen 

that complaint unless plaintiff pays the applicable filing fee. If, as to defendant PNC Bank, the 

undersigned finds that the second amended complaint is not frivolous or malicious, states a claim 

on which relief may be granted, and does not seek monetary relief against an immune defendant, 

the undersigned will grant plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and order 

defendant PNC Bank to file a responsive pleading. 

////

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The amended complaint filed July 9, 2019 (ECF No. 8) is dismissed with leave to 

amend.2

2. Within twenty-eight days from the date of this order, a second amended complaint 

shall be filed that cures the defects noted in this order and complies with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice.3 The second amended complaint must bear the 

case number assigned to this action and must be titled “Second Amended Complaint.”

3. Failure to comply with this order in a timely manner may result in a recommendation 

that this action be dismissed.

4. Defendant’s July 31, 2019 motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 9 & 12) is denied without 

prejudice as premature. 

Dated: February 7, 2020

DLB:6

DB/orders/orders.pro se/benoit1063.dism.lta.ord

 

2

 Plaintiff need not file another application to proceed in forma pauperis at this time unless 

plaintiff’s financial condition has improved since the last such application was submitted.

3

 Alternatively, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action plaintiff may file a notice of 

voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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