Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00239/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00239-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Ralph Zavala
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

LAURA JEAN BERGER

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

RALPH ZAVALA,

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00239-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS 

CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME; AND 

ORDER

DATE: January 27, 2021

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on January 27, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further 

notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18 

U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s 

judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after 

May 2, 2021.

1

 This and previous General Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial emergency,

were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). The Government’s position is that although the Speedy Trial Act does not 

directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this 

Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United 

States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the 

trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 

(citing Furlow to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant 

public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7).

2

 

If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in 

time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 27, 2021.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until March 

10, 2021, and to exclude time between January 27, 2021, and March 10, 2021, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports and extensive audio footage. All of this discovery has been either 

produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to further review discovery, discuss 

potential resolution with her client and the government, and investigate possible defenses and 

prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 27, 2021 to March 10, 

2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it 

results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties’ request on the basis of the Court’s 

finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

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public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 15, 2021 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ LAURA JEAN BERGER

LAURA JEAN BERGER

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: January 15, 2021 /s/ MEGHAN MCLOUGHLIN

MEGHAN MCLOUGHLIN

Counsel for Defendant 

RALPH ZAVALA

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the status conference is continued from January 27, 2021, to March 10, 

2021, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 18 

U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2021 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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