Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-19-04233/USCOURTS-ca4-19-04233-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christy Santiago
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4233

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTY SANTIAGO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big 

Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00008-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: April 30, 2020 Decided: May 19, 2020

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas 

T. Cullen, United States Attorney, Laura Day Rottenborn, Assistant United States

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Christy Santiago of conspiracy to distribute suboxone to a 

federal inmate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018), and conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute suboxone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(E), 846 

(2018). The jury acquitted her of distributing suboxone to a federal inmate, making a false 

statement regarding the alleged suboxone distribution, and possession with intent to 

distribute and distribution of suboxone. She now appeals her 18-month sentence, an 

upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range established by the district court, 

arguing that the court violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by improperly 

sentencing her based on acquitted conduct. She also argues that her sentence is 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

We review a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In so doing, we examine the sentence for 

“significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 

the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2018)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. “A sentencing court’s 

explanation is sufficient if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular 

history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis 

of the statutory factors.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2017) 

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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If we find no procedural error, we also consider the substantive reasonableness of 

the sentence in view of the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When a 

district court departs from or imposes a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, we “must 

consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently 

compelling to support the degree of the variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 

(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven though we might reasonably 

conclude that a different sentence is appropriate, that conclusion, standing alone, is an 

insufficient basis to vacate the district court’s chosen sentence.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). 

Santiago first argues that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to 

trial by jury by sentencing her based on acquitted conduct. The record does not support 

Santiago’s contention. Rather, the record shows that the district court varied upward based 

on its consideration of various § 3553(a) factors related to Santiago’s crimes of conviction, 

such as her extended relationships with numerous federal and state inmates and the fact 

that she was involved with introducing drugs into a maximum-security facility, where the 

risk of harm is greater than a lower-security facility. None of these considerations by the 

district court leads us to conclude that the district court sentenced her based on acquitted 

conduct or violated her Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.

1

1 Moreover, a district court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been 

acquitted if the conduct has nonetheless been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). 

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Next, Santiago’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district 

court opined that the Guidelines range did not adequately reflect the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors in light of the seriousness of providing drugs to federal inmates, the 

extensive ties between Santiago and federal inmates at a maximum-security facility over a 

period of time, and the need for just punishment and deterrence. In so doing, the district 

court provided an individualized assessment of the facts before it and determined that an 

upward variance was appropriate based on those facts.

2

 We conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in imposing the variant sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

2 To the extent the district court articulated that Santiago was convicted of 

distributing drugs to a federal inmate, rather than conspiracy to do so, the inartful phrasing 

of a single sentence does not negate the entirety of the district court’s explanation. 

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