Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02710/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02710-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio Diaz-Jimenez
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO RP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Antonio Diaz-Jimenez, 

Defendant/Movant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-2710-PHX-JAT (JRI)

No. CR 07-978-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Movant Antonio Diaz-Jimenez, who is confined in the Federal Correctional Institution

(FCI II Medium)-Victorville in Adelanto, California, filed a pro se “Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody” (Doc. #1

in CV 09-2710-PHX-JAT (JRI) and Doc. #41 in CR 07-978-PHX-JAT). The Court will

summarily dismiss the motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Illegal Reenty After Deportation,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with sentencing enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2). On December 17, 2007, the Court sentenced Movant to a 63-month term of

imprisonment followed by three years on supervised release.

Movant alleges two grounds in his § 2255 motion:

(1) “‘Ineffective Assista[n]ce of C[]ounsel’ Sixth Amendment Const.

Violation by Ms. Milagros A. Cisneros during plea negotiations and at critical

stage at sentencing”; and

Case 2:09-cv-02710-JAT--JRI Document 4 Filed 03/23/10 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

(2) “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel U.S. Fed. Const. Violation [] under

the Sixth Amendment. C[o]unsel Ms. Cisneros did not possess[] an

understanding of the law in relating to facts ‘last physical removals’ for

enhanced and the advice give[n] to his client [he Movant] was the wrong

application of law.”

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

Case 2:09-cv-02710-JAT--JRI Document 4 Filed 03/23/10 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which defendant could assert to

the information or indictment, or to the court’s entry of

judgment against defendant and imposition of sentence upon the

defendant, provided that the sentence is consistent with this

agreement. The defendant further waives: (1) any right to

appeal the Court’s entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any

right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals);

and (3) any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction

and sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section

2255, or any other collateral attack. The defendant

acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the dismissal of

Case 2:09-cv-02710-JAT--JRI Document 4 Filed 03/23/10 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

any appeal or collateral attack defendant might file

challenging his conviction or sentence in this case.

(Doc. #22 in CR 07-978-PHX-JAT) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea

agreement that he had discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and

conditions, and entered into the plea voluntarily. (Doc. #22 in CR 07-978-PHX-JAT).

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion do not pertain to the voluntariness of the

waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of sentence and expressly

waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily made.

Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing issues raised in his § 2255

motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the “Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside Or

Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody” (Doc. #1 in CV 09-2710-PHX-JAT (JRI)

and Doc. #41 in CR 07-978-PHX-JAT) is denied and that the civil action opened in

connection with this motion (CV 09-2710-PHX-JAT (JRI)) is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 22nd day of March, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-02710-JAT--JRI Document 4 Filed 03/23/10 Page 4 of 4