Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03722/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03722-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fred Chambers
Appellant
Greg T. Robinson
Appellant
Jeffrey W. Robinson
Appellant
Tommy F. Robinson
Appellant
Terra International
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3722

___________

Terra International, Inc., *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Tommy F. Robinson, Individually and * Appeal from the United States

as partners of Ag Pro Farm Partnership; * District Court for the 

Jeffrey W. Robinson, Individually and * Eastern District of Arkansas.

as partners of Ag Pro Farm *

Partnership; Greg T. Robinson; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Fred Chambers, Individually and as *

partners of Ag Pro Farm Partnership, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2004

Filed: November 1, 2004

___________

Before RILEY, HEANEY, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Tommy F. Robinson and his co-defendants (collectively, “Appellants”) seek

review of two orders issued by the District Court in this suit to collect payment under

a defaulted promissory note. We affirm both decisions.

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The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Appellants first claim the District Court1

 erred by failing to recuse from

Robinson’s case. We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s denial of a

motion to recuse. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 2002). A judge must

recuse himself, regardless of any actual bias or prejudice, if the judge’s impartiality

might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000); Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Moran, 296 F.3d at 649. However, neither a judge’s

unfavorable rulings nor his opinions held as a result of earlier proceedings necessarily

infer bias unless they are “so extreme as to display a clear inability to render fair

judgment.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551; see also Moran, 296 F.3d at 649.

Because Appellants’ allegations of Robinson’s history of directing improper

statements toward the District Court were not included in Robinson’s motion, they

are not properly before this Court on review. The sole basis proffered for recusal in

Robinson’s motion was that the District Court had sent Robinson to jail for contempt

of court in a previous matter. This bare allegation, without any indication of the

District Court’s inability to render fair judgment, forms no basis on which one might

reasonably question the District Court’s impartiality. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548,

551; see also Moran, 296 F.3d at 649. The District Court therefore did not abuse its

discretion by denying Robinson’s motion to recuse. Moreover, even if we were to

review the improper and offensive statements directed by Robinson toward the

District Court some years before the present lawsuit was brought, we would reach the

same conclusion.

Appellants next claim the District Court erred by denying their motion for

relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We

review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Watkins v. Lundell,

169 F.3d 540, 543–44 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928 (1999); United

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States v. Denham, 817 F.2d 1307, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987). Rule 60(b) provides for

relief from judgment in any of several enumerated circumstances and for “any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Such relief, however, is an “extraordinary remedy” that is only justified by

“exceptional circumstances.” Watkins, 169 F.3d at 544. Further, Rule 60(b) is “not

a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits.” Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987,

990 (8th Cir. 1999).

The basis for Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion was “discontent[] with their

representation” due to “several pleadings and motions . . . that did not fully and

completely express [Appellants’] reasons and responses.” Motion for Relief from

Judgment or Order Pursuant to Rule 60 at 1 (emphasis added). In Broadway v.

Norris, however, we held that a Rule 60(b) motion is not for the purpose of

“reargu[ing], somewhat more fully, the merits of [a] claim.” 193 F.3d at 990

(emphasis added). We therefore cannot say the District Court abused its discretion

by denying Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion. The judgment of the District Court is

affirmed.

______________________________

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