Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01200/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01200-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ManorCare of Kingston PA, LLC
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2015 Decided May 20, 2016

No. 14-1166

MANORCARE OF KINGSTON PA, LLC, 

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 14-1200

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for 

Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations 

Board

Charles P. Roberts, III argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Clifford H. Nelson, Jr.

Kellie Isbell, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were 

Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, 

Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate 

General Counsel, Usha Dheenan, Supervisor Attorney, and 

Gregoire Sauter, Attorney.

USCA Case #14-1200 Document #1614284 Filed: 05/20/2016 Page 1 of 22
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Before: BROWN AND SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion filed for the Court by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Employees of ManorCare of 

Kingston (ManorCare), a skilled-nursing facility in Kingston, 

Pennsylvania, selected the Laborers International Union of 

North America, Local 1310 as their collective-bargaining 

representative. Because ManorCare alleges third-party 

misconduct disrupted the election, it challenges the National 

Labor Relations Board’s order requiring it to bargain with the 

union. On the basis of the Board’s own precedent, we 

determine the third-party conduct here was sufficiently 

disruptive to undermine the conditions necessary for a free 

and fair election. We grant ManorCare’s petition in part and 

grant the Board’s cross-application in all other respects.

I

In the summer of 2013, the Laborers International Union 

of North America began to organize the employees 

of ManorCare’s Kingston facility. By August 1, 2013, 

ManorCare and the union had reached a stipulated agreement 

to conduct an election limited to a unit of certified nurses’ 

aides. The Board scheduled an election at ManorCare for 

September 6, 2013. The union eked out a narrow victory—

thirty-four in favor and thirty-two against.

ManorCare objected to the election results a week later, 

claiming several employees eligible to vote in the election 

threatened to physically harm other employees and harm their

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property—a circumstance the company alleges destroyed the 

“laboratory conditions” necessary for a fair and free 

election. After an initial investigation, the Board’s regional 

director ordered a hearing on the objections.

Most relevant here, ManorCare called two witnesses at 

the hearing, Harriet Robinson and Amy Kovac, to testify 

about alleged threats made by two other employees, Lucy 

Keating and Juanita Davis.

The Keating Threat. Robinson, a ManorCare nurse, testified 

that shortly after the election petition was filed, she was on a 

smoke break with Keating, another ManorCare nurse, when 

Keating said “if the Union didn’t get in ... if we started 

bitching[,] that she was going to start punching people in the 

face.” JA 599. At the time, Robinson was not afraid because 

she knew she could defend herself. But later, during the days 

and weeks immediately before the election, Robinson told 

other employees about what Keating had said. Three 

employees (Kim Lord, Keisha Keller, and Kovac) testified 

about what Robinson told them, which included Robinson’s 

statements that someone had made physical threats against 

employees who would not support the union. Keating also 

testified and denied making the alleged threatening 

statements.

The Davis Threat. Robinson also testified that on the day 

before the election, she and three other nurses, Kovac, Krista 

Renfer, and Davis, were walking together in the parking lot 

when Davis started yelling that “if the Union didn’t get in that 

she was going to start beating people up and destroying their 

cars.” JA 601. According to Robinson, Kovac replied to 

Davis that “she didn’t think she would beat her up, but if her 

car got damaged, she was coming after [Davis] for that.” Id. 

At the time, Robinson did not report the matter to her

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supervisor because she felt she could handle the situation 

herself but later thought better of it and reported the incident 

the following day.

Kovac told a similar story. Kovac testified that she, 

Robinson, and Renfer were standing in an employee smoking 

area when Davis “came out of work and says she was going to 

slash our tires if we voted no for the Union.” Id. Kovac 

initially thought Davis was joking but upon reflection she 

changed her mind.

Pam Brittain testified that on the morning of the election, 

Robinson was “very upset, very distraught,” and also 

“nervous” and “scared.” Id. When asked, Robinson 

explained that the previous night, Davis said “if somebody 

voted no, and they were upset because we were 

[understaffed], that she was going to go after that person, and 

beat them up and then go after their cars.” Id. Brittain 

insisted that Robinson report the incident. Together, they 

told Director Mark Fuhr, and separately Brittain 

related Robinson’s story to four other employees. Several 

of these employees corroborated Brittain’s 

recollection. ManorCare also presented several other 

managers and supervisors who testified they had heard about 

threats for not supporting the union made against employees 

and their property. For example, one manager testified that 

on the morning of the election she noticed “clusters” of 

voting-eligible employees standing around and “chitchatting” 

about their concern that their cars would be damaged if they 

voted against union representation. JA at 602.

Davis also testified and denied making threatening 

statements, although she acknowledged that she had said “if 

you voted no then you shouldn’t complain about, you know, 

whatever happens after that.” Id. When asked if she had

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threatened physical violence to any employees, Davis 

answered: “Physically hurt? Not really.” JA 603. It was also 

widely known that Davis had been in violent altercations in 

the past, and in fact, at the time, she had a hand injury from a 

knife fight.

A few weeks later, the hearing officer issued a written 

decision sustaining ManorCare’s objection. The hearing 

officer credited Robinson’s and Kovac’s testimony about the 

statements Davis made, and the hearing officer did not credit 

Davis’s denial of those statements, which she found “vague,” 

“inconsistent,” and “evasive.” JA 603. Plus, “Davis herself 

admitted that a few days after the incident, she told another 

employee that security had been provided in the parking lot 

because of her.” Id. As to the context surrounding the 

statements, the hearing officer did not credit Robinson’s 

testimony (which included Davis yelling the alleged threats), 

but instead credited the testimony of Kovac and Davis, who 

described the conversation as occurring in at least a somewhat 

joking manner.

Ultimately, the hearing officer concluded that “the 

statements by Davis and Keating were ‘so aggravated as to 

create a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal rendering a 

free election impossible.’” JA 604, (quoting Westwood 

Horizons Hotel, 270 NLRB 802, 803 (1984)). The threats 

“dealt with serious subjects—harm to person and property,” 

and although they reached a relatively small number of 

employees, the election was so close that “had just one voter” 

voted differently, “the [u]nion would not have prevailed in the 

election.” JA 604. Although the threats were initially stated 

in a casual manner, they were repeated to other employees out 

of context and prompted ManorCare to provide additional 

security for three days following the 

election. Id. Cumulatively, the hearing officer concluded that

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these circumstances required sustaining ManorCare’s 

objection to the election results.

The union appealed to the Board, raising several 

exceptions to the hearing officer’s findings. The union argued 

the hearing officer erred by crediting what it believed to be 

the conflicting testimony of both Robinson and Kovac and by 

determining that the threats so aggravated the election 

atmosphere as to render a free election impossible. The union 

also alleged that any dissemination occurred when 

ManorCare’s representatives restated the threatening 

statements.

The Board agreed with the union and rejected the hearing 

officer’s findings about the threatening statements. The 

Board emphasized the hearing officer’s conclusion that the 

threats were initially made in a casual or even light-hearted 

manner and stated that as a result, “neither [threatening 

statement] rose to the level of objectionable third-party 

threats.” Manorcare of Kingston PA, LLC, 360 NLRB No. 93 

(Apr. 24, 2014). The Board recited the test for threatening 

statements laid out in its Westwood Hotels decision, on which 

the hearing officer had also relied. But in doing so, the Board 

relied on additional factors: that the threats were made by 

third parties and circulated without their original 

context. Id. Rather than evaluate whether these 

circumstances could nevertheless create a threatening 

situation capable of influencing voting employees, the Board 

determined that a “game of telephone” should never be the 

basis for a sustained objection against a union 

election. Id. The Board relied on the vote tally without 

acknowledging the close decision in the election, and based 

on that tally certified the union as the exclusive collectivebargaining representative of ManorCare’s employees. Id.

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Following the Board’s decision, ManorCare refused to

recognize or bargain with the union. The union 

charged ManorCare with violating the National Labor 

Relations Act by unlawfully refusing to bargain. See 29

U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The Board agreed. Manorcare of

Kingston PA, LLC, 361 NLRB No. 17 (Aug. 11,

2014). ManorCare filed a petition in our court challenging 

the Board’s order, and the Board filed a cross-petition to 

enforce it. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).

II

We review the Board’s findings under a deferential 

standard, NLRB v. Downtown Bid Servs. Corp., 682 F.3d 109,

112-13 (D.C. Cir. 2012), but we will reverse the Board’s 

decision if it is not “reasonable and consistent with applicable 

precedent,” Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 451 F.3d

241, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Here, we apply our usual 

deferential standard, but find the Board’s decision to be 

irreconcilable with the Board’s own precedent. In that 

circumstance, we have no choice but to reverse.

The Board has drawn a firm line that an election cannot 

stand where the results do not reflect the employees’ free 

choice. General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124, 127 (1948). The 

Board has further determined that threats that create a 

“general atmosphere of fear and reprisal” render a free 

election impossible. Westwood Horizons Hotel, 270 NLRB

802, 803 (1984). Threats will interfere with a free election 

when they are “serious and likely to intimidate prospective 

voters to cast their ballots in a particular manner.” Id. The 

question here is whether the comments made by Davis and 

Keating and disseminated to other voting employees in a very 

close election crossed the line, becoming threats that made a 

free election impossible. We conclude that the Board abused

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its discretion here by finding that the threats did not create a

“general atmosphere of fear and reprisal” according to the 

Board’s own precedent. See id; see also Honeywell Int’l, Inc. 

v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding the 

Board’s cursory departure from precedent rendered its 

decision arbitrary and capricious).

Under the Board’s Westwood Hotel precedent (on which

it relied in issuing its decision here), there are six factors used 

to determine whether a threat is serious and likely to 

intimidate voters: “[1] the nature of the threat itself . . . [2] 

whether the threat encompassed the entire bargaining unit; [3] 

whether reports of the threat were disseminated widely within 

the unit; [4] whether the person making the threat was capable 

of carrying it out; . . . [5] whether it is likely that the 

employees acted in fear of his capability of carrying it out; 

and [6] whether the threat was ‘rejuvenated’ at or near the 

time of the election.” Westwood Hotel, 270 NLRB at

803. Here, the analysis of each of these six factors points to 

an election that fell short of the free and fair standard set out 

in the Board’s precedent.

Westwood Hotel begins by considering “the nature of the 

threat itself.” Id. Here, Keating and Davis each made 

statements that, on their face, threatened physical harm and 

property damage to non-supporters of 

unionization. “[P]unching people in the face,” JA

599, “beating people up and destroying their cars,” JA

601, and “slash[ing] [their] tires,” id., are serious threats, and 

if believed, these threats would be clearly capable of changing 

the behavior of other voting members of the bargaining 

unit. Indeed, some of the threatening statements in this case 

are identical to those in Westwood Hotel, where some 

employees threatened to “beat up” those who did not support 

the union. Westwood Hotel, 270 NLRB at 802. It is clear

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that, in its review of these facts, the Board misapplied its own 

precedent.

Next, Westwood Hotel asks “whether the threat 

encompassed the entire bargaining unit.” Id. Keating and 

Davis’s threats were indiscriminate in their focus, aimed not 

at any particular individual but instead at all of the voting 

employees “if the Union didn't get in.” JA 599, 601. Here 

again, the facts of this case line up with those of Westwood 

Hotel. In Westwood Hotel, two employees threatened to beat 

up any other employee in the unit who did not vote for the 

union. Id. That type of broadly aimed threat was sufficient to 

damage the free and fair election atmosphere and require a 

new election.

Relatedly, Westwood Hotel also considers whether the 

threats were “disseminated widely within the unit,” id., and

here they were. About eight or nine employees heard about 

Davis’s threatening statements, and around five employees 

heard Keating’s. And in an election as close as this one—

where only a single voter could have changed the outcome—

the requirement of “widespread dissemination” is satisfied at 

a relaxed threshold. Robert Orr-Sysco Food Servs., LLC, 338

NLRB 614, 615 (2002); Smithers Tire & Auto. Testing of 

Texas, Inc., 308 NLRB 72, 73 (1992). The Board insists that 

any comment relayed with less than stenographic accuracy 

cannot count as dissemination. But this view is inconsistent 

with the Board’s own precedent, see, e.g., Q.B. 

Rebuilders, Inc. 312 NLRB 1141, 1142 (1993) (any humor 

attached to initial remark was diluted over the course of its 

dissemination), and would preclude a finding of dissemination 

in most cases. Here, in reaching its conclusion, the Board did 

not follow its own precedent: the threatening statements were 

disseminated widely enough to have affected the outcome of 

the election.

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Looking to “whether the person making the threat was 

capable of carrying it out,” the facts of this case again satisfy 

the Westwood Hotel inquiry. The record gives no reason to 

doubt that both Keating and Davis, but particularly Davis, 

were capable of delivering on the threatening statements they 

made. Although Robinson did not credit Keating’s threat to 

“start punching people in the face” in the moment, largely 

because Keating is small and Robinson is tall, that does not 

mean Keating would have been unlikely to carry out her 

threat against others who also heard about the 

statement. Most people are physically capable of delivering a 

punch to another person’s face, and the record gives no 

indication why Keating would have been entirely incapable of 

making good on her threat. But even if Keating were not 

capable of “punching people in the face” in the way she 

suggested, it is clear that Davis was capable of making good 

on the threatening statements she communicated to other 

employees. It was widely known that Davis had been in 

fights in the past and, in fact, at the time of the election bore a 

hand injury resulting from a knife fight. Employees would

have had every reason to assume Davis could punch people 

and damage their cars if she chose.

Another Westwood Hotel factor is “whether it is likely 

that employees acted in fear of [the speaker’s] capability of 

carrying out the threat.” Westwood Hotel, 270 NLRB at

803. Although the statements from Davis and Keating were 

probably “not intended to induce fear to the audience who 

heard them . . . the remarks were repeated to employees who 

were not in a position to judge how the remarks were 

intended” and those employees “could not have known that 

Davis . . . would not have followed through on her 

threat.” JA 604. That employees experienced real fear is 

only confirmed by the fact that ManorCare hired parking lot

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security for three days following the election based on 

Davis’s threats to employees’ cars. Nefarious intentions or 

not, it is apparent from the evidence that employees were 

likely to have acted in fear of the threatening statements Davis 

made.

Lastly, “whether the threat was ‘rejuvenated’ at or near 

the time of the election,” Westwood Hotel, 270 NLRB at

803, has limited application here: there was no need for 

“rejuvenation” in this case because the threats occurred for 

the first time in close proximity to the election. Given that the 

threats were stated and disseminated close in time to the 

election, we find this factor satisfied as well.

Rather than analyze these factors as Westwood 

Hotel requires, the Board cursorily acknowledged its 

own precedent and then dismissed the effect of the 

threatening statements in a discussion too brief to demonstrate 

how the facts of this case align with the Board’s 

precedent. Such truncated analysis may often encourage 

reviewing courts like this one to affirm the Board’s decisions 

because the reasoning is so skeletal as to thwart assessment of 

its reasonableness. But this habit would shortchange the 

obligations of reviewing courts. It is the Board that must 

demonstrate its decisions are consistent with its precedent 

because, although our standard of review is deferential, it is 

not meaningless. Here, the Board has given us little to 

evaluate, and the record demonstrates that the Board’s 

decision was inconsistent with its own precedent in the form 

of Westwood Hotel.

Moreover, when the Board concluded the threatening 

statements here were merely jokes, it failed to follow its 

precedent in another way. The Board’s test for determining 

whether a statement constitutes a threat is an objective

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one. “The test is not the actual intent of the speaker or the 

actual effect on the listener,” but “whether a remark can 

reasonably be interpreted by an employee as a 

threat.” Smithers Tire, 308 NLRB at 72. A threatening 

statement, “even one uttered in jest,” can nonetheless convey 

a risk to another of serious harm. Here, the Board 

emphasized the “casual and joking nature” of the original 

comments and dismissed the threatening content of those 

remarks as “no more than bravado and bluster.” Manorcare,

360 NLRB No. 93. But although Keating and Davis may 

have intended their remarks in jest, some employees 

interpreted the remarks as threats, and it was reasonable for 

them to do so. That the comments might have originated as 

jokes is irrelevant. The remarks were threatening, and 

seriously so. The objective standard demanded by the 

Board’s precedent requires assessing the threats according to 

what they reasonably conveyed, not what the speakers 

intended to convey.

Nor does it matter, as the Board thought it did, that the 

threats were disseminated by third parties. The Board has 

repeatedly found “that voting-related threats of substantial 

harm” to persons or property “directed at a determinative 

number of voters create an atmosphere of fear and reprisal 

sufficient to set aside an election.” Robert Orr, 338 NLRB at

616. And the Board has made clear that “conduct disruptive 

or destructive of the exercise of free choice by the voters . . . 

regardless of whether the person responsible for the 

misconduct is an agent of a party to the election or simply an 

employee...” may warrant setting aside results and holding a 

new election. Westwood Hotel, 270 NLRB at 804. In fact, 

the Board has not hesitated to “set aside elections where, as 

here, threats have been made or disseminated to voters whose 

ballots might have been determinative.” Robert Orr, 338

NLRB at 615 (emphasis added). The Board did not even

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acknowledge this precedent, let alone distinguish it. The 

threatening statements Keating and Davis made were 

addressed and disseminated to enough employees to sway the 

outcome of this election. That is enough to warrant setting 

aside the election result. “The Board’s decision 

is not consistent with its past practice” and its “departure from 

precedent without a reasoned analysis renders its decision 

arbitrary and capricious.” Honeywell Int’l, 253 F.3d at 123.

In its submitted briefs—but not in its decision—the 

Board relied on several cases that are clearly 

distinguishable. In Beaird-Poulan Div., Emerson Elec. Co. v. 

NLRB, 649 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1981) an administrative law 

judge credited five of twenty alleged instances of misconduct, 

including at least one threatening statement similar to the 

statements made here. 649 F.2d at 593. The Board’s 

agreement that these incidents did not warrant overturning the 

challenged representation election, id. at 594, rested on the 

conclusion the five credited incidents constituted “empty 

threats,” “occurring during a ten-week election campaign” 

that involved “over 800 eligible voters.” Id. at 595. Here, 

employees testified that they interpreted the threatening 

statements as real threats backed by the pugnacious reputation 

of one of the speakers, the statements occurred close to the 

election, and they were disseminated to a significant 

proportion of a much-smaller electorate in a very close 

election.

The Board does no better with its reliance on NLRB v. 

Bostik Div., USM Corp., 517 F.2d 971 (6th Cir.

1975). In Bostik, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Board’s 

evaluation of twenty incidents—including twelve threats—

that occurred during the course of a representation 

election. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the threats “were not 

considered or intended seriously” and included exchanges

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between two employees who “always kidded and joked 

around with each other a lot.” 517 F.2d at 973. The Sixth 

Circuit found the threats nothing more than the banter 

common “among workers in an industrial setting” and the 

objects of this jocular invective all testified they were not 

intimidated and voted against the union. Id. at 973-74. Here, 

none of the employees gave any indication that they had 

previously “kidded or joked around” with Davis or 

Kovac. Nor is there any indication the alleged threats were 

simply profanities or expressions common in the 

workplace. And, unlike in Bostik, the employees who 

discounted the threatening remarks in the moment of their 

utterance, reconsidered their import and later came to 

consider them serious threats.

Finally, the Board’s reliance on Kux Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,

890 F.2d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1989) is also easily 

distinguishable from the present case. In Kux 

Manufacturing, the employer objected to the certification of 

the representation election on multiple grounds, including 

threats allegedly made by a union-sympathizing 

employee. But the threatening remarks were bravado: they 

were only heard and discussed by two employees and not 

widely disseminated, nor taken seriously as they were here 

where the employer increased security—leading one of the 

speakers to brag about eliciting that response. Here, the 

threats crossed the line from bluster and playful profanity to 

intimidation.

III

ManorCare also challenges the legitimacy of the 

Regional Director’s election supervision. The Board 

appointed Dennis P. Walsh as Regional Director during a 

period in which the Board lacked a quorum, as later

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determined by NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 

(2014). ManorCare argues that, as a result of the Board’s lack 

of a quorum when it appointed Walsh, his actions as Regional 

Director were “null and void,” including his certification of 

ManorCare’s election result. The Board, however, argues that 

ManorCare waived any arguments about the Regional 

Director’s authority by not raising them in the representation 

proceeding. The Board further points out that, even if 

ManorCare had not forfeited its right to challenge Walsh’s 

appointment by failing to raise it in the representation 

proceeding, it also signed a Stipulated Election Agreement in 

which it expressly consented to Walsh’s oversight of the 

election.

Although challenges to an agency’s action based on the 

agency’s lack of authority may ordinarily be raised for the 

first time on appeal, see SSC Mystic Operating Co. v. 

NLRB, 801 F.3d 302, 308–09 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and UC 

Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 672–73 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 

ManorCare’s argument is different, depending not on a 

challenge to institutional legitimacy but on a challenge to a 

delegated officer’s appointment. Here, the Board was 

properly constituted when the election took place and 

throughout the relevant review period. The challenge, then, 

does not confront the institutional legitimacy of the Regional 

Director’s exercise of delegated authority at a time when the 

Board lacked a quorum. Rather, the challenge is to the 

Regional Director’s initial appointment, and a challenge to an 

officer’s appointment or the authority of a body to decide a 

claim is subject to forfeiture. See United States v. L.A. Tucker 

Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) (rejecting belated 

challenge to appointment of hearing examiner); see also, e.g., 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1994) (“No 

procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a 

constitutional right may be forfeited by the failure to make

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timely assertion of the right.”) (citation omitted); 9 C. Wright

& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2472, p. 455 

(1971) (Forfeiture is “not a mere technicality and is essential 

to the orderly administration of justice.”). Here, the Board 

acted reasonably in determining that ManorCare had forfeited 

this argument.

The Board further points out that ManorCare signed a 

Stipulated Election Agreement in which it expressly 

consented to Walsh’s oversight of the representation election, 

thus likely dooming its challenge even if it had been raised to 

the Board in the representation proceeding. ManorCare 

cannot now complain about the authority of the supervisor it 

agreed to use. And because the Stipulated Election 

Agreement signed by the parties starkly limited any discretion 

the Regional Director may have had in setting the terms of the 

election, his supervisory role here was de minimis.

ManorCare suggests it would have been futile to 

challenge Walsh’s appointment at this early stage because the 

Board processed cases even during the Noel Canning 

interregnum as if it was duly configured. But this overlooks 

Board rules which allow the General Counsel to transfer an 

election petition to a different region where the legitimacy of 

the Regional Director’s appointment is not in doubt. See 29

C.F.R. § 102.72; see, e.g., Lyric Opera of Chicago, 322

NLRB 865, 865 n.1 (1997) (noting that the General Counsel 

transferred representation proceedings from Region 13 to 

Region 19 for decision). Moreover, as is clear from the 

record, by the time the Board heard ManorCare’s objections 

to the election and then certified that election, the Board was 

operating with a fully confirmed quorum. The Board decision 

here appealed suffered from no jurisdictional defect. We 

reject ManorCare’s contention that any interim illegitimacy in

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the Regional Director’s appointment warrants a new 

election.

In Advanced Disposal Servs. East, Inc. v. NLRB, 2016

WL 1598607 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2016) , the Third Circuit relied 

on UC Health and SSC Mystic to reject the Board’s arguments 

that an employer’s challenge to the authority of a Regional 

Director to conduct a representation election was forfeited, or 

alternatively, the parties had agreed to the Regional Director’s 

authority to conduct the election when the stipulated election 

agreement was signed and submitted. The Third Circuit held 

that, because the Board lacked a quorum at the time of the 

Regional Director’s appointment, the employer’s challenge to 

the Regional Director’s authority to act constituted an 

extraordinary circumstance under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), and did 

not need to be raised before the Board first.

But our prior decisions in UC Health and SSC Mystic 

found that “extraordinary circumstances” existed because 

“challenges to the composition of an agency can be raised on 

review even when they are not raised before the agency.” UC 

Health, 803 F.3d at 672−73. Here, because ManorCare’s 

challenge is not to the Board’s ability to exercise its authority 

but rather to Walsh’s authority to conduct the election—

authority that was exercised after the Board “once again

consist[ed] of sufficient members to constitute a quorum,” 

Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564

F.3d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2009)—this case does not raise a 

“challenge to the composition of an agency.” Thus, there are 

no “extraordinary circumstances” at play here.

IV

Because the Board arbitrarily departed from its own 

analytical framework for evaluating the allegations of thirdUSCA Case #14-1200 Document #1614284 Filed: 05/20/2016 Page 17 of 22
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party electoral misconduct, we grant ManorCare’s petition in 

relation to that issue, and grant the Board’s cross-application 

for enforcement in all other respects.

So ordered.

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SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment: I fully agree with Part III of the 

court’s opinion, in which the court concludes that ManorCare 

forfeited its challenge to the Regional Director’s authority. 

With regard to Part II of the opinion, I agree with my 

colleagues that the Board’s decision in this case was too 

cursory, in that the Board at least needed to do more to 

explain how its decision in this case fits with its precedent. 

Unlike the majority, however, I do not understand the Board’s 

decision declining to set aside the election to be irreparably 

inconsistent with its prior decisions. Rather, I would remand 

the case to enable the Board to explain how its rejection of 

petitioner’s election objection aligns with its precedent.

As a preliminary matter, “our review of the Board’s 

rulings regarding [an] election is ‘extremely limited.’” NLRB 

v. Downtown Bid Servs. Corp., 682 F.3d 109, 112 (D.C. Cir.

2012) (quoting Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers 

Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). If 

“the Board’s decision to certify a union is consistent with its 

precedent and supported by substantial evidence in the record, 

we may not disturb it.” Id. And because of the Board’s 

“particular expertise” in assessing whether the original 

election or a new election would better reflect employees’ 

free choice, the Board has “particularly broad discretion” in 

deciding whether to rerun a representation election. 

Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 736 F.2d at

1562–63.

In reviewing whether the Board’s decision is “consistent 

with its precedent,” Downtown Bid, 682 F.3d at 112, the court 

today appropriately focuses on the Board’s Westwood 

Horizons Hotel decision, which frames the test for 

overturning an election result based on third-party 

misconduct. Under that test, the Board examines “whether 

the misconduct was so aggravated as to create a general 

atmosphere of fear and reprisal rendering a free election

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impossible.” 270 NLRB 802, 803 (1984). The decision in 

Westwood Horizons Hotel sets forth specific factors to guide 

the inquiry into whether that overarching standard is satisfied. 

See pp. 7–10, supra. Here, the Board concluded that the 

misconduct did not meet that standard and thus did not require 

rerunning the election.

In reaching that conclusion, however, the Board did not 

adequately ground its rationale in its precedent. Although the 

Board initially listed the factors set forth in Westwood 

Horizons Hotel for assessing the seriousness of a third party’s 

threatening statements, the Board undertook no application of 

those factors to the facts of this case, even though the hearing 

officer, applying the same factors, concluded that they 

warranted setting aside the election. The Board observed that 

the statements at issue were initially made in a joking or 

casual manner and amounted to no more than “bravado and 

bluster” that was “likely to be discounted by other 

employees.” Manorcare of Kingston PA, LLC, 360 NLRB 

No. 93 (Apr. 29, 2014). But as the Board acknowledged, the 

statements then were “apparently characterized out of 

context” when the initial recipients repeated them to other 

employees. Id. “In other words,” the Board assumed, “these 

were characterizations by those who had not made the 

statements and, further, repeated to employees who” were left 

to draw their own conclusions about the extent of the 

statements’ threatening nature without “the benefit of hearing 

them and evaluating them personally.” Id.

In declining to overturn the election in those 

circumstances, the Board noted its historic “reluctan[ce] to set 

aside an election where employees circulate third-party 

statements that have been stripped of their original context.” 

Id. The Board also cited a concern that setting aside the 

election “would open the door to objections being

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substantiated by rumors devoid of any truth, and encourage 

false attributions in order to influence election outcomes.” Id. 

Those general considerations, in my mind, could form the 

foundation of a decision declining to set aside the election in 

this case under the analysis established by Westwood 

Horizons Hotel.

The Board’s recitation of those considerations, however, 

was not just the foundation of its decision—it was essentially 

the entirety of the Board’s analysis. The Board, for instance, 

failed to note or contend with its prior decisions, including 

those cited by the majority, see, e.g., Q.B. 

Rebuilders, Inc., 312 NLRB 1141 (1993), that could be seen 

to be in some tension with its conclusion on the main issue 

before it here: whether joking or blustery comments, when 

further disseminated in a manner divorced from their original 

context, “create a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal 

rendering a free election impossible,” Westwood Horizons 

Hotel, 270 NLRB at 803. Moreover, the Board, as noted, did 

not apply the Westwood Horizons Hotel factors to the facts of 

this case. The Board also made no effort in its analysis to 

address the closeness of the election (34 votes in favor of the 

Union and 32 votes against), which the Board’s precedent 

suggests could be a significant consideration in deciding 

whether to rerun an election. See Robert Orr-Sysco Food 

Servs., LLC, 338 NLRB 614, 615 (2002).

In the end, although one can conceive of ways to align 

the Board’s conclusion in this case with its prior decisions, 

“[i]t is not this court’s role to supply post hoc justifications 

for the Board’s result; the duty to justify lies exclusively with 

the Board in the first instance.” United Food & Commercial 

Workers v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

And while there of course is no requirement for the Board to 

engage in an examination of any particular length, here, the

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Board needed to do more to explain how its decision fit 

within its precedents, as indicated by the hearing officer’s 

reaching the contrary conclusion under those precedents.

For those reasons, I would remand this case to the Board 

to give it an opportunity (if it elected to adhere to its original 

conclusion) to ground its decision in its prior cases and further 

explain its rationale for finding that a new election is 

unwarranted in the circumstances. See Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United Food & 

Commercial Workers, 880 F.2d at 1439. I thus concur in the 

judgment of the court insofar as it grants the petition for 

review in part and denies the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement in part.

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