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Parties Involved:
James Ray Russell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 88-2154 

. FILED 

Ut11tm;{ Sttti1$ Cotttt of Appeals 

Tench Circuir 

JUN l 9 1.9SO 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

JAMES 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

} 

) 

) 

RAY RUSSELL, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-88-90-R) 

Susan M. Otto, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Ted A. Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney (Timothy D. 

Leonard, United States Attorney, and Williams. Price, Assistant 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, BRORBY, and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 1 
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the United States, James 

Ray Russell pled guilty to an information charging him with the 

robbery of a federally insured bank by force, violence, and 

intimidation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). 1 The district 

judge who sentenced Russell had previously declared the Sentencing 

Guidelines unconstitutional in an unrelated criminal proceeding, 

and accordingly he sentenced Russell to twenty years imprisonment 

under the provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which was the maximum 

penalty permitted by the pre-Guidelines statute. Russell appealed 

the sentence thus imposed. 

While Russell's appeal was pending in this court, the Supreme 

Court in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) held the 

Sentencing Guidelines constitutional. In accord with Mistretta, 

we, in an unpublished order and judgment, vacated Russell's 

sentence on October 25, 1989, and partially remanded the case to 

the district court for resentencing 

Guidelines. 

under the Sentencing 

On November 3, 1989, Russell was resentenced to imprisonment 

for 105 months. A transcript of the resentencing proceedings has 

been certified to this court and Russell now challenges his 

resentencing on two grounds. 

As indicated, Russell pled guilty to an information charging 

a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a), which statute makes no mention 

of a dangerous weapon. However, an issue raised on original 

1 § 2113(a) makes no mention of the use of a dangerous weapon in 

the commission of a robbery. That language appears in§ 2113(d). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 2 
sentencing, and renewed on resentencing, was whether, regardless 

of the crime to which Russell had pled guilty, Russell had in fact 

possessed a firearm when he robbed the Grant Square Bank & Trust 

Company in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At the original sentencing, 

and again on resentencing, the district court found that Russell 

did possess a firearm when he robbed the bank, which, under the 

Guidelines, enhanced Russell's resentence by three levels. 

Russell challenges the district court's finding that he possessed 

a firearm when he robbed the bank, and the resulting enhancement 

of his sentence. 

In United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1990), we 

recently held that under the Sentencing Guidelines the government 

bears the burden of proof for "sentence increases," and the 

defendant has the burden of proof for "sentence decreases,'' and 

that in each instance the burden is to produce evidence which 

preponderates. "Evidence which does not preponderate or is in 

equipoise simply fails to meet the required burden of proof." Id. 

at 1164. 

Applying Kirk, it is now agreed that before Russell's 

sentence could be increased by three levels the government had the 

burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that 

when Russell robbed the bank he was in possession of a firearm. 

The government's position is that it did preponderate on this issue, whereas Russell argues that the government did not meet its 

burden of proof. 

Three witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing. The 

bank teller accosted by Russell testified that she did not actu-

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 3 
ally see a gun. She stated that when she "turned around" she saw 

Russell in front of her and read his note, which said, "This is 

real. Come on." She testified that Russell also said, "This is 

real. Come on. Give me your money. Don't make me use it. If 

you touch anything, you're going with me." The teller testified 

that Russell asked her for a bag, and when she said she did not 

have a bag, Russell replied, "Just lay it up here then." The 

teller said she then started pushing currency towards Russell. 

She further stated that when Russell said, "Don't make me use it," 

that he "had a hold of his jacket." 

The only other government witness was an F.B.I. agent who was 

involved in the investigation of the robbery. Russell was arrested at his residence shortly after the robbery. The F. B. I. 

agent testified that a search of Russell's residence disclosed 

some of the money taken in the robbery hidden under a cushion on a 

couch, and that next to this currency was a .38 caliber revolver. 

The agent acknowledged that Russell denied possessing the revolver 

at the time of the robbery. 

The agent also recounted his conversation with Russell's 

wife, wherein she stated that she saw Russell "put it [the 

revolver] in his jacket pocket" shortly before they left their 

home to proceed to the bank. 2 

Russell admitted that he robbed the bank but stated that he 

did not possess any firearm when he robbed the bank. He 

acknowledged owning a revolver, which he said was a .22 caliber 

2 Russell's wife had diagrammed the bank which Russell robbed and 

drove Russell to and from the bank. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 4 
and not a .38 caliber revolver. However, he said after his wife 

went out to "warm up" the car, he slid the revolver under the sofa 

cushion and did not have it on his person when he robbed the 

bank. On cross-examination, Russell stated that he knew that a 

bank robbery "with a gun" was a "more serious" offense than a bank 

robbery "without a gun." He also testified that he did not recall 

telling the teller, "Don't make me use it. If you touch anything, 

you're going with me." 

Based on this testimony, the district court found that 

Russell was in possession of a firearm when he robbed the bank and 

enhanced his sentence by three levels. We believe the evidence 

supports such finding. The fact that the teller did not actually 

see a gun does not necessarily end the matter. Nor does the fact 

that Russell denied having a gun with him at the time of the 

robbery end the matter. The evidence shows that Russell possessed 

a firearm minutes before the robbery and again very shortly after 

the robbery, and that during the robbery Russell, while patting 

his jacket pocket, said, "Don't make me use it. If you touch 

anything, you're going with me." Russell's statement to the 

teller is some evidence that he was armed. He indicated he was 

armed. The teller testified that she thought he was armed and 

complied promptly with all his requests. As indicated, after the 

robbery, a revolver was found alongside certain proceeds of the 

robbery. The district court's finding that the government had 

preponderated on the issue in dispute is not "clearly erroneous" 

and finds support in the record. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 

F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 5 
Russell also argues on appeal that the sentence imposed on 

resentencing was in violation of the Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984. At resentencing, in response to an inquiry by defense 

counsel, the district judge announced his intention to depart 

upward from the calculated guideline range because of the 

"inadequacy of [Russell's] criminal history." For that reason, 

the district court departed upward from the Guideline Sentencing 

range of 51 to 63 months to a guideline range of 84 to 105 months 

and then imposed the maximum sentence within the enhanced 

guideline range, committing Russell to the custody of the Bureau 

of Prisons for a term of 105 months. 

Russell sustained a burglary conviction in 1965, another 

burglary conviction in 1967, and an escape conviction in 1968, an 

escape which was effected while he was in custody on the 1967 

burglary conviction. Russell does not contest the fact that he 

sustained these three convictions. However, under the Guidelines 

these three convictions were excluded from the criminal history 

computation because of the Sentencing Commission's fifteen-year 

limitation for prior felony convictions and confinements. See 

United States 

Notwithstanding 

Sentencing Commission Guidelines, § 4Al.2(e). 

the fifteen-year limitation, the district court 

enhanced Russell's criminal history score by adding three points 

for each of these three prior felonies. 

Counsel for Russell concedes that the Guidelines vest a 

district court with some discretion to determine whether the 

criminal history computation, using the fifteen-year limitation, 

accurately reflects the defendant's criminal behavior. In this 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 6 
regard, the United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 4Al.3 provides 

as follows: 

"If reliable information indicates that the 

criminal history category does not adequately 

reflect the seriousness of the defendant's 

past criminal conduct or the likelihood that 

the defendant will commit other crimes, the 

court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline 

range ...• " 

Conceding, then, that under the Guidelines a district court 

has the power to depart upward from the guidelines range when the 

defendant's criminal history computation, using the fifteen-year 

limitation, does not accurately reflect his criminal behavior, or 

the likelihood that he will commit future crimes, counsel argues 

that the facts of the instant case do not warrant any departure. 

We disagree. 

The pre-sentence report indicates that Russell, then eighteen 

years of age, was arrested on October 20, 1965, on a burglary 

charge and that on November 24, 1965, he was sentenced to the 

Oklahoma State Penitentiary for two years by the Pittsburg County 

(Oklahoma} District Court. He was discharged from the 

penitentiary on that commitment on December 17, 1966. Two months 

later, on February 25, · 1967, Russell was again arrested on a 

burglary charge and on February 27, 1967, he was sentenced to four 

years imprisonment in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary by the 

Haskell County District Court. While serving this sentence 

Russell effected an escape, but he was captured on or about August 

10, 1968, and returned to the penitentiary .. On August 10, 1968, 

Russell pled guilty to an escape charge and was sentenced to three 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 7 
years imprisonment in the penitentiary. On June 27, 1969, Russell 

was paroled on his second burglary conviction and rebilled on his 

escape conviction and sentence. He was discharged from the 

penitentiary on his escape sentence on April 29, 1971. 

On March 25, 1972, Russell was arrested on a homicide charge 

and on August 30, 1975, was sentenced to 35 years in the state 

penitentiary upon his conviction for manslaughter. According to 

the pre-sentence report, Russell and an accomplice robbed an 

elderly victim and in the course of the robbery beat the victim 

inflicting mortal wounds. He was discharged from that 

incarceration on July 24, 1984. 

In fixing Russell's criminal history score, the probation 

officer took into consideration Russell's conviction and commitment on the manslaughter charge, which was three points, and thus 

established a criminal history category of II. However, the 

probation officer added no points for the two burglary convictions, and the escape conviction, since all three were more than 

fifteen years remote from his sentencing in the instant case. In 

this' regard, the probation officer noted that "the defendant has 

numerous prior criminal convictions which did not count in 

computing the criminal history category. This factor may warrant 

an upward departure from the guideline range." 

As indicated, the district court did make an upward departure 

based on the two burglary convictions and the conviction for 

escape, increasing Russell's criminal history score by nine 

points, i.e., three points for each conviction, which made a 

criminal history category of v. In so doing, the district court 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 8 
observed, inter alia, that "every time you [Russell] have been out 

of prison within a short period of time you have committed another 

offense" and also indicated that to restrict Russell's criminal 

history score to the manslaughter charge and ignore the three 

prior felony convictions because they occurred more than fifteen 

years prior to the instant sentencing would not fully and 

adequately reflect Russell's past criminal conduct or the 

likelihood that, when discharged from his robbery sentence, he 

will commit further offenses. In this general connection, the 

government points out that for much of the fifteen-year period 

preceding his current sentencing, Russell has been incarcerated on 

the manslaughter charge and suggests that the fact that Russell 

has committed no crimes while incarcerated should not inure to his 

benefit. 

United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1990) sheds 

light on the present proceeding. There the district court made an 

upward departure because one prior sentence was imposed as a 

result of two independent crimes committed on different occasions 

and also because the defendant had committed the instant offense 

while on bond for a prior charge. In upholding the upward 

departure, we approved a three-step review of an upward departure: 

(1) Do the circumstances cited by the district court justify a 

departure from the Guidelines? (2) Do the underlying facts 

support the circumstances cited by the district court for 

departure? And (3) Is the degree of departure reasonable? 

Russell does not dispute the fact of the prior convictions 

which the district court considered in enhancing his sentence, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 9 
nor, as we understand it, does counsel claim that the degree of 

departure was unreasonable. Counsel does challenge the use of the 

prior convictions beyond the fifteen-year limitation to enhance 

the sentence. 

Where a sentencing judge bases his upward departure in his 

belief that a defendant's criminal history category score 

underrepresents the seriousness of his criminal history, our 

review thereof is plenary. In White, the cited reasons for upward 

departure were explicitly stated by the Sentencing Commission as 

appropriate grounds for departure. Such is not true in the 

instant case. However, in White, we noted that a sentencing court 

may also make an upward departure from the Guidelines on the basis 

of factors that the Commission has not explicitly stated to be 

appropriate grounds for departure. Such is our case. 

It would appear that for eleven of the fifteen years 

preceding the present proceeding, Russell was in custody on the 

manslaughter charge. It would also appear that Russell was in 

custody from October 20, 1965 until April 29, 1971, except for two 

months. Eleven months after Russell was released on April 29, 

1971, Russell was arrested on the manslaughter charge and was 

thereafter apparently in custody until his release on July 24, 

1984. Four years later he was arrested on the present bank 

robbery charge. Such circumstance we believe justified the 

district court in going beyond the fifteen-year period. We agree 

with the district court that to limit Russell's criminal history 

to the fifteen years immediately preceding his present sentencing, 

when Russell has been confined for eleven of those fifteen years, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 10 
would not "adequately reflect the seriousness of [his] ... past 

criminal conduct or likelihood that [he] •.. will commit other 

crimes." 

Under the Guidelines, a district court "may consider imposing 

a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline 

range" if the ''criminal history category does not adequately 

reflect the seriousness of the· defendant's past criminal conduct 

or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other • II crimes .... 

When a person has been in custody for eleven o~t of the fifteen 

years prior to the commencement of a new criminal proceeding 

against him, his criminal history for that fifteen-year period may 

well have been diluted by the fact of such incarceration. In such 

circumstance, we believe a district court has the discretion to go 

beyond the fifteen-year limitation to determine the "seriousness 

of the defendant's past criminal conduct ..•. " If the defendant 

has no criminal record beyond the fifteen-year period, such inures 

to his benefit. If, however, the defendant has an extensive 

criminal record beyond the fifteen-year period, as does Russell, 

who was apparently in custody on three separate felony convictions 

for seven of the eight years beyond the fifteen-year limitation, 

such record, under the Guidelines, may inure to his detriment. 

In support of the foregoing, see, by way of example, United 

States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990). In that case the 

district court enhanced the defendant's guideline range on the 

ground that. his criminal history, with the fifteen-year 

limitation, did not adequately reflect the seriousness of his 

prior criminal history and the court considered three felony 

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Appellate Case: 88-2154 Document: 01019867880 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 11 
convictions which were beyond the fifteen-year limitation. In 

upholding the upward departure, the Eighth Circuit stated that the 

defendant's ''serious criminal history is not adequately taken into 

account by his criminal history category and the Guidelines 

specifically allow an upward departure in such circumstances." 

Judgment and sentence affirmed. 

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