Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_24-cv-00160/USCOURTS-ared-2_24-cv-00160-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dirk Burchard
Plaintiff
Chad Garrett
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

DELTA DIVISION 

DIRK BURCHARD PETITIONER 

Reg #20705-021 

V. Case No. 2:24-CV-00160-BSM-BBM 

CHAD GARRETT, Warden 

FCI Forrest City-Low RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 This Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United 

States District Judge Brian S. Miller. Either party may file written objections to this 

Recommendation. If objections are filed, they should be specific and should include the 

factual or legal basis for the objection. To be considered, objections must be received in 

the office of the Court Clerk within 14 days of this Recommendation. If no objections are 

filed, Judge Miller can adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing the 

record. By not objecting, parties may also waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On August 26, 2024, Dirk Burchard (“Burchard”), a prisoner incarcerated at the 

Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas (“FCI Forrest City-Low”), filed 

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). In his Petition, 

Burchard alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) refuses to accommodate his dyslexia 

in accordance with the First Step Act (“FSA”). Burchard is currently serving a sentence for 

violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252(A)(b)(2). See (Judgment, United 

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States v. Dirk Allen Burchard, 4:15-cr-00205-LGW-GRS-1 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2016) 

(ECF. No. 35)). For the reasons explained below, Burchard’s claims are not cognizable in 

a § 2241 habeas action. Accordingly, it is recommended that Burchard’s Petition, (Doc. 1), 

be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Habeas Corpus 

Habeas Corpus is the exclusive remedy when a claim “goes directly to the 

constitutionality of [a prisoner’s] physical confinement itself and seeks either immediate 

release from that confinement or the shortening of its duration.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 

U.S. 475, 489 (1973). If a prisoner is not challenging the validity of his criminal conviction 

or sentence or the duration of his confinement, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper 

remedy. Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014); Kruger v. Erickson, 77 

F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Where [a] petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and 

fails to attack the validity of his sentence or the length of his state [or federal] custody, the 

district court lacks the power or subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ.”). 

All habeas corpus petitions are subject to preliminary review; if, considering the 

petition and any attached exhibits, it “plainly appears . . . that the petitioner is not entitled 

to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition.” RULES GOVERNING 

§ 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Rule 4 (emphasis added); see 

also Rule 1(b) (§ 2254 Rules may be applied to other habeas corpus petitions). Thus, a 

judge must sua sponte dismiss a petition if the Court lacks jurisdiction. 

 

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B. First Step Act 

In late 2018, the FSA was enacted into law, ushering in a number of changes to 

federal inmate programming. As part of the FSA, Congress directed the Attorney General 

to develop a risk and needs assessment system to appropriately direct programming and 

programming incentives by “determin[ing] the recidivism risk of each prisoner” and 

classifying “each prisoner as having minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism[.]” 

18 U.S.C. § 3632(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3631. The FSA also included the creation of an 

evidence-based recidivism reduction program that incentivizes prisoners to participate in 

and complete programs and productive activities by allowing certain prisoners to earn “10 

days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation” and allowing prisoners 

classified as a minimum or low risk of recidivism to earn “an additional 5 days of time 

credits for every 30 days of successful participation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). 

As relevant to the present action, the FSA provides that, “[a] prisoner, except for an 

ineligible prisoner under subparagraph (D), who successfully completes evidence-based 

recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits” at the 

rate described by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). Pursuant to “subparagraph (D),” 

however, “[a] prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits under this paragraph if the 

prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under,” among other things, “Section 2252, 

relating to certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of 

minors,” and “Section 2252A, relating to certain activities involving material constituting 

or containing child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xli–xlii). Burchard is serving 

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a sentence for a conviction under both sections; accordingly, Burchard is serving a 

disqualifying sentence under the FSA. 

There are other separate incentives in addition to time credits, such as phone and 

visitation privileges. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(1), (2), & (3). As relevant to Burchard’s specific 

claims, the system shall also be used to “determine the appropriate use of audio technology 

for program course materials with an understanding of dyslexia,” and Congress directed 

the Attorney General to incorporate “a dyslexia screening program into the System” and 

“programs designed to treat dyslexia into [FSA programming].” 18 U.S.C. 3632(a)(8), (h). 

C. Analysis 

Here, Burchard does not challenge his conviction or seek a remedy that would result 

in an earlier release from prison. Instead, Burchard requests the following relief: 

Burchard asks that this court find the Bureau has abused its discretion in 

interpreting the FSA to empower them with the option to preclude disabled 

prisoners from FSA programming, and to order the BOP to make all 

reasonable accommodations available to him, even by Special Purchase 

Order means, to enable him to work, study, and program equally with the 

Bureau’s non-disabled population. 

(Doc. 1 at 6–7). Moreover, Burchard does not allege that his request, if granted, would 

result in a shorter sentence or earlier release from prison. As the Court explained above, 

even if Burchard participated in FSA programming and received other incentives, his 

conviction disqualifies him from receiving time credits. Accordingly, federal habeas 

jurisdiction is lacking. See Wessels v. Houden, No. 23-CV-1266 (WMW/ECW), 2023 WL 

7169154, at *1 (D. Minn. June 22, 2023) (recommending dismissal of habeas petition 

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seeking immediate transfer to pre-release custody for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7168926 (D. Minn. Oct. 31, 2023). 

D. Conversion to a Civil Rights Action

The Eighth Circuit has held that a pro se habeas petitioner raising a “potentially 

viable” conditions-of-confinement claim should receive an opportunity to pursue that claim 

if he so chooses. Spencer, 774 F.3d at 471. To the extent that Burchard’s Petition challenges 

the conditions of his confinement, he fails to raise a potentially viable claim. 

Claims alleging prison conditions are unconstitutional are properly litigated as civil 

rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). However, § 1983 claims are only cognizable 

against a state entity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (requiring action under color of state law). And 

Bivens actions permit individual-capacity suits for damages against federal officers for a 

narrow class of constitutional violations. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (holding that the 

Constitution creates a cause of action for money damages). 

Burchard is not suing state officers or seeking money damages, so neither § 1983 

nor Bivens clearly provide Burchard a route to a remedy. Additionally, Burchard’s Petition 

affirmatively disclaims any association with Bivens: “This habeas motion . . . is not made 

to challenge his conviction and sentence, nor his conditions of confinement-pursuant to an 

action cognizable under Bivens.” (Doc. 1 at 1). Without more information, the Court takes 

no position on any other causes of action that may be available to Burchard. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider 

the claims raised in Burchard’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT Burchard’s § 2241 Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, (Doc. 1), be DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

DATED this 8th day of November, 2024. 

____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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