Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00239/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00239-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Gibbs
Plaintiff
Kaplan College
Defendant
Kaplan Higher Education, LLC
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN GIBBS,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

KAPLAN COLLEGE aka KAPLAN HIGHER 

EDUCATION, LLC,

 Defendant.

1:14-cv-239-LJO-BAM

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR REVIEW OF CLERK’S 

TAXATION OF COSTS (Doc. 23)

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 10, 2015, the Court granted Defendant Kaplan College aka Kaplan Higher Education, 

LLC’s (“Kaplan”) motion for summary judgment in its entirety, which disposed of this case. See Gibbs 

v. Kaplan College, No. 1:14-cv-239-LJO-BAM, 2015 WL 1622181, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2015)

(“the MSJ Order”). On April 24, 2015, after judgment entered, Kaplan submitted a bill of costs for 

$4,307.66, to which Plaintiff Brian Gibbs (“Plaintiff”) did not object. Doc. 21 at 1. On June 12, 2015, 

the Clerk of Court taxed $3,844.89 in costs against Plaintiff. Doc. 22 at 1. 

On June 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for review of the Clerk of Court’s taxation of costs. 

Doc. 23 at 1. Relying primarily on Stanley v. Univ. of So. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999), 

Plaintiff asserts the Court would abuse its discretion if Plaintiff is required to pay the costs awarded to 

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Kaplan because (1) he would be rendered indigent by the cost award, whereas Kaplan is a large 

corporation that easily could absorb the costs; (3) awarding costs in this case would have a chilling 

effect on civil rights claims; and (4) the legal issues in this case were close and difficult. Doc. 23-1 at 2-

3; see also Doc. 25 at 2. Plaintiff testifies that he has been unemployed since his termination from 

Kaplan in December 2013, his “only source of income is a monthly disability pension,” and he is 

responsible for himself and his two children. Doc. 23-2 at 2. Plaintiff further testifies that he cannot 

afford to pay Kaplan its awarded costs and “[a]n order requiring [him] to do so would cause serious 

havoc on [his]m current financial situation.” Id.

Kaplan opposes Plaintiff’s motion, arguing that it is entitled to costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(d)(1). Doc. 24.1The thrust of Kaplan’s opposition is that Plaintiff (and his attorney, Shelley G. 

Bryant) pursued a meritless case for over a year at substantial expense to Kaplan. See id. at 2.2In 

Kaplan’s view, neither Plaintiff’s alleged indigency nor Kaplan’s ability to pay its own costs justifies 

denying its bill of costs in this case because this was not a close case concerning important public issues 

and the costs at issue are relatively modest. Id. at 4-5. 

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits the clerk of the district court to tax costs. “Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) 

provides that ‘costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless 

the court otherwise directs.’ Thus, Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to 

prevailing parties, and it is incumbent upon the losing party to demonstrate why the costs should not be 

awarded.” Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1079 (citation omitted). “A district court need not give affirmative 

reasons for awarding costs; instead, it need only find that the reasons for denying costs are not 

 

1 Kaplan does not argue that Plaintiff waived his right to object to Kaplan’s bill of costs after it was taxed by the Clerk of 

Court.

2 Kaplan asserts that it incurred approximately $23,000 in costs, but the approximately $4,000 it requested in its bill of costs 

was “limited to those costs recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” Id. at 2 n.22; Doc. 24-1, Declaration of Cheryl Orr (“Orr 

Decl.”) at ¶ 28. Kaplan asserts that it incurred approximately $190,000 in attorneys’ fees, but provides no corroborating 

evidence for the assertion. See Doc. 24 at 4 n.4.

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sufficiently persuasive to overcome the presumption in favor of an award.” Save Our Valley v. Sound 

Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2003). 

District courts have “wide discretion” in determining whether and to what extent prevailing 

parties may be awarded costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). K–S–H Plastics, Inc. v. Carolite, Inc., 408 F.2d 54, 

60 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Ass’n of Mexican–American Educators v. State of Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 591 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, “this discretion is not unlimited. A district court must ‘specify 

reasons' for its refusal to award costs.” Ass’n of Mexican–American Educators, 231 F.3d at 592 (quoting 

Subscription Television, Inc. v. S. Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n, 576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1978)). The 

reasons specified must “explain why a case is not ordinary and why, in the circumstances, it would be 

inappropriate or inequitable to award costs.” Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). The losing 

party bears the burden of providing such reasons to the court. See Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of the 

Univ. Of Cal. at Davis, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2008).

The Ninth Circuit has approved the following reasons for refusing to award costs to a prevailing 

party: (1) the losing party’s limited financial resources; (2) misconduct on the part of the prevailing 

party; (3) the chilling effect of imposing such high costs on future civil rights litigants; (4) whether the 

issues in the case were close and difficult; (5) whether the prevailing party’s recovery was nominal or 

partial; (6) whether the losing party litigated in good faith; and (7) whether the case presented a 

landmark issue of national importance. Quan v. Comp. Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2010), 

abrogated on other grounds, Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S.Ct. 2459 (2014); see also

Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(affirming denial of cost in “extraordinarily important” case with “close and difficult” issues brought by 

parties with limited resources). In addition, the Court may consider the economic disparity between the 

parties. See Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 1144. It is not necessary to find that a 

non-prevailing party currently is indigent; rather, the proper inquiry is whether an award of costs might 

make that party indigent. Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1079-80. Plaintiff need not provide documentary evidence 

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of his financial status. See Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 572.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court finds Kaplan was the prevailing party in this action. The parties do not and cannot 

dispute this finding given the Court’s grant of summary judgment to Kaplan on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Accordingly, Kaplan may recover fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).

Plaintiff argues that this was a close and difficult case because he “established a prima facie case 

of discrimination” and a “thirty-[s]even page order [on Kaplan’s motion for summary judgment] was 

required to analyze the factual disputes arising from the proffered reason for the termination.” Doc. 23-1 

at 4 (citing “Docket 19,” i.e., the MSJ Order). Plaintiff misreads the MSJ Order3; the Court did not find 

that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case but found that, even if he had done so, Kaplan still 

would have prevailed. See, e.g., MSJ Order at *18 (“Even if Plaintiff has satisfied his prima facie 

burden, Kaplan has met its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating 

him, and Plaintiff has proffered no evidence of pretext.”), *18 n.25 (same). 

That the MSJ Order was almost 40 pages does not indicate that this was a close or difficult case. 

In the Court’s view, this was not at all a close or difficult case. Approximately half of the MSJ Order

discussed the straightforward (but substantial and uncontroverted) evidence—the overwhelming 

majority of which, if not all, supported Kaplan’s motion for summary judgment. And based on that 

evidence, the Court’s analysis was brief and uncomplicated because Kaplan made an overwhelming 

showing that Plaintiff’s claims lacked merit. Plaintiff’s opposition to Kaplan’s motion for summary 

judgment, on the other hand, was not a model of clarity. See, e.g., MSJ Order at *1 n.1 (“Plaintiff 

submitted almost 400 additional facts, the overwhelming majority of which are not sufficiently 

supported (or not supported at all) by the cited evidence.”).

 

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In the MSJ Order, the Court explained that “[d]ue to the dozens of instances where counsel for Plaintiff, Shelley G. Bryant, 

mischaracterized the cited evidence,” it was difficult for the Court “to believe those mischaracterizations were unintentional 

or based on a genuinely different understanding of the evidence.” MSJ Order at 1 n.1. Given Mr. Bryant’s lack of a specific 

citation to the MSJ Order where it allegedly found Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the Court is again left to 

wonder whether Mr. Bryant is mischaracterizing the facts in this case. 

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Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, this also was not a civil rights case with important issues of 

public concern, much less a case concerning “a landmark issue of national importance.” This was a case 

about an unremarkable dispute between an employee and his employer that, at best, will have a marginal 

effect (if any) on employee-employer relationships or the general public. “This is simply not a situation 

in which an indigent civil rights litigant pursued a matter of such great public importance that a cost 

award might chill future litigants from bringing similar cases in an effort to promote the greater good.” 

Padula v. Morris, No. 2:05-cv-411-MCE-EFB, 2014 WL 280971, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014); see 

also Darensburg v. Metro Transp. Comm’n, No. C-05-1597 EDL, 2009 WL 2392094, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

August 4, 2009) (collecting “cases involve[ing] relatively small awards that did not pose a risk of 

chilling future litigation” and observing that “larger cost awards . . . have been denied to prevailing 

defendants based on a combination of [] reasons”).

Thus, the only remaining grounds proffered by Plaintiff that weigh against granting Kaplan’s bill 

of costs is (1) the threat it poses of causing Plaintiff to be indigent and (2) the economic disparity 

between Plaintiff and Kaplan. It is undisputed that a significant economic disparity exists between 

Plaintiff, a single father of two who has been unemployed since December 2013 and whose only income 

is from government disability benefits, and Kaplan, a large national corporation with annual revenue in 

the billions of dollars. This weighs against granting Kaplan’s bill of costs. See Ass’n of MexicanAmerican Educators, 231 F.3d at 592. 

Although Kaplan may consider its $3,844.89 bill of costs to be “modest,” Doc. 24 at 5, Plaintiff 

testifies that being required to pay that amount “would cause serious havoc on [his] current financial 

situation.” Doc. 23-2 at 2.

IV. CONCLUSION

When the case is absent of merit, yet filled with misrepresentations, to nonetheless disallow costs 

cannot be justified. Such a result would promote a philosophy that if a person or business has substantial 

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resources, that it is a free target of abuse (i.e., spurious lawsuits).4The motion for review is granted in 

that this Court has indeed reviewed its prior ruling and the Clerk’s taxation of costs. The result remains 

intact, and Plaintiff’s motion for review of the Clerk’s taxation of costs (Doc. 23) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

4 Whether Plaintiff has an alternative remedy against his own counsel is an issue not before this Court.

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