Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03827/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03827-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald P. Roper
Appellee
William L. Rousan
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3827

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William L. Rousan,

Appellant,

v.

Donald P. Roper, Superintendent,

Potosi Correctional Center,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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Submitted: November 16, 2005 

 Filed: February 8, 2006

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Before ARNOLD, MURPHY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A Missouri state court sentenced William L. Rousan (“Rousan”) to death after

he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The Missouri Supreme Court

affirmed the convictions and sentence and subsequently affirmed the denial of

Rousan’s motion for post-conviction relief. Rousan timely petitioned for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief on nineteen separate grounds.

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The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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The district court1 denied habeas relief but granted a certificate of appealability on

eight of the grounds. Rousan now appeals the denial of the writ on those eight

grounds. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 1993, Rousan resided at the farm of his girlfriend, Mary Lambing.

Rousan, his son, Brent Rousan (“Brent”), and his brother, Robert Rousan (“Robert”),

decided to steal cattle from the nearby farm of sexagenarians Charles and Grace

Lewis. They drove to the Lewis farm in Rousan’s truck. During the drive, the three

men discussed the prospect of killing the Lewises and agreed that “if it had to be done

it had to be done.”

Rousan parked the truck approximately two miles from the Lewis farm. Rousan

then pulled out Lambing’s .22 caliber rifle and loaded it “in case anyone was home.”

Brent asked to be the one who carried the rifle, stating that he was “man enough to do

whatever needed to be done and that he would use the weapon.” After debating

whether Brent was “man enough,” Rousan yielded the gun to Brent. He warned Brent

that if they were caught, they would “fry.” The three men then approached on foot to

within viewing distance of the Lewis residence and sought cover behind a fallen tree.

The three men lay in wait until the Lewises returned to their residence that

afternoon. Charles Lewis mowed the lawn, while Grace Lewis talked on the phone

to the couple’s daughter. Brent became impatient and said he wanted to “do it.”

Rousan instructed Brent to remain behind the tree while he and Robert secured the

house. Before Rousan reached the house, however, Charles Lewis spotted Brent and

shouted at him. Brent shot Charles Lewis six times with the rifle, causing his death.

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Inside the house, Grace Lewis told her daughter on the phone that she heard gunfire

and hung up. When Grace ran out the front door to investigate, Brent shot her several

times, fracturing both of her arms. Grace turned and ran back into the house. Rousan

followed. Rousan placed a garment bag over Grace’s head and the upper part of her

body, picked her up, carried her back outside and placed her on the ground. At that

point, Grace was still alive. Rousan instructed Brent to “finish her off.” Brent fired

one shot into Grace’s head. That shot was fatal. 

Rousan, Brent and Robert took the bodies to the Lambing farm and buried

them. About a year later, Rousan’s brother-in-law called the police, believing the call

to be anonymous, and informed them where the Lewises’ killer resided. The police

traced the call to Rousan’s brother-in-law, interviewed him for more information, and

eventually apprehended Rousan hiding on another nearby farm.

A jury found Rousan guilty on two counts of first-degree murder for the

murders of Grace and Charles Lewis. The jury recommended a death sentence on

both counts, finding five statutory aggravating circumstances in reaching each

decision. The trial judge pronounced a death sentence for the murder of Grace Lewis

and a sentence of life without parole for the murder of Charles Lewis. On direct

appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v.

Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1998). After exhausting his state-law postconviction remedies, see Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. banc 2001), Rousan

sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on nineteen separate grounds.

The district court denied habeas relief but granted a certificate of appealability on the

following eight claims: (1) the striking of three jurors for cause violated Rousan’s

rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) insufficient evidence

supported the conviction for first-degree murder of Charles Lewis, violating the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the admission into evidence of

victim photographs violated due process; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to move to redact references to Rousan’s prior convictions when Rousan’s statement

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to police was introduced as evidence; (5) the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing

argument violated due process; (6) a jury instruction on accomplice liability

prejudicially confused the jury, violating due process; (7) a jury instruction on

statutory aggravating circumstances prejudicially confused the jury, violating

Rousan’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (8) the trial

court’s refusal to instruct on specific non-statutory mitigating circumstances, violating

Rousan’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions

of law de novo. Lyons v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2005). To succeed

on a claim for habeas relief under § 2254, an applicant must show that the state court

adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“AEDPA”). “A

decision is ‘contrary to’ federal law . . . if a state court has arrived ‘at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law’ or if it

‘confronted facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court

precedent’ but arrived at an opposite result.” Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 874 (8th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)) (alteration in

Davis). “A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law when it

‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Id.

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(quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 413) (alteration in Davis). In other words, it is not

enough for us to conclude that, in our independent judgment, we would have applied

federal law differently from the state court; the state court’s application must have

been objectively unreasonable. Lyons, 403 F.3d at 592. Finally, facts found by the

state court are presumed to be correct unless the applicant can rebut the presumption

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

A. The Striking of Three Potential Jurors for Cause

Rousan claims the trial court violated his constitutional rights in striking three

potential jurors for cause. Potential jurors may not be struck for cause simply because

they state general conscientious or religious scruples with regard to the death penalty.

Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657 (1987). However, a potential juror may be

struck for cause if his views “would prevent or substantially impair the performance

of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quotation omitted). In striking such a juror, it is not

necessary to prove with “unmistakable clarity” that a potential juror’s ability is

impaired. Id.

Rousan points to statements made during voir dire by each of the three potential

jurors, venirepersons Cowan, Henkins and Davis, to the effect that they could put

aside their personal reservations and apply the law as instructed with regard to the

death penalty:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: [Y]ou personally will be satisfied if they prove

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to you, is that right?

COWAN: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You won’t make them do more than what the

law says, you will apply the burden of proof which says that the State

must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that’s the

standard you use?

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COWAN: Yes.

***

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Can you set aside your opinion for the purposes

of doing citizenship duty as a juror . . . ?

HENKINS: I believe so.

***

COURT: Could you follow the instructions and give realistic

consideration to both sides?

DAVIS: Yes.

COURT: Could you under any circumstances return a verdict of death

in a case?

DAVIS: Yes, I think.

The Missouri Supreme Court summarized the voir dire of the three potential

jurors as follows:

During the state’s voir dire, venireperson Cowan expressed doubt that he

could vote for the death penalty. He also stated that “there would have

to be no doubt at all” before he would vote to impose the punishment of

death and that he probably would require more proof of guilt in a capital

case than in other cases. In response to later questions, however, Cowan

equivocated about his ability to follow the law. Cowan stated that he

could sign the death verdict if he were foreman. During the defense’s

voir dire, Cowan stated a number of times that he could follow the law,

but also stated once that he was not sure he could do so. When later

questioned by the court and by the state, Cowan stated that he was not

sure whether he would require extra proof in a capital case and that he

was not sure that his nerves would “hold up” during the trial. Based in

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part on Cowan’s increasing indications of stress during voir dire, the

court sustained the state’s motion to strike Cowan for cause.

***

Venireperson Henkins stated unequivocally that she could not vote for

the death penalty. She later stated to appellant’s counsel, “I can't

conceive of me voting that way.” In response to further questioning

about whether she could set aside her opinion for purposes of doing her

duty as a citizen, however, Henkins offered, “I believe so.”

The record shows that venireperson Henkins repeatedly and

unequivocally indicated that she could not vote for the death penalty.

Despite her one equivocal statement to the contrary, the trial court

clearly did not err in sustaining the state’s motion to strike venireperson

Henkins for cause.

Venireperson Davis initially equivocated about whether he could vote

for the death penalty. In response to further questions from the state

about voting for the death penalty, Davis stated, “It would be very hard,

I honestly do not know if I could do this.” The state then asked whether

Davis could sign the death verdict if he were the foreperson. Davis

stated “no” and then repeated that he would be unable to do that. During

the defense’s voir dire, Davis stated, “I honestly don’t know that I could

vote for the death penalty.” He later repeated his uncertainty regarding

his ability to impose this punishment.

State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839-40 (citations omitted).

 The Missouri Supreme Court then summarized its response to Rousan’s claim:

Although the juror’s ability to follow the law is the ultimate issue in

capital cases, the court may, and should, consider a venireperson’s

answers to all questions relevant to this issue, not just the questions

phrased in one particular way. In each of these cases, the totality of the

voir dire establishes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sustaining the state’s motion to strike for cause.

Id. at 841.

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The availability of habeas relief for a claim that the state court improperly

struck a potential juror for cause is both a legal and factual question. Kinder v.

Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 544 (8th Cir. 2001). First, the Missouri Supreme Court’s

holding was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. The Missouri Supreme Court correctly identified the governing

principle—that the ultimate issue is the potential juror’s ability to follow the law as

instructed by the court, rather than the potential juror’s personal views about the death

penalty. Gray, 481 U.S. at 657-58; Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. It was reasonable

to apply that principle to the facts of the case by examining the totality of the

responses of each potential juror during voir dire, rather than relying on isolated

responses that appeared favorable to Rousan’s argument. Second, there is no clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness we must afford to the

state court’s factual finding that the performance of the three potential jurors would

be substantially impaired. See Kinder, 272 F.3d at 543 (“In this case, Judge Blackwell

found that regardless of their recantations or rehabilitation, the four jurors needed to

be excused for cause. It was ‘peculiarly within [the] trial judge’s province’ to evaluate

the ‘demeanor and credibility’ of the venire members and to make that

determination.”) (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 428) (alteration in Kinder).

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief based on the claim that

the trial court violated Rousan’s constitutional rights in striking three potential jurors

for cause.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Conviction for First-Degree

Murder of Charles Lewis

Rousan contends that the evidence did not support a finding that he deliberated

in the killing of Charles Lewis. Under Missouri law, deliberation, described as “cool

reflection upon the victim’s death for some amount of time, no matter how short,” is

required for a first-degree murder conviction under an accomplice liability theory and

may not be imputed from an accomplice. State v. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 217-18

(Mo. banc 1993). Reviewing all the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict, the

Missouri Supreme Court determined that a reasonable juror could have found

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deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 841-42. That

is precisely the analysis required by federal law. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979). 

We find no clear and convincing evidence in the record to rebut the

presumption of correctness in the state court’s factual finding. In particular, Rousan’s

agreement that “if it had to be done it had to be done,” his act of loading the rifle “in

case anyone was home” and his warning as he handed the rifle to Brent that they

would “fry” if they were caught support the finding that Rousan deliberated in the

killing of Charles Lewis. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying habeas

relief on this ground.

C. The Admission into Evidence of Victim Photographs

The trial court admitted seven photographs of the victims’ bodies taken after

the bodies were recovered. The bodies, recovered one year after the murders, were

severely decomposed. Rousan argues the gruesome appearance of the bodies rendered

the photographs unfairly prejudicial. 

“Questions regarding admissibility of evidence are matters of state law, and

they are reviewed in federal habeas inquiries only to determine whether an alleged

error infringes upon a specific constitutional protection or is so prejudicial as to be a

denial of due process.” Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1993). The

petitioner must show that “the alleged improprieties were so egregious that they

fatally infected the proceedings and rendered his entire trial fundamentally unfair.”

Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). 

The Missouri Supreme Court found that the photographs were probative

because they “tended to corroborate the testimony of Robert Rousan, one of the state’s

key witnesses,” “assisted the jury in understanding the testimony of the pathologist”

and “assisted the state’s proof of deliberation” by showing that Grace Lewis was

bound and shot at close range, State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 844-45, and concluded

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that “this Court cannot say that the allegedly prejudicial impact of these photographs

outweighed their probative value [or that] the admission of the photographs caused the

jury to act on the basis of passion, rather than reason,” id. at 845. This was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See

Kuntzelman v. Black, 774 F.2d 291, 292-93 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding no

error of constitutional magnitude in the admission of “flagrantly gruesome”

photographs where the photographs “were at least arguably relevant and probative in

showing the identity and condition of the deceased, the location of the wound, and the

intent of [the petitioner] in firing the shot that killed [the victim]”). We also find that

the admission of the photographs, even if it had been erroneous, did not “fatally infect

the proceedings,” Anderson, 44 F.3d at 679, because “[t]he jury’s finding . . . clearly

rests on a substantial factual basis, even absent the photographic evidence in

controversy here,” Kuntzelman, 774 F.2d at 292. Therefore, the district court did not

err in denying habeas relief on this ground.

D. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel for Not Moving to Redact References

to Prior Convictions from Rousan’s Statement to Police

Rousan referred to his prior convictions in his videotaped confession to the

police. The police did not prompt Rousan to talk about the convictions; rather,

Rousan volunteered the information to explain how he had initially met the Lewises.

Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d at 590-91. The videotaped confession was played at trial,

and trial counsel objected to the inclusion of Rousan’s mention of his illegal drug use,

but not to Rousan’s references to his other prior convictions for assault, rape, unlawful

use of a weapon, and escape. Rousan argues that his trial counsel’s failure to move

to redact those references from the confession allowed the jury to convict him

improperly on the basis of his prior convictions.

In order to overturn a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the defendant must show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below the

standard of customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would

display and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been

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Rousan’s story to the police was as follows:

[Rousan] told the police that he had first met the victims in 1975. He

saw them again in 1989 after he escaped from custody in the State of

Washington and sought refuge at the Lewises’ farm. When Mr. Lewis

discovered [Rousan] hiding in his barn, he fed him, clothed him, and

when [Rousan] left the farm two weeks later, Mr. Lewis gave him twenty

dollars. Shortly after that time, [Rousan] was apprehended and returned

to prison.

After release from prison in June of 1993, [Rousan] returned to the farm

to thank Mr. and Mrs. Lewis for their kindness and to rekindle their

friendship, he said. According to [Rousan], Mrs. Lewis was in poor

health. [Rousan] explained that Mr. Lewis asked [Rousan] to kill Mrs.

Lewis to put her out of her misery and to kill him because he did not

want to live without his wife. [Rousan] also claimed that he was hired

by Charles Lewis, IV, son of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis, to kill them in

exchange for fifty-thousand dollars. [Rousan] maintained, however, that

his actual motivation for the murders was mercy.

State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 838-39.

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different but for the substandard actions of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

The Missouri Supreme Court found no reasonable probability that the failure

to move to redact the references to those prior convictions prejudiced Rousan because

(1) the jury already had learned of the prior convictions during voir dire and had been

given a limiting instruction that they could not use the convictions to determine guilt

or innocence, and (2) the objection would have been fruitless because the references

were necessary to explain the story Rousan told in his confession.2

 Rousan v. State,

48 S.W.3d at 590-91. The Missouri Supreme Court properly applied Strickland, and

its analysis was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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federal law. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying habeas relief on this

ground.

E. The Prosecutor’s Penalty Phase Closing Argument

During penalty-phase rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the

defense’s request for mercy. The prosecutor stated that “[m]ercy is good” but went

on to make the state’s argument that Rousan did not deserve mercy under the facts and

circumstances of the case. The prosecutor then concluded, “The defense has asked

you for mercy and what they are hoping for is weakness. . . . Weakness is something

we can no longer afford. Do your duty.” Rousan argues that the closing admonition

not to be “weak” improperly influenced the jury’s decision to recommend the death

penalty.

To grant habeas relief based on an inappropriate comment from a prosecutor,

the comment must be so inappropriate as to make the trial fundamentally unfair. See

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1986). There must be a “reasonable

probability” that the error affected the jury’s verdict and that without the error, the

jury’s verdict would have been different. Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328,

1336-37 (8th Cir. 1989).

The Missouri Supreme Court found that the prosecutor should have avoided

suggesting that the jury would be “weak” if it returned a certain verdict. However, the

Missouri Supreme Court found no reversible error because the statement was brief,

isolated, and followed a proper discussion of mercy and the jury’s role in sentencing.

State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 850-51. The Missouri Supreme Court did not act

contrary to, nor unreasonably apply, clearly established federal law in determining that

there was no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent

the prosecutor’s statement. See, e.g., Kinder, 272 F.3d at 551 (holding it was not an

unreasonable application of federal law for the Missouri Supreme Court to find no

reversible error where the prosecutor stated during penalty-phase argument that the

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defendant was “pure evil. Evil stares at you in the courtroom, and I ask you to stare

back and do not blink. . . . We don’t want to share our streets one day with evil. We

cannot risk one day sharing our lives and our world with evil.”). Therefore, the

district court did not err in denying habeas relief on this ground.

F. The Jury Instruction on Accomplice Liability

The general accomplice-liability jury instruction given in Rousan’s trial stated

that “[a] person is responsible . . . for the conduct of another person . . . if, for the

purpose of committing that offense, he aids or encourages the other person in

committing it.” Rousan argues that the jury could have used that instruction to ascribe

to Rousan liability for Brent’s commission of first-degree murder without a finding

that Rousan deliberated. To support a conviction for first-degree murder based on

accomplice liability, the deliberation element cannot be imputed; the state had to

prove deliberation by Rousan. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 841. 

Where the defendant alleges that jury instructions may have been erroneously

interpreted, the proper inquiry under federal law “is whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents

the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990). In conducting this analysis, the jury instructions must be

viewed as a whole. Id. at 378.

The instructions in this case are similar to those we considered in Johns v.

Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2000). The petitioner in Johns challenged a portion

of the jury instructions that required the jury to find only that either the defendant or

his accomplice acted with deliberation. Id. at 542-43. However, the verdict-directing

instruction also required a finding “that with the purpose of promoting or furthering

the commission of capital murder, the defendant acted together with or aided or

encouraged [the accomplice] in committing that offense.” Id. at 543 (emphasis

added). Applying the pre-AEDPA standard of review, we agreed with the Missouri

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Supreme Court that these instructions, viewed as a whole, “effectively required the

jury to find deliberation” by the petitioner. Id.

Similarly, in this case, the verdict-directing jury instructions for both firstdegree murder counts required the jury to find that “the defendant aided, or

encouraged [the murder] and did so after deliberation, which means cool reflection

upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief,” in order to find Rousan

guilty. See State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 847-48. The Missouri Supreme Court,

viewing the jury instructions as a whole, found no reasonable likelihood that the

general accomplice-liability instruction caused the jury to ignore the explicit

requirement for a finding of deliberation by Rousan in the verdict-directing

instructions. Id. As suggested by Johns, the Missouri Supreme Court’s conclusion

in this case was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in denying habeas

relief on this ground.

G. The Jury Instruction on Statutory Aggravating Circumstances

Rousan contends that the jury instruction on statutory aggravating

circumstances in the murder of Grace Lewis prejudicially confused the jury. Jury

Instruction No. 25 read as follows (emphasis added):

In determining the punishment to be assessed under Count I against

defendant for the murder of Grace Lewis, you must first unanimously

determine whether one or more of the following statutory aggravating

circumstances exists:

* * *

4. Whether the defendant directed Brent Rousan to murder Grace Lewis.

5. Whether the murder of Grace Lewis involved depravity of mind and

whether, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly

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The other three statutory aggravating circumstances that the jury found to exist

were a 1988 Washington conviction for rape, a 1998 Washington conviction for

assault and the fact that Rousan murdered Grace Lewis while he also was engaged in

the unlawful homicide of Charles Lewis. Rousan does not challenge the jury’s finding

on these three statutory aggravating circumstances.

4

An issue that receives plain-error review on direct appeal in state court is not

procedurally barred from review under the AEDPA. James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d

866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999).

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vile, horrible, and inhuman. You can make a determination of depravity

of mind only if you find:

That the defendant killed Grace Lewis after she was bound or otherwise

rendered helpless by defendant or Brent Rousan and that defendant

thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life.

The jury found the presence of five aggravating circumstances in the murder of

Grace Lewis, including the fourth and fifth aggravating circumstances as listed

above.3

 Rousan argues that the use of the word “killed” instead of “murdered” in

describing the fifth aggravating circumstance prejudicially confused the jury because

“killing,” unlike “murder,” could not be imputed to Rousan as an accomplice of Brent.

Rousan contends the jury was confused because it found that he both directed Brent

to commit the murder, as stated in the fourth aggravating circumstance, and “killed”

Grace Lewis himself, as stated in the fifth. Because Rousan did not object to the

instruction at trial, this claim was reviewed by the Missouri Supreme Court for plain

error resulting in manifest injustice.4

 State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 852.

Where a petitioner claims that an instruction confused the jury, federal law

requires the court to determine “whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). The

challenged instruction “must be considered in the context of the instructions as a

whole and the trial record.” Id.

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The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Rousan that the fourth and fifth

aggravating circumstances were inconsistent with each other. However, it found the

inconsistency would not undermine confidence in the jury’s penalty-phase

deliberations because:

The state’s theory throughout trial, the evidence, and the jury’s finding

at the close of the guilt phase supported a sole finding that appellant was

guilty of first degree murder as an accomplice; therefore, the statement

in the depravity of mind aggravator that “defendant killed Grace Lewis”

would be insufficient to confuse the jury as to the nature of appellant’s

involvement in the murders.

State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 853. The Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis of the

allegedly confusing jury instruction was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law.

The Missouri Supreme Court did invalidate the jury’s finding that the fifth

aggravating circumstance was present because there was insufficient evidence to show

Rousan “killed” Grace Lewis himself, rather than by imputation as an accomplice to

Brent. Id. However, that court found that even if the fourth and fifth aggravating

circumstances were both invalidated, the remaining three aggravating circumstances

found by the jury would still support the death sentence because, under Missouri law,

“only one valid aggravating circumstance need exist to uphold a death sentence.” Id.

Rousan contends that a death sentence premised on a jury’s finding of even one

invalid aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional because the invalid aggravating

circumstance may have skewed how the jury weighed aggravating and mitigating

evidence. We have long analyzed the effect of an invalid aggravating circumstance

on the constitutionality of a death sentence by first determining whether the defendant

was sentenced in a “weighing” or “non-weighing” state. See, e.g., Clay v. Bowersox,

367 F.3d 993, 1005 (8th Cir. 2004) (“In a nonweighing state such as Missouri, a

finding of one valid aggravating circumstance renders harmless the conclusion that

a second aggravating circumstance was constitutionally infirm.”); Sloan v. Delo, 54

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F.3d 1371, 1385 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1995). However, in a recently announced decision,

Brown v. Sanders, No. 04-980 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2006), the Supreme Court has stated that

the “weighing/non-weighing scheme is accurate as far as it goes, but it now seems to

us needlessly complex and incapable of providing for the full range of possible

variations” in state death-penalty sentencing procedures. Id., slip op. at 7. Instead,

“we are henceforth guided by the following rule: An invalidated sentencing factor

(whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by

reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing

process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give

aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances.” Id. at 7-8 (footnote

omitted). In other words, where the allegation of error is “the skewing that could

result from the jury’s considering as aggravation properly admitted evidence that

should not have weighed in favor of the death penalty,” id. at 8, constitutional error

occurs “only where the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the same facts

and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor,” id. at 9.

In addition to the narrow situation addressed in Sanders, the Court recognized that

constitutional error also may arise from “other distortions caused by the invalidated

factor beyond the mere addition of an improper aggravating element.” Id. at 8 n.6.

Analyzing California’s death-penalty sentencing procedure, the Supreme Court

noted that the jury first must find the existence of at least one statutory “eligibility

factor,” or “special circumstance” in the parlance of the California statute, to render

the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 9. If the jury finds one of these

eligibility factors, it then considers a separate list of “sentencing factors” in

determining whether the individual defendant merits the death penalty. The list of

sentencing factors directs the jury to consider, among other things, any special

circumstances found in the eligibility phase and the circumstances of the crime in

general. Id. at 9. The jury in habeas petitioner Sanders’s case found four special

circumstances to be present and pronounced a death sentence; two of the special

circumstances were later invalidated by the state supreme court. Id. at 10-11. The

Supreme Court found that the jury’s consideration of the two invalidated eligibility

factors did not render Sanders’s death sentence unconstitutional because at least one

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5

We would reach the same result under the previous weighing/non-weighing

jurisprudence. See Clay, 367 F.3d at 1005.

Contrary to Rousan’s argument, the presence of an aggravating-versusmitigating-factors weighing step anywhere in the jury instructions does not establish

Missouri as a “weighing state” under that framework. In this case, the jury was

required to find the existence of one of the listed statutory aggravating circumstances

as a necessary prelude to contemplating the death penalty, but it was then instructed

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eligibility factor was valid and “[a]ll of the aggravating facts and circumstances that

the invalidated factor permitted the jury to consider were also open to their proper

consideration under one of the other factors,” namely the general circumstances-ofthe-crime sentencing factor. Id. at 10.

 The Missouri death-penalty sentencing procedure has the same salient aspects

as the California scheme considered in Sanders. In Rousan’s case, Jury Instruction

No. 25 instructed the jury that “if you do not unanimously find from the evidence

beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the foregoing statutory aggravating

circumstances exists, you must return a verdict [of] imprisonment for life.” The

statutory aggravating factors fulfill the role of the “eligibility factors” described in

Sanders. Jury Instruction No. 26 instructed the jury that, in the event it had found the

presence of at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in Instruction

No. 25, it was then to consider all evidence from the guilt and penalty phases of the

trial and “decide whether there are facts and circumstances in aggravation of

punishment which, taken as a whole, warrant the imposition of a sentence of death

upon the defendant.” This is analogous to the general circumstances-of-the-crime

sentencing factor in Sanders.

We find that the fourth and fifth aggravating circumstances did not permit the

jury to consider any aggravating facts and circumstances that were not already “open

to their proper consideration” as stated in Jury Instruction No. 26. Sanders, slip op.

at 10. Thus “[t]he erroneous factor[s] could not have ‘skewed’ the sentence, and no

constitutional violation occurred.”5

 Id. Furthermore, we find no constitutional error

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to consider, or “weigh,” all facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether

the death penalty should apply. This establishes Missouri squarely as a non-weighing

state. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1992) (“[I]n Georgia [a nonweighing state], the jury must find the existence of one aggravating factor before

imposing the death penalty, but aggravating factors as such have no specific function

in the jury’s decision whether a defendant who has been found to be eligible for the

death penalty should receive it under all the circumstances of the case. Instead, under

the Georgia scheme, in making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes into

consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the

sentence phases of the trial. These circumstances relate both to the offense and the

defendant.”) (internal quotations omitted); Sloan, 54 F.3d at 1385-86 (“In a

nonweighing state such as Missouri, a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance

is a threshold requirement to imposing a death sentence. Here the jury found one

valid aggravating circumstance, that of multiple murders, and was free then to

consider all evidence in aggravation and mitigation.”)

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arising from any “other distortions caused by the invalidated factor.” Id. at 8 n.6; see

supra 14-17 (discussing Rousan’s claim that the invalid factor confused the jury).

We conclude that the Missouri Supreme Court did not act contrary to, nor

unreasonably apply, clearly established federal law in determining that the

inconsistent wording in the fifth aggravating circumstance did not prejudicially

confuse the jury’s death-penalty deliberations and that the first three aggravating

circumstances found by the jury were each sufficient to permit the jury to consider the

death penalty. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in denying habeas

relief on this ground. 

H. The Trial Court’s Refusal to Instruct on Specific Non-Statutory

Mitigating Circumstances

Missouri law lists seven specific mitigating circumstances that must be included

in the jury instructions in a death penalty case if suggested by the evidence. R.S. Mo.

§ 565.032.3. Rousan proposed two additional specific mitigating circumstances for

inclusion in the jury instructions that would have directed the jury to consider his

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6

Rousan also argues that his two proposed specific mitigating circumstances

should have been included in the instructions because they fit within two of

Missouri’s statutorily required mitigating circumstances. To the extent this claim

challenges the Missouri courts’ application of a Missouri statute, rather than alleging

a violation of Rousan’s constitutional rights, we cannot review it. See Lupien v.

Clarke, 403 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We may not review questions of state law

that have been decided by a state court, even under the deferential standard of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).”) (internal quotation omitted).

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“early life and upbringing” and the fact that “other participants in this crime have

received sentences of less than death.” The trial court rejected the two specific

additional mitigating circumstances. However, the instruction stated, “You shall also

consider any other facts or circumstances which you find from the evidence in

mitigation of punishment.” Rousan contends that the trial court’s rejection of his two

proffered specific circumstances violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.6

Once a jury has determined, through a process that channels and limits the

jury’s discretion to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary or

capricious manner, that a defendant is eligible for the death penalty, the jury must be

allowed to conduct “a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an

individualized determination” as to whether the death penalty is warranted in a

specific case. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998). “[T]he State may

shape and structure the jury’s consideration of mitigation so long as it does not

preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence.” Id. at 276.

There is no requirement that the jury be instructed on particular mitigating factors.

Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 232-33 (2000). “[T]he standard for determining

whether jury instructions satisfy these principles [is] ‘whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents

the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.’” Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276.

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The Missouri Supreme Court noted Rousan’s acknowledgment that it had

repeatedly rejected this argument in other cases, and it chose not to revisit the issue.

State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 849. We have previously agreed with the Missouri

Supreme Court’s determination that an essentially identical instruction “adequately

covered the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence and complied with

constitutional requirements for the submission of mitigating circumstances in death

penalty cases.” Tokar v. Bowersox, 198 F.3d 1039, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). Therefore,

we find that the refusal to list Rousan’s proffered specific mitigating circumstances

in the jury instructions was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. The district court did not err in denying habeas relief on this

ground.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court did not err in denying habeas relief on each

of the eight grounds for which Rousan was granted a certificate of appealability.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court denying the writ of habeas

corpus.

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