Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02989/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02989-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesse Lee Crawford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The HONORABLE ROBERT W. PRATT, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2989

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Jesse Lee Crawford, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2006

Filed: June 7, 2006 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

A jury found Jesse Lee Crawford guilty of conspiracy to distribute

methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), a Schedule I controlled substance

commonly known as ecstasy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846.

Crawford appeals his conviction, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because the

district court1

 erred in refusing to give two proposed jury instructions regarding

conspiracy issues. We affirm.

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The indictment charged Crawford and seven others with conspiracy to distribute

MDMA, cocaine, and marijuana in the Southern District of Iowa from May 1996 to

October 2002. At the February 2005 trial, California native Robert Morataya testified

that he began distributing marijuana to various Iowa customers while attending an

Iowa college in 1994. California associates continued to ship marijuana to Iowa

customers when Morataya moved to Spain in 1997. The group expanded its

operations to include cocaine in 1998 and commenced regular cocaine shipments to

their Iowa customers. Crawford met Morataya in California and agreed to transport

cocaine to Morataya in Spain in May 1999. After arriving in Spain, Crawford

accompanied Morataya to Amsterdam, where they established a Dutch source for

MDMA. Morataya testified that, between May and late October 1999, Crawford

transported 1000 MDMA pills from Spain to California for Morataya, some of which

were distributed in Iowa; received thousands of MDMA pills in California from

Morataya in Spain; made two more trips to Amsterdam with Morataya to buy MDMA

pills; and obtained 10,000 of the second 30,000-pill purchase. Crawford was arrested

in late October 1999 after pills addressed to him in California were seized at the JFK

Airport mail facility in New York. Morataya continued distributing MDMA in Iowa

and elsewhere until his arrest in October 2002.

At the close of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury, without

objection, that the essential elements of the charged conspiracy offense were that two

or more persons agreed to distribute MDMA or cocaine or marijuana, and that a

particular defendant knowingly joined in the agreement at some time while it was still

in effect. As there was no evidence linking Crawford to the distribution of marijuana,

the court, again without objection, submitted a verdict form asking whether Crawford

was guilty of “knowingly and intentionally distribut[ing] a controlled substance, as

charged in Count 1,” and if so, asking separately whether he conspired to distribute

MDMA and cocaine. The jury found Crawford guilty of conspiring to distribute

MDMA but not cocaine.

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On appeal, Crawford first argues that the district court abused its discretion in

refusing to give his proposed jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. The lengthy

proposal included an instruction that, “The common aim or purpose alleged in this

indictment is the distribution of MDMA, cocaine and marijuana.” (Emphasis added.)

Though that language accurately paraphrased the indictment, it is well settled that a

conspiracy to distribute more than one controlled substance may be charged in the

conjunctive -- MDMA, cocaine, and marijuana -- but submitted to the jury, as here,

in the disjunctive -- MDMA, cocaine, or marijuana. United States v. Barrios-Perez,

317 F.3d 777, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2003). Thus, Crawford’s proposed multiple

conspiracies instruction would have improperly instructed the jury to acquit, given the

absence of evidence linking him to marijuana distribution. Acknowledging that

multiple conspiracies was a legitimate issue, the government objected to the proposed

instruction and urged the court to give the multiple conspiracies instruction found in

Eighth Circuit Model Instruction 5.06G. The court did so, thereby avoiding the error

of law lurking in Crawford’s proposal. There was no abuse of discretion. The

instructions as a whole properly conveyed the law to be applied. See United States

v. Ryder, 414 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Crawford next argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to

give a purported theory-of-defense instruction that instructed the jury to determine

whether he was an “independent contractor,” as opposed to a “conspirator,” and

incorporated a multi-factor test that the Internal Revenue Service has adopted to

distinguish independent contractors from employees. This argument is without merit.

Crawford cites no authority for the contention, implicit in the proposed instruction,

that an independent contractor for tax purposes may never be a criminal conspirator.

The contention is absurd on its face. However the tax laws might describe Crawford’s

relationship to Morataya and other conspirators in business terms, the evidence was

more than sufficient to prove that Crawford knowingly joined a conspiracy to

distribute MDMA in the Southern District of Iowa and elsewhere. Thus, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the government’s objection to this

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proposed instruction. A defendant is only entitled to a theory of defense instruction

“if the evidence supports the proffered instruction, and the instruction correctly states

the law.” United States v. Ellerman, 411 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation

omitted).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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