Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03119/USCOURTS-caDC-23-03119-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry Bennet Ramey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-3119 September Term, 2024

 FILED ON: NOVEMBER 19, 2024 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

BARRY BENNET RAMEY, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:22-cr-00184-1) 

Before: KATSAS, Circuit Judge, and GINSBURG and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges. 

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was presented to the court and briefed and argued by counsel. The Court has 

accorded the issues full consideration and determined that they do not warrant a published 

opinion, see Fed. R. App. P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d), and it is now 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the conviction on Count Three and the sentence 

imposed by the district court on July 7, 2023, be affirmed. 

I 

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Barry Ramey of seven counts for his actions 

around the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021. Relevant here are Counts Two and Three of Mr. 

Ramey’s indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Specifically, the district court found that 

Mr. Ramey had assaulted Capitol Police Officer David Riggleman by spraying him with a 

chemical irritant or pepper spray, and that Mr. Ramey assaulted Capitol Police Officer Bryant 

Williams by “intentionally attempt[ing] to spray” him with a chemical irritant spray. The district 

court therefore found Mr. Ramey twice guilty of violating § 111(a) but did not find Mr. Ramey 

guilty of committing these assaults with a deadly or dangerous weapon, § 111(b). See United States 

USCA Case #23-3119 Document #2085500 Filed: 11/19/2024 Page 1 of 3
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v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (interpreting § 111(b) to define “dangerous weapon” 

as either an object that is “inherently deadly” or one that “must be capable of causing serious bodily 

injury or death” and which the defendant uses “in that manner”).

At sentencing, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement pursuant to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines for use of a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (“Dangerous 

weapon has the meaning given that term in § 1B1.1, Application Note 1, and includes any 

instrument that is not ordinarily used as a weapon . . . if such an instrument is involved in the 

offense with the intent to commit bodily injury” (cleaned up)). Relying on its earlier finding that 

Mr. Ramey caused bodily injury to the officers, the district court concluded that the sentencing 

enhancement was warranted. After analyzing the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 

the district court sentenced Mr. Ramey to 60 months in prison. This sentence was below the 87 to 

108 month sentence range advised by the Sentencing Guidelines with the dangerous weapon 

enhancement and even below the 63 to 78 month sentence range advised by the Sentencing 

Guidelines without that enhancement.1

II

On appeal, Mr. Ramey argues (1) the district court erred in imposing the § 2A2.2 

enhancement, and (2) the Government presented insufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Ramey 

assaulted Officer Williams. As to the first issue, the district court’s application of § 2A2.2 to the 

facts at issue here plainly comports with the sentencing guidelines. In any event, even if Mr. Ramey 

were correct that the district court erred by applying the enhancement for use of a dangerous 

weapon, the Government correctly argues the error was harmless. See Williams v. United States, 

503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (a district court’s misapplication of the guidelines is harmless where it 

“did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed”); United States v. Simpson, 

430 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (non-constitutional error is harmless if it did not have a 

“substantial and injurious effect” on the length of the sentence). The district court made clear it 

would have imposed the same 60-month sentence “even if it had reached a different conclusion on 

the dangerous weapon . . . enhancement that it had decided in the government’s favor.” Nor is 

there any indication in the record that the district court’s reason for sentencing Mr. Ramey below 

the Guidelines range would change if it did not consider the dangerous weapon enhancement; the 

court wanted to align Mr. Ramey’s sentence with those imposed in other similar cases rather than 

with only the Guidelines range. Indeed, the sentence imposed by the district court is below that 

advised in the Sentencing Guidelines even without the enhancement. 

As to the second issue, having considered the evidence in the record — in particular, video 

evidence of Mr. Ramey spraying a substance at Officer Williams, see Gov. Ex. 200 — we conclude 

that a rational trier of fact could find that Mr. Ramey attempted to spray Officer Williams with 

pepper spray and is therefore guilty of violating § 111(a). See United States v. Boyd, 803 F.3d 690, 

692 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

1 Despite the 108-month maximum sentence advised by the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentence 

was capped at 96 months by statute. 18 U.S.C § 111(a). 

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* * * 

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed 

to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition 

for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41. 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk 

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