Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02277/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02277-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Gene Furqueron
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2277

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

James Gene Furqueron, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2010

Filed: May 24, 2010

___________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge,1

 BRIGHT and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

James Gene Furqueron pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The district court

determined that Furqueron was subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and the related section of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), § 4B1.4, after finding that he had three

prior convictions for violent felonies. Furqueron appeals from his sentence,

contending that his convictions for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, in

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violation of Minnesota Statutes § 609.487 subdivision 3 (2006), and escape from

custody, in violation of Minnesota Statutes § 609.485 subdivisions 2(1) and 4(1)

(1988), do not constitute violent felonies. We reverse and remand.

I.

Furqueron’s presentence investigation report listed a litany of prior convictions,

including three it identified as violent felonies under the ACCA: fleeing a peace

officer in a motor vehicle, escape from custody, and second-degree attempted

homicide. The report determined that Furqueron was subject to the ACCA’s fifteenyear mandatory minimum sentence. The report calculated Furqueron’s base offense

level and criminal history category under the USSG’s armed career criminal section,

§ 4B1.4, and concluded that the sentencing range was 180 to 188 months’

imprisonment. Furqueron objected to the report’s determination that he had three

predicate offenses under the ACCA, conceding only that the second-degree attempted

homicide conviction was a violent felony.

The district court adopted the presentence investigation report’s findings, ruled

that Furqueron was subject to the ACCA’s enhanced sentence because his convictions

for fleeing and escape constituted violent felonies, and sentenced Furqueron to fifteen

years’ imprisonment. 

II. 

The ACCA mandates a minimum fifteen-year term of imprisonment for a

defendant who has been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who

previously has been convicted of three violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1). We

recently held that the crime of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, in violation

of Minnesota Statutes § 609.487 subdivision 3, does not constitute a crime of violence

under the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.

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Section 2K2.1(a)(2) assigns a base offense level of twenty-four to a defendant

who committed the charged offense “subsequent to sustaining at least two felony

convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Section

2K2.1(a)(4) assigns a base offense level of twenty to a defendant with only one

previous felony conviction for a crime of violence. 

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2009). We recognize the term “violent felony” under the ACCA as synonymous with

the term “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2. United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969,

971 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the relevant definitions of the two terms are “virtually

identical”). Furqueron’s conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle thus

cannot serve as a basis for a sentence under the ACCA or USSG § 4B1.4. 

This holding removes Furqueron from the armed career criminal classification

because he has been convicted of at most two violent felonies. Whether Furqueron’s

escape conviction is a violent felony, or in sentencing guidelines parlance, a crime of

violence, remains justiciable. See United States v. Clinkscale, 559 F.3d 815, 817 (8th

Cir. 2009) (concluding that the defendant was not an armed career criminal because

his motor vehicle theft conviction was not a violent felony and deciding the issue

whether his terroristic threats conviction constituted a crime of violence). If

Furqueron’s felony escape conviction is a crime of violence, he is subject to a higher

base offense level on remand than if he has only one predicate conviction.2

 The same

analysis applies to determine whether a conviction constitutes a violent felony under

the ACCA as applies to determine whether it is a crime of violence under the USSG,

see Williams, 537 F.3d at 971, and the parties have fully briefed the issue whether

Furqueron’s escape conviction constitutes a violent felony. We thus reach the merits

of Furqueron’s argument. 

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III.

Section 4B1.2(a) of the USSG defines a crime of violence as any offense

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that “(1) has as an element

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.” To determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction falls

within the “otherwise” clause, “we must consider whether it poses a similar degree of

risk of physical injury and whether it typically involves conduct that is similarly

purposeful, violent and aggressive when compared to the conduct involved in its

closest analogue among the example crimes.” United States v. Gordon, 557 F.3d 623,

625 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137

(2008)). 

In conducting the analysis, we apply a categorical approach, looking to the

elements of the offense to determine whether the conviction constitutes a crime of

violence. Id. If the statute is overinclusive, covering offenses that would constitute

crimes of violence, as well as offenses that would not, we apply a modified categorical

approach, which allows a court to “refer to the charging document, the terms of a plea

agreement, jury instructions, or comparable judicial records to determine” whether the

prior conviction is a crime of violence. United States v. Pearson, 553 F.3d 1183, 1186

(8th Cir. 2009). 

Furqueron was convicted of escape from custody, in violation of Minnesota

Statutes 609.485 subdivision 2(1) (1988), which prohibits “[e]scapes while held in

lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime.” He was sentenced under

subdivision 4(1), which provides a term of imprisonment of not more than five years

and a fine of not more than $10,000 “[i]f the person who escapes is in lawful custody

on a charge or conviction of a felony.” The statute defines “escape” as including

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“departure without lawful authority and failure to return to custody following

temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.” Id. subd. 1. The

Minnesota statute thus criminalizes conduct ranging from a jail break to failing to

return to custody after furlough. 

In Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009), the Supreme Court held

that a conviction for failure to report to a penal institution was not a violent felony

under the ACCA. We have recognized that Chambers “overrule[d] our precedent that

all escape offenses are crimes of violence, including failures to return or report to

custody” but “[left] intact our precedent holding that escape from penal custody is a

crime of violence.” United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2009); see

Pearson, 553 F.3d at 1186 (remanding for a determination of whether the escape

conviction “was a career-offender-qualifying escape from custody or a non-qualifying

failure to return or report to custody”). The Minnesota escape statute criminalizes

multiple offenses, including escapes that no longer constitute crimes of violence. E.g.,

State v. Beito, 332 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1983) (failure to return from work

release); Headbird v. State, 375 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (failure to

report to halfway house after treatment program while on furlough); State v. L’Italien,

363 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (failure to return from furlough).

Accordingly, the statute is overinclusive, and Furqueron’s conviction is subject to

analysis under the modified categorical approach.

Although the charging document is not in the record, Furqueron does not

challenge the summary thereof set forth in the presentence investigation report:

Furqueron escaped from a county jail by exiting a security door that was ajar and that

should have been closed. See United States v. Clark, 563 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.

2009) (concluding that the district court properly relied on undisputed facts in the

presentence investigation report in applying the modified categorical approach).

Furqueron thus escaped from the secure custody of a penal institution, an offense that

remains a crime of violence after Chambers. 

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Furqueron contends that his escape was a “walkaway” escape and as such does

not constitute a crime of violence. See United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 874 (11th

Cir. 2009) (holding that a nonviolent walkaway escape from halfway house does not

constitute a violent felony); United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 425-26 (6th Cir.

2009) (holding that leaving custody in a non-secured setting by walking away is not

a crime of violence); United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 382-83 (7th Cir.

2008) (noting that a “prisoner’s walkaway from a halfway house or a camp that lacks

fences” is a form of escape and holding that a walkaway is not a crime of violence).

See generally United States v. Jackson, 594 F.3d 1027, 1029-30 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010)

(recognizing that the Eighth Circuit has not yet determined whether a walkaway

escape qualifies as a crime of violence in light of Chambers and Begay). Furqueron’s

offense, however, was not a walkaway escape from a halfway house or some other

non-secured setting. Rather, he escaped from a county jail by taking advantage of a

security breach. 

Furqueron’s escape conviction is roughly similar to burglary, posing a similar

degree of risk of physical injury and involving purposeful, aggressive conduct. Like

burglary, escape from a secured setting is “a stealth crime that is likely to cause an

eruption of violence if and when it is detected.” United States v. Pratt, 568 F.3d 11,

22 (1st Cir. 2009). “The main risk of burglary arises not from the simple physical act

of wrongfully entering onto another’s property, but rather from the possibility of a

face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party.” James v. United

States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) (holding that attempted burglary under Florida law

is a violent felony). Similarly, the main risk of escape from a penal institution arises

not from leaving custody, but from the possibility of being discovered in the act of

escaping. Furqueron’s escape conviction also involved the “more aggressive

behavior” of escape from custody, not the passive behavior involved in failing to

report. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691 (“The behavior that likely underlies a failure to

report would seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive,

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more aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody.”); see also Pratt, 568

F.3d at 22 (holding that the defendant’s escape from a county jail “by crawling under

a fence and leaving the area” constituted a violent felony within the meaning of the

ACCA). Applying the modified categorical approach, we hold that Furqueron’s

conviction for escape from a penal institution, in violation of Minnesota Statutes

609.485 subdivisions 2(1) and 4(1) (1988), constitutes a crime of violence for

purposes of the sentencing guidelines. 

Conclusion

Furqueron’s sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court

for resentencing.

RILEY, Chief Judge, concurring.

I concur because United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2009) and

our prior precedent rule compel reversal. See Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th

Cir. 1987) (“One panel of this Court is not at liberty to disregard a precedent handed

down by another panel.”).

In my view, Tyler was wrongly decided because fleeing a peace officer in a

motor vehicle, Minn. Stat. § 609.487(3), involves the purposeful, violent, and

aggressive conduct discussed in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-45 (2008)

(contrasting crimes involving purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct from crimes

such as drunk driving, which are more comparable to “crimes that impose strict

liability, criminalizing conduct in respect to which the offender need not have any

criminal intent at all”) and Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct.

687, 692 (2009) (addressing passive crimes such as failing to report or return to law

enforcement custody and saying, “While an offender who fails to report must of

course be doing something at the relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the

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something poses a serious potential risk of physical injury.”). Fleeing a peace officer

in a motor vehicle shadows the “more aggressive behavior” of escape from custody.

See Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691 (“The behavior that likely underlies a failure to report

would seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more

aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody.”). Before Tyler, we

implicitly recognized the purposeful, violent, and aggressive nature of fleeing a peace

officer in a motor vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Kendrick, 423 F.3d 803, 809

(8th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder the stress and urgency which will naturally attend his

situation, a person fleeing law enforcement will likely drive recklessly and turn any

pursuit into a high-speed chase with the potential for serious harm to police or

innocent bystanders.”) (internal marks omitted). That is why nearly every circuit

court of appeals to consider similarly worded statutes disagrees with Tyler. See

United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 588-97 & nn.3 & 7 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding

Wisconsin’s vehicular-fleeing offense, Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), qualified as a violent

felony after collecting cases from the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh

Circuits, and declaring “our conclusion here . . . actually parts company with just one

circuit, the Eighth, in Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726”). Cf. United States v. Harrison, 558

F.3d 1280, 1290-1301 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding Florida’s willful fleeing statute is not

a violent felony based upon the specific facts of the case).

The en banc court may wish to bring our precedent back in line with the

Supreme Court and our sister circuits. See, e.g., Owens v. Miller (In re Miller), 276

F.3d 424, 428-29 (8th Cir. 2002) (“‘As an appellate court, we strive to maintain

uniformity in the law among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus

avoiding unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court docket.’” (quoting United States

v. Auginash, 266 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 2001))).

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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the fine opinion of Judge Wollman, and I disagree with my

respected colleague Chief Judge Riley that this court wrongly decided Tyler. 

I recognize that we generally do not look at the specific facts of a prior

conviction when deciding whether it qualifies as a crime of violence. See Tyler, 580

F.3d at 725. But I write separately to express that when sentencing Furqueron on

remand, the district court may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) whether

Furqueron’s escape from a county jail posed an actual threat of violence to anyone.

The judge may sentence the offender below the guidelines, taking the § 3553(a)

factors into account and exercising informed discretion. 

______________________________

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