Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01562/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01562-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cardpool, Inc.
Appellant
Plastic Jungle, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CARDPOOL, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC., NKA CARDFLO, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1562

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 3:12-cv-04182-

WHA, Judge William H. Alsup.

______________________ 

Decided: April 5, 2016

______________________ 

JASON F. HOFFMAN, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented 

by JOHN P. MOY, EDWARD A. PENNINGTON, SEAN PHELAN, 

Smith Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Washington, DC; JAMES 

S. MCDONALD, Blackhawk Network, Pleasanton, CA.

MARC BELLOLI, Feinberg Day Alberti & Thompson 

LLP, Menlo Park, CA, argued for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by JEREMIAH A. ARMSTRONG, NICKOLAS 

BOHL, ELIZABETH DAY; THOMAS RICHARD BURNS, JR., 

Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, LLP, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Case: 14-1562 Document: 48-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/05/2016
2 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Cardpool, Inc., appeals the ruling of the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of California, 

denying the joint motion of Cardpool and Plastic Jungle, 

Inc. to vacate the district court’s judgment1 of patent 

invalidity insofar as the judgment was with prejudice.2 

The parties’ stated reason for the requested vacatur was 

that all of the Cardpool patent claims had been replaced 

on reexamination, and that Plastic Jungle (now operating 

as CardFlo, Inc.) was no longer conducting the accused 

infringing activities. Cardpool Dist. Dk. 89 at 2 (May 13, 

2014) (“it is CardFlo’s representation that it is no longer 

in the business of computer-implemented, online gift card 

exchange . . . . As a result, Plaintiff believes this case is 

no longer viable or necessary at this time.”). We affirm

the district court’s denial of vacatur, because the denial is 

within the district court’s discretion and also because the 

premise of the motion is both speculative and inaccurate: 

the district court’s final judgment as to an original group

of claims does not automatically render that judgment res 

judicata as to new claims granted upon reexamination. 

BACKGROUND

Cardpool sued Plastic Jungle for infringement of U.S. 

Patent No. 7,494,048 entitled “System and Method for 

Brand Name Gift Card Exchange” (the ’048 patent). 

Plastic Jungle’s defenses were that the claims in suit are

 

1 Cardpool, Inc., v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., No. 3:12-cv04182-WHA, 2013 WL 245026 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) 

(finding invalidity under section 101).

2 Cardpool, Inc., v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., No. 3:12-cv04182-WHA, Supplemental Joint Case Management 

Statement, Dk. 89 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014). In the 

remainder of this opinion, district court documents will be 

cited as: Cardpool Dist. Dk. [##] at [page] (filing date).

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CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 3

invalid on the ground of obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103

(2006), and that the claimed subject matter is patentineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court agreed 

as to ineligibility under section 101, and on this ground 

the court granted Plastic Jungle’s motion to dismiss the 

suit with prejudice under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Cardpool 

appealed to the Federal Circuit on February 12, 2013.

Before that appeal was decided, in June 2013 Cardpool filed a request for ex parte reexamination in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 304. For reexamination, Cardpool

presented both amended and additional claims, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(e) (2013), alongside certain 

claims that stood unamended. Cardpool provided the 

Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) with the invalidity 

contentions made by Plastic Jungle before the district 

court, along with a copy of the foreign prior art Plastic 

Jungle cited. Reexamination was ordered by the PTO.

Before reexamination was completed, on January 30, 

2014 the Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion under 

Federal Circuit Rule 36 the district court’s judgment of 

ineligibility under section 101. Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic 

Jungle, Inc., 552 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014). On February 6, 2014, the PTO issued a notice of intent to issue 

an ex parte reexamination certificate. The Ex Parte 

Reexamination Certificate was issued on February 27, 

2014, holding amended claims 1, 2–7, and 9–11, and new 

claims 12–52, patentable under section 103. See

37 C.F.R. § 1.552 (section 101 eligibility is not considered 

on reexamination). 

Cardpool then filed a petition for rehearing of the 

Federal Circuit’s decision of January 30, 2014, asking this 

court to vacate our affirmance of the district court decision of section 101 ineligibility because the claims that 

were the subject of that decision no longer existed. Cardpool stated: 

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4 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

Because the District Court’s decision dismissing 

the case under Rule 12(b)(6) as not claiming statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was 

based on the original Asserted Claims that no 

longer exist and have been superseded by the 

amended Asserted Claims, the District Court decision is moot and must be vacated. Not doing so 

would create the improper ruling that an intervening final PTO decision is not controlling of a 

still pending District Court case—directly in conflict with Federal Circuit precedent. Accordingly, 

this petition should be granted to allow rehearing 

consistent with Federal Circuit precedent.

Pet. for Reh’g, No. 2013-1227, ECF No. 53 at 2-3 (Feb. 28, 

2014).

Plastic Jungle, in response to the request for rehearing, argued to this court that “the entire case is moot” 

because the reexamination “substantially changed” the 

claims at issue, requiring that “the prior rulings must be 

vacated and the case dismissed.” Response to Petition for 

Panel Rehearing, Appeal No. 2013–1227 Dk. 58 at 2. 

Cardpool replied that, while the district court’s decision of 

section 101 unpatentability had been rendered “moot” by 

the reexamination, the underlying cause of action was not 

moot because infringement might be renewed by Plastic 

Jungle or a successor to Plastic Jungle. Reply, Appeal No. 

2013–1227 Dk. 60 at 3–5. Cardpool stated that the validity of the reexamined claims had not been evaluated by 

any court, and asked that the district court decision of 

invalidity be vacated as moot. 

The Federal Circuit then granted rehearing, vacated 

its summary affirmance of section 101 invalidity, and 

remanded to the district court “to determine what actions, if any, are appropriate in light of the reexamined 

claims.” Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., 564 F. 

App’x 582, 583 (Fed. Cir. 2014). However, the Federal 

Circuit declined to vacate the district court’s invalidity 

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CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 5

judgment of January 22, 2013, stating that “it would not 

be appropriate in this context to vacate the district court’s 

judgment because Cardpool, the losing party below, 

caused the change in circumstances.” Id. 

On return to the district court, Cardpool and Plastic 

Jungle jointly moved the district court to vacate its prior 

judgment so that the parties could move for a voluntary 

dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 

Cardpool Dist. Dk. 89 at 3 (May 13, 2014). The joint 

motion stated:

Once the Court vacates its order, the parties have 

stipulated to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) . . . . Because all of 

the Asserted Claims were amended during reexamination or depend from an amended claim—

and because the Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 

was entirely based on the unamended Asserted 

Claims, the parties agree that the Court’s earlier 

decision should be vacated without need for the 

Court or the parties to expend additional resources briefing the matter.

Id. The parties jointly stated that Plastic Jungle was no 

longer in the business of computer-implemented online 

gift card exchange, that Cardpool questioned Plastic 

Jungle’s solvency, and that Cardpool did not believe the 

case was viable or necessary at that time. Id. at 2. The

parties also jointly stated that: 

The parties are not seeking to vacate the Court’s 

Order finding the unamended claims invalid . . . . 

Rather, the parties request that the Court vacate 

the judgment because the prior Order no longer 

applies because the claims on which that Order 

was based are now different.

Cardpool Dist. Dk. 92 at 1 (May 29, 2014). The joint 

motion was signed by Brian E. Mitchell, counsel of record

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6 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

for Cardpool, and Marc Belloli, counsel of record for 

Plastic Jungle.

Cardpool filed a separate brief to the district court, 

stating that while the basis for the district court’s prior 

invalidity judgment was mooted by the changed claims on 

reexamination, the “entire case” is not moot because it 

might become necessary in the future to enforce the 

reexamined patent against Plastic Jungle (or a successor), 

should infringing activity reoccur. Cardpool Dist. Dk. 93 

at 3–5 (May 29, 2014). Cardpool asked the district court 

to “either (1) vacate its dismissal with prejudice to allow 

the parties to dismiss without prejudice; or (2) vacate the 

dismissal to the extent that it was with prejudice and 

dismiss this case without prejudice.” Id. at 7 (emphasis 

removed). 

Cardpool told the district court that the case was not 

“settled”—although the district court had so stated—and 

argued that vacatur of “with prejudice” was appropriate

because the “final PTO judgment” on reexamination was 

issued before “the appellate mandate that would have 

finalized the interim district court decision,” citing the 

authority of Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 

F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013), in which this court held 

that “the statute requires that a final PTO decision affirmed by this court be given effect in pending infringement cases that are not yet final,” and is not affected by a 

subsequent final court ruling contrary to the PTO ruling. 

Cardpool Dist. Dk. 93 at 1–2 (May 29, 2014). 

Cardpool told the district court that if the “with prejudice” quality of the judgment of invalidity of the original 

claims were not vacated, Cardpool may lose the right to 

“file a new case at any time against Plastic Jungle asserting the reexamined claims.” Id. at 4.

The district court declined the requested vacatur,

stating that Fresenius was distinguishable in that no 

Article III court had reviewed the Cardpool reexamined 

claims. Cardpool Dist. Dk. 94 at 7 (May 30, 2014). “Just 

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CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 7

because a PTO examiner allowed the amended claims 

does not mean the reexamination certificate can displace 

a district court judgment following a contested motion to 

dismiss . . . . The judgment (and order) are a part of the 

history of the asserted patent and cannot be removed by 

some joint request for vacatur.” Id. “Since the mootness 

was due to a voluntary act by Cardpool (the losing party), 

vacating the final judgment is not appropriate.” Id. at 8. 

“This order finds that it would be against the public 

interest for Cardpool (the losing party) to displace our 

final judgment by simply commencing an ex parte agency 

reexamination and amending its invalid claims.” Id. at 9.

Cardpool again appeals, stating that the “district 

court position [is] incorrect in this case,” citing this court’s 

prior decision on the matter. Cardpool Br. 12. Cardpool

asks this court to vacate the district court’s “with prejudice” judgment of unpatentability, stating that the parties 

had agreed and jointly moved for vacatur of the final 

judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and further 

argues that the “with prejudice” aspect of the district 

court’s ruling is “superfluous” for the claims that had been 

before the district court no longer exist. Id. at 7, 9. 

Cardpool states that while “the appeal of the unpatentability finding had become moot [] the civil case was certainly still alive [although] it became financially 

unattractive from a business standpoint . . . .” Id. at 15. 

Plastic Jungle now opposes the requested vacatur, despite 

having joined in the motion for vacatur. See generally 

Plastic Jungle Br.

DISCUSSION

Standard of review

A district court’s denial of a motion to vacate its judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), is reviewed on the procedural

standards of the regional circuit, while any aspects of the 

motion that are unique to patent law are reviewed in 

accordance with Federal Circuit law. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. 

of Trs. v. VanVoorhies, 342 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 

Case: 14-1562 Document: 48-2 Page: 7 Filed: 04/05/2016
8 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

2003); Lazare Kaplan International, Inc. v. Photoscribe 

Technologies, Inc., 714 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the 

Ninth Circuit, the relevant regional circuit in this appeal, 

a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Asarco Inc., 430 

F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005). In reviewing discretionary 

rulings, the Ninth Circuit determines whether the district 

court applied an incorrect legal rule or whether the district court’s application of the law to the facts was “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may 

be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v. 

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 

(internal quotation marks and numbering omitted) (quoting” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 

577 (1985)). 

The Supreme Court counsels that “vacatur must be 

decreed for those judgments whose review 

is . . . ‘prevented through happenstance’—that is to say, 

where a controversy presented for review has ‘become 

moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the 

parties.’” U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 

513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)). Applying this 

precedent, the Ninth Circuit holds that “when an appellant renders his appeal moot by his own act, our established procedure is not to vacate the district court’s 

decision automatically, but to remand so the district court 

can decide whether to vacate its judgment in light of ‘the 

consequences and attendant hardships of dismissal or 

refusal to dismiss’ and ‘the competing values of finality of 

judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes.’” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1370–71 (9th Cir. 

1995) (quoting Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. W. Conference 

of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982), and stating that “Ringsby is wholly consistent with the ‘equitable 

tradition of vacatur’ reflected in U.S. Bancorp.”).

The Federal Circuit conformed to this procedure in 

remanding to the district court, which Cardpool does not 

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CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 9

contest. Instead, Cardpool appeals the district court’s 

denial of vacatur “with prejudice.” 

Cardpool’s arguments

Cardpool argues that the entire case is not “moot,” for 

it was not settled and there had been no ruling on the 

validity and infringement of the reexamined claims. 

Cardpool states that the case never became moot, although the district court’s initial unpatentability ruling 

became moot because the claims that were the subject of 

that ruling do not exist “in the same form.” Cardpool Br. 

15.

Cardpool argues that in applying the Ninth Circuit 

equitable standards to the special circumstance of the 

substantial revision of patent claims upon reexamination, 

it would be inequitable to preserve the final judgment 

“with prejudice” because the subject of that judgment no 

longer exists. Id. at 22–23. Cardpool states that the 

judgment with prejudice could “improvidently strip patent 

rights from Cardpool through the res judicata effect.” Id.

at 23.

In support of this concern, Cardpool points to this 

court’s decision in Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., holding that a settlement and resultant dismissal with prejudice was res judicata against a later suit 

when infringement reoccurred, although the claims were 

different due to reexamination. 672 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). The Aspex court determined that the 

reexamined claims were simply “new versions” and not

“materially different” from an original claim, and thus did 

not “create a new legal right against infringement that 

Aspex lacked under the original version of the patent.” Id.

at 1342. The Aspex court ruled that Aspex was estopped 

by res judicata from suing for infringement of the reexamined claims.

Cardpool argues that the district court’s dismissal

with prejudice, paired with the broad statements in Aspex,

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10 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

could result in Cardpool being barred from enforcing its 

reexamined claims against Plastic Jungle or a successor to

Plastic Jungle, should infringing activity be renewed. 

Cardpool Br. 24. Cardpool states that the district court 

did not properly exercise its discretion in declining to 

vacate the “with prejudice” aspect of its prior decision. Id. 

Had the district court done so, Cardpool continues, it

would have eliminated debate about whether Aspex applied on the facts of this case. Id. at 24–25.

Cardpool urges that this case is distinguished from 

Aspex because the PTO’s issuance of the Reexamination 

Certificate was an interpretation or application of federal 

law, and must be given retroactive effect because the 

infringement suit was still pending on appeal. Id. at 2. 

Cardpool argues that the district court erred in law, 

because “the controlling interpretation of federal law. . . 

must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open 

on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of 

the rule.” Id. (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 

509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). The Court requires that this 

principle “applies with equal force where the change is 

made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to 

legislative authorization.” Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 

U.S. 268, 282 (1969).

Cardpool also criticizes the district court for “fail[ing]

to consider the case under the reexamined claims.” Cardpool Br. 21. Cardpool states that the district court “committed legal error in not giving full effect to the 

reexamined amended claims . . . and by denying the

motion to vacate without reconsideration of the basis in 

view of the amended reexamined claims.” Id. at 22. 

Cardpool stresses that it requested such review, Cardpool

Br. 2, and faults the district court’s statement that “[i]t is 

not necessary to [consider the reexamination claims] 

because the instant motion is to vacate an earlier final 

judgment.” Cardpool Dist. Dk. 94 at 10 (May 30, 2014).

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CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 11

Plastic Jungle’s argument

The record contains the joint motion of Cardpool and 

Plastic Jungle, signed by both parties, requesting that “the 

Judgment dismissing this case with prejudice should now 

be vacated.” Cardpool Dist. Dk. 92 at 2 (May 29, 2014). 

Nonetheless, Plastic Jungle now argues against Cardpool’s 

request, although Cardpool requests no more than what 

Plastic Jungle had jointly urged. Plastic Jungle does not 

explain its changed position; instead, Plastic Jungle 

accuses Cardpool of “procedural games,” and states that 

“any ‘harm’ that may result to Cardpool by virtue of res 

judicata is self-inflicted and not ripe for review by this 

Court.” Plastic Jungle Br. 9–10. Cardpool replies that it 

“is not at fault for mooting the cause of action in any way 

and has consistently made all efforts to preserve its 

rights.” Cardpool Reply 14. 

Before we address the merits of Cardpool’s arguments, 

we must reject several of Plastic Jungle’s arguments as 

unsupported or estopped. Although the record shows 

Cardpool’s request that the district court review the 

reexamined claims if disinclined to grant vacatur, Plastic 

Jungle states that Cardpool “steadfastly refused to 

demonstrate to the district court why its new and amended claims are valid under section 101.” Plastic Jungle Br. 

9–10. This statement is not readily reconciled with Cardpool’s brief to the district court, which stated that “if the 

Court is inclined to apply its prior invalidity decision to 

the amended reexamined claims in justification of not 

vacating its dismissal, such a determination must not be 

done in a cursory manner but with a full opportunity of 

the parties to provide briefing and argument.” Cardpool

Dist. Dk. 93 at 5–6 (May 29, 2014).

We discern no error in the district court’s action in declining to review the reexamined claims, for the parties 

jointly moved for dismissal on the ground that Plastic 

Jungle was no longer conducting the accused activity and 

that the case was moot. Plastic Jungle does not explain 

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12 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

how the district court would have (or could have) reviewed 

the new claims when there was no remaining controversy 

about infringement. 

Plastic Jungle’s other arguments are similarly unsupported. Plastic Jungle states that the district court denied 

the joint motion to vacate “because Cardpool failed to 

demonstrate that the new and amended claims substantially differed from the claims already rejected by the 

Court under Section 101.” Plastic Jungle Br. 12. No such 

reason appears in the district court’s opinion. What is 

more, Plastic Jungle criticizes as “duplicitous” Cardpool’s 

argument of the “alleged mootness of the district court’s 

invalidity order.” Id. at 13. That argument contradicts 

Plastic Jungle’s representation that because of mootness 

“Cardpool’s lawsuit, based on now cancelled claims, must 

be dismissed . . . . Thus, the prior rulings must be vacated and the case dismissed.” Id. at 2. Plastic Jungle offers 

no explanation of its contradictory position in which it now 

states that the case is not “moot” and thus vacatur is 

improper.

Plastic Jungle’s prior statements to this court were 

that “the entire case was mooted,” that “this cause of 

action is extinguished—neither party appears to dispute 

that,” and that “all causes of action stemming from [the 

reexamined patent] are necessarily mooted.” Response to 

Combined Petition for Rehearing and Hearing En Banc, 

Appeal No. 2013-1227 Dk. 58 at 2, 4, 6 (filed March 21, 

2014). Plastic Jungle is judicially estopped from taking 

this change of position, on which this court relied in remanding to the district court. See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. 

Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel is that where a party successfully 

urges a particular position in a legal proceeding, it is 

estopped from taking a contrary position in a subsequent 

proceeding where its interests have changed.” (citations 

omitted)).

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CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 13

Analysis

The parties mutually agreed to discontinue this litigation because the accused activities had been voluntarily 

terminated by Plastic Jungle. The only issue on appeal

arises from Cardpool’s concern that it not be estopped 

from acting in the future against any infringement upon 

the new reexamined claims. 

The district court based its denial of the motion to vacate or change the finality of its decision on straightforward principles of judicial process. Federal courts are 

precluded from deciding “questions that cannot affect the 

rights of litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Whenever an action 

loses its “character as a present live controversy” during 

the course of litigation, federal courts are required to 

dismiss the action as moot. Allard v. DeLorean, 884 F.2d 

464, 466 (9th Cir. 1989). Here the district court’s decision 

was final and had been affirmed on appeal before the 

PTO’s reexamination decision. The district court violated 

no legal right in preserving its original decision, which is 

limited to the claims and grounds that existed.

Dismissal “with prejudice” operates as res judicata as 

to the same cause of action. 747 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 

§ 547. How this rule of finality would apply to changed 

circumstances depends on the factual circumstances of 

the specific situation. See Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. 

Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327–328 (1955) (“That both suits 

involved ‘essentially the same course of wrongful conduct’ 

is not decisive” of the applicability of the doctrine of res 

judicata and courts must examine factual circumstances, 

such as, for example, whether “new causes of action” or 

“substantial changes in scope” of wrongful conduct exist, 

in determining its applicability.). Res judicata does not 

automatically arise against unknown future situations. In 

Aspex, the court applied these principles to the facts of 

that case, recognizing that “it is necessary that the claim 

either was asserted, or could have been asserted, in the 

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14 CARDPOOL, INC. v. PLASTIC JUNGLE, INC. 

prior action. If the claim did not exist at the time of the 

earlier action, it could not have been asserted in that 

action and is not barred by res judicata.” 672 F.3d at 

1342; see also Lawlor, 349 U.S. at 328 (a prior judgment 

“cannot be given the effect of extinguishing claims which 

did not even then exist and which could not possibly have 

been sued upon in the previous case”).

On the facts and procedures of this case, the issue of 

validity of the reexamined claims remains to be addressed 

in any future proceeding. In the initial proceeding the 

original claims were adjudicated only on the ground of 

subject matter eligibility under section 101. As in Aspex, 

the effect of a prior judgment rendered on specific issues 

as applied to the original claims, depends on the facts and 

issues of the reexamination, and invokes equity as well as 

law. 672 F.3d at 1341–1346. The district court correctly 

deemed it inappropriate to advise on the new claims, in a 

case that the parties agreed was moot. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 

vacate its judgment or the finality thereof. That judgment is affirmed.

Each party shall bear its costs.

AFFIRMED

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