Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03103/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley B. DeWalt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 4, 1996 Decided August 20, 1996

No. 95-3103

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WESLEY B. DEWALT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00282-01)

CarmenD. Hernandez, Assistant FederalPublic Defender, argued the cause for appellant, withwhom

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs.

Thomas C. Black, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. Eric H. Holder,

Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, William M. Sullivan, Jr. and

Leanne Shaltis, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Wesley Dewalt pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully

possessing an unregistered sawed-offshotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The district court

sentenced Dewalt to 33 monthsin prison, to be served after he completes an unrelated state sentence.

Dewalt asks this court to vacate the plea on the ground that the district judge who presided at the

plea hearing failed in two respects to comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Dewalt also challenges his sentence as inconsistent with the United States Sentencing

Guidelines. Because we conclude that the district court failed, in violation of Rule 11(c)(1),

adequately to notify Dewalt of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty, we vacate

the plea without reaching Dewalt's other claims.

I. Background

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At Dewalt's plea hearing the Government said it could prove the following facts: Police

officers observed Dewalt carrying a blue tote bag through a bus terminal in Washington, D.C. The

bag looked "a little odd" to the officers, and Dewalt appeared to themto be "having difficulty carrying

[it]." The officers approached Dewalt, and asked for and received his permission to search the bag.

Inside the officers found a J.C. Higgins .16 gauge bolt action shotgun with a sawed-off barrel 161/4

incheslong, and severalrounds of ammunition. A check with the National Firearms Registry revealed

that neither the shotgun nor the ammunition was registered.

Based upon Dewalt's possession of this weapon and ammunition, the Government obtained

a three-count indictment charging him with one violation of federal law, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)

(unlawfulpossessionof an unregistered firearm), and two violations oftheDistrict ofColumbiaCode,

§§ 6-2311(a) (same) and 6-2361(3) (unlawful possession of unregistered ammunition). Dewalt

pleaded guilty to the federal charge in exchange for which the Government agreed to dismissthe two

D.C. charges. On appeal Dewalt argues that his guilty plea was not taken in accordance with the

requirements of Rule 11.

II. Analysis

A guilty plea is not "voluntary in the sense that it constitute[s] an intelligent admission that

[the defendant] committed the offense unless the defendant received "real notice of the true nature

of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process'."

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976), quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334

(1941). "Real notice of the true nature of the charge" means notice sufficient to give the defendant

"an understanding of the law in relation to the facts" of his case, McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.

459, 466 (1969). Specifically, a defendant's ignorance of the mens rea element of the offense with

which he is charged renders his guilty plea involuntary as a matter of constitutional law. Henderson,

426 U.S. at 645-46 (defendant did not know that to convict himofsecond-degreemurderstate would

have to prove he assaulted victim "with a design to effect [ ] death"); see also United States v. Frye,

738 F.2d 196, 199-201 (7thCir. 1984) ("the defendant was waiving her right to make the prosecution

prove to a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt not only that she participated in the check-kiting

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scheme, but also that she did so with a culpable state of mind").

That the defendant's guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if he pleaded without understanding

the nature of the offense charged does not imply a constitutional obligation on the part of the court

to inform the defendant about the nature of the charge, Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644. In federal

courts, however, Rule 11 prescribes a procedure "designed to assist the district judge in making the

constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary ... [and] to

produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factorsrelevant to this voluntariness

determination." McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465. Indeed, "Rule 11 is designed to eliminate any need to

resort to a later [i.e., post-conviction] fact-finding proceeding in [the] highly subjective area" of

voluntariness." Id. at 469. To this end, Rule 11(c)(1) requires that the district judge who presides

at the plea hearing inform the defendant of "the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered."

Neither Rule 11 nor the case law, however, specifies the minimum that a district judge must

do to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge in question; rather, the plea hearing must meet

a standard aptly stated by the Seventh Circuit: "[A] court must have a colloquy with the defendant

that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant understood the nature of the

charge." Frye, 738 F.2d at 201. See also United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 937-38 (5th Cir.

1979) (en banc); United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 1994) (where record

shows defendant understood charge, court's failure to describe charge with greater specificity does

not require reversal); United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1304 (7th Cir. 1991) ("totality of the

circumstances").

Dewalt pleaded guilty to a charge that he violated 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), which makes it

unlawfulfor any person "to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National

Firearms Registration and Transfer Record." As used in the statute, a "firearm" is defined as any

weapon of a type listed at 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). In this case, the Government charged that Dewalt

possessed a firearm of the sort described in § 5845(a)(2)namely, "a weapon made from a shotgun

if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less

than 18 inchesin length." More specifically, the Government charged Dewalt with having possessed

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a sawed-off shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18 inches.

The Government concedes that one of the elements it must prove in order to obtain a

conviction under the charge is that when Dewalt possessed the weapon he knew that it had a barrel

less than 18 inches long. We find that proposition dubious, see United States v. Barr, 32 F.3d 1320

(8th Cir. 1994), but see United States v. Edwards, 1996 WL 401332 (7th Cir.); United States v.

Mains, 33 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Imes, 1996 WL 381897 (9th Cir.), vacating

80 F.3d 1309, but the Government's express and unequivocal concession on this point leaves us

without occasion to rule otherwise. Dewalt says that the district judge who presided at his plea

hearing failed to inform him of this knowledge element and thus failed to comply with Rule 11(c)(1).

The district judge appears to have approached his solemn task with a somewhat casual

attitude. He did not describe the nature of the charge to Dewalt and ascertain that Dewalt

understood. Indeed, the judge did not even mention that the charge to which Dewalt was pleading

concerned possession of a weapon, much less possession of a sawed-off shotgun with a barrel less

than 18 inches long. Instead the judge asked Dewalt only whether he had received a copy of the

indictment and whether he understood the charges contained therein; he did not squarely ask even

whether Dewalt had read the indictment or whether he was relying upon counsel's (or anyone else's)

representations regarding what it said. Nothing in the transcript of the plea colloquy, including the

prosecutor's factual proffer, "would lead a reasonable person to believe that [Dewalt] understood"

that the Government intended to (or, more to the point, was required to) prove that Dewalt knew at

the time he possessed the shotgun that the barrel had been sawed-off and was less than 18 inches in

length.

The Government argues that because Dewalt raised this issue for the first time after

sentencing, he must show that vacating his plea is necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." The

1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do make it clear that once the district

court has imposed sentence, the defendant's sole vehicle for obtaining relief in the district court is a

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. And in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962), the

Supreme Court stated that in order to prevail under § 2255, a defendant must show that the plea

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proceeding was tainted either by "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete

miscarriage of justice" or by "an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair

procedure."

The defendant is not appealing the denial of a § 2255 motion, however. On a direct appeal

after sentencing, such as this, however, we must grant the defendant relief from the district court's

failure to complywithRule 11 unlessthe error was harmless. That a defendant can escape the burden

of showing a manifest injustice merely by filing a notice of appeal within the allotted time might at

firstseemincongruous, but that isjust what the AdvisoryNotes accompanying the 1983 Amendments

indicateat least where the claimisthat the district court hasfailed substantiallyto complywithRule

11. The note accompanying the amendment to Rule 11(h) (harmless error "shall be disregarded")

explains: Because the public interest in the finality of a guilty plea is "of somewhat lesser weight

when a direct appeal [as opposed to a § 2255 motion] is involved ... the Hill standard is obviously

inappropriate in that setting"; on the other hand, the finality interest on direct appeal is "sufficiently

compelling to make unsound the proposition that reversal is required even where it is apparent that

the Rule 11 violation was of the harmless error variety."

The seeming incongruity of giving the defendant a break on direct appealisfurther diminished

once one realizes that, whereas Rule 32(e) governs motions to withdraw generally, Rule 11(h)

governs the special case of a motion to withdraw based upon the district court's substantial

non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 11. See United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d

1368, 1370 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant's burden in challenge to guilty plea based upon Rule 11

greater in collateral attack than on direct appeal); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215,

1219-20 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing but reserving question of which standard applies on direct

appeal). A direct appeal based upon Rule 11 is subject to a different standard because Rule 11 cracks

open the door behind which plea bargains are struck; appellate review and supervision of guilty pleas

is facilitated by the district court's making a record from which we can discern whether the

defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. That record provides at least formal assurance that the

plea is not wholly the product of the defendant's confusion or the prosecutor's deceit.

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The Government pointsto a statement in our decision in United States v. Farley, 72 F.3d 158

(1995), that appears to contradict the Rules Advisory Committee on this point. See id. at 162 ("On

direct appeal the defendant must show that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a "manifest

injustice' "). Later in that same opinion, however, the court recognized that the harmless error

standard applies to Rule 11 claims. Id. at 163. Indeed, the court concluded that "setting aside

Farley's plea [was not] necessary to correct a manifest injustice because any variance from Rule 11's

provisions was harmless, at most." Id. Although the court also noted that Farley had failed to

"advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent," the "more important" reason for

concluding that any error was harmless was that the district court had adequately determined that

Farley's plea was voluntary. Id. In substance, therefore, Farley is not inconsistent with the

commentary to Rule 11 indicating that on direct appeal the Government must show that a Rule 11

violation was harmless in order to prevail; indeed in United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1321, 1322 n.1

(1995), in which the Government argued that a departure from Rule 11 warrants reversal only if it

rises to the level of plain error under United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993), we stated

expressly that "[a]ny deviation from the requirements of Rule 11 is reversible [on direct appeal after

sentencing] unless the government demonstrates that it was "harmless'."

In order to show that a Rule 11 violation caused no harm, of course, the Government must

show that the error did not affect the outcome of the district court proceeding. Lyons, 53 F.3d at

1322. A district court's failure to comply with Rule 11(c)(1) is harmless if the record reveals either

that the defendant had actual notice of the information that the district judge failed to convey or that

the information would not have been important to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Liboro,

10 F.3d 861, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Liboro was sufficiently apprised of the charges and

comprehended them"); Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1323 (defendant'sfailure to protest at sentencing indicates

that amount of fine had not been important factor in decision to plead guilty).

The record in this case permits neither inference, however. Because the district court

dispensed with any substantive colloquy at Dewalt's plea hearing, the indictment is the one item in

the record that merits attention in this regard, and it is at best ambiguous concerning the mens rea

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element of the charge. In the indictment the Government charged that Dewalt

knowingly received and possessed a firearm, that is, J.C. Higgins sawed-offshotgun,

with an overall length of 291/4 inches and a barrel length of 161/2 inches, which had

not been registered to him....

What terms are modified by "knowingly" in this passage? "Received and possessed" for sure, but

what about "with ... a barrel length of 161/2 inches"? The indictment is not clear on that, and the

more obvious reading is that the adverb "knowingly" modifies only the verbs, not the adjectival

phrase. In any event, Dewalt's affirmative response when asked at the plea hearing whether he

understood this charge is a poor indicator indeed of what he really understood. Unlike the jury

instruction that the Tenth Circuit approved in Mains, 33 F.3d at 1229 ("knowingly possessed a

shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches"),

Dewalt could reasonably have read the indictment as charging him with knowing possession of a

firearm that, whether he knew it or not, happened to be a sawed-off J.C. Higgins shotgun with an

overall length of 291/4 and a 161/2 inch barrel. In other words, the indictment appears first to

describe the crime and then to describe the evidence. There is no reason for Dewalt to have inferred

even that "a barrel length of 161/2 inches" is a substantive element of the crime, much less that his

knowledge of that fact is also an element. After all, that J.C. Higgins manufactured the shotgun and

that the overall length was 291/4 inches are merely descriptive detailsthey do not bring the weapon

within the statutory definition of a "firearm," and are therefore irrelevant to the sufficiency of the

charge.

Moreover, if Dewalt did not read the indictment to say that he had to know that the barrelwas

less than 18 inches, then nothing that occurred at his plea hearing would have informed him that he

misunderstood the charge. At the plea hearing Dewalt was in the same position, vis-a-vis the

indictment, as a student who emerges from a French movie impressed with how much of it he

understood; without some authoritative guidance, he cannot know whether he understood anything

correctly.

The Government argues that the charge against Dewalt was "not unduly complicated" and

Dewalt was represented throughout by competent counsel who "concurred" in Dewalt's decision to

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plead guilty. As noted earlier, however, one purpose of Rule 11 is to create a record that clearly

establishes whether the defendant made an intelligent and voluntary plea. That purpose would be

ill-served by our surmising that a court's failure to comply with Rule 11(c)(1) was harmless because

competent counsel would have advised his or her client of the "nature of the charge." See United

States v. Harvey, 850 F.2d 388, 395 (8th Cir. 1988) ("the court should have explained the charges

... instead of relying on counsel").

Finally, the Government observes that Dewalt has not claimed that he is innocent or that he

would not have pleaded guilty had he been apprised of the mens rea element in the charge against

him. That observation would be compelling if Dewalt had the burden of demonstrating a manifest

injustice, but here, as we have explained, the Government has the burden of persuading us that the

Rule 11 error did not affect the outcome of this prosecution. "[W]here [a] defendant has shown his

plea was taken in violation of Rule 11, we have never hesitated to correct the error," even if the

defendant failed to assert a legally cognizable defense. United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1207

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Moreover, nothing in this record indicates whether Dewalt, had he understood the

knowledge element of the charge, would nonetheless have pleaded guiltynor, for that matter,

whether the Government, if forced to go to trial, could prove that Dewalt knew at the time he

possessed the shotgun that the barrel had been sawed-off to a length of less than 18 inches.

III. Conclusion

Because the district court failed to comply with Rule 11(c)(1) at Dewalt's plea hearing we

must vacate his plea. We need not, therefore, address his argument under Rule 11(f) (district court

must make "such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea"), or his claims of

sentencing error. Accordingly, Dewalt's conviction is vacated and this case is remanded to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.

So ordered.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

WesleyB. Dewalt was caught in possession of an operable, unregistered sawed-offshotgun.

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Because the barrel measured under 18 inchesin length161/2 inches, to be precisethe weapon fit

within the definition of "firearm" contained in the National Firearms Act,see 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(1),

(Act) and Dewalt was charged with possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of section

5861(d) of the Act. He pleaded guilty. He now asks us to vacate his plea on the ground that his plea

hearing was not in substantial compliance with rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

First, he contends that the district court could not have satisfied itself that there was a factual basis

for his plea, as required by rule 11(f), because no evidence was proferred at the rule 11 hearing to

show that he knew the barrel was under 18 inches. Second, he contends that the court failed to

inform him of, and determine that he understood, the nature of the charge, as required by rule

11(c)(1), because the court did not explain that the government had to prove he knew the barrel was

under 18 inches. In short, Dewalt complains that the court failed both to establish a factual basis for

and to explain fully the elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.

But Dewalt misstatesthemensrea element ofthe crime and unfortunatelythe majorityfollows

suit. As I read Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994), and as I discern Congress's intent

in enacting the National Firearms Act, anyone found in possession of an unregistered sawed-off

shotgun with a barrel under 18 inches can be convicted so long as he knowsthe gun in his possession

is a sawed-offshotgun; although the jury must find that the barrel is shorter than 18 inches (to bring

the weapon within the reach ofthe Act), the jury need not find that the defendant knew that the barrel

wasshorter than 18 inches. I believe the record shows that Dewalt knew he was carrying a sawed-off

shotgun. And because he knew he had a sawed-off shotgun, any rule 11 error was harmless.

Therefore I dissent.

I. The Mens Rea Element After Staples

The Act requires the registration of a "firearm" and makes it illegal to receive or possess an

unregistered firearm. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... to receive or

possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer

Record."). On its face, section 5861(d) does not contain a mens rea requirement. The Supreme

Court, however, has decided that Congress did not mean to dispense with a mens rea elementat

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least in part. On the one hand, the Court has held that the government need not prove that the

defendant knew the firearm was unregistered. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-10 (1971).

On the other hand, in Staples the Court held that the government must prove he knew the weapon

had the characteristics of a regulated "firearm." 114 S. Ct. at 1804; cf. United States v. Harris, 959

F.2d 246, 259-61 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362 (1992).

Staplesinvolved a semiautomatic sporting rifle that had beenmodified for fullyautomatic fire.

Because it wasfully automatic, the weapon was a "machinegun" and hence a "firearm" under the Act.

26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (b). The defendant argued that the government had to prove he "knew that the

weapon would fire fully automatically." Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796. The government argued that

all guns are potentially dangerous and therefore it need prove only that the defendant knew he

possessed a firearm in the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at 1798. The Supreme Court rejected the

government's argument:

[D]espite their potentialfor harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence.

Of course, we might surely classify certain categories of gunsno doubt including

machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery piecesthat Congress hassubjected to

regulationas items the ownership of which would have the same quasi-suspect

character we attributed to owning hand grenades in Freed. But precisely because

gunsfalling outside those categoriestraditionally have been widely accepted aslawful

possessions, their destructive potential, while perhaps even greater than that ofsome

items we would classify along with narcotics and hand grenades, cannot be said to put

gun ownerssufficiently on notice ofthe likelihood ofregulation to justify interpreting

§ 5861(d) as not requiring proof of knowledge of a weapon's characteristics.

Id. at 1800 (emphasis added). The Court concluded:

We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one. As in our prior cases, our

reasoning depends upon a common-sense evaluation of the nature of the particular

device or substance Congress has subjected to regulation and the expectations that

individuals may legitimately have in dealing with the regulated items.... We note only

that our holding depends critically on our view that ifCongress had intended to make

outlaws of gun owners who were wholly ignorant of the offending characteristics of

their weapons, ... it would have spoken more clearly to that effect.

Id. at 1804 (citations omitted). At bottom, the Court worried that "virtually any semiautomatic

weapon may be converted, either by internal modification or, in some cases,simply by wear and tear,

into a machinegun within the meaning of the Act" but with "no externally visible indication that it is

fully automatic." Id. at 1802.

Since Staples the Eighth Circuit has held that, when an individual is charged with possession

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1 The jury in Starkes was instructed that the government had to prove the defendant knew the

item in his possession was a firearm within the general meaning of the term. United States v.

Starkes, No. 92-5190, 1993 WL 212487, at *1 (4th Cir. June 16, 1993). On appeal he argued

that the government must prove he knew he possessed a sawed-off shotgun. Id. The Fourth

Circuit rejected his claim, id. at *1-2, but the Supreme Court vacated his conviction and

"remanded for further consideration in light of [Staples]." Starkes v. United States, 114 S. Ct.

2129 (1994). The Fourth Circuit in turn remanded for "a new trial in which the government must

put on evidence of knowledge by the defendant of the features of the weapon that brought it

within the scope of the statute." Starkes, 32 F.3d at 101 (emphasis added). It is therefore unclear

whether the Fourth Circuit requires the government to prove the defendant knew the barrel was

shorter than 18 inches or simply that he knew it was a sawed-off shotgun. 

of an unregistered shotgun with a barrel under 18 inches, the government need prove only that he was

aware that the shotgun was a sawed-off shotgun, not that he knew the barrel was under 18 inches.

United States v. Barr, 32 F.3d 1320 (8th Cir. 1994). In Barr the court observed, "Unlike the

modified semi-automatic rifle in Staples, a sawed-off shotgun is clearly not a traditionally lawful

weapon and [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation that the weapon was not subject to

regulation." Id. at 1324. The court emphasized that a sawed-off shotgun is "quasi-suspect" in

character and "[a] defendant who observes such a weapon cannot possess it with innocence." Id.

But see United States v. Edwards, __ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 1996) (Staples requires proof defendant

knew barrel under 18 inches); United States v. Mains, 33 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); cf.

United States v. Starkes, 32 F.3d 100 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).1

The Eighth Circuit's rationale is sound. Just as the government must prove the defendant

knew he had a fully automatic rifle rather than simply a rifle (Staples), the government must prove

the defendant in possession of a shotgun with a barrel under 18 inches knew he had a sawed-off

shotgun rather than simply a shotgun (Barr). The government need prove no more because the

destructive potential of a sawed-offshotgun should alert anyone to the likelihood of regulation. Cf.

United States v. Mayo, 498 F.2d 713, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("As with the grenade in Freed, a

sawed-offshotgun is a highlydangerous weapon, the possession ofwhichwould rarelybe an innocent

act."); see Freed, 401 U.S. at 616 (Brennan,J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he firearms covered

by the Act are major weapons such as ... sawed-off shotguns.... Without exception, the likelihood

of governmental regulation of the distribution of such weapons is so great that anyone must be

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2

See also United States v. Ranney, 524 F.2d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[O]ne would hardly

be surprised to learn that possession of a sawed-off shotgun is not an innocent act."), cert. denied,

424 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir.) ("While a sawed-off

shotgun ... may be a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of

regulation, we do not find that an ordinary firearm that is internally and undetectably modified to

be automatic yet legal in appearance and markings falls within this category."), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 266 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts have

described [sawed-off shotgun] as inherently dangerous and generally lacking usefulness, except

for violent and criminal purposes.") (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

1284 (1996); Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 1960) (sawed-off shotgun

"useless for any lawful purpose").

Dewalt suggests that there might be a situation where someone could innocently possess a

sawed-off shotgun and thus not be alerted to the likelihood of regulation. It suffices to note that

the same might be suggested of a hand grenade (also a "firearm" under the Act). Robert Batey,

Strict Construction of Firearms Offenses: The Supreme Court and the Gun Control Act of 1968,

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 163, 177 n.122 ("There is a market for facsimile hand

grenades, for use as paperweights and firecrackers. These uses clearly would not automatically

alert one to the possibility of regulation.). Yet Staples makes clear that because a hand grenade is

a highly dangerous weapon, one knowingly in possession of a grenade should be alerted to the

likelihood of regulation. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1799. Likewise as to the sawed-off shotgun

which, like the hand grenade, is not included in "a long tradition of widespread lawful ...

ownership by private individuals in this country." Id.

presumed to be aware of it.").2

More to the point, the Eighth Circuit's reading ofsection 5861(d) isfaithful to congressional

intent. Congress enacted the National Firearms Act in 1934 to target sawed-off shotguns and

machineguns because they were the preferred weapons of gangsters. H.R. Rep. No. 1780, 73rd

Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) ("[T]here is no reason why anyone except a law officer should have a

machine gun or sawed-off shotgun.");S. Rep. No. 1444, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (same); cf.

Lane v. Washington Daily News, 85 F.2d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ("It is a matter of common

knowledge that sawed-offshotguns are the implements of but two classes of persons, "gangsters' and

officers of the law."). United States Attorney General Homer Cummings, a sponsor of the bill,

emphasized, "A sawed-off shotgun is one of the most dangerous and deadly weapons." National

Firearms Act: Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong.,

2d Sess. 6 (1934) ("House Hearings"). As one congressman remarked during hearings on the

proposed legislation, "If a man is carrying [a sawed-off shotgun], if he is not an officer, he ought to

be taken into custody anyway, because we know that he is carrying it for an unlawful purpose." Id.

at 111.

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3 Today's typical sportsman or hunter uses a shotgun with a barrel length ranging from 26 to

32 inches. TOM ROSTER, TOM ROSTER'S SHOTGUN BARREL ALTERATION MANUAL 55 (1995). 

4 The number "18" has no talismanic significance. Attorney General Cummings testified that

experts believed that the minimum length could be set at 20 inches. House Hearings at 6. Indeed,

shortly before enacting the National Firearms Act Congress passed a law regulating firearms in

the District of Columbia. Pub. L. No. 72-275, 47 Stat. 650 (1932). The law, extant still, makes it

illegal to possess a "sawed-off shotgun" defined as "any shotgun with a barrel less than twenty

inches in length." Id. §§ 14, 1; see D.C. Code Ann. §§ 22-3214, 22-3201(b). 

Congress's intent was to make the Act's application to shotguns as broad as possible without

infringing on the legitimate use of shotguns by sportsmen and hunters. Congress, it appears, chose

to regulate shotguns with barrels under 18 inches because they serve no legitimate hunting orsporting

purpose.3" "[W]ith such a barrel length a shotgun has a decreased range and therefore minimal utility

as a hunting and sporting tool. Its chief value is as a weapon, regardless of its overall length and

concealability.' " State v. Ellenberger, 543 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Brook

v. State, 448 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). Congress's concern was not simply that a

sawed-off shotgun may easily be concealed; the gun's size turns on its overall length, stock plus

barrel, so barrel length alone may not determine that it is concealable. Rather, "because shortened

barrels scatter shot indiscriminately they are especially dangerous, even if difficult to conceal" and

therefore Congress "punish[ed] the use of any shotgun with a barrel of less than eighteen inches,

regardless of the gun's overall length." United States v. Hall, 972 F.2d 67, 70 (4th Cir. 1992).4

To sum up, Congress recognized that the sawed-off shotgun is an inherently dangerous

weapon, both because it ordinarily can be concealed and because it shoots indiscriminately with

scattered shot. It is consistent with congressional intent therefore (and not inconsistent with the

reasoning of Staples) to conclude that a section 5861(d) charge arising from possession of a

sawed-offshotgun requires the government to prove only: (1) the barrel is under 18 inches; (2) the

shotgun is not registered to the defendant; and (3) the defendant knew he possessed a sawed-off

shotgun. The government can prove the latter element with direct or circumstantial evidence. Cf.

Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1802 n.11 ("[K]nowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence,

including any external indications signaling the nature of the weapon.").

At argument and in supplemental briefsfiled after argument, the government agreed with this

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approach: it took the position that it need prove only that Dewalt knew he possessed a sawed-off

shotgun, not that he knew the barrel was under 18 inches. The government then filed a motion to

withdraw its supplemental briefs. Apparently because of "a change from previous Department [of

Justice] guidance," themotion recited, the governmentstipulated that, under Staples,section 5861(d)

requires proof that Dewalt knew the barrel was under 18 inches. Unlike my colleagues, I do not

consider myself bound by a party'sstipulation in construing a statute or a Supreme Court holding and

therefore have found it necessary to reach the Staples issue.

Incidentally, before we hastily endorse a stipulation that frustrates congressional intent, the

government should at least explain how it might prove a defendant knew the gun barrel is under 18

inches. The defendant (if he testified) could assert that he never stopped to consider the actual length

of the barrel or that he did not know the barrel was under 18 inches. The government could counter

with evidence that the defendant actually measured the barrel. But in the real world such evidence

willrarely (if ever) exist and, critically, the statute would be rendered largely a nullity ifsuch evidence

were required. Perhaps the government could put on evidence that the defendant visually inspected

the weapon and then argue for the inference that he should have known the barrel was under 18

inches and therefore should have known it was a dangerous item likely subject to regulation. But if

that is sufficient to prove the mens rea element, there is no practical difference between requiring

knowledge of the barrel length and requiring that he knew the weapon was a sawed-off shotgun. I

analyze Dewalt's rule 11 claims on the assumption that the latter is all that is required.

II. Rule 11(f)

The government'sfactual proffer at the plea hearing did not include the statement that Dewalt

knew the weapon in his possession was a sawed-offshotgun (as opposed to a standard, unmodified

shotgun). Rule 11(f) requires that the court "satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea."

"[T]he factual basis of which the rule speaks is merely sufficient evidence from which a reasonable

jury could conclude that the defendant committed the crime." United States v. Abreu, 964 F.2d 16,

19 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Arguably the government's proffer passed this test. It established that drug

interdiction officers saw Dewalt carrying a tote bag "that to them looked a little odd and it looked

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to them as if Mr. Dewalt was having difficulty carrying that bag." Tr. at 12. The officers "found the

.16-gauge shotgun in the bag," id., and as the indictment makes clear, the shotgun was a sawed-off

shotgun with "a barrel length of 161/2 inches." A jury could reasonably conclude that Dewalt knew

he had the weapon (291/4 inches in overall length) in the odd-looking bag he had difficulty carrying.

Further, a jury could reasonably conclude that he likely saw the item he knew he was carrying in his

bag and that, consequently, he was aware it was a sawed-off shotgun.

In any event, if the court erred in failing to establish on the record that Dewalt knew he had

a sawed-off shotgun, the issue is whether the error is harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). In

United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1321, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we made clear that we can look to

the record as a wholeincluding the presentence investigation report (PSI) and the sentencing

transcriptto determine whether error is harmless. Here the record as a whole reveals the following.

Dewalt was stopped in an urban bus station carrying a gym bag containing a sawed-off

shotgun and ammunition; the weapon was located beneath his clothes and other personal items. PSI

at 4. When the officers approached Dewalt he was in line for a bus heading for New York City and

he had a ticket showing he was traveling from Richmond, Virginia to New York City. Id. Defense

counsel conceded at sentencing that Dewalt knew the gun was in his bag, Sentencing Tr. at 13, and

Dewalt gave an alias to the officers, PSI at 5, manifesting subterfuge. He later explained to the

probation officer that he was traveling with his friend Gerald Neal (who was not apprehended) and

they were "taking the weapon to New York City to sell it illegally." Id. And, significantly, the

probation officer's notesfrom his presentence interview of Dewalt indicate that Dewalt knew he was

transporting a sawed-off shotgun: "Traveled to South Boston, Virginia with Gerald Neal. Neal

bought sawed-off shotgun, shotgun of defendant, and Neal traveled back to New York by bus."

Sentencing Tr. at 12 (emphasis added); see PSI at 5 ("Mr. Dewalt asserted he wastravelling ... with

a friend, Gerald Neal, who had purchased a sawed-offshotgun."); cf. Brief ofAppellant at 24 ("[T]he

defendant's other admissions concerning when and bywhomthe gun had been purchased, that he had

been advised to give an aliasif arrested, and that the gun would ultimately be sold in New York City,

describe the type of detail that supports the conclusion that defendant had knowingly aided and

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5 Dewalt asserts that "there is no evidence that the defendant ... had any particularized

knowledge of ... guns and their characteristics." Brief of Appellant at 20. But the record shows

that Dewalt was no novice with guns. Defense counsel represented at sentencing that Dewalt

"has some knowledge of individuals that were selling guns, and he was going to make efforts to

bring that to the government's attention." Sentencing Tr. at 4. Moreover, while released on bond

for the instant offense, Dewalt and an accomplice committed an armed robbery. While arresting

Dewalt for that offense, the police recovered three guns from his apartment. PSI at 6-7. 

6 Dewalt and defense counsel both signed a "Receipt and Acknowledgment of Presentencing

Investigation Report" form attesting that they "received and reviewed" the PSI. They checked a

box labeled "There are material/factual inaccuracies in the PSI report as set forth in the

attachment." The attachment stated simply that "Mr. Dewalt is entitled to acceptance of

responsibility." We must assume, therefore, that there are no factual inaccuracies in the PSI. 

abetted the possession and transportation of the shotgun."). In short, Dewalt accompanied Neal to

Virginia where Neal bought a sawed-off shotgun, Dewalt was aware Neal bought a sawed-off

shotgun and he planned to help Neal sell the gun in New York City.5

In Lyons we relied on the fact that the defendant "acknowledged having reviewed the [PSI]

and even registered specific objections" yet raised no objection to the paragraph describing the

maximum penalty. Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1323. Here defense counsel objected to the PSI's failure to

acknowledge his acceptance ofresponsibility yet voiced no objection to the statement indicating that

Dewalt knew he had a sawed-offshotgun.6 And neither Dewalt nor defense counsel took issue with

the substance of the presentence investigation interview notes which were read at sentencing. Cf. id.

(relying on failure of defendant or defense counselto expresssurprise or raise objection to statements

made at sentencing to indicate defendant knew maximum penalty). It thus appears that Dewalt does

not claim he did not know he was carrying a sawed-offshotgun (he claims only that he did not know

the barrelwas under 18 inches). Because the record as a whole establishes that Dewalt knew the gun

in his possession was a sawed-offshotgun, the factual basisfor the mensrea element waslaid and any

error is harmless.

III. Rule 11(c)(1)

Dewalt, citing rule 11(c)(1), next complains that the court did not explain to him that the

government had to prove he knew he was carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Rule 11(c)(1) requires the

court to "inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, ... the nature of the

charge to which the plea is offered." The rule does not require the court to explain each element of

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the charge: where the charge is straightforward and the defendant is represented by counsel, the

court need only ensure the defendant understands the "substance" of the charge. See United States

v. Liboro, 10 F.3d 861, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In many if not most cases the court conveys the nature

of the charge by publishing the indictment at the plea hearing; the court should ordinarily publish the

indictment.

The indictment here charges that Dewalt "knowingly received and possessed a firearm, that

is, J.C. Higgins[sic] sawed-offshotgun" and statesthat the gun had "a barrel length of 161/2 inches"

and "had not been registered to him." App. at 7. The indictment conveys the "substance" of the

charge: it reflects that he was charged with having knowingly possessed an unregistered firearm,

specifically a sawed-offshotgun. Had the district court published the indictment at the plea hearing,

there would have been no rule 11 error. But the court did not, and I agree there was error. In my

view, however, the error was harmless.

The record manifeststhat Dewalt knew he was carrying a sawed-offshotgun so his complaint

is that the court failed to explain that the government had to prove he knew what he knew. Would

that "information"that the government had to prove he knew what he knewhave been

"important" to Dewalt in his "decision to plead guilty" (see Majority Opinion at 7-8)? Dewalt,

represented by an assistant public defender, presumablywas aware that, even without his admissions,

the government could make the following case. First, far from being an innocent sportsman or

hunter, Dewalt was caught toting a sawed-off shotgun in a D.C. bus station en route to New York

City. Second, Dewalt knew he had the shotgun in his bag: officers could testify that they were

alerted because Dewalt's bag appeared to contain a relatively lengthy object, Dewalt appeared to be

exerting unusual effort in carrying the bag and he periodically glanced at the officers. See PSI at 3.

And they could testify that he gave them a bogus name. Third, the inference could be drawn that at

some point before his arrest Dewalt saw the weapon (and therefore knew he had a sawed-off

shotgun)a rational defendant in Dewalt's shoes, assisted by counsel, likely would not have rolled

the dice and gone to trial hoping the jury would decline to draw that inference. Finally, in analyzing

Dewalt's decision making process, we cannot ignore what the district court observed at the plea

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7 The majority (but not Dewalt) cites Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), where the

Court held that the defendant's ignorance of the mens rea element of second degree murder

rendered his guilty plea unconstitutional as a matter of law. Dewalt does not attack the

constitutionality of his plea; he challenges 

only the district court's compliance with rule 11. Dewalt could challenge the constitutional

validity of his plea in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding and request an evidentiary hearing on

whether his counsel in fact gave him adequate notice of the mens rea element. Cf. Henderson,

426 U.S. at 647; United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1984). Regarding the

constitutionality of his plea, presumably defense counsel, an assistant public defender, was aware

that both the Supreme Court (Staples) and this court (two years earlier in Harris, supra) had held

that section 5861(d) had a mens rea element. And presumably she explained the substance of the

charge to Dewalt. Cf. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. 

hearing: "The whole tenor of the [plea] agreement ... is that [Dewalt] would be attempting to assist

the government with the hope that the government would file ... a [United States Sentencing

Guidelines section] 5K1.1 motion to permit sentencing below the guidelines." Tr. at 8; id. at 9

("expectation of cooperation" was "really the purpose of the plea agreement"). In this connection

Dewalt told the probation officer that he pleaded guilty "believing he would receive a "slap on the

wrist.' " PSI at 5. His expectation of a "slap on the wrist" based on his hope of a substantial

assistance motion by the government would not have evaporated had the court explained that the

government had to prove he knew what he knew. I am completely "confident" that the court's failure

to explain that "played no role in inducing [his] decision to plead guilty." Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1323.

I therefore respectfully dissent.7

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