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Parties Involved:
Anthony Lee Erity
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15820

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00554-VMC-EAJ-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY LEE ERITY,

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(November 5, 2015)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Anthony Lee Erity appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm and 

ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 

924(a)(2). 

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On appeal, Mr. Erity contends that (1) the district court abused its discretion 

by admitting testimony about his prior attempted sale of narcotics; (2) the district 

court abused its discretion in instructing the jury regarding his attempted flight; (3) 

the district court erred in allowing the government to elicit substantially the same 

testimony from its lay witness as its expert witness; and (4) the felon-in-possession 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

I

We assume the parties are familiar with the case and summarize the 

proceedings and facts only insofar as necessary to provide context for our decision.

Prior to trial, Mr. Erity filed a motion in limine to preclude the government 

from eliciting testimonial evidence that a confidential informant had observed Mr. 

Erity sell MDMA1 and that Mr. Erity had offered to sell the drug to the CI. Mr. 

Erity argued that any drug-related evidence was not intrinsic to the charged 

conduct, that the government could not prove the uncharged conduct, and that the 

accusation of a CI was not sufficient to allow prejudicial testimony to be 

introduced under Rule 404(b). The district court ultimately denied Mr. Erity’s

motion. 

 1 MDMA is the more commonly known name for the controlled substance 3, 4-

methylenedixymethamphetamine. See United States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d 949, 951 (11th Cir. 

2006).

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At trial, Special Agent Michael Coad testified that the CI “believed he could 

purchase firearms and possibly narcotics from [Mr. Erity].” D.E. 120 at 158. 2 Mr. 

Erity now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in permitting the 

government to elicit any testimony that he was involved in the sale of narcotics

because it was irrelevant to the charged offense and was prejudicial in providing 

the jury an inaccurate account of his prior involvement with both illegal drugs and 

firearms. 

We assume, without deciding, that the admission of Special Agent Coad’s 

testimony relating to Mr. Erity’s narcotics involvement was not intrinsic to the 

charged offense (possessing a firearm as a felon). An error, however, is harmless 

unless it has a substantial influence on the case’s outcome or leaves a grave doubt 

as to whether the error affects the outcome. See United States v. Henderson, 409 

F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). The government has the burden of establishing 

that the error was harmless, see United States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th 

Cir. 2009), and here the evidence at trial shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

admission of this extrinsic evidence was harmless. See Henderson, 409 F.3d at 

1300.

 2 The testimony of Special Agent Coad regarding information he learned from the CI appears to 

be hearsay, but Mr. Erity did not object on this basis at trial and does not raise a hearsay 

challenge on appeal.

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The government presented direct evidence that Mr. Erity sold a firearm to 

the CI, made admissions to law enforcement about knowingly transporting the 

firearm, photographed the firearm, possessed the firearm in his vehicle, and had his 

fingerprints on the gun manual located in the firearm container. Given this

evidence, the extrinsic evidence of narcotics involvement did not substantially 

affect the outcome.

II

Mr. Erity also argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

instructing the jury regarding flight. He argues that, because flight is an admission 

by conduct, the jury should have been instructed on flight no differently than any

other admission or confession. According to Mr. Erity, the district court failed to 

inform the jury that they must consider the evidence “with great care,” as it was

required to do for admissions. The jury instruction regarding flight read as 

follows:

Intentional attempts to flee by a person when a crime has been 

committed is not, of course, sufficient in itself to establish the guilt of 

that person, but intentional attempts to flee under those circumstances 

is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by the jury in light of all 

the other evidence in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of 

that person.

Whether or not the Defendant’s conduct constituted an attempt 

to flee is exclusively for you, as the jury, to determine. And if you do 

so determine that the attempted flight showed a consciousness of guilt 

on the Defendant’s part, the significance to be attached to that 

evidence is also a matter exclusively for you as a jury to determine.

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I do remind you that in your consideration of any evidence of 

attempted flight, if you should find that there was attempted flight, 

you should consider that there may be reasons for this which are fully 

consistent with innocence. And, may I suggest to you that a feeling of 

guilt does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of a crime which you 

may be considering.

D.E. 85 at 16. We review the legal correctness of a jury instruction de novo, but

we defer to the district court on questions of phrasing, absent an abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Though circumstantial, evidence of flight is generally admissible to establish 

a defendant’s guilt. See United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1324-26 (11th 

Cir. 1982). Giving a jury instruction on flight is not an abuse of discretion where 

the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant fled to 

avoid apprehension for the charged crime. See United States v. Williams, 541 F.3d 

1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2008). With respect to phrasing, a flight instruction is not

erroneous if it informs jurors that it is up to them to determine whether the 

evidence proved flight and properly explains the potential weaknesses in the

relevant chain of inferences. See Borders, 693 F.2d at 1328. 3

 Further, we have 

upheld flight instructions of varying degrees of specificity. See, e.g., Borders, 693 

F.2d at 1327-28; Williams, 541 F.3d at 1089.

 3 The four inferences are “(1) from the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to 

consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the 

crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt 

of the crime charged.” United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977).

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In this case, the evidence permitted the jury to conclude that Mr. Erity’s 

flight was motivated by consciousness of guilt. The jury heard evidence that after

he was indicted Mr. Erity told a friend that he planned to move to Canada to avoid 

prosecution. Mr. Erity talked of obtaining a fake driver’s license, passport, and 

social security card, and wanted to use his friend’s identity to leave the United 

States. Further, in an audio-recording Mr. Erity spoke of his plans to obtain false 

identification to leave the country after fingerprint evidence had been found against 

him with respect to the charged felon-in-possession offense. This evidence may 

have permitted the jury to conclude that Mr. Erity was planning on leaving the 

country for reasons other than guilt, but “the reason for a defendant’s flight is a 

question for the jury.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 

2004). 

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving the flight 

instruction. The instruction was extremely similar to the flight instruction upheld 

in Borders; Mr. Erity’s contrary argument is not supported by our precedent.

III

Mr. Erity further asserts that the district court erred in allowing the 

government’s lay witness, Robert Saye, to testify about matters falling within the 

parameters of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Because Mr. Saye testified as a lay 

witness about “secreter” status and the lack of fingerprint evidence, Mr. Erity 

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argues, the testimony did not comply with the standards set out in Rule 702. Mr. 

Erity further contends that the testimony was materially indistinguishable from that 

of the government’s expert witness, and was offered solely to bolster the expert 

testimony.

The admissibility of lay opinion testimony is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Improper lay opinion testimony is generally subject to a harmless error analysis. 

Henderson, 409 F.3d at 1300. Because Mr. Erity did not object to Mr. Saye’s 

testimony at trial, however, and raises these Rule 702 arguments for the first time 

on appeal, we review only for plain error. See United States. v. Rodriguez, 398 

F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).

Plain error occurs when there is (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects 

substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the fairness of the judicial 

proceedings. See United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 

2014). “An error is ‘plain’ if controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or the 

Eleventh Circuit establishes that an error has occurred.” Id. “A substantial right is 

affected if the appealing party can show that there is a reasonable probability that 

there would have been a different result had there been no error.” United States v. 

Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 831-32 (11th Cir. 2006). 

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We assume, without deciding, that Mr. Saye’s lay opinion testimony 

regarding “secreter” status was improper. When the government asked Mr. Saye 

to explain, based on his ten years of crime scene investigative work, how someone 

could touch an item and not leave a fingerprint, Mr. Saye responded “[t]hat’s 

possible because 80 percent of the human population is a secreter, 20 percent of the 

population is not a secreter. If you’re not a secreter, you’re not leaving 

fingerprints.” D.E. 121 at 75 (alterations added). Mr. Saye went on to explain that 

“[a] secreter is [when] you release oils from your skin. But if you’re not a secreter, 

you’re not releasing those oils. Therefore, you’re not leaving anything behind.” 

Id. at 75–76 (alterations added). 

Mr. Erity has not shown that his substantial rights were affected by Mr. 

Saye’s testimony or that there were serious effects on the fairness of the judicial 

proceedings. An expert for the government also testified, in far greater detail, that 

it was possible for someone to touch an item and not leave a fingerprint, and spoke 

about factors that might affect whether the fingerprints might be useable for 

identification. Because Mr. Saye’s testimony was duplicative of properly admitted 

evidence, any negative inferences were harmless and, therefore, Mr. Saye’s 

testimony regarding “secreter” status did not rise to the level of plain error. See 

Coquina Investments v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014). 

IV

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The last argument Mr. Erity makes—one that he presents for the first time 

on appeal— is that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional. Mr. Erity asserts that § 

922(g) is unconstitutional because the subsection dealing with possession of a 

firearm or ammunition does not limit the use of the statute to “interstate or foreign 

commerce,” and does not define what “commerce” means. He further argues that 

this subsection of the statute goes beyond Congress’ power under the Commerce 

Clause because it fails to require that the possession of a firearm by a felon 

substantially affects interstate commerce, in effect regulating mere possession. 

According to Mr. Erity, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 

514 U.S. 549 (1995), requires that the criminalization of possession of a firearm by 

a felon have a substantial effect on interstate commerce to fall within Congress’ 

Commerce Clause powers. 

We review the constitutionality of statutes de novo. See United States v. 

Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1107 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, an 

identical constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has already been rejected 

by this Court in United States. v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715–16 (11th Cir. 2010),

and we are bound by prior panel decisions unless or until they are overruled by the 

Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. See United States v. VegaCastillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation 

omitted).

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We have interpreted § 922(g) to indicate “a Congressional intent to assert its 

full Commerce Clause power.” United States v. Nichols, 124 F.3d 1265, 1266 

(11th Cir. 1997). As such, § 922(g) is not facially unconstitutional simply because 

it uses the word “commerce” rather than “interstate or foreign commerce.” Id.; see 

also Wright, 607 F.3d at 715. We have also concluded that § 922(g) prohibits 

possession of a firearm that has a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, and that

this minimal nexus test does not violate the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lopez. See 

United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).

Mr. Erity’s arguments are foreclosed by our precedent. No plain error was 

committed. See Wright, 607 F.3d at 715; Vega-Castillo ̧ 540 F.3d at 1236; 

Nichols, 124 F.3d at 1266; McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390.

V

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Erity’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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