Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04084/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Linda Luinstra
Appellee
Kenneth Stettler
Appellee
Herbert Tepper
Appellant
Judith Hilbun Tepper
Appellant
Paul Van Dam
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT SEP S 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECREh 

Clerk 

HERBERT TEPPER and JUDITH 

HILBUN TEPPER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

R. PAUL VAN DAM, individually and ) 

in his capacity as Attorney General) 

of the State of Utah, LINDA ) 

LUINSTRA, individually, in her ) 

capacity as Assistant Attorney ) 

General and in her capacity as ) 

Chief of the Human Services Divi- ) 

sion, KENNETH STETTLER, individu- ) 

ally and in his capacity as ) 

Licensing Specialist of the: State ) 

of Utah Department of Social ) 

Services, JOHN DOES 1 through 30, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

No . 91-4084 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-C-1049W) 

(C.D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EISELE, Senior District Judge.** 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Garnett Thomas Eisele, Senior District Judge for 

the District of Arkansas. 

Appellate Case: 91-4084 Document: 010110309483 Date Filed: 09/09/1992 Page: 1
On December 18, 1990, Herbert Tepper and his wife, Judith 

Tepper, brought suit in the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah against the following: (1) R. Paul Van Dam, the 

attorney general for Utah; (2) Linda Luinstra, an assistant attorney general for Utah, serving as Chief of the Human Services 

Department for Utah; (3) Kenneth Stettler, a licensing specialist 

in the Department of Social Services for Utah; and (4) 30 John 

Does, all of whom were said to be either agents or officials for 

Utah. 

On or about January 28, 1991, the defendants filed a motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, which motion was supported by a memorandum which is not 

included in the record on appeal. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, which is a 

part of the record on appeal. After hearing, the district court 

on May 3, 1991, granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding 

that the defendants were "shielded by qualified immunity." The 

Teppers now appeal the judgment of the district court dismissing 

their action with prejudice. 

The action having been dismissed on a 12(b) motion (it would 

_ appear that the 12(b) motion was in reality a 12(b)(6) motion, 

i.e., failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted), the allegations in the Tepper complaint become all important. From the complaint we learn that Herbert and Judith 

Tepper are residents and citizens of California, and that the defendants named in the complaint are all officials of the State of 

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Utah. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, 28 

U.S.C. S 1332 and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 

The Teppers alleged in their complaint that in July, 1990, 

they enrolled their son, Jordan, in a wilderness training program 

for troubled teens run by a Delaware corporation, Challenger Foundation II, which operated a camp in southern Utah. In this regard, the Teppers alleged that for an "enrollment fee" they 

granted "physical control" of their son to Challenger Foundation 

II with the hope and expectation that the "rigorous and unusual 

methods" used by Challenger Foundation II would benefit their son. 

The Teppers went on to allege in their complaint that the 

defendants, pretending to act in their respective offices for the 

State of Utah, conspired with each other to put Challenger Foundation II out of business, and that their efforts culminated on August 23, 1990, when they filed in a state court in Utah a civil 

action on behalf of the State of Utah against Challenger Foundation II wherein the state sought to enjoin Challenger Foundation 

II's operation in Utah on the ground that such was not in compliance with Utah's child welfare and licensing laws. The Teppers 

alleged, inter alia, that they were not given notice of the im-

_pending state action, that the defendants violated Tappers' custodial rights, that their son's "behavioral program" was interrupted, and that the end result of the state's action against 

Challenger Foundation II caused it to cease operation and Jordan 

was returned to his home in California. 

Tappers' first claim for relief was based on an alleged violation of rights secured them by the United States Constitution 

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Appellate Case: 91-4084 Document: 010110309483 Date Filed: 09/09/1992 Page: 3
and laws of the United States by the several defendants acting 

under the color of state law. A second claim for relief charged 

the defendants with conspiring to deprive the Teppers of their 

civil rights. The third, and last, claim for relief charged the 

defendants with violating rights secured them by the Fifth, Ninth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 42 u.s.c. S 1983. 

Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642 

(10th Cir. 1988), has particular present pertinancy. In that case 

at pp. 645-46, we spoke of qualified immunity for government officials as follows: 

While qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, it cannot be analogized to other 

affirmative defenses because of the interests 

implicated in suits against governmental officials. Unlike: other affirmative defenses, 

qualified immunity not only shields a defendant from liability, but is also intended to 

protect the defendant from the burdens associated with trial. Furthermore, this court has 

recognized that qualified immunity is a defense of a different character by allowing 

appeals from interlocutory orders denying 

qualified immunity based sUDDDary judgment motions. 

Because the defendant's status as a governmental official or "agent" is an essential 

element of a section 1983 claim, the potential 

applicability of the qualified immunity defense will usually appear in the complaint. 

The complaint should include "all of the factual allegations necessary to sustain a conclusion that defendant violated clearly established law." Thus, a defendant could, prior 

to filing an affirmative defense, challenge 

the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

on the ground that he or she is entitled to 

qualified immunity because the pleaded facts 

failed to show that his or her conduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. Similarly, 

the defendant could raise the immunity issue 

in a motion for sUDDDary judgment. In either 

case, once the defense has been raised, the 

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court must allow the plaintiff the limited 

opportunity allowed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) and 46 to come forward with facts or 

allegations sufficient to show both that the 

defendant's alleged conduct violated the law 

and that that law was clearly established when 

the alleged violation occurred. Unless such a 

showing is made, the defendant prevails. If 

the plaintiff has identified the clearly established law and the conduct that violated 

the law, the defendant as the movant in a motion for summary judgment bears the normal 

burden of showing that no material issues of 

fact remain that would defeat his or claim of 

qualified innnunity (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district 

court held, in effect, that the pleaded facts in the Tappers' complaint were insufficient to show that the defendants' alleged conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of the Teppers which a reasonable person would have known. 

In this regard, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), 

where the Supreme Court spoke as follows: 

[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known. 

We are in accord with the district court's analysis of the 

Tappers' complaint. About the only overt act of the defendants 

set forth in the complaint which could have conceivably affected 

the Teppers and violated any of their claimed rights is that the 

defendants instituted an action on behalf of the State of Utah 

against Challenger Foundation II. The complaint itself does not 

tell us very much about the nature of the state court proceeding. 

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However, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, a copy of an 

order entered in the state court proceeding was given the district 

court without objection. The order showed that the state district 

court on August 30, 1990, denied the State of Utah's request for a 

preliminary injunction, but at the same time observed that the 

State of Utah might well ultimately prevail on its cause of action 

and ordered Challenger Foundation II to post a $100,000 bond to 

demonstrate its financial stability, which it failed to do. 

Counsel agreed that shortly thereafter Challenger Foundation II 

went into bankruptcy and closed its camp and returned its 

enrollees to their respective homes, and that there were no 

further state proceedings against Challenger Foundation II. 

We agree with the district court that the complaint itself is 

insufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. It does not articulate with sufficient specificity the clearly established constitutional rights involved or how the conduct of the defendants violated those rights. We are not impressed with Teppers' argument 

that their constitutionally protected "custodial rights" were 

somehow impacted by the defendants. From the complaint it would 

appear that the Teppers' had themselves voluntarily surrendered 

"control," if not "temporary custody," to Challenger Foundation 

II. The only overt act of the defendants directed at Jordan, the 

son, set forth in the complaint was that, pursuant to subpoena, 

Jordan and several other enrollees were brought from the camp to a 

state court, apparently by Challenger Foundation II employees, 

where Jordan and the others were interviewed for a short period of 

time and were then returned to camp by the employees of Challenger 

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Foundation II. The complaint fails to state how defendants' actions interfered with any custodial rights of Teppers. 

The Teppers also argue that the district court erred in dismissing their action "with prejudice" . and that any dismissal 

should have been "without prejudice" to the end that they would 

have opportunity to file an amended complaint. Under the circumstances, we find no error. Although it was not an issue on appeal, we note that in Brierley v. Schoenfeld, 781 F.2d 838 

(l0thCir. 1986), we affirmed a district court's order dismissing • 

with prejudice a civil rights suit under 42 u.s.c. S 1983. In 

Okusami v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, 959 F.2d 1062, 

1066 (D.C. Cir. 1992), an antitrust suit, the District of Columbia 

Circuit held that the dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) is "a resolution on the merits and is ordinarily prejudicial." In cortec Industries, Inc. v. sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 

42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991), a securities fraud action, the Second Circuit held that a 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice was proper with 

the conunent that "where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact 

sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed 

with prejudice." 

As indicated, the defendants' motion to dismiss was filed on 

January 28, 1991. The hearing on that motion was not held until 

April 18, 1991. During the intervening time the Teppers never 

indicated to the district court that they desired to file an 

amended complaint. Further, in their memorandum in opposition to 

defendants' motion to dismiss, the Teppers did not indicate any 

desire to replead, and instead stated that "[s]uccinctly put, 

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Teppers' argument is that they have the constitutional right to 

raise their children as they see fit without interference from 

individuals claiming to act under color of law." In thus arguing, 

the Teppers apparently were of the view that the State of Utah had 

no legitimate interest in controlling and licensing schools such 

as Challenger Foundation II, which, as mentioned, operated a program designed to rehabilitate troubled teenagers. And then even 

after the district court had dismissed their action, the Tappers 

did not ask leave of the district court to file an amended complaint. Nor have they suggested to this court what other facts 

they could allege which would put their cause of action beyond the 

reach of a 12(b)(6) motion. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Circuit Judge 

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