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Parties Involved:
Tony Gladney
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted May 25, 2010

Decided May 25, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

         MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

        ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No.  09‐3650

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

TONY MONTEZ GLADNEY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:98CR40088‐001‐JPG

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

After Tony Gladney admitted to violating conditions of his supervised release, the

district court revoked his supervision and ordered him to serve an additional 60 months’

imprisonment.  Gladney appeals, but his appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal

is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Gladney

has not responded to counsel’s motion, so we review only the potential issues counsel

identifies in his facially adequate brief.  See CIR. R. 51(b); United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968,

973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Gladney pleaded guilty in 1999 to one count of conspiring to distribute crack

cocaine.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1).  He faced a statutory minimum of 10 years in prison

and a maximum of life imprisonment; his guidelines range was 188 to 235 months.  The

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3650 Page 2

district court imposed a 192‐month term of imprisonment and a 5‐year term of supervised

release.  Gladney’s prison term was reduced in 2001 to 128 months because he provided

substantial assistance to the government, and his supervised release began in November

2007.  Gladney failed to comply with several conditions of his supervision, so in May 2008

the court modified his supervision and placed him in a halfway house for up to 180 days.

That modification did not deter further violations, and in August 2009 the probation

office petitioned for revocation.  By then Gladney had violated at least six conditions of his

supervision, including the condition that he not commit additional crimes.  According to his

probation officer, Gladney had committed five more offenses while on supervision,

including first‐degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, aggravated discharge of a

firearm, and making false statements.  At his revocation hearing, Gladney denied

committing the murder but admitted the other crimes.  He also admitted to violating four

other conditions of his supervision: leaving the judicial district without permission, failing

to report to his probation officer, failing to follow the probation officer’s directions, and

associating with a felon without permission.  In view of these uncontested violations, the

government did not offer evidence about the murder, and the district court did not make a

finding on that allegation.

Based on Gladney’s admissions, the district court revoked his supervised release and

ordered him to serve a 60‐month term of reimprisonment, the statutory maximum.  See 18

U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3), 3559(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii).  The

reimprisonment range was 37 to 46 months, based on a Grade A violation (aggravated

discharge of a firearm) and Gladney’s criminal‐history category of IV.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1,

7B1.4.  Gladney argued in mitigation that a federal judge and assistant United States

attorney in St. Louis, Missouri, had told him that his supervised release would not be

revoked if state authorities did not prosecute him for the new crimes, and he asked the court

to abide by that understanding.  He also insisted that he already had been punished for

some of his violations; several of them—making false statements, leaving the district

without permission, failing to report to the probation officer, and failing to follow the

probation officer’s instructions—were the same violations that led the court to place

Gladney in the halfway house for 180 days.  These arguments did not sway the court:

Mr. Gladney, even apart from the admissions to violations that you say that you

were put in a halfway house and feel like you were punished for violating those,

your plea to aggravated discharge of a firearm is a very serious offense.  The

Court notes that you received a 64‐month Rule 35 reduction in your sentence for

your cooperation with the Governmentin the judgment ofthis Court and you’ve

[sic] continued violations of your supervised release, you threw all that away.

The Court’s going to sentence you to the maximum of 60 months.

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No. 09‐3650 Page 3

Counsel considers arguing on appeal that the district court should not have revoked

Gladney’s supervised release in light of the assurances he allegedly received from the judge

and prosecutor in St. Louis.  But Gladney did not back up his representation with

evidence—not even his own testimony—so the district court had no basis to conclude that

any promise had been made to him.  Even if we assume that Gladney received such

assurances and that he will not be prosecuted by state authorities, we would find his

revocation proper.  Refraining from crime was a mandatory condition of Gladney’s

supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and the district court had authority to revoke his

release once he committed those offenses, see id. at § 3583(e)(3).  And a promise by a court or

prosecutor in another judicial district could not bind the district court here, which sentenced

Gladney originally and thus maintained ultimate authority over his supervised release.  See

United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 472 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,

761‐62 (7th Cir. 2000).

Counsel also examines whether Gladney could challenge the reasonableness of his

term of reimprisonment.  Although a district court must consider the range established by

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 and most of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before imposing a term of

reimprisonment, we would disturb that term only if it was plainly unreasonable.  See 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Berry, 583 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438 (7th Cir. 2008).

It would be frivolous to argue that the term in this case is plainly unreasonable. The

district court was aware of the guidelines range of 37 to 46 months but explained that 60

months was more appropriate because aggravated discharge of a firearm is a “very serious”

offense and Gladney had thrown away the 64‐month reduction he had earned for providing

substantial assistance to the government.  We have consistently approved of weighing the

seriousness of the violation of supervised release when selecting a term of reimprisonment,

e.g., Neal, 512 F.3d at 438; United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d 852, 854‐55 (7th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 589 (7th Cir. 2004), and district courts may impose longer

terms of reimprisonment if the defendant previously benefitted from a sentence reduction

for providing substantial assistance, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.4; United States v. Hergott, 562

F.3d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007).

Moreover, as counsel recognizes, Gladney could not argue that the district court

unreasonably refused to credit him with the 180 days he spent at the halfway house.  See

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.5(b) (“Upon revocation of supervised release, no credit shall be given (toward

any term of imprisonment ordered) for time previously served on post‐release

supervision.”).

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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