Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00361/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00361-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.
Plaintiff
Moose Lodge 1293
Defendant
Roseville Lodge No. 1293, Loyal Order of Moose, Incorporated
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSEVILLE LODGE NO. 1293, 

LOYAL ORDER OF MOOSE,

INCORPORATED, an unknown 

business entity d/b/a MOOSE LODGE 

1293,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In initiating this action against Defendant Roseville Lodge No. 1293, Loyal Order 

of Moose, Inc., an unknown business entity doing business as Moose Lodge 1293 

(“Defendant”), Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant 

unlawfully intercepted and broadcasted a television program to which Plaintiff had 

exclusive commercial distribution rights to pursuant to a Distributorship Agreement. Now 

pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing

that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this lawsuit. For the following reasons, Defendant’s 

Motion is DENIED without prejudice.1

 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

Case 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB Document 16 Filed 09/29/14 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., is a commercial distributor and licensor of 

sporting events. Pursuant to a Distributorship Agreement, Plaintiff was granted the 

exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights to Ultimate Fighting Championship 

157: Ronda Rousey v. Liz Carmouche (“the Program”), which was telecast nationwide 

on February 22, 2013. Through sublicensing agreements with various commercial 

entities throughout the country, Plaintiff granted those entities the rights to publicly 

exhibit the Program within their respective commercial establishments. Plaintiff claims 

that it spent a substantial sum on marketing, advertising, promoting, administering, and 

transmitting the Program to its customers.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 22, 2013, Defendant unlawfully intercepted and 

broadcasted the Program at Moose Lodge 1293 with the knowledge that this was 

unlawful, and for the purpose of commercial and/or financial gain. Plaintiff filed this 

instant action on February 5, 2014, alleging causes of action for violations of 47 U.S.C 

§§ 605, 553 and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., as well as a cause of action for 

conversion. 

On July 11, 2014, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure3 12(c) on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing 

because Plaintiff does not have rights to the Program in non-commercial establishments 

such as Defendant’s. ECF No. 8 at 3.

///

///

///

///

 2 Unless otherwise noted, the following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 1.

3 All references to “Rule” or “rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 

noted.

Case 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB Document 16 Filed 09/29/14 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

STANDARD

Under Rule 12(c), “a party may move for judgment on the pleadings” after the 

pleadings are closed “but early enough not to delay trial.” A motion for judgment on the 

pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's 

pleadings. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 805 F. Supp. 

1503, 1506 (E.D. Cal. 1992). Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings under 

Rule 12(c) after the pleadings are closed but within such time as to not delay trial. 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted if “the moving 

party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact 

remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Judgment on the pleadings is also proper when there is either a “lack of cognizable legal 

theory” or the “absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In reviewing a Rule 

12(c) motion, “all factual allegations in the complaint [must be accepted] as true and 

construe[d] . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 

581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is 

warranted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that 

could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. 

Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

Although Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts have the discretion 

in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant 

dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 

300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 

982 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 

///

///

Case 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB Document 16 Filed 09/29/14 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing because the Distributorship

Agreement at issue only granted Plaintiff exclusive distribution rights with respect to 

commercial establishments, and Plaintiff therefore may not bring this action against 

Defendant. In support of this argument, Defendant relies exclusively on the Declaration 

of Cary Warner (“Warner Declaration”), which it attached to its Motion. See ECF No. 8-4. 

Defendant cites the Warner Declaration for the proposition that “Defendant’s 

establishment is part of a fraternal organization dedicated to serving needy children, 

designated as a fraternal beneficiary society for tax purposes . . . .” and therefore is not a 

commercial entity. ECF No. 8 at 5. Defendant further argues that it is proper for the 

Court to consider the Warner Declaration when ruling on its motion, because “the Court 

can consider and treat the motion as one for summary judgment . . . .” Id. at 8.

When ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court may consider certain documents

outside of the pleadings, such as “documents attached to the complaint [and] documents 

incorporated by reference in the complaint,” without converting the motion into a motion 

for summary judgment. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). A document 

is considered incorporated by reference if the plaintiff “refers extensively to the 

document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. However, if the 

Court decides to consider other documents outside of the pleadings, the Court “must 

normally convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and must give 

the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond.” Id. at 907.

Here, it is clear that the Warner Declaration is neither a document attached to the 

Complaint nor a document incorporated by reference, since Plaintiff neither attached the 

document nor referenced it in its Complaint. See ECF No. 1. Thus, if the Court were to

consider this document, as Defendant suggests, in ruling on the instant motion, it would 

have to convert this motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The Court 

finds that it would be inappropriate to convert this motion into one for summary judgment 

Case 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB Document 16 Filed 09/29/14 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

at this time, given the early stage of the case and the fact that discovery has not 

commenced.

4 The Complaint alleges that Defendant is a commercial establishment.

Because the Court must take all factual allegations in the complaint as true in reviewing 

the propriety of a Rule 12(c) motion, this motion must be denied. 

However, even if the Court considered the Warner Declaration and were to find

Defendant to be a non-commercial entity, Defendant could still not prevail at this time. 

As set forth in Plaintiff’s briefing, the Distributorship Agreement is governed by Nevada 

law. Under that state’s law, “it is well-established that a course of dealing may modify an 

agreement.” Wal-Go Associates v. Leon, 624 P.2d 507, 510 (Nev. 1981). Therefore, 

Plaintiff argues that the course of conduct between the parties to the Distributorship 

Agreement confirms that the intent of the parties was for the agreement to cover all nonresidential use. If correct, the Distributorship Agreement would cover the exhibition of 

the Program at Defendant’s Lodge, whether or not Defendant is deemed to be a 

commercial entity. Thus, even if the Court considered the Warner Declaration, denial of 

Defendant’s motion is warranted.

Because the Complaint alleges that Defendant is “a commercial establishment 

doing business as Moose Lodge 1293,” and that Defendant unlawfully intercepted and 

broadcasted the Program without authorization from Plaintiff, the exclusive rights holder, 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged standing. See, e.g., J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. 

Mendoza-Gowan, 2011 WL 1544886 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) (“The complaint alleges 

that plaintiff has exclusive distribution rights to the program, but defendant unlawfully 

intercepted its transmission and displayed it without authorization. Plaintiff has therefore 

adequately alleged standing.”). Given Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged standing,

Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion is denied.

///

 4 Moreover, whether Defendant is a commercial establishment is a material disputed question of 

fact at this stage in the litigation. Judgment on the pleadings is warranted “only if it is clear that no relief 

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Deveraturda,

454 F.3d at 1046.

Case 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB Document 16 Filed 09/29/14 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF 

No. 8) is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2014

Case 2:14-cv-00361-MCE-EFB Document 16 Filed 09/29/14 Page 6 of 6