Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-11161/USCOURTS-ca11-15-11161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Demarco Doxie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-11161

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00101-WSD-GGB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DEMARCO DOXIE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(January 4, 2016)

Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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After pleading guilty, Defendant Demarco Doxie appeals his total 53-month 

sentence for 21 counts of mail fraud, 41 counts of wire fraud, and 4 counts of filing 

a false tax return, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, and 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7206(1) respectively. On appeal, Doxie argues that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court improperly grouped his 66 counts under 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 to determine his total offense level. After review, we find no 

grouping error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Offense Conduct

Between 2007 and 2011, Defendant Doxie was employed by Ennis Paint as 

its Corporate Environmental Health and Safety Manager. During this time, Doxie 

defrauded Ennis Paint by creating and submitting fictitious invoices for 

environmental work ostensibly performed by a company called Outlook. 

Unbeknownst to Ennis Paint, Doxie was the owner and sole employee of Outlook,

and Outlook had not performed the invoiced work. As a result of Doxie’s actions, 

Ennis Paint mailed checks totaling $642,196.00 to the address on Outlook’s false 

invoices, which were then deposited into Outlook’s bank account. 

In addition to the false invoices, Defendant Doxie charged payments to 

Outlook for work-related expenses totaling $287,466.33 using an employer-issued 

corporate credit card, even though Outlook had not actually performed any work. 

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Doxie also used his corporate credit cards to pay for his personal expenses, which 

totaled $80,194.58. 

Meanwhile, for the tax years 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, Defendant Doxie 

did not report the income he received from defrauding Ennis Paint on his income 

tax returns. Consequently, Doxie underpaid his taxes by a total of $299,750.00. 

In 2014, Doxie pled guilty to 21 counts of mail fraud for the false invoices 

(Counts 1 to 21), 41 counts of wire fraud for the false credit card charges (Counts 

22 to 62), and 4 counts of filing a false tax return for the four tax years (Counts 63 

to 66). 

B. Guidelines Calculations

At sentencing, the district court, over Doxie’s objection, grouped the 62 

counts of mail fraud and wire fraud together in one group (Group 1) and grouped 

the 4 counts of filing a false tax return as a second group (Group 2) to determine 

Doxie’s total offense level under Chapter 3 of the Sentencing Guidelines. In 

particular, for the fraud offenses in Group 1, the district court calculated a base 

offense level of 7, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1); added 16 levels because the 

loss amount exceeded $1,000,000, but was less than $2,500,000, pursuant to 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(I); and added two levels for abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to 

§ 3B1.3, which resulted in an adjusted offense level of 25. 

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As to the tax offenses in Group 2, the district court calculated a base offense 

level of 18, pursuant to § 2T1.1(a)(1), because there was a tax loss of more than 

$200,000, but less than $400,000, and added two levels because the source of the 

unreported income was from criminal activity, pursuant to § 2T1.1(b)(1), for an 

adjusted offense level of 20. 

Doxie argued the mail and wire fraud counts in Group 1 should be further 

grouped with the four tax counts in Group 2 under § 3D1.2 (c) or (d). The 

government argued that neither subsection (c) nor (d) of § 3D1.2 required Doxie’s 

tax and fraud counts to be grouped together and that grouping was inappropriate 

here because the tax and fraud counts involve different types of offense conduct 

and different societal interests, and thus are not “closely related.” The district 

court agreed with the government and concluded that “the mail and wire fraud 

counts and the tax failure to report income counts are not grouped” under 

§ 3D1.2(c) or (d). 

Then, using Group 1’s offense level of 25 because it was the higher offense 

level, the district court imposed a one-level multi-count increase pursuant to 

§ 3D1.4, for an combined offense level of 26. The effect of the district court’s 

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grouping decision was to increase Doxie’s offense level by one level and his 

advisory guidelines range from 46 to 57 months to 51 to 63 months. 1

 

After a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to 

§ 3E1.1(a), Doxie’s total offense level was 24. With a criminal history category of 

I, Doxie’s advisory guidelines range was 51 to 63 months. 

After considering the parties’ arguments, an extended allocution from Doxie, 

and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court imposed 53-month sentences 

on Counts 1 through 62 and 36-month sentences on Counts 63 through 66, all to 

run concurrently, followed by 3 years’ supervised release. Doxie timely appealed 

his sentence. The only issue on appeal is whether the tax counts should have been 

grouped with the mail and wire fraud counts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Grouping Counts Under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2

Although the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory after United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the district court still must calculate 

the advisory guidelines range correctly. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 

1190 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence based on a miscalculated advisory guidelines 

 

1

To determine the combined offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, the district court takes 

the offense level for the group with the highest offense level and increases it based on a table. 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. In Doxie’s case, to apply the table, the district court combined “one Unit” for 

Group 1 to “one-half Unit” for Group 2, for a total of 11⁄2 Units. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a) & (b). 

Under the table, a total of 11⁄2 Units called for a one-level increase in the highest offense level, 

which in Doxie’s case was offense level 25 for Group 1. See id. § 3D1.4. Thus, Doxie’s 

combined offense level was 26.

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range is procedurally unreasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 

128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).2

In Part D of Chapter 3, the Sentencing Guidelines provide rules for grouping 

multiple counts together. According to the Introductory Commentary, the 

underlying goals of Part D are “to provide incremental punishment for significant 

additional criminal conduct,” and “to limit the significance of the formal charging 

decision and to prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical offense 

conduct.” See U.S.S.G. ch.3, pt. D, introductory cmt. To that end, when a 

defendant is convicted of multiple counts, the Sentencing Guidelines instruct the 

district court to group “closely related” counts of conviction according to the rules 

in § 3D1.2 before determining each group’s offense level and the combined 

offense level for all the counts. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1; see also United States v. 

Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2004).

Under § 3D1.2 “counts are to be grouped together for purposes of 

calculating the appropriate guideline range whenever they involve ‘substantially 

the same harm.’” United States v. Register, 678 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting § 3D1.2). Section 3D1.2 further provides circumstances in which counts 

involve substantially the same harm, as follows: 

 

2

This Court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Pugh, 515 

F.3d at 1190. We review de novo the sentencing court’s application of the Sentencing 

Guidelines, including whether the court correctly grouped the offenses of conviction. United 

States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 1231, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003).

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(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or 

transaction.

(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or 

transactions connected by a common criminal objective or 

constituting part of a common scheme or plan.

(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a 

specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline 

applicable to another of the counts.

(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the 

total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or 

some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is 

ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to 

cover such behavior.

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a)-(d). “Counts involving different victims (or societal harms in 

the case of ‘victimless crimes’) are grouped together only as provided in 

subsection (c) or (d).” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. background. Because the “decision 

as to whether to group [multiple counts] together may not always be clear cut,” the 

Background Commentary to § 3D1.2 instructs courts to “look to the underlying 

policy of this Part as stated in the Introductory Commentary” when “interpreting 

this Part and resolving ambiguities.” Id.

On appeal, the parties agree that neither (a) nor (b) of § 3D1.2 applies 

because the victim of Doxie’s fraud counts, Ennis Paint, is distinct from the victim 

of his tax counts, the Internal Revenue Service. Doxie argues, however, that the 

district court should have grouped his tax counts together with his mail and wire 

fraud counts under either § 3D1.2(c) or (d). 

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B. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) and (d)

Section 3D1.2(c) calls for grouping counts where “conduct that represents a 

separate count, e.g., bodily injury or obstruction of justice, is also a specific 

offense characteristic in or other adjustment to another count. Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.5. 

Subsection (c) is intended to prevent double counting of offense behavior, but it 

“applies only if the offenses are closely related.” Id.; see also United States v. 

Jimenez-Cardenas, 684 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the 

defendant’s illegal reentry and possession of a firearm counts harmed different 

societal interests and were not sufficiently closely related to warrant grouping 

under § 3D1.2(c)).

Section 3D1.2(d) calls for grouping of “crimes where the guidelines are 

based primarily on quantity or contemplate continuing behavior,” such as property 

crimes and drug offenses. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.6. Subsection (d) contains a 

list of guidelines covering offenses that “are to be grouped” and another list of 

guidelines covering offenses that are explicitly excluded. Id. § 3D1.2(d). Included 

in the first, “to be grouped” list are both § 2B1.1 and § 2T1.1, the guidelines 

applicable to wire and mail fraud and filing a false tax return, respectively. Id. 

It is well-settled in this Circuit, however, that “the ‘mere listing’ of . . . 

offenses as types that ‘are to be grouped does not automatically necessitate 

grouping [under subsection (d)].’” United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 998 (11th 

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Cir. 2012) (quoting in part United States v. McClendon, 195 F.3d 598, 601 (11th 

Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Harper, 972 F.2d 321, 322 (11th Cir. 1992). 

This is because the “automatic grouping of offenses listed in the first category can 

detract from the purpose of section 3D1.2—‘to combine offenses involving closely 

related counts.’” McClendon, 195 F.3d at 601 (quoting in part Harper, 972 F.2d at 

322). Instead, where, as here, the counts involve “offenses to which different 

offense guidelines apply,” the counts “are grouped together under subsection (d) if 

the offenses are of the same general type and otherwise meet the criteria for 

grouping under this subsection.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.6; see also Register, 678 

F.3d at 1267, McClendon, 195 F.3d at 601-02. Thus, for grouping under 

subsection (d), “our cases have required that the offenses not only be similar in a 

general sense but also ‘closely related’ on the facts of the particular case.” 

Register, 678 F.3d at 1267.

C. Analysis

We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to group Doxie’s 

tax offense counts with his wire and mail fraud counts under either (c) or (d) of 

§ 3D1.2. We note that the majority of circuits to address this issue have concluded 

that fraud counts and tax offense counts involving the proceeds of the fraud should 

not be group together under subsection (c) or (d) of § 3D1.2. See, e.g., United 

States v. Vucko, 473 F.3d 773, 779-80 (7th Cir. 2007) (addressing subsections (c) 

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and (d)); United States v. Martin, 363 F.3d 25, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); 

United States v. Shevi, 345 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2003) (addressing only 

subsection (d)); United States v. Peterson, 312 F.3d 1300, 1304 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(addressing subsection (c)); Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 354-55 

(6th Cir. 2001) (addressing subsections (c) and (d)); United States v. Lindsay, 184 

F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressing subsection (d)); United States v. 

Vitale, 159 F.3d 810, 815 (3rd Cir. 1998) (addressing subsection (c)); United 

States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1425-26 (3d Cir. 1992) (addressing subsection 

(d)). We agree with the majority of circuits.

3

 

As to subsection (c), Doxie’s mail and wire fraud counts in Group 1

governed his offense level because they produced the highest offense level. See

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 (explaining that the combined offense level is determined by 

taking the offense level for the group with the highest offense level and increasing 

it based on a table). Under § 2B1.1, the mail and wire fraud counts do not have a 

 3

The only circuit to conclude that fraud counts and tax offense counts should be grouped 

under § 3D1.2(c) is the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Haltom, 113 F.3d 43, 45-47 (5th Cir. 

1997). Other circuits have roundly criticized Haltom. See, e.g., Vucko, 473 F.3d at 777; Martin, 

363 F.3d at 43 n.31; Peterson, 312 F.3d at 1303; Weinberger, 268 F.3d at 354; Vitale, 159 F.3d 

at 815.

The only circuit to conclude that fraud counts and tax offense counts should be grouped 

together under § 3D1.2(d) is the Second Circuit. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 232 F.3d 315, 

318-21 (2d Cir. 2000). Two circuits, the Sixth and the Seventh, have declined to follow 

Fitzgerald. See Weinberger, 268 F.3d at 355 n.2; Vucko, 473 F.3d at 780. And, at least one 

Second Circuit judge has since suggested that Fitzgerald may be wrongly decided and has called 

on the Sentencing Commission to “cut through this morass and tell us in plain English whether it 

wants tax offenses grouped with the offenses that produced the income on which the taxes were 

evaded.” See United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2002) (Newman, J, 

concurring).

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specific-offense-characteristic increase based on the tax offense conduct. That is, 

under § 2B1.1, Doxie’s offense level was not increased because Doxie failed to 

report his income obtained from the mail and wire fraud. See generally U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1. 

As Doxie points out, the guideline for tax offenses, U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, 

imposes a two-level specific-offense-characteristic increase if the unreported 

income is from criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.4. But 

Doxie’s offense level ultimately was not determined by § 2T1.1, but by § 2B1.1, so 

the specific offense characteristic increase in § 2T1.1(b)(1) did not increase his 

sentence.

4

 

In any event, the specific offense characteristic in § 2T1.1(b)(1) does not 

address fraud conduct in particular nor adjust depending on the seriousness of the 

underlying criminal activity. Instead, the two-level increase applies regardless of 

the type of criminal activity that resulted in unreported income. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2T1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.4. The purpose of the two-level increase is not to account 

 

4

We note that the two-level increase under § 2T1.1(b)(1) from level 18 to level 20 did not 

affect the number of Units used to calculate Doxie’s combined offense level under § 3D1.4. See

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(b) (counting as “one-half Unit any Group that is 5 to 8 levels less serious than 

the Group with the highest offense level”). Stated another way, if Doxie’s tax offenses had not 

involved a failure to report income derived from criminal activity, his Group 2 offense level of 

18 still would have resulted in one-half Unit under § 3D1.4(b) and his combined offense level 

would have remained 26 under § 3D1.4. This fact distinguishes Doxie’s case from the 

defendant’s in Haltom. See Haltom, 113 F.3d at 46-47 & n.5 (concluding that the defendant’s 

mail fraud “counted twice toward his sentence” because “the enhanced tax evasion count was 

directly responsible for the ultimate 2-level increase” under § 3D1.4). 

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for the underlying criminal activity, but rather to adjust for the fact that 

“[c]riminally derived income is generally difficult to establish,” making the tax 

loss “tend to be substantially understated.” Id. § 2T1.1 cmt. background. Thus, 

Doxie’s fraud counts are not “embodie[d]” by the conduct treated as a specific 

offense characteristic in § 2T1.1(b)(1), and grouping the tax and fraud counts 

separately does not result in double counting. Id. § 3D1.2(c) & cmt. n.5. 5

As for subsection (d) of § 3D1.2, although both guidelines—§ 2B1.1 and 

§ 2T1.1—are included in the “to be grouped” list, they are not “of the same general 

type.” The tax offenses are governed by the Internal Revenue Code in Title 26, 

rather than the criminal code in Part I of Title 18. Likewise, the offense level for 

the tax offenses are governed by a different part of the Sentencing Guidelines, Part 

T rather than Part B. Cf. Register, 678 F.3d at 1267 (concluding the defendant’s 

failure-to-pay-over and filing false returns counts were “of the same general type” 

in part because they were both governed by the Internal Revenue Code and Part T 

of the Sentencing Guidelines).

 

5

In 2001, the Sentencing Commission proposed an amendment to the official 

commentary to § 2T1.1 that would have called for grouping a tax evasion count with the count 

charging the offense that provided the income under § 3D1.2(c), but that proposed amendment 

was never promulgated. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 

Fed. Reg. 7962, 8004 (Jan. 26, 2001). Notably, the Sentencing Commission has managed to 

promulgate a similar amendment indicating that money laundering counts are to be grouped with 

the counts for an underlying offense that generated the laundered funds under § 3D1.2(c). See

U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 634; U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 cmt. n.6. In light of this history, it appears “the 

Sentencing Commission does not support a categorical rule requiring courts to group fraud and 

tax evasion counts.” Martin, 363 F.3d at 44 n.32.

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Further, the loss for the tax offenses is determined differently under the 

Guidelines. Specifically, § 2T1.1 determines the base offense level based on tax

losses, not on fraud losses. Also, to the extent § 2T1.1 accounts for fraud losses, it 

does so only as a two-level increase, so the fraud losses are not aggregated with the 

tax losses to set an offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(1) (providing for a twolevel increase “[i]f the defendant failed to report or to correctly identify the source 

of income exceeding $10,000 in any year from criminal activity”).

Perhaps most important for both subsections (c) and (d) of § 3D1.2, Doxie’s

fraud and tax offenses are not “closely related” on the facts of this case. Doxie’s 

tax crimes involved not just different victims, but distinct offense behavior. The 

circumstances of Doxie’s wire and mail fraud—submitting false invoices and 

making fraudulent credit card charges at his work—are different in kind from his 

failure to report all of his income on his federal tax returns. Further, Doxie’s fraud 

and tax crimes were not interrelated in a way that made them “integral cogs in 

continuing [a] scheme.” Cf. United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (11th 

Cir. 1995) (explaining that the defendant’s money laundering of the proceeds of 

the Ponzi scheme promoted the Ponzi scheme by “returning false profits to some 

investors and paying expenses to maintain the façade of success [which in turn] 

enabled [the defendant] to attract new investors and keep old investors from 

discovering his deceit”). In fact, the only connection between Doxie’s unreported 

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income and his fraud was that “the money represented the proceeds of the fraud,” 

which by itself is insufficient for grouping under § 3D1.2. See McClendon, 195 

F.3d at 602 (concluding that money laundering and fraud counts should not be 

grouped under § 3D1.2(d) merely because the laundered money was the proceeds 

of the fraud). 6

Finally, any ambiguity as to whether to group Doxie’s fraud and tax counts 

together under § 3D1.2(c) or (d) is resolved by reference to the Sentencing 

Guidelines’ stated goals for grouping counts. Regardless of how Doxie’s counts 

are grouped, his offense level ultimately is determined by his wire and mail fraud 

counts because they produce the highest adjusted offense level (25 as opposed to 

20). See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a)-(b). Because the Group 1 adjusted offense level of 

25 did not include a specific-offense-characteristic increase for Doxie’s tax counts, 

there was no double counting of Doxie’s tax offense behavior when the district 

court applied the one-level increase under § 3D1.4 to determine the combined 

offense level. By imposing § 3D1.4’s one-level increase for the four tax counts, 

the resulting advisory guidelines range furthered the goal of providing 

 

6

Had the district court grouped all 66 counts together in one group under either U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.2(c) or (d) as Doxie urged, the adjusted offense level would have remained 25 under 

§ 3D1.3(a) or (b). The only difference is there would have been no multi-count enhancement 

under § 3D1.4. The total offense level after the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction would 

have been 23. With a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of I, Doxie’s 

advisory guidelines range would have been 46 to 57 months, instead of the 51 to 63 months used 

by the district court. 

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“incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct.” See

U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. 

Had the district court done as Doxie urged and placed all 66 counts into one 

group, there would have been no additional punishment for Doxie’s tax crimes

reflected in the advisory guidelines range. In short, the only way to achieve the 

stated goals of providing incremental punishment for additional crimes while 

preventing double counting for substantially the same conduct is to refuse to group 

the tax counts with the wire and mail fraud counts.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err when it grouped 

Doxie’s tax counts separately for purposes of calculating his offense level and 

advisory guidelines range. Accordingly, Doxie has not shown that his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable.7

AFFIRMED.

 

7

Doxie’s counseled brief states in passing that his sentence is both procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable, but offers no further argument as to substantive reasonableness. 

Thus, Doxie has abandoned any argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. See

United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1064 n.23 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a defendant 

abandons an issue to which he merely makes a passing reference and fails to develop any 

argument).

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