Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01338/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01338-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Warren Babiar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1338

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Warren Babiar, * 

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: October 19, 2004

 Filed: November 29, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Warren Babiar (Babiar) was tried and convicted of conspiracy to distribute

marijuana. The district court1

 granted Babiar a new trial based on the prosecutor’s

failure to turn over newly discovered evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,

87, 90-91 (1963) (holding the prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to an

accused violates due process and the defendant is entitled to a new trial). On retrial,

a jury again found Babiar guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district

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We denied Babiar’s motion to file a supplemental brief addressing Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We reserve ruling on the applicability of

Blakely until the Supreme Court decides United States v. Booker and United States

v. Fanfan. 

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court sentenced Babiar to 151 months imprisonment. Babiar appeals the district

court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct.2

 

Babiar argues his case should be dismissed due to the prosecutor’s misconduct

in failing to turn over newly discovered evidence before the first trial. Before

Babiar’s first trial, government investigators in Texas knew another suspect was using

a fake driver’s license and birth certificate bearing Babiar’s name. After Babiar’s

trial, this other party was charged with a nation-wide conspiracy of identity theft and

marijuana trafficking, including the marijuana shipment used to convict Babiar.

Where the defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, dismissal is proper if

the defendant demonstrates flagrant misconduct and substantial prejudice. United

States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124, 126-27 (8th Cir. 1992). We will reverse a district

court’s denial of a motion to dismiss only upon a finding of abuse of discretion. Id.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Babiar’s motion to

dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct. First, to the extent the prosecution

violated Brady by failing to disclose evidence favorable to Babiar, the district court

properly remedied any Brady error before the second trial. As the district court

stated, “Defendant received a full and adequate remedy when he was granted a new

trial.” The newly discovered evidence was provided to Babiar before the second trial,

and Babiar used this evidence in presenting his defense. Babiar was not denied the

use of any witnesses or other evidence at the second trial relating to the Brady issue.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Babiar’s motion

to dismiss.

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Second, Babiar failed to show substantial prejudice. In this context,

“prejudice” means prejudice to an individual’s ability to present a defense and receive

a fair trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534 (1972) (concluding prejudice to

the defendant was “minimal,” because all of the defendant’s witnesses still were

available and lapses in memory were minor, even though trial had been delayed more

than four years and the defendant spent ten months in jail before trial). Babiar argues

he was prejudiced because he was incarcerated for eighteen months before receiving

a second trial. However, Babiar has not shown how this delay or his incarceration

prejudiced his right to a fair trial. As the district court explained, the time during

which Babiar was incarcerated before his second trial will be credited to his sentence.

The district court correctly held Babiar did not demonstrate substantial prejudice. 

Babiar also argues the district court misstated the record in his opening remarks

during the second trial, thereby tainting the jury. The district court stated to the jury:

This case was tried once before, but it did not go to final judgment. And

the reason it did not is very shortly after the trial, new evidence that

neither the Government nor the Defendant had known about began to

surface, and it–an investigation went on for some while, and more

evidence surfaced. And it’s important that any jury trying a case have

all of the evidence that is relevant to the case; and, therefore, a new trial

has been granted.

I mention that to you because in the course of the trial there will be a

reference to the new trial. In fact, I think one of the witnesses presented

will be presented simply by having read to you the testimony that she

gave in the first trial, and there may be other occasions of reference to

that first trial. But the case is being tried anew.

Following this statement, Babiar moved to dismiss the jury panel on the ground

the district court misstated the record because the government had constructive

knowledge of the new evidence. The district court denied Babiar’s motion to dismiss

and provided the jury the following clarification: 

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I will clarify something I said earlier. When I referred to the

Government–I indicated the Defendant and Government didn’t know

about this evidence. I’m referring to the Defendant and his counsel at

the time of the first trial. And when I refer to the Government, I’m

referring to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District

of Iowa.

A district court’s formulation of instructions to the jury is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Williford, 309 F.3d 507, 509 (8th Cir. 2002). The

district court’s challenged instruction in this case was an accurate and necessary

explanation of the facts leading to a second trial. Accordingly, the district court did

not abuse its discretion. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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