Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00616/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00616-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miller
Respondent
Patricia Anne Ordway
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICIA ANNE ORDWAY,

Petitioner,

v.

MILLER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:11-cv-00616 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented by Peter W. Thompson

of the office of the California Attorney General.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Calaveras, 

following her conviction by jury trial on December 6, 2006, for first degree murder, elder 

abuse, financial elder abuse, forgery and grand theft. (Lodged Doc. 1, Clerk's Tr. at 436-

39.) On January 24, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of life without the 

possibility of parole. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 

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District. On January 28, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the conviction, but struck the 

restitution fine imposed. (Lodged Docs. 2-4.) Petitioner's petition for review was 

summarily denied by the California Supreme Court on April 15, 2009. (Lodged Docs. 5-

6.) 

After exhausting her direct review, Petitioner filed twelve petitions for postconviction collateral relief in the form of petitions for habeas corpus with the California 

Courts. (See Lodged Docs. 7-30.) All of the petitions were denied. Specifically, Petitioner

filed five petitions with the Calaveras County Superior Court (Lodged Docs. 7-8, 11-12, 

19-22, and 25-26), four petitions with the Third District Court of Appeals (Lodged Docs. 

9-10, 15-16, 23-24, and 27-28), and three petitions with the California Supreme Court 

(Lodged Docs. 13-14, 17-18, 29-30.) To the extent that certain petitions contain relevant 

challenges to Petitioner's claims, the petitions are described in detail below. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on April 21, 2011, and filed an 

amended petition on November 9, 2011. (ECF No. 17.) The amended petition raised the 

following ten grounds for relief: 1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct pretrial investigations and hire experts to rebut testimony; 2) trial counsel was ineffective

due to a conflict of interest; 3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to thoroughly review

police reports and for allowing tainted evidence into trial; 4) the statements of the 

prosecution violated Petitioner's right to a fair trial; 5) the prosecution presented 

destroyed evidence and introduced tainted evidence at trial; 6) ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel; 7) the trial court allowed improper hearsay evidence to be introduced 

at trial; 8) the trial court violated Petitioner's due process by imposition of the witnessmurder special circumstance; 9) Petitioner was not provided the opportunity to confront 

and cross-examine certain witnesses; and 10) that due to prejudicial statements of the 

court, Petitioner was denied the right to a fair trial and impartial jury.

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on April 24, 2012. (Answer, ECF No. 

31.) Petitioner filed a traverse on May 10, 2012. (Traverse, ECF No. 32.) 

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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1

1. The Discovery of the Victim's Body and the Cause and Timing of Death

On September 17, 2004, about 6:20 a.m., the lifeless body of 77-

year-old Ray Shires was discovered lying in the parking lot of the Avery 

Tire Center in Avery. His car was still in the lot. Shires died from an 

extensive head beating in which he suffered 23 injuries consistent with the 

use of a claw hammer.

Based on information from the owner of Avery Tire Center, from an 

adjoining business owner, and from a passerby, together with evidence 

found at the crime scene, a criminalist opined that the crime occurred 

between 9:30 p.m. and 11:15 p.m. on September 16, 2004.

2. Defendant and Her Relationship to Victim

Defendant, who was on Social Security disability, worked for Shires 

as a housekeeper. She was having financial difficulties around the time of 

Shires's death.

About a week before his death, Shires told Amy S. and Debbie N. 

that he was looking for a housekeeper.[fn2] He wanted them or someone 

they knew personally to do the job. Repeatedly, Shires said he needed 

someone he could trust who would not take advantage of him. He did not 

want anyone who would steal from him. He added that he had given loans 

to a housekeeper before, and he did not want to do that. According to 

Debbie, Shires said he was having a problem with his current 

housekeeper.

FN2: To maintain privacy, we will use only last name initials for witnesses.

According to defendant's best friend, Rhonda S., defendant did 

construction activities and was strong. When Rhonda talked to defendant 

the day after Shires was found dead, defendant told Rhonda that her 

(defendant's) fingerprints would be found on the passenger door of 

Shires's car because she and Shires had taken a drive in his car the night 

before he was found dead, and that Shires would have dog hair on him 

because she had allowed Shires to touch her. Rhonda thought it was odd 

that defendant had relayed this information.

Defendant told police that Shires paid her $ 150 each time she 

cleaned his house and visited him, which occurred numerous times. When 

the police asked defendant about her activities on the night of September 

16, 2004, she provided varying and inconsistent accounts in response to 

police skepticism. Defendant's car had been seen at Shires's house on the 

afternoon of that day.

3. Physical and Forensic Evidence

 

1 The Third District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its January 28, 2009 opinion is presumed 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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Just a few days after the discovery of Shires's body, evidence was 

found on some vacant property in Angels Camp owned by Debra H. that 

was about a 10-minute drive from the Avery Tire Center. This evidence 

included Shires's wallet (which contained his driver's license and other 

identification), his checkbook (with cover), a hammer (and some latex 

gloves), a pair of jeans, a T-shirt, a linen sheet, a cell phone charger, and 

a toilet wax ring box (which contained some torn papers and was sealed 

shut with black electrical tape). These items, in turn, disclosed the 

following:

--Defendant's fingerprints were found inside the back cover of Shires's 

checkbook cover.

--Blood found on the hammer matched Shires's DNA.

--The size of the jeans was consistent with jeans found at defendant's 

house. The jeans discovered on Debra H.'s property had spots that tested 

positive for blood, and defendant's and Shires's DNA were on the jeans.

--The T-shirt resembled the T-shirt defendant had been wearing at a local 

store on September 16, 2004, as captured on a video surveillance tape 

(the T-shirt had the word Arnold and a picture of frogs on it). Spots on the 

T-shirt tested positive for blood.

--The linen sheet had a logo of Lodi Memorial Hospital. Defendant's 

former husband had operated an ambulance service that transported 

patients to Lodi.

--The cell phone charger was the same type as one that Shires had 

purchased.

--And the torn pieces of paper found within the toilet wax ring box were 

reassembled to include: (1) Shires's check No. 699, made out to Mark S. 

for $ 2,500, which defendant had endorsed but unsuccessfully tried to 

cash at the Pacific State Bank around September 15, 2004; (2) a bank 

deposit slip for $ 2,500 dated September 14, 2004, with defendant's name 

and account number and Shires's check No. 699 on it; (3) another deposit 

slip dated September 14, 2004, with defendant's signature on it showing a 

deposit of $ 2,500 pursuant to a corresponding check from Shires, check 

No. 700; and (4) a $ 2,500 check from Shires dated August 16, 2004, 

payable to defendant. Check Nos. 699 and 700, along with their carbons, 

were found missing from Shires's checkbook. As for the toilet wax ring box 

in which these torn-up documents were found, evidence showed that 

defendant went with her father to Home Depot on September 15, 2004, 

where he bought three toilets, one of which she installed at his house and 

another she took home with her. Defendant installed a new toilet at her 

home on September 17; a wax ring is a device used to reseat a toilet.

The bank records of Shires and defendant provided further 

revelations. Shires's records revealed two checks made out to defendant: 

check No. 675 for $ 2,500, dated August 16, 2004, and check No. 700 for 

$ 2,500, dated September 14, 2004. It appeared that the handwriting on 

check No. 675 had been used to trace the writing on check No. 700. 

Defendant told an investigating police officer that Shires had given her 

check No. 675 as a loan to buy a used red Subaru, and had given her 

blank check No. 700 for housecleaning and minor sexual contact and told 

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her she could write it out for $ 2,500. Defendant had saved a photocopy of 

check No. 675, so she used it to trace the writing for check No. 700. 

Defendant acknowledged she was taking advantage of Shires.

Defendant's bank records showed a deposit of $ 2,500 (less $2,000 

cash received) from Shires's check No. 675 on August 16, 2004, and a 

deposit of $ 2,500 (less $ 500 cash received) from Shires's check No. 700 

on September 14, 2004.

4. Defendant's Letters from Jail

While in jail, defendant wrote two letters to Shelly C. In the letters, 

defendant claimed that Shires must have been robbed and murdered by 

Joyce P., Joyce's son and the son's wife, who in turn had framed 

defendant by dumping the evidence found on the Angels Camp property 

(i.e., Debra H.'s property). (For a period of time, defendant had allowed 

Joyce and her clan to live at defendant's residence, until they were asked 

to move out by defendant's parents, who owned the residence.) Defendant 

wrote that, to prove her innocence, she needed Shelly to find a person 

who would lie to defendant's lawyer, the district attorney and the police 

using a false story that defendant had concocted. Defendant offered to 

pay Shelly and the other person for this assistance with substantial lottery 

winnings she had never told anyone about. Defendant admitted this 

scheme in her trial testimony, but maintained it was done to prove her 

innocence. Defendant added at trial that Joyce had forged checks on 

Shires's account and blackmailed defendant into cashing them.

From jail, defendant also wrote to Ruby J. and asked her to relay 

the concocted story to the police.

5. Third Party Culpability

The manager of an Angels Camp mini-mart told Detective Jim 

Stenquist that one of her store clerks had seen a woman--who did not fit 

defendant's description--in the store with blood or oil on her hands 

between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. the night Shires was killed. A customer at the

store who had overheard the manager and the detective talking told the 

detective that she (the customer) knew of the woman the manager was 

describing, and that the woman had been working on her car at the 

residence of Billy B., who lived about three blocks from the mini-mart.

Detective Stenquist then checked with Billy B., who echoed the 

customer's account. Billy stated that he and a woman named Cheryl S. 

had been working on her car "the last few weeks," that they had "probably" 

worked on the car on the evening of September 16, 2004, and that he had 

sent Cheryl to the mini-mart "to get items." The detective then confirmed 

that indeed it was Cheryl's registered car on Billy's property--with its hood 

up and surrounded by cans of motor oil and transmission fluid (which is 

red). The detective also checked with the original source of the information 

regarding the allegedly bloody-handed woman, the mini-mart store clerk 

(Ann F.), who said the substance on the woman in the store "possibly 

could have been motor oil." Based on all this information, Detective 

Stenquist did not contact Cheryl, concluding that the woman in the minimart with the substance on her hands did not pertain to the Shires murder.

Ann F., the mini-mart store clerk, testified for the defense. She 

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stated that on a September 2004 evening, between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m., a 

woman, who was not defendant, came into the store with dried blood all 

over her hands. Ann did not think the substance was transmission fluid, 

but admitted she had never seen dried transmission fluid. The woman 

wandered around the store, bought a snack, and ate it in the store.

The evidence of the statements to Detective Stenquist from the 

(eavesdropping) mini-mart customer and from Billy B. is the subject of 

defendant's first issue on appeal, to which we turn now.

People v. Ordway, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 727, 1-9 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Jan. 28, 

2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Calaveras County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, 

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

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Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

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As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Procedural Bar

Respondent asserts that eight of Petitioner's ten claims are procedurally barred 

as a result of various state laws. The Court shall examine each claim of procedural bar.

 1. Claims 1, 4, 9, and 10

a. Procedural History 

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In her first, fourth, ninth, and tenth claims, Petitioner contends that her rights 

under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by her counsel’s 

failure to hire expert witnesses, to fully conduct pre-trial discovery, to subpoena 

important material witnesses, and to provide Petitioner with all known discovery prior to 

trial. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 17 at 9-14, 19-23, 35-38.) In addition to these general 

allegations Petitioner asserts numerous sub-claims within claims 1, 4, 9 and 10. For

example, within claim one, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

request a dismissal of the case in light of alleged destruction of evidence, that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to have DNA testing performed on the victims fingernails, that 

counsel failed to object to admittance of latex gloves into evidence, that counsel failed to 

present any expert witnesses in support of the defense, that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to view the mini-mart security video in the presence of the manager and sales 

clerk of the store, that counsel failed to examine a witness regarding another woman 

who was in the mini-mart on the night of the crime, that counsel failed to provide 

Petitioner all discovery paperwork prior to trial, that counsel allowed favorable evidence 

to be lost that would have supported Petitioner's alibi, that counsel was incompetent for 

failing to ask her certain questions during her direct examination, and that counsel failed 

to object when the prosecution misstated facts in evidence and stated that evidence was 

presented when it was not. (Id. at 9-12.) These sub-claims are exemplary of Petitioner's 

sub-claims as to claim one. As stated, many more sub-claims are included in claims 1, 4, 

9 and 10 of the petition. 

Petitioner brought claims 1, 4, 9, and 10 of her federal Petition in a state court 

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Calaveras County Superior Court on August 

31, 2009. (Lodged Doc. 7.) The Petition was summarily denied without prejudice based 

upon Petitioner’s failure to file a verified petition under California law. (Lodged Doc. 8.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of 

Appeal, asserting the same claims and sub-claims on December 2, 2009. (Lodged Doc.

9.) The petition was denied without prejudice to Petitioner properly filing a verified 

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petition in the Superior Court of Calaveras County on December 17, 2009. (Lodged Doc 

10 (citing Cal. Pen. Code § 1474 and People v. Seijas 36 Cal.4th 291, 307 (2005).)

Finally, the claims and sub-claims were raised in the California Supreme Court and 

denied without comment on August 11, 2010. (Lodged Docs. 13-14.)

Under the “look through” doctrine the Court relies on the last reasoned state court 

decision. Yslt v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. Here, the last reasoned decision was the 

denial by the Third District Court of Appeal which denied the state petition for writ of 

habeas corpus because Petitioner failed to verify her petition, citing to California Penal 

Code § 1474 and People v. Seijas, 36 Cal.4th at 307.1

b. Respondent's Contentions 

California Penal Code § 1474 requires state habeas petitions to be verified by the 

oath or affirmation of the party making the application. Section 1474 was enacted in 

1872 and California courts have enforced the statutory requirement that a petition be 

verified. See, e.g., Ex parte Newell, 64 Cal.App. 103 (1923); People v. Manson, 61

Cal.App.3d 102 (1976). Accordingly, Respondent contends that the state procedural rule 

was in effect and firmly established and should serve as a procedural bar to prevent 

federal review of the petition. Alternatively, Respondent argues that the claims were not 

denied on the merits in state court, and therefore were not exhausted. 

c. Analysis: Technical Exhaustion and Procedural Default

The Supreme Court described the procedural default doctrine in Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991). The doctrine 

denies review of a petitioner's federal habeas claim when the claim was rejected in state 

court based on an adequate and independent state procedural bar. Id. at 729-30.

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in 

state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can 

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 

 

1

The decision, in its entirety reads: "The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without 

prejudice to filing a properly verified petition (See Pen. Code. § 1474) in the Superior Court of Calaveras 

County. (See, e.g., People v. Seijas, 36 Cal.4th at 307.)" (Lodged. Doc. 10.)

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alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Id. at 750.

A procedural bar must have risen from explicit and independent state law. Id. at 

735; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1988). For 

the procedural bar to be adequate, the bar must be clear, consistently applied, and well 

established at the time of the alleged default. Collier v. Bayer, 408 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Also, the opinion of the last state court rendering a judgment in the case must 

clearly and expressly state that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Harris, 489 

U.S. at 263; see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.

Here, the Court is presented a novel issue: Does the state court's dismissal 

without prejudice for failure to sign and verify the petition serve as a procedural bar? On 

one hand, the state court did not reach the merits of the petition based on a state 

procedural rule. However, in dismissing the petition without prejudice the state court did 

not foreclose consideration of the claims. Petitioner needed only to re-file a signed and 

verified copy of the petition to obtain state review.

 No federal courts have relied on the verification requirement of California Penal 

Code § 1474 to support finding a procedural bar. However, the Court need not 

determine the issue here, as other grounds support a finding that the claims are 

procedurally barred. Since Petitioner did not re-file the habeas petitions, she failed to 

obtain state decisions on the merits of the claims, and therefore the claims are not 

exhausted. 

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the 

length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34, 107 S. Ct. 1671, 95 L. 

Ed. 2d 119 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must 

present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every 

issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 

481 U.S. at 133-34; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 

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L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995). If the claim was not presented to the state's highest court on direct 

appeal, state collateral remedies must be exhausted. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 

1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986).

Even where a claim has not been properly presented to the state's highest court, 

a petitioner has satisfied the technical requirements of exhaustion if she no longer has 

state court remedies available. Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(en banc) ("The Supreme Court has noted that a habeas petitioner who has defaulted 

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there 

are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him."), quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 

F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) ("An applicant shall not 

be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within 

the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any 

available procedure, the question presented.") In such a situation the claim would likely 

be procedurally defaulted in this Court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (Holding that a 

procedural default arises when a petitioner has "failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.").

Here, the 'technical exhaustion' doctrine applies to Petitioner's claims to which no 

state remedies are available, even when the remedy is no longer available based on 

Petitioner's failure to seek state court review in a timely manner. See Woodford v. Ngo, 

548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006). In Woodford, the 

Supreme Court described the technical exhaustion requirement as follows:

In habeas, state-court remedies are described as having been 

"exhausted" when they are no longer available, regardless of the reason 

for their unavailability. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161, 116 S. 

Ct. 2074, 135 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1996). Thus, if state-court remedies are no 

longer available because the prisoner failed to comply with the deadline 

for seeking state-court review or for taking an appeal, those remedies are 

technically exhausted, ibid., but exhaustion in this sense does not 

automatically entitle the habeas petitioner to litigate his or her claims in 

federal court. Instead, if the petitioner procedurally defaulted those claims, 

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the prisoner generally is barred from asserting those claims in a federal 

habeas proceeding. Id., at 162, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 135 L. Ed. 2d 457; 

Coleman, supra, at 744-751, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640.

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93.

Clearly, recent Supreme Court authority requires this Court to consider claims that 

were not exhausted and no longer capable of review in state court as technically 

exhausted and subject to the doctrine of procedural default. Id. at 109 (Stevens, J., 

dissenting) ("[W]e decided no fewer than six cases in which we stated explicitly that a 

habeas petitioner satisfies the statutory exhaustion requirement so long as state-court 

remedies are no longer available to him at the time of the federal-court filing, regardless 

of the reason for their unavailability.") (listing cases). The Ninth Circuit has adhered to 

the technical exhaustion doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court. See Smith v. Baldwin, 

510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007); Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 

2011).

1. Do State Remedies Remain Available to Petitioner?

As the technical exhaustion doctrine is well established by the Supreme Court 

and Ninth Circuit, the Court must determine if Petitioner has any state remedies 

available. "In determining whether a remedy for a particular constitutional claim is 

'available,' the federal courts are authorized, indeed required, to assess the likelihood 

that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner a hearing on the merits of his claim." 

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 268, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 

Although Petitioner's claims were filed without prejudice to allow her to re-file 

verified and signed petitions in state court, the question now presented is whether any 

attempt to do so would be considered untimely and barred by the state courts. California 

does not have a specific time limit for filing habeas petitions. The United States Supreme 

Court has described California's timeliness requirements as follows:

California directs petitioners to file known claims “as promptly as the 

circumstances allow.” In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 765, n. 5, 21 Cal. Rptr. 

2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 738, n. 5 (1993). Petitioners are further instructed 

to state when they first learned of the asserted claims and to explain why 

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they did not seek postconviction relief sooner. In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 

770, 780, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317-318 (1998). Claims 

substantially delayed without justification may be denied as untimely. Ibid.; 

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th, at 765, n. 5, 855 P. 2d, at 738, n. 5.

Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2011). 

Petitioner was notified that her petition was not signed and verified, and therefore 

not reviewed by the Calaveras County Superior Court, on September 25, 2009. (Lodged. 

Doc. 8.) Petitioner did not attempt to re-file the petition, and over four years have since 

passed. It is without question that Petitioner's delay would be considered unreasonable 

under state law and any subsequent petition would be denied as untimely. There are

exceptions to California's timeliness requirement, but none appear to be relevant and 

none were raised by Petitioner. In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 at 780-781.

Requiring Petitioner to return to state court to attempt to exhaust her state court 

remedies would frustrate the pursuit of justice. "[D]ismissing such petitions for failure to 

exhaust state court remedies would often result in a game of judicial ping-pong between 

the state and federal courts, as the state prisoner returned to state court only to have the 

state procedural bar invoked against [her]." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-270, 109 

S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Accordingly, this Court finds that the claims are technically exhausted and subject 

to procedural default based on California's timeliness rules. 

2. Exceptions to Procedural Default

Nevertheless, "'[i]f a petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, a federal 

court may nonetheless consider the claim if she shows: (1) good cause for his failure to 

exhaust the claim; and (2) prejudice from the purported constitutional violation; or (3) 

demonstrates hearing the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'" 

Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 

2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991)) (further citation omitted). "An objective factor outside of 

a petitioner's control (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel or a basis for the claim that 

was previously unavailable) could constitute cause. The petitioner can meet the 

prejudice prong if he demonstrates that the errors . . . worked to his actual and 

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substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire proceeding with errors of constitutional 

dimension. A petitioner can demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice by 

establishing that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual 

innocence." Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327 (citations and internal quotation marks and 

punctuation omitted).) "Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel plus actual 

prejudice will satisfy this test and allow habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim." 

Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 938 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 

467, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991)).

Petitioner raises several claims and sub-claims alleging that counsel was 

ineffective. Before addressing the substance of the claims, the Court notes that the 

prosecution had a strong case against Petitioner based on significant amounts of 

evidence. As described by the state court, Petitioner worked for the victim as a 

housekeeper, and was having financial difficulties. Down the road from the crime scene 

items were found related to the crime, including the victim's checkbook with Defendant's 

fingerprints on it, a hammer with the victims' blood, bloody jeans of comparable size to 

those worn by Petitioner with Petitioner's and the victim's DNA, a bloody t-shirt 

resembling one worn by Petitioner in a local mini-mart on the night of the crime, and 

checks from the victim to Petitioner along with Petitioner's deposit slips corresponding to 

those checks. Further, many of the items were found in a toilet wax ring box, and it was 

shown that Petitioner purchased and installed toilets the day before the crime. 

Afterwards, Petitioner attempted to have a friend present a fabricated story that she was 

framed and the evidence was planted by the real killer. Based on the extensive and 

strong evidence implicating Petitioner in the crime, the Court must view the 

reasonableness of the actions of defense counsel in that context.

Petitioner presents numerous claims of ineffective actions by defense counsel. 

She asserts that he failed to inform her of an in chamber meeting with the judge and the 

prosecution regarding new exculpatory evidence and witnesses, but fails to describe the 

evidence or witnesses, and how they would have assisted her defense. (Am. Pet., ECF 

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No. 17 at 9-14.) Petitioner also claims that counsel was ineffective in his handling of 

alleged destruction of evidence, failing to object to damaging evidence that was admitted 

in trial, failing to investigate and perform further scientific testing, failing to present expert 

witnesses at trial, failing to have material witnesses testify, and failing to object when the 

prosecution misstated the evidence. (Id.) However, all of the claims presented by 

Petitioner are cursory in nature, and do not describe in specific detail what further 

evidence could have been presented, or how the prosecution's case could have been 

refuted. 

In determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must 

consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 

2d 674 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner 

must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 

by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that 

counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must 

identify counsel's alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable 

professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. 

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687; see also, Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 

(2011).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were "so serious 

as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. The 

Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable 

because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348; United 

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States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

In this case, Petitioner has not shown that counsel's conduct was deficient or that 

she was prejudiced by the conduct. Petitioner suggests that counsel could have 

performed further investigations and presented additional evidence and witnesses. 

However, Petitioner provides little in the way of specific details regarding how the 

additional information would have changed the outcome at trial. For example, Petitioner 

asserts that counsel did not inform Petitioner of an in chamber meeting in which new 

exculpatory evidence was discussed, but Petitioner does not provide any information 

about the allegedly exculpatory information. She also alleges that exculpatory 

information was destroyed, but mentions only a t-shirt and a gas receipt. (Am. Pet., ECF 

No. 17 at 11.) Petitioner does not describe how those pieces of evidence would have 

supported her defense. Petitioner asserts that counsel did not attempt to obtain further 

forensic evidence, such as DNA from the victim's fingernails to see if there was evidence 

of a different assailant. However, counsel did not act unreasonably in not attempting to 

obtain forensic evidence in light of the possibility that the new evidence might only 

provide more evidence linking Petitioner to the crime. Further, Petitioner claims that 

counsel failed to object when the prosecution made alleged misstatements about the 

evidence. Even if counsel could have objected, the jury was provided instructions 

regarding what was to be considered as evidence, and it is presumed that the jury 

followed the instructions. Clerks Tr. 330-31; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) ("It 

must also be presumed that such a juror would conscientiously obey the instructions of 

the trial court...").

As stated, strong evidence, including forensic evidence, implicated Petitioner in 

the murder. Petitioner has provided mostly cursory arguments and allegations regarding 

how counsel's actions were unreasonable or resulted in prejudice. Petitioner has not 

shown that counsel was ineffective, and she cannot obtain relief from procedural default 

on that ground. 

Likewise, Petitioner has not made a showing of actual innocence as required 

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under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995), and 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 165 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2006), to overcome the 

procedural bar. Petitioner's cursory claims of additional or destroyed evidence do not 

raise real concerns regarding her innocence. Petitioner has not shown that it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted her in light of the evidence 

presented in her federal petition. As Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or 

actual innocence to provide an exception to the procedural bar, her first, fourth, ninth, 

and tenth claims are denied as procedurally defaulted.

 2. Claims 2, 3, 5, and 6

a. Procedural History

Respondent asserts that claims two, three, five and six of Petitioner's federal 

petition were denied as untimely under state law and therefore procedurally barred. As 

each of the claims were presented in different procedural contexts, the Court shall 

describe how each claim was presented on state collateral review.

1. Claim 2

In claim two of her federal petition, Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective 

due to a conflict of interest arising from the fact that counsel's brother-in-law was the 

director of the state crime lab where evidence in the case was examined. (Am. Pet., ECF 

No. 17 at 15.)

Petitioner presented this claim in a writ of habeas corpus filed with the Calaveras 

County Superior Court on April 22, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 25.) The petition was denied in a 

reasoned decision on the same day. (Lodged Doc. 26.) Petitioner filed a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeal on May 11, 2011, asserting the 

same claim. (Lodged Doc. 27.) The petition was denied in a summary decision on May 

12, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 28.) Petitioner then raised the claim before the California 

Supreme Court. On September 28, 2011, the court denied the petition citing to In Re 

Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re Clark, 5, Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (1993). 

(Lodged Docs. 28-29.) Accordingly, the California Supreme Court denied the petition as 

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untimely. See Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2011).

2. Claim 3

In claim three of her federal petition, Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to thoroughly review all police reports for discrepancies and thereby allowed

tainted evidence to be admitted into trial. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 17 at 17.) 

Petitioner presented this as the second claim in a writ of habeas corpus filed with 

the Calaveras County Superior Court on February 4, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 21.) The 

petition was denied in a reasoned decision on February 7, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 22.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeal on 

February 22, 2011, asserting the same claim. (Lodged Doc. 23.) The petition was denied 

in a summary decision on February 24, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 24.) Petitioner then raised 

the claim before the California Supreme Court. On September 28, 2011, the court 

denied the petition as untimely citing to In Re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998) and 

In re Clark, 5, Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (1993). (Lodged Docs. 17-18.) 

3. Claim 5

In claim five of her federal petition, Petitioner claims that procedural neglect 

resulted in the destruction of evidence and the illegal introduction of tainted evidence at 

trial. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 17 at 24-25.) 

Petitioner presented this claim in a writ of habeas corpus filed with the Calaveras 

County Superior Court on November 8, 2010. (Lodged Doc. 11.) The petition was denied 

in a reasoned decision on November 9, 2010. (Lodged Doc. 12.) Petitioner filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeal on January 12, 

2011, asserting the same claim. (Lodged Doc. 15.) The petition was denied in a 

summary decision on January 27, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 16.) Petitioner then raised the 

claim before the California Supreme Court. On September 28, 2011, the court denied 

the petition as untimely citing to In Re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re 

Clark, 5, Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (1993). (Lodged Docs. 17-18.) 

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4. Claim 6

In claim six of her federal petition, Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. (Am. 

Pet., ECF No. 17 at 26-28.) 

Petitioner presented this claim in a writ of habeas corpus filed with the Calaveras 

County Superior Court on December 10, 2010. (Lodged Doc. 19.) The petition was 

denied in a reasoned decision on the same day. (Lodged Doc. 20.) Petitioner filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeal on January 12, 

2011, asserting the same claim. (Lodged Doc. 15.) The petition was denied in a 

summary decision on January 27, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 16.) Petitioner then raised the 

claim before the California Supreme Court. On September 28, 2011, the court denied 

the petition as untimely citing to In Re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re 

Clark, 5, Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (1993). (Lodged Docs. 17-18.) 

As described, claims two, three, five and six were all denied by the California 

state courts as untimely. 

b. Analysis

Petitioner's claims two, three, five and six are potentially procedurally barred by 

the California Supreme Court's decisions to deny state habeas review because the 

petitions were untimely. As described above, a procedural bar precludes federal habeas 

review when the state court's denial of review was based on a petitioner's failure to meet 

an "independent and adequate" state procedural requirement. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

729-30.

Here, Petitioner's claims were denied with citations to In Re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 

770, 780 (1998) and In re Clark, 5, Cal.4th 750, 767-769 (1993), indicating that 

Petitioner had failed to meet the state's timely filing requirement. See Walker v. Martin, 

131 S. Ct. at 1124. California's "substantial delay" timeliness standard satisfies the 

"independent and adequate" requirement. See Bennet v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 582-83 

(9th Cir. 2003) (finding that California's timeliness standard is independent of federal 

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law); Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1131 (finding that California's timeliness standard is 

adequate). Therefore, Petitioner is procedurally barred from seeking habeas review. 

Moreover, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown cause or prejudice or made a 

showing of actual innocence to overcome the procedural bar. Accordingly, claims two, 

three, five and six are procedurally barred. As claims one, four, nine and ten were also 

procedurally barred, only claims seven and eight remain pending, and are discussed 

below. 

B. Review of Claims on the Merits

1. Claim Seven – Admission of Hearsay Testimony

Petitioner contends the trial court violated her constitutional rights in allowing the 

prosecution to present unreliable hearsay statements at trial. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 17 at 

29.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that statements made by witnesses to an investigating

officer regarding what they saw at the mini-mart near the crime scene were allowed into 

evidence. (Id.) 

a. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented her claim in her direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

Court of Appeal and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 2-6.) Since the California Supreme Court denied the 

petition in a summary manner, this Court “looks through” the decisions and presumes 

the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the last state court to 

have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3

(1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher court 

agrees with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see 

also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts 

look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court’s rejection of 

petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

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In denying Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeals explained that:

5. Third Party Culpability

The manager of an Angels Camp mini-mart told Detective Jim 

Stenquist that one of her store clerks had seen a woman--who did not fit 

defendant's description--in the store with blood or oil on her hands 

between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. the night Shires was killed. A customer at the 

store who had overheard the manager and the detective talking told the 

detective that she (the customer) knew of the woman the manager was 

describing, and that the woman had been working on her car at the 

residence of Billy B., who lived about three blocks from the mini-mart.

Detective Stenquist then checked with Billy B., who echoed the 

customer's account. Billy stated that he and a woman named Cheryl S. 

had been working on her car "the last few weeks," that they had "probably" 

worked on the car on the evening of September 16, 2004, and that he had 

sent Cheryl to the mini-mart "to get items." The detective then confirmed 

that indeed it was Cheryl's registered car on Billy's property--with its hood 

up and surrounded by cans of motor oil and transmission fluid (which is 

red). The detective also checked with the original source of the information 

regarding the allegedly bloody-handed woman, the mini-mart store clerk 

(Ann F.), who said the substance on the woman in the store "possibly 

could have been motor oil." Based on all this information, Detective 

Stenquist did not contact Cheryl, concluding that the woman in the minimart with the substance on her hands did not pertain to the Shires murder.

Ann F., the mini-mart store clerk, testified for the defense. She 

stated that on a September 2004 evening, between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m., a 

woman, who was not defendant, came into the store with dried blood all 

over her hands. Ann did not think the substance was transmission fluid, 

but admitted she had never seen dried transmission fluid. The woman 

wandered around the store, bought a snack, and ate it in the store.

The evidence of the statements to Detective Stenquist from the 

(eavesdropping) mini-mart customer and from Billy B. is the subject of 

defendant's first issue on appeal, to which we turn now.

Discussion

1. Allegedly Inadmissible Hearsay Statements from Mini-mart Customer 

and from Billy B.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting these hearsay 

statements, which undermined defendant's third party culpability defense 

involving the allegedly bloody-handed woman observed in the Angels 

Camp mini-mart on the night of the murder. We find no error because the 

evidence was properly admitted for a nonhearsay purpose and the jury 

was instructed accordingly.

These statements were admitted in the following manner. In a 

reported discussion outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor asked the 

trial court if it was going to allow the defense to question Detective 

Stenquist about the allegedly bloody-handed woman, even if the 

prosecutor did not raise this issue with Detective Stenquist. Defense 

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counsel responded that he was "obviously going to ask [Detective 

Stenquist] what he did to investigate this case and what he didn't do to 

investigate this case," explaining that such questioning went "to [Detective 

Stenquist's] credibility, his bias, his motive and his interest, and [was] 

certainly fair fodder for cross-examination." The trial court agreed.

In light of this ruling, the prosecutor then asked Detective Stenquist 

on direct examination (1) what information the eavesdropping mini-mart 

customer had provided him about the identity of the supposedly bloodyhanded woman in the mini-mart on the night of the murder, and (2) what 

Billy B. had told the detective in this regard as well.

Defendant unsuccessfully objected to both of these inquiries on 

hearsay grounds. In each instance, the trial court instructed the jury that 

the statements from the mini-mart customer and from Billy B. were not 

being admitted for the truth of the matters stated, but only to explain 

Detective Stenquist's investigation into the matters based on the 

detective's state of mind. (As noted, the customer stated she knew of the 

allegedly bloody-handed woman whom the mini-mart manager had 

described and this woman was working on her car at Billy B.'s, and Billy B. 

confirmed the customer's account and provided the woman's name, 

Cheryl S.)

We conclude the trial court acted properly. As defense counsel had 

argued, what Detective Stenquist did and did not do to investigate this 

case, especially with respect to the allegedly bloody-handed woman at the 

mini-mart on the night of the murder, was relevant. The prosecution was 

entitled to have Detective Stenquist explain his investigation regarding this 

woman, if the defense was going to criticize that investigation as lacking. 

Detective Stenquist's investigation in this regard was based on the 

information he had obtained from the mini-mart customer and from Billy B. 

That information was consistent and exculpatory as to the supposedly 

bloody-handed woman. Detective Stenquist then combined this 

information with his observation of the ongoing car repair at Billy B.'s, his 

confirmation that the car being repaired was registered to Cheryl S., and

the subsequent equivocations from mini-mart clerk Ann F. concerning the 

substance on the woman's hands, to conclude the bloody-handed woman 

theory was a dead end.

Because Detective Stenquist's investigative actions were at issue in 

this case, and because those actions were based on statements from the 

mini-mart customer and from Billy B., these statements constituted 

nonhearsay evidence that was admissible to show the detective's (i.e., the 

hearer's) actions in conformity with the statements. The statements were 

not hearsay and were admissible because it was how Detective Stenquist 

acted in light of the statements, not the truth of the matter asserted in the 

statements, which was the relevant fact sought to be proved. (People v. 

Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907, and authorities cited therein.) n3

[FN3] In light of our resolution of the hearsay issue, defendant's related 

contentions that the trial court violated her constitutional right to 

confrontation and constitutional due process right to be convicted on 

reliable evidence--if not forfeited--fall as well. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence 

(4th ed. 2000) Hearsay, § 1, pp. 679-680 [hearsay rule functions to 

preserve confrontation and reliable evidence].)

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People v. Ordway, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 727, 9-13 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Jan. 28, 

2009).

b. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal 

defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. "The 'main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 

opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.'" Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections 

for California, 692 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 678 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).

In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars 

the state from introducing into evidence out-of-court statements which are "testimonial" 

in nature unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 

cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable. 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Crawford rule applies only to hearsay 

statements that are "testimonial" and does not bar the admission of non-testimonial 

hearsay statements. Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 

(2007) ("the Confrontation Clause has no application to" an "out-of-court nontestimonial 

statement.").

Although the Crawford court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the 

term "testimonial," it stated that "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 

interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 

52. The court also provided the following "formulations" of a "core class" of testimonial 

statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material 

such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable 

to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 

to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 

testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" 

and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 

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witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 

trial." Id. at 51-52. The court in Crawford also pointed out that the Sixth Amendment 

Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other 

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." Id. at 59, n.9. However, "state 

evidence rules do not trump a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation," and a 

reviewing court "ensures that an out-of-court statement was introduced for a 'legitimate, 

nonhearsay purpose' before relying on the not-for-its-truth rationale to dismiss the 

Confrontation Clause's application." (citation omitted). Williams v. Illinois, U.S. , 132 

S.Ct. 2221, 2226, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012).

Further, Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis. 

Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2000). "In the context of 

habeas petitions, the standard of review is whether a given error 'had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 

461, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

Factors to be considered when assessing the harmlessness of a Confrontation Clause 

violation include the importance of the testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, 

the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony, the 

extent of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). 

b. Analysis

At issue is whether the witnesses' statements to Detective Stenquist constituted 

testimonial hearsay in violation of the Supreme Court's holding in Crawford. 

 Tthe Supreme Court explained that the Confrontation Clause "does not bar the 

use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 

asserted." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. The witnesses' statements at issue here were 

only admitted to show Detective Steinquist's actions in conformity with the statements. 

Thus, Crawford is simply inapplicable. See also Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755-56 

(9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Crawford did not apply to a social worker's testimony about 

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statements made by the petitioner's son because the hearsay was admitted to explain 

why the social worker contacted the authorities and not "to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted"); United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 966 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 

Crawford did not apply to "[t]estimony by a patrol officer about information an eyewitness 

gave her" because the hearsay "was offered as a basis for action, not for its truth"). The 

statements were provided to explain why Detective Stenquist did not continue to pursue 

an investigation regarding the woman seen in the store with transmission fluid on her 

person and not for the fact of the matter asserted.

Moreover, even if the admission of the witnesses' statements to Detective 

Stenquist violated Petitioner's constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause, any 

error was harmless under the Brecht standard. See Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 755 

(9th Cir. 2009) ("Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless-error analysis."); 

Indeed, the evidence implicating Petitioner in the murder was very strong. See Allen v. 

Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. as amended Jan. 24, 2005) ("[T]o the extent that 

any claim of error . . . might be meritorious, we would reject that error as harmless 

because the evidence of [the petitioner's] guilt is overwhelming."). Even if Petitioner 

could have presented a stronger alibi based on other witnesses' observing what they 

perceived to be a woman in the mini-mart with blood on her person, there was strong 

evidence against Petitioner, including evidence that she took financial advantage of the 

victim and physical evidence linking her to the killing.

In sum, the Court concludes that the admission of the witnesses' statements to 

Detective Stenquist's did not violate Petitioner's constitutional rights. Moreover, even if 

was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless. Thus, the Court concludes that the 

state courts' denial of this claim was not contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

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2. Claim Eight – Insufficient Evidence of Special Circumstance 

Allegation

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove the special 

circumstance allegation that Petitioner committed the murder to prevent the victim from 

testifying in a criminal proceeding. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 17 at 32-34.) 

a. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented her claim in her direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

Court of Appeal and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California 

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 2-6.) Since the California Supreme Court denied the 

petition in a summary manner, this Court “looks through” the decisions and presumes 

the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the last state court to 

have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3 

(1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher court 

agrees with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see 

also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts 

look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court’s rejection of 

petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal explained that:

2. Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Special Circumstance of WitnessMurder

Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the 

special circumstance finding that defendant killed Shires to prevent him 

from testifying in a criminal proceeding. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10).) We 

disagree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal appeal, we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements 

at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 

557, 576-578; People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 385.)

As pertinent here, three elements comprise the witness-murder 

special circumstance: (1) the victim witnessed a separate crime prior to 

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being killed; (2) the defendant intended to kill the victim; and (3) the 

purpose of the killing was to prevent the victim from testifying about the 

crime he had witnessed. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 801 

(Stanley).) The trial court properly instructed the jury with these three 

elements. (CALCRIM No. 725.)

"The relevant fact under this [special] circumstance is that the 

defendant believes that he or she is exposed to criminal prosecution, not 

that in fact criminal proceedings are pending or contemplated." (3 Witkin & 

Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) § 457, p. 610; People v. Weidert

(1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 853-854.) Consequently, it is the accused's 

subjective intent that is relevant in proving this special circumstance. 

(Weidert, supra, at p. 853.) And killing for the purpose of preventing the 

victim from testifying about the crime he had witnessed does not have to 

be the sole or predominant purpose of the killing. (Stanley, supra, 10 

Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.)

Defendant concedes the evidence is sufficient to prove the first two 

elements of this special circumstance: Shires witnessed a separate crime 

(forgery/theft), and defendant intentionally killed Shires.

Defendant's evidentiary challenge is to the third element. Defendant 

argues: "[T]here was absolutely no evidence to prove that the purpose of 

the intentional killing was to prevent [Shires] from testifying against 

[defendant] about the crimes involving [Shires's] checks. There was no 

evidence that [Shires] had reported [defendant's] criminal conduct with his 

checks, no statements by [defendant] that she feared that [Shires] was 

going to report her criminal conduct with his checks, and no evidence of 

any law enforcement investigation of [defendant's] criminal conduct with 

[Shires's] checks prior to the murder. [P] [Defendant's] case is entirely 

different from People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641 [(Ledesma)] and 

People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471 . . . . In Ledesma, the court 

[found sufficient evidence of the third element by relying] on the 

defendant's statement that if he 'got rid of the witness, he wouldn't have a 

witness to testify against him.' (Ledesma, supra, at p. 723.) In Sanders, 

the court relied on the defendant's expression of concern that one of the 

victims of a robbery attempt could identify him. (Sanders, supra, at p. 

520.) In contrast, there is no evidence of any statement by [defendant 

here] to show that the purpose of the killing was to prevent [Shires] from 

testifying."

Defendant has framed her sufficiency argument too narrowly, 

essentially basing it on direct evidence of the third element. Because this 

third element involves defendant's purpose underlying the killing--i.e., her 

criminal intent--circumstantial evidence has a role to play. Direct evidence 

is not required. Indeed, a defendant's criminal intent is often proved 

through circumstantial evidence because criminal defendants often do not 

expressly state what was on their mind regarding the crime. (See People 

v. Patino (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 11, 27.) As Ledesma itself recognized 

regarding the evidence before it, "[t]he circumstances of the offense also 

support the conclusion that the victim was killed to prevent his testimony." 

(Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 723.) As we shall see, it is the 

circumstantial evidence that is defendant's undoing here.

As the People note, defendant herself testified that she knew she 

had committed a crime by taking and depositing checks from Shires's 

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bank account and that she was going to get in trouble for it. When 

originally questioned by the police, defendant lied about Shires giving her 

money. Defendant also acknowledged to officers that she felt she was 

taking advantage of Shires. Moreover, defendant was financially strapped 

at the time of Shires's death. One reason for killing a financial lifeline 

during a time of financial distress would be if the lifeline had become 

aware he was being criminally exploited.

Aside from evidence from defendant herself, there was evidence 

from Debbie N. that Shires had stated he was having a problem with his 

current housekeeper, and Shires repeatedly told Debbie and Amy S. that 

he needed a housekeeper he could trust who would not take advantage of 

him. Shires made these statements only about a week before his death.

Defendant's forgery and theft involved Shires's checks and 

checking account, and deposit slips with defendant's name, signature and 

account number. This meant there was a paper trail of wrongdoing. As the 

prosecutor argued, Shires's upcoming bank statement, especially 

regarding the September 14, 2004, check and deposit, would prove very 

troubling for defendant. A treasure trove of this paper evidence--torn up, 

secreted in a taped-up box and dumped in a vacant, trashy, overgrown, 

unlit area--pointed to defendant.

This evidence, then, from defendant's own mouth, from statements 

Shires made shortly before his death, and from the paper trail of forgery 

and theft, revealed a timing and motive for Shires's death that led to 

defendant. Although it is at least arguable the $ 2,500 defendant obtained 

from Shires in mid-August 2004 may have been a loan, the same cannot 

be said for the $ 2,500 defendant obtained on September 14. The 

evidence showed only outright theft as to this transaction, accomplished 

via defendant's forgery. Shires was murdered on September 16.

We conclude there is sufficient evidence to sustain the special 

circumstance finding that defendant killed Shires to prevent him from 

testifying against defendant concerning the forgery and theft involving 

Shires's checking account.

People v. Ordway, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 727, 13-18 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Jan. 28, 

2009).

b. Analysis

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees that a criminal 

defendant may be convicted only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 

necessary to constitute the charged crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 

S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Under the Jackson standard, "the relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original).

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In applying the Jackson standard, the federal court must refer to the substantive 

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. 

A federal court sitting in habeas review is "bound to accept a state court's interpretation 

of state law, except in the highly unusual case in which the interpretation is clearly 

untenable and amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional 

violation." Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

Petitioner argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding of the 

special circumstance that the murder was committed to prevent the victim from testifying. 

Specifically, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove the third 

element that the purpose of the killing was to prevent the victim from testifying about the 

crime he had witnessed. As the California Court of Appeals explained, there was no 

direct evidence of Petitioner making overt statements that the killing was made to 

prevent the victim from testifying. However, based on the totality of the circumstances, 

including the fact that the victim was murdered at the same time that Petitioner was 

financially defrauding the victim, plus the fact that evidence of the financial fraud was 

dumped with evidence relating to the murder, created a strong inference that the murder 

was committed to prevent the victim from discovering or eventually testifying regarding 

the financial fraud perpetrated by Petitioner. The fact that there were no overt statements 

regarding Petitioner's motive does not undermine the state court's finding that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the finding on the special circumstance. The Court 

therefore finds that the state appellate court's analysis was based on the correct federal 

legal standard and did not unreasonably apply federal law in evaluating Petitioner's 

sufficiency of the evidence claim. 

Under Jackson and AEDPA, the state decision is entitled to double deference on 

habeas review. Based on the Court's independent review of the trial record, it is 

apparent that Petitioner's challenge to whether there was sufficient evidence to support 

the special circumstance finding is without merit. There was no constitutional error, and 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief with regard to this claim.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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