Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10515/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10515-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
F. Harvey Whittemore
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

F. HARVEY WHITTEMORE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10515

D.C. No.

3:12-cr-00058-

LRH-WGC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 6, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed January 26, 2015

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions of making excessive

campaign contributions in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 441a(a)(1) and 437g(d)(1)(A)(i), and making contributions

in the name of another in violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441f and

437g(d)(1)(A)(i).

The panel held that the defendant’s theory – that

unconditional gifts under Nevada law cannot be conduit

contributions in violation of federal law – is not supported by

law, and that to the extent the defendant’s theory is that the

unconditional nature of the gifts prevented him from forming

the necessary intent, the instructions given by the court

adequately encompassed his theory.

The panel did not entertain the defendant’s challenge to

the district court’s tentative ruling denying the defendant’s

motion in limine to exclude proffered testimony from a

linguistics professor, where the defendant never renewed the

motion. Regarding the defendant’s contentions that the

district court improperly allowed speculative testimony in

violation of Fed. R. Evid. 602, the panel held that defense

counsel had opened the door to some of the testimony, that

some of the testimonywas not impermissibly speculative, and

that any error was harmless.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 3

The panel held that there was sufficient evidence to

support the conviction.

COUNSEL

Justin James Bustos, Gordon & Silver, Reno, Nevada; Brian

Warner Hagen, Whittemore Law Firm, Reno, Nevada;

Dominic P. Gentile and Vincent Savarese, III (argued),

Gordon & Silver, Las Vegas, Nevada, for DefendantAppellant.

Elizabeth Olson White (argued), Appellate Chief and

Assistant United States Attorney, Reno, Nevada; Steven

Warren Myhre, First Assistant United States Attorney, Las

Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

In February 2007, F. Harvey Whittemore agreed to raise

$150,000 for Senator Harry Reid’s reelection campaign by

March 31. A few days before the deadline, Whittemore

distributed a total of $145,000, in increments of $5,000 per

person, to some of his relatives and to employees of a

company of which he was chairman, requesting that the

recipients make contributions to Senator Reid’s campaign. 

Each recipient made a contribution of $4,600, the maximum

allowed under federal law. A jury convicted Whittemore of

making excessive campaign contributions in violation of

2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1) and 437g(d)(1)(A)(i), and making

contributions in the name of another in violation of 2 U.S.C.

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4 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

§§ 441f and 437g(d)(1)(A)(i). (The relevant provisions of

Title 2 of the U.S. Code have since been moved to Title 52

and renumbered.) Whittemore appeals, arguing that (1) the

district court impermissibly failed to instruct the jury on the

theory of his defense; (2) the individual contribution limits in

the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) and the

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violate the First

Amendment; (3) the district court made two erroneous

evidentiary rulings; and (4) the conviction was based on

insufficient evidence.

We affirm.

I. Background

F. HarveyWhittemore is a prominent attorney, developer,

and lobbyist who has long been active in Nevada politics and

political fundraising. In early 2007, Whittemore was serving

as Chairman of Wingfield Nevada Group, a holding company

with significant interests in golf courses, land development,

oil and gas properties, and dairy operations.

Whittemore had been a past supporter of Senator Harry

Reid. In February 2007, after a meeting with Senator Reid,

Whittemore promised to raise $150,000 for Senator Reid’s

2010 reelection campaign before the upcoming March 31

campaign finance filing deadline. When the campaign had

not received any funds from Whittemore by late March,

Senator Reid’s fundraiser twice followed up with

Whittemore.

On March 27, 2007, the day of the second follow-up call,

Whittemore transferred a total of $145,000 to seventeen

relatives and employees through wire transfers and checks. 

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 5

Those who were single received $5,000, while couples who

were married or engaged received $10,000. Each recipient

made a campaign contribution to Senator Reid’s campaign of

the statutory maximum contribution of $4,600, most within

one day of receiving the money. Many of the recipients

testified at trial that they would not or could not have made

such large contributions absent the transfers from

Whittemore. The recipients generally testified that

Whittemore had characterized the funds as “bonuses” or

“gifts” and that he simultaneously encouraged them to make

contributions to Senator Reid’s campaign, sometimes

explicitly stating that the funds were intended to cover the

cost of the contribution.

Whittemore’s assistant, Roxanne Doyle, testified that on

March 28 she sent contribution checks by FedEx to Jake

Perry, Senator Reid’s fundraiser, with a cover memo and a

spreadsheet of donor information. The cover memo indicated

that three of the checks listed on the spreadsheet had been

sent to the campaign separately. The spreadsheet identified

thirty-three donors, thirteen of whom were employees of

Wingfield Nevada Group, including Whittemore. 

Whittemore was identified as the company’s chairman. Two

other donors were identified as employees of Red Hawk, a

Wingfield subsidiary. Perry testified that the campaign

received all of the checks except for one of the three that had

been sent separately.

On April 13, two days before Senator Reid’s campaign

was to report its quarterly fundraising information to the

Federal Election Commission, Whittemore sent Perry an email with the subject heading “contribution list,” along with

a new spreadsheet that listed the same thirty-three donors. 

On this spreadsheet, however, only four of the donors were

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6 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

listed as Wingfield employees. Several were now identified

as employees of Wingfield subsidiaries whose names did not

signal any relationship to Wingfield. Roxanne Doyle had

previouslybeen identified as “ExecutiveAssistant, Wingfield

Nevada Group.” She was now identified as an employee of

Harvey Whittemore Attorney at Law. Christina Mamer had

been identified as “VP of Human Resources, Wingfield

Nevada Group.” She was now identified as an employee of

Whittemore-Seeno Company; the prosecution introduced

evidence that there is no company registered by that name in

Nevada. Whittemore himself was now identified as “Partner,

Lionel Sawyer & Collins.”

Following a two-week trial, a jury convicted Whittemore

of making excessive campaign contributions in violation of

2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1) and 437g(d)(1)(A)(i), making

contributions in the name of another in violation of 2 U.S.C.

§§ 441f and 437g(d)(1)(A)(i), and making a false statement

to a federal agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2)

and 2. The jury could not reach a verdict on a second charge

of making a false statement to a federal agency. The district

court declared a mistrial on that count and granted the

government’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court

granted Whittemore a downward variance from the guideline

sentencing range of 41 to 51 months, sentencing him to 24

months in prison.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo whether jury instructions properly

state the elements of the charged offense and adequately

cover the defense’s theory of the case. United States v.

Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). We also

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 7

review constitutional claims de novo. United States v.

Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013).

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and

any underlying factual determinations for clear error. United

States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Evidentiary rulings will be reversed for abuse of discretion

only if such nonconstitutional error more likely than not

affected the verdict.” United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876,

882 (9th Cir. 1994).

“Where a defendant moves for acquittal at the close of the

government’s evidence, we review de novo whether sufficient

evidence exists to support a guilty verdict.” United States v.

Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005). A conviction

is supported by sufficient evidence if, “viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier

of fact could conclude that the evidence was adequate to

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990).

III. Discussion

Whittemore makes a number of arguments challenging

his conviction. We address them in turn.

A. Jury Instructions

Whittemore first argues that the district court erred in

refusing to instruct the jury that an unconditional gift of funds

cannot violate § 441f if the funds have become the property

of the donors under Nevada law.

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8 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

“A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury

on his theory of defense, provided that it is supported by law

and has some foundation in the evidence.” United States v.

Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on

other grounds by Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006),

as recognized by United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134 (9th

Cir. 2013). “[B]ut it is not reversible error to reject a

defendant’s proposed instruction . . . if other instructions, in

their entirety, adequately cover that defense theory.” Id. In

United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir.

2010), we articulated a three-part test, requiring the defendant

to show (1) that his theory has some foundation in evidence;

(2) that it is supported by law; and (3) that the given

instructions did not adequately encompass his theory.

Whittemore’s theory that unconditional gifts under

Nevada law cannot be conduit contributions in violation of

federal law is not supported by law. Furthermore, to the

extent Whittemore’s theory is that the unconditional nature of

the gifts prevented him from forming the necessary intent, the

instructions given by the court adequately encompassed his

theory.

1. Unconditional Gifts

Section 441a imposes limits on individual campaign

contributions made directly to candidates. See 52 U.S.C.

§ 30116(a)(1)(A) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)). In

2007, the inflation-adjusted limit for both primary and

general election campaign contributions was $2,300, for a

total base limit of $4,600 per person per candidate during a

single election cycle. See id. § 30116(c)(1) (formerly

2 U.S.C. § 441a(c)(1)); 72 Fed. Reg. 5294, 5295 (Feb. 5,

2007). The statute defines a “contribution” as “any gift,

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 9

subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything

of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing

any election for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)

(formerly 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i)). The limit includes “all

contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly,

on behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions

which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed

through an intermediary or conduit to such candidate.” Id.

§ 30116(a)(8) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8)). Section 441f

directly addresses so-called “conduit” or “straw donor”

contributions. See Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247,

1251 (9th Cir. 1990). It provides:

No person shall make a contribution in the

name of another person or knowingly permit

his name to be used to effect such a

contribution, and no person shall knowingly

accept a contribution made by one person in

the name of another person.

52 U.S.C. § 30122 (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441f).

Whittemore argues that § 441f, on its face, does not

prohibit “an unconditional gift made to a third party who

subsequently decides to voluntarily contribute to a

campaign,” “even if that contribution is made pursuant to the

suggestion of the giftor.” Whittemore argues that because the

money he transferred to his relatives and employees became

“the giftees’ own money” and because the transfers were not

“conditioned upon the making of campaign contributions or

otherwise, the giftees’ subsequent campaign contributions

could not trigger a violation of § 441f” as a matter of law. He

further contends that this reading is mandated by the rule of

lenity.

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10 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

Whittemore’s arguments are foreclosed by our decision

in United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In O’Donnell, the defendant arranged to reimburse

contributions made by thirteen employees and family

members to the Edwards for President campaign. Id. at 548. 

On appeal, he argued that § 441f did not apply to “straw

donor” contributions made from a conduit donor’s funds that

were later reimbursed, since the straw donor “actually made”

the contribution. Id. at 549. We held that the statutory text

and purpose precluded this reading. We first noted that the

statutory definition of “contribution” did not address the

identity of the donor who actually “makes” the contribution. 

Id. at 550. We then applied the dictionary definition of

contribute—“‘[t]o give or supply in common with others;

give to a common fund or for a common purpose’”—to hold

that “it is clear that O’Donnell gave the money at issue for the

common purpose of advancing the Edwards campaign” and

so made a “contribution” within the meaning of the statute. 

Id.(quotingAMERICANHERITAGECOLLEGEDICTIONARY 303

(3d ed. 2000)) (alteration in original). We also specifically

examined the statute’s use of the word “gift.” “In the context

of gifts,” we noted, “the word ‘giving’ connotes the idea of

providing from one’s own resources . . . , and thus we refer to

the original source rather than the intermediary as the one

who gave.” Id. Accordingly, we held that

the person who actually transmits the money

acts merely as a mechanism, whereas it is the

original source who has made the gift by

arranging for his money to finance the

donation. To identify the individual who has

made the contribution, we must look past the

intermediary’s essentially ministerial role to

the substance of the transaction. Accordingly,

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 11

the statutory language applies when a

defendant’s funds go to a campaign either

directly from him or through an intermediary.

Id. We wrote that our interpretation of § 441f clearly

furthered the congressional purpose of “ensur[ing] the

complete and accurate disclosure of the contributors who

finance federal elections,” since straw donor contributions

“undermine transparency no less than false name

contributions do by shielding the identities of true

contributors.” Id. at 553–54.

Whittemore argues that O’Donnell does not control

because the transferees here did not act as mere

intermediaries. He argues that the legal difference between

the intermediaries discussed in O’Donnell and the transferees

here is equivalent to the difference between bailees and

owners. He contends that because the court failed to instruct

the jury regarding Nevada state property law, the jury was

prevented from considering this legal difference.

We disagree. In O’Donnell, the contributions at issue

were made with the straw donors’ own funds, which were

later reimbursed. The status of the donated funds under state

property law, at the time of their donation, was irrelevant to

a determination of who “made” the contribution for the

purposes of § 441f. The key issue under § 441f is the source

of the funds, regardless of the status of the funds under state

property law at the time of the donation. See id. at 550. In

this case, the jury instructions required the jury to find that

Whittemore knew the named contributors were not in fact the

“true source” of the money used for the contributions, and

that Whittemore caused those contributions to be made. In

light of these findings, each of Whittemore’s transfers

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12 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

constitutes a “contribution” under § 441f. The jury’s

conclusions that Whittemore made excessive campaign

contributions in violation of § 441a(a)(1) and caused a false

report to be made to the Federal Election Commission in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and 2 follow

accordingly.

2. Intent

Whittemore also argues that the court’s failure to instruct

the jury on his unconditional gift theory prevented the jury

from fully considering whether he had the intent to make an

illegal conduit contribution. We hold that the instructions

were adequate.

Jury instructions must be legally accurate and must allow

the jury to consider any defense theory supported by law. See

Mason, 902 F.2d at 1441. However, the defendant is not

entitled to the instructions of his choice. Our recent decision

in Thomas is illustrative. There, the district court gave a

model jury instruction in the defendant’s perjury prosecution

that required the jury to find that the defendant’s testimony

was false and that the defendant knew of its falsity. Thomas,

612 F.3d at 1122. The defendant argued that the court erred

by failing to give an instruction based on her “literal truth”

defense—that her testimony could not be perjury if it were

literally true, even if it had “an especially strong tendency to

be misleading.” Id. at 1119–20. We held that the provided

instruction was adequate because it required findings that

would be incompatible with a finding that the same statement

was “literally true.” Id. at 1121–22; see also Romm, 455 F.3d

at 1002 (holding that because the given instructions required

the same finding as the defendant’s proffered instructions,

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 13

refusal to give defendant’s instructions did not constitute

error).

Here, the court read to the jury the text of §§ 441f and

437g(d)(1)(A) and recited the required elements of the

offense. It also instructed the jury on conduit contributions,

drawing from the statutory definition of “contribution” in

§ 431(8)(A)(i) and from our decision in O’Donnell. The

instruction provided:

Specifically, the law prohibits conduit

contributions, which occur when a person

provides anything of value, including a gift,

subscription, loan, advance, deposit of money,

or promise of reimbursement, to another

person for the purpose of causing that other

person to make a contribution in that other

person’s name. In other words, it is unlawful

when a defendant solicits others to contribute

to a candidate for federal office in their own

names and furnishes the money for the

contribution either through an advance or a

prearranged reimbursement.

The court also instructed the jury that the defendant must

have acted “knowingly and willfully,” meaning that “the

defendant is aware of the act and does not act through

ignorance, mistake, or accident,” and that “the defendant

acted with knowledge that some part of his course of conduct

was unlawful and with the intent to do something the law

forbids.”

Based on these instructions, the jury was permitted to

conclude that Whittemore acted without the requisite intent

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14 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

by giving funds to his donees without the purpose that these

funds be used for improper campaign contributions, and, on

that basis, to return a verdict of acquittal. See O’Donnell,

608 F.3d at 550. The district court thus did not err by

excluding Whittemore’s proffered instructions.

B. Constitutional Claim

Whittemore also argues that the individual contribution

limits of § 441a and the prohibition on conduit contributions

in § 441f violate his free speech and association rights under

the First Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by the

Supreme Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1

(1976) (per curiam), that contributions, as distinct from

independent expenditures, may be limited.

In Buckley, the Court held that quid pro quo corruption

and the “impact of the appearance of corruption stemming

from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent

in a regime of large individual financial contributions”

constituted “a constitutionally sufficient justification” for

FECA’s individual contribution limit. 424 U.S. at 26–27. 

Neither Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,

558 U.S. 310 (2010), nor McCutcheon v. Federal Election

Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), overrules this holding

of Buckley. In Citizens United, the Court concluded that

2 U.S.C. § 441b, prohibiting corporations from express

advocacy in the election or defeat of federal candidates,

violated the First Amendment. 558 U.S. at 337, 372. Rather

than “eviscerate” Buckley, as Whittemore claims, the Court

reinforced it, distinguishing between § 441b and the statute at

issue in another case, Federal Election Committee v. National

Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982), which

restricted corporations’ ability to solicit PAC funds that

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 15

would be used to make direct contributions. The Court

reasoned that National Right to Work Committee “involved

contribution limits, which, unlike limits on independent

expenditures, have been an accepted means to prevent quid

pro quo corruption,” and noted that Citizens United “ha[d]

not made direct contributions to candidates, and it [had] not

suggested that the Court should reconsider whether

contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First

Amendment scrutiny.” 558 U.S. at 359 (citation omitted). In

McCutcheon, limits on contributions to individual campaigns

were not at issue, and the Court explicitly declined to address

them. See 134 S. Ct. at 1442, 1445. Rather, the Court struck

down aggregate limits on individual contributions under

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3). Id. at 1442.

C. Evidentiary Rulings

Whittemore makes two arguments based on the district

court’s evidentiary rulings. First, he argues that the district

court improperly excluded proffered testimony from Valerie

Fridland, a linguistics professor who would have offered her

opinion regarding potential interpretations of the text of

§ 441f. Second, he argues that the district court improperly

allowed speculative testimony in violation of Federal Rule of

Evidence 602.

1. Exclusion of Fridland’s Testimony

In response to a pretrial motion in limine, the district court

concluded that Fridland’s proposed testimony was “likely

inadmissible on two grounds.” First, to the extent that

Fridland would testify that Whittemore’s alleged

interpretation of § 441f was “reasonable,” it was “excludable

as a legal conclusion.” Second, the testimony was unlikely to

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16 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

assist the jury because, among other things, it “ha[d] nothing

to do with Whittemore’s actual beliefs”; it “resulte[d] from a

process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,” namely

speaking standard American English; and testimony about

“something [the jury] already knows” backed by “impressive

credentials” could lead the jury to give Fridland’s testimony

undue weight. The court denied the motion without

prejudice, stating that evidence introduced during the trial

could warrant reconsideration.

A ruling on a motion in limine is not a final order under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 because such rulings “are by their very

nature preliminary.” Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,

764 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985). “Where a district court

makes a tentative in limine ruling excluding evidence, the

exclusion of that evidence may only be challenged on appeal

if the aggrieved party attempts to offer such evidence at trial,”

which allows the court make a final ruling. Adkins v. Mireles,

526 F.3d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 103(b) provides,

however, that a formal proffer of evidence at trial is not

required if the court “rules definitively on the record” to

exclude that evidence, either before or at trial.

The district court’s ruling was tentative and without

prejudice to Whittemore’s renewing his motion. The court

specifically noted that it was possible that changed

circumstances could “warrant reconsideration” of the court’s

initial ruling that Fridland’s testimonywas inadmissible. The

court thus left Whittemore the opportunity to renew his

motion, but he never did so.

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UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 17

2. Speculative Testimony

Under Rule 602, “[a] witness may testify to a matter only

if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that

the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” FED. R.

EVID. 602. Rule 602 requires any witness to have sufficient

memory of the events such that she is not forced to “fill[] the

gaps in her memory with hearsay or speculation.” 

27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6023 (2d ed. 2007). Witnesses are

not “permitted to speculate, guess, or voice suspicions.” Id.

§ 6026. However, “[p]ersonal knowledge includes opinions

and inferences grounded in observations and experience.” 

Great Am. Assurance Co. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Co., 669 F.

Supp. 2d 1084, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United States

v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 1999)). Lay witnesses

may testify about inferences pursuant to Rule 701:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert,

testimony in the form of an opinion is limited

to one that is: (a) rationally based on the

witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly

understanding the witness’s testimony or to

determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based

on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

FED. R. EVID. 701.

During Whittemore’s trial, counsel for both the

prosecution and the defense asked witnesses questions asking

for various degrees of speculation. Whittemore objects to the

admission of testimony of various witnesses. Roxanne

Doyle, his assistant, testified that Whittemore had given her

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18 UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE

a check for $10,000 and that upon Whittemore’s request, she

and her husband had used those funds to make maximum

contributions to Senator Reid’s campaign. On crossexamination, defense counsel asked Doyle if she would have

expected to be fired or disciplined had she not made the

contribution. Doyle responded that she would not expect to

be fired, but she “would expect to be spoken to about it.” On

redirect, the prosecutor followed up, asking what she

“expected would have been said” if she had been “talked to”

about not making a contribution. Doyle responded that she

would “expect to be asked, ‘Why didn’t you make the

contribution?’” The district court did not err in allowing

Doyle to answer the prosecutor’s question because defense

counsel had opened the door during cross-examination. But

even if it had been error, it was harmless. Doyle’s response

provided nothing that the jury could not have easily inferred

from her answer to defense counsel’s question. The other

testimony Whittemore identifies—Joshua Whellams’s

testimony that, given his personal and professional

relationship with Whittemore, he would have made a

contribution to Reid’s campaign if Whittemore had asked him

to do so, and Terry Reynolds’s testimony that he thought he

risked losing his job if he did not write a check to Reid’s

campaign—was not impermissibly speculative or was

similarly harmless.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Finally, Whittemore argues that the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree.

Sufficient evidence for only six conduit contributions of

$4,600 is required to sustain Whittemore’s conviction for

conduit contributions in excess of $25,000. See 52 U.S.C.

 Case: 13-10515, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394791, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 18 of 19
UNITED STATES V. WHITTEMORE 19

§ 30109(d)(1)(A) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A)). The

government presented evidence that Whittemore had

promised to raise $150,000 for Senator Reid’s campaign by

March 31, 2007; evidence that the campaign contacted him to

check on his progress on March 21 and on March 27;

testimony from thirteen relatives and employees describing

the transfer of funds on March 27 and March 28; copies of

checks from Whittemore to the transferees and from the

transferees to the campaign written within days of each other;

and a new spreadsheet list of campaign donors that obscured

the employment relationships between Wingfield Nevada

Group and the donors. This evidence was more than

sufficient to support Whittemore’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 13-10515, 01/26/2015, ID: 9394791, DktEntry: 34-1, Page 19 of 19