Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00333/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00333-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benicia Unified School District
Defendant
Shalee Cunningham
Defendant
Laurie Ellen Flanagan
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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Although the motion was originally filed as a motion for

judgment on the pleadings, motion to dismiss, and/or motion to

strike, in their supplemental briefing the defendants requested

that the motion be treated only as a motion to dismiss under

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURIE ELLEN FLANAGAN,

NO. CIV. S-07-333 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

BENICIA UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, a governmental

agency, SHALEE CUNNINGHAM,

an individual,

Defendants.

 /

The plaintiff was a school-teacher at the Benecia Unified

School District. She has brought several claims against the School

District and Shalle Cunningham, the Superintendent of the School

District, alleging twelve causes of action relating to her

dismissal from her position. The defendants move to dismiss for

failure to state a claim1 and move to dismiss or strike the

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and/or a motion to strike.

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These allegations are taken from the plaintiff’s first

amended complaint, filed with the court on October 14, 2007.

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In paragraph 62 of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that

she “was not a temporary employee.” At oral argument, however,

plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the plaintiff was a temporary

employee, although she asserts here that she should have been

reclassified as a permanent or probationary employee. 

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plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages. For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants the motion to dismiss in part and denies

it in part.

 I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT2

 The plaintiff, Laurie Flanagan, was a school teacher employed

by the Benicia Unified School District ("BUSD"). Defendant Shalee

Cunningham was formerly the superintendent of BUSD. At the times

relevant to her complaint, the plaintiff was a licensed California

teacher with a secondary teaching credential. She served as an

Adult English as a Second Language teacher at BUSD. While she was

employed there, her own children were enrolled in BUSD's school

system. She alleges that she was a temporary employee of BUSD

during the times relevant to the complaint.3

 The plaintiff was dismissed on November 2, 2004 by the

defendants for allegedly having forged and fabricated attendance

rosters. Defendants also reported plaintiff to the Benecia Police

Department, on the same allegations. Charges were eventually filed

against her but later dropped. Defendants also reported their

allegations to the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing,

resulting in the loss of the plaintiff’s teaching credentials. 

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The plaintiff has brought suit alleging twelve causes of

action. She seeks compensatory, punitive, and treble damages, as

well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

II. STANDARDS

A. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts consistent

with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the deference the court is bound

to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper

for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which

[he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated

the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated

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General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

B. Standard for Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f)

Rule 12(f) authorizes the court to order stricken from any

pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter." A party may bring on a motion to strike within 20 days

after the filing of the pleading under attack. The court, however,

may make appropriate orders to strike under the rule at any time

on its own initiative. Thus, the court may consider and grant an

untimely motion to strike where it seems proper to do so. See 5A

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380.

Motions to strike are generally viewed with disfavor, and will

usually be denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no

possible relation to the controversy, and may cause prejudice to

one of the parties. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure: Civil 2d ' 1380; See also Hanna v. Lane, 610 F.

Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1985). If the court is in doubt as to

whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law,

the motion to strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the

sufficiency of the allegations for adjudication on the merits.

See 5A Wright & Miller, supra, at ' 1380.

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges twelve causes of action, all

of which appear to be directed against both defendant BUSD and

defendant Cunningham. For the reasons stated herein, the

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defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in

part.

A. Motion to Dismiss 

1. Plaintiff’s State Common Law and Statutory Claims

a. California Government Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff seeks money damages for all of her claims. Because

she has not pled that she has complied with the California

Government Tort Claims Act, or that she is exempt from it,

defendants’ motion must be granted as to plaintiff’s state law

claims, which are her first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,

eleventh, and twelfth causes of action.

The California Tort Claims Act states that “except as

otherwise provided by statute, [a] public entity is not liable for

an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of

the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Cal.

Gov’t. Code § 815. A public school district is a “public entity.”

Id. § 811.2. Prior to filing a suit against a government entity,

a written claim must be presented to the public entity’s board. Id.

§ 945.4. A claim must be filed with the board even if the entity

is immune from liability. Id. § 950.2. A plaintiff is excepted from

section 945.4 if she pleads and proves that she neither knew nor

had reason to know, within the time required for presenting her

claim to the relevant state board, that her injury was caused by

the public entity or by a public employee acting within the scope

of employment. Id. § 950.4. Otherwise, the failure to have filed

a claim with the relevant government board is fatal to the

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At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff contended there is

a basis for excusing the failure to file a claim. Accordingly,

plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint.

Counsel, however, is cautioned not to file a complaint which is

groundless. Such conduct will be met by sanctions, payable both

to defendants and the court.

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plaintiff’s cause of action. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32

Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004). A plaintiff must allege compliance

with the state presentment requirement in her complaint. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th

Cir. 1998); Dujardin v. Ventura County General Hospital, 69 Cal.

App. 3d 350, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).

Here, plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the California

Government Tort Claims Act or that the exception contained in

section 945.4 applies. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not alleged

facts the permit the court to infer either compliance with the

presentment requirement or that the section 945.4 exception applies

here. The court cannot assume that the plaintiff can prove facts

that she has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at

526. The defendant’s motion must be granted as to the plaintiff’s

first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eleventh, and twelfth

claims, as they allege violations in state law but do not allege

compliance with the California Government Tort Claims Act.4

b. Contract Claims

Moreover, because California law specifically bars contract

claims when brought against state employers, the defendant’s motion

must be granted as to the plaintiff’s second, fifth, and sixth

causes of action.

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In the second cause of action for promissory estoppel,

plaintiff alleges that she relied on promises of defendant BUSD

that she was entitled to permanent employment status. In her fifth

cause of action for breach of contract, plaintiff alleges that

defendants breached their contractual duties to her as an employee.

In her sixth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that the defendants

violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in

her employment contract. 

Public employment is not enforced by contract, but by state

statute. Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal.3d 808 (1977). This

rule applies to civil service and non-civil service employment. Kim

v. Regents of University of California, 80 Cal. App. 4th 170, 164

(Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Neither an express nor an implied contract

can restrict the reasons for, or manner of, termination of public

employment provided by California statue. Portman v. County of

Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the

plaintiff can neither maintain a cause of action for breach of

contract against the defendants, nor derivative claims based on

that action. See Shoemaker v. Myers 52 Cal. 3d 1 (1990); Camp v.

Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal. App. 4th 620, 631 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1995). 

Because plaintiff’s contract claims are untenable as a matter

of law, the defendant’s motion must be granted as to plaintiff’s

second, fifth, and sixth causes of action, without leave to amend.

////

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The court observes that, with regards to the plaintiff’s

false light claim, not only has she identified no statute that

permits this claim, but California law specifically bars this cause

of action where the plaintiff alleges the defendant made statements

in “any . . . official proceeding authorized by law.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 47(b). 

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c. Common Law Tort Claims

In addition to failing to comply with the California

Government Tort Claims Act, plaintiff’s common law tort claims must

be dismissed because they fail to allege an authorizing statute.

Four of plaintiff’s causes of action allege common law tort

claims. Her third claim alleges the tort of false light. Her fourth

cause of action alleges negligence. Her eleventh cause of action

alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, her

twelfth claim alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress.

California law bars liability for any public entity or

employee for injuries caused by their act or omissions, unless

otherwise provided by statute. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. The

legislative committee comment for this section described the

purpose of this statute as “abolish[ing] all common law or

judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except

for such liability as may be required by the state or federal

constitution. . . .” The California Supreme Court explained that

this section is to restrict governmental liability to narrow and

statutorily-delineated circumstances. Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal.

3d 834, 838 (Cal. 1976).5 Courts have held specifically that this

section grants immunity to public school districts and employees

for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

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negligent infliction of emotion distress. See, e.g., Davidson ex

rel. Sims v. Santa Barbara High School District, 48 F. Supp. 2d

1225, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

Because the plaintiff has not alleged any statute that would

permit her common law tort claims against the defendants, the

defendant’s motion must be granted as to her third, fourth,

eleventh, and twelfth causes of action.

d. Retaliation Claim

In addition to being barred by the California Tort Claims Act,

the plaintiff’s retaliation claim is also specifically barred by

California law. 

In her first cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the

defendant violated California Civil Code section 52 by terminating

her employment after she exercised her right of free speech and

other unspecified “fundamental civil and statutory rights.” She

alleges that the defendants also “blacklisted” her by having

brought about the loss of her teaching license.

California Civil Code section 52 provides a claim for damages

for a violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Unruh

Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on “sex, race,

color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical

condition, marital status, or sexual orientation.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 51. It specifically prohibits blacklisting based on any of these

characteristics. Id. § 51.5. The Unruh Civil Rights Act, however,

does not encompass allegations of employment discrimination. Alcorn

v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499-500 (Cal. 1970).

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Moreover, the complaint has not pled sufficient causes of

action under the additional code sections mentioned in the first

claim. Included in the first claim is the statement that,

“California Labor Code Section 232.5 recognizes the statutory right

to disclose information regarding employment conditions.” If, by

way of this statement, the plaintiff intended to plead a cause of

action under section 232.5, such a claim is inadequately pled.

Section 232.5 forbids employers from denying employees the right

to disclose information about working conditions or from

discriminating against an employee who does. The plaintiff,

however, has not pled what her alleged working conditions were nor

what she was prevented from or discriminated against for

disclosing. Therefore, if the plaintiff intended to plead a cause

of action under California Labor Code section 232.5, her complaint

lacks the requisite factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic, 127 S.

Ct. at 1968-69. 

Similarly, to the extent that the plaintiff’s first cause of

action pleads a claim under California Labor Code section 1050, the

complaint is also inadequately pled. The plaintiff alleges that,

“The acts of defendants in causing the loss of [the plaintiff’s]

licensure effectively and constructively constituted blacklisting

in violation of California Labor Code Section 1050.” Section 1050

prohibits an employer from making misrepresentations about a former

employee, which prevents or attempts to prevent the former employee

from obtaining new employment. The plaintiff has not alleged what

misrepresentations the defendants made, after the plaintiff’s

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discharge. If the plaintiff intended to plead a cause of action

under California Labor Code section 1050, her complaint lacks the

requisite factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at

1968-69. 

Because the plaintiff does not plead a cause of action upon

which relief may be granted under California Civil Code section 52

and has inadequately pled causes of action under California Labor

Code sections 232.5 and 1050, the defendants’ motion must be

granted as to the plaintiff’s first claim, with leave to amend.

e. Immunity of Defendant Cunningham

Public employees are typically immune from liability for their

discretionary acts. Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972 (Cal.

1995). A public employee has broad immunity for employment

decisions. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 820, 820.2; Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at

981-82 (immunity for school board “dealing with personnel

problems,” including the decision to fire a school superintendent).

A complaint against a public employee must allege facts that would

permit an inference that the defendant is not protected by section

820 immunity. See Smith v. County of Kern, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1826,

1832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).

In the her first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eleventh

causes of action, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Cunningham

wrongfully terminated the plaintiff. Because defendant Cunningham

is immune under California law for actions related to the

termination of an employee, the plaintiff has not pled any facts

that, if true, would afford her relief against defendant Cunningham

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The court has concluded in section III(A)(1)(b), supra, that

the plaintiff’s second, fifth, and sixth causes of action must be

dismissed without leave to amend.

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for these claims. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. The plaintiff is

given leave to amend her first, fourth, and eleventh cause of

action to allege facts sufficient to permit the court infer that

these causes of action are not barred against defendant Cunningham

as a result of her statutory immunity.6 See Bell Atlantic, 127 S.

Ct. at 1967-69. 

2. Plaintiff’s Claims Under the California and United State

Constitutions

a. Seventh Cause of Action

The plaintiff’s seventh claim is pled under Article 1, section

2 of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution. In it, the plaintiff alleges that

the defendants’ infringed on her right to free speech and

association. She alleges that “educational issues,” “the continuity

of a qualified teacher in Adult ESL,” and “working conditions” are

all matters of public concern. She alleges that, by causing her to

be terminated, to be criminally prosecuted, and to lose her

teaching licence, the defendants deprived her of her right to free

speech. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants infringed

on her freedom of association by refusing to allowing her to

volunteer at public school events. She seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief, and damages.

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The court observes that damages are not an available remedy

for a violation of Article 1, section 2 of the California

constitution. Degrassi v. Cook, 29 Cal. 4th 333 (Cal. 2002).

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The court interprets the plaintiff’s reference to the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as intending

to allege that the defendants’ actions violated her rights under

the First Amendment of the United States Constitution as

incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.

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The plaintiff has not adequately pled a cause of action under

either the state nor federal constitutions.7

 With regards to her

free speech claim, the plaintiff has not alleged what speech was

circumscribed or prohibited by the defendant. Instead, she appears

to allege that her speech included complaints and concerns about

the “educational experience” of her children and other students,

her temporary employment status, “educational issues pertaining to

students,” and “working conditions.” Such allegations do not

sufficiently give the defendants’ notice of the nature of her

complaint or adequately describe the grounds of her complaint. See

Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n. 3. This defect is true of the

claim, whether it is pled under the state constitution or federal

constitution.8 The defendants’ motion is granted as to this claim,

with leave to amend.

b. Eighth Cause of Action

The plaintiff brings her eighth cause of action under Article

1, section 7 of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. She alleges that the

defendants terminated her employment without notice or an

opportunity to respond and without charges or a hearing. In her

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The court also observes that damages are not an available

remedy for a violation of article 1, section 7 of the California

Constitution. Carlsbad Aquafarms, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Health

Services, 83 Cal. App. 4th 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

10 At paragraph 62 of her eighth cause of action the plaintiff

has alleged that she was a permanent or provisional employee,

although she alleged elsewhere in her complaint and counsel at oral

argument claimed that she was a temporary employee who should have

been classified as a permanent or provisional employee. It appears

that California law supports the position that an employee who is

misclassified is owed the degree of due process corresponding to

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complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she was not a temporary state

employee; at oral argument, however, plaintiff’s counsel conceded

that the plaintiff was a temporary employee, although she believed

she should have been reclassified. The plaintiff alleges that the

defendants caused her to be deprived of her liberty by falsely

accusing her of crimes, for which she was subsequently arrested and

prosecuted, although prosecution was later dropped. She also

alleges that the defendants caused her to be deprived of her

employment, in which she had a protected property interest. 

The plaintiff has not pled a cause of action under the United

States and California constitutions.9

 Under California law, a

temporary employee can be summarily discharged from her employment.

See Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist., 29

Cal. 4th 911, 917-18 (Cal. 2003); Taylor v. Board of Trustees, 36

Cal. 3d 500, 505 (Cal. 1984). Consequently, a temporary employee

has no right to a hearing before being terminated and only has a

right to a limited form of notice. Kavanaugh, 29 Cal. 4th at 1273.

The procedural due process violations that the plaintiff alleges,

therefore, are not tenable bases of relief under California law.10

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that employee’s correct classification. See Bakersfield Elementary

Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bakersfield City School Dist., 145 Cal. App. 4th

1260, 1301-1302 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Nonetheless, laches may bar

a plaintiff from proceeding on such a due process claim if she

unreasonably and prejudicially failed to challenge her

classification prior to her termination. See id. at 1274-75. At

this stage of the proceedings, the court expresses no opinion as

to the applicability of either of these rules to the present case.

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Because the scope of the property interests protected by the

federal Constitution are defined by state law, Cleveland Bd. of

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985), both the plaintiff’s

federal and state claims alleging violations of her property rights

must be dismissed. The plaintiff is granted leave to amend. 

c. Ninth Cause of Action

The plaintiff brings her ninth cause of action under the

California and United States Constitutions. She identifies this

claim as a violation of right to privacy. She alleges that the 

“conduct of the defendants infringing [the plaintiff’s] rights to

and in liberty and property and denying her the right to associate

deprived her of the constitutionally protected right to privacy.”

To assert a cause of action for the invasion of the California

constitutional right to privacy, the plaintiff must allege: (1) a

legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation

of privacy, and (3) conduct by the defendant that constitutes a

serious invasion of privacy. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic

Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 (Cal. 1994). Even drawing every inference

in favor of the plaintiff, she has not pled these elements, nor has

she pled sufficient facts to provide fair notice of the nature of

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the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Bell Atlantic,

127 S. Ct. at 1965 n. 3.

Furthermore, she has not alleged facts that suffice to state a

cause of action under the federal constitution for violation of

one’s right to privacy. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713

(1976)(identifying the Constitutional right to privacy as

encompassing “matters relating to marriage, procreation,

contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and

education”). 

Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted

as to the plaintiff’s ninth cause of action. Plaintiff is given

leave to amend. 

3. Plaintiff’s Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In her tenth claim, she alleges that defendants violated her

civil rights under 28 U.S.C. section 1983. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead

that a person acting under the color of state law engaged in

conduct that deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the federal Constitution, and that this

caused the plaintiff damages. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,

1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff need only plead that “the

conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and

that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of

rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitutions of

the United States.” Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir.

1962). 

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11Because the court dismisses the plaintiff’s claim for

punitive damages, the defendants’ motion to strike is moot.

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Here, the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim under

section 1983. She has alleged that the defendants acted under color

of state law because they receive funding from the City of Benicia

and because the school board is elected by local voters. The

defendants’ conduct of which plaintiff complains is defendants’

terminating her employment, causing her arrest and prosecution, and

causing her loss of teaching license. Finally, she alleges that

this deprived her of her Constitutional rights to free speech,

association, and due process. No additional facts are required to

be pled. See Marshall, 301 F.2d at 646. 

B. Request for Punitive Damages

In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages

against defendant BUSD for her first, third, fourth, tenth,

eleventh, and twelfth causes of action. Under California law,

public entities are not liable for punitive damages. Cal. Gov’t

Code § 818. A county is a public entity, as is a school district.

Id. § 811.2; Wright v. Compton Unified School Dist., 46 Cal. App.

3d 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). Moreover, a public entity cannot be

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for punitive damages. City of Newport

v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Therefore, the

plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages must be dismissed as to

defendant BUSD.11

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court orders:

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1. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the

plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,

seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of

action. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as

to the plaintiff’s tenth cause of action.

2. The plaintiff is granted leave to amend her first,

third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh, and

twelfth causes of action. She is granted thirty days

from the date of this order to file an amended

complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 16, 2007. 

Case 2:07-cv-00333-LKK -GGH Document 62 Filed 11/19/07 Page 18 of 18