Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08057/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08057-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Company
Defendant
Michelle Youso
Plaintiff
Timothy Youso
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Timothy Youso and Michelle Youso,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Company, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-8057-PCT-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial (Doc. 53) under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 59. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

“Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous 

order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 

finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A 

Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 

time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id. 

“Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is appropriate if (1) the district court is presented with 

newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial 

decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling 

law.” SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence—or any 

other error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a 

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verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every 

stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect 

any party’s substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiffs contend that the Order (Doc. 46) granting Defendants summary 

judgment included three errors: (1) reliance on evidence held to be inadmissible hearsay 

and other evidence for which foundation objections were overruled; (2) determining that 

issues regarding Coverage C (personal property) could be decided as a matter of law 

despite disputed facts; and (3) misinterpreting the application of Coverage B (related 

structure). Plaintiffs do not contend that reconsideration is justified because of newly 

discovered evidence or an intervening change in controlling law. 

The Order sustained hearsay objections to specific paragraphs of Defendant’s 

separate statement of facts “to the extent that the paragraphs assert the truth of statements 

made within correspondence attached as Exhibits 11 and 12 to the Declaration of Kirk 

Benson (Doc. 38),” but found admissible “Mr. Benson’s declaration asserting that he 

received the attached correspondence, including specific bids for repairing Plaintiffs’ 

residence.” Mr. Benson’s declaration stated that he had determined that the policy would 

provide coverage for loss to Plaintiffs’ residence, including debris removal, of 

$400,339.95. The declaration also stated that Exhibit 11 was a true and correct copy of 

correspondence from Bruce Thomson of Frontier Adjusters. Mr. Benson received Mr. 

Thomson’s correspondence and the enclosed letter from Bob Brown of R.M.B. Inc., dba 

Apple Construction Company, agreeing to do the repair work for $400,339.95. The 

relevancy of the bid is the fact it was made in the stated amount within policy limits. The 

substance of the bid was not hearsay. The fact and the good faith of the bid are 

undisputed. 

Regarding Coverage C (personal property), the Court did not misunderstand that 

Defendant paid Plaintiffs $132,181.32 based on an incomplete personal property 

inventory they submitted to Defendant. The Complaint alleges that Defendant breached 

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its contract and acted in bad faith by failing to timely and reasonably compensate 

Plaintiffs for their personal property losses, but Plaintiffs did not submit to Defendant a 

complete inventory of personal property for which they sought compensation until a year 

after initiating this lawsuit. Defendant could not have breached its contract and acted in 

bad faith by failing to timely and reasonably compensate Plaintiffs as alleged in the 

Complaint if Plaintiffs had not yet submitted to Defendant a complete inventory. Further, 

it is irrelevant that Defendant knew that Plaintiffs believed they were entitled to more 

than $132,181.32 if Plaintiffs did not provide Defendant with a personal property 

inventory showing a loss greater than $132,181.32. Therefore, the Court did not err by 

finding that Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence to the Court that they were entitled to 

more compensation than what they were paid for loss of personal property. 

Regarding Coverage B (related structures), Plaintiffs contend that Coverage B 

adds 10% to the Coverage A limit when the replacement cost of any damaged related 

private structures is less than $1,000, and because no related structures were damaged, 

the Coverage A limit should have been increased by 10%. Although the Coverage B 

limit is initially established as 10% of the Coverage A limit before periodic adjustments, 

the relevant policy endorsement, which is titled “Increased Coverage A Limit,” does not 

mention 10% or damage. Rather, it states that when the combined replacement cost of all 

detached related private structures is less than $1,000, the amount of the Coverage B limit 

will be added to the Coverage A limit. In other words, even though the insured was 

required to pay for coverage for related structures, if there were no related structures or 

the existing related structures could be replaced for less than $1,000, the coverage for 

related structures, which would be essentially useless, would be added to the coverage for 

the residence. But Defendant denied the “increased Coverage A limit” because Mr. 

Benson opined that the detached stone retaining wall had a replacement value exceeding 

$1,000. Plaintiffs did not offer evidence on summary judgment to dispute that opinion. 

Therefore, the Coverage A limit was not increased, and there was no basis for any 

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compensation under Coverage B because the retaining wall was not in need of repair or 

replacement. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial (Doc. 53) is 

denied. 

Dated this 8th day of April, 2013. 

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