Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-40405/USCOURTS-ca5-14-40405-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dahin Garcia-Monroy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-40405

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DAHIN GARCIA-MONROY,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:13-CR-1822-1

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dahin Garcia-Monroy pleaded guilty to illegal presence in the United 

States after removal and was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment. He 

appeals the district court’s determination that his prior Texas conviction for 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance qualified as a drug 

trafficking offense warranting a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) and as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 15, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-40405 Document: 00512903971 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/15/2015
No. 14-40405

Garcia-Monroy argues that the Texas statute criminalizes the “administering” 

of drugs, which is not covered by either sentencing provision. Because GarciaMonroy preserved these arguments in the district court, our review is de novo. 

See United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 548 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

Garcia-Monroy has failed to show that it is a realistic possibility that a 

person would be prosecuted for “administering” cocaine as that term is defined 

under the Texas statute. See United States v. Teran-Salas, 767 F.3d 453, 460-

62 (5th Cir. 2014). He specifically has set forth no prior Texas case applying

the statute in an “administering” situation. See id. at 460-61. A theoretical 

possibility that a statute might include types of conduct that would not qualify 

as a drug trafficking offense is insufficient. See United States v. CarrascoTercero, 745 F.3d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2014).

Thus, the district court was correct in determining that Garcia-Monroy's 

conviction was a drug trafficking offense and an aggravated felony. See TeranSalas, 767 F.3d at 461-62 & n.5. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court 

is AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 14-40405 Document: 00512903971 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/15/2015