Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30229/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30229-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lloyd Nickle
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

LLOYD NICKLE,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 14-30204

14-30229

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-00023-

SEH-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Sam E. Haddon, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 15, 2015—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 21, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, William A. Fletcher

and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski

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2 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a jury conviction and sentence for

conspiracy and possession of a controlled substance with

intent to distribute, and, on the government’s cross-appeal,

vacated the district court’s order that the defendant’s forfeited

assets be used to reimburse the court for payment to his

appointment counsel. 

The panel held that the defendant should not have

received a trial and should instead have been permitted to

plead guilty. The panel explained that the judge’s stated

reason for rejecting the defendant’s guilty plea—that the

defendant’s limited admissions left no “clear record that

warrants this Court in making the kind of decision that Ithink

I am obligated to make”—was inapt. The panel observed that

the defendant never suggested that the government did not

have sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he is

guilty, and that armed with the defendant’s admission of guilt

and the government’s offer of proof, the district court had all

it needed to fulfill its duty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) to

determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.

Because a new trial is possible, the panel reviewed the

defendant’s claims of error as to the trial to help guide the

parties and the district court on remand. The panel held that

the district court did not act within the area of permissible

discretion in preventing the defendant from questioning three

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 3

of the government’s cooperating witnesses about their pleaagreement terms providing that the government maymove for

a reduction of sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 to

reward the witnesses for any substantial assistance. The

panel explained that it is the fact that the government had not

yet made a Rule 35 motion that would give the witnesses the

greatest incentive to tailor their testimony to please the

prosecution.

The panel vacated the district court’s sua sponte order

directing that the defendant’s forfeited cash and proceeds

from the sale of his forfeited property be used to pay past and

future court-appointed counsel. Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f),

the panel explained that once the district court ordered the

defendant’s assets forfeited, it was as if the government had

title to them all along, and they were not available for

payment from or on behalf of the defendant. The panel also

held that the district court could not achieve this result by

amending the original judgment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a),

where no error for which Rule 35(a) permits amendment

occurred here.

To preserve the appearance of justice, the panel remanded

to a different judge.

COUNSEL

Palmer A. Hoovestal (argued), Hoovestal Law Firm, PLLC,

Helena, Montana, for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Michael S. Lahr, Assistant United States Attorney (argued),

Office of the United States Attorney, Helena, Montana,

Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney, Zeno B. Baucus,

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4 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States

Attorney, Billings, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

We consider whether the district court abused its

discretion by rejecting defendant’s guilty plea or by

preventing him from cross-examining cooperating witnesses

regarding the scope of their plea agreements.

FACTS

Lloyd Nickle faced two hefty charges involving at least

500 grams of a controlled substance. He agreed to plead

guilty to one count involving the greatly reduced minimum of

50 grams; in exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the

two more severe charges and make favorable sentencing

recommendations.

The district judge, however, refused to accept the plea. 

During the plea colloquy, the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: [I]f I’m going to consider

accepting a plea from you to admit to this

charge, you are going to have to tell me what

happened. That is, you are going to have to

tell me what you did, and what your part in

this undertaking was, and why that activity,

whatever it may have been, would bring you

here to court today to admit to having violated

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 5

the law in whatever way the government has

charged. If you intend to make a statement on

it, this is the time to do it.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I admit I was in

conspiracy with other people to, uhm—with

50 grams or more of meth, to have bought it.

THE COURT: Where did this take place, Mr.

Nickle?

THE DEFENDANT: In Montana.

The district judge pressed Nickle for more details about

his involvement in the crime, stating that defendant had to

“admit enough information for [the judge] to make a

reasonable decision about [his] drug activity.” The district

judge made clear that he would reject the plea unless Nickle

gave more detailed answers. But Nickle added only that “the

conspiracies were other than Montana, in other states.” The

district judge ended the hearing, refusing to “accept a plea

from this man under these circumstances.”

At trial, the government called three cooperating

witnesses who claimed to have participated in the meth

conspiracy with Nickle. All had already pleaded guilty and

been sentenced, but each of their plea agreements contained

the following language: “Under appropriate circumstances,

the United States may move, but has not made any

commitment as part of this agreement to move, for a

reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35, Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, to reward the Defendant for any

substantial assistance the Defendant provides after

sentencing.” Defense counsel wanted to cross-examine the

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6 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

witnesses regarding the scope of their deals with the

government but the district judge would have none of it.

The juryfound Nickle guilty of conspiracyand possession

with intent to distribute, and the court sentenced him to 30

years in prison. After Nickle filed his notice of appeal, the

district court ordered that his forfeited assets be used to

reimburse the court for payment to Nickle’s appointed

counsel. Nickle appeals his conviction and sentence; the

government appeals the reimbursement order.

DISCUSSION

The Plea Hearing

A district court must accept an unconditional guilty plea

so long as it meets the requirements of Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11(b). In re Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d

692, 695–96 (9th Cir. 2006). To comply with Rule 11(b), the

court must determine that the plea is knowing, voluntary and

intelligent, and has a factual basis. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(b); see also Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d at 695 & n.4. The

factual-basis requirement “ensure[s] that the defendant is not

mistaken about whether the conduct he admits to satisfies the

elements of the offense charged.” United States v. MancinasFlores, 588 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2009) (as amended). A

district court’s discretion in this area is limited. It can only

reject a plea for lack of a factual basis if the defendant

“denie[s] committing a specific element of the offense or

protest[s] his innocence even after demonstrating that he

underst[ands] the charge.” Id. at 685.

Nickle never denied committing an element of the

offense, nor did he protest his innocence. If the judge had

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 7

doubts about whether Nickle understood the charge or was

disputing guilt, that would have been a proper basis for

rejecting the plea. But the judge would then have been

required to disclose those as his reasons. See id.

The judge’s stated reason for rejecting the plea—that

Nickle’s limited admissions left no “clear record that

warrants this Court in making the kind of decision that Ithink

I am obliged to make”—was inapt. There is no requirement

in Rule 11(b) that the defendant himself give an in-depth

account of his crime or confirm that everything in the

government’s offer of proof is true. Although Nickle claimed

“some of the things that the witnesses say [in the

government’s offer of proof] are untrue,” he never suggested

that the government did not have “sufficient evidence for a

jury to conclude that he is guilty.” United States v. Webb,

433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1970). Armed with the

defendant’s admission of guilt and the government’s offer of

proof, the district court had all it needed to fulfill its duty

under Rule 11(b)(3), which is to “determine that there is a

factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3); see

United States v. Alvarado-Arriola, 742 F.2d 1143, 1144 (9th

Cir. 1984). Once the court identifies facts supporting the

plea, it must accept a tendered guilty plea that otherwise

satisfies Rule 11(b). Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d at 695–96,

700. Nickle “should not have received a trial at all and

instead been permitted to plead guilty.” United States v. ReaBeltran, 457 F.3d 695, 703 (7th Cir. 2006).1

1 The district judge gave Nickle a second opportunity to plead guilty, but

gave no indication he would reconsider the terms on which he would

accept the plea. Nickle thus cannot be faulted for failing to take this

opportunity, as the government argues.

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8 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

The district court’s error made Nickle significantly worse

off: He was convicted of two offenses that carried

substantially higher maximum sentences than the single

offense to which he was ready to plead guilty.

2

 Under these

circumstances, “the verdict resulting from the jury trial

cannot stand.” Id. We therefore vacate Nickle’s convictions

and remand so that he may plead guilty pursuant to the terms

of his original plea agreement. See id.

Trial Errors

Although the district court must give Nickle the

opportunity to plead guilty under the terms of his original

plea agreement, that doesn’t mean he is required to so plead. 

Nickle could choose to hold out for a better deal or to go to

trial anew.3 Because a new trial is possible, we review

2 Nickle would have pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy

involving at least 50 grams, which carried a statutory sentencing range of

5 to 40 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii); see id. § 846. The jury

convicted him of two counts (possession and conspiracy) and found that

each offense involved at least 500 grams. The statutory sentencing range

for that amount is 10 years to life. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).

3 We have found authority suggesting that a defendant in Nickle’s

circumstances should not have the option of a new trial. Rather, he should

be forced to choose between accepting the original plea offer or accepting

the result of the trial where he was properly convicted. In United States

v. Maddox, which also involved the erroneous rejection of a guilty plea,

the D.C. Circuit ordered the district court to vacate the jury verdicts

“[u]pon satisfactory completion of plea proceedings.” 48 F.3d 555, 561

(D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2013)

(noting that the proper remedy when ineffective assistance of counsel

leads a defendant to reject a plea offer “may be to require the prosecution

to reoffer the plea proposal,” after which the judge may “accept the plea

or leave the conviction undisturbed”). And Mancinas-Flores, though

more vague about the precise remedy it was ordering, noted that it was

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 9

Nickle’s claims of error as to the first trial to help guide the

parties and the district court on remand.

Nickle argues that the district court violated his

confrontation right by preventing him from questioning three

of the government’s cooperating witnesses about the Rule 35

terms of their plea agreements. When Nickle’s counsel tried

to do so with the first of these witnesses, the district judge sua

sponte interjected, “[W]e’re not going to get into introduction

of the plea agreement in this proceeding . . . . There’s no Rule

35 that’s been filed.” Addressing the jury, he added that Rule

35 was “irrelevant to the issues in this case at this time.” The

second witness denied knowing what a Rule 35 motion was

and claimed she wasn’t sure what her plea agreement said. 

And when defense counsel tried to question the third witness

about his plea agreement, the district judge again intervened: 

“We’re not going to go into the content of the plea agreement

in this trial. There is no Rule 35 motion before the Court.”

The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants

the right to cross-examine government witnesses regarding

their “biases and motivations to lie.” United States v. Larson,

495 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Davis

v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974). But “trial judges retain

wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned

to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination.” 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). When,

following the procedure utilized in Maddox. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d

at 686. But Nickle asked us to “reverse [his] conviction and remand so as

to place Nickle in the position that he was in prior to the termination of the

change of plea proceedings.” The government did not contest Nickle’s

proposed remedy and has therefore waived the argument. For this reason,

we leave to another day the question of the proper remedy for a court’s

erroneous rejection of a plea.

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10 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

as here, a trial judge allows some inquiry into “the biases and

motivations to lie of the Government’s cooperating

witnesses” but limits the scope of that inquiry, we review the

defendant’s claims for abuse of discretion. Larson, 495 F.3d

at 1102. We consider three questions: (1) whether the district

court excluded relevant evidence; (2) whether “there were

other legitimate interests outweighing the defendant’s interest

in presenting the evidence”; and (3) whether the jury had

“sufficient information to assess the credibility of [each]

witness.” Id. at 1102–03.

As the government concedes, the excluded testimonywas

unquestionably relevant.4

 Rule 35 provides that “[u]pon the

government’s motion . . . the court may reduce a sentence if

the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial

assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1). Each plea agreement roughly

tracked the language of Rule 35, but also suggested the

government might move for a Rule 35 reduction “[u]nder

appropriate circumstances” and characterized Rule 35

motions as “reward[s]” for cooperation. As this language

suggests an exchange between the witnesses and the

government, Nickle had a right to ask whether any of the

witnesses had a particular understanding of the terms of such

an exchange.

4 While Larson instructs us to “review the limitation on the crossexamination of each witness separately,” 495 F.3d at 1103, the limitation

here was the same as to all three witnesses: The district court precluded

defense counsel from questioning them in detail about the Rule 35

provisions in their plea agreements. Accordingly, the answers to the first

two questions are the same for each witness.

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 11

Our law is clear: “Where a plea agreement allows for

some benefit or detriment to flow to a witness as a result of

his testimony, the defendant must be permitted to cross

examine the witness sufficiently to make clear to the jury

what benefit or detriment will flow, and what will trigger the

benefit or detriment.” United States v. Schoneberg, 396 F.3d

1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended). The district court

had it precisely backwards: It is the fact that the government

had not yet made a Rule 35 motion that would give the

witnesses the greatest incentive to tailor their testimony to

please the prosecution.

In Schoneberg, we held that the district court abused its

discretion by preventing the defendant from cross-examining

the government’s key witness regarding the Rule 35 term of

his plea agreement. Id. at 1042–43. As in Schoneberg, the

witnesses here may have been hoping to “trigger” a

benefit—specifically, the “reward” of a Rule 35 motion by

the government. Because it was entirely up to the

government to determine, after the witnesses testified,

whether they had earned that benefit by providing

“substantial assistance,” they had a strong incentive to testify

in a way that would please the government. See id. at 1043. 

The witnesses could reasonably believe that the more

incriminating their testimony against Nickle, the more likely

it would be that they would be rewarded with a Rule 35

motion. See Larson, 495 F.3d at 1107 & n.14. Certainly, a

juror might believe that the lure of that reward would color

the witnesses’ testimony.

Nor did the district judge articulate a reason that could

have outweighed Nickle’s interest in cross-examining the

witnesses about their plea deals, such as precluding

“repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation.” Schoneberg,

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12 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

396 F.3d at 1042. Instead, the district judge determined that

the witnesses “had no promise of a Rule 35, and no

expectation of such, and there is no justification in this record

for attempting to go into a legal matter that is . . . dependent

upon a motion that has not been filed, and . . . dependent

upon action of this Court.” But, as explained above, it is

precisely the hope that the government will file a Rule 35

motion that may motivate a witness to tailor his testimony to

serve the government’s purposes. Indeed, the incentive is far

stronger when the government has not filed a Rule 35 motion

than if it has.

In Larson, the same district judge who presided over

Nickle’s case had prevented defense counsel from asking

cooperating witnesses what mandatoryminimums they faced

absent their testimony against the defendants. 495 F.3d at

1096, 1102–04. He reasoned that “all matters related to

sentencing are the decision of the court and the court only.” 

Id. at 1104. We explained that this statement was inaccurate

because the government had the discretion to move to reduce

the witnesses’ sentences if it was pleased with their

testimony. Id. at 1104–05. “[T]he fact that [the witnesses]

had not yet been sentenced” was “of no consequence”

because their sentences were subject to “the Government’s

evaluation of the quality and significance of [their] testimony

at . . . trial and its subsequent recommendation . . . regarding

a sentence reduction.” Id. at 1107 n.14. Undaunted by

Larson, the district judge this time didn’t merely shut down

defense counsel’s valid efforts to vindicate his client’s right

to confrontation, he threatened sanctions: “Your effort to

inject this issue into the case is . . . entirely inappropriate,

borders on being reprehensible, and I am cautioning you not

to repeat it in this courtroom again.” It was the district judge,

not defense counsel, who was out of line in making such a

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 13

heavy-handed threat against an advocate seeking to serve his

client zealously and ethically.

The limitations on cross-examination did not leave the

jury “with sufficient information to assess the credibility of

[each] witness.” Id. at 1103. The first witness testified as to

his crude understanding of Rule 35 (“People get a reduction

in their sentence for testifying”) and admitted that, while the

government had made no promises, he “hope[d] that

anything,” including a Rule 35 motion, would reduce his

sentence. This witness also mentioned that he “would like to

get out sometime before” his two young children were

“grown and old.” Cf. Larson, 495 F.3d at 1109–10 (Graber,

J., concurring in part and specially concurring in part) (noting

that a jury’s awareness that an incarcerated witness has

children helps it assess that witness’s credibility). Left alone,

this may have been sufficient impeachment. But the district

judge’s “emphatic admonition[],” Schoneberg, 396 F.3d at

1043, that Rule 35 was “irrelevant to the issues in this case”

fatally undermined the inference defense counsel was seeking

to present.

The second witness testified on direct that she wasn’t

promised a sentence reduction. She added on cross that she

hadn’t heard of Rule 35, that she wasn’t sure what her plea

agreement said and that she was only testifying “to tell the

truth about what happened.” Had defense counsel had the

opportunity to cross-examine her regarding the Rule 35 term

in her plea agreement, he could have shown that she stood to

benefit by testifying against Nickle and he might have led the

jury to question her claims that she knew nothing about a key

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14 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

term in a document she had signed.5 As with the first

witness, the jury was left with insufficient information with

which to assess the second’s credibility.

The third witness testified on cross that his plea

agreement contained a Rule 35 provision “just stating what

the rule was” and added that he had no expectation or hope of

Rule 35 treatment. In fact, his plea agreement—like that of

the other two—did more than just state the rule; it added that

“[u]nder appropriate circumstances,” the government might

make a Rule 35 motion as a “reward” for cooperation. 

Defense counsel should have been allowed to chip away at

this witness’s credibility by exposing an inconsistency

between what he testified about his plea agreement and what

it actually said. Instead, the jury only heard this witness

testify that he wasn’t even hoping to receive Rule 35

treatment and that “[t]he only thing I was told is if I lied

today, I’d get five more years on my sentence.” Those

statements, combined with the judge’s earlier comment in the

presence of the jury that Rule 35 was irrelevant and the

reminder that there was “no Rule 35 motion before the

Court,” disabled defense counsel from effectively calling this

witness’s credibility into question.

The district judge’s rulings were not “within the area of

permissible discretion” with respect to any of the above

witnesses. Schoneberg, 396 F.3d at 1043. In the typical case,

5 Although defense counsel did not press the second witness on Rule 35

or seek to refresh her recollection with her plea agreement, the district

judge had already forcefully rejected counsel’s efforts to do the same with

the first witness. “[I]n light of the district court’s clear ruling,” Nickle did

not forfeit his Confrontation Clause claim with respect to the second

witness. Larson, 495 F.3d at 1104 n.8.

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 15

we would next ask whether the jury verdict could

nevertheless stand because the trial errors were harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Larson, 495 F.3d at 1107. 

That would be a close call here, as the witnesses all gave

highly incriminating testimony that tied Nickle to various

drug deals. But, because we vacate Nickle’s conviction on

other grounds, we need not conduct a harmlessness analysis.6

The Government’s Cross-Appeal

The original judgment ordered Nickle to forfeit cash and

property that the government had seized from him. After

Nickle moved the court to appoint counsel on appeal, the

district judge issued a sua sponte order directing that Nickle’s

forfeited cash and proceeds from the sale of Nickle’s forfeited

property “be held and disbursed as appropriate in

reimbursement of” the costs of Nickle’s past and future courtappointed representation. We address the government’s

challenge to this order in case the issue arises again on

remand. See United States v. Mancuso, 718 F.3d 780, 796

(9th Cir. 2013).

The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) requires the government

to provide funds for the representation of indigent federal

criminal defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a), (i). Whenever

a district court “finds that funds are available for payment

from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may

6 Nickle appeals his sentence, but that sentence may well be significantly

different on remand. Thus, although we have in the past addressed a

defendant’s claims of sentencing error despite vacating his conviction “in

case the same issues arise on remand,” United States v. Mancuso,

718 F.3d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 2013), we decline to do so here. See

Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d at 679.

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16 UNITED STATES V. NICKLE

authorize or direct that such funds be paid . . . as a

reimbursement” for CJA-related spending. Id. § 3006A(f). 

The question is whether the forfeited assets were “available

. . . from or on behalf of” Nickle, the person furnished

representation.

A defendant must forfeit, upon conviction, all property

constituting or derived from the proceeds of federal drug

crimes. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a); see also United States v.

Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607–08, 612 (1989). Moreover,

“[a]ll right, title, and interest in [forfeited] property . . . vests

in the United States upon the commission of the act giving

rise to forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(c); see also Caplin &

Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627

(1989) (explaining that “§ 853(c) reflects the application of

the long-recognized and lawful practice of vesting title to any

forfeitable assets, in the United States, at the time of the

criminal act giving rise to forfeiture”). Thus, once the district

court ordered Nickle’s assets forfeited, it was as if the

government had title to them all along. Because the assets

belonged to the government, they were not “available for

payment from or on behalf of” Nickle. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f).

Additionally, federal law requires that “all amounts from

the forfeiture of property under any law enforced or

administered by the Department of Justice” be deposited,

28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4)(A), in a special fund used for various

law enforcement purposes, see id. § 524(c)(1). That fund is

entirely separate from the money “appropriated to the United

States courts . . . to carry out the provisions of” the CJA. 

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(i). The district court had no authority to

redirect money earmarked for the Justice Department’s fund.

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UNITED STATES V. NICKLE 17

Nor could the district judge achieve such a result by

amending the original judgment under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 35(a), as he attempted to do at the same

time he filed the sua sponte order. The amended judgment

added a note that “[t]he defendant shall pay . . . [a]ll

previously expended and future fees and costs of CJA

representation from forfeited assets.” Rule 35(a) provides

that, “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct

a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other

clear error.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Because no such error

occurred here, the district court could not amend the

judgment to correct it. See United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d

271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Ceballos,

671 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Reassignment

On remand, the court may have to re-sentence Nickle,

whether following a guilty plea or retrial. The judge who

presided over Nickle’s first trial has seen a jury convict him

of two offenses that are not part of the plea agreement. More

critically, in determining Nickle’s original sentence, the

district judge relied in part on the testimony of witnesses

whom he prevented Nickle from effectivelycross-examining. 

We find it unlikely that the district judge would be able to put

out of his mind his already-developed notions about what

Nickle’s punishment should be. Therefore, “to preserve the

appearance of justice,” we remand to a different judge. See

United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 769–70 (9th

Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223,

1237 (9th Cir. 2012).

VACATED and REMANDED.

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