Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01137/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Byron Darren Butler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1137

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern

v. * District of Iowa.

*

Byron Darren Butler, *

*

Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: October 23, 2009

 Filed: February 9, 2010 

_____________

Before, COLLOTON, BENTON, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL1

, District Judge.

_____________

PIERSOL, District Judge.

After being indicted for being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm and

Ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Defendant Byron Darren Butler

moved to suppress all evidence obtained through a search and seizure conducted on

September 12, 2007, by the Mid-Iowa Drug Task Force at a residence in which

Defendant resided with a woman. The .40 caliber handgun which is the subject of the

felon in possession of a firearm charge was discovered during this search. The motion

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The Honorable James E. Gritzner, Judge of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

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to suppress was denied and Defendant proceeded to a jury trial in which he was

convicted of the felon in possession of a firearm charge. Defendant was sentenced to

a term of imprisonment of 63 months.

On appeal Defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to

suppress and the denial of his motion in limine to exclude evidence at trial. Defendant

also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and whether

the district court was justified in sentencing him to 63 months of imprisonment. We

affirm the district court2

 on all issues.

I. Factual Background

In September of 2007 there had been an ongoing investigation of Defendant

by the Mid-Iowa Drug Task Force. On September 12, 2007, Officer David Powell

from the Marshalltown, Iowa Police Department submitted an application for search

warrant to search a house located at 107 South 5th Avenue which was possessed by

Rachel Woodruff. The application asserted good reason and probable cause to believe

that controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, drug related cash and documents, as

well as firearms found in violation of Iowa law would be found at the home. The

application specified Defendant, as well as any other person present and connected to

drug activity at the house, as a person to be searched. In one paragraph in the two

pages of specific information supporting the September 2007 application for the

search warrant, mention is made of a 2004 search and seizure which resulted in

Defendant being arrested for possession with intent to deliver marijuana. Although

the search and seizure was ultimately suppressed and Defendant was never convicted

for any offense related to the 2004 search and seizure, the September 2007 application

does not advise of the same.

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The September 2007 application states that on September 4, 2007, the MidIowa Drug Task Force conducted a controlled buy using a confidential informant who

went to the home of a Kenny Weston to buy crack cocaine. The application reports

that the confidential informant advised the task force that Weston would probably

leave on his bicycle to get the drugs from Defendant at an unknown location.

Investigating officers then observed the confidential informant going into Weston’s

residence and leaving. The application reports that a short time later Weston was

observed leaving on his bicycle and was followed to 107 South 5th Avenue where

officers conducting surveillance “saw a subject consistent in appearance with

[Defendant].” The application further states that Weston was then observed riding his

bicycle back to his home. Although Weston left on a bicycle and was pulling a lawn

mower behind him, the application makes no reference to the lawn mower. The

application advises that Detective Powell met with the confidential informant who

reported that Weston had sold crack cocaine to her.

A search warrant for the residence at 107 South 5th Avenue in Marshalltown,

Iowa, was issued by a Magistrate of the Iowa District Court on September 12, 2007.

Law enforcement officers on that date also executed a search warrant on an apartment

linked to Defendant. No person, and only a small amount of furniture and personal

items were found at this apartment. The officers also found in this apartment an

energy bill in Defendant’s name, approximately $90 under a mattress, what appeared

to be residue of crack cocaine, and sandwich bags consistent with drug packaging.

While the search was conducted at the apartment, the search warrant in issue

in this case was executed on the residence at 107 South 5th Avenue, a house owned

by Defendant’s girlfriend, Rachel Woodruff. Defendant and Rachel Woodruff were

both in the home at the time the officers entered the house. At this residence a large

quantity of marijuana, some scales and drug packaging were seized. Some of the

marijuana was being dried in the bathtub and Rachel Woodruff was attempting to

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flush some of it down the toilet. Bags of marijuana were also found in the upstairs

bathroom closet, and another was found under the bed in the master bedroom.

A search of the bed in the master bedroom led to the discovery of a .40 caliber

handgun between the mattress and the box spring on the south side of the bed and

bedroom. The gun was loaded and the magazine had to be removed from the gun.

One of the detectives on the task force testified at trial that in his experience and

training he has found that persons involved in illegal drug trafficking often keep guns

to keep from being robbed and to protect themselves. The officers also seized from

the house a video monitor attached by a cable to a video camera. The detective also

testified that such video monitors were commonly found where drugs are being sold.

On the north side of the master bedroom at 107 South 5th Avenue was a closet

with purses and other women’s items. On the south side of the master bedroom were

baseball caps and other men’s clothing. In addition, Defendant’s wallet was found on

the south side of the bed. Other items found on the south side of the master bedroom

were videotapes of Defendant and Rachel Woodruff as well as Defendant and a

woman other than Rachel Woodruff in intimate situations. One of the Government’s

witnesses, Candace Klaas, testified that she had been a friend of Defendant and had

received drugs from him. Klaas testified that although she had had sex with

Defendant at his apartment she did not believe he lived at the apartment, and that

Defendant had told her he lived with his girlfriend.

 II. Discussion

Denial of Suppression Motion

Defendant relies upon Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L.

Ed. 2d 667 (1978), in contending that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress. The Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware held that where a defendant

makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was knowingly and

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intentionally, or with the reckless disregard for the truth, included by an affiant in a

search warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to a finding

of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at

defendant's request. The Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware further held that if,

after such an evidentiary hearing, the defendant establishes by a preponderance of

evidence that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, was included by the affiant in the search warrant affidavit, and, with the

affidavit's false material set to one side, the remaining content of the affidavit is

insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the

fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on

the face of the affidavit. 438 U.S. at 155-156. The holding of Franks v. Delaware also

applies to material that has been deliberately or recklessly omitted from a

search-warrant affidavit. See United States. v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1234 (8th Cir.

1993). In the case at hand, the district court followed its practice of conducting a

Franks evidentiary hearing and then determining after a record was made whether a

Franks evidentiary hearing was warranted. The Government called and the Defense

cross examined Officer Powell and another member of the task force and Defendant

was given the opportunity to call witnesses at the hearing.

Defendant first contends that a Franks violation occurred because the

supporting affidavit for the search warrant stated that Weston left on his bicycle to go

to the house at 107 South 5th Avenue, but that the affidavit failed to state that Weston

was pulling a lawnmower behind the bicycle. Defendant maintains that the delivery

of a lawnmower is relevant in that the delivery of the lawnmower was a legitimate

reason for Weston to travel to the house where Defendant was staying. Defendant

next contends Patrol Office Powell recklessly stated that the controlled buy occurred

on September 4, 2007, when the law enforcement reports state that the controlled buy

occurred on either September 5 or 6, 2007. Defendant also complains about

references in the affidavit to the 2004 investigation in which evidence was suppressed.

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 In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's

factual determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States

v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 958 (8th Cir. 2009). A showing of negligence or innocent

mistake is not enough to establish a Franks violation. The test for determining

whether an affiant's statements were made with reckless disregard for the truth is

whether, after viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious

doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy

of the information he reported. United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir.

1995). A showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is “not lightly met.” United

States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987).

Officer Powell testified that he did not consider the fact about the lawnmower

being pulled by Weston as a fact relevant to the investigation. The district court also

found that considering the totality of the circumstances, Weston pulling the

lawnmower to where Defendant was residing was of marginal relevance. Omissions

of facts in a supporting affidavit do not constitute misrepresentations unless they cast

doubt on the existence of probable cause. United States v. Parker, 836 F.2d 1080,

1083 (8th Cir. 1987).

The Government contended that the controlled buy actually occurred on

September 5, 2007, although the search warrant application lists September 4, 2007,

as the controlled buy date. Officer Powell testified and the district court accepted his

testimony as true that the incorrect date on the application was the result of a

typographical error. A mere typographical error does not establish a “deliberate

falsehood,” or a “reckless disregard for the truth,” nor does it cast doubt on the

affidavit's showing of probable cause to search the residence. See, e.g.,United States

v. White, 356 F.3d 865, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2004)(incorrect date typed on pre-printed

form); United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 425 (8th Cir. 1993).

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The paragraph in the Affidavit for search warrant pertaining to the earlier

investigation in 2004 which resulted in the suppression of evidence based on a stale

application states:

During the month of April 2004, the [task force] conducted another crack

cocaine investigation involving [Defendant and two other individuals],

all of who were living together at 602 E. Church St. in Marshalltown.

During this investigation a search warrant was served at the residence.

[The two other individuals] were both arrested for possession schedule

II crack with intent to deliver after officers found a quantity of crack

cocaine in their bedroom. [Defendant] was arrested for possession

schedule I with intent to deliver after officers found 97 grams of

marijuana in his bedroom. 

The affidavit fails to advise that the 2004 search of Defendant Byron Butler was

suppressed for being stale. The affidavit contained more than a dozen additional

paragraphs of factual information implicating Defendant in illegal conduct. The

district court accepted as true Officer Powell’s testimony that he did not know that

mention of previously suppressed evidence could not be included in a subsequent

search application.

The district court concluded that if the challenged portions of the affidavit had

been corrected, added, or omitted, the warrant still would have been supported by

probable cause. We find no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and

conclude that no Franks violation occurred which would require suppression based

on the challenged portions of the affidavit.

Defendant contends that even if the challenged portions of the affidavit were

corrected, added or omitted, the application was still deficient in establishing probable

cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Defendant bases his argument on his

contentions that the information supplied by the confidential informant and contained

in the affidavit was not corroborated by independent evidence and that it was not

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established that the confidential informant had a track record of supplying reliable

information.

As a reviewing court, we pay “great deference” to the probable cause

determinations of the issuing judge or magistrate, and limit our inquiry to discerning

whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause

existed. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed.2d 527

(1983). When a confidential informant provides information in support of a search

warrant, the issuing magistrate considers the informant's reliability and the basis of his

knowledge. United States v. Lucca, 377 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2004). The totality

of the circumstances analysis applicable to probable cause determinations, however,

does not mandate that both factors be present before a warrant may issue. See United

States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1991). The information from a

confidential informant is sufficiently reliable if it is corroborated by other evidence,

or if the confidential informant has a history of providing reliable information. See

United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993).

The information from the confidential informant who implicated Defendant and

who was one of four confidential informants referenced in the affidavit, was

corroborated by surveillance officers. The surveillance officers witnessed Weston

making the bicycle trip to the residence at which Defendant resided and saw a subject

consistent in appearance with Defendant at that residence at the time Weston was at

the residence before bringing back drugs to the confidential informant as part of a

controlled buy. In a fill-in-the blank portion of the application for the search warrant,

Officer Powell advised that this confidential informant had supplied information

multiple times in the past and information supplied by this confidential informant had

led to eight arrests, and the discovery and seizure of stolen property, drugs or other

contraband. The information provided by this confidential information was

sufficiently corroborated and a sufficient track record of the confidential informant

was provided to support the district court’s finding of probable cause. The district

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In United States v. Claybourne, 415 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004), a panel of this

Court held that evidence that drug paraphernalia was present in the bedroom where

a firearm was found was admissible in a prosecution for being a felon in possession

of a firearm to establish motive, opportunity, intent, and plan to possess the firearm

to protect the drug items and cash.

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court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, and we affirm

the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

Admission of Evidence of Drug Paraphernalia

Defendant contends that the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of drug

paraphernalia at his trial substantially outweighed its probative value and that the

district court erred in admitting this evidence. We review evidentiary rulings of the

district court under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d

1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999). We give great deference to the district court's

determination in balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value of evidence of

other crimes, and reverse only when the evidence admitted clearly has no bearing on

any issue involved. United States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1985).

Prior to trial the Government gave notice under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) that it

intended to present during its case-in-chief a number of items, including marijuana

and items consistent with drug use, which were discovered during the execution of the

search warrants on September 12, 2007. Before the trial began in Defendant’s case

the district court held a hearing which addressed a number of matters including

Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the evidence concerning drug transactions.

The Government argued that the evidence of drug trafficking pertaining to Defendant

was relevant to his motive to possess the gun that was found under the bed and that

this evidence also established the background of the case. After considering the

holding in United States v. Claybourne,

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 and balancing the prejudicial effect and

probative value of the evidence, the district court denied the motion in limine

requesting the exclusion of the evidence concerning drug transactions but advised that

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he would consider giving the jury a limiting instructing if the defense wanted one.

During the trial the district court gave the following limiting instruction:

Members of the jury, as I believe I indicated to you during the jury

selection process, this case is a charge only that the defendant was in

possession of a firearm when he had been previously convicted of a

felony. There is going to be some evidence in the case, and this is the

beginning of some of that now, that does deal with drug transactions that

may or may not have dealt with the defendant but are not at issue in this

case. The only issue in this case is the firearm charge. The evidence is

being admitted for the purposes of showing you the circumstances under

which the firearm was found. 

A district court judge acts within his sound discretion in admitting evidence of

prior criminal or wrongful acts when the evidence is relevant to an issue in question

other than defendant's character, when clear and convincing evidence exists that

defendant committed the prior wrongful acts, and when potential unfair prejudice of

the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value. See United States

v. Simon, 767 F.2d at 526. When drug-related evidence is “closely and integrally

related” to the issue of ownership and possession of firearms, the district court does

not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug-related evidence in a possession of a

firearm case. Id. After reviewing all the evidence in this case we hold that the drugrelated evidence, including the paraphernalia, was “closely and integrally related” to

the issue of ownership and possession, and that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting this evidence.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed because there was

insufficient evidence submitted at trial to prove that he possessed the firearm. We

review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. United

States v.Coleman, 584 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2009). In conducting this review, we

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and draw all

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18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for any person “who has been

convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year” to possess a firearm. 

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reasonable inferences in the Government's favor. United States v. McAtee, 481 F.3d

1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 2007). We do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility

of witnesses. We will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable jury could have

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Santana, 524

F.3d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 2008).

To convict Defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),4

 the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

(1) Defendant had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of

imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and

(3) the firearm has been in or has affected interstate commerce. United States v.

Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004). The parties stipulated at trial to the first

and third elements, so the government had to prove only that Defendant knowingly

possessed a firearm.

There was evidence presented at trial that Defendant had for some period of

time been staying at the home of Rachel Woodruff, where the firearm was found in

a bedroom Defendant shared with Ms. Woodruff. Although Defendant maintained

a separate apartment, the testimony revealed that he spent little time there, and few of

his belongings were found in that apartment. The Defendant was present at Ms.

Woodruff’s house when the search warrant was executed. The bedroom Defendant

shared with Ms. Woodruff was separated with female possessions on the north side

of the room and male items on the south side of the room. The firearm was discovered

between the mattress and box springs on the south side of the bedroom. Cash was

likewise located between the mattress and box springs in the apartment kept by

Defendant. Videotapes of a very personal nature involving the Defendant and Ms.

Woodruff as well as Defendant and another woman were found on the south side of

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the bedroom. The firearm which was discovered between the mattress and box

springs at the upper left corner of the bed, was accessible to a person lying on that side

of the bed. Defendant’s wallet and other personal items were found on the table next

to this part of the bed.

Items consistent with drug trafficking were found in the bedroom and other

parts of the house. When the officers gained entry to execute the search warrant, Ms.

Woodruff was in the upstairs bathroom attempting to flush marijuana down the toilet,

and Defendant was at the top of the stairs between Ms. Woodruff and the officers.

Additionally, the Government presented evidence that the .40 caliber handgun had

been purchased in Muncie, Indiana, a city near Indianapolis, Indiana. Evidence was

also presented that Defendant’s brother and associate, John Wallace, had a driver’s

license with an Indianapolis address.

Defendant points out that the .40 caliber handgun was in the possession of an

Indiana firearms dealer 280 days before being found under the mattress in

Marshalltown, and that the Government was unable to present evidence showing the

last time Wallace was in Indiana or Marshalltown. Defendant further submits that the

evidence was insufficient to convict because Defendant’s fingerprints were not found

on the handgun, there was no forensic evidence presented to link Defendant to the

handgun and no witness testified to seeing Defendant with the handgun. Constructive

possession of a firearm, however, may be established with circumstantial evidence.

See United States v. Byas, 581 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2009). Considering the evidence in

the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that a reasonable jury could

have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence

presented at trial.

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Correctness of Advisory Guideline Range and Reasonableness of the Sentence

Defendant maintains that the district court erred in sentencing him by enhancing

the Base Offense Level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6). This Guideline provides

for a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or

ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” The Sentencing Guidelines

define “another felony offense” as “any federal, state, or local offense, other than the

explosive or firearms possession or trafficking offense, punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought,

or a conviction obtained.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 14(C). We review de novo the

“legal conclusions a district court reaches in order to apply an enhancement for

purposes of calculating an advisory guidelines range ... while the factual findings

underpinning the enhancement are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Septon,

557 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2009).

Defendant relies on United States v. Smith, 535 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2008), a case

where the U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement was held to be not warranted, as

support for his position that the nexus was lacking between the handgun found under

the mattress and the trafficking of marijuana. The facts in Smith, however, are

significantly different from those in the case at hand. In Smith, a search of the

defendant’s home led to the discovery of a rifle, shotgun, shotgun barrel and

ammunition, as well as a methamphetamine pipe, a baggie containing

methamphetamine residue and marijuana. Smith admitted to using the rifle to kill

coyotes and Smith’s wife admitted owning the marijuana. At the time the district

court judge imposed the enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6) he stated that it

was clear that Smith had been using marijuana and that the use of drugs in the

presence of firearms justified the enhancement. 535 F.3d at 884-85. The

enhancement was found not warranted in part because there was no evidence of a

temporal link between the firearms and a greater amount of methamphetamine than

just the residue. 535 F.3d at 886.

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In United States v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 704-05 (8th Cir. 2009), a panel

of this Court explained as follows the change in the application of the U.S.S.G.

§2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement: 

Application Note 14(A) to § 2K2.1(b)(6) provides that the “in

connection with” adjustment will apply “if the firearm ... facilitated, or

had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n.14(A). This application note was added in 2006.

Prior to that time, the guidelines were silent on the definition of “in

connection with,” and our case law routinely upheld the adjustment

when weapons and drugs were in the same vicinity, regardless of

whether the underlying drug offense was for possession or trafficking.

e.g., United States v. Linson, 276 F.3d 1017, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 2002).

However, with the addition of Application Note 14, the Sentencing

Commission decided to make a distinction between the factual

circumstances of when the other felony was a drug trafficking offense,

or alternatively, a simple drug possession offense. If the felony is for

drug trafficking, Application Note 14(B) mandates application of the

adjustment if guns and drugs are in the same location. U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n.14(B). See United States v. Fuentes Torres, 529 F.3d

825, 827 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing the new application notes to

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) and noting that the Commission treated drug

possession and trafficking offenses differently). 

If the underlying drug offense is for simple possession, the district court

may still apply the adjustment, but only after making a finding that the

firearm facilitated the drug offense. Id. at 827-28 n. 2 (holding that when

the “in connection with” offense is a drug possession offense, the district

court “must make the ‘in connection with’ finding, applying the

‘facilitate’ standard” from application note 14(A) to guideline §

2K2.1(b)(6)) (emphasis added). In other words, when the defendant

subject to a 2K2.1(b)(6) adjustment possesses a “user” amount of drugs

and is not a trafficker, instead of automatically applying the adjustment

when both drugs and weapons are involved in the offense, the district

court must affirmatively make a finding that the weapon or weapons

facilitated the drug offense before applying the adjustment.

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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides:

 The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to

comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in

determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider--

 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics

 of the defendant; 

 (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- 

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and

to provide just punishment for the offense; 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

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The evidence in the case at hand does not show that Defendant possessed only

a “user” amount of drugs. Instead, the evidence shows that Defendant was in

possession of a large amount of marijuana, packaging material and scales. The

evidence presented at trial supports a finding that Defendant was a trafficker in drugs.

The district court at the sentencing hearing announced and explained his finding that

the handgun was possessed in connection with the distribution of marijuana. The

factual findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous and the U.S.S.G.

§2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement was warranted.

Defendant also argues that he was entitled to a downward departure pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1) because a criminal history category of III over-represents

his risk of recidivism. We have no authority, however, to review the district court's

denial of Defendant’s request for a downward departure because Defendant does not

argue that the district court had an unconstitutional motive in denying his request and

because the district court recognized that it had the authority to depart downward. See

United States v. Anderson, 570 F.3d 1025, 1034 (8th Cir. 2009).

Defendant also contends that the district court, in declining to sentence

Defendant below the advisory guidelines, did not properly apply the factors in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a).5

 Defendant contends that the district court failed to properly

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(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 

 (3) the kinds of sentences available; 

 (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-- 

 (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category

 of defendant as set forth in the guidelines-- 

 (i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of 

 title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such 

 guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have

 yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments 

 issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and 

 (ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the

 defendant is sentenced; or 

 (B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable

guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant

to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any

amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress

(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the

Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title

28); 

 (5) any pertinent policy statement-- 

 (A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title

28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy

statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet

to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued

under section 994(p) of title 28); and 

 (B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the

defendant is sentenced.

 (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

 similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 

 (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 

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consider: 1. that Defendant had a new-born child who will suffer from Defendant’s

incarceration; 2. that Defendant grew up without a father during his teenage years;

3. that Defendant benefitted from a substance abuse program in 2007; 4. that

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Defendant had a good work history and was supported by his most recent employer;

5. that Defendant displayed good conduct while on release pending disposition of this

case; and 6. that Defendant has demonstrated that he will not commit further offenses.

Section 3553 requires that a sentence be “not greater than necessary.” In

addition, in Gall v. United States the Supreme Court emphasized the requirement that

“‘the sentencing judge consider every convicted person as an individual and every

case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes

magnify, the crime and punishment to ensue.’” 552 U.S. 38, 52, 128 S. Ct. 586, 598

(2007)(quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). Gall sets forth the

procedure the district court should follow in sentencing. After correctly calculating

the advisory Guidelines range and “giving both parties an opportunity to argue for

whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all

of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by

a party.” 552 U.S. at 49-50. The district court “must make an individualized

assessment based on the facts presented, ... [and] must adequately explain the chosen

sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 50. In explaining the

chosen sentence and analyzing the relevant § 3553(a) factors, “a district court is not

required to provide ‘a full opinion in every case,’ but must ‘set forth enough to satisfy

the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned

basis for exercising his own legal decision making authority.’” United States v.

Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L. Ed.2d 203 (2007)). If a district court judge’s

discretionary decision in a case accords with the sentence the Sentencing Commission

deems appropriate “in the mine run of cases,” it is likely that the sentence is

reasonable. United States v. Harris, 493 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2007).

In the case at hand the district court followed the proper sentencing procedure.

The sentencing transcript establishes that the district court thoroughly considered the

3553(a) factors and was aware of his ability to vary from the Sentencing Guidelines

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but chose not to for reasons carefully explained on the record. Nothing in the record

persuades us that the district court arrived at an unreasonable sentence in Defendant’s

case.

***

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

______________________

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