Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02071/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02071-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick S. McGuire
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2071

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PATRICK S. MCGUIRE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 14-CR-30148-NJR-1 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 24, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 30, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Patrick McGuire pleaded guilty to a 

single count of interfering with commerce by threat or 

violence. At sentencing the district court classified McGuire

as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines, which increases the offense level if the defendant 

has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.”

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2014). “Crime of violence” is defined in 

§ 4B1.2 and includes “any offense ... that ... is burglary of a 

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2 No. 15-2071

dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

The emphasized text is known as the residual clause.

The district judge counted two of McGuire’s prior convictions as crimes of violence, one of which—a conviction for 

fleeing the police—qualified only under the residual clause. 

With the career-offender enhancement in the mix, McGuire’s 

Guidelines range increased from 63–78 months to 151–188 

months. Citing McGuire’s extensive criminal history, the 

judge imposed a 188-month sentence. In doing so she noted 

her surprise that the government hadn’t asked for the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. 

McGuire appeals, arguing that in light of Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the residual clause in the 

career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. The 

government agrees and confesses error. In a recent decision 

circulated to the full court under Circuit Rule 40(e), we also 

agreed and invalidated § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause as 

unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Hurlburt, 

No. 14-3611 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016) (en banc).

Applying Hurlburt here, McGuire was wrongly classified 

as a career offender. As in most cases involving miscalculation of a defendant’s Guidelines range, that error warrants 

full resentencing. 

I. Background

McGuire pleaded guilty to one count of interfering with 

commerce by threat or violence, which carries a 20-year 

maximum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. At sentencing the 

judge classified McGuire as a career offender based on two 

Case: 15-2071 Document: 39 Filed: 08/30/2016 Pages: 9
No. 15-2071 3

prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.1. As relevant here, one of the predicates for the careeroffender enhancement—a conviction for fleeing the police—

qualified under the residual clause of the crime-of-violence 

definition in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Applying the enhancement substantially increased McGuire’s Guidelines sentencing range, 

which jumped from 63–78 months to 151–188 months.

The government asked for a sentence at the high end of 

the range, and the judge agreed that McGuire’s extensive 

criminal history warranted at least that: 

But, if anything, I think all of the defense arguments in mitigation, they certainly don’t call 

for anything below the [G]uidelines range. 

And I’m actually a little surprised that the government isn’t seeking the statutory maximum 

in this case because I think they would have all 

the argument for why that is appropriate. 1

The judge sentenced McGuire to 188 months in prison and

3 years of supervised release.

II. Discussion

McGuire argues that the residual clause in the careeroffender guideline is unconstitutionally vague in light of the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. Ordinarily our review 

would be de novo. United States v. Boatman, 786 F.3d 590, 593 

(7th Cir. 2015). But McGuire did not raise this challenge at 

sentencing, so plain-error review applies instead. United 

 1 The judge’s assessment was based primarily on McGuire’s extensive 

criminal history: Over the past three decades, he had been found guilty 

of more than 50 offenses, including 15 felonies. 

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States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014). That 

standard requires McGuire to establish “(1) an error or 

defect (2) that is clear or obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s 

substantial rights (4) and seriously impugning the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” 

Id. at 1097 (quotation marks omitted). 

In Johnson the Supreme Court invalidated the residual 

clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The residual clause in the 

career-offender guideline is identical. The government 

agrees that Johnson’s holding applies to § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause and therefore confesses error in McGuire’s case.

In our recent decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 

No. 14-3611, we accepted the government’s concession and 

overruled our circuit precedent in United States v. Tichenor, 

683 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2012), which held that the Sentencing 

Guidelines are immune from vagueness challenges. Slip op.

at *3, 17 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016) (en banc). Applying Johnson, 

we held that the residual clause in the career-offender 

guideline is unconstitutionally vague.2 Id.

Hurlburt resolves the central issue in this case. Relying on 

an unconstitutional guideline to calculate McGuire’s Guidelines range is plain error. See Henderson v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 1121, 1130 (2013) (explaining that “whether a legal 

question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, ‘it is 

enough that an error be plain at the time of appellate consid-

 2 The Sentencing Commission amended the career-offender guideline to 

remove the residual clause in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2551 (2015); the amendment became effective August 1, 2016. See 81 Fed. 

Reg. 4741, 4742 (2016).

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No. 15-2071 5

eration’” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 

(1997))).

The question remains whether the Johnson error “affected 

[McGuire’s] substantial rights.” United States v. Goodwin, 

717 F.3d 511, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). To satisfy the prejudice 

requirement of plain-error review, a defendant typically 

must “‘show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,’ 

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)

(quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 

82 (2004)). “When a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range[,] ... the error itself can, and most often 

will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome absent the error.” Id. at 1345 (emphasis 

added). 

There’s no question that McGuire was sentenced under 

an incorrect Guidelines range: Without the career-offender 

enhancement, McGuire’s range drops from 151–188 months 

to 63–78 months. That’s obviously a substantial difference, 

and McGuire asks us to remand for full resentencing. Here’s 

where the parties’ positions diverge. The government argues 

that in light of the judge’s comments at sentencing, it’s 

unclear whether she would have chosen a different sentence 

had she properly calculated McGuire’s Guidelines range. 

Specifically, the judge noted that she was “actually a little 

surprised that the government isn’t seeking the statutory 

maximum in this case because ... they would have all the 

argument for why that is appropriate.” The government 

urges us to order a limited remand similar to the procedure 

we adopted in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 

2005).

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The Paladino remand was devised in the wake of United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to determine whether a 

sentencing judge’s misunderstanding of the Guidelines’

legal effect implicated the defendant’s substantial rights—in 

other words, whether the judge would have imposed a 

different sentence had he known that the Guidelines were

merely advisory. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483. In holding that a 

limited remand was the appropriate remedy, we emphasized the unique circumstances that necessitated this solution. We explained: 

[U]nless any of the judges in the cases before 

us had said in sentencing a defendant preBooker that he would have given the same sentence even if the [G]uidelines were merely advisory ... , it is impossible for a reviewing court 

to determine—without consulting the sentencing 

judge ... —whether the judge would have done 

that.

Id. at 482. Accordingly, we fashioned a limited-remand 

procedure “to permit the sentencing judge to determine 

whether he would (if required to resentence) reimpose his 

original sentence.” Id. at 484.

Consistent with its origins, a Paladino remand is generally

not appropriate when the judge’s sentencing error involves a 

miscalculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range as opposed to a misunderstanding of the Sentencing Guidelines’ 

legal effect. United States v. Williams, 742 F.3d 304, 307 (7th 

Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 743

(7th Cir. 2014). “When a district court incorrectly calculates 

the [G]uideline[s] range, we normally presume the improperly calculated [G]uideline[s] range influenced the judge’s 

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No. 15-2071 7

choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.” Adams, 

746 F.3d at 743. That presumption follows naturally from the 

Guidelines’ centrality to the sentencing process: “The Guidelines inform and instruct the district court’s determination of 

an appropriate sentence. In the usual case then, the systemic 

function of the selected Guidelines range will affect the 

sentence.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346. 

Of course the presumption can be overcome. See id. (“The 

sentencing process is particular to each defendant, of course, 

and a reviewing court must consider the facts and circumstances of the case before it.”). We have sometimes ordered a 

Paladino-style limited remand in cases involving miscalculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range when the sentence 

imposed fell either within or below the correct range, creating ambiguity about whether the miscalculation actually 

affected the defendant’s sentence. See United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. 

Billian, 600 F.3d 791, 794–95 (7th Cir. 2010). But it remains 

“[o]ur normal practice ... to presume that the improperly 

calculated [G]uidelines range influenced the choice of sentence unless the judge said otherwise at sentencing.” 

Williams, 742 F.3d at 307. 

McGuire’s sentence (188 months) falls far above the correct range (63–78 months), so there’s no ambiguity on that 

front. And the judge did note that she was surprised the 

government had not requested the statutory maximum of 

20 years. However, she also explicitly cited McGuire’s

(miscalculated) Guidelines range to justify the 188-month 

sentence: “[I]f I look at the [G]uidelines ... as I must, I think 

a high end sentence ... will be sufficient.” On this record we 

see no reason to depart from the usual presumption that the 

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judge’s miscalculation of McGuire’s Guidelines range influenced her choice of sentence. And to the extent that the 

miscalculation resulted in a higher Guidelines range, it 

seriously affected the integrity of the proceedings. See United 

States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Accordingly, we VACATE McGuire’s sentence and 

REMAND for full resentencing. 

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No. 15‐2071 9

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. While I dissented in

United States v. Hurlburt, No. 14‐3611, — F.3d — (7th Cir. 2016)

(en banc), it is now the law of the circuit. As Judge Sykes ex‐

plains, it requires a remand in this case for re‐sentencing. On

remand, however, the district judge will have the power and

the right to impose the same sentence she did in the first place.

See Hurlburt, slip op. at 25–26, — F.3d at — (Hamilton, J., dis‐

senting). The advice from the Sentencing Guidelines will be

different on remand, but that should not necessarily change

the judgeʹs assessment of the relevant sentencing factors un‐

der 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In particular, the criminal history pro‐

visions in the Guidelines have always been somewhat arbi‐

trary. (For example, a defendant receives the same three

points for a bar fight that produced a fourteen‐month sen‐

tence and a first‐degree murder conviction. See U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.1.) That’s why the Guidelines have always encouraged

departures on the basis that a defendant’s guideline calcula‐

tion of criminal history is under‐  or over‐representative.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. On remand, the judge needs to exercise her

judgment under § 3553(a).

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