Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00415/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00415-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Bowman
Defendant
C. Hammond
Defendant
M. Searman
Defendant
Quincy Sims
Plaintiff
C. Wegman
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUINCY SIMS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

C. WEGMAN, et al.,

Defendants

Case No. 1:14 cv 00415 GSA PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE 

AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE

IN THIRTY DAYS

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).1 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

 

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Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate Judge on April 7, 2014 (ECF No. 5). 

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appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the Centinela State Prison, brings this civil rights action against 

defendant CDCR officials employed by the CDCR at Kern Valley State Prison, where the events 

at issue occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants the following individuals: Community Resource 

Manager C. Wegman; Chaplain C. Bowman; Correctional Counselor M. Searman; Staff Services 

Manager C. Hammond. Plaintiff claims that he was denied the right to freely exercise his 

religious beliefs. 

Plaintiff alleges that, while he was housed at Kern Valley, Defendants refused to provide

him with religious meals. Plaintiff alleges that he requested a “kosher diet program for Nation of 

Islam inmates.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “failed to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable 

accommodation to a Jewish kosher diet.” Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that On July 17, 2013, 

he requested from Defendant Wegman a Jewish kosher diet that meets Plaintiff’s dietary 

requirements according to the guidance and teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of 

Islam. Plaintiff’s request was denied by Defendant Wegman on the ground that Jewish kosher 

diets are only provided to Jewish inmates. Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the issue, and 

Defendant Chaplain Bowman denied the appeal on the ground that Plaintiff did not meet the 

requirement for a Jewish kosher diet. Plaintiff alleges that in the Nation of Islam, “the food of 

the Jew and Muslim are similar.” Plaintiff therefore alleges that the refusal to provide him with a 

Jewish diet violates his right to equal protection. 

Plaintiff attaches as an exhibit to his complaint a copy of the Third Level Appeal 

Decision of his grievance. The appeal was denied, based on the following findings:

The TLR notes that pursuant to CCR 3054.2(g)(1), Jewish kosher 

meals shall be available at designated institutions, and Jewish 

inmates may participate in the JKDP, as determined by a Jewish 

Chaplain. According to CCR 3054.2(g)(1), the JKDP shall be 

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administered in accordance with the provisions of this section, and 

a Jewish Chaplain shall determine entry into the program. 

Chaplain Bowman recently interviewed the appellant and informed 

him he was not eligible to participate in the JKDP. It was noted 

that appellant acknowledged that he is Islamic, not Jewish, and is 

not approved to participate in the JKDP. As the appellant does not 

currently meet the criteria to participate in the JKDP, he may wish 

to explore other options if he does not like the RMA program. The 

appellant is free to purchase kosher food items from an approved 

outside vendor at his expense. 

A. First Amendment

“The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. 

The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be 

curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” 

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 

(1987); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). Only beliefs which are sincerely held and 

rooted in religious beliefs trigger the Free Exercise Clause. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 

884-885 (9th Cir. 2008)(citing Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); Callahan v. 

Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981). Under this standard, “when a prison regulation 

impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 

First, “there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the 

legitimate government interest put forward to justify it,” and “the governmental objective must 

itself be a legitimate and neutral one.” Id. A second consideration is “whether there are 

alternative means of exercising the right that remains open to prison inmates.” Id. at 90 9internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A third consideration is “the impact accommodation of 

the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally.” Id. “Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the 

reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id.

Plaintiff fails to sate a claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause because he does not 

allege facts that indicate that he was denied the ability to practice his faith. Plaintiff requests a 

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Kosher diet, but fails to demonstrate why he requires the Jewish Kosher diet for his religious 

beliefs. Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to the Nation of Islam, the “the food of the Jew and 

Muslim are similar.” In his attached appeal, form, Plaintiff acknowledges that he is Muslim. 

The appeal form indicates that Plaintiff does not meet the regulatory criteria for Jewish Kosher 

meals. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate why the Muslim diet, or another available religious diet, 

was insufficient to meet his dietary needs.

B RLUIPA

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) provides

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . 

even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 

unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden 

on that person –

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; 

and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 

compelling government interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. RLUIPA “mandates a stricter standard of review for prison regulations 

that burden the free exercise of religion than the reasonableness standard under Turner.” Shakur, 

514 F.3d at 888 (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

Supreme Court has noted “RLUIPA ... protects institutionalized persons who are unable to 

freely attend their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission 

and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 

(2005). RLUIPA defines religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not 

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); San Jose 

Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has 

failed to allege facts indicating that the practice of his religion was substantially burdened. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege how, as a self- identified Muslim, the practice of his religions has 

been substantially burdened by the denial of Jewish religious meals.

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C. Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 

situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 

439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). A prisoner is entitled to “a 

reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow 

prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891 (quoting Cruz 

v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-322 (1972)(per curiam). To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts 

sufficient to support the claim that prison officials intentionally discriminated against him on the 

basis of his religion by failing to provide him with a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith 

compared to other similarly situated religious groups. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321-322; Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 891; Serrano v.Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of L.A., 250 

F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff makes no such allegations here. 

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it does not state any claims 

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the

opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this

order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff is cautioned that he

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended

complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal 

rights, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 987-88. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must 

be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (citations omitted). Plaintiff must name the individual 

defendant, describe where that defendant is employed and in what capacity, and explain how that 

defendant acted under color of state law. Plaintiff should state clearly, in his or her own words, 

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what happened. Plaintiff must describe what each defendant, by name, did to violate the 

particular right described by Plaintiff.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, 

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an 

original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d 

at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a 

claim;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

an amended complaint; 

4. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended 

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended 

complaint; and 

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will dismiss this action, 

with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2015 

/s/ Gary S. Austin 

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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