Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03216/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03216-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brendan Corkery
Petitioner
Department of Homeland Security
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BRENDAN CORKERY,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3216

______________________ 

Petition for review of an arbitrator's decision in No. 

FMCS 13-02672-6 by Roger P. Kaplan.

______________________ 

Decided: January 4, 2017

______________________ 

 MICHAEL WILSON MACOMBER, Tully Rinckey PLLC, 

Albany, NY, for petitioner.

ELIZABETH ANNE SPECK, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

SCOTT D. AUSTIN; JILL M. SKRENTY-PACKARD, United 

States Customs and Border Protection, Buffalo, NY. 

______________________ 

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2 CORKERY v. DHS

Before O’MALLEY, WALLACH, and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Brendan Corkery appeals from an arbitrator’s decision following the arbitration between the American 

Federation of Government Employees, Local 2724 (“the 

Union”) and the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (“the Agency”) with 

respect to Corkery’s removal from his position as a Border 

Patrol Agent (“BPA”). Because substantial evidence 

supports the arbitrator’s decision, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Corkery began work for the Agency as a BPA in December 1997, and was transferred to the Erie Border 

Patrol Station in June 2009. BPAs at Corkery’s level (GS1896-12) perform demanding duties related to intelligence 

collection and utilization, and also may be required to 

perform physically strenuous tasks. The Agency also 

required Corkery to qualify and show proficiency with a 

government-issued firearm. 

In 2012, several of Corkery’s coworkers made statements explaining that Corkery had exhibited odd and 

concerning behavior while on duty. Several BPAs provided written statements complaining about Corkery’s body 

odor in the gym and while patrolling. Other agents noted 

that Corkery talked to himself, sometimes in nonsensical 

sentences. A BPA reported witnessing an incident in 

which Corkery had what appeared to be human feces on 

his leg while in the workplace locker room. Other BPAs

witnessed Corkery leave communal shower facilities 

tracking what appeared to be human feces across the 

locker room floor. Based on these observations, Agency

management ordered Corkery to attend a fitness-for-duty

evaluation and placed Corkery on administrative leave 

pending the results of the evaluation. 

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CORKERY v. DHS 3

Corkery attended the physical evaluation portion of 

the fitness-for-duty evaluation in November 2012. The 

physical evaluation did not reveal a medical condition 

explaining the odd behavior Corkery’s colleagues observed, and the reviewing medical official recommended 

that Corkery undergo a psychiatric evaluation. 

Dr. Jeffrey Grace, an independent medical examiner 

and board-certified psychiatrist, conducted a psychiatric 

evaluation of Corkery in December 2012. As part of a 

complete assessment of Corkery, Dr. Grace administered 

the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 

(“MMPI-2”) psychiatric assessment to Corkery. Dr. 

Richard Frederick, a licensed clinical psychologist, scored 

Corkery’s MMPI-2 assessment. Based on his analysis and 

the results of Corkery’s MMPI-2 assessment, Dr. Grace 

diagnosed Corkery with “Psychotic Disorder NOS.”1 Dr. 

Grace found that Corkery’s prognosis was “guarded” and 

the severity of his illness was “significant.” Dr. Grace 

further concluded that Corkery likely suffered from 

psychotic symptoms such as auditory hallucinations. The 

functional implication of Corkery’s responses to such 

hallucinations, according to Dr. Grace, meant that Corkery’s “judgment, in a comprehensive way, is significantly 

1 Psychotic Disorder NOS “is a psychotic disorder 

that does not meet the criteria, or there is conflicting 

information, for the diagnosis of a specific psychotic 

disorder.” J.A. 87. “An unspecific psychotic disorder 

occurs when the psychotic symptoms though present do 

not meet all the diagnostic criteria for a specific psychotic 

disorder such as schizophrenia.” J.A. 87 n.2. At the 

arbitration hearing, Dr. Grace explained that “NOS” 

stands for “not otherwise specified,” and this diagnosis 

reflects a “category of illness where there is clearly psychotic illness but it’s not delineated in any of the other 

more formal diagnosis [sic].” J.A. 224.

 

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4 CORKERY v. DHS

impaired and he is not able to safely and effectively 

function as a Border Patrol Agent.” J.A. 120–21. 

Dr. Paul Prunier, the Agency’s board-certified psychiatric consultant, reviewed Dr. Grace’s psychiatric assessment and Dr. Frederick’s interpretation of the MMPI-2 

results. Given the severity of Corkery’s symptoms, Dr. 

Prunier concurred with Dr. Grace’s assessment and 

concluded that Corkery was psychiatrically unfit for any 

form of duty.

Dr. Grace later submitted an addendum discussing 

Corkery’s limitations and restrictions. In this report, Dr. 

Grace again noted Corkery’s diagnosis of “Psychotic 

Disorder NOS,” stated that Corkery’s prognosis was

guarded, and restated his opinion that Corkery’s illness 

was significant. Dr. Grace again opined that Corkery 

could not safely or effectively perform several of the 

specific duties of a BPA. Dr. Prunier reviewed Dr. Grace’s 

addendum and agreed that Corkery was psychiatrically 

unfit for duty. 

Based on the medical opinions of Drs. Grace, Frederick, and Prunier, the Agency concluded that Corkery was 

unfit for duty, and proposed removing him from his position as a BPA. The Agency notified Corkery by letter of 

this decision in April 2013. Corkery and his representative responded to the letter orally and in writing. In 

support, Corkery submitted results of a psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Jay Supnick, a licensed psychologist. Dr. Supnick’s report reflected more favorably on 

Corkery’s mental condition than did the reports commissioned by the Agency.

The Agency asked Dr. Prunier to review Dr. Supnick’s 

report. Dr. Prunier concluded that he did not agree with 

Dr. Supnick’s findings—and further noted that at no point 

in his report did Dr. Supnick conclude that Corkery was 

fit for duty. Dr. Prunier recommended that Dr. Frederick 

review Dr. Supnick’s report, particularly Dr. Supnick’s 

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CORKERY v. DHS 5

psychological testing of Corkery and his results. Dr. 

Frederick criticized Dr. Supnick’s methods and concluded 

that Dr. Supnick’s testing reached “essentially the same 

outcome obtained in the evaluation conducted by Dr. 

Grace.” J.A. 141. After reviewing Dr. Frederick’s report, 

Dr. Prunier issued a final report and recommendation in 

June 2013, concluding that, based on his review of all 

medical documentation including Dr. Supnick’s report, 

Corkery was psychiatrically not fit for duty. 

The deciding official, U.S. Border Patrol Chief Patrol 

Agent (Buffalo Sector) Brian Hastings (“Hastings”), 

sustained the Agency’s proposal to remove Corkery. 

Given the medical reports and the risks and responsibilities of the BPA position, Hastings concluded that he had 

no option but to remove Corkery from service. Corkery’s 

removal became effective on June 14, 2013. 

On July 3, 2013, the Union invoked arbitration on behalf of Corkery pursuant to Article 34 of the parties’ 

controlling collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator held hearings on October 7 and 8, 2014, and February 

3, 2015. Contemporaneously with the filing of its closing 

brief, the Union filed a motion for sanctions alleging, 

among other things, that the Agency failed to produce a 

memorandum prepared by BPA Edward Hess in December 2012 (“the Hess memorandum”) related to Hess’s 

observations of Corkery on the day of the first feces incident mentioned above. In the Hess memorandum, Hess 

explains that, after speaking to Corkery in the locker 

room, another BPA asked Hess if he noticed anything 

unusual about Corkery. Hess told that BPA that he had 

not.

On July 2, 2015, the arbitrator upheld the Agency’s 

removal of Corkery. The arbitrator also denied the Union’s motion for sanctions, concluding that there was no 

evidence that the Agency deliberately withheld the Hess 

memorandum and that the information in the Hess 

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6 CORKERY v. DHS

memorandum was not key to the removal decision. 

Corkery appeals these determinations. We have jurisdiction to adjudicate a petition for review of an arbitrator’s 

decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(l) and 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(a). Corkery timely appealed under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(l). 

DISCUSSION

We review the arbitrator’s decision under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7121(f), which establishes that arbitrations of such 

grievances are reviewed under the same standard of 

review that applies to appeals from Board decisions. 5 

U.S.C. § 7121(f); see also Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 

652 (1985). Section 7703(c) requires this court to set aside 

“any agency action, findings, or conclusions found to be 

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). As to element (3), substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support” the Board’s conclusion. Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 

U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 

An agency may remove an employee “only for such 

cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7513(a). We sustain an employee’s discharge if it 

is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(1)(B). Where an employee occupies a position 

with medical standards or physical requirements and the 

finding that he was unable to perform was based on 

medical history, the agency is required to show the following to establish a charge of inability to perform: “[1] the 

condition at issue is itself disqualifying, [2] recurrence 

cannot medically be ruled out, and [3] the duties of the 

position are such that a recurrence would pose a reasonable probability of substantial harm.” 5 C.F.R. § 339.206. 

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CORKERY v. DHS 7

At the outset,2 Corkery argues that the arbitrator 

failed to cite to a legal standard in his decision, or alternatively, that the arbitrator failed to apply the correct 

standard in making his determination. But it is substance, rather than form, which guides our review of 

arbitrators’ decisions. Martin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 

412 F.3d 1258, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Girani v. Fed. 

Aviation Admin., 924 F.2d 237, 242 (Fed. Cir. 1991);

Wissman v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 848 F.2d 176, 178 (Fed. Cir.

1988). Further, the arbitrator identified the legal standard when he stated that “the Agency proved by preponderant evidence that Corkery was not fit for duty as a 

BPA. Corkery was removed for just and sufficient cause. 

His removal promoted the efficiency of the service.” J.A. 

50 (emphasis added). 

The arbitrator’s determination finds support in the 

testimony of multiple BPAs who expressed concern about 

Corkery’s behavior. The arbitrator acknowledged that no 

BPA actually witnessed Corkery defecating on himself, 

and further that some of the memoranda offered by BPAs 

had inaccuracies. J.A. 42. The arbitrator concluded, 

however, that the testimony about the defecation incidents was credible, as were the reports of Corkery’s body 

odor and observations of Corkery talking to himself and 

appearing to respond to internal stimuli. J.A. 48–49. 

“Credibility determinations are within the discretion of 

the arbitrator and are virtually unreviewable on appeal.” 

Raney v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 222 F.3d 927, 939 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000). 

The arbitrator’s determination is further supported by 

the medical testimony of Drs. Grace and Prunier, who 

2 Corkery challenges whether he should have been 

required to undergo a Fitness for Duty Examination. 

Corkery failed to raise this issue as part of the arbitration, and thus has waived it. J.A. 2–3. 

 

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8 CORKERY v. DHS

both concluded that Corkery was unfit for duty. Dr. 

Grace explicitly stated that, based on his testing and 

examination of Corkery, “[w]ithin reasonable medical 

certainty, [Corkery] is not able to safely and effectively 

perform any of the duties of the position, including, but 

not limited to, working considerable amounts of overtime 

and responding to emergencies in a law enforcement 

capacity.” J.A. 120. Dr. Grace also stated that Corkery 

has “psychotic symptoms, very likely auditory hallucinations” and that Corkery could not safely and effectively 

function as a BPA. J.A. 120. Dr. Prunier concurred with 

this determination, finding that, “[g]iven the severity of 

[Corkery’s] current psychiatric symptoms, it appears [he] 

should focus his attention on getting well, and not engage 

in any form of even light-duty function.” J.A. 125.

The arbitrator properly exercised his discretion to determine that the testimony of Dr. Supnick was less probative in Corkery’s case than the testimony of Drs. Grace, 

Frederick, and Prunier. Dr. Supnick’s opinion did not 

reach the conclusion that Corkery is fit for duty, nor did 

Dr. Supnick testify to this effect at the arbitration hearing. Further, the arbitrator discounted Dr. Supnick’s 

testimony, in part, because Dr. Supnick failed to 

acknowledge that he administered a “practice” MMPI-2 to 

Corkery before administering the “real” test, a method the 

arbitrator characterized as unacceptable. Dr. Frederick 

also criticized Dr. Supnick’s testing methods as improper. 

In addition, Dr. Prunier explained that Dr. Supnick’s 

report contained many of the same conclusions Drs. Grace 

and Frederick reached—in particular, that Corkery was 

defensive during his psychiatric examinations. 

The arbitrator reasonably concluded that Corkery

failed to offer credible explanations for his behavior. 

Corkery’s explanation for the alleged feces on his leg 

changed over time, as did his explanations for whether 

and how he talks to himself.

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CORKERY v. DHS 9

The arbitrator reasonably concluded that the Agency 

properly removed Corkery from service. The Agency 

possesses substantial discretion in choosing an appropriate action once the Agency’s underlying charge has been 

sustained. See LaChance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1251–

52, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Although the Agency applies 

the factors outlined in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981) in most cases, they do not 

apply here because the Agency removed Corkery based on 

medical, rather than disciplinary, reasons. See Lisiecki v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 769 F.2d 1558, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 

1985). 

During the arbitration hearing, Hastings addressed in 

detail his review of all relevant evidence in making his 

decision. Hastings examined the job requirements for a 

BPA and concluded that, based on the evidence before 

him, Corkery could not perform the essential functions of 

the job or any light duty position. Further, Hastings 

noted that Corkery had not sought treatment for his 

condition. 

Corkery also has failed to show harmful error as to 

the alleged withholding of the Hess memorandum. Harmful error is “error by the agency in the application of its 

procedures that is likely to have caused the agency to 

reach a conclusion different from the one it would have 

reached in the absence or cure of the error.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(c)(2)(A). To show harmful error, Corkery must 

demonstrate that the error “caused substantial harm or 

prejudice to his [] rights.” Id. The arbitrator concluded 

that the Agency did not deliberately withhold the Hess 

memorandum, and further, the Agency did not rely upon 

the Hess memorandum in reaching its decision to remove 

Corkery. J.A. 35–39. The Hess memorandum states that 

Hess did not notice anything “unusual” about Corkery 

that day. This memorandum, according to the arbitrator, 

did not contradict the report of one of the BPAs who 

reported seeing feces on Corkery’s leg on the same day. 

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10 CORKERY v. DHS

J.A. 36–38. We conclude that the Hess memorandum 

does not undermine the testimony of the other BPA, both 

because the arbitrator found the BPA’s testimony on the 

feces incident to be credible and because Corkery has not 

denied that some substance was on his leg on the day in 

question. 

We have considered Corkery’s other arguments, and 

find them to be without merit. The arbitrator considered 

the evidence presented by both parties and found a preponderance favoring the Agency’s position. Corkery has 

failed to show that the arbitrator’s decision contained

reversible error under § 7703(c). We therefore affirm the 

arbitrator’s decision. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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