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Parties Involved:
Navegar, Incorporated
Appellant
Penn Arms, Incorporated
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 8, 1996 Decided January 3, 1997

No. 96-5088

NAVEGAR, INCORPORATED AND

PENN ARMS, INCORPORATED,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00550)

Richard E. Gardiner argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee, with

whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney,

and Michael S. Raab, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Federally-licensed firearms manufacturers Navegar, Inc. (doing

business as "Intratec") ("Intratec") and Penn Arms, Inc. ("Penn Arms") filed a complaint in federal

district court on March 3, 1995,seeking a declaratory judgment that certain provisions ofthe Violent

Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 ("the Act"),

were outside of Congress' enumerated powers, unconstitutional Bills of Attainder, and vague in

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The

government filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint did not set forth

a justiciable controversy as required by Article III of the United States Constitution, because the

plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that they faced a genuine "threat of prosecution." Following

discovery, the filing of a Joint Stipulation of Fact, additional briefing, and oral argument, the district

court on February 1, 1996 issued a Memorandum and Order granting the government's motion and

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dismissing the case. Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1996). We affirm the

dismissal of three of appellants' challenges, but reverse in regard to their other claims, and remand

the case for further proceedings on the merits of these latter claims.

I. BACKGROUND

The Act, which became effective on September 13, 1994, made it unlawful for a person to

"manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon," 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1) (1994),

and defined "semiautomatic assault weapon" to include "any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates

of the firearms in any caliber, known as ... INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9 and TEC-22; and ...

revolving cylinder shotguns, such as (or similar to) the Street Sweeper and Striker 12." 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(30)(A) (1994). The definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon" also includes

semiautomatic pistols that have "an ability to accept a detachable magazine" and at least two of five

other specified characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(C) (1994).

Section 922(w)(1) of the Act outlawed the transfer or possession of any "large capacity

ammunition feeding device," which section 921(a)(31) defined to include ammunition magazines

manufactured after the date of enactment of the Act which can hold more than ten rounds of

ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(w)(1), 921(a)(31) (1994).

The Act provides exemptions for transfer of these weapons to government agencies and law

enforcement officers, 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(4) and (w)(3), and for export ofthe weapons under certain

conditions. Units lawfully possessed on the effective date of the Act are "grandfathered," meaning

theymay lawfully be transferred and possessed after the Act's passage. 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(2), (w)(2)

(1994). Persons convicted of knowingly violating these provisions of the Act are subject to fines and

prison sentences of up to five years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (1994).

On the day the Act became law, inspection agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms ("ATF") visited the facilities of Intratec and Penn Arms, informed officers of these

companies of the prohibitions cited above, and gave notice that they planned to conduct inventories

of the weapons that would be "grandfathered" under the Act. Over the next two days, ATF

inspection agents conducted these inventories. Appellants ceased the manufacture and transfer of the

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outlawed weapons from the date of the Act's enactment, and have expressed no intention to violate

the Act in the future. On September 26, 1994, the ATF sent a letter to appellants and other firearms

manufacturers which summarized the above-described prohibitions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Justiciability Requirements

The district court's grant of summary judgment on the ground of lack of standing is subject

to de novo review by this court. See, e.g., Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Article III ofthe United States Constitution limitsthe role ofthe federal courtsto the decision

of "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. Before undertaking to decide any dispute

brought before it, a federal court must first assure itself that the dispute presented by the parties

represents a justiciable "case" or "controversy"; that is, that the plaintiff suffers an actual injury fairly

traceable to some challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by the judicial relief

requested, and that the factual claims underlying the plaintiff's challenge are concrete enough and the

legal issuessubmitted for decision sharply focused enough to ensure that a genuine clash between the

parties exists. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church

and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). This principle of justiciability derived from Article III serves

several important functions, not the least of which are maintaining the limits on judicial power

appropriate in a democratic society,see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), and ensuring that

the federal courts act only when the disputes brought before them involve sharply-defined issues

pressed by truly adversary parties with a genuine stake in the outcome. See Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.

99, 105 (1977); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).

Under the "standing" component of Article III justiciability doctrine, plaintiffs in a federal

court must demonstrate that their claims spring from an "injury in fact"an invasion of a legally

protected interest that is "concrete and particularized," "actual or imminent," "fairly traceable" to a

challenged act ofthe defendant, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in the federal court.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Even where these requisites for

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Article III standing are present, a federal court may still deny standing under certain "prudential"

principles. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). Standing

maybe denied on prudential grounds, for example, to litigants who present abstract questions ofwide

public significance that would more appropriately be addressed by the representative branches of

government, or who seek to assert the rights of third parties or to proffer grievances not relevant to

the "zone ofinterests" intended to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutionalguarantee

in question. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99-100.

A related component of justiciability which is particularly relevant in the context of actions

for preenforcement review ofstatutes is "ripeness," which focuses on the timing of the action rather

than on the parties seeking to bring it. In deciding whether a case is ripe for adjudication, federal

courts generally consider the hardship to the parties of withholding court resolution (a factor that

overlaps with the "injury in fact" facet of standing doctrine), and the fitness of the issues for judicial

decision (a factor that resembles the prudential concerns applied in the standing context). Abbott

Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149. By refusing to hear disputes which are not yet ripe, federal courts

avoid becoming entangled in "abstract disagreements," id. at 148, enhance judicial economy, and

ensure that a record adequate to support an informed decision exists when the case is heard.

Even when the criminalstatute that a litigant challenges has not yet been enforced against her,

the challenger's claim may be justiciable if the challenger can demonstrate that she faces a threat of

prosecution under the statute which is credible and immediate, and not merely abstract orspeculative.

In the proper circumstances, such threats of enforcement can simultaneously ripen a preenforcement

challenge and give the threatened party standing. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l

Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1979); American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1196 (D.C.

Cir. 1992); see generally 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.5 (1984). A credible threat of imminent prosecution

can injure the threatened party by putting her between a rock and a hard placeabsent the availability

of preenforcement review,shemust eitherforego possiblylawful activitybecause of her well-founded

fear of prosecution, or willfully violate the statute, thereby subjecting herself to criminal prosecution

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and punishment. See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298-99. In such situations the threat of prosecution

providesthe foundation for justiciabilityas a constitutional and prudentialmatter, and the Declaratory

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994), providesthe mechanismforseeking preenforcement review

in federal court. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) ("the declaratory judgment

procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal activity") (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

Federal courts most frequently find preenforcement challenges justiciable when the challenged

statutes allegedly "chill" conduct protected by the First Amendment, but preenforcement challenges

have been heard outside of the First Amendment context as well. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorg. Act

Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 122-25 (1974) (finding hardship sufficient to ripen the controversy and to

create a present injury where the challenged statute threatened a taking for which the plaintiffs would

never be compensated); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506-08 (1972) (finding

sufficient injury and ripeness where boat owners were effectively required, by a soon to be

implemented state law, to installnew sewage pumping facilities on their boats); Abbott Laboratories,

387 U.S. at 152-53 (finding sufficient hardship where the alternative to risking criminal and civil

penalties was far-ranging and expensive relabeling of drug products).

B. Challenges to the Portions of the Act Referring to Specific Brand Names and Models

Appellants' complaint includes a total ofsix challenges to the constitutionality of the Act, set

out in five counts. Count I includes two claimsone alleging that § 922(v)(1) exceeds the powers

of Congress enumerated in the Constitution, and one making the same allegation regarding §

922(w)(1). Count II sets out Intratec's claim that § 922(v)(1), in combination with the definition of

"semiautomatic assault weapon" in § 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), is an unconstitutionalBill of Attainder, and

Count V includes Penn Arms' Bill of Attainder challenge to § 922(v)(1) in combination with §

921(a)(30)(A)(ix) insofar as the latter subsection includes Penn Arms' "Striker 12" weapon in the

definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon." Count III states Intratec's claim that § 921(a)(30)(C),

which includes semiautomatic pistols with certain combinations of features in the definition of

prohibited weapons, is vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, and in Count IV Penn Arms directs a similar challenge to the general

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language in § 921(a)(30)(A)(ix).

Appellants' enumerated powers challenge to § 922(v)(1), and all of their Bill of Attainder

claims, involve portions of the Act that single out specific weapons manufactured only by the

appellants. These portions of the Act make it unlawful to manufacture or transfer Intratec's "TEC-9,"

"TEC-DC9," and "TEC-22" models, and Penn Arms' "Striker 12" model. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1)

and §§ 921(a)(30)(a)(viii) and 921(a)(30)(A)(ix) (1994). Because the weapon-specific nature of

these provisions putsthem in a special posture with regard to the issues of ripeness and standing, we

addressthese challengesseparately from the challenges based on the generally-worded provisions of

the Act.

The question of whether a threat of prosecution adequate to satisfy the requirements of

justiciability is present in any particular preenforcement challenge is a factual and case-specific one.

Federal courts look to a variety of factors to determine whether the plaintiff's decision to forego

certain activity is truly motivated by a well-founded fear that engaging in the activity will lead to

prosecution under the challenged statute. See, e.g., Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459; Lion Mfg. v. Kennedy,

330 F.2d 833, 839 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

In concluding that appellants had failed to show that they faced a genuine threat of

prosecution in this case, the district judge focused on the circumstancessurrounding the visits byATF

agents to appellants' facilities. Navegar, 914 F. Supp. at 636. Finding that such visits to regulated

entities are routine and that the visiting agents were not themselves authorized to bring criminal

investigations, the judge here concluded that appellants faced no credible threat of prosecution. Id.

We think, however, that the district judge failed to consider the fullpanoplyof circumstancesrelevant

to the plaintiffs' claim of an imminent threat of prosecution; the judge focused on a few saplings in

a forest of far more significant growth.

The most important circumstance that the district judge overlooked is that the Act in effect

singles out the appellants as its intended targets, by prohibiting weapons that only the appellants

make. This fact sets this case apart from most others in which preenforcement challenges to the Act

have been held nonjusticiable. Cf. San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th

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1Two federal courts have dismissed preenforcement challenges to the Act by means of

unpublished orders. See Kropelnicki v. United States, No. CA-94-186-1 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 3,

1995), aff'd by Kropelnicki v. United States, 92 F.3d 1179 (4th Cir. 1996) (Table); Todd v.

United States, No. J-C-94-284 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 30, 1994). 

Cir. 1996) (dismissing preenforcement challenge to the Act brought by an individual holder of a

federal license to sell firearms)1; but see National Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw, 909 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.

Mich. 1995) (dismissing preenforcement challenges to the Act, including one by Intratec), appeal

pending, No. 95-2150 (6th Cir.). It also makes the applicability of the statute to appellants' business

indisputable: if these provisions of the statute are enforced at all, they will be enforced against these

appellants for continuing to manufacture and sell the specified weapons (the only possible exception

being the prosecution of people making "copies or duplicates" ofthe outlawed weapons, as provided

in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A)).

Because it is clear to whom these provisions of the Act would be applied were they to be

applied at all, the imminent threat of such prosecutions can be deemed speculative only if it is likely

that the government may simply decline to enforce these provisions at all. This argument has

generally been found compelling only when litigants seek preenforcement review of antiquated laws

of purely "historical curiosity," claiming that the threat of prosecution under these laws has "chilled"

their conduct. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986) (dismissing preenforcement

challengesto Virginia laws against fornication and cohabitation which had not been enforced against

the conduct in which the plaintiffs desired to engage since the 19th century). But the Violent Crime

Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 is decidedly not a "historical curiosity"; in fact, the ink

had barely dried on this extraordinarily high-profile piece of legislation when pro-enforcement

activities began. And the fact that the Act specifically names products made only by the appellants

istelling indeed, because it showsthat the law places a high priority on eliminating this portion of the

appellants' business. The visits by the ATF agents to appellants' places of business merely provide

a bit of additionalsupport for a fear of prosecution already firmly grounded in the language ofthe Act

itself. By sending its agents to notify appellants of the prohibitions of the Act on the day it was

passed, directing themto conduct an immediate inventoryof "grandfathered"weapons, and following

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up the visits by sending appellants a letter reminding them of the prohibitions of the Act, the

government made it quite clear that it had every intention of enforcing these prohibitions. As in Lake

Carriers Ass'n, the government affirmatively "sought on the basis of the act and the threat of future

enforcement to obtain compliance as soon as possible," to make the Act "present[ly] effective[ ] in

fact" for these appellants. Lake Carriers Ass'n, 406 U.S. at 507.

To conclude that the appellants face no credible threat of prosecution under these portions

of the Act, we would have to believe that the government would enact a widely publicized law

targeting productsthat only the appellants make,send its agentsto the appellants'facilities on the day

of enactment to informthemofthe law's prohibitions and to begin quarantining "grandfathered" units,

and soon thereafter remind appellants of the provisions of the Act by letter, but then sit idly by while

the appellants continued to manufacture the outlawed weapons. To imagine that the government

would conduct itself in so chimerical a fashion would be to declare in effect that federal courts may

never, in the absence of an explicit verbal "threat," decide preenforcement challenges to criminal

statutes. This has never been the law. To require litigants seeking resolution of a dispute that is

appropriate for adjudication in federal court to violate the law and subject themselves to criminal

prosecution before their challenges may be heard would create incentives that are perverse from the

perspective of law enforcement, unfair to the litigants, and totally unrelated to the constitutional or

prudential concerns underlying the doctrine of justiciability.

It is, in sum, this threat of prosecution which creates the "injury in fact" required under

standing doctrine, for the threat forces appellants to forego the manufacture and transfer of the

weaponsspecified in the Act. For the same reason, the threat creates the "hardship" required to ripen

the controversy, and because the issues raised in these challenges are purely legal, no prudential

considerations weigh against finding that they are appropriate for judicial decision at this time. Thus

we hold that the appellants' challenges to the provisions of the Act that single out by model name

products that they alone make are justiciable.

C. Challenges to the Portions of the Act Identifying Prohibited Materials by Characteristics

One of appellants' claims alleging that the Act exceeded the powers of Congress enumerated

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in the Constitution, and all of their claims that the Act is too vague to comply with the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, are based on portions of the Act which refer to

weapons and accessories sharing certain features, rather than to particular brands and models of

weapons. The second enumerated powers claim challenges the portion of the Act outlawing "large

capacity ammunition feeding devices," which the Act defines as ammunition magazines "that ha[ve]

a capacity of ... more than 10 rounds of ammunition." 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(w)(1) and 921(a)(31)

(1994). The vagueness claims focus on the provisions that outlaw firearms "known as ... revolving

cylinder shotguns," 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A)(ix), and semiautomatic pistols that have two out of

five listed characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(C) (1994). Because this distinction in the Act's

description of the weapons involved in these counts assumes great importance in our justiciability

analysis, we discuss them separately.

Appellants' claim to an "injury in fact" giving them standing to challenge these generic

provisions ofthe Act must, as wastrue in regard to the other claims, be premised on the assertion that

the threat of prosecution under these provisions is genuine and imminent; without such a threat the

enforcement of these provisions against appellants would be too remote and speculative to render

their challenges justiciable. In seeking to show that they have been threatened with the enforcement

of these provisions of the Act, appellants can point to some of the same circumstancesthat we found

relevant to the justiciability of their challenges to the portions of the Act that name individual

weapons, including the high-profile nature of their business and the publicity accorded to the Act, the

visits by the ATF agents, and the letter from the ATF. But they cannot invoke the one factor that we

found most significant in our analysis of the other challengesthe statute's own identification of

particular products manufactured only by the appellants. In the absence of this factor, the threat of

prosecution becomes far less imminent, and these parties' claims to standing concomitantly much

weaker. These generic portions of the Act could be enforced against a great number of weapon

manufacturers or distributors, and although the government has demonstrated itsinterest in enforcing

theAct generally, nothing in these portionsindicates anyspecialpriorityplaced upon preventing these

parties from engaging in specified conduct. In such circumstances we cannot say that a genuine

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2Although in Hoffman Estates the Court did not discuss the issue of the challenger's standing

to attack the challenged statute, its discussion demonstrates that a party-specific and

product-specific threat of prosecution under the challenged portions of the statute was present in

that case. Prior to the time that the appellee store, a seller of marijuana-related products, brought

suit to challenge the town's drug paraphernalia ordinance, the village had already conducted an

administrative inquiry, determined that the appellee was one of two stores in the village violating

the ordinance, and asked appellee to remove the items being sold in a certain section of the store

"for his protection." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 493. 

threat of enforcement has given rise to the requisite "injury in fact" and thus given these parties

standing.

Further, because the general nature of the language in these portions of the Act makes it

impossible to foretell precisely how these provisions may be applied, the issues presented in these

challenges are less fit for adjudication, suggesting additional concerns as to their ripeness. We can

hold a statute to be impermissibly vague on its face only if we conclude that it is capable of no valid

application,see Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982),2

and in the absence of an enforcement action either commenced or specifically threatened, we have

no actual or imminent concrete application of the statute in which to anchor our inquiry into whether

any valid application is possible. For these reasons, we hold that the appellants' challenges to the

portions of the Act which describe the outlawed itemsin general categorical terms are not justiciable

at this time.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court as to the appellants'

claims that 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1) exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress, that § 922(v)(1) in

combination with § 921(a)(30)(A)(viii) is an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, and that § 922(v)(1)

in combination with § 921(a)(30)(A)(ix) is an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, we affirm the

judgment of the district court with regard to dismissal of the appellants' claims that 18 U.S.C. §§

921(a)(30)(A)(ix) and 921(a)(30)(C) are vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that § 922(w)(1) exceedsthe enumerated powers

of Congress, and we remand the case for further proceedings on the merits of the surviving claims.

So ordered.

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