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Parties Involved:
Jerry L. Boyce
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 10, 2024*

Decided December 13, 2024 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge 

DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-2350 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JERRY L. BOYCE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 18-CR-29-JPS

J. P. Stadtmueller, 

 Judge.

O R D E R

Jerry Boyce, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his most recent motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Because the district judge did not 

abuse his discretion, we affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2350 Page 2 

Boyce moved for release six years after he pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs 

Act robbery and one count of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b); one 

count of discharging a firearm in connection with the attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).1 Boyce was sentenced to 45 months’ imprisonment for the 

robbery and gun possession convictions and a consecutive 120 months’ imprisonment 

for the § 924(c) conviction, for a total of 165 months’ imprisonment. 

In February 2024, roughly 5.5 years before his projected release date, Boyce filed 

a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)—his third such 

motion. He advanced four reasons, which he asserted were extraordinary and 

compelling, for his early release. First, Boyce argued that the Supreme Court’s decision 

in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), constituted an intervening, non-retroactive

change in the law that left him with a grossly disparate sentence. See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(b)(6).2 The Supreme Court held in Taylor that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery 

does not qualify as a predicate “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. at 857–

60. Second, Boyce cited Part C of Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which

gave district judges discretion to depart downward from a defendant’s criminal history 

category if the defendant received criminal history points from a sentence for 

possessing marijuana for personal use. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 cmt. n.3. Third, Boyce 

asserted that the alleged physical abuse inflicted on him by a correctional officer 

warranted his release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(4), (5). Fourth, Boyce argued that he had 

been rehabilitated through prison programming. Boyce also stated that the factors 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed in favor of a reduction. 

The district judge denied Boyce’s motion, concluding that Boyce had not 

demonstrated any extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. And regardless,

the judge explained, the factors under § 3553(a) weighed against Boyce’s release 

because of the violent nature of his crimes (wielding a firearm during the attempted and 

completed robberies and firing the gun at a store owner). 

1 Beginning with the indictment, many documents in the record (including the 

plea agreement, judgment, and PSR) refer to § 924(a)(2) as the applicable penalty 

provision. But § 924(a)(8) is the provision that applies to violations of § 922(g). 

2 The government preserves its argument that the Sentencing Commission 

exceeded its authority in enacting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). We do not address that 

argument here. 

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We review the denial of a compassionate-release motion for abuse of discretion, 

United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021), and any underlying factual

findings for clear error, United States v. Gamble, 969 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2020). For a 

compassionate-release motion to be successful, the defendant must have an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence, and early release must be 

consistent with the applicable § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. 

Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2023) (explaining that § 3553(a) is an “independent 

basis” for resolution of a compassionate-release motion). 

On appeal, Boyce first faults the district judge for not considering the 

extraordinary and compelling reasons he raised in his first two motions for 

compassionate release along with the new reasons he raised in the third motion. 

Previously Boyce had argued that his medical and mental health conditions put him at 

a high risk amid the COVID-19 pandemic. He had also argued that certain nonretroactive changes in the law entitled him to relief, though the law of the circuit 

foreclosed that reason for relief. See United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir. 

2021). Here, nothing required the district judge to look back to the prior motions he had 

denied already. Yet, although the judge told the government to respond only to new 

arguments in the third motion, the judge analyzed all grounds Boyce ever presented, 

alone and in combination: “Even considering together all of these bases for relief, 

Defendant’s prior bases for relief that the Court previously adjudicated ... and 

Defendant’s rehabilitation and programming while in prison, the Court is not 

persuaded that Defendant has proffered an extraordinary and compelling basis for 

relief.” Boyce’s argument therefore rests on a faulty premise.

And we need not address Boyce’s challenge to the conclusion that he was 

ineligible for relief because the judge reasonably denied the motion in his discretion 

under § 3553(a). The judge appropriately considered the violent nature of Boyce’s 

crimes in concluding that early release would not promote the goals of deterrence, 

public protection, and continued rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). The 

judge needed only “one good reason” for denying Boyce’s motion under § 3553(a), 

see United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021), and his reasonable assessment 

of the seriousness of Boyce’s crimes was sufficient. 

Finally, Boyce maintains that the district judge abused his discretion in 

concluding that, despite the enactment of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), the non-retroactive 

changes in the law that Boyce cited could not provide an extraordinary and compelling 

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No. 24-2350 Page 4 

reason for relief and then not considering those changes in the § 3553(a) analysis. But 

legal developments are not part of Boyce’s history and characteristics, the nature and 

circumstances of his offenses, or any other pertinent sentencing factor listed in the 

§ 3553(a). And district judges have “wide discretion” over what they consider 

“relevant” to the § 3553(a) analysis. See Williams, 65 F.4th at 346. 

AFFIRMED

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