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Parties Involved:
Rudolph Ramphal
Petitioner
U.S. Attorney General
Respondent

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10869

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A088-949-524

RUDOLPH RAMPHAL, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(November 17, 2015)

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Rudolph Ramphal seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to remand his removal proceedings to the 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to address his application for adjustment of status based 

on his recent marriage to a United States citizen. The BIA found that Ramphal’s 

motion to remand was not supported by sufficient evidence of his prima facie 

eligibility for adjustment of status because he presented no evidence showing that 

his present marriage was bona fide. Ramphal argues that the BIA abused its 

discretion by requiring him to present evidence of his prima facie eligibility and 

violated his due process rights by denying the motion to remand without providing 

him with additional time and an opportunity to present evidence showing that his 

marriage was bona ride. After careful review, we deny the petition.

I.

Ramphal is a native and citizen of Guyana. He was admitted to the United 

States as a non-immigrant visitor in 2004 with authorization to remain until March 

2005. In August 2004, Ramphal married Gladys Garcia, a Cuban national and 

lawful permanent resident who obtained her status through the Cuban Adjustment 

Act (“CAA”). Ramphal met Garcia, who lived with Ramphal’s sister in Florida, 

six days before they obtained their marriage license on July 29, 2004. 

In January 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served 

Ramphal with a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable for having remained 

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in the United States without authorization. See Immigration and National Act 

(“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). In August 2012, while removal 

proceedings were ongoing, Ramphal applied for adjustment of status under the 

CAA based on his marriage to Garcia.

1

 The CAA is a note to INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1255, the statutory provision governing adjustment-of-status determinations for 

permanent residence in general. See Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1420 n.1 

(11th Cir. 1993) (quoting the CAA). 

After hearing testimony from Ramphal, Garcia, and Garcia’s daughter, the IJ 

denied Ramphal’s application for adjustment of status and ordered him removed to 

Guyana. The IJ found that Ramphal’s and Garcia’s testimony in court about each 

other and their family members was imprecise, inconsistent, and generally lacking 

in information that should be known to persons in a bona fide marriage. 

Consequently, the IJ determined that Ramphal did not meet the requirements for 

adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. 

Ramphal appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. In December 2013, while 

his appeal was pending, Ramphal filed with the BIA a motion to remand to the IJ 

for further proceedings, claiming that he was eligible to adjust his status based on 

 1 This was the second time Ramphal had done so. Ramphal first applied for adjustment 

of status based on his marriage to Garcia in 2006, but this application was denied in 2007 after 

Ramphal failed to appear for an interview. Then, in June 2010, Ramphal was ordered removed 

in absentia for failure to appear at his removal proceedings. An immigration judge later granted 

Ramphal’s motion to reopen based on lack of notice. Thereafter, Ramphal again filed for 

adjustment of status based on his marriage to Garcia. 

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his new marriage to Bibi Ramphal (“Bibi”), a recently naturalized United States 

citizen. Ramphal explained that he and Garcia divorced on June 17, 2013, and that 

he married Bibi on July 2, 2013. In support of his motion to remand, Ramphal 

submitted a copy of his adjustment-of-status package, which, among other 

documents, included Ramphal’s application for adjustment of status; the June 17 

dissolution decree; the July 2 marriage certificate; Bibi’s I–130 alien relative 

petition naming Ramphal as a beneficiary; and Bibi’s naturalization certification

showing that she became a naturalized citizen on July 30, 2013. 

In January 2015, the BIA issued a decision dismissing Ramphal’s appeal and 

denying his motion to remand. The BIA did not address the IJ’s determination that 

Ramphal’s marriage to Garcia was not bona fide, finding that his application for 

adjustment of status based on this marriage was no longer viable due to their 

divorce. The BIA also denied the motion to remand because the motion was not 

supported by prima facie evidence of Ramphal’s eligibility for adjustment of 

status. First, the BIA stated, Ramphal did not show that the I–130 alien relative 

petition actually was pending with the United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services. Second, even assuming that a visa application was pending, the BIA 

explained, Ramphal’s motion to reopen was not supported by sufficient evidence 

of his prima facie eligibility because he did not “provide[] any documentation with 

his motion regarding the bona fide nature of his marriage.” 

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Ramphal now brings this petition for review of the BIA’s decision. He 

contends that there is no requirement that a petitioner must establish prima facie 

eligibility in a motion to remand. Furthermore, he contends, he was arbitrarily 

deprived of the opportunity to be heard on whether his new marriage is bona fide,

in violation of his due-process rights, and he should have been given additional 

time in which to file materials supporting the bona fide nature of his marriage. 

Ramphal also asserts that his prior marriage to Garcia should have been reviewed 

by the BIA in support of his motion to remand, even if it was no longer a ground 

for adjustment.2

II.

We review only the BIA’s decision unless the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s 

opinion or reasoning. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Here, the BIA issued its own opinion and did not expressly adopt the opinion or 

reasoning of the IJ, so we review only the BIA’s decision.

A.

 2 In passing, Ramphal also takes issue with the BIA’s decision not to resolve his appeal 

from the IJ’s denial of his application for adjustment of status based on his marriage to Garcia. 

However, he does not develop any argument on this point, and he acknowledges that his prior 

marriage “may have no longer been a ground for adjustment.” Accordingly, we consider any 

argument that his prior marriage to Garcia still provided a basis for adjustment of status to be 

abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(stating that a party can abandon an issue if he makes only, passing conclusory references to the 

issue in his opening brief) 

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Ramphal first contends that the BIA erred in requiring him to present prima 

facie evidence of his eligibility for adjustment of status and in denying his motion 

to remand on that basis. We disagree.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to remand, “courts generally look at the 

substance of such a motion to determine how it should be scrutinized on appeal.” 

Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1301. Because Ramphal’s motion to remand is in the nature 

of a motion to reopen, in that it requested additional proceedings to present new 

evidence regarding his eligibility for adjustment of status based on his marriage to 

Bibi, we will analyze it as such on appeal. See Chacku v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 

1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f a motion to remand seeks to introduce evidence 

that has not previously been presented, it is generally treated as a motion to reopen 

under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We review the 

BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Montano Cisneros 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1224, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen on at least three independent bases: 

“1) failure to establish a prima facie case; 2) failure to introduce evidence that was 

material and previously unavailable; and 3) a determination that despite the alien’s 

statutory eligibility for relief, he or she is not entitled to a favorable exercise of 

discretion.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1302. Motions to reopen removal proceedings 

are disfavored. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). As 

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a result, the movant bears a “heavy burden, and must present evidence of such a 

nature that the BIA is satisfied that if proceedings before the IJ were reopened, 

with all attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result 

in the case.” Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir. 2006) (brackets 

and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations adopted).

An alien is qualified to have his status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent 

resident if he (1) “makes an application for such adjustment,” (2) “is eligible to 

receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent 

residence,” and (3) “an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time 

his application is filed.” INA. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An I–130 alien 

relative petition filed by a United States citizen on behalf of a spouse, if approved,

“provides the evidentiary basis for the beneficiary’s adjustment of status” to that of 

a lawful permanent resident. See Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191, 

1194 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Because Ramphal married Bibi during his removal proceedings, he faces a 

presumption that his marriage to Bibi was not bona fide. Specifically, as a general 

rule, “an alien seeking to receive an immigrant visa on the basis of a marriage 

which was entered into during [admissibility or deportation proceedings] may not 

have the alien’s status adjusted under [§ 1255(a)].” INA § 245(e)(1)–(2), 8 U.S.C. 

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§ 1255(e)(1)–(2). However, pursuant to the “bona fide marriage exception,” this 

bar to adjustment of status

shall not apply with respect to a marriage if the alien 

establishes by clear and convincing evidence to the 

satisfaction of the Attorney General that the marriage 

was entered into in good faith and in accordance with the 

laws of the place where the marriage took place and the 

marriage was not entered into for the purpose of 

procuring the alien’s admission as an immigrant. . . . 

INA § 245(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3).

In Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 255-56 (BIA 2002), the 

BIA held that a motion to reopen may be granted under certain conditions, in the 

exercise of discretion, to enable an alien to pursue adjustment of status based on a 

marriage entered into after the commencement of removal proceedings. One of the 

required conditions is that “the motion presents clear and convincing evidence 

indicating a strong likelihood that the respondent’s marriage is bona fide.” 

Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256.

Because Ramphal’s motion to remand was in substance a motion to reopen, 

the BIA did not err in denying his motion on the basis of his failure to present 

evidence of his prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status pursuant to the 

“bona fide marriage exception.” See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1302; INA § 245(e)(3), 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3). Under Velarde-Pacheco, Ramphal needed to support his 

motion to remand with “clear and convincing evidence indicating a strong 

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likelihood that the respondent’s marriage is bona fide.” Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & 

N. Dec. at 256; see also Ali, 443 F.3d at 813 (stating that a motion to reopen must 

be supported by evidence showing a likelihood of a different result if removal 

proceedings were reopened). In other words, it was Ramphal’s burden to show the 

BIA that on remand to the IJ he could have established by clear and convincing 

evidence that his marriage to Bibi was bona fide. See INA § 245(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1255(e)(3). 

We agree with the BIA that Ramphal did not submit any documentation 

showing that the marriage was entered into in good faith. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 

§ 204.2(a)(iii)(2)(B) (listing various forms of documentation a petitioner may 

submit to establish a bona fide marriage, such as a lease showing the joint tenancy 

of a common residence or affidavits of third parties having knowledge of the 

marital relationship); Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256 (finding that the 

petitioner’s submission of the birth certificate of his United States citizen son, in 

addition to other evidence, “indicate[d] a high probability that the [petitioner’s] 

marriage is bona fide”). Nor does Ramphal contend that he presented evidence of 

that his marriage to Bibi was bona fide. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Ramphal’s motion to remand.

B.

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Ramphal also contends that his due-process rights were violated when the 

BIA denied his motion to remand without giving him notice and more time to 

present clear and convincing evidence regarding the bona fide nature of his 

marriage to Bibi. We disagree.

We review due-process challenges de novo. Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 352 

F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). Due process requires that aliens receive notice 

and an opportunity to be heard in their removal proceedings. Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish a due-process violation, 

a petitioner must show that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law, 

and that the asserted errors caused him substantial prejudice. Id. The prejudice 

prong requires a showing that, “in the absence of the alleged violations, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

Initially, because Ramphal has no constitutionally protected liberty interest 

in either adjustment of status or the reopening of his removal proceedings, which 

are forms of discretionary relief, he cannot establish a due-process violation based 

on the BIA’s decisions. Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th 

Cir. 2008); see also Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 

1999) (“[T]he failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not 

amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.”). 

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In any case, we are satisfied that Ramphal was not denied an opportunity to 

present his case on the bona fide nature of his new marriage. See Lapaix, 605 F.3d 

at 1143-44. Given the applicable law recounted above, Ramphal had ample notice 

of his burden to present evidence with his motion to remand showing that his 

marriage to Bibi was bona fide and that remand was warranted despite the bar to 

adjustment of status in INA § 245(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(1). Further, there is no 

evidence that the BIA refused to accept or review any documentation Ramphal did 

submit in support of his motion. 

Ramphal also has not shown prejudice. While his marriage was relatively 

recent, still, over five months had passed between the date of the marriage and the 

filing of the motion to remand. His contention that this period was too short to 

establish the bona fide nature of a marriage is unconvincing. Ramphal also has not 

explained what evidence, if given additional time, he would have presented to the 

BIA that would have indicated that his marriage to Bibi was bona fide. 

C.

Finally, the BIA did not err in failing to address Ramphal’s prior marriage to 

Garcia as a factor in determining whether to grant a motion to remand. Ramphal 

does not explain the relevance of this prior marriage to the present issues, nor is it 

apparent how Ramphal’s prior marriage to Garcia, which an IJ found to be not 

bona fide, could be evidence of the bona fide nature of his marriage to Bibi. 

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III.

In sum, Ramphal’s petition for review is DENIED.

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