Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04203/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04203-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent Ellis
Appellee
David Hughes
Appellant
James P. Ripley
Appellee
Roger D. Stottlemyre
Appellee
Eric Wilhoit
Appellee

Document Text:

1

Stottlemyre is no longer a party to this action.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4203

___________

David Hughes, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Roger D. Stottlemyre, Colonel, in his * District Court for the Western

official capacity; James P. Ripley, as an * District of Missouri.

individual and in his official capacity; *

Eric Wilhoit, as an individual and in *

official capacity; Vincent Ellis, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2007

Filed: October 26, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

David Hughes was a sergeant with the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP)

until he was demoted and transferred. Hughes brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

against Roger D. Stottlemyre in his official capacity as MSHP Superintendent,1

 his

immediate supervisors, Captain Vincent Ellis and Lieutenant James Ripley,

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The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri. 

3

For additional facts see Hughes v. Stottlemyre, 454 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006)

(Hughes I).

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individually, and Eric Wilhoit, an investigator in the MSHP's Professional Standards

Division, individually. Hughes claimed Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit violated his First

Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against him for opposing proposed

changes in MSHP policy. The district court2

 granted defendants' motion for summary

judgment finding Hughes failed to discredit the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons

offered for his demotion and transfer. Hughes appeals and we affirm.

I

The facts relevant to this appeal, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes,

Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment

standard), are as follows.3

 In 2003, Hughes was a Zone Sergeant assigned to Bates

County, Missouri. His direct supervisor was Lieutenant Ripley who served in a

supervisory role in Bates County and Cass County, Missouri. Bates County and Cass

County are located within the boundaries of the MSHP's Troop A, which was

commanded by Captain Ellis. In June 2003, the MSHP was considering consolidating

Bates and Cass counties. Hughes attended a meeting with Ellis and Ripley to discuss

the proposed consolidation and expressed disagreement. As an alternative, Hughes

suggested one trooper from Bates County be reassigned to Cass County to relieve its

personnel problems. Ellis and Ripley favored consolidation and Ripley voiced

dissatisfaction with Hughes's alternative plan, but Ellis delayed consolidation and

temporarily adopted Hughes's suggestion. Following the meeting, Ripley was visibly

angry and, at this point, according to Hughes, Ellis and Ripley began a campaign of

retaliation.

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Hughes contends four disciplinary complaints initiated against him were

brought in retaliation for his criticism of the consolidation plan. The first involved a

trooper under Hughes's supervision who darted across a Missouri highway to kill a

coyote and trespassed on private land to retrieve it. The complaint, initiated by

Corporal Kevin Fisher, alleged Hughes told him to report the incident to Ripley but

not volunteer any details. Additionally, the complaint alleged Hughes advised the

trooper not to talk with investigators without a lawyer present.

 

The second complaint alleged Hughes ordered an on-duty trooper to transport

Hughes's children to and from school on various occasions. The complaint further

alleged Hughes also used his patrol vehicle to transport his children to and from

school. 

 

The third complaint alleged Hughes, at the behest of state senator Harold

Caskey, ordered one of his troopers to retrieve license plates from a private vehicle

held at an impound lot. The owner of the lot had not been paid for towing or storage

charges and complained to Hughes. When interviewed by the investigator, the owner

stated Hughes was rude and told him not to "mess with Senator Caskey." 

The fourth complaint involved an incident where Hughes entered Fisher's

residence to retrieve the keys to Fisher's patrol vehicle. Hughes's patrol vehicle had

been damaged en route to a traffic accident and he needed a substitute. Fisher was off

duty and his patrol vehicle was parked at his home a few miles away. Hughes drove

to Fisher's home, entered the locked home using the keypad access code, and located

the vehicle keys. Fisher admitted giving Hughes the access code on a previous

occasion but had not otherwise given Hughes permission to enter his home.

 

The four complaints were initiated by Fisher but signed by Ripley or Ellis

because MSHP rules do not permit a subordinate to sign a complaint involving a

superior. Wilhoit investigated the complaints and interviewed Hughes who admitted

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the essential factual allegations underlying each complaint. Nevertheless, Hughes

contends Ripley and Ellis used the complaints as an opportunity to retaliate against

him and enlisted the aid of Wilhoit to further their plan. 

In his first appeal, Hughes argued the district court granted summary judgment

on a basis not advanced by defendants. We agreed and reversed. On remand,

defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment, expressly arguing the

complaints were initiated and investigated for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons. The

district court again granted summary judgment and this appeal followed. On appeal,

Hughes argues the district court erred in 1) applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) instead of Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274

(1977), and 2) finding the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons offered by defendants

were not pretextual. 

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Henerey

v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is

proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on the First Amendment, a

plaintiff must allege and prove he engaged in conduct protected by the First

Amendment and the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the

employer's decision to take the adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at

287; Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 878 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting the same

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We reject Hughes's argument that our citation to Mt. Healthy in Hughes I

suggests the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable to his

claims. See Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1042-43 (8th Cir.

2007) ("Without direct evidence of a retaliatory motive, we analyze retaliation claims

. . . under the burden-shifting framework of [McDonnell Douglas]."). 

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test applies to both First Amendment and Tile VII retaliation cases).4

 Under the

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03, Hughes has

the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. After a prima facie

showing is made, a presumption of retaliation arises, and the burden of production

shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate reason for the employment action. See

Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1997). Once the employer advances

a legitimate reason for the adverse action, the presumption drops out and "the trier of

fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven that the

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Id. (citing St. Mary's

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11(1993)). In some situations, this can be

shown indirectly by establishing the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for

retaliation. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08. The ultimate burden of persuasion

remains with the employee to show the adverse employment action was motivated by

intentional retaliation. Id. at 508.

Ellis, Ripley, and Wilhoit argue the complaints and investigations were not

initiated or undertaken in retaliation for Hughes's protected speech. They offer the

affidavit and testimony of Fisher stating he alone initiated the complaints and was not

coaxed or coached by Ellis or Ripley. Defendants also offer Wilhoit's affidavit stating

he was unaware of Hughes's speech until Hughes filed suit, and did not discuss the

matter with Ellis or Ripley prior to investigating the complaints. In opposition,

Hughes argues Fisher's affidavit and testimony are ambiguous and a reasonable trier

of fact could conclude he was not the catalyst for the complaints. Further, he argues,

even assuming Fisher was the source of the complaints, Ellis and Ripely pursued them

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with retaliatory motives. Finally, he claims Wilhoit conspired with Ellis and Ripley

in pursuing the investigations which led to his demotion and transfer. 

A review of the evidence demonstrates Fisher came forward with the damaging

information without prodding from Ellis or Ripley, and we find nothing in the record

to support Hughes's contrary claims. Similarly, we find no support for Hughes's

conspiracy theory. Other than Hughes's unfounded speculation, nothing in the

evidence supports a link between Wilhoit's investigations, Hughes's opposition to the

policy change, and Ellis or Ripley. The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates the

complaints were handled in accordance with established MSHP policy and the only

involvement Ellis and Ripley had was to sign them and provide information when

interviewed by Wilhoit. They neither supervised nor directed the investigations, and

there is no evidence whatsoever indicating similarly situated members of the MSHP

were treated differently. See Logan v. Liberty Healthcare Corp., 416 F.3d 877, 881

(8th Cir. 2005) (holding a showing of pretext requires more evidence than a prima

facie showing because evidence of pretext and retaliation is viewed in light of the

employer's proffered non-retaliatory reasons). 

III

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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