Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05194/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05194-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Karl Hampton
Appellant
Tom Vilsack
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 7, 2012 Decided July 13, 2012

No. 11-5194

KARL HAMPTON,

APPELLANT

v.

TOM VILSACK, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-02221)

Michael J. Kator argued the cause for the appellant. 

Andrea Goplerud entered an appearance.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen, Jr., United 

States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United 

States Attorney, were on brief. Christian A. Natiello, 

Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #11-5194 Document #1383483 Filed: 07/13/2012 Page 1 of 12
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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Karl 

Hampton (Hampton) appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Tom Vilsack (Secretary), Secretary of 

the United States Department of Agriculture (Department, 

USDA), on a race discrimination claim he brought under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et 

seq. See Hampton v. Vilsack, 760 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 

2011). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district 

court. 

I.

Hampton is a black male who began working in the 

Department’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) in 1987.1

Hampton had been the subject of two USDA 

investigations before the investigation at issue here. In April 

2002, a USDA employee informed Miller that he had 

discovered sexually explicit materials in the printer tray of a 

USDA printer. The USDA Human Resources Division and 

Computer Security Office conducted an investigation and 

determined that the materials were printed from Hampton’s 

computer. Acting on a Department employee relations 

specialist’s recommendation, Miller proposed a fourteen-day 

 

Hampton is no stranger to litigation against the Department.

He joined a class action against USDA in 1991 and filed an 

Equal Employment Opportunity complaint against USDA in 

1996. Both cases related to racially discriminatory 

employment practices and both settled. From March 2002 to

June 2002, Hampton was detailed to the Executive Office of 

the President. In April 2002, Dale Miller (Miller), Hampton’s 

first-line supervisor at FAS, used a racial epithet in describing 

Hampton’s detail to another FAS employee. 

 1 For the facts, we rely on the undisputed facts set out in the 

district court’s decision and other documents filed in that court. 

USCA Case #11-5194 Document #1383483 Filed: 07/13/2012 Page 2 of 12
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suspension. Hampton contested the suspension. Ellen 

Terpstra, a USDA administrator and the deciding official, 

ultimately sustained two of the three charges against Hampton 

and reduced his suspension to seven days. Later, in June 

2003, FAS’s human resources department initiated another 

investigation involving Hampton, this one alleging that 

Hampton had a conflict of interest resulting from a food 

processing company he incorporated in 1998. The 

investigation—still ongoing in 2004—revealed that Hampton 

had failed to disclose his financial interest in the company to 

USDA as required by its ethics regulations. 

In early 2004, Hampton submitted for reimbursement a 

copy of a hotel receipt. USDA employee Christine Lipscomb 

processed the reimbursement request and, per USDA 

procedure, asked Hampton to submit the original receipt. 

Hampton submitted what he said was the original but 

Lipscomb noticed what she believed were handwritten 

changes on the receipt. Lipscomb then contacted the hotel to 

obtain the original receipt. Based on her review of the receipt 

provided by the hotel and the receipt Hampton submitted, 

Lipscomb concluded that Hampton had altered the receipt. 

She then brought the matter to Miller’s attention who in turn 

showed the receipts to Roy Henwood (Henwood), Miller’s 

supervisor and Hampton’s second-line supervisor.2

 2 As Hampton’s second-line supervisor, Henwood was the 

deciding official for any disciplinary sanctions taken against 

Hampton. 

 Henwood 

believed that the matter should be referred to the 

Department’s Compliance Review Staff (CRS)—Miller 

agreed and turned over the receipts to Richard Maxwell, a 

CRS security officer with twenty-five years’ experience as an 

Army criminal investigator. 

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In his Report of Investigation (Report), Maxwell

concluded, inter alia, that Hampton had submitted for 

reimbursement nine falsified receipts from hotels at which he 

stayed during six different business trips. The receipts totaled

over $1,400, and were altered—some by pen and others typed 

in a format inconsistent with each hotel’s bona fide receipts—

to indicate that Hampton had spent additional nights, thereby 

increasing the reimbursement amount. The Report was based 

on eighteen witness interviews, copies of records from 

Hampton’s government-issued credit card, hotel receipts and 

travel vouchers that Hampton submitted. The results of the 

investigation relating to Hampton’s hotel receipts as well as 

the earlier conflict of interest investigation were sent to Lucy 

Muir, a USDA employee relations specialist who had had no 

earlier contact with Hampton. Muir believed Hampton should 

be terminated. She discussed the matter with Miller who was 

the proposing official for any sanction imposed on Hampton. 

After reviewing the Department’s table of penalties, Miller 

likewise determined that termination was the appropriate 

sanction. Muir drafted and Miller signed a proposal that 

Hampton be terminated. 

Hampton responded to his proposed termination in 

writing and at a pre-termination hearing before both Muir and 

Henwood in March 2005. Shortly after the hearing, Henwood 

asked Maxwell to investigate further several “reasonable 

questions” that Hampton raised regarding some of the charges 

against him. Letter from Roy Henwood to Richard Maxwell 

and Robert Huttenlocker (May 3, 2005) (Maxwell Letter). 

Specifically, Henwood asked Maxwell to obtain the original 

receipts from the hotels or, alternatively, to supplement the

record with confirmation from each hotel manager that each 

receipt had been altered or was otherwise fraudulent. 

Interviews with managers and employees of the hotels for 

which Hampton submitted receipts revealed that the receipts 

were not valid. The interviews also revealed that Hampton 

USCA Case #11-5194 Document #1383483 Filed: 07/13/2012 Page 4 of 12
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threatened legal action against at least one hotel manager if he 

cooperated with CRS investigators. 

On April 25, 2006, Henwood recommended Hampton’s 

termination, sustaining four of the six charges set forth in

Miller’s termination proposal: Hampton (1) submitted false 

receipts for reimbursement; (2) failed to properly remit to 

USDA a credit issued by a hotel to his government-issued 

credit card; (3) failed to report all required financial interests; 

and (4) provided false information to CRS as part of an 

official investigation.3

 Henwood’s recommendation was then 

forwarded to the Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSGB).4

 3 Henwood did not sustain the charges that Hampton misused a 

government-issued credit card and used his government position for 

personal gain. 

 

After a hearing, the FSGB determined that the Department

had established cause for Hampton’s termination. On May 1,

4 With limited exceptions not relevant here, 22 U.S.C. § 4010(a) 

provides that 

whenever the Secretary decides . . . to separate, on 

the basis of misconduct, any member of the 

[foreign] service . . . who . . . is serving under a 

career appointment . . . , the member may not be 

separated from the Service until the member 

receives a hearing before the Foreign Service 

Grievance Board and the Board decides that cause 

for separation has been established, unless the 

member waives . . . the right to such a hearing.”

22 U.S.C. § 4010(a)(2)(A); see also 3 F.A.M. § 4365(a) (“A 

separation-for-cause hearing before the Foreign Service Grievance 

Board will be held . . . for those employees who are entitled to and 

do not waive such a hearing.”). 

USCA Case #11-5194 Document #1383483 Filed: 07/13/2012 Page 5 of 12
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2007, Henwood formally terminated Hampton’s 

employment.5

Hampton filed a formal complaint of discrimination with 

the Department on June 11, 2007. He then filed suit in the 

district court on December 6, 2007, alleging various claims 

under Title VII. On January 13, 2011, the district court 

granted the Department summary judgment on nine of 

Hampton’s ten counts, including his race discrimination 

claim.

 

6

Hampton timely appealed the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment and denial of reconsideration thereof. 

Hampton’s appeal “concerns only his allegation that race was 

a motivating factor in his termination.” Appellant’s Br. 3. 

 As the district court explained in its order denying 

Hampton’s motion for reconsideration, Hampton “failed [to]

raise a material dispute of fact as to whether USDA’s 

proffered reason for terminating [Hampton] (namely, that 

[Hampton] was found to have submitted falsified 

reimbursement requests) was pretextual.” Hampton v. 

Vilsack, 791 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2011). The district 

court concluded that despite the evidence of Miller’s racial 

slur, Miller’s involvement in Hampton’s termination was

“ ‘too remote, purely contingent, or indirect’ to constitute the 

proximate cause of the harm to [Hampton].” Id. at 168. 

(quoting Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192

(2011)). 

 5 The FSGB did not issue its final decision until June 2007. 

6 The district court denied summary judgment on Hampton’s 

claim that the Department retaliated against him by denying him a 

foreign assignment. Hampton and the Department eventually 

stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice on that claim. 

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II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Bush 

v. District of Columbia, 595 F.3d 384, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact.” McCready v. 

Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the 

evidence, “ ‘viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,’ ” could support a reasonable jury’s verdict for 

the non-moving party. Id. (quoting Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 

635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice 

for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise 

to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race [or] color.” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish an “unlawful 

employment practice,” it is sufficient that “race [or] color . . . 

was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 

though other factors also motivated the practice.” 

Id. § 2000e-2(m); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 

U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (to make out Title VII claim, “plaintiff 

need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

conclude . . . that race [or] color . . . was a motivating factor 

for any employment practice” (quotation marks omitted)). 

Where, as here, “an employee has suffered an adverse 

employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reason for the decision,” the district court 

must resolve one central question: Has the 

employee produced sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s 

asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the 

actual reason and that the employer 

USCA Case #11-5194 Document #1383483 Filed: 07/13/2012 Page 7 of 12
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intentionally discriminated against the 

employee on the basis of race [or] color?

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). 

In answering this question, sufficient evidence may 

include, inter alia, “ ‘(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) 

any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s 

proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further 

evidence of discrimination that may be available to the 

plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory 

statements or attitudes on the part of the employer).’ ” 

Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992-93 

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 

F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). Significantly 

here, “evidence of a subordinate’s bias is relevant where the 

ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the 

subordinate’s influence.” Griffin v. Washington Convention 

Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Hampton’s primary argument is that, because FAS policy

prevented Henwood from imposing a sanction more severe 

than the sanction Miller proposed, Miller’s alleged racial 

animus was a motivating factor in Henwood’s decision to 

terminate Hampton. While Miller’s proposed sanction 

created a ceiling on the sanction that Henwood could impose,

it did not create a floor. See 3 F.A.M. 4367(a) (if termination 

is proposed, deciding official “may decide to . . . [w]ithdraw 

the charges,” or “[a]dmonish,” “[r]eprimand,” “[s]uspend” or 

terminate the employee).7

 7 If the proposed sanction were either a reprimand or a 

suspension, it would also act as a ceiling—but not a floor—on the 

sanction the deciding official can impose. See 3. F.A.M. § 4345(a) 

(if reprimand is proposed, deciding official “will decide to . . . 

[w]ithdraw the charges,” or “[a]dmonish” or “[r]eprimand the 

That is, Henwood was free to 

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depart downward from Miller’s proposed sanction if he 

decided, based on his independent review of the evidence, 

that termination was unwarranted. Henwood concluded, 

however, that termination was warranted given “the nature 

and seriousness of the . . . [c]harges . . . and their relation to 

the duties and responsibilities of [Hampton’s] position.” 

Letter from Roy Henwood to Karl Hampton at 5 (Apr. 25, 

2006). As Henwood noted, Hampton’s position entails 

“work[ing] with little or no supervision and [having] 

extensive contact with the public” and “[t]herefore[] a great 

deal of trust is placed on [Hampton] and utmost integrity is 

expected.” Id. Because Hampton’s conduct made “the 

agency [] los[e] all faith and confidence that [Hampton] could 

be trusted to perform ethically or with good judgment,” 

Henwood concluded that termination was “a reasonable 

response to the sustained charges, and that [Hampton’s] 

removal will promote the agency’s efficiency of service.” Id.

Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Henwood’s

“stated reason [for terminating Hampton] was not the actual 

reason and that the [Department] intentionally discriminated 

against [Hampton] based on his race.”8

 

employee”); id. § 4355(a) (if suspension is proposed, deciding 

official “will decide to . . . [w]ithdraw the charges” or 

“[a]dmonish,” “[r]eprimand” or “[s]uspend the employee for a 

specified period of time not to exceed the period proposed”). 

 Brady, 520 F.3d at 

8 Although Hampton attempts to challenge before us the factual 

basis of the four charges that led to Henwood’s decision, see Reply 

Br. 15-19, his challenge is misplaced. In a Title VII action, “[t]he 

question [before us] is not whether the underlying . . . incident[s] 

occurred; rather, the issue is whether the employer honestly and 

reasonably believed that the underlying . . . incidents[s] occurred.” 

Brady, 520 F.3d at 496 (emphasis in original). It is undisputed that 

Henwood believed the underlying misconduct occurred. The 

FSGB’s determination that the Department established “by a 

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495. Assuming, as we must, that Miller’s April 2002 remark

manifested some racial animus toward Hampton, Hampton 

introduced no evidence that Miller’s animus infected 

Henwood’s recommendation or decision, made four and five 

years later, respectively. To begin with, Miller was in no way 

involved in the investigation of Hampton’s alleged 

misconduct. Although he formally initiated the investigation, 

he did so only after Lipscomb discovered the suspicious hotel 

receipt submitted by Hampton and after Henwood expressed 

his belief that CRS should investigate the matter. Miller Dep.

at 176-79. Lipscomb had had no dealings with Hampton 

before the events in this case, Hampton Dep. at 249; nor is 

there any evidence that Miller did anything but follow proper 

procedure in reporting Hampton’s misconduct to CRS, Miller 

Dep. at 178-79. After turning over the documents to 

Maxwell, he took no part in the investigation or in the 

preparation of the Report.

 

preponderance of evidence” that “[Hampton] commit[ed] the acts 

he is charged with” amply supports Henwood’s belief, Decision at 

3, FSGB, No. 2006-012 (June 6, 2007), and Hampton has offered 

no evidence “sufficient to show that [Henwood’s] conclusion was 

dishonest or unreasonable,” Brady, 520 F.3d at 496. 

If Hampton sought to attack the factual basis of the FSGB’s 

decision, he should have sought judicial review of that decision 

pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 4140(a). See 22 U.S.C. § 4140(a) (“Any 

aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of a final action of . . . 

the Board on any grievance in the district courts of the United 

States in accordance with the [judicial review] standards set forth in 

[the Administrative Procedure Act], if the request for judicial 

review is filed not later than 180 days after the final action of . . . 

the Board . . . .”); see also United States v. Paddack, 825 F.2d 504, 

508 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Any party aggrieved by a Board 

decision may obtain judicial review of that decision in the United 

States District Court, which reviews the Board’s decision under the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 706 [].” (citation omitted)). 

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Furthermore, the evidence is clear that Henwood—the 

deciding official—did not merely rely on Miller’s proposed 

sanction in deciding to terminate Hampton. Henwood 

conducted an independent review of the evidence. He 

provided Hampton an opportunity to respond in writing and 

orally to the proposed termination and he even ordered an 

additional investigation after Hampton raised several 

“reasonable questions” about the charges made against him at

the March 2005 hearing. Maxwell Letter. Ultimately, 

Henwood withdrew two of the charges that Miller had

proposed against Hampton: one for lack of evidence and the 

other based on evidence Hampton submitted. 

In sum, this is not a case in which the deciding official 

was “dependen[t] upon [a biased subordinate’s] opinion” or 

was “[unable] independently to assess” the basis for 

sanctioning an employee. Griffin, 142 F.3d at 1311. On the 

contrary, Henwood “made an independent assessment of 

[Hampton’s] conduct and concluded that [Hampton’s] 

violations of multiple [USDA] employment policies 

warranted his termination.” Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 

F.3d 1074, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1999). There is no evidence that 

Henwood “was in any way influenced by [Miller]” in 

reaching his decision to terminate Hampton. Vickers v. 

Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Willis v. 

Marion Cnty. Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 

1997) (“[W]hen the causal relationship between the 

subordinate’s illicit motive and the employer’s ultimate 

decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made 

on an independent and a legally permissive basis, the bias of 

the subordinate is not relevant.”); cf. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193 

(“[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action 

for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action 

. . . , then the employer will not be liable.”). Given 

Henwood’s authority to reduce Miller’s proposed sanction

and the absence of any evidence suggesting that Henwood’s

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termination decision was pretextual or that Henwood “[was] 

not insulated from [Miller’s] influence,” Griffin, 142 F.3d at 

1312, we believe that Hampton failed to produce sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was 

terminated because of racial discrimination. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to the Secretary. 

So ordered.

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