Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00351/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00351-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lassen Forest Preservation Group
Plaintiff
Quincy Library Group
Intervenor Defendant
Sierra Club
Plaintiff
Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign
Plaintiff
Sierra Pacific Industries
Intervenor Defendant
Laurie Tippin
Defendant
United States Forest Service
Defendant
Bernard Weingardt
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SIERRA NEVADA FOREST NO. CIV. S 06-00351 FCD DAD

PROTECTION CAMPAIGN, SIERRA

CLUB, and LASSEN FOREST

PRESERVATION GROUP,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

v.

LAURIE TIPPIN, in her official

capacity as Forest Supervisor

of the Lassen National Forest,

BERNARD WEINGARDT, in his

official capacity as Regional

Forester; and UNITED STATES

FOREST SERVICE,

Defendants.

___________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary

judgment filed by plaintiffs, Sierra Nevada Forest Protection

Campaign, Sierra Club, and Lassen Forest Preservation Group

(collectively “plaintiffs”), and defendants, Laurie Tippin,

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1 The following facts are undisputed, except where noted

to the contrary.

2

Bernard Weingardt, and the United States Forest Service

(collectively “defendants” or “Forest Service”). The court heard

oral argument from parties’ counsel on August 4, 2006. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. The Creeks Forest Health Recovery Project

The present controversy surrounds the Creeks Forest Health

Recovery Project (“the Project”), a resource management project

located within the Lassen National Forest, Almanor Ranger

District. (Pls.’ Resp. To Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(“DSUF”), filed July 21, 2006, ¶ 1). The Project area

encompasses approximately 33,000 acres and is located twelve

miles south of Chester, California, within Plumas County. (DSUF

¶ 2). 

As outlined, the Project includes various techniques for

resource management, including the construction of a strategic

system of fuel breaks called defensible fuel profile zones

(“DFPZs”), and two uneven-aged methods of timber harvest: group

selection and harvest by selection of individual trees. (DSUF ¶

4). DFPZs are a strategic system of linear fuelbreaks with open

forest cover and dominated by larger, fire-tolerant trees. (DSUF

¶ 4). The stated purpose of DFPZs is to create a system of

fuelbreaks to provide fire suppression personnel relatively safe

locations from which to take action against wildfires. (DSUF ¶

8). Group selection involves harvest of patches (.25 to 2 acres)

of forest for the purposes of regenerating uneven-aged stands and

promoting the growth of shade-tolerant trees. (DSUF ¶ 4). The

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stated purpose of group selection to achieve an all-age, multistory, fire-resilient forest while contributing to the local

economy through a sustainable output of forest products. (DSUF ¶

10). The stated purpose of individual tree selection is to lower

forest stand densities by removing small to intermediate-sized

trees in order to improve forest health, assist in the

maintenance of late-successional forest conditions, and assist

the DFPZs in creating a strategic network of areas with reduced

fuel concentrations where fire severity and spread would be

reduced. (DSUF ¶ 9). 

Specifically, the Project authorizes approximately 10,376

acres of logging, including 5,905 acres of DFPZs, 3,285 acres of

individual tree selection (area thinning), and 1,245 acres of

group selection treatments. (DSUF ¶ 6). In all treatment areas,

trees greater than 30 inches diameter at breast height (“dbh”)

would be retained, except where removal is required for

operability or safety reasons. (DSUF ¶ 6). In the group

selection areas, approximately 1,150 acres would be interplanted. 

(DSUF ¶ 6). Approximately 150 acres of group selection treatment

would be left to regenerate naturally. (DSUF ¶ 6). 

B. Regulatory Framework

Forest planning decisions are impacted by several

overlapping statutory and regulatory regimes.

1. National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et

seq., (“NEPA”), was enacted by Congress in 1969 to “declare a

national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable

harmony between man and his environment; promote efforts which

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will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment . . . [and]

to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural

resources important to the nation. . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 

Despite this ambitious declaration of purpose, NEPA has been

interpreted as essentially procedural. See Blue Mountains

Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.

1998)(noting that the purpose of NEPA is to ‘ensure a process,

not to ensure any result.’”). The NEPA process is designed to

“ensure that the agency . . . will have detailed information

concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees

that the relevant information will be made available to the

larger [public] audience.” Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d at 1212.

2. National Forest Management Act

The National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §

1604, et seq., (“NFMA”), requires the Secretary of Agriculture to

“develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource

management plans for units of the National Forest System.” 16

U.S.C. § 1604(a). The Forest Service, which manages the System,

develops land and resource management plans pursuant to the NFMA,

and uses these forest plans to “guide all natural resource

management activities,” including use of the land for “outdoor

recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and

wilderness.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1); 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b). In

developing forest plans, the Service must take both environmental

and commercial goals into account. See e.g., 16 U.S.C. §

1604(g); 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(a). 

Forest planning occurs at two levels: forest and project. 

At the forest level, the Forest Service develops a Forest Plan,

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which is a broad, long-term programmatic planning document for an

entire National Forest. Each Forest Plan includes goals and

objectives for individual units of the forest and provides

standards and guidelines for management of forest resources.

Consistent with its obligations under the NFMA, in 1993, the

Forest Service adopted the Lassen National Forest Land and

Resource Management Plan (the “Lassen LRMP”), which provides

standards and guidelines for project-level planning within the

Lassen National Forest. In 1999, the Forest Service adopted the

Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group (QLG) record of decision

(ROD) which amended the LRMP for the Lassen National Forest and

other national forests in the Northern Sierra Nevada. In 2001,

the Forest Service approved the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan

Amendment (SNFPA), also known as the Sierra Nevada Framework,

which amended the LRMPs for all national forests in the Sierra

Nevada (the “2001 Framework”). Finally, in 2004, the Forest

Service replaces the 2001 Framework with a new plan, referred to

as the 2004 Framework or 2004 Supplement, which also amended the

LRMPs for all Sierra national forests. Because the Project lies

within the Lassen National Forest, it must be consistent with the

1993 Lassen LRMP, as amended by the QLG ROD and the 2004

Framework.

C. History of the Creeks Forest Health Recovery Project 

The Forest Service initiated the scoping process for the

Project in June 2004. (Defs.’ Resp. To Pls.’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“PSUF”), filed June 26, 2006, ¶ 13). On June

4, 2004, a scoping letter, including a detailed description of

the proposed action and a map showing the location of the

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proposed action, was sent to interested parties. (DSUF ¶ 11). 

Plaintiffs submitted detailed comments in response, describing

the kind of information, analysis, and alternatives that should

be included in the environmental analysis for the project. (PSUF

¶ 13). On February 14, 2005, the Forest Service initiated a

second scoping process and announced that an Environmental Impact

Statement (“EIS”) would be prepared in connection with the

Project. (DSUF ¶ 12). Plaintiffs also submitted comments in

response to the second scoping period, in particular, urging that

the EIS consider all reasonable alternatives, including

alternatives that would protect trees 20" diameter and greater,

that maintain canopy cover at 50% or greater, and that is

consistent with the 2001 Framework. (PSUF ¶ 13).

In May 2005, the Forest Service issued a draft EIS (“DEIS”)

for the Project, including a proposed action. (PSUF ¶ 14; DSUF ¶

13). Other than the proposed action and “no action,” the DEIS

failed to consider in detail any alternatives. (PSUF ¶ 14). On

June 6, 2005, the Forest Service initiated a formal 30-day notice

and comment period on the Project DEIS by publishing a notice in

the Lassen County Times. (DSUF ¶ 13). Plaintiffs filed comments

on the DEIS, together with critiques from experts in the field of

wildlife biology and fire ecology. (PSUF ¶ 14). In their

comments, plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service had (1) failed

to disclose important information about environmental impacts;

(2) failed to analyze all significant issues; and (3) failed to

consider reasonable alternatives. (RSUF ¶ 14). Wildlife

biologists who reviewed the plan concluded that the Project would

adversely affect the spotted owl, marten, and fisher, potentially

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2 The stated purpose and need of the Project in the FEIS

is as follows:

1. Implementation of the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library

Group (“HFQLG”) Act , which requires the construction

of a network of DFPZs, group-selection timber harvest,

and individual tree selection (area thinning);

2. Implementation of a DFPZ as part of an extensive fuel

treatment network that is effective in reducing the

potential size of wildfires, and providing safe

locations for fire suppression personnel in the event

of a wildfire;

3. Implementation of individual tree selection (area

thinning) to promote forest health and provide an

uneven-aged structure to forested stands;

4. Implement of group selection as directed in the 1998

HFQLG Act to achieve desired future condition of allage, multistory, fire-resilient forests while

contributing to the local economy though a sustainable

output of forest products;

5. Implementation of economically efficient treatments to

reduce hazardous fuels and to contribute to community

stability; and

6. Providing the necessary access for the construction of

the DFPZs, group-selection timber harvest, and area

thinning, and to reduce impacts on the transportation

system.

(Creeks Forest Health Recovery Project FEIS (“FEIS”) provided in

the Creeks Forest Health Recovery Project Administrative Record

(CR), filed April 20, 2006, at 01867-68). 

3 Plaintiffs dispute that the Forest Service adequately

(continued...)

7

threatening the viability and distribution of these species. 

(RSUF ¶ 14). The Forest Service prepared a substantive response

to the comments received on the DEIS, which plaintiffs assert was

not legally adequate. (RSUF ¶ 15).

In September 2005, the Forest Service issued a record of

decision (ROD) and final EIS (“FEIS”) approving the Project. 

(PSUF ¶ 15; DSUF ¶ 16). The FEIS considered fourteen

alternatives to address the enumerated purpose and need2 of the

Project; three studies were considered in detail, while eleven

were considered but eliminated from detailed study.3 (DSUF ¶

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3(...continued)

considered reasonable alternatives. (DSUF ¶ 17).

4 On April 6, 2006, Sierra Pacific Industries (“SPI”)

moved to intervene as a defendant in this matter. On May 15,

2006, the court granted SPI’s motion to intervene only as to the

remedial issues in this case. (Mem. & Order, filed May 15, 2006,

Docket No. 23). However, on June 26, 2006, defendant-intervenor

SPI filed a 16-page brief, primarily addressing the merits of

plaintiffs’ claims. Because SPI’s role in this case is limited,

the court will not consider SPI’s briefing on issues relating to

the merits of the claim. However, the court will consider SPI’s

arguments that relate to the injunctive relief sought by

plaintiff, which are set forth in large part on pages 15-16.

8

17). The FEIS analyzed in detail a new alternative, Alternative

14, which differs in only minor respects from Alternative 1, the

proposed action in the DEIS. (PSUF ¶ 15). The FEIS failed to

consider in detail any alternative other then Alternative 14,

Alternative 1, and no action. (PSUF ¶ 15).

On September 9, 2005, Forest Supervisor Laurie Tippin signed

the record of decision (ROD) for the Project. The ROD implements

Alternative 14, as described in the FEIS, and sets forth the

rationale for the decision. (DSUF ¶ 19).

In November 2005, plaintiffs appealed the Project decision. 

(DSUF ¶ 20; PSUF ¶ 17). By letter dated December 19, 2005, the

Appeal Deciding Officer denied the appeals and affirmed the

Forest Supervisor’s decision to approve the Project. (DSUF ¶ 21;

PSUF ¶ 17). This decision constituted the final administrative

determination of the Department of Agriculture. (PSUF ¶ 17). In

January 2006, the Forest Service awarded three of four timber

sale contracts implementing the Creeks Project to Sierra Pacific

Industries.4 (DSUF ¶ 22).

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On February 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit

challenging the Project and seeking to have the Project set

aside. The parties agrees that “no logging or other ground

disturbing activities will occur to implement the Creeks Project

until 14 days after this Court issues a final judgment.” (DSUF ¶

22; PSUF ¶ 17). Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ decision to

approve the project is contrary to NEPA because the FEIS failed

to consider reasonable alternatives and failed to take a hard

look at significant environmental issues. Plaintiffs also assert

that the implementation of the Project violates NFMA because (1)

the conclusion that the Project will insure the viability and

distribution of old forest wildlife is based upon flawed analysis

and insufficient evidence and (2) the Forest Service failed to

obtain and analyze required wildlife monitoring data prior to

approving the Project. Defendants contend that the Project,

including the FEIS, fully complies with NEPA and NFMA. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962). If the moving party does not bear the burden of

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proof at trial, he or she may discharge his burden of showing

that no genuine issue of material fact remains by demonstrating

that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catret, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56

by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting

the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

Where as here, the court’s review is limited to the

administrative record, stipulated to by the parties, there are no

triable issues of fact, and summary judgment is appropriate. See

Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 18 F.3d

1468 (9th Cir. 1994).

B. Administrative Procedures Act

Under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), the court

may set aside a final agency action only where the action is

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise

in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. Review under the

APA is “searching and careful.” Ocean Advocates v. United States

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 361 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, the court may not substitute its own judgment for that

of the agency. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), overruled on other grounds by

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). In short, the court

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must ensure that the agency has taken a hard look at the

environmental consequences of its proposed action. Oregon

Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th Cir.

1997). As part of this inquiry, the court should ask “whether

the [] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant

factors and whether there has been a clear error in judgment.” 

Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1118. In addition, the court

determines “whether the agency articulated a rational connection

between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. at 1118-1119

(quoting Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. United States Fish and

Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs challenge defendants’ decision to implement

Alternative 14 of the Creeks Forest Health Recovery Project on

the basis that this decision violates the National Environmental

Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321, and the National Forest

Management Act (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1604. 

I. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

NEPA mandates that federal agencies prepare a detailed

Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for all “major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). These statements must

include a description and analysis of the environmental impact of

the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects that

cannot be avoided if the action is implemented, alternatives to

the proposed action, the relationship between short-term uses and

long-term productivity, and any irreversible or irretrievable

commitment of resources that would be involved is the action were

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5 Plaintiffs also assert that the FEIS failed to take a

hard look at fire and fuels issues and to disclose and respond to

contrary scientific information and opinion. Many of the

arguments that plaintiffs set forth in support of that assertion

overlap with the arguments made in support of the assertion that

defendants did not adequately analyze the range of reasonable

alternatives. As such, and for the reasons set forth herein, the

court does not separately analyze plaintiffs’ assertion that

defendants failed to take a hard look at fire and fuels issues. 

12

to be implemented. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442

F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)). 

“In short, NEPA requires that a federal agency ‘consider every

significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed

action’ and ‘inform the public that it has indeed considered

environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.’” Id.

(quoting Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002)). 

A. Failure to Analyze an Adequate Range of Alternatives5

Plaintiffs also challenge the adequacy of the FEIS,

asserting that it failed to address an adequate range of

alternatives. NEPA mandates that an agency consider and discuss

the range of all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action,

to “provid[e] a clear basis for choice among options by the

decisionmaker and the public.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. An agency

is not required to extensively analyze alternatives that do not

meet the purpose and need of the Project. Laguna Greenbelt, Inc.

v. United States Dept. of Trans., 42 F.3d 517, 523-525 (9th Cir.

1994). Nor, however, can the agency narrowly define its purpose

and need so as to winnow down the alternatives until only the

desired one survives. See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United

States Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 814 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1999)

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6 These citations are set forth as examples of the

similarities between the alternatives as illustrated by charts

which describe the effect of each alternative’s techniques on

treated stands within the Project area. These examples by no

means exhaust the examples of similarities between the

alternatives set forth in the FEIS.

13

(noting that, in the EIS context, “[o]ne obvious way for an

agency to slip past the strictures of NEPA is to contrive a

purpose and need so slender as to define competing reasonable

alternatives out of consideration. . . .”).

Here, the Forest Service evaluated three action alternatives

in detail: (1) no action, (2) Alternative 1, and (3) Alternative

14, which differs only in minor respects from Alternative 1 in

order to address connectivity concerns that may affect the

viability of the American marten. (CR 01869) The two

alternatives analyzed by the Forest Service are nearly identical,

as is evidenced by the fact that the Forest Service analyzes them

in tandem throughout most of the FEIS. (See, e.g., CR 01892-

01912; 01916-01920) Both proposals contain identical quantities

of DFPZs and area thinning. Alternative 14, however, provides

that 612 acres of DFPZ would be treated with Prescription E,

which would leave small “leave islands” up to 1/4 acre in size

untreated over approximately 20% of the treatment unites to

provide a greater component of small sized trees and stand

heterogeneity. The similarity between the two action

alternatives raises concern that the Forest Service may not have

taken the requisite hard look. (Compare CR 01929 with CR 01955;

compare CR 01933 with CR 01956; compare CR 01936 with CR 01957).6

Plaintiffs assert that defendants should have considered, in

detail, alternatives involving less intensive logging. 

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7 At oral argument, defendants also relied heavily on the

fact that the Project FEIS “tiers” to the 2004 Framework FEIS. 

However, while the court acknowledges that this tiering approach

is generally acceptable, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28, the ROD

implementing the 2004 Supplement provides that “[s]ite-specific

decisions will be made on projects in compliance with NEPA, ESA,

and other environmental laws following applicable public

involvement and administrative appeal procedures.” CR 00124, at

20; see Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1154. Further, site-specific

analysis and decisions are referred to consistently throughout

the ROD in the area of species conservation as well as in

relation to less-intensive logging measures. See e.g., CR 00124,

at 9-11, 17, 27.

8 For example, Dr. Dennis Odion, a fire ecologist at the

University of California, Santa Barbara, concluded that fuels

reduction goals can be met by logging only small trees and by

retaining greater canopy cover. CR 01836; see also 01830-32. 

While an appendix to the FEIS quotes his comments, neither the

appendix nor the text of the FEIS discusses the basis for his

scientific opinion or responds to the scientific information

provided. See Sierra Club v. Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078

(E.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that despite disclosure of expert

(continued...)

14

Specifically, plaintiffs assert that defendants should have

considered (1) at least one option that retained higher canopy

cover (e.g., 50%, rather than 30-40%); (2) at least one option

that did not direct logging of medium and large trees (e.g.,

trees larger than 12-20" diameter, rather than 30" diameter); and

(3) at least one option based upon the 2001 Framework. 

Defendants respond that while certain fuel reduction goals of the

project may be met be plaintiffs’ proposed alternatives, other

important goals of the project would not be met, such as

providing a safe place for fire-fighting personnel from which to

fight wildfire, and improving forest health and economic

efficiency.7 

1. Canopy Cover

Plaintiffs assert that numerous commenters on the DEIS,

including experts in fire ecology and wildlife biology,8 argued

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8(...continued)

comments and conclusions, including one from Dr. Odion, the

Forest Service failed to take a hard look because there was “no

indication that any views [] expressed contrary to the logging

proposed by the [project] were duly weighed”). 

15

that the Forest Service’s fuels objectives can be met with less

adverse impacts to old forest wildlife by retaining higher canopy

cover and urged that the Forest Service to consider such an

alternative in the EIS. However, in the FEIS, any alternatives

that provided for retaining more canopy closure was rejected.

The Forest Service’s stated reasons were that “the alternative

does not meet Purpose and Need Statements 1 through 3,” (CR

01913), and that to reduce canopy closure “any further would

compromise the effectiveness of the DFPZs,” (CR 01914). The

Forest Service provided no further explanation as to why canopy

closure would not meet the Purpose and Need statements or why

reduction would compromise the effectiveness of DFPZs. 

In their briefing, defendants assert that plaintiffs’

suggested canopy cover limits would prevent the Forest Service

from accomplishing its goal of promoting forest health because

high stand densities force individual trees to compete for

resources and are at risk for insect and disease outbreaks. As

an initial matter, this justification was not listed by the

Forest Service as a reason for rejecting the alternatives calling

for greater retention. See Motor Vehichle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S.,

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)

(“It is well established that an agency’s action must be upheld,

if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”). To

support their argument, defendants point to a number of pages in

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the FEIS, none of which were cited to or referenced in the FEIS

as an explanation why the alternatives were summarily dismissed

without detailed analysis. This runs contrary to the public

disclosure purpose of NEPA, which requires that “the public

receive the underlying environmental data from which a Forest

Service expert derived her opinion.” Ecology Center v. Austin,

430 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Idaho Sporting

Cong., 137 F.3d at 1150) (holding that the Forest Service

violated NEPA by failing “to either adequately explain its impact

assessment or provide the information that is necessary to

understand and evaluate the Forest Service’s decision”); see also

Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Native Ecosystems Council

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

that a review of the adequacy of an FEIS’s hard look includes “a

pragmatic judgment whether the [FEIS’s] form, content, and

preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed

public participation”) (emphasis added). 

Further, defendants citations to the administrative record

do not fully support their proposition. Defendants argue that

maintaining 50% canopy cover would result in excess crown bulk

density. However, plaintiffs point to evidence in the record

that stands logged to 50% canopy cover would on average result in

49% of maximum stand density after logging, CR 00858, which is

within the range of “desirable stand densities,” CR 01883. In

response, defendants point to evidence that thinning to 50%

canopy cover would retain undesirably high stand densities on

modeled stands. CR 00861. Given these conflicting conclusions

that could be reached based upon the agency’s own findings, how

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9 For example, Chad Hanson, a Ph.D student at the

University of California, Davis with a research focus on fire

ecology in forest ecosystems, cited specific research which

demonstrates that severe fire could be prevented by logging only

trees 8-10" in diameter. CR 01697-99. While an appendix to the

FEIS quotes his comments, neither the appendix nor the text of

the FEIS discusses the basis for his scientific opinion or

responds to the scientific information provided. See Sierra

Club, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. 

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can the Forest Service justify that “it was immediately clear”

that the proposed alternatives retaining higher canopy cover

would inhibit the goal of promoting a healthy forest? The Forest

Service offers no explanation for this conclusion. 

Finally, defendants’ arguments only address the alleged

insufficiencies of retaining 50% canopy cover, but do not address

why alternatives were not considered that retained higher canopy

cover than Alternatives 1 or 14, but less than 50%. The Forest

Service again offers no explanation for the failure to do so. 

In light of the above deficiencies, the court finds that

defendants have simply failed to adequately explain why the goal

of “forest health” justifies the wholesale rejection of all

alternatives involving retaining higher canopy cover. 

2. 12-20" dbh Limit

Plaintiffs also assert that various commenters and experts

argued that the Forest Service’s fuel objective could be met by

less intensive logging which would not log medium and large trees

(trees 12-20" dbh).9 However, in the FEIS, any alternatives that

provided for retaining medium and large trees was rejected. The

Forest Service’s stated reasons were that “the alternative does

not meet Purpose and Need Statements.” (CR 01912-13). The

Forest Service provided no further explanation.

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10 Because defendants failed to include these reasons in

the FEIS, these explanations suffer from the same problems as

those relating to canopy cover. See Motor Vehichle Mfrs. Ass’n

of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. at 50. 

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In their briefing,10 defendants assert that setting a 12"

dbh limit or 20" dbh limit would make it difficult to implement

the project in a cost-effective manner. In support of this

assertion, defendants point to the 2004 SNFPA, which modified the

2001 SNFPA to “improve the cost-effectiveness of treatments.” CR

124, at 9; CR 124, at 91 (“[E]xisting diameter limit restrictions

have significantly reduced managers’ ability to design and

implement cost-efficient fuels treatments.”). Yet nowhere in the

FEIS does the Forest Service provide any analysis regarding the

cost-effectiveness of each of the various alternative approaches. 

Rather, the Forest Service simply dismissed out of hand without a

reasoned explanation any proposal which would have called for a

lower diameter limit. This does not constitute a hard look at

reasonable alternatives. See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1089-90 (E.D. Cal.

2004).

3. 2001 Framework

Finally, plaintiffs assert that defendants should have

analyzed in detail an alternative that implements the 2001

Framework. Experts, including Dr. Tom Kucera, an expert cited by

the Forest Service in the FEIS, stated that this would be an

“obvious alternative that should be analyzed” because “[s]uch an

alternative would have a much less adverse impact on marten

populations and habitat connectivity while meeting the project’s

purpose and need.” CR 01775. In response, the FEIS states that

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“[t]he 2004 SNFPA ROD has superceded the 2001 SNFPA ROD. . . .

This alternative would not be consistent with the 1993 Lassen

LRMP, as amended by the 2004 SNFPA ROD.” CR 01912.

To the extent that defendants assert that the 2004 Framework

supercedes the 2001 Framework such that implementation of a plan

in accordance with the 2001 Framework would be inconsistent with

the 2004 Framework, they are mistaken. The 2004 Framework

amended the 2001 Framework to provide the Forest Service with

increased flexibility, but did not mandate more intensive logging

measures. CR 00119-20 (setting more flexible maximum guidelines

for logging, but not mandating minimum requirements). Further,

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), in its scoping

comments on a similar project in the Sierra Nevada, recommended

that the Forest Service include a comparison of the 2001

Framework and the 2004 Framework as well as an evaluation of an

alternative which would implement the 2001 Framework in the

environmental documentation. CR Supp. 05215. The stated reason

for these recommendations was the “on-going public debate . . .

regarding the scientific basis for; the fuel management,

environmental, and social benefits of; and the adverse effect

associated with the 2004 [Framework] versus the [2001

Framework].” CR Supp. 05215. As such, an alternative applying

the 2001 Framework would not necessarily be inconsistent with the

2004 Framework.

In their briefing, defendants argue that because the

plaintiffs focus on the retention of canopy cover and the 12-20"

dbh limit aspects of the 2001 Framework, this alternative is

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11 Because defendants failed to include these reasons in

the FEIS, these explanations suffer from the same problems as

those relating to canopy cover and dbh limits. See Motor

Vehichle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. at 50.

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merely a repackaging of plaintiffs previous two arguments.11 To

the extent that this argument has any merit, the court has found

that defendants failure to consider those alternatives violated

NEPA. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the Forest Service

arbitrarily and capriciously failed to analyze an adequate range

of alternatives or to explain sufficiently why other alternatives

would not accomplish the Project’s purpose and need. 

B. Failure to Take a Hard Look at Environmental Impacts

NEPA does not contain substantive environmental standards

but instead establishes procedural requirements to ensure that

agencies take a hard look at the environmental impacts of their

actions. Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1154 (citing Kern, 284 F.3d

at 1066). “A hard look includes ‘considering all foreseeable

direct and indirect impacts.’” Id. at 1159 (quoting Idaho

Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 973 (9th Cir.

2002)). A hard look also includes “a discussion of adverse

impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side effects.” 

Id. at 1159 (citing Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Forest Service,

therefore, must “undertake a thorough environmental analysis

before concluding that no significant environmental impact

exists.” Id. (citing Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1239). In

reviewing the adequacy of an EIS, the Ninth Circuit applies the

“rule of reason” standard, “which requires ‘a pragmatic judgment

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whether the EIS’s form, content and preparation foster both

informed decision-making and informed public participation.’” 

Native Ecosystems, 418 F.3d at 960 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Pursuant to NEPA, “[a]gencies shall insure the professional

integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and

analyses in environmental impact statements.” 40 C.F.R. §

1502.24. “Agencies have wide discretion in assessing scientific

evidence, but they must ‘take a hard look at the issues and

respond to reasonable opposing viewpoints.’” Earth Island, 442

F.3d at 1160. An agency must be permitted discretion in relying

on the reasonable opinion of its own qualified experts, even if

the court might find contrary views more persuasive. See Kleppe

v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). However, NEPA

does not permit an agency to rely on the conclusions and opinions

without providing both supporting analysis and date. Idaho

Sporting Cong., 137 F.3d at 1150. An agency must also evaluate

and disclose credible scientific evidence that contraindicates a

proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b).

1. American Marten 

Plaintiffs contend that the FEIS fails adequately to analyze

and disclose the project’s likely adverse impacts to the American

marten and its habitat. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the

FEIS fails to disclose new research that indicates that the

marten’s population in the northern Sierra is far more precarious

than assumed in the FEIS and that the FEIS fails adequately to

analyze and disclose the project’s adverse impacts to marten

habitat, particularly habitat connectivity.

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12 The FEIS also cites to previous research conducted by

Dr. Zielinski in its analysis of the marten and fisher.

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The FEIS provides that “marten appear to occupy much of its

historic range in California particularly in the Sierra Nevada.” 

CR 02047 (citing Kucera et al 1995). However, Dr. Thomas Kucera,

the same expert cited by the Forest Service, submitted comments

on the DEIS and FEIS, asserting that “the statement in the FEIS

is misleading and fails to recognize the marten’s imperiled

status in the area.” CR 03876. Kucera relies on a 2005 peer

reviewed paper by Forest Service carnivore expert Dr. William

Zielinski12 and an earlier 2004 paper by Zielinski that included

similar information. “The research concluded that the marten is

a species ‘with substantial changes in distribution,’ including

‘large gaps between contemporary detections that were not present

historically’ in the northern Sierra Nevada and southern

Cascades.” CR 03876 (citing Zielinski 2004, Zielinski et al.

2005a). The research also concludes that marten “populations in

the southern Cascades and northern Sierra Nevada now appear

discontinuous,” CR 03876 (citing Zielinski et al. 2005a: 1394),

and that “the apparent reduction in the range of the marten and

other forest carnivores is most likely due to a combination of

factors, including ‘loss of mature forest habitat,’” CR 03876

(citing Zielinkski et al. 2005a: 1385-86). Kucera summarizes

that this research indicates that the marten’s status in the

northern Sierra Nevada is precarious. CR 03876. The FEIS fails

to consider this research. 

Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s rule of reason standard, the

FEIS’s form, content and preparation should foster both informed

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13 Defendants also note that the paper cited to defendant

was published in August 2005, while the FEIS is dated September

14, 2005. The implication that the agency does not have to

consider “eleventh-hour” research to comply with NEPA is without

merit. Further, defendants do not address the 2004 research by

Zielinski that included similar information. 

Zielinsky’s 2004 research cited by plaintiffs is not

included in the administrative record. As such, the court will

not examine the research itself. However, the court will analyze

the research to the extent that it is referenced in Kucera’s

comments to the FEIS, which is included in the administrative

record. 

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decision-making and informed public participation. Native

Ecosystems, 418 F.3d at 960 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants, citing

CR 02047, argue that no new published data cited by plaintiffs

does not contradict the statement that the marten occupies most

of its historic range.13 However, the statement in the FEIS

would likely lead a reasonable person to believe that the marten

are not imperiled in the Sierra Nevada, specifically in light of

the absence of any reference to the 2004 or 2005 research

conducted by Zielinski. As such, the FEIS does not foster

informed public participation. This issue is also particularly

troubling because the expert cited by the Forest Service, Dr.

Kucera, maintains that the science relied upon is outdated and

the characterization is misleading. CR 03876. 

Defendants also contend that the FEIS analyzes ranger

district and Forest Survey records from within the Creeks project

area, sufficient to satisfy NEPA. However, defendants have

excluded from their analysis any reference to the most recent

research conducted by the very experts whose past opinions they

relied upon in formulating the FEIS. Further, the most current

research raises serious questions about the viability of the

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marten in the Project area. See Seattle Audobon Soc. v. Espy,

998 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the Forest

Service failed to take a hard look for purposes of NEPA where it

did not address in any meaningful way a report that concluded the

spotted owl was declining more substantially and more quickly

than previously thought). Therefore, because defendants failed

to address the most recent research regarding the viability of

the marten and because the exclusion of such reference is

misleading, defendants failed to take a hard look at the impact

of the project on the American marten and its habitat.

Plaintiffs also assert that defendants failed adequately to

analyze the impact of the project on habitat connectivity between

northern and southern marten populations. The FEIS acknowledges

that Alternative 1 would negatively affect marten habitat

connectivity, CR 2054, but provides that Alternative 14 includes

a new DFPZ Prescription (Prescription E) which will maintain

north-south habitat connectivity, CR 2062-65. Plaintiffs argue

that the FEIS is deficient because it fails to indicate where the

prescription will be applied and fails to provide any specific

information about the habitat quality. The FEIS provides that:

Prescription E combines a higher retention of canopy

(40-45% minimum) with untreated areas within 10% of the

stand and a higer retention of down logs (>12 inch

small end diameter) to improve conditions for subnivean

foraging and provided sufficient cover. These

prescriptions were placed strategically to link the

areas of highest habitat quality. This included areas

within the former habitat management area, linking

areas to the south (Storrie Fire area) to the higher

quality red fir and linkages from the Butt Creek

drainage north to the higher quality habitat identified

in Alternative 1. This alternative also maintains

existing linkages to the north and west within the

former HMA.

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14 Dr. Susan Britting, a biological consultant with a

Ph.D. in Biology from University of California, Los Angeles,

submitted a report establishing the overlap between the Project

and areas identifies by Zielinkski in his 2005 research as

important to fisher and marten conservation. CR 03900-04. 

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CR 02062. 

However, while the FEIS acknowledges that the Project would

create consequences to marten habitat connectivity, the Forest

Service failed to analyze Zielinsky’s research from both 2004 and

2005. Zielinksy’s 2005 report includes a map of marten habitat

in the Sierra Nevada’s, demonstrating that most of the treatments

in the Project area overlap with areas determined to have

moderate habitat suitability for marten. CR 03898, 03903. The

map also illustrates that the Project occurs within the area

directly between two areas of high quality marten habitat and

includes the best habitat between those areas. CR 3903. As

such, the research and expert analysis demonstrates that the

Project area likely plays an important role in ensuring northsouth habitat connectivity for marten and reducing the

possibility that marten populations to the north and south will

become isolated from one another. CR 3903. While Zielinsky’s

2005 study is included in the administrative record in this case,

along with analysis and comments by an expert,14 there is no

indication that this information was duly weighed in the FEIS. 

See Sierra Club v. Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078-79 (E.D.

Cal. 2004). 

The FEIS acknowledges that limits to the scientific

information available relating to the marten. CR 02047. Because

the Forest Service failed to analyze and evaluate the most recent

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scientific information on the marten, which was prepared by a

leading Forest Service expert and that offered more detailed

information relating to habitat connectivity issues implicated by

the Project, the court cannot find that the Forest Service

sufficiently evaluated the effects of the Project on habitat

connectivity. See Seattle Audobon Soc’y, 998 F.2d at 704 (“If

[the project] is based on an incomplete NEPA analysis of the

consequences continued logging will have on . . . old growth

dependant species’ viability over both the short and long term,

there will be a gap in planning that cannot be closed.”). 

Therefore, the court finds that the Forest Service abused its

discretion in failing to disclose and analyze this information

and thus, failed to take a hard look at the impact of the Project

on marten habitat connectivity as required by NEPA.

2. Pacific Fisher

Plaintiffs contend that the FEIS entirely failed to consider

the project’s impacts on the Pacific fisher and its habitat. 

Specifically, plaintiffs object to the finding in the FEIS that

“the project area provides little or no habitat potential for

this species therefore the project would have little or no affect

on the totality of habitat within its former range.” CR 02049. 

Plaintiffs assert that this conclusion is flatly inconsistent

with a recent analysis by leading Forest Service researchers,

specifically Zielinski, that indicates that the project area

provides moderate to moderately-high potential habitat for the

fisher. CR 03902. Defendants contend that Forest Service’s

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15 Defendants also contend that the predictive habitat

model relied upon by plaintiffs was not available during the

Project’s analysis and the utility and accuracy of the research

remains unknown. However, the research by Dr. Zielinksi, a

Forest Service expert relied upon throughout the FEIS for his

research on marten and fisher, is dated June 27, 2005, CR 03890,

whereas the Project was not approved until September 9, 2005. As

such, the court finds this argument unavailing. 

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conclusions regarding fisher are well-founded.15 Specifically,

defendants assert that the conclusion is supported by: (1) the

absence of some vegetative components favored by fisher; (2)

higher elevations of the project areas and deep winter snow packs

that persist for long periods; and (3) overlap with marten. CR

02048-49.

While defendants could have disclosed and examined the

recent research by Zielinski in the FEIS but chose not to, the

failure to do so was not an abuse of discretion. The research by

Zielinski referenced by plaintiffs was an exercise “designed to

identify general areas of for consideration” for fisher

conservation and reintroduction. CR 03894. However, Zielinski’s

research also provides that 

Regional marten habitat connectivity should also be

considered in selecting fisher conservation areas. For

example, if the Plumas County candidate site is used as

a fisher reintroduction location it would appear to be

more disruptive to the goal of martens maintaining

north-south continuity between the Sierra Nevada and

the Cascades.

CR 03894. Further, Zielinski’s research indicates that “[t]he

literature is replete with references to the potential for

negative competitive interactions between the [] fisher and the

[] marten, usually with the martens suffering from the

interaction.” CR 03890. Because Zielinski’s research states

that sites such as the Project area may not be suitable for

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fisher conservation or reintroduction due to the overlap with

marten and areas dedicated to maintaining habitat connectivity

for the marten, this research is not inconsistent with the Forest

Service’s conclusions set forth in the FEIS that the Project

would not impact fisher habitat due to overlap with the marten.

Plaintiffs also assert that the FEIS failed to take a hard

look at the impact of the project on the fisher because the

Forest Service’s conclusion is based upon the incorrect premise

that “fisher do not appear to overlap with marten.” Plaintiffs

contend that this conclusion is inconsistent with research from

the Sierra Nevada and elsewhere documenting that fisher and

marten can and do occur in the same area. CR 3879-80. However,

the FEIS acknowledges that “marten and fisher occasionally occupy

the same areas,” but notes that “in general there is very little

overlap of fisher sighting with those of marten.” CR 02048. 

Therefore, plaintiffs’ contention that the Forest Service relied

upon an incorrect premise is erroneous. 

The conclusion in the FEIS that the project area would not

impact fisher habitat is not premised on the conclusion that

fishers and martens cannot co-exist, but rather because of the

overlap between fisher and marten. Further, the recent Zielinski

research is not inconsistent with this conclusion. Thus, despite

defendants’ failure to analyze this data, the FEIS took the

necessary hard look at the Project’s impact on the Pacific fisher

and its habitat.

3. California Spotted Owl

Plaintiffs contend that the FEIS fails adequately to analyze

and disclose the project’s likely adverse impacts to the

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16 Dr. Jennifer Blakesly, holding a Ph.D. in Wildlife

Biology from Colorado State University, has conducted research on

northern and California spotted owls over the past 17 years. CR

03905.

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California spotted owl and its habitat. At the outset,

plaintiffs contend that the FEIS underestimates the owl’s

imperiled status in the project area. The EIS cites a 2003

analysis of owl population trends to support the conclusion that

spotted owl populations “are either stable or only slightly

declining.” CR 02012. However, plaintiffs point to the comments

and statistics submitted by Dr. Jennifer Blakesly,16 an expert

relied upon in the FEIS for her studies relating to the

California spotted owl, that demonstrate that the number of

territories within the Project area occupied by resident spotted

owls has declined from 11 in 1992 to 5-6 in 2002-2004. CR 03906. 

Blakesly describes this as an “alarming decline in the number of

owls within the Creeks project area.” CR 03906. However, the

FEIS does not evaluate this information in the FEIS.

Plaintiffs also attack the Project’s reliance on the minimum

threshold requirements for suitable habitat for the owl. 

Defendants argue that in all but two of the nest core areas

within or adjacent to the Project area, the Project will maintain

suitable habitat above the 50% threshold suggested by plaintiffs. 

However, defendants confuse the threshold minimums applied to owl

nest core areas and owl home ranges. 

With respect to owl home ranges - which are 4500 acre areas

surrounding the activity center - plaintiffs assert that the FEIS

inexplicably waters down a 50% standard and instead bases it

analysis on the assumption that 30% habitat within each home

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range is “the minimum threshold.” Defendants rely on a study

which sets a threshold of 30% to 50% suitable habitat in home

ranges to ensure long-term viability. CR 02022. Plaintiffs

contend that this same study was referenced in the 1999 QLG FEIS,

but in that case, a 50% minimum was used and therefore, to the

extent that defendants seek to use a lower threshold, it is

changing its methodology and needs to provide a rational

explanation for its change. See Native Ecosystems, 418 F.3d at

964. However, the Forest Service has not changed its underlying

methodology. The Forest Service continues to rely on the study

which sets a minimum percentage somewhere in the range of 30%-

50%. The Forest Service’s decision to use a 30% minimum in this

Project as opposed to a 50% minimum is not inconsistent with the

underlying study relied upon in the FEIS and does not require

further explanation. 

However, the Forest Service’s discretion to use a 30%

threshold for owl home ranges does not resolve the issue of the

minimum thresholds applied to owl nest core areas. With respect

to owl nest core areas – which are 500 acre areas surrounding the

activity center – the FEIS states that “Blakesly’s data indicates

that 50% habitat within the core area is an important threshold.” 

CR 02022. However, in her comment to the FEIS, Blakesly states

that “[t]his statement is completely erroneous.” CR 03905. 

Blakesly contends that her research has never indicated that

there is such a “critical threshold.” CR 03905. Further,

Blakesly provides that her data indicates that 83% suitable

habitat within nest core area is a reasonable minimum target, and

that anything less than 71% should be unacceptable as a

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17 Defendants cite: (1) Bull, E., 2005 Study of the

effects of thinning on Pileated Woodpecker (CR 02654), (2)

Robinson and Alexander, 2002 – Habitat Descriptions (CR 03441),

(3) Sauer et al. 1999 – Population trends (CR 03494), and (4)

local distribution data specific to the Lassen area (CR 02736). 

31

management target. CR 03905. There is no indication that the

Forest Service responded or weighed these comments. This is

particularly troubling where the expert, upon whose data the

Forest Service relies, submits that the Forest Service is

misinterpreting that data and that the conclusions reached by the

Forest Service are not supported by that data. Nor does the

Forest Service cite any other experts for its interpretation of

Blakesly’s data. CR 02022. Therefore, without offering a

rational explanation for its conclusion that Blakesly’s data

supports a 50% minimum threshold for owl nest core areas and

without a discussion of Blakesley’s assertion that the Forest

Service misstated and misapplied her data, the court cannot find

that the Forest Service took the requisite hard look at the

Project’s affect on the California spotted owl’s habitat.

4. Pileated Woodpecker 

Plaintiffs contend that the FEIS overlooked the Project’s

impact on the pileated woodpecker and its habitat. Specifically,

plaintiffs assert that the FEIS fails to offer a rational

explanation for its conclusion that the Creeks projects would

have no effect on the pileated woodpecker, despite the logging of

large snags and the reduction of future recruitment of such

snags. Defendants contend that a wide range of recent research

was used to develop the conclusions in the FEIS17 and that while

plaintiffs may disagree with the conclusions reached, the agency

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was within its discretion to adopt the research and findings of

its experts. 

The FEIS acknowledges that the “current snag densities are

below the Forest Guidelines” and that “there would be a general

reduction in the number of snags within the areas treated.” CR

02006, 02008. However, the FEIS predicts that after the initial

small drop in the overall percentage, snags and snag numbers

“would continue to increase within the project area due to

natural recruitment process.” CR 02008. The FEIS also predicts

that “down wood material are expected to increase within the

project area over time” and that “large wood recruitment [] would

increase due to project activities.” CR 02008. In analyzing the

Project’s impact on the pileated woodpecker, the FEIS again

states that most lands within the project area would not meet the

criteria for high or moderate quality habitat “due to the snag

densities and age and size class of the stands.” CR 02081. To

the extent that there are lands that would meet fall into the

moderate to high quality suitability category, the Forest Service

relied upon a 2005 study by Bull, which concluded “that fuels

reduction projects do not necessarily preclude use by pileated

woodpecker, if sufficient down wood and snags are retained.” CR

02082. The Forest Service concluded that “[b]ased upon the data

supplies, the snag and down log retention guidelines are expected

to retain sufficient foraging substrates as described by Bull.” 

CR 02082. 

Plaintiffs argue that a recent study on landbirds in the

Lassen area, commissioned by the Forest Service, recommended that

“as many snags as possible” be retained, with an “absolute

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18 While agencies are entitled to deference to their

interpretation of their own regulations, Forest Guardians v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003), that deference

must give way when the agency’s interpretation of its regulation

runs counter to the governing statute. See Auer v. Robbins, 519

U.S. 452, 457 (1997). 

19 The Ninth Circuit has recently held that “NFMA

(continued...)

33

minimum” of 4 snags/acre with “priority given to the largest

ones.” CR 5270. However, the FEIS does address the issue of

maintaining minimum snag requirements, but concludes that “it is

more important to ensure that a landscape has continual snag

replacement as opposed to direction that requires a set number of

snags within a given area.” CR 02008. 

Therefore, because defendants’ conclusion that the Project

would not affect the pileated woodpecker is supported by expert

studies, and because defendants’ considered a minimum snag

requirement (although ultimately rejecting it), the FEIS took the

requisite hard look at the Project’s impact on the pileated

woodpecker. 

II. National Forest Management Act

Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the Project violates

the National Forest Management Act in that it is inconsistent

with the Lassen LRMP, as amended. As an initial matter, the

parties dispute which regulations apply to the Project. 

Defendants assert that the 1982 regulations do not apply because

these regulations were repealed on January 5, 2005 and replaced

by new planning regulations.18 While that is generally true, the

Project continues to be governed by the 1982 regulations because

the Lassen LRMP was prepared under the 1982 regulations,19 and

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19(...continued)

regulations promulgated in 1982 apply to the 2001 Framework and

2004 Supplement.” Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1173. 

34

thus, those regulations continue to govern all management of the

Lassen National Park until a new LRMP is passed under the 2005

regulations. Idaho Wildlife Fed’n v. Tower, No. CV 04-371, 2006

WL 988494, at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 13, 2006) (citing Utah Envtl.

Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2006) (“stating

that 1982 regulations extend beyond preparation of LRMP and

‘continue [] throughout the [LRMP’s] existence’”)). The Forest

Service cannot later dilute its obligations, including monitoring

designated management indicator species (“MIS”), “by passing new

regulations without also amending the LRMP that relied on the

greater obligations. . . . That would violate a cardinal

principle of NFMA that the management of an area be consistent

with its LRMP.” Id. (citing Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430

F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, the court will apply the

1982 regulations. 

A. Viable, Well Distributed Populations of Wildlife

Plaintiffs contend that the Project fails to insure viable,

well-distributed populations of the California spotted owl and

the American marten. The regulations that applied when the

Forest Service adopted and amended the Lassen National Forest

plan require that: 

Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain

viable populations of existing native and desired nonnative vertebrate species in the planning area. For

planning purposes, a viable population shall be

regarded as one which has the estimated numbers and

distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its

continued existence is well distributed in the planning

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areas. In order to insure that viable populations will

be maintained, habitat must be provided to support, at

least a minimum number of reproductive individuals and

that habitat must be well distributed so that those

reproductive individuals can interact with others in

the planning area.

 

36 C.F.R. § 219.19. This regulation has been interpreted to

require that the Forest Service “ensure a proposed action will

not cause a loss of viability of an existing species.” Inland

Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service, 88

F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, the ROD implementing the

2004 Framework provides that management direction strategy is

“aimed at sustaining viable populations of at-risk species

associated with old-forest ecosystems well-distributed across

Sierra Nevada national forests.” CR 00082. 

In this case, the Forest Service concluded that the Project

“may affect individuals, but is not likely to result in a trend

toward Federal listing or loss of viability” for the California

spotted owl or the American Marten. CR 00752. Defendants assert

that this finding is well supported in the Biological

Evaluation/Biological Assessment (“BE/BA”) of the Project. In

support of this assertion, defendants reassert the same arguments

that they made in relation to plaintiffs’ claims that the Forest

Service failed to take a hard look at the Projects impact on the

owl and the marten in violation of NEPA. As set forth above in

the court’s analyses of this issue, defendants failed to take a

hard look at the effect of the Project on the marten, its

habitat, and habitat connectivity because the Forest Service

failed to evaluate the most current research on the marten. Cf.

Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d

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754, 762 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We believe that an analysis that uses

all the scientific data currently available is a sound one.”). 

Also, as set forth above, defendants failed to take a hard look

at the effect of the Project on the spotted owl through the

failure to address conflicting information about the current

status of the owl and through the failure to provide a rational

explanation for the use of a 50% threshold for owl nest core

areas. Because the Forest Service failed to consider scientific

data currently available in relation to the marten and failed to

adequately explain its conclusions in relation to the spotted

owl, the court cannot be reasonably certain that the Project –

which the Forest Service concedes may harm individual martens and

spotted owls - will not jeopardize the marten’s and spotted owl’s

viability. See Ecology Center v. Austin, 430 F. 3d 1057, 1068

(9th Cir. 2005) (“Because the Forest Service failed to provide

the factual basis for its analysis and failed to adequately

explain its decision, we cannot be reasonably certain that the

salvaging . . . will not jeopardize . . . viability.”). 

B. Surveys of Management Indicator Species

According to plaintiffs, the Forest Service violated the

NFMA’s viability and diversity requirements by not conducting

population surveys of Management Indicator Species (“MIS”). As

set forth above, the NFMA regulations promulgated in 1982 apply

to the 2001 Framework and 2004 Supplement. See Earth Island, 442

F.3d at 1173. These regulations require population monitoring. 

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20 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) provides: “In order to

estimate the effects of each alternative on fish and wildlife

populations, certain vertebrate and/or invertebrate species

present in the area shall be identified and selected as

management indicator species and the reasons for their selection

will be stated. These species shall be selected because their

population changes are believed to indicate the effects of

management activities.”

37

See 36 C.F.R. § 219.20 “Because the 2001 Framework and 2004

Supplement were developed based on regulations in effect before

November 9, 2000, transitional rules, not contained at 36 C.F.R.

§ 219.14, govern this case.” Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1173-74. 

The applicable regulation provides:

For units with plans developed, amended, or revised

using the provisions of the planning rule in effect

prior to November 9, 2000, the Responsible Official may

comply with any obligations relating to management

indicator species by considering data and analysis

relating to habitat unless the plan specifically

requires population monitoring or population surveys

for the species. 

36 C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (emphasis added); Earth Island, 442 F.3d at

1174. Rather than monitor every species present within a project

area, agencies may monitor the MIS, which act as proxies for all

species within a species association, to determine whether the

agencies are satisfying the NFMA’s viability and diversity

requirements. Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “An MIS

species is a bellwether, or class representative, “for other

species that have the same special habitat needs of population

characteristics.” Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1173 (quoting Inland

Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 762

n.11 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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21 Defendants vigorously contend that population

monitoring is not required and that Earth Island was wrongly

decided. However, the Forest Service’s petition for rehearing en

banc in that case was denied on July 12, 2006.

38

Appendix E to the 2001 Framework identifies certain species

as MIS species, for which increased population monitoring is

required, and this framework is incorporated into the 2004

Supplement. CR 00121 (“This Decision adopts the Monitoring Plan

presented in Appendix E of the SNFPA FEIS.”); Earth Island, 442

F.3d at 1173. The designated MIS listed in Appendix E include

the pileated woodpecker and the black bear. The 2001 Framework

requires “distribution” monitoring for these species, Id. at E64, which is defined as data indicating “changes in the presence

of species across a number of sample locations” which are

designed to reveal “the status and change of populations” of the

species. Id. at E-19. Appendix E to the 2001 Framework also

provides that the Forest Service “will monitor the status and

change in the geographic distribution of martens . . . .

Monitoring the presence/absence of martens, across large areas

that are differentially affected by treatments,” was planned in

order to “provide information that will inform future decisions

about management.” CR 42, Vol. 4, App. E at E-56. The Framework

also states that “[b]ecause we do not yet have an empirical

habitat model that can distinguish suitable from unsuitable

habitat, it is necessary to monitor martens directly.” Id. 

As an initial matter, plaintiffs assert that the Ninth

Circuit has held in almost identical circumstances that annual

monitoring of MIS was required.21 In Earth Island, the court

analyzed the same 2001 Framework and 2004 Framework at issue in

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this case. 442 F.3d at 1175. The plaintiffs in Earth Island

challenged the Forest Service’s decision not to conduct

population monitoring of the hairy woodpecker and Williamson’s

sapsucker. Id. Both of these species were listed as MIS in

Appendix E and were designated to be monitored in the form of

“distribution data.” Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that “the

Framework expressly requires ‘population monitoring,’

specifically in the form of ‘distribution data’” and that “[i]t

is difficult to see how distribution data could effectively be

gathered in the absence of actual population monitoring.” The

court therefore rejected that Forest Service’s argument that it

was under no obligation to determine population trends for the

two species at issue and held that the Forest Service’s approval

and implementation of site-specific projects without appropriate

or sufficient population and habitat data is contrary to the NFMA

and governing provisions of the forest plan. Id. at 1175-76. 

In this case, Appendix E of the 2001 Framework, incorporated

into the 2004 Framework, requires “population monitoring” of both

the pileated woodpecker and the black bear in the form of

“distribution data.” Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Earth Island, the Forest Service has an obligation to determine

population trends for the pileated woodpecker and the black bear. 

Likewise, because the 2001 Framework requires that the Forest

Service monitor the status and change of the American marten, and

provides even greater detail as to why and how the marten should

be monitored, the Forest Service has an obligation to determine

population trends for the American marten.

///// 

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Plaintiffs contest the Forest Service’s decision not to

acquire annual monitoring and population trend data for the

marten, the pileated woodpecker, and the black bear, in

preparation for the Project. Instead, the Forest Service

analyzed marten habitat as a proxy for marten population,

migratory monitoring information and Wildlife Service’s Breeding

Bird Survey (“BBS”) data as a proxy for woodpecker monitoring,

and California Fish and Game data as a proxy for bear monitoring. 

Parties disagree as to whether the data evaluated by the Forest

Service is sufficient. Plaintiffs assert that this information

is inadequate to satisfy defendants’ obligations because “the

Forest Service has cobbled together bits and pieces of

information regarding the population or distribution of MIS,

gathered at different geographic scales and intensities and by

different agencies and organizations.” (Pls.’ Opp’n, filed July

21, 2006, at 18-19). 

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a) to

permit use of habitat as a proxy for population surveys in

certain circumstances. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 761. In Inland

Empire, the court confronted a challenge to the Forest Service’s

proposed timber sale in the Kootenai National Forest in

northwestern Montana. In evaluating the effect of the Project on

species viability within the Project area, the Forest Service did

not conduct population surveys. Rather, it “examined each

proposed alternative to see how many acres of each type of

relevant habitat would remain after timber was harvested,” and

concluded that “a species would remain viable as long as the

threshold percentage of each type of habitat remaining in the

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chosen alternative was greater than the percentage required for

that species to survive.” Id. at 759-760. The court recognized

that such an approach “necessarily assumes that maintaining the

acreage of habitat necessary for survival would in fact assure a

species’ survival.” Id. at 761. However, the court found the

assumption “eminently reasonable” and concluded that the habitat

analysis as a proxy for population surveys was not arbitrary and

capricious. Id. Similarly, in Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas,

the Ninth Circuit upheld use of habitat as a proxy for population

where the Forest Service performed further analysis that

demonstrated the Project would result in “no appreciable habitat

disturbance.” 137 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Court confronted the proxy on proxy issue again in Idaho

Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.

2002). Distinguishing both Inland Empire and Thomas, the

Rittenhouse Court held that use of habitat as a proxy was

inappropriate in that case because the methodology used for

monitoring habitat was unsound. Id. at 972. Specifically, the

court noted that the Forest Service’s methodology for identifying

old growth habitat was demonstrably inaccurate and could not

“reasonably ensure viable populations of the species at issue.” 

Id. 

1. American Marten

Plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service has failed to

gather and analyze adequate monitoring data for the American

marten. The FEIS states that marten data was obtained by placing

baited camera stations in a designated grid pattern and that

twenty-three camera stations have been places in various

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locations throughout the project area from 1996. CR 02047. 

However, the most recent survey work was completed in 2003. CR

02047. Further, the FEIS explicitly states that the 

[s]urveys only offer presence data and cannot provide

any estimation of population numbers, reproductive

success, or territorial data. Therefore, assumptions

on the status of the local population, other than to

say that marten are present throughout the project

boundary, cannot be made.

CR 02048. Because the Framework requires that the Forest Service

“monitor the status and change in the geographic distribution of

martens,” the statement in the FEIS that the data gathered and

analyzed by the Forest Service cannot provide population numbers,

reproductive success, territorial data, or even status of the

local population severely undermines the assertion that the

Forest Service adequately monitored the marten population. Based

upon this lack of information, the Forest Service cannot

“reasonably ensure viable populations of the species at issue.” 

As such, the Forest Service failed to satisfy the requirements

for population monitoring for the American marten. 

2. Pileated Woodpecker

Plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service has failed to

gather and analyze adequate monitoring data for the pileated

woodpecker. Specifically, plaintiffs point to the section of the 

FEIS which states that “[t]here is no local data on population

numbers.” CR 02090. 

Defendants argue that the data for the pileated woodpecker

is sufficient to serve as a proxy for population monitoring

because the Forest Service relies on BBS data as well as landbird

monitoring being completed by the Point Reyes Bird Observatory

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22 When confronted with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion

that BBS data was insufficient to meet the population monitoring

requirement in Earth Island, the defendants again asserted that

they believed the case was wrongly decided. However, this court

is not free to disregard Ninth Circuit precedent merely because

defendants disagree with it.

43

(“PRBO”). In regards to the sufficiency of the BBS data, the

Ninth Circuit has previously held that “BBS data alone cannot

satisfy the population monitoring requirement.” Earth Island,

442 F.3d at 1176. In this case, the Forest Service’s reliance on

BBS data is particularly problematic because the data tracks the

national population from 1966-1999. CR 02080.22 In regards to

the sufficiency of the PRBO data, the information was derived

from 10 transects of various lengths within the proposed

treatment area from which point counts are taken and all birds

heard within 50 meters are noted. CR 02068. However, despite

this methodology and information acquired, the FEIS still

concedes that “[t]here is no local data on population numbers.” 

CR 02090. As such, the court cannot conclude that the Forest

Service “reasonably ensure[d] viable populations” of the pileated

woodpecker. 

Defendants also assert that the Forest Service perfomed a

detailed analysis of snags in the project area, a habitat

attribute essential for woodpeckers. CR 02006-10. However, the

pages of the FEIS cited by defendant discuss only the effect of

the project on “selected vegetative decadence,” but do not

discuss its relationship to the pileated woodpecker. Therefore,

the court cannot conclude that the analysis of snags performed by

the Forest Service adequately substituted for the required

population monitoring. See Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1175 (“It

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is difficult to see how distribution data could effectively be

gathered in the absence of actual population monitoring.”). 

3. Black Bear

Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service has failed

to gather and analyze adequate monitoring data for the black

bear. Specifically, plaintiffs point to the section of the FEIS

that states that “little data is available on the current status

of the bear.” CR 02074

Defendants argue that the data analyzed relating to the

black bear is a sufficient proxy for population data because the

FEIS incorporates data from the California Department of Fish and

Game. Specifically, the FEIS provides that “[p]resently the

statewide population is believed to be between 25,000 and 30,000"

in comparison to between 10,000 and 15,000 in 1982. CR 02074

(emphasis added). The FEIS also provides that “[t]he Department

of Fish and Game estimates that within Plumas County bear

populations average .5 to 1.0 bear per square mile.” CR 02074

(emphasis added). 

Defendants data is insufficient to serve as a proxy for

population monitoring. First, the FEIS explicitly states that

the population numbers set forth by the California Department of

Fish and Game are beliefs and/or estimate about the current

status of black bears statewide and specifically within the

Project area. Second, the FEIS sets forth no information

regarding the methodology used to obtain this data. Finally,

defendants fail to offer any analysis or factual basis for

determining the quantity or quality of suitable habitat. 

/////

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23 However, defendant-intervenor SPI asserts that “unusual

circumstances” exist in this case because it has been awarded

timber sale contracts in relation to the implementation of the

Project. However, SPI cites to no applicable cases where a court

(continued...)

45

Therefore, the Forest Service’s analysis does not satisfy the

population monitoring requirement of the NFMA. 

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Forest Service’s

approval of the Project without appropriate or sufficient

population and habitat data for the American marten, the pileated

woodpecker, and the black bear is contrary to the NFMA and

governing provisions of the forest plan.

III. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Forest Service from

implementing the Project until the Forest Service complies with

NEPA, NFMA, and the Lassen LRMP. To determine whether injunctive

relief is appropriate, the court applies the traditional balance

of harms analysis. National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.

Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Forest

Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489,

1496 (9th Cir. 1995). “Environmental injury, by its nature, can

seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often

permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable.” Id.

(quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542

(1987)). “If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the

balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction

to protect the environment.” Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545. Further,

the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that “absent ‘unusual

circumstances,’23 an injunction is the appropriate remedy for

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has denied injunctive relief in an environmental case based upon

the award of timber sale contracts. Defendant-intervenor cites

to the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the denial of

injunctive in Forest Guardians v. Dombeck, 131 F.3d 1309 (1997). 

However, in Forest Guardians, plaintiffs sought to retroactively

apply amendments to the applicable Land and Resource Management

Plan, and the court held that the Forest Service did not err in

applying the old standards to prior existing agreements and

applying the new standards to new authorizations, contracts, and

permits. In this case, plaintiffs seek to enforce federal

statutes, specifically NEPA and NFMA, that were applicable when

the contracts were awarded to SPI. As such, Forest Guardians is

inapplicable. 

Further, based upon Ninth Circuit precedent relating to the

weight given economic harm in an environmental case, the court

finds SPI’s argument unavailing.

Federal defendants also assert that they should be allowed

further proceedings to present evidence that “unusual

circumstances” weigh against injunctive relief. (Mem. P.&A. in

Supp. of Federal Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed June 26, 2006,

at 7 n.3). However, when asked at oral argument what “unusual

circumstances” they referred to, federal defendants deferred to

SPI’s counsel to present argument.

Federal defendants also request additional proceedings to

present evidence to assist the court in fashioning the

appropriate scope of any injunctive relief awarded. However,

when asked at oral argument how relief might be shaped, federal

defendants offered no suggestions or insight into how they might

assist the court. 

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violation of NEPA’s procedural requirements.” Thomas v.

Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 2985) (citing Save Our

Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984); Alpine

Lakes Protection Soc’y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.

1975); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1971)).

In this case, the record demonstrates that it is

sufficiently likely that implementation of the Project will cause

irreparable harm to old forests through the unnecessary cutting

of trees that might otherwise survive. See Earth Island, 442

F.3d at 1177. The record also demonstrates that the Project will

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expressed concern over “a disturbing trend in the Forest

Service’s recent timber-harvesting and timber-sale activities,” 

Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1177-78 (collecting cases), observing

that, in many recent cases analogous to this case, the Forest

Service “appears to have been more interested in harvesting

(continued...)

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likely cause irreparable harm to the wildlife that inhabit the

project area, including the California spotted owl and the

American marten.

In light of the above finding of potential irreparable harm

to the environment, the balance of hardships tips in plaintiffs’

favor. Defendant-intervenor SPI argues that it will suffer

economic losses by enjoining the Project, and thus, the timber

sales. SPI also argues that curtailments and layoffs will likely

occur at its Quincy sawmill and cogeneration facility. (Decl. Of

Mark Bosetti in Supp. of SPI’s Mem. of P.&A., filed June 26,

2006, ¶ 5). The court is not unmindful of the adverse economic

consequences that can result when environmental laws are

violated. Such consequences may include loss of revenues to both

the government and private business. Importantly, workers, their

families, and the community also may be adversely affected by a

finding that the Forest Service has failed to abide be the legal

requirements of NEPA and NFMA. Nevertheless, the “loss of

anticipated revenues . . . does not outweigh the potential

irreparable damage to the environment.” Babbitt, 241 F.3d at

738; Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1177. The Ninth Circuit has noted

“the importance of preserving the public’s interest in

‘preserving precious, unreplenishable resources.’” Earth Island,

442 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Earth Island, 351 F.3d at 1309).24 

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timber than in complying with our environmental laws.” Id. at

1178.

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The environment is a vital constituent public interest that must

be recognized and protected by federal law even in the face of

adverse economic consequences. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the court finds the following:

(1) The Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to analyze

an adequate range of alternatives, particularly

alternatives involving less intensive logging. 

(2) The Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to take a

hard look at the Creeks Forest Health Recovery

Project’s impact on the American marten and the

California spotted owl.

(3) The Forest Service violated NFMA by failing to insure

viable, well-distributed populations of the American

marten and the California spotted owl. 

(4) The Forest Service violated NFMA by approving the

Project without appropriate or sufficient population

and habitat data for the American marten, the pileated

woodpecker, and the black bear.

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Based upon the above findings, the court hereby enjoins the

Forest Service from implementing the Creeks Forest Health

Recovery Project until and unless the Forest Service complies

with NEPA, NFMA, and all applicable laws, and an EIS is prepared

in conformity with NEPA and NFMA. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 16, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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