Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03141/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Myron A. Gladney
Appellant
William Pollard
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 13-3141 

MYRON A. GLADNEY, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

WILLIAM POLLARD, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 13-C-805 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 26, 2015 

____________________ 

Before BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS, 

District Judge.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Myron Gladney challenges his 1996 Wisconsin conviction for murdering Christopher Wilson. At trial, Gladney did not dispute that he inten-

 The Honorable Sara L. Ellis, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 13-3141 

tionally killed Wilson, but he argued unsuccessfully that he 

should not be found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide because he acted in what Wisconsin calls “imperfect 

self-defense.” Imperfect self-defense, unlike perfect selfdefense, does not serve as a complete defense to the charge 

of first-degree intentional homicide but instead mitigates 

that charge down to second-degree intentional homicide. 

Over a decade later, Gladney filed a federal petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging 

that (1) his due process rights were violated because subsequent state case law cast doubt on whether he was convicted 

under the correct imperfect self-defense standard and (2) his 

trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to interview a witness who would have corroborated his selfdefense theory. The district court concluded that the petition 

was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and rejected 

Gladney’s theory that the statute of limitations did not apply 

to his claims because he has demonstrated actual innocence. 

We affirm. Gladney’s federal petition was filed far too 

late. Even if the limitations period could have been tolled 

until Gladney found out about his counsel’s failure to interview the witness, his petition would still have been filed well 

outside the adjusted limitations period. Gladney’s attempt to 

invoke the narrow actual innocence exception to disregard 

the time limits for seeking federal habeas relief, see Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), is not persuasive. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

Gladney killed Wilson in August 1996 when Gladney 

confronted Wilson about money Wilson owed him. According to Gladney, Wilson had robbed him at gunpoint several 

weeks earlier during a dice game. Gladney and Wilson knew 

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No. 13-3141 3

each other prior to the robbery, so Gladney thought he 

would try to talk to Wilson about getting his money back. 

When Gladney ran into Wilson one week after the robbery, 

Wilson promised to return the money. When Gladney met 

up with him two weeks after that, however, Wilson had 

changed his mind and refused to honor his earlier promise. 

Wilson’s refusal to pay led to an argument that escalated 

quickly. Gladney testified that he hoped to end the argument 

and turned away from Wilson. But as he was doing so, he 

decided to take out his gun and hold it by his side. When 

Gladney was distracted by a car horn, Wilson rushed him 

and grabbed his wrist. They struggled for the gun. During 

that struggle, Gladney was shot in the arm, but he also shot 

Wilson multiple times, killing him. 

The State charged Gladney with first-degree intentional 

homicide. At trial, Gladney did not argue that he had not intentionally shot and killed Wilson. He argued instead that he 

should not be found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide because he acted in self-defense. Gladney testified at 

trial that he shot Wilson because he feared Wilson would 

gain control of his gun and kill him. Gladney argued that he 

had been particularly afraid given Wilson’s reputation for 

violence and the earlier armed robbery. The jury rejected the 

self-defense theory and found Gladney guilty of first-degree 

intentional homicide. The court sentenced Gladney to life in 

prison without parole for a minimum of seventy-five years. 

Over a decade later, and long after the first round of postconviction review was complete, Gladney seeks postconviction relief based on two developments that took place 

after his conviction became final. First, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Carl CalCase: 13-3141 Document: 35 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 18
4 No. 13-3141 

houn, a man who had also been present at the robbery and 

could have corroborated Gladney’s claim that Wilson had 

robbed him. Gladney claims he did not learn of his counsel’s 

failure to interview Calhoun until 2010 when he happened 

to run into Calhoun in prison. At this chance meeting, Gladney asked Calhoun why he did not testify about the robbery 

at his trial. Calhoun explained that he had never been contacted by Gladney’s lawyer. 

Second, after Gladney’s conviction became final, Wisconsin modified the standard for “imperfect self-defense,” 

which can transform first-degree intentional homicide into 

second-degree intentional homicide with a much less severe 

sentence. Gladney presents this as a federal claim that his 

conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment because the State was permitted to convict him 

without proving all of the elements of intentional firstdegree murder. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228–29 (2001) 

(per curiam). 

Under Wisconsin law, to convict a person of first-degree 

intentional homicide the State is required to defeat any credible claim of self-defense. Wis. Stat. § 940.01(3). Gladney 

claims that the State was not required to do so here because 

it was given the option of defeating his imperfect selfdefense claim merely by attacking the objective reasonableness of his threshold belief that he was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person. At the time 

of his trial, this accurately stated the law of imperfect selfdefense in Wisconsin. See State v. Camacho, 501 N.W.2d 380, 

388–89 (Wis. 1993). After Gladney’s trial, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the State cannot defeat a 

claim of imperfect self-defense by arguing that the defendCase: 13-3141 Document: 35 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 18
No. 13-3141 5

ant’s threshold belief was objectively unreasonable. See State 

v. Head, 648 N.W.2d 413, 434, 437 (Wis. 2002) (explicitly modifying this part of Camacho). Now, the only way the State can 

defeat such a claim is by proving that the defendant did not 

subjectively believe the amount of force used was necessary 

to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself. Id.

Gladney’s state conviction became final on January 12, 

1999. He did not file his federal habeas petition until July 17, 

2013. The district court ordered Gladney to show cause why 

his petition should not be dismissed as untimely. The court 

explained that unless some form of statutory or equitable 

tolling applied, Gladney’s petition was untimely because he 

would have needed to file his federal petition by January 12, 

2000, one year after his state court conviction became final. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The district court rejected Gladney’s attempts to toll the 

limitations period—either statutorily or equitably—based on 

his 2010 discovery that his lawyer had failed to interview 

Calhoun. The district court also concluded that Gladney had 

failed to establish that he should be exempt from the limitations period altogether because he was actually innocent of 

his crime of conviction. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely and decided not to issue a certificate of appealability. 

Gladney appealed. We granted a certificate of appealability on both of his constitutional claims and also directed the 

parties to address the timeliness questions presented by the 

petition. We asked the parties to address whether the petition might be considered timely and, if not, whether Gladney can demonstrate that he is entitled to an equitable excepCase: 13-3141 Document: 35 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 18
6 No. 13-3141 

tion to § 2244(d)(1)’s timeliness requirements because he is 

actually innocent of his crime of conviction. 

II. Timeliness of Federal Habeas Petitions

A. Determination of the Limitations Period 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a state prisoner seeking 

federal habeas relief has just one year after his conviction becomes final in state court to file his federal petition. Gladney 

was convicted by a jury on November 21, 1996. Wisconsin 

courts may elect to conduct direct review of a conviction at 

the same time they review a post-conviction petition, and 

that is what happened here. See Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 

674, 678 (7th Cir. 2014). Simultaneous review does not 

change the time when the limitations clock starts under 

§ 2244(d)(1). See id. at 678–79. For purposes of 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A), therefore, the limitations period expired on 

January 12, 2000, which was one year after the date Gladney 

could no longer seek certiorari from the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court’s October 14, 1998 decision to deny review. See Morales 

v. Boatwright, 580 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Gladney did not file either of the two state postconviction petitions raising the claims on which his federal 

petition is based until much later. He filed the first on October 5, 2009 and the second petition on April 7, 2010. Though 

the clock did not run from the time Gladney filed his October 5, 2009 petition in state court to its resolution on May 14, 

2012, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review of 

both petitions, see § 2244(d)(2); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 

663, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2001), Gladney’s July 17, 2013 federal 

filing was still well outside the one-year limitations period 

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No. 13-3141 7

that began when his conviction first became final back in 

January 1999. 

This appeal centers on whether Gladney has a legally viable basis for allowing such a late federal habeas petition. 

We agree with the district court that he does not. We consider first, and briefly, Gladney’s arguments for statutory or equitable tolling, and then his argument for actual innocence 

based on his theory of imperfect self-defense. 

B. Tolling the Limitations Period 

Gladney gestures in the direction of statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(D) as well as equitable tolling under Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (counsel abandoned petitioner), 

as bases for finding his petition timely. But he concedes correctly that his petition would still be late even if we gave him 

the benefit of generous tolling under either theory. 

Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), a petitioner has an additional year 

to file any claim starting from “the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Under 

equitable tolling principles, a petitioner need not count the 

time during which he (1) pursues his rights diligently, and 

(2) “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 

prevented timely filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Gladney’s only asserted basis for either form of tolling is 

that he could not have filed a petition alleging the claims he 

does now until his February 4, 2010 discovery that his attorney failed to interview Calhoun as part of his trial preparaCase: 13-3141 Document: 35 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 18
8 No. 13-3141 

tion.1 Even if all other criteria were satisfied, a new one-year 

limitations period would have expired on February 4, 2011 

unless Gladney stopped the clock by seeking post-conviction 

review in state court. See § 2244(d)(2). As noted above, 

Gladney had state court post-conviction petitions pending 

on at least one of the claims beginning on October 5, 2009. 

This was enough to stop the clock until the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review of those petitions on May 14, 

2012. See Carter, 275 F.3d at 665–66. That generous calculation would yield a new federal filing deadline of May 14, 

2013, and Gladney’s July 17, 2013 filing would still have been 

two months late. Because no form of tolling he seeks would 

render his petition timely, we need not address the underlying details of Gladney’s tolling arguments. 

C. Actual Innocence Gateway

Gladney’s last theory for avoiding the one-year time limit 

is to argue for an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1) based 

on a claim of actual innocence. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 

U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (describing difference between equitable excuse that permits extending a time limit 

and equitable exception that renders a time limit inapplica-

 1 The Calhoun discovery does not directly support the due process 

claim, so it is possible that each claim would present a different date on 

which to begin the timeliness calculation. As we noted in Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 806, 809 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013), we have yet to decide how to 

evaluate the timeliness of habeas petitions that present multiple claims. 

While all circuit courts addressing this issue have determined that the 

best approach is to evaluate timeliness on a claim-by-claim basis, see id., 

we have yet to foreclose the possibility of considering all claims if one 

claim is timely. Because no individual claim by Gladney is timely, we 

need not resolve this issue. 

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No. 13-3141 9

ble). Gladney argues that he can avoid his procedural default 

because he is actually innocent of his crime of conviction—

first-degree intentional homicide—under the standard articulated in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 

The Supreme Court has not recognized a petitioner’s 

right to habeas relief based on a stand-alone claim of actual 

innocence. See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931, citing Herrera v. 

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404–05 (1993). To win federal relief, a 

petitioner must show an independent constitutional violation. But when a petitioner accompanies his persuasive 

showing of actual innocence with a different claim for relief—here, ineffective assistance of counsel or the denial of 

due process—actual innocence may be used as a “gateway” 

to excuse procedural defaults that would otherwise bar a 

federal court from reaching the merits of the underlying 

claims. See id. at 1931–32. 

In federal habeas law, the actual innocence exception is 

one application of the broader “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” exception to procedural default intended to ensure 

that “federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons.” Id. at 1931, quoting Herrera, 

506 U.S. at 404. The Supreme Court has made clear that this 

exception covers all sorts of procedural defaults and recently 

explained that it covers the procedural default at issue here: 

Gladney’s failure to comply with § 2244(d)(1). See id. at 

1931–32. 

The actual innocence gateway is narrow. Gladney’s procedural default can be excused only if he “presents evidence 

of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in 

the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that 

the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” 

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Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Gladney must show that “in light of 

new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006), quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; see also McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1935. 

Gladney’s gateway claim of actual innocence under 

Schlup could be viable only if he presents evidence not previously considered. Such new evidence can take the form of 

any “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence.” See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The reviewing court then considers the total record—“all the evidence, 

old and new, incriminatory and exculpatory”—and makes 

“a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, 

properly instructed jurors would do.” House, 547 U.S. at 538, 

quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28, 329. It is not the role of 

the court to “make an independent factual determination 

about what likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely 

impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.” Id. 

Gladney argues that two developments since his trial 

meet the Schlup standard of actual innocence: (1) the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s modification of the law of imperfect 

self-defense in State v. Head, 648 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. 2002), and 

(2) Calhoun’s testimony corroborating that Wilson had 

robbed Gladney a few weeks before the fatal encounter. 

1. Change in State Law 

When Gladney was convicted, the controlling case on 

imperfect self-defense in Wisconsin was State v. Camacho, 501 

N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1993), which required a defendant asserting it to meet an objective threshold requirement. Under 

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Camacho, in essence, a killing that would otherwise be treated as first-degree intentional homicide would be reduced to 

second-degree intentional homicide if the accused (a) had an 

objectively reasonable belief that he was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person; and (b) 

had either (1) “an actual, but unreasonable, belief that force 

was necessary because the unlawful interference resulted in 

an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm,” or (2) a 

reasonable belief that some degree of force was necessary 

but had an unreasonable belief about the amount of force 

needed. See id. at 388–89; see also Head, 648 N.W.2d at 432–

33 (describing the rule under Camacho). 

In State v. Head, the Wisconsin Supreme Court modified 

the imperfect self-defense standard to make it easier for defendants to satisfy. The court made clear that a defendant 

need not make the threshold showing that he held “an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of an unlawful interference.” 648 N.W.2d at 434. Following this change in the 

law, a defendant can prevail on the imperfect self-defense 

claim if she has an “actual but unreasonable belief that she 

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and 

an actual but unreasonable belief that the force she used was 

necessary to defend herself.” Id. To convict of first-degree 

intentional homicide under the new standard, the State must 

show that the “defendant did not have an actual belief in one 

or both elements.” Id.

Gladney argues that under the Head standard, he would 

be found actually innocent of first-degree intentional homicide. That argument raises a new question in this circuit, 

which is whether the Schlup actual innocence standard can 

be satisfied by a change in law rather than new evidence. See 

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513 U.S. at 324 (emphasizing need for new evidence). Gladney urges us to adopt the view that a petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence by showing “in light of subsequent 

case law that he cannot, as a legal matter, have committed 

the alleged crime.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th 

Cir. 2014); see also Phillips v. United States, 734 F.3d 573, 581 

n.8 (6th Cir. 2013) (declining “to accept the government’s 

suggestion that in McQuiggin, the Court meant to limit actual innocence claims to those instances where a petitioner 

presents new facts ... and by implication to undermine those 

cases that have applied an equitable exception in cases 

where the innocence is occasioned not by new evidence but 

by an intervening, controlling change in the law as applied 

to a static set of facts”). 

We need not resolve that broader question here because 

the Wisconsin Supreme Court has made it clear that the rule 

announced in Head does not apply to defendants in Gladney’s position. In State v. Lo, 665 N.W.2d 756, 770–72 (Wis. 

2003), the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that the interpretation of the imperfect self-defense rule announced in 

Head was a “new rule” that would not apply retroactively to 

cases on collateral review. In other words, defendants like 

Gladney convicted under the “reasonable belief” threshold 

test of Camacho were not entitled to benefit from Head’s more 

defendant-friendly rule because it was not the law at the 

time their convictions became final. See id. at 773–74. The 

state court of appeals reviewing Gladney’s claims said as 

much, concluding that “Camacho was the law in this state 

during the trial and postconviction proceedings, and therefore, the circuit court was obliged to follow it.” 

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No. 13-3141 13

Gladney resists the holding of Lo, explaining all the ways 

that the state court may have gotten the retroactivity analysis 

wrong. Whether a state must make retroactive changes in 

state law, however, is itself ordinarily a matter of state law. 

As a general rule, the federal Constitution “neither prohibits 

nor requires” retroactive application of a state’s judicial decisions. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965), disapproved 

on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320–22 

(1987); see also Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23–24 (1973) 

(state supreme court was not compelled “to make retroactive 

its new construction of the [state] statute”).2 States are free to 

choose whether a change in state law is retroactive without 

running afoul of the federal Constitution. See Great Northern 

Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 

(1932) (“A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of 

forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say 

that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are 

law none the less for intermediate transactions.”). The Lo 

court did exactly that, concluding as a matter of Wisconsin 

 2 By contrast, if a state court holds that a subsequent interpretation of 

a statute was the correct statement of the law at the time a defendant’s 

conviction became final, the Due Process Clause requires giving petitioners on collateral review the benefit of that subsequent interpretation. 

See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228–29 (2001) (per curiam); Bunkley v. 

Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 839–842 (2003) (per curiam). The Wisconsin court 

avoided any constitutional problem here by holding that Camacho—and 

not Head—was the correct view of the imperfect self-defense statute until 

Head came along. See Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 841 (“Ordinarily, the [state] 

Court’s holding that [intervening precedent] constitutes a change in—

rather than a clarification of—the law would be sufficient to dispose of 

the Fiore question.”). Thus, petitioner Gladney, like petitioner Lo, was 

convicted under the applicable state-law standard. 

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14 No. 13-3141 

law that the change in law announced in Head would not be 

applied retroactively. See 664 N.W.2d at 772. 

Gladney presents no federal constitutional issue and no 

ground upon which we could grant habeas relief because a 

“federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” See Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 

876, 884 (7th Cir. 1997), quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 

41 (1984); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 

(1991); Burris v. Farley, 51 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Gladney cannot rely on subsequent state case law 

on imperfect self-defense to establish his actual innocence 

and thereby to excuse his late federal habeas petition. 

2. New Evidence

Gladney’s other argument for actual innocence is based 

on the testimony of Calhoun about Wilson’s earlier robbery 

of Gladney. To be sure, this evidence cannot be considered 

newly discovered—in the way that would be required for 

equitable or statutory tolling—because Gladney had been 

aware of Calhoun’s presence at the robbery. But the Schlup

actual innocence gateway does not require that the new evidence be newly discovered. We have rejected limiting the 

Schlup inquiry to newly discovered evidence: “All Schlup requires is that the new evidence is reliable and that it was not 

presented at trial.” See Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (“[N]othing in Schlup indicates that there is such a 

strict limitation on the sort of evidence that may be considered.”); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (permitting any new 

evidence to be considered so long as it was “not presented at 

trial”). So long as the evidence was “genuinely not presented 

to the trier of fact then no bar exists to the habeas court evalCase: 13-3141 Document: 35 Filed: 08/26/2015 Pages: 18
No. 13-3141 15

uating whether the evidence is strong enough to establish 

the petitioner’s actual innocence.” Gomez, 350 F.3d at 680. 

The Supreme Court has since explained that we were 

right to conclude that “the absence of a newly ‘discovered’ 

requirement in Schlup” was not a “mere oversight.” Id. at 

679. In McQuiggin, the Court made clear that the threshold 

diligence requirement of equitable tolling and 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D) tolling does not apply when a court is considering whether evidence is new for the purposes of the actual innocence inquiry. See 133 S. Ct. at 1935. Unexplained 

delay in presenting such evidence is not an absolute bar, 

though it may play a role in determining whether a petitioner has proven his actual innocence: a delayed petition 

“should seriously undermine the credibility of the actualinnocence claim.” See id. at 1935–36 (whether petitioner 

should have known about new evidence earlier is only relevant “as part of the assessment whether actual innocence has 

been convincingly shown.”). Since Calhoun’s testimony 

about the earlier robbery was not presented at trial, it can be 

considered for Gladney’s actual innocence gateway theory, 

though any unexplained delay calls for some skepticism on 

our part. 

Gladney has failed to meet Schlup’s demanding standard 

for actual innocence. We are not convinced that it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him even in light of Calhoun’s testimony that the robbery 

actually took place. Under Wisconsin’s law of imperfect selfdefense, under both Camacho and Head, the State could convict Gladney of first-degree intentional homicide if it could 

persuade a jury that Gladney did not actually believe that he 

was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death or 

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16 No. 13-3141 

did not actually believe that the amount of force used was 

necessary to prevent that harm. See Head, 648 N.W.2d at 437. 

Nothing in Calhoun’s statement, which focuses on the circumstances of the robbery several weeks earlier, bears directly on Gladney’s mental state at the time of the shooting: that 

he actually believed he was acting to prevent harm to himself when he shot and killed Wilson. There is no indication 

that Calhoun would have testified, for example, that Gladney had discussed with him after the robbery that he lived in 

fear that Wilson would kill him. Further, and contrary to 

Gladney’s suggestion, the state trial court did not definitively establish that Gladney had the actual belief necessary to 

make out an imperfect self-defense claim. The trial court 

language to which he points—the court’s conclusion that 

Gladney “intentionally fired to get him off of him” and that 

his testimony showed that his defense was self-defense—is 

best understood in the context in which it was used: explaining that the court would not give a reckless homicide instruction because no juror could find that it was a reckless 

homicide rather than an intentional one. 

Even though Calhoun’s testimony could not directly establish Gladney’s mental state at the time of the killing, 

Gladney argues that Calhoun’s testimony would have been 

decisive because it provided the only first-hand account—

besides his own—that Wilson robbed Gladney at gunpoint 

several weeks before Gladney fatally shot him. Two other 

witnesses testified about the robbery, but neither had actually witnessed it. In Gladney’s view, their relatively weak second-hand accounts enabled the State to cast doubt on 

whether the robbery actually took place. Calhoun’s detailed 

account of the robbery—including that he feared he might 

be shot by Wilson, who was waving a pistol around while 

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No. 13-3141 17

demanding everyone’s money—would have made it harder 

for a reasonable juror to doubt that Gladney had been 

robbed. 

For purposes of argument, we grant Gladney the premise 

that, in light of Calhoun’s testimony, any reasonable juror 

would conclude that the earlier robbery took place. From 

that premise, Gladney argues that it necessarily follows that 

the same reasonable juror would be compelled to conclude 

that he actually believed he was acting in self-defense when 

he killed Wilson. That is a possible inference but by no 

means a required one. The actual innocence gateway of 

Schlup demands more than a possible inference that might 

lead a juror to acquit. To meet his heavy burden, Gladney 

must show it is likely that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted. 

Gladney does not meet that standard. Calhoun was not a 

witness to the critical, fatal encounter. He corroborated an 

important point of Gladney’s version of the back-story, but 

he provided no details of the fatal shooting itself. It would be 

reasonable for a juror—even one who accepted that the robbery happened as Gladney described—to conclude that 

Gladney did not actually believe that the force used was 

necessary to protect himself from great bodily harm or 

death. As the State argued in state court, and again at oral 

argument, a juror hearing about the earlier robbery could 

reach one of two conclusions: Gladney killed Wilson out of a 

fear that he would otherwise be shot by Wilson; or, alternatively, Gladney killed Wilson because Gladney was angry 

that Wilson had robbed him and refused to repay the money 

he had taken. 

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18 No. 13-3141 

On the record here, a reasonable juror could accept the 

second theory. The actual jury heard evidence that Gladney 

confronted Wilson about the robbery and brought a gun 

with him to do it. Gladney testified that the argument got 

“heated” once Wilson refused to pay up. Following that 

heated argument, the jury heard, Gladney pulled out a gun. 

He was the only person to pull a gun, and he shot Wilson 

multiple times. Of course, some testimony indicated that 

Wilson charged at Gladney and that the two struggled for 

control of the gun. But consistent with that testimony, a trier 

of fact might reasonably conclude that all this showed is that 

Gladney had threatened to kill Wilson—either verbally or by 

taking out his gun—as their argument escalated. A juror 

would not be required to conclude that Gladney actually believed he was acting in self-defense at the time he shot Wilson just because Gladney testified there was a struggle for 

the gun and that he shot Wilson only because he feared for 

his life. Accordingly, we are not convinced that no reasonable juror hearing Calhoun’s testimony would have convicted him of first-degree intentional homicide. Without a strong 

showing of actual innocence required by Schlup, Gladney’s 

petition is untimely and we cannot address its merits. 

The judgment of the district court dismissing the habeas 

corpus petition as untimely is AFFIRMED. 

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