Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02154/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Friedman
Defendant
A. P. Kane
Defendant
Cesar Sinnaco
Defendant
Edward J. Wright
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD J. WRIGHT, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

CESAR SINNACO, M.D.; MICHAEL

FRIEDMAN, M.D., Chief Medical Officer;

A. P. KANE, Warden (A), and DOES 1-

25,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-2154 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Defendants have filed a

motion for summary judgment and plaintiff has opposed it. It is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that in response to a grievance the year 2000 he

was told he would be seen by a neurologist for numbness in his arm and hand, and that

defendant doctor Sinnaco told him in response to an April, 2003, grievance that he would

be seen for evaluation and treatment, but he was not. He also alleged that later in 2003,

after having a CT scan, he filed a grievance complaining that he had asked to discuss the

case with the doctor who saw him but that doctor refused, and that doctor Rosenthal had

told him that the results of the CT scan were “not informative” and that nothing could be

done. This grievance, he alleged, had been partially granted by defendant doctor

Friedman. In its initial review order the court dismissed defendant Kane and concluded that

plaintiff's allegations as to doctors Friedman and Sinnaco were sufficient to require a

response.

///

Case 4:05-cv-02154-PJH Document 15 Filed 03/27/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

B. Analysis 

1. Medical care standard for prisoners 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on

other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc). A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two

elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's

response to that need. Id. 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id.

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a reasonable

Case 4:05-cv-02154-PJH Document 15 Filed 03/27/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of

a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence

of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a "serious"

need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if she knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference. Id. at 835-36 & n.4 (1994); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard

for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists

and have actually drawn the inference. Id. If a prison official should have been aware of

the risk, but was not, the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how

severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

"A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). A claim of mere negligence or harassment related to medical

problems is not enough to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see, e.g.,

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in claims stemming

from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose and providing

replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence); O'Loughlin

v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (repeatedly failing to satisfy requests for aspirins

and antacids to alleviate headaches, nausea and pains is not constitutional violation;

isolated occurrences of neglect may constitute grounds for medical malpractice but do not

rise to level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain).

///

Case 4:05-cv-02154-PJH Document 15 Filed 03/27/07 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 He was warned of the need to do so in the order of service. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12

(9th Cir. 1988).

4

2. Analysis

Defendants contend that plaintiff can produce no evidence sufficient to generate a

genuine issue of material fact going to the "deliberate indifference" issue, and have

supported their contention with a declaration from doctor Sinnaco and medical records

sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. 

See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)

(movants claiming that party with the burden of proof at trial has no facts must produce

summary judgment materials to show lack of genuine issue of material fact, at which point

party opposing motion must produce materials sufficient to show the existence of such

facts for trial).

Plaintiff has not verified his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, nor is it

supported by a declaration.1

 The allegations in it therefore cannot serve as evidence in

opposition to the motion. His complaint, however, is verified, so to the extent it contains

facts rather than conclusions or vague allegations, it can serve that purpose. See

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (verified complaint

can serve as affidavit in opposition to motion for summary judgment if it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence). 

Plaintiff's allegation in the complaint that he was told he would be referred to a

neurologist is undisputed, and although plaintiff never actually says that no such referral

occurred, the defendants do not contend that it did, and they assume in their motion that

there was none. Also undisputed, however, is doctor Sinnaco's statement, based on his

medical experience, that experienced physicians, such as those who saw plaintiff, are fully

capable of making the necessary evaluation. Decl. of Sinnaco at ¶¶ 6, 7, 8. As a result it

could not have been deliberate indifference to not refer plaintiff, given that the general

practitioners at the prison were qualified to do the examination. There is no genuine issue

Case 4:05-cv-02154-PJH Document 15 Filed 03/27/07 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

of material fact going to the issue of whether failure to refer plaintiff to a neurologist was

deliberate indifference, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this

claim. 

Plaintiff may also be attempting to claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent

to the numbness in his hand, leaving aside the neurologist issue. As to that claim, the

complaint is evidence that plaintiff was told on October 23, 2000, that he would be seen by

a neurologist; that in response to a grievance filed in April of 2003 he was told by defendant

Sinnaco that he would be given evaluation and treatment; that this was not done; that he

filed a grievance in September of 2003 complaining about events after he received a CT

scan,; and that defendant Friedman responded that the grievance as "partially granted." 

In short, most of plaintiff's complaint – the only evidence in this record that the court

can consider in deciding whether he has shown a genuine issue of material fact – is a

recitation of what he contended in grievances, rather than direct allegations of what

happened. These allegations are evidence of what defendants knew, but are not evidence

of the events recited in the grievances. 

And even if the court were to stretch a point and consider plaintiff's description of

what was in the grievances as being allegations that those events happened, rather than

merely that they were grieved, the only factual allegations about lack of treatment are his

assertions that in response to a grievance filed on April 18, 2003, doctor Sinnaco told him

he would be seen for evaluation and treatment and that he was not. This contention is

undermined by plaintiff's own allegation that he received a CT scan before he filed another

grievance in September of 2003, and by the undisputed record that he received the CT

scan in July of 2003 and was evaluated again by doctor Friederichs in January of 2004. 

See Sinnaco decl., exh. B at 007. The district court may not resolve disputed issues of

material fact by crediting one party’s version of events and ignoring another, see Wall v.

County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004), but as against such undisputed

evidentiary facts plaintiff's conclusory statement is insufficient to generate a genuine issue

of material fact. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005)

Case 4:05-cv-02154-PJH Document 15 Filed 03/27/07 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

(conclusory statement not sufficient to carry nomoving party’s burden). 

The other factual contention in a grievance was that doctor Rosenthal, who is not a

defendant, told him that the numbness would not improve and that no further testing would

be done, and that the doctor who gave him the CT scan refused to talk to him. These

allegations do not go to what the named defendants did, nor do they even show a genuine

issue of material fact regarding deliberate indifference by nondefendants Rosenthal or the

unnamed CT doctor, because there is no evidence that doctor Rosenthal was not right and

acting in a medically appropriate manner, or that there was anything for the CT doctor to

discuss.

The motion for summary judgment will be granted. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (document

number 8 on the docket) is GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.05\WRIGHT154.SJ

Case 4:05-cv-02154-PJH Document 15 Filed 03/27/07 Page 6 of 6