Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00038/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00038-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Ruby L. Portis
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

RUBY L. PORTIS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 06-0038-M

 :

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, :

Commissioner of :

Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Application for

Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, with

supporting Affidavit (Doc. 19) and Defendant's Response to

Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access

to Justice Act (Doc. 20). After consideration of the pertinent

pleadings, it is ORDERED that the Application be GRANTED as set

out herein and that Plaintiff's attorney be AWARDED an EAJA

attorney's fee in the amount of $912.50.

Plaintiff filed this action on January 25, 2006 (Doc. 1). 

On July 11, 2006, upon written consent being filed by the parties

(Doc. 15), Judge Steele referred this action to the undersigned

Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to enter final

judgment (Doc. 16). On July 12, 2006, the Court issued a

Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 17), in which it granted

Defendant’s Motion and Memorandum for Entry of Judgment Pursuant

to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) With Remand of the Cause

Case 1:06-cv-00038-M Document 21 Filed 12/18/06 Page 1 of 7
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to the Defendant (Doc. 14). On that same date, Judgment was

entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, reversing

and remanding this action to the Commissioner for further

proceedings (Doc. 18). On August 11, 2006, William T. Coplin,

Jr., counsel for Plaintiff, filed an Application for Attorney

Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, with supporting

Affidavit, in which Plaintiff requests a fee of $1,162.38,

computed at an hourly rate of $159.23 for 7.3 hours spent in this

Court (Doc. 19). Defendant in her Response filed August 28,

2006, stated that she does not dispute the issues of prevailing

party status, timeliness, nor in general the number of hours

requested for compensation. However, Defendant does object to

the requested hourly rate (Doc. 20).

 The EAJA requires a court to 

award to a prevailing party ... fees and

other expenses ... incurred by that party in

any civil action ..., including proceedings

for judicial review of Agency action, brought

by or against the United States ..., unless

the court finds that the position of the

United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award

unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a

prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees within

thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days after it

is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken

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pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 2632 (1993).

Defendant concedes that Plaintiff became the prevailing

party when the Court remanded this action, Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. at

2631; that the fee application was timely filed; and that her

position was not substantially justified (Doc. 20).

The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985)(EAJA), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt,

461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)(§ 1988). In

describing this lodestar method of calculation, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis

on which to make an initial estimate of the

value of a lawyer’s services. The party

seeking an award of fees should submit

evidence supporting the hours worked and the

rates claimed. Where the documentation of

hours is inadequate, the district court may

reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not

“reasonably expended” .... Cases may be

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the

prevailing party should make a good-faith

effort to exclude from a fee request hours

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

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unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private

practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission. In the

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an

important component in fee setting. It is no

less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are not

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 The Court, after examination of Plaintiff’s Application and

supporting documentation, and after consideration of the

reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff’s time

expended in prosecuting this action before this Court for a total

of 7.3 hours is reasonable. 

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply

in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act provides in

pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished, except that ... attorney

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125

per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special

factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee.

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 Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp.

1997).

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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be

applied in calculating attorney's fees under the Act.

The first step in the analysis, ... is to

determine the market rate for "similar

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and

reputation." ... The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether

the court should adjust the hourly fee

upward...to take into account an increase in

the cost of living, or a special factor.

Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted & footnote omitted)1. The

applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence

that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. 

NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of

the attorney performing the work. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time claimed

seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or testimony in

support, the court may make an award on its own experience. 

Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.

1988). Where documentation is inadequate, the court is not

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relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the

court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. 

Id. 

In his application, Plaintiff is requesting the Court to

award a fee computed at an hourly rate of $159.23. Other than

requesting that hourly rate, attaching copies of Orders from

other Districts awarding attorney fees at a higher amount, and a

suggested method for computing cost of living increases (Doc.

20), Plaintiff has not otherwise documented it; therefore, the

documentation before the Court is inadequate and the Court must

arrive at an hourly rated based on its own experience.

This Court, utilizing the Meyer analysis, has determined

that the prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama is $125.00 per hour. See Smith v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0812-P-M (October 25, 2001); Boone v. Apfel, Civil

Action 99-0965-CB-L (August 30, 2001); Lee v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0518-RV-S (June 29, 2001); Willits v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0530-RV-C (May 4, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil

Action 00-0516-BH-L (April 12, 2001). Because the market rate is

not greater than the statutory rate of $125.00 per hour, the

Court need not reach the second step set out in the Meyer case. 

Multiplying the 7.3 hours by the Southern District of Alabama

inflation-adjusted prevailing market rate of $125.00 results in a

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fee of $912.50. 

 In conclusion, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application be

and is hereby GRANTED as set out above and that Plaintiff's

attorney be and is hereby AWARDED an EAJA attorney's fee in the

amount of $912.50.

DONE this 18th day of December, 2006.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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