Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10454/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10454-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denard Darnell Neal
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DENARD DARNELL NEAL, AKA

Denard Darnell of the Family Neal,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-10454

D.C. No.

1:11-cr-00297-

LJO-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 6, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed January 12, 2015

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, N. Randy Smith,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

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2 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction and sentence for fourteen

counts of attempting to file false liens and encumbrances

against the real or personal property of officers and

employees of the United States Penitentiary, Atwater, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1521.

The panel held that the prohibition in § 1521 is triggered

by the filing, attempting to file, or conspiring to file a false or

fictitious lien, without regard to the validity or existence of

the collateral identified in the document; and that on plain

error review, the conviction was supported by sufficient

evidence. 

The panel held that the district court did not commit plain

error in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte

before allowing the defendant to represent himself at all

stages of the proceedings.

The panel held that the district court did not commit plain

error in applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) for multiple liens against multiple

victims; and that because the § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement

and the grouping guideline, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, serve distinct

purposes, the Sentencing Commission authorized and

intended the cumulative application of both provisions. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 3

The panel held that the district court did not plainly err in

imposing the sentence, despite the fact that the presentence

report inaccurately described the length of the defendant’s

prior sentences.

COUNSEL

John Paul Balazs (argued), Sacramento, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Jared C. Dolan (argued) and Michael G. Tierney, Assistant

United States Attorneys, Sacramento,California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

A defendant violates 18 U.S.C. § 1521 when the

defendant files, attempts to file, or conspires to file a false

document of the sort regularly used to create liens or

encumbrances against the real or personal property of a

United States officer or employee. The prohibition is

triggered by filing, attempting to file, or conspiring to file a

false or fictitious lien, whether or not the described collateral

sought to be liened or encumbered in the document is in fact

real or personal property.

Additionally, we find the district court did not commit

plain error in (a) allowing Defendant-Appellant Denard Neal

to represent himself throughout these proceedings;

(b) applying the two-level enhancement described in United

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4 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)

§ 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) to Neal’s sentence; and (c) imposing 87-

months’ imprisonment on each of the fourteen counts (to be

served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to any

unserved prior term of imprisonment), though the presentence

report inaccurately described the length of Neal’s prior

sentences.

A. Background

In 2010, Neal was serving a sentence for armed robbery

in the United States Penitentiary, Atwater (“USP-Atwater”)

in Merced County. While processing another prisoner for

release fromthe penitentiary, USP-Atwater guards discovered

a package that Neal had given the prisoner to mail for Neal

once released. Upon inspecting Neal’s package, the guards

discovered various handwritten documents. Four of the

documents were titled “Security Agreement Commercial

Lien,” identifying Neal as the secured party and fourteen

USP-Atwater employees as debtors. Each Security

Agreement was accompanied by a standardized Uniform

CommercialCode (“UCC”)FinancingStatement(“UCC-1”).

1

The Security Agreements and UCC-1 Financing Statements

(“Lien Documents”) indicated that the identified USPAtwater employees owed Neal amounts ranging from five

thousand to forty-five million dollars, arising from their

alleged criminal activities that caused Neal harm. Each Lien

Document listed collateral for the lien as the employee’s

“oath of offices and all collateral related to the bonds that

1 A UCC-1 financing statement is a standardized legal form filed by a

creditor giving notice of an interest in the personal property of a debtor (a

person who owes a debt to the creditor as typically specified in the

agreement creating the debt).

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 5

support, endorse the oath of offices.” According to the Lien

Documents, the “liens were to remain in place for 100 years,”

or until Neal was paid in full.

Included with the Lien Documents was a cover letter from

Neal to his mother. In the letter, Neal asked his mother to

type the documents. Neal also gave his mother step-by-step

instructions for correctly filing the documents with the

California Secretary of State and the County Recorder in

Merced County on his behalf. Neal advised his mother that

the “value of each oath of office [could] be found in the

Security Agreement and matching UCC-1.” Neal wanted his

mother to act quickly. Once the documents were filed, Neal

wanted to “present the documents to the Department of

Justice and get [the USP-Atwater employees] fired.”

Lastly, a letter addressed to Deputy Assistant Attorney

General Daniel Koffsky was included in the packet. The

letter claimed to provide “Actual and Constructive Notice”

that Neal had “filed and registered the enclosed government

officials[’] Oath of Offices with the [California] Secretary of

State.”

After discovering Neal’s Lien Documents, the FBI

interviewed Neal about his attempt to file liens against the

USP-Atwater employees. In the interview, Neal affirmed he

wrote the documents. Neal told the agent the fourteen USPAtwater employees had committed crimes against him. 

Because of their crimes, Neal concluded the employees

should be fired and should also monetarily compensate him. 

As a result of the information obtained in the interview and

in Neal’s packet, Neal was charged with fourteen counts of

attempting to file false liens and encumbrances against the

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6 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

real or personal property of fourteen officers and employees

of USP-Atwater, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1521.

At Neal’s arraignment and plea hearing, Neal informed

the court that he wanted to represent himself. In response, the

court immediately conducted a Faretta hearing. The court

informed Neal of: (1) the nature of the charges against him;

(2) the possible penalties; and (3) the dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation. During the hearing,

Neal frequently engaged in lengthy back-and-forth dialogue

in response to the court’s questions. Neal affirmed that he

understood the charges against him and the possible penalties. 

Neal also respectfully disagreed with the court’s

admonishment that Neal would be better off represented by

counsel. Neal reasoned he was better off without a lawyer,

because lawyers did not have a very high success rate. Neal

also stated that no one “fights for yourself like you do.” 

Neal’s adamant desire to represent himself did not diminish

during the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

court found Neal wanted to represent himself and that Neal

had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Before trial, Neal filed numerous motions. In many of

Neal’s filings, Neal disputed the court’s jurisdiction, asserting

the “United States [was] a corporation.” The court denied

most of Neal’s motions as frivolous and nonsensical.

At trial, Neal’s Lien Documents were presented as

exhibits and entered into evidence. Neal did not dispute that

he created and attempted to file the Lien Documents. Instead,

Neal argued his liens were not criminal, because USPAtwater employees had engaged in various criminal activities

causing him personal harm and losses. Neal also argued his

liens did not violate the statute, because the collateral he

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 7

identified (oath of offices and all collateral related to the

bonds that support or endorse the oath of offices) was owned

by the American people, not a USP-Atwater employee. Neal

even encouraged the jury to look at the Lien Documents,

stating the jury would agree the documents “[do] not mention

any real property.” Neal argued that his Lien Documents

“plac[ed] a value on the oath of office, not on the debtor.” 

Neal encouraged the jury to ignore the government’s expert

witness “[b]ecause [the expert] couldn’t read or understand”

his Lien Documents. Neal argued the real reason he was

being prosecuted was “because [he] came up with a concept

to remove government officials from their office when they

commit criminal activity,” not for “fil[ing] liens against

government officials.”

The government argued Neal’s Lien Documents were

precisely the type of documents prohibited by the statute. 

The government explained Neal’s documents were of the sort

regularly used to create liens and encumbrances against

property. According to the government, Neal’s motivation

was retaliation. Neal’s Lien Documents accused the

employees of engaging in a litany of criminal actions

(trespass, theft, fraud, “aiding and abetting, and numerous

criminal torts, acts constituting treason and sedition against

the Life, Liberty, private property, birthright and happiness of

our Master Secured Party/Creditor Denard-Darnell Neal”),

allegedly resulting in personal harm to Neal. In the Lien

Documents, Neal also claimed each USP-Atwater employee

admitted committing the various criminal offenses against

him while they were employed at USP-Atwater. “I

[USP-Atwater employee] do freely admit and affirm without

reservation . . . [regarding] the above state acts . . . [I] acted

with intent . . . [and] did commit . . . criminal acts . . . .” 

Further, the liens declared that each USP-Atwater employee

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8 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

agreed to the imposition of Neal’s liens. “I [USP Atwater

employee] . . . accept and agree that this . . . Common Law

Lien is Binding Upon ALL OATH OF OFFICES AND ALL

COLLATERAL RELATED TO THE BONDS THAT

SUPPORT, ENDORSE THE OATH OF OFFICES.”

As shown in Neal’s Lien Documents, Neal’s collateral

was not limited to the employee’s oath of office. The

collateral also included all bonds that supported and endorsed

the oaths of office. The government’s expert witness testified

that, despite the falsity and technical deficiencies of Neal’s

documents, they would likely be accepted and filed. Once

filed, the alleged debtors would bear the burden of proving

the documents false and having the liens removed.

After the two-day jury trial, Neal was convicted on all

fourteen counts. The district court sentenced Neal to 87-

months’ imprisonment on each of the fourteen counts, to be

served concurrently with each other but consecutively to any

prior, undischarged term of imprisonment. Neal filed a

timely appeal.

Neal appeals (1) the sufficiency of the evidence. Neal

argues the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction, because the collateral he identified (oath of

offices and all collateral related to the bonds that support or

endorse the oath of offices) is not the real or personal

property of a federal officer or employee. Neal appeals

(2) his waiver of counsel, claiming he was incompetent. Neal

argues it was error for the court to allow him to represent

himself throughout the proceedings without holding a

competency hearing. Neal also appeals (3) his sentence. 

Neal argues the application of a two-level, multiple-lien

enhancement to his sentence resulted in impermissible double

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 9

counting. Finally, Neal appeals (4) the length of his sentence. 

Neal argues the district court may have imposed a different

sentence if his presentence report had correctly reported the

length of his previous sentences.

B. Discussion

1. On plain error review, Neal’s conviction was

supported by sufficient evidence.

Neal argues that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction. Specifically, Neal argues there was

no evidence that the collateral he attempted to attach (oath of

offices and all collateral related to the bonds that support or

endorse the oath of offices) was real or personal property of

a federal employee as required by the statute. Neal does not

argue what type of property his collateral is; he simply insists

that it is not real or personal property. Generally, we would

review Neal’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

under the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia,

determining “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the [government], any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in

original). However, our task here is further complicated by

Neal’s failure to raise the issue in the district court, requiring

us to review only for plain error or to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d

529, 531 (9th Cir. 1992).

To succeed on plain error review, Neal “must show (1) an

error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and

(4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Zalapa,

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10 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

509 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

omitted). “Reversal of a criminal conviction on the basis of

plain error is an exceptional remedy . . . .” United States v.

Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986). There was no

error in this case, much less plain error or a miscarriage of

justice. Even under Jackson’s less deferential standard of

review, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Neal’s

conviction.

Because Neal’s argument regarding the insufficiency of

the evidence challenges whether the collateral identified in

his liens was real or personal property, we must look to the

text of the statute to determine the meaning of “real or

personal property.” See United States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d

1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013) (when a sufficiency argument

hinges on the interpretation of a statute, we review the district

court’s statutory interpretation de novo). Specifically, we

must review the portion of the statute criminalizing the filing

of, the attempted filing, or the conspiring to file “any false

lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property” of

a federal employee.

18 U.S.C. § 1521 provides:

Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to

file, in any public record or in any private

record which is generally available to the

public, any false lien or encumbrance against

the real or personal property of [a U.S. officer

or employee], on account of the performance

of official duties by that individual, knowing

or having reason to know that such lien or

encumbrance is false or contains any

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 11

statement or representation, shall be fined

under this title or imprisoned for not more

than 10 years, or both.

When interpreting a statute, we are guided by the

fundamental canons of statutory construction and begin with

the statutory text. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States,

541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). We interpret statutory terms in

accordance with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute

clearly expresses an intention to the contrary. United States

v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). We must

“interpret [the] statut[e] as a whole, giving effect to each

word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in

a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute

inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Boise Cascade

Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Additionally, “[p]articular phrases must be construed in light

of the overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory

scheme.” United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228–29 (9th

Cir. 1995).

This statute does not define the terms “real or personal

property” as used in the statute. Nor does chapter 73 of title

18—in which § 1521 is located—include a definition section

for these terms. Similarly, there is no guiding preamble,

recital, or purpose clause. The statute’s title and heading

simply signal that the statute punishes retaliation against

federal employees. However, we are able to determine the

meaning of the terms “real or personal property,” by

examining the terms in the context of the surrounding text

and examining the statute’s scheme and overall purpose.

The statute’s overall scheme and purpose seeks to prevent

false filing of liens or encumbrances intended to harm a

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12 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

federal employee. The statute focuses on preventing a

specific type of harm. The text of the statute prohibits all

persons from using false financial filings to harm and

intimidate federal employees. The foreseeable

circumstances, determining who may cause the harm and how

the harm results, are numerous and varied and seem of

limited (if any) importance in the statute.

The statute’s surrounding text also assists in interpreting

the meaning of “real and personal property” as used in

§ 1521. The statute’s repetition of the indefinite determiner

“any” signals an intended broad and expansive application of

the statute. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5

(1997) (noting the word “any” has expansive meaning, “one

or some indiscriminately of whatever kind”). In § 1521, the

word “any” modifies where an individual is prohibited from

filing—in any public record or in any private record (which

is generally available to the public). See 18 U.S.C. § 1521.

“Any” also modifies what is prohibited. The statute prohibits

the filing of any false liens or encumbrances. Id. The statute

does not attempt to identify all possible offending documents. 

Id. Rather, the statute prohibits documents of the sort used to

create liens or encumbrances. The focus is on preventing the

harm such documents may cause, rather than focusing on the

actual documents.

We also note that the conduct prohibited by the statute is

not confined to completed acts. Rather than requiring that the

false lien or encumbrance actually be filed in order to violate

the statute, the statute’s prohibition is triggered by filing,

attempting to file, or conspiring to file a false lien or

encumbrance. See id. Because the statute can be violated

without completed conduct, the harm the statute protects

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 13

against arises from the nature of the documents to be filed,

not the validity of the documents.

Further, the statute lacks any reference either to technical

filing requirements in the statute or to a filer’s understanding

of technical requirements therein. Again, validity is not a

prerequisite for violation. Indeed, the statute criminalizes the

filing of, the attempting to file, or the conspiring to file false

liens or encumbrances, not false valid liens or encumbrances. 

Id. Validity inquiries examine inter alia, the sufficiency of

the information found in the documents (e.g., correctness and

completeness of the debtor’s name and address), the timing

of the filing, the manner of the filing, the correctness of the

listed collateral or its legal description and the sufficiency of

supporting documents. The statute makes such validity

inquiries irrelevant.

Not only are such validity inquiries irrelevant to

determining whether the statute has been violated, they often

have little or no impact on whether such documents can or

will be filed by the filing authorities. The California

Commercial Code, following the UCC, grants little authority

to filing offices to refuse to accept fraudulent or invalid

filings.2See Cal. Com. Code §§ 9516(b), 9520(a). Indeed,

the filing office is not authorized to determine whether the

information in a filing is (or could be) legitimate or valid. Id.

§ 9516, Editors’ Note 3. Therefore, the terms “real and

personal property” are not intended to limit the scope of the

2

See UCC § 9-520(a) & cmt. 2; Cal. Com. Code § 9516. Generally, the

bases for rejection are limited to the document missing some requisite

information (e.g., debtor’s name), the record not being communicated in

a manner (e.g., written rather than electronic) that the filing office accepts,

or filer failing to tender the required filing fee.

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statute, but rather to indicate the class of documents

prohibited by the statute. The statute prohibits the filing of,

the attempting to file, or the conspiring to file documents of

the sort that could create false liens and encumbrances against

federal employees. The prohibition is triggered by the type

of document and resulting harm without regard to the validity

or existence of the identified collateral in such documents. 

Neal’s focus on collateral is misplaced, because the collateral

he listed in his Lien Documents is not relevant to whether he

violated the statute.

Our reading of the statute is consistent with the general

legislative policy behind the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1521. 

“Since 2004, there [was] a nationwide increase in the number

of filings by prison inmates of unsubstantiated liens and

[UCC] financing statements against state or federal officials

involved with their incarceration.” Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d

258, 261 (6th Cir. 2009). Section 1521 was enacted in

response to the increasing vulnerability of federal employees

as part of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007.3It

intends to penalize individuals who seek to intimidate and

harass federal employees and officers by filing, attempting to

file or conspiring to file false liens or encumbrances. See

H.R. Rep. 110-218 (2007).

The Eighth Circuit took an analogous view of real or

personal property in the first appellate case to interpret

§ 1521. See United States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978, 984–85 (8th

Cir. 2012). Similar to Neal, the defendant in Reed argued that

“the government failed to prove a violation of § 1521 because

[the UCC-1 financing statement] did not . . . [indicate] any

property of [a federal employee] as collateral.” Id. at 984

 

3

 Pub. L. 110–177, § 201(a), 121 Stat. 2534, 2535–36 (2008).

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 15

(quotation marks omitted). The Reed court acknowledged

that Reed’s documents were technically deficient, and his

“lengthy” and “incoherent” description of collateral in the

filings would not have succeeded in perfecting a priority

claim under UCC law. Id. However, the court stated

technical deficiencies were not a defense. Id. The Reed court

affirmed that “[t]he prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1521 is

triggered by the filing of a false or fictitious lien, whether or

not it effectively impairs the government official’s property

rights and interests.” Id. at 984–85. “Indeed, legal

insufficiency is in the nature of the false, fictitious, and

fraudulent liens and encumbrances that Congress intended to

proscribe.” Id. at 985.

We now consider Neal’s argument that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction under § 1521

in light of our interpretation of the terms “real and personal

property” in that statute as referring to documents of the sort

that could create false liens and encumbrances against federal

employees.

Similar to Reed’s jury, Neal’s jury was presented with

undisputed evidence that Neal created and attempted to file

standard lien documents bearing common lien language—

documents of the sort regularly used to create liens and

encumbrances against real or personal property. Neal’s Lien

Documents clearly identified individual debtors and their

corresponding debts. There was no ambiguity as to who

owed the debt and why the obligation was being asserted. 

Contrary to Neal’s assertion, the collateral listed was not

limited to each employee’s oath of office. Neal also

attempted to attach all bonds that supported and endorsed the

oaths of office.

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Evidence was also presented indicating that false,

technically deficient, financial documents are routinely

accepted by filing offices without regard to the document’s

accuracy or legitimacy. Once a false lien is filed, the alleged

debtor bears the burden of proving the lien’s falsity and

having it removed.4 Evidence demonstrated documents

similar to Neal’s can encumber property, cloud title, and

cause significant harm to innocent persons alleged to be

debtors.

The government also presented the letter Neal wrote to

his mother. Neal gave his mother step-by-step instructions

for filing the Lien Documents on his behalf. Neal also told

his mother that if he was able to register the “[s]taff[’s] oath

of offices” under his name, “the [DOJ] will fire them.” It was

reasonable for the jury to infer from this evidence that Neal

believed if he acquired rights in an employee’s oath of office,

he could demand payment of the false debt if the employee

did not want to risk being fired. In other words, it was

reasonable for the jury to infer that Neal intended to file

documents of the sort that could create false liens and

encumbrances against federal employees.

There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to

find Neal knowingly attempted to file false documents,

intending to harass the USP-Atwater employees on account

of their performance of official duties. Congress enacted

§ 1521 precisely to prevent this type of conduct. Therefore,

the jury’s conviction of Neal for violating § 1521 was not

plainly erroneous.

 

4

See Cal. Com. Code § 9518.

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 17

2. The district court did not commit plain error in

failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte

before allowing Neal to represent himself at all

stages of the proceedings.

Neal argues the district court erred in failing to order a

competency hearing sua sponte before allowing him to waive

counsel and represent himself at all stages of his proceedings. 

We review a district court’s failure to sua sponte order a

competency hearing for plain error. United States v. Dreyer,

705 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2013). “Failing to sua sponte

hold a competency hearing is plain error only if ‘the evidence

of incompetence was such that a reasonable judge would be

expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the

defendant’s competence.’” United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d

1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dreyer, 705 F.3d at 961). 

Relevant evidence includes medical history, the defendant’s

behavior in and out of court, and the connection between the

defendant’s serious mental disease or defect and some failure

by the defendant to understand the proceedings, assist in his

own defense, or carry out the basic tasks needed to present his

own defense without the help of counsel. See id. at 1134–35. 

Absent such evidence, a district court does not plainly err in

failing to sua sponte hold a hearing to determine the

defendant’s competence to stand trial, see id., or to represent

himself at trial and sentencing, see Godinez v. Moran,

509 U.S. 389, 399–402 (1993).5

5 We note that once a district court holds such a hearing, it may

determine that the defendant is not competent to represent himself at trial,

even if the defendant would be sufficiently competent to stand trial. See

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).

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A. The medical evidence presented to the district

court was insufficient to cause a reasonable

judge to experience genuine doubt as to Neal’s

competency to represent himself.

A defendant must present “strong” medical evidence of a

serious mental disease or defect before a genuine doubt about

competency will arise. Garza, 751 F.3d at 1135. Even then,

it would not be error for the court to fail to hold a competency

hearing unless the defendant also established a causal

connection between the mental disease or defect and his

inability to understand the proceedings.6Id at 1136. “Where

the defendant’s mental problem—even if severe—has no

discernible impact on the proceedings, we have not found

substantial evidence.” Id.

7

“Even a mentally deranged

defendant is out of luck if there is no indication that he failed

to understand or assist in his criminal proceedings.” Id.

8

“And even if that same defendant did fail to understand or

assist in his proceedings, he would still be out of luck unless

his mental impairment caused the failure.” Id.

6

See, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2004);

Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343–44 (9th Cir. 1985); Steinsvik v.

Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949, 952–54 (9th Cir. 1981); Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d

271, 274–75 (9th Cir. 1977).

 

7

See also Davis, 384 F.3d at 645–46; Steinsvik, 640 F.2d at 952–54.

8

See also Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 617, 619–21 (9th Cir.

1977) (concluding that no genuine doubt as to competency existed even

though defendant was deemed schizophrenic, declared insane by two

government psychiatrists prior to trial and refused to cooperate with his

counsel at trial, because prior to the crime, defendant was a socially

capable, average college student).

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 19

Neal relies on his presentence report to show he suffered

from a severe mental disease or defect. However, Neal’s

presentence report does not contain sufficient medical

evidence to raise a genuine doubt as to Neal’s competency. 

The report referred to Neal’s suicide attempts twenty-two

years previous. According to the report, around the time of

the suicide attempts, Neal believed psychiatrists were

attempting to medicate him. However, there are no details

about a diagnosis or medications prescribed. The report

noted that, even when counseling was required as part of

Neal’s previous parole, the counselor stated therapy was not

recommended.

According to the presentence report, Neal had reported a

deterioration in his current mental health, because he realized

“people don’t follow the truth in his eyes,” and that the court

had taken a “bias[ed]” position in his case. As a result, Neal

had requested therapy to help him deal with the “conflicts in

what he described as a flawed system.” Neal’s request for

therapy, to help him deal with his disillusionment with the

judicial system, was not sufficient to create serious doubt as

to his competency. “Certainly the mere fact that psychiatric

help was felt to be desirable . . . cannot be said to create a

bona fide doubt of [Neal’s] capacity to participate

intelligently in the proceedings facing him.” Sailer, 548 F.2d

at 275. “To hold otherwise would reflect disparagingly” on

those who are clearlycompetent, yet require some therapeutic

assistance. Id. We find the record lacks substantial medical

evidence that would lead a reasonable judge to harbor a

genuine doubt about Neal’s competency.

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20 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

B. Neal’s conduct in and out of court did not

create genuine doubt as to his competency.

Neal argues that, if we find the medical evidence he now

emphasizes is insufficient to raise a genuine doubt as to his

competency during the proceedings, we should find his

courtroom conduct and his many “nonsensical” filings

containing “rambling statements” and “irrational arguments”

should have raised serious doubt as to his competency. In the

past, we have found that if medical evidence fails to establish

the existence of a mental disease or defect, bizarre or erratic

behavior—especially in court—may raise a genuine doubt as

to a defendant’s competency. See Garza, 751 F.3d at

1135–36.9 However, competency will not be questioned

when a defendant merely displays rude, uncooperative and

sometimes wacky behavior. See United States v. Johnson,

610 F.3d 1138, 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no doubt

concerning competency when defendant’s courtroom

behavior was uncooperative and eccentric, but not

significantly disruptive or defiant). Likewise, voluminous

filings of nonsensical pleadings do not create per se serious

doubt about competency. See id.

Reviewing the record, Neal did not manifest any

observable signs of incompetency during his proceedings

such that a reasonable judge would experience genuine doubt

about his competency. The record showed that, during his

Faretta hearing, Neal consistently responded to the court’s

inquiries in a coherent and respectful manner. Neal informed

the court that he was a high school graduate with some

college education. Neal stated he had studied some law on

9

See also McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2008);

Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 519 (9th Cir. 1981).

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 21

his own, including the applicable rules of procedure and

evidence. Neal even debated the efficacy of trained attorneys

after the judge stated Neal would be better off represented by

trained counsel. Neal informed the court he believed “the

disadvantage of not being trained in the law acts as an

advantage because those who [are] trained in the law [do] not

seem to be effective.”

Similarly, during trial and sentencing, the record does not

include evidence that Neal manifested such conduct. Neal

was responsive and rational at trial and participated

effectively when he chose to do so. Neal made opening

statements, closing arguments, and cross-examined witnesses

with a fair degree of skill—even rephrasing his questions in

response to a sustained objection. Neal also generally

followed courtroom rules and protocol.

It is not disputed that Neal made numerous comments and

filed a variety of documents disputing jurisdiction and other

“nonsensical” issues (e.g., “[the] United States is a

corporation. . . . as a corporation it cannot interact with

human beings; “the sale of bonds based on Petitioners [sic]

conviction by the court creates a financial conflict of

interest”.). However, Neal also professed a “sovereign

citizen” belief system.10 His comments and conduct were

indicative of that belief, not a lack of competence. Neal

cannot now use those beliefs as an expression of

incompetency. “In the absence of any mental illness or

uncontrollable behavior, [Neal] had the right to present [his]

unorthodox defenses and argue [his] theories to the bitter

end.” See Johnson, 610 F.3d at 1147.

10 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603–06

(D. Md. 2005) (describing the “sovereign citizen” belief system).

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C. Neal’s Faretta waiver was valid.

Neal claims that his waiver of counsel in his Faretta

hearing was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. We

review whether a Faretta waiver satisfied these requirements

de novo, even where the defendant failed to raise the issue of

the validity of the Faretta waiver to the district court. United

States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Although no specific colloquy is required, we have held a

waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent if the defendant

was informed and understands (a) “the nature of the charges

against him,” (b) “the possible penalties,” and (c) “the

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” United

States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487–88 (9th Cir. 1987).

Neal’s Faretta waiver was voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent. Prior to Neal’s arraignment and plea hearing,

Neal informed his appointed counsel he wished to represent

himself. Neal renewed the request at his arraignment and

plea hearing. In response to Neal’s request, the court

immediately conducted a Faretta hearing.

At the Faretta hearing, the court clearly explained the

charges and possible penalties to Neal. The court also

explained the specific allegations to Neal. The court

informed Neal that each offense was punishable by a

maximum of 10 years in prison and/or a fine of $250,000. 

The court, in an effort to convey the seriousness of the

charges, told Neal that his sentence could be 140 years if the

court decided to run the sentences consecutively. The court

also engaged in a lengthy discussion about sentencing,

sentencing guidelines, and factors used by a court when

sentencing. Neal consistently assured the court that he

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 23

understood what he was being told and that he did not have

any questions.

The record also established that the court spent a

significant amount of time warning Neal about the dangers

and disadvantages of self-representation. Neal was advised

that, if he chose to represent himself, he was going to be held

to the same rules of evidence and the same rules of procedure

as if an attorney was representing him. The court discussed

the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, explaining that

the rules can prove critical in a case. Although Neal indicated

he was knowledgeable about the rules, the court still

cautioned that the rules were often complicated and difficult,

even for lawyers. The court also explained that trial was

difficult. Neal was informed he would be on his own and the

court could not advise or help him. The court advised Neal

it was unwise to represent himself and that he would be better

off being represented by a trained attorney.

11

However, Neal was insistent in his desire to represent

himself. Neal assured the court he had no questions and that

he understood the pitfalls of representing himself. When the

court finally asked Neal, in light of the penalty if he was

 

11 Continuing to caution Neal, the judge stated that if he were “charged

with a crime, I would want an attorney to represent me.” The judge

continued, “I’m just telling you personally that I would want someone to

represent me because when you have something personal at stake,

sometimes you lose sight of the strategic details and other things when

you’re too personally involved. So although I would have long

discussions with my attorney and give my attorney my opinions and try

and guide them in what I thought were important things, I would be

represented by an attorney if I were charged with a crime. And in my

opinion I think that you’d be better served by having a trained attorney to

represent you.”

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24 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

found guilty, whether he still wished to represent himself and

give up his right to be represented by counsel, Neal

responded “absolutely.”

After review, the record does not evidence that Neal

failed to understand the nature of the charges against him, the

possible penalties, or the dangers and disadvantages of

self-representation. Neal clearly endorsed the “sovereign

citizen” ideology. Neal’s request to represent himself could

not be denied solely because he adhered to such beliefs. The

right to represent oneself, like the right to counsel, is secured

by the Constitution. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,

814–15 (1975). “[F]orcing a lawyer upon an unwilling

defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he

truly wants to do so.” Id. at 817. The choice must be

honored even when it is ultimately to the defendant’s own

detriment. Id. at 834. The evidence demonstrates that Neal

knew exactly what he was doing and made the choice to

represent himself with eyes open. See Id. at 835.

3. The district court’s application of the Sentencing

Guidelines was not plainly erroneous.

Neal argues that the court should not have applied the

two-level, multiple lien enhancement under USSG

§ 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) (“Offense Specific Guideline”) to his

sentence. Instead, he argues, the Offense Specific Guideline

only allows application of the multiple lien enhancement

when there are multiple offenses against the same victim. In

Neal’s circumstance, while he was convicted of fourteen

offenses, each offense involved a different victim.

Neal also argues that, even if the Offense Specific

Guideline enhancement applied, it was error for the court to

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 25

apply it here. He argues its application results in

impermissible double counting. The fourteen offenses were

previously accounted for when the district court increased

Neal’s base offense level by five points under USSG § 3D1.4

(“Multiple Count Grouping Guideline”). Therefore, Neal

argues, the fourteen offenses were double counted when the

court also added the multiple lien enhancement under the

Offense Specific Guideline.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of

the United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v.

Johansson, 249 F.3d 848, 858 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Neal

did not raise this objection in the district court, we review the

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines for

plain error. United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1103

(9th Cir. 2009).

A. It was not plain error to apply the two-level

enhancement to Neal’s sentence for multiple

liens against multiple victims.

USSG§ 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) specificallyaddresses sentencing

for harms associated with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1521. It

was added to the USSG after 18 U.S.C. § 1521 was enacted

in 2007. See USSG app. C amend 718 (2007). The plain

language of the subsection provides for a two-level

enhancement “[i]f the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1521 and the offense involved more than two false liens or

encumbrances.” See USSG § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) (emphasis

added).

Neal contends the court should not have applied the

enhancement, because he was convicted of fourteen offenses

and each offense only involved one lien. Neal explains that

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26 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

each of the fourteen liens he attempted to file was charged as

a separate count and a separate violation of § 1521. 

Therefore, he was ultimately charged with fourteen separate

offenses. Each offense represented one lien—each offense

did not involve more than two false liens or encumbrances.

Neal has misinterpreted § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B). To clarify

when the two-level multiple lien enhancement is applicable,

we look to the application notes. See United States v.

Hernandez-Sandoval, 211 F.3d 1115, 1117 n.3 (9th Cir.

2000) (“In general, the application notes are binding on the

courts in their construction of the Sentencing Guidelines”). 

Application Note (1) provides:

Scope of Conduct to Be Considered.—In

determining whether subsections (b)(1),

(b)(2), and (b)(3) apply, the court shall

consider conduct that occurred prior to or

during the offense; however, conduct that

occurred prior to the offense must be

substantially and directly connected to the

offense, under the facts of the case taken as a

whole. For example, if the defendant engaged

in several acts of mailing threatening letters to

the same victim over a period of years

(including acts that occurred prior to the

offense), then for purposes of determining

whether subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3)

apply, the court shall consider only those prior

acts of threatening the victim that have a

substantial and direct connection to the

offense.

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 27

USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.1(emphasis added). In determining

whether to apply the enhancement, Note (1) requires a

sentencing court to consider conduct occurring during the

offense. Note (1) also requires a sentencing court to consider

prior conduct, but only if the prior conduct was substantially

and directly connected to the offense. Note (1) does not

specify any number of victims to whom the conduct must

occur. Note (1) merely cautions a court to only consider

conduct that is substantially and directly connected to the

offense. We agree that the example in Note (1) clearly

indicates multiple offenses against the same victim is conduct

that a court must consider. However, because it is only an

example, it does not preclude a court from applying the

enhancement for multiple offenses against different victims. 

Note (1) only requires that a sentencing court consider

conduct occurring during the offense and conduct that

occurred prior to the offense that is substantially and directly

related to the offense.

In short, because Note (1) requires a sentencing court to

consider conduct occurring prior to and during the offense,

and does not expressly preclude a court from considering

other charged offenses aimed at different victims, it was not

plain error for the district court to conclude that Neal’s

offense (placing a lien on a victim) “involved” the false liens

placed on other victims that occurred prior to and during the

offense conduct. Therefore, on plain error review, we cannot

say the court committed error when it concluded that Neal’s

offense made him eligible for an enhancement under USSG

§ 2A6.1(b)(2).12

12 The question of whether we would have reached the same conclusion

if we were deciding the question in the first instance is not before us.

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28 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

B. It was not plain error for the district court to

apply multiple enhancements to Neal’s

sentence.

“As a general rule, it is appropriate for a court to consider

all applicable Guidelines provisions in calculating the

guidelines range for an offense. In particular, the Sentencing

Guidelines contemplate that courts will apply all applicable

specific offense characteristics to enhance the base offense

level.” United States v. Smith, 719 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir.

2013); see also USSG § 1B1.1(a)(2).

We infer that the Sentencing Commission would not

intend us to apply a Guideline provision that “would increase

a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that

has already been fully accounted for by application of another

part of the Guidelines.” Smith, 719 F.3d at 1124 (internal

quotation marks omitted). However, “when each invocation

of the behavior serves a unique purpose under the Guidelines,

we conclude that the Commission authorized and intended the

cumulative application of both provisions.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

On plain error review, we cannot say the district court

committed error when determining Neal’s sentence. The

district court applied upward enhancements under the

Multiple Count Grouping Guideline § 3D1.4 and under the

Offense Specific Guideline § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B). Because the

enhancements serve distinct purposes, we conclude that the

Commission “authorized and intended” the cumulative

application of both provisions. See Smith, 719 F.3d at 1124.

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 29

i. MultipleCountGroupingGuideline § 3D1.4

Section § 3D1.4 provides for upward enhancements when

a defendant commits multiple offenses. Because Neal was

convicted of fourteen offenses, Neal’s base offense level was

increased by five points. Section § 3D1.4 accomplishes the

Guidelines’ overall objective of providing “incremental

punishment for a defendant who is convicted of multiple

offenses.” See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154

(1997).

ii. OffenseSpecificGuideline § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B).

On the other hand, the enhancement under

Section 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) serves a distinct purpose from the

purpose of Section 3D1.4. The Offense Specific Guideline

§ 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement accounts for “the additional

time and resources required to remove multiple false liens or

encumbrances,” rather than accounting for incremental

punishment for multiple offenses. See USSG app. C amend.

718 (2007). The Comments to the Amendment enacting

§ 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) provide:

[T]he amendment expands the scope of the

two-level enhancement at subsection (b)(2) to

apply if the defendant is convicted under

18 U.S.C. § 1521 and the offense involved

more than two false liens or encumbrances,

and also provides an upward departure

provision that may apply if the offense

involved substantially more than two false

liens or encumbrances against the real or

personal property of the same victim. These

modifications reflect the additional time and

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30 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

resources required to remove multiple false

liens or encumbrances.

Id. (emphasis added). According to the Comments, the

§ 2A6.1(b)(2) enhancement may be imposed for one of two

reasons (only one of which Neal challenges). The

enhancement focuses on the number of false liens or

encumbrances, not the number of victims.

Additionally, § 2A6.1 Application Note (4)(B)

specifically allows for an upward departure if the offense

involved multiple liens and multiple victims. Note (4)(B)

provides:

(B) Multiple Threats, False Liens or

Encumbrances, or Victims; Pecuniary

Harm.—If the off ens e invol v ed

(i) substantially more than two threatening

communications to the same victim, (ii) a

prolonged period of making harassing

communications to the same victim,

(iii) substantially more than two false liens or

encumbrances against the real or personal

property of the same victim, (iv) multiple

victims, or (v) substantial pecuniary harm to a

victim, an upward departure may be

warranted.

USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.4(b) (emphasis added).

On plain error review, we cannot say the district court

committed error in applying multiple enhancements to Neal’s

sentence.

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UNITED STATES V. NEAL 31

4. The district court did not plainly err in imposing

Neal’s sentence, despite Neal’s presentence report

incorrectly listing the lengths of his previous

sentences.

Neal argues that the district court imposed a longer

sentence than it otherwise would have imposed, because his

presentence report incorrectly reported the lengths of his

previous sentences. Neal’s previous convictions were listed

in the criminal history section of his presentence report. The

presentence report indicated Neal was convicted of eight

separate counts related to a bank robbery. Each count was

listed separately along with its corresponding sentence (in

months). However, the presentence report did not include a

total number of months of imprisonment for the eight related

counts.

Neal argues that, if the months of imprisonment listed in

the presentence report for the eight counts related to the bank

robbery had been totaled, that total would show the report had

incorrectly listed the length of the individual sentences. We

agree that, if the individual sentences listed in the presentence

report had been totaled, the total would have been 425

months of incarceration, even though Neal was actually

sentenced to a total of 665 months of incarceration for the

related counts. However, we find no evidence to substantiate

Neal’s argument that, “[i]f the court had known” his previous

sentence was 665 months instead of 425 months as indicated

in the presentence report, “there was a reasonable probability

that the court would have imposed a lesser [current]

sentence.” Neal is correct, his presentence report did not

indicate the correct total number of months of imprisonment

for his previous sentences. However, Neal has provided no

evidence to indicate that the probation office used the length

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32 UNITED STATES V. NEAL

of his previous sentences (correct or incorrect) at all, in its

Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Nor is there evidence that

the lengths of Neal’s previous sentences were used for the

probation office’s within-Guidelines recommendation for

Neal’s current sentence.

Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate the court used

Neal’s previous sentences when determining the current

sentence. The district court sentenced Neal in accordance

with the Guidelines. According to USSG § 5G1.3(a) “[i]f the

instant offense was committed while the defendant was

serving a term of imprisonment . . . the sentence for the

instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the

undischarged term of imprisonment.” (Emphasis added). 

When sentencing Neal, the district court ordered that “[a]ny

sentence imposed is to be served consecutively, however, to

any undischarged term of imprisonment which the defendant

is currently serving.” (Emphasis added). Because the district

court neither miscalculated Neal’s sentence nor relied on

erroneous information in calculating his sentence, we

conclude that the sentence imposed was not plainly

erroneous.

For the foregoing reasons, Neal’s conviction and sentence

are AFFIRMED.

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