Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02153/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02153-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yan Naing
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2153

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Yan Naing

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: February 12, 2016

 Filed: May 2, 2016

____________

Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Yan Naing pleaded guilty to one count of failing to depart because he willfully

failed or refused "to make timely application in good faith for travel or other

documents necessary" for his departure after the Board of Immigration Appeals held

that he was removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B). Naing appeals the district

Appellate Case: 15-2153 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/02/2016 Entry ID: 4394129 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting that the deportation 1

order that was a predicate for the charge against him was invalid. Naing also appeals

the district court's grant of the government's motion in limine precluding him from

raising a coercion defense at trial.

Naing, a citizen of Burma, entered the United States as a refugee. He later

pleaded guilty in a Kansas state court to aggravated intimidation of a witness or

victim, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–3833 (repealed 2011) (now codified at Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 21–5909(b)), and the government notified him that this conviction was an

"aggravated felony" that rendered him deportable from the United States. See 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). After a number of hearings, the immigration judge

determined that Naing was indeed deportable and denied his requests for

discretionary relief. Naing appealed to the BIA, but it agreed with the IJ and

dismissed the appeal. Naing pursued no other administrative or judicial avenues of

relief; instead, he failed, contrary to his legal obligation, to procure the necessary

travel documents needed for his deportation, leading to the government'sindictment.

Naing maintains that he was not subject to a valid final order of removal—an

element of a failure-to-depart charge—because of due-process errors that the IJ

committed in the course of his deportation proceedings. A defendant charged with

violating § 1253(a) may, by a motion in limine in the district court, challenge the

"validity" of his deportation order if, as here, the order has not previously been

judicially reviewed. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(7)(A). It is not usual for courts to call an

order "invalid" unless the entity that rendered it was without jurisdiction to do so or

the order suffered from some other fundamental flaw. We do not ordinarily regard an

order invalid merely because it was erroneous. Nevertheless, the scope of the

challenge that this statute permits has been the subject of some dispute. Some courts

The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.

-2-

Appellate Case: 15-2153 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/02/2016 Entry ID: 4394129 
have borrowed the standard for collateral attacks used in the similar context of aliens

charged with illegal reentry into the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Ayeni,

66 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 (M.D. Pa. 1999); see also United States v. Matveyenko, No.

4:12–CR–306 CEJ (NAB), 2013 WL 1090338, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2013). Under

thatstatute, an alien must show that fundamental errorsin the deportation proceeding

improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review and that he exhausted

his administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). Other courts have intimated that the

scope of the challenge under the statute applicable here is much broader and mirrors

that of a direct review of the entire deportation proceeding. See United States v.

Diabate, No. 15–6042, 2016 WL 1104865, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2016). We need

not resolve the issue because Naing's challengesfail under any standard. We therefore

proceed as if the underlying deportation order is on direct review.

We review an alien's due-process challenges de novo. Bracic v. Holder, 603

F.3d 1027, 1032 (8th Cir. 2010). To prevail on such a claim, Naing must show that

there was a fundamental procedural error that resulted in prejudice to him; prejudice

arises when "the outcome of the proceeding may well have been different had there

not been any procedural irregularities." Id.

The first of Naing's contentions is related to his right to counsel at his

deportation proceeding. Although aliens have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel

in immigration proceedings, they do have a statutory right to have counsel represent

them at their own expense under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A) and 1362. The IJ must

advise the alien of his right to have counsel present, require him "to state then and

there whether he" desires representation, advise him of the availability of local pro

bono legal services, and ensure that he has received a list of pro bono legal-services

providers. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(2). Here, the IJ advised Naing of his right to

counsel during his first immigration hearing and ensured that he received the required

list, and Naing informed the IJ that he wanted an attorney. The IJ recommended

several times at this hearing that Naing speak with an attorney and suggested ways

-3-

Appellate Case: 15-2153 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/02/2016 Entry ID: 4394129 
to contact one, and the IJ continued the proceedings to allow Naing to hire counsel.

When proceedings resumed more than five weeks later, Naing appeared without an

attorney. The IJ did not question Naing again about his desire for counsel, and Naing

contendsthat the IJ violated due process by proceeding without an affirmative waiver

of counsel from him.

We see no fundamental unfairness here. Given the circumstances, the IJ was

justified in assuming that Naing wished to proceed without counsel, that, in other

words, he had waived his right to representation. Naing said nothing at the second

hearing suggesting that he needed more time to obtain counsel. See United States v.

Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 486 (1st Cir. 1997). The IJ advised Naing multiple times of

his right to counsel at the first hearing and provided Naing five weeks to obtain one

and suggestions for how to do so. In short, the IJ did nothing identifiably unfair,

"[a]nd absent some signal from [Naing]—such as a plausible request for a further

delay—we do not think that" the IJ violated due process by proceeding to the merits.

Id.

Naing's second due-process contention is that the IJ and the BIA failed to

advise him of his right to judicial review, and we see no evidence that they did. The

government points out that the IJ told Naing at least twice that he had a right to

appeal, once advising of a right to appeal "to a higher court." But in the context these

statements are best understood as referring to an appeal to the BIA, not a federal

court, not least because there is no right to direct judicial review of an IJ's order.

Nonetheless, we reject Naing's contention. It is true that we have held that a mere

failure to advise an alien in a deportation proceeding of his right to judicial review

ordinarily precludes the government from later using that deportation proceeding as

a predicate for a criminal offense against him. See United States v. Santos-Vanegas,

878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1989). But in this case Naing can show no resulting

prejudice. See id. The only possibly meritorious argument that Naing has that the IJ

and BIA erred in holding him removable is that the Kansas crime of which he was

-4-

Appellate Case: 15-2153 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/02/2016 Entry ID: 4394129 
convicted was not an "aggravated felony" that renders him removable under the law.

Naing made this argument to the district court and he makes it again here, but he did

not appeal that issue to the BIA, nor did the BIA rule on it. So that issue would not

have been reviewable had Naing appealed the BIA's order. See Ming Ming Wijono v.

Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 868, 871–72 (8th Cir. 2006). In short, Naing forfeited the point

by failing to raise it before the BIA, and so he could not possibly have obtained any

relief in a federal court on that point. Naing suffered no prejudice from not having

been told of his right to appeal.

Naing next insists that he was given no reasonable opportunity to examine

evidence against him because he did not receive a translated copy of the 2011 State

Department report on human rights in Burma used to reject his request for deferral

of removal under the Convention Against Torture. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).

Even if this was error, which we doubt, Naing has not demonstrated how it prejudiced

him. He never explains how he would have rebutted this report or how "the outcome

of the proceeding may well have been different" had he received a translated copy of

it sooner. See Bracic, 603 F.3d at 1032. 

Finally, Naing challenges the district court's grant of the government's motion

in limine precluding him from raising a coercion defense or calling an expert in

support of that defense. We review the district court's denial of a proffered legal

defense de novo, United States v. Diaz, 736 F.3d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir. 2013), and

while we typically review the exclusion of testimony intended to establish an

affirmative defense for abuse of discretion, we review the exclusion de novo where

it was based on the legal insufficiency of an affirmative defense. United States v.

Andrade-Rodriguez, 531 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on an affirmative defense if he can

demonstrate an "underlying evidentiary foundation" for each of its elements. United

States v. Hudson, 414 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 2005). The evidence of each element

-5-

Appellate Case: 15-2153 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/02/2016 Entry ID: 4394129 
must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in the defendant's favor. Diaz, 736

F.3d at 1149–50.

A coercion defense requires a defendant to prove, among other things, "that he

had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law." Id. at 1150. But Naing in

fact had such alternatives to failing to procure the documents necessary for his

departure. He could have moved the BIA to reconsider or reopen the immigration

proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)–(c), petitioned this court for review, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(2), or affirmatively designated another country for removal rather than

requesting that he be deported to any country but Burma. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(A)(i).

Because the evidentiary predicate for a successful coercion defense is lacking, the

district court committed no error precluding Naing from raising it.

Affirmed.

______________________________

-6-

Appellate Case: 15-2153 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/02/2016 Entry ID: 4394129