Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-13-02062/USCOURTS-ca10-13-02062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Kasey Dupree
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEVEN KASEY DUPREE,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-2062

(D.C. No. 2:12-CR-01165-JBM-1)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before LUCERO, MURPHY and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Steven Kasey Dupree pled guilty to a single-count indictment charging him with 

conspiracy to transport illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), 

1324(a)(1)(B)(i), and 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). His conditional plea agreement permits him to 

bring this appeal challenging the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress 

evidence. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The facts below reflect the findings of the district court, which adopted findings by 

 

*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of 

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 6, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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a magistrate judge. We accept these findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See 

United States v. Taylor, 592 F.3d 1104, 1108 (10th Cir. 2010). “A finding of fact is 

clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all the 

evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 

Plaza Speedway, Inc. v. United States, 311 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations 

omitted). Because we are reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, 

we recite the facts “in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. 

Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 996 (10th Cir. 2011). 

A. Factual Background 

 On February 7, 2012, Deputy Mike Waldrop—a deputy sheriff in Luna County, 

New Mexico—responded to a tip from his girlfriend, Marci Dworkin, notifying him that 

(1) her friend Brooke Jacobson had recently been beaten by Mr. Dupree and might still be 

in danger and (2) Mr. Dupree was harboring eight illegal immigrants at Ms. Jacobsen’s 

house, where he had been staying. 

 The magistrate judge did not make specific factual findings regarding when during 

the day Deputy Waldrop received the tip. See ROA, Vol. I at 148. However, testimony 

in the record indicates that Ms. Dworkin spoke with Deputy Waldrop about Ms. Jacobsen 

twice that day: once in the morning, and again around 3:30 in the afternoon. See id. at 

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79, 91-95.1 

 Ms. Dworkin told Deputy Waldrop that she had found Ms. Jacobsen badly beaten 

in a car in Ms. Dworkin’s driveway that morning, sometime around 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. 

According to the magistrate judge, Ms. Dworkin notified Deputy Waldrop that Ms. 

Jacobsen “feared that [Mr. Dupree] was going to kill her.” Id. at 148. Ms. Dworkin also 

mentioned that Mr. Dupree had eight illegal immigrants staying at Ms. Jacobsen’s house. 

 Although Ms. Dworkin was with Ms. Jacobsen early in the morning, Ms. Jacobsen 

dropped Ms. Dworkin off at work sometime before midday. While Ms. Jacobsen and 

Ms. Dworkin were in the car together, Mr. Dupree called Ms. Jacobsen, and Ms. Dworkin 

overheard him on the speakerphone asking Ms. Jacobsen, “Do you want me to kill you?” 

Id. at 96. 

Ms. Dworkin testified that when she called Deputy Waldrop that afternoon, she 

was concerned that Ms. Jacobsen would return to her home where Mr. Dupree was 

staying. Ms. Dworkin urged Deputy Waldrop to go to Ms. Jacobsen’s house to look for 

her, and she provided Deputy Waldrop with directions to the house. 

 Deputy Waldrop testified that he was concerned about Ms. Jacobsen’s safety at the 

 1

 Ms. Dworkin testified that she spoke to Deputy Waldrop once in the morning, in 

person, and again on the phone in the afternoon. See ROA, Vol. I at 91-95. Deputy 

Waldrop’s testimony, on the other hand, mentions only the afternoon phone call. See id.

at 79. It seems clear, however, that Deputy Waldrop spoke with Ms. Dworkin at least 

once around 3:00-3:30 p.m. 

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time of the call and that he decided to go to the house out of concern for her welfare.2 

Deputy Waldrop contacted his colleague Bobby Brookhouser, a detective, and together 

they went to the house. Although the magistrate judge did not make specific findings 

about when Deputy Waldrop and Detective Brookhouser got to the property, see id. at 

148, Deputy Waldrop testified that they arrived sometime between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m., 

after a half-hour drive, see id. at 47, 76. 

 Deputy Waldrop and Detective Brookhouser drove onto the property through an 

open gate. According to the magistrate judge’s findings, the officers initially knocked on 

the back door of the house, where no one answered.3

 They peered in the windows of the 

 2

 Deputy Waldrop also testified that he made unsuccessful attempts to contact Ms. 

Jacobsen by phone and to speak to another friend of Ms. Jacobsen’s who could be aware 

of her whereabouts. The magistrate judge’s findings of fact do not indicate the timing of 

Deputy Waldrop’s phone calls to Ms. Jacobsen. See ROA, Vol. I at 149. Moreover, it is 

unclear from Deputy Waldrop’s testimony whether his attempts to call her occurred 

before or after he went to the house to look for her. Compare id. at 61, with id. at 77-78. 

3

 There are inconsistencies in the record and in the parties’ briefs regarding which 

side of the house the officers approached first. Compare Aplt. Br. at 3 (indicating the 

officers initially knocked on the front door), with Aplee. Br. at 3 (indicating they knocked 

on the back door). Deputy Waldrop’s testimony is also inconsistent. At one point during 

the suppression hearing, Deputy Waldrop referred to an exhibit as depicting the back 

door of the house; he later referred to the same exhibit as an image of the front door. See

ROA, Vol. I at 46, 49, 50. 

A review of the record indicates plausible reasons for genuine confusion. 

Photographs of the property demonstrate that both sides of the residence look remarkably 

similar. Id. at 161-63. The architecture of the home does not clearly indicate which side 

is the front and which is the back, and the yard around the house appears continuous and 

mostly barren, providing no clue as to which side of the house is the front. Id. at 163. 

Furthermore, Deputy Waldrop testified that the driveway to the house approaches the 

Continued . . . 

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house and did not see anybody. Deputy Waldrop testified that the fact nobody answered 

heightened his concern for Ms. Jacobsen’s safety: “She could have been unconscious in 

there. She could have been dead in there. We did not know at that time. That’s why we 

were trying to make contact with her.” Id. at 47. 

While the officers stood outside the house, the door to a balcony on the second 

story of the house opened, and smoke started coming out of the door.4

 Deputy Waldrop 

testified that this fact heightened his concerns that Ms. Jacobsen “could have been in 

there, house burning, unconscious or dead.” Id. at 49. Deputy Waldrop and Detective 

Brookhouser circled to the other side of the house—what the magistrate judge concluded 

was the front door—where they saw a man who told them that the front door would not 

open. Deputy Waldrop and Detective Brookhouser then went back around to the back 

door, where the man came outside. 

 Deputy Waldrop asked the man how many people were inside. The man 

responded there were three, including himself. At that point a second man came out of 

 

back door, suggesting that the side of the home facing the main road is not necessarily the 

typical means of access into the house. See id. at 49. 

Given the parties’ confusion, we rely on the finding of the magistrate judge that 

the officers approached the back door of the house first. We cannot conclude that this 

finding is clearly erroneous based on our review of the record. See Plaza Speedway, 311 

F.3d at 1270 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, 

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quoting Anderson v. 

City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 

 

4

 It was later established that tortillas had caught fire while cooking on a stove on 

the second floor of the house, and this was the cause of the smoke. The fire was 

contained and limited to stove area. 

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the house. The two men yelled into the house for the third man to come out, but he did 

not. 

 Detective Brookhouser then entered the house to see who was there and conduct a 

protective sweep. He found a third man and brought him out of the house. Detective 

Brookhouser asked all three men if they had identification papers, and they stated they 

did not. The officers called United States Border Patrol, whose agents arrived and took 

the three undocumented men into their custody. 

 After leaving Ms. Jacobsen’s residence, Deputy Waldrop made phone calls to Ms. 

Jacobsen inquiring about her whereabouts, though he was unable to reach her. The 

following day, Deputy Waldrop saw Ms. Jacobsen at a restaurant and verified that she 

was safe. He testified that he did not generate a police report about her beating because 

Ms. Jacobsen did not want to pursue the matter. 

 Mr. Dupree was arrested the day after Deputy Waldrop and Detective 

Brookhouser searched Ms. Jacobsen’s residence. The presence of the three illegal aliens 

at Ms. Jacobsen’s house formed the basis to prosecute Mr. Dupree. 

B. Procedural Background 

 On May 16, 2012, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Mr. 

Dupree charging him with conspiracy to transport illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), and 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). 

 On June 25, 2012, Mr. Dupree moved to suppress all evidence derived from the 

February 7 search, including the three undocumented men found at the house. Mr. 

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Dupree argued that the police officers had no search warrant and that neither probable 

cause nor exigent circumstances excused the warrantless search. At the ensuing hearing, 

Mr. Dupree contended more specifically that the officers impermissibly entered the 

curtilage of Ms. Jacobsen’s property—the constitutionally protected “area to which 

extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the 

privacies of life.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quotations omitted).

In response, the Government argued at the hearing that (1) Mr. Dupree did not have 

standing to suppress the identity of the undocumented immigrants because he himself 

was not unlawfully detained or arrested; and (2) the police legally entered the curtilage of 

Ms. Jacobsen’s home due to exigent circumstances. 

The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, who conducted an evidentiary 

hearing at which Deputy Waldrop and Ms. Dworkin testified. 

 On October 24, 2012, the magistrate judge issued her Proposed Findings and 

Recommended Disposition. The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Dupree had 

standing to challenge the seizure of the undocumented immigrants because the 

Government had already conceded that Mr. Dupree had standing to contest the officers’ 

search of the property, in which he, as a temporary resident, had a reasonable expectation 

of privacy. See ROA, Vol. I at 151-53. The magistrate judge decided, however, that Mr. 

Dupree’s motion to suppress failed because (1) the officers did not impermissibly intrude 

upon the curtilage of the property before they entered the house and (2) their entry into 

the house itself was justified by exigent circumstances. Id. at 153-156. 

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 Regarding the first issue, the magistrate judge concluded that the officers did not 

move into the curtilage of the property before entering the house. She relied on the four 

factors defining curtilage articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn, 480 

U.S. 294, 301 (1987).5

 In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate judge found credible 

Deputy Waldrop’s testimony that the officers did not have to open any closed gates to 

drive up to the house. The magistrate judge also reasoned that the fence around the home 

did not restrict the public’s view of the property, nor was there any indication that the 

area around the house was intended for any particularly private use “associated with the 

sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quotations 

omitted). Additionally, photographs provided at the suppression hearing indicated that 

the back yard of the house was not separated from the front yard of the house, and both 

sides of the house looked very similar. In light of these facts, the magistrate judge 

concluded that the police had not impermissibly strayed from “places visitors could be 

expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches),” United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 

1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003), and so their observations from outside the house were not 

covered by the Fourth Amendment, id.

 Second, the magistrate judge concluded that the officers’ entry into the home itself 

 5

 The four factors used to determine the scope of the area around the home to be 

considered curtilage are: (1) “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the 

home”; (2) “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home”; 

(3) “the nature of the uses to which the area is put”; and (4) “the steps taken by the 

resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 

301 (1987). 

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was justified by exigent circumstances. There was no violation of Mr. Dupree’s 

constitutional rights when the two men came out of the house and voluntarily answered 

questions about their immigration status. Nor did Detective Brookhouser’s entry into the 

house violate the Fourth Amendment because it was justified by an “objectively 

reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of . . . 

others.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006). The magistrate 

judge concluded that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe there was 

an immediate need to protect Ms. Jacobsen because (1) there was smoke coming out of 

the second-story door, suggesting there may be a fire inside; (2) the two men who had 

come out of the house indicated that there was a third man inside,6

 and (3) Deputy 

Waldrop and Detective Brookhouser had reason to believe that Ms. Jacobsen may also 

have been inside the house based on the tip from Ms. Dworkin. The magistrate judge 

further determined that the protective sweep Detective Brookhouser conducted inside the 

house was reasonable and did not exceed the permissible bounds of a search justified by 

exigent circumstances. 

Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that Mr. Dupree’s motion to 

suppress be denied because (1) the officers had not entered onto the curtilage of the home 

when the two men came outside and (2) the entry into the home and discovery of the 

 6

 Although the magistrate judge did not specifically state this in her findings, see

ROA, Vol. I at 156, it would have been reasonable for the officers to believe the third 

man inside might be Mr. Dupree, who according to Ms. Dworkin’s tip was living with 

Ms. Jacobsen at the house at that time. 

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third man was justified by exigent circumstances. ROA, Vol. I at 155-56. Over Mr. 

Dupree’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations—

which it called “well-supported”—in full in an order dated November 8, 2012. Id. at 171. 

Mr. Dupree pled guilty on the condition that he would be allowed to appeal the 

district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Dupree contends the officers’ warrantless entry onto the property, movement 

around the property, and search inside the home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 

Specifically, Mr. Dupree argues that by entering the fenced premises without a warrant, 

approaching the house, and knocking on doors from both sides, the police impermissibly 

invaded the curtilage of the home, thereby conducting an unconstitutional search. See 

generally Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); Oliver, 466 U.S. 170. Mr. Dupree 

also contends that the exigent circumstances exception did not justify the officers’ entry 

into the house because some of the facts supporting the magistrate judge’s finding of 

exigency—specifically, the smoke coming from the second-story door and the statement 

of the two men who opened the door—were not apparent to the officers until they had 

already impermissibly entered onto the curtilage. 

 Because we hold that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ initial entry onto 

the property as well as the entire search, we need not decide whether their activities 

around the property occurred within the curtilage of the home. See Harvey v. United 

States, 685 F.3d 939, 950 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012) (we may “affirm on any ground adequately 

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supported by the record” (quotations omitted)). 

A. Standard of Review 

 As noted above, when reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and accept the 

district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Polly, 630 F.3d at 

996. We “review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth 

Amendment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 

2009)). 

“The existence of exigent circumstances is a mixed question of law and fact.” 

Najar, 451 F.3d at 717 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th 

Cir. 1992)). “Although we accept underlying fact findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous, the determination of whether those facts satisfy the legal test of exigency is 

subject to de novo review.” Anderson, 981 F.2d at 1567 (quotations omitted). 

B. Legal Framework 

 “It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside 

a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable” and therefore 

unconstitutional. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quotations 

omitted). The Fourth Amendment protection against “unreasonable searches and 

seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, extends to any areas in which “a person has a 

constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177. 

The curtilage—“the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home”—is 

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protected as part of the home itself. Id. at 180; see also Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414-15. 

 Searches of the curtilage or the home itself may be exempt from the warrant 

requirement if a “reasonable exception[]” applies. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 

1856 (2011). Exigent circumstances are one such exception; a warrantless search is 

permissible if the “exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so 

compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Exigencies excusing the warrant requirement include the “emergency aid” exception, 

under which “officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency 

assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Id.

(quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403). 

 Under this exception, officers may conduct a warrantless entry into a house when 

“(1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate 

need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope 

of the search is reasonable.” Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. The Government bears the burden 

of proving both elements of exigent circumstances. Id. at 717. 

C. Analysis 

 We hold that exigent circumstances justified Deputy Waldrop and Detective 

Brookhouser’s initial entry onto the property and the search that followed. Our inquiry 

asks first whether the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe there was an 

immediate need to protect Ms. Jacobsen. Second, we ask whether the manner and the 

scope of the search was reasonable in response to the exigency. See Najar, 451 F.3d at 

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718. 

 As we explain more fully below, the nature of the exigency changed during the 

course of the officers’ entry onto the property, and, as a result, the permissible manner 

and scope of the search changed as well. We therefore analyze the search in two stages: 

(1) the officers’ activities outside the home and (2) their entry and subsequent search 

inside the home. 

1. Search outside the home 

 a. The officers’ basis to believe there was an immediate need to protect lives 

Based on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and our review of the record, we 

conclude that at the time they arrived at the property, Deputy Waldrop and Detective 

Brookhouser had an “objectively reasonable basis to believe there was an immediate need 

to protect” Ms. Jacobsen, and this reasonable basis justified their entry onto the property. 

Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. 

 The Supreme Court has instructed that the emergency aid exception permits law 

enforcement officers to enter a home without a warrant “to render emergency assistance 

to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, 

547 U.S. at 403. Both justifications apply here. Deputy Waldrop testified that he knew 

from Ms. Dworkin that Ms. Jacobsen was injured and in need of protection, having been 

badly beaten, allegedly at the hands of Mr. Dupree. Admittedly, Ms. Dworkin testified 

that she first notified Deputy Waldrop that Ms. Jacobsen was injured sometime that 

morning, and Deputy Waldrop did not go over to her house until later that afternoon, 

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suggesting that the need “to render emergency assistance” to the injured Ms. Jacobsen 

may have passed. Id. But the second type of exigency—the need “to protect [Ms. 

Jacobsen] from imminent injury,” id.—was present at 4:30 p.m. Ms. Dworkin’s and 

Deputy Waldrop’s testimony agreed that Ms. Dworkin called Deputy Waldrop about Ms. 

Jacobsen around 3:30 p.m. Ms. Dworkin testified that she urged Deputy Waldrop to go 

over to Ms. Jacobsen’s house to check on her because she was afraid that Ms. Jacobsen 

may have gone back to the house since that morning and that Mr. Dupree would be there. 

Ms. Dworkin also told Deputy Waldrop that Ms. Jacobsen was afraid that Mr. Dupree 

would kill her. In these circumstances, we agree with the magistrate judge that “the 

officers were entitled to go to [Ms. Jacobsen’s] home to make sure she was all right.” 

ROA, Vol. I at 156. 

 Ms. Dworkin’s statement to Deputy Waldrop that Ms. Jacobsen was badly beaten 

was “credible evidence . . . of physical abuse” of the sort highlighting “the potential for 

violence” in a domestic dispute. See Storey v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 987, 995-96 (10th Cir. 

2012) (discussing cases from other jurisdictions in which exigent circumstances justified 

entry into a home in response to a report of a domestic dispute). Ms. Dworkin was not an 

unknown informant; she was Deputy Waldrop’s girlfriend. Deputy Waldrop testified that 

he believed her and was concerned about Ms. Jacobsen’s safety at the time of the call. 

Deputy Waldrop also testified that his knowledge of Mr. Dupree heightened his concern 

for Ms. Jacobsen’s welfare. Because Deputy Waldrop knew that Mr. Dupree had 

reportedly beaten and threatened Ms. Jacobsen that morning, he could reasonably 

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conclude that Mr. Dupree would do so again if she returned to the house. The officers’ 

initial entry onto the property was therefore justified to secure her safety. 

 Furthermore, the record indicates that Deputy Waldrop and Detective Brookhouser 

arrived at the house as quickly as possible after receiving Ms. Dworkin’s call around 3:30 

p.m. Deputy Waldrop took directions from Ms. Dworkin to Ms. Jacobsen’s house, met 

up with Detective Brookhouser, drove for half an hour, and arrived at Ms. Jacobsen’s 

property around 4:30 p.m. The speed of Deputy Waldrop’s response, coupled with his 

testimony that he feared Ms. Jacobsen was in danger, indicates that he and Detective 

Brookhouser acted in a manner that objectively reasonable officers would to “protect 

[Ms. Jacobsen] from imminent injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; see also Ohio v. 

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 

reasonableness.” (quotations omitted)). 

 b. Manner and scope of the search 

 We further conclude that “the manner and scope of the search” the officers 

conducted outside the house was reasonable and proportionate to the exigency at the 

time. See Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. Acting on information that Ms. Jacobsen was 

potentially in danger and inside the house, Deputy Waldrop and Detective Brookhouser 

initially approached the house and knocked on a door. When they received no answer, 

they had a reasonable basis to believe Ms. Jacobsen might be immobilized inside; at that 

point, they went to the other side of the home. This limited search was an appropriate 

attempt to find Ms. Jacobsen. 

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2. Search inside the home 

a. The officers’ heightened basis to believe there was an immediate need to 

protect lives 

 Mr. Dupree argues that exigent circumstances could not have justified the officers’ 

entry into the home because two facts the magistrate judge relied upon in her exigency 

determination—the smoke coming out of the house and the statement of the two 

undocumented men that there was a third man inside the house—were not apparent to the 

officers until they had already invaded the curtilage of the home. We disagree for two 

reasons. 

First, as explained above, the officers already had an exigency basis to search 

around the house to try to find Ms. Jacobsen. The officers therefore had not exceeded the 

scope of a permissible search when these additional facts came to their attention. 

Second, both the smoke and the statement about the third man heightened the 

exigency after the officers arrived at the home. The smoke flowing from the secondstory door in particular suggested the presence of a fire—a classic example of the sort of 

exigent circumstance that would justify a warrantless entry into a house. See Najar, 451 

F.3d at 714 (“A warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to 

rescue occupants or extinguish a fire.” (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 

212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). The statement that a third man was inside likewise reinforced the 

officers’ reasonable belief that Mr. Dupree might be present in the house. This 

information supplemented the ongoing threat to Ms. Jacobsen’s safety, coupled with the 

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fact that Ms. Dworkin apparently could not locate her and strongly suspected she had 

returned to the house. 

b. Manner and scope of the search

The manner and scope of Detective Brookhouser’s search inside the home was 

reasonable in light of this heightened exigency. The magistrate judge found that once 

Detective Brookhouser entered the home, he “did not search the house, other than to look 

for people in the house, and did not open drawers.” ROA, Vol. I at 156. We agree with 

the district court that under these circumstances, the manner and scope of the search was 

reasonable and lawful, and Mr. Dupree’s motion to suppress was properly denied. 

* * * 

 Because we hold that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ entry onto the 

property and the ensuing search was reasonable, we do not need to decide whether the 

officers came onto the curtilage of the property before entering the house itself.7

 

 7

 Although we are not required to decide this issue, we note that Deputy Waldrop 

and Detective Brookhouser’s initial search around the house likely did not impermissibly 

invade the curtilage. As we have already explained, photographs of the house indicate 

that it is unclear which side of the house is the back versus the front and what route marks 

the normal means of egress into the house. See supra note 3. As the magistrate judge 

noted, there was no indication that the yard was blocked off by a closed gate or that the 

area around the house, which was largely barren, was intended for “intimate activity 

associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Oliver, 466 U.S. 

at 180 (quotations omitted). 

Furthermore, law enforcement officers are permitted to enter onto part of the 

curtilage—“the normal route of access for anyone visiting the premises”—without first 

obtaining a warrant. See United States v. Shuck, 713 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 2013); see 

also id. (entry onto “walkways, driveways, porches” is allowed (quoting 1 Wayne R. 

Continued . . . 

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III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err by denying 

Mr. Dupree’s motion to suppress. His conviction is therefore affirmed. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

 

LaFave et al., Search & Seizure § 2.3(f) (5th ed., 2012 update))). Detective Brookhouser 

approached the house from the side closest to the driveway first; they then went around 

and examined the other side of the house, after they observed the smoke that heightened 

the exigency. See ROA, Vol. I at 49, 148-49. In these circumstances, it seems that the 

officers limited their approach to “the normal route of access for anyone visiting the 

premises,” or what appeared to be “places visitors could be expected to go.” Shuck, 713 

F.3d at 567. 

Moreover, the observations that the officers made while outside the house—

including seeing the smoke and looking in the windows—did not rise to the level of 

“searches” under the Fourth Amendment. See id. (“Observations made from such 

vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment.” (quotations omitted)); see 

also Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that officers 

standing in the front yard of a house were permitted to look inside windows); cf. 

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 n.2 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“If officers can smell drugs 

coming from a house, they can use that information; a human sniff is not a search, we can 

all agree.”). 

Appellate Case: 13-2062 Document: 01019181409 Date Filed: 01/06/2014 Page: 18