Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01046/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01046-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carbon Sequestration Council
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Gina McCarthy
Respondent
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 26, 2015 Decided June 2, 2015

No. 14-1046

CARBON SEQUESTRATION COUNCIL AND SOUTHERN COMPANY 

SERVICES, INC.,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND GINA 

MCCARTHY, ADMINISTRATOR,

RESPONDENTS

Consolidated with 14-1048

On Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action 

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency

Thomas Sayre Llewellyn argued the cause for petitioners.

With him on the briefs were Stacy R. Linden and Robert F. 

Van Voorhees. Alec W. Farr entered an appearance.

Michele L. Walter, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was 

John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, 

and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Under the Safe 

Drinking Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(“EPA” or “Agency”) is authorized to regulate the injection of 

fluids into underground wells to ensure that injection does not 

endanger drinking water sources. Under the Resource 

Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), EPA is 

authorized to regulate “solid waste,” which is defined, in part, 

as “discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 

contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 

commercial, mining, and agricultural operations.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6903(27). When fluid “solid waste” is injected into 

underground wells, that waste may be subject to regulation 

under both the Safe Drinking Water Act and RCRA.

In 2010, acting pursuant to its authority under the Safe 

Drinking Water Act, EPA promulgated a rule creating the 

new “Class VI” well, and prohibiting the injection of 

hazardous RCRA “solid waste” into such wells. See Federal 

Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control 

(UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic 

Sequestration (GS) Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230 (Dec. 10, 

2010). Class VI wells are designated to receive carbon 

dioxide streams generated as part of a climate change 

mitigation program known as “carbon capture and storage.” 

This program involves the capture of carbon dioxide from 

industrial sources, the compression of that carbon dioxide into 

a “supercritical fluid” that is neither a liquid nor a gas but has 

properties of both, and the injection of that supercritical 

carbon dioxide into an underground well to ensure that it does 

not reenter the atmosphere. Because the final stage of carbon 

capture and storage – geologic sequestration of the 

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supercritical carbon dioxide – involves the underground 

injection of fluid, it is subject to Safe Drinking Water Act 

regulation.

A question arose during the course of the Class VI 

rulemaking whether carbon dioxide streams injected into 

Class VI wells are also “solid waste” subject to regulation 

under RCRA. EPA initiated a separate rulemaking in part to 

address that question. Several commenters argued that the 

carbon dioxide streams do not fit within the statutory 

definition of solid waste. And a number of commenters were 

concerned that if EPA determined that supercritical fluids are 

solid waste, then generators and injectors of these streams 

would be obliged to comply with costly RCRA regulations.

On Jan. 3, 2014, EPA issued a final rule in which it 

determined that supercritical carbon dioxide injected into 

Class VI underground wells for purposes of geologic 

sequestration is “solid waste” within the meaning of RCRA. 

See Hazardous Waste Management System: Conditional 

Exclusion for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Streams in Geologic 

Sequestration Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 350 (Jan. 3, 2014).

EPA interpreted the phrase “including solid, liquid, semisolid, 

or contained gaseous material” as illustrative, rather than 

exhaustive, and stated that supercritical fluids fall within the 

statutory definition because they are of the same kind as those 

expressly included in the definition. 79 Fed. Reg. at 355. EPA 

also determined that the geologically sequestered streams 

constitute “discarded material” within the meaning of the 

statute because they are injected underground with the express 

intention of isolating them from reentry into the atmosphere, 

even though they could, theoretically, be extracted and reused 

in the future. Id. Having so concluded, EPA determined that

supercritical carbon dioxide streams injected into Class VI 

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wells for the purpose of geologic sequestration constitute

“solid waste” subject to RCRA. 

The Carbon Sequestration Council, Southern Company 

Services, Inc. (which is a member of the Carbon 

Sequestration Council), and the American Petroleum Institute 

(together, “Petitioners”) now seek review of EPA’s solid 

waste determination, arguing that the supercritical carbon 

dioxide streams at issue in this rule are not RCRA solid waste. 

The Carbon Sequestration Council asserts representational 

standing on behalf of Southern; and the American Petroleum 

Institute asserts representational standing on behalf of 

Occidental Oil and Gas (“Occidental”). Because we find that 

Petitioners have no standing to pursue this challenge, we 

dismiss for want of jurisdiction. As the parties invoking 

federal jurisdiction, Petitioners “bear[] the burden of 

establishing” Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). They “must support each 

element of [their] claim to standing by affidavit or other 

evidence. [Their] burden of proof is to show a substantial 

probability that [they have] been injured, that the defendant 

caused [their] injury, and that the court could redress that 

injury.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Petitioners have failed to meet this burden of proof. 

Southern Company Services, Inc. (“Southern”) has failed 

to allege that it uses or intends to use any Class VI wells.

Rather, it captures and compresses carbon dioxide either for 

use in enhanced oil recovery or in Class V experimental 

wells. The disputed rule addresses only streams injected into 

Class VI wells for the purpose of geologic sequestration, 

which are not mentioned in Southern’s affidavit supporting 

standing. American Petroleum Institute (“Institute”), in turn, 

relies on one of its members, Occidental, in an effort to 

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demonstrate representational standing. Occidental, however, 

acknowledges that it is not directly regulated by the disputed 

rule. Rather, Occidental claims that EPA’s 2014 rule presages 

regulation of its enhanced oil recovery activities, and that this 

will cause it to change its business practices in anticipation of

likely future regulation. This is not enough in this case to 

demonstrate injury sufficient to meet the standing 

requirements of Article III. There is nothing in EPA’s 

disputed rule to suggest that EPA intends to extend the rule to 

cover the activities of concern to Occidental; indeed, EPA 

expressly distinguished Occidental’s activities from those 

being regulated and suggested that they are unlikely to be 

regulated in the future. Therefore, the actions taken by 

Occidental in anticipation of unspecified regulations are not 

fairly traceable to EPA’s 2014 rulemaking. 

Neither Southern nor Occidental can show any injury 

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III. They 

therefore lack standing. Carbon Sequestration Council lacks 

standing because Southern lacks standing. And American 

Petroleum Institute lacks standing because Occidental lacks 

standing. The petitions for review are hereby dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Because Petitioners lack standing, we have no occasion 

to consider whether supercritical fluids injected into a Class 

VI well that is subject to regulation under the Safe Drinking 

Water Act constitute “solid waste” that must also be regulated 

under RCRA. Nevertheless, because the regulatory context is 

crucial to understanding the Article III standing issues in this 

case, we begin with a brief review of the relevant statutes and 

regulations.

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A. The Safe Drinking Water Act’s Regulation of 

Underground Injection of Fluids 

The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq., 

empowers EPA to promulgate regulations protecting the 

quality of drinking water sources in the United States. One of 

the industrial activities regulated under the statute is the 

injection of fluids into underground wells, when that injection 

may endanger the safety of drinking water sources. Id.

§ 300h(b)(1). To prevent any danger from underground 

injection of fluids, EPA has promulgated regulations creating 

“classes” of underground injection control wells, each with 

different construction and use requirements, and each 

authorized to receive different kinds of fluids under different 

circumstances. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (describing the classes 

of wells). For example, Class I wells are the most secure and 

can be used for the injection of hazardous and radioactive

waste. Class II wells are used for natural gas storage 

operations or oil or natural gas production. See id. This case 

involves the recently created “Class VI” well, which EPA 

created for carbon capture and storage operations involving 

the geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide. Any well owner 

or operator who seeks to inject fluids underground must meet 

the permitting requirements for the kind of injection well they 

intend to operate.

B. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s 

Regulation of Solid Waste

EPA also administers RCRA, which establishes 

regulatory standards for “solid waste.” Under RCRA, 

generators of solid waste must determine whether that waste 

is hazardous, and then treat hazardous solid waste according 

to various regulatory requirements. The Act defines “solid 

waste,” in relevant part, as follows:

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The term “solid waste” means any garbage, refuse, 

sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply 

treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other 

discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 

contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 

commercial, mining, and agricultural operations . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (emphasis added). Importantly, this 

definition makes clear that statutory “solid waste” is not

limited only to waste that is solid. Rather, it includes “other 

discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 

contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 

commercial, mining, and agricultural operations.” See id.

Some waste that is not in a solid state – for example, liquid 

waste – can thus be considered “solid waste” within the 

meaning of the statute if it is “discarded material” and 

otherwise within the definition in the statute.

As noted above, generators of solid waste “must 

determine if that waste is a hazardous waste.” 40 C.F.R. 

§ 262.11. The statute defines “hazardous waste” as follows:

The term “hazardous waste” means a solid waste, or 

combination of solid wastes, which because of its 

quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or 

infectious characteristics may –

(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase 

in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or 

incapacitating reversible, illness; or

(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to 

human health or the environment when improperly 

treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise 

managed.

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42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). The Act then creates a “‘cradle-tograve’ regulatory structure overseeing the safe treatment, 

storage and disposal of hazardous waste.” United Techs. 

Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

EPA has construed RCRA to allow it to conditionally

exclude regulated parties from the potentially costly 

requirement of determining whether solid waste is hazardous.

See Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 958 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (upholding the authority to grant conditional 

exclusions). Whether a waste should be exempted from 

hazardous waste regulation “turns upon [EPA’s] assessment 

of whether such regulation is necessary to protect human 

health and the environment.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) 

(directing EPA to issue regulations governing the 

management of hazardous waste “as may be necessary to 

protect human health and the environment”).

C. Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide and the 

“Class VI” Well

Carbon capture and storage is an emerging climate 

change mitigation program that involves capturing carbon 

dioxide from industrial sources, compressing it into a 

“supercritical fluid,” and injecting that fluid underground for 

the purposes of geologic sequestration, with the goal of 

preventing the carbon from reentering the atmosphere.

Because the last of these steps – geologic sequestration of the 

supercritical carbon dioxide – involves the injection of fluid 

into underground wells, it is subject to regulation under the 

Safe Drinking Water Act.

As carbon capture and storage technologies developed, 

EPA concluded that, in compliance with the Safe Drinking 

Water Act, it should create a new “class” of underground 

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injection well specifically to govern injection of carbon 

dioxide for geologic sequestration. After notice and comment, 

EPA promulgated a rule creating the “Class VI” well. See 75 

Fed. Reg. at 77,230. The Class VI well exists strictly “for 

underground injection of carbon dioxide (CO2) for the

purpose of geologic sequestration.” Id.

While the Class VI well is meant to receive carbon 

dioxide streams for geologic sequestration, EPA clarified in 

the rule that the wells could not receive “any carbon dioxide 

stream that meets the definition of a hazardous waste under”

RCRA and its associated regulations. Id. at 77,231.

A number of commenters expressed concerns about this 

exclusion of hazardous waste from Class VI wells because it 

suggested that some supercritical carbon dioxide streams were 

solid waste regulated by RCRA. Although EPA had never

addressed this issue, these commenters feared that if EPA 

found RCRA applicable to these carbon dioxide streams this 

would require regulated parties to make costly pre-injection 

determinations as to whether their streams were hazardous.

Although the commenters raised their concerns during 

the course of the Class VI rulemaking proceedings, EPA 

stated that the Class VI rule “does not itself change applicable 

RCRA regulations.” Id. at 77,260. The agency thus made 

clear that the Class VI rule did not provide an answer to the 

question whether geologically sequestered carbon dioxide 

streams are either solid or hazardous waste.

D. EPA’s Rulemaking to Determine RCRA’s Applicability 

to Geologically Sequestered Carbon Dioxide Streams

In 2010, EPA initiated a rulemaking to determine 

whether RCRA applies to carbon dioxide streams being 

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geologically sequestered in a Class VI well. See Hazardous 

Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of 

Hazardous Waste: Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Streams in 

Geologic Sequestration Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,073

(Aug. 8, 2011) (proposed rule). In the course of this 

rulemaking, EPA made two principal determinations.

First, EPA concluded that a “supercritical [carbon 

dioxide] stream injected into a permitted . . . Class VI well for 

purposes of [geologic sequestration] is a RCRA solid waste.”

76 Fed. Reg. at 48,077–78; see also 79 Fed. Reg. at 355. The 

relevant part of RCRA’s “solid waste” definition reads:

The term “solid waste” means any garbage, refuse, 

sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply 

treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other 

discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 

contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 

commercial, mining, and agricultural operations . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (emphasis added).

Several commenters had argued that supercritical carbon 

dioxide streams injected into Class VI wells for purposes of 

geologic sequestration could not be solid waste because, as 

“supercritical fluids” that are neither liquids nor gases but 

have properties of both, they are not among the “solid, liquid, 

semisolid, or contained gaseous” physical states mentioned in 

the definition. See 79 Fed. Reg. at 354–55. These commenters 

also argued that the carbon dioxide streams were not 

“discarded” when they were injected for the purpose of 

geologic sequestration in a Class VI well, because the carbon 

dioxide streams could be extracted again and used 

productively in drilling and other operations. Id.

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EPA rejected these arguments, interpreting the statute to 

include these supercritical fluid streams. It stated that while 

“supercritical fluids” were not expressly mentioned in the 

statutory list defining “solid waste,” the list was illustrative, 

not exhaustive, and supercritical fluids were similar to the 

physical states expressly included. See id. Furthermore, EPA 

found that carbon dioxide streams injected into Class VI wells 

for the purpose of long-term geologic sequestration were 

“discarded” at the moment they were injected, even if they 

could, theoretically, be extracted again for other uses. Id. As a 

result, these streams, when injected into Class VI wells for the 

purpose of geologic sequestration, were solid waste and 

subject to regulation under RCRA.

Second, EPA concluded that although it “believes that the 

RCRA hazardous waste regulations can apply to [carbon 

dioxide] streams being geologically sequestered” because 

these streams are solid waste, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,077, it would 

nevertheless grant a conditional exclusion from the definition 

of “hazardous waste” for such supercritical carbon dioxide 

streams when the generators and injectors of those streams 

abided by certain requirements. 79 Fed. Reg. at 355–57. EPA 

concluded that RCRA regulations were unnecessary because 

existing pipeline safety regulations promulgated by the 

Department of Transportation, in conjunction with the safety 

requirements already in place in the Class VI regulations, 

were sufficient to achieve RCRA’s goals. 76 Fed. Reg. at 

48,081. Under EPA’s conditional exclusion, generators and 

well owners and operators could consider their carbon dioxide 

streams excluded from the hazardous waste definition, and 

could avoid testing their solid waste streams for hazardous 

properties, if they: (1) abided by the relevant Department of 

Transportation pipeline regulations, (2) abided by the Class 

VI injection regulations, (3) did not mix other hazardous 

wastes with their carbon dioxide streams, and (4) certified to 

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the above conditions. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(h). Thus, excluded 

streams could be injected into Class VI wells without running 

afoul of the Class VI regulation’s ban on the injection of 

RCRA hazardous waste.

Petitioners do not contest the portion of EPA’s rule that 

creates a conditional exclusion from the hazardous waste 

definition. Instead, Petitioners challenge only EPA’s 

determination that supercritical carbon dioxide streams 

injected into Class VI wells are “solid waste” within the 

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).

Before this court, Petitioners submit two declarations to 

demonstrate their standing to pursue their petitions for review. 

The first of these declarations is from petitioner Southern 

Company Services, Inc., which is part of a corporate family 

that includes several electricity generating power plants. 

Southern is also a member of petitioner Carbon Sequestration 

Council, which claims representational standing on behalf of 

Southern. Southern’s corporate family tests carbon capture 

technology, participates in geologic sequestration experiments 

in “Class V” experimental wells, and also captures carbon for 

use in enhanced oil recovery and other commercial purposes. 

The second declaration is from Occidental Oil and Gas. 

Occidental is a member of petitioner American Petroleum 

Institute, which claims representational standing on behalf of 

Occidental. Occidental is an oil exploration company that 

injects carbon dioxide into underground wells as part of its 

drilling operations. 

The record is clear that neither Occidental nor Southern 

operates or plans to operate Class VI wells and neither is 

regulated in any way by the narrow rule at issue in this case. 

Since neither can show any injury attributable to EPA’s 

disputed rule, they lack the standing necessary to satisfy the 

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requirements of Article III. Carbon Sequestration Council 

lacks standing because Southern lacks standing. Likewise, 

American Petroleum lacks standing because Occidental lacks 

standing.

II. ANALYSIS

“It is well understood that a party who seeks to pursue an 

action in federal court must first establish Article III 

standing.” Bauer v. Mavi Marmara, 774 F.3d 1026, 1028 

(D.C. Cir. 2014). Therefore, a federal court cannot proceed to 

the merits of a claim unless it can satisfy itself that at least 

one claimant has standing to bring suit. 

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Petitioners

“bear[] the burden of establishing” standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 561. In a case such as this, 

[t]he petitioner's burden of production in the court of 

appeals is . . . the same as that of a plaintiff moving for 

summary judgment in the district court: it must support 

each element of its claim to standing by affidavit or other 

evidence. Its burden of proof is to show a substantial 

probability that it has been injured, that the defendant 

caused its injury, and that the court could redress that 

injury.

Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

In some cases, such as when a petitioner is “an object of 

the action” under review, standing may be “self-evident.” Id.

at 899–900 (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a 

“petitioner’s standing is not self-evident . . . the petitioner 

must supplement the record to the extent necessary to explain 

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and substantiate its entitlement to judicial review.” Id. at 900 

(emphasis added). Thus, a petitioner has a duty to “establish 

its standing by the submission of its arguments and any 

affidavits or other evidence appurtenant thereto at the first 

appropriate point in the review proceeding.” Id. “Requiring 

the petitioner to establish its standing at the outset of its case 

is the most fair and orderly process by which to determine 

whether the petitioner has standing to invoke the jurisdiction 

of the court.” Id. at 901. And because the party seeking to 

invoke the jurisdiction of the court carries the burden of 

proof, we normally accept a petitioner’s submissions in 

support of standing as offered. The court then determines 

whether the petitioner’s submissions demonstrate a substantial 

probability of actual or imminent injury, show that the alleged 

injury was caused by the disputed agency action, and indicate

that the court can redress that injury.

As we explain below, Petitioners have failed to meet their 

burden of proof necessary to demonstrate standing.

A. Southern Company Services, Inc.

Southern provides regulatory and engineering services 

for its corporate family, which delivers energy-related 

services, including electric power, in the states of Alabama, 

Georgia, Florida, and Mississippi. Southern submitted the 

declaration of Richard A. Esposito, its Principal Research 

Geologist, in support of its claim to standing and in support of 

Carbon Sequestration Council’s claim to representational 

standing.

Esposito’s affidavit describes Southern’s involvement in 

carbon capture, including testing carbon capture technologies 

and installing carbon capture equipment on a variety of the 

electricity generating plants in its corporate family. Among 

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other things, Southern’s corporate family provides 

supercritical carbon dioxide from several of its plants for 

geologic sequestration demonstration projects being 

conducted by the United States Department of Energy. Much 

of the captured carbon dioxide from the plants is injected into

Class V wells, which are authorized for testing experimental 

technologies such as those involved in geologic sequestration.

Decl. of Richard A. Esposito ¶¶ 7–8, 10. Beyond its 

involvement in testing carbon sequestration technologies 

using experimental Class V wells, Southern’s corporate 

family also plans to capture carbon dioxide for use by other 

companies in enhanced oil recovery and for “other 

commercial uses.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Esposito’s affidavit contends

that EPA’s solid waste determination injures Southern by 

requiring it to incur costs to determine whether its carbon 

dioxide streams are hazardous.

Southern lacks standing because Esposito’s affidavit fails

to point to any activity covered by the regulation at issue in 

this case – namely, the injection of “a supercritical [carbon 

dioxide] stream . . . into a permitted . . . Class VI well for 

purposes of [geologic sequestration].” 79 Fed. Reg. at 354. As 

a result, there is no evidence in the record to support 

Southern’s claim that the disputed rule injures Southern by

requiring it to incur costs related to determining whether its 

carbon dioxide streams are hazardous waste. Stated simply, 

the record is devoid of evidence showing that Southern is 

regulated or otherwise injured by EPA’s solid waste 

determination.

As noted above, Southern has averred that it engages or 

plans to engage in two assertedly relevant activities: (1) 

capturing carbon dioxide for use in enhanced oil recovery and 

“other commercial uses,” and (2) capturing carbon dioxide for 

injection into Class V experimental wells in connection with 

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geologic sequestration demonstration projects. Neither of 

these activities is covered by EPA’s solid waste 

determination. EPA has strictly and clearly limited its solid 

waste determination to carbon dioxide streams injected into 

Class VI wells for purposes of geologic sequestration, 

meaning that any requirement that Southern might have to 

determine whether its carbon dioxide streams are hazardous is 

speculative rather than actual or imminent. There is no 

evidence that Southern operates or plans to operate Class VI 

wells, or that any of Southern’s business activities are covered 

by this rule.

Petitioners attempt to escape this conclusion by stating

that “Southern is harmed by EPA’s decision to include 

captured supercritical carbon dioxide streams in the definition 

of ‘solid waste’ because Southern will incur costs to 

determine if any carbon dioxide stream it captures is a RCRA 

hazardous waste.” Opening Br. of Petitioners 16. In support of 

this theory of standing, Southern points to Esposito’s 

declaration in which he states that “[u]nder the final rule, it 

will be necessary for anyone who captures carbon dioxide 

streams from an emission source to determine whether the 

captured carbon dioxide stream is a ‘hazardous waste’ subject 

to RCRA.” Decl. of Richard A. Esposito ¶ 18 (emphasis 

added). This claim finds no support in the record.

EPA has made it very clear in its rule, in its brief, and 

during oral argument before the court that its solid waste 

determination is limited to supercritical carbon dioxide 

streams injected into Class VI wells for the purpose of 

geologic sequestration. The rule does not classify carbon 

dioxide used in enhanced oil recovery or for experimentation 

in Class V wells as “solid waste,” and so Esposito’s statement 

that “anyone who captures carbon dioxide streams from an 

emission source [must] determine whether the captured 

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carbon dioxide stream is a ‘hazardous waste’” is simply 

wrong. 

In a vain attempt to support their position, Esposito and 

Petitioners selectively quote part of EPA’s proposed rule as 

saying that “all generators that capture [carbon dioxide] . . . 

would incur costs to determine if the [carbon dioxide] stream 

is a RCRA hazardous waste.” See, e.g., Opening Br. of 

Petitioners 16–17 (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,089). But 

Esposito and Petitioners leave out that this quotation comes 

from the proposed rule’s economic assessment of the possible 

impact of the rule, in which EPA “assume[d]” that all existing 

generators capturing carbon would incur costs. 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 48,089. In the context of the cost-benefit analysis that 

assumption made sense, because EPA also “assume[d] . . . all 

generators that capture [carbon dioxide] will . . . send their 

[carbon dioxide] streams to Class VI wells.” Id. at 48,090.

These assumptions do not define the scope of the disputed 

rule. To the contrary, EPA has stated that it “considers 

[supercritical carbon dioxide streams] to be a solid waste” 

only “[o]nce the decision is made that the supercritical 

[carbon dioxide] stream will be sent to a . . . Class VI well for 

discard.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,078. Since Southern has not 

stated that it currently or in the future intends to send its 

carbon dioxide streams to Class VI wells, the rule, by its own 

terms, does not apply, and Southern will not incur the injuries 

it claims as a result of EPA’s solid waste determination in this 

case.

With respect to the use of carbon dioxide in commercial 

activities such as enhanced oil recovery, EPA expressly

distinguished such commercial uses of carbon dioxide from 

the specific, narrow use at issue in this case. EPA made it 

clear that carbon dioxide used in oil recovery raises issues that 

“are beyond the scope of this final rule.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 355. 

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The rule concerns only carbon dioxide “streams when they 

are to be injected into . . . Class VI wells for the purpose of 

[geologic sequestration].” Id. (emphasis in original).

It is no less clear that EPA’s rule does not embrace any 

determination regarding Class V experimental wells, because

EPA explicitly stated in its solid waste determination that the 

“rule is not intended to affect the status of [carbon dioxide] 

that is injected into wells other than . . . Class VI wells.” 76 

Fed. Reg. at 48,078 & n.16. Counsel for EPA also confirmed 

at oral argument that the agency’s solid waste determination 

in this rule did not reach experimental injection into Class V 

wells. Oral Arg. 24:35.

Finally, Petitioners argue that Southern is injured by 

EPA’s solid waste determination because the company may 

not always be able to rely on the conditional exclusion

included in EPA’s final rule. And, according to Petitioners, 

this may cause Southern to incur the costs associated with the 

requirement to make hazardous waste determinations. For 

example, “Southern may decide to contract for geologic 

sequestration of some of [its] carbon dioxide . . . through a 

commingled pipeline system” that will deliver carbon dioxide 

streams both to Class VI wells and to other uses such as 

enhanced oil recovery operations. Reply Br. of Petitioners 11. 

“In that circumstance, Southern will have no way of knowing 

whether its carbon dioxide stream is actually sequestered in a 

Class VI well . . . .” Id. EPA contests Southern’s description 

of the requirements of the conditional exclusion, arguing that 

Southern would have no difficulty abiding by the exclusion. 

We need not address this matter, however, because Southern’s 

claim fails on its own terms. The Esposito affidavit does not 

say, or even suggest, that Southern is considering entering 

into such an arrangement. In order to establish standing, a 

petitioner’s evidentiary submissions “must be more than an 

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ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.” Alaska 

Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 181 F.3d 1333, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Counsel’s 

unsupported assertions in a Reply Brief are inadequate to 

meet the burden of proof to demonstrate standing.

B. The American Petroleum Institute and Occidental Oil 

and Gas 

American Petroleum Institute, a party in this case, 

attempts to rely on its member Occidental Oil and Gas in 

support of representational standing. See Public Citizen, Inc. 

v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1289 

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“An organization has standing to sue on 

behalf of its members when, among other things, its members 

would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Occidental produces oil 

and gas in the United States and around the world, 

occasionally using enhanced oil recovery processes involving 

the injection of carbon dioxide into underground wells. In 

support of standing, Occidental submitted the affidavit of 

Greg Hardin, its Director of Regulatory Affairs.

Hardin’s affidavit explains Occidental’s use of carbon 

dioxide streams in its oil exploration efforts, which involve 

injecting these streams underground to release trapped oil 

from porous rock and make the oil flow more easily to the 

wellhead. The affidavit states that over time virtually all of 

the injected carbon dioxide becomes permanently trapped 

underground, occupying the pore space remaining after the oil 

and gas have been produced. While Hardin acknowledges that 

the rule under review does not directly cover Occidental’s use 

of carbon dioxide streams, and further acknowledges that the 

rule explicitly indicates that EPA’s position is that use of 

carbon dioxide streams in enhanced oil recovery “would not 

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generally be a waste management activity,” Hardin 

nevertheless claims that the rule injures Occidental. Decl. of 

Greg Hardin ¶ 8 (quoting 79 Fed. Reg. at 355).

Hardin contends that EPA’s “broad assertion” of 

authority resulting from the agency’s solid waste 

determination may presage further regulatory action touching 

on Occidental’s drilling operations. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. For this

reason, Hardin claims that “EPA’s assertion of authority, if 

left undisturbed, will influence Occidental’s business 

decisions concerning the expansion of [carbon dioxide 

enhanced oil recovery] going forward.” Id. ¶ 8. This is 

insufficient to demonstrate standing.

Occidental has not averred that it is engaged in any 

activity regulated by the narrow rule at issue in this case. Any 

injury it could claim as a direct result of the regulation would 

be speculative, because, as demonstrated above, EPA 

carefully cabined its rule to encompass only the injection of 

carbon dioxide streams into Class VI wells for purposes of 

geologic sequestration. Occidental has not claimed any 

interest in pursuing these regulated activities. Perhaps sensing 

this problem, Petitioners do not claim that Occidental will 

incur costs as a direct consequence of EPA’s solid waste 

determination. Rather, they claim that EPA’s determination 

“will influence Occidental’s business decisions,” forcing it to 

incur costs and alter its behavior in anticipation of

incremental regulatory action. See Opening Br. of Petitioners 

17–18.

In support of their position, Petitioners cite Sabre, Inc. v. 

Department of Transportation, 429 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). In Sabre, the Department of Transportation

(“Department”) issued a rule “unambiguously claim[ing] 

jurisdiction over” Sabre, the petitioner in that case. Id. at 

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1117. Although that contested claim of jurisdiction did not 

itself impose any immediate regulatory injuries, this court 

found that Sabre had standing to challenge the jurisdictional 

determination because the Department’s statements 

“indicate[d] a very high probability that it [would] act against 

a practice that” Sabre had shown, through detailed evidence, 

it was interested in pursuing. Id. Specifically, the Department 

“strongly condemn[ed]” Sabre’s desired activity and made 

clear that it viewed it as “categorically anti-competitive and 

unfair,” “reject[ing] arguments that [it] may have social 

benefits.” Id. Because the Department had authority to impose 

penalties on Sabre without any further action, the court found 

that, under these circumstances, the Department’s assertion of 

jurisdiction had “immediate, unavoidable implications for 

Sabre’s business choices and investments, which constitutes a 

sufficiently distinct and palpable injury.” Id. at 1118. Because 

Sabre had “proffered evidence in a sealed supplemental 

declaration that confirm[ed] the present existence” of business 

plans that would be interrupted as a result of the Department’s 

assertion of jurisdiction, the court concluded that the company

had met its burden of showing that its “injury [was] actual, 

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id.

Sabre is clearly inapposite, and gives no support to 

Occidental’s standing claim here. Unlike that case, in which 

the agency had unambiguously established jurisdiction over a 

party, in this case EPA has – as Hardin admits in his affidavit

– explicitly declined to assert jurisdiction over the enhanced 

oil recovery activities engaged in by Occidental. Additionally, 

the agency’s statements in Sabre explicitly condemned the

regulated party’s desired activity and indicated a high 

likelihood of agency enforcement action. Occidental has faced 

no such statements from EPA in this case. In fact, EPA has 

stated its “expectation that [injection of carbon dioxide 

streams as part of enhanced oil recovery] would not generally 

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be a waste management activity” subject to RCRA. 79 Fed. 

Reg. at 355.

In sum, the record in this case stands in stark contrast to 

the situation encountered by the regulated party in Sabre. The 

disputed rule here is indisputably narrow and it does not 

capture any of Occidental’s business activities. Therefore, 

Occidental cannot show that EPA’s solid waste determination

has “immediate, unavoidable implications” for its business 

that create a “distinct and palpable injury.” Occidental 

speculates that its enhanced oil recovery activities may at 

some ill-defined time in the future be subject to the disputed 

rule. But there is nothing in the record to support this claim. 

Standing cannot be “inferred argumentatively,” based on a 

party’s “(mis)characterization” and “exaggeration of [an 

agency’s’] findings.” See Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc. v. FAA, 

211 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Occidental surely cannot claim injury sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements of Article III standing based purely on a 

speculative concern that EPA may choose to regulate its 

business at some point in the indefinite future. And any 

business decisions prompted by its misreading of the solid 

waste determination cannot reasonably be attributed to EPA. 

Because Occidental lacks standing, the Institute cannot claim 

representational standing on its behalf.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Petitioners have failed to establish the standing 

of any party in this case, we dismiss the petitions for review.

So ordered.

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