Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_08-cv-00516/USCOURTS-almd-3_08-cv-00516-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Defendant
Greyhound Lines, Inc.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

 The parties have thoroughly briefed the issues and the court does not find that oral

argument would be helpful in resolving the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

 GREYHOUND LINES, INC., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 3:08cv516-WHA

 ) (WO)

THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s

Property Damage Claim (Doc. #87) filed by the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) and

a Motion for Oral Argument (Doc. #109) filed by Greyhound.1 

Goodyear has moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiff, Greyhound Lines, Inc.’s

(“Greyhound”) property damage claim for damage to a bus. Goodyear contends that, because

Greyhound repaired the bus without first allowing Goodyear to inspect it, this is the only

adequate sanction, and it is the only one requested. 

For reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED.

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 The evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be

drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

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II. FACTS

The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, viewed in a light most

favorable to the non-movant:2

This lawsuit arises from an accident involving a bus owned by the Plaintiff, Greyhound. 

Greyhound has brought claims against Goodyear, claiming that Goodyear’s product, a tire,

caused the accident, and seeking, in part, damages relating to the repair of the bus. 

There is no dispute that the bus was damaged in the accident at issue and that it was

repaired many months before this suit was filed, without notifying Goodyear and giving

Goodyear an opportunity to inspect the bus before it was repaired. Goodyear, however,

disputes the extent of the performance and reasonableness of the repairs to the bus. Goodyear

specifically points to the deposition testimony of James Minton, a Greyhound Rule 30(b)(6)

deponent, in which he states that costs reflected in a Bus Damage Computation provided to

Goodyear were greater than those reflected in his own report of the repairs to the bus. 

Goodyear contends that because it was not allowed to inspect the bus before it was repaired, it

has been prejudiced in its ability to defend against the damage claim.

III. DISCUSSION

As stated above, Goodyear has moved for partial summary judgment only as to

Greyhound’s property damage claim for the cost of repairs to the bus. Goodyear contends that

the repair to the bus by Greyhound was spoliation of evidence essential to its ability to defend

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the property damage claim. Goodyear states that without an opportunity to inspect the bus in its

damaged condition, it cannot determine the extent of Greyhound’s damages, or whether the

claimed repairs were reasonable, necessary, or even performed. Greyhound seeks summary

judgment on the issue of damages as a sanction for spoliation of the evidence.

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment for Spoliation of the Evidence

The Eleventh Circuit has held that federal law governs the imposition of sanctions for

spoliation of the evidence in a diversity suit because spoliation sanctions are an evidentiary

matter. Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh

Circuit also has explained, however, that in evaluating the need for sanctions, federal courts look

to factors enumerated in state law, because federal law does not set forth specific guidelines

regarding sanctions for spoliation. Id.

In analyzing the propriety of sanctions for spoliation of the evidence, the Alabama

Supreme Court applies five factors: (1) the importance of the evidence destroyed; (2) the

culpability of the offending party; (3) fundamental fairness; (4) alternative sources of the

information obtainable from the evidence destroyed; and (5) the possible effectiveness of other

sanctions less severe than dismissal. Story v. RAJ Properties, Inc., 909 So. 2d 797, 803 (Ala.

2005).

Although the Eleventh Circuit has looked to state law in analyzing spoliation of the

evidence, the Eleventh Circuit has also outlined the boundaries of sanctionable conduct under

federal law. In Flury, the circuit court explained that dismissal is the most severe sanction

available, and should only be used where there is a showing of bad faith and where lesser

sanctions will not suffice. Flury, 427 F.3d at 944. In describing the standard governing bad

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faith, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the law does not require a showing of malice, but that

instead, in determining whether there is bad faith, a court should weigh the degree of the

spoliator’s culpability against the prejudice to the opposing party. Id. at 946. Although the

Eleventh Circuit was examining Georgia law in Flury, the court explained that “Georgia state

law on spoliation is wholly consistent with federal spoliation principles.” Id. at 944.

This court previously has been confronted with an issue related to sanctions for

spoliation, namely, whether an adverse inference could be drawn based on failure to preserve

evidence. Drakeford v. Ala. Coop. Extension Sys., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2006). In

that case, this court, relying on Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997), determined

that an adverse inference was not required because such an inference is only allowed upon a

showing of bad faith.

In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit cited Bashir and Flury together, and

noted that a district court’s drawing of an adverse inference had to be supported by a finding of

bad faith under Bashir, and that it was proper for a court, not the jury, to find bad faith, because

the inference is a sanction for the failure to preserve evidence. See BP Products N.A., Inc. v. SE

Energy Group, Inc., 282 Fed. Appx. 776, 2008 WL 2485589 at 780 n. 3 (11th Cir. June 23,

2008). 

The law to be applied in this case, where the only sanction sought is summary judgment,

therefore, is that only if there is a finding of bad faith, determined by weighing the degree of the

spoliator’s culpability and prejudice to the opposing party, and only if no lesser sanction will

suffice, may a sanction as severe as summary judgment be imposed. 

B. Analysis

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In moving for partial summary judgment in this case, Goodyear relies on cases from the

Alabama Supreme Court, including one in which summary judgment was granted because the

plaintiff had repaired the stucco on his home without allowing a defense inspection of the stucco,

and the defendant’s experts testified that they could not form an opinion as to causation based on

photographs of the damaged stucco. See Story v. RAJ Prop., Inc., 909 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 2005).

Greyhound responds that in the cases relied on by Goodyear, the spoliated evidence was

evidence relevant to the causation inquiry. Here, Greyhound preserved the tire, which is the

evidence relevant to causation. Greyhound further contends that, even if Goodyear were able to

prove intent, Greyhound is not guilty of bad faith.

This court’s first duty, as charged by the Eleventh Circuit under Flury, is to examine the

evidence of bad faith. Goodyear has not presented evidence of malice on the part of Greyhound. 

Goodyear instead states that Greyhound acted willfully because it recognized its responsibility to

allow potential litigants to inspect the bus, placing a “legal hold” on the bus while attorneys for

injured passengers inspected it, but then repaired the bus without advising Goodyear and giving

Goodyear an opportunity to inspect the bus before the repairs were made. 

Because there is no evidence of malice, to determine whether there is bad faith, this

court has been instructed to weigh the culpability of Greyhound and the prejudice to Goodyear.

Flury, 427 F.3d at 926. As stated above, the only evidence of culpability presented by

Goodyear is evidence suggesting that Greyhound acted willfully by not inviting Goodyear, as a

potential defendant in a future claim by Greyhound to recover property damage, to inspect the

bus before it was repaired. On the issue of prejudice to Goodyear, Goodyear contends that it

has been prejudiced because evidence of the bus before it was repaired would have been

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3 Greyhound also points this court to Cooper v. Toshiba Home Tech. Corp., 76 F.

Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Ala. 1999), where no sanction was imposed for the destruction of a

mobile home and heater. In that case, however, the heater alleged to have been the cause of

the fire was not destroyed and there was no contention that the home or other heaters were

relevant to the issue of damages. Id. at 1275. In this case, the court cannot conclude that the

evidence of the damage to the bus before it was repaired might not be helpful evidence to

Goodyear in its defense against the property damage claim. 

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extremely important to its defense. Goodyear argues that without an opportunity to inspect the

bus in its damaged condition, Goodyear cannot determine the extent of the claimed damages, or

whether the claimed repairs were actually reasonable, necessary, or even performed. Goodyear

further contends that it would be fundamentally unfair for Goodyear to have to defend the

property damage claim where it has been prevented by the repair of the bus from gathering

evidence essential to combat that claim. Goodyear contends that no other sources of evidence

suffice because the only evidence produced by Greyhound is poor quality pictures of the

damage. 

In response, Greyhound states that contrary to Goodyear’s representation, it has

produced color copies of the photographs of the damage to the bus, and these photographs

were available at the time of, and made exhibits to, James Minton’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. 

Greyhound further states that Goodyear could have questioned the bus driver about the

photographs of the damage to the bus during her deposition.3

In this case, there is no question that evidence of causation was preserved, there is no

evidence of malice in the destruction of evidence of damage, the damage to the bus was

photographed, and the evidence destroyed is only relevant to the extent of damage, it being

conceded that damage occurred. Whether a defective tire was the cause of the bus to suffer

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 Goodyear has not requested any sanction other than summary judgment. In an

unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the imposition of sanctions short of

dismissal where the plaintiff was the more culpable party and caused the defendant substantial

prejudice. Graff v. Baja Marine Corp., No. 08-10413, 2009 WL 226308 at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 2,

2009). While, as explained above, the state of the evidence at this point in the proceedings,

when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, does not warrant summary judgment

on the damage claim, it could be that the state of the evidence at trial might warrant some lesser

sanction.

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damage is at issue in this case. Goodyear has had full access to the tire, and has had it

inspected by its expert. Whether the bus was damaged in the wreck, however, is not an

issue–it was. The extent of the damage cause by the wreck becomes an issue if liability is

established.

It will be Greyhound’s burden to prove its property damage. Goodyear is able to

explore the legitimacy of claimed damages and repairs through such things as depositions of

those who repaired the bus, obtaining records of any prior damages or repairs to the bus, etc.,

to attack the credibility of Greyhound’s evidence offered in support of its claim, and to argue

at trial that the burden of proof has not been met by credible evidence. Goodyear might also

be able to obtain expert testimony of its own, based on evidence available, as to what a

reasonable sum for property damage would be, or as to the unreasonableness of Greyhound’s

claim, or even that repair of the bus has made it difficult to refute Greyhound’s claim.

Therefore, weighing the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, the court cannot

conclude that Goodyear has sufficiently proven that Greyhound acted with such culpability, and

that Goodyear suffered such substantial prejudice, so as to constitute bad faith for which only

the sanction of summary judgment on the property damage claim would suffice.4

 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the court concludes that the Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Plaintiff’s Property Damage Claim is due to be denied. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Motion for Oral Argument (Doc. #109) is DENIED.

2. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #87) is DENIED.

Done this 24th day of March, 2009.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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