Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00275/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00275-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Benov
Respondent
Matthew Rowan Davies
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW ROWAN DAVIES,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL L. BENOV, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00275 MJS (HC)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is represented by Cody Harris, Phillip Tassin, 

and Steven Ragland of Keker & Van Nest, LLP. Respondent, Michael Benov, warden of 

Federal Correctional Institution, Taft is represented by Assistant United States Attorney 

Gregory Broderick. Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 10, 22.) 

In July 2012, Petitioner was indicted on multiple counts of manufacturing, 

distributing, and conspiring to manufacture and distribute marijuana, a Schedule I 

controlled substance. (See United States v. Davies, E.D. Cal. Case No. 2:12-cr-0255 

GEB.) On May 31, 2013, Petitioner plead guilty to ten of the above-referenced counts, 

and was sentenced to sixty (60) months in federal prison. (Id. at ECF Nos. 64, 98.) 

Petitioner's sole claim in the present petition is that the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment to 

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the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 prohibits the Justice 

Department and the Bureau of Prisons from expending any funds with respect to the 

execution of Petitioner's sentence. 128 Stat. 2130, 2217, § 538 ("The Rohrabacher-Farr

Amendment".)1 Petitioner contends that the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment forbids the 

Department of Justice, including the Bureau of Prisons, from expending appropriated 

funds to investigate, prosecute, or incarcerate individuals complying with state medical 

marijuana laws. Based on this interpretation of the Amendment, Petitioner argues that 

further funds should not be spent on his incarceration, and that he be released from 

custody. 

Petitioner filed his petition on February 20, 2015. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Respondent

filed an answer to the petition on May 18, 2015. (Answer, ECF No. 14.) Petitioner filed a 

traverse on June 17, 2015.

2

(Traverse, ECF No. 15.) The matter stands ready for 

adjudication.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of 

the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Writ of habeas corpus relief is available if a 

federal prisoner can show he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner's claims are proper 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and not 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because they concern the manner, 

location, or conditions of the execution of Petitioner's sentence and not the fact of 

Petitioner's conviction or sentence. Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(stating that a challenge to the execution of a sentence is "maintainable only in a petition 

 

1

The language of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment contained in § 538 reads as follows: "None 

of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used, with respect to the 

States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 

Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode 

Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such States 

from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of 

medical marijuana."

2

Additionally, on June 24, 2015, United States Senator Mark Leno filed a motion for leave to file 

an amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner. (ECF No. 18.) The motion is granted. 

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for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241"); Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 

162 F.3d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1998).

Further, Petitioner is challenging the execution of his sentence at Federal 

Correctional Institution in Taft, California. Petitioner is confined within the Fresno Division 

of the Eastern District of California, and the Court has jurisdiction over this petition. See

Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990).

II. REVIEW OF THE PETITION

Before addressing the substantive merits of Petitioner's claim, the Court must 

determine whether Petitioner waived his rights to challenge his sentence through this 

habeas petition. Petitioner concedes that in entering the plea agreement, he waived the 

right to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241 attacking his conviction or 

sentence. (See Pet. at 13.) While Petitioner acknowledges that he waived his right to 

attack the legality of his conviction or imposed sentence, he asserts that he remains free 

to challenge the conditions of his confinement and that is what he undertakes to do here. 

(Id. at 13-14.) Petitioner argues that the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment defunds 

Respondent's continued effort to confine Petitioner and thus that his challenge here goes 

to the conditions of his confinement, not his conviction or sentence. (Id.) Finally, 

attempting to clarify the argument in his traverse, Petitioner states that the waiver only 

limited his ability to attack the legality of his sentence, but did not affect his ability to 

attack the execution of his sentence, as he is doing here. (Traverse at 16.)

Respondent counters that the waiver was not so limited and applies to the present 

challenge to the execution of Petitioner's sentence. (Answer at 3-4.) Respondent further 

alleges that the present challenge is not jurisdictionally proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

as it is a veiled attempt to collaterally attack Petitioner's sentence. (Id. at 4.) As 

previously stated in the order requiring Respondent to answer the petition, challenges to 

the execution of a sentence are proper under § 2241. See U.S. v. Giddings, 740 F.2d 

770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984); Porter v. Adams, 244 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001); Zavala 

v. Ives, 785 F.3d 367, 370 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). Regardless, whether the present 

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challenge is appropriate under § 2241 is a separate and distinct inquiry as to whether 

Petitioner waived his right to challenge his sentence. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] defendant's waiver of his appellate rights is 

enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the 

grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made." United States v. 

Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 

1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000)). Waivers may also encompass collateral attacks to the 

conviction or sentence. Id. at 672 n.3; United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th 

Cir. 1993).

The scope of a knowing and voluntary waiver is demonstrated by the express 

language of the plea agreement. Leniear, 574 F.3d at 672; Anglin, 215 F.3d at 1066.

"Plea agreements are generally construed according to the principles of contract law, 

and the government, as drafter, must be held to an agreement's literal terms." Leniear, 

574 F.3d at 672; Anglin, 215 F.3d at 1067; United States v. Cannel, 517 F.3d 1172, 

1176 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Plea agreements are contracts and are enforced as such."). Any 

ambiguity in a plea agreement is construed against the drafter. See Lemke v. Ryan, 719 

F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d 1222, 1228 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner does not argue that the waiver was made without his knowledge or 

consent. Accordingly, the only issue is that of whether his collateral challenge is 

encompassed within the waiver's scope. Petitioner argues that the waiver does not limit 

challenges to the conditions of his confinement or the execution of his sentence. The 

Court is not persuaded that the waiver can be construed so narrowly. The waiver stated 

that Petitioner gave up "the right to appeal the conviction and the right to appeal any

aspect of the sentence imposed," and that he gave up the right to bring a post-appeal 

attack on his conviction or sentence under § 2241. United States v. Davies, E.D. Cal. 

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Case No. 2:12-cr-0255 GEB, ECF No. 64 at 10. (emphasis in original).3 Under the plain 

language of the agreement, there was no limitation to Petitioner's waiver of the type of 

challenge he could present to his sentence. While any ambiguities in the plea agreement 

should be construed against the drafter, in this case, the government, the Court finds no 

ambiguity with regard to the scope of the waiver. The waiver was to any right to attack 

his sentence; that would include all challenges, including challenges to the execution of 

his sentence, such as the one presented here. Further, the language of the waiver 

specifically mentions that Petitioner waived his right to bring post-appeal attacks by way 

of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

There is no ambiguity with respect to the scope of the waiver with respect to what 

subject matter was covered (challenges to the conviction or sentence) or the methods by 

which Petitioner could present a challenge (waiving the right to file motions under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 and § 2241).

Petitioner could not have known that the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment would be 

enacted after he entered into the plea agreement. However, the waiver of his right to 

challenge his conviction or sentence included waiver of prospective relief. "The waiver of 

an appeal will not be invalidated merely because unanticipated events occur in the 

future. The prospective nature of waivers has 'never been thought to place [waivers] off 

 

3

As requested by Respondent, the Court takes judicial notice of the plea agreement in Petitioner's 

criminal case. See Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). The relevant section 

to the plea agreement, relating to Petitioner's waiver of his right to appeal reads as follows:

Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack: The defendant understands that the 

law gives him a right to appeal his conviction and sentence. He agrees as part of his

plea, however, to give up the right to appeal the conviction and the right to appeal any

aspect of the sentence imposed in this case so long as his prison sentence is no longer 

than 5 years. 

Regardless of the sentence he receives, the defendant also gives up any right he 

may have to bring a post-appeal attack on his conviction or his sentence. He specifically 

agrees not to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241 attacking his conviction or 

sentence.

United States v. Davies, E.D. Cal. Case No. 2:12-cr-0255 GEB, ECF No. 64. (emphasis in original).

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limits or to render a defendant's act 'unknowing.''" United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 

207, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 

2001)); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2001). The possibility of a 

favorable change in the law occurring after a plea agreement is merely one of the risks 

that accompanies a guilty plea. See United States v. Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2005); 

United States v. Cortez-Arias, 425 F.3d 547, 548 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005).

By waiving any right to bring a post-appeal attack to his sentence, the Court finds 

Petitioner's assertion that he only waived challenges to the legality of his sentence, as 

opposed to challenges to the execution of his sentence, without merit. Petitioner's 

alternative contention that this challenge is only to the conditions of his confinement is 

likewise without merit. Petitioner seeks release from custody, and while the exact 

contours of what qualifies as a conditions of confinement claim remain open, claims 

seeking release from custody fall outside the scope of such claims. Nettles v. Grounds, 

788 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[The Supreme Court] has not directly addressed the 

question whether a challenge to the degree of constraints in prison (such as a release 

from administrative or disciplinary segregation) is a claim seeking release from custody, 

or merely a challenge to conditions of confinement.").

Petitioner has voluntarily waived his right to present post-appeal attacks to his 

conviction or sentence. The waiver is not ambiguous and Petitioner is bound to the terms 

of the waiver. Petitioner may not procced with this petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As Petitioner has waived his right to collaterally attack his 

sentence, the Court need not address the remaining arguments presented in the 

petition. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

"The plain language of [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c)(1) does not require a petitioner to 

obtain a [certificate of appealability] in order to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition." 

Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2008). "Nor is there any other statutory 

basis for imposing a [certificate of appealability] requirement on legitimate § 2241 

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petitions. Although state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a [certificate of 

appealability], see § 2253(c)(1)(A), there is no parallel requirement for federal prisoners." 

Id.

As Petitioner is a federal prisoner bringing a legitimate § 2241 petition, a 

certificate of appealability is not required.

IV. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The motion for leave to file amicus curiae brief is GRANTED (ECF No. 18);

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED; and 

3. The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to enter judgment and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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