Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05028/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
America's Community Bankers
Appellant
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 19, 1999 Decided January 18, 2000

No. 99-5028

America's Community Bankers,

Appellant

v.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00416)

H. Stephen Harris, Jr., argued the cause for appellant.

With him on the briefs was Philip R. Stein.

Thomas L. Holzman, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the

brief were Jack D. Smith, Deputy General Counsel, Ann S.

Duross and Thomas A. Schulz, Assistant General Counsel,

and Robert D. McGillicuddy and Barbara Sarshik, Counsel.

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Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: America's Community Bankers

(Bankers), a trade association of banks and savings institutions, appeals from a district court order granting summary

judgment for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(FDIC) in an action challenging the results of an FDIC

rulemaking undertaken in response to the Deposit Insurance

Funds Act of 1996 (the Act or the 1996 Act). Reviewing the

agency's rulemaking under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the

district court upheld the FDIC's conclusions as a reasonable

interpretation of the relevant statutes. Because we agree

with the district court that the FDIC's interpretation of its

governing statute is a reasonable one entitled to Chevron

deference, we affirm the district court's decision.

I. Glossary

Because of the numerous acronyms and terms of art employed in this opinion, we provide a brief glossary.

Bankers America's Community Bankers (Appellant)

APA Administrative Procedure Act

Bank Fund Bank Insurance Fund

Act or 1996 Act Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996

FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Appellee)

FICO Financing Corporation

FIRREA Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act

FSLIC Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

Savings Fund Savings Association Insurance Fund

II. Background

In 1987, in an effort to stem a crisis in the savings and loan

industry, Congress established the Financing Corporation

(FICO) and authorized it to issue and service bonds for the

purpose of recapitalizing and stabilizing the insolvent Federal

Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). See Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Recapitalization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, s 302, 101 Stat. 552, 585

(1987); see also 12 U.S.C. s 1441 (1994) (current version at 12

U.S.C.A. s 1441 (West Supp. 1999)); Marirose K. Lescher &

Merwin A. Mace III, Financing the Bailout of the Thrift

Crisis: Workings of the Financing Corporation and the

Resolution Funding Corporation, 46 Bus. Law. 507, 510 (1991)

(discussing the establishment of FICO). The problems of the

savings and loan industry failed to abate, however, so in 1989

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Congress enacted more sweeping legislation to increase the

supervisory authority of the FDIC and other regulatory

agencies and to "reform, recapitalize, and consolidate" the

federal deposit insurance system. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.

101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 183 (1989) (FIRREA); see also How a

Good Idea Went Wrong: Deregulation and the Savings and

Loan Crisis, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 643, 656-58 (1995) (discussing

the enactment of FIRREA). To accomplish the latter,

FIRREA created two insurance funds under the administrative authority of the FDIC: the Savings Association Insurance Fund (Savings Fund) and the Bank Insurance Fund

(Bank Fund). See FIRREA s 206 (codified at 12 U.S.C.

s 1815). FIRREA also abolished the FSLIC, gave the Federal Housing Finance Board administrative authority over

FICO, and shifted responsibility for the interest on FICO's

bonds to Savings Fund member institutions. See id.

ss 401(a), 512.

In further legislation, Congress ordered the FDIC to promulgate by regulation a schedule to assess Savings Fund

member institutions semiannually to achieve by the year 2004

a designated 1.25% reserve-to-deposits capitalization ratio,

then to set semiannual assessments to maintain reserves at

that level. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, s 302(a), 105

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Stat. 2236, 2345 (1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.

s 1817(b) (West Supp. 1999)). The FDIC's governing statute

instructed the FDIC Board, in setting the Savings Fund's

assessments, to consider "(I) expected operating expenses,

(II) case resolution expenditures and income, (III) the effect

of assessments on members' earnings and capital, and (IV)

any other factors that the Board of Directors may deem

appropriate." 12 U.S.C.A. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp.

1999).

Another section of that statute, 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2), also

authorized FICO, "with the approval of the Board of Directors of the [FDIC]," to assess Savings Fund members to

service FICO's bonds. 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) (1994) (current

version at 12 U.S.C.A. s 1441(f)(2) (West Supp. 1999)). The

same provision mandated that the sum of amounts assessed

by FICO and by the Resolution Funding Corporation under

12 U.S.C. s 1441b "shall not exceed the amount authorized to

be assessed against [Savings Fund] members pursuant to [12

U.S.C. s 1817];" and that FICO "shall have first priority to

make the assessment." Id. s 1441(f)(2)(A)-(B). Finally, 12

U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2)(C) required the amount of the Savings

Fund assessment under 12 U.S.C. s 1817 to be reduced by

the amount of the FICO and Resolution Funding Corporation

assessments. See id. s 1441(f)(2)(C). After FIRREA abolished the FSLIC in 1989, the FDIC collected the FICO

assessments on FICO's behalf along with the Savings Fund

assessments. Thus the pre-1996 statutory scheme linked

FICO's bond interest funding to the Savings Fund's insurance premium assessment process and gave FICO funding

the higher priority.

The Bank Fund achieved capitalization in May 1995, so the

FDIC lowered the assessments of member institutions. See

Lisa L. Bonner, Updating FDICIA/RTC, 15 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 81, 84-87 (1996) (describing the state of the insurance

funds immediately prior to passage of the 1996 Act). In

comparison, the Savings Fund remained significantly undercapitalized, and Savings Fund assessments remained high,

because of the diversion of a portion of Savings Fund assessments to satisfy FICO's bond interest obligation. See id.

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Pursuing lower insurance fund assessments, Savings Fund

member institutions sought to shift their deposits to the Bank

Fund, and thus threatened to destabilize the Savings Fund

and FICO's ability to pay its bond interest obligation. See J.

Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the

Issues Raised by Financial Modernization, 2 N.C. Banking

Inst. 25, 62-63 (1998) (discussing the enactment of the 1996

Act). To address this problem, Congress passed the 1996

Act, which the President signed into law on September 30,

1996. See id.

The Act ordered the FDIC to impose a special assessment

sufficient to raise the Savings Fund to the 1.25% designated

reserve ratio for the fourth quarter of 1996 as of October 1,

1996. See 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, s 2702, 110 Stat.

3009, 3009-479 (1996). The Act also amended 12 U.S.C.

s 1817(b)(2)(A)(i) to require that the FDIC make Savings

Fund assessments "when necessary, and only to the extent

necessary" to maintain Savings Fund reserves at the designated reserve ratio. 1996 Act s 2708(a), 110 Stat. 3009-497

(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1999)).

Finally, effective January 1, 1997, the Act authorized FICO to

service its bonds by assessing all insured depository institutions, not just Savings Fund member institutions; and in a

related amendment, the Act eliminated the language in 12

U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) that linked the FICO and Savings Fund

assessments. See 1996 Act s 2703(a), 110 Stat. 3009-485

(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. s 1441(f)(2) (West Supp. 1999)).

To summarize: As of October 1, 1996, the Savings Fund

was fully capitalized at the designated reserve ratio. Thus,

under 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(i), the FDIC could only

assess Savings Fund members to the extent necessary to

maintain the Savings Fund at that level. Because the amendment to 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) severing the statutory relationship between the Savings Fund and FICO did not become

effective until January 1, 1997, however, FICO could only

assess Savings Fund members to the extent authorized under

12 U.S.C. s 1817 to cover its bond interest obligation for the

fourth quarter of 1996.

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On May 30, 1996, before the 1996 Act was enacted, FICO

sent a memorandum to the FDIC requesting funding of

$396,665,000 for the period of July 1 through December 31,

1996. On August 31, 1996, the FDIC sent invoices to the

Savings Fund member institutions for the fourth quarter 1996

Savings Fund and FICO assessments. On September 30,

1996, the day the President signed the Act into law, the FDIC

collected the fourth quarter Savings Fund and FICO assessments and transmitted to FICO its portion. On October 16,

1996, the FDIC issued a final rule imposing the special

assessment ordered by the Act, to be collected on November

27, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 53,834 (1996). Since the special

assessment capitalized the Savings Fund retroactive to October 1, the FDIC also issued on October 16 a notice of

proposed rulemaking to revise the fourth quarter assessment

schedules so as to refund the fourth quarter Savings Fund

assessment collected on September 30, 1996. See 61 Fed.

Reg. 53,867 (1996) (proposed Oct. 16, 1996).

On December 11, 1996, the FDIC Board held an open

meeting to consider a final rule revising the fourth quarter

Savings Fund assessment rates. At that meeting, the Board

considered whether a refund of the fourth quarter FICO

assessment was appropriate as well. While acknowledging

that the statutes could be read otherwise, the Board rejected

the legal interpretation favored by Bankers in this litigation

in favor of what the Board deemed to be "the better reading."

The Board concluded that the statutory relationship between

the FICO and Savings Fund assessments should be construed

to satisfy congressional intent that FICO be funded, that

FICO's needs fell within the scope of "any other factors that

the Board of Directors may deem appropriate" under 12

U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), and that the FDIC serves

purely a custodial role in collecting and disbursing the FICO

assessments, thus has no authority to refund the fourth

quarter 1996 FICO assessment. The final rule adopting the

revised assessment schedules, including the Savings Fund

refund but no FICO refund, was issued December 24, 1996.

See 61 Fed. Reg. 67,687 (1996) (codified as amended at 12

C.F.R. ss 327.3-327.10).

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Bankers sued under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) seeking a declaratory judgment that its members are

statutorily entitled to a refund of the FICO portion of the

September 30, 1996, assessment.1 The district court applied

the two-part test of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the

FDIC Board's interpretation of the statutory scheme, and

found that the FDIC's decision not to refund the FICO

portion of the fourth quarter 1996 assessments "was neither

arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise unlawful." America's

Community Bankers v. FDIC, 31 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141

(D.D.C. 1998). Additionally, the district court found that the

refund sought by Bankers was not available under 5 U.S.C.

s 702: Because the FDIC had disbursed the funds to FICO

immediately upon collection, the FDIC lacked the particular

res required for recovery under the APA. See id. at 142

(citing City of Houston v. Department of Hous. and Urban

Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The court suggested that Bankers should sue FICO for relief instead.

III. Article III Standing

First, the FDIC challenges Bankers's standing before this

court, a contention which we must address before proceeding

to the merits of Bankers's claim. To meet the case or

controversy requirement of Article III of the United States

Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered injury in fact, that the injury is fairly traceable to the

defendant's actions, and that a favorable decision will redress

the plaintiff's injury. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162

(1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992). The FDIC does not challenge Bankers's satisfaction

of the injury-in-fact element,2 but asserts that Bankers cannot

__________

1 Under the APA, reviewing courts hold unlawful and set aside

only those agency actions or conclusions found to be "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law." 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A) (1994).

2 Bankers's standing rests on the concept of associational standing. A membership organization may sue to redress its members'

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satisfy the causation and the redressability requirements for

Article III standing. To establish causation, Bankers must

demonstrate a causal link between the injury to its members

and the FDIC's conduct, that is that the injurious conduct is

fairly traceable to the FDIC's actions, as opposed to the

independent action of a third party not before the court. See

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61. To satisfy the

redressability requirement, Bankers must establish that it is

likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable

decision by this court will redress the injury suffered. See id.

A. Causation

The FDIC suggests that, to satisfy the causation element

of the standing analysis, the challenged agency must have

been the driving force behind the injurious conduct. Employing this standard, the FDIC maintains that it did not cause

the injury to Bankers's members because it was only a

conduit, a passive intermediary acting entirely on FICO's

behalf and at FICO's instruction. Contrary to the FDIC's

assertion, our precedents generally do not require so high a

degree of independent agency action for a finding of causation. We have held in several recent opinions that the

causation element is satisfied by a demonstration that an

administrative agency authorized the injurious conduct. See,

e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) v. Glickman, 154

F.3d 426, 440-43 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

Telephone and Data Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 42, 46-47

(D.C. Cir. 1994). In ALDF v. Glickman, we held that even

agency action which implicitly permits a third party to behave

in an injurious manner offers enough of a causal link to

support a lawsuit against the agency. See 154 F.3d at 440-

43. In short, our precedents suggest that an agency does not

__________

injuries, even if the organization cannot demonstrate an injury to

itself. See, e.g., UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Hunt v.

Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Our discussion therefore

concerns injury to Bankers's member institutions, not the organization per se.

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have to be the direct actor in the injurious conduct, but that

indirect causation through authorization is sufficient to fulfill

the causation requirement for Article III standing.

In the present case, the FDIC was more involved in both

the assessment and collection processes than our precedents

require. Both before and after the 1996 Act, FICO was

statutorily required to obtain "the approval of the Board of

Directors of the [FDIC]" in assessing Savings Fund member

institutions. 12 U.S.C.A. s 1441(f)(2) (West Supp. 1999); see

also 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) (1994). Even if the FDIC is

correct that it could not collect the semiannual FICO assessment without FICO's permission, clearly 12 U.S.C.

s 1441(f)(2) contemplates that FICO could not assess Savings

Fund member institutions without FDIC approval, either.

The FDIC's own deliberations over whether or not to refund

the FICO portion of the funds collected on September 30,

1996, suggest that, contrary to its position here, the FDIC

viewed itself as playing an active role in the assessment

process. Moreover, once the assessments were final, the

FDIC was solely responsible for collecting the funds from

Savings Fund members. So while the FDIC's involvement in

the FICO assessment was perhaps something less than we

often see, cf. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 169-70; Northeast

Energy Assocs. v. FERC, 158 F.3d 150, 153-54 (D.C. Cir.

1998), the FDIC's actions are well within the outer boundary

of causation established by ALDF v. Glickman and the cases

discussed therein.

B. Redressability

In its suit against the FDIC, Bankers seeks a declaratory

judgment that 12 U.S.C. ss 1441 and 1817, as of October 1,

1996, limited the fourth quarter 1996 Savings Fund assessment (including the FICO assessment portion) to the rate

necessary to maintain the Savings Fund at the 1.25% designated reserve ratio. See Appellant's Br. at 2. Bankers also

seeks a declaration that its members are entitled to a refund

from the FDIC of all fourth quarter assessments exceeding

that amount--in other words, a refund of the fourth quarter

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FICO assessment paid September 30, 1996--plus interest and

costs. See id. The FDIC maintains that a decision against it

will not redress the injury to Bankers's members because the

FDIC does not control the funds it collects on FICO's behalf

and does not have the authority to use the Bank Fund and

Savings Fund reserves it does control to provide a refund.

Bankers responds that the FDIC still must approve FICO

assessments and continues to be actively involved in the

structure and timing of those assessments. Moreover, Bankers claims that 12 U.S.C. s 1817(e)(1) gives the FDIC the

statutory authority to make the requested refund. Thus, the

parties perceive that whether a favorable decision by this

court would redress the injury to Bankers's members turns

upon whether the FDIC has the authority either to pay the

refund sought by Bankers or to require FICO to pay it.

The parties misconstrue the inquiry. The redressability

element does not depend upon the defendant's financial ability to pay a judgment against it. Courts do not deny a

plaintiff his day in court simply because the defendant may be

unable to pay all or part of a potential judgment against it.

Indeed, courts regularly grant awards against defendants

who cannot pay, then leave the problems of collection to the

prevailing plaintiffs. As a general rule, governing statutes do

not explicitly authorize agencies to pay judgments against

them, presumably because such statutes do not typically

address the consequences of agencies overstepping their authority. Instead, Congress has promulgated statutes like the

APA to waive sovereign immunity and authorize parties

aggrieved by agency actions to seek relief against the offending agencies in court. See generally 5 U.S.C. s 702 (1994).

If an agency errs, the agency is liable, to the extent that

Congress has waived the government's immunity from suit.

Premising redressability on the agency's explicit authority to

pay contradicts the premise of agency accountability which

underlies the APA.

The law does not require that the challenged agency be

able to pay before the redressability element for Article III

standing is satisfied. Instead, the law only requires that the

relief requested, if granted, will resolve the injury. In NatuUSCA Case #99-5028 Document #491091 Filed: 01/18/2000 Page 10 of 25
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ral Resources Defense Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012 (D.C.

Cir. 1998), for example, the appellants sought an injunction

precluding a government agency from using a particular

report prepared by a committee organized and operated in

violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).

We concluded that the NRDC failed to satisfy redressability

for two reasons: First, the NRDC could not demonstrate that

denying use of the report would redress the injury caused by

past FACA violations; and second, even if ongoing FACA

violations continued to injure the NRDC, the injunction

sought would do nothing to resolve ongoing violations. See

id. at 1021-22. In contrast, the relief that Bankers seeks

would redress the alleged injury by giving Bankers's members their money back, so long as they could collect the

award.

Where an agency rule causes the injury, the redressability

requirement may be satisfied as well by vacating the challenged rule and giving the aggrieved party the opportunity to

participate in a new rulemaking the results of which might be

more favorable to it. See, e.g., Lepelletier v. FDIC, 164 F.3d

37, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Northeast Energy Assocs. v.

FERC, 158 F.3d at 154; Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v.

Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). If we order

the relief that Bankers seeks, the FDIC would issue new

fourth quarter 1996 schedules assessing a lesser amount, in

essence revoking its approval of the FICO assessment retroactively, as it did with the fourth quarter 1996 Savings Fund

assessment, and entitling Bankers's members to a refund.

Finally, collectibility is not in fact a problem in this case.

At oral argument, the FDIC conceded that it could utilize its

approval authority to require FICO to offer Bankers's members a credit against future assessments if this court were to

find for Bankers on the merits. Thus, while several lines of

analysis appear to support Bankers's satisfaction of the redressability requirement for Article III standing, at a minimum, the FDIC's ability to offer a remedy in the form of a

credit is sufficient to establish redressability. On that basis,

we hold that Bankers has standing to bring this claim for

declaratory relief against the FDIC.

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IV. Money Damages

The FDIC additionally contests our jurisdiction under the

APA to consider Bankers's request for declaratory relief.

That provision limits judicial review of claims challenging

agency actions to those "seeking relief other than money

damages." 5 U.S.C. s 702. Relying upon our opinion in City

of Houston v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 24 F.3d

1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the district court held that, since

the FDIC was merely a conduit for the payment of funds by

the Savings Fund member institutions to FICO, the FDIC

did not retain the specific res from which a refund could be

paid; thus, it held, the refund Bankers seeks is unavailable

under 5 U.S.C. s 702. See America's Community Bankers,

31 F. Supp. 2d at 141-42. In other words, since the FDIC no

longer holds the funds paid by Bankers's members for the

fourth quarter of 1996, a refund constitutes money damages

beyond the scope of the APA's jurisdictional grant. Bankers

suggests that the district court misconstrued City of Houston

and interpreted 5 U.S.C. s 702 too narrowly.

The pivotal analysis in distinguishing specific relief available under the APA from unavailable money damages comes

from our opinion in Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v.

Department of Health and Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441

(D.C. Cir. 1985), which the Supreme Court adopted in Bowen

v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988). Not all forms of

monetary relief are money damages. See Maryland Dep't of

Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1447. Rather, money damages represent compensatory relief, an award given to a

plaintiff as a substitute for that which has been lost; specific

relief in contrast represents an attempt to restore to the

plaintiff that to which it was entitled from the beginning. See

id. at 1446. Maryland Department of Human Resources,

Bowen, and subsequent cases focus on the nature of the relief

sought, not on whether the agency still has the precise funds

paid.

Where a plaintiff seeks an award of funds to which it claims

entitlement under a statute, the plaintiff seeks specific relief,

not damages. See, e.g., Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901; Maryland

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Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1446-48; National

Ass'n of Counties v. Baker, 842 F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988);

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 71 F.3d 475, 478-79

(2d Cir. 1995); Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255,

1266-67 (3d Cir. 1994). In the present case, Bankers maintains that the statutory scheme, as it was for the fourth

quarter of 1996, required the FDIC to provide for a FICO

assessment refund in the revised assessment schedules promulgated in December 1996. If Bankers is correct that the

FDIC violated its statutory obligation by adopting revised

assessment schedules which permitted an overcharge, then

under established and binding precedent, Bankers's claim

represents specific relief within the scope of 5 U.S.C. s 702,

not consequential damages compensating for an injury. That

the FDIC no longer possesses the precise funds collected is

not determinative of this analysis.

Our precedent in City of Houston does not preclude Bankers's claim. In that case, Houston sued HUD for congressionally appropriated grant money that HUD first allocated

to Houston, then reallocated elsewhere after Houston failed

to meet spending targets. The FDIC notes that we rejected

Houston's argument that HUD could use other funds at its

disposal to pay its claim and concluded that "specific relief"

under section 702 requires payment "out of a specific res."

City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1428. The FDIC argues that

Bankers's claim is analogous to Houston's, as Bankers suggests that if the FDIC does not have adequate authority to

pay a refund from FICO funds, the FDIC could use Savings

Fund reserves instead. This resemblance is superficial, however.

The principal issue in City of Houston was mootness, not

the question of allowable specific relief as opposed to unavailable money damages. We dismissed Houston's claim as moot

because the grant funds were contractually obligated to another recipient and the appropriation in question had lapsed.

See id. at 1427. We rejected Bowen as inapplicable in view of

the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. Because the

Appropriations Clause precludes a distribution of money from

the Treasury unless appropriated by Congress, we held that

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we had no authority to provide monetary relief by ordering

reapplication of lapsed or fully obligated appropriations. See

id at 1428. The commitment of the appropriated funds to

other recipients and the expiration of the congressional appropriation eliminated Houston's particular entitlement to

government monies. Outside the appropriations process,

HUD had no statutory, regulatory, or other legal obligation

or authority to distribute funds to Houston. Under those

circumstances, an award from other available HUD funds not

only would have represented compensation for Houston's loss

of the grant money--thus money damages as opposed to

specific relief--but also would have created a separation of

powers encroachment under the Appropriations Clause of the

Constitution. The City of Houston petitioners sought to have

us control the appropriation of funds, or the distribution of

appropriated funds, while the present case does not directly

implicate appropriated funds, but rather seeks restoration of

funds allegedly taken wrongfully by assessment from Bankers's member institutions.

Whereas City of Houston addressed whether a court could

award to a claimant funds which otherwise belonged to the

government, this case questions whether the government can

retain funds which originally belonged to Bankers's members.

Unlike Houston, Bankers is not seeking compensation for

economic losses suffered by the government's alleged wrongdoing; Bankers wants the FDIC to return that which rightfully belonged to Bankers's member institutions in the first

place. Bankers alleges that the FDIC violated the terms of

12 U.S.C. ss 1441 and 1817 by assessing more in the fourth

quarter of 1996 than the statutory scheme permitted. If

Bankers is correct in its statutory interpretation, then the

FDIC improperly collected money from Bankers's members,

and they are entitled under the statutory scheme to get their

money back. The FDIC cannot eliminate the entitlement of

Bankers's member institutions to reimbursement by distributing the improperly collected funds elsewhere.

The FDIC also cites Department of the Army v. Blue Fox,

Inc., 119 S. Ct. 687 (1999), as supporting the district court's

conclusion. In Blue Fox, a prime contractor on a government

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contract failed to pay a subcontractor, who then sued the

Army seeking an equitable lien on any funds available or

appropriated for the project and an order directing payment

of those funds. The Supreme Court held that, since the

subcontractor's claim for specific relief was against the defaulting prime contractor, an equitable lien represented compensatory or substitute relief, thus money damages. See id.

at 692. The present case is different because the FDIC's

responsibility for the alleged overassessment is not purely

subsidiary to FICO's. Unlike the Army in Blue Fox, the

FDIC at least shares with FICO primary responsibility for

the alleged wrongdoing. Although the FDIC disclaims any

active role in the alleged injurious conduct, as we have

already discussed, the FDIC's characterization is inaccurate.

Since the FDIC shares direct responsibility for assessing and

collecting the FICO assessment, Bankers's claim for monetary relief is equitable, like the claims in Bowen and Maryland Department of Human Resources, not compensatory,

like the claim in Blue Fox.

Regardless, even if we were to order a refund in this case,

no transfer of funds would be necessary to follow our command. At oral argument, the FDIC conceded that it had the

authority to offset Bankers's members' future FICO assessments by the amount of any refund this court might order.

In other words, if we found for Bankers on the merits, we

could order the FDIC to give them a credit against future

FICO assessments as opposed to a cash refund of past

assessments. Bankers agreed that such a remedy would be

functionally equivalent to the relief it seeks. These concessions render the FDIC's cash position both practically and

legally irrelevant. For these reasons, we hold that the remedy sought by Bankers does not constitute money damages.

Thus we have power under 5 U.S.C. s 702 to consider the

merits of Bankers's claim.

V. Alleged Issues of Fact

Bankers challenges the district court's grant of summary

judgment on the ground that the court improperly resolved

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genuine issues of material fact which should be left to a jury.

Bankers raises three allegedly key facts as in dispute: First,

whether FICO could have met its interest payment obligations in the fourth quarter of 1996 without the special

assessment; second, whether the FDIC played an active or

passive role with respect to the assessment; and third,

whether the FDIC is capable of paying a refund. An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standard as governed the district court's

decision. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir.

1999). Accordingly, we must determine whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists in this case. See Byers v.

Burleson, 713 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Bankers's claim misapprehends the district court's decision

and the nature of the inquiry at hand. Summary judgment is

appropriate when evidence on file shows "that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Not all alleged factual disputes represent

genuine issues of material fact which may only be resolved by

a jury. "Material facts are those 'that might affect the

outcome of the suit under governing law,' and a genuine

dispute about material facts exists 'if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.' " Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Grain Board of Iraq, 904

F.2d 732, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The "factual issues"

raised by Bankers do not meet this standard.

With respect to FICO's ability to meet its interest payment

obligation, the FDIC's concern was with the construction of

the statutory funding scheme overall. The FDIC at no point

in the record said that FICO could not make its fourth

quarter 1996 interest payment unless it retained the funds

collected on September 30, 1996. Instead, the FDIC reasoned that Bankers's interpretation of the statute could yield

inconsistent funding and disrupt FICO's ability to meet its

bond interest obligation, that another reading would generate

a more stable cash flow for FICO, and that the stable cash

flow was consistent with congressional intent. Thus, the

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FDIC's discussion of FICO's ability to meet its bond interest

obligation represents statutory construction, not fact finding,

and the district court appropriately treated it as such.

The nature of the FDIC's role in the FICO assessment

process is also a legal, not a factual, question. The adequacy

of the Savings Fund reserves is not a material fact because it

is not relevant. But even if we considered these allegedly

factual disputes to be issues of fact, and a jury found that the

FDIC was an active participant, that finding would only

influence whether Bankers clears the Article III standing

hurdle, a question which we have already decided in Bankers's favor as a matter of law; and for a jury to find that the

Savings Fund reserves are adequate to cover the refund

would resolve nothing. Neither finding would inform the

question of whether the FDIC properly interpreted its statutory obligation with respect to the FICO assessment. Put

simply, even if Bankers were correct in characterizing these

so-called disputes as issues of fact, they do not involve

material facts because they have no bearing on the outcome

of the case. This case turns on whether the FDIC properly

interpreted the statutory scheme governing Savings Fund

and FICO assessments, not on determinations of fact. The

district court did not invade the jury's province.

VI. Statutory Interpretation

Accordingly, we turn to the bottom line of the present case:

whether the FDIC properly construed its authority and obligations under 12 U.S.C. ss 1441 and 1817. Prior to the

enactment of the 1996 Act and through January 1, 1997, 12

U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) provided that the FICO assessment "shall

not exceed the amount authorized to be assessed against

Savings Association Insurance Fund members pursuant to [12

U.S.C. s 1817]...." 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) (1994); see also

Pub. L. 104-208, s 2703(a), (c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-485 to

3009-486 (1996) (making the amendments to s 1441(f)(2) effective only with respect to semiannual periods beginning

after December 31, 1996). As of September 30, 1996, however, 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(i) required the FDIC Board to

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set semiannual assessments for insured depository institutions when necessary and only to the extent necessary

... to maintain the reserve ratio of each deposit insurance fund at the designated reserve ratio; or ... if the

reserve ratio is less than the designated reserve ratio, to

increase the reserve ratio to the designated reserve

ratio....

12 U.S.C.A. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1999). The statute instructed the FDIC Board in carrying out that task to

consider the Savings Fund's expected operating expenses,

case resolution expenditures and income, the effect of assessments on members' earnings and capital, and "any other

factors that the Board of Directors may deem appropriate."

Id. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(ii). The statute also precluded the FDIC

Board from setting the Savings Fund assessments "in excess

of the amount needed ... to maintain the reserve ratio of the

fund at the designated reserve ratio; or ... if the reserve

ratio is less than the designated reserve ratio, to increase the

reserve ratio to the designated reserve ratio." Id.

s 1817(b)(2)(A)(iii). Notably, the limitation on assessment

codified in 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(iii) was part of the 1996

Act, and thus became effective September 30, 1996. Additionally, even though the changes to 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2)

severing the link between the FICO and Savings Fund assessments were not effective until January 1, 1997, the portion of 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2) which addressed the FICO

assessment was repealed effective September 30, 1996: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, amounts

assessed by the Financing Corporation under section 1441 of

this title against Savings Association Insurance Fund members shall be subtracted from the amounts authorized to be

assessed by the Corporation under this paragraph." 12

U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(D) (1994); see also Pub. L. No. 104-208,

s 2703(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-485 (1996) (repealing

s 1817(b)(2)(D)).3

__________

3 In its final rule, the FDIC took the view that section 2703(c) of

the 1996 Act contained a misprint, and that the Act actually

repealed 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(D) effective January 1, 1997. See

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Bankers asserts that the plain meaning of these provisions

as they read for the fourth quarter of 1996 unambiguously

excused Savings Fund members from paying fourth quarter

1996 assessments in excess of the amount necessary for the

Savings Fund to achieve or maintain the designated 1.25%

reserve-to-deposits capitalization ratio. Congress, through

the 1996 Act, ordered the FDIC to set and collect a special

assessment sufficient to raise the Savings Fund reserves to

the designated reserve ratio as of October 1, 1996, and limited

the Savings Fund assessment to the amount needed to maintain the Savings Fund reserves at that level. But Congress

preserved the statutory link between the FICO and Savings

Fund assessments until January 1, 1997. Therefore, Bankers

argues, Congress clearly intended to limit the fourth quarter

FICO assessment. As the fourth quarter FICO assessment

had already been collected when the Act came into effect,

Bankers argues a refund is required, as with the fourth

quarter Savings Fund assessment. Bankers suggests that

the FDIC's approach reduces 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) to an

instruction for the FDIC to allocate to FICO whatever

amounts FICO requested, while 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2) clearly

limited the FICO assessment to the amount necessary to

achieve or maintain the Savings Fund at the designated

reserve ratio.

The FDIC, in contrast, maintains that the only reasonable

interpretation of the statutory scheme as a whole, both before

the 1996 Act and through the fourth quarter of 1996, was for

the Savings Fund assessment to include the amounts necessary for both the Savings Fund and FICO. Before the Act

required a special assessment raising the Savings Fund reserves to the designated ratio, 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(3)(B)

ordered the FDIC to bring the Savings Fund to that level

within a fifteen year time frame. As the FDIC sees it, if

Bankers's interpretation of the pre-1996 statutory scheme is

correct, then the FDIC would have had to satisfy the requirements of FICO and the Savings Fund both out of the

__________

61 Fed. Reg. at 67,688 n.2. We do not need to resolve whether the

FDIC is correct on this point to reach our conclusion.

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assessment necessary to fund the Savings Fund alone, and

the Savings Fund could not have achieved the designated

reserve ratio within the required fifteen year period. Moreover, as the Savings Fund approached and achieved the

designated level, FICO would have received less and less,

then nothing at all unless the Savings Fund fell below that

ratio. Such an outcome, it argues, would contradict Congress's clear intent to provide FICO with the funding necessary to satisfy its bond interest payment obligations. Under

its own interpretation, the statutory scheme merely precluded

the FDIC from assessing for the Savings Fund's needs until

it had assessed an amount adequate to fund FICO, and the

FDIC could maintain a stable cash flow for FICO even after

the Savings Fund attained the designated reserve ratio.

Moreover, the statute does not provide for a refund of the

FICO assessment. If Congress intended a refund, the FDIC

asserts, it would have provided for one.

The overall statutory scheme involves a statute over which

the FDIC does not possess administrative authority, 12

U.S.C. s 1441. Ordinarily, an agency's interpretation of a

statute it does not administer is not entitled to deference.

See, e.g., Professional Reactor Operator Soc'y v. United

States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051

(D.C. Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, because the FDIC's actions

derive principally from its interpretation of 12 U.S.C.

s 1817(b)(2), which it does administer, the two-step Chevron

inquiry is appropriate here. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

Under the Chevron standard, if Congress has directly spoken

to the issue, and the intent of Congress is clear, then there is

nothing for the agency to interpret, and the court must give

effect to the unambiguous expression of Congress. See id.

If, however, the court decides that the statute is ambiguous,

then the court determines only whether the agency's interpretation is a reasonable one. See id.

Turning to the first step of the analysis, we cannot agree

with Bankers that the plain meaning of 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2)

and 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2) required the FDIC to refund the

FICO assessment. Neither can we concur with the FDIC's

claim that these provisions explicitly precluded a refund.

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Indeed, both parties offer reasonable interpretations of the

proper functioning of the statutory scheme. In our view, the

intersection of 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A) and 12 U.S.C.

s 1441(f)(2) was somewhat ambiguous even before the Act,

and the staggered effective dates imposed by the Act substantially compounded that ambiguity.

We note however that 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A) gives the

FDIC the authority to "set" the Savings Fund assessment

amount, then articulates several factors including the "any

other factors" element for the FDIC to consider in doing so.

In its notice of final rulemaking and before this court, the

FDIC asserted that the pre-1996 Act statutory scheme in

effect when the assessment at issue was collected, as well as

the "any other factors" language of 12 U.S.C.

s 1817(b)(2)(A)(ii) which survived the Act, gave it some discretion to deny a FICO assessment refund on the ground that

such a refund would imperil FICO funding. See 61 Fed. Reg.

at 67,692; Appellee's Br. at 26-27, 30, 32. Although each

party argued that the case should be resolved in its favor at

Chevron step one, our conclusion that the statutory scheme is

facially ambiguous and our acceptance of the FDIC's claim

that 12 U.S.C. s 1817(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows it some discretion

over these matters permit us to move to the second phase of

the Chevron analysis.

We recognize that the FDIC's interpretation of the provisions in question has been inconsistent. Indeed, in its final

rule addressing the refund issue, the FDIC blamed the FICO

allocation for the Savings Fund's failure to receive the full

amount of the revenues that the Savings Fund assessments

generated prior to the Act. See 61 Fed. Reg. 67,687 & n.1

(1996). The FDIC noted that, "[t]hrough the end of 1996, the

FICO draw serves to reduce the amounts that the FDIC

assesses against [Savings Fund]-member savings associations." Id. at 67,688 (citing 12 U.S.C. s 1441(f)(2)). Only

after 1996, the FDIC claimed, would FICO assessments be

"independent of and in addition to those of the FDIC." Id. at

67,688 & n.2. These statements suggest that the FDIC's

December 1996 interpretation of the pre-Act statutory

scheme was in line with Bankers's interpretation here.

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Moreover, in challenging Bankers's standing to raise the

refund claim, the FDIC maintained before this court that it

had no discretion with respect to the FICO assessment, but

was merely a passive collection agent and conduit for the

assessed funds.

However, despite these inconsistencies, the FDIC in its

rulemaking process clearly considered the alternative interpretations of the statute, and settled on a construction that is

at least permissible. For the most part, the FDIC has

continued to support this construction throughout the litigation, even if at times it has advanced additional, somewhat

contradictory positions as well. Thus, under the deferential

Chevron standard, we conclude that the FDIC's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. s 1817 was a reasonable one which we must

respect. We conclude as well that the FDIC, in declining to

refund the fourth quarter 1996 FICO assessment, did not act

arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise contrary to the law.

Both in the district court and before us, the FDIC has

advanced the additional argument that the amended statutory

language effective October 1, 1996, bars the FDIC only from

"set[ting]" assessments and from "assess[ing]" amounts in

excess of statutory limitations. 12 U.S.C. ss 1441(f)(2)(A)(i)-

(ii), 1817(b)(2)(A)(i), (iii). Because the assessment in this case

was "set" no later than May 30, 1996, by memorandum from

FICO to the FDIC and "assessed" on or about August 31,

1996, when the FDIC sent invoices to the saving institutions,

both events, potentially barrable by the amended statute,

occurred well before the effective date of the statutory

change. As the FDIC points out, Bankers has not even

argued that the fourth quarter 1996 FICO assessment was

unlawful under the statutory scheme as it existed prior to the

October 1, 1996, effective date of the amendment. Because

nothing in the new statute requires the FDIC to reconsider

the previously set lawful assessment, the FDIC argues that

the language upon which Bankers relies is not applicable to

the assessment at issue. We find this argument to be a

persuasive one.

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The principal drawback with this additional argument of

the FDIC is that the FDIC did not rely upon it or even

discuss it during the rulemaking process as the basis for its

decision not to refund the fourth quarter FICO assessment.

Thus, we cannot apply to this interpretation of the statutory

words "set" and "assess" the same Chevron deference we

afforded to the FDIC's "any other factors" analysis discussed

above. This does not, however, mean that we may not

consider the argument, or even rely on the interpretation. It

is true, of course, that a court can only uphold the decision of

an administrative agency on those grounds "upon which the

record discloses that its action was based." SEC v. Chenery

Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). Courts are not commissioned

to remake administrative determinations on different bases

than those considered and relied upon by the administrative

agencies charged with the making of those decisions.

An obvious corollary to this principle is that post hoc

rationalizations cannot support an affirmance of an agency

decision based on an otherwise invalid rationale. See, e.g.,

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, Inc., 401 U.S.

402, 419-20 (1971). This principle applies as well to our

review of statutory interpretations under the second prong of

Chevron. As we stated in City of Kansas City v. Department

of Hous. & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1991), "[i]n

whatever context we defer to agencies, we do so with the

understanding that the object of our deference is the result of

agency decisionmaking, and not some post hoc rationale developed as part of a litigation strategy." Id. at 192.

However, the FDIC does not ask us to do anything barred

by Chenery or Kansas City. The corporation does not seek

before us to substitute a post hoc, and therefore unacceptable,

rationale for an otherwise invalid rationale rejected by the

court on review. Rather, the FDIC, in defending the reasonableness of its interpretation of one part of the relevant

statute subject to the second prong of the Chevron analysis,

offers a persuasive interpretation of other words of that same

statute consistent with the interpretation it seeks to have us

uphold under Chevron. The FDIC does not claim, and we do

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dently carries the day in our review of its decision. Were we

to so hold, we might well be countenancing the sort of post

hoc-ery we have rejected in prior cases. But again, that is

not what we do in the present analysis. Rather, the FDIC

argues, and we hold, that the apparent legal meanings of the

statutory terms "set" and "assess" are consistent with the

FDIC's interpretation of the "any other factor" rationale in

fact relied upon by the FDIC and reviewed by us under the

Chevron standard. There is no difficulty in our reviewing the

statutory language de novo. That is, after all, what courts do.

It is fixed law of Chevron jurisprudence, applicable to the

"any other factors" interpretation, that we may employ the

traditional tools of statutory interpretation in determining

both whether the meaning of the language is clear at Chevron

step one and whether the agency's interpretation is a reasonable one at Chevron step two. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Tel.

Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997); American

Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C.

Cir. 1986). Consistency of interpretation of one portion of a

statute with the apparent meaning of another portion is a

traditional tool of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Lexecon

Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct.

956, 962 (1998); Atwell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 670 F.2d

272, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Therefore, the argument is properly before us; it is also convincing. The FDIC's interpretation

of the "any other factors" language of 12 U.S.C.

s 1817(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) yields a result consistent with the apparent congressional goal of 12 U.S.C. ss 1441(f)(2)(A)(i)-(ii)

and 1817(b)(2)(A)(i) and (iii). This is evidence that the

FDIC's interpretation of the statutory scheme is reasonable.

The opposing interpretation advanced by appellants is not so

consistent with the apparent congressional intent of the other

section. Therefore, the FDIC's interpretation is not only

reasonable, but the more reasonable of those before us, even

if we subjected it to a more stringent standard than Chevron

analysis. It does no violence to Chenery or Kansas City

principles for an agency to advance a legal argument in

support of its administrative position which bolsters rather

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than duplicates the consistent position upon which its decision

was made below.

Conclusion

In summary, we hold that Bankers satisfies the requirements for Article III standing, and that the remedy Bankers

seeks represents relief other than money damages within the

context of 5 U.S.C. s 702. As a result, we are able to

consider the merits of Bankers's claim. Upon consideration

of those merits, however, we hold that the district court did

not improperly invade the jury's province and resolve genuine

issues of material fact; and we hold that the FDIC's interpretation of the relevant statutory scheme is a reasonable one

entitled to Chevron deference and is not arbitrary, capricious,

or otherwise contrary to the law. For these reasons, we

affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of the FDIC.

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