Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00409/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00409-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Marshall
Respondent
Alexey Popov
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXEY POPOV,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0409 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 8]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 10, 2006. In the

petition, Petitioner seeks reversal of the disciplinary conviction for possession of a deadly

weapon, received while he was housed at Wasco State Prison. (Petition, at 2-3.) Petitioner

alleges that he was denied due process because there was insufficient evidence to support the

finding that he was in possession of the deadly weapon. Id. 

The incident occurred on October 15, 2001, and the disciplinary hearing at which

Petitioner was found guilty occurred on November 18, 2001. (Exhibit A, attached to

Respondent’s Motion.) Petitioner submitted an administrative appeal challenging the

disciplinary conviction, and on May 30, 2002, the appeal was denied at the Director’s Level of

review. (Exhibit B, attached to Respondent’s Motion.) 

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

On December 18, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings

County Superior Court, challenging the disciplinary conviction for possession of a deadly

weapon. (Exhibit C, attached to Respondent’s Motion.) The petition was denied by the Superior

Court on December 31, 2003. (Id.) The Superior Court stated, “Petitioner has failed to

adequately explain the delay of a year and a half in seeking writ relief.” (Id.) The Court went on

to state, “This unexcused delay alone justifies denial of the writ petition. (In re Clark (1993) 5

Cal.4th 750, 765 n.5) [petitioner must explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas

corpus relief.]” (Id.) The Superior Court alternatively denied the petition on the merits. (Id.) 

On February 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Exhibit D, attached to Respondent’s

Motion.) The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition on February 19, 2004. (Id.)

On April 5, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court on the same grounds as in the lower courts. (Exhibit E, attached to Respondent’s 

Motion.) On March 16, 2005, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (Id.) 

Pursuant to the Court’s order of May 1, 2006, Respondent filed the instant motion to

dismiss on July 3, 2006, arguing that the instant petition is untimely. Petitioner filed an

opposition on July 20, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one year

limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the face

of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . ." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Petitioner’s claim in his opposition that the statute of limitations does not apply to challenges to 1

disciplinary decisions, is without merit. In Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061 (9 Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit Court th

of Appeals specifically held that “. . . § 2244's one-year limitation period applies to all habeas petitions filed by

persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), even if the petition

challenges a pertinent administrative decision rather than a state court judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Shelby, at

1063. 

3

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in

procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

C. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for

writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. th

denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on April 10, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 1

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. However, in a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a

prison disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the

statute of limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. See Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9 Cir.2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of th

an inmate’s administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered

the commencement of the limitations period); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9 Cir. th

2004) (holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a petitioner’s

administrative appeal has been denied). Therefore, the limitations period commenced on May

31, 2002, the day after Petitioner was informed that his Director’s Level appeal had been denied.

(See Exhibit B, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.) Under section 2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner had

one year until May 30, 2003, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner did not file his federal petition until March 12, 2006 (the date it

is signed and presumed mailed), after the limitations had expired.

D. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is

tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Even giving Petitioner the benefit of the mailbox rule does not render the instant petition timely, as the 2

proof of service is dated November 25, 2003, which is also well after the statute of limitations expired. (Attachment

2, to Respondent’s Motion.) In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas

petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed

to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988);

Saffold v. Newland, 224 F.3d 1081, 1097 (9 Cir. 2000) (applying mailbox rule to both federal and state habeas

th

corpus petitions for purposes of the AEDPA). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's mailing of legal

documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be adverse

to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382.

th

The Supreme Court noted that it has never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is 3

available under AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In Pace, the Supreme Court again declined to do so and only

assumed for the sake of argument that it did, because Respondent assumed as much and Petitioner was not entitled to

tolling under any standard. 125 S.Ct. at 1814 n. 8. 

5

during the intervals between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a

habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see

also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). th

Although Petitioner filed three state post collateral petitions, he did not file the first

petition in the Kings County Superior Court until December 18, 2003, well after the statute of

limitations had expired. Because the petition was filed after the expiration of the limitations 2

period, it had no tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) th

(Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also

Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354

(N.D.Cal.2002). Likewise, Petitioner’s subsequent state petitions had no tolling consequences.

Therefore, the petition remains untimely. 

E. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of 3

Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert th th

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. th

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

In his opposition, Petitioner contends that during the running of the statute of the

limitations he was transferred to Tehachapi State Prison on April 15, 2002, which was on lockdown status for five out of the eight months that he was housed there. Petitioner states that he

was then transferred to Corcoran State Prison which was on lock-down for seven months that

affected his opportunity to access assistance in the preparation of his writ. Petitioner states that

he was ultimately transferred to CMC-East on March 14, 2004, and filed the petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on April 5, 2004. 

In general, unpredictable lockdowns or library closures do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances warranting equitable tolling, absent a showing of how the lockdowns interfered

with the ability to file on time. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D.

Cal. 1997) (no tolling for prisoner who failed to show how intermittent lockdowns prevented him

from filing his petition.); Atkins v. Harris, 1999 WL 13719, * 2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1999)

(“lockdowns, restricted library access and transfers do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to equitably toll the [AEDPA] statute of limitations.) 

Petitioner has not demonstrated how the transfers or lockdown status affected his abililty

to file a timely petition. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9 Cir. 2005) (requiring a th

“casual connection” between the alleged extraordinary circumstance and the failure to file a

timely petition), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9 Cir. 2006). As to his housing th

at Tehachapi State Prison, Petitioner concedes that he was only on lock-down status for five out

of the eight months that he was housed there. (Opposition, at 1.) Additionally, Petitioner’s claim

that he was transferred and on lock-down status for seven months at Corcoran State Prison which

affected his ability to seek assistance in preparation of his writ, is too vague and conclusory to

warrant equitable tolling. Petitioner provides no dates with respect to when the alleged

lockdowns occurred nor evidentiary support that they occurred at all during the relevant time

frame. 

Petitioner is advised that ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary circumstance

sufficient to justify equitable tolling. See e.g. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge th

of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220

(10th Cir.2000) (“it is well established that ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

prisoner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.”); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. th

1999); Warren v. Lewis, 365 F.3d 529, 532 (6th Cir.2004), quoting Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331,

1335 (6th Cir.1991) (“[i]t is well-settled that ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to

warrant equitable tolling.”). Likewise, Petitioner’s inability to file the writ due to the failure of

legal assistance is not sufficient, because prisoners in California are not entitled to legal

assistance, including inmate assistance, in collateral proceedings as a matter of right. 

Pennslyvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (state not required to provide appointed

counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067-

68 (9 Cir. 2002) (denying equitable tolling for attorney negligence because there is no right to

th

effective assistance of counsel for post-conviction relief.); Hughes v. Idaho Board of Corrections,

800 F.2d at 909 (lack of legal assistance is generally insufficient to justify tolling the statute of

limitations); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir. 1999) (same). Here, Petitioner’s

th

vague allegations fail to demonstrate how the transfers and lockdowns prevented him from

complying with the one-year statute of limitations, and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a

“but-for”connection between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and that he was attempting

to diligently pursue his rights. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and the action be dismissed,

with prejudice, for a violation of the one-year statute of limitations.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 5, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00409-OWW -DLB Document 10 Filed 09/07/06 Page 8 of 8