Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16405/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16405-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
23andMe, Inc.
Appellee
Public Justice, P.C.
Amicus Curiae
David Tompkins
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID TOMPKINS, an

individual, on behalf of himself

and others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

23ANDME, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-16405

D.C. No.

5:13-cv-05682-LHK

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 23, 2016

Amended October 13, 2016

Before: Stephen S. Trott, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Concurrence by Judge Watford

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2 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

SUMMARY*

Arbitration / California Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s order enforcing the

terms of a Terms of Service agreement, and granting

23andMe, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiffs are a class of 23andMe customers who

purchased a DNA test kit and assented to an online Terms of

Service, and they challenged the 23andMe arbitration

provision under the California doctrine of unconscionability.

The panel held that none of the challenged portions of the

arbitration provision, alone or in concert, rendered the

arbitration provision unconscionable under current California

law.

The panel rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges to the

arbitration provision. First, concerning the arbitration

provision’s prevailing party clause, which provided that the

arbitration costs would be borne by the losing party, the panel

held that the plaintiffs did not carry their burden of

demonstrating unconscionability of the clause where: the

bilateral attorneys’ fee shifting clause in the Terms of Service

was not unconscionable under California law; and the

arbitration fee-shifting provision was not unconscionable

under the case-specific standard announced in Sanchez v.

Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 911 (2015). 

Second, concerning the arbitration provisions’ forum

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 3

selection clause, which stated that arbitration proceedings

would be held in San Francisco, California, the panel held

that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that the

clause was unreasonable. Third, concerning the clause

excluding intellectual property claims from mandatory

arbitration, the panel held that plaintiffs had not carried their

burden of demonstrating that the exemption was

unconscionable under current California law. The panel

concluded that the arbitration agreement was valid and

enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.

The panel also rejected plaintiffs’ challenges to provisions

in the Terms of Service not contained within the arbitration

clause itself. First, the panel held that the agreement’s oneyear statute of limitations did not make the arbitration

provision itself unconscionable under California law where

California courts afford parties considerable freedom to

modify the length of a statute of limitations, and the statute of

limitations in the Terms of Service was not unfairly onesided. Second, the panel held that a provision giving

23andMe a unilateral right to modify the agreement did not

make the arbitration provision itself unconscionable. Judge

Watford concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the

majority that the arbitration provision was valid and

enforceable, albeit for different reasons.

COUNSEL

Jeremy Robinson (argued), Jason C. Evans, and Gayle M.

Blatt; Casey, Gerry, Schenk, Francavilla, Blatt & Penfield,

LLP, San Diego, California; Mark Ankcorn, Ankcorn Law

Firm, PC, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

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4 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

Robert P. Varian (argued), James N. Kramer, M. Todd Scott,

and Alexander K Talarides; Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe,

LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

Jennifer D. Bennett, Public Justice, P.C.,Oakland, California;

F. Paul Bland, Jr., Public Justice, P.C., Washington, D.C.; for

Amicus Curiae Public Justice, P.C.

ORDER

The opinion filed August 23, 2016, is hereby amended as

follows:

On page 28 of the slip opinion:

<Given this precedent, our authority to review

portions of the contract outside the arbitration

provision is limited, if it exists at all. Even

assuming we can review the two outside

provisions, we are limited to considering

whether, in the specific circumstances of the

parties and the context in which the contract

was formed, these outside provisions

contribute to making the arbitration provision

itself unconscionable.>

is amended to:

<Given this precedent, our authority to review

portions of the contract outside the arbitration

provision is limited. But as Rent-A-Center

indicates, “[i]t may be that” where a plaintiff

challenges “the validity under § 2 of the

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 5

precise agreement to arbitrate at issue” on the

ground that certain general contract provisions

“as applied” to the agreement to arbitrate

render it unconscionable, such a “challenge

should [be] considered by the court.” 

561 U.S. at 71, 74 (emphasis in original).>.

On page 28 of the slip opinion, the following sentence is

deleted:

<As a general rule where the arbitration

agreement itself is not unconscionable,

provisions outside the arbitration agreement

will not make it so.>.

On page 29 of the slip opinion:

<Likewise, the unilateral modification clause

does not make the arbitration provision itself

unconscionable.>

is amended to:

<Likewise, under the circumstances here, the

unilateral modification clause does not

make the arbitration provision itself

unconscionable.>.

No further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc

will be entertained from this amendment.

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6 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Under the terms of the agreement at issue here, the

customers of 23andMe, Inc., were required to arbitrate the

present action. The district court enforced the terms of that

agreement and granted 23andMe’s motion to compel

arbitration. We hold that none of the challenged portions of

the arbitration provision, alone or in concert, render the

arbitration provision unconscionable under currentCalifornia

law. We therefore affirm.

I

23andMe, Inc., provides a direct-to-consumer genetic

testing service, which it calls the “Personal Genome Service.” 

A customer interested in obtaining the genetic testing service

must visit the 23andMe website to purchase an online DNA

testing kit. When purchasing the kit, the customer can click

on a link to the company’s Terms of Service that was

available at the bottom of the webpage. However, the

customer is not required to read or click through the terms

before making a purchase.

After receiving the kit, the customer returns to the website

to create an online account with 23andMe to register the

DNA kit. At this stage, and in order to proceed to use the

genetic testing service, a customer has to click on a box

indicating agreement to the Terms of Service. The Terms of

Service is a multipage agreement which states that it

constitutes the entire agreement between 23andMe and its

customers. Paragraph 28(b) of the Terms of Service contains

a mandatory arbitration provision which states, in full:

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 7

Applicable law and arbitration. Except for

disputes relating to intellectual property

rights, obligations, or any infringement

claims, anydisputes with 23andMe arising out

of or relating to the Agreement (“Disputes”)

shall be governed byCalifornia law regardless

of your country of origin or where you access

23andMe, and notwithstanding of any

conflicts of law principles and the United

Nations Convention for the International Sale

of Goods. Any Disputes shall be resolved by

final and binding arbitration under the rules

and auspices of the American Arbitration

Association, to be held in San Francisco,

California, in English, with a written decision

stating legal reasoning issued by the

arbitrator(s) at either party’s request, and with

arbitration costs and reasonable documented

attorneys’ costs of both parties to be borne by

the party that ultimately loses. Either party

may obtain injunctive relief (preliminary or

permanent) and orders to compel arbitration

or enforce arbitral awards in any court of

competent jurisdiction.

After conducting a self-test, a customer would send the

completed DNA kit to 23andMe, which performed the

genetic testing services and provided the results to the

customer.

Until 2013, 23andMe claimed that its service could be

used to help customers manage health risks, as well as

prevent or mitigate diseases such as diabetes, heart disease,

and breast cancer. In November 2013, the Food and Drug

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8 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

Administration (FDA) told 23andMe to discontinue

marketing its services for health purposes until the company

obtained government approval. The company then ceased its

health-related marketing.

As a result of the FDA’s determination, multiple plaintiffs

filed different class actions against 23andMe relating to the

company’s health claims. The claims were consolidated by

agreement in federal district court in the Northern District of

California. David Tompkins represents a consolidated class

of customers bringing a number of separate causes of actions

against 23andMe for unfair business practices, breach of

warranty, and misrepresentations about the health benefits of

23AndMe’s services. All the named plaintiffs in the present

action purchased a DNA test kit, created an online account

with 23andMe to register their DNA kits, and assented to the

Terms of Service.

In April 2014, 23andMe filed a motion to compel all

plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. A few months later, the

district court granted 23andMe’s motion. After reviewing the

mandatory arbitration provision in the Terms of Service, the

district court concluded that although the arbitration provision

was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively

unconscionable and therefore was enforceable under

California law. The court held that plaintiffs’ other

challenges to the Terms of Service had to be determined by

the arbitrator in the first instance. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2) because the parties satisfied minimal diversity

and the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). 

We “review de novo district court decisions about the

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 9

arbitrability of claims.” Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp.,

705 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013). We review factual

findings for clear error, Balen v. Holland Am. Line Inc.,

583 F.3d 647, 652 (9th Cir. 2009), and review “[t]he

interpretation and meaning of contract provisions” de novo,

Lee v. Intelius Inc., 737 F.3d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 2013).

II

In order to determine whether a state legislative or

common law rule makes an agreement to arbitrate

unenforceable, we must consider both the federal law of

arbitration and the state rule at issue.

A

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in

1925 in order to “counter prevalent judicial refusal to enforce

arbitration agreements.” Mortensen v. Bresnan Comm’ns,

722 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013). Section 2 of the FAA

makes a written provision in a contract to settle a controversy

by arbitration “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of

any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.1“Section 2 is a congressional

 

1

 9 U.S.C. § 2 states, in full:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or

a contract evidencing a transaction involving

commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

thereafter arising out of such contract or

transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or

any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to

submit to arbitration an existing controversy

arising out of such a contract, transaction, or

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10 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration

agreements.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury

Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). “The overarching

purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of

arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to

facilitate streamlined proceedings.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). Any doubts about the

scope of arbitrable issues, including applicable contract

defenses, are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H

Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25; Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.,

733 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2013).

The Supreme Court has long made clear that the FAA’s

“national policy favoring arbitration” also applies to the

states. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10

(1984). The FAA forecloses both “state legislative attempts

to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements,” id.,

at 16, and state common law principles that interfere with

“the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their

terms,” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. The text of the FAA

makes only one exception to the validity of an arbitration

agreement: the savings clause in § 2 provides that a court may

strike or limit an arbitration provision on “such grounds as

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 

9 U.S.C. § 2. The savings clause “permits agreements to

arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract

defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not

by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their

meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at

issue.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (quoting Doctor’s

refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at

law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 11

Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). “[I]n

assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration

agreement” a court may not “construe that agreement in a

manner different from that in which it otherwise construes

nonarbitration agreements under state law.” Perry v. Thomas,

482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).

Even when the state rule at issue is “a doctrine normally

thought to be generally applicable,” such as

unconscionability, it may nevertheless be preempted if it has

been “applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration,”

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341, or in a manner that, in practice,

would “have a disproportionate impact on arbitration

agreements,” id. at 342. We have interpreted this rule

broadly, holding that “[a]ny general state-law contract

defense, based in unconscionability or otherwise, that has a

disproportionate effect on arbitration is displaced by the

FAA.” Mortensen, 722 F.3d at 1159.

The plaintiffs here challenge the 23andMe arbitration

provision under the California doctrine of unconscionability. 

Under the savings clause in § 2, we must first

determine whether California has a generally applicable

unconscionability doctrine that would make the arbitration

provision invalid. In discerning California law, “[d]ecisions

of the California Supreme Court, including reasoned dicta,

are binding on us as to California law.” Muniz v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013). “When

the state’s highest court has not squarely addressed an issue,

we must predict how the highest state court would decide the

issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions

from other jurisdictions, statutes, treaties and restatements for

guidance.” Glendale Assocs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145,

1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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12 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

“Decisions of the six district appellate courts are persuasive

but do not bind each other or us,” although we generally will

“follow a published intermediate state court decision

regarding California law unless we are convinced that the

California Supreme Court would reject it.” Muniz, 738 F.3d

at 219.

B

Under California law, a state court may refuse to enforce

a provision of a contract if it finds that the provision was

“unconscionable at the time it was made.” Cal. Civil Code

§ 1670.5(a). Courts may find a contract as a whole “or any

clause of the contract” to be unconscionable. Id. The party

asserting that a contractual provision is unconscionable bears

the burden of proof. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC,

61 Cal. 4th 899, 911 (2015). Unconscionability has “both a

procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on

oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the

latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” Id. at 910

(internal quotation marks omitted). Both procedural and

substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a

clause to be unconscionable, but they need not necessarily be

present to the same degree. Armendariz v. Found. Health

Psychcare Services, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000). Although

California courts have characterized “substantive

unconscionability” in various ways, “[a]ll of these

formulations point to the central idea that unconscionability

doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad

bargain’ but with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to

the more powerful party.’” Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v.

Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1145 (2013) (Sonic II).

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 13

Under California law, “[a]n evaluation of

unconscionability is highly dependent on context.” Sanchez,

61 Cal. 4th at 911. California courts give the parties “a

reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to [the

provision’s] commercial setting, purpose, and effect,” Cal.

Civil Code § 1670.5, and then examine the context in which

the contract was formed and the “respective circumstances of

the parties” as they existed at the formation of the agreement. 

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1288 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc) (quoting Bolter v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App.

4th 900, 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).

The California Supreme Court has recently revisited the

general principles of unconscionability under state law, and

has explained how they apply to arbitration provisions in light

of Concepcion and other recent U.S. Supreme Court cases. 

See Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237 (2016);

Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 911; Sonic II, 57 Cal. 4th at 1143–45.

In doing so, the California Supreme Court confirmed that

California’s “unconscionability standard is, as it must be, the

same for arbitration and nonarbitration agreements” under the

FAA’s savings clause. Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 912. We are

bound by the California Supreme Court’s most recent

articulation of its standard in determining whether the

arbitration provisions challenged by plaintiffs are

unconscionable. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name

& Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1278 (9th Cir.

2013).

III

We now apply these principles to the plaintiffs’ claim that

the arbitration provision in Paragraph 28(b) of the Terms of

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14 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

Service is substantively unconscionable.

2 The plaintiffs

challenge the provision’s prevailing party clause, the forum

selection clause, and the clause excluding intellectual

property claims from arbitration. They claim that these

clauses together, along with the one-year statute of limitations

and 23andMe’s right to modify the Terms of Service, render

the provision unenforceable. We consider these claims in

turn.

A

We first turn to the arbitration provision’s prevailing

party clause, which states that “arbitration costs and

reasonable documented attorneys’ costs of both parties” will

“be borne by the party that ultimately loses.” Plaintiffs claim

that this provision is unconscionable because AAA arbitrators

charge $1500 a day for arbitration, and 23andMe’s “top-tier

lawyers” would also have significant charges.

We begin with California cases addressing the

enforceability of prevailing party clauses that shift attorneys’

fees to the losing party. The California Supreme Court has

held that as a general rule, “[p]arties may validly agree that

the prevailing party will be awarded attorney fees incurred in

any litigation between themselves, whether such litigation

sounds in tort or in contract.” Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th

599, 608 (1998) (quotingXuereb v. Marcus &Millichap, Inc.,

3 Cal. App. 4th 1338, 1341 (1992)). A number of California

appellate courts have enforced prevailing party clauses under

this general rule in the nonarbitration context. See Lennar

2 The parties do not dispute the court’s finding that the Terms of Service

were procedurally unconscionable, and thus we do not address that

question.

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 15

Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Stephens, 232 Cal. App. 4th 673, 694

(Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]here is nothing generally absurd or

unconscionable about prevailing partyclauses.”); Maynard v.

BTI Grp., Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 984, 989 (Cal. Ct. App.

2013) (“It is quite clear from the case law . . . that parties may

validly agree that the prevailing party will be awarded

attorneyfees incurred in anylitigation between themselves.”).

Several state appellate courts have held that provisions

shifting attorneys’ fees are unconscionable in the arbitration

context, see, e.g., Carmona v. Lincoln Millenium Car Wash,

Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 74, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014),

Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1138,

1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P.,

203 Cal. App. 4th 771, 799–800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). These

cases, however, all involved unilateral, rather than bilateral

fee-shifting provisions. For instance, Carmona considered a

provision in an arbitration agreement between a buyer and

seller that permitted the seller to recover attorneys’ fees and

costs whenever it instituted litigation or arbitration, and did

not give employees any reciprocal right. The court held that

this clause contributed to unconscionability because it was

“oppressively one-sided and unenforceable as written” under

section 1717 of the California Civil Code. Id. at 89. 

Similarly, Samaniego noted that a clause which required the

employees to pay attorneys’ fees incurred by the employer,

but imposed no reciprocal obligation on the employer to pay

the employees’ fees, “contributes to a finding of

unconscionability.” 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1147; see also

Ajamian, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 799 (invalidating a clause that

required the employee, but not the employer, to pay both

parties’ attorneys’ fees because “[t]he provision is obviously

not mutual and, on that basis alone, is unconscionable and

unenforceable.”).

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16 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

By contrast, the plaintiffs have not identified any case

where a state appellate court held that a bilateral clause

awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party was

unconscionable, whether in an arbitration or nonarbitration

context. Indeed, section 1717 of the California Civil Code

appears to approve such bilateral prevailing party clauses,

since it requires courts to treat all unilateral prevailing party

clauses as if they were bilateral clauses.3 This rule is equally

applicable to contracts of adhesion. See Sys. Inv. Corp. v.

Union Bank, 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)

(“Section 1717 was enacted to make all parties to a contract,

especially an ‘adhesion contract,’ equally liable for attorney’s

fees and other necessary disbursements.”).

In this case, the prevailing party clause is explicitly

bilateral, providing that either party can request binding

arbitration, and the “arbitration costs and reasonable

documented attorneys’ costs of both parties [are] to be borne

by the party that ultimately loses,” whoever that might be. In

light of the California Supreme Court’s ruling that the

standard for unconscionability must be the same for

arbitration and nonarbitration agreements, see Sanchez,

61 Cal. 4th at 911, and the general rule that parties may

validly agree to a bilateral prevailing party clause, see

 

3

 Section 1717 of the California Civil Code states, in full:

In any action on a contract, where the contract

specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs,

which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be

awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing

party, then the party who is determined to be the party

prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the

party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 17

Santisas, 17 Cal. 4th at 608; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1717,

we conclude that the bilateral attorneys’ fee shifting clause in

the Terms of Service is not unconscionable under California

law.

Plaintiffs next claim that the portion of the prevailing

party clause that shifts the arbitrators’ fees to the losing party

is unconscionable because it would require consumers to

shoulder fees that they would not have to bear in litigation.

We again start with California Supreme Court precedent. 

Plaintiffs rely on Armendariz v. Foundation Health

Psychcare Services, which held that “when an employer

imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment,

the arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot

generally require the employee to bear any type of expense

that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she

were free to bring the action in court.” 24 Cal. 4th at 110–11. 

We have previously struck down arbitration fee-shifting

clauses as unconscionable under this Armendariz rule. See,

e.g, Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1004 (9th Cir.

2010); Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).

The California Supreme Court has since indicated that

this Armendariz rule is limited to the employment context. 

See Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 918–19. In the area of consumer

arbitration, Sanchez explained, the California legislature took

a different approach by enacting section 1284.3 of the

California Code of Civil Procedure. Id. Section 1284.3

provides that “[a]ll fees and costs charged to or assessed upon

a consumer party by a private arbitration company in a

consumer arbitration, exclusive of arbitrator fees, shall be

waived for an indigent consumer.” Cal. Civ. Proc.

§ 1284.3(b)(1). According to Sanchez, this shows the

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18 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

legislature’s decision to adopt “an ability-to-payapproach” to

arbitration fees in the consumer context, requiring a “case-bycase determination of affordability” for consumers, and a

rejection of the Armendariz categorical approach. 61 Cal. 4th

at 919. Sanchez explained that while “jobseekers are more

likely to face ‘particularly acute’ economic pressure to sign

an employment contract with a predispute arbitration

provision . . . [c]onsumers, who face significantly less

economic pressure, would seem to require measurably less

protection.” Id. at 919–20. Deferring to this legislative

determination, Sanchez held that in the consumer context, a

fee-shifting “provision cannot be held unconscionable absent

a showing that appellate fees and costs in fact would be

unaffordable or would have a substantial deterrent effect.” 

Id. at 920.4

Applying this case-specific approach to a provision which

made the party appealing an arbitral ruling responsible for

filing fees and other arbitration costs, Sanchez concluded that

because the plaintiff “does not claim, and no evidence in the

record suggests, that the cost of appellate arbitration filing

fees were unaffordable for him, such that it would thwart his

ability to take an appeal in the limited circumstances where

such appeal is available,” the provision imposing arbitral

appeal fees on the plaintiff was not unconscionable. Id. at

921. Only if the agreement “impos[es] arbitral forum fees

that are prohibitively high,” such that the agreement

“effectively blocks every forum for the redress of disputes,

4 Because Section 1284.3 is applicable only in the arbitration context,

there is a question whether it would be preempted by the FAA if used to

invalidate a fee-shifting clause. We need not reach this issue, however,

because we determine that the fee-shifting provision in this case is not

unconscionable under existing California law.

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 19

including arbitration itself,” would the provision be

unenforceable. See id. (quoting Sonic II, 57 Cal. 4th at

1144–45).

Because Sanchez supersedes prior state appellate court

decisions, we apply its approach in determining whether a

provision in a consumer contract that shifts arbitration fees,

such as the one here, is unconscionable.5 We conclude that

the arbitration fee-shifting provision in the Terms of Service

is not unconscionable. As in Sanchez, the plaintiffs here do

not claim, and no evidence in the record suggests, that the

arbitration fees are unaffordable for them or would thwart

their ability to arbitrate this dispute. Under the case-specific

standard announced in Sanchez, the fee-shifting clause in the

Terms of Service is not unconscionable. Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th

at 911. We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs here did not

carry their burden of demonstrating the substantive

unconscionability of the bilateral prevailing party clause.

B

We next turn to the arbitration provision’s forum

selection clause, which states that final and binding

arbitration proceedings will be held in San Francisco,

California. Plaintiffs claim that the district court should have

concluded this clause was substantively unconscionable

5 Although we previously applied the Armendariz rule in the context of

a consumer agreement, Ting, 319 F.3d at 1135, we are bound by the

California Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Sanchez. See In re

Watts, 298 F.3d 1077, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that our

interpretation of a state law issue “was only binding in the absence of any

subsequent indication from the California courts that our interpretation

was incorrect,” and we are bound to follow the rationale California

Supreme Court would likely follow).

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20 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

because it could potentially require consumers to travel from

a faraway city or state for a small potential recovery. 

Because those costs involved in traveling outweigh any

potential remedies, plaintiffs argue, consumers are effectively

forced to give up the right to pursue their claim. As evidence,

plaintiffs point to affidavits by two of the nine plaintiffs

stating that the cost of traveling to San Francisco for

arbitration would be burdensome and expensive.

We begin by considering when a forum selection clause

is unconscionable under California law. The California

Supreme Court recently indicated that its decision in Smith,

Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491,

495–96 (1976) (In Bank), exemplifies California’s

unconscionability doctrine with respect to forum selection

clauses. See Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 912 (citing Smith,

Valentino, 17 Cal. 3d at 495–96). Smith, Valentino joined the

“modern trend which favors enforceability” of forum

selection clauses, and concluded “that forum selection clauses

are valid and may be given effect, in the court’s discretion

and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a

clause would be unreasonable.” 17 Cal. 3d at 495–96. A

clause would be unreasonable if “the forum selected would be

unavailable or unable to accomplish substantial justice.” Id.

at 494. In particular, Smith, Valentino rejected the plaintiff’s

arguments that the clause was unenforceable because of the

inconvenience and expense of the forum. Id. at 496. Because

the contract had been “entered into freely and voluntarily by

parties who have negotiated at arm’s length,” Smith,

Valentino concluded that the parties “reasonably can be held

to have contemplated in negotiating their agreement the

additional expense and inconvenience attendant on the

litigation of their respective claims in a distant forum,” and

therefore “[m]ere inconvenience or additional expense is not

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 21

the test of unreasonableness since it may be assumed that the

plaintiff received under the contract consideration for these

things.” Id.

Following Smith, Valentino, California courts have

generally expressed a policy approving forum selection

clauses because they “play an important role in both national

and international commerce,” Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of

California, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1493 (Cal. Ct. App.

1992), and “provide a degree of certainty, both for business

and their customers, that contractual disputes will be resolved

in a particular forum,” Net2Phone, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal.

App. 4th 583, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). “Given the

importance of forum selection clauses, both the United States

Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have placed

a heavy burden on a plaintiff seeking to defeat such a clause,

requiring it to demonstrate that enforcement of the clause

would be unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.” 

Lu, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 1493.

Although Smith, Valentino approved a forum selection

clause in a negotiated contract, California appellate courts

have implemented this broader policy and enforced forum

selection clauses in adhesion contracts in a non-arbitration

context. In Intershop Communications v. Superior Court, the

court agreed that an employment contract was a contract of

adhesion, but nevertheless held that its forum selection

clause, requiring disputes to be litigated in Germany, was

enforceable. 104 Cal. App. 4th 191, 201 (Cal. Ct. App.

2002). “A forum selection clause within an adhesion contract

will be enforced as long as the clause provided adequate

notice to the [party] that he was agreeing to the jurisdiction

cited in the contract.” Id. at 201–02 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Olinick v. BMG Entm’t, 138 Cal. App. 4th

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22 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

1286, 1294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a forum selection

clause in an employment contract, and stating that “mere

inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of

unreasonableness of a mandatory forum selection clause”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). California appellate

courts considering forum selection clauses in adhesion

contracts have held that “[n]either inconvenience nor

additional expense in litigating in the selected forum is part

of the test of unreasonability.” Cal-State Bus. Prods. &

Servs., Inc. v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1679 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1993); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court,

90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting the

argument that a forum selection clause in an adhesion

contract was unenforceable because it would have required

the members of the putative class to travel out of state to

litigate “the relatively nominal individual sums at issue”).

In the arbitration context, however, some California

appellate courts have not followed Smith, Valentino and its

progeny, but rather have considered expense and

inconvenience caused by a forum selection clause and

concluded that these factors made the clause unconscionable. 

Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., for example, held that a forum

selection clause requiring California customers of an internet

service provider to arbitrate their claims in Georgia was

unreasonable. See 134 Cal. App. 4th 544, 561 (Cal. Ct. App.

2005). The appellate court held that there may be a large

number of “consumers who have suffered losses in the range

of $40 to $50” but that “to expect any or all of them to travel

to Georgia” was “unreasonable as a matter of law.” Id. For

much the same reasons, Bolter held that a forum selection

clause requiring “Mom and Pop” franchisees to arbitrate

disputes in Utah was unconscionable. 87 Cal. App. 4th at 

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 23

909; see also Magno v. Coll. Network, Inc., — Cal. Rptr. 3d

—, 2016 WL 3667572, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (same).

To the extent the state appellate courts apply different

standards in arbitration and nonarbitration contexts,

upholding forum selection clauses in the nonarbitration

context (even in adhesion contracts) without considering

expense and inconvenience, while striking them down in the

arbitration context due to expense and inconvenience, these

cases are not binding on us as California law. We reach this

conclusion because Sanchez has confirmed that California’s

“unconscionability standard is, as it must be, the same for

arbitration and nonarbitration agreements.” 61 Cal. 4th at

912; see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (“A court may not

. . . construe [an arbitration] agreement in a manner different

from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration

agreements under state law.”). In determining whether the

California Supreme Court would adopt the rule in Smith,

Valentino or in Bolter, we are guided by the fact that Sanchez

mentioned Smith, Valentino with approval as exemplary of

how to determine unconscionability of forum selection

clauses. See 61 Cal. 4th at 912. Further, the rule in Bolter

would be grossly overbroad if applied to all contracts: it could

invalidate any forum selection clause in any consumer

contract used by a company to sell moderately priced goods

in more than one state. Such a rule would clearly contravene

California’s general policy preference for the enforcement of

forum selection clauses. See Net2Phone, 109 Cal. App. 4th

at 588; Whimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics Int’l,

Inc., 32 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).6

 

6

 Although we followed Aral and Bolter’s approach to forum selection

clauses in Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1288–90, we did not have guidance

from Sanchez at that time. Sanchez has since barred state courts from

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24 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

Here, plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that

the forum selection clause in the Terms of Service is

unreasonable. San Francisco is not “unavailable or unable to

accomplish substantial justice.” Smith, Valentino, 17 Cal. 3d

at 494. San Francisco is the principal place of business of

23andMe and so it has a sufficient nexus to the contract. See

Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Sys., Inc., 623 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir.

2010). Furthermore, the forum selection clause provided

adequate notice that the consumers were agreeing to arbitrate

in San Francisco. See Intershop, 104 Cal. App. 4th at

201–02. Although plaintiffs submitted two affidavits stating

that the cost of traveling to San Francisco for arbitration

would be burdensome and expensive, “[m]ere inconvenience

or additional expense” does not make the locale

unreasonable. Smith, Valentino, 17 Cal. 3d at 496 (citing M/S

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1972)).

Moreover, even if California courts continue to consider

expense and inconvenience in their unconscionabilityanalysis

in some circumstances, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated

that San Francisco will be “so gravely difficult and

inconvenient that [the plaintiffs] will for all practical

purposes be deprived of [their] day in court,” Aral, 134 Cal.

App. 4th at 561 (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18); see

Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1290 & n.13. The two affidavits

submitted by plaintiffs do not provide any detail regarding

why the expense of traveling to San Francisco would be too

applying an unconscionability doctrine in a different manner in arbitration

and nonarbitration contexts. 61 Cal. 4th at 912. Because Aral and Bolter

both adopted an arbitration-specific approach to determining the

unconscionability of a forum selection clause, we must reconsider the

current state of California law in light of Sanchez. See In re Watts,

298 F.3d 1077, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2002).

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 25

burdensome. Seven of the plaintiffs in this consolidated

action reside in California, and, as the district court noted, six

of the nine actions in this case were filed in California. All

cases were voluntarily transferred to San Jose, California. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the forum selection clause is

not unconscionable.

C

Finally, we consider the arbitration clause’s provision

exempting “any disputes relating to intellectual property

rights, obligations, or any infringement claims” from

mandatory arbitration. The plaintiffs argue that this clause is

substantively unconscionable because 23andMe is more

likely to bring intellectual property claims against its

customers than vice versa, and therefore 23andMe has

reserved for itself the advantages of a judicial forum while

forcing customers to use the arbitral forum. This argument is

based on the assumption that an arbitral forum is inferior to

a judicial forum for resolving disputes.

Such a theory finds some support in California law. In

Armendariz, the California Supreme Court held that an

arbitration provision in an employment agreement was

unconscionably unilateral (and thus unenforceable) because,

among other things, it required the employee to arbitrate all

wrongful termination claims against the employer but gave

the employer a choice of forums for its claims. 24 Cal. 4th at

120. Armendariz explained that “[g]iven the disadvantages

that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly

one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining power to

impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to

accept such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim

against the employee.” Id. at 117. Armendariz emphasized,

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26 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

however, “that if an employer does have reasonable

justification for the arrangement,” and the arbitration

agreement contained a “modicum of bilaterality,” in the

context of the “business realities” surrounding the contract’s

formation, it would not be unconscionable. Id. at 117–18.

The California Supreme Court has since clarified

Armendariz’s reasoning on this issue in several ways. First,

the California Supreme Court has backed away from

Armendariz’s assumptions regarding the inferiority of the

arbitral forum. Instead, Sonic II stated that “California and

federal law treat the substitution of arbitration for litigation as

the mere replacement of one dispute resolution forum for

another, resulting in no inherent disadvantage.” 57 Cal. 4th

at 1152. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme

Court cases holding that a state court cannot “rely on the

uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a statelaw holding that enforcement would be unconscionable,”

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492

n.9), as well as with our decisions, see Ferguson, 733 F.3d at

936 (holding that the California Supreme Court’s reliance “on

the institutional advantages of the judicial forum” as the basis

for its rule that claims for public injunctive relief could not be

arbitrated was inconsistent with Concepcion.), and that of the

Tenth Circuit, see THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton,

741 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that the FAA

preempts state common law “that is predicated on the view

that arbitration is an inferior means of vindicating rights”).

Second, the California Supreme Court has confirmed that

a one-sided contract is not necessarily unconscionable. “[A]

contract can provide for a margin of safety that provides the

party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra

protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 27

without being unconscionable.” Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1250

(internal quotation marks omitted). Along these lines,

Sanchez upheld two provisions in a contract between a car

buyer and a car dealership that were alleged to be more

favorable to the stronger party. Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 916. 

The first provision forbade appeals of an arbitral decision

unless it reached a specific dollar threshold. Sanchez

concluded that this provision was not unconscionable because

“the appeal threshold provision does not, on its face,

obviously favor the drafting party.” Id. at 916. The second

provision provided that “only arbitral grants of injunctive

relief” were subject to a second arbitration. Id. at 917. 

Although acknowledging that “overall the car buyer is more

likely than the seller to seek injunctive relief,” Sanchez held

that the one-sided nature of this provision did not render it

unconscionable because the extra margin of safety provided

by the clause was reasonable given “the broad impact that

injunctive relief may have on the car seller’s business.” Id.

Similarly, Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. held that a provision

that “compelled arbitration of all employment-related claims,

while permitting both parties to seek injunctive relief” in a

preliminary court proceeding was not unreasonably

unconscionable even if the employer was “practically

speaking” more likely to seek the remedy of preliminary

injunctive relief. 62 Cal 4th at 1248 & n.4.

Under this precedent, the provision in the Terms of

Service in this case excluding intellectual property claims

from mandatory arbitration is not unconscionable. As in

Sanchez, the provision in this case exempting “any disputes

relating to intellectual property rights, obligations, or any

infringement claims” from mandatory arbitration “does not,

on its face, obviously favor the drafting party.” 61 Cal. 4th

at 916. Under the Terms of Service, customers retained

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28 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

certain intellectual property rights, including rights in usergenerated content and genetic information. The customers

would be able to bring claims against 23andMe based on

these rights in court. Conversely, the plaintiffs have not

identified any intellectual property rights claims that

23andMe are likely to bring against its customers.7 Even

under Armendariz, the intellectual property provision has

more than a “modicum of bilaterality,” Armendariz, 24 Cal.

4th at 117. Moreover, to the extent 23andMe has valuable

intellectual property rights in its website and database, it is

entitled to an extra “margin of safety” based on legitimate

business needs, Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1250. We therefore

conclude plaintiffs have not carried their burden of

demonstrating that the intellectual property exemption is

unconscionable under current California law.

7

In oral argument, the plaintiffs asserted that 23andMe is building a

database of genetic information based on its customers’ DNA results and

that 23andMe might resort to copyright law to prevent customers from

publishing the DNA data of other customers. (Customers are allowed to

publish their own data under the agreement.) There is no support in the

record for this assertion, and it appears to be purely speculative. 

Therefore, it does not support the plaintiffs’ argument that 23andMe is

more likely to bring intellectual property claims then consumers.

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 29

D

Plaintiffs also challenge a provision in the Terms of

Service establishing a one-year statute of limitations period,8

and a provision giving 23andMe a unilateral right to modify

the agreement.9 These provisions are not contained within

the arbitration clause itself.

Because § 2 of the FAA states that an agreement to

arbitrate is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” and does not

address “the validity of the contract in which it is contained,”

the United States Supreme Court has held that “a party’s

challenge to another provision of the contract, or to the

contract as a whole, does not prevent a court from enforcing

a specific agreement to arbitrate.” Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.

 

8

 Section 28(d) states:

Term for cause of actions. You agree that regardless of

any statute or law to the contrary, any claim or cause of

action arising out of or related to use of the Services or

the TOS must be filed within one (1) year after such

claim or cause of action arose or be forever barred.

 

9

 Paragraph 26, entitled “Changes to the Terms of Service” states:

23andMe may make changes to the TOS [terms of

service] from time to time. When these changes are

made, 23andMe will make a new copy of the TOS

available on its website and any new additional terms

will be made available to you from within, or through,

the affected services.

You acknowledge and agree that if you use the Services

after the date on which the TOS have changed,

23andMe will treat your use as acceptance of the

updated TOS.

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30 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70–71 (2010). In other words, if the

plaintiff does not specifically and directly challenge the

“precise agreement to arbitrate at issue,” id. at 71, a court

must treat the arbitration agreement as valid under § 2 and

enforce it, thereby letting the arbitrator decide questions as to

the validity of other provisions in the first instance, id. at 72. 

This rule applies even when the plaintiff challenges the

contract on “a ground that directly affects the entire

agreement (e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or

on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s

provisions renders the whole contract invalid.” Buckeye

Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006). 

Given this precedent, our authority to review portions of the

contract outside the arbitration provision is limited. But as

Rent-A-Center indicates, “[i]t may be that” where a plaintiff

challenges “the validity under § 2 of the precise agreement to

arbitrate at issue” on the ground that certain general contract

provisions “as applied” to the agreement to arbitrate render

it unconscionable, such a “challenge should [be] considered

by the court.” 561 U.S. at 71, 74 (emphasis in original). Cf.

Nagrampa, 69 F.3d at 1276 (holding a court’s determination

whether an arbitration agreement is procedurally

unconscionable may be informed by consideration of the

contract as a whole).

Turning first to the one-year statute of limitations, we

conclude that it does not make the arbitration provision itself

unconscionable under California law. The leadingCalifornia

case on this issue is Moreno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal. App. 4th

1415 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), which was cited by the California

Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Valencia as exemplifying the

application of California’s unconscionability doctrine to

statute of limitations clauses. 61 Cal. 4th at 912. Moreno

explained that California courts “have afforded contracting

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 31

parties considerable freedom to modify the length of a statute

of limitations.” Id. 1434; see also Han v. Mobile Oil Corp.,

73 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A contractual limitation

period requiring a plaintiff to commence an action within 12

months following the event giving rise to a claim is a

reasonable limitation which generally manifests no undue

advantage and no unfairness.”). Moreover, California courts

generally interpret contractual statute of limitations as

incorporating California’s discovery rule, in order to avoid

unfair or unreasonable applications of the limitations period. 

Moreno, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 1430. Nor is the statute of

limitations in the Terms of Service in this case unfairly onesided; the provision by its terms, applies to claims brought by

both parties. Compare Pokorny, 601 F.3d at 1001 (holding

that a unilateral clause shortening the limitations period

added to the unconscionability of the contract). Accordingly,

the statute of limitations provision does not make the

arbitration provision unconscionable.

Likewise, under the circumstances here, the unilateral

modification clause does not make the arbitration provision

itself unconscionable. California courts have held that the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prevents a

party from exercising its rights under a unilateral

modification clause in a way that would make it

unconscionable. See, e.g., Casas v. Carmax Auto Superstores

Cal. LLC, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014);

see also, e.g., Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233 Cal. App.

4th 960, 965–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Although we have

held that a unilateral modification provision itself may be

unconscionable, see Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,

328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003), we have not held that

such an unconscionable provision makes the arbitration

provision or the contract as a whole unenforceable. Id. at

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32 TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC.

1179 n.23. We conclude that plaintiffs have not carried their

burden of demonstrating that the unilateral modification

provision renders the arbitration clause, set forth in a separate

provision, unconscionable. While plaintiffs are free to argue

during arbitration that the unilateral modification clause itself

is unenforceable, we do not reach this claim here. See

Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.9 (9th

Cir. 2013) (en banc).

IV

We conclude that under principles established by recent

California Supreme Court decisions, California’s common

law rule of unconscionability does not provide a basis to

revoke the arbitration agreement in the Terms of Service here. 

Accordingly, the arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.

AFFIRMED.

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I agree with the majority that the arbitration provision is

valid and enforceable, albeit for different reasons. Like the

district court, I see no need to address whether the feeshifting clause is substantively unconscionable because

23andMe has waived its right to enforce that clause—a clause

that would have been severable in any event. As for the

venue-selection clause, it cannot be deemed substantively

unconscionable as to these plaintiffs. Three of the class

actions involved in this appeal were filed in the District Court

for the Northern District of California, and the plaintiffs in

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TOMPKINS V. 23ANDME, INC. 33

each of the other class actions voluntarily transferred their

actions to that court. So, provided the cases can proceed on

a class-action basis, it seems obvious that litigating in an

arbitral forum in San Francisco will not pose any undue

hardship for the plaintiffs. At oral argument, 23andMe

conceded that these cases may proceed as class arbitrations

(the arbitration provision does not contain a class-action

waiver), and the rules of the arbitration provider designated

by the parties specifically provide for class arbitration. 

Finally, the arbitration provision’s carve-out for intellectual

property claims is not so one-sided as to be substantively

unconscionable. The plaintiffs have not shown that

intellectual property claims represent the claims that

23andMe would be most likely to assert against consumers

and that consumers would be least likely to assert against

23andMe.

I would not address the remaining two clauses—the 1-

year limitations period and the unilateral modification

clause—because the plaintiffs have challenged those two

clauses only insofar as they aggravate the supposed

substantive unconscionability of the other three clauses.

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