Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04810/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04810-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Michael Hara
Petitioner
Bill Lockyer
Respondent
Santa Clara Superior Court
Respondent

Document Text:

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT MICHAEL HARA,

Petitioner,

 v.

SANTA CLARA SUPERIOR COURT AT SAN

JOSE, and BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General

of California,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-04810 JSW

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Now before the Court is Petitioner Scott Michael Hara’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 related to his August 2003 conviction for driving under the influence. 

After considering the administrative record, the parties’ papers and arguments, and the relevant legal

authority, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Hara was convicted in the Superior Court of California in and for the County of Santa Clara

for violating California Vehicle Code § 23152(a) for driving under the influence of alcohol. 

(Response to Order to Show Cause (“Response to OSC”) at 1.) On August 21, 2003, he was

sentenced to five years of court probation, a fine of $1,261 by payment of $100 per month, a

restricted driving privilege for ninety days, and to fifteen days in county jail. He was also ordered to

enroll and complete the first offender drinking driver program. On November 24, 2004, this Court

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temporarily stayed the fifteen-day county jail portion of Hara’s sentence. On January 7, 2005, the

Court issued an order extending the stay pending resolution of this habeas petition.

At trial, Hara sought to prove his theory of defense that another person was driving his

vehicle. (Hara Federal Habeas Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay (“Hara Fed. Pet.”) at 9.)

Arresting Officer Jesus Alonzo testified that on October 3, 2002, around 12:40 a.m., he saw a SUVtype vehicle with a bike rack and a bicycle on the rear portion pass at about 40-45 miles per hour in

an area of Campbell where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. (Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at 45, 46,

48, 131.) While following the vehicle, Alonzo testified that he lost track of the SUV for a minute or

two. (Id. at 51.) Alonzo testified that he later observed the SUV on a side street in the driveway of a

house. (Id. at 53.) Alonzo and the other officers who joined him at the scene saw no other people in

the area. (Id. at 132-33.)

Alonzo determined that the vehicle had been driven recently because of the heat coming from

the motor and the pinging noise from the car. (Id. at 55-57.) Alonzo found Hara standing and

talking on a cell phone behind bushes in front of the house. (Id. at 55-56.) In response to Alonzo’s

questions, Hara admitted the car was his but denied that anyone had moved it in the previous thirty

minutes. Hara also told Alonzo that his friends probably gave him a ride home “because he had too

much to drink.” (Id. at 58.) Hara told Alonzo that he did not have the keys to the vehicle, which

Alonzo later found in the grass close to the vehicle. (Id. at 59-60.)

Hara’s admission that he had five drinks that night beginning at 11:30 p.m. confirmed

Alonzo’s suspicions that Hara had been drinking. (Id. at 60-61.) Hara was unable to perform some

of the field sobriety tests as Alonzo instructed or demonstrated. (Id. at 62-65, 68-71.) Alonzo asked

Hara if he would take a Preliminary Alcohol Screening (“PAS”) test, which Hara refused. (Id. at

73.) Alonzo testified that he did not inform Hara of his right under California Vehicle Code 

§ 23612(i) to refuse to take the test. (Id.) Hara did, however, later agree to give a blood sample for

testing. (Id. at 73.) The parties have stipulated that the blood sample was tested by the crime

laboratory using scientifically approved methods and indicated a blood alcohol (“BAC”)

concentration of 0.08 percent by weight of alcohol. (Id. at 74-75.)

Certain procedures and findings in the trial court are the subject of Hara’s habeas petition. 

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For example, during Hara’s counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Alonzo, the trial court sustained

the prosecutor’s objection to a question regarding whether Alonzo had a warrant to enter the house. 

(Id. at 115-16.) Moreover, during a voir dire to examine possible juror misconduct, the juror in

question stated that Alonzo said “Go Niners” to him as they were leaving the building, but that the

juror did not respond. (Id. at 142-43.) The juror also stated that he was not aware of any

conversation with Alonzo on the day when Alonzo testified. (Id. at 143.) In addition, the trial court

admitted into evidence over the defense’s foundation objection a chart that a prosecution witness had

used to explain his opinion regarding correlations between alcohol consumption and human

impairment. (Id. at 157-163, 222.) Finally, the trial court allowed the use of Hara’s refusal to take a

PAS test as evidence of consciousness of guilt, failed to take judicial notice of Hara’s statutory right

to refuse the PAS test, and did not allow the special jury instruction on this same subject. (Hara

State Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Hara State Pet.”), Ex. A.)

Hara unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court

(“Appellate Division”), which issued a reasoned opinion with respect only to his last three claims

concerning the evidence, judicial notice and jury instruction about a PAS test. (Id.) The Appellate

Division concluded that the trial court’s errors with respect to these three claims were harmless. (Id.) 

Raising the same six issues as presented in his federal habeas, Hara additionally filed a state petition

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which denied the petition in an

unreasoned denial dated June 22, 2004. (Id., Ex. C.) On October 20, 2004, the Supreme Court of

California also denied his petition for review. (Response to OSC, Ex. B.) On November 12, 2004,

Hara filed this federal habeas petition. Pursuant to this Court’s Order to Show Cause dated

November 24, 2004, the Respondent filed an answer to the petition and a Response to the Order to

Show Cause on December 10, 2004 and December 8, 2004, respectively. On December 21, 2004,

Hara filed a reply.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Standard of Review of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas.

The Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

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Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Because the petition in

this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), the AEDPA’s provisions apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997);

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Under the AEDPA, a district

court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d).

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion “opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). If no Supreme Court precedent controls on

the legal issue the petitioner raised in state court, the state court’s decision cannot be contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069,

1071 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from Supreme Court

decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529

U.S. at 413. A federal court on habeas review “may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting a writ. Id. at 409.

To assess whether habeas relief is warranted, a federal court looks to the decision of the

highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). If that state court only considered state law, the

federal court must determine whether the state law, as explained by the state court, is “contrary to”

clearly established governing federal law. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.

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2001). If the state court disposed of a constitutional error as harmless under an appropriate standard

of review, the federal court must determine whether the state court’s application of the standard was

objectively unreasonable pursuant to section 2254(d)(1). Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878

(9th Cir. 2004).

However, where the highest state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a

petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim, the federal

court must review the record to decide whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable

pursuant to section 2254(d)(1). See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus,

the federal court should conduct “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the

state court’s resolution or decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. Id.; see also Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “while we are not

required to defer to a state court’s decision when the court gives us nothing to defer to, we must still

primarily focus primarily on Supreme Court cases in deciding whether the state court’s resolution of

the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law”).

In addition, a federal habeas court must determine whether a state trial court’s credibility

finding is an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

Court proceeding.” Rice v. Collins, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 969, 974 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2)). Similarly, a court must presume that any determination of a factual issue made by a

state court is correct, unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Specific Standard of Review for Each of Hara’s Six Claims.

Hara articulates six claims in his petition. First, he argues that the trial court’s refusal to

allow his counsel the right to cross-examine the arresting officer in matters pertaining to Hara’s

theory of defense denied him due process of law under the Sixth Amendment and Confrontation

Clause of the Federal Constitution. Second, he argues that allowing a biased juror to remain on the

jury panel denied Hara an impartial jury and thus due process in violation of the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Third, he argues that the trial court prejudiced him by admitting a

demonstrative chart into evidence over a foundation objection. Fourth, Hara argues that the trial

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court denied him due process when it allowed into evidence as a consciousness of guilt the fact that

Hara exercised his statutory right to refuse a PAS device test. Fifth, he argues that the trial court’s

failure to follow California Evidence Code § 451, requiring giving the jury mandatory judicial notice

of Hara’s statutory right to refuse a PAS test, denied him a fair and impartial trial under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, Hara argues that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on his

statutory right to refuse a PAS test denied him due process of law and a fair and impartial trial.

In this case, for Hara’s first and third claims, this Court must decide, based on an independent

review of the record, whether the denials by the Supreme Court of California and California Court of

Appeal were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Fisher,

263 F.3d at 914; see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Given the factual basis for Hara’s second claim

(juror bias), this Court reviews the record to determine if the trial court’s finding of no juror bias

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State [trial] court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). For Hara’s fourth, fifth and sixth claims,

this Court looks through to the decision of the Appellate Division, which addressed these claims on

the merits. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.7. Because the Appellate Division dismissed these three

claimed errors as harmless under California law, this Court must determine whether the harmless

error analysis was objectively unreasonable, and whether California law, as explained by the

Appellate Division, is contrary to clearly established governing federal law. See Medina, 386 F.3d at

878; see also Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1230.

ANALYSIS

A. Hara’s Claim Regarding Restricted Cross-Examination.

1. Legal Standard.

The Confrontation Clause “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might

wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). Trial

judges retain broad latitude to impose “reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on

concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’

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safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 679 (1986).

To state a violation of the Confrontation Clause, a criminal defendant must show that the trial

court prohibited him from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination “designed to show a

prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from

which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” Id. at

680 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). A court must inquire whether: (1) the

evidence was relevant; (2) other legitimate interests outweighed the defendant’s interests in

presenting the evidence; and (3) the jury had sufficient information, despite the exclusion of

evidence, to assess the credibility of the witness. See United States v. James, 139 F.3d 709, 713 (9th

Cir. 1998).

The denial of the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness is not, however, a type of

constitutional error that is deemed prejudicial per se. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 682. Rather, such an

error is subject to the harmless-error analysis. Id. at 684. Thus, a reviewing court must determine

whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, assuming the full damaging potential of

the cross-examination. Id. Five factors bear on this determination: (1) the importance of the

witness’s testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the

presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the witness’s testimony on material

points; (4) the extent of cross-examination that was permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the

prosecution’s case. Id. The reviewing court “should be able to decide whether the not-fullyimpeached evidence might have affected the reliability of the factfinding process at trial.” Id.

2. The Trial Court’s Limitation on Cross-Examining Officer Alonzo Does Not

Constitute a Denial of Hara’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Right.

Hara contends that the trial court’s limitation of his counsel’s cross-examination of Officer

Alonzo into the legality of the search of Hara’s house violated the Confrontation Clause because he

was unable to elicit his theory of defense, which was that someone else was driving the vehicle. The

Respondent argues that Hara has not established that the trial court excluded relevant or significant

evidence affecting Alonzo’s credibility, and that he never sought to develop any factual basis for his

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claimed theory of defense.

The cross-examination into whether Alonzo’s search of Hara’s house was proper may have

been to elicit two types of information: first, evidence of another possible driver of Hara’s vehicle, or

second, evidence of bias or a reason to doubt Alonzo’s testimony. With respect to the first type of

information, such cross-examination appears cumulative because Alonzo had already testified that

the other officers involved were trying to locate the other possible driver of Hara’s vehicle, and that

he did not know if somebody else had driven Hara’s vehicle. (Tr. at 114, 116.) With respect to the

second type of information, the first James factor favors Hara, since bias evidence is always relevant

in terms of discrediting the witness. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The theory would be that testimony

of a police officer who performs searches illegally is not very credible. The second James factor

weighs slightly against Hara because counsel’s inquiry into the constitutionality of the search of the

house had very little to do with whether Hara was the driver of the vehicle or whether the police had

located another driver of the vehicle, which was Hara’s theory of defense. Thus, this would have

tended to confuse the issues for the jury. The final James factor weighs strongly against Hara

because the jury had otherwise sufficient evidence to assess Alonzo’s credibility. Specifically,

Hara’s counsel elicited testimony from Alonzo that Alonzo did not advise Hara of his right to refuse

taking the PAS test, in contravention of state law. (Tr. at 118.) Hara’s counsel also brought out

Alonzo’s failure to advise Hara of his right to refuse the additional field sobriety tests performed at

the station. (Id. at 121.) In addition, Hara’s cross-examination cast doubt on the credibility of

Alonzo’s visual identification of Hara’s vehicle. (See id. at 85-91.) These blows to Alonzo’s

testimony by themselves afforded the jury sufficient evidence to assess the credibility of his

testimony. Therefore, Hara has not stated a claim for a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

In addition, even if Hara has established such a violation, the error would be harmless under

the five relevant factors. First, Alonzo’s testimony is important to the prosecution’s case because he

was one of only two witnesses, and the only witness used to connect Hara to the vehicle. (See id. at

50-55.) Thus, this factor thus favors Hara. Second, in establishing that someone else could have

driven Hara’s vehicle, which is Hara’s stated theory of defense, the excluded evidence Hara’s

counsel sought on cross-examination was cumulative because Alonzo had already testified to the

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possibility of, and the search for, another person. (Id. at 114, 116.) As a result, this factor cuts

against Hara. Third, because Alonzo’s testimony was central to the prosecution’s case, there is no

evidence corroborating his testimony on whether Hara was driving the vehicle while inebriated. 

Hara’s counsel, however, never asked Alonzo about the fruits of the search of Hara’s house, but only

about its legality. This contributed to the lack of corroborating evidence with respect to Hara’s

theory of defense. Fourth, the trial court afforded Hara’s counsel a thorough cross-examination of

Alonzo. (Id. at 77-129, 139-148.) Fifth, the prosecution’s case is strong overall, comprising

testimony regarding Hara’s inebriated state and his driving in such state, and a blood sample

indicating a BAC concentration of 0.08 percent by weight of alcohol (See id. at 66, 74-75.) On

balance, any error would thus be harmless.

Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s unreasoned denial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).

B. Hara’s Claim Regarding Failure to Remove a Biased Juror.

1. Legal Standard.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial

jurors. U.S. Const. amend. VI. “Because impartial jurors are the cornerstone of our system of

justice and central to the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a fair trial, we ‘guard jealously the sanctity

of the jury’s right to operate freely as possible from outside unauthorized intrusions purposefully

made.’” United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Remmer v. United

States, 350 U.S. 377, 382 (1956) (“Remmer II”)). Any private communication or contact “with a

juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury” is deemed presumptively prejudicial. 

Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 379 (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (“Remmer

I”)). The Constitution, however, “does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a

compromising situation.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). Brief encounters between a

third party and a juror are generally less prejudicial than a continuous and intimate association. See

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965).

Trial courts facing claims of juror bias raised by the parties “may” hold a hearing, which “is

sufficient” to satisfy due process. Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2003)

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(citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 217, 218). For example, in United States v. Sears, the Ninth Circuit

endorsed the trial court’s finding of no juror misconduct where a juror had remarked “nice job” or

“good job” to a FBI agent who had just testified against the defendant. 663 F.2d 896, 899-900 (9th

Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit found it sufficient that the trial court questioned the juror extensively

enough to satisfy itself, in light of the juror’s explanation for his statement, that the juror was not

biased. Id. at 900.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Unreasonably Determine that No Juror Bias Existed

Based on the Evidence at Trial.

Here, Hara challenges the trial court judge’s finding, based on the state court record, that the

juror’s contacts with Alonzo did not warrant the juror’s removal. In answer to the trial judge’s

questions in the presence of only the allegedly biased juror, Hara, and both attorneys, the juror first

relayed that he had not responded to Alonzo’s statement “Go Niners” to him as they were leaving the

building. (Tr. at 142-43.) Contrary to Hara’s counsel’s account, the juror also stated that he did not

recall saying “Good job” to Alonzo during a break while Alonzo was still at the witness stand. (Id.

at 142-44.) The trial judge reminded the juror not to speak to any attorney or witness involved in the

case and called the juror back in a second time to assure himself, through the juror’s answers, that

the juror was keeping an open mind about the case until the close of the evidence. (Id. at 143, 145-

46.)

With respect to the “Go Niners” statement, no presumption of prejudice arose because the

encounter was brief and did not relate to the matter pending before the jury, Hara’s guilt or

innocence. See Turner, 379 U.S. at 473; see also Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 379. In regards to the

second alleged contact, similar to Sears, the trial judge here inquired into the situation and accepted

the juror’s statements that he did not recall any such conversation with Alonzo and that he was

keeping an open mind until the end of the case. In light of the evidence, the trial court’s refusal to

remove the juror based on its factual finding of no juror bias or misconduct was not an unreasonable

determination. See Rice, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. at 974. Hara has not presented clear and convincing

evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of correctness of the trial court’s factual findings. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Therefore, Hara’s claim regarding juror bias fails.

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C. Hara’s Claim Challenging Admission of Demonstrative Evidence without Foundation.

1. Legal Standard.

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless the admission

violates a specific guarantee or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th

Cir. 1999). Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor sufficient basis

for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, the due process inquiry for a federal habeas court is whether the

admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). Only if there are no permissible

inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920.

2. The Admission into Evidence of the Chart Did Not Render the Trial

Fundamentally Unfair.

Hara argues that the jury’s verdict of guilty of the violation of California Vehicle Code 

§ 23152(a) (being impaired while driving) but not guilty of California Vehicle Code § 23152(b)

(driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater) evinces the prejudice that the admission of the demonstrative

evidence created. The demonstrative evidence in question was a chart prepared by Larry Turner, a

forensic toxicologist testifying for the prosecution, which described the expected reactions and

characteristics of “the general individual when consuming alcohol” at “different points of

intoxication.” (Tr. at 159-160.) The trial court accepted this chart into evidence over the objection

of Hara’s counsel. (Id. at 222.) The record reveals, however, that admitting the chart into evidence

was not so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. In particular, Turner testified to the

contents of the chart, explaining what one could expect from an individual consuming alcohol at

different points of intoxication: a BAC of 0.00, 0.02 to 0.04, 0.05 to 0.06, and so on up through 0.40

to 0.50. (Id. at 160-64.) Because Turner used the chart in presenting his opinions, the chart did not

provide any information for the jury’s consideration beyond what Turner’s live testimony had

already provided. There was no inference the jury could have drawn from the chart that it could not

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have drawn from Turner’s testimony. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Thus, any possible prejudice

flowing from the admission of the chart into evidence did not make Hara’s trial fundamentally

unfair. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. Consequently, Hara’s third claim regarding the admission of

the demonstrative chart fails.

D. Hara’s Claim Regarding Admission into Evidence of His Refusal to Take the PAS Test.

1. Legal Standard.

Having the benefit of the Appellate Division’s dismissal on the merits of this claim as

harmless under California law, this Court must determine whether the harmless error analysis was

objectively unreasonable, and whether California law, as explained by the Appellate Division, is

contrary to clearly established governing federal law. See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18

(2003); see also Medina, 386 F.3d at 878; Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1230. “A constitutional error is

harmless when ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute

to the verdict obtained.’” Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,

15 (1999)). Under clearly established federal law, harmless errors may be quantitatively assessed in

the context of other evidence presented to determine their effect on the trial. Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). A habeas petitioner

deserves relief only if the trial error resulted in “actual prejudice” or “had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. If the federal habeas

court is convinced that the error did not influence the jury, or only had a very slight effect, the verdict

and judgment should stand. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995) (citing Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)).

2. The Appellate Division’s Harmless Error Analysis Was Not Objectively

Unreasonable.

The Appellate Division cited People v. Golston, 188 Cal. App. 3d 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986),

in support of its conclusion that the trial court’s error in admitting evidence of Hara’s refusal to take

the PAS test, in contravention of California Vehicle Code § 23612(i), was harmless. Specifically,

the Appellate Division found the error harmless “in view of the overwhelming evidence of [Hara’s]

guilt.” (Hara State Pet., Ex. A.) In Golston, the error was harmless because the evidence presented

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did not make it reasonably probable that the result would have been different. 188 Cal. App. 3d at

354. The Golston court considered such things as the strength of the prosecution’s claim against the

defendant, the credibility of the defendant’s testimony, and the inferences the jury would need to

make in order to reach a different result. Id. In addition, California law, as represented by the

Golston decision, is not contrary to clearly established federal law because both look to the entire

record to determine whether the trial error prejudiced the jury verdict. See Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18-

19; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Golston, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 354.

The Appellate Division did not unreasonably apply the harmless error analysis. The jury

heard testimony, during both the direct and cross-examination of Officer Alonzo, that Hara had the

right not to take the PAS test. (Tr. at 73, 118.) Moreover, the jury heard Alonzo’s testimony that

Hara told him that “his friends probably gave [Hara] a ride home because he had too much to drink.” 

(Id. at 58.) When further combined with the uncontested BAC test results indicating the presence of

alcohol in Hara’s blood (id. at 74-75), Hara has not shown that the trial court’s error in admitting

evidence that Hara refused to take a PAS test actually prejudiced or had a substantial and injurious

effect in reaching the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Thus, Hara is not entitled to

habeas relief based on his claim that the trial court erred by admitting this evidence. See O’Neal,

513 U.S. at 437.

E. Hara’s Claims Regarding Failure to Take Judicial Notice of, or Instruct the Jury on

Hara’s Right to Refuse a PAS Test.

1. Legal Standard.

Hara contends that the trial court’s failure to take judicial notice of, and consequently instruct

the jury, on his right under California Vehicle Code § 23612(i) to refuse to take a PAS test further

denied him a fair and impartial trial. The Respondent argues that the trial court’s error does not

warrant habeas relief and that the error was harmless because the jury already knew of Hara’s right to

refuse a PAS test.

The standard for these two claims is the same as that for the previous claim. Thus, this Court

must determine whether the trial error resulted in “actual prejudice” or “had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Given the close

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factual nature of these claims to Hara’s fourth claim above and the Appellate Division’s identical

analysis, the Court need not repeat that California law, as explained by the Appellate Division, is not

contrary to clearly established governing federal law. See Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1230.

2. The Trial Court’s Errors Relating to the PAS Test Did Not Actually Prejudice

Hara.

The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to use

Hara’s refusal to take a PAS test as evidence of consciousness of guilt despite his right to refuse to

take the test under California law. (Hara State Pet., Ex. A.) The Appellate Division found that “[i]t

follows that the trial court also erred in failing to take judicial notice of, and allow the special jury

instruction on this same subject.” (Id.) The Appellate Division, however, considered these errors

harmless for the same reasons as for Hara’s claim regarding the admission into evidence of his

refusal to take a PAS test. (Id.) Here also, the Appellate Division’s harmless error analysis was not

objectively unreasonable in light of the strength of the prosecution’s case. Specifically, the jury

knew that (1) Hara had a statutory right to refuse to take a PAS test, (2) Hara had alcohol present in

his blood, and (3) there was no indication that the police’s investigation turned up another person

who Hara claimed was the driver. (See Tr. at 66, 73-75, 116, 118.) Because the Court is convinced

that the error did not influence the jury, or at most only had a very slight effect, the verdict and

judgment should stand. O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 437.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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