Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01988/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01988-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack Egnor
Appellee
Frank Edward Peters
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

UDited States Cmm: (>f Appeals 

Tenth Cir:.:ui: 

NOV .. 2 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FRANK EDWARD PETERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JACK EGNOR, United States 

Marshal for the District of 

Colorado, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-1988 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. CIV-88-M-156) 

Norman R. Mueller (Saskia A. Jordan with him on the briefs) 

Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C., Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Thomas M. O'Rourke, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael J. 

Norton, Acting United States Attorney with him on the brief), 

Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and 

O'CONNOR,* District Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 1 
In October 1987, appellant Frank Peters was arrested in 

--Colorado on-a .British.warrant alleging four acts of theft by 

deception under the Theft Act of 1968, and two violations of the 

Forgery and Counterfeiting Act of 1981. The British government 

sought extradition under the United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty. 1 

After a hearing, a United States Magistrate issued a 

Certification of Extraditability and Order of Commitment. Peters' 

subsequent petition to the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. This 

appeal followed. At each proceeding, Peters argued that there was 

not probable cause to extradite him, and that the doctrine of dual 

criminality was not satisfied. We agree with the magistrate and 

the district court that Peters may be extradited because both of 

these requirements were met with reference to each of the six 

charges against him. 

I • BACKGROUND 

The charges against Peters arise from his efforts to raise 

capital for the Parrot Corporation, a company formed by Peters and 

others for the purpose of manufacturing computer floppy disks in 

Wales. Parrot Corporation Investment Report, R. Supp. Vol. I at 

315 (Ex. 22). Peters contacted Neil Taylor, investment development director for the Wales Development Agency ("WDA"), a governmental corporation. The WDA agreed to be the lead investor in the 

1 Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United 

Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 2 
Parrot project, providing a factory and one million British 

pounds •. ~-Another .source.of financing was to be a.low-interest loan 

from the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), an agency of 

the European Economic Community. Bowen Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I 

at 22-23. The ECSC requires a bank repayment guarantee for loans 

to new ventures. 

To obtain additional funding from private institutional 

investors, Peters and Taylor procured the services of Development 

Capital Group Limited ("DCG"), which agreed that if the WDA would 

lead the investment and arrange the ECSC loan, DCG would find additional investors. Faulkner Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 37-39. 

Their joint efforts persuaded CIN Industrial Investments Limited 

("CIN") and Legal General Assurance Society Limited ("LGA") to 

invest seven hundred thousand pounds each. Commercial Union 

Assurance Company Limited ("CUA") agreed to invest an additional 

three hundred thousand pounds. 

After several unsuccessful attempts to find a guarantor for 

the ECSC loan, Peters approached the London branch of The Northern 

Trust Company of Chicago ("Northern Trust"). Evans Affidavit, R. 

Supp. Vol. I at 102. After some negotiating, a proposal was 

submitted to Northern Trust's main office for approval. 

Significantly, the proposal required that the guarantee be secured 

by one hundred percent cash collateral: i.e., Northern Trust would 

guarantee Parrot's repayment of the two and one-half million pound 

ECSC loan only if Parrot would keep two and one-half million 

pounds on deposit with Northern Trust for the term of the loan, 

which was eight years. Buchanan Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 56-

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 3 
57. Consequently, the corporation's available working capital 

would be that much less. 

Meanwhile, Peters and Taylor grew concerned that further 

delays in closing the deal would cause the institutional investors 

to back out, so a closing date of December 23, 1983 was set. 

Bowen Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 27. Northern Trust approved 

the guarantee, but a formal commitment letter could not be 

prepared in time for the closing. Instead, the vice-president of 

the London branch submitted an informal "comfort letter" which 

stated in full: 

"We confirm that subject to: 

(1) the negotiation of a satisfactory agreement between 

Parrot Corporation Limited and ourselves; and 

(2) our review of documentation between an ECSC agent 

bank or institution, and Parrot Corporation Ltd. 

We are prepared in principle to issue a Standby Letter 

of Credit guaranteeing your obligations to such bank or 

institution arising from their role as Agent for the 

European Coal & Steel Community in lending up to []2.5 

million [pounds] to Parrot Corporation Ltd. 

We look forward to discussing the proposed transaction 

with you in more detail." 

R. Supp. Vol. I at 313 (Ex. 21). 

The closing was held as scheduled. Present at the meeting, 

in addition to Peters and Taylor, were representatives of the WDA, 

CIN, and DCG (representing LGA and CUA). They were shown the 

comfort letter, but not told of the cash collateral requirement. 

Owens Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 48-50. The most common way 

for a guarantee to be secured in these circumstances would be a 

debenture over the assets of the company, and at least some of the 

investors were under the impression that that was how the Northern 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 4 
Trust guarantee would be secured. 2 Bowen Affidavit~ R. Supp. Vol. 

I-at 34-35. ---.Some.of those-presen~-were-unhappy with the letter's 

vagueness, but the investment agreement was signed anyway. Id. at 

31. The investor representatives would not have gone through with 

the investment had they known that their money or the borrowed 

funds would be used to satisfy the collateral requirement, instead 

of being used as working capital. Id. at 33; Faulkner Affidavit, 

R. Supp. Vol. I at 43. 

A full letter of intent, containing the cash collateral 

requirement, was executed in January and back-dated December 22, 

1983. R. Supp. Vol. I at 213-15 (Ex. 16); R. Vol. II at 11. 

Northern Trust required Parrot to show that the board of 

directors had authorized the deposit of the collateral, so Peters 

signed and submitted two extracts (because the loan was distributed in two installments) of corporate minutes indicating that the 

board was informed of the cash collateral .requirement and approved 

of the deposits. R. Supp. Vol. I at 172-73, 183 (Exs. 3, 6). The 

extracts were false. No such discussions ever took place. R. Vol 

I at 42; Shakespeare Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 66. 

II. DISCUSSION 

An extradition order cannot be directly appealed. Collins v. 

Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920). Instead, this case is before us 

2 According to the WDA solicitor who was at the meeting, the 

usual arrangement was that the bank would charge a percentage fee 

and take a debenture over the company's assets. At the meeting, 

when asked about the fee Northern Trust would charge for the 

guarantee, Peters simply stated, "1%,'' without mentioning the cash 

collateral requirement. Bowen Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 31, 

35. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 5 
on appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, which affords 

.. -a narrower review. Gr_eci v.-,--Birknes, 527. F.2d 9.56, 958 (1st Cir. 

1976); see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 

United States§ 478 reporters' note 2 (1987). Our inquiry is 

limited to 

"determining 'whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, 

whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by 

a somewhat liberal construction, whether· there was any 

evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.'" 

Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoting 

Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)). Peters does not 

contest the magistrate's jurisdiction, nor does he claim that the 

charges against him are not extraditable crimes. He only challenges the determinations that there was probable cause to 

extradite him and that the principle of dual criminality was 

satisfied. 

While on its face the doctrine of dual criminality seems to 

require a full-blown inquiry into both the question of whether the 

alleged acts would violate American law and the question of 

whether the alleged acts constitute a violation of the British 

statutes, we think that an extensive investigation of British law 

would be inappropriate. For one thing, we "are not expected to 

become experts in the laws of foreign nations." In re Assarsson, 

635 F.2d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 958 

(1981), and the issues Peters raises could require just such 

expertise. In addition, the issue of whether there is "probable 

cause to believe that there has been a violation of ••• the 

criminal laws of the [request]ing country," Peroff v. Hylton, 542 

-6-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 6 
F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 

. ( 1977-), .. relates both to .whether or not Peters committed the 

alleged acts, and to the dual criminality question of whether 

those acts violated British law. Because these two questions 

share essential material elements, the resolution of one guides 

the resolution of the other. 

Accordingly, our discussion of dual criminality will be 

devoted to the matter of whether the acts alleged would violate 

substantially analogous American law. Whether those acts also 

violate the British statutes will be considered in connection with 

the probable cause requirement. 

A. Probable Cause 

For a person to be extradited, there must be probable cause 

to hold him for trial. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-

. tions Law of the United States§ 476(l)(a) (1987); see Extradition 

Treaty, art. IX(l), 28 u.s.T. at 232 ("Extradition shall be 

granted only if the evidence be found sufficient. to justify 

the commital for trial of the person sought • . . . " ) . The role of the committing magistrate in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is "to determine whether there is 

competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, 

and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify 

a conviction." Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922); 

accord,~, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); see also Restatement 

-7-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 7 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States S 476 

. comment b (1987). 

Habeas corpus review of the magistrate's finding of probable 

cause is even narrower. The court uses the "lenient standard," 

Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 576, of "by a somewhat liberal 

construction, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused 

guilty." Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. at 312. "[A]ppeal on 

this issue must fail if there is 'any evidence of probable 

cause.'" Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 501 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (quoting Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 1830 

(1988). 

There is sufficient evidence that Peters committed acts which 

violated the law of the United Kingdom to support the finding of . probable cause to believe that he is guilty as charged. 

The facts provide reasonable cause to try Peters on the 

theft-by-deception charges. The evidence shows an active role in 

obtaining investors and closing the deal, and that the investors 

were deluded about the terms of the Northern Trust guarantee. 

In response, Peters first contends that he did not violate 

the Theft Act because he did not make any affirmative misrepresentations. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that he did 

make an affirmative misrepresentation by suggesting at the 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 8 
December 23 meeting that the only money Northern Trust would 

. ~ -.~require~in.exchange for the~guarantee was .. a one percent fee. 3 

In addition, our limited research into English law suggests 

that an affirmative misrepresentation is not always required to 

commit the crime of theft by deception. Director of Public 

Prosecutions v. Ray, [1973] A.C. 370, seems to hold that there can 

be deception by omission where the defendant's omission is inconsistent with a prior and continuing implied or express 

representation. Regina v. Silverman, 86 Cr. App. 213 (1987), 

relied upon Ray to hold that silence can amount to deception where 

mutual trust had been built up between the defendant and the 

victim. Also, reckless, as opposed to intentional, misrepresentation can suffice. Regina v. Potger, 55 Cr. App. 42 (1970). 

We need not determine definitively whether any of these decisions applies to this case. It is enough to note that under these 

circumstances an affirmative misrepresentation may not be necessary to violate the Theft Act. 

3 There is also some evidence, albeit weak, that Peters later 

admitted to the DCG representative that he had concealed the 

existence of the cash collateral requirement: 

"I pointed out to Frank Peters this meant he and 

Neil Taylor had attended a completion meeting ••• at 

which they had suppressed the information that clearly 

demonstrated that the business could expect to have a 

[]2.5 million [pound] cash deficiency. 

I also stated that it must have been clear to him 

that if we had known about this at the time, none of us 

would have proceeded with the completion. 

Peters said, 'You must have a very low blood 

pressure because I was expecting you to go through the 

roof.'" 

Faulkner Affidavit, R. Supp. Vol. I at 43-44. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 9 
Secondly, Peters argues that knowledge of the cash collateral 

r.equirement should- be. imputed _to the investors, ,so they were not 

deceived about it. His theory is that Neil Taylor knew about the 

requirement, and Taylor was an agent of the WDA, which was an 

agent of the other investors. There is probable cause to believe, 

however, that Taylor acted adversely to the interests of his 

principals by not disclosing the terms of the Northern Trust 

guarantee, in which case his knowledge would not be imputed to 

them. At his criminal trial, Peters "may be able to submit 

substantial proof that another rather than he was the perpetrator 

of the fraud, but that is a matter for exploration during the 

trial ••• and not for extensive evidentiary inquiry during the 

extradition hearing." Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d at 1249. 

Peters also contends that no evidence establishes a causal 

link between his alleged deception and the putative victims' decision to invest in Parrot, because the investors relied only on the 

concededly vague and tentative comfort letter. This argument is 

without merit. The evidence establishes probable cause to believe 

that there was such a causal connection if the cash collateral 

requirement was already a firm part of the guarantee, but Peters 

fostered the misconception that Northern Trust would require only 

a fee and a debenture. 

Likewise, there was sufficient evidence to establish probable 

cause for the forgery charges. Under section l of the Forgery and 

Counterfeiting Act, 

"[a] person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false 

instrument, with the intention that he or another shall 

use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and 

-10-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 10 
by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act 

to his own or any other person's prejudice." 

Peters is accused of creating, signing, and submitting inaccurate 

extracts of Parrot's corporate minutes in order to induce Northern 

Trust to accept the deposit of the ECSC funds as cash collateral. 

The evidence supports the magistrate's decision that there was 

probable cause to believe that Peters knew that the extracts were 

inaccurate because the board of directors never in fact discussed 

the issue. Peters contends that his acts did not violate the law 

because the extracts were themselves genuine, not false; because 

he was authorized by the board to sign loan documentation; and 

because Northern Trust, the victim of the alleged forgery, suffered no prejudice. These arguments also are unpersuasive. 

We reject the first two arguments because the evidence suggests that the extracts were not what they purported to be, i.e., 

accurate representations of the proceedings of the board of directors. Peters' signature on the extracts does not change this. In 

addition, we hardly think that Peters' authorization extended to 

fabricating the needed documentation. 

His final argument fails because the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act clearly encompasses situations in which the person receiving the forged document acts to the prejudice of a third party. 

There is probable cause to believe that Northern Trust prejudiced 

the investors when it accepted the deposit of a large proportion 

of Parrot's assets as cash collateral. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 11 
B. Dual Criminality 

The doctrine of dual criminality provides that a person shall 

not be extradited "if the offense with which he is charged. 

is not punishable as a serious crime in both the requesting and 

requested state[s]." Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 

Law of the United States§ 476(l)(c) (1987); accord,~, United 

States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Extradition Treaty expressly incorporates this principle. 4 Whether dual 

criminality is satisfied is a "purely legal question" to be 

reviewed de novo. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). 

The magistrate found, and the district court agreed, that the 

acts with which Peters is charged are criminal in both countries. 

The Theft Act charges were determined to correspond to, inter 

alia, 15 u.s.c. § 78j (securities fraud). The acts alleged in the 

forgery charges were found to be proscribed by Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 18-5-101 to -103 (forgery and simulation). 

Peters does not challenge the congruity of the statutes which 

the magistrate used to find that the forgery charges satisfied the 

doctrine of dual criminality. He does, however, argue that it was 

improper for the magistrate to base his decision that dual 

criminality was present regarding the theft charges on federal 

securities laws. Peters contends that because he has been charged 

under a theft-by-deception statute, dual criminality can only be 

based upon a theft-by-deception (or very similar) statute. The 

4 

232. 

Extradition Treaty, arts. III(l)(a), IX(l), 28 U.S.T. at 229, 

-12-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 12 
question, then, is how much congruity between the statutes of the 

requested-~nd requesting nations dual criminality.requires, and 

whether the match between the Theft Act and federal securities law 

is sufficient. 

Preliminarily, we note that the language of the Extradition 

Treaty, which states that the alleged conduct must be "punishable 

under the laws of both parties, 115 has been interpreted to include 

both federal and state law. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 

58-59 (1903); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 918 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981); see also,~, Oen Yin-Choy v. 

Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal law), cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 3157 (1989); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 851 

( state law). 

While dual criminality does not require identical statutes, 

Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. at 312, the provisions must be "substantially analogous. 116 Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 851; accord 

Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d at 496. 7 Statutes are 

substantially analogous when they "punish conduct falling within 

5 Extradition Treaty, art. III(l)(a), 28 U.S.T. at 229. 

6 At least one circuit appears to follow the broader rule that 

any criminal statute can support a finding of dual criminality so 

long as it relates to an extraditable offense. See United States 

v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989)(finding dual 

criminality based upon the.Theft Act and a federal child 

pornography statute); United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 

1465 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1158 (1989). 

7 Another Ninth Circuit decision, Emami v. United States Dist. 

Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444, 1450 (9th Cir. 

1987), can be rea~ to require that the two statutes address 

"functionally identical" conduct. To the extent that this is a 

narrower test than that adopted in Theron, the Ninth Circuit 

appears to have chosen the latter. See Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 

858 F.2d at 1404. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 13 
the broad scope" of the same "generally recognized crime." Brauch 

v. Raiche,. 618 F.2d at 848 n.7, 852. Differences in instrumentalities or purposes are not important, so long as the statutes 

relate to the same general offense. United States v. Sensi, 879 

F.2d at 893. In other words, when "the laws of both the 

requesting and the requested party appear to be directed to the 

same basic evil," Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 908 (2d 

Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973), the statutes are substantially analogous, and can form the basis of dual criminality. 

Thus, it was held that the Theft Act and a federal mail fraud 

statute could form the basis of a dual criminality finding because 

both statutes go to the general crime of stealing. United States 

v. Sensi, 879 F.2d at 893. Similarly, dual criminality was found 

between the Theft Act and the New Hampshire bad check statute 

because both laws forbid conduct which constitutes obtaining 

property by false pretenses. Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 851-

52. See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 

the United States§ 476 comment d (1987) (embezzlement substantially analogous to fraud or larceny by trick). 

Turning to the laws sub judice, sections 15(1) and 16(1) of 

the Theft Act makes it unlawful to "by any deception dishonestly 

obtain[] property belonging to another" or "any pecuniary 

advantage." Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 

17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5, 8 makes it unlawful 

8 Rule LOb-5 was promulgated under 15 u.s.c. § 78j(b), which 

makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the 

purchase or sale of any security ••• , any manipulative or 

deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 

regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 

-14-

and 

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 14 
~(a) To employ any device, artifice, or scheme to 

defraud, 

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact 

or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 

to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 

business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 

deceit-upon any person, 

in connection with the purchase or sale of any 

security." 

The Theft.Act and Rule lOb-5 proscribe different ways of obtaining 

property by deception. We hold that they are substantially 

analogous. See Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1262 

(N.D. Ga. 1977) (federal securities laws substantially analogous 

to Canadian fraud statute); see also Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 

853 ("We do not think that the double criminality requirement 

extends so far as to require that the reason particular conduct 

constitutes deception-be some substantive law common to both 

jurisdictions."). 

Peters was a co-founder and part-owner of the Parrot Corporation. He stood to benefit from increased investment in the 

company. The substance of the four theft charges is that Peters 

misled four investors (WDA, LGA, CIN, and CUA) into believing that 

the corporation would have the proceeds of the ECSC loan to use as 

working capital, when in fact the company was in a much weaker 

financial position because either the investors' money or the 

proceeds of the loan would be used to satisfy Northern Trust's 

cash collateral requirement. The alleged acts clearly state a 

violation of Rule lOb-5, for they show an omission to state a 

-15-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 15 
necessary material fact and a practice or course of business which 

would operate as a fraud or deceit. 

The forgery charges against Peters stem from the alleged 

falsification of extracts of the corporate minutes to convince 

Northern Trust that the board of directors had authorized him to 

deposit the proceeds of the ECSC loan to serve as collateral for 

the guarantee. In other words, he alle~edly "falsely ma[de] 

a written instrument which ••• purport[ed] to ••• evidence, 

create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, 

interest, obligation, or status," in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 18-5-103(l)(a). The doctrine of dual criminality has been 

satisfied. 9 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

9 Peters also argues that his extradition would violate the 

doctrine of specialty, which provides that "once extradited, a 

person can be prosecuted only for those charges on which he was 

extradited." United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d at 892. This rule 

would seem to be irrelevant to this case, as it relates to 

prosecution rather than extradition. See In re Extradition of 

Prushinowski, 574 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 n.4 (E.D.N.C. 1983). We are 

unaware of any decision in which extradition was denied because of 

specialty. At this point in the proceedings, the doctrine of 

specialty requires at most no more than the doctrine of dual 

criminality. Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 851. For the reasons 

stated above, then, we find that the doctrine of specialty has 

been satisfied. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 88-1988 Document: 010110063753 Date Filed: 11/02/1989 Page: 16