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Parties Involved:
Anlando McMillian
Appellant
Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13928

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00335-CB-N

ANLANDO MCMILLIAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

POSTMASTER GENERAL, 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE,

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

________________________

(December 29, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Anlando McMillian, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion for summary judgment and grant of summary judgment in favor of the 

Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (the “Postmaster”) in 

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McMillian’s employment discrimination and retaliation suit under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Upon a thorough 

review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

I.

McMillian, a letter carrier for the United States postal Service (“USPS”), 

claims that a USPS manager, Leander Harris, sexually harassed him.1

 During his 

break, McMillian had parked his postal truck in front of a Mobile, Alabama 

restaurant and was talking to a female friend when Harris drove up behind 

McMillian’s truck, parked, and spoke to him. McMillian did not know who Harris 

was until Harris produced a badge showing he was a USPS manager. While 

giggling, snapping his fingers, and looking between McMillian and his friend, 

Harris told McMillian several times to “pop [his] trunk.” Both McMillian and his 

female friend understood this phrase to be sexual in nature. McMillian contends 

that Harris’s comment was meant to humiliate him and was in retaliation for 

McMillian’s work as a union representative, assisting other employees in filing 

discrimination charges against Harris.

McMillian filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a 

formal complaint of harassment, which was dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

 

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to McMillian on defendant the 

Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment. See Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th 

Cir. 1996).

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He then filed in the district court a complaint that the court liberally construed as 

alleging claims of a sexually hostile work environment and retaliation under Title 

VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a)(1). After conducting discovery, 

the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Upon the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation, the district court granted the Postmaster’s motion and 

denied McMillian’s, concluding that McMillian failed to state a prima facie case of 

sexual harassment. As regards the sexually hostile work environment claim, the 

court held that McMillian failed to come forward with evidence showing the 

harassment was based on his sex and, in any event, the isolated incident was 

insufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of his 

employment. As regards the retaliation claim, the court held that McMillian failed 

to show he suffered a materially adverse action. For these reasons, the court 

dismissed McMillian’s complaint. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, McMillian challenges the district court’s dismissal of his sexual 

harassment and retaliation claims. “We review de novo the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment, construing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 

favor of the nonmoving party.” Ezell v. Wynn, 802 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 

2015). “Summary judgment is appropriate where the record gives rise to ‘no 

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genuine dispute as to any material fact,’ such that ‘the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

A.

The district court properly granted the Postmaster’s motion for summary 

judgment and denied McMillian’s as to his sexual harassment claim. Title VII 

protects federal government employees from discrimination on the basis of sex. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Where, as here, the plaintiff does not allege he was 

subjected to a tangible employment action, he may establish a viable sexual 

harassment claim only by showing he was subjected to a hostile work environment. 

Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2004). To prove 

a hostile work environment under Title VII based on unwelcome sexual 

harassment, McMillian must show:

(1) that he . . . belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has 

been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual 

advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual 

nature; (3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the 

employee; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive 

to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a 

discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for 

holding the employer liable.

Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the district court correctly held, 

McMillian’s claim fails at least on the third and fourth elements.

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McMillian failed to submit evidence that the alleged harassment was “based 

on” his sex. To prevail on his hostile work-environment claim, McMillian must 

“prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual 

connotations, but actually constituted ‘discrimina[tion]. . . because of . . . sex.’ ” 

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Even assuming that Harris’s comment was sexual in 

nature, there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that the 

comment constituted discrimination because McMillian was male.

2

 

In addition, the isolated comment was insufficiently severe or pervasive to 

alter the terms and conditions of McMillian’s employment. To prove a hostile 

work environment, a plaintiff must establish that “the workplace is permeated with 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 

working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The severe and pervasive element 

has both a subjective and objective component. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809. “The 

employee must subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe and 

pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and this subjective 

 

2 “[N]othing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination because of sex merely 

because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 

(quotation marks omitted) (alteration adopted). It is well-established that sexual harassment can 

occur between members of the same sex.

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perception must be objectively reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We assume that McMillian subjectively perceived the harassment as sufficiently 

severe and pervasive to alter the terms of his employment; thus, we consider only 

whether that perception was objectively reasonable. “[T]he objective severity of 

harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 

plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“In evaluating allegedly discriminatory conduct, we consider its ‘frequency; 

its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.’ ” Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808-809 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23) 

(alteration adopted). One isolated incident of sexually inappropriate behavior will 

not amount to actionable sexual harassment unless the incident is “extremely 

serious.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

Harris’s one-time, ambiguous comment was insufficiently severe to amount 

to actionable sexual harassment. Although McMillian and his friend both were 

offended by Harris’s conduct, the phrase “pop your trunk,” even if sexual in 

nature, was not “extremely serious” so as to support a sexual harassment claim. 

Cf. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245-51 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 

(collecting cases involving conduct more severe and more frequent than conduct at 

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issue here, in which courts rejected sexual harassment claims). McMillian 

presented no evidence that the comment was anything more than a “mere offensive 

utterance” and no evidence that the comment interfered with his job performance.

Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing his 

hostile work environment claim.

B.

The district court also properly granted the Postmaster’s motion for 

summary judgment, and denied McMillian’s, on the retaliation claim because 

McMillian failed to present evidence of an adverse employment action. Title VII 

prohibits retaliation against an employee because the employee “has made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that 

(1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) there is some causal relation between the two events.” 

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, absent evidence of an adverse employment 

action, McMillian cannot prevail on his retaliation claim. The record contains no 

evidence of an adverse employment action. Although a plaintiff may satisfy the 

adverse employment action requirement by showing a sufficiently severe and 

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pervasive hostile work environment, Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311-1312 

(11th Cir. 2012), as explained above, the record does not support such a finding

here. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the Postmaster’s

motion for summary judgment on McMillian’s retaliation claim. 

AFFIRMED.

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