Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07066/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2004 Decided August 31, 2004

No. 03-7021

IN RE: SEALED CASE (MEDICAL RECORDS)

Consolidated with

03–7066

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00401)

Lois R. Goodman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Harvey S. Williams, pro hac vice, argued the cause for

appellees. With him on the brief was Patrick A. Malone.

Before: SENTELLE, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The appellant, an adult male who

is a committed ward of the District of Columbia Mental

Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Administration

(MRDDA), appeals from a district court order requiring

MRDDA to produce all of his records to counsel for plaintiffs

who are suing MRDDA and the District. We conclude that

the court abused its discretion by ordering production of the

records without determining whether any are subject to the

federal psychotherapist privilege recognized in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), and without weighing the probative

value of the non-privileged records against the extent of the

intrusion into the appellant’s legitimate privacy interests.

We therefore vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

I

The plaintiffs in the district court — the appellees here —

are ‘‘two mentally retarded adult men’’ who are ‘‘wards of the

District of Columbia government’’ and for whose care and

well-being MRDDA is responsible. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9. For

several years during the 1990s they lived in a residential

group home at 2303 Minnesota Avenue, S.E. The appellant

here also is a ‘‘mentally retarded adult’’ man and ‘‘committed

ward’’ of the District. Appellant’s Br. at 1. He lived in the

same group home beginning in mid–1997.

According to the complaint, the appellant sexually assaulted the plaintiffs at the group home. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15. The

complaint further alleges that, although the resident director

of the facility notified District officials of those assaults, the

District did nothing to protect the plaintiffs until it moved the

appellant to another facility on August 31, 1998. The plaintiffs seek damages from the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating their civil rights, and under various District of

Columbia causes of action, including negligence.1

 The complaint asserts that the district court has federal question

1 The plaintiffs have joined as defendants the corporation and

individuals who owned and operated the group home, as well as the

MRDDA case worker assigned to the plaintiffs.

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jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim, see Compl. ¶ 2 (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1331), and supplemental jurisdiction over the local

law claims, id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).

During pre-trial proceedings, the plaintiffs moved to compel production of the District of Columbia’s ‘‘complete files’’

on the appellant. The District took no position on whether

the files should be produced, either at that time or subsequently. On October 11, 2002, the district court granted the

motion, directing that ‘‘the files of [appellant] shall be produced for inspection by the plaintiffs’ counsel,’’ and requiring

that they be ‘‘treated as confidential’’ and used ‘‘only TTT in

connection with this litigation.’’ Order, No. 02–401 (D.D.C.

Oct. 11, 2002) (hereinafter October 2002 Order).

Thereafter, the appellant’s guardian ad litem, appointed by

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, entered a

special appearance to represent the appellant in connection

with the requests for his ‘‘medical and ward files.’’ Objecting

to the breadth of the district court’s discovery order, and

contending that the documents were subject to a number of

privileges, the guardian filed a motion for reconsideration and

for a more extensive protective order pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Unconsented Mot. for Ct. to

Reconsider at 1. On February 14, 2003, the district court

denied the motion to reconsider and ordered that ‘‘defendant

District of Columbia shall produce the relevant medical records of [appellant] to plaintiffs’ counsel in accordance with the

prior Order of this CourtTTTT’’ Order, No. 02–401 (D.D.C.

Feb. 14, 2003) (hereinafter February 2003 Order).

The plaintiffs then asked the court for clarification, contending that the District should produce the appellant’s ‘‘entire file,’’ regardless of whether the records were ‘‘relevant’’

or ‘‘medical.’’ 5/15/03 Tr. at 3, 4, 12. At a hearing conducted

on May 15, 2003, the plaintiffs insisted that they were ‘‘entitled to receive any documents that might reasonably lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence,’’ and that they did not

‘‘want someone else saying, Well, we don’t think this is

relevant when we might in fact think it is relevant.’’ Id. at

12. The appellant’s guardian objected on the ground that

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some of the documents were privileged and confidential, and

that the court had not weighed the plaintiffs’ interest in the

documents against the appellant’s privacy interest. Id. at 5–

11. The court nonetheless granted the plaintiffs’ request and

directed that their counsel be allowed ‘‘to review the entire

file and to tab those records that he believes will serve his

evidentiary purposes in connection with this case.’’ Id. at 15.

The court further instructed plaintiffs’ counsel to prepare a

written order, which the court entered on August 7, 2003.

The order stated:

[T]he mental retardation records of [appellant], including

medical records and case notes, in the possession of

defendant District of Columbia [shall] be made available

to counsel for plaintiffs for review. Counsel for plaintiffs

shall designate which records are to be produced in

connection with this caseTTTT

Order at 1–2, No. 02–401 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2003) (hereinafter

August 2003 Order).

The appellant, through his guardian ad litem, appealed the

August 2003 Order requiring production of his MRDDA files.2

On October 28, 2003, another panel of this court granted a

stay of production pending appeal. We now consider the

issues raised by the appellant.

II

We begin with a question of appellate jurisdiction. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that we lack jurisdiction because the

district court’s order was merely an interlocutory discovery

order, rather than a final order subject to our review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ordinarily, a decision is not considered final under § 1291 unless it ‘‘ends the litigation on the

2 The appellant also seeks review of the district court’s February

2003 Order, and further contends that the lower court still considers

the October 2002 Order to be ‘‘live’’ as well. Appellant’s Br. at 21–

22. Because both sides agree that the August 2003 Order supersedes the prior orders, we vacate those prior orders as moot. See

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).

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merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment.’’ Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,

712 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the

collateral order (Cohen) doctrine, however, an order qualifies

as ‘‘final’’ under § 1291 if it: ‘‘(1) conclusively determine[s]

the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [is]

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’’

Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,

Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337

U.S. 541, 546 (1949).

The application of the collateral order doctrine to the

discovery order at issue here is controlled by our recent

decisions in United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612

(D.C. Cir. 2003), and In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir.

2004). In those cases, we concluded that orders compelling

production of allegedly privileged information satisfied the

three criteria for collateral review. See Philip Morris, 314

F.3d at 615–16 (attorney-client privilege); England, 375 F.3d

at 1175–76 (statutory non-disclosure provision covering Navy

selection board proceedings); see also Pearson v. Miller, 211

F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the collateral order

doctrine permitted appeal from an order compelling the production of records relating to the ‘‘violent sexual proclivities’’

of an individual, where the individual contended the records

were protected by state and federal privileges). The same

analysis applies to the order in this case, which overrode the

appellant’s claims of a number of privileges.

First, by compelling production notwithstanding the appellant’s claims of privilege, the order ‘‘conclusively and finally

determined’’ that the documents were not protected from

disclosure to plaintiffs’ counsel by any privilege. Philip

Morris, 314 F.3d at 617. As in Philip Morris, ‘‘[i]n no way

does the record suggest that the district court’s conclusion is

tentative or subject to revision.’’ Id. The plaintiffs dispute

the conclusiveness of the district court’s order on the ground

that it requires disclosure only to counsel; disclosure for use

at trial requires a further decision by the court. But the

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order is final with respect to that initial disclosure, and if the

documents are privileged — a point we must accept as true

for purposes of deciding this jurisdictional question — an

involuntary disclosure to the plaintiffs’ counsel breaches the

privilege. Although the appellant may suffer additional injury if additional disclosure is later permitted, that does not

diminish the original injury or make the court’s authorization

of it any less final.

Second, the issue is both completely separate from the

merits and important. Just as was the case for the attorneyclient privilege in Philip Morris, ‘‘the privilege question’’ here

‘‘is separable from the merits of the underlying case.’’ Id.;

see England, 375 F.3d at 1175. And like the attorney-client

privilege, the privileges at issue here are ‘‘ ‘important’ in

Cohen’s sense,’’ in that they are ‘‘weightier than the societal

interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment principles.’’ Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct,

Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994). As we discuss below, the

appellant’s privilege claims fall into two categories: the federal psychotherapist privilege and D.C. statutory medicalrecords privileges. The Supreme Court has determined that

the psychotherapist privilege is important enough to rank

with the attorney-client privilege as one of only a handful of

privileges cognizable under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9–10. ‘‘Like the spousal and attorneyclient privileges,’’ the Court said, ‘‘the psychotherapist-patient

privilege is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and

trust,’’ and ‘‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’’ Id. at 9–10 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The District of Columbia has

similarly indicated the importance it attaches to the other

(perhaps overlapping) privileges claimed by the appellant by

specifically according them statutory protection. Cf. England, 375 F.3d at 1176 (noting that a federal statutory nondisclosure provision was an indication of the ‘‘importance’’ of a

protected interest for purposes of the Cohen doctrine); Pearson, 211 F.3d at 64 (concluding that a claim that state

statutory confidentiality provisions should be recognized as

federal evidentiary privileges was important for purposes of

Cohen).

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Third, the order will be effectively unreviewable on appeal

from a final judgment. The district court has ordered the

District of Columbia to turn over the appellant’s records to

plaintiffs’ counsel. The District has indicated that, absent our

intervention, it will follow that order. See Am. Notice of

Defs. Regarding Production of Records at 1. At that point,

‘‘the entirety of the [records] will have been disclosed to third

parties, making the issue of privilege effectively moot.’’ Philip Morris, 314 F.3d at 619. As our prior cases have repeatedly noted, ‘‘appeal after final judgment is obviously not

adequate in [privilege] cases — the cat is out of the bag.’’

England, 375 F.3d at 1176 (quoting In re Papandreou, 139

F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see Philip Morris, 314 F.3d

at 619 (same).

We therefore conclude that the criteria for invocation of the

collateral order doctrine are satisfied, and that we properly

have jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal. We note that appellate jurisdiction is also supported here by the rationale of

the Perlman doctrine, which holds that ‘‘a discovery order

directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.’’ Church of Scientology v.

United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (citing Perlman v.

United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918)). Although the document

custodian in this case, the District of Columbia, is not a

‘‘disinterested third party,’’ we have applied Perlman when

one party seeks documents in the hands of another and a

nonparty claims to possess a privilege in the documents. See

United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(holding that an appeal should be permitted because the

nonparty appellant ‘‘was not the object of the document

demand and could therefore not possibly refuse disclosure

and undergo a contempt citation as a means to appeal’’).3

Moreover, whatever the District’s degree of interest in the

disposition of the documents, it has raised no objection to

3 See also In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(noting that Perlman ‘‘reflected concern that where the subject of

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producing them and, to the contrary, has unequivocally stated

its intention to do so upon court order. See In re Sealed

Case, 146 F.3d 881, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that ‘‘[t]he

Perlman doctrine applies here because the [custodian] swore

TTT an intention to produce the documents rather than submit

to a contempt citation’’).4

III

In this Part, we consider the appellant’s claims of privilege

regarding the documents subject to the district court’s discovthe discovery order (characteristically the custodian of the documents) and the holder of a privilege are different, the custodian

might yield up the documents rather than face the hazards of

contempt, and would thereby destroy the privilege’’); In re Grand

Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 673 (D.C. Cir.

1979); 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 3914.23, at 156 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter WRIGHT &

MILLER) (noting that the Perlman doctrine ‘‘allows appeal by a

person who cannot control the decision whether to act in contempt’’).

4 The plaintiffs note in their ‘‘Statement of the Case’’ that they

objected in the district court to the appellant’s standing to oppose

production of his records, on the ground that he was not named as a

party defendant and had not moved to intervene. Appellees’ Br. at

3. They do not, however, raise such a standing objection on this

appeal. There certainly is no question regarding the appellant’s

constitutional standing, as his privacy interest in the records creates

the necessary case or controversy. Cf. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536

U.S. 1, 6–7 (2002). The Supreme Court has ‘‘never TTT restricted

the right to appeal to named parties to [a] litigation,’’ id. at 7, and

‘‘if the decree affects [a third party’s] interests, he is often allowed

to appeal.’’ Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339, 349 (5th Cir.

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘‘Thus, a non-party may

appeal orders for discovery if he has no other effective means of

obtaining review.’’ Id. Moreover, courts of appeals have construed

a district court’s decision to permit a non-party to participate in a

discovery dispute as the equivalent of authorizing intervention. See

Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 784 (1st Cir.

1988); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294–95

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ery order. We review a district court’s discovery rulings for

abuse of discretion. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61,

64 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food &

Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). Because a ‘‘district court by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law,’’ the ‘‘abuse-ofdiscretion standard includes review to determine that the

discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.’’

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).

In subpart A, we consider whether federal or state privilege law applies to the district court’s discovery order.5

 In

subpart B, we examine the federal psychotherapist privilege.

In subpart C, we address the appropriate disposition for

those documents that, although outside the scope of the

federal privilege, implicate the privacy concerns reflected in

District of Columbia statutory privileges.

A

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the

United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules

prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory

authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,

State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed

by the principles of the common law as they may be

interpreted by the courts of the United States in the

light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions

and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or

(2d Cir. 1979); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 589 F.2d 786, 789

(5th Cir. 1979).

5 For purposes of pendent (supplemental) jurisdiction analysis, we

treat the District of Columbia as if it were a state. See, e.g.,

Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 188 & n.6 (D.C. Cir.

1986); see also Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (‘‘In

considering this pendent claim, we are of course bound by the law

of the District of Columbia, as authoritatively interpreted by the

D.C. Court of Appeals.’’).

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defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government,

State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined

in accordance with State law.

FED. R. EVID. 501.6

 It is thus clear that when a plaintiff

asserts federal claims, federal privilege law governs, but

when he asserts state claims, state privilege law applies.

What is unclear is the proper resolution in a case like this,

where the plaintiffs assert both federal and state claims, and

relevant evidence may be privileged under one but not the

other. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17 n.15 (noting the problem but

finding its resolution unnecessary to decide that case); 23

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5434, at 861–64 (2d ed. 1980 &

Supp. 2004) (hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAM) (noting uncertain

legislative history and suggesting various methods of resolution).

‘‘The usual solution by the courts’’ in such cases ‘‘has been

a preference for federal privilege law when it conflicts with

state privilege law.’’ 3 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.02[2][c], at 501–14 (2d ed.

2004) (hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S) (collecting cases).7

 There is

6 See also FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (providing that the ‘‘rule with

respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and

proceedings’’); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2016, at 221 (noting that the

usual view is that ‘‘the same rules of privilege apply to discovery as

apply at the trial’’).

7 See Virmani v. Novant Health Incorp., 259 F.3d 284, 287 n.3

(4th Cir. 2001) (‘‘We agree with our sister circuits that in a case

involving both federal and [pendent] state law claims, the federal

law of privilege applies.’’); Pearson, 211 F.3d at 66 (finding that

Rule 501 directs the courts to apply federal privilege law where the

material is relevant to both federal and state claims); Hancock v.

Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that ‘‘the

existence of pendent state law claims does not relieve us of our

obligation to apply the federal law of privilege’’); Hancock v. Hobbs,

967 F.2d 462, 466 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that ‘‘when the federal

and state laws of privilege are in conflict,’’ courts ‘‘have uniformly

held that the federal law of privilege governs even where the

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much to be said for this approach. Where a document is

relevant to both federal and state claims but the federal and

state privilege rules are inconsistent, the application of an

inconsistent state rule in either direction could undermine the

federal evidentiary interest — either by barring disclosure of

a document that federal law permits a party to see, or by

requiring the disclosure of a document that federal law

protects from prying eyes. At least with respect to discovery, ‘‘it would be meaningless to hold the communication

privileged for one set of claims and not for the other.’’

Memorial Hosp., 664 F.2d at 1061 n.3.8

 And where the

primary source of the court’s jurisdiction is the federal claim,

to which the state claim is merely pendent (supplemental), it

seems appropriate that the federal evidentiary interest —

whether in privilege or production — should be primary as

well.

Unfortunately, neither the district court nor the parties

have addressed this question, and we hesitate to decide it

conclusively (and for the first time in this circuit) without the

benefit of briefing. Fortunately, it does not appear that we

have to do so to resolve this appeal. As we discuss below, the

evidence sought [in discovery] might be relevant to a pendent state

claim’’); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 n.10

(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that federal privilege law applies in a case

involving both federal and pendent state claims); von Bulow v. von

Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987) (declaring that, where the

evidence sought ‘‘is relevant to both the federal and [pendent] state

claims,’’ courts ‘‘consistently have held that the asserted privileges

are governed by the principles of federal law’’); Memorial Hosp. v.

Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the

fact that a complaint asserts a pendent state claim does not change

the applicability of federal privilege law). But see Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995) (looking to state

privilege law for state cause of action in a case with both federal

and state claims).

8 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM § 5434, at 862 n.20 (contemplating a

rule in which, although evidence is discoverable despite a claim of

state privilege, a court ‘‘might still rule that the evidence was

inadmissible on the state claim at the time of trial’’).

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federal psychotherapist privilege requires the withholding of

some documents (if they exist) as absolutely privileged, and

the D.C. statutes appear to be at least as protective. See

infra note 9. Whether or not additional documents are

subject to privilege under state law, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26 at least requires the district court to weigh the

appellant’s privacy interest in those documents against the

plaintiffs’ need for them before it orders production. Because

the court did not undertake such a weighing, a remand is

required in any event. Until that weighing is complete and

the court decides which (if any) documents still must be

produced over the appellant’s objection, we need decide neither whether a state privilege would cover such hypothetical

documents, nor (if it would) whether state privilege law is

applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims.

B

In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court held that ‘‘confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist

and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are

protected from compelled disclosure’’ — including from compelled production pursuant to pretrial discovery — under

Rule 501. 518 U.S. at 15; see id. at 6. The Court also

extended this federal psychotherapist privilege ‘‘to confidential communications made to licensed social workers in the

course of psychotherapy.’’ Id. at 15. Thus, any ‘‘conversations between’’ the appellant and a licensed psychotherapist

or social worker ‘‘and the notes taken during their counseling

sessions are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule

501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.’’ Id. at 6, 18. District

of Columbia statutory provisions appear to provide a privilege

at least as broad.9

9 See D.C. CODE § 7–1201.02 (providing that, except in specific

instances not applicable here, ‘‘no mental health professional, mental health facility, data collector or employee or agent of a mental

health professional, mental health facility or data collector shall

disclose or permit the disclosure of mental health information to any

person, including an employer’’); id. § 7–1201.03 (providing that the

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Although the district court did not address Jaffee directly,

it did state generally that ‘‘privileges are qualified or conditional for a number of reasons, including in the interests of

justice.’’ See 5/15/03 Tr. at 10. That statement is incorrect

with respect to the psychotherapist privilege. In Jaffee, the

Court flatly rejected the suggestion that the privilege was

subject to balancing. 518 U.S. at 17. ‘‘Making the promise

of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in

privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure,’’ the Court

said, ‘‘would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.’’ Id.

Accordingly, the district court may not permit the plaintiffs’

counsel to see materials covered by this privilege, regardless

of its assessment of ‘‘the interests of justice.’’

The appellant’s guardian has represented that she has

reviewed the appellant’s MRDDA files, and that they do

contain confidential communications to mental health workers

in the course of psychotherapy. Oral Arg. Tape at 2:10–2:25.

We, of course, do not know whether that is correct. But the

district court and plaintiffs did not know either. Nonetheless,

the court ordered disclosure of all of the appellant’s records,

‘‘personal notes’’ taken by a mental health professional regarding a

client ‘‘shall not be disclosed except to the degree that [they] TTT

are needed in litigation brought by the client against the mental

health professional’’); see also id. § 7–1305.12 (providing that ‘‘[a]ll

information contained in a [mentally retarded] customer’s records

shall be considered privileged and confidential’’). In addition to the

provisions just cited, appellant also cites D.C. Code § 14–307, which

states: ‘‘In the Federal courts in the District of Columbia and

District of Columbia courts TTT [a] mental health professional TTT

may not be permitted TTT to disclose any information, confidential

in its nature, that he has acquired in attending a client in a

professional capacityTTTT’’ Both this court and the D.C. Court of

Appeals, however, have construed that section ‘‘as creating a mere

in-court evidentiary privilege,’’ inapplicable to the pretrial production of documents. Doe v. Stephens, 851 F.2d 1457, 1464 (D.C. Cir.

1988); see Richbow v. District of Columbia, 600 A.2d 1063, 1068

(D.C. 1991); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., Miller &

Rhoades, Inc., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985).

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without regard to their content and without screening them in

any way. Because that order could compel the disclosure of

material subject to a federal privilege, it constitutes an abuse

of the district court’s discretion.

C

The federal psychotherapist privilege recognized in Jaffee

extends no further than confidential communications between

licensed mental health professionals and their patients. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15; see id. at 10. The appellant cites no other

federal privilege, but does cite several provisions of the D.C.

Code that appear to extend privacy protection to appellant’s

files well beyond the protection accorded by Jaffee. See

supra note 9. We have been unable to find District of

Columbia cases that delineate the scope of those asserted

statutory privileges in any way that is relevant here.10 But

regardless of whether the statutory provisions afford privileges that would of themselves bar disclosure of documents in

the appellant’s file, those provisions should at least inform a

district court’s determination of whether to compel production

of the documents under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.

Rule 26(b)(1), under which the plaintiffs sought discovery of

the appellant’s file, provides as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not

privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any

partyTTTT For good cause, the court may order discov10 The District of Columbia courts have denoted certain narrow

exceptions that do not apply to this case. See, e.g., Jackson v.

United States, 623 A.2d 571, 583 (D.C. 1993) (stating, with respect

to D.C. CODE § 6–2002 (the precursor of § 7–1201.02), that although

the section restricts disclosure of mental health records to any

person, an individual’s interest in confidentiality ‘‘may have to yield

where the right of the defense to cross-examine a witness in a

criminal case must be accorded protection’’); In re O.L., 584 A.2d

1230, 1233 (D.C. 1990) (holding that the child-neglect proceedings

provision of D.C. CODE § 2–1355 is an exception to § 6–2002).

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15

ery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved

in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by

Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). The last sentence

of Rule 26(b)(1) was added in 2000 ‘‘to emphasize the need for

active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control excessive

discovery.’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note

(2000).11 Subdivision (b)(2) — entitled ‘‘Limitations’’ — in turn

provides:

[The] extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise

permitted under these rules TTT shall be limited by the

court if it determines that TTT (iii) the burden or expense

of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,

taking into account the needs of the case, TTT the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the

importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the

issues. The court may act upon its own initiative after

reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule

26(c).

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). Finally, Rule 26(c), entitled ‘‘Protective Orders’’ and referred to in the last sentence of subdivision (b)(2), authorizes the court,

for good cause shown, TTT [to] make any order which

justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or

expense, including one or more of the following: TTT (4)

that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the

11 The 2000 amendments also inserted the sentences distinguishing between discovery relevant to claims or defenses and discovery

‘‘for good cause’’ of matters relevant to the subject matter of the

action. That change, too, was ‘‘designed to involve the court more

actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery.’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000).

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scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain

mattersTTTT

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).

As a whole, ‘‘Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad

discretion to tailor discovery narrowly.’’ Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). And ‘‘[i]t is appropriate for the

court, in exercising its discretionTTT, to undertake some

substantive balancing of interestsTTTT’’ Laxalt v. McClatchy,

809 F.2d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see United States v.

Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding

that Rule 26(c)’s ‘‘ ‘good cause’ standard TTT is a flexible one

that requires an individualized balancing of the many interests that may be present in a particular case’’). In particular,

‘‘[a]lthough [Rule 26(c)] contains no specific reference to

privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated,

such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language

of the Rule.’’ Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35

n.21 (1984). Hence, in exercising their discretion under the

rule, courts have long ‘‘recognized that interests in privacy

may call for a measure of extra protection,’’ even where the

information sought is not privileged. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)

advisory committee’s note (1970) (referring to income tax

returns, which are ‘‘generally held not privileged’’); see Pearson, 211 F.3d at 72 (holding that ‘‘[l]egitimate interests in

privacy are among the proper subjects of’’ Rule 26(c)’s protection).

Moreover, in determining which interests to weigh in the

Rule 26 balance, courts look to statutory confidentiality provisions, even if they do not create enforceable privileges. In

Laxalt v. McClatchy, for example, we noted that, although

the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, did not create a qualified

discovery privilege, the fact that a document was subject to

the Act was not ‘‘irrelevant to the manner in which discovery

should proceed.’’ 809 F.2d at 889. To the contrary, we held

that ‘‘[w]here the actual content of the record has the potential to cause harm to the affected party, a court supervising

discovery should consider this factor in determining how to

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exercise its traditional authority to limit disclosure.’’ Id. at

890; see also Microsoft, 165 F.3d at 959–60.

The Seventh Circuit made a similar point in a case raising

issues close to those we face here. In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, a district court had quashed a subpoena for patients’ medical records based on a state evidentiary privilege (which, the district court held, trumped a less

stringent federal regulation pursuant to the operation of a

specific federal statute). 362 F.3d 923, 924–27 (7th Cir. 2004).

Relying on Rule 501, the court of appeals held that the state

evidentiary privilege did not apply in a suit to enforce federal

law. Id. at 926. Nonetheless, relying on a provision of Rule

45 (governing subpoenas) similar to Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and (c),12

it affirmed the district court’s disposition because there was

only ‘‘the possibility’’ that the records might have something

probative in them, while their disclosure would cause ‘‘the loss

of privacy by the patients,’’ id. at 927. Particularly relevant

here, the Seventh Circuit held that ‘‘[t]he fact that quashing

the subpoena comports with Illinois’ medical-records privilege’’ was a ‘‘factor in favor of the district court’s action.’’ Id.

at 932. ‘‘Comity,’’ the court said, did not require it ‘‘to apply

the Illinois privilege,’’ but did require it ‘‘to consider with

special care the arguments for quashing the subpoena on the

basis of relative hardship under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c).’’ Id. at

933.

In sum, as the Third Circuit has likewise held, even where

an evidentiary ‘‘privilege is not available, a party may petition

the court for a protective order that limits discovery in

accordance with Rule 26(c).’’ Pearson, 211 F.3d at 65. And

the ‘‘court, in its discretion, is authorized by this subsection to

fashion a set of limitations that allows as much relevant

material to be discovered as possible, while preventing unnecessary intrusions into the legitimate interests — including

privacy and other confidentiality interests — that might be

harmed by the release of the material sought.’’ Id.; see id. at

12 Rule 45(c)(3)(A) provides that the court ‘‘shall quash or modify

the subpoena if it TTT (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.’’

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv).

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18

61 (holding that, although a state mental-health-records privilege was inapplicable, the appellants had ‘‘legitimate concerns

regarding the confidentiality of the information sought’’ that

should be ‘‘addressed in the context of the District Court’s

power to impose reasonable limits on the discovery of information pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)’’).

In this case, the district court undertook no balancing of

competing interests at all. As its August 2003 Order makes

clear, it required production of the appellant’s entire MRDDA

file — regardless of whether the material was privileged,

regardless of whether it was relevant to a claim or defense,

regardless even of whether it was relevant to the subject

matter of the case. August 2003 Order at 1–2. At the

request of plaintiffs’ counsel, the preceding (February 2003)

order’s requirement of relevancy was jettisoned, and plaintiffs’ counsel was effectively deputized by the court to review

the records and determine which were relevant. See 5/15/03

Tr. at 15–16 (directing that plaintiffs’ counsel be allowed ‘‘to

review the entire file and to tab those records that he believes

will serve his evidentiary purposes’’).

The scope of this intrusion into the appellant’s privacy is

breathtaking. The court directed that plaintiffs’ counsel ‘‘be

permitted to review all records referred to in District of

Columbia Code section 7–1305.12.’’ 5/15/03 Tr. at 16. As the

appellant’s guardian correctly complained, and as the portion

of the statute set out in the margin makes manifest, that

section covers records involving ‘‘every area of the severely

mentally-retarded’s lives.’’ Id. at 6.13 There may well be

13 Section 7–1305.12 applies to the records of mentally retarded

‘‘customers,’’ who are defined as persons ‘‘admitted to or committed

to a facility TTT for habilitation or care,’’ id. § 7–1301.03(8B). The

section provides that ‘‘[c]omplete records for each customer shall be

maintained,’’ and directs that these records shall include:

(1) Identification data, including the customer’s legal status;

(2) The customer’s history, including but not limited to:

(A) Family data, educational background and employment

record;

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documents within that universe that are highly relevant to the

plaintiffs’ case because they ‘‘afford evidence of notice to the

District of Columbia that, as alleged in the complaint, [the

appellant was] a sexual predator’’ who was a threat to the

plaintiffs. 5/15/03 Tr. at 4 (explanation by plaintiffs’ counsel

of the relevance of the requested documents). And the

(B) Prior medical history, both physical and mental, including prior institutionalization;

(3) The customer’s grievances, if any;

(4) An inventory of the customer’s life skills;

(5) A record of each physical examination TTT;

(6) A copy of the individual habilitation plan; and any modifications thereto TTT;

(7) The findings made in periodic reviews of the habilitation

plan which findings shall include an analysis of the successes

and failures of the habilitation program TTT;

(8) A medication history and status;

(9) A summary of each significant contact by a professional

person with a customer;

(10) A summary of the customer’s response to his or her

program, prepared and recorded at least monthly TTT;

(11) A monthly summary of the extent and nature of the

customer’s work activities and the effect of such activity upon

the customer’s progress along the habilitation plan;

(12) A signed order by a professional person, as set forth in

§ 7–1305.10(b), for any physical restraints;

(13) A description of any extraordinary incident or accident in

the facility involving the customer, TTT including any reports of

investigations of customer’s mistreatment;

(14) A summary of family visits and contacts;

(15) A summary of attendance and leaves from the facility;

and

(16) A record of any seizures, illnesses, treatments thereof, and

immunizations.

D.C. CODE § 7–1305.12.

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probative value of such documents may well outweigh the

appellant’s privacy interests. But it would be surprising if

there were not also documents that — although hugely

invasive of the appellant’s privacy — are of only marginal

relevance. And it would also be surprising if there were not

others that — while equally intrusive — have nothing at all to

do with the plaintiffs’ claims. By treating all of the MRDDA

documents alike, and thereby failing to weigh the appellant’s

privacy interest in a record against the record’s value to the

plaintiffs, the district court abused the discretion conferred

upon it by Rule 26. See In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 272

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that ‘‘[a]lthough a district court has

considerable leeway in weighing the different factors, the

failure to balance at all requires remand’’) (internal citation

omitted); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 484

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that ‘‘the district court abuses [its]

discretion when it fails to weigh’’ the relevant factors).

IV

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

requiring the District of Columbia to produce all of the

appellant’s ‘‘mental retardation records’’ to counsel for the

plaintiffs, August 2003 Order at 1, without protecting any

records that may be subject to the federal psychotherapist

privilege, and without weighing the appellant’s privacy interests against the plaintiffs’ evidentiary need for the remaining

records. We therefore vacate the court’s order and remand

the case for further proceedings.

On remand, the district court has a number of options. It

may, for example, permit the appellant’s guardian to conduct

an initial screening and produce any documents she concludes

are not privileged or confidential. As to any withheld documents, the court may require the guardian to produce the

‘‘privilege log’’ described in Rule 26(b)(5).14 If the log is

14 Rule 26(b)(5) provides:

When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable

under these rules by claiming that it is privileged TTT, the

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21

insufficient to enable the court to resolve the issue, it may

review the withheld documents in camera.

15 And if the

volume of withheld documents is too large for the court’s own

review, the court may delegate the task to a magistrate

judge.16 But whether the district court employs this procedure or one of its own devise, it may not compel production of

the appellant’s records without determining whether any are

subject to a federal privilege, and without weighing the

probative value of each of the non-privileged documents

against the extent of the intrusion into the appellant’s legitimate privacy interests.

Vacated and remanded.

party TTT shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that,

without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will

enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege

or protection.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).

15 Or, the court may skip the preliminaries and proceed directly

to in camera inspection. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,

568–69 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court ‘‘has approved the

practice of requiring parties who seek to avoid disclosure of documents to make the documents available for in camera inspection’’);

Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1344

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that ‘‘[i]n camera inspection of allegedly

privileged documents TTT, when appropriate, [is an] accepted procedure[ ] in this circuit’’).

16 See 28 U.S.C. § 636; FED. R. CIV. P. 72; Chudasama v. Mazda

Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.40 (11th Cir. 1997).

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