Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01260/USCOURTS-caDC-14-01260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc.
Petitioner
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Submitted October 16, 2015 Decided April 19, 2016

No. 14-1260

CACTUS CANYON QUARRIES, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

AND SECRETARY OF LABOR,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Andy Carson was on the brief for petitioner.

Philip Mayor, Attorney, and W. Christian Schumann, 

Counsel, U.S. Department of Labor, were on the brief for 

respondents. John T. Sullivan, Attorney, Mine Safety and 

Health Review Commission, entered an appearance.

Before: KAVANAUGH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Petitioner Cactus 

Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) operates a surface 

non-coal mine that is required to comply with safety and 

health standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under 

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the “Mine 

Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. In May 2013, a mine inspector

for the Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) 

issued seven citations to Cactus Canyon for violations of 

those standards. Cactus Canyon then sought to contest the 

citations before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission (“Commission”). After the case was assigned to 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), but before any 

hearings were held, the Secretary decided to vacate the 

citations and moved to have the ALJ dismiss the proceedings. 

Over the objection of Cactus Canyon, the ALJ dismissed the 

case without indicating whether the dismissal was with or 

without prejudice. Following dismissal, Cactus Canyon filed 

an application for the award of attorney’s fees under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), which was opposed by the 

Secretary. The ALJ denied the application for fees, 

concluding that Cactus Canyon was not a “prevailing party.” 

The Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision. 

Cactus Canyon now seeks review of the denial of attorney 

fees.

The EAJA provides for the award of attorney’s fees in an 

agency adjudication “to a prevailing party other than the 

United States . . . unless the adjudicative officer of the agency 

finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified 

or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 504(a)(1). The Secretary opposes the petition for review 

principally on the ground that Cactus Canyon was not a 

“prevailing party” within the meaning of the EAJA. In 

advancing this position, the Secretary (as did the ALJ) cites

the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “prevailing party” in 

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Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia

Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 

(2001). Cactus Canyon contends that the ALJ should not have 

applied Buckhannon’s interpretation of “prevailing party” to 

Cactus Canyon’s fee application. Cactus Canyon further 

contends, however, that it should be awarded fees even if 

Buckhannon controls the disposition of its fee application.

We have made it clear that Buckhannon’s interpretation

of “prevailing party” controls in the application of fee-shifting 

statutes, including the EAJA, unless there is some “good 

reason” for doing otherwise. See Green Aviation Mgmt. Co. v. 

FAA, 676 F.3d 200, 202-03 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Cactus Canyon 

has offered no “good reason” to justify a different approach in 

this case. Therefore, following this court’s precedent in 

Turner v. National Transportation Safety Board, 608 F.3d 12 

(D.C. Cir. 2010), we are constrained to hold that, because it is 

not a “prevailing party,” Cactus Canyon is not eligible for 

fees. Accordingly, the petition for review is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Under the Mine Act, every surface coal or other mine, 

such as the one operated by Cactus Canyon, must be 

inspected at least twice a year to ensure compliance with the 

Secretary’s mandatory safety and health standards. 30 U.S.C. 

§ 813(a). On May 20, 2013, MSHA Inspector Michael 

Sonney conducted an inspection of Cactus Canyon’s mine and 

issued Cactus Canyon seven citations under section 104(a) of 

the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 814(a), for violations of the 

Secretary’s standards. The MSHA proposed a $100 penalty 

for each violation. Exercising its right under the Mine Act, 

Cactus Canyon sought to challenge the seven citations and 

accompanying penalties before the Commission.

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Shortly after the case was assigned to an ALJ, counsel for 

the Secretary learned that Inspector Sonney was no longer 

employed by the MSHA and was thus unavailable to testify at 

a hearing. The Secretary pursued the possibility of a 

settlement with Cactus Canyon, but settlement negotiations 

failed. Because Inspector Sonney remained unavailable to 

testify, the Secretary elected to vacate the citations rather than 

litigate the matter before the ALJ. 

The Secretary then filed a motion requesting that the ALJ 

dismiss the proceedings. Cactus Canyon opposed the 

Secretary’s motion by filing a “motion for judgment,” asking 

the ALJ to render a judgment in Cactus Canyon’s favor. 

Cactus Canyon requested, in the alternative, that the ALJ 

dismiss the case with prejudice to the Secretary. On June 16, 

2014, the ALJ denied Cactus Canyon’s motion for judgment 

and entered an order of dismissal. The ALJ’s order was silent 

regarding whether the dismissal was with prejudice. 

After dismissal of the underlying proceedings, Cactus 

Canyon filed an application for the award of attorney’s fees

under the EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). In its application for 

fees, Cactus Canyon sought reimbursement for $11,250, 

which represented 45 hours of legal work at the “enhanced” 

rate of $250 per hour. The ALJ, citing the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Buckhannon, denied the application for fees

because Cactus Canyon was not a “prevailing party” under

the EAJA. The ALJ’s judgment rested on two principal 

findings: first, the dismissal of the underlying proceedings did 

not involve any judicial consideration of the case; and, 

second, the dismissal did not provide Cactus Canyon with any 

court-ordered relief. Cactus Canyon petitioned the 

Commission for discretionary review, see 30 U.S.C. 

§ 823(d)(2)(A)(i), which was denied.

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II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo whether Cactus Canyon was a 

“prevailing party” under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). No deference

is due to any agency’s interpretation of the EAJA because it is 

a statute of general application. Green Aviation, 676 F.3d at 

202.

A. The Court’s Decision in Buckhannon

In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court defined the term 

“prevailing party” in fee-shifting statutes, as follows:

Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award 

attorney’s fees and costs to the “prevailing party.” The 

question presented here is whether this term includes a 

party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or 

a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless 

achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought 

about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. We 

hold that it does not. . . .

. . . .

In designating those parties eligible for an award of 

litigation costs, Congress employed the term “prevailing 

party,” a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 

(7th ed. 1999) defines “prevailing party” as “[a] party in 

whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the 

amount of damages awarded <in certain cases, the court 

will award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party>. —

Also termed successful party.” This view that a 

“prevailing party” is one who has been awarded some 

relief by the court can be distilled from our prior 

cases. . . .

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. . . .

. . . These decisions, taken together, establish that 

enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered 

consent decrees create the “material alteration of the legal 

relationship of the parties” necessary to permit an award 

of attorney’s fees.

We think, however, the “catalyst theory” falls on the 

other side of the line from these examples. It allows an 

award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in 

the legal relationship of the parties. Even under a limited 

form of the “catalyst theory,” a plaintiff could recover 

attorney’s fees if it established that the “complaint had 

sufficient merit to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted.” This is not the type of legal merit that 

our prior decisions, based upon plain language and 

congressional intent, have found necessary. . . . A 

defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although 

perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to 

achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial 

imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel 

against holding that the term “prevailing party” 

authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a 

corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the 

parties.

532 U.S. at 600-05 (citations omitted).

Following Buckhannon, we “concluded that the phrase 

‘prevailing party’ in [fee-shifting] statutes should be treated 

the same . . . unless there is some good reason for doing 

otherwise.” Green Aviation, 676 F.3d at 202 (ellipsis in 

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original) (citing Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 

AFL–CIO v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C. Cir. 

2002)). We have “joined other circuits in acknowledging that 

the burden of establishing ‘good reason[]’ not to apply 

Buckhannon is not easily met.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). 

Cactus Canyon concedes that we have applied 

Buckhannon’s interpretation of the phrase “prevailing party” 

to the EAJA administrative adjudication provision, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 504(a)(1), that is at issue in this case. We did so in Turner 

without “determin[ing] whether the understanding of 

‘prevailing party’ in Buckhannon necessarily or always 

applies to that phrase in § 504(a)(1).” Turner, 608 F.3d at 15

n.3. And we did so again in Green Aviation, in which we 

rejected the petitioner’s efforts to establish “good reason” not 

to apply Buckhannon. Green Aviation, 676 F.3d at 203. In the 

present case, Cactus Canyon has also failed to present “good 

reason” not to apply Buckhannon’s interpretation of

“prevailing party.”

Cactus Canyon first argues that there is “good reason” 

based on certain statutory provisions of the Mine Act, which 

allegedly differ from the civil rights statutes at issue in 

Buckhannon. Cactus Canyon notes that the Mine Act requires 

the Secretary to issue citations for violations, makes citations 

and accompanying penalties binding until terminated, and 

provides separate prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions for 

the Secretary and the Commission. But Cactus Canyon never 

explains why these purported differences matter. The only 

remotely discernable explanation given by Cactus Canyon is 

that applying Buckhannon to the administrative adjudication 

provision of the EAJA would allow the Secretary to avoid 

paying attorney’s fees in certain cases by vacating citations. 

This concern is insufficient to prevent the application of 

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Buckhannon to 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). Indeed, in Green 

Aviation, we found no merit in an argument that was nearly 

identical to the one advanced here by Cactus Canyon. See 

Green Aviation, 676 F.3d at 203. The court noted that “in 

Buckhannon, the Supreme Court rejected the relevance of 

such policy arguments . . . given its view of the ‘clear 

meaning’ of the phrase ‘prevailing party.’” Id. (quoting 

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610); see also Alegria v. District of 

Columbia, 391 F.3d 262, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recognizing 

that Buckhannon had given “short shrift” to similar policy 

arguments). 

Cactus Canyon argues further that there is “good reason” 

based on certain statutory differences between the EAJA’s

administrative adjudication provision and the civil rights 

statutes at issue in Buckhannon. Cactus Canyon notes that 5 

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) prohibits fee recovery by the government 

and entitles a “prevailing party” other than the government to 

recover fees unless the agency’s position was substantially 

justified. Again, however, Cactus Canyon neglects to put 

forth any rationale for why these purported differences are 

significant. We see none. 

Finally, Cactus Canyon contends that the legislative 

history of the EAJA clearly demonstrates that a defendant 

who obtains a voluntary dismissal is entitled to “prevailing 

party” status. Tellingly, Cactus Canyon cites as its principal 

support a Seventh Circuit decision that expressly rejected this

argument. See Jeroski v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review 

Comm’n, 697 F.3d 651, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2012). As the 

Seventh Circuit noted, despite particular statements in the 

EAJA’s legislative history that favor the position advocated 

by Cactus Canyon, the legislative history does not make clear 

that a voluntary dismissal necessarily entitles a defendant to 

“prevailing-party status.” Id. Furthermore, “similar language 

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appeared in the legislative history of the fee-shifting 

provisions at issue in Buckhannon, and the Court was 

unmoved by it.” Id. at 654 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 

607-08). Like Cactus Canyon’s other arguments, the EAJA’s 

legislative history does not provide “good reason” not to 

apply Buckhannon in this case.

B. Cactus Canyon’s Alternative Claim Fails Under 

the Law of the Circuit

Cactus Canyon’s alternative claim, that it was a 

“prevailing party” under Buckhannon, is foreclosed by this 

court’s precedent in Turner. 

In Turner, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 

suspended the certifications of two pilots, who then appealed 

to the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”). 608 

F.3d at 13. Prior to the scheduled hearing, the FAA withdrew 

its complaints and the ALJ issued an order terminating the 

proceedings. Id. The ALJ’s order did not specify whether the 

dismissal was with or without prejudice. Id. The two pilots 

then sought to recover attorney’s fees under the EAJA, 5 

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). Id. The Turner court explained that this 

circuit “has distilled from Buckhannon a three-part test for 

determining whether a party has ‘prevailed’: (1) there must be 

a court-ordered change in the legal relationship of the parties; 

(2) the judgment must be in favor of the party seeking the 

fees; and (3) the judicial pronouncement must be 

accompanied by judicial relief.” Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 

(citation omitted). Applying this test, the court held that the 

pilots were not “prevailing parties” because they had failed to 

obtain judicial relief. Id. at 16. 

The court concluded that although the ALJ’s order was 

silent on the subject, the ALJ had dismissed the pilots’ 

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complaints without prejudice. Id. at 15. The court reasoned 

that such a conclusion was consistent with the rule in civil 

proceedings that, in situations such as those posed in Turner,

the dismissal is presumed to be without prejudice. Id. (citing 

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2)). Furthermore, treating the silent 

order as a dismissal without prejudice was consistent with 

NTSB practice. Id. at 15-16. 

Ultimately, the court in Turner explained:

Because the ALJ dismissed the cases without 

prejudice, there was nothing in th[e] case analogous to 

judicial relief. . . . For all practical purposes, the FAA had 

unilaterally ended the adversarial relationship between 

the parties, leaving them where they were before the 

complaint was filed. . . . Had the ALJ done nothing, the 

pilots would have been in essentially the same position as 

they were after the ALJ dismissed th[e] case. These 

circumstances do not make them prevailing parties 

according to the criteria of Buckhannon . . . . 

Id. at 16 (citations omitted). 

The material facts in the present case are nearly identical 

to those at issue in Turner. The Secretary issued citations to 

Cactus Canyon, who then appealed to the Commission. Prior 

to the scheduled proceedings, the Secretary withdrew the 

citations and the ALJ issued an order terminating the case. 

And although the ALJ’s order was silent on the subject, it is

properly viewed as a dismissal without prejudice. See 29 

C.F.R. § 2700.1(b) (“On any procedural question not 

regulated by the [Mine] Act, these Procedural Rules, or the 

Administrative Procedure Act . . . , the Commission and its 

Judges shall be guided so far as practicable by the Federal 

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Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure.”). 

In USA Cleaning Service & Building Maintenance v. 

Secretary of Labor, 33 FMSHRC 2264 (2011), aff’d sub nom.

Jeroski, 697 F.3d 651, which is similar to this case, the ALJ 

issued an order granting the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the 

underlying proceeding. The order was silent on whether 

dismissal was with prejudice. The employer subsequently 

sought fees under EAJA. In a decision relying heavily on 

Turner, the ALJ found that the employer was not a 

“prevailing party” because the underlying proceeding had not 

been dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 2268. The same 

conclusion follows from the facts here. The Secretary

unilaterally ended its relationship with Cactus Canyon, 

leaving the parties where they were before the citations were 

issued. And the order of dismissal was not with prejudice. 

Therefore, we are bound by our previous determination in 

Turner that, given these circumstances, Cactus Canyon is not 

a “prevailing party.”

Cactus Canyon attempts, unsuccessfully, to distinguish 

Turner. Cactus Canyon notes that in this case the MSHA 

sought civil penalties, whereas in Turner the FAA sought 

injunctive-type relief. This is true, but irrelevant. Nothing in 

Turner suggests that the type of remedy was germane to the 

court’s “prevailing party” analysis, nor has Cactus Canyon 

identified a basis for according this factual difference any 

significance. Cactus Canyon also claims that more time 

elapsed in this case between the initiation of the 

administrative proceedings and the termination of the case 

than in Turner. Again, nothing in Turner suggests that the 

amount of time elapsed is relevant to determining whether the 

EAJA applicant is a “prevailing party,” nor has Cactus 

Canyon provided a reason why it is relevant. 

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“[T]he precedential value of a decision is defined by the 

context of the case from which it arose.” UC Health v. NLRB, 

803 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Edwards, J., concurring).

“If, in light of that context, the decided case is materially or 

meaningfully different from a superficially similar later case, 

the holding of the earlier case cannot control the latter.” Id.

Here, there is no material or meaningful difference between 

the facts at hand and the facts in Turner. Turner is thus 

controlling. We do not say this lightly. “For judges, the most 

basic principle of jurisprudence is that we must act alike in all 

cases of like nature because [i]nconsistency is the antithesis of 

the rule of law.” Id. at 681 (citing LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 

F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (en 

banc)). 

In an effort to avoid Turner, Cactus Canyon cites the 

Commission’s decision in Secretary of Labor v. Black 

Diamond Construction, Inc., 21 FMSHRC 1188 (1999). In 

that case, the Commission awarded attorney’s fees under

EAJA after the Secretary had vacated citations. Id. at 1188.

But, as Cactus Canyon acknowledges, “[t]he Secretary did not 

try to advance a ‘prevailing party’ defense in Black 

Diamond.” Br. of Petitioner at 45. And, more importantly, 

Black Diamond was decided before the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Buckhannon, and before this court’s decision in 

Turner. It thus carries no weight here.

Cactus Canyon also argues that the Commission’s 

dismissal following the Secretary’s decision to vacate the 

citations has res judicata effect, and because the Secretary is 

prohibited from re-issuing the citations, Cactus Canyon is a 

“prevailing party.” This argument is likewise baseless. In 

District of Columbia v. Straus, we noted that “[r]es judicata 

effect would certainly qualify as judicial relief where, for 

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example, it protected the prevailing [party] from having to 

pay damages or alter its conduct.” 590 F.3d 898, 902 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). In Green Aviation, we applied this principle to 

find that the petitioner was a “prevailing party” under 5 

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). There, the FAA brought and then 

withdrew a complaint against a chartered flight operator for 

allegedly violating the FAA’s safety regulations. 676 F.3d at 

201. Following the FAA’s withdrawal of the complaint, the 

ALJ dismissed the proceedings with prejudice. Id. In a 

subsequent proceeding for attorney’s fees under the EAJA, 

we reversed the FAA Administrator’s determination that the 

petitioner was not a “prevailing party” under Buckhannon. Id.

at 205. We explained that the petitioner had sufficiently 

obtained judicial relief because “the dismissal with prejudice 

has res judicata effect” and the agency was therefore barred 

from re-filing a complaint based on the same set of facts. Id.

at 204-05. We noted that, unlike in Turner, the parties were 

“not where they were before the complaint was filed.” Id. at 

204 (citing Turner, 608 F.3d at 16). Instead, the petitioner was 

“protected . . . from having to pay damages” because of the 

dismissal with prejudice. Id. (ellipsis in original) (citation 

omitted). 

Nothing in the record before us suggests that the ALJ’s 

dismissal in this case has res judicata effect or bars the 

Secretary from re-issuing the citations against Cactus Canyon.

Unlike in Green Aviation, the ALJ’s dismissal in this case 

was without prejudice. “Dismissal without prejudice is a 

dismissal that does not operate as an adjudication upon the 

merits, and thus does not have a res judicata effect.” Cooter & 

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990)

(alterations, ellipsis, and citation omitted). The Commission 

can, as it has done in the past, dismiss proceedings with 

prejudice when the Secretary vacates a citation. See, e.g., 

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Sec’y of Labor v. N. Am. Drillers, LLC, 34 FMSHRC 352, 

355 (2012). But it did not do so here. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Cactus Canyon is not a 

“prevailing party,” and we deny the petition for review. 

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