Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00207/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00207-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio Tawan Bankhead
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

CHRISTOPHER S. HALES 

Assistant United States Attorney 

501 I Street, Suite 10-100 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Telephone: (916) 554-2700 

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

ANTONIO TAWAN BANKHEAD, 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-00207-TLN 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

DATE: March 26, 2020 

TIME: 9:30 a.m. 

COURT: Hon. Troy L. Nunley 

This case is set for status conference on March 26, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California scheduled to 

commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”). 

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Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 26, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 7, 

2020, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between March 26, 2020, and May 7, 2020, under Local Code 

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T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports, photographs, CAD logs, and related documents in electronic form 

including approximately 61 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been either produced 

directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. 

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and 

analyze discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare 

pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. This includes preparation to address the 

companion alleged supervised release violation in case 2:14-CR-00292-TLN. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence. 

d) The government does not object to the continuance. 

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because: 

 Both counsel have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to 

the greatest extent possible, and the Federal Defender’s office space is currently 

closed. It will be difficult to avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed. 

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 26, 2020 to May 7, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

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the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: March 19, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ CHRISTOPHER S. HALES 

 CHRISTOPHER S. HALES 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: March 19, 2020 /s/ BENJAMIN GALLOWAY 

BENJAMIN GALLOWAY 

Counsel for Defendant 

ANTONIO TAWAN 

BANKHEAD 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 19th day of March, 2020. 

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