Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02458/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02458-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shelly Averill
Defendant
Chad Christopher Strader
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD CHRISTOPHER STRADER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHELLY AVERILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-02458-JSC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. ' 1983 against a judge of the Sonoma County Superior Court.

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 His application to proceed 

in forma pauperis is granted in a separate order. For the reasons explained below, the complaint is 

dismissed without leave to amend. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. 1 at 4.) 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 

state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to 

provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. Pro se pleadings must be liberally 

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shelly Averill, a Judge of the Sonoma County Superior 

Court, denied his request for a return of his property at a hearing on February 26, 2014. He further 

alleges that Defendant told his attorney to file a motion for return of the property that would be 

heard at a future date, but after the hearing Judge Averill ordered the property “forfeited and 

destroyed” before he “had the chance” to file the motion. (Compl. at 3.) He seeks an order 

directing Defendant to return the property to him or to pay monetary damages for the cost to 

replace the property. 

As a state judge, Defendant is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts 

performed in her judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying judicial 

immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Although the doctrine of judicial immunity does 

not bar claims for injunctive relief in § 1983 actions, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 

(1984), § 1983 itself provides that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This 

bar is limited to injunctive relief for acts taken in a judicial capacity. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 

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F.3d 358, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant’s rulings in court are clearly actions taken in her 

judicial capacity. As a result, she is immune from liability under § 1983 for damages arising from 

those rulings, and § 1983 itself bars Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Accordingly, his 

claims must be dismissed. The appropriate place to challenge Defendant’s rulings is in the state 

appellate courts, not in a civil rights action in federal court. 

Leave to amend is not granted because the claims cannot be amended to avoid Defendant’s

judicial immunity from damages and the bar against federal injunctive relief against a state judge. 

CONCLUSION

The complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Clerk 

shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-02458-JSC Document 8 Filed 08/17/15 Page 3 of 3