Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03742/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03742-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jermaine Anthony Givens
Petitioner
Michael McDonald
Respondent

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERMAINE ANTHONY GIVENS,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL McDONALD, warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 09-3742 SI (pr)

ORDER ON INITIAL REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Jermaine Anthony Givens, an inmate at the High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se

action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition is now before the

court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases. His in forma pauperis application and motion for appointment of counsel also are before

the court for consideration. 

BACKGROUND

Givens states in his petition that he was convicted in Alameda County Superior Court of

murder and attempted murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus

25 years to life in prison. He appealed. His conviction was affirmed by the California Court of

Appeal and his petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court in 2008. 

Givens reports that he did not file any state habeas petitions before filing this action. 

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DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A

district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall "award the writ or issue

an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28

U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition are

vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v.

Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Givens alleges several claims in his petition. In claim 1, he alleges that he was subjected

to an "unreasonable search, seizure, detention and coercion/Miranda violation." Petition, p. 6.

In Claim 2, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel did an

inadequate investigation, did not objection to any argument, and did not challenge "pertinent

prospective jurors." Id. In Claim 3, he contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in

that he subpoenaed two witnesses he did not intend to call, expressed his personal belief about

some unidentified thing, improperly commented in closing argument that the absence of

petitioner's grandmother and mother reflected their belief that petitioner was guilty, and "tainted

petitioner's reputation by continued deliberate deceits to jury." Id. at 6A. In Claim 4, Givens

alleges that tapes of conversations between Givens and his mother and grandmother were played

for the jury that were not verified or authenticated. In Claim 5, he contends that all Blacks were

dismissed from the jury and one juror slept during the trial. In Claim 6, Givens contends that

his sentence violated the federal constitution because the "court relied on factors that were not

found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury." Id. at 6B. 

The petition has three threshold problems which require Givens' further attention before

the court can determine whether to require a response from respondent. First, Givens has not

identified the federal constitutional basis for almost all of his claims. For each of his claims,

Givens should state in the amended petition what federal constitutional right was violated and

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give a short statement of the facts that shows the constitutional violation. A federal court has

jurisdiction to issue the writ to remedy violations of the laws, treaties, or Constitution of the

United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), but not to remedy violations of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Therefore, Givens therefore needs to file an amended

petition in which he identifies the federal constitutional provision on which each claim is based

and deletes any claims that are for state law errors. 

Second, the short description of each of the claims is simply too short for the court to

evaluate whether a claim for a constitutional violation has been stated. Givens must provide

more detail regarding each claim in his amended petition. If a claim has been raised in a state

appellate brief written by an attorney, it is usually sufficient for the petitioner to submit a copy

of that state appellate brief to present his claim to this court. (This is because an appellate

attorney usually will have provided an adequate explanation of the facts and law, as well as

citations to the record so that the reviewing court may examine the claim.) On the other hand,

when a petitioner presents a claim that has not been presented in state court by an attorney, he

must describe the facts that show the alleged constitutional violation, must cite to the record if

possible, and may cite to relevant case authority in support of the claim. Although the factual

inadequacy exists for all the claims, the court will provide one example of the problem. Givens

alleges that counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an "effective investigation" and failing

to interview or call witnesses. Givens must do far more than that, however, as he has not

explained the specific investigation that should have been done but was not done, has not

identified the specific witnesses who should have been interviewed but were not, and has not

provided any evidence as to what these uncalled witnesses would have said had they testified.

Givens' minimal description of his several claims (including his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim) would not allow the court to find an error, let alone any error that was not harmless. His

amended petition must provide a short but adequate description of the facts that demonstrate

each of the alleged constitutional violations. 

Third, there is an exhaustion problem. Givens states that Claims 1, 4, and 5 were not

presented to the state's highest court "due to ineffective counsel." Petition, p. 6. Givens'

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petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims and therefore is what is referred to as

a "mixed" petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). The court cannot

adjudicate the merits of a habeas petition containing any claim as to which state remedies have

not been exhausted, such as a mixed petition. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522.

Due to a critical one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), see 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d), the court is reluctant to dismiss the mixed petition (and possibly cause a later-filed

petition to be time-barred) without giving Givens the opportunity to elect whether to proceed

with just his exhausted claims, or to try to exhaust the unexhausted claims before having this

court consider all his claims. Accordingly, instead of an outright dismissal of the action, the

court will allow Givens to choose whether he wants to – 

(1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only the exhausted

claims, or 

(2) dismiss this action and return to state court to exhaust all claims before filing a new

federal petition presenting all of his claims, or 

(3) file a motion for a stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his unexhausted claims

in the California Supreme Court. 

Givens is cautioned that the options have risks which he should take into account in deciding

which option to choose. If he chooses option (1) and goes forward with only his exhausted

claim, he may face dismissal of any later-filed petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If he chooses

option (2), dismissing this action and returning to state court to exhaust all claims before filing

a new federal petition, his new federal petition very likely would be rejected as time-barred

because he filed the petition in this action just days before the one-year limitations period

expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). If he chooses option (3), he must file a motion in this court

to obtain a stay and (if the motion is granted) then must act diligently to file in the California

Supreme Court, to obtain a decision from the California Supreme Court on his unexhausted

claims, and to return to this court. And under option (3), this action stalls: this court will do

nothing further to resolve the case while petitioner is diligently seeking relief in state court.

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Givens' assertion that Claims 1, 4 and 5 were not presented due to ineffective assistance of

counsel does not alone show good cause for a stay. Among other things, he has not shown what

counsel did that prevented him from raising those claims in state court in the many months since his

direct appeal concluded. 

5

In Rhines, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the stay-and-abeyance procedure for mixed

habeas petitions. The Court cautioned district courts against being too liberal in allowing a stay

because a stay works against several of the purposes of the AEDPA in that it "frustrates

AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of

the federal proceeding" and "undermines AEDPA's goal of streamlining federal habeas

proceedings by decreasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior

to filing his federal petition." Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. A stay and abeyance "is only appropriate

when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his

claims first in state court," the claims are not meritless, and there are no intentionally dilatory

litigation tactics by the petitioner. Id. at 277-78.1

 Any stay must be limited in time to avoid

indefinite delay. Id. Reasonable time limits would be 30 days to get to state court, as long as

necessary in state court, and 30 days to get back to federal court after the final rejection of the

claims by the state court. See id. at 278; Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d at 1071.

Givens has moved for appointment of counsel to represent him in this action. A district

court may appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner whenever "the court determines that

the interests of justice so require and such person is financially unable to obtain representation."

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of the

district court. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.

1023 (1987). Appointment is mandatory only when the circumstances of a particular case

indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations. See id. Based

on the materials in the court file, it does not appear that appointment of counsel is required in

this action to prevent a due process violation. Givens cited to a California Rule of Court that

requires appointment of counsel when an order to show cause is issued; however, that rule

applies to state court proceedings and not to federal court proceedings. The motion for

appointment of counsel is denied.

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CONCLUSION 

Petitioner must file no later than February 19, 2010, a notice in which he states whether

he elects to (1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only the

remaining claims, or (2) dismiss this action and return to state court to exhaust all of his claims

before returning to federal court to present all of his claims in a new petition, or (3) moves for

a stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his state court remedies for the unexhausted

claims. If he chooses Option (1) or Option (2), his filing need not be a long document; it is

sufficient if he files a one-page document entitled "Election By Petitioner" and states simply:

"Petitioner elects to proceed under option ___ provided in the court's Order On Initial Review."

Petitioner would have to insert a number in place of the blank space to indicate which of the first

two options he chooses. If he chooses Option (3), petitioner must file no later than February

19, 2010, a motion for a stay in which he explains why he failed to exhaust his unexhausted

claims in state court before presenting them to this court, that his claims are not meritless, and

that he is not intentionally delaying resolution of his constitutional claims. If petitioner does not

choose one of the three options or file a motion by the deadline, the court will dismiss the

unexhausted claims. 

Petitioner also must file no later than February 19, 2010 an amended petition in which

he states the federal constitutional provision on which each of his claims is based and provides

a brief description of the facts in support of each claim. 

Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. (Docket # 3.)

Petitioner in forma pauperis application is DENIED. (Docket # 2.) The application is

incomplete and, in any event, is unnecessary because he has paid the filing fee. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 11, 2010 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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