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Parties Involved:
Shechem Lafayette
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 3, 2002 Decided August 1, 2003

No. 01-3067

& No. 01-3099

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SHECHEM LAFAYETTE,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 88cr00254–01)

Edward C. Sussman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Shechem Lafayette filed a pro se supplemental brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Roy W.

McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary-Patrice

Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the

Supreme Court held that, ‘‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ 530 U.S.

466, 490 (2000). Appellant Shechem Lafayette, who was

convicted of multiple narcotics and firearms charges, contends that the 292–month sentence he received on one count

of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base exceeds the maximum permissible sentence under Apprendi by 52 months. We conclude that any Apprendi

error in the sentence imposed on that single count was

harmless, because the United States Sentencing Guidelines

would in any event have required the district court to run the

sentences on his multiple counts consecutively until the sum

yielded the same 292 months.

I

On November 9, 1988, a jury of the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia found Lafayette guilty on

all counts of a nine-count indictment charging him with

federal narcotics and firearms violations.1

 On January 27,

1 The nine counts were: (1) conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a); (2) conspiracy to distribute and to

possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846 and 841(a); (3) conspiracy to use and carry firearms during

and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 371 and 924(c); (4) possession with intent to distribute 50 grams

or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii); (5) possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); (6) using and carrying a firearm

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1989, the district court sentenced Lafayette to a total of 410

months’ imprisonment. The court imposed 290–month terms

for each of three convictions relating to cocaine, one of which

(Count Four) involved 50 grams or more of cocaine base; 60–

month terms for each of three convictions relating to marijuana; and 60–month terms for each of three counts relating to

using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense. The court ordered that all of the sentences run concurrently, with the exception of two of the 60–

month firearms sentences, which were to run consecutively to

each other and to one of the 290–month sentences.2

 Lafayette filed a direct appeal, and on February 22, 1990, we

affirmed his convictions. United States v. Lafayette, 896 F.2d

599 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (table). Lafayette did not file a petition

for a writ of certiorari, and his convictions became final no

later than May 23, 1990, the date on which the time for filing

such a petition expired. See Clay v. United States, 123 S. Ct.

1072, 1076 (2003); United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 387

(D.C. Cir. 2002).3

Five years later, on June 15, 1995, Lafayette mounted a

collateral attack on his sentence, moving to vacate and/or

amend it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On August 22, 1996,

the district court denied all but four of the numerous claims

that Lafayette had raised by that date, either in his June

1995 motion or in later ‘‘supplements.’’ On September 30,

during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c); (7) another charge of possession with intent to

distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); (8) possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a); and (9) another charge of using and carrying a firearm

during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c).

2 In 1997, the district court granted the government’s motion to

correct clerical errors in the above-described sentence, increasing

Lafayette’s total sentence to 470 months. Lafayette did not appeal.

3 Lafayette filed a motion for a new trial soon after he was

convicted, alleging ‘‘newly discovered evidence’’ of police misconduct. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. The district court denied Lafayette’s motion, and this court affirmed. United States v. Lafayette,

983 F.2d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

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1999, the district court denied the remaining four claims, as

well as all of the additional claims that Lafayette had filed in

the interim, with one exception: in light of the Supreme

Court’s then-recent ruling in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.

227 (1999), the court directed the government to respond to

Lafayette’s argument that the court had ‘‘erred in attributing

a drug quantity and type to Lafayette at sentencing.’’ United States v. Lafayette, No. 88cr00254–01, at 11 (D.D.C. Sept.

30, 1999). Furthermore, on the basis of the Supreme Court’s

intervening decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137

(1995)—which defined the meaning of ‘‘using’’ a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)—the court granted Lafayette’s and the

government’s joint motion to vacate two of the defendant’s

firearms convictions. As a result of that vacatur, the court

scheduled a hearing to resentence the defendant.

On June 26, 2000, before the resentencing took place, the

Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466 (2000). In July 2000, Lafayette filed a ‘‘Motion for

Release from Further Incarceration’’ based on Apprendi.

The district court denied the motion on May 23, 2001. The

court ruled that Apprendi was not retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; that even if it were, Lafayette had

procedurally defaulted by not raising the claim on direct

appeal; and that he could not show ‘‘ ‘cause and actual

prejudice’ TTT for excusing such default.’’ United States v.

Lafayette, No. 88cr00254–01, at 6–7 (D.D.C. May 23, 2001).4

On August 6, 2001, the district court resentenced Lafayette

in view of the vacatur of the two firearms counts.5

 The court

sentenced Lafayette to a total of 292 months’ imprisonment,

the bottom of the range determined by the applicable United

4 The court also denied Lafayette’s motion for a downward

sentencing departure premised on his status as a deportable alien

and on his good behavior during his incarceration.

5 One effect of the vacatur of the firearms counts was to

increase the guidelines offense level of the remaining counts, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See United States v. Morris, 116 F.3d

501, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

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States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). The court imposed

a 292–month sentence for Lafayette’s conviction on Count

Four, the count that charged him with possession with intent

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The court

also prescribed sentences of 240 months for each of the other

two cocaine convictions, and 60 months for each of the three

marijuana convictions and the surviving firearms conspiracy

conviction, all to be served concurrently.

Lafayette filed notices of appeal both from the denial of his

§ 2255 motion and from his new sentence. With respect to

the former, this court directed the district court to determine

in the first instance whether a certificate of appealability

should be issued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); United States v. Saro, 252 F.3d

449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Although the district court declined to issue one, this court subsequently granted a certificate that was limited to the Apprendi issue, and then consolidated the two appeals.

II

The ‘‘lengthy and tortured procedural history’’ of this case,

Appellant’s Br. at 1, gives rise to a host of questions concerning both Lafayette’s right to assert an Apprendi claim at this

late stage and the standard of review that would govern any

claim that he may assert. We describe some of these issues

in the next four paragraphs.

The government contends that Lafayette may not make

any claim at all under Apprendi for two reasons. First, it

argues that Apprendi cannot be applied retroactively on

collateral review. Under Teague v. Lane, ‘‘new constitutional

rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those

cases which have become final before the new rules are

announced,’’ unless the new rule ‘‘places certain kinds of

primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the

criminal law-making authority to proscribe,’’ or constitutes a

‘‘watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure’’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.

489 U.S. 288, 310, 311 (1989) (citations, internal quotation

marks, and alterations omitted). Lafayette responds that

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Teague is inapplicable to Apprendi because, inter alia, Apprendi did announce such a watershed rule.

The government disagrees, but also offers a second reason

for Apprendi’s inapplicability: Lafayette’s Apprendi motion,

it asserts, is barred by the one-year limitations period of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), Pub L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, codified in

relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(1). Lafayette counters

that the relevant AEDPA deadline is not ¶ 6(1) of § 2255, but

¶ 6(3)—which permits a prisoner to file a motion within a year

of ‘‘the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 2255

¶ 6(3). The government parries by arguing that ¶ 6(3) is

relevant only when the Supreme Court has made a right

retroactively applicable, which the Court has not done with

respect to Apprendi. See Hicks, 283 F.3d at 389 (noting the

issue but not deciding it). Lafayette ripostes with the claim

that ¶ 6(3) permits this court to make the retroactivity ruling

by applying the principles of Teague—thus returning us to

the issue that we discussed in the preceding paragraph.

Drawing another, independent line of defense, the government contends that, even if Lafayette’s Apprendi claim survives both Teague and AEDPA, it is doomed because Lafayette did not raise it on direct appeal, and because he cannot

satisfy the test described in Bousley v. United States:

‘‘Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by

failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in

habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either

‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’ ’’ 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (citations omitted). Needless to say, Lafayette disagrees that Bousley precludes his

Apprendi claim, arguing that he had ‘‘cause’’ for not raising

such a claim during his trial or on direct appeal because it

would have been ‘‘novel’’ to do so that many years before the

Supreme Court decided Apprendi, id. at 622, and that the 52

additional months he must serve under Count Four demonstrates the necessary ‘‘prejudice.’’

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Lafayette also seeks to side-step all of the government’s

defenses by arguing that, even if a collateral attack under

Apprendi were partially or wholly barred by Teague,

AEDPA, or Bousley, his Apprendi challenge still would not

fail because it is not properly characterized as collateral.

Rather, he contends that when the district court vacated his

firearms convictions following Bailey and scheduled a resentencing on the remaining counts, his entire ‘‘sentence package’’ was reopened and the court ‘‘was required to apply the

law in effect at the time of the new sentencing.’’ Appellant’s

Br. at 10.6

 In essence, Lafayette argues that the district

court should have treated the resentencing as if it were his

initial sentencing, and that we should treat this appeal as if it

were a direct appeal. On that theory, we would review the

denial of Lafayette’s Apprendi claim either (1) for plain error,

if we deem the claim untimely because it was not raised at

trial; or (2) for harmless error, if we regard the assertion of

the claim at the resentencing as sufficient. See FED. R. CRIM.

P. 52; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993).

Although the parties would like us to untie each of these

knots, Lafayette’s last point permits us to cut through them

all. Even if the appellant were correct as to all of the

arguments just discussed, he concedes that we may not set

aside his sentence if the government demonstrates that any

Apprendi error that occurred was harmless—i.e., that it did

not affect his substantial rights. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a);

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734–35. And because we conclude in the

following Part that any such error was in fact harmless, we

have no need to pursue these antecedent questions any

further.7

6 But see Dahler v. United States, 259 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir.

2001) (‘‘[A] belated challenge to events that precede a resentencing

must be treated as a collateral attack on the original conviction and

sentence, rather than as an initial challenge to the latest sentence.’’).

7 In Caspari v. Bohlen, the Court instructed: ‘‘A threshold

question in every habeas case TTT is whether the court is obligated

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III

The only challenge Lafayette raises on this appeal is to the

sentence the district court imposed for his conviction on

Count Four of his indictment.8

 That count charged a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(A)(iii), which authorizes a

40–year (480–month) maximum sentence for possession with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The

district court sentenced Lafayette to a 292–month term of

imprisonment on the basis of that charge.

Under the rule announced in Apprendi, ‘‘any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ 530 U.S. at 490. In United

States v. Fields, this circuit held that ‘‘[i]n light of Apprendi,

it is now clear that, in drug cases under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and

846, before a defendant can be sentenced to any of the

progressively higher statutory maximums that are based on

progressively higher quantities of drugs specified in subsections 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the Government must state the drug

type and quantity in the indictment, submit the required

evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug quantity

beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ 242 F.3d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (‘‘Fields I’’), aff’d and amended on reh’g, 251 F.3d 1041,

1043 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘Fields II’’). When those requirements

are not met, the statutory maximum is instead set by the only

subsection of § 841(b) for which drug quantity is not an

element: § 841(b)(1)(C), which authorizes a maximum sento apply the Teague rule to the defendant’s claimTTTT [I]f the

State TTT argue[s] that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new

rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague before

considering the merits of the claim.’’ 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994)

(second emphasis added). Because our disposition does not require

us to consider ‘‘the merits’’ of Lafayette’s Apprendi claim, this

instruction is not applicable and we need not resolve the Teague

issue. See Hicks, 283 F.3d at 389 (similarly declining to decide

whether Apprendi applies retroactively for purposes of a collateral

challenge).

8 The defendant challenges only his sentence and not his conviction.

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tence of 20 years (240 months). See United States v. Webb,

255 F.3d 890, 897, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Although Lafayette’s indictment did charge him with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine

base, the district court did not instruct the jury that, to

convict Lafayette, it had to find that the amount of the drug

involved in his offense was at least 50 grams. On this basis,

Lafayette contends that the sentence he received on Count

Four—292 months—exceeded by 52 months the maximum

sentence that the court could lawfully impose under Apprendi. The government does not contest the point, but argues

that even if the 292–month sentence on Count Four violated

Apprendi, Lafayette suffered no prejudice because he would

have received the same total sentence in the absence of the

alleged error. We agree.9

Lafayette does not dispute that, based on the weight of

cocaine base involved in his offense as well as other required

adjustments, 292 months was well within the sentencing

range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. See 2001

Presentence Invest. Rep. ¶¶ 21–26. Nor does he contend that

the sentences the court imposed on his other six counts of

conviction were erroneous. These concessions lead us directly to Guideline § 5G1.2(d), entitled ‘‘Sentencing on Multiple

Counts of Conviction,’’ which instructs district courts on how

to structure a sentence under such circumstances:

If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment,

then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other

counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent

necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the

total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all

9 See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (explaining that normally for an

error to ‘‘affect substantial rights’’ it ‘‘must have been prejudicial:

It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’’

(alteration omitted)); Webb, 255 F.3d at 898 (holding that where the

lawful application of the Sentencing Guidelines would result in the

same sentence received as a result of an Apprendi error, the

defendant’s substantial rights are unaffected).

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counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.

U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 5G1.2(d) (emphasis added). Applying the

clear language of this guideline, even if the sentence on Count

Four were capped by Apprendi at 240 months, the district

court would have been compelled to run or ‘‘stack’’ the

sentences imposed on his multiple counts consecutively until

the sum reached the total punishment of 292 months—the

minimum of the applicable guidelines range.10 This could

have been accomplished, without exceeding the statutory

maximum on any count, by running any one of Lafayette’s

240–month sentences consecutively with his sentence on any

other count.

Lafayette does not maintain that ‘‘stacking’’ his multiple

sentences in this fashion would violate Apprendi. See Fields

II, 251 F.3d at 1043–44 (‘‘Apprendi does not apply to enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines when the resulting sentence remains within the statutory maximum.’’).11

10 Application Note 1 to § 5G1.2 explains that the ‘‘total punishment’’ referred to in the section is ‘‘determined’’ by calculating ‘‘the

adjusted combined offense level and the Criminal History Category’’ under the guidelines. U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 5G1.2, cmt. n.1; see

United States v. Velasquez, 304 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2002) (‘‘Total

punishment is calculated by combining the factors in the relevant

sections of the Guidelines without respect to maximum statutory

sentences.’’ (citing U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 3D1.5)).

11 See also United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir.

2001); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 570–71 (9th Cir.

2002) (en banc) (holding that ‘‘Apprendi is not implicated’’ when

‘‘not one of the stacked consecutive sentences exceeds the statutory

maximum for that count’’). In Apprendi itself, the Supreme Court

said that the possibility that the state could have employed consecutive sentencing to achieve a sentence in excess of the statutory

maximum on a single count was not relevant to the ‘‘narrow issue’’

of whether the sentence imposed on ‘‘that count’’ was constitutional.

530 U.S. at 474. In the instant case, the government does not

dispute that Apprendi, if applicable, renders the sentence imposed

on Count Four unconstitutional; the only question is whether that

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Rather, he argues that stacking is not mandatory; that were

we to return the case to the district court, it might decide to

set his multiple sentences to run concurrently rather than

consecutively; and that, as a consequence, his total prison

term might amount to only 240 months—the highest statutory sentence that could be imposed on any individual count.

Lafayette recognizes that in tendering this argument he is

‘‘swimming against the legal current,’’ Appellant’s Br. at 6,

and indeed he is. All of the circuits that have addressed the

issue, with one possible exception, have held that (where

applicable) § 5G1.2(d) requires the imposition of consecutive

sentences, and that such stacking can render an Apprendi

error with respect to any individual count nonprejudicial.12

We agree with our sister circuits. Guideline § 5G1.2(d)’s

command that multiple sentences ‘‘shall’’ run consecutively in

the circumstances of this case leaves no room for district

court discretion.13 The application note to Guideline § 5G1.2

error prejudiced Lafayette. See United States v. Hernandez, 330

F.3d 964, 983 n.13 (7th Cir. 2003); see also White, 240 F.3d at 135.

12 See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 639–40 (2d Cir.

2002); United States v. Stokes, 261 F.3d 496, 500–01 (4th Cir. 2001);

United States v. Garcia, 322 F.3d 842, 845–46 (5th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 544–45 (6th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 982–84 (7th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 683–85 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc);

United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 570–71 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

banc); United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1242–43 (10th Cir.

2002); United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1253–54 (11th Cir.

2003). Although the Third Circuit held to the contrary in Velasquez, 304 F.3d at 243–45, it recently took the same position as the

other circuits in an opinion that did not mention Velasquez. See

United States v. Jenkins, 333 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2003). We

further note that, although some of the above-cited cases involved

the plain rather than harmless error standard, the meaning of

‘‘prejudice’’ under each standard is the same. See Olano, 507 U.S.

at 734.

13 See cases cited supra note 12; cf. United States v. Hall, 326

F.3d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that consecutive terms are

compelled by § 5G1.3(a), which provides that ‘‘the sentence for the

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is equally clear and equally mandatory: ‘‘If no count carries

an adequate statutory maximum, consecutive sentences are to

be imposed to the extent necessary to achieve the total

punishment.’’ U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 5G1.2, cmt. n.1 (emphasis

added). Hence, it would serve no purpose to remand the case

for yet another resentencing, as doing so would only yield the

same total punishment: a sentence of 292 months’ incarceration.

Lafayette contends that, notwithstanding the mandatory

nature of the guidelines, the relevant sentencing statutes

confer discretion on the district courts. He points first to 18

U.S.C. § 3584, which states:

(a) Imposition of concurrent or consecutive terms.—If

multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, TTT the terms may run concurrently or consecutivelyTTTT

(b) Factors to be considered in imposing concurrent or

consecutive terms.—The court, in determining whether

the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently

or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for

which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the

factors set forth in section 3553(a).

Id. (emphasis added). Lafayette discerns indicia of discretion

in both the statute’s statement that multiple terms ‘‘may’’ run

concurrently or consecutively, and in its instruction that the

court shall ‘‘consider’’ the factors set forth in § 3553(a). The

latter section states:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—

TTT The court, in determining the particular sentence to

be imposed, shall consider TTT (4) the kinds of sentence

instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment’’ if the offense was committed while

the defendant was, inter alia, on furlough (emphasis added)); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (declaring that, with

reference to a statute providing that a person convicted of specified

offenses ‘‘shall’’ forfeit property, ‘‘Congress could not have chosen

stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory’’).

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and the sentencing range established for TTT the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable

category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines TTT

issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section

994(a)(1)TTTT

Id. § 3553(a) (emphasis added). Reading this section as he

reads § 3584—i.e., to require the district court to do nothing

more than ‘‘consider’’ the Sentencing Guidelines—Lafayette

concludes that the district court retains discretion to ‘‘consider the ramifications of the sentencing guidelines and to

fashion a just punishment.’’ Reply Br. at 4.

But following the defendant down the path of his logic

would lead to the conclusion that all of the Sentencing Guidelines—not merely those relating to concurrent and consecutive sentencing, since § 3553(a) applies to all sentencing

decisions—are mere advisories for sentencing judges to consider in the exercise of their discretion. That conclusion, of

course, is plainly incorrect. As the Supreme Court said in

Mistretta v. United States, the Sentencing Reform Act of

1984 ‘‘makes the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines binding

on the courtsTTTT’’ 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and (b)); see Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (‘‘A district judge now must

impose on a defendant a sentence falling within the range of

the applicable GuidelineTTTT’’ (emphasis added)); U.S.S.G.

MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.2, intro. cmt. (‘‘Pursuant to the [Sentencing Reform] Act, the sentencing court must select a sentence

from within the guideline range.’’ (emphasis added)).14

14 There is a single exception to this rule: a sentencing judge

has ‘‘discretion to depart from the guideline applicable to a particular case if the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor

present that the Commission did not adequately consider when

formulating the guidelines.’’ Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; see Koon,

518 U.S. at 92; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 5K2.0.

The possibility of a departure from the applicable guidelines is not

before us, however, because the district court denied the only

departure requests Lafayette made—based on his status as a

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Lafayette’s error lies in reading §§ 3584 and 3553(a) without reference to the balance of the statutory sentencing

structure. Although § 3584(a) provides that a court ‘‘may’’

run multiple terms concurrently or consecutively, Congress

also authorized the Sentencing Commission, in 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(a)(1), to promulgate guidelines ‘‘for use of a sentencing

court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal

case, including TTT (D) a determination whether multiple

sentences to terms of imprisonment should be ordered to run

concurrently or consecutively.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(D).

And, as the Supreme Court said in Mistretta, subsections

3553(a) and (b) make application of those guidelines binding

on the district court. 488 U.S. at 367. Subsection 3553(b)

provides that ‘‘[t]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind,

and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4),’’ 18

U.S.C. § 3553(b) (emphasis added), and the kind and range of

sentence referred to in subsection (a)(4) is that ‘‘set forth in

the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant

to section 994(a)(1),’’ id. § 3553(a)(4)(A). The guidelines’

restriction on the grant of discretion contained in § 3584(a) is

not unique: most criminal statutes grant district courts wide

discretion over the length of a defendant’s sentence, but the

guidelines as a whole function to narrow that discretion

considerably. Compare, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (prescribing a sentence of not more than 20 years (240 months)

for distribution of a controlled substance), with U.S.S.G.

MANUAL § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(1), & ch. 5, pt. A (prescribing a

sentence of not less than 235 months for distribution of 1.5

kilograms of cocaine base).

The same analysis applies to § 3584(b)’s instruction that

the district court shall ‘‘consider’’ the factors set forth in

deportable alien and on his alleged good behavior, see supra note

4—and he has neither appealed those denials nor suggested any

other mitigating factor that would justify a departure. Cf. United

States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that

the court of appeals will reject a claim that the sentencing court

erred in failing to make an unrequested departure unless the

defendant ‘‘unequivocally demonstrate[s] the sentencing court misconstrued its authority to depart’’).

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§ 3553(a). Although § 3584(b) only requires the court to

‘‘consider’’ those factors—one of which is the kind and range

of sentence established by the Sentencing Guidelines—

§ 3553(b) makes clear that where the guideline in question is

mandatory, the district court’s consideration is at an end.

See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; United States v. Bruce, 285

F.3d 69, 71–74 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Garcia, 322

F.3d 842, 846 (5th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, where the

guideline is itself only advisory, the district court retains a

measure of discretion and is free to consider the other factors

listed in § 3553(a).15 Because § 5G1.2(d) is a mandatory

guideline, and in this case would compel the district court to

impose consecutive sentences totaling 292 months’ imprisonment, Lafayette was not prejudiced by the imposition of the

same sentence on Count Four.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, even if Apprendi obligated the district court to reduce Lafayette’s

sentence on Count Four, Guideline § 5G1.2(d) would have

required the court to impose the same total term of imprisonment that Lafayette is currently serving. Accordingly, any

Apprendi error was harmless, and the decisions of the district

court are

Affirmed.

15 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 3D1.2 (providing that, ‘‘[f]or

multiple counts of offenses that are not listed [in the guideline],

grouping under this subsection may or may not be appropriate; a

case-by-case determination must be made based upon the facts of

the case and the applicable guidelines’’ (emphasis added)); id.

§ 5F1.1 (‘‘Community confinement may be imposed as a condition

of probation or supervised release.’’ (emphasis added)); id. § 5F1.4

(‘‘The court may order the defendant to pay the cost of giving

notice to victims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3555.’’ (emphasis added)).

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