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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Yolanda Sanchez deFundora
Appellant

Document Text:

P 1 L E 0 

PUBLISH 

JAN l 0 1~90 

ROBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 88-2682 

v. 

YOLANDA SANCHEZ DeFUNDORA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-88-70-P) 

William P. Early, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Okla~oma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

D. Blair Watson, Assistant United States Attorney (William S. 

Price, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. · 

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2682 Document: 01019297307 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 1 
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma, defendant Yolanda Sanchez 

DeFundora was convicted of eight counts of distribution of 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l); one count of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l); and one count of unlawful travel in aid of 

racketeering, in violation of the Travel Act, 18 u.s.c. § 1952. 

On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence 

to support the convictions for distribution of cocaine and the 

Travel Act conviction. We disagree, and therefore we affirm the 

judgment of the district court. 

Facts 

Defendant was arrested on March 19, 1988, at the Will Rogers 

Airport in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, after law enforcement officers 

found approximately 64 grams of cocaine in defendant's purse. On 

July 19, 1988, a grand jury returned an indictment charging 

defendant with the ten counts described above. 

One of the government's witnesses at defendant's trial was 

Sarah Phillip. Phillip testified that she was addicted to cocaine 

from September 1987 to February 1988. Tr. II at 10. Phillip 

stated that she purchased cocaine from defendant, for personal use 

and resale, on eight separate occasions. Those alleged 

transactions form the basis for the eight counts of distribution 

of cocaine. 

Phillip testified as follows. In late 1987, "[r]ight after 

Thanksgiving," defendant sold one-half ounce of cocaine to Phillip 

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Appellate Case: 88-2682 Document: 01019297307 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 2 
for $700.00. Tr. II at 14. This was Phillip's first purchase of 

cocaine from defendant. Id. Phillip ingested some of the 

substance purchased from defendant, and it affected her in the 

same way that cocaine had affected her in the past. Tr. II at 15. 

On or about December 1, 1987, defendant, accompanied by a man 

named Juan Martinez, sold one ounce of cocaine to Phillip for 

$1,300. Tr. II at 16. Phillip sampled the cocaine with Martinez 

and at least one other unnamed individual. Tr. II at 17 -1 8 .. 1 On 

or about December 7, 1987, defendant sold one ounce of cocaine to 

Phillip for $1,100. Tr. ·II at 20. Approximately one week later, 

defendant again sold Phillip one ounce of cocaine for $1,100, and 

Phillip sampled and weighed the substance. Tr. II at 21. 

On or about December 21 and 28, 1987, defendant sold one 

ounce of cocaine to Phillip for $1,100, and on both of those 

occasions Phillip sampled the cocaine. Tr. II at 22-25. On 

January 4, 1988, Phillip purchased two ounces of cocaine from 

defendant for $2,200. Tr. II at 27. Phillip, the defendant, and 

two other individuals "tested" the substance. Tr. II at 27-28. 

Approximately one week later, Phillip purchased four ounces of 

1 On cross-examination, Phillip testified that after each 

purchase, she would sample the alleged cocaine by "tast[ing] it," 

"clear[ing] it out [i.e., melting it] in a spoon," and then 

"snort[ing] some of it." Tr. II at 41. Phillip also stated that 

a man that she knew "chemically evaluated" the first quantity of 

cocaine purchased from defendant. Tr. II at 41-42. 

Defendant argues that Phillip's testimony concerning chemical 

testing was "not directed at any of the specific occasions charged 

in counts one through eight of the indictment." Principal Br. of 

Defendant-Appellant at 20. However, Phillip testified that 

chemical testing was performed on the substance obtained by 

Phillip in her "first purchase" from defendant, Tr. II at 42, 

which was the basis for count one of the indictment. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2682 Document: 01019297307 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 3 
cocaine from defendant for $4,400. Tr. II at 28. The substance 

was sampled. Tr. II at 29. 

Defendant told Phillip that she travelled to Miami, Florida, 

on a weekly basis to purchase cocaine, and she asked Phillip to go 

to Miami to purchase cocaine for her. Tr. II at 36-37. Defendant 

also told Phillip that a man wanted to take over defendant's 

"cocaine business." Tr. II at 34. 

After Phillip completed her testimony, the government called 

Darrell Bryson as a witness. Bryson, a ticket salesman for 

American Airlines, testified that defendant purchased an airplane 

ticket dated March 10, 1988, for a round trip from Oklahoma City 

to Miami and then back to Oklahoma City. Tr. II at 56. According 

to Bryson, defendant paid cash for the ticket and used the name 

Maria Diaz. Tr. II at 56. Bryson notified law enforcement 

officers of that transaction. Tr. II at 56-57. Bryson testified 

that one week later, defendant purchased a similar one-day, roundtrip ticket under the name Edilia Rios. Tr. II at 58. 

On March 19, 1988, Special Agents of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration executed a search warrant to search the person and 

baggage of a particularly described person, using the name Edilia 

Rios, Maria Diaz, or Kayla Kairadad, who was expected to arrive in 

Oklahoma City on a flight from Florida via Dallas, Texas. Tr. II 

at 68. Defendant was the only person arriving on that flight who 

fit the description in the warrant. Law enforcement officers 

stopped defendant after she had deplaned and proceeded directly to 

get into a taxicab. Tr. II at 70. One of those officers, DEA 

Agent Lawrence Beck, asked defendant for her airplane ticket, and 

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Appellate Case: 88-2682 Document: 01019297307 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 4 
defendant presented Beck with an American Airlines ticket issued 

in the name of Edilia Rios. Tr. II at 72. Defendant's purse was 

searched pursuant to the warrant, and approximately 64 grams of 

cocaine was found. The parties stipulated that if a chemist from 

the DEA were to testify, he would state that he performed "the 

normal scientific analysis" on the substance removed from 

defendant's purse, and that based on his training, experience, and 

the number of tests that he ran on the substance, he concluded 

that the substance was 92-percent pure cocaine. Tr. II at 93. 

Discussion 

I. Distribution of Cocaine 

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict her of the eight counts of distribution of cocaine because 

the substances allegedly distributed by defendant were not 

subjected to scientific analysis and no evidence was adduced to 

establish the chemical makeup of those substances. Principal Br. 

of Defendant-Appellant at 17-18. "Evidence is considered 

sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, when viewed in the 

light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could 

find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United 

States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (lOth Cir. 1987) (citing 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). 

The government need not introduce scientific evidence to 

prove the identity of a substance. See United States v. Baggett, 

No. 88-2767, slip op. at 3-4 (lOth Cir. Nov. 28, 1989) (to be 

reported at 890 F.2d 1095). As long as there is sufficient lay 

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Appellate Case: 88-2682 Document: 01019297307 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 5 
testimony or circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find 

that a substance was identified beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

lack of scientific evidence does not warrant reversal. See United 

States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1984); United States 

v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976); see also United 

States v. Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201, 1204 (8th Cir. 1988); United 

States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 978 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 469 u.s. 1164, 470 u.s. 1027 (1985). The lay testimony 

and circumstantial evidence relevant to determining the identity 

of a substance includes: 

"'evidence of the physical appearance of the substan-ce 

involved in the transaction, evidence that the substance 

produced the expected effects when sampled by someone 

familiar with the illicit drug, evidence that the 

substance was used in the same manner as the illicit 

drug, testimony that a high price was paid in cash for 

the substance, evidence that transactions involving the 

substance were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, 

and evidence that the substance was called by the name 

of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in 

[her] presence .... '" 

Baggett, slip op. at 4 (quoting Dolan, 544 F.2d at 1221); see also 

United States v. Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087, 1095 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); Harrell, 737 F.2d at 978-79; Scott, 

725 F.2d at 45-46. 

Here, there is direct evidence in the record that the 

substances allegedly sold by defendant were cocaine. Phillip 

testified that she, and on some occasions, others, sampled the 

alleg~d cocaine and that when she ingested it, it affected her in 

the same way as cocaine had affected her in the past. Phillip 

further testified that the first quantity purchased from defendant 

was chemically tested. 

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The record also contains indirect evidence tending to 

corroborate the direct evidence that the. substances sold were 

cocaine. For example, Phillip testified that she was able to 

resell the substances as cocaine. Phillip also testified that 

defendant had attempted to have Phillip travel to Miami to 

purchase some cocaine and that defendant had stated that another 

individual wanted to take over her cocaine business. In addition, 

DEA agents seized approximately 64 grams of 92-percent pure 

cocaine from defendant on March 19, 1988. Although that seizure 

was not the basis for any of the eight distribution counts, it 

does lend credence to the conclusion that defendant was dealing in 

cocaine. 

In light of this evidence in the record, we believe that a 

reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

substances allegedly sold by defendant were cocaine. We therefore 

affirm defendant's convictions for distribution of cocaine. 

II. Travel Act 

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting her Travel Act conviction. The Travel Act provides, in 

part: 

Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or 

uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, 

including the mail, with intent to --

(l) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful 

activity: or 

(2) commit any crime of violence to further 

any unlawful activity: or 

(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, 

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carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, 

establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful 

activity, 

and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of 

the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), 

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for 

not more than five years, or both. 

18 u.s.c. § l952(a) (emphasis a~ded). 

The indictment alleges that defendant traveled from Miami to 

Oklahoma City with the intent to promote or carry on the "unlawful 

activity" of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and that 

thereafter defendant did perform and attempted to perform acts to 

promote, establish and carry on that unlawful activity. 2 In order 

to prove a Travel Act violation, the government must prove that 

defendant committed "an overt act after having traveled or after 

having used the facilities of interstate or foreign commerce." 

H.R. Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., lst Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 2664, 2664; see also United States v. 

Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 

3172 (1989); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1351 (5th 

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 u.s. 1005 (1984); United States v. 

Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 

U.S. 939 (1982); United States v. Stevens, 612 F.2d 1226, 1231 

(lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). 3 

2 "Unlawful activity" is defined to include "any business 

enterprise involving ..• narcotics or controlled substances." 

18 u.s.c. § l952(b)(l). 

3 An act need not be unlawful in order to satisfy the overt-act 

requirement of§ l952(a). See United States v. Blanco, 844 F.2d 

344, 352 (6th Cir.) (telephone calls made by defendant held to 

satisfy the overt-act requirement), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2042 

(1988); United States v. Stevens, 612 F.2d at 1231 (same); see 

[Footnote continued--.-.. ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2682 Document: 01019297307 Date Filed: 01/10/1990 Page: 8 
Defendant argues that she did not commit an overt act 

subsequent to her interstate travel. As noted earlier, defendant 

was stopped immediately after deplaning and stepping into a 

taxicab. However, the crime that she was alleged to have promoted 

or carried on by interstate travel was the crime of possession of 

cocaine with the intent to distribute. Possession of an object is 

an act, for criminal law purposes, if the possessor knowingly 

received the object or if he became aware that he possessed it for 

a sufficient period of time to have been able to terminate his 

possession. Model Penal Code§ 2.01(4) (1985); w. LaFave & 

A. Scott, Criminal Law§ 25, at 182 (1972). The record in this 

case demonstrates that defendant was aware that she was in 

possession of cocaine. See, ~' Tr. II at 140-41. Therefore, 

defendant's possession of cocaine constituted an overt act, and 

because she was in possession of cocaine after traveling from 

Florida to Oklahoma, she committed an act in furtherance of the 

alleged unlawful activity of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine after her interstate travel. 

This case is distinguishable from the decision of the Third 

Circuit in United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989). In that case, the court 

held that "the acts of deplaning and entering the terminal do not, 

without more, satisfy" the overt-act requirement of the Travel 

Act. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d at 775. The defendant in Zolicoffer 

[ ••. footnote continued] 

also United States v. Monu, 782 F.2d 1209, 1211 (4th Cir. 1986) 

(unwrapp1ng packages of heroin received in the mail held. to 

satisfy the overt-act requirement). 

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\ 

traveled from Florida to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, allegedly to 

collect $37,000 owed to him for a prior sale of cocaine. The 

defendant was arrested at the Harrisburg International Airport 

after deplaning and entering the terminal. There was no evidence 

that the defendant in Zolicoffer was in possession of any illegal 

drugs or drug money at the time he was arrested, nor was there any 

evidence that he had done anything after deplaning that furthered 

or tended to further his alleged objective of collecting drug 

money owed to him. The court observed that deplaning and entering 

the terminal are acts that every air traveler must do, and that 

they were therefore more appropriately considered part of the 

travel than acts taken "thereafter." Id. However, possession of 

cocaine is not an indispensable part of interstate travel, and, as 

we have shown previously, knowing possession can be considered an 

act. It was not alleged or implied that the defendant in 

Zolicoffer had committed an act of possession, and thus that case 

is not relevant to the issue we decide here. 

In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 

support defendant's convictions for distribution of cocaine and 

the Travel Act conviction. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district 

court's October 18, 1988 judgment •. 

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