Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02383/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02383-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee USA
Liddon Young
Appellant

Document Text:

14‐2383‐cr

United States v. Liddon Young  

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit ________

AUGUST TERM 2015

No. 14‐2383‐cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LIDDON YOUNG,

Defendant‐Appellant.

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of New York

________

   

SUBMITTED: DECEMBER 7, 2015

DECIDED: JANUARY 29, 2016

________

Before: CABRANES, PARKER, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

________

On appeal from a July 1, 2014 judgment of the United States

District Court for the Western District of New York (Frank P. Geraci,

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Jr., Judge) sentencing defendant‐appellant Liddon Young principally

to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years.    We AFFIRM the

sentence insofar as it rests on the District Court’s rejection of

Young’s arguments for a downward departure and a variance, but

insofar as the sentence rests on the District Court’s application of

sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and its denial of a sentencing adjustment under

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, we REMAND for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.

Judge LOHIER concurs in part and concurs in the judgment in

part in a separate opinion.

________

David C. Pilato, LaDuca Law Firm, Rochester,

NY, for Defendant‐Appellant.

Stephan J. Baczynski and Joseph J. Karaszewski,

Assistant United States Attorneys, for William J.

Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for the

Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for

Appellee.

________

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

The principal question presented is whether, in the

circumstances of this case, the imposition of sentencing

enhancements under both U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) and U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on the same underlying conduct—

transferring firearms with reason to believe they would be used in

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felony offenses—constituted “double‐counting” clearly prohibited

by the United States Sentencing Commission (the “Sentencing

Commission”).

Defendant‐appellant Liddon Young contends that imposing

both sentencing enhancements did constitute such prohibited

double‐counting, and on that basis appeals a July 1, 2014 judgment

of the United States District Court for the Western District of New

York (Frank P. Geraci, Jr., Judge) sentencing him principally to a term

of imprisonment of fifteen years.    Young further argues that the

District Court erred by applying a sentencing enhancement for

obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, refusing to apply an

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

failing to consider his arguments in support of a downward

departure and a variance, and imposing a substantively

unreasonable sentence.   

We find no error in the District Court’s decision not to

expressly discuss and reject Young’s arguments for a downward

departure and a variance.  We conclude, however, that the District

Court’s application of the sentencing adjustments was in error.  

Specifically, on the facts presented here, the District Court’s

imposition of a sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

constituted “double‐counting” clearly prohibited by the Sentencing

Commission, and its rulings on adjustments under § 3C1.1 and         

§ 3E1.1 were not supported by the requisite factual findings.  Thus,

without reaching Young’s substantive‐unreasonableness argument,

we AFFIRM his sentence insofar as it rests on the District Court’s

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rejection of his arguments for a downward departure and a

variance; insofar as the sentence rests on the District Court’s

application of sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G.                       

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and its denial of an adjustment

under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, we REMAND for resentencing consistent

with this opinion.   

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2013, Young was indicted for his role in a scheme

that involved the unlawful distribution of firearms.    Without the

benefit of a plea agreement, he entered a plea of guilty to three

firearms violations.1

Prior to sentencing, a probation officer interviewed Young to

assist in preparing a presentence report.   In discussing his offense

conduct, Young told the probation officer that he never sold guns to

known drug dealers and had no reason to think that the guns he

distributed would be used in connection with felony offenses. He

also told the probation officer that he never dealt in firearms before

meeting an individual named Paul Davis in 2012.    The probation

officer concluded that Young was likely being untruthful on both

points.  

 

1 Specifically, Conspiracy to Engage in the Business of Dealing Firearms

without a License (18 U.S.C. § 371); Unlawful Dealing in Firearms (18 U.S.C. §§

922(a)(1)(A) & 924(a)(1)(D)); and Selling Firearms to a Person Knowing or

Having Reasonable Cause to Believe that Such Person Is a Felon (18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(d)(1) & 924(a)(2)).   

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The District Court held a hearing to determine whether Young

had lied to the probation officer about his conduct.  At the hearing,

Davis testified that he met Young in 2012, at which time Young was

already engaged in the illegal sale of firearms.  According to Davis,

he and Young developed a business relationship.   The two would

meet in Atlanta, where Young would sell guns to Davis, eight to ten

at a time.    Davis would bring the guns to Rochester to sell them.  

Davis made up to four such trips.  Between Davis’s trips and direct

sales to other customers, Young sent between twenty‐five and fifty

guns—including AK‐47s, MAC‐10s, and TEC‐9s—to Rochester.   

According to Davis, he and Young discussed their customers

early in their relationship.    When Davis made his first trip

northward, Young inquired about who might purchase the guns in

Rochester.  Davis told Young he planned to sell to two “cocaine and

marijuana dealers.”  Young told Davis to be careful.   

Young also spoke with Davis about Young’s preexisting

customers.  He disclosed that he was selling firearms to his cousin, a

Rochester cocaine dealer named “Reggie” or “Reginald.”    At one

point, Young gave Davis three firearms to deliver to this cousin.  

An individual named Reggie Bullock—the drug‐dealing

cousin “Reggie” known to Davis—also testified.  He told the Court,

contrary to Davis’s testimony, that Young had never provided him

with a gun.  But he also testified that he was a cocaine dealer and

that he had once seen Young sell three guns, including a TEC‐9, to a

person Young knew to be Bullock’s primary source of drugs.  Young

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also took the stand, testifying that he never sold to anyone he knew

to be a drug dealer and had not engaged in trafficking prior to

meeting Davis.   

Following the hearing, Judge Geraci articulated factual

findings on the record.  He recognized that all three witnesses had

reason to fabricate testimony.  But he credited Davis’s statement that

Young had provided him with guns to deliver to Young’s cousin

Reggie, a drug dealer.    He also credited Davis’s testimony that

Young had been engaged in firearms dealing before the two met.  

Judge Geraci declined to credit Young’s testimony that he did not

know Reggie Bullock to be in the drug business.    Based on the

testimony described above and his credibility determinations, Judge

Geraci concluded that Young had had reason to believe that the

weapons he transferred would be used or possessed in connection

with other felony offenses.  He also concluded that Young had lied

to the probation officer who prepared the presentence report

“regarding his knowledge, intent or reason to believe that the

weapons he sold would be used in connection with another felony

offense” and in telling the officer that he had not illegally sold

firearms prior to meeting Davis.  Judge Geraci accordingly imposed

sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (for

transferring a firearm with reason to believe it would be used in

connection with another felony)2 and 3C1.1 (for obstruction of

 

2 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides: “If the defendant—(B) used or

possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense;

or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent,

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justice).3    He also ruled that, in light of his application of the

obstruction enhancement, an adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 was unavailable.  

These rulings, combined with Young’s base offense level of 22,

two enhancements Young does not challenge on appeal,4 and a

criminal history category of III, initially yielded a United States

Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) calculation of 292–365 months.  

The bottom of this range, however, exceeded the 20‐year statutory

maximum; thus, Young’s Guidelines sentence was 20 years.    See

United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 180‐81 (2d Cir. 2010).

Prior to sentencing, Young requested that the District Court

(1) depart downward because his criminal‐history category

significantly overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal past,

and (2) vary from the Guidelines range based on such factors as his

 

or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with

another felony offense, increase [the offense level] by 4 levels.”  U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2013) (“2013

U.S.S.G.”).

3 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides: “If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with

respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of

conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense

of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense, increase

the offense level by 2 levels.”  2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

4 These enhancements were imposed under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)

(offense involving between 25 and 99 firearms) and 2K2.1(b)(5) (trafficking of

firearms).

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difficult upbringing, his close relationship with his family, and the

need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing.5  The Court did

 

5 Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553 provides:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The court

shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than

necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph

(2) of this subsection.  The court, in determining the particular

sentence to be imposed, shall consider—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant;  

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for

the offense;  

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational

or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner;  

(3) the kinds of sentences available;  

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

established for—

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the

applicable category of defendant as set forth in the

guidelines—

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant

to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code,

subject to any amendments made to such

guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of

whether such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into

amendments issued under section 994(p) of title

28); and

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not explicitly address the arguments made in connection with these

requests and sentenced Young principally to a term of fifteen years’

imprisonment.

On appeal, Young argues that the District Court erred by (1)

imposing a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

(the “other‐felony‐offense enhancement”); (2) imposing a sentencing

 

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are

in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised

release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements

issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to

section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking

into account any amendments made to such guidelines

or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of

whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated

by the Sentencing Commission into amendments

issued under section 994(p) of title 28);  

(5) any pertinent policy statement—

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to

section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject

to   any amendments made to such policy statement by

act of Congress (regardless of whether such

amendments have yet to be incorporated by the

Sentencing Commission into amendments issued

under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in

effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among defendants with similar records who have been

found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the      

offense.

   

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enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (the “obstruction

enhancement”); (3) declining to apply a sentencing adjustment

under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (the “acceptance‐of‐responsibility

adjustment”); (4) failing to explicitly address Young’s arguments in

support of a downward departure and a downward variance; and

(5) imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.

There was no error in the District Court’s decision not to

expressly discuss and reject Young’s arguments for a downward

departure and a variance. Nothing in the record suggests that Judge

Geraci misunderstood his authority to depart downward, and in

imposing the sentence he plainly considered the relevant factors

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  We conclude, however, that the District

Court erred in imposing the other‐felony‐offense and obstruction

enhancements and in declining to apply the acceptance‐of‐

responsibility adjustment.  On this basis we vacate and remand for

resentencing.   In light of this disposition, we need not and do not

reach Young’s argument that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable.

DISCUSSION

We review sentences “under a deferential abuse‐of‐discretion

standard.”   Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).    “We must

first ensure that the district court committed no significant

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a

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sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately

explain the chosen sentence.”   United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128,

130–31 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Although

a district court . . . is not required to impose the now‐advisory

Guidelines‐recommended sentence, the court is nonetheless

normally required to calculate the sentencing range that the

Guidelines recommend.”  United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 103 (2d

Cir. 2009).   

We also review sentences for substantive reasonableness,

“reversing only when the trial court’s sentence cannot be located

within the range of permissible decisions.”    Tutty, 612 F.3d at 131

(internal quotation marks omitted).    “In reviewing the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence, we take into account the totality of the

circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge’s

exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional

advantages of district courts.”  United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746

(2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).    We “do not

presume that a Guidelines sentence is necessarily substantively

reasonable.”  United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 2015).  

If a sentence is tainted with procedural error, “we may

remand to the district court for resentencing without proceeding to a

substantive review of the original sentence, or, where circumstances

warrant, we may review for both procedural error and substantive

unreasonableness in the course of the same appeal.”  Tutty, 612 F.3d

at 131 (internal citations omitted).

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I. Requests for Downward Departure & Variance

Young requested that the District Court depart downward

because his criminal‐history category overrepresented the

seriousness of his criminal past, see 2013 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1), and

that the Court vary from the Guidelines range based on a number of

factors relevant under § 3553(a).  He contends that the District Court

erred by not formally ruling on his requests and failing to discuss

his arguments during sentencing.  We disagree.

A district court’s decision not to depart downward is “within

the court’s broad discretion and rarely reviewed on appeal.”  United

States v. Scott, 387 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).  “A district court is

not obliged to give reasons for refusing to depart,” and, where a

defendant has not shown a violation of law or misapplication of the

Guidelines, refusal to depart warrants vacatur only if the defendant

“point[s] to clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge

misapprehended the scope of his departure authority.”  Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).  “A district court’s silence concerning its

refusal to depart downward, generally, does not support an

inference that the district court misapprehended its scope of

authority.”  Id.  In this case, Young offers no reason why we should

suppose that the District Court misunderstood its authority to

depart, and we do not think it did.  The Court was merely silent on

the point.

Nor need a district judge imposing a sentence recite every

§ 3553(a) argument advanced by a defendant.  Rather, we presume

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that the judge properly considered the sentencing factors even in the

absence of protracted discussion pertaining to each of the factors

and all of the defendant’s contentions.   United States v. Brown, 514

F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30

(2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338 (2007).    Here, Young identifies nothing in the record

suggesting that Judge Geraci failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors

or his arguments in support of a variance, and indeed the record

shows that Judge Geraci appropriately discharged his obligations

under § 3553(a).    See, e.g., App. 374 (discussing the factors

enumerated in § 3553(a)).  We accordingly reject this argument.

II. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (Other Felony Offense

Enhancement)

Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four‐point enhancement

if the defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition in

connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred

any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to

believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with

another felony offense.”    2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).    Young

challenges the application of this enhancement on three separate

grounds.    He argues, first, that the District Court clearly erred in

crediting Davis’s testimony that Young gave him a gun to deliver to

Young’s cousin, a drug dealer named Reggie; second, that even if

that testimony were credited, the evidence adduced at the hearing

did not support a reasonable inference that Young had reason to

believe the firearms he distributed would be used in connection with

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other felonies; and third, that applying the enhancement constituted

impermissible “double‐counting.”   

Young’s first argument is easily dispatched.    The District

Court’s decision to credit Davis’s testimony, even in the face of

contrary testimony from Bullock, is “entitled to substantial

deference.”  United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2015).  It

was reasonable not to believe the testimony from Bullock, who had

cause to lie about having received guns from Young.  Indeed, Young

himself suggests elsewhere in his brief that Bullock’s testimony was

not credible.    We have no reason to disturb the District Court’s

credibility determination.6   

Young’s second argument is no more convincing than his first.  

The District Court specifically found that Young unlawfully sold a

large number of unusually dangerous weapons—AK‐47s and TEC‐

9s—to people he knew to be drug dealers.    That is sufficient to

support an inference that he had reason to believe the guns would

be used in connection with other felonies.  See United States v. Martin,

78 F.3d 808, 811–12 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming application of

enhancement based on defendant’s sale of a large number of easily

concealable handguns in “unusual circumstances”).

 

6 Young raises the same clear‐error argument in connection with his

challenges to application of the obstruction enhancement and non‐application of

the acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment.  Because the District Court’s rulings

concerning those adjustments turned on the same credibility determinations

discussed above, we also reject Young’s clear‐error argument in those contexts.

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Young’s final argument, however, has merit.    He contends

that applying the other‐felony‐offense enhancement constituted

impermissible “double‐counting” because the District Court also

applied a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for

“trafficking” in firearms.  He is correct.7

 

7 Our concurring colleague suggests that an “obstacle” stands in the way

of our reviewing Young’s double‐counting argument: “Young never advanced

this analysis on appeal or before the District Court, and the Government has had

no opportunity to rebut it.”  Concurring Op. 3.   

We think that Young has adequately presented his double‐counting

argument on appeal.    See, e.g., Defendant’s Br. 32 (arguing that application of

both §§ 2K2.1(b)(5) and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on defendant’s transfer of “several

guns to individuals who he had reason to believe would use them unlawfully      

. . . . amounts to impermissible double counting”); Defendant’s Reply Br. 7

(relying on United States v. Johns, 732 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2013), in which the

Seventh Circuit interpreted Application Note 13(D) to § 2K2.1 to hold that

application of both enhancements constituted improper double‐counting).   We

can agree with the concurrence that this argument might have been advanced

somewhat more cogently; just the same, we are not at liberty to ignore it.

As for our concurring colleague’s observation that Young does not

appear to have advanced this analysis below, we do not disagree.    We have

found nothing in the record indicating that Young argued double‐counting

before the District Court.  The government, for its part, does not say whether he

did or did not, because the government does not respond to Young’s double‐

counting argument at all.    Accordingly, even if Young did not present this

argument below, the government has “waived waiver.”    See United States v.

Quiroz, 22 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Of course, this is an imperfect state of affairs: neither party (it appears)

argued this issue before the District Court, and only one of them has argued it

here.    We benefit greatly when, as typically occurs, questions are passed on

below and fully aired on appeal.    But the government’s failure to brief either

forfeiture or double‐counting, though it makes our task more difficult, does not

relieve us of our duty to perform it.

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Simple “double‐counting”—applying more than one

Guidelines enhancement based on the same conduct—is

unobjectionable, and indeed commonplace.  United States v. Maloney,

406 F.3d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2005).    But double‐counting is

impermissible if the Guidelines instruct against it.    Id.; see United

States v. Morris, 350 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting double‐

counting argument because the defendant “offered nothing in the

Sentencing Guidelines or relevant statutes reflecting an intent to

preclude the double counting the District Court employed”).   

We conclude that the relevant Guidelines provisions and

Application Notes indicate that the Sentencing Commission

intended to preclude application of the other‐felony‐offense

enhancement in the circumstances of this case.   When a defendant

receives a sentencing enhancement for “trafficking” in firearms

under § 2K2.1(b)(5), Application Note 13(D) to § 2K2.1 prohibits

imposition of an enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on the

defendant’s transfer of a firearm with reason to believe it will be

used in another felony offense.

We begin with the text of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).  The other‐felony‐

offense enhancement applies if a defendant “used or possessed any

firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or

possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with

knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or

possessed in connection with another felony offense.”  2013 U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).  The provision thus consists of two clauses, each of

which describes a different set of circumstances.  The first clause—

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the in‐connection‐with clause—concerns defendants who use or

possess firearms in connection with another felony offense.    The

second—the reason‐to‐believe clause—concerns defendants who

possess firearms, or transfer them to others, with knowledge, intent,

or    reason to believe that they will be used or possessed in

connection with another felony offense.    The District Court

concluded that this second clause applied to Young’s conduct: it

found that he had knowledge, intent, and reason to believe that the

weapons he transferred would be used in connection with other

felonies (i.e., drug trafficking).  

Young also received a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(5), which applies if “the defendant engaged in the

trafficking of firearms.”    2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).    Application

Note 13(A) to § 2K2.1 describes what is meant by “trafficking of

firearms,” explaining that the enhancement applies if a defendant:

(i) transported, transferred, or otherwise disposed of

two or more firearms to another individual, or

received two or more firearms with the intent to

transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of

firearms to another individual; and

(ii) knew or had reason to believe that such conduct

would result in the transport, transfer, or disposal

of a firearm to an individual—

(I) whose possession or receipt of the

firearm would be unlawful; or

(II) who intended to use or dispose of the

firearm unlawfully.

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Application Note 13(D) describes the interaction of the

“trafficking” enhancement with the other‐felony‐offense

enhancement.  It states that if the “trafficking” enhancement applies,

the other‐felony‐offense enhancement also applies “[i]f the

defendant used or transferred one of such firearms in connection with

another felony offense (i.e., an offense other than a firearms possession

or trafficking offense).”    2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, Application Note

13(D) (emphasis supplied).

   These provisions, read together, preclude application of the

other‐felony‐offense enhancement to Young.    The District Court

found that Young had knowledge, intent, and reason to believe that

the guns he transferred would be used in connection with other

felonies.  In the normal run of things, that is a valid reason to apply

the other‐felony‐offense enhancement.    But when the “trafficking”

enhancement also applies, as it does in this case, Application Note

13(D) limits the application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement

to those situations in which “the defendant used or transferred one

of such firearms in connection with another felony offense,”

incorporating language from the in‐connection‐with clause set forth

in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (emphasis supplied).    See note 2, ante.    No

mention is made of situations—like this one—in which the

defendant transferred a firearm not in connection with another felony

offense, but with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe it would later be

used in connection with another felony offense, which would have

incorporated language from the reason‐to‐believe clause set forth in

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).   

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The omission of such an application compels the conclusion

that the application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement is

limited to the situations specifically addressed in Application Note

13(D).  Put another way, by expressly mentioning one application of

the enhancement and conspicuously leaving out the other, the

Sentencing Commission said clearly—by negative implication, to be

sure, but clearly—that when the “trafficking” enhancement applies,

a sentence may be enhanced under the in‐connection‐with clause but

not under the reason‐to‐believe clause.    See VKK Corp. v. Nat’l

Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 130 & n.12 (2d Cir. 2001) (“To express

or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other . . . .”

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.

Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 770‐71 (2d Cir. 1996) (relying in part on the

canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius to hold that a Guidelines

provision stating that “[p]rior sentences . . . are to be counted in the

criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor

sentences where imprisonment was not imposed” implicitly excluded

from the criminal‐history computation uncounseled misdemeanor

sentences where imprisonment was imposed (emphasis in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Application Note’s text is,

in our view, very much the equivalent of that which the concurrence

concedes would prohibit double‐counting here: an “express[ ]

provi[sion] [stating] that an additional enhancement under §

2K2.1(b)(6) is permissible ‘only’ when trafficking occurs . . . in

connection with a felony.”    Concurring Op. 4.    Accordingly, we

conclude that transferring a firearm with knowledge, intent, or

reason to believe it will be used in connection with another felony

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cannot support an enhancement in a case where the “trafficking”

enhancement also applies.

As is clear from the analysis above, however, transferring a

firearm in connection with another felony offense can support a        

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement in “trafficking” cases.    One might

argue (particularly in view of the broad definition of “in connection

with” set out in Application Note 14(A)) that transferring a firearm

with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe it will be used in

connection with another felony, without more, can be characterized

as transferring a firearm in connection with that other felony.  But it is

not plausible to read § 2K1.1 in that fashion.    If the phrase “in

connection with another felony offense” in Application Note 13(D)

includes the concept of transferring a firearm with knowledge,

intent, or reason to believe it will be used in connection with another

felony offense, the phrase presumably embraces the same concept

where it is used in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).   Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508

U.S. 248, 260 (1993) (identical language appearing in two places in

the same statute should be given the same meaning in each

instance); United States v. Potes‐Castillo, 638 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.

2011) (ordinary principles of statutory construction apply to

Guidelines provisions and their explanatory commentary).    But if

that is so, the second, reason‐to‐believe clause in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

does no work at all.    The Sentencing Commission could have

reached the same substantive result by stopping after the first, in‐

connection‐with clause.    We accordingly reject this reading of the

provision.    See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir.

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2012) (“[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all

its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,

void or insignificant.”).

Our construction of § 2K2.1 yields a sensible result in light of

the Sentencing Commission’s apparent concern (in this particular

instance) with double‐counting.    The “trafficking” enhancement

applies in situations (among others) in which a defendant transfers

two or more firearms to another person with reason to believe that

that person intends to use the firearms unlawfully.    2013 U.S.S.G.     

§ 2K2.1, Application Note 13(A).    But for Application Note 13(D),

such conduct would also support application of the other‐felony‐

offense enhancement pursuant to the reason‐to‐believe clause,

provided the transferee intended to use the firearms not just

unlawfully but in connection with another felony.    Thus,

Application Note 13(D) avoids the simultaneous application of two

provisions likely in many circumstances to punish the same

behavior.8

 

8 We acknowledge, as the concurrence emphasizes, that Application Note

13(D) is not perfectly tailored to address all double‐counting concerns that might

arise through application of the provisions in question.  Plainly, the “trafficking”

enhancement and § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s reason‐to‐believe clause are not coextensive

in the conduct to which they apply; the latter applies when a person “possesse[s]

or transfer[s] any firearm . . . with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it

[will] be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense,” 2013

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (emphasis supplied), whereas the former can be

triggered by transfer of a firearm with reason to believe it will be possessed, used

or disposed of merely unlawfully.  And Application Note 13(D) appears to permit

imposition of a “trafficking” enhancement in cases where the defendant also

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In sum, we conclude that application of the other‐felony‐

offense enhancement to Young constituted impermissible double‐

counting.    Accordingly, the District Court erred in imposing the

enhancement, and we must vacate and remand for resentencing.9

III. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (Obstruction of Justice Enhancement)

Young next argues that the District Court erred in applying an

enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  We

agree.

Section 3C1.1 provides for a two‐level enhancement if “(1) the

defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct

or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the . . .

sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the

obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of

conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related

 

receives an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A)—which provides for a

four‐level increase if the defendant “possesse[s] or transfer[s] any firearm or

ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it [will] be

transported out of the United States”—even though conduct supporting a §

2K2.1(b)(6)(A) enhancement might often support a “trafficking” enhancement as

well.    But even if imperfectly tailored, Application Note 13(D) appears

reasonably calculated to address a legitimate concern about double‐counting and

produces a sensible result in furtherance of that end.  This buttresses our reading

of the Guidelines’ text.

9 Though it is not clear to us that the record would support application of

the enhancement on the ground that Young “used or possessed a[ ] firearm . . . in

connection with another felony,” we do not foreclose the possibility that on

remand the District Court could make such a finding.

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offense.”    2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.    Covered conduct includes

“providing materially false information to a probation officer in

respect to a presentence . . . investigation.”    2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,

Application Note 4(H).   It is “essential” that a court applying this

enhancement make “a finding that the defendant had the specific

intent to obstruct justice, i.e., that the defendant consciously acted

with the purpose of obstructing justice.”  United States v. Brown, 321

F.3d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is

not sufficient merely to find that the defendant made materially

false statements concerning his offense conduct.    United States v.

Bradbury, 189 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1999).

Here, the District Court found that Young made two

materially false statements to the probation officer: that he did not

know he was selling guns to drug dealers, and that he did not traffic

in guns before meeting Davis.    On this basis it imposed the

enhancement.  The government specifically requested that the Court

enter a finding that in making those false statements, Young “had

the intent to obstruct justice.”  App. 358.  Judge Geraci replied that

there was no need to “articulate [Young’s] motivation” in speaking

falsely—only to find that the statements “were materially false.”  

App. 359.  But there was such a need: material falsity is not enough

to support application of the enhancement.    Bradbury, 189 F.3d at

205.

The government argues that a finding of specific intent to

obstruct justice is not necessary when a “defendant has clearly lied

in a statement made under oath.”  United States v. Lincecum, 220 F.3d

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77, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  When the

clearly false statement was made under oath, the court need only

“point to the obvious lie and find that the defendant knowingly

made a false statement on a material matter.”  Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).    But here, the false statements the District Court

identified were not made under oath.   They were made during an

interview with a probation officer.    App. 356 (“[T]his Court finds

that there’s sufficient evidence that the defendant obstructed the

administration of justice by providing false statements to the

probation officer.”).    Accordingly, the rule of Lincecum does not

apply.

We do not mean to imply, of course, that the District Court

could not have found on this record that Young specifically

intended to obstruct justice, or that the District Court could not have

imposed the enhancement based on Young’s sworn testimony

without making such a finding.  But those determinations are for the

District Court in the first instance.    We leave them for its

consideration on remand.

IV. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility

Enhancement)

Even without making a finding that Young specifically

intended to obstruct justice, the District Court could reasonably have

concluded that he was not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance

of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  But in refusing to apply the

adjustment, the Court seems to have relied significantly, perhaps

exclusively, on Application Note 4 to § 3E1.1, which reads: “Conduct

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resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or

Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the

defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.  

There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments

under both [provisions] may apply.”    2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,

Application Note 4; see App. 356 (“Based upon the Court’s finding

that [Young] provided material[ly] false statement[s] to the

probation officer who was conducting the presentence investigation,

this is conduct that’s inconsistent with the defendant’s acceptance of

responsibility, and . . . the Court finds that there are no

extraordinary circumstances that would justify the defendant

receiving a three step reduction . . . .”).   

Thus, it appears that the District Court, having imposed the

obstruction enhancement, declined to adjust downward for

acceptance of responsibility because no “extraordinary”

circumstances justified the application of both adjustments.  In other

words, the Court’s ruling on the acceptance‐of‐responsibility

adjustment was premised on its ruling on the obstruction

enhancement.    The latter having been made in error, the former

must fall with it, and application of the acceptance‐of‐responsibility

adjustment considered on remand.    

V. Substantive Unreasonableness

Because we vacate Young’s sentence and remand for

resentencing on the basis of procedural error, we need not, and do

not, consider his substantive‐unreasonableness argument. See Tutty,

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612 F.3d at 131 (“Where there is procedural error, we may remand to

the district court for resentencing without proceeding to a

substantive review of the original sentence . . . .”).

CONCLUSION

In sum, we hold that there was no error in the District Court’s

decision not to expressly discuss and reject Young’s arguments for a

downward departure and a variance.    But we also hold that the

District Court’s application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement

(U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)) constituted impermissible double‐

counting clearly prohibited by the Guidelines, and that its rulings

concerning the obstruction enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1) and the

acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1) were not

supported by the necessary factual findings.    In light of these

holdings, we do not reach Young’s argument that his sentence was

substantively unreasonable.    We thus REMAND for resentencing

consistent with this opinion.

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