Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04880/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04880-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Comcast
Defendant
Leon Harrison
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEON HARRISON,

Plaintiff

v

COMCAST, et al,

Defendant. /

 No C-04-4880 VRW

 ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Leon Harrison has brought an action for

wrongful discharge and related torts against Comcast of

California/Colorado/Texas/Washington, Inc (Comcast). Doc #27, Ex

41 (Complaint). Comcast has moved for summary judgment on all

claims. Doc #21. For the reasons stated below, Comcast’s motion

for summary judgment is GRANTED.

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 1 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I

Harrison’s employment with Comcast began in March 1996. 

When he was terminated in May 2003, Harrison worked as an Advanced

Technician, a position covered by a collective bargaining agreement

(CBA) between Comcast and the Communications Workers of America,

AFL-CIO (union). Doc #26 (Perdue Decl) ¶4; id, Ex 1 (CBA). The

CBA was ratified in June 2002 and was in effect at all times

relevant to this case.

Comcast asserts that it terminated Harrison for

repeatedly violating the company’s tools and equipment policy. 

Perdue Decl, Ex 2-16. During the last three years of his

employment, Harrison allegedly lost a number of company items and

received various verbal and written warnings as a result. Id. 

Among the company items Harrison reportedly lost were radios, a

stealth tracker meter, an amp clamp, a pager, torque wrenches, a

gas cap from an assigned vehicle, a cell phone, and a set of system

maps. Id. Harrison also received warnings and disciplinary

actions for a range of misconduct, such as failure to follow outage

procedures and unsafe driving practices. Id, Ex 18-21. The final

incident, resulting in termination, occurred when Harrison

allegedly left company equipment worth $25,000 unattended in the

company parking lot overnight. Id, Ex 17. 

On June 11, 2003, Harrison filed a complaint with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH),

alleging that he had been wrongfully discharged after complaining

of race discrimination. Comcast RJN, Ex 47 (DFEH complaint). One

day later, DFEH issued Harrison a right-to-sue letter, informing

him that he could bring a civil action under the Fair Employment

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 2 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

and Housing Act (FEHA) against Comcast “within one year from the

date of [the] letter.” Id, Ex 48. The letter also instructed

Harrison that, in order to request a federal notice of right-tosue, he must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) “within 30 days of receipt of [the letter] or

within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is

earlier.” Id.

Harrison also filed a grievance with the union on June 6,

2003, under the procedures set forth by the CBA. Perdue Decl, Ex

22; Ex 1 at Art 8. Yet after advancing through the CBA’s four-step

process, the union declined to submit his grievance to arbitration. 

Doc #35 at 4. 

On January 26, 2004, Harrison sued Comcast in Alameda

county superior court with Melina J Burns as his counsel. Id, Ex

41. On February 25, 2004, Comcast removed the matter to this

court. Doc #1 of 04-0788. After Harrison and his attorney failed

to appear at a scheduled case management conference (CMC) on July

13, 2004, the court ordered Harrison to show cause why this case

should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to FRCP

41(b) and why the court should not award defendant expenses related

to the July 13, CMC. Doc #14 of 04-0788. Neither Harrison nor his

attorney ever responded to this order; hence, the court dismissed

the action on August 6, 2004, and ordered plaintiff to pay

defendant $665.00 in reasonable expenses incurred for the July 13,

CMC. Doc #17 of 04-0788.

On August 19, 2004, Harrison filed an identical complaint

against Comcast in Alameda county superior court and Comcast again

removed the case to this court on November 16, 2004. Doc #1. On

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 3 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

August 5, 2005, Harrison terminated his lawyer and elected to

represent himself. Doc #18. On September 26, 2005, Comcast moved

for summary judgment. Doc #21. Harrison initially did not file an

opposition but rather moved on December 1, 2005, to continue or

enlarge time to respond. Doc #30. 

On March 7, 2006, the court granted Harrison’s motion to

enlarge time, in light of the difficulties Harrison had with his

former counsel. Doc #34 at 2-3. Nevertheless, the order

emphasized that the court would not provide any further extensions

in this case. Id at 3. 

II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the nonmoving party. “[S]ummary judgment

will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’

that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v Liberty

Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. The burden

of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317,

322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting the claim

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 4 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v

Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). 

Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers

is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary

judgment. Thornhill Publishing Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730,

738 (9th Cir 1979). 

III

Harrison alleges seven claims against Comcast: (1) breach

of implied-in-fact promise not to terminate except for cause; (2)

breach of oral promise not to terminate except for cause; (3)

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4)

termination in violation of public policy; (5) retaliation; (6)

failure to investigate and (7) specific performance. Complaint at

2-6.

A

As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether

section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 USC §

185(a), preempts any of Harrison’s claims. If preempted, such

claims would be precluded by the Collective Bargaining Agreement’s

(CBA) finality provision, which provides that the union’s decision

not to submit a grievance to arbitration “automatically

constitute[s] a waiver of the grievance and bar[s] all further

action thereon.” CBA at Art 8C(2). 

It is undisputed that the union chose not to arbitrate

Harrison’s case. See Doc #35 at 4; Doc #37 at 5. This decision

constitutes the final disposition of Harrison’s grievance under the

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 5 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

CBA, and thereby triggers the finality provision. CBA at Art

8C(2); see also McNaughton v Dillingham Corp, 707 F2d 1042, 1046

(9th Cir 1983) (holding that the disposition of an employee's

grievance becomes final “at whatever stage of the grievance

procedure the union and employer resolve the grievance or terminate

further consideration of it”). 

Moreover, the lone exception to the CBA’s finality

provision does not apply here. To be exempt, Harrison must

demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair

representation. United Parcel Serv, Inc v Mitchell, 451 US 56, 61-

62 (1981). Harrison has never alleged, nor does the record

indicate, that the union wrongfully refused to arbitrate his

claims. Accordingly, Harrison cannot pursue any claims preempted

by the LMRA.

The LMRA does not, however, preempt every claim that

tangentially involves a provision of the CBA; rather, it only

preempts claims that “necessarily require[]” the court to interpret

an existing provision of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

for the resolution of the dispute. Cramer v Consol Freightways,

Inc, 255 F3d 683, 693 (9th Cir 2001); see also Lingle v Norge Div

of Magic Chef, 486 US 399, 405-06 (1988). Hence, for each claim,

the court must determine whether resolving it would require the

court to interpret the CBA between Harrison and Comcast.

//

//

//

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 6 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

B

Applying the standard set forth above, the court first

finds that the LMRA preempts, and the CBA’s finality provision

precludes, Harrison’s third and sixth causes of action: breach of

an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and failure to

investigate. 

Breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing is a tort designed to protect at-will employees with little

job security, as opposed to unionized employees protected by a

collective bargaining agreement. Jackson v Southern California Gas

Co, 881 F2d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir 1989). As a result, the Ninth

Circuit has consistently held that an implied covenant claim is

“preempted by section 301 when the employee has comparable job

security under a collective bargaining agreement.” Id; see also

Audette v International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,

Local 24, 195 F3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir 1999); Schlacter-Jones v

General Tel of Cal, 936 F2d 435, 440 (9th Cir 1991); Cook v Lindsay

Olive Growers, 911 F2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir 1990). Harrison was a

union employee covered by the CBA, which provided job security by

preventing termination except for just cause. CBA at Art 1. 

Accordingly, Harrison’s implied covenant claim is preempted by the

LMRA and precluded by the finality provision in the CBA. 

Harrison’s claim for “failure to investigate” is likewise

preempted by the LMRA and precluded by the CBA’s finality

provision. Harrison has not identified, and the court has not

found, an independent California cause of action for failing to

“exercise due care in investigating and substantiating allegations,

if any existed that [an individual] was an inadequate employee.” 

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 7 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Complaint ¶ 30. The court therefore concludes that Harrison’s

“failure to investigate” claim arises not from state law but from

the CBA provision that Comcast must conduct a “thorough

investigation of all facts and circumstances leading up to and/or

resulting in an employee’s * * * discharge.” CBA at Art 10B. 

Because the court cannot rule on this claim without interpreting

and applying this CBA provision, Harrison’s sixth cause of action

is preempted by the LMRA and precluded by the CBA’s finality

provision.

C

Harrison’s first and second claims — breach of an implied

contract not to terminate except for cause and breach of an oral

contract not to terminate except for cause — fail to identify

whether they rely on the CBA or on an implied or oral contract

between Harrison and Comcast. To the extent they rely on the CBA

provision that employees can be terminated only for cause, they are

preempted by the LMRA and precluded by the finality provision of

CBA. Perdue decl, Ex 1 at Art 10A.

Harrison could avoid preemption on these claims if he

provided evidence, other than the CBA, of an implied or oral

contract between him and Comcast. But Harrison fails to allege any

relevant factors in support of his implied contract claim, such as

"the personnel policies or practices of [Comcast], [Harrison’s]

longevity of service, actions or communications by [Comcast]

reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of

the industry in which [Comcast] is engaged." Foley v Interactive

Data Corp, 47 Cal 3d 654, 680 (1988) (citing Pugh v See's Candies,

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 8 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Inc, 116 Cal App 3d 311, 327 (1981)). Nor has Harrison alleged any

“explicit words by which the parties agreed that he would not be

terminated without good cause” to support his oral contract claim. 

Id at 675. 

Comcast has borne its burden at the summary judgment

stage by appropriately pointing out the lack of evidence in the

record supporting Harrison’s first two claims. Doc #21 at 16, 18;

Celotex, 477 US at 325 (1986) (holding that the burden on a party

moving for summary judgment may be discharged by “‘showing’ -- that

is, pointing out to the district court -- that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case”). Because

Harrison has failed to put forward any evidence supporting his

implied contract and oral contract claims, summary judgment for

Comcast is appropriate. 

D

Harrison’s fourth claim alleges that Comcast terminated

him in violation of public policy. Under California law, to

establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy, a plaintiff must prove that “his dismissal violated

a policy that is (1) fundamental, (2) beneficial for the public,

and (3) embodied in a statute or constitutional provision.” Turner

v Anheuser-Busch, Inc, 7 Cal 4th 1238, 1256 (1994) (internal

citation omitted). None of these issues requires interpreting the

CBA. Accordingly, the court is able to rely on state law to rule

on this claim.

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 9 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

1

As a matter of state law, Harrison’s claim of termination

in violation of public policy does not raise a genuine factual

dispute. A plaintiff’s claim of wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy “largely unaccompanied by citations to specific

statutory or constitutional provisions, puts * * * the court in the

position of having to guess at the nature of the public policies

involved, if any. This kind of showing is plainly insufficient to

create an issue of material fact justifying a trial on the merits.” 

(emphasis original). Turner, 7 Cal 4th at 1257; see also Green v

Ralee Engineering Co, 19 Cal 4th 66, 83 (1998); Green v Par Pools,

Inc, 111 Cal App 4th 620, 633 (2003).

Harrison was represented by counsel when his complaint

was filed. And yet his complaint does not identify any specific

statutory or constitutional provision that would be undermined by

his termination. Although Harrison alleges that his termination is

against “the public policy prohibiting retaliatory termination for

exercising an employee’s legal rights,” he fails to identify what

those legal rights are. Complaint ¶ 22. Under Turner, this

allegation is not sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute. 7

Cal 4th at 1257.

Notwithstanding the complaint’s deficiencies, Harrison

elsewhere appears to argue that he was discharged because of his

race. The complaint Harrison filed with the DFEH alleged that he

was terminated one day after he complained of race discrimination. 

Jud Notice, Ex 47 (DFEH Complaint). Moreover, in the complaint

before this court, Harrison alleges he received verbal threats in

response to a remark he made regarding race discrimination. 

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 10 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Complaint ¶4. When deposed, Harrison said he could not recall

making such a remark, but did insist that he had been terminated

because of his race. Doc #24, Koepf decl, Ex 34 at 95-96. 

California’s public policy clearly prohibits workplace

discrimination based on race. See Cal Govt Code § 12920. Yet,

even if Harrison is assumed to have alleged racial discrimination

as a basis of his violation of public policy claim, he fails to

provide any factual support for this claim. Comcast again directs

the court’s attention to the lack of support for Harrison’s

discriminatory discharge claim. Doc #21 at 19. 

Further, Comcast offers an alternative explanation for

Harrison’s termination: he was habitually irresponsible. This

basis for termination is supported by Harrison’s colorful history

of misconduct and discipline. Perdue Decl, Ex 2-21. The record

indicates, and Harrison does not dispute, that during his tenure

with Comcast, Harrison lost a number of company-issued tools. As a

result, Comcast warned and disciplined Harrison on a number of

occasions — at least twelve verbal and written warnings and two

suspensions. Doc #25, Escalante Decl ¶4. But the last straw for

Harrison came when he left expensive electronic equipment

unattended in an unsecured parking lot overnight. Id, Ex 17. 

Although Harrison implies that he was not responsible, Comcast

provides evidence undisputed by any evidence Harrison presents to

the contrary. Comcast has established that (1) Harrison regularly

used the equipment, Escalante Decl ¶7, (2) the equipment was found

“near company vehicles assigned to Harrison” and another employee,

Id ¶8, and (3) the serial numbers of the equipment matched the

“serial numbers on the items that previously had been assigned to

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 11 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Harrison,” Id ¶11. Moreover, Comcast has provided the court with

time-stamped frames from the security camera where Harrison worked. 

Doc #22, Ex 33. These images show Harrison taking the equipment

out of the warehouse on the day in question, and then returning

empty-handed. Id.

Harrison does not contest this laundry list of misconduct

except to say that a “[f]raud was intentionally perpetrated” on

him. Doc #35 at 3. To support this theory, Harrison points to the

time stamps from the security camera, which are one hour earlier

than Harrison’s scheduled work day. Id. But, as Comcast explained

in its opening brief, this error was due to daylight savings time –

an explanation the court finds undisputed by Harrison’s puzzling

theory of fraud. Doc #21 at 7 n2. 

Accordingly, because Harrison fails to provide any

evidence that he was terminated because of his race, his claim for

violation of public policy does not raise a genuine factual

dispute. 

2

For Harrison’s fifth claim, retaliation, the cause of

action is provided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended (Title VII), 42 USCS § 2000e et seq, or under the FEHA,

Cal Gov Code § 12900 et seq. To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under either statute, a plaintiff must show (1) that he

engaged in an activity protected by the statute, (2) that he was

thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by his employer,

and (3) that there was a causal link between the two. Hernandez v

Spacelabs Med, Inc, 343 F3d 1107 (9th Cir 2003); Soldinger v

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 12 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Northwest Airlines, Inc, 51 Cal App 4th 345 (1996). To resolve

this claim, the court need not interpret the CBA. Hence,

Harrison’s retaliation claim is not preempted by the LMRA.

Yet Harrison’s retaliation claim raises no genuine

factual dispute, whether based on Title VII or the FEHA. Title VII

provides that a plaintiff who has already filed a complaint with a

state agency can pursue his federal retaliation claim under Title

VII by filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) within three-hundred days of the alleged

discriminatory act. 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1). But Harrison does not

allege, and the record does not indicate, that he filed a complaint

with the EEOC at all, let alone within the strict time requirement. 

Hence, Harrison’s retaliation cannot arise under Title VII.

Harrison also cannot proceed under the FEHA because his

claim is untimely. The FEHA provides that a plaintiff must bring a

suit within one year from the date on which the DFEH issues a

right-to-sue notice. Cal Gov Code § 12965(b). Harrison was issued

the right-to-sue notice on June 12, 2003. Jud Notice, Ex 48. Yet

Harrison filed the current action on August 19, 2004, over one year

after his receipt of the right-to-sue notice from the DFEH. 

The only way Harrison’s retaliation claim can avoid being

time-barred is if the statute of limitations equitably tolled

during the pendency of Harrison’s first action. But under

California’s tolling rules, in the absence of a statute, the

limitations period is not equitably tolled during the pendency of a

case that is later dismissed without prejudice based on a

plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. Wood v Elling Corp, 20 Cal 3d

353, 359 (1977) (citing 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 311

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 13 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

at 813); see also Thomas v Gilliland, 95 Cal App 4th 427, 433

(2002). The court dismissed Harrison’s first action because

Harrison had failed to appear at the scheduled case management

conference and had failed to respond to this court’s order to show

the cause of the absence. Jud Notice, Ex 43. Because Harrison’s

first action was dismissed based on his failure to prosecute,

equitable tolling does not apply to this case.

Harrison appears to attribute his failure to prosecute to

his “horrible misfortune of retaining The Lawyer From Hell.” Doc

#35 at 6. But “attorney neglect does not satisfy the standard of

reasonableness and special circumstances required by California's

equitable tolling doctrine.” Bonifield v County of Nevada, 94 Cal

App 4th 298, 306 (2001). Accordingly, Harrison’s state retaliation

claim under the FEHA is time-barred.

E

Finally, the court notes that Harrison’s seventh “claim”

for “specific performance” states a remedy, not a cause of action. 

See, e g, Harara v ConocoPhillips Co, 377 F Supp 2d 779, 796 (ND

Cal 2005) (“Specific performance is a form of contractual relief,

not an independent claim.”) (citing 5 Witkin, California Procedure,

Pleading § 740 (4th ed 1997)). Because summary judgment is

appropriate on the other claims Harrison alleges, he retains no

independent basis to obtain specific performance. Accordingly,

summary judgment is also appropriate on this “claim.”

//

//

//

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

//

IV

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Comcast’s

motion for summary judgment. The clerk is DIRECTED to close the

file and terminate all pending motions.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:04-cv-04880-VRW Document 38 Filed 09/25/06 Page 15 of 15