Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cr-00764/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cr-00764-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Herrera-Santos
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JUAN HERRERA-SANTOS,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-00764 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

On April 18, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss the

indictment. Having considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby

DENIES defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2007, a grand jury returned an indictment against defendant Juan HerreraSantos, charging him with reentry after deportation from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1326. The government indicated in the face sheet attached to the indictment that defendant faced a

maximum prison term of 20 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1326(b), rather than a two-year maximum

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a), presumably because defendant had been deported subsequent to having

pled guilty on April 13, 2000, to a violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11351.5, an

aggravated felony. The indictment alleged that defendant had been removed from the United States on

October 3, 2001, September 7, 2002, April 9, 2003, April 22, 2005, July 1, 2005, November 30, 2005,

November 28, 2006, and February 22, 2007, but did not allege that he had been convicted of an

aggravated felony or that any of his removals occurred subsequent to his aggravated felony conviction.

Case 3:07-cr-00764-SI Document 29 Filed 04/21/08 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Currently before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that his indictment must be dismissed because, although it alleges the dates

of his removals, it does not allege the date of his prior conviction and thus does not allege the temporal

relationship between his conviction and subsequent removals. Defendant argues that this missing

information violates the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), and United States v. Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court disagrees.

“Under Apprendi and its progeny, ‘[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary

to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or

a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005)). In addition, a fact other than a prior conviction must be charged in

the indictment. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002). In the context of a conviction for

reentry after removal, the Apprendi rule means that if a defendant faces a sentence beyond the two-year

statutory maximum set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a) because the defendant was removed subsequent to

certain convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1326(b), a jury must find – or a defendant must admit – that

the defendant was removed on a date that was subsequent to the relevant § 1326(b) conviction. SalazarLopez, 506 F.3d at 752. This fact also must be alleged in the indictment. Id. The question presented

by defendant’s motion is whether it is sufficient for the indictment to allege only the date of a prior

removal, or if instead the indictment must allege the date of removal and that this removal occurred

subsequent to the relevant prior conviction. Another way of stating this question is whether the Ninth

Circuit in Salazar-Lopez meant to require the government to allege both the date of removal and that

this removal occurred after a qualifying conviction, the position urged by defendant, or meant to require

the government to allege only the date of removal, the position urged by the government. For the

following reasons, the Court determines that the Ninth Circuit created a disjunctive rule, not a

Case 3:07-cr-00764-SI Document 29 Filed 04/21/08 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

conjunctive rule, and that there is no barrier to a court taking note of the date of a qualifying conviction

when it finds as a fact that a defendant has a prior qualifying conviction.

Defendant’s argument relies on the framing of the question presented by the Salazar-Lopez

panel, which explained that

we must resolve whether the dates of a previous felony conviction and of a previous

removal from the United States, subsequent to that conviction, must be alleged in the

indictment and proved to a jury for the defendant to be subject to an increased sentence

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). We answer that question in the affirmative.

Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d at 749-50 (emphasis added). While this language strongly suggests that an

indictment must allege both the date of a previous removal and the date of a previous felony conviction,

the remainder of the opinion clarifies that defendant’s argument hinges on the inartful drafting of the

question presented. The opinion concludes that “the date of the removal, or at least the fact that SalazarLopez had been removed after his conviction, should have been alleged in the indictment and proved

to the jury. The failure to do so was an Apprendi error.” Id. at 752. This language clarifies not only

that the date of removal alone is sufficient to satisfy Apprendi, see id. (“the date of the removal . . .

should have been alleged in the indictment . . .”), but also that the Salazar-Lopez court viewed as a

lesser, but still acceptable, alternative the inclusion of an allegation that the removal had occurred after

a qualifying conviction, see id. (“or at least the fact that Salazar-Lopez had been removed after his

conviction” (first emphasis added)). 

This reading of the Ninth Circuit’s intent is confirmed by the court’s analysis leading up to this

conclusion. The court explained that the case was similar to the case of Covian-Sandoval, in which the

Ninth Circuit held that although the fact of a prior conviction need not have been found by the jury, the

jury should have been required to find the date of a prior removal. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d at 1096-

98. The Salazar-Lopez court held that the same error had occurred because “the jury was presented with

evidence of two removals, one which preceded Salazar-Lopez’s felony conviction and one which

followed, and was never asked to find that the later removal had indeed occurred.” Salazar-Lopez, 506

F.3d at 751. Thus, the problem presented by Salazar-Lopez’s conviction was that the jury could have

made a finding only as to his first removal, and not his second. Id. This was the crux of the problem

Case 3:07-cr-00764-SI Document 29 Filed 04/21/08 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Defendant points to two district court cases from the Eastern District of Washington, one of

which interpreted Salazar-Lopez as creating a disjunctive rule, United States v. Salinas-Ruiz, 2008 WL

506054 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 20, 2008), and one of which interpreted it as creating a conjunctive rule,

United States v. Ramos-Tadeo, 2008 WL 444557 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2008). These cases, and the split

in the Eastern District of Washington, demonstrate that reasonable minds can certainly differ over the

meaning of Salazar-Lopez, but do not alter the Court’s decision here. 

4

faced by the Salazar-Lopez court, leading it to the solution of requiring the jury to find – and the

indictment to allege – the date of removal. Moreover, in discussing the Covian-Sandoval holding, the

court explained that “an Apprendi error had occurred where the date of a prior removal (necessary to

determine whether the removal had followed the conviction in time) was not admitted by the defendant

or found by a jury.” Id. This language also suggests that the jury’s finding of a prior removal date is

all that is required for a court to determine, at sentencing, that the removal had been subsequent to a

qualifying conviction.

Since the issuance of the Salazar-Lopez opinion, at least two other Ninth Circuit panels have

affirmed this interpretation of Salazar-Lopez.

1

 In United States v. Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104 (9th

Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “[u]nder Salazar-Lopez . . . the indictment must allege . . .

either the date of the prior removal or that it occurred after a qualifying prior conviction,” id. at 1111

(citing Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d at 752). Similarly, in United States v. Ledesma-Aceves, 2008 WL

162956 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2008), the defendant raised a challenge similar, if not identical, to that raised

by defendant here. There, as here, the indictment had alleged the prior dates of removal. Id. at *1. In

addition, unlike the present case, the defendant had admitted these dates in his Rule 11 hearing. Id. 

The court ruled that this satisfied Apprendi and Salazar-Lopez because “it is sufficient if the date of

removal is alleged in the indictment and admitted by the defendant or found by the jury.” Id. (citing

Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d at 751-55). Although this unpublished opinion may not be cited as precedent,

the panel’s interpretation of Salazar-Lopez provides guidance to this Court in resolving a nearlyidentical issue. For these reasons, the Court finds that defendant’s indictment, which alleged the dates

Case 3:07-cr-00764-SI Document 29 Filed 04/21/08 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

At oral argument, defendant suggested that requiring the U.S. Attorney’s office to research the

dates of relevant prior convictions – and their temporal relationship to the dates of removals – prior to

seeking indictments would have a real-world impact on defendants who were not removed subsequent

to a qualifying conviction. Although additional information certainly may be useful, this is a policy

matter that must be addressed in a different forum. 

5

of his prior removals, does not violate his Sixth Amendment rights.2

If this case proceeds to the sentencing stage, either the jury will have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant was removed on one or more of the dates alleged, or defendant will have admitted

those facts. The Court, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, may then make a factual finding whether

defendant had a qualifying prior conviction. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. Defendant has presented no

support for his contention that the Court may not, in finding the fact of a prior conviction, also recognize

the inextricably-intertwined fact of the date the prior conviction occurred. If this date is prior to the date

of removal found by the jury or admitted by defendant, the Court may sentence defendant to a prison

term exceeding the two-year statutory maximum of 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a). A date of conviction, like the

fact of conviction itself, is not a fact that must be tested by the jury; it will be readily apparent to the

judge who is also finding the fact of a prior conviction. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that

when a court finds the fact of a prior conviction, it may also find the fact that the conviction occurred

on a given date that was prior to the date of removal. United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020,

1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he recidivism exception to Apprendi’s holding is not, contrary to Castillo’s

suggestion, somehow inapplicable to an aggravated felony enhancement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 because

removal must have been subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction.”). The motion to dismiss is

DENIED [Docket No. 24]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cr-00764-SI Document 29 Filed 04/21/08 Page 5 of 5