Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56104/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56104-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Adams
Appellee
Burr
Appellee
Edgar Clark
Appellee
Adonai El-Shaddai
Appellant
P. Finander
Appellee
J. Fitter
Appellee
Teresa Macias
Appellee
C. McCabe
Appellee
Nguyen
Appellee
W. Olukamni
Appellee
P. Pak

Ruff
Appellee
P. Shank
Appellee
Glenn Thiel
Appellee
Jeffery Wang
Appellee
C. Wu

L. D. Zamora

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADONAI EL-SHADDAI, AKA

James R. Wilkerson,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

L. D. ZAMORA, Chief

CCHCS in individual

capacity and official

capacity; P. PAK, MD in

individual capacity and

official capacity, C. WU, MD

Physician and Surgeon in

individual capacity and

official capacity,

Defendants,

and

JEFFERY WANG, MD Chief

Medical Executive in

individual capacity and

official capacity, TERESA

MACIAS, Chief Executive

Officer in individual capacity

and official capacity; GLENN

THIEL, DO PHD in individual

capacity and official

capacity; C. MCCABE, MD in

No. 13-56104

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-02327-UA-JC

OPINION

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2 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

individual capacity and

official capacity; NGUYEN,

MD in individual capacity

and official capacity; EDGAR

CLARK, MD Secretary Pain

Committee in individual

capacity and official

capacity; RUFF, PHD

Psychologist in individual

capacity and official

capacity; BURR, Physical

Therapist in individual

capacity and official

capacity; A. ADAMS, MD

Chief Physician and Surgeon

in individual capacity and

official capacity; P. SHANK,

Chief Executive Officer in

individual capacity and

official capacity; P.

FINANDER, MD Chief

Medical Executive in

individual capacity and

official capacity; J. FITTER,

MD in individual capacity

and official capacity; W.

OLUKAMNI, Physician

Assistant in individual

capacity and official

capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 3

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. King, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 4, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed August 12, 2016

Before: JEROME FARRIS, CARLOS T. BEA,

and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a

prisoner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis after the

district court found that the “three-strikes” rule in the Prison

Litigation Reform Act prohibited the prisoner from

proceeding in forma pauperis because he had brought at least

three actions that were “dismissed on the grounds that [they

were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The panel held that of the eleven potential strikes that the

district court may have relied upon in finding the prisoner

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

ineligible for in forma pauperis status, only one was a valid

strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Therefore, the

panel remanded for the district court to assess whether the

prisoner was otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.

In assessing whether the prior dismissals qualified as

strikes, the panel held that: (1) in an action where in forma

pauperis status is denied solely on the ground that the

plaintiff has accumulated too many strikes, and there has

been no additional finding that the action is itself frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim, the denial of in forma

pauperis status and subsequent dismissal of the case do not

count as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g); (2) the district

court’s prior dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, as required under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, did not count as a strike because the

failure to exhaust was not clear from the face of the

complaint, and the district court made no finding that the

complaint was frivolous or malicious; (3) the prior summaryjudgment dismissals did not count as strikes because they

were not decided on the ground that the complaint was

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, but rather were

decided on evidentiary grounds; (4) an appellate affirmance

does not count as separate strikes unless the court expressly

states that the appeal itself was frivolous, malicious or failed

to state a claim; and (5) actions brought pursuant to § 1983

which challenge the fact or duration of a prisoner’s sentence

and should be construed as habeas petitions, do not count as

strikes.

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 5

COUNSEL

Michael Shipley (argued), Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Misha D. Igra (argued) and Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising

Deputy Attorneys General; Jonathan L. Wolff, Senior

Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney

General; Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento,

California; for Defendant-Appellee Jeffery Wang.

No appearance for Defendants-Appellees L. D. Zamora, P.

Pak, C. Wu, Teresa Macias, Glenn Thiel, C. McCabe,

Nguyen, Edgar Clark, Ruff, Burr, A. Adams, P. Shank, P.

Finander, J. Fitter, and W. Olukamni.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

While incarcerated in California, Adonai El-Shaddai

(previously known as James Wilkerson), filed at least eleven

lawsuits against prison officials prior to filing this case. On

appeal, we must decide whether these previous cases amount

to at least three “strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act of 1995 (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), such that ElShaddai is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis(IFP) in

this and future cases. Because we conclude that only one of

the prior actions was “dismissed on the grounds that it [was]

frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim,” id., we hold

that El-Shaddai has not incurred three strikes, and we reverse

the contrary decision of the district court.

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6 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

El-Shaddai is a prisoner incarcerated in California. In

1976, before his incarceration, he was injured in a car

accident. As a result of his accident, El-Shaddai suffers from

chronic back pain and related health issues. Since at least

2007, he has received a variety of accommodations for his

conditions, including a bottom bunk, a back brace, orthopedic

shoes, special bedding, and lifting restrictions.

In April 2011, El-Shaddai requested that the prison begin

treating his pain with medical marijuana, glucosamine

chondroitin, and Osteo Bi-Flex, consistent with his religious

belief in African Holistic Healing. His request was denied,

and his bottom-bunk accommodation was also revoked. ElShaddai brought suit against prison officials, claiming

deliberate indifference to his medical needs because they

failed to grant his requested course of medical treatment and

revoked his accommodation.

El-Shaddai submitted his complaint in this case in

conjunction with a request to proceed IFP. The district court

denied the motion, concluding that the “three-strikes” rule in

the PLRA prohibited El-Shaddai from proceeding IFP

because he had brought at least three actions that were

“dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous,

malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The district court cited two

cases that it categorized as strikes under the PLRA, and noted

that one of those cases, Wilkerson v. Prunty, Civ. No. 96-

1222B (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1997) (Prunty I) listed several

other strikes. The district court also found that El-Shaddai had

not shown that he was entitled to the “imminent danger”

exception to the three-strikes rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 7

In response to El-Shaddai’s motion for reconsideration, the

district court explicitly found three additional cases to be

strikes. Counting all of the cases cited in the district court’s

two orders, as well as all of the cases identified as strikes in

Prunty I, there are eleven potential strikes that the district

court may have relied on in finding El-Shaddai ineligible for

IFP status. El-Shaddai timely appealed the denial of his

motion for reconsideration.1

ANALYSIS

The PLRA provides that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner

bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or

proceeding [in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or

more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “Not all

1 Although El-Shaddai’s notice of appeal stated that he was appealing

only the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration, we

construe the appeal to encompass the district court’s original order

denying IFP status. “[T]he rule is well settled that a mistake in designating

the judgment appealed from should not result in loss of the appeal as long

as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from

the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake.” Munoz v. Small

Bus. Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, El-Shaddai filed

the notice of appeal pro se, his motion for reconsideration fairly referenced

the district court’s order denying IFP status and the reasons for that

decision, an appeal from the district court’s order denying IFP status

would have been timely, and both parties have fully briefed the merits of

the district court’s order which denied IFP status. As a result, we do not

restrict our analysis to the district court’s order which denied El-Shaddai’s

motion for reconsideration. See id.

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8 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g).

Rather, § 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP

status only when, after careful evaluation of the order

dismissing an action, and other relevant information, the

district court determines that the action was dismissed

because it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005).

As a general matter, when we review a dismissal to

determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the

central question is whether the dismissal “rang the PLRA

bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.”

Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013); see also

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121; Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117,

126 (3d Cir. 2013); Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,

492 F.3d 428, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

El-Shaddai concedes that he has one strike. In Popke, the

district court dismissed the case on the grounds that ElShaddai failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This appeal addresses whether the ten other cases

were dismissed on one of the grounds enumerated in the

statute. Those cases were disposed of on several different

procedural postures: through denials of motions to proceed

IFP, rulings that El-Shaddai had failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, grants of summary judgment in

favor of the defendants, appellate affirmances, and dismissals

for filing actions that should have been brought as habeas

petitions. We address each category of dismissal in turn.

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 9

I. Denial of IFP Status

In four of the cases that are potential strikes, El-Shaddai

was denied IFP status on the basis that he had already

accumulated three strikes. After he failed to pay the required

filing fee, the cases were dismissed. We hold that this ground

for dismissal does not count as a strike. Where a dismissal is

based solely on a finding that the plaintiff has previously

incurred at least three strikes, without any additional finding

that the instant action is itself frivolous, malicious, or fails to

state a claim, the dismissal does not count as an additional

strike. This is so because having incurred three strikes,

standing alone, is not an enumerated ground for creating an

additional strike under the language of § 1915(g).

We have previously held that “when a district court

disposes of an in forma pauperis complaint ‘on the grounds

that [the claim] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted,’ such a complaint is

‘dismissed’ for purposes of § 1915(g) even if the district

court styles such dismissal as denial of the prisoner’s

application to file the action without prepayment of the full

filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir.

2008) (alteration in original). Thus, a dismissal predicated on

a denial of IFP status may be strike-worthy. Id. But that does

not mean that all dismissals predicated on denials of IFP

status are strikes; to constitute a strike, the denial of IFP

status must be based on one of the enumerated grounds in the

statute. Where IFP status is denied solely on the ground that

the plaintiff has accumulated too many strikes, the denial of

IFP status and subsequent dismissal of the case do not count

as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g). Rather, denying IFP

status simply because the plaintiff has too many strikes is

unrelated to whether the action before the court is frivolous,

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10 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

malicious, or fails to state a claim. That is because the threestrikes rule applies regardless of whether the plaintiff’s

current claim is well-pleaded or brought in good faith. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a

prisoner” proceed IFP if he has incurred three or more strikes,

unless he meets the “imminent danger” exception (emphasis

added)).

Four of the dismissals that the district court identified as

strikes against El-Shaddai follow this fact pattern. In Prunty

I, the district court dismissed El-Shaddai’s case on two

alternative grounds,2one of which was that “Plaintiff is a

vexatious litigant not entitled to in forma pauperis status

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” The district court did not

rule that Prunty I itself was frivolous, malicious or failed to

state a claim.

El-Shaddai appealed from Prunty I in Wilkerson v.

Prunty, No. 98-55154 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 1998) (Prunty II). We

denied IFP status on appeal, concluding that “the record

confirms that appellant is not entitled to in forma pauperis

status for this appeal. . . . Failure to pay the [filing] fees will

result in the automatic dismissal of the appeal by the Clerk

for failure to prosecute.” El-Shaddai failed to pay, and the

appeal was dismissed. We did not make any finding that the

appeal itself fell within one of the enumerated grounds of

§ 1915(g).

In El-Shaddai v. Woodford, No. 08-CV-2429 (E.D. Cal.

June 18, 2009) (Woodford), the district court denied IFP

2 We address whether the second justification for dismissal in Prunty

I—failure to exhaust administrative remedies—is a strike-worthy

dismissal in Part II of this opinion.

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 11

status again because it concluded that El-Shaddai had

accumulated too many strikes. Not only did the Woodford

court not rule that El-Shaddai’s claim fell within one of the

enumerated grounds, it affirmatively noted that El-Shaddai

had successfully “stated plausible procedural due process

claims.”

Finally, in El-Shaddai v. Doyle, No. 1:10-CV-01159,

2011 WL 3875478 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (“Doyle”), the

district court similarly denied IFP status because it concluded

that El-Shaddai had accrued too many strikes, without

addressing the merits of his case.

Because the grounds for dismissal in Prunty I, Woodford,

and Doyle were that El-Shaddai had incurred too many

strikes, and not because the cases were themselves frivolous,

malicious, or failed to state a claim, they do not count as

separate strikes against El-Shaddai. Similarly, in Prunty II,

we did not dismiss the appeal under one of the three

enumerated grounds, and it does not count as a strike.

II. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The alternative basis on which the district court dismissed

El-Shaddai’s action in Prunty I was that he had “failed to

exhaust all available non-judicial administrative remedies

prior to filing suit,” as required by the PLRA.3 The district

court in Prunty I ruled that the case could be dismissed via a

pre-answer “non-enumerated 12(b) motion.”

3 An alternative ground for dismissal can create a strike when it is “a

fully sufficient condition . . . for a dismissal with prejudice.” O’Neal,

531 F.3d at 1156.

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12 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted” from § 1915(g) purposely “parallels the language

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Andrews,

398 F.3d at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if

a claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim under rule

12(b)(6), it counts as a strike for PLRA purposes. “A

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if

the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled

to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Under the

PLRA, a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies

before bringing suit against prison officials, but is not

required to affirmatively allege that he has done so in order

to state a cognizable claim. Id. Instead, failure to exhaust is

an affirmative defense. Id.; see also Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d

1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

Notwithstanding the fact that failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense, a “complaint may be subject to dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense . . . appears

on its face.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 215 (alteration in Jones)

(quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001));

see also Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (“[I]n those rare cases

where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the

complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”); Thompson,

492 F.3d at 438 (“[E]ven when failure to exhaust is treated as

an affirmative defense, it may be invoked in a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion if the complaint somehow reveals the exhaustion

defense on its face.”).

In Prunty I, the district court considered documents

outside the four corners of the complaint in finding that ElShaddai had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The district court did not dismiss El-Shaddai’s claim because

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 13

a failure to exhaust was “clear from the face of the

complaint,” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169, which would have been

sufficient to dismiss under 12(b)(6). The district court also

made no finding that the complaint was frivolous or

malicious. Thus, this alternative basis for dismissal in Prunty

I does not count as a strike.

III. Summary Judgment

Three of El-Shaddai’s potential strikes were not disposed

of on a motion to dismiss; instead, they were resolved by

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We hold that

the summary-judgment dismissals at issue here do not count

as strikes, because they were not decided on the ground that

the complaint was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a

claim.4

This reasoning is consistent with our holding in Richey v.

Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2015). In Richey, the district

court granted a motion to dismiss, but did not limit its

analysis to the four corners of the pleadings. Id. at 1207–08.

4

In doing so, we do not hold that no summary-judgment disposition

could ever count as a strike. We agree with other circuits that have held

that where an order explicitly states summary judgment is proper because

the case is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, the dismissal

counts as a strike. Blakely, 738 F.3d at 613; see also Byrd, 715 F.3d at

126; Thompson, 492 F.3d at 436. This is consistent with our reasoning in

Andrews, in which we stated that it is not the style or procedural posture

of a dismissal that is dispositive, but whether we can determine, “after

careful evaluation ofthe order . . . and other relevant information,” that the

district court dismissed the case on one of the grounds enumerated in

§ 1915(g). 398 F.3d at 1121. The Fourth Circuit in Blakely noted,

however, that it would be a rare summary judgment order that fits this

criteria because “at that point, frivolousness, maliciousness, and failure to

state a claim are not typically addressed.” 738 F.3d at 614.

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14 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

Instead, it considered evidence submitted by the parties in

reaching its decision. Id. We construed its order as a grant of

summary judgment, and concluded that “[c]onsequently, it

was not a strike under the PLRA.” Id. at 1208. The

underlying principle is that we must decide whether the case

was disposed of because the complaint was frivolous,

malicious, or failed to state a claim, regardless of how the

district court labels its decision. The summary-judgment

orders against El-Shaddai were not based on one of these

grounds, and do not count as strikes.

In Wilkerson v. Lawrence, No. 93-CV-1732, 1994 WL

412441 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1994) (Lawrence), El-Shaddai

claimed that prison officials had restricted his access to the

prison law library such that he did not have meaningful

access to the courts. This allegation, taken as true, stated a

claim for relief. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828

(1977). The district court acknowledged that “[p]risoners

possess the constitutional right of meaningful access to the

courts,” and that right is abridged if “inmates are not allowed

a reasonable amount of time to use a law library.” On

summary judgment, however, El-Shaddai failed to “establish

that he ha[d] suffered an actual injury.” Specifically, the

evidence reviewed by the district court showed that he had

accessed the law library “fifty-four times over a period of

approximately six months.” The district court concluded that

this did not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning

whether his access to the law library was unconstitutionally

restricted. In this context, it is clear that the district court did

not grant summary judgment on a ground enumerated by the

PLRA—it granted summary judgment because the evidence

did not support the claim. Lawrence does not count as a

strike.

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 15

In Wilkerson v. Marshall, No. 94-CV-0009, 1994 WL

564650 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1994) (Marshall I) El-Shaddai

raised claims that prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. The district court noted that

“[d]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs presents

a cognizable claim” where “prison officials deny, delay, or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Based on the

evidence presented by the defendants at summary judgment,

the court concluded that El-Shaddai’s allegations lacked merit

because the court could “not find any similarity between the

acts performed by the defendants in this case and those in

which courts have previously found Eighth Amendment

violations.” Because summary judgment was granted on

evidentiary grounds, rather than for frivolousness,

maliciousness, or failure to state a claim, Marshall I does not

count as a strike.

In Wilkerson v. Smith, No. 94-CV-3962, 1996 WL

432324 (N.D. Cal. July23, 1996) (Smith), El-Shaddai brought

two claims. He alleged again that prison officials denied him

sufficient access to the law library, and also alleged that

prison officials had retaliated against him for filing civilrights suits by “manipulating” his trust account. The district

court dismissed the law library claim and granted summary

judgment on the retaliation claim. Although the first claim

was nominally decided on a motion to dismiss, the substance

of the disposition shows that the district court actually

decided both claims based on the “facts presented in . . .

summary judgment papers,” and evidence beyond the

pleadings. As a result, we construe the full disposition as a

grant of summary judgment, which does not count as a strike.

See Richey, 807 F.3d at 1208.

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16 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

IV. Appellate Affirmance

Another one of El-Shaddai’s potential strikes involved his

appeal of the dismissal of an action, in which we affirmed the

decision of the district court. We hold that where an appellate

decision simply affirms the district court, and does not

dismiss the appeal on a statutorily enumerated ground, the

appellate decision does not count as a separate strike.

The PLRA defines a strike-worthydismissal as an “action

or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed

on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g) (emphasis added). As the D.C. Circuit noted in

Thompson, the statute “speaks only of dismissals, not

affirmances. The choice of the word ‘dismiss’ rather than

‘affirm’ in relation to appeals was unlikely an act of careless

draftsmanship.” 492 F.3d at 436. Again, the style of the

disposition is not determinative. Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d

1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he procedural mechanism or

Rule by which the [appellate] dismissal is accomplished,

while informative, is not dispositive.”). “To be sure, we can

easily imagine a case in which an appellate court expressly

states that an appeal was frivolous but erroneously styles its

disposition as an affirmance rather than as a dismissal.”

Thompson, 492 F.3d at 436. We agree with the D.C. Circuit

that “[a]ppellate affirmances do not count as strikes unless the

court expressly states that the appeal itself was frivolous,

malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. at 440.

This holding is consistent with the reasoning we adopted

in Knapp. In that case, we held that two dismissed appeals

counted as strikes “because they relied on district court

findings that the appeal ‘[was] not taken in good faith,’ and

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 17

lack of ‘good faith’ in this context has been held to be

equivalent to a finding of frivolity.” Knapp, 738 F.3d at 1110

(footnote and citations omitted). This strongly implies that

where the appellate disposition does not conclude that the

appeal itself is frivolous or malicious, it does not count as a

separate strike.

Wilkerson v. Marshall, 53 F.3d 341 (9th Cir. 1995)

(unpublished table decision) (Marshall II) affirmed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in Lawrence. We

directly reviewed the summary-judgment order on its merits,

looking to the substance of El-Shaddai’s claim that he was

unconstitutionally denied access to the law library. Id. The

decision does not state that the appeal itself was frivolous,

malicious, or failed to state a claim, and does not adopt any

certification of the district court that an appeal would be

brought in bad faith. Cf. Knapp, 738 F.3d at 1110. Marshall

II does not count as a strike.

V. Would-Be Habeas Petitions

When a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement, the sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1989).

When a habeas petition is dismissed, that disposition cannot

count as a strike under the PLRA because the “PLRA’s

revised [in] forma pauperis provisions relating to prisoners do

not apply to habeas proceedings.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1122

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1997)).

“[T]he language of § 1915(g) does not encompass habeas

petitions,” because “Congress intended § 1915(g) to address

civil rights and prison condition cases, not habeas petitions.”

Id.

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18 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

El-Shaddai filed two actions alleging that parole officials

were arbitrarily refusing to set his parole eligibility date. In

Wilkerson v. Gillis, No. 94-CV-3278, 1995 WL 84197 (N.D.

Cal. Feb. 21, 1995) (Gillis), El-Shaddai brought this claim

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court held that such

a suit challenged the duration of his confinement, and thus his

sole remedy was a habeas petition. The district court thus

dismissed the suit without prejudice, and indicated that ElShaddai could file his claim as a habeas petition after he had

exhausted all of his state remedies. In Wilkerson v. Nelson,

No. 95-CV-0248, 1995 WL251147 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1995)

(Nelson), El-Shaddai brought the same claim as a petition for

a writ of mandamus to compel parole officials to promptly

“assign him a fixed primary term and parole release date.”

The district court similarlydismissed the petition, because the

remedy sought sounded in habeas.

Although it is correct that El-Shaddai’s claims in Gillis

and Nelson were not cognizable under the form of suit that

El-Shaddai chose to use, they were both, in essence, habeas

claims. Our circuit’s case law directs district courts to

construe § 1983 claims challenging the fact or duration of the

plaintiff’s sentence as a petition for habeas corpus when the

“complaint evince[s] a clear intention to state a habeas

claim.” Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th

Cir. 1995); see Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 & n.2

(9th Cir. 1991). Had the district court in Gillis and Nelson

done so, it would have construed each case as a habeas

petition and dismissed them as premature because El-Shaddai

had not yet exhausted his state remedies. Such a dismissal

would not have counted as a strike. Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1122–23.

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EL-SHADDAI V. WANG 19

Furthermore, we recognized in Andrews that we should

look to the substance of the dismissed lawsuit in order to

determine whether it can be counted as a “strike.” Id. at 1122

n.12. We recognized that “some habeas petitions may be little

more than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions mislabeled as habeas

petitions so as to avoid the penalties imposed by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).” Id. In that case, we held that it would be proper

for the district court to “determine that the dismissal of the

habeas petition does in fact count as a strike for purposes of

§ 1915(g).” Id. We recognize that the opposite can also be

true: a habeas petition can be mislabeled as a § 1983 claim

(either inadvertently, or as a strategy to avoid the significant

substantive hurdles of our habeas jurisprudence). In such a

case, it follows that the mislabeled habeas petition should be

considered such for purposes of the PLRA, and that it should

not count as a strike. Gillis was, in substance, a habeas

petition that the district court dismissed for failure to exhaust

state remedies, and does not constitute a strike.

Nelson was likewise a mislabeled habeas petition. The

mandamus petition sought relief that could be obtained only

on habeas and, as in Gillis, the district court dismissed the

case without prejudice to allow El-Shaddai the opportunity to

exhaust his state remedies and then bring a habeas petition.

Unlike habeas petitions mislabeled as § 1983 claims,

however, our case law does not specifically indicate that

district courts should construe mislabeled mandamus

petitions as habeas petitions. But we need not decide that

issue to analyze the dismissal in Nelson, because the petition

for a writ of mandamus in Nelson is criminal, not civil, in

nature and is thus not the proper basis for a PLRA strike.

In our concurrently-issued opinion Washington v. Los

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, No. 13-56647 (9th Cir.

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20 EL-SHADDAI V. WANG

Aug. 12, 2016), we adopted a framework for determining

when a petition for writ of mandamus is civil or criminal in

nature for PLRA purposes. In Washington, we held that

mandamus, as a common-law writ that functions in some

respects like an appeal, is not categorically either civil or

criminal. Id. at 19–20. Instead, its characterization depends on

the nature of the underlying claim. A writ of mandamus

against a judge presiding in the petitioner’s civil prison

litigation, for instance, would function like a civil appeal and

could properly be counted as a strike under the PLRA. Id. at

19 (citing Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 854–55 (7th

Cir. 1996)). “A petition for mandamus in a criminal

proceeding,” however, “is not a form of [civil] prison

litigation,” Martin, 96 F.3d at 854, and would not be

susceptible to being counted as a strike. Here, Nelson directly

challenged El-Shaddai’s sentence and parole terms. As it

challenged the duration of his criminal sentence, it was like

a habeas petition and outside of the scope of the PLRA.

Nelson does not count as a strike.

CONCLUSION

Of the eleven potential strikes that the district court could

have relied upon in denying El-Shaddai’s motion for

reconsideration, only one is a valid strike under the PLRA.

Therefore, we REVERSE the decision of the district court,

and REMAND for the district court to assess whether ElShaddai is otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.

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