Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cr-00667/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cr-00667-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Alberto Jara-Candia
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Manuel Alberto Jara-Candia,

Petitioner, 

vs.

United States of America,

Respondent.

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CASE NO. CV-06-165-TUC-FRZ

 CR-05-667-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

Petitioner has filed a “Motion to Modify and Correct Sentence Pursuant to Title 28

U.S.C. §§ 2255.”

Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States

District Courts provides, in relevant part, that

[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits,

and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not

entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and direct

the clerk to notify the moving party.

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255.

Background

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count Two of the

Indictment, which charged him with knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with

the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).

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Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner waived “any and all motions, defenses,

probable cause determinations, and objections which [he] could assert to the indictment or

to the Court’s entry of judgment against [him] and imposition of sentence upon [him]

consistent with [the plea] agreement.” In addition, Petitioner waived “any right to

collaterally attack [his] conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section

2255.”

The plea agreement provided for a sentencing range of 37-71 months. At sentencing,

the Court imposed a sentence of forty-one months, departing below the United States

Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) range: (1) “[p]ursuant to the Plea Agreement based on

§ (5K3.1) Early Disposition Program and savings to the government by early plea and waiver

of appeal” and (2) “[p]ursuant to the Plea Agreement based on § 5k2.0.” 

Discussion

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Ineffective Assistance in Plea Agreement

It appears that Petitioner may be asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

relating to his decision to plead guilty. Petitioner alleges that “defense counsel

misrepresented and misadvised the plea to defendant about the condition of his plea bargain,

specifically inquired by Defendant, in as much as counsel knew that defend[a]nt’s whole

behavior and guilty plea was structured to avoid a plea agreement that would not result in a

long sentence or a prison time” and that Petitioner “detrimentally rel[ied] on counsel’s

advi[c]e, [and] pleaded guilty to the charges.”

When a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and pleads guilty

based upon the advice of counsel, the defendant can “‘only attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel’”

was outside “‘the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases’” and was

prejudicial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59, 106 S. Ct 366, 369-70, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203

(1985) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d

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Moreover, had Petitioner proceeded to trial, he would have also faced trial on Count

One (conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine), Count Three (conspiracy

to import cocaine), and Count Four (importation of cocaine). In the plea agreement, the

government agreed to dismiss these counts.

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235 (1973), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L. Ed.

2d 763 (1970)). “[T]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370. 

Petitioner does not specify what advice counsel gave that fell outside the range of

competence for criminal attorneys. Moreover, Petitioner faced a significantly more serious

sentence had he been found guilty after a trial. He does not dispute that his Adjusted Offense

Level was 30 and that he had a Criminal History I. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the

sentencing range for an Offense Level 30 and Criminal History I is 97-121 months.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any reasonable probability that, when his “whole

behavior” was structured to avoid a long prison sentence, he would have proceeded to trial

facing a sentencing of 97-121 months, rather than accept a plea agreement which capped his

sentence at 71 months.1 Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim fails. See Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d

1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997) (Court “do[es] not have to evaluate both prongs of the [Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)] test if the defendant

fails to establish one.”). 

2. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing

a. Aberrant Behavior

Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing because his attorney

failed to request a downward departure based on Petitioner’s aberrant behavior.

 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show both

that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that

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counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 

Petitioner was not entitled to a downward departure based on his aberrant behavior.

Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20(c)(3), the Court cannot depart downward based on aberrant

behavior if the offense is a “serious drug trafficking offense.” The Sentencing Commission

defines a “serious drug trafficking offense” as “any controlled substance offense under title

21, United States Code, other than simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844, that provides

for a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years or greater, regardless of

whether the defendant meets the criteria of § 5C1.2 . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20 n.1.

Petitioner was charged with, and pled guilty to, a serious drug trafficking offense. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Therefore, he was not entitled to a downward departure

based on his aberrant behavior and his attorney’s failure to request this departure did not

prejudice the defense. See Strickland. Thus, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

fails. See Pollard.

b. Deportable Alien Status

Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing because his attorney

failed to request a downward departure based on Petitioner’s status as a deportable alien. 

First, the Court was well aware at sentencing of Petitioner’s status as a deportable

alien. Even if Petitioner’s attorney had made the argument that the Court should depart

downward based on Petitioner’s status as a deportable alien, this Court, in its discretion,

would not have departed downward. See Lizarraga-Lopez v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d

1166, 1170 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that defendant’s “status as a deportable alien was

squarely within the ‘heartland’ of the Sentencing Guidelines and was specifically accounted

for in the early release statute”); United States v. Martinez-Villegas, 993 F. Supp. 766, 781

(C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying downward departure based on deportable alien status and noting

that “the Ninth Circuit has shown a reluctance to allow deportability status as a basis for a

downward departure”); cf. United States v. Davoudi, 172 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1999)

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(upholding district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward based on

deportable alien status). 

Second, Petitioner notes that a “Memorandum to all Prosecutors (Federal) dated April

28, 1995,” instructs federal prosecutors to recommend a one or two level downward

departure “in exchange for the alien’s concession of deportability.” Petitioner has presented

no evidence that he agreed to accept a final deportation order. Nor does he address whether

the United States Attorney for this District has chosen to make a downward departure

recommendation in exchange for a such an agreement, or whether this eleven-year-old

memorandum is still in effect.

Finally, to the extent Petitioner may be asserting an equal protection argument when

he asserts that “he will be confined to a higher security than a comparable [A]merican

counterpart on accounts of factors unrelated to moral worthiness and be subjected to more

severe puni[s]hment” because he is required to spend “the last 10% of his sentence [in a

deportation center rather than in] minimum security confinement,” the Court notes that the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument in McLean v. Crabtree, 173

F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999). In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that there was no equal

protection violation and held that “excluding prisoners with detainers from participating in

community-based treatment programs, and consequently from sentence reduction eligibility,

is at least rationally related to the BOP’s legitimate interest in preventing prisoners from

fleeing detainers while participating in community treatment programs.” Id. at 1186. 

Because Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to seek a downward departure based on

Petitioner’s deportable alien status did not prejudice the defense, this ineffective assistance

claim fails. See Pollard.

c. Fast Track/Early Disposition

Petitioner contends his attorney was ineffective because his attorney failed to seek

downward departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 based on Petitioner’s compliance with

“the requirements of the ‘Fast Track’ program” and U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 based on his

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compliance with an “Early disposition” program. These claims fail because the Court,

pursuant to the plea agreement, did depart downward on these grounds.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion (U.S.D.C. document #25 in CR05-667-TUC-FRZ) is DENIED and this case (CV-06-165-TUC-FRZ) is DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court SHALL SERVE a copy

of the Motion and this order on Respondent and SHALL SERVE a copy of this order on

Petitioner.

DATED this 6th day of April, 2006.

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