Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01220/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01220-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tony John Luker
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1220

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Tony John Luker, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 19, 2004

Filed: February 2, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Tony Luker appeals from the district court's1

 denial of his motion to suppress

and the court's grant of the government's motion in limine regarding the admission

of evidence supporting Luker's justification defense. We affirm the well-reasoned

judgment of the district court. 

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
2

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District

Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 

-2-

I. BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2003, Officer Bieber, joined shortly by two other officers, stopped

Luker's vehicle for use of an excessively loud muffler in Anamosa, Iowa. Luker was

under the influence of alcohol. After administering a field sobriety test, which Luker

failed, Officer Bieber arrested Luker for driving drunk. Following the arrest, and

because the officers were aware of Luker's history of methamphetamine use, Officer

Bieber asked Luker if there was anything that could stick or poke him, and then

performed a pat-down search. The officers then asked Luker if there was anything

in Luker's vehicle that shouldn't be there or that they should know about. Luker said,

"Just my .410 [shotgun]." All of these events occurred before Luker was Mirandized.

The officers searched the vehicle, found the shotgun in Luker's trunk, and, because

Luker was a convicted felon, he was eventually charged with being a felon in

possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

While in custody, Luker apparently explained to the officers that he had the

shotgun in the trunk because he had been in fear for his life because his girlfriend's

husband had threatened to "take him out" and beat him and shoot him. Luker also

said this man had actually tried to run Luker down with his car. 

Luker moved to suppress his answer regarding the shotgun because (1) he was

not given his Miranda warnings prior to questioning that was likely to elicit an

incriminating response, and (2) the shotgun in the trunk would not have been found

during the search but for his response to the pre-Miranda questioning. The

Magistrate Judge,2

 determined that the officer's question fell within the public safety

exception to Miranda and denied Luker's motion to suppress. The district court

adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. 

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
-3-

Luker also wanted to raise a justification defense to the unlawful possession

charge because, according to him, his life had been threatened. In a pretrial

conference, the district court granted the government's motion in limine, holding that

Luker was unable as a matter of law to establish a justification defense as regarding

his possession of the gun and thus no mention could be made by either party at trial

of any facts relating to Luker's excuse for having the shotgun in his trunk. That ruling

culminated in a plea agreement conditioned on Luker's ability to appeal both that

ruling and the denial of the motion to suppress, which he does at this time. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Justification Defense

We review the district court's grant of the government's motion in limine for

abuse of discretion. ACT, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Systems, Inc., 296 F.3d 657, 669

(8th Cir. 2002). Luker argues that the district court erred by granting the

government's motion in limine excluding testimony intended by Luker to establish

a justification defense. 

We first note that the Eighth Circuit has never validated justification as a

defense to a section 922(g) violation. See United States v. Taylor, 122 F.3d 685, 688

(8th Cir. 1997). We do not need to rule on the availability of a justification defense

in this case because even if we were willing to grant a felon the opportunity to justify

his unlawful possession of a gun in rare circumstances, Luker cannot establish such

a defense in this case. See id. 

To establish a justification defense, other circuits require proof of the following

four elements:

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
-4-

"(1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and

impending [threat] of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded

apprehension of death or serious bodily injury, (2) that defendant had

not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it

was probable that he would be [forced to choose the criminal conduct],

(3) that defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the

law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the

threatened harm, and (4) that a direct causal relationship may be

reasonably anticipated between the [criminal] action taken and the

avoidance of the [threatened] harm." 

United States v. Blankenship, 67 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States

v. Stover, 822 F.2d 48, 50 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1987) (alterations in original) (citing the

elements of the defense from the Fifth Circuit)). 

In reviewing Luker's offer of proof in this case, he is unable to satisfy these

elements. There is no evidence that Luker was under an unlawful, present, imminent

and impending threat such that he feared death or serious bodily injury. He speaks

of previous death threats made by another man and that man's attempt to run him over

in the street or "take him out." Whatever threat may have been posed, it surely was

not present, imminent, or both, given Luker's conduct. If Luker had a sincere

apprehension of death, it is unlikely that he would be out in public, late at night, and

without his faculties due to the influence of alcohol, as he was on the evening in

question. Such is inconsistent with the cautious and alert behavior that would be

expected on the part of one so threatened. Further, it almost goes without saying that

when the man making the threats is Luker's girlfriend's husband, no reasonable juror

could surmise that Luker had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a

situation "in which it was probable that he would be [forced to choose the criminal

conduct]." Id. 

Finally, Luker fails to establish that he had no legal alternative to violating the

law. As the district court noted, "Certainly, he had a chance to refuse to do the

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
-5-

criminal act and to avoid the threatened harm by other means and he elected not to

do that." Although Luker alleges that he reported the threats to the Anamosa Police

Department but that they refused to take any action, the police department has no

record of this report and Luker cannot provide the exact date the report was made or

the person to whom he reported. 

Because Luker is unable to satisfy even one of the necessary prerequisites to

a justification defense, we affirm the district court's ruling that prohibited Luker's use

of the defense. The district court did not abuse its discretion. 

B. Public Safety Exception to Miranda 

We review the district court's factual findings in the order denying the motion

to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.

Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2004). "We will not affirm if the order is

unsupported by substantial evidence, reflects an erroneous view of the applicable law,

or leaves us with a firm and definite conviction that in light of the whole record a

mistake has been made." Id. 

As to the application of the public safety exception to Miranda in this case, the

district court, relying upon United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 1999),

and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), thoroughly and correctly analyzed

the legal and factual aspects of this claim. We agree with the district court that the

circumstances in the instant case fit the public safety exception to Miranda. The

officers were aware of Luker's history of methamphetamine use and were concerned

about needles or substances associated with such use in the car and thus the question

concerning the contents of the vehicle was warranted. We see no reason to repeat the

district court's analysis on this issue. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-6-

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm. 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the district court’s holding that Luker’s

statement was admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda.

3

 New York

v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). 

The government concedes that Luker was in custody and that no Miranda

warning was given, but argues the officer’s question–would they find “anything in

the car . . . that shouldn’t be in there” (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 18)–was permissible

under the public safety exception to Miranda. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56. The

public safety exception applies where there is an “objectively reasonable need to

protect the police and the public from any immediate danger.” Id. at 659 n.8.

Statements are admissible under this exception only if the questions posed are

“reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.” Id. at 656. The questions

must be necessary to secure the safety of officers or the public, and may not be

designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect. Id. at 658-59. 

The majority holds that the officer’s night-time search of the car of a known

felon involved with methamphetamine permitted questions about dangerous objects

in the car. See United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1999). The

officers testified that they were concerned that needles or hazardous chemicals might

injure them when they searched the car. The only basis for this concern is the

officers’ unsupported assertions. Anamosa Police Officer Burkholder stated that

Luker was “involved with drugs and narcotics,” (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 7-8), but did

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
4

Interestingly, Menard also admitted that he asks questions like the one at issue

in this case “[p]rimarily . . . every time I look through a vehicle.” (Id. at 17.) This

casts doubt on the majority’s assertion that it was Luker’s particular circumstances

which led to Menard’s questioning. 

-7-

not clarify how he was involved. He also conceded that there was “no outward

indication” that there were any drugs or any weapons involved in this stop. (Id. at

10.) Anamosa Police Chief Menard, who actually questioned Luker, explained that

he was concerned for his safety when searching the car because he knew that Luker

“ha[d] been hanging out with” methamphetamine users.4

 (Id. at 17). There are no

drug-related arrests or convictions in the record to suggest the majority’s conclusion

that Luker had a “history of methamphetamine use.” See ante at 2. 

Menard’s belief that Luker associated with drug users did not by itself create

an objectively reasonable threat to public safety. While the present case is similar in

some respects to Williams, it lacks many of the factors that create concern for the

safety of the officers. 

 

Luker was stopped for a traffic offense. No drugs, drug paraphernalia, or

weapons were found in the passenger compartment of Luker’s car or on his person

in a pat-down search. His involvement with methamphetamine was apparently

limited to “hanging out” with methamphetamine users. Cf. Williams, 181 F.3d at 954

n.14 (noting that Williams had been arrested in the past for weapons possession, and

was suspected of narcotics trafficking). The officers did not detect any odor of

chemicals in the car. Luker was already arrested, handcuffed, and patted down when

the officers questioned him. There were no other people in the area that might be

harmed by the contents of his car and no one else in the car who might have posed a

threat to the police officers.

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380 
-8-

Admitting Luker’s statement under these circumstances would expand the

public safety exception far beyond its original scope. I would reverse the district

court and find that Luker’s statement does not fall within the public safety exception.

______________________________ 

Appellate Case: 04-1220 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/02/2005 Entry ID: 1862380