Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05102/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Bruce McDermott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

_,FILED - Ualted States Court of Appca~ 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 9 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

DAVID BRUCE MCDERMOTT II, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

PATRICK FISHER 

--Clerk 

Nos. 94-5101 

94-5102 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-163-E) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, and Allen J. Litchfield, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on behalf of 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and James P. Moran, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, on behalf of 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, t District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. This cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

t Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-5102 Document: 01019279753 Date Filed: 08/29/1995 Page: 1 
David Bruce McDermott II appeals his conviction on charges of 

engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and interstate travel 

in aid of unlawful activity. He makes the following arguments:l 

(1) The district court violated his Sixth Amendment right of selfrepresentation by refusing to let him participate in bench 

conferences when he was proceeding pro se with standby counsel; 

(2) he was subjected to double jeopardy by being criminally 

prosecuted after the government had filed civil forfeiture 

proceedings against him to which he had responded; (3) the 

district court abused its discretion by admitting allegedly 

irrelevant and prejudicial testimony that Mr. McDermott had 

threatened to kill a woman after she called him a pothead and a 

drug dealer; (4) the district court abused its discretion by 

denying him a mistrial after a government witness testified that a 

codefendant had been on probation; and (5) the evidence was 

insufficient to show that Mr. McDermott had exercised the 

necessary supervisory or managerial role for a conviction under 

the continuing criminal enterprise statute. 

Because we conclude that Mr. McDermott's Sixth Amendment 

right to self-representation was violated, but that the evidence 

1 Mr. McDermott moved to proceed pro se with assistance of 

counsel on direct appeal, and we denied his request. Briefs were 

filed on his behalf by his counsel from the Federal Public 

Defender's office. Mr. McDermott also submitted his own briefs, 

but to the extent that he raises additional issues, we do not 

address them, invoking our policy of addressing on direct appeal 

only those issues raised by counsel. United States v. Coleman, 9 

F.3d 1480, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 s. Ct. 1234 

(1994). 

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was sufficient to sustain the conviction, we reverse the 

conviction and remand for a new trial. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 23, 1993, law enforcement officials executed search 

warrants at the residence and business premises of David Bruce 

McDermott II, in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. The next month, federal 

authorities seized Mr. McDer.mott's pickup truck and boat, and in a 

letter dated July 2, the FBI notified him that it was proceeding 

administratively to forfeit the property on grounds that it had 

been used to transport a controlled substance, was furnished or 

intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance, 

or represented proceeds of a drug transaction, in violation of 21 

U . S . C . § § 8 81 (a) ( 4 ) and (a) ( 6 ) . 

Mr. McDermott subsequently sent the FBI a letter w-ith an 

affidavit of indigency, asserting claims to the pickup and the 

boat, to stop the administrative forfeiture and force the filing 

of a judicial forfeiture. On August 19, the FBI in Tulsa accepted 

cost bonds from Mr. McDermott, and on October 5, the government 

filed a civil complaint for forfeiture in rem. On November 2, 

Mr. McDermott answered and demanded a jury trial. 

The next day, November 3, 1993, a federal grand jury in the 

Northern District of Oklahoma indicted Mr. McDermott, together 

with Lewis Stacy Lacy, Juan Antonio Mata, and Jaime Javier Mata. 

Mr. McDermott was charged with continuing criminal enterprise; 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to 

distribute, 100 kilograms or more of marijuana; and travel in 

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interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, establish, and 

facilitate distribution of marijuana. The conspiracy count also 

alleged that Mr. McDermott's pickup and boat were subject to 

criminal forfeiture pursuant to 21 u.s.c. § 853. 

On November 23, on the government's motion and over 

Mr. McDermott's objection, the civil forfeiture case was stayed 

pending the outcome of the criminal case. 

On December 28, Mr. McDermott moved in the criminal case to 

proceed pro se, with his retained attorney acting as standby 

counsel. At the pretrial conference, his lawyer, Stuart 

Southerland, advised the court that there was no animosity between 

him and Mr. McDermott, but Mr. McDermott wanted to represent 

himself. The court granted the motion, but after the government 

objected to Mr. McDermott's full participation, the court ruled 

that he would not be allowed to participate in bench conferences, 

the jury instruction conference, or "the purely legal matters" of 

the case. 

On the first day of the criminal trial, Mr. McDermott moved 

for dismissal on double jeopardy grounds, and the motion was 

denied. The government then put on twenty-eight witnesses. Of 

those, eight were business people testifying either to 

Mr. McDermott's cash purchases from them or, in one case, of the 

witness's equipment purchase from Mr. McDermott; three testified 

concerning records of 262 phone calls placed from Mr. McDermott's 

phone to various Mata family phone numbers in Texas; and three 

offered testimony concerning a controlled purchase by a government 

operative of a pound of marijuana from one of Mr. McDermott's 

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alleged coconspirators, Billy Miller, and the subsequent 

laboratory tests on the substance. 

One witness, Sharla Doss, testified that during an argument 

she had with Mr. McDermott concerning her love life, she called 

him a pothead and a drug dealer, and he threatened her life. 

Of the remaining thirteen witnesses, who provided key 

testimony about their direct knowledge of Mr. McDermott's drug 

activities, at least eleven testified under grants of immunity. 

Seven also received pretrial diversion; three had plea bargains; 

and one, serving a twenty-year sentence, was told his cooperation 

would be reported to appropriate authorities. 

On January 26, after a six-day trial, the jury convicted 

Mr. McDermott on the continuing criminal enterprise and interstate 

travel counts and found that his boat and pickup were subject to 

criminal forfeiture. About two months later, the court sentenced 

Mr. McDermott and signed an order of criminal forfeiture. 

Mr. McDermott subsequently moved to dismiss the civil forfeiture 

case, and the government opposed dismissal until the criminal 

forfeiture was final, at which point the government itself sought 

and was granted dismissal of the civil proceeding. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Self Representation 

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to conduct their own 

defense, subject to conditions not pertinent to this case. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975); see also McKaskle 

v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). It is undisputed that 

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Mr. McDermott timely and unequivocally asserted that right, 

together with a request for standby counsel to assist. Def.'s 

Motion filed Dec. 28, 1993, R. Vol. I, tab 46. 

At pretrial on January 7, 1994, the district court broadly 

granted Mr. McDermott's motion, but imposed a critical exception. 

The court ruled that Mr. McDermott would not be permitted to be 

present at bench conferences. The ruling recognized 

Mr. McDermott's objection to that ruling and, by its terms, 

precluded the need for any renewal of the objection: 

MR. McDERMOTT: Your Honor, are you telling me that 

I shall not be allowed at a certain type of in-camera 

hearing? 

THE COURT: No, what I'm saying is you will not be 

allowed at the bench conferences, you will not be 

allowed at instruction conference. You will not address 

the purely legal matters, but you will be able to 

represent yourself on all other matters and you can 

communicate through your counsel on those matters. And 

the Court grants an exception redundantly under the 

Federal Rules to my ruling, because I take it that you 

object to the limitations I have placed on you, but 

those will be the limitations. 

R. Vol. VI at 25.2 

The reason given by the court for this restriction was that 

Mr. McDermott was not equipped to handle purely legal matters and 

bench conferences centered on them: 

THE COURT: Well, the bench conferences issues, to 

begin with those will deal with evidentiary issues, they 

will deal with the Federal Rules regarding criminal 

procedure. Those are not matters within the knowledge 

of Mr. McDermott and I think on all such issues his 

attorney should be involved and his attorney can 

2 As the excerpt from the record indicates, the court also 

ruled that Mr. McDermott would not be allowed to participate in 

jury instruction conferences. However, he was, in fact, allowed 

to participate when the time came. Thus, the point is not in 

issue. 

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communicate with Mr. McDermott because we're dealing in 

those conferences strictly with the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, and Mr. McDermott is not schooled in those. 

At the instruction conference we're dealing with 

the esoterics of criminal cases, instructions of courts 

to juries on criminal cases, and it's my feeling that 

counsel is more appropriate for those proceedings than 

is the defendant. 

I don't mean to unduly restrict you, Mr. McDermott, 

but we're going to restrict you from matters that are 

pure law, that is dealing with Federal Rules, federal 

instructions to juries, we will strict [sic] those to 

your lawyer and he can communicate those to you. 

R. Vol. VI at 24. 

It is important to note that the court gave no other reasons 

for excluding Mr. McDermott, including such matters as security 

considerations or any suggestion that Mr. McDermott would not 

abide by the necessary procedures or protocol of the court. The 

Supreme Court has made it clear that mere lack of familiarity with 

procedural and evidentiary rules is irrelevant, and this court has 

recently emphasized the point. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836; United 

States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475, 1481 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

At trial, held from January 18 through January 26, 1994, 

Mr. McDermott was in fact barred from thirty bench conferences.3 

Some of these bench conferences addressed only minor procedural 

issues or matters concerning codefendants. But others concerned, 

inter alia, Mr. McDermott's motion for a judgment of acquittal, 

his motion for mistrial because of the admission of Sharla Doss's 

death threat testimony, multiple government objections to the 

3 After the second bench conference of the trial, Mr. McDermott 

asked: "Your Honor, at any point in time will I have a chance to 

review word for word the transcript of what was said up there?" 

The court replied, "You may confer with counsel." R. Vol. X at 

31. 

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substance and manner of Mr. McDermott's cross-examination, the 

admissibility against Mr. McDermott of hearsay testimony by his 

alleged coconspirators, Mr. McDermott's objection to the admission 

of photos seized in the challenged search of his home and 

business, and his request for instructions to a witness not to 

mention guns found in Mr. McDermott's safe. 

Mr. McDermott contends that by barring him from participation 

in bench conferences, the court violated his right of selfrepresentation. He cites no federal case which established a per 

se rule on the subject, and the scant directly relevant authority 

is distinguishable factually. The closest cases are Oses v. 

Massachusetts, 961 F.2d 985 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 410 (1992), and United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897 

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990). In Oses, the First 

Circuit held that the combination of three sets of errors, one of 

which was exclusion of the defendant but not standby counsel from 

bench conferences, violated the defendant's right of selfrepresentation. The other errors cited by the court consisted of 

forcing the defendant to conduct his defense at one point in leg 

irons and shackles, and at another point gagging the defendant in 

front of the jury, plus sarcastic, damaging comments by the judge, 

and the judge's unwillingness to curb the prosecutor's rhetorical 

excesses. Oses, 961 F.2d at 986. 

In Mills, the Second Circuit found no violation of the Sixth 

Amendment when the defendant was excluded from sidebar conferences 

at which his standby counsel participated. The circuit reasoned 

that during the first half of the trial the defendant waived his 

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right to participate, and during the remainder of the trial 

(approximately three days) the apparently few instances of 

exclusion did not constitute "a substantial violation of [the 

defendant's] Faretta rights." Mills, 895 F.2d at 904. Citing the 

tests set out in Wiggins, the circuit panel concluded that taking 

the trial as a whole Mills had "a fair chance to present his case 

in his own way." Id. at 905.4 

At the outset of our analysis here, we reject the government's argument that Mr. McDermott's counsel was transformed into 

hybrid counsel (going from adviser/helper to representative) by a 

vacillating and acquiescent Mr. McDermott. This transcript leaves 

no doubt about Mr. McDermott's role, and the consistency of that 

role vis-a-vis that of his standby counsel during trial. 

McDermott in fact conducted his defense. His standby counsel, 

Mr. Southerland, did nothing more than what standby counsel might 

be expected to do: consult, make some objections, help with the 

admission and admissibility of exhibits, and make some motions. 

The Supreme Court makes clear in Wiggins that: 

Faretta rights are . . . not infringed when standby 

counsel assists the pro se defendant in overcoming 

routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the 

completion of some specific task, such as introducing 

evidence or objecting to testimony, that the defendant 

has clearly shown he wishes to complete. Nor are they 

infringed when counsel merely helps to ensure the 

defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom 

protocol and procedure. In neither case is there any 

significant interference with the defendant's actual 

control over the presentation of his defense. 

4 One state court has held that a defendant's right to selfrepresentation under the state constitution includes the right to 

attend sidebar conferences. People v. Rosen, 613 N.E. 2d 946, 

948-50 (N.Y. 1993). 

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Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 183. 

Mr. McDermott made his own opening and closing arguments to 

the jury, conducted his own cross-examination of every government 

witness, and planned and pursued his own defense through an 

accountant called by him as an expert witness. He also argued 

some major motions outside the jury's presence and handled the 

admission of defense exhibits with procedural help from 

Mr. Southerland and the court. In short, there is no record 

support for the proposition that Mr. McDermott gave up control 

over his own defense except to the extent he was involuntarily 

excluded from sidebar. 

In Wiggins, the Court stated that: "In determining whether a 

defendant's Faretta rights have been respected, the primary focus 

must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his 

case in his own way." Id. at 177. The Second Circuit relied 

heavily on this principle in Mills, and we would have little 

trouble finding no violation of McDermott's Faretta rights if no 

more specific mandate existed. After all, Mr. McDermott does not 

allege that he would have done anything differently than 

Mr. Southerland did at sidebar, or that any prejudice resulted, or 

that there was any failure of communication between him and 

Mr. Southerland about the content or strategy of sidebar discussions or motions. The court even encouraged such communication. 

McDermott's objection is based on principle, not specific content 

or result. 

But the Supreme Court was more pointed. It articulated the 

following rules which, of course, constrain our review: 

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First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve 

actual control over the case he chooses to present to 

the jury. This is the core of the Faretta right. If 

standby counsel's participation over the defendant's 

objection effectively allows counsel to make or 

substantially interfere with any significant tactical 

decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, 

or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of 

importance, the Faretta right is eroded. 

Second, participation by standby counsel without 

the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy 

the jury's perception that the defendant is representing 

himself. The defendant's appearance in the status of 

one conducting his own defense is important in a 

criminal trial, since the right to appear pro se exists 

to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy. 

In related contexts the courts have recognized that a 

defendant has a right to be present at all important 

stages of trial. 

* * * 

Faretta rights are adequately vindicated in 

proceedings outside the presence of the jury if the pro 

se defendant is allowed to address the court freely on 

his own behalf and if disagreements between counsel and 

the pro se defendant are resolved in the defendant's 

favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be 

left to the discretion of counsel. 

Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 178 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 

The second item listed by the court--preservation of the 

jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself--was 

not violated in the context of McDermott's whole trial. He was so 

visibly in charge of his defense that Mr. Southerland's trips to 

the bench for what were obviously technical matters would not have 

destroyed Mr. McDermott's "dignity and autonomy." This is 

especially so where McDermott largely allocated the primary 

responsibility for technical objections and assistance with the 

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technicalities of evidence to Mr. Southerland throughout the 

trial.s 

It is the first of the court's admonitions which detains us. 

As the passage quoted above explains, standby counsel may not, 

over the defendant's objection, "make or substantially interfere 

with any significant tactical decisions . . . or . . . speak 

instead of the defendant on any matter of importance II 

at 178. That occurred here. 

Of course, the Court's language seems to stop short of a per 

se rule when it states that such events only "erode" Faretta 

rights. "Erode" is not a synonym for "violate." Thus, the cases 

become fact-specific, and some minor incursions, as in Mills, will 

fall short of a Sixth Amendment violation. However, unlike the 

situation in Mills, we cannot say that McDermott's exclusion, over 

his objection, from thirty bench conferences during a six-day 

trial was an insignificant incursion on his Faretta right. 

Accordingly, we must grant a new trial. We do so reluctantly 

because the district court was overall a model of patience and 

accommodation where Mr. McDermott's self-representation was 

concerned, and by due process standards the trial was fair, and 

any error relative to most other principles would be harmless. 

5 This was not invariably the case. For example, when counsel 

for codefendant Tony Mata sought a mistrial because of a witness's 

remark concerning Mr. Mata's criminal record, and the court 

subsequently asked the lawyers to research and argue the issue the 

following week, Mr. McDermott asked if the hearing was to be "a 

lawyer thing only." When the judge said no and allowed him to 

attend, Mr. McDermott argued his own motion for severance. 

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But harmless error analysis does not apply to the Sixth Amendment 

right in question.6 Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8. 

Our decision to grant a new trial does not end our appellate 

review. The double jeopardy claim requires our attention, and the 

law of this circuit compels us to review claims of insufficient 

evidence prior to remanding for a new trial because of procedural 

error. United States v. Haddock, 961 F.2d 933, 934 (lOth Cir. 

1992). We turn, then, to an examination of these issues raised by 

Mr. McDermott. 

II. Double Jeopardy 

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three-pronged protection: 

against a second prosecution for the same offense after an 

acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after a 

conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. United 

States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); United States v. 

Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 266 (lOth Cir. 1990). Mr. McDermott argues 

that his criminal conviction following the institution of civil 

forfeiture proceedings subjected him to multiple punishments for 

the same offense. 

6 

Since the right of self-representation is a right 

that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of 

a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial 

is not amenable to "harmless error" analysis. The right 

is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be 

harmless. 

Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8. 

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The government makes several counter arguments, including 

that jeopardy never attached in the civil proceedings. This is 

dispositive. 

The courts do not appear to agree on when jeopardy attaches 

in civil administrative and judicial forfeiture proceedings.? 

Mr. McDermott argues that jeopardy attached when his property was 

seized or when he filed his administrative claim and/or his answer 

in the judicial proceeding. He has not pointed us to any 

decisions, however, and we are aware of none, that hold that 

jeopardy attaches when property is seized. Nor do we consider the 

mere filing of an administrative claim sufficient to trigger 

jeopardy, at least where that act converts the proceeding to a 

judicial one with opportunity for hearing.8 

7 Some courts have held or suggested that jeopardy might attach 

at some point before entry of a final judgment. See. e.g., United 

States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 

Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 

669 (1994); United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 203 

(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992); United 

States v. Messina, 876 F. Supp. 980, 981-82 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 

Others have held that jeopardy does not attach until there is a 

final administrative action or an adjudication of civil liability, 

or until the final judgment of forfeiture is entered. See United 

States v. Park, 947 F.2d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 1991); Ragin v. United 

States, No. 3:94CV379-P, 1995 WL 394292 at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 

1995); United States v. Tamez, 881 F. Supp. 460, 466 (D. Wash. 

1995); United State v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 798 (D. Ore. 

1994); United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (W.D. 

Wash. 1994). Cf. Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 827-29 

(E.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that jeopardy attached when defendant 

in criminal case, which contained no criminal forfeiture count, 

entered plea agreement calling for forfeiture of property disputed 

in civil proceeding) . 

8 We need not and do not decide here when, if ever, jeopardy 

attaches in an uncontested administrative forfeiture, which occurs 

automatically without a hearing after the required notice is given 

and 20 days pass. 

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Mr. McDermott has asserted that he was placed in jeopardy of 

double punishment and does not appear to be arguing that he was 

subjected to double prosecution. Admittedly, once double jeopardy 

analysis was expanded from the criminal to the civil context, the 

distinction between these two prongs blurred significantly. But 

whether we analyze Mr. McDermott's argument under only one prong 

or both, he loses. We have previously held that for purposes of 

multiple prosecution analysis, jeopardy did not attach in an 

administrative debarment proceeding before the adjudicative 

hearing stage. See Bizzell, 921 F.2d at 266. We now hold that 

jeopardy cannot attach any earlier for multiple punishment 

purposes, at least where a defendant does not settle a case and 

thus incur civil "punishment" before an adjudicative hearing. See 

United States v. Ursery, No. 94-1127, 1995 WL 411189 at **2-4 (6th 

Cir. July 13, 1995) (jeopardy attached before trial in civil 

forfeiture case when court entered consent judgment) . This civil 

proceeding never got to a hearing or a settlement, so jeopardy 

cannot have attached. The criminal case, therefore, was not 

double jeopardy. 

III. Admission of Sharla Doss's Testimony 

Mr. McDermott contends that the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting testimony of Sharla Doss regarding a death 

threat she says Mr. McDermott made against her. He argues that 

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under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ,9 the extrinsic acts testimony was not 

probative of any issue before the court, not offered for any 

proper purpose, and highly prejudicial, and the court improperly 

admitted it without a limiting instruction. 

We review a district court's admission of evidence under Rule 

404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Grissom, 44 F.3d 

1507, 1513 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1720 (1995). 

That discretion is not abused, and a defendant is presumed not to 

have been subjected to undue prejudice, if four requirements are 

met: (1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; (2) the 

evidence is relevant; (3) the trial court determines under Fed. R. 

Evid. 403 that the probative value of the evidence is not 

substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; 

and (4) the court, if requested, provides an appropriate 

instruction limiting the jury's use of the evidence to its proper 

purpose. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 

(1988); Grissom, 44 F.3d at 1513; United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 

1089, 1094 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

9 Fed. R. Evid. 404{b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 

provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice 

in advance of trial, or during trial if the court 

excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 

general nature of any such evidence it intends to 

introduce at trial. 

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Although we have held that the government must precisely 

articulate a proper purpose for the evidence and the trial court 

must specifically identify the proper purpose for which it is 

admitted, United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (lOth Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986), the failure of the 

government or the court to do so will not be deemed harmful if the 

evidence's proper purpose is apparent from the record and the 

evidence was correctly admitted. Birch, 39 F.3d at 1094. 

We look first at the specific evidence admitted. Ms. Doss 

testified about an altercation that occurred two weeks before the 

search of Mr. McDermott's home, when she was moving out from 

living with her ex-fiance, and Mr. McDermott was there helping him 

with some work. She testified that McDermott and she argued over 

the fact that she had slept with a third man, and McDermott 

"accused me of things and told me that I would get hurt. He had 

higher powers than himself and he would have me dead." R. Vol. 

XIII at 660. She filed a police report at the time, which was 

admitted into evidence, and in her testimony she referred to the 

report, saying, "As the report states, I called him a pothead and 

a drug dealer and he told me to leave my own house .... [H]e did 

say that he would have somebody hurt me. [H]e threatened my 

life." Id. at 660-62. 

The police report itself recounts the incident as follows: 

The victim had come from work and Dave [McDermott] 

started accusing the victim of cheating on her fiance. 

Dave was being verbally abusive and kept poking the 

victim in the chest with his finger and telling her to 

get out of the house. The victim told Dave that he was 

nothing but a pothead and a drug dealer. Dave then told 

the victim that if she ever told anyone that she would 

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get hurt. Dave said that he had connections bigger than 

himself and that if she said anything she would end up 

dead. 

R. Vol. I, Tab 7. 

The government never specifically stated the purpose for 

which it was offering the evidence or the precise inferences to be 

drawn from it. The court initially prohibited the evidence under 

Rule 403, R. Vol. X at 31, then reconsidered, saying it appeared 

to be a direct threat to a witness. R. Vol. XII at 394. Counsel 

for one of the codefendants argued that it was not in retaliation 

for any testimony Ms. Doss might give, to which the court replied 

that this could be brought out on cross-examination. Id. at 395. 

The government argues on appeal that the threat, under the 

circumstances in which it was made, tends to prove that 

Mr. McDermott was part of a criminal organization or group with 

some connection to drug activity. The government argues that the 

testimony was admissible to show Mr. McDermott's knowledge of and 

intent and opportunity to be a part of a drug conspiracy, and his 

identity as a conspiracy member. These are proper purposes in the 

context of the case at bar, as would be the purpose stated by the 

court: to show a threat made to a witness. But it is not entirely 

clear that Mr. McDermott viewed Ms. Doss as a potential witness at 

the time. This link was stronger in the police report than in her 

testimony on the stand, and the district court also seemed 

concerned that the actual testimony proved less than what the 

court had anticipated. See R. Vol. XIII at 665. 

Even if we agree that there is some relevance to this 

testimony, however, we cannot escape the conclusion that the 

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district court was right the first time: whatever probative value 

the testimony had was substantially outweighed by its potential 

for unfair prejudice. It was error to admit it. 

IV. Sufficiency of Evidence of Continuing Criminal Ente£Prise 

Finally, Mr. McDermott challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain his continuing criminal enterprise conviction. 

We review de novo whether sufficient evidence exists in the 

record to support a conviction. United States v. Pike, 36 F.3d 

1011, 1012 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1170 (1995). 

The standard is "whether any rational factfinder, viewing the 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom as a whole in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, could find the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Pike, 36 F.3d 

at 1012 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 

To be guilty of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 

under 21 U.S.C. § 848, a defendant must have acted in concert with 

five or more persons with respect to whom the defendant occupied a 

position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 

management. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (2) (A). The government does not 

have to show that a defendant organized, supervised, or managed 

the five people simultaneously, as long as the defendant did so 

during the life of the criminal enterprise. United States v. 

Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 911 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 

S. Ct. 1156 (1995). 

Mr. McDermott contends that he was not an organizer, 

supervisor or manager of five other people, that the government 

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showed no more than buyer-seller relationships at most. He is 

correct that proof of a buyer-seller relationship alone is not 

enough to establish a managerial role, id. at 912, but additional 

evidence of formal or informal authority or responsibility 

respecting a purchaser's conduct may suffice. Id. 

Even if we set aside any evidence concerning Mr. McDermott's 

sales of marijuana to various dealers, we find ample evidence of 

Mr. McDermott's organizing, supervisory, and/or managerial role 

just in his hiring of various people to perform tasks in furtherance of his drug operation. 

The evidence showed that he paid Robert Nelson, Christy 

Fielding, Mike Grogg, Billy Miller, Bobby Collinson, Joel Bean and 

Stacy Lacy to transport marijuana from Texas to Oklahoma and/or to 

allow use of their or their relatives' homes for storage and 

repackaging of drug shipments. Mr. Nelson also delivered drugs to 

Mr. McDermott's buyers; Ms. Fielding collected payments for him; 

Mr. Grogg helped Mr. McDermott carry $18,000 to Texas to pay a 

supplier. Mr. McDermott planned and went along on most, if not 

all, of the Texas trips, and helped to break up and repackage the 

marijuana into smaller packages at the storage houses. The 

evidence is more than sufficient. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the evidence was 

sufficient to sustain Mr. McDermott's conviction, and that 

Mr. McDermott was not twice placed in jeopardy in violation of the 

Constitution; but that Mr. McDermott is entitled to a new trial 

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because his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was 

violated. AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED for a new 

trial. 

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