Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05182/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gerald Llopis
Defendant
Rotonda R. Llopis
Defendant
U.S. Bank National Association
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROTONDA R. LLOPIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-05182-EDL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO REMAND; ORDER GRANTING 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AND REASSIGNING CASE

On November 12, 2015, Defendant Rotonda Llopis filed a notice of removal of this 

unlawful detainer case filed by Plaintiff against Defendants Rotonda Llopis and Gerald Llopis in 

Solano County Superior Court on June 3, 2011, as well as an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP Application”). As only Defendant Rotonda Llopis has consented to this Court’s 

jurisdiction, the Court issues this report and recommendation and reassigns this case to a district 

judge. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the IFP Application and recommends 

remanding this matter to state court. 

Defendant’s IFP Application adequately alleges her poverty. Defendant is not employed. 

Her spouse’s net income is $1,800 per month, her monthly expenses total $670 per month, and she 

has two dependent children. She does not own a home, and has a bank account with a present 

balance of $200. She owns $50.00 in cash. Therefore, Defendant qualifies for in forma pauperis

status, and her IFP Application is granted. 

However, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case and the case should be 

remanded. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 

in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the 

district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

at any time before final judgment, it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 

the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Thus, “[f]ederal 

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id.; see also Abrego v. 

Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). Removal jurisdiction may be based on 

diversity of citizenship or on the existence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Whether 

removal jurisdiction exists must be determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint. 

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 

Defendant Rotonda Llopis fails to meet the requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) 

that all Defendants must join in a notice of removal. Remand, therefore, is appropriate on the 

ground that all Defendants have not joined in the notice of removal. 

Additionally, although Defendant Rotonda Llopis bases her notice of removal on federal 

question jurisdiction, none exists. When a civil action over which the federal courts have original 

jurisdiction is brought in state court, the defendant may remove the action to federal district court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However, a case may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 only when 

a federal question appears on the face of the properly pleaded complaint. See Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 

535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (“The well-pleaded-complaint rule has long governed whether a case 

“arises under” federal law for purposes of § 1331.”); see also Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 

294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is 

governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only 

when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”). 

Here, the face of the complaint asserts only one state law claim for unlawful detainer. Because the 

complaint does not provide any basis for removal, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

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Moreover, although Defendant Rotonda Llopis does not base her notice of removal on 

diversity jurisdiction, no such basis is evident from the complaint. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 

this Court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in controversy 

exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” The complaint does not 

allege Plaintiff’s citizenship. The complaint also does not indicate that the damages at issue meet 

the jurisdictional minimum. Because the case is not removable as a diversity action, remand is 

also appropriate on this ground.

Accordingly, the Court recommends remanding this case to the Solano County Superior 

Court. Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court's order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

________________________

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

November 17, 2015

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