Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00223/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00223-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
All Star Auto Recycling
Defendant
Joseph Cream
Defendant
David Moore
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID MOORE, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ALL STAR AUTO RECYCLING, INC., 

et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:11-cv-00223-MCE-CKD 

ORDER 

Plaintiff David Moore (“Plaintiff”) brought the present action against his former 

employers for unpaid overtime and related violations under the California Labor Code, 

the California Business and Professions Code, and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 

(“FLSA”). Plaintiff now moves for partial summary judgment against Defendants – All 

Star Auto Recycling, Inc. (“All Star”) and its owner, Joseph Cream (“Cream”). Plaintiff 

argues there is no dispute that (1) he was not an exempt employee; (2) he is entitled to 

overtime compensation and subsequent waiting penalties for driving a truck for All Star; 

and (3) Defendants failed to provide him with pay records, in violation of California Labor 

Code section 226. Plaintiff also seeks to have fifteen of Defendants’ affirmative 

defenses dismissed. 

/// 

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Defendants counter that the facts underpinning Plaintiff’s claims remain in dispute 

and must be determined by a trier of fact. Furthermore, Defendants contend that 

because Plaintiff has failed to prove his claims, Plaintiff has not negated Defendants’ 

affirmative defenses, making summary judgment inappropriate. 

As set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED in 

part and GRANTED in part.1

BACKGROUND 

 Cream owns All Star, which includes a junk yard and metal recycling facility in 

Corning, California. In May 2005, Cream hired Plaintiff for $1,200 a week to drive a truck 

for All Star. Typically, Plaintiff drove a loaded truck from his home in Sacramento to 

Schnitzer Steel in Oakland, California, or Sims in Redwood City, California. (Cream’s 

Dep. 19:10-22:18, Apr. 23, 2012, ECF No. 26-2 at 8-10.) When Plaintiff left Schnitzer 

Steel, he received a sales slip or weight sheet, which indicated “in” and “out” times. He 

then would drive to All Star’s Corning yard, re-load the truck and return to Sacramento, 

beginning the process again the next morning. (See Pl.’s Undisputed Facts Nos. 2-7.) 

Plaintiff sometimes made additional runs to pick up cars from other yards or auto 

auctions before completing his route and returning to Sacramento. (Pl.’s Dep. 

33:8-36:17, Apr. 23, 2012, ECF No. 26-1 at 20-22.) According to Plaintiff, these runs 

sometimes took as long as fourteen hours. (Id. at 20-25.) Plaintiff drove a truck for All 

Star until August 2008 and received no overtime pay during any that of time (ECF 

No. 26-2 at 7). (See also Cream’s Dep. 68:1-4, Apr. 23, 2012, ECF No. 23-2 at 13; ECF 

No. 24-1.) 

Plaintiff was required by law to keep daily logs of his travel time as a truck driver. 

(See Pl.’s Undisputed Fact No. 8.) 

 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

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Plaintiff stored those logs in a “private box” in his home (ECF No. 26-1 at 58). Plaintiff 

claims he maintained his driver’s logs each day he worked, while Defendants did not 

keep track of his hours worked, violating California Labor Code section 1174(d) (ECF 

No. 23 at 8). Plaintiff argues those logs show he is entitled to unpaid overtime (ECF 

No. 23 at 14). Plaintiff also seeks unpaid overtime for work hours not recorded in those 

driver’s logs. Plaintiff claims that Cream asked Plaintiff to work numerous additional 

hours beyond what Plaintiff recorded. To accommodate these requests, Plaintiff alleges 

he only recorded the number of hours worked up to the allowed limit for truck drivers. 

Plaintiff accordingly claims he worked extra hours for Cream without recording them 

(ECF No. 26-1 at 32-35). For the purposes of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 

Plaintiff only seeks the alleged $15,982.50 in unpaid overtime from 2007 to 2008 

reflected in his driver’s logs (ECF No. 23 at 14). 

Defendants challenge the accuracy of those driver’s logs. First, they point out 

Plaintiff did not produce his driver’s logs, which they claim they repeatedly requested to 

no avail, until this litigation began in 2011 (ECF No. 26 at 6-8). Defendants maintain 

Plaintiff never mentioned overtime pay or a reduction in work until this litigation (ECF 

No. 26 at 16). Defendants also point to discrepancies between the “on duty (not 

driving)” times on the driving logs and the “in” and “out” times from the Schnitzer Steel 

receipts Plaintiff received when dropping off loads in Oakland.2

 Defendants argue the 

times from the logs and receipts should correspond if the driver’s logs accurately reflect 

time Plaintiff worked (ECF No. 26 at 9). Finally, Jeff Fletcher (“Fletcher”), who took over 

driving Plaintiff’s route for All Star, testified the route from Corning to Oakland and back 

to Corning takes him about eight hours. (See Fletcher’s Dep. 13:20-21, Apr. 24, 2012, 

ECF No. 26-2 at 40.) 

/// 

 2 Plaintiff argues these receipts are irrelevant because they refer to trips made in September 28, 

2006, October 5, 2006, and November 9, 2006, which fall outside the period of time contested in this case. 

See Ex. 8 to Decl. of Jennifer Lee; (ECF No. 27 at 5). Even though the Schnitzer Steel receipts may be 

time barred, to the extent they may illuminate discrepancies in Plaintiff’s record keeping, they have some 

relevance. 

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In the fall of 2008, Cream purchased a towing company in Redding that he 

renamed All Star Towing. Cream appointed Plaintiff as the manager of the Redding yard 

in August 2008 (ECF No. 26-2 at 5-7). (See Pl.’s Undisputed Fact No. 17.) Plaintiff was 

one of three signatories on the All Star bank account while he worked in Redding, and 

he wrote checks to cover rent, uniforms, the Port-a-John for the yard, and one 

employee’s paycheck (ECF No. 26-1 at 50-54). Plaintiff also towed cars for customers 

and the police department, holding those latter vehicles at the Redding yard until the 

police authorized their release. Plaintiff completed the paperwork associated with those 

police tows. (Id. at 47-48); (see also Hammond’s Dep. 60:3-4, Apr. 24, 2012, ECF 

No. 26-2 at 35.) Finally, when All Star drivers came to the Redding yard, Plaintiff 

directed them as to which vehicles to pick up. (Decl. of William Noble ¶¶ 4, 5, ECF 

No. 26-6; Decl. of Dustin Nelson ¶¶ 4, 5, ECF No. 26-5.) 

All Star general manager Eric Hammond (“Hammond”) and Cream testified at 

their depositions that Plaintiff ran the Redding yard. According to Hammond, Plaintiff 

“pretty much . . . was on his own. He overseen (sic) himself” (ECF No. 26-2 at 34). 

Cream stated Plaintiff was his own boss and had the power to hire and fire employees at 

the Redding yard. Plaintiff’s son, Michael Moore, and daughter-in-law, Tiffany Moore, 

came to work at the Redding yard during Plaintiff’s tenure there. Michael Moore worked 

full time towing cars, while Tiffany Moore performed office work about seven hours a 

week (ECF No. 23-2 at 14-19). Cream testified that Plaintiff hired Michael Moore and 

“probably” hired Tiffany Moore (ECF No. 26-2 at 16, 18-20). 

Plaintiff saw his time in Redding somewhat differently. He said Cream set the 

procedures and Cream and Hammond hired Michael Moore and Tiffany Moore. Plaintiff 

stated his job, for all intents and purposes, was to tow vehicles and keep the Redding 

yard in good condition (ECF No. 26-1 at 55-57, 61; ECF No. 23 at 13). Otherwise, 

Plaintiff described his position as “basically a desk clerk” (ECF No. 26-1 at 44). Plaintiff 

received no overtime pay during his tenure at the Redding yard (ECF No. 26-2 at 7). 

/// 

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All Star fired Plaintiff in September 2009. (Id. at 49.) Hammond stated the 

Redding yard was $30,000 in debt at the time and “I did not have another position for 

him” (ECF No. 26-2 at 25). Cream closed the Redding yard following Plaintiff’s 

departure (ECF No. 26 at 12). On October 11, 2010, Plaintiff requested that All Star 

provide his pay records, pursuant to California Labor Code section 226(b) (ECF 

No. 23-10 at 4). Defendants did not provide those records. 

Plaintiff filed this action on January 25, 2011. He seeks unpaid overtime wages 

under California and federal law from both his time as a truck driver for the Corning yard 

and as a manager of the Redding yard. Plaintiff also filed claims for All Star’s alleged 

failure to itemize wage statements, failure to pay unpaid wages, failure to provide pay 

records, and unlawful business practices (ECF No. 2 at 3-9). Plaintiff now moves for 

partial summary judgment on the following issues: 

1. Plaintiff was not an exempt employee while driving trucks for the Corning 

yard. 

2. Plaintiff is entitled to $15,982.50 in overtime pay from Defendants for his 

time driving trucks for the Corning yard. 

3. Plaintiff is entitled to thirty days wages from Defendants for their failure to 

pay him proper wages upon termination under California Labor Code 

section 203. 

4. Plaintiff was not an exempt employee while managing the Redding yard. 

5. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to inspect or copy 

his pay records in accordance with California Labor Code section 226. 

6. Defendants’ affirmative defenses should be dismissed. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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STANDARD 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). One of 

the principal purposes of Rule 563 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or 

defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on part of a claim or 

defense. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a claim . . . may . . 

. move . . . for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”); 

see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France 

Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 

1992). 

The standard that applies to a motion for summary adjudication is the same as 

that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), 56(c); 

Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, 

and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)). 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does 

exist. 

 3 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First 

Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party 

must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or admissible 

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 

56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a 

fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the 

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 

347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury, 

there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, 

but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for 

the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L. Ed. 867 (1872)). As 

the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under 

Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87. 

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 

/// 

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ANALYSIS 

A. Exempt Employee Status. 

The FLSA exempts persons employed “in a bona fide executive, administrative or 

professional capacity” from overtime requirements and allows the United States 

Secretary of Labor to define the scope of the exemptions. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The 

FLSA “explicitly permits greater employee protection under state law.” Ramirez v. 

Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 795 (1999) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 218(a)). California 

also recognizes overtime exemptions for executive, administrative, or professional 

employees. CAL. LAB. CODE § 515(a). The California Labor Code empowers the state’s 

Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) to establish those exemptions. Id. Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff meets the executive and administrative exemptions (ECF No. 26 at 

13-17). Plaintiff counters that he does not meet the prerequisites for either exemption 

and moves for summary judgment on both issues (ECF No. 23 at 11-15). 

1. Executive Exemption. 

For purposes of the FLSA, the Secretary of Labor defines an executive employee 

as one: “(1) Compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week . . .; 

(2) Whose primary duty is management of the enterprise in which the employee is 

employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; (3) Who 

customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees; and (4) Who 

has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and 

recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change 

of status of other employees are given particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a). 

/// 

/// 

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Under California law, ICW Wage Order No. 9 outlines the requirements for each 

exemption with regard to the transportation industry, which encompasses towing and 

truck driving. See Which IWC Order? Classifications, Division of Labor Standards 

Enforcement, 22 (Jan. 2003), http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/WhichIWCOrderClassifications.PDF. 

California’s executive exemption generally follows the FLSA and applies to any 

employees who manage an enterprise, have the authority or influence to hire or fire 

other employees, direct the work of at least two employees, and customarily and 

regularly exercise “discretion and independent judgment.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, 

§ 11090(A)(1). 

To direct two or more employees, the employee must direct the equivalent of two 

full-time employees to meet the exemption requirement. If an employee supervises one 

full-time employee and two half-time employees, that would equal “two or more other 

employees” under the meaning of the exemption. 29 C.F.R. § 541.104. 

Courts are to construe these exemptions “narrowly,” Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 794, 

and the exemptions only apply to employees “plainly and [unmistakably] within their 

terms and spirit.” Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Klem v. County of Santa Clara, 208 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000)). While 

Defendants bear the burden of proving the exemption at trial, Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 

794-95, Plaintiff, as the moving party in this action, must show there is no genuine issue 

of material fact regarding the exemption issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). If Plaintiff meets 

that initial responsibility, then the burden shifts back to Defendants to show a material 

fact actually exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 

While Plaintiff served as the manager of the Redding yard, he supervised his son 

Michael Moore and daughter-in-law Tiffany Moore. Michael Moore worked full time, 

while Tiffany Moore worked about seven hours a week. Plaintiff asserts that Michael 

Moore and Tiffany Moore were the only employees he supervised. There is no dispute 

in the record that Michael Moore and Tiffany Moore were not the equivalent of two, fulltime employees. 

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With this showing, Plaintiff meets his initial responsibility under Rule 56(c) of 

demonstrating the executive exemption does not apply. The burden shifts to 

Defendants. 

To show Plaintiff supervised the equivalent of two employees, Defendants 

submitted the declarations of Dustin Nelson (“Nelson”) and William Noble (“Noble”) (ECF 

No. 26-5; ECF No. 26-6). Nelson and Noble both drove trucks for All Star and assert 

that Plaintiff told them which cars to pick up from the Redding yard. Nelson said he 

generally went to Redding once a month for pick-ups (ECF No. 26-5 at 2), while Noble 

said he went to Redding “several times a month, up to as much as twice a week” (ECF 

No. 26-6). Defendants reason that since these two drivers worked full time and Plaintiff 

directed them as to which cars to take, then Plaintiff directed the work of Michael Moore, 

Tiffany Moore, Nelson, and Noble – the equivalent of more than two full-time employees 

(ECF No. 26 at 21). 

Defendants’ argument fails because it misconstrues the calculation. “Hours 

worked by an employee cannot be credited more than once for different executives. . . . 

[A] full-time employee who works four hours for one supervisor and four hours for a 

different supervisor, for example, can be credited as a half-time employee for both 

supervisors.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.104(d). Therefore, Defendants cannot count all of Nelson 

and Noble’s hours worked for All Star toward Plaintiff’s executive exemption since 

Plaintiff only directed each driver a few times a month, at most. 

For Defendants to withstand summary judgment on this point, they have to do 

more than raise “some metaphysical doubt.” Defendants must show a rational trier of 

fact could find Plaintiff supervised Nelson and Noble for thirty-three hours a week.4

 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87. Defendants failed to do this. 

/// 

 4 Two full-time employees would work eighty hours a week. Michael worked full time, and Tiffany 

worked about seven hours a week, meaning Plaintiff had to supervise other employees for another thirtythree hours a week to meet the eighty-hour mark – the equivalent of two full-time employees. 

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While the record does not indicate how long it takes to load a “4-car” truck5 like Noble 

and Nelson drove, Fletcher testified that unloading his truck typically took about fortyfive minutes, including wait time, at Schnitzer Steel (ECF No. 26-2 at 39). Plaintiff said it 

took him fifteen minutes to prepare his truck for unloading and another fifteen minutes for 

the loader to unload the truck (ECF No. 26-1 at 18). It is difficult to imagine, even in a 

week in which Noble and Nelson visited the Redding yard three times collectively, that 

Plaintiff spent thirty-three hours directing them which twelve total cars to load. 

In sum, it is not rational to conclude Plaintiff directed All Star’s truck drivers for 

thirty-three hours a week, which means there is no genuine issue of material fact 

regarding Plaintiff’s status under the executive exemption. It is clear Plaintiff did not 

supervise the equivalent of two employees. Furthermore, Defendants did not contend 

the executive exemption applied to Plaintiff’s time as a truck driver for the Corning yard. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for summary adjudication as to his failure to qualify as an 

exempt employee under the executive exemption is GRANTED.6

 

2. Administrative Exemption.

In addition to the executive exemption discussed above, the FLSA also includes 

an administrative exemption for employees who are: “(1) Compensated on a salary or 

fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week . . . ; (2) Whose primary duty is the 

performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general 

business operations of the employer or the employer's customers; and (3) Whose 

primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect 

to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). 

 5 A “4-car” truck can carry four cars at a time (ECF No. 26-6 at 1). 

6 Plaintiff also requested this Court find the declarations of Noble and Nelson inadmissible 

because Defendants did not disclose either witness as required under Rule 26(a)(1) until after the close of 

discovery. As noted above, Defendants’ argument fails even with these declarations; therefore, this Court 

does not need to address the issue on procedural grounds. 

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California law generally tracks the federal statute. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, 

§ 11090(A)(2). 

The dispute regarding Plaintiff’s primary duties running the Redding yard are 

readily apparent. Plaintiff contends his primary responsibilities were maintaining the 

yard and towing vehicles, not office or non-manual management work. However, 

Plaintiff acknowledges he had the responsibilities of a desk clerk, filling out paper work 

and writing checks for rent, uniforms, a Port-a-John, and at least one employee’s pay. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts Cream set the procedures for running the Redding yard. 

However, both Cream and Hammond testified that Plaintiff ran the Redding yard with 

little interference, set his own hours, and had the authority to hire and fire employees. 

Hammond said “pretty much [Plaintiff] was on his own. He overseen (sic) himself.” 

On a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the opposing party is to be 

believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before 

the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Applying that standard to Cream and Hammond’s testimony and Plaintiff’s own 

admissions regarding the office work his job entailed, it is apparent summary judgment is 

inappropriate. A clear dispute remains on the administrative exemption issue for a trier 

of fact to resolve. 

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue that Plaintiff was not 

an exempt employee under the administrative exemption while managing the Redding 

yard is DENIED. 

Defendants did not assert that the administrative exemption applied to Plaintiff’s 

time as a truck driver for the Corning yard. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for summary 

adjudication as to his failure to qualify as employee under the administrative exemption 

while driving trucks for the Corning yard is GRANTED. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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B. Overtime Compensation for Time as Truck Driver for Corning Yard. 

Employers cannot employ an employee for a work week longer than forty hours 

without compensating that employee at rate of at least one-and-a-half times the regular 

rate for the excess hours worked. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). An employer who violates 

section 207 is liable to the employee for the unpaid overtime in addition to an equal 

amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). California law likewise protects 

employees, CAL. LAB. CODE § 501(a), and entitles them to recover unpaid overtime in a 

civil action. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194(a). 

 Plaintiff asserts he maintained daily driver’s logs throughout his time as a truck 

driver for All Star and that Defendants failed to keep records of Plaintiff’s employment, as 

required by law. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1174(d) (requiring employers to keep payroll 

records of hours worked daily by employees). Since Plaintiff testified the logs accurately 

reflect hours he actually worked and Defendants do not have records to contradict the 

driver’s logs, Plaintiff argues there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the 

unpaid overtime. Plaintiff concludes that summary judgment is appropriate for the 

unpaid overtime those logs reflect Plaintiff worked, which amounted to $15,982.50 (ECF 

No. 23 at 14). 

 While Plaintiff appears to have met his initial burden under Rule 56(c) and shifted 

the onus to Defendants, Defendants do not necessarily need their own payroll records to 

withstand summary judgment under Rule 56(e). Instead, Defendants demonstrate a 

genuine issue of material fact with the following: (1) Fletcher’s testimony regarding the 

route Plaintiff used to drive; (2) Plaintiff’s admission he falsified his driver’s logs; (3) the 

Schnitzer Steel receipts; and (4) Defendants’ allegations Plaintiff never made them 

aware of his unpaid overtime hours. 

 First, Fletcher testified that he took over Plaintiff’s route and continues to drive it. 

Fletcher said that beginning and ending at the Corning yard, the route usually takes him 

about eight hours. 

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Plaintiff said the route sometimes took him as long as fourteen hours, though that 

included other stops after Schnitzer Steel. Defendants argue that any additional work 

time Plaintiff claims is false or stems from his Sacramento commute and should not 

count toward an overtime claim. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 

Defendants, a dispute surfaces about how many work hours the Corning-to-Oakland 

route required. 

 Next, Plaintiff admitted that he falsified his driver’s logs. Plaintiff maintains the 

driver’s logs accurately reflect hours he worked and the falsification only happened with 

regard to additional hours worked beyond what he noted in the logs. However, 

Defendants use the falsification of the logs as a starting point to undermine Plaintiff’s 

credibility when it comes to the veracity of those logged hours. Defendants build on this 

point by noting that the times on the driving logs do not correspond with the times on the 

receipts from Schnitzer Steel. Defendants assert that the receipts demonstrate Plaintiff 

falsified his logs in a manner different than what he claims. Defendants conclude 

Plaintiff did not omit hours from his logs but, rather, added unworked hours to support his 

claim for unpaid overtime. 

Defendants finally allege that Plaintiff never made them aware of the overtime he 

worked until this litigation. Defendants note that if an employee “fails to notify the 

employer or deliberately prevents the employer from acquiring knowledge of the 

overtime work, the employer’s failure to pay for the overtime hours is not a violation.” 

Forrester v. Roth’s I. G. A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants argue that is the case here. 

 Plaintiff counters that Cream was aware of the overtime hours and Cream asked 

Plaintiff to falsify the logs in order to allow Plaintiff to work additional time. Plaintiff 

contends that the Schnitzer Steel receipts show work activity from 2006, not 2007 and 

2008; therefore, they are irrelevant.7

 

 7 Plaintiff is not claiming unpaid overtime from 2006 because the applicable statute of limitations 

limits his claims to after January 25, 2007 (ECF No. 23 at 6).

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However, if this Court takes the evidence as true that the route takes Fletcher eight 

hours; that Plaintiff falsified his 2006 records to reflect hours that he did not in fact work; 

that Plaintiff falsified his 2007 and 2008 records, as well; and that Plaintiff never made 

Defendants aware of his overtime claims until the present litigation, then it would be 

rational to infer Plaintiff’s driver’s logs do not accurately reflect overtime Plaintiff actually 

worked for Defendants. Even if the logs do reflect overtime Plaintiff actually worked for 

All Star, Defendants still have an argument under Forrester that Plaintiff cannot recover 

because he failed to notify them of his unpaid overtime. 

Defendants claim their evidence shows Plaintiff falsified his logs to reflect 

overtime hours that he did not in fact work. Plaintiff maintains he recorded the hours 

contemporaneously to his work and his logs accurately reflect hours actually worked. 

This presents a clear factual dispute for a trier of fact to resolve. Defendants have met 

their burden to withstand summary judgment under Rule 56(e). 

Plaintiff’s request for partial summary judgment as to his entitlement to $15,982.50 in 

overtime for his work as a truck driver for All Star is DENIED. 

C. Thirty Days in Wages. 

Plaintiff claims that because he is entitled to wages for unpaid overtime and 

Defendants refused to pay those wages, Plaintiff can recover thirty days in wages as a 

waiting time penalty for non-payment under California Labor Code section 203(a). 

However, Plaintiff’s claim under section 203 depends on a showing that he has, in fact, 

earned wages that he did not receive. Section 203 punishes an employer for not paying 

what is owed. As already discussed, Plaintiff has not shown he is owed unpaid overtime 

at this stage. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to his entitlement to 

thirty days’ wages under California Labor Code section 203 is DENIED. 

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D. Right to Inspect Pay Records. 

Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to a penalty payment of $750 from Defendants for a 

violation of California Labor Code section 226. Section 226(b) gives current and former 

employees a right to inspect or copy their employment records. If the employer fails to 

allow the employee to inspect her records, the employee can collect a $750 penalty from 

the employer. CAL. LAB. CODE §226(f). 

On October 11, 2010, Plaintiff requested that Defendants send his employment 

records (ECF No. 23-10 at 4). Plaintiff claims Defendants’ failure to send these records 

entitles him to the $750 penalty. Defendants counter that they are required to make 

those records available, not send them to an employee. Furthermore, Defendants cite 

impossibility under California Labor Code section 226(c) as an affirmative defense for 

not complying with a section 226(b) request. Defendants argue they cannot provide 

records from Plaintiff’s time as a truck driver for All Star because Plaintiff refused to 

submit his driver’s logs. This factual dispute makes summary judgment inappropriate. 

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment that Defendants violated section 

226(b), entitling Plaintiff to a $750 penalty under section 226(f), is DENIED. 

E. Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses. 

Finally, Plaintiff moves to dismiss fifteen of Defendants’ seventeen affirmative 

defenses as “baseless and without any evidentiary support” (ECF No. 23 at 21). While a 

court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 

on a motion for summary judgment, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, Defendants still must 

provide factual support for their affirmative defenses to withstand summary judgment. 

See Harper v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1090-91 (D. Del. 

1990). This Court will address Defendants’ affirmative defenses in the order in which 

Plaintiff challenges them (ECF No. 10 at 9-11; ECF No. 11 at 9-11). 

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1. Failure to State a Claim; Failure to State a Claim with Sufficient 

Particularity. 

Defendants’ first and seventeenth affirmative defenses assert Plaintiff’s Complaint 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and fails to state a claim with 

sufficient particularity to enable or permit Defendants to raise all appropriate defenses 

(ECF No. 10 at 9, 11; ECF No. 11 at 9, 11). Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication on 

grounds that Defendants should have addressed these defenses in a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion. Defendants counter Plaintiff should have done the same with regard to his 

attempt to dismiss these defenses. 

While parties can use a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failing to 

state a claim, the Rules do not require them to do so. “[E]very defense, in law or fact, 

may be asserted in the responsive pleading.” 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.

MILLER ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1347 (3d ed. 2013). See also Radio Corp. of 

Am. v. Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17 (10th Cir. 1970) (noting that Rule 8(c) 

requires a party to set forth affirmative defenses in her pleading, a Rule 12(b) motion, or 

tried by the express or implied consent of the parties). Since Defendants properly raised 

their affirmative defenses in their answers, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment on Defendants’ first and seventeenth affirmative defenses is DENIED. 

2. Plaintiff Suffered No Damages; Plaintiff’s Damages are Vague, 

Uncertain, and Speculative. 

Next, Plaintiff moves to dismiss Defendants’ second and tenth affirmative 

defenses – that Plaintiff suffered no damages and that those damages were vague, 

uncertain, and speculative. Plaintiff claims that he has demonstrated that he worked 

unpaid overtime hours as a non-exempt employee. Since Defendants do not have 

employment records to counter that evidence, Plaintiff concludes he has proven his 

damages and this Court should dismiss these two defenses (ECF No. 23 at 22). 

/// 

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To support his argument, Plaintiff quotes Bao Yi Yang v. Shanghai Gourmet, which 

states that “where an employer’s records of the hours an employee worked are 

inaccurate, the employee carries his burden ‘if he proves that he has in fact performed 

work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to 

show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.’” 

471 F. App’x 784, 787 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 

328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)). 

Of course, Bao Yi Yang requires the employee prove she actually worked the 

uncompensated hours in question. As previously discussed, whether Plaintiff worked 

uncompensated overtime remains a disputed issue in this case. As such, Plaintiff’s 

motion to dismiss Defendants’ damages-related affirmative defenses is DENIED. 

3. Contributory negligence/comparative fault of Plaintiff; Any Alleged 

Damages Were Caused by a Third Party; Laches; Estoppel; 

Waiver; Unclean Hands; Failure to Mitigate; Punitive Damages 

Barred; Plaintiff Made Informed Decisions; Plaintiff Lacks 

Standing; Defendants’ Conduct Was Privileged and Justified.

Lastly, Plaintiff moves to dismiss the Defendants’ remaining affirmative defenses 

– except for the statute of limitations defense (ninth defense) and the exemption 

defenses (sixteenth defense) whose merits this Court already addressed above – on the 

basis they are “baseless and nonsensical” (ECF No. 23 at 22). Plaintiff claims these 

defenses lack evidentiary support and are “simply irrelevant.” Id. However, Plaintiff 

does not assert the specific failures of each defense and merely relies on the blanket 

assertion that he has proven he worked uncompensated overtime. Once again, Plaintiff 

has not established he worked those uncompensated hours; therefore, his motion to 

dismiss Defendants’ third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, 

fourteenth and fifteenth affirmative defenses is DENIED. 

/// 

/// 

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CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (ECF 

No. 23) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s request for summary 

adjudication on grounds he was not an exempt employee under the executive exemption 

while working for All Star is GRANTED. Summary adjudication also is GRANTED as to 

Plaintiff’s claim he was not an exempt employee under the administrative exemption 

while driving a truck for All Star’s Corning yard. Plaintiff’s remaining requests for 

summary adjudication are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

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