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Parties Involved:
Frederick D. Arledge
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIT, ED 

United States ""court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tent.'i Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FREDERICK D. ARLEDGE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

SEP O 4 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5203 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-47-2-E) 

( N. D. Okla. ) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Defendant Frederick Dleon Arledge was charged under a 

three-count indictment with (1) conspiracy to possess with intent 

to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 

21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l), 841(b)(l)(A)(iii) and 846; (2) possession 

with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, 

aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l), 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-5203 Document: 010110133329 Date Filed: 09/04/1991 Page: 1 
841(b)(l)(A)(iii), and 18 u.s.c. § 2, and (3) assault upon a 

federal officer with a deadly weapon, in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

§ lll(b). 

Following a jury trial, defendant was acquitted on all three 

counts, but was found guilty of the lesser included offense of 

simple possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 

u.s.c. § 844(a). 1 On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the trial 

court erroneously considered itself powerless to depart downward 

from the sentencing guidelines; (2) the trial court gave an 

erroneous jury instruction on the elements of simple possession; 

(3) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict; (4) 

defendant's sentence was improperly enhanced by the actions of 

federal agents; (5) the trial court erroneously denied defendant's 

motion for mistrial; (6) the Attorney General has not followed 

statutory requirements in listing cocaine base on the controlled 

substance schedule; and (7) defendant's federal prosecution 

violated his fifth amendment due process rights. Appellant's 

Brief at 2-3. 

Facts 

United States postal inspectors in Los Angeles, California, 

intercepted a parcel addressed to Mrs. J. Brewer in Tulsa, 

Oklahoma. After a suspicious alert by a police dog, the postal 

inspectors opened the parcel to find a large amount of cocaine 

base. The package was repacked with eighty-six grams of the 

cocaine base, resealed, and delivered as addressed. The Tulsa 

1 Defendant was tried with a codefendant, 

Howard does not join in this appeal. 

2 

Roderick Howard. 

Appellate Case: 90-5203 Document: 010110133329 Date Filed: 09/04/1991 Page: 2 
address, home of Mrs. J. Brewer, codefendant Howard's former 

girlfriend's mother, was staked out by postal inspectors and the 

local police at the time defendant and Howard arrived to retrieve 

the package. When the law enforcement officers attempted to 

arrest them, a high speed chase ensued which involved a collision 

with another vehicle before defendants were finally stopped and 

apprehended. The defendant was driving the vehicle. Howard had 

allegedly injured his arm in a recent motorcycle accident, and was 

unable to drive. When the defendant and Howard were finally 

apprehended, the officers recovered the package of cocaine base 

from the vehicle. 

Following trial and conviction, defendant was sentenced to 

151 months imprisonment, based upon a base offense level of 

thirty-two, with a two-level increase for obstruction of justice. 

A total base offense level of thirty-four and a criminal history 

category of I results in a sentencing range of 151-188 months. 

u.s.s.G. § 201.1 and Ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). At 

sentencing, counsel for the defense requested a downward departure 

from the guidelines due to defendant's age and minimal criminal 

history. 2 u.s.s.G. §§ 4Al.3, 5Hl.1 and 5K2.0. The district court 

denied the departure request. 

I. 

First, defendant asserts that the district court did not 

apprehend its power to depart downward. We review questions 

2 Defendant was eighteen years old at 

He had one juvenile conviction at 

convictions for alluding and leaving the 

arising out of the circumstances of this 

3 

the time of his arrest. 

age seventeen, and two 

scene of property damage 

offense. 

Appellate Case: 90-5203 Document: 010110133329 Date Filed: 09/04/1991 Page: 3 
involving the legal interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de 

novo. United States v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1210, 1211 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

This issue is controlled by 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b) which states: 

The court shall .impose a sentence .of .the kind, and 

within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) 

unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating 

or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 

not adequately taken into consideration by the 

Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 

should result in a sentence different from that 

described. 

Section 3553(b)(emphasis added). Following defense counsel's 

request for the downward departure, the court specifically asked 

that counsel provide the court with "work of the Guidelines 

Commission where they did not address the issue of age?" Tr. Vol. 

VII at 4. The court stated that it "cannot depart except where it 

can be pointed out or the Court independently can determine that a 

matter was not addressed by the sentencing commission." We 

do not think that these remarks indicate that the court thought 

itself powerless under the guidelines to depart. On the contrary, 

it is clear that the court correctly interpreted the statute, 

concluding that the grounds proffered by defendant for departure 

were not extraordinary circumstances of the kind encompassed by 

section 3553(b), and therefore did not warrant a 

departure. 

downward 

We lack jurisdiction to review decisions in which the 

district court clearly apprehends its power to depart, but 

exercises its discretion not to do so. 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a); see 

United States v. Bromberg, 933 F.2d 895, 896 (10th Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Fox, 930 F.2d 820, 824 (10th Cir. 1991), getition 

4 

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for cert. filed, July 8, 1991; United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 

1524, 1529-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 155 (1990). 

II. 

Defendant next asserts that the district court's instruction 

to the jury regarding the lesser included offense of simple 

possession of a controlled substance was erroneous because it 

"caused the jury to speculate and guess when arriving at their 

verdict." Appellant's Brief at 9. The court gave the following 

instruction: 

The crime of possession with intent to distribute, 

which is charged in the indictment in this case, 

necessarily includes the lesser offense of possession of 

a narcotic controlled substance drug. It is against 

federal law to possess cocaine-base. 

So, if you should unanimously find a defendant "not 

guilty" of the crime of possession with intent to 

distribute, as charged in the indictment, then you must 

proceed to determine whether defendant is guilty of any 

lesser offense which is necessarily included in the 

crime charged. 

For you to find a defendant guilty of the lesser 

included offense of possession of cocaine-base, you must 

be convinced that the government has proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt both of the following things: 

First: That the defendant possessed cocaine-base. 

Second: That the defendant did so knowingly and 

intentionally. 

As I have instructed you previously, you should 

find that a defendant had possession of the cocaine-base 

if he had control of it, even though it was not 

physically on his person. If two or more people had 

control of it together, they had possession of it 

jointly. But it is not enough that a defendant knew 

about the cocaine-base; the defendant possessed the 

cocaine-base only if he had control of it, either alone 

or together with someone else. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 16 at 22. 

5 

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Prior to this instruction, the court offered the following 

definition of possession: 

You should find that a defendant had possession of 

the cocaine-base if he had control of it, even though it 

was not physically on his person. If two or more people 

had control of it together, they had possession of it 

jointly. But it is not enough that a defendant knew 

about the cocaine-base; the defendant possessed the 

cocaine-base only if he had control of it, either alone 

or together with someone else. 

Id. at 20. 

Defendant contends that the jury was confused by the fact 

that the instruction did not adequately address the element of 

control. Defendant admits that no objection was made to this 

instruction, and that our review can only be for plain error. 

Appellant's Brief at 11. Appellate courts will not usually 

disturb judgments based on errors not raised at the trial court 

level. United States v. Mitcheltree, No. 89-6406, slip op. at 4 

(10th Cir. July 24, 1991)(1991 WL 139645)(citing United States v. 

Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936)). We reverse for a plain error 

only when the errors "'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. at 4-5 (quoting 

Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160. "To find reversible plain error, we 

must be satisfied that the error not only affected substantial 

rights in a serious way, but also that the 'error had an unfair 

prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.'" Id. at 5 

(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16-17 n.14 (1985)). 

We review a claim of jury instruction error by reviewing the 

instructions in their entirety. United States v. Haar, 931 F.2d 

1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 199l)(citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-5203 Document: 010110133329 Date Filed: 09/04/1991 Page: 6 
146-47 (1973)). "[A] trial judge is given substantial latitude 

and discretion in tailoring and formulating the instructions so 

long as they are correct statements of law and fairly and 

adequately cover the issues presented." United States v. Pack, 

773 F.2d 261, 267 (10th Cir. 1985). "Our standard of review is 

not whether an instruction was faultless in every respect, but 

whether the jury, considering the instructions as a whole, was 

misled." United States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 

1989). Applying these standards to the facts of this case, we are 

satisfied that the trial court's instruction was sufficient and an 

adequate statement of the law. The jury was instructed that 

knowledge of cocaine base alone was insufficient; control was 

required. So defined, the concept of control was within the 

comprehension of the jury. Even if we were to conclude that the 

instruction lacked a certain measure of clarity, upon review of 

the instructions and the trial as a whole, we would hold that the 

error did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. 

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. at 16; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 

III. 

Defendant next asserts that the evidence presented at trial 

was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict on the 

lesser included offense of simple possession, and that his motion 

for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). We disagree. In reviewing the trial 

court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we review 

the evidence "'in the light most favorable to the government to 

determine whether there [was] sufficient evidence from which a 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-5203 Document: 010110133329 Date Filed: 09/04/1991 Page: 7 
jury could find that the defendant [was] guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Berry, 931 F.2d 671, 673 

(10th Cir. 1991)(quoting United States v. Lopez, 576 F.2d 840, 843 

(10th Cir. 1978)). In addressing a claim of insufficiency of 

evidence, we must determine whether "after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979)(emphasis in original). 

The evidence and testimony presented at trial indicate that 

defendant drove Howard to Ms. Brewer's home to pick up the 

package. There was additional testimony that defendant carried 

the package from the house to the vehicle. When the federal 

officers attempted to stop defendants from driving away from the 

front of the residence, one officer, in the path of the moving 

vehicle, was almost injured. Defendant attempted to avoid arrest 

and was not apprehended until after a police chase and a collision 

with another vehicle. 

The agents supervising the arrest testified that they had 

placed phosphorus dye on the "cocoon" containing the cocaine base 

inside the package. Traces of this dye were found on defendant's 

clothing and person when he was arrested. Defendant's obvious 

attempt to avoid arrest suggests that he had the requisite 

knowledge of the contents of the parcel, and dye on his clothes 

points to possession. "To constructively possess contraband, a 

person must knowingly hold the power and ability to exert control 

over it." United States v. Brooks, No. 90-5114, slip op. at 4 

8 

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(10th Cir. August 2, 1991)(1991 WL 143363)(citing United States v. 

Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987)). Constructive 

possession may be established through circumstantial evidence and 

possession may be shared by two or more individuals. Id. at 882. 

Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

government's case, we conclude that sufficient evidence was 

presented, both direct and circumstantial, to support the jury's 

verdict; defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal was 

properly denied. 

We must agree 

defendant's fourth claim 

with 

of 

IV. 

the 

error 

government's assessment 

is vague and unclear. 

that 

He 

asserts that, because the postal inspectors selected an amount of 

cocaine base over fifty grams to return to the package, they 

engaged in entrapment. Defendant does not point us to any 

indication in the record that he ever raised an entrapment defense 

during trial or that he requested a jury instruction on 

entrapment. Because defendant failed to raise this issue at any 

point during trial, or to point us to any specific error, we deem 

this issue waived. 

Defendant also argues that, because the postal inspectors 

repacked an amount of cocaine base in excess of fifty grams, they 

were responsible for his sentence enhancement. We conclude that 

this argument is without merit because, in light of the fact that 

the parcel originally contained over 4,000 grams of cocaine base, 

the repackaging did not prejudice the defendant. 

9 

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v. 

Defendant contends that remarks by the government during 

opening statement, and certain testimony of a government witness, 

were so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial, and 

therefore, his motion for mistrial -should have been granted. We 

review the decision to deny a motion for mistrial for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 108 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

In opening statement, the government indicated it would 

offer the testimony of the codefendant's former girlfriend. She 

would testify that defendant had remarked, in her presence, that 

he was going to travel to Kansas City to kill someone who had 

stolen his cocaine. Over an objection, the court allowed the 

testimony, but gave the jury a strong cautionary admonition to 

disregard any reference to the commission of a crime not charged 

in the indictment. The court further stated it was allowing the 

testimony "in regard to what [the witness] was told about any type 

of cocaine operation." Tr. vol. IV at 151. In the final 

instructions, the court again admonished the jury to disregard 

certain testimony, Rec. vol. 1, doc. 16 at 7, and instructed them 

that counsel's remarks are not evidence. Id. 

We also review questions regarding the admission of evidence 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bowser, Nos. 90-3234 

& 90-3256, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. July 19, 1991)(1991 

WL 130560)(citations omitted). Evidence of other wrongdoing is 

admitted if relevant for "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 

10 

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accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 403 of the Federal Rules 

of Evidence gives the court discretion in excluding relevant 

evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury . . . . . " We conclude .. that the district 

court's admission of the evidence in question, together with a 

limiting instruction, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Thus, the government's description of that testimony in opening 

statement would not be an appropriate basis for a mistrial. The 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 

for a mistrial. 

VI. 

In his sixth claim of error, defendant argues that "crack" or 

cocaine-base has not been properly classified as a controlled 

substance as proscribed by 21 u.s.c. § 811(a). Defendant cites, 

and liberally quotes, this court's decision in United States v. 

Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1990), in which we held that 21 

u.s.c. § 8ll(h), delegating the Attorney General the power to 

temporarily place substances on a schedule to avoid "imminent 

hazard to the public safety," is an unconstitutional delegation of 

power. Id. at 591. First, our holding in Widdowson has been 

recently overruled by the Supreme Court in Touby v. United States, 

111 S. Ct. 1752 (1991). Consequently, defendant cannot rely upon 

it. Second, defendant does not contend that the Attorney General 

has temporarily placed cocaine base on a controlled substance 

schedule. We fail to discern the applicability of our overruled 

holding to defendant's circumstances. 

11 

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Defendant further argues that the sentencing guideline 

provisions, enhancing the punishment for possession of cocaine 

base, violate his fifth amendment rights to due process and equal 

protection. The sentencing guidelines treat fifty grams of 

cocaine base the same as five kilograms of cocaine. See 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 841(b)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii). In United States v. Turner, 928 

F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1991), we joined other circuits in denying 

this constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme. 

" [D]ifferent penalties for cocaine base and cocaine in its other 

forms do not violate due process." Id. at 960. Defendant's other 

arguments addressing this issue are without merit. 

Finally, 

pursuant to 

guidelines. 

VII. 

defendant argues that he should be resentenced 

state penalties instead of federal sentencing 

He appears to believe that he was wrongly prosecuted 

under federal law. However, we are again at a disadvantage in our 

ability to discern, from defendant's brief, why this is so. 

Although it appears that local law enforcement agencies were 

involved in this case, it was a federal matter from the time 

United States postal authorities intercepted the package of 

cocaine base until defendant's arrest. Defendant's reliance on 

United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Utah 1990) is 

misplaced. In Williams, a case involving referral to federal 

prosecutors following a local strike force arrest, the court 

questioned the unlimited discretion of authorities to assign the 

case to federal or local prosecutors. We recently stated that the 

discretion afforded prosecutors in cases involving the referral of 

12 

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a case to federal authorities does not violate due process. 

United States v. Andersen, No. 90-4044, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. 

July 29, 1991)(1991 WL 136504). "'[S]o long as the prosecutor has 

probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense 

defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and 

what charge to file. generally rests entirely in his 

discretion.'" Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 

364 (1978)); see also United States v. Raymer, No. 89-6362, slip 

op. at 15-26 (10th Cir. July 24, 1991)(1991 WL 138158)(rejecting 

claim that state referral to federal prosecutor constitutes 

vindictive prosecution). A local strike force's decision to refer 

a case for federal prosecution, even if the sentence imposed may 

be more harsh, does not violate due process rights. See Andersen, 

No. 90-4044, slip op. at 5. Here, the case was federal from its 

inception and defendant's due process rights were not violated. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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