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Parties Involved:
Loretta Y. Jackson
Appellee
Pool Mortgage Company
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 81989 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

LORETTA Y. JACKSON, 

v. 

Plaintif f-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant, 

POOL MORTGAGE COMPANY, an 

Oklahoma Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant and 

Cross-Appellee. 

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Nos. 87-1361 

87-1363 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. Civ-85-1767-E) 

Harvey L. Harmon, Sr., of Kornfeld, Franklin & Phillips, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 

Donald w. Davis, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Pl~intiff-Appellee 

and Cross-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 1 
This employment discrimination case raises two issues: (1) 

whether the damage award was excessive because it exceeded 

statutory limitations on backpay awards; and (2) whether the 

district court properly vacated the jury's award of punitive 

damages. 1 

The underlying facts are as follows. Defendant Pool Mortgage 

Company, an Oklahoma Corporation, hired plaintiff Loretta Jackson, 

a black female, in 1967. In 1969 she took a leave of absence but 

resumed her employment with Pool from 1971 until her termination 

on July 19, 1984. On September 7, 1984, plaintiff filed a charge 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging 

sexual and racial discrimination. The EEOC subsequently gave her 

notice of a right to sue, and on July 11, 1985, she brought suit 

in the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma claiming that the defendant had engaged in sexual and 

racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e, et~, and 42 u.s.c. § 1981. 2 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34; 

10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the cause is ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

2 On her Title VII claim, plaintiff specifically alleged that 

defendant violated 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(a), which provides: 

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer 

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 

any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 

against any individual with respect to his 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 

of employment, because of such individual's 

race, color, religion, sex, or national 

[continued on next page ••. ] 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 2 
At trial, the jury rejected plaintiff's claim of sexual 

discrimination. However, the jury found that plaintiff was 

discriminated against on the basis of her race in violation of 

both Title VII and Section 1981. 3 The jury awarded plaintiff 

$74,146 in actual damages under Section 1981 and recommended the 

same amount as actual damages under Title VII. The jury also 

awarded plaintiff $25,000 in punitive damages under Section 1981. 

The district court entered judgment accordingly. Defendant then 

moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the 

alternative for a new trial or remittitur of damages. The 

district court affirmed the judgment for plaintiff for $74,146 in 

actual damages but vacated the award of punitive damages. 

[ ••• continued from previous page] 

origin; or 

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 

employees or applicants for employment in any 

way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 

individual of employment opportunities or 

otherwise adversely affect his status as an 

employee, because of such individual's race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin. 

Section 1981 provides: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United Stat~s 

shall have the same right in every State and Territory 

to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 

evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws 

and proceedings for the security of persons and property 

as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to 

like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and 

exactions of every kind, and to no other. 

3 Because plaintiff was not entitled to a jury on her Title VII 

claim, see Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); Great 

American-Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 

·375 (1979), the trial judge had the jury. fill out advisory 

interrogatories rather than a verdict form. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 3 
On appeal, defendant argues that the actual damage award was 

excessive as a· matter of law because it exceeded the limits on 

backpay liability applicable to Title VII and Section 1981. 

Plaintiff argues in her cross-appeal that the trial judge erred in 

vacating the jury's award of punitive damages. 

I. 

LIMITS ON BACKPAY 

Defendant contends that the district court erred in refusing 

to grant remittitur of damages because the actual damage award of 

$74,146 is excessive as a matter of law. Defendant attributes the 

entire amount of the damage award to backpay, and it then asserts 

that the damage award exceeds limits on backpay applicable to 

Title VII and Section 1981. 

We recognize that Title VII limits recovery of backpay to no 

more than two years prior to the filing of the discrimination 

charge with the EEOC, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-S(g), and that backppy 

liability under Section 1981 may be limited by an appropriate 

state statute of limitations, see, ~, Kornegay v. Burlington 

Industries, Inc., 803 F.2d 787, 788 (4th Cir. 1986). However, we 

do not reach the issue of whether the damage award here exceeds 

the limits on backpay liability because we do not agree with 

defendant that the damage award necessarily was based solely on 

backpay. 

In arguing that the actual damage award was based exclusively 

on plaintiff's lost backpay, defendant relies on plaintiff's trial 

Exhibit 9, which sets forth the difference between plaintiff's 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 4 
actual wages and the wages she should have received from 1968 to 

1987. According to the exhibit, which was prepared by an expert 

in rates of pay, the total amount of lost wages since 1968 was 

$74,146. That is the precise amount, to the dollar, of the actual 

damages awarded by the jury in this case. Therefore, defendant 

infers that the jury necessarily must have based its actual damage 

award solely on plaintiff's lost backpay reflected on Exhibit 9. 

We disagree. 

Defendant concedes that the jury properly could have awarded 

plaintiff $49,725 in damages for backpay. (Appellant's Br. at p. 

6.) Our review of the record convinces us that the remaining 

$24,421 (the difference between the actual damage award here and 

the $49,725 that defendant concedes could be attributed properly 

to backpay) is supported by evidence of other damages presented at 

trial. 

Initially, we note that the jurors were instructed that 

backpay was only one element of the damages that they could award 

under Section 1981: 

If you find from the evidence that the defendant 

terminated ~he plaintiff on the basis of her race, then 

you may award her reasonable compensation for her 

financial losses and any pain, suffering and physical 

and emotional distress. If you find the defendant acted 

in a manner which violated the plaintiff's rights under 

Section 1981, you may award damages to compensate her 

for this violation, including any back pay to which the 

plaintiff may be entitled to receive. 

(Instruction No. 10.) 

The trial transcript reveals that plaintiff in fact 

introduced evidence of damages other than lost pay. Plaintiff and 

a doctor testified about ·physical problems that plaintiff 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 5 
developed after her termination including depression, headaches, 

muscle spasms, stomach pains, and hair loss. (Tr. at 71-72, 148.) 

Plaintiff also testified that she was on medication and had 

already spent nearly $3,000 for medical expenses. {Tr. at 74.) 

In addition, the doctor testified that future medical costs could 

amount to $27,000. {Tr. at 149.) 

The evidence summarized above is sufficient to support the 

portion of the damage award that defendant contends could not 

properly be based on backpay. Here, where there was a general 

verdict, damages "need not be broken down and attributed piece by 

piece to particular injuries. Rather, a verdict 'will be upheld 

if it is within the scope of the evidence presented.'" Johnson v. 

Consolidated Rail Corp., 797 F.2d 1440, 1446 (7th Cir. 1986) 

(quoting Board of Commissioners of Cass County v. Nevitt, 448 

N.E.2d 333, 344 (Ind. App. 1983)). See also Whiteley v. OKC 

Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir. 1983) ("(T]he jury's verdict 

need by supported only by any evidence tending to sustain 

it. As the reviewing court, we must view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party."). 

Defendant also relies on a statement by the trial judge to 

the jury to support its argument that the jury awarded only lost 

backpay. During the jury's deliberations, the jury asked the 

judge whether it should award the same amount of damages for a 

violation of Title VII as for a violation of Section 1981. The 

judge informed the jury that it should award the same amount of 

damages for both violations: 

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen. I 

have your note, which reads as follows: "Please 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 6 
explain. Do we put same amount on question No. 4 as we 

do on No. 6? Signed J. Laquement," your Foreman. 

Your answer to that is "yes." Let me take a minute 

to explain. Although conduct may violate two separate 

provisions of the law, there is a single injury and it 

would be the same -- the injury would be the same -·- or 

the amount of damages would be the same regardless of 

which section is violated or if both are violated. 

(Tr. at 399-400.) 

Although the judge's response was not correct because 

additional types of damages can be recovered under Section 1981 

that are not recoverable under Title VII, 4 we do not believe that 

the judge's statement leads to the conclusion that the award in 

this case necessarily was limited to backpay. Although the jury 

could have interpreted the judge's statement to mean that Section 

1981 damages were limited to the backpay recovery allowed under 

Title VII, it is equally possible that it could have interpreted. 

the judge's statement to mean that recovery under Title VII could 

include the full panoply of damages allowed under Section 1981. 

Under the latter interpretation, the damages awarded by the jury 

could have included, in addition to back pay, compensation for 

other damages as well. Of course, neither interpretation of the 

judge's statement would be a correct statement of the law, but the 

parties did not object to the judge's statement. Thus, it is too 

late for defendant to argue that the statement to the jury 

constituted reversible error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; Zimmerman 

4 Although full compensatory damages and exemplary damages are 

allowed under Section 1981, compensatory and punitive damages are 

not available in Title VII employment discrimination suits. 

Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443 (10th Cir. 

1988). Rather, Title VII authorizes only equitable remedies, 

including backpay. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 7 
v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1054 (10th 

Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we affirm the.district court's denial of 

remittitur of damages. 

II. 

PUNITIVE DAMAGES 

On cross-appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court 

erred in vacating the jury's award of punitive damages. At trial, 

the judge instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages 

if it found actual damages and if it found that "the acts 

complained of were oppressively, wantonly, or maliciously done." 

(Instruction No. 11.) After the jury awarded plaintiff $25,000 in 

punitive damages, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. Defendant argued that there was not sufficient evidence 

for the jury to conclude that the defendant discriminated against 

plaintiff willfully or maliciously, which is required for the 

award of punitive damages under Section 1981, see EEOC v. Gaddis, 

733 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1984). After considering 

defendant's motion, the judge held that he "erroneously submitted 

the issue of punitive dam~ges to the jury under the law of the 

State of Oklahoma and the jury verdict should be set aside insofar 

as it pertains to the award of punitive damages." (March 2, 1987 

Journal Entry.) 

Initially, we note that the trial judge erred in relying on 

Oklahoma law to vacate the award of punitive damages. As this 

court previously has held, federal standards govern the 

determination of punitive damages under federal civil rights 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 8 
statutes. Garrick v. City and County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971 

(10th Cir. 1981); see also Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1199 

(6th Cir. 1986); cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 

U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969) (federal standards govern compensatory 

damages in civil rights cases). 

In the Tenth Circuit, the standard for punitive damages for 

discrimination in violation of federal civil rights is that the 

discrimination must have been "malicious, willful, and in gross 

disregard of [plaintiff's] rights." Gaddis, 733 F.2d at 1380. 

The standard for punitive damages under Oklahoma law allows juries 

to award punitive damages when there is ''wanton or reckless 

disregard for the rights of another, oppression, fraud or malice, 

actual or presumed." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23 § 9 (West 1987). 

That standard for punitive damages is less rigorous than the Tenth 

Circuit rule.5 Therefore, because the trial judge vacated the 

punitive damage award under the Oklahoma standard, we can assume 

that he would have vacated the award had he applied the correct 

federal standard. 

In her brief on appeal, plaintiff does not refer to any 

evidence that would compel us to reverse the denial of punitive 

damages. Although she asserts that the defendant's acts "showed 

personal animosity and malice toward the appellant, and presented 

a strong case for the awarding of punitive damages," she fails to 

provide any support in the record for that assertion. Thus, 

5 Similarly, the judge's instruction to the jury in this case, 

which provided that plaintiff must show "by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the acts complained of were oppressively, wantonly, 

or maliciously done," see Instruction No. 11 (emphasis added), was 

no more r·estrictive than the appropriate federal standard. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1361 Document: 01019740016 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 9 
plaintiff has failed to explain why, under the facts of this case, 

the trial judge committed reversible error. Further, our own 

review of the trial record does not reveal any evidence that would 

compel us to reverse the district court. 

Although the determination of the amount of punitive damages 

is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, the issue of 

the sufficiency of evidence to justify an award of punitive 

damages is an issue of law for the court. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 

858 F.2d 1449, 1457 (10th Cir. 1988). Thus, despite the jury's 

discretion, an award of punitive damages must be set aside if the 

court determines that the issue should not have been submitted to 

the jury in the first place. Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 

477 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). In this 

case the trial judge did determine that he should not have 

submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Because 

plaintiff has not shown that the trial judge's decision was 

erroneous, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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