Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-10389/USCOURTS-ca9-06-10389-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lei Shi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 06-10389 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-02-00116-1-HG

LEI SHI,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Helen Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 6, 2007—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed April 24, 2008

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A. Wallace Tashima, and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

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COUNSEL

DeAnna S. Dotson, Esq., Kapolei, Hawaii, argued the cause

for the defendant-appellant and filed briefs. 

Marshall H. Silverberg, Assistant United States Attorney,

Honolulu, Hawaii, argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellee;

Thomas J. Brady, Assistant United States Attorney, Honolulu,

Hawaii, filed a brief for the plaintiff-appellee; Edward H.

Kubo, Jr., United States Attorney, District of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, was on the brief.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 

We are called upon to decide whether a foreign national

who forcibly seizes control of a foreign vessel in international

waters may be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States

when such vessel is intercepted by federal authorities.

I

A

On March 14, 2002, the Full Means No. 2, a Taiwanese

fishing vessel registered in the Republic of the Seychelles,

was sailing in international waters off the coast of Hawaii.

The Captain of the vessel was Taiwanese, while its 29 crewmembers, including Lei Shi,1

 the ship’s cook, were mainland

Chinese. According to Shi, the Captain and First Mate beat

and harassed him repeatedly and, on this date, demoted Shi

1There is some confusion between the parties and an ambiguity in the

record as to whether the defendant’s proper name is “Lei Shi” or “Shi

Lei.” We refer to the defendant by the former name, as it is the one most

commonly used in the papers before us. 

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from the position of cook to deck hand, punctuating the decision with a beating that was particularly severe. A few hours

later, Shi responded. He retrieved two large knives from the

kitchen, ascended to the deck of the ship, and fatally stabbed

both men. 

According to the government, Shi then ordered the Second

Mate to “drive the ship” and ordered the other crewmembers

to throw the captain’s body overboard. Shi stated he would

kill anyone who disobeyed him and refused to let his fellow

crewmates use the radio. Shi retained control of the ship for

two days, setting a course for China and threatening to scuttle

the vessel if his instructions were not obeyed. 

On March 16, 2002, the crew overpowered Shi and imprisoned him in a storage compartment on the ship. The crew then

set a course for Hawaii, though they never contacted the

ship’s parent company, apparently because none of them

knew how to operate the radio. After several days of silence,

the parent company notified the U.S. Coast Guard that the

Full Means No. 2 was missing and requested the Coast

Guard’s assistance in recovery. 

On March 19, 2002, a Coast Guard cutter intercepted the

ship approximately 60 miles from Hilo, Hawaii. Two of the

Full Means No. 2’s crewmembers set out on a raft to meet the

cutter, carrying a letter addressed to the Hawaiian government

which described Shi’s takeover. After the Republic of the

Seychelles waived jurisdiction, the ship’s acting master permitted the Coast Guard to board. The Coast Guard did not

attempt to take control of the ship at the time because the officers decided first to determine whether the crew was staging

an emergency to gain entry into the United States or whether

a true exigency existed. 

Among the officers who boarded the ship was Lt. Junior

Grade Hsing-Yen John Fu, who spoke Mandarin Chinese. Lt.

Fu came upon the storage compartment where Shi was

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imprisoned and examined it from the outside. The crew had

sealed the door to the compartment shut by welding a metal

bar across its doorway. The door contained holes, however,

through which Fu could see Shi sitting inside. Shi’s hands

were bound behind him with wire which appeared to be cutting his wrists. The compartment contained no windows or a

toilet. Fu later testified that he believed the crew fed Shi

through a hole in the door, although he did not personally witness such acts. 

Because the Coast Guard had not yet assumed control of

the vessel, the officers still considered Shi to be a prisoner of

the crew. Accordingly, they did not immediately instruct the

crew to release Shi from the compartment. Still, Lt. Fu

insisted that the crew remove the wire restraints from Shi’s

hands. The crew obliged, and the wires were replaced with

handcuffs. 

On March 19 and 20, Lt. Fu stood outside the compartment

and spoke to Shi through the holes in the door. He later testified that his decision to initiate contact with Shi was an effort

to determine whether Shi could corroborate the story told by

the crew. In the course of their exchanges, Shi told Lt. Fu that

he had killed the Captain and First Mate. Fu never read Shi

the Miranda warnings.

On March 21 at approximately 3:00 pm, FBI agents

boarded the vessel and arrested Shi for violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 2280, which prohibits acts of violence that endanger maritime navigation. In addition, the agents obtained a warrant to

search Shi’s bunk area on the ship, where they discovered

several incriminating letters Shi had written to his family. 

Immediately upon releasing Shi from the storage compartment, the agents allowed Shi to use the bathroom. Next, they

escorted him to the ship’s dining area, where Agent Lynelle

Torikai, through the assistance of Language Specialist Kipiu

Wun, informed Shi of the charges against him and read him

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his Miranda rights. In addition, the agents furnished Shi with

an Advice of Rights waiver written in Mandarin. Shi

expressed his willingness to answer questions, but called them

“insignificant” and did not sign the form. Agent Torikai and

Language Specialist Wun then explained the Miranda rights

and the purpose of the form for approximately five minutes,

after which Shi signed it. 

Thereafter, a Coast Guard health technician examined Shi,

treated his wrists with ointment, and wrapped them. The FBI

then transported Shi to the federal building in Honolulu,

where he was fed, permitted to use the restroom, and given a

change of clothing. At approximately 5:30 pm, Shi was

escorted to an interrogation room where Agent Torikai questioned him for approximately 4.5 hours. During such time, Shi

was fed again, permitted two smoke breaks, and confessed to

killing the Captain and First Mate.

B

The government filed an indictment charging Shi with several violations of § 2280, which proscribes certain acts of violence that endanger maritime navigation. The statute codifies

the United States’ obligations under the Convention for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation (the “Maritime Safety Convention”), 27 I.L.M.

672 (1988), which authorizes any signatory state to extradite

or prosecute offenders, regardless of where the offender’s acts

occurred. Accordingly, § 2280 authorizes federal jurisdiction

over any offender “later found” in the United States after a

prohibited act is committed. 18 U.S.C. § 2280(b)(1)(C). In a

published order, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the statute. United States v. Shi, 396 F. Supp. 2d

1132 (D. Haw. 2003). 

Next, the district court granted Shi’s motion to suppress his

unwarned statements to Lt. Fu on March 19 and 20, but

denied his motion to suppress his subsequent confession to

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Agent Torikai. The court also denied Shi’s motion to exclude

the personal letters the FBI agents seized from his bunk space,

rejecting Shi’s arguments that the warrant was invalid and

that the scope of the search was overbroad. 

Shi initially pled guilty, but soon withdrew the plea, and the

government filed a superseding indictment.2 The new indictment charged Shi with one count of seizing control over a

ship by force, in violation of § 2280(a)(1)(A), and two counts

of performing an act of violence likely to endanger the safety

of the ship, in violation of § 2280(a)(1)(B). The indictment

alleged that the acts charged in all three counts “resulted in

death,” elevating the maximum statutory penalty for each

from 20 years to life in prison. The jury convicted Shi on all

counts, and the district court sentenced him to 36 years in

prison. 

Shi timely filed this appeal, challenging (1) the district

court’s jurisdiction, (2) the sufficiency of the indictment, (3)

the admissibility of his statement to Agent Torikai, (4) the

admissibility of the letters seized from his bunk, and (5) the

constitutionality of his sentence. We now turn to the merits of

these claims. 

II

We begin with Shi’s contention that the district court

lacked jurisdiction because he did not meet the jurisdictional

prerequisites set forth in § 2280 and, in the alternative,

because § 2280 is unconstitutional as applied to him. We consider Shi’s constitutional argument first.

2Because Shi’s appeal does not implicate the initial indictment, we refer

to the first superseding indictment as “the indictment.” 

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A

Section 2280 codifies the United States’ obligations under

the Maritime Safety Convention to extradite or to prosecute

those who commit acts of maritime violence. Section

2280(a)(1) lists eight proscribed acts, and § 2280(b)(1) vests

federal courts with jurisdiction if certain conditions are met.

18 U.S.C. § 2280. At issue here is the provision which renders

jurisdiction proper if the “offender is later found in the United

States.” Id. § 2280(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The district

court concluded that § 2280 provided it with jurisdiction over

Shi because Shi’s arrest and transport to Honolulu rendered

him “later found” in the United States as the statute defines

that term.

1

[1] Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution (the “Offense Clause”) empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high

Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” Because the

high seas, by definition, lie outside United States territory, see

United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990), the

Offense Clause grants Congress the authority to apply federal

law beyond the borders of the United States, see EEOC v.

Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 

[2] Section 2280 is an exercise of Congress’s constitutional

authority to define and punish “Felonies on the high Seas”

because it proscribes felony offenses and expressly applies to

international waters. See 18 U.S.C. § 2280(e). In addition,

§§ 2280(a)(1)(A) and (B), the provisions under which Shi was

charged, proscribe offenses which meet the definition of

piracy. “Piracy” traditionally has been defined as “robbery, or

forcible depredations upon the sea.” United States v. Smith, 18

U.S. 153, 161 (1820). “Depredation” is “the act of plundering,

robbing, or pillaging.” Black’s Law Dictionary 397 (5th ed.

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1979). All three acts require the use of force.3

 Section

2280(a)(1)(A) prohibits “seiz[ing] or exercis[ing] control over

a ship by force or threat thereof,” and § 2280(a)(1)(B) prohibits “act[s] of violence against a person on board a ship” that

are “likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.”

Because such offenses involve interference with property on

the open sea through the use of force, they are within Congress’s power to define and to punish crimes of piracy. See

Smith, 18 U.S. at 158-59 (treating “Piracies,” “Felonies on the

high Seas,” and “Offenses against the Laws of Nations” as

three separate offenses). 

[3] In addition to the Offense Clause, Congress derived the

authority to promulgate § 2280 by virtue of the Necessary and

Proper Clause. That Clause empowers Congress “to make all

Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into

execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in

the Government of the United States, or in any Department or

Officer thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Such “Powers”

include the Executive’s Article II Treaty Power. See Missouri

v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). Section 2280 implements the Maritime Safety Convention, an international

accord which requires signatory states to “prosecute or extradite” offenders found within their territory regardless of

where the offense was committed. See United States v.

Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (discussing a similar provision in the Montreal Convention). In

order to satisfy this obligation, it was necessary for the United

States to codify the Convention’s “extradite or prosecute”

requirement into federal law. Section 2280 accomplishes this

3The definition of “plunder” includes the taking of “property from persons or places by open force.” Id. at 1039 (emphasis added). “Robbery”

is the “[f]elonious taking of . . . [any] article of value, in the possession

of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,

accomplished by means of force or fear.” Id. at 1193 (emphasis added)

(citations omitted). Finally, the act of “pillaging” is the “forcible taking of

private property by an invading or conquering army from the enemy’s

subjects.” Id. at 1033 (emphasis added). 

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task. Accordingly, the Treaty Power coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause provided Congress with an additional

source of authority to apply § 2280 beyond U.S. borders. 

2

[4] Congress’s constitutional authority to apply a federal

law outside U.S. borders does not end our inquiry, however,

because we may not presume that Congress intended to do so

unless it clearly expresses such intent. See Sale v. Haitian

Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993). Section

2280(b)(1) applies to “covered ships,” which the statute

defines as ships “navigating or . . . scheduled to navigate into,

through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial

sea of a single country,” 18 U.S.C. § 2280(e) (emphasis

added). In addition, the statute provides federal jurisdiction

over acts committed on such ships if “the offender is later

found in the United States.” Id. § 2280(b)(1)(C) (emphasis

added). We are satisfied that these two provisions are a clear

expression that § 2280 applies outside United States territory.

3

Even if Congress had the authority to apply § 2280 beyond

the United States’ borders and clearly manifested its intent to

do so, Shi argues that the application of the statute to him violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Shi

points to our decision in Davis, in which we held that when

the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) is

applied to a foreign defendant apprehended on a foreign-flag

ship, due process requires “a sufficient nexus between the

defendant and the United States, so that such application

would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” 905 F.2d at

249-50 (internal citation and footnote omitted). Shi argues

that no such nexus exists here. Yet before we reach the question of whether a jurisdictional nexus exists, we must first

determine whether such nexus is required.

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[5] The Due Process Clause requires that a defendant prosecuted in the United States “should reasonably anticipate

being haled into court in this country.” United States v.

Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The MDLEA prohibits

the possession of narcotics on the high seas. Because some

states do not consider such conduct criminal, we held in Davis

that due process requires a foreign defendant apprehended on

a foreign flag ship to have some connection to the United

States before he can be prosecuted in a domestic court.4 905

F.2d at 248-49. Yet in United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370

(9th Cir. 1995), we concluded that due process does not

require any such nexus when the MDLEA is applied to foreign defendants apprehended on stateless vessels because

“[s]uch vessels are international pariahs,” that, “by attempting

to shrug the yoke of any nation’s authority, . . . subject themselves to the jurisdiction of all nations.” Id. at 372 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

[6] We need not determine whether the Full Means No. 2

was a foreign-flag or stateless vessel at the time it was intercepted by the Coast Guard in order to resolve this case.

Instead, we abide by our instruction in Caicedo that “[a]

nexus requirement, imposed as a matter of due process, makes

sense when the ‘rough guide’ of international law also

requires a nexus.” Id.; see also Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2

(explaining that while not binding, “[i]nternational law principles may be useful as a rough guide of whether a sufficient

nexus exists between the defendant and the United States”).

[7] In applying the “rough guide” of international law, we

turn to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is based on the premise that offenses against all states

may be punished by any state where the offender is found. See

4Such nexus would be established, for example, if the foreign defendant’s extraterritorial conduct is purposefully aimed at the United States.

See, e.g., United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Stephen Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction 2-12 (2004). Accordingly, it allows a state to claim jurisdiction over such an

offender even if the offender’s acts occurred outside its

boundaries and even if the offender has no connection to the

state. 

As explained above, the acts with which Shi is charged

constitute acts of piracy. See supra at 4376-77. Prosecuting

piracy was the original rationale for creating universal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction

Under International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785, 803 (1988)

(citing piracy as the “archetypal universal crime”), and federal

courts have historically accepted the notion that a pirate may

be tried by any state, see Smith, 18 U.S. at 176 (“piracy . . .

is an offense against the universal law of society, a pirate

being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani generis

[an enemy of the human race]”) (quoting 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries *71, 73). Due process does not require a nexus

between such an offender and the United States because the

universal condemnation of the offender’s conduct puts him on

notice that his acts will be prosecuted by any state where he

is found. See United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d

1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that inasmuch as a crime

is “condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no

reason to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally unfair’ for Congress to provide for the punishment” of offenders apprehended on the high seas). 

[8] Sections 2280(a)(1)(A) and (B) prohibit interference

with the safe navigation of a maritime vessel through the use

or threat of force. Because these are acts of piracy, and

because such acts are universally condemned, due process

does not require the same nexus between the offender and the

United States as does the MDLEA. 

Moreover, due process does not require the same nexus

between violators of § 2280 and the United States because

§ 2280 implements the Maritime Safety Convention, which

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expressly provides foreign offenders with notice that their

conduct will be prosecuted by any state signatory.

5

 We

acknowledge that in a similar case, the Second Circuit suggested that a jurisdictional nexus was required. In Yousef, a

foreign national apprehended abroad was prosecuted in the

United States for violating 18 U.S.C. § 32(b), which prohibits

aircraft piracy, after he hijacked a Philippine Airlines flight.

327 F.3d at 56. The Second Circuit cited our decision in

Davis, which applied a nexus requirement to a foreign defendant apprehended abroad and prosecuted under the MDLEA.

Id. at 111. The court reasoned that such requirement was met

in Yousef’s case because his conduct was purposefully aimed

at the United States: he previously hijacked aircrafts in the

United States and his hijacking of the Philippine Airlines

flight was a test-run for an attack in this country. Id. at 111-

12. 

The court’s treatment of the due process question consisted

of only three paragraphs of a 147-page opinion, however, and

while the court cited our decision, id. at 111 (citing Davis,

905 F.2d at 248), it never considered the implications of our

refusal to extend the nexus requirement to foreign defendants

apprehended on stateless vessels in Moreno-Morillo and

Caicedo. See Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 828; Caicedo, 47

F.3d at 372. Those decisions suggest that a nexus is not

required when the offender’s conduct is proscribed universally. 

5This is not to suggest that the Convention creates “universal jurisdiction” over the crimes it proscribes. As the Second Circuit explained in

interpreting an identical “extradite or prosecute” provision, “[w]hile the

purpose of such treaties is to assure ‘universal punishment of the offenses

in question’ . . . it is incorrect to speak of these treaties as creating ‘universal jurisdiction,’ or even ‘treaty-based universal jurisdiction,’ because the

treaties create obligations only in States party to them, not universally in

all states.” Yousef, 327 F.3d at 95 n.29 (interpreting a nearly identical provision in the Montreal Convention). Instead, such accords amount to “jurisdictional agreement[s] among contracting States to extradite or

prosecute offenders.” Id. at 96. 

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The D.C. Circuit’s decision United States v. Rezaq, 134

F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998), supports such conclusion. In that

case, a foreign national was apprehended abroad and charged

with hijacking an Air Egypt flight in violation of 49 U.S.C.

app. § 1472(n) (1994). Id. at 1125. The D.C. Circuit concluded that federal jurisdiction over Rezaq was proper without

noting any possible due process concerns. Although the

court’s silence may have stemmed from any number of reasons, it is important to note that, like § 2280, the statute in

Rezaq was enacted to implement an international agreement

to extradite and to prosecute perpetrators of widelycondemned conduct. (Section 1472(n) implemented the

Hague Convention, which prohibits aircraft hijacking.) 

[9] Congress’s authority to apply § 2280 beyond United

States borders stems in part from its power under the Offense

Clause to punish “Piracies on the high Seas,” not merely “Felonies,” as Congress has done in statutes such as the MDLEA.

Because piracy is a universally-condemned crime, a jurisdictional nexus is not required to satisfy due process. As such,

we conclude that the universal condemnation of Shi’s conduct

and the existence of the Maritime Safety Convention provided

him with all the notice due process requires that he could be

prosecuted in this country. Accordingly, the district court’s

exercise of jurisdiction over Shi was “neither arbitrary nor

fundamentally unfair.” Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 828 n.7

(citing Caicedo, 47 F.3d at 372). 

B

Having established that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Shi satisfied the Constitution’s requirements, we

next consider Shi’s arguments that jurisdiction was improper

under the statutory requirements set forth in § 2280, which

permits jurisdiction if the “offender is later found in the

United States.” Id. § 2280(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The

government contends that Shi’s arrest and transport to the

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Honolulu federal building brought him within the terms of

this provision. Shi argues otherwise. 

It is well-established that jurisdiction over a defendant is

not impaired by the fact that he was brought within the jurisdictional territory of the court against his will. See Frisbie v.

Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.

436 (1886).6 Yet Shi argues that § 2280 creates an exception

to this rule because it requires the defendant to be “later

found” in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2280(b)(1)(C).

Accordingly, he reads the statute to require a defendant to

enter the United States voluntarily before he can be prosecuted. 

The D.C. Circuit rejected an identical argument launched

against a similar statute. In Rezaq, a foreign defendant was

arrested abroad and tried in the United States for violating 49

U.S.C. app. § 1472(n) (1994), an anti-hijacking statute. 134

F.3d at 1125. Section 1472(n) requires the defendant to be

“afterwards found” in the United States and the defendant

argued that this language required that he enter the United

States voluntarily. The D.C. Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that “the word ‘found’ means only that the

hijacker must be physically located in the United States, not

that he must be first detected here.” Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1132

(emphasis added).7

6

Indeed, in certain circumstances, jurisdiction will satisfy due process

even when a foreign national is forcibly abducted in another country by

United States officials for the sole purpose of being brought to trial here.

See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661-62 (1992). 

7

In a similar case, the Second Circuit in Yousef upheld jurisdiction over

a foreign defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 32(b), which requires the defendant

to be “afterwards found” in the United States. 327 F.3d at 88. In that case,

the defendant was arrested in Pakistan and transferred to the United States

on charges relating to his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Id. at 78-80. Subsequent to his arrival, the government added charges

under § 32(b) for the unrelated bombing of a Philippine Airlines plane. Id.

The defendant argued that jurisdiction was improper under § 32(b)’s “afUNITED STATES v. SHI 4383

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[10] We are persuaded by this analysis, and conclude that

the requirement that a defendant be “later found” does not

contain the implicit requirement that the defendant’s arrival in

the United States be voluntary. Indeed, if Congress intended

to create such an exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule, we would

expect it to manifest its intent more directly. Moreover, the

Maritime Safety Convention contains no such voluntary entry

requirement. See Maritime Safety Convention, art. 9. To the

extent Congress intended § 2280 to deviate from the Convention it was designed to implement, we would expect such an

instruction to be express. 

[11] Accordingly, we conclude that Shi’s arrest on the Full

Means No. 2 after the United States had established jurisdiction over the ship and his subsequent transport to the Honolulu federal building rendered him “later found” in the United

States and subjected him to jurisdiction under § 2280. With

the propriety of the district court’s jurisdiction now established, we turn to Shi’s additional challenges to his conviction. 

III

Shi next argues that the indictment against him was insufficient. The indictment contained every element of

terwards found” provision because he did not enter the United States voluntarily. Id. at 88. The Second Circuit disagreed, noting that “[b]y the time

Yousef was charged with the crime . . . he was already lawfully in federal

custody in the United States.” Id. at 89. While the court’s reasoning suggests that the voluntariness of the defendant’s arrival was irrelevant to

determining whether he was “afterwards found” in the United States, id.

at 89-90, the court considered the fact that Yousef was not charged under

§ 32(b) until after he was inside the United States to be of some significance, id.; see also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.3d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(holding that a foreign defendant was subject to jurisdiction under

§ 1472(n) even though he did not enter the United States voluntarily, but

noting the fact that the defendant was already inside U.S. territory before

he was charged). 

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§§ 2280(a)(1)(A) and (B), the offenses with which Shi was

charged. As such, it fairly informed him of the charges against

him and “enable[d] him to plead an acquittal or conviction in

bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” United States

v. Vroman, 975 F.2d 669, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Yet Shi contends that

the indictment was flawed because it failed to allege that he

engaged in acts of terrorism.8 Sections 2280(a)(1)(A) and (B)

contain no such requirement. 

[12] The face of the statute does not reference “terrorism”

or suggest that its scope is limited to terrorist acts. Moreover,

the statutory context does not indicate that such limitation

exists. Section 2280 is codified in Title 18, Part I, Chapter 111

of the U.S. Code, which describes offenses related to “Shipping.” A separate Chapter defines offenses related to “Terrorism.” See Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113b. Shi correctly notes

that a violation of § 2280 is one of several offenses which

may constitute a “federal crime of terrorism,” but fails to note

that such classification requires additional statutory showings.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (listing § 2280 as one

offense which may be prosecuted as a “federal crime of terrorism” if such offense is “calculated to influence or affect the

conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to

retaliate against government conduct”). That a violation of

§ 2280 may be a “federal crime of terrorism” in certain cases

does not imply that “terrorism” is an element of the crime.

Accordingly, we conclude that the indictment against Shi was

sufficient. 

8We reject Shi’s separate argument that the indictment was insufficient

because it failed to allege that the deaths of the Captain and First Mate

occurred “in connection with” Shi’s acts. Sections 2280(a)(1)(A) and (B)

contain no such language. We also reject Shi’s argument that the indictment was insufficient because it failed to allege the requisite state of mind.

Section 2280(a)(1) requires the defendant to act “unlawfully and intentionally.” All three counts of the indictment include this exact phrase. 

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IV

We next turn to Shi’s argument that the district court erred

in admitting his March 21 confession to Agent Torikai into

evidence. Shi argues that such confession was inadmissible

because (1) it was tainted by his unwarned statements to Lt.

Fu on March 19 and 20; (2) Shi did not adequately waive his

Miranda rights upon his arrest; (3) Shi invoked his right to

silence, and (4) the confession was involuntary. We consider

each argument in turn. 

A

Shi made statements to Lt. Fu on March 19 and 20 without

the benefit of Miranda warnings.9 The next day, after he

received the warnings, Shi confessed to Agent Torikai. The

Supreme Court has held that when a defendant’s properlywarned confession is preceded by an unwarned statement or

statements, the confession may only be admitted if both the

pre-warning statements and the confession were voluntary, or

if the confession was sufficiently separated from the prewarning statement such that the “causal connection” between

the two statements would be “speculative and attenuated.”

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1985); see Missouri

9At the time of Shi’s statements to Lt. Fu, he remained a prisoner of the

crew. We have held that an officer’s obligation to administer Miranda

warnings attaches only where the suspect is in custody. United States v.

Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations omitted). In asking this question, we examine the totality of the circumstances

from the perspective of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position. Id.

(citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). In this case, Shi

was unquestionably in custody, but he was in the custody of the crew of

the Full Means No. 2, not the United States. In such an unusual circumstance, it is not clear whether Miranda warnings are required. Because we

are only asked to decide whether Shi’s statements to Lt. Fu tainted his

later confession to Agent Torikai, we decline to resolve such question

here. Instead, we assume, without deciding, that Miranda warnings were

required. 

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v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 619-20 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 

Although the district court concluded that Shi’s statements

to Lt. Fu on March 19 and 20 were voluntary, it assumed for

purposes of this analysis that the statements were involuntary

because of the poor conditions of the storage compartment in

which Shi was confined at the time. We proceed on the same

assumption. As such, Shi’s confession to Agent Torikai is

admissible only if it was sufficiently attenuated from his

March 19 and 20 statements. 

In undertaking this analysis, we consider (1) the temporal

proximity between the statements; (2) the intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 941 (9th Cir.

1991) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)).

Our examination of the degree of attenuation “is merely

another way of asking whether the subsequent confession

was, itself, voluntary.” Id.

In this case, one full day elapsed between Shi’s March 20

statement to Lt. Fu and his properly-warned confession. In

addition, several significant intervening events separated the

pre-warning statements from Shi’s properly warned confession. First, Shi’s unwarned statements were made to Coast

Guard Lt. Fu, while his properly-warned confession was made

to FBI Agent Torikai. Second, Shi’s unwarned statements

were made on board the Full Means No. 2, while his Mirandized confession was made at the Honolulu federal building.

Third, during the time that elapsed between Shi’s March 20

statement and his confession, Shi was fed, treated by a health

technician, given a change of clothes, and twice permitted

access to a restroom. 

[13] In addition to these intervening events, we note that

Shi’s unwarned statements were not the product of purposeful

or flagrant official misconduct. See id. Lt. Fu spoke to Shi

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before the Coast Guard had exercised jurisdiction over the

Full Means No. 2 and testified that his purpose in engaging

Shi was not to ascertain his guilt, but to determine whether

Shi would corroborate the crew’s story or whether the crew

was simply staging the emergency. As the Supreme Court has

explained, “[i]t is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to

hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free

will, so taints the investigator’s process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. Even if Lt. Fu’s

decision to speak with Shi without first reading the Miranda

warnings was imprudent, we cannot conclude that it was calculated to overcome Shi’s exercise of his free will. Accordingly, we conclude that whatever taint was caused by Shi’s

unwarned statements to Lt. Fu does not preclude the admission of Shi’s properly-warned confession to Agent Torikai. 

B

Even if the taint of his pre-warning statements was sufficiently dissipated, Shi argues that his confession to Agent

Torikai must be excluded because he did not adequately

waive his Miranda rights. To admit an inculpatory statement

made by a defendant during custodial interrogation, the defendant’s “waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing,

and intelligent.” United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 536

(9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A valid waiver of Miranda rights depends upon the “totality of the circumstances including the background,

experience, and conduct of defendant.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The prosecution bears the burden

of proof, and there is a presumption against waiver. Id. at 536-

37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1

“A waiver is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a free and deliberate

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choice rather than coercion or improper inducement.” United

States v. Doe, 155 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation

omitted). Prior to his arrest, Shi spent four days in a storage

compartment where he had been kept by the crew. Still, the

district court found that upon his release from the compartment, Shi appeared coherent and alert. Indeed, the district

court credited the agents’ description of Shi’s demeanor as

“cocky” and “not timid at all.” In addition, Shi was allowed

access to a bathroom before the agents escorted him to the

dining area to read him the warnings. 

Finally, there is no evidence of police coercion. See United

States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (1992) (“Coercive police

activity is ‘a necessary predicate’ to finding a confession

involuntary.”) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,

167 (1986)). While the conditions in the storage compartment

were quite troubling, Shi was in the compartment as the

crew’s prisoner, not the Coast Guard’s or the FBI’s. Once the

FBI released Shi from the compartment and assumed custody,

the district court found no evidence that the FBI intimidated

or coerced Shi in any way, or that there was “anything . . . that

would render the atmosphere combative.” We require “some

causal connection” between police conduct and the defendant’s statement to render it involuntary. Id. (citation omitted). No such connection exists here. 

[14] Accordingly, Shi’s coherent and “cocky” demeanor

and the absence of improper tactics by the agents satisfy us

that his waiver was the product of a free and deliberate

choice. 

2

Nevertheless, even if a waiver is voluntary, we must also

determine whether the district court’s finding that such waiver

was “knowing and intelligent” was clearly erroneous. United

States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

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language barrier between Shi and the agents is relevant, see

Garibay, 143 F.3d at 538, and the district court took account

of such fact in making its determination. First, it credited Language Specialist Wun’s testimony that he maintained a “90 to

95%” level of understanding with Shi throughout their

exchange. Second, the district court noted that the Advice of

Rights form provided to Shi was written in Mandarin.

Although Mandarin was not Shi’s native dialect, Shi had a

ninth grade education and, when asked by Language Specialist Wun, stated that he understood the form. Finally, the district court found Shi’s dismissal of Agent Torikai’s questions

as “insignificant” to be a product of his “cockiness” rather

than confusion, and that Torikai and Wun’s rearticulation of

the Miranda rights eliminated whatever confusion did exist.

Based on this record, we conclude that the district court did

not clearly err in concluding that Shi’s waiver was knowing

and intelligent. See Doe, 155 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)); Rodriquez-Preciado, 399

F.3d at 1127-28 (concluding that a district court did not commit clear error in finding that a foreign defendant made a

valid waiver despite confusion between the interrogating officers and the defendant over the word “methamphetamine”

because the defendant told the officers he understood his

rights and the officers did not indicate that the defendant had

difficulty understanding English).

C

Even if Shi’s initial waiver were valid, he contends that he

invoked his right to silence before he spoke. “Once a person

invokes the right to remain silent, all questioning must cease.”

Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74

(1966)). While a defendant who invokes his right to counsel

must do so unambiguously, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

452, 459 (1994), we have not yet determined whether such

rule applies when a defendant invokes his right to silence.

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Still, we have established that, at a minimum, such invocation

must not be “so equivocal or unclear that ‘a reasonable officer

in light of the circumstances would have understood only that

the suspect might be invoking’ his right to remain silent.”

Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis in original)). 

Shi suggests that his dismissal of Agent Torikai’s questions

as “insignificant” was an invocation of his right to silence.

But as the district court explained, such claim is belied by the

fact that Shi consistently manifested his willingness to answer

questions and that Shi signed the waiver form after making

this comment. 

[15] These facts distinguish this case from United States v.

Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1984), the principal authority

on which Shi relies. In Heldt, the defendant was read his

Miranda rights and provided with a waiver form, but told his

interrogator that he “understood his rights, but did not wish to

waive them, and that he . . . did not wish to answer questions.”

Id. at 1277 (emphasis added). We concluded that Heldt’s

refusal to sign the form was important evidence supporting

the finding that he did not waive his rights. Id. at 1277-78.

Yet as we later explained in United States v. Andaverde, 64

F.3d 1305 (1995), a defendant’s refusal to sign the waiver

form alone does not render his waiver invalid. Id. at 1314

(citations omitted). Rather, “a refusal to sign a waiver form is

an ‘indication’ that the defendant is invoking his right to

silence which casts ‘initial doubt’ on the government’s waiver

claim.” Id. at 1313 (quoting Heldt, 745 F.2d at 1277) (emphasis added). Additional evidence is necessary to confirm that

initial doubt. For example, in Heldt, “the defendant verbally

refused to answer questions and was ‘exhorted’ to answer by

police.” Id. (quoting Heldt, 745 F.2d at 1277-78) (emphasis

added). Here, Shi never refused to sign the form or to answer

questions, merely referring to Torikai’s questions as “insignificant.” Once Torikai again explained the rights, Shi signed the

form. 

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Shi also argues that he invoked his right to silence during

his interrogation at the federal building when he said to Agent

Torikai “I don’t want to talk about the accident.” But as the

district court explained, once Torikai responded by reminding

Shi of the waiver form the fact that Shi had the right to stop

talking at any time, Shi continued to respond to questions. 

We conclude that Shi’s comment would not have caused a

reasonable officer in the circumstances to understand anything more than that Shi “might” have been invoking his right

to remain silent. See Arnold, 421 F.3d at 866. Accordingly,

Agent Torikai was not required to terminate the interrogation.

D

Finally, we consider Shi’s claim that his confession was

involuntary. “A confession is involuntary if coerced either by

physical intimidation or psychological pressure.” United

States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We consider the totality of the circumstances in

engaging in this inquiry. United States v. Gamez, 301 F.3d

1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Dickerson v. United States,

530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000)). Relevant factors include: (1) the

time between the defendant’s arrest and arraignment, (2)

whether the defendant knew the nature of the offense with

which he was charged at the time of his confession, (3)

whether the defendant was aware that he was not required to

make any statement, (4) whether the defendant had been

advised of his right to counsel, and (5) whether counsel was

present at the time of the defendant’s confession. Id. (citing

18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)). 

[16] The time that elapsed between Shi’s arrest and his

arraignment (approximately 19 hours) was reasonably limited.

See id. (holding a 31-hour delay reasonable where the defendant did not speak English, could not be interrogated until an

interpreter arrived, and was arraigned at the first available

opportunity after interrogation was complete). Moreover, the

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agents informed Shi of the charges against him upon his

arrest. In addition, Agent Torikai informed Shi of his right to

counsel and his right to remain silent. See id. at 1144-45

(finding foreign national’s confession to be voluntary where

he was interrogated and advised of his rights in his native language, even though he was not assisted by counsel). Of

course, in the case of a foreign national, we consider whether

extra steps were taken to ensure that the defendant understood

his rights. United States v. Amano, 229 F.3d 801, 804-05 (9th

Cir. 2000). In this case, Shi was read his rights by an interpreter who maintained a “90 to 95 percent” level of understanding with him and Shi signed a Miranda waiver written

in Mandarin Chinese. Shi told the agents he understood the

form. Although this was Shi’s first interaction with the United

States criminal justice system, we agree with the district court

that these facts indicate that Shi’s statement was voluntary.

See id. at 805 (holding that a defendant’s inexperience with

the United States criminal justice system and his lack of contact with the consulate did not render his Miranda waiver

involuntary). 

E

[17] Based on the foregoing, the district court properly

admitted into evidence Shi’s March 21 confession to Agent

Torikai at the federal building. 

V

We now move to Shi’s argument that the district court

should have suppressed the writings seized from his bunk area

because the search warrant was deficient and because the

scope of the FBI agents’ search was overbroad. 

A

The affidavit accompanying the search warrant listed

§ 2280 as the offense charged, but the warrant itself did not

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cite § 2280 or describe the acts it prohibits. Shi argues that

this rendered the warrant deficient because it failed to notify

the executing agents as to what evidence would be relevant to

a prosecution under this uncommon statute. 

[18] We need not determine whether the warrant’s failure

to refer to § 2280 created a technical deficiency under the

Fourth Amendment if we conclude that the executing agents

relied on the warrant in good faith. United States v. Crews,

502 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2007). Good faith reliance

exists if the agents’ affidavit establishes “at least a colorable

argument for probable cause,” and the agents relied on the

search warrant in an objectively reasonable manner. United

States v. Luong, 470 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court found that whatever the consequence of the warrant’s failure to cite § 2280, the agents were entitled to the

good faith exception because the affidavit they filed listed the

statute and because the same agents who executed the warrant

prepared the affidavit. We agree. 

[19] The affidavit, which is incorporated by reference into

the warrant, cites § 2280 and explains that Shi stabbed the

Captain and First Mate and took control of the ship. Thus,

even if § 2280 is an uncommon statute, we are satisfied that

the affidavit adequately notified the executing agents of the

evidence relevant to the charged crimes. Moreover, none of

the factors which preclude the application of the good faith

exception apply here.10 Accordingly, we conclude that even if

the warrant was technically deficient, the executing agents

were entitled to the good faith exception. 

10Specifically, (1) the agents did not mislead the magistrate judge with

false statements or reckless disregard for the truth; (2) Shi does not allege

that the magistrate judge abandoned her neutral role in reviewing the warrant application; (3) the warrant describes the place to be searched and the

things to be found in adequate detail; and (4) the affidavit is not so lacking

in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it

in good faith. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923-26 (1984). 

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We also reject Shi’s argument that the warrant was deficient because it did not describe the items to be seized with

sufficient particularity. The search warrant authorized the FBI

agents to seize, among other things: 

items of personal property which tend to identify the

person(s) in control, possession, and ownership of

the property that is the subject of this warrant,

including, but not limited to mail, photographs, personal telephone books, diaries, journals, bills and

statements, keys, identification cards and documents,

passport and related travel documents, bank books,

checks, and check registers.

The warrant authorized a search only of the “[b]unk space,

cupboard, drawer, and two storage spaces” which the crew

had told the agents belonged to Shi. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “general warrants” and

prevents law enforcement from engaging in general exploratory searches. United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1147-

48 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). However, “ ‘[w]arrants

which describe generic categories of items are not necessarily

invalid if a more precise description of the items subject to

seizure is not possible.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)). When determining

whether a warrant which authorizes the seizure of a category

of items is overbroad, we consider: (1) whether probable

cause existed to seize all items of a category described in the

warrant; (2) whether the warrant set forth objective standards

by which executing officers could differentiate items subject

to seizure from those which were not; and (3) whether the

government could have described the items more particularly

in light of the information available to it at the time the warrant issued. United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1447

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963). 

[20] In this case, there was probable cause to seize items of

Shi’s property which could identify him as the person in conUNITED STATES v. SHI 4395

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trol of the bunk area, including his mail. Further, the warrant

only authorized the agents to seize written documents from

the prescribed area that could identify Shi. Under such limitation, written materials such as books, magazines, or newspapers containing no identifying information would not be

subject to seizure. Finally, the agents lacked additional information which would have allowed a more specific description

of the items to be seized. See id. Accordingly, we conclude

that the warrant adequately described the items to be seized.

Compare United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1509 (9th

Cir. 1989) (upholding warrant authorizing a search for “any

cash, jewelry, bonds and notes obtained through this fraud

scheme”); with United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 425-26

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding a warrant to be insufficiently particularized where it authorized officers to seize from a video store

any documents fitting under one of several dozen general categories). 

B

Finally, Shi argues that the search of his bunk space was

overbroad because the agents seized written materials written

in Chinese without sending an agent fluent in Chinese to the

scene who could assess the relevance of such documents.

“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs

Fourth Amendment analysis . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant.” United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65,

71 (1998) (citation omitted). In this case, the warrant authorized the agents to search for items of personal property which

could identify Shi, including mail, photographs, diaries, and

passports, among other things. Although the agents expected

such documents to be written in Chinese, it does not require

a person fluent in Chinese to identify documents which meet

this definition, even if such person is unable to interpret their

contents. For example, even a person who cannot read a foreign language will likely be able to distinguish documents in

a foreign language capable of identifying their owner (e.g.,

personal mail) from those which are not (e.g., magazines or

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newspapers). As the Third Circuit has explained, “there are

plainly circumstances in which it is reasonable to execute a

warrant for documents in a foreign language (or for technical

records) without the assistance of an officer who is capable of

understanding the materials sought.” United States v. NinetyTwo Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and FiftySeven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 153 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.). 

[21] We are persuaded that this is such a case; we conclude

that the agents did not act unreasonably in failing to enlist the

help of an agent fluent in Chinese in conducting the search.

VI

Our final task is to consider whether the sentence imposed

by the district court was reasonable. This requires us first to

determine whether the district court committed a “significant

procedural error.” United States v. Carty, 2008 WL 763770,

*5 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“It would be procedural error for

a district court to fail to calculate—or to calculate incorrectly

—the Guidelines range; to treat the Guidelines as mandatory

instead of advisory; to fail to consider the § 3553(a) factors;

to choose a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; or to

fail adequately to explain the sentence selected, including any

deviation from the Guidelines range.” (citing Gall v. United

States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007))). If the district court’s sentence is free from procedural error, we next consider the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Id. (citing Gall, 128

S. Ct. at 597). 

[22] The district court correctly determined that the applicable Sentencing Guideline for Shi’s case was U.S.S.G.

§ 2A1.1, which provides the advisory sentencing range for

certain felonies resulting in death, including § 2280.11

11Shi contends that the application of this Guideline required the district

court to find facts not proven to a jury because § 2A1.1 requires the

offender to have committed a “premeditated killing,” yet the indictment

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Although that Guideline recommends a maximum sentence of

life imprisonment, the district court departed downward and

sentenced Shi to 36 years. 

[23] Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists the factors to be considered by a district court imposing a sentence.12 The district

court considered each factor in applying its downward departure. The court noted Shi’s personal history, which was free

from prior criminal activity, the unique circumstances of his

crime, and the fact that no victims had claimed restitution. It

also noted that Shi’s acts were violent, serious, and put the

lives of the crew at risk.13 In light of the district court’s careful

consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we are satisfied that the

sentence it imposed was not unreasonable. See Gall, 128

S. Ct. at 594-98; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-

69 (2007). 

VII

For the foregoing reasons, Shi’s conviction and sentence

never included such an allegation. This argument is without merit. While

§ 2A1.1 does apply to “cases of premeditated killing,” it “also applies

when death results from the commission of certain felonies,” including

§ 2280. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a)(1) app. n.1 (emphasis added). 

12These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the

sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of

sentences and the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among

defendants who have similar criminal records and have been found guilty

of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

13In a case of a felony resulting in death, § 2A1.1 advises a downward

departure only “if the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or

knowingly.” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a)(1) app. n.2(B). 

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imposed are 

AFFIRMED. 

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