Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03248/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03248-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fongyxmany Phommachanh
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

FONGYXMANY PHOMMACHANH, 

akaLO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 95-3248 

FILED 

lJIUecl States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JUL 2 6 1996 

.PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 94-10123-01) 

Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. Phillips, Federal Public 

Defender, with him on the brief), Office of Federal Public Defender, Wichita, Kansas, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

David M. Lind, Assistant United Stats Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United States 

Attorney, and Lanny D. Welch, Assistant United States Attorney with him on the brief), 

Office of United States Attorney for the District of Kansas, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

In this appeal, Defendant-Appellant Fongyxmany Phommachanh challenges on 

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jurisdictional and due process grounds the district court's order that he be deported as a 

condition of his term of supervised release. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and modify the district court's judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Phommachanh is a permanent resident alien in the United States. On Apri126, 

1995, he pleaded guilty to two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation 

to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Mr. Phommachanh's petition to 

enter a guilty plea included the following paragraph: 

I have been advised and understand that if I am not a U.S. citizen, a 

conviction of a criminal offense may result in deportation from the United 

States, exclusion from admission to the United States, and/or denial of 

naturalization. 

Rec. vol. I., doc. 73 at 3. In addition, the United States Probation Office prepared a 

presentence investigation report (PSI), which advised Mr. Phommachanh that he might be 

deported as a condition of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Rec. vol. 

III, at 10. Mr. Phommachanh filed written objections to this portion of the PSI. See id. at 

13-14. 

At sentencing, the government asked the district court to order Mr. Phommachanh, 

as a condition of supervised release, to surrender to the INS to go through its 

administrative proceedings. See Rec. vol. II, doc. 89 at 10. The district court refused this 

request, stating that Mr. Phommachanh "doesn't deserve to be in the United States under 

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any circumstances at any time ever." I d. at 10-11. At Mr. Phommachanh' s sentencing 

hearing, the district judge told Mr. Phommachanh that one of the "[s]pecial conditions of 

supervision" to which he was going to sentence Mr. Phommachanh was "that you be 

deported and if you are not deported that you will participate in a program for substance 

abuse at the direction of the probation office." Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added). The 

district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Phommachanh to twenty-five years in prison 

and to three years of supervised release. Rec. vol. I, doc. 81 at 2, 3. As a condition ofhis 

supervised release, the district court ordered that Mr. Phommachanh "be deported and 

remain outside the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3583(d) and U.S. v. 

Chukwura, 5 F.3d [1]420 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. den., 115 S.Ct. 102 [(1994)]." Id. at 3. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Mr. Phommachanh claims that the sentence imposed by the district 

court is illegal for two reasons. First, he argues that the district court was without 

jurisdiction to enter an order deporting him upon release from prison. He next asserts that 

the order deporting him violated his right to due process because it denied him a 

meaningful hearing, which he would have received from a deportation hearing provided 

by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We hold that the district court 

lacked the authority to order, as a condition of supervised release, that Mr. Phommachanh 

be deported. We therefore need not address Mr. Phommachanh's due process argument. 

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See United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 448 (lOth Cir. 1990) (refusing to reach the 

constitutional issue raised by the appellant where the court had another ground upon 

which to dispose of the case). 

The district court based its order deporting Mr. Phommachanh as a condition of his 

supervised release on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Section 3583(d) states: 

If an alien defendant is subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a 

condition of supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the 

United States, and may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized 

immigration official for such deportation. 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Mr. Phommachanh argues that§ 3583(d) only allows the district 

court "to order that, upon commencement of supervised release, [he] would be turned 

over to officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) for them [sic] to 

conduct an administrative deportation hearing in accordance with the applicable statutes 

and I.N.S. regulations." Aplt's Br. at 8. We review de novo Mr. Phommachanh's 

challenge to his sentence because it involves a question of law. See United States v. 

Bailey, 76 F.3d 320, 323 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1889 (1996); United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1484 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1862 (1994). 

Although the Tenth Circuit has not previously decided the issue of whether a 

district court has the authority to deport a defendant-alien as a condition of supervised 

release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), five circuits have. The First, Second, Fourth, 

and Fifth Circuits have held that a district court does not have such authority under 18 

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U.S.C. § 3583(d); see United States v. Xiang, 77 F.3d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1996); United 

States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447, 449-51 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 

562, 568 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Ramirez, 948 F.2d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Sanchez, 923 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); whereas the 

Eleventh Circuit has held that it does; see United States v. Chukwura, 5 F.3d 1420, 1423 

(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 102 (1994). For several reasons, we adopt the 

First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). We hold 

that§ 3583(d) does not authorize a district court to deport a defendant-alien as a condition 

of supervised release, but that it instead authorizes a district court to impose as a 

condition of supervised release that a defendant be delivered to the INS for deportation 

proceedings consistent with the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § § 

1101-1524. 

A. The Ambiguity of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) 

We begin our analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) by determining that§ 3583(d) is 

ambiguous. While§ 3583(d) allows a sentencing court to "provide, as a condition of 

supervised release, that [an alien subject to deportation] be deported and remain outside 

the United States," 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), it then allows the sentencing court to "order that 

[the defendant-alien] be delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for such 

deportation." ld. When these two portions of§ 3583(d) are read together, the proper 

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allocation of the authority to deport the alien between the sentencing court and the INS is 

left unclear. 

B. Statutory Interpretation 

1. Construction in Favor of the Alien 

Because§ 3583(d) is ambiguous, we must utilize various tools of statutory 

construction in order to interpret its meaning. In construing § 3583( d), a deportation 

statute, we are mindful of "the longstanding principle of construing any lingering 

ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien." See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 

480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); see also INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (recognizing 

that doubts as to the correct construction of a deportation statute "should be resolved in 

favor ofthe alien"); United States v. Quintana, 914 F.2d 1409, 1410 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

("Statutes relating to deportation of aliens are liberally construed in favor of the alien 

concerned as the deportation penalty can be harsh."). 

2. Textual Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583( d) 

The text of§ 3583(d) itself is instructive in gleaning the import of the statute. By 

using two different verbs to describe what a district court may do under § 3583( d), 

Congress presumably intended the verbs to convey their respective meanings. Section 

3583(d) states that "the court may provide, as a condition of supervised release, that [an 

alien subject to deportation] be deported," but that it "may order that [the alien] be 

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delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for such deportation," 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d) (emphasis added). The verb "provide" is defined as "[t]o exercise foresight in 

taking due measures in view of a possible event;" 12 The Oxford English Dictionary 713 

(2d ed. 1989); whereas the verb "order" is defined as "[t]o ... command [or] 

authoritatively direct." 10 The Oxford English Dictionary 907 (2d ed. 1989). Had 

Congress intended that§ 3583(d) allow the sentencing court to order, or "authoritatively 

direct," deportation, it could have easily so stated. However, its choice of the verb 

"provide" connotes a different, presumably intended, meaning; it allows the sentencing 

court "[t]o exercise foresight ... in view of a possible event," see 12 The Oxford English 

Dictionary 713 (2d ed. 1989), by directing that in the event that the INS determines that 

the defendant-alien is "subject to deportation" upon release from prison, see 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d), then the defendant-alien is to be deported. See Quaye, 57 F.3d at 449 

(recognizing that "Congress used the verb 'order' elsewhere in Section 3583(d), implying 

that its choice of the verb 'provide' was intentional here"); see also Xiang, 77 F.3d at 772 

(emphasizing that§ 3583(d) "states that the court 'may provide, as a condition of 

supervised release, that [the defendant] be deported,' and 'for such deportation' 

authorizes the court to order delivery of the defendant to the INS"). 

3. Reading 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and 8 U.S.C. § 1251 Together 

Examining the first clause of§ 3583( d), we next note that the statute allows the 

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sentencing court to provide that a defendant-alien be deported as a condition of 

supervised release only "[i]f [the] alien defendant is subject to deportation." 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d) (emphasis added). However, as explained below, the initial determination of 

whether an alien is subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 falls outside the 

jurisdiction of the district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1251, part ofthe Immigration and 

Naturalization Act (INA) entitled "Deportable aliens," explains which aliens are subject 

to deportation. Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and 8 U.S.C. § 1251 are in pari materia, and as 

such, must be read and applied together. See Sanchez, 923 F.2d at 237 ("As subsection 

3 5 83 (d) provides no indication of a contrary legislative design, we read its language in 

pari materia with the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act."); see also 

Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972) ("The rule [of in pari materia] ... 

necessarily assumes that whenever Congress passes a new statute, it acts aware of all 

previous statutes on the same subject."); United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 67-68 

(1963) ('"When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both 

if possible."' (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939))). The 

result ofthis simultaneous application is that§ 3583(d) can only be interpreted as 

allowing "the sentencing court to order, as a condition of supervised release, that 'an alien 

defendant [who] is subject to deportation' be surrendered to immigration officials for 

deportation proceedings under the Immigration and Naturalization Act ... for the purpose 

of determining whether he is 'an alien defendant ... subject to deportation."' See 

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Sanchez, 923 F .2d at 23 7. 

4. Congress's Division of Responsibility Between the Executive and Judicial 

Branches 

Our interpretation of§ 3583(d) "is consistent with the overall division of 

responsibility that Congress created between the INS and the courts." See Xiang, 77 F.3d 

at 772-73. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Xiang, Congress "established the INS as 

part of the Executive Branch under the Attorney General, and gave the Attorney General 

far reaching authority to deport aliens .... See generally 8 U.S.C. § § 1101-1503. The 

courts are brought into the process only after the Attorney General reaches a final 

decision on deportability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.[1

]" Xiang, 77 F.3d at 773; see also 

Jalilian, 896 F.2d at 448 (recognizing that "Congress ... has delegated exclusive 

authority to the Attorney General to order the deportation of aliens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

section 1252" and holding that the district court exceeded its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 

3563 "by imposing a probation condition ordering [the alien-defendant] to leave the 

country"); Quaye, 57 F.3d at 449-50 (adopting this interpretation of§ 3583(d) and 

recognizing that it "preserves Congress's long tradition of granting the Executive Branch 

sole power to institute deportation proceedings against aliens"); Kassar, 47 F.3d at 568 

("[T]he decision to deport rests in the sound discretion of the Attorney General."). 

1

8 U.S.C. § 1105a provides the procedure for judicial review of the Attorney General's 

orders of deportation and exclusion. 

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5. Judicial Deportation Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d) 

As the Fourth Circuit recognized, by enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d), "Congress 

made one exception to the Executive Branch's plenary role" regarding the deportation of 

aliens. See Xiang, 77 F.3d at 773. Section 1252a(d)(l) gives a district court 

jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of deportation at the time of sentencing 

against an alien whose criminal conviction causes such alien to be 

deportable under section 125l(a)(2)(A) of this title, if such an order has 

been requested by the United States Attorney with the concurrence of the 

Commissioner [of Immigration and Naturalization] and ifthe court chooses 

to exercise such jurisdiction. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d)(l). Section 1251(a)(2)(A) lists three types of criminal offenses, 

crimes of moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, and aggravated felonies, which 

qualify an alien for deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A). Thus, § 1252a(d) 

provides, "in limited circumstances, for direct judicial deportation of aliens." See Xiang, 

77 F.3d at 773.2 

As discussed by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, if we were to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d) as allowing a district court to order a defendant-alien deported as a condition of 

2

Section 1252a(d) does not directly apply to this case because the United States Attorney 

did not request the order deporting Mr. Phommachanh, as§ 1252a(d) requires. See Rec. vol. II, 

doc. 89 at 10 (explaining the government's position that "the path of least resistance" should be 

taken by ordering Mr. Phommachanh "to the immigration [sic] and be afforded whatever 

opportunities there are by way of administrative proceedings"). Because§ 1252a(d) does not 

apply here, it does not provide the district court with the authority it lacked for its deportation 

order. 

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supervised release, it would result in an illogical set of judicial deportation rules: 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(d) would allow judicial deportation of"any deportable aliens without 

affording them any procedural safeguards," while 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d) "protect[s] 

deportable aliens convicted of particularly heinous crimes with more expansive 

procedural checks." See Quaye, 57 F.3d at 450. Additionally, if§ 3583(d) were 

interpreted as allowing broader judicial deportation than that allowed by the subsequently 

enacted§ 1252a(d), then§ 1252a(d) would be meaningless. See Xiang, 77 F.3d at 773 

("The exception that Congress provided for judicial deportation [in 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d)] 

would be meaningless if we could now read§ 3583(d) to authorize judicial deportation 

for lesser crimes without any procedural safeguards."). We do not presume that in 

enacting§ 1252a(d), Congress performed such "a useless act." See 2B Norman J. Singer, 

Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 49.11, at 83 (5th ed. 1992). Therefore, we do not 

interpret§ 3583(d) in such a way as to create this nonsensical combination of judicial 

deportation rules. 

6. United States v. Chukwura in Doubt 

Finally, we note that the case upon which the district court relied in ordering Mr. 

Phommachanh deported as a condition to supervised release has recently been called into 

question. The district court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d) in United States v. Chukwura, 5 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. 

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Ct. 102 (1994). See Rec. vol. I, doc. 81 at 3. In Chukwura, the Eleventh Circuit held that 

§ 3 5 83 (d) "authorizes district courts to order deportation as a condition of supervised 

release, any time a defendant is subject to deportation." Id. at 1423. However, in a 

subsequent Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Oboh, 65 F.3d 900 (11th Cir.), vacated 

and reh'g en bane granted, 70 F.3d 87 (11th Cir. 1995), both the United States and the 

defendant-alien requested that the court overrule Chukwura. See Oboh, 65 F.3d at 901. 

Controlled by the precedent of Chukwura, the Oboh court held that "the district court had 

authority to order [the defendant-alien] deported." Id. The court explained that "a panel 

cannot overturn one of [that] court's prior decisions," id., and that "only the court sitting 

en bane may" do so, id. at 902. Since that decision, the Eleventh Circuit has vacated the 

panel opinion in Oboh and has voted to rehear Oboh en bane. See United States v. Oboh, 

70 F.3d 87 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Xiang, 77 F.3d at 773 (recognizing that Chukwura 

"may currently be in some doubt"). 

Having concluded that Mr. Phommachanh's sentence is illegal because the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentence, we find it unnecessary to remand the case 

to the district court for resentencing. The district court expressed in its judgment its intent 

that Mr. Phommachanh's supervised release be conditioned as allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d). See Rec. vol. I, doc. 81, at 3 (ordering "[t]hat the defendant be deported and 

remain outside the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3583(d)"); see also 

Sanchez, 923 F .2d at 23 8 (amending the district court's judgment where "the district 

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court expressly directed that appellant's term of supervised release be conditioned as 

permitted under subsection 3583( d)"). Therefore, we amend the district court's judgment, 

as did the courts in Xiang, 77 F.3d at 773, Quaye, 57 F.3d at 451, Ramirez, 948 F.2d at 

68, and Sanchez, 923 F.2d at 238, as follows: 

As a condition of supervised release, upon completion of his term of 

imprisonment the defendant is to be surrendered to a duly-authorized 

immigration official for deportation in accordance with the established 

procedures provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 

§ 1101-1524. As a further condition of supervised release, if ordered 

deported, the defendant shall remain outside the United States. 

It is so ORDERED. 

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