Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-01030/USCOURTS-caDC-23-01030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
Troutbrook Company LLC
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 2023 Decided July 12, 2024

No. 23-1025

TROUTBROOK COMPANY LLC, D/B/A BROOKLYN 181

HOSPITALITY LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 23-1030

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

Thomas G. Eron argued the cause for petitioner. With him 

on the briefs was Raymond J. Pascucci.

David A. Seid, Senior Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief 

were Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel, Ruth E. Burdick, 

Deputy Associate General Counsel, David S. Habenstreit, 

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Assistant General Counsel, and Milakshmi V. Rajapakse, 

Supervisory Attorney. 

Before: RAO and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

GARCIA, Circuit Judge: The National Labor Relations Act 

specifies the topics over which an employer must bargain in 

good faith with an employee representative. The National 

Labor Relations Board held that Troutbrook Company, LLC 

violated the Act by resolutely refusing to discuss certain of 

those mandatory subjects—including wages, health benefits, 

and retirement benefits—throughout months of negotiations 

over an initial collective bargaining agreement for one of its 

hotels. Troutbrook now petitions for review of the Board’s 

decision. Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

determination, we deny Troutbrook’s petition and grant the 

Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order. 

I

A

Troutbrook owns and operates a sixty-room hotel in 

Brooklyn, New York. On September 24, 2018, after the hotel’s 

employees voted for union representation, the Board certified 

New York Hotel and Motel Trades Council, AFL-CIO (“the 

Union”) as their exclusive collective-bargaining 

representative. Troutbrook challenged the certification and 

refused to bargain with the Union. On June 3, 2019, the Board 

found the company’s refusal unlawful and ordered it to 

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recognize and bargain with the Union. See Troutbrook Co. 

d/b/a Brooklyn 181 Hosp., LLC & N.Y. Hotel & Motel Trades 

Council, AFL-CIO, 367 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (June 3, 2019). On 

February 28, 2020, we denied Troutbrook’s petition for review 

and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. 

Troutbrook Co. v. NLRB, 801 F. App’x 781 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 

A few months later, Troutbrook and the Union began 

negotiating an initial collective-bargaining agreement. The 

parties met six times by teleconference: three times in mid2020 and, after a hiatus due to the COVID-19 pandemic, three 

times in early 2021. The Union’s primary spokesperson during 

negotiations was Assistant General Counsel Gideon Martin. 

Martin was assisted by Union General Counsel and Executive 

Vice President Rich Maroko. Attorney Raymond Pascucci 

served as the primary spokesperson for Troutbrook.

On May 18, 2020, before the parties’ first bargaining 

session, Martin sent Pascucci the Union’s proposal, which 

comprised its Industry-Wide Agreement with the Hotel 

Association of New York City, Inc. (“IWA”) and a 

Memorandum of Understanding modifying the IWA’s terms 

for Troutbrook’s hotel. During the session, Maroko presented 

the proposal’s terms, covering both economic subjects (e.g., 

wages, severance pay, and sick leave) and non-economic 

subjects (e.g., union recognition, non-discrimination 

requirements, and agreement duration). The Union voiced its 

preference that Troutbrook sign onto the IWA and offered to 

answer any questions. Pascucci said that he needed time to 

review the proposal with the company. 

On June 4, 2020, the parties met for a second session. At 

the start of the call, Pascucci proposed ground rules to guide 

the parties’ negotiations, including that the “[p]arties would 

focus on non[-]economic issues before moving onto economic 

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issues.” J.A. 96; see J.A. 300. Maroko countered that the 

Union preferred to discuss all issues without limiting the topics. 

The parties then turned to the Union’s proposal. Pascucci 

stated that Troutbrook was “not willing to accept the IWA, 

whatsoever.” J.A. 96. He explained that the pandemic had 

significantly altered the hotel industry’s labor market and room 

rates and that the company sought a standalone agreement 

tailored to its hotel. Maroko asked whether Troutbrook took 

issue with specific provisions of the IWA, and Pascucci 

clarified that the entire agreement was “way too convoluted 

and unnecessarily complex and burdensome.” J.A. 97. 

Maroko said he understood if Troutbrook wanted to discuss 

particular subjects of concern, but he objected to the company’s 

wholesale rejection of the IWA as a starting point for 

negotiations. Pascucci asked if Maroko viewed the IWA as a 

“one size fits all” document, and Maroko initially said yes. 

J.A. 97. But he then made clear that “[i]f [Troutbrook] raise[s]

issues that are legitimate, [the Union will] be flexible on them.” 

J.A. 98. After Maroko requested a counterproposal, Pascucci

stated that the company’s response would address “just some 

of the articles” in the IWA rather than the whole agreement. 

Id. Maroko replied that good-faith bargaining required a 

complete counterproposal. Pascucci disagreed, claiming that 

the parties could make more progress by considering a few 

issues at a time.

Between June 4 and June 18, 2020, Pascucci and Martin 

exchanged emails. Pascucci presented in writing Troutbrook’s 

proposed ground rules from the second session, including the 

proposal to defer discussion of economic subjects. Martin 

rejected that ground rule, though he agreed to some others. In 

his words, the Union “d[id] not want to constrain the parties’ 

capability to freely explore and discuss any items, such as 

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specific proposals, terms, or conditions, during bargaining 

sessions.” J.A. 107. 

Pascucci countered with a modification: “The parties 

agree to focus primarily on non-economic subjects before 

turning to economic subjects, but it is understood that this 

general framework does not preclude either party from raising 

and freely discussing any item at any point during the 

bargaining process.” J.A. 105. Martin again rejected the rule 

as unnecessarily restrictive and asked whether Troutbrook was 

“refusing to have meaningful discussion on economics until all 

non-economic subjects are addressed.” J.A. 103. Pascucci 

replied that Troutbrook was prepared to move forward without 

a formal, agreed-upon rule, but that “[i]n responding to the 

Union’s proposals, the [company] will focus on non-economic 

subjects first.” J.A. 101. 

On June 25, 2020, the parties conferred for a third time. 

After an update on the hotel’s operations, Pascucci briefly 

introduced six “non-economic counterproposals” addressing 

recognition of the Union, non-discrimination, a prohibition on 

strikes and lockouts, a probationary period for new employees, 

hours of work, and the effective dates of any agreement. 

J.A. 112–13, 120–21. Martin suggested it was “worth walking 

through” the counterproposals. J.A. 112. Because the 

effective-dates counterproposal was a placeholder, he asked if 

Troutbrook knew how long it wanted any agreement to be 

valid. J.A. 113. The company had not yet considered the issue, 

Pascucci responded, but it would “be part of [the] wages and 

benefits” discussion. J.A. 113. Pascucci’s reference to those

mandatory economic subjects prompted Martin to inquire

when the Union could expect to receive Troutbrook’s 

counterproposals on wages, health benefits, and retirement. Id. 

Pascucci reiterated that the company’s “plan” was to “[w]ork[] 

on non-economics first.” Id. Martin repeated the Union’s 

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preference for a complete counterproposal, noting that “it’s 

difficult to evaluate a response when it doesn’t respond to every 

term and condition.” Id. 

Martin then turned to Troutbrook’s non-economic 

counterproposals. He asked how the Union should interpret

Troutbrook’s silence on terms that were included in the 

Union’s original proposal but not addressed in Troutbrook’s 

counters. “We’re not agreeing to whatever else is in your 

versions of these topics,” Pascucci responded. J.A. 114. When 

asked how many sets of counterproposals Troutbrook intended 

to make, Pascucci replied that the “intention is we work on 

these topics, then we reach a tentative agreement and then 

move on to the next set of proposals.” Id. Martin requested 

that Troutbrook at the very least offer counterproposals on

wages, health benefits, and retirement, but Pascucci pivoted 

back to the company’s non-economic counterproposals. 

Despite the parties’ disagreement over bargaining procedure, 

for the rest of the third session, the parties discussed the details 

of Troutbrook’s non-economic counterproposals but did not 

come to any concrete agreements. 

After a seven-month hiatus due to the COVID-19

pandemic, on February 2, 2021, the parties met for the fourth 

time. Martin noted that the Union was “still waiting on a 

complete proposal including economics, health, [and] wages” 

and that “[i]t’s hard to analyze a proposal without that.” 

J.A. 123. Pascucci replied: “[T]he way I do it is first work 

through non[-]economics, get through a half dozen and resolve 

and then move on to next sets, and then eventually work 

through economics.” Id. In response to Pascucci’s concerns 

about the IWA, Martin stated that “we can bargain flexib[ly]. 

We should change the IWA for your operational needs.” 

J.A. 124. Martin further offered to “bargain over [language] 

and talk about it so [Troutbrook] do[es]n’t think it’s more 

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convoluted than it is” or to “bargain over things to make them 

less expensive.” Id. Pascucci emphasized that Troutbrook 

already gave counters on multiple non-economic subjects. But 

Martin underscored how difficult it would be to come to an 

agreement through piecemeal bargaining. For example, he

explained that “it’s a lot easier to go to the crew on hours of

work if I also know how much they are getting paid.” J.A. 125. 

Pascucci found that reasoning “absolutely not persuasive.” Id. 

In an email after the session, Martin again requested that 

Troutbrook “provide a complete proposal, including 

economics and addressing all mandatory topics.” J.A. 127. 

On March 11, 2021, the parties met for a fifth bargaining 

session but made no progress. Martin restated that the Union 

would like Troutbrook to sign the IWA but noted that if “you 

want to put on your deal-making hat, I can come up with as 

many deals and breaks to come up with [an agreement]” as 

possible. J.A. 132. Pascucci stressed Troutbrook’s preference 

for a simple, tailored contract. He reaffirmed his intention to 

negotiate “over a subset of non-economic subjects, then move 

to another subset, and ultimately move onto economics.” 

J.A. 303. 

In a March 30, 2021 letter, Martin claimed that 

Troutbrook’s failure to discuss economic subjects or to provide 

a counterproposal encompassing all mandatory subjects of 

bargaining constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith. 

Pascucci responded that same day, accusing the Union of 

impeding negotiations by refusing to bargain over 

Troutbrook’s six non-economic counterproposals until the 

company provided a complete counterproposal. 

On April 5, 2021, Martin gave Pascucci notice that the 

Union would file an unfair-labor-practice charge against 

Troutbrook with the Board later that day. J.A. 136.

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On April 21, 2021, the parties held a final bargaining 

session, where they rehashed their positions on the mechanics 

of bargaining and acknowledged that the Board would decide 

whether Troutbrook’s conduct violated the Act. 

B

On June 17, 2021, the Board’s Regional Director filed a 

complaint against Troutbrook based on the Union’s charge. 

The complaint alleged that the company violated the Act by 

refusing to provide the Union with a comprehensive 

counterproposal, restricting the non-economic subjects over 

which it would bargain, and refusing to bargain over economic 

subjects until all non-economic subjects were resolved. On 

August 3, 2021, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a 

remote hearing at which Pascucci and Martin testified about the 

course of negotiations between the parties. On December 1, 

2021, the ALJ found that the Regional Director abandoned the 

claim that Troutbrook was legally obligated to provide a 

complete counterproposal. Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded 

that Troutbrook violated Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act 

because the company refused to bargain over economic 

subjects until the parties resolved all non-economic subjects,

and it restricted the non-economic subjects over which it would 

bargain. 

Troutbrook appealed to the Board. On December 16, 

2022, the Board issued a decision agreeing that the company’s

refusal to bargain over economic subjects violated the Act.

Troutbrook Co. d/b/a Brooklyn 181 Hosp., LLC & N.Y. Hotel 

& Motel Trades Council (“Troutbrook II”), 372 N.L.R.B. No. 

26, at 4 (Dec. 16, 2022). The Board found it “unnecessary” to 

address, as potential additional support for the violation,

Troutbrook’s restrictions on the non-economic subjects it 

would discuss. Id. at 4 n.7. Because it determined that 

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Troutbrook’s conduct “effectively denied the Union its full 

opportunity to bargain during the entirety of the” year for 

which the Union had been certified to represent the employees, 

the Board granted the Union’s request for a twelve-month 

certification extension, to commence on the date the company 

“begins to bargain in good faith.” Id. at 6. 

Troutbrook timely petitioned for review, and the Board 

filed a cross-application for enforcement of its decision.

II

A

“Our review of Board unfair labor practice determinations 

is quite narrow.” Traction Wholesale Ctr. Co. v. NLRB, 216 

F.3d 92, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “We must uphold the judgment 

of the Board unless, upon reviewing the record as a whole, we 

conclude that the Board’s findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence, or that the Board acted arbitrarily or 

otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts of the 

case.” Wayneview Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 341, 348 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Mohave Elec. Coop., Inc. v. NLRB, 

206 F.3d 1183, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Substantial evidence 

requires enough “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Micro Pac. Dev. 

Inc. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1325, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting 

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

Thus, we reverse the Board “only when the record is so 

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to 

the contrary.” Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.3d 929, 

935 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. 

NLRB, 938 F.2d 240, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

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B

Under Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 

an employer commits an unfair labor practice if it “refuse[s] to 

bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] 

employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Such a refusal also 

violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which prohibits 

“interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in 

the exercise of” their rights under the Act, id. § 158(a)(1), 

including the right to “bargain collectively through 

representatives of their own choosing,” id. § 157. Per the Act, 

to “bargain collectively” includes “confer[ring] in good faith 

with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 

employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 

Accordingly, an employer’s refusal to discuss any

mandatory bargaining subject—a subset of which are referred 

to as “economic subjects”—may constitute an unfair labor 

practice. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742–43 (1962). 

Applying that principle, the Board has repeatedly held that an 

employer violates Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) when its refusal 

to bargain over economic subjects until all non-economic 

subjects are resolved “unreasonably fragment[s] the 

negotiations and drastically reduce[s] the parties’ bargaining 

flexibility.” John Wanamaker Phila., 279 N.L.R.B. 1034, 

1034–35 (1986); see also S. Shore Hosp., 245 N.L.R.B. 848, 

857–60 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1980); Patent 

Trader, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 842, 853 (1967), enforced in 

relevant part, 415 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1969). The Board has 

supported those holdings by explaining that “[t]he very nature 

of collective bargaining presumes that while movement may be 

slow on some issues, a full discussion of other issues . . . may 

result in agreement on the stalled issues.” Yama Woodcraft, 

Inc., d/b/a Cal-Pac. Furniture Mfg. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1337,

1341 (1977), enforcement denied on other grounds, 580 F.2d 

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942 (9th Cir. 1978). Refusing to discuss mandatory subjects, 

by contrast, tends to “narrow[] the range of possible 

compromises.” Patent Trader, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. at 853.

In this appeal, Troutbrook does not contest those legal 

principles. Instead, it argues that, even accepting those 

principles, the Board’s unfair-labor-practice finding is 

unsupported by the evidence. 

C

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that 

Troutbrook refused to bargain over mandatory subjects and 

violated the Act. 

As the Board explained, the record shows that the 

company steadfastly refused to bargain on economic subjects 

until non-economic subjects were resolved. At the start of 

negotiations, after rejecting versions of a proposed ground rule 

tracking Troutbrook’s “non-economics first” approach, the 

Union asked whether the company was “refusing to have 

meaningful discussion on economics until all non-economic 

subjects are addressed.” Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 

at 2. Troutbrook did not deny the suggestion. Instead, it 

declared that “[i]n responding to the Union’s proposals, [it] will 

focus on non-economic subjects first.” Id. 

That pattern continued throughout negotiations. During 

the third bargaining session, the Union asked when it could 

expect to receive counterproposals on wages, health benefits, 

and retirement—three topics Troutbrook does not deny are 

mandatory subjects of bargaining. Troutbrook responded:

“[W]orking on non-economics first, that’s our plan.” Id. When 

pressed, the company revealed that it had not even discussed 

any of those three subjects internally. At the fourth bargaining 

session, the Union restated its request for counterproposals on 

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“economics, health, [and] wages,” noting the difficulty of 

bargaining effectively without them. J.A. 123. In response, 

Troutbrook reiterated its intent to “first work through 

non [ - ] economics . . . and then eventually work through 

economics.” Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 4. When 

the Union explained that coming to an agreement on hours of 

work—one of the company’s six non-economic 

counterproposals—would be easier if it knew how much 

workers were getting paid, Troutbrook dismissed the Union’s 

position as “nonsense.” J.A. 125. During the fifth bargaining 

session, Troutbrook once again declared that the parties should 

“negotiate over a subset of non-economic subjects, then move 

onto another subset, and ultimately move onto economics” 

after reaching agreement on non-economic subjects first. 

J.A. 303; see generally Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 

2–4. 

Consistent with Troutbrook’s firm stance on bifurcating 

negotiations, the Board found that over the course of the 

parties’ several bargaining sessions, the company never 

provided the Union with a single counterproposal on economic 

subjects. Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 4. Pascucci

confirmed as much in his testimony before the ALJ. 

See J.A. 55 (“Q. [Troutbrook] never provided any proposals on 

economics, did they? A. We did not.”). 

The Board also reasonably found that Troutbrook’s 

persistent refusal to discuss economic subjects “unreasonably 

fragmented the negotiations and drastically reduced the parties’ 

bargaining flexibility.” Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 

4 (quoting John Wanamaker Phila., 279 N.L.R.B. at 1034–35). 

The Board observed that Troutbrook’s refusal to discuss 

economic subjects led the parties to “expend[] significant 

bargaining time discussing how negotiations would be 

conducted instead of negotiating substantive terms.” Id.

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(emphasis added). The record bears out this effect. See J.A. 

96 (disputing the priority of non-economic subjects during the 

second session); J.A. 101– 09 (email exchanges between June 4 

and June 18, 2020 rehashing the dispute); J.A. 113–14 

(debating the relative merits of partial- versus completeproposal approaches to bargaining during the third session); 

J.A. 123–24 (same during fourth session); J.A. 132 (same 

during fifth session); J.A. 142 (same during sixth session). The 

“foreseeable result,” the Board noted, was that “after six 

bargaining sessions over the course of 11 months, [the parties] 

failed to reach agreement on a single provision.” 

Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 4. 

For these reasons, we disagree with the dissent’s 

characterization of the Board’s decision as resting on a “per se 

rule” that any “initial” refusal to bargain over economic 

subjects violates the Act. See Dissenting Op. 1. Instead, as the 

Board summarized, throughout the entire course of bargaining 

Troutbrook “never provided any counterproposals on 

economic subjects” and instead “insisted on discussing noneconomic subjects first and continued to do so well after it 

became apparent that its approach was obstructing the parties’ 

ability to make progress towards reaching an agreement.” 

Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 4. 

D

Troutbrook contests the Board’s decision on several

grounds. The company asserts that the Board misunderstood 

the intent behind its bargaining strategy, disregarded the effects 

of the Union’s conduct, failed to consider the impact of the 

COVID-19 pandemic, deviated from Board precedent, and 

improperly sided with the Union’s substantive bargaining 

position. None of these arguments has merit. 

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1

Troutbrook does not directly engage with the substantial—

indeed, overwhelming—evidence that it refused to discuss 

economic subjects throughout the course of negotiations. The 

company instead seizes on Martin’s testimony before the ALJ 

that Pascucci never explicitly stated that he would refuse to 

discuss economic subjects until all non-economic subjects 

were resolved. Petitioner’s Brief 35. But as we have 

explained, the Board reasonably found, based on the full 

record, that the company improperly insisted on “adhering to 

its non-economics-first approach.” Troutbrook II, 372 

N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 4. 

Troutbrook’s primary argument is that its bargaining 

strategy did not violate the Act because it was part of “a sincere 

effort to reach an agreement on [the company’s] terms.” 

Petitioner’s Brief 28. That claim, even if true, is irrelevant 

under longstanding Supreme Court precedent. As the Board 

noted, Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 5, the Supreme 

Court explained in Katz that “[a] refusal to negotiate in fact as 

to any subject which is within § 8(d), and about which the 

union seeks to negotiate, violates § 8(a)(5) though the 

employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union 

upon an over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all 

good faith bargains to that end.” 369 U.S. at 743. The Board’s

precedent reflects this same principle. See John Wanamaker 

Phila., 279 N.L.R.B. at 1035 (rejecting the view that an 

employer’s refusal to make an economic proposal may be 

excused if the purpose was to obtain bargaining leverage); 

Long Island Jeep, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 1361, 1367 (1977) (“The 

law is clear that an employer’s willingness to enter into an 

agreement on its own terms . . . does not preclude a 

determination that [the] employer has violated its statutory duty 

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to bargain in good faith where such a finding is reasonably 

supported by other circumstances.”). 

2

Troutbrook also claims that the Board failed to consider 

the Union’s conduct as part of the totality of circumstances 

surrounding bargaining. In particular, the company argues that 

the Board’s analysis did not account for the Union’s professed 

intent to sign Troutbrook to the IWA as well as its demand for 

a complete set of counterproposals before discussing specific 

topics. The dissent endorses this argument. Dissenting Op.

6– 7.

We disagree. To start, neither Troutbrook nor the dissent 

identifies any Board or judicial decision in which one party’s 

conduct was found to have excused the other’s refusal to 

bargain over mandatory subjects. As the Board put it, no 

unfair-labor-practice charge was brought against the Union—

“the lawfulness of the Union’s bargaining actions is” therefore 

“not at issue here.” Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 5. 

In any event, the Board considered the Union’s conduct 

and reasonably concluded that the Union’s approach to 

negotiations did not “somehow excuse[]” Troutbrook’s 

“persistent refusal to bargain over mandatory subjects.” Id. 

The Board reasonably found that, unlike Troutbrook, the Union 

attempted to bargain over all mandatory subjects. As the Board 

noted, “the Union did not present the IWA on a take-it-orleave-it basis,” and it “repeatedly emphasized its flexibility 

with respect to both economics and contract wording.” Id. 

True enough, at the second bargaining session, Martin initially 

agreed with Pascucci’s statement that the IWA is a “one size 

fits all” agreement. J.A. 97. But immediately after that 

exchange, he told Pascucci that “[i]f you raise issues that are 

legitimate, we’ll be flexible on them.” J.A. 98; see Troutbrook 

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II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 19. At the fourth session, the Union 

reiterated that “we can bargain flexib[ly]” and that “[w]e 

should change the IWA for [Troutbrook’s] operational needs.” 

Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 25. After Troutbrook 

expressed concerns that the IWA contained “convoluted 

provisions that are restrictive and expensive,” the Union 

responded: “Let’s bargain over it and talk about it so you don’t 

think it’s more convoluted than it is or we can bargain over 

things to make them less expensive.” J.A. 124; see Troutbrook 

II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 25. At the fifth session, the Union 

took the same position, telling Troutbrook that “[i]f at any time 

you want to put on your deal-making hat, [we] can come up 

with as many deals and breaks to come up with [an 

agreement].” Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 25. 

Troutbrook counters that the Union conditioned any 

flexibility on the company first agreeing to the IWA in 

principle. That argument hinges on a single statement in the 

Board’s brief characterizing the Union’s comment during the 

fifth session. In the Board’s paraphrasing, the Union explained 

that “if [Troutbrook] expressed a willingness to agree to the 

IWA, [it] could ‘come up with as many deals and breaks’ as 

possible to arrive at an overall agreement.” Respondent’s Brief

15 (quoting J.A. 132). Troutbrook seizes on the conditional 

“if” clause, insisting that it proves the Union’s unwillingness 

to negotiate without a commitment from the company to sign 

onto the IWA.

Troutbrook is incorrect. Offering to make deals and 

provide breaks in exchange for agreeing to the IWA in 

principle does not necessarily mean that, in the absence of such 

an agreement, the Union would be inflexible. In fact, the 

record demonstrates the Union’s broader willingness to 

negotiate an agreement specific to the company’s needs. 

Martin communicated to Troutbrook after the fifth session that

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“the Union remains flexible on nearly every issue, and it is our 

hope to reach a contract that suits the particularized operation 

of the Hotel.” J.A. 135. Indeed, the Union repeatedly 

expressed openness to considering proposals that did not draw 

on the IWA at all if the company were to provide them. And

when Troutbrook did provide a few such proposals, the Union 

negotiated over them.

Relatedly, the record supports the Board’s finding that 

although the Union “consistently sought a full counterproposal 

from” Troutbrook, it “continued to bargain without one.” 

Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 5. At the third session, 

for instance, the Union narrowed its focus and “demonstrated 

flexibility by requesting proposals specifically relating to 

wages, health benefits, and retirement benefits.” Id.; see also 

J.A. 115 (asking for counters on the “holy trinity” of economic 

subjects). And when Troutbrook refused to engage on those 

mandatory subjects, the Union still “bargain[ed] over the 

limited noneconomic proposals the [company] unilaterally 

chose to present.” Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 5. 

The notes from the rest of the third session reflect substantive 

discussions on Troutbrook’s counterproposals addressing nondiscrimination, the new-employee probationary period, and 

hours of work. See J.A. 115–18. 

If anything, contrasting the parties’ bargaining conduct 

only buttresses the Board’s holding. The Union and 

Troutbrook both entered negotiations with strong views on 

what an agreement should look like and how best to get there. 

But whereas the Union narrowed its demand for a complete 

counterproposal and maintained flexibility on its desire to sign 

Troutbrook onto the IWA in full, Troutbrook never budged on 

its categorical refusal to discuss mandatory economic subjects 

until non-economic subjects were resolved. And whereas the 

Union engaged Troutbrook on the company’s non-economic 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 17 of 33
18

counterproposals, Troutbrook admitted that it never offered the 

Union a single counterproposal on economic subjects. 

3

Troutbrook next contends that the COVID-19 pandemic 

created an “uncertain economic position” that warranted the 

company’s unwillingness to bargain over economic subjects. 

Reply Brief 4–5; see Petitioner’s Brief 22. But even assuming 

the pandemic could have justified Troutbrook’s complete 

refusal to engage on mandatory economic subjects, the Board 

reasonably found that the pandemic was not the reason for the 

company’s position. As the Board noted, Troutbrook adopted 

its bargaining strategy because “it viewed such [an] approach 

as the most efficient way to negotiate a first contract, not 

because of economic uncertainty resulting from the pandemic.” 

Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 6. Pascucci’s 

comments fully support that conclusion. At the parties’ 

February 2, 2021 bargaining session, he stated: “[T]he way I 

[negotiate a first contract] is first work through noneconomics, 

get through a half dozen and resolve and then move on to next 

sets, and then eventually work through economics.” Id. at 6 

n.11. Similarly, in a March 30, 2021 email, he explained: “[I]n 

my experience having negotiated over 200 collective 

bargaining agreements, in the overwhelming majority of cases 

both parties mutually agree to focus on non-economic subjects 

first, since this is seen as the most efficient way to get to an 

overall contract, and this has been especially true when 

negotiating initial contracts in my experience.” Id. The Board 

reasonably found that these statements show Troutbrook’s 

bargaining strategy stemmed from Pascucci’s standard 

approach to labor negotiations—one he apparently would have 

insisted on regardless of the pandemic.

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19

4

Contrary to Troutbrook’s assertions, the Board’s decision 

does not deviate from its precedent. The company analogizes 

this case to Long Island Jeep, where the Board found no unfair 

labor practice even though the parties did not bargain over 

economic issues until their fifth meeting. 231 N.L.R.B. at 

1365. But that comparison ignores critical distinctions. The 

employer there provided the union with a complete economic 

counterproposal approximately a month after bargaining 

commenced and just two weeks after the union requested one. 

Id. And although the employer deferred discussion of 

economic subjects during that month, the union initially 

appeared to consent to that approach. See id. at 1364. In the 

interim, moreover, the parties reached agreement on several 

non-economic subjects such that one could hardly describe the 

bargaining process as unreasonably fragmented. Id.; id. at

1366 (noting the employer “made substantial concessions to 

union demands”). None of that is true here.

Relying on District Hospital Partners, L.P., 370 N.L.R.B. 

No. 118 (Apr. 30, 2021), Troutbrook submits that the Board 

neglected to consider the Union’s failure to test its willingness 

to negotiate. But the Board vacated that decision last year

before reversing itself and finding that the employer engaged 

in bad-faith bargaining. See Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., 372 

N.L.R.B. No. 109 (July 25, 2023); Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., 

373 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (May 8, 2024). And in any event the facts 

there again look nothing like this case. In its original decision, 

the Board found that the union declined to test the employer’s 

willingness to bargain because it “summarily rejected” the 

employer’s initial proposal rather than “substantively 

engaging” with it. 370 N.L.R.B. No. 118, at 8– 9. It was 

therefore unclear whether the employer was inflexible on its 

bargaining position. Here, by contrast, the record reflects that 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 19 of 33
20

after Pascucci initially declared that Troutbrook would not 

engage on economic subjects, the Union repeatedly, over the 

course of many months, sought to persuade the company to 

engage on those mandatory subjects of bargaining. Yet 

Troutbrook refused.

The additional authorities the dissent cites also do not 

show that the Board acted arbitrarily in finding a violation on 

the specific facts of this case. For reasons similar to District 

Hospital Partners, Captain’s Table, 289 N.L.R.B. 22 (1989), 

is inapposite. There, the union filed charges when negotiations 

“had just begun” and the employer had in fact recently 

provided a “counterproposal regarding wages” as “a starting 

point for future negotiations.” Id. at 24. And in Wyman 

Gordon Pa., LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Dec. 16, 2019), the 

Board found, on a different record than ours, that the 

employer’s conduct had not “frustrated the parties’ ability to 

reach agreement.” Id. at 5. For all the reasons we have 

mentioned, the Board reasonably reached the opposite 

conclusion here. See Troutbrook II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 6 

n.8 (distinguishing Wyman Gordon on this basis). 

5

Finally, Troutbrook claims that the Board’s decision 

“effectively sided with the Union’s bargaining strategy, and 

substantive bargaining position, over Troutbrook’s, in 

violation of Congressional labor policy prohibiting the Board 

from directly or indirectly compelling concessions or otherwise 

sitting in judgment on the substantive terms of collectivebargaining agreements.” Petitioner’s Brief 39. Not so. 

Nothing in the Board’s order obliges the company to concede 

on any subject or requires the inclusion of any substantive

provision in the parties’ agreement. The order simply directs

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 20 of 33
21

Troutbrook to bargain in good faith on mandatory economic 

subjects—a remedy consistent with the Act.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Troutbrook’s petition 

for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement.

So ordered. 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 21 of 33
RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: During a global pandemic, 

Troutbrook Company, LLC, began negotiating a collective 

bargaining agreement with the New York Hotel and Motel 

Trades Council, AFL-CIO (“Union”). After only several brief 

bargaining sessions, interrupted by an agreed upon pandemic 

hiatus, the Union abruptly abandoned negotiations and accused

Troutbrook of failing to bargain in good faith. Ignoring the 

context of the negotiations, the National Labor Relations Board 

found that Troutbrook committed an unfair labor practice. 

The majority enforces the Board’s order, relying primarily 

on deference to the Board’s factual findings. But the Board’s 

decision rests on a fundamental misstatement of longstanding 

legal standards. By failing to consider the totality of the 

circumstances, the Board creates what is, in effect, a per se rule 

that an initial refusal to discuss mandatory bargaining subjects

will constitute an unfair labor practice. This new rule disrupts 

the delicate balance between unions and employers protected 

by Congress and allows the Board to intervene prematurely 

into the ordinary hurly burly of labor negotiations. Because I 

would grant Troutbrook’s petition for review and set aside the 

Board’s order, I respectfully dissent.

I.

A.

At issue in this case is whether Troutbrook’s negotiation 

strategy constituted an unlawful failure to bargain. To answer 

this question, the Board was required to consider the totality of 

the circumstances, a test drawn from the text and structure of 

the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and fleshed out in 

Board decisions and our precedents. 

The NLRA was enacted to “promote industrial peace” 

through a regulatory scheme that fosters the creation of 

“voluntary agreements” between unions and employers. NLRB 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 22 of 33
2

v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401–02 (1952); see also

Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 

at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69). The NLRA requires “confer[ring] in 

good faith” over the mandatory subjects of collective 

bargaining, including “wages, hours, and other terms and 

conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also id.

§ 158(a)(1), (a)(5), (b)(3). Both parties are responsible for 

“satisfying the duty to bargain” that is essential to the statutory 

scheme. Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227,

232 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. at 

402.

Yet in Section 8(d) of the NLRA, Congress also 

recognized the role of private contracting in the collective 

bargaining process by explicitly providing that good faith 

bargaining “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal 

or require the making of a concession.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 

Although parties must “confer in good faith” about the subjects 

of mandatory bargaining, “neither party is legally obligated to 

yield” in its negotiations. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. 

NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964) (cleaned up). Section 8(d) 

“prevent[s] the Board from controlling the settling of the terms 

of collective bargaining agreements,” allowing parties “wide 

latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental 

power to regulate the substantive solution of their differences.” 

NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1960).

A collective bargaining agreement is of course shaped by 

the requirements of the NLRA, but the Board’s jurisdiction 

does not extend to dictating the terms of such agreements. 

Congress left “employers and unions free to set the terms and 

conditions of employment by mutual consent rather than 

administrative fiat.” Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. NLRB, 967 F.3d 878, 

893 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Rao, J., concurring in part and dissenting 

in part). 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 23 of 33
3

When determining whether an employer or a union failed 

to negotiate in good faith, the Board and this court have looked 

to the totality of the circumstances. “[A] statutory standard 

such as ‘good faith’ can have meaning only in its application to 

the particular facts of a particular case.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 343 

U.S. at 410. The Board must review the “previous relations of 

the parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the 

bargaining table, and the course of negotiations [that]

constitute the raw facts for reaching such a determination.” 

South Shore Hosp., 245 NLRB 848, 858 (1979) (quoting Local 

833, UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 706 (D.C. Cir. 

1962)), enf’d 630 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1980). Because “an 

employer’s bargaining position is not itself bad faith but only 

evidence of bad faith,” the Board must consider the totality of 

the circumstances and the parties’ entire course of conduct to 

determine if there was a failure to bargain in good faith. 

Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 284, 

289 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This approach prevents the Board from 

improperly endorsing the substance of a particular bargaining 

position in violation of Section 8(d). See Pub. Serv. Co. of 

Okla., 334 NLRB 487, 487 (2001), enf’d 318 F.3d 1173 (10th 

Cir. 2003).

B.

In contrast to these longstanding principles, the Board 

concludes that Troutbrook’s initial deferral of economic 

subjects constitutes a per se violation of the Act.1 Troutbrook 

Co., LLC, 372 NLRB No. 26, at *1, 3–4 (Dec. 16, 2022). This

1 The majority properly disclaims the creation of a per se rule, which 

at least minimizes the consequences of the decision and requires the 

Board to continue to consider the totality of the circumstances in 

determining whether parties have bargained in good faith. Majority 

Op. 13.

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4

approach cannot be reconciled with Board and circuit 

precedent applying the good faith bargaining standard.

As even the cases cited by the majority demonstrate, 

finding a failure to bargain in good faith requires the Board to 

examine the entire context of negotiations between the parties.

See Majority Op. 10–11. In John Wanamaker Philadelphia, the 

Board found a failure to negotiate in good faith only after the 

employer refused to provide economic terms for seven months, 

insisted on resolving all non-economic issues first, refused to 

discuss economic subjects until the Union agreed to certain 

strike and arbitration principles, and withheld wage and benefit 

increases during negotiations. 279 NLRB 1034, 1034–35 

(1986). The totality of the employer’s behavior, which included 

several unfair labor practices, demonstrated bad faith by 

“unreasonably fragment[ing] the negotiations.” Id. at 1035. 

Similarly in South Shore Hospital, the Board found a violation 

after the employer refused to submit wage and benefit 

proposals over eighteen bargaining sessions in eight months 

and demanded the union first agree to benefit reductions. 245 

NLRB at 858. The employer’s “rigid[]” bargaining approach

and conduct showed it “was not dealing with the [u]nion in a 

serious attempt to resolve their differences and reach a 

common ground.” Id. (cleaned up). 

The Board and the majority also attempt to ground their 

finding of a violation in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 

See Troutbrook, 372 NLRB No. 26, at *3; Majority Op. 10, 14.

But that decision is similarly inapposite. Katz upheld a per se 

violation when an employer unilaterally imposed terms of 

mandatory bargaining on a union. 369 U.S. at 745–47. There is 

no such unilateral imposition here, and Katz “cannot 

reasonably be read to imply[] that parties must negotiate every 

term or condition of employment immediately or 

simultaneously or that it is a per se violation of the Act 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 25 of 33
5

whenever a party fails to do so.” Troutbrook, 372 NLRB No. 

26, at *14 n.13 (Ring, dissenting).

The NLRA sets forth mandatory subjects for collective 

bargaining, but does not “regulate the substantive solution” of 

disagreements between employers and unions. Ins. Agents’ 

Int’l Union, 361 U.S. at 488. Persistent and unreasonable 

failure to consider economic subjects may be evidence of bad 

faith, but the Board must consider all of the circumstances 

around collective bargaining before making such a finding.

II.

The majority emphasizes the narrowness of substantial 

evidence review. Yet judicial review is not a “rubber-stamp,” 

and courts “bear the responsibility to examine carefully both 

the Board’s findings and its reasoning.” Erie Brush & Mfg. 

Corp. v. NLRB, 700 F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 

We cannot “abdicate the conventional judicial 

function ... [and] responsibility for assuring that the Board 

keeps within reasonable grounds.” NCRNC, LLC v. NLRB, 94 

F.4th 67, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “When reviewing a 

Board decision, this court must “identify the standard at issue, 

examine its application in prior adjudications, and then 

determine whether the instant case is a faithful application of

existing law or instead a sub silentio revision.” Circus Circus 

Casinos, Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.3d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 

And if the Board “entirely fails to consider an important aspect 

of the problem or offers an explanation ... that runs counter to 

the evidence before the agency,” the order must be set aside for 

“failing to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.” Fred Meyer 

Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 865 F.3d 630, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

(cleaned up).

By starting with the wrong legal standard, the Board 

considered only whether Troutbrook refused to initially 

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6

bargain over economic subjects. The Board’s blinkered 

approach to the evidence failed to consider the bargaining 

context or to “take into account whatever in the record fairly 

detract[ed] from” its determination. Universal Camera Corp. 

v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). Although the Board 

claimed to consider the totality of the circumstances, it ignored 

three key facts that undermine the finding of bad faith. Looking 

at the full picture of the parties’ negotiations compels the 

conclusion that the Board’s decision was unreasonable and not 

supported by substantial evidence.

A.

First, the Board failed to consider Troutbrook’s actions 

within the context of the Union’s negotiating position. The 

Board found that the Union’s negotiation tactics were

immaterial and emphasized that Troutbrook did not bring an 

unfair labor practice charge against the Union. See Majority 

Op. 15 (ratifying Board’s finding). But Troutbrook should not 

be penalized for declining to run to the Board in the middle of 

negotiations. The Union’s actions here, although not formally 

challenged, demonstrated at least some bargaining

recalcitrance by offering a “take it or leave it” contract. Cf.

Graphic Arts Int’l Union, Local 280, 235 NLRB 1084, 1096

(1978) (concluding a “take it or leave it” position by a union 

was evidence of bad faith), enf’d 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979); 

see also Teamsters Local 418, 254 NLRB 953, 957 (1981)

(explaining that “[t]he insistence of a union on a contract of its 

own composition, combined with an intransigent attitude 

during negotiations, supports a finding of bad faith by the 

Union”). Evaluating the totality of the circumstances includes

considering the conduct of both the employer and union, their 

“approach and attitude toward negotiations[,] as well as [their] 

specific treatment of items for negotiations.” Patent Trader, 

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 27 of 33
7

Inc., 167 NLRB 842, 852 (1967) (cleaned up), enf’d 415 F.2d 

190 (2d Cir. 1969). 

Moreover, the Board gave no weight to the fact that 

Troutbrook and the Union were negotiating a first contract, and 

each party had the right to “take an initial bargaining 

position ... and to bargain hard from that point.” NLRB v. CNN 

America, Inc., 865 F.3d 740, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2017); cf. TruServ 

Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 1105, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(recognizing that “good-faith, hard bargaining” can lead to 

impasse on mandatory subjects). First contracts are complex

and time consuming to negotiate because the parties are usually 

starting from scratch, and the resulting agreement will define

the future relationship between the parties. The record here 

demonstrates Troutbrook and the Union engaged in textbook 

hard bargaining over a first contract. The Union proposed 

adopting its standard Industry-Wide Agreement (“IWA”), a 

157-page contract with 74 articles and 17 attachments.2

Troutbrook rejected the Union’s proposal and instead 

suggested a standalone agreement tailored for a “small business 

with a small workforce ... currently under severe financial 

strain” due to the COVID pandemic. Troutbrook also tried to 

focus initially on non-economic issues to facilitate 

negotiations. 

In the handful of short bargaining sessions, the Union 

never backed away from using the IWA as a model and 

2 The only part of the IWA adapted for Troutbrook, a 13-page 

memorandum of understanding, included terms that further limited

the company’s future bargaining position by providing it would be 

bound by any successor IWA and that it would be included in the 

IWA’s multiemployer bargaining unit. Cf. Charles D. Bonanno 

Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 405–06, 412 (1982) 

(explaining the substantial legal obligations that follow from being 

part of a multiemployer bargaining unit).

USCA Case #23-1030 Document #2064322 Filed: 07/12/2024 Page 28 of 33
8

demanded a complete counterproposal from Troutbrook in 

response to its IWA.

3 Troutbrook similarly never backed off its 

demand “to negotiate its own contract.” Troutbrook, 372 

NLRB No. 26, at *21 (findings of the ALJ). Moreover, the 

parties made progress on non-economic issues. In the final 

bargaining session before the pandemic-induced hiatus, the 

parties “address[ed] non-discrimination, the new-employee 

probationary period, and hours of work.” Majority Op. 17. It 

was only after the hiatus that the Union stopped discussion of 

these issues, reiterated its demand for a complete 

counterproposal to the IWA, and then abandoned negotiations 

after only two short meetings. See Troutbrook, 372 NLRB No. 

26, at *15 (Ring, dissenting).

Ultimately, “[t]he test of good faith in bargaining that the 

Act requires of an employer is not a rigid but a fluctuating one, 

and is dependent in part upon how a reasonable man might be 

expected to react to the bargaining attitude displayed by those 

across the table.” Times Publishing Co., 72 NLRB 676, 682–

83 (1947). Looking at Troutbrook’s negotiating position in 

context shows lawful hard bargaining on both sides. The record

therefore does not support the Board’s finding of an unfair 

labor practice.

B.

Second, the Board unreasonably ignored the serious

effects of the COVID pandemic on Troutbrook’s business and 

ability to offer economic terms.

3 The majority credits the Board’s finding that the Union was 

“flexibl[e] on its desire to sign Troutbrook onto the IWA in full.” 

Majority Op. 17. But the majority points to no evidence in the record 

that the Union offered to negotiate a standalone agreement.

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9

The Board’s approach flies in the face of this court’s 

precedent, which recognizes that evaluating a company’s good 

faith bargaining requires consideration of the “economic 

exigencies” facing the company. TruServ Corp., 254 F.3d at 

1115. Those exigencies were patently obvious—a hotel in New 

York City during the COVID pandemic faced unprecedented 

challenges. At almost every session, Troutbrook explained its 

uncertain economic position and why it sought to prioritize

non-economic issues until the business had stabilized. 

Moreover, a COVID resurgence caused a mutually agreed 

negotiation hiatus, which lasted seven months. When 

negotiations resumed, Troutbrook informed the Union that its 

workforce had decreased from thirty to approximately eight

employees, and it could propose only a “lean” economic offer. 

Troutbrook also promised to send a counterproposal in due 

course. In the fifth and final session before the Union filed its 

complaint, Troutbrook reiterated that its financial state was so 

unstable that it was not “making full payments on [its] loan” 

and could not provide economic proposals when it did not

know what its lender would do.

The Board neither questioned Troutbrook’s 

representations of its dire financial situation nor cited a case in 

which a company in financial distress was required to provide 

economic terms for negotiation. Substantial evidence does not 

support the Board’s fact finding when it fails to “take account 

of anything in the record that fairly detracts from the weight of 

the evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion.” Reno Hilton 

Resorts v. NLRB, 196 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(cleaned up). Here, the Board unreasonably glossed over 

important facts regarding the pandemic’s effect on 

Troutbrook’s business and its ability to negotiate economic 

terms. 

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10

C.

Finally, the Board unreasonably failed to consider whether 

the Union tested Troutbrook’s willingness to bargain. 

Distinguishing between a permissible negotiation tactic

and unlawful bad faith bargaining depends on the course of 

negotiations. Consequently, a union must test an employer’s 

willingness to bargain before the Board will conclude that the

employer failed to bargain in good faith. Audio Visual Servs. 

Grp., 367 NLRB No. 103, at *6 (Mar. 12, 2019), aff’d sub nom. 

Int’l All. of Theatrical Stage Emps. v. NLRB, 957 F.3d 1006 

(9th Cir. 2020); see also Captain’s Table, 289 NLRB 22, 24 

(1988) (requiring a party to participate in the “give and take of 

negotiations” before alleging a failure to bargain in good faith). 

Such testing reveals whether a party has a “predetermined 

resolve not to budge from an initial position.” NLRB v. Truitt 

Mfg., 351 U.S. 149, 154 (1956). When negotiations are brief, 

the Board generally will not find a party’s willingness to 

bargain has been adequately tested unless there is some

evidence of other “unlawful conduct away from the bargaining 

table that might have affected the negotiations.” Captain’s 

Table, 289 NLRB at 24.

Reviewing the record, there is little evidence that the 

Union adequately tested Troutbrook’s willingness to bargain.

As discussed above, the parties stuck to their initial demands 

over several bargaining sessions. The Union then filed an 

unfair labor practice charge after remotely negotiating with 

Troutbrook for 147 minutes over five sessions in three months.4

The Union did not allege that Troutbrook engaged in other 

4 The parties’ sixth bargaining session was short and largely nonsubstantive, and it was held after the Union filed its complaint with 

the Board. 

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11

unfair labor practices, attempted to undermine the Union, or 

delayed bargaining beyond the certification year. Instead, the 

Union hinged its complaint on the time elapsed from the 

initiation of negotiations without receiving an economic 

proposal and used this as evidence of Troutbrook’s bad faith. 

Such scanty negotiations ordinarily will not suffice for 

testing a party’s willingness to bargain.

5 The Board was 

required to consider whether the Union had adequately tested

Troutbrook’s willingness to bargain. Finding bad faith 

bargaining without such a consideration runs afoul of the 

NLRA’s protections for private negotiations and incentivizes a 

race to the Board when parties are engaged in ordinary hard 

bargaining.6

By disregarding key facts about the collective bargaining 

context, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and 

unsupported by substantial evidence.

5 For instance, the Board has held that there was no evidence of a 

failure to bargain in good faith when an employer’s “insistence on 

resolving noneconomic subjects of bargaining before discussing 

economic subjects” lasted for a little over a month. Wyman Gordon 

Pa., LLC, 368 NLRB No. 150, at *3–5 (Dec. 16, 2019), enf’d 836 F. 

App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Similarly, in Captain’s Table, the Board 

determined the willingness of the employer to bargain had not been 

adequately tested after four months of negotiations. 289 NLRB at 

22–24. And in Kalthia Group Hotels, Inc., the Board found bad faith 

after a three-month delay in presenting initial wage and healthcare 

terms and an eleven-month delay in proposing pension terms, but 

only in conjunction with the employer using other unlawful and 

dilatory tactics to erode the union’s support. 366 NLRB No. 118, at 

*18–19 (June 25, 2018).

6 The Board’s rush to decision can harm unions as well as employers. 

As the Board has observed, “[t]he greater the rewards of 

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12

* * *

Employers and unions must negotiate in good faith, but 

that compels neither agreement nor concessions. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(d). The Board’s hair trigger finding of bad faith 

bargaining rests on an error of law and fails to consider the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding Troutbrook’s 

negotiations. I respectfully dissent.

recalcitrance ... the stronger the probability of indulgence-untoexcess by one or the other.” Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 235 NLRB at 

1095. 

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