Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04074/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04074-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allan Mugan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 __________

 No. 03-4074

 __________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern 

* District of Iowa. 

Allan C. Mugan, * 

* 

Defendant - Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: January 23, 2006

Filed: March 28, 2006 (Corrected: 03/31/06)

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

We previously affirmed Allan Mugan's conviction and sentence, and his case

is now back from the Supreme Court which granted his petition for certiorari, vacated

our earlier judgment, and remanded for further proceedings in light of United States

v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Additional briefing was requested from the parties

addressing the impact of Booker on this case. After studying these submissions as

well as the record, we conclude that Mugan is not entitled to relief under Booker

because he failed to raise a Sixth Amendment objection to his sentence in the district

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1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa. 

2

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) prohibits the use of a minor “to engage in...any sexually

explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct”

if the depiction is produced with materials previously "mailed, shipped, or transported

in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer.” 

3

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) prohibits the knowing possession of “any book,

magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that

contains an image of child pornography” if it was produced with materials that have

been “mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any

means, including by computer.”

2

court1

, and he has not shown plain error. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543,

548-49 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). We affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I.

Mugan used a digital camera to take sexually explicit photographs of himself

having intercourse with his 13 year old daughter. The photographs were stored on

a digital memory stick that had previously been shipped in interstate and foreign

commerce. Because the photographs were stored in this way, they were capable of

immediate and widespread distribution over the internet. Law enforcement officials

discovered the memory card while executing a warrant at Mugan's residence. At that

time they also found a videotape of Mugan's daughter dancing while the camera

zoomed in on her pubic area.

Mugan was indicted for using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct

for the purpose of producing a visual image, with the use of materials which had been

shipped in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).2

 The indictment

also charged Mugan with knowing possession of child pornography produced with

interstate materials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).3

 Mugan moved to

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dismiss the indictment, contending that the federal government was without authority

to prosecute him since he had not transported the stored images in interstate

commerce, nor had he intended to do so. 

Before the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, Mugan entered a

conditional plea of guilty to the charge under § 2251(a) of using a minor in order to

produce child pornography. His plea agreement preserved his right to raise his

constitutional issue on appeal, and the district court later denied his motion to

dismiss. Mugan attempted to appeal prematurely from that ruling, but his appeal was

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Mugan's relationship with his attorney became strained over the course of the

proceedings. His lawyer moved to withdraw from representation, complaining that

Mugan failed to take legal advice or pay attorney fees. Mugan opposed the motion,

and it was withdrawn before he pled guilty. The motion was later renewed and

granted by the court; new counsel was then appointed for Mugan. One week prior to

his sentencing hearing, Mugan filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He

contended that his first lawyer had not adequately explained the plea bargaining

process and that he had been misled about the sentencing departures that would be

sought by the government. The motion was denied, and the case came on for

sentencing on Mugan's § 2251(a) conviction. 

The district court assigned Mugan a base offense level of 27, see U.S.S.G. §

2G2.1(a), and increased it by four levels due to the age of the victim and her

relationship to Mugan. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.1(b)(1)(B), 2G2.1(b)(2). The district

court also imposed a two level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on letters

in which Mugan had solicited false, exculpatory testimony from family members. His

adjusted offense level of 33, together with his criminal history category III, resulted

in a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months. 

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The district court departed upward two levels on the grounds that Mugan’s

administration of sleeping medication to his daughter to facilitate the production of

the sexually explicit photographs was a factor not accounted for in the sentencing

guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. 3553(b), and that Mugan's criminal history failed to reflect

the seriousness of his past conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). The resulting total

offense level of 35 placed Mugan in a range of 210 to 262 months imprisonment, and

the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison.

His sentence also included three years supervised release, $4,500 restitution to his

wife for wages lost when she was fired as a result of his conduct, and a $100 special

assessment. Mugan appealed from the judgment, challenging both his conviction and

sentence. 

II.

Mugan argues that the statutes under which he was charged are beyond the

constitutional authority of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce

because they target the purely intrastate production and possession of child

pornography. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3. Mugan contends that the intrastate

production and possession of child pornography without a proven intent to distribute

it beyond the state is noneconomic conduct outside the reach of the commerce power,

citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Although the statutes contain

a jurisdictional element which requires that the child pornography have been

produced with interstate materials, he says they fail to ensure a connection between

the images and interstate commerce. He also claims that Congress has not made

findings addressing the effects of intrastate pornography on interstate commerce and

that the connection between purely local child pornography and interstate commerce

is attenuated.

The government responds that this court has already upheld the

constitutionality of § 2251(a) and other child pornography provisions, based on their

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express jurisdictional elements requiring that interstate materials have been used in

the production of the pornography. Since Mugan was shown to have used a digital

memory card obtained through interstate commerce in producing the images, the

government maintains that his prosecution is constitutional. The government further

argues that the prosecutor need not prove commercial distribution or an intent to

distribute commercially because the child pornography industry as a whole

substantially affects interstate commerce.

While we review a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo,

United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 934 (1997), "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of

Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain

showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds," United States v.

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.

Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate “activities that

substantially affect interstate commerce," as well as the channels and

instrumentalities of interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-

59 (1995). Whether an activity is one that substantially affects interstate commerce

is determined by focusing on four factors in particular: (1) whether the regulated

activity is economic in nature; (2) whether the statute contains an express

jurisdictional element which limits its application to activities with "an explicit

connection with or effect on interstate commerce"; (3) whether there are

congressional findings about the regulated activity's effects on interstate commerce;

and (4) whether the connection between the activity and a substantial effect on

interstate commerce is attenuated. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13. 

We have already upheld the constitutionality of federal child pornography

prosecutions under the statute of which Mugan was convicted and under similar

statutes. The first of our cases preceded the Supreme Court's Morrison decision, but

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the other two came after it. In United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998),

we affirmed a conviction for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §

2252(a)(4)(B). We rejected the defendant's claim that his prosecution was

unconstitutional, for the statute's "express jurisdictional element," which limits

prosecution to cases in which the depictions or the underlying materials had been

transported in interstate commerce, ensured that "each defendant's pornography

possession affected interstate commerce." Id. at 741. Then in United States v.

Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2001), we upheld a conviction under § 2251(b)

for pornographic photographs of children engaged in sex acts with the defendant's

wife which were produced with interstate materials. In the opinion authored by Judge

Richard S. Arnold, the court held that it was "bound by the reasoning of Bausch" and

it distinguished Morrison and Lopez because in neither of those cases "did the statute

involved contain an express jurisdictional element, requiring the government to

prove, in each case, a concrete connection with interstate commerce." Id.

Our third precedent was one involving the same statute under which Mugan

was convicted. The defendant in United States v. Hampton, 260 F.3d 832, 833-34

(8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1058 (2002), was prosecuted under §§ 2251(a)

and 2252(a)(4)(B) for the intrastate production and possession of child pornography

on videotapes transported in interstate commerce. The defendant argued that Bausch

was "no longer good law" in light of Morrison, Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848

(2000), and Lopez. Id. at 834. The opinion, authored by then Chief Judge Roger

Wollman, pointed out that subsequent to those Supreme Court decisions, our court

held in Hoggard "that Bausch continues to control the constitutionality of federal

criminalization of child pornography produced with materials that have traveled in

interstate commerce." Id. at 834-35. The defendant's constitutional attack thus failed.

These circuit precedents are controlling here. See United States v. Wright, 22

F.3d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1994). The statutes under which Mugan was charged, §§

2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(B), both require proof that the subject child pornography

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was produced with materials transported in interstate commerce, and the evidence in

this case includes proof that the offending images were stored on a digital memory

card previously transported in interstate commerce. Mugan's convictions are

therefore tied to interstate commerce, and they are not constitutionally infirm. 

Although our Eighth Circuit cases have focused on the express jurisdictional

element part of the Morrison test in analyzing the constitutionality of federal

prosecution of intrastate child pornography, some other circuits have used a broader

approach. In a case brought like Mugan's under § 2251(a), for the production of child

pornography with equipment transported in interstate commerce, the First Circuit

looked at the congressional findings underlying the statute. See United States v.

Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004). It cited the findings Congress made

about the large scale of the interstate child pornography market, the reliance of that

market on materials produced intrastate, and the ability of intrastate production

to"inflame[] the desires" of consumers and thereby increase interstate demand. Id.

at 10-11 (quoting Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,

§ 1(4), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). Based on the existence of a nationwide "highly

organized, multimillion dollar" child pornography industry that relies on locally

produced images, id. at 10 (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-438, at 6 (1977)), the First Circuit

concluded that the intrastate production of child pornography is an economic activity

which has a direct connection with a substantial effect on interstate commerce and

that Congress could "curb the nationwide supply for these materials" by stopping

such intrastate production. Id. at 16.

In yet another § 2251(a) prosecution, the Second Circuit used a similar analysis

in rejecting a challenge to federal jurisdiction in a case where child pornography was

produced with videocassettes which had traveled interstate. United States v. Holston,

343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003). The court found that intrastate child pornography

production is an economic activity due to its role in supplying the extensive interstate

market which Congress documented and that there is more than an attenuated

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Not long after Morrison, two circuits took a narrower approach in deciding

that § 2252(a)(4)(B) had been unconstitutionally applied in the prosecutions before

them. The Sixth Circuit held that a substantial connection to interstate commerce was

not evident in the facts presented in United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332-33 (6th

Cir. 2001), and the Ninth Circuit found no economic activity in the specific facts of

United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003). Neither case

considered the extent of the child pornography market described by Congress and its

dependency on intrastate materials.

8

connection between intrastate child pornography production and a substantial effect

on interstate commerce. Id. at 88-89. Since “much of the child pornography that

concerned Congress is homegrown, untraceable, and enters the national market

surreptitiously,” Congress had the authority to prohibit the “local production that

feeds the national market and stimulates demand," for it has a substantial effect on

interstate commerce. Id. at 90.

The Fifth Circuit also focused on the national market in United States v.

Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000), where it upheld a § 2252(a)(4)(B) conviction

for possession of pornographic materials. It observed that interstate child

pornography traffic often “‘involves photographs taken by child abusers

themselves,’” which are then published in commercial magazines distributed through

the mails. Id. at 228-29 (quoting Attorney General's Commission on Pornography:

Final Report 406 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1986)). The relationship between intrastate

possession and interstate commerce was held to be substantial. Since law

enforcement officials are often unable to determine whether a particular piece of child

pornography has traveled in interstate commerce, the Fifth Circuit concluded that

Congress could constitutionally regulate purely intrastate production and possession

in order to curb interstate trade. Id. at 231.

In these three child pornography cases our sister circuits considered all of the

Morrison factors, including the realities of the marketplace,4

 and it makes sense for

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us also to look beyond the jurisdictional nexus element in analyzing the effects on

interstate commerce. The extent of the interstate market for child pornography

described by Congress and its dependence upon locally produced materials

demonstrate that the intrastate production and possession of child pornography is an

economic activity connected to interstate commerce. The congressional findings

underlying the child pornography statute at issue in the case before the court

distinguish it from Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63, where there were no findings tying the

statute to interstate commerce, and from Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15, where there

were only general findings showing no more than an attenuated effect on interstate

commerce. Moreover, unlike the possession of guns in school zones in Lopez, 514

U.S. at 561, and the gender related violence in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617, the

intrastate production of child pornography is “an essential part of a larger regulation

of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the

intrastate activity were regulated,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 

The connection between intrastate child pornography and interstate commerce

is even stronger in this case than those decided by the First, Second, and Fifth

Circuits. Not only had the materials Mugan used in the production of his

pornography traveled in interstate commerce, but the sexually explicit images of him

with his daughter were digitally stored on a memory card. By storing the images on

this digital card, Mugan placed them on a medium which would permit their

immediate and widespread dissemination over the internet. Although locally

produced and possessed, Mugan’s images were thus ready to be offered on the

national market in child pornography. In contrast, the images at issue in Morales-De

Jesús, Holston, and Kallestad were not as easily distributable since they would have

required physical reproduction and dissemination on film or videocassettes. The

convictions in those cases were nonetheless upheld without proof that the images had

been transmitted in interstate commerce or that such transmission was intended. That

type of detailed proof need not be made in each individual case when there is a

“general regulatory statute bear[ing] a substantial relation to commerce,” such as

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there is here. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (internal citations omitted). This is because

"the de minimis character of individual instances arising under [such a] statute is of

no consequence." Id.

Not only must Mugan's constitutional challenge be rejected under our circuit

precedents, but a more detailed application of the Morrison factors supports that

result. Given the congressional findings about the nationwide child pornography

market and its dependence upon locally produced materials for both supply and

demand, Mugan is not entitled to prevail on his constitutional arguments.

III.

Mugan next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. He contends that he should have been allowed to withdraw

the plea because his counsel was ineffective and the prosecutor was misleading about

the extent of sentencing departures that would be sought. We review a district court's

denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Payton, 168 F.3d 1103, 1105 (8th Cir. 1999). A guilty plea may be withdrawn before

sentencing if the defendant demonstrates a "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The district court may also consider any assertions of

legal innocence, the amount of time between the plea and the motion to withdraw, and

the prejudice to the government in granting the motion. Payton, 168 F.3d at 1105.

The defendant bears the burden of showing fair and just grounds for withdrawal.

United States v. Gray, 152 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1998).

Mugan did not show a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his plea. No

factual record was developed to support his assertions of ineffective assistance, and

such claims ordinarily are best reviewed in collateral proceedings. See Payton, 168

F.3d at 1105 n.2. Mugan’s contention that he was misled about the government’s

sentencing posture is also not supported by the record. The government stated at

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Mugan's plea hearing that the parties could seek departures under the plea agreement,

and the court notified Mugan that he faced up to twenty years in prison. At the same

hearing Mugan acknowledged that no promises beyond those in the plea agreement

had been made to him. Mugan did not move for withdrawal until five months after

the entry of his plea (and three and a half months after the appointment of new

counsel), and his only assertion of innocence was made at the prompting of his lawyer

during the motion hearing. Guilty pleas should not be "set aside lightly." United

States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824 (1997).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mugan's

motion to withdraw.

IV.

Mugan raises a number of issues in respect to his sentence. In his initial

arguments on appeal he contended that the district court clearly erred in imposing an

obstruction of justice enhancement based upon his letters to family members and that

it abused its discretion by departing upward based on its findings about the nature of

his offense and his criminal history. After Booker he also argues that he is entitled

to resentencing because the district court made upward adjustments based on facts not

charged or proven beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed an unreasonable sentence.

The government responds that there was sufficient evidence for the district court to

apply the obstruction of justice enhancement and to depart upward based on the

nature of the offense and Mugan's past behavior. It argues that Mugan's Booker

issues are subject to plain error review and that there is no indication the district court

would have imposed a lesser sentence had the sentencing occurred after Booker

issued.

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A.

We initially address Mugan's argument that the district court erred by granting

an obstruction of justice enhancement based upon letters he wrote to family members

and by departing upward because of his use of sleeping medication to facilitate his

crime, his propensity for committing future crimes, and the seriousness of his past

conduct. The review of findings of fact at sentencing is for clear error and this

remains true after Booker. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir.

2003). The reasonableness of the district court's sentencing departures are reviewed

for abuse of discretion, and whether the district court based its departures on a

permissible factor is reviewed de novo. United States v. Long Turkey, 342 F.3d 856,

859-60. 

The district court found that Mugan attempted to obstruct justice by sending

letters to his wife and other family members in which he solicited false and

exculpatory testimony. He wrote his wife in violation of a state no contact order and

repeatedly asked and demanded that she withdraw her earlier identification of him in

the photographs that were the subject of the prosecution, going so far as to suggest

she indicate "only 50%" certainty that he was the one pictured. A letter from Mugan

to his brother also emphasized his wife needed to claim uncertainty and requested

ideas about how to minimize a prior instance of his sexual contact with a minor. 

Under USSG § 3C1.1, a two level enhancement should be applied if the court

finds a defendant "willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or

impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

Obstruction includes both "threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully

influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to

do so," and "committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury." Id. cmt. n.4(a)-

(b). 

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Mugan argues that the district court misconstrued his letters. At the sentencing

hearing Mugan testified that he was only seeking truthful testimony from all

involved. The district court disbelieved this testimony, and its credibility

determination is entitled to deference. United States v. Peck, 161 F.3d 1171, 1174

(8th Cir. 1998). Moreover, his letters do not read like his goal was the pursuit of the

truth. To the contrary, the letters solicited testimony to diminish evidence of his guilt

and to improve his sentencing posture. The district court did not err in enhancing

Mugan’s sentence.

The district court departed upward based in part on Mugan’s use of sleeping

medication in committing his crime. The court relied on a letter Mugan wrote to his

wife about his offense in which he said that he had used “sleep medicine” before

taking pictures of his sexual intercourse with the daughter because he did not want

her to know what he had done. The district court found Mugan had drugged his

victim in order to facilitate his offense. The guidelines provide no specific

enhancement for the drugging of a victim, and the court found that Mugan’s drugging

of his daughter was an aggravating circumstance of a kind not accounted for in the

guidelines. 

At the sentencing hearing Mugan denied using the medication and claimed he

lied to his wife in order to dispel rumors that his daughter was a willing participant.

According to Mugan, the government failed to rebut this testimony so the district

court's finding that medication was used was clearly erroneous. The district court was

in the best position to determine the credibility of Mugan's testimony, however. See

United States v. Holt, 149 F.3d 760, 762 (8th Cir. 1998). It was not clear error for it

to believe Mugan's earlier written statement, rather than the oral comments made at

the sentencing hearing. Mugan also contends that the Sentencing Commission must

have specifically considered and rejected an enhancement for defendants who use

chemicals to accomplish their way with a victim since the guidelines specifically

provide for an enhancement when a victim is physically restrained. See U.S.S.G. §§

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3A1.3, 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(K). There is no indication in the guidelines that the

enhancement for physical restraint was intended to include the use of drugs to

facilitate sex abuse, and we conclude that Mugan's administration of sleep medication

to his daughter to accomplish his purpose was a permissible factor on which to depart

and that the district court’s departure was reasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i).

Mugan's other argument relates to the other basis for the upward departure, the

finding by the district court that his criminal history category of III failed to represent

the seriousness of his past conduct and future risk. This finding was based on the

testimony of three of Mugan's nieces. The first niece testified that Mugan molested

her at the age of fourteen, but no charges were filed. The second testified that Mugan

viewed a pornographic film with her and another minor girl; Mugan pled guilty to

contributing to the delinquency of a minor as a result. The third testified that Mugan

sexually assaulted her on three occasions; he pled guilty to simple assault. The

district court also found from Mugan's letters that he had taken "inappropriate

pictures" of another daughter from a former marriage. The court concluded that the

seriousness of these actions and the likelihood of future criminal conduct suggested

by them was not reflected in the minor convictions that resulted from the conduct,

thus justifying an upward departure under § 4A1.3.

Section 4A1.3 permits upward departures when there is "reliable information"

that the seriousness of the defendant's past crimes or the likelihood that he would

commit others was not fully reflected in his criminal history category. Mugan

contests the departure both factually and legally. First he contends that his nieces

were motivated to lie and that they gave conflicting testimony. The district court

believed their testimony, however, and we see no reason not to credit its

determination. See Holt, 149 F.3d at 762 (8th Cir. 1998). Mugan also argues that his

prior conduct does not demonstrate the level of incorrigibility or dangerousness

required under § 4A1.3. While Mugan's prior criminal history is not as extensive as

some, his consistent pattern of sexual misconduct indicates a likelihood of future

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sexual abuse not reflected in his criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 cmt.

n.2(B) ("[T]he nature of the prior offenses rather than simply their number is often

more indicative of the seriousness of the defendant's criminal record."). The district

court did not err in departing upward on this basis.

B.

Mugan also argues that he is entitled to resentencing under Booker. Since he

did not raise any Sixth Amendment issue in the district court or object to the

application of mandatory guidelines or cite Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), we will not remand for resentencing absent a showing of plain error. See

United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). To establish

plain error, Mugan must establish (1) an error, (2) that is plain, that not only (3)

affected his substantial rights, but also (4) "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

466-67 (1997). When, as here, the sentencing court treated the guidelines as

mandatory, the first two factors of the plain error test are established. To meet the

third factor, Mugan must show a "reasonable probability" that the court would have

imposed a more lenient sentence under the now advisory guidelines. Pirani, 406 F.3d

at 551. 

Mugan argues that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had

it considered the guidelines advisory because he vigorously objected to the

underlying facts upon which the departures and enhancement were based and the

court would not have made the same findings under a reasonable doubt standard

instead of preponderance of the evidence. Booker did not change the standard of

proof for a sentencing court's factual findings, however, and the district court did not

use an incorrect standard in sentencing Mugan. United States v. Garcia-Gonon, 433

F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2006); Pirani, 406 F.3d at 551 n.4. Since the district court's

findings were not clearly erroneous and it chose to sentence Mugan at the middle of

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the guideline range and at the statutory maximum, Mugan has not shown a reasonable

probability that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence under advisory

guidelines. See United States v. Schwalk, 412 F.3d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Finally, Mugan asserts that his sentence was unreasonable because the district

court did not consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. A sentence may be

unreasonable if the court "fails to consider a relevant factor . . . gives significant

weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or . . . commits a clear error of judgment."

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005). A sentence within the

applicable guideline range is "presumptively reasonable." United States v.Lincoln,

413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2005). 

The district court carefully calculated the applicable guideline range and

sentenced Mugan to the statutory maximum sentence of 240 months imprisonment,

which was in the middle of the 210 to 262 month recommended guideline range.

Although the district court did not specifically address all the § 3553(a) factors when

it imposed the 240 month sentence, it explicitly referenced them in setting the

conditions of supervised release. In addition the district court stated that Mugan's

case was "outside the heartland of cases" and had aggravating factors "considered in

the guidelines but present to an unusual degree". 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The record

before the court included evidence that Mugan had drugged his 13 year old daughter

to have intercourse with her, had taken pictures of the sex act, had mailed letters to

family members attempting to persuade them into lying in his defense, had previously

molested two of his nieces, and had watched a sexually explicit video with a third

niece and her friend. The resulting sentence reflects sufficient consideration by the

district court of the applicable factors. See United States v. Winters, 411 F.3d 967,

976 (8th Cir. 2005). Based on all the circumstances we conclude Mugan's sentence

was not unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Lincoln, 413 F.3d at 717-18. 

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V.

Because Congress did not exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause in

enacting the statutes under which Mugan was convicted, because he did not offer a

fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea, and because he has not

shown that the district court erred or abused its discretion in sentencing, we affirm the

judgment.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I continue to believe that a defendant's challenge to the factual basis for a

sentence enhancement preserves his Sixth Amendment sentencing claim. See United

States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 555-62 (en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting). Moreover,

I adhere to the view stated by Judge Bye in Pirani, that defendants who did not

properly preserve their Booker claims in the district court are nonetheless generally

entitled to resentencing under a constitutional regime. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 562-67

(Bye, J., dissenting). Because a majority of our court held to the contrary on both

counts, however, I concur.

__________________________ 

Appellate Case: 03-4074 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/28/2006 Entry ID: 2026091