Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-11861/USCOURTS-ca11-14-11861-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deonte Archer
Appellee
Satis J. Bailey
Appellee
Essex Insurance Company
Appellant
Chasma S. Lagrant
Appellee
Kendric Stephens
Appellee
Tina Marie Entertainment, LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11861

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-00060-SDM-TGW

ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TINA MARIE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, 

d.b.a. Scene Premium Night Club, 

CHASMA S. LAGRANT, 

SATIS J. BAILEY, 

DEONTE ARCHER, 

KENDRIC STEPHENS, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(February 13, 2015)

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 1 of 7
2

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, DUBINA and GILMAN,

* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In January 2013, Essex Insurance Co. filed a one-count complaint seeking 

reformation of an insurance contract. It named as defendants Tina Marie 

Entertainment, LLC (TME) and four individuals: Chasma Lagrant, Satis Bailey, 

Deonte Archer, and Kendric Stephens. The individual defendants had been injured 

in a Florida nightclub that TME had insured under an Essex commercial general 

liability insurance policy. Essex sought reformation of that policy to include two 

endorsements, a “restaurant and bars” endorsement and an “assault and battery 

sublimit” endorsement, that were not attached to the policy when Essex issued it to 

TME. 

Because they failed to answer the complaint, the clerk entered defaults 

against TME, Lagrant, Bailey, and Archer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The 

remaining parties, Essex and Stephens, filed cross motions for summary judgment. 

In April 2014, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stephens. 

In a separate order, the court dismissed with prejudice Essex’s claims against TME 

 * Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting 

by designation. 

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 2 of 7
3

and Archer, finding that Essex had failed to state a claim for reformation.1 This is 

Essex’s appeal of both orders. 

I.

Essex contends that the district court erroneously granted summary 

judgment to Stephens on Essex’s claim for reformation of the insurance policy. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all facts 

and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc., 764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014).

In Florida, “[a] court of equity has the power to reform a written instrument

where, due to a mutual mistake, the instrument as drawn does not accurately 

express the true intention or agreement of the parties.”2

 Providence Square Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1987). Given the “strong 

presumption” that a contract accurately expresses the true intention or agreement 

of the parties, however, the party seeking reformation on the basis of a mutual 

mistake faces a high evidentiary burden. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ours, 266 So. 2d 

168, 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). That party must show by clear and convincing 

evidence “that the parties [to the contract] agreed on one thing and when they put it 

 1 By the time the court ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment, Essex had 

settled the underlying personal injury lawsuits filed by Lagrant and Bailey. The court’s 

summary judgment order dismissed as moot Essex’s claims against those two defendants. 

2 No one disputes that Florida law applies in this diversity case. 

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 3 of 7
4

in the contract they said something different.” Blumberg v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 

51 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1951); see Rosenthal v. First Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 77 So. 

92, 94 (Fla. 1917); see also Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds 

Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 8 F.3d 760, 765–67 (11th Cir. 1993). “Clear and 

convincing evidence” is evidence that “produces in the mind of the trier of fact a 

firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought 

to be established.” S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 

869, 872 (Fla. 2014). 

Essex has not shown by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a 

mutual mistake. We have recognized that Florida law imposes “stringent standards 

for reformation.” Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc., 8 F.3d at 766. To 

determine if those standards are met, we compare those cases in which Florida 

courts have addressed the availability of reformation based on mutual mistake with 

the case at hand. See id. Florida courts have found mutual mistake where the 

party seeking reformation presented evidence of “contact between the [contracting] 

parties,” such as discussion or negotiation of a particular provision, showing that 

they agreed on one thing before they put their agreement in writing and that their 

written agreement said something different. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Threadgill, 

729 So. 2d 476, 478–79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (discussing cases); see, e.g., Fed. Ins. 

Co. v. Donovan Indus., Inc., 75 So. 3d 812, 813–15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Essex, 

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 4 of 7
5

however, points to no evidence that it and TME ever discussed or negotiated the 

inclusion of the two endorsements at issue before Essex issued the policy without 

them. Instead, it attempts to show mutual mistake by relying primarily on two 

facts: that the quote it provided to TME for the policy listed the two endorsements 

by form number and title, and that TME accepted the quote and asked that 

coverage be bound according to its terms. Even if we were to view this case in a 

vacuum, and not (as we must) by comparing it to Florida cases that address the 

availability of reformation, we would still conclude that Essex has failed to create a 

factual question on whether there was a mutual mistake. Indeed, the evidence 

shows just the opposite, because the policy binder itself provides that “[c]overages 

may differ from those on the application or quote.” Since we cannot say “without 

hesitancy” that Essex and TME agreed to include the two endorsements at issue,

we hold that the district court properly refused to reform the commercial general 

liability policy.3

 S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 139 So. 3d at 872.

 3 We decline to consider Essex’s alternative argument, raised for the first time on appeal, 

that we should direct the district court to reform the policy to include the two endorsements at

issue but invalidate on public policy grounds the “wasting limit” provision in the assault and 

battery sublimit endorsement. See, e.g., Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 

1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing that we will not consider “an issue not raised in the district 

court and raised for the first time in an appeal”) (quotation marks omitted); Hurley v. Moore, 233 

F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not properly 

before this Court.”); Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); Provenzano 

v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1329 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (same). In any event, as far as we can 

tell, Essex’s alternative resolution does nothing to advance its position in the underlying dispute 

about the policy limit applicable to Stephens’ individual claim. 

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 5 of 7
6

II.

Essex also contends that the district court erroneously dismissed its claims 

against TME and Archer for failure to state a claim for reformation. Its contention 

depends on the fact that, as defaulted defendants, TME and Archer are charged 

with admitting the well-pleaded allegations in Essex’s complaint, including the 

existence of mutual mistake. See, e.g., Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., — F.3d. —, 

No. 13-13853, 2014 WL 7229271, at *8 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014); see also

Strickland v. Thelman, 665 So. 2d 284, 287 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (observing 

that whether there was a mutual mistake is a question of fact); Hieber v. Hieber, 

151 So. 2d 646, 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (same). 

Essex cannot show that any procedural error in the way the district court 

disposed of its claims against TME and Archer affected its substantial rights. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 28 U.S.C. § 2111; United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 

1527 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that the party asserting error has the burden of 

proving that the error prejudiced its substantial rights); see also Jimenez v. 

Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[P]rocedural error does not 

warrant reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties.”). Although 

Essex’s complaint named five defendants, it sought reformation of one insurance 

policy on one ground, and that was mutual mistake. In granting summary 

judgment in favor of one of those defendants, the court determined as a matter of 

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 6 of 7
7

law that Essex was not entitled to reform the policy based on mutual mistake. 

Thus, Essex’s identical claims against two other defendants necessarily fail.4

AFFIRMED.5

 4 The fact that the clerk entered a default against TME before the court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Stephens does not change our conclusion. The order of those events might

matter if Essex had argued that TME’s admission of the complaint’s factual allegations about

mutual mistake controlled the court’s inquiry on summary judgment. Essex briefly alluded to 

that argument in its summary judgment motion but did not raise it before us. Essex has therefore 

abandoned any argument it might have made concerning that procedural issue. See, e.g., Access 

Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330 (“Any issue that an appellant wants [us] to address should be 

specifically and clearly identified in the brief. . . . Otherwise, the issue — even if properly 

preserved at trial — will be considered abandoned.”) (quotation marks omitted). 

5 We express no opinion on the ultimate disposition of Stephens’ underlying personal 

injury claim against Essex, which he has brought in a separate lawsuit. 

USCA11 Case: 14-11861 Date Filed: 02/13/2015 Page: 7 of 7