Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-10404/USCOURTS-ca5-15-10404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark A. Cowart
Appellee
Erwin
Appellant

Document Text:

REVISED September 20, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10404

MARK A. COWART, 

 Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

ERWIN, SRT Officer,

 Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and OWEN and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:

Former prisoner Mark A. Cowart filed suit against four Dallas County 

Jail detention officers, including Special Response Team Officer Erwin,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, claiming that the officers beat him 

without justification. After the officers unsuccessfully argued that Cowart 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (PLRA), a jury trial ensued. The jury found Erwin liable as to all 

claims, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, Erwin 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 13, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

assails the district court’s ruling on her PLRA defense as well as its denial of 

her post-verdict motions. We affirm.

I

Cowart originally filed suit against the Dallas County Jail, Officer Erwin 

and various John Doe officers. After the district court dismissed the John Doe 

defendants and the Jail, we vacated the dismissal to permit discovery 

regarding the identity of other involved officers.1 Cowart ultimately proceeded 

against Erwin and three other detention officers—Officers Garrett, Weeks, and 

Holt—and asserted claims for excessive force and bystander liability under 

§ 1983, as well as assault under state law. The officers moved for summary 

judgment, arguing in relevant part that Cowart failed to comply with the 

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and that Cowart’s claims were barred by 

qualified and official immunity. After the district court denied the motion, a 

magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes 

underlying the officers’ PLRA defense.

At the hearing, Cowart testified that he handed a grievance form to an 

officer at the jail on April 22, 2009, just eight days after Cowart’s altercation 

with the officers. Cowart did not receive a response from the jail’s Grievance 

Board, however, prior to his May 21, 2009 transfer to the custody of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. A grievance officer testified that no response, 

either interim or final, was issued because the Board never received a 

grievance from Cowart.

Crediting Cowart’s testimony, the magistrate judge concluded that 

Cowart satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement by handing his grievance 

to a jail staff member. He determined that the PLRA required nothing further, 

 

1 Cowart v. Dall. Cty. Jail, 439 F. App’x 332, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

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as the jail’s grievance procedures became unavailable to Cowart when he was 

transferred from the jail’s jurisdiction.2 The district court adopted the 

magistrate’s findings and conclusions and the suit proceeded to trial.

At trial, the jury heard sharply divergent testimony regarding the 

altercation between Cowart and the detention officers. All parties agree that 

on April 14, 2009, several detention officers conducted a “shakedown” of the 

tank in which Cowart was housed. The officers ordered the inmates to line up 

against the wall and assume a submissive position—on their knees, hands 

behind their heads, and elbows touching the wall.

Cowart testified that he became uncomfortable in the position and asked 

to stand, but was denied permission to do so. He admitted that he stood up 

anyway, but was forced back to his knees by two officers—Garrett and Weeks—

amidst the officers’ racial epithets. Cowart admitted that he “mouthed off” in 

kind.

According to Cowart, the interaction escalated quickly from there, and 

we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to him, as the prevailing 

party. Presumably in reaction to Cowart’s verbal responses, Erwin walked in 

front of Cowart, who was on his knees and held in position by Garrett and 

Weeks, and punched him twice in the face. Immediately after, a “swarm” of 

officers took Cowart to the ground and began beating him; officers kicked, 

punched, and stomped upon Cowart, and sprayed him with mace. At some 

point, Cowart temporarily lost consciousness. Eventually, the officers

attempted to lift Cowart to his feet exclusively by his arms—now handcuffed 

behind him—causing Cowart great pain. In response to his protests, Cowart 

 

2 See, e.g., King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 895 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a county 

jail’s administrative remedies became unavailable after an inmate was transferred beyond 

the county jail’s jurisdiction); Johnston v. Maha, 460 F. App’x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2012) (same); 

Rodriguez v. Westchester Cty. Jail Corr. Dep’t, 372 F.3d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).

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was sprayed again with mace by Officer Holt and dropped on his face. Cowart 

was subsequently removed from the tank and escorted to the nurses’ station 

by multiple officers, including Erwin. En route, an unidentified officer 

slammed Cowart’s head into the elevator wall. At no point did Cowart 

physically threaten the officers or fight back.

Cowart’s testimony was largely corroborated by five inmate witnesses. 

Each recalled that multiple officers attacked Cowart and that Cowart was not 

resisting. However, while each inmate could identify Erwin, or an officer 

matching Erwin’s description, none could identify Erwin’s co-defendants as 

participants.

Testifying officers presented a different story. Erwin testified that she 

took Cowart down to the ground when he “came off the wall” and cursed at the 

officers. She denied punching Cowart. Other officers had difficulty recalling 

the events, but each testified that no officer punched, kicked, stomped upon, or 

otherwise used unreasonable force against Cowart. Multiple officers claimed 

Cowart was resisting and only minimal force was used to subdue him. An 

incident report completed by Erwin described Cowart as “belligerent” and 

reported that he was taken down with “minimal force.”

Despite the conflicting testimony, it is undisputed that Cowart was 

transported to Parkland Hospital later that evening. There, an emergency 

room physician diagnosed Cowart with contusions of the face, scalp, and neck, 

a neck sprain, and a ruptured eardrum, and noted that Coward had tenderness 

and swelling on his right hand. At trial, the physician testified that such 

injuries were consistent with severe trauma. Cowart testified that he still 

experiences a ringing in his ear and has difficulty gripping objects due to nerve 

damage in one hand, which limits his employment options.

The jury returned a verdict finding Erwin alone liable on all claims and 

awarded Cowart $10,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000 in punitive 

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damages. The district court entered judgment on the verdict, denying Erwin’s 

renewed post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. 

Erwin timely appealed.

On appeal, Erwin challenges the district court’s determination that 

Cowart complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, as well as the 

district court’s denial of her post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of 

law and for new trial.

II

We review the district court’s legal rulings regarding exhaustion of 

administrative remedies de novo and its factual findings for clear error.3

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter 

of law de novo, “applying the same standard as the district court.”4 When a 

case is tried to a jury, a motion for judgment as a matter of law “is a challenge 

to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.”5 “In 

resolving such challenges, we draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all 

credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” 

and will uphold the verdict “unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary 

basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did.”6

Finally, we “review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for 

abuse of discretion.”7 But when the district court has denied a new trial 

motion, “[o]ur review is particularly limited” and “we must affirm the verdict 

unless the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict—

 

3 Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 273 (5th Cir. 2010).

4 Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Foradori v. Harris, 523 

F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008)).

5 Id. (quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995)).

6 Id. at 273 (quoting Foradori, 523 F.3d at 485); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).

7 Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 2009)

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points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court 

believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary [conclusion].”8

III

We first address Erwin’s threshold argument that Cowart failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies. The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust 

“such administrative remedies as are available” prior to filing a § 1983 action 

regarding prison conditions.9 The prison’s grievance procedures, and not the 

PLRA, define the remedies that are available and must thus be exhausted.10 

“This circuit has taken a ‘strict’ approach to § 1997e’s exhaustion requirement, 

under which prisoners must not just substantially comply with the prison’s 

grievance procedures, but instead must ‘exhaust available remedies 

properly.’”11 Because “exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the burden is on 

[Erwin] to demonstrate that [Cowart] failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies.”12

It is undisputed that the Dallas County jail provides a two-step grievance 

procedure: First, a prisoner must submit a written grievance to any staff 

member at the jail (Step 1); second, a prisoner must appeal an adverse decision 

to the Detention Service Manager (Step 2). According to the jail’s inmate 

handbook, the Grievance Board, upon receiving a grievance, “sends a[n]

interim reply to the inmate showing grievance receipt, and the grievance 

 

8 Id. (alterations in original).

9 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.”); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that 

exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in 

court.”).

10 Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296, 299 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 218).

11 Id. at 299-300 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 

F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010)).

12 Dillon, 596 F.3d at 266 (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 216).

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criteria the grievance is judged on.” The Board sends the interim reply to the 

prisoner within 15 days of receipt; an answer within 60 days.

Erwin does not contest the magistrate’s factual finding that Cowart 

submitted a Step 1 grievance to a jail staffer. She further acknowledges that 

the parties previously stipulated that Step 2 of the process was not at issue, 

given Cowart’s transfer to TDCJ custody prior to the lapse of the Board’s 

60-day response period.13

Erwin contends that Cowart was required to appeal, or take some other 

action, when he failed to receive a timely interim response from the Board. 

Erwin asserts that Cowart was familiar with the grievance process and 

acknowledged that he “should have known” something had gone amiss when 

he did not receive a timely interim reply. Based on this argument and 

according to Erwin’s timeline, Cowart had two weeks prior to his transfer to 

rectify the improper processing or non-receipt of his grievance. While we 

question Erwin’s timeline, which assumes both that a jail staffer immediately 

delivered the Cowart’s grievance and that the grievance was filed that same 

day, it is irrelevant to our holding.

Erwin primarily relies on this court’s opinion in Wilson v. Epps.14 In 

Wilson, we held that when a prison fails to respond timely “at some preliminary 

step in the grievance process,” a prisoner is “entitle[d]” to “move on to the next 

step.”15 We explained that “it is only if the prison fails to respond at the last 

step of the grievance process that the prisoner becomes entitled to sue, because 

then there is no next step (save filing a lawsuit) to which the prisoner can 

 

13 See King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 895 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a county jail’s 

administrative remedies became unavailable after an inmate was transferred beyond the 

county jail’s jurisdiction); Johnston v. Maha, 460 F. App’x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2012) (same); 

Rodriguez v. Westchester Cty. Jail Corr. Dep’t, 372 F.3d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).

14 776 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2015).

15 Id. at 301.

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advance.”16 We held in that case that Wilson failed to exhaust available 

remedies when he did not continue on to the next available step after the 

prison’s response period on a preliminary step had lapsed.17 

The grievance policies of the Dallas County Jail indicate that Wilson does 

not apply on the facts before us. The jail’s Grievance Plan provides that “[i]f 

an inmate is not satisfied with a Board’s findings, the inmate may appeal to 

the Detention Service Manager, Quality Assurance Unit.”18 The Plan further 

indicates that the “Board’s findings” are delivered to an inmate in a “written 

reply . . . within 60 days of the initial grievance receipt.” An interim response 

does not contain “findings” that a prisoner may appeal. Nor does any other 

provision in the plan permit an inmate to appeal the lack of a timely interim 

reply. Here, unlike in Wilson, the policies afforded Cowart no “next step” once 

the response period for an interim reply had lapsed, but pending his receipt of 

a written answer with findings.

Essentially, Erwin reads an additional requirement into the policies—

one requiring prisoners to object in some way if they do not receive a timely 

interim reply. However, “[e]xhaustion is defined by the prison’s grievance 

procedures, and courts neither may add to nor subtract from them.”19 The

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Cowart complied 

with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 

IV

Erwin contends that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict on 

his § 1983 claims for excessive force and bystander liability, the jury’s finding 

that Erwin was not entitled to official immunity under state law, and the jury’s 

 

16 Id. (emphasis in original).

17 Id. at 302.

18 The inmate handbook similarly provides “If you disagree with the Board’s findings, 

you may appeal to the Chief Deputy, Office of Inmate Housing.”

19 Cantwell v. Sterling, 788 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).

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award of compensatory and punitive damages. She further argues that the 

district court erred by denying Erwin qualified immunity against Cowart’s 

§ 1983 claims and by denying a requested jury instruction pertinent to 

Cowart’s claim for assault. Finally, Erwin challenges the district court’s denial 

of her motion for new trial.

A

In evaluating excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment, the 

“core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”20 

Though “[t]he focus of this standard is on the detention facility official’s 

subjective intent to punish,”21 intent is determined by reference to the

well-known Hudson factors—“the extent of injury suffered, the need for 

application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force 

used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any 

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”22 The amount of 

force used must be more than de minimis, “provided that the use of force is not 

of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”23 A plaintiff need not show 

significant injury, although the extent of the injury may supply insight as to 

the amount of force applied.24 

Erwin concedes the evidence supports a finding that she punched Cowart 

twice in the face but claims the record supports nothing more. She further 

 

20 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).

21 Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993). 22 Kitchen v. Dall. Cty., 759 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7); see also Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1449.

23 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).

24 See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-39 & n.2 (2010) (“Injury and force, however, 

are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.”).

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avers that the punches did not involve the level of force required for an Eighth 

Amendment violation.

Erwin’s position is that the “objective evidence” offered at trial, which 

included photographs, medical records, and testimony from medical 

professionals, cannot be contradicted by Cowart’s or other witnesses’ 

testimony. Erwin’s “objective evidence” argument is derived from her 

misplaced reliance on two opinions in which this court considered objective 

evidence—in both cases, a videotape—to determine whether factual disputes 

existed at the summary judgment stage.25 Those cases are factually 

inapposite. In the present case, the objective evidence is not necessarily 

inconsistent with eye witness accounts of what transpired at the jail on the day 

in question. There were material factual disputes to be resolved by a 

factfinder, and we apply the long-standing principle of deference afforded to 

verdicts rendered by a jury. We “review all of the evidence from the record, 

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may not 

make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”26

The evidence in this case supports the jury’s verdict finding Erwin liable 

for excessive force. We note that the questions put to the jury did not 

differentiate between Erwin’s punches and the subsequent melee; the jury was 

simply asked whether the officers used excessive force. Accordingly, in 

reviewing the verdict, we consider whether the jury could have found that 

Erwin used excessive force by punching Cowart, by beating him further 

alongside other officers, or both.

 

25 Schneider v. Kaelin, 569 F. App’x 277, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Carnaby 

v. City of Hous., 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011).

26 E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg’l Healthcare Sys. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 575 F.3d 520, 525 (5th 

Cir. 2009).

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As Erwin admits, a reasonable jury could find that she punched Cowart 

twice in the face. The record contravenes Erwin’s characterization of the 

punches as a mere “malevolent touch” that involved only de minimis force. 

Though an excessive force plaintiff need not show significant injury, the extent 

of injury may supply insight as to the force applied.27 Photographs of Cowart’s 

injuries reveal bruising on Cowart’s face and ear; hospital records report 

contusions to his face, as well as a ruptured ear drum; and the emergency room 

physician testified that “clearly repeated blows [to the head] could give you 

these sorts of findings, as well as could a single blow.” The jury was entitled 

to tie these injuries to Erwin’s punches and conclude that the injuries were 

indicative of excessive force. We reject Erwin’s implication that the confused 

nature of the attack erodes a causal connection between her conduct and 

Cowart’s injuries so as to insulate her from liability.

Regardless, the jury was entitled to find an excessive force violation 

based on other Hudson factors, namely, the use of force despite the lack of a 

perceived threat or need for force. There was evidence that Cowart was 

restrained and non-threatening when Erwin punched him. This version of 

events, which we must accept at this stage, supports a finding of excessive 

force—“courts have frequently found constitutional violations in cases where a 

restrained or subdued person is subjected to the use of force.”28 It is notable 

that even Erwin testified that, assuming she had punched him, such force 

would be excessive.

Erwin suggests that no testimony tied her to the beating that followed

her punches. However, Cowart and multiple inmate witnesses testified that 

Erwin participated in the fray. The testimony established that Cowart was 

 

27 See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-39 & n.2 (2010).

28 Kitchen v. Dall. Cty., 759 F.3d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 2014).

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restrained, if not incapacitated, during this portion of the assault. Drawing all 

inferences in Cowart’s favor, as we must, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s

finding that Erwin used unjustified force on Cowart beyond her two initial 

punches.

Erwin nevertheless claims that she is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity shelters state officials from liability only “to the extent 

that the officials’ actions do not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights.”29 “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity

unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively 

unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation.”30 

In defining clearly established law, we must avoid a high level of generality 

and instead consider “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is 

clearly established.”31

We have little difficulty concluding that in 2009, the time of the incident, 

it was well-established, in sufficiently similar situations, that officers may not 

“use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has already been subdued . . . [or] 

incapacitated.”32 Reasonable officers had fair notice that such conduct under

the circumstances violated Cowart’s right to be free from excessive force.33

 

29 Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

30 Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2012).

31 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

32 Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Kitchen v. Dall.

Cty., 759 F.3d 468, 479 & n.27 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing pre-2009 cases holding that the use of 

force against a nonresisting inmate violates the Eighth Amendment); Brown v. Lippard, 472 

F.3d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2006); Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 

1999). 

33 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

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We do not address Erwin’s challenges to the jury’s findings of § 1983 

bystander liability or assault under state law, as Erwin’s liability for excessive 

force is alone sufficient to uphold the verdict.

B.

Erwin challenges the jury’s award of damages. Erwin first argues that 

the $10,000 in compensatory damages is unsupported by the evidence. The 

jury was instructed to consider damages for physical pain and mental anguish, 

physical impairment, and loss of earning capacity. When a damage award 

includes recovery for pain and suffering, which are “to a large degree, not 

susceptible to monetary quantification,” the jury “has especially broad 

leeway.”34

We are satisfied that the award of $10,000 in compensatory damages 

falls within the range of permissible awards supported by the evidence in this 

case. Cowart testified that he “was in so much pain and blood [was] 

everywhere,” that his arms and hands were “completely numb,” that he heard 

a “constant ringing” in his left ear, and that he was screaming from the pain. 

The inmate witnesses corroborated Cowart’s report of pain and suffering at the 

scene. Photographs taken after the altercation show redness and injury to 

Cowart’s face, ear, neck, and back. Medical records and testimony further

support Cowart’s account of his injuries and pain. A triage nurse observed 

bruising and redness on Cowart’s face and neck and noted that Cowart was 

complaining of throbbing in his left eye and ear and his right hand, as well as 

diminished hearing. The treating physician diagnosed Cowart with a 

perforated ear drum, a neck sprain, multiple contusions, and swelling and 

tenderness on his right hand. When asked, the physician confirmed that 

 

34 Seidman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

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Cowart’s diagnoses are consistent with severe trauma. Compensatory 

damages in the amount of $10,000 is not “entirely disproportionate to the 

injury sustained.”35

Erwin next asks this court to exercise its “discretionary moral judgment” 

and set aside the jury’s award of $4,000 in punitive damages. She contends 

the award must be set aside because she lacked the requisite mental state and 

because the damages serve no deterrent value since Erwin no longer works in 

law enforcement. Erwin does not challenge the quantum of punitive damages, 

only the fact of their imposition.

A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983 action when an official’s 

conduct is “‘motivated by evil intent’ or demonstrates ‘reckless or callous 

indifference’ to a person’s constitutional rights.”36 As Cowart correctly notes, 

the jury’s verdict on Cowart’s excessive force claim—premised on a finding of 

malicious intent—permitted the jury to impose punitive damages.37 

Additionally, Erwin fails to realize that punitive damages are aimed not only 

at her, but also to “deter h[er] and others like h[er] from similar conduct in the 

future.”38 Finally, the “discretionary moral judgment” of whether to award 

punitive damages when the legal threshold is met belongs to the jury, not this

court.39

 

35 Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 36 Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 

U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).

37 See Smith, 461 U.S. at 51-55; see also Cooper v. Morales, 535 F. App’x 425, 432 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Jones v. Conner, 233 F.3d 574, at *1 (5th Cir. 2000) (per 

curiam) (unpublished)).

38 Smith, 461 U.S. at 55 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1977) 

(emphasis added)).

39 Id. 

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C

We finally turn to the district court’s denial of Erwin’s motion for new 

trial. Erwin contends that a new trial is warranted because (1) the testifying 

inmate witnesses likely conspired en route to the trial to produce corroborating 

testimony, (2) the jury was confused about damages, and (3) there is “no legally 

principled basis” for finding Erwin alone liable. 

The record does not support Erwin’s claim that the inmate witnesses

fabricated a joint tale. The inmate witnesses were no more consistent in their 

accounts of the events than the testifying officers. Moreover, Erwin asked each 

inmate if they had conversed during cross-examination. Apparently the jury 

did not find the contrived-testimony theory convincing, and we do not “reweigh 

the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.”40 

Erwin argues that the jury was confused by a particular interrogatory

and read it to require a damages award. The jury sent a question to the district 

court during deliberations indicating that the jury was confused by a specific 

interrogatory and “d[id] not want to consider damages for the defendants.” We 

agree with the district court that a fair reading of the record indicates that the 

jury initially interpreted the interrogatory to permit damages in favor of the 

defendants, as opposed to Cowart. However, the district court’s responses

advised the jury that if it reached the issue of damages, damages could only be 

awarded to Cowart. The responses provided to the jury do not evince a 

mandatory damages instruction, as Erwin suggests.

Erwin maintains that she should not have been found solely liable 

because trial testimony indicated that multiple officers attacked Cowart. It is 

of course no defense to Erwin’s liability that a jury did not find her 

co-defendants liable by a preponderance of the evidence. As both Cowart and 

 

40 United States v. Owens, 683 F.3d 93, 101 (5th Cir. 2012).

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the district court noted and our review of the record confirms, the jury’s 

findings as to Erwin’s co-defendants can be attributed to the inmate witnesses’ 

repeated identification of Erwin and her actions in contrast to their inability 

to identify Erwin’s male co-defendants.

In sum, the result in this case does not reflect a miscarriage of justice

and the district court acted within its discretion in denying Erwin’s new trial 

motion. 

* * *

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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