Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00092/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shen Lee
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

SHEN LEE Plaintiff

v. 5:05CV00092 SWW/HDY

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge Susan Webber Wright. The parties may file specific

written objections to these findings and recommendations and must

provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. An original

and two copies of the objections must be filed with the Clerk no

later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and

recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party. The

District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these

proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Shen Lee, has appealed the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny his claim

for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income

(SSI), based on disability. Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Summary

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 1 of 13
 1It is now the practice in this District to decide cases on

appeal briefs rather than on motions for summary judgment.

2

Judgment and Brief in Support.1 Defendant filed a response; the case

is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole and free of legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d

185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir.

1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 2 of 13
 2The Hon. Robert L. Neighbors.

3

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff was found disabled and entitled to SSI with an onset

of October 1, 1991, due to mental retardation and a speech disorder.

(Tr. 10) In a continuing disability review, it was found that

Plaintiff’s disability ceased July 1, 2001, because of medical

improvement. Id. Plaintiff also filed an application for disability

benefits in 2001 alleging he became disabled June 30, 1999. (Tr. 11)

An administrative hearing was held to consider both his continuing

disability and his new application. (Tr. 10)

After conducting the administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge2 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff’s eligibility for SSI had

ended effective September 1, 2001, and that he had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

thereafter through April 13, 2004, the date of his decision. (Tr.

18) On March 16, 2005, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's

request for a review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision

the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3-5) Plaintiff then

filed his complaint initiating this appeal. (Docket #1)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 3 of 13
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Plaintiff was 26 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr.

218) He completed high school in special education classes. (Tr.

81, 218) He has no past relevant work. (Tr. 10)

The Commissioner has established, by regulations, a multi-step

evaluation for determining continuing disability:

1) The Commissioner determines if the claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals a

Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(i) (2003). If so, benefits will

continue; if not, the evaluation continues. Id.

2) The Commissioner next determines if there has been medical

improvement. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(ii) (2003). "Medical

improvement" is any decrease in the medical severity of a claimant’s

impairments which were present at the time of the most recent

favorable medical decision that claimant was disabled or continued to

be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1)(i) (2003). A determination

that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on

changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory

findings associated with a claimant’s impairment(s). Id. If there

has been improvement, the Commissioner proceeds to the next Step; if

not, the Commissioner skips the next Step. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.994(b)(5)(ii) (200). 

3) If there has been medical improvement, the Commissioner

determines if it is related to the claimant’s ability to do work

i.e., whether there has been an increase in the claimant’s residual

functional capacity based on the impairment(s) that was present at

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 4 of 13
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the time of the most recent favorable medical determination. 20

C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(iii) (2003). If the medical improvement is

not related to claimant’s ability to do work, the Commissioner

proceeds to the next Step; if it is, she skips the next Step. Id.

4) If no medical improvement has been found, or if any medical

improvement found is not related to claimant’s ability to work, the

Commissioner determines whether any exception to the medical

improvement standard of review applies. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.994(b)(5)(iv) (2003). The exceptions are not applicable in

this case.

5) If a claimant’s medical improvement is related to ability to

do work, the Commissioner determines whether claimant’s current

impairments, in combination, are "severe," i.e., whether they

significantly limit claimant’s physical or mental abilities to do

basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(v) (2003). If the

impairments are "severe," the evaluation continues; if not, claimant

is no longer deemed disabled. Id.

6) The Commissioner then determines if a claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, despite impairments, to

perform past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(vi) (2003). If so,

the disability will have ended; if not, the evaluation continues.

Id.

7) The Commissioner considers a claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education and past work experience to determine if

claimant can do other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5)(vii) (2003).

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 5 of 13
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If so, the disability will have ended; if not, the disability will be

found to continue. Id.

The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (2003). If

the claimant is, benefits are denied, regardless of medical

condition, age, education or work experience. Id.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical

evidence, of whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits claimant’s ability to perform

basic work activities, a “severe” impairment. Id., § 404.1520(c).

If not, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the

medical evidence, of whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals

a listed impairment which is presumed to be disabling. Id.,

§ 404.1520(d). If so, and the duration requirement is met, benefits

are awarded. Id.

If claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a residual

functional capacity assessment is made based on all the relevant

medical and other evidence. Id., § 404.1520(e). This residual

functional capacity assessment is utilized at Steps 4 and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, despite the impairment(s),

to perform the physical and mental demands of past relevant work.

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 6 of 13
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Id., § 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age, education

and work experience. Id., § 404.1520(g). If so, benefits are

denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since October 1, 1991, the date upon which he was

found disabled. (Tr. 17) He found that Plaintiff had “severe”

impairments, a history of mental retardation, a speech disorder and

major depressive disorder, recurrent, with psychotic features, but

that he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

met or equaled a Listing. (Tr. 11-12, 17) He judged that

Plaintiff’s allegations as to the extent of his symptoms,

limitations and restrictions were credible only to the extent that

they were supported by medical evidence. (Tr. 17)

The ALJ found that there had been substantial improvement in

Plaintiff’s impairments related to his ability to perform basic workrelated activities. (Tr. 18) He found that he had no exertional

impairments; nonexertionally, he was limited to work where

interpersonal contact was incidental to the work performed, tasks

were learned by rote with few variables, little judgment was required

and supervision was single, direct and concrete. Id. 

The ALJ correctly noted that, since Plaintiff had no past

relevant work, the burden shifted to the Commissioner to show a

significant number of jobs within the economy that he could perform,

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 7 of 13
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given his residual functional capacity, age, education and past work.

(Tr. 16) Based on the testimony of a vocational expert witness in

response to a hypothetical question, the ALJ found that there were a

significant number of jobs in the economy which Plaintiff could

perform, notwithstanding his limitations, for example, harvest worker

and janitor. (Tr. 17, 18) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 18)

Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner specifically discounted

the validity of his past consultative intellectual assessment and

evaluation of adaptive functioning merely because he had reached the

age of majority. (Br. 7) However, the record does not support his

contention. To the contrary, as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff was found

disabled as of October 1, 1991, and continued in that status until

July 1, 2001. (Tr. 10) When Plaintiff reached the age of 18, the

Social Security Administration was required to redetermine his

eligibility by applying the criteria used in determining initial

eligibility of claimants who are 18 or over. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(H)(iii). 

Plaintiff notes that test results from 1984, when he was seven

years old, indicated that he was functioning within the moderate

range of mental retardation. (Br. 9, Tr. 212) He also notes that

there is a presumption that IQ scores remain fairly constant

throughout life. A person’s IQ is presumed to remain stable over

time in the absence of any evidence of a change in a claimant’s

intellectual functioning. Maresh v. Barnhart, 438 F.3d 897, 900 (8th

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 8 of 13
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Cir. 2006); Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001). 

In May of 2001, Mickey K. Shell, M.S., administered an

intellectual assessment and evaluation of adaptive functioning of

Plaintiff. (Tr. 119-26) On the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-3d

edition, he scored a verbal IQ of 56, performance IQ of 48 and fullscale IQ of 48. (Tr. 124) The examiner judged that his scores were

of questionable validity. Id. “. . . he worked very carelessly

during the test. On the Coding subtest, he appeared to deliberately

make mistakes and was warned to work more carefully. . . . . On

some items of the Arithmetic subtest, he correctly counted the blocks

under his breath but responded with the wrong answer. (Tr. 120)

Mr. Lee clearly did not put forth his best effort. At

times it appeared Mr. Lee may have been malingering as it

seemed that he was intentionally giving incorrect answers.

The scores obtained on this administration of the WAIS-III

should be considered of very questionable validity. From

his behaviors and response to his interview, it is

estimated that Mr. Lee is probably functioning in the

borderline to mild range of mental retardation.

(Tr. 121)

In June of 2001, David A. Nanck, M.A., administered a

psychological evaluation. (Tr. 128-31) The Wechsler Adult

Intelligence Scale-3d edition was again administered; Plaintiff’s

scores were a verbal IQ of 71, performance IQ of 64 and full-scale IQ

of 65. (Tr. 129)

Mr. Lee’s approach to testing varied from subtest to

subtest. At times he would give very quick “I don’t know”

responses, almost starting to say “I don’t know” before the

question was finished. Also during the Arithmetic subtest

of the WRAT-3, he stopped working after 4 minutes 45

seconds of the allotted 15 minute time period. He was

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 9 of 13
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encouraged to work on, but would not. Also on the Reading

subtest of the WRAT-3 he did not try to sound out the

words; he would just state the words he knew and state he

did not know the other words.

Id. 

In general, Mr. Lee currently tested into the Mild range of

Mental Retardation according to the Wechsler Classification

System. This may be considered a minimal score as again

his quick responses and lack of reflection on questions may

have had a negative influence on his responding.

(Tr. 130)

If Plaintiff’s argument was taken to its logical conclusion,

once a child was found disabled based upon IQ, the individual would

draw benefits as long as he lived; there could never be a

determination that his disability had ceased unless he engaged in

substantial gainful activity.

The claimant in a disability benefits case has a

"continuing burden" to demonstrate that he is disabled,

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903,

47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and no inference is to be drawn from

the fact that the individual has previously been granted

benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(f).

Nelson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 1314, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991).

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider his

subjective complaints. (Br. 15) The record reflects that he did

consider Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Tr. 15, 17) The ALJ

evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints in light of Polaski v.

Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). (Tr. 15)

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports

the degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged is

just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The

adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 10 of 13
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evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and

observations by third parties and treating and examining

physicians relating to such matters as:

1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the

claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of

personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for Plaintiff's

claim of disability during the relevant time period. No evaluations

from that period showed medical conditions that were disabling.

Furthermore, inconsistencies between the medical evidence and

Plaintiff's subjective complaints gave reason to discount those

complaints. Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1141, 1443 (8th Cir. 1994).

Given the inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements, the lack of

medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's allegations, the lack of

medications taken, the lack of more treatment, Plaintiff's daily

activities, his poor work record, his functional capabilities and the

lack of restriction placed on Plaintiff by any physician, the ALJ

could rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints. See, e.g.,

Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ may

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 11 of 13
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discount complaints inconsistent with the evidence as a whole);

Dodson v. Chater, 101 F.3d 533, 534 (8th Cir. 1996)(after full

consideration of all evidence relating to subjective complaints, ALJ

may discount complaints if there are inconsistencies in evidence as

a whole). The ALJ's credibility analysis was proper. He made

express credibility findings and gave multiple valid reasons for

discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v.

Chater, 87 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d

254, 258 (8th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224 (8th Cir.

1995).

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make

an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of

the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence on the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g.,

Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,

956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence on the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion"

of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see

also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The

Commissioner's decision is not based on legal error.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the final determination of the

Commissioner be affirmed and that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed

with prejudice. 

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 12 of 13
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DATED this 16 day of June, 2006.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 5:05-cv-00092-SWW Document 17 Filed 06/16/06 Page 13 of 13