Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02096/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mike Johanns
Appellee
Safwat Soliman
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2096

___________

Safwat Soliman, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Mike Johanns, Secretary, United *

States Department of Agriculture, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 7, 2005

Filed: June 20, 2005

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Safwat Soliman (Soliman) appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of

summary judgment in his Title VII action. In Soliman’s counseled complaint, he

sought damages from the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture

(Secretary), claiming he had been terminated from his job as a meat inspector, and

had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of his Arabic descent and

Egyptian national origin. The Secretary moved for summary judgment on March 3,

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The Honorable F. A. Gossett, III, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Nebraska. 

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2004, and on March 8, Soliman, who by then was proceeding pro se, moved to extend

the deadline “to apply for” summary judgment. The magistrate judge2

 interpreted this

language as also meaning “to respond to” the March 3 summary judgment motion,

and gave Soliman until April 5 to do so. In another order entered March 23, the

magistrate judge warned that the March 3 summary judgment motion would be

deemed submitted for decision no later than April 5, and no further extensions for a

response would be granted. On March 29, Soliman notified the court he was living

in Michigan temporarily, as his father had died there on March 19; he attached a copy

of a death certificate; and he requested another ninety days “to apply for” summary

judgment. The magistrate judge summarily denied the extension on April 7. The

district court granted the Secretary’s summary judgment motion on April 8. 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a request for an

extension to file a summary judgment response. Griffin v. Super Valu, 218 F.3d 869,

870 (8th Cir. 2000). Soliman argues the district court should have granted his March

29 motion for an extension, because he suffered from extreme family hardship due

to the unexpected death of his father. While we sympathize with Soliman’s situation

and may have taken different action than did the district court, we cannot say the

district court abused its considerable discretion in denying Soliman’s March 29

motion for an extension. The district court did not preclude Soliman from filing a

response to the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. Rather, it merely enforced

a deadline governing the timing of submissions and denied any enlargement beyond

the extension of time already granted. See Biby v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 629

F.2d 1289, 1293 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding it is critical to the trial court’s power of

control over its own docket and its ability to serve effectively all litigants that it

maintain control over progress of cases before it, including requests for extensions

of time). Even pro se litigants must comply with court rules and directives. See

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Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (declaring pro

se parties are not excused from complying with procedural and substantive law). 

The district court gave Soliman one extension before his father’s death, and the

district court thereafter warned Soliman it would not grant any further extensions.

Although Soliman asserts he was residing out of state when the court entered an order

warning of no further extensions, a litigant who invokes the processes of the federal

courts is responsible for maintaining communication with the court during the

pendency of his lawsuit. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam) (“A party, not the district court, bears the burden of keeping the court

apprised of any changes in his mailing address.”). Soliman waited until several days

after his father’s death and within a few days of the revised deadline to file his March

29 extension motion. See Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987) (per

curiam) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on summary

judgment motion where, inter alia, plaintiff had been given repeated notices court

intended to rule on motion and it was plaintiff’s burden to rebut defendant’s

evidence). We further note that, although the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Soliman’s motion for an extension, the district court also would

have been well within its discretion in granting the motion. 

As to the merits, we must determine whether entry of summary judgment was

proper despite Soliman’s failure to respond to the motion. See Jacob-Mua v.

Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 520 (8th Cir. 2002) (summary judgment standard of review);

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 27 F.3d 327, 329 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994)

(failure to respond to summary judgment motion does not automatically compel

resolution of appeal in favor of moving party). We decline to consider the documents

Soliman submitted for the first time on appeal. See Griffin, 218 F.3d at 871. 

To establish a prima facie case of race and national-origin discrimination based

on circumstantial evidence, as Soliman attempted to do below, he had to show, among

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other things, that he adequately was performing his meat-inspector job, and he

suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances permitting an inference

of discrimination. See Habib v. NationsBank, 279 F.3d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 2001).

Given the numerous serious complaints the supervisory veterinary medical officer

received from Soliman’s trainers and coworkers–within a few months of Soliman’s

employment, and while he was on probation and presumably on his best behavior–

we agree with the district court that Soliman failed to establish trialworthy issues on

these elements. We also agree with the district court that the incidents Soliman

reported to the supervisory officer did not create a jury issue as to a hostile work

environment based on Soliman’s race and national origin. Cf. Burkett v. Glickman,

327 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (for hostile work environment claim to succeed,

conduct must be so extreme as to change terms and conditions of employment).

Finally, neither Soliman’s assertions of judicial bias and ineffective assistance of

counsel, nor the magistrate judge’s denial of Soliman’s discovery-related motions,

provides a basis for reversal. See Sheets v. Butera, 389 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir. 2004)

(reversal of discovery rulings is unwarranted absent gross abuse of discretion

resulting in fundamental unfairness); Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir.

1988) (rejecting ineffectiveness of counsel claim, as there is no constitutional or

statutory right to counsel in civil case).

Finally, the district court did not allow Soliman ten days to object to the

magistrate judge’s order as provided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).

The district court entered its order granting summary judgment only one day after the

magistrate judge denied Soliman’s second motion for an extension of time. Upon a

timely objection to a magistrate’s order disposing of a nondispositive matter, a

litigant is entitled to have the district court “consider such objection[ ] and . . . modify

or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous

or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Here, Soliman could have argued he was

prejudiced by the district court’s failure to observe the ten-day rule. However, after

independently reviewing Soliman’s appellate briefs and the record, we conclude

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Soliman has not proposed any non-frivolous argument, nor do we discover any nonfrivolous issue, which would convince us the district court erred in failing to wait ten

days before entering summary judgment. We hold, therefore, that the district court’s

failure in this case to observe the ten-day rule was harmless and does not constitute

reversible error. See, e.g., Habets v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 363 F.3d 378, 381-82 (5th

Cir. 2004) (permitting district court to adopt magistrate judge’s recommendation,

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), one day after receiving the recommendation and before

receiving any objections).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1), the

district court “for cause shown may at any time in its discretion” order a period

enlarged if a request therefor is made before the originally prescribed period ends.

In my view, the magistrate judge abused his discretion by denying Soliman another

extension, given the death of Soliman’s father and his consequent need to reside

temporarily out of state, the fact that his extension motion was unopposed, and the

brief time (36 days) between the filing of the summary judgment motion and the

district court’s final order. Cf. Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., 57 F.3d 101, 108

(1st Cir. 1995) (in deciding motion for extension of time, district court’s failure to

allow for factors beyond party’s control, such as counsel’s unexpected illness, may,

in certain cases, constitute abuse of discretion). I note that the magistrate judge’s

warning that no more extensions would be granted appeared in a March 23 order,

when Soliman was already out of the state because of his father’s death. Further,

Soliman was not given time to object to the magistrate judge’s April 7 denial of

another extension before the district court issued its April 8 final order. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a) (within 10 days after being served copy of magistrate judge’s order on

nondispositive matters, party may serve and file objections to order, and thereafter

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may not assign as error defect in order to which objection was not timely made). I

would therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further

proceedings. 

______________________________

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