Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-02066/USCOURTS-ca10-95-02066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Becky J. Kidd
Appellant
Taos Ski Valley, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ualted States Court or Apptllll Tenth Clrwlt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

JUL 0 51996 

BECKY J. KIDD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

TAOS SKI VALLEY, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-2066 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

( CIV- 93-327 -JC) 

Grant Marylander (Jim Leventhal and Natalie Brown, of Leventhal & 

Bogue, Denver, Colorado, and Marion J. Craig, III, Roswell, New 

Mexico, with him on the briefs) of Leventhal & Bogue, Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

JoeL. McClaugherty (Jere K. Smith with him on the brief), Santa 

Fe, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and LIVELY*, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Pierce Lively, Senior Judge, United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 1 
Becky J. Kidd (Kidd) appeals from a memorandum opinion and 

order granting Taos Ski Valley, Inc. (TSV) summary judgment and 

dismissing her complaint with prejudice. 

Kidd suffered a broken back, ribs, hip, and pelvis in a skiing 

accident at TSV. "Her injuries were possibly received when she 

crossed a diversionary rope located on an area permanently marked 

as a slow skiing area by a huge orange banner." (Appellant's 

Appendix, Vol. II, Memorandum Opinion, Undisputed Facts, at 445). 

"The black and yellow rope, held up by bamboo poles and marked 

with strips of orange fluorescent flagging, was intended to close 

off a portion of the mountain to prevent collisions between skiers 

returning to the base from different sides of the mountain." ~­

"Plaintiff, an experienced TSV skier, never saw the rope closure." 

l.Q.. at 445-46. 

Kidd filed a complaint in which she alleged, inter~, that: 

TSV, in installing the diversionary rope, had breached its 

obligations under New Mexico's Ski Safety Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 

24-15-1, et seq. (the Act), by failing to properly mark, warn 

and/or correct a dangerous hazard created by the suspension of the 

rope between two poles (Count I); TSV had acted with wanton or 

gross negligence in maintaining the unmarked rope and she was, 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 2 
accordingly, entitled to punitive damages (Count II); TSV breached 

it contractual obligations under a special use permit with the 

United States under which she was a third party beneficiary (Count 

III); and TSV's installation of the rope created an inherently 

dangerous condition, thereby imposing the duty of highest care on 

TSV (Count IV) . 

TSV moved to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district 

court denied TSV's motion to dismiss Kidd's Count II punitive 

damage claim, concluding that although the Act was silent on the 

availability of punitive damages, general New Mexico law principles 

allowed for the recovery of punitive damages in limited 

circumstances, including conduct committed with a wanton disregard 

of a plaintiff's rights. The district court did, however, grant 

TSV's motion to dismiss Counts III and IV, Kidd's third party 

beneficiary and inherently dangerous condition claims. 

In dismissing Count III, the district court concluded that 

the "language of the statute indicates that the legislature 

intended the Act as the sole remedy for skiers" and that New Mexico 

case law "provide[s] persuasive authority indicating that the state 

courts would reject Plaintiff's theory of liability based on a 

third party beneficiary cause of action." (Appellant's Appendix, 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 3 
Vol. I at 73-74). In dismissing Count IV, the district court 

concluded that the inherently dangerous activity doctrine "is 

inconsistent with the Act because it would permit the imposition of 

additional duties on ski operators" and that the "Act was intended 

to limit the duties which can be imposed upon ski area operators 

[and] therefore forecloses the application of the" doctrine. .IQ.. 

at 75-76. Kidd's subsequent motion for reconsideration of the 

dismissal of Count III was denied. 

Thereafter, TSV moved for summary judgment on Kidd's 

remaining claims and Kidd moved for partial summary judgment on the 

issue of TSV's negligence. Following briefing, the district court 

entered a memorandum opinion and order granting TSV summary 

judgment and dismissing Kidd's complaint with prejudice. In so 

doing, the district court found that: although TSV offered 

convincing evidence that Kidd breached her duty to ski safely, 

Kidd's testimony that she was not skiing out of control created a 

genuine issue of material fact making summary judgment improper, 

(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 447); Kidd failed to produce 

competent evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude 

that the rope closure was not in accordance with industry usage and 

National Ski Area Association (NSAA) standards, iQ. at 449; and, no 

reasonable juror could conclude that the closure itself created a 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 4 
hazard under the Act requiring TSV to warn skiers of its presence. 

I.Q.. at 451. 

On appeal, Kidd contends that the district court erred when it 

granted TSV's motion for summary judgment, barred her from 

obtaining critical discovery, and dismissed her third party 

beneficiary claim. 

I. 

Kidd contends that the district court erred when it granted 

summary judgment in favor of TSV. Kidd argues that summary 

judgment was erroneous because she presented substantial evidence 

that TSV breached its duties under §§ 24-15-7(I) and (C) of the 

Act. 

We review a district court's grant or denial of summary 

judgment ~ DQYQ, applying the same legal standard used by the 

district court. Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l., 76 F.3d 

1509, 1516 (lOth Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hagelin for 

President Comm. of Kan. v. Grayes, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (lOth Cir. 

1994), ~. denied, u.s. (1995). When applying this 

standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving/opposing 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 5 
party. Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). 

a. 

Kidd asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate because 

there was substantial evidence that TSV breached its duty under § 

24-15-7(I) of the Act. This section provides that "[e]very ski 

area operator shall have the following duties with respect to the 

operation of a skiing area: . to warn of or correct particular 

hazards or dangers known to the operator where feasible to do so." 

Kidd argues that TSV breached this duty when it installed the 

single strand diversionary rope and blocked off an otherwise 

skiable area without giving the skier sufficient warning. The 

district court rejected these arguments, concluding that: 

The evidence submitted by the parties in this case 

demonstrates as a matter of law that the TSV rope 

closure, by virtue of its location and purpose, cannot 

qualify as a hazard under the Act. The rope is located 

in a well-marked slow skiing zone near the base of the 

mountain. The closure serves to prevent, not cause, 

collisions between skiers returning to the base area. 

Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that the rope has 

been in place since 1978, and [over one] million skiers 

have managed to ski past it without injury. 

(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 447). 

Kidd maintains that this conclusion was erroneous and that 

summary judgment improper when, as here: TSV's expert acknowledged 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 6 
that a rope between two poles on a ski slope could be a hazard if 

a skier did not have time to react to the rope or could not see it. 

(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 333); the evidence was undisputed 

that Kidd, an experienced TSV skier did not see the rope, id. at 

445-46; Kidd presented the testimony of another skier who stated 

that the "rope was not reasonably visible" and that "[i]n skiing 

down the slope to Becky J. Kidd I did not see the rope," .i.Q.. at 

309; and photographs taken immediately after the accident 

demonstrated the rope's lack of visibility against the white 

background. 

TSV responds that summary judgment was proper based on the 

undisputed evidence that the area of Kidd' s accident had been 

marked off and closed to skiing for at least twelve years without 

incident and its expert's testimony that the rope did not create a 

hazardous situation and that the rope complied with the Act. TSV 

also maintains that a ski area operator's duty to warn of or 

correct particular hazards or dangers under§ 24-15-7(I) is limited 

to those hazards or dangers which are known to the operator and 

that Kidd failed to present any evidence that TSV knew that the 

rope closure was a hazard. 

Although the determination of "[w] hether a duty [under the 

Act] has been breached is a question of fact," Lopez v. Ski 1\pache 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 7 
Resort, 836 P.2d 648, 655 (N.M. Ct. App.), ~- denied, 113 N.M. 

815 (1992), the determination of "[w] hether a duty exists is 

generally a question of law for the court to determine." l_d. As 

a matter of law, the duty imposed on ski area operators by § 24-15-

7(I) "is limited to situations where the particular hazard is both 

known to the ski area operator ~ warning of or correcting the 

particular hazard is feasible." ~- at 656 (emphasis original). 

Applying Lopez, we hold that the district court did not err in 

granting TSV summary judgment on Kidd's § 24-15-7(I) claim. Kidd 

failed to present any probative evidence that the diversionary rope 

in question was a "particular hazard ... known to" TSV. On the 

contrary, the undisputed evidence was that the rope had been in 

place since 1978 and over one million skiers had managed to ski 

past it without injury. Therefore, TSV was entitled to judgment on 

this claim as a matter of law. 

b. 

Kidd reasons that she presented substantial evidence that TSV 

breached its duty under § 24-15-7(C) of the act making summary 

judgment on this claim improper. 

Section 24-15-7(C) provides: 

Every ski operator shall have the following duties 

with respect to the operation of a skiing area: 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 8 
* * * 

to mark conspicuously the top or entrance to each slope, 

trail or area with the appropriate symbol for its 

relative degree of difficulty; and those slopes, trails 

or areas marked at the top or entrance with the 

appropriate symbols aa established ~ approved ~ ~ 

national £ki ~ association . . . 

(Emphasis added) . 

Kidd asserts that she presented evidence which created a 

triable issue on whether TSV breached its duty under§ 24-15-7(C) 

to comply with NSAA standards when it installed a single strand 

diversionary rope rather than multiple ropes or other barriers. 

Kidd argues that the evidence included the fact that although the 

NSAA had no written standards for marking closures, industry 

practice dictated the proper use of ropes for closures; TSV' s 

expert on NSAA standards stated that rope closures should be as 

visible as possible, that multiple ropes create a more effective 

barrier than single ropes, and that unless there are indications to 

the contrary, three rope barriers should be used rather than a 

single rope (Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 335, 340 and 343); 

and there was nothing to prevent TSV from using multiple ropes. 

Kidd maintains that this evidence created a triable issue on 

whether TSV complied with NSAA standards making summary judgment on 

this claim improper. 

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TSV responds that: the only issue is whether the rope closure 

at issue complied with NSAA standards; Kidd is attempting to divert 

the inquiry away from whether TSV complied with NSAA standards by 

focusing on what TSV could have done rather than on what it did; 

and its expert testimony established, without exception, that the 

rope closure complied with NSAA standards. 

We agree with the district court's findings that Kidd produced 

"[o]nly speculation, not expert testimony . . in attempting to 

rebut Defendant's submitted compliance with the Act" and that "the 

record [is] absent of competent evidence that the closure fell 

outside industry norms established by NSAA standards." (Appellant's 

Appendix, Vol. II at 450). Kidd failed to meet her burden as a 

nonmoving party of producing specific facts "by any of the kinds of 

evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere 

pleadings themselves" to avoid TSV' s properly supported summary 

judgment motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 

(1986). Her conclusory allegations are not sufficient to defeat 

TSV's motion. Milton v. Scriyner. Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). 

II. 

Kidd contends that the district court erred when it barred her 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 10 
from obtaining critical discovery relevant to issues raised in the 

summary judgment proceedings. Kidd maintains that the district 

court abused its discretion when it prevented her from deposing TSV 

employees and from designating a visual acuity expert. 

a. 

Kidd states that the district court abused its discretion when 

it prevented her from deposing TSV employees concerning the 

hazardous nature of the rope. Under Fed. R.Civ. P. 26(c), the 

district court may limit or bar discovery. The decision of a 

district court to enter a protective order under Rule 26(c) is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Boughton v. Cotter Co~., 65 

F.3d 823, 828 (lOth Cir. 1995). Under this standard, "we will not 

disturb a trial court's decision absent 'a definite and firm 

conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or 

exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.'" 

Thomas v. International Business Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 482 (lOth 

Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 

Senior TSV employees testified that patrol members had been 

trained concerning the use of markings and compliance with both TSV 

and the Act's standards. They also testified that patrol members 

were instructed to insure that markings were visible. When Kidd 

attempted to depose ski patrol members on their training and 

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Appellate Case: 95-2066 Document: 01019276532 Date Filed: 07/05/1996 Page: 11 
whether the rope in question was appropriately marked, TSV filed a 

motion for a protective order. 

Following a hearing, the magistrate judge entered a discovery 

order granting TSV's motion "to the extent Defendant seeks to bar 

the deposition of the Chief Groomer and the Assistant Head of the 

Ski Patrol at this time, based upon the court's finding that 

subordinate employees should not be deposed to the extent the same 

information may be obtained from supervisors." (Appellant's 

Appendix, Vol. I at 109). 

Kidd objected to the magistrate's order. Thereafter, the 

district court entered a memorandum opinion overruling Kidd' s 

objections, finding, inter ~: 

Plaintiff next objects to Magistrate Judge Svet' s 

limitation of questioning as to certain non-supervisory 

employees. The court has reviewed the deposition 

testimony provided by both the Plaintiff and Defendant 

and fails to identify the inconsistencies claimed by the 

Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff's assertions misstate the 

evidence. The clear import of all of the depositions is 

that the supervisory [personnel] are ultimately 

responsible for the marking of the trails, and that the 

non-supervisory patrol members have little if any 

discretion in deciding how trails and hazards are to be 

marked. 

(Appellant's Appendix at 442B-42C). 

We agree. Michael Blake, TSV's General Manager, testified 

that he had the "ultimate responsibility" for properly marking TSV. 

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(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 285). Under these circumstances, 

we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

overruling Kidd's objections to the magistrate judge's order. 

b. 

Kidd declares that the district court abused its discretion 

when it prevented her from designating a visual acuity expert. The 

decision to allow the testimony of an expert not described or 

listed in the pretrial order rests with the sound discretion of the 

district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 

discretion. F.D.I.C. v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1556 (lOth Cir. 

1994). 

In the initial pre-trial report, Kidd agreed to identify her 

liability expert witnesses by September 15, 1993. Kidd did not 

identify any liability expert witnesses by that date. However, 

Kidd retained additional counsel on January 15, 1994. On January 

21, 1994, Kidd's additional counsel filed a motion to add Freeman 

Hall, a visual acuity specialist and engineer, as an expert 

witness. The magistrate judge denied Kidd's motion. 

Following a review of Kidd' s objections to the magistrate 

judge's order, the district court entered a memorandum opinion 

overruling Kidd's objections, stating: 

Plaintiff . objects to the Magistrate Judge's 

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refusal to permit the endorsement of an expert witness . 

Plaintiff had sought to add an additional expert 

witness over four months after the deadline for 

designating experts had passed. Plaintiff has provided 

no reason for her delay, and the court can find no reason 

other than the recent addition of new counsel for the 

Plaintiff. The court therefore finds that Magistrate 

Judge Svet's order denying the addition of the expert 

. is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 

(Appellant's Appendix at 442B). 

Kidd asserts that the district court abused its discretion 

when it prevented her from designating a visual acuity expert who 

would have testified that the rope in question was not visible 

when, as here: the trial date had not been set; TSV would not have 

been prejudiced; she had been diligent, with the exception of 

designating the expert, in conducting her discovery; she did not 

appreciate the need for a visual acuity expert until she retained 

additional counsel; and a visual acuity expert was a critical 

expert who would explain to the jury what factors affected the 

rope's visibility and why it could not be seen by skiers. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in refusing to allow Kidd to designate a visual acuity expert. 

Kidd' s request to designate an expert was made more than four 

months after the time period for designating such experts had 

lapsed. Moreover, Kidd provided no reason for her delay, save to 

allege that she was not aware of the need for such an expert until 

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after she had retained additional counsel and that the expert would 

explain why the rope could not be seen by skiers. Neither of these 

assertions are sufficient to support Kidd's claim that the 

district court abused its discretion, particularly in that it was 

undisputed that Kidd, "an experienced TSV skier, never saw the 

rope closure." (Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II, Memorandum Opinion, 

Undisputed Facts, at 445). 

III. 

Kidd contends that the district court erred when it dismissed 

her third party beneficiary claim. We review ~ llQYQ the district 

court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. Seymour y. 

Thorton, 79 F.3d 980, 984 (lOth Cir. 1996). 

In Count III, Kidd alleged, inter allia: 

Under the terms of the Permit between the United States 

and the Defendant, Defendant is to conduct the operations 

of the ski area, with full recognition of the need of 

public safety, 1 and is to regularly inspect the ski area 

1 Section "24. Safety" of the Special Use Permit between 

TSV and the Forest Service provided in part: 

The permittee [TSV] shall conduct the operations 

authorized by this permit with full recognition of the 

need for public safety. In furtherance of this 

requirement, the permittee shall prepare a safety plan 

designed to provide adequate safety to the users of the 

permitted area and facilities. The plan shall have 

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and correct any hazardous conditions. 

The Defendant's maintaining and permitting the use 

of an unmarked Rope in the middle of the ski area 

constituted a breach of this lease term. 

The United States . . . in granting the Defendant a 

right to use [its] property, required that the operation 

be conducted with full recognition for the need of public 

safety. The people of the United States, including the 

Plaintiff, are third-party beneficiaries of the 

provisions the Lease Agreement between the United States 

and the Defendant. The Defendant's operation of the ski 

area, in violo.tion of the needs for "Public Safety", 

constitute a breach of the Agreement. Plaintiff, was a 

third-party beneficiary of this Lease Contract, had the 

right to expect the contract to be performed and 

therefore should be allowed to recover her damages caused 

by Defendant's breach. 

(Appellant's Appendix at 5). (Emphasis added). 

In dismissing Count III, the district court concluded: 

The question before the court is whether the Act 

provides the exclusive remedy available to the Plaintiff. 

* * * 

The language of the statute indicates that the 

legislature intended the Act as the sole remedy for 

skiers. The Act states that '[u]nless a ski operator is 

written approval of the Forest Supervisor prior to the 

operation of the facilities for public-use purposes. 

The plan shall include, but shall not be limited to, 

avalanche prevention and control; amount and kind of 

rescue equipment; conditioning of trails; and frequency 

of permittee inspection of area, equipment, machinery, 

and uphill facilities. 

(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. I at 37). 

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in violation of the Ski Safety Act, with respect to the 

skiing area ... , and the violation is a proximate cause 

of the injury complained of, no action shall lie against 

such ski area, operator by any skier [or his 

representative] . " . Under New Mexico law when the 

meaning of a statute is plain, it must be given effect, 

and there is no room for construction . . Here, the 

language of the Act is clear and unambiguous, stating 

that no action shall lie against a ski area operator 

unless the operator violates the Act and that violation 

is the proximate cause of the skier's injury. 

The precise question of whether a ski operator is 

liable to a plaintiff as a third party beneficiary has 

not been addressed by any appellate court in New Mexico. 

In Wood v. Angel Fire Ski Corp., 108 N.M. 453, 355 

(Ct.App. 1989), the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that 

the Act 'limited in part the tort liability of ski 

operators.' Later, in Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, 114 

N.M. 202 (Ct.App. 1992), the plaintiff sued for tort 

damages resulting from personal injury. Again, the Court 

of Appeals held that the 'provisions of the Act were 

intended by the legislature to exclusively control each 

of plaintiff's claims herein.' 

From the above cases, it is clear that the Act is 

the sole remedy for an action based in tort. In regards 

to a contract claim, however, the above cases provide 

only dicta. Yet, these opinions provide persuasive 

authority indicating that the state courts would reject 

the Plaintiff's theory of liability based on a third 

party beneficiary cause of action. Since the clear 

language of the Act must be given its plain effect, this 

Court concludes that a state court hearing this issue 

would reject the third party beneficiary theory contained 

in Count III. 

(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. I at 73-74). 

We agree with the district court that New Mexico case law 

provides "persuasive authority indicating that the state courts 

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would reject Kidd's theory of liability based on a third party 

beneficiary cause of action." 

AFFIRMED. 

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