Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03131/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03131-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Rhodes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 13, 1998 Decided June 19, 1998

No. 97-3131

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Robert Rhodes,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00329-01)

Lois Godfrey Wye, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was John P.

Dean, appointed by the court.

Lisa C. Baskerville, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas C. Black,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Wald, Silberman, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: At resentencing following remand

required by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995),

appellant sought downward departure based on his rehabilitative efforts undertaken while serving his original sentence.

Finding departure foreclosed under the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court denied appellant's request. Because

we find nothing in the Guidelines prohibiting departures

based on post-conviction rehabilitation, we reverse and remand for the district court to determine whether appellant's

rehabilitative efforts, when compared to the rehabilitative

efforts of all defendants, were so exceptional as to warrant

departure.

I

A jury convicted appellant Robert Rhodes of two counts of

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,

21 U.S.C. s 841(a) (1994), and one count of using or carrying

a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, 18

U.S.C. s 924(c) (1994). The district court sentenced Rhodes

to concurrent 121-month terms of imprisonment for his drug

possession convictions. For the firearm conviction, the district court sentenced him to a consecutive sixty-month term.

Because of the section 924(c) conviction, the district court

declined to apply section 2D1.1(b)(1)'s two-level enhancement

for possession of a dangerous weapon, U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") s 2D1.1(b)(1) (1997). See id.

s 2K2.4 backg'd (section 924(c) conviction precludes the application of "any specific offense characteristic for ... firearm

... use ... or possession").

After this court affirmed Rhodes' conviction, United States

v. Rhodes ("Rhodes I"), 62 F.3d 1449, 1450-51 (D.C. Cir.

1995), the Supreme Court issued Bailey v. United States, 516

U.S. at 143 (section 924(c) requires "active employment" of a

firearm for conviction), granted Rhodes' subsequently filed

petition for certiorari, vacated Rhodes I, and remanded for

reconsideration in light of Bailey. Rhodes v. United States,

517 U.S. 1164-65 (1996). We in turn reversed Rhodes' section 924(c) conviction and remanded his remaining convictions

to the district court "for possible resentencing taking into

account the provisions of s 2D1.1(b)(1)." United States v.

Rhodes ("Rhodes II"), 106 F.3d 429, 433 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 248 (1997).

At resentencing, Rhodes sought downward departure, arguing that during his six and a half years in prison, he had

taken "every opportunity" to improve his circumstances, entering drug rehabilitation, taking vocational and college-level

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average work reports, and repaying his assessment early.

Finding no authority to depart based on post-conviction rehabilitation, the district court rejected Rhodes' request.

Again appealing, Rhodes now contends that the district

court misperceived its departure authority. Although we

review district court departure decisions for abuse of discretion, Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96-100 (1996),

"whether a given factor could ever be a permissible basis for

departure is a question of law which we address de novo."

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 975

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 100).

II

We begin with the government's contention that Rhodes II

limited the district court to applying section 2D1.1(b)(1)'s

weapon-possession enhancement, thus precluding Rhodes

from seeking departure. Had Rhodes II remanded "solely to

apply" or even "to apply" section 2D1.1(b)(1), we would agree.

But Rhodes II contains no such prescriptive language. It

merely remanded for "possible resentencing taking into account the provisions of s 2D1.1(b)(1)." Rhodes II, 106 F.3d

at 433 (emphasis added). Nothing in this open-ended language limits the district court to the mechanical application of

the Guidelines' weapon enhancement.

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The government argues that our rejection of de novo

resentencing in United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 959-60

(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1059 (1998), barred

Rhodes' departure argument in the district court. In Whren

we held that unless we "expressly direct[ ] otherwise," at

resentencing occasioned by remand, sentencing courts may

consider "only such new arguments or new facts as are made

newly relevant by the court of appeals' decision--whether by

the reasoning or by the result." Id at 960. Relying on this

language, the government argues that Whren limits resentencing to facts existing at the time of original sentencing.

We disagree. Whren considered only whether a defendant

could seek departure based on facts available at the time of

initial sentencing (defendant's presence within 1,000 feet of a

school), not whether, as here, he could do so based on facts

not even existing at the time of initial sentencing (postconviction rehabilitation). Indeed, Whren itself said that a

"defendant should not be held to have waived an issue if he

did not have a reason to raise it at his original sentencing."

Id. As the government acknowledges, Rhodes "could not

have argued [at initial sentencing] for a departure based upon

his post-sentence rehabilitative efforts since these efforts had

not yet taken place." Appellee's Br. at 9. Moreover, consideration of post-initial sentencing events, in those rare circumstances in which such events may become relevant, neither

contravenes Whren's concern with ensuring that parties receive fair notice of their opponent's arguments at initial

sentencing nor undermines its goal that district courts "resolve all material issues ... when the record is fresh in

mind." Whren, 111 F.3d at 960. Rhodes thus never waived

his argument that the Sentencing Guidelines allow such departures, an issue to which we now turn.

III

Recognizing a sentencing court's "obligation to consider all

the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence

outside the guidelines in an appropriate case," S. Rep. No.

98-225, at 52 (1983), the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 gave

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lines range if they find "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into

consideration by the Sentencing Commission," 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(b)). The Sentencing Commission, acknowledging that

in drafting the Guidelines it had not adequately taken into

consideration "unusual" cases, U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro.

cmt. 4(b); see Koon, 518 U.S. at 93, allowed district courts to

depart in "atypical case[s], [where] a particular guideline

linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs

from the norm." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b). See

generally id. s 5K2.0 (discussing departures under the Guidelines).

In approaching departure requests, sentencing courts operate under a set of clearly defined principles. As Koon

directs, if the district court identifies features of a case that

" 'potentially . . . take it outside the Guidelines' "heartland"

and make of it a special, or unusual, case,' " Koon, 518 U.S. at

95 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st

Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.)), it must determine whether " 'the

Commission [has] forbidden departures based on those features[.]' " Id. (quoting Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949). Koon

requires district courts to ask this question because Congress

gave the Sentencing Commission, not courts, authority categorically to prohibit consideration of sentencing factors.

[F]or the courts to conclude a factor must not be considered under any circumstances would be to transgress the

policymaking authority vested in the Commission.

....

...Congress created the Commission to "establish

sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal

justice system," and Congress instructed the Commission, not the courts, to "review and revise" the Guidelines

periodically. As a result, the Commission has assumed

that its role is "over time [to] ... refine the guidelines to

specify more precisely when departures should and

should not be permitted." Had Congress intended the

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ture factors, we expect it would have said so in a clear

way. It did not, and we will not assume this role.

Id. at 106-09 (internal citations omitted). If, considering

"only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official

commentary of the Sentencing Commission," 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(b), the district court determines that the Commission

prohibited consideration of a given factor, that ends the

matter--the court may not depart. But if nothing in the

Guidelines prohibits consideration of the factor, then Koon

directs further analysis to determine the appropriate departure standard, an issue we return to in section IV.

Applying Koon to this case, we begin by asking whether

the Commission prohibited consideration of post-conviction

rehabilitation. Koon itself largely answers this question.

Pointing out that the Commission "chose to prohibit consideration of only a few factors, and not otherwise to limit, as a

categorical matter, the considerations which might bear upon

the decision to depart," Koon, 518 U.S. at 94, Koon identifies

only race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status, see U.S.S.G. s 5H1.10, lack of guidance as a

youth, see id. s 5H1.12, drug or alcohol abuse, see id.

s 5H1.4, and personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business, see id. s 5K2.12, as prohibited

under the Guidelines. Koon, 518 U.S. at 93. Obviously, postconviction rehabilitation is not one of these prohibited factors,

nor have we found any other provision of the Guidelines,

policy statements, or official commentary of the Sentencing

Commission prohibiting its consideration. We therefore hold,

as have two of our sister circuits, that sentencing courts may

consider post-conviction rehabilitation at resentencing. See

United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) ("We find

nothing in the pertinent statutes or the Sentencing Guidelines

that prevents a sentencing judge from considering postconviction rehabilitation in prison as a basis for departure if

resentencing becomes necessary."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.

735 (1998); United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir.

1997) (holding that "post-offense rehabilitation efforts, including those which occur post-conviction, may constitute a sufficient factor warranting a downward departure").

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Attempting to distinguish Koon and avoid the Second and

Third Circuits' holdings that sentencing courts may depart

based on post-conviction rehabilitation, the government argues that such departures somehow "revive the parole system" abolished by the Sentencing Reform Act. Our dissenting colleague goes even further. Citing authority granted to

the Bureau of Prisons to award "good time" credits as well as

the abolition of parole, Judge Silberman argues that "the very

passage" of the Sentencing Reform Act "implicitly" precluded

consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation, concluding that

"it would not be permissible for even the Sentencing Commission itself to authorize such a departure." Dis. at 1. Certainly to the extent the Act clearly limits sentencing discretion,

courts must act accordingly, regardless of the Guidelines'

silence. For example, if the Guidelines contained no prohibition on consideration of an offender's race as a departure

factor, see U.S.S.G. s 5H1.10, the Act's direction that the

Commission ensure the Guidelines' neutrality as to offender

race, see 28 U.S.C. s 994(d) (1994)--if not the Fifth Amendment--would clearly prevent such departures. But neither

the Act nor any other provision of law we have found explicitly bars consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation.

We think the government and the dissent, moreover, misinterpret the implications to be drawn from the abolition of

parole and overlook significant differences between parole

and resentencing. Congress ended parole largely to remedy

significant problems flowing from the fact that district court

sentences for terms of imprisonment were generally openended, with the United States Parole Commission actually

determining an offender's date of release. As a result, "the

offender, the victim, and society" were unaware of the prison

release date regardless of the nominal term imposed. S. Rep.

No. 98-225, at 46. Split authority between the Parole Commission and the courts also produced sentencing inconsistency

because judges were "tempted to sentence a defendant on the

basis of when they believe[d] the Parole Commission" might

release the defendant. Id. To solve these problems, the

Sentencing Reform Act vested sole sentencing responsibility

in district courts, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

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367 (1989) (the Act "consolidates the power that had been

exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission

to decide what punishment an offender should suffer"), and

instituted "real-time" sentencing, ensuring that the sentence

imposed by the district court will actually be served, see id.

(the Act "makes all sentences basically determinate" with

prisoners released at the completion of their sentence "reduced only by any credit earned by good behavior while in

custody"); see also United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 956

(7th Cir. 1991) (discussing the real-time nature of sentencing

under the Guidelines); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 3 (in

abolishing the parole system, "Congress first sought honesty

in sentencing").

Allowing district courts to depart from the Guidelines for

post-conviction rehabilitation implicates none of the concerns

that primarily led Congress to abolish parole. There will be

no mystery about the sentences defendants will serve because

sentences that take account of post-conviction rehabilitation

will be entirely determinate. And because the same district

court that imposed the initial, erroneous sentence will impose

the second, correct sentence, such sentences pose no risk of

judicial second-guessing.

Nor would consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation

"infringe upon" the Bureau's responsibility for awarding good

time credit under 18 U.S.C. s 3624. See Dis. at 1. While

considerations that inform the Bureau of Prisons' exercise of

discretion in awarding good time credits, see 18 U.S.C.

s 3624(b)(1) (in awarding good time credits, the Bureau of

Prisons should consider whether "the prisoner has displayed

exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations"); id. ("In awarding credit under this section, the

Bureau shall consider whether the prisoner ... has earned,

or is making satisfactory progress toward earning, a high

school diploma or an equivalent degree."), may parallel some

factors sentencing courts could weigh for post-conviction rehabilitation departures, awards of good time credits differ

from post-conviction departures in several important respects. For one thing, good time credits simply reduce time

served for behavior expected of all prisoners, see United

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States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that

"compliance with the conditions for awarding good time credit

is one of the terms of the original sentence"), while departures based on rehabilitation alter the very terms of imprisonment; indeed, prisoners receiving departures at resentencing

will remain eligible for future good time credits. Moreover,

from Department of Justice statistics showing that prisoners

eligible for good time credits (i.e., their sentences exceeded

one year but were not for life, see 18 U.S.C. s 3624(b)(1))

served between eighty-seven and ninety percent of their

sentences, see United States Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 1995, at 83 (1995) (studying prisoners released between

October 1, 1994 and September 30, 1995), it is clear that most

prisoners receive good time credits, cf. United States v.

Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 132 (2d Cir.) (assuming in the context of

calculating a maximum prison term that prisoners will generally comply with prison regulations and therefore receive

good time credit despite Bureau of Prison discretion), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 1581 (1998). As we hold in section IV,

however, post-conviction rehabilitation departures will be

available only in extraordinary cases. Departures at resentencing for post-conviction rehabilitation thus no more represent awards of good time credit than they amount to grants of

parole. Cf. Core, 125 F.3d at 78 (arguing that section

3624(b)'s good time credit provision has no bearing on departures based on post-conviction rehabilitation).

At two points in its brief, the government points to Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, suggesting that Congress'

1984 modification of the rule provides another ground to

prohibit departures based upon post-conviction rehabilitation.

But that amendment merely deleted Rule 35's reference to a

district court's discretion to reduce sentences on its own

motion within 120 days of certain specified contingencies,

compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (1986) (amended 1987) (allowing courts on their own motion to modify sentences already

imposed in certain circumstances), with Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

(1998) (allowing courts to modify sentences already imposed

on motion of government for substantial assistance); it said

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nothing about departures at resentencing in response to a

defendant's motion. The government has identified nothing

in either the Act or its legislative history, see S. Rep. No.

98-225, at 158 (discussing the amendment to Rule 35 without

mentioning district court departure authority), suggesting

that this amendment limits district court authority to consider

all relevant information at resentencing.

For its final effort to distinguish Koon, the government, as

well as our dissenting colleague, see Dis. at 2, argues that

because all defendants can potentially seek departure based

on pre-initial sentencing rehabilitation, while only those defendants "lucky enough" to be resentenced following appeal

can seek departure for post-conviction rehabilitation, Appellee's Br. at 14, allowing Rhodes' departure would contravene

the Guidelines' goal of treating similarly situated defendants

alike. Any disparity that might result from allowing the

district court to consider post-conviction rehabilitation, however, flows not from Rhodes being "lucky enough" to be

resentenced, or from some "random" event, Dis. at 2, but

rather from the reversal of his section 924(c) conviction. The

Sentencing Reform Act seeks to eliminate not all sentencing

disparities, but only "unwarranted" disparities, see 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(a)(6) (sentencing judges must consider "the need to

avoid unwarranted sentence disparities"); 28 U.S.C.

s 991(b)(1)(B) (directing Commission to "avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct");

id. s 994(f) (Commission should "reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities"). Distinguishing between prisoners whose

convictions are reversed on appeal and all other prisoners

hardly seems "unwarranted." Cf. United States v. LaBonte,

117 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1997) (disparity arising from normal

exercise of prosecutorial discretion not unwarranted).

Considering post-conviction rehabilitation, moreover, is perfectly consistent with the fact that Congress, notwithstanding

its concern about reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity,

directed the Sentencing Commission to maintain "sufficient

flexibility to permit individualized sentences." 28 U.S.C.

s 991(b)(1)(B). "It has been uniform and constant in the

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federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider

every convicted person as an individual and every case as a

unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate,

sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue."

Koon, 518 U.S. at 113. In enacting the Sentencing Reform

Act, Congress preserved the long-standing rule that "[n]o

limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of

an offense which a court of the United States may receive and

consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. s 3661 (emphasis added); see also United

States v. Wishnefsky, 7 F.3d 254, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting

that the Act recodified 18 U.S.C. s 3577 into section 3661,

without change); accord 18 U.S.C. s 3553(a)(1) (sentencing

courts shall consider "the nature and circumstances of the

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant")

(emphasis added). We know of no reason why sentencing

courts' broad mandate under sections 3553(a) and 3661 to

sentence defendants as they stand before the court--whether

after plea bargaining, trial, or appeal--should exclude consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation. See Core, 125 F.3d

at 77 (at resentencing, district courts have obligation to

consider defendants as they stand before the court "at that

time").

To be sure, both the Sentencing Reform Act and its

legislative history reflect congressional concern with the failure of rehabilitation as the central goal of sentencing. See,

e.g., 28 U.S.C. s 994(k) (directing the Commission to "insure

that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a

sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of

rehabilitating the defendant"); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 40

(citing studies rejecting basing parole decisions on rehabilitation and concluding that "[w]e know too little about human

behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine

basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a

particular prisoner has been rehabilitated"); id. at 53 n.74

(indicating in a footnote that Congress considered the abolition of parole consistent with doubts about the efficacy of

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tation). Yet, in many places the Act takes rehabilitation into

account. In addition to providing good time credits in part

for rehabilitative efforts, the Act requires sentencing courts

to consider "the need for the sentence imposed ... to provide

the defendant with needed educational and vocational training

... or other correctional treatment." 18 U.S.C.

s 3553(a)(2)(D); see also United States v. Harrington, 947

F.2d 956, 959 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("While Congress ...

rejected imprisonment as a means to achieve rehabilitation, it

also recognized 'correctional treatment' as a proper goal of

sentencing."). The Guidelines themselves describe the "basic

purposes of criminal punishment" promoted by the Act as

"deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation," U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A intro. cmt. 2 (emphasis added), and

explicitly mention rehabilitation as one factor to be weighed

in the acceptance of responsibility departure, section 3E1.1.

See U.S.S.G. s 3E.1.1 n.1(g); see also section IV, infra.

Given rehabilitation's continuing role in sentencing, and in the

absence of any contrary directive from the Commission, we

decline to read the Act's abolition of parole and restructuring

of good time credits as definitive congressional statements

that district courts may not account for post-conviction rehabilitation. Although the Commission may someday choose to

prohibit departures based on post-conviction rehabilitation,

we have no authority to make that decision for it. See Koon,

518 U.S. at 106-09.

IV

Having concluded that nothing in the Guidelines prohibits

post-conviction rehabilitation departures, we move to Koon's

next set of questions in order to determine the threshold for

departure Rhodes must meet and the method of analysis the

district court should undertake. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95.

Koon classified permissible departure factors into three general categories: encouraged, discouraged, or unmentioned in

the Guidelines. If the Guidelines encourage departures

based on a given factor, sentencing courts may depart "if the

applicable Guideline does not already take it into account."

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Id. at 96. If the Guidelines discourage departures based on

the factor, or if the factor is encouraged but already taken

into account by the applicable Guideline, courts may depart

"only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in

some other way makes the case different from the ordinary

case where the factor is present." Id. If the factor is

"unmentioned" in the Guidelines, courts must, "after considering the 'structure and theory of both relevant individual

guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole,' decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's

heartland." Id. (quoting Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949). Departures based on unmentioned factors should be " 'highly infrequent.' " Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A).

Post-conviction rehabilitation does not fit easily into Koon's

framework. Koon focused largely on those sections of the

Guidelines that give fairly clear departure instructions. Id.

at 94-95. For example, the Court cites Guidelines that use

language broadly encouraging departures, like section 5K2.10,

which directs that "[i]f the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court

may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect

the nature and circumstances of the offense," U.S.S.G.

s 5K2.10 (emphasis added). See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94. Koon

also referred to Guidelines broadly discouraging departures,

like section 5H1.6--"Family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline

range," U.S.S.G. s 5H1.6 (emphasis added)--and section

5H1.2--"Education and vocational skills are not ordinarily

relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside

the applicable guideline range," id. s 5H1.2 (emphasis added).

See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95.

The Guidelines offer no such clear instruction about postconviction rehabilitation. Although the Guidelines mention

"post-offense rehabilitative efforts," U.S.S.G. s 3E.1.1 n.1(g),

a concept linguistically broad enough to cover post-conviction

rehabilitation, that reference appears in the acceptance of

responsibility departure, which generally applies only to pretrial efforts, see id. n.2 ("[A] determination that a defendant

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has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pretrial statements and conduct."). Post-conviction rehabilitation is thus neither clearly "encouraged" nor "discouraged,"

as Koon used those terms. And because of section 3E1.1's

reference to "post-offense rehabilitative efforts," it is also not

"unmentioned."

Faced with this quandary, the Third Circuit, relying on a

Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Brock, 108 F.3d 31

(4th Cir. 1997), treated post-conviction rehabilitation as "already taken into account" by the commentary to the acceptance of responsibility departure. Sally, 116 F.3d at 80

(citing Brock, 108 F.3d at 35). Brock, in turn, drew this

approach from an earlier Fourth Circuit decision, United

States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,

117 S. Ct. 956 (1997), which considered whether district

courts could depart based on a defendant's restitution despite

the fact that application note 1(c) to the acceptance of responsibility departure mentions restitution. Id. at 107 (citing

U.S.S.G. s 3E.1.1 n.1(c), which lists "voluntary payment of

restitution prior to adjudication of guilt" as a consideration in

evaluating acceptance of responsibility). According to Hairston, the listing of a factor as supporting a reduction within

the Guidelines "implies" either "that the factor is discouraged

as a basis for departure from the Guidelines, or alternatively,

that the factor is encouraged--at least as a basis for reduction--but has already been taken into account." Id. (emphasis omitted). Hairston, Sally, and Brock thus found that

mentioned factors already taken into account in an explicit

departure Guideline are, at least implicitly, analogous to

Koon's second category.

Turning to the question of the circumstances under which a

district court can depart, and building on Hairston, Brock

concluded that if a factor is "listed by the Commission as one

appropriately considered in applying an adjustment to the

guidelines, a court may depart only if the factor is present to

such an exceptional or extraordinary degree that it removes

the case from the heartland of situations to which the guideline was fashioned to apply." Brock, 108 F.3d at 35. For

district courts to depart based on such a factor, Brock held,

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the factor must be present "to such an exceptional degree

that the situation cannot be considered typical of those circumstances" in which the explicit departure--rehabilitation in

the context of acceptance of responsibility--is normally granted. Id. Sally, in turn, applied this rationale to the issue we

face in this case--post-offense rehabilitative efforts that occur

post-conviction. Sally, 116 F.3d at 80.

We think the Third Circuit's approach makes sense and

therefore adopt its requirement that before district courts can

depart based on post-conviction rehabilitation, that factor

must be present " 'to such an exceptional degree that the

situation cannot be considered typical of those circumstances

in which the acceptance of responsibility adjustment is granted.' " Id. (quoting Brock, 108 F.2d at 35). Treating postoffense rehabilitation as mentioned by a departure within the

Guidelines, thus implying that such departures are either

"discouraged" or "encouraged but already taken into account," is not only faithful to Koon, but also accurately

reflects the content of the Guidelines. We read the Commission's mentioning of a factor within the context of a relatively

narrow departure Guideline to mean that the factor represents an appropriate sentencing consideration, as well as to

imply that courts may depart beyond the terms of the Guideline, but only if the factor is present to an "unusual" extent.

Applying this standard to the facts of this case--that is,

determining whether Rhodes' work, education, and other

rehabilitative activities exceed "to an exceptional degree" the

rehabilitative efforts of all defendants, cf., e.g., Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Statement No. 5251.04 %57 1(a) (1996) (requiring federal prisoners

"physically and mentally able to work ... to participate in [a]

work program"); Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Statement No. 5350.25 %57 1 (1997)

(requiring prisoners who have neither a General Educational

Development (GED) credential nor high school diploma "to

attend an adult literacy program for a minimum of 240

instructional hours or until a GED is achieved")--is a question Koon directs us to leave, at least in the first instance, to

the district court. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. Informed by their

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"vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing," district courts are best equipped to determine whether a

case falls outside the "heartland." Id. Because district

courts "see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate

courts do," we defer to their "institutional advantage ... in

making these sorts of determinations," subject, of course, to

review for abuse of discretion. Id.

This case is remanded to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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Silberman, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I agree with the

majority that the Sentencing Guidelines do not address the

question presented--whether a district court may consider a

prisoner's post-conviction conduct when it resentences a prisoner following an appeal. But I do not believe this case is

controlled by the standards set forth in Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), that govern guideline departures.

But see United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1997);

United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997). I think the

very passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which

abolished parole and substantially reduced and restructured

good behavior adjustments, implicitly precludes a district

court from considering post-conviction behavior in imposing

sentences. Under that analysis, it would not be permissible

for even the Sentencing Commission itself to authorize such a

departure.

Congress chose to take account of a defendant's rehabilitative efforts in a different and more limited way than it had

under the parole system. The Bureau of Prisons may award

good-time credits to a prisoner who has shown "exemplary

compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations," including progress toward earning a degree. 18 U.S.C. s 3624

(1994). This is just the sort of determination that Rhodes has

asked the district court to make, arguing that "he has earned

his GED, taken college level courses, consistently received

better than average to much better than average work reports, paid the full $150 assessment imposed by the District

Court ... completed one drug rehabilitation program ... and

taken advantage of every other opportunity for rehabilitation

presented to him while incarcerated." Rather than operating

within the framework that Congress has provided, appellant

has asked the district court to infringe upon the Bureau's

role. See United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1993)

(per curiam) ("[I]t is the Bureau of Prisons, not the court,

that determines whether a federal prisoner should receive

good time credit.")

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One of the primary goals of the Act was to narrow the wide

disparity in sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch.1, pt. A,

intro. cmt. 3 (1997). To be sure, the Act requires a court to

consider the individual circumstances of the defendant as well

as the need for uniformity in sentencing. 18 U.S.C. s 3553(a)

(1994). Post-conviction good conduct, however, is not a circumstance particular to appellant. Rhodes will have the

chance to secure a downward departure that is unavailable to

other prisoners with identical, or even superior, prison records. The Sentencing Reform Act seeks to end the sort of

unfairness that results from allowing some defendants to gain

consideration that others cannot. When sentencing was almost totally discretionary, some judges relaxed sentences for

reasons that others refused even to consider. Rhodes' position injects the same unfairness back into the process. The

line between those who will have the opportunity to make his

argument and those who will not is totally random. Only

those prisoners who are lucky enough to have a sentencing

judge who commits legal error can benefit from their postconviction conduct.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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