Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01442/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01442-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan Shub
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1442

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa.

Jonathan Shub, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: December 27, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After Jonathan Shub pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce to

engage in sexual conduct with a minor, see 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), the district court1

sentenced him to 121 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Mr. Shub maintains that the

district court erred by applying three sentencing enhancements under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines and that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 06-1442 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263002
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Mr. Shub first contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level

sentence enhancement for unduly influencing the victim to engage in prohibited

sexual conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(2)(2003). We need not reach the merits of

Mr. Shub's argument: Because the district court made clear that it would have

imposed the same 121-month sentence without the undue-influence enhancement, and

that sentence would have fallen within the guideline range as calculated with or

without the enhancement, any error was necessarily harmless. See United States v.

Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928 (1992).

Mr. Shub also challenges the district court's imposition of a two-level sentence

enhancement for using a computer to "persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the victim

to engage in prohibited sexual conduct." See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(3)(A)(2003).

Because Mr. Shub did not raise this issue in the district court, we review for plain

error only. United States v. Gomez, 419 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 597 (2005). To establish plain error, Mr. Shub "must show (1) an

error, (2) that is plain, that not only (3) affected his substantial rights, but also (4)

seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mr. Shub is unable to show that there was any error, much less plain error, in

the district court's decision to impose the computer-use enhancement. The undisputed

facts in this case demonstrate that Mr. Shub used a computer to persuade, induce,

entice, or coerce the child to have sex with him. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(3)(A)

(2003). Even if, as Mr. Shub maintains, the child needed little persuasion, it is clear

that Mr. Shub used a computer to facilitate his crime. Further, Mr. Shub presented

nothing from which we could conclude that the claimed error affected either his

"substantial rights" or "the fairness, integrity or public reputation" of the sentencing

proceeding.

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Mr. Shub contends in addition that the district court erred in applying a twolevel sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2003).

But Mr. Shub waived this claim before the district court, thus precluding appellate

review. See United States v. Plano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993); United States v.

Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 526-27 (8th Cir.2002). At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Shub

initially objected to the enhancement, but explicitly withdrew his objection. On

appeal, Mr. Shub argues that the waiver is not valid because his attorney forced him

to withdraw the objection. This argument fails, however, because the decision to

withdraw the objection is the type of strategic decision for which a defendant is

"deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent." See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110,

115 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mr. Shub also argues that his 121-month sentence is unreasonable. As we have

said, Mr. Shub's sentence was within the advisory guideline range, and a sentence that

falls within the guideline range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Lincoln,

413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 840 (2005). Mr. Shub

contends, however, that the sentence is unreasonable because the district court did not

consider the circumstances surrounding his offense, including the child's conduct, his

history and characteristics, his remorse, and the disparity between the sentence that

he received and the sentence that the State of Iowa would have imposed for the same

offense. But the record reflects that the district court adequately addressed all of the

relevant considerations under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing its sentence, and we

have held that federal/state sentencing disparities cannot render a defendant's federal

sentence unreasonable, United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 807-08 (8th Cir.

2006). We thus conclude that Mr. Shub has not overcome the presumption that the

sentence imposed on him was reasonable.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court's judgment.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1442 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263002