Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08030/USCOURTS-ca10-95-08030-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles John McCarty
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White Unitd States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

May 16, 1996 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 95-8030 USA v. McCarty 

April24, 1996 by The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Circuit Judge 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision: 

On page 7, line 2 "is it" should read "it is" so the clause will read "where it is 

defined as an act . . . " 

On page 9, lines 3-4, delete the following: ''None of the parties has suggested and" 

making the sentence now read: ''No evidence indicates that the warrant ... " 

Please make the corrections to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-8030 Document: 01019279355 Date Filed: 04/24/1996 Page: 1 
PUBLISH United J:.tl L E D IC( escou t Tenth c· 1 ,. o App., .. • •rcuit .._ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 2 4 1996 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

CHARLES JOHN MCCARTY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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PATRICKFJs 

Cler:, HEn 

No. 95-8030 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-0048) 

Christopher A. Crofts, Assistant United States Attorney, District 

of Wyoming, Casper, Wyoming, (David D. Freudenthal, United States 

Attorney, District of Wyoming, Casper, Wyoming, with him on the 

brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Maynard D. Grant, Grant & Newcomb, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before KELLY, BARRETT and JONESt, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Mr. McCarty appeals his conviction on five counts of federal 

firearms violations alleging that the search upon which his 

convictions are predicated violated the Fourth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution; the district court violated-his Sixth 

Amendment right to confrontation by prohibiting cross examination 

of two prosecution witnesses for bias; and the district court 

erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines by ordering Mr. 

t The Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Senior United States 

Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-8030 Document: 01019279355 Date Filed: 04/24/1996 Page: 2 
McCarty to serve his federal sentence consecutively to a 

previously imposed state criminal sentence. 

Background 

In October 1991, Mr. McCarty was arrested and charged with 

assaulting his former girlfriend and her brother. He pled guilty 

to reckless endangering, a misdemeanor for which he served a year 

in prison, and felony aggravated assault and battery, for which 

the state court placed him on probation for five years and 

prohibited Mr. McCarty from either contacting his former 

girlfriend or possessing firearms. In March 1993, the former 

girlfriend informed state officials that she had received mail 

apparently sent by Mr. McCarty. After the Wyoming State Crime Lab 

discovered Mr. McCarty's fingerprint on a portion of the suspect 

mail, a search warrant was issued to the Worland police alleging 

Mr. McCarty had violated a condition of his probation by 

contacting the victim by letter. During the search of Mr. 

McCarty's residence, police discovered a rifle equipped with a 

silencer. 11 R. 71-72. On April 13, 1993, the state court 

revoked Mr. McCarty's probation and sentenced him to a five to 

seven year term of imprisonment. 

In March 1994, on the basis of the search of the residence, 

Mr. McCarty was charged with making a false statement in 

connection with the purchase of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (6), 

924(a) (1}, receiving a firearm while under indictment for a 

felony, id. §§ 922(n), 924(a) (1), possession of a sawed-off rifle, 

26 u.s.c. §§ 5841, 5845, 5861(d), 5871, possession of a silencer, 

id. §§ 5841, 5845, 5861(d), 5871, and possession of a silencer not 

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.. 

identified with a serial number, id. §§ 5841, 5842, 5845, 586l(i), 

5871. In December 1994, Mr. McCarty was convicted of all five 

federal firearms violations and sentenced to 71 months, to be 

served consecutively to his state sentence received for his 

assault conviction. 

Discussion 

A. Fourth Amendment 

In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the 

district court's findings of fact and view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the government. United States v. Baker, 30 

F.3d 1278, 1280 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 273 (1994). 

The reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment is a question of law we review de novo. United States 

v. Martinez-Cigarroa, 44 F.3d 908, 910 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

115 s. Ct. 1386 (1995). To assess the validity of a search 

warrant under the Fourth Amendment, we review whether the totality 

of the circumstances in the affidavit provided the judicial 

officer "'a substantial basis for finding a fair probability that 

contraband or other evidence of a crime would be found'" at the 

searched premises. Baker, 30 F.3d at 1280 (quoting United States 

v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 887 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 

437 (1992)). 

This case involves the question of whether a suspected 

violation of a condition of probation constitutes probable cause 

for which a search warrant may issue, particularly where the 

probation violation in question would not constitute a crime 

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beyond the confines of the defendant's probation agreement. This 

presents a question of first impression in this circuit. To 

assist our assessment of the reasonableness of the search in this 

case, we turn first to an analysis of a probationer's rights under 

the Fourth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment protects a probationer's home, like that 

of any other citizen, from unreasonable searches. Griffin v. 

Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). However, the special needs 

and benefits presented by a state's probation system compels a 

probationer to occupy the unusual status of a citizen with only 

conditional, rather than absolute liberty. Id. at 873-74; see 

also United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 361-62 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

It is clear that a probation officer may search a probationer's 

home or even arrest a probationer without a warrant and with less 

than probable cause. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78; Lewis, 71 F.3d 

at 362. It is equally well established that a probation officer 

cannot act as a "stalking horse" on behalf of police to assist 

police in evading the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 

United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1995); 

United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 1994). 

According to Wyoming law, a probation officer may arrest a 

probationer without a warrant "if the agent has probable cause to 

believe the person has violated the terms of his probation or 

parole," Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-411(a) (iii), or conduct a warrantless 

search of a probationer's home upon reasonable suspicion of 

probation violation, Pena v. Wyoming, 792 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wyo. 

1990). 

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In many cases, the police may arrest a probationer or search 

a probationer's premises without a warrant at the behest of the 

parole officer. See. e.g., Lewis, 71 F.3d at 361, 363 (search by 

parole officers and police, who were acting at the request of 

parole officers but without a warrant, did not offend the Fourth 

Amendment); United States v. Shephard, 21 F.3d 933, 936 n.6 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (under Montana law, violation of probation constitutes 

an offense for which police may arrest probationer without a 

warrant but at the written request of parole officer); United 

States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 1990) ("police 

officers and parole officers are fungible when the former serve as 

mere implimentors of decisions already made by the latter"), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 1049 (1991). Such is the case in Wyoming, where 

state law empowers the police to "arrest without [a] warrant an 

alleged probation or parole violator after receiving a written 

statement from a probation and parole agent setting forth that the 

probationer or parolee has, in the judgment of the probation and 

parole agent, violated the conditions of his probation or parole." 

Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-41l(b). Furthermore, in Wyoming, to determine 

if a probationer has violated a condition of his probation, the 

police may conduct a warrantless search of probationer's home on 

less than probable cause and without written consent of the 

probation officer if accompanied by the probation officer. 

Sanderson v. Wyoming, 649 P.2d 677, 678-79 (Wyo. 1982). This is 

true even where the police initiate contact with the probation 

officer and only the probation officer had received consent to 

search. Id. By informing the probation officer of an alleged 

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... 

probation violation and conducting the search in the presence of 

the probation officer, the police "become the probation officer's 

agents when they gave assistance to the probation officer at her 

request." Id. at 679. 

This case, however, does not involve a probation officer's 

warrantless search of a probationer's home but rather a search 

conducted by the police pursuant to a warrant. Accordingly, the 

question that concerns us is whether, in light of Mr. McCarty's 

status as a probationer, the warrant satisfies the probable cause 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 

Mr. McCarty concedes that the affidavit upon which the 

warrant was based contained sufficient grounds under Griffin to 

allow a Wyoming probation officer to conduct a warrantless search 

of Mr. McCarty's home. Aplt. Br. at 13. However, Mr. McCarty 

argues that because mailing a letter is not per se illegal, Mr. 

McCarty's alleged parole violation constituted a non-criminal act 

that is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute probable 

cause for which a search warrant may issue. We disagree. 

Violation of probation constitutes indirect contempt of court 

under Wyoming law and constitutes a crime punishable by 

imprisonment. Criminal contempt emanates from the common law 

axiom that a court inherently possesses the power to punish 

trangressions of its orders. See generally International Union. 

UMWA v. Bagwell, 114 s. Ct. 2552 (1994) (discussing case law 

development of criminal contempt) . Although not codified in the 

Wyoming statutes, criminal contempt finds solid support in Wyoming 

case law, see~. Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989); 

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Skinner v. Wyoming, 838 P.2d 715 (Wyo. 1992), and is specified in 

the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, where is it defined as an 

act "not committed in the immediate presence of the court, and of 

which it has no personal knowledge, including . [d]isobedience 

of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court." Wyo. R. 

Crim. P. 42(a) (2) (C). Conviction of criminal contempt may result 

in imprisonment for up to six months if the defendant is convicted 

by a judge, or longer if convicted by a jury. Wyo. R. Crim. P. 

42(e). The act of mailing a letter, unaffiliated with courtordered probationary requirements, generally is not a crime; 

however, Mr. McCarty's letter defied the court's Judgment and 

Sentence prohibiting Mr. McCarty from contacting his former 

girlfriend, and therefore constituted indirect criminal contempt. 

See Aplt. App. A at 1-2. 

In this case, the Worland police had a substantial basis for 

believing that Mr. McCarty had violated a condition of his 

probation and in so doing committed criminal contempt. Mr. 

McCarty's former girlfriend informed the Washakie County Attorney 

that she had received mail which she believed was sent by Mr. 

McCarty. A suspect piece of mail contained Mr. McCarty's 

fingerprint. The totality of these circumstances, contained in 

the affidavit, Aplt. Br. app. C, constituted probable cause of the 

crime of indirect criminal contempt, namely Mr. McCarty's 

violation of his probation. Had the police at that point informed 

Mr. McCarty's probation officer of the result of the analysis, the 

probation officer could have conducted a warrantless search of 

probationer's residence for evidence concerning possible parole 

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violations. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878. However, the police 

did not contact Mr. McCarty's probation officer but rather 

prepared the appropriate affidavit and presented it to a detached 

and neutral magistrate, who determined that probable cause existed 

to support a search of Mr. McCarty's residence and vehicle. The 

police were not obligated to contact Mr. McCarty's probation 

officer but could act pursuant to the warrant. 

Finally, the seizure of the rifle and silencer from Mr. 

McCarty's house fits squarely within the plain view doctrine. The 

police were lawfully on the premises and the object seized was in 

plain view. Because the object's incriminating character was 

immediately apparent, the seizure was permissible. See United 

States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1554-55 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 116 S. Ct. 87 (1995). 

Even assuming that the warrant was defective, we would affirm 

the district court's denial of Mr. McCarty's motion to suppress 

based on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the 

exclusionary rule would not apply where an officer acts "in 

objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated 

search warrant .... " Id. at 922. In this case, the police 

acted in good faith within the scope of a warrant which they 

objectively believed to be valid. The engine that drives Fourth 

Amendment protection is prevention and deterrence. In cases "when 

an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search 

warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope 

.. there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter." Id. 

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at 920-21. Cf. Cardona, 903 F.2d at 66 ("the source of the 

decision to act, not the robotic agent who implements it, is 

ultimately responsible for the decision's consequences"). None of 

the parties has suggested and no evidence indicates that the 

warrant was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," in which 

case reliance upon the warrant could not have been in good faith. 

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., 

concurring) . 

B. Sixth Amendment 

We generally review the district court's evidentiary rulings 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 

1581 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 773 (1995). An 

alleged violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, 

however, presents a question of law that we review de novo. Hatch 

v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (lOth Cir. 1995). Generally, "a 

criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause 

by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in oth~rwise 

appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical for.m 

of bias on the part of the witness." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 

u.s. 673, 680 (1986). 

In this case, the district court prevented Mr. McCarty from 

pursuing particular lines of questioning during cross-examination 

of two prosecution witnesses, Ms. Cindy Johnson, Mr. McCarty's 

former probation officer, and Ms. Karma Andricci, Mr. McCarty's 

former girlfriend and the victim of the state crime for which Mr. 

McCarty was initially placed on probation. At oral argument, Mr. 

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McCarty conceded that the district court correctly curtailed his 

cross-examination of Ms. Andricci. We therefore do not address 

his arguments concerning this witness. 

Mr. McCarty alleges that the district court violated his 

right to confrontation by prohibiting him from effectively crossexamining Ms. Johnson, his former probation officer, in an attempt 

to demonstrate bias. In this case, the government called Ms. 

Johnson to compare the credibility of Mr. McCarty with that of Mr. 

George Vigil, a witness who testified against Mr. McCarty and for 

whom Ms. Johnson also served as probation officer. Defense 

counsel objected and advised the court that he intended to crossexamine Ms. Johnson based on information he had received from his 

client, namely that Ms. Johnson, while serving as Mr. McCarty's 

probation officer, advised Mr. McCarty that he would experience 

more favorable probation treatment if he engaged in sexual 

intercourse with her. Mr. McCarty allegedly tape recorded this 

conversation with Ms. Johnson but was unable to produce the 

recording to substantiate the allegations. Aplt. Br. at 23 n.S. 

The court summoned Ms. Johnson and counsel into chambers to pursue 

the inquiry. 13 R. 76. After questioning Ms. Johnson regarding 

Mr. McCarty's allegations, the court concluded that Mr. McCarty's 

allegations were unsubstantiated and refused to permit such crossexamination of Ms. Johnson. 13 R. 78-79, 81, 86-87. When 

questioning resumed, Ms. Johnson testified that she believed Mr. 

Vigil to be more credible than Mr. McCarty. 13 R. 88. 

The trial judge has the power to exclude evidence when it is 

offered in an impermissible manner or is unduly prejudicial under 

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• 

Rule 403. "Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on 

cross-examination based on concerns about . . . harassment, 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." 

VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. The Confrontation Clause 

guarantees Mr. McCarty "only an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever 

way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. 

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis added). 

Having reviewed the record and Mr. McCarty's contentions, we 

can say that the district court neither abused its discretion nor 

violated Mr. McCarty's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by 

circumscribing Mr. McCarty's intended cross-examination of Ms. 

Johnson. The district court prohibited a particularly invasive, 

injurious line of questioning concerning serious and 

unsubstantiated allegations of sexual impropriety. In light of 

the incredibility of the allegation, Mr. McCarty's prior felony 

convictions, 13 R. 10, and his admitted instances of misleading 

the court, 12 R. 159-60, the trial judge was justified in 

preventing Mr. McCarty from cross-examining Ms. Johnson on serious 

allegations of sexual misconduct substantiated only by Mr. McCarty 

himself. 

C. Sentencing Guidelines 

In April 1993, the state court of Wyoming revoked Mr. 

McCarty's probation, ordered entry of his 1991 conviction for 

aggravated assault and battery and imposed a sentence of five to 

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seven years in the state penitentiary. While serving his state 

sentence, Mr. McCarty was sentenced in the present matter to a 

term of 71 months to be served consecutively to his state 

sentence. 3 R. docs. 102, 104. Mr. McCarty contends that the 

district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelinesl by imposing 

his federal sentence consecutively to his state sentence. We 

review de novo the district court's interpretation and application 

of the Sentencing Guidelines and apply the clearly erroneous 

standard to review the court's factual determinations at 

sentencing. United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1320 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1439 (1995). 

In general, a district court has broad discretion in choosing 

to sentence a defendant to a consecutive or concurrent sentence. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), (b). However, the court's discretion is 

confined by consideration of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

and USSG § 5G1.3.2 United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 

1 All references to the Sentencing Guidelines are to the 1993 

version in effect at the time Mr. McCarty was sentenced. 

2 USSG § 5G1.3 provides in relevant part: 

(a) 

(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged 

term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been 

fully taken into account in the determination of the offense 

level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant 

offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the 

undischarged term of imprisonment. 

(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for 

the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to 

the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent 

necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for 

the instant offense. 

USSG § 5G1.3. 

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1127 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037 (1992). In 

this case, the district court applied USSG § 5G1.3(c), referring 

to Application Note 4 for guidance, to order Mr. McCarty's federal 

sentence served consecutively to his state sentence. 16 R. 58-59. 

Mr. McCarty contends that USSG § 5G1.3(b) rather than USSG § 

5Gl.3(c) applies because the undischarged term of Mr. McCarty's 

state sentence resulted from offenses that were fully taken into 

account in the determination of the offense level for the instant 

offense. See Aplt. Br. at 34-36; USSG § 5G1.3(b). 

We disagree. Subsection (b) does not apply because Mr. 

McCarty's Wyoming offense has not been "fully taken into account 

in the determination of the offense level for the instant 

offense." USSG § 5G1.3(b). The district court assigned Mr. 

McCarty a Base Offense Level ("BOL") of 20, 16 R. 57, by applying 

USSG § 2K2.l(a) (4) (B), which mandates a BOL of 20 "if the 

defendant . . . is a prohibited person, and the offense (of 

conviction) involved a firearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) ." 

See USSG § 2K2.1(a) (4) (B). A "prohibited person" is defined as 

"anyone who: (i) is under indictment for, or has been convicted 

of, a 'crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.'" 

USSG § 2K2.1, comment. n.6. Assigning Mr. McCarty a BOL of 20 

because he was a prohibited person in possession of a firearm does 

not take into account the nature, type, aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances or any other substantive aspect of Mr. McCarty's 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

The parties agree that USSG § 5G1.3(a) does not apply. See 

Aplt. Br. at 34. 

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previous crime. Had the district court applied USSG § 

2K2.1(a) (4) (A), which mandates a BOL of 20 "if the defendant had 

one prior felony conviction of . a crime of violence" 

(emphasis added), or USSG § 2K2.l(a) (3), which assigns a BOL of 22 

"if the defendant had one prior felony conviction of ... a crime 

of violence . . . and the instant offense involved a firearm" 

(emphasis added), a stronger argument could be made that Mr. 

McCarty's Wyoming conviction was fully taken into account due to 

the consideration of its violent nature. 

Similarly, the district court's utilization of USSG § 

2K2.l(b) (5) to increase Mr. McCarty's offense level from 20 to 24 

did not fully take into account Mr. McCarty's state law 

conviction. USSG § 2K2.l(b) (5) instructs the district court to 

increase a defendant's offense level by 4 points "[i]f the 

defendant used or possessed any firearm . in connection with 

another felony offense." USSG § 2K2.1(b) (5). The district court 

properly applied subsection (b) (5) by noting that Mr. McCarty used 

a firearm in connection with an additional felony offense, namely 

aggravated assault and battery. 16 R. 57. Increasing a 

defendant's offense level by noting that a defendant used a 

firearm to commit a previous felony does not take into account the 

substantive aspects of the underlying felony any more than noting 

that the felony occurred in the afternoon, on a sunny day or in an 

urban area. 

Based upon our conclusion that the district court properly 

applied§ 5G1.3(c), Mr. McCarty alternatively invokes the 

reasoning set forth in the presentence report ("PSR") to argue 

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.. 

that the imposition of a consecutive federal sentence under USSG § 

5G1.3(c) constituted an abuse of discretion by the district court. 

Aplt. Br. at 36 n.12. In the PSR, the probation officer noted the 

applicability of USSG § 5G1.3(c) to this case, but advised the 

court to consult Application Note 3 for guidance in applying § 

5G1.3(c). 4 R. 11 (PSR 11 at~ 45). The district court rejected 

the PSR's invocation of Application Note 3 and instead chose to 

look to Application Note 43 for guidance. 16 R. 58-59. 

Suggestions contained in the PSR are advisory only. The 

district court retains discretion in choosing whether to impose a 

consecutive or concurrent sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3584, subject to 

the constraints of USSG § 5G1.3 and pursuant to consideration of 

the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a}. The plain language of 

Application Note 4 squarely fits the facts of this case. 

Furthermore, the record reflects that the district court expressly 

considered the statutory factors embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 

such as the need "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 

promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 

the offense," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A), "to afford adequate 

deterrence to criminal conduct," id. § 3553(a) (2) (B), and "to 

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant," id. § 

3 Application Note 4 provides: 

If the defendant was on federal or state probation . . . at 

the time of the instant offense, and has had such probation . . . revoked, the sentence for the instant offense should be 

imposed to be served consecutively to the term imposed for 

the violation of probation . . . in order to provide an 

incremental penalty for the violation of probation . . . . 

USSG § 5G1.3, comment. n.4. 

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3553(a) (2) (C). See 16 R. 78-80. We cannot say that the court 

abused its discretion in disregarding the suggestions of the 

probation officer in the PSR and applying Application Note 4 to 

impose a consecutive federal sentence upon Mr. McCarty. 

AFFIRMED. 

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' 

No. 95-8030: United States v. McCarty 

Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, Concurring. I fully concur 

in Parts B and C of the opinion, and likewise concur in Part A, 

excepting the last paragraph. 

explain my concern. 

I write separately to briefly 

The court's discussion on [p.8] of United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897 (1984) is unnecessary after determining that the 

warrant and search, relating to evidence of a crime, were valid. 

To reach this issue the court must assume that the warrant was 

defective, and under the facts of this case, the warrant could 

be defective only if it did not relate to the commission of a 

crime. As we have not decided the broader issue of whether a 

warrant must relate only to the commission of a crime to satisfy 

the Fourth Amendment, it is unwise to assume such in dictum. 

Further, it is not at all clear to me, given the court's 

assumption, valid or not, that the doctrines of Leon and related 

cases would apply here. 

Appellate Case: 95-8030 Document: 01019279355 Date Filed: 04/24/1996 Page: 18