Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02986/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02986-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Dwayne Dunbar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2986

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Michael Dwayne Dunbar, * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

___________

Submitted: June 2, 2004

Filed: June 8, 2004

___________

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Michael Dunbar (Dunbar) pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm

transported in interstate commerce after he had been convicted of a felony, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the district court1

 found that he was subject to the

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and sentenced him to 180 months

imprisonment (15 years is the mandatory minimum) and 5 years supervised release.

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

arguing that Dunbar should not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal

Appellate Case: 03-2986 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2004 Entry ID: 1775071 
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because his prior robbery conviction was non-aggravated and thus not a predicate

offense. Dunbar has filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he argues that he was

unable to take advantage of the plea agreement originally offered by the government

because of problems with his former counsel, and that he possessed a firearm out of

fear for his life.

We agree with the district court that Dunbar’s robbery conviction was a violent

felony for purposes of section 924(e), see United States v. Leeper, 964 F.2d 751, 753

(8th Cir. 1992), and Dunbar therefore qualified as an armed career criminal. Further,

Dunbar does not have a remedy on direct appeal for the government’s withdrawal of

a plea agreement, see United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1993)

(defendant not entitled to relief based on government’s withdrawal of consent to

agreement, because either party may withdraw consent until bargain is accepted by

court), and his guilty plea forecloses any claim that he possessed the firearm in selfdefense, see United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 2001) (“valid guilty

plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects” (quoting Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d

603, 604 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Following our independent review, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we

find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-2986 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/08/2004 Entry ID: 1775071