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Parties Involved:
Michael William Gardner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

Uaicc:d SrateS Court of Appeals 

PUBLISH Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS J IJl 2 ·! 1991 

TBN'l'll CIRCUIT &OBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL WILLIAM GARDNER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-2244 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-89-517JC) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS:* 

Clerk 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Robert J. Baca, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Alonzo J. Padilla, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for DefendantAppellant. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and~' Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Michael William Gardner appeals his sentence of eighty-seven 

months imprisonment imposed pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines relating to bank robbery, after Gardner pled guilty 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-2244 Document: 01019295270 Date Filed: 07/24/1991 Page: 1 
to the crime of bank larceny. u.s.s.G. § 1B1.2(a) provides that 

"in the case of conviction by a plea of guilty .•. containing a 

stipulation that specifically established a more serious offense 

than the offense of conviction," the court must apply "the offense 

guideline •.. most applicable to the stipulated offense." 

Gardner contends that his guilty plea to bank larceny, including 

the "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Guilty Plea" did not 

contain a written stipulation establishing the more serious 

offense facts of bank robbery, and that a written stipulation as 

part of the plea agreement is required for § 1B1.2 to apply. The 

government contends that Gardner expressly agreed to a presentation of facts establishing the more serious offense of bank robbery, and an application of the Sentencing Guidelines relating to 

that offense, as part of his plea agreement. We agree, and affirm 

the sentence imposed by the district court in this case. 

Mr. Gardner was indicted, together with Clifton Mark Wiggins 

and Larry Walton, on charges of bank robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and§ 2. 

Subsequently, he entered into negotiations with the government 

with respect to a guilty plea. The negotiations centered on his 

possible status as a career offender and the effect of the status 

on potential sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines. If he was 

not classed as a career offender he was willing to plead guilty to 

bank robbery. If he was classed as a career offender, he was 

willing to plead guilty to bank larceny, but on facts supporting a 

charge of bank robbery. His aim, to which the government agreed, 

was to avoid a sentence exceeding ten years. This approach led to 

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some minor confusion in subsequent proceedings, but the underlying 

agreement was nevertheless made clear on the record. 

The negotiations just outlined resulted in a written 

"Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Guilty Plea" agreed to by 

Gardner and the government. This two-page memorandum consisted of 

five numbered paragraphs in which Gardner agreed to plead guilty 

to bank larceny, upon which the government would move for dismissal of the indictment for bank robbery. The government expressly 

declined to be bound regarding a sentencing recommendation, and 

reserved the right to "make known to the probation service of the 

Court, for inclusion in the presentence report • . • any 

information which the Government believes may be helpful to the 

Court." R. Vol. I, "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Guilty 

Plea" at par. 3(c). 

At the hearing on Gardner's guilty plea, the district court 

dwelt on the crime of bank larceny and the ten year maximum 

punishment for that crime. However, the court then elicited the 

following crucial information from the government to which 

Gardner, who was under oath, agreed: 

THE COURT: What will the government be able to 

prove if we went to trial in this matter? 

MR. BACA: Should this matter have gone to trial, 

the United States would show by competent evidence that 

on November 13th, a little before eleven o'clock in the 

morning, two white males entered the United New Mexico 

Bank, 9700 Montgomery here in Albuquerque, and one of 

the males handed the victim teller a note which said 

that the guy behind me has a gun, throw the money on the 

counter and nobody will get hurt. She put the money on 

the counter and they left the bank. 

Later on that evening a vehicle was stopped, which 

had been identified as being used in the ban~ robbery, 

and Mr. Gardner was in the vehicle, and on him were two 

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bait bills. A photo spread was shown to the victim 

teller who identified Mr. Gardner as one of the persons 

who handed her the note asking for the money. 

Q. Mr. Gardner, how do you plead to the information, guilty or not guilty? 

A. I plead guilty, your Honor. 

Q. Tell me in your own words what it is you 

understand you are pleading guilty to. 

A. That I unlawfully took money that didn't belong 

to me. I'm guilty of that. 

Q. Basically what the United States Attorney has 

said? 

A. Yes, sir. 

R. Supp. Vol. I at 12-13. 

The foregoing facts -- which establish the offense of bank 

robbery -- were subsequently recited in the presentence report. 

The report also referred to the cited exchange in open court as a 

stipulation which would authorize the court to impose a sentence 

within the Guidelines relating to bank robbery. Gardner objected. 

He stated in written objections to the presentence report that the 

written plea agreement (the "Memorandum of Understanding") did not 

contain any facts regarding the crime, and that the recitation of 

facts in open court during the plea hearing did not constitute a 

stipulation within the meaning of§ 2Bl.2(a). He argued that 

U.S.S.G. 6B1.4 governs stipulations, requires a degree of formalism and states, in commentary, that "stipulations ordinarily 

should be in writing." R. Vol. I, "Objection to the Presentence 

Report," at 4. 

The government's response to Gardner's objections outlined 

the plea negotiations and stated "an agreement Wil;S reached whereby 

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the United States at the time of the plea would state the elements 

of bank robbery, while Gardner would be allowed to plead to bank 

larceny." R. Vol. I, "Response to Objections to Presentence 

Report," at 2. The government listed Gardner's status as a possible career offender as the reason for this tactic. The government referred to the facts to which Gardner agreed at the plea 

hearing, and expressed a willingness to have the court allow 

Gardner to withdraw his guilty plea if he still disagreed with the 

facts and content of the underlying agreement. The government 

also attached letters from Gardner's counsel confirming the nature 

of the agreement. 

All these arguments were restated and reviewed at the sentencing hearing. Among others, the following exchange occurred: 

MR. PADILLA [Gardner's Counsel]: 

* * * 

In this case I think Mr. Gardner probably clearly 

acknowledged perhaps those facts, but in terms of what 

he plead to it was still bank larceny and there was no 

stioulation. And perhaps it's a matter of how you 

interpret a stipulation, whether it should be given a 

very strict interpretation, that is something that has 

to be in writing and proved by the parties, or perhaps 

what we find in this case. A lot of it may have to do 

with semantics and a stipulation and just something that 

might be applicable to figure out the guidelines, your 

Honor. 

THE COURT: What do you have to say, Mr. Baca? 

MR. BACA: Your Honor, the reason that happened was 

because we both understood that he would be a career 

offender and he would be sentenced under bank larceny. 

If he wasn't, it would give bank robbery facts. In case 

he wasn't a career offender he would be sentenced to 

bank larceny [sic] like the other two codefendants. 

That was the whole agreement we had, my understanding of 

the agreement, and I thought that is what he understood 

based on the correspondence I gave the Court as far as 

his record. And if there is confusion I would rather 

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have him withdraw his plea and try him whenever the 

Court wants, but I don't think he should be allowed to 

be sentenced on bank larceny when the two defendants got 

bank robbery and had lesser rap sheets than he had. And 

that was the entire agreement. I think I gave it to the 

court prior to the plea being taken. We asked the Court 

to take a conditional plea. 

MR. PADILLA: Your Honor, I don't want to dispute 

that. There was correspondence going back and forth 

between -- I will say my office and Mr. Baca, because I 

think one of the letters was from me and one might have 

been from Susan Weeks, my associate, and conversations 

back and forth. And I think the initial concern was the 

fact that he would be classified as a career offender, 

if he either went to trial and was convicted of bank 

robbery or if he plead guilty to bank robbery, and that 

was the concern at that time. 

THE COURT: Well, under bank larceny he can get up 

to ten years. Under bank robbery he can get up to 20 

years. I intend to sentence him to less than ten years. 

I don't know whether that makes any difference or not. 

MR. BACA: The agreement was at one time, I recall, 

as long as he stayed under the cap of ten years we had 

an agreement. That was his concern. 

THE COURT: In his letter -- that is what Susan 

Weeks' letter says. 

MR. PADILLA: I am not going to deny that. That 

was the conversations that took place and the letters 

that went back and forth. There is still a question 

about the stipulation. It may not make any difference 

with regard to the guidelines, but I think Mr. Gardner's 

concern when he saw the presentence report, because I 

took it up to Santa Fe for him to review it, is he saw 

the word stipulation and he says, wait a minute, I don't 

remember stipulating to --

THE COURT: I don't quite see that it is an oral 

stipulation. I guess in a sense you could call it that, 

but what it is is you just worked out a deal and you 

can't change the facts. In other words, it's bank robbery and not bank larceny. But I am going to find 

against you on your objections. 

However, it does bother me, and if your client 

wants to withdraw his plea and go to trial, as the 

United States says, I would probably look favorably on 

that. 

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MR. PADILLA: Your Honor, we have discussed that 

and it is his feeling that he will go with what the 

court rules, but that he does not want to withdraw his 

plea, your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. I will rule against you on 

all of your objections. There is no need for an 

evidentiary hearing. They are all questions of law. 

R. Supp. Vol. II at 20-23 (emphasis added).l The objections in 

question in the foregoing exchange went to the proviso in 

§ 1Bl.2(a). It appears to us that Gardner's counsel in effect 

either waived the objections or agreed with the court's 

interpretation and disposition. 

DISCUSSION 

We apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law 

relating to interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines, and a 

clearly erroneous standard to factual determinations made by the 

district court. 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e). See United States v. 

Shewmaker, (lOth Cir. Nos. 90-3207 and 90-3215, filed June 24, 

1991): United States v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349, 351 (lOth Cir. 

1991) (citing United States v. Smith, 900 F.2d 1442, 1445 (lOth 

1 At the hearing on Gardner's plea of guilty, his counsel, Mr. 

Padilla, confirmed the reason for a plea on larceny, but with bank 

robbery facts: 

It was an interesting type of situation where we 

did, or I had my client sign what the probation 

authorities call a Form 13 which allows a report to be 

prepared prior to the plea, and that was why we were 

going back and forth in terms of a plea, bank larceny or 

bank robbery, because it was a question about whether or 

not he was a career offender. So some of the 

preliminaries have been already done. I wanted to bring 

that to the court's attention. 

R. Supp. Vol. I at 14-15. 

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Cir. 1990) and United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1163 (lOth 

Cir. 1990)); United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1560 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 88 (1990); United States v. 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. 

Ct . 3 3 0 2 ( 19 9 0 ) . 

Here, the district court found that the facts of record, that 

is, the admission in the plea hearing, established "bank robbery 

and not bank larceny." R. Supp. Vol. II at 23. That finding is 

not clearly erroneous. The question is whether Gardner's admissian constituted a "stipulation" for purposes of u.s.s.G. 

§ lBl. 2 (a). 

Section 1Bl.2(a) provides: 

Determine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two 

(Offense Conduct) most applicable to the offense of 

conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the 

count of the indictment or information of which the 

defendant was convicted). Provided, however, in the 

case of conviction by a plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere containing a stipulation that specifically 

establishes a more serious offense than the offense of 

conviction, determine the offense guideline section in 

Chapter Two most applicable to the stipulated offense. 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 

1990). 2 

The circuits dispute the nature of the "stipulation" required 

in§ 1Bl.2(a). Compare United States v. Braxton, 903 F.2d 292, 

298 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that an oral stipulation at a plea 

hearing is sufficient), rev'd on other grounds, with United States 

2 The Commentary, Application Note 1, makes clear that the 

sentence on the more serious offense established by the stipulated 

facts is limited to the maximum authorized by the statute under 

which the defendant is convicted. In this case, that maximum was 

ten years, as contemplated by the parties in the~r plea 

negotiations. 

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v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 816, n.4 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that 

stipulation must be part of a plea agreement but passing on the 

question whether or not it must be written) and United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1561 (stipulation must be part of a plea 

agreement between government and defendant). The Supreme Court 

recently reviewed the decision of the Fourth Circuit in United 

States v. Braxton, but expressly declined to clarify the dispute 

regarding the meaning of "stipulation" under § 1B1.2(a) on the 

grounds that the United States Sentencing Commission had "undertaken a proceeding that will eliminate circuit conflict over the 

meaning of § 1B1.2 •... " Braxton v. United States, 1991 WL 

84633, *2 (U.S.). To date, the commission has neither submitted 

any proposed amendment of § 1B1.2(a) to Congress nor issued any 

other clarification, and we have no way of knowing when and if 

such a clarification will issue. 

However, applying even the most restrictive circuit's 

interpretation of the proviso in § 1B1.2(a) would not alter the 

result in this case. No circuit has explicitly held that the 

stipulation under § 1Bl.2(a) must be written, and we are confident 

that application of the proviso does not turn on such a technical 

use of the word "stipulation." The essence of a stipulation is an 

agreement. Thus, as we have held, application of the proviso 

turns on whether there was a knowing agreement by the defendant, 

as part of a plea bargain, that facts supporting a more serious 

offense occurred and could be presented to the court for application of guidelines relating to the more serious offense. United 

States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1561; see also United States v. 

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McCall, 915 F.2d at 815. That is just what happened here. When 

Gardner's objection to the presentence report was aired during the 

sentencing hearing, the district court not only found that bank 

robbery facts had been agreed to in open court at the time of the 

hearing on Gardner's plea agreement, the court also offered to let 

Gardner withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial if he disputed 

the existence of the agreement with respect to the more serious 

offense. At that time Gardner's counsel stated on the record: 

"We have discussed that and it his feeling that he will go with 

what the court rules, but that he does not want to withdraw his 

plea, your Honor." R. Supp. Vol. II at 23. The court then 

stated: "All right, I will rule against you on all of your objections. There is no need for an evidentiary hearing." Id. It 

could not be more clear that Gardner, through his counsel, 

assented to the applicability of the proviso under § 1B1.2(a) in 

the sentencing proceedings. The district court gave him every 

opportunity to withdraw the plea agreement if any confusion or 

doubt remained on that point, and the offer was rejected. 

Under the circumstances, this case satisfies every circuit's 

definition of "stipulation" under § 1B1.2(a). It was a "'quid pro 

quo' for the Government's agreement not to charge a higher 

offense." Braxton v. United States 1991 WL 84633, *2. At the 

critical point of sentencing, Gardner knew exactly what the provisions of his plea negotiation with the government entailed and he 

received the benefit of his bargain at that time, i.e., a ten-year 

cap on the potential sentence. Had he withdrawn his plea, the 

government would have proceeded on the bank robb~ry charge and 

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Gardner would have been exposed to both a more serious conviction 

and a much higher sentence. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly applied 

the Sentencing Guidelines in imposing sentence on Gardner, and the 

sentence is AFFIRMED. 

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