Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-19-10944/USCOURTS-ca11-19-10944-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Birmingham Police Department
Appellee
City of Birmingham, Alabama
Appellee
Club Atlantis
Appellee
Dewayne Howard
Appellant-Cross Appellee
Mario Martin
Appellee-Cross Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-10944

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00355-MHH

MARIO MARTIN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant,

versus

SERGEANT DEWAYNE HOWARD, 

 Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee,

CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA,

BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants-Cross Appellees.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(January 10, 2020)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

Dewayne Howard, a retired Sergeant with the Birmingham Police 

Department, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for summary 

judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Separately, Mario Martin crossappeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of 

Birmingham, Alabama, and the denial of his motion for leave to amend his 

complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

qualified immunity and dismiss Martin’s appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

Mario Martin is a concert and event promoter. He scheduled a performance 

by the rapper “Yo Gotti” at the Bill Harris Arena in Birmingham, Alabama, but a 

last-minute change forced him to change the venue to the Club Atlantis. However, 

Yo Gotti failed to show and the gathered audience grew restless and angry. 

Martin, along with his associates, attempted to leave the Club and return to the 

hotel to ascertain the nature of the rapper’s absence. 

At this point, Martin alleges that he was stopped by several off-duty officers 

with the Birmingham, Alabama, Police Department, who had been contracted by 

the Club to provide security. The officers prevented Martin from leaving and 

demanded that he pay them for their security services. A disagreement ensued as 

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to whether Martin or the Club were responsible for paying the officers. The 

officers informed Martin that if he did not pay them, he would be charged with 

nine counts of theft of services—one count for each of the unpaid officers. 

Martin’s attempts to include Jeremy Cooper, the manager of the Club, in the 

discussion proved fruitless, and he surrendered to the officers the $200.00 he had 

with him. When this proved unsatisfactory to the officers, Martin telephoned one 

of his associates, who provided him with another $400.00, which he provided to 

the officers, again, not satisfying them.

It was at this point that Sergeant Dewayne Howard arrived on the scene. 

Howard became aware that many of his officers had been dispatched to the Club 

and, curious as to the reason for the en masse dispatchment, decided to investigate 

himself. Upon arriving, Howard discovered that the crowd, restless and upset at 

the performer’s cancellation, had started fighting, which precipitated the 

dispatches. The officers met Howard at the scene and informed him that Martin 

had not paid them, so Howard confronted Martin about the matter. Martin alleges 

that Howard threatened that he would arrest him if Martin did not pay the officers. 

In response, Martin agreed to pay the officers from his percentage of the event’s 

bar sales, an amount totaling about $575.00. Howard and the officers then allowed 

Martin to address the crowd to inform them that their tickets would be refunded. 

After Martin returned, Howard agreed to escort Martin from the venue.

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Martin followed up with the police department, filing complaints alleging 

that his money had been taken from him by police officers. The police department 

tasked an internal affairs investigator with investigating Martin’s allegations. The 

investigator determined that Martin was not detained and that the officers had not 

threatened him with criminal charges if he did not pay them. The investigator 

ultimately concluded that Martin’s complaint was not supported by the available 

evidence and did not discipline any of the officers alleged to have been involved.

On February 29, 2016, Martin filed the instant case in federal court against 

the City of Birmingham, the Birmingham Police Department, Sergeant Howard, 

the unknown officers, and the Club. Martin’s complaint included a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from unreasonable seizures; a section 1983 claim against the City for failure to 

train, supervise, or discipline its officers; a § 1985 conspiracy claim against all 

defendants; an unjust enrichment claim against all defendants; and a negligence 

and wantonness claim against all defendants. Later, Martin sought to amend his 

complaint to add the names of the previously unknown officers, which the district 

court denied. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all 

of Martin’s claims except for his section 1983 claim against Howard and his claims 

for unjust enrichment and negligence and wantonness against the Club. Howard 

timely appealed to us. Martin cross-appealed the district court’s grant of summary 

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judgment to the City on Martin’s section 1983 claim and its denial of his motion 

for leave to amend his complaint. We address each in turn.

II. HOWARD’S APPEAL

We review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. Nolin 

v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000). We begin by resolving “all issues 

of material fact in favor of the plaintiff” and then “answer the legal question of 

whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the 

facts.” Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary 

functions” from suit “unless the conduct which is the basis for the suit violates 

‘clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.’” GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 

1366 (11th Cir. 1998) (alteration omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 

800, 818 (1982)).

We begin by determining whether the official in question was performing a 

discretionary function. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 

2004). Because Sergeant Howard was indisputably acting within his discretionary 

authority at the time of the conduct in question, the burden shifts to Martin to 

prove that Howard is not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified 

immunity. Id. To succeed, Martin must demonstrate that (1) Howard violated his 

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“constitutional rights” and that (2) those rights “were clearly established at the time 

of the putative misconduct.” Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 790 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (alteration omitted) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226 

(2009)). We are free to decide these inquiries in either order, depending on what 

makes the most sense in the circumstances before us. See Callahan, 555 U.S. at 

236.

Here, we start with Martin’s claim that Howard violated his constitutional 

rights. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. Jones, we “take, as 

given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment.” 

515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995). The district court indicated that

Mr. Martin maintained that Club Atlantis was supposed to pay the offduty officers. Mr. Martin did not have a written agreement with Club 

Atlantis, so Mr. Martin’s dispute with Mr. Cooper amounted to a he 

said, [s]he said disagreement. According to Mr. Martin, Sergeant 

Howard credited Mr. Cooper’s version of events and told Mr. Martin 

that if he did not pay the officers within 15 minutes, he would go to jail.

District Court Order, Doc. 66, at 16. Martin argued before the district court that 

this conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He argued, inter alia, that 

Howard violated his Fourth Amendment rights when Howard seized his property 

by threatening him with arrest to compel the seizure. The district court agreed with 

Martin. It determined that a jury “reasonably could conclude that Sergeant 

Howard violated Mr. Martin’s Fourth Amendment rights when he conditioned Mr. 

Martin’s release from detention on Mr. Martin surrendering his money to the offUSCA11 Case: 19-10944 Date Filed: 01/10/2020 Page: 6 of 14
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duty officers.” The district court then concluded that this right was clearly 

established at the time of the incident, citing our cases applying the Fourth 

Amendment and our opinion in Wright v. Sheppard, in which we held, “If an 

officer departs from the role of a neutral law enforcement officer by attempting to 

enforce a private debt collection, and engages in conduct that effectively 

intimidates an alleged debtor into refraining from exercising her legal rights, then 

the officer exceeds constitutional limits on his authority.” 919 F.2d 665, 673 (11th 

Cir. 1990) (citing Booker v. City of Atlanta, 776 F.2d 272 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

Howard contends that this was incorrect. We disagree. 

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A seizure of property occurs when there is a 

‘meaningful’ interference with a person’s possessory interest in it. Generally, the 

seizure of personal property is per se unreasonable when not pursuant to a warrant 

issued upon probable cause.” Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1136 (11th Cir. 

2018) (citing United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007)). 

Though there are several exceptions to this “general rule,” they largely relate to 

seizure of property in the context of an ongoing law enforcement investigation. 

See generally Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (noting the exigent 

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement).

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It is clear to us that at the time of Martin’s seizure, he had a constitutional 

interest in his property—that is, the $575.00 he paid to the officers after Howard’s 

threat. And when Howard directed Martin to give the officers his property, 

Howard effectively “seized” the property within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. At the time of this seizure, Howard was not operating pursuant to a 

warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, as the Fourth Amendment 

requires. Nor were “exigent circumstances,” such as the imminent destruction of 

evidence, present that would justify Howard’s warrantless seizure. Indeed, the 

currency that Martin held, and then surrendered upon threat of arrest, at the time of 

the incident was not evidence in any sense of the word—rather, it was Martin’s 

personal property, to which the off-duty officers, rightly or wrongly, felt they were 

entitled. We conclude, therefore, that Howard violated Martin’s constitutional 

rights.

Our inquiry does not end here. We must next consider whether Martin’s 

constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident. As we 

have previously held

[a] right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in 

one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly 

establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle 

within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a 

constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional 

right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.

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Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(citations omitted). A broad statement of principle “may give notice to officers, 

provided that the decisions clearly apply to the situation at hand” and that it is 

“specific enough to give the officers notice of the clearly established right.” 

Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005).

We conclude that our holding in Wright—that an officer exceeds the 

constitutional limits on his authority by attempting to enforce a private debt 

collection—was sufficient to put Howard on notice that his actions violated 

Martin’s clearly established rights. As we have explained, “[e]xact factual identity 

with a previously decided case is not required,” so long as the available law 

provided the official with “fair warning” that his conduct violated the constitution. 

Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation 

omitted). We conclude that the requisite “fair warning” existed here. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s order as to this issue.

III. MARTIN’S CROSS-APPEAL

In addition to defending the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to 

Sergeant Howard, Martin also cross-appeals the district court’s decisions to 

(1) deny his motion to amend his complaint and (2) its grant of summary judgment 

to the City of Birmingham. Before reaching the merits of Martin’s arguments, “we 

have a special obligation to satisfy ourselves . . . that we have jurisdiction” to do 

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so. See Tamiami Partners, Ltd. by & Through Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee 

Tribe of Indians, 177 F.3d 1212, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions” issued by district courts. “As a 

general rule, an appeal may be taken . . . only where the district court has disposed 

of all claims against all parties.” Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 

1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th 

Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added).

The exceptions to this rule are narrow and well-delineated. As we have 

routinely explained, denials of qualified immunity fall within the collateral order 

doctrine—so long as “the disputed issue involves whether or not the defendant’s 

conduct constitutes a violation of clearly established law”—and public officials 

“may appeal such a decision because it is considered a final, collateral order 

regarding qualified immunity.” Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 

1996) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985)). Accordingly, 

Howard’s appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity is properly 

before us, even though it is not a “final judgment” under section 1291, because it is 

an appeal in which the “disputed issue involves whether or not the defendant’s 

conduct constitutes a violation of clearly established law.” Johnson, 74 F.3d at 

1090. 

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Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 carves out a discrete exception 

in an action that “presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple 

parties are involved.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). In that case, “the court may direct 

entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties 

only if the court expressly determines that there is no reason for delay.” Id. If not, 

any order “that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or rights and liabilities of 

fewer than all the parties does not end the action . . . and may be revised at any 

time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ 

rights and liabilities.” Id. As we have explained, 

An order is appealable under Rule 54(b) when three conditions are 

satisfied. First, the order must be “final,” as traditionally defined under 

section 1291, as to one or more, but fewer than all, of the multiple 

claims or parties. Second, if the order is final as to a claim or party, the 

district court must direct entry of judgment. Third, the district court 

must expressly determine that there is no just reason for delay.

Mathis v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). In other 

words, as our sister circuit explained, “an order which disposes of one or more 

parties or claims but does not end the litigation must either be certified as final 

pursuant to Rule 54(b) or be disposed of with the remainder of litigation at the 

conclusion of the entire case in compliance with Rule 58.” Willhauck v. Halpin, 

919 F.2d 788, 793 (1st Cir. 1990).

Here, the orders denying Martin’s request to amend his complaint and 

granting the City of Birmingham summary judgment on Martin’s section 1983 

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claim, which he cross-appeals to us, were not expressly certified as a “final 

judgment” in compliance with Rule 54(b). Accordingly, we may only hear them if 

they fit within our pendent appellate jurisdiction.

“Under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine, we ‘may address 

otherwise nonappealable orders if they are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an 

appealable decision or if ‘review of the former decision is necessary to ensure 

meaningful review of the latter.’” Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 

2000) (cleaned up) (quoting Summit Med. Assoc., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1325, 

1335 (11th Cir. 1999)). A nonappealable order is “inextricably intertwined” with 

an appealable order only if determination of the pendent issue is “essential to the 

resolution of properly appealed collateral orders.” Swint v. Chambers Cty. 

Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995) (quotation omitted).

We conclude that we do not have pendent appellate jurisdiction over 

Martin’s cross-appeal. The question of whether a municipality is liable for a 

section 1983 claim concerns a determination as to whether “the execution of a 

government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts [an] injury,” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 696 (1978), is entirely separate from our qualified immunity 

analysis, which questions whether an individual public official violated a plaintiff’s 

clearly established constitutional rights. See Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1292 n.1. “[T]he 

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the [municipality under Monell] . . . 

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does not fall within our pendent appellate jurisdiction” in a qualified immunity 

appeal. Id. 

Similarly, the question of whether the district court properly denied Martin’s 

motion under Rule 15(a) to amend his complaint to replace the fictitious names of 

defendants with their actual names is separate from our qualified immunity 

analysis. Determining whether the district court abused its discretion under Rule 

15(a) requires us to evaluate whether there was “a substantial reason to deny leave 

to amend,” Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988), like 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to 

the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 

amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). These questions are 

answered by looking to a party’s conduct in the course of litigation, which are 

altogether disentangled from the merits of that party’s case. In other words, the 

questions of qualified immunity and the propriety of the district court’s decision to 

not grant Martin leave to amend his complaint pull on threads of a different cloth

and are not intertwined so as to allow us to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction 

over them. Accordingly, we dismiss Martin’s cross-appeal.

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IV. SUMMARY

Our review persuades us that the district court appropriately denied Sergeant 

Howard qualified immunity and we affirm the district court’s opinion as to that 

issue. Because we determine that we are without jurisdiction to hear Martin’s 

cross-appeal concerning the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City 

of Birmingham on his section 1983 claim and its denial of his motion for leave to 

amend his complaint, we dismiss his cross-appeal.

The district court’s order is AFFIRMED. We DISMISS Martin’s crossappeal.

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