Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-15030/USCOURTS-ca9-11-15030-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Civil Rights Organizations
Amicus Curiae
Michael S. Evans
Appellee
Keelon T. Jenkins
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT MCDANIELS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD J. KIRKLAND, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-17339

D.C. No.

4:05-cv-00904-

PJH

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding

KEELON T.JENKINS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL S. EVANS, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-15030

D.C. No.

3:05-cv-02003-

MHP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Marilyn H. Patel, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

June 16, 2015—San Francisco, California

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2 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

Filed December 24, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and Harry

Pregerson, M. Margaret McKeown, William A. Fletcher,

Marsha S. Berzon, Richard C. Tallman, Consuelo M.

Callahan, Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, Andrew D.

Hurwitz and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland;

Concurrence by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

Clarifying the scope of the record that federal courts may

consider in habeas cases in which certain evidence was

presented to the state trial court but not to any state appellate

court, the en banc court held that, in such cases, federal courts

may consider the entire state-court record, including evidence

that was presented only to the trial court.

Robert McDaniels and Keelon Jenkins, who were

convicted of murder in California Superior Court, and whose

convictions were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal

in 2003, filed federal habeas corpus petitions arguing that the

prosecution made racially motivated peremptory strikes, in

violation of Batson v. Kentucky, during pre-trial jury

selection.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 3

The en banc court held that the California Court of

Appeal’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). In so holding, the en banc court explained that,

in 2003, Supreme Court precedent did not require courts to

undertake a comprehensive comparative juror analysis, sua

sponte, in adjudicating a Batson claim; and that because the

trial court did not combine Batson’s second and third steps,

the California Court of Appeal could not have contravened

Batson by failing to correct a non-existent error.

The en banc court explained that a comparative analysis

of the treatment of jurors may be central to a federal court’s

review of whether a state court’s decision rested on an

unreasonable determination of facts for purposes of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2), regardless of the fact that the state court was not

required by clearly established law to perform such

comparisons. The en banc court then reaffirmed the holding

in Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013), that

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), allows federal

courts sitting in habeas to consider information that was

available to the state trial court, even if that information was

not also presented to the state appellate court.

Having clarified the scope of the record that should be

considered in determining the petitioners’ Batson claims, the

en banc court remanded the appeals to the three-judge panel

to determine in the first instance whether the failure to

conduct a comparative juror analysis resulted in an

unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning

of § 2254(d)(2).

Concurring, Judge Ikuta, joined by Judges Tallman and

Callahan, wrote that Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231

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4 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

(2005), could not and did not establish a new procedural rule

that a state court must use comparative juror analysis when

adjudicating a Batson claim; and that a failure to do so

therefore cannot result in a decision that is “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1).

COUNSEL

Jovita P. Tamor and Richard A. Tamor, Tamor & Tamor,

Oakland, Californa, for Petitioner-Appellant Robert

McDaniels.

Albert Joel Kutchins (argued), Berkeley, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant Keelon T. Jenkins.

Arthur P. Beever (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Peggy

S. Ruffra, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Gerald A.

Engler, Senior Assistant AttorneyGeneral; Kamala D. Harris,

Attorney General of California, Office of the Attorney

General, San Francisco, California, for Respondent-Appellee

Richard Kirkland, Warden.

Arthur P. Beever (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Pamela

K. Critchfield, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler,

Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D. Harris,

Attorney General of California, Office of the Attorney

General, San Francisco, California, for Respondent-Appellee

Michael Evans, Warden.

Joy G. Kim and David J. Berger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &

Rosati, Palo Alto, California; Allison Elgart and Eva

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 5

Paterson, Equal Justice Society, Oakland, California, for

Amici Curiae Civil Rights Organizations.

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

After a jury in California Superior Court convicted them

each of murder, Robert McDaniels and Keelon Jenkins

challenged their convictions in the California Court of

Appeal. McDaniels and Jenkins argued that the prosecution

had made racially motivated peremptory strikes during pretrial jury selection. They did not, however, move to place the

entire record of voir dire before the California Court of

Appeal, nor did they ask that court to perform a

comprehensive comparative juror analysis. The California

Court of Appeal affirmed their convictions. McDaniels and

Jenkins then filed federal petitions for writs of habeas corpus,

which were denied by the district court.

We took their appeals en banc to clarify the scope of the

record that federal courts may consider in habeas cases in

which certain evidence was presented to the state trial court

but not to any state appellate court. We conclude that, in such

cases, federal courts may consider the entire state-court

record, including evidence that was presented only to the trial

court. We also consider and reject Petitioners’ arguments

that the California Court of Appeal’s approach to evaluating

Petitioners’ challenges to the prosecution’s peremptory

strikes violated clearly established law. Having done so, we

return the case to the original three-judge panel to evaluate

whether, in light of the whole state-court record, the

California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioners’

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6 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

challenges to the strikes was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

I.

McDaniels and Jenkins were tried together for murder in

California Superior Court. During voir dire, the prosecution

used peremptory challenges to strike seven of ten AfricanAmerican prospective jurors from the venire. McDaniels and

Jenkins objected, arguing that the prosecution’s peremptory

challenges were racially motivated in violation of People v.

Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). Wheeler is “the

California procedural equivalent of” Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits the use of racially

motivated peremptory challenges as a matter of federal law. 

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 951 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“[A] Wheeler motion serves as an implicit Batson objection.” 

Id.

Batson requires trial courts to follow three steps in

adjudicating claims of racial discrimination during voir dire:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie

showing that a peremptory challenge has been

exercised on the basis of race; second, if that

showing has been made, the prosecution must

offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror

in question; and third, in light of the parties’

submissions, the trial court must determine

whether the defendant has shown purposeful

discrimination.

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015).

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 7

Proceeding in accordance with this framework, the state

trial court first found that the defendants had made a prima

facie showing that the prosecution had made peremptory

challenges on the basis of race. The prosecutor then offered

justifications for the four peremptory challenges, arguing that

his reasons for striking the jurors were all race-neutral. After

hearing the prosecutor’s proffered justifications, the state trial

court rejected the defendants’ Batson/Wheeler challenges. 

The trial court found the prosecutor’s reasons for the

peremptory strikes to be race-neutral, and concluded that “[i]t

didn’t appear here to be any type of racism going on.”

The trial proceeded, and the jury found McDaniels and

Jenkins guilty of murder. McDaniels and Jenkins renewed

their Batson/Wheeler claims on appeal to the California Court

of Appeal, which affirmed their convictions. See People v.

Jenkins, No. A095527, 2003 WL 22881662 (Cal. Ct. App.

Nov. 25, 2003) (unpublished).

Responding to the defendants’ argument that, generally,

“only African-American potential jurors were asked whether

they could convict even if they felt sympathetic toward the

defendants,” the California Court of Appeal observed that

“Jenkins identifies no less than six other jurors who were

queried on this point.” Id. at *4. Additionally, the court

stated that “[e]vidence supporting such ‘comparative juror

analysis’ is properly considered on appeal only if it was

presented to the trial court,” and noted that “neither [Jenkins]

nor McDaniels made this argument below.” Id. The

California Court of Appeal did not otherwise discuss

comparative juror analysis, and it appears that neither

McDaniels nor Jenkins requested that it do so.

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8 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

The California Court of Appeal actually could not have

conducted a comprehensive comparative juror analysis using

the portions of the record in its direct possession because

those portions did not include the entire record of voir dire. 

The trial judge had asked each prospective juror to complete

a written questionnaire, but the portions of the record the

parties presented to the California Court of Appeal did not

include those questionnaires. The court also lacked a

transcript of the first day of voir dire. There is no indication,

however, that anything prevented McDaniels and Jenkins

from adding this missing evidence to the record or that the

California Court of Appeal was unable to exercise its

discretion to do so sua sponte. See Cal. R. Ct. 12 (2002)

(providing a procedure for “[a]ugmenting and correcting the

record” on appeal “on motion of a party or [the reviewing

court’s] own motion”).1 On the contrary, McDaniels and

Jenkins successfully augmented the record on appeal with

other materials at least once.

McDaniels and Jenkins sought review in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied. After unsuccessfully

seeking state post-conviction review, they both then filed

federal habeas petitions reasserting their Batson claims. The

habeas petitions were assigned to different judges of the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of California. The

evidence before the federal district court included the juror

questionnaires for the seated and alternate jurors and the

transcript from the first day of voir dire, which had not been

1 Rule 12 of the California Rules of Court was renumbered as Rule

8.155 as of January 1, 2007.

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 9

presented to the California Court of Appeal.2 The district

court denied habeas relief in each case. Petitioners appealed,

and their appeals were consolidated.

The three-judge panel that initially heard this appeal held

that it could not consider the juror questionnaires or the

transcript of the first day of voir dire—even though those

materials were before the state trial court—because theywere

not presented to the California Court of Appeal. McDaniels

v. Kirkland, 760 F.3d 933, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2014). We had

previously held in an unrelated case, however, that a federal

habeas court may consider evidence that was before the state

trial court, whether or not that evidence was subsequently

presented to a state appellate court. Jamerson v. Runnels,

713 F.3d 1218, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.

Ct. 1285 (2014). Faced with this tension, we granted

rehearing en banc. McDaniels v. Kirkland, 778 F.3d 1100,

1101 (9th Cir. 2015).

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, sharply limits the

availability of federal habeas relief. We may not grant habeas

relief to “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court . . . with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the statecourt adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “(2) resulted in a

2 The questionnaires completed by venire members who were not

selected as jurors or alternates were destroyed at some point after trial.

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10 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A Batson challenge may

implicate either or both prongs of § 2254(d).

III.

We first consider whether the California Court of

Appeal’s decision was “contrary to” or “an unreasonable

application of” clearly established Supreme Court precedent

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We conclude

that it was not.

A.

Petitioners argue that the California Court of Appeal

should have augmented the appellate record sua sponte to

conduct comparative juror analysis based on the entire record

of voir dire.3In their view, the California Court of Appeal’s

failure to conduct a comprehensive comparative juror

analysis sua sponte renders that court’s decision contrary to

or an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), within

the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). We reject this argument

because no clearly established Supreme Court precedent at

3 The State perhaps could have asserted procedural default to prevent us

from reaching this argument because Petitioners did not ask the California

Court of Appeal to augment the record with the missing voir dire records

at the time of their direct appeals. Because the State has not asserted

procedural default either before the district court or on appeal, however,

we proceed to address Petitioners’ argument on its merits. See Hughes v.

Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 906 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A state

may waive procedural default by failing to raise it in federal court.” (citing

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 11

the time of the California Court of Appeal’s decision in 2003

required state courts to conduct a comprehensive, sua sponte

comparative juror analysis.

Batson itself neither engaged in nor required comparative

juror analysis. “Batson did not specify the form of the trial

court’s inquiry into the prosecutor’s motive, only that it must

‘undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and

direct evidence of intent as may be available.’” Murray v.

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Batson,

476 U.S. at 93). Indeed, Batson specifically “decline[d] . . .

to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a

defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges.” 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. Not until 2005—after the California

Court of Appeal decision at issue here—did the Supreme

Court even use comparative juror analysis to adjudicate a

Batson claim. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 

As a consequence, as to state-court decisions made prior to

Miller-El, we have “already addressed and rejected” the

argument that state courts “unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law when they declined to conduct a

comparative juror analysis.” Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d

1218, 1224 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1285

(2014).4

Petitioners nevertheless argue that Green v. LaMarque,

532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), stands for the proposition that

Batson requires comparative juror analysis. It does not. We

4 To the extent that our treatment of Miller-El in Kesser v. Cambra,

465 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), may have implied otherwise,

we now clarify that state court decisions issued prior to Miller-El did not

contravene clearly established law by declining to conduct a comparative

juror analysis.

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12 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

stated in Green that “the [state] trial court failed to undertake

‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct

evidence of intent as may be available,’ including a

comparative analysis of similarly situated jurors, as required

by clearly established Supreme Court law at the time of the

trial.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93). This

statement may have been ambiguous as to whether Batson’s

“sensitive inquiry” requires comparative juror analysis, but,

as we later explained, “the better reading of Green is that a

comparative juror analysis is one of many tools available to

undertake such a ‘sensitive inquiry.’” Murray, 745 F.3d at

1005 n.3. In Green, the state court had entirely “failed to

reach step three in the Batson analysis.” 532 F.3d at 1031. 

In explaining the state court’s error, we noted that Batson’s

third step “may include a comparative analysis of the jury

voir dire and the jury questionnaires of all venire members.” 

Green, 532 F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). This permissive

language cuts against the idea that Batson’s third step must

include comparative juror analysis. In this light, Green

stands for the proposition that a state court must evaluate a

prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral justifications for

peremptory strikes, and that this evaluation may include

comparative juror analysis—not that a state court must

conduct comparative juror analysis.5

5

In the same vein, the California Court of Appeal was not required to

augment the appellate record, sua sponte, to incorporate the entire

transcript of voir dire given that Petitioners were not at the time making

arguments that explicitly compared jurors who were stricken with those

who were not. Petitioners’ reliance on Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139,

1142–43 (9th Cir. 2006), to argue otherwise is misplaced. In Boyd, the

“[p]etitioner filed three requests to supplement the record to include the

entire voir dire transcript. . . . But the court of appeal denied [the]

[p]etitioner’s requests.” Id. Boyd has no application in cases like this one,

in which there was never an effort to place the entire voir dire transcript

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 13

Of course, the Supreme Court’s Batson jurisprudence has

evolved since the California Court of Appeal’s 2003 decision

at issue here. As the California courts have recognized, see

People v. Lenix, 187 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2008), more recent

developments in the law—most notably the Supreme Court’s

2005 decision in Miller-El—have clarified the role that

comparative juror analysis plays in the adjudication of Batson

claims. We have no need to address here the extent to which

decisions like Miller-El may have established a rule that,

when appropriatelyraised by the parties, “[c]omparative juror

analysis . . . must be considered when reviewing claims of

error at [Batson’s] third stage,” Lenix, 187 P.3d at 950, 961. 

For present purposes all that matters is that, in 2003, Supreme

Court precedent did not clearly require courts to undertake a

comprehensive comparative juror analysis, sua sponte, in

adjudicating a Batson claim.

B.

McDaniels also argues that the state trial court

impermissibly combined Batson’s second and third

steps—the prosecutor’s proffering of race-neutral reasons,

and the trial court’s evaluation of those reasons—and that the

before the appellate court, or to make arguments that required evaluation

of more of the record than was placed before it.

Had Petitioners been making arguments that required consideration

of more of the record, the California Court of Appeal’sfailure to augment

the record might in and of itself have implicated § 2254(d)(2). Flaws in

a state court’s fact-finding process may mean that the court’s decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning

of that provision. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 790–91 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014); Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1007–10

(9thCir. 2013); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000–01 (9thCir. 2004).

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14 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

California Court of Appeal contravened Batson by failing to

correct this error. We reject this argument, which reads the

state trial court’s decision too uncharitably.

Combining Batson’s second and third steps would have

been contraryto clearlyestablished Supreme Court precedent. 

See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)

(a court “err[s] by combining Batson’s second and third steps

into one”); see also McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1223

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that because “Batson [held] that

a trial court has ‘the duty to determine if the defendant has

established purposeful discrimination,’” “[a] court’s refusal

to second-guess the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising a

peremptory challenge” is contrary to Batson) (quoting

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). But we do not read the state trial

court’s ruling as having combined Batson’s second and third

steps. The state trial court clearly addressed Batson’s second

step, by finding that the prosecutor “articulated specific

reasons other than race based reasons for exercising his

peremptory challenges.” The state trial court additionally

found that there “didn’t appear here to be any type of racism

going on,” which, though laconic, addressed Batson’s third

step. It would make little sense to read this latter statement

as addressed to Batson’s second step, because whether there

actually was “any type of racism going on” in the

prosecution’s peremptory challenges is a different question

from whether the prosecution offered race-neutral

justifications for those challenges in the first place. The

fairest reading of the state trial court’s ruling is therefore that

the court did find that the prosecution’s proffered race-neutral

justifications were genuine, even if its finding was terse. We

will not strain to read the trial court’s decision otherwise, for

AEDPA “demands that state-court decisions be given the

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 15

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002) (per curiam).

Indeed, the brevity of the state trial court’s ruling at

Batson’s third step seems easier to understand when

considered in context. The trial court’s terseness in ruling on

the Batson/Wheeler challenges mirrored defense counsel’s

terseness in making those challenges in the first place. In

raising their Wheeler objections, Petitioners identified

seven African-American prospective jurors who were struck

from the venire. The prosecution then gave a series of

justifications—spanning five pages of transcript—defending

its peremptory strikes. Faced with this extended explanation,

Petitioners said almost nothing in response. Jenkins’s trial

counsel said only, “Submitted, your honor,” without making

any further argument. McDaniels’s counsel asserted that “[it]

sounded to me as if the only reason [the prosecution]

challenged [prospective juror Reeves] peremptorily was

because he was an African-American,” and also that “I saw

no hesitation when [the prosecution] asked [Reeves] those

questions,” but said little else. Given that defense counsel

said almost nothing, it is understandable that the state trial

court did not say more.

Because the trial court did not combine Batson’s second

and third steps, the California Court of Appeal could not have

contravened Batson by failing to correct a non-existent error. 

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision was

not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” clearly

established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

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IV.

Having resolved petitioners’ challenges to the California

Court of Appeal’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we

next consider whether the Court of Appeal’s decision was

based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). To be clear, our

holding that the California Court of Appeal’s failure to

conduct a comparative juror analysis did not contravene law

clearly established in 2003 does not resolve whether

comparative juror analysis may reveal that the state court’s

decision rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts

for purposes of § 2254(d)(2).

A federal court on habeas review of a Batson claim must

consider the “‘totality of the relevant facts’ about a

prosecutor’s conduct” to determine whether the state court

reasonably resolved Batson’s final step. Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986)). The prosecution’s treatment of

minority jurors as compared to its treatment of nonminority

jurors is among the facts indicative of the presence of a

purpose to discriminate. See id. at 241 (“If a prosecutor’s

proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as

well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to

serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful

discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”). 

And, because “we are separated by time and distance from

the proceedings,” this comparative analysis is often the best

if not “the only means we will have for assessing the state

court’s factfinding.” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1005

(9th Cir. 2014). A comparative analysis of the treatment of

jurors may therefore be central to a federal court’s review of

whether a state court’s findings as to purposeful

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 17

discrimination were reasonable, regardless of the fact that the

state court was not required by clearly established law to

perform such comparisons. See id.

Miller-El itself demonstrated that a comparative juror

analysis may be relevant to, if not dispositive of, a federal

court’s § 2254(d)(2) analysis in the context of a Batson claim. 

The Supreme Court therein conducted a comparative juror

analysis in the first instance in the course of analyzing the

reasonableness of the state court’s factual determinations

under § 2254(d)(2). Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240–52. These

side-by-side panelist comparisons, along with other

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, led the

Supreme Court to conclude that the state court’s finding that

the juror strikes were not racially motivated was

“unreasonable as well as erroneous.” Id. at 266.

Similarly, it is well settled in our jurisprudence that

comparative juror analysis is an important tool for assessing

the state court’s factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2).

See Murray, 745 F.3d at 1005 (“[I]n order for us to discharge

our responsibility under AEDPA to review a Batson claim

under section 2254(d)(2), we often will have to conduct a

formal comparative juror analysis[.]”). Our application of

this tool on habeas review has, in some instances, revealed

racial motivations behind peremptory strikes that

convincingly undermined the prosecutor’s stated

justifications, see, e.g., Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174 (9th

Cir. 2009), Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.

2008), and in others led us to uphold state court findings of

lack of discrimination, see, e.g., Jamerson v. Runnels,

713 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1285

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(2014); Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010);

Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2012).6

In Jamerson, we set forth the procedure through which we

carry out such a review when the state courts declined to

conduct a comparative juror analysis in the first instance. 

First, “we must perform . . . the comparative analysis that the

state court declined to pursue. Then, we must reevaluate the

ultimate state decision in light of this comparative analysis

and any other evidence tending to show purposeful

discrimination” to decide whether the decision rested on

objectively unreasonable factual determinations. Jamerson,

713 F.3d at 1225.

Our examination of the circumstantial evidence of

discriminatory intent in this case, however, would be stymied

were our review limited to the incomplete record presented to

the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, before we can conduct our

§ 2254(d)(2) analysis for the Batson claims at issue here, we

6

In each of these cases, our application of comparative juror analysis

was prompted by arguments that the petitioner made in support of his

habeas petition. It was in that context—when presented with arguments

comparing the disparate treatment of different jurors—that we stated in

Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc): “Miller-El . . .

made clear that the comparative analysis is required even when it was not

requested or attempted in the state court.” Id. at 361; see also Jamerson,

713 F.3d at 1224 (stating when presented with comparative juror

arguments that, “[a]s part of its evaluation of the prosecutor’s reasoning,

the court must conduct a comparative juror analysis—that is, it must

‘compar[e] African American panelists who were struck with those nonAfrican American panelists who were allowed to serve.’” (quotingBriggs,

683 F.3d at 1170)). Neither Kesser nor Jamerson had occasion to opine

on a situation in which comparative juror analysis was not raised by the

parties, and, because such a situation is not presented here either, we

likewise have no need to do so.

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 19

must address the question of the scope of the state-court

record that a federal court may consider in exercising habeas

review.

A.

Petitioners argue that the record we should consult in

evaluating their Batson claims includes the questionnaires for

seated and alternate jurors and the transcript of the first day

of voir dire—materials that they did not present to the

California Court of Appeal. The State disagrees, arguing that

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), forbids

consideration of materials that were not before the California

Court of Appeal. We hold that the entirety of the existing

state-court record should be considered.

In Pinholster, the Supreme Court considered whether

AEDPA “permits consideration of evidence introduced in an

evidentiary hearing before [a] federal habeas court.” 131 S.

Ct. at 1398.7 The Court concluded that it does not. Id. The

Court emphasized that the “backward-looking language” in

§ 2254(d) “requires an examination of the state-court decision

at the time it was made,” and that “[t]he federal habeas

scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts.” 

Id. at 1398–99. Based on these concerns, the Court held that

review under AEDPA “is limited to the record that was

7 Specifically, the Court considered “whether review under

§ 2254(d)(1)” permits consideration ofsuch evidence. Pinholster, 131 S.

Ct. at 1398. As we have previously recognized, however, the evidentiary

limitation described in Pinholster applies with equal force under

§ 2254(d)(2). Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 n.6 (9th Cir.

2013); see also Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 n.7.

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20 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the

merits.” Id. at 1398.

In Jamerson we examined whether Pinholster forbade us

from considering evidence that was not presented to the state

appellate court if that evidence (or equivalent evidence) had

been presented to the state trial court. Specifically, the

habeas petitioner in Jamerson asked us to consider—in ruling

on his Batson claim—“driver’s license photographs that [he]

submitted to show the race of each venire member.” 

Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226. The photographs in question

had not been presented to the California Court of Appeal. 

Instead, that court had reviewed only “the transcripts of voir

dire, which did not reveal the racial makeup of the entire jury

venire.” Id. The State argued in Jamerson that, because the

California Court of Appeal “did not know the race of each

jury venire member,” Pinholsterforbade us from considering

the photographs. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226. We disagreed,

holding that “Pinholster allows us to consider photographs

that show the racial composition of a jury venire to the extent

that those photographs merely reconstruct facts visible to the

state trial court that ruled on the petitioner’s Batson

challenge.” Id. at 1227. In other words, we held that

Pinholster allowed us to consider information that was

available to the state trial court, even if that information was

not also presented to the state appellate court.

Today we reaffirm our reasoning in Jamerson. Federal

courts sitting in habeas may consider the entire state-court

record, not merelythose materials that were presented to state

appellate courts. As Jamerson correctly explained,

“Pinholster’s concerns are not implicated” when a federal

habeas court is asked to consider evidence that was presented

to the state trial court, whether or not that evidence was

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 21

subsequently presented to a state appellate court. Jamerson,

713 F.3d at 1226–27. “Pinholster itself precluded review

only of evidence that was never revealed in any state court

proceeding,” id. at 1227, and the Supreme Court’s reasoning

counsels against extending its holding beyond that scenario. 

Pinholster turned on the observation that habeas review under

AEDPA is “backward-looking,” requiring “an examination of

the state-court decision at the time it was made.” 131 S. Ct.

at 1398. The Supreme Court thus held that “the record under

review is limited to the record in existence at that same time.” 

Id. Such backward-looking review does not limit our ability

to consider a state-trial-court record that existed at the time a

state-appellate-court decision was made.8 Nor does

consultation of that record implicate Pinholster’s broader

commitment to “ensuring that the state’s consideration of a

petitioner’s claims [a]re the ‘main event’ rather than a ‘tryout

on the road’ to federal court.” Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226

(quoting Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398–1401). That

commitment reflects a concern with the division of authority

between state and federal courts, not a concern with the

division of authority between two different state courts.

In short, as we held in Jamerson, “nothing in Pinholster

inherently limits this court’s review to evidence that the state

appellate court—as opposed to the state trial court—

considered.” 713 F.3d at 1227.

8 This is particularly true where, as here, the state appellate court could

have exercised its discretionary authority to augment the record with the

missing transcript and questionnaires. See Cal. R. Ct. 12 (2002). Our

review is no broader than the inquiry the state appellate court had the

authority and ability to conduct. Moreover, as noted above, the State has

not argued that Petitioner’s failure to ask the California Court of Appeal

to augment the record amounted to a procedural default of any claim

requiring review of the fuller record.

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B.

Having clarified the scope of the record that should be

considered in evaluating Petitioners’ Batson claims, we are

left with the need to implement this conclusion by conducting

a § 2254(d)(2) analysis based on the entire state-court record. 

At the present juncture, we decline to express an opinion as

to whether the failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis

resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts in this

case, as we find it appropriate to leave this determination to

be made by the original three-judge panel in the first instance.

“Although an en banc court takes a case, not an issue, en

banc, it has the discretion to decide the entire case or only the

parts of the case that formed the basis for the en banc call.” 

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1135 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc) (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 309 F.3d 1193,

1993 (9th Cir. 2002)). Remand to the original three-judge

panel of issues extraneous to an en banc call is at times a

useful mechanism to conserve judicial resources and achieve

an expeditious resolution of issues on appeal. Asherman v.

Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc); see

also Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320,

1326 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (returning the case to the

original three-judge panel for consideration of additional

issues raised on appeal); Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.

Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(remanding to the three-judge panel to implement the en banc

court’s conclusion); Confederated Bands and Tribes of

Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d 443, 449 (9th

Cir. 1977) (en banc) (remanding the case “to the panel before

which it initially was heard to consider the other issues

involved”). Such is the case here, where our resolution of the

narrow legal question that motivated the en banc call

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 23

broadens the factual record that remains to be evaluated. We

therefore elect to send this appeal back to the previously

assigned three-judge panel to address whether the California

Court of Appeal reasonably adjudicated Petitioners’ Batson

claims within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2).

V.

We have concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s

adjudication of Petitioners’ Batson claims was not contrary to

or an unreasonable application of Batson, or its pre-2003

progeny, within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). We have also

concluded that whether the California Court of Appeal’s

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2) would be more

appropriatelyevaluated by the original three-judge panel than

by this en banc panel, and we have clarified the scope of the

record that the three-judge panel should consider in

performing its review. We therefore return the case to the

three-judge panel for further evaluation of Petitioners’ Batson

claims. We address Petitioners’ remaining claims in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

REMANDED to the three-judge panel.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, joined by TALLMAN, and

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, concurring:

I write separately to address a question raised by the

majority: whether Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S.

231 (2005), established a new procedural rule that a state

court must use comparative juror analysis when adjudicating

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24 MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND

a Batson claim, such that a failure to do so results in a

decision that is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law” under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Maj. Op. at 13. For the reasons

explained below, Miller-El II could not and did not establish

any such rule.

AEDPA provides that a federal court may not grant

habeas relief to “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court . . . with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless

that state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). When evaluating a claim under § 2254(d)(1),

the Supreme Court has instructed us to measure state-court

decisions against rules that were clearly established by the

Supreme Court’s precedents “as of the time the state court

renders its decision.” Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44

(2011) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 

Because “‘clearly established Federal law’ in § 2254(d)(1)

‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision,’” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74

(2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000)), “it is not ‘an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply

a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by

[the Supreme] Court,” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

122 (2009) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)); see also Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2008) (indicating that a

Supreme Court rule is not “clearly established” unless it

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 25

“squarely addresses” the issues in a case or gives a “clear

answer to the question presented”).

Under this framework, a Supreme Court decision

establishes a new procedural rule binding on state courts only

if the decision (1) squarely establishes a specific legal rule,

and (2) the rule was necessary to the disposition of the case,

and therefore is not merely dictum. The Supreme Court’s

decision in Miller-El II meets neither of these requirements.

In Miller-El II, a petitioner sought habeas relief, claiming

that his Batson rights had been violated after the state court

made a “determination of fact that the State’s race-neutral

explanations were true.” 545 U.S. at 240. The Supreme

Court did not ask whether the state court’s decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Batson under

§ 2254(d)(1). Rather, the Supreme Court analyzed the claim

as a factual question under § 2254(d)(2): whether the state

court’s application of Batson had involved an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Id. Indeed, the Court stated that

the prisoner could “obtain relief only by showing the Texas

conclusion to be ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding’” under § 2254(d)(2). Id. (emphasis added). 

After making “side-by-side comparisons” of venire members

who had been struck and allowed to serve, id. at 241, the

Court determined that the state court had made an

“unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and

therefore granted the writ. Id. at 266.

Because Miller-El II considered only whether the state

court made an unreasonable factual determination, the

Supreme Court did not discuss, let alone “squarely establish,”

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a new procedural rule that state courts must conduct

comparative juror analysis when evaluating a Batson claim. 

At no point did Miller-El II suggest that the state court in that

case violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights by failing

to adhere to such a procedural rule. Accordingly, because

Miller-El II does not provide a “clear answer,” Van Patten,

552 U.S. at 126, to the question whether a state court must

conduct comparative juror analysis as part of its Batson

inquiry, we cannot hold that a state court which fails to

conduct comparative juror analysis violates clearly

established Federal law, as determined by Miller-El II.

Even if a court concluded that Miller-El II somehow

implicitly stands for the principle that state courts must

always engage in comparative juror analysis when making a

Batson inquiry, this principle would not be the Supreme

Court’s holding in that case. While the Supreme Court issued

its decision in Miller-El II in 2005, the state court rendered its

underlying decision in 1992. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 237. 

Because “§ 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts . . . to measure

state-court decisions against [Supreme Court] precedents as

of the time the state court renders its decision,” Greene,

132 S. Ct. at 44 (emphasis removed) (internal quotation

marks omitted), the Supreme Court could not have granted

the writ in Miller-El II on the ground the state court

unreasonably applied any rule created by Miller-El II. There

is no dispute that at the time of the underlying state court

decision, the Supreme Court had not enunciated a rule,

implicit or otherwise, requiring comparative juror analysis in

Batson inquiries. For this reason, the holding of Miller-El II

was that the state court made an unreasonable factual finding,

not that it violated clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. Accordingly, even if it were possible to read

Miller-El II as implicitly enunciating a procedural rule that

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MCDANIELS V. KIRKLAND 27

state courts must always engage in comparative juror analysis

when conducting a Batson inquiry, such a rule would have

been unnecessary to the Supreme Court’s disposition in that

case, and therefore not binding on state courts in the AEDPA

context. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74.

In recognition of these principles, we have held that

“Miller-El II merely clarif[ied] Batson and [did] not establish

new rules of criminal procedure.” Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d

1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006). Said otherwise, “[t]his court has

already addressed and rejected [the] argument” that a state

court’s failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

under § 2254(d)(1).” Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218,

1224 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Murray v. Schriro,

745 F.3d 984, 1005 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the habeas

petitioner’s claim that “a comprehensive, formal comparative

juror analysis” was a “ per se legal requirement of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” because

“Miller-El [II] did not establish any such principle of law”).1

This precedent is binding on any subsequent three-judge

panel.

1 At least two of our sister circuits have also reached this conclusion. 

See, e.g., Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 168, 186 (4th Cir. 2008)

(“Contrary to [the petitioner’s] belief, Miller-El II did not alter Batson

claims in any way. Miller-El II itself was a case under AEDPA, so the

Court, simply following clearly established federal law as AEDPA

requires, could not have crafted a newlegal standard.”); Murphy v. Dretke,

416 F.3d 427, 439 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that in Miller-El II, “[t]he Court

did not announce any new elements or criteria for determining a Batson

claim, but rather simplymade a final factual and evidentiary determination

of that particular petitioner’s Batson claimpursuant to the ‘demanding but

not insatiable’ standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)” (quoting

Miller El II, 545 U.S. at 240)).

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While Miller-El II did not establish a new constitutional

rule for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it did suggest

that a state court’s failure to examine comparative juror

evidence could, under some circumstances, result in an

“unreasonable determination of the facts” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). See, e.g., Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1224–25 & n.1

(citing Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.

2012); Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 2010);

and Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

For this reason, we have suggested that “California courts

may wish to revisit” their analysis of Batson claims in light

of Miller-El II, even though Miller-El II did not create a new

rule. Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 360 n.3 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc). While the failure to use comparative juror

analysis would not render a state court’s decision an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1), a state appellate court

could be objectively unreasonable in concluding that a trial

court’s credibilitydetermination was supported bysubstantial

evidence, if it failed to use this or other ordinary techniques

for reviewing the record as part of its Batson inquiry.

Because Miller-El II “only . . . clarified the extant Batson

three-step framework,” and did not “create a new rule of

criminal procedure,” Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1146, the majority

creates needless confusion by suggesting that there might be

an open question as to whether Miller-El II established a rule

that “[c]omparative juror analysis . . . must be considered

when reviewing claims of error at [Batson’s] third stage.” 

Maj. op. at 13 (quoting People v. Lenix, 187 P.3d 946, 950,

961 (Cal. 2008). There is no such open question, because it

is clear that Miller-El II established no such rule. I otherwise

concur in the majority’s opinion.

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