Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00326/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00326-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Willie M. Lambert
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

Counsel for Plaintiff requests in the Motion for Attorney’s

Fees that any sum approved be ordered paid to Plaintiff’s

attorney rather than to Plaintiff. In her Brief, counsel states

that “Plaintiff requests that any sum approved be ordered to be

paid to the attorney for the Plaintiff, Rose A. McPhillips”. 

1

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE M. LAMBERT, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 07-0326-M

 :

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of :

Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, with

supporting Brief (Doc. 22), Defendant's Notice of Intent Not to

Object to Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412

(Doc. 23), and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Notice of

Intent Not to Object to Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc.

24). After consideration of the pertinent pleadings, it is

ORDERED, without objection, that the Motion be GRANTED and that

Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA attorney's fee in the amount of

$4,069.82, plus costs in the amount of $350.001

.

Case 1:07-cv-00326-M Document 25 Filed 06/20/08 Page 1 of 8
However, there is no supporting documentation, such as a signed

fee agreement or an assignment of the fee, attached. In Panola

Land Buying Ass’n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988),

the Court stated: “It is readily apparent that the party eligible

to recover attorneys’ fees under the EAJA as part of its

litigation expenses is the prevailing party.” See also, Reeves

v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude the

EAJA means what it says: attorney’s fees are awarded to the

“prevailing party,” not to the prevailing party’s attorney.”) In

the absence of any evidence that Plaintiff assigned her right to

collect EAJA attorney fees to her attorney, the award should be

paid to Plaintiff, not Plaintiff’s attorney.

2

Plaintiff filed this action on May 9, 2007 (Doc. 1). On

January 31, 2008, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and

Order and Judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner and

remanding this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings

not inconsistent with the Orders of this Court (Docs. 20, 21). 

On April 9, 2008, Rose A. McPhillips, counsel for Plaintiff,

filed a Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to

Justice Act with supporting Brief, in which Plaintiff requests a

fee of $4,294.44 (25.8 hours at a monthly cost of living adjusted

rate for time spent in this Court) (Doc. 22). Defendant in his

Notice filed April 23, 2008, stated that he does not oppose

Plaintiff’s Motion after an agreed-upon reduction in the number

of hours claimed (Doc. 23). In Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendant’s Notice, counsel for Plaintiff acknowledged that she

had agreed to reduce her attorney hours by 1.2 hours and to use

the temporal midpoint for determining the hourly rate (Doc. 24). 

The EAJA requires a court to 

Case 1:07-cv-00326-M Document 25 Filed 06/20/08 Page 2 of 8
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award to a prevailing party ... fees and

other expenses ... incurred by that party in

any civil action ..., including proceedings

for judicial review of Agency action, brought

by or against the United States ..., unless

the court finds that the position of the

United States was substantially justified or

that special circumstances make an award

unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a

prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees within

thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days after it

is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken

pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 2632 (1993).

Defendant concedes that Plaintiff became the prevailing

party when the Court remanded this action, Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. at

2631 and that the fee application was timely filed; however, he

does not concede that his position was not substantially

justified (Doc. 23).

The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985)(EAJA), quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt,

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461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)(§ 1988). In

describing this lodestar method of calculation, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis

on which to make an initial estimate of the

value of a lawyer’s services. The party

seeking an award of fees should submit

evidence supporting the hours worked and the

rates claimed. Where the documentation of

hours is inadequate, the district court may

reduce the award accordingly. The district

court also should exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not

“reasonably expended” .... Cases may be

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the

prevailing party should make a good-faith

effort to exclude from a fee request hours

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private

practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission. In the

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an

important component in fee setting. It is no

less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are not

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 The Court, after examination of Plaintiff’s Motion and

supporting documentation, and after consideration of the

Case 1:07-cv-00326-M Document 25 Filed 06/20/08 Page 4 of 8
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reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff’s time

expended in prosecuting this action for a total of 24.6 hours is

reasonable. 

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply

in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act provides in

pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished, except that ... attorney

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125

per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special

factor, such as the limited availability of

qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a two-step

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be

applied in calculating attorney's fees under the Act.

The first step in the analysis, ... is to

determine the market rate for "similar

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and

reputation." ... The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether

the court should adjust the hourly fee

upward...to take into account an increase in

the cost of living, or a special factor.

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2

 Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp.

1997).

6

Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted & footnote omitted)2. The

applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence

that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. 

NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of

the attorney performing the work. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time claimed

seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or testimony in

support, the court may make an award on its own experience. 

Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.

1988). Where documentation is inadequate, the court is not

relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the

court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. 

Id. 

For years, the prevailing market rate in the Southern

District of Alabama has been $125.00 per hour. See e.g., Smith

v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (October 25, 2001); Boone

v. Apfel, Civil Action 99-0965-CB-L (August 30, 2001); Lee v.

Massanari, Civil Action 00-0518-RV-S (June 29, 2001); Willits v.

Massanari, Civil Action 00-0530-RV-C (May 4, 2001); and Square v.

Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (April 12, 2001). Recently, in

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3“The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living

adjustment is the temporal midpoint of the period during which

the compensable services were rendered[;] ... [t]he temporal

midpoint is calculated by computing the number of days from the

date the claim was prepared until the date of the Magistrate or

District Judge’s Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart, CA 06-

0147-C, Doc. 31, at 3.

7

an action before Judge Cassady, that rate was increased to

account for the ever-increasing cost of living. Lucy v.

Barnhart, CA 06-0147-C. In Lucy, the Court adopted the following

formula to be used in calculating all future awards of attorney’s

fees under the EAJA: “‘($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All

Items Index”, South Urban, for month and year of temporal

midpoint3)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the

month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.’” (Id. At 11,

quoting Doc. 31, at 2). The undersigned agrees with Judge

Cassady that the time has come to adjust the hourly rate and also

adopts this formula in this and future actions in arriving at the

appropriate hourly rate.

The temporal midpoint in this action was September 20, 2007,

the complaint having been filed on May 9, 2007 (Doc. 1), and the

Court having entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order and

Judgment on January 31, 2008 (Docs. 20, 21). The CPI-U for

September 2007 was 201.697. Plugging the relevant numbers into

the foregoing formula renders the following equation: $125.00 x

201.697/152.4. Completion of this equation renders an hourly

rate of $165.44. 

Case 1:07-cv-00326-M Document 25 Filed 06/20/08 Page 7 of 8
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 In conclusion, it is ORDERED, without objection, that

Plaintiff's Motion be GRANTED as set out above and that Plaintiff

be AWARDED an EAJA attorney's fee in the amount of $4,069.82,

plus costs in the amount of $350.00.

DONE this 20th day of June, 2008.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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