Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50142/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50142-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roberto Espinoza
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERTO ESPINOZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:05-CR-646

Before DeMOSS, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

At issue is whether the district court properly denied Defendant-Appellant

Roberto Espinoza’s request to represent himself under the Sixth Amendment.

We find that Espinoza did not clearly and unequivocally waive his right to

counsel. Furthermore, he engaged in obstructionist conduct—namely, his refusal

to answer the district court’s questions about his desire to proceed pro se.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 26, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-50142

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I.

The relevant facts are undisputed. In October 2005, a grand jury indicted

Espinoza with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). At a suppression hearing on

August 21, 2007, Espinoza’s attorney informed the district court that Espinoza

wished to proceed pro se. In response, the court scheduled a hearing for the next

day and instructed Espinoza’s counsel to advise him regarding the waiver of

counsel. 

At that hearing, Espinoza’s counsel assured the court that he had advised

Espinoza about the “pros and cons” of self-representation and his constitutional

right to do so and that Espinoza still wanted to represent himself. However,

when the court attempted to verify this with Espinoza, he responded with a

series of non-responsive questions: (1) “What is your name?” (2) Do you have a

claim against me?” (3) “Do you know anyone who has a claim against me?” (4)

“Is there anyone present to press the claim against me in any alleged name other

than their own?” Espinoza then asked the court to place any person present

“with a claim against him” under oath “to testify as to the damage and the

claim.” When the court denied the request, Espinoza demanded that the court

immediately “release the order of the court” to him. The court patiently

responded to each statement, indicating that it did not understand some of the

requests. The court also offered to research the issue if Espinoza submitted the

request in writing in either English or Spanish. Espinoza responded with the

same requests for testimony or an order. Each attempt to determine whether

Espinoza wanted to represent himself was met with similar non-responsive

statements. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court scheduled another

hearing for October 9, 2007.

At that second hearing, Espinoza’s counsel reiterated his client’s request

for self-representation. When the court attempted to verify that request,

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Espinoza replied with the same non-responsive statements that he had given at

the prior hearing. He also asked the court to place the federal prosecutor under

oath “to testify as to the damage in the claim.” The court denied the request and

explained that, if Espinoza continued with the obstructionist behavior,

Espinoza’s counsel would proceed at the suppression hearing that was scheduled

for the next day.

Espinoza did not request self-representation at the suppression hearing.

However, he repeated his previous requests for anyone with a “claim against

him,” including the prosecutor, to be placed under oath and made to testify. The

court denied the request.

On October 24, 2007, Espinoza filed a “Notice of Waiver of Counsel and

Entry of Appearance as Pro Se Defendant.” This document, signed by Espinoza,

states that he wishes to represent himself, but it provides no factual support for

his conclusory statements that his waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.

Problems arose the next day when the court attempted to confirm that the

written waiver was knowing and intelligent. The court asked Espinoza if he had

prepared the notice of waiver or if he had someone prepare it for him. Espinoza

responded, “Is there anyone present to press the claim against me in any alleged

name other than their own?” The court then asked, “Mr. Espinoza, let me ask

you one other time, do you wish to represent yourself.” Espinoza replied, “I

request the order of the Court be released to me immediately.” The court

repeated the question and received the same response. Faced with these

responses, the court questioned Espinoza’s competency and expressed concern

about relying on the notice of waiver. Accordingly, the court ordered a

competency exam, which concluded that Espinoza was competent to stand trial.

Months after the exam, Espinoza sent a pro se letter to the court. The

letter contained the court’s scheduling order with handwritten notes scribbled

all over it, such as “Accepted for value”; “This property is exempt from levy”; and

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“Please adjust this account, the proceeds, products, accounts and fixtures, and

release the order(s) of the court to me immediately.” Espinoza also wrote his

“employer ID #.” There is no discernable connection between the handwriting

and the order.

At the pre-trial conference on September 10, 2008, the court noted the

result of the competency exam and asked Espinoza if he still wished to represent

himself. Once again, Espinoza responded, “Is there anyone present to press a

claim against me in any alleged name other than their own?” At that point, the

court concluded that it was unable to determine whether Espinoza could actually

represent himself. Therefore, it denied the request for self-representation and

ordered Espinoza’s counsel to proceed.

The bench trial lasted one day. At Espinoza’s request and with the court’s

permission, his attorney asked the government’s witnesses only four questions:

(1) “What is your name?” (2) “Do you have a claim against Mr. Espinoza?” (3) “Do

you know anyone who does have a claim against Mr. Espinoza?” (4) “Is there

anyone present that you know of to press any claim against Mr. Espinoza and

in any name, any alleged name, other than his own.” The court found Espinoza

guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and sentenced him to a 51-month term of

imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. Espinoza

timely appealed. 

II.

We review a properly preserved Sixth Amendment challenge relating to

the right of self-representation de novo. United States v. Jones, 421 F.3d 359, 363

(5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In Faretta v. California, the Supreme Court

held that a criminal defendant has a right to represent himself, provided that

the accused “knowingly and intelligently” waives the right to be represented by

counsel. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (citations and internal quotation marks

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omitted). Such a waiver must be “clear and unequivocal,” a requirement that

this circuit has strictly construed. Burton v. Collins, 937 F.2d 131, 133 (5th Cir.

1991) (citations omitted). “Where a fundamental constitutional right, such as the

right to counsel, is concerned, courts indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver.” Id. (citation omitted). “An impermissible denial of selfrepresentation cannot be harmless.” United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d 512, 516

(5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To invoke the right, the defendant must first unequivocally inform the

court that he wishes to represent himself. Id. Then the court must hold a

hearing to determine whether the waiver was “knowing and intelligent.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). At the hearing, the court must also

determine if the defendant had waived the request through subsequent conduct,

such as obstructionist behavior. See id.; United States v. Long, —F.3d—, 2010

WL 569653, at *5 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

III.

The case boils down to this: On the one hand, Espinoza, through his

attorney, filed a notice of waiver that was unequivocal. His attorney assured the

district court that he had advised Espinoza about self-representation and that

Espinoza insisted on self-representation. A competency exam revealed that

Espinoza was competent to stand trial. On the other hand, the notice of waiver

lacked any meaningful explanation or facts that would show Espinoza truly

understood the consequences of self-representation. Moreover, throughout three

hearings, Espinoza refused to answer the district court’s simple questions

seeking to confirm his desire for self-representation. The district court patiently

asked the question numerous times and even offered to communicate with

Espinoza in Spanish. In each instance, Espinoza’s response was non-responsive.

On top of this, while the request was pending, Espinoza sent the district court

a pro se letter with nonsensical handwriting on the scheduling order. 

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No. 09-50142

 Espinoza argues that his behavior cannot be obstructionist because the district court

1

later permitted his attorney to ask the very same questions to the government’s witnesses that

Espinoza had posed to the district court. This misses the point. By responding to the district

court’s simple questions with non-responsive statements, Espinoza, in effect, refused to

answer the district court’s questions, which merely sought to confirm his request for selfrepresentation. Put differently, Espinoza’s refusal to cooperate with the district court was

obstructionist, not the questions themselves. While he may be entitled to ask these question

on cross examination, using these questions to dodge the district court’s inquiries was

improper.

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Under these circumstances, we have no difficulty holding that the district

court properly denied the request for self-representation. Given the stark

contrast between what Espinoza purportedly conveyed through his attorney (the

notice of waiver and his attorney’s in-court assurances) and what he directly

conveyed to the district court (his in-court statements and pro se letter) the

district court questioned whether something was amiss, and rightfully so. The

district court’s persistent and patient attempts to resolve this conflict, which

included three hearings and a competency exam, are commendable. Espinoza’s

responses to the district court’s diligent efforts provided ample reason to

question whether Espinoza sincerely sought self-representation. See id. at *5

(“Given his uncooperative and non-responsive nature, we believe that Long’s

prior comments [about firing his attorney] are unclear and equivocal.”).

Espinoza’s conduct also provided ample cause for concern that he would be

obstructionist if granted the right to represent himself. See id. at *5-6, 8 1

(holding that Long’s refusal to answer the judge’s questions with nothing more

than “nonsensical statement[s]” constituted obstructionist behavior that waived

the right to self-representation). In sum, the district court properly denied

Espinoza’s request to proceed pro se.

AFFIRMED.

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