Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05291/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05291-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cassandra M. Payne
Appellant
Kenneth Lee Salazar
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 10, 2010 Decided September 7, 2010

No. 09-5291

CASSANDRA M. PAYNE,

APPELLANT

v.

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-00164)

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellant.

Christian A. Natiello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This case raises an important

and largely undecided issue under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The government

contends that a federal employee who wins one Title VII claim

before her agency, but loses another, must put the first at risk in

order to seek relief on the second in federal court. Finding no

basis for the government’s interpretation of the statute, we reject

that contention.

I

In Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 468-470 (D.C. Cir.

2005), we explained the relevant statutory and regulatory

framework. Before filing suit, a federal employee who believes

that her agency has discriminated against her in violation of

Title VII must first seek administrative adjudication of her

claim. Id. at 468; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Under

regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) pursuant to Title VII, the employee must

do so by filing a complaint with her agency. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1614.106(a). The employing agency then conducts an

investigation and, if the employee so requests, refers the matter

to an EEOC administrative judge for a hearing. Id.

§§ 1614.106(e)(2), 1614.108-09. After the employing agency

investigates, or the administrative judge issues a decision, the

employing agency must take “final action.” Id. § 1614.110. If

the employee never requests a hearing, the agency’s final action

must “consist of findings . . . on the merits of each issue . . . and,

when discrimination is found, appropriate remedies and relief.” 

Id. § 1614.110(b). If the employee requests a hearing, the

employing agency’s “final order shall notify the complainant

whether or not the agency will fully implement the

administrative judge’s decision.” Id. § 1614.110(a). An

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employee who is aggrieved by the agency’s final disposition of

her complaint may then either appeal to the EEOC or file suit in

federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Id.

§ 1614.110. 

Cassandra Payne has been employed by the Department of

the Interior since 1978. From April 1984 until June 2000, she

worked as a tractor operator at Rock Creek Park in Washington,

D.C. During that period, she worked Monday through Friday

and was able to attend church and Bible study on the weekends. 

In June 2000, Payne suffered a nearly-fatal allergic reaction to

a bee sting. When she recovered, the Department reassigned her

to work indoors Wednesday through Sunday at the Rock Creek

Nature Center. From June 2000 through May 2004, Payne

repeatedly asked her supervisor for weekends off so she could

attend church and Bible study. All of her requests were denied.

In September 2004, Payne filed an Equal Employment

Opportunity (EEO) complaint with the Interior Department

alleging religious discrimination. Later in September, Payne

alleges, her supervisor retaliated against her for filing the EEO

complaint by giving her a minute-by-minute work schedule,

forbidding her to have breakfast with co-workers, and denying

her leave. Based on that allegation, Payne filed a retaliation

complaint, which the Department consolidated with her

discrimination complaint.

On September 18, 2007, an EEOC administrative judge

found that the Interior Department had discriminated against

Payne on account of her religion. The administrative judge also

found, however, that the Department had not retaliated against

her for filing a complaint. In October 2007, the judge entered an

order for monetary damages on the discrimination charge, which

the Department paid in December 2007.

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In January 2008, Payne filed suit in district court alleging

a single claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a), based on the same retaliatory conduct initially

alleged in her 2004 EEO complaint. In July 2008, Payne

amended her suit to add a second retaliation claim based on the

Interior Department’s refusal in January 2008 to assign her

light-duty work after she returned from an extended medical

leave for a bad back. On June 22, 2009, the district court

granted the Department’s motion to dismiss Payne’s suit

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Payne v.

Salazar, 628 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2009). 

The court dismissed Payne’s first retaliation claim on the

ground that she did not also sue on the discrimination claim she

had won before the EEOC administrative judge. According to

the court, “a federal employee who obtains a final administrative

disposition that finds discrimination . . . as to a portion of the

allegations in the EEO Complaint, may [not] challenge in

federal court just those liability findings by the EEOC that are

unfavorable to the employee . . . while preserving those liability

findings that are favorable to her.” Id. at 45-46. Because Payne

sought review only of the claim she lost before the

administrative judge, the court dismissed her suit for “failure to

state a claim.” Id. at 52.

The district court also dismissed Payne’s second retaliation

claim -- which was based on the Interior Department’s January

2008 refusal to assign her light-duty work -- for failure to

exhaust her administrative remedies. Payne conceded that she

had not filed this claim with the Department, but contended it

was unnecessary to do so because the claim was “like or related

to [her September 2004] administrative complaint.” Id. at 51. 

The district court rejected that contention, holding that a “‘Title

VII plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative

remedies with respect to each discrete allegedly discriminatory

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or retaliatory act.’” Id. (quoting Wada v. Tomlinson, 517 F.

Supp. 2d 148, 183 (D.D.C. 2007)). Payne timely appealed the

dismissal of both claims.

II

This court reviews de novo a dismissal for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,

529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We consider Payne’s

first claim in Part II.A and her second in Part II.B.

A

The district court dismissed Payne’s first retaliation claim

because she did not also sue on her successful discrimination

claim. The government contends that this result is dictated by

“the plain language” of Title VII, which assertedly makes clear

that federal court review of a final agency decision regarding an

employee’s EEO complaint “is an all-or-nothing proposition.” 

Appellee’s Br. 7. We fail to discern such a proposition in the

statutory text.

1. The provision of Title VII that provides federal

employees with a cause of action states: “[A]n employee

. . . aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint . . . may

file a civil action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). As the

government concedes, an employee like Payne, who did not win

all of the claims raised in her EEO complaint, is aggrieved by

that disposition. Oral Arg. Recording 9:50-9:55. At the same

time, Payne is in no sense “aggrieved by” the claim she won

before her agency, and there is nothing in the text of

section 2000e-16(c) that requires her to include that claim in a

case she files in court. This circuit, for example, routinely hears

cases brought under statutes authorizing suit by persons

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“aggrieved by” agency action.1 Petitioners in such cases

challenge only the parts of agency orders that continue to

aggrieve them, and we have never required such petitioners to

also bring before us the parts of agency orders that they do not

dispute.2

The government is correct that “the language in the statute

explicitly states that it is the final disposition of the complaint

that is actionable; not of the individual claims therein.” 

Appellee’s Br. 7. But this only means that the employee cannot

sue until the agency takes final action on all of the claims

contained in her administrative complaint. Cf. Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (authorizing judicial review of

“final agency action”); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (authorizing appellate

review of “final decisions of the district courts”). Section

2000e-16(c) does not say that, once the agency has finally

disposed of the complaint, the employee must then file that same

1

See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A

person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely

affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a

relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); Securities Act

of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (“Any person aggrieved by an order of the

[Securities and Exchange] Commission may obtain a review of such

order . . . in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia.”); Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2344 (“Any party aggrieved by [a] final order [of specified agencies]

may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order

in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”).

2

See, e.g., Guard Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53, 58 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (reviewing an employer’s challenge to only the unfavorable

portions of an NLRB ruling); Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 462

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (reviewing one of three parts of an SEC ruling); CF

Indus. Inc. v. STB, 255 F.3d 816, 819 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reviewing

only those parts of the STB’s ruling that the petitioner appealed).

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“complaint” in court. Instead, it says that she may then file a

“civil action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure

in all civil actions” in federal district courts. FED R. CIV. P. 1. 

Federal Rule 2 states that there is only “one form of action -- the

civil action,” and Rule 3 provides that a “civil action is

commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Rule 8 --

which governs the content of such a complaint -- requires only

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Nothing in the Federal Rules

suggests that the “complaint” filed in federal court must include

all the claims the plaintiff previously raised in a complaint she

filed with her agency -- let alone those that were satisfactorily

resolved in her favor. Indeed, a complaint filed in federal court

cannot include the latter because “a plaintiff must demonstrate

standing for each claim he seeks to press,” DaimlerChrysler

Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006), and standing requires

that the plaintiff “suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

Notwithstanding the way in which the government has

framed the issue, it is not really arguing that an employee’s civil

action must include a claim as to which she does not believe

herself aggrieved. Rather, the government is effectively arguing

that, if the employee wants relief on a claim she lost below, she

must permit the agency to withdraw its final action on the claim

she won, requiring her to prove it again in court. See Appellee’s

Br. 15 (“Payne could bring her retaliation claim if she also

br[ings] her discrimination claim and returns the award that was

already recompensed to her as a result of her EEO complaint.”). 

But there is nothing in the statute upon which the government

can hang such a construction. To the contrary, section 2000e16(c) authorizes the employee to file in federal court after “final

action taken by a department [or] agency.” Nothing in the

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statutory language renders such “final” agency action nonfinal

merely because the employee files a civil action.

 We note that the government’s construction of the statute

effectively gives it complete control over the scope of an

employee’s access to the courts. In this case, for example,

Payne filed two separate EEO complaints: the first asserting

discrimination and the second asserting retaliation. Had the

complaints remained separate, even the government’s

construction would have permitted Payne to file a civil action

limited to the retaliation complaint. See Oral Arg. Recording

23:28-23:37 (acknowledgment by government counsel). It is

only because the agency consolidated the complaints, and then

issued a single disposition, that the government contends Payne

must sue on all her claims or none of them. Id. at 21:08-21:19. 

Moreover, because EEOC regulations require consolidation in

all cases, even when the complaints are unrelated,3 the

government’s view ensures that every complainant who wins a

partial victory will face the litigation parameters upon which the

government insists. As the government acknowledges, however,

no statutory provision requires the consolidation of separate

complaints of discrimination (or retaliation). Oral Arg.

Recording 20:58-21:07. And nothing in the language of section

2000e-16(c) suggests that the government’s decision to combine

two complaints into one should govern the scope of an

employee’s subsequent lawsuit. 

3

See Appellee’s Br. 6 (“If a complainant files more than one

complaint, the EEO is required to consolidate them, even if the

complaints are unrelated.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.606); see also

EEOC, EEO Management Directive 110, at 5-13 & n.4 (Nov. 9, 1999)

(requiring consolidation of an employee’s complaints, “[e]ven if the

complaints are unrelated,” because “their resolution in a single

proceeding will make better use of agency and Commission

resources”).

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2. In adopting the government’s construction of the statute,

the district court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s

determination, in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976),

that the “civil action” referred to in section 2000e-16(c) is a

“trial de novo.” 425 U.S. at 846; see id. (holding that “federal

employees are entitled to a trial de novo of their employment

discrimination claims”). Reasoning that “a trial de novo is

generally understood to mean a de novo judicial examination of

the entire case,” the district court concluded that “[p]ermitting

Plaintiff to obtain partial de novo review on only some issues

. . . is inconsistent with this definition.” Payne, 628 F. Supp. 2d

at 50. This reading misapprehends what the Supreme Court

meant by “trial de novo.”

In Chandler, the plaintiff lost a discrimination claim in an

agency adjudication and then brought suit in federal court

pursuant to section 2000e-16(c). The district court rejected her

motion for discovery, holding that a “trial de novo is not

required . . . in all cases” and that “review of the administrative

record is sufficient if an absence of discrimination is

affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence in

the record.” 425 U.S. at 843 (quotation marks omitted). 

Concluding that the administrative record affirmatively

established the absence of discrimination, the district court

granted summary judgment for the defendants without

conducting a trial, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id.

The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that section

2000e-16(c) gives federal employees in all cases the “right to a

trial de novo” of their Title VII claims. Id. at 848, 864. The

Court’s exploration of the legislative history of the 1972

amendments that extended the protections of Title VII to federal

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employees4 makes clear what the Court meant by that phrase. 

As the Court explained, Congress “chose to permit de novo

judicial trial of . . . complaints rather than mere judicial review

of employing agency determinations,” id. at 852, thus

“allow[ing] federal employees judicial trials rather than

‘substantial evidence’ review of administrative dispositions.” 

Id. at 858. In short, what the Court meant by “trial de novo”

was the traditional federal trial of a civil action -- in contrast to

the limited, deferential review of agency decisionmaking

afforded, for example, under the Administrative Procedure Act,

see 5 U.S.C. § 706. It did not in any way suggest that plaintiffs

in federal civil actions were required to sue on claims previously

resolved in their favor. 

In reaching the contrary conclusion in Payne’s case, the

district court cited Chandler’s statement that “‘[n]othing in the

legislative history indicates that the federal-sector “civil action”

was to have [a] chameleon-like character, providing fragmentary

de novo consideration of discrimination claims where

“appropriate,”’” and otherwise providing record review. Payne,

628 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (quoting 425 U.S. at 861). But the

“fragmentary” consideration to which Chandler objected was

not a plaintiff’s decision to sue on only some of her claims. 

Rather, it was the lower court’s view that a judge could choose

to apply de novo review in some cases and mere “record

review” in others.5

 Chandler rejected this approach, noting that

4

See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.

92-261, 86 Stat. 103.

5

As the Supreme Court noted, the court of appeals’ view was,

essentially, that:

The trial de novo is not required in all cases. . . . If [the

district court] determines that an absence of discrimination is

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Congress, “faced [with] a choice between record review of

agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial

de novo of Title VII claims,” had chosen the latter to govern in

all cases. 425 U.S. at 861.

Finally, the district court emphasized Chandler’s statement

that Congress intended federal employees to have “the same

right to a trial de novo as is enjoyed by private-sector

employees.” Payne, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (quoting 425 U.S. at

848) (emphasis added by district court). The district court

thought that “permitting a federal employee to obtain a trial de

novo only as to certain liability findings” would not give the

federal employee the “same rights,” but rather would provide

“greater rights than are available to a private sector employee.” 

Id. at 50. This was so, the court said, because “[e]mployees in

the private sector cannot obtain a legally-binding administrative

decision, and so must litigate their entire EEO complaint in

federal court if conciliation is not reached below.” Id. at 50. 

But this reads Chandler’s statement out of context. The

Supreme Court did not suggest that the 1972 amendments were

intended to equalize the position of federal and private-sector

employees in every respect,6

 but rather to ensure that the former

affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence

in the record, no new trial is required. If this exacting

standard is not met, the Court shall, in its discretion, as

appropriate, remand, take testimony to supplement the

administrative record, or grant the plaintiff relief on the

administrative record.

425 U.S. at 860-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

6

Indeed, the Court could not have made such a suggestion given

the text of Title VII. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (granting the

EEOC “authority to enforce” the federal employment provisions of

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had the same right as the latter to a trial de novo. The Court’s

exposition of the legislative history made this clear, explaining

that “equal treatment of private-sector and federal-sector

complainants” meant that both “were entitled to plenary

adjudication of their claims by a federal district court, rather

than mere appellate review on a substantial-evidence basis

following agency adjudication.” Chandler, 425 U.S. at 857.7

In sum, an employee’s right to trial de novo -- whether her

employer is the federal government or a private company --

means that she is entitled to a plenary trial of whatever claims

she brings to court. It does not mean that she must sue on

claims she has no interest in pursuing. Indeed, were we to

impose such a requirement, we would ourselves be treating

federal employees differently than private-sector employees. 

After all, Title VII does not require a private-sector employee,

who complains to her employer about two acts of discrimination

but receives voluntary recompense for (only) one, to sue on both

claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (authorizing private-sector

employees to bring civil actions for violations of Title VII).

Title VII “through appropriate remedies . . . [and to] issue such rules,

regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and

appropriate”), with id. § 2000e-5 (authorizing the EEOC to use only

“informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion” with

private employers). 

7

As the Supreme Court noted, the full text of the provision

affording federal employees the right to file a “civil action” states that

an aggrieved employee “may file a civil action as provided in section

2000e-5.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (emphasis added); see Chandler,

425 U.S. at 845. Section 2000e-5, in turn, is the civil action provision

for private-sector employees, which the Court had previously held

“accords private-sector employees the right to de novo consideration

of their Title VII claims.” Chandler, 425 U.S. at 844 (citing

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 425 U.S. 36 (1974)). 

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3. Although it acknowledges that our decision in Scott v.

Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, is not “directly on point,” the

government contends that the “general principles established” in

that case support its construction of section 2000e-16(c). 

Appellee’s Br. 9. We disagree.8

Unlike Payne, the plaintiff in Scott did not sue on a Title

VII claim that an agency had rejected. Instead, Scott sued on a

claim that the agency had accepted, challenging only the

sufficiency of the remedy the agency provided. 409 F.3d at 468. 

Scott argued that the court should defer to the agency’s liability

determination, but that it should review the remedy de novo. Id

at 469-70. We rejected Scott’s argument for two principal

reasons, neither of which casts doubt on our acceptance of

Payne’s.

First, we found it “[c]ritical” that:

[S]ection 2000e-5(g), one of the provisions applied to

federal sector suits by sections 2000e-16(c) and (d),

states: “[i]f the court finds that the respondent has

intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in

an unlawful employment practice,” it may order

various specified remedies, id. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Thus,

in a federal-sector Title VII case, any remedial order

must rest on judicial findings of liability, and nothing

in the statute’s language suggests that such findings are

unnecessary in cases where a final administrative

disposition has already found discrimination and

awarded relief. 

8

The government also cites cases from other circuits that reached

the same result as Scott. See Timmons v. White, 314 F.3d 1229 (10th

Cir. 2003); see also Laber v. Harvey, 438 F. 3d 404 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Like Scott, these cases are inapposite for the reasons discussed below.

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409 F.3d at 470-71 (second emphasis added). In short, Scott

required the plaintiff to prove liability in court, notwithstanding

the plaintiff’s success on that issue before the agency, because

Title VII expressly predicates a court-ordered remedy on a

judicial finding of liability. By contrast, in Payne’s situation

there is no statutory language that predicates a court’s decision

regarding one independent claim on its decision regarding

another.

Second, after noting Chandler’s discussion of the right of

an employee to a trial de novo, Scott held: “Under Title VII,

federal employees who secure a final administrative disposition

finding discrimination and ordering relief have a choice: they

may either accept the disposition and its award, or file a civil

action, trying de novo both liability and remedy. They may not,

however, seek de novo review of just the remedial award.” Id.

Thus, we barred a plaintiff from splitting a single claim into

separate determinations of liability and remedy, with de novo

review for the latter alone. But our opinion did not suggest that

we would also require a plaintiff to sue on a separate claim she

did not want to pursue in order to obtain relief on one she did.

4. Finally, the government warns that, “[s]hould this Court

accept [a]ppellant’s position and allow administrative

complainants to advance only the claims they find unfavorable,

a serious chilling effect on the government’s ratifying of adverse

administrative findings could result.” Appellee’s Br. 15 n.5. If

the “agency believes it is liable on one claim, but not the other,”

the government posits, “[w]hy would it rule in complainant’s

favor on the one claim for which it believes it is liable if it will

be precluded from challenging that finding in federal court?” Id. 

The government can find the answer to its question in the

inscription outside the Attorney General’s Office at the

Department of Justice: “The United States wins its point

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whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The same is true of justice

done its employees in the agencies. If an agency “believes it is

liable” on a claim, Title VII requires it to rule in the

complainant’s favor without regard to tactical litigation

considerations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e) (declaring that

“[n]othing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government

agency or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure

nondiscrimination in employment”).

B

The district court also dismissed Payne’s second retaliation

claim, which was based on the Interior Department’s January

2008 refusal to provide her with light-duty work. That claim

was neither submitted to nor ruled on by the Department, and

the court dismissed it because Payne failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Payne, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52.

As we have held and Payne concedes, Title VII

“[c]omplainants must timely exhaust the[ir] administrative

remedies before bringing their claims to court.” Bowden v.

United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see

Appellant’s Br. 14. Payne further concedes that she never filed

her second retaliation claim with the Department. Oral Arg.

Recording 3:14-3:19. Nonetheless, she contends that her civil

action is not barred, citing a line of cases that permits federal

employees to litigate unfiled claims that are “like or reasonably

related to” claims they did file with their agencies. Appellant’s

Br. 14 (quoting Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.

Cir. 1995)). The district court rejected this contention, holding

that National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.

101 (2002), invalidated those precedents. “[T]he Supreme

Court’s decision in Morgan,” the court said, “rejected the

‘continuing violation’ theory that would permit plaintiffs to

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recover for discrete acts of discrimination and retaliation that

were not exhausted but were ‘sufficiently related’ to exhausted

claims.” Payne, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (quotation marks

omitted).

We need not decide whether Morgan did in fact overtake

that line of cases because Payne acknowledges that, for a charge

to be regarded as “reasonably related” to a filed charge under

that doctrine, it must “‘[a]t a minimum . . . arise from the

administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to

follow the charge of discrimination.’” Appellant’s Br. 14-15

(quoting Park, 71 F.3d at 907) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This connection is necessary to give the agency “‘an

opportunity to resolve [the] claim administratively before [the

employee] file[s] her complaint in district court.’” Wiley v.

Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Weber

v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). But as Payne

conceded at oral argument, her claim concerning the retaliatory

conduct that took place in January 2008 could not possibly have

“arisen from the administrative investigation” that followed the

EEO complaints she filed with Interior in 2004. Oral Arg.

Recording 4:02-4:16. This is necessarily so because the

administrative investigation of those complaints ended in

September 2007, well before January 2008. Hence, Payne failed

to exhaust her second retaliation claim even on her own theory,

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and the district court was correct to dismiss that claim. See Artis

v. Greenspan, 158 F.3d 1301, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1998).9

III

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of Payne’s first retaliation claim and affirm its

dismissal of her second. 

So ordered.

9

Payne’s citation to Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of Educ., 126 F.3d 347

(D.C. Cir. 1997), does not support her contention that she should be

relieved of the obligation to exhaust her administrative remedies. 

Saksenasingh, which addressed exhaustion in the context of the breach

of a settlement agreement, did not discuss the requirement that unfiled

“Title VII claims must arise from the administrative investigation that

can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.” 

Park, 71 F.3d at 907 (quotation marks omitted).

USCA Case #09-5291 Document #1264254 Filed: 09/07/2010 Page 17 of 17