Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-18-02254/USCOURTS-ca13-18-02254-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adrian Rivera Maynez Enterprises, Inc.
Appellant
Eko Brands, LLC
Cross-Appellant
Adrian Rivera
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

EKO BRANDS, LLC,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., 

ADRIAN RIVERA,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________

2018-2215, 2018-2254

______________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Washington in No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD, 

Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue.

______________________

Decided: January 13, 2020

______________________

DAVID ALLEN LOWE, Lowe Graham Jones PLLC, Seattle, WA, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented by LAWRENCE D. GRAHAM. 

 WILLIAM A. DELGADO, Dto Law, Los Angeles, CA, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by 

ASHLEY LYNN KIRK, Willenken Wilson Loh & Delgado LLP, 

Los Angeles, CA. 

 ______________________

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2 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS.

Before DYK, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK.

Opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part filed by 

Circuit Judge REYNA.

DYK, Circuit Judge:

This case involves claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,720,320 

(“the ’320 patent”) owned by Adrian Rivera and Adrian Rivera Maynez Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “ARM”) and 

U.S. Patent No. 8,707,855 (“the ’855 patent”) owned by Eko 

Brands, LLC (“Eko”). The parties appeal and cross-appeal 

various rulings made by the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Washington in infringement 

proceedings concerning the two patents. We affirm the 

judgment of invalidity as to the asserted claims of the ’320 

patent and the award of attorney’s fees. We also affirm the 

judgment of infringement as to the asserted claims of the 

’855 patent.

BACKGROUND

I. The ’320 Patent

ARM owns the ’320 patent, which describes an adaptor 

device for use with Keurig® single-brew coffee machines or 

similar brewers. The ’320 patent describes single-brew coffee machines as generally accepting one of two cartridge 

formats: “pods,” which are “small, flattened disk-shaped filter packages of beverage extract” and “larger cup-shaped 

beverage filter cartridges.” ’320 patent, col. 1, ll. 17–21. 

The patent describes the configuration used by a particular 

type of Keurig® coffee machines (known as K-Cup® machines) as “inherently limit[ed] [to] the use of . . . cupshaped cartridges” and that users of K-Cup® machines 

“would have to purchase a different machine to brew beverage from pods.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 39–44. The ’320 patent 

describes an “adaptor assembly configured to effect operative compatibility between a single serve beverage brewer 

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[for use with cup-shaped cartridges] and beverage pods.” 

Id. at col. 1, ll. 6–9; see also Rivera v. ITC, 857 F.3d 1315, 

1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (discussing the ’320 patent in detail). 

On August 4, 2014, ARM filed a complaint against Eko 

and ten other respondents at the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) alleging infringement of claims 5–8 and 

18–20 of the ’320 patent and seeking a limited exclusion 

order and cease and desist order. In proceedings involving 

other respondents, the ITC found that claims 5–7, 18, and 

20 of the ’320 patent were invalid for lack of written description, and this court affirmed. Rivera, 857 F.3d at 

1323. However, the ITC made no invalidity determination 

concerning claims 8 and 19 (those claims had been withdrawn as to respondents other than Eko). Eko defaulted in 

the ITC proceedings with respect to ARM’s allegations that 

it infringed claims 8 and 19, and the ITC issued a limited

exclusion order and cease and desist order.

On April 2, 2015, Eko filed this action against ARM in 

the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Washington. Eko sought (1) a declaratory judgment of noninfringement as to claims 8 and 19 of the ’320 patent, and

(2) a declaratory judgment that claims 8 and 19 were invalid as obvious. ARM counterclaimed alleging infringement 

of claims 8 and 19. The district court issued a Markman

ruling construing various claim terms. Eko filed for summary judgment of noninfringement and obviousness. The

district court granted Eko declaratory judgment of noninfringement but denied Eko’s motion for summary judgment 

as to obviousness, finding that there remained disputed issues of material fact. After a five-day jury trial, the jury

found claims 8 and 19 of the ’320 patent to be invalid as 

obvious. During these proceedings, the district court 

awarded Eko attorney’s fees associated with obtaining a 

judgment of noninfringement and obviousness. ARM appeals the district court’s findings of noninfringement and 

obviousness, as well as the district court’s fee awards.

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II. The ’855 Patent

Together with its declaratory judgment claims as to the 

’320 patent, Eko asserted an infringement claim against 

ARM with respect to claim 8 of the ’855 patent owned by 

Eko, which describes a reusable filter cartridge device for 

use with single-serve beverage brewing machines. Unlike 

typical filter cartridges, which must be pierced by the beverage brewing device during operation, the device described by the ’855 patent allows for the operation of the 

brewing machine without piercing the filter cartridge, 

thereby allowing the device to be reused multiple times. 

The district court entered an order construing claim 8 of 

the ’855 patent, and ARM stipulated to infringement based 

on the district court’s claim construction. At trial, the jury 

awarded Eko compensatory damages but found that ARM 

did not willfully infringe, and the district court did not 

award enhanced damages. ARM appeals the district 

court’s judgment of infringement. Eko cross-appeals the 

jury’s finding of no willful infringement and the district 

court’s denial of enhanced damages. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.

DISCUSSION

We review the jury’s verdict for substantial evidence, 

and the jury instructions de novo. Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 

Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We 

review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 

1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “We review the district court’s 

ultimate construction de novo, and any underlying factual 

findings supporting the construction for clear error.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 

1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 

Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331 (2015)). “The ultimate determination of obviousness presents a legal question subject to de novo review, but ‘explicit and implicit’ subsidiary 

factual determinations made by the jury—including the 

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scope and content of the prior art—are reviewed for substantial evidence.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola 

Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing 

Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 

1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). We review the district court’s 

award of attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 for abuse of 

discretion. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 

572 U.S. 559, 561 (2014).

I. ARM’s ’320 Patent

A. Claim Construction

ARM argues that the jury verdict that claims 8 and 19 

of the ’320 patent were invalid for obviousness should be 

set aside because the district court erred in its claim construction, and that under the proper construction, U.S. Patent No. 3,878,722 to Nordskog (“Nordskog”) does not 

disclose a fully enclosed space and the obviousness verdict 

cannot stand. The district court construed the term “brewing chamber” in claims 5 and 18, which claims 8 and 19 

depend from, to mean “a compartment in which brewing 

occurs.” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 

2016), ECF No. 42 at 10 (“Claim Construction Order”). The 

district court explained that “[w]hile the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the word ‘chamber’ certainly conveys the idea 

of a compartment or defined area, it does not necessarily 

have to be sealed or fully-enclosed.” Id. 

ARM contends that the district court erred when it rejected ARM’s proposed construction of “brewing chamber.” 

That construction required a “sealed or fully-enclosed” 

space. ARM makes several arguments in favor of its more 

limited construction.

First, ARM directs us to two patents assigned to Keurig 

that are incorporated by reference into the ’320 patent: 

U.S. Patent No. 5,325,765 (“the Keurig ’765 patent”) and

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U.S. Patent No. 6,606,938 (“the Keurig ’938 patent”).1 

ARM argues that because these prior art references depicted enclosed brewing chambers, the term brewing chamber in the ’320 patent must also be enclosed.

Unlike the claims of the ’320 patent, the claims of the 

Keurig ’765 patent specifically describe the brewing chamber as being sealed. Keurig ’765 patent, col. 4, ll. 35–42 

(describing the brewing chamber as being defined by two 

“components,” wherein one “component which may be . . .

closed to coact in sealing engagement with [the other component defining the brewing chamber]”). The Keurig ’938 

patent includes a “brewing chamber 44,” but Figures 3 and 

4 show that the “brewing chamber” is not a fully-enclosed 

space. Thus, nothing in the incorporated patents requires 

that the term “brewing chamber,” standing alone, be fully 

sealed. In fact, they suggest the opposite—that the term 

“brewing chamber” standing alone does not require sealing.

Second, ARM argues that certain embodiments in the 

specification require us to apply ARM’s proposed construction. ARM points to passages of the patent specification 

that describe specific embodiments that have fully-enclosed structures. But ARM ignores other embodiments in 

the specification, which clearly show that a “brewing chamber” is not fully enclosed. For example, Figure 6, “a schematic illustration of a cross-sectional view of a pod brewing 

chamber of one preferred embodiment of the present invention,” ’320 patent, col. 3, ll. 37–39, depicts a “lower opening 

614,” id. at col. 7, ll. 46–47. Accepting ARM’s construction 

would exclude such a preferred embodiment from the scope 

of the claim. SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Tech., Inc., 709 F.3d 

1365, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A claim construction that 

‘excludes the preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever, 

 

1 ARM also directs us to U.S. Patent No. 5,840,189. 

Since that patent does not use the term “brewing chamber,” 

it is irrelevant here.

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correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary 

support.’” (quoting Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. 

Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). The 

specification thus supports the district court’s construction.

Third, ARM suggests that because the specification of 

the ’320 patent notes that the brewing chamber must 

“trap” hot water, it must be a fully enclosed chamber. As 

the patent makes clear, it is the “beverage packet” or “pod,”

not the brewing chamber, that traps hot water. ’320 patent, col. 1, ll. 14–17 (“Once the beverage packet is placed 

in the brewing chamber, the machine injects hot water into 

the packet . . . .”). 

The district court correctly determined that the term 

“brewing chamber” in the ’320 patent does not require a 

fully-enclosed space. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 

1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

B. Jury Finding that Prior Art Disclosed Sealing Engagement

The jury found claims 8 and 19 to be invalid as obvious 

in light of Nordskog, standing alone, and in combination

with U.S. Patent No. 6,079,315 to Beaulieu (“Beaulieu”) or 

U.S Patent No. 5,840,189 to Sylvan (“Sylvan”). Independent claims 5 and 18 of the ’320 patent, which claims 8 and 

19 depend from, require a “cover [of the brewing chamber

that] is adapted to sealingly engage with a top edge of the 

at least one sidewall.” ’320 patent, col. 9, ll. 12–13, col. 11, 

ll. 4–5. ARM argues that the jury’s findings of obviousness 

were not supported by substantial evidence because the

cited references do not disclose this claim limitation.

Claim 1 of the Beaulieu patent discloses a “chamber for 

a cartridge . . . including a bottom, sidewall and top sealed 

to the sidewall along a peripheral rim, said chamber comprising . . . a cup shaped housing having a sidewall . . .

[and] a lid overlaying said housing.” Beaulieu, col. 5, ll. 24–

44. Beaulieu’s specification also contains detailed 

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descriptions of the operation of the lid in conjunction with 

the cartridge holder. Id. at col. 4, ll. 19–59. Thus, the jury 

could have reasonably found that Beaulieu discloses this 

claim limitation when it described a cartridge holder with 

a cover sealingly engaged with the top of the cartridge 

holder sidewall. Under these circumstances, we need not 

address whether Sylvan discloses the same limitation. 

Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. 

C. Attorney’s Fees for Noninfringement

ARM argues that the district court erred in granting 

Eko attorney’s fees related to its noninfringement of claims 

8 and 19 of the ’320 patent. The district court construed 

the term “passageway” in these claims as (1) “a narrow

space of some depth or length connecting one place to another,” and (2) not “encompass[ing] a receptacle that had 

no bottom or that utilized a broad, thin mesh.” Claim Construction Order at 12. The district court concluded that a 

fee award was appropriate because of ARM’s unreasonable 

pursuit of its infringement claims.

ARM’s sole contention here is that Eko should not have 

been the prevailing party on this issue because the district 

court’s construction of the term “passageway” in claims 8 

and 19 was erroneous.2 ARM urges that requiring “a 

 

2 Claim 8 recites:

[A beverage brewer, comprising:

a brewing chamber;

a container, disposed within the brewing chamber 

and adapted to hold brewing material while brewed 

by a beverage brewer, the container comprising:

a receptacle configured to receive the brewing material; and

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a cover;

wherein the receptacle includes

a base, having an interior surface 

and an exterior surface, wherein at 

least a portion of the base is disposed a predetermined distance 

above a bottom surface of the brewing chamber, and

at least one sidewall extending upwardly from the interior surface of 

the base,

wherein the receptacle has at least 

one passageway that provides fluid 

flow from an interior of the receptacle to an exterior of the receptacle;

wherein the cover is adapted to sealingly 

engage with a top edge of the at least one 

sidewall, the cover including an opening, 

and

wherein the container is adapted to accept 

input fluid through the opening and to provide a corresponding outflow of fluid 

through the passageway;

an inlet port, adapted to provide the input fluid to 

the container; and

a needle-like structure, disposed below the base;

wherein the predetermined distance is selected 

such that a tip of the needle-like structure does not 

penetrate the exterior surface of the base];

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narrow space of some length connecting one place to another” (1) improperly reads limitations of “length” and 

“narrowness” into the claim language, (2) excludes an embodiment in the specification, and (3) is inconsistent with 

constructions adopted by the ITC and the United States 

District Court for the Central District of California, which 

both construed the term “passageway” to mean a “path, 

channel, or course by which something passes.” But 

whether or not the first part of the district court’s claim 

construction (requiring a “narrow space,” Claim Construction Order at 12) was correct, we think the second part of 

the construction (that “passageway” does not “encompass a 

receptacle that [has] no bottom or utilized a broad-thin, 

mesh,” id.) was correct, and that the district court properly 

granted summary judgment based on its construction.

ARM makes no claim that the receptacle (cup) itself 

constitutes a passageway. As the district court found,

“[Eko]’s products utilize a broad, thin mesh or micropunched steel filter to allow the brewed beverage to exit the 

receptacle,” and it is “patently obvious” that Eko’s products 

could not infringe on the claims of the ’320 patent because

“[n]o reasonable person looking at the cut-out openings on 

the side of [Eko’s] devices would describe them as passageways.” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., 

Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2016), 

ECF No. 130 at 1–2; Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera 

Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. 

Feb. 24, 2016), ECF No. 42 at 4 (“Summary Judgment Order”). 

 

wherein the container is reusable.

’320 patent, col. 8, ll. 60–67, col. 9, ll. 1–23, 31–32 (emphases added). 

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D. Attorney’s Fees for Obviousness

ARM’s final argument is that the district court erred in 

awarding attorney’s fees to Eko as to the issue of obviousness with respect to the ’320 patent. The district court 

awarded these fees because ARM’s conduct as to the issue 

of obviousness was “exceptional.” See 35 U.S.C. § 285. 

ARM suggests that the district court’s denial of summary 

judgment conclusively established the reasonableness of 

its litigation position. Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. All-Tag 

Security, S.A. held that “[a]bsent misrepresentation to the 

court, a party is entitled to rely on a court’s denial of summary judgment . . . as an indication that the party’s claims 

were objectively reasonable and suitable for resolution at 

trial.” 858 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. 

BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 

943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). But Checkpoint did not hold that 

the denial of summary judgment conclusively establishes 

objective reasonableness. Our cases require only that the 

district court considers the denial of summary judgment, 

not that the district court always gives that denial decisive 

weight. 

Further, under Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 

Fitness, Inc., “[t]here is no precise rule or formula” for deciding whether a case is “exceptional.” 572 U.S. 545, 554

(2014) (alteration in original). The district court must 

consider the “totality of the circumstances” on a “case-bycase” basis. Id. An “exceptional” case is “simply one that 

stands out from others with respect to the substantive 

strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both 

the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Id. 

Here, the district court carefully explained why it did 

not give its denial of summary judgment decisive weight. 

In its order awarding attorney’s fees, the court noted that 

at the pretrial conference, ARM “offered no . . . explanation 

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to the [district court] for its [obviousness] position,” except 

to assert that the ITC’s limited exclusion order and cease 

and desist order remained valid and that ARM was not 

willing to “write that off,” and “it was not until the trial was 

well underway that it became apparent that ARM was not 

seriously trying to defend the obviousness of the claims at 

issue.” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., 

Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. July 13, 2018), 

ECF No. 271 at 12–13 (“Post-Trial Order”); see also Summary Judgment Order at 3 (noting that denial of summary 

judgment was based on “[ARM’s expert’s] explanations for 

why [ARM’s] invention would not have been obvious” and 

noting that while those explanations were “questionable,” 

they gave rise to “clearly disputed issues of fact”). The 

court observed that at trial, “[i]n addition to failing [to 

prove] the primary indicators of [non]obviousness, ARM 

did not bother to try to show secondary factors of non-obviousness.” Post-Trial Order at 14 n.5. The court concluded 

that “ARM’s insistence on trying [the issue of obviousness] 

was largely a charade used for the purpose of extending the 

life of the earlier ITC . . . order.” Id. at 13. 

The district court properly considered its denial of summary judgment and provided a reasonable explanation for 

why ARM’s position warranted a fee award. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion.

II. Eko’s ’855 Patent

A. Infringement

ARM contends that the district court erred in construing claim 8 of the ’855 patent as not requiring a “singleserve beverage brewer,” and that the judgment of infringement should be set aside. Claim 8 recites:

A beverage brewing device for use with a single 

serve beverage brewer having a brewing holster, an 

inlet probe for dispensing water, the inlet probe 

moveable between a non-brewing position and a 

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brewing position, and an outlet probe extending 

upwardly into the brewing holster for outleting a 

brewed beverage, the beverage brewing device 

comprising: . . . .

’855 patent, col. 15, ll. 13–18 (emphasis added).3

 

3 The remainder of claim 8 reads:

(a) a body removably receivable within a 

brewing holster of a single serve beverage brewer, the body having at least one 

substantially vertical sidewall, a top 

opening, and a bottom surface intersecting the at least one substantially vertical sidewall, wherein the at least one 

substantially vertical sidewall and the 

bottom surface of the body define a brew 

chamber configured to contain a dry 

beverage medium;

(b) at least one outlet probe receptacle defined in the body and extending from 

the bottom surface of the body and into 

the brew chamber such that the at least 

one outlet probe receptacle is configured to receive an outlet probe of the 

single serve beverage brewer when the 

body is received within the brewing holster, wherein the at least one outlet 

probe receptacle is fluidly isolated from 

the brew chamber to prevent the outlet 

probe from penetrating the brew chamber, thereby preventing fluid from exiting the brew chamber through the 

outlet probe;

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Because it sold only the brewing device and not the beverage brewer itself, ARM asserts that it did not infringe. 

But claim 8 on its face does not require a beverage brewer, 

even if the preamble is limiting. To the extent that claim 

8 mentions a beverage brewer, it is only as a “reference 

point” to define the purpose and structure of the brewing 

device. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1350 

(Fed. Cir. 1998). And there is nothing in the prosecution 

history suggesting that the beverage brewer itself is part 

of the claim. The district court correctly construed that 

claim 8 on its face does not require a beverage brewer.

B. Jury Instruction 40

On its cross-appeal, Eko challenges the district court’s 

jury instruction on willful infringement (Jury Instruction 40), the jury’s finding of no willful infringement based 

 

(c) a lid removably securable to the body, 

the lid engageable with the body to selectively enclose a top opening of the 

body;

(d) an inlet probe opening defined in the 

lid, the inlet probe opening configured 

to receive an inlet probe of the single 

serve beverage brewer in a brewing position for placing the inlet probe into 

fluid communication with the brew 

chamber; and

(e) at least one filter defined within the 

body, the at least one filter configured 

to retain the dry beverage medium 

within the brew chamber while allowing the brewed beverage to exit the 

brew chamber. 

’855 patent, col. 15, ll. 19–48 (emphases added).

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on that instruction, and the district court’s denial of enhanced damages based on the jury verdict. Before trial, 

both parties proposed that the district court use the Federal Circuit Bar Association’s (“FCBA”) National Patent 

Jury Instructions (“NPJI”) No. 4.1 for willful infringement. 

The district court initially agreed to use the FCBA instructions. Jury Instruction 40, in its original form, provided:

Eko argues that ARM willfully infringed the Eko 

855 patent. For purposes of this case only, you are 

to assume direct infringement of amended claim 8 

of the Eko 855 patent. Therefore, you must go on 

and address the additional issue of whether or not 

this infringement was willful. Willfulness requires 

you to determine whether Eko proved that it is 

more likely than not that the infringement was especially worthy of punishment. You may not determine that the infringement was willful just 

because ARM knew of the Eko 855 patent and infringed it. Instead, willful infringement is reserved 

for only the most egregious behavior, such as where 

the infringement is malicious, deliberate, consciously wrongful, or done in bad faith.

To determine whether ARM acted willfully, consider all facts. These may include, but are not limited, to:

(1) Whether or not ARM intentionally copied a product of Eko that is covered by the 

Eko 855 patent;

(2) Whether or not ARM reasonably believed it did not infringe or that the patent 

was invalid;

(3) Whether or not ARM made a good-faith 

effort to avoid infringing the Eko 855 patent, for example, whether ARM attempted 

to design around the 855 patent; and

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(4) Whether or not ARM tried to cover up 

its infringement.

Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 

No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2018), ECF 

No. 233 at 23 (emphases added) (“Jury Instruction 40”).

On the morning that the final jury instructions were to 

be read to the jury, Eko objected to the language of the jury 

instruction. Eko argued that the inclusion of the phrases 

“especially worthy of punishment” and “willful infringement is reserved for only the most egregious behavior” in 

Jury Instruction 40, “invite[d] the jury to make the legal 

decision as to whether damages should be enhanced, or 

whether it is an exceptional case, rather than limiting the 

jury to the underlying factual question of whether the infringement was willful,” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera 

Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. 

June 7, 2018), ECF No. 234 at 1. The district court considered Eko’s proposed changes and revised the jury instruction to delete the phrase “only the most” from the 

instruction. Post-Trial Order at 5. The jury was instructed 

accordingly and returned a verdict of no willful infringement. 

There is no claim that the FCBA model instructions are

afforded special status, nor could there be, since these instructions have not been endorsed or approved by this 

court. Here, we agree with Eko that the jury instruction 

contained language that in isolation was erroneous. As the 

plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 284 makes clear, the issue of 

punishment by enhancement is for the court and not the 

jury. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 

1934 (2016) (holding that section 284 “‘commits the determination’ whether enhanced damages are appropriate ‘to 

the discretion of the district court’”). Under Halo, the concept of “willfulness” requires a jury to find no more than 

deliberate or intentional infringement. Id. at 1933 (“The 

subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or 

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knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard 

to whether his infringement was objectively reckless.”); 

SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 930 F.3d 1295, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 

2019). The question of enhanced damages is addressed by 

the court once an affirmative finding of willfulness has 

been made. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34. It is at this 

second stage at which the considerations of egregious behavior and punishment are relevant. Questions of whether 

an accused patent infringer’s conduct was “egregious behavior” or “worthy of punishment” are therefore not appropriate for jury consideration. As the district court noted, 

Eko timely raised this objection to the jury instruction under Rule 51, and the claimed error has been preserved on 

appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.

However, this is not the end of our consideration. In 

general, a party challenging jury instructions must “prove

the jury instructions read in their entirety were incorrect 

or incomplete as given.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage 

Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1307 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

(quoting Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 

F.2d 850, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). We apply Federal Circuit 

law to review “the legal sufficiency of jury instructions on 

an issue of patent law without deference to the district 

court.”4 Synqor, 709 F.3d at 1379 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. 

 

4 This case is distinguishable from Voda v. Cordis 

Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Voda, this court 

reviewed a cross-appellant’s challenge to jury instructions 

regarding willful infringement under the law of the regional circuit. Id. at 1328. But Voda did not involve a situation where this court was required to determine the legal 

sufficiency of a jury instruction. Instead, the parties in 

Voda agreed that the jury instruction on willfulness was 

erroneous under the correct standard at the time, and the 

only dispute was whether the erroneous jury instruction 

was harmless. Id. Therefore, the issue in this case—

Case: 18-2254 Document: 3 Page: 17 Filed: 01/13/2020
18 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS.

v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en 

banc in relevant part)). The question here is whether Jury 

Instruction 40, in its entirety, correctly stated the law. 

DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304 (citing Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, 

Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

Although the inclusion of the phrases “especially worthy of punishment” and “reserved for egregious behavior” 

in Jury Instruction 40 was erroneous, we think that the instruction taken as a whole provides reasonable clarity as to 

the correct test for willful infringement. First, although 

the instruction states that willful infringement is “reserved 

for egregious behavior,” the same sentence also clarifies 

that willful infringement can simply be “deliberate” infringement. Therefore, the jury was apprised that “deliberate” behavior can qualify as “egregious” behavior for the 

purposes of willful infringement. Second, the latter half of 

Jury Instruction 40 provides a list of facts that the jury 

could properly consider, including “[w]hether or not ARM 

intentionally copied a product of Eko that is covered by the 

Eko 855 patent,” and “whether or not ARM reasonably believed it did not infringe or that the patent was invalid.”5 

See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (“[C]ulpability is generally 

measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of 

the challenged conduct.”); Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp 

Corp., 920 F.3d 1337, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“As to willfulness, an accused infringer’s reliance on an opinion of 

 

whether the jury instructions correctly state an issue of patent law—was never addressed by the court in Voda. 5 There is no contention that the other two factors 

(“[w]hether or not ARM made a good-faith effort to avoid

infringing the Eko 855 patent, for example, whether ARM 

attempted to design around the 855 patent” and “[w]hether 

or not ARM tried to cover up its infringement”) are irrelevant to willfulness, and given the lack of objection we need 

not decide whether they are.

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EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 19

counsel regarding noninfringement or invalidity of the asserted patent remains relevant to the infringer’s state of 

mind post-Halo.”). This portion of the instruction again 

clarifies that the jury is to consider whether ARM’s infringement of the ’855 patent was intentional. In view of 

the entire jury instruction, the district court provided the 

jury an adequate test for willfulness. The jury was reasonably informed that it could make a finding of willful infringement if it found that ARM deliberately or 

intentionally infringed the ’855 patent. 

Also, it is significant that deletion of the only two 

phrases to which Eko objected would not have cured the 

problem that Eko identified, since Jury Instruction 40

would still have referred to “malicious,” “consciously 

wrongful,” and “bad faith” conduct. Verizon, 503 F.3d at 

1305 (“A party seeking to alter a judgment based on erroneous jury instructions must establish that [the proposed 

instruction] would have remedied the error.” (alteration in 

original) (quoting Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State 

Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). We conclude 

that the instruction as a whole was not legally erroneous

given the limited nature of Eko’s objection. We do not 

reach the question of harmless error.6

AFFIRMED

Costs to neither party.

 

6 We note that a legally erroneous jury instruction 

can only be harmless error if it “could not have changed the 

result.” Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1307 n.7 (quoting Ecolab, Inc. 

v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

Case: 18-2254 Document: 3 Page: 19 Filed: 01/13/2020
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

EKO BRANDS, LLC,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., 

ADRIAN RIVERA,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________

2018-2215, 2018-2254

______________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Washington in No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD, 

Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue.

______________________

REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part, dissenting-inpart.

The district court erred in its construction of “passageway” by rewriting the claims, including adding a negative 

limitation that is unsupported by the specification. The 

district court further erred when it granted summary 

judgement of noninfringement and an award of attorney’s 

fees based on its erroneous construction. I would vacate

the district court’s grant of summary judgement, reverse

the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for further proceedings.

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2 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS.

The district court construed the term “passageway” as 

“a narrow space of some depth or length connecting one 

place to another.” J.A. 12. This construction is not supported by the specification. The district court also interpreted “passageway” to exclude a receptacle “that utilized 

a broad, thin mesh.” Id. This exclusion was raised sua 

sponte by the court and not argued by either party. As 

shown below, the district court relied on its construction of 

passageway to base, erroneously, its grant of summary 

judgment and attorney’s fees. 

To properly determine the meaning of a claim limitation, a court must consider the claim term in view of the 

specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman v. Westview 

Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (1996)). A claim term 

carries its ordinary meaning “unless the patentee unequivocally imparted” a new or different meaning or “expressly 

relinquished claim scope during prosecution.” Omega 

Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003) (citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 

F.3d 1313, 1325–26, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed.

Cir. 2002)). 

Here, the district court’s construction of “passageway”

to mean a “narrow space of some depth or length connecting one place to another” is not supported by the specification. Unlike other portions of its claim construction order 

where the district court refers to the claims, written description, figures, and prosecution history to support it construction (see, e.g., J.A. 7-8, 9-11), the district court fails to 

identify any support for its construction of “passageway.” 

Instead, the district court construed “passageway” “in light 

of the intrinsic evidence.” J.A. 12. Neither the claims nor 

the written description, however, impose dimensional limitations (i.e., narrowness, length, or depth) on “passageway.” While the specification describes a “passageway” on 

sixteen occasions, it only twice describes exemplary diameter and length parameters. ’320 patent col. 4 ll. 37-39, 

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EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 3

col. 5 ll. 28-30. Those examples alone cannot limit the 

claimed invention as a whole. See, e.g., ScriptPro LLC v. 

Innovation Assocs., Inc., 833 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (“[A] specification’s focus on one particular embodiment or purpose cannot limit the described invention 

where that specification expressly contemplates other embodiments or purposes.”). On this basis alone, the district 

court’s construction of “passageway” is erroneous. 

The majority appears to recognize that the district 

court erred in its construction of “passageway,” noting that:

whether or not the first part of the district court’s 

claim construction (requiring a “narrow space” . . .)

was correct, we think the second part of the construction (that “passageway” does not “encompass 

a receptacle that [has] no bottom or utilized a 

broad-thin, mesh,” id.) was correct, and that the 

district court properly granted summary judgment 

based on its construction. 

Maj. Op. 10 (emphasis added). This is incorrect. The district court also erred by interpreting “passageway” to exclude a receptacle “that utilized a broad, thin mesh.” This 

aspect of the district court’s construction constitutes a negative claim limitation that is unsupported by the specification.

Negative limitations added during claim construction 

must find support either in the specification or the prosecution history. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1322-23. A 

specification adequately supports the addition of a negative 

limitation where the limitation is expressly disclaimed or 

where “independent lexicography in the written description” justifies adding it. Id. In Omega Eng’g, Inc., the district court construed “periphery” to mean “projection of the 

laser light toward the surface,” but the court added that 

periphery “does not encompass light striking the center or 

interior portion of the energy zone.” Id. at 1321. On appeal, we rejected that negative limitation, reasoning that 

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4 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS.

there was no “express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding 

[it].” Id. at 1322-23. We concluded that the negative limitation was not inherent to the claim term by relying on its

dictionary definition. Id. at 1322. We also concluded that 

the negative limitation had no support in the prosecution 

history. Id.; see also id. at 1327. In Linear Tech. Corp. v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, we similarly reversed a claim construction that incorporated an unsupported negative limitation. 566 F.3d 1049, 1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The 

Administrative Judge (“AJ”) construed the phrase “monitoring the current” to exclude “monitoring voltage.” See id.

at 1059. We found that the AJ erred by adding the negative 

limitation because the specification provided no support for 

it. Id. at 1060 (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1323).

Here, the district court’s exclusion of “a broad, thin 

mesh” from the meaning of “passageway” writes into the 

claim an unsupported negative limitation. Neither the 

claims nor the written description of the ’320 patent mention a mesh, let alone a broad, thin mesh, and there is no 

express disclaimer supporting the negative limitation. 

There also is no independent lexicography in the written 

description upholding the negative limitation. The ’320 patent includes no definition of “passageway.” And the dictionary definition of “passage”—“a way of exit or entrance: 

a road, path, channel, or course by which something 

passes”1—does not inherently require the exclusion of a 

broad, thin mesh. Nor is there any record evidence to suggest that the prosecution history supports the exclusion. 

The only record evidence, or mention of “broad, thin mesh”

is in relation to Eko Brands’ accused product. There is no 

basis, therefore, for the district court to have redirected the 

 

1 See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2003) (defining “passageway” as “a way that allows passage”).

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EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 5

scope of the claim to exclude broad, thin mesh other than 

to exclude the accused products. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. 

v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[I]t 

is not appropriate for the court to construe a claim solely to 

exclude the accused device”). The district court therefore 

erred by rewriting the claimed “passageway” to exclude a 

broad, thin mesh. 

Because the district court relied on its erroneous construction of “passageway” as its basis for granting summary judgment and in awarding attorney’s fees, I dissent. 

I concur in all remaining aspects of the majority’s opinion.

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