Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05560/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05560-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jacques London Samuel
Plaintiff
San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACQUES LONDON SAMUEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF'S 

DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

Case No.16-cv-05560-JSC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate in the San Francisco County Jail, filed this pro se civil rights complaint 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department.1

 Plaintiff’s application to 

proceed in forma pauperis is granted in a separate order. For the reasons explained below, the 

complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 

 1 Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (ECF No. 4.) 

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F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 

state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . .. Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that he is a “validated” member of a gang called the Portrero Hill Gang,

and that Sherriff’s Department officials at the county jail knowingly allowed him to be in the same 

classroom with a member of a rival gang called the Page Street Gang. When he inquired about 

this, officials told him that members of rival black gangs are not separated, unlike members of 

rival Mexican gangs, because members of rival black gangs do not always attack each other on 

sight but rival Mexican gang members do. Plaintiff claims that this practice constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment by exposing him to dangerous inmates, as well as discrimination on the basis 

of race. He seeks monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief to stop recurrence of his 

exposure to members of a rival gang. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim that Defendant violated his constitutional right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment. First, as Plaintiff is in the county jail and presumably 

a pretrial detainee, his claim falls under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause not the 

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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 535 (1979). 

Second, the allegations that he was exposed to harm from other inmates are not sufficient 

to state a failure-to-protect due process claim. In the context of claims for failure to protect an 

inmate from harm from other inmates, a pretrial detainee must prove that Defendant acted with

“more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.” 

Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The elements 

of a pretrial detainee’s due process failure-to-protect claim are:

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;

(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 

serious harm;

(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to 

abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances 

would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making 

the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and

(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 

injuries.

Id. at 1071 (footnote omitted). 

Plaintiff has not provided sufficient allegations on the second element. He does not allege 

that he was attacked by members of the Page Street Gang, or that members of that gang commonly 

attack members of Plaintiff’s gang on sight or otherwise present a substantial risk of harm to him. 

He simply alleges that they were a “rival” gang; without specific allegations that the rivalry 

presents a substantial risk of harm at the level of exposure Plaintiff experienced, the second 

element of a due process claim is not adequately pled. Similarly, because Plaintiff has not alleged 

that the Page Street Gang members commonly attack Portrero Hill Gang members, he has not 

satisfied the third element that a reasonable officer would know not to allow members of the two 

gangs in the same room. Consequently, the claim must be dismissed. It is also noted that because 

Plaintiff does not allege that he was hurt in the incident, there is no basis for him to collect 

monetary damages on this claim, although the lack of physical harm to him would not preclude the 

availability of injunctive relief assuming he can satisfy all of the elements of the claim. See 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (prisoner need not wait until he is actually assaulted 

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or harmed to state a claim and obtain relief). Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his 

complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim due process 

claim.

Plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination is also not sufficiently pled. "Prisoners are 

protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious 

discrimination based on race." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation omitted). 

A prison classification based on race is immediately suspect and requires officials to demonstrate 

that the race-based policy or action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 

Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505-06, 510-11. A claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection 

Clause also requires demonstration of discriminatory intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 

239-40 (1976). The first step in determining whether the inmate’s equal protection rights were 

violated is to identify the relevant class of prisoners to which he belongs. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 

F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). The class must be comprised of similarly situated persons so that 

the factor motivating the alleged discrimination can be identified. Id. at 1031. 

Plaintiff has alleged that he is not similarly situated to inmates who are being treated 

differently from him. Specifically, he has alleged that he is a member of a different gang than the 

Mexican gangs who are kept separate from each other. He has alleged that the jail policy is 

treating inmates differently based upon the gang they are in, not based upon their race. Under 

such a policy, a black member of a Mexican gang would be treated similarly to any other members 

of that gang regardless of their race, as would any person of any race who is a member of a black 

gang. In other words, he has alleged that it is the inmate’s gang membership and that gang’s 

known history --- as opposed to the inmate’s race --- that determines whether jail officials separate 

the inmate from rival gang members. It may well be that all members of the black gangs are black 

and all members of the Mexican gangs are Mexican, and it may also be that the black gangs have 

the same history as the Mexican gangs, but if that is the case, Plaintiff has not so alleged. 

Consequently, his claim of racial discrimination must be dismissed, albeit with leave to file an 

amended complaint in which he attempts to make the allegations necessary to state a cognizable 

equal protection claim. 

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CONCLUSION

1. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint within twenty-eight (28) days from the date this order is filed. The 

amendment must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (No. C 16-5560 JSC

(PR)) and the words “COURT-ORDERED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. 

Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, see Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992), Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the original 

complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time and in accordance with this 

order will result in the dismissal of this action. 

2. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2016

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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