Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06090/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Stephen Kaiser
Appellee
Donald Vaughan
Appellant

Document Text:

FILLD 

United States Court of Appeal!' Tenth CiTcuit 

UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

DEC 3 0 1992 

__________ R~OBERTL.HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CI RCUI T 

DONALD VAUGHAN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v . 

STEPHEN KAISER; ATTORNEY GENERAL , 

Respondents-Appellees. 

No . 92 - 6090 

(D.C. No . CIV-91-1696 -W) 

(W. Dist. Okla .) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiall y 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P. 

34(a) ; 1 0th Cir. R. 34 . 1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Defendant -Petitioner Donald Vaughan appeals the order of the 

district court concluding that the State o f Oklahoma had jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Vaughan's parole. We affirm. 

While on parole from a murder convicti on i n Oklahoma, Mr. 

Vaughan committed a murder in Texas . He was arrested in Oklahoma 

for the murder. The Oklahoma authorities extradited him to Texas 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the l aw of the case, 

res judicata, or collate ral e stoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6090 Document: 010110155944 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 1 
and also filed a parole violator warrant in Texas so that Oklahoma 

could exercise its rights over Mr. Vaughan at the conclusion of 

his incarceration in Texas. 

When Mr. Vaughan was paroled on the Texas conviction in 1990, 

he was sent to Oklahoma where he underwent parole revocation 

proceedings. His parole was revoked in August 1990. Mr. Vaughan 

contends that Oklahoma had relinquished jurisdiction over him and 

thus had no power to revoke his parole. He argues that Oklahoma 

first relinquished jurisdiction by allowing him to move to Texas 

when he was paroled in 1974, and then by extraditing him to Texas 

in 1977. Mr. Vaughan's appeal chiefly complains that the district 

court did not specifically rule on his second contention. 

Mr. Vaughan asserts that Saunders v. Michigan Dep't of 

Corrections, 406 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Mich. 1976), supports his 

argument that Oklahoma's extradition of him to Texas resulted in a 

voluntary relinquishment of jurisdiction over him. The Saunders' 

court held that where a state has actual knowledge of a parolee's 

whereabouts, an inference of waiver by the state is permitted if 

such knowledge was not acted upon. Saunders involved a parolee 

who was actually a fugitive from his parole - - the Michigan 

authorities had not located him. Mr. Vaughan was in fact in the 

custody of either the Oklahoma or the Texas authorities at all 

times after Oklahoma issued the parole violator warrant. His 

situation is simply not similar to the one in Saunders. While it 

is true that Oklahoma authorities had actual knowledge of Mr. 

Vaughan's location in Texas, they did act in regard to his 

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Appellate Case: 92-6090 Document: 010110155944 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 2 
whereabouts. Oklahoma's filing of the parole violator warrant is 

an action evidencing Oklahoma's interest in Mr. Vaughan's eventual 

return to Oklahoma. The parole violator warrant alerts the Texas 

authorities that Oklahoma retains an interest in Mr. Vaughan. In 

fact, Texas sent Mr. Vaughan to Oklahoma at the close of his 

sentence in Texas, which was the expected result from the filing 

of the warrant. The Oklahoma authorities thus did not relinquish 

jurisdiction over Mr. Vaughan by extraditing him to Texas. 

Mr. Vaughan also argues that an Oklahoma case, Peoples v. 

State, 523 P.2d 1123 (Okl. Cr. App. 1974), supports his appeal. 

The defendant in Peoples had stolen cattle in Texas and transported them across the state line into Oklahoma. He was 

originally arrested and charged with violating an Oklahoma 

criminal statute. However, Oklahoma voluntarily surrendered him 

to a federal marshal, who took custody on behalf of a Texas 

federal district court in which Peoples had been charged with a 

federal crime. The Oklahoma court held that when a state 

surrenders a person pursuant to an extradition request, the 

surrendering state effectively waives the right to demand the 

person' s return as a fugitive from justice. However, Peoples also 

expressly held that the surrendering state nonetheless retains the 

right to try the person if the state thereafter reacquires 

jurisdiction. Id. at 1124. The Court of Appeals of Arizona, 

interpreting Peoples, held that even if a state has waived 

jurisdiction, it reacquires jurisdiction if the person returns. 

State v. Knapp, 123 Ariz. 402, 599 P . 2d 855 (Ariz. App. 1979 ) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-6090 Document: 010110155944 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 3 
Oklahoma thus had jurisdiction over Mr. Vaughan, in any eve nt, 

when he was returned to Oklahoma authorities. 

For the reasons given in the magistrate's report, we c onclude 

that Oklahoma did not r e linquish jurisdiction over Mr. Vaughan by 

permitting him to r e side in Te xas. For the reasons given above, 

we also c onc lude that Oklahoma did not relinquish jurisdiction by 

extraditing Mr. Vaughan t o Texas. We therefo re AFFIRM the 

district c ourt's order. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6090 Document: 010110155944 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 4