Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03959/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03959-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent E. Keates
Petitioner
Jeanne S. Woodford
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT E. KEATES,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, California

Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-3959 CW

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

HABEAS CORPUS

PETITION

Petitioner Vincent E. Keates filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus on September 29, 2005. Respondent Jeanne S. Woodford

moves to dismiss the habeas petition as untimely. Petitioner

opposes this motion. The hearing scheduled for December 16, 2005

is vacated and the matter is submitted on the papers. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS

Respondent's motion.

BACKGROUND

On April 15, 1997, Petitioner plead guilty to violations of

California Penal Code §§ 288.5, 288 and 289(j). Four months later,

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the court sentenced Petitioner to a twelve-year State prison term. 

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction.

Seven years later, on August 23, 2004, Petitioner filed a

habeas petition in the Alameda Superior Court; the petition was

denied. Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court

of Appeal; that petition was also denied. Petitioner filed a

Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court; the Supreme

Court denied that petition on August 17, 2005. 

On September 29, 2005, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in

this Court, challenging the application of California Penal Code

§ 2933.1 to his sentence. In 1994, the California legislature

enacted § 2933.1, which capped "worktime credit" at fifteen

percent, as opposed to fifty percent, for certain enumerated

felonies, including Penal Code § 288.5. Section 2933.1 applies

only to offenses committed on or after the date on which it became

effective: September 21, 1994. When Petitioner was sentenced, the

trial court gave him fifteen percent credit. There was no

discussion, or even mention, however, of § 2933.1 or fifteen

percent credit. Petitioner contends that the Information charged

him with a violation of Penal Code § 288.5 that occurred between

May, 1990 and September, 1995; thus, he could have committed the

felony before the date on which § 2933.1 became effective. 

Petitioner states that he thought that he was receiving fifty

percent credit and did not discuss the issue of credits with his

counsel. It is not clear when Petitioner realized that he received

only fifteen percent credit. 

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DISCUSSION

When the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) became law on April 24, 1996, it "imposed for the first

time a statute of limitations on habeas petitions filed by State

prisoners." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on all habeas

petitions filed by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review

of the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing

an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Here, as noted above, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced

on August 15, 1997. He did not appeal. The conviction became

final sixty days after Petitioner was sentenced. See California

Rules of Court 30.1; Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060

(C.D. Cal. 2001). Thus, Respondent argues that, absent any

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tolling, Petitioner had until October 14, 1998 to file a timely

federal habeas petition. Petitioner filed his federal habeas

petition in September, 2005, almost seven years later. A State

habeas petition can toll the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). But Respondent argues that it does not in this

situation when the State habeas petitions were filed years after

the time to file a timely federal petition had passed. As

Respondent notes, State habeas petitions cannot revive the statute

of limitations once it has expired. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding "that section 2244(d) does

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has

ended before the state petition was filed"). 

According to Petitioner, however, the statute of limitations

did not start running sixty days after he was sentenced. Instead,

he argues that, because there has been no administrative or similar

adjudication of the credits issue and because there is a continuing

unlawful detention, the statute of limitations has not begun. This

argument is unpersuasive and directly conflicts with the AEDPA's

purpose of furthering the principle of finality. See, e.g., Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001). Under Petitioner's

interpretation, he would have virtually "an unlimited time in which

to file his habeas petition, thus hindering the finality

principle." Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.

2004).

Petitioner's alternative argument is more persuasive. 

According to Petitioner, had he received fifty percent credit, he

should have been released from State custody on July 21, 2003,

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which triggers the AEDPA's one-year period of limitation, and thus

his habeas petition should have been filed on or before July 21,

2004. As noted above, the AEDPA provides that its limitation

period shall run from the latest of four described circumstances. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The date when Petitioner allegedly

should have been released could constitute "the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence," the last of the

four circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Murphy v.

Espinoza, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2005 WL 3093430 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7,

2005) ("petitioner was, or with the exercise of reasonable

diligence, should have been aware of the factual predicate of this

claim no later than April 11, 1990, the date he believes his

sentence should have expired"). However, Petitioner does not

disclose when or how he first learned that he would receive only

fifteen percent credit. 

Even using July 21, 2004 as last day of the limitations

period, because Petitioner's first State habeas petition was not

filed until August 23, 2004, the statutory tolling provided in

§ 2244(d)(2) does not assist Petitioner. Instead, Petitioner

relies upon equitable tolling. He provides a declaration by his

son stating that his son paid an attorney to file a motion relating

to the credits issue on May 5, 2004, months before the statute of

limitations had run. As Petitioner correctly notes, the Ninth

Circuit has "held that the one-year statute of limitations for

filing a habeas petition may be equitably tolled if 'extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to

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file a petition on time,'" and were the cause of the petition being

untimely. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003),

amended in other respects by 342 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). In

Spitsyn, the Ninth Circuit noted, "Equitable tolling is justified

in few cases, though." Id. at 799.

Here, Petitioner fails to meet his burden to show that this is

one of those few cases where equitable tolling is justified. See

id. (the petitioner "bears the burden of showing that this

extraordinary exclusion should apply to him"). Ordinary attorney

negligence does not justify equitable tolling. Id. at 800. Only

where an attorney's misconduct is "sufficiently egregious" can the

attorney's action, or inaction, constitute an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of

limitations. Id. 

In Spitsyn, the court found such egregious conduct: the

attorney was hired nearly a full year in advance of the deadline,

and, despite being contacted by the petitioner and the petitioner's

mother numerous times, failed to prepare and file a habeas petition

and did not return the petitioner's file until three months after

the file was requested and a month after the limitations period had

passed. Based on the limited information provided by Petitioner,

however, it does not appear that the attorney's conduct at issue

here "was so deficient as to distinguish it from the merely

negligent performance of counsel" in cases where the Ninth Circuit

has not found equitable tolling. Id. at 801; see, e.g., Frye v.

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (miscalculation of the

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limitations period by counsel and counsel's negligence in general

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant

equitable tolling). Petitioner's attorney was paid in May, 2004,

to prepare and file a habeas petition; the attorney filed that

petition in August, 2004. This could be negligence. And

Petitioner presents no additional facts to show that the time that

elapsed between payment and filing resulted from his attorney's

sufficiently egregious behavior. 

Because Petitioner has not disclosed when or how he first

learned that he would receive only fifteen percent credit nor met

his burden to show that equitable tolling is warranted in this

case, the Court concludes that his September 29, 2005 federal

habeas petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

Habeas Petition as Untimely (Docket No. 4) is GRANTED. 

Petitioner's petition is dismissed with leave to amend. Petitioner

has two months from the date of this order to file a new petition. 

That petition, however, must explain when and how he discovered

that he would receive only fifteen percent credit and show that

extraordinary circumstances beyond Petitioner's control existed,

which made it impossible to file the petition on time, and warrant

equitable tolling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/13/05 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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