Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01865/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01865-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lorillard Tobacco Company
Appellee
Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
National Tobacco Company
Appellee
Smokeless Tobacco Council
Appellee
The Pinkerton Tobacco Company
Appellee
Gloria Tuttle
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1865

___________

Gloria Tuttle, as Trustee for the *

next-of-kin of Bill Tuttle a.k.a. *

William R. Tuttle, deceased, *

 *

Appellant, * 

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Lorillard Tobacco Company; * District of Minnesota.

National Tobacco Company, L.P.; *

The Pinkerton Tobacco Company; *

Smokeless Tobacco Council, * 

*

Appellees, *

_______________________ *

*

Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of *

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 11, 2004

Filed: July 30, 2004 

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

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1

Since filing the lawsuit, Mrs. Tuttle has remarried and is now named Gloria

Tuttle Fisher. 

2

As a young professional baseball player Bill Tuttle (Tuttle) began chewing

smokeless tobacco in 1955, and continued chewing regularly until 1993. His product

of choice was Beech-Nut, which was manufactured by Lorillard Tobacco Company

and later acquired in 1988 by National Tobacco Company. In October 1993, Tuttle

was diagnosed with oral cancer, and he later died in July 1998 from related

complications. On September 21, 1999, Tuttle’s widow, Gloria Tuttle1

 (Mrs. Tuttle)

filed a lawsuit against several smokeless tobacco manufacturers and their trade

association, alleging both common law claims of negligence, fraud, and civil

conspiracy, as well as statutory claims alleging violations of several Minnesota

consumer protection statutes. Following extensive discovery, the defendants moved

for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment

on the claims and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Mrs. Tuttle appeals.

We reverse the district court’s ruling on the statute of limitations, but conclude Mrs.

Tuttle’s claims are legally insufficient, because her claims fail for want of admissible

proof of causation and reliance. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary

After experiencing difficulty swallowing, Tuttle scheduled an appointment

with his physician, Dr. Timothy Regan (Dr. Regan), on October 6, 1993. Tuttle

presented complaining of an oral lump or mass that had been growing in his right

cheek for ten days. Tuttle told Dr. Regan he had had a small lesion in his cheek for

a long time but the lump had recently gotten bigger. Dr. Regan observed a 3 by 4

centimeter indurated mass in Tuttle’s right cheek, and a 2 by 2 centimeter mass inside

Tuttle’s mouth near his parotid duct. Tuttle told Dr. Regan he wore dentures and he

chewed tobacco, predominantly on the left side of his mouth. Based on his

observations and Tuttle’s patient history, Dr. Regan diagnosed Tuttle’s right cheek

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2

Inflamation of the parotid gland, the largest of the salivary glands in humans

located in front of or below the ear. 

3

mass as parotitis2

 and prescribed an antibiotic and Advil for discomfort. Dr. Regan

also referred Tuttle to Dr. Steven Koutroupas (Dr. Koutroupas), an ear, nose, and

throat specialist. (otolaryngologist).

Dr. Koutroupas examined Tuttle on October 8, 1993, and observed a 2.5

centimeter fungating mass in the right buccal mucosa. Dr. Koutroupas’s notes reflect

that Tuttle noticed the right cheek mass “about 10 days ago and it suddenly increased

in size.” After Dr. Regan started Tuttle on an antibiotic, his right cheek mass

decreased markedly in size. Dr. Koutroupas also noted Tuttle was a “long time

tobacco chewer from his baseball days.” Having the impression that the right cheek

mass looked like “an infected tumor,” Dr. Koutroupas took a biopsy of the mass.

Three days later, on October 11, 1993, the biopsy revealed an advanced squamous

cell buccal carcinoma, and Dr. Koutroupas informed Tuttle he had oral cancer. Dr.

Koutroupas referred Tuttle to Dr. George Adams (Dr. Adams), a reputed head and

neck surgeon at the University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic. 

Dr. Adams examined Tuttle on October 23, 1993, and observed “a large buccal

carcinoma that has now reached golf ball size and showing a massive protrusion of

the right upper cheek.” On November 11, 1993, Dr. Adams performed surgery on

Tuttle and excised from his right oral cavity an 8 by 8 centimeter right buccal

carcinoma. In his discharge summary dated November 23, 1993, Dr. Adams noted,

upon physical examination, Tuttle’s right cheek mass measured approximately 11 by

12 centimeters. 

Following surgery, Tuttle underwent radiation therapy, which ended in March

1994. Thereafter, Tuttle experienced a reoccurrence of the right buccal carcinoma,

which Dr. Adams surgically excised. Tuttle underwent additional radiation therapy,

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3

Pinkerton manufactures a smokeless tobacco called “Red Man,” which Tuttle

occasionally chewed when he could not obtain Beech-Nut. 

4

and was referred by Dr. Adams to an oncologist, Dr. Dorothy Uhlman (Dr. Uhlman).

In a follow-up letter to Dr. Adams, Dr. Uhlman noted:

[Tuttle’s] head and neck cancer dates back to October 1993 when he

first noticed a lesion on the right buccal mucosa. He had a small lesion

which he had ignored for several months. When it became infected, he

sought medical attention and it was biopsied. [Tuttle] then states that

over a period of 5 weeks the lesion grew very rapidly to the point that

when it was finally resected it was a large penetrating tumor growing out

through the skin. 

Tuttle survived oral cancer for nearly five years. However, he eventually

succumbed to complications related to his cancer and died on July 27, 1998.

B. Procedural Summary

On September 21, 1999, Mrs. Tuttle filed this lawsuit. After extensive

pleadings and amendments thereto, Mrs. Tuttle filed a Second Amended Complaint

against Lorillard Tobacco Company (Lorillard), National Tobacco Company

(National), Pinkerton Tobacco Company3

 (Pinkerton), and the Smokeless Tobacco

Council (STC), a trade association whose members are smokeless tobacco

manufacturers, including Pinkerton and National. Lorillard was not a member of the

STC, but did make several monetary contributions to the STC. Mrs. Tuttle alleged

both common law tort claims (negligence, fraud, and conspiracy), as well as statutory

violations of Minnesota’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Deceptive Trade Practices

Act, Consumer Fraud Act, and False Advertising Act.

During his deposition, Dr. Adams testified he wrote “51⁄2 years” on Tuttle’s

death certificate as the time period for the interval between the onset of Tuttle’s

disease and his death. Dr. Adams testified he understood the death certificate inquiry

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4

The district court dismissed Mrs. Tuttle’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim

before the defendants moved for summary judgment. Mrs. Tuttle does not appeal the

dismissal of this claim.

5

to mean “from the time of the diagnosis to the time he died,” and confirmed that 51⁄2

years from July 1998, when Tuttle died, would correspond to the beginning of 1993.

In the same deposition Dr. Adams also testified:

I think the problem is that Mr. Tuttle, for whatever reason, was

convinced that this whole thing was an infection, it was on the opposite

side and therefore it was an infection, and even the first doctor, the first

doctor he saw, must have thought it was an infection, so that there was

a delay in the recognition of the problem, delay in diagnosis there that

we wished we had not had.

Following extensive discovery, the defendant smokeless tobacco manufacturers

and the STC moved for summary judgment on all claims.4

 The district court granted

summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice all of Mrs. Tuttle’s claims. Upon

review of all the evidence, the district court succinctly concluded:

Pinkerton’s separate Motion is granted in its entirety because

there is no evidence that Pinkerton’s product was a substantial cause of

Mr. Tuttle’s injuries. Likewise, Lorillard’s separate Motion is granted

because there is no evidence that the allegedly fraudulent statements

made by STC can be attributed to Lorillard. STC’s separate Motion is

granted in part because there is no evidence that STC had a duty to Mr.

Tuttle. National’s separate Motion is denied to the extent that National

challenges whether its product caused Mr. Tuttle’s injury.

Plaintiff’s negligence, common-law fraud, conspiracy, and

Unlawful Trade Practices Act claims were brought outside the statute of

limitations and must be dismissed. Plaintiff’s Consumer Fraud Act and

False Advertising Act claims fail because Plaintiff’s lawsuit will not

benefit the public. Alternatively, all of Plaintiff’s fraud claims, both

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6

common-law and statutory, fail because Plaintiff cannot show the

essential element of reliance, and because her conspiracy claim depends

on her fraud claim, the conspiracy claim likewise fails. The Court

therefore dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.

Mrs. Tuttle raises five issues on appeal, contending the district court erred in

concluding: (1) the statute of limitations had expired on certain counts; (2) her

Consumer Fraud Act and False Advertising Act claims served no public purpose; (3)

the STC did not assume a duty to Tuttle and other smokeless tobacco users; (4) the

record lacked proof of reliance to substantiate her fraud and conspiracy claims; and

(5) the STC neither spoke nor acted on Lorillard’s behalf.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

All parties agree the applicable statute of limitations for the common law

negligence, fraud and conspiracy claims is governed by Minn. Stat. section 541.05,

subd. 1(5)-(6), providing that actions for personal injury and fraud must be brought

within six years from the date of accrual. Before a cause of action can accrue in cases

involving injury caused by defective products, the Minnesota discovery rule requires

a showing of two elements: “(1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease

or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and

the defendant’s product, act, or omission.” Hildebrandt v. Allied Corp., 839 F.2d

396, 398 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Minnesota law). Concluding the evidence

compels the conclusion that Tuttle was aware of the lump in his cheek before

September 21, 1993, the district court held the plaintiff’s negligence, common law

fraud, conspiracy, and Unlawful Trade Practices Act claims were not timely filed and

must be dismissed.

In Hildebrandt, we reversed a district court’s limitations ruling, concluding

genuine issues of material fact existed whether the “plaintiffs had knowledge of the

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7

cause of their medical problems at the time found by the district court.” Id. at 399.

The court declared:

We do not believe Minnesota’s applicable statutes of limitation were

intended to provoke the premature commencement of claims for

temporary sickness or discomfort. Rather the plaintiffs are entitled to

wait until the cause has been rationally identified.

Id. (emphasis added). Five years later, in Klempka v. G.D. Searle & Co., 963 F.2d

168 (8th Cir. 1992), we affirmed summary judgment where the undisputed evidence

established the plaintiff clearly knew she had pelvic inflamation disease and “the

injuries were, in her physician’s opinion, caused by the [intrauterine device].” Id. at

170 (emphasis added). 

In this case, Mrs. Tuttle presented evidence that both Tuttle and Dr. Regan, the

first physician to examine Tuttle, believed the lesion inside Tuttle’s mouth was

caused by oral infection and was treatable with antibiotics. The second treating

physician, Dr. Koutroupas, noted his first impression was “an infected tumor.” Dr.

Adams’ deposition testimony further substantiates their beliefs. We, therefore,

cannot say the evidence of “causal connection” before September 21, 1993, is so

clear that the limitations’ determination can be made as a matter of law. Mindful that

we must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all

reasonable inferences in her favor, we conclude the limitations issue is for the jury

to determine. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th

Cir. 1975).

B. Common Law Claims

1. Negligence Claims

Having concluded the statute of limitations issue cannot be decided as a matter

of law, we proceed to review the legal sufficiency of the common law claims. The

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district court noted in its Memorandum and Order that Mrs. Tuttle had conceded to

the dismissal of her negligent manufacture claim, including her claims of failure to

properly package, maintain, prepare for use, and compound. Thus, the remaining

claims against the smokeless tobacco manufacturers and the STC in Count I of the

Second Amended Complaint allege negligent misrepresentation and negligent failure

to warn.

a. Negligent Misrepresentation

Mrs. Tuttle alleges Lorillard and thirteen other tobacco manufacturers

negligently misrepresented their so-called “Frank Statement,” which was published

in more than 300 newspapers in January 1954. The “Frank Statement,” in part,

declared:

We accept an interest in people’s health as a basic responsibility,

paramount to every other consideration in our business. We believe the

products we make are not injurious to health. We always have and

always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard

the public health . . . . We are pledging aid and assistance to the research

effort into all phases of tobacco use and health. This joint financial aid

will of course be in addition to what is already being contributed by

individual companies. . . . This statement is being issued because we

believe the people are entitled to know where we stand on this matter

and what we intend to do about it.

Mrs. Tuttle also alleges the STC, as the agent of the smokeless tobacco industry,

negligently misrepresented the addictive and injurious effects of using smokeless

tobacco. 

In Smith v. Brutger Cos., 569 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 1997), the Minnesota

Supreme Court identified the elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation

involving the risk of physical harm as being: “(1) a duty of reasonable care in

conveying information; (2) breach of that duty by negligently giving false

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9

information; (3) reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations, which reliance is the

proximate cause of physical injury; and (4) damages.” Without foreclosing the future

possibility of recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation involving risk of

physical harm, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Smith declined to recognize the tort

based on the facts of the case, concluding the plaintiffs could not prove a causal

connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the injury sustained, nor could

the plaintiffs prove reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 414.

Mrs. Tuttle’s negligent misrepresentation claims against the smokeless tobacco

manufacturers and the STC fail as a matter of law because Mrs. Tuttle similarly

cannot prove Tuttle read and relied upon the alleged misrepresentations. Assuming

the smokeless tobacco manufacturers’ “Frank Statement” and the STC’s statements

contain material misrepresentations, the fact that these statements were widely

published in the media during the nearly forty years Tuttle used smokeless tobacco

does not prove Tuttle actually read the alleged misrepresentations and relied upon the

misrepresentations in continuing to use smokeless tobacco. 

Mrs. Tuttle filed this lawsuit after Tuttle died. The record on appeal contains

no admissible evidence identifying what statements attributable to any of the

defendants Tuttle actually read and actually relied upon to support his belief that

using smokeless tobacco did not endanger his health. In her affidavit prepared in

opposition to summary judgment, Mrs. Tuttle attests that, before his cancer diagnosis

and death, Tuttle told her (1) “they say in the papers that chewing is safe,” (2) “he

thought smoking was dangerous but had read that smokeless tobacco wasn’t,” (3)“he

felt he had been deceived by the tobacco companies’ claims that spit tobacco doesn’t

do anybody any harm and that it was a safe thing to do instead of smoking” and (4)

“if somebody would have told me in the early years what could happen I wouldn’t

have ever started chewing and I would have tried to stop.”

Mrs. Tuttle cannot rely on hearsay to avoid summary judgment. See Mays v.

Rhodes, 255 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding the unsworn statements in

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10

question were hearsay, and not cognizable on summary judgment motion);

Rademacher v. FMC Corp., 431 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). In ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he district court must base its determination

regarding the presence or absence of a material issue of factual dispute on evidence

that will be admissible at trial.” Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 8 F.3d 1307, 1310

(8th Cir. 1993); Bersch v. Rgnonti & Assocs., Inc., 584 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn. Ct.

App. 1998) (declaring“[a] district court must disregard inadmissible hearsay evidence

on a motion for summary judgment”).

 

Aside from being inadmissible hearsay, Tuttle’s purported statements are

exceptionally vague and conclusory. Tuttle’s statements fail to identify any

misrepresentation he actually read and relied upon in using smokeless tobacco.

Tuttle’s unsworn statements also fail to identify any party or parties responsible for

making the misrepresentation on which he allegedly relied. In her attempt to defeat

summary judgment, Mrs. Tuttle fails to lay the most basic foundation blocks for

establishing any reasonable reliance, and her affidavit fails to raise a genuine issue

of material fact on the crucial issue of reasonable reliance. Therefore, Mrs. Tuttle’s

claims for negligent misrepresentation resulting in physical harm must be dismissed.

See Smith, 569 N.W.2d at 414. 

b. Negligent Failure to Warn

Count I of the Second Amended Complaint also alleges the smokeless tobacco

manufacturers and the STC failed to warn Tuttle and the public of the dangerous

properties and addictive nature of smokeless tobacco. Based on the record before us,

Mrs. Tuttle does not appear to have conceded the dismissal of her negligent failure

to warn claims, which are neither barred by the statute of limitations, nor are they

preempted by the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986

(Smokeless Tobacco Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (2000). The Act’s savings clause

expressly preserves state tort liability by providing,“[n]othing in this chapter shall

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relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any

other person.” Id. § 4406(c).

To establish a negligent failure to warn claim under Minnesota law, a plaintiff

must show: (1) the defendants had reason to know of the dangers of using the

product; (2) “the warnings fell short of those reasonably required,” breaching the duty

of care; and (3) the lack of an adequate warning caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Erickson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 455 N.W.2d 74, 77-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).

Whether a duty to warn exists is a question of law. Germann v. F. L. Smithe Mach.

Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986). Assuming, without deciding, the

defendants had reason to know of the dangerous properties and addictive nature of

smokeless tobacco, had a legal duty to warn Tuttle and consumers at large, and

breached their duty by failing to provide adequate product warnings, the record on

appeal fails to establish a direct causal nexus between a failure to warn and the injury

sustained. Where the undisputed facts demonstrate a lack of causation between the

failure to warn and the injury sustained, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that

the issue of causation may be decided as a matter of law. Balder v. Haley, 399

N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987).

Proximate cause focuses on the individual product user and requires some

admissible evidence the product user would have acted differently had the

manufacturers provided adequate warnings. See Erickson, 455 N.W.2d at 78 (ruling

product users’ testimony that “if they had been made aware of the dangers of

improper ATV use, they would not have allowed [ ] children to operate the vehicle

or to be passengers” is sufficient evidence that failure to warn caused injury); Krein

v. Raudabough, 406 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (declaring “the . . .

failure to warn must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury,” and affirming

refusal to instruct jury on failure to warn, because the product user presented“no

evidence at trial that he would have acted differently had GMC provided a warning”

and adduced “no evidence which would reasonably tend to prove that GMC’s failure

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5

In products liability law, a majority of jurisdictions recognize a rebuttable

presumption that if a product comes with a warning, the user will read and heed the

warning. See Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837, 842-

845 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing presumption as applied under Arkansas, Louisiana,

New York, Iowa and New Jersey common law). When applied, the presumption

operates to the benefit of the manufacturer where adequate warnings are provided

because the manufacturer receives the benefit of the doubt that the warning provided

is effective in alerting the user of the product’s potential danger. Where no warning

is given, the presumption operates in favor of the user by presuming the user would

have read, understood, and heeded the warning. Id. at 842. The practical effect of

the presumption is to relieve a plaintiff of the burden of proving proximate cause. 

12

to warn . . . proximately caused [product users’] injuries”). To establish the prima

facie element of proximate cause, Mrs. Tuttle must present some affirmative evidence

Tuttle would have refrained from using smokeless tobacco had the defendants

provided adequate product warnings. The record on appeal contains a Reader’s

Digest article published in October 1996 that records Tuttle telling baseball players,

“When I started [using smokeless tobacco], no one told me it was harmful . . . I

thought [smokeless tobacco] was a safe substance for the 38 years I used it.” In her

affidavit, Mrs. Tuttle attests that after his oral cancer diagnosis Tuttle told her, “if

somebody would have told me in the early years what could happen I wouldn’t have

ever started chewing and I would have tried to stop.” As discussed above, Tuttle’s

unsworn, out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered

as evidence of proximate cause.

Importantly, the Minnesota state courts have not adopted the so-called

“heeding presumption”5

 within the context of a failure to warn claim. See Kallio v.

Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 99-100 (Minn. 1987) (sustaining failure to warn

verdict “[w]ithout deciding whether a rebuttable presumption exists that a warning

would have been heeded”). We recognize application of the heeding presumption

would be particularly beneficial in this case, where Tuttle died before testifying under

oath that he would have read and heeded warnings had they been provided by the

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6

By February 1987, the Smokeless Tobacco Act required smokeless tobacco

warnings in advertising and on packaging. 15 U.S.C. § 4402(a). Tuttle continued to

use smokeless tobacco until 1993, which undercuts any “heeding presumption” and

any reasonable reliance arguments.

13

smokeless tobacco manufacturers and their trade association. However, based on the

evidentiary record submitted and the status of the law in Minnesota, we do not

believe the Minnesota state courts would adopt the rebuttable presumption in this

case. Accordingly, we must conclude Mrs. Tuttle’s negligent failure to warn claims

fail for want of admissible proof of proximate causation.6

 

2. Fraud and Conspiracy Claims 

In Counts Two and Eight of the Second Amended Complaint, Mrs. Tuttle

alleges the smokeless tobacco manufacturers and the STC committed fraud and civil

conspiracy. While the district court dismissed these claims as being barred by the

statute of limitations, the court ruled alternatively that Mrs. Tuttle had failed to

establish the prima facie element of reliance. Our review of the record convinces us

no proof of reliance was presented, and reliance cannot be presumed in this case. See

Berg v. Berg, 275 N.W. 836, 840 (Minn. 1937) (declaring “fraud and undue influence

must be proved. Neither is presumed.”); Norwest Bank Midland v. Shinnick, 402

N.W.2d 818, 825 (Minn. App. 1987) (ruling “presumption of reliance is limited to

cases involving primarily omissions”); see also Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168,

178 n.21 (8th Cir. 1982) (explaining “this circuit’s view [is] that the presumption of

reliance is limited to cases involving primarily omissions”). Because the common

law fraud claim is legally insufficient for want of proof that Tuttle relied on the

smokeless tobacco manufacturers’ and the STC’s representations, we agree with the

district court’s ruling that the civil conspiracy claim, which depends on a viable

underlying tort, must fail as well. Harding v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 41 N.W.2d 818, 824

(Minn. 1950) (declaring “[t]he gist of the action is not the conspiracy charged, but the

tort working damage to the plaintiff”) (citation omitted); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570

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14

N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding “conspiracy count fails because it

is not supported by an underlying tort”).

C. Statutory Claims

Mrs. Tuttle further alleges in the Second Amended Complaint violations of the

Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, Minn. Stat. § 325F.68-70 (2000)

(Count III), Minnesota Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Minn. Stat. § 325D.09-16

(2000) (Count IV); and Minnesota False Statement in Advertising Act, Minn. Stat.

§ 325F.67 (2000) (Count VII). These statutory claims are governed by the same sixyear statute of limitations discussed above in Section IIA. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05,

subd. 1(2). However, “[t]his provision does not include a discovery allowance as

does the statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims.” Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp.,

875 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (D. Minn. 1995) (citing Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(2)),

aff’d, 87 F.3d 231 (8th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 179 (1997). Therefore, the six-year

limitations period commenced on the dates of sale, when the alleged violations of

these consumer statutes occurred. See id. at 1352-53. We agree with the district

court that the consumer protection claims depend on the purchase of a product within

the applicable six-year limitations period, and Mrs. Tuttle’s statutory claims are

untimely.

Even if the claims were timely filed and Mrs. Tuttle had standing to recover

damages under Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (private attorney general statute) in a

wrongful death action, we conclude her statutory claims fail for want of proof of a

causal nexus between the defendants’ conduct and Tuttle’s injuries. In Group Health

Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 11(Minn. 2001), the Minnesota

Supreme Court addressed the certified question “whether a plaintiff must plead and

prove reliance on the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations in order to recover

damages under Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, for violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.67,

325F.69, subd. 1, or 325D.13.” The court concluded“to prove their claims for

damages under the misrepresentation in sales statutes, the [plaintiffs] must establish

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15

a causal nexus between their alleged damages and the conduct of the defendants

alleged to violate the statutes.” Id. at 15. In explaining the causal requirement, the

court stated the plaintiffs (Health Maintenance Organizations) “must demonstrate the

defendants’ conduct had some impact on their members’ use of tobacco products that

caused their damages.” Id. at 14. The court further explained:

[I]n cases such as this, where the plaintiffs’ damages are alleged to be

caused by a lengthy course of prohibited conduct that affected a large

number of consumers, the showing of reliance that must be made to

prove a causal nexus need not include direct evidence of reliance by

individual consumers of defendants’ products. Rather, the causal nexus

and its reliance component may be established by other direct or

circumstantial evidence that the district court determines is relevant and

probative as to the relationship between the claimed damages and the

alleged prohibited conduct.

Id.

While the court declined to answer in detail what manner of proof would

suffice to establish the causal nexus between the claimed damages and defendants’

conduct, id. at 15, the court suggested the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), may

provide some guidance on the nature of proof required, and cited, as examples,

consumer testimony and circumstantial evidence, including consumer surveys,

consumer reaction tests, and market research. Id. at 14 n.9 & 15 n.11. Causation may

also be established by expert testimony. See Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris

USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2003). Although Mrs. Tuttle need not

present direct evidence of Tuttle’s individual reliance, Mrs. Tuttle must establish

some proof that the conduct of the smokeless tobacco manufacturers and the STC in

failing to warn caused consumers to continue using smokeless tobacco and to sustain

physical injury in reliance on the defendants’ conduct. The Minnesota Court of

Appeals has ruled for a plaintiff “to prove causation, a necessary element of her

statutory consumer fraud claims, she must at least present circumstantial evidence of

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some reliance on [defendants’]alleged misrepresentations.” Flynn v. Am. Home

Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 351 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). Because Mrs. Tuttle

failed to present any admissible evidence of reliance, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of the consumer protection claims.

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of

the defendants. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-1865 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/30/2004 Entry ID: 1794072