Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01479/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01479-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger R. Clayton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1479

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roger R. Clayton

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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 Submitted: January 11, 2016

 Filed: July 6, 2016

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Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Roger R. Clayton appeals the sentence imposed by the district court after he 1

pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and 18

U.S.C. § 2; to brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a bank robbery, in violation of

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States DistrictJudge for the

1

Eastern District of Missouri.

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18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 2; and to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We affirm.

I.

On October 8, 2013, Clayton and two accomplices, Candice Wright and Joshua

Thompson, traveled from Indiana to the home of another accomplice, Alisha Porter,

in Oran, Missouri. The following day, Clayton, Thompson, and Wright drove

Porter’s car to Morley, Missouri, to reconnoiter the First Commercial Bank and its

surrounding area. Afterward, the group returned to Porter’s home, where the four

agreed on a plan to rob the First Commercial Bank. On October 10, 2013, the group

drove back to the bank in two cars. Clayton and Thompson approached the rear

entrance of the bank as it was about to open while Porter, the getaway driver, and

Wright, the lookout, waited in their designated locations nearby. A bank employee

was unlocking the rear door when Clayton ran up to her, pointed a handgun at her

head, threatened to shoot her if she did not cooperate, and ordered her to open the

door and turn off the alarm. Once inside the bank, Clayton continued to threaten the

employee and point the gun at her head, while Thompson took $140,014 from the

vault and the employee’s teller drawer. Before leaving the bank, Clayton and

Thompson bound the employee’s hands behind her back and left her sitting on the

floor. 

Following his arrest in Ohio on October 16, 2013, Clayton was charged in a

four-count indictment, which included the three countsset forth above and one count

of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 371. 

Clayton entered into a plea agreement under which the government agreed to dismiss

the conspiracy charge.

Clayton’s presentence investigation report (PSR) initially calculated a

combined advisory sentencing range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment for the

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armed-bank-robbery and felon-in-possession-of-a-firearmoffenses. But because the

fifteen-year statutory minimum sentence for the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm

charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) was greater than 168 months, the advisory

sentencing range became 180 to 210 months’ imprisonment. The PSR next

incorporated Clayton’s offense of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a bank

robbery, which carried a statutory minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment,

to be served consecutively to his other sentences. The seven-year term was added to

the sentencing range, resulting in an effective advisory sentencing range of 264 to

294 months’ imprisonment.

The PSR revealed that Clayton’s first conviction was at age twelve for armed

disorderly conduct and that he had accumulated four juvenile convictions for violent

or weapons-related crimes. As an adult, he had been convicted of, among other

offenses, burglary, auto theft, attempted armed robbery, resisting a peace officer, and

intimidation with a dangerous weapon. 

The PSR recounted Clayton’s traumatic childhood, in which, among other

deprivations, he received little support or supervision from his family and was

subjected to both physical and emotional abuse, which included witnessing as a tenyear-old his mother being repeatedly physically abused by her boyfriend. Clayton

had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),

Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Mild Mental Retardation, Post Traumatic Stress

Disorder, and Environmental Disorder. He left school because oflack ofinterest after

completing the ninth grade.

Clayton raised no objections to the PSR’s sentencing calculations, but

requested the statutory minimum sentence of 264 months’ imprisonment, pointing to

his traumatic childhood and arguing that the minimum sentence would keep him in

prison until he was nearly sixty years old and thus would be sufficient to accomplish

the goals of sentencing.

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The district court sentenced Clayton to a term of 279 months’ imprisonment,

the middle of the Guidelines range. In doing so, the district court noted that this

sentence was shorter than the high end of the Guidelines range that it had initially

intended to impose, saying, “I’m willing to give you a little bit of relief, but it’s solely

because of your upbringing. . . . [T]he presentence is very revealing that, you know,

you didn’t have much of a chance.” The district court noted that the factors weighing

in favor of a longer sentence includedClayton’s criminal history and the “aggravating

circumstances of the offense,” but that it “cut it back to the middle of the guidelines

[because of your] difficult upbringing.”

II.

Clayton argues that the district court procedurally erred and that the sentence

imposed was substantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of the

sentence by first ensuring “that the district court committed no significant procedural

error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We then “consider the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Id. Because Clayton did not object at sentencing, we review his

procedural-error arguments only for plain error. See United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d

686, 690 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). 

A. Procedural Error

Clayton argues that the district court’s brief reference to Clayton’s difficult

childhood was insufficient to demonstrate that it had considered the “history and

characteristics of the defendant” as required by § 3553(a)(1). Procedural error can

include “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, . . . or failing to adequately explain

the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A district court need not “categorically

rehearse” each of the § 3553(a) factors, however, “as long as it is clear that they were

considered.” United States v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1049 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting

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United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006)). It is sufficient that the

record contain “evidence that the district court was aware of the relevant factors,” and

“[i]f a district court references some of the considerations contained in § 3553(a), we

are ordinarily satisfied that the district court was aware of the entire contents of the

relevant statute.” Id. (quoting United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (8th

Cir. 2008)). We look to “the entire sentencing record, not merely the district court’s

statements at the hearing.” United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir.

2008).

From its statements recounted above, we are satisfied that the district court

considered all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Although the court’s discussion of

the § 3553(a) factors was brief, the record shows that it was aware of the relevant

factors and that it considered them in imposing sentence.

Clayton argues that the district court did not adequately explain the sentence

it imposed because it did not discuss why it rejected Clayton’s argument in favor of

a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. But we conclude that the district

court’s earlier-recounted statements about why it was imposing lessthan the high-end

sentence that it had intended to impose adequately explained why it believed that a

low-end sentence would be inadequate in light of Clayton’s criminal history and his

behavior during the bank robbery. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not

commit procedural error, plain or otherwise, in sentencing Clayton.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion,

considering the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “A district court

abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a relevant factor, gives significant

weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers only appropriate factors but

nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies

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outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” United States

v. San-Miguel, 634 F.3d 471, 475 (8thCir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jones, 509

F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2007)).

Clayton argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

district court placed undue weight on Clayton’s criminal history and insufficient

weight on his childhood abuse, history of mental illness, and cognitive impairments. 

“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and

assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate

sentence.” Id. at 476 (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.

2009)). For all of the reasons earlier set forth, we conclude that the court did not

commit a clear error of judgment by placing greater weight on some relevant factors

and less weight on others than Clayton would have preferred.

Clayton argues that by imposing a sentence fifteen months longer than the

statutory minimum, the district court failed to consider two relevant factors: (1)

whether the sentence was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with

the purposes set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)],” and (2) whether the sentence

would cause “unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records

who have been found guilty ofsimilar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (6). In light

of Clayton’s conduct during the bank robbery and his criminal history, the district

court’s decision to sentence Clayton to fifteen months longer than the statutory

minimum does not represent a clear error of judgment. Finally, the cases cited by

Clayton to support his sentencing-disparities argument involved defendants whose

conduct and criminal histories are distinguishable from Clayton’s.

The sentence is affirmed.

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