Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02789/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02789-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Stockton
Defendant
Robert Wooten
Plaintiff

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT WOOTEN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2789 FCD EFB PS

vs.

THE CITY OF STOCKTON, 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant. 

 /

This action was referred to the undersigned under Local Rule 72-302(c)(21), pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This case was before the undersigned on August 12, 2007, for hearing on

the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Charmaine Virginia Jackson appeared as

counsel for defendant. Plaintiff appeared on behalf of himself. The court has carefully

considered the moving and opposing papers and the oral argument at the hearing, and for the

reasons set forth below, recommends that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied

and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding on the complaint filed by plaintiff on December 8, 2006, in

which plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1343. Compl., at ¶ 3. The basis of the complaint is plaintiff’s allegation that the City of

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Stockton, as a political subdivision of San Joaquin County, California, altered its voting

practices and procedures after 1968, without first obtaining “preclearance” from the federal

government in violation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1973. Compl., at ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff alleges that this “improper alteration does in fact dilute the ability of the minority vote

to impact elections.” Compl., at ¶ 7. Although plaintiff does not identify the voting practices

and procedures that he claims violate the Voting Rights Act, he asks the court to declare them

null and void, and to have “the results of such elections set aside.” Compl., at 2:12:-16. Finally

he asks that defendant be compelled to return to the practices and procedures in effect prior to

“the complained of change.” Id.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on May 29, 2007, and defendant filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment on July 13, 2007.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 avoids unnecessary trials in cases with

no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 18

F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine

disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be determined

through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility determinations of

conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

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summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to overcome summary judgement an opposing party must show a dispute that is

both genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome. Two steps are

necessary. First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are

material. Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether

material factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id., at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

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 The nonmoving party with the burden of proof “must establish each element of his

claim with significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Barnett v. Centoni,

31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). A complete failure of proof on an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial, and entitles

the moving party to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

2

 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.1

 The opposing

party must demonstrate that disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that disputes are genuine, i.e., the

parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 631. 

The opposing party may not rest upon the pleadings’ mere allegations or denials, but must present

evidence of specific disputed facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.2

 Conclusory statements

cannot defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d

1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

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 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (pro se pleadings are to be liberally

construed).

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omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment.

B. Voting Rights Act

Plaintiff asks this court to find that the Ninth Circuit decision in Badillo v. City of

Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992) has been effectively overruled. He argues that two United

States Supreme Court decisions – Lopez v. Monterey Co., 525 U.S. 266 (1999) and Beer v. United

States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) – require reversal of Badillo. In particular, he argues that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez holds that the City of Stockton is a political subdivision of

San Joaquin County and that San Joaquin County is a “covered” county under section 5 of the

Voting Rights Act. He appears to argue that the decision in Lopez undermines the Ninth Circuit’s

ruling in Badillo that the City of Stockton was not a covered jurisdiction.

First and foremost, this court has no authority to overturn a decision of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. “Only an en banc panel may overturn existing Ninth

Circuit precedent.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. 1997).

Second, assuming plaintiff’s argument to be that the Supreme Court has necessarily

overturned, sub silentio, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Badillo, his claim, even construed liberally,3

fails as a matter of law. Based on plaintiff’s papers and representations at the hearing, the court

construes his complaint to allege that defendant violated the preclearance requirements of Section

5 of the Voting Rights Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

Section 5 of the Act freezes election practices or procedures in “covered jurisdictions”

until new procedures have been subjected to “preclearance” review, either by the Attorney

General of the United States or a federal court. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140

(1976). Whether or not a jurisdiction is “covered” by the preclearance requirements of Section 5

is determined by a formula set forth in Section 4 of the Act. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130,

133, n.2 (1981) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973b). 

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 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ dilution

claims under section 2 of the Act because plaintiffs failed to make the required showing

articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 (1986). That is, plaintiffs failed to show

that a “bloc voting majority was usually able to defeat candidates supported by a politically

cohesive, geographically insular minority group.” Badillo, 956 F.2d at 886. “While plaintiffs’

evidence clearly established that Hispanics and blacks together could form a majority in a

single-member district, the evidence failed to establish that such a combined group of blacks and

Hispanics would vote in a politically cohesive manner that would guarantee election of a

minority representative.” Id., at 886. 

5

 Based on the formula set forth in Section 4 of the Act, the appendix lists the

jurisdictions to which the preclearance requirement of Section 5 applies. Neither San Joaquin

County nor the City of Stockton are among the covered California jurisdictions. Id.

6

Again, it is unclear from the complaint which changes in voting procedure plaintiff seeks

to challenge, but based on his representations at the hearing, he is challenging the same changes

that were at issue in Badillo. In Badillo, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal

of a voting rights action by Hispanic and black voters challenging the City of Stockton’s adoption

of an at-large legislative election system. Badillo, 956 F.2d at 891. The Court approved the

district court’s determination that plaintiffs could not proceed under section 5 of the Act because

the City of Stockton was not a covered jurisdiction. Id., at 886.4

Indeed, the City of Stockton is not a covered jurisdiction for purposes of section 5 of the

Act, and nothing in Lopez changes that. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 51, App. (identifying jurisdictions

covered under section 4(b) of the Act).5

Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court in Lopez decided that “although the state [of

California] was not expressly delineated as a covered jurisdiction under [the Act], Monterey

County was nevertheless subject to the [preclearance] provisions of the Act as a result of

California’s literacy requirement that was in effect on the date the [Act] was activated.” See Pl.’s

Mot. for Summ. J., at 2:5-15. Plaintiff argues that based on this finding with regard to Monterey

County, San Joaquin County – and by extension, the City of Stockton – must also be subject to

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6

 Defendant challenges plaintiff’s characterization of the City of Stockton as a political

subdivision of San Joaquin County. The court acknowledges that objection, but does not address

it here. As discussed above, plaintiff challenges defendant’s change from district to at-large city

council elections. Neither the City of Stockton nor San Joaquin County are covered by the

preclearance provisions of Section 5, so whether or not Stockton is a “subdivision” of the county

has no bearing on the court’s analysis. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 51, App.; Badillo, 956 F.2d at 886. 

7

 Plaintiff’s reliance on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), is equally unavailing. 

In Beer, it was similarly undisputed that New Orleans was a covered jurisdiction. See also 28

C.F.R. Pt. 51, App. (2006). 

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the preclearance requirements of section 5.6

 

Plaintiff misreads Lopez. Contrary to his assertions, the Court in Lopez merely

acknowledged that Monterey County was “unquestionably subject to Section 5.” Lopez, 525 U.S.

at 281. Indeed, Monterey County is specifically designated a covered jurisdiction under the Act. 

Significantly, however, neither San Joaquin County nor the City of Stockton are. See 28 C.F.R.

Pt. 51, App.; Badillo, 956 F.2d at 886. The Court in Lopez did not broaden coverage to any

previously uncovered counties. Rather, it held that a covered jurisdiction could not administer

state-mandated changes regarding the election of judges without first subjecting the changes to

the preclearance requirements. Id., at 269.7

Nothing in Lopez undermines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Badillo, which remains

controlling in this circuit. Moreover, plaintiff has presented no facts that otherwise distinguish

his claims from those rejected in Badillo. Neither San Joaquin County nor the City of Stockton

are covered jurisdictions. Therefore, as confirmed in Badillo, neither is subject to the

preclearance provisions of section 5. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to

comply with section 5 fails as a matter of law.

Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as asserting a dilution

claim pursuant to section 2 of the Act, that claim, too, fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff

challenges the same voting procedure changes that were at issue in Badillo. The Ninth Circuit

already held that those changes did not dilute the minority vote in Stockton, and plaintiff has

alleged no facts to distinguish his claims from those already decided in Badillo. Moreover, he has

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presented no evidence or argument on summary judgment to support those claims, let alone

identify a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court recommends that plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment be denied, and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be

granted. 

Finally, the court addresses plaintiff’s request for a three-judge court to preside over this

action. For the reasons previously stated, plaintiff’s claims are insubstantial and do not warrant

convening a three-judge court. See Ariz. Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep.

Redistricting Comm'n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894 (D. Ariz. 2005) (citing Simkins v. Gressette, 631

F.2d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1980)); see also Montgomery v. Leflore County Republican Exec. Comm.,

776 F. Supp. 1142, 1144-45 (D. Miss. 1991) (“Because of the significant time and expense

involved with impaneling a three-judge court, courts confronted with § 5 claims have consistently

held that the single judge to whom the case is assigned may properly dismiss § 5 claims that are

wholly insubstantial and completely without merit. Regardless of the nature of the relief sought, a

single judge has the authority to review a complaint seeking the convening of a three-judge court

in order to determine whether it states a substantial claim and one over which the court would

have jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, it is recommended that plaintiff’s request for a three-judge

court be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied; 

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted;

3. Plaintiff’s request for a three-judge court be denied; and, 

4. The Clerk be directed to close the case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 11, 2008.

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