Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-17-01244/USCOURTS-ca7-17-01244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Brown
Respondent
McKinley Kelly
Petitioner

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17‐1244

MCKINLEY KELLY,

Applicant,

v.

RICHARD BROWN,

Respondent.

____________________

On Motion for an Order Authorizing the District Court to Entertain a

Second or Successive Petition for Collateral Review.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 6, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 16, 2017

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, POSNER, and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. McKinley Kelly has filed an appli‐

cation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), seeking authoriza‐

tion to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under § 2254. Kelly is serving a 110‐year sentence (two

consecutive terms of 55 years) for two murders he committed

when he was 16 years old. He will first be eligible for parole

on February 1, 2050, when he will be 70 years old. Kelly wants

to challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.

Case: 17-1244 Document: 5 Filed: 03/16/2017 Pages: 8
2 No. 17‐1244

2455 (2012) (mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders is

unconstitutional), which was made retroactive by Montgom‐

ery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Miller applies not just to

sentences of natural life, but also to sentences so long that, alt‐

hough set out as a term of years, they are in reality a life sen‐

tence. McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016).  

Because Kelly stated a possible claim to relief under Mil‐

ler, we invited the State to respond, which it has done. It ar‐

gues that Kelly cannot state a claim to relief under Miller be‐

cause his sentencing judge was afforded significant discretion

by the Indiana Code to fashion an appropriate sentence and,

in fact, considered Kelly’s age at the time of the offense in mit‐

igation.  

In resolving Kelly’s direct appeal, the Supreme Court of

Indiana explained that IC § 35‐50‐2‐3 set a presumptive sen‐

tence of 55 years for murder and allowed a sentencing court

to increase or decrease the presumptive sentence by no more

than ten years for special circumstances. The court also was

allowed to decide whether sentences for multiple convictions

should run concurrently or consecutively. IC § 35‐38‐1‐7.1.

Kelly v. State, 719 N.E. 2d 391, 394‐95 (Ind. 1999). In other

words, Kelly’s sentence could have been as low as 45 years

(55 minus 10 for each count, with the two sentences running

concurrently) or as high as 130 years (55 plus 10 for each

count, with the two sentences running consecutively).

In Kelly’s case, counsel argued his age in mitigation,

pressing hard on the fact that “[n]obody is the same person

when they’re 25 or 35 or 45 or whatever, that they were when

they were 16,” and “[y]ou don’t know to what extent their

conduct is the product of gross immaturity or whether there

Case: 17-1244 Document: 5 Filed: 03/16/2017 Pages: 8
No. 17‐1244 3

is something more missing.” (Sent’g Tr. at 1326‐27.) The sen‐

tencing judge identified six aggravating circumstances:

(1) Kelly was on probation with the Juvenile Court

at the time of the crimes;  

(2) Kelly fired the first shot and his shots killed the

first of three victims, setting the subsequent murders

in motion;  

(3) Kelly shot the victims at close range;  

(4) the murders evince Kellyʹs lack ofrespect for hu‐

man life;  

(5) there was a risk that Kelly would commit future

crimes; and  

(6) Kelly killed more than one person.

It then considered two mitigating conditions:

(1) Kelly was sixteen years old at the time of the of‐

fense and seventeen years old at the time of sentencing;

and  

(2) Kelly had no adult or felony convictions.

Kelly, 719 N.E. 2d at 395. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed

Kelly’s sentence, holding that, “[d]espite its long list of iden‐

tified and recognized aggravating circumstances, the trial

court imposed the presumptive, rather than an aggravated,

sentence for each murder. The trial court properly outlined its

reasoning for [Kelly’s] sentences, and adequately balanced

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances with which it

was presented.” Id. at 395.  

Case: 17-1244 Document: 5 Filed: 03/16/2017 Pages: 8
4 No. 17‐1244

We agree with the State: Kelly was afforded all he was

entitled to under Miller. The sentencing court had considera‐

ble leeway in fashioning Kelly’s sentence and in fact consid‐

ered his age when deciding on the appropriate term. Accord‐

ingly, we DENY authorization and DISMISS his application.

Case: 17-1244 Document: 5 Filed: 03/16/2017 Pages: 8
No. 17‐1244 5

POSNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. When McKinley Kelly

was 16 years old, he shot and killed two people. Tried and

convicted in an Indiana state court of the two murders, he

was sentenced to 110 years in prison. Even if, as the State

says, Kelly will be eligible for parole when he is 70, he never‐

theless is effectively serving a life sentence. The ACLU of

Michigan reports that the average life expectancy of an in‐

mate sentenced to life in prison is 58 years; for African‐

Americans like Kelly the average life expectancy is 56; and

for juveniles sentenced to life the average is 501⁄2 years. See

ACLU of Michigan, “Michigan Life Expectancy Data for

Youth Serving Natural Life Sentences,” April 2013,

http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp‐content/uploads/2010/

02/Michigan‐Life‐Expectancy‐Data‐Youth‐Serving‐Life.pdf

(visited March 15, 2017, as were the other websites in this

opinion).

Kelly claims that his sentence is unconstitutional and that

he therefore is entitled to be resentenced. We should author‐

ize the district court to accept a second petition for a writ of

habeas corpus from Kelly, to enable the validity of his claim

to be determined.

The Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,

2469 (2012), outlawed statutes that require judges to impose

a life sentence without parole on a juvenile offender, defined

as anyone who committed the crime (or crimes) before his

eighteenth birthday. Miller requires judges to give special

consideration to the fact of youth and how it reflects on the

culpability of the offender. For “children are constitutionally

different from adults for purposes of sentencing ... because

juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects

for reform.” Id. at 2464. “[Y]outh is more than a chronologi‐

Case: 17-1244 Document: 5 Filed: 03/16/2017 Pages: 8
6 No. 17‐1244

cal fact. It is a time of immaturity, irresponsibility, impetu‐

ousness, and recklessness. It is a moment and condition of

life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and

to psychological damage. And its signature qualities are all

transient.” Id. at 2467 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2468;

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).

In 2015 the Department of Justice released data from a 7‐

year longitudinal study of more than 1,300 “serious juvenile

offenders”—those who had committed felony‐level violent,

property, or drug crimes. See Laurence Steinberg et al., “Psy‐

chosocial Maturity and Desistance From Crime in a Sample

of Serious Juvenile Offenders,” Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, March 2015, www.ojjdp.gov/

pubs/248391.pdf; Melissa Sickmund and Charles Puzzanche‐

ra, eds., “Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2014 National Re‐

port,” Ch. 3, National Center for Juvenile Justice, December

2014, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/downloads/NR2014.

pdf. The Justice Department study revealed that more than

90 percent of juvenile offenders grow out of such antisocial

behavior by young adulthood and do not re‐offend after

their first contact with a court—and that regardless of the

sanction imposed on the child. Even after matching the sub‐

jects with the gravity of their offenses—whether they were

incarcerated, placed in residential facilities, put on proba‐

tion, or received community‐based services—the vast major‐

ity did not re‐offend; instead they grew up. Thomas A.

Loughran et al., “Studying Deterrence Among High‐Risk

Adolescents,” August 2015, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248617.pdf.

Researchers conclude that “most juvenile offending is, in

fact, limited to adolescence” and that “the process of matur‐

ing out of crime is linked to the process of maturing more

Case: 17-1244 Document: 5 Filed: 03/16/2017 Pages: 8
No. 17‐1244 7

generally, including the development of impulse control and

future orientation.” Steinberg et al., supra, at 1. The “signa‐

ture qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature,

the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in

younger years can subside,” and generally does. Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005), quoting Johnson v. Texas,

509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993).

As a result of these insights, nineteen states now prohibit

imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, The

Sentencing Project, “State Advances in Criminal Justice Re‐

form, 2016,” p. 4, January 2017, www.sentencingproject.org/

publications/state‐advances‐criminal‐justice‐reform‐2016; the

incarceration of juveniles in both adult and juvenile facilities

has fallen, Ashley Nellis & Marc Mauer, “What We Can

Learn from the Amazing Drop in Juvenile Incarceration,”

January 24, 2017, www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/24/

what‐we‐can‐learn‐from‐the‐amazing‐drop‐in‐juvenile‐

incarceration#.tWDqrzgtg; and likewise the number of hom‐

icides committed by juveniles, “OJJDP Statistical Briefing

Book,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven‐

tion, May 2016, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/offenders/qa03105

.asp?qaDate=2014.

Consistent with these trends, the Supreme Court con‐

cluded in Miller that a life sentence is unconstitutional for all

but the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irrepa‐

rable corruption.” Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S. Ct. at 2469,

quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); see also

Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. Yet in

sentencing Kelly the trial judge said only one thing relating

to his youth when he committed the murders: “The mitigat‐

ing factors, as far as Mr. Kelly is concerned, is [the judge

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8 No. 17‐1244

meant “are”] the fact that he’s 17 years old right now and

[was] 16 years [old] at the time he committed this offense.”

So cursory a statement does not evidence the deliberate re‐

flection on Kelly’s character that would be necessary to con‐

clude that he is “irretrievably depraved” and his “rehabilita‐

tion is impossible.” Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 570;

Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 136 S. Ct. at 733. As far as the

record reflects, Kelly is a typical youthful offender. We do

not know the details of the fight that resulted in his shooting

two people, but the judge found that the killings were not

planned and were tragic for everyone involved, including

Kelly. The judge mused that there “have always been disa‐

greements among young people” and that what would have

been a fist fight or a knife fight in years past, today has ele‐

vated consequences because of the ubiquity of guns; not the

stuff of a crime demonstrating the complete depravity and

irredeemability of Kelly.

We should allow him to pursue his Miller claim in the

district court, which should conduct a hearing to determine

whether he is or is not incorrigible.

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