Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02084/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Raymond Woods
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

F l LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

'femh Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

OCT 2 0 1989 

ROBERT L. ~HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

RAYMOND WOODS I 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 88-2084 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-35) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael J. Norton, Acting United States Attorney, Michael P. 

Carey, Assistant United States Attorney, and Kathryn Meyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender and Vicki Mandell-King, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, HENLEY* and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

*The Honorable J. Smith Henley, Senior United States Circuit Judge 

for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

**After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a). lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore submitted 

without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 1 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant, Raymond Woods, appeals the denial of 

credit on his prison sentence for time spent on bond in a 

residential treatment center {"halfway house") prior to the 

commencement of his sentence. Woods argues that statute entitles 

him to such credit and that a denial violates his constitutional 

right to equal protec~ion because halfway house residents who have 

commenced their sentences are granted credit, while pre-sentence 

residents are not. We have jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 

and affirm. 

I. 

On February 4, 1988, Woods was arrested and charged with 

assault on a federal officer. On February 8, the district court 

released him on bond with the condition that he reside at 

Independence House, a halfway house. On March 2, the district 

court modified Woods's bond to enable him to participate in work 

release. On April 14, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rob and 

assault a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. S 371. On April 21, bond was 

modifi ed to enable Woods to spend weekends at home pending 

sentence. On June 24, the court sentenced Woods to 27 months 

imprisonment. Woods unsuccessfully sought to reduce this sentence 

with credit for the time he resided at the halfway house. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 2 
II. 

The Attorney General has the initial discretion to credit a 

prison term with time spent in custody prior to commencement of 

sentence. United States v. Baez, 732 F.2d 780, 782 (lOth Cir. 

1984). A defendant must therefore exhaust his administrative 

remedies with the Attorney General before seeking judicial review. 

United States v. Mitchell, 845 F.2d 951, 952 (11th Cir. 1988). 

However, a defendant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

does not preclude judicial review where the government fails to 

raise an objection. See, ~, Granberry v. Greer, 481 u.s. ·129, 

132-34 {1987) {state may waive exhaustion requirement in federal 

habeas corpus action); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 

385, 393 (1982) {exhaustion of administrative remedies is not 

jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII suit but merely condition 

precedent subject to waiver and estoppel); Middendorf v. Henry, 

425 u.s. 25, 29 n.6 (1975} (court martialed serviceman's' failure 

to exhaust military remedies no bar to judicial review where 

military waives exhaustion requirement); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 

U.S. 319, 330-31 (1975) (Social Security Administration can waive 

exhaustion requirement at any stage of administrative process); 

Reed v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 779, 783 (lOth Cir. 1985) (same). 

Because the government has not raised exhaustion in the instant 

case, we deem it waived and address the merits of Woods's appeal. 

III. 

Disposition of Woods's claim requires a two-step inquiry. 

First, we must determine whether 18 u.s.c. § 3585 entitles a 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 3 
criminal defendant credit for pre-sentence custody in a 

conditional release environment. If S 3585 does not apply to 

defendants on conditional release, we must then consider whether 

providing credit to a halfway house resident serving his sentence, 

while denying credit for such residence prior to commencement of 

sentence, violates equal protection. Application of these facts 

to 18 u.s.c. § 3585 and analysis of Woods's equal protection claim 

are questions of law subject to de novo review. Supre v. 

Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

A. 

The statute governing credit for time served prior to trial 

provides in pertinent part: 

A defendant shall be given credit toward the 

service of a term of imprisonment for any time 

he has spent in official detention prior to 

the date the sentence commences-

(1) as a result of the offense for which 

the sentence was imposed .••• 

18 u.s.c. § 3585(b} (emphasis supplied}. Section 3585 replaced 18 

u.s.c. § 3568 which provided that a defendant receive credit for 

time spent "in custody'' prior to commencement of his sentence. S. 

Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 128-129, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3311-12. Congress did "not intend 

a different result" from the old statute (18 u.s.c. § 3568) 

because only time served in "official custody" could be credited 

against jail time. Id. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, 

the only difference between S 3585 and the superseded section is 

that the latter applies to defendants accused of committing crimes 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 4 
prior to November 1, 1987. See Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 30-

31 (2d Cir. 1988). We find nothing in the language of 18 u.s.c. § 

3585 itself or its legislative history to indicate a departure 

from the precedents decided under the predecessor statute. 

This court considered whether a prisoner could receive credit 

for time spent on bond in Ortega v. United States, 510 F.2d 412 

(lOth Cir. 1975). We concluded that no such credit was 

envisioned, holding that "the 'custody' contemplated by § 3568 

relates to actual custodial incarceration." Id. at 413. Other 

circuits considering this question have reached similar results. 

See, ~, United States v. Mares, 868 F.2d 151, 152 (5th Cir. 

1989}; Villaume v. United States Dept. of Justice, 804 F.2d 498, 

499 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 s.ct. 1908 (1987); United 

States v. Golden, 795 F.2d_ 19, 21 (3d Cir. 1986); United States 

v. Robles, 563 F.2d 1308, 1309 {9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 

u.s. 925 (1978). 

For the purpose of calculating credit for time served under 

18 u.s.c. § 3585, "official detention" means imprisonment in a 

place of confinement, not stipulations or conditions imposed upon 

a person not subject to full physical incarceration. See Robles, 

563 F.2d at 1309 (conditional release on bond not custody); United 

States v. Peterson, 507 F.2d 1191, 1192 (D.c. Cir. 1974) 

("custody" under § 3568 "means detention or imprisonment in a 

place of confinement"); Polakoff v. United States, 489 F.2d 727, 

730 (5th Cir. 1974} (defendant's time on "highlf restricted bond" 

not "custody" under § 3568). Although a criminal defendant is 

entitled credit under 18 u.s.c. § 3585 for time spent in detention 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 5 
prior to commencement of sentence, no such credit is allowed for 

time spent on conditional release. 

In Anderberg v. Martin, 679 F.Supp. 1034 (W.D. Okla. 1987), a 

prisoner sought credit for time spent at a halfway house while on 

conditional release. Despite the fact that the defendant was not 

completely at liberty, the court held that he was not entitled to 

any credit. 

Credited custody is equated not just with 

"severe restraint on individual liberty," but 

with the punishment of incarceration. 

Although restrictions were placed on 

petitioner's conduct, they were in no way 

equal to the restrictions placed on a person physically confined in a jail or similar 

institution. 

Id. at 1036 (quoting United States v. Hoskow, 460 F.Supp 929, 931 

(E.D. Mich. 1978)). See also Ramsey v. Brennan, 878 F.2d 995, 996 

(7th Cir. 1989) (tim~ spent in halfway house as condition of bond 

not creditable under § 3568). We find this reasoning persuasive 

and fully applicable to the definition of "official detention" in 

18 u.s.c. § 3585(b). 

It is important to distinguish the definition of detention 

under 18 u.s.c. S 3585 from the definition of custody under 

federal habeas corpus. See 28 u.s.c. § 2241. The Supreme Court 

has adopted an expansive definition of custody for purposes of 

conferring standing to bring a habeas corpus action. See Hensley 

v. Municipal Court, 411 u.s. 345, 351-52 (1973) (petitioner 

released on own recognizance meets "custody" requirement of 18 

u.s.c. S 2241). This definition, however, has never been extended 

to prisoners seeking credit for pre-sentence detention. Ortega, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 6 
510 F.2d at 413; Mares, 868 F.2d at 152 (federal habeas statute 

"irrelevant to the definition of custody under§ 3568"). It thus 

has no bearing on 18 u~s.c. § 3585. 

We hold that 18 u.s.c. § 3585 does not entitle Woods to 

credit for time spent at Independence House when he was on bond. 

See Ortega, 510 F.2d at 413. Although the court required, as a 

condition of release, that Woods reside at Independence House, 

this restriction does not equal the deprivation of liberty 

experienced by a person incarcerated in a jail facility. See 

Ramsey, 878 F.2d at 996; Anderberg, 679 F.Supp. at 1036. As such, 

Woods is not entitled to credit under 18 u.s.c. S 3585. 

B. 

A two-part test is required to evaluate Woods•s contention 

that giving credit to halfway house residents serving their 

sentences, while denying such credit to residents who have not 

commenced their sentence, violates equal protection. First, we 

must determine whether pre-sentence residents of Independence 

House are ttsimilarly situated" to post-sentence prisoners. See 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 u.s. 432, 439 

(1985). If the groups are not similarly situated, there is no 

equal protection violation. If they are similarly situated, the 

government must demonstrate a rational basis for the disparate 

treatment. Id. at 440-41. Because pre-sentence residents of 

halfway houses are not a suspect class, a rational basis will 

render their disparate treatment constitutional. See id. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 7 
Here, we have no factual record from which to determine 

whether residents of Independence House serving their sentence 

experience the same level of restraint as those who have not yet 

commenced their sentence. However, even if the two groups are 

equally treated, we hold as a matter of law that their divergent 

legal status negates the possibility that they are similarly 

situated. Post-sentence residents have been adjudicated guilty 

and are serving their sentence at Independence House pursuant to 

the Attorney General's discretion to determine the conditions of 

punishment. 1 In contrast, pre-sentence residents are not being 

punished; they are conditionally released to Independence House to 

protect the community and assure their presence at trial and 

sentencing. 2 See United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 958-59 

l The Attorney General•s authority to house prisoners in 

halfway houses is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 400l(b) which provides in pertinent part: 

(1) The control and management of Federal 

penal and correctional institutions, except military or naval institutions, shall be 

vested in the Attorney General ••• 

(2) The Attorney General may establish and 

conduct industries, farms, and other 

activities and classify the inmates; and 

provide for their proper government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, 

and reformation. 

2 A court's authority to grant a criminal defendant conditional 

release is codified in 18 u.s.c. 3142(c) which provides: 

Release on conditions.--(!} If the judicial officer determines that ••• release [on 

personal recognizance] will not reasonably 

assure the appearance of the person as 

required or will endanger the safety of any 

other person or the community, such judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-2084 Document: 01019408189 Date Filed: 10/20/1989 Page: 8 
(lOth Cir. 1985) (en bane) (purpose of bail not punitive). For 

Woods to be similarly situated, he would have to compare himself 

to other pre-sentence residents at Independence House. See 

Anderberg, 679 F.Supp. at 1036-37; Brown v. Rison, 673 F.Supp. 

1505, 1508-09 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 

woods invokes Johnson v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 

1983), where the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award of credit for 

time served by a pre-sentence resident in a halfway house on equal 

protection grounds. In Johnson, the government conceded without 

argument that pre- and post-sentence residents were similarly 

situated and failed to argue any rational basis for only giving 

credit to the latter group. Id. at 340. Here, the government 

denies that pre- and post-sentence residents are similarly 

situated and advances a rational basis for their disparate 

treatment. Appellant's reliance upon Johnson is therefore 

inapposite. See Ramsey, 878 F.2d at 997 (rejecting Johnson's 

equal protection analysis altogether). 

AFFIRMED. 

{footnote continued from previous page) 

the person-

(B) subject to the least restrictive 

further condition, or combination of 

conditions, that such judicial officer 

determines will reasonably assure the 

appearance of the person as required and 

the safety of any other person and the 

community •••• 

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