Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07079/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07079-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edmond Leon Leopard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2li 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~OBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

EDMOND LEON LEOPARD, aka 

"Red" Leopard, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 90-7079 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-90-00043-01) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Ike Allen Laws, Jr., of Laws & Murdoch, P.A., Russellville, 

Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant. 

John Raley, United States Attorney, Paul G. Hess, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Edmond Leon Leopard appeals his conviction and 

resulting sentence following a jury trial in which he was found to 

have: 1) knowingly and intentionally attempted to manufacture 

Appellate Case: 90-7079 Document: 01019297221 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 1 
methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance; 2) knowingly 

and intentionally possessed a listed chemical, knowing or having 

reasonable cause to believe that the listed chemical would be used 

to manufacture a schedule II controlled substance; 3) knowingly 

and intentionally possessed with the intent to distribute 

methamphetamine; 4) knowingly used and carried a firearm during 

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or crimes for which he 

may be prosecuted in a court of the United States; and 5) 

knowingly possessed a firearm which had been shipped or 

transported in interstate commerce, affecting commerce thereby, 

after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment 

for a term exceeding one year. 

The district court denied Mr. Leopard's motion to suppress 

evidence seized pursuant to a search of his pickup and refused to 

instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of 

a controlled substance. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on 

all five counts charged. The presentence report provided for a 

base offense level of 36 which was based on testimony that 41.7 

pounds of methamphetamine could have been produced by Mr. Leopard 

with the chemicals and equipment involved. The district court, 

after conducting a presentence hearing, followed the presentence 

report and sentenced Mr. Leopard to a term of 327 months as to 

each of counts I and III and 120 months as to each of counts II 

and V, all terms to be served concurrently. As to count IV, 

Mr. Leopard was sentenced to sixty months in prison. The sentence 

for count IV is to be served consecutively to the sentences in the 

remaining counts. 

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Before this court, Mr. Leopard argues that: 1) there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of attempting to manufacture 

a controlled substance in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988): 

2) the court erred in determining that he had sufficient chemicals 

on hand to manufacture 41.7 pounds of methamphetamine and thus 

inaccurately calculated his sentence under the federal sentencing 

guidelines: 3) a pistol and an amount of methamphetamine found in 

his pickup during a warrantless search should have been 

suppressed: and 4) the jury should have been instructed on the 

lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance. 

We review these issues in order and affirm the district court. 1 

Sufficiency of the Evidence of Attempt to Manufacture 

Our standard of review on this claim is to determine whether, 

after reviewing the record as a whole, "'[t]he evidence--both 

direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom--is sufficient if, when taken in the light 

most favorable to the government, a reasonable [trier of fact] 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

United States v. Cox, 929 F.2d 1511, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(quoting United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1497 (lOth Cir. 

1990)). 2 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

on 

Mr. Leopard did not move for a directed verdict of acquittal 

this count or object at the close of the Government's case 

(continued on next page) 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-7079 Document: 01019297221 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 3 
In order to convict Mr. Leopard of attempting to manufacture 

methamphetamine, the government was required to prove: 1) the 

required criminal intent and (2) "an act or omission constituting 

a 'substantial step' toward commission of the substantive 

offense." United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1429 

(lOth Cir. 1990). Mr. Leopard argues that the evidence presented 

at trial did not show the required "substantial step" sufficient 

to constitute an attempt, and that the government offered no proof 

that he intended to manufacture an illegal substance. 

The unrebutted evidence adduced at trial established that 

Mr. Leopard, after preliminary discussion and planning, agreed to 

meet a DEA undercover agent for the purpose of purchasing 

chemicals and equipment necessary to the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. As part of their undercover operation, DEA 

agents loaded a U-Haul truck with the chemicals and equipment 

discussed by the parties and necessary to the manufacture of 

methamphetamine and arranged to meet Mr. Leopard to facilitate the 

exchange. Witnesses testified that Mr. Leopard drove into the 

Walmart parking lot in Broken Bow1 Oklahoma, parked a couple of 

spaces away from the U-Haul truck in which the agent was waiting 

(continued from previous page) 

based on the insufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing 

sufficiency of the evidence claims, plain error language is 

sometimes used when a defendant has not moved for a directed 

verdict of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. United 

States v. Cox, 929 F.2d 1511, 1514 (lOth Cir. 199l)(citations 

omitted). Nevertheless, "the standard actually applied is 

'essentially the same as if there had been a timely motion for 

acquittal"'. Id. (quoting United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 

1497 (lOth Cir. 1990)); Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d 646, 648 

(lOth Cir. 1958). 

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Appellate Case: 90-7079 Document: 01019297221 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 4 
for him, entered the passenger side of the truck and spoke briefly 

with the agent. The agent and another witness testified that Mr. 

Leopard's person exuded a distinctive odor associated with the 

manufacture of methamphetamine. 

When the agent exited the U-Haul and went around the back to 

open the back doors, Mr. Leopard accompanied him and, when asked 

by the agent whether the articles in the truck "would work," 

Mr. Leopard indicated that they would. Rec. Vol. III at 36. 

After giving the agent $5500, one-half of the agreed on price of 

$11,000, Mr. Leopard took the keys to the U-Haul and the key to 

the padlock on the back of the U-Haul doors and began to drive out 

of the parking lot. He was stopped when another DEA agent 

activated a "kill switch" disabling the vehicle. Mr. Leopard was 

arrested and a subsequent search of his pockets yielded a small 

amount of methamphetamine and a loaded .22 magnum pistol. 

The testimony at trial was somewhat in conflict as to whether 

there were enough chemicals and equipment in the U-Haul to 

manufacture either methamphetamine powder or methamphetamine oil. 

Compare Testimony of William J. Bryant, Rec. Vol. III at 65-66, 

and William Kent Glanville, id. at 91, 96, with further testimony 

of William Kent Glanville at 98-99. In summary, however, the only 

additional ingredients identified as necessary for the production 

of saleable methamphetamine were heat, aluminum foil, and 

distillation equipment, id. at 98, 102, items that are relatively 

generic and easily available when compared to the extensive array 

of sophisticated chemicals and equipment present in the U-Haul. 

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Mr. Leopard argues that because the seizure here was not of a 

"working lab" and because there was evidence that not all of the 

chemicals and equipment necessary to produce a finished product 

were present in the U-Haul, he cannot be said to have taken a 

"substantial step" toward manufacture. We disagree. In United 

States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 673 (lOth Cir. 1985), this court 

affirmed the defendant's conviction for attempted possession with 

intent to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance even 

though no "working lab" had yet been set up and the defendant had, 

in fact, been shipped a noncontrolled substance by his supplier 

who was cooperating with the DEA. Id. at 675-76. Citing United 

States v. Bunney, 705 F.2d 378 (lOth Cir. 1983), the court in 

Johnson found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 

conviction for attempt because there were not only detailed 

discussions concerning the purchase of a controlled substance "but 

also a firm agreement to buy sealed by a cash payment." Johnson, 

767 F.2d at 675-76. 

We hold that the evidence of Mr. Leopard's conduct, 

particularly when accompanied by his payment of $5500 for the 

chemicals and equipment, constituted a substantial step toward the 

commission of the underlying offense. See id. at 675 (defendant's 

request that the chemical he tried to purchase be mislabeled, his 

use of an alias, his willingness to pay an inflated price for the 

chemical, and his partial payment all displayed acts sufficient 

for conviction of attempted possession with intent to manufacture 

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Appellate Case: 90-7079 Document: 01019297221 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 6 
a controlled substance); cf. United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 

841-42 (8th Cir. 1982) (defendant's refusal to produce any money 

in payment negated the finding of a substantial step). 

Mr. Leopard further argues that the government failed to 

present any direct evidence of his intent with regard to the items 

in the U-Haul. Intent and knowledge, however, can be inferred 

from surrounding circumstances, Cox, 929 F.2d at 1514 (citing 

United States v. Price, 795 F.2d 61, 63 (lOth Cir. 1986)), and 

"'is rarely capable of direct proof.'" Johnson, 767 F.2d at 676 

(quoting United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 

1984). Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we 

hold that the above described evidence, both direct and 

circumstantial, in addition to demonstrating a substantial step 

toward the manufacture of methamphetamine, is also sufficient for 

a reasonable jury to infer that Mr. Leopard intended to attempt 

the manufacture of methamphetamine and for the jury to find that 

fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Calculation of Sentence for Count I 

Mr. Leopard contends that the court, under the sentencing 

guidelines, erred in calculating his sentence for attempting to 

manufacture methamphetamine because it erroneously determined that 

he had sufficient chemicals and equipment to manufacture 41.7 

pounds of methamphetamine. 18 u.s.c. § 3742 (1988) guides our 

review of sentences imposed under the sentencing guidelines and 

directs us to determine whether the sentence "(1) was imposed in 

violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 

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Appellate Case: 90-7079 Document: 01019297221 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 7 
application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the 

applicable guideline range . . . . ' or (4) was imposed for an 

offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and 

is plainly unreasonable." United States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 

704 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 687 (1991) (citing 

18 u.s.c. § 3742(e) (1988)). We will affirm factual 

determinations made by the district court unless they are clearly 

erroneous, id. at 704, and, while we give due deference to the 

application of the guidelines to the facts, we will fully review 

the application of those guidelines for legal error. Id. 

Initially, Mr. Leopard again argues that, because other 

ingredients were necessary before a finished product could be 

produced, it was improper for the district court to calculate a 

produceable amount at all for purposes of sentencing. This issue 

is controlled by Havens, which holds that, even in the absence of 

some component parts, the trial court may properly estimate the 

ultimate quantity of produceable drugs. Havens, 910 F.2d at 705. 

Mr. Leopard's argument that the sentencing guidelines limit 

the court's ability to estimate produceable quantities to solely 

those instances where a "laboratory" is seized is also without 

merit. Application Note 2 to u.s.s.G. § 201.4 provides: 

Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does 

not reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing 

judge shall approximate the quantity of the controlled 

substance. In making this determination, the judge may 

consider, for example, the price generally obtained for 

the controlled substance, financial or other records, 

similar transactions in controlled substances by the 

defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory 

involved. 

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The factors listed in Note 2 are not exclusive; their 

consideration is permissive. There is thus no requirement 

limiting the judge's authority in this area to only those 

situations involving a working lab. See Havens, 910 F.2d at 

704-05 (produceable product estimated based on chemicals seized 

from a storage locker). 

Admission of Evidence Obtained in Search of Mr. Leopard's Pickup 

As his third point of error, Mr. Leopard argues that the 

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the second 

weapon and the additional supply of methamphetamine seized from 

his pickup. 

accept the 

erroneous. 

"When we review a denial of a motion to suppress, we 

trial court's findings of fact unless clearly 

The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the 

fourth amendment is, however, a conclusion of law that we review 

de novo." United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 672 

(lOth Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 931 

F.2d 64 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

After Mr. Leopard was arrested, the DEA agents seized his 

pickup, as a vehicle used to facilitate a drug crime pursuant to 

21 u.s.c. § 88l(a)(4). Rec. Vol. III at 13. Pursuant to agency 

policy, agents are required to search seized vehicles to protect 

the agency from claims of theft or other loss of property. Id. at 

17. The search of Mr. Leopard's pickup revealed a .45 caliber 

pistol and a package of methamphetamine. Rec. Vol. III at 13. 

Generally, a valid warrant is required before a search may be 

legally carried out. McKinnell, 888 F.2d at 672. A warrantless 

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inventory search, however, is justified after the forfeiture of a 

vehicle pursuant to 21 u.s.c. § 881(a)(4). United States v. 

Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Johnson, 572 F.2d 227, 234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 u.s. 907 

(1978); O'Reilly v. United States, 486 F.2d 208, 210-11 (8th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043 (1973). There was substantial 

evidence that the pickup was properly seized pursuant to 21 u.s.c. 

§ 881, Rec. Vol. II at 15-16; Rec. Vol. III at 13, and that the 

later search of the pickup was an inventory search done pursuant 

to agency policy. Id. at 17. Mr. Leopard's argument regarding an 

illegal search, therefore, is unavailing. 

Availability of Lesser Included Offense Instruction 

Mr. Leopard finally argues that he was entitled to a lesser 

included offense instruction on the theory of possession of a 

controlled substance. If the evidence is such that a rational 

jury could convict a defendant of a lesser offense while 

acquitting him of a greater offense, the defendant is entitled to 

a lesser included offense instruction. United States v. Swingler, 

758 F.2d 477, 498 (lOth Cir. 1985) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 

447 U.S. 625, 635 (1980)). In order to receive a lesser included 

offense instruction, the following conditions must be present: 

"(1) a proper request; (2) the lesser-included-offense must 

consist of some, but not all, of the elements of the offense 

charged; (3) the element differentiating the two offenses must be 

a matter in dispute; and (4) a jury must be able to rationally 

convict the defendant of the lesser offense and acquit of the 

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greater offense." United States v. Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 219 

(lOth Cir. 1987), (quoting Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 

1069 (lOth Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988). 

Mr. Leopard argues that the evidence at trial was equally 

consistent with possession of methamphetamine as it was with 

intent to distribute because the quantities he possessed were in 

user amounts. In making this argument, Mr. Leopard misstates the 

record. Contrary to Mr. Leopard's characterization, the testimony 

of the government's chemist was not that the baggies of 

methamphetamine seized from Mr. Leopard's truck were in "user 

proportions," see Brief of Appellant at 29, but rather that they 

were "middle or lower level distributor quantities." 

Rec. Vol. III at 95. There was no dispute, therefore, that the 

amount of methamphetamine found in Mr. Leopard's truck was a 

distributor quantity. Because the element differentiating the two 

offenses, i.e., the quantity of drugs in Mr. Leopard's possession, 

was not in dispute, and because a jury could not rationally acquit 

Mr. Leopard of the charge of intent to distribute when there was 

no dispute that he possessed a distributor-type quantity of 

methamphetamine, a lesser included offense instruction of simple 

possession was unwarranted. See Swingler, 758 F.2d at 498. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

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