Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04080/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mahonri Faber
Appellant
Mary Anne Thorum
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAHONRI FABER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

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Dt:c ~ 11990 

ROBERT L HOECKJ3 

Clerk R. 

v. 

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No. 90-4080 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and 

MARY ANNE THORUM, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 89-C-791G) 

Mahonri Faber, pro se. 

Shirley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, and Gary R. 

Allen, Charles E. Brookhart, Regina S. Moriarty, Attorneys, Tax 

Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-4080 Document: 01019604189 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Mahonri Faber appeals a district court 

order dismissing his petition to quash a third party summons that 

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served on American Savings and 

Loan.

1 On appeal, Faber argues the district court erred in 

dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because the form of the 

summons is invalid and cannot initiate the twenty-day limit of 26 

u.s.c. § 7609(b)(2(A) on a motion to quash. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

The IRS served a third party summons on American Savings and 

Loan on July 31, 1989, requesting bank records held in the name of 

Mahonri Faber. On that same day, the IRS sent a copy of the 

summons by certified mail to Faber at his last known address. On 

August 31, 1989 Faber filed a petition in federal district court 

to quash the summons. 

The statute governing the timely filing of a taxpayer's 

petition to quash a third party summons is 26 U.S.C. 

S 7609(b)(2){A). It provides: 

Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person 

who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection 

(a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash 

such summons not later than the 20th day after the day 

such notice is given in the manner provided 1n 

subsection(a)(2). In any such proceeding, the Secretary 

may seek to compel compliance with the summon. 

26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A). Subsection (a)(l) states that the 

person identified in the summons' description of the records is 

entitled to notice. See id. S 7609(a)( l ). In most cases, this 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-4080 Document: 01019604189 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 2 
person is the taxpayer subject to an income tax investigation. 

Subsection (a)(2) explains that notice is sufficient if it is 

personally served upon or mailed by certified mail to the last 

known address of the taxpayer. See id. §7609(b)(2). 

Faber contends the district court improperly dismissed his 

motion to quash to the summon. We disagree. In Stringer ~ 

United States, 776 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), the 

Eleventh Circuit addressed this jurisdictional issue resulting 

from an untimely filing of a taxpayer's motion to quash a third 

party summons. The court in Stringer held that a petition to 

quash a third party summons that is filed more than twenty days 

after the mailing of the summons by the IRS must be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit construed section 7609 

the same way in holding in Ponsford~ United States, 771 F.2d 

1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985), that a district court does not have 

jurisdiction when a plaintiff has failed to comply with the 

twenty-day filing period of section 2609(b)(2)(A). 

The courts in both Stringer and Ponsford explain the 

jurisdictional limitation of section 2609 in terms of a 

conditional waiver of the government's sovereign immunity. Under 

the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is not 

subject to suit absent its consent. Stringer, 776 F.2d at 275 

(citing Lehman~ Nakshian, 453 u.s. 156, 160 (1981)). Because 

any exercise of a court's jurisdiction over the government depends 

on the government's consent, a statute that waives sovereign 

immunity must be strictly construed. Ponsford, 771 F.2d at 1306; 

Stringer, 776 F.2d at 275 (citing United States ~ Sherwood, 312 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4080 Document: 01019604189 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 3 
u.s. 584, 586 (1941)). Construing section 2609.strictly, the 

plain language of the statute indicates motions to quash must be 

filed within twenty days from the date notice is given. Notice is 

given on the date it is mailed. Stringer, 776 F.2d at 276. The 

government's waiver of sovereign ~unity ends -- and thus 

jurisdiction ends -- when the twenty-day limitation period has 

run. Id. at 276; Powell, 771 F.2d at 1309; see also Callahan~ 

Schultz, 783 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1986) (government's 

consent to sue requires strict compliance with twenty-day rule). 

The brief opportunity this twenty-day waiver provides for 

taxpayers to challenge a third party summons is best explained by 

practical administrative concerns. As Circuit Judge Rubin pointed 

out for the court in Masat ~ United States, 745 F.2d 985, 987 

(5th Cir. 1984), the provision was added in 1982. It eliminated 

the simple method of instructing a third-party recordkeeper in 

writing not to comply with an IRS summons and substituted the 

current procedure, which requires a taxpayer to institute a court 

action to quash a swmnons. This change in procedure was based on 

the fact "objections were mainly dilatory, most taxpayers failed 

to contest the summons when the Internal Revenue Service sought 

enforcement, and, when they did, the Internal Revenue Service 

prevailed 'in the vast majority of actions it brings to enforce 

third-party summons.'" Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 494 (Vol. 1), 

97th Cong., 2d Sess. 282, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News 781, 1027). The Senate committee report states that 

shifting the burden to initiate proceedings would "eliminate most 

of the frivolous delay . . . without adverse ly affecting the 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4080 Document: 01019604189 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 4 
rights of taxpayers." s_. Rep. No. 494 (Vol. 1), 97th Cong. I 2d 

Sess. 282, reprinted in 1982 u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 781, 

1027. 

We follow the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits in holding that a 

taxpayer's motion to quash an IRS third party summons must be 

filed within twenty days from the date notice is sent or 

personally served to avoid dismissal by a district court. Here, 

the IRS gave notice on July 31, 1989, the date the summons to 

American Savings and Loan was served and a copy was mailed to 

Faber. Because Faber filed his motion to quash on August 31, 1989 

-- more than twenty days after the IRS gave notice -- the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion. we hold the 

district court correctly dismissed Faber's motion to quash under 

section 7609 for lack of jurisdiction. 

Because there is no basis for jurisdiction over the 

defendants, we do not reach the merits of Faber's claim that the 

summons form is invalid. We AFFIRM. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4080 Document: 01019604189 Date Filed: 12/21/1990 Page: 5