Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02458/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02458-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Approximately $73,562 in United States Currency
Defendant
Eugene Brisco
Claimant
Raashida J. Moore-Brisco
Claimant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

APPROXIMATELY $73,562 IN UNITED 

STATES CURRENCY, 

 Defendant. 

Case No: C 08-2458 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING CLAIMANT 

RAASHIDA MOORE-BRISCO’S

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

[Docket 41] 

This is an in rem action brought by the United States of America (“the Government”) 

against currency in the amount of $73,562, which was seized from the residence of Eugene 

Brisco (“Brisco”) and his wife, Raashida Moore-Brisco (“Moore”), as money furnished or 

intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance. On July 10, 2009, the Clerk 

entered default against Moore, who claims the funds are hers. The parties are presently before 

the Court on Moore’s motion to set aside default. (Docket 41.) Having read and considered 

the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court GRANTS 

Moore’s motion for the reasons set forth below. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter 

suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). 

I. BACKGROUND 

On May 13, 2008, the Government filed a Complaint for Forfeiture (“Complaint”) 

against currency in the amount of $73,562, which was seized as money furnished or intended to 

be furnished by a person in exchange for a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 

(Docket 1.) The currency and controlled substances were recovered from the residence of 

Brisco and Moore by the Alameda County Narcotics Task Force on June 13, 2007. (Ibarra 

Decl. ¶ 2 (Docket 26).) On or about June 2, 2008, the Government served Moore with the 

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Complaint and Notice of Forfeiture of Action (“Notice”) and various other court-related 

documents. The Notice states that “[i]n order to contest forfeiture of the in rem currency, any 

person who asserts an interest or right in or right against the property, must file a verified 

statement identifying the interest or right within 35 days after service of the complaint in 

accordance with Rule G(5) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime and Asset 

Forfeiture Claims . . . .” (Docket 3 at 1.) In addition, the Notice specifies that a claimant must 

file an answer or Rule 12 motion in response to the Complaint within 20 days of submitting a 

claim. (Id. at 1-2.) On June 27, 2008, Brisco and Moore, acting pro se, timely filed a joint (but 

unverified) claim (Docket 9), though neither filed an answer or Rule 12 motion thereafter.1

On April 27, 2009, the Government filed a motion to strike Moore’s claim based on her 

failure to submit a verified claim and to file an answer in response to the Complaint. Moore 

did not oppose the motion, which the Court granted on July 6, 2009. (Docket 31.) On July 10, 

2009, upon request of the Government, the Clerk entered default against Moore. (Docket 33.) 

On July 16, 2009, the Government filed a motion for default judgment. (Docket 36.) 

On August 12, 2009, Moore filed a document styled as “Claimaint Raashida J. MooreBrisco’s Opposision (sic) to Plaintiff’s Request for the Clerk to Enter Default, and in the 

Alternative Request to Set Aside Any Default Entered Aside Due to Extrinsic and/or Intrinsic 

Fraud, Surprise, Excusable Neglect, Detrimental Reliance and Mistake Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) & 

60(b) motion to vacate the civil forfeiture default & judgment.” (Docket 41.) The Court 

liberally construed this document as a motion to set aside the entry of default and for 

reconsideration of the Court’s order granting the Government’s motion to strike, and set a 

briefing schedule on Moore’s motion. (Docket 46.) The Government and Moore have since 

filed their opposition and reply papers, respectively, and the matter is now ripe for resolution. 

 1 The Court notes that on September 28, 2007, after the funds were seized but prior to the 

commencement of this action, Brisco and Moore allegedly filed a verified claim in “Case No. CC08-0047.” (Reply Ex. 3 and 4 (Docket 49.) It is unclear, however, whether Moore served this 

“claim” on the Government or what prompted Moore and Brisco to submit these purported claims 

in the first instance. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “[t]he court may set aside an entry of 

default for good cause.” Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests. Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 

922, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). “The good cause analysis considers three factors: (1) whether 

[defendant] engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether [defendant] had a 

meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default . . . would prejudice [plaintiff].” Id.

at 925 -926. “As these factors are disjunctive, the district court [is] free to deny the motion “if 

any of the three factors [is] true.’” Id. (quoting in part Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians 

v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000)). Defendant bears the burden of showing 

good cause to set aside the default under this test. Id. However, any doubt regarding whether 

to grant relief should be cast “in favor of setting aside the entry of default and deciding the case 

on its merits.” See O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 363 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, pro se 

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. MOORE’S CULPABILITY

“[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice of 

the filing of an action and intentionally failed to answer.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. 

Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). The mere negligent failure to 

answer does not establish a defendant’s culpability. Id. Rather, in the context of a motion to 

set aside a default, “intentional” means more than simply a conscious choice; it requires a 

showing that a defendant’s conduct evinces a “devious, deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure 

to respond.” Id. at 698. 

Based on the record presented, the Court is persuaded that Moore’s failure to submit a 

verified claim and response to the complaint was due to her negligence, and was not the result 

of any willful, deliberate, or bad faith behavior. There is no dispute between the parties that 

Moore timely submitted a claim to the Government in response to the Notice. Though the 

claim was defective because it was not verified, it is clear, particularly when liberally 

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construed, that Moore’s intent was to assert her interest in the seized funds. This fact is 

underscored by Moore’s subsequent submission of a declaration, signed under penalty of 

perjury, affirming that the funds are, in fact, hers. (Moore Decl. ¶ 1 (Docket 50).)2

 With 

regard to Moore’s answer, it is uncontroverted that her failure to respond to the Complaint was 

the result of her unfamiliarity with the rules of procedure, as opposed to any nefarious or bad 

faith purpose. See TCI Group Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d at 698. 

For its part, the Government erroneously predicates its opposition entirely on the notion 

that Moore received adequate notice of the action. The question is not whether Moore was 

aware of her obligation to file a claim and answer, but rather, whether her failure to comply 

with such requirements was intentional, notwithstanding her awareness. Id. Notably, the 

Government neither alleges nor presents any evidence to show that Moore’s failure to comply 

was intentional. At best, the Government’s response shows that Moore has conducted herself 

in a dilatory or neglectful manner which, under the law of this Circuit, is insufficient to show 

culpability. Moreover, while Moore may not have filed an answer, her numerous filings make 

clear Moore’s intent to challenge the forfeiture of funds. See 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, 

Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2682 (1998) (default should not be entered if the 

defendant has filed a response indicating its intent to defend the action).3

 

B. MERITORIOUS DEFENSE

A party seeking to vacate entry of default must allege “specific facts that would 

constitute a defense.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 700 (9th Cir. 

2001). This burden is “not extraordinarily heavy.” Id. A defendant need only show facts or 

 2 The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 specifies that “[a] claim need not be made 

in any particular form.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(C). In addition, each federal agency conducting a 

nonjudicial forfeiture under the Act “shall make claim forms generally available on request, which 

forms shall be written in easily understandable language.” Id.

3 Moore’s alternative suggestion that her default should be excused on the ground that a 

“conflict of interest” exists because the Court and the U.S. Attorneys’ Office “all work for the same 

employer” is meritless. The mere fact that the district court and the U.S. Attorney’s Office are 

connected to the United States government obviously does not, standing alone, create a 

disqualifying conflict of interest. If that were the case, the district court would never be able to 

preside over any case involving a government agency or government lawyers, which obviously is 

not the case. 

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law in support of a viable defense; it is not necessary that the defendant prove that it will 

prevail on that defense. Id. Here, the Government seized the currency pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

§ 881(a)(6), as money furnished or intended to be furnished by a person in exchange for a 

controlled substance or money traceable to such a transaction. If a claimant establishes 

ownership of the seized property, the burden shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the 

property to be forfeited is substantially connected to drug dealing. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). 

“If the government meets its burden, the burden then shifts to [the claimant] to prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the money was not connected with illegal drug activity.” 

United States v. Currency, U.S. $42,500.00, 283 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 983(d)(1) (“innocent owner” defense). 

In this case, Moore declares, under oath, that the $73,562 seized is “her legal property” 

generated through “legitimate business earnings from a Barber Shop and Beauty Shop business 

that [she and her husband] have owned and operated for several years . . . .” (Moore Decl. 

¶¶ 1-2 (Docket 68).) She also claims that some of the seized funds were from “saving[s] and 

wedding gifts[.]” (Id. ¶ 7.) With regard to the disclaimer, Moore asserts that she signed the 

form under duress. Specifically, Moore states that she felt compelled to sign the form to secure 

her release, which was of particular concern to her since Brisco had been detained and she 

wanted to be reunited with her minor child. (Id. ¶ 10.) Moore also asserts that she was misled 

by the police as to what she was signing. (Id.) These assertions, if proven, may constitute a 

meritorious defense to the Government’s seizure complaint. See Currency, U.S. $42,500.00, 

283 F.3d at 980. 

C. PREJUDICE TO PLAINTIFF

The final issue presented is whether setting aside the default would be prejudicial to the 

Government. “To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm 

than simply delaying the resolution of a case.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d at 701. 

Rather, the salient question is whether granting such relief would hinder the plaintiff’s ability 

to pursue its claim. Id. (citing Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)). To be 

considered prejudicial, “the delay must result in tangible harm such as a loss of evidence, 

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increased difficulties of discovery, or greater opportunity for fraud or collusion.” Id. Notably, 

the Government does not claim that it will suffer any tangible harm if the default is set aside. 

D. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

As noted, there are essentially three steps in a forfeiture proceeding. First, the claimant 

must establish ownership in the seized property. Second, if claimant establishes ownership, the 

burden shifts to the Government to show that the property to be forfeited is substantially 

connected to drug dealing. And finally, if the Government meets its burden, the claimant must 

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was not connected with illegal drug 

activity. Because resolution of Moore’s claim likely will require the consideration of 

testimony to assess the validity and sufficiency of her claim to the seized funds, the Court, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),4

 will refer this matter to a magistrate judge of this Court 

to conduct the necessary proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to 

prepare a Report and Recommendation regarding validity of Moore’s claim, including whether 

she meets the requirements of the innocent owner defense under 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

The relevant factors militate in favor of finding “good cause” to set aside the default. 

Thus, for the reasons stated above, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Moore’s motion to set aside the default is GRANTED. 

2. The Government shall forthwith send all claimants in this action, including 

Moore, the claim form required by 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(C)(2). Within 30 days of the date this 

Order is filed, Moore shall file (1) a verified claim that complies in all respects with Rule 

G(5)(a) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims and (2) an 

answer to the Complaint for Forfeiture. The failure to comply with both of these requirements 

within the specified deadline may result in sanctions, up to and including the re-entry of default 

 4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), “a judge may . . . designate a magistrate judge to conduct 

hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of 

fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court . . . .” 

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against Moore. 

3. This matter is referred to the Chief Magistrate Judge or her nominee for the 

preparation of a Report and Recommendation as set forth above. 

4. The parties shall appear by telephone for a Case Management Conference on 

April 21, 2010 at 3:00 p.m. The parties shall meet and confer prior to the conference and 

shall prepare a joint Case Management Conference Statement which shall be filed no later than 

ten (10) days prior to the Case Management Conference that complies with the Standing Order 

for All Judges of the Northern District of California and the Standing Order of this Court. 

Plaintiff shall be responsible for filing the statement as well as for arranging the conference 

call. All parties shall be on the line and shall call (510) 637-3559 at the above indicated date 

and time. 

5. This Order terminates Docket No. 41. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 4, 2010 ____________________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

USA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

&#036;73,562 U.S. CURRENCY et al, 

 Defendant. 

 / 

Case Number: CV08-02458 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District 

Court, Northern District of California. 

That on February 5, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing 

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle 

located in the Clerk's office. 

Eugene Brisco 

1434 South Tuxedo Ave. 

Stockton, CA 95204 

Raashida J. Moore-Brisco 

1434 South Tuxedo Ave. 

Stockton, CA 95204 

Dated: February 5, 2010 

 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk 

 

 By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

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