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Parties Involved:
Department of the Air Force
Petitioner
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 1996 Decided January 24, 1997

No. 96-1060

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Katherine S. Gruenheck, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for petitioner, with

whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, were on

the briefs.

Davis M. Smith, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, argued the cause for respondent, with

whom William R. Tobey, Deputy Solicitor, and James F. Blandford, Attorney, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: This case, which is before the court for the second time, involves

a decision by the FederalLaborRelations Authority("FLRA" or "Authority") holding that petitioner,

Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois ("Scott AFB"), violated the Federal

Labor-Management Relations Statute ("Labor Statute"), 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B), when it refused

to disclose informationto theNationalAssociationofGovernment Employees("NAGE" or "Union").

The dispute between the Union and Scott AFB arose when a commissary employee, who was

a member of a bargaining unit represented by NAGE, claimed that a supervisor used physical force

against him on two occasions. The Union filed a grievance under the parties' collective bargaining

agreement, under a grievance provision allowing either party to seek "appropriate relief in a matter

of concern or dissatisfaction which issubject to the control of the union or the employer." When the

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parties were unable to resolve the grievance, the Union filed for arbitration under the agreement. The

Union also requested to see a copy of the disciplinary letter that Scott AFB had issued to the

supervisor,so that it could determine whether to proceed with arbitration. When Scott AFB declined

to disclose the disciplinary letter, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA.

When the case wasfirst before the FLRA, the Authority held that the Labor Statute required

disclosure of the letter. See Department of the Air Force and NAGE, 38 F.L.R.A. No. 42 (1990)

(hereinafter Scott I), reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 194. On review of Scott I, this court

remanded the case to the FLRA for reconsideration in light of NLRB v. FLRA, 952 F.2d 523 (D.C.

Cir. 1992), to allow the Authority to determine whether the requested letter was necessary, and not

merely relevant, to the Union's carrying out of itsrepresentational duties. See Department of the Air

Force v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1223, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court instructed the FLRA to determine

whether the Union possessed a "particularized need" for the information that was not defeated by

countervailing interests. See id. at 1225. On remand, the Authority found that the Union did possess

a particularized need for disclosure of the letter, and that any countervailing interests did not

outweigh the Union's need, and, thus, the Labor Statute requires disclosure of the letter. The

Authority also held that the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, does not prohibit release of the document.

See Department of the Air Force and NAGE, 51 F.L.R.A. No. 59 (1995) (hereinafter Scott II),

reprinted in J.A. 292. In its petition for review to this court, Scott AFB claims that the Authority's

finding that the Labor Statute requires disclosure of the letter is unreasonable, and that disclosure of

the letter to the Union violates the Privacy Act. We find no merit in these contentions.

The issue of whether the disputed letter is necessary to the Union to fulfill itsrepresentational

duties turns on whether the Union's claim to view the letter is tied to a matter that is grievable under

the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The question of grievability, in turn, hinges on whether

the Union sought the letter to evaluate a claim regarding workplace safety, which is indisputably a

grievable subject, or solely to contest the appropriateness of disciplinary action taken against a

supervisor, which is outside of the scope of collective bargaining. As a supervisor striking an

employee is undoubtedlytied to workplace safety, the Authoritywas not unreasonable in holding that

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the Union's request for disclosure was tied to workplace safety. Thus, because the Union sought

information that was necessary to determine whether to pursue arbitration over a grievable subject,

the Authority was justified in finding that the Union possessed a particularized need for the disputed

letter. The Authority also reasonably balanced the interests that weigh against disclosure of the letter

and committed no error in finding that the countervailing interests do not defeat the Union's

particularized need. Additionally, we hold that the Privacy Act does not prohibit disclosure of the

letter to the Union, because the Union's request for the document falls within the "routine use"

exception of the Act. Finally, we reject petitioner's contention that this case should be dismissed on

grounds of prudential mootness.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

NAGE is the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit of non-supervisory employees at

the commissary at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. The collective bargaining agreement between

NAGE and Scott AFB contains a grievance procedure and defines a grievance covered by the

negotiated procedure as "a request by any employee ..., the union, or the employer for appropriate

relief in a matter of concern or dissatisfaction which is subject to the control of the union or the

employer." Amended Appropriated Fund Labor- Management Agreement Between Scott Air Force

Base, Illinois and NAGE, article XXI, section 3, reprinted in J.A. 30.

On March 6, 1987, a bargaining unit employee at the commissary complained to the Union

that his supervisor had used physical force against him on two occasions, that the force was unfair

and improper treatment, and that the supervisor, who worked in the meat cutting room, contributed

to an unsafe work environment. In turn, the Union filed a grievance with Scott AFB, seeking to

ensure safe working conditionsfor unit employees. Noting that the supervisor worked "around sharp

knives, saws and other dangerous factors," the Union requested that Scott AFB refer the supervisor

for a fitness-for-duty examination and suspend him for 30 days. See Letter from Carl Denton,

NAGE, to Darlene Greenleaf, CommissaryOfficer, Scott AFB (Mar. 27, 1987),reprinted in J.A. 32.

During the various steps of the grievance procedure, Scott AFB continually denied the Union's

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grievance request, asserting that the discipline ofsupervisors was not within the scope ofsubjectsthat

were grievable under the collective bargaining agreement. See Letter from Darlene Greenleaf,

Commissary Officer, Scott AFB, to Jerry Files, Union Steward (Apr. 7, 1987), reprinted in J.A. 33;

LetterfromGracinAkers, AssistantCivilianPersonnelOfficer, Scott AFB, to CarlDenton, President,

NAGE Local R7-23 (Apr. 22, 1987), reprinted in J.A. 35.

The Union finally sought to resolve the grievance through arbitration. To determine whether

to pursue arbitration, Union officials asked to see the disciplinary letter issued to the supervisor. See

Letter from Mark Clevenger, Assistant GeneralCounsel, NAGE Midwest Office, to Daniel Marlett,

Civilian Personnel Officer, Scott AFB (July 28, 1987), reprinted in J.A. 71. Scott AFB denied the

Union's request to view the letter. See Letter from Daniel Marlett, Civilian Personnel Officer, Scott

AFB, to Mark Clevenger, Assistant General Counsel, NAGE Midwest Office (Oct. 18, 1987),

reprinted in J.A. 74. Subsequently, the Union filed an unfair labor charge against Scott AFB with

the Authority, asserting that disclosure of the letter was required by 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B) of the

Labor Statute.

B. Procedural Background

In its initial decision in this case, the Authority concluded that NAGE was entitled to see the

disciplinary letter in order "to evaluate the grievance, [to] decide whether to pursue it, and to prepare

to represent the grievant in the arbitration ofthe grievance." See Scott I at 416,reprinted in J.A. 200.

The FLRA also held that the requested information was necessary without regard to whether an

arbitrator had the authority to order the discipline of a supervisor, and that the Privacy Act did not

prohibit disclosure of the requested information. See id. at 416-17, reprinted in J.A. 200-01.

Scott AFB petitioned for review of Scott I. Without reaching the merits, this court remanded

the case to the Authority for reconsideration in light of this court's intervening decision in NLRB v.

FLRA, 952 F.2d at 523. See Department of the Air Force, 956 F.2d at 1224. In NLRB v. FLRA, the

court had concluded that, pursuant to the Labor Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7114, an agency need not

disclose certain information to a union unless the union has a "particularized need" for such

information and, further, that the Labor Statute requires consideration of the "countervailing

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interests" against disclosure. See NLRB v. FLRA, 952 F.2d at 531-32. This court, in its remand of

Scott I, identified three interestsfor the Authorityto balance against the Union'sinterest in disclosure:

(1) Scott AFB'sinterest in confidentiality, (2) the supervisor's interest in privacy, and (3) the interest

in postponing disclosure of the document until the grievability question isresolved. See Department

of the Air Force, 956 F.2d at 1225. The court declined to analyze whether the Privacy Act prohibited

disclosure of the requested disciplinary letter. See id.

On remand, the Authority concluded that the record before it was insufficient to make the

determinationsthat were required by this court. Accordingly, the Authority remanded the case to an

administrative law judge ("ALJ") for further proceedings. After supplemental hearings, the ALJ

concluded that the "countervailing interests" identified by this court did not outweigh the Union's

interest in disclosure ofthe document. See Department of the Air Force and NAGE, Case No. 5-CA80069, Supplemental Decision (September 30, 1992) at 13, reprinted in J.A. 286. The Authority

then adopted the conclusions of the ALJ, finding that 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B) required disclosure

of the final letter of discipline. See Scott II, reprinted in J.A. 292. Further, the FLRA determined

that the Union's request for the disciplinary letter was within the scope of subjects covered by the

collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 12, reprinted in J.A. 303. Finally, the Authority found

that the Privacy Act did not prohibit disclosure of the letter. See id. at 16-17, reprinted in J.A. 307-

08.

Scott AFB now petitions this court for review of the Authority's most recent decision, and

the Authority cross-applies for enforcement.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Section 7114(b)(4)(B)

The Labor Statute requires federal employers to disclose to unions information that is

"necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation ofsubjects within the scope

of collective bargaining," 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B), aslong as, among other things, disclosure is "not

prohibited by law." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4). In NLRB v. FLRA, this court held that, pursuant to

subsection (b)(4)(B), the statute entitles unions only to information that is "necessary," and not

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merely relevant, to subjects within the scope of collective bargaining. See 952 F.2d at 531. Hence,

in order to warrant disclosure of a document, a Union must demonstrate a particularized need, and,

further, no countervailing interests may outweigh the Union's need. See id. at 531-32.

The court in NLRB v. FLRA noted that "the union may well meet the particularized-need

standard where the union has a grievable complaint covering the information. A statute or the

contract mayimpose a dutyon the agencyregarding predecisional deliberation, and the dutymaythen

ground a grievable claim of right in the employee or union. If so, disclosure normally should obtain."

NLRB v. FLRA, 952 F.2d at 532-33. This is precisely the situation that we face in the instant case.

Thus, we find that the Authority reasonably concluded that the Union possesses a particularized need

for disclosure of the requested document and that countervailing interests do not defeat the need.

1. Particularized Need

In the instant case, the bargaining agreement between Scott AFB and NAGE defines a

grievance "as a request by any employee or group of employees acting as individuals, the union, or

the employer for appropriate relief in a matter of concern or dissatisfaction which is subject to the

control ofthe union or the employer." Amended Appropriated Fund Labor-Management Agreement

between Scott Air Force Base, Illinois and NAGE, article XXI,section 3,reprinted in J.A. 30. Given

the bargaining agreement's broad language, matters affecting workplace safety are clearly grievable.

And physical abuse of employees by supervisorsin the workplace surely is a matter relating to safety

on the job. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Union sought redress under the collective

bargaining agreement to protect against a supervisor assaulting employees on the job. Likewise, it

is hardly surprising that the Union sought to see the disciplinary letter issued to the offending

supervisor in order to determine whether to pursue arbitration. After all, it is difficult for a union to

know whether a supervisor remains a threat to employees without knowing how the employer has

treated the supervisor's prior offenses.

The Authority ruled that, although the disputed letter deals with the discipline of a supervisor

(a nonbargainable issue), the main focus of the Union's grievance wasto ensure the workplace safety

of its bargaining unit employees. In other words, there is no question that there is a connection

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1

In NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., the Supreme Court aptly noted that:

[a]rbitration can function properly only if the grievance procedures leading to it

can sift out unmeritorious claims. For if all claims originally initiated as grievances

had to be processed to arbitration, the system would be woefully overburdened. 

Yet, that is precisely what the respondent's restrictive view would require. It

would force the union to take a grievance all the way through to arbitration

without providing the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim. The expense

of arbitration might be placed upon the union only for it to learn that the machines

had been relegated to the junk heap. Nothing in federal labor law requires such a

result.

385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967) (internal footnotes omitted). 

between an employee being struck by a supervisor and workplace safetya bargainable subject; and

the fact that a grievable subject may overlap on the edges with a nonbargainable subject does not

eviscerate the grievability of the claim.

Furthermore, as the Authority correctly noted, see Scott II at 9, reprinted in J.A. 300, the

Union possesses a substantial interest in information that will assist it in determining whether to

proceed to arbitration.1If the Union decides that the action taken against the supervisor is adequate

to address its concerns over workplace safety, then the grievance can be dropped. Such a

determination cannot be made, however, without information detailing how the employer handled the

situation. This is not to say that the Union has the right to dictate personnel actions affecting

supervisors, or to second-guess management decisions on supervisory discipline. However, when

unit employees have faced physical assault on the job, a Union surely is entitled to know how

management has handled the problem in order to assess whether to pursue arbitration over an issue

of workplace safety.

Scott AFB argues that, in its request for arbitration, the Union has sought a remedy that

would define the terms of the supervisor's discipline, a matter beyond the scope of bargaining. This

is beside the point. What is important here is that the Union has the right to information that is

necessary to determine whether to proceed to arbitration in an attempt to ensure the workplace safety

of unit employees. The fact that certain "remedies" sought may not be available to the Union in

arbitration does not render an otherwise grievable claim not arbitrable. See Marine Corps Logistics

Support Base and Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 3 F.L.R.A. 397, 399 (1980). We need not address

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whether any remedy is even due the Union under the parties' agreement. Rather, we simply find that

the Union's request to view the disputed disciplinary letter involves a clearly grievable

subjectworkplace safetyand, thus, the Authority's finding that the Union possesses a

particularized need for the information is not unreasonable.

2. Countervailing Interests

In Department of the Air Force, this court instructed the Authority to determine whether

countervailing interests outweighed the Union's interest in viewing the disputed letter. See

Department of the Air Force, 956 F.2d at 1225. On the record at hand, we hold that the Authority

was fully justified in finding that the countervailing interests do not defeat the Union's interest in

disclosure of the letter.

In examining the interests weighing against disclosure, the Authority discounted Scott AFB's

interest in maintaining confidentiality of its disciplinary records, noting that any resulting disrespect

from employees toward the supervisor or any diminution of the supervisor's credibility was

speculative. See Scott II at 10, reprinted in J.A. 301. Further, the Authority, while recognizing that

the supervisor possesses a substantial personal interest in maintaining the privacy of his disciplinary

records, found that the Union seeks disclosure of only one specific disciplinary action that wastaken

with respect to an incident ofmisconduct that is already common knowledge amongst workers at the

commissary. See id. at 11, reprinted in J.A. 302. Finally, with respect to an interest in postponing

disclosure of the letter until an arbitrator decides the grievability issue, the Authority noted that the

Union'srequest for disclosure of the letter was clearly made in pursuit of a grievable subject. See id.

at 12, reprinted in J.A. 303. Scott AFB simply disagrees with the Authority's weighing of the

relevant factors, but this disagreement furnishes no basis upon which to grant a petition for review.

We must defer to the Authority's judgment on these issues, for it is not unreasonable.

B. Privacy Act

A further issue in this case is whether the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of the disputed

letter. We review the Authority's interpretation of the Privacy Act de novo. See FLRA v. U.S. Dep't

of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1989). We find that, as the Union's request falls within

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the Act's "routine use" exception, the Privacy Act does not bar disclosure of the disciplinary letter.

The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, ordinarily prohibits disclosure of personal information

about federal employees without their consent. However, there are several exceptions to the Act's

application. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(3) and (e)(4) set forth the routine use exception to the Privacy Act

and require that all agencies that maintain a system of records publish identified routine uses in the

Federal Register. The Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") published notice of the system of

records at issue in the instant case at 57 Fed. Reg. 35,698, 35,705 (1992). The OPM's routine use

"j" authorizes

disclos[ure of] information to officials of labor organizations recognized under 5

U.S.C. chapter 71 when relevant and necessary to their duties of exclusive

representationconcerning personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working

conditions.

57 Fed. Reg. 35,706 (1992).

OPM's interpretation of routine use "j" is entitled to "great deference" by this court, see

Department of Treasury, 884 F.2d at 1451, and that interpretation makes it clear that the Union is

entitled to disclosure of the disputed letter in this case. In a September 17, 1992, policy letter, OPM

interpreted routine use "j," in pertinent part, as follows:

Unions will often cite a generalized need for information about agency actions with

respect to individual employees. For example, the union may ask for lists of

employees who have beencounseled or disciplined within a specific timeframe,stating

that it needs the information in order to consider whether or not to file a grievance.

Agencies must apply a two-step analysis in determining whether the requested

information isreleasable. First, the union must show that the information is "relevant"

to carrying out its representational obligations. For example, a dispute may not be

grievable under the parties' collective bargaining agreement and, if that is the case,

information pertaining to it is not "relevant."

Second, if the agency determines that the information is "relevant," it must also

determine that the information isin fact "necessary." The union must show that it has

a particularized need for the information in a form that identifies specific individuals,

and that its information needs cannot be satisfied through less intrusive means, such

as by releasing records with personally-identifying information deleted.

See Office of Personnel Management Federal Personnel Management Letter 711-164 at 3 (Sept. 17,

1992), reprinted in Brief for the Petitioner at addendum C.

Ordinarily, the scope of the Privacy Act is not determined by reference to the commands of

the Labor Statute. However, in this case, in accordance with OPM's interpretation of its routine use

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exception to the Privacy Act, whether the Union's request falls within the routine use "j" exception

hinges onwhetherthe Union'srequest isrelevant and necessaryto carryout itsrepresentationalduties

and, thus, on whether the claim is in pursuit of a grievable subject. As described above, because

workplace safety is clearly grievable, the requested disciplinary letter is both relevant and necessary

to the Union to carry out its representational duties and, thus, falls within OPM's routine use "j"

exemption to the Privacy Act.

C. Mootness

Finally, petitioner asserts that, because the alleged assaults by the supervisor occurred ten

years ago and the grievant in question has since retired from the commissary, this court should

dismissthe case on prudential mootness grounds, see Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011,

1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In other words, petitioner urges that the release of the disciplinary letter

will do nothing today to help the union ensure a safe work environment for its bargaining unit

employees. We reject petitioner's contention.

First, the Union, not the unit employee, decides whether and on what terms to proceed with

arbitration. Therefore, the employee's retirement is not determinative of whether the Union has a

viable claim to pursue in arbitration. Furthermore, in the instant case, the Union still possesses an

interest in the workplace safety of its bargaining unit employees. Second, although the supervisor's

objectionable behavior occurred ten years ago, the supervisor still works at the commissary.

Therefore, the Union is entitled to consider whether the supervisor remains a threat to the workplace

safety of the bargaining unit employees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons hereinabove indicated, the petition for review is denied and the

cross-application for enforcement is granted.

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