Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-00966/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-00966-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jim Brown
Defendant
James Painter
Defendant
Gina Marea Phillips
Plaintiff
John Mark Tirey
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

GINA MAREA PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JIM BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 6:14-CV-966-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 

29). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 30, 31 and 32). 

The court initially notes that the Motion is filed by Defendants James Browne, John Mark 

Tirey, and James Painter. (Doc. # 29). In her Opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff has indicated 

that her claims against Defendants Tyree and Painter are due to be dismissed. (Doc. # 31). 

Therefore, Defendants Tyree and Painter are entitled to summary judgment, and the court limits 

its analysis to Plaintiff’s claim against Browne. 

I. Summary of Relevant Facts

If facts are in dispute, they are stated in the manner most favorable to the non-movant

(Phillips), and all reasonable doubts about the facts have been resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993); Info. Sys. & 

Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). These are the “facts”

for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the actual facts that could be established 

through live testimony at trial. See Browne. v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 

(11th Cir. 1994).

FILED

 2016 Mar-09 AM 08:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:14-cv-00966-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/09/16 Page 1 of 17
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On April 16, 2012, Walker County Deputy Sheriff James Browne was on duty in a 

marked patrol car when he received a call from dispatch to go to 274 Sunlight Road, Jasper, 

Alabama on a report of death threats made by Plaintiff Gina Phillips. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶¶ 1-3; Doc. 

# 30-2). The dispatcher informed Browne that Phillips had threatened via phone and text 

message to kill people at the Sunlight Road residence, she was under the influence of drugs and 

alcohol, and she was driving a silver BMW heading to the Sunlight Road residence. (Doc. # 30-

1, ¶ 4; Doc. # 30-2). The dispatcher also informed Browne that Phillips’s mother reported that 

Phillips had sent her a text message stating that she was going to shoot her father and had a hit 

list of other people she intended to kill. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 5; Doc. # 30-2).

Upon arriving at Sunlight Road, Browne spotted Phillips. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 6). Phillips is 

approximately five feet, two inches tall, and weighs about ninety-eight pounds. She had on fitted 

shorts, a fitted tank top shirt and a brassiere. Phillips’ keys were in her car. Phillips claims that 

because her clothes fit snugly, it was obvious there was nowhere for her to hide a weapon. There 

was nothing between Phillips and Browne to obstruct his view. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶¶ 1, 5-6). 

Browne, who is approximately six feet, two inches tall and weighs approximately two 

hundred pounds, ordered Phillips to approach and place her hands on the hood of his patrol car. 

(Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 7). Upon being directed to approach him and place her hands on the hood of his 

patrol car one time, Phillips stopped walking towards the home, turned to face Browne, making 

sure that her open, empty hands were in plain view, and asked him “why.” Phillips’s hands were 

out to her sides, open and empty and she was approximately 15 feet from Browne. (Doc. # 31-1,

¶¶ 5-6). At that point, Browne deployed his Taser at Phillips. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 18).

The Taser prongs hit Phillips in the chest and she fell face-forward into the ground. (Doc. 

# 30-1, ¶ 20). Browne ordered Phillips to put her hands behind her back. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 21). 

Case 6:14-cv-00966-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/09/16 Page 2 of 17
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Phillips claims the Taser blast temporarily paralyzed her, and caused intense pain throughout her 

body. Because of the paralyzing effects of the Taser, Phillips could not move her arms behind 

her back. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 8). While she was on the ground, Browne shocked Phillips with the 

Taser again. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶¶ 21-24). Browne grabbed Phillips’s head by her hair, forcefully 

shoved her face into the gravel driveway, and told her “lucky I didn’t shoot your ass.” Brown 

then handcuffed Phillips’s hands. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 9). 

Browne pulled Phillips from the ground by the handcuffs, walked her to his police car, 

and shoved her into the back seat, forcing her to sit and pull down on the wires connected to the 

Taser prongs buried in her chest. One of the prongs came out and Phillips was bleeding from the 

cut made by the barb of the prong. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 9). Phillips told Browne that she was 

bleeding from the hole in her from the Taser, was still hurting badly, she was a nurse, and she 

needed to go to the emergency room.1 (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 10). Browne told Phillips that the only

place that she was going was to jail because he was charging her with interfering with a 

governmental operation and resisting arrest. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 10). 

Browne then called in on his radio and reported that he had made contact with the female

suspect, that she left running and didn’t obey his command, so he had used his Taser on her. He 

further reported that he had her in custody in the back seat of his patrol unit. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 10). 

Phillips appeared to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 34). 

A search of Phillips’ vehicle revealed no weapons, but numerous prescription drugs were 

uncovered. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 37). A review of Phillips’ text messages confirmed the existence of 

the death threats. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 38). 

 1 Browne has stated in his affidavit that he did not recall Phillips receiving any injuries. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 30). 

Phillips may have received some minor scrapes or bruising from her fall, but she did not appear to Browne to have 

any injury that required medical treatment. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 31).

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Phillips was transported to the Walker County Jail and released the following day – on 

April 17, 2012. (Doc. # 30-3).

On September, 11, 2012, Browne testified at Phillips’s hearing. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶ 39). 

Browne testified that he had shocked Phillips with the Taser in the back as she walked away

from him. Phillips claimed Browne had deployed the Taser at Phillips and hit her squarely in the 

chest above her sternum as she walked towards him. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 3). Judge Lapkovitch, 

Walker County District Court Judge, found that Phillips had not committed any crime and found 

her not guilty on each charge brought against her. (Doc. # 31-1, ¶ 12).

After the hearing, Browne was waiting for Phillips in the hallway. Brown walked up to 

Phillips, put his hand on her shoulder to stop her, and told her that “you are under arrest and in

my custody now.” (Doc. # 31, ¶ 14). Browne directed Phillips to sit on the bench in the hallway 

and called over his radio for an officer to come and pick Phillips up and take her to jail. (Doc. # 

31-1, ¶ 14). District Attorney Bill Adair came and spoke with Browne. After talking to the 

District Attorney, Browne told Phillips she was “free to leave for now.” (Doc. # 31-1, ¶¶ 14-15). 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or 

filings that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, the Rule requires the non-moving party 

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to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. 

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts 

and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of 

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving 

party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere 

allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc. teaches, Rule 56(c) “does not allow the plaintiff to simply rest on his

allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof of trial, he 

must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to his case at 

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Mere allegations” made by a plaintiff are insufficient. Id.

Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be 

granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”

Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (D.Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson,

477 U.S. at 250-51). 

“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the 

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue 

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for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a 

sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so onesided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Sawyer, 243 F. Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 

(“The law is clear ... that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment.”).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint asserts four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Browne: Count I – unlawful seizure arising from Plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent detention, 

(Doc # 15, pp. 10-11); Count II – excessive force used in effecting Plaintiff’s arrest, (Doc # 15, 

pp. 11-13); Count III – denial of medical treatment, (Doc # 15, pp. 13-14); and Count IV –

unlawful seizure arising from a subsequent encounter between Plaintiff and Browne.

A. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions 

from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory 

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 

486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An official asserting 

the affirmative defense of qualified immunity must initially establish that he was acting within 

his discretionary authority.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir.

2007). “If the official was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority ... the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 1136-

37. Here, Plaintiff has not challenged the assertion that Browne was at all times acting within 

the scope of his discretionary authority. Moreover, arrests by police officers fall within the 

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discretionary authority function. See, e.g. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(“there can be no doubt that [the officer] was acting in his discretionary authority when he 

arrested [the plaintiff].”)

Therefore, “[t]o overcome qualified immunity, [a] plaintiff must satisfy a two prong test; 

he must show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly 

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 

1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). “The threshold inquiry” a court must consider in a qualified 

immunity analysis is whether Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 736 (2002). “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations 

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

B. Count I – Unlawful Seizure 

Plaintiff alleges that Browne violated her constitutional rights by arresting her on April 

16, 2012. That argument is based on her claim that Browne lacked probable cause to arrest her. 

(Doc. # 31 at 13). 

A warrantless arrest carried out without probable cause violates the Constitution and can 

give rise to a claim under Section 1983. However, probable cause is an absolute bar to a false 

arrest claim. See Rankin v. Evans, 133 F .3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998). “[I]n cases involving 

arrests or warrantless searches and seizures, law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity if they had even arguable probable cause.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 

1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013). “Arguable probable cause exists where reasonable officers in the 

same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defendant could have believed 

that probable cause existed to arrest.” Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) 

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(citation omitted). “Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude 

that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 

(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Importantly, all that is required for an officer to make an arrest based upon probable 

cause is that the arrest be for some crime. Neither Alabama, nor the Eleventh Circuit, has

adopted a rule requiring the facts and circumstances giving rise to probable cause to be closely 

related to the charge stated by the police officer. See United States v. Saunders, 476 F.2d 5, 7

(5th Cir. 1973) (“When an officer makes an arrest, which is properly supported by probable 

cause to arrest for a certain offense, neither his subjective reliance on an offense for which no 

probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense vitiates the arrest.”); 

Hill v. State, 665 So.2d 1024 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (“If [the officer’s] observation of [the 

arrestee’s] conduct was sufficient to supply [the officer] probable cause to arrest [the arrestee] 

for any chargeable offense, then the probable cause element is qualified”); Powell v. State, 548 

So.2d 590, 600 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest the 

plaintiff even though he did not have probable cause to arrest him for the charge stated at the 

time of the arrest); see also Burdeshaw v. Snell, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1201 (M.D. Ala. 2005).

As Browne correctly points out, based on the death threats attributed to her by third 

parties and reported by the police dispatcher, Plaintiff could have been charged with making a 

terrorist threat. “A person commits the crime of making a terrorist threat when he or she 

threatens by any means to commit any crime of violence . . . [i]ntentionally or recklessly . . . 

[t]errorizing another person.” Ala. Code § 13A-10-15. Here, it is undisputed that Browne 

received information indicating Plaintiff had made threats. It is also undisputed that he was 

directed to the Sunlight Road residence and responded to that call. Plaintiff has not disputed that 

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she made death threats to people living at the Sunlight Road residence, and, in any event, her text 

messages subsequently confirmed the existence of the death threats. (Doc. # 30-1 ¶ 38). 

Therefore, at a minimum, Browne had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and there was 

no constitutional violation in connection with that arrest.

C. Count II – Excessive Force 

“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest ... 

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to 

effect it.” Jean–Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotes 

omitted). However, “[a]ny use of force must be reasonable,” id., and “[i]t is clearly established 

that the use of excessive force in carrying out an arrest constitutes a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment.” Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 767 (11th Cir.2006). The question presented here 

is whether, on April 16, 2012, it was clearly established that the amount of force used by Browne 

against Plaintiff was unconstitutionally excessive.

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s 

chambers” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 

evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. Therefore, 

“[u]se of force must be judged on a case-by-case basis from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 

1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“In the Eleventh Circuit, [courts] recognize that the typical arrest involves some force 

and injury.” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002). For even minor 

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offenses, police officers are authorized to use physical restraint, handcuffs, and to push suspects. 

See, e.g., Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257 (finding no constitutional violation to grab suspect, push him

against a van, search his groin in an uncomfortable manner, and place him in handcuffs); Jones 

v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (finding no constitutional 

violation to slam plaintiff against wall, kick plaintiff’s legs apart, and require plaintiff to raise 

arms above his head); Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1997) (per 

curiam) (finding no constitutional violation for affixing handcuffs too tightly on disorderly 

conduct arrestee); Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 7 F.3d 1552, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(finding no excessive force when a non-resisting individual was arrested for building code 

violation and pushed against a wall, put in a chokehold, and handcuffed).

In this case, according to Plaintiff’s version of the facts, which the court must accept as 

true,2

when Brown discharged his Taser at Plaintiff, she was facing Browne, her hands were to 

her sides, open and empty, and she was approximately 15 feet from Browne. (Doc. # 31-1 ¶¶ 5-

6). According to Plaintiff’s sworn affidavit testimony, she obeyed Browne’s commands, was 

unarmed, and was not resisting arrest. 

Eleventh Circuit precedent establishes that shocking a non-threatening, unresisting 

suspect with a Taser is unconstitutionally excessive. In an unpublished decision in Thompson v. 

Mostert, 489 F. Appx. 396 (11th Cir. 2012), the court addressed a fact scenario similar to that 

presented here. In Thompson, the plaintiff testified that during an arrest he did not resist being 

handcuffed, but the officers proceeded to force him to the ground and deployed a Taser device 

into his back. Thompson, 489 F. Appx. at 397-98. Under these facts, the Eleventh Circuit held a 

 2 The court must accept as true Plaintiff’s testimony at this stage in the proceedings. Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 

F.3d 972, 977 (11th Cir. 2012),

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reasonable jury could find that the officers violated Thompson’s clearly established 

constitutional rights. Id.

In Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.2009), the plaintiff was repeatedly shocked 

by a Taser over a two-minute period. Before the Taser was deployed, however, the plaintiff was 

not advancing toward the officer, and the officer shocked the plaintiff with the Taser without 

warning. Oliver, 586 F.3d at 904. The Eleventh Circuit held that the officer’s conduct was so 

plainly unnecessary and disproportionate that no reasonable officer could have thought that this 

amount of force was legal under the circumstances. Id.

3

Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, not only did Browne shock 

Plaintiff with the Taser without warning and while she was in a non-threatening and nonaggressive posture, he also shocked her a second time, while she was lying face-down on the 

ground with one had cuffed behind her back. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that 

Plaintiff’s assertions regarding both the first and the second discharge of the Taser are enough to 

put the question to a jury. That is, her allegations, if believed, support a claim of excessive force 

that violated her clearly established rights. See also Runge v. Snow, 514 Fed. Appx. 891 (11th 

Cir. Mar.27, 2013) (holding the gratuitous use of force when a criminal suspect is detained and 

not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force); Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1274 (11th Cir. 

2008) (allowing excessive force claim against police officers where defendant was beaten and 

sprayed with pepper spray while lying face down on the ground, posed no danger of immediate 

harm to anyone, and was not actively resisting arrest). 

 3 Similarly, in Cherry v. City of St. Petersburg, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2011), the district court 

held that the discharge of a Taser at a plaintiff who was in a nonaggressive, nonthreatening posture a distance of one 

foot from the officer was disproportionate to, and excessive under, the circumstances. Id. at 1355.

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D. Count III – Denial of Medical Treatment

Plaintiff also contends that Browne was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical 

needs in violation of section 1983. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual 

punishment, which includes deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

arise under the Eighth Amendment when the claimant is a convicted prisoner. However, when a 

Section 1983 Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee, the claim must be asserted under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 271 (11th Cir. 2013). In any event, the 

minimum standard for providing medical care to a pretrial detainee is identical to the minimum 

standard required by the Eighth Amendment for a convicted prisoner, and courts analyze the 

claim under the decisional law of both amendments. Id.

“Our cases have consistently held that knowledge of the need for medical care and an 

intentional refusal to provide that care constitutes deliberate indifference.” Adams v. Poag, 61 

F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Carswell v. Bay Cnty., 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th Cir.

1988); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, not 

every claim of inadequate medical treatment states a cognizable claim under the federal 

constitution. Id. “Medical treatment [is deliberately indifferent] only when it is so grossly 

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to 

fundamental fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation 

omitted) (Eighth Amendment case).

To establish that Browne was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical need, 

Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and subjective test. Under the objective component of the 

test, Plaintiff must show that she had a serious medical need. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 

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1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). An objectively serious medical need is “one that has been 

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person 

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 

1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To establish the subjective component, a prisoner must establish three factors: (1) 

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) that the conduct 

complained of is more than merely negligent. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th 

Cir. 1999). Additionally, the plaintiff must show that an injury was caused by the defendant’s 

wrongful conduct. See Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). It is not 

enough to show that the care provided was less than optimal, or that a different course of 

treatment might have been preferable. The required subjective elements of a deliberate 

indifference claim ensure that “mere accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, 

[and] even medical malpractice” are not actionable under Section 1983. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 

1258. 

Plaintiff asserts that she was bleeding from a cut inflicted by the barbs of the Taser. 

Plaintiff also states she told Browne that she is a nurse and needed medical attention. However, 

as to Plaintiff’s burden on the objective component of her deliberate indifference claim, there is

no evidence of a medical diagnosis to the effect that her cut required medical attention, nor does 

the evidence establish that it would have been obvious to a lay person that her bleeding cut 

required medical attention. Plaintiff has not met the objective component of the deliberate 

indifference test.

But even if the facts showed Plaintiff had an objectively serious medical need (and, to be 

clear, they do not), she must also show that Browne subjectively perceived a serious medical 

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need to which he was indifferent. Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet that burden, as well. That is, 

no evidence has been presented that Browne had any subjective knowledge that Plaintiff needed 

medical attention. Browne stated in his affidavit that he did not recall Phillips receiving any 

injuries. (Doc. # 30-1 ¶ 30). To be sure, Phillips may have received a cut when she was tased 

and may have been bruised by her fall. But the record facts do not suggest that she appeared to 

Browne to have any injury that required medical treatment. (Doc. # 30-1 ¶ 31). Even taking as 

true Plaintiff’s assertion that she told Browne she is a nurse and required medical treatment, she 

has not met her burden. 

“Each individual Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that 

person knows.” Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1331. Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Browne (1) 

had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, and (2) disregarded that risk. 

“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, 

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of 

punishment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). Plaintiff has not shown that 

Browne was subjectively aware that Plaintiff had a serious medical need that medical attention.

Summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim here 

because the undisputed evidence does not show deliberate indifference by Browne to either an 

objectively serious medical need that he subjectively perceived. 

E. Count IV – Unlawful Seizure 

Plaintiff asserts another unlawful seizure claim based on Browne’s instruction to her, 

after the hearing in which the charges against her were dismissed, that she was under arrest and 

should wait on the bench in the hallway outside the courtroom. (Doc. # 31-1- at ¶ 14). 

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“A ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when 

government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way 

restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989) (quoting 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968)). Three types of encounters between police and 

citizens implicate the Fourth Amendment: “(1) police-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or 

detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.... [A]n 

encounter that does not involve coercion or detention does not implicate Fourth Amendment 

scrutiny.” Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 

Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A show of authority can constitute a seizure if the subject yields to that authority. 

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991). “Whenever an officer restrains the 

freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person.” West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063 

(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (internal modifications 

omitted)). “If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has 

not been seized.” Miller, 458 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Perez, 443 F.3d at 777–78 (emphasis 

omitted)). “Absent the use of physical force, a seizure requires both a show of authority and 

‘submission to [that] assertion of authority.’” United States v. Dolomon, 569 Fed.Appx. 889 

(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)). But “[t]he Fourth 

Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief 

detention short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878

(1975). 

Although the “seizure” at the courthouse involved no physical restraint and lasted only a 

short period of time, a reasonable jury could conclude that Browne used a show of authority such 

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that Plaintiff, in light of her prior dealings with Browne, would have understood that she had 

been arrested and may not have felt free to leave. Therefore, just as with her other lawful seizure 

claim (asserted in Count I), the question becomes whether Browne had arguable probable cause 

to detain Plaintiff. Arguable probable cause is evaluated by determining whether a reasonable 

officer, possessing the same knowledge as the arresting officer at the time of the arrest, would 

have believed probable cause to exist. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Browne had just been present at a hearing on the 

charges against Plaintiff. The judge had dismissed those charges. According to Plaintiff, 

Browne was present to hear the judge announce that Plaintiff was not guilty of the charges. 

Thereafter, she was allowed to leave the courtroom. Browne claims that he saw Plaintiff in the 

hall, asked her to wait, and then spoke with the district attorney. After confirming there were no 

other charges or warrants against her, he then told her she could leave. (Doc. # 30-1, ¶¶ 40-42). 

The problem for Browne here is that when facts are in dispute, the court must accept Plaintiff’s 

version of those facts in resolving his motion. According to Plaintiff, Browne detained her and 

told Plaintiff she was arrested. He did not investigate whether there was any probable cause to 

arrest her until after he detained her. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could 

conclude that the detention outside the courtroom, however brief, violated Plaintiff’s clearly 

established constitutional rights. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 29) is due 

to be granted in part and denied in part. A separate order will be entered.

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DONE and ORDERED this March 9, 2016.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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