Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03991/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03991-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Troy Aksamit
Appellee
City of Lincoln
Appellee
Sharon Elder-Keep
Appellant
Jerome Thraen
Appellee

Document Text:

1

David B. Keep died on December 21, 2004, of causes unrelated to the instant

case. Despite Keep's death, his cause of action survives, as pending actions for

personal injury do not abate by death of the plaintiff under Nebraska Law. Neb. Rev.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3991

___________

Sharon Elder-Keep, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Troy Aksamit, Individual capacity; * 

Jerome Thraen, Sgt., Individual * 

capacity and in their official capacities *

as Police Officers; City of Lincoln, *

*

Appellees. * 

___________

Submitted: May 19, 2006

Filed: August 21, 2006

___________

Before BYE, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

David B. Keep sued police officers Troy Aksamit and Jerome Thraen, in their

individual and official capacities as police officers for the City of Lincoln, Nebraska

("the City"), alleging that they used excessive force against him in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983.1

 In a summary judgment motion on the individual capacity claim, the

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
Stat. § 25-1402 (1995). Sharon Elder-Keep, Keep's wife and administrator of his

estate, was substituted as the plaintiff in the instant action. 

2

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska. 

-2-

officers asserted that qualified immunity shielded them. The district court2

 granted this

motion for summary judgment after excluding two of the plaintiff's affidavits filed in

opposition to the motion. After denying several other of the plaintiff's motions, the

district court ultimately granted the police officers' second motion for summary

judgment on the official capacity claim. Sharon Elder-Keep, acting as administrator

of Keep's estate, timely filed this appeal. We affirm. 

I. Background

Elder-Keep's allegations arose from an altercation between Keep and the

officers following a traffic stop. Keep, while transporting Elder-Keep to the hospital,

passed Officer Thraen of the Lincoln Police Department ("LPD"), who noticed Keep's

vehicle had no license plate. Thraen activated his patrol car's overhead lights and

pursued Keep's van for approximately 18 blocks. Thraen ordered Keep to stop, but

Keep appeared to ignore the officer, who was unaware that Keep had requested a

police escort through Elder-Keep's son, A.J. 

Keep stopped at a traffic light and, as the light turned green, Thraen used his

public address system to instruct Keep to pull over to the right of the road. Instead,

Keep accelerated. Assuming that Keep was fleeing, Thraen activated his siren. Keep

apparently ignored the officer, drove through a red light, and finally stopped at the

entrance to the hospital. Thraen, still in pursuit, pulled his patrol car in front of Keep's

van. 

Officer Aksamit observed Thraen, activated his overhead lights in an attempt

to stop Keep's van, and joined in pursuit of Keep. Aksamit recognized Keep as

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
3

The officers' version of events is as follows: Aksamit told Keep to remove his

hand from his coat pocket and get back into the van. Keep did not comply but instead

proceeded towards Aksamit and then turned and moved around the rear of the van.

Aksamit repeatedly told Keep to remove his hand from his pocket, put his hands on

his head, and lie on the ground, but Keep failed to comply with his commands.

Aksamit grabbed Keep from behind, took Keep to the ground, causing the front of

Keep's body to hit the concrete, wrestled Keep's hand out of his pocket, and placed

Keep in handcuffs. Keep had no weapon on his person. Just prior to Aksamit exiting

his vehicle and taking Keep to the ground, Thraen heard a radio dispatch regarding a

possible medical emergency in Keep's vehicle. 

Elder-Keep's affidavit presents a substantially different picture. According to

Elder-Keep, Keep exited the van at the hospital, put his arms up, and called for help.

Keep's pockets were sealed shut, and he had nothing in his hands. No officer gave any

orders or directions to Keep. Elder-Keep saw Thraen exit his vehicle before Aksamit

exited his vehicle. Keep went around the van from behind and opened the passenger

door. Then, Aksamit grabbed Keep from behind, threw him to the ground, and kicked

him and hit him as he lay silent and motionless. Elder-Keep alleges that Keep suffered

a variety of physical injuries as a result of Aksamit's use of force. 

-3-

someone he had seen in connection with a disturbance at a Lincoln restaurant

approximately two hours earlier. At that time, Aksamit believed Keep was intoxicated.

Aksamit saw Keep's vehicle run the stop light and then pursued the van into the

hospital parking lot where he parked his patrol car behind the van. Aksamit testified

that he never heard any radio dispatch regarding a possible medical emergency in

Keep's vehicle. 

Although their accounts differ substantially,3

 neither party disputes that

Aksamit grabbed Keep from behind, took him to the ground, causing the front of

Keep's body to hit the concrete, and then handcuffed Keep. 

 After the incident, Keep filed a § 1983 action against Thraen and Aksamit in

their individual and official capacities. Thraen and Aksamit filed a motion for

summary judgment on the individual capacity claim, alleging that they were entitled

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-4-

to qualified immunity. In opposition to summary judgment, plaintiff's counsel

electronically filed the purported affidavits of Sharon Elder-Keep and A.J. Elder, who

witnessed some of the evening's events. 

The district court, however, did not consider the affidavits in making its

summary judgment ruling. The court ruled the affidavits inadmissible because the

electronically-filed affidavits "b[ore] no signatures or evidence of having been

executed before a notary public" and because the affidavits were "at times

contradictory with the allegations in the Amended Complaint itself." The district court

thus "disregar[ed] [the] incompetent evidence when ruling on the Defendants'

Motion." 

Twenty-five days after the district court granted Thraen's and Aksamit's

summary judgment motion, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion under Rule 60 of the

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, asking the district court to reconsider its exclusion

of the electronically-filed affidavits. Plaintiff's counsel submitted faxed copies of

purported affidavit signature pages signed by Sharon Elder-Keep and Allen Peithman,

Jr. However, discrepancies existed between the later faxed "copies" and the initial

electronically-filed signature pages. The date that Sharon Elder-Keep's signature was

notarized on her faxed affidavit signature page differed from the date that it was

purportedly notarized on the earlier, electronically-filed signature page. Plaintiff's

counsel also submitted his own affidavit, explaining that the person identified as "A.J.

Elder" in the previous electronically-filed "affidavits" of Sharon Elder-Keep and A.J.

Elder was actually "Allen Peithman, Jr." Plaintiff's counsel explained that he had no

knowledge that A.J.'s last name was actually "Peithman" until A.J. informed him after

A.J. faxed the affidavit back to him. 

 The district court treated Elder-Keep's motion as a motion for reconsideration,

stating that Rule 60 applies only to relief from final judgments or orders. The district

court's previous summary judgment was not a final order. According to local rules, a

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
4

The District of Nebraska docket report reveals that Elder-Keep did file an

objection to the motion to strike on October 4, 2005. 

-5-

motion for reconsideration must be filed no later than ten days after the district court

files its order, unless the party demonstrates good cause for a later filing. Because

Elder-Keep's motion for reconsideration was filed 25 days after the order, the district

court considered the motion late and ruled that Elder-Keep failed to show good cause

for the delay. While Elder-Keep filed other motions, they were denied. 

Thraen and Aksamit then filed a second motion for summary judgment on the

official capacity claim. Elder-Keep's response to the motion was due on Friday,

September 9, 2005. However, she filed a motion to extend the deadline on September

6, 2005, noting that her attorney had arranged depositions for September 7, 2005. She

hoped to file the depositions with the court by September 23, 2005, a week before

discovery closed in the case. Thraen and Aksamit waived any objections to the motion

to extend. 

Because the district court had not yet granted the motion to extend, on

September 12, 2005, Elder-Keep filed all evidence in her possession, as well as an

"interim" index. She made reference to the depositions that were taken on September

7 and to the depositions to be taken on September 15. Thraen and Aksamit then filed

a motion to strike on September 22, 2005, arguing that some documents in ElderKeep's index of evidence were not identified and authenticated by affidavit. On

September 26, 2005, the district court denied Elder-Keep's motion to extend as moot.

The court concluded that it need not reconsider its denial of Elder-Keep's motion to

extend because, even if it had granted the motion, the extension would have expired

on September 23, 2005. On October 4, 2005, the district court granted the motion to

strike, stating that Elder-Keep failed to respond to the motion.4

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-6-

The district court then granted the second motion for summary judgment to

Thraen and Aksamit, stating that Elder-Keep failed to prove "an unconstitutional

policy or custom . . . that in any way contributed to Keep's injuries." 

II. Discussion

Elder-Keep appeals, arguing that the district court erroneously: (1) excluded the

electronically-filed affidavits; (2) denied the Rule 60 motion; (3) denied the motion

for reconsideration; (4) denied the motion to expedite deadlines and motion to extend

deadlines; (5) granted summary judgment to Thraen and Aksamit; (6) denied her

second motion to extend; and (7) denied her second motion for reconsideration and

leave to submit additional evidence. 

A. Exclusion of Affidavits

Elder-Keep argues that the district court erred by excluding two electronicallyfiled affidavits despite no objection from Thraen and Aksamit. She contends that the

district court's sua sponte exclusion of the affidavits was in violation of the local rules,

this court's rules, and applicable case law. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. In particular,

Rule 56(e) requires that "[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof

referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith." While Rule

56(e) only states that papers referred to in the affidavit must be "sworn," an affidavit,

by definition, is "a statement reduced to writing and the truth of which is sworn to

before someone who is authorized to administer an oath." Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d

850, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 

In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1746 mandates that the affiant declare, under penalty

of perjury, that the facts contained in the affidavit are true. Therefore, "[a]ffidavits are

admissible in summary judgment proceedings [only] if they are made under penalties

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
5

The plain language of Rule 60 states that it applies to "a final judgment, order,

or proceeding." The district court "may" relieve a party from such an order when, for

example, the party demonstrates "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect" or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (6). 

-7-

of perjury," meaning that a district court may properly reject unsworn documents. Id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1746). 

Here, the affidavits lacked signatures and attestation before a notary public.

Thus, the affiants failed to execute their affidavits under penalty of perjury as

mandated by § 1746. Therefore, we hold that the district court was authorized to

exclude sua sponte such affidavits from its consideration of the first summary

judgment motion. 

B. Rule 60 Motion

Elder-Keep's second argument is that the district court improperly treated her

Rule 60 motion as a motion for reconsideration. Elder-Keep contends that the court

erred because filing electronically-filed affidavits without signatures qualifies as

"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" under Rule 60. Furthermore,

she maintains that a Rule 60 motion properly applies to a motion filed in response to

a non-final order. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not mention motions for

reconsideration." Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 1999). However,

we have determined that motions for reconsideration are "nothing more than Rule

60(b) motions when directed at non-final orders."5 Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 340

F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Broadway, 193 F.3d at 989). We review a district

court's denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-8-

In the present case, the district court had not entered a final judgment or order

when Elder-Keep filed her Rule 60 motion. The district court's grant of summary

judgment to Thraen and Aksamit based on qualified immunity in their individual

capacities did not resolve whether liability existed in their official capacities. See

Erickson v. Holloway, 77 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that no "final

order" existed where the district court granted summary judgment to officials in their

individual capacities based on qualified immunity). Because this grant of summary

judgment was a non-final order, the district court properly characterized Elder-Keep's

motion as a motion for reconsideration. 

Under the local rules for the United States District Court for the District of

Nebraska, a party "must file a motion for reconsideration of an order no later than ten

(10) days after the court files the order, unless the party shows good cause for late

filing." NECivR 60.1(b). Here, the district court entered its non-final order on January

4, 2005. Elder-Keep did not file her motion until January 29, 2005—25 days after

entry of the court's order. 

In addition, the local rules provide that motions for reconsideration are

disfavored and will ordinarily be denied unless the party demonstrates manifest error

in a prior ruling or sets forth new facts or legal authority that could not have been

brought to the court's attention previously with reasonable diligence. NECivR 60.1(c).

The district court concluded that Elder-Keep failed to demonstrate manifest error in

the prior ruling or present new facts or legal authority to the court that she could not

have previously presented with due diligence. Thus, applying the Rule 60 standard to

the non-final order, the district court essentially determined, in its discretion, that

Elder-Keep failed to show "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" or

"any other reason justifying relief" from the order. We cannot say that the district

court abused its discretion in making such a determination. 

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-9-

C. Motion for Reconsideration

Elder-Keep's third argument on appeal is that the district court erred in denying

her motion for reconsideration of its previous order denying her motion for Rule 60

relief, which the district court treated as a motion for reconsideration. 

Because we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) labeling

Elder-Keep's Rule 60(b) motion as a motion for reconsideration and (2) determining

that Elder-Keep failed to meet the requisite criteria under both the local rules and Rule

60 in denying the motion, we also find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Elder-Keep's subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial

of her Rule 60 motion. 

D. Motion to Expedite and Motion to Extend

Elder-Keep's fourth argument is that the district court erroneously denied her

motion to expedite deadlines and motion to extend. According to Elder-Keep, the

district court denied her Rule 60(b) motion on February 14, 2005. She subsequently

filed her motion for reconsideration on February 24, 2005. Elder-Keep sought to

expedite Thraen and Aksamit's responses to the motion to reconsider and the court's

ruling on the motion to reconsider so as to avoid the 30-day deadline to appeal the

Rule 60(b) motion ruling. She filed a motion to extend the time to appeal under

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(B).

Elder-Keep's argument lacks merit. Her motion to expedite deadlines and

motion to extend were predicated upon her erroneous belief that the denial of her Rule

60(b) motion constituted an appealable order. However, as previously stated, the

district court's order was not a final order, as the claims against Aksamit and Thraen

in their official capacities were still pending. Most importantly, we have already

decided that Elder-Keep had no right to appeal the denial of her Rule 60 motion and

motion for reconsideration. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, No. 05-2093 (8th Cir. June 17,

2005) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction). 

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
6

Prior to the incident, Aksamit underwent 44 hours of instruction in defensive

tactics and 5.5 hours of continuing education on those topics at the LPD police

academy. He also passed a series of exams that tested, among other things, his

knowledge of the appropriate levels of the use of force. The LPD use-of-force policy

requires that the officer use verbal commands first; soft-empty-hand techniques if a

subject resists in a passive or defensive manner; hard empty-hand techniques when a

subject resists in an active or aggressive manner; use of intermediate weapons if hard

empty-hand techniques are ineffective; and, finally, lethal force in the defense of

human life or to defend a person in immediate danger of serious bodily harm. The

LPD does not retain officers who do not pass the training program and disciplines or

requires follow-up training for officers who fail to comply with LPD's use-of-force

policy. 

7

No recording was made of the incident, as the City's policy only allows an

officer trained in the use of recording equipment to operate it, and Aksamit was not

trained to operate such equipment.

-10-

E. Summary Judgment

Elder-Keep's fifth argument for reversal is that the district court erroneously

granted summary judgment to Thraen and Aksamit on her official capacity claims

because numerous issues of fact remain unresolved. In addition, she argues that

Aksamit failed to follow the City's policy on force by not giving Keep a verbal

command and by initiating an assault on Keep when Keep's hands were not in his

pockets.6

 Furthermore, she asserts that the City's policy allowing only officers trained

in the use of recording equipment to operate it contributed to the alleged assault.7

 We

review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tamko Roofing Prod., Inc. v. Smith

Eng'g Co., 450 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 2006). 

A suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against

the entity for which the official is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985) ("An official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as

a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-11-

in interest is the entity.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The

plaintiff must prove that the "municipality itself caused the constitutional violation at

issue." Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 604 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in

original). Therefore, to establish the liability of an official acting in his official

capacity, the plaintiff must prove that "a policy or custom [of the city] caused the

alleged violation." Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 800 (8th Cir. 1998).

Therefore, "[a] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor," meaning the municipality cannot be held liable on a respondent superior

theory. Kuha, 365 F.3d at 603 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation

omitted). 

An "official policy" is a "deliberate choice to follow a course of action made

from among various alternatives by an official who is determined by state law to have

the final authority to establish governmental policy." Id. at 604 (internal quotations,

citations, and alterations omitted). 

Here, Elder-Keep has failed to allege an unconstitutional policy or custom that

caused a constitutional violation of a federally protected right or privilege. Elder-Keep

identifies two of the City's policies that she contends led to Keep's assault: (1) the

City's policy on force and (2) the City's policy that only officers trained in the use of

recording equipment may operate it. 

As to the City's policy on force, Elder-Keep does not argue that the City's useof-force policy caused the constitutional deprivation but that Aksamit's failure to

follow the policy caused the constitutional deprivation. Elder-Keep did not dispute the

evidence that the City's policies on force and training practices are designed to ensure

that officers exercise any use of force in a lawful manner.

As to Elder-Keep's allegation that Keep's assault was caused by the City's policy

allowing only officers trained in the use of recording equipment to operate it, she has

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-12-

not shown how Aksamit's failure to use the equipment "caused" the alleged assault.

As Elder-Keep herself points out, the videotape would only show the events leading

up to the alleged assault. The videotape itself could not have prevented or caused the

assault. 

Given the nature of the issues, any factual questions remaining respecting the

events at the hospital are not material. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not

err in granting Thraen's and Aksamit's second motion for summary judgment. 

F. Motion to Extend

Next, Elder-Keep argues that the district court erroneously denied her motion

to extend as moot. According to Elder-Keep, at the time that her response to the

second motion for summary judgment was due, she had already filed an unopposed

motion to extend the deadline. However, when the district court did not issue a ruling

on her motion to extend, she filed all the evidence in her possession but expressly

noted that additional depositions would occur on September 7, 2005 and September

15, 2005. Thus, Elder-Keep maintains that because she properly alerted the district

court that she would file late depositions, the district court abused its discretion in

holding that the motion to extend was moot. We review a district court's denial of a

motion to extend for an abuse of discretion. See Ceridian Corp. v. SCSC Corp., 212

F.3d 398, 401 (8th Cir. 2000). 

While Elder-Keep initially asked the district court to extend the deadline until

September 23, 2005, she failed to submit an additional brief or any additional

evidence as of September 26, 2005, the date on which the district court denied ElderKeep's motion to extend as moot. Therefore, we agree with the district court that even

if it had granted Elder-Keep's motion to extend, she failed to meet her requested

deadline of September 23, 2005. The district court's treatment of the motion as moot

was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340
-13-

G. Motion for Reconsideration 

and for Leave to Submit Additional Evidence

 Finally, Elder-Keep maintains that the district court abused its discretion in

denying her motion for reconsideration and for leave to submit additional evidence

and a supplemental brief. According to Elder-Keep, her counsel did not receive the

remaining depositions until September 27, 2005, a day after the district court's order.

Therefore, she immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and for leave to file the

additional evidence and supplemental brief, attaching the depositions of several

witnesses. 

As we previously noted, the local rules provide that the district court will

ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration unless the party demonstrates a showing

of manifest error in the prior ruling or demonstrates new facts or legal authority that

the party could not have previously produced with reasonable diligence to the court.

NECivR 60.1(c). Elder-Keep has failed to meet this burden. Therefore, we hold that

the district court did not err in denying Elder-Keep's motions. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-3991 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/21/2006 Entry ID: 2080340