Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04180/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04180-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregg Allen
Appellant
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

GREGG ALLEN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-4180 

(D.C. No. 2:14-CV-00904-DBP) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Gregg Allen appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the 

Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 The question before the agency was whether Mr. Allen was disabled between 

his alleged onset date of May 1, 2008, and his date last insured of December 31, 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

September 27, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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2012. At step one of the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process, see Wilson 

v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010), the administrative law judge (ALJ) 

found that Mr. Allen had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during this 

period. At step two, the ALJ found that he suffered from the severe impairments of 

an affective disorder, an anxiety-related disorder, and a personality disorder. At step 

three, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Allen did not meet or medically equal the severity 

of a listed impairment. Then the ALJ assessed Mr. Allen with the residual functional 

capacity (RFC) to perform medium work, with the following mental RFC: 

He is not significantly limited in his ability to understand, remember and 

carryout job instructions, and can understand, remember and carryout 

detailed instructions. He is not impaired in his ability to make work related 

plans and goals. He is able to interact with supervisors and coworkers, but 

should have only brief and superficial interactive contact with the public. 

He is not limited in his ability to deal with changes in the routine work 

setting. 

Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 31. Based on testimony from a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ 

concluded that Mr. Allen was capable of performing his past relevant work as a 

computer programmer. He therefore denied benefits at step four. The Appeals 

Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 

decision, and the district court (a magistrate judge presiding by consent of the 

parties) affirmed. 

DISCUSSION

 “We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct 

legal standards were applied.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1140. “Substantial evidence is 

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such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We may neither reweigh the 

evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Barnett v. Apfel, 

231 F.3d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Allen raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) the ALJ erred in 

failing to consider all of the relevant listings; (2) in assessing the RFC at step four, 

the ALJ failed to account for limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace that 

he had previously acknowledged at step three; and (3) the ALJ failed to adequately 

question the VE with regard to concentration and the effects of impediments to 

concentration. We generally agree with the district court’s assessment of these 

claims and rather than repeat that analysis here, we affirm for substantially the 

reasons stated, with one clarifying comment. 

 At step three, the ALJ’s decision identifies the relevant listings as 12.04 

(affective disorders) and 12.08 (personality disorders). Mr. Allen argues that the ALJ 

committed reversible error in failing to consider listing 12.06 (anxiety-related 

disorders). In rejecting this argument, the district court first held that “the ALJ’s 

opinion appears to suffer a typographical error, rather than an analytical error.” Aplt. 

App., Vol. 1 at 64. We agree with this assessment. Although the ALJ did not 

explicitly identify listing 12.06, it is clear that he did not overlook Mr. Allen’s 

anxiety disorder at step three. To the contrary, he explicitly mentioned anxiety 

during this portion of the discussion. Further, he relied on the testimony of the 

testifying medical expert, whose opinion considered all three listings in combination. 

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“Where, as here, we can follow the adjudicator’s reasoning in conducting our review, 

and can determine that correct legal standards have been applied, merely technical 

omissions in the ALJ’s reasoning do not dictate reversal. In conducting our review, 

we should, indeed must, exercise common sense.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 

695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). Because we affirm on the district court’s 

conclusion that there was no error regarding this point, we need not consider the 

alternative harmless-error discussion. 

CONCLUSION

 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Jerome A. Holmes 

Circuit Judge 

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