Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05193/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05193-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bobby Gene Richardson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

,.. I 

PUBLISH 

FILED 

tJuJ&td Srat11 Court ot Appcnla Tendl Circuit 

JUN • 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Cerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-5193 

BOBBY GENE RICHARDSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-3-C) 

Stuart W. Southerland, of Fransein and Southerland, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Allen J. Litchfield, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen C. Lewis, United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, TACHA and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-5193 Document: 01019276474 Date Filed: 06/06/1996 Page: 1 
Mr. Bobby Gene Richardson was convicted on eight counts of various drug 

trafficking offenses, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine and cocaine and to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S. C. 

§ 846; distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S. C. § 841(a)(l); using and carrying a 

firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 

U.S. C. § 924(c)(1); possession of a firearm after a former conviction of a felony 

in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 922(g); and maintaining a location for storing and 

distributing methamphetamine and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S. C. § 856. The 

court sentenced Mr. Richardson to 168 months imprisonment for the drug 

offenses followed by 60 months imprisonment for the section 924(c)(1) firearm 

conviction. Mr. Richardson contends on appeal (1) the search of his home 

violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his 

firearm and conspiracy convictions; (3) evidence was erroneously admitted during 

trial; (4) his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (5) the district 

court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm. 

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I 

In the fall of 1993, Mr. Christopher Gilmartin agreed to assist the Tulsa 

Police Department and the Tulsa County District Attorney's Office with drug 

trafficking investigations in exchange for the dismissal of charges against him. 

To that end, Mr. Gilmartin agreed to set up controlled narcotics buys involving 

Mr. Richardson, Mr. Darrell TWayne Stone, Police Officer Jeff Cash, and himself. 

Mr. Gilmartin and Mr. Stone were to act as middlemen between the purchaser, 

Officer Cash, and the supplier, Mr. Richardson. Agent Debrah Pickering of the 

Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics (OBN) also participated in the investigation. 

Mr. Gilmartin called Mr. Stone to set up a narcotics transaction near 

Spoonfork Bridge at 126th Street in North Tulsa. Officer Cash drove Mr. 

Gilmartin to the meeting place and gave him $460 to make the purchase. Mr. 

Gilmartin got into Mr. Stone's truck and gave him the cash. Mr. Stone took the 

money and informed Mr. Gilmartin that he had to acquire the cocaine from Mr. 

Richardson. Mr. Stone left and returned with four small bags of cocaine, which 

he gave to Mr. Gilmartin. Later that evening, Mr. Gilmartin told Mr. Stone that 

he would get back in touch with him when he was ready to do something else. 

Mr. Gilmartin contacted Mr. Stone about two weeks later and arranged to 

purchase an ounce of cocaine near Mr. Richardson's farm, although the location 

for the purchase was later changed to Wann Cemetery in Oologah, Oklahoma. 

Officer Cash drove Mr. Gilmartin to the cemetery and gave him $1600 in marked 

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bills to make the second purchase. Mr. Gilmartin gave the cash to Mr. Stone, 

who again took the money, drove away, and returned in approximately fifteen 

minutes with an ounce of cocaine. Surveillance officers observed Mr. Stone enter 

Mr. Richardson's driveway after Mr. Stone received the cash and before he 

returned to the cemetery. 

Officer Cash then obtained a search warrant for Mr. Richardson's 

residence. He described the controlled buys in the affidavit and stated that Mr. 

Gilmartin named both Mr. Stone and Mr. Richardson as participants. Officer 

Cash also stated that other officers observed Mr. Stone enter Mr. Richardson's 

driveway immediately after receiving cash from Mr. Gilmartin. 

Mr. Gilmartin contacted Mr. Stone the next day and arranged to purchase a 

pound of cocaine at Mr. Richardson's farm. Mr. Stone did not show up at the 

prearranged time, however, because Mr. Richardson had observed one of the 

surveillance officers while he was driving and had informed Mr. Stone. 

Shortly after the failed purchase, Officer Cash, Agent Pickering, and other 

officers proceeded in six cars to Mr. Richardson's residence to execute the search 

warrant. On the way, the officers observed Mr. Richardson driving toward them 

and one of them blocked the roadway by placing his unmarked car sideways. 

Two officers wearing raid jackets and displaying their badges waived for Mr. 

Richardson to stop. Mr. Richardson drove onto the shoulder of the roadway and 

past the officers, but stopped about thirty feet thereafter. One officer saw Mr. 

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Richardson reaching down but could not see what he was reaching for. 

Mr. Richardson was arrested and a "pat down" revealed a loaded .22 

caliber derringer in his left rear pocket. Another gun, a .22 caliber Ithaca rifle, 

was recovered from the front seat of Mr. Richardson's truck. Two notebooks 

were found in the truck, one of which contained a list of precursor chemicals 

used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Approximately one pound of 

cocaine and a half-pound of methamphetamine were found in Mr. Richardson's 

tool shed, which was located near his residence. In addition, officers recovered 

from the tool shed $1540 of the marked money from the last controlled buy, large 

digital scales, and gallon-size ziplock bags with narcotics residue. 

Mr. Richardson's motion to suppress the evidence was denied by the 

district court. After a trial, he was convicted on all counts. 

II 

Mr. Richardson raises several challenges under the Fourth Amendment. 

We review the factual findings in support of a district court's denial of a motion 

to suppress evidence under the clearly erroneous standard. United States y. 

Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 76 (lOth Cir. 1994). The evidence is considered in the 

light most favorable to the district court's ruling. United States y. Soto, 988 F.2d 

1548, 1551 (lOth Cir. 1993). The ultimate determination of reasonableness and 

other conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Betancur, 24 F.3d at 76; SQm, 

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988 F.2d at 1551. 

A. Search of Residence 

Mr. Richardson first contends that the search warrant was invalid because 

Officer Cash and other Tulsa city police officers exceeded their jurisdiction by 

conducting the search outside Tulsa city limits. He relies on State y. Stuart, 855 

P.2d 1070 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), which upheld the suppression of evidence 

where the "affidavit for the search warrant was fatally defective because the 

evidence supporting it was obtained by officers outside their jurisdiction." I.d... at 

107 4. The court held that the police officers in that case "should have notified 

... any other law enforcement agency having jurisdiction outside the city limits, 

to conduct the controlled purchase of narcotics." I.d... at 1073. Cf.. Ross v. Neff, 

905 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (lOth Cir. 1990)(an arrest made outside of the arresting 

officer's jurisdiction violates the Fourth Amendment). 

In determining the reasonableness of a state search or seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment, we conduct an independent inquiry and apply federal law. 

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). We are not prohibited 

from considering state law,~ United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1408 

(lOth Cir. 1992)(considering Wyoming law in Fourth Amendment context), 

although such consideration may not enlarge nor diminish federal law, Elkins, 

364 U.S. at 224. "A violation of state law may or may not form the basis for 

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suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds." United States v. Price, 75 F.3d 

1440, 1443-44 (lOth Cir. 1996); see also Ibarra, 955 at 1408-11. 

Here, in contrast to Stuart, Agent Pickering of the OBN participated with 

the Tulsa police in the entire investigation from the first controlled purchase until 

she served Mr. Richardson with the search warrant. Because Tulsa city police 

officers acted in concert with the OBN, the investigation 1 and search of Mr. 

Richardson's residence were not beyond their authority. ~Price, 75 F.3d at 

1442-44 (holding evidence admissible where county undersheriff acted outside of 

jurisdiction but was accompanied by agents with state-wide jurisdiction); United 

States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 798-99 (1Oth Cir. 1993) (same). Accordingly, 

the warrant issued to search Mr. Richardson's residence was not invalid. 

B. Overbreadth of Search Warrant 

Mr. Richardson asserts the search warrant was overbroad because the 

"lengthy list of specific things" to be seized allowed agents conducting the search 

1 We reject Mr. Richardson's assertion that the investigation violated the 

Fourth Amendment because Officer Cash and Mr. Gilmartin possessed a 

controlled substance in violation of state and federal drug laws when conducting 

the controlled purchases. "'The purpose of controlled drug purchases ... is to 

identify and prosecute drug dealers, not to resell or consume the drugs. Such 

undercover operations therefore do not contain the criminal intent, or mens rea, 

necessary to convert the action into a crime."' United States y. Vargas, 925 F.2d 

1260, 1263 (lOth Cir. 199l)(quoting United States v. French, 900 F.2d 1300,. 

1302 (8th Cir. 1990)). 

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to rummage through all of his papers and effects without any real limitations. 

"The [F]ourth [A]mendment requires that warrants 'particularly describ[e] the 

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' United States v. 

Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 774 (lOth Cir. 1990)(quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). 

"[T]he problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory 

rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 

443,467 (1971). The particularity requirement is intended to ensure "that those 

searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible." l.d... Broad and 

generic terms of description may be valid when the terms are "'as specific as the 

circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit."' United 

States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. 

Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

In the instant case, the search warrant indicated that Mr. Richardson 

unlawfully possessed cocaine, that cocaine was easily destroyed, and that Mr. 

Richardson engaged in the sale of cocaine. The illegal activity described in the 

warrant "makes it difficult to list with any greater particularity the books and 

records desired to be seized which evidences such activity." Harris, 903 F.2d at 

775. The particularity requirement does not prohibit all intrusions. It prohibits 

only those intrusions which are not as limited as possible. We hold the warrant 

was valid because it described the items to be seized as specifically as possible 

under the circumstances. 

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C. Probable Cause for Search Warrant 

.Mr. Richardson also contends the affidavit in support of the warrant failed 

to establish probable cause because neither the informant nor his source 

connecting Mr. Richardson to the crime were known to be credible and reliable, 

and there was no evidence that contraband was located in Mr. Richardson's 

home. "An affidavit in support of a search warrant must provide a substantial 

basis for determining the existence of probable cause; that there is a fair 

probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched." 

United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (lOth Cir. 1986)(citing Massachusetts 

v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1984)). "The mere fact an affidavit does not 

contain personal knowledge of illegal activity at the residence is not fatal to the 

determination of probable cause." United States y. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 1296 

(1Oth Cir. 1991 ). A magistrate's determination of probable cause rests upon a 

practical, common- sense analysis of the totality of the circumstances. Upton, 

466 U.S. at 732. We do not review a magistrate's determination of probable 

cause de novo; we decide "whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a 

'substantial basis' for the Magistrate's finding." ld.. at 732-33. Moreover, we 

give great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 214 

(lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092 (1990). 

In Gates, the Supreme Court rejected the formal requirement that affidavits 

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provide facts establishing the veracity or specific reliability of an informant in 

favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances test. Upton, 466 U.S. at 732. Under the 

latter test, "there is no need for a declaration of the reliability of an informant 

when the informant's information is corroborated by other information." United 

States· v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 457 (1Oth Cir. 1992). See also United States 

v. Brown, 984 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (lOth Cir.)(affiant-officer observed residence 

and corroborated seemingly innocent activity), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 204 

(1993); United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 887 (lOth Cir.)(details provided by 

informant corroborated by law enforcement authorities), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 

964 (1992). 

In the instant case, Officer Cash's affidavit described the following events. 

An informant told Officer Cash that he could arrange a large cocaine transaction 

involving Mr. Richardson and Mr. Stone. After Officer Cash verified the alleged 

participants' identities, a meeting was arranged. Officer Cash observed the 

informant enter Mr. Stone's vehicle to make a cocaine purchase. The informant 

returned from Mr. Stone's vehicle and informed Officer Cash that he had given 

Mr. Stone cash and that Mr. Stone was going to Mr. Richardson's residence to 

acquire the cocaine. Other officers observed Mr. Stone enter the driveway of Mr. 

Richardson's residence, exit his vehicle, disappear from sight for twenty minutes, 

return to his vehicle and depart. Officer Cash then observed Mr. Stone's return 

from Mr. Richardson's residence. The informant again entered Mr. Stone's 

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vehicle and returned with cocaine. The affidavit also recited the informant's 

numerous prior cocaine transactions with Mr. Richardson and Mr. Stone. The 

affidavit demonstrated that the informant's tip was corroborated by a controlled 

narcotics purchase and the observation of Mr. Richardson's residence. We are 

persuaded the evidence contained in the affidavit provided the magistrate with a 

sufficient basis for concluding there was probable cause for issuing the warrant 

and for believing evidence of a crime would be found in Mr. Richardson's home. 

III 

Mr. Richardson asserts the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conspiracy and firearm convictions. When we consider a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the government. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1513 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990). Our task is to determine whether the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. l.d... 

A. Conspiracy 

.The government charged a conspiracy between Mr. Richardson and Mr. 

Stone to traffic in narcotics from October 10 to October 29, 1993. Mr. 

Richardson argues the government proved only a buyer-seller relationship 

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between him and Mr. Stone. "[W]e are mindful that the conspiracy doctrine is 

inherently subject to abuse and that the government frequently uses conspiracy to 

cast a wide net that captures many players." United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 

663, 668 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 922 (1993). "In order to sustain 

a conviction for conspiracy, the government must show that there was an 

agreement to violate the law, that the defendant knew the essential objectives of 

the conspiracy, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily took part in the 

conspiracy, and that the coconspirators were interdependent." l.d... at 668. The 

government must show that the defendant had at least a "general awareness of 

both the scope and the objective" of the conspiracy. l.d... at 670. See also United 

States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1563 (lOth Cir. 1992). The government must 

also show that the defendant had '"a meeting of the minds in the common design, 

purpose, or objects of the conspiracy"' with other conspirators. l.d... (quoting 

United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 754, 755 (lOth Cir. 1987)). "It is not enough .. 

. for the government to show only ... a buyer-seller relationship between the 

defendant and a member of the conspiracy." Evans, 970 F.2d at 669. However, 

"' [t]he nature of the offense of conspiracy with its attendant aspects of secrecy, 

often requires that elements of the crime be established by circumstantial 

evidence."' United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1293 (lOth Cir.) (quoting 

United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 964 (lOth Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 488 

u.s. 836 (1988). 

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Mr. Stone testified that he and Mr. Richardson had an arrangement 

whereby he would notify Mr. Richardson when he needed methamphetamine or 

cocaine, and that he had sold narcotics while working for Mr. Richardson on 

hundreds of occasions. Significantly, on the day Mr. Richardson was arrested, 

Mr. Stone had informed Mr. Richardson that he knew an individual who wanted 

to purchase a pound of cocaine, and Mr. Richardson had agreed to make the sale. 

Mr. Stone further testified that Mr. Richardson had told him not to resell his 

drugs at Mr. Richardson's residence, and that Mr. Richardson kept track of the 

drug deals in a notebook. Mr. Stone testified Mr. Richardson had told him that 

his source, Mr. Castillo, was in California and that Mr. Richardson was indebted 

to Mr. Castillo for approximately $100,000. Mr. Stone accompanied Mr. 

Richardson to an airport to acquire drugs from Mr. Castillo. 

Pursuant to the search warrant, the government seized from Mr. 

Richardson's residence approximately 8,000 dosage units of methamphetamine, 

approximately 5,000 dosage units of cocaine, a large set of digital electronic 

scales, and large ziplock bags with narcotics residue. The government seized 

from Mr. Richardson's truck a list of ingredients for making methamphetamine, 

two notebooks detailing drug transactions, and a cellular phone. A narcotics 

officer testified that the evidence recovered from Mr. Richardson's residence and 

truck indicated a large narcotics distribution effort. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we 

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hold the evidence was clearly sufficient to establish Mr. Richardson's 

participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Stone to distribute narcotics. 

B. Using or Carrying a Firearm in Connection with a Drug Trafficking 

Offense 

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) requires the government to prove 

three elements: (1) the defendant committed the underlying crime~ (2) the 

defendant "used" or "carried" a weapon~ and (3) the use or carriage of the 

weapon was "during and in relation to" the drug trafficking crime. United States 

v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 990 (lOth Cir. 1993). Because Mr. Richardson was 

charged under both the "use" and "carry" prongs of section 924(c)(l), we must 

determine whether either prong may serve as a basis for upholding his 

conviction. 2 ~Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1995)~ Parrish, 

925 F.2d at 1297. 

2 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) "[w]hoever, during and in relation to any .. 

. drug trafficking crime ... uses QI. carries a firearm ... shall ... be sentenced 

to imprisonment for five years." Count Six charged that Mr. Richardson 

"knowingly used .and carried" a firearm. The jury instructions defining Count Six 

state "it shall be unlawful to use a firearm." The jury instructions defining the · 

essential elements of Count Six state the government must prove "the defendant 

uses QI. carries a firearm." The jury instructions defining use of a firearm include 

"uses QI. carries." We therefore examine both prongs of§ 924(c)(l). ~Parrish, 

925 F.2d at 1297 ("[A] crime denounced in the statute disjunctively may be 

alleged in an indictment in the conjunctive, and thereafter proven in the 

disjunctive." (citation omitted)). 

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1. The "Use" Prong 

At the time of trial, a conviction under the "use" prong of section 924(c)(l) 

required that Mr. Richardson have "ready access" to a firearm that was an 

"integral part" of the drug trafficking offense and increased the likelihood that 

the offense would succeed. United States y. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (lOth 

Cir. 1989). To show that a firearm was readily accessible, the government was 

required to show only that "the firearm was available to the defendant in the 

vicinity where the drug trafficking offense took place." Parrish, 925 F.2d at 

1297. 

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o sustain a 

conviction under the 'use' prong of§ 924(c)(l), the Government must show that 

the defendant actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the 

predicate crime." Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 509. The Court reasoned that "'use' must 

connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug 

offense." I.d... at 506. The Court then described activities that fall within active 

employment of a firearm, and those that do not. 3 I.d... at 508. The Court 

concluded that "[a] defendant cannot be charged under § 924(c)(l) merely for 

storing a weapon near drugs or drug proceeds .... If the gun is not disclosed or 

3 The Court noted that "use" includes "brandishing, displaying, bartering, 

striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm." Bailey, 

116 S. Ct. at 508. The Court further noted that "use" does not include "the inert 

presence of a firearm." ld... 

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mentioned by the offender, it is not actively employed, and it is not 'used.'" Id.. 

Applying the "active employment" rule, the Court found no evidence of use of a 

firearm where the firearm was found in a bag locked in the trunk of the car 

defendant was driving when he was arrested. l.d.. at 509. Similarly, the Court 

found no evidence of active employment where the firearm was found locked in a 

footlocker in a bedroom closet of the defendant's apartment. Id.. Consequently, 

the Bailey Court reversed both section 924(c)(l) convictions. 

In United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (lOth Cir. 1995), we applied the 

"active employment" rule of Bailey, reversed two "use" convictions under 

section 924(c)(l), and remanded a third section 924(c)(l) "use" conviction for a 

new trial with proper jury instructions. 4 In the first conviction, the firearm was 

found in a bag in the rear camper shell of the truck the defendant was driving. 

Id.. at 1460-61. In the second conviction, the firearm was found in a file cabinet 

at defendant's home. Id.. at 1462. The third firearm conviction was supported by 

specific testimony that the defendant carried a gun on her person while picking 

marijuana and that the gun could be seen. l.d.. at 1462, 1464. Because "'a firearm 

can be used ... when an offender has a gun on display during a transaction,'" id... 

at 1464 (quoting Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507), we could not say how a properly 

instructed jury might decide the issue, i.d.. at 1465. 

4 Wacker did not involve the § 924(c)(l) "carry" prong. 

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There is no evidence that Mr. Richardson actively employed a firearm at 

all. One witness testified Mr. Richardson "carried" guns, but there is no 

evidence that he brandished, bartered, fired or attempted to fire a firearm with 

respect to any drug trafficking offense. There was testimony that Mr. Richardson 

reached down after he stopped his truck, but there was no testimony that he was 

reaching for a firearm. The firearms were not disclosed nor mentioned prior to 

Mr. Richardson's arrest. That Mr. Richardson generally carried guns does not 

satisfy the active employment requirement of Bailey. Accordingly, we hold that 

Mr. Richardson may not be convicted under the "use" prong of section 924(c)(l). 

2. The "Carry" Prong 

A conviction under the "carry" prong of section 924(c)(l) requires 

possession of the firearm through dominion and control, and transportation or 

movement of the weapon. United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 419, 420 (lOth 

Cir. 1990)(citing United States y. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1535-36 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989)). In this case, it is clear that Mr. Richardson 

carried a firearm. One firearm was found on his person and another was found in 

the truck on the seat next to him. 

Section 924(c)(l) also requires the government to prove Mr. Richardson 

carried a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense. "To prove 

this necessary relation, the Government's evidence must support a finding that 

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the defendant intended the weapon to be available for use during the drug 

transaction." Nicholson, 983 F.2d at 990 (citing United States v. Matthews, 942 

F.2d 779, 783 (lOth Cir. 199l))(emphasis in original). Specifically, the 

government must prove that the defendant availed himself of the weapon and that 

the weapon "played an integral role" in the drug offense. Id.. As an appellate 

court reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we "presume a nexus between a 

firearm and a drug trafficking offense when an individual with ready access to a 

firearm is involved in such an offense." United States v. Baker, 30 F.3d 1278, 

1280 (lOth Cir.)(quoting United States v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 1493, 1495 (lOth Cir. 

1993)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 273 (1994). However, "[a] defendant can 

overcome this presumption by presenting evidence that the weapon was present 

for a reason other than facilitating the drug transaction." Id.,5 

Mr. Richardson was charged with carrying a firearm during and in relation 

to the predicate crimes of possession of methamphetamine and conspiracy. There 

is no evidence that Mr. Richardson carried a firearm during and in relation to the 

possession of methamphetamine. The firearms were found on Mr. Richardson's 

person and in his truck. Mr. Richardson did not possess methamphetamine at that 

5 We have often treated the question of whether a weapon was used or 

carried "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense as if it were 

inextricably related to the issue of whether use of the firearm formed an integral 

part of the criminal undertaking, which was one aspect of the pre-Bailey 

interpretation of "use" under§ 924(c)(l). £e.e. .e....g.,, Matthews, 942 F.2d at 783-

84. However, these two questions are distinct. 

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time. There is no evidence that a firearm was present or referenced during any of 

the methamphetamine transactions detailed at trial, nor were weapons found 

where these transactions took place. We hold, therefore, that Mr. Richardson did 

not carry a firearm during and in relation to his conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine. 

We now tum to the question of whether Mr. Richardson carried a firearm 

during and in relation to a drug conspiracy. 6 We have reasoned that '"the evident 

purpose of [section 924(c)] was to impose more severe sanctions where firearms 

facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, the commission of'" a drug 

transaction. United States y. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1432 (1Oth Cir. 

1990)(quoting United States y. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985)). In 

Sullivan, one defendant was convicted of a conspiracy in violation of section 846 

and was charged with carrying a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy 

charge. I.d.. at 1408. There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the 

defendant possessed a firearm located in her bedroom. ld.. at 1430-31. We 

noted, however, that "[t]he government does not cite any specific evidence to 

6 We have previously held that a 21 U.S. C. § 846 conspiracy may serve as the 

predicate crime for a section 924(c)(l) conviction. United States y. Abreu, 962 F.2d 

1425, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1992), affd on remand, 997 F.2d 825 (lOth Cir. 1993), ~ 

denied, 114 S. Ct. 2748 (1994). Section 924(c)(l) does not restrict predicate crimes to 

substantive crimes, but instead "provides that the underlying offense need only be one for 

which the defendant·~ be prosecuted .... " United States y. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 

1464 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

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indicate that she carried or used a firearm" during and in relation to the drug 

conspiracy, ill at 1432, and held the evidence insufficient to support the section 

924(c)(l) conviction. In our other cases in which the predicate crime for a 

conviction under section 924(c)(l) was a drug conspiracy, the defendant had used 

or carried the gun while engaged in overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

S.e..e. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1464 (Evidence that defendant "carried the gun on her 

person while picking marijuana" was "sufficient to demonstrate that the pistol 

was carried in furtherance of the conspiracy."); Matthews, 942 F.2d at 782 

("Members of the conspiracy routinely took the weapons with them on drugselling excursions in order to protect the drugs and cash they carried."); Sullivan, 

919 F. 2d at 1431-3 2 ("Three of the defendants possessed weapons at the 

laboratory site, and ... two defendants took weapons to investigate possible 

trouble with the 'feds. "'). 7 

The Second Circuit addressed a conviction under the section 924(c)(l) 

carry prong in United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992), where the 

predicate crimes were section 846 conspiracies. "The jury found that [one 

7 Similarly, when other circuits have upheld§ 924(c)(l) convictions based 

on the predicate crime of conspiracy, the defendant was engaged in overt acts in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. S.e..e. United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 42, 45 (1st 

Cir. 1996) (gun used in conspiracy to steal marijuana); United States v. Jackson, 

65 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 1995) (gun kept near drug stash and used when 

defendant heard intruders); United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 772 (8th 

Cir. 1992 )(weapons on display at drug-trafficking scene). 

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defendant] possessed a loaded revolver ... immediately after a narcotics-related 

meeting ... during the course of' the charged conspiracies. ld... at 1308. The 

gun was found in the driver's side door of the defendant's car. ld... However, 

"the agents found no drugs despite their thorough search of the inside of the car, 

trunk, and [the defendant's] person." ld... at 1309. There was no evidence that 

the gun found in the car was carried during the meeting. The court concluded 

that "[t]he only thing we know is his involvement in heroin and cocaine 

conspiracies. . . . In order to sustain this conviction ... we would have to 

conclude that any time a conspirator carried a gun during the course of a 

conspiracy, he or she violated this provision. We are not prepared to do so." ld... 

In the present case, the record reflects more of a nexus between the drug 

conspiracy and the gun Mr. Richardson carried than was present in Lasanta. Mr. 

Stone testified that on the morning of October 29, he went to Mr. Richardson's 

ranch and told him he knew someone who wanted to purchase a pound of 

cocaine. Mr. Richardson asked a couple of questions and then agreed to the 

transaction. Mr. Stone testified that Mr. Richardson was to meet him at a bait 

shop where the transaction was to take place. As Mr. Stone and Mr. Richardson 

were traveling in separate cars back to Mr. Richardson's house, Mr. Richardson 

noticed they were being followed. He signaled to Mr. Stone, told him they were 

being followed by the police, and stated that the deal was off. Mr. Richardson's 

discussions with Mr. Stone and his subsequent travel to his home constituted acts 

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in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. Mr. Richardson was arrested on his way 

home with a firearm in his pocket and a rifle on the seat next to him. Unlike the 

defendant in Lasanta, there is specific evidence Mr. Richardson carried a firearm 

when he engaged in acts in furtherance of the conspiracy while in his truck. 

Accordingly, we hold the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that 

Mr. Richardson carried a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy 

notwithstanding his proffered explanation for the presence of the firearm. 

IV 

Mr. Richardson contends extrinsic evidence was erroneously admitted on 

rebuttal because it was outside the bounds of the charges alleged and was used to 

bolster the prosecution's case-in-chief. On cross examination, Mr. Richardson 

testified that Mr. Stone's testimony regarding Mr. Castillo was untrue. Mr. 

Richardson further testified that he was unaware Mr. Castillo had a felony 

conviction. In response, the government called Officer Hondros who testified 

that Mr. Castillo had a felony conviction for the transportation for sale of a 

controlled substance. This is the evidence Mr. Richardson objects to. 

We need not determine whether the admission of the testimony was error 

because if it was it was harmless. We review the record de novo to determine 

whether an error is harmless. United States v. Flanagan, 34 F.2d 949, 955 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). Because the alleged error was not a constitutional error, it "is 

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deemed harmless 'unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves 

one in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect."' I.d... (quoting United 

States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (1Oth Cir. 1990)). "[T]he government has 

the burden of proving that the non-constitutional error was harmless." I.d... 

Mr. Castillo's involvement in trafficking narcotics had been previously 

disclosed during the trial. On direct examination, Mr. Stone testified that he and 

Mr. Richardson traveled to an airport to acquire narcotics from Mr. Castillo. Mr. 

Stone further testified that Mr. Richardson told him he owed Mr. Castillo 

approximately $100,000. Mr. Richardson's only objection during the relevant 

portion of Mr. Stone's testimony concerned leading and suggestive questions. 

Because Mr. Castillo's involvement in drug trafficking was previously 

admitted as a result of Mr. Stone's testimony, we cannot say that any error in 

admitting similar evidence on rebuttal had a "substantial influence" on the 

outcome, nor that we have "grave doubt" as to whether it had such an effect. 

Upon Mr. Richardson's objection to Officer Hondros' testimony, moreover, the 

district court offered to give a limiting instruction which Mr. Richardson's 

counsel declined. We hold that any error in admitting Mr. Castillo's felony 

conviction was harmless. 

v 

We next address Mr. Richardson's contention that evidence concerning 

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drug transactions between Mr. Stone and Mr. Gilmartin was erroneously admitted 

into evidence. "We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion." United 

States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 271 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

Before trial, the government signalled its intention to offer testimony by 

Mr. Gilmartin in which he would relate his participation in drug transactions with 

Mr. Stone at Mr. Richardson's toolshed before the onset of the alleged 

conspiracy. Upon Mr. Richardson's objection, the court limited the scope of the 

testimony to unlawful or bad acts in which Mr. Richardson actively participated. 

The government indicated that Mr. Gilmartin's testimony would show such active 

participation. 8 

Mr. Gilmartin's testimony did not live up to its advance billing. On the 

stand, he testified about three occasions on which he purchased cocaine at the 

shed, but when asked from whom he had bought the drugs he named only Mr. 

Stone. At that point, the government sought direction from the court about how 

to proceed without running afoul of the court's prior order. Without objection, 

the court advised the government to ask Mr. Gilmartin whether he had personally 

purchased cocaine from Mr. Richardson. Mr. Gilmartin answered that he had 

8 "Specifically, Your Honor, there are instances where Mr. Stone and Mr. 

Gilmartin went to Mr. Richardson's tool shed and Mr. Richardson handed 

narcotics, cocaine and methamphetamine to Mr. Stone and Mr. Gilmartin and 

they left the shed. That's the type of testimony that we'll be having." Rec., vol. 

I, pt. C at 569. 

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not. On cross-examination, Mr. Gilmartin again testified that he had not seen 

Mr. Richardson give cocaine to Mr. Stone or to him. The defense then moved for 

a mistrial based on the admission of Mr. Stone's purchases of cocaine in Mr. 

Richardson's shed. The district court refused to grant a mistrial. On appeal, Mr. 

Richardson contends the admission of Mr. Gilmartin's testimony about Mr. Stone 

requires a new trial. 

It appears that in the pretrial proceedings concerning the admission of Mr. 

Gilmartin's testimony, the parties and the court agreed that evidence about Mr. 

Stone prior to the beginning of the charged conspiracy with Mr. Richardson 

would not be admissible unless it demonstrated Mr. Richardson's direct 

participation in criminal activity. 9 When Mr. Gilmartin's testimony diverged 

from the parties' expectations, the government sought instruction from the court. 

When Mr. Gilmartin said he had not purchased cocaine from Mr. Richardson, the 

government abandoned the line of questioning. Mr. Richardson never objected to 

the questioning. Indeed, he declined the court's offer to strike offending 

testimony from the record. By failing to object, the defense waived the argument 

9 & Fed. R. Evid. 404(b ). "Rule 404(b) provides that ' [ e ]vidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 

order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.' Such evidence may be 

admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 

United States y. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

U.S. 1081 (1986). 

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that the evidence was inadmissible. Jetcraft Corp. y. Flight Safety Int'l, 16 F.3d 

362, 366 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Once Mr. Gilmartin's evidence was a part of the record, Mr. Richardson 

could have sought to remedy its effects on the jury by requesting a limiting 

instruction. Instead, he moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. "[T]he 

trial court ordinarily is in the best position to determine whether the incident of 

impropriety merited a mistrial," United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1246 (7th 

Cir. 1985), and we review its denial for an abuse of discretion, United States v. 

Martinez, 979 F.2d 1424, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1022 

(1993). 

The evidence of Mr. Stone's bad acts did not concern Mr. Richardson 

himself, and therefore was not relevant. S.e..e. Huddleston v. United States, 485 

U.S. 681, 689 (1988). Moreover, Mr. Gilmartin's testimony could well be taken 

to support Mr. Richardson's contention that Mr. Stone sold drugs from the shed 

without his knowledge. "There is no evidence that the Government's actions 

were more than an oversight and [Richardson] does not allege that the 

Government acted in bad faith." 1

° Kendall, 766 F.2d at 1437. Accordingly, we 

hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the motion for 

a mistrial. 

10 The record does not resolve whether Mr. Gilmartin changed his story or 

the government failed to adequately question its witnesses before trial. 

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VI 

Mr. Richardson argues that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment in two instances. He asserts first that Counts 

One, Four and Five, when taken together, are multiplicious of Count Eleven, and 

second that Count Four is multiplicious of Count Five. Mr. Richardson raises his 

multiplicity challenge for the first time on appeal. We thus review for plain 

error. United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). Our first inquiry 

under the plain error analysis is to determine whether there has been an error. I.d.. 

at 1777. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause has two components: the prosecution 

component, which "protects against a subsequent prosecution for the same 

offense after either an acquittal or a conviction;" and the punishment component, 

which "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." United 

States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1148 (lOth Cir. 199l)(citing Grady v. Corbin, 

495 U.S. 508, 516 (1990)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 994, 503 U.S. 998 (1992). 

With respect to the punishment component, "[m]ultiplicity occurs when more 

than one count of an indictment cover the same criminal behavior." United States 

v. Wood, 57 F.3d 913, 919 (lOth Cir. 1995). "'To support a claim for double 

jeopardy, a defendant must show that the two offenses charged are in law and in 

fact the same offense."' United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360, 1373 (lOth 

Cir. 1992)(quoting United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1978)), 

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cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1070 (1993). Moreover, we must consider whether 

Congress intended that a defendant be subject to multiple convictions and 

sentences for the underlying offenses. United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 

461 (lOth Cir. 1992); .s.e..e. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)("Where 

consecutive sentences are imposed at a single trial, the role of the constitutional 

guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative 

authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense."). We 

discern the intent of Congress by looking first "to the language of the statutes and 

then to legislative history." United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1506 

(lOth Cir. 1992), aff'd on rehearing sub. nom. United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 

1461 (lOth Cir. 1992)(en bane). 

A. Counts One, Four, Five and Eleven 

Mr. Richardson contends the counts for possession of cocaine and 

metham-phetamine, and the count for conspiracy are multiplicious of the count 

for use of property for narcotics-related purposes under section 856 because all 

are based on possession of the same drugs. We rejected this argument in 

Sturmoski: 

The statutory language and legislative history of 21 U.S. C. 856(a) 

demonstrate that Congress intended to create a new felony that 

would punish a defendant's use of property for manufacturing 

activities related to narcotics. The plain language of the statute 

evidences a clear congressional intent to punish a defendant who 

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maintains property for the purpose of manufacturing controlled 

substance. This section goes beyond the proscriptions found in other 

statutes relating to possession and manufacture of controlled 

substances and actually criminalizes a particular defendant's use of 

property. 

Sturmoski, 971 F.2d at 461-62 (emphasis in original). Mr. Richardson's 

convictions for possession, conspiracy, and use of property for narcotics-related 

purposes were not multiplicious. 

B. Counts Four and Five 

Mr. Richardson also asserts the counts for possession of cocaine and for 

possession of methamphetamine are multiplicious because the two controlled 

substances were found together. One pound of cocaine and a half-pound of 

methamphetamine were found in Mr. Richardson's tool shed in the same bag. 

We have held that simultaneous possession of different controlled 

substances may qualify as separate offenses under section 841(a) where they are 

found in the same vehicle. United States v. Davis, 55 F.3d 517, 521 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 249 (1995). In Davis, powder cocaine was found in the 

wheel well of a vehicle and crack cocaine was found in a briefcase in the trunk. 

The defendant argued that he should not have been sentenced for two section 

924(c)(l) firearm convictions because the two controlled substance counts 

constituted a single underlying offense. We held that "possession with intent to 

distribute crack and possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine are 

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separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes." ld.. The facts here, where 

different controlled substances were found in the same bag, do not warrant a 

different conclusion. 

Five other circuits have similarly concluded that the simultaneous 

possession of different controlled substances constitute separate offenses under 

section 841(a). ~United States v. Bonilla-Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 46-47 (1st 

Cir. 1987)(consecutive sentences under§ 841(a)(l) for possession of heroin and 

cocaine with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988); United 

States v. DeJesus, 806 F.2d 31, 35-37 (2d Cir. 1986)(same), cert. denied, 479 

U.S. 1090 (1987); United States y. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1155-56 (4th 

Cir)(same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 845 (1986); United States v. Davis, 656 F.2d 

153, 156-60 (5th Cir. 1981)(consecutive sentences under§ 841(a)(l) for 

possession of quaaludes and marijuana with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 456 

U.S. 930 (1982); United States y. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 

1977)(reversing conviction on other grounds but concluding under§ 841(a)(l) 

possession of heroin and methadone with intent to distribute are separate 

offenses). We have found no circuit interpreting section 841(a)(l) to hold 

otherwise. 

The plain language of section 841 confirms that Congress intended to treat 

different controlled substances as separate offenses. Section 841(a)(l) prohibits 

"possession of 'a controlled substance,' not of 'a controlled substance or group of 

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• 

controlled substances."' Bonilla-Romero, 836 F.2d at 47. In addition, the 

penalty provisions for section 84l(a) distinguish between controlled substances. 

& DeJesus, 806 F.2d at 36; Grandison, 783 F.2d at 1156. But see Davis, 656 

F.2d at 158 (finding persuasive argument that "a controlled substance" creates 

single punishable offense for possession of several controlled substances). The 

legislative history of section 84l(a)(l) does not reveal an intent different from 

the statute's plain meaning. & Bonilla-Romero, 836 F.2d at 47. 

Punishment for the simultaneous possession of different controlled 

substances under section 84l(a)(l) does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

Mr. Richardson's separate convictions did not result in error, plain or otherwise. 

VII 

Finally, Mr. Richardson argues the district court erred when it included ten 

pounds of methamphetamine allegedly acquired at an airport to determine his 

base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. We are not persuaded. 

We review the district court's factual determinations of quantities for 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines under the clearly erroneous standard. 

United States y. Richards, 27 F.3d 465, 468 (lOth Cir. 1994). The district court's 

legal conclusions with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to de 

novo review. United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 523 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

The court must find the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes by a 

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.. 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Cody, 7 F.3d 1523, 1527 (lOth 

Cir. 1993). The Guidelines provide that "in a drug distribution case, quantities 

and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in 

determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or 

part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 

(Background). The defendant need not be convicted of, ~ United States v. 

~' 901 F.2d 842, 844 (lOth Cir. 1990), nor charged in the indictment for,~ 

Harris, 903 F.2d at 778, the underlying offenses pertaining to any additional 

quantities of drugs used for sentencing purposes. "A sentencing court may 

consider any reliable source of information that has some minimum indicia of 

reliability." ~' 7 F.3d at 1527. 

In the instant case, Mr. Stone testified that he accompanied Mr. Richardson 

to an airport to obtain ten pounds of methamphetamine. Mr. Stone testified that 

Mr. Richardson told him the methamphetamine was from Mr. Castillo. He also 

testified that the methamphetamine was packaged in approximately two-anda-half-pound vacuum-sealed bags and was transferred into bags recovered from 

Mr. Richardson's tool shed. This testimony clearly supplies sufficient evidence 

to support the drug quantity finding. 

Mr. Richardson further asserts the ten pounds of methamphetamine 

allegedly acquired at the airport were erroneously calculated as "D" 

methamphetamine rather than "L" methamphetamine because no one testified to 

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the type of methamphetamine. "The government has the burden of proof and 

production during the sentencing hearing to establish the amounts and types of 

controlled substances related to the offense." United States y. Deninno, 29 F.3d 

572,580 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 117 (1995). The type of 

methamphetamine, however, "need only be proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence at sentencing." Id.. 

"Although the burden of proof is on the government" to prove the type of 

methamphetamine, "the burden of alleging factual inaccuracies of the presentence 

report is on the defendant." Id.. "Failure to object to a fact in a presentence 

report, or failure to object at the hearing, acts as an admission of fact." Id.. 

Because Mr. Richardson failed to object to the type of methamphetamine prior to 

appeal, we review for plain error. "However, factual disputes do not rise to the 

level of plain error." Id.. (citing United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518 

{lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 942 (1993)). Mr. Richardson's argument 

based on the type of methamphetamine used for sentencing must fail. 11 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

11 We note that the government introduced evidence at the sentencing hearing that 

the methamphetamine found at Mr. Richardson's apartment was "D" methamphetamine. 

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