Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02002/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02002-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary L. Bunn
Petitioner
Lewis
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY L. BUNN, No. 2:13-cv-2002-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

LEWIS,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 21). Petitioner filed an opposition (Doc. 25). Respondent filed a request for an

enlargement of time to file a reply, which was filed prior to the court issuing a ruling on the

motion. Accordingly, the reply brief is deemed timely filed. Petitioner also filed a motion for

leave to amend and file in lower court (Doc. 27), and motions for the appointment of counsel

(Docs. 29, 30). 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is challenging his 2010 conviction out of the Sacramento Superior

Court. Petitioner was found guilty of robbery, and sentenced to 37 years. On appeal, the

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California Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence to support two of the enhancements, and

remanded the case for re-sentencing. (Lodged Docs., Doc. 22 at 18). On June 21, 2013,

petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The

petition was denied with citations to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), In re Dixon, 41

Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953), In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949), and In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d

709, 723 (1947). (Lodged Docs., Doc. 22 at 33).1

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the instant federal petition must be dismissed because

petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his claims in state court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), the

exhaustion of available state remedies is required before claims can be granted by the federal

court in a habeas corpus case. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); see also Kelly v. Small,

315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); Hunt v. Pliler, 336 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2003). Claims may

be denied on the merits notwithstanding lack of exhaustion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). “A

petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in two ways: (1) by providing the highest state

court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of the claim . . .; or (2) by showing that at the time

the petitioner filed the habeas petition in federal court no state remedies are available to the

petitioner and the petitioner has not deliberately by-passed the state remedies.” Batchelor v.

Cupp , 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The exhaustion doctrine is based

on a policy of federal and state comity, designed to give state courts the initial opportunity to

correct alleged constitutional deprivations. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see

also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518. 

1 The court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of

matters of public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 530 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Thus, this court may take judicial notice of state court records, see Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp.

of America, 336 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1964), as well as its own records, see Chandler v. U.S.,

378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967). 

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Regardless of whether the claim was raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction proceeding, the exhaustion doctrine requires that each claim be fairly presented to the

state’s highest court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). Although the exhaustion

doctrine requires only the presentation of each federal claim to the highest state court, the claims

must be presented in a posture that is acceptable under state procedural rules. See Sweet v.

Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, an appeal or petition for post-conviction relief that is

denied by the state courts on procedural grounds, where other state remedies are still available,

does not exhaust the petitioner’s state remedies. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 488

(1979); Sweet, 640 F.2d at 237-89.2

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s

habeas corpus petition with a citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), In re

Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953)3

, In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949), and In re Lindley,

29 Cal.2d 709, 723 (1947). The Swain citation indicates that petitioner did not “allege with

particularity the facts upon which he would have a final judgment overturned.” Id. Under

California law, a denial of relief under Swain is without prejudice to the filing of a new state

court petition which meets the requirements described in the case. See id. Because a citation to

In re Swain as the basis for denying a state habeas petition generally indicates that the petitioner

2 This situation of procedural deficiency is distinguishable from a case presented to

the state court using proper procedures but where relief on the merits is precluded for some

procedural reason, such as untimeliness or failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. The former

represents an exhaustion problem; the latter represents a procedural default problem. 

3 Respondent does not specifically argue that the citation to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d

756, 759 (1953) is another grounds for this court to grant the motion to dismiss. The United

States Supreme Court has recently determined that California’s Dixon bar, which is a procedural

default issue, is well-established and adequate to bar federal habeas review. See Johnson v. Lee,

__ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1802, 1805 (2016). However, procedural default is an affirmative defense

which must be raised by the respondent. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir.

2003). The Supreme Court’s decision was not issued until after the current motion to dismiss

was filed. Therefore, given the uncertainty at the time the motion was filed, it is understandable

why it was not raised. Regardless, had it been raised, the Dixon bar would have been an

additional reason to dismiss this action, as it is clear that the claims raised in the petition filed in

the California Supreme Court were not raised on direct appeal. 

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has not alleged with particularity sufficient facts in support of his petition, and is without

prejudice to the filing of a subsequent petition meeting the pleading requirements, such denials

do not establish the exhaustion of available state remedies. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d

1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). However, a Swain denial does not per se establish that the claim is

unexhausted if the federal court independently determines that the claim could not have been

alleged with any greater particularity. See id. at 1320. 

Here, the petition filed with the California Supreme Court raised two claims: the

trial judge erred in denying a mistrial and that petitioner was not positively identified. These

claims could certainly been found to be vague and required to be alleged with greater

particularity. The undersigned does not see any reason that these claims could not be alleged

with greater particularity, and petitioner failed to contend otherwise. In addition, there does not

appear to have been any reason petitioner could not have filed a new petition with the California

Supreme Court prior to filing his current petition for federal review. Therefore, based on the

state court’s Swain denial, petitioner’s current petition is unexhausted.

As to the state court’s citation to People v. Duvall, that case outlines the various

procedural requirements for a state habeas petition. See 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). Among other

things, the petition must “include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence

supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of the trial transcripts and affidavits or

declarations.” Id. A failure to comply with this requirement is a pleading defect subject to cure

by amendment. There is no indication that petitioner ever filed an amended petition in the

California Supreme Court attempting to cure the procedural defects found by that Court. For this

reason, the court finds that the Duvall citation is also a valid basis to conclude that the claims

were not exhausted in the California Supreme Court. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

/ / /

/ / /

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Petitioner argues that he did file a petition with the California Supreme Court to

exhaust his claims. Respondent acknowledges the petition was filed, but argues the petition was

insufficient to exhaust his claims. As set forth above, the undersigned agrees that based on the

citations in the California Supreme Court’s denial, the state petition did not comply with the

Court’s requirements. Petitioner was required not only to file a petition with the California

Supreme Court, but also to do so in such a way that all procedural requirements were met. Here,

he failed to do so. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner did not properly exhaust

his claim in the California Supreme Court, and thus his petition is unexhausted and must be

dismissed. 

Petitioner’s motion to amend and file a petition in the lower court is in essence a

motion to stay. In certain circumstances, the court has authority to stay a “mixed” petition

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005);

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063) (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey,

481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the present petition is not mixed; it is completely

unexhausted. The court cannot stay a completely unexhausted petition. See Raspberry v. Garcia,

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) be granted;

2. Petitioner’s motion to amend (Doc. 27) be denied; and

3. All other pending motions be denied as moot.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 26, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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