Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01084/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark M. Benson
Appellant
Timothy Douma
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued September 9, 2015 

Decided October 15, 2015 

Before 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1084 

MARK M. BENSON, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

 

v. 

TIMOTHY DOUMA, Warden, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 14 C 249 

William C. Griesbach, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

Mark Benson petitions for habeas corpus relief from his state court sentence. He 

claims that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information in a toxicology report 

and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object 

to or correct the allegedly inaccurate information in the report. Because the district court 

was correct to find that Benson was not prejudiced by either the procedural default of his 

due process claim, or his counsel’s performance, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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I. Background 

Mark Benson plowed his vehicle into the rear of Jennifer Bukosky’s stopped car at 

full speed, without touching his brakes. He killed Bukosky, her unborn child, and her 

ten-year-old daughter, injured her son, and seriously injured her daughter’s friend. 

Benson was an orthopedic surgeon who had three prior convictions for obtaining 

prescription drugs by fraud and three convictions for driving while intoxicated. At the 

time of the crash, Benson was driving on a revoked license. He was due to report for a 

75-day sentence in county jail for his last conviction and was only free to arrange his 

affairs. He was expressly told not to drive. 

 Benson pleaded no contest to three counts of homicide, one count of causing great 

bodily harm, and one count of causing injury. The intoxicated use of a motor vehicle was 

an element of each crime. At the time of the crash, Benson had several prescription drugs 

in his system. He admitted to taking Xanax (an anti-anxiety medication), Ambien (a 

sleep aid), and Percocet (a painkiller) prior to the crash. 

At sentencing, Benson submitted a report from his pharmacology expert, Dr. 

Francis Gengo. At issue in this case is the information in the report concerning Ambien, 

otherwise known by the generic name zolpidem. In the report, Dr. Gengo discussed the 

level of zolpidem in Benson’s blood after the crash: 

The concentrations of zolpidem measured in Dr. Benson’s 

blood shortly after the crash are much higher than those that 

would be expected if he had taken therapeutic doses of 

zolpidem at bedtime the night before. These concentrations 

of 253 ng/ml are much higher than therapeutic and zolpidem 

has a very short half life. This indicates that Dr. Benson 

consumed a daytime dose of zolpidem both before and 

possibly after the crash. I am not able to rule out that 

zolpidem could have produced significant cognitive 

impairment in Dr. Benson at the time of the crash. 

Dist. Doc. 11-5 at 24. Benson admitted to taking a large dose of Ambien in the morning 

before the crash. Yet, he claimed that the level in his blood was a result of him taking a 

dose directly after the accident to prevent a panic attack. 

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The sentencing court found that Benson’s intoxication was an aggravating factor. 

It stated that it did not rely on the state’s expert reports because they provided only 

general statements. The court said that only Dr. Gengo’s report had any real information 

about the degree of intoxication. It ruled out the other medications as being major 

contributors and said that the Ambien was “the culprit” because the “medication was 

present at much higher than therapeutic levels.” Supp. App. at 164, 165. However, 

despite these statements, the court immediately acknowledged that “there is some lack 

of perfect clarity as to when that therapeutic level was reached or the above therapeutic 

level, because it is reported that Mr. Benson took Ambien both before and after the time 

of the crash that killed people.” Id. at 165. The court said, “All in all, no one can, I can’t, 

no expert has told me, any way to quantify the degree of Mr. Benson’s impairment at the 

time of the collision.” Id. It acknowledged that witnesses had said that Benson did not 

seem “wasted,” but “[t]hat doesn’t mean he wasn’t impaired.” Id. at 165–66. The 

sentencing court then considered “other factors ... to try and address the level of 

inability to properly control his vehicle.” Id. The court considered his hands-free phone, 

and his history of back pain and health problems. After considering the other factors it 

said, “So this certainly is a serious level of being under the influence, of being 

incapacitated.” Id. But this was not enough information “to conclude that it was highly 

aggravated,” such as cases where persons “hit the road after ... they take multiple 

dose[s] of opiate, medicine, and otherwise.” Id. After noting that speed was not a factor, 

the court settled on what it considered to be the true aggravating factor: 

But, the aggravating factor here is that he didn’t brake, 

not at all, not a little bit. And the car that he hit was stopped, 

had been stopped at a red light, hadn’t gotten going yet, and 

it was right in front of him. ... And a stopped car, in broad 

daylight, at an intersection where there is a red and green 

stop and go light, is something you have to notice. You 

should notice. You always notice. It is highly aggravating 

that he would plow into that vehicle in this manner. 

The seriousness here, trying to take into account all of 

these, is above intermediate. It is aggravated to a degree for 

the various factors I have mentioned. To put it in the 

vernacular, it is a shocking and frightening collision with 

permanent consequences. 

 

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Id. at 167–68. The state court sentenced Benson to 30 years of confinement with 35 years 

of extended supervision. 

Benson moved for post-conviction relief, specifically for resentencing, on the 

grounds that 1) the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information in Dr. Gengo’s 

report in violation of his due process rights, and 2) he was provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to or correct the inaccurate 

Ambien-related information in Dr. Gengo’s report. Benson submitted an affidavit from 

Dr. Gengo in which Dr. Gengo asserted that upon reexamination of his report he 

“discovered a lack of clarity” regarding whether the level of Ambien in Benson’s blood 

was much higher than the therapeutic level. Id. at 141. According to Dr. Gengo, the 

report could be “misinterpreted” to “give the impression that Dr. Benson took a dose of 

Ambien well in excess of [the proper amount].” Id. Dr. Gengo stated that he meant to say 

that the level of Ambien in Benson’s blood was greater than the level would have been 

had Benson taken a dose the night before, but within the therapeutic range had Benson 

taken a dose shortly before or after the accident. Dr. Gengo concluded that: “I cannot say 

whether zolpidem may have caused him significant cognitive impairment at the time of 

the crash.” Id. Benson also submitted an affidavit from his attorney who stated that he 

thought something was wrong with the report but neglected to say anything. Id. at 138. 

The same state judge who sentenced Benson denied his post-conviction motion 

for resentencing. He ruled that he had not relied upon Dr. Gengo’s report. Instead, he 

had relied upon the finding that Benson was intoxicated by virtue of his no-contest pleas 

to “multiple offenses of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle” and “the facts and 

circumstances of rear ending somebody without hitting the brakes when they’re right in 

front of you in clear view.” Id. at 124, 127. The state judge also ruled that Dr. Gengo’s 

report did not contain inaccurate information, but that, as Dr. Gengo stated, the “original 

report could have been misunderstood, or could have left a false impression.” Id. at 128. 

According to the state judge, at sentencing he was aware of the report’s deficiency and 

so “explicitly sa[id] it didn’t have a particular factual understanding of what happened 

as far as the effect of the drugs on the defendant’s system at the time.” Id. at 128–29. The 

state judge also ruled that Benson’s counsel’s performance was not deficient because his 

counsel could not have realized the report’s potential to be misunderstood, just as Dr. 

Gengo did not at first realize it. Furthermore, the state judge ruled that Benson’s 

counsel’s alleged deficient performance had no impact on the proceeding because it 

would not have turned out differently had his counsel clarified the report’s potential for 

misunderstanding. The court did not rely on the information, but upon “how he 

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committed the crash, and the fact that he had been found intoxicated as defined by the 

statute, which he was convicted of repeatedly.” Id. at 130. 

Benson appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion, but the Wisconsin 

Court of Appeals held that Benson forfeited his due process claim since he submitted the 

report himself and failed to correct or object to the Ambien-related information. State v. 

Benson, 822 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). It also held that his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim failed because Benson was not prejudiced by his counsel’s 

submission of the report, and failure to correct or clarify the report. Id. at 491. 

After the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review, Benson petitioned the district 

court for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court relied on our decision in 

Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2010), to conclude that Benson had procedurally 

defaulted on his due process claim. Specifically, it held that the Wisconsin Court of 

Appeals’ holding that Benson had forfeited his claim by failing to object was an adequate 

and independent state law ground precluding relief. To overcome his procedural 

default, Benson argued that he showed both cause and prejudice in accordance with 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The district court found that Benson 

showed cause because if counsel could not be faulted for failing to see the problems with 

the report then neither should Benson. Nevertheless, the district court found that Benson 

failed to show prejudice because he could not show that the sentencing court relied on 

the information when it imposed his sentence. For this same reason, the district court 

also found that Benson could not show the prejudice required under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Benson 

appeals. 

II. Analysis 

 When reviewing a district court’s judgment on habeas corpus relief, we review its 

legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Promotor, 628 F.3d at 885. 

Furthermore, the AEDPA provides that habeas corpus relief may only be granted if the 

state court decision, on the merits, was 1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States,” or 2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This 

deferential standard applies “when a state court makes the basis for its decision clear,” 

and “only to those issues the state court explicitly addressed.” Quintana v. Chandler, 723 

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F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2013). If the state court did not address the merits of an issue, we 

review it de novo. Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)). 

A. Benson procedurally defaulted on his due process claim. 

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Benson forfeited his due process claim 

by failing to correct or object to the Ambien-related information at sentencing. Benson, 

822 N.W.2d at 488. The district court found that Wisconsin’s 

forfeiture-by-failure-to-object rule was an adequate and independent state law ground 

on which to find that Benson had procedurally defaulted his due process claim. See 

Promotor, 628 F.3d at 885. A state law ground is independent if it was actually relied 

upon and adequate if “it is a firmly established and regularly followed state practice at 

the time it is applied.” Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010). Benson argues 

that the district court erred in finding that the rule was an adequate and independent 

state law ground because the rule was improperly applied to him. According to Benson, 

Wisconsin’s forfeiture-by-failure-to-object rule does not apply to a person like him who 

could not have known to object.1 In other words, Benson argues that the rule is not 

adequate because the improper manner in which it was applied to him was not firmly 

established and regularly followed. For this argument, he relies on State v. Thompson, 818 

N.W.2d 904 (Wis. 2012). 

Benson’s reliance on Thompson is misplaced. In Thompson, the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court addressed the rule under Wis. Stat. § 971.31 that an objection to the sufficiency of a 

complaint must be made before trial or the preliminary examination or be deemed 

waived. Although the state argued that the defendant forfeited his claim by failing to 

comply with § 971.31, the court declined to extend the rule to the defendant. First, the 

word “waiver” in § 971.31 implied an understanding of the possible objection, but the 

situation presented to the court was one “in which the entire courtroom was operating 

under a mistaken understanding of the law” so that “the defendant and his counsel were 

given misleading information” regarding the applicability of a 25-year mandatory 

 

1 To establish that his counsel could not have known to object, Benson points to the post-conviction court’s 

ruling that an ordinary criminal defense lawyer should not be expected to spot the potentially misleading 

but not inaccurate statement in Dr. Gengo’s report. Supp. App. at 130. He does not make this assertion 

himself, however, because he submitted an affidavit from his counsel in support of his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim that contradicts the court’s finding. In the affidavit, Benson’s counsel stated 

that he noticed that the therapeutic range for zolpidem listed in the report looked wrong to him, but he 

failed to do anything about it. Id. at 138. 

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minimum sentence. Thompson, 818 N.W.2d at 919. Second, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 

also noted that § 971.31 may not, by its terms, apply to Thompson because he was “really 

complaining about more than the ‘insufficiency of the complaint’ or ‘information,’ which 

are specifically addressed in the statute.” Id. at 919. Whereas here, in holding that Benson 

forfeited his due process claim, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals instead relied on its 

firmly established and regularly followed practice that “[w]here the facts stated in a 

presentence report are not challenged or disputed by the defendant at the time of 

sentencing, the sentencing judge may appropriately consider them.” State v. Mosley, 547 

N.W.2d 806, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). The district court, therefore, did not err by 

concluding that Benson procedurally defaulted on his due process claim. 

B. Benson cannot show prejudice for either the procedural default of his due 

process claim or his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Both Benson’s due process claim and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

fail because he cannot show prejudice. To overcome the procedural default of his due 

process claim, Benson must show cause and prejudice for the default or establish that the 

failure to consider the defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Promotor, 628 F.3d at 885. Benson does not argue a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice, but attempts to show cause and prejudice. To show cause for his default, Benson 

relies on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 

258, 272 (7th Cir. 2014). To show prejudice for his default, he must show “that the 

violation of [his] federal rights worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Promotor, 628 F.3d at 

887 (internal quotation marks omitted). For his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

Benson must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To show prejudice for his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, Benson “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Id. at 694. 

The issue of cause aside, because the sentencing judge did not rely on the 

Ambien-related information in the report, Benson cannot show either that he was 

prejudiced by his procedural default or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s 

performance. To establish that Benson was in fact impaired, the sentencing court relied 

on his no-contest plea, which under Wisconsin law “constitutes an implied confession of 

guilt for the purposes of the case to support a judgment of conviction and in that respect 

is equivalent to a plea of guilty.” Lee v. Wisc. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 139 N.W.2d 61, 63 

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(Wis. 1966). Thus, by pleading no contest to three counts of homicide by intoxicated use 

of a motor vehicle, Benson admitted to being materially impaired. See Wis. Stat. 

§§ 940.09(1)(a), 939.22(42). To determine that Benson’s impairment was an aggravating 

factor, the sentencing court clearly relied on the severity of Benson’s terrible driving, 

“that he didn’t brake, not at all, not a little bit.” Supp. App. at 167. The sentencing judge 

did not rely on Dr. Gengo’s report because “no expert [] told [him] any way to quantify 

the degree of Mr. Benson’s impairment at the time of the collision.” Id. at 166. Put simply, 

Benson cannot show that allegedly inaccurate information “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” Promotor, 628 F.3d at 887 (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither can 

he show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged] 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

III. Conclusion 

Therefore, because the district court was correct to find that Benson was not 

prejudiced by the procedural default of his due process claim, or his counsel’s 

performance, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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