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Parties Involved:
Mickey Frank Pryor
Appellant
William Stephens, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10340

Summary Calendar

MICKEY FRANK PRYOR,

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

WILLIAM STEPHENS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:13-CV-808

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mickey Frank Pryor, Texas prisoner # 1536612, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as barred by the limitations 

period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In support of his claims of error, Pryor argues 

that he properly filed a second state habeas application; the second application 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 11, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-10340 Document: 00513305211 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/11/2015
No. 14-10340

2

tolled the limitations period pursuant to § 2244(d)(2); and, based on the tolling, 

his § 2254 petition was timely filed.

The record contains no proof that Pryor filed a second state habeas 

application, much less a properly-filed application that tolled the limitations 

period under § 2244(d)(2). Specifically, the state court records submitted in 

the district court, which are entitled to a presumption of regularity, see Webster 

v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 926, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1974), do not contain the second 

application that Pryor purportedly filed. Pryor has never submitted the 

application, and the assertions made in this court, offered as proof of such a 

filing, are too vague to show he properly filed a second state habeas application. 

See Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1983). Finally, the record, as 

supplemented by an unopposed motion, indicates that a second application was 

not part of the state court’s official record and that there was no proof that 

Pryor ever filed one. In light of the foregoing, we find no error, plain or 

otherwise, in the district court’s ruling regarding § 2244(d). See Salts v. Epps, 

676 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2012); Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 617 (5th 

Cir. 2008). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-10340 Document: 00513305211 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/11/2015