Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-19-01308/USCOURTS-ca3-19-01308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kaboni Savage
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

________________ 

No. 19-1308 

________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

KABONI SAVAGE, ALSO KNOWN AS YUSEF BILLA, 

ALSO KNOWN AS JOSEPH AMILL, AGENT BONNIE, 

BON, B,

 Appellant 

________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 2-04-cr-00269-001) 

District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney 

________________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

October 1, 2019 

Before: SHWARTZ, FUENTES, and FISHER, Circuit 

Judges 

(Opinion filed: March 31, 2020) 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
2 

Barry J. Fisher 

Office of the Federal Public Defender 

39 North Pearl Street 

5th Floor 

Albany, NY 12207 

Avram D. Frey 

Weir & Partners LLP 

215 Fries Mill Road 

Turnersville, NJ 08012 

 Counsel for Appellant 

William M. McSwain 

Robert A. Zauzmer 

David E. Troyer 

Office of United States Attorney 

615 Chestnut Street 

Suite 1250 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

 Counsel for Appellee 

________________ 

OPINION 

________________ 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
3 

Appellant, Kaboni Savage, was convicted of drug 

offenses, money laundering, and witness tampering in 2005. 

For those crimes, he was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, 

a special assessment of $1,400, and a fine of $5,000. The fine 

has been periodically collected from Savage’s prison trust 

account by the Federal Bureau of Prisons under the Inmate 

Financial Responsibility Program. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3572(d)(3), Savage asked the District Court to modify his 

judgment and provide that installment payments be made 

directly to the court on a fixed schedule, based on a material 

change in his economic circumstances. The issue before us is 

whether the District Court properly denied Savage’s motion to 

modify his fine payment schedule for a lack of jurisdiction 

under § 3572(d)(3). For the reasons that follow, we conclude 

that the District Court properly denied Savage’s request based 

on a lack of jurisdiction. 

I.

At Savage’s sentencing hearing for his 2005 

convictions, the sentencing judge stated that the $5,000 fine 

was “due immediately,” but “recommended” that the 

defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program.1

 Under the Inmate Financial 

1

 A64-65. Although the written Judgment states “[f]ine is to 

be paid through the federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate 

Financial Responsibility Program due during imprisonment,” 

A31, the sentencing transcript clarifies that the judge 

specifically ordered the fine “due immediately” and merely 

“recommended” participation in the Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program, A64-65. See United States v. Faulks, 

201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A long line of cases 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
4 

Responsibility Program, the Bureau periodically takes money 

from an inmate’s prison trust account for the payment of fines,

restitution, or other financial obligations, and forwards it to the 

Court on the inmate’s behalf. Additionally, the Court stated 

“[i]n the event the fine is not paid prior to the commencement 

of [supervised release], the defendant shall satisfy the amount

due in monthly installments of not less than $100 . . . .”2

 

Savage’s probation officer advised that Savage would 

be able to contribute half of his monthly prison work earnings 

toward any fine that might be imposed. However, after 

Savage’s sentencing, his conditions of confinement changed. 

Specifically, after Savage was charged with directing several 

killings from the Federal Detention Center of Philadelphia, he 

was transferred to a federal super-maximum-security prison in 

Florence, Colorado.3

 At the maximum-security prison, Savage 

is not permitted to work and earn money. Thus, Savage claims 

that the restrictions placed on him in the maximum-security 

prison have created obstacles to his ability to pay his fine and 

purchase stamps and supplies needed to correspond with 

counsel in his ongoing capital appeal. 

In connection with his claims, Savage filed a motion in 

the District Court to modify the payment schedule of his 

$5,000 fine, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3). Section 

3572(d)(3) provides that a court can modify a judgment which 

“permits payments in installments” based on a “material 

provides that when the two sentences are in conflict, the oral 

pronouncement prevails over the written judgment.”). 

2

 A65. 

3

 Savage was convicted of these murders, among other crimes, 

in a separate case in 2013. As a result of that conviction, 

Savage was sentenced to death on 13 capital counts. The case 

is currently on direct appeal before this Court (No. 14-9003). 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
5 

change in the defendant’s economic circumstances.” The 

District Court denied Savage’s motion, concluding that it 

lacked jurisdiction to modify the Bureau of Prisons’ payment 

schedule because the fine was “due immediately” and “no 

court-ordered payment schedule currently governs [Savage’s] 

payment of his criminal fine.”4

 Therefore, the District Court 

held that the sentencing judgment imposing the fine was not 

modifiable under § 3572(d)(3). 

Savage subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, 

which was also denied by the District Court. However, the 

District Court relied on a different rationale in denying 

Savage’s motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the District 

Court put aside the question of whether Savage’s sentencing 

order “permit[ted] payments in installments” and, instead, 

concluded that Savage’s motion is beyond the scope of § 

3572(d)(3) because challenges to the Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program collection mechanism concern the 

execution of a sentence and, thus, are properly framed as 

habeas challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.5

 The issue of 

whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant Savage’s 

requested relief under § 3572(d)(3) is now before us on 

appeal.6

 

II.

4 See A4. 

5

 A6. 

6

 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 

Savage’s prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court 

has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and this appeal presents a pure question of law over which this

Court exercises plenary review. T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of 

Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311, 318 n.5 (3d Cir. 2019). 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
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Savage argues that (A) Third Circuit case law supports 

his position that a judgment recommending the scheduling of 

payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility 

Program is modifiable under § 3572(d)(3) as an order 

“permit[ting] payments in installments,” and (B) the District 

Court mischaracterized his request when it ruled that he was 

challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ collection mechanism, and 

thus, that his challenge must be brought as a habeas petition. 

We address each argument in turn. 

A. 

Section 3572(d)(3) states: 

A judgment for a fine which permits payments in 

installments shall include a requirement that the 

defendant will notify the court of any material 

change in the defendant’s economic 

circumstances that might affect the defendant’s 

ability to pay the fine. Upon receipt of such 

notice the court may, on its own motion or the 

motion of any party, adjust the payment 

schedule, or require immediate payment in full, 

as the interests of justice require.7

The critical question here is whether the District Court’s 

sentencing order permitted payment in installments when it 

ordered the fine “due immediately” and recommended that the 

Bureau of Prisons collect the fine through its Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program. 

7

 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3) (emphasis added). 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
7 

 Savage cannot move for a modification of payment 

under § 3572(d)(3) because the sentencing court never 

permitted payment in installments. Instead, the court required

immediate payment. The sentencing court stated that “[t]he 

fine is due immediately,”8

 and thus never “provide[d] for 

payment . . . in installments.”9

 Section 3572(d)(3) by its plain 

language does not apply where the fine is due immediately. 

While the sentencing court “recommended” that Savage 

“participate in” the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program,10

nothing in § 3572(d)’s language precludes the Bureau of 

Prisons under its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program 

regulations from setting a payment schedule to satisfy a fine 

that was due to be paid immediately. Accordingly, the 

sentencing court’s recommendation that Savage participate in 

the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program did not transform 

his fine payable immediately into one subject to installments.11 

Put simply the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program 

provides a means to make good faith payments but is not an 

installment order.12 As a result, § 3572(d)(3) does not apply to 

8

 A64. 

9

 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1). 

10 A64–65. 

11 See United States v. Ellis, 522 F.3d 737, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(“If a fine is ordered payable immediately, ‘immediate 

payment’ does not mean ‘immediate payment in full;’ rather it 

means ‘payment to the extent that the defendant can make it in 

good faith, beginning immediately.’” (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted)). 

12 Id. at 738–39 (concluding that “a payment schedule 

established by the [Bureau of Prisons] does not conflict with 

[a] sentencing court’s immediate payment order” because “the 

court has no equivalent responsibility [to set a payment 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
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Savage, and the District Court properly denied his motion 

brought pursuant to that section. 

Moreover, although the sentencing judge in this case 

recommended that the Bureau of Prisons enroll Savage in the 

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, she did not direct the

Bureau to take such action or implicitly delegate any statutorily 

prescribed authority. Instead, she explicitly used her authority 

to order that Savage’s fine be paid immediately. Furthermore, 

interpreting the sentencing order as one “permit[ing] payments 

in installments” under § 3572(d)(3) would not only go against 

the specific language used at sentencing, it would also mean 

that the sentencing judge failed to comply with § 3572(d)(2) 

by inappropriately delegating her authority to set a payment 

schedule.13 For those reasons, Savage’s argument that the 

schedule] when it orders a fine payable immediately” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

13 Compare United States v. Foote, 413 F.3d 1240, 1253 (10th 

Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court erred in delegating

the creation of a payment schedule to the probation office 

because “[w]hen a district court provides that a criminal fine 

be paid in installments, 18 U.S.C. § 3572 requires the court to

specify the period of time over which the payments must be 

made”); United States v. Workman, 110 F.3d 915, 919 (2d Cir. 

1997) (vacating a sentence requiring the Bureau of Prisons to 

fix a schedule for a defendant’s fine payments because “§ 

3572(d) does not allow courts to delegate the scheduling of 

installment payments for fines”); United States v. Miller, 77 

F.3d 71, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that “a district court 

may not delegate its authority to set the amount and timing of 

fine payments to the Bureau of Prisons or the probation 

officer”). In each of these cases courts held that a sentencing 

court impermissibly delegated its authority where that court 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
9 

sentencing order permitted “payments in installments” is 

unpersuasive. 

Savage’s reliance on United States v. Wynn14 does not 

change the outcome. As a non-precedential opinion, Wynn

does not bind our Court. In spite of that limitation, Savage 

points to dicta in Wynn stating that although a district court 

may have ordered a fine to be paid immediately, “an informal 

understanding that the [Bureau of Prisons] would set a payment 

schedule” could call into question whether the district court 

simply delegated setting a payment schedule, thus permitting 

payments in installments.15 Notably, such a delegation is 

proscribed by § 3572(d)(2). That is not the issue that we 

decided in Wynn, however, and Savage’s reliance on this case 

is misplaced.16 

Because Savage’s fine was ordered “due immediately,” 

and no court-ordered payment schedule currently exists, we 

conclude that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over

Savage’s motion to modify under § 3572(d)(3). 

ordered the defendant to pay the fine in installments and then 

delegated the task of establishing installment payment 

schedules to a probation officer or the Bureau of Prisons. 

14 328 F. App’x 826 (3d Cir. 2009). 

15 Id. at 828. 

16 In Wynn, we determined that if Wynn’s “true aim” in filing 

his motion was to object to “the manner in which the [Bureau 

of Prisons] is encouraging him to pay the money he owes” his 

complaint is beyond the scope of § 3572(d)(3) and would 

properly be framed as a habeas petition. 328 F. App’x at 829. 

On that basis, the case was remanded to the District Court 

without determining whether Wynn’s sentence permitted 

payments in installments or constituted a delegation. 

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B. 

Next, Savage argues that the District Court 

mischaracterized his request when it ruled that he was 

challenging the method and means of collecting his fine and 

such a challenge must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in 

the jurisdiction of his confinement. 

Savage claims that he is not challenging the Bureau of 

Prisons’ collection mechanism, but instead is asking the Court 

to remove the collection process from the Bureau of Prisons’ 

control altogether. Specifically, Savage’s motion asked the 

Court to modify the judgment by adjusting the payment 

schedule, from one delegated to the Bureau of Prisons to one 

set by the court, with fixed payments to be made directly to the 

court. 

However, even if we were to accept Savage’s argument 

that he is not challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ collection 

mechanism, his sentencing judgment cannot be modified by 

the District Court under § 3572(d)(3) for the reasons discussed

supra in Section II(A). As a result, the District Court lacks 

jurisdiction to grant Savage’s motion to modify. 

However, as discussed by the District Court, after 

exhausting his administrative remedies, Savage may object to 

the Bureau of Prisons’ collection mechanism for his fine and 

seek an alternate payment schedule from the Bureau by filing 

a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district where he is 

incarcerated. 

Case: 19-1308 Document: 51 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/31/2020
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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 

the District Court denying Savage’s motion to modify the 

District Court’s fine and schedule for fines. 

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