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Parties Involved:
Ward Laray Price
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

SEP 111991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) No. 90-5037 

v. ) 

) 

WARD LARAY PRICE, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Northhern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-91-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael Gassaway (OBA 3282), Oklahoma City, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Oklahoma, for 

Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, and James L. Swartz, 

Assistant u.s. Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-5037 Document: 01019294173 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 1 
After this case was set for oral argument, counsel asked that 

they be excused from oral argument and that the case be submitted 

on the briefs. After examining the briefs and the appellate 

record, we have also determined that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. The cause is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

Ward Laray Price and five others were charged in the first 

count of a two-count indictment with conspiring from August 1, 

1988, to July 20, 1989, in Tulsa, Oklahoma in violation of 21 

u.s.c. § 846 as follows: (1) to knowingly and intentionally 

distribute a mixture or substance which contained cocaine base in 

an amount in excess of fifty grams in violation of 21 u.s.c. §§ 

841(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(A)(iii) and (2) to knowingly and 

intentionally possess with an intent to distribute cocaine in an 

amount in excess of five hundred grams in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 84l(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(B)(ii). In a second count Price alone 

was charged with the possession on July 20, 1989, of one kilogram 

of cocaine with an intent to distribute in violation of 21 u.s.c. 

§§ 841(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(B)(ii). 

Price was tried jointly with four of the other five 

defendants and the jury convicted Price on both counts. Price was 

sentenced to life imprisonment on Count 1, and thirty years 

imprisonment on Count 2, the two sentences to be served 

concurrently. Price appeals. 

On appeal, Price asserts that the district court erred in two 

particulars: (1) in denying his motions for acquittal under Fed. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5037 Document: 01019294173 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 2 
R. Crim. P. 29 made at the close of the government's case and 

renewed at the close of all the evidence, and (2) in imposing 

sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines which violate the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and which did not 

comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). 

In view of the nature of the issues raised on appeal, we need 

not summarize in any detail the evidence adduced at trial. It is 

sufficient to state that the government's evidence showed that 

Price headed a conspiracy which distributed massive amounts of 

crack cocaine in Tulsa, Oklahoma, over an extended period of time. 

As concerns Count 2, the government's evidence showed that on July 

20, 1989, Chris Witt, a police officer in Tulsa, Oklahoma, "sold" 

Price a kilogram of cocaine and received therefor $6,000. Price 

was arrested immediately after the exchange with the cocaine in 

his possession. 

Price testified in 

involved in any conspiracy. 

his own behalf and denied that he was 

His claim was that for a period of 

some two years he was a victim of "police harassment" by the Tulsa 

police department. As concerns Count 2, Price's defense was 

entrapment. 

At the conclusion of the government's evidence, and at the 

conclusion of all the evidence, Price moved for a judgment of 

acquittal on the ground that the government had failed to prove 

its case. No mention was made of entrapment. However, on appeal, 

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Appellate Case: 90-5037 Document: 01019294173 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 3 
Price's initial argument is that he was entrapped as a matter of 

1 law. 

Although Price did not make his "entrapment as a matter of 

law" argument to the district court, he did ask that the jury be 

instructed on the law of entrapment. The district court agreed 

and gave the jury an instruction on entrapment to which no 

objection was made. The jury rejected Price's entrapment defense 

and convicted him on both counts. 

Because the jury held, in effect, that as a matter of fact 

Price was not entrapped into "buying" the kilogram of cocaine from 

Officer Witt, it would be anomalous for us to now hold that there 

was entrapment as a matter of law. Be that as it may, our study 

of the trial record convinces us that there was no entrapment as a 

matter of law. A court may find entrapment as a matter of law if 

the evidence satisfying the essential elements of entrapment is 

"uncontradicted." United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1430 

(lOth Cir. 1988); United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 

(lOth Cir. 1986). The government's evidence in the instant case 

does not show governmental "inducement" of an "undisposed person." 

Officer Witt, posing as a "crooked cop," merely gave Price the 

"opportunity" to purchase the kilogram of cocaine, and Price most 

definitely had the requisite "predisposition" to commit the crime. 

Such being the case, the essential elements of entrapment are 

1 Price's entrapment argument presumably relates to 

only. He does not argue that his entrapment argument is 

to Count 1, the conspiracy charge. 

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Count 2 

relevant 

Appellate Case: 90-5037 Document: 01019294173 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 4 
contradicted, and the evidence would not permit a finding of 

entrapment as a matter of law. 

Price's other argument in this court is that the life 

sentence he received under the Sentencing Guidelines on Count 1 is 

excessive and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 

by the Eighth Amendment and that in imposing sentence the district 

court did not comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). 

Prior to sentencing, a presentence report was prepared, and, 

as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3), was given to Price and 

his counsel. Counsel filed several specific objections to 

statements contained in the presentence report. The first of his 

objections was directed to the statement in the presentence report 

that the "organization was responsible for the distribution of at 

least seven (7) kilograms of crack cocaine at various locations in 

the Tulsa area." 2 In response to those objections, the probation 

officer filed an addendum in which he basically stood by the 

challenged statements. At sentencing, the district court listened 

to the statements of counsel and, in effect, overruled the 

objections and accepted the presentence report. 

On appeal, Price complains that the district court did not 

follow the mandate of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), which provides 

that if a defendant challenges the factual accuracy of statements 

contained in the presentence report, the court "shall, as to each 

matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or 

(ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the 

2 The amount of the drug involved bears 

level. 

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on the base offense 

Appellate Case: 90-5037 Document: 01019294173 Date Filed: 09/11/1991 Page: 5 
matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing." 

That same rule also provides that a written record of such finding 

or determination shall be appended to the presentence report. 

From the record before us it would appear that the district 

court did not make the findings or determinations required by Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D). In United States v. Alvarado, 909 F.2d 

1443, 1445 (lOth Cir. 1990), decided after sentence was imposed in 

the instant case, we held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) 

requires that when a defendant challenges information in a 

presentence report, the district court must either make a factual 

finding regarding the accuracy of the challenged information or 

expressly state that in imposing sentence he is not taking into 

consideration the challenged statement. In Alvarado we remanded 

for resentencing and commented that such findings or 

determinations must be made not only for use by the corrections 

system, but also so that "we know the facts upon which the 

district judge relies." Id. at 1445. 

Price's objections to the presentence report were not 

perfunctory but were specific. The district court did not comply 

with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) and its counterpart, u.s.s.G. 

§6Al. 3. 

Judgment of conviction affirmed, but sentence is vacated and 

case remanded for resentencing. 3 

3 Because his sentence has been vacated and remanded, we do not 

address Price's Eighth Amendment argument. In this regard, 

however, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991); United 

States v. Colbert, 894 F.2d 373 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. 

Ct. 2601 (1990). 

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