Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06011/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06011-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Jack Cowley
Appellee
Patrick H. Young
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I LC ~rt, Df Appec.ln 

United States -0~ <! 

Te- th C•rt-mt FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT i. • . ~ 

PATRICK H. YOUNG, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

V. 

JACK COWLEY and ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

APR 16 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clert 

No. 92-6011 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-1428-A) 

(W.D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App . P. 

34 (a ) ; 10th Cir. R. 34. 1. 9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Young, a state prisoner, filed a pro se petiti on f or 

habeas relief under 28 U.S. C. § 2254. After referring the matte r 

to a Magistrate Judge, the District Court denied relie f and 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall n ot 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

f or purpo ses of establishing the doct rines of the law o f t he case , res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 3 6 .3. 

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dismissed the petition. Young v. Cowley. No. CIV-91-1428-A (W.D. 

Okla. filed Dec. 18, 1991). The District Court further denied Mr. 

Young permission to proceed 

certificate of probable cause. 

in forma pauperis and denied him a 

Id. Mr. Young appeals prose. 

We grant Mr. Young permission to proceed in forma pauperis. 

In January 1988, Mr. Young, with the assistance of counsel, 

entered his plea of guilty to nine separate felonies and received 

an aggregate sentence of life plus forty-five years. Mr. Young 

now attacks these felony convictions. 

In his pro se habeas petition, Mr. Young asserted: (1 ) he 

"was denied a proper judicial determination of his competency" 

prior to the stated court's acceptance of his guilty pleas; and 

(2) the state court allowed an unsworn narrative statement by the 

victim at his sentencing hearing. 

The Magistrate Judge found Mr. Young had exhausted his state 

remedies. The Magistrate Judge reviewed the state court 

transcript and concluded the record failed to support Mr. Young's 

contentions surrounding the competency issue and further found the 

state court record supported the state trial court's factual 

determination that Mr. Young was competent. 

Concerning Mr . Young's second contention, the Magistrate 

Judge found the state court record revealed the victim, in open 

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court, made a short statement to the state court in the presence 

of Mr. Young and his counsel. The record failed to show the 

victim was sworn. When presented with this issue, the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals concluded: (1) error was waived when 

Mr. Young and his counsel failed to object; (2) as neither Mr. 

Young nor his counsel made any attempt to cross-examine the 

victim, Mr. Young's right of confrontation was not violated; and 

(3) the testimony of the victim was merely cumulative to the 

information contained in the presentence report. The Magistrate 

Judge likewise concluded the error was harmless. 

The District Court reviewed the Magistrate Judge's findings 

and recommendations and adopted them. 

In his prose appeal to this court, Mr. Young raises the same 

arguments yet fails to tell us why the District Judge was wrong . 

He merely asserts he was illiterate and the state court failed to 

ask him to explain, in his own words, the facts and consequences 

underlying his guilty plea. 

We have reviewed the record on appeal and are in substantial 

agreement with the actions of the District Court. We therefore 

AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court for substantially the 

same reasons set forth by the Magistrate Judge in his nine-page 

Findings and Recommendations of November 21, 1991, a copy of which 

is attached. 

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Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

PATRICK HENRY YOUNG, 

Petitioner, 

FILED 

NOV ~ ~ 1991 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CIV-91-1428-A 

JACK COWLEY, Warden, 

Defendant. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

.. .. ,• 

This is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 by an 

Oklahoma prisoner challenging his convictions received in the District Court of Oklahoma 

County, Oklahoma. These convictions for Robbery with a Firearm (three counts), Rape in 

the First Degree, Rape by Instrumentation, Forcible Oral Sodomy, Unauthorized Use of a 

Motor Vehicle (two counts), and Burglary in the Second Degree, were entered on January 

26, 1988 pursuant to Petitioner's pleas of guilty. For these convictions, Petitioner received 

an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus 45 years. State of Oklahoma v. Young, 

Case Nos. CRF-87-5114 and CRF-87-6898. The convictions were confirmed on appeal. 

Young v. State, Case No. C-88-443, Order Denying Petition for Certiorari (Okl.Cr. filed 

August 18, 1989). 

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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l)(B), the petition has been referred to the 

undersigned for the purpose of submitting findings and a recommendation for the proper 

resolution of the case. Respondent has answered the petition, contending that the petition 

should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Respondent has also filed the 

state court record and a transcript of the hearings conducted on the guilty pleas, 

sentencing, and Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. See Exhibit B to 

Respondent's Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (hereinafter Respondent's Brief). Petitioner has filed a Traverse. 

The petition asserts two grounds for habeas relief: Ground One alleges that the 

Petitioner "was denied a proper judicial detennination of his competency as was required 

prior to the acceptance of his plea of guilty. U.S.C.A. 14th Amend." Ground Two alleges 

that "the allowing of an unsom (sic) narrative statement by the prosecutrix immediately 

prior to the sentencing prejudiced the Petitioner's right to a fair and impartial sentencing 

hearing." In consideration of well established statutory and judicial requirements of 

exhaustion, Respondent contends that Petitioner did not raise on appeal any issue of a 

denial of a judicial determination of competency, and, therefore, Respondent urges that the 

petition be dismissed as a mixed petition due to the Petitioner's failure to exhaust Ground 

One of the petition. 

The Petitioner objects to the Respondent's contention, citing the argument that 

appears in his Petition in Error filed in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Young 

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v. State, Case No. C-88-443, at 4, in which Petitioner, through appointed counsel, argues 

that 

Additionally, this Court in Coyle reaffirmed its concern that a proper judicial 

determination of Petitioner's competency was required prior to the 

acceptance of the plea of guilty. The dialogue in the instant case is 

extremely similar to the dialogue criticized by this Court and determined by 

this Court to be incomplete in Coyle, supra. The trial judge in the instant 

case merely asked the defendant's attorney if she believed he was mentally 

competent to understand the nature, purposes, and consequences of the 

proceedings, and additionally the Court asked the defendant if he had ever 

been treated for mental illness. In light of the defendant's statements that 

he had in fact been treated by a psychiatrist approximately two to three 

years before and a limited nature of the inquiry in the instant case, the Court 

clearly failed to make a sufficient finding of competency. Petitioner's plea of 

guilty must be withdrawn. 

See Exhibit D to Respondent's Brief. 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not, however, address the issue raised 

by Petitioner as to the sufficiency of the trial court's competency determination, although 

the appellate court reached the merits of issues raised by Petitioner regarding the 

sufficiency of the factual basis for the pleas and alleged error in the admission of testimony 

by the victim at sentencing. See Exhibit E to Respondent's Brief. 

It is well settled that "once [a] federal claim has been fairly presented to the state 

courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 

(1971). Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, codified at 28 U.S.C. §2254(c), have 

been recognized 'where the state has actually passed upon the claim, as in Brown ( v. Allen, 

344 U.S. 443 (1953)]; and where the claim has been presented as of right but ignored and 

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therefore impliedly rejected, as in [Smith v. Digman, 434 U.S. 332 (1978)(per curiarn)]. 

In both those contexts, it is fair to assume that further state proceedings would be useless." 

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not address the competency issue 

raised in the Petitioner's brief on appeal and again asserted in the instant petition. Under 

the circumstances, and in view of recognized authorities, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies by presenting the issues raised herein 

before the state courts. In the alternative, an exception to the general rule of exhaustion 

applies in the instant case where the issue was presented to the state court but ignored. 

Petitioner alleges a denial of due process as a result of the trial judge's failure to 

conduct an independent "judicial determination of his competency'' prior to accepting the 

Petitioner's guilty pleas. The record is contrary to Petitioner's claim. In the colloquy 

between the trial judge and the Petitioner at the plea proceeding, the trial judge inquired 

whether Petitioner was taking any medication, to which Petitioner testified that he had 

taken cold tablets on the day before the hearing at approximately 12:00 p.m. The judge 

then asked whether the medication was affecting Petitioner's judgment, and Petitioner 

replied, "No, sir.

11 See Exhibit B to Respondent's Brief, at 1. The trial judge inquired as to 

any previous treatment for a mental illness, and Petitioner replied that he had been treated 

by a psychiatrist. He could not remember the exact date but it was "about two years ago, 

maybe three." Id. at 2. When asked if it could have been 1985, Petitioner replied that it 

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occurred in "about 1983." Id. The trial judge then asked Petitioner if it was accurate to 

say that he went to see a psychiatrist for therapy for a while and then was released, to 

which Petitioner replied, ''Yes, sir." Id. When asked if he was treated voluntarily or 

ordered to go, Petitioner replied "A school ordered me, sir." Id. The trial judge then asked 

if Petitioner was going to school at the time. Petitioner replied, "US Grant." Id. at 3. The 

trial judge then inquired of Petitioner's counsel as to whether counsel had any reason to 

believe that her client was "not mentally competent to appreciate and understand the 

nature, purpose and consequences of this proceeding and to assist you in presenting any 

defense he may have to this charge." Id. Counsel replied, "No, Your Honor. He's 

competent." Id. The trial judge inquired as to whether counsel had "any reason to believe 

that [her] client was not mentally competent to appreciate and understand the nature, 

purpose and consequences of his acts at the time they were committed and out of which 

the charges contained in the Information arose," to which counsel again replied in the 

negative. Id. After inquiring as to Petitioner's understanding of his trial rights, the 

voluntariness of the pleas, the Petitioner's desire to enter guilty pleas, and the factual bases 

for the pleas (contained in affidavits), the trial judge entered a finding that Petitioner was 

competent to understand the proceeding and its consequences, and the trial judge also 

found that Petitioner was competent to appreciate and understand the acts he committed 

and their consequences. Id. at 8. 

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The trial judge's factual conclusion regarding Petitioner's competency is "fairly 

supported by the record" of the plea proceeding, and is therefore entitled to a presumption 

of correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983)(per 

curiam). Petitioner's mere allegation that the dialogue at the plea proceeding was 

"incomplete" is insufficient to overcome the presumption. The trial judge did not merely 

rely on "demeanor evidence," but made specific inquiries of Petitioner and his counsel into 

Petitioner's competency to enter the pleas. Although Petitioner alleges he has a "prior 

history of irrational conduct," none can be inferred from the record, and Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that any such evidence exists. The Petitioner's claim is without merit. 

In Ground Two of the petition, the Petitioner alleges that his rights to confrontation, 

due process, and equal protection were violated by the "prejudicial effect" of the admission 

at sentencing of a narrative statement by the victim. Petitioner also alleges that the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' finding on this issue is an "abuse of discretion" and 

"fundamental error." 

The appellate court found that the "short statement to the court" made by the victim 

of the Petitioner's sexual assault at his sentencing was consistent with Oklahoma statutory 

procedures and prior precedent. Oklahoma law provides that : 

After a plea or verdict of guilty in a case where the extent of the punishment 

is left to the court, the court, upon suggestion of either party that there are 

circumstances which may be properly taken into view, either in aggravation 

or mitigation of the punishment, may in its discretion hear the same 

summarily at a specified time and upon such notice to the adverse party as 

it may direct. 

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22 O.S. 1981, §973. Title 22 O.S. 1981, §974 provides that the circumstances generally 

must be presented by witnesses' testimony in open court except in specific situations in 

which the witness is unable to attend. 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found error only in the failure of the trial 

court to place the victim under oath prior to her testimony. The appellate court found that 

the error was waived because Petitioner failed to object to the omission and that no 

fundamental error occurred as a result of the omission of the oath. The appellate court 

further found that the "Petitioner made no attempt to cross-examine the witnesses," and 

therefore no right of confrontation that Petitioner may have had was violated. The 

appellate court concluded that "the testimony of the victim was merely cumulative to the 

information contained in the Pre-Sentence Report specifically requested by Petitioner." 

Therefore, no reversible error was committed by allowing the victim to make her statement 

in open court. See Exhibit E to Respondent's Brief, at 5. 

The record of the sentencing proceeding is consistent with the state appellate court's 

findings with regard to what transpired at that proceeding. Petitioner and his counsel were 

present when the victim made her statement in open court, and no attempt was made by 

the defense to cross-examine the victim, although the trial court specifically gave Petitioner 

and his counsel the opportunity to speak immediately after the victim's statement. Thus, 

assuming that Petitioner retained a right of confrontation for sentencing purposes following 

his guilty pleas, see Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981)(recognizing that 

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"many of the protections available to a defendant at a criminal hearing also are available 

at a sentencing hearing [including the] right to confront witnesses . . . "), the Petitioner was 

not denied his right of confrontation where the victim's testimony was received in open 

court and she was available for cross-examination. 

The standard governing federal habeas corpus review of the admission of victim 

impact evidence is limited to a determination whether the use of the victim impact 

statement made the sentencing hearing "so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due 

process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo. 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974). Accord, Payne v. 

Tennessee. 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991)(victim impact evidence may be the subject of a 

collateral attack on a capital sentence where it "is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the 

trial fundamentally unfair' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause). In Payne v. 

Tennessee, the Supreme Court overruled its prior opinion in Booth v. Maryland. 482 U.S. 

496 (1987) and its successor South Carolina v. Gathers. 440 U.S. 95 (1989), in which the 

Court had held unconstitutional the use of victim impact statements in capital sentencing 

proceedings. Id. at 2609. The Court recognized in Payne that where judges have 

discretion to impose sentence, "the consideration of the harm caused by the crime has been 

an important factor in the exercise of that discretion . .. " Id. at 2606. The Court also 

recognized that Congress and most of the states have enacted legislation to allow the 

sentencing authority to consider information about the harm caused by crimes committed 

by the defendant. Id. In the Court's opinion, "victim impact evidence serves entirely 

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legitimate purposes .. . ," and, consequently, the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the 

admission of such evidence or prosecutorial argument on the subject. Id. at 2608, 2609. 

The state appellate court found in Petitioner's case that the victim's testimony was 

merely cumulative to information already contained in the presentence investigation report 

prepared at Petitioner's request. Oklahoma law requires that the presentence investigation 

report include "the voluntary statement of the victim concerning the offense [and] the 

amount of the loss of the victim . . . " The Petitioner stated to the court at sentencing that 

he did not disagree with any of the facts in the presentence report and that he did not have 

anything he wanted to say. 

The record shows Petitioner had the opportunity to rebut both the oral and written 

statements of the victim, and he has not demonstrated that the victim's remarks so 

prejudiced him that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding. 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the writ of habeas corpus be denied 

and the cause dismissed. Because the petition does not comprehend issues of federal 

constitutional deprivations warranting further judicial review, the undersigned further 

recommends that leave to proceed on appeal in forrna pauperis and a certificate of probable 

cause be denied. As provided by law, any appeal/ objection shall be filed on or before the 

6th day of December, 1991. This statutory enlargement of time obviates the need for any 

motions for enlargement of time. 

Entered this 21st day of November, 1991. 

RONALD L. HOWLAND 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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