Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00249/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00249-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Brown
Defendant
Anthony Cisneros
Defendant
Phil Collins
Defendant
Cathy Quiggle
Defendant
Royal Ahold
Defendant
Royal Ahold USA
Defendant
Henry Smith
Defendant
Sandra Stokes
Plaintiff
U.S. Foodservice, Inc.
Defendant
Linda Williams
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRA STOKES and LINDA WILLIAMS,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

U.S. FOODSERVICE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-00249 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

AND REMAND TO STATE

COURT

Now before the Court is Sandra Stokes and Linda Williams’ (“Plaintiffs”) motion for

leave to amend their complaint and remand the case to state court. The Court finds the present

motion suitable for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing date of

March 10, 2006. See Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Having carefully considered the parties’

arguments as presented in their papers and the relevant legal authority, the Court HEREBY

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 28, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Alameda County Superior Court

against their former employer and other related parties, U.S. Foodservice, Inc., Royal Ahold

USA, Royal Ahold, Henry Smith, Phil Collins, Cathy Quiggle, Charles Brown, Anthony

Cisneros, and does 1 through 50 (“Defendants”), alleging causes of action based on California

and Federal law, including sexual harassment and sex discrimination in violation of the Federal

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C § 2000e et seq; failure to take 

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all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring in

violation of FEHA; discrimination and harassment based on race in violation of FEHA and Title

VII; retaliation for opposing sex and race discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA

and Title VII; wrongful termination in violation of public policy under California Government

Code § 12900; sexual battery in violation of California Civil Code § 1708.5; assault and battery;

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligence; and negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention. (Compl. at ¶¶ 17-83.) On January 12, 2006, Defendants filed an

answer to Plaintiffs complaint in Alameda County Superior Court. Also on January 12, 2006,

Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 based

upon federal question jurisdiction. 

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Amend the Complaint.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a party to amend its pleading once as a

matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Once a

responsive pleading has been served, however, amendment requires written consent of the

adverse party or leave of the court. Id. Leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” Id. The general rule is that amendment of the pleading is permitted unless the

opposing party makes a showing of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing side, or

futility of amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC

v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Prejudice to the opposing party carries the

greatest weight of the relevant factors and denial is only warranted where the prejudice is

substantial. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052; Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose,

893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). The burden of showing prejudice is on the party opposing

amendment. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). Absent

prejudice, or a strong showing of the remaining factors, a presumption exists in favor of

granting the amendment. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

Here, Plaintiffs have not caused undue delay, as they have filed their motion to amend

the complaint less than three weeks after removal of the action to this Court. Futility of

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amendment is also inapplicable to the facts because Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to

delete a claim, rather than to add or clarify an existing claim.

In addition, there is no indication that Plaintiffs are seeking amendment in bad faith. 

Although Defendants argue that Plaintiffs intentionally included federal claims, such intentional

inclusion does not automatically amount to bad faith. As the Ninth Circuit stated, a plaintiff is

“entitled to file both state and federal causes of action in state court.” Baddie v. Berkeley

Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1995). Upon removal to federal court, the plaintiff is

also “entitled to settle certain claims or dismiss them with leave of the court.” Id. Such tactical

decisions are not manipulative unless there is reason to believe that the inclusion of federal

claims was “for the purpose of putting defendants through the removal-remand procedure.” Id.

at 490-91. Defendants have not provided evidence sufficient to indicate that Plaintiffs engaged

in such conduct. Defendants merely attempt to refute Plaintiffs’ contention that their inclusion

of Title VII claims was inadvertent by arguing that the inclusion was actually intentional. (Opp.

Br. at 2-3.) Defendants do not argue or offer evidence showing that Plaintiffs included the

federal claims solely to put defendants through the removal-remand procedure.

Finally, there has been no showing of prejudice to the opposing party, the predominate

factor in this inquiry. As both Plaintiffs and Defendants admit, this matter is still in the early

stages of litigation. (Br. at 6; Opp. Br. at 5.) Only an answer has been filed and discovery has

yet to be completed. Therefore, Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating

prejudice. Based on these factors, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend should be granted.

B. Motion to Remand.

If Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint and dismiss the Title VII

allegations, Plaintiffs request that the remaining state causes of action be remanded to state

court. (Br. at 4.) In opposition to the motion to remand, Defendants argue that the motion

should be denied because Plaintiffs are engaging in forum manipulation. (Opp. Br. at 5-6.) 

The propriety of removal jurisdiction is determinated at the time of removal. See

Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939). The Ninth Circuit has held that plaintiffs

cannot compel remand by amending their complaint to eliminate the federal claims which

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provided the basis for removal. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159

F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). However, federal courts have discretion “either to retain

jurisdiction to adjudicate the pendent state claims or to remand them to state court.” Harrell v.

20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has directed

district courts to consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, as well as forum

manipulation, when determining whether to remand a case to state court. Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). The Ninth Circuit recognized that “it is generally

preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendant claims to state court.” Harrell, 934

F.2d at 205. 

Here, the factors that the Supreme Court directed district courts to consider in CarnegieMellon weigh in favor of remand. Plaintiffs have been granted leave to amend their complaint,

which will eliminate the federal claims for relief that provided a basis for removal. The

remaining claims arise solely under state law. The state court is equally competent to hear this

case and more familiar with the law of its own forum. Therefore, principles of comity favor

remand to the state court. 

Judicial economy also weighs in favor of remand. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants note

that this case is in its early stages. (Br. at 6; Opp. Br. at 5.) Defendants removed the case to

this Court on January 13, 2006 and Plaintiffs swiftly filed a motion to remand on January 29,

2006. Furthermore, this Court has played little part in the overall litigation of the case. The

present motions before the Court are the first substantive considerations undertaken, which will

not need to be duplicated regardless of whether the case is remanded. 

Considerations of convenience and fairness do little to sway the balance for or against

remand. Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants cite to facts indicating that the decision whether to

remand will implicate the convenience or fairness factors. In addition, a state forum will

provide an equally fair adjudication of the matter as this Court.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs has “attempted to manipulate the choice of forum.”

(Opp. Br. at 5.) Plaintiffs, however, characterize their inclusion of Title VII claims as an

inadvertent error. (Br. at 3.) The Ninth Circuit has held that “[f]iling federal claims in state

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court is a legitimate tactical decision by the plaintiff: it is an offer to the defendant to litigate the

federal claims in state court.” Baddie, 64 F.3d at 491. “If the defendant rejects the plaintiff’s

offer to litigate in state court and removes the action, the plaintiff must then choose between

federal claims and a state forum” Id. In Baddie, the plaintiffs dismissed their federal claims

and moved for remand shortly after removal from state court. Id. The court concluded that

there was “nothing manipulative about that straight-forward tactical decision and there would

be little to be gained in judicial economy by forcing plaintiffs to abandon their federal causes of

action before filing in state court.” Id. 

In Moyles v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the court applied the reasoning in Boddie to

procedural facts similar to those before this Court and granted plaintiffs motion to remand. 

2005 WL 1561519, at **3-4 (E.D. Cal. 2005). In Moyles, the plaintiffs filed a motion to

remand the action to state court shortly after removal and simultaneously filed a motion to

amend their complaint in order to eliminate all federal claims. Id. at *1. Although the court

noted that the plaintiffs’ motivation for amending the complaint was to obtain remand, the court

found nothing manipulative in such a straight-forward tactical decision. Id. at **2, 4 (citing

Baddie, 64 F.3d at 491).

Here, as in Baddie and Moyle, Plaintiffs moved for remand “with all due speed after

removal.” See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 491; Moyles, 2005 WL 1561519 at *4. Even if Plaintiffs’

inclusion of Title VII claims was a “calculated decision” as Defendants argue, there is nothing

manipulative about such a legitimate tactical decision. (Opp. Br. at 7.) Therefore, exercising its

discretion, this Court finds that the remaining state law causes of action should be remanded to

state court.

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CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint and GRANTS

the motion to remand the case to state court. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for the

County of Alameda. The Clerk shall close this Court’s file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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