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Parties Involved:
Mona Hanesworth
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

. : FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUN 2 li 198 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

In re: MONA HANESWORTH, ) 

) 

Debtor, ) 

) 

) 

MONA HANESWORTH, ) No. 90-8075 

) (D.C. No. C89-0261-K) 

Appellant, ) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Debtor Mona Hanesworth appeals from the district court's 

affirmance of the decision of the bankruptcy court determining 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 1 
debtor liable for unpaid income taxes, interest, and penalties for 

the year 1978. Debtor's motion to determine tax liability ensued 

after she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in response to the 

IRS levy and seizure of her home for nonpayment of the 1978 

assessment. 

The single issue presented for review is whether the 1978 tax 

return, signed by debtor's husband and the tax preparer, was 

intended to be a joint return despite the absence of the debtor's 

signature. Debtor presents two interrelated arguments in support 

of her position that the 1978 tax return was not intended to be a 

joint return: (1) the government did not meet its burden of 

proving the debtor's intent to file a joint tax return, and (2) 

the IRS' destruction of the records and reports related to the 

1978 tax return precluded the government from meeting its burden 

of proof. 

Debtor and 

August 17, 1956. 

her ex-husband, Alan Hanesworth, were married on 

.They were separated on October 24, 1977, and 

ultimately divorced in February, 

point to the maintenance of a legal 

though the relationship was less 

1984. The facts in this case 

marriage during 1978, even 

than harmonious. Although 

occupying separate residences, neither party instituted divorce 

proceedings until several years after the filing of the disputed 

return. During the period of time in question, the husband 

continued to be the sole financial support of the debtor. She 

remained unemployed outside the home and had no independent income 

during that year. It is undisputed that the couple filed joint 

tax returns during the years of their marriage including 1976, 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 2 
1977, and 1979, even though they were living apart during the 

latter part of 1977 and during all of 1979. 

The determination as to whether the nonsigning spouse 

intended a joint return is one of fact and must be affirmed unless 

determined to be clearly erroneous. O'Connor v. Commissioner, 412 

F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970). 

Generally, "a finding of fact is 'clearly erroneous' if it is 

without factual support in the record, or if the appellate court, 

after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made." LeMaire ex rel. 

LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987). 

"A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of 

income taxes," I.R.C. § 6013(a), if it "shall be signed by both 

parties." 26 C.F.R. § 1.6013-l(a)(2). Spouses filing a joint 

income tax return incur joint and several liability as to any tax 

deficiencies. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3); Tavery v. United States, 897 

F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1990). The failure of one spouse to 

sign the return does not negate the intent of filing a joint 

return by the nonsigning spouse. Snyder v. Commissioner, 47 

T.C.M. (CCH) 667, 669 (1983); Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 46 

T.C.M. (CCH) 1330, 1332 (1983); Frank v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. 

(CCH) 1149, 1155 (1982)(citations omitted); Estate of Campbell v. 

Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12 (1971). 

The commissioner's determination that a tax return is joint 

is accorded a presumption of correctness. If the evidence 

indicates that one of the spouses did not sign the return, the 

commissioner's presumption of correctness is defeated and the 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 3 
burden shifts to the government to present additional evidence of 

intent. Cassity v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 514, 516 (1987); 

O'Connor v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d at 309. If mutual intent is 

not apparent on the face of the return, the finder of fact may 

look to other sources. Wills Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 

(CCH) 174, 185 (1969). 

Here, a copy of the 1978 income tax return, placed into 

evidence by the debtor, was marked as "married filing jointly." 

Debtor's name and social security number appear at the top of the 

form along with those of her husband. Debtor, her husband, and 

the couple's two children are claimed as exemptions. See R. Vol. 

I, Tab 1 at 35. 

The government presented evidence that debtor signed two IRS 

form 900 waivers of collection, one on January 3, 1985, and the 

second on August 11, 1986. Addendum to Appellee's Brief, 

Defendant's Exh. A. Therefore, it can be assumed that, although 

the exact point at which debtor received notice of the tax 

assessment is unclear, she was definitely placed on notice at the 

time she signed the first waiver in 1985. However, there is no 

evidence that she objected to her liability for the assessment 

until February, 1989, more than four years later, when she learned 

that she could not avoid the levy and seizure of her home through 

her bankruptcy action. 

In debtor's original motion to determine tax liability, she 

claimed protection pursuant to I.R.C. § 6013(e), 1 the "innocent 

1 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6013(e), a spouse can be relieved of tax 

liability if: 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 4 
spouse" provision. At the time of hearing in the bankruptcy 

court, debtor withdrew this argument in favor of her claim that 

the 1978 return was not a joint return. Tr. at 3-4. The 

government argues that because the innocent spouse defense 

requires the filing of a joint return, by so initially claiming, 

debtor admitted her joint intent. We do not agree. Parties have 

been allowed to plead these two defenses in the alternative 

without incurring the kind of prejudice which the government seeks 

to impose. See Cassity v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 514; 

Snyder v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 669; Klayman v. 

Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 277, 278 (1979). Although not 

dispositive of intent, debtor's original request for innocent 

spouse protection, along with her unexplained delay in challenging 

her liability, leads us to question whether her claim of lack of 

intent to file a joint return may have been an afterthought born 

of desperation. 

(continued on previous page) 

(A) a joint return has been made under this section for 

a taxable year, 

(B) on such return there is a substantial 

understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous 

items of one spouse, 

(C) the other spouse establishes that 

return he or she did not know, and 

know, that there was such substantial 

and 

in signing the 

had no reason to 

understatement, 

(D) taking into account all the facts and 

circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other 

spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable 

year attributable to such substantial understatement. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 5 
The necessary intent to file a joint tax return can be 

established by the conduct of the nonsigning spouse rather than 

the presence or absence of a signature. Walsh v. United States, 

56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-5370, 85-5371 (1985). The debtor testified that 

her husband handled all of the family's financial affairs, and 

that she knew very little of his business dealings. Tr. at 9. 

She further testified that she was in the habit of signing 

anything he asked her to sign. Tr. at 12. The couple had 

established a consistent pattern of filing joint tax returns. 

Debtor signed a joint return for the tax year ending December 31, 

1979, the year following the one in dispute, even though she had 

some independent income during that year and could have filed a 

separate return. Id. Debtor offered no reason why she would not 

have signed a joint return for 1978 had she been requested to do 

so, and in fact, testified that she thought she had to file a 

joint return with her husband in 1978 because she was not working. 

Tr. at 11. The fact that debtor began filing separate returns in 

1980 indicates that she was aware of her obligation to file a 

separate return once she acquired independent taxable income and 

ceased filing joint returns with her husband. 

In Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 1986), 

the Tax Court had set forth factors to be considered in 

determining intent as, (1) whether a separate return was filed by 

the nonsigning spouse, (2) whether the nonsigning spouse objected 

to the joint filing of the return, and (3) whether the parties had 

established a pattern of joint filings. The Sixth Circuit opined 

that, while these factors were important, the main focus should 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 6 
not be on "petitioner's intent to file any joint return, but 

whether she intended to file and be bound by the particular return 

in question." Id. (emphasis in original). Using these criteria, 

the court reversed the Tax Court and decided the wife had not 

intended to file a joint tax return. However, the facts in Shea 

are distinguishable from debtor's circumstances. In Shea, the 

disputed tax return was not signed by either the husband or the 

wife. It only carried the signature of the tax preparer. The 

court determined that the wife in Shea never authorized anyone but 

her husband to sign on her behalf, and the absence of a signature 

by either party negated the requisite intent. Id. at 568. 

Debtor argues that the Tax Court's determination in Snyder is 

dispositive in this case. In Snyder, the court refused to find a 

joint return was intended. Snyder v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. 

(CCH) at 670. However, unlike the present case, the wife in 

Snyder had refused to sign the disputed return when asked to do 

so. Id. at 669. Also distinguishable is Cassity, where, under 

similar facts, the court concluded the wife was not liable because 

the parties failed to establish a continuous pattern of joint 

filings, and the wife had demonstrated a propensity to question 

her husband regarding the need for her signature on various 

documents. Cassity v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 517. 

We are inclined to agree with the district court, that the 

facts of Frank v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1149 (1982), more 

closely align with the facts of this case. In Frank, the wife was 

not employed outside the home, had no income of her own, and was 

totally uninvolved in her husband's business affairs. Id. at 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 7 
1150. Debtor argues that Frank is distinguishable in that the 

husband and wife maintained an intact marriage during the period 

in question, whereas debtor's marriage was estranged. We do not 

find this persuasive in light of the fact that during the year in 

question, neither debtor nor her husband took any steps to legally 

dissolve the marriage. Although maintaining separate residences, 

they continued to represent a financial unit which could benefit 

from filing a joint return. 

Debtor further argues that because the reports and work 

papers regarding the 1978 return had been destroyed by the IRS, 

the government was unable to meet its burden of proof as to 

intent. Appellant's Brief at 28; tr. at 25-27. The cases cited 

by debtor in support of this argument relate to challenges of the 

validity and amount of tax assessments, issues never raised by 

debtor. Debtor never explained the import of these documents to 

her claim of lack of intent and we fail to see the relevance. 

Also, it is apparent that the unavailability of the documents is 

attributable to debtor's long delay in challenging her liability. 

Regardless, it appears the destroyed reports and work papers would 

only be relevant to a challenge of the validity and amount of the 

assessment and would not, in our opinion, have supported debtor's 

claim of lack of intent. 

Debtor also argues, in her brief, that she did not receive 

notice of the assessment until she was asked to sign the first 

form 900 waiver of collection in January, 1985. The record 

supports this claim as it is void of any additional evidence of 

notice. Although we question the government's statement that 

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Appellate Case: 90-8075 Document: 010110128213 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 8 
"presumably" debtor received notice of assessment (Appellee's 

Brief at 12), the issue of adequate or timely notice was never 

raised until debtor argued it in her opening brief. We, 

therefore, do not reach this issue. Baker v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. 

Co., 788 F.2d 650, 663 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Although the bulk of the evidence is circumstantial, it 

weighs heavily on the side of the government. Debtor's failure to 

object to her liability until she realized her home was actually 

in jeopardy, the established pattern of joint filings both before 

and after the year in question, and debtor's history of 

acquiescence in her husband's handling of the family's financial 

affairs, coupled with the facial declarations on the return, lead 

to the conclusion that debtor tacitly consented to the filing of a 

joint tax return for 1978. 

We therefore conclude that the bankruptcy court's 

determination of tax liability is not clearly erroneous. The 

parties' respective requests for oral argument are DENIED, and 

judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Wyoming is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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