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Parties Involved:
McKenzie-Willamette Regional Medical Center Associates, LLC
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-1125 September Term, 2016

FILED ON: NOVEMBER 22, 2016

MCKENZIE-WILLAMETTE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

ASSOCIATES, LLC, DOING BUSINESS AS

MCKENZIE-WILLAMETTE MEDICAL CENTER,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 15-1171

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of

the National Labor Relations Board

Before: SRINIVASAN and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior

Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

The court has considered this petition for review and the cross-petition for

enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board on the record and on the

parties’ briefs. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 34(j). After giving full

consideration to the issues, we have determined that a published opinion is not needed.

See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for review be denied and the crossapplication for enforcement be granted.

The Board found that petitioner McKenzie-Willamette Regional Medical Center

violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (5) when it failed to provide information a union

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requested during collective bargaining. McKenzie-Willamette Med. Ctr. & Serv.

Employees Int’l Union Local 49, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Feb. 24, 2015).

The company’s petition for judicial review does not contest the Board’s decision

on its merits. The argument instead is that the Board’s order should not be enforced

because the complaint charging the company with unfair labor practices was void.

Regional Director Ronald K. Hooksissued the complaint. The appointment of a Regional

Director requires a quorum of the Board consisting of no less than three members. 29

U.S.C. § 153(b); 67 Fed. Reg. 62992-01 (Oct. 1, 2002). The company claims the Board

appointed Hooks on January 6, 2012, at which time it lacked a quorum. See Noel Canning

v. N.L.R.B., 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557, 2578 (2014). During the administrative proceedings

theBoard’s GeneralCounsel produced Hooks’Certificate of Appointment. The certificate

bore the date of December 22, 2011, when the Board clearly had a quorum. The

Administrative Law Judge, in a decision the Board adopted, took official notice of the

certificate. In light of that document, the Board determined – with ample support, see,

e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 157 (1803) – that even though Hooks

may not have assumed his duties until several weeks after December 22, 2011, this had

no bearing on the legality of his appointment.

The company objects that the Board’s General Counsel did not present the

Certificate of Appointment until after the administrative hearing closed. But the company

first raised this defense at the last moment. Moreover, at the administrative hearing before

the record closed, the General Counsel specifically stated that Regional Director Hooks

was appointed on December 22, 2011. In addition, the company expressly agreed to

supplemental briefing on its very belatedly raised claim. Accordingly, this is not a case

in which the company was surprised or caught off guard by the General Counsel’s

submission. In any event, the ALJ and the Board properly relied on the certificate. The

Federal Rules of Evidence govern proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board

as far as practicable. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The Board took notice of the date, December

22, 2011, on Hooks’ Certificate of Appointment as a fact that “can be accurately and

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED.

R. EVID. 201(b)(2). The certificate was a self-authenticating document. See Yellow Taxi

Co. of Minneapolis v. N.L.R.B., 721 F.2d 366, 375 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1983). It contained a

“seal purporting to be that of . . . [an] agency [of the United States]” and “a signature

purporting to be an execution or attestation.” FED. R. EVID. 902(1).

The company also claims that the Board was estopped from considering evidence

that Director Hooks was appointed on December 22, 2011. The Board was estopped, the

company says, because in the Ninth Circuit in a case involving a different employer the

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Board filed a brief stating that Regional Director Hooks had been appointed in January

2012. But the Board later notified the Ninth Circuit that it had misstated the date of

appointment in the brief. In addition, there was no “definite representation to the party

claiming estoppel”: the misstatement in the brief was to a different party in a different

court. Morris Commc’ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 566 F.3d 184, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations omitted). The company also argues that the Board press release announcing

the appointment of Hooks in January 2012 estopped the Board. This is incorrect. The

press release mentioned only the date of the announcement, not the date of the

appointment.

The company, relying on 5 U.S.C. § 556(e), argues that we must remand the case

to the Board and order it to reopen the record. We do not agree. Section 556(e) states:

“When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the

evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the

contrary.” The company did not make the necessary “good showing it could contest the

evidence.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 453 F.3d 473, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(internal quotations and alteration omitted). Information about when Hooks began

working as the Regional Director did not contradict “the significance of the [] officially

noticed information.” S. Cal. Edison Co. v. F.E.R.C., 717 F.3d 177, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Moreover, there is no indication the company could provide other evidence to contradict

the date on the certificate. Midwest Television, Inc. v. F.C.C., 426 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C.

Cir. 1970). The company requested discovery without even specifying what it hoped to

find. Therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion in not reopening the administrative

record. See Reno Hilton Resorts v. N.L.R.B., 196 F.3d 1275, 1285 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk

is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of

any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C.

CIR. R. 4.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

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