Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01350/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01350-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Phil Ivaldy
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PHIL IVALDY, American Shareholder Rights Loral 

Stockholder Protective Committee,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1350

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00243-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. 

Firestone. 

______________________ 

Decided: July 7, 2016

______________________ 

PHIL IVALDY, Huntington Beach, CA, pro se.

CAMERON COHICK, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR. 

______________________ 

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2 IVALDY v. US

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Phil Ivaldy (“Ivaldy”) appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“the Claims 

Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Ivaldy v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 633 

(2015). Because the Claims Court did not err in dismissing the complaint, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Ivaldy was a shareholder of Loral Space and Communication Ltd. (“Loral”). In 2003, Loral filed for Chapter 11 

bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 

the Southern District of New York. Loral’s bankruptcy

proceedings led to several appeals to the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of New York, and 

ultimately a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 

States Supreme Court, which the Court denied in 2009.

In 2015, Ivaldy filed a complaint against the United 

States in the Claims Court, seeking $2 billion in damages. 

Appellee’s App. 11–21. Ivaldy alleged that the decisions

of the bankruptcy court and district court in Loral’s

bankruptcy proceedings: (1) resulted in a Fifth Amendment taking of his and other shareholders’ shares in 

Loral; (2) violated his constitutional due process rights; 

(3) deprived him of access to the courts in violation of the 

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the 

Constitution; and (4) deprived him of his rights to “uniform bankruptcy laws” in violation of Article I, Section 8, 

Clause 4 of the Constitution. Id. He also alleged that the 

entire bankruptcy court system is unconstitutional as 

violating the separation of powers. Id.

The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. The Claims Court granted the motion 

and dismissed the suit. Ivaldy, 123 Fed. Cl. at 635–37. 

Specifically, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 

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IVALDY v. US 3

to review Ivaldy’s Fifth Amendment takings claim because review of such a claim would require the Claims 

Court to scrutinize the merits of bankruptcy court and 

district court decisions, a task it is without authority to 

undertake. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Ivaldy’s remaining claims because none of the

constitutional provisions that Ivaldy relied on are moneymandating.

Ivaldy timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s decision to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Waltner v. 

United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence, Taylor v. United States, 

303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and “the leniency 

afforded pro se litigants with respect to mere formalities 

does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements,” 

Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) (citing 

Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 1987)).

Ivaldy argues that the bankruptcy court erred in determining that Loral’s liabilities exceeded its assets. He 

also argues that various decisions of the bankruptcy court 

and district court resulted in a Fifth Amendment taking 

of his shares and violated his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 

He asserts that the “absolute priority rule” set forth in the 

Bankruptcy Code is “money mandating at the time the 

United States took the shareholder value of their property.” Appellant’s Informal Br. 7. Moreover, he alleges 

violations of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution and the separation-of-powers doctrine. He maintains 

that his claims, when considered in the aggregate, are

based on money-mandating provisions of law. 

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4 IVALDY v. US

The government responds that the Claims Court correctly determined that it did not possess jurisdiction over 

Ivaldy’s claims for alleged violations of constitutional 

provisions that are not money-mandating and for alleged 

takings, which would require the Claims Court to review 

bankruptcy court and district court decisions. 

We agree with the government that the Claims Court 

lacked jurisdiction over the case. The Claims Court is a 

court of limited jurisdiction. Brown v. United States, 105 

F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Congress created the 

Claims Court “to permit a special and limited class of 

cases to proceed against the United States,” and the 

Claims Court “can take cognizance only of those [claims] 

which by the terms of some act of Congress are committed 

to it.” Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 

(1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, 

limits the jurisdiction of the Claims Court to claims for 

money damages against the United States based on 

sources of substantive law that “can fairly be interpreted 

as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.” 

United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Claims 

Court correctly determined that none of Ivaldy’s claims 

were tied to money-mandating statutes or provisions of 

law or any contract with the United States, thus depriving the Claims Court of jurisdiction over his claims.

In particular, the Claims Court correctly dismissed 

Ivaldy’s Fifth Amendment takings claim. Ivaldy’s takings 

claim is based solely on alleged errors in the bankruptcy 

court and district court decisions. As we have explained, 

the Claims Court does not possess jurisdiction to review 

the judgments of bankruptcy courts and district courts. 

Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 

1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (district court); Allustiarte 

v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

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IVALDY v. US 5

(bankruptcy court). Those decisions are reviewable, if at 

all, in the regional circuit courts of appeals. 

Ivaldy attempts to couch his allegations in terms of a 

Fifth Amendment taking by the United States, but the 

Claims Court could not review those allegations without 

second-guessing the merits of the bankruptcy court and 

district court decisions. Thus, the true nature of Ivaldy’s 

claims is a collateral attack on the judgments of the 

bankruptcy court and district court. The Claims Court 

does not possess jurisdiction to entertain them. Pines 

Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 444 F.3d 

1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Regardless of a party’s 

characterization of its claim, we look to the true nature of 

the action in determining the existence or not of jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Likewise, the Claims Court correctly dismissed 

Ivaldy’s remaining claims based on the Due Process 

Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Article 

I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, as well as his 

challenge to the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court

system. Those constitutional provisions that Ivaldy relied 

on do not mandate payment of money by the government 

for violations. See, e.g., Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 

1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 

F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995); May v. United States, 

534 F. App’x 930, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Because Ivaldy’s

claims are not tied to money-mandating sources of law,

the Claims Court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain them.

Accordingly, the Claims Court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over all of Ivaldy’s claims 

and correctly dismissed the complaint.

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6 IVALDY v. US

CONCLUSION

We have considered Ivaldy’s remaining arguments 

and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Claims Court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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