Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02627/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02627-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin D. Risner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2627

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN D. RISNER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:08-cr-00049—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Chief Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2009—DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2010

Before BAUER, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. After Kevin Risner choked and

threatened to kill his girlfriend, she called 911. After

an officer arrived she told him that Risner was drunk,

armed, and hiding in the basement crawl space of

their shared home. Police entered the home and arrested

Risner without a warrant. Police reentered the home to

take the girlfriend’s statement, and eventually removed

several guns from the home at her request. The girlfriend

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never expressly consented to either of the police entries

into her home. Nevertheless, the district court denied

Risner’s motion to suppress, finding that the girlfriend

had impliedly consented to both entries. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In late January 2008, Deborah Dean called 911 from

Kevin Risner’s house but hung up before talking to a

dispatcher. The Starke County Sheriff’s Department

responded anyway, as was its policy with all 911

hangups. Deputy Bill Dulin found Dean, Risner’s girlfriend and cohabitant, in the front yard wearing a trench

coat. She told Dulin that she had called 911 because

Risner had been drinking heavily, threatened to kill her,

and assaulted and choked her. Dulin observed injuries

on Dean’s face and neck that appeared to corroborate

Dean’s story. Dean also told Dulin that she lived in

Risner’s house, that Risner had several weapons inside,

and that Risner had said that he had nothing to lose

because he was going to prison anyway. Dean also told

Dulin that Risner usually hid in a basement crawl space

when police came to the house.

Dulin knocked on the back door but Risner did not

answer. Dulin called for backup but did not secure a

warrant. With the four additional officers that arrived,

Dulin entered the unlocked back door and found Risner,

drunk, exactly where Dean said he would be hiding. One

of the officers took Risner to jail while the others

remained at the house. Dulin asked Dean if they could go

inside to take her statement, and Dulin and Dean went

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No. 09-2627 3

inside together and sat at the kitchen table. Next to the

table was Risner’s gun cabinet. Dean later asked the

officers to remove the guns from the house. Both Dulin

and Dean agree that Dean never affirmatively consented

to either police entry into her home.

Risner was indicted for possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon (Count I) and possession of an unregistered

firearm (Count II). Risner filed a motion to suppress,

arguing that the officers’ entry and seizure of his guns

violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied

the motion after holding an evidentiary hearing. A jury

then convicted Risner of Count I. The district court sentenced Risner to 27 months’ imprisonment and three

years of supervised release. Risner filed a timely appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo,

but review its findings of fact for clear error. United States

v. Hernandez-Rivas, 513 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2008).

Whether Dean impliedly consented to the police

entries into her home is a question of fact to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); United

States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2007).

A warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment’s

protection against unlawful searches and seizures unless

an exception to the warrant requirement applies, United

States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2009), such as

receiving a co-tenant’s consent to the search, see United

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States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 2006).

Consent can be express or implied. See United States v.

Renken, 474 F.3d 984, 987 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[C]onsent in

certain cases can be implied in the absence of clear

verbal permission.”). To determine whether consent was

voluntarily given, the court should consider 

“(1) the person’s age, intelligence, and education,

(2) whether he was advised of his constitutional

rights, (3) how long he was detained before he

gave his consent, (4) whether his consent was

immediate, or was prompted by repeated requests

by the authorities, (5) whether any physical coercion was used, and (6) whether the individual

was in police custody when he gave his consent.”

McGraw, 571 F.3d at 628-29 (quoting United States v.

Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 2001)).

We agree with the district court that Dean impliedly

consented to the police entering her home on both occasions. Regarding the first entry, Dean called the police.

Although she hung up before speaking with the dispatcher, she willingly spoke with Dulin when he arrived

on the scene. She told him that she had called 911

because Risner had attacked her and threatened her

life. She also told him that Risner was armed and where

he was hiding in the house. Any reasonable person

would infer from Dean’s communications that she consented to the police entry into her home to arrest

Risner. In fact, we have trouble imagining why Dean

would have provided Dulin such information if she was

not actually requesting that the police enter her home

and arrest Risner.

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Risner’s efforts to distinguish United States v. Wesela,

223 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Hylton, 349

F.3d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 2003) are unpersuasive. Although

Wesela dealt with the scope of consent, the concept of

implied consent in that case applies with equal force

under the facts before us. In Wesela, the wife called 911

because her husband had a gun and threatened to kill

her. Wesela, 223 F.3d at 659. When the police arrived she

told them where to find her husband and the gun.

The police arrested the husband, but then reentered

the bedroom to search for the gun. This court affirmed

the district court’s finding that the wife had impliedly

consented to the police’s search for the gun, even after

arresting the husband: “The fact that there was no

direct verbal exchange between [the police officer] and [the

wife] in which she explicitly said ‘it’s o.k. with me for

you to search the apartment,’ is immaterial, as the events

indicate her implicit consent.” Id. at 661. The wife was

aware that the search was going on and could have objected, but did not. Id.

In Hylton, the girlfriend called 911 because she had

fought with her boyfriend, who kicked her out of the

house. She “advised officers of the specific circumstances inside the apartment, telling them that there was

a gun in the apartment” and “that the gun was located

in the bedroom where she and [the defendant] slept . . . .”

349 F.3d at 786. The Fourth Circuit found that the girlfriend impliedly consented to the police entry into the

apartment and search for the gun, because “there would

be virtually no other reason for her calling the police

and giving them the details of what existed in the apartment.” Id.

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As noted above, Dean hung up after calling 911. The

record does not indicate why she hung up, and in any

event, she voluntarily communicated with Dulin when

he arrived on the scene; the fact that she hung up earlier

does not suggest that she did not want police help.

She told police that she had been attacked and threatened,

and she provided detailed information about the circumstances inside the house, including the exact location of

Risner’s hiding place. She must have been aware that

police were entering her home based on her statements,

and she could have objected but did not. There is

nothing in the record to suggest that the police overcame her will or that something about her age,

intelligence, or experience undermined her ability to

impliedly consent to the search. The district court did not

clearly err in holding that Dean impliedly consented to

the first police entry into her home.

We agree with the district court that under the

specific facts of this case Dean impliedly consented to the

police re-entering her home to take her statement. It was

late January in northern Indiana. The weather and

common sense compelled them to move inside to take

Dean’s statement. Dulin asked her if it was all right that

they do so, and she did not object. Although ordinarily

mere acquiescence is not enough to show voluntary

consent, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49

(1968), we agree with the district court that Dean

impliedly consented to the second police entry of her

home. There is no evidence that the officers repeatedly

requested permission to enter or that the police otherwise compelled Dean’s implied consent. See Renken, 474

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No. 09-2627 7

F.3d at 987. That Dean consented to their continued

presence in her home is bolstered by her asking that the

police remove the guns. Although the entry had already

occurred, she obviously did not object to their presence

given her desire that they remove the guns. Thus, the

district court did not clearly err in finding that Dean

impliedly consented to the second police entry into

her home.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not clearly err, we AFFIRM.

2-3-10

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