Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01374/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01374-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Kim R. Harmon
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIM R. HARMON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-1374 DAD

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of a final administrative decision 

denying her application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. By order 

filed September 19, 2014, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was granted, the decision of 

the Commissioner was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. (Dkt. No. 

17.) On September 8, 2015, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Dkt. No. 21.)

At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 

agreement. (Dkt. No. 21-2 at 1.

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) Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,500, which represents 17.2% of the retroactive disability 

 

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 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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benefits received by plaintiff on remand, for approximately 15.5 hours of attorney time expended 

on this matter. (Dkt. No. 21 at 4.) Defendant filed a response on September 21, 2015, (Dkt. No. 

22), which addresses the applicable factors relating to counsel’s fee request but takes no position 

on the reasonableness of the requested fee.

Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 

security claimants.

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 

attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment 

a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 

of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social 

Security may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such 

attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due 

benefits.

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 

U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 

party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). Although an attorney fee 

award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is not paid by the government, the Commissioner has 

standing to challenge the award. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 324, 

328 (4th Cir. 1989). The goal of fee awards under § 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to 

attorneys for representing claimants while ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits 

received are not greatly depleted. Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989).

The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 

ensure that the fee actually requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“[Section] 

406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) 

instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). “Within the 25 

percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is 

reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a 

reasonable fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 

arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 

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Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793 & 808). The Supreme Court has 

identified five factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a 

contingent-fee arrangement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court: (1) 

the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the 

attorney engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; 

(4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; 

and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for 

noncontingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). Below 

the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee requested by counsel in this case 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable.

Here, there is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 

performance by counsel. Rather, counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful 

result for plaintiff. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any dilatory 

conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $8,500 fee, which represents 17.2% 

of the past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits awarded. In 

making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case and 

counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on 

such terms. See Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Finally, 

counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. (Dkt. No. 21-5 

at 1.)

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 

counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. See generally Azevedo v. Commissioner of Social 

Security, No. 1:11-cv-1341 AWI SAB, 2013 WL 6086666, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013) 

(granting petition pursuant to 406(b) for $17,893.75 in attorney’s fees); Coulter v. Commissioner 

of Social Security, No. 1:10-cv-1937 AWI JLT, 2013 WL 5969674, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 

2013) (recommending award of $15,084.23 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 406(b)); Taylor v. 

Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-00957-SMS, 2011 WL 836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011) (granting 

petition pursuant to 406(b) for $20,960 in attorneys’ fees); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09cv0490 

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LJO DLB, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) (recommending award of $34,500 in 

attorney fees pursuant to 406(b)).

An award of § 406(b) fees is, however, offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees 

granted under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 

at 796. Here, plaintiff’s counsel was previously awarded $3,300 in EAJA fees (see Dkt. No. 20) 

and the award under § 406(b) must be offset by that amount.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees (Dkt. No. 21) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is 

granted;

2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $8,500 in attorney fees under § 406(b). The 

Commissioner is directed to pay the fee forthwith and remit to plaintiff the remainder of her

withheld benefits; and

3. Upon receipt of the $8,500 in attorney fees pursuant to § 406(b), counsel shall 

reimburse plaintiff in the amount of $3,300 previously paid by the government under the EAJA.

Dated: September 29, 2015

DAD:6

Ddad1/orders.soc sec/harmon1374.attyfees.406(b).ord.docx

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