Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01134/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Jerry L. Vinyard
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1134 

JERRY L. VINYARD, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:10-cv-00341-WDS — William D. Stiehl, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER, 4, 2015 

Before POSNER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a challenge 

to the constitutional sufficiency of a criminal defense attorney’s advice in unusual circumstances. Appellant Jerry 

Vinyard pled guilty to charges of conspiracy to manufacture, 

distribute, and possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. At sentencing, he started to backtrack on whether he 

was admitting some of the relevant conduct listed in his 

presentence report. After consulting with his attorney, he 

withdrew his objections. His hesitation, however, prompted 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
2 No. 14-1134 

the district judge (Judge Gilbert) to vacate his guilty plea 

and sentence on the court’s own initiative. That led in turn to 

an unusual series of proceedings culminating in a writ of 

mandamus from this court ordering the district court to reinstate Vinyard’s plea and sentence. 

Vinyard still wished to challenge his guilty plea, however, and he tried to do so in the district court proceedings 

conducted to comply with our mandate. A different district 

judge (Judge Stiehl) rejected Vinyard’s challenge and reinstated the plea and sentence. Vinyard then had a choice to 

make: he could file a direct appeal, or he could forgo that 

route in favor of an immediate collateral attack under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. On his attorney’s advice, he chose the latter 

path. He now argues that advice caused him to default some 

of his claims and amounted to constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). Vinyard seeks reinstatement of his right to a direct appeal. 

The district court denied relief, concluding that the decision to forgo a direct appeal was strategic and not objectively 

unreasonable, and that Vinyard could not show prejudice in 

any event. This court granted a certificate of appealability on 

only that claim. After full briefing and argument, we affirm 

the denial of relief because Vinyard has shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice under Strickland. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Vinyard’s only claim on appeal is that his attorney was 

constitutionally ineffective when he advised Vinyard to challenge his guilty plea as part of a collateral attack under 

§ 2255 without first pursuing a direct appeal. That advice, 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 3

Vinyard contends, was wrong because as a general rule “the 

voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct 

review.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). The 

government defends the attorney’s advice as a reasoned strategic decision—a decision, moreover, with which Vinyard 

agreed at the time—and argues that even if the advice was 

wrong, Vinyard suffered no prejudice by following it. This 

court reviews the district court’s denial of a § 2255 petition de 

novo with regard to issues of law, and we review factual 

findings for clear error. Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 

879 (7th Cir. 2013), citing Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 

1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2002). 

The procedural history of this case is unusual and central 

to the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. We must review the relevant portions in some detail. Vinyard was arrested on April 27, 2006 for participating in a conspiracy to 

manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Vinyard decided to plead guilty. He signed a stipulation of facts admitting: that he had been involved in the conspiracy; that his 

role had been to obtain “precursor materials” such as 

pseudoephedrine pills and anhydrous ammonia for use in 

methamphetamine cooks; and that the total amount of 

methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy exceeded 500 

grams. 

Judge Gilbert held a guilty plea hearing on November 7, 

2006. Much of that hearing, including the adequacy of the 

district court’s guilty plea colloquy with Vinyard, is not before this court. Relevant to the present appeal, however, the 

government explained its evidence, which tracked the stipulation of facts that Vinyard had signed. Vinyard agreed that 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
4 No. 14-1134 

the government’s recitation was correct. When the judge 

asked if any threats or promises had been made to induce 

his plea, Vinyard said no. When asked if his plea was his 

own free and voluntary act, he said it was. The judge accepted the guilty plea and set a date for sentencing. Before the 

hearing concluded, Vinyard’s attorney, Susan Gentle, noted 

for the record that the parties had agreed that the government would not proceed with a forfeiture action against 

Vinyard’s home and property. 

The court sentenced Vinyard on May 3, 2007. The presentence investigation report indicated that Vinyard was responsible for 36,491 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, 36,000 of which stemmed from an 

incident in which Vinyard supplied tanks to store 300 gallons of anhydrous ammonia stolen by his co-conspirators. 

Vinyard’s attorney did not object to the report. When Judge 

Gilbert asked Vinyard directly if he wanted to correct any 

errors or make any alterations, Vinyard declined. Later on, 

however, Vinyard questioned the accuracy of the report. He 

told the judge that although he was guilty, he was “not 

guilty of everything that I’m accused of” and that, of the 

36,491 grams of methamphetamine listed in his presentence 

investigation report as relevant conduct, “36,000 of that does 

not belong on there. Is simply not true. I did not do that.” 

Understandably troubled by this sudden change in 

Vinyard’s position, Judge Gilbert asked Vinyard if he wished 

to object to the relevant conduct identified in the presentence 

report. The prosecutor said there was no “realistic possibility” that the relevant conduct would fall below 500 grams of 

methamphetamine, the threshold needed to apply the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence in light of Vinyard’s 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 5

criminal record. The court recessed while Vinyard consulted 

with his attorney. After that consultation, Vinyard said he 

would not contest the relevant conduct described in the 

presentence investigation report. He specifically declined to 

contest whether the relevant conduct involved more than 

500 grams of methamphetamine. Judge Gilbert then sentenced Vinyard to the mandatory minimum of 240 months in 

prison. 

Judge Gilbert remained troubled by Vinyard’s protests at 

sentencing. The next day, May 4, without first notifying the 

government, he ordered that Vinyard be released on bail. 

The order was not filed until May 7, however, and the government learned of Vinyard’s release only when an agent 

saw him walking into the Probation Office. The government 

immediately appealed the release order. On May 10, it filed 

an additional motion to reverse the release order. That same 

day, Judge Gilbert vacated the release order and directed 

Vinyard to surrender to the United States Marshal, mooting 

the first appeal. The judge also sua sponte vacated Vinyard’s 

guilty plea and sentence and ordered that new counsel be 

appointed to represent him, terminating attorney Gentle and 

appointing attorney Gene Gross in her place. The government appealed again and on June 5 moved for a stay in both 

the district court and this court. 

Judge Gilbert granted the motion to stay on June 13 and 

explained his reasons for vacating the plea and sentence. He 

was concerned that Vinyard had not agreed knowingly and 

voluntarily to the relevant conduct in the presentence investigation report. The judge also believed he had not adequately informed Vinyard of his right to challenge a prior conviction that raised the mandatory minimum sentence to twenty 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
6 No. 14-1134 

years under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851. With its second appeal 

still pending, the government then petitioned for a writ of 

mandamus to compel the district court to reinstate the plea 

and sentence. 

This court granted the writ, holding that the district court 

had committed patent error and that the government had 

demonstrated irreparable harm. See United States v. Vinyard, 

539 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2008). While expressing doubt that 

the district court had erred at all in failing to inform Vinyard 

of his rights under § 851 or in adopting the relevant conduct 

described in the presentence investigation report, we held 

that neither arguable error could call the guilty plea itself 

into question. Id. at 593–94. We further held that neither error warranted relief from the sentence. Id. Accordingly, we 

vacated the district court’s May 10 order and issued a writ 

mandating “that judgment be entered pursuant to the May 

3, 2007 sentence pronounced by the district court.” Id. at 595. 

The case returned to the district court, where Judge Gilbert recused himself. The case was reassigned to Judge 

Stiehl. Vinyard then filed for the first time a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which Judge Stiehl denied on May 20, 

2009. Recognizing the rarity of the situation, the judge correctly noted that the remand was “very simply a mandamus 

directing the Court to enter judgment on the sentence.” 

Judge Stiehl concluded that he could not grant Vinyard relief 

because of the specific and limited nature of the remand. He 

denied Vinyard’s motion and noted that Vinyard was “not 

without remedy as he may challenge his plea on direct appeal of this sentence, or on habeas review.” The district court 

entered judgment on June 8, 2009. 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 7

At that point, attorney Gross offered the advice that 

Vinyard now challenges. Gross and Vinyard discussed 

whether to pursue a direct appeal of the conviction and sentence. Vinyard’s affidavit in support of his § 2255 petition 

says that Gross advised him “that the record was not sufficiently developed to pursue a direct appeal, that the best issue I had going for me was a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel and the appropriate vehicle to pursue this claim 

was through a § 2255 motion.” Vinyard took that advice, and 

the period for filing a direct appeal expired. A letter from 

Gross to Vinyard dated April 5, 2010 provides further insight 

into the challenged advice: 

1. The thrust of our motion is not a sentencing 

argument. The thrust of our motion is that you 

received ineffective assistance of counsel in 

that objections were not filed to the PSR and 

you were allowed to plead guilty to the offense 

of conspiracy over 500 grams. As I point out in 

the motion, the plea agreement did not comply 

with Rule 11 concerning plea agreements, in 

that all of the information was not presented to 

the Court (which is clear from the transcript 

concerning threats of forfeiture).1

2. The decision to pursue issues of ineffective 

assistance or proceed with direct appeal [was] 

 1 The Rule 11 issue referred to in the April 5 letter was that counsel 

had failed to disclose a plea agreement that existed in the form of the 

government’s promise not to pursue forfeiture proceedings against 

Vinyard’s home if he pled guilty. As noted, however, Vinyard’s lawyer 

had disclosed that promise to the court on the record at the guilty plea 

hearing. 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
8 No. 14-1134 

discussed last year. I believe you have made 

the right decision in that the only direct appeal 

issues would be whether or not Judge Gilbert 

properly advised you of your right to contest 

the [§ 851] enhancement. I am still convinced 

that your most likely avenue for relief is collateral attack and not direct appeal. The most persuasive features of your case are Judge Gilbert’s Orders following your first sentencing 

hearing and his action in removing your first 

attorney. 

On May 6, 2010, Vinyard filed his own § 2255 petition pro se, 

apparently due to concerns that his attorney had not yet 

filed one despite the looming deadline. His petition raised 

the expected ineffective-assistance claims against his first attorney (Gentle), but it also raised several others, including a 

claim that his second attorney (Gross) was ineffective for advising him to pursue a collateral attack on his plea in lieu of 

a direct appeal. This advice, Vinyard contended, was legally 

erroneous and caused his procedural default of certain meritorious claims. 

Judge Stiehl denied relief. Vinyard v. United States, No. 10-

CV-341-WDS, 2013 WL 6153268 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2013). He 

found that the decision to pursue a collateral attack under 

§ 2255 instead of a direct appeal was “undoubtedly” strategic and that Vinyard had agreed with his attorney that a collateral attack was “the best course.” Id. at *18. The claims 

Vinyard argued he would have raised on direct appeal did 

“not appear to be claims that could not be raised on collateral attack,” and he had in fact raised them in his § 2255 petiCase: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 9

tion. Id.2 Thus, Gross’s advice to pursue “further factual development beyond the criminal record” was not objectively 

unreasonable, and Vinyard also could not show prejudice. 

Id. The court rejected Vinyard’s other plea-related claims as 

well, holding that he had procedurally defaulted the direct 

attack on his guilty plea, id. at *20, and that his first attorney 

had not provided ineffective assistance by permitting the 

government to coerce him into pleading guilty, id. at *9–11. 

We granted a certificate of appealability as to whether 

Vinyard’s attorney “rendered ineffective assistance by erroneously advising him that he could challenge his guilty plea 

only on collateral attack and not on direct appeal.” 

II. Analysis

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

guarantees the accused in a criminal case the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 684–86 (1984); Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455, 

457 (7th Cir. 2009). This right is “firmly established” not only 

for trial but also for a first appeal as of right. Gray v. Greer, 

800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1985), citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 

U.S. 387 (1985). Under the familiar two-pronged test of 

Strickland, Vinyard must show both that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. E.g., Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 2015), 

citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). 

 2 Those claims included: (1) Vinyard’s plea was coerced by the government; (2) the district court was not informed of an oral plea agreement between Vinyard and the government; and (3) the district court 

had removed Vinyard’s first attorney on its own motion. Vinyard, 2013 

WL 6153268, at *17. 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
10 No. 14-1134 

To satisfy the deficient performance prong, a petitioner 

must show that the representation his attorney provided fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688; Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 983 

(7th Cir. 2002). A court’s scrutiny of an attorney’s performance is “highly deferential” to eliminate as much as possible the distorting effects of hindsight, and we “must indulge 

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689; see also Groves v. United States, 755 F.3d 588, 

591 (7th Cir. 2014). Under these standards, “strategic choices 

made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also, e.g., United States v. Berg, 714 

F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 2013) (decision not to call a particular 

witness); Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 

2004) (decision not to advocate for guideline “safety valve” 

at sentencing). 

A strategic choice based on a misunderstanding of law or 

fact, however, can amount to ineffective assistance. “An attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to 

his case combined with his failure to perform basic research 

on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable 

performance under Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 

—, —, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014); see also, e.g., Thomas v. 

Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2015) (“counsel admitted his failure to reach out to [a pathology] expert was 

not a conscious decision—he just did not think to do so”); 

Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 423 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Though 

we often defer to an attorney’s calculated decision to forgo a 

certain trial strategy, it is undisputed that there was no strategic rationale underlying these errors.”). 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 11

These principles apply with equal force to appeals. An attorney is not expected to raise every possible non-frivolous 

claim on appeal; winnowing down possible claims to those 

an attorney believes are strongest is a classic example of a 

strategic decision. Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 897–98 (7th 

Cir. 2015). A decision not to file a notice of appeal at all will 

be appropriate if the lawyer has consulted adequately with 

her client about the decision. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 

470, 478 (2000). And of course, a defendant who instructs his 

attorney not to appeal cannot claim deficient performance 

when the attorney complies with his wishes. Id. at 477, citing 

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). But if a lawyer has 

been instructed to appeal and inadvertently fails to do so, 

she has acted “in a manner that is professionally unreasonable” under the Sixth Amendment. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 

477, citing Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969); see 

also, e.g., Kitchen v. United States, 227 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 

2000); Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 

1994) (“If the defendant told his lawyer to appeal, and the 

lawyer dropped the ball, then the defendant has been deprived, not of effective assistance of counsel, but of any assistance of counsel on appeal. Abandonment is a per se violation of the sixth amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 

Vinyard concedes that he never instructed Gross to file a 

notice of appeal. Vinyard agreed that not appealing would 

be the “best course.” Vinyard, 2013 WL 6153268, at *18. 

Vinyard argues that ought to be irrelevant, however, because 

he based his decision not to appeal entirely on his lawyer’s 

erroneous advice. Attorney Gross advised Vinyard not to 

pursue a direct appeal challenging the validity of his guilty 

plea. Vinyard argues, though, that it is well established that 

“section 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal,” see Qualls 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
12 No. 14-1134 

v. United States, 774 F.2d 850, 851 (7th Cir. 1985), and that 

“the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be 

attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct review.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); 

see also Ballinger v. United States, 379 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 

2004). Thus, Vinyard contends, advising a client to forgo a 

direct appeal of his guilty plea forecloses the possibility of 

collateral attack as a matter of law and cannot be a strategic 

decision. 

One problem with Vinyard’s argument is that he has 

been unable to explain what, exactly, he could have appealed 

to challenge the voluntariness of his plea. Arguments on direct appeal are “necessarily limited to the trial record, since a 

court of appeals does not take evidence.” United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1991). In this case, the limited 

record that would have been available on direct appeal contains no hint of the government coercion that Vinyard now 

contends he would have challenged. Rather, the record offers only the plea colloquy—when Vinyard repeatedly swore 

that his plea was voluntary and that the government’s factual basis for the charges was correct—and the stipulation of 

facts Vinyard signed agreeing that the conspiracy involved 

over 500 grams of methamphetamine. 

It would make little sense to require defendants to challenge their guilty pleas on direct appeal (and as a corollary 

to require attorneys to advise such appeals to avoid claims of 

constitutional ineffectiveness) even when the challenge 

would depend on evidence outside the available record. See 

Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (per curiam) 

(where petitioner alleged his guilty plea was coerced by the 

government, that issue “was appropriately raised by the haCase: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 13

beas corpus petition. The facts relied on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to consideration and review on appeal”); see also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 

621–22 (distinguishing between claim that a guilty plea had 

been coerced by threats made by government agent, which 

“falls within an exception to the procedural default rule for 

claims that could not be presented without further factual 

development,” and a claim that the plea colloquy was erroneous, which “can be fully and completely addressed on direct review based on the record created at the plea colloquy”). Nor could Vinyard have challenged the May 20, 2009 

denial of his motion to withdraw his plea: our mandate 

clearly ordered entry of judgment on the original sentence, 

leaving the district court no room to grant Vinyard’s motion. 

So the record showed no non-frivolous grounds to attack 

Vinyard’s guilty plea on direct appeal. Attorney Gross’s advice to proceed instead with a collateral attack was not legally erroneous or constitutionally ineffective. In fact, if he had 

advised Vinyard to pursue a direct appeal of his plea, that 

advice would have raised a serious constitutional concern in 

its own right. To raise a claim on direct appeal in spite of an 

inadequate record would have been fruitless but also might 

well have resulted in procedural default because issues 

“raised on direct appeal may not be reconsidered on a § 2255 

motion absent changed circumstances.” Varela v. United 

States, 481 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2007). 

To illustrate this danger, consider the context of the most 

common sorts of claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Like Vinyard’s challenge to his plea, such claims generally 

depend on information outside the record available on direct 

appeal. The Supreme Court has definitively held that ineffecCase: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
14 No. 14-1134 

tive-assistance claims need not be presented on direct appeal 

to preserve them for collateral attack under § 2255, Massaro v. 

United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003), because ineffectiveassistance claims nearly always require more extensive and 

targeted factual development than is available in the record 

on direct appeal. Furthermore, once “an ineffectiveassistance claim is rejected on direct appeal, it cannot be 

raised again on collateral review.” United States v. Flores, 739 

F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2014). “A litigant gets to argue ineffective assistance, and for that matter any other contention, just 

once.” Id. Thus, bringing a premature claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel on direct appeal is not prudent, and we 

have repeatedly cautioned defendants against raising such 

claims on direct appeal. E.g., United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 

443, 444 (7th Cir. 2014) (ineffective-assistance claims “usually 

as a matter of prudence should not” be raised on direct appeal); Flores, 739 F.3d at 341 (“Raising ineffective assistance 

on direct appeal is imprudent because defendant paints 

himself into a corner.”); Harris, 394 F.3d at 558. 

These principles and the blanket exception in Massaro

apply specifically to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, 

but their logic applies equally to the claims Vinyard says he 

would have brought on direct appeal. Issues “raised on direct appeal may not be reconsidered on a § 2255 motion absent changed circumstances.” Varela v. United States, 481 F.3d 

932, 935 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Olmstead v. United States, 55 

F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to reconsider issue 

previously raised on direct appeal “in the absence of 

changed circumstances of fact or law”). A challenge to 

Vinyard’s plea on direct appeal, then, would have yielded 

procedural default, and without the benefit of the factual 

development that collateral attack permits. 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 15

We have previously allowed defendants to withdraw 

claims raised on direct appeal when oral argument made 

clear that those claims would benefit from additional factual 

development. E.g., United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 607, 615 

(7th Cir. 2009) (validity of jury waiver); United States v. Rosario, 234 F.3d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 2000) (use of perjured testimony); United States v. Hardamon, 188 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 

1999) (ineffective assistance of counsel). By advising Vinyard 

to avoid the same path that we encourage criminal defendants to avoid as a matter of prudence, his lawyer was not ineffective. Vinyard has failed to show deficient performance 

under Strickland. 

Vinyard’s claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland as 

well. A showing of prejudice generally requires a defendant 

to establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Vinyard has 

not actually attempted to show prejudice under this standard. Given the flaws in his claims of coercion, he would be 

hard-pressed to do so. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States, 

618 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a defendant’s “afterthe-fact explanation wholly insufficient to override the verity 

that presumptively attaches to a defendant’s statements 

when entering a guilty plea” and rejecting his argument that 

he had pled guilty based on a promise of a sentence reduction); Bontkowski v. United States, 850 F.2d 306, 313–14 (7th 

Cir. 1988) (defendant’s responses made during a plea colloquy were “voluntary and binding” as to whether his plea 

had been obtained via promises or threats). 

Instead, Vinyard argues that his situation fits a different 

category altogether: cases in which a defendant has, through 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
16 No. 14-1134 

an attorney’s errors, been denied access to the appeal process 

altogether. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); 

Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1994). In such 

cases, courts apply a presumption of prejudice “with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims” because the lawyer’s deficient performance has 

rendered the adversary process itself unavailable. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, to satisfy Strickland in a 

case like Flores-Ortega, a defendant need not show a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal. Instead, “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise 

would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an 

appeal.” Id. at 484; accord Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 720 (if defendant timely tells attorney he wishes to appeal and attorney fails to do so, defendant “need not make a preliminary 

showing of ‘prejudice’ tantamount to presenting the appeal 

without legal assistance”) (footnote omitted). 

The presumption of prejudice applied in Flores-Ortega

and Castellanos, where counsel failed to file a notice of appeal 

as requested, does not extend to the very different facts here. 

Vinyard did not instruct counsel to appeal only to have 

counsel refuse or forget; such cases justify the presumption 

because defendants abandoned by their lawyers have “suffered injury from that very fact—from the loss of advocacy 

services that could have been used to establish a nonfrivolous issue for appeal.” Betts v. Litscher, 241 F.3d 594, 597 

(7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original), citing Flores-Ortega, 528 

U.S. at 483, and Castellanos, 26 F.3d 717; see also FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 486 (concluding it is “unfair to require an 

indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate that his 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1134 17

hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for appeal”) (emphasis in original). Instead, Vinyard and his attorney discussed the options, and the attorney gave reasonable advice not to pursue 

a direct appeal. This was not abandonment and did not 

make it unfair to require a showing of prejudice. See Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 719 (“If the defendant wants to take an imprudent appeal, the lawyer properly may try to talk him out 

of it.”); cf. Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(appellate counsel can be constitutionally ineffective for failing to present a particular issue on appeal only when it is 

“obvious” and “clearly stronger” than the claim actually 

presented, unless he has a strategic justification). The FloresOrtega presumption of prejudice does not apply to this case. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 14-1134 Document: 43 Filed: 11/04/2015 Pages: 17