Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00507/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00507-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandon E. Bjerkhoel
Plaintiff
C. Ogbuehi
Defendant
Robert G. Scharffenberg
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON E. BJERKHOEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT B. SCHARFFENBERG, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00507-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO AMEND

Plaintiff Brandon E. Bjerkhoel, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 11, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening. Plaintiff has consented to 

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this case. (ECF No. 8.) No other parties have appeared in 

the action.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 

has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

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immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. PLEADING STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to 

have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, 

the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California State Prison in Corcoran, California

(“CSP-Corcoran”) where this claim arose. He brings this action against Dr. Robert G. 

Scharffenberg and Physician’s Assistant C. Ogbuehi (“Defendants”), both employed by 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at CSP-Corcoran, 

in their personal and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his right to be 

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free from inhumane conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment by denying 

him adequate medical treatment for his Hepatitis C virus (“HCV”). 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized as follows:

Plaintiff has HCV and stage 1 cirrhosis of the liver. Left untreated, HCV can lead 

to severe cirrhosis, liver cancer, and the need for a liver transplant. Furthermore, 

individuals with HCV face a higher risk of developing insulin resistance and heart 

disease.1In January 2014, Plaintiff began to experience pain in his joints, tiredness, 

cramps, flu-like symptoms, darkening of the urine, and extreme pain. He also began to 

experience depression and anxiety.

When Plaintiff sought help from the medical staff2, he was told he did not qualify 

for treatment under CDCR policy because he would soon be eligible for parole and 

because CDCR only approved treatment for prisoners who had advanced to stage 3 or 4 

cirrhosis. Plaintiff believes stage 3 or 4 cirrhosis is indicative of liver cancer. Plaintiff 

believes if he were to wait until stage 3 or 4 for treatment, he will have already suffered 

irreversible liver damage.

On March 14, 2014, Dr. Scharffenberg examined Plaintiff in response to a 602 

Plaintiff filed. Plaintiff told Dr. Scharffenberg he was “still having abdominal pain due to 

Hep C” and wanted treatment. Dr. Scharffenberg did not prescribe pain medication, nor 

start a treatment course for HCV. Dr. Scharffenberg told Plaintiff that the “guidelines for 

treatment should change,” at which point Plaintiff might be able to receive treatment.

Plaintiff believes he is not receiving treatment because of its high cost. He states 

one 12 week course of treatment costs $94,500.00 and 24 weeks costs $189,000.00. He 

states there is no medical reason why he cannot receive treatment.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to provide Plaintiff with 

medication to treat his HCV and pain. Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive 

damages.

 

1

Plaintiff cites the “Journal of Hepatology October 2014 Volume 61, Issue 4, Pages 755-760” as his source 

for these facts.

2

Plaintiff does not identify these staff members. 

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff claims Defendants, acting in their official capacities as CSP-Corcoran 

medical staff, failed to provide adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. 

First, Plaintiff cannot recover money damages from state officials sued in their 

official capacities. Aholelei v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Official capacity suits may seek only prospective or injunctive relief. 

See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, to the 

extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against all Defendants in their official capacities, 

those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and will be dismissed. Plaintiff 

cannot cure this deficiency and sowill not be given leave to amend this claim. 

In addition to being limited to prospective relief, a plaintiff pursuing defendants in 

their official capacities must demonstrate that a policy or custom of the governmental 

entity of which the official is an agent was the moving force behind the violation. See

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

That is, the plaintiff must establish an affirmative causal link between the policy at issue 

and the alleged constitutional violation. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

385, 391-92 (1989); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, although Plaintiff 

is permitted to pursue claims for injunctive relief against state actors in their official 

capacities, “[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege 

a named official’s personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25.) “Rather, a plaintiff need only identify 

the law or policy challenged as a constitutional violation and name the official within the 

entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1127 

(citing Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-36 (2010)).

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted pursuant to a CDCR policy which bars 

inmates from receiving treatment for HCV unless their disease has progressed beyond 

stage 3. While Plaintiff does not explicitly say so, it appears he seeks to have the policy 

modified so that he may receive treatment. In that regard, Plaintiff has sufficiently 

identified the policy he wishes to challenge as a constitutional violation for the purposes 

of an official capacity suit. 

However, Plaintiff has not shown how Defendants are responsible for the policy at 

issue. He has not shown that Defendants established, implemented, or played any role 

in proffering the policy at issue, and therefore has not shown how they could 

appropriately respond to his request for a change in the policy. Plaintiff has therefore 

failed to make out a cognizable claim against Dr. Scharffenberg and Ogbuehi in their 

official capacities. Those claims will be dismissed with leave to amend.

B. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 

(2009); Simmons, 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21(9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 

F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth specific 

facts as to each individual defendant’s” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 

F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable 

under § 1983 . . . ‘if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or 

a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the 

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constitutional violation.’”) (quoting Lolli v. Cty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 

2003)); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 

F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 

1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has alleged no facts linking Ogbuehi to the violation of his rights; he 

makes only a conclusory allegation that Ogbuehi “den[ied] and delay[ed] medical 

treatment.” He does not state when, how, or in what capacity Ogbuehi had the 

opportunity to treat Plaintiff yet failed to do so. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against 

Ogbuehi will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

C. Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 

580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2006); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a 

link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation 

of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

For Eighth Amendment claims arising out of medical care in prison, Plaintiff “must 

show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” 

and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm 

v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

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indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite 

state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of 

due care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

The second element of an Eighth Amendment claim is subjective deliberate 

indifference, which involves two parts. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078. Plaintiff must 

demonstrate first that the risk was obvious or provide other circumstantial evidence that 

Defendants were aware of the substantial risk to his health, and second that there was no 

reasonable justification for exposing him to that risk. Id. (citing Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)) (quotation marks omitted). There must be some causal 

connection between the actions or omissions of each named defendant and the violation 

at issue; liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 

915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In cases involving medical care in prison, the correct inquiry is whether “the course 

of treatment the doctors chose was medically acceptable under the circumstances and 

[whether] the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

plaintiff’s health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a plaintiff alleges a defendant

denied medical treatment solely because of an administrative policy despite medical 

considerations in favor of treatment, the Ninth Circuit has found the defendant’s actions 

to be deliberately indifferent unless the defendant’s independent evaluation of the 

plaintiff’s condition led him to believe non-treatment was a medically acceptable option. 

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff alleges he has HCV, which, if left untreated, may lead to severe liver 

damage, liver cancer, and heart disease. This amounts to an objectively serious medical 

need. Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066; Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

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However, Plaintiff has not stated facts showing Dr. Scharffenberg was deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff states Dr. Scharffenberg 

examined Plaintiff on March 14, 2014 in response to a 602 filed by Plaintiff regarding his 

abdominal pain. Plaintiff provides only a fleeting description of his appointment with Dr. 

Scharffenberg and the 602 that led to the appointment. At the appointment, Plaintiff says 

he told Dr. Scharffenberg he was experiencing pain and wanted medication. Dr. 

Scharffenberg did not prescribe Plaintiff any medication, but did tell Plaintiff “the 

guidelines for treatment should change.” 

On these facts, the Court cannot tell whether Dr. Scharffenberg conducted an 

independent examination of Plaintiff and concluded, based on the examination, that

Plaintiff did not need medication or if he simply denied Plaintiff medication, without 

conducting an exam, on the basis of CDCR policy. Had Dr. Scharffenberg done the 

latter, Plaintiff may have a cognizable claim. At this stage however, Plaintiff must plead 

more facts describing the nature and extent of Dr. Scharffenberg’s interaction with 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s claim for medical indifference against Dr. Scharffenberg will be 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

V. REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff also seeks a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to provide

treatment for Plaintiff’s HCV.

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555, U.S., 7, 20 

(2008) (citations omitted). Alternatively, a preliminary injunction may issue where the 

plaintiff demonstrates the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the 

hardship balance tips sharply toward the plaintiff, assuming the other two elements of the 

Winter test are also met. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-

32 (9th Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief 

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should be denied if the probability of success on the merits is low. See Johnson v. Cal. 

State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (even if the balance of 

hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible 

minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits).

As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, there is no 

case or controversy before the Court; therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to preliminary 

injunctive relief at this time. Knapp v. Cate, No. 1:08–cv–01779–AWI–WMW PC, 2009 

WL 1684900, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2009) (citing Zepeda v. United States Immigration 

Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it 

has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it 

may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”)). Therefore, the 

Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining 

order at this time. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Dr. Scharffenberg and Ogbuehi in 

their official or personal capacities for denying Plaintiff treatment for his HCV in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has not previously been provided with notice of the 

deficiencies in his claims and the Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an 

amended complaint, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not 

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. 

George, 507 F.3d at 607.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but 

under section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

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[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF No. 1) IS DENIED;

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form along with a 

copy of the complaint filed April 11, 2016;

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or

b. File a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend this action 

be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to obey a 

court order, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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