Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-08052/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-08052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Respondent
Larry Charles Welch
Petitioner

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LARRY CHARLES WELCH, )

)

Movant, )

)

vs. ) 2:10-cv-8052-JHH-JHE

) 2:07-cr-0394-JHH-JHE

)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The court has before it the November 23, 2010 Motion (Doc. #1) to Vacate, Set Aside,

or Correct a Sentence, brought by LarryCharles Welch, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After

careful consideration of all the briefs and evidence presented by the parties, the Motion (Doc.

#1) is due to be denied for the following reasons.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Movant LarryCharles Welch was convicted in this court on December 5, 2007, of the

following three counts: one count of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more

of a mixture and substance of cocaine base and an amount of marijuana, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(D)(Count 1); one count of carrying a firearmduring

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(Count

2); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

FILED

 2014 Apr-09 AM 11:59

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:10-cv-08052-JHH-JHE Document 16 Filed 04/09/14 Page 1 of 42
922(g)(1)(Count 3). He was sentenced on April 2, 2008, to a total sentence of 420 months,

to be followed by a 120-month term of supervised release.

On appeal, Welch argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions,

and that his sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to satisfy the

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his

conviction and sentence on June 1, 2009, United States v. Welch, 330 Fed. Appx. 859 (11th

Cir. 2009), and denied his application for rehearing en banc on July 27, 2009, United States

v. Welch, 349 Fed. Appx. 534 (11 Cir. 2009)(table). The United States Supreme Court th

denied Welch’s petition for a writ of certiorari on December 7, 2009, Welch v. United States,

558 U.S. 1082 (2009) and denied his petition for rehearing on February 22, 2010, Welch v.

United States, 559 U.S. 964 (2010). 

II. CLAIMS PRESENTED

In support of his Motion to Vacate, Welch makes the following 

1. He received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel:

a. failed “to conduct an adequate investigation. Counsel failed

to interview crucial witnesses, properly inspect the crime scene,

and file motions to both suppress and exclude damaging

evidence”;

b. failed “to oppose the repeated playing of the 911 recording

on the basis that it created a bad man inference, and therefore

the unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value”;

c. failed “to oppose the introduction of the 911 recording

without the testimony of the actual 911 operator as being a

2

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violation of the confrontation and cumpulsory [sic] clauses of

the sixth amendment”;

d. failed “to oppose the introduction of the gun and drugs into

evidence on the basis that there was no established chain of

custody”;

e. failed “to adequately cross examine the two police officers

who first arrived at the scene”; and

f. failed “to oppose the Court’s instruction to the Jury that they

must continue to deliberate even though they had already

exhausted all attempts at unanimity and were at a total impasse”;

2. he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing because counsel:

a. made “prejudicial statement within the sentencing

memorandum to the effect that the petitioner is guilty of the

charged crimes”;

b. failed “to oppose the improper stacking/grouping of the

sentences that resulted in a sentence that was 10-years greater

than otherwise necessary”;

3. he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel

failed “to raise claim that District Court committed reversible error by failing

to assure that the petitioner was afforded his right of allocution”;

4. “the totality of the circumstances [and] the cumulative effect of counsel’s

errors amounts [sic] to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel”;

5. there is newly discovered evidence that establishes that he is actually

innocent of the charges;

6. he is challenging two of his prior state court convictions in state court, and

if he succeeds in overturning them, he will be actually innocent of being an

armed career criminal in this case; and

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7. the consecutive sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is

unauthorized because he also faced a greater mandatory minimum sentence

under some other provision of law.

(Doc. # 1).

On April 10, 2012, Welch amended his motion to vacate, raising the following claim:

8. he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the pre-trial phase

because counsel failed “to even attempt to negotiate a plea agreement on

Welch’s behalf” and failed to “properly advise him in regards to his chances

of success at trial, and the sentence he likely faced if he lost, as opposed to that

he would receive if he entered into a plea agreement with the government or

entered a naked plea with the court, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent

holdings in Lafler and Frye.”

(Doc. # 7).

In response to the court’s orders to show cause, the respondent filed answers to both

the original motion and the amendment, in which it maintains that the motion to vacate is due

to be denied. (Docs. # 4, 10.) By orders of the court, the parties were advised that the 1

respondent’s answers would be treated as a motion for summary dismissal. The movant was

advised that in responding to the motions for summary dismissal, he must supply the court

with counter affidavits and/or documents to set forth specific facts showing that there are

genuine issues of material fact to be decided. In response, the movant has filed traverses and

affidavits. (Docs. # 6, 12, and 12-1.) 

III. ANALYSIS

The respondent has also filed the affidavit of Welch’s attorney, Glennon F. Threatt. 1

(Doc. 4-1).

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The court begins its analysis by discussing Welch’s claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel at trial, sentencing, and on appeal. The court then discusses Welch’s claim of

actual innocence. Third, the court considers Welch’s claim regarding his prior state court

convictions. Fourth, the court discusses Welch’s claim that the sentence imposed under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) was unauthorized. Finally, the court addresses Welch’s amendment

to his Motion to Vacate, that counsel was ineffective in the pre-trial stage.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Claims 1-4)

The United States Supreme Court established a national standard for judging the

effectiveness of criminal defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment. “The benchmark for

judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court

elaborated:

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to

require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First,

the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “Because the [petitioner] must prove both deficiency and

prejudice, a [petitioner’s] failure to prove either will be fatal to his claim.” Johnson v. Scott,

68 F.3d 106, 109 (5 Cir. 1995). th

5

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Under the Strickland test, the petitioner must initially show that counsel’s

representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688. “While it need not be errorless, counsel’s advice ‘must be within the realm of

competence demanded of attorneys representing criminal defendants.’” Jones v. White, 992

F.2d 1548, 1557 (11 Cir. 1993)(quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1151 (11 Cir.)(en th th

banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991)). In making such an evaluation, “the court should

recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of counsel must be evaluated by

consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).

The second requisite element in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a

showing of prejudice. Even if counsel made an error so egregious as to be outside the broad

scope of competence expected of attorneys, a movant can obtain relief only if the error

caused actual prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. In order to establish actual

prejudice, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that but for the

attorney’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 207 (5 Cir. 1994). A reasonable probability is a probability th

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694. Furthermore, in addition to showing that the outcome would have been different, a

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petitioner must prove that “counsel’s deficient performance caused the outcome to be

unreliable or the proceeding to be fundamentally unfair.” Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202,

207 (5 Cir. 1994)(citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993)). “In other words, th

a ‘counsel’s unprofessional errors [must] so upset the adversarial balance between the

defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect.’” Weekley

v. Jones, 56 F.3d 889, 897 (8 Cir. 1995)(quoting Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842). “Unreliability th

or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant

of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.” Fretwell, 113 S. Ct.

at 844.

1. Failure to Conduct an Adequate Investigation (Claim 1(a))

Welch first claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because

counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation. Specifically, he claims that counsel

failed to interview crucial witnesses, failed to properly inspect the crime scene, and failed to

“file motions to both suppress and exclude damaging evidence.” (Doc. # 1 at 18-27). 

a. Failure to Interview Crucial Witnesses

Welch maintains that since “the very birth of this case” he has “asserted to Counsel

that there had to be several people that had witnessed the events that transpired that day, as

he was familiar with the location and knew that there was a place across the street where

locals congregated.” (Id. at 18-19). Welch claims that prior to his trial, he heard rumors

“from sources on the street” that “people did see what happened that day and knew it was not

7

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him who committed the crimes.” (Id. at 19). Welch claims he asked counsel to “go out

interview and/or call some of the tenant’s [sic] who lived at the apartment complex where

these crimes are alleged to have happened” because he “knew some of these people and that

they know [Welch is] not a drug dealer, and may have seen the events that transpired that

day.” (Id. at 48). 

Welch has submitted the affidavits of Carolyn Boone, Willie Giddens, and Melvin

Wilson. He explains that it took him several years to “track down these people and get an

understanding of exactly what the substance of their testimony would be, then get them to

sign Affidavits to that effect.” (Id. at 19). The affidavits, all identical with the exception of

the affiant’s name, provide as follows:

1). I ______________, along with several others, was sitting in Uncle

Bob’s yard on the day of April 18 , 2007, between the hours of 1:30 pm and th

approximately 4:00 pm socializing and having fun. 

2). I observed many things go on that day that involved the police,

including an argument that took place between two men, one of which who

was carrying a gun.

3). I can testify to what I saw that day and would have gladly done so

had Mr. Welch’s Attorney or acting representative contacted me.

4). I know for a fact that Mr. Welch was not on Avenue J at the time

in question because I was in a position to see the events that transpired.

5). In addition, I could see from my vantage point (across the street)

that the police went into the first upstairs Apartment and shortly thereafter let

everyone out of the house. The police then came out of the first Apartment

(“Drug House”) and climbed into the next-door Apartment. When the police

came out of the second Apartment they had a Blue Pocket Book Purse and a

Rifle.

8

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6). I could and would testify that the person that ran the drug house was

constantly going in and out of then [sic] next-door Apartment with a Blue Bag

that looked just like the one the police came out with. In fact, everyone around

there (including some Birmingham police) knew those two Apartments were

used to sell drugs.

7). Ultimately, I know for a fact that Larry Welch is not the man who

lived there, and is not the person I saw arguing with the other man.

(Doc. # 1 at 50-55). Welch claims that counsel’s failure to interview these eyewitnesses was

constitutionally ineffective. He contends that had this testimony been presented to the jury,

it is not likely he would have been convicted. (Id. at 19). 

Welch further alleges that counsel should have interviewed and called as witnesses,

some of the tenants who lived in the apartment building where the crime took place. (Id. at

21). He claims that some of “these people may have seen what happened on the day in

question” and “would have testified that he is not and never has been a drug dealer.” (Id.). 

In response, Welch’s attorney, Glennon Threatt, states:

In my meetings with him prior to trial, Welch never gave me any identifying

information that I could have used to identify these witnesses to determine if

they existed, where they were, if they had prior criminal histories or if in fact,

theywould be credible witnesses for his defense. Welch claims in his affidavit

that he had heard from “people on the outside” that there was exculpatory

evidence concerning his case. Welch did not tell me then, nor does he identify

now, who these people were that he supposedly told me at the time could

provide exculpatory testimony on his behalf. I had no reason not to talk to

these witnesses had I known their identity(s) at the time. As to the affidavits

attached to Welch’s petition, I had never heard ofCarol Boone, Willie Giddens

or Melvin Wilson until my review of Welch’s petition. 

(Doc. # 4-1 at 7). Mr. Threatt points out that from a strategic standpoint, there is no way to

tell if Carol Boone, Willie Giddens or Melvin Wilson would have been good witnesses

9

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because it is impossible to tell if any of them had an adequate opportunity to observe the

events in question, if any of them had criminal records that might have impeached their

veracity as witnesses, or if any of them were impaired by drugs or alcohol at the time in

question. (Id. at 7). Mr. Threatt adds that in his experience, witnesses from near the scene

of alleged drug sales are often unhelpful at trial because they refuse to admit their presence

at the scene, they were under the influence of drugs or alcohol themselves, and/or they have

prior criminal convictions that would allow their testimony to be impeached. (Id. at 8). He

adds, however, that if he had known about these witnesses and had been able to locate them,

he would have allowed Welch to decide if they should be called as witnesses at the trial. 

(Id.).

Mr. Threatt adds that:

I did in fact go to the crime scene with my co counsel, Mary K. Laumer,

on 12/1/07 and conduct a detailed investigation of the scene. While at the

scene, I spoke to three witnesses, L. Hamilton, E. Welch (the Petitioner’s

brother I believe) and a Mr. Stokes. I walked through the entire area,

including the location of the arrest of Welch. 

I also took more than 30 photographs of the scene, 19 of which I shared

with Welch during our pretrial conferences. I still have 19 of these digital

photographs in my case file. While at the crime scene, I distinctly remember

at least one of the witnesses telling me that they remembered the day in

question, and that they remembered seeing Welch in an argument with another

man, and in possession of both the rifle and the backpack. In addition, at least

one of the witnesses told me that around the time of the incident, Welch

frequented the apartment complex as he was a drug user and that drugs were

constantly being sold there. As a strategic decision, I did not think that either

of these witnesses would be beneficial to the defense so I did not call them. 

I traveled to the Cullman Detention Center the same day I visited the crime

scene (12/1/07) and told Welch everything that I had learned. 

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(Id. at 8-9). 

Welch argues in his traverse that his “claim is premised upon [time] as being the

swinging factor.” (Doc. # 6 at 1). The crime occurred on April 18, 2007. The trial took

place on December 3, 2007. Mr. Threatt conducted his investigation of the crime scene on

December 1, 2007. Welch maintains that byDecember, 2007, the housing complex had been

shut down and was completely vacant. (Id. at 2). He contends that if Mr. Threatt had

investigated the crime scene in a more timely fashion, he could have interviewed the people

who lived there during the time in question. (Id.). Welch admits that he did not provide Mr.

Threatt with the names of any people who actually witnessed the crime, but claims he gave

him the names of several people who “hung out” at the apartment complex and several who

lived at the complex during the time. Welch adds that had he known Mr. Threatt had

2

encountered witnesses who gave “disfavorable information,” he would have insisted on

calling them at trial because “their testimony would likely end up being favorable” because

he is innocent. (Id. at 34). 

It is undisputed that prior to trial, Welch never provided Mr. Threatt with the name

of a single witness to the crime. Welch implies that if Mr. Threatt had gone to the crime

scene earlier, he would have found favorable witnesses. However, this claim is speculative

Welch identifies Carolyn Square, Eddie Welch, Bruce Wayne, Lillien Prince, 2

Sharon Beverly, and Carolyn Moore as people who “hung out” and/or lived in the apartment

complex at the time of the crime. (Id. at 34). Welch has not provided affidavits from any

of these individuals. 

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as there is no way of knowing who, if anyone, Mr. Threatt might have encountered if he had

gone to the crime scene earlier or what their testimonymight have been. Further, the movant

has offered nothing to suggest how Mr. Threatt might have discovered Carolyn Boone, Willie

Giddens, or Melvin Wilson prior to trial. Finally, during his investigation of the crime, Mr.

Threatt encountered one witness who remembered seeing Welch in an argument with another

man, and in possession of both the rifle and the backpack, and another witness who indicated

that around the time of the incident, Welch frequented the apartment complex as he was a

drug user and drugs were constantly being sold there. Mr. Threatt made the strategic

decision, not to call either of these witnesses. The movant has offered nothing but

speculation to support his claim that counsel was deficient for failing to interview favorable

witnesses. Thus, he has failed to establish that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. 

Further, even if counsel’sfailure to interview favorable witnesses could be considered

deficient, Welch has not shown that but for the alleged deficiency, there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Welch asserts that

had Carol Boone, Willie Giddens, and Melvin Wilson testified at trial, it is “not likely” that

he would have been convicted. However, “not likely” a conviction would have occurred is

not the standard. Rather, Welch must show that had they testified, there is a reasonable

probability that he would have been acquitted. There is no way of knowing how credible the

testimony of these witnesses might have been. Further, at trial:

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Two officers testified they saw a man in a black shirt and gold pants who fit

Welch’s description carrying a rifle and a blue backpack. Both testified they

got a clear look at the suspect’s face before he fled into an apartment building

and both identified Welch at trial as the suspect. When the officers captured

Welch less than a block away from the apartment building, he was wearing a

black shirt and gold pants and one of the officers testified that he recognized

Welch’s face. 

United States v. Welch, 330 Fed. Appx. 859, 861 (11 Cir. 2009). Thus, even if these th

witnesses had testified at trial to the facts alleged in their affidavits, their testimony would

have only contradicted the testimony of the police officers. Their purported testimony is

insufficient to establish a reasonable probabilitythat the results ofthe proceeding would have

been different had they testified. 

Welch further claims counsel was ineffective for failing to call Officers Staton and

Lovett to testify. Welch explains that these officers were the ones who arrested him “while

he was knocking on a friend[’]s door where he was going to conduct a break [sic] job.” 

(Doc. # 1 at 20). He asserts “they would have testified that upon his arrest Welch was not

out of breath, scratched or bleeding, dirty, or anything else that would be consistent with

being in a fight, a foot chase, and jumping out of a third story window and then over a tall

fence with barbed wire on top.” (Id.). He claims this testimony would have provided much

needed support to his misidentification defense. (Id. at 21, 49; Doc. # 6 at 35). 

Welch speculates that Officers Staton and Lovett would have testified that Welch’s 

appearance at the time they apprehended him was not consistent with his having just fled

from the apartment where he left the rifle and backpack. However, there is nothing to

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support his conclusion that the officers would have provided such testimony. Further, even

if the officers had testified that Welch was not out of breath, scratched, bleeding or dirty

when they arrested him, there is not a reasonable probability that such testimony would have

changed the outcome of the trial. Officers Vickroy and Hays both identified Welch as the

man they saw running with a rifle and the blue backpack in which the drugs were found. 

(Doc. # 45 at 50-53; Doc. # 46 at 60). Although Welch implies that to have eluded officers

Vickroy and Hays, he would have had to jump out of a three story building and scale a

barbed wire fence, the record does not support this position. The photographs admitted into

evidence at trial clearly establish that the apartment building from which the petitioner fled

was a two-story building. (Doc. # 1 at 56 - 57). Officer Vickroy testified that there was an

opening in the fence behind the apartment that Welch could have gone through rather than

scaling the fence. (Doc. # 46 at 49). Thus, even if Officers Staton and Lovett had testified

as Welch imagines they would have, their purported testimony is insufficient to establish a

reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different. This

claim is due to be denied.

b. Failure to Properly Inspect the Crime Scene

Welch claims counsel was ineffective for failing to properlyconduct his own personal

investigation of the crime scene before everyone moved out of the apartment complex and

failing to take his own pictures of the scene. (Doc. # 1 at 21). He claims that since the entire

case was “hinged upon Officer Vickroy’s identification of Welch and his version of how the

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events transpired,” if counsel had “personally gone to the crime scene and taken some

pictures of his own (before all of the tenants moved out), he would have been in a much

better position to impeach Officer Vickroy.” (Id. at 22). Welch maintains that:

Pictures of the apartment complex while people still lived there would

have created a completely different and more realistic impression. That is, all

of the pictures that were presented by the Government were of a completely

abandoned apartment complex. (See Exhibits C, D, and E). These pictures

created the impression that there was absolutely nothing going on there except

the events that transpired on the day in question, which in turn unfairly

bolstered Officer Vickroy’s testimony. Especially considering the

Government’s repeated references to the apartments and parking lot as being

vacant.

(Id.). Welch claims that additional pictures showing a wide view of the apartment complex

would have impeached Officer Vickroy’s testimony that he got a good look at Welch and that

they lost view of Welch once he entered one of the apartments. He adds that if counsel had

carefullyinspected and photographed the “alleged getawayroute,” he could have “floundered

the Government’s entire case” by showing that Welch could not have been the perpetrator

since he would not have had time to arrive at the scene of his arrest and could not have

arrived at the arrest scene unscathed if he had jumped from a three-story window and

climbed a barbed wire fence. (Id. at 23-24). 

In response to this claim, Mr. Threatt states in his affidavit:

Welch also claims that had I gone to the scene, I would have been better able

to impeach Officer Vickroy’s eyewitness identification of him for several

reasons. I went to the scene, and used this knowledge to cross-examine

Officer Vickroy to the best of my ability at trial. Next, Welch claims I was

ineffective because of my failure to take pictures of the apartment complex

when more people lived there, so I could have shown the jury pictures of the

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apartment complex while more people lived there. I do not understand this

argument. 

One of the Exhibits used by the jury in the trial, (Governments Exhibit

6), was an aerial view of the apartment complex. It would not have mattered

at all whether or not this exhibit showed a building that was occupied or not

as it was an aerial view. Welch repeatedly claims in his affidavit at page 15,

that the building was three stories. It in fact was a two-story garden apartment

complex. Further, there was an alternate escape route by which the suspect

could have escaped that would not have required jumping a fence at all; he

simply could have run through the back of the complex around the fire station. 

This fact was discovered by me during my crime scene investigation. When

I went to the scene, I discovered a hole in the fence that could also have been

used by the suspect to escape the apartment complex and run out the back of

the apartments. Officer Vickroy testified about his observation of this break

in the chain link fence during his testimony on redirect examination

(Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 49). 

(Doc. # 4-1 at 9-10). 

As stated in his affidavit, counsel conducted a detailed investigation of the crime

scene on December 1, 2007. (Doc. # 4-1 at 8-9). He took more than thirty photographs of

the crime scene and interviewed several potential witnesses. (Id.). Welch suggests that

counsel’s photographs might have been more helpful to him if counsel had investigated and

taken photographs closer to the date of the crime, April 18, 2007. However, Welch was not

indicted until September 25, 2007, and Mr. Threatt was not appointed to represent Welch

until October 10, 2007. Further, at trial, Officer Hays testified that when the crime occurred,

only the last apartment on one end was occupied and the “rest of them were vacant.” (Doc.

# 46 at 68). Thus, even if Mr. Threatt had gone to investigate the scene on the day he was

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appointed, there is nothing to indicate that he would have discovered anything more helpful

to Welch that he found on December 1, 2007. 

Furthermore, Mr. Threatt took his own photographs of the scene and personally

observed the apartment complex and its surroundings. Mr. Threatt saw for himself that the

window through which Welch probably escaped was a second floor window and that there

was a gap in the fence behind the apartment through which Welch could have gone. There

is nothing to indicate that an even more thorough investigation would have turned up

anything different. Thus even if Mr. Threatt had investigated and taken photographs of the

crime scene earlier, there is nothing to indicate there would be a reasonable probability that

the results of the proceeding would have been different. This claim is due to be denied.

c. Failure to File Motions to Suppress and Exclude Damaging Evidence

Welch claims that counsel failed to file anypretrial motions with respectto “excluding

and suppressing damaging evidence.” He claims “it is likely that had Counsel done so,

neither Welch’s pretrial statement [n]or the 911 call would have been admitted.” (Doc. #

3

1 at 24).

Special Agent Alicia Hanne interviewed Welch at the Jefferson County Jail on May

1, 2007. After waiving his Miranda rights, Welch provided the following information to

Agent Hanne:

Welch does not discuss the 911 call in this section of his motion; rather, he discusses 3

it in the next section. 

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•Welch stated he was going to a friend’s house to help repair his car when he

was arrested.

•Welch stated he drank six beers and smoked crack on the day he was arrested.

•Welch denied having a gun or drugs in his possession and denied running

from the police the day he was arrested.

•Welch stated that the gun belonged to a guy named “Black,” who lived

nearby. He stated that his fingerprints might be on the gun because he had

considered purchasing the gun from “Black” and had touched the gun. Welch

described the gun as a black 9 millimeter rifle.

•Welch stated that the drugs probably belonged to a girl he knew, who lived

by the abandoned apartments.

•Welch stated that he had a drug and alcohol problem and that he had been

arrested previously on robbery charges. He stated that he was willing to

cooperate in any way.

(Doc. # 1 at 59; Doc. # 46 at 134-138). 

Welch argues that counsel should have moved to suppress/exclude this statement, or

portions of it, for two reasons. (Doc. # 1 at 25). First, he claims the statement was not

entirely accurate. He states that he did not tell Agent Hanne that his fingerprints would

definitely be on the gun, but told her IF they were on the gun, it was because he had touched

the gun when a man called “Black” had tried to sell the gun to him. (Id. at 49). Welch states

that he also told Agent Hanne “that when he was booked at Jefferson County Jail he was told

that he was being detained in connection with a blue backpack containing cocaine and other

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drugs as well as a black 9 millimeter rifle.” (Id. at 26). Welch further states that he did not 4

“just say that he had an alcohol and drug problem with a prior criminal history of robbery,

but rather that it was not his Modus operandi, he was not a drug dealer.” (Id.). Welch alleges

that the “Government used this inaccurate version of Welch’s verbal statements as being a

confession/direct evidence of guilt” and that counsel “in his experience should have clearly

seen that coming, and moved to suppress/exclude at least the disfavorable portions of the

projected testimony/statement.” (Id.). 

Second, Welch claims that counsel “should have moved to exclude certain portions

of the verbal statement on the basis that: (1) it was not relevant to determining guilt or

innocence; and/or (2) the unfair prejudice far outweighs any probative value.” (Id.). 

Specifically, he claims counsel should have moved to exclude all mention of Welch’s drug

use and all mention of his criminal history because both of these factors were “very

prejudicial towards Welch because they create a bad mans inference,” since a “person who

has a criminal history or uses drugs is far more likely, in the jury’s eyes, to have committed

the crimes that are in question.” (Id. at 26-27). 

In response to this claim, Mr. Threatt offers the following:

Officer Alicia Hanne interviewed Welch at the Jefferson County Jail on May

1, 2007. Prior to this interview, Welch was read his Miranda rights and signed

a waiver of those rights. He never disputed this in our conversations. And, the

version of the statement given by Welch to Officer Hanne in the jail that she

Welch explains that this is important because without this information, it looked like 4

he was guilty because he knew specifics about the evidence. (Id. at 26). 

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testified to at trial was essentially identical to the version of facts that Welch

had given me in our interviews when we discussed the events of that day. In

my meetings with Welch, he denied possessing the gun or the drugs. Hanne

said this same thing to the jury when she testified at trial about his statement

to her. 

Since Welch never denied to me this custodial, post Miranda interview,

was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, I never felt that this statement could

be legitimatelysuppressed since his constitutional rights had not been violated. 

Welch did in fact dispute some of the factual details of the statement as

testified to by Hanne, but the statement itself could not be suppressed because

it was a knowing, voluntary post Miranda statement. As a consequence, I fail

to understand the logic of Welch’s claim that I should have moved to suppress

the disfavorable portions of the statement. If the statement was post Miranda

(which Welch does not deny); and if it was knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily given (again which Welch does not deny) then as an admission by

the Defendant it is admissible in the totality.

This statement is also clearly relevant, because it is probative of a

material fact at issue - whether or not Welch knowingly and voluntarily

possessed the drugs and/or the gun. He denies it in his statement to Hanne,

and therefore if the jury had believed it, he could have been found not guilty

on that basis alone. Apparently, they did not. The fact that the jury found him

guilty does not make the statement irrelevant. Clearly, it is prejudicial, as is

any confession. The fact that Welch disputes some details of Hanne’s version

of his statement does not make it unconstitutional and inadmissible. It simply

means that they disagree about the contents of the statement. Welch was free

to testify and tell the jury that Hanne was wrong. He exercised his

constitutional right to remain silent and chose not to do so.

(Doc. # 4-1 at 10-11). 

Welch maintains that counsel should have moved to suppress or exclude all of his

statement, or at least portions of his statement because Agent Hanne’s version of his

statement was not entirely true and because it was irrelevant or prejudicial. However, as Mr.

Threatt indicated, there was no basis upon which to seek to have the statement suppressed

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or excluded since Welch voluntarily made the statement after being read his Miranda rights

and agreeing to speak with Agent Hanne, and the statement clearly was not irrelevant. The

only way Welch could have challenged Agent Hanne’s testimony would have been to testify

in his own defense. 

Welch claims that had counsel “not given [him] the erroneous advice not to testify on

his own behalf, th[e]n he would have been able to get on the stand and rebutt [sic] Agent

[H]anne’s testimony, as well as give exculpatory evidence on his own behalf.” (Doc. 6 at

10). Welch states that the “evidence in dispute informed the jury that [he] had a criminal

record and a history of drug abuse,” so there was “no strategic purpose or reason” for him

not to testify. (Id. at 11). He adds that his testimony “could have put a great deal of light on

several questionable aspects of this case, and is quite likely to have resulted in either a hung

jury or an outright acquittal.” (Id.). 

Clearly, counsel’s failure to move to have Welch’s statement suppressed or excluded 

was not deficient. Likewise, counsel was not deficient for advising Welch not to testify in

light of his prior robbery convictions and history of drug abuse. Further, Welch cannot show

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to move to suppress or exclude his statement. 

Because there was no basis upon which to move to suppress or exclude the statement, it is

not reasonable to conclude that the statement would have been excluded even if counsel had

sought to suppress it. Moreover, even if the statement had been suppressed, there is nothing

to suggest there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been

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different, given the police officers’ testimony that they got a clear look at Welch’s face when

he was running with the gun and backpack and the fact that they both identified him at trial

as the suspect. Finally, Welch cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s advice that

he not testify at trial. Although Welch believes he could have changed the jurors’ minds if

he had testified, it is only speculation and highly improbable that his testimony would have

helped him in any way. This claim is due to be denied.

2. Failure to Oppose the Repeated Playing of the 911 Recording (Claim 1(b))

Welch claims that at trial, the government repeatedly played the 911 recording to

unfairly prejudice him. (Doc.# 1 at 27). Welch explains that the “substance of the

anonymous 911 call was that on 21 Street and Avenue J there was a black man wearing gold st

pants and a black shirt, beating another man with a rifle.” (Id.). He adds that the 911 caller

“did not identify Welch as being the person in question, but did provide a clothing

description and reported another crime other than the one charged. (i.e., an assault involving

the use of a rifle).” (Id.). Welch claims that it was not necessary to “keep playing this

recording” and it was extremely prejudicial to him because it “created an impression on the

jury that the suspect was an extremely violent man, beating someone down on the street with

a rifle.” (Id. at 27-28). Welch asserts that counsel should have objected to the introduction

of the 911 recording on the grounds that it violated Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of

Evidence because it presented evidence of an uncharged crime and it violated Rule 403 of

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the Federal Rules of Evidence because the prejudice resulting from the “repeated playing”

of the recording far outweighed any probative value the recording might have had. (Doc. 1

at 28; doc. 6 at 13). Welch contends that counsel “could have easily kept this damaging

evidence from being admitted at trial by just stipulating to background/foundation in this

regard.” (Id. at 27). 

In response to this claim, Mr. Threatt points out that he repeatedly objected to the

admission of the 911 tape. (Doc. # 4-1 at 12). He adds that the government was not willing

to stipulate to the content of the 911 tape, but wanted to play the tape for the jury. (Id.).

Counsel was not deficient for failing oppose the playing of the 911 recording. As

reflected in the transcript of the trial, the 911 recording was played only one time. (Doc. #

45 at 39). Furthermore, the tape was played for the purpose of explaining the actions of the

police officers on the date Welch was arrested, not for the purpose of proving Welch was

guilty of the crimes for which he was charged because he had been involved in another,

different crime earlier in the day. Counsel could not have stipulated to the contents of the

911 tape since the government did not choose to make such a stipulation. This claim is due

to be denied.

3. Failure to Oppose the Introduction of the 911 Recording (Claim 1(c))

Welch next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to oppose the introduction

of the 911 recording on constitutional grounds, because it deprived him of his right to

confront the witnesses against him, specifically, the 911 operator and the 911 caller. (Doc.

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# 1 at 30). The record reflects that counsel did in fact object to the introduction of the 911

recording. Counsel argued that there was “no foundation that the content of what’s on the

tape is the same as what was on the call that was made to the police department,” (doc. # 45

at 28) and that “somebody has got to come in here and say that what’s on that tape is what

someone called in and said” (doc. # 45 at 30). Because counsel clearly opposed the

introduction of the 911 recording, this claim is without merit and is due to be denied.5

4. Failure to Oppose the Introduction of the Gun and Drugs into Evidence

(Claim 1(d))

Welch claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of

the drugs and gun into evidence on the basis that the government failed to establish a chain

of custody. (Doc. # 1 at 31). He claims that the “evidence went through several different

peoples hands before it was tested and then presented at trial,” there were “many gaps in the

chain of custody,” and the evidence at trial was insufficient to “establish that the evidence

tested and presented was actually that which was seized on the day in question.” (Id.). 

Welch maintains that if counsel had objected, “the Court would have been forced to

‘determine whether the Government has made a prima facie showing of authenticity.’” (Id.). 

He adds that by “failing to make this objection, Counsel failed to put the Government’s case

Welch adds in a footnote that counsel was also ineffective for failing to “try and find 5

the 911 caller (“eye witness”) and present their testimony, and/or for failing to raise a

confrontation objection involving the 911 caller.” (Doc. # 1 at 21, n.3). Even assuming

counsel was deficient for either of these reasons, Welch has offered nothing to indicate that

the result of his trial might have been different if counsel had tried to find the 911 caller or

if counsel had raised a confrontation objection specific to the 911 caller. 

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to a meaningful test, and denied Welch of a potential defense. (i.e., That the drugs and gun

that he is alleged to have possessed were/are phony, different, or had been tampered with.).” 

(Id.). 

Mr. Threatt explains that he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence because

in the Eleventh Circuit, challenges to the chain of custody of evidence go to the weight of the

evidence, not the admissibility of the evidence. (Doc.# 4-1 at 13). 

This claim is wholly speculative. The government established a proper chain of

custody for all of the evidence admitted at trial. In any event, a “[c]hallenge to the chain of

custody goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.” United States v.

Lopez, 758 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11 Cir. 1985). Thus, “the adequacy of proof relating to the th

chain of custody is not a proper ground to challenge the admissibility of evidence.” Id. 

There is nothing to indicate that the drugs and rifle admitted at trial were anything other than

what they were represented to be. Counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the drugs

and gun into evidence was not unreasonable, and Welch has failed to establish prejudice. 

This claim is due to be denied.

5. Failure to Adequately Cross-Examine Two Police Officers (Claim 1(e))

Welch contends counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine

Officers Vickroy and Hays. (Doc. # 1 at 32). He claims that if counsel had adequately

inspected the crime scene and interviewed “certain witnesses,” “with emphasis on the point

where the Officer’s [sic] allegedly identified the suspect and then lost sight of him, and the

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alleged getaway rout[e] in comparison to the time and place where Welch was found and

arrested, he would have been much better armed in the cross examination of” the officers. 

(Id.). Welch asserts that if counsel had the right information, he could have “completely

impeached these two Officer’s [sic] testimony which included there [sic] shady eye witness

identification.” (Id.). 

Mr. Threatt states that in cross-examining the officers:

did the best I could to challenge their ability to observe, their ability to recall

and the accuracy oftheir identification of Welch. I also inquired about another

potential suspect that had been seen at or near the crime scene seconds after

the original observation of the suspect with the gun and the backpack. 

I feel that I effectively showed during the cross examination of Officer

Vickroy that he made mistakes in the description of Welch’s hair color, the

model of the gun, and whether or not the suspect had facial hair (Transcript

Vol. 2, at p. 29, 30 and 31). Further, I specifically asked Officer Vickroy if he

noticed whether or not Welch had any grass stains on his clothing, broken

bones, or if he was bleeding at the time of his arrest (Transcript Vol., 2, p. 41

and 42). The fact that Welch was convicted may not be due to my failure to

effectively cross-examine the officers, but rather the jury’s belief in their

credibility as witnesses.

(Doc. # 4-1 at 14). 

Counsel’s cross-examination of Officers Vickroy and Hays was in no way deficient. 

Counsel rigorously cross-examined both officers, calling into question their entire

testimonies, including their identifications of Welch as the suspect; whether or not they were

ever in a position to get a clear view of the suspect; their misdescription of Welch as having

black hair when it was in fact gray or salt and pepper; their inability to recall other details

about the day of the crime that were not included on the police report; whether they were in

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a position to see Welch if he had jumped from a second story window in the back of the

apartment complex; and whether Welch had grass stains on his clothing or anything to

indicate he had jumped from a second story window and escaped over a barbed wire fence. 

(Doc. # 45 at 5-43; 53-55; 73-81). Further, Welch has not shown prejudice since there is

nothing to indicate that further cross-examination of the officers on these or other issues

would have resulted in a different outcome. This claim is due to be denied.

6. Failure to Oppose a Jury Instruction (Claim 1(f))

During their deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court stating:

We cannot come to a unanimous decision on Count 1 and seem to have

exhausted all argument. We are at an impasse. We are unanimous on Count

3. Please advise.

(Doc. # 47 at 4). In response, the court sent a note back to the jury, informing them:

During the trial, you heard and viewed a lot of evidence which must be fully

considered and discussed by all of you. It is my judgment you have not had a

sufficient opportunity to do that. Therefore, I’m going to request that you

continue your deliberations. 

(Id. at 4-5). The judge explained that he chose this language because he thought it was “too

early to give a dynamite charge.” (Id. at 5). 

Welch claims counsel was ineffective for failing to oppose this instruction because

it was “improper and severely prejudicial, as it essentially told the jury not to come back until

it unanimouslyfound Welch guilty of count one,” since the instruction “created the inference

that the only verdict that would be accepted by the Court was one finding Welch guilty of all

counts.” (Doc. # 1-1). Welch maintains that if counsel had opposed “this improper

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instruction,” he “would not likely be serving” the “20-year mandatory minimum sentence”

imposed for his conviction on Count 1. (Doc. # 1 at 34). 

In response to this claim, Mr. Threatt offers the following: 

I respectfully disagree with this allegation. First, the record will reflect

that the jury had not been deliberating an undue amount of time at the time this

note was sent back to the Court. Secondly, what the jury note actually said

was not that they were at a total impasse, but only as to Count 1. They stated

that they had in fact reached a unanimous verdict as to Count 3. (Transcript

Vol. 3, p.4). This verdict was apparently guilty, unless they changed it before

they came out with all three verdicts later. What the Court said at the time was

that the Court felt that it was too early in their deliberations to give what is

commonly knows and the “dynamite charge.” I did in fact not object to this

decision. This decision not to object and not to request a mistrial at that point

was a strategic one, because in my experience when the Court gives a

“dynamite charge” to a jury, more often than not, the jury comes back with a

guilty verdict. If in fact there was a holdout or holdouts for the defendant, I

felt it strategically more beneficial for Welch to wait and see if there was

another note that they were still unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Then at

that point, I would have moved for a mistrial. I explained this to Welch at the

time and told him that the Court had the authority to take a partial verdict on

the Count to which the jury indicated they had in fact reached a unanimous

verdict at any rate. He indicated at the time that he understood and did not tell

me to object.

(Doc. # 4-1 at 15). 

It was not unreasonable for counsel not to object to the court instructing the jury to

continue its deliberations. As Mr. Threatt explained, he believed it was beneficial to Welch

to allow the jury to deliberate longer since there was at least one juror who was holding out

in Welch’s favor. Further, Welch cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure

to object, as there is nothing to indicate that had he made such an objection, the court would

have changed its message to the jury. This claim is due to be denied.

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7. Prejudicial Statement in the Sentencing Memorandum (Claim 2(a))

Welch claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing

phase of his trial when counsel made a “prejudicial statement within the sentencing

memorandum to the effect that the petitioner is guilty of the charged crimes.” Welch objects

to counsel stating in the sentencing memorandum that “[t]he Defendant has engaged in

substantial self-reflection and recognizes that his decision to become involved in the instant

offense was the worst decision he has ever made in his life and he is dedicated to never again

becoming involved in illegal conduct.” (Doc. # 1 at 34-35). Welch further objects to

counsel’s statement that, “[a]s the Defendant’s criminal behavior was at least partially due

to his involvement with drugs, the Defendant submits that his sentence should not be based

upon an act that occurred when the Defendant was not in control of his faculties.” (Id. at 35). 

Welch asserts that these statements show “that Counsel clearly believed that Welch was

guilty, and therefore could not properly represent him as being an innocent,” because he had

a conflict of interest. (Id.). 

In response to this claim, Mr. Threatt points out that the first sentence of the

sentencing memorandum stated, “[a]s an initial matter, although the Defendant has been

found guilty after trial by jury, he respectfully maintains his innocence of the instant

offense.” (Doc. # 4-1 at 16). However, because Welch was facing a mandatory statutory

minimum sentence of 25 years in prison, counsel used the sentencing memorandum to argue

for a lower sentence, by attempting to show that Welch was remorseful and had a drug

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problem that influenced his actions. Counsel’s attempt to persuade the court to give Welch

a lower sentence than recommended by the sentencing guidelines was not unreasonable, and

Welch has failed to establish prejudice. This claim is due to be denied.

8. Failure to Oppose the Improper Stacking/Grouping of Sentences (Claim 2(b))

According to Welch, the court “incorrectly crafted its own sentence using only the

mandatoryminimums in each count and [not] the guideline calculation provided in the PSR,”

and “clearly misunderstood its range of authority and the applicable guideline range which

was 360-life.” (Id. at 35-36). Welch claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to oppose

the court’s miscalculation of the guideline range as being 420 months, rather than 360

months to life. (Id. at 37). 

There was no basis for counsel to object to the court’s calculation of Welch’s

sentence. In reviewing the reasonableness of Welch’s sentence on appeal, the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals found that “the district court followed the proper procedures in

sentencing Welch” and that it “correctly calculated Welch’s Guidelines range.” United

States v. Welch, 330 Fed. Appx. 859, 863 (11 Cir. 2009). Thus, counsel was not deficient th

for failing to make such an objection and Welch was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

make an unnecessary objection. This claim is due to be denied.

Welch further argues that counsel should have “opposed the imposition of the 60-

month consecutive §924(c) sentence on the basis that the ‘Except clause’ of § 924(c)

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disallows such a sentence where the Defendant also faces a larger mandatoryminimumunder

some other provision of law. . . [s]uch as Welch’s 20-year mandatoryminimum for the drugs,

as well as his 15-year mandatory minimum for the ACCA offense.” (Doc. # 1 at 38). As

discussed below in Claim 7, Welch was properly sentenced to a consecutive sentence for the

§ 924(c) conviction because “a defendant is subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for

a § 924(c) conviction, and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher

mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction.” Abbott v. United States, 131 S.Ct.

18, 23 (2010). Thus, counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge the 60-month

consecutive sentence on the basis of the “except clause,” and Welch was not prejudiced by

counsel’s failure to make an unnecessary objection. This claim is due to be denied.

9. Failure of Appellate Counsel to Raise Allocution Issue (Claim 3)

Welch claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that

the trial court “committed plain reversible error by failing to assure that the petitioner was

afforded his right of allocution.” (Doc.# 1 at 30). In response to this claim, Mr. Threatt

points out that that the trial court did in fact address Welch on the issue of allocution. (Doc.

# 4-1 at 17). At the sentencing hearing, the court clearly directed questions to both Welch

and Mr. Threatt. 

THE COURT: Mr. Threatt, have you and Mr. Welch had sufficient

opportunity fully to review the presentence report?

MR. THREATT: Yes, we have, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Are there any matters of a factual nature in the presentence

report that either you or Mr. Welch find to be inaccurate or incomplete or that

you would like to discuss with the court?

MR. THREATT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Welch, let me focus your attention on Paragraph 39. If

you would, Mr. Threatt, open the report and show him Paragraph 39. There

the report reflects a prior felony conviction and sentence in the Circuit Court

ofJefferson County, Alabama, on or about September 7 of 1990 for possession

of a controlled substance, in Case No. CC-90-3178. Were you the only

defendant in that case?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: There were other defendants?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you pursue any sort of an appeal of the conviction or

sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. The reason that I got that conviction is because

I was on a parole, it was a 7-year sentence, and I was advised by the attorney

that it wouldn't have no kind of effect on my time. He said I would just go and

finish up the prison sentence that I was just -- It was just like -- He advised that

I plead out.

THE COURT: But you did not appeal the conviction itself?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: I want to advise you that any challenge by you as to the

validity of that conviction, which is not made before I impose sentence today,

may not thereafter be attacked, the conviction itself. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: All right. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Sir?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I understand.

THE COURT: All right. The court expressly finds that pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

Section 851, the conviction identified in the information filed November 21

of 2007 has been sufficiently established for purposes of sentencing under

Count One. The court also expressly finds that based upon any three of the

four qualifying convictions described in Paragraphs 33, 34, 35, 36 of the

presentence investigation report, the defendant is an armed career criminal for

purposes of Count Three. The court also expressly finds that the defendant is

a career offender under the guideline section 4B1.1. These findings were

made. Any comments or observations, Mr. Threatt, by you with regard to the

mechanical calculation of the guidelines in the presentence report?

MR. THREATT: No, Your Honor.

The court went on to inquire of both Welch and Mr. Threatt if they had anything to present

by way of “mitigation or punishment or otherwise”:

THE COURT: Anything then that you would like to present to the court by

way of mitigation or punishment or otherwise or that Mr. Welch would like to

present by way of mitigation or punishment or otherwise before the court

proceeds with a sentence?

MR. THREATT: We would, Your Honor, if we may. Thank you.

THE COURT: Please do.

(Doc. # 49 at 3-6). Mr. Threatt then argued that Welch should be sentenced below the

guidelines, to no more than 25 years in prison, to give him “some hope of not dying in

prison.” (Id. at 6-7). Although Welch did not answer the question himself, Mr. Threatt

explains that he did not raise the issue on appeal because he knew that:

[Welch’s] failure to speak in allocution was not due to anything done by the

Court, but simply that when asked he had nothing to say. I did not see his

voluntary failure to speak in response to the Court’s direct offer to speak as

error and therefore did not include it as an issue on his direct appeal. 

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(Id.). 

Clearly, the court personally addressed Welch, giving him the opportunity to speak

or present any information to mitigate his sentence. Thus, there was no reason for counsel

to argue on appeal that Welch had not been afforded the opportunity to do so. This claim is

due to be denied.

10. Cumulative Effect of Counsel’s Errors (Claim 4)

Welch argues that:

In the instant case, the petitioner provides at least nine (9) instances of

ineffectiveness ranging from the pretrial phase all the way to appeal. 

Cumulatively, these errors amount to the constructive denial of Counsel

altogether, and are sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland

analysis.

(Doc. # 1 at 40). 

As discussed above, none of Welch’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims has

merit. Thus, there are no errors to accumulate. See Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 823 (11th

Cir. 2011)(“Because Borden has not sufficiently pled facts that would establish

prejudice—cumulative or otherwise—we decline to elaborate further on [a cumulative-effect

ineffective assistance of counsel claim] for fear of issuing an advisory opinion on a

hypothetical issue.”). This claim is due to be denied.

B. Actual Innocence (Claim 5)

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Welch claims he has newly discovered evidence that establishes that he is actually

innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. (Doc. # 1 at 41-45). Specifically, he

points to the affidavits of Carolyn Boone, Willie Giddens and Melvin Wilson, discussed

above. (Id. at 42). Welch claims that “had these three eye witnesses been discovered, and

their testimony had been admitted, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find

Welch guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at 44). He adds that “indeed, three eye

witness accounts that clearly establish that it was [not] Welch who was being chased by the

Police that day, would have most like[ly] resulted in a unanimous acquittal.” (Id.). 

However, in a non-capital case, “a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a

constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to

have his otherwise barred constitutional claimconsidered on the merits.” Herrera v. Collins,

506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). See also, Rozzelle v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 672

F.3d 1000, 1010-1011 (11 Cir. 2012). Thus, Welch’s free-standing actual innocence claim th

is due to be denied.

C. Armed Career Criminal Enhancement (Claim 6)

Welch claims that he is currently attacking in state court, two of the four prior

convictions that were used to support his Armed Career Criminal enhancement. He claims

that if he is successful in overturning these convictions, he will no longer be an Armed

Career Criminal, and will be due to have his sentence reduced. (Doc. # 1 at 45-46). Welch

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recognizes that this claim is not ripe for review, but asks that “he be allowed to preserve this

claim for future amendment ‘in relation back.’” (Id.). 

In Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 865 (11 Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit th

Court of Appeals held that a § 2255 motion arising from the vacatur or expungement of state

convictions will not be considered as second or successive under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The precedent of Stewart establishes that if

Welch, acting diligently, succeeds in having his state convictions overturned, then he may

bring another § 2255 motion challenging his sentence enhancement based on his careeroffender status, without having it be deemed second or successive within the meaning of the

AEDPA. Thus, there is no need to “preserve this claim” for later since Welch may file

another § 2255 motion if he succeeds in overturing his prior convictions. This claim is due

to be denied. 

D. § 924(c) Consecutive Sentence (Claim 7)

As set out above, Welch was convicted of one count of possession with intent to

distribute fifty grams or more of a mixture and substance of cocaine base and an amount of

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(D)(Count 1); one

count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(Count 2); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(Count 3). He was sentenced to a term of 240-months’

imprisonment under Count 1. Under Count 3, he was sentenced to 180 months’

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imprisonment, with 60 months to run concurrently with Count 1 and the remaining 120

months to run consecutively with Count 1. Under Count 2, the § 924(c) conviction, he was

sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in

Count 3. 

Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides:

Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by

this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and

in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced

punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or

device) . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,

possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime — (i) be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment for not less than 5 years.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Courts refer to the emphasized portion of the

statute as the “except” clause. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 18, 22 (2010).

Section 924(c) further states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law—no term of

imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any

other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment

imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which a firearm was used,

carried, or possessed.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).

Welch maintains that since the mandatory minimum sentences he received for his

other two convictions are greater than the sentence he received for the § 924(c) violation, the

consecutive sentence he received for the § 924(c) conviction was unauthorized, pursuant to

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the “except” clause. (Doc. 1 at 38-39). However, the Supreme Court has rejected this

argument. In Abbott v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 18 (2010), the court held that “a defendant

is subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for a § 924(c) conviction, and is not spared

from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count

of conviction.” Id. at 23. Welch was properly sentenced to a consecutive sentence for the

§ 924(c) conviction. This claim is due to be denied.

E. The Amendment (Claim 8)

Welch filed an amendment to his motion to vacate on April 10, 2012. (Doc. # 7). In

the amendment, Welch claims that counsel was ineffective during the pre-trial phase because

he failed “to even attempt to negotiate a plea agreement on Welch’s behalf” and failed to

“properly advise him in regards to his chances of success at trial, and the sentence he likely

faced if he lost, as opposed to that he would receive if he entered into a plea agreement with

the government or entered a naked plea with the court, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent

holdings in Lafler and Frye.” (Id. at 1).

There is a one-year statute of limitations on § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

The limitations period runs from the latest of:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction

becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion

created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was

prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

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(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

Id. Welch’s conviction became final December 7, 2009, when the Supreme Court denied his

petition for certiorari. See Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11 Cir. th

2001). The limitations period expired one year later on December 7, 2010. Welch’s original

motion to vacate, filed on November 23, 2010, was timely. However, his amendment was

not filed until April 10, 2012. 

Welch’s new claim is untimely unless it relates back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, to one of the claims in his original motion. Davenport v. United

States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11 Cir. 2000). “‘Relation back’ causes an otherwise untimely th

claim to be considered timely by treating it as if it had been filed when the timely claims were

filed.” Id. A pleading relates back to the original pleading when “the amendment asserts a

claim . . . that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out -- or attempted to

be set out -- in the original pleading.” Rule 15(c)(1)(b).

For a claim to relate back in a § 2255 proceeding, “the untimely claim

must have more in common with the timely filed claim than the mere fact that

they arose out of the same trial and sentencing proceedings.” Davenport, 217

F.3d at 1344. “Instead, in order to relate back, the untimely claim must have

arisen from the same set of facts as the timely filed claim, not from separate

conduct or a separate occurrence in both time and type.” Id. (quotation marks

and citations omitted). “So long as the original and amended petitions state

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claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be

in order.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 2574, 162

L.Ed.2d 582 (2005). An amendment that serves to expand facts or cure

deficiencies in an original claim relates back to the original claim. Dean v.

United States, 278 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11 Cir. 2002) (per curiam). th

Mabry v. United States, 336 Fed. Appx. 961, 963 (11 Cir. 2009). th

Welch’s new claimis that counsel was ineffective during the pre-trial phase by failing

“to even attempt to negotiate a plea agreement on Welch’s behalf,” and by failing to

“properly advise him in regards to his chances of success at trial, and the sentence he likely

faced if he lost, as opposed to that he would receive if he entered into a plea agreement with

the government or entered a naked plea with the court.” He argues that this claim relates

back to his original motion because he “raised several claims in his initial § 2255 Motion in

regards to Counsel’s ineffectiveness during the pre-trial phase of the proceedings,” and the

“newly asserted claim involves both ineffective assistance and takes place during the same

pre-trial phase of the proceedings.” (Doc. 7 at 3). He reasons, therefore, that the “new claim

takes place during the same time, and is of the same type already pleaded.” (Id.). He adds

that the “new claim is merely an expansion of [his] initial pre-trial ineffective claims, and

directly relates to the initial claim that the Cumulative effect of Counsel’s errors amounts to

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id.). 

In the original motion, Welch raised only one claim pertaining to ineffective

assistance of counsel prior to trial. In that claim, he alleged counsel was ineffective for

failing to conduct an adequate investigation, failing to interview crucial witnesses or properly

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inspect the crime scene, and failing to file motions to suppress and exclude damaging

evidence. (Doc. 1 at 18-27). Welch’s new claim, involving potential plea negotiations and

advice regarding the benefits of a plea agreement versus going to trial involves very different

aspects of counsel’s performance and has no core facts that coincide with the original claim. 

As a result, the new claim does not relate back to the original motion. 

Welch further argues that he should be allowed to amend his original motion because 

because the cases upon which his new claim is based, Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399

(2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), did not exist at the time he filed his

original pleading. (Doc. 7 at 3). Since Welch filed the amendment within one year of the

decisions in Frye and Lafler, the amendment is timely if the right established in Frye and

Lafler has been “newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). 

That being said, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that neither Frye nor

Lafler announced a newly recognized right that applies retroactively to cases on collateral

review. In re Perez, 682 F.3d 930 (11 Cir. 2012). Rather, in Frye and Lafler, “the Supreme

th

Court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel . . . extends

to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected.” Id. at 932. 

Since Frye and Lafler did not recognize a new constitutional right made retroactive to cases

on collateral review, the decisions in those cases did not re-start the limitations period under

§ 2255(f)(3). See Flores v. United States, Criminal Action No. 1:07–CR–0279–14–CAP,

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Civil Action No. 1:13–CV–1347–CAP, 2013 WL 2636987 at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 10,

2013)(finding that Lafler and Frye did not announce newly recognized retroactive rights for

purpose of the calculation of the one year period of limitation under § 2255(f)(3)). Thus, the

amendment is time-barred and the amended claim is due to be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Motion (Doc. #1) to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

is due to be denied for all the reasons stated. A separate order will be entered dismissing this

case with prejudice. 

DONE this 9th day of April, 2014. 

 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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