Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01646/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01646-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy John Ehrmann
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1646

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Timothy John Ehrmann, *

* 

Appellant. *

 ___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: August 31, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Timothy John Ehrmann (Ehrmann) appeals his convictions and sentence. In

April 2003, the government charged Ehrmann with eight counts of conspiracy to

distribute, aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute, and possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine and ecstasy between April 2001 and

February 2003. A jury found Ehrmann guilty of seven counts, and the district court1

sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On

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appeal, Ehrmann assigns numerous errors, including (1) the denial of his suppression

motion; (2) the denial of a fair trial due to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a

prospective juror based on the juror’s sexual orientation; (3) the admission at trial of

prejudicial videotape evidence; (4) the denial of his right to testify on his own behalf;

(5) prosecutorial misconduct; (6) the improper assessment of a two-level sentencing

enhancement for obstruction of justice; and (7) Booker sentencing errors. Finding no

reversible errors, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary

After earning a bachelor’s degree in finance, Ehrmann worked as a controller

for three different companies. He later completed a master’s degree in business

administration and earned an annual salary of nearly $70,000. In late September

2001, Ehrmann was laid off due to a corporate merger. He then decided to apply his

considerable business acumen to organizing a nationwide narcotics operation based

out of his Minneapolis home.

Law enforcement first learned of Ehrmann’s involvement in narcotics

trafficking in April 2001, when United States Customs officials interdicted a package

of ecstasy mailed from Toronto, Ontario, to a Minneapolis residential address.

Customs officials made a controlled delivery to the residence, and Ian St. James (St.

James) signed for the controlled package. After arresting St. James, law enforcement

searched the residence and found Northwest Airlines ticket stubs for a return trip

from Minneapolis to Toronto in March 2001. The tickets were issued to St. James,

but they were addressed to Ehrmann.

Upon being arrested, St. James agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. St.

James phoned co-defendant Thomas Haslip (Haslip), who later arrived at St. James’s

residence. Haslip discussed with St. James the distribution of 1,500 ecstasy pills

before taking possession of the controlled package and departing. Haslip delivered

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the package to 4302 Portland Avenue, a residence owned by Ehrmann, where he and

Haslip lived. Thereafter, law enforcement agents obtained a search warrant and

searched Ehrmann’s residence, where they found evidence of three recent wire

transfers from Ehrmann to St. James in the amounts of $8,000, $4,500 and $1,700,

and a fourth wire transfer from Ehrmann to Ron Geoff. Agents also discovered and

seized a notebook recording drug orders. Law enforcement officers made no arrests,

but they continued to monitor Ehrmann’s residence in an attempt to discover more

information about the ongoing narcotics operation.

In January 2002, Bloomington, Minnesota, police stopped Anthony Florian

(Florian), who possessed ninety-three grams of methamphetamine. Florian agreed to

cooperate with authorities, telling them he had located a supply source for

methamphetamine in Arizona, and Ehrmann and others had given Florian $4,500 to

purchase methamphetamine. Thereafter, Florian purchased eight ounces of

methamphetamine, delivered four ounces to Ehrmann, and retained possession of

four ounces, approximately the amount Florian possessed when the police stopped

him. Police also seized from Florian detailed drug ledgers containing numerous

references to “TE,” which police presumed were the identifying initials of Timothy

Ehrmann. 

Six months later, on June 8, Trooper Anthony Gerard (Trooper Gerard), an

Arizona Highway Patrol Officer, pulled over an automobile on Interstate 40 traveling

ninety-four miles per hour. Eugene Blaylock (Blaylock) was driving, and Ehrmann

was riding in the front passenger seat. Trooper Gerard approached the car and spoke

first to Blaylock, who gave Trooper Gerard the rental agreement and his Texas

driver’s license. Ehrmann did not acknowledge Trooper Gerard, but instead focused

intently on his laptop computer. Trooper Gerard asked Blaylock why he was

traveling from Dallas to Arizona, and Blaylock told Trooper Gerard he and Ehrmann

came to Arizona “just to hang out.” Blaylock also told Trooper Gerard he was

unemployed and had been for some time.

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Trooper Gerard issued Blaylock a speeding ticket, and then told Blaylock he

was free to go. As Blaylock began walking back to the car, Trooper Gerard asked

Blaylock if he would answer a few more questions, and Blaylock said he would.

After asking Blaylock several questions related to narcotics trafficking, Trooper

Gerard asked Blaylock’s permission to search the vehicle. Blaylock paused for a

second before consenting to the search. When Blaylock attempted to remove the car

keys from the ignition, Ehrmann inquired what Blaylock was doing and Ehrmann

then objected to the search. After Blaylock and Ehrmann conversed for about ten

seconds, Blaylock told Trooper Gerard that Ehrmann did not want the car searched,

and Trooper Gerard would need to talk with Ehrmann. 

Trooper Gerard then approached the passenger side of the vehicle and noticed

Ehrmann had set down his laptop computer and was now fidgeting in his seat,

squirming back and forth. Trooper Gerard asked Ehrmann for permission to search

the vehicle. Ehrmann told Trooper Gerard he had been delayed long enough and did

not want to wait for Trooper Gerard to search the vehicle. Ehrmann’s hands were

shaking, causing Trooper Gerard to believe Ehrmann was nervous. Trooper Gerard

assured Ehrmann the search would take only five minutes, but Ehrmann renewed his

objection to the search, this time saying he did not want his privacy invaded. When

Trooper Gerard asked Ehrmann if there were any illegal drugs in the vehicle,

Ehrmann’s right eyebrow began twitching uncontrollably. At this point, Trooper

Gerard called a canine unit to the scene. 

Seventeen minutes later a canine unit arrived. When the handler walked the

canine around the vehicle, the canine alerted to the trunk. The officers then opened

and searched the trunk. The search revealed a small black bag inside a larger black

duffle bag. The small black bag contained two packages each with two packets of a

white crystal substance. The packages weighed just under one pound and field tested

positive for methamphetamine. The small bag also contained ten ecstasy tablets. The

large black duffle bag contained a digital scale and $520 in cash. Trooper Gerard also

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2

Circuit parties are a series of gay dance parties held around the world.

3

Pseudoephedrine is a precursor chemical used in manufacturing

methamphetamine.

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confiscated $156 from Ehrmann’s wallet, two Dell computers, drug ledgers, and an

American Airlines ticket addressed to Ehrmann, but issued to Blaylock for round-trip

air travel between Dallas/Fort Worth and Minneapolis on October 19, 2002. 

Following the search, officers arrested Ehrmann on state drug charges. He

posted bond and returned to Minneapolis, where he continued to purchase large,

distributable quantities of methamphetamine and ecstasy. In August 2002, Ehrmann

traveled with Haslip to Arizona, where they purchased methamphetamine, which they

mailed to Minneapolis, before returning by air. In October, Ehrmann and Haslip

traveled to Las Vegas, where they met a drug supplier named Timothy Range (Range)

at a circuit party.2

 Initially, Haslip purchased one pound of methamphetamine from

Range. Throughout November and December, Ehrmann lived with Range and

purchased two to three pounds of methamphetamine from Range on five or six

occasions. 

On February 12, 2003, Ehrmann was arrested in San Diego attempting to

purchase three pounds of pseudoephedrine3

 from an undercover Drug Enforcement

Agency (DEA) agent. Ehrmann admitted to the DEA agent he intended to process the

pseudoephedrine into methamphetamine. When Ehrmann was arrested, agents also

seized $18,000 in cash and approximately 325 tablets of ecstacy, which Ehrmann

offered to sell to the DEA agent.

B. Procedural Summary

A federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against Ehrmann and

four co-defendants in March 2003. The indictment alleged a conspiracy to distribute

ecstasy and methamphetamine, possession of controlled substances with intent to

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distribute, and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute controlled

substances. The following month, the government filed a superceding indictment

adding Jimmie Charles Orr (Orr) as a defendant and an eighth count charging

Ehrmann and Orr with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.

Ehrmann and four co-defendants pled not guilty and proceeded to trial. Orr pled

guilty to the conspiracy count, and agreed to cooperate with authorities. 

Before trial, Ehrmann moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from the

rental car in Arizona. Adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge, the district court denied the suppression motion. During the three week trial,

the government called some thirty witnesses, including Trooper Gerard, Orr, Range,

and several unindicted co-conspirators who either had sold distributable quantities

of drugs to Ehrmann and Haslip or had purchased drugs for resale from them. The

jury convicted Ehrmann of seven of the eight counts, including the conspiracy count.

On March 8, 2004, the district court sentenced Ehrmann to 360 months’

imprisonment. In determining the sentence, the district court adopted the drug

quantity finding proposed in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), and twice

assessed two-level role enhancements, one for Ehrmann’s role in the offense and a

second for obstruction of justice. Ehrmann appeals his convictions and sentence,

contending the district court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress, (2) denying

a Batson challenge, (3) admitting a videotape into evidence, (4) failing to have

Ehrmann waive his right to testify on the record, (5) prejudicing his right to a fair trial

based on cumulative prosecutorial misconduct, and (6) assessing a sentencing

enhancement for obstruction of justice. After oral argument, Ehrmann’s counsel

filed a letter, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), claiming Sixth

Amendment Booker sentencing errors.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Pretrial Suppression Motion

When considering a district court’s order denying the suppression of evidence,

we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions

de novo. United States v. Welerford, 356 F.3d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2004). “We must

affirm an order denying a motion to suppress unless the decision is unsupported by

substantial evidence, is based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light

of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has

been made.” United States v. Fuse, 391 F.3d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation omitted).

Traffic stops constitute “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004), and

must be reasonable under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Fuse,

391 F.3d at 927. Generally, a traffic “stop must be supported by at least a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that criminal activity” has occurred or is occurring. United

States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001). A traffic violation, no matter how

minor, creates probable cause for a law enforcement officer to stop the vehicle. See

United States v. Barry, 98 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1996). In performing a traffic stop,

the officer may conduct investigatory procedures “reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that initially” justified the interference. United States v. McCoy, 200

F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The officer may detain a motorist while

the officer performs routine tasks, such as writing a citation and completing

computerized checks of a driver’s license, vehicle registration, and criminal history.

United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999).

However, “once the officer decides to let a routine traffic offender depart with

a ticket, a warning or an all clear–a point in time determined, like other Fourth

Amendment inquiries, by objective indicia of the officer’s intent–then the Fourth

Amendment applies to limit any subsequent detention or search.” Id. at 648. An

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officer cannot continue to detain a motorist after the officer completes the initial stop,

unless the officer has “a reasonably articulable suspicion for believing” criminal

activity is afoot. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998); see also

Fuse, 391 F.3d at 927-28; Jones, 269 F.3d at 925 (explaining “with the purpose of the

traffic stop completed, it would be an unreasonable extension of the scope of the

investigation for [the trooper] to further detain [the suspect] or his vehicle, ‘unless

something that occurred during the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable

suspicion to justify a further detention’”) (quoting United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d

159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995)).

The facts surrounding the traffic stop in this case are straightforward. Trooper

Gerard clocked the rental vehicle traveling nineteen miles per hour in excess of the

speed limit. Trooper Gerard had probable cause to stop the vehicle for speeding.

United States v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000). Once Trooper Gerard

issued Blaylock a speeding citation and told him he was free to go, Ehrmann argues

Trooper Gerard no longer had reasonable suspicion to delay the vehicle or its

occupants. 

Recently, we declared “the termination of a traffic stop does not effectively

erase the objectively reasonable suspicions developed by a police officer during the

traffic stop.” Fuse, 391 F.3d at 929. Our review of Ehrmann’s suppression record

convinces us Trooper Gerard had developed objectively reasonable suspicions before

first asking Blaylock, and then Ehrmann, for consent to search the vehicle. When

Trooper Gerard first approached the vehicle, he testified he thought it strange

Ehrmann did not look up from his computer and make eye contact with him. Trooper

Gerard also found it odd that Blaylock said he was driving from Dallas to Phoenix

with no specific purpose, other than to “just to hang out.” He also thought it

suspicious Blaylock would be vacationing when he was unemployed. Trooper

Gerard’s initial suspicions increased when Blaylock initially consented to a search,

but then told Trooper Gerard he would have to speak to Ehrmann. When Trooper

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Gerard approached Ehrmann to discuss the matter, Trooper Gerard testified Ehrmann

appeared nervous, his hands were shaking, and he was fidgeting and squirming in his

seat. Ehrmann first told Trooper Gerard he was in hurry and did not want to be

detained further. When Trooper Gerard assured Ehrmann a search would take only

five minutes, Ehrmann changed his basis for objecting to the search, telling Trooper

Gerard a search would invade his privacy. Trooper Gerard then cut to the chase,

asking Ehrmann whether illegal drugs were concealed in the vehicle. Upon hearing

the question, Ehrmann’s eyebrow began twitching uncontrollably, making Trooper

Gerard even more suspicious that Ehrmann had something to hide. Under these facts,

we conclude Trooper Gerard had reasonable suspicion to detain Ehrmann and call a

canine unit. See Fuse, 391 F.3d at 929-30. The district court committed no error in

denying Ehrmann’s motion to suppress the fruits of the search.

B. Batson Challenge

Ehrmann raised a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to

the government’s peremptory strike of a panel member, contending the government

struck the panel member because of his sexual orientation. The district court denied

the Batson challenge. The court first questioned Batson’s application to sexual

orientation challenges. Then the court found Ehrmann failed to make a prima facie

showing of unlawful discrimination and the government offered legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against the panel

member. Ehrmann attempts to elevate this challenge to the level of a constitutional

error under the Batson line of cases, arguing the denial of his Batson objection denied

him the right to a fair trial.

We review the district court’s Batson ruling for clear error, United States v.

Jones, 245 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2001), and we accord great deference to the district

court’s findings, United States v. Roebke, 333 F.3d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21). Although the California Supreme Court has held sexual

orientation should be a protected class for jury selection purposes, see People v.

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Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347-48 (2000), and the Ninth Circuit has assumed,

without deciding, sexual orientation qualifies as a Batson classification, Johnson v.

Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1996), neither the United States Supreme Court

nor this circuit has so held.

While we seriously doubt Batson and its progeny extend federal constitutional

protection to a venire panel member’s sexual orientation, our review of the trial

record persuades us that even if Ehrmann made a prima facie case of purposeful

discrimination, his Batson objection fails because the government offered legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the panel member. The prosecutor told the

district court he questioned the suitability of this panel member even before learning

of the panel member’s sexual orientation. The prosecutor was concerned about the

panel member’s liberal education and background, his livelihood as a musician, and

his being a potential loner. Ehrmann offered no evidence to show the government’s

proffered reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district

court’s denial of Ehrmann’s Batson challenge. 

C. Videotape Evidence

In his third assigned error, Ehrmann claims the district court erred in allowing

the government to introduce prejudicial videotape evidence, the admission of which,

Ehrmann claims, constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Ehrmann specifically objects

to the admission of the videotaped phrase “Gay Mafia” as being inherently

prejudicial. The government claims the videotape evidence of Ehrmann’s admissions

relating to his organization and pending conspiracy charges is plainly relevant. We

review a district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 2005).

Our review of the videotape transcript establishes that, on January 3, 2003,

Ehrmann visited a friend named Patrick Jarmuzek (Jarmuzek), while Jarmuzek was

in custody at the Sherburne County Jail. The evidence further establishes Ehrmann

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and Jarmuzek knowingly consented to communicating via video conferencing. Twice

while conversing, they expressed their disdain of videoconferencing. The record does

not reveal whether Ehrmann and Jarmuzek knew their conversation was being

recorded, but given the jailhouse setting, they presumably considered the possibility.

During the jailhouse conversation, Ehrmann told Jarmuzek to let Ehrmann

know if “they try and charge you with . . . conspiracy as of big picture conspiracy.”

Ehrmann then told Jarmuzek that Florian had been hauled back in court, and “they are

threatening to charge him with conspiracy . . . , same as what Bam is being charged

with.” Ehrmann also told Jarmuzek, “they’re trying to tie me very heavily to Bam,”

and “my attorney told me . . . the Feds . . . are looking to charge me federally now as

well.” Ehrmann predicted to Jarmuzek that if “they do that they’re looking at . . .

Bam like this kingpin in the Gay Mafia so to speak. . . . You or I would be the next

best candidate after Bam.” (emphasis added).

In discussing potential conspiracy charges, Ehrmann’s phrase “kingpin in the

Gay Mafia” appears not to be a reference to himself, but to “Bam,” an unidentified

co-conspirator. Ehrmann, not the government, uttered the “Gay Mafia” phrase in an

apparent reference to an unidentified co-conspirator. Ehrmann’s admissions

regarding the activities of alleged co-conspirators were plainly relevant, as were his

admissions concerning confiscated proceeds, his fears of future federal indictment,

and his plan to lie low. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the videotape evidence.

D. Right to Testify

Ehrmann also claims the district court erred in failing to obtain Ehrmann’s

express waiver of his right to testify on the record. After the government completed

its case-in-chief and rested, the district court advised Ehrmann of his “personal” right

to testify at trial. When the court inquired of Ehrmann if his lawyer had discussed

with Ehrmann his right to testify, he responded in the affirmative. When the court

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asked Ehrmann if he had any questions, Ehrmann responded in the negative.

Ehrmann rested his case without testifying.

A district court is not required to obtain from a defendant an express, on-therecord waiver of his right to testify. If a defendant wishes to exercise his

constitutional right to testify, a defendant “must act affirmatively and express to the

court [his] desire to do so at the appropriate time or a knowing and voluntary waiver

of the right is deemed to have occurred.” United States v. Blum, 65 F.3d 1436, 1444

(8th Cir. 1995). Thus, we find no error.

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Ehrmann next claims the prosecutor impugned defense counsel’s integrity by

revisiting at trial a preliminary conflict-of-interest issue, which the magistrate judge

had resolved in favor of Ehrmann. Before trial, Ehrmann knowingly waived any

actual or perceived conflict of interest between his defense counsel and a government

witness whom Ehrmann’s counsel had represented two years earlier. “To obtain a

reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the

prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and (2) such remarks prejudiced the defendant’s

rights in obtaining a fair trial.” United States v. King, 36 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir.

1994).

Ehrmann claims that during trial the prosecutor suggested to the district court

Ehrmann’s defense counsel was acting unethically, and during cross-examination

would “use confidences” defense counsel received from his previous representation

of a government witness named Jeremy Jacobsen (Jacobsen). As a result, Ehrmann

claims the prosecutor denied him a right to a fair trial and to effective assistance of

counsel. The government agrees that, before trial, the prosecutor raised the conflictof-interest issue before the magistrate judge to protect Ehrmann’s Sixth Amendment

rights. However, the government argues defense counsel, not the prosecutor, was the

first to revisit the conflict-of-interest issue at trial, when defense counsel informed the

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court that, since the magistrate judge’s ruling, a conflict of interest had arisen, and

another attorney would cross-examine Jacobsen. Shortly before Jacobsen was called

to testify, Ehrmann’s counsel informed the court Ehrmann waived the newly

discovered conflict of interest, and defense counsel would cross-examine Jacobsen.

Only then, when asked by the district court to respond, did the prosecutor state the

case law clearly established a presumption that confidences are passed between client

and attorney during representation.

Having reviewed the record, we first note defense counsel never made a formal

objection to the prosecutor’s statements. The district court asked Ehrmann’s counsel,

“What kind of a ruling do you want or need?” Ehrmann’s counsel responded, “I don’t

think we need one.” Because the record contains no defense objection to the

prosecutor’s remarks or motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, we

review only for plain error. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)

(standard of review); United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 983 (8th Cir. 1999). After

reviewing the relevant portions of the trial transcript, we find no prosecutorial

misconduct and no showing of substantial prejudice to Ehrmann.

 F. Sentencing Enhancement

In his last assigned error, Ehrmann contends the district court clearly erred in

assessing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under section 3C1.1 of

the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). The jury never heard evidence

or made a determination regarding the issue of whether Ehrmann obstructed justice.

Instead, the district court considered conflicting testimony and reports from law

enforcement investigators and, based on a preponderance of the evidence adduced at

sentencing, determined Ehrmann made death threats against a trial witness and the

prosecutor. Under application note 4(a) to section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines,

threatening a witness warrants the justice obstruction enhancement. U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(a). Section 3C1.1 also applies when a defendant willfully attempts

to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the investigation,

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prosecution, or sentencing of an offense. Finding Ehrmann obstructed justice, the

district court applied a two-level enhancement under section 3C1.1(A) of the

Guidelines, and sentenced Ehrmann to 360 months. Our record review persuades us

the district court did not err in applying this enhancement.

G. Booker Errors

Following oral argument, Ehrmann submitted a Rule 28(j) letter citing Blakely

v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), contending he is entitled to resentencing

because he received an enhanced sentence based on the district court’s drug quantity

determination and its application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, without

affording Ehrmann his Sixth Amendment right to a jury’s determination of disputed

facts, beyond a reasonable doubt. More recently, the Supreme Court held the

mandatory application of the Guidelines is unconstitutional, but the Guidelines pass

constitutional muster if applied in an advisory fashion. United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738, 756, 764-66 (2005). Although Ehrmann objected to the obstruction of

justice enhancement and drug quantity at sentencing, his objections were not based

on a Sixth Amendment challenge. Therefore, we review Ehrmann’s Booker

challenges only for plain error. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir.

2005) (en banc). “Plain error is error that is ‘plain’ (that is, clear or obvious), ‘affects

substantial rights’ (that is, prejudicial) and ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769,

775 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993)).

The jury found Ehrmann conspired to distribute 500 grams or more of

methamphetamine. The PSR found Ehrmann responsible for 386.56 grams of actual

methamphetamine, 7,821.50 grams of methamphetamine mixture, 1,199.75 grams of

ecstasy, and 1,360.80 grams of pseudoephedrine. Converting these drug amounts into

their marijuana equivalent, the cumulative drug quantity totaled 37,582.08 kilograms

of marijuana, resulting in a base offense level of 38. At sentencing, the district court

adopted the PSR’s drug quantity and also found Ehrmann had obstructed justice

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based on evidence that Ehrmann made threats in jail against a trial witness and the

prosecutor. The district court then sentenced Ehrmann to 360 months.

Applying the test for plain error, Ehrmann satisfies the first two factors. Pirani,

406 F.3d at 550. Having carefully reviewed the sentencing transcript, we glean

nothing in the record to suggest the district court would have applied a more

favorable sentence under an advisory sentencing regime. Thus, Ehrmann has not

established the error affected his substantial rights, because he cannot demonstrate

a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a more favorable

sentence under an advisory sentencing guidelines regime mandated by Booker. Id.

at 553. Morever, because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt Ehrmann

conspired to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine, which is punishable

by ten years to life, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), his 360-month sentence does not

exceed the statutory maximum life sentence. Consequently, we conclude there are

no Blakely/Booker plain errors in this case. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm Ehrmann’s convictions and his sentence.

______________________________

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