Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00402/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00402-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Bates
Defendant
Boona Cheema
Defendant
Mary Duley
Defendant
Hataitip Feng
Defendant
Darrell D. Foley
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL D. FOLEY,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-0402 PJH

v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

 WITH PREJUDICE AS TO ALL

TOM BATES, et al., DEFENDANTS

Defendants.

_______________________________/

 Plaintiff Darrell D. Foley (“plaintiff”) filed the instant complaint on November 14,

2006. It was removed on January 22, 2007 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1442(a)(1).

Now before the court is the motion of federal defendant Hataitip Feng (“Ms. Feng” or

“federal defendant”), an employee of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development (“HUD”) to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and considered their arguments

and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the

moving defendant’s motion for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

The background of this case and the details of plaintiff’s complaint are fully detailed

in this Court’s May 14, 2007 Order Dismissing the Complaint (as to the non-federal

defendants). Of particular note here, plaintiff did not allege any acts by Ms. Feng or any

other HUD employee regarding the Ninth Street property in Berkeley in which plaintiff

resides (“Ninth Street Property”). Plaintiff, however, alleged each and every claim against

“all defendants.” 

In the May 14, 2007 Order, the court granted Tom Bates’, Boona Cheema’s, and

Mary Duley’s motion to dismiss the complaint, requiring that any amended complaint must

Case 4:07-cv-00402-PJH Document 40 Filed 06/25/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff has not amended his complaint.

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be filed no later than June 14, 2007 or the court would dismiss the action.1

 The federal

defendant now seeks to dismiss the instant complaint on the following bases: (1) the

complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8; (2) the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over the federal defendant because the action is barred by the

doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (3) the complaint does not state a claim against Ms.

Feng because it fails to allege any specific acts done by her. In the alternative, defendant

moves for summary judgment.

In support of its motion, the federal defendant has submitted unrefuted evidence

regarding HUD and its activities that relate to this case. Ms. Feng is a Community Planning

and Development (“CPD”) representative for HUD. The CPD administers two types of

grants. The first type is a “formula grant” which is not awarded to non-governmental

agencies such as Building Opportunities for Self-Sufficiency (“BOSS”) – the agency that

plaintiff alleges operated the Ninth Street Property. Rather, it is awarded to governmental

entities, like the City of Berkeley, who then decides how to use the funds. Larry Wuerstle

Decl. ¶¶ 3-8. The second type of grant is the competitive grant, for which non-profit

organizations like BOSS can apply. HUD’s records, however, reflect that BOSS has not

applied for and has not been awarded any competitive grant for the Ninth Street Property. 

Id. ¶ 11.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1), plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction. In effect, the court presumes lack of jurisdiction until the plaintiff proves

otherwise. See Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873

F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or

factual. In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

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complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. In a facial attack, the

court must consider allegations of the complaint as true. By contrast, in a factual attack,

the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise

invoke federal jurisdiction. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may

review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a

motion for summary judgment. The court then determines the facts for itself. See Safe Air

v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In resolving a facial attack, a motion will be

granted if the complaint, when considered in its entirety, on its face fails to allege facts

sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High

School, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In addition, if a plaintiff fails to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. Hymen v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 799 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th

Cir. 1986).

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

A court should dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See, e.g., Broam v. Brogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d

661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

3. Rule 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint “contain ... a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). Under the “notice pleading” standard embraced by Rule 8, a plaintiff must include

“sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” 

McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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4. Rule 56

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of

the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to

a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court must view the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be

drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the

opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue

for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. “To show the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue, . . . [a plaintiff] must produce at least

some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Smolen v. Deloitte,

Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). The court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. City

of Tacoma, 332 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 2003). If the nonmoving party fails to show that

there is a genuine issue for trial, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

B. Federal Defendant’s Motion

As this court has previously noted, plaintiff’s amended complaint is not a model of

clarity. Nonetheless, construing plaintiff’s amended complaint as liberally as possible,

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plaintiff’s amended complaint purports to state the multiple causes of action described in

the court’s May 14, 2007 Order. The federal defendant, however, is correct in its

arguments, and plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for the following reasons.

As the court has already found, the complaint must be dismissed because it fails to

put the federal defendant on notice of the claim or claims being asserted against it. Plaintiff

does not allege his specific claims against any specific defendant. Rather, he generally

alleges all claims against “all defendants,” without identifying which defendant is

responsible for his alleged injuries. This is an impermissible attempt to sweep all four

defendants into the lawsuit without making specific allegations as to any. See McKeever v.

Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff must include "sufficient allegations to put

defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them"). This is especially true with respect

to the federal defendant, because plaintiff does not allege any acts by Ms. Feng or any

HUD employee in his factual statement.

Moreover, immunity bars suit here. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields

the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475

(1994). Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, and the terms of any waiver of that

immunity define a federal court’s jurisdiction to entertain suit. Id. Plaintiff has not alleged

that the federal defendant has waived immunity or consented to suit. This action is

therefore barred by sovereign immunity.

Insofar as plaintiff is attempting to allege tortuous conduct by Ms. Feng, the Federal

Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (“FTCA”) is the

exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity for tort actions against the United States and its

agencies and employees acting within the scope of their employment. See Smith v. United

States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). Under the FTCA, the United

States is the only proper party defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a); Kennedy v. United

States Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). In addition, a key prerequisite to

filing suit under the FTCA is the presentation of an administrative claim to the government

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within two years of the alleged incident (or commencement of the action within six months

after the agency mails a notice of final denial of the claim). See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 

The United States is the only proper federal defendant under the FTCA, and Ms.

Feng must be dismissed as a plaintiff. More significantly, however, plaintiff has not shown

that sovereign immunity has been waived pursuant to the FTCA. Nor has plaintiff

exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA, as he did not file a written claim

with HUD prior to filing suit. See Culpepper Decl. ¶ 3.

In addition, dismissal based on sovereign immunity must be without leave to amend

because plaintiff’s “HUD oversight” theory has no basis in the law or facts. While the

complaint generally alleges that HUD funded the Ninth Street Property and should have

known that BOSS was not adequately operating the property, and that it therefore had

some legal obligation, as a factual matter, HUD has not awarded BOSS any grants for the

Ninth Street Property. Plaintiff has not refuted this evidence. 

Even if sovereign immunity did not bar this suit, which it does, plaintiff has not

alleged any specific acts by Ms. Feng regarding the Ninth Street Property. Nor does he

allege any mandatory act that HUD failed to do. HUD is not involved in the facts giving rise

to plaintiffs’ allegations; thus, dismissal is proper on this basis as well.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety with

regards to the federal defendant, because it does not comply with Federal rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), does not plead subject matter jurisdiction, and fails to state a claim. 

Moreover, there is no basis on which plaintiff could plead and prove subject matter

jurisdiction against the federal defendant. Accordingly, the dismissal is WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND. Furthermore, all remaining claims in this case against any and all defendants

are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as plaintiff failed to amend his complaint

by June 14, 2007 as previously ordered by this court. This order terminates the case and

any pending motions. The clerk shall close the file. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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