Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01276/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01276-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Jennifer M. Granholm
Petitioner
Upper Peninsula Power Company
Intervenor

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 1999 Decided June 11, 1999

No. 98-1276

Jennifer M. Granholm ex rel.

Michigan Department of Natural Resources,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

Upper Peninsula Power Company,

Intervenor

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Pamela J. Stevenson, Assistant Attorney General, State of

Michigan, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the

briefs were Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Alan F.

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Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General. John C. Scherbarth,

Assistant Attorney General, entered an appearance.

David H. Coffman, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on

the brief was Jay L. Witkin, Solicitor.

Amy S. Koch and Linda C. Ray were on the brief for

intervenor Upper Peninsula Power Company.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Michigan's Attorney General, on

behalf of the state's Department of Natural Resources, filed a

petition for judicial review of three Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders issued in connection with an application by the Mead Corporation for a hydroelectric power

license. We hold that Michigan's failure to seek rehearing of

the Commission's "Order on Remand" deprives the court of

jurisdiction.

This proceeding has its genesis in orders the Commission

issued in 1995 and 1996. In Mead Corp., 72 F.E.R.C.

p 61,027 (1995), the Commission granted Mead's application

for a new license to continue operation and maintenance of a

hydroelectric power project in Michigan under Part I of the

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 791a-823b, without implementing certain recommendations of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. Among the rejected recommendations were license conditions requiring additional studies

designed to reduce the number of fish trapped in the project's

turbines and to compensate Michigan for the fish killed. The

Commission determined that the proposed conditions did not

fall within s 10(j) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.

s 803(j), which requires the Commission to afford significant

deference to fish protection recommendations of state and

federal fish and wildlife agencies. The Commission considered the Michigan recommendations pursuant to s 4(e) and

s 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 797(e), 803(a),

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ronmental interests against development interests in promoting the best comprehensive use of a waterway. The Commission rejected the Michigan recommendations after finding

that Mead's study method was a reasonable means of assessing the project's impact on fishery resources.

Michigan sought rehearing, asserting that the Commission

should have considered the Michigan recommendations under

s 10(j). In Mead Corp., 76 F.E.R.C. p 61,352 (1996), the

Commission denied rehearing after reiterating that Michigan's recommendations were not subject to s 10(j), and that

the public interest did not require performance of those

studies.

Michigan then sought judicial review of the 1995 and 1996

orders in this court. The case was docketed as No. 96-1453,

but on August 5, 1997, after Michigan submitted its initial

brief, the Commission filed an unopposed motion for voluntary remand so that the Commission could reconsider whether it should have reviewed Michigan's recommendations under s 10(j). The Commission's motion was prompted, in part,

by this court's intervening decision in Kelley v. FERC, 96

F.3d 1482, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1996), which viewed as "weighty"

the question whether the Commission may legitimately treat

fish and wildlife recommendations as outside s 10(j). This

court granted the motion on August 8, 1997, and remanded

the case to the Commission.

On April 22, 1998, the Commission issued its "Order on

Remand," Upper Peninsula Power Co., 83 F.E.R.C. p 61,071,

at 61,362 (1998) ("remand order")1, further elucidating, but

adhering to, its prior ruling. Without seeking rehearing of

the remand order, Michigan petitioned for judicial review of

the 1995, 1996, and 1998 orders, contending once again that

the Commission erred in considering Michigan's recommen-

__________

1 By order dated February 19, 1997, not under review here, the

Commission also approved the transfer of the license from Mead to

Upper Peninsula Power Company. See Mead Corp., 78 F.E.R.C.

p 62,121 (1997). For simplicity, this opinion refers to the licensee as

"Mead."

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dations under s 10(a) rather than the more deferential

s 10(j).

On July 30, 1998, the Commission moved to dismiss for lack

of jurisdiction on the ground that Michigan failed to seek

rehearing of the remand order as required by s 313(a) of the

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. s 825l(a). By order dated

October 15, 1998, the court directed the motion to dismiss to

be referred to the merits panel. Upper Peninsula Power

Company intervened in support of the Commission's position.

Section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act provides that "[n]o

proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be

brought by any person unless such person shall have made

application to the Commission for rehearing thereon." 16

U.S.C. s 825l(a). This petition-for-rehearing requirement is

mandatory. See ASARCO, Inc. v. FERC, 777 F.2d 764, 774

(D.C. Cir. 1985).2 Neither the court nor the Commission

retains "any form of jurisdictional discretion" to ignore it.

ASARCO, 777 F.2d at 775 (quoting Boston Gas Co. v. FERC,

575 F.2d 975, 979 (1st Cir. 1978)); see also Bluestone Energy

Design, Inc. v. FERC, 74 F.3d 1288, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1996);

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance

Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 34-35 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc

denied, 972 F.2d 1362 (1992); Town of Norwood, Mass. v.

FERC, 906 F.2d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Such a mandatory

petition-for-rehearing requirement exists in each of the three

major statutes the Commission administers. See ASARCO,

777 F.2d at 774 (citations omitted).

As the court explained in Northwest Pipeline Corp. v.

FERC, 863 F.2d 73, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the "obvious (and

salutary) purpose" of the petition-for-rehearing requirement

is to afford the Commission "an opportunity to bring its

knowledge and expertise to bear on an issue before it is

__________

2 The court in ASARCO interpreted s 19(a) of the Natural Gas

Act, the counterpart to s 313(a) of the Federal Power Act. See 777

F.2d at 772-75. Substantially identical provisions of the Natural

Gas Act and the Federal Power Act are to be interpreted consistently with each other. See Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S.

571, 577 n.7 (1981).

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presented to a generalist court." The requirement also permits the agency an initial opportunity to correct its errors.

See ECEE, Inc. v. FERC, 611 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1980).

Michigan acknowledges s 313(a)'s petition-for-rehearing requirement and the line of authorities just cited, but tries to

avoid the consequences by analogizing its situation to that in

Southern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 877 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir.

1989), a case arising under the Natural Gas Act s 19(b), 15

U.S.C. s 717r(b). The petitioner in Southern Natural Gas

had failed to seek rehearing of a Commission order denying

rehearing. See 877 F.2d at 1068-73. The court held that the

petitioner did not need to seek further rehearing of the

Commission order denying rehearing because the original

outcome had not been changed although the Commission had

"supplie[d] a new improved rationale." Id. at 1073. The

court reasoned that if the statute were read as making a

request for rehearing a predicate to judicial review of each

order denying rehearing, the process might never end. See

id. Such an interpretation would have permitted "an endless

cycle of applications for rehearing and denials," limited, the

court stated, "only by FERC's ability to think up new rationales--which, since none of them would be put to a test in

court, would not be much of a limitation." Id. (citations

omitted).

Michigan's theory is that since the Commission, in its order

on remand, did nothing more than attempt to improve the

rationale supporting its earlier decisions, Southern Natural

Gas excused the State from having to seek rehearing under

s 313(a). Michigan misses the point that Southern Natural

Gas, given its reasoning, is confined to the question whether

this court has jurisdiction if the petitioner failed to seek

rehearing of a Commission order on rehearing, a question not

entirely resolved by the statute. The situation here is not

comparable. Michigan stands on no different footing than

any other petitioner who has failed to seek rehearing from a

Commission order rendered in an initial proceeding. That

the proceeding here was on remand from this court is of no

moment. As far as s 313(a) is concerned, the case before the

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agency was in the same posture as if it had begun anew.3

Nothing in s 313(a) exempts Commission orders issued on

remand from the rehearing requirement. In such circumstances, requiring parties to seek rehearing before petitioning

for judicial review--requiring, that is, parties to comply with

the terms of s 313(a)--will not entail a cycle of agency

orders, the key concern in Southern Natural Gas. The

rehearing requirement is triggered anew only if the court

orders the case remanded and the agency issues a fresh

decision.

Michigan also thinks it did not have to seek rehearing

because this would have done no good and, at all events, the

arguments it would have raised before the Commission on

rehearing are the same as those the Commission is now

opposing in this court.4 A party's belief that nothing would

change on rehearing is irrelevant. Section 313(a) speaks in

absolutes. It brooks no exceptions. Our precedents are as

firm as can be on this point: an application for rehearing

must be filed before the litigant seeks judicial review "even if

the point sought to be appealed was raised, considered, and

rejected in the original proceeding." ASARCO, 777 F.2d at

773. As the saying goes, "rules is rules." Bartlett J.

Whiting, Modern Proverbs and Proverbial Sayings 541 (1989).

Dismissed.

__________

3 Because the court here remanded the "case"--instead of merely

remanding the record and holding the case in abeyance--the court

did not retain jurisdiction. See D.C. Cir. R. 41(b).

4 The remand order did not, as Michigan supposes, simply reach

the same conclusion as the 1995 licensing and 1996 rehearing

orders--that the Michigan studies did not constitute s 10(j) recommendations--and address only the points raised in Michigan's prior

brief, submitted in case No. 96-1453. The remand order also held

that even if some of Michigan's requests were considered under the

more deferential s 10(j), instead of s 10(a), the record provided

substantial evidence for the Commission's conclusion that the studies and protective devices suggested by Michigan need not be

included as license conditions.

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