Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03661/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03661-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frederick T. Garner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3506

FREDERICK T. GARNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:09-cv-739 — Larry J. McKinney, Judge.

____________________

No. 15-3661

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FREDERICK T. GARNER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 05-cr-0194-01 — Larry J. McKinney, Judge.

Case: 15-3661 Document: 9 Filed: 12/21/2015 Pages: 5
2 Nos. 13-3506 & 15-3661

ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. In 2007 Frederick Garner was convicted by a jury for federal gun and drug crimes; the court 

imposed a sentence of 322 months’ imprisonment. Garner

appealed, but counsel filed a no-merit brief under Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We agreed with that assessment and dismissed the appeal. See United States v. Garner,

281 F. App’x 571 (7th Cir. 2008). About a year later, Garner 

filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he 

asserted that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. That motion lay dormant until January 2013, when new 

counsel revived it with an amendment raising two new arguments: (1) the enhancement of his sentence using a state 

conviction that was later vacated violated Garner’s due process rights, and (2) his attorney was ineffective for failing to 

object to the introduction at both the guilt and sentencing 

stages of evidence that came directly from plea negotiations. 

The district court granted Garner’s motion. It found merit 

in his first argument, but not the second one. The court’s 

opinion, which is dated August 15, 2013, concludes as follows: 

The foregoing shows that Garner is entitled 

to relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the 

form of a new sentencing hearing. The amended motion for relief pursuant to § 2255 [dkt 37] 

Case: 15-3661 Document: 9 Filed: 12/21/2015 Pages: 5
Nos. 13-3506 & 15-3661 3

is therefore granted. The sentence in the underlying criminal action shall be vacated.

Garner filed a pro se notice of appeal from that judgment on 

November 6, 2013 (No. 13-3506), and this court later recruited counsel for him. (We questioned the timeliness of his appeal, because parties in a civil matter, including proceedings 

under § 2255, have only 60 days from the date of judgment 

to appeal in cases to which the United States is a party. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2107(b)(1). But Garner explained that he had 

written to the district court on October 11, 2013, to tell the 

court that he wanted “to appeal the parts of my 2255 that 

was denied.” This sufficed, we concluded, as a timely notice 

of appeal.) On October 1, 2014, we issued a certificate of appealability that identified the question relating to the effectiveness of counsel as appropriate for appeal. 

In the meantime, on October 24, 2013, the district court 

held the promised resentencing hearing. The hearing was 

limited in scope, however, because both parties believed that 

the question of the effectiveness of counsel’s handling of the 

evidentiary issue was not before the district court because of 

the pending appeal in No. 13-3506. On November 6, 2013, 

the court entered an amended judgment, in which it reduced 

Garner’s sentence to 248 months. Garner did not file a timely 

notice of appeal from that judgment, but as we explain below, he has now appealed from the new criminal judgment 

in No. 15-3661.

As this brief account reveals, this case turned into an unnecessary procedural snarl. The fundamental problem is 

simple: Garner won everything he could receive in his § 2255 

proceeding. The fact that the district court accepted one reason for that outcome and rejected another is of no imCase: 15-3661 Document: 9 Filed: 12/21/2015 Pages: 5
4 Nos. 13-3506 & 15-3661

portance. What matters is the judgment, and once the court 

ordered a full resentencing, that is what Garner should have 

received.

Matters went off the rails, through no fault of Garner’s 

(who after all had been acting pro se), when he thought that 

he needed to appeal from the adverse portion of the district 

court’s August 2013 opinion. We should have spotted this 

problem immediately, but we did not. Instead, we first focused on the timeliness issue, and once that was resolved, 

we looked at the merits of the point Garner had briefed: his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. That led to the certificate of appealability, and in time to the oral argument on 

November 6, 2015, before this panel. 

At that argument, we asked the parties to file memoranda addressing the status of the appeal in No. 13-3506, in light 

of the fact that Garner took the appeal notwithstanding the 

fact that he had prevailed in the district court. We also asked 

them to comment on the bearing that the November 6, 2013, 

resentencing in the criminal proceeding has on Garner’s motion under § 2255. They have done so, and they now agree 

that the appeal in the § 2255 case should not have been taken. Their joint statement suggests that “[i]f a petitioner like 

Garner wishes to challenge the portion of his § 2255 motion 

the district court has denied (where the court also granted 

part of the motion), the proper recourse is to appeal the 

judgment in the related criminal case that follows resentencing on the granted portion of the § 2255 motion.”

While this joint statement represents some progress, it 

still fails to recognize that Garner did not win in part and 

lose in part back in August 2013 when the court ruled on his 

§ 2255 motion. He won, period. The only relief that he wantCase: 15-3661 Document: 9 Filed: 12/21/2015 Pages: 5
Nos. 13-3506 & 15-3661 5

ed was resentencing, and resentencing is what the district 

court promised him. But because of the misunderstanding 

that arose after Garner tried to appeal from the district 

court’s comments indicating that the court saw no merit in 

Garner’s ineffective-counsel argument, Garner did not receive the full resentencing to which he was entitled.

All that remains is to dispose of the two appeals before 

us: No. 13-3506, which complains about the district court’s 

rationale in the § 2255 case, and No. 15-3661, which is an untimely appeal from the resentencing. Because Garner prevailed in the § 2255 proceeding, he is not entitled to take an 

appeal in that case. We therefore DISMISS No. 13-3506. What 

remains is Garner’s appeal from his resentencing, No. 

15-3661. His notice of appeal in the criminal case is untimely 

(by quite a lot), but the time-bar of Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(b) is not jurisdictional. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 

U.S. 205, 212 (2007). Here, the government has agreed not to 

invoke Rule 4(b), and so the appeal in No. 15-3661 is properly before us. For the reasons we have already stated, we 

VACATE the new criminal sentence and REMAND this case to 

the district court for full resentencing, at which both sides 

will be free to present all their arguments. 

So ordered.

Case: 15-3661 Document: 9 Filed: 12/21/2015 Pages: 5