Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03092/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Emor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 2008 Decided July 17, 2009 

No. 07-3092 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

CHARLES EMOR, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 06cr00064-02) 

Peter V. Taylor argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Danny C. Onorato. David Schertler entered 

an appearance. 

Michael T. Ambrosino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Elizabeth 

Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GARLAND and 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Count filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Charles Emor appeals his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit mail fraud on two 

grounds. First, that the government’s failure to disclose 

exculpatory and impeachment evidence in a timely fashion 

violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006). 

Second, that the government hindered his defense by 

introducing evidence that the conspiracy began at an earlier 

date than alleged in the indictment. We affirm the judgment 

of the district court. There is no reasonable probability that 

the verdict would have been different had Emor received the 

undisclosed evidence, and any variance between the 

indictment and the evidence presented at trial did not 

substantially prejudice his defense. 

I. 

By an indictment filed on March 7, 2006, a federal grand 

jury charged Emor and co-defendant Dwayne Simmons with 

one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 371, as well as several other charges that were 

later dismissed. According to the government’s evidence, 

Simmons, a supervisor at the Gateway Computers shipping 

department in Hampton, Virginia, devised a scheme to divert 

the shipment of computers from legitimate customers to 

illegitimate buyers or, in some cases, alternative addresses for 

later sale. Simmons recruited Orlando Marshall and Michael 

Ralph to find buyers for the diverted computers, facilitate the 

illicit transactions, and transport the stolen property. Marshall 

and Ralph also enlisted the help of several other individuals, 

including Abdul Jalloh, to provide addresses to which the 

diverted computers could be shipped without arousing 

suspicion. Emor was the primary buyer. He purchased a large 

number of the diverted computers at fifty to eighty percent 

below the Gateway retail price, acquiring many of them for 

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use at a charter school he founded and reselling others to third 

parties. Although the indictment focused on diverted 

shipments and illegal transactions between late 2000 and the 

middle of 2002, the government’s evidence at trial showed 

that Emor began purchasing stolen computers from Ralph and 

Marshall as early as 1998. 

Ralph, Marshall, and Simmons each pleaded guilty to one 

count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and testified as 

government witnesses. Although Ralph and Marshall both 

testified that Emor knew the computers were obtained 

illegally, the defense maintained that Emor legitimately 

purchased the computers at a discounted rate and was 

unaware they were stolen. After a three-day trial in December 

2006, a jury found Emor guilty, and the district court imposed 

a sentence of twelve months in prison followed by three years 

of supervised release.1

Prior to trial, Emor filed a motion to compel production 

of any material in the government’s possession subject to the 

disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 154 (1972), 

particularly exculpatory evidence related to the coconspirators named in the indictment. In response, the 

government stated that it “underst[ood] its ongoing 

obligations with respect to Brady and Giglio” and promised to 

disclose any such materials. App. at 25. Shortly before 

Marshall appeared as a witness, the government gave the 

defense several documents relating to his expected testimony, 

including grand jury transcripts, police reports, and his plea 

agreement. Two weeks after trial, however, the government 

 

1

 The district court also imposed $69,000 in restitution jointly and 

severally on Emor, Simmons, Marshall, Ralph, and Jalloh, and 

granted Emor’s motion to remain free on bond pending appeal. 

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informed Emor that it had failed to disclose audio and video 

recordings of a July 2002 interview the D.C. Metropolitan 

Police Department had conducted with Marshall. In a letter 

accompanying copies of these recordings, the prosecutor 

acknowledged that the recordings should have been turned 

over during the trial, explained that they were inadvertently 

overlooked, and asserted that Marshall’s 2002 statements 

were consistent with the other documents disclosed prior to 

his trial testimony. “Out of an abundance of caution,” the 

government also provided Emor with two investigative 

reports prepared by John Karr, an inspector for Gateway, 

which include a summary of Marshall’s 2002 interview. App. 

at 36 (Letter from U.S. Attorney’s Office to Counsel for 

Appellant). 

Based on these post-trial disclosures, as well as a 

contention that the evidence at trial went beyond the 

timeframe set out in the indictment, Emor filed a series of 

motions—for declaration of a mistrial, for judgment of 

acquittal, and for a new trial—each of which the district court 

denied. In denying Emor’s motion for a new trial, the court 

highlighted two potential discrepancies between Marshall’s 

2002 interview with police and his trial testimony. First, 

Marshall’s 2002 account of a telephone conversation he had 

with Emor contained no reference to Emor suggesting he 

would lie to investigators and claim he had purchased the 

computers legitimately, as Marshall later testified at trial. See 

Tr. of Mot. Hr’g 34 (Mar. 20, 2007). Second, Marshall did not 

mention in the 2002 interview that Emor knew the computers 

were stolen, as he later testified at trial. Id. The court 

characterized these inconsistencies as omissions rather than 

lies and determined Marshall had been so thoroughly 

impeached during cross-examination that timely production of 

his 2002 interview would not have changed the outcome of 

the trial. Id. at 35–36. 

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In denying Emor’s motion for declaration of mistrial 

based on the alleged variance between the indictment’s 

timeline and the government’s proof at trial, the district court 

noted that when Emor first objected to the introduction of 

evidence regarding early stages of the conspiracy, the court 

“reserved ruling and asked [him] to provide authority for his 

position.” United States v. Emor, No. 06-0064, at 1 (Feb. 7, 

2007) (Memorandum Order). Although Emor never provided 

any such authority, see id., the court proceeded to address his 

renewed motion at the conclusion of trial. Framing the 

question as whether Emor “was prejudiced by unfair surprise 

as to evidence of conduct outside the charged period,” id. at 4, 

the court pointed to materials turned over to the defense 

weeks before trial identifying the conspiracy as having begun 

in 1998 and concluded that Emor had not sustained his burden 

of showing prejudice, see id. at 2–5. 

II. 

Emor appeals his conviction, arguing that the 

government’s untimely disclosures violate both Brady and the 

Jencks Act, and that each violation requires a new trial. We 

discuss each argument in turn. 

A. 

Emor contends that the government’s failure to turn over 

recordings of Marshall’s 2002 police interview constitutes a 

Brady violation and warrants a new trial. Brady requires the 

government to disclose, upon request, material evidence 

favorable to a criminal defendant. 373 U.S. at 87. This duty 

includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence held by 

law enforcement officials. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. We 

review de novo whether the government has breached its 

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obligations under Brady. United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 

590, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

There are three components of a Brady violation: “The 

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). The parties 

agree that Emor has satisfied the first two components—that 

is, the prosecution inadvertently suppressed impeaching 

evidence in the form of Marshall’s 2002 police interview. See 

Br. of Appellee at 22. At issue is whether the nondisclosure 

resulted in prejudice to Emor. 

 

To satisfy the prejudice component, “the withheld 

evidence must be ‘material;’ that is, there must be ‘a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.’” United States v. Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 488 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280). Emor argues 

that the withheld recordings are material because they would 

have assisted in impeaching Marshall at trial. The government 

responds that because Marshall had already been impeached, 

his 2002 interview could have been used only for cumulative 

impeachment and would not have affected the outcome. 

Evidence is material if “the undisclosed information 

could have substantially affected the efforts of defense 

counsel to impeach the witness, thereby calling into question 

the fairness of the ultimate verdict.” United States v. Cuffie, 

80 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. 

Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Cumulative 

impeachment evidence is generally not material because the 

marginal effect of additional impeachment is relatively small 

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and unlikely to result in a different outcome. See Oruche, 484 

F.3d at 599 (failure to disclose witness’s admission she lied to 

police was not Brady violation because the witness was 

“thoroughly impeached” at trial). The simple “fact that other 

impeachment evidence was available to defense counsel,” 

however, “does not render additional impeachment evidence 

immaterial.” Smith, 77 F.3d at 515 (quoting United States v. 

O’Conner, 64 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1995)). We have 

emphasized that “undisclosed impeachment evidence can be 

immaterial because of its cumulative nature only if the 

witness was already impeached at trial by the same kind of 

evidence.” Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 517. 

Emor identifies two primary ways in which he could have 

impeached Marshall with the undisclosed evidence. Armed 

with the July 2002 police interview, he might have sought to 

discredit Marshall’s trial testimony that those who purchased 

the stolen computers “knew [they] were hot,” Trial Tr. 231 

(Dec. 19, 2006), with Marshall’s prior, more benign 

suggestion to police that Emor was simply buying a large 

number of computers and “would get a price at a discount for 

purchasing in bulk,” App. at 45 (Transcript of Marshall 

Interview). Emor might also have sought to cast doubt on 

Marshall’s suggestion at trial that Emor effectively promised 

to lie to the authorities and “say he bought all these computers 

legitimately [and] wrote checks to [Ralph] for them,” Trial Tr. 

245 (Dec. 19, 2006), by pointing out that Marshall had not 

previously mentioned any such comment when recounting the 

same conversation during his 2002 interview. 

As the government notes, however, Marshall’s credibility 

was thoroughly impeached by numerous admissions that he 

had previously lied in attempting to cover up or minimize 

various aspects of the conspiracy to protect himself and other 

conspirators. During cross-examination, Marshall admitted to 

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lying under oath in a separate proceeding about the date on 

which he introduced Ralph to Emor. See id. at 253–57. 

Marshall also admitted to lying to inspectors when he initially 

said he never collected any money from Emor, when he stated 

that all the computers were shipped directly from Ralph to 

Emor, and when he suggested he knew nothing about 

shipments to Emor prior to 2000. Id. at 258, 264–65. In each 

instance, defense counsel impeached Marshall on the basis of 

inconsistent prior statements made to government inspectors 

in the course of their investigations. This impeachment used 

the same type of evidence—namely, government interview 

and investigation records showing Marshall initially lied 

about various aspects of the conspiracy—as Marshall’s July 

2002 interview with police investigators. Evidence Marshall 

lied to an investigator regarding two aspects of a conspiracy 

about which he was repeatedly impeached for lying to 

investigators does not constitute a different “kind of 

evidence” that would have meaningfully changed the jury’s 

assessment of his credibility, see Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 518. 

Timely disclosure of Marshall’s 2002 police interview would 

not have “substantially affected the efforts of defense counsel 

to impeach the witness,” id. at 517, and thus the government’s 

nondisclosure does not raise doubt about the fairness of the 

jury’s verdict. 

Nor were either of the two ways Emor identifies for using 

the undisclosed evidence for impeachment likely to have 

materially assisted his defense. Marshall’s statement at trial, 

that Emor told him he planned to tell the authorities he 

“bought all these computers legitimately,” Trial Tr. 245 (Dec. 

19, 2006), was not itself inculpatory. Indeed, that is exactly 

what Emor did tell authorities and what his counsel argued at 

trial. Marshall did not testify that Emor told him he planned to 

lie about the legitimacy of the purchase. Hence, impeaching 

Marshall’s testimony by sowing doubt that Emor had 

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previously said he planned to say the purchases were 

legitimate would not have advanced Emor’s defense. 

Moreover, had he wished to cast doubt on Marshall’s 

testimony that Emor indicated he would tell investigators he 

purchased the computers legitimately, defense counsel could 

have done so by referring to Marshall’s interview with Postal 

Inspector Marydith Newman, in which he likewise made no 

mention of that conversation. See Mem. of Interview 3 (Dec. 

1, 2005); see also Smith, 77 F.3d at 515 (suggesting we must 

look not only to the ways defense counsel was able to 

impeach a witness but also “to the ways in which the witness’ 

testimony was allowed to stand unchallenged”). 

Emor suggests the July 2002 interview is also 

exculpatory because Marshall stated that Emor “was pretty 

much buying [the computers] at wholesale rate,” App. at 45 

(Transcript of Marshall Interview), consistent with Emor’s 

defense that he legitimately took advantage of Ralph’s 

employee discount and purchased the computers at belowmarket prices, see Br. of Appellant at 28–29. But the 

prosecution did turn over Detective Vincent Tucci’s summary 

of the July 2002 interview before trial, which included a 

report of the same statement by Marshall. See MPD 

Investigative Supplement Report at 2 (July 16, 2002) (“Mr. 

Marshall also told investigators that Mr. Charles 

Emor[] . . . was purchasing systems in bulk and at a reduced 

price . . . .”). Emor has not shown why cross-examination 

using recordings of the interview would have been anything 

more than cumulative of the cross-examination he could have 

conducted using Detective Tucci’s notes of that interview. 

We also note, as does the government, that although 

Emor could have used the recordings or notes to impeach 

Marshall, he could not have used them as substantive 

evidence under the hearsay rules because the taped statement 

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was not “given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at 

a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition,” FED.

R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); see also United States v. Livingston, 

661 F.2d 239, 242–44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversible error to 

allow use of prior unsworn statement to a postal inspector as 

substantive evidence). Emor maintains that had he been able 

to confront Marshall with the statement during crossexamination, “Marshall may well have conceded that that 

was, indeed, the truth.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 4. In the 

face of such a claim, we must inquire into “how effectively 

the evidence could have been used in cross-examination.” 

United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

There is little reason to suppose Marshall would have 

stood by his initial suggestion to police that Emor was merely 

purchasing computers at a legitimate wholesale rate. His trial 

testimony provided much circumstantial evidence that the 

purchases were anything but legitimate. Marshall admitted 

that he personally delivered the redirected computers to 

various secondary buyers, Trial Tr. 223 (Dec. 19, 2006), that 

purchasers often paid for the computers in cash, id. at 232, 

that many of the transactions took place at convenience stores 

and fast food restaurants, id. at 225, 228, that he instructed 

buyers not to register the computers with Gateway, id. at 231, 

that he personally oversaw repairs and technical service, id. at 

232, and that the computers were sold for extremely low 

prices, id. Indeed, Marshall specifically admitted to knowing 

the computers were stolen, id. at 229, and explained that the 

purchasers “knew that the computers were hot,” id. at 231. 

And even were it not contradicted by his trial testimony, 

Marshall’s 2002 reference to a “wholesale” price, App. at 45 

(Transcript of Marshall Interview), provides little direct 

support for Emor’s defense that he was merely taking 

advantage of Ralph’s “employee discount,” see Trial Tr. 532–

33 (Dec. 20, 2006), because the two forms of below-retail 

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purchasing are conceptually and practically distinct. In short, 

Emor failed to demonstrate that anything from Marshall’s 

2002 interview “could reasonably be taken to put the whole 

case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in 

the verdict,” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).2 

B. 

Emor also argues that the government’s failure to timely 

disclose Marshall’s July 2002 interview violates the Jencks 

Act and warrants a new trial. The Jencks Act requires the 

government to disclose any prior “statement” made by a 

prosecution witness that “relates to the subject matter as to 

which the witness has testified.” 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).3

 We 

review de novo whether the Jencks Act applies. United States 

v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996). When a 

Jencks Act violation has occurred, we apply the harmless 

error standard to determine whether a new trial is appropriate. 

 

2

 Because a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of newly 

discovered evidence must show that the evidence “would probably

produce an acquittal,” United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 593 

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 

653 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (emphasis added)), Emor’s suggestion that the 

recent discovery of Marshall’s July 2002 interview warrants a new 

trial even under this admittedly higher standard, see Br. of 

Appellant at 36, likewise fails. 

3

 The statute defines “statement” to include “(1) a written statement 

made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved 

by him; (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 

recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially 

verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and 

recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral 

statement; or (3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a 

transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3500(e). 

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United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 310 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991). 

Assuming the government’s failure to disclose recordings 

of Marshall’s 2002 police interview violated the Jencks Act, 

which neither party disputes, Emor is not entitled to relief 

because the violation was harmless. As discussed above, 

Marshall’s 2002 statements would have assisted Emor only in 

further impeaching an already impeached witness. Thus, as 

we have already concluded in our Brady analysis, the 

government’s failure to disclose the recordings did not affect 

the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Carter, 70 F.3d 

146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“If the unproduced statement 

could not have assisted the defense in cross-examining the 

witness, there is no reason for the trial court to order a mistrial 

or for an appellate court to reverse a conviction.”). 

Emor also argues the government committed a Jencks 

Act violation with respect to investigative reports authored by 

John Karr, a prosecution witness who worked as an inspector 

for Gateway. Only the first two pages of Karr’s second 

investigative report relate to his testimony at trial and are thus 

within the scope of the Jencks Act. Compare App. at 60–61 

(Report of July 17, 2002), with Trial Tr. 363–73 (Dec. 19, 

2006). See also Norinsberg Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 47 

F.3d 1224, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that the 

“relates to” provision of the Jencks Act includes only “the 

subject matter as to which the witness has testified” and not 

the “subject matter of the proceeding” generally). And Emor 

has not identified any information contained in these pages 

that conflicts with Karr’s trial testimony. 

Even were we to conclude that the full content of both 

Karr reports constitutes Jencks material, Emor has failed to 

show that withholding those reports was in fact harmful to his 

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case. For example, although he suggests that information in 

the Karr reports about Jalloh’s involvement in the scheme 

would have prompted the defense to interview and obtain 

exculpatory material from Jalloh, Emor was aware that Jalloh 

pleaded guilty as a co-conspirator and received Jalloh’s plea 

agreement documents months prior to trial. See 

Norinsberg, 47 F.3d at 1230 (finding harmless the failure to 

disclose Jencks material when “the [information sought] 

merely duplicate[s] matter already in the defendant’s 

possession”) (alterations in original); Landry v. FDIC, 204 

F.3d 1125, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding harmless the failure 

to disclose Jencks materials that effectively “duplicate other 

evidence in the record”). Likewise, Emor’s contention that a 

supposed discrepancy between the “122 computers” the 

investigating detective suggested were delivered to Marshall’s 

address and the “169 packages” described in Karr’s second 

report would have called into question “the thoroughness and 

good faith of the government’s investigation,” Br. of 

Appellant at 33 n.10, is unconvincing because the precise 

number of computers shipped to Marshall was never at issue 

during trial. See Norinsberg, 47 F.3d at 1230 (suggesting that 

whether such an error is harmless involves determining 

“whether Jencks material could have been used effectively in 

defense of the charge”). In short, Emor has failed to show that 

disclosure of the Karr reports would have affected the trial’s 

outcome, and therefore any error in failing to produce them 

after his testimony on direct examination was harmless. 

III. 

 Finally, Emor contends that a variance between the 

timeline set forth in his indictment and the years for which the 

government presented evidence at trial resulted in substantial 

prejudice and requires a new trial. The first count of the 

indictment alleged a conspiracy “[f]rom between in or about 

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December, 2000, until in or about May, 2002” among Emor, 

Simmons, Marshall, Ralph, Jalloh, and others. App. at 2 

(Indictment). In its response to Emor’s request for a bill of 

particulars, the government asserted that “the indictment 

defines the defendant’s role in the charged conspiracy in a 

manner sufficient to avoid surprise and permit the defendant 

to prepare a defense.” App. at 26. According to Emor, the 

prosecution’s case went beyond the bounds set by the 

indictment. The government, he contends, “chang[ed] its 

theory of prosecution” at trial “by adding a two-year period of 

the alleged conspiracy” during 1998 and 1999, and thereby 

“severely prejudiced [his] ability to meet those new 

allegations.” Br. of Appellant at 38. Without notice of the 

accusations against him and others during those early years, 

often referred to as “Phase 1” of the conspiracy, Emor claims 

he was unable to gather evidence to show “that the activity 

attributed to him in 1998 and 1999 actually involved Mr. 

Jalloh, not him,” Reply Br. of Appellant at 15, and “to 

disprove the newly alleged timeframe and the whole ‘Phase 1’ 

theory,” Br. of Appellant at 38. 

“A variance between the allegations of the indictment 

and the proof at trial constitutes grounds for reversal only if 

the appellant proves (1) that the evidence at trial established 

facts materially variant from those alleged in the indictment, 

and (2) that the variance caused substantial prejudice.” United 

States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In 

particular, a discrepancy between the facts alleged in an 

indictment and the evidence actually proffered may be cause 

for a new trial if the divergence prejudiced the defendant by 

depriving him “of notice of the details of the charge against 

him,” United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 

1991) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1072 

(D.C. Cir. 1969)). 

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Emor had notice that the evidence at trial would include 

testimony about the early years of the scheme. Despite 

Emor’s contention that the government “ambush[ed]” him 

with new information relating to the first phase of the 

conspiracy, Br. of Appellant at 38, materials disclosed prior to 

trial indicated that prosecution witnesses would identify the 

scheme as having begun in 1998. More than six weeks prior 

to trial, the government provided Emor with Simmons’s plea 

agreement and statement of offense, which clearly identified 

the conspiracy as having started prior to 2000 and mentioned 

Emor, using his initials, as one of those to whom “many of the 

stolen computers went.” R. Material Tab 8, Exhibit 2 at 1 

(Statement of Offense for Simmons). A week before trial, the 

government also provided the defense with notes from a 

postal inspector’s interview with Simmons, who indicated the 

conspiracy started in 1998 and said Emor provided “a lot of 

addresses” for the diverted computers. R. Material Tab 8, 

Exhibit 3 at 1–2 (Memorandum of Interview with Simmons). 

Indeed, the defense did not object when, during its opening 

statement, the government described the conspiracy as 

beginning “all the way back in 1998” and stated that Emor 

was involved in the scheme during “those first couple of 

years.” Trial Tr. 104–05 (Dec. 18, 2006). Instead, defense 

counsel agreed in his own opening statement that “the 

evidence in this case will establish that in 1998 Dwayne 

Simmons and Michael Ralph agreed to steal Gateway 

computers,” id. at 110, and sought to confront the Phase 1 

issue by arguing that Emor “didn’t know Mr. Ralph or Mr. 

Simmons in 1998,” id. at 111. 

Regardless of whether Emor was sufficiently apprised in 

advance of trial that the government believed the conspiracy 

began in 1998, “this is not a case where the Government’s 

evidence allowed a defendant to be convicted of a different 

conspiracy or offense than that alleged in the indictment,” 

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16 

United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008). 

The indictment contained a detailed description of the alleged 

conspiracy, including its members, its goals, its means of 

operation, and a catalogue of overt acts taken in furtherance of 

the scheme. See App. at 1–5 (Indictment). The government’s 

documentary evidence—including phone, bank, and shipping 

records—related to overt acts within the timeframe set out in 

the indictment. All critical aspects of the conspiracy remained 

unchanged throughout its existence, and the precise timing of 

the criminal scheme was not a material element either in the 

indictment or during trial. Moreover, the jury instruction 

regarding the conspiracy contained the same dates as the 

indictment. Trial Tr. 600 (Dec. 20, 2006) (explaining that the 

government was required to prove, inter alia, that “between 

December 2000 and May 2002, an agreement existed between 

two or more people to commit the crime of mail fraud . . .”). 

Emor has not identified a divergence between the indictment 

and the evidence on which his conviction was based that 

would have caused substantial prejudice. Cf. United States v. 

Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that 

a variance is grounds for reversal only if the defendant shows 

he was substantially prejudiced by, for example, “the spillover 

effect” of evidence from other conspiracies or activities to 

which he was not a party). 

The primary issue at trial was whether Emor knew the 

computers he acquired were stolen. Emor has not provided 

any reason for us to conclude that the government’s evidence 

with respect to the early stages of the conspiracy prejudiced 

his ability to assert that defense. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 110–13 

(Dec. 18, 2006) (defense counsel acknowledging that the 

conspiracy commenced in 1998 and arguing that Emor had no 

knowledge the computers were stolen). In fact, as the 

government notes, trial testimony by several cooperating 

witnesses regarding the initial phase of the scheme was 

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thoroughly impeached by earlier inconsistent statements in 

which each claimed the conspiracy did not start before 2000. 

If anything, inclusion at trial of testimony pertaining to Phase 

1 of the conspiracy inured to Emor’s benefit by casting some 

doubt on the entire testimony of these witnesses. Any 

variance between the timeline in his indictment and the years 

for which evidence was presented at trial did not result in 

substantial prejudice to Emor’s defense. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is 

Affirmed. 

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