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Parties Involved:
Charles K. Love
Appellee
Paul J. McBreen
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United Stawa Co~rt <?f Appeals Tenth C1rcmt 

UNITED STATES COIURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB 2 61988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

PAUL J. MCBREEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CHARLES K. LOVE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 85-2913 

(D.C. Civ. No. 85-M'-240) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before McKAY, BALDOCK, and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

Paul J. McBreen filed suit in the United States District 

Court for the District of Colorado against Charles K. Love seeking 

damages in the amount of $750,000 for personal injuri~s sustained 

when he was struck by a motor vehicle driven by Love. 

Jurisdiction was based on diversity. 28 u.s.c. § 1332. 

McBreen alleged in his complaint that he was hit while 

standing on the shoulder of Interstate 70 when Love drove his 

vehicle in a negligent manner, losing control of his vehicle and 

failing to give any warning. In addition to so-called common-law 

negligence, McBreen also alleged that Love violated two Colorado 

statutes, i.e., C.R.S. § 42-4-707, requiring drivers to exercise 

"due care" toward pedestrians and to "give warning by sounding the 

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horn when necessary," and C.R.S. § 42-4-1204, which provides that 

one who drives in a "careless and imprudent manner is 

guilty of careless driving." 

By answer, Love denied any negligence on his part, 

affirmatively alleged sole or comparative negligence by McBreen, 

and further alleged that his actions "were reasonable when he was 

faced with a sudden emergency through no fault of his own." 

Trial by jury resulted in a special verdict wherein the jury 

found that although McBreen had suffered physical injuries, 

defendant Love was "not negligent." Based on that verdict, the 

district court entered judgment for Love. McBreen's motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial was denied, 

and this appeal followed. Brief reference to the facts will place 

the contested matters in focus. 

The accident occurred on Interstate Highway 70 about one and 

one-half miles east of the Eisenhower Tunnel in the late afternoon 

on March 6, 1981, during a snowstorm. McBreen and Love had been 

skiing on that date and both were returning to Denver, Colorado, 

proceeding in an easterly direction on I-70. 

The roads on the western side of the tunnel were dry, but 

both McBreen and Love encountered snow and wet, if not yet slick, 

road conditions as they exited the tunnel on the east. McBreen 

exited I-70 at the Loveland Pass exit, stopped for a few minutes, 

and then returned his vehicle to I-70, using first the access road 

and then the acceleration lane. While in the acceleration lane, 

McBreen decided to pull his Toyota Landcruiser off to the right 

side and put his vehicle in four-wheel drive by "engaging" the 

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hubs on the front wheels. At this particular point there were 

three lanes of travel in an easterly direction--the acceleration 

lane on the extreme right-hand side, a second lane to the north of 

the acceleration lane, and, further north, a third lane--and then 

a center median. 

McBreen testified that he pulled off on the gravel shoulder 

to the right of the acceleration lane, and he and a passenger got 

out of the vehicle, the passenger for the purpose of "warning" 

cars following their vehicle. Other witnesses, however, placed 

the McBreen vehicle in the acceleration lane, and not on the 

shoulder. 

front wheel. 

and McBreen 

In any event, McBreen "engaged" the hub on the left 

A Subaru vehicle came sliding by McBreen's vehicle 

was able to ward it off with his hands, this vehicle 

coming to rest more or less parallel to the McBreen vehicle. As 

McBreen went around the rear of his vehicle, he was struck by a 

Mazda automobile driven by Love. McBreen's passenger yelled a 

split second before the contact, but it was too late. McBreen 

himself saw the Mazda just before impact and jumped onto the hood 

of the oncoming vehicle, managing to get his body and left leg up 

and out of the way; but his right leg was caught between the front 

end of the Mazda and the rear end of the Toyota. McBreen 

sustained severe injuries to his right leg. 

Love testified that the roads were dry west of the tunnel, 

but that as he progressed through the tunnel he was warned by 

signs that the roads on the east side of the tunnel were icy and 

that it was snowing. He testified that he was in the extreme left 

lane for east bound traffic, following another vehicle that was 

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about fifty feet in front of him. According to Love, about one 

and one-half miles east of the tunnel the driver of the car ahead 

of him applied his brakes and fishtailed a bit, but continued on 

in the same lane. Love then tested his brakes, fishtailed, lost 

control of his vehicle, slid into the rear of the Toyota, and then 

came in contact with the Subaru vehicle stopped alongside the 

Toyota, with the three cars corning to rest in a triangle of sorts. 

Love stated that he didn't see anyone behind the Toyota until the 

last split second and that he did not have time to sound his horn 

before pinning McBreen's right leg between the vehicles. 

On appeal, McBreen raises four grounds for reversal. First, 

based on the district court's instruction to the jury that a state 

statute requires a driver to exercise due care to avoid striking a 

pedestrian and to "give warning by sounding the horn when 

necessary" and, further, that a violation of the statute 

constitutes "negligence," the jury's answer in the special verdict 

that Love was not negligent is contrary to the law and the facts, 

Love having admitted that he never sounded his horn. Second, it 

was error to instruct the jury on "sudden emergency." Third, it 

was error for the district court to refuse McBreen's tendered 

instruction based on Colorado's "careless driving" statute. 

Fourth, the jury's finding of "no negligence" is inconsistent with 

the evidence. We will discuss these matters separately, but we 

shall treat "sudden emergency" first, since we believe it to be 

the central issue. 

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Sudden Emergency 

Upon request, and over objection, the 

instructed the jury as follows: 

district 

A person who, through no fault of his own, is placed in 

a sudden emergency is not chargeable with negligence if 

he exercises that degree of care which a reasonably 

careful person would have exercised under the same or 

similar circumstances. 

court 

The giving or refusal to give tendered instructions in a 

diversity case is a matter of procedure governed by federal law 

and rules. Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 

1984). Under federal law, an instruction is properly given if 

supported by competent evidence; only where there is sufficient 

evidence to support an issue or theory is the party offering an 

instruction entitled to have the instruction given. Further, the 

question of whether an incorrect instruction given in a diversity 

case is prejudicially erroneous is governed by federal procedural 

law. Id. 

A determination of the substance of a jury instruction in a 

diversity case, however, is a matter of state law. Whether 

evidence exists to support a party's theory may only be determined 

by considering the evidence with respect to the legal principle 

that it was introduced to support. Achin v. Begg Tire Center, 694 

F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1982). Therefore, we look to Colorado 

negligence law to determine the propriety of the sudden emergency 

instruction given in this case. 

The doctrine of sudden emergency is well recognized under 

Colorado law as a "valid principle" bearing on allegedly negligent 

conduct attributed to one who finds himself confronted with an 

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emergency choice. The reasoning behind the doctrine is that in 

case of an emergency there is inadequate time for cool, thoughtful 

deliberation where alternative courses of action might be weighed 

and an intelligent choice made; on the contrary, the actor must 

make a speedy decision based upon his perception of the compelling 

circumstances. Davis v. Cline, 177 Colo. 204, 493 P.2d 362 

(1972). See also Cudney v. Moore, 163 Colo. 30, 428 P.2d 81 

(1967); Daigle v. Prather, 152 Colo. 115, 380 P.2d 670 (1963). 

McBreen, as we understand it, concedes that the doctrine of 

sudden emergency is recognized under Colorado law, but argues, 

initially, that the evidence does not warrant the giving of the 

instruction. Alternatively, counsel argues that in the instant 

case Love himself created any ''emergency" and in such circumstance 

he cannot avail himself of the doctrine. We are not in accord. 

Our reading of Love's testimony convinces us that the district 

court did not err in giving an instruction on sudden emergency, 

and that whether there was, or was not, a sudden emergency, and, 

if so, whether Love caused the emergency, were questions to be 

resolved by the trier of the facts. 

As a variation of this particular argument, counsel argues 

that the district court erred in rejecting his instruction to the 

effect that the jury could not even consider sudden emergency 

until it first determined whether Love's own conduct created the 

emergency. The court's instruction on sudden emergency was that 

provided in Colo. Jury Instr. - Civ. 2d 9:10 (1980). Where the 

standard jury instruction sufficiently apprises the jury of the 

applicability of the doctrine, rejection of a supplemental 

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instruction which merely elaborates without significant 

contribution to the clear statement of the law contained in the 

given instruction is correct. Downing v. Lillibridge, 39 Colo. 

App. 231, 566 P.2d 714 (1977), cert. denied. In our view, this 

matter was adequately covered in the instruction given the jury, 

which stated that a "person who, through no fault of his own, is 

placed in a sudden emergency ... " (emphasis added). 

In his brief, counsel seems to suggest that although sudden 

emergency may be properly considered in connection with common-law 

negligence, it is inappropriate where there is a violation of a 

state statute constituting negligence~ se. No authority is 

cited for this proposition, and hence we need not here decide that 

particular matter. We would note, however, that the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts§ 288A indicates that an excused violation of a 

statute is not negligence, and unless the statute in question 

permits no excuse, a violation may be excused where one is 

confronted with an emergency not due to his own misconduct. See 

also Eddy v. McAninch, 141 Colo. 223, 347 P.2d 499 (1959), where 

the Colorado Supreme Court quoted with approval language from an 

earlier Colorado case to the effect that although a violation of 

state statute or municipal ordinance passed for the protection of 

the public is negligence ~ se, it is not an inflexible rule 

applicable to every conceivable situation. Further, from the 

record before us it does not appear that McBreen requested the 

district court to limit the sudden emergency instruction to 

common-law negligence. 

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Sounding the Horn 

As indicated, the district court instructed the jury that 

Colorado statutory law requires a driver to give warning of an 

imminent accident involving a pedestrian by sounding his horn, and 

further, that a violation of that statute constitutes negligence. 

From that instruction counsel proceeds to theorize that since Love 

conceded he did not blow his horn, the jury's answer to the 

special interrogatory that Love was not negligent was contrary to 

the instruction. This is too simplistic. It is axiomatic that 

the instructions must be considered together as a whole, and no 

one instruction can be read in isolation. Counsel's argument 

ignores the instruction on sudden emergency, and, under that 

instruction, the jury could find that Love had no time to sound 

his horn before the impact and thus exercised reasonable care in 

response to the sudden emergency. Certainly such was a question 

of fact. 

Careless Driving 

McBreen tendered an instruction based on C.R.S. § 42-4-1204, 

which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

(1) Any person who drives any motor vehicle ... in a 

careless and imprudent manner, without due regard for 

the width, grade, curves, corners, traffic, and use of 

the streets and highways and all other attendant 

circumstances is guilty of careless driving. 

The district court refused to give the tendered instruction 

on the ground that the evidence did not justify the giving of such 

an instruction, i.e., there was insufficient evidence that Love 

was guilty of careless driving. 

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In People v. Chapman, 192 Colo. 322, 323, 557 P.2d 1211, 1213 

(1977), the Colorado Supreme Court stated that "[t]he mental 

element of careless driving is, in essence, negligence, i.e., the 

'careless and imprudent' frame of mind indicating the absence of 

due care." The court in Chapman was concerned with the same 

statute as are we, i.e., C.R.S. § 42-04-1204(1). Counsel argues 

that if careless driving is negligence, and that if there was 

sufficient evidence to require the submission to the jury of the 

issue of negligence, there would, a fortiori, be sufficient 

evidence to require an instruction based on the careless driving 

statute. Be all that as it may, in our view any possible error in 

this regard was harmless error as the matter of careless driving 

was adequately covered by another instruction given the jury. 

An instruction based on C.R.S. § 42-4-707 was given the jury 

and that instruction advised the jury that the driver of a motor 

vehicle must exercise "due care'' to avoid striking a pedestrian 

and further that the driver should give warning to a pedestrian by 

sounding the horn when necessary. That same instruction further 

stated that a violation of the statute constituted negligence, 

though it could not be considered unless it was a cause of the 

claimed injuries. 

In the instant case, at the time of the accident, McBreen was 

a pedestrian, and he was so described in the complaint. The 

instruction given, in our view, adequately informed the jury that 

Love had a statutory duty to use "due care" to avoid striking 

McBreen, and that a violation of the statute constituted 

negligence. The statute requiring a driver of a motor vehicle to 

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exercise ''due care" towards a pedestrian is violated when the 

driver does not exercise "due care," and a failure to exercise 

"due care" is "careless driving." § 42-4-707 commands a driver to 

use "due care," and§ 42-4-1204(1) prohibits one from "careless 

driving." The former, which is specific in nature, states the 

statutory duty in the affirmative, and the latter, which is 

general in nature, states basically the same duty in the negative. 

Inconsistent Verdict 

Counsel's final argument is that the jury's verdict is simply 

"inconsistent'' with the evidence and that the district court erred 

in denying McBreen's motion for judgment n.o.v. We do not agree. 

Judgment n.o.v. is appropriate in very limited circumstances, 

and is only proper where the evidence and all the inferences to be 

drawn therefrom are so patent that reasonable minds could not 

differ as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. Symons v. 

Mueller Company, 493 F.2d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1974). Such is not 

the case here. 

McBreen's theory of the case was that Love drove too fast for 

the conditions, slid down the mountain road, and pinned him 

between the two cars. Love's theory of the case was that in the 

adverse weather conditions McBreen stopped his vehicle to engage 

the hub in his four-wheel drive where he shouldn't have, that he 

(Love) proceeded with due care, and only because of the emergency 

created by the car preceding him and the weather conditions did 

his vehicle get out of control. Counsel emphasized that the 

vehicle ahead of Love had a driving problem because of road 

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• • 

conditions and had fishtailed, and that a Subaru also got out of 

control and narrowly missed striking McBreen's vehicle. Our study 

of the transcript convinces us that both McBreen and Love were 

capably represented at trial, that the instructions were adequate, 

and that six jurors simply saw it differently than did McBreen, or 

his counsel. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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Entered for the Court: 

Robert H. McWilliams, 

Circuit Judge 

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