Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03250/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03250-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diana L. Mason
Appellee
Texaco, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

PUBLISH United St.ates Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DIANA L. MASON, Individually and as 

Administrator of the Estate of OTIS 

MASON, Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TEXACO, INC. , 

Defendant-Appellant. 

w. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

NOV 18 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

Nos. 90-3250 

and 90-3278 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 78-1337-T) 

Gerald L. Michaud of Michaud, Hutton & Bradshaw and Richard D. 

Cordry of Cordry & Hartman (Marlys· A. Marshall with them on the 

brief), Wichita, Kansas, attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Joseph w. Morris (James M. Sturdivant and Richard B. Noulles with 

him on the brief) of Gable & Gotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Ken M. 

Peterson (Robert w. Coykendall and Diane s. Worth with him on the 

brief) of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chartered, 

Wichita, Kansas, (Arthur R. Miller, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 

Massachusetts, and Eric w. Wiechmann and William H. Narwold of 

Cummings & Lockwood, Harford, Connecticut, with them on the 

brief), attorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 1 
Texaco, Inc. (Texaco) appeals from a products (benzene) 

liability judgment following a jury trial, awarding plaintiff 

Diana L. Mason, (Mason), individually and as Administrator of the 

Estate of Otis w. Mason, (Butch), Deceased, $9,025,000 in actual 

damages, and $25,000,000 in punitive damages. The claims of 

personal injury and wrongful death were based upon Mason's 

contention that her husband, Butch, developed leukemia and died 

after being exposed to benzene produced and marketed by Texaco. 

Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship. 28 u.s.c. § 

1332. Texaco moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 

for a new trial. The motion was denied. This appeal followed. 

Our jurisdiction vests under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. Substantially 

for the reasons set forth in the district court's well-reasoned, 

47-page "Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Post Trial Motion," 

Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1472 (D. Kan. 1990), (Mason), 

we affirm with one exception. We shall remand to the district 

court with directions to enter a remittitur order on the award of 

punitive damages. 

Background 

In June, 1974, Butch and his young wife and child left 

Wichita, Kansas, for Yorktown, Virginia, where Butch had decided 

to serve in the United States Coast Guard. As a student in 

training, Butch was first exposed to benzene in the water and 

sediment class. He was taught to use a test kit sold by Gerin 

Corporation which was designed and used to test the levels of 

water and sediment in engine oil used in Coast Guard vessels. 

Benzene was a solvent used as a component of the test. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 2 
Butch died from leukemia on December 10, 1979. Mason was 

substituted as plaintiff in the personal injury action for pain 

and suffering and as plaintiff/administrator of Butch's estate in 

the wrongful death action. As regards the defendants, it was 

alleged that Butch had been exposed to benzene, manufactured and/ 

or distributed by them and that they had failed to properly and 

adequately warn him of the cancer risks from benzene exposure. 

At the conclusion of the four-month trial, the jury answered 

official verdict interrogatories, finding by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that: Butch's leukemia was caused by exposure to 

benzene; the benzene which caused Butch's leukemia was produced by 

Texaco; Texaco either knew or should have known of scientific 

knowledge that benzene was considered to be cancer causing at the 

time of Butch's exposure; Texaco's actions were insufficient to 

warn its immediate purchaser of benzene of its cancer propensity; 

Texaco did not take reasonable measures to determine that its 

immediate purchaser, Mellen, was capable of conveying adequate 

warning to others in the chain of distribution of benzene; and, 

Texaco's failure to adequately warn Mellen or to take reasonable 

measure to see that Mellen passed on an adequate warning was a 

direct cause of Butch's leukemia. 

Based upon fault at one hundred percent, the first jury 

attributed fault as follows: 

Otis Mason 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Gerin Corporation 

Dooner and Smith 

Mellen Chemicals 

Texaco, Inc. 

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3% 

26% 

25% 

5% 

6% 

35% 

Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 3 
The jury determined that the total actual damages on the 

wrongful death claim amounted to $3,500,000 based upon pecuniary 

damages of $3,475,000 and non-pecuniary (a $25,000 maximum under 

Kansas law) of $25,000. In addition, the jury returned a personal 

injury verdict of $5,000,000. The jury found that it was not 

appropriate to award punitive damages. Mason's motion for a new 

trial on the jury's denial of punitive damages was denied. 

Texaco appealed. Mason did not cross-appeal from the 

district court's denial of her motion for new trial on the jury's 

denial of an award of punitive damages. This court reversed and 

remanded for a new trial because of erroneous jury instructions 

which obligated Texaco, contrary to Kansas law, to take reasonable 

steps to "see that its distributor knew and complied with its duty 

to inform," and to "instruct and train [its] salesmen" in 

conveying the health warning. We concluded that these 

instructions imposed a greater duty on Texaco than Kansas law 

required. See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242, 246-48 (10th 

Cir. 1988), (Mason I). Our remand was general, reading "The 

judgment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for a new trial." 

Id. at 250. 

Upon remand, Texaco filed a motion to preclude the submission 

of punitive damages to the jury on retrial. Texaco argued then, 

as it does now, that the unappealed finding/ruling on punitive 

damages became the law of the case as a consequence of Mason's 

failure to preserve the issue by cross-appeal. The trial court 

denied Texaco's motion, finding that resubmission of the issue of 

punitive damages upon retrial was appropriate. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 4 
Following many pre-trial motion hearings and depositions, 

retrial commenced on September 26, 1989, and concluded with 

special verdict accompanied by interrogatories on January 24, 

1990, approximately a four-month trial. The jury answered special 

verdict interrogatories, finding that by a preponderance of the 

evidence: Butch's leukemia was caused by his exposure to benzene; 

the benzene produced by Texaco was the cause of Butch's leukemia; 

the benzene produced by other manufacturers did not contribute in 

part to Butch's leukemia; Texaco knew or should have known at the 

time of Butch's exposure to benzene that there existed scientific 

knowledge that benzene was cancer-causing; the actions taken by 

Texaco were insufficient and inadequate to warn Texaco's immediate 

purchaser, Mellen, of the dangerous carcinogenic propensity of 

benzene; Texaco did not take reasonable measures to determine that 

its immediate purchaser, Mellen, was capable of conveying adequate 

warning to others in the chain of distribution of benzene; 

Texaco's negligent failure to warn caused, either in whole or in 

part, Butch's exposure to benzene; and, considering all of the 

fault at one hundred percent, the evidence dictates that Texaco 

was 100% at fault and that none of the fault, as a contributing 

cause to Butch's leukemia, was attributable to Ashland Chemical, 

Union Amoco, Mellen Chemicals, Dooner & Smith, Gerin Corp., U.S. 

Coast Guard or Butch. 

The jury awarded Mason and her children $5,000,000 pecuniary 

damages and $25,000 (maximum allowable) non-pecuniary damages in 

their wrongful death action. The jury also awarded $4,000,000 for 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 5 
personal injuries suffered by Butch before his death. Finally, 

the jury awarded $25,000,000 against Texaco as punitive damages. 

The district court entered judgment in favor of Mason for 

$9,025,000 compensatory damages and $25,000,000 in punitive 

damages for a total award of $34,025,000. Texaco moved for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for 

a new trial. The motion was denied by the district court. See 

Mason, supra. 

Contentions on Appeal 

On appeal, Texaco contends that: (1) the trial court erred in 

retrying punitive damages, (2) because the Coast Guard's fault was 

undisputed, the trial court committed multiple critical errors in 

denying Texaco's motions for a directed verdict, judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, (3) the trial was 

permeated with error that cumulatively precluded Texaco from 

receiving a fair trial and constitutes reversible error, (4) the 

trial court erred by permitting speculation as to the source of 

benzene and by coercing the jury to reach a decision on that 

issue, and (5) the jury's findings of $9,025,000 actual damages 

and $25,000,000 punitive damages are excessive. 

The appellate contentions of error were raised and presented 

to the trial court in Texaco's motion for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district 

court dealt with each contention in detail in Mason, supra. 

Because we affirm, with one exception, substantially for the 

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reasons set forth in Mason, supra, our discussion shall be simply 

supplemental. 

I. 

Texaco argues that the trial court erred in retrying punitive 

damages. We review issues of law de novo. Boise City Farmers Coop v. Palmer, 780 F.2d 860, 866 (10th Cir. 1985). 

In support of its argument, Texaco contends that (a) 

established principles of finality and fundamental fairness 

prohibited a retrial of punitive damages, (b) the first trial 

afforded Mason a full and fair hearing of her punitive damage 

claim, (c) Mason had an obligation to cross-appeal to prevent the 

punitive damage determination from becoming final, (d) special 

jury verdicts, not infected by error, uniformly are given effect 

on retrial, (e) the only case directly on point prohibits retrial 

of punitive damages, (f) policies of fairness, judicial economy, 

and encouraging repose support limiting retrial of issues 

specifically decided, and (g) the improper relitigation of 

punitive damages made a fair trial of Texaco's liability and the 

amount of actual damages impossible. 

Although we shall discuss and decide Texaco's contentions, we 

observe that a decision rendered by this court which was not 

available to the district court or to the parties when they 

prepared their opening and reply briefs on appeal, controls the 

issue of the scope of the retrial in Mason and fully justifies the 

trial court's decision to retry the issue of punitive damages. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 7 
That decision is Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090 (10th 

Cir. 1991). 

In Wheeler, also a products liability diversity case, the 

jury found defendant John Deere 75% at fault and plaintiff 

Wheeler's employer 25% at fault. The jury calculated Wheeler's 

total damages at $3.1 million. The court entered judgment against 

John Deere for $2.3 million. Defendant John Deere appealed. We 

reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial 

court committed reversible error in key evidentiary rulings. See 

Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1415 (10th Cir. 1988). 

At the second trial, the jury found John Deere 68% at fault 

and Wheeler's employer 32% at fault. The jury assessed damages at 

$2,883,407. The district court entered judgment against John 

Deere in amount of $1,960,717. Plaintiff Wheeler appealed, 

contending, inter alia, that because John Deere did not appeal 

from the first jury's damages award of $2,325,000, he was entitled 

to that sum instead of the second jury's award of $1,960,717. We 

rejected this contention and held: 

This argument overlooks our reversal in Wheeler I. 

To 'reverse' a judgment means to 'overthrow, vacate, set 

aside, make void, annul, repeal, or revoke it.' Black's 

Law Dictionary, 1319 (6th Ed. 1990). A judgment 

reversed by a higher court is 'without any validity, 

force or effect, and ought never to have existed.' 

Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240 .•. (1891). See Leroy 

v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1990); 

Rika v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 533 F.2d 1053, 1054 

(8th Cir. 1976). Reversal of a judgment and remand for 

a new trial places the parties in the same position, 

insofar as relief is concerned, as if the case had never 

been tried. See Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 

543 ..•. (1947). 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 8 
In Wheeler I, we 'reverse[d] the judgment of the 

district court and remand[ed] for a new trial.' 862 

F.2d at 1415. Once we reversed the original judgment 

incorporating the first jury's verdict and our mandate 

issued, the first verdict became null and void in its 

entirety. The district court could no more reinstate 

the damages portion of the first verdict than it could 

substitute the second jury's award with a larger sum 

pulled out of a magically appearing hat. See Dr. Seuss, 

The 500 Hats of Bartholomew Cubbins (1938). 

935 F.2d at 1096. 

Texaco, in its "law of the case doctrine" argument, points 

to the case of Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 

1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1102 (1983) as "an indistinguishable 

case." (Appellant's Brief, p. 19). We disagree. 

Arnold involved, inter alia, a wrongful death action brought 

by the personal representative of a passenger who was killed in an 

airplane crash near Charlotte, North Carolina. Eastern, unlike 

Texaco, admitted liability based on "the failure of the pilots to 

be aware of the plane's altitude immediately prior to the crash." 

Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages. 

Eastern's pleadings conceded liability and, thus, unlike Texaco, 

responsibility for compensatory damages. However, Eastern denied 

liability for punitive damages. The Arnold jury returned a 

plaintiff's verdict for $847,000 in compensatory damages but 

denied punitive damages. Post-trial motions were denied, 

including plaintiff's motion for new trial on the punitive damage 

issue. 

However, the trial court determined that it had erred in 

submitting decedent's pain and suffering damage claim to the jury 

because there was insufficient evidence that decedent had survived 

the crash even momentarily. On that basis, the trial court 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 9 
ordered a new trial on the compensatory damages claim alone, 

conditioned upon plaintiff's refusal to accept a remittitur of 

$50,000. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur, and the court 

entered judgment in the reduced sum of $797,000. 

On appeal, the court reversed, holding that: (1) the 

remittitur devise was improper, but plaintiff, as appellee, having 

accepted the remittitur, was limited to defending the judgment as 

entered and could not enlarge her rights under it, and (2) upon 

remand the district court should conduct a new trial limited to 

the issue of compensatory damages only. The court observed that 

"The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial on 

the punitive damages liability issue, and plaintiffs did not 

appeal from that order. This ruling, unappealed, was not in 

consequence subject to defense by Eastern on appeal and Eastern is 

entitled to have it treated as the law of the case. See F. James 

& G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 11.5 (2d ed. 1977)." Id. at 206. 

The instant case and Arnold are strikingly different. First, 

in Arnold the remand order specifically limited the new trial to 

determination of compensatory damages only. Mason I, on the other 

hand, was a general remand for new trial because of erroneous jury 

instructions as to Texaco's duty to warn and to train salesmen. 

862 F.2d at 250. Thus, the entire question of Texaco's liability 

was at issue upon retrial. Secondly, plaintiff in Mason was not 

offered nor did she accept a remittitur of compensatory damages. 

Finally, and most significant, Texaco, unlike Eastern, challenged 

any liability on its part. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 10 
In Mason I, this court reversed and remanded for a new trial 

on the sole basis that the trial court's liability instructions 

imposed an impermissibly high duty to warn on Texaco. Our remand 

was general. This court observed that the additional issues 

raised by Texaco on appeal (beyond the liability instructions) 

were all "fact bound" and that extensive discussion thereof would 

be "unproductive." Id. Thus, as to those "additional issues," 

there was no appellate court determination thereof. On that 

predicate, there is no reason to believe that this court would 

have addressed the issue of punitive damages even had it been 

raised on cross-appeal by Mason. It, too, would have been treated 

as "fact bound." 

When this court issued its general mandate in Mason I, we 

reversed the first judgment and remanded for a new trial on all 

"fact bound" issues without limitation. Certainly liability and 

damages were "fact bound" issues for jury determination. Thus, 

the trial court, upon remand, did not abuse its discretion in 

ruling that all issues of liability and damages were matters to be 

resolved by the jury. 

In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. 928 F.2d 966, 971 (10th Cir. 

1991), we held that "(W]hen the further proceedings are specified 

in the mandate the district court is limited to holding such as 

are directed. When the remand is general, however, the district 

court is free to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate." 

And in K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Intern. Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 

1163 n.22 (10th Cir. 1985), we stated: 

A new trial on part of the issues is appropriate 

where 'it clearly appears that the issue to be retried 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 11 
is so distinct and separate from the others that a trial 

of it alone may be without injustice.' Gasoline 

Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 

500, 51 S. Ct. 513, 515, 75 L. Ed. 1188 (1931). 

Professors Wright and Miller explain that 

if an error at the trial requires a new trial 

on one issue, but this issue is separate from 

the other issues in the case and the error did 

not affect the determination of the other 

issues, the scope of the new trial may be 

limited to the single issue. Perhaps the most 

common example is the grant of a new trial 

limited to damages when liability has been 

properly determined. 11 C. Wright & A. Miller 

Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2814 at 93 

(1973) (footnotes omitted); see also J. Moore 

and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, 1 

59.06, at 59-56 to 59-58 (1984). Professors 

Wright and Miller note that 'a new trial on 

damages only is not proper if there is reason 

to think that the verdict may represent a 

compromise among jurors with different views 

on whether defendant was liable or if for some 

other reason it appears that the error on the 

damage issue may have affected the 

determination of liability.' (Emphasis 

supplied). 

In Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., supra, at 

500, the Court reasoned that a new trial could not be based on 

part of the issues because "[h]ere the question of damage on the 

counterclaim is so interwoven with that of liability that the 

former cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the latter 

without confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to a denial 

of fair trial." In Brown v. Richard H. Wacholz, Inc., 467 F.2d 

18, 21 (10th Cir. 1972), we reversed and remanded for a new trial 

on the damages issue only, holding that the liability issue was 

properly determined and the issues were not intermingled. 

In Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1981), we held 

that in conducting a retrial, the trial court should follow 

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rulings of law previously made by the court of appeals. That 

mandate was faithfully followed by the trial court in this case. 

Under the "law of the case" doctrine, the district court may not 

deviate from the appellate court's mandate; however, the district 

court may reconsider an issue and disregard the appellate court 

mandate if the subsequent trial produces substantially different 

evidence. Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094 

(11th Cir. 1987). We observe that Mason cites to Gertz v. Robert 

Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982) for the rule that the 

law of the case doctrine does not apply where the evidence on 

retrial is substantially different than that presented at the 

original trial and contends: 

It cannot seriously be argued that the evidence 

upon retrial of this case mirrored that presented in the 

first. Indeed, the second trial so substantially and 

significantly varied from the first as to prevent 

meaningful comparison. As defendant must surely 

concede, the cultivation and development of an entirely 

new liability or causation expert radically altered the 

evidence heard by the jury. Defendant's emphasis on a 

theory of defense virtually ignored in the first trial, 

i.e., that toluene was substituted for benzene by Gerin 

Corporation, in addition to its new theory on the supply 

issue, combined to change the complexion of the case 

beyond recognition. Defendant in this trial shifted the 

focus almost exclusively to proving Texaco's product 

never reached Butch Mason at all. 

(Appellee's Brief, p. 13). 

Among the law of the case rules is the obligation of every 

court to honor the rulings of a court that stands higher in the 

hierarchical judicial structure. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. 

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4478 at 788. No 

violation of that rule occurred in this case. The law of the case 

doctrine posits that "[w]hen a court decides upon a rule of law, 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 13 
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in 

subsequent stages in the same case." Arizona v. California, 460 

U.S. 605, 618 (1983). "The doctrine of law of the case comes into 

play only with respect to issues previously determined." Quern v. 

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 (1979). Furthermore, the law of the 

case doctrine is solely a rule of practice and not a limit on the 

power of the court. Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 

(1912). See also Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 

1981) (law of the case doctrine is not an "inexorable command" but 

a rule to be applied with good sense). 

"The rule of the law of the case is a rule of practice, based 

upon sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and 

decided, that should be the end of the matter." United States v. 

U.S. Smelting Ref. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198 (1950). See 

also, Fox v. Mazda Corp. of America, 868 F.2d 1190, 1194 (10th 

Cir. 1989); Gage v. General Motors,· 796 F.2d 345, 349 (10th Cir. 

1986). 

A punitive damage claim is not an independent cause of action 

or issue separate from the balance of a plaintiff's case. It is 

part and parcel of a liability determination and does not have any 

independent being until a jury has decided, based on the 

preponderance of the evidence, that not only was a defendant's 

conduct negligent, but that it was gross, willful, wanton or 

malicious. Proof of gross, willful, wanton or malicious conduct 

by a defendant is not separate from proof of a defendant's 

negligence. The evidence proving negligence establishes liability 

and the degree of negligence is determinative in the award of 

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punitive damages. Upon remand in this case, the entire issue of 

liability was subject to retrial. It was in fact resubmitted to 

the jury in a hard fought contest. 

In light of our holding in Wheeler v. John Deere Co., supra, 

and the law of the case doctrine, we hold that the trial court did 

not err in permitting retrial of the punitive damages claim. 

II. 

Texaco contends that because the Coast Guard's fault was 

undisputed, the trial court committed multiple critical errors in 

denying Texaco a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict, or a new trial. Texaco argues that the Coast Guard's 

wrongful conduct was an effective intervening and superseding 

cause of Butch's injuries and that the jury's failure to find that 

the Coast Guard was at fault required that the trial court grant 

Texaco a new trial. 

In Rajala v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 

1990), we stated our standard of review, which is controlling 

here: 

We review de nova the denial of a motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, applying the same 

standard of review as that used by the district court. 

See, Guilfoyle v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co., 812 

F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1987). 'Although we have 

often used different phraseology to express this 

standard,' the inquiry is best summarized as 'whether 

there is evidence upon which the jury could properly 

find a verdict for the party [against whom the motion is 

directed].' Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 

F.2d 495, 498-99 (10th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted) 

(quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 

procedure, 2524 at 543 (1971)). In making that 

determination, we are obligated to view 'evidence and 

inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party,' 

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Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 848 F.2d 

1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 1988), 

Because the directed verdict/judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict inquiry asks whether there 

was evidence such that the jury could have properly 

found for the party against whom the motion is made, we 

must necessarily frame our analysis in terms of the 

underlying burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 ... (1986). ( 'We are 

convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling 

necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary 

standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the 

merits'), 

And in Ccysco Oilfield Serv. v. Hutchison-Hayes Intern., 913 

F.2d 850-51 (10th Cir. 1990), we stated: 

In order to reverse the trial court's decision on a 

motion for directed verdict, we must find that 'the 

evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no 

reasonable inferences supporting the party [opposing the 

motion]; we must construe the evidence and inferences 

most favorably to the nonmoving party.' Zimmerman v. 

First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 848 F,2d 1047, 1051 

(10th Cir, 1988), 

In Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905 F,2d 

1413, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990), we observed: 

We will reverse the trial court's denial of either 

motion [a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v.] only 

if, after a de novo review, we determine that the 

evidence taken in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn therefrom point but one way, in favor of the 

moving party. Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 

463, 467 (10th Cir. 1990), 

Finally, we have held that the trial court's discretion as to 

whether to grant a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion. In Garrick v. City and County of 

Denver, 652 F,2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1981), we required a "strong 

showing" of the trial court's abuse of discretion. See also 

Meyers v. Ideal Basic Industries, Inc., 940 F.2d 1379, 1383 (10th 

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Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 16 
Cir. 1991); Q.E.R., Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th 

Cir. 1989). 

Our review of the entire record on appeal leads us to 

conclude that there was in fact a genuine dispute relative to the 

Coast Guard's fault. We hold, based on our review, that the jury 

could conclude, as surely it did, that the Coast Guard did not 

know that benzene induced or caused leukemia during the time of 

Butch's exposure thereto. We agree with the trial court's careful 

review of the evidence relative to this issue. See Mason, 741 F. 

Supp. at 1484-87. 

III. 

Texaco argues that it was denied a fair trial due to the 

cumulative effect of erroneous rulings by the trial court in (a) 

barring cross-examination as to the credibility of plaintiff's 

experts, (b) allowing plaintiff to present irrelevant and highly 

prejudicial evidence of OSHA benzene hearings and of "other 

deaths" allegedly caused by the OSHA delay in lowering the 

occupational benzene exposure standard, (c) finding as a fact 

that key testimony from the first trial had been transcribed 

correctly, and (d) precluding cross-examination of the plaintiff 

regarding her inconsistent statements in prior pleadings. 

11 A district court possesses considerable discretion in 

governing the presentation of evidence, and its decisions will not 

be disturbed absent manifest injustice to the parties. See 

Thweatt v. Ontko, 814 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th Cir. 1987); ~ also 

Marsee v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319, 324 (10th Cir. 1989). 11 

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Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Telephones, Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 633 (10th Cir. 

1991). "The admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed 

absent a clear abuse of discretion. Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 1408." 

Wheeler v. John Deere Co., supra, 935 F.2d at 1099. "[T]he 

admission of evidence is largely a matter of the district court's 

discretion. In the absence of manifest error, we will not reverse 

the district court's decision to admit (refuse admission of] 

evidence." Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 

1365 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Among its contentions of error, Texaco asserts that the trial 

court erred in denying it the right to cross-examine the 

credibility of Mason's two expert epidemiologists, Ors. Wagoner 

and Infante. These experts were critical of Texaco's methodology 

in formulating its MSDA warning. They opined that it was 

inadequate and that because exposure·to benzene at low levels was 

known to cause leukemia in 1973, a prudent manufacturer of benzene 

would not have relied on Texaco's MSDA warning. In order to 

attack the credibility of Ors. Wagoner and Infante, Texaco sought, 

during cross-examination, to question them relative to hearsay 

documents prepared by other expert epidemiologists which were 

highly critical of a study and conclusions made by Ors. Wagoner 

and Infante relative to the carcinogenicity of beryllium. 

Texaco argues that "[h]ad Texaco been allowed to question 

Infante and Wagoner about the reviews of their beryllium study, it 

would have been obvious to the trier of fact that these scientists 

were biased advocates who consistently have misrepresented data in 

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order to reach desired conclusions. It certainly bore on their 

qualifications to represent views of the 'scientific community.'" 

(Brief of Appellant, p. 50). 

Texaco contends that "the court erred in prohibiting this 

classical line of impeachment cross-examination. Rule 608(a) 

[Fed. R. Evid.] permits an attack on credibility by using the 

evidence Texaco attempted to offer. Rule 608(b) also provides 

that specific instances of a witness' conduct, if probative of his 

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, are admissible to 

attack that witness' credibility." (Brief of Appellant, p. 49). 

The hearsay documents Texaco relied upon related to 

challenges to Mason's experts concerning research in a field 

completely unrelated to benzene. These documents challenged Ors. 

Wagoner and Infante solely relating to their research conducted on 

beryllium. This evidence was inadmissible for several reasons. 

First, the authors of the documents relied upon by Texaco were not 

present or subject to cross-examination. Secondly, the documents 

do not challenge (Rule 608(a)) Dr. Wagoner's and Dr. Infante's 

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, but rather, and 

only, their objectivity in the beryllium study. 

A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether 

evidence is properly admitted for impeachment purposes. United 

States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 629 (10th Cir. 1984). 

In United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1501 (10th Cir. 

1990), we stated that: 

We might agree with this proposition 

incidents were more directly related 

case. The only possible trial use 

incident, however, was as evidence 

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if 

to 

of 

of 

all prior 

the instant 

the prior 

a specific 

Appellate Case: 90-3250 Document: 010110097380 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 19 
instance of the conduct of the witness' credibility. 

Such instances may never be proved by extrinsic 

evidence, and they can be inquired into on crossexamination only in the discretion of the trial court. 

Fed. R. Evid. 608 (b); TM generally McCormick on 

Evidence, § 42 ( E. Clearly 3d Ed. 1984). 

In United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 802 (10th Cir. 

1990), we defined the purpose of 608(a) evidence: 

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) permits a party to attack the 

credibility of a witness by evidence in the form of 

opinion or reputation as to the witness's character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness. The admission of this 

type of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the 

district court, which must also determine whether the 

evidence passes the rule 403 balancing test. 

See also United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1350 (10th Cir. 

1979). 

In United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (10th 

Cir. 1987), we defined the scope of 608(b) cross-examination: 

Under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), a defendant may impeach a 

Government witness by cross-examining him about specific 

instances of conduct not resulting in conviction if such 

conduct is probative of the witness' character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness. Such inquiry is within 

the discretion of the trial court subject to rule 403. 

United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 257, 261 (10th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 106 s. Ct. 1379 .•• 

(1986) ..•. 

In United States v. Atwell, 766 F.2d 416, 420 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 106 s. Ct. 251 (1985), we affirmed the 

district court's refusal to permit the defense to cross-examine a 

prosecution witness concerning his prior arrests which did not 

result in convictions and held: 

The appellant argues that Federal Rules of Evidence 

608(b) compels the admission of the evidence of the 

arrests because they bear on Holden's truthfulness. 

Rule 608(b) does no such thing. The trial court in its 

discretion may allow inquiry into the prior conduct of a 

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witness concerning his character for truthfulness. The 

rule does not require inquiry. Additionally, Rule 

608(b) is still subject to the balancing under Rule 403 

mentioned above. 

Here, the II specific instances of conduct II by Mason's experts. 

sought to be introduced by Texaco related to the beryllium study 

rather than the benzene study. This is a far cry from expert 

testimony or other impeachment evidence attacking the scientific 

propriety of the methodology employed by Ors. Wagoner and Infante 

in their benzene study and report. 

We have carefully reviewed the record, the parties' briefs 

and the district court's decision. See Mason, 741 F. Supp. at 

1495-1501. We hold and conclude that none of the trial court's 

challenged evidentiary rulings constituted a clear abuse of 

discretion, manifest error, or reversible error. 

IV. 

Texaco contends that the trial court erred by permitting 

(jury) speculation as to the source of benzene to which Butch was 

exposed to. This matter was thoroughly discussed in Mason. Id. 

at 1479-81. We agree with the trial court's reasoning. 

Texaco argues that the jury was obviously guessing and 

speculating on its finding/conclusion that Butch had been exposed 

only to Texaco's benzene when, on the sixth day of jury 

deliberation, it sent a note to the court stating that it had 

become "locked" on question No. 2. Question No. 2 asked "Do you 

find by a preponderance of the evidence that the benzene produced 

by Texaco was a cause of Mason's leukemia?" The jury note to the 

court asked: "Why does question No. 2 on the verdict form have to 

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be 100% yes or no when question number 8 has a place for a 

percentage of blame?" 

Texaco contends that the trial court, rather than accepting 

the jury's statement that it was hung, issued a modified Allen 

instruction improperly telling the jury that "from my observation, 

the issues in this case can be decided on a preponderance of the 

evidence without difficulty." Texaco argues that this instruction 

impermissibly coerced or influenced the jury to find for plaintiff 

on this issue. Texaco asserts that when the trial court 

instructed the jury that it 11 reserved the right of course to 

comment or do whatever is necessary by way of further instruction 

to help the jury reach a verdict" that the court, in effect, 

advised the jury that it would not permit them to hang. 

Immediately after the court gave its Allen instruction, the 

foreman of the jury requested dismissal, on the basis that the 

stress of deliberations was threatening to his health. Texaco 

requested leave to question the jury foreman. The court denied 

the request, dismissed the foreman and denied Texaco's motion for 

mistrial. Texaco argued that by dismissing the jury foreman, it 

was denied a unanimous verdict under Fed. R. Civ. P. 48. We find 

no error in the trial court's Allen instruction or the dismissal 

of the jury foreman. 

( a) 

In Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 

951, 978 (10th Cir. 1990), we reiterated the rule laid down in 

United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1987) that 

although the preferred procedure is that an Allen instruction be 

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given at the same time as other instructions, it is not a per se 

rule, and the coercive effect of the Allen-type instruction must 

be determined on a case-to-case basis. Texaco does not point to 

any specific error in the trial court's Allen instruction; 

rather, Texaco argues that the giving of the instruction was 

coercive in light of the jury's inability to resolve the evidence 

as to whether Texaco's benzene was the cause of Butch's leukemia. 

Contrary to Texaco's contentions, we do not discern any 

evidence or any reasonable inference that the jury was deadlocked 

on this issue. The jury's correspondence with the court asked 

"why does question No. 2 on the verdict form have to be 100% yes 

or no when question number 8 has a place for a percentage of 

blame?" The jury was obviously confused about the verdict form. 

In response to this question, the trial court properly instructed 

the jury that even should the jury answer question No. 2 in the 

affirmative (i.e., that benzene produced by Texaco caused Butch's 

leukemia), this does not answer the question of whether Texaco was 

at fault for causing such exposure, nor does it answer the 

question of the percentage of fault attributable to Texaco and 

other parties. 

We hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error 

in giving the Allen instruction. It was not coercive. The trial 

court's statement that all issues in the case could be resolved 

was not coercive and it did not "virtually direct a verdict 

against Texaco on the issue of who supplied the benzene." (Brief 

of Appellant, p. 65). The jury continued to deliberate for 

another six days. That, in itself, dilutes any indicia of 

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coercion on the part of the trial court. See Reazin v. Blue Cross 

and Blue Shield of Kansas, supra; United States v. Dyba, 554 F.2d 

417 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977). 

(b) 

Texaco argues that the trial court's Allen instruction, which 

virtually instructed the jury that a verdict must be reached, 

"appears to have had the effect of driving a dissenting juror off 

the jury." (Brief of Appellant, p. 64, n. 69). There is nothing 

in the record to support this assertion. 

The jury foreman delivered a note to the court which the 

judge and counsel examined and discussed. The note explained that 

the jury foreman had been hospitalized about a year ago with a 

serious heart condition brought about as a result of stress caused 

by his job, resulting in early retirement. The note further 

explained that the juror had no idea at the outset of 

deliberations that he would be under· the type of stress which 

caused his previous hospitalization. He referred the court to his 

doctor's letter which stated that the foreman had been recently 

examined and that he was suffering from "acute nervous reaction, 

hypertension and acute insomnia" and should be released from jury 

duty. 

We agree with the district court's observation that under the 

circumstances, it would have been unconscionable to subject the 

jury foreman to further jury deliberation at the risk of 

aggravating his existing heart condition. In Green v. Zant, 715 

F.2d 551, 555 (11th Cir. 1983), the court held that "a federal 

district court possesses the discretion to remove a juror when 

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( 

that juror's capacity to perform his duties becomes impaired." 

Here, the district court had a sound factual basis upon which to 

exercise its discretion to remove the jury foreman and a hearing 

on the issue was not necessary. 

v. 

Texaco argues that the jury's findings of $9,025,000 actual 

damages and $25,000,000 punitive damages are excessive, and that 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying Texaco's motion 

for a new trial due to the excessiveness of the verdict. Our 

standard of review is that of abuse of discretion. 

City and County of Denver, supra. 

Garrick v. 

Texaco contends that a review of the record will demonstrate 

to this court that passion, prejudice, corruption or other 

improper cause invaded the trial and that the jury award was so 

excessive as to shock the judicial conscience. 

(a) 

Actual Damages 

With respect to the actual damages of $9,025,000 representing 

$5,025,000 for the wrongful death claim and $4,000,000 for Butch's 

survival claims, Texaco points out that Mason sought $3,500,000 

under her wrongful death claim and that the jury's award exceeded 

that amount by $1,525,000. That award included the statutory 

maximum of $25,000 for bereavement and mental anguish. Of the 

remaining $5,000,000, a total of $1,315,561 was awarded for 

Butch's past and prospective lost earnings, medical expenses, 

nursing care and burial expenses. The balance of approximately 

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$3,600,000 must be attributed to the economic value of the loss of 

services and care, which Texaco contends to be grossly excessive. 

Texaco asserts that the $4,000,000 award for Butch's 

survival claims must be considered as compensation for pain and 

suffering which occurred between September, 1977, and Butch's 

death in December, 1979 a period of 27 months. Texaco also 

points out that Butch was in remission for approximately 15 of 

these months during which time he was able to work, travel and 

engage in most normal activities. Thus, while recognizing that 

Butch suffered physical pain and mental anguish during this 

period, Texaco argues that the $4,000,000 award is 

disproportionately large. Texaco contends that the magnitude of 

the award may be explained by the "[g]ross misconduct of 

plaintiff's counsel in closing, when, holding up a life expectancy 

chart, he told the jury to use the chart in determining actual 

damage The trial court recognized this was error, but 

refused to correct the matter because compensation for pain and 

suffering obviously presupposes that the person was alive and thus 

able to experience pain .... " (Brief of Appellant, p. 68). 

In Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985), 

we referred to a time-honored principle: 

It is a fundamental legal principle that the 

determination of the quantum of damages in civil cases 

is a fact-finder's function. The trier of fact, who has 

the first-handed opportunity to hear the testimony and 

to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, is clothed 

with a wide latitude and discretion in fixing damages 

pursuant to the court's instructions .... 

In our view, there was substantial evidence in the record to 

support the jury's award of compensatory damages. We affirm these 

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awards substantially for the reasons set forth in Mason, 741 F. 

Supp. at 1513-14. 

(b) 

Punitive Damages 

Texaco argues that the $25,000,000 punitive damage award is 

unprecedented in a personal injury accident case in Kansas or in 

the Tenth Circuit. (Appellant's Brief, n. 74, p. 69). Further, 

Texaco cites Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3701, 60-3702 (Supp. 1989) for 

the rule that $5,000,000 is the maximum punitive damage award 

allowed in Kansas on a tort claim since 1987. 

Texaco contends that allowing the jury to assess punitive 

damages under a standardless punitive damage instruction on the 

basis that Texaco's conduct was "malicious" or "reckless," when 

the evidence shows that Texaco complied with government and safety 

organization standards, deprived Texaco of the Due Process 

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 

70-72) . 

A recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in 

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, __ u.s. __ , 59 u.s.L.W. 

4157 (March 5, 1991), held that a punitive damages award that was 

four times the amount of compensatory damages was not wanting 

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for 

vagueness where the punitive damages instruction by the trial 

court advised the jury that: the purpose of punitive damages was 

not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury but to punish the 

defendant; an additional purpose was to protect the public by 

deterring the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the 

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futurei and it must take into consideration the character and the 

degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and the necessity of 

preventing similar wrong. Id. at 4161-62. Where properly 

instructed, as in the instant case, the Supreme Court reasoned 

that the jury would be enlightened as to the nature and purpose of 

punitive damages and that such instructions would reasonably 

accommodate a defendant's interest in rational decisionmaking and 

the state's interest in meaningful individualized assessment of 

appropriate deterrance and retribution. Id. See also Malandris 

v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152, 1173 

(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983). 

Texaco acknowledges that Kansas law on the imposition of 

punitive damages was properly and accurately stated in the trial 

court's instruction. (Brief of Appellant, p. 72). See Tetuan v. 

A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987). Texaco nevertheless 

contends, just as was argued and contended in Haslip. supra, that 

the instruction is "[c]ontentless and hopelessly vague regarding 

(1) under what circumstances punishment is warranted, (2) the 

relative degree of punishment to be imposed, and (3) the range 

within which punishment might properly be imposed." (Brief of 

Appellant, p. 72). Texaco also argues that because the punitive 

damage result on retrial involved the same conduct that the jury 

found not to warrant any punitive damage award during the first 

trial, the clear inconsistency shows that Texaco was denied due 

process. 

The trial court, in denying Texaco's motion for j.n.o.v. or, 

alternatively, for a new trial, carefully reviewed Kansas law 

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applicable to the award of punitive damages and the evidence 

supporting 

concluded: 

the jury's determination. The district court 

Considering all the evidence in light of the relevant 

factors, and giving the due deference required under 

Kansas law and the Seventh Amendment to the jury's 

determination of the amount necessary to punish and 

deter defendant and other manufacturers from such 

conduct in the future, the punitive award is not so 

excessive as to shock this court's judicial conscience. 

Thus, the court rejects defendant's contention that the 

punitive damage award was motivated by passion, 

prejudice or bias. 

741 F. Supp. at 1517. 

The trial court recognized that if a damages award is deemed 

to be excessive, but not the result of passion, prejudice or 

bias, the court may order a remittitur, and that such a decision 

rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 

1514-15. The trial court correctly cited and relied upon 

Malandris, supra, 703 F.2d at 1168; K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l 

Corp., supra, 763 F.2d at 1162; and Garrick v. City and County of 

Denver, supra, 652 F.2d at 971. Id. 

In Malandris, supra, we concluded that the punitive damage 

award was excessive and unwarranted even though passion and 

prejudice did not affect the jury finding of liability. We stated 

that "[s]ince we conclude that there is only error in the size of 

the punitive award, the remedy of remittitur is appropriate." 703 

F.2d at 1168. Thus, a new trial was not required. On that 

predicate, the court ordered a remittitur to reduce the punitive 

award from $3,000,000 to $1,000,000. The Malandris court 

observed: 

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Where the court concludes there was error only in an 

excessive damage award, but not one also tainting the 

finding of liability, the appellate court may order a 

remittitur and alternatively direct a new trial if the 

plaintiff refuses to accept the remittitur, a widely 

recognized remedy. 

The issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify 

punitive damages is a question of law, and our review is confined 

to the assessment of whether the plaintiff presented evidence 

sufficient that a reasonable person might conclude that the 

defendant acted in a punitive manner. Marshall v. El Paso Natural 

Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1384 (10th Cir. 1989); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 769 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

476 u.s. 1104 (1986). we concur with the district court's 

finding/conclusion that there was sufficient evidence in this case 

to justify the jury in finding that Texaco "knowingly embarked 

upon a course of conduct dangerous to the public, motivated by 

private gain." Mason, 741 F. Supp. at 1516. 

The trial court agreed with Texaco "[T]hat 25 million is 

indeed a staggering sum." Id. Even so, the court did not 

conclude, based on all of the evidence, that the punitive damage 

award was so excessive as to shock the court's judicial conscience 

or that the award was motivated by passion, prejudice or bias. 

Id. at 1517. We agree with the district court's finding that the 

award was not motivated by passion, prejudice or bias. In our 

view, however, the award was so excessive as to shock our judicial 

conscience. 

The trial court cited to Folks v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 

755 P.2d 1319, 1336 (Kan. 1988), wherein the Kansas Supreme Court 

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identified the following as relevant factors in reviewing a jury's 

award of punitive damages: 

with 

the actual damages sustained, the actual damage award, 

the circumstances of the case (the nature, extent, and 

enormity of the wrong), the intent of the party 

committing it, the relative positions of the plaintiff 

and the defendant, the defendant's financial worth and 

the plaintiff's probable litigation expenses. 

The trial court analyzed each of the above factors, together 

the deterrent effect of the award and the ratio that the 

punitive damage award bears in relation to the compensatory 

damages award, Mason, 741 F. Supp. at 1515-17, and concluded that 

the jury performed the difficult balancing act of not allowing 

sympathy to overcome reason, and not allowing desire for result to 

overcome justice. Id. at 1518. While we agree with the trial 

court's rejection of Texaco's contention that the punitive damage 

award was motivated by passion, prejudice or bias, id. at 1517, we 

cannot agree that the "staggering sum" of $25,000,000 does not 

shock the judicial conscience. 

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), the 

Supreme Court pertinently observed that: 

In most jurisdictions jury discretion over amounts 

awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they may 

not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive 

damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no 

necessary relation to the actual harm caused. 

In his concurring opinion in Haslip, supra, Associate Justice 

Kennedy wrote that inconsistency in jury results can be expected 

for at least two reasons: 

First, the jury is empaneled to act as a 

decisionmaker in a single case, not as a more 

permanent body. As a necessary consequence of 

this case-to-case existence, juries may tend 

to reach disparate outcomes based on the same 

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instructions. Second, the generality of the 

instructions may contribute to a certain lack 

of predictability. The law encompasses 

standards phrased at varying levels of 

generality ... the standard can be more 

abstract and general to give the adjudicator 

flexibility in resolving the dispute at hand. 

These features of the jury system for 

assessing punitive damages discourage uniform 

results, but nonuniformity cannot be equated 

with constitutional infirmity. 

59 U.S.L.W. 4157 at 4167. 

We observe that: even though the evidence presented during 

the course of the second trial in the instant case may not have 

been "substantially similar" to that presented during the first 

trial, both trials consumed about four months; plaintiff Mason 

sought punitive damages of $8,000,000 and the court so instructed 

the jury (R., Vol. VI, Tab 485, Inst. No. l); and Mason did not 

file a cross-appeal with this court from the jury's finding of no 

punitive damages in the first trial. Thus, the jury's 

determination in the first trial that no punitive damages should 

be awarded stands in stark contrast to the $25,000,000 in punitive 

damages awarded by the jury against Texaco following the second 

trial. 

It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of 

an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which 

results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In 

that case, a new trial is required. See Melandris, supra, at 

1177-78; O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 

1447 (10th Cir. 1987); Karns v. Emerson Electric Co., 817 F.2d 

1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; 11 Wright and 

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Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 2820 (1973); J. Moore, 

Moore's Federal Practice, 6A ,r 59.08(7) (1991). 

We conclude that the $25,000,000 punitive damages award is 

excessive and beyond a reasonable punitive award under the law of 

Kansas. We find the award so excessive as to shock 

conscience. We do not, however, conclude that 

liability determinations were tainted. 

our judicial 

the jury's 

Thus, we conclude that a remittitur must be entered reducing 

the punitive award by one-half to $12,500,000. Should plaintiff 

Mason decline to accept a reduced judgment, there should be a new 

trial on all issues. 

We AFFIRM the trial court's judgment, provided that the 

plaintiff accepts a reduction in the punitive damage award to 

$12,500,000. Therefore, we REMAND to the district court with 

directions to enter a remittitur order providing that if, within a 

reasonable time to be fixed by the district court, plaintiff 

accepts a reduction of the judgment reducing the punitive damages 

award from $25,000,000 to $12,500,0000, then the judgment as so 

modified shall be final; otherwise, an order shall be entered 

granting a new trial on all issues. 

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