Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02077/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02077-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. Byron Charles
Plaintiff
Charles Guenther
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

M. BYRON CHARLES, M.D.,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2077 GEB DAD PS

v.

CHARLES GUENTHER, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant.

 /

This matter came before the court on August 24, 2007, for hearing of defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. Jeffery Owensby, Esq. appeared for defendant. No appearance

was made by plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se. Defendant’s unopposed motion was taken

under submission. Upon consideration of defendant’s motion and the entire record, the

undersigned recommends that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 14, 2005, by filing a complaint

alleging defamation, interference with prospective business advantage, and interference with

contractual relationship by defendant Guenther and twenty Doe defendants.

Plaintiff alleges as follows: he is a physician and surgeon residing in Nevada;

defendant Guenther is Chief Executive Officer of Eastern Plumas Health Care; plaintiff was

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employed by Eastern Plumas Health Care from August 25, 1998, to June 1, 2002; in August

2004, plaintiff was recruited for a general surgery position at Kaweah Delta Health Care District

(“Kaweah Delta”); in September 2004, plaintiff was verbally offered a position as general

surgeon at Kaweah Delta and accepted the offer; plaintiff submitted an application form and a

signed consent form permitting Kaweah Delta to investigate plaintiff’s professional background

and credentials; Kaweah Delta’s verbal offer of employment was confirmed in writing on

September 27, 2004; on October 6, 2004, Kaweah Delta faxed plaintiff an employment contract;

on October 18, 2004, a Kaweah Delta employee informed plaintiff that Kaweah Delta had

stopped processing plaintiff’s application after receiving a negative reference letter from the chief

executive officer of one of plaintiff’s former employers; plaintiff responded with a written

request in which he indicated his belief that any negative comments regarding his qualifications

were inaccurate and requested that Kaweah Delta investigate the negative reference fully; staff at

Kaweah Delta would not disclose which former employer provided the negative reference but

read or paraphrased the contents of the reference, which indicated that plaintiff’s cooperation

with fellow workers was poor, he had failed to maintain orderly records, and he had been

suspended for chronic failure to complete medical records; in a letter dated October 21, 2004,

Kaweah Delta withdrew plaintiff’s employment contract; plaintiff believes that defendant

Guenther is the chief executive officer who authored the negative reference and that the

defendant made false and damaging statements regarding plaintiff’s qualifications as a physician

and surgeon to other hospitals and healthcare facilities where plaintiff has sought employment;

while plaintiff was pursuing employment at Kaweah Delta, he declined an offer of employment

by another hospital in anticipation of employment at Kaweah Delta; since October 2004 plaintiff

has been employed as a physician and surgeon at various locations on a contract basis but has not

obtained a permanent staff position with any hospital or health care facility. (Compl. at 2-5.)

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of not less than $135,000, punitive

damages, and injunctive relief.

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Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint on February 27, 2006. In the

scheduling order filed March 13, 2006, the district judge dismissed plaintiff’s Doe defendants. 

Discovery closed on August 22, 2007, and the time for hearing pretrial motions will expire on

October 22, 2007. The case is set for final pretrial conference on December 17, 2007, and jury

trial on March 25, 2008, before the Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Owen v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992).

A party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 323. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323.

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 California Civil Code § 43.8 provides that “there shall be no monetary liability on the 1

part of, and no cause of action for damages shall arise against, any person on account of the

communication of information in the possession of that person to any hospital, hospital medical

staff . . . when the communication is intended to aid in the evaluation of the qualifications,

fitness, character, or insurability of a practitioner of the healing or veterinary arts.”

 The release signed by plaintiff states: “I hereby release . . . all persons and entities 2

providing credentialing information to such representatives of [Kaweah Delta Health Care

District] from any liability they might incur for their acts and/or communications in connection

with evaluation of my qualifications for participation in this Healthcare Organization, to the

extent that those acts and/or communications are protected by state or federal law.” (Decl. of

Charles Guenther in Supp. of Dispositive Mot., Ex. 1 at 1.) 

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of

Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607

F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979). The opposing party must demonstrate that a fact in contention

is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the

“purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff cannot establish

all the elements of any of his claims. In his statement of undisputed facts, defendant presents

facts regarding each of plaintiff’s claims as well as facts in support of the bar imposed by

operation of California Civil Code § 43.8 and by the release executed by plaintiff in favor of 1

persons who responded to Kaweah Delta’s inquiry about him. Defendant’s undisputed facts are 2

supported by defendant’s own declaration and an attached exhibit.

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Defendant argues that (1) he is immune from liability for all of plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to California Civil Code § 43.8; (2) the evidence demonstrates that the allegedly

defamatory statements made by defendant were truthful; (3) plaintiff executed a binding release

of all claims associated with disclosures of information about him to the recipient of the

information on which plaintiff bases his claims; and (4) the evidence demonstrates that defendant

did not engage in any independently wrongful act that would provide a basis for a claim of

interference with prospective economic relations or for interference with contract. Defendant

contends that no triable issues of material fact exist with regard to the essential elements of

plaintiff’s claims and that summary judgment should therefore be granted in defendant’s favor as

to each claim.

The undersigned finds that defendant’s contentions are supported by defendant’s

statement of undisputed facts and the evidence cited. Because defendant has met his initial

responsibility as the moving party, the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue

as to any material fact actually does exist.

Plaintiff did not file opposition to defendant’s motion and did not appear at the

hearing of the motion. Plaintiff has failed to contradict defendant’s evidence with evidence of

his own. Taking defendant’s evidence as the truth, the undersigned finds that there are no

disputed issues of fact and defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law. 

A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the

nonmoving party does not file opposing material, even if the failure to oppose violates a local

rule. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2003); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652

(9th Cir. March 9, 1994) (citing Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

However, when a local rule does not require the court to grant an unopposed motion for summary

judgment, the court may determine whether noncompliance should be deemed consent to the

motion. Id.

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Here, the local rule governing civil motion procedures provides that opposition to

the granting of a motion “shall be in writing and shall be filed with the Clerk not less than

fourteen (14) days preceding the noticed (or continued) hearing date.” Local Rule 78-230(c). 

The rule further provides that failure to appear at the hearing of a motion may be deemed

withdrawal of opposition. Local Rule 78-230(j). Plaintiff has not prosecuted this action in any

manner since the court permitted plaintiff’s attorney of record to withdraw on June 12, 2007. 

Plaintiff’s failure to file opposition and failure to appear at the hearing should therefore be

deemed a waiver of opposition to defendant’s well supported and meritorious motion for

summary judgment.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s July 18, 2007 amended motion for summary judgment be granted;

and

2. This action be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and serve

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections shall be filed

and served within ten (10) days after the objections are served. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the

right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 1, 2007.

DAD:kw

ddad1\orders.prose\charles2077.msj.f&r

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