Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00218/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Stanislaus
Defendant
Lynn R. Meredith
Defendant
Anthony John Pellegrino
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY JOHN PELLEGRINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

LYNN R. MEREDITH, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00218-LJO-SAB

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY (30) 

DAYS

On February 9, 2015, Plaintiff Anthony John Pellegrino filed the complaint in this action. 

(ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to 

state any cognizable claims and that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed, with leave to 

amend.

I.

SCREENING

District courts may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) if the Court gives notice of its intention to dismiss and afford plaintiffs an opportunity to 

at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 683 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 

(9th Cir. 1987); Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1981)). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint 

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

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relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ 

a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must 

accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s 

legal conclusions as true. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555).

II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names Lynn R. Meredith and the County of Stanislaus as defendants in this 

action. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) Lynn R. Meredith is identified as a “Commissioner.” (Compl. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff’s complaint arises from a traffic infraction Plaintiff received in December 2012 

for failing to have his headlights on in foggy weather. Plaintiff’s complaint recounts the events 

starting from when he received the traffic ticket from a California Highway Patrol Officer up 

through the guilty verdict Plaintiff received after a court trial.

Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff recounts in detail Plaintiff’s harassing treatment of 

government officials. Nearly every interaction with a government official involves Plaintiff 

demanding to see an “oath of office.” The complaint recounts numerous incidents where 

Plaintiff refuses to cooperate with requests from government officials, such as resisting requests 

to show his license, registration and insurance information to the officer who cited him, refusing 

to pay filing fees to court clerks, and contesting the government’s authority and jurisdiction to 

prosecute traffic citations.

/ / /

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Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated when he was forced to rise 

during court proceedings, that he was denied due process when he was asked to pay a filing fee 

to file court documents, that he was denied due process when he was prosecuted for his traffic 

violation. Plaintiff also asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for 

negligence.

III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint raises six causes of action: 1) for violation of Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment right to freedom of religion, 2) for violation of Plaintiff’s first amendment right of 

free speech, 3) for violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process rights, arising from the 

filing fees the court clerk attempted to charge Plaintiff, 4) for violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth 

Amendment due process rights, arising from the traffic infraction Plaintiff was found guilty of, 

5) for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 6) for negligence.

A. Absolute Judicial Immunity

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against 

Defendants for conduct which occurred during courtroom proceedings related to Plaintiff’s 

traffic violation.

“Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage 

liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Judges are 

immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.” Id. 

“Judicial immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in 

its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 

U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)). California law also affords judges absolute immunity to judges:

“It is well established judges are granted immunity from civil suit 

in the exercise of their judicial functions. [Citations]. This rule 

applies even where the judge’s acts are alleged to have been done 

maliciously and corruptly. [Citations.] ...” Judicial immunity 

from a civil action for monetary damages is absolute. [Citations.]

Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal. App. 4th 577, 585-586 (1999).

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Defendant Meredith is absolutely immune from Plaintiff’s claims for damages, as the acts 

alleged were judicial acts performed in her official capacity and taken within the jurisdiction of 

her court. Plaintiff’s allegations challenging Defendant Meredith’s jurisdiction are fanciful and 

implausible, and therefore not entitled to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). For example, Plaintiff alleges the following frivolous objections to the state 

court’s jurisdiction to prosecute Plaintiff for a traffic infraction:

 That the State lacks jurisdiction to prosecute Plaintiff because “the State” was the injured 

party and therefore a “conflict of interest” existed (Compl. ¶¶ 40, 49-50.);

 That the Court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff was not given a trial by jury for his 

traffic violation (Compl. ¶ 52);

 That the Court lacked jurisdiction because “jurisdiction was never told or proven to 

[Plaintiff]” (Compl. ¶ 82);

It is worth noting that California Government Code § 72190 states that “[a]t the direction of the 

judges, commissioners may have the same jurisdiction and exercise the same powers and duties 

as the judges of the court with respect to any infraction or small claims action.” See also In re 

Kathy P., 25 Cal. 3d 91, 98 (1979) (recognizing jurisdiction conferred upon commissioners and 

traffic referees to conduct trials regarding traffic infractions). It is also worth noting that the 

United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision does 

not apply to petty crimes and offenses. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nev., 489 U.S. 538, 

542 (1989). Offenses where the maximum authorized prison term is six months or less are 

presumed to be “petty” crimes and, generally, do not require trial by jury. Id. at 542-43. Finally, 

the Court is unaware of any authority which suggests that a court must “prove” the existence of 

jurisdiction to a litigant such as Plaintiff, in response to fanciful and vexatious challenges to the 

court’s jurisdiction.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant Meredith is entitled to absolute 

judicial immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages.

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Municipal Liability

The Court also notes that Plaintiff attempts to bring claims against the County of 

Stanislaus, a municipal entity. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New 

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely

because it employs a tortfeasor ... in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 

1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Defendant County of Stanislaus can only be held liable 

for injuries caused by the execution of its policy or custom or by those whose edicts or acts may 

fairly be said to represent official policy. Id. at 694.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts which plausibly support the conclusion that 

Defendant County of Stanislaus is liable for an injury caused by its own policies or customs. 

Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant Meredith, a court commissioner in the County of Stanislaus, 

engaged in certain acts during the court proceedings pertaining to Plaintiff’s traffic infraction. 

Since the County of Stanislaus cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely by reason of torts 

committed by an employee, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under Section 1983 against 

Defendant County of Stanislaus.

C. Freedom of Religion Claim

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Meredith violated Plaintiff’s rights under the First 

Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that during a June 14, 2013 

court proceeding, Defendant Meredith demanded that Plaintiff stand while swearing an oath to 

testify truthfully. Plaintiff refused, stating that “I only rise before my Lord and Savior Jesus 

Christ.” Defendant Meredith ordered a bailiff to make Plaintiff rise, but Plaintiff refused. 

Plaintiff was then escorted outside the courtroom for about an hour. Plaintiff returned and “was 

escorted to the bench area” and “while [Plaintiff] was already standing at the bench area, he was 

sworn in,” without incident.

The Free Exercise Claus of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution states 

that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 

exercise thereof....” U.S. Const. amend. I. As a general proposition, “a law that is neutral and of 

general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law 

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has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi 

Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).

The Court notes that there appears to be no law or regulation which requires Plaintiff to 

stand before the judge while taking an oath to testify truthfully. “[W]hen the challenged 

government action is neither regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory, alleging a subjective 

chilling effect on free exercise rights is not sufficient to constitute a substantial burden.” 

American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citing Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff’s 

complaint does not allege governmental action which was regulatory, proscriptive of 

compulsory. Plaintiff did not suffer any substantial burden from his refusal to stand before 

Defendant Meredith. Plaintiff, at most, was subjected to insubstantial inconvenience when was 

required to wait for an hour before he was sworn in while standing in the bench area of the 

courtroom.

The facts alleged show that Plaintiff was not subjected to substantial pressure to modify 

his behavior and to violate his beliefs. Ultimately, Plaintiff was not forced to violate his beliefs 

as the complaint alleges that the court allowed Plaintiff to swear an oath while standing in the 

“bench area” of the courtroom, which Plaintiff did not object to. This did not constitute a 

“substantial burden.” “Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct 

proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by 

religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 

violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 

Employment Sec. Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any 

claims for the violation of his First Amendment Free Exercise rights.

D. Free Speech Claim

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Meredith violated Plaintiff’s rights under the First 

Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Similar to the basis of Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim, 

Plaintiff contends that his free speech rights were violated when he was forced to stand while 

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taking his oath before testifying in court.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts which plausibly support the conclusion that 

sitting down constituted expressive speech. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, by sitting:

[Plaintiff] attempted to express his beliefs about the protections 

that he was entitled to have under the First Amendment to the 

Constitution of the United States of America....

(Compl. ¶ 93.) Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that sitting constituted protected “symbolic 

speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.

In U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized that “[w]e 

cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled “speech” 

whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” In determining 

whether symbolic acts constitute protected speech, the Court looks to whether there is 1) an 

intent to convey a particularized message, and 2) that the likelihood is great that the message 

would be understood by those who viewed it. Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410 

(1974); Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003).

The facts alleged do not support the conclusion that Plaintiff’s acts constituted expressive 

conduct protected under the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that he was attempting to convey

the particularized message, via sitting down in the courtroom, regarding his beliefs about the 

protections afforded under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court 

finds that there is very little likelihood that this message would be understood as Plaintiff 

intended by a casual observer. Sitting down when asked to stand in a courtroom does not convey 

a readily understood message regarding the First Amendment or the Constitution. Someone 

observing Plaintiff’s conduct in the courtroom would be more likely to assume that Plaintiff is 

just being obstinate or possessed no respect for the court’s authority—an assumption that would 

be supported in this specific context by Plaintiff’s constant badgering of government officials for 

their “oath of office” and challenging the jurisdiction of the court. However, Plaintiff does not 

allege that this was the message he was attempting to convey. Since Plaintiff contends that he 

was attempting to convey a different message that would not be readily understood by those who 

viewed it, his claim fails.

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Moreover:

A courthouse—and, especially, a courtroom—is a nonpublic 

forum. [Citations.] A courtroom’s very function is to provide a 

locus in which civil and criminal disputes can be adjudicated. 

Within this staid environment, the presiding judge is charged with 

the responsibility of maintaining proper order and decorum. In 

carrying out this responsibility, the judge must ensure “that [the] 

courthouse is a place in which rational reflection and disinterested 

judgment will not be disrupted.” [Citation.]

Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Here, the facts 

alleged by Plaintiff clearly demonstrates that Defendant Meredith’s actions were justified 

because the rationale for her actions are plain from a cursory examination of the facts. See

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)

(access to a nonpublic forum can be restricted as long as the restrictions are reasonable and are 

not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view).

The facts alleged by Plaintiff rather candidly recount Plaintiff’s harassing behavior 

toward public officials, disrespect for the court’s authority and childish refusal to address the 

merits of his traffic infraction and instead raise frivolous arguments based upon Plaintiff’s 

misunderstanding of the concept of jurisdiction. Plaintiff demanded names and job titles from 

court employees. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff demanded to see an “oath of office” from court 

employees. (Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff refused to pay filing fees charged by the court. (Compl. ¶ 

32.) Plaintiff raised frivolous arguments regarding the charging documents. (Compl. ¶ 38.) 

Plaintiff raised frivolous arguments claiming that the state could not prosecute Plaintiff because 

of a “conflict in interest” when “the state” was the “injured party” to his crime. (Compl. ¶ 40.) 

Plaintiff raised frivolous motions to dismiss. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff raised frivolous arguments 

regarding the court’s jurisdiction. (Compl. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff raised frivolous, and frankly childish, 

complaints when Defendant Meredith entered a “not guilty” plea on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Compl. ¶ 

51.) Plaintiff raised frivolous arguments pertaining to his claimed right to a jury trial on his 

traffic infraction. (Compl. ¶ 52.)

Given the totality of the circumstances as described alleged by Plaintiff, the Court finds 

that Defendant Meredith’s actions were reasonable and were not directed at suppressing 

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Plaintiff’s point of view. Given the context of the situation, it is clear from this Court’s reading 

of the complaint that Defendant Meredith viewed Plaintiff’s refusal to stand while taking the 

oath as another incident in a long line of immature, disrespectful and frivolous protests by 

Plaintiff throughout his court proceedings. Further, the Court finds that Defendant Meredith 

responded to Plaintiff’s behavior in the least intrusive means available, as Plaintiff was 

ultimately allowed to take the oath in the bench area of the courtroom and his ability to testify 

and present a defense was not inhibited.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any 

cognizable claims for the violation of Plaintiff’s free speech rights under the First Amendment.

E. Due Process (Filing Fee) Claim

Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated because he was asked to pay a 

filing fee to file certain defense documents. While the Supreme Court has held that indigent

defendants must be afforded a waiver of filing fees in criminal cases, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 

12, 18 (1956); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999), Plaintiff’s claim suffers 

from a number of defects.

First and foremost, Plaintiff identifies no tangible injury, as Plaintiff was eventually 

allowed to file his documents without paying any fees. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that his defense 

was hindered, but it is unclear how his defense was impacted at all, given that the court 

eventually accepted the documents. It is also worth noting, that the documents at issue, attached 

as exhibits to the complaint in this action, could not possibly have had any bearing on Plaintiff’s 

case, as they were plainly frivolous and immaterial. These documents include a made-up 

document authored by Plaintiff entitled “Affidavit of Status,” an “Affidavit of Facts” which 

recounts the December 2012 incident where he received the traffic ticket but does not deny the 

merits of the ticket, an “Affidavit of Facts” recounting Plaintiff’s court proceedings, frivolous 

objections which appear to complain about the flags on display at the court, and Defendant 

Meredith’s oath of office.

Secondly, while filing fees must be waived for indigent defendants, Plaintiff does not 

claim to be indigent in his complaint. The Court notes that Plaintiff was able to pay the $400.00 

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filing fee in this action. The Constitution does not require a waiver of filing fees for nonindigent defendants simply because they do not feel like paying them.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any 

cognizable claims for the violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights stemming from the charging 

of filing fees.

F. Due Process (Oath of Office) Claim

Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated because Defendant Meredith 

“consciously and deliberately never disclosed the jurisdiction that [Plaintiff] was being tried 

under.” and “The Rules of Procedure are different under certain jurisdictions in which it makes it 

improbably[sic] to mount a defense, civil or criminal.” (Compl. ¶ 105.) Plaintiff also claims 

Defendant Meredith was biased (Compl. ¶ 107) and that “on May 9, 2013, [Defendant Meredith] 

changed the nature and cause of the against[sic] [Plaintiff] in the middle of the motions hearing.” 

(Compl. ¶ 104.)

The Court is unaware of any authority which requires courts to “disclose” the basis of 

jurisdiction in response to frivolous challenges raised by Plaintiff. Furthermore, it appears that, 

under California Government Code § 72190, Defendant Meredith had actual jurisdiction to 

conduct the trial on Plaintiff’s traffic infraction. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no facts which 

seriously challenge the state court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, this claim fails.

Further, the Court is unaware of any authority which suggests that the Due Process 

Clause requires all jurisdictions to follow identical rules of procedure. Accordingly, this claim 

fails.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any facts which plausibly support the conclusion that 

Defendant Meredith was biased or that the charges against Plaintiff were changed in the middle 

of a motions hearing. Accordingly, these claims fail.

G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff attempts to raise a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against 

Defendant Meredith for removing Plaintiff from the courtroom for exercising his religious 

beliefs. Aside from the fact that Defendant Meredith possesses absolute judicial immunity for 

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damages claims, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts which plausibly support a claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Under California law, the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress are: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, 2) the plaintiff’s suffering 

severe or extreme emotional distress, and 3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 

distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009). 

Outrageous conduct is defined as conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community. Id. at 150-51. Asking a litigant to stand while taking an oath 

to testify truthfully is not outrageous conduct.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

fails.

H. Negligence

Plaintiff attempts to raise a claim for negligence against Defendants. Plaintiff’s 

negligence claim is premised upon the allegation that Defendants possessed a duty to not violate 

Plaintiff’s rights. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts which plausibly support 

the conclusion that any of his rights were violated. Therefore, Plaintiff’s attempt to state a 

negligence claim based upon the same necessarily fails.

I. Leave to Amend

“Generally, Rule 15 advises the court that ‘leave [to amend the complaint] shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.’ This policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.’” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. 

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). The factors the Court 

should consider in deciding whether to grant leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, and futility of the amendment. Id. at 1052.

/ / /

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In accordance with the “extreme liberality” with which leave to amend should be granted, 

the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies 

identified herein.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any 

cognizable claims.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with 

leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint, if any, within thirty (30) days from 

the date of service of this order. Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to file a timely amended 

complaint will result in a recommendation that this action be closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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