Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01517/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01517-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frito-Lay North America, Inc.
Appellee
Princeton Vanguard, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC,

Appellant

v.

FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1517

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

91195552 and 92053001. 

______________________ 

Decided: May 15, 2015

______________________ 

DAVID HAL BERNSTEIN, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, 

New York, NY, argued for appellant. Also represented by

JEREMY N. KLATELL, LAUREN E. KAPSKY. 

WILLIAM G. BARBER, Pirkey Barber LLP, Austin, TX, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by PAUL JOSEPH 

THOMAS MADRID. 

JOHN W. CRITTENDEN, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, CA, 

for amicus curiae Counsel of American Survey Research 

Organizations Incorporated. Also represented by VINCENT 

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2

JAMES BADOLATO, MORGAN AYN CHAMPION, Washington, 

DC.

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Princeton Vanguard, LLC (“Princeton Vanguard”) appeals from the final decision of the Trademark Trial and 

Appeal Board (“the Board”) cancelling its registration of 

the mark PRETZEL CRISPS for pretzel crackers on the 

Supplemental Register and denying its application to 

register PRETZEL CRISPS on the Principal Register. 

Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC, 109 

U.S.P.Q.2d 1949 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2014) (“Board Decision”). Because the Board applied the incorrect legal 

standard in evaluating whether the mark is generic, we 

vacate and remand for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2004, Princeton Vanguard filed U.S. 

Trademark Application Serial No. 78/405,596, seeking to 

register PRETZEL CRISPS in standard character format

for “pretzels” on an intent-to-use basis under § 1(b) of the 

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051. The trademark examining 

attorney refused registration on the Principal Register on 

grounds that the proposed mark was merely descriptive

under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). In response, Princeton 

Vanguard: (1) amended its identification of goods from 

“pretzels” to “pretzel crackers;” (2) disclaimed the exclusive right to use the term “pretzel” apart from the mark 

as a whole; and (3) requested registration on the Supplemental Register. Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1950

& n.1. Princeton Vanguard subsequently obtained Registration No. 2,980,303 for the PRETZEL CRISPS mark on 

the Supplemental Register. 

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Several years later, Princeton Vanguard filed U.S. 

Trademark Application Serial No. 76/700,802, seeking to 

register PRETZEL CRISPS in standard character format

for “pretzel crackers” on the Principal Register. In its

application, Princeton Vanguard identified October 6, 

2004 as its first use of the mark in commerce, disclaimed 

the exclusive right to use the term “pretzel” apart from 

the mark as shown, and claimed acquired distinctiveness 

in the mark as a whole. Id. at 1950 n.2.

On July 2, 2010, Frito-Lay North America, Inc. (“Frito-Lay”) filed a notice of opposition to Princeton Vanguard’s Application Serial No. 76/700,802 to register 

PRETZEL CRISPS on the Principal Register. In its 

opposition, Frito-Lay argued that the term PRETZEL 

CRISPS is generic for pretzel crackers and thus is not 

registrable. In the alternative, Frito-Lay asserted that 

PRETZEL CRISPS is highly descriptive of a type of 

cracker product and has not acquired distinctiveness. Id. 

at 1950. Frito-Lay subsequently filed a petition to cancel 

Supplemental Registration No. 2,980,303 on the same 

grounds. The petition for cancellation was consolidated

with the opposition proceeding and both parties filed 

motions for summary judgment. 

In denying Frito-Lay’s motion for summary judgment 

that the mark is generic, the Board found that Princeton 

Vanguard’s submissions, including survey evidence and 

news articles, “give[] rise to a genuine dispute regarding 

the element of whether the public understands ‘pretzel 

crisps’ as the generic wording for pretzel crackers, or as 

designating applicant as the source of pretzel cracker 

products bearing the mark.” Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. 

Princeton Vanguard, LLC, Opp’n Nos. 91190246 & 

91195552, Canc’n No. 92053001, slip op. at 8 (T.T.A.B. 

Feb. 9, 2011). The Board likewise denied Princeton 

Vanguard’s later motion for summary judgment, finding a 

genuine dispute as to whether the mark is generic for 

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ness. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC, 

Opp’n No. 91195552, Canc’n No. 92053001, slip op. at 3-4 

(T.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2012). The parties agreed to proceed to 

trial on the summary judgment record, as well as supplemental expert declarations. That record included, among 

other things, testimony in the form of declarations with 

attached exhibits, media references, third party use in the 

food industry, use by the parties themselves, and expert 

survey evidence. Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1951. 

Both parties filed trial briefs and, pursuant to Princeton 

Vanguard’s request, the Board conducted oral argument. 

On February 28, 2014, the Board sustained FritoLay’s opposition to Princeton Vanguard’s application and 

granted its petition for cancellation. Id. at 1960.1 At the 

outset, the Board found that “pretzel crisps” is a compound term, not a phrase, and analyzed the terms individually. Id. at 1953 (noting that “compound words that 

do not add new meaning may be analyzed by their constituent terms”). Specifically, the Board found that the 

term “pretzel” in PRETZEL CRISPS is generic for pretzels 

and pretzel snacks, and the term “crisps” is generic for 

crackers. In reaching this conclusion, the Board cited: 

(1) media references and third-party use of the term 

“crisps” to identify crackers; (2) registrations disclaiming 

the term “crisps”; (3) dictionary definitions of the word 

“crisp”; (4) Princeton Vanguard’s admission that its 

packages for its PRETZEL CRISPS products provide 

nutritional facts for a serving size of a stated number of 

“crisps”; (5) a few generic references to the combined term 

“pretzel crisps;” and (6) the surveys of two of the parties’ 

1 The Board found that Frito-Lay has standing to 

oppose the registration because it sells pretzels, crackers, 

and other snack foods. Id. at 1951. Standing is not at 

issue on appeal. 

 

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experts: Dr. Alex Simonson for Frito-Lay and Dr. E. 

Deborah Jay for Princeton Vanguard. 

Dr. Simonson’s survey found that 41% of respondents 

thought PRETZEL CRISPS was a brand name, 41% 

thought it was a category name, and 18% answered “don’t 

know” or “not sure.” Id. at 1957. Dr. Jay noted several 

problems with Dr. Simonson’s methodology, including 

that “the universe of survey participants was underinclusive,” the two options of giving no opinion—“don’t know” 

and “not sure”—may have caused confusion, and Dr. 

Simonson failed to conduct a “mini-test” to determine 

whether participants understood the difference between 

brand names and category (generic) names. Id. at 1957-

58. The Board agreed with Dr. Jay’s criticisms of Dr. 

Simonson’s survey, and thus gave Frito Lay’s survey little 

probative weight. As to Dr. Jay’s survey—which found 

that 55% of respondents thought that PRETZEL CRISPS 

was a brand name, while 36% thought it was a common or 

generic name—the Board noted Dr. Simonson’s objection

to the screening criteria, but did not adopt it. Id. at 1958.

The Board indicated that it considered the entire record, including the surveys, but gave “controlling weight to 

the dictionary definitions, evidence of use by the public, 

including use by the media and by third-parties in the 

food industry, and evidence of use by defendant itself.” 

Id. at 1960. On this record, the Board found “PRETZEL 

CRISPS” is generic for “pretzel crackers.” Id. The Board 

explained that its conclusion would be the same if it had

analyzed PRETZEL CRISPS as a phrase instead of a 

compound term, because “the words strung together as a 

unified phrase also create a meaning that we find to be 

understood by the relevant public as generic for ‘pretzel 

crackers.’” Id. Given the Board’s finding of genericness, 

it did not address whether the term PRETZEL CRISPS, 

when used in connection with pretzel crackers, has acquired distinctiveness. Id. at 1960 n.13. 

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Princeton Vanguard timely appealed to this court. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(B). 

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and 

its factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Pacer 

Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Whether the 

Board applied the correct legal standard in assessing the 

mark is a question of law we review de novo. See In re 

Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1345 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). Whether an asserted mark is generic is 

a question of fact. In re Hotels.com, LP, 573 F.3d 1300, 

1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Accordingly, “[o]n appellate review

of the Board’s factual finding of genericness, we determine whether, on the entirety of the record, there was 

substantial evidence to support the determination.” Id. at 

1302. Substantial evidence requires “more than a mere 

scintilla” and is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind would accept as adequate’ to support a conclusion.” 

Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Consol. Edison v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

On appeal, Princeton Vanguard argues that the Board 

erred in its genericness analysis when it assessed the 

PRETZEL CRISPS mark as a compound term instead of a 

phrase. Specifically, Princeton Vanguard contends that 

the Board “took the short-cut of analyzing whether the 

words ‘pretzel’ and ‘crisps’ are each generic for a pretzel 

and a cracker, and then it merely assumed the public 

would understand the combined mark PRETZEL CRISPS 

to be generic for ‘pretzel crackers’ without due consideration of the actual evidence of record.” Appellant Br. 9. 

According to Princeton Vanguard, by focusing solely on 

the mark’s constituent parts, the Board: (1) deviated from 

this court’s precedent, which requires consideration of the 

mark it its entirety; and (2) failed to consider the evidence 

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of record, which shows that the purchasing public understands the term PRETZEL CRISPS to be a brand name. 

For the reasons explained below, we agree with 

Princeton Vanguard that the Board applied the incorrect 

legal standard when it failed to consider the relevant 

public’s understanding of the PRETZEL CRISPS mark in 

its entirety. 

A. The Board Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard 

A generic term “is the common descriptive name of a 

class of goods or services.” H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l 

Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 

1986). Because generic terms “are by definition incapable of indicating a particular source of the goods or services,” they cannot be registered as trademarks. Dial-AMattress, 240 F.3d at 1344. “The critical issue in genericness cases is whether members of the relevant public 

primarily use or understand the term sought to be protected to refer to the genus of goods or services in question.” Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989-90. 

We have said that determining a mark’s genericness 

requires “a two-step inquiry: First, what is the genus of 

goods or services at issue? Second, is the term sought to 

be registered or retained on the register understood by 

the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of

goods or services?” Id. at 990. Evidence of the public’s 

understanding of the mark may be obtained from “any 

competent source, such as consumer surveys, dictionaries, 

newspapers and other publications.” In re Northland 

Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 

1985). In an opposition or cancellation proceeding, the 

opposer or petitioner bears the burden of proving genericness by a preponderance of the evidence. See Magic 

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Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641-42 (Fed. Cir. 

1991).2 

Applying the first prong of the Marvin Ginn test, the 

Board defined the genus of goods at issue as “pretzel 

crackers.” Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1952. 

Turning to the second prong, the Board identified the 

relevant public as “ordinary consumers who purchase and 

eat pretzel crackers.” Id. Neither party disputes these 

findings on appeal. 

2 Although the parties agree that the relevant 

standard is preponderance of the evidence, Frito-Lay 

notes that they disputed who bore the burden of proof on 

the issue of genericness at trial. Appellee Br. 20 n.5. 

Frito-Lay argued to the Board that Princeton Vanguard 

should bear the burden to show that its mark is not 

generic because its registration on the Supplemental 

Register is not prima facie evidence of the validity of the 

registered mark. The parties did not brief this issue on 

appeal. Indeed, Frito-Lay states that we “need not consider this issue at this juncture,” but concedes that it 

would become “relevant in the event of a remand.” Id. 

We agree with the Board that the burden was on FritoLay to prove genericness by a preponderance of the evidence. See Am. Med. Rehab. Providers Ass’n. v. UB 

Found. Activities, Inc., Opp. No. 91158512, Canc’n No. 

92043381, 2008 WL 4674613, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 

2008) (“In an opposition/cancellation, the opposer/petitioner has the burden of proving genericness by a 

‘preponderance of the evidence.’”); Racine Indus., Inc. v. 

Bane-Clene Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1838 (T.T.A.B. 

1994) (“Opposer, as the party contending that the designation ‘PCA’ is a generic term for applicant’s professional 

carpet cleaners’ association, bears the burden of proof 

thereof.”). 

 

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The Board began its discussion of the public’s perception of the mark by stating that it “first must decide how 

to analyze the term.” Id. Although the Board acknowledged that the ultimate inquiry is whether the mark as a 

whole is generic, it then cited In re Gould Paper Corp., 

834 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987), for the proposition that, 

“in cases where the proposed mark is a compound term (in 

other words a combination of two or more terms in ordinary grammatical construction), genericness may be 

established with evidence of the meaning of the constituent words.” Id. (citing Gould, 834 F.2d at 1019). The 

Board indicated that, “[b]y contrast, ‘where the proposed 

mark is a phrase . . . the board cannot simply cite definitions and generic uses of the constituent terms of a mark; 

it must conduct an inquiry into the meaning of the disputed phrase as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Dial-A-Mattress, 

240 F.3d at 1345 (citing In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 

1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 

The Board appears to believe that there is a dichotomy in the standard applicable to a particular mark depending on whether it is a compound term or a phrase. 

According to the Board, if the mark is a compound term, 

then Gould applies, and it can focus on the individual 

words, but if it is a phrase, American Fertility requires 

that the Board consider the mark in its entirety. Id. at 

1953. Because the Board found “no additional meaning 

added to ‘PRETZEL CRISPS’ in relation to ‘pretzel crackers,’ when the individual terms are combined,” the Board 

analyzed it as a compound term. Id. The Board then 

considered the terms individually and concluded that 

“pretzel” is generic for pretzels and pretzel snacks, and 

“crisps” is generic for crackers. Id. 

The problem with the Board’s analysis is that there is 

only one legal standard for genericness: the two-part test

set forth in Marvin Ginn. Am. Fertility, 188 F.3d at 1348. 

As noted, to determine whether a mark is generic under 

that test, the Board must first identify the genus of goods 

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or services at issue, and then assess whether the public 

understands the mark, as a whole, to refer to that genus. 

Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 990. On appeal, Frito-Lay cites 

our decisions in Gould and American Fertility to suggest 

that the Board can somehow short-cut its analysis of the 

public’s perception where “the purported mark is a compound term consisting merely of two generic words.” 

Appellee Br. 21. As discussed below, however, there is no 

such short-cut, and the test for genericness is the same, 

regardless of whether the mark is a compound term or a 

phrase. Neither Gould nor American Fertility hold otherwise. 

The applicant in Gould sought to register the mark 

SCREENWIPE for goods identified as “pre-moistened, 

anti-static cloth for cleaning computer and television 

screens.” 834 F.2d at 1017. While the Board looked to 

the individual definitions of “screen” and “wipe,” we found 

that “Gould’s own submissions provided the most damaging evidence that its alleged mark is generic and would be 

perceived by the purchasing public as merely a common 

name for its goods rather than a mark identifying the 

good’s source.” Id. at 1018-19. Indeed, Gould described 

its own product as “a . . . wipe . . . for . . . screens.” Id. at 

1019. Given this admission, we noted that the “compound 

immediately and unequivocally describes the purpose, 

function and nature of the goods as Gould itself tells us.” 

Id. (“Gould has simply joined the two most pertinent and 

individually generic terms applicable to its product, and 

then attempts to appropriate the ordinary compound thus 

created as its trademark.”). In that context, where the 

mark in its entirety has exactly the same meaning as the 

individual words, we stated that “the PTO has satisfied 

its evidentiary burden if, as it did in this case, it produces 

evidence . . . that the separate words joined to form a 

compound have a meaning identical to the meaning 

common usage would ascribe to those words as a compound.” Id. at 1018. Because “the terms remain as 

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generic in the compound as individually,” we concluded 

that the compound itself was generic. Id. at 1019.

In American Fertility, we explained that: (1) Gould

did not alter the legal standard for genericness; and 

(2) the correct legal test “is set forth in Marvin Ginn and 

is to be applied to a mark . . . as a whole, for the whole 

may be greater than the sum of its parts.” Am. Fertility, 

188 F.3d at 1348. In that case, the Board held that the 

proposed mark—SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE 

MEDICINE—was generic based on evidence of record 

relating solely to the individual terms. Id. at 1344 (“Despite the lack of evidence of the public’s understanding of 

the phrase as a whole, the Board held that the ‘combination of the terms ‘society’ and ‘reproductive medicine’ 

results in a designation, SOCIETY FOR 

REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, which is also generic.’”)

(citation omitted). We vacated the Board’s decision on 

appeal, finding that it applied the incorrect legal standard 

when it “assumed the genericness of a phrase as a whole 

based solely on proof of the genericness of its individual 

terms.” Id. at 1342. 

In reaching this conclusion in American Fertility, we 

clarified that the Gould decision “did not purport to 

modify Marvin Ginn . . . and seemingly sought to follow” 

it by focusing on Gould’s generic use in its entirety. Id. at 

1347. We reiterated that Marvin Ginn requires evidence 

of the “genus of goods or services at issue” and the “understanding by the general public that the mark refers 

primarily to ‘that genus of goods or services.’” Id. 

“Properly interpreted, Gould does not justify a short-cut 

around this test, but rather found that the evidence 

presented met this burden.” Id. at 1348. We further 

indicated that the Board “cannot simply cite definitions 

and generic uses of the constituent terms of a mark . . . in 

lieu of conducting an inquiry into the meaning of the 

disputed phrase as a whole to hold a mark . . . generic.” 

Id. at 1347. Accordingly, we remanded the case for the 

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Board to apply the Marvin Ginn test to the mark as a 

whole. Id. at 1349.

In subsequent decisions, this court has reiterated 

that, “[a]n inquiry into the public’s understanding of a 

mark requires consideration of the mark as a whole. 

Even if each of the constituent words in a combination 

mark is generic, the combination is not generic unless the 

entire formulation does not add any meaning to the 

otherwise generic mark.” In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 

F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In Steelbuilding, the 

applicant sought to register the mark 

STEELBUILDING.COM in connection with “computerized on-line retail services in the field of pre-engineered 

metal buildings and roofing systems.” Id. at 1296. The 

Board found that the mark was either generic or highly 

descriptive, and that there was insufficient evidence of 

acquired distinctiveness. Id. On appeal, we found 

that the record did not contain substantial evidence that 

“STEELBUILDING,” “in common usage, is a compound 

word used to mean either ‘steel building’ or ‘steel buildings.’” Id. at 1298 (citing Gould, 834 F.2d at 1018). In 

reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that Gould

required consideration of the mark in its entirety, and 

that the applicant in Gould “admitted that ‘screen wipe’ 

denoted a ‘screen wipe.’” Id. at 1298. In other words, the 

combined term at issue in Gould—SCREENWIPE—itself 

described the genus of goods at issue. In contrast, the 

applicant denied that “STEELBUILDING” describes 

merely “steel buildings.” Id. Although the Board cited 

evidence showing that “steel building” was generic, that 

evidence did not “address directly the composite term 

STEELBUILDING.” Id. at 1299. We concluded, therefore, that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to 

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support the Board’s finding that STEELBUILDING.COM 

was generic for the applicant’s services. Id.3 

On appeal, Frito-Lay argues that American Fertility is 

distinguishable from this case because it involved a 

phrase, not a compound term. According to Frito-Lay, the 

applicable legal standard depends on an initial “factual 

determination of whether the purported mark is a compound term or a phrase.” Appellee Br. 36-37.4 We disa3 Other decisions have likewise emphasized that 

the Board must consider the mark in its entirety. See 

Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1346 (“Analyzing the ‘1-888-

M-A-T-R-E-S-S’ mark as a whole, substantial evidence 

does not support the conclusion that the mark is generic. 

There is no record evidence that the relevant public refers 

to the class of shop-at-home telephone mattress retailers 

as ‘1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S.’”).

4 Frito-Lay cites Cummins Engine Co., Inc. v. Continental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892 (CCPA 1966), for the 

proposition that analyzing compound terms individually 

“has been a part of this Court’s trademark precedent for 

nearly fifty years, if not longer.” Appellee Br. 23. In 

Cummins, however, our predecessor court found that “the 

definitions alone indicate that ‘turbodiesel’ is a word 

which by its nature will convey a specific and correct 

meaning which is such that it cannot become a trademark 

as a result even of origination and first use.” Cummins, 

359 F.2d at 894. The record also contained a “Flight” 

magazine article which was published prior to the applicant’s use of the term TURBODIESEL and referred to 

“turbo-diesel” as an engine name. Id. at 894-95. Given 

the evidence of record, the court concluded that the term 

“turbodiesel” “would be recognized as a natural composite 

term for designating such engines.” Id. at 895. Despite 

Frito-Lay’s suggestion to the contrary, the court in Cum-

 

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gree. Regardless of whether the mark is a compound 

term or a phrase, the applicable test is the same and the 

Board must consider the record evidence of the public’s 

understanding of the mark as a whole. Am. Fertility, 188 

F.3d at 1348-49. Our decision in Gould merely provides 

additional assistance in assessing the genericness of 

compound terms where it can be shown that “the public 

understands the individual terms to be generic,” and the 

joining of those terms into one compound word provides 

no additional meaning. Id. It is not a short-cut and does 

not supplant the two-part test set forth in Marvin Ginn. 

Even in cases where we have recognized that Gould

provides an evidentiary standard applicable to compound 

terms, we have nonetheless emphasized that the Board 

must consider the mark in its entirety. See Hotels.com, 

573 F.3d at 1304-06 (citing Gould and concluding that 

“the Board satisfied its evidentiary burden, by demonstrating that the separate terms ‘hotel’ and ‘.com’ in 

combination have a meaning identical to the common 

meaning of the separate components”); see also In re 

1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

2009). 

In 1800Mattress.com, for example, the Board initially 

considered the terms “mattress” and “.com” individually 

and determined that they were both generic. 586 F.3d at 

1363. We explained that the Board “then considered the 

mark as a whole and determined that the combination 

added no new meaning, relying on the prevalence of the 

term ‘mattress.com’ in the website addresses of several 

online mattress retailers that provide the same services 

as Dial-A-Mattress.” Id. In affirming the Board’s decision, we indicated that the Board “properly determined” 

that “the correct inquiry is whether the relevant public 

mins looked to the public’s understanding of the mark as 

a whole.

 

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would understand, when hearing the term ‘mattress.com,’ 

that it refers to online mattress stores.” Id. at 1364. 

Accordingly, even in circumstances where the Board finds 

it useful to consider the public’s understanding of the 

individual words in a compound term as a first step in its 

analysis, the Board must then consider available record 

evidence of the public’s understanding of whether joining 

those individual words into one lends additional meaning 

to the mark as a whole. See id. at 1363-64; see Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1304-06.

As noted, here, the Board determined that PRETZEL 

CRISPS is a compound term, not a phrase, and evaluated 

the terms individually under Gould. Board Decision, 109 

U.S.P.Q.2d at 1953. The Board concluded that the “commonly understood meaning of the words ‘pretzel’ and 

‘crisps,’ demonstrates that purchasers understand that 

‘PRETZEL CRISPS’ identifies ‘pretzel crackers.’” Id. at 

1959. Where, as here, the record is replete with evidence 

of the public’s perception of the term PRETZEL CRISPS 

as a whole, it is unclear why the Board would resort to 

analyzing the terms individually or why it would believe 

doing so would aid its analysis. In any event, as we have 

explained, the appropriate legal standard set forth in 

Marvin Ginn requires consideration of the mark as a 

whole. 

At the end of its decision, the Board stated in passing 

that, although it analyzed the term PRETZEL CRISPS as 

a compound term, “were we to analyze it as a phrase, on 

this record, our conclusion would be the same, as the 

words strung together as a unified phrase also create a 

meaning that we find to be understood by the relevant 

public as generic for ‘pretzel crackers.’” Board Decision, 

109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1960. But the Board’s decision lacks 

any indicia that it actually engaged in such an analysis. 

Specifically, as explained below, there is no evidence that 

the Board conducted the necessary step of comparing its 

findings with respect to the individual words to the record 

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evidence demonstrating the public’s understanding of the 

combined term: PRETZEL CRISPS. By failing to do so, 

the Board took the type of short-cut analysis we have said 

is prohibited and ignored evidence that might compel a 

contrary conclusion. See Am. Fertility, 188 F.3d at 1348 

(stating that “Gould does not justify a short-cut around” 

the test articulated in Marvin Ginn). We conclude, therefore, that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard 

in its genericness determination. On remand, the Board 

must consider evidence of the relevant public’s understanding of the term PRETZEL CRISPS in its entirety. 

B. Evidence of Record

As previously discussed, the relevant public’s perception is the primary consideration in determining whether 

a term is generic. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 

Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“It is 

basic to the inquiry to determine whether members of the 

relevant public primarily use or understand the term to 

refer to the genus of goods or services.”). And, as noted, 

evidence of the public’s perception may be obtained from 

“any competent source, such as consumer surveys, dictionaries, newspapers and other publications.” Northland 

Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1559. 

One of our sister circuits has indicated that “direct 

consumer evidence, e.g., consumer surveys and testimony 

is preferable to indirect forms of evidence.” Berner Int’l 

Corp. v. Mars Sales, Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982-83 (3d Cir. 

1993) (“Consumer surveys have become almost de rigueur 

in litigation over genericness.”) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). We likewise have recognized 

that “consumer surveys may be a preferred method of 

proving genericness.” BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational 

Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“While consumer surveys may be a preferred method of proving 

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standing, we are satisfied that on the facts of this case 

genericness has been established under that test.”). 

On appeal, Princeton Vanguard argues that the Board

cherry-picked the media references in the record and 

chose only those references that supported genericness. 

According to Princeton Vanguard, the Board failed to 

consider evidence that, “since the launch of PRETZEL 

CRISPS pretzel crackers, 86% of unsolicited media references clearly use the term PRETZEL CRISPS” as a brand 

name. Appellant Br. 23. Next, Princeton Vanguard 

argues that the Board failed to consider the declarations 

it presented from four independent participants in the 

snack food industry who testified that they use and understand the term PRETZEL CRISPS exclusively to refer 

to Snack Factory’s PRETZEL CRISPS products.5 Instead, 

the Board cited “two instances in which a snack food 

company used the term PRETZEL CRISPS in an arguably 

generic fashion.” Id. at 27. Finally, Princeton Vanguard 

argues that the Board erred in disregarding the results of 

Dr. Jay’s survey without any explanation. 

In response, Frito-Lay argues that, “even if the Board 

somehow ‘cherry picked’ generic uses of ‘pretzel crisps’ by 

the media (which it did not), there is ample other evidence 

supporting its genericness finding, including dictionary 

definitions; generic use by Princeton, competitors, and 

consumers; and survey evidence.” Appellee Br. 43-44. 

Frito-Lay maintains that the Board’s findings are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 

Given our conclusion that the Board applied the incorrect standard for genericness and our decision to 

remand for application of the correct legal test, we need 

5 Princeton Vanguard explains that it “has granted 

Snack Factory an exclusive license to use the PRETZEL

CRISPS mark.” Appellant Br. 4 n.2.

 

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not analyze the parties’ specific arguments with respect to 

the evidence of record. We reiterate, however, that substantial evidence review “requires an examination of the 

record as a whole, taking into account both the evidence 

that justifies and detracts from an agency’s opinion.” 

Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Our review under that standard “can only take place 

when the agency explains its decisions with sufficient 

precision, including the underlying factfindings and the 

agency’s rationale.” Packard Press, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

The record here contains significant evidence in the 

form of declarations, survey evidence, and evidence of use 

of PRETZEL CRISPS in the snack food industry and by 

the media and Frito-Lay does not dispute Princeton 

Vanguard’s description of much of it. Though the Board is 

not required to discuss every piece of evidence, it cannot 

focus primarily on evidence of the word “crisps” in isolation, select a few pieces of evidence involving the combined term “pretzel crisps,” and conclude that the 

trademark is generic. Nor can it disregard the results of 

survey evidence without explanation. Just as it may not 

short-cut its legal analysis, the Board may not short-cut 

its consideration of the factual record before it. 

As previously noted, the Board expressly agreed with 

Dr. Jay’s criticisms of Dr. Simonson’s survey and gave his 

findings “little probative weight.” Board Decision, 109 

U.S.P.Q.2d at 1958. In particular, the Board concluded 

that the two “don’t know” and “not sure” answers “potentially were confusing to survey participants, and may 

have le[d] those who understood the survey question to 

elect to indicate they did not.” Id. As to Dr. Jay’s survey, 

which found that 55% of respondents thought that 

PRETZEL CRISPS was a brand name, the Board merely 

noted Dr. Simonson’s criticism, which was that “less than 

65% of the initial group ‘of qualified respondents’ was 

entered into the survey due to the underinclusive nature 

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of the questions.” Id. at 1958. The Board did not agree 

with this critique, however. Id. Nor did the Board call 

into question Dr. Jay’s conclusion that “the primary 

significance of the name ‘PRETZEL CRISPS’ to past and 

prospective purchasers of salty snacks is as a brand 

name.” Id. Nevertheless, in finding the mark generic, the 

Board indicated that it considered the evidence of record 

“including the surveys (which in any event arrive at 

different conclusions),” but gave controlling weight to 

dictionary definitions, evidence of use by the public, and 

evidence of use by Princeton Vanguard. Id. at 1960. The

Board seems to have treated the surveys as though they 

cancelled each other out, but failed to offer any explanation for doing so. The Board thus overlooked or disregarded a genericness survey as to which it apparently

found no flaw. On remand, the Board will have the 

opportunity to make the relevant factual findings based 

on all of the evidence of record, and must give appropriate 

consideration to the proffered survey evidence. 

CONCLUSION

Because we find that the Board applied the incorrect 

legal standard in assessing whether the term PRETZEL 

CRISPS is generic, we vacate the Board’s decision cancelling Registration No. 2,980,303 and its decision sustaining Frito-Lay’s opposition to Application Serial No. 

76/700,802. We remand for application of the appropriate 

standard as set forth in Marvin Ginn and discussed 

herein. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

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