Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00968/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00968-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant
Andre Rhynes
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ANDRE RHYNES, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 

 ) 1:08-CV-968-TFM 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Following administrative denial of his application for disability insurance benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and 

supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

1381 et seq., Andre Rhynes (“Rhynes”) received a hearing before an administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”) who rendered a partially favorable decision. When the Appeals Council 

rejected review of this decision, it became the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”). Judicial review proceeds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 

405(g) , 1383(c)(3), and 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), and for reasons herein explained, the court 

AFFIRMS IN PART and REMANDS this case to the Commissioner. 

 

Case 1:08-cv-00968-TFM Document 19 Filed 03/17/10 Page 1 of 6
 2

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is limited. The 

court cannot conduct a de novo review or substitute its own judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1982). This court must find 

the Commissioner’s decision conclusive “if it is supported by substantial evidence and 

the correct legal standards were applied.” Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F. 3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 

1999), citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F. 3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

 Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more 

than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. 

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995), citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 

 If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district 

court will affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, 

and even if the court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s 

decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court 

must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as 

unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. 

 The district court will reverse a Commissioner’s decision on plenary review if the 

decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the district court with 

sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. 

Case 1:08-cv-00968-TFM Document 19 Filed 03/17/10 Page 2 of 6
 3

Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 

1994). 

II. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

 The Commissioner found Rhynes disabled on and after March 15, 2005. In 

pertinent part, the ALJ wrote 

[A]t the September 13, 2006 hearing, the claimant testified that he 

has constant pain in his stomach and throat, that he has difficulty 

swallowing, and that he experiences chronic weakness, fatigue, and 

depression.” The medical documentation of record reflects that the 

claimant had severely elevated liver enzymes and bilirubin in May, 2005 

and an EGD performed at that time established that the claimant had Grade 

II esophageal varices, which had progressed from Grade I since August, 

2004. A liver biopsy performed in July, 2006 confirmed the presence of 

“evolving cirrhosis” whereas the previous liver biopsy in November, 2003 

had indicated only and equivocal possibility of cirrhosis. Clearly, the 

claimaint’s symptomatology and his liver disease have progressively 

worsened since March 15, 2005. 

Based upon the objective documentation of the severity and 

worsening of the claimant’s Hepatitis C infection since March 15, 2000, the 

Administrative Law Judge concluded that the claimant has been severely 

limited in his abilities to perform basic work activities since that time and 

that the combined effects of the claimant’s impairments and his related 

symptomatology have rendered the claimant incapable of performing even 

unskilled sedentary work. 

R. at 301. 

 Rhynes contends the record indicates his disability dates from November, 2003. 

Both parties agree that the ALJ misunderstood the medical records inasmuch as Rhynes 

underwent only one liver biopsy which was done in November, 2003.

III. ISSUES

 Rhynes posits two issues for judicial review: 

Case 1:08-cv-00968-TFM Document 19 Filed 03/17/10 Page 3 of 6
 4

1. Whether the ALJ misunderstood the medical records to the extent that the date 

of disability should relate back to November, 2003 rather than March 15, 2005; 

and 

2. Whether the ALJ posed a sufficient hypothetical to the vocational expert. 

IV. DISCUSSION

1. The ALJ misunderstood the medical records to the extent the case must be 

remanded to determine whether the disability began in November, 2003 

rather than March 15, 2005. 

 Both parties agree that the only liver biopsy before the ALJ was done in 

November, 2003 at the behest of Dr. William McLaughlin. (R. 170). Each side differs as 

to the effect of the misunderstanding. Rhynes argues the misunderstanding is so 

fundamental and severe to call into question whether the ALJ meant to date the disability 

from November, 2003 as opposed to March 15, 2005. The Commissioner argues the 

evidence is sufficient, despite the clear misunderstanding, for the ALJ to find Rhynes was 

not disabled, under the Act, before March 15, 2005. 

For two reasons, the Court does not agree with the Commissioner that the 

misunderstanding of the medical records by the ALJ is harmless error and thus remands 

the case to the Commissioner. 

 First, the ALJ gave weight to the medical finding that Rhynes had, “evolving 

cirrhosis” as shown by a biopsy in July, 2006 whereas the biopsy in November, 2003 

Case 1:08-cv-00968-TFM Document 19 Filed 03/17/10 Page 4 of 6
 5

indicated only an equivocal possibility of cirrhosis.1 The degree of weight the ALJ gave 

to the misidentified July, 2006 biopsy is not clear but the ALJ, by his findings, indicates 

he put enough value on the medical record to find Rhynes disabled at least as early 

March, 2005. It is entirely plausible that the ALJ, had he realized the biopsy was done in 

November, 2003, might have related the onset of disability back to November, 2003 

rather than March, 2005. Nothing in the record before the Court indicates the ALJ would 

not have related the disability back to November, 2003 had he known the record he relied 

upon actually refers to a biopsy done in November, 2003. 

Finally, the November, 2003 biopsy was part of the course of treatment by Dr. 

William McLaughlin. In finding Rhynes disabled the ALJ said, in pertinent part, “In 

reaching the above conclusion, the Administrative Law Judge has assigned determinative 

evidentiary weight to the findings and conclusions expressed by the claimant’s treating 

physician, Dr. McLaughlin.”2

 The November, 2003 biopsy, being part of the 

determinative medical evidence, requires the ALJ to have an accurate understanding of 

the medical evidence before the Court can satisfy itself the ALJ did not mistakenly 

choose the wrong date as the date of disability. On remand, the ALJ is free to choose 

March 15, 2005, or some other date as the date of disability.

2. The hypothetical the ALJ posed to the expert was sufficient.

 Rhynes argues the hypothetical to the Vocational Expert (VE) omitted environmental 

limitations that Rhynes must avoid exposure to extreme heat or cold. Testimony from a 

vocational expert may constitute substantial evidence for an ALJ to determine whether 

1

 R. at 301. 

2

 R. at 301. 

Case 1:08-cv-00968-TFM Document 19 Filed 03/17/10 Page 5 of 6
 6

there are jobs in the national economy which a claimant may perform if the ALJ poses a 

hypothetical question to the VE which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments. 

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F. 3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). 

 The Commissioner concedes the ALJ omitted the environmental limitations but 

contends the omission was harmless error because the VE identified jobs such as garment 

bagger, housekeeper, and cafeteria attendant which Rhynes could perform. The Court 

agrees. None of the listed jobs would expose Rhynes to extreme temperatures. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 Pursuant to the findings and conclusions detailed in this Memorandum Opinion, 

the court concludes that the case should be remanded for compliance with applicable 

regulations. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is

REVERSED AND REMANDED. A separate judgment is entered herewith. 

 DONE this 17th day of March, 2010. 

 /s/ Terry F. Moorer 

 TERRY F. MOORER 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:08-cv-00968-TFM Document 19 Filed 03/17/10 Page 6 of 6