Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03073/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lawrence E. Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 2003 Decided March 16, 2004

No. 02-3073

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LAWRENCE E. THOMAS,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

02–3121 and 03–3053

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00423–01)

(No. 02cr00132–01)

(No. 99cr00399–01)

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 1 of 18
2

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Tony Axam, Jr. and

Erica J. Hashimoto, Assistant Federal Public Defenders.

Tony W. Miles, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered

an appearance.

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Barbara J.

Valliere, and Stephen J. Gripkey, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and GARLAND and ROBERTS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The defendants in these consolidated cases raise two questions under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines. The first, which is a question of first

impression in this circuit, is whether escape is a crime of

violence under Guideline § 4B1.2(a)(2) — the guideline that

defines the crimes that trigger career offender sentencing

enhancements. The second question, upon which there is

controlling precedent, is whether the district courts that

sentenced two of the defendants erred by relying on the

defendants’ arrest records in denying their motions for sentencing departures pursuant to Guideline § 4A1.3.

I

On February 28, 2000, Lawrence Thomas pled guilty to one

count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On

July 30, 2002, the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia sentenced Thomas as a ‘‘career offender’’

pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1

[hereinafter U.S.S.G.].1

 That provision subjects a defendant

to a substantial sentencing enhancement if, among other

1 Thomas was sentenced under the 2000 edition of the Manual;

Smith was sentenced under the 2001 edition; and Cook was sentenced under the 2002 edition. The three editions were identical in

all respects relevant here.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 2 of 18
3

things, he has two prior felony convictions for ‘‘crime[s] of

violence’’ or ‘‘controlled substance offense[s],’’ as defined in

§ 4B1.2. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a); see id. cmt. n.1. In sentencing Thomas as a career offender, the district court determined that Thomas had previously been convicted of at least

two qualifying crimes of violence. The court based that

determination on Thomas’ 1977 armed robbery conviction,

and on his three prior convictions for escape: a 1987 conviction for violating the District of Columbia’s former prison

breach statute, D.C. Code § 22–2601 (1973); a 1988 conviction

for violating the same statute; and a 1995 conviction for

escape from a federal facility in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 751(a). These past convictions, the court concluded, triggered § 4B1.1, thus increasing Thomas’ guidelines offense

level from 24 to 32 and placing Thomas in criminal history

category VI. See Thomas Presentence Investigation Report

(PSR) ¶¶ 19–20, 41.2

Thomas challenged this conclusion, arguing that, although

his conviction for armed robbery concededly qualified as a

crime of violence under Guideline § 4B1.2(a), his previous

escape convictions did not. Thomas also maintained that

category VI over-represented the seriousness of his criminal

history, and urged the district court to grant a downward

departure from his guidelines sentencing range pursuant to

Guideline § 4A1.3. The district court rejected Thomas’ arguments, holding that escape was a crime of violence, and

that — in light of Thomas’ record of arrests and convictions — category VI did not overstate his criminal history.

The court did, however, decrease Thomas’ offense level by 3

levels for accepting responsibility for his crime, see U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1(a)–(b), and by another 8 levels because Thomas had

provided substantial assistance to law enforcement after his

arrest, id. § 5K1.1. Thomas Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 46 (July

30, 2002). This resulted in an offense level of 21, which,

2 Guideline § 4B1.1(b) mandates a criminal history category of VI

for all career offenders. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). It also mandates an

offense level of (at least) 32 when the instant offense of conviction

carries a statutory maximum of between 20 and 25 years’ imprisonment. Id.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 3 of 18
4

combined with a criminal history category of VI, yielded a

sentencing range of 77–96 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A

(sentencing table). The district court sentenced Thomas to

80 months in prison.

On March 28, 2002, Dale Smith pled guilty to one count of

possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He also accepted responsibility for 2.5 grams of cocaine powder as conduct relevant to

that offense. At sentencing, the district court concluded —

over the defendant’s objection — that Smith was a career

offender based on two prior felony convictions: a 1993 conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and a

1997 conviction for escape from an institution in violation of

the current D.C. Code escape statute, D.C. Code § 22–

2601(a)(1) (2001). The career offender designation gave

Smith an adjusted offense level of 29 (after a 3–level reduction for acceptance of responsibility), and a criminal history

category VI. That combination mandated a guideline sentencing range of 151–188 months’ imprisonment, as compared

to what would have been a range of 33–41 months without the

career offender designation. Compare Smith PSR ¶¶ 28, 85,

with id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 41, and U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. Like

Thomas, Smith filed a motion for a downward departure

pursuant to Guideline § 4A1.3, claiming that, even if he

technically qualified as a ‘‘career offender’’ under § 4B1.1,

that designation significantly overstated the seriousness of his

criminal history. The district court denied the motion in light

of Smith’s history of arrests and convictions, and sentenced

Smith to a 151–month term of incarceration.

Finally, on April 4, 2002, Andrew Cook, Jr. pled guilty to

one count of a five-count indictment charging him with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Although that crime generally carries a

base offense level of 14, that level increases to 24 if the

defendant has two prior felony convictions for ‘‘crime[s] of

violence’’ or controlled substance offenses, as defined ‘‘in

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).’’ U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a), cmt. n.5; see id.

§ 2K2.1(a). Over Cook’s objection, the district court found

that Cook had two prior convictions for crimes of violence: a

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 4 of 18
5

1970 armed robbery and a 1989 prison breach in violation of

former D.C. Code § 22–2601 (1973).3

 After the district court

subtracted 5 levels for substantial assistance to law enforcement and 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, Cook’s

adjusted offense level was 16. See Cook PSR ¶¶ 16, 22, 23;

Cook Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 21 (Dec. 16, 2002). Combined

with a criminal history category of V, the guideline sentencing

range was 41–51 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. The court

sentenced Cook to 41 months in prison, the bottom of the

range.

All three defendants filed timely notices of appeal. Although their crimes were unrelated, we granted the defendants’ unopposed motion to consolidate their appeals because

they raised common questions of law. In Part II, we consider whether escape is properly regarded as a crime of violence

under Guideline § 4B1.2(a). In Part III, we consider whether the district courts erred by relying on arrest records in

denying Thomas’ and Smith’s motions for downward departures under § 4A1.3.

II

At sentencing, each defendant objected to the enhancement

of his sentence based on the designation of a prior escape

offense as a ‘‘crime of violence,’’ as that term is defined in

Guideline § 4B1.2(a). Whether a particular crime constitutes

a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines is a

question of law, which we review de novo. See United States

v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1062 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United

States v. Mathis, 963 F.2d 399, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Guideline § 4B1.2(a) defines ‘‘crime of violence’’ as:

[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that —

3 Cook also moved for a downward departure under Guideline

§ 4A1.3, but unlike defendants Thomas and Smith, he does not

appeal the district court’s denial of that motion.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 5 of 18
6

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). All of the circuits that

have considered the question — numbering nine to date —

have concluded that the crime of escape falls within the ambit

of § 4B1.2(a).4

 Today, we join them.

4 See United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2002)

(‘‘Every circuit court that has considered the issue has held that an

escape, from whatever location by whatever means, constitutes

‘conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.’ ’’); United States v. Luster, 305 F.3d 199, 199–202 (3d Cir. 2002)

(concluding that a conviction under a state escape statute that

‘‘extends to a ‘walk away’ from custody’’ is a conviction for a crime

of violence under the Guidelines); United States v. Dickerson, 77

F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that escape in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 751(a) is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2); United

States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that ‘‘a

knowing escape from lawful federal custody TTT constitutes a crime

of violence under § 4B1.2,’’ notwithstanding that the defendant

merely walks away from a prison camp); United States v. Harris,

165 F.3d 1062, 1068 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that a defendant’s

escape from a workhouse falls within the scope of § 4B1.2); United

States v. Bryant, 310 F.3d 550, 553–54 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding

that a defendant’s conviction for escape, resulting from his failure to

return to his halfway house, constitutes a crime of violence); United

States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001) (declaring that

‘‘every escape, even a so-called ‘walkaway’ escape, involves a potential risk of injury to others’’); United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d

909, 915 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that an escape always constitutes

a crime of violence, even when the defendant merely ‘‘fail[s] to

return to a halfway house from work release’’) (internal quotation

marks omitted); United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 954–55 (11th

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 6 of 18
7

Defendants Thomas and Cook had prior convictions for

prison breach in violation of former D.C. Code § 22–2601

(1973). That statute provided, in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

committed to a penal institution of the District of Columbia

who escapes or attempts to escape therefrom, or from the

custody of an officer thereof TTT, shall be guilty of an

offenseTTTT’’ Defendant Smith had a prior conviction for

violating the District of Columbia’s current ‘‘escape from an

institution’’ provision, which states: ‘‘No person shall escape

or attempt to escape from: (1) Any penal institution or

facility in which that person is confined pursuant to an order

issued by a court, judge, or commissioner of the District of

Columbia.’’ D.C. Code § 22–2601(a)(1) (2001).5

 Finally, in

addition to his D.C. Code violation, Thomas had also been

convicted of violating the federal escape statute, which makes

it a crime to ‘‘escape[ ] or attempt[ ] to escape from the

custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined

by direction of the Attorney GeneralTTTT’’ 18 U.S.C.

§ 751(a).

We begin with common ground. First, both the defendants

and the government agree that, in determining whether the

crime of escape comes within the scope of Guideline

§ 4B1.2(a), we must utilize a categorical approach. See Hill,

131 F.3d at 1062; U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (stating that the

relevant inquiry under § 4B1.2(a)(2) is whether the conduct

‘‘expressly charged TTT by its nature’’ presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury); see also Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990); Mathis, 963 F.2d at 408.6

Cir. 2001) (concluding that even a walkaway escape from an unsecured facility constitutes a crime of violence).

5 Subsection (a)(2) of the same statute bars escape from ‘‘(2) The

lawful custody of an officer or employee of the District of Columbia

or of the United States.’’ D.C. Code § 22–2601(a)(2).

6 See also, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir.

2002); Bryant, 310 F.3d at 553–54; Nation, 243 F.3d at 472;

Harris, 165 F.3d at 1068; United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115,

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 7 of 18
8

Utilizing this approach, we must confine our review to the

conduct prohibited by the statutes at issue or set forth in the

charging papers, and ‘‘ ‘should not examine the actual conduct

underlying the offense.’ ’’ Hill, 131 F.3d at 1062 (quoting

Mathis, 963 F.2d at 408).7

 In this case, because Smith’s and

Cook’s escape indictments are devoid of detail, and Thomas’

indictments were never proffered to the court, the parties

agree that we should look no further than the statutory

language. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600; United States v.

Luster, 305 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v.

Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2002).

The parties also agree that neither the D.C. Code provisions, nor the federal escape statute, fall within the first

subsection of § 4B1.2(a). That is, the offenses defined by

those statutes do not have ‘‘as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another.’’ U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Nor is

escape one of the four crimes of violence specifically enumerated in § 4B1.2(a)(2): burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of

explosives. Thus, the only remaining question is whether

escape falls within the ‘‘otherwise’’ clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2): a

crime that ‘‘otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another.’’ Id.

§ 4B1.2(a)(2).

The defendants contend that the offenses for which they

were convicted do not fall within the ‘‘otherwise’’ clause

because they can be committed without force or violence. As

117 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir.

1994).

7 In some circumstances, a court may also examine jury instructions. See Hill, 131 F.3d at 1062 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).

In addition, if a defendant has pled guilty to a lesser included

offense of a charge in an indictment, a sentencing court may

examine certain other indices — such as a judgment of conviction,

plea agreement, or statement by the defendant on the record. See

id. at 1064–65; see also United States v. Williams, 2004 WL

330016, at *8 (D.C. Cir. 2004). None of those circumstances are

relevant here.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 8 of 18
9

they correctly point out, the statutes at issue have been

construed expansively. Knowingly absenting oneself from

custody without permission is sufficient to constitute a violation.8

 Consequently, although both the federal and D.C.

statutes prohibit escape from the lawful custody of an officer,

see 18 U.S.C. § 751(a); D.C. Code § 22–2601(a)(2), walking

away from a halfway house — or simply failing to return on

time — violates the statutes as well.9

 And, as defendants

further note, in United States v. (Toumani) Thomas, we

expressed ‘‘reluctan[ce]’’ about extending § 4B1.2(a) to an

offense that could include a ‘‘walkaway’’ escape, stating that

‘‘[a]rguably, the approach taken by the other circuits proves

too much.’’ 333 F.3d 280, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

In Thomas, however, we made clear that our expression of

concern was merely dicta, because there the defendant’s prior

conviction was specifically for ‘‘escape from an officer’’ under

D.C. Code § 22–2601(a)(2), a crime that plainly involves a

serious potential risk of injury. We thus did not have to

decide whether a conviction for the offense of ‘‘escape from an

institution,’’ or for a general offense that encompasses both

forms of escape, is likewise covered. Now that the issue is

squarely before us, we conclude that our sister circuits, which

regard such crimes (including walkaways) as violent offenses

under § 4B1.2(a), are right. See cases cited supra note 4.

The fact that escape can be committed by a nonviolent

walkaway does not shield it from designation as a crime of

8 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980) (concluding that ‘‘the prosecution fulfills its burden’’ under 18 U.S.C. § 751

by demonstrating ‘‘that an escapee knew his actions would result in

his leaving physical confinement without permission,’’ and need not

also show ‘‘an intent to avoid confinement’’); Thurston v. United

States, 779 A.2d 260, 263 (D.C. 2001) (same under D.C. Code § 22–

2601(a)).

9 See United States v. Vaughn, 446 F.2d 1317, 1318 (D.C. Cir.

1971); Thurston, 779 A.2d at 262 n.4; Gonzalez v. United States,

498 A.2d 1172, 1174 (D.C. 1985); see also Bailey, 444 U.S. at 413

(holding that ‘‘escape from federal custody as defined in § 751(a) is

a continuing offense and TTT an escapee can be held liable for

failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure’’).

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 9 of 18
10

violence for two reasons. First, the fact that escape can take

place without force merely confirms the point upon which all

parties have agreed: that escape does not have the use or

threat of force ‘‘as an element,’’ and thus does not fall within

§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Subsection (2) of 4B1.2(a), however, is an

independent ground for designating an offense as violent, and

hence it must cover crimes that do not have force as an

element. And indeed it does: subsection (2) adds to the list

of violent offenses those in which there is only a ‘‘serious

potential risk’’ of injury.

Second, the fact that the defendants can hypothesize circumstances in which escape can be committed without either

force or risk of injury cannot be dispositive under § 4B1.2(a),

as such an analytical approach would eviscerate the notion of

a ‘‘categorical’’ definition. See United States v. Vigil, 334

F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (‘‘[T]he possibility that a

crime may be completed without injury is irrelevant to the

determination of whether it constitutes a crime of violence

within the meaning of § 4B1.2.’’) (emphasis added). Many

concededly violent offenses can be hypothesized to take place

in a manner that eliminates risk of injury: attempted murder,10 for example, becomes riskless if we assume that the

sniper’s gun has no bullets. In essence, by assuming facts

that render a crime riskless, the defendants effectively shave

offense conduct down to the smallest possible ‘‘category’’ —

the circumstances of any given case. In so doing, they

circumvent the definitional question posed by the guideline:

whether, as a category (i.e., ‘‘by its nature’’), escape involves

conduct that presents ‘‘a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another,’’ U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.11 See United

States v. Franklin, 302 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding

that, in determining whether escape poses a risk of violence,

10 See Guideline § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (stating that the term ‘‘ ‘[c]rime

of violence’ includes murder,’’ as well as ‘‘attempting to commit’’

such an offense).

11 For the same reason, we cannot accept the defendants’ contention that ‘‘an offense is not categorically a crime of violence unless

every such offense is.’’ Reply Br. at 6.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 10 of 18
11

‘‘the benchmark should be the possibility for violent confrontation, not whether one can postulate a nonconfrontational

hypothetical scenario’’) (internal quotation marks omitted).

With these preliminary points clarified, we now turn directly to that question. To answer it, we first consider the

meaning of the phrase ‘‘serious potential risk.’’ A ‘‘risk,’’ of

course, is merely ‘‘the possibility’’ of loss or injury. MERRIAM

WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1011 (10th ed. 1996). And

while the addition of the adjective ‘‘serious’’ would seem to

increase the required degree of probability, the interjection of

the second adjective, ‘‘potential,’’ appears to reduce it again.12

In short, a textual analysis of the guideline’s key phrase, by

itself, sheds only a little light on our question.

The context in which the phrase ‘‘serious potential risk’’

resides, however, provides substantially more illumination.13

The phrase is part of an ‘‘otherwise’’ clause that begins with a

list of four offenses that the guideline regards as unquestionably crimes of violence: burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives. And when a statute or

regulation begins with a list of specific categories and ends

with a general catch-all, the interpretative canons of ejusdem

generis (‘‘of the same kind or class’’) and noscitur a sociis (a

word is ‘‘known by its associates’’) counsel that the latter be

read in light of the former. See Washington State Dep’t of

Soc. & Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,

537 U.S. 371, 384–85 (2003).

Now we have something more to work with, and to apply to

the issues raised by the defendants. It is true, as the

defendants contend, that a person can escape without force or

serious risk of injury to anyone by simply walking away from

an unguarded halfway house; he may also peacefully end his

12 See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S at 912 (defining ‘‘potential’’ as ‘‘existing

in possibility,’’ or as ‘‘something that can develop or become actual’’ — as in ‘‘a [potential] for violence’’).

13 Cf. Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809

(1989) (‘‘It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the

words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to

their place in the overall statutory scheme.’’).

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 11 of 18
12

offense by waiting until the coast is clear and returning of his

own volition. But the same is true of the individual who

commits burglary of a dwelling: he can wait until the residents are on vacation and enter the house unarmed. The

same is also true of the arsonist, who, with care, can avoid

serious risk of physical injury to another by limiting his fires

to isolated, abandoned buildings. See Vigil, 334 F.3d at 1223

(noting that § 4B1.2 ‘‘expressly includes arson and burglary

of a dwelling as crimes of violence,’’ notwithstanding that ‘‘a

sizable percentage of burglaries and arsons occur in ‘safely’

unoccupied homes’’). And injury can likewise be avoided by

the extortionist — who can commit his crime by threatening

to damage only the reputation of his victim, and who can

target only the meek and the weak. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.

§ 875(d) (making it a crime to extort money by transmitting

‘‘any threat to injure the property or reputation of the

addressee’’); United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir.

1994) (holding that a state extortion statute that encompassed, ‘‘in addition to threats against the person, threats

against the reputation, property or financial condition of

another,’’ was a crime of violence under § 4B1.2) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The issue, then, is whether the offense of escape — as a

category — carries appreciably less risk of injury to another

than do the listed crimes. Cf. DeLuca, 17 F.3d at 8 (holding

that ‘‘the wording of the guideline tells us unequivocally that

the Sentencing Commission believed that extortion, by its

nature, should be classified as a crime of violence’’). And in

making that evaluation, we must keep in mind that escape is a

‘‘continuing offense,’’ which does not end until the defendant

is returned to custody. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,

413 (1980) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 751); see Craig v. United

States, 551 A.2d 440, 440–41 (D.C. 1988) (referring to D.C.

Code § 22–2601 (1973)). Hence, the risk of injury must be

evaluated not only at the time of the defendant’s escape from

imprisonment, but at the time of his reapprehension as well.

Evaluated from that perspective, we have no basis for

concluding that the risk of physical injury during an escape is

any less than during a burglary, arson, or extortion. Like

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 12 of 18
13

burglary of a dwelling or arson, a defendant may accomplish

an escape in the safest possible way. But just as the cautious

burglar may be startled by the unexpected return of the

homeowner, or the careful arsonist surprised by a fire that

spreads out of control, the stealthy escapee may suddenly be

confronted by police officers sent to apprehend him, leading

to injury to the officers or bystanders. As the Second Circuit

has observed:

An inmate who escapes by peacefully walking away TTT

will (if he can) be inconspicuous and discreet, and will (if

he can) avoid confrontation and force. But escape invites

pursuit; and the pursuit, confrontation, and recapture of

the escapee entail serious risks of physical injury to law

enforcement officers and the public.

United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2002); see

United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 916 (10th Cir. 2002)

(‘‘Even though initial circumstances of an escape may be nonviolent, there is no way to predict what an escapee will do

when encountered by the authorities.’’); United States v.

Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001) (‘‘Even the most

peaceful escape cannot eliminate the potential for violent

conflict when the authorities attempt to recapture the escapee.’’). Accordingly, we conclude that the offense of escape is

a crime of violence within the meaning of Guideline

§ 4B1.2(a), and we therefore deny the defendants’ first

ground of appeal.

III

Defendants Thomas and Smith contend that their respective district judges also erred in denying their requests for

downward departures pursuant to Guideline § 4A1.3. That

provision permits the court to depart from the otherwise

applicable guideline sentencing range if the defendant’s criminal history category ‘‘significantly over-represents the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood

that the defendant will commit further crimes.’’ U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.3, p.s. The defendants contend that their sentencing

judges erred by relying on their arrest records in determinUSCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 13 of 18
14

ing that their criminal history categories did not overrepresent the seriousness of their criminal histories.

Although we have no authority to review a ‘‘court’s discretionary decision that the particular circumstances of a given

case do not warrant a departure,’’ United States v. Pinnick,

47 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we can review a defendant’s

contention that a court’s refusal to depart was based on ‘‘an

incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,’’ 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a)(2). See United States v. Joaquin, 326 F.3d 1287,

1290 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Pinnick, 47 F.3d at 439. However,

because the defendants here failed to raise this objection in

the district court, our review is limited to scrutiny for plain

error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993); Joaquin,

326 F.3d at 1290. Under that standard, we can overturn the

district court’s decision only if there was ‘‘(1) ‘error,’ (2) that

is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’ ’’ Johnson

v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507

U.S. at 732) (alteration in original). ‘‘If all three conditions

are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to

notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.’’ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

In United States v. Joaquin, this circuit held that a district

court errs, and that such an error is ‘‘plain,’’ if the court relies

on a defendant’s prior arrest record itself (that is, on the fact

of an arrest, without a conviction or other evidence that the

alleged criminal conduct actually took place) in denying a

motion to depart under the 2000 version of Guideline § 4A1.3.

See 326 F.3d at 1292. The same guideline text is applicable

to this case.14 The court’s decision in Joaquin, of course,

14 In 2000, the text of § 4A1.3 permitted a departure if ‘‘reliable

information,’’ including ‘‘prior similar adult criminal conduct not

resulting in a criminal conviction,’’ indicated ‘‘that the criminal

history category [did] not adequately reflect the seriousness of the

defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant [would] commit other crimes.’’ U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. (2000).

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 14 of 18
15

binds this panel. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389,

1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Nonetheless, the government contends that Joaquin is distinguishable from the cases

at issue here because, in Joaquin, the district court ‘‘focused

directly on Joaquin’s arrests alone’’ and ‘‘decided not to

depart because the arrest record standing by itself showed a

propensity to commit crimes.’’ Gov’t Br. at 34–35. In contrast, the government submits, the courts that sentenced

Thomas and Smith merely ‘‘mentioned appellants’ arrest records, among many other facts.’’ Id. at 35.

The government’s effort to distinguish Joaquin misapprehends that case’s holding. In Joaquin, the defendant’s sentence was remanded, not because the district court relied on

an arrest record alone, but ‘‘because, contrary to section

4A1.3’s plain language, the district court based its decision in

part on appellant’s ‘prior arrest record itself.’ ’’ 326 F.3d at

1288 (emphasis added). Since the government concedes that

the district courts here also relied in part on the defendants’

arrest records themselves,15 Joaquin mandates the conclusion

that those courts plainly erred. See id. at 1293.

But the text also stated that ‘‘a prior arrest record itself shall not be

considered under § 4A1.3.’’ Id. Joaquin read the latter as barring

consideration of an arrest record in deciding a motion for either a

downward or an upward departure. That language was unchanged

both at the time Smith and Thomas committed their offenses and at

the time they were sentenced, and it therefore applies to their

cases. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a)-(b), p.s. We note, however, that

the Sentencing Commission has recently amended § 4A1.3. Although it now expressly prohibits consideration of a prior arrest

record ‘‘for purposes of an upward departure,’’ U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.3(a)(3) (2003) (emphasis added), it does not mention such a

prohibition with respect to denying a downward departure, id.

§ 4A1.3(b)(2).

15 See also Smith Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 17 (May 1, 2003)

(statement of the court) (noting that, ‘‘in about 14 years and 10

months, Mr. Smith has raked up approximately 20 arrests, eight

convictions, five post-conviction violations and two crimes committed

while serving sentences,’’ and that ‘‘if one looks to these factors TTT

Mr. Smith’s prospects for recidivism TTT are high and the criminal

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 15 of 18
16

That conclusion does not, however, end our examination.

Before we can correct a plain error, we still must determine

whether that error satisfies the final two prongs of the Rule

52(b) standard: (3) that it ‘‘ ‘affect[s] substantial rights,’ ’’ i.e.,

that it is prejudicial; and (4) that it ‘‘ ‘seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ’’ Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at

732) (alteration in original). With respect to the third prong,

we note that, while the burden of establishing prejudice is on

the defendant, Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, this circuit has held

that burden to be ‘‘ ‘slightly less exacting’ ’’ in the context of

sentencing errors as compared to trial errors, and that to

meet it a defendant ‘‘need show only ‘a reasonable likelihood’

that the error affected the court’s sentence,’’ Joaquin, 326

F.3d at 1290 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287–

88 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

A comparison of the facts in Joaquin with those in defendant Smith’s case again makes the former controlling. In

Joaquin, the court found that, because Joaquin’s record

contained 11 arrests without convictions — all within 15 years

of the instant offense — there was a reasonable likelihood

that the district court would have reached a different decision

regarding the seriousness of Joaquin’s record absent consideration of those arrests. See id. at 1289, 1294. The court

further found that such an error seriously affected the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. Id. at 1294. Defendant Smith’s record — which likewise contains 11 arrests

without convictions within 15 years of the instant offense — is

indistinguishable.16 Accordingly, because Joaquin held that

history category reflects properly Mr. Smith’s criminal history as

realistically portrayed’’); Thomas Presentencing Hr’g Tr. at 37–38

(July 12, 2002) (statement of the court) (‘‘reviewing very carefully

the chronology of his arrests, incarcerations and releases on parole’’

and rejecting ‘‘the argument that the criminal history category

overrepresents the likelihood of recidivism’’).

16 See Smith PSR ¶¶ 43–53. The two defendants’ records of prior

arrests with convictions are also not materially different: Joaquin

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 16 of 18
17

such a record satisfied the final two prongs of the plain error

standard, we can reach no other conclusion here. We therefore remand Smith’s sentence to the district court.17 On

remand, of course, the district court is free to decline to

depart again, as long as it does so without reference to the

defendant’s arrest record.

Defendant Thomas’ sentencing presents a different case.

By contrast to Joaquin’s 11 relatively recent arrests without

convictions, Thomas had only two within the previous 15

years. Thomas PSR ¶¶ 49, 50. Although Thomas also had

older arrests that did not lead to convictions, all of those

occurred more than 20 years before the instant offense and

all but three led to unfavorable dispositions for the defendant.

Id. ¶¶ 42–48.18 Moreover, the number of times Thomas was

arrested without convictions was dwarfed by his 12 prior

adult arrests with convictions — as well as two additional

probation revocations. Id. ¶¶ 26–37. On that record, we

think it highly unlikely that it was Thomas’ few and mostly

stale arrests — rather than the sheer number of his convichad 6; Smith had 8. See Joaquin, 326 F.3d at 1289; Smith PSR

¶¶ 30–37.

17 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (‘‘If the court of appeals determines

that the sentence was imposed TTT as a result of an incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the

case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as

the court considers appropriate.’’).

18 A number of Thomas’ older arrests took place while he was in

the Army, and, while they did not lead to criminal convictions, they

did lead to Thomas’ undesirable discharge. Thomas PSR ¶¶ 42, 43,

45. Although Joaquin bars the consideration of a ‘‘ ‘prior arrest

record itself under § 4A1.3,’ without supporting evidence indicating

that [the defendant] had in fact engaged in prior criminal conduct

not resulting in a conviction,’’ Joaquin, 326 F.3d at 1293, an arrest

that results in a discharge from the military is adequately supported (by the fact of the discharge) such that a court can reasonably rely upon it. Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 11 F.3d 10, 13 (1st

Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s reliance on an arrest record

that was corroborated by extrinsic evidence); United States v.

Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 330 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 17 of 18
18

tions — that led the district court to conclude that the

defendant’s criminal history category appropriately reflected

the seriousness of his criminal history. Thomas has thus

failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the court’s

erroneous reference to his arrests affected the sentence that

it imposed, and hence there is no reason for a remand.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentences imposed

on Thomas and Cook, and remand Smith’s sentence for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #02-3073 Document #809856 Filed: 03/16/2004 Page 18 of 18