Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00088/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00088-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amphone Kongkham
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMPHONE KONGKHAM, No. CIV S-07-0088-LKK-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JAMES A. YATES,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court are Petitioner’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), respondent’s answer (Doc. 25), and petitioner’s reply (Doc.

29). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a 1

State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The California Court of Appeal recited the following facts, and petitioner has not

offered any clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

On April 21, 2004, 15-year-old Lilly Chanthavong was

riding her bicycle with two friends. She noticed a red hatchback

automobile with three people in it. She recognized one of the

passengers as a person she knew as “Hum.” She also recognized

the driver, but she did not know his name. The car slowed down

and followed Lilly for a few minutes. Then the car made a U-turn

and went another way.

Lilly continued riding her bicycle. As she continued down

the street, Lilly saw the driver of the vehicle standing near a street

corner. Lilly rode past him. The man followed Lilly, grabbed her

by her neck, and pulled her off her bicycle. He yanked a gold

necklace with a jade Buddha charm off Lilly’s neck and ran away.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Mitchell Marquez arrived at the

scene. Lilly told him what happened and provided him with a

description of her assailant. A month and a half later, Lilly

identified defendant in a photographic lineup as the man who had

taken her necklace.

Before trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence of his

gang membership. The trial court tentatively ruled gang evidence

was inadmissible because it was irrelevant, but said the evidence

could become relevant to the victim’s state of mind, if, for

example, she refused to testify out of fear. The court also noted the

evidence could become probative of potential witness bias should a

witness give inconsistent statements while testifying.

At trial, Lilly cried when asked to identify her assailant and

asked to speak with her mother. Out of the jury’s presence, the

prosecutor argued that, in accordance with the court’s previous

ruling, gang evidence was now admissible to explain Lilly’s fear of

identifying defendant in court. The court decided that if Lilly could

not or would not identify anyone, the prosecutor could ask her if

she believed defendant was a member of a gang.

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Lilly then testified she was afraid to identify her assailant

and began to cry again. She identified defendant by describing

what he was wearing, but she never pointed to him. Later, out of

the jury’s presence, the court noted Lilly’s “extreme reluctance” in

identifying defendant and labeled the identification “cryptic” but

“sufficient.” The court decided Lilly’s state of mind was at issue,

and allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence showing Lilly

was afraid to identify defendant because she believed him to be a

member of Laos Pride Gangsters (LPG). The court gave the jury a

limiting instruction stating the gang evidence related only to Lilly's

state of mind.

Lilly then testified she believed defendant was a member of

LPG because his relatives had “LPG” tattooed on their arms, she

had seen defendant in the company of LPG members, with whom

she was familiar, and had seen defendant wear a shirt with “LPG”

inscribed on the pocket.

The prosecution introduced additional gang evidence when

15-year-old Andy Phonesavanh testified. Andy testified he

remembered telling a detective he was in the backseat of a red

hatchback with defendant and “Hum” on April 21, 2004. Andy

remembered telling the detective he saw Lilly on her bicycle and

defendant said he planned to take her necklace from her. He

remembered telling the detective that defendant left the car and

later returned with the necklace. Andy also testified everything he

told the detective was a lie and he was home all day on April 21,

2004.

Further, Andy testified he knew defendant and “Hum” were

gang members, but Andy denied being a gang member. After the

prosecutor asked Andy how long he had been “hanging out with”

LPG, defense counsel objected, and the court held a sidebar

discussion. The court ruled the prosecutor could ask Andy if he

associated with LPG for the limited purpose of proving witness

bias. Andy resumed his testimony, and stated he had not associated

with LPG “that long.” The court again provided the jury with a

limiting instruction telling them it could only consider the gang

evidence to “show the witness’ potential bias and his state of

mind.” Upon further questioning, Andy admitted he had been

associating with LPG for four years. 

The court also ruled gang evidence was relevant on the

issue of the perpetrator’s identity, in addition to the grounds stated

before. The court reasoned that, since Lilly was reluctant to

identify defendant in court because she believed him to be a gang

member, her initial statements to the police on the day of the

robbery were relevant to her identification of defendant as the

perpetrator. The court maintained, however, that evidence of an

unrelated alleged shooting incident in 2003, as well as the fact that

defendant was a “validated” gang member, were irrelevant and

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioner was also sentenced to two years on a violation of probation, which was 2

to run concurrent to the principle charge. 

4

inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352.

Officer Marquez testified Lilly told him she believed the

man who took her necklace was a member of LPG. Marquez said

Lilly gave him an address of where she believed LPG “hung out.”

The court provided a limiting instruction informing the jury that

the evidence was only relevant to Lilly's state of mind and to her

identification of defendant as the perpetrator.

(Pet. at 22-26; Resp’t Lod. Doc. 3, at 1-5.)

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was charged in a felony complaint, deemed an information, with

violating California Penal Code § 211, robbery of the second degree. (Clerk’s Tr., Lod. Doc. 1,

at 8). Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the charge of robbery in the second

degree. (Id. at 192). On October 22, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to three years. (Id. at 220). 2

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal. On March 23, 2006, the

Court of Appeal issued an order affirming the judgment. Petitioner then appealed to the

California Supreme Court, who denied his petition for review on June 16, 2006. 

Following this denial, Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this court on January 16, 2007. In his petition, Petitioner claims the admission of gang

membership evidence violated his rights to a fair trial and due process. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “re-litigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

Thus, under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available only where the state court’s decision is

“contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Under both

standards, “clearly established law” means those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)

(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412) . “What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not

the holdings of lower federal courts.” Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc). Supreme Court precedent is not clearly established law, and therefore federal habeas

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

relief is unavailable, unless it “squarely addresses” an issue. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

753-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 28 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008)). 

For federal law to be clearly established, the Supreme Court must provide a “categorical answer”

to the question before the state court. See id.; see also Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (holding that a

state court’s decision that a defendant was not prejudiced by spectators’ conduct at trial was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s test for determining prejudice

created by state conduct at trial because the Court had never applied the test to spectators’

conduct). Circuit court precedent may not be used to fill open questions in the Supreme Court’s

holdings. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74. 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a

majority of the Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A

state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by

the Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently

than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 520 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams, suggested

that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75-76 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be found

even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. This is because “[t]he gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. at 75.

As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6.

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated by the trial

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

court’s admission of evidence that he was a member of a gang. He claims the admission of gang

evidence was irrelevant to motive or identity, and the evidence was unduly prejudicial. He

argues the evidence of gang membership was unnecessary for the reasons it was admitted,

specifically that the witnesses testified that they knew Petitioner, the evidence was merely

cumulative, and it did not change the quality of the witness’s testimony or credibility. Thus, the

trial court abused its discretion in allowing such highly inflammatory evidence to be admitted,

especially in light of the lack of physical evidence and alibi defense. 

In affirming Petitioner’s conviction, the California Court of Appeal rejected his 

claim, reasoning as follows: 

Gang evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some

fact other than the defendant's criminal propensity. (Evid. Code, §

1101, subd. (b); People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.) 

However, “even where gang membership is relevant, because it

may have a highly inflammatory impact on the jury trial courts

should carefully scrutinize such evidence before admitting it.

[Citation.]” (People v. Williams, supra, at p. 193.) Because it may

prejudice a jury, our Supreme Court has warned against the

introduction of “evidence of gang membership if only tangentially

relevant, given its highly inflammatory impact.” (People v. Cox

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 660.)

“[T]he prejudice contemplated by this rule is not merely

evidence unfavorable to the [defendant]. Realistically, the majority

of prosecution evidence will be unfavorable to the [defendant]. 

Rather, the rule contemplates ‘ “... evidence which uniquely tends

to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual

and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section

352, ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ ” ’ ”

(People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377, 394, citing People v.

Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)

Evidence Code section 352 provides the trial court with

discretion to exclude evidence if the probability that its admission

will create substantial danger of undue prejudice substantially

outweighs its probative value. The trial court has broad discretion

in ruling on whether evidence is substantially more prejudicial than

probative. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121.) An

appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling on the admissibility

of evidence for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) “The admission of gang

evidence over an Evidence Code section 352 objection will not be

disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s decision exceeds the

bounds of reason. [Citation.]” (People v. Olguin (1994) 31

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

Cal.App.4th 1355, 1369.)

Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting

evidence of defendant’s gang membership. We conclude admitting

the evidence was proper because it was probative on the issues of

the perpetrator’s identity and Lilly’s state of mind.

Although gang-related evidence creates a risk the jury will

infer the defendant has a criminal disposition and is guilty of the

offense charged, the evidence is admissible if directly relevant to a

material issue. ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 193.) 

Evidence of gang membership is useful when identity is an issue.

(People v. Contreras (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 749, 756.)

Furthermore, evidence that a witness is afraid to testify is relevant

to her credibility. (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 232.) 

This may include evidence that the defendant belongs to a gang.

(People v. Harris (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 944, 957.)

Defendant argues that because the prosecution did not file

any gang enhancement allegations in this case, gang evidence is

irrelevant. Defendant’s argument ignores the reality that even

though gang membership is not an element of a crime or

enhancement, it can still be relevant to a material issue, such as

identity. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.)

The main issue in this case was identity. Lilly’s initial

description of the perpetrator narrowed the pool of people that

could have committed the crime to members of LPG. Officer

Marquez testified that shortly after the robbery Lilly told him her

assailant was a gang member and knew where the gang “hung out.” 

Gang evidence was highly probative of the perpetrator’s identity,

and thus, relevant. Furthermore, the gang evidence was relevant

because it explained Lilly’s reluctance to identify defendant in

court, despite the fact that she had previously picked him out of a

photographic lineup. 

Defendant contends that, even if the evidence were relevant

to Lilly’s state of mind, it was only marginally relevant because

Lilly did in fact identify defendant in court, and the trial court

found the identification sufficient. Moreover, defendant contends

Lilly’s testimony was bolstered by the testimony of the police

officers who interviewed Lilly shortly after the incident and, thus,

was superfluous and unnecessary for the prosecution’s case.

However, there was conflicting testimony about the

defendant’s appearance and clothing, as well as the color of

defendant’s vehicle during pertinent times. Because the defense

highlighted such conflicting testimony with respect to the identity

of the perpetrator, it was important for the prosecution to bolster

the credibility of Lilly’s initial, cryptic identification. Thus, the

gang evidence was highly probative of the perpetrator’s identity,

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, only three justices concluded the 3

admission of gang evidence was error and thus this conclusion lacks precedential authority. 

(People v. Harris (1985) 157 Cal.App.3d 944, 957-958.)

10

the main disputed issue before the jury.

When evidence of gang membership is relevant to proving

the identity of the perpetrator, it is admissible, subject to analysis

under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Champion (1995) 9

Cal.4th 879, 922-923.) The trial court conducted an Evidence Code

section 352 analysis and ruled the prejudicial effect did not

significantly outweigh the probative value of the evidence. While

there may have been some danger of prejudice to defendant in

identifying him as a gang member, the gang evidence was

probative on the issues of his identity as the perpetrator and Lilly’s

state of mind. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the limited gang evidence. 

Defendant also contends the trial court erred by allowing

admission of gang evidence to prove potential witness bias. He

claims it was cumulative and unduly prejudicial. We conclude the

trial court properly admitted the evidence.

Evidence of gang membership must be excluded if the

evidence is only relevant to prove a defendant’s criminal

disposition. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People v. Sam (1969)

71 Cal.2d 194, 203.) However, “[e]vidence of a relationship

between a witness and a party is logically relevant to show bias.

[Citation.] One such relationship is common membership in an

organization.... [Citation.]” (People v. Ruiz (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th

234, 240.) For example, a witness’s common gang membership

with a defendant on whose behalf he testifies is relevant to

establish the witness’s bias. (In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d

69, 76-77; United States v. Abel (1984) 469 U.S. 45, 49, 52 [83

L.Ed.2d 450, 455, 457].) However, “when other evidence has

established such a ‘relationship’ then common membership

evidence is cumulative and, if prejudicial, inadmissible.

[Citations.]” (People v. Maestas (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1482,

1495.)

The cases finding that the admission of gang evidence to

prove bias was cumulative and prejudicial are distinguishable from

this case. In People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 904-905,[ ]

3

the plurality opinion found the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence that defendant and

his witnesses associated in the same gang. The court reasoned that

since other evidence established the fact that defendant and the

witnesses “ ‘lived in the same neighborhood’ ” and “ ‘had the same

circle of friends,’ ” the probative value of the gang evidence was

“minimal at best,” and created a substantial danger of prejudice

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

because the jury could infer defendant had a criminal disposition

because gangs commit crimes. (Ibid.) Here, the only evidence

connecting Andy with defendant was that he had known defendant

for four years, he knew Hum, he knew defendant’s wife, and

defendant had known Andy’s older brother for “a long time.” 

Thus, the gang membership evidence was not cumulative to any

other evidence tending to establish a relationship between

defendant and Andy, other than the fact that they knew each other.

(Cf. People v. Maestas, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [because

of compelling and overwhelming evidence of codefendants’ close

relationship and affinity for one another, evidence they allegedly

belonged to the same criminal street gang was cumulative and

prejudicial].)

In light of this record, it was not an abuse of discretion to

permit Andy to testify defendant was a member of LPG. The

evidence explained Andy’s conflicting testimony and his prior

statements to the detective, which corroborated Lilly’s account of

the robbery. Given these several probative features, as well as the

already existing references in the evidence to defendant’s gang

membership, any prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh

the probative value of this portion of Andy’s testimony. 

Defendant asserts the prosecutor exacerbated the prejudice

during his closing argument. The prosecutor did not dwell on gang

evidence in his closing argument. He discussed Lilly’s belief that

defendant was a gang member and her fear of retaliation. The

prosecutor then explained Andy’s refusal to cooperate with the

prosecution because of his “deep ties” with defendant and the gang. 

He reiterated that Andy, as well as Lilly, have to go back to the

same gang neighborhood, thus implying fear of the gang influenced

their testimony. Most of the prosecutor’s closing argument,

however, was devoted to the strength of the prosecution’s evidence

and the weaknesses in the defense’s case. 

In sum, the gang membership evidence in this case was

probative not only on the issue of Andy’s bias, but also on the

issues of Lilly’s identification and state of mind. While gang

evidence may be prejudicial, its prejudicial impact was

considerably lessened in this case. While any gang evidence is

potentially inflammatory, here the evidence was limited to gang

membership and did not include the more inflammatory evidence

of gang criminal activity. Argument was similarly limited to

Lilly’s fear of retaliation based on her belief defendant was a gang

member, Andy’s association with LPG, and the likelihood this

relationship was Andy’s probable motive to give false evidence to

protect defendant. This limitation distinguishes this case from

People v. Bojorquez (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 335, 343-345, in

which the court found evidence of gang membership was

admissible to show witness bias but the admission of evidence of

criminal activities of gangs, and specifically criminal activity

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

attributed to defendant’s gang, was prejudicial error because it

tended to imply criminal disposition or actual culpability. 

Additionally, the court here gave a limiting instruction after the

introduction of each piece of gang evidence to further minimize the

risk of prejudice.

Finally, defendant contends even though the trial court

instructed the jury several times about the limited purpose of the

evidence, it was virtually impossible to ignore the implication that

defendant was guilty of this crime because he was a gang member. 

However, absent contrary indications, we presume the jury

followed the court’s instructions. (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1

Cal.4th 865, 919.) 

The court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code

section 352 when it determined that evidence of defendant’s

membership in the gang was relevant to Lilly’s state of mind, the

perpetrator’s identity, and Andy’s bias, and that the probative value

of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. 

(Pet. at 26-33; Resp’t Lod. Doc. 3, at 5-12.)

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at

1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. 

See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Because federal habeas

relief does not lie for state law errors, a state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see

also Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994). To raise such a claim in a

federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of

justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293, 294-95

(9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). In any event, an

evidentiary error is considered harmless if it did not have a substantial and injurious effect in

determining the jury’s verdict. See Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, the evidence that Petitioner was a member of a gang was admitted for the

limited purpose of establishing identity, witness credibility, and witness bias. The trial court

allowed the evidence to be admitted as it related to the victim’s credibility, as well as explaining

her cryptic in court identification. In addition, the trial court allowed the prosecution to question

a witness as to Petitioner’s gang membership due to the witness’s prior inconsistent statements

and to show possible bias as the witness was a member of the same gang.

Because the gang evidence in this case was admitted to establish identity, witness

credibility, and witness bias, all of which were material issues in this case, the state court did not

err in finding the evidence admissible. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984)

(deciding that gang membership was “sufficiently probative of ... possible bias ... to warrant its

admission into evidence.”); United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1995)

(recognizing that gang evidence is admissible on the issue of witness credibility). Because the

jury at Petitioner’s trial could draw permissible inferences from the gang membership evidence,

admission of that evidence did not violate petitioner’s right to due process. See Jammal, 926

F.2d at 920. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s application

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 3, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00088-LKK -CMK Document 30 Filed 06/04/10 Page 14 of 14