Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01552/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01552-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Civil Rights Department
Plaintiff
Grimmway Enterprises, Inc.
Defendant
Grimmway Farms
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT, an 

agency of the State of California, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GRIMMWAY ENTERPRISES, INC., 

d.b.a. GRIMMWAY FARMS, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:21-cv-01552 DAD AC 

ORDER 

This case is before the court a motion for a protective order brought by plaintiff. ECF No. 

43. The discovery motion was referred to the magistrate judge pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(1). 

The motion was taken under submission on the papers. ECF No. 44. For the reasons set forth 

below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

I. Relevant Background 

Plaintiff, the Civil Rights Department (“CRD”),1

 is the state department charged with 

prosecutorial authority to investigate, mediate, and litigate civil rights enforcement actions. ECF 

No. 1 at 1-2. Defendant Grimmway Enterprises, Inc. is a carrot farming organization employing 

over 2,000 people, in addition to farm labor contractor employes, in Kern County, California. Id. 

1

 Plaintiff was referred to in prior filings as the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. 

ECF No. 43-3 at 2. 

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at 1. CRD commenced the investigation giving rise to this case in 2017, after an aggrieved 

employee filed a complaint with CRD alleging that although Grimmway had accommodated his 

on-the-job injury for nearly twenty years, he had recently been informed there was no more work 

available for him and was included in a layoff. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also contends Grimmway 

engaged in other unfair employment practices, including disability discrimination and retaliation 

for sexual harassment complaints. Id. Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on August 30, 

2021, alleging multiple violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and California’s Fair 

Employment and Housing Act, as well as other state law claims. Id. at 8-16. The current 

deadline for fact discovery completion is February 2, 2024. ECF No. 42. 

The parties have been engaging in discovery. On October 5, 2023, Grimmway sent CRD 

a list of proposed deposition topics in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). 

ECF No. 43-3 at 3. On October 11, 2023, CRD sent Grimmway a meet and confer letter which 

asserted that the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition would be improper for various reasons, including 

because it would require the deposition of CRD attorneys on topics which the CRD contends 

includes information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Id. 

Following meet and confer efforts, Grimmway removed one of the proposed topics and, on 

October 13, 2023, served (1) a Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Plaintiff Civil Rights 

Department (set for November 1, 2023); (2) a Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff Civil Rights 

Department’s Administrator II, Selena Wong, who verified CRD’s responses to Grimmway’s first 

set of Interrogatories; and (3) a Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff Civil Rights Department’s 

District Administrator, Patrice Doehrn, who verified CRD’s first amended responses to 

Grimmway’s first set of Interrogatories. Id. at 4. 

The parties engaged in further meet and confer efforts, but were unable to reach an 

agreement regarding whether CRD is required to produce a 30(b)(6) deponent and whether the 

depositions of Wong and Doehm were proper under the circumstances. Id. Grimmway offered to 

conduct the depositions of Ms. Wong and Ms. Doehm via Zoom rather than in person. Id. On 

October 30, 2023, Grimmway shared a draft of a Joint Statement and a recent Magistrate Judge 

decision in the Eastern District, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sunshine 

Case 2:21-cv-01552-DAD-AC Document 45 Filed 12/07/23 Page 2 of 8
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Raisin Corp., No. 1:21-cv-01424-JLT-HBK, 2023 WL 5596004 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2023), and 

asked CRD to reconsider its position. October 31, 2023, Grimmway re-noticed the CRD’s 

30(b)(6) deposition, changing the 30(b)(6) topics again from the October 13, 2023 version, and 

setting a date of November 20, 2023 for the amended 30(b)(6) Deposition. Id. at 5. On 

November 15, 2023, the CRD unequivocally informed Grimmway that it would not be producing 

any individual(s) to testify on behalf of the CRD at the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on November 20, 

2023, given the CRD’s present Motion for Protection from deposition. Id. 

II. Motion for Protective Order 

Plaintiff seeks an order of protection from defendant’s noticed 30(b)(6) deposition of 

plaintiff, the Civil Rights Division, and two individual administrators (Doehm and Wong) who 

verified interrogatories on behalf of CRD. ECF No. 42-3 at 2. The parties filed the required joint 

statement. ECF No. 43-3. 

A. Standard on Motion for Protective Order 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the method available to limit the breadth or 

use of a discovery request is a motion for a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). This rule 

states in relevant part: 

A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for 

a protective order in the court where the action is pending[.] The 

motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith 

conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an 

effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for 

good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 

expense[.] 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Options available to the court include, in part, “forbidding the disclosure or 

discovery; [ ] forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or 

discovery to certain matters.” Id. District courts have broad discretion to determine whether a 

protective order is appropriate and, if so, what degree of protection is warranted. Seattle Times 

Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2002). The party seeking to limit discovery has the 

burden of proving “good cause,” which requires a showing “that specific prejudice or harm will 

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result” if the protective order is not granted. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 

F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2003)). As discussed above, the scope of discovery in federal cases is governed by 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. 

B. Dispute as to Noticed 30(b)(6) Deposition 

Plaintiff argues that it should not be compelled to participate in a 30(b)(6) deposition for 

multiple reasons, each addressed individually below. 

a. The 30(b)(6) Topics are Not Cumulative and Duplicative 

Plaintiff argues that the proposed deposition topics are largely duplicative. The proposed 

topics, available at Exhibit A in the joint statement, are indeed correlated with requests for 

production and interrogatories. Compare Ex. E ROG Nos. 1 – 5, 7, 10, 12, 22 – 23 and Ex. D 

RFPD Nos. 1 – 3, 24, 31, 39 – 41, 50, 57, to Exhibit A, Topics 1-16. Each of these 30(b)(6) 

topics duplicate the interrogatories and requests for production which seek “factual information 

and documents” to “support or rebut” plaintiff’s claims in the complaint. Grimmway’s 30(b)(6) 

topics 16 – 31 concern CRD’s damages allegations and evidence that supports CRD’s emotional 

distress allegations. Compare Ex. A at pp. 5-8, to RFPD Nos. 25 – 30 and 51 – 55. Grimmway’s 

30(b)(6) topics 17, 18, 23, 24, 32 and 33 seek the identity of individuals who may have claims or 

damages. Compare Ex. A at pp. 5-8 to ROG Nos. 3, 8, 9, 11, 13, 19, 20, 23 and the Initial 

Disclosures at Ex. E. Grimmway’s 30(b)(6) Notice topic 34 seeks information related to the 

administrative complaints that it received from the real parties in interest in this matter. Compare 

Ex. A at p. 8 to RFPD Nos. 4 – 6, 7 – 12, 23 – 28 at Ex. D. Finally, deposition topic 35 seeks 

communications or contacts between CRD and any current or former employees of Grimmway, 

which is a repetition of the information sought in ROG No. 21 and RFPD 59, 60 – 62. Compare 

Ex. A at p. 8 with Ex. D, E. Grimmway argues that the proposed deposition is not cumulative or 

duplicative because the responses provided in written discovery were limited and full of 

objections, and that to prepare for trial Grimmway must be able to explore the questions in more 

detail via a 30(b)(6) deposition. This, also, appears true, per the Amended Responses at Exhibit 

H to the joint statement. 

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The court agrees with defendant that the 30(b)(6) deposition is not duplicative such that it 

is unduly burdensome or wasteful. The mere fact that the interrogatories and requests for 

production seek similar information to the questions posed in the 30(b)(6) deposition is not 

enough to warrant a protective order preventing the deposition at the outset. Though “various 

courts have ruled differently on whether a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice with language similar 

to that in [interrogatories and requests for production] should be allowed to proceed,” the 

undersigned agrees with defendant that in this case, the questions and responses are not so fully 

duplicative that a 30(b)(6) deposition would be entirely redundant. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Sunshine 

Raisin Corporation, 1:21-cv-1424-FLT-HBK (E.D. Cal. 2023) at ECF No. 63 at 5 (partially 

reversed on reconsideration at ECF No. 73) (quoting U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Source One Staffing, Inc., 

2013 WL 25033, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2013)). The court does not opine as to any objections that 

may be raised at the deposition; this ruling is limited to the conclusion that the deposition itself is 

not so duplicative or cumulative as to warrant a protective order preventing it. 

b. The Information is Not More Readily Available From Other Sources 

Plaintiff argues that a protective order is warranted because several of the topics 

Grimmway seeks to explore in the deposition are more appropriately directed at experts or 

individual witnesses with personal knowledge. For example, plaintiff argues topics seeking 

factual information supporting CRD’s damages claims are more appropriately sought from a 

damages expert. ECF No. 43-3 at 9. Further, plaintiff contends Grimmway has not noticed 

depositions for any of the individual group members CRD has identified in its interrogatory 

responses and amendments, or any of the individuals CRD identified in its Initial Disclosures as 

having relevant information. Id. The court is not persuaded by the conclusory arguments 

presented by plaintiff. Plaintiff provides no convincing rationale is to why it is more practicable 

to seek the information at issue from a non-parties than from a party deponent, and the court finds 

none. 

c. Plaintiff’s Employment Practices are Irrelevant 

Plaintiff argues that Grimmway’s 30(b)(6) Topics 36 -37 seek testimony from CRD on 

irrelevant information regarding CRD’s internal policies and procedures for providing a good 

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faith interactive process and preventing discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation. The 

questions at issue read as follows: 

36. The CRD’s policies and procedures during the period of time 

encompassed by the CRD’s COMPLAINT for engaging in a good 

faith interactive process and/or providing reasonable accommodation 

to disabled employees of the CRD. 

37. The factual information and documents that relate to the steps 

taken by the CRD during the time period encompassed by the 

COMPLAINT to prevent discrimination, harassment, and/or 

retaliation from occurring at the CRD. 

ECF No. 43-3 at 40. 

 This precise issue was addressed in the Sunshine Raisin case mentioned above, in an order 

by the district judge partially reversing the magistrate judge’s ruling. District Judge Jennifer 

Thurston found that deposition topics regarding an investigative agency’s own employment 

practices were not appropriate where there are also more convenient, less burdensome, and less 

expensive alternative means to obtain this discovery; here, plaintiff contends the information is 

publicly available on the websites that set forth the State of California’s employment policies.2 

ECF No. 43-3 at 10; Sunshine Raisin, ECF No. 73 at 6. Additionally, Judge Thurston found that 

situational differences between government and private employees make the information sought 

irrelevant and disproportionate to the needs of the case. Sunshine Raisin, ECF No. 73 at 6-7. 

Finally, insofar as Grimmway argues that the information is relevant to its defenses because it 

modeled its own practices on CRD’s, it would have modeled such practices on publicly available 

information. These 30(b)(6) topics are not reasonably calculated to lead to relevant, admissible 

evidence and the motion for a protective order is granted as to these topics. 

d. Involvement of an Attorney Deponent is Not Prohibitive 

Plaintiff contends that because its investigation was conducted by CRD attorneys and staff 

acting under their direction, CRD attorneys are the only individuals with the knowledge necessary 

to act as a 30(b)(6) deponent, and they are subject to the higher burden applicable to an attempt to 

depose a party’s counsel. ECF No. 43-3 at 12. Grimmway argues it is not expressly seeking 

2

 See e.g., https://www.calhr.ca.gov/. 

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depose an attorney, and if plaintiff chooses to designate an attorney, the simple fact that a 

deponent is an attorney does not shield them from a deposition. Id. at 21. 

“Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit 

the taking of attorney depositions. However, courts have recognized the deposition of an 

opposing party’s counsel can have a negative impact on the litigation process and these 

depositions are therefore discouraged.” Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., No. 14-cv-1158 BAS (JLB), 

2015 WL 8492501, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2015). Generally, courts allow for the deposition of 

an opposing party’s attorney where the party seeking to take the deposition can show “(1) No 

other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) The information 

sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) The information is crucial to the preparation of the 

case.” Id., citing Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8thCir. 1986). Here, the 

court finds that the burden is met. Plaintiff asserts that every person with knowledge sufficient to 

be a 30(b)(6) deponent will be an attorney, such that no other options exist but to depose counsel. 

The 30(b)(6) topics are sufficiently calculated to elicit relevant and non-privileged information, 

but to the extent a response contains privileged information, that objection can and should be 

made during the deposition. The court declines to prohibit the 30(b)(6) deposition in its entirety 

simply because in-house counsel are, per plaintiff, the only potential deponents. 

C. Dispute as to Depositions of Wong and Doehm 

In addition to the 30(b)(6) designee, Grimmway seeks to depose CRD District 

Administrators Selena Wong and Patrice Doehm. ECF No. 43-3 at 30. Ms. Doehrn signed the 

Verification of Plaintiffs’ Amended Responses to Defendant’s Interrogatories, Set One (Exhibit 

“I” to the joint statement), and Ms. Wong signed the Verification of Plaintiff Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing’s Responses to Defendant’s Interrogatories, Set One (Exhibit “G” to 

the joint statement). The only rationale provided by Grimmway with respect to the need to 

depose Ms. Doehm and Ms. Wong is that they attested to the truth of the facts in the interrogatory 

responses. Id. at 30-31. Grimmway does not explain how the depositions of Doehm and Wong 

are calculated to lead to any information that differs from that which could be obtained for the 

30(b)(6) deposition, or gleaned from the interrogatories themselves. There is no apparent 

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relevance to the attestation itself. The court concludes that these depositions would be entirely 

duplicative, and the burden on plaintiff outweighs any potential benefit to Grimmway. 

Accordingly, the motion for a protective order is granted on this point. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons explained above, the motion for a protective order (ECF No. 43) is 

GRANTED as to the 30(b)(6) proposed topics 36-37 and as to the depositions of Selena Wong 

and Patrice Doehm. The motion is otherwise DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 7, 2023 

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