Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01111/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01111-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Connie Gipson
Respondent
Alfredo Rudy Pena
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALFREDO RUDY PENA,

Petitioner,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON,

Respondent.

Case No. 12-cv-01111-WHO (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner Alfredo Rudy Pena seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions 

because (1) the trial court’s exclusion of third party culpability evidence deprived him of 

his right to due process; and (2) the CALCRIM No. 376 instruction lessened the 

prosecutor’s burden of proof.1

 Because neither of these claims has merit, the petition for 

habeas relief is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2009, a Santa Clara County Superior Court jury found Pena guilty of first degree 

murder and first degree robbery. (Ans., Ex. 6 at 1 (State Appellate Opinion, People v. 

Pena, No. H034159, 2010 WL 4112211 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2010) (unpublished).) He 

 

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Pena’s two other claims were dismissed upon a motion by respondent. (Docket No. 20.) 

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received a sentence of 75 years to life in state prison. (Id.) His attempts to overturn his 

convictions in state court were unsuccessful. This federal habeas petition followed. 

The prosecution proved to the jury’s unanimous satisfaction that on May 6, 2007, 

Pena tied up and strangled to death Johanna Giron, a prostitute, in her hotel room, and then 

used her credit card for purchases. The evidence included test results showing that his 

DNA signature matched that of DNA samples taken from Giron’s hand and from the cloth 

used to tie her up at the crime scene, the record of many calls that were made from his cell 

phone to the victim’s during the time surrounding her death, and the testimony of a store 

clerk that Pena looked similar to a person who attempted to use Giron’s credit card a few 

days after her death. (Id. at 4-8.) Pena also told the police that he had visited Giron the 

night of her death, stated that he left after she had refused his offer of money in exchange 

for her sexual services, and admitted that he stole her laptop computer. (Id. at 10.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

this Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated 

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 

(2000).

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“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” 

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

When presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for 

its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state-court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This review is not de novo. “[W]here a state 

court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still 

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Exclusion of Evidence of Third Party Culpability 

Prior to trial, Pena sought to admit evidence that another person, Turo Collins, was 

Giron’s killer.2

 He made an offer of proof that Collins (1) telephoned Giron on May 6th, 

(2) was within 3 miles of Giron’s hotel near the time of her murder, (3) had sufficient time 

to commit the crime, (4) lacked a good alibi because his girlfriend repeatedly lied about his 

whereabouts on May 6th, and (5) was arrested in 2006 for beating up a woman and, while 

holding a gun to her head, threatening to shoot her. (Ans., Ex. 6 at 12.)

 

2 At trial, Pena also sought to introduce evidence that another man, Vincent Hudson, could 

have been responsible, but his motion was denied. He did not raise the exclusion of the 

Hudson evidence to the state appellate court, which deemed the claim waived, nor has he 

raised the claim in this action. (Ans., Ex. 6 at 12 n.10.) 

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The prosecution responded that (1) the only connection between Collins and Giron 

was the telephone call, and that there was no evidence that he had actually talked to her, 

(2) no physical evidence linked Collins to the crime, and (3) neither Collins nor his blue 

Cadillac was seen on any of the hotel’s video footage that was taken around the time of the 

murder. (Id. at 13.) 

The trial court excluded the evidence. It concluded that there was no direct or 

circumstantial link between Collins and the murder. It found that whatever probative value 

the evidence had was outweighed by concerns about consuming undue court time and a 

creating a confusion of issues. (Id.) 

The state appellate court rejected Pena’s claim. Evidence of third-party culpability 

must be “direct or circumstantial evidence linking that third person to the actual 

perpetration of the crime.” (Id. at 15.) Evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit 

the crime is insufficient to justify the admission of third-party culpability. (Id. at 18.) 

Under these principles, it held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in 

excluding the evidence. Further, the court found that “it was questionable whether Collins 

ever spoke with [Giron] at all” and that there was no evidence that Collins met Giron or 

went to her hotel. (Id.) Pena, on the other hand, admitted to being in Giron’s hotel room 

close in time to her murder. 

State and federal rulemakers have broad discretion in excluding evidence from 

trials, limited by a defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense. 

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). The Court recognizes that “wellestablished rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value 

is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 326. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly found that state 

courts have acted reasonably in excluding unreliable or insubstantial evidence of thirdparty culpability. See Phillips v. Herndon, 730 F.3d 773, 776-78 (9th Cir. 2013); Christian 

v. Frank, 595 F.3d 1076, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2010); and Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 978 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

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Habeas relief is not warranted here. The state appellate court reasonably 

determined that the evidence lacked probative value. There was no evidence, either direct 

or circumstantial, that linked Collins to the murder. The sole link between him and the 

victim was evidence that he called her, a link made weaker by the fact that there is no 

evidence that they ever spoke. The state appellate and trial courts reasonably determined 

that introduction of such insubstantial evidence would unduly consume court time.

Furthermore, Pena has not shown prejudice. There was strong evidence supporting 

his guilt. He admitted to being at the crime scene. His DNA signature matched those of 

the samples taken from the crime scene of the victim’s hand and of the cloth bindings that 

were used to tie her up. There was a record of many phone calls from him to Giron. And 

there was testimony from a store clerk that Pena resembled the man who tried to use 

Giron’s credit card after the murder. 

The state appellate court’s decision was reasonable and is entitled to AEDPA 

deference. This claim is DENIED. 

II. CALCRIM No. 376 

 Pena’s next claim regards the words italicized below in the text of CALCRIM 

No. 376 (“Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime”), which, as 

read to his jury, states 

If you conclude that the defendant knew he possessed property and you 

conclude the property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not convict 

the defendant of robbery or the lesser offense of theft based on those facts 

alone; however, if you also find supporting evidence tends to prove his 

guilt, then you may conclude the evidence is sufficient to prove robbery or 

the lesser offense of theft. The supporting evidence need only be slight, 

[and] need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how 

and where the defendant possessed the property along with any other 

relevant circumstance tending to prove his guilt of the robbery or the lesser 

offense of theft. [¶] Remember, you may not convict the defendant of any 

crime unless you’re convinced each fact essential to conclude the defendant 

is guilty of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Italics 

added.)

(Ans., Ex. 6 at 22.) Pena contended on appeal that the term “slight” as used in the 

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instruction unconstitutionally lowered the prosecutor’s burden of proof: 

‘To tell jurors that they may make an inference of guilt based on ‘slight’ 

corroboration is to dilute the constitutionally ineluctable rule that a criminal 

conviction may be predicated only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 

[Pena] contends that the instruction was not prejudicial ‘to the robbery 

conviction as such,’ but rather reduced the prosecution’s proof burden for 

murder. 

(Id.) 

The state appellate court rejected this claim. “[T]here is nothing in the 

instruction that directly or indirectly addresses the burden of proof, and nothing in 

it relieves the prosecution of its burden to establish guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (Id. at 23) (citations omitted). Also, the court’s other instructions on the 

weighing of evidence and burdens of proof eliminated the possibility that the 

instruction reduced the burden of proof. (Id.) 

The court also found that the instruction’s use of “slight” does not violate due 

process. The state appellate court concluded that the instruction allows the jury to draw a 

permissive inference. Because it is a permissive, rather than a mandatory, inference, due 

process requires only that the supporting evidence be slight. (Id.) 

The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove every element charged in 

a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 

(1970). If the jury is not properly instructed that a defendant is presumed innocent until 

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has been deprived of due process. 

See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004). Any jury instruction that “reduce[s] 

the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden . . . is plainly 

inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” Cool v. United 

States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must 

show that the disputed instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

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conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The 

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context 

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. In other words, a federal habeas 

court must evaluate the jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a 

component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) 

(citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). 

Habeas relief is not warranted here, both because the instruction was proper and 

there was no prejudice to Pena. First, the state appellate court reasonably concluded that 

the instruction did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof. The instruction repeated 

the reasonable doubt standard at its end, reminding the jury that its final determination of 

guilt must adhere to that standard. That supporting evidence need only be “slight” lowered 

no burden of proof. The instruction clearly limited the use of “slight” to only one sub-part 

of a larger determination, a larger determination that was subject to the beyond a 

reasonable doubt standard. Furthermore, the jury could not consider that “slight” 

supporting evidence until it had first concluded that Pena knowingly possessed stolen 

property and that the property had in fact been recently stolen. 

In addition, the jury heard a separate instruction that it cannot convict petitioner of 

any crime unless the prosecutor proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ans., Ex. 2, 

Vol. 6 at 672-73.) Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. See Richardson v. 

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). This Court must presume that the jury understood the 

trial court’s instructions and applied the correct standard. Id. 

Second, Pena has not shown prejudice. The evidence of his guilt was strong. He 

admitted to meeting Giron on the day of her death, his DNA signature was found at the 

crime scene, he called her many times in the time surrounding her death, and he was seen 

using her credit card in the days following her death. The weight of this evidence renders 

meritless any contention that he suffered prejudice. 

There is no support for the assertion that the disputed instruction lowered the 

burden of proof or deprived Pena of a constitutionally fair trial. The state appellate court’s 

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decision was reasonable and is entitled to AEDPA deference. This claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

The state courts’ adjudication of Pena’s claims did not result in decisions that were 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor 

did they result in decisions that were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition 

is DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Pena may seek a certificate of appealability from the 

Ninth Circuit. 

The Clerk shall judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 1, 2015

_________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge

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