Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01059/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01059-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Secretan
Petitioner
Warden
Respondent

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD SECRETAN, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-1459 GGH

vs.

WARDEN, et al., 

Respondents. ORDER

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at Wasco State Prison in Kern County. 

Petitioner alleges a violation of his rights during parole revocation proceedings. 

It is established that a petitioner for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

must name “the state officer having custody of him or her as the respondent to the petition.”

Stanley v. Cal. Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir.1994). The U.S.Supreme Court

recently reiterated that with certain infrequent exceptions not applicable here: 

The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the

proper respondent to a habeas petition is “the person who has

custody over [the petitioner].” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also § 2243

(“The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person 

Case 1:08-cv-01059-OWW -WMW Document 8 Filed 07/23/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

having custody of the person detained”). The consistent use of the

definite article in reference to the custodian indicates that there is

generally only one proper respondent to a given prisoner’s habeas

petition. This custodian, moreover, is “the person” with the ability

to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court. Ibid. We

summed up the plain language of the habeas statute over 100 years

ago in this way: “[T]hese provisions contemplate a proceeding

against some person who has the immediate custody of the party

detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before 

the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason 

is shown to the contrary.” Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574, 5

S.Ct. 1050, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885) (emphasis added); see also Braden

v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-495, 93

S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus”

acts upon “the person who holds [the detainee] in what is alleged

to be unlawful custody,” citing Wales, supra, at 574, 5 S.Ct. 1050);

Braden, supra, at 495, 93 S.Ct. 1123 (“‘[T]his writ ... is directed to

... [the] jailer,’” quoting In the Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417,

439- 440 (1867)). In accord with the statutory language and

Wales’ immediate custodian rule, longstanding practice confirms

that in habeas challenges to present physical confinement–“core

challenges”--the default rule is that the proper respondent is the

warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the

Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-435, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2717-2718 (2004) (emphasis

added) (refusing to recognize the Secretary of Defense as the custodian of military detainees, and

finding that the commander of the brig where Padilla was being held is the proper custodian).

See also Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A

custodian ‘is the person having a day-to-day control over the prisoner. That person is the only

one who can produce ‘the body’ of the petitioner.” Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416

(D.C.Cir.1986) (Parole Commission is not custodian despite its power to release petitioner). But

see Ortiz-Zandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1996) permitting the head of California

Corrections to be the proper custodian, but this case is in doubt after Padilla which held that a

remote supervisory official was not to be the custodian). 

Thus, the proper custodian is the warden or sheriff in charge of the facility where

the prisoner is confined. 

/////

Case 1:08-cv-01059-OWW -WMW Document 8 Filed 07/23/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 If the literal interpretation of “conviction and sentencing” were to be employed, i.e., the 1

district where petitioner suffered his underlying conviction, maintaining the action in that place in

parole suitability situations would not be as appropriate as having it in the place of confinement.

First, in the logistical sense, the issue of parole suitability has little to do with the place of conviction

– the court will not be concerned with the ease of mustering witnesses and evidence. Secondly, even

though the local government officials at the place of conviction may retain an interest in having

parole denied, habeas cases are handled by the state Attorney General’s Office, and local officials

are not involved in the federal court litigation regarding review of the parole eligibility decision. The

issues involved in the federal court review will not center about the opinions of local officials, and

even if it did, those opinions will be of record already.

3

Any warden or sheriff in California is amenable to personal jurisdiction in the

Eastern District in cases alleging violations of rights during parole revocation proceedings

because personal jurisdiction is a state-wide, not individual district, concept. However, venue

concepts are oriented to individual districts. In habeas corpus cases, venue is proper: (1) in the

district of confinement, or (2) in the district of “conviction and sentencing.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(d). Because it is difficult to stretch “conviction and sentencing” into a decision revoking

parole, only the first venue option is appropriate. Moreover, since prisoners are not normally

transferred about for parole eligibility or revocation hearings, the district of confinement would

normally be the district of “conviction and sentencing” anyway even if that rubric were utilized

in the parole eligibility setting.1

Because Wasco State Prison is located in the Fresno Division of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California, this action will be transferred to the Fresno

Division.

Accordingly, in the furtherance of justice, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California sitting in Fresno; and

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 1:08-cv-01059-OWW -WMW Document 8 Filed 07/23/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

2. All future filings shall reference the new Fresno case number assigned and

shall be filed at:

United States District Court

Eastern District of California

2500 Tulare Street

Fresno, CA 93721

DATED: 07/23/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

sec1459.tra

Case 1:08-cv-01059-OWW -WMW Document 8 Filed 07/23/08 Page 4 of 4