Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01428/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01428-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rhoda Jewell Surveyor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL ~ .J 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Cou:-~ of AppealF Tenth Ci.-cuit 

JAN 2 5 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff/Appellee, 

v. 

RHODA JEWELL SURVEYOR, 

Defendant/Appellant 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Clerk . 

No. 91-1428 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-194) 

Before BALDOCK and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.** 

Appellant Rhoda Jewell Surveyor was convicted pursuant to 18 

u.s.c. S 113(c) and S 1153 of assault with a dangerous weapon with 

intent to do bodily harm on the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Reservation 

in Colorado. She appeals her conviction asserting three points of 

error in the trial court: (1) the court's refusal to instruct the 

jury on the lesser included offenses of assault by striking, 

beating and wounding under 18 u.s. c. S 113(d), and simple assault 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and 

shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrine of the law of the 

case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

** Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-1428 Document: 010110159217 Date Filed: 01/25/1993 Page: 1 
under 18 U.S . C. S 113(e); (2) the court's failure to instruct the 

jury adequately on the defendant's theory of self-defense; and (3) 

the court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding evidence of the 

victim's aggressive character. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 

u.s.c. S 1291 and affirm. 

I. 

The events described herein occurred in front of an apartment 

building on the Ute Mountain Ute Indian reservation in Colorado. 

On the night of May 10, 1991, a fight broke out between several 

men, including the appellant's boyfriend, Troyd Vincenti, and the 

victim's brother, Thomas Tom. After the fight started, the 

appellant and the victim, Jacalynn Tom, began arguing, but someone 

yelled "Cops!" and everyone fled the scene. When it became 

apparent that the police were not actually coming, the fight 

between the men resumed. The appellant also returned to the scene, 

where she and the victim continued their shouting match. According 

to the victim, the appellant was yelling about gangs and stating 

that she (the appellant) had been in gangs and had killed people 

before. The appellant then grabbed the victim by her hair, dragged 

her to the ground, and stabbed her repeatedly with a pocket knife. 

II. 

The first asserted point of error is the trial court's refusal 

to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of assault by 

striking, beating, and wounding (18 u.s.c. S 113(d)), and simple 

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Appellate Case: 91-1428 Document: 010110159217 Date Filed: 01/25/1993 Page: 2 
assault (18 u.s.c. S 113 (e)). In declining the defendant's request 

at trial, the court based its ruling on the insufficiency of 

evidence for the jury to reasonably believe that the defendant 

lacked intent to do bodily harm. "The decision of whether there is 

enough evidence to justify a lesser included offense charge rests 

within the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. 

Chapman, 615 F . 2d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 

967 (1980). Thus, we review for abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Whether or 

not a lesser included offense instruction is appropriate depends 

upon the evidence, and the trial court is in a unique position to 

determine whether or not the instruction should be given. Thus, 

the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal in 

the absence of an abuse of discretion."). 

"'In a case where some of the elements of the crime charged 

themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the 

evidence j ustif [ ies] it, [is] entitled to an instruction which 

would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.'" United 

States v. Dennison, 937 F.2d 559, 564 (10th Cir. 1991) (alterations 

in original) (quoting Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134 

(1956)), cert. denied, __ U.S. ___ , 112 s.ct 886 (1992). 

Specifically, a lesser included offense instruction is warranted 

if: (1) there has been a proper request; (2) the lesser offense 

includes some, but not all, of the elements of the offense charged; 

(3) the element differentiating the two offenses is in dispute; and 

( 4) a rational jury could convict the defendant of the lesser 

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included offense and acquit of the greater offense. Dennison, 937 

F.2d at 564; Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th 

Cir. 1983). 

We find no error in the district court's refusal to give the 

lesser included offense instructions proffered by the defense. The 

purported basis for these instructions was the defendant's alleged 

incapacity to form specific intent due to alcohol intoxication. 

However, the district court concluded that from the evidence, the 

jury could not reasonably believe that the defendant lacked 

specific intent. Upon review of the evidence, we are satisfied 

that this ruling was correct. The appellant engaged the victim in 

a verbal confrontation and made references to gangs and gang 

activity. When someone yelled "Cops!", she ran and hid inside a 

nearby apartment. When the others returned to the yard, the 

appellant came out of the apartment and resumed arguing with the 

victim. The appellant then grabbed the victim and pulled her to 

the ground, stabbing her with a knife more than eleven times. The 

district court concluded from the evidence that "there's no 

question but that she [the defendant] was in such control of her 

faculties that she could give numerous commands, varying language, 

which is undisputed in the evidence." (R. Vol. 4, at 371). Given 

the evidence in this case, we are convinced that the jury could not 

have found the appellant lacked the intent to do bodily injury, if 

it found she possessed the intent to commit any crime at all. Cf. 

Dennison, 937 F. 2d at 564. Accordingly, we find no abuse of 

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discretion in the district court's refusal to instruct on the 

lesser included offenses as requested by the defense . 

III. 

Appellant's second point of error is that the district court 

failed to adequately instruct the jury on her theory of selfdefense . The appellant contends that the court's instruction on 

self-defense was deficient in two respects: (1) in failing to 

inform the jury that a person has no duty to retreat from her own 

home or grounds; and (2) in failing to adequately instruct the jury 

on the possible effect of the number of people present at the scene 

and the weight the jury could give this fact. 

"' A criminal defendant is entitled to jury instructions on any 

theory of defense finding support in the evidence and the law.'" 

Dennison, 937 F.2d at 562 (quoting United States v. Lofton, 776 

F.2d 918, 919-20 (10th Cir. 1985)). The trial judge, however, "is 

given substantial latitude in tailoring and formulating the 

instructions so long as they are correct statements of the law and 

fairly and adequately cover the issues presented," and "[t]here is 

no requirement that the trial judge must follow the exact language 

from the jury instructions offered by the defendant. " United 

States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 267 (10th Cir. 1985). We review the 

instructions as a whole for abuse of discretion. United States v . 

Haar, 931 F.2d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 1991). "'[A]n abuse of 

discretion occurs only when the failure to give a requested 

instruction serves to prevent the jury from considering the 

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defendant I s defense. 1 11 Dennison, 937 F. 2d at 562-63 (quoting 

United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1986)). 

The defendant requested that the self-defense instruction 

include: "a defendant is never required to retreat from her own 

land or premises." The district court denied this request on the 

grounds that the concept was already sufficiently covered in the 

instructions. On this point, the instructions stated: 

If the Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe 

and actually did believe that she was in imminent danger 

of assault or bodily harm, she was not required to 

retreat or to consider whether she could safely retreat. 

She was entitled to stand her ground and use as much 

force as was reasonably necessary under the circumstances 

to protect herself from bodily harm. 

However, if the Defendant could have safely 

retreated but did not do so, her failure to retreat is a 

circumstance which you can consider, together with all 

other circumstances, in determining whether she went 

farther in repelling the harm, real or apparent, than she 

was justified in doing under the circumstances. 

(R. Vol. IV, p. 387). The court advised the defense attorney that 

the instructions as constituted would permit him to argue that 

these principles apply with more force when a person is in close 

proximity to her home. 

Considering the self-defense instruction in its entirety, we 

find that it accurately states the law and the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in refusing to include the appellant's 

proffered language on the duty to retreat. 

The appellant also asserts that the district court erred by 

failing to instruct the jury on the possible effect of the number 

of people present at the scene and the weight the jury was entitled 

to give that fact. The court's instruction to the jury provided: 

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"In determining whether the defendant used excessive force in 

defending herself, you may consider all the circumstances under 

which she acted." 

the court to add: 

(R. Vol. 4, p. 388). The defendant requested 

"including the number of persons reasonably 

appearing to be threatening the defendant." The court declined the 

request because the court was of the view that there were many 

circumstances the jury could consider and it would not be 

appropriate to outline them specifically in the instructions. The 

court further advised defense counsel that the court's instructions 

would permit him to argue his point to the jury, but that the court 

wanted to avoid any comment on the evidence in the case. 

We find no abuse of discretion in the court I s refusal to 

include the appellant's proffered language in the instruction. 

IV. 

Appellant I s final point of error is the district court's 

refusal to instruct the jury regarding evidence of the victim's 

aggressive character. In rejecting the defendant's proffered 

instruction, the court made the following statement: 

Let me state on the record, with respect to that 

particular request, three things about it. 

One, it was submitted very late. 

Second, it made specific reference to the testimony of, 

I think, three different witnesses that I felt unduly 

emphasized their testimony and constituted, in essence, 

a comment on the evidence. 

And, third and most important, I think the other 

instructions certainly permit an argument to be made 

about the evidence reflecting the reputation of the 

alleged victim, Jacalynn Tom, so the defendant and her 

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counsel are not precluded from pointing out to the jury 

and making arguments based on it. I think a separate 

instruction on it would unduly emphasize it. 

(R. Vol. IV, p. 368-69). As the court correctly pointed out at 

trial, the court's instructions permitted argument to the jury 

about the victim's aggressive character. The court's instructions 

permitted the jury to consider the defendant I s theory that the 

aggressive character of the victim was probative of her selfdefense claim. It follows that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in refusing to give the proffered instruction. See 

Dennison, 937 F.2d at 562-63. 

AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Earl E. O'Connor 

Senior District Judge 

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