Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05169/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05169-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter Joseph McMahon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appenls 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 2 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-5169 

PETER JOSEPH McMAHON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-176-BU) 

Stephen J. Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Stephen J. Knorr, Federal Public 

Defender, with him on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Neal B. Kirkpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen C. Lewis, United States 

Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, ENGEL* and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Albert J. Engel, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-5169 Document: 01019292012 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 1 
Defendant Peter J. McMahon appeals his conviction and sentencing, after a jury 

trial, on charges of possessing a firearm and ammunition after a previous felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(l), and possession of a firearm in 

relation to drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The district court 

sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act with a sixty-month consecutive 

sentence on the § 924( c)( 1) charge. 

On appeal, defendant contends that ( 1) the § 924( c)( 1) conviction should be 

reversed and the charge dismissed under Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), 

and the district court erred in (2) refusing a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, USSG § 3E1.1, and (3) treating an Oklahoma state drug conviction as a "serious drug offense" and defendant's prior conviction for escape from a drug 

detoxification center as a "violent felony" for purposes of § 924( e) enhancement. 

I 

On separate occasions in September and October 1994, law enforcement officers 

searched an apartment defendant occupied with codefendant Kandy Kay Thomas and her 

son, Dallas Woods. The two affidavits supporting the search warrants detailed controlled 

drug purchases from defendant by a confidential informant and law enforcement observations of defendant and Thomas. The officers recovered 2~ K-4 Dilaudid pills, two 

syringes, and a 20-gauge shotgun during the first search, and 14~ K-4 Dilaudid pills, 

syringes and ammunition during the second search. At the suppression hearing defendant 

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Appellate Case: 95-5169 Document: 01019292012 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 2 
testified that he could not have participated in the controlled drug sales described in the 

affidavits because he was elsewhere when the sales occurred. 

Michael Sinclair and Thomas' sons, Dallas Woods and Waylon Woods, all 

testified at defendant's joint trial with Thomas. Sinclair testified that he witnessed 

Dallas' father, Ronny Woods, deliver a shotgun to the apartment on the morning of the 

first search. Dallas Woods testified that he owned a shotgun which he observed his father 

deliver to the apartment that day. Waylon Woods testified that the ammunition seized in 

the second search belonged to him and that defendant and Thomas did not know he had 

left it in their apartment. 

After the court recessed for the day, prosecutors interviewed all three Woods and 

other family members. Dallas and Waylon Woods ultimately admitted to giving perjured 

testijnony at defendant's urging and to assist their mother's defense. Ronny Woods 

provided prosecutors with a letter from defendant detailing the proposed false testimony 

and offering sons Dallas and Waylon $50 each for their false testimony. Prosecutors 

revealed the perjury conspiracy to the district court and defense counsel. Thomas then 

consulted with her attorney and pleaded guilty to two counts of a superseding indictment. 

When the trial reconvened defendant knew the prosecution had witnesses available 

to testify as to the perjury conspiracy. Defendant took the stand and acknowledged to the 

court that his desire to avoid the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence had motivated 

him to suborn perjury. He denied selling drugs from his apartment and using a firearm to 

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Appellate Case: 95-5169 Document: 01019292012 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 3 
further the drug operation. Dallas and Waylon Woods, on rebuttal, admitted to the 

perjury conspiracy and that they had testified falsely at defendant's and Thomas' behest. 

Dallas Woods admitted seeing defendant and Thomas sell drugs and observing buyers 

inject themselves with drugs at the apartment. Ronny Woods testified that defendant 

asked him to say that he had brought the gun to defendant's apartment on a date just 

before the search. 

II 

The government concedes defendant's first issue--that under Bailey the§ 924(c) 

conviction must be reversed and that count of the indictment dismissed. Bailey held that 

a § 924( c) conviction requires a showing the defendant actively used the firearm "in 

relation to the predicate crime." 116 S. Ct. at 505. "Use" of the firearm does not include 

having it available if needed, but rather "active employment" of the weapon. Id. at 508. 

The shotgun here was not loaded when seized, and the government found it secreted 

behind clothing in a closet. The officers executing the search found no drugs in the 

closet. Thus, applying Bailey we reverse defendant's § 924( c) conviction and remand, 

directing the district court to vacate the sixty-month consecutive sentence and other 

conditions associated with this charge. 

III 

Defendant argues that the district court erred by refusing to lower his offense level 

for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3El.l. We review for clear error a district 

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Appellate Case: 95-5169 Document: 01019292012 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 4 
court decision not to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. 

Garcia, 987 F.2d 1459, 1461 (lOth Cir. 1993). Defendant must prove that he is entitled to 

this offense level reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Chimal, 

976 F.2d 608, 613 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 938 (1993). 

Defendant argues that his admissions at trial demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. He contends that waiving his right to remain silent, and admitting to suborning 

perjury, possession of a firearm and other crimes, support the adjustment. The government responds that defendant only admitted to the perjury plot after the government 

discovered it and defendant provided only partially true testimony at trial. 

A defendant is not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility merely 

because he admits to wrongdoing. See Garcia, 987 F.2d at 1461-62. We have read the 

record and agree with the district court's assessment that defendant's admissions were 

untimely and incomplete. This is not the rare case in which a defendant acts in good faith 

in putting the government to its burden of proof for legitimate reasons other than contesting guilt. See USSG § 3El.l, comment. (n.2); see also United States v. Janus Indus., 48 

F.3d 1548, 1560 (lOth Cir.) (noting that defendant's "main regret [was] the fact that he 

got caught"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2628 (1995). The district court did not err in finding 

defendant failed to establish that he was entitled to this adjustment. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5169 Document: 01019292012 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 5 
IV 

Finally, defendant challenges his sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 

the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which provides for a fifteen-year mandatory 

minimum sentence for § 922(g) convictions by persons with three prior convictions "for a 

violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both." Defendant had two convictions that 

unquestionably qualify, but he contends that the district court erred in determining that his 

1981 Oklahoma conviction for distributing eight ounces of marijuana was a "serious drug 

offense," and that his 1990 conviction for escaping from a detox center was a "violent 

felony." We review de novo a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to§ 924(e). 

United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1153 (lOth Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

258 (1995). The government carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that an enhancement is appropriate. United States v. Green, 55 F.3d 1513, 1515 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 324 (1995). 

The district court found that defendant's 1981 drug conviction was a "serious drug 

offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A), which provides: 

(2) As used in this subsection--

(A) the term "serious drug offense" means--

(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 

U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and 

Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law 

Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.), for which a 

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maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law; or 

(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or 

distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of 

the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a 

maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. 

Defendant was convicted of violating Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 2-401(B)(2) which then 

provided: 

B. Any person who violates this section with respect to: 

2. Any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule 

I, II, III, or IV is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to a term of 

imprisoment for not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years and 

a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Such sentence 

shall not be subject to statutory provisions for suspended sentences, deferred sentences or probation except where the conviction is for a first 

offense. 

Defendant argues correctly that in 1981, under federal law, distributing eight 

ounces of marijuana would not have qualified as a serious drug offense because 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(l)(D) provided for a five-year maximum sentence. Consequently, the ACCA 

enhancement would not have applied if that had been a federal conviction. He contends 

that state offenses should be treated like the most analogous federal drug offense to 

ensure equality in sentencing under the ACCA. This appears to be an issue of first 

impression in the appellate courts. 

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We note that the Supreme Court has endorsed a categorical approach to identifying 

predicate offenses, focusing on the fact of conviction and its statutory definition. Taylor 

v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-92 (1990). The plain language of the statute sets 

forth certain federal and state drug convictions as predicate offenses under the ACCA. 

Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires that the state offense carry a maximum penalty often 

years or more in prison; the Oklahoma statute defendant violated provided for a maximum ten-year sentence. Although defendant's argument for a rule that promotes equality 

in sentencing has appeal, we believe the wording of the statute does not permit that 

interpretation. We hold the district court correctly applied the ACCA enhancement after 

finding that a preponderance of the evidence established defendant's 1981 drug conviction and sentence. 

Because we conclude that defendant's 1981 state drug offense satisfies the 

statutory requirement as a third conviction for ACCA enhancement purposes, we need not 

reach the question whether his conviction for escape from a detox center was a "violent 

felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 

We REVERSE the conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), but otherwise 

AFFIRM. 

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