Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04295/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04295-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darmonica Alexander
Plaintiff
Sonic Automotive
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARMONICA ALEXANDER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SONIC AUTOMOTIVE,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

Case No. C-03-4295 JCS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

[Docket No. 23]

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 8, 2005, after an arbitrator found in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s

employment discrimination claim, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court requesting that his case be

reopened and set for trial. The Court denied that motion on November 4, 2005. Subsequently,

Plaintiff sent the Court another letter, dated February 14, 2006, asking that the Court “review this

case again.” The Court construes this letter as a Motion for Leave to File Motion for

Reconsideration (“the Motion”). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Darmonica Alexander, a former sales manager employed by Defendant Sonic

Automotive (“Sonic”), filed an employment discrimination complaint in this Court on September 22,

2003. Alexander, who is African-American, alleged that Sonic discriminated against him by

demoting him from a full-time to part-time manager, in order to create a full-time manager position

for a less experienced employee who was not African-American. In response, Sonic filed a Motion

to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings based upon an arbitration agreement (“Agreement”)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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signed by Alexander. The Agreement provided that all disputes arising out of Alexander’s

employment shall be resolved through binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

On December 16, 2003, the Court granted the Motion to Compel and ordered the dispute

submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitration hearing was held on July 18 and 19, 2005. 

Subsequently, the arbitrator issued his “Findings and Award of Arbitrator,” finding in favor of 

Defendant Sonic and against Plaintiff Alexander. Sonic did not request a final judgment in this

Court on the basis of the arbitration award, and one has not been entered.

Following issuance of the arbitration decision, Alexander sent a letter to the Court (the

Motion) requesting that his case be reopened and set for trial. Alexander asserted that the case

should be reopened because one or more former employees of Sonic who did not testify at the

arbitration were subsequently “willing to testify against Sonic.” According to Alexander, these

witnesses, who included Alexander’s former manager, Jerry Fernandez, did not testify at the

arbitration because they did not receive his letters asking them to testify until after the arbitration. 

Alexander further asserted that this late notice resulted from the fact that Sonic did not provide the

addresses for these individuals until “very late” and some of the addresses were incorrect.

The Court construed Plaintiff’s letter as a motion to set aside the arbitration award. Applying

the standard for judicial review of arbitration awards set forth in section 10 of the Federal

Arbitration Act, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish that the arbitration award

should be set aside.

Plaintiff now asks the Court to review his case again, asserting that he has evidence showing

that Defendants’ witnesses told numerous lies in the arbitration. 

III. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9, a party may bring a Motion for Consideration if it can

show:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in

fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before

entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought.

The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence

the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at

the time of the interlocutory order; or

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Court notes that even if it were to consider Plaintiff’s arguments on the merits, the Court

does not find any arguments or evidence in the Motion that would justify setting aside the arbitration

award.

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(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law

occurring after the time of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or

dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court

before such interlocutory order.

Civil L. R. 7-9(b). Plaintiff has failed to meet any of these requirements. In particular, Plaintiff’s

assertions are not based on a “material difference in fact or law,” “new material facts or a change of

law,” or a “manifest failure” on the part of the Court to consider facts or legal arguments that were

presented to it. All of the arguments Plaintiff now raises could (and should) have been included in

his earlier motion to set aside the arbitration. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED.1

III. CONCLUSION

The Motion is DENIED. Should Plaintiff seek further review of the Court’s order denying

his Motion to Reopen, Plaintiff should file an appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The

Clerk is directed to close the file in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 6, 2006

____________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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