Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00603/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00603-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor M. Correa
Plaintiff
R.L. Gower
Defendant
Sandoval
Defendant
Townsend
Defendant
M. Wright
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR M. CORREA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-10-0603 GGH P

vs.

R.L. GOWER, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently

without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall be collected

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and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). 

“The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct.

1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id.

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In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct.

1843 (1969). 

Plaintiff names the following as defendants at High Desert State Prison (HDSP):

Chief Deputy Warden R. L. Gower; Associate Warden M. Wright; Correctional Counselor (CC)

II Sandoval; CCI Townsend. Complaint, pp. 1-2. The gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations is that

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights are being violated because the defendants have failed to

protect him by falsely documenting that he is a child molester, when he has never been convicted

of such a charge. Id., at 5. Plaintiff further claims that defendants’ alleged falsification of

records and documents have violated his due process rights. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that his “only offense is a 1982 sodomy” conviction, an offense

which was committed in a county jail, and for which he must register under Cal. Penal Code §

290. Complaint, p. 7. Plaintiff includes as Exhibit A an unauthenticated copy of a 2009

classification chrono, which, under plaintiff’s “sex offenses,” in addition to a 1983 “sodomy in

concert with force,” lists “L&L [for lewd and lascivious] Acts W/Child; Age Specific x 2 and

Oral Copulation W/Person Under 18.” Complaint, p. 19. Further review of plaintiff’s

unauthenticated exhibits shows that plaintiff has filed administrative grievances regarding what

he contends is a false accusation which places him in danger. At Exhibit B in an informal level

response evidently signed by defendant Townsend, plaintiff was informed that his records

indicate that in 2006 he was in court for two counts of L&L Acts with a child and one count of

oral copulation with a person under 18. Id. at 21. Defendant Townsend also acknowledges that

these charges were dismissed but contends that it is CDCR’s responsibility to record any sex

offense for which plaintiff was arrested or detained. Id. 

\\\\\

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The classification chrono at Exh. A reflects a current sentence of 200 years to life for 1

plaintiff. Complaint, p. 19.

4

At Exhibit C, a copy of a June 19, 2009, first level appeal response, evidently

signed by defendant Wright and referencing an interview plaintiff had with defendant Sandoval,

defendant Wright makes essentially the same point as stated above, specifically stating that the

November 22, 2009, California Identification and Information (CC&I) System Report in

plaintiff’s central file reflects the 1983 sodomy conviction as well as plaintiff’s later arrest for the

sex offenses for which plaintiff was not convicted, stating in part: “The report further reflects that

the charges were subsequently dismissed; however, they are a permanent record and will not be

omitted from your records.” Complaint, p. 27. 

The second level appeal response at Exhibit D, dated July 20, 2009, apparently

signed by defendant Gower, is more detailed and references CC&I information in plaintiff’s

central file dated June 23, 2009 (not the date cited in the first level response). Complaint, pp. 29-

31. Defendant Gower references, in addition to the sodomy conviction, plaintiff’s 2006 

possession of a firearm offense for which plaintiff received a sentence of 25 years to life. Id., at 1

30. 

A review of your central file, specifically the California

Identification and Information (CI&I) dated 6/23/09 reflects you

appeared before San Mateo Superior Court on 4/14/1983. On

4/22/1983 you were received by California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) for the conviction of PC

286(D) Sodomy in concert with force, two counts, and PC 288A(b)

Oral copulation with the use of a weapon. You paroled from

CDCR on 3/26/1989 and you registered as PC 290 registant on

03/29/1989. Your CI&I also reflects on 02/05/06 you were

arrested by Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office and you appeared

before Sacramento County Superior Court on 10/20/06 receiving

twenty five years to life for Possession of a Firearm. Additionally,

your CI&I reflects on 11/03/06 you appeared before Sacramento

County Superior Court...for two counts PC 288(C)(1) Lewd and

Lascivious acts with a child (age specific) and PC 288A(B)(1) Oral

Copulation with a person under 18 years old.

Upon further review of your central file, the Sacramento County

Probation Officer Report dated 10/20/06...reflects a subsequent

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arrest by Sacramento Police Department ... on 3/21/2006 for PC

288a(B)(1) Oral Copulation with a person under age 16, and PC

288(C)(1) Lewd Act with a Child of 14 or 15 years. The details of

the incident are described and the disposition notes the charges

were trailing the current matter, which was later dismissed.

Complaint, p. 30.

In denying plaintiff’s appeal protesting that he is being wrongly classified as a

child molester, the second level appeal response concludes:

Your request to remove the arrest for L&L acts with a child from

your records is denied. The information contained on your CI&I

and Sacramento County Probation Officers Report is not within the

jurisdiction of CDCR to add or delete items. The contents of your

central file are considered a permanent record and will not be

omitted from your records. Your request to have the CDCR 128G

dated 3/25/09 corrected because it contains false information is

denied. Your allegation stating that you are being denied your

right to appeal is without merit. Inmate Correa, your allegation

that these documented arrests contained in your central file

involving children are lies is without merit. You have failed to

provide any compelling evidence to prove that the information

contained in your central file, which was included with the review

by UCC on 3/25/09, is false information.

Id., at 31.

Plaintiff does not include a third level appeal response for this decision, but he

affirmatively indicates that the grievance process is completed. Complaint, p. 2.

As relief, plaintiff speaks of having suffered “severe emotional and psychological

distress,” but does not ask for money damages. Complaint, p. 5. Instead, plaintiff states that he

would like to go trial and apparently seeks injunctive relief in the form of a transfer from HDSP. 

Id. He does not ask that any correction be made to his record. Id. 

“‘[P]rison officials have a duty...to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994). “[A]

prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’.... For a claim (like the one here)

based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions

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“[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which 2

are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 107

S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from

restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493,

100 S.Ct.1254, 1263-1264 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington[ v. Harper], 494 U.S. 210,

221- 222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037 (involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs), nonetheless

imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra. 

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posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. Second, “[t]o violate

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable

state of mind’ ... [T]hat state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or

safety.” Id. The prison official will be liable only if “the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Plaintiff fails to show how recording his arrest record involving his having been

charged with sex offenses with children, even though those charges were ultimately dismissed,

on his classification chrono constitutes a failure to protect and rises to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Plaintiff makes no allegation that, as a result, he has suffered or been

subjected to any assault or attack or even a threat of attack. 

As to any alleged violation of due process, in general, prison officials’

classification decisions do not give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the

protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). State

regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal

constitution only if those regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Even if the information included 2

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in his classification chrono were erroneous, plaintiff, who in any event has an R-suffix

classification apparently arising from his sodomy conviction offense, even without reliance on

the child molestation charges at issue, does not demonstrate how he is subjected due to the

recording of the arrests on his chrono to an “atypical and significant hardship” beyond those that

generally characterize prison life. Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed, but he will be granted

leave to amend.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. The complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file

an amended complaint within twenty-eight days from the date of service of this order. Failure to

file an amended complaint will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

4. Plaintiff’s April 14, 2010 motion for the appointment of counsel (Docket No.

5) is denied.

DATED: June 2, 2010

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

corr0603.bnf

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