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Parties Involved:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Respondent
Long Island Power Authority
Intervenor
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press.

 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 16, 2007 Decided December 18, 2007

No. 06-1025

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY

 OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT

KEYSPAN-RAVENSWOOD, LLC, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

No. 06-1027

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 1 of 14
2

Elias G. Farrah and William F. Young argued the cause for

petitioners. With them on the briefs were Rebecca J. Michael,

Neil H. Butterklee, and James J. Dixon.

Jeffery S. Dennis, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were John S. Moot, General Counsel, and Robert H.

Solomon, Solicitor. 

Kenneth M. Simon argued the cause for intervenors

KeySpan-Ravenswood, LLC, Long Island Power Authority, and

NRG Power Marketing, Inc. With him on the brief were Mark

L. Perlis, David P. Yaffe, Howard E. Shapiro, Steven A. Weiler,

Robert C. Fallon, and Christopher C. O'Hara. James J.

Bertrand entered an appearance.

Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In these consolidated cases, the

Petitioners challenge two orders of the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) following our decision in

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. FERC, 347 F.3d 964

(D.C. Cir. 2003). In Con Edison, the court remanded two issues

to FERC for further explanation in connection with the remedies

available for electric service providers that experienced

substantial price increases in January-March 2000 as a result of

failures in a deregulated energy market. Id. at 966-67; 972-73.

In the challenged orders, FERC explained its reasoning for not

invoking temporary emergency procedures (“TEP”) of the New

York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) that

allowed rebilling, and for not ordering refunds despite the

NYISO’s violation of its tariff when pricing different types of

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 2 of 14
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power reserves. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 110 F.E.R.C.

¶ 61,244, 62,005-11 (2005) (“Remand Order”); N.Y. Indep. Sys.

Operator, Inc., 113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,155, 61,609-16 (2005)

(“Rehearing Order”). In view of the deference due to FERC’s

determinations that the NYISO had acted reasonably in not

implementing TEP because problems in the reserves market did

not rise to the level of a market design flaw, and that retroactive

refunds were not an appropriate remedy for NYISO’s tariff

violation because its pricing system protected system reliability,

we conclude that FERC’s denial of a remedy was not arbitrary

and capricious or contrary to law, and we deny the petitions.

I.

The issues before the court arise out of events occurring

approximately two months after the NYISO began operations.

Con Edison, 347 F.3d at 966-68. Between January and March

2000, transmission facility owners — i.e., load-serving entities

(“LSEs”) — experienced dramatic price increases for nonspinning reserve (“NSR”) in markets administered by the

NYISO. NSR is a power reserve that can be synchronized

within ten minutes and is of lower quality than spinning reserve

(“SR”), which is available almost immediately. In response to

these price increases, NYISO presented a number of requests to

FERC, including immediately suspending market-based bids

and authorizing a cap for NSR bids. The LSEs complained to

FERC that the NYISO had violated its tariff and “operated under

several market design flaws” by failing to accept bids from other

qualified suppliers, and sought correction of these practices and

refunds; they also sought to compel the NYISO to invoke TEP’s

remedial measures. FERC found no withholding of capacity by

any supplier, but inasmuch as the market was not operating

properly, approved the NSR bid cap while concluding that it

lacked authority to grant retroactive relief, that the NYISO had

not violated its tariff, and that it would not require the NYISO

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 3 of 14
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to implement TEP. Upon the LSEs’ petitions for review, this

court agreed that FERC lacked authority to revise rates

retroactively under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), § 205(d), 16

U.S.C. § 824d(d), but held that FERC had not adequately

explained why TEP was unavailable and had incorrectly

concluded that the NYISO had not violated its tariff by linking

the prices of SR and NSR reserves. The court remanded to

FERC, requiring additional explanation concerning why the

NYISO’s TEP tariff mechanism should not be implemented, and

whether refunds should be provided for the NYISO’s violations

of its tariff when pricing operating reserves. Id. at 972-73. 

A.

The TEP process was established, and approved by FERC,

in order to “address market design flaws, transitional

abnormalities and severe operational difficulties . . . .” N.Y.

Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 88 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,228, 61,752 (1999)

(“TEP Order”). In instances where the NYISO declares that a

market design flaw or transitional abnormality is occurring,

extraordinary corrective actions can be taken on an interim

basis, such as recalculation “of clearing prices to the level that

would have been reached if a market design flaw or transitional

abnormality had not arisen . . . .” Id. at 61,752-755. A possible

indicator of a “market design flaw” is excluding a lower-cost

resource for no “valid reason.” Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at

62,006. TEP requires, where possible, prior notice of any such

actions by the NYISO. TEP Order, 88 F.E.R.C. at 61,753. 

On remand, in response to the court’s holding in Con

Edison that FERC’s view of TEP’s scope was excessively

narrow, 347 F.3d at 971, FERC offered that TEP was

inapplicable to address the price increases of early 2000 in the

NYISO market because “the NYISO did not abuse its discretion

by refraining from exercising its TEP authority to recalculate

prices,” Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at 62,005; in any event,

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 4 of 14
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FERC concluded that refunds could not be recalculated with

“reasonable certainty” as TEP required. Id. at 62,007.

Specifically, FERC explained that “TEP provides [the] NYISO

with discretion as to when, or whether, it may take

[extraordinary corrective actions],” id. at 62,005, as well as

“what measures to take,” id. at 62,006; “abuse of discretion”

turns on what was “reasonable under the circumstances faced by

[the] NYISO at the time,” Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at

61,612. FERC concluded “that [the] NYISO made a reasonable

determination that problems in its market were primarily due to

[the concentration of] market power [and related bidding

behavior], not market design flaws, and that invocation of TEP

was not the best and most efficient procedure to remedy such

flaws.” Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at 62,006. Under TEP,

FERC noted, “‘possible indications of Market Design Flaws

include the dispatch of higher priced resources . . . when . . .

lower-priced bids are available and not selected . . . and there is

no valid reason for not operating the lower-priced resource.’”

Id. (citing TEP, NYISO Services Tariff, Attachment E, at

Section A). Here, three entities controlled ninety-seven percent

of the NSR market in New York. Id. n.62. Although certain

lower priced resources were available, namely the “western

generators” and the Blenheim-Gilboa facility (“B-G”), FERC

explained that there were valid reasons for these sources’

exclusion from bidding into reserves. The NYISO had noted

that western generators faced serious transmission constraints

eighty percent of the time, making them unreliable reserves for

eastern areas of the system, while the owners of B-G, the only

other source of potential reserves, wished to use its output for

energy rather than reserves. Id. at 62,006-07; Rehearing Order,

113 F.E.R.C. at 61,612-13. According to FERC, the NYISO’s

market is not designed to provide it with “unconstrained

authority” to compel sources like B-G to sell reserves if the

owners choose not to do so. Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at

61,613. Further, FERC noted, the NYISO did not attribute the

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 5 of 14
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reserve market’s problems to the western generators’ and B-G’s

non-participation. Id. at 61,612. 

FERC further emphasized that under TEP, even if market

design flaws had been found, tariffs could be recalculated only

“‘[i]f [it is] possible [to do so] with reasonable certainty.’”

Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at 62,007 n.65 (quoting NYISO’s

Services Tariff, Attachment E, § C.2.c.). This would not be

possible, in FERC’s view, given that the NYISO had only

recently commenced operations and historical price information

was thus limited. FERC possessed no evidence regarding the

effect that inclusion of the western generators could have had on

NSR prices. Id. at 62,007. Although the NYISO had attempted

to create proxy prices through modeling the effect of including

B-G in the reserve market, FERC found that the proxy prices’

use of future rather than contemporary prices did not yield

sufficient certainty. “[B-G had] not bid in the NSR market at

the time, and there is no evidence as to what its bid would have

been or what factors would have influenced its bid.” Id. In

addition “numerous other parties [had] raise[d] significant

objections to the [NYISO methodology] . . . .” Id. 

B.

The court held in Con Edison that the NYISO’s setting of

SR prices to be no lower than NSR prices violated its tariff and

that on remand FERC should either “follow its ‘general policy’

of providing refunds, or [] explain . . . its divergence from this

policy.” 347 F.3d at 973 (citations omitted). On remand, FERC

determined, upon balancing the equities, considering what was

just and reasonable, and exploring whether an alternate remedy

was more appropriate, that it would not order refunds. Remand

Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at 62,008. FERC explained that the

“NYISO’s [pricing] policy did not provide an improper windfall

for SR providers because it was the proper and appropriate

pricing method that provided efficient prices for the least cost

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 6 of 14
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dispatch.” Id. In particular, FERC found that the NYISO’s

pricing method served consumers’ “short-run [and] long-run”

interests and protected the reliability of the system, id. at 62,009,

assuring the availability of higher quality SR, which the

NYISO’s tariff required to represent fifty percent of available

reserves, id. at 62,002; Con Edison, 347 F.3d at 973, by

preventing SR reserves’ diversion into NSR markets when the

latter were expected to be higher priced. Remand Order, 110

F.E.R.C. at 62,009. FERC also found that the NYISO’s pricing

approach “provides, in the long run, the lowest costs to

customers and the correct market incentives to generators to bid

into the appropriate reserve market.” Id. Because the NYISO’s

pricing mechanism provided the lowest possible prices

consistent with avoiding the “perverse incentive[]” of diverting

SR into NSR, FERC concluded that the resulting profits for SR

providers did not constitute “unjust enrichment for which

refunds are appropriate.” Id. at 62,010. 

In addition to analyzing bidding incentives and consumers’

interests, FERC concluded that refunds would be unjust to the

SR producers, who had bid competitively and complied with the

tariff rules. The “NYISO . . . should not be able to adopt a

pricing regime when necessary to preserve system reliability,

and then, after reliability is preserved, require the generators that

provided that reliability to pay refunds based on an alternative

pricing regime that would not have preserved system

reliability.” Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,616. Further,

it would be unjust to force SR producers to return their gains

while the NSR producers who had allegedly been involved in

any market manipulation that did occur retained their profits. Id.

FERC also noted that customers had at least some notice that a

“cost pricing methodology” would be employed. Although the

NYISO’s approach violated its tariff by not pricing SR and NSR

independently, it complied with the tariff provision in “section

4.9 requiring least cost dispatch,” Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C.

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 7 of 14
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at 62,010, which was consistent with Central Hudson Gas &

Electric Corp., 86 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,062, 61,227 (1999), where

FERC had indicated that the tariff should allow additional

purchases of higher quality reserves when this resulted in lowest

cost, Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at 62,009.

II.

Petitioners seek an order from the court directing FERC to

“abide by its general policy of providing refunds for

overcharges, when faced with tariff violations and market design

flaws that create[] or exacerbate[] supplier market power.”

Petrs. Br. at 3. Noting an increase of $71,000,000 in the total

cost of NSR and SR from January 29 through March 27, 2000,

Petitioners maintain that FERC’s original orders found that the

NYISO operating reserves market was “plagued with market

design flaws, including software flaws, and that the market did

not match the circumstances under which original market-based

rate authority for operating reserves was granted.” Id. at 4.

They further note that FERC ordered prospective corrections to

the market, allowing incorporation of reserves from B-G “as

quickly as possible,” N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 91

F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,218, 61,800 (“Waiver Order”), and that FERC

instituted a prospective bid cap on NSR rates, id. at 61,802.

A.

As an initial matter, Petitioners appear to contend that

where market conditions are disrupted, FERC has an

“obligation” to grant remedial relief, and thus TEP should be

implemented and refunds ordered for SR charges. Petrs. Br. at

12-13; Reply Br. at 7. For support they rely on California ex

rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2004), where the

Ninth Circuit observed that FERC had “abdicat[ed] its

regulatory responsibility” when California consumers were

subject to “a variety of [artificial] market machinations,” and

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 8 of 14
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“improperly concluded that retroactive refunds were not legally

available.” Id. at 1015, 1018. Inasmuch as the tariff violations

and market conditions in the NYISO operating reserves market

“are far more egregious than in the Lockyer case,” Petrs. Br. at

12, Petitioners maintain that FERC’s refusal to order TEP

implementation or refunds for SR charges cannot be squared

with the predicates for its approval of the market-based rate

tariff or the severity of the harm to customers who paid rates

“far above any ‘just and reasonable’ standard,” id. However,

Lockyer acknowledges that “FERC may elect not to exercise its

remedial discretion by requiring refunds,” 383 F.3d at 1016, and

contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, its holding was not to order

FERC to grant refunds but was limited to the conclusion that

under the circumstances FERC "unquestionably ha[d] the power

[to order refunds]," id. FERC’s authority to order refunds is not

at issue in the instant case and, consequently, Lockyer is

unhelpful to Petitioners, particularly because the Ninth Circuit,

like this court in Con Edison, remanded for FERC to consider its

remedial options. Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1018. 

More broadly, Petitioners incorrectly imply that this court

should enforce some absolute requirement of action on the part

of FERC. “[FERC] ordinarily has remedial discretion, even in

the face of an undoubted statutory violation, unless the statute

itself mandates a particular remedy.” Conn. Valley Elec. Co. v.

FERC, 208 F.3d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Under the FPA,

the court has authority “to affirm, modify, or set aside” a FERC

order. § 313(b), 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b). However, where FERC

possesses but is not required to use certain powers, see, e.g.,

Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,611, our review is limited

to ensuring that in explaining its decisions, FERC “examine[s]

the relevant data and articulat[es] a . . . rational connection

between the facts found and the choice made.” Midwest ISO

Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (citations omitted). Our review is particularly deferential

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 9 of 14
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when a challenge “relates to the fashioning of remedies” where

“[a]gency discretion is often at its zenith . . . .” Towns of

Concord, Norwood, & Wellesley Mass. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 67,

76 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 

B.

Petitioners’ specific contention that FERC abused its

discretion in not ordering rebilling under TEP fails for both

procedural and substantive reasons. Petitioners dispute FERC’s

framing of the NYISO’s initial decision not to invoke TEP.

They also maintain that FERC’s refusal to invoke TEP

conflicted with policies enunciated in prior FERC orders. Thus,

according to Petitioners, FERC did not “enforce the TEP

provisions consistent with their intended purpose,” Petrs. Br. at

23, and “FERC’s failure to enforce the TEP provisions is

directly at odds with its own findings.” Id. at 24. Relatedly,

Petitioners contend that the court in Con Edison held that “the

failure to include [B-G] as a facility to provide operating

reserves” was a market design flaw. Id. at 26. They suggest,

then, that the exclusion of B-G meets FERC’s definition of a

market design flaw, maintain that any software flaw excluding

B-G was equivalent to a market design flaw, and conclude that

B-G’s exclusion from the market created an “independent

obligation” for FERC to invoke the TEP mechanism, id. at 27.

Based on their assertion that a market design flaw was present,

Petitioners conclude that FERC was obligated to invoke TEP to

order refunds whether or not the NYISO chose to do so, and that

these refunds can be calculated with reasonable certainty, noting

that a just and reasonable rate encompasses a range of options

and that FERC did not explain why the prospective bid cap it

had established in March 2000 was not a suitable rate. 

Petitioners’ challenges to FERC’s framing of the NYISO’s

initial decision not to invoke TEP are not appropriately

developed in their brief and thus not properly before the court.

USCA Case #06-1027 Document #1086980 Filed: 12/18/2007 Page 10 of 14
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Their suggestion that the NYISO did not recognize that TEP

could be applied is limited to a single sentence in their opening

brief. Petrs. Br. at 23. “It is not enough merely to mention a

possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to

do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put

flesh on its bones.” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Moreover, Petitioners’ contention that the

NYISO did not make an initial decision against deploying TEP,

contrary to FERC’s finding, see, e.g., Remand Order, 110

F.E.R.C. at 62,006, is raised only in their Reply Brief, compare

Petrs. Br. at 23 with Reply Br. at 8-10, and is thus waived. “We

require petitioners and appellants to raise all of their arguments

in the opening brief . . . .” Corson & Gruman Co. v. NLRB, 899

F.2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

As regards Petitioners’ contention that FERC acted

inconsistently with its precedent in not invoking TEP, it is true

that FERC had previously noted the availability of TEP and its

potential utility in addressing market problems. See, e.g., TEP

Order, 88 FERC at 61,754. However, acknowledging the

existence and utility of a remedial tool is not equivalent to

requiring its use in a specific circumstance. On remand FERC

explained that under its tariff, the NYISO has discretion to

choose whether or not to invoke TEP. Remand Order, 110

F.E.R.C. at 62,005-06. Although, as Petitioners note, FERC had

acknowledged market failures in early 2000, see, e.g., Waiver

Order, 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,798, Petitioners are not able to show

why this acknowledgment requires FERC to invoke TEP.

Additionally, the fact that FERC approved prospective filings by

the NYISO to change aspects of the reserves market in response

to the market irregularities of early 2000 does not mean that it

is also required to order retroactive relief through TEP.

Concluding otherwise would, as the NYISO has previously

noted, open the gates to retroactive changes in tariffs any time

the power markets’ rules were adjusted. See Remand Order,

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110 F.E.R.C. at 62,006 (quoting Motion of the NYISO to

Reopen Record, June 25, 2004 at 12); Conn. Valley Elec. Co.,

208 F.3d at 1044.

Petitioners fail to show that FERC’s explanation concerning

B-G is arbitrary and capricious. First, Petitioners

mischaracterize Con Edison’s holding regarding B-G’s

exclusion from the reserves market. The court rejected FERC’s

narrow interpretation of TEP’s scope, but it did not hold that BG’s exclusion was a “market design flaw,” as Petitioners

inaccurately claim. Compare Petrs. Br. at 26, with Con Edison,

347 F.3d at 971-72. To the extent Petitioners suggest that the

exclusion of B-G from the reserve market was similar to the

“possible indication[] of Market Design Flaws” discussed in

FERC’s orders – “the dispatch of higher priced resources . . .

when . . . lower-priced bids are available and not selected . . .

and there is no valid reason for not operating the lower-priced

resource,” Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at 62,006 (emphasis

omitted); see also Petrs. Br. at 25-26 – FERC explained that

software controlling the reserves market was deliberately

modeled to exclude B-G because its owners did not wish to

participate in the reserve market, Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C.

at 62,007; Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,613. Although

Petitioners dismiss this choice as “irrelevant,” Petrs. Br. at 26,

B-G owners’ preferences are a rational reason for not modeling

reserve market software to purchase this potentially lowerpriced resource. Petitioners’ reference in their Reply Brief to

another indicator of market design flaws, Petrs. Reply Br. at 12-

13, is not properly before the court, Corson & Gruman Co., 899

F.2d at 50 n.4, and therefore we do not address it. 

Second, although FERC’s ultimate decision that B-G should

be added to the reserve pool used phrases such as “software

flaws” and “other market flaws” to describe the state of affairs

in early 2000, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 97 F.E.R.C. ¶

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61,155, 61,680-81, this does not indicate that the initial

exclusion of B-G from the software controlling reserve market

bids was invalid and rose to the level of a market design flaw.

Similarly, the NYISO’s assertion in 2000 that it “does not

disagree that [B-G’s exclusion from the reserves market] could

be characterized as a market design flaw,” Answer of New York

Independent System Operator, Inc. at 6, to Complaint, Motion

to Consolidate and Request for Fast Track Complaint

Procedures of Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Docket

No. EL00-04-000, et al. (Apr. 20, 2000), lacks both the authority

and conclusiveness necessary to render FERC’s explanation

regarding B-G arbitrary or capricious. The exclusion of B-G

from the reserves market may have been unwise in retrospect,

but FERC’s explanation for why it was not a market design flaw

is due deference.

Because FERC on remand provided reasoned explanations,

that were consistent with its precedent and the early 2000 market

conditions, for not invoking TEP and for why the exclusion of

B-G was not a market design flaw, we need not reach the

question of whether TEP refunds could be calculated with

“reasonable certainty.” 

C.

Petitioners’ challenge to FERC’s decision on remand not to

order refunds for high SR prices also fails. Petitioners contend

that FERC did not consider all necessary factors and incorrectly

balanced the need to provide both fair prices and consistent

service by allowing SR producers to receive a “windfall,” Petrs.

Br. at 20, as a result of uncompetitive market conditions, id. at

17-18, and thus acted in a way that conflicted with the FPA’s

“core purpose of protecting customers from excessive rates,” id.

at 14. Rejecting FERC’s determination that penalizing SR

producers for alleged wrongdoing by NSR producers would be

unfair, they maintain that it is unreasonable to protect

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“enormous windfall” profits, id. at 20, enjoyed by SR producers

given the harm to consumers from paying higher prices. 

On remand, FERC considered the relevant factors,

balancing the several interests at stake, including the tariff

violation, market context, high NSR prices paid, expectations of

affected entities, various tariff provisions, and the need to

balance fair prices and system reliability, before concluding that

refunds were not appropriate. See Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C.

at 62,008-010; Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,616.

Further, FERC’s decision not to order refunds for the NYISO’s

tariff violation was not inconsistent with the FPA’s “core

purpose” for, as Petitioners acknowledge, see Petrs. Br. at 14

n.33, the FPA has multiple purposes in addition to preventing

“excessive rates,” including protecting against “inadequate

service,” Cities of Anaheim, Riverside, Banning, Colton &

Azusa, Cal. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 656, 663 (9th Cir. 1984), and

promoting the “orderly development of plentiful supplies of

electricity,” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 367 F.3d 925,

929 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). FERC reasonably

explained that the NYISO's linking of the SR and NSR pricing

was most advantageous to consumers precisely because that

linking protected the availability of higher quality SR reserves

and thus system reliability. Remand Order, 110 F.E.R.C. at

62,009-010; Rehearing Order, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,616. Because

FERC’s explanation of the need to protect the availability of

high quality SR reserves provides a reasoned basis for its

decision not to order refunds, see Towns of Concord, 955 F.2d

at 76, we need not address Petitioners’ other contentions

regarding refunds. 

Accordingly, we deny the petitions.

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