Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02708/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02708-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James A. Pettaway
Petitioner
David L. Runnels
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES A. PETTAWAY,

Petitioner,

 v.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 04-2708 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner was convicted of robbery by a jury in the Superior Court of the

State of California in and for the County of Alameda. In addition, the court -

petitioner having previously waived jury trial - found true that petitioner had

suffered prior convictions for robbery and attempted murder. On February 5,

2001, petitioner was sentenced to 35 years to life in state prison.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction and

sentence, and the Supreme Court of California denied review. 

On July 8, 2004, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on October 26, 2004, the court

found that the petition, when liberally construed, stated cognizable claims under §

2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not

be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause and

petitioner has filed a traverse.

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 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Paulina Hoang was working as [] a teller at Alameda Bank in

Hayward on March 4, 1997. At approximately 2:50 p.m., [petitioner]

came up to Hoang's window and gave her a slip of paper that said:

“No alarm. No dye pack. Nobody gets hurt. Give me the money.”

[Petitioner] said nothing to Hoang when he gave her the note, but he

did smile. She made a point of looking at him so she could

remember what he looked like. He had an overbite with white teeth,

and also had a mustache. He wore a long-sleeved black T-shirt with a

circle on it and writing around the circle that said “San Leandro” and

a round cotton fishing hat. Hoang gave [petitioner] the money in her

drawer as well as “bait money,” which contained a tracking device

between two bills. She gave him approximately $1,200.

[Petitioner] then left the bank and Hoang immediately

activated the alarm and wrote down a description of [petitioner] and

the incident. She also alerted her supervisor, Joan Pine. A police

officer arrived within a couple of minutes. About 20 minutes later an

officer took Hoang to view a person being held in front of the

Hayward Library, about two blocks away. From about eight to ten

feet away, Hoang identified [petitioner] as the robber, saying she was

100 percent certain it was him. He had on a jacket and it looked like

he had turned his shirt inside out. At trial, she was still certain

[petitioner] was the robber.

On March 4, 1997, Joan Pine was operations manager for

Alameda Bank in Hayward. That day at about 2:53 p.m., teller Paulina

Hoang told Pine that she had just been robbed. Pine put a plastic

sheet over Hoang's teller window to protect evidence, and provided a

listing of the bait money and the surveillance tape when police

arrived. Laura West was a teller supervisor at the bank. She

conducted an audit of Hoang's drawer after the robbery and found

that about $2,000 was missing.

Bank customer Jose Valle stood in line behind the robber.

The man was wearing a tan fisherman's hat and a dark sweatshirt. He

saw the man approach a teller, pull out a checkbook, take out a piece

of paper, and hand it to the teller. The man leaned over the counter

and got very close to the teller. He then pulled back a bit, and raised

and lowered his shirt. The teller then handed the man something, he

grabbed it, and walked out of the bank. Based on the man's

movements, Valle believed he was robbing the bank. About 20

minutes after the robbery, Valle was taken to the Hayward library to

look at a possible suspect. Valle was certain that the man he saw was

the robber. At trial, Valle could not identify [petitioner] as the

robber. [Petitioner] looked heavier and had a beard and longer hair

than the man he remembered.

Hayward police officer Fraser Ritchie was on patrol when he

was dispatched to Alameda Bank at about 2:50 p.m. on March 4,

1997. Teller Hoang gave him a description of the robber, which

Ritchie broadcast. When he learned that a subject had been stopped,

Ritchie had Hoang and customer Jose Valle taken separately to view

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the suspect. Later, Ritchie checked the serial numbers of the United

States currency recovered from [petitioner] and found that all of the

bait money matched the serial numbers on the bait money list. Later,

in 2000, Ritchie received a property list regarding the robbery. After

doing a computer check, he found information he believed showed

that the case had been adjudicated. He therefore mistakenly marked

on the property list he had been given that the property should either

be returned to the victim or destroyed.

When Hayward police officer Jerry White heard the

broadcast of the robbery at about 2:53 p.m., he activated the radio

detection finder in his patrol car and received a directional signal for

the transmitter hidden in the bait money, which he began to follow.

The signal seemed to be coming from Library Park in Hayward,

which is about two blocks from the bank. He broadcast this

information and began to look for a man matching the suspect's

description: African-American male, approximately 27 years old,

short, with overbite, and with a black shirt on. White then saw

[petitioner] walking towards a bus stop near the library. White

detained the waiting buses; when other officers arrived, they detained

[petitioner]. An officer arrived with a hand-held radio detector, and

once they found that the transmitter was not on [petitioner], they

started searching the park. They found the transmitter by a retaining

wall at the corner of the library.

Hayward Police Detective Stan Brandon responded to a

broadcast that the tracking device was in the area of Library Park, and

saw a person fitting the robber's description standing near a bus. The

person was [petitioner], and Brandon contacted him. [Petitioner]

produced his identification and said he had come from the library.

Other officers set up a perimeter in the area and checked the buses

and nearby area for other possible suspects. Another officer, Tom

Rodriguez, pat-searched [petitioner] and found a large bundle of

folded money in one of his pockets. [Petitioner] said: “I just got paid

today. I have a check stub for the money.” [Petitioner] was also

carrying a large bag, which the officers looked into. They saw a

newspaper, a light-colored sport fishing hat, more U.S. currency

inside the hat, a bottle of shampoo, and a check stub. The check stub

was from an auto parts store and it was for less money than

[petitioner] had on him. Brandon noticed that [petitioner’s] black

shirt appeared to have white writing on the inside. He asked

[petitioner] to turn up his shirt, which revealed a white logo and

lettering on the front of the shirt.

After the officers handcuffed [petitioner], they requested that

the bank bring witnesses to the scene to view him. At about 3:03

p.m., Paulina Hoang was brought to the scene, and made a positive

identification. About 10 minutes later, Jose Valle also identified

[petitioner] as the man he had seen in the bank passing a note to

Hoang.

Hayward Police Officer Theodore Zona booked [petitioner]

after his arrest. Zona found three bundles of one-dollar bills, totaling

$25 each, inside [petitioner’s] coat, for a total of $75. Another

officer found $715 in new, crisp bills in [petitioner’s] pants pocket,

and a single older, crumpled dollar bill in another pocket.

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Crime scene technician Laura Martin collected the evidence

from the bank robbery. All of the $20 bills used as bait money during

the robbery were in [petitioner’s] possession when he was arrested.

A bank employee informed Martin that the amount of money taken

during the robbery was $1,248. In addition to the $75 and $716

found on [petitioner’s] person, Officer Rodriquez gave Martin $458

(presumably from [petitioner’s] bag). Aside from the one crumpled

dollar bill taken from one pants pocket, the total amount of currency

found in appellant's possession was $1,248.

[Petitioner] worked full-time for Speed Warehouse from

January 2, 1997, until his termination on February 26, 1997, filling

automotive part orders from the warehouse. [Petitioner] received a

$200 cash advance on February 17, 1997, and a paycheck on

February 20, 1997, for $217.72.

People v. Pettaway, No. A084426, slip op. at 2-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2003)

(footnote omitted) (Resp’t Exh. 4).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

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U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application

must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application

of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court

as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

B. Claims

Petitioner raises two claims for relief under § 2254: (1) the prosecutor’s

use of peremptory challenges against four African-American jurors violated the

Equal Protection Clause; and (2) the trial court’s for cause removal of a

prospective juror violated petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a

fair and impartial trial by jury, equal protection, and due process.

1. Peremptory Challenges

Petitioner, who is African-American, claims that the trial court erred in

finding that the prosecutor had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

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1

 In California, a party who believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges

to strike jurors on grounds of group bias alone may raise the point by way of a timely motion. 

See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280 (1978). After Batson, these motions are

sometimes referred to as “Batson/Wheeler” motions.

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exercising peremptory challenges as to four African-American jurors. He argues

that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against these four

prospective jurors deprived him of his right to equal protection under Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

The Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of jurors by peremptory

challenge solely on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Batson permits

prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges under a three-step process. 

First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has

exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97. That is, the

defendant must demonstrate that the facts and the circumstances of the case “raise

an inference” that the prosecution has excluded venire members from the petit jury

on account of their race. Id. at 96. If the defendant makes this showing, the burden

then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the

jurors in question. Id. at 97. Finally, the court must determine whether the

defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98. 

To fulfill its duty, the court must evaluate the prosecutor’s proffered reasons and

determine whether there was intentional discrimination. Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d

824, 831 (9th Cir. 2003).

The record shows that the prosecutor exercised several peremptory

challenges. At issue in this case are the prosecutor’s challenges to four

prospective African-American jurors – Naomi B., Joan F., Beverly L., and

Lawrence B. Petitioner made a “Batson/Wheeler”

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 motion after the prosecutor

exercised a peremptory challenge to Naomi B. Although the trial court did not find

that the petitioner had made a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecutor

stated her reasons for the peremptory challenge at that time. In addition, after the

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petitioner’s second and third “Batson/Wheeler” motions, the court did find that a

prima facie case had been made with respect to race. The court then called upon

the prosecution to offer an explanation for the exercise of the challenges. After

the prosecutor stated her reasons for excusing both Naomi B. and Joan F., the court

denied petitioner’s motion. The petitioner also made “Batson/Wheeler” motions

after the prosecution’s peremptory challenges of Beverly L. and Lawrence B. In

each case, the court denied petitioner’s motion after the prosecutor stated her

reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges.

As he unsuccessfully did on appeal, petitioner now challenges the

prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges as to these four jurors.

a. Joan F.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the juror’s voir dire and the

prosecutor’s reasons for excusing this juror as follows:

Joan F. is a deeply religious woman, whose husband is a

minister with both a church ministry and a prison ministry. Joan F. is

very active in her church, and she and her husband show love and

kindness to other people every day. Until recently, a Christian

“brother” had been staying with Joan F. and her husband while he

went through rehabilitation for cocaine addiction. When the

prosecutor asked why she left blank the question in the jury

questionnaire regarding whether she has any religious or other

beliefs that would make it difficult to sit in judgment of another

person, Joan F. responded that she “was going to come back and

answer that. I had to think about that. But, no, I don’t, it’s all right.”

When asked why she previously had wanted to become a

correctional officer, as she had stated in her questionnaire, Joan F.

responded: “Oh, well, I’m a people person, whether people are good

or bad, I just--the thought of me being who I am and they’re

incarcerated and just everybody that is locked up is not, I don’t

believe is guilty, okay, but they’re still people and still humans and

you know.” Joan F. said that she would be able to follow the law and

vote guilty if the prosecutor proved the case against [petitioner]

beyond a reasonable doubt.

When later asked to give her reasons for challenging Joan F.,

the prosecutor stated: “She was the woman who is very, very involved

in her church group and I--and her husband had the prison ministry

and she explained--I wish we would have put this on the record right

after she talked but I think the record will speak for itself when

reviewed on appeal.

“She had a very forgiving attitude toward people. She

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described herself as a people person. She had just taken someone

into her house from her church that she was ministering to and I felt

that she was--her life in her church and her husband’s--I think her

husband didn’t want her to be a correctional officer.

“Anyway, I did not feel that she would be someone when push

came to shove and it came time to make a decision to convict, she

definitely would not be comfortable doing that because her whole

life is dedicated to her religious beliefs and her husband is involved

in the prison ministry so that fact alone is enough for me to doubt

whether she might ultimately be able to convict and particularly

convict an African-American, because that seems to be the focus of

her prison ministry or the ministry that she is involved in.”

People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 8-9. The trial court then accepted the prosecutor’s

explanation as legitimate and denied the defendant’s motion.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s Batson claim as to

juror Joan F. on the ground that there was substantial evidence to support the trial

court’s ruling that the prosecutor challenged the juror for race-neutral reasons. 

Although the court noted that the prosecutor’s “gratuitous” comment about Joan

F.’s possible inability to convict an African-American defendant was “unjustified

and inappropriate,” it proceeded to conduct a “mixed motive” analysis and

concluded that the “prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing Joan F. . . . were

plausible and supported by the record, and not merely a surrogate for racial

stereotypes.” People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 9. The court acknowledged that the

prosecutor’s gratuitous comment “suggests that there could have been a racial

aspect to the prosecutor’s attitude toward her,” but discounted this possibility on

the grounds that Joan F. showed an uncertainty about sitting in judgment of others,

stated a belief that people in prisons are not guilty, and took into her home a man

trying to recover from cocaine addiction. Id. at 10. Because the prosecutor’s

stated reasons for the challenge demonstrated that she wanted to excuse Joan F. for

race-neutral reasons, the court concluded that a racial reason was not “a meaningful

factor in the prosecutor’s decision to exclude Joan F.” Id.

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The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the court’s

conclusion an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The

prosecutor’s expressed concerns about the hesitancy of a person active in church

and closely tied to a prisoner ministry to sit in judgment are a legitimate raceneutral justification for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. See United States

v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 669-70 (2nd Cir. 2003). Furthermore, when a prosecutor

tenders both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons for challenging a venire

member, as was the case here, a state court’s undertaking of an analysis of both the

discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge, i.e., a “mixed

motive” analysis, is not contrary to or a clear misapplication of Batson. See

Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1993) (“dual motivation” analysis

applies to a Batson challenge); See also Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 232-35

(3d Cir. 2002) (upholding mixed motive analysis of Delaware state court); United

States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1531-34 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding district

court’s mixed motive analysis on direct appeal); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d

1507, 1530-32 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding mixed motive analysis on direct

appeal). In the present case, the state court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was

motivated by race-neutral reasons is reasonable and supported by the record. The

records shows that Joan F. exhibited hesitancy about sitting in judgment of others,

stated a belief that people in prisons are not always guilty, and that she was very

forgiving as evidenced by the fact that she took into her home a man trying to

recover from cocaine addiction.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

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2 Supreme Court precedent does not require courts to engage in comparative juror

analysis for the first time on appeal. Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.

2004). However, “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies

just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence

tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El

v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at 2325 ( 2005). Therefore, this court will consider petitioner’s jury

comparison as evidence in determining whether petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

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(“AEDPA”), a state court’s findings on the issue of discriminatory intent are

presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 ( 2005) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The petitioner must show the state court’s conclusion to

be “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

Petitioner’s evidence does not overcome the presumption of correctness. 

Petitioner offers a jury comparison as evidence that the prosecutor’s challenge of

Joan F. was racially motivated.2 Petitioner compares Joan F. to Juror Number 3

and Juror Number 4. Petitioner asserts that Juror Number 3 was an equally 

religious white woman who was involved in her church. Juror Number 4 was

another white woman involved in her church, had a daughter who was a minister and

a son who wanted to be a missionary, and who had been visiting a friend in prison.

Petitioner’s jury comparison does not present sufficient evidence to

overcome the presumption of correctness. Although the other jurors were

involved in church and Juror Number 4 visited a prisoner, there is no evidence that

these jurors were closely tied to a prisoner ministry or were so forgiving as to

have invited a person with a cocaine addiction into their home. Nor is there

evidence that either Juror Number 3 or Juror Number 4 left blank the question in

the jury questionnaire regarding whether they had any religious or other beliefs that

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would make it difficult to sit in judgment of another person, or stated during voir

dire that they did not believe that everybody that is locked up is guilty. There are

valid non-discriminatory reasons why the prosecutor would choose to strike Joan

F. and not Juror Number 3 or Juror Number 4.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. The court is

satisfied that the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the prosecutor

was genuinely motivated by race neutral reasons she articulated for striking Joan F.

was not objectively unreasonable. Furthermore, a comparative analysis does not

significantly undermine the reasonableness of the prosecutor’s proffered

justifications, such that it calls into question the genuineness of her motive. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

b. Naomi B.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the juror’s voir dire and the

prosecutor’s reasons for excusing this juror as follows:

Naomi B. works waiting on customers at a K.F.C. restaurant.

She has a fifth grade education. She likes to read and write. She

writes letters or after she reads a book, “I’ll just write some of the

things out.” When asked what kind of books she reads, she answered:

“Just any book.” When defense counsel again asked: “Well, what

kind, mysteries?” Naomi B. said: “Not mysteries, just regular books,

any book, I can just pick up and--“

Although the trial court initially did not find a prima facie

case with respect to Naomi B., the prosecutor gave the following

reasons for challenging her: “The primary reason for bumping her as

I’m sure is obvious to everyone is that she is essentially illiterate.

And she may say she enjoys reading and writing, however, the manner

in which she filled out the questionnaire seems to weigh against that.

She left almost every question unanswered and, even the questions

she answered, she didn’t answer fully. She didn’t put where she works

and it took a little while for her to explain where she works.

“I believe that in a case--well, any criminal case in which I

have been involved and I have been a juror on two cases, I believe it’s

very important for the jurors to be able to read the jury instructions

for themselves in the jury room. And it’s been my personal

experience as a juror twice on criminal cases in San Francisco, that

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the jurors did read the jury instructions again to themselves in the

jury room and I would want each and every juror to have at least a

minimal level of reading comprehension to be able to do that.

“I don’t think that Ms. B[.] evidenced that. And one of the final

reasons is that when we were asking her the questions orally to try

and get a little more information out of her, that is myself and also

when Ms. Browne [defense counsel] spoke with her, she looked

down and really didn’t look up and meet our questioning with eye

contact.

“And it was for those reasons that made me uncomfortable

leaving her on the jury.”

People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 11-12. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s

explanation as legitimate and denied the defendant’s motion.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s Batson claim as to

juror Naomi B. The court examined Naomi B.’s juror questionnaire and noted that

she had left several questions blank. In addition, the court stated that the record of

voir dire plainly indicated that both the trial court and counsel had trouble getting

Naomi B. to fully answer their questions. As an example, the court noted that the

trial court had to ask three follow-up questions before determining that Naomi B.

worked at a K.F.C. restaurant. Finally, the court noted that defense counsel could

not get Naomi B. to explain what kind of books she read. The court concluded:

The record thus shows that the prosecutor was not unreasonable in

expressing concern about Naomi B.’s literacy and ability to fully

follow the proceedings. This, coupled with the prosecutor’s

observations that Naomi B. failed to look up or make eye contact

during questioning by both attorneys, rebuts any showing of

purposeful discrimination.

People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 12-13.

The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the court’s

conclusion an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A prosecutor’s

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concern for a juror’s ability to understand and follow the proceedings is a proper

basis for a challenge. See People v. Turner, 8 Cal. 4th 137, 169 (1994). In the

present case, the state court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was motivated by

race-neutral reasons is reasonable and supported by the record. The record shows

that Naomi B. left several questions in her juror questionnaire blank, had trouble

fully answering questions, and could not explain what kind of books she read. The

record also shows that during further questioning Naomi B. looked down and

avoided eye contact.

Petitioner offers a jury comparison as evidence that the prosecutor’s

challenge of Naomi B. was racially motivated. Petitioner asserts that Naomi B.’s

juror questionnaire was no less complete than that of Juror Number 5. But

regardless of whether Juror Number 5 also checked “yes” or “no” to virtually every

question as petitioner asserts, there is no evidence that Juror Number 5 had

difficulty communicating during jury voir dire. Nor is there evidence that the trial

court needed to ask Juror Number 5 multiple follow-up questions before

determining Juror Number 5’s place of work, or that Juror Number 5 was not able

to answer a simple question about what kind of books he or she read--or some

other similar simple question. There are valid non-discriminatory reasons why the

prosecutor would choose to strike Naomi B. and not Juror Number 5.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. The court is

satisfied that the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the prosecutor

was genuinely motivated by race neutral reasons she articulated for striking Naomi

B. was not objectively unreasonable. Furthermore, a comparative analysis does not

significantly undermine the reasonableness of the prosecutor’s proffered

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justifications, such that it calls into question the genuineness of her motive. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

c. Beverly L.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the juror’s voir dire and the

prosecutor’s reasons for excusing this juror as follows:

Beverly L. is actively involved in her church. Her father is a

pastor, though she does not attend his church, and she reads the Bible

in her spare time. When the prosecutor asked if she felt that her

involvement gives her more of a forgiving attitude toward other

people, she answered: “That is what we’re taught but yet still we’re

humans and we have [to] make judgments based upon what we know

is the right thing.” She answered in the negative when the prosecutor

asked whether, if the prosecution proved its case beyond a

reasonable doubt and according to the judge’s instructions, “would

there be any hesitancy on your part to be able to vote guilty?”

However, when the prosecutor observed that she had paused before

saying “no,” Beverly L. responded: “Well, I don’t make hasty

decisions, plus I’m nervous, so I want to be able to say the right

thing.”

Beverly L. had been married for five years to a man who was

arrested three times during their marriage, once for drugs, and twice

for violating probation. She left him after the third arrest. She never

knew all of the details of the arrests, even though she went to his

court appearances and talked to his lawyer. She still asks herself

why: “Why didn’t I see the signs? Why didn’t I try to get more

information? Maybe I didn’t get more information because I was

afraid that more things would be uncovered. The less I knew, the

better I could deal with it.

When asked to give her reasons for challenging Beverly L.,

the prosecutor stated: “As the court knows, based on my questions of

any juror who feels they are heavily involved with church or have a

background in psychology or elementary school teachers or

preschool teachers, I am very worried about people who might show

too forgiving an attitude and might hold me to a higher burden of

proof.

“And, throughout Ms. L[.’s] questionnaire, she showed that

she had an involvement with her church and, more importantly, it was

her questioning about her forgiving her husband and I think some

level of denial. But she has, I believe, a high ability to rationalize,

deny and forgive.

“And, for that reason, I didn’t want to get to the end of a fourweek trial and have her be indecisive. She was a quiet, mildmannered-type person. So that was a reason for excusing her.”

Defense counsel responded: “There is nothing further from

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the truth that Ms. L [.] was a quiet, mild person. Ms. L[.] got into my

face when I asked her whether she was attending her father’s church.

She made it quite clear that she walked out on her husband after he

was involved in drugs and two probation violations. And she made it

quite clear that she didn’t have a clue why she had bothered to go see

him in San Bruno [jail] the one time that she did.

“So the district attorney can put on the record what she wants

to say. She was mild-mannered or to say she was forgiving. But the

record makes it very, very clear that there was a very judgmental,

very strong person who took no grief from anyone and who was

demanding that people be responsible for their behavior. She

exercised that against her husband. She doesn’t attend her father’s

church, even though she is strongly religious, even though it’s the

same denomination, even though it’s local.”

The prosecutor then responded: “Her forgiveness of this

husband occurred over a five-year period. He was arrested three

different times, yet she remained ignorant of the details of those

arrests and she explained that even when she went and talked to the

public defender, she still didn’t understand the reasons for those

arrests.”

People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 13-15 (footnote omitted). The trial court denied the

defendant’s motion stating “[t]he rationale stated by the district attorney satisfied

the court that they were non-racially made.” Id. at 15.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s Batson claim as to

juror Beverly L. on the grounds that the record supported the prosecutor’s nondiscriminatory reasons for challenging Beverly L. The court noted that Beverly L.

acknowledged a high degree of church involvement, and that the prosecutor’s

concern that Beverly L. showed a “high ability to rationalize, deny, and forgive”

with regard to her ex-husband arrests was supported by the record. Beverly L.

knew little about the nature of the arrests or their outcomes, and even admitted to

being in denial about his problems. The court concluded that “the prosecutor thus

provided valid, race-neutral reasons for challenging Beverly L.” Pettaway, slip op.

at 15.

The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, or an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the court’s

conclusion an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The

prosecutor’s expressed concerns about a juror being too forgiving or unable to sit

in judgment are legitimate race-neutral justifications for a prosecutor’s exercise

of a peremptory challenge. See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 669-70 (2nd

Cir. 2003). In the present case, the state court’s conclusion that the prosecutor

was motivated by race-neutral reasons is reasonable and supported by the record. 

The record shows that Beverly L. acknowledged a high degree of church

involvement, showed a “high ability to rationalize, deny, and forgive” with regard to

her ex-husband arrests, and even admitted to being in denial about her ex-husband’s

problems.

Petitioner offers a jury comparison as evidence that the prosecutor’s

challenge of Beverly L. was racially motivated. Petitioner compares Beverly L. to

Juror Number 3 and Juror Number 4. Petitioner asserts that Juror Number 3 and

Juror Number 4 were similarly situated but received disparate treatment as

compared to Beverly L. Petitioner’s jury comparison does not present sufficient

evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness. Although both Juror

Number 3 and Juror Number 4 were involved in church, there is no evidence that

these jurors lived with anyone over a five-year period who was arrested multiple

times without becoming aware of the nature of the arrests or their outcomes. Nor

is there evidence that either Juror Number 3 or Juror Number 4 displayed in their

personal background the same ability to “rationalize, deny, and forgive” that

Beverly L. displayed, or that either Juror Number 3 or Juror Number 4 hesitated

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when asked if they would be able to vote guilty. There are valid non-discriminatory

reasons why the prosecutor would choose to strike Beverly L. and not Juror

Number 3 or Juror Number 4.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. The court is

satisfied that the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the prosecutor

was genuinely motivated by race neutral reasons she articulated for striking

Beverly L. was not objectively unreasonable. Furthermore, a comparative analysis

does not significantly undermine the reasonableness of the prosecutor’s proffered

justifications, such that it calls into question the genuineness of her motive. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

d. Lawrence B.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the juror’s voir dire and the

prosecutor’s reasons for excusing this juror as follows:

Lawrence B. is 25 years old, having graduated from college in

1999. He is a management trainee at a car rental agency. His father is

the city manager of Oakland. He has had both positive and negative

experiences with police officers, and wrote on his questionnaire, in

explaining his affirmative response to the question whether he had

ever been discriminated against because of race: “I don’t want to

seem like a martyr, but honestly there are too many to name.” He

explained on voir dire that the discrimination mostly involved

profiling, usually being followed around in his car and once being

pulled over. Lawrence B. did not believe his experiences would

affect his ability to be fair.

When asked to give her reasons for challenging Lawrence B.,

the prosecutor said: “[A]fter Ms. Browne [defense counsel] wanted

Mr. W[.] excused for cause and that was granted, I had to look for

someone who I might consider to be a wise leader, so I have

exercised many challenges to get to people deeper in the panel who

could really fill Mr. W[.’s] shoes on the jury. And, as part of that

effort, I wanted to get rid of the 20-year-olds and we have

successfully done that now. I don’t believe there are any other--no,

we have a more mature, more sophisticated jury group sitting. Mr.

B[.] was one of the last young people.

“There were several things. The most important thing I’ll get

to last.

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“But Mr. B[.] has not smiled really much since he has been

seated. He has been very stiff. He answered both counsel’s questions

very stiffly and in situations where everybody else has either laughed

or smiled, where something [humorous] has gone over the last day

and a half, end even if it’s Ms. Browne making a joke and everyone

laughs, he still does not smile and has remained very stiff.

“But the most important thing is the deputy who came in--so I

have been watching him as well as the other jurors to see how well

they start interacting and that never started happening with him.

“The final two factors and most important one to my mind is

the deputy sheriff who was in here yesterday came up to me and

indicated, pointed to Mr. B[.] and said that guy was just downstairs

and had a real attitude coming through the metal detector. He does

not like law enforcement and here he is sitting on your jury. So you

have to take that into account.

“And, finally, the fact that he is the son of a prominent person

is something that I keep in the back of my mind. I sat as a juror as I

said twice before in San Francisco and one of my experiences there

was that the daughter of Dianne Feinstein was on the same panel that

I was on and I believe that was in 1991. And when that was pointed

out to everybody, and I’m not saying that had started to happen in this

case, but when ... it was brought to everyone’s attention, they treated

her with a lot more deference and it sort of made her stand out to the

other people.

“And I don’t like media in the courtroom, I don’t like anything

that makes a particular witness or a juror an unusual person. I want a

cohesive jury and a smooth presentation.

“So for all of those combined factors, but most specially,

what the deputy told me about the attitude at the metal detector,

which is something we would never see in the courtroom exactly, I

exercise that challenge.”

People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 15-17 (footnote omitted). The trial court denied the

defendant’s motion stating “once again, I sort of will stretch my discretion but I

think it is sufficient reason to deny the Wheeler motion.” Id. at 17.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s Batson claim as to

juror Lawrence B. The court did not consider the deputy sheriff’s comment about

Lawrence B.’s attitude because it is vague and it occurred outside the courtroom

where neither counsel nor the court could see it. However, the court did note that

Lawrence B. was 25 years old, had graduated from college a year previously, was in

a management training program, and “clearly had had only limited life experiences

at that point, and the fact that he was no longer in college does not, as [petitioner]

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argues, prove that the prosecutor’s reason was pretextual.” Pettaway, slip op. at 18. 

The court further noted that neither the trial court nor defense counsel

contradicted the prosecutor’s characterization of Lawrence B.’s body language. 

The court concluded that “these observations by the prosecutor constituted a valid

reason for a peremptory challenge, and [petitioner] has not shown that this reason

was pretextual.” Id. (The court also noted that Lawrence B.’s father was “a local

public figure whose name appears regularly in the media.” Id.)

The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. Nor was the court’s

conclusion an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Young people

are not a cognizable group for Batson/Wheeler purposes. See People v.

Henderson, 225 Cal.App.3d 1129, 1153 (1990). A prosecutor’s concern about

having young people lacking life experience on a jury is a legitimate, non-racial

justification for using peremptory challenges. See United States v. Pichay, 986

F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner argues that youth must be tied to a lack of

experience in the world. However, the record shows that Lawrence B. “clearly had

had only limited life experiences at that point.” Likewise, the prosecutor’s

concern regarding Lawrence B.’s body language is a valid reason for using a

challenge. See Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Turner, 8

Cal. 4th 137, 171 (1994). Petitioner argues that resort to “body language” is a

“safe haven” to justify a discriminatory peremptory challenge because the appellate

court is helpless to evaluate the claim on a cold record. However, neither the trial

court nor defense counsel contradicted the prosecutor’s characterization of

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Lawrence B.’s body language. Finally, petitioner argues that Lawrence B.’s

“celebrity-by-proxy is a makeweight excuse.” However, the record indicates that

Lawrence B.’s father was a local figure whose name appeared regularly in the

media. The state court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was motivated by raceneutral reasons is reasonable and supported by the record.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. The court is

satisfied that the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the prosecutor

was genuinely motivated by race neutral reasons she articulated for striking

Lawrence B. was not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

2. For Cause Challenge

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s for cause removal of a prospective

juror violated petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and

impartial trial by jury composed of representatives of a fair cross-section of the

community, equal protection, and due process. Petitioner bases this claim on an

assertion that the trial court improperly granted the prosecutor’s challenge for

cause to a prospective juror who failed to disclose prior criminal history on his

questionnaire and in his voir dire.

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right stemming from the Sixth

Amendment to a fair and impartial jury pool composed of a cross section of the

community. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476 (1990); Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-58

(1968). The fair cross-section requirement applies only to the larger jury pool or

venire and is not applicable to petit juries. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,

173-74 (1986); Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). Although

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the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury will be selected from a pool of

names representing a cross-section of the community, it does not require that petit

juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various

distinctive groups in the population. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538; Lockhart, 476

U.S. at 173; see also Harris v. Pulley, 852 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (fair crosssection requirement does not apply to petit juries). 

In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), the Supreme Court held that to

establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant

must show that (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the

community, (2) the group was not fairly represented in the venire from which the

petit jury was chosen, and (3) the underrepresentation resulted from a systematic

exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.

In the present case, petitioner has provided no evidence whatsoever showing

that African Americans were not fairly represented in the venire from which the

petit jury was chosen. Nor does the record show any violation of petitioner’s due

process or equal protection rights.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim on the grounds

that the trial court’s decision to excuse James B. for cause based on juror

concealment was supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion. 

Specifically, the court reasoned:

“The qualification of a juror challenged for cause is a matter

within the discretion of the trial court and is seldom a ground for

reversal on appeal.” (People v. Morris, (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 183.) 

When a prospective juror withholds information regarding his or her

criminal history, a trial court is justified in excusing the juror for

cause. In People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pages 183-184, our

Supreme Court found a prospective juror’s excusal for cause

warranted, explaining: “In view of [the prospective juror’s] rap sheet,

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his responses to questions about his arrest record were lacking in

candor and completeness. Concealment by a potential juror

constitutes implied bias justifying disqualification.”

Here, the trial court’s decision to excuse James B. for cause

was based on the following. First, James B. failed to mention several

police contacts and arrests (detained and handcuffed 6 or 7 times,

arrested and jailed for robbery, and arrested for a second DUI), and

at least one conviction (§ 12500--driving without a license), on his

questionnaire. Second, during voir dire, he acknowledged the

detentions and the robbery arrest, but did not acknowledge a second

DUI arrest and claimed he did not remember being convicted of

driving without a license. The trial court found that the various

omissions on the questionnaire and especially the acknowledgement

on voir dire of only two of at least four arrests were not negligent

omissions.

[Petitioner] avers that the prosecutor did not “prove” that James

B. had a second DUI arrest. However, in light of the prosecutor’s and

trial court’s discussion of that arrest showing up on his rap sheet and

defense counsel’s failure to dispute its presence there, [petitioner’s]

claim is not persuasive. [Petitioner] also argues that James B. may have

considered the section 12500 violation a minor traffic citation rather

than an arrest and conviction and that he may not have believed he was

arrested for a DUI “due to the bogus nature of the arrest.” This

speculation on [petitioner’s] part does not undermine the trial court’s

reasonable conclusions that James B. was not being forthright about his

criminal history.

The trial court’s decision to excuse James B. for cause is

supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion. (See

People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 183.)

People v. Pettaway, slip op. at 22-23.

“Concealment by a potential juror constitutes implied bias justifying

disqualification.” People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 183-84 (1991). A state

trial court’s determination of the partiality of a prospective juror is a question

of fact that is entitled to a presumption of correctness in a federal habeas

proceeding. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-38. (1984). In the present

case, the record supports the trial court’s finding of concealment. James B.

reported on his questionnaire that he had been accused of a crime once. In

addition, when asked about his times in a courtroom, he only reported on his

questionnaire that he had been to court for traffic citations. In light of his

multiple arrests, his conviction for violating California Vehicle Code § 12500,

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and his being detained and handcuffed by police several 6 or 7 times, James B.

was clearly not being forthcoming in his questionnaire. Furthermore, when

asked about visiting jail or being incarcerated, James B. responded in his

questionnaire that he spent a night in Santa Rita for a DUI/Suspended license. 

However, during voir dire James B. revealed that he was arrested for robbery

and spent 3 to 4 days in jail. James B. never acknowledged in his questionnaire

or during jury voir dire a second DUI arrest and the Vehicle Code § 12500

conviction. The trial court concluded that a challenge for cause was appropriate

because of concealment by the juror. The court felt the omitted information

involved “things that people would not forget.” The state court’s conclusion

was not objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Petitioner has not provided evidence

to overcome the presumption of correctness entitled to the state trial court’s

determination. And in any event, the claim is without merit. Even if petitioner

were to demonstrate that it was error for the trial court to remove the juror for

cause, he must also show prejudice. See People v. Mickey, 54 Cal.3d 612, 684

(1991) (“an erroneous ruling on a ‘for cause’ challenge is not automatically

reversible but subject to scrutiny for prejudice under harmless-error analysis”). 

He does not. Petitioner simply asserts that not removing James B. for cause

would have caused the prosecutor to use peremptory challenges on James B.

and, then, petitioner would have been able to challenge the use of that

peremptory challenge with a “Batson/Wheeler” motion. Such pure speculation

cannot suffice.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED.

///

///

///

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The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 01, 2005 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge 

G:\CRBALL\2004\2708\Order.wpd

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