Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02385/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02385-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick David Quick
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2385

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

Patrick David Quick, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 15, 2005

Filed: November 22, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Patrick David Quick guilty of twelve counts of mail fraud and one

count of engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property. The

district court*

 sentenced Quick to forty-six months in prison. 

On appeal, Quick challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. “Mail fraud is

use of the mails to execute a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud.’” United States v.

Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341). “‘The

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essence of a scheme to defraud is an intent to harm the victim.’” Id. at 754 (quoting

United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996)). Quick argues the evidence

merely showed a failed business plan and did not establish that he intended to defraud

the victims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,

however, we conclude a reasonable jury could find Quick’s intent to defraud beyond

a reasonable doubt. See id. at 753. Fraudulent intent may be inferred from a series

of acts and relevant circumstances. United States v. Snelling, 862 F.2d 150, 154 (8th

Cir. 1988). The evidence at trial showed Quick made false statements to several

customers of his rare coin and gold business over a period of many months, and based

on Quick’s knowing misrepresentations, the customers entrusted him with money and

precious metals that he used for purposes other than he had represented. The evidence

also showed Quick created false and misleading documents and lied to cover up his

diversion of his customers’ funds. Further, the jury could properly infer Quick’s guilt

from its disbelief of his denials during his trial testimony, given the other

corroborative evidence. United States v. Reed, 297 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Quick also contends there was a fatal variance between the crimes charged in

the indictment and the theory of the case put forth in the Government’s rebuttal

closing argument. A fatal variance occurs when the essential elements of the offense

set forth in the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence presented at trial proves

facts that are materially different from those alleged in the indictment. United States

v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 928 (8th Cir. 1999). Here, the jury received instructions about

the elements of each charge and a copy of the indictment, and was asked only to

decide Quick’s guilt with respect to the charges stated in the indictment. Consistent

with the indictment and the Government’s closing argument, the evidence at trial

showed Quick diverted his customers’ funds for his personal use. The passage in the

Government’s rebuttal closing argument relied on by Quick simply points out the

implausibility of Quick’s excuse for diverting one customer’s money.

We thus affirm the district court.

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Appellate Case: 05-2385 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/22/2005 Entry ID: 1977636