Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03753/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03753-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Lindquist
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3753

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

James Lindquist,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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Submitted: June 22, 2005

 Filed: August 31, 2005 

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Before MELLOY, HEANEY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

James Lindquist pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He appeals the district court’s finding that his illegal

possession of a firearm occurred subsequent to sustaining at least two felony

convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(2) (2003). He also appeals the district

court’s finding that he illegally possessed the firearm in connection with another

felony offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Finally, he challenges the propriety of his

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The guidelines range for a defendant such as Lindquist with a total offense

level of 25 and a criminal history category of VI is 110 to 137 months. However,

because the statutory maximum sentence for a violation of § 922(g) is 10 years, 18

U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), Lindquist’s effective guidelines range was 110 to 120 months.

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sentence based on United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). We affirm in part,

reverse in part, vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

James Lindquist pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court calculated

Lindquist’s base offense level to be 24 after it found that he had sustained at least two

prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance

offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). The first predicate conviction, which is

uncontested, was for a controlled substance offense. The second predicate conviction

was based alternatively on Lindquist’s Iowa conviction for operating a vehicle

without the owner’s consent or his Iowa conviction for third degree burglary of a

motor vehicle. Over Lindquist’s objection, the district court concluded that either of

these convictions sufficed for purposes of § 2K2.1(a).

The district court then increased Lindquist’s offense level by four levels

because he illegally possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense.

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Again over Lindquist’s objection, the district court found

that Lindquist possessed the firearm in connection with violating Iowa Code §

724.16, which prohibits acquiring ownership of a handgun without a valid annual

permit to acquire handguns. Finally, the district court reduced Lindquist’s offense

level by three levels because of his acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

With a total offense level of 25, a criminal history category of VI, and a statutory

maximum sentence of 10 years, the district court calculated a sentencing range of 110

to 120 months.1

 The district court then sentenced Lindquist to 110 months’

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imprisonment based on a mandatory application of the guidelines and announced an

alternative sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment based on its discretion after

considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). On appeal, Lindquist

challenges the district court’s categorization of operating a vehicle without the

owner’s consent and third degree burglary as crimes of violence for purposes of §

2K2.1(a)(2) and its application of the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5).

Lindquist also argues that his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.

II. DISCUSSION

The proper application of the sentencing guidelines remains the critical starting

point for the imposition of a reasonable sentence based on the factors of 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a). United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2005).

Under the first step of the Mashek two-step analysis, we continue to review a

challenge to the district court’s interpretation and application of the guidelines de

novo and its findings of facts for clear error. Id. at 1017. Our de novo review of the

application of the guidelines includes the legal question of whether a prior conviction

constitutes a crime of violence as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. United States v.

Johnson, No. 04-1839, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2005). “If the sentence was

imposed as the result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, we will remand for

resentencing as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) without reaching the

reasonableness of the resulting sentence in light of § 3553(a).” Mashek, 406 F.3d at

1017.

Lindquist first challenges the district court’s calculation of his base offense

level pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(2). A defendant sentenced under § 2K2.1 faces a base

offense level of 24 if he committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at

least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance

offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Since Lindquist has a prior controlled substance

conviction, the issue on appeal is whether a conviction for either operating a vehicle

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For purposes of § 2K2.1, a felony conviction means “a prior adult federal or

state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as

a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt n.1.

Therefore, an aggravated misdemeanor, which is punishable for a term not exceeding

two years, Iowa Code § 903.1(b)(2), qualifies as a felony conviction.

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without the owner’s consent or third degree burglary of a vehicle qualifies as a crime

of violence as defined by § 4B1.2. In light of the Court’s recent decision in Johnson,

which held that the Missouri offense of tampering with an automobile by operation

is a crime of violence, we affirm the district court’s holding that the Iowa aggravated

misdemeanor offense of operating an automobile without the owner’s consent

constitutes a crime of violence.2

 See Johnson, No. 04-1839, slip op. at 7-11.

The commentary to § 2K2.1 directs the district court to the definition of crime

of violence found in § 4B1.2. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.5. There, a prior conviction

may qualify as a crime of violence if it is an “offense under federal or state law,

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . involves conduct

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2(a)(2). The guidelines definition of “crime of violence” found in § 4B1.2 is

also viewed as interchangeable with the statutory definition of “violent felony” found

in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2003)

(“The definitions of ‘violent felony’ and ‘crime of violence’ are almost identical[.]”).

Therefore, in determining whether a defendant has committed a predicate crime of

violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a), we are bound by our case law that is related to

both crimes of violence under § 4B1.2 and violent felonies under § 924(e). See

United States v. Sprouse, 394 F.3d 578, 580 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Because the definitions

of crime of violence and violent felony are identical, the same analysis applies in

determining whether [a defendant’s] convictions fall within the conduct defined.”).

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Lindquist also argues that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment

when it found facts necessary to categorize § 714.7 as a crime of violence. We have

consistently rejected the applicability of Booker to the fact of a prior conviction, see,

e.g., United States v. Paz, 411 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2005), and to the legal

determination of whether a prior conviction may be categorized as a crime of

violence, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 411 F.3d 928, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2005).

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The Missouri offense of tampering by operation, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 569.080.1(2), is a crime of violence as defined by § 4B1.2(a)(2). Johnson, No. 04-

1839, slip op. at 7-11. A person commits the offense of tampering by operation in the

first degree if he knowingly and unlawfully operates an automobile without the

consent of the owner. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.080.1(2). “The Missouri offenses of

‘tampering by operation’ [Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.080.1(2)] and ‘automobile theft’ [Mo.

Rev. Stat. § 570.030.1] differ only with respect to the permanence of the offender’s

intent to deprive the owner of possession.” Johnson, No.04-1839, slip op. at 9-10;

see also Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002) (per curiam) (holding

that tampering by possession is the lesser included offense of automobile theft for

purposes of double jeopardy). By comparison, a person commits the Iowa offense of

operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent when he “take[s] possession or

control of . . . any self-propelled vehicle . . . without the consent of the owner of such,

but without the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof.” Iowa Code § 714.7;

see also State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973) (holding that the offense of

operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent is the lesser-included offense of

automobile theft). Though “tampering by operation” may not sound exactly like

“operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent,” the Missouri and Iowa offenses

proscribe the same conduct and contain essentially the same elements. Therefore,

because a violation of § 714.7 involves the same serious risks of physical injury

identified in Johnson and United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747, 752-53 (8th Cir.

2002), we affirm the district court’s holding that operating a vehicle without the

owner’s consent is a crime of violence as defined by § 4B1.2. Accordingly, we need

not reach the question of whether third degree burglary is a crime of violence.3

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Indeed, in both Booker and Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005), the

Supreme Court reaffirmed the ability of the sentencing court to take notice of a

defendant’s criminal history and, as a matter of law, determine whether any prior

conviction is properly categorized as a crime of violence. See United States v.

Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Lindquist also challenges the district court’s application of § 2K2.1(b)(5),

which requires a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any

firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. §

2K2.1(b)(5). He argues that his failure to obtain a valid annual permit to acquire

handguns, in violation of Iowa Code § 724.16, is an offense for “firearms possession

or trafficking” that is specifically excluded from the term “another felony offense” as

used in § 2K2.1(b)(5). See U.S.S.G. §2K2.1, cmt. n.18. We have previously

interpreted the exclusions to “another felony” narrowly, generally limiting them to

the types of offenses enumerated in the application note to § 2K2.1. United States v.

Kenney, 283 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Lloyd, 361 F.3d

197, 201 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[R]egardless of the interpretation given to the word

‘another’ in 2K2.1(b)(5), ‘firearms possession or trafficking offenses’ are

categorically removed from the set of crimes that may constitute ‘another felony

offense.’”). In the context of this appeal, an offense falls within the ambit of

“firearms trafficking” when it involves illegal commercial activity involving firearms.

United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2003) (involving the

transportation of firearms); see also United States v. English, 329 F.3d 615, 616-617

(8th Cir. 2003) (reversing imposition of § 2K2.1(b)(5) where the “other felony

offense” was the sale of firearms). If an offense is excluded from consideration under

§ 2K2.1(b)(5), we need not consider whether the firearm was possessed in connection

with the underlying conviction. See United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 406-07

(4th Cir. 2003) (determining whether § 2K2.1(b)(5) applies requires the court to

consider whether the underlying offense constitutes “another felony offense” and, if

so, whether the firearm was possessed “in connection with” the underlying offense).

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Iowa Code § 724.16A prohibits the trafficking of stolen firearms. A person

traffics in stolen firearms when he “knowingly transfers or acquires possession . . .

of a stolen firearm.” Iowa Code § 724.16A. By comparison, Lindquist violated §

724.16 by acquiring ownership in a firearm that was not stolen. See infra n.5.

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At sentencing, the district court found that Lindquist illegally possessed a

handgun in connection with the aggravated misdemeanor of acquiring the handgun

without a valid annual permit to acquire handguns. See Iowa Code § 724.16 (“[A]

person who acquires ownership of a pistol or revolver without a valid annual permit

to acquire pistols or revolvers . . . is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor.”). This is

the sort of firearms-trafficking offense that is specifically excluded from

consideration as “another felony” under § 2K2.1(b)(5). Before an Iowan can legally

acquire ownership of a handgun, he must either obtain a valid annual permit to

acquire handguns or meet one of the exceptions found in Iowa Code § 724.15(2). See

Iowa Code § 724.15(1) (“Any person who acquires ownership of any pistol or

revolver shall first obtain an annual permit.”). A valid annual permit is not necessary

for each handgun purchased, but rather is a license to purchase legally handguns in

Iowa. Iowa Code § 724.15(3); see 1977-78 Op. Atty Gen. Iowa 502. Certain groups

of individuals, such as those with a prior felony conviction, are statutorily prohibited

from acquiring a valid annual permit, § 724.15(1)(b), and, therefore, are unable

legally to acquire ownership of a handgun, § 724.16. It follows that Lindquist, a

prohibited person under § 724.15(1)(b), engaged in illegal commercial activity when

he illegally acquired ownership of a handgun, in violation of § 724.16.4

Even if we were to read § 724.16 as an offense not involving firearms

trafficking, we would still be compelled to reach the same conclusion. This is

because Lindquist’s violation of § 724.16 involved essentially the same conduct as

his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. See Lloyd, 361 F.3d at 200

(“[T]he use in § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the phrase ‘another felony offense’ – as opposed to

‘any felony offense’ – represents an attempt by the drafters of the Sentencing

Guidelines to avoid the ‘double counting’ of certain elements of criminal activity

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It is noteworthy that, under Iowa law, ownership of a firearm generally implies

constructive possession of that firearm. See Scott v. State, 666 N.W.2d 619, 2003

Iowa App. LEXIS 451, at *8, 2003 WL 21229785, at *2 (Iowa App. May 29, 2003)

(unpub.) (quoting II Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 2400.7 (1990) for the proposition

that ownership of a firearm means “dominion and control” over that firearm); State

v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137-38 (Iowa 2003) (noting that the exercise of dominion

and control over contraband is sufficient to establish constructive possession); accord

United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Constructive

possession of the firearm is established if the person has . . . control, ownership, or

dominion over the firearm itself.” (emphasis added)).

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already incorporated into the base offense level.”). As a person with a prior felony

conviction, Lindquist was statutorily prohibited from legally acquiring ownership of

the handgun. Iowa Code § 724.15(1)(b).5

 Further, Lindquist’s possession of the

illegally acquired firearm violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In other words, because of

his prior felony conviction, Lindquist could not legally acquire the handgun, §

724.16, much less legally possess the handgun, § 922(g)(1). “[I]t would be

unreasonable, and hence presumably contrary to the Commission’s intent, to allow

the ‘additional felony’ to be an offense that the defendant has to commit, in every

case, in order to commit the underlying offense.” English, 329 F.3d at 618.

Unlawfully acquiring a handgun, by whatever name it is called, is essentially

accounted for in the calculation of Lindquist’s base offense level under § 2K2.1.

Accord United States v. Szakacs, 212 F.3d 344, 350-51 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Because

almost every weapons crime could also be charged as a state law offense, [the district

court’s] reading of the guideline would lead to a routine four-level enhancement and

defeat the purpose behind the structure to the Guidelines.”). Therefore, the district

court erroneously applied the four-level enhancement in § 2K2.1(b)(5) to Lindquist’s

acquisition of ownership of a handgun without a valid annual permit to acquire

handguns. 

We need not remand the case, however, if the error in the application of the

guidelines was harmless, such as where the district court would have reached the

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same guidelines range absent the error. See United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080,

1082 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017. Unlike Hadash, where the

district court’s erroneous application of a § 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction was harmless in

light of the district court’s alternative § 5K2.0 departure to the same guidelines range,

Hadash, 408 F.3d at 1083, the error in this case has resulted in a significantly higher

sentencing range. Indeed, the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5)

erroneously produced a guidelines range of 110 to 120 months, rather than the correct

guidelines range of 70 to 87 months. After a thorough review of the record, we find

that the error was not harmless.

The district court correctly found that the Iowa offense of operating a vehicle

without the owner’s consent, in violation of Iowa Code § 724.16, is a crime of

violence for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(1). However, the district court imposed

Lindquist’s sentence as a result of an incorrect application of § 2K2.1(b)(5).

Therefore, we remand the case for resentencing based on a proper application of the

advisory guidelines. Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1015 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)

continues to require remand where the district court imposed a sentence based on an

incorrect application of the guidelines). Further, because we remand for resentencing,

we need not address Lindquist’s challenge to the district court’s application of

mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Borer, 412 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2005)

(“Because this case must be remanded for resentencing due to an incorrect application

of the guidelines, we conclude that the district court also should resentence [the

defendant] in light of Booker.”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for

resentencing consistent with this opinion and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Booker.

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HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately on the issue of whether

Lindquist’s criminal history includes two prior crimes of violence. The majority,

bound by our precedent, finds that Lindquist’s conviction for operating a motor

vehicle without the owner’s consent is a crime of violence. I restate my view that our

circuit “has far too broad a conception of what the guidelines mean by stating that

violent crimes include ‘conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another.’” United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) (Heaney, J.,

concurring) (quoting USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2)).

The district court increased Lindquist’s base offense level because he had prior

violent-crime convictions. Those Iowa state court convictions resulted from joyriding

on an all-terrain vehicle before abandoning it in a field (operating a motor vehicle

without the owner’s consent), and waiting in a car while Lindquist’s friend opened

an unlocked pickup truck door and stole its stereo (third-degree burglary). It conflicts

with the very concept of a crime of violence to include these offenses in that category.

“Certainly, the risk of physical injury exists in nearly every felony. The guidelines,

however, focus on whether the risk is a serious one, not just an abstract possibility.”

Mohr, 407 F.3d at 904; see also United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747, 755 (8th

Cir. 2002) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (“All felons fear apprehension in the midst of, and

following, their criminal conduct, and all may act recklessly when attempting to

evade capture.”).

The purpose of crimes-of-violence enhancements is to treat violent criminal

history more seriously than non-violent criminal history. It is not hard to conceive

scenarios in which non-violent felony crimes could become violent, but, in my view,

we ought not trivialize this guideline section’s purpose by expanding the category too

broadly. Here, the result is that James Lindquist’s sentence is increased substantially

because of the “violent felony” of joyriding on a recreational vehicle.

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A panel of our court recently held that a guidelines sentence “is generally

indicative of reasonableness.” United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir.

2005). I do not believe the appropriately calculated guidelines range is to be given

any more weight than any other factor laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United

States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005) (modifying the Federal Sentencing Act

to require district courts to consult the guidelines as well as the other § 3553(a)

factors). While we are not faced with the issue here, a defendant whose guidelines

sentence was increased significantly solely due to the characterization of non-violent

felonies as violent crimes could make a persuasive argument that a sentence within

the guidelines was nonetheless unreasonable in view of § 3553(a)’s other factors.

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The majority opinion remands Lindquist’s case for resentencing due to an

erroneous guidelines calculation, and I agree with that result. As the majority notes,

the district court is now presented with the opportunity to resentence Lindquist under

the advisory guidelines regime. We are not presented with the issue of whether a

guidelines sentence for Lindquist would be unreasonable.6

 With the increased

latitude Booker bestowed on a district court’s determination of the ultimate sentence,

the district court in this case should consider whether a guidelines sentence would

further the statutory sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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