Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01681/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01681-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
F&G Research, Inc.
Defendant
Primax Electronics LTD.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1 Primax contends that F&G’s responses to its jurisdictional interrogatories are

insufficient and evasive. Primax, when it did not receive timely responses to interrogatories,

made no effort to seek relief from the Court. Nor did Primax follow this Court’s procedures

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRIMAX ELECTRONICS LTD.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

F&G RESEARCH, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-01681 JSW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR LACK OF

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND

DENYING AS MOOT MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION AND MOTION

TO TRANSFER

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant F&G Research, Inc. (“F&G”). Also before the Court

are F&G’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion to transfer. In

light of the Court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, those

motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 

On July 15, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on each of the pending motions,

granted Plaintiff Primax Electronic Ltd.’s (“Primax”) request for discovery on the issue of

personal jurisdiction, and ordered supplemental briefing on that issue. The parties’

supplemental briefing now is complete, and the Court concludes that no further oral argument is

necessary as to that motion.1 See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 
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relating to discovery disputes when it received the allegedly untimely and incomplete

responses to the interrogatories, which would have been the appropriate means by which to

raise the issue of sanctions to the Court. Moreover, for the reasons set forth herein, the court

concludes that more complete responses to the interrogatories posed would not alter the

analysis. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the request for sanctions. 

2 Attached as Exhibit A to Primax’s initial opposition to the motion to dismiss.

2

Having considered the parties’ pleadings, relevant legal authority, the record in this case,

and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Primax is a Taiwanese corporation, with a principal place of business in Taiwan. 

Although Primax is not a California corporation, it has a wholly-owned subsidiary, Polaris

Electronics, Inc. in Pleasanton, California, and it does business with a number of companies

located in California, including companies within the Northern District. (See Declaration of

Brian Yang, ¶¶ 2-3).2 Primax’s customers within the United States are original equipment

manufacturers (“OEMs”). (Id., ¶ 5.) These OEMs use Primax products but sell them under

their own brand names. (Id.)

F&G is a Florida corporation. It is undisputed that F&G has no offices, telephone

numbers, assets, employees or property in California, and that F&G’s sole business is licensing

the patents in suit. 

On or about February 14, 2005, through its counsel in Florida, F&G sent a letter to

Primax in Taiwan that states that Primax is “offering for sale and selling a scrolling mouse

which may require a license under F&G’s patent(s).” (Complaint, Ex. A.) The letter further

states that “[w]e would appreciate it if you consider this an invitation to license F&G’s patents

at our standard, one-time, fully paid upon, non-refundable license ... An indication of no interest

will be interpreted by our client that you wish to continue potentially infringing activities which

may subject your company to liability for patent infringement. We therefore urge you to contact

the undersigned immediately with your comments or cease and desist from further sales of the

products in question and account to F&G for past sales.” (Id.) 
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3 Primax also points to a number of lawsuits that F&G initiated, which are or

were pending in this district and in other district courts in California. Most of those cases

initially were filed by F&G in Florida and subsequently were transferred here upon motion of

the defendants in those cases. Primax contends that F&G litigated these cases without

contesting personal jurisdiction. However, that fact is irrelevant because in ruling on a

motion to transfer, the transferring court would have to consider whether F&G could have

initiated the suit in the transferee court. Thus, it would be important to know whether the

defendants in those cases were subject to the jurisdiction of the transferee court, rather than

whether F&G, as the plaintiff, would be subject to the transferee court’s jurisdiction. See 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

Further, although Hewlett-Packard Company filed a similar declaratory relief action

in this district against F&G, that case was apparently settled before F&G was required to

respond to the complaint. Thus, that case also has no bearing on the question of whether

F&G has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Court.

4 Primax’s declaratory relief action is based on F&G’s assertion that Primax has

infringed upon its patents. As such, Federal Circuit law applies. See Silent Drive, Inc. v.

Strong Industries, Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

3

F&G has also engaged in similar conduct with other companies in California, including

Logitech, Hewlett-Packard, and Kye International.3 (See, e.g., Declaration of Debra Nye in

Support of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief Regarding Personal Jurisdiction (“Nye Decl.”), Exs. A

(Response to Interrogatory No. 2), D (Cease and Desist Letters); Supplemental Declaration of

Debra Nye (“Nye Supp. Decl.”), Ex. A.) The terms and conditions of those licenses have not

been made a part of the record. 

On April 22, 2005, Primax initiated this declaratory relief action against F&G. 

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

1. Primax bears the burden of establishing that the Court has

jurisdiction over F&G.

A defendant may move for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction prior to trial. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). A court can decide the motion on the basis of affidavits and declarations

submitted in response to the motion, or it can hold an evidentiary hearing. See Electronics for

Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003).4 Regardless of the procedure a

court chooses, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court’s jurisdiction over a defendant.

If a court determines that it will resolve a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction “based on affidavits and other written materials in the absence of an evidentiary
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5 Even if Primax contended that F&G was subject to the general jurisdiction,

the Court’s concludes that the licensing activities described do not rise to the level of

“continuous and systematic contacts” with the forum.

4

hearing, a plaintiff need only to make a prima facie showing that defendants are subject to

personal jurisdiction.” Electronics for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1349. In that situation, a court

must take uncontroverted allegations in a complaint as true and resolve factual conflicts in a

plaintiff’s favor. Id.; see also Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

2. F&G must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state.

“Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is appropriate if the relevant state’s

long arm-statute permits the assertion of jurisdiction without violating federal due process.” 3D

Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1376-1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see

also Akro, 45 F.3d 1541. California’s long arm statute is co-extensive with federal due process

requirements and, thus, the jurisdictional analyses under California law and federal due process

are the same. 3D Systems, 160 F.3d at 1377. This Court must determine whether F&G has

“minimum contacts” with this forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

The concept of minium contacts encompasses two types of jurisdiction: general and

specific. Primax relies solely on the latter to establish jurisdiction over F&G.5 Specific

jurisdiction over a defendant exists where: (1) the defendant has purposefully directed his or her

activities at residents of the forum state or the forum state itself; (2) the plaintiff’s claim arises

out of or relates to those activities; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable

and fair. See 3D Systems, 160 F.3d at 1378. 

With respect to the first prong of this test,

[i]n general, there must be “some act” by which defendants

“purposefully avail[]” themselves of the “privilege of

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking

the benefits and protections of its laws.” ... The contacts

made by defendants must therefore by their actions create a

“substantial connection” to the forum state – where

defendants have deliberately “engaged in significant

activities within a State” or have “created ‘continuing

obligations’ between [themselves] and residents of the
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forum – and “proximately result from the actions by the

defendant[s] themselves,” such that it is it is

“presumptively not unreasonable to require [defendants] to

submit to the burden of litigation in that forum as well.”

Electronics for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 475-76 (1985)).

3. Primax has not met its burden to show the Court has jurisdiction over

F&G.

The Federal Circuit has held that sending cease and desist letters which threaten

infringement litigation, without more, does not confer personal jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant. See Silent Drive, 326 F.3d at 1202, 1206. Therefore, in order to meet its burden to

show jurisdiction exists, Primax must make a prima facie showing that F&G did more than send a

letter to Primax that threatened infringement.

Primax argues it has met its burden by relying on the fact that F&G has engaged in similar

conduct with California companies and has entered into license agreements with those companies. 

Primax relies heavily on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Akro, supra, in support of this argument. 

In Akro, however, in addition to sending a cease and desist letter to the plaintiff, the defendant

entered into an exclusive license with one of plaintiff’s competitors, also a resident of the forum,

and the terms of the agreement created continuing obligations between the defendant and its

licensee. Id. at 1546. 

Primax also relies on Deprynyl Animal Health, Inc. v. University of Toronto Innovations

Foundation, 297 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). (See Docket No. 37, List of Additional Authorities.) 

In the Deprynyl case, however, the defendant entered into a license agreement with the plaintiff, a

forum resident. As in Akro, the terms of the license agreement created a continuing obligation

between the defendant and a forum resident. 

The Court also finds the facts in this case to be distinguishable from the facts supporting

jurisdiction in Electronics For Imaging. In that case, the additional activities that the Federal

Circuit found supported a finding of purposeful direction also were directed at the plaintiff itself,

rather than other forum residents. For example, the defendants entered into a non-disclosure

agreement with the plaintiff, which was governed by the forum state law and created continuing
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obligations to the plaintiff in the forum after it had expired, and defendants repeatedly visited

plaintiff’s facilities in the forum to demonstrate the technology underlying the patents-in-suit. In

addition, the defendants hired counsel within the forum state to prosecute the patents-in-suit. See 

Electronics For Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1351; see also Inamed Corporation v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding personal jurisdiction where non-resident defendant had negotiated

and entered into license agreements relating to patents-in-suit with the plaintiff). 

In this case, by contrast, the licenses on which Primax relies are with other California

companies, rather than with it. Moreover, the terms and conditions of those licenses are not

before the Court. As such, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that F&G has created

continuing obligations with residents of this forum.

The Court also concludes that Primax has not demonstrated that this action arises out of

F&G’s licensing activities with other forum companies. While there is no doubt that the

declaratory relief action arose because of F&G’s threat of infringement, and although Primax

contends that it has received requests for indemnification from its customers with whom F&G has

entered into licenses, Primax’s complaint cannot be read to suggest that this action arose from

F&G’s licensing activities with Primax customers, rather than from the direct threat of

infringement F&G made to Primax. To the extent Primax is asserting that the Court could find

that F&G’s activities satisfy the “effects” test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),

the Court disagrees. 

Under that test, a court can exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has

committed an intentional act, the act is expressly aimed at the forum state, and the act causes harm

that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. See, e.g., Silent Drive, 326

F.3d at 1204-05. In Calder, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “effects” of the defendants

acts, out of which the litigation arose, were designed to harm the plaintiff, who was a resident of

the forum state. The Court finds that Primax has not demonstrated that, to the extent F&G has

been seeking licenses from California companies, it knew or intended that these acts would cause

harm to Primax, a Taiwanese company, in California. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (“Here, the

plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit arises.”); id. at 789
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(“California is the focus point both of the story and of the harm suffered.”). The Court does not

read Calder so broadly as to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

without a showing that the defendant engaged in acts that were intentionally designed to cause

harm to a particular plaintiff in the forum state. Accordingly, the Court concludes Primax has not

set forth a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, F&G’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE