Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03135/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Operation Crackdown
Amicus Curiae for Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Charles Edward Wade
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 15, 1998 Decided August 21, 1998

No. 97-3135

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Charles Edward Wade, a/k/a Buck,

Appellant

Consolidated with

Nos. 97-3140, 97-3141, 97-3170, 97-3171

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Nos. 96cr00472, 472-01, -03, -06)

Andrew P. McGuire, with whom Mitchell M. Seltzer (both

appointed by the court) was on the briefs for appellants

Shelton Wade, et al., argued the cause for all appellants.

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David B. Smith and Thomas Lumbard (both appointed by

the court) were on the briefs for appellants Charles and

Eugene Wade.

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant United States Attorney, with

whom Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, and John R.

Fisher and William B. Wiegand, Assistant United States

Attorneys, were on the brief, argued the cause for appellee.

John L. Brownlee, Assistant United States Attorney, entered

an appearance for appellee.

Craig D. Margolis and William E. Lawler III were on the

brief for amicus curiae Operation Crackdown.

Before Sentelle and Randolph, Circuit Judges, and

Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Senior Judge Buckley.

Buckley, Senior Judge: The defendants, who were convicted of keeping a "disorderly house" used in connection with

their drug-related activities, challenge the district court's

authority to enter an order of abatement against the house.

Because such orders may be issued only to abate nuisances

arising out of the use of premises for purposes of lewdness,

assignation, or prostitution, we vacate the order.

I. Background

On May 28, 1997, Charles Wade and his brother Eugene

Wade pleaded guilty to a three-count information alleging

(1) conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and to possess the

drug with intent to distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 371,

(2) unlawful distribution of cocaine base in violation of D.C.

Code s 33-541, and (3) maintenance of a disorderly house in

the District of Columbia in violation of D.C. Code s 22-2722

("section 2722").

According to the Government, the Wades sold drugs from

and in the vicinity of a residence at 647 G Street, S.E., in

Washington, D.C. Although neither Charles nor Eugene

lived at that address, their parents and various other family

members lived there at the time and continue to do so today.

On the basis of their pleas, the district court assessed fines

against Charles and Eugene, sentenced them both to terms of

imprisonment, and entered an order of abatement against 647

G Street. See Order of Abatement, Crim. No. 96-472

(Sept. 25, 1997); see also D.C. Code s 22-2717 ("section

2717") (requiring abatement of nuisance in certain circumstances). The order of abatement commanded that the United States Marshal close the house for one year and that,

during the period of abatement, the Marshal remove all

fixtures and personalty "used in conducting the nuisance...."

See Order of Abatement at 2-3.

Both Charles and Eugene objected to the order, and

Charles moved the district court to reconsider it. Various

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family members who either resided at or had an interest in

647 G Street intervened seeking reconsideration of the order.

The court permitted the family members to intervene but

refused to reconsider its decision, holding that an order of

abatement is a mandatory sanction upon conviction of keeping

a disorderly house under section 2722. See Memorandum

Opinion at 6-9, 15, Dec. 10, 1997, No. 96-0472 ("Mem. Op.").

Charles and Eugene, joined by members of their family,

appeal the order of abatement, which was stayed pending our

resolution of this case.

II. Analysis

Federal district courts in the District of Columbia have

jurisdiction over offenses "under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia which offense is joined in the

same information or indictment with any Federal offense."

D.C. Code s 11-502(3). Thus, where an indictment or information couples District of Columbia and federal charges, the

district court may adjudicate the entire case. See United

States v. Greene, 834 F.2d 1067, 1069 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In

this instance, the Wades pleaded guilty to various offenses

under both federal and D.C. law, including keeping a disorderly house in violation of section 2722 (providing criminal

penalties for anyone convicted of keeping "a bawdy or disorderly house" in the District of Columbia).

On the basis of the Wades' admission that they kept a

disorderly house, the district court entered an order of abatement against the property pursuant to section 2717, which

specifies, in relevant part, that where "the existence of the

nuisance be established ... in a criminal proceeding, an order

of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in

the case...." D.C. Code s 22-2717.

The Wades challenge the district court's order on three

grounds: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order;

(2) section 2717's abatement provision does not apply to the

kind of disorderly house they were convicted of keeping; and

(3) the district court did not afford them due process prior to

entering its order. Because we hold the statutory argument

dispositive, we do not address the constitutional question.

See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,

347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not

pass upon a constitutional question ... if there is also present

some other ground upon which the case may be disposed

of."). We review the district court's order pursuant to 28

U.S.C. s 1291.

A. District Court's Jurisdiction to Enter an Order of Abatement

The Wades cite D.C. Code s 11-921(a)(3) and (5) for the

proposition that an order of abatement is a form of equitable

relief that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District

of Columbia Superior Court and contend that the district

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court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter it. Thus, the

Wades' complaint appears to be that any connection between

their conviction and the order of abatement is too attenuated

to permit the district court to enter the order. That argument, however, ignores the mandatory nature of the penalty

imposed by section 2717, which states that "an order of

abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment" in any

criminal proceeding that establishes the existence of the

predicate nuisance. D.C. Code s 22-2717 (emphasis added).

Because the order was entered "as a part of the [criminal]

judgment," it was within the court's jurisdiction--assuming,

of course, that section 2717 was properly invoked. See D.C.

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Code s 11-502(3) (district court has jurisdiction over any

offense under any law applicable exclusively within D.C. when

joined with any federal offense); see also United States v.

Jones, 527 F.2d 817, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (permitting

imposition of either D.C. or federal sentence, but not both,

where defendant was convicted of conduct that violated both

federal and local laws).

B. Keeping a Disorderly House and D.C. Code s 22-2717

The Wades next claim that section 2717 does not apply to a

disorderly house other than one used for the purpose of

"lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."

1. Statutory Structure

The Government implicitly relies upon the proximity of

sections 2717 and 2722 in Title 22 of the D.C. Code to support

its claim that conviction of keeping any disorderly house

under section 2722 requires application of the remedy specified in section 2717. The two sections, however, were enacted

by Congress at different times as part of different bills.

Thus their juxtaposition in the D.C. Code is without relevance.

Section 2722 was originally part of the Act of July 16, 1912,

in which Congress granted jurisdiction over cases concerning

"the keeping of a bawdy or disorderly house" to the trial

courts of the District of Columbia. See Act of July 16, 1912,

P.L. 62-226, s 1, 37 Stat. 192 (1912). Section 1 of the Act

specified that the keeping of a bawdy or disorderly house was

punishable by a fine of $500, one year imprisonment, or both.

Id. That provision has since been amended to read: "Whoever is convicted of keeping a bawdy or disorderly house in the

District shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not

more than 180 days or both." Id. as amended by 1994 D.C.

Stat. 10-151, s 107.

Section 2717, on the other hand, was passed into law as

part of the Act of February 7, 1914, Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 280

(1914), which is codified at D.C. Code ss 22-2713 through

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22-2720. The introductory section of the 1914 Act provides

that

whoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, use,

own, occupy, or re-lease any building ... used for the

purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution ... is

guilty of a nuisance, and the building ... in or upon

which such lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted ... and the furniture, fixtures, musical instruments, and contents are also declared a nuisance, and

shall be enjoined and abated as hereinafter provided.

Id. (codified at D.C. Code s 22-2713) ("section 2713"). Nuisance is not otherwise defined in the statute. Section 2 of the

Act authorizes the Government or any citizen to bring an

equitable action to enjoin "a nuisance ... as defined in this

Act." Id. s 2 (emphasis added) (codified at D.C. Code s 22-

2714). Section 5, which is codified at D.C. Code s 22-2717

and is the provision at issue here, then commands that

[i]f the existence of the nuisance be established in an

action as provided in [this Act, i.e., an equitable action

under section 2], or in a criminal proceeding, an order of

abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in

the case....

Id., sec. 5 (emphasis added).

2. Discussion

The Government contends that section 5 of the 1914 Act,

D.C. Code s 22-2717, requires entrance of an order of abatement upon conviction of any crime whose prosecution entails

proof that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting a

common law nuisance per se. The Wades, on the other hand,

claim that the 1914 Act is exclusively concerned with the kind

of nuisance described in section 2713, namely the use of a

building for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution;

as a consequence, the abatement orders authorized by section

2717 may apply only to buildings that have been used for such

purposes. We review this legal question de novo. United

States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The Government notes that the Wades, who have pleaded

guilty of maintaining a disorderly house, were engaged in

illegal drug dealing on a regular basis at 647 G Street. It

then refers us to a host of hoary cases showing that a

disorderly house is a nuisance per se and that the term

"disorderly house" applies to any house, including but not

limited to houses of prostitution, in which activities occur that

disrupt the general public peace, health, or morals. The

Government asserts that the repeated selling of illicit substances in the vicinity of 647 G Street satisfies the common

law definition of keeping a disorderly house and that because

the building is a nuisance per se, the issuance of the section

2717 abatement order was proper.

Regardless whether the Government's description of these

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cases is accurate, they are irrelevant. This case is governed

by statute, not by the common law. Cf. Day v. United States,

682 A.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C. 1996) (noting that "D.C. statutory

law and D.C. case law agree that a relevant statute supersedes the common law"). The 1914 Act is plain: section 2717

concerns only those nuisances defined in section 2713. Section 2713 specifies that one who uses a building for "the

purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution ... is guilty

of a nuisance," D.C. Code s 22-2713; and section 2717 specifies that an order of abatement shall be entered upon proof of

"the nuisance." (The district court incorrectly read this

passage to require that it enter an order of abatement upon

proof of "a nuisance." See Mem. Op. at 23 (emphasis added).)

Thus, the nuisance to which section 5 of the 1914 Act refers is

one of the nuisances described at the opening of the Act, now

codified at section 2713. Indeed, neither the Government's

nor our own review of case law discloses a single instance

where the predicate for invoking the section 2717 abatement

remedy involved a conviction for keeping a disorderly house

other than one "used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation,

or prostitution." Furthermore, as the Government's silence

on this question implicitly concedes, the Wade brothers have

not been convicted of a crime involving lewdness, assignation,

or prostitution; nor is there any evidence that 647 G Street

was ever used for such purposes.

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Section 2722 criminalizes keeping a "bawdy or disorderly

house[ ]." While conviction for keeping a bawdy house, which

is commonly defined as a "house of prostitution[ ] ... [or as

a] house ... maintained for the convenience and resort of

persons desiring unlawful sexual connection," Black's Law

Dictionary 153 (6th ed. 1990), would clearly entail the type of

nuisance described in section 2713, the keeping of a disorderly house might or might not, depending on the nature of the

activity conducted in it. See Harris v. United States, 315

A.2d 569, 573 (D.C. 1974) (holding that in prosecution for

maintenance of disorderly house under section 2722, Government "must prove that the activities on the premises either

disturb the public or [as in the case of a bawdy house]

constitute a nuisance per se.") (footnote omitted). Because

the Government failed to show that 647 G Street was "used

for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution," the

Wades' plea of guilty to keeping a disorderly house is insufficient to permit the application of section 2717.

The structure of the 1912 and 1914 Acts confirms our

reading of sections 2713 and 2722. Whereas the remedies for

maintaining a nuisance under section 2713 are laid out in

subsequent statutory provisions, see D.C. Code ss 22-2714

(injunctions) & 22-2717 (abatement), section 2722 includes its

own penalty provisions and is therefore self-enforcing. Thus,

conviction under section 2722's prohibition on the keeping of a

house found to be disorderly for reasons unrelated to the

exploitation of sex will subject the defendant to fines and

imprisonment but not to a section 2717 abatement order.

The Government nevertheless cites dicta in the D.C. Court

of Appeals' decision in Raleigh v. United States, 351 A.2d 510,

514 (D.C. 1976), as "unassailable authority" for the proposition that an abatement order must issue upon any conviction

for keeping a disorderly house. The Government overstates

its case. In Raleigh, the prosecutor proved that the defendant ran a house of prostitution. The trial court nevertheless

declined to hold that the property was a nuisance subject to

abatement under section 2717. See id. at 513-14. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated:

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The government contends before us that when a defendant has been found guilty of maintaining a bawdy or

disorderly house in violation of s 22-2722, the house in

question must be deemed to be a nuisance per se which

the trial court is compelled to abate. We agree.

Id. at 514 (footnote omitted). In the accompanying footnote,

the court characterized the house of prostitution "as a typical

'disorderly house,' " id. at 514 n.5, which, of course, it was.

As we have pointed out, however, that a bawdy house is a

disorderly house does not imply that the reverse is necessarily true. Because there is no doubt that the property in

Raleigh was used for "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution,"

D.C. Code s 22-2713, there is no question that it fell within

the ambit of sections 2713 and 2717.

The Raleigh court did not have before it the question

whether a disorderly house not used for such purposes is the

kind of nuisance referred to in section 2717. Nevertheless,

even if its discussion of disorderly houses purported to decide

that section 2717 applies to a disorderly house of any kind, we

would still not be bound by it. Because that issue was not

before the court, its overly broad language would be obiter

dicta and not entitled to deference. See Kendall v. Pladson

(In re Pladson), 35 F.3d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We give no

effect to the California court's criticism of Cole [a bankruptcy

appellate panel decision] because it was pure dicta.... Federal courts are not bound by dicta of state appellate courts.");

McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir.

1980) ("a federal court should be circumspect in surrendering

its own judgment concerning what the state law is on account

of dicta"); Walker v. Felmont Oil Corp., 240 F.2d 912, 916-17

(6th Cir. 1957) (holding that dictum of state's highest court is

not binding and that its precedential value should be premised upon the respect it enjoys). Although we respect the

Court of Appeals' "considered dict[a]" when predicting how

the D.C. courts will address a novel question of law, see

Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d 356, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1953), we will

not defer to what appears to be no more than an unintentional blurring of the important distinction between houses that

are used for sexual purposes and those that are not. Cf.

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Kendall, 35 F.3d at 466. Accordingly, we conclude that, if

confronted with this question, the D.C. Court of Appeals

would hold that conviction for keeping a disorderly house

under section 2722 will require an abatement order pursuant

to section 2717 only if that house was used, at least in part,

for the purposes described in section 2713.

III. Conclusion

Because the district court lacked statutory authority to

enter its order of abatement, we vacate the order.

So ordered.

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