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Parties Involved:
ANR Limited, Inc.
Appellee
Convest Energy Corporation
Appellee
Forcenergy, Inc.
Appellee
Glen L. Lamb
Appellant
Lehndorff/LGB Minerals, Inc.
Appellee
Orbit Valve, Inc.
Appellee
Texas Gas Exploration Corporation
Appellee
W-Energy, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

PILBO 

Uoired Sttiett Courr of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

S£P '7.., 1989 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

GLEN L. LAMB, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 87-1930 

) 

W-ENERGY, INC., a Florida corporation; ) 

CONVEST ENERGY CORPORATION, a ) 

Massachusetts corporation; ) 

LEHNDORFF/LGB MINERALS, INC., a Texas ) 

corporation; TEXAS GAS EXPLORATION ) 

CORPORATION, a Louisiana corporation; ) 

ANR LIMITED, INC., a Delaware ) 

corporation; FORCENERGY, INC., a ) 

Delaware corporation; and ) 

ORBIT VALVE, INC. , ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 85-0156-.)() 

GSubmitted on the briefs: 

E. Scott Savage, David J. Jordan, and David R. 

Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Black, 

City, 

Van Cott, 

Utah, for 

Kent H. Murdock and Thomas L. Kay, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees Texas Gas Exploration 

Corporation and ANR Limited, Inc. 

McKAY, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-1930 Document: 01019897604 Date Filed: 09/07/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court 

granting summary judgment for defendants, holding them to be 

"statutory employers" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann 

§ 35-1-60 and 62 (1974)(amended 1975). The pertinent facts and 

the analysis of the district court may be found in Lamb v. 

W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1987). 

While this appeal was pending, the Utah Supreme Court issued 

its opinion in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., No. 20485, 110 Utah 

Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah filed June 6, 1989), a case presenting issues 

similar to those raised herein concerning application of the cited 

provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. In that 

opinion, the supreme court unanimously determined "that the 

legislature -has in clear and unmistakable language [in its 1975 

amendment to§ 35-1-62] evinced an intention to allow suits by an 

injured worker against those who might be his or her statutory 

employer as defined in section 35-1-42," and accordingly held that 

the state workers' compensation act should no longer be construed 

to provide tort immunity to statutory employers who have not been 

required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker. Id., 

slip op. at 6. Since just such immunity was the premise upon 

which the district court's analysis rested, see Lamb, 663 F. Supp. 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1930 Document: 01019897604 Date Filed: 09/07/1989 Page: 2 
at 398 n.9, if Pate is applicable in the present proceeding, the 

district court's judgment in favor of defendants cannot stand. 

As discussed in Pate and in the district court's opinion, the 

Utah Supreme Court dealt once before with the 1975 amendment to 

§ 35-1-62 in the present context, and in that earlier encounter a 

divided court implied that, despite strong textual arguments to 

the contrary, the amendment had not divested statutory employers 

of the tort immunity they had enjoyed under the earlier version of 

the statute. See Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 

(Utah· 1978). Consequently, in determining the validity of 

plaintiff's cause of action, our first concern must be with the 

effect to be given Pate in pending workers' compensation 

litigation. 

It is for the Utah courts to decide whether to accord 

retroactive or only prospective effect to their own decisions 

overruling· prior precedents. See Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 

1256, 1270 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 1091 (1988), 

citing Great N. R.R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 

358, 364 (1932). For the reasons set out below, · the actions of 

the Utah Supreme Court and principles of Utah law generally both 

persuade us that Pate will be given retroactive application in the 

Utah courts. 

First of all, it is the established rule in Utah that 

overruling decisions ordinarily have retroactive effect. See 

generally Loyal Order of Moose, No. 259 v. County Bd. of 

Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982); State Farm Mut. Ins. 

Co.· v~ ·Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Utah 1972). 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1930 Document: 01019897604 Date Filed: 09/07/1989 Page: 3 
Moreover, there is nothing in the languag~ of the Pate opinion to 

suggest that the supreme court contemplated any departure from the 

general rule favoring retroactivity. Indeed, the supreme court's 

unqualified application of its new interpretation of S 35-1-42 to 

the Pate litigants themselves is some affirmative evidence of the 

court's intent to give its ruling general retroactive 

application. 1 See generally Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 

239, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Zavala v. 

Arizona State Personnel Bd., 766 P.2d 608, 609 (Ariz. App. 1987). 

Furthermore, in light of the divided nature, tentative character, 

and brief, untested tenure of the Hinds decision, and given the 

supreme court's later unanimous acknowledgment of the amended 

statute's "clear and unmistakable language" squarely inconsistent 

therewith, Pate cannot realistically be characterized as the type 

of clear, unanticipated break with firmly established precedent 

that would counsel in favor of prospective application. Finally, 

we take judicial notice of the Utah Supreme Court's recent order 

in Mathie v. Interwest Construction Co., Inc., No. 890085 (Utah 

filed July 5, 1989), summarily reversing· and remanding another 

statutory employer case "for a trial on the merits in accordance 

1 We do recognize, however, the special nature of first 

impression cases (as compared to those of second impression, such 

as the one at bar), which involve the additional policy 

consideration of affording the benefits of a change in law to the 

party whose efforts brought it about. See generally, ~, 

Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 

(D.Co Cira 1972) 8 explained in Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating 

Agency v. F.E.R.C.f 826 F.2d 1074, 1082 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 108 s. Ct. 1088 (1988); Lau v. Nelson, 601 P.2d 527, 

529 (Wash. 1979). 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1930 Document: 01019897604 Date Filed: 09/07/1989 Page: 4 
with [the] holding in Pate v. Marathon Steel Company," which is 

entirely consistent with our retroactivity determination today. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent herewith. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

5 

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