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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Edgar Wayne Webb
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS0 ltedStatesCourtof Appeals 

D Tenth Clreu\t 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

EDGAR WAYNE WEBB, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

FEB28l995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-3400 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 92-CR-40056-01) 

Gregory G. Hough, Assistant United States Attorney (Randall K. 

Rathbun, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), District 

of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Marilyn M. Trubey, Branch Chief (David J. Phillips, Federal Public 

Defender, with her on the brief), Federal Public Defender's Office 

for the District of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before TACHA, LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

The only issue presented by this appeal is whether the 

district court erred in granting a downward departure from the 

sentence range prescribed by the United States Sentencing 

Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 1 
Guidelines (U.S.S.G). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and reverse. 

I. Background 

As part of a marijuana eradication effort, the Morris County 

sheriff, the Kansas National Guard, and the Kansas Bureau of 

Investigation (KBI) engaged in surveillance efforts to locate 

cultivated marijuana. Aerial surveillance revealed marijuana at 

defendant Edgar Wayne Webb's residence. The sheriff and a KBI 

agent confirmed that observation by viewing defendant's yard from 

a nearby football field. The next day, KBI agents executed a 

search warrant and found 142 cultivated marijuana plants in a 

fenced area of defendant's backyard. Defendant consented to a 

search of his house, where agents found additional marijuana. 

They also discovered a .22 caliber semiautomatic rifle with a 

homemade silencer attached and a second, partially-complete 

homemade silencer. 

Defendant cooperated throughout the agents' search and 

admitted to cultivating the marijuana. He showed the agents his 

"personal stash" of marijuana and stated that he was addicted to 

the substance. Defendant asserted that he grew the marijuana for 

his own use and that he neither sold nor gave it away. 

A jury convicted defendant of possession of marijuana in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and of possession of unregistered 

firearms and firearms not identified by a serial number in 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 2 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and (i) .1 The Sentencing 

Guidelines prescribed a range of twenty-seven to thirty-three 

months imprisonment for these offenses. The district court, 

however, sentenced defendant to three years probation (including 

six months of home confinement) . The government now appeals the 

district court's decision to depart downward from the applicable 

guideline range. 

II. Discussion 

The Guidelines prescribe sentencing ranges for a 

"'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that 

each guideline describes." U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(4) (b), intro. 

comment. Although the Sentencing Reform Act states that district 

courts may depart from these ranges, it permits departure only 

where a "court finds that there exists an aggravating or 

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 

different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The 

Guidelines themselves state that a departure is justifiable only 

in the "atypical case, one to which a particular guideline 

linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs 

from the norm." U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(4) (b), intro. comment. 

Moreover, when a district court decides to depart from the 

Guidelines, it must state the specific reasons for doing so. 18 

1 Defendant was acquitted of possessing marijuana with intent 

to distribute and of using a firearm in relation to a drug 

trafficking crime. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 3 
u.s.c. § 3553(c) (2); United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723 

(lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068 (1990). 

In reviewing a district court's departure from the 

Guidelines, we apply a three-step analysis: 

First, we determine de novo whether the circumstances 

cited by the district court admit of a factor not 

adequately taken into account by the Sentencing 

Commission which would justify departure. Second, we 

review the district court's factual findings supporting 

departure and determine whether they were clearly 

erroneous. Third, if the departure was justified, we 

review the degree of departure to determine whether it 

was reasonable. 

United States v. Ziegler, 39 F.3d 1058, 1061 (lOth Cir. 1994); see 

also United States v. Pefia, 930 F.2d 1486, 1494 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

In this case, we need address only the first step -- whether the 

factors relied on by the district court justify its departure. 

The district court believed that a "downward departure [wa)s 

not only authorized but absolutely essential." The court based 

its ruling on three general justifications: (1) defendant's 

psychiatric history and condition; (2) his son's need to have 

defendant care for him; and (3) the "unsophisticated nature of the 

silencers."2 The court's primary emphasis was that defendant was 

2 Specifically, the district court stated: 

Departure is based on the defendant's psychiatric 

history, testimony, and statements made by doctors in 

this case. There is a clear indication that 

incarceration would significantly affect the defendant's 

psychiatric condition. Also, Webb is the sole caretaker 

of his minor child. In addition, the unsophisticated 

nature of the silencers warrants consideration. 

Overall, the Court finds this case is outside the heart 

land and warrants departure .... I'm willing to take 

this chance [of a mistake) and see if we can't help this 

man and his son, and that is the reason basically for 

this departure .... I am willing at this time to have 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 4 
the sole caretaker of his son and that the son "needs to be taken 

care of." 

This court has upheld departures based in part on the adverse 

effect of incarceration on family members. See Peffa, 930 F.2d at 

1494-95 (upholding a downward departure for a defendant whose 

illegal conduct was aberrational, who was a single parent of a 

two-month old, and who supported another daughter and her infant). 

But the Guidelines start from the premise that "[f]amily ties and 

responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining 

whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 

range." U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. Consequently, a district court must 

identify some extraordinary personal circumstances warranting 

mitigation in sentencing to justify a departure. 

In the case at bar, the district court was sensitive to the 

relationship between defendant and his son, Dylan. Indeed, some 

of the medical evidence supports the finding that defendant is a 

loving and conscientious parent and that his son has served as a 

stabilizing influence in defendant's life. There was also some 

evidence that defendant contributed to his son's well-being; the 

son apparently was on the honor roll in school before defendant's 

incarceration but was having difficulty thereafter. 

The court may also have relied on defendant's unusual family 

situation. Defendant's three ex-wives all had children by their 

prior marriages. Defendant's son is his only child, the product 

Continued from previous page 

confidence in you [defendant] to this extent, and it's 

primarily because I feel sorry for your son, and certainly he needs to be taken care of, and I know that 

you're going to take care of him. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 5 
of his third marriage. In that divorce defendant was awarded 

custody. The presentence ·report indicates Dylan would stay with a 

stepson of defendant if he were incarcerated. That stepson is 

apparently in his early twenties and never finished high school. 

Although unfortunate, these circumstances are insufficiently 

aberational to place defendant's case outside the "heartland" 

contemplated by the Guidelines; that is, this is not an "atypical 

case" in which "a particular guideline linguistically applies but 

where conduct significantly differs from the norm." The 

defendant's role as a "sole caretaker" and the child's need "to be 

taken care of" do not render the circumstances of this case 

extraordinary. Defendant's family situation therefore cannot 

justify a departure from the applicable guideline range. 

The district court also relied on defendant's psychiatric 

history and other corroborating evidence concerning his mental 

condition offered at sen~encing. Data of diminished capacity can 

support a departure under section SK2.13 of the Guidelines.3 The 

medical evaluations provided to the district court, however, did 

not address the specific issues required by that section. The 

psychiatric reports do~ument a significant history of mental 

problems and contain diagnoses -- dysthymia, post-traumatic stress 

3 Section SK2.13 of the Guidelines states: 

If the defendant committed a non-violent offense 

while suffering from significantly reduced mental 

capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs 

or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be 

warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced 

mental capacity contributed to the commission of 

the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal 

history does not indicate a need for incarceration 

to protect the public. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 6 
disorder, panic disorder, personality disorder with paranoid 

features -- which may not have resulted from defendant's voluntary 

use of drugs. But they do not address or lead to the conclusion 

that defendant suffered from "significantly reduced mental 

capacity." 

The district court stated that "incarceration would 

significantly affect the defendant's psychiatric condition," and 

referred to "defendant's psychiatric history." But the court did 

not state how this would be extraordinary compared with other 

defendants with psychiatric problems who are incarcerated. 

Defendant's psychiatric history therefore cannot justify the 

court's departure. 

Finally, the district court cited "the unsophisticated nature 

of the silencers" as a reason for its departure. The silencers 

were clearly unsophisticated; they were made of "[o]ld toilet 

paper tubes and stuffing from some old stuffed animals."4 After a 

4 On cross-examination by government counsel, defendant's son 

Dylan responded to questions about the construction of the 

silencers as follows: 

Q. Okay. And that silencer or -- how many of the 

toilet paper tubes did you have on that? 

A. One. 

Q. And so it was about -- was one of them big rolls or 

was it one of the normal rolls? 

A. Normal. 

Q. Okay. So it's about that (indicating). 

A. Yes. 

Q. About four or five inches. 

A. Yeah. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 7 
two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, defendant's 

offense level was eighteen: The convictions for possession of 

unregistered firearms (the silencers) mandated eighteen points 

toward the base offense level calculation under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(a) (5}, and defendant received two additional points for 

lack of identifying serial numbers under § 2K2.1(b) (4). 

The offenses for which defendant was convicted are part of 

the National Firearms Act, which includes silencers in the 

definition of firearms. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (7) .5 The Act 

Continued from previous page 

Q. Okay. And then on the inside of it, you had put 

some toiler paper and some stuffed animal stuffing? 

A. No toilet paper, just some stuff -- animal 

stuffing, and something to keep it from collapsing 

inside the thing itself. 

Q. What did you put in there to keep it from collapsing down? 

A. Some mesh screen. 

Q. Where did you get that at? 

A. It was laying around. 

Q. Was it up in the attic? 

A. Yeah, it came from -- I guess it came from the 

attic. It was downstairs. 

5 More specifically, section 5845(a) states that "[t]he term 

'firearm' means ... (7) any silencer (as defined in section 921 

of title 18, United States Code)." The referenced section, 18 

U.S.C. § 921(a) (24), in turn provides: 

The terms "firearm silencer" and "firearm muffler" mean any 

device for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of 

a portable firearm, including any combination of parts, 

designed or redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or 

fabricating a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, and any 

part intended only for use in such assembly or fabrication. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 8 
requires every "manufacturer, importer, and maker" of a firearm to 

register with the Secretary of the Treasury every firearm it 

manufactures, imports, or makes. Id. § 5841(b) and (c). The 

specific sections under which defendant was convicted prohibit 

receiving or possessing an unregistered firearm, id. § 5861(d), 

and receiving or possessing a firearm not identified by a serial 

number, id. § 5861(i). Defendant made the silencers involved in 

the charge. Thus, his duty as manufacturer was to stamp a serial 

number on the silencers and register them within twenty-four hours 

of the close of the day on which they were made. 27 C.F.R. 

§ 179.103; see also United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 818 

(lOth Cir. 1986). 

In this case, the district court may have thought that 

defendant's silencers represented a significantly less serious 

violation of the Firearms Act than those usually prosecuted under 

these provisions. Alternatively, the court may have thought it 

unrealistic to expect defendant to stamp an identification number 

on a toilet paper roll used as the exterior covering of the 

silencer. The court may even have thought that Congress intended 

the Firearms Act to punish criminality qualitatively different 

from defendant's behavior. Even so, none of these explanations 

adequately justify the court's departure from the applicable 

guideline range; none is sufficient to adjudge the circumstances 

of this case outside the "heartland" contemplated by the 

Guidelines. The "unsophisticated nature" of the silencers 

therefore cannot justify the district court's departure. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 9 
III. Conclusion 

For the aforementioned reasons, we find the justifications 

cited by the district court insufficient to set this case outside 

the "heartland" contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines. The 

decision of the district court to depart from the applicable 

guideline range is therefore REVERSED. The case is REMANDED for 

resentencing within the prescribed range of twenty-seven to 

thirty-three months imprisonment. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 10 
No. 93-3400, United States v. Webb 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

The majority finds this case to be wholly within the "heartland" contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so that no departure is possible. Although I agree that we have to reverse the 

district court, I would remand for resentencing. 

The district court obviously believed downward departure was 

warranted here. It stated, "This is a case that I think downward 

departure is not only authorized but absolutely essential." II R. 

27. As the majority opinion states, the district court mentioned 

three general bases as justification for his departure: defendant's psychiatric history, the family situation--particularly the 

son's need to have defendant care for him, and the "unsophisticated nature of the silencers." I agree with the majority that 

the court's statement of reasons is inadequate. But I here comment on each of the justifications given by the district court and 

why I believe there should be remand for resentencing instead of 

an outright reversal. 

At sentencing defendant sought downward departure based upon 

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (diminished capacity) p.s. When the district 

court relied upon defendant's psychiatric history it may have 

meant defendant had diminished capacity. All the appellate record 

contains is the testimony and reports of two psychiatrists and a 

social worker that chronicle defendant's psychiatric history, 

Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 11 
which is an extensive one.l The psychiatric reports and testimony, however, do not address or conclude that defendant suffered 

from a "significantly reduced mental capacity." 

I cannot tell whether diminished capacity was a defense at 

trial, as we do not have the trial transcript. If diminished 

capacity was a defense at trial and the jury found guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, then I believe that finding would be controlling 

on the district court for sentencing purposes. That situation is 

distinguishable from one in which a defendant is acquitted of a 

charged offense and the court, because the preponderance of the 

evidence standard is applicable to sentencing proceedings, can 

treat the defendant as if he had been convicted. 

If diminished capacity was not a defense at trial, then I 

believe the court has the authority to ask the psychiatrists to 

address that issue in the sentencing proceedings, and make a 

determination based on the preponderance standard. Although I 

think this is the weakest point in the district court's justification for departure, without the trial transcript I am not as 

confident as the majority that no diminution is permitted on this 

ground. 

I agree with the majority, of course, that the guidelines 

start from the premise that "[f]arnily ties and responsibilities" 

are not relevant in sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 p.s.; therefore 

to justify a departure the district court must identify some 

extraordinary personal circumstances warranting mitigation in 

1 The government, as appellant, has the responsibility of providing us a record sufficient to make an appropriate disposition 

of this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 12 
sentencing. However, as the majority recognizes, this court has 

upheld departures based in part upon the adverse effects of 

incarceration upon family members. United States v. Pena, 930 

F.2d· 1486, 1486 (lOth Cir. 1991). The majority opinion recites 

some of the evidence of the special relationship between defendant 

and his son, the son's needs, and the unusual family situation. I 

think these factors possibly could serve as a basis for departure. 

They need to be further developed and explained, of course. But 

the majority opinion forecloses the district court from revisiting 

this issue. 

Where I really have trouble with the majority's conclusion is 

with respect to the silencers. I certainly agree that a mere 

reference to the "unsophisticated nature" of the silencers is not 

sufficient to explain why a downward departure is justified. 

Nevertheless, other than his convictions for possession of unregistered firearms and firearms not identified by a serial number, 

defendant's only conviction was for possession of marijuana--which 

would produce an offense level of 4. Defendant's offense level 

was 18 after a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The convictions for possession of unregistered firearms 

provided essentially all of the base offense level calculation 

under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) (5) (eighteen points), with two more for 

lack of identifying serial numbers under § 2K2.1(b) (4). Although 

the Marlin .22 rifle, which had identification numbers, was referenced in each of these counts, the silencers had to provide the 

basis of the conviction for the following reasons. 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 13 
The weapons offenses charged, violations of 26 U.S.C. 

§ 5861(d) and (i), are part of the National Firearms Act, enacted 

under the government's taxing power. That Act requires every 

"manufacturer, importer, and maker" of a firearm to register with 

the Secretary of the Treasury every firearm it manufactures or 

imports. Id. § 5841(b). The manufacturer or importer who makes a 

transfer has to register the firearm to the transferee; thus the 

burden of registration is on the transferor. See id. Firearms 

are defined to include silencers. Id. § 5845(a) (7). 

The specific sections under which defendant was charged deal 

with receiving or possessing an unregistered firearm, § 5861(d), 

and receiving or possessing a firearm not identified by a serial 

number, § 5861(i). Defendant is not a "transferor," and the rifle 

had identification numbers. The only items that could bring 

defendant under the Act were the ones he manufactured and had no 

numbers--the silencers. Because defendant made the silencers 

involved in the charge he did not "receive" them; he only possessed them. Thus, as the majority notes, his duty as manufacturer was to stamp a serial number on the silencers and register 

them within twenty-four hours of the close of the day in which 

they were made. See United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 818 

(lOth Cir. 1986); 27 C.F.R. § 179.103. The government, of course, 

uses the "receive or possess" prohibition of unregistered or 

unidentifiable firearms to convict those who possess dangerous 

weapons such as machine guns--see Staples v. United States, 114 

S. Ct. 1793 (1994)--or hand grenades--see United States v. Freed, 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 14 
401 U.S. 601 (1991), not those who possess rifles purchased 

legally.2 

Silencers on guns are often utilized by organized crime 

figures, and it is understandable that they would be included in 

the list as a "firearm" that the manufacturer must register and 

mark with identification numbers. But the silencers involved in 

the instant case were not what we think of as silencers, at least 

on the basis of the evidence in the appellate record. These 

silencers were made of "[o]ld toilet paper tubes and stuffing from 

some old stuffed animals." I R. Supp. 56. The evidence in the 

appellate record, which the district court quite apparently 

believed, was that in constructing these silencers defendant 

intended to muffle the sound of .22 rifle shots he intended to aim 

at animals invading defendant's yard. Of course, it seems unrealistic to expect defendant to stamp an identification number on 

the toilet paper roll used as exterior covering of these homemade 

contraptions. 

The silencers involved in the instant case are not included 

in the appellate record, nor does that record contain the evidence 

2 Defendant's possession of a regular Marlin .22 rifle with an 

identifying serial number would not be a violation of this statute. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (1994) 

("Moreover, despite the overlay of legal restrictions on gun 

ownership, we question whether regulations on guns are sufficiently intrusive that they impinge upon the common experience 

that owning a gun is usually licit and blameless conduct. Roughly 

50 per cent of American homes contain at least one firearm of some 

sort, and in the vast majority of States, buying a shotgun or 

rifle is a simple transaction that would not alert a person to 

regulation any more than would buying a car.") (footnotes omitted). 

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Appellate Case: 93-3400 Document: 01019283559 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 15 
• 

put on by the government with respect to those items.3 And we 

cannot tell by the short reference to the "unsophisticated" nature 

of the silencers the thinking of the judge or his reasoning for 

the particular departure he selected. But based on the record 

presented to us on appeal, I simply cannot imagine how the jury 

could have found defendant guilty on these firearms counts, or why 

the district court did not set aside those verdicts. Possibly 

there is more in the trial record than we have in the appellate 

record. But without more I simply do not believe that this is a 

"heartland" case with respect to these homemade toilet paper roll 

silencers. I would not deny the district court the right to rely 

upon this as a basis for departing downward. 

For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent. 

3 The majority opinion in its footnote 3 recites all the evidence 

that is in the appellate record as to how these "silencers" were 

constructed. 

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