Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05118/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Lee Mason
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

. FILED 

United States Court or Appeals 

Tentb Circuit 

MAY 3 0 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-5118 

v. 

ROBERT MASON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-141-K) 

Allen J. Litchfield, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, (James L. Swartz, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Craig P. Bryant, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public 

Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 1 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm after a prior felony 

conviction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury, based 

on his stipulations, that two elements of the offense with which he was charged had been 

proved. This court affirms. 

Defendant Robert Mason was charged in a one-count indictment with possession 

of a firearm after prior conviction of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 922(g). At trial, 

Mason stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a felony and that the firearm 

he was charged with possessing had been transported in interstate commerce. 

At the close of evidence, the judge instructed the jury that to sustain its burden of 

proof, the government was required to prove: (1) the defendant had previously been 

convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) the 

defendant knowingly possessed the firearm described in the indictment; and (3) the 

possession was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. In addition, the court 

instructed the jury as follows: 

The parties stipulate that the first and third elements have been met, that is, 

that the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and that the possession of the 

firearm was in or affecting commerce. Therefore, the government need not 

offer proof as to these elements, and you should consider them proven by 

the government. 

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Defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial. The jury returned a verdict of 

guilty and Mason was sentenced to seventy-eight months imprisonment, to be followed 

by three years supervised release. 

Notwithstanding his stipulations, Mason on appeal argues that the district court 

erred by instructing the jury that the first and third elements of the crime with which he 

was charged had been proved. He contends that the district court improperly invaded the 

province of the jury by removing the stipulated elements from the jury's consideration. 

Because no objection was raised at the time of trial, this court reviews the district 

court's instructions to the jury only for plain error. United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 

1465, 1478 (lOth Cir. 1995). Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

which governs an appeal from criminal proceedings, provides that "[p ]lain errors or 

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 

attention of the court." Because the court finds no error in the trial court's instructions to 

the jury, the court need not determine whether the claimed error was plain or affected 

substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 

The defendant relies upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Jones, 65 

F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and reh 'g en bane granted, 73 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 3 
1996), 1 to support his argument that the district court improperly invaded the province of 

the jury by removing the stipulated elements from the jury's consideration. In Jones, the 

Sixth Circuit held that it is plain error for a trial court to instruct a jury that an essential 

element of a crime has been established when the defendant has stipulated to the facts 

which prove that element. Id. at 522-23. The defendant in Jones, like the defendant in 

this case, had been charged with possession of a firearm after prior conviction of a felony 

and had stipulated that he was a convicted felon. Id. at 521. The court, relying on 

general language from court of appeals and Supreme Court precedent, declared that 

"stipulated evidence remains evidence for the jury's consideration," and that a trial judge 

"override[s] or interfere[s] with the jurors' independent judgment" when it instructs the 

jury that an element of the crime has been established, notwithstanding the defendant's 

stipulation to that element. !d. at 522. (emphasis in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

As the dissent in Jones indicates, however, none of the cases cited by the Jones 

majority involved a stipulation to an element of the crime. Id. at 524-25 (Matia, J., 

dissenting). Rather, in each of the cases upon which the Jones majority relies, the trial 

court removed the consideration of an issue from the jury based on the strength or 

1 Although the panel's Jones opinion is no longer binding precedent in the Sixth 

Circuit or persuasive authority in the instant case, this court addresses Jones both because 

the defendant relied upon it and because its reasoning, left unanswered, threatens to 

mislead the trial courts. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 4 
singularity of the government's evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315 

(6th Cir. 1988). By relying on such cases, the Jones majority fails to distinguish between 

evidence and facts. 

When the only evidence tends to establish an elemental fact, or when the parties 

stipulate to evidence tending to establish an elemental fact, the jury must still resolve the 

existence or nonexistence of the fact sought to be proved. In contrast, the jury need not 

resolve the existence of an element when the parties have stipulated to the facts which 

establish that element. In the latter circumstance, the judge has not removed the 

consideration of an issue from the jury; the parties have. More specifically, by stipulating 

to elemental facts, a defendant waives his right to a jury trial on that element. If such a 

partial waiver runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment, then traditional, wholesale waivers 

manifest in bench trials and guilty pleas must necessarily violate the right to a jury trial. 2 

2

The dissent relies on this court's dicta in United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 

(1Oth Cir. 1995), for the proposition that a stipulation to a prior felony conviction in a § 

922(g) prosecution does not "seek to preclude the jury from deciding the prior conviction 

element of the crime." Id. at 1473. In Wacker, the court distinguished between those§ 

922(g) cases in which the defendant stipulates to a prior felony conviction in an attempt 

to hide his felony status from the jury and those cases in which the defendant seeks only 

to avoid the prejudice that would result from the presentation of evidence of the nature 

and number of his prior felony convictions. The Wacker court's recognition that the 

prosecution may not reject a defendant's offer to stipulate when the defendant's sole 

purpose is to avoid prejudice is in no way inconsistent with our holding that a defendant, 

by stipulating to elemental facts, waives his right to a jury trial on that element. 

In addition to Wacker, the dissent relies on this court's decisions in Johnson v. 

Cowley, 40 F.3d 341 (lOth Cir. 1994), and United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773 (lOth 

Cir. 1985), for the proposition that a stipulation to an element is not a waiver of a jury 

trial on that element. The dissent's reliance on these decisions is misplaced. Cowley 

holds that a trial court is not required to engage in an independent inquiry to ensure that a 

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Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 5 
By holding that a defendant may not waive the right to a jury trial on a particular 

element by stipulating to the facts that prove that element, the Jones decision deprives 

defendants like Mason of the strategic benefit of a sterile stipulation in lieu of stark 

evidence of both the number and character of prior felony convictions. See Jones, 65 

F.3d at 526 (Matia, J., dissenting). If the jury is allowed to ignore facts that have been 

proved by stipulation, prosecutors will have little incentive to enter stipulations. Instead, 

"the government will be forced to introduce into evidence every previous felony 

conviction a defendant has, lest the jury choose to 'disbelieve' either a stipulation or any 

one such conviction the government might select." !d. (Matia, J., dissenting). In this 

case, if Mason had not stipulated to a prior felony conviction, the prosecution likely 

would have sought to introduce evidence3 of his multiple felony convictions, including 

his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. This result would have been far more 

prejudicial to Mason than the following antiseptic stipulation: "It is hereby stipulated and 

agreed between the parties that the defendant, Robert Lee Mason, had been previously 

stipulation to an element is knowing and voluntary. 40 F.3d at 346. Benally, which the 

dissent concedes is distinguishable, merely holds that it is reversible error for a trial court 

to instruct the jury that an element has been proved where the defendant has stipulated to 

the testimony a witness would have given if called. 756 F.2d at 778. Neither case 

addresses the issue of whether a stipulation to an element constitutes a waiver of a jury 

determination on that element. 

3

Generally, the government supplies such proof by means of a certified copy of the 

judgment which expressly reflects the nature of the crime. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 6 
convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year." 

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Jones is its underlying premise: jury 

nullification. 4 While we recognize that a jury in a criminal case has the practical power 

to render a verdict at odds with the evidence or the law, a jury does not have the lawful 

power to reject stipulated facts. Such a power, if exercised, would conflict with the 

jurors' sworn duty to apply the law to the facts, regardless of outcome. See United States 

v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (11th Cir. 1983). 

In addition to relying on Jones, Mason argues that the Supreme Court's decision in 

United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995), mandates a finding of plain error in this 

case. We disagree. In Gaudin, a criminal prosecution for making false statements in a 

matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, the Court held that the Sixth 

Amendment required the trial judge to submit the question of the materiality of the 

defendant's allegedly false statements to the jury. !d. at 2320. The defendant had not 

stipulated to the materiality of his statements. Gaudin holds that "[t]he Constitution gives 

4

The view that juries may disregard the parties' stipulations based on jury 

nullification is explicit in the Jones concurrence: "[J]uries, in the exercise of their power 

of nullification, are free to ignore or reject facts that are 'proved'; whether proved by the 

introduction of evidence or by stipulation." Jones, 65 F.3d at 524 (Ryan, J., concurring) 

(emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 7 
a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of 

the crime with which he is charged." Jd. at 2314. Our holding simply reaffirms that a 

defendant may waive this right to a jury determination on a particular issue when it is in 

his interest to do so. Because the district court's instructions to the jury were consistent 

with Mason's right to a jury determination of every element of his crime and his decision 

to waive that right, this court finds no error. 5 

The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. 

5

We note that our holding is consistent with the panel's decision in United States 

v. Sherman, 576 F.2d 292 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cerase v. United States, 439 

U.S. 913 (1978), and with the decisions of other circuits holding, without analysis, that it 

is not error for a trial court to instruct a jury that an essential element of a crime has been 

established when the defendant has stipulated to the facts establishing the element. See 

United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 107 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States 

v. Sims, 529 F.2d 10, 11 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 

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Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 8 
No. 95-5118, United States v. Mason 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

As I see it, the issue in this case is whether the court violates a defendant's right to 

trial by jury when it directs a jury that it must accept stipulated facts as proven. 

Apparently, the majority believes that no error occurred because the Defendant waived 

his right to a jury trial as to those facts which he stipulated. Because this position is 

contrary to clear circuit precedent, I dissent. 

I believe the majority's erroneous analysis begins with its failure to understand the 

nature and intent of Defendant's stipulation. In another case in which a defendant offered 

to stipulate that he had a prior conviction, we explained the true nature of such a 

stipulation: 

[Defendant]'s proposed stipulation did not attempt to keep from the jury the 

fact that he was a convicted felon, nor did it seek to preclude the jury 

from deciding the prior conviction element of the crime. Rather, the 

stipulation sought only to limit the prejudice that would result from the jury 

being informed that [Defendant] had been convicted of murder and 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 

United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (lOth Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Here, 

Defendant's similar confession was made for the same purpose: he did not seek to 

preclude the jury from deciding an element of the crime; rather, his purpose was to limit 

the prejudicial effect of his prior conviction. The government's proffer of the stipulation 

itself supports this conclusion: 

Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 9 
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, the government has no further witnesses. 

However, we do have a stipulation that has been entered into between 

counsel and myself, and I'd ask the Court's permission to read that into the 

record at this time. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the following stipulation has been entered into 

between the government as plaintiff and Robert Lee Mason as defendant 

R., Vol. ill, at 34-35. This excerpt clearly shows that the stipulation was not a plea by 

Defendant, and it was not an offer to the judge to decide an issue as a matter of law. 

Rather, the stipulation was merely an agreement between the parties (not between the 

parties and the court) and was presented to the jury for its consideration. The trial court 

instructed the jury, however, that "the parties stipulated that the first and third elements 

have been met" and that "the government need not offer proof as to these elements and 

you should consider them proven by the government." R., Vol. ill, at 70. This 

instruction missed the point that the stipulation was itself an offer of proof and not some 

form of plea to the first and third elements of the crime. As this circuit has stated before, 

"we cannot conclude a stipulation to the fact of a prior valid conviction ... is the 

functional equivalent of a guilty plea." Johnson v. Cowley, 40 F.3d 341, 346 (lOth Cir. 

1994). Given this analysis, I cannot concur that Defendant intended to waive his right to 

a jury trial on this issue. 

In another case similar to this one, the parties stipulated that the alleged crime took 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 10 
place in Indian country. United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773, 778 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

The judge gave the jwy the following instruction: "Second: that the offense charged in 

the indictment took place in Indian country. This element has been stipulated to by the 

parties and you must accept it as being true .... " ld. (emphasis omitted). We held: 

The instruction that the jwy must accept that the accident occurred 

in Indian country as true because it had been stipulated by the parties is 

reversible error. The jury was free to consider the stipulated testimony and 

the other evidence. 

ld. We based this holding on the following reasoning: 

"[A] stipulation as to the testimony a witness would give if called, although 

it may constitute evidence of the facts covered, is not an admission of the 

truth of such testimony and does not prevent a party from attacking it as he 

might attack the testimony itself, had it been given." 

ld. (quoting United States v. Spahn, 515 F.2d 579, 583 (lOth Cir. 1975). Certainly 

Benally is distinguishable in that the defendant in this case, unlike in Benally, did not 

present evidence which contradicted his stipulation. This difference, however, does not 

undermine the position I hold. Rather, it underscores the fact that a stipulation in a 

criminal case is not a waiver of the right to have a jury decide a particular element of a 

crime. As we have said before, a prior conviction is merely "an evidentiary fact to which 

a defendant can stipulate like any other fact." Johnson y. Cowley, 40 F. 3d 341, 346 (lOth 

Cir. 1994 ). In this sense, a stipulation is no different than the presentation of uncontested 

testimony. Even with uncontested testimony, the defendant retains the right to have the 

jury, rather than the court, decide every element of the crime. The Supreme Court 

recognized this when it stated that a judge may not "direct a verdict for the State, no 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-5118 Document: 01019279339 Date Filed: 05/30/1996 Page: 11 
matter how overwhelming the evidence." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 

(1993). Thus, the court erred when it removed certain elements of the crime from the 

jury's consideration by instructing the jury that it must consider the stipulated evidence as 

proven. 

Finally, I think it is necessary to point out that my conclusion in this case would 

not create a disincentive for prosecutors to agree to stipulations. Stipulations will still 

save prosecutors time and money in the presentation of their cases. Additionally, I 

believe juries will continue to accept stipulations as sufficient proof even if the judge 

does not instruct them to accept stipulated facts as proven. 

Given that an error occurred but no objection was made, the issue remains whether 

that error was plain and whether substantial rights were affected. ~United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Because of the precedent cited above, I believe the 

error was indeed plain. In answering the question whether substantial rights were 

affected, however, it will be helpful to look to the Supreme Court's harmless error 

jurisprudence. 1 Although most constitutional errors are subject to harmless-error 

analysis, an error which constitutes a "structural defect affecting the framework within 

1

In doing so, I remain mindful of the fact that the defendant bears the burden of 

proof in plain-error analysis, but the government bears the burden of persuasion in 

harmless-error analysis. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 

4 

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which the trial proceeds" is not subject to harmless-error analysis and automatically 

requires reversal. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308-10 (1991); see also Sullivan 

v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court 

recently held that petitioner's right to a jury trial was violated when the trial court gave an 

improper instruction defining "reasonable doubt." ld. at 277-78. The Court further held 

that this violation of the right to a jury trial was the type of structural defect which 

required automatic reversal. Id. at 281. It also based its reasoning on the fact that 

harmless-error analysis can only take place where the jury has actually made factual 

findings. Because the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction vitiated the jury's 

findings, no meaningful harmless-error analysis could take place. ld. at 280-81; see also 

til at 283 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). At the heart of the Court's analysis was the 

concern that the judge, rather than the jury, would be making the requisite findings of 

guilt in direct violation of the right to a jury trial. ld. at 277, 278, 280,281. 

Thus, the case at hand is similar to Sullivan to the extent that the jury did not make 

findings on two elements of the crime because the judge instructed the jury that it must 

consider those elements as proven. Under the Sullivan analysis, the constitutional error 

in this case would require automatic reversal because the judge in effect usurped the 

jury's role in making the necessary findings of fact. Given the result that would occur 

under harmless error analysis, I conclude that Defendant's substantial rights were 

affected. The constitutional error which occurred constituted a structural defect in the 

5 

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trial itself, an error so serious that reversal is warranted Thus, I believe Defendant's 

conviction should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. 

6 

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