Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02358/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02358-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom L. Carey
Respondent
Michael D. Smith
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL D. SMITH,

Petitioner,

v.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-2358 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

MichaelD.Smith,aCalifornia prisonerincarcerated atCalifornia State Prison - Solano,

filed this prose action seeking awrit of habeas corpus pursuantto 28U.S.C.§ 2254. This matter

is now before the court for consideration of the merits of the habeas petition. For the reasons

discussed below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

 On two successive days in March 1999, Smith and a friend stole computer equipment

from a law office. As they were trying to leave the premises on the second day, they were

confronted by a security guard,who blocked Smith’s truck in the parking lot. Smith fled on foot,

but later was arrested in the State of Washington.
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1 The existence of the two prior "strike" convictions meant that Smith was subject to

sentencing underCalifornia'sThreeStrikesLaw. The Three Strikes Law consists of two almost

identicalstatutory schemes – one adopted by initiative and the other passed by the legislature --

that allowharshersentencesfor defendants who are convicted of felonies and have previously been

convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 667, 1170.12. 

2

Following a no contest plea inSantaClaraCountySuperiorCourt, Smith was convicted of

three counts ofsecond degree burglary. He also admitted he had suffered four prior prison terms

and two prior “strike” convictions.1 In exchange, the district attorney dismissed three counts of

petty theftwith a priortheft-related conviction and one count of receiving stolen property. Smith

moved to have one or both priorstrike convictions dismissed in the interests of justice, under

section 1385. The court denied the motion to dismiss either prior strike conviction, but did

reduce count one to amisdemeanor and struck the terms for the prior prison term enhancement.

Smithwassentenced to two concurrentterms of 25 yearsto life and a concurrent term of one year

for the misdemeanor. 

Smith unsuccessfully appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of

conviction and deniedSmith’s petition forwrit of habeas corpus. The California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review. 

Smith’sfederal habeas petition raises a single claimofineffective assistance of counsel.

Smith claimsthat counselincorrectly advised himthatthe sentencing judge would strike one of

his prior convictions and sentence him to somewhere between five and thirteen years, rather than

the twenty-five yearsto life sentence the judge actually imposed. The court ordered respondent

to showcausewhy the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer. The matter is

now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court hassubjectmatter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction

occurred inSanta Clara County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).
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EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the higheststate court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on themerits of each and every claimthey seek to raise

in federal court. See 28U.S.C.§ 2254(b),(c). The parties do not dispute that state court remedies

were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he isin custody in

violation of the Constitution orlaws ortreaties oftheUnitedStates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petitionmay not be grantedwith respectto any claimthatwas adjudicated on themeritsin state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by theSupreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Underthe ‘contrary to’ clause,a federal habeas courtmay grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to thatreached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

“Underthe ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifiesthe correct governing legal principle from[the]Court’s decisions but

unreasonably appliesthat principle to the facts ofthe prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgmentthatthe relevantstate-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
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orincorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id.at 411. A federal habeas

court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application

of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where, as here, the state court

gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner'sfederal claim. In such a case, a

review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was

objectively reasonable. SeeHimes v.Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). The federal

court should conduct “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. In considering

such a case, no deference under §2254(e) to factual findings is required because a summary

decision by a state court does not “implicitly” make any factual findings in support of the decision.

SeeFisher v.Roe,263F.3d906,913 (9thCir.2001)(refusing to inferfactualfindings from state

court summary denial of habeas petition).

DISCUSSION

Smith claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his lawyer

incorrectly advised himthatthe sentencing judgewould strike one of his prior convictions and

sentence him to somewhere between five and thirteen years, rather than the longer 25 years to life

sentence the judge actually imposed. The California Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court rejected the claim, but neither discussed it in a reasoned opinion. 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance,of counsel. Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668,686 (1984). A defendant who

enters a guilty plea on the advice of counsel may generally only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character ofthe guilty plea by showing thatthe advice he received from counsel was not within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. SeeHill v.Lockhart,474U.S.52,

56 (1985);Tollett v.Henderson,411U.S.258,267 (1973). A defendant must satisfy the two-part

standard ofStrickland,466U.S.at 687,i.e.that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
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deficient performance prejudiced his defense,and establish the prejudice requirement by showing

thatthere is a reasonable probability that,butfor counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial. SeeHill,474U.S.at 57-59;Iaea v.Sunn,800F.2d861,

864-65 (9th Cir. 1986).

The record before this court is the same one that was before the California Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court: the transcripts of the plea colloquy and sentencing as well as

declarations from Smith, his wife, his two sisters, and his appellate counsel concerning the

statements made by trial counsel who advised on the plea. Upon due consideration, this court

reaches the same conclusion the state courts did and rejects the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. As will be seen below, the transcripts flatly contradict the declarations from Smith and his

family, clearly showing there was no promise regarding the sentence.

Smith statesin his declaration that on several occasions before he pled no-contest, attorney

Jacobs "toldme that,ifI did so, Judge Kim would not sentence me to life imprisonment. [¶] Ms.

Jacobssaid thatJudgeKimwas a fairjudge and thatshe would strike one of my strike convictions

and would sentence me to somewhere between five and thirteen yearsimprisonment. On one

occasion,Ms.Jacobstoldme,'Michael,you're not going to getlife.'" Petition, Exh. 1 (Michael

Smith Decl.), ¶¶ 3-4.

Smith offers three declarations from his family stating they also heard the false

representations. His sister, Elizabeth Smith, states that defense counsel told her “she could

guarantee [Smith] would ‘not do more than ten years’” if he pled guilty. (Petition, Exh. 2). Smith’s

wife,Rechelle Smith,states that defense counsel told her that Smith “would do ten to fifteen

years,” but “won’t do 25 yearsto life.” (Petition,Exh. 3,¶3). Smith’s other sister, Susan Smith,

claims defense counseltold her “both of his priorstrike convictions would be dropped and the

judge would not give [Smith] a life sentence.” Petition, Exh. 4, ¶ 3). Susan Smith additionally

declares that defense counsel at one point told her Smith would receive a five to seven year

sentence, and at another point that he would probably receive a ten to fifteen year sentence.

The transcript ofthe plea hearing flatly rebuts Smith’s claims regarding the representations
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about his sentence. The following colloquy took place at the change-of-plea hearing:

[THECOURT:] Mr.Smith,I’mgoing to ask you a lot of questions. Listen carefully.

If you don’t understand something, just stop me. You can ask me or

you can ask yourlawyer. Okay? The -- you’re going to plead guilty

or no contest to three charges. All of them are felonies, and all of

themare burglaries ofthe second degree. In other words, burglaries

of a businessrather than a residence. You will also be admitting a

number of priors, prior convictions. Two of them are what’s

commonly known asstrike priors,whichmakesthis a three strikes

case. The strike priors are two robberies that you suffered in

Alameda County. And you will also be admitting four prison priors.

Those are also felony convictions for which you served a prison

sentence. And they are a burglary in Contra Costa County, a burglary

inSanFrancisco County, another burglary in Contra Costa County

and then, again, that robbery in Alameda County. Do you understand

the nature of these charges?

[SMITH:] Yes.

[THECOURT:] Have you discussed the facts and the possible defenses to the charges

with your attorney?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] And do you understand that the maximum time you could be

sentenced to, if I don’t strike any of the prior convictions, then the

maximum is 79-years-to-life in state prison. Do you understand

that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] And it could be less,it can’t bemore but -- obviously can’t, but your

attorney, of course, going is going to make a motion at the time of

sentencing to strike some of the prior convictions so it may become

less, but that’s not a promise. Do you understand that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] And probation is not an option in this case. It will be a prison

sentence. It just depends on how long. But the maximum is 79-

years-to-life. Do you understand that? 

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am. 

[THE COURT:] And -- 

THE COURT: Is it 85 percent or -- he has to serve -- I always get confused.

[PROSECUTOR:] No. It -- if he were -- if you were to strike a prior, it will be 80

percent. If you don’t strike a prior, it’s -- a minimum of 25

calendar years in addition to an indeterminate sentence.
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[THE COURT:] Do you understand that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

RT 43-45 (emphasis added).

[THECOURT:] Has anyonemade any promises to you other than what we promised

--Ipromised you here today? And I didn’t promise you very much.

The only thing we promised is that we -- the district attorney is going

to dismiss some of the charges, but it will still leave three of the

burglaries andwe really didn’t promise you anything other than life

in state prison. Has anyone promised you anything else?

[SMITH:] No, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] All right. You understand the -- your attorney is going to make a

motion and try to get me to dismiss or to strike some of the prior

convictions. But that’s not a promise that I will do that. You

understand that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] So when you come in for sentencing and I say no, I’m not striking

anything, I’m not dismissing anything, you can’t just turn around

and say, gee, that’s not what we agreed upon and I want to

withdraw my plea. It’s not going to work. Do you understand

that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

RT 52-53 (emphasis added).

Smith also submitted a declaration from his appellate counsel, who recounted a

conversation with attorney Jacobs. Smith's appellate counsel declared that attorney Jacobs denied

thatshe hadmisledSmith aboutthe terms of the offer and denied thatshemade any promisesto

Smith. Attorney Jacobs viewed Smith’s case as a “close case” regarding whether one of the prior

strike convictions would be dismissed and said she had told Smith she hoped the court would “go

ourway” but did not promise that Smith would not receive a sentence under the Three Strikes Law.

(Petition, Exh. 5, ¶ 3).

Smith does not reconcile the statements of his former counsel or Smith’s own testimony

atthe plea colloquywith the declarationsfromhimand hisfamily. He does not explain why he

agreed to the plea and told the court that no promises had been made if he was in fact promised that

the judge would “go his way,” strike at least one of the prior convictions, and give him a
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determinate sentence. The declarations from Smith's family members also are not persuasive.

Smith'ssistersstated they had attended allthe courtsessions(and his wife stated she had attended

some ofthe court appearances) and all claim to have been shocked when Smith received a 25 years

to life sentence. Like Smith himself, none of his family members explain how they could have

heard the plea colloquy – in which Smith repeatedly acknowledged no promise had been made to

himand hewassubjectto a sentence of 79 yearsto life – and nonetheless been shockedwhen a

25 yearsto life sentencewasimposed.Moreover, there is no explanation of why his sister Susan

pleadedwith the court attheRomero hearing notto sentenceSmith to life imprisonment ifshe

was underthe impression he had been promised a sentence of 5-7 years or 10-15 years. Compare

RT69-70withPetition,Exh.4, ¶ 3. Finally, even if believed, the declarations from the family

memberswould be of limited value and could atmost corroborateSmith's declaration because

each ofthe family-member declarations discusses what attorney Jacobs told that family member

rather than what attorney Jacobs told Smith himself. 

During the plea colloquySmith repeatedly acknowledged that no promises had been made

and specifically denied that any promise to dismiss a prior strike conviction had been made. Smith

also spoke at his Romero hearing--i.e.,the hearing to determine whether any prior conviction

would be dismissed--and did notsuggestthat any promises had beenmade. Smith also did not

object or protest atthe sentencing hearingwhen the court denied hismotion to dismiss his prior

strike convictions and sentenced himto 25 yearsto life under three strikes. The record reveals

that,in addition to the plea colloquy,Smith and hisfamily acknowledged that he might receive a

life sentence. Several letters were submitted for the court to consider during sentencing. Two of

the lettersfromSmith’sfamily acknowledged that Smith might receive a life sentence under the

Three Strikes Law. One letter stated, “if they give him 3 serikes . . . thay don’t have to tack he’s

life ifhe did not do nothing.” CT355 (errorsin original). Another family member wrote, “people

have been telling me you will prombly get life or 20 to 30 years in jail.” CT 266 (strikeout in

original). Family members were also allowed to address the judge during the Romero hearing.

Smith’ssister Susan stated, “All Iwantto say isinstead oflockingmy brother up for the rest of
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hislife,please just give hima chance. . . ” and “[d]on’t lock him up for life, please, Your Honor.”

RT 69-70. 

The foregoing demonstratesthatthe sentence imposed was no greater than that to which

Smith agreed. The trial court specified and Smith agreed that he could be sentenced to a maximum

term of 79 years to life. The trial court specifically alerted Smith to the fact that although his

attorneywould “try” to persuade the judge to dismiss one of Smith’s priors,the judgemade no

promises that she would do so. RT 53. 

Smith offers no persuasive evidence thatsupports his assertionsthat he was misled by

counsel. Smith’s declarations are insufficient to rebut the “strong presumption of verity” afforded

hissolemn declarationsin open court. SeeBlackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see

also Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir 1999) (finding habeas petitioner’s alleged

“subjective” impressions insufficient to undermine his own statements at the plea colloquy);

Slevin v.UnitedStates,71F.Supp.2d 348,356-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (requiring some “objective

evidence” to support petitioner’s self-serving allegations because convicted prisoner faces

tremendous incentives to fabricate allegations of misconduct in an attempt to avoid incarceration).

The record showsthat Smith was accurately informed of the 79 yearsto life maximum

sentence that the court could impose. Smith’s own statements in court show he understood he

could receive a 79 years to life sentence. The court advised Smith that if none of his strikes were

dismissed he could not decide “‘that’s notwhatwe agreed upon and I want to withdraw my plea.’”

RT53. Smith agreed, yet this is precisely what Smith has done in his habeas petition. When he

pled no contest, Smith acknowledged that he faced up to a life sentence and that there were no side

promises orthreats prompting himto plead no contest. He now provides no explanation for the

discrepancy between the record and his allegations. A “disappointed hope for leniency does not,

without more,render a guilty plea invalid.” Conley v.United States, 407 F.2d45,47 (9th.Cir.

1969). 

Smith has notshown deficient performance by counsel and no prejudice resulted from
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counsel’s advice. Havingmade an independent review of the record, this court concludes that the

state courts’rejection ofSmith’s claimwas not an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d at 853. Smith is not entitled to the writ.

CONCLUSION

The petition forwrit of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July_5__, 2005 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL D. SMITH,

Petitioner,

v.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-2358 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

MichaelD.Smith,aCalifornia prisonerincarcerated atCalifornia State Prison - Solano,

filed this prose action seeking awrit of habeas corpus pursuantto 28U.S.C.§ 2254. This matter

is now before the court for consideration of the merits of the habeas petition. For the reasons

discussed below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

 On two successive days in March 1999, Smith and a friend stole computer equipment

from a law office. As they were trying to leave the premises on the second day, they were

confronted by a security guard,who blocked Smith’s truck in the parking lot. Smith fled on foot,

but later was arrested in the State of Washington.
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1 The existence of the two prior "strike" convictions meant that Smith was subject to

sentencing underCalifornia'sThreeStrikesLaw. The Three Strikes Law consists of two almost

identicalstatutory schemes – one adopted by initiative and the other passed by the legislature --

that allowharshersentencesfor defendants who are convicted of felonies and have previously been

convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 667, 1170.12. 

2

Following a no contest plea inSantaClaraCountySuperiorCourt, Smith was convicted of

three counts ofsecond degree burglary. He also admitted he had suffered four prior prison terms

and two prior “strike” convictions.1 In exchange, the district attorney dismissed three counts of

petty theftwith a priortheft-related conviction and one count of receiving stolen property. Smith

moved to have one or both priorstrike convictions dismissed in the interests of justice, under

section 1385. The court denied the motion to dismiss either prior strike conviction, but did

reduce count one to amisdemeanor and struck the terms for the prior prison term enhancement.

Smithwassentenced to two concurrentterms of 25 yearsto life and a concurrent term of one year

for the misdemeanor. 

Smith unsuccessfully appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of

conviction and deniedSmith’s petition forwrit of habeas corpus. The California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review. 

Smith’sfederal habeas petition raises a single claimofineffective assistance of counsel.

Smith claimsthat counselincorrectly advised himthatthe sentencing judge would strike one of

his prior convictions and sentence him to somewhere between five and thirteen years, rather than

the twenty-five yearsto life sentence the judge actually imposed. The court ordered respondent

to showcausewhy the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer. The matter is

now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court hassubjectmatter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction

occurred inSanta Clara County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).
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EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the higheststate court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on themerits of each and every claimthey seek to raise

in federal court. See 28U.S.C.§ 2254(b),(c). The parties do not dispute that state court remedies

were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he isin custody in

violation of the Constitution orlaws ortreaties oftheUnitedStates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petitionmay not be grantedwith respectto any claimthatwas adjudicated on themeritsin state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by theSupreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Underthe ‘contrary to’ clause,a federal habeas courtmay grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to thatreached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

“Underthe ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifiesthe correct governing legal principle from[the]Court’s decisions but

unreasonably appliesthat principle to the facts ofthe prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgmentthatthe relevantstate-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
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orincorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id.at 411. A federal habeas

court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application

of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where, as here, the state court

gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner'sfederal claim. In such a case, a

review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was

objectively reasonable. SeeHimes v.Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). The federal

court should conduct “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. In considering

such a case, no deference under §2254(e) to factual findings is required because a summary

decision by a state court does not “implicitly” make any factual findings in support of the decision.

SeeFisher v.Roe,263F.3d906,913 (9thCir.2001)(refusing to inferfactualfindings from state

court summary denial of habeas petition).

DISCUSSION

Smith claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his lawyer

incorrectly advised himthatthe sentencing judgewould strike one of his prior convictions and

sentence him to somewhere between five and thirteen years, rather than the longer 25 years to life

sentence the judge actually imposed. The California Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court rejected the claim, but neither discussed it in a reasoned opinion. 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance,of counsel. Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668,686 (1984). A defendant who

enters a guilty plea on the advice of counsel may generally only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character ofthe guilty plea by showing thatthe advice he received from counsel was not within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. SeeHill v.Lockhart,474U.S.52,

56 (1985);Tollett v.Henderson,411U.S.258,267 (1973). A defendant must satisfy the two-part

standard ofStrickland,466U.S.at 687,i.e.that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
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deficient performance prejudiced his defense,and establish the prejudice requirement by showing

thatthere is a reasonable probability that,butfor counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial. SeeHill,474U.S.at 57-59;Iaea v.Sunn,800F.2d861,

864-65 (9th Cir. 1986).

The record before this court is the same one that was before the California Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court: the transcripts of the plea colloquy and sentencing as well as

declarations from Smith, his wife, his two sisters, and his appellate counsel concerning the

statements made by trial counsel who advised on the plea. Upon due consideration, this court

reaches the same conclusion the state courts did and rejects the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. As will be seen below, the transcripts flatly contradict the declarations from Smith and his

family, clearly showing there was no promise regarding the sentence.

Smith statesin his declaration that on several occasions before he pled no-contest, attorney

Jacobs "toldme that,ifI did so, Judge Kim would not sentence me to life imprisonment. [¶] Ms.

Jacobssaid thatJudgeKimwas a fairjudge and thatshe would strike one of my strike convictions

and would sentence me to somewhere between five and thirteen yearsimprisonment. On one

occasion,Ms.Jacobstoldme,'Michael,you're not going to getlife.'" Petition, Exh. 1 (Michael

Smith Decl.), ¶¶ 3-4.

Smith offers three declarations from his family stating they also heard the false

representations. His sister, Elizabeth Smith, states that defense counsel told her “she could

guarantee [Smith] would ‘not do more than ten years’” if he pled guilty. (Petition, Exh. 2). Smith’s

wife,Rechelle Smith,states that defense counsel told her that Smith “would do ten to fifteen

years,” but “won’t do 25 yearsto life.” (Petition,Exh. 3,¶3). Smith’s other sister, Susan Smith,

claims defense counseltold her “both of his priorstrike convictions would be dropped and the

judge would not give [Smith] a life sentence.” Petition, Exh. 4, ¶ 3). Susan Smith additionally

declares that defense counsel at one point told her Smith would receive a five to seven year

sentence, and at another point that he would probably receive a ten to fifteen year sentence.

The transcript ofthe plea hearing flatly rebuts Smith’s claims regarding the representations
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about his sentence. The following colloquy took place at the change-of-plea hearing:

[THECOURT:] Mr.Smith,I’mgoing to ask you a lot of questions. Listen carefully.

If you don’t understand something, just stop me. You can ask me or

you can ask yourlawyer. Okay? The -- you’re going to plead guilty

or no contest to three charges. All of them are felonies, and all of

themare burglaries ofthe second degree. In other words, burglaries

of a businessrather than a residence. You will also be admitting a

number of priors, prior convictions. Two of them are what’s

commonly known asstrike priors,whichmakesthis a three strikes

case. The strike priors are two robberies that you suffered in

Alameda County. And you will also be admitting four prison priors.

Those are also felony convictions for which you served a prison

sentence. And they are a burglary in Contra Costa County, a burglary

inSanFrancisco County, another burglary in Contra Costa County

and then, again, that robbery in Alameda County. Do you understand

the nature of these charges?

[SMITH:] Yes.

[THECOURT:] Have you discussed the facts and the possible defenses to the charges

with your attorney?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] And do you understand that the maximum time you could be

sentenced to, if I don’t strike any of the prior convictions, then the

maximum is 79-years-to-life in state prison. Do you understand

that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] And it could be less,it can’t bemore but -- obviously can’t, but your

attorney, of course, going is going to make a motion at the time of

sentencing to strike some of the prior convictions so it may become

less, but that’s not a promise. Do you understand that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] And probation is not an option in this case. It will be a prison

sentence. It just depends on how long. But the maximum is 79-

years-to-life. Do you understand that? 

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am. 

[THE COURT:] And -- 

THE COURT: Is it 85 percent or -- he has to serve -- I always get confused.

[PROSECUTOR:] No. It -- if he were -- if you were to strike a prior, it will be 80

percent. If you don’t strike a prior, it’s -- a minimum of 25

calendar years in addition to an indeterminate sentence.
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[THE COURT:] Do you understand that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

RT 43-45 (emphasis added).

[THECOURT:] Has anyonemade any promises to you other than what we promised

--Ipromised you here today? And I didn’t promise you very much.

The only thing we promised is that we -- the district attorney is going

to dismiss some of the charges, but it will still leave three of the

burglaries andwe really didn’t promise you anything other than life

in state prison. Has anyone promised you anything else?

[SMITH:] No, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] All right. You understand the -- your attorney is going to make a

motion and try to get me to dismiss or to strike some of the prior

convictions. But that’s not a promise that I will do that. You

understand that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

[THE COURT:] So when you come in for sentencing and I say no, I’m not striking

anything, I’m not dismissing anything, you can’t just turn around

and say, gee, that’s not what we agreed upon and I want to

withdraw my plea. It’s not going to work. Do you understand

that?

[SMITH:] Yes, ma’am.

RT 52-53 (emphasis added).

Smith also submitted a declaration from his appellate counsel, who recounted a

conversation with attorney Jacobs. Smith's appellate counsel declared that attorney Jacobs denied

thatshe hadmisledSmith aboutthe terms of the offer and denied thatshemade any promisesto

Smith. Attorney Jacobs viewed Smith’s case as a “close case” regarding whether one of the prior

strike convictions would be dismissed and said she had told Smith she hoped the court would “go

ourway” but did not promise that Smith would not receive a sentence under the Three Strikes Law.

(Petition, Exh. 5, ¶ 3).

Smith does not reconcile the statements of his former counsel or Smith’s own testimony

atthe plea colloquywith the declarationsfromhimand hisfamily. He does not explain why he

agreed to the plea and told the court that no promises had been made if he was in fact promised that

the judge would “go his way,” strike at least one of the prior convictions, and give him a
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determinate sentence. The declarations from Smith's family members also are not persuasive.

Smith'ssistersstated they had attended allthe courtsessions(and his wife stated she had attended

some ofthe court appearances) and all claim to have been shocked when Smith received a 25 years

to life sentence. Like Smith himself, none of his family members explain how they could have

heard the plea colloquy – in which Smith repeatedly acknowledged no promise had been made to

himand hewassubjectto a sentence of 79 yearsto life – and nonetheless been shockedwhen a

25 yearsto life sentencewasimposed.Moreover, there is no explanation of why his sister Susan

pleadedwith the court attheRomero hearing notto sentenceSmith to life imprisonment ifshe

was underthe impression he had been promised a sentence of 5-7 years or 10-15 years. Compare

RT69-70withPetition,Exh.4, ¶ 3. Finally, even if believed, the declarations from the family

memberswould be of limited value and could atmost corroborateSmith's declaration because

each ofthe family-member declarations discusses what attorney Jacobs told that family member

rather than what attorney Jacobs told Smith himself. 

During the plea colloquySmith repeatedly acknowledged that no promises had been made

and specifically denied that any promise to dismiss a prior strike conviction had been made. Smith

also spoke at his Romero hearing--i.e.,the hearing to determine whether any prior conviction

would be dismissed--and did notsuggestthat any promises had beenmade. Smith also did not

object or protest atthe sentencing hearingwhen the court denied hismotion to dismiss his prior

strike convictions and sentenced himto 25 yearsto life under three strikes. The record reveals

that,in addition to the plea colloquy,Smith and hisfamily acknowledged that he might receive a

life sentence. Several letters were submitted for the court to consider during sentencing. Two of

the lettersfromSmith’sfamily acknowledged that Smith might receive a life sentence under the

Three Strikes Law. One letter stated, “if they give him 3 serikes . . . thay don’t have to tack he’s

life ifhe did not do nothing.” CT355 (errorsin original). Another family member wrote, “people

have been telling me you will prombly get life or 20 to 30 years in jail.” CT 266 (strikeout in

original). Family members were also allowed to address the judge during the Romero hearing.

Smith’ssister Susan stated, “All Iwantto say isinstead oflockingmy brother up for the rest of
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hislife,please just give hima chance. . . ” and “[d]on’t lock him up for life, please, Your Honor.”

RT 69-70. 

The foregoing demonstratesthatthe sentence imposed was no greater than that to which

Smith agreed. The trial court specified and Smith agreed that he could be sentenced to a maximum

term of 79 years to life. The trial court specifically alerted Smith to the fact that although his

attorneywould “try” to persuade the judge to dismiss one of Smith’s priors,the judgemade no

promises that she would do so. RT 53. 

Smith offers no persuasive evidence thatsupports his assertionsthat he was misled by

counsel. Smith’s declarations are insufficient to rebut the “strong presumption of verity” afforded

hissolemn declarationsin open court. SeeBlackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see

also Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir 1999) (finding habeas petitioner’s alleged

“subjective” impressions insufficient to undermine his own statements at the plea colloquy);

Slevin v.UnitedStates,71F.Supp.2d 348,356-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (requiring some “objective

evidence” to support petitioner’s self-serving allegations because convicted prisoner faces

tremendous incentives to fabricate allegations of misconduct in an attempt to avoid incarceration).

The record showsthat Smith was accurately informed of the 79 yearsto life maximum

sentence that the court could impose. Smith’s own statements in court show he understood he

could receive a 79 years to life sentence. The court advised Smith that if none of his strikes were

dismissed he could not decide “‘that’s notwhatwe agreed upon and I want to withdraw my plea.’”

RT53. Smith agreed, yet this is precisely what Smith has done in his habeas petition. When he

pled no contest, Smith acknowledged that he faced up to a life sentence and that there were no side

promises orthreats prompting himto plead no contest. He now provides no explanation for the

discrepancy between the record and his allegations. A “disappointed hope for leniency does not,

without more,render a guilty plea invalid.” Conley v.United States, 407 F.2d45,47 (9th.Cir.

1969). 

Smith has notshown deficient performance by counsel and no prejudice resulted from
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counsel’s advice. Havingmade an independent review of the record, this court concludes that the

state courts’rejection ofSmith’s claimwas not an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d at 853. Smith is not entitled to the writ.

CONCLUSION

The petition forwrit of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July_5__, 2005 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge