Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02020/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angel Florentino
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United s·tates Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

January 7, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINIONS 

Re: No. 90-2020; U.S.A. v. Florentino 

Filed December 28, 1990 

Please make the following two corrections in the opinion of 

this court filed December 28, 1990: 

Page 5, add the missing parenthesis before the word "when". 

Page 10, correct the spelling of the word "rejected". 

tas 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

""---

Deputy 

::#_ 

Clerk 

?U ~ ~ 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

P·ILED 

United Stste5 Court of Appeals 

Tenth .circuit 

DEC 2 8 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

vs. 

ANGEL 

MESA, 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee. ) 

} No. 90-2020 

) 

) 

FLORENTINO, a/k/a JOSE ) 

a/k/a MANUEL MARTINEZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D. C. No. CR-89-356) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Charles L. Barth, 

Assistant u. s. Attorney, 200 E. Griggs, Room E-108, Las Cruces, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Richard C. Cauble, 303 N. Alameda, Suite B, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, 

District Judge** 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

** Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 2 
Defendant-appellant, Angel Florentino (hereinafter 

Florentino), challenges the sentence imposed upon him after his 

plea of guilty to a single count of transporting illegal aliens 

and aiding and abetting in violation of 8 u.s.c. § 1324(a)(1)(B) 

and 18 U.S.C § 2. 1 Florentino contends that the district court 

erred in double counting his prior convictions when it calculated 

his offense level and criminal history category under the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 28 u.s.c. § 994(a). He also 

objects to the court using the same prior convictions as a basis 

for sentencing him at the top of the applicable guideline range, 

thus effecting multiple counting. Our jurisdiction arises under 

18 u.s.c. §3742(a). 

We affirm. 

Background 

The facts in this case are straightforward and are not in 

dispute. On August 17, 1989, Florentino was driving a car 

accompanied by a van near a United States Border Patrol checkpoint 

on Interstate 10, Dona Ana County, New Mexico. Both vehicles were 

stopped by the Border Patrol and ten illegal aliens from the 

Republic of Mexico were found in the van. The van was driven by 

Florentino's co-defendant, who admitted that both vehicles were 

traveling together. In addition, Florentino stated that he was to 

receive $3,000 for transporting the aliens to California. On 

September 14, 1989, Florentino was indicted on four counts of 

1 

The district court entered judgment on January 

defendant-appellant filed a timely notice of appeal 

1990 pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules 

Procedure. 

2 

29, 1990. The 

on January 30, 

of Appellate 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 3 
transporting aliens but in return for his guilty plea, the 

government dismissed Counts II, III, and IV. 

The probation officer calculated Florentino's base offense 

level at nine pursuant to § 2L1.1 of the Guidelines, titled 

Smugglingt Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2L1.1. That section permits the adjustment of the base offense 

level upon a finding of the following specific 

characteristics: 

(1) If the defendant committed the 

offense other than for profit and without 

knowledge that the alien was excludable 

under B u.s.c. §1182(a)(27}, (28), (29), 

decrease by three levels. (2) If the 

defendant previously has been convicted 

of smuggling, transporting, or harboring 

an unlawful alien, or a related offense, 

increase by two levels. (3) If the 

defendant is an unlawful alien who has 

been deported· {voluntarily or 

involuntarily) on one or more occasions 

prior to the instant offense, and the 

offense level determined above is less 

than level B, increase to level 8.2 

offense 

The Presentence Report indicated that Florentino had two 

prior convictions for illegally transporting aliens, which 

increased his offense level by two points from nine to eleven 

under§ 2L1.1(b)(2). This level was then decreased by two points 

to a total offense level of nine because Florentino accepted 

responsibililty for his crime. u.s.s.G. § 3E1.1. 

Florentino's criminal history category was determined to be 

IV based on: (l)two prior felony convictions, and (2) the fact 

2 

The defendant was sentenced January 11, 1990, under the 

guidelines as they existed prior to the amendments which became 

effective November, 1 1990. See United States Sentencing 

Commission, Guidelines Manual, Appendix Cat C.l84-85. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 4 
that he had committed the offense while on probation. Appellant's 

Brief at vii (citing Presentence Report at 6.) An offense level 

of nine at criminal history category IV subjected Florentino to a 

guideline range of twelve to eighteen months' imprisonment. See 

I R., doc. 18, at 2. The district judge determined that there was 

no need to hold an evidentiary hearing because there were no 

disputed facts. He sentenced Florentino to the maximum 

imprisonment term of eighteen months, plus two years of 

conditional supervised release, and a fifty dollar penalty 

assessment. II R. at 9-10. 

I. 

18 u.s.c. § 3742(e) sets forth the standard for review of 

sentences imposed under the Guidelines. It provides: 

Upon review of the record, the court of appeals 

shall determine whether t he sentence -

(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an 

incorrect application of the sentencing 

guidelines; 

(3) is outside the applicable guideline 

range, and is unreasonable, having regard 

for - (A) the factors to be considered in 

imposing a sentence, as set forth in 

chapter 227 of this title; and 

(B) the reasons for imposition of the 

particular sentence, as stated by the 

district court pursuant to the provisions 

of section 3553(c); or 

(4) was imposed for an offense for which 

there is no applicable sentencing 

guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 

The court of appeals shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the district court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the 

findings of fac t of the district court unless they 

are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference 

to the district court's application of the 

guidelines to the facts. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 5 
Thus, while we review the factual findings of a district 

court under the clearly erroneous standard, and while we give due 

deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to 

the facts, when that application involves contested issues of law, 

we review de novo. States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1560 (lOth 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723 (lOth Cir. 

1990). See also United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1469 

(lOth Cir. 1990) when "the issue •... turns primarily on the 

legal interpretation of a guideline term, [or on) which of several 

offense conduct guidelines most appropriately apply to the facts 

as found, . . . the standard moves closer to de nQYQ 

review.'")(quoting United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 

(4th Cir. 1989)). Here Florentino does not challenge the factual 

findings of the district court. 

judge misapplied § 2L1.1 because 

He contends only that the trial 

his sentence was based on 

impermissible multiple-counting of his prior convictions. United 

States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1461 (lOth Cir. 1990 ) . See also 

United States v. Reyes-Ruiz, 868 F.2d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 

1989)(whether prior conviction falls within scope of§ 2L1.1(b)(2) 

is question of law reviewed de novo). 

Our research indicates that we have not yet addressed the 

sentence enhancement provision of§ 2L1.1(b)(2). 

II. 

Congress adopted the Guidelines "to enhance the ability of 

the criminal justice system to reduce crime through an effective, 

fair sentencing system." 

comment., at 1.2 (1989). 

U. s. S. G. Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A, intra. 

Congress sought to achieve this goal by 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 6 
promoting three fundamental sentencing principles: honesty, 

uniformity and propor ionality. Id. Accordingly, the Sentencing 

Commission has expressed a strong presumption in favor of using 

the Guidelines to advance those principles. See Id. at .1.5. See 

also 18 u.s.c. §3553(b)(imposition of sentence should be within 

guideline range unless appropriate mitigating or aggravating 

circumstances exist). 

We have noted that because of the sentencing goals of 

uniformity and proportionality, judges should depart from the 

Guidelines range "only when necessary." United States v. Jackson, 

~.2d ___ , (lOth Cir. 1990)(en bane), slip op. at 5. See 

United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1989). 

Furthermore, 

a statute 

the Guidelines should be interpreted as if they were 

or court rule: therefore we follow the clear, 

unambiguous language of the 

manifestation of contrary intent. 

F.2d 811, 813 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

A. 

guidelines unless there is a 

United States v. Goldbaum, 879 

We believe the language of § 2Ll.l is clear and unambiguous 

and reflects the Sentencing Commission's intention to have prior 

convictions for transporting illegal aliens count towards 

increasing both a defendant's offense level and criminal history 

category. Application of Note 4 to the Section clearly states 

that "[t]he adjustment under § 2Ll.1(b)(2) for a previous 

conviction is in addition to any points added to the criminal 

history score for such conviction in Chapter Four, Part A 

(Criminal History) . " U.S. S. G. § 2Ll.l (b) ( 2) comment ( n. 4) 

(emphasis added). In addition, the Background to § 2Ll.l 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 7 
emphasizes that crimes for which sentences are discussed.in this 

section are especially serious and advocates sentence enhancement 

for prior convictions. It states in relevant part: 

This section includes the most serious immigration 

offenses covered under the Immigration Reform and 

Control Act of 1986 . . A second specific 

offense characteristic provides an enhancement if 

the defendant was previously convicted of a similar 

offense." See u.s.s.G. §2Ll.l, comment (backg' d). 

Further evidence of the seriousness with which the Sentencing 

Commission views these offenses is found at § 3D1.2. This section 

of the Guidelines provides for the grouping of certain types of 

offenses and some amelioration in sentencing for them. "In 

essence, counts that are grouped together are treated as 

constituting a single offense for purposes of the guidelines." 

Part D-Multiple Counts, Introductory Commentary. Offenses such as 

transporting unlawful aliens covered by§ 2Ll.l are classified 

with offenses which are specifically excluded from the grouping 

process. 

We conclude that the sentencing judge properly applied the 

express terms of § 2Ll.l(b)(2) when he increased Florentino's 

offense level by two points because of his two prior convictions 

for transporting i llegal aliens. The judge also acted correctly 

when he followed the express language of Note 4, § 2Ll.l(b)(2) in 

considering the same convictions again for sentence enhancement 

purposes by adding five points to Florentino's criminal history 

category. u.s.s.G. § 2Ll.l(b)(2), comment. (n.4). 

United States v. Martinez-Pe rez, 916 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 

1990)(prior convictions for transporting aliens increase both 

offense level and criminal history category). Another two points 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 8 
were added because he committed the instant offense while on 

parole, but these are not contested by Florentino. 

§ 4Al.l(d). See Brief for Appellee at 5. 

rd. at 

B. 

Florentino contends that the Supreme Court rejects double or 

multiple · counting or the imposition of multiple punishments for 

one offense, absent a clear expression of legislative intent to 

the contrary. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 

(1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 u.s. 6, 12-13 (1978); United 

States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990). He 

further argues that the Sentencing Commission has also sought to 

avoid double counting in certain conte xts. See~· g., u.s.s.G. 

§ 3Cl.l, comment. (n.4)(obstruction of justice enhancement not 

applicable to offenses such as contempt and bribery of witness); 

id. § 3Dl. 2, comment. (n. 5) (combined offense level for "Groups of 

Closely Related Counts" prevents double counting). 

Although these general propositions have support, 

Florentino's position is not persuasive to us. As we noted 

earlier, the guidelines are to be construed as if they were 

statutes or court rules and, in the absence of any contrary 

intent, we must apply their clear and unambiguous terms. We 

believe the Sentencing Commission has amply expressed its 

intention to count prior convictions for alien transportation as 

the district judge did here. Indeed, both the general application 

principles of the guidelines as well as the specific language at 

§ 2Ll.l directed the judge to count Florentino's prior convictions 

twice: first, in computing the offense level and, second, in 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 9 
determining the criminal history category. u.s.s.G. 

§ lB.l(b),(f); § 2Ll.l, comment. (n.4). See also. United States v. 

Goldbaum 879 F.2d 811 (lOth Cir. 1989)(criminal history category 

determined independent of the offense conduct level); United 

States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1253 (5th Cir. 1989)(offense 

level increased by two points under § 2Ll.l(b)(2) for prior 

conviction of smuggling aliens). 

Florentino also argues 

c. 

that § 2Ll. 1 (b) ( 2 ) 's sentence 

enhancement provision is arbitrary and unfair because it applies 

only to prior convictions for alien transportation. Brief for 

Appellant at 2. we disagree. 

In United States v. Thomas, 884 F~2d 540, 543 (lOth Cir. 

1989), we noted Congress' power to control judicial sentencing 

discretion; this includes "the power to specify the factors that 

a court may consider in setting a sentence." United States v. 

Sorensen, 915 F.2d 599, 602 (lOth Cir. 1990)(quoting United States 

v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1990)). Congress 

delegated this "factor-specifying" power to the 

Commission which reviewed over 40,000 cases and 

Sentencing 

carefully 

scrutinized 10,000 of them before formulating sentencing standards 

in the Guidelines. rd.; u.s.s.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, i ntra. comment., 

at 1.10. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 

As a result of this comprehensive review, the Sentencing 

Commission determined that alien transportation offenses are 

especially serious. u.s.s.G. § 2Ll.l, comment (backg'd). The 

Sentencing Commission is free to decide the extent to which prior 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 10 
convictions for such offenses constitute a specific aggravating 

factor that warrants an increase to§ 2Ll.l.'s base offense level. 

Whether this specific aggravating factor or the degree of 

enhancement it triggers is wise is not for us to decide. See 

United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1990). 

In any event, we hold that § 2Ll.l's cumulative sentence 

enhancement provision the use of prior convictions for a 

mandatory two point increase in offense level in§ 2Ll.l(b)(2) and 

the counting of those convictions again in computing Florentino's 

criminal history category - is not arbitrary and, therefore, is 

constitutional. In fact, § 2Ll.l(b)(2) reduces the liklihood of 

arbitrariness by imposing a uniform methodology for calculating 

sentences for the transportation of aliens. 

D. 

Florentino further argues that the trial court was not bound 

to follow the double counting provision of § 2Ll.l and should have 

adjusted his criminal history category downward or declined to 

make the upward adjustment in offense level based upon the same 

prior offenses. He claims essentially that the court erred in not 

departing downward from the guidelines. 

In United States v. Goldbaum, we rejectd a double counting 

claim and affirmed a district court's sentence for the underlying 

offense of escape. The base offense level for escape was 13. 

Moreover, the judge counted the offense a second time under 

§ 4Al.l(d} and (e) of the Guidelines by adding three points to the 

defendant's criminal history category because the offense was 

committed while he was imprisoned. 879 F.2d 811, 812. See 18 

u.s.c. § 751(a); u.s.s.G. § 4Al.l(d),(e). Our affirmance in 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 11 
Goldbaum was based in large part on the express language of the 

guidelines. 879 F.2d 811, 813-14; see 18 u.s.c. § 751(a); 

u.s.s.G. § 4A1.1(d),(e). We noted that under traditional rules of 

statutory interpretation, courts should presume that Congress 

intended to exclude other exceptions to the general application 

principles, not expressly stated in the guidelines. 879 F.2d 811, 

813. See United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720, 723 (lOth Cir. 

1989) cert. denied, ___ u.s. ___ , 110 s.ct. 1786, 108 L.Ed.2d 788 

(1990). 

Florentino does not have a right to a departure from 

§ 2L1.1's mandatory enhancement language unless specifically 

mandated by statute. See United States v. La Guardia, 902 F2. 

1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1990). Because there is no express exception 

to§ 2L1.1(b)(2)'s enhancement provision, the judge did not commit 

a legal error in refusing to depart from the guidelines by 

increasing both Florentino's offense level and criminal history 

category. 

judge had 

Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the sentencing 

discretion to depart from the § 2Ll.l's enhancement 

provision, we have held that such discretionary refusals are not 

appealable when the sentence is within the guideline range, as in 

the instant case. E. g., United States v. Adams. 914 F.2d 1404, 

1409 (lOth Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 

882 (lOth Cir. 1990)(18 u.s.c. §3742 does not grant appellate 

jurisdiction over a district court's discretionary refusal to 

depart downward from the guidelines). And, Florentino's final 

contention that the sentencing judge improperly counted his prior 

convictions a third time when he elected to sentence him at the 

11 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 12 
top of the guideline range is not persuasive. The judge did what 

the Guidelines permitted by choosing the sentence from within the 

permissible bounds. See United States v. Garcia, ___ F.2d 

(lOth Cir. No. 89-2193 11/30/90). 

A F F I R M E D. 

12 

Appellate Case: 90-2020 Document: 01019616481 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 13