Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-40182/USCOURTS-ca5-09-40182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kerianne Green
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40182

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

KERIANNE GREEN,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC 7:08-CR-1411

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

In this appeal, we review Defendant-Appellant Kerianne Green’s (“Green”)

sentence resulting from a guilty-plea conviction for knowingly and willfully

making and causing to be made a false statement in the records of a federally

licensed firearms dealer, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(1)(A) & 2. Concluding

that the district court erred in sentencing Green, we vacate and remand for

resentencing. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 6, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Green purchased five Beretta pistols in McAllen, Texas which she then

smuggled into Mexico for her common-law spouse, Gabriel Gardea (“Gardea”),

and a man identified in the presentence report as FNU LNU. For her straw

purchases, Green was paid $1,500 in cash.

After being apprehended by Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm

agents, Green admitted her part in the scheme. The probation officer assigned

Green a base offense level of 12. She received two additional levels because she

purchased five firearms for Gardea and FNU LNU. Although Green purchased

firearms to transfer to Gardea and FNU LNU, the probation officer concluded

that Green’s sentence should not be increased by four levels for trafficking

firearms under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) because there was insufficient evidence

that Gardea and FNU LNU were “individuals whose possession or receipt of the

firearm[s] would be unlawful.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, com. n.13(A). With no

further enhancements or reductions, Green’s total offense level was 14, which,

when combined with her criminal history category of I, yielded a guidelines

range of 15 to 21 months in prison. 

The Government objected to the probation officer’s failure to recommend

that the district court impose the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5).

The Government argued that the probation officer failed to recognize that

Application Note 13 also provides that the enhancement should be imposed

where the firearms are transported or transferred to “individuals who intend to

use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, com. n.13(A).

Green responded that the enhancement was not applicable because there was

no evidence showing that she knew that Gardea and FNU LNU’s intended use

or disposition of the firearms would be unlawful. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court granted Green two levels off

of her total offense level for acceptance of responsibility. In relation to the

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 To encapsulate the final guideline offense level calculations: 1

Base offense level 12

Enhancement for number of firearms +2

Enhancement for trafficking +4

Minor role reduction -2

Reduction for acceptance of responsibility -3

TOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL 13

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Government’s argument that Green’s sentence should be enhanced, the district

court found that Green was “not buying a gun and giving it to somebody who she

knows is going to use it to bird hunt or deer hunt, [sic] or target practice.”

Instead, the court found that Green was buying a gun and taking it “into Mexico

where you can’t get these guns. Where there’s common knowledge that guns are

predominately used by drug trafficking organizations.” Accordingly, the district

court concluded that the four-level enhancement was warranted. The court

found, however, that Green was a minor participant in the scheme. Because the

district court’s finding that the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement applied put Green’s

offense level above 16, the Government moved for an additional point reduction

for acceptance of responsibility, which the court granted. Green’s total offense

level was 13, which resulted in an advisory guideline range of 12 to 18 months

in prison. The court sentenced Green to 12 months and one day in prison. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Green avers that the district court clearly erred in imposing the four-level

enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5). The district court’s application of the

Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed

for clear error. United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir.

2008). “In regard to guideline enhancements, the district court may adopt facts

contained in the PSR without inquiry, so long as the facts have an adequate

evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence.” United

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States v. Caldwell, 448 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2006). In determining whether

an enhancement applies, a district court is permitted to draw reasonable

inferences from the facts, and these inferences are factual findings reviewed for

clear error as well. United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324, 1326 (5th Cir.

1990). This court upholds a district court’s factual finding on clear error review

so long as the enhancement is plausible in light of the record as a whole. United

States v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560, 584 (5th Cir. 2006). The Government must

prove sentencing enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence. United

States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Where a defendant is convicted of a firearms possession offense, the

guidelines provide for a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant engaged in

the trafficking of firearms[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). The application notes

instruct that this enhancement applies where the defendant:

(I) transported, transferred, or otherwise disposed of two or more

firearms to another individual, or received two or more firearms

with the intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of

firearms to another individual; and 

(ii) knew or had reason to believe that such conduct would result in the

transport, transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individual– 

(I) whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful;

or 

(II) who intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.

Id., com. n.13(A).

The first point, that Green transferred two or more firearms to another

person, is not in dispute. At sentencing, the Government did not argue, and the

district court did not find that Gardea or FNU LNU were persons prohibited

from the possession or receipt of firearms. But the district court did find that

Green “knew . . . that she was transferring more than one weapon to somebody

whose intended use of the weapon was for unlawful purposes.” Green avers that

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the Government failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she

knew or had reason to believe that Gardea or FNU LNU intended to use or

dispose of the firearms unlawfully. She argues that the district court’s findings

that: (1) “you can’t get these guns” in Mexico; (2) it was “common knowledge

that guns are predominately used by drug trafficking organizations;” and (3) she

was “not buying a gun and giving it to somebody who she knows is going to use

it to bird hunt or deer hunt, [sic] or target practice” were not based on anything

in the record. Therefore, Green argues that the Government’s preponderance of

the evidence burden was not satisfied. 

While there is no case law in our circuit directly on point, several cases

from our sister circuits have examined this particular issue. In United States v.

Grinnage, 309 F. App’x 334 (11th Cir. 2009)(unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit

found that the Government, through its use of indirect evidence, established by

a preponderance of the evidence that Grinnage had reason to believe that he was

transferring firearms to individuals who intended to dispose of them unlawfully.

The court based its conclusion on a conversation between Grinnage and an

undercover investigator to whom Grinnage transferred the firearms. During

that conversation, the undercover investigator told Grinnage that “the money

from selling the guns was spent on a tattoo parlor ‘to make it look legit.’”

Grinnage, 309 F. App’x at 336. The court reasoned that this conversation

represented indirect evidence of Grinnage’s knowledge that he was transferring

the firearms to an individual who intended to dispose of them unlawfully

because “there would have been no reason for the investigator to make the

money ‘look legit’ unless something illegal was occurring.” Id. 

Similarly in United States v. Marceau, 554 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009), the

First Circuit relied upon indirect evidence to hold that the defendant had reason

to believe that he was transferring firearms to individuals who intended to

dispose of them unlawfully. The court based its holding upon the defendant’s

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pre-arrest statements evincing an intent to traffic the firearms coupled with his

actions which precisely tracked his stated intent. Id. at 32. After stealing the

firearms, the defendant removed their serial numbers and stated that he wanted

to sell them to obtain money to buy drugs. Id. The court concluded that these

events – including most prominently the obliteration of serial numbers, which

is done in anticipation that the guns will be used in criminal activity, were more

than sufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard required for

a four level enhancement. Id. 

Here, in contrast, to Grinnage and Marceau there is no evidence in the

record to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard. The record is

silent about what Green knew, or had reason to believe, with regard to Gardea

and FNU LNU’s plans for the guns. Even if it is assumed that Green knew that

Gardea and FNU LNU were not personally going to use the guns for hunting or

target practice in Mexico, she might still have thought that the guns were

destined for Mexican customers who did intend to engage in these, or other,

innocent pursuits. Moreover, the Government presented no evidence showing

that Berettas could not be obtained in Mexico or that Green knew this to be true.

Likewise, there was no evidence presented by the Government that it is common

knowledge that guns are predominantly used by drug trafficking organizations

and no evidence that Green was aware of this allegedly commonly known fact.

In sum, based upon the record before us the Government failed to meet the

preponderance of evidence standard to warrant an enhancement of Green’s

sentence. Although Green admitted that she bought the firearms in question

and knew her actions were illegal, the record is devoid of any evidence showing

that she knew or had reason to believe that Gardea and FNU LNU intended to

use or dispose of the firearms unlawfully. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Green’s sentence is vacated and we remand for

resentencing. At a new sentencing hearing, the Government may offer evidence

not presented previously to justify the sentence, and Green may offer rebuttal.

United States v. Kinder, 980 F.2d 961, 963 (5th Cir. 1992). We have held that

when a defendant succeeds in having a sentence vacated, on remand “all new

matter relevant to the issue appealed, reversed, and remanded, may be taken

into consideration by the resentencing court.” United States v. Marmolejo, 139

F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1998). A district court should gather “the relevant facts

and evidence on the specific and particular issues heard by the appeals court and

remanded for resentencing.” Id.

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