Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04784/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04784-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Curtis Spears
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4784

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JAMES CURTIS SPEARS,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton 

Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00372-NCT-1)

Submitted: January 22, 2010 Decided: February 25, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher A. Beechler, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

James Curtis Spears pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to one count of distribution of cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2006). The 

district court calculated Spears’ advisory Guidelines 

imprisonment range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(2008) at 262 to 327 months, but granted Spears’ request for a 

downward variance and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ 

imprisonment, the minimum imprisonment term required by statute. 

Spears now appeals. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that the 

appeal is frivolous. Spears was informed of his right to file a 

pro se supplemental brief but has not done so, and the 

Government declined to file a brief. We affirm. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

review. Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing leads 

us to conclude that the district court substantially complied 

with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Spears’ 

guilty plea and that Spears’ substantial rights were not 

infringed. Critically, the transcript reveals that the district 

court ensured that the plea was supported by an independent 

factual basis and that Spears entered the plea knowingly and 

voluntarily with an understanding of the attendant consequences. 

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See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 

(4th Cir. 1991). 

Turning to Spears’ sentence, we review it for 

reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In conducting 

this review, we first examine the sentence for “significant 

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 

[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.” Id. When “rendering a sentence, the district court 

must make an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented,” applying the “relevant § 3553(a) factors to the 

specific circumstances” of the case and the defendant, and “must 

state in open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen 

sentence.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 

If the sentence is free from procedural error, we then 

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008). “Substantive 

reasonableness review entails taking into account the ‘totality 

of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from 

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the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 

473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Even if we

would have imposed a different sentence, “this fact alone is 

insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id. at 

474 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a] 

statutorily required sentence . . . is per se reasonable.” 

United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 129 S. Ct. 743 (2008). 

Here, the district court correctly calculated the 

advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from the parties on 

the appropriate sentence and allocution from Spears. The court 

considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, addressing on the record 

the nature and circumstances of the offense, Spears’ history and 

characteristics, and the need for the sentence to reflect the 

seriousness of Spears’ offense, promote respect for the law, and 

deter Spears. In granting Spears’ request for a downward 

variance, the court explained that it considered the need to 

provide just punishment for Spears. Based on these factors, the 

court concluded that a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment, the 

minimum imprisonment term required by statute, was sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary, to achieve the purposes of 

sentencing. We conclude that the district court adequately 

explained its rationale for imposing the variant sentence and 

that the reasons relied upon by the district court are valid 

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considerations under § 3553(a) and justify the sentence imposed. 

See Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473-76. Further, the 240-month prison 

term was the minimum term required by statute, and a 

statutorily-required prison term is always reasonable. See

Farrior, 535 F.3d at 224. Thus, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Spears. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Spears, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Spears requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Spears. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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