Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16859/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16859-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General for the State of Nevada
Appellee
George W. Gibbs
Appellant
Robert LeGrand
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE W. GIBBS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT LEGRAND, Warden;

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE

OF NEVADA,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-16859

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-00750-

KJD-CWH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Kent J. Dawson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 13, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed September 17, 2014

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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2 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing a

habeas corpus petition as untimely, and remanded for

consideration of the petition on the merits.

The panel held that the petitioner’s attorney’s misconduct

was an extraordinary circumstance which directly caused the

petitioner not to learn that the time for him to file his federal

habeas petition had begun until the time was over – where

counsel did not inform the petitioner that state postconviction proceedings had ended, even though counsel had

pledged to do so, even though the petitioner wrote to his

counsel repeatedly for updates, and even though the time in

which to file a federal habeas petition was swiftly winding

down. The panel also held that the petitioner exercised

reasonable diligence in pursuit of his post-conviction rights

both before and after learning of the Nevada Supreme Court’s

denial of the appeal of his state post-conviction petition.

COUNSEL

Megan C. Hoffman (argued), Debra A. Bookout, and Ryan

Norwood, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Las Vegas,

Nevada, for Petitioner-Appellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 3

Victor-Hugo Schulze, II (argued), Senior Deputy Attorney

General, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Respondents-Appellees.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from a prisoner’s vigorous pursuit of

post-conviction review in the face of egregious misconduct

from his court-appointed lawyers. We focus here on one

serious episode of attorney misconduct: The failure, despite

prisoner-petitioner George Gibbs’s repeated inquiries, to

inform Gibbs that the Nevada Supreme Court denied the

appeal of his state post-conviction petition. By the time

Gibbs learned the fate of his appeal, he had already missed

the one-year deadline for filing a federal habeas corpus

petition.

We hold that the attorney’s conduct amounted to client

abandonment, and that the district court erred by not

recognizing that such abandonment can, in certain

circumstances, constitute an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling of the federal filing deadline. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of

Gibbs’s petition and remand for consideration of the petition

on the merits.

I.

Gibbs was convicted by a Nevada jury for crimes ranging

from manufacture of a controlled substance to possession of

child pornography and received a life sentence with the

possibility of parole. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed

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4 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

his conviction on June 3, 2003. Two instances of attorney

misconduct, not directly relevant here, prevented Gibbs from

properly filing his state petition for post-conviction relief

(“PCR petition”) until 2007.1 That petition was rejected on

the merits, and Gibbs appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. 

Dayvid Figler was appointed to represent Gibbs on the PCR

appeal.

Relations between Gibbs and Figler quickly soured. In

November and December of 2008, Gibbs sent a series of

letters to Figler noting his frustration with Figler’s failure to

communicate with him. Figler did not respond to Gibbs’s

letters, and Gibbs lodged a complaint against Figler with the

Nevada State Bar. The State Bar forwarded the complaint to

Figler’s law firm, Bunin & Bunin, prompting Figler to reach

out to Gibbs. Gibbs, in turn, alerted the State Bar that Figler

was now “on board.” The Bar dismissed the complaint,

informing Gibbs that the “matter has been resolved.”

Figler filed Gibbs’s state PCR appeal with the Nevada

Supreme Court on August 12, 2009. On May 25, 2010, he

wrote to Gibbs on the letterhead of a new firm, Bailus, Cook

& Kelesis, promising to forward him “any receipt of notice

from [the] Supreme Court” (emphasis in original) and

1 First, Gibbs’s attorney on direct appeal refused to hand over Gibbs’s

files. Then, new counsel agreed to file Gibbs’s PCR petition but never did

so. Gibbs was not aware that PCR counsel did not file the promised

petition until the state court ruled that any further petitions were barred as

untimely because the first PCR petition was never filed. Gibbs appealed

the state court’s untimeliness ruling pro se, arguing that his attorney’s

misconduct constituted good cause to overcome the state procedural bar. 

The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and, in November 2006, vacated the

state court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of Gibbs’s petition

on the merits.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 5

inviting him to “send written correspondence to the above

address if you have any questions or concerns.” The letter

also stated, erroneously, that “the time for you to file postconviction relief has not yet started”; in fact, Gibbs was in the

midst of pursuing post-conviction relief.

In June 2010, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the

denial of Gibbs’s PCR petition. Despite his pledge to do so,

Figler did not forward Gibbs the notice from the Nevada

Supreme Court that the petition had been denied. In both

June and October of 2010, unaware that the Nevada Supreme

Court had issued its decision, Gibbs wrote to Figler

expressing his renewed frustration with the attorney’s lack of

communication and offering suggestions about how to

present his case to the Nevada Supreme Court. “I have not

heard from you in over 8 months,” Gibbs complained. “I

never got a response from you, asking you to add the

Melendez case to my opening brief. It was a big concern to

me that you look it over and respond to your thoughts of all

my effort. Figler did not reply.

On December 3, Gibbs wrote to the Nevada Supreme

Court requesting the docket sheet and explaining, “I can not

find my attorney of record.” On December 11, he wrote to

the Nevada State Bar in search of Figler’s address, phone

number and bar number.2 Two days later, on December 13,

he wrote a third letter to Figler, with suggestions for possible

oral argument. The next day, December 14, Gibbs received

the docket sheet from the court and discovered that his appeal

had been rejected six months earlier.

2 The current record does not indicate whether or when the State Bar

provided Gibbs Figler’s address, nor whether the December 13 letter was

correctly addressed.

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6 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

Gibbs promptly took pen to paper to express his

“amazement” at Figler’s unethical conduct. “I have done

everything in my power to locate you to no avail. The

concern [be]came very serious so I wrote the Supreme Court

for a Docket Sheet.” He asked, “what do I do now[?]” and

requested that Figler address his concerns “with simple

communication.” Figler did not respond. On December 20,

Gibbs wrote to the Supreme Court again, requesting copies of

its order affirming the denial of his petition and the remittitur.

Finally, on February 7, 2011, Gibbs wrote to Figler

terminating him as counsel and requesting that he return

Gibbs’s documents within five days.3

“By failing to inform

me you have put me in a terrible position,” Gibbs wrote. 

“[U]nskilled in law” and with “little access to a full law

library service,” he explained that he now faced the “daunting

task” of preparing his own federal habeas petition. Three

weeks later, on February 28, Gibbs’s sister acquired a

“banker’s box” of files from Figler. Gibbs mailed his federal

habeas petition on May 3, 2011, approximately sixty-five

days after his sister procured his files from Figler.

The Warden moved to dismiss, arguing that Gibbs’s

petition was untimely. Gibbs countered that his attorney’s

misconduct entitled him to equitable tolling such that the

petition was timely. The district court granted the motion to

dismiss, ruling that equitable tolling was not merited because

3 The record does not indicate how Gibbs discovered that Figler had

again switched law firms — he was now, apparently, at J.S.L. Law Firm. 

Presumably by this point, the State Bar had provided the address in

response to Gibbs’s request. In any case, the record suggests that Figler’s

change of firms, without notice to Gibbs, made it particularly difficult for

Gibbs to contact him.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 7

Gibbs had “not demonstrated that his counsel was . . .

incompetent,” but only that “he had trouble communicating

with the attorney and that he was not timely informed that his

appeal had been decided.” After the district court issued a

certificate of appealability on the equitable tolling question,

Gibbs brought this appeal.

II.

We review de novo the dismissal of a federal habeas

petition as untimely. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799

(9th Cir. 2003). “If the facts underlying a claim for equitable

tolling are undisputed, the question of whether the statute of

limitations should be equitably tolled is also reviewed de

novo. Otherwise, findings of fact made by the district court

are to be reviewed for clear error.” Id. (citation omitted)

(citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner ordinarily has one year

from the date his state conviction becomes final to file a

habeas corpus petition in federal court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). By statute, the limitations period is tolled

while a properly filed state post-conviction petition is

pending. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Excluding the statutorilytolled period when Gibbs’s postconviction petition was before the Nevada courts, both

parties, and the district court, agree that Gibbs accrued 257

untolled days before the Nevada Supreme Court denied his

PCR appeal. Absent equitable tolling, then, Gibbs had 108

days to file his federal habeas petition, with the limitations

period expiring October 22, 2010. Gibbs did not file his

federal petition until May 3, 2011, 193 days late.

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8 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to

equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649

(2010). A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden

of establishing two elements: (1) “‘that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 

Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).

For Gibbs’s petition to be timely, he has to establish

equitable tolling through at least January 15, 2011.4In

considering whether he had done so, we address the two

Holland requirements for equitable tolling in reverse order,

as the facts of this case lend themselves better to that

treatment.

A. Extraordinary Circumstances

Courts take a flexible, fact-specific approach to equitable

tolling. “[S]pecific circumstances, often hard to predict in

advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate

case.” Id. at 650; see also Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d

1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Consistent with the flexible approach, attorney conduct

compromising the filing of a timely federal habeas petition

4 At oral argument, the Warden objected for the first time to the district

court’s finding that statutory tolling ceased when the Nevada Supreme

Court’s remittitur issued on July 6, 2010, claiming instead that it ceased

when the decision was reached, on June 9, 2010. If equitable tolling is

warranted, it is warranted for the time period when, due to Figler’s

abandonment, Gibbs was unaware that the Nevada Supreme Court had

reached its decision. Thus, whether statutory tolling ended on June 9 or

July 6 is irrelevant to our disposition of this appeal; either date would be

within the equitable tolling period if one is warranted.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 9

can constitute the requisite “extraordinary circumstance” in

some circumstances but not others. Holland held that

“garden variety claim[s] of excusable neglect” — such as

“simple miscalculation” of time limits — do not constitute an

extraordinary circumstance. 560 U.S. at 651–52 (internal

quotation marks omitted). But attorneymisconduct can be so

egregious as to create an “extraordinary circumstance,”

justifying equitable tolling. Id. at 652. In a concurring

opinion, Justice Alito explained his understanding of the logic

behind this framework, reasoning that, “the principal

rationale for disallowing equitable tolling based on ordinary

attorney miscalculation is that the error of an attorney is

constructively attributable to the client and thus is not a

circumstance beyond the litigant’s control.” Id. at 657 (Alito,

J., concurring).

Maples v. Thomas clarified Holland’s distinction between

“garden variety” attorney negligence and egregious attorney

misconduct, drawing on Justice Alito’s Holland concurrence

and casting the distinction in terms of agency principles.5

132 S. Ct. 912, 923–24 (2012). Maples explained that while

agencylaw binds clients, including federal habeas petitioners,

to their attorneys’ negligence, “a client cannot be charged

with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned

him.” Id. at 924. An attorney’s failure to communicate about

5 Maples involved cause for procedural default rather than entitlement

to equitable tolling, but the Supreme Court saw “no reason” why the

distinction between attorney negligence and attorney abandonmentshould

not hold in both contexts. 132 S. Ct. at 924 n.7. Because we hold that

Figler’s conduct amounted to abandonment of his client under the standard

announced in Maples, we do not have occasion to consider whether

attorney misconduct which stops short of effective abandonment could, in

appropriate instances, constitute an extraordinary circumstance supporting

equitable tolling.

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10 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

a key development in his client’s case can, therefore, amount

to attorney abandonment and thereby constitute an

extraordinary circumstance. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923–24;

see also Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 942–43 (9th Cir.

2012).

1.

So, contrary to the district court’s analysis of the

circumstances here, it was absolutely critical that Gibbs “had

trouble communicating with [his] attorney” and “was not

timely informed that his appeal had been decided”: If Gibbs’s

attorney effectively abandoned him, Gibbs cannot be charged

with the knowledge that the Nevada Supreme Court had

denied his appeal.

Failure to inform a client that his case has been decided,

particularly where that decision implicates the client’s ability

to bring further proceedings and the attorney has committed

himself to informing his client of such a development,

constitutes attorney abandonment. See Mackey v. Hoffman,

682 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2012). Attorneys are generally

required to “perform reasonably competent legal work, to

communicate with their clients, to implement clients’

reasonable requests, [and] to keep their clients informed of

key developments in their cases.” Holland, 560 U.S. at

652–53. Gibbs’s attorney failed on all but the first count.6

6 After reciting these general standards, Holland remanded as to whether

there were extraordinary circumstances, because the district court had not

reached the issue. But Holland identified as “serious instances of attorney

misconduct” possibly constituting extraordinary circumstances, several

factors: that Holland’s attorney “failed to file Holland’s federal petition on

time”; did not “do the research necessary to find out the proper filing

date”; “failed to inform Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 11

Our case law confirms that Figler’s behavior in failing to

notify Gibbs of the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision

constituted abandonment, and thereby created extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to justify equitable tolling. Busby,

for example, held that extraordinary circumstances existed

where counsel failed to timely file his client’s habeas petition

despite having promised to do so, even though the petitioner

hired him over a year before the AEDPA deadline, paid him

$20,000, gave him his files and repeatedly inquired about his

case. 661 F.3d at 1012. Likewise, Spitsyn held that an

attorney’s failure to file a habeas petition at all, despite being

hired almost a year before the AEDPA deadline, was

sufficiently egregious to constitute extraordinary

circumstances, where Spitsyn contacted him three times and

filed two complaints with the state bar. 345 F.3d at 798, 801.

Relatedly, we recognized in Ramirez v. Yates that, “‘a

prisoner’s lack of knowledge that the state courts have

reached a final resolution of his case can provide grounds for

equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently in the

matter.’” 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir.

2001)). Although that case dealt with a pro se petitioner who

should have received notification directly from the court, it is

instructive here. If Gibbs had been proceeding pro se, he

would have been entitled to notification from the court, and

the court’s failure to mail him notice of its denial of his PCR

petition would have been an extraordinary circumstance

justifying equitable relief. “Because [Figler] failed to notify

that the Florida Supreme Court had decided his case”; and “failed to

communicate with his client over a period of years,” despite Holland’s

repeated communications and requests that his lawyer do all of these

things. 560 U.S. at 652.

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12 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

the court of his intention to withdraw, [Gibbs] was deprived

of the opportunity to proceed pro se and to personally receive

docket notifications from the court.” Mackey, 682 F.3d at

1253. Here, Gibbs’s lack of actual notice was occasioned by

the breach and abandonment of his attorney, but the result

was the same: Gibbs did not know that the federal limitations

clock had started ticking. Furthermore, as counsel had

expressly promised Gibbs that he would forward him the

court’s notice of decision, it is as true here as it was in

Ramirez that the petitioner’s “ignorance of the limitations

period was caused by circumstances beyond the party’s

control.” Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2001) (en banc).

These cases stand in stark contrast to Towery, where the

attorney’s alleged negligence did not rise to the level of

abandonment or egregious misconduct because he actually

represented his client and filed a habeas petition, albeit an

imperfect one. See 673 F.3d at 936. We reasoned that

Towery’s attorney “diligently pursued habeas relief on

Towery’s behalf, although omitting a colorable constitutional

claim from Towery’s amended petition.” Id. at 942. As the

attorney continued as Towery’s legal representative, even if

his performance was inadequate, his conduct did not

constitute abandonment of his client and did not justify the

conclusion that extraordinary circumstances existed. Id.

In contrast, here, Figler failed to communicate with Gibbs

“over a period of years,” despite repeated efforts by Gibbs to

engage him. Holland, 560 U.S. at 652. That Figler briefly

reappeared after the Nevada State Bar forwarded him Gibbs’s

formal complaint and did bring Gibbs’s PCR appeal does not

excuse his prolonged absence and, most critically, his failure

to inform Gibbs when the state PCR proceedings concluded.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 13

Moreover, Figler went out of his way to guarantee Gibbs

that he would update him about the case: “Upon any receipt

of notice from Supreme Court on your case we will forward

it to you by mail. Please send written correspondence to the

above address if you have any questions or concerns.” 

(Emphasis in original). Gibbs had questions and concerns

and wrote to Figler several times at the address provided. But

Figler did not respond, nor did he alert Gibbs that the Nevada

Supreme Court had denied his appeal. In fact, Figler had

moved to a new firm; his failure to provide Gibbs with an

updated address hampered Gibbs’s ability to communicate

with him. Such egregious conduct is not analogous, as the

Warden would have it, to the conduct in Towery, and is

amenable to only one conclusion: Figler was not serving as

Gibbs’s agent “in any meaningful sense of that word.” 

Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 659

(Alito, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Warden contends that Gibbs “attempts . . . to lower

the governing standard” because, overall, Gibbs’s attorney

was less negligent than Holland’s. This argument

misconstrues Holland. Nothing in that case suggests that the

Court intended Holland’s attorney’s performance to serve as

a floor for the extraordinary circumstances prong of equitable

tolling. The only guidance the Court gave as to what would

not satisfy that prong was that courts should exclude “garden

variety claim[s] of excusable neglect” such as a “simple

miscalculation.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 651 (internal quotation

marks omitted). That Figler may have acted less egregiously

than Holland’s counsel does not compel the conclusion that

Figler’s behavior was not egregious, or that his negligence

was “garden variety.”

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14 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

We therefore conclude that Figler’s egregious conduct

amounted to client abandonment, such that Gibbs is not

responsible for the fact that he did not learn of the Nevada

Supreme Court’s decision until December 14, 2010. See

Rudin v. Myles, No. 12-15362, slip op. at 25 (9th Cir. Sept.

10, 2014).7 We next consider whether Figler’s effective

abandonment and Gibbs’s resulting lack of notice of the

Nevada Supreme Court’s decision caused Gibbs to miss the

federal filing deadline. See Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225,

1229 (9th Cir. 2013).

2.

By the time Gibbs learned that his state post-conviction

proceeding was complete, the federal deadline had passed. 

Although it was technically possible for Gibbs to write to the

Nevada Supreme Court daily to ask about the status of his

state PCR petition, he had no obligation or reason to do so,

given that he was represented and had, moreover, been

specifically promised by his lawyer prompt notice of any

decision. “[This court has] granted equitable tolling in

circumstances where it would have technically been possible

for a prisoner to file a petition, but a prisoner would have

7 We note a striking feature of Rudin: the very same attorney who

abandoned Gibbs, Dayvid Figler, also abandoned Rudin. See Rudin, No.

12-15362, slip op. at 10, 24. The court in Rudin found equitable tolling

warranted on that basis, just as we do. Id. at 25. Rudin’s ultimate holding,

that even tolling the entire period of Figler’s involvement was not

sufficient to render the federal habeas petition timely in that case, relied

on its conclusion that Rudin was not diligent in pursuing her rights once

counsel had been appointed to replace Figler. See id. at 27-28. Because

Gibbs was diligent during and after Figler’s involvement in this case, our

analysis is entirely consistent with Rudin. Figler’s abandonment of both

Gibbs and Rudin is deeply troubling, to say the least.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 15

likely been unable to do so.” Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d

1051, 1054 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008).8 By failing to notify Gibbs of

the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision, Figler created a

situation in which Gibbs, despite his diligence in tracking

down Figler, was extremely unlikely, acting perfectly

reasonably, to meet the AEDPA deadline. Our case law

requires nothing more to establish that the extraordinary

circumstance caused the failure to meet the federal deadline. 

See Sossa, 729 F.3d at 1236; Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054 n.5.

Thus, as a direct result of Figler’s abandonment, Gibbs

did not learn that the state PCR process was over until after

the federal statute of limitations expired. This effective

abandonment, resulting in lack of actual notice, satisfies the

“extraordinary circumstances” prong of equitable tolling at

least through December 14, 2010, when Gibbs learned of the

Nevada Supreme Court’s decision.

To establish that his petition was filed timely, Gibbs must

demonstrate that Figler’s conduct continued to stand in his

way and prevent timely filing for at least an additional month,

through January 15, 2011. We conclude that he has done so.

8

“After Holland, we have continued to rely on our previous equitable

tolling cases in which we held that equitable tolling is available only when

extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time and the extraordinary circumstances

were the cause of the prisoner’s untimeliness.” Sossa, 729 F.3d at 1229

(alterations, emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent

with Holland, our cases have applied this ‘impossibility’ standard

leniently, rejecting a literal interpretation. See id. at 1236; Harris, 515

F.3d at 1054 n.5; Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2002);

see also Rudin, No. 12-15362, slip op. at 23 (applying impossibility

standard to a circumstance in which timely filing was not literally

impossible).

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16 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

First, until Gibbs definitively terminated the attorneyclient relationship in February 2011, Gibbs may reasonably

have believed that Figler was going to assist him in federal

court. Gibbs intended to file a federal habeas petition and

relied on Figler for advice as to how to do so despite the

timeliness bar he now faced, indicating that Figler may have

given Gibbs reason to believe that Figler would represent him

in federal proceedings. The same day Gibbs learned of the

Nevada Supreme Court’s decision, he wrote to Figler, asking

“what do I do now[?]” and requesting that Figler “please

address [his] concerns with simple communication.” It was

not until Figler again failed to respond that Gibbs sent Figler

correspondence officially terminating Figler as his

representative and demanding return of his legal files.

Second, even if Gibbs did not reasonably believe that

Figler’s representation would continue, an attorney who

ceases to represent a client has certain continuing obligations

to his client, including taking “steps to the extent reasonably

practicable to protect a client’s interests.” Nev. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.16(d). Figler therefore should have been

protecting Gibbs’s interests, including preserving his right to

seek federal habeas review of his conviction. Not only did

Figler not protect Gibbs’s right to have his conviction

reviewed, Figler’s failure to notify Gibbs of his change in

firms, lack of response to Gibbs’s inquiries, and retention of

Gibbs’s legal files, obstructed Gibbs’s ability to timely file

his petition. As to the last factor, “we have previously held

that a complete lack of access to a legal file may constitute an

extraordinary circumstance, and that it is ‘unrealistic to

expect a habeas petitioner to prepare and file a meaningful

petition on his own within the limitations period without

access to his legal file.’” Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998 (quoting

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1027–28

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 17

(9th Cir. 2005)). And the Nevada professional rule which

required Figler to take “steps to the extent reasonably

practicable to protect a client’s interests,” indicates that one

such step may be “surrendering papers to which . . . the client

is entitled.” Nev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(d).

The Warden rejects the lack of files as a relevant

consideration, pointing to evidence that Figler sent Gibbs

copies of the state post-conviction briefs in May 2010. But,

as Gibbs’s federal habeas petition indicates, the claims in the

federal habeas petition are not identical to the post-conviction

claims Gibbs pursued in state court. For instance, the federal

petition includes a due process claim not present in the state

post-conviction petition.

Moreover, while Gibbs knew that the Nevada Supreme

Court had denied his petition, he did not know if they did so

in a reasoned decision. Promptly after receiving the docket

reflecting that his petition was denied, Gibbs wrote to the

Nevada Supreme Court to request copies of its order

affirming the denial of his petition. It is not clear from the

record when the Court responded by sending a copy of its

order to Gibbs. However, until it did so, Gibbs could not

realistically file a federal petition. Thus, Figler’s

abandonment continued to affect Gibbs for this reason, as

well.

For these reasons, we conclude that Gibbs has established

that Figler’s abandonment was an extraordinarycircumstance

obstructing his ability to file his federal petition through at

least January 15, 2011. We next consider whether Gibbs has

acted with diligence in attempting to bring this habeas

petition to federal court.

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18 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

B. Diligence

Holland reaffirmed that the standard of diligence required

of a petitioner seeking equitable tolling is “reasonable,” not

“maximum feasible” care. 560 U.S. at 653 (internal quotation

marks omitted). “[R]easonable diligence does not require an

overzealous or extreme pursuit of any and every avenue of

relief.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Rather, “[i]t requires the effort that a reasonable person might

be expected to deliver under his or her particular

circumstances.” Id.

The district court found that Gibbs was not sufficiently

diligent to merit equitable tolling, because Gibbs: (1) “could

have, but did not, contact” the Nevada Supreme Court

regarding his case between May and December of 2010;

(2) “could have, but apparently did not, begin to prepare his

federal habeas petition once he received copies of his postconviction appellate briefs” in May of 2010; (3) unnecessarily

“waited two months” after learning that his appeal had been

denied before requesting that Figler return his files;

(4) “could have, but apparently did not, have his sister pick

up his files from the attorney’s office” in less than three

weeks from his request; and (5) could have filed his habeas

petition sooner after learning of the state court decision. We

address each reason in turn.

1. As to the first point, Gibbs reasonably relied on his

attorney during this period, and so was adequately diligent. 

Holland, Maples, Spitsyn and Busby all illustrate the basic

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 19

principle that a petitioner’s reasonable reliance on an attorney

should not prejudice his opportunity to file a habeas petition.9

In Busby, where the attorney promised — and then failed

— to file a habeas petition on his client’s behalf, and the

client relied on his absent attorney for four years before

eventually filing a late petition pro se, this court held the

petitioner’s reliance reasonable. 661 F.3d at 1009–10, 1015. 

“Even had [the petitioner] known his attorney had not

handled a habeas petition before, his reliance would still have

been reasonable,” the court held. Id. at 1015. “[A]

reasonable litigant in [the petitioner’s] situation who is

represented by experienced counsel, if asked about the status

of his or her lawsuit, would be justified in replying, ‘My

lawyer is handling it.’” Id. So, too, here.

After Figler wrote to him in May 2010, Gibbs wrote to

Figler three times before contacting the Nevada Supreme

Court in December of that year. He had no reason to contact

the court earlier. Figler had assured him that he would

perform the simple task of forwarding the Nevada Supreme

Court’s notice upon receipt. And although Figler had

abandoned Gibbs for periods before, he had also stepped up

to the plate in time to fulfill his legal duties when contacted

by the State Bar. Moreover, it was Figler’s ethical duty to

take “steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect

[Gibbs’s] interests” if he had ceased representing him, Nev.

R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(d), and, if so, to notify the court so that

the court would send its disposition to Gibbs rather than

Figler, Nev. R. App. P. 3C(b)(3). See Mackey, 682 F.3d at

1253. In light of these circumstances, we have no trouble

9 Of course, reliance on an attorney must be “reasonable.” See LaCava

v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2005).

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20 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

concluding that Gibbs acted with reasonable diligence in

discovering, albeit after the untolled federal filing deadline

had run, the Nevada Supreme Court’s denial of his petition.

2. The notion that Gibbs should have prepared his own

habeas petition between June and December 2010, evenwhile

he believed his Nevada Supreme Court case was still pending

and many of his federal claims therefore unexhausted, is no

stronger. To expect Gibbs to have done so improperly raises

the standard from “reasonable” to “maximum feasible”

diligence. Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

Moreover, the Warden is mistaken that, “[i]t would have

been a ten-minute exercise” for Gibbs to simply slap a new

coversheet on either his own pro se brief from 2006 or

Figler’s brief to the Nevada Supreme Court “and submit it as

a § 2254 petition.” Even if Gibbs had access to these

materials and was “fully informed of the precise legal issues

to be raised in a 2254 petition,” as the Warden contends,

converting a state court brief to a federal habeas petition is

not an automatic undertaking. Besides the obvious necessity

of removing references to state case law and authority, and

the federal requirement of alleging exhaustion of state

remedies, it appears that local rules required Gibbs, now a pro

se litigant, to file his petition on a form provided by the

district court. D. Nev. LSR V.3-1, available at

www.nvd.uscourts.gov (last visited 7/30/2014). In light of

the changes of form and substance Gibbs had to make to

convert his state pleadings to a proper federal petition, the

Warden’s argument is inapt.

In sum, Busby specifically rejected the suggestion that a

“represented petitioner [should] proceed on a dual track with

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 21

his own petition.” 661 F.3d at 1014. The Warden offers no

good reason why this case compels a shift in course.

3. Nor, for reasons alreadydiscussed, was it unreasonable

for Gibbs to wait two months before demanding Figler return

his files. Gibbs wrote to Figler the day he learned his PCR

appeal had been denied, asking for counsel. Gibbs begged

Figler to respond and assist him; when Figler did not do so,

Gibbs terminated him and insisted on the return of his files.

4. & 5. Finally, the Warden contends that Gibbs is not

entitled to equitable tolling, because it took his sister three

weeks to pick up his files from Figler and because, by taking

so long to file his federal petition after learning of the Nevada

Supreme Court’s decision, he failed to act diligently. We

disagree with this assessment based on the undisputed facts

in the record, and also because of the outsized importance the

Warden attributes to Gibbs’s actions after the extraordinary

circumstance occasioned by Figler’s misconduct was lifted.

Holland did stress the petitioner’s remarkable diligence

in filing his habeas petition the day after he learned that he

had missed the AEDPA deadline. 560 U.S. at 639. Similarly,

in Busby, the court deemed the petitioner diligent where, after

four years of reliance on his attorney and a six-month delay

in recovering his files, he submitted his habeas petition in ten

days. 661 F.3d at 1015. In Spitsyn, the court remanded on

the question of diligence because it was not clear why the

petitioner waited over 170 days after receiving his files to

submit his petition. 345 F.3d at 802. And in Lott, the court

remanded on the extraordinary circumstances prong, but

noted that the petitioner might have been able to file within

the statute of limitations despite the obstacle to filing. 

304 F.3d at 923. Finally, in Pace, the Supreme Court denied

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22 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

the petitioner’s request for equitable tolling, in part on the

basis of a five-month delay in filing the federal petition after

the state post-conviction proceedings became final. 544 U.S.

at 419.

We note some tension between examining a petitioner’s

diligence after the lifting of an obstacle to timely filing, and

the stop-clock rule established by an en banc panel of this

Court in Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1195–96. SocopGonzalez rejected the approach to equitable tolling wherein

courts consider whether a claimant should have been

expected to file his lawsuit within the amount of time left in

the statute of limitations, after an extraordinary circumstance

barring filing was lifted. Id. Instead, “the event that ‘tolls’

the statute simply stops the clock until the occurrence of a

later event that permits the statute to resume running.” Id. at

1195.

The Socop-Gonzalez rule is fully in line with AEDPA’s

aim of encouraging the exhaustion of state remedies without

eliminating federal habeas relief. See Holland, 560 U.S. at

648–49. Requiring a degree of diligence after an

extraordinary circumstance ceases when that degree of

diligence would not otherwise have been required risks

infringing the statutory right to habeas corpus review; it also

“arguably usurps congressional authority . . . by substituting

[the court’s] own subjective view of how much time a

plaintiff reasonably needed to file suit.” Socop-Gonzalez,

272 F.3d at 1196. Socop-Gonzalez’s “stop-clock” holding

remains the law in our circuit and applies here. That rule

prohibits courts from constraining litigants to a judicially

imposed filing window, and warns against imposing

additional diligence requirements on recipients of equitable

tolling.

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 23

Courts may, however, consider a petitioner’s diligence,

after an extraordinary circumstance has been lifted, as one

factor in a broader diligence assessment. See, e.g., Pace,

544 U.S. at 419. By requiring those seeking equitable tolling

to show they exercised reasonable diligence, we “ensure that

the extraordinary circumstances faced by petitioners . . . were

the cause of the tardiness of their federal habeas petitions.” 

Lampert, 465 F.3d at 973. “‘[I]f the person seeking equitable

tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting

to file, after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link

of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the

failure to file is broken.’” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 802 (alteration

in original) (quoting Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134

(2d Cir. 2000)).

Because it is most relevant to the causation question, we

are primarily concerned with whether a claimant was

“diligent in his efforts to pursue his appeal at the time his

efforts were being thwarted.” Lampert, 465 F.3d at 970–71

(emphasis in original). In other words, diligence during the

existence of an extraordinary circumstance is the key

consideration. Also relevant is whether petitioners “pursued

their claims within a reasonable period of time before the

external impediment . . . came into existence.” Id. at 972; see

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 419.

Diligence after an extraordinary circumstance is lifted

may be illuminating as to overall diligence, but is not alone

determinative. This conclusion draws not only on the

obvious inference that diligence after the fact is less likely to

be probative of the question of whether the extraordinary

circumstance caused the late filing, but also from SocopGonzalez’s recognition that courts should not take it upon

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24 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

themselves to decide how much time a claimant needs to file

a federal case.

Examining the record in view of the weight afforded these

considerations, we observe that Gibbs’s diligence dates back

for a decade. He sought out counsel, appealed pro se the

denial of his state PCR petition on timeliness grounds, wrote

to his attorneys frequently regarding his appeals, and when

necessary, wrote directly to the State Bar and the Nevada

Supreme Court. The Warden refers to Gibbs as “hysterical[]”

because, at one point in 2008, he sent four letters to Figler

over several weeks. Given the circumstances — Gibbs’s

awareness that he stood to lose his opportunity to challenge

a life sentence — this behavior is more aptly characterized as

“diligent.”

Most importantly, Gibbs was diligent during the time that

Figler’s abandonment and failure to inform him of a critical

development in his case created an extraordinary

circumstance keeping him from filing a timely federal

petition. One month after Figler wrote to assure Gibbs all

was well with his case, Gibbs wrote to Figler, asking him to

supplement the briefing with new case law and to stay in

touch. Several months later Gibbs wrote to Figler again,

asking why Figler did not respond to his last letter and

expressing a desire to discuss strategy for oral argument

before the Nevada Supreme Court. Gibbs also reached out to

both the State Bar and state Supreme Court.

After he learned of the state court decision, Gibbs

immediately wrote to Figler. He promptly asked the Nevada

Supreme Court for a copy of the order denying his PCR

appeal. After he did not hear back from Figler, he fired him

and demanded return of his files. And even without knowing

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GIBBS V. LEGRAND 25

anything about what went on during the three weeks it took

Gibbs’s sister to retrieve the files from Figler, three weeks is

a reasonable time in which to have contacted Figler,

ascertained his availability, and arranged to pick up the files.

After terminating Figler and receiving his files, Gibbs

filed a pro se habeas petition in sixty-five days’ time. In

Espinoza-Matthews, we granted equitable tolling because the

petitioner “had only slightly over a month with his legal file

to try to prepare a proper petition.” 432 F.3d at 1028. That

Gibbs took slightly more than two months to prepare his

federal habeas petition — his “single opportunity for federal

habeas review of the lawfulness of his imprisonment” —after

diligently pursuing his rights for ten years, does not undercut

his overall record of diligence. Holland, 560 U.S. at 653.

Taken as a whole, the record provides ample evidence of

Gibbs’s persistent diligence over a period of ten years, often

in the face of utter disregard by those charged with

representing him. We therefore conclude that Gibbs acted

with reasonable diligence both before and after learning of

the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision, thereby satisfying the

first prong of the Holland equitable tolling inquiry.

III.

Gibbs’s counsel did not inform him that state postconviction proceedings had ended, even though counsel had

pledged to do so, even though Gibbs wrote to his counsel

repeatedly for updates, and even though time in which to file

a federal habeas petition was swiftly winding down. As a

direct result, Gibbs did not learn that the time for him to file

his federal petition had begun until the time was over. We

conclude that his attorney’s misconduct was an extraordinary

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26 GIBBS V. LEGRAND

circumstance which caused Gibbs’s inability to timely file his

federal petition. We are also satisfied that Gibbs exercised

reasonable diligence in pursuit of his post-conviction rights.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for proceedings

not inconsistent with this opinion.

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