Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02776/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02776-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cinda Clare Mullins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donald E. O’Brien, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2776

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Cinda Clare Mullins, * 

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: December 13, 2004

 Filed: March 3, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Cinda Clare Mullins (Mullins) pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to

conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine

within 1,000 feet of a protected location, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 846, and 860(a). Applying the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (Guidelines), the district court1

 determined Mullins’s sentencing range

was 78 to 97 months in prison, based on Mullins’s criminal history category of III and

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a total offense level of 26. However, the district court sentenced Mullins to 120

months in prison, the statutory mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(A). Mullins appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by

denying Mullins’s motion for an evidentiary hearing on her motion to compel the

government to make a substantial assistance departure motion. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

At her sentencing hearing, Mullins testified she gave the government names;

showed officers businesses, houses, and people associated with illegal narcotics; and

“did everything I could possibly do.” Mullins further testified she repeatedly

telephoned officers, but they never returned her phone calls. She believes officers

used her information to apprehend some people and used her information in their

cases. However, Mullins never testified before a grand jury, never testified in any

contested sentencing hearings, and never purchased drugs for the government.

Mullins is unable to name any person the government charged or held using her

information. Mullins contends the government acted irrationally and in bad faith,

because she took every affirmative step she could think of to assist the government.

The government, relying on its discretion, maintains it was under no duty to move for

a downward departure because Mullins did not provide substantial assistance. 

II. DISCUSSION

Before a district court may depart below a statutory mandatory minimum

sentence to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance, the government first must

make a motion requesting the court impose a sentence below the mandatory

minimum. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1996) (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(e)). Both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (“[u]pon motion of the government”) and

section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines (same) give the government the power, but not the

duty, to make a substantial assistance motion. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,

185 (1992). “[T]he government has no duty to make [a substantial assistance] motion

unless it has entered into a plea agreement with the defendant that creates such a

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duty.” United States v. Wolf, 270 F.3d 1188, 1190 (8th Cir. 2001). Here, Mullins

pled guilty without a plea agreement, and the government never promised it would

move for a downward departure. Therefore, the government retained its discretion

to decline to make a substantial assistance motion. 

The government’s discretion to refuse to make a substantial assistance motion

“is subject to constitutional limitations that district courts can enforce.” Wade, 504

U.S. at 185. A district court may review the government’s refusal to make a

substantial assistance motion under section 3553(e) or section 5K1.1, if such refusal

(1) was prompted by an unconstitutional motive, such as the defendant’s race or

religion; or (2) was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id. at

185-87. To obtain an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must make a “substantial

threshold showing” that the government’s refusal to make a substantial assistance

motion was premised on an improper motive. Id. at 186. “In the absence of such a

showing, a defendant is not entitled to any remedy or even an evidentiary hearing.”

United States v. Hardy, 325 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

Mullins’s testimony at her sentencing hearing merely demonstrates (1) she

provided information concerning drug activities; (2) she was willing to provide

continued assistance; and (3) she disagrees with the government’s assessment of the

extent to which her information assisted the government. Even crediting her version

of assistance, Mullins’s assertions do not support any inference the government acted

unconstitutionally or irrationally in refusing to move for a downward departure based

on substantial assistance. A defendant’s bare assertions of assistance do not

constitute a “substantial threshold showing” of improper conduct by the government.

See Wade, 504 U.S. at 186 (holding neither “a claim that a defendant merely provided

substantial assistance” nor “additional but generalized allegations of improper

motive” is sufficient to merit an evidentiary hearing). Because Mullins failed to make

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We note Mullins did not challenge her sentence based on the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005) (holding

mandatory application of the Guidelines is unconstitutional, and the Guidelines are

now “effectively advisory”). Therefore, Mullins has waived any Sixth Amendment

argument on appeal. Even if Mullins had preserved a Booker challenge on appeal,

the holdings in Booker are of no avail to Mullins, because the district court imposed

Mullins’s sentence based on a statutorily mandated minimum sentence, and not on

sentencing enhancements. See United States v. Vieth, No. 04-1451, 2005 WL

284724, at *4 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2005) (holding defendant was not entitled to

resentencing because his “sentence was not determined based upon an application of

the federal sentencing guidelines, but rather based upon the mandatory minimum

sentence set forth in the governing criminal statute”). 

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a “substantial threshold showing,” the district court correctly concluded it lacked

authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment.2

______________________________

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