Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03041/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03041-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick Townsend
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 18, 1999 Decided June 11, 1999

No. 98-3041

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Derrick Townsend,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 88cr00254-03)

Thomas Lumbard, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Neal K. Katyal, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. On the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher

and Susan A. Nellor, Assistant United States Attorneys.

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Before: Williams, Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Derrick Townsend was

convicted on numerous drug- and gun-related counts in 1988,

including two counts of using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c). He received a sentence

which included a 450-month term of imprisonment. After a

motion by the government under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), the

sentencing court departed downward significantly, resulting

in a total term of imprisonment of 240 months, of which 60

months were allocated to each of two s 924(c) counts, and 120

months were allocated to the other charges. Following the

Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S.

137 (1995), the government stipulated that Townsend's

s 924(c) convictions should be vacated, and that he should be

resentenced on the remaining counts. The district court

resentenced Townsend in 1998, again imposing a total term of

imprisonment of 240 months. Townsend appeals from this

resentencing, arguing that the court lacked authority to reimpose the same total term of imprisonment in light of the fact

that his convictions on the s 924(c) counts were vacated, and

that doing so violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Fifth Amendment. We conclude that because the total sentence Townsend originally received was properly considered a

single "package," by challenging his s 924(c) conviction,

Townsend reopened his entire sentence, and that the sentence imposed on the remaining counts was lawful. Townsend further argues that the 1998 resentencing did not comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 because he did not timely receive

the probation office's memorandum and because he lacked

notice of the court's sentencing theory, and that the court

erred in reimposing a fine which appellant claims had been

previously vacated. We conclude that the first and third

arguments are not properly before us, and that the second is

without merit.

I. Background

A 1988 indictment charged Derrick Townsend with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. s 846;

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conspiracy to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. s 846; conspiracy to carry and use firearms during a drug trafficking

offense, 18 U.S.C. s 371; possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. s 841(a); two counts of possession

with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. s 841(a); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. s 841(a);

and two counts of using a firearm during a drug trafficking

offense, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c). Townsend was convicted on all

counts in 1988 and sentenced in 1989. He received concurrent sentences on the drug and conspiracy charges, the

longest of which was 330 months. He also received two 60-

month terms, consecutive to the other counts and to each

other, on the s 924(c) charges, for a total term of imprisonment of 450 months. In addition, he received a five-year

term of supervised release, and fines totaling $600,000. We

affirmed both the conviction and the district court's denial of

a new trial. United States v. Lafayette, No. 89-3023, 1990

WL 18648 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 1990); United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Before their arrest in this case, Townsend and codefendant

Lewis had provided information to authorities in New York

about a drug operation and related homicides. After their

convictions here, Townsend and Lewis entered into agreements for cooperation and testimony with the U.S. Attorney

for the Eastern District of New York. The agreements

called for the U.S. Attorney to move to reduce the sentences

previously imposed in this case, as permitted by Fed. R.

Crim. P. 35(b). On January 24, 1990, the Government filed a

motion for reduction of sentence. At a status hearing on

February 28, 1991, the district judge stated on the record

that he intended to grant the government's motions to reduce

sentence. He further stated that he intended to reduce

Lewis to the twenty-year range, and Townsend to the twentyfive-year range, and that he needed to "work out the formula"

to accomplish those reductions. He also noted, at the urging

of counsel, that he would reconsider the amount of the fines,

but he did not rule on the motion.

Finally, almost three years later, on January 10, 1994,

Townsend's counsel filed a motion asking for a hearing on the

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sentence reduction. The district court held no hearing, but

on May 26, 1994 issued an "Order Modifying Sentence" for

both Townsend and codefendant Lewis. The order provided

"that the judgment entered on January 27, 1989, be and it is

hereby vacated." It went on to order identical 240-month

sentences for Lewis and Townsend, consisting of consecutive

terms of 60 months on each of the two s 924(c) counts; and

concurrent sentences on the other counts, with the longest

being 120 months. The order, like the original order, also

provided for five years supervised release. It did not mention any fines. Although the order indicated that the attached statement of reasons should be made part of the

record, no statement of reasons was ever filed. Neither

party appealed the 1994 order. By order of October 23, 1995,

the court, citing confusion as to whether the originallyimposed fines still applied after the 1994 order, ordered that

the original fine was still operative. The 1995 order was

denominated "Clarification of Order Modifying Sentence" and

was not appealed by either party.

Meanwhile, in 1995, Townsend filed a motion pursuant to 28

U.S.C. s 2255, arguing, inter alia, that there was insufficient

evidence to support his s 924(c) convictions. On December 6,

1995, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bailey v.

United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), holding that conviction for

using a firearm under 18 U.S.C. s 924(c) requires proof of

active use of a firearm to facilitate the underlying offense. In

light of Bailey, the U.S. Attorney and Federal Defender filed

a joint motion stipulating that there was insufficient evidence

to support Townsend's convictions on the two s 924(c) counts.

The motion further stipulated that the appropriate relief was

to vacate the s 924(c) convictions and resentence appellant on

the remaining counts, with credit for the 113 months already

served. The motion also noted that a defendant who earns

good-time credits must serve 102 months of a 120-month

sentence.

On March 18, 1998, the Probation Office issued a ten-page

"Memorandum" regarding Townsend's resentencing. The

Memorandum described the sentencing history, including the

findings of the original presentence report and the 1994

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downward departure. The Memorandum then presented a

revised calculation for the remaining counts under the 1997

Guidelines, incorporating a two-level enhancement for possession of a weapon under U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(b)(1). This enhancement had not been applied in the original sentencing

proceeding, because the enhancement is unavailable where

there is a s 924(c) conviction. See U.S.S.G. s 2K2.4 (background). With this enhancement, the revised calculation for

the remaining counts yielded an offense level of 40 (as

compared to 38 in the original 1989 presentence report) and a

guideline imprisonment range of 360 months to life. The

1994 downward departure, although discussed in the sentencing history, was not incorporated in the calculations. On

March 27, 1998, defense counsel filed a "Memorandum Regarding Re-Sentencing." The Memorandum argued, inter

alia, that because Townsend had completed the 120-month

sentence originally allocated to the non-924(c) counts (taking

into account good time credits), imposing an additional sentence on those counts would violate the Due Process Clause.

On March 30, 1998, the district court held a sentencing

hearing. The government argued that the defendant had no

expectation that his sentence would be only 120 months, that

vacating the s 924(c) convictions "unravels the whole package," and that "the Court is well within its latitude in just

simply imposing the 240 months on the remaining counts."

The court adopted this suggestion. The court stated that the

intention in 1994 was to reduce the sentence to 240 months,

and the sentence was only structured as 120 on the s 924(c)

charges and 120 on the other charges because there was a

required 60-month consecutive sentence on each of the

s 924(c) charges. Accordingly, the court found no bar to

imposing the entire 240-month sentence on the remaining

counts. The court also imposed five years of supervised

release, and fines totaling $500,000. Townsend appeals from

this 1998 resentencing order.

II. Townsend's Rule 32 Arguments

We first address Townsend's argument that his 1998 resentencing did not comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6).

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The rule provides that "[n]ot less than 35 days before the

sentencing hearing--unless the defendant waives this minimum period--the probation officer must furnish the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant's counsel, and

the attorney for the Government." Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(b)(6)(A). Townsend claims that the requirements of Rule

32 were not satisfied in this case, and that we must therefore

vacate the sentence imposed and remand for a new resentencing proceeding. In appellant's view, the probation office's "Memorandum" regarding resentencing was for all intents and purposes a presentence report, and Rule 32 was

therefore applicable. Townsend argues that he did not himself see a copy of the probation office's resentencing memorandum until the day of resentencing, and that his attorney

did not receive the memorandum far enough in advance to

satisfy the requirements of Rule 32. Indeed, the memorandum was not made available until twelve days before the

sentencing occurred.

Without deciding whether Rule 32's time requirements

were applicable to the memorandum at issue here, we conclude that even if Townsend's Rule 32 arguments would

otherwise have merit, those arguments have been waived. In

contrast to Townsend's present objections that he did not

have the time required by Rule 32 to peruse the probation

office's memorandum, he made no objection on this ground at

the sentencing hearing. Neither he nor his counsel informed

the court that they had had insufficient time to review the

memorandum. In fact, defense counsel had reviewed the

memorandum and had filed a memorandum in response. By

participating in the resentencing hearing without objection,

Townsend waived his right to raise Rule 32's time requirements on appeal. See United States v. Workman, 110 F.3d

915, 920 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 80 F.3d 436,

438 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Knorr, 942 F.2d 1217,

1221 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705,

713-14 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(A)

(explicitly making the requirement that the presentence report be provided 35 days in advance of the hearing inapplicable where "the defendant waives this minimum period").

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Appellant further argues that Rule 32 was violated because

the possibility of reimposing the entire 240-month sentence

was introduced for the first time at the sentencing hearing

itself. Townsend claims that prior to that time the parties

anticipated that the court would simply impose the sentence

originally allocated to the remaining charges (120 months),

and that disagreement focused only on the propriety of

imposing an additional two-year "gun bump" under U.S.S.G.

s 2D1.1(b)(1). Thus, appellant urges, he had no notice regarding the theory of sentencing the court ultimately embraced. In appellant's view, such notice is required by the

Supreme Court's decision in Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.

129 (1991), which held that the then-in-force version of Rule

32 required that before a district court could depart upward

on a ground not identified as a ground for upward departure

either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the government, the parties must be given reasonable

notice that such a ruling was contemplated. See also

U.S.S.G. s 6A1.2 n.1 (memorializing the holding of Burns).

The Court reasoned that such notice was necessary to meaningfully satisfy Rule 32's requirement that counsel must have

the opportunity to comment on matters relating to the appropriate sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c), formerly 32(a). The

Court concluded that it made "no sense to impute to Congress an intent that a defendant have the right to comment

on the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure but not the

right to be notified that the court is contemplating such a

ruling." Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-36 (emphasis in original).

Although Burns itself dealt with the need for notice regarding potential upward departures, Townsend notes that

some lower courts have extended its reasoning to adjustments, see United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.

1994); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991),

abrogated on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511

U.S. 738 (1994); but see United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d

263 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that Burns' notice requirements

did not apply to adjustments, which are more predictable

than departures); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407 (8th

Cir. 1993) (same), and he argues that Burns' reasoning

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certainly applies to the introduction of a "brand-new theory of

sentencing" at the sentencing hearing. Appellant's Brief at

38. Appellant analogizes this case to United States v. Zapatka, 44 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1994), in which the court concluded

that where the district judge utilized a different underlying

Guideline than that employed in the presentence report,

defendant was deprived of adequate notice regarding the

possibility of an adjustment available under the section employed by the court that was not available under the section

employed by the presentence report.

We need not determine the reach of Burns' notice requirements, as we are unpersuaded by Townsend's argument that

the method employed by the district court was a "brand-new

theory of sentencing." The calculations in the memorandum

from the probation office resulted in a sentencing range of

360 months to life. The memorandum did not indicate that

resentencing would be limited to consideration of the

s 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, or that the full amount of the

original downward departure would necessarily be applied.

Indeed, appellant himself appears not to have taken reimposition of the entire 1994 departure for granted-his "Memorandum Regarding Re-Sentencing" contained a section entitled

"The Rule 35 Departure Based on Mr. Townsend's Substantial Assistance To The Government's Prosecution of Delroy

'Uzi' Edwards Should Remain In Effect." Given this, we are

unsympathetic to Townsend's claim that in adopting the view

that the original 240-month sentence could be imposed, the

district court and prosecutor were employing a new sentencing theory. Accordingly, we reject Townsend's argument

that Burns might have any application here.

III. Townsend's Arguments Regarding the Fines

Appellant argues that it was impermissible for the court to

impose $500,000 in fines in 1998 because no fines were

specified in the 1994 resentencing order and the 1995 order

"clarifying" that the original fines were still in place was

improper. The court's treatment of Townsend's fines was

admittedly somewhat irregular. At the original sentencing

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proceedings in 1989, fines totaling $600,000 were imposed.

After the government moved to reduce sentence, the court in

1991 noted that it would also reconsider the amount of the

fines. In 1994, when the court actually acted on the sentence

reduction in an "Order Modifying Sentence," it made no

mention of fines. However, more than a year later, the court

issued a "Clarification of Order Modifying Sentence," citing

confusion regarding whether Townsend's original fines were

still in force and indicating that they were.

Townsend argues that his fines were vacated by the 1994

order and could not be resuscitated by the 1995 order.

Townsend cites the language of the 1994 order, which provided "that the judgment entered on January 27, 1989, be and it

is hereby vacated." In Townsend's view, after the 1994 order

issued, there were no fines in place. Thus, he argues, it was

impermissible for the court to augment Townsend's punishment the following year by "clarifying" that the fines were in

effect, since such a "correction" of the 1994 order was not

within the parameters established for correcting a sentence

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. The government, in contrast,

argues that the 1994 order was addressed only to modifying

the term of imprisonment and should not be read as vacating

the portion of the 1989 order regarding fines. Since the

government views the original fines as never having been

vacated, it treats the 1995 order as making no change at all to

Townsend's sentence, but simply clarifying the continued

applicability of the fines.

We do not address the parties' differences as to the propriety of the 1995 "clarifying order," but instead conclude, as the

government urges with no response from appellant, that this

issue is not properly before us. To be sure, Townsend has

timely appealed from the 1998 order, which reimposed a

portion of the complained-of fines. However, Townsend's

attack on the fines imposed in 1998 is based entirely on

arguments regarding the impropriety of the 1995 order. If

Townsend believed that the district court acted improperly in

"clarifying" that the fines were still in effect in its 1995 order,

he could have appealed that order within the time provided

under Fed. R. App. P. 4. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of

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Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (time limits of

Rule 4 are "mandatory and jurisdictional"). Having failed to

timely appeal the 1995 order he now contests, Townsend may

not properly attack it by appealing the 1998 order. Cf.

United States v. Barragan-Mendoza, No. 97-30264, 1999 WL

221857 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 1999) (reaching issue of whether

modification of sentence by district court was within court's

authority under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, but only after first

determining that appeal was timely). See also United States

v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1991) (where defendant

failed to appeal court's earlier order denying his Rule 35

motion regarding the interest rate on restitution owed, he

cannot relitigate the issue on appeal from denial of a later

motion); United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434, 437-48 (10th

Cir. 1990) (where conviction and original sentence not appealed, defendant cannot appeal conviction by appealing later

resentencing); United States v. June, 503 F.2d 442, 443-45

(8th Cir. 1974) (though appeal timely as to denial of motion to

reduce sentence, the appeal amounted to untimely challenge

to conviction itself); Yates v. United States, 308 F.2d 737, 738

(10th Cir. 1962) (where conviction not appealed, defendant

may not later challenge it as void and illegal in appeal from

order revoking probation).

IV. Reimposition of the Full Term of Imprisonment

As noted above, Townsend's original term of imprisonment

totaled 450 months, consisting of 120 months on the two

s 924(c) counts and 330 months on the other counts. When

the court departed downward in 1994 in response to the

government's Rule 35(b) motion, the resulting term of imprisonment totaled 240 months, of which 120 months were again

allocated to the s 924(c) charges, and 120 months were

allocated to the other counts. In 1998, after vacating the

s 924(c) convictions on Bailey grounds, the court resentenced

Townsend on the other counts, imposing a term of imprisonment of 240 months, equivalent to his total term prior to the

vacatur. Townsend argues that the court was without authority to reimpose the full 240-month term of imprisonment

in 1998, and that doing so violated the Double Jeopardy

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Clause, which may bar an increase in a sentence if the

defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in the

previously-imposed sentence. United States v. Fogel, 829

F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. DiFrancesco,

449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980).

A. Review of the 1998 Term of Imprisonment

Before addressing the merits of Townsend's arguments, we

first consider the government's claim that Townsend is simply

challenging the amount of downward departure he received in

1998, which the government argues is unreviewable under 18

U.S.C. s 3742. That section provides in relevant part that a

defendant may appeal a sentence if the sentence

(1) was imposed in violation of law;

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of

the sentencing guidelines; or

(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range ...; or

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no

sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.

18 U.S.C. s 3742(a). In the government's view, because

Townsend's 1998 sentence of 240 months on the non-924(c)

counts represents a downward departure from the 330

months originally imposed on those counts in 1989, Townsend

should have no right to complain that he is entitled to retain

the more generous departure imposed on those counts in

1994.

The government focuses on s 3742(a)(3), which provides

that a defendant may seek review of upward departures, but

does not provide for review of downward departures at the

defendant's behest. Certainly it is correct that where a

defendant simply disagrees with the district court's judgment

regarding the amount of downward departure which is warranted, review is unavailable. See, e.g., United States v.

Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1991). However, that is

not Townsend's argument. Townsend is not simply disagreeing with the district court's view of what departure was

proper, but is arguing that the court lacked authority to

reconsider the departure it granted on those counts in 1994,

and that the sentence which resulted from so doing was in

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Where, as here, a

defendant claims that his sentence "was imposed in violation

of law," the sentence is reviewable under s 3742(a)(1). The

fact that the specific illegality here claimed involves the

amount of downward departure he received does not render

s 3742 (a)(1) inapplicable. Cf. United States v. La Guardia,

902 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1st Cir. 1990). To conclude otherwise

would insulate from review the extent of a downward departure even if the resulting sentence was plainly unlawful or the

amount of departure was influenced by unlawful considerations. See United States v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 139 (7th

Cir. 1995). Therefore, we conclude that this issue is properly

before us.

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B. Resentencing after Bailey Vacatur

We now turn to the substance of Townsend's challenge to

the reimposition of his full term of imprisonment after his

s 924(c) convictions were vacated. This is not the first time

we have encountered arguments regarding the proper scope

of resentencing after Bailey vacatur, although this case does

raise specific issues we have not previously addressed. In

United States v. Rhodes, 106 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

("Rhodes I"), we vacated a s 924(c) conviction, and remanded

for possible resentencing on the remaining counts, "taking

into account the provisions of s 2D1.1(b)(1)." Id. at 433. We

observed that because U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

s 924(c) are mutually exclusive, the otherwise mandatory

enhancement was unavailable so long as the s 924(c) conviction stood. But we held that this did not entitle a defendant

to escape application of the s 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement because of a s 924(c) conviction which was later vacated. We

held that 28 U.S.C. s 2106, which provides that an appellate

court may require "such further proceedings to be had as

may be just under the circumstances," established statutory

authority for this court to remand for resentencing on the

remaining counts. Furthermore, we found no merit in appellant's arguments that resentencing on his remaining charges

would violate the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses.

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Given the interdependence of a s 924(c) conviction and the

s 2D1.1 enhancement, we noted that appellant had no legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence on the

remaining drug charges, and that by challenging his s 924(c)

charges, defendant brought his remaining sentences into

question. Id. at 432 n.3.

We addressed similar questions in United States v. Morris,

116 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1997), where the s 924(c) vacatur

arose not on direct appeal but, as here, in the s 2255 context.

There, the district court had vacated appellants' convictions

under s 924(c), and then increased the sentence on the

remaining terms by imposing the two-level s 2D1.1 enhancement. This court affirmed, holding that s 2255 provided the

district court statutory authority for resentencing on the

remaining counts. We held that s 2255's grant of power to

" 'correct the sentence as may appear appropriate' ... necessarily includes the power to apply the s 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement at the same time as it removes the hitherto blocking

s 924(c) conviction." Id. at 504. We also rejected defendants' double jeopardy and due process arguments, noting as

in Rhodes I that because of the "interdependence and mutual

exclusivity" of the s 924(c) conviction and the s 2D1.1 enhancement, there was no reasonable expectation of finality of

the unchallenged sentences. Id. at 505.

C. The Sentencing Package Theory

Townsend seeks to distinguish Rhodes I and Morris on two

principal grounds. First, he emphasizes that those cases

considered only the propriety of imposing a s 2D1.1 enhancement, while the district court's resentencing here was not so

limited. In particular, Townsend argues that even if s 2255

provides authority for a court to "correct" the remaining

sentence by imposing a s 2D1.1 enhancement, as we held in

Morris, it does not provide authority for broader resentencing on the remaining counts. Second, Townsend makes much

of the fact that taking into account good-time credits, he had,

by the time of the 1998 resentencing, "fully served" the 120-

month term of imprisonment which had previously been

allocated to the non-924(c) counts. In Townsend's view, the

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fact that that sentence was fully served makes any resentencing, even the s 2D1.1 enhancement approved in Rhodes I and

Morris, a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Both of these arguments rest on the premise that the 120

months allocated to the non-924(c) charges represent a freestanding sentence distinct from the sentence on the s 924(c)

counts. In this view, when the 120 months allocated to the

s 924(c) charges were vacated, s 2255 required the court to

begin with the 120 months previously allocated to the remaining counts, and to justify any modification as a necessary

"correction" to that remaining term. In effect, Townsend

argues that the court must treat the previously-imposed

sentence as being composed of independent subunits, each of

which survives the destruction of the others except to the

extent that vacation of one component of the sentence renders a remaining component actually illegal.1 Similarly, his

argument that his "sentence" was fully served assumes that

the portion of his earlier sentence allocated to the remaining

counts remained an independent fixed entity even while he

sought to have other counts vacated.

We disagree with Townsend's premise that the terms of

imprisonment previously allocated to his non-924(c) counts

necessarily survived intact his challenge to the s 924(c)

counts. As other circuits have recognized, at least in some

instances, sentences on multiple counts may comprise a "sentencing package," so that attacking the sentence on some

counts via s 2255 reopens the sentence on the other counts as

well. See United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.

__________

1 In support of his narrow view of what constitutes a permissible

correction to a sentence, Townsend cites our decisions in United

States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Tatum v. United

States, 310 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1962). These cases are inapposite,

as they do not involve situations in which a defendant has voluntarily placed his sentence at issue by challenging it via s 2255. Indeed,

in explaining why the sentence modification in Fogel was impermissible, we explicitly noted that the modification was not predicated

by any challenge to the sentence by the defendant, who unlike

Townsend had "proceeded to serve the sentence as if it were final."

Fogel, 829 F.2d at 89.

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1997); United States v. Mata, 133 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 1998);

United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118 (3rd Cir. 1997); United

States v. Smith, 115 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Rodriguez, 114 F.3d 46, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1997); Pasquarille v.

United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Smith, 103 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1996); Gardiner v. United

States, 114 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.

McClain, 133 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Easterling, 157 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). The sentencing

package doctrine recognizes that " 'when a defendant is found

guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood

that the district court will craft a disposition in which the

sentences on the various counts form part of an overall

plan,' " and that if some counts are vacated, " 'the judge

should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light

of the original plan.' " Davis, 112 F.3d at 122 (quoting

United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir.

1989)). "Under the sentencing package concept, when a

defendant raises a sentencing issue he attacks the bottom

line." Smith, 103 F.3d at 534.

Sentences which include s 924(c) counts are particularly

well suited to be treated as a package. The counts in such

sentences are inherently interdependent, since "without the

drug conviction, there can be no s 924(c)(1) conviction."

Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1223. In addition, the fact that

s 924(c) carries a mandatory sentence may influence the

sentence imposed on other counts. See Davis, 112 F.3d at

123 (" '[W]here a sentencing judge imposed a multicount

sentence aware that a mandatory consecutive sentence is to

be tacked on to it and the mandatory sentence is later

stricken, the judge is entitled to reconsider the sentence

imposed on the remaining counts.' ") (quoting Gordils v.

United States, Nos. 89CR0395 & 95CIV8034, 1996 WL

614139, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).

Our decisions in Rhodes I and Morris implicitly acknowledged the concept of a sentencing package, at least to a

degree, in that they allowed modification of the sentence

previously imposed on counts other than those specifically

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contested by the defendant. However, we focused there on

the mutual exclusivity of s 924(c) and the s 2D1.1 enhancement, and did not directly address the propriety of other

types of resentencing on the remaining counts. Other circuits have approved resentencing not limited to application of

the two-level enhancement. For example, in United States v.

Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1998), imposing a

s 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement at resentencing would have had

no effect on the sentence because the defendant was a career

offender. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit approved the

district court's recalculation of other aspects of the sentence,

including the appropriate reduction for the defendant's substantial assistance. See id. at 1295-96. The court noted that

"the availability of the U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is

not necessary to the court's jurisdiction to resentence on

unchallenged counts." Id. at 1297. Similarly, the Seventh

Circuit approved the district court's resentencing after

s 924(c) vacatur where the judge not only imposed the

s 2D1.1 enhancement, but recalculated the sentence on the

remaining counts based on a higher base offense level than

used in the original sentence after concluding that there was

an error in the original sentencing. Smith, 103 F.3d at 535.

Several courts considering resentencing after s 924(c) vacatur have reopened the sentences on the remaining counts and

required consideration of not only changes which would increase the remaining sentence, but of the prisoner's new

arguments for decreases in his sentence as well. See Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1225 (on resentencing, district court required to consider whether defendant should receive threelevel downward departure for acceptance of responsibility

available under current guidelines rather than two-level departure he originally received); United States v. Core, 125

F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that resentencing should

consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to

consider defendant's argument for downward departure

based on post-conviction rehabilitation); Reyes v. United

States, 944 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (resentencing is de

novo and defendant may argue for downward departures).

Indeed, while we focused on the possibility of a s 2D1.1(b)(1)

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enhancement when we remanded for resentencing in Rhodes

I, we later held that the district court was also required to

consider on remand defendant's request for a possible downward departure based on his post-conviction rehabilitation.

United States v. Rhodes, 145 F.3d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

("Rhodes II").

D. Treatment of the 1994 Sentence as a Package

In conducting its 1998 resentencing, the district court

explicitly relied on a "sentencing package" theory, noting that

the intention in allowing the downward departure in 1994 was

to achieve an overall sentence of 240 months rather than

particular sentences on the component counts. The record

supports the proposition that this was the court's original

intention. In 1991, the judge, in response to the government's motion for reduction of sentence, noted on the record

that he intended to grant the motion, but needed to "work out

the formula" to accomplish the overall term of imprisonment

desired. The fact that the court in 1991 expressed an intention of figuring out a formula yielding 25 years for Townsend,

but ultimately chose a formula yielding 20 years, does not

affect our analysis. The interpendence of the departures

granted on the various counts is further illustrated by the

court's observation in 1991 that "there were nine counts, and

they all have to be coordinated." Although this remark was

made in discussing the sentence of codefendant Lewis, not

Townsend himself, the remark is equally applicable to Townsend's sentence, since he and Lewis originally received identical sentences on identical counts.

In addition, a sentencing package theory is particularly

appropriate given that the 1994 sentence was the result of a

downward departure. Indeed, the fact that the existing

sentence was the result of a downward departure makes it

difficult to ascertain what exactly the district court would

have done had it wanted only to "correct" the sentence by

imposing a s 2D1.1(b)(1) adjustment. Townsend argues that

the proper way of imposing a s 2D1.1(b)(1) adjustment on the

remaining counts would be to "reason backward," finding an

offense level which corresponds to the 120-month sentence

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allocated to the non-924(c) counts after the 1994 departure,

and then to apply a two-level adjustment. Unfortunately,

this backward reasoning does not lead to a unique offense

level, since a 120-month sentence falls within the sentencing

range for more than one offense level. Below, appellant

indicated that "the offense level that most closely approximates" the 120 months imposed on his remaining counts in

1994 is level 30, because that level provides for a sentence of

121 months at the bottom of the range. On appeal, he argues

that the proper level is 28, which leads to a range of 97-121

months, or 29, with a range of 108-135 months. Neither the

probation office's Memorandum nor the court adopted this

backward-reasoning strategy, but instead recalculated Townsend's offense level under the Guidelines, leaving any downward departure to be imposed on the resulting sentence.

This method resulted in an offense level of 38, or 40 if the

s 2D1.1 enhancement were applied.

We are not persuaded that resentencing after a downward

departure must proceed by the backward reasoning appellant

would require. Indeed, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit

that "where the district court is sentencing outside the guidelines range, it is particularly important that the district court

have discretion to reevaluate the entire sentencing package."

Watkins, 147 F.3d at 1297. The amount of downward departure allowed by a sentencing judge is inevitably affected by

the total sentence imposed, and the departure allowed on a

given count will naturally depend on the departure allowed on

other counts. Requiring a sentencing judge to retain the full

downward departure originally allowed on a given count even

when convictions on other counts are vacated could well make

judges hesitant to give generous downward departures in the

first instance. This is particularly the case here, where the

judge apparently believed that all of the downward departure

had to be applied to the non-924(c) counts to maintain the

five-year statutory minimum on each of the s 924(c) counts.

Appellant argues that in fact the judge could have departed

below the statutory minimum on the s 924(c) counts, given

the government's Rule 35 motion. However, that would not

change the fact that the departure actually imposed on the

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non-924(c) counts was chosen in light of the term imposed on

the s 924(c) counts.

E. Townsend's Constitutional Arguments

Our conclusion that the district court properly treated the

1994 sentence as a sentencing package necessarily undermines Townsend's argument that because his term of imprisonment on the remaining counts was fully served, resentencing on those counts violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment. Citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18

Wall.) 163 (1873), and In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943),

Townsend begins with the premise that a defendant who has

satisfied the sentence imposed for an offense may not be

resentenced for that offense. However, because the 1994

sentence was properly viewed as a package, Townsend had

not satisfied his sentence on the remaining counts in any

meaningful sense. His "sentences were, in essence, 'one

unified term of imprisonment,' " Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1224

(quoting Smith, 103 F.3d at 355). Thus we join the other

circuits which have addressed this question in concluding that

even where the term originally allocated to the remaining

counts of a package has been served, a defendant can have no

legitimate expectation of finality regarding the sentence previously allocated to certain counts while simultaneously challenging his sentence on other counts of the package. See

Smith, 115 F.3d at 246; United States v. Benbrook, 119 F.3d

338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1997); Pasquarille, 130 F.3d at 1222;

Smith, 103 F.3d at 535; United States v. Alton, 120 F.3d 114,

115-16 (8th Cir. 1997); McClain, 133 F.3d at 1194; Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1223-24.2

Townsend framed his arguments on appeal almost exclusively in terms of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but to the

__________

2 We note that even leaving the "package" concept aside, as of the

time of his resentencing Townsend had not yet served the entire

sentence he would have received with the gun bump alone. At oral

argument, defendant conceded that even using his own guidelines

calculation, as a result of the gun bump he still would be imprisoned

until March 15, 1999--a month after oral argument, but a year after

the resentencing at issue here.

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extent that he relies on the Due Process Clause, such reliance

is also unavailing. Because Townsend could not expect finality of his sentence on some counts even while he challenged

others, resentencing was not fundamentally unfair. See Pasquarille, 130 F.3d at 1223; Woodhouse v. United States, 934

F. Supp. 1008 (C.D.Ill.1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 347 (7th Cir.

1997). At oral argument, Townsend suggested a due process

argument not raised below or meaningfully discussed in his

briefs--that the increase in the sentence on his non-924(c)

counts would give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.

See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). However,

even assuming appellant has properly raised this argument,

given that the existing sentence was properly viewed as a

package, the fact that the sentence allocated to certain counts

increased gives rise to no presumption of vindictiveness. For

sentences within a package, Pearce analysis is conducted "in

the aggregate rather than count by count." United States v.

Sullivan, 967 F.2d 370, 374 (10th Cir. 1992). As we noted in

Morris, there is no indication of vindictiveness in resentencing a defendant to "exactly the sentence that the defendant

would have received but for the erroneous application of

s 924(c)." Morris, 116 F.3d at 506. See also Mata, 133 F.3d

at 202.

We need not determine today the full range of cases in

which a sentence on multiple counts may properly be treated

as a package. In particular, we do not address whether such

treatment would be appropriate where there was no indication in the record at the time of the earlier sentencing that a

package was intended, or where there were indications to the

contrary. Nor do we address whether a sentence could

properly be treated as a package where the distinct counts

involved conduct more tenuously related than the drug and

weapons charges at issue here. Cf. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d at

30-31 (approving sentencing package concept for situations

where Guidelines "contemplate an interdependent relationship"). We hold only that in this case, where the vacated and

remaining counts are closely related and the judge indicated

an intention to arrive at a "formula" for reaching the overall

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sentence desired after the downward departure in 1994, treating the sentence as a unitary package is appropriate.

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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