Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-24-05014/USCOURTS-ca6-24-05014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Euclide Aquino Urraca
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 24a0270p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EUCLIDE AQUINO URRACA,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 24-5014

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.

No. 1:22-cr-10039-1—J. Daniel Breen, District Judge.

Argued: December 12, 2024

Decided and Filed: December 18, 2024

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MURPHY and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mary H. Morris, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Memphis, 

Tennessee, for Appellant. Lloyd R. Tatum, TATUM & TATUM, Henderson, Tennessee, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mary H. Morris, Adam C. Davis, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S 

OFFICE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Lloyd R. Tatum, TATUM & TATUM, 

Henderson, Tennessee, for Appellee.

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OPINION

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SUTTON, Chief Judge. During the stop of a semitrailer, police learned one suspicious 

thing after another about the truck’s cargo, its destination, and its other contents, ultimately 

leading to a dog sniff that alerted to drugs in the truck. The police found 20 kilograms of cocaine 

>

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inside a wrapped box. Because the objective facts known to the officers warranted each step of 

the investigation, we uphold the search and reverse the district court’s contrary determination. 

I.

A.

On the morning of May 9, 2022, Sergeant Jeff Fuller, a 16-year veteran of the Tennessee 

Highway Patrol, pulled over a semitrailer for a regulatory inspection. Before stopping the truck, 

he noticed the driver sitting oddly with his back not touching the driver’s seat and entered the 

truck’s registration number with the Department of Transportation into a database. The inquiry 

showed that the trucking company had the worst possible score (99) for a company still allowed 

to operate. Under federal law, Fuller testified, he had the authority to stop any truck for an 

inspection if the company’s score was 70 or above. After stopping the truck, a driver of another 

car told Fuller that the semitrailer had been “swerving all over” as if the trucker had been 

distracted by something such as a cell phone. Video at 1:32–1:50. Before approaching the 

driver of the truck, Fuller put on his bodycam, which recorded the relevant events. 

The inspection did not go well for the truck’s driver, Euclide Aquino Urraca. Over the 

course of an hour and a half, Fuller noticed one irregularity after another. The first irregularity 

started with Urraca’s paperwork, which was strewn throughout the cabin. Next was his 

electronic logbook, which was set up incorrectly. Then came the supposed bills of lading, which 

were outdated. When Fuller asked for the current bill of lading, Urraca obliged but only via a 

screenshot on his co-driver’s phone. Even this bill had unexplained and seemingly inexplicable 

discrepancies. Urraca had told Fuller that he was transporting air fryers, and the bill revealed 

deliveries in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Maryland. When Fuller inspected the trailer, which 

itself lacked any security seals or locks, he noticed that the cargo consisted of Craftsman tools (a 

“hot item” for theft), not air fryers, in boxes labeled “Philadelphia,” though Pennsylvania was 

not a listed destination. Video at 51:10–52:25; R.80 at 39. At the end of the inspection, Fuller 

spoke to the cargo’s purported broker, but that didn’t help. The broker failed to provide basic 

information about the freight’s origin, contents, or destination, something Fuller considered 

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“extremely unusual,” given that the broker “facilitated” the shipment. Video at 1:15:02–1:18:07; 

R.80 at 41.

When Fuller sought to check the passenger compartment for required safety equipment, 

other oddities emerged. Looking for a fire extinguisher, Fuller asked the drivers to lift up their 

sleeping bunk. Urraca’s co-driver appeared reluctant to do so, stalling by picking up trash from 

the floor—behavior Fuller found strange, as drivers usually want to get moving as quickly as 

possible, and this inspection had already taken over an hour. When Urraca’s co-driver finally 

lifted the bunk, albeit only after Fuller again gestured at him to do so, Fuller saw a clean Home 

Depot box heavily wrapped in clear tape. He asked the drivers: “What’s in the box?” Video at 

1:13:35–1:13:40. The drivers’ demeanor changed. Up until this point, Urraca had been chatty, 

even telling Fuller about his plan to buy a German Shepherd for his daughter. Now he looked 

away and said nothing. His co-driver did the same. After a few more seconds of silence, Fuller 

repeated the question: “Hey, what’s in the box?” Video at 1:13:45–1:13:52. The drivers 

glanced at each other, spoke a few words in Spanish, and Urraca finally told Fuller: “He says it’s 

got to be some s**t of the truck owner.” Video at 1:13:59–1:14:02. This surprised Fuller, who 

testified that, while it is not unusual for drivers to keep a box under their bunk, these boxes 

typically contain truck parts, “like air filters or something,” and are “never” from Home Depot or 

“wrapped up in tape.” R.80 at 48.

Last of all came the dog sniff. After completing his report, but before printing it, Fuller 

led his canine, Bo Dixi, around the truck. Bo Dixi had previously inspected other nearby trucks 

and part of Urraca’s semitrailer while Urraca looked for paperwork, and she had not alerted. 

This time, however, Fuller took Bo Dixi all of the way around the semitrailer, and she alerted. 

That prompted Fuller to search the passenger compartment. A few minutes later, Fuller came 

across the Home Depot box, which someone had moved from under the bunk to a cabinet. 

Inside the box were 20 kilogram-sized bricks of cocaine. Fuller arrested the drivers. 

B.

A federal grand jury indicted the drivers for possessing cocaine with the intent to 

distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Urraca moved to suppress the cocaine as the result of an 

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unlawful search. Both parties agreed that the administrative inspection was constitutional, that 

the dog sniff was not part of that inspection, and that the pivotal issue was whether Fuller had 

reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to permit the dog sniff. 

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Fuller lacked reasonable 

suspicion to extend the stop. It found the background facts as outlined above, and it largely 

credited Fuller’s testimony. But it rejected his testimony that he subjectively believed at the time 

of the search that the box likely contained narcotics. In the absence of any credible evidence that 

Fuller subjectively believed that the box contained illegal drugs, the court determined that the 

dog-sniff search was unreasonable and granted Urraca’s motion to suppress. The government 

filed this interlocutory appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 

II.

A few ground rules and a few features of this appeal set the stage. The government does 

not contest any of the district court’s factual findings. And it agrees that Fuller needed 

“reasonable suspicion” to extend the “otherwise-completed” inspection. Rodriguez v. United 

States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015). Urraca does not dispute Fuller’s authority to stop the truck in 

view of the company’s poor safety score. And Urraca does not dispute that the dog’s alert 

justified the search of the interior of the truck. That leaves us with the task of reviewing anew 

whether the facts found by the district court amount to reasonable suspicion at the time the police 

ordered the dog sniff. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97 (1996). In doing so, we 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to Urraca, the prevailing party below. United 

States v. Panak, 552 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2009).

III.

A.

Reasonable suspicion sets a modest bar. It requires a “particularized and objective basis” 

for suspicion. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). That is more than just a 

“hunch,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), but “obviously less” than probable cause, United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). It is a “commonsense” standard based on “the factual 

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and practical considerations of everyday life.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–81 (2020) 

(quotation omitted). To succeed, the government must demonstrate a “minimal level of 

objective justification” for its officers’ actions, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000), 

“based upon all the circumstances,” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.

This appeal presents one question under this standard: Would a reasonable officer, 

apprised of all the facts, have had a legitimate reason to suspect that Urraca’s truck contained 

drugs at the time he ordered the dog sniff? 

Yes, he would. Three aspects of the inspection, taken together, lead to this conclusion. 

First was the drivers’ reaction when Fuller asked them about the bunk and the box. At 

the tail end of an already hour-long inspection—all legitimate and unchallenged up to then in 

view of the safety concerns that prompted the stop and the poor safety score of the trucking 

company—Fuller asked the drivers to lift up the bunk. They stalled. Urraca’s co-driver started 

to pick up trash from the floor, and only after Fuller prompted him a second time to lift the bunk 

did he comply. A reasonable officer could pause over this development, as drivers “usually” 

want to leave “as quick[ly] as possible,” and Fuller had given them a clear instruction. R.80 at 

46. Their failure to promptly comply was suspicious, and reasonably prompted the inference that 

they had something to hide. Cf. United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 711 & n.8 (4th Cir. 

2012). 

Combine that with their change in demeanor when confronted with the box. Fuller asked 

the drivers: “What’s in the box?” Video at 1:13:38. Urraca, who had been chatty up to that 

point, looked away and said nothing. His co-driver did the same. Ten seconds of silence passed 

before Fuller had to ask again: “Hey, what’s in the box?” Video at 1:13:48. The drivers 

exchanged a few words in Spanish before Urraca finally told Fuller: “He says it’s got to be some 

s**t of the truck owner.” Video at 1:13:59–1:14:02. That the drivers’ demeanor changed only 

when confronted with questions about the contents of the box—a box they had tried to hide—

could fairly heighten a reasonable officer’s suspicions. Such a “noticeable change” in behavior 

(especially in Urraca’s case) in response to “relatively basic follow-up questions” seems 

“strongly indicative of criminal activity” in the context of this inspection, United States v. Stepp, 

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680 F.3d 651, 666–67 (6th Cir. 2012), in which the drivers had already shown themselves to be 

less than scrupulous. 

Second was the box itself and the drivers’ explanation for it. Fuller testified that he often 

comes across such boxes, but they typically contain “parts for the truck,” “like air filters or 

something,” “in case of a breakdown or something.” R.80 at 48. Urraca’s explanation for the 

box—that it contained “some s**t of the truck owner,” so he didn’t know what was inside—

made little sense. Why would a truck owner keep his personal items underneath the bunk when 

other drivers took a cross-country trip? Urraca had told Fuller that he had been on the road for 

three weeks. On top of that, the box was “clean,” with “no grease on it,” such that it appeared to 

Fuller as though it “had not been in there very long at all.” R.80 at 47. How, then, could this 

box have come with the truck? Urraca gave a hard-to-believe explanation for an already 

suspicious box.

Third is the context in which these events occurred, all after Urraca’s half-truths, 

apparent lies, and unexplained deviations from standard industry practice. Urraca, recall, told 

Fuller that he was transporting air fryers, and showed him a bill of lading for deliveries to 

Tennessee, North Carolina, and Maryland. When Fuller looked in the trailer, however, he found 

Craftsman tools and boxes labeled “Philadelphia.” Video at 51:10–52:25. Urraca at first denied 

any discrepancy, telling Fuller that Philadelphia was their “third” stop. Video at 51:30. But 

Fuller followed up. He looked at the bill of lading again and told Urraca that Pennsylvania 

wasn’t listed. It was only then that Urraca conceded that he didn’t know “why it says that.” 

Video at 52:25. A reasonable officer could conclude this wasn’t mere confusion; it was an 

attempt to fabricate details when caught in a lie. 

Other aspects of the inspection bolster this inference. Unlike most drivers, Urraca’s 

paperwork was strewn “all over the truck,” with his logbook inactive and essential safety 

equipment missing from its usual locations. R.80 at 28, 45. Urraca initially tried to give Fuller 

outdated bills of lading, and only had the supposedly current bill on his co-driver’s phone. When 

Fuller tried to verify these details, the broker could not tell him anything about the load, 

something Fuller found “extremely unusual” given that the broker’s role is to facilitate the 

shipment. R.80 at 42. A reasonable officer, relying on everyday “judgments and inferences 

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about human behavior,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, could doubt that Urraca was engaged in the 

interstate transportation of lawful goods. He could suspect, instead, that this fly-by-night 

operation was a front for criminal activity—perhaps criminal activity centered around the 

heavily-taped box that the drivers did not want to talk about. 

Under all of these circumstances, a reasonable officer could fairly suspect that the box 

contained contraband, extend the stop for a “de minimis” amount of time in Urraca’s words, 

Appellee’s Br. 3, and order a dog sniff around the entire truck. 

In challenging this conclusion, Urraca embraces the district court’s factual finding that 

Fuller did not suspect that the box contained drugs at the time of the search. But that finding 

does not resolve this case. True, Fuller is an experienced law enforcement officer. True also, 

one might fairly expect that he acts reasonably. But the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable 

officer” is not a real officer with real subjective thoughts and feelings. It is a hypothetical 

construct of the law, one that no district court can cross-examine. That Fuller did not suspect 

that the box contained drugs simply does not resolve the inquiry. Just as a police officer’s 

subjective belief that a box does contain drugs fails to establish the reasonableness of a search, 

an officer’s subjective belief that a box does not contain drugs fails to establish the 

unreasonableness of a search. The reality that an officer “does not have the state of mind which 

is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does 

not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that 

action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). That explains why the Fourth 

Amendment does not require courts to inquire into the subjective reasons for a police officer’s 

stop of a vehicle; it asks only whether the objective facts known to a reasonable officer would 

permit the stop. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). The facts known to 

Fuller at the time of the dog sniff objectively warranted the investigation, whether he 

subjectively appreciated all of the reasons justifying it or not. 

Urraca offers other reasons to limit any suspicion arising from the drivers’ change in 

demeanor during the stop. He notes, for instance, that the district court found that he struggled 

“to answer basic questions . . . throughout the entire inspection,” and that his co-driver “did not 

speak much, if any, English.” R.81 at 14. All true. But these facts do little to alter the key 

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point, which even Urraca seems to concede: that he went from talkative to taciturn when 

confronted with the box. Gone was the driver who mused about buying his daughter a dog, 

called Fuller “bro,” Video at 29:51, and asked Fuller unprompted whether “y’all been having a 

long day,” Video at 29:16. At most Urraca’s argument “slightly mitigate[s]” the weight we 

assign to his marked change in demeanor, R.81 at 14, but no more than that. What was left, 

when viewed alongside the other facts known to Fuller, sufficed to meet the “minimal level of 

objective justification” that reasonable suspicion demands. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.

Urraca claims that we cannot rely solely on nervousness—his and his fellow driver’s 

discomfort in response to Fuller’s questions about the box—in upholding the reasonableness of a 

search. But, as shown, more than mere nervousness supported Fuller’s actions. The term 

“nervousness” at any rate deserves elaboration and context. At one end of the spectrum is the 

kind of baseline anxiety that is inevitable (and hardly suspicious) when the police stop anyone, 

including a judge. See United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630–31 (6th Cir. 2004). At 

the other end is the kind of change in demeanor—from candid and calm to nervy and evasive in 

response to a particular question or line of questions—that is more unusual and plays a legitimate 

role in the reasonable-suspicion assessment. See United States v. Shank, 543 F.3d 309, 317 (6th 

Cir. 2008). That’s what we take the Supreme Court to mean when it says that courts may 

consider “commonsense” inferences based on “the factual and practical considerations of 

everyday life” in assessing the reasonableness of a search. Glover, 589 U.S. at 380–81 

(quotation omitted). Urraca’s nervousness fits the latter variety. 

Urraca insists that we should ignore his evasions and apparent lies about his cargo and its 

destination because those facts suggested a theft, not the transportation of illegal narcotics. But 

the Fourth Amendment “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002); see United States v. Coker, 648 F. App’x 541, 544–45 (6th 

Cir. 2016). That suspicious conduct may be “susceptible of an innocent explanation”—or 

suggestive of other crimes—does not preclude the police from briefly detaining a suspect “to 

resolve the ambiguity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125; see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10. The reality 

is that Urraca’s apparent lies about basic aspects of his trip were fertile ground for suspicion as to 

all sorts of possible crimes. When combined with the drivers’ change in demeanor after being 

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confronted with the heavily taped box, and their reluctance to lift up the sleeping bunk in the first 

place, a reasonable officer could focus his suspicions on the box and on what it might contain. 

Whether these facts also might have supported an investigation into theft is irrelevant. The 

Fourth Amendment required only that Fuller have a reasonable basis to suspect that the drivers 

were concealing drugs. 

B.

Because the dog sniff was permissible, so was the search. Bo Dixi’s alert gave Fuller 

probable cause that the semitrailer contained drugs, United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 535–

36 (6th Cir. 2022), and thus, the automobile exception allowed him to conduct the search without 

a warrant, Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466–67 (1999) (per curiam). It follows that the 

Fourth Amendment poses no bar to admission of the cocaine as evidence.

For these reasons, we reverse.

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