Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01370/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01370-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Kipkemei Kirong
Petitioner
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 07-1370

________________

Paul Kipkemei Kirong, *

*

Petitioner, *

*

v. * Petition for Review from the

* Board of Immigration Appeals.

Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney *

General of the United States of *

America, *

*

Respondent. *

_______________

Submitted: January 17, 2008

 Filed: June 20, 2008 (Corrected: 06/23/2008)

________________

Before BYE, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Paul Kipkemei Kirong, a native of Kenya, petitions for review of the decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that he was ineligible for adjustment

of status and its alternative decision denying his application for adjustment of status

as a matter of discretion. He also petitions for review of the BIA’s discretionary

decision not to grant voluntary departure. For the reasons discussed below, we deny

the petition.

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The INS ceased to exist on March 1, 2003, and its functions were transferred

to the DHS. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135

(2002).

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I. BACKGROUND

Kirong came to the United States in 2001 on an F-1 student visa. On four

occasions between 2001 and 2005, he marked the “citizen or national of the United

States” box on Form I-9s to obtain private employment. Along with the Form I-9s,

he presented an altered social security card to potential employers. His social security

card originally contained the restriction that the card was “valid for work only with

INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] authorization.” He removed this

language before using the card to obtain employment without INS authorization. In

2005, Kirong was convicted of burglary and child endangerment, following an

incident where he threatened his girlfriend and their child with a knife. He married

his girlfriend while in state custody, but they have never lived together at any point.

In 2006, Kirong admitted that he was removable because he failed to maintain the

conditions of his nonimmigrant status when he was employed for wages without

authorization of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).1

 See 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(1)(C)(i). However, Kirong sought to adjust his status based on his marriage

to a United States citizen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), (e)(3). 

At a hearing before the immigration judge (“IJ”), Kirong argued that he was

admissible and eligible for adjustment of status based on his testimony that he did not

mark the “citizen or national of the United States” box on the Form I-9s to falsely

represent himself as a citizen of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).

Instead, Kirong testified that he simply wanted employment. Kirong also testified that

he had been drinking alcohol on the night of the knife incident, and his wife testified

that she felt pressured by other people involved in the incident to exaggerate her

version of the events to the police. 

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After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the IJ determined that

Kirong was removable because he falsely represented himself as a United States

citizen when he marked on Form I-9s that he was a “citizen or national of the United

States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D). The IJ then held that Kirong was ineligible

for adjustment of status because he was inadmissible based on his false claim of

United States citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). The IJ also

held that, even if Kirong were eligible for adjustment of status, she would deny the

application as a matter of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). She based this

discretionary decision on the facts that Kirong never lived with his wife before or after

the marriage, that he was convicted of child endangerment after threatening his wife

and child with a knife, and that he marked the “citizen or national of the United

States” box on Form I-9s and used an altered social security card to obtain

employment. Finally, the IJ denied Kirong voluntary departure because his lack of

good moral character based on his conviction caused him to be ineligible for voluntary

departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B).

Kirong appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA first held that the IJ

erred in concluding that Kirong was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D). It

concluded that, in order for Kirong to be removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D),

the DHS had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Kirong

falsely represented himself as a citizen, as opposed to a national, of the United States.

The BIA found that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the IJ’s

finding that the DHS met this burden. The BIA, though, held that Kirong previously

conceded his removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), based on his failure to

maintain the conditions of his nonimmigrant status. Therefore, he still had to prove

that he was eligible for adjustment of status to remain in the United States. See 8

U.S.C. § 1255(a). The BIA held that Kirong did not satisfy his burden to prove

clearly and beyond doubt that he was admissible and, therefore, eligible for

adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 1229a(c)(2)(A). It

determined that Kirong could not meet his burden of establishing clearly and beyond

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doubt that he had not made a false claim of citizenship based on the evidence that he

marked the “citizen or national of the United States” box on the Form I-9s and signed

them under penalty of perjury, altered his social security card, and testified that he was

not claiming to be either a citizen or a national by filling out the Form I-9s before later

claiming in a brief that he believed he was a national of the United States.

Alternatively, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny Kirong’s

application for adjustment of status. The BIA then made the discretionary decision

to deny voluntary departure. 

II. DISCUSSION

Kirong petitions for review of several aspects of the BIA’s decision and argues

that: (1) the BIA held him to the incorrect burden of proof in determining whether he

proved he was admissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii); (2) he did not falsely

represent himself as a citizen of the United States for a purpose or benefit under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“the Act”); (3) the BIA violated his right to due

process by failing to consider the “positive equities” of his case in reaching its

discretionary decision to deny adjustment of status; and (4) the BIA erred in its

discretionary decision not to grant voluntary departure.

A. Adjustment of Status

The BIA found that Kirong was ineligible for adjustment of status before

alternatively holding that, even if Kirong were eligible for adjustment of status, it

would deny the application as a matter of discretion. In most circumstances, we

simply would turn to the alternative, discretionary decision, see Ling Yang v.

Mukasey, 514 F.3d 278, 280 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), and hold that we lack

jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision unless Kirong raised a

constitutional claim or a question of law, see Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878,

886 (8th Cir. 2006) (“This Court lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of

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adjustment of status, unless the petition for review raises a constitutional claim or

question of law.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D). However, because the BIA’s

alternative finding that Kirong was inadmissible based on his failure to prove clearly

and beyond doubt that he did not falsely represent himself as a citizen of the United

States could result in a permanent bar to entry into the United States, see 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), we are required to review the BIA’s determination that Kirong

was inadmissible and, therefore, ineligible for adjustment of status. See Nguyen v.

Mukasey, 522 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that even though

Nguyen conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), we were obliged

to review the BIA’s decision that Nguyen was also “removable for having committed

marriage fraud and for having procured an immigration benefit by fraud or willful

misrepresentation, because such findings could result in a permanent bar to entry into

the United States”).

“We review the Board’s conclusions of law de novo, with substantial deference

to its interpretations of statutes and regulations administered by the agency.”

Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “The

Board’s findings of fact will be disturbed only if unsupported by substantial

evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), an alien who is

removable may seek adjustment of status. An alien must be “admissible to the United

States” to be eligible for adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An alien is

inadmissible if he or she “falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or

herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this

chapter (including section 1324a of this title) or any other Federal or State law.” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). 

Kirong first argues that the BIA erred in requiring him to prove clearly and

beyond doubt that he was admissible and that this error also violated his due process

rights. He contends that, while “applicants for admission” to the United States bear

the burden of proving clearly and beyond doubt that they are admissible, he is not an

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applicant for admission because he was lawfully admitted to the United States in

2001. Instead of being required to prove clearly and beyond doubt that he is

admissible, Kirong argues that he must only prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the apparent grounds for inadmissibility do not apply. We disagree. Kirong

admitted he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). Therefore, he is an

applicant for admission because he is seeking to adjust his status to be admitted as a

lawful permanent resident. See Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193, 197-98 (2d

Cir. 2007) (explaining that an applicant for adjustment of status is in a similar position

as an alien seeking entry into the United States and, “like [an alien] seeking entry,

must show that [he is] eligible for admissibility under [8 U.S.C. § 1182]”) (internal

quotation omitted). With this “applicant for admission” classification, the BIA

correctly determined that Kirong was required to prove clearly and beyond doubt that

he was admissible and, therefore, eligible for adjustment of status. See Rodriguez, 519

F.3d at 776; Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1085 (10th Cir. 2007); Blanco v.

Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, in this case, Kirong was required

to prove clearly and beyond doubt that he did not make a false claim of United States

citizenship for a purpose or benefit under the Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).

 Kirong then argues that falsely claiming United States citizenship to obtain

private employment by marking the “citizen or national of the United States” box on

a Form I-9 is not for a purpose or benefit under the Act. See 8 U.S.C. §§

1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 1324a. We have since decided this issue and held that “an alien

who marks the ‘citizen or national of the United States’ box on a Form I-9 for the

purpose of falsely representing himself as a citizen to secure employment with a

private employer has falsely represented himself for a benefit or purpose under the

Act.” Rodriguez, 519 F.3d at 777. In light of this holding, Kirong’s argument that his

checking the “citizen or national of the United States” box on the Form I-9s was not

for a purpose or benefit under the Act fails so long as he cannot prove clearly and

beyond doubt that he did not represent himself as a United States citizen. See id. at

776 (noting that an alien is only inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)

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The equivocal nature of the evidence in this case is demonstrated further by the

BIA’s holding that the DHS did not carry its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that Kirong falsely represented himself as a United States citizen.

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“when he falsely represents himself as a citizen of the United States for any of the

described purposes”).

After reviewing the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

finding that Kirong did not clearly and beyond doubt prove that he was admissible.

Kirong marked the “citizen or national of the United States” box on four Form I-9s

to obtain employment with four different employers. Along with submitting the Form

I-9s, Kirong showed potential employers an altered social security card, from which

he had removed the language requiring INS approval for his employment. Kirong

testified that he did not know what a national was and also that a citizen was a person

born in the United States. He knew that he was not born in the United States and was

not a United States citizen. He also testified that he intentionally marked the “citizen

or national” box but that he did not mean to claim anything by that action. He only

sought to obtain employment. Although it is conceivable that Kirong marked the

“citizen or national of the United States” box on the Form I-9s to indicate he was a

national, the evidence does not clearly and beyond doubt establish that Kirong did not

falsely represent himself as a United States citizen when he marked the “citizen or

national of the United States” box on the Form I-9s. As the BIA stated and as Kirong

argued in his brief to this court, “the evidence in this case, at best, is equivocal as to

whether his attestation involved a claim of citizenship or nationality.” BIA Order at

3.2

 Therefore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Kirong did not

satisfy his burden of proving clearly and beyond doubt that he did not falsely represent

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Kirong also argues that the BIA made a new and incorrect factual finding by

stating that Kirong asserted “something” by marking the “citizen or national of the

United States” box on the Form I-9s. We disagree with his characterization that this

was a new and incorrect factual finding. Instead, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s refusal

to believe that Kirong only marked the box to obtain employment without claiming

anything. Clearly, by marking the box on the four Form I-9s, Kirong was claiming

either to be a citizen or a national of the United States.

Additionally, we reject Kirong’s argument that the BIA made a new and

incorrect factual finding when it characterized his argument in his brief to the BIA as

including a new claim that he meant to indicate he was a national when he marked the

“citizen or national” box. In his brief to the BIA, Kirong discussed the disjunctive

nature of the “citizen or national of the United States” box on the Form I-9s and

argued, “Isn’t it more likely that Mr. Kirong, not really knowing what a national was,

thought that it might then apply to him?” Br. of Pet’r to the BIA at 21. Kirong claims

that he did not argue that he was, in fact, indicating he was a national by marking the

box. He only argued that a person’s decision to mark the “citizen or national” box on

a Form I-9 does not automatically prove that he or she is claiming to be a citizen. We

see no reason to view the BIA’s interpretation of Kirong’s argument as a new and

erroneous factual finding. 

4

Because the BIA correctly held that Kirong was ineligible for adjustment of

status, we need not reach the BIA’s alternative, discretionary decision to deny

adjustment of status or Kirong’s due process claim challenging the discretionary

decision.

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himself as a United States citizen and that he, therefore, did not prove he was

admissible.3

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s holding that Kirong did not

satisfy his burden of proof, we agree with the BIA’s determination that Kirong is

inadmissible and, therefore, ineligible for adjustment of status. Therefore, we deny

Kirong’s petition for review with respect to his adjustment of status claim.4

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B. Voluntary Departure

We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision denying voluntary

departure. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal from

denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure . . . .”). However, we have

jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law relating to a voluntary

departure determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D). Kirong argues that the

BIA legally erred by denying voluntary departure in its discretion sua sponte, instead

of reviewing the IJ’s determination that he was ineligible for voluntary departure.

The BIA “may review questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other

issues in appeals from the decisions of immigration judges de novo.” 8 C.F.R. §

1003.1(d)(3)(ii). Based on the regulation’s broad grant of authority to the BIA to

review de novo “all . . . issues in appeals from the decisions of immigration judges,”

we see no reason to limit the BIA’s authority to make a discretionary decision to deny

voluntary departure after an IJ denies voluntary departure based on an applicant’s

ineligibility for it. Requiring the BIA to remand this case to the IJ so that the IJ can

first make a discretionary determination “would be an imprudent expenditure of

resources.” Solano-Chicas v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006).

Therefore, we reject Kirong’s legal argument and deny his petition for review with

respect to his voluntary departure claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Kirong’s petition for review.

BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring.

A false claim of citizenship is a ground for the mandatory denial of an

application for relief from removal. Despite the clear regulatory language imposing

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a mere preponderance standard upon an alien who argues a ground for denial of relief

should not apply to him, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) ("If the evidence indicates that one

or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply,

the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

such grounds do not apply." ), we hold Paul Kipkemei Kirong had the higher burden

of proving "clearly and beyond doubt" that he did not make a false claim of

citizenship. I will not belabor the reasons why I disagree with this conclusion,

because we are bound by Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2008), issued

after this case was submitted to our panel. See Rodriguez, 519 F.3d at 776

("Rodriguez bore the burden of proving clearly and beyond doubt that he was not

inadmissible."). I concur in denying Kirong's petition for review because I agree he

cannot show clearly and beyond doubt that he did not make a false claim of

citizenship when he marked the "citizen or national of the United States" box on Form

I-9.

I write separately for the purpose of urging the government to revise Form I-9.

In Rodriguez, we noted "Form I-9 is poorly designed in that by checking one box the

person ambiguously represents that he is either a citizen or a national." Id. at 776-77.

The ambiguous nature of the "citizen or national" box on Form I-9 has spawned

needless litigation in this circuit as well as others over whether an alien makes a false

claim of citizenship by checking the box. See id.; see also Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384

F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2004); Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1085 (10th Cir.

2007); United States v. Karaouni, 379 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004). The doubt

created by Form I-9's disjunctive choice between "citizen or national" is exacerbated

by the fact that few people know what it means to be a "national" of the United States.

Indeed, counsel for the government in this case could not advise our panel on the

precise meaning of a "national" of the United States. As a result, some aliens may

genuinely, but mistakenly, believe they are nationals of the United States when they

complete Form I-9, only to be subsequently imposed with the onerous burden of

proving clearly and beyond doubt that they were not making a false claim of

citizenship.

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The government offers no reason why the "citizen or national" inquiry on Form

I-9 must be posed as a single disjunctive choice, rather than as two separate, standalone questions. Given the dire consequences which face an alien who falsely

represents himself to be a citizen, see ante at 5 (noting such a claim can result in a

permanent bar to entry into the United States), I suggest a simple revision in this

widely-used form is more than overdue.

_____________________________

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