Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07121/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07121-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rochelle Jaffe
Appellant
Pallotta Teamworks
Appellee
University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

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before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2004 Decided July 16, 2004

No. 03-7121

ROCHELLE JAFFE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE ESTATE OF EVE JAFFE,

APPELLANT

v.

PALLOTTA TEAMWORKS, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL. AND

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION,

ON BEHALF OF ITS R. ADAMS COWLEY SHOCK TRAUMA CENTER,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01048)

Frederic W. Schwartz, Jr. argued the cause for appellant.

With him on the briefs was James W. Taglieri.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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William J. Carter argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Jan E. Simonsen and Neal M. Brown.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents a choice of

law question arising from the death of a young woman, Eve

Jaffe, in Virginia while participating in a 300–mile, 4–day

bicycle ride to raise funds for charity. Rochelle Jaffe, in her

personal capacity and on behalf of the estate of her daughter,

Eve Jaffe, appeals the grant of summary judgment in her

negligence and wrongful death action to Pallotta TeamWorks

(‘‘Pallotta’’), which sponsored and organized the bike ride, and

the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation

(‘‘UMMS’’), which provided, in Virginia, the medical services

in dispute. The district court, applying the law of the District

of Columbia, ruled that a pre-participation waiver executed

by Eve Jaffe absolved Pallotta and UMMS from liability. We

hold, upon comparing which jurisdiction has the more substantial interests, that the District of Columbia would apply

the law of Virginia, and not that of the District of Columbia

regarding the effect of the waiver, and that the waiver is void

as against public policy under Virginia law. Accordingly, we

reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case

to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

On de novo review of the grant of summary judgment, the

court reviews the evidence most favorably to the non-moving

party, according her all favorable inferences. See Tao v.

Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 56

(2004). Pallotta is a California corporation that operates

‘‘AIDSRide’’ events — multiple-day, non-competitive bicycle

rides that raise funds for AIDS-related charities — throughout the United States. Participants collect pledges, and

Pallotta handles logistics such as securing corporate sponsorship, selecting a route, and arranging for services for the

riders — such as, in this case, arranging for the University of

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Maryland Medical System Corporation (‘‘UMMS’’) to provide

medical care for the riders. Eve Jaffe died while participating in the fifth annual Washington, D.C. AIDSRide. This

event, covering 300 miles over four days, was scheduled for

June 22–25, 2000, with over 1,600 bicycle riders, beginning in

Raleigh, North Carolina, crossing through Virginia, and ending on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.

Before commencement of AIDSRide, Pallotta required all

participants to read and sign an entry form that included a

section titled ‘‘Waiver of Negligence & Complete Release of

Liability.’’ The form calls for the signatories to acknowledge

that they are ‘‘aware that serious injuries occur during bicycle

riding’’ and that they ‘‘may be seriously injured or killed as a

result.’’ The form further states that ‘‘[i]n consideration for

being permitted to participate in Washington, D.C. AIDSRide

5 TTT, I agree to assume all risks and to release and hold

harmless TTT [Pallotta] TTT [UMMS], or any other Ride

Medical Team member’’ who ‘‘through negligence, carelessness or any other cause, might otherwise be liable to me.’’

Eve Jaffe, a 31–year-old resident of the District of Columbia who had also participated in AIDSRide the previous year,

executed this entry form on June 2, 2000 in the District of

Columbia. A few weeks later, on June 22, she began the

bicycle ride in Raleigh, North Carolina. On the afternoon of

the first day, however, while traveling through Virginia, she

went to a medical aid station set up for the riders and

complained that she felt nauseated and dizzy. She was given

intravenous fluids by the volunteers at the station, but her

condition worsened and she began vomiting, then lost consciousness as her blood pressure dropped. An ambulance

took her to the Greensville Memorial Hospital, where she

died the following day without regaining consciousness.

Rochelle Jaffe filed suit for negligence and wrongful death

against Pallotta and UMMS, on her own behalf and as

representative of her daughter’s estate. She alleged that her

daughter’s death could have been prevented if not for the

negligence of Pallotta and UMMS. Specifically, as relevant

here, she alleged and offered expert opinion evidence that the

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aid station was manned by untrained volunteers who overhydrated her daughter, and that, to a reasonable medical certainty, Eve Jaffe died of global brain hypoxia and would have

survived if proper medical care had been provided or an

ambulance with advanced life support had been available to

transport her to the hospital. UMMS denied these allegations and moved to dismiss the complaint, and in the alternative for summary judgment, on the grounds that the complaint was time-barred under Virginia’s two year statute of

limitations, and that liability was barred by Eve Jaffe’s

waiver. Pallotta also moved for summary judgment on the

basis of the waiver.

The district court granted summary judgment to Pallotta

and UMMS on the basis of the waiver. Because the events

leading up to Eve Jaffe’s death took place in Virginia, the

district court ruled that Virginia tort law would govern the

underlying negligence action, but because the waiver was

executed in the District of Columbia, Eve Jaffe was a resident

of the District of Columbia, and AIDSRide ended in the

District of Columbia and raised money for local charities, the

court ruled that the District of Columbia law, rather than

Virginia law, should control its effect. The court then concluded that District of Columbia law would recognize prospective waivers for personal injury claims in the absence of

unfairness in the conditions under which the waiver was

signed, and that the waiver was thus valid.

II.

On appeal, Ms. Jaffe contends that the district court, in

relying on factors not dispositive under District of Columbia

law, failed to weigh properly the governmental interests of

Virginia against those of the District of Columbia. We first

review the relevant law in the two jurisdictions, and then

compare the interests of those jurisdictions in the effect of

the waiver.

A.

In Virginia, where any alleged negligence leading to Eve

Jaffe’s death occurred, Eve Jaffe’s release has no legal effect:

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Virginia unambiguously rejects pre-injury releases as ‘‘prohibited by public policy and [ ] thus [ ] void.’’ Hiett v. Lake

Barcroft Community Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va. 1992).

In the District of Columbia, on the other hand, where Eve

Jaffe resided, executed the entry form, and was destined,

along with over a thousand other riders and the funds they

had raised, it is at least arguable that the waiver would be

enforced. The case, therefore, presents a classic choice of

law question: which jurisdiction’s law governs the effect of

the waiver? Or to put it more aptly given the nature of

diversity jurisdiction: which jurisdiction’s law would the

courts of the forum, the District of Columbia, apply to

determine the effect of the release? See Klaxon Co. v.

Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

Agreements of the type that Pallotta had Eve Jaffe execute — a release prospectively absolving itself, and UMMS,

of liability for any future negligence that might cause personal injury — raise difficult public policy issues. At common

law, such agreements were void, the rule being that ‘‘the law

did not permit a person to exculpate himself by contract from

the legal consequences of his negligence.’’ Maiatico v. Hot

Shoppes, Inc., 287 F.2d 349, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1961). As with the

proscription against prospective waiver of tort liability for

intentional torts or for strict liability, such agreements interfere with the ability of the state to ensure that persons do not

put each other at risk of bodily harm, a policy that often

serves goals beyond the protection of the immediate contracting party. On the other hand, any rule limiting the ability of

consenting individuals to contract freely will prevent mutually

beneficial exchanges, and risk-tolerant individuals may stand

to gain from being permitted to trade away their entitlement

to non-negligent treatment. Similarly, as is often the case

with recreational or charitable activities, persons involved in

group efforts may jointly agree to sign such waivers so as to

protect shared resources from each others’ legal claims, meritorious or otherwise.

Given the tradeoffs and policy issues presented by preinjury releases, it is no surprise that different jurisdictions

have varied positions on their validity. Some jurisdictions

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widely enforce prospective releases so long as they are clear.

See, e.g., Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, 392

N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1986); Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering,

636 P.2d 492, 493 (Wash. 1982); Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass’n, 291 N.E.2d 30, 32 (Ill. 1972). A few

categorically prohibit them, either generally or in specific

contexts. See, e.g., Coughlin v. T.M.H. Int’l Attractions, 895

F. Supp. 159, 162 (W.D. Ky. 1995); Hiett, 418 S.E.2d at 896;

N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §§ 5–321 through 5–326 (2004). Still

others honor them generally, but impose much more rigorous

scrutiny of the parties’ relative bargaining power than they

do for other types of contract. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of

Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445–46 (Cal. 1963). And some

jurisdictions refuse to recognize them in areas where the

state has a heightened regulatory interest in ensuring the

non-negligent provision of certain licensed services, such as

medicine, see, e.g., Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525

N.W.2d 891 (Mich. App. 1995); Olsen v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d

429 (Tenn. 1977); Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447; or in furthering

other safety policies, such as premises liability, see, e.g.,

Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 800 (Vt. 1995).

Where the District of Columbia falls on this spectrum is not

obvious. There is no definitive statute or case law indicating

whether the District of Columbia would recognize a prospective liability waiver for a personal injury claim at all, and, if it

did, what conditions and limitations, if any, it would first

require. Cases on closely related subjects go either way:

parties can prospectively waive claims of negligently inflicted

economic harm, see, e.g., Houston v. Sec. Storage Co. of

Washington, 474 A.2d 143, 144 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam); see

also Hot Shoppes, 287 F.2d at 350–51, but cannot waive,

absent contributory negligence, the duty of care to which they

are entitled under certain public safety statutes. See Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. 1980); Martin v.

George Hyman Const. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 71–74 (D.C. 1978).

In Virginia there is no such ambiguity: Virginia continues to

follow the common law rule that personal injury claims cannot

be waived prospectively. See Hiett, 418 S.E.2d at 896.

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B.

To decide which jurisdiction’s law applies in tort cases, the

District of Columbia follows the ‘‘substantial interest’’ position

of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)

§ 145, under which the court will ‘‘balance the competing

interests of the two jurisdictions, and apply the law of the

jurisdiction with the more ‘substantial interest’ in the resolution of the issue.’’ Lamphier v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 524

A.2d 729, 731 (D.C. 1987). This inquiry is to include consideration of several contacts, including (1) ‘‘the place where the

injury occurred,’’ (2) ‘‘the place where the conduct causing the

injury occurred,’’ (3) ‘‘the domicile, residence, nationality,

place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,’’

and (4) ‘‘the place where the relationship is centered.’’ Herbert v. District of Columbia, 808 A.2d 776, 779 (D.C. 2002)

(quoting RESTATEMENT, § 145(2)).

Because Eve Jaffe’s death and the medical care leading to

it occurred in Virginia, the district court ruled that Virginia

tort law governed the underlying tort action. This ruling was

correct, as was the district court’s realization that a separate

analysis was required to decide which law should govern the

effect of the waiver, for, under District of Columbia choice of

law rules, ‘‘[d]ifferent law may apply to different issues in a

lawsuit.’’ Logan v. Providence Hospital, 778 A.2d 275 at 280

(D.C. 2001); see also RESTATEMENT, § 145(2) cmt. d. Application of the same rules, however, should have revealed to the

court that Virginia law governs the effect of the waiver as

well.

In ‘‘construing a contract where the laws of two jurisdictions are involved,’’ the District of Columbia ‘‘applies the law

of the state which has the ‘more substantial interest in the

resolution of the issue.’ ’’ Coulibaly v. Malaquias, 728 A.2d

595, 606 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d

344, 348 (D.C. 1970)). Irrespective of whether the effect of

the waiver is framed as a question of contract law or a

question of tort liability, it is clear that the District of

Columbia’s interest in the waiver’s legal effect is less than

Virginia’s.

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Virginia’s interests in invalidating the waiver are substantial. The waiver directly affects Virginia’s ability, through its

substantive tort law, to regulate the safety of conduct within

its borders, including the provision of medical services. In

Lamphier, a similar case, the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals faced a situation where a health care corporation that

had allegedly caused negligent injury through its services in

the District of Columbia tried to use a post-injury settlement

entered into in Maryland by the plaintiff and a different party

involved in the accident as a defense to liability; Maryland

law tends to read such settlements broadly to protect the

settling tortfeasor from later contribution claims by nonsettling tortfeasors, whereas the District of Columbia does

not. 524 A.2d at 733. The court rejected the argument that

Maryland law should govern the effect of the release, notwithstanding its having been executed in Maryland between Maryland residents, because the District of Columbia ‘‘has a

strong and recognized interest in determining the liability of

District health care corporations for negligence attributable

to them that occurs within the District.’’ Lamphier, 524 A.2d

at 731. A similar situation is presented in the instant case.

Virginia has a strong policy against recognizing prospective

liability waivers for personal injury claims, in order to preserve the incentives for conduct that does not place people at

risk of bodily injury. See Hiett, 418 S.E.2d at 897. Not only

is this public safety policy directly implicated here, but if

parties entering a contract to provide medical services within

Virginia could evade this policy simply by executing the

contract elsewhere, the policy would be easily circumvented.

Virginia’s interest in public safety in the instant case is not

substantially diluted by the fact that AIDSRide also traveled

through two other jurisdictions. While the ride began in

Raleigh, North Carolina, and ended in the District of Columbia, the court can take judicial notice of a map, see Washington Water Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305, 328 n.11 (D.C.

Cir. 1985), and note that the vast bulk of the ride’s route, and

hence the chief place in which Pallotta and UMMS were

responsible for the riders, was within Virginia. Nor is Virginia’s interest in regulating the safety of recreational events

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and medical services within the state meaningfully diminished

by the fact that it is a non-resident who died from the alleged

negligence. Virginia obviously has an interest in preventing

non-residents from being negligently injured or killed within

its borders. And, in any event, the organizers of large

recreational events, as well as medical service providers,

presumably do not tailor the level of care they provide based

on the residence of individual participants or patients; the

tort liability exposure they face toward non-residents will

likely also influence the level of care they observe toward

residents, and vice versa.

The District of Columbia’s interests in the effects of the

waiver, on the other hand, are much more attenuated. While

Eve Jaffe was a resident of the District of Columbia, this

means little: she would not benefit from application of District of Columbia law as opposed to Virginia law, and as

Pallotta and UMMS are incorporated in California and Maryland, respectively, any interest the District of Columbia might

have in protecting its residents is not implicated here. Cf.

District of Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 817 (D.C.

1995); Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Rose, 583 A.2d 156,

159 (D.C. 1990); Lamphier, 524 A.2d at 731. Nor is the fact

that she executed the waiver in the District of Columbia of

much significance when the services provided by Pallotta and

UMMS during the bicycle ride to participating riders would

be performed mostly in Virginia.

Where the District of Columbia does have some interest in

the effect of the waiver is that it operates to protect funds

raised by a charitable event ending in the District of Columbia and raising money for District of Columbia area charities.

The District of Columbia might, therefore, have an interest in

protecting the funds because District of Columbia residents

suffering from AIDS will benefit from them and doing so

might make the District of Columbia an attractive and lowliability-risk destination for similar fundraising events in the

future. Two factors, however, dilute this interest in the

instant case.

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First, nothing in the record indicates that the charitable

funds raised by Washington, D.C. AIDSRide 5 are destined

only to the District of Columbia, and not at least in part to

AIDS-related charities serving locations in northern Virginia

that are part of the District of Columbia metropolitan area.

It is impossible to gauge, on the record before the court,

whether the District of Columbia’s interest in the charitable

funds is any more meaningful than Virginia’s.

Second, and more importantly, it is not clear that the

District of Columbia would have a policy of protecting the

charitable funds by enforcing the waiver. The District of

Columbia has no recognizable policy, either way, on the

acceptability of prospective liability waivers for personal injury claims. The absence of such a policy diminishes further

any interest it might have in having its own law decide the

effect of Eve Jaffe’s waiver. In Logan v. Providence Hospital, 778 A.2d at 278–80, another choice-of-law case involving

the effect of an out-of-state post-injury release on a tort claim

arising in the District of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals

applied Maryland rather than District of Columbia law to

determine the legal effect of the release, in part out of

deference to the fact that Maryland had a firm public policy

on the offsets created by third-party settlements whereas the

District of Columbia did not. Id. at 279. It stands to reason

that the District of Columbia would similarly defer to Virginia

on this point in the instant case.

In short, Virginia has a public policy which is directly

implicated by the prospective waiver executed by Eve Jaffe,

whereas the interests of the District of Columbia are at best

attenuated, if it has a policy interest in the waiver at all.

Under the circumstances, the district court erred when it

applied District of Columbia law to determine the legal effect

of the prospective liability waiver Eve Jaffe executed in order

to participate in the AIDSRide. Virginia’s interest in the

matter is more substantial, and Virginia’s interest is to see

the waiver invalidated. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of

summary judgment to Pallotta and UMMS, and we remand

the case to the district court for further proceedings.

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