Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00090/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Rackley
Respondent
Gustavo Villegas
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUSTAVO VILLEGAS, No. 2:15-cv-0090-KJM-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RONALD RACKLEY,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with counsel, brings this petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1).

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary

dismissal of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any

exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” In the

instant case, it is plain that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Reversing the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the United

States Supreme Court recently observed:

/ / / 

1

Case 2:15-cv-00090-KJM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/06/15 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Whatever liberty interest exists [in parole] is, of course, a state

interest. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be

conditionally released [on parole] before the expiration of a valid sentence,

and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners. Id. at 7. 

When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause

requires fair procedures for its vindication – and federal courts will review

the application of those constitutionally required procedures. . . .

Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam) (citing Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)) (emphasis in original). 

The Court held:

In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures required

are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a parole

statute similar to California’s received adequate process when he was

allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the

reasons why parole was denied. 442 U.S. at 16. “The Constitution,” we

held, “does not require more.” Ibid. Cooke and Clay received at least this

amount of process: They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings

and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to their

records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was

denied. (citations omitted). 

That should have been the beginning and the end of the federal

habeas courts’ inquiry into whether Cook and Clay received due 

process. . . .

Id. The Court added that “[n]o opinion of ours supports converting California’s ‘some evidence’

rule into a substantive federal requirement” and “it is no federal concern . . . whether California’s

‘some evidence’ rule of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution demands) was

correctly applied” because “a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due process.” Id. at 862-

63 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121, n.21 (1982)). Thus, in cases challenging the denial

of parole, the only issue subject to federal habeas review is whether the inmate received the

procedural due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard. There is no other

clearly established federal constitutional right in the context of parole. 

Here, to the extent petitioner claims that the decision to deny parole was

supported by evidence that petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public,

essentially an argument that the decision not based on “some evidence,” or otherwise failed to

satisfy substantive due process, the claim is foreclosed as a matter of law because there is no

2

Case 2:15-cv-00090-KJM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/06/15 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

clearly established federal constitutional substantive due process right in parole. There is no

claim in the petition, nor does one appear to be feasible, that petitioner was not provided the

minimal procedural due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard, the

minimum procedural protections guaranteed by the federal constitution. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be summarily dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 6, 2015

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3

Case 2:15-cv-00090-KJM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/06/15 Page 3 of 3