Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06238/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06238-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Contreras
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ulllttd States Court ot Appeala Tenth Clreult 

JUL 0 6 1995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JESUS CONTRERAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-6238 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-93-153-03-A) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Thomas D. McCormick, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellant. 

Rozia McKinney-Foster, United States Attorney, and Frank Michael 

Ringer, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and BROWN,** 

District Judge. 

BROWN, District Judge. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 

lOth Cir. R. 34. 1. 9. The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

** The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-6238 Document: 01019277244 Date Filed: 07/06/1995 Page: 1 
Defendant Jesus Contreras pled guilty to one count of 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 

21 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

of 151 months and four years of supervised release. He now argues 

that the district judge committed three errors in determining his 

guideline range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We 

conclude that the district court correctly applied the guidelines 

and we affirm. 

Defendant's first argument is that the court erred by 

increasing his offense level under USSG § 201.1 (b) ( 1) . That 

section, which applies to offenses under 21 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1), 

requires a two-level increase "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including 

a firearm) was possessed." Undisputed portions of the Presentence 

Report asserted that the defendant participated with several other 

individuals in shipping large quantities of marijuana. The report 

alleged that the defendant permitted his house to be used as a 

"stash house" for marijuana on numerous occasions. The government 

put on evidence at the sentencing hearing that agents searching the 

defendant's residence found a loaded . 22-caliber rifle under a 

couch in a living room of the house. The agents also found 

approximately 238 pounds of marijuana in an attached garage 

approximately twenty-five feet from where the gun was found. 

Additionally, marijuana residue was found in a closet inside the 

house. At the time of the search, the defendant told an agent that 

the weapon was for "personal home protection." 

After hearing the evidence, the district court concluded that 

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Appellate Case: 94-6238 Document: 01019277244 Date Filed: 07/06/1995 Page: 2 
it was highly probable that the possession of the weapon was 

connected to the drug offense. The court cited several factors in 

support of this conclusion, including the relatively close 

proximity between the gun and a valuable stash of marijuana, the 

unusual and potentially dangerous location of the gun, and the fact 

that the weapon was immediately accessible and was loaded with a 

round in the chamber. Defendant argues that the adjustment should 

not apply because he possessed the rifle only for personal 

protection. 

The enhancement for weapons possession reflects the increased 

danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. USSG § 

201.1, commentary (n. 3). The adjustment should be applied if the 

weapon was present unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon 

was connected with the offense. Id. The government has the burden 

to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a weapon was 

possessed in physical proximity to the offense. United States v. 

Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F. 3d 464, 466 (lOth Cir. 1993). Once that 

burden is met, the burden is on the defendant to show that the 

increase should not apply because it is "clearly improbable" that 

the gun was connected to the offense. Id. 

In light of the evidence, we cannot say that the district 

court's conclusion was clearly erroneous. Cf. Roberts, 980 F.2d at 

648 (trial judge's finding that a weapon was connected to a drug 

offense is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard). The 

factors cited by the district judge, including the unusual location 

of the loaded gun and its close proximity to the marijuana, 

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Appellate Case: 94-6238 Document: 01019277244 Date Filed: 07/06/1995 Page: 3 
' rationally support a conclusion that the defendant's possession of 

the gun was in fact related to the drug offense. See id. at 647 

(the mere possession of a firearm in physical proximity to the 

offense is sufficient to permit application of the increase.) 

Defendant's next argument is that his criminal history was 

over-represented by two prior DWI convictions and that the trial 

court should have granted a downward departure. This argument is 

unavailing. So long as a district court understands its authority 

to depart from the guidelines, this court has no jurisdiction to 

review a district court's discretionary refusal to grant a 

departure. United States v. Williamson, ____ F.3d ____ , 1995 WL 

225507 (lOth Cir., Apr. 14, 1995); 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a). Defendant 

does not argue that the district court misunderstood its authority 

to depart and we see no evidence of such a fact in the record. 

Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to review the district court 1 s 

denial of a departure. 

Defendant's final argument is that the district court erred by 

refusing to grant an adjustment under USSG § 3El.l for acceptance 

of responsibility. Although the district court recognized that the 

defendant had admitted the elements of the offense of conviction, 

the court declined to grant a reduction under § 3El.l because he 

found that the defendant had understated his culpability for other 

relevant conduct. Specifically, the court found that the defendant 

admitted participating in a significantly lesser number of episodes 

of transporting marijuana than the government had proven. In 

asserting that he is entitled to the reduction, defendant does not 

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Appellate Case: 94-6238 Document: 01019277244 Date Filed: 07/06/1995 Page: 4 
specifically challenge the district court's factual finding. 

Rather, he argues that admitting the offense of conviction is all 

that is required to obtain the reduction. Citing United States v. 

Moored, 997 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1993). 

We conclude that the district court committed no error in 

denying the adjustment. It is true that a defendant is not 

required to affirmatively admit relevant conduct beyond the offense 

of conviction to obtain a reduction under§ 3E1.1(a). Id., comment. 

( n. 1 (a) ) (Nov. 19 9 2) . Thus, a defendant may remain silent with 

respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction 

without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this 

subsection. Id. "However, a defendant who falsely denies, or 

frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to 

be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of 

responsibility. 11 Id. 1 

In this case, rather than remaining silent with respect to the 

instances of transporting marijuana, the defendant significantly 

understated his culpable conduct with respect to those trips. In 

light of this, the district court could properly conclude that the 

United States v. Moored, supra, relied upon by defendant 

for the proposition that relevant conduct should not be considered 

under § 3E1.1, appears to have been based on a previous version of 

the guidelines that did not contain Application Note 1(a) •s 

directive that a defendant who falsely denies or frivolously 

contests relevant conduct is not entitled to the reduction. See 

Moored, 997 F.2d at 145 (examining application notes and concluding 

that the inquiry under § 3E1.1 is limited to the offense of 

conviction). This language was inserted in Note 1(a) by way of 

amendment dated November 1, 1992, which was after the date of the 

offense in Moored. See USSG App. C, Amendment 459; Moored, 997 F.2d 

at 140. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6238 Document: 01019277244 Date Filed: 07/06/1995 Page: 5 
" defendant was falsely denying his involvement in this relevant 

conduct and was not clearly demonstrating acceptance of 

responsibility for his offense. 

unique position to evaluate a 

"The sentencing judge is in a 

defendant's acceptance of 

responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the 

sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review." § 

3E1.1, comment. (n.5). The district court's determination in this 

case had a basis in the record and was not clearly erroneous. See 

United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1449 (lOth Cir. 1995) (A 

denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is reviewed 

under the clearly erroneous standard.) 

Conclusion. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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