Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-01758/USCOURTS-caDC-93-01758-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ciba-Geigy Corporation
Petitioner
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 30, 1995 Decided February 21, 1995

No. 93-1758

CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

Petition for Review of an Order of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Cara S. Jablon argued the cause for the petitioner. On brief was Kenneth W. Weinstein.

Daniel R. Dertke, Attorney, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent. On brief

were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and John A. Sheehan, Attorney, Department of

Justice.

Before HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Ciba-Geigy Corporation petitions

for review of a finalrule issued January 31, 1991, which set the MaximumContaminant Level(MCL)

and Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG) for the herbicide atrazine at 0.003 mg/l based on,

inter alia, a Reference Dose (RfD) of 0.005 mg/kg/day, set by the EPA. For the reasons set forth

below, we dismissthe petitionwithout prejudice and remand to theEnvironmentalProtectionAgency

(EPA) to reconsiderthe appropriate MCLand MCLG in light ofthe agency's October 1, 1993 revised

RfD of .035 mg/kg and any other relevant factors.

The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) requires the EPA to promulgate for each of various

contaminants, including atrazine, (1) a "national primary drinking water regulation" consisting of

either an MCL or, if it is not feasible to ascertain the contaminant level, a list of the known treatment

techniques for the contaminant and (2) an MCLG. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1, 300f(1). The MCLG is to

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be set at "the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur

and which allows an adequate margin of safety." 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4). The MCL is to be set

"as close to the maximumcontaminant level goal asisfeasible," 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4), and is "the

maximum permissible level of a contaminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public water

system," 42 U.S.C. § 300f(3).

In a Final Rule issued January 30, 1991 the EPA established MCLGs and MCLs for various

contaminants, including atrazine, an herbicide developed and in large part produced by the petitioner.

56 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1991). The Final Rule uses three different methods for establishing MCLGs,

depending on a particular contaminant's carcinogenicity. 56 Fed. Reg. at 3531-33. The method it

used for atrazine yielded an MCLG of .003 based on an RfD of 0.005 mg/kg/day. Id. at 3543-44.

It then set the MCL at the same level. Id. at 3528.

On October 1, 1993, the EPA published a revised atrazine RfD of .035 mg/kg, which, under

the method EPA had used in the Final Rule, would yield a higher MCLG of .02 mg/l. On account

of this change, on November 15, 1993, Ciba-Geigy filed a petition for review of the Final Rule's

atrazine MCLG and corresponding MCL in this court under section 1448(a) of the SDWA. That

section vests in this court exclusive review of "actions pertaining to the establishment of national

primary drinking water regulations (including maximum contaminant level goals)" and requires that

petitions for such review generally be filed "within the 45-day period beginning on the date of the

promulgation of the regulation or issuance of the order with respect to which review is sought or on

the date of the determination with respect to which review is sought." 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a). The

statute permits late filing, however, "if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the

expiration of such period." Id. It is under this last provision that Ciba-Geigy filed its petition after

the forty-five day period, citing as a new ground the recently revised RfD.

On October 2, 1993, the day after Ciba-Geigy filed its petition here, it filed a petition with the

EPA as well,seeking reconsideration and revision of the atrazine MCL and MCLG and a stay oftheir

effectiveness on account of the new RfD. The EPA denied the petition in a letter dated October 17,

1994, asserting that a new rulemaking to revise the atrazine MCLG and MCL would be "premature"

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1Then section 307 of the CAA provided in part:

A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating ... any

standard of performance under (Section 111) ... may be filed only in the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.... Any such petition shall be

filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation, or after such date if

petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b). 

and stating it was "not convinced that such a revision would adequately reflect the risk posed to

public health from exposure to atrazine." Joint Appendix 468. Specifically, the EPA noted that it

might have underestimated the risk of atrazine exposure and, in anyevent, was contemplating changes

in its methodology that might affect the MCLG and MCL for atrazine. Id. Because Ciba-Geigy's

petition here seeks review only of the Final Rule, and not of the EPA's denial of the subsequent

petition, the agency asks that we dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

or for lack of ripeness. We agree the petition should be dismissed but, given the posture of this case,

believe remand also appropriate.

In Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975), this court

construed section 307 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) which, like section 1448(a) of the SDWA,

permitted filing of a petition for review out of time if based on a new ground1and "f[ou]nd it within

our inherent powers to enforce our interest in informed decision-making by requiring presentation

to the Administrator of any new information thought to justify revision of a standard of performance,

or any other standard reviewable under Section 307, before we will exercise our Section 307

jurisdiction." Id. at 666. The court reasoned that such a procedure "ma[de] good sense," was

"consistent with the statutory scheme" and "would avoid litigation when the Administrator acceded

to a request and, when he did not, it would present us with an administrative record, including the

Administrator's views in a nonlitigation context, a judicially recognized distinction of importance."

Id. at 665-66 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971);

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-169 (1962)). The court

subsequently endorsed the same procedure, also under section 307, in Group Against Smog &

Pollution, Inc v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and Natural Resources Defense

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2

In fact, the Supreme Court has since made it clear that courts cannot require exhaustion of

administrative remedies where, as here, it is not expressly required either by statute or agency

rule. See Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 2548 (1993). 

Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 845 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1988). While we agree with the reasoning of

those cases and find it equally applicable to petitions filed under section 1448(a) of the SDWA, we

do not believe simple dismissal is required or appropriate under the particular circumstances here.

The Oljato rule derives not from any administrative exhaustion requirement but rather from

ripeness concerns. See Thomas, 845 F.2d at 1091-93.2 As the Thomas court observed:

"[T]he ripeness inquiry take [sic] into account pragmatic concerns regarding the

institutional capacities of, and the relationship between, courts and agencies. These

concerns include the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is

subject to judicial review. The court's interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication

and in deciding issues in a concrete setting, and the petitioner's interests in prompt

consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action."

Id. at 1093 (quoting Better Gov't Ass'n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).

As in Thomas, we conclude that "the prudential aspects of the ripeness doctrine considerations

counsel against immediate decision," id., but we believe that both judicial economy and the

petitioner's interests favor remand over simple dismissal. Cf. Moreau v. FERC, 982 F.2d 556, 570

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (dismissing without prejudice and remanding to agency claims that "will not be ripe

or within our jurisdiction until FERC addresses them in the first instance"). Unlike the petitioners in

the CAA cases, Ciba-Geigy has in fact presented the issue it desires reviewed to the EPA and

obtained an unfavorable response. Thus, this petition would be ripe for review but for Ciba-Geigy's

failure to file a petition for review of the EPA's reconsideration petition denial, which has deprived

us of a complete record of the EPA's proceedings. Accordingly we dismiss Ciba-Geigy's petition

without prejudice and remand the case to develop a reviewable record and, in the interest of

economy, to consider again whether to revise the atrazine MCLG and MCL in light of the new RfD.

So ordered.

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