Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05067/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05067-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David M. Brockman
Appellee
City of Tulsa, Oklahoma
Appellee
Christopher E. Longstreth
Appellant
Frank Thurman
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHRISTOPHER E. LONGSTRETH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Coμrt qf Appeals Tenth C1rcu1t 

l~OV 13 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 91-5067 

v. 

CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, a 

municipal corporation; Police 

Officer, DAVID M. BROCKMAN; and 

Sheriff, FRANK THURMAN, of the 

County of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

Defendant-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D,C. No. 88-C-346-E) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Christopher E. Longstreth, prose. 

M. Denise Graham, Assistant District Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 1 
This appeal raises two issues: First, should a motion to 

extend the time in which to file a notice of appeal be considered 

a substantial equivalent of a notice of appeal? Second, should a 

motion to enlarge the time in which to file a motion for relief 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 be considered a 

substantial equivalent of a Rule 59 motion? We answer both of 

these questions in the negative. 1 

FACTS 

The Appellant filed suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 and the 

Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution for injuries sustained in a shoot-out with the Tulsa 

Police and for subsequent care received in prison. Final judgment 

for the Appellees was entered on December 13, 1990. On December 

24, 1990 the Appellant filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time in 

which to File a Rule 59 Motion. 2 On January 14, 1991 he filed a 

Motion for Extention [sic] of Time to File Notice of Appeal. The 

district court denied these two motions on April 9, 1991. On 

April 22, 1991 the Appellant filed a notice of appeal. 

A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from the 

date that final judgment was entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 December 24, 1990 was a Monday and hence it was within ten 

days of the entry of the final judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 2 
The Appellant did not file this notice, however, until 128 days 

after final judgment. 3 Thus, the notice of appeal was not timely. 

The Appellant argues, however, that his Motion for Extention 

[sic] of Time to File Notice of Appeal, filed within the 

thirty-day time limit, constituted "sufficient compliance" with 

the notice of appeal requirement. In the alternative, the 

Appellant argues, his Motion for Enlargement of Time in which to 

File a Rule 59 Motion should be considered a motion under Rule 59, 

which would toll the commencement of the thirty-day time limit for 

filing a notice of appeal until after the disposition of the 

motion. We cannot agree with either of these arguments. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

The Appellant first argues that his Motion for Extention 

[sic] of Time to File Notice of Appeal was substantially 

equivalent to a notice of appeal. 4 This motion was filed on 

January 14, 1991, the thirtieth day following final judgment. 5 

3 Although 130 days actually elapsed between final judgment and 

notice of appeal, the final Saturday and Sunday in that period are 

not counted. Fed. R. App. P. 26(a). 

4 The district court denied this motion as beyond its 

jurisdiction. Although the district court did indeed have 

jurisdiction to grant such an extension, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), 

the Appellant does not appeal this denial. 

5 Although the motion was actually filed 32 days after final 

judgment, January 14, 1991 was a Monday, and the final Saturday 

and Sunday are not counted. Fed. R. App. P. 26(a) • 

. - 3 -

Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 3 
Hence, the motion was filed within the time limit for notice of 

appeal. 

The requirements for a notice of appeal must be construed 

liberally. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) ("An appeal shall not be 

dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of 

appeal.")· "[S]o long as the function of notice is met by the 

filing of a paper indicating an intention to appeal, the substance 

of the rule has been complied with." Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) 

advisory committee's note (1979). 

The Appellant's motion to extend the time in which to appeal, 

however, does not demonstrate intent to appeal. Rather, asking 

for more time in which to file an appeal indicates uncertainty as 

to whether one will file an appeal and compels the conclusion that 

the notice of appeal is something yet to be filed. 

At least three other circuits have refused to treat a motion 

for extension of time in which to appeal as substantially 

equivalent to a notice of appeal. See Alamo Chem. Transp. Co. v. 

M/V Overseas Valdes, 744 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1984); Selph v. 

Council of the City of Los Angeles, 593 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 

1979); Dyotherm Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co., 434 F.2d 65, 66 (3d 

Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 

Although one circuit has held that a motion to extend the 

time to appeal is substantially equivalent to a notice of appeal, 

we respectfully disagree with that court's reasoning. The Sixth 

Circuit held that because the motion to extend the time for appeal 

contains the same information as that required in a notice of 

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Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 4 
{ 

appeal, the two can be treated as substantial equivalents. United 

States v. Christoph, 904 F.2d 1036, 1040 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting 

that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) sets forth only 

three requirements for a notice of appeal, all of which are 

contained in a motion for extension: specification of the party 

taking the appeal, the order from which appeal is taken, and the 

court to which appeal is taken), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 713 

(1991). 6 We believe, however, that the list of requirements for a 

notice of appeal set forth in Rule 3(c) presupposes "the filing of 

a paper indicating an intention to appeal •. II Fed. R. App. 

P. 3 advisory committee's note to subdivision (c) (1979). As 

previously discussed, we do not believe that a motion to extend 

the time in which to file an appeal indicates such an intent. 7 

6 In Christoph both parties to the appeal agreed that the 

request for an extension of time to appeal should be treated as a 

notice of appeal. Although parties cannot confer jurisdiction on 

the court by agreement, we note that apparently no party argued to 

the contrary when the court ruled that the request for the 

extension of time to appeal should be regarded as the notice of 

appeal. 

7 Two other circuits have addressed whether a motion to extend 

the time in which to file an appeal can be considered 

substantially equivalent to a notice of appeal. Judge Friendly of 

the Second Circuit commented that "[t]here is some force in this 

since the application puts the prevailing party on notice that 

trouble may lie ahead." Matter of Orbitec Corp., 520 F.2d 358, 

361 (2d Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). He declined, however, to 

accept the motion as a notice of appeal in that case and dismissed 

the appeal. Id. at 362. Additionally, the First Circuit once 

considered a motion to extend the time to file an appeal as a 

notice of appeal. See Pasquale v. Finch, 418 F.2d 627, 629 (1st 

Cir. 1969). Pasquale, however, noted that the two pleadings could 

be considered substantially equivalent "for purposes of this case 

only," admonishing that "the proper procedure is to file the 

formal Notice of Appeal contemporaneously with the motion to 

extend -- or at least within the 30-day extension 

period ..•• "). Id. The Court ultimately held that the appeal 

was not timely because the government had failed to establish 

Footnote cont'd ••• 

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Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 5 
As noted by the Appellant, we hold prose pleadings, which 

are at issue here, to "less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520 (1972) (per curiam). Even under a generous reading of the 

Appellant's motion, however, we can find no evidence of intent to 

appeal. Thus, the Appellant's motion to extend the time in which 

to appeal cannot serve as a notice of appeal. 

II. 

Alternatively, the Appellant urges us to consider his Motion 

for Enlargement of Time in which to File a Rule 59 Motion as a 

Rule 59 motion. 8 A timely motion under Rule 59 tolls the 

commencement of time for appeal until after the disposition of 

that motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). The Appellant's motion to 

enlarge the time in which to file a Rule 59 motion would have been 

timely if it had been a Rule 59 motion, as it was filed seven days 

... footnote cont'd 

excusable neglect for the late filing. Id. at 630-31. The Sixth 

Circuit is the only circuit that appears regularly to recognize 

motions to extend as notices of appeal. See Christoph, 904 F.2d 

at 1040; United States v. Hoye, 548 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 

1977) (per curiam). We note, additionally, that this Sixth 

Circuit practice appears limited to appeals from criminal 

convictions and sentences. 

8 The district court denied this motion as well. Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 6(b) specifically prohibits enlargement of time 

for motions under Rules 59(b), (d), and (e). We do not consider 

the Appellees' argument that this filing is invalid because it was 

signed by the Appellant's mother, whom it is not clear is an 

attorney. The district court, exercising its broad discretion 

with respect to pleadings, evidently chose to accept and rule upon 

the motion. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 6 
after final judgment. 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e) (motions must 

be filed within ten days). 

In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Continental Casualty 

Co., 684 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1982), we laid out a test for 

substantial compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

4(a)(4), which tolls the time for appeal upon the filing of 

certain post-judgment motions. To toll the appeal time under this 

rule a pleading must (1) be a motion, (2) be timely, and (3) be 

one of the four types of motion specified in the tolling rule. 

Id. at 692. Although the Appellant's motion meets the first two 

criteria of the St. Paul test, it fails under the third. 

Moreover, even if we were to forego the St. Paul test and 

apply a simple intent test similar to that used for a notice of 

appeal, and even under the broad reading required for prose 

pleadings, the Appellant's motion would not constitute a Rule 59 

motion. Again, a motion to extend the time for filing a pleading 

does not evidence intent to file the pleading, but rather 

evidences uncertainty as to whether the party will file that 

pleading. A party's motion to extend the time in which to file a 

Rule 59 motion thus compels the conclusion that the Rule 59 motion 

is something yet to be filed. 

At least one other circuit has refused to allow a motion for 

an extension of time in which to file a motion for post-judgment 

relief to serve as a Rule 59 motion and thereby to toll the time 

9 The motion was filed 11 days after final judgment. 

the specified time period is less than 11 days, however, 

intermediate Saturdays and Sundays are counted. Fed. R. 

6(a). 

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Because 

no 

Civ. P. 

Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 7 
for appeal. See Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 

849 (7th Cir. 1981) (motion that "does not propose an alteration 

or amendment of the [judgment] and states no grounds upon which 

this type of relief could be granted" cannot qualify as a Rule 59 

motion). No court appears to have held to the contrary. 

In sum, the Appellant's Motion for Extention of Time to File 

Notice of Appeal cannot serve as a notice of appeal and his Motion 

for Enlargement of Time in which to File a Rule 59 Motion cannot 

serve as a Rule 59 motion so as to toll the time for appeal. 

Thus, his formal notice of appeal, which was filed beyond the 

thirty-day deadline for filing--and beyond the additional 

thirty-day period for extension--cannot be considered timely. We 

are therefore without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

( Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5067 Document: 010110097326 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 8