Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00627/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00627-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Luis Lopez Moctezuma
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

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These facts were recited by the prosecutor at petitioner’s change of plea hearing. 1

As part of a plea agreement, petitioner admitted that these facts are accurate.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS LOPEZ MOCTEZUMA, No. CIV S-06-0627-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JAMES A. YATES,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on March 24, 2006, respondent’s answer (Doc. 14), filed

on July 19, 2006, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 16), filed on September 5, 2006.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The parties agree on the following statement of facts:

1

On the early morning hours of December 25th, 1995, the victim in

this particular case, Macario Robledo . . . was in the accompany of Hilda

Romero, Adrianna Cruz, and Rafael Guiterrez Martinez. The four of them

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were returning home from a Christmas part at about 3:30 in the morning

when they approached their residence at 126 Willow in the city of

Manteca, San Joaquin County. As they were approaching their front door,

the defendant came up and grabbed Hilda Romero, because he wanted to

talk to her. The defendant and Ms. Romero had had a boyfriend-girlfriend

relationship prior to this occasion. When he grabbed her, he began to drag

Ms. Romero off. The three friends – Macario, Adrianna, and Rafael –

tried to stop the defendant from taking Hilda away. 

The defendant pulled out a gun, threatened them, and at one point

fired off two shots. One shot struck Mr. Robledo in the neck, severing the

aorta and landing in the chest cavity at the spinal chord.

The pathologist in this particular case, Bill Maduros, would

indicate that the cause of Mr. Robledo’s death was in fact a gunshot

wound that he received in this case. 

B. Procedural History

The state court recited the following procedural history:

Defendant Jose Luis Lopez Moctezuma appeals from the sentence

imposed following his plea of no contest to voluntary manslaughter and

three counts of assault with a firearm, and his admission that he was

personally armed with a firearm during the commission of the

manslaughter (citations to the California Penal Code omitted). As part of

the plea, it was agreed defendant would be sentenced to 15 years in state

prison. Specifically, the parties agreed he would be sentenced to the upper

term of 11 years on the manslaughter conviction, receive the low term of

three years on the firearm enhancement, and be sentenced to one-third of

the midterm (one year) on the three assault with a firearm convictions,

with one term running consecutive and the other two running

concurrently. 

Petitioner was sentenced consistent with the plea agreement. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the conviction and sentence in a reasoned opinion issued on June 29, 2005. The

California Supreme Court denied review, without comment or citation, on September 21, 2005. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. For instance, when the state court reaches a

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decision on the merits, but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas

court independently reviews the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Similarly, when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim,

because it was not raised in state court or because the court denied it on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de

novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not

apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach petitioner’s claim under its

“relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that,

where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on perjury claim, AEDPA did not

apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the evidentiary hearing in federal

court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing petition de novo where state

court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the claim alleged by petitioner).

 When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, “concerns about comity and

federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Lockhart v.

Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

A state court decision is reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot be found

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even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. As

with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that his negotiated sentence violated his Sixth Amendment

rights under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). First, petitioner asserts that the state

trial court committed structural error by imposing a sentence greater than the maximum that

could have been imposed based on the facts admitted by petitioner. Next, petitioner claims that

Blakely invalidates California’s three-tiered sentencing scheme. Finally, petitioner argues that

imposition of consecutive sentences violates Blakely. Respondent concedes these claims are

exhausted. In addressing these claims, the state court stated:

Applying the Sixth Amendment to the United Stated Constitution,

the United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must

be tried to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490. For

this purpose, the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that a court

could impose based solely on facts reflected by a jury’s verdict or

admitted by the defendant. Thus, when a sentencing court’s authority to

impose an enhanced sentence depends upon additional fact findings, there

is a right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the

additional facts. Blakely, 159 L.Ed.2d at 413-14.

Relying on Apprendi and Blakely, defendant claims the trial court

erred in imposing the upper term on his manslaughter conviction in count

1 and imposing a consecutive sentence as to the assault in count 2. The

contention fails. 

Plea bargaining is a judicially and legislatively recognized

procedure. People v. Masloski, 25 Cal.4th 1212, 1216 (2001). When, as

part of a plea agreement, a defendant specifies the maximum sentence that

may be imposed, he necessarily admits that his conduct is sufficient to

expose him to that punishment and reserves only the exercise of the trial

court’s sentencing discretion in deciding whether to impose that sentence. 

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People v. Hoffard, 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1181-82 (1995). 

Because the state court applied the correct federal legal rules, this court must review the state

court’s decision under the deferential “unreasonable application of” standard.

As to petitioner’s first argument – that he was sentenced beyond the statutory

maximum based on facts found only by the trial court – the court finds that the state court’s

decision was not an unreasonable application of Blakely. Specifically, as respondent notes,

petitioner admitted to the underlying facts and accepted a 15-year sentence in his plea

agreement. Petitioner also admitted to using a firearm. Based on the admitted facts, and

consistent with the agreed-upon sentence, petitioner was sentenced to 15 years. The trial court

did not impose a longer sentence based on the firearm enhancement. Therefore, petitioner’s

claim fails for two reasons. First, petitioner’s sentence was based on the facts he admitted and

not based on any facts found only by the trial court. Second, petitioner’s sentence was not

increased beyond the 15 years stipulated to in the plea agreement. 

Next, petitioner claims that Blakely forecloses application of California’s threetiered sentencing scheme. The state court addressed this issue as follows: “The California

Supreme Court recently issued its decision in People v. Black, [35 Cal.4th 1238 (2005)], holding

that Blakely does not apply to California’s [three-tiered] determinate sentencing law.” The court

finds that this conclusion is based on a reasonable application of Blakely. Under Blakely,

judicial fact-finding in sentencing is permitted in selecting a sentence that is within the statutory

range for a given offense. In this case, California law provides for a three-level sentencing range

and gives the trial court the opportunity to find facts in order to determine, in its discretion,

whether a defendant will be sentenced at the low end, middle, or high end of the sentencing

range. As the California Supreme Court explained in Black:

[I]n operation and effect, the provisions of the California determinate

sentence law simply authorize a sentencing court to engage in the type of

factfinding that traditionally has been incident to the judge’s selection of

an appropriate sentence within a statutorily prescribed sentencing range. 

Therefore, the upper term is the “statutory maximum” and a trial court’s

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Because the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits, it 2

is not necessary to address respondent’s procedural default argument. 

7

imposition of an upper term sentence does not violate a defendant’s right

to a jury trial under the principles set forth in . . . Blakely. 

35 Cal.4th at 1254. 

Finally, petitioner claims that imposition of consecutive sentences violates

Blakely. Again, the court disagrees. Because consecutive sentencing in California does not

involve any judicial factfinding, see California Rule of Court 4.433(c), Blakely simply is not

implicated. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be denied.2

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 24, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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