Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02875/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02875-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Douglas Miller
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the

United States (Ret.), sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2875

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Todd Douglas Miller, * 

* 

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2007

Filed: May 2, 2007

___________

Before O'CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.),1

 WOLLMAN, and SMITH, Circuit 

Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Todd D. Miller pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2. The district court determined that Miller's Guidelines range was 37 to 46 months'

imprisonment but imposed a sentence of three years' probation, with conditions,

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In addition to the home detention and the typical probation conditions such as

mandatory drug testing, the court also conditioned Miller's probation on him

continuing to take and successfully complete college courses in pursuit of an

associate's degree.

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including that Miller be confined to home detention for the first 12 months. The

government appeals the sentence. We reverse.

I. Background

Miller was actively involved in a cocaine distribution conspiracy on Indian

reservations and other communities in northern Minnesota. On June 17, 2005, Miller

was arrested and ordered detained in connection with a three-count federal indictment.

On February 1, 2006, Miller pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to aiding

and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The plea agreement

stipulated that Miller possessed 26.4 grams of cocaine seized from his vehicle on one

occasion, that he intended to distribute the drugs, and that he knew his actions were

unlawful. The plea agreement further stipulated that Miller had possessed and

distributed between 500 and 2,000 grams of cocaine during his involvement in the

conspiracy. In exchange for Miller's guilty plea, the remaining two counts in the

indictment were dismissed. On March 1, 2006, Miller was released on bond, prior to

sentencing. At the time of his release, Miller had spent approximately eight and onehalf months in pretrial detention.

At sentencing, the district court determined that Miller's Guidelines range was

37 to 46 months based upon an adjusted offense level of 21 and a criminal history

Category I. The court then varied downward to sentence Miller to three years'

probation, with conditions, including that Miller be confined to home detention for the

first 12 months.2

 The court fully explained its justifications for the sentence in a fivepage Statement of Reasons filed with the sentencing judgment. In the Statement of

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United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

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Reasons, the court noted that post-Booker3

 the Guidelines were no longer mandatory,

but that the court was nonetheless required to take into account the applicable

Guidelines range and the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements to

impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the

sentencing purposes set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court further noted that it

must:

consider[] the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant; the kinds of sentences available; the

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the

need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

The district court based the sentence of three years' probation on the following

factors: (1) the sentence was sufficient to carry out the court's purposes in sentencing

as stated in § 3553(a); (2) the sentence would adequately punish and deter Miller from

committing future crimes; (3) Miller had already spent almost nine months in custody

before being released on bond; (4) Miller had immediately sought and obtained

gainful employment upon his release, which demonstrated his commitment to future

achievements; (5) Miller had shown great respect for the court's orders by obtaining

tribal membership, as previously ordered by the court; (6) Miller had obtained his

GED since his arrest; (7) since being released on bond, Miller had enrolled in college

courses; (8) Miller displayed remorse for his crime and respect for the laws he

violated; (9) Miller would present little risk to the general public because he would be

supervised through home monitoring systems; (10) Miller had a difficult childhood;

(11) Miller had accepted full responsibility for his actions; (12) Miller had one child

at home and another on the way, and the court believed the public would benefit from

keeping Miller at home with his children; and (13) Miller had the family support to

assist him in remaining law-abiding and making appropriate decisions for himself and

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his family. The court emphasized that it had taken all of these factors into

consideration, placing particular significance on Miller's achievements since his arrest

(GED, employment, college, tribal membership, etc.) and the fact that he had already

served almost nine months for the offense, and determined that a sentence of three

years' probation was reasonable. 

The government appeals, arguing that the sentence is unreasonable because the

district court failed to give significant weight to certain relevant factors, gave too

much weight to other relevant factors, and gave significant weight to improper factors.

We reverse.

II. Discussion

Neither party contests the district court's calculation of the Guidelines range.

The government appeals only the variance from the 37 to 46 months Guidelines range

to the sentence imposed. "When there is no dispute about the applicable guideline

range, the issue we examine on appeal is whether the sentence imposed is 'reasonable'

in light of the factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." United States v.

Gonzalez-Alvarado, 477 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.

Bryant, 446 F.3d 1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 2006)). A sentence within the Guidelines range

is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir.

2006), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 551, 166 L.Ed.2d 406 (2006).

Sentences outside of the Guidelines range are reasonable as long as the judge offers

appropriate justifications under the factors in § 3553(a). Gonzalez-Alvarado, 477 F.3d

at 650 (citing Claiborne, 439 F.3d at 481). However, such a sentence:

may be unreasonable if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant

factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant

weight to an improper factor or irrelevant factor, or considers only

appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice

dictated by the facts of the case.

United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006).

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In reviewing the sentence, we must determine: (1) "whether the district court's

decision to grant a § 3553(a) variance from the appropriate guidelines range is

reasonable" and (2) "whether the extent of any § 3553(a) variance . . . is reasonable."

United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005). Here, the government

only takes issue with the extent of the variance. As to that issue, "[t]he further the

district court varies from the presumptively reasonable guideline range, the more

compelling the justification based on the 3553(a) factors must be." Bryant, 446 F.3d

at 1319. "An extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary

circumstances." Id. (citing United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir.

2005)).

The district court sentenced Miller to three years' probation, with 12 months'

in-home detention, but no imprisonment beyond time served. On its face, the

probationary sentence imposed constituted a 100% downward variance from the

Guidelines range. See United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352, 357 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating

that a sentence of probation but no imprisonment "amounts to a 100% variance from

the Guidelines range"). When Miller's eight and one-half months in pretrial detention

is considered, the sentence would be a 77% variance from the low end of the

Guidelines range. Whether viewed as 100% or 77%, the variance is atypical and is

greater than the Eighth Circuit has generally deemed reasonable. 

Although the district court recited the § 3553(a) factors and stated that it took

those factors into consideration in formulating the sentence imposed, the court failed

to give certain factors significant weight. The court failed to accord significant weight

to the seriousness of Miller's offense and to the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparities. The sentence imposed also does not adequately promote respect for federal

drug laws, provide just punishment, or ensure adequate deterrence to drug dealers. See

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (4), (6). Giving due weight to these factors, we conclude that a

sentence of eight and one-half months imprisonment with three years of

probation—much less a sentence with no term of imprisonment—is unreasonable in

this case. 

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First, the court did not properly weigh the seriousness of Miller's offense.

Before his arrest, Miller had been actively involved in the distribution of substantial

quantities of powder and crack cocaine on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. Miller

stipulated to voluntarily obtaining and distributing between 500 and 2,000 grams of

cocaine. The sentence of eight and one-half months "time served" plus probation is

inadequate for such a serious offense on the instant record. See Gall, 446 F.3d at 890

(finding sentence imposed inadequate considering seriousness of defendant's

involvement in drug distribution conspiracy).

Second, the court failed to properly weigh whether the sentence would result

in unwarranted sentencing disparities. See Bryant, 446 F.3d at 1319 ("The sentencing

guidelines are indeed no longer mandatory, but they continue to be guideposts that

must be respected, lest we see a return to the unwarranted sentencing disparities that

resulted in the adoption of the guidelines themselves."). "Congress has made avoiding

unwarranted disparity a legislative priority." United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928,

933 (8th Cir. 2006). The disparity between Miller's time-served-plus-probation

sentence and the sentence of the typical defendant with a similar record who has been

convicted of similar conduct does not reflect Congress's sentencing priority. See id.

Third, although the court stated that the sentence would "adequately punish and

deter Miller from committing future crimes," the court failed to weigh the sentence's

effect of deterring others. As "[g]eneral deterrence . . . is one of the key purposes of

sentencing, . . . the district court abused its discretion when it failed to give that matter

its proper weight." United States v. Medearis, 451 F.3d 918, 920–21 (8th Cir. 2006).

In determining the sentence imposed, the district court placed "particular

significance" on Miller's achievements since his arrest. Such conduct is relevant in

evaluating the § 3553(a) factors. See Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 932; cf. United States v.

Kapitzke, 130 F.3d 820, 923–24 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that atypical post-offense

rehabilitation may support guidelines downward departure). However, a defendant's

rehabilitation "cannot be allowed to trump all the other considerations listed in §

3553(a)." Medearis, 451 F.3d at 921. Miller's rehabilitation, taken together with the

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other relevant factors, does not justify the extent of the variance granted. While

Miller's "post-offense rehabilitation is dramatic and hopefully permanent," the

sentence imposed for Miller's involvement in the distribution of between 500 and

2,000 grams of cocaine, "lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts

of the case." Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 933 (quoting United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997,

1004 (8th Cir. 2005)); Gall, 446 F.3d at 890. Therefore we conclude the district court

imposed an unreasonable sentence in this case.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for

resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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