Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07112/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Giant Food, Inc.
Appellee
Marvin W. Hall
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 22, 1999 Decided May 25, 1999

No. 98-7112

Marvin W. Hall,

Appellant

v.

Giant Food, Inc.,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00470)

Stephan J. Boardman argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellant. Edward C. Golumbic entered an appearance.

Edward R. Levin argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Separate statement filed by Circuit Judge Henderson,

concurring in the result.

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Edwards, Chief Judge: On August 18, 1995, Marvin W.

Hall, who was employed as a tractor trailer driver with Giant

Food, Inc. ("Giant"), was discharged by Giant for repeated

acts of misconduct. A grievance was filed on Hall's behalf by

his union, Local 639 of the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters ("Local 639"), and the matter was subsequently

submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator converted Hall's

discharge to a disciplinary suspension and ordered his reinstatement without back pay.

Following his reinstatement, Hall filed a charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging for the first time that his termination had been motivated by age discrimination. Hall's claim was based on an

alleged discussion that he had with a supervisor shortly after

his return to work. According to Hall, the supervisor told

him that he was too old for the job and had been terminated

for that reason. Hall, who was forty years old at the time of

his termination, then sued Giant under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 42 U.S.C. ss 621-34,

alleging that Giant terminated him because of his age. The

District Court granted summary judgment for Giant, and we

now affirm.

Hall cannot establish discrimination, either directly or indirectly, because he has failed to raise a triable issue of

discriminatory intent on the part of Giant, or to create a jury

question as to Giant's asserted grounds for discharging him.

This is a run-of-the-mill case concerning employee misconduct

and the appropriateness of the disciplinary penalty imposed

therefor. The issues in dispute here do not implicate the

federal laws against discrimination. The matter was properly

submitted to arbitration and resolved there. Hall may be

dissatisfied with the arbitrator's judgment, but his mere

displeasure does not afford him a further avenue of redress in

the federal courts.

I. Background

On June 27, 1988, Giant hired Hall as a tractor trailer

driver. Until 1994, Hall apparently performed his job withUSCA Case #98-7112 Document #437876 Filed: 05/25/1999 Page 2 of 12
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out incident. Beginning in late 1994, however, problems

began to arise. Between November 1994 and July 1995, Hall

was subject to disciplinary actions for failure to properly

notify the company when absent, driving company equipment

in an unsafe manner, and wasting time on the job.

The incident that resulted in Hall's termination occurred on

August 4, 1995, when Lorin Turnblacer, a Giant driver supervisor, observed a Giant truck illegally parked in a right turn

lane off of its designated route. Turnblacer discovered that

Hall had been shopping for motorcycle parts without recording the break on his "trip card." Company policy requires all

drivers to maintain detailed records of the start and end

times of all breaks and activities occurring during the course

of their work shifts, and to record the times and locations of

breaks at the start of those breaks. Company policy further

prohibits shopping on company time and traveling off-route

without an authorized reason. Abuse of these policies may

subject a driver to dismissal.

Following the August 4, 1995 incident, Turnblacer suspended Hall, citing violations of Giant's break and off-route policies. On August 7, 1995, Turnblacer reported the facts of the

incident to Pamela Sanford, Giant's General Manager of

Transportation. Sanford, in turn, provided written notice of

Hall's suspension to union officials at Local 639. Sanford also

relayed the information to Chris Balodemas, Giant's Director

of Transportation, Traffic and Fleet Maintenance. Although

Sanford is responsible for disciplining drivers who do not

comply with company policies and procedures, she does not

have the authority to terminate drivers. Upon review, Balodemas determined that Hall's violation of multiple company

policies warranted dismissal. On August 18, 1995, following a

grievance meeting between Hall, Giant, and Local 639, Giant

terminated Hall. Hall was forty years old at the time.

On August 21, 1995, in accordance with the collective

bargaining agreement between Giant and Local 639, union

officials filed a grievance contesting Hall's termination. Giant

attempted to settle the matter by offering to reinstate Hall if

he would sign a conditional reinstatement agreement, but

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Hall declined this offer on three separate occasions. Negotiations between the parties were ultimately unsuccessful, and

the matter proceeded to arbitration. After "careful consideration," the neutral arbitrator was "unable to conclude that the

discharge was for good cause," but was also "unable to

conclude that [Hall's] offense ... was 'minor.' " Arbitration

Statement and Award at 2, reprinted in Supplemental Appendix ("S.A.") 27. The arbitrator believed that, although Hall

had violated company rules, the penalty of discharge was too

severe. Accordingly, he directed Giant to reinstate Hall with

seniority, but denied Hall's request for back pay or benefits,

instead treating the time off as a "disciplinary suspension."

Id.

On May 7, 1996, following his reinstatement, Hall filed a

charge with the EEOC, alleging for the first time that his

termination had been motivated by age discrimination. Hall's

claim was based on a discussion that he had with Sanford

shortly after his return to work. According to Hall's affidavit, Sanford "informed [him] that the true reason for [his]

termination was [his] age." Hall Affidavit p 6, reprinted in

Appendix ("App.") 24. Sanford allegedly told Hall that he

was "too old" for the job, and that she wanted him "to resign

because [she] want[ed] younger and safer drivers in here."

Transcript of Deposition Testimony at 41, reprinted in S.A.

90. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.

Hall then filed suit in District Court under the ADEA,

alleging, inter alia, that Giant terminated him because it

wanted to replace him with younger drivers. On May 27,

1998, the District Court granted Giant's motion for summary

judgment. See Hall v. Giant Food Inc., No. 97-470 (D.D.C.

May 27, 1998) ("Memorandum"), reprinted in App. 4-12.

The court found that Hall had established a prima facie case

of age discrimination, that Giant had advanced legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for Hall's termination, and that

Hall had failed to create a jury question as to whether Giant's

stated reasons were pretextual. See id. at 6, reprinted in

App. 9. In the court's view, the remark allegedly made by

Sanford was of only limited probative value, because it was

made eight months after the decision to terminate Hall, and

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because Balodemas, not Sanford, made the final decision to

terminate Hall. See id. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment,

we consider the evidence de novo. See Aka v. Washington

Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

"[A] party is only entitled to summary judgment if the record,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."

Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[S]ummary judgment will not

lie if ... the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Aka, 156 F.3d at

1288 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Age Discrimination Claim

The ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer ... to

discharge ... or otherwise discriminate against any individual [who is at least forty years old] ... because of such

individual's age." 29 U.S.C. s 623(a)(1) (1994); see id.

s 631(a). In analyzing a discrimination claim under the

ADEA, we apply the framework developed in the context of

Title VII litigation, see Paquin v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage

Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1997)--that is, where direct

evidence of discriminatory intent is not available, a party may

establish unlawful age discrimination by relying on the familiar burden-shifting scheme first articulated in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee

must first establish a prima facie case of prohibited discrimination. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1288. In the ADEA context,

Hall had to show that he belongs in the statutorily protected

age group, he was qualified for the position, he was terminated, and he was disadvantaged in favor of a younger person.

See Paquin, 119 F.3d at 26. If the employee succeeds in

establishing a prima facie case, the burden "shifts to the

employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

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for the challenged employment decision." Aka, 156 F.3d at

1288. The employer must " 'clearly set forth, through the

introduction of admissible evidence,' reasons for its actions

which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding

that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

507 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If the employer does so,

the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie

showing is rebutted and "drops from the case." Burdine, 450

U.S. at 255 & n.10. At that point, the employee "has an

opportunity to discredit the employer's explanation," Aka, 156

F.3d at 1288, by demonstrating that the proffered reasons are

a mere pretext for discrimination, see Paquin, 119 F.3d at 26-

27. The employee retains throughout the "ultimate burden of

persuading the court that [he] has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

In the proceedings before the District Court, Hall relied on

a single piece of evidence in support of his claim of age

discrimination--namely, Sanford's alleged remark that Hall's

age was the "true reason" for his termination, and that Hall

was "too old" for the job of tractor trailer driver. In Hall's

view, this remark constitutes both direct evidence of age

discrimination and indirect evidence that Giant's stated reasons for his discharge were pretextual. See Brief for Appellant at 8. Although Sanford denies making the alleged

remark, see Sanford Declaration p 13, reprinted in App. 17,

for the purposes of summary judgment, we must accept as

true the allegations contained in Hall's affidavit. See Greene

v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that

district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant

invaded jury's province, because plaintiff's sworn affidavit was

sufficient to support verdict against defendant, and credibility

determinations are within "exclusive domain" of fact finder).

We conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment for Giant, because, even if Sanford made the

remark, Hall cannot prove discrimination either directly or

indirectly based solely on that evidence.

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The District Court perceived this case as one proceeding

under the McDonnell Douglas framework of indirect proof.

The court found that, construing the facts in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, Hall could establish the initial presumption of age discrimination based on a prima facie showing that

he was forty years old at the time of his termination, was

qualified for and performing the duties of his driver position,

was terminated from that position, and was disadvantaged

with respect to younger drivers who were retained in Giant's

employ. See Memorandum at 6, reprinted in App. 9. The

court further found that Giant effectively rebutted Hall's

prima facie case by demonstrating that Hall had been disciplined on several occasions, including the instance directly

leading to his discharge, and that several of the policies at

issue expressly provided for termination in the event of

violations. See id. Finally, the court determined that Hall

had failed to demonstrate that Giant's asserted basis for

terminating him was a pretext for discrimination, because

Hall's only evidence was the remark allegedly made by

Sanford during a discussion that occurred eight months after

Hall was terminated, and was not made by the party who

made the decision to discharge Hall. See id.

There is absolutely nothing in this record to indicate that

Hall was disadvantaged in favor of a younger person; thus,

there is a question as to whether Hall even made out a prima

facie case. The District Court found that Hall was disadvantaged with respect to younger drivers who were retained in

Giant's employ, but this finding is baffling on this record.

Hall was reinstated pursuant to arbitration, so he did not lose

his job. He lost wages and benefits during the time of his

disciplinary suspension, but these losses indisputably resulted

from Hall's misconduct, not his age. In other words, the

arbitrator found that Hall was guilty of misconduct as alleged

by Giant, so a disciplinary suspension was found fully justified. Claims of age discrimination were never even raised in

arbitration. We need not pursue this line of inquiry, however, for the parties' arguments on appeal do not concern the

sufficiency of Hall's prima facie case and, indeed, the District

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nation claim and Giant's rebuttal evidence. See United States

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715

(1983) ("Where the defendant has done everything that would

be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a

prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no

longer relevant."); see also Hayman v. National Academy of

Sciences, 23 F.3d 535, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding, on review

of district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, that once court had allowed in employer's full rebuttal evidence, relevant question turned on sufficiency of employee's evidence of discrimination as opposed to sufficiency

of her prima facie case); Debs v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 153

F.3d 390, 395-96 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining, on review of

district court's grant of summary judgment, that where parties were not disputing whether employee made out prima

facie case, court would assume that prima facie requirements

were satisfied and proceed to question whether employer's

proffered reasons were pretextual). We will therefore indulge the fiction that Hall made out a prima facie case and

review the case on the same terms as did the District Court.

Assuming for the purposes of our analysis that the District

Court was correct with regard to its assessment of Hall's

prima facie case and Giant's rebuttal thereof, any presumptions arising under the burden-shifting scheme are no longer

a factor in this case. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n.10.

We are left, then, with the question whether Hall could meet

his ultimate burden of demonstrating--whether directly or

indirectly--that Giant intentionally discriminated against him:

[T]he focus of proceedings at trial (and at summary

judgment) will be on whether the jury could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) the plaintiff's

prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents

to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its

actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination

that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes

on the part of the employer) or any contrary evidence

that may be available to the employer (such as evidence

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of a strong track record in equal opportunity employment).

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. "[T]he court must consider all the

evidence in its full context in deciding whether the plaintiff

has met his burden of showing that a reasonable jury could

conclude that he had suffered discrimination and accordingly

summary judgment is inappropriate." Id. at 1290.

We have no doubt that, considering "the total circumstances of the case," Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291, Hall's evidentiary

proffer is insufficient to survive Giant's motion for summary

judgment, whether it is advanced as direct evidence of discriminatory intent or indirect evidence of pretext for discrimination.

First, the record is clear that Balodemas, not Sanford,

made the decision to terminate Hall. Sanford did not have

the authority to fire Hall; indeed, Hall offered no evidence to

establish that Sanford was even involved in the decisionmaking process. To be sure, Sanford conveyed to Balodemas

the information in connection with Hall's August 4, 1995

suspension. Sanford, however, merely communicated the

facts as relayed to her by Turnblacer. Hall offers no evidence that Sanford recommended to Balodemas that Hall be

discharged, that Sanford was sufficiently involved to be aware

of Balodemas's reason for terminating Hall, or that Sanford

had the ability to influence Balodemas's decision. See Griffin

v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) ("[E]vidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant

where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the

subordinate's influence."); cf. Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine,

Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 13-15 (1st Cir. 1998) (pointing to lack of

evidence that managers who allegedly made discriminatory

remarks participated in employer's discharge decisions). It

appears from the record that Balodemas made an independent assessment of Hall's conduct and concluded that Hall's

violations of multiple Giant employment policies warranted

his termination. See Balodemas Declaration p 3, reprinted in

App. 20-21. Hall offers nothing to refute this version of

events, and thus, his reliance on Sanford's remark proves at

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most that Sanford herself harbored a bias completely unrelated to Giant's decision to terminate Hall.

Second, Sanford's alleged remark was made shortly after

Hall had been reinstated to his position, and a full eight

months after the original decision to terminate him had been

made. This fact tends to isolate the comment reflecting age

bias from the relevant decision to terminate Hall. Although

the temporal gap is not necessarily dispositive in itself, it

obscures any conceivable nexus between Sanford's statements

and the challenged employment decision. Cf. Indurante v.

Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 367 (7th Cir.

1998) (considering, inter alia, the fact that statements allegedly reflecting age discrimination were made sixteen months

before employee's termination).

Third, Hall does not even attempt to impugn Giant's stated

reason for terminating him. At the time of the events leading

to Hall's termination, the relevant employment policies were

clearly established and were made known to Giant employees

in both oral and written form. Giant's break, trip card, and

off-route policies expressly provided that violations constituted grounds for dismissal. These policies were cited by

Turnblacer as the reason for Hall's initial suspension, and by

Balodemas as the reason for Hall's ultimate termination.

These policies were also the subject of the arbitration proceedings concerning Hall's discharge--proceedings during

which the subject of Hall's age did not even arise. Moreover,

as a factual matter, Hall does not dispute that he violated

these policies. Under these circumstances, we find that

Giant's stated justification for Hall's discharge is credible and

unrefuted.

Finally, Giant offered evidence that compellingly demonstrates a favorable record of hiring and retaining drivers over

the age of forty. We have stated that "[w]here an employer

has a strong record of equal opportunity employment, any

inference of discrimination arising from the discrediting of

the employer's explanation may be a weak one, and in some

cases not strong enough to let a reasonable factfinder conclude that discrimination has occurred at all." Aka, 156 F.3d

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at 1291. Here, Giant's hiring records show that, of the 317

union drivers employed by Giant in August 1995, 243--

approximately three quarters--were older than Hall. Likewise, as of April 1997, 229 of 309--about the same percentage--were older than Hall. This evidence tends to refute any

implication that Giant was attempting to purge its force of

older employees. Cf. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d

554, 561 (10th Cir. 1996) (permitting plaintiff to introduce

evidence that other employees in protected age class were

replaced, because "evidence concerning the make-up of the

employment force and events which occurred after plaintiff's

termination were entirely relevant to the question of whether

or not age was one of the determinative reasons for plaintiff's

termination").

In short, whatever claims Hall had to bring were raised,

heard, and resolved in arbitration pursuant to the terms of

the collective bargaining agreement between Giant and Local

639. The matter ended with the issuance of the arbitrator's

award. The issues in dispute here do not implicate the

federal laws against discrimination.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District

Court's grant of summary judgment for Giant.

So ordered.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

While I concur in the result, I write separately to point out

that the first sentence of paragraph 6 of Hall's affidavit (as

Hall's lawyer--who acknowledged he drafted the affidavit--

conceded at oral argument), which avers that Sanford "informed [Hall] that the true reason for [Hall's] termination

was [Hall's] age, not the other reasons raised earlier," is

Hall's lawyer's gloss on Sanford's actual words quoted in the

next two sentences of paragraph 6--that he was "too old,"

that she wanted "younger," safer drivers and that he "had to

go." Hall Aff. p 6, reprinted in App. 24. Hall, then, does not

aver that Sanford in fact said "the true reason for [his]

termination was [his] age," id., and there is no other evidence

of discrimination in the record. Accordingly, Hall failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination and I find it

unnecessary to go further.

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