Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56615/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56615-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard B. Ives
Appellee
Daniel Alejandro Zavala
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL ALEJANDRO ZAVALA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD B. IVES, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-56615

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-03603-JFW-E

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 4, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 18, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Callahan

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2 ZAVALA V. IVES

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of federal

prisoner Daniel Alejandro Zavala’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas

corpus petition claiming improper denial of sentencing credit,

and remanded.

The panel held that when immigration officials detain an

alien pending potential prosecution, the alien is entitled under

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) to credit toward his criminal sentence;

that an alien is entitled to credit for all time spent in

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency detention

subsequent to his indictment or the filing of formal criminal

charges against him; and that where a factual dispute exists,

the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing as to

whether an alien’s detention by ICE prior to the date of his

indictment or the filing of criminal charges against him

constituted detention pending prosecution.

The panel held that the district court erred when it denied

Zavala sentencing credit forthe post-indictment period during

which ICE detained him pending criminal prosecution. The

panel remanded for the district court to determine in the first

instance whether and when during the pre-indictment period

Zavala’s detention status changed from detention pending

deportation to detention pending potential prosecution. The

panel held that, on remand, the government has the burden of

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ZAVALA V. IVES 3

proving that the pre-indictment detention was for the purpose

of deportation rather than potential prosecution.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Callahan

agreed with the majority that under § 3585(b) an alien is

eligible for credit for all time spent in ICE custody from the

day he or she is indicted or criminally charged. She dissented

from the majority’s broader interpretation of § 3585 – that an

alien is entitled to credit toward his criminal sentence for the

period during which ICE detained the alien pending potential

criminal prosecution.

COUNSEL

Ashfaq G. Chowdhury (argued), Deputy Federal Public

Defender; Sean Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Tritia L. Yuen (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

André Birotte, Jr., United States Attorney; Joseph B.

Widman, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Riverside

Branch Office, Riverside, California, for RespondentAppellee.

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4 ZAVALA V. IVES

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Daniel Zavala seeks credit toward his criminal sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), the sentencing credit statute, for

two periods of time during which he was detained by the U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service (ICE) prior

to the commencement of his criminal sentence for illegal

reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We hold that where ICE

detains an alien pending potential criminal prosecution, that

detention constitutes “official detention” within the meaning

of § 3585(b) and the alien is accordingly entitled to credit

toward his criminal sentence.

I.

On September 20, 2010, Zavala was transferred from state

custody, where he had finished serving a state criminal

sentence, into the custody of ICE. That same day, an ICE

officer gave him a Form I-871, U.S. Department of Homeland

Security Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order,

which Zavala signed.1 The I-871 Form provided that ICE had

determined that Zavala was subject to a prior order of

removal entered on May 2, 2006, that he had previously been

removed on May 3, 2006 pursuant to an order of removal,

and that he illegally reentered the United States on or about

July 14, 2009. Zavala signed the “Acknowledgment and

1 We grant Zavala’s unopposed motion to take judicial notice of the

September 20, 2010 Form I-871 and the Record of Sworn Statement in

Affidavit Form dated September 20, 2010, both of which documents were

in Zavala’simmigration file and were provided to him by the Government

in these proceedings.

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ZAVALA V. IVES 5

Response” section of the I-871 Form stating “I do not wish to

make a statement contesting this determination.”2 The ICE

officer accordingly reinstated the prior order of removal by

signing the “Decision, Order, and Officer’s Certification”

section of Form I-871, which stated that “[h]aving reviewed

all available evidence, the administrative file and any

statements made or submitted in rebuttal, I have determined

that the above-named alien is subject to removal through

reinstatement of the prior order, in accordance with section

241(a)(5) of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.”

Although reinstatement of the prior order allowed ICE to

remove Zavala from the country at any time from September

20, 2010 onward, ICE nonetheless continued to detain Zavala

until October 6, 2010—sixteen days later.

On October 6, 2010, a grand jury in the District of

Nevada returned an indictment charging Zavala with illegal

reentry under § 1326. ICE then transferred Zavala into the

custody of the United States Marshals Service (USMS), and

Zavala was in USMS custody as of October 7, 2010.

Sixty-two days later, on December 7, 2010, the United States

District Court for the District of Nevada granted the

Government leave to dismiss the unlawful reentry charge due

to improper venue.

On December 10, 2010, following dismissal of the

indictment for improper venue, Zavala was transferred from

USMS custody back into ICE custody. Twelve days later, on

2 Also on September 20, 2010, Zavala completed and signed an affidavit

on a form provided by ICE admitting that he was a citizen of Mexico, that

he had previously been deported, that he reentered the United States on

foot from Mexico, and that he had not sought permission to reenter the

United States.

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6 ZAVALA V. IVES

December 22, 2010, a criminal action for illegal reentry under

§ 1326 was again brought against Zavala, this time in the

Central District of California, the proper venue, and he was

again transferred into USMS custody from ICE custody.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Zavala was sentenced on

March 28, 2011 to 46-months’ imprisonment and 3-years’

supervised release for illegal reentry under § 1326(a). In

calculating Zavala’s entitlement to sentencing credit under

§ 3585(b) for time he spent in detention prior to the

commencement of his criminal sentence, the Bureau of

Prisons (BOP) granted Zavala credit for the two periods of

time during which USMS detained him—October 6, 2010

through December 10, 2010, and December 22, 2010 through

March 27, 2011.3

BOP denied Zavala sentencing credit, however, for the

two periods of time during which ICE detained him prior to

the commencement of his criminal sentence: (1) September

20, 2010 through October 5, 2010, when ICE detained him

after reinstatement of the removal order but before an

indictment was returned, hereinafter referred to as the “preindictment period”; and (2) December 11, 2010 through

December 21, 2010, when ICE detained him between the

dismissal of the first indictment for improper venue and the

re-initiation of the criminal proceeding in the proper venue,

hereinafter referred to as the “post-indictment period.”

3 BOP, rather than the sentencing court, calculates the defendant’s

entitlement to sentencing credit under § 3585(b) in the first instance. See

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). A defendant may then

challenge BOP’s calculation—in other words, the execution of the

sentence—by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. See United States v. Giddings, 740 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984).

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ZAVALA V. IVES 7

On May 20, 2013, Zavala filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming

improper denial of sentencing credit because he had “been in

official custody of the federal government since September

20, 2010.” A magistrate denied sentencing credit for both

periods of detention by ICE, and the district court adopted in

full the magistrate’s report and recommendation. Zavala

appealed.

II.

Zavala contends that the district court erred in concluding

that detention by immigration authorities never constitutes

“official detention” within the meaning of § 3585(b), the

statute governing the calculation of a term of imprisonment.

We review the district court’s denial of a habeas petition de

novo, while we review any underlying factual findings for

clear error. Reynolds v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. United

States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012). We review questions of

statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Thompson,

728 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013); Phoenix Mem’l Hosp.

v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010).

A.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585 governs the calculation of the

length of a federal criminal sentence. Under the statute, a

term of imprisonment begins “on the date the defendant is

received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives

voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official

detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”

§ 3585(a). The statute then provides that the defendant is

entitled to sentencing credit for time spent in “official

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8 ZAVALA V. IVES

detention” prior to the commencement of the term of

imprisonment:

Credit for prior custody.—A defendant shall

be given credit toward the service of a term of

imprisonment for any time he has spent in

official detention prior to the date the sentence

commences—

(1) as a result of the offense for which the

sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for which

the defendant was arrested after the

commission of the offense for which the

sentence was imposed;

that has not been credited against another

sentence.

§ 3585(b). The statute does not define “official detention.”

When interpreting a statute, “[w]e start, as always, with

the language of the statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,

431 (2000). In so doing, “[w]e give the words of a statute

their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an

indication Congress intended them to bear some different

import.” Id. Under the plain text of the sentencing credit

statute, when ICE detains an alien for the purpose of securing

his presence at a potential criminal prosecution and the alien

is indeed criminally prosecuted and sentenced, this period of

detention by ICE is “as a result of the offense for which the

sentence was imposed.” § 3585(b)(1). The “as a result of”

formulation denotes a causal relationship. When ICE detains

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ZAVALA V. IVES 9

an alien pending a potential criminal prosecution, electing to

defer deportation until the conclusion of such criminal

proceedings (and often until after service of the criminal

sentence), that period of ICE detention is causally attributable

to the criminal offense rather than to ICE’s authority to detain

an alien pending deportation. Under the plain meaning of the

words, detention is the holding of aliens in custody (which

the immigration statutes expressly describe as “detention”),4

and ICE is without question an official entity. Pending

prosecution means the time during which the alien is detained

for the purpose of securing his presence at a potential

criminal prosecution, whereas pending deportation means

detention for the purpose of removing him from the country.

The legislative history of § 3585 does not shed any

additional light on whether ICE detention pending criminal

prosecution constitutes “official detention,” but similarly it

does not contain any indication that Congress intended the

statute’s words to have a different import than their plain

meaning.

5 Thus, we conclude that the relevant inquiry to

 

4

 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1); 1231(a)(2).

 

5 Early versions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which rewrote

and recodified the sentencing credit statute, creating § 3585, included a

definition of “official detention” that encompassed “detention by a public

servant . . . pending deportation”—a far more expansive definition than

the one we adopt. See, e.g., Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630,

97th Cong. § 111 (1981). The entirety of the definitions section, however,

was deleted prior to enactment.

In United States v. Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the deletion

of a reference to the Attorney General during the recodification of the

sentencing credit statute effected no change in the statute’s meaning. See

503 U.S. at 336 (concluding the reference “was simply lost in the

shuffle”). The Court noted that Congress’s replacement of the term

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10 ZAVALA V. IVES

determine whether a period of ICE detention constituted

“official detention . . . as a result of the offense for which the

sentence was imposed” is whether the detainee was being

held pending a potential criminal prosecution, rather than

pending deportation in the ordinary course—that is, whether

the alien’s detention status had changed from pending

deportation, which it was at the time he was first detained, to

pending prosecution.

A number of considerations support our interpretation of

the statute as having the meaning its plain words afford it.

First, issues of sentencing credit arise only in cases in which

the alien has in fact been criminally prosecuted and

convicted, so the scope of our holding is necessarily

circumscribed. In such cases, we always know that the

government elected to pursue criminal prosecution, rather

than to attempt to deport the alien forthwith. Otherwise, there

would be no criminal sentence to credit. The only question is

when the alien’s detention status changed from detention

pending deportation to detention pending potential

prosecution.

Second, federal immigration officers and federal

prosecutors work together closely to facilitate criminal

prosecutions of aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d)(1) (requiring

cooperation between the Attorney General and federal, state,

and local authorities “with respect to the arrest, conviction,

and release of any alien charged with an aggravated felony”);

United States Customs and Border Protection Inspector’s

“custody” with “official detention” might have constituted a meaningful

change, id. at 337, but it subsequently held that the change was a technical

one that did not alter the meaning of the statute. See Reno v. Koray,

515 U.S. 50, 59–60 (1995).

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Field Manual § 18.11 (2008) (providing detailed instructions

to immigration officers regarding development of a case for

criminal prosecution in cooperation with U.S. Attorneys);

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual § 14.8

(2006) (providing instructions on preserving a case for

criminal prosecution after reinstatement of removal). It is

typically ICE’s referral of a case to a U.S. Attorney that

prompts the filing of charges for an immigration-status

offense, and it is ICE’s delay of deportation and delivery of

the alien to the U.S. Attorney that enables criminal

proceedings to occur. Indeed, the record in this case is

illustrative of the fact that prosecutions for immigration-status

crimes are a collaborative effort by immigration officers and

prosecutors: the only evidence supporting the criminal

complaint against Zavala filed in the Central District of

California was an affidavit by an ICE deportation officer.

Given that prosecutions for immigration-status crimes

result from cooperative efforts between the two sets of

officials, it would be arbitrary to afford sentencing credit

when the government elects to hold a defendant in USMS

detention while it builds its criminal case but not when the

government elects to hold a defendant in ICE detention while

it does so. Under the district court’s hardline rule that

immigration detention never constitutes “official detention,”

two identically situated defendants would serve sentences of

differing lengths based solely on the federal government’s

election of ICE rather than USMS detention pending potential

criminal prosecution. Individuals in immigration detention,

unlike those in USMS detention, could be subjected to

lengthy periods of detention with no offsetting sentencing

credit. Further underscoring the arbitrariness of a blanket rule

denying sentencing credit any time aliens are in ICE

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12 ZAVALA V. IVES

detention is the fact that BOP itself has afforded credit to

aliens held in state detention pending federal prosecution, see

§ 3585(b)(2); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons

Program Statement No. 5880.28, 1-14A, 1-21 (Feb. 14,

1997); Abpikar v. Lompoc Federal Bureau of Prisons, No.

CV 12-00827 MMM, 2012 WL 3777156, at *2 (C.D. Cal.

July 16, 2012), adopting report &recommendation, 2012 WL

3776499 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012), and ICE detention often

occurs in a state facility. See, e.g., Galan-Paredes v. Hogsten,

No. 1:CV-06-1730, 2007 WL 30329, *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3,

2007) (defendant held in county jail in ICE detention status).

In other words, two individuals could receive different

sentencing credit and thus serve different length sentences

based solely on which agency was nominally in charge of

their detention in the same facility.

6

B.

The Government makes four arguments in support of its

contention that a defendant is never entitled to sentencing

credit for time spent in ICE detention: (1) that Supreme Court

precedent interpreting § 3585(b) in the context of pretrial

release under the Bail Reform Act controls the instant case;

(2) that BOP’s interpretation of § 3585(b) precludes

sentencing credit for any and all time spent in immigration

detention; (3) that sentencing credit is inappropriate because

deportation proceedings are classified as civil; and (4) that

6 The dissent’s approach, under which a person held in ICE detention

pending criminal prosecutionwould receive credit only if criminal charges

have already been filed perpetuates this arbitrary disparity. When police

officers arrest a criminal suspect, sentencing credit begins at the time of

arrest, rather than when formal charges are filed. See, e.g., BOP Program

Statement 5880.28 at 1-21.

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requiringBOP to work with ICE to calculate sentences would

be unworkable. We reject these arguments.

The Government argues that Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50

(1995), controls the instant case, but Koray’s holding was far

narrower. The question presented to the Court by the grant of

certiorari was “whether a federal prisoner is entitled to credit

against his sentence under § 3585(b) for time when he was

‘released’ on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984,”

and the Court held that release on bail to a private community

treatment center did not constitute “official detention.” Id. at

54, 65. Although the release on bail at issue in Koray

included restrictive conditions, it was clear that under the

terms of the Bail Reform Act the defendant was “released”

from official detention to a private facility. Id. at 59. In the

instant case, it is equally clear that under the relevant statutes,

detention byimmigration officials constitutes “detention” and

not “release.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1)–(2), 1231(a)(2).7

Despite dicta to the effect that official detention meant

detention in a facility under the control of BOP, see 515 U.S.

at 58, Koray had no occasion to address immigration

detention, and it expressly declined to reach cases in which a

7 The dissent asserts that we adopt different definitions of “official

detention” with respect to ICE detention and communitytreatment centers.

Not so. To recapitulate: Koray held that a person released to a community

treatment center is not detained. We hold that where a person is detained

by ICE, § 3585(b) may apply. Certainly where a person is released on

bond by ICE, it does not.

Nor do we agree with the dissent’s contention that because the

Immigration Nationality Act and the Sentencing Reform Act were created

by different legislation, we should not presume that Congress intended for

them to be construed harmoniously.

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14 ZAVALA V. IVES

defendant is held in detention in an official facility not

operated or controlled by BOP. The Court expressly stated

that “BOP often grants credit under § 3585(b) for time spent

in state custody, even though the defendant was not subject

to the control of BOP. These situations obviously are not

governed by reference to a [Bail Reform Act] § 3142

‘release’ or ‘detention’ order. . . . [B]ecause the only question

before us is whether a defendant is in ‘official detention’

under § 3585(b) during the time he is ‘released’ on bail

pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, we need not and do

not rule here on the propriety of BOP’s decision to grant

credit under § 3585(b) to a defendant who is denied bail

pursuant to state law and held in the custody of state

authorities.” 515 U.S. at 63 n.5 (citation omitted).8 A fortiori,

Koray did not determine that immigration detention must be

under the control of BOP in order to constitute “official

detention”; rather, it left open the question we now answer:

whether detention by immigration officials can constitute

8 The dissent asserts that we make too much of the statements in Koray

pertaining to credit for state detention and that “official detention” in

§ 3585(b) is in all circumstances limited to detention under the control of

BOP, USMS, or the Attorney General of the United States because that is

the detention referred to as “official detention” in § 3585(a) and other

provisions ofthe SentencingReformAct—the enactmentthat included the

Bail Reform Act. We conclude, however, that we must abide by the

Supreme Court’s statement that “situations [in which “the defendant was

not subject to the control of the BOP”] obviously are not governed by

reference” to the Bail Reform Act. Koray, 515 U.S. at 63 n.5. (second

emphasis added). It is equally obvious that such situations are not

governed by reference to other provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act

pertaining to inmates in federal prisons.

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ZAVALA V. IVES 15

“official detention.” We conclude that it can and that in this

case it does.9

Next, the Government argues that BOP’s Program

Statement interpreting § 3585(b) precludes sentencing credit

for all time spent in immigration custody, and that the

Program Statement is entitled to deference. Congress

delegated responsibility for the initial computation of

sentences to the Attorney General, see United States v.

Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992), who has in turn delegated

that authority to BOP. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.96. We need not,

however, reach the question of administrative deference.10

9 Even if Koray required a defendant to be under the control of BOP,

USMS, or the Attorney General in all circumstances to be eligible for

sentencing credit as the dissent contends, our colleague overlooks the

dispositive fact that when Koray was decided in 1995 (and when BOP

adopted its Program Statement), all immigration detainees—whether

charged with a crime or not—were indeed within the control of the

Attorney General. The Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) was in

the Department of Justice and the Department had jurisdiction over

immigration matters until 2002, when the Attorney General’s authority

over immigration, including over the INS, was transferred to the Secretary

ofthe newly formed Department ofHomeland Security. See Establishment

of Department; replacement of Immigration and Naturalization Service;

transfer of functions, 3A Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 35 (George

Blum et al. eds., 2015). Surely the transfer of INS to a new,

comprehensive agency designed to cover national security matters did not

change the nature of its control over immigration detention. Nor does it

matter that INS was reorganized to be part of a newly created federal

department reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who

exercises the authority over immigrationmatters that the AttorneyGeneral

formerly did.

10 Under Tablada v. Thomas, the BOP Program Statement would be

entitled to Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference if it addressed the

question presented. See 533 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying

Skidmore deference to the interpretation of the good-time credit statute

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BOP’s Program Statement does not speak to situations in

which ICE detains an alien pending criminal

prosecution—potential or otherwise. The Government’s

claim that the Program Statement establishes a blanket nocredit rule is thus incorrect.

BOP Program Statement 5880.28 provides:

Official detention does not include time spent

in the custody of the U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) under the

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 pending a final

contained in the same BOP Program Statement). Even ifthe BOP Program

Statement precluded sentencing credit for any and all time spent in

immigration detention, as the Government asserts, we would find this

interpretation of the statute unpersuasive under Skidmore. When applying

Skidmore deference, “[a]mong the factors we consider are the

interpretation’s thoroughness, rational validity, consistencywith prior and

subsequent pronouncements, the logic and expertness of an agency

decision, the care used in reaching the decision, as well as the formality

of the process used.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

The BOP Program Statement “does not purport to carry the force of law

and was not adopted after notice and comment,” id., and the closest it

comes to giving any explanation for its interpretation of the statute is the

inclusion of three case citations. See BOP Program Statement 5880.28 at

1-15A. All three cases cited involved claims of constitutional error

committed in the course of deportation proceedings and none of them

involved sentencing credit. Rather, the cited cases simply denominate

deportation proceedings as “civil” proceedings. See Ramirez-Osorio v.

INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984); Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.

1983); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1978). As discussed

infra, that deportation proceedings are classified as civil has no bearing on

whether a criminal defendant is entitled to credit toward his criminal

sentence. Thus, even if the Government’s reading of the Program

Statement were correct, it would lack the logic, expertise, and

thoroughness needed to trigger deference to an agency’s interpretation of

a statute.

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determination of deportability. An inmate

being held by INS pending a civil deportation

determination is not being held in “official

detention” pending criminal charges.

BOP Program Statement 5880.28 at 1-15A (emphasis added).

By its text, the BOP Program Statement does not deny

sentencing credit for any and all time an alien is held in

immigration custody, as the Government contends. At best,

it follows the same interpretation that we adopt: a line

between detention pending deportation, for which a defendant

is not entitled to sentencing credit, and detention pending

criminal prosecution, including the filing of criminal charges,

for which a defendant is entitled to sentencing credit.11 At

worst, the Program Statement is silent as to whether a

defendant is entitled to sentencing credit where ICE detains

him pending potential criminal prosecution.12

11 The dissent proclaims that the phrase “pending criminal charges”

refers solely to criminal cases in which charges have already been filed,

as opposed to cases awaiting the filing of charges. This argument is

without merit. In addition to the two definitions mentioned by the

dissent—one of which is wholly consistent with our opinion—“pending”

is also defined as “While awaiting; until” when used as a preposition.

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See also Webster’s New World

Dictionary 998 (3d Coll. ed. 1988) (including the following definitions:

“not decided, determined, or established”; “about to happen; impending”;

“throughout the course or process of”; and “while awaiting; until”). We

decline to read into the Program Statement a distinction between cases in

which charges have already been filed and those in which they are being

explored, for the reasons previously discussed in Section II.A, supra.

12 On at least four occasions reported in federal court decisions BOP has

voluntarily granted sentencing credit for time the defendant spent in ICE

detention where BOP determined that the detention was pending criminal

prosecution and not pending deportation—including one case in which the

detention preceded formal criminal charges. See Sanchez v. Kruger, No.

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Although a number of district courts have relied on the

BOP Program Statement to deny sentencing credit for time

during which a defendant was held in ICE detention pending

deportation proceedings, we do not read these cases as

inconsistent with our holding in any respect. First, they

engage in only cursory analysis, stating merely that the BOP

Program Statement is entitled to deference and that

deportation proceedings are classified as civil. Second, these

cases all refer to persons being held in custody pending

deportation proceedings.

13 Thus, these cases do not provide

3:CV-13-2025, 2014 WL 6886240, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2014)

(dismissing habeas petition as moot because BOP granted the defendant

credit for the nineteen days prior to his indictment during which he was

held in ICE detention pending criminal prosecution); De Leon v.

Copenhauer, No. 1:12-CV-00976-BAM (HC), 2012 WL 5906551, at *2

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (noting that BOP granted the defendant credit

for the time he was held pending prosecution, including thirty-eight days

in ICE detention); United States v. Tames, CR No. 07-108-S, 2010 WL

93695, at *1-2 (D.R.I. Jan. 8, 2010) (noting that BOP granted the

defendant credit for five days during which he was held in ICE detention

after criminal charges were filed but before the defendant was transferred

to USMS custody); Reyes-Ortiz v. Schultz, CIV. 08-6386 (JEI), 2009 WL

4510131, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009) (noting that BOP granted the

defendant sentencing credit for the time after the defendant “was ordered

deported, but then continued to be held for prosecution,” including credit

for one day in ICE detention prior to his transfer into USMS custody). We

have no reason to think that BOP did not grant similar credits for ICE

detention in other instances that did not find their way into litigated federal

cases.

13 See Solorzano-Cisneros v. Zych, No. 7:12-cv-00537, 2013 WL

1821614, at *3 (W.D. Va. April 13, 2013) (“The period . . . when

Solorzano-Cisneros was held in ICE custody pending civil deportation

review, does not constitute ‘official detention’ under pending criminal

charges”); Castro-Frias v. Laughlin, No. 5:11cv174-DCB-RHW, 2012

WL 4339102, at *2 (S.D. Miss. July 13, 2012), adopting report &

recommendation, 2012 WL 4339216 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 20, 2012) (finding

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ZAVALA V. IVES 19

support for the Government’s argument that sentencing credit

must be denied when ICE detains an alien pending potential

criminal prosecution, as opposed to pending deportation.

The Government also argues that detention by ICE never

constitutes “official detention” within the meaning of

§ 3585(b) because deportation is a civil proceeding. There is

no dispute, however, that an alien being held for deportation,

a civil proceeding, is not entitled to sentencing credit. The

question here is whether an alien held by ICE for the purpose

claim moot but noting that “time spent in ICE custody awaiting

deportation determination is not ‘official detention’”); Plummer v.

Longley, No. CIV.A. 10-171 ERIE, 2011 WL 1204008, at *3 (W.D. Pa.

Mar. 28, 2011) (declining to disturb BOP’s determination that “‘official

detention’ under § 3585(b) does not include time spent in ICE ‘civil

custody’ pending a final determination of deportability”); U.S. v.

Acosta-Leal, No. 10-30036-DRH, 2010WL4608477, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov.

5, 2010) (“[A] person detained by INS while awaiting a deportation

determination is not ‘in official detention’”); Similien v. United States, No.

4:04-CV-162, 2007 WL 496637, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2007) (“During

this time, Petitioner was detained by [ICE] while awaiting exclusion

proceedings.”); Ghadiri v. Sniezek, No. 4:06CV1765, 2006 WL 3023034,

at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2006) (“[D]uring the period of time Mr. Ghadiri

was confined by the I.N.S. . . . he was in I.N.S. custody solely for the

purpose of deportation proceedings.”); Alba-Tovar v. U.S., No.

05-1899-JO, 2006 WL 2792677, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2006)

(“Petitioner’s custody . . . was due to pending administrative deportation

proceedings and does not constitute ‘official detention’”); Fletcher v.

Pugh, No. CV 303-082, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29450, at *5-6 (S.D. Ga.

Apr. 16, 2004) (“[P]rior to the time of his indictment, Petitioner was only

being held for disposition of civil proceedings that were not related to his

eventual sentencing on the criminal charge ofillegal re-entry.”); Decraene

v. Winn, No. 03-40212-GAO, 2004 WL 594976, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 23,

2004) (“[T]hat period of time during which petitioner was confined by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service was not the result of the offense

for which he was convicted . . . . To the contrary, he was in INS custody

solely for the purpose of deportation proceedings.” (emphasis omitted)).

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of securing his attendance at a criminal proceeding is entitled

to such credit. Thus, the Government’s argument simply

misses the point.

The Government’s final argument is that requiring BOP

to grant credit for time spent in ICE detention would be an

unworkable regime because it would be “extremely difficult

if not impossible to administer.” Zavala v. Ives, No. CV

13-3603-JFW(E), 2013 WL 4763839, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept.

3, 2013). We reject this argument, for two reasons.

First, a number of district courts have already adopted the

interpretation of § 3585(b) that we adopt today and granted

credit for time spent in immigration detention pending

potential prosecution, including pre-indictment periods as

long as nearly two months.14 These courts engaged in a factbased inquiry to determine when the defendant’s detention

status changed from detention pending deportation to

detention pending criminal prosecution. Courts are wholly

competent to adjudicate when that status change occurred, as

it is a factual inquiry that can often be resolved by examining

ICE’s administrative records and the ICE officers responsible

for an alien’s case. Indeed, BOP has at least on occasion

voluntarily undertaken this inquiry itself. See supra note 12.

Second, BOP already grants sentencing credit for time

spent in state or foreign custody where that time was not

credited to another sentence. See § 3585(b)(2); Koray,

14

See Paz-Salvador v. Holt, No. 3:10-CV-2668, 2011 WL 3876268, at

*5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011) (31 days); Reyes-Ortiz, 2009 WL 4510131,

at *1, 4 & n.2 (34 days); Galan-Paredes, 2007 WL 216699, at *1 (49

days); Guante v. Pugh, No. CV 305-92, 2005 WL 3867597, at *1 (S.D.

Ga. Dec. 2, 2005) (47 days).

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515 U.S. at 63 n.5; BOP Program Statement 5880.28 at

1-14A, 1-21. In order to facilitate the calculation of sentences

in such circumstances, BOP has in place a policy for

intergovernmental communications to investigate and verify

claims of entitlement to sentencing credit. See BOP Program

Statement 5880.28 at 1-26 (“Proper documentation will

consist of written documentation . . . from any law

enforcement agency (including probation officers). This

includes verified phone, fax, or teletype messages, PSI, Rap

Sheet, Booking Sheets, SENTRY, USM Form 129, etc.”). If

anything, it should be easier, not harder, to coordinate an

information exchange between two federal government

actors—BOP and ICE—than it is to coordinate between state

and federal or foreign and federal actors.15

The fears that BOP and courts will be unable to

administer a system that requires determining whether an

alien’s detention constituted detention pending potential

criminal prosecution, as opposed to detention pending

deportation, are thus without merit. We are confident in

BOP’s ability to comply with its statutory mandate with

respect to detention by ICE—just as it does with respect to

detention by state and foreign governments—and in the

courts’ ability to adjudicate disputes over sentencing credit

should they arise.

15 In fact, it may be markedly easier to determine eligibility for

sentencing credit for ICE detention time than for state detention time, as

the former situation does not present the double-counting problempresent

in the latter situation. See § 3585(b) (providing that a defendant may not

receive credit against a federal sentence for detention time that has “been

credited against another sentence”).

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III.

For the forgoing reasons, we hold that an alien is entitled

to credit toward his criminal sentence under § 3585(b) for the

period during which ICE detained the alien pending potential

criminal prosecution. We turn now to application of this

principle to the facts of the instant case.

A. Post-Indictment Detention

ICE detained Zavala during the period of time after

dismissal of the first indictment for improper venue and

before the filing of identical criminal charges in the proper

venue. This detention occurred from December 11, 2010

through December 21, 2010. Zavala is clearly entitled to

sentencing credit for this post-indictment period of ICE

detention because it constituted detention pending criminal

prosecution.

Most important, this time period occurred after the

Government instituted criminal charges. Where ICE retains

an alien in custody subsequent to an indictment or the filing

of criminal charges and the alien is then convicted of those

charges, we hold that the intervening period of detention is

presumed to be for the purpose of criminal prosecution and

the alien is entitled to sentencing credit.

The Government does not contend that during the postindictment period ICE held Zavala pending deportation. The

record makes clear that all governmental actors involved

always intended that the criminal charges against Zavala be

reinstated in the proper venue. The language of the

Government’s proposed order of dismissal indicated its

intention to refile criminal charges in the proper venue,

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expressly identifying that venue, and the refiled charges were

supported exclusively by an ICE officer’s affidavit. We thus

hold that the district court erred when it denied Zavala

sentencing credit for the post-indictment period during which

ICE detained him pending criminal prosecution.

B. Pre-Indictment Detention

As for the pre-indictment period, Zavala was subject to a

reinstated order of removal on his first day in ICE custody,

September 20, 2010, and he did not contest this order,

meaning ICE could have deported him at any time thereafter.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (stating that “the alien shall be

removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry”).

ICE nonetheless continued to detain Zavala until October 6,

2010, when he was indicted for illegal reentry.

As we stated earlier, the BOP Program Statement does not

bar Zavala from receiving sentencing credit during anyperiod

in which he was being detained pending potential

prosecution. The record before us, however, does not show

whether he was held pending potential criminal prosecution,

and if so, for what part of the pre-indictment period. On the

one hand, execution of a removal order is not required to be

instantaneous, see § 1231(a)(1), and it is therefore possible

that Zavala’s continuing detention was related to the process

of implementing the deportation order.16 On the other hand,

the process of indicting a criminal defendant is ordinarily not

a one-day affair. Usually it requires some investigation and

deliberation before a decision to indict (or to file a criminal

complaint) is made by the criminal authorities, normally the

16 We note that when Zavala was previously removed in 2006, ICE

deported him just one day after it obtained the order of removal.

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24 ZAVALA V. IVES

U.S. Attorney’s Office. During that process, federal

prosecutors and immigration officials often cooperate in

determining whether criminal charges are warranted and

particularly in ensuring the alien’s presence at the criminal

proceedings. Zavala is entitled to credit for the latter type of

detention—detention for the purpose of ensuring his presence

at his prosecution—but not for the former type—detention for

the purpose of executing the removal order.17 Because the

district court erred in holding that as a matter of law Zavala

could not receive any credit toward his sentence for time

spent in ICE detention, it failed to consider whether that

detention was pending deportation or pending potential

prosecution. We therefore remand for the district court to

determine in the first instance whether and when, during the

pre-indictment period, Zavala’s detention status changed

from detention pending deportation to detention pending

potential prosecution.

We hold that, on remand, the government has the burden

of proving that the pre-indictment detention was for the

17 To be clear, we disagree with the statement in Abpikar v. Lompoc

Federal Bureau of Prisons relied upon by the magistrate judge in this

case. The magistrate judge held, quoting Abpikar, that the filing of “a

charge [by a U.S. Attorney] or [a] determination of probable cause” by a

grand jury is required before detention can constitute “official detention”

within the meaning of § 3585(b). Abpikar, 2012 WL 3777156, at *3. First,

in cases concerning detention by law enforcement officials, sentencing

credit is awarded from the time of arrest, not from the time that charges

are formally filed or an indictment returned. See BOP Program Statement

5880.28 at 1-21. Second, as explained supra, the approach we adopt has

already been successfully applied to detention by immigration officials,

and BOP already regularly calculates sentencing credit in the analogous

state detention context. Moreover, the Abpikar approach (also propounded

by the dissent) has no basis in the text of the statute and would fail to

address arbitrary sentencing disparities.

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purpose of deportation rather than potential prosecution. This

burden is justified for two reasons. First, it furthers judicial

efficiencyin light of the “judicial estimate of the probabilities

of the situation.” 2 McCormick on Evidence § 337 (7th ed.

2013). After all, we know how this story ends: Zavala was

not deported, but prosecuted. This is so in all sentencing

credit cases arising under § 3585(b). In such cases, it is

always clear that at some point in time the government

elected to pursue the possibility of prosecution, rather than to

deport the alien in the normal course. Had it chosen

otherwise, the question of credit toward a criminal sentence

would not arise. In other words, the most likely outcome is

that the alien is entitled to some sentencing credit beyond that

credited from the date on which the indictment or formal

charges were filed.

Second, evidence as to the reason for an alien’s detention

“is peculiarly accessible to one of the parties,” Edmund M.

Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden

of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 79 (1933). The government

unquestionably has superior access to the critical

information—i.e. reports of investigation by ICE officers,

records of the criminal investigation component of ICE,

sworn statements by investigating officers, the time and

contents of communications between ICE officers and

prosecutorial agencies, and so forth—the information that is

determinative of when an alien’s detention status changed

from detention pending deportation to detention pending

potential prosecution. The fact-finding required on remand is

not some amorphous “inquiry into the elusive intent of

individual [ICE] officers,” as the dissent contends. Dissent at

12. Rather, it is primarily a matter of reviewing records that

ICE alreadymaintains in the ordinary course of its operations.

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For example, the government could meet its burden of

proving that pre-indictment detention was for the purpose of

deportation rather than potential prosecution by producing

evidence that proceedings to determine deportability were

actively being pursued, or, where a final removal order has

already been obtained (as in this case), that it was in the

process of making logistical arrangements for the detainee’s

departure from the country, and that it was not merely

awaiting action by the U.S. Attorney’s Office or helping build

a criminal case.18

We accordingly remand for the district court to conduct

an evidentiary hearing. The relevant question on remand is

whether the Government can establish that Zavala’s detention

from September 20, 2010 to October 5, 2010 was not for the

purpose of potential prosecution.

IV.

We hold that when immigration officials detain an alien

pending potential prosecution, the alien is entitled under

§ 3585(b) to credit toward his criminal sentence. We also

hold that an alien is entitled to credit for all time spent in ICE

detention subsequent to his indictment or the filing of formal

criminal charges against him. Finally, we hold that where a

factual dispute exists, the district court must hold an

evidentiary hearing as to whether an alien’s detention by ICE

18 To be clear: the foregoing are merely examples of how the

government could meet its burden of proving that detention was not for

the purpose of securing the detainee’s presence at a criminal prosecution.

We, of course, do not imply in any way that “official detention” can occur

only subsequent to a final removal order. Quite the contrary. To the extent

that the dissent suggests otherwise, it simply misunderstands our opinion.

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prior to the date of his indictment or the filing of criminal

charges against him constituted detention pending

prosecution.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

At issue is how much of the time that an alien spends in

the custody of the U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement Agency (ICE) prior to the commencement of a

criminal sentence must be credited against that alien’s

sentence for illegal reentry. I agree with the majority that,

under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), an alien is eligible for credit for

all time spent in ICE custody from the day he or she is

indicted or criminally charged. On that day, the alien

becomes subject to the U.S. Attorney General’s control and

thus is in “official detention” within the meaning of § 3585(b)

as the Supreme Court and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

have interpreted that term. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50,

55–56 (1995); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BOP Program

Statement No. 5880.28(c).

The majority, however, also adopts a broader

interpretation of § 3585(b), that “an alien is entitled to credit

toward his criminal sentence . . . for the period during which

ICE detained the alien pending potential criminal

prosecution.” Maj. Op. 22 (emphasis added). I dissent from

this broader ruling and its application to this case because it

(1) contravenes Supreme Court precedent, (2) violates the

rules of statutory construction, (3) fails to defer to the BOP’s

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reasonable interpretation of § 3585(b), and (4) is

prospectively problematic. Left in place, the rule will

generate a slew of habeas petitions that will require district

courts to conduct time-consuming evidentiary hearings to

determine the elusive moment when pre-indictment

immigration detention changed from “pending deportation”

to “pending potential prosecution.”

I.

The majority’s broad rule, that time spent in ICE custody

pending potential criminal prosecution is “official detention,”

is inconsistent with Reno v. Koray. In that case, the Supreme

Court held that time spent by a prisoner at a community

treatment center after he pleaded guilty, but before he was

sentenced, was not “official detention” within the meaning of

§ 3585(b). In so holding, the Court ruled that “credit for time

spent in ‘official detention’ under § 3585(b) is available only

to those defendants who were detained in a ‘penal or

correctional facility,’ § 3621(b), and who were subject to

BOP’s control.” Koray, 515 U.S. at 58.1

The majority’s interpretation of § 3585(b) cannot be

reconciled with Koray. More than the “potential” for

criminal prosecution is required before an alien in ICE

1 While the Court used the words “subject to BOP’s control,” the

opinion as a whole makes clear that the Court also meant, more broadly,

“subject to the discretion of the U.S. Attorney General, the Bureau of

Prisons, or the U.S. Marshals Service.” Koray, 515 U.S. at 60 n.4

(quoting BOP Program Statement No. 5880.28(c) (July 29, 1994)). I use

the shorthand “subject to the Attorney General’s control,” because the

Attorney General’s control is inclusive of that of the BOP and the U.S.

Marshals Service (USMS), which operate under the Department of

Justice.

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custody becomes subject to the Attorney General’s control. 

The potential for prosecution of an alien in civil immigration

custody exists from the moment an alien is apprehended by

ICE. Rather, for an alien in ICE custody to be in “official

detention” within the meaning of § 3585(b), as the Supreme

Court has interpreted that term, the alien must be indicted or

criminally charged.2 Only then is an alien in ICE’s custody

“subject to [the Attorney General’s] control” as a result of his

or her immigration offense, and thus entitled to credit against

his or her sentence. Koray, 515 U.S. at 58. An ICE officer

may play a part in building a criminal case, but the emergent

intention of an ICE officer to refer a case for criminal

prosecution has no bearing on whether an alien in ICE

custody is subject to the Attorney General’s control and thus

in “official detention.”

A review of the Supreme Court’s extensive analysis of the

term “official detention” in Koray exposes the majority’s

error. The Court looked to § 3585(b)’s larger statutory

scheme, including other sentencing provisions showing that

“official detention” means “in a penal or correctional facility”

that is “subject to BOP control.” Id. at 58–59 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Supreme Court

looked to “§ 3585(a) and related sentencing provisions,” and

observed:

2 The government has not developed an argument that time spent in ICE

custody is not “official detention” because ICE facilities are not penal or

correctional facilities. Accordingly, I assume that ICE facilities qualify

as penal or correctional facilities even though immigration detention is

civil in nature. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), (d) (indicating that “detention”

within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act may include an immigration

official’s custody of “a person charged with [a criminal] offense”).

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Section 3585(a) provides that a federal

sentence “commences” when the defendant is

received for transportation to or arrives at “the

official detention facility at which the

sentence is to be served.” Title 18 U.S.C.

§ 3621, in turn, provides that the sentenced

defendant “shall be committed to the custody

of the Bureau of Prisons,” § 3621(a), which

“may designate any available penal or

correctional facility . . . , whether maintained

by the Federal Government or otherwise . . . ,

that the Bureau determines to be appropriate

and suitable,” § 3621(b) (emphasis added). 

The phrase “official detention facility” in

§ 3585(a) therefore must refer to a

correctional facility designated by the Bureau

for the service of federal sentences, where the

Bureau retains the discretion to “direct the

transfer of a prisoner from one penal or

correctional facility to another.” § 3621(b).

Id. at 58 (alterations and emphasis in original).

The Court explained that its “reading of § 3585(a) is

reinforced by other provisions governing the administration

of federal sentences,” including language in § 3622 showing

that “official detention” means “subject to BOP control.” Id. 

Reasoning that “the words ‘official detention’ should bear the

same meaning in subsections (a) and (b) of § 3585 as they do

in the above related sentencing statutes,” the Court found that

§ 3585(b) turned on whether the detention was subject to the

control of the BOP (or the U.S. Attorney General or USMS). 

Id. It ruled that “credit for time spent in ‘official detention’

under § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who

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were detained in a ‘penal or correctional facility,’ § 3621(b),

and who were subject to BOP’s control.” Id. The Court

explained that “[t]he context and history of § 3585(b) also

support this view,” as does the BOP’s Program Statement No.

5880.28(c), which is due deference. Id. at 59–61.

Recognizing that its rule is inconsistent with the rule

announced in Koray, the majority attempts to relegate the

Supreme Court’s rule to the status of dicta. The majority

relies on a footnote in Koray where the Court declined to

address the propriety of the BOP’s policy of granting “credit

under § 3585(b) to a defendant who is denied bail pursuant to

state law and held in the custody of state authorities.” Id. at

63 n.5. But what the Supreme Court did rule was not undone

by a footnote stating what applications of that rule the Court

declined to address. Thus, the broad rule announced by the

majority in this case, which does not require an alien’s

custody by ICE to be subject to the Attorney General’s

control to qualify as “official detention” under § 3585(b),

contravenes Reno v. Koray.

II.

The majority’s broad rule also runs contrary to the rules

of statutory construction. As explained above, Koray’s

interpretation of § 3585(b) followed the “normal rule of

statutory construction that identical words used in different

parts of the same act are [presumed] to have the same

meaning.” Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The majority’s

interpretation of § 3585(b) violates this rule by interpreting

“official detention” in § 3585(b) not to mean “subject to [the

Attorney General’s] control,” even though that is part of the

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term’s meaning as it is used in subsection § 3585(a). Koray,

515 U.S. at 58.

In doing so, the majority violates an even more

fundamental rule of statutory construction, the rule that

prohibits “[a]scribing various meanings to a single iteration”

of a statutory term in different applications. Ratzlaf v. United

States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386

(2005) (rejecting “the dangerous principle that judges can

give the same statutory text different meanings in different

cases”). The majority holds that “official detention” in

§ 3585(b) means one thing (what the majority says it does) in

the context of custody by ICE but another thing (what the

Supreme Court said it does in Koray) in the context of

custody by a community treatment center. Such an approach

to understanding a statute is in tension with the rule of law

and should be rejected. Clark, 543 U.S. at 382 (to accept that

the same statutory provision could have multiple meanings

“would render every statute a chameleon, its meaning subject

to change . . . in each individual case”).

It is true that, in Koray, the Supreme Court also construed

§ 3585(b) in conjunction with the Bail Reform Act of 1984,

which is not directly at issue here.3 Koray, 515 U.S. at

56–57. Doing so made sense “because the Bail Reform Act

of 1984 was enacted in the same statute as the Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984, of which § 3585 is a part.” Id. 

3

It does not follow that the Supreme Court’s extensive analysis of the

Sentencing Reform Act, which is at issue here, and resultant ruling

regarding § 3585(b)’s meaning, which is controlling here, may be ignored

or distinguished as only applicable to custody in a community treatment

center. See Koray, 515 U.S. at 55–65.

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Accordingly,Congress could be presumed to have “legislated

with reference to” the terms of § 3585 in drafting the Bail

Reform Act. Id. at 57 (quoting Gozlon–Peretz v. United

States, 498 U.S. 395, 408 (1991)). The same cannot be said

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). To the extent

that immigration law is relevant to construing § 3585, it only

confirms that immigration detention is civil rather than

criminal in nature. See Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957,

959 (9th Cir. 1978).

The majority contradicts itself in attempting to align the

terms “detention” and “release” in the INA with the same

terms in the Bail Reform Act. Maj. Op. 13 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1226(a)(1)–(2), 1231(a)(2)). First, as the majority later

states, these terms of the Bail Reform Act “obviously” do not

apply to civil immigration custody. Id. at 14 n.8. Second, if

Congress intended immigration “detention” within the

meaning of the INA to be “official detention” within the

meaning of the Sentencing Reform Act, then all time spent in

ICE custody would be entitled credit. The majority rejects

this proposition.4

4

Indeed, the Bail Reform Act supports the view that an alien in ICE

custody is not in “official detention” before criminal charges are filed. 

The Act requires that “a person charged with [a criminal] offense” and

awaiting trial, disposition of appeals, or commencement of his sentence

be either “released” or “detained.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (a); see also id.

§ 3143. Thus, a person, including an alien in immigration custody, id.

§ 3142(d), becomes subject to official detention once “charged with [a

criminal] offense.” Id. §§ 1342, 1343. The INA, by contrast, only

addresses the “detention” or “release” of a person who has been “arrested

and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Such civil immigration

“detention” is not, as the majority agrees, “official detention” within the

meaning of § 3585(b).

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By giving the term “official detention” a different

meaning in a different category of cases to which it applies,

the majority “invent[s] a statute rather than interpret[s] one.” 

Clark, 543 U.S. at 378. The majority’s invention might be

sensible, but the job of judges is to interpret statutes, not to

rewrite them.

III.

The majority also oversteps the judicial role by failing to

provide any deference to the interpretation of “official

detention” set forth in the BOP’s Program Statement. 

According to the BOP:

Official detention does not include time spent

in the custody of the U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) under the

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 pending a final

determination of deportability. An inmate

being held by INS pending a civil deportation

determination is not being held in “official

detention” pending criminal charges.

BOP Program Statement 5880.28, at 1-15A.

The government appears to contend that this part of the

program statement means that an alien is never in “official

detention” while in ICE custody. I join the majority in

declining to defer to this unreasonable interpretation of the

program statement’s interpretation of a statutory term.

But the program statement itself is “entitled to some

deference.” Koray, 515 U.S. at 61. By its text, the program

statement does not deny sentencing credit for all time an alien

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is held by ICE. Rather, a reasonable inference from the

program statement is that an alien in ICE custody is in

“official detention” once “criminal charges” are “pending.” 

BOP Program Statement 5880.28, at 1-15A. As used,

“pending” logically means filed but not yet resolved. See

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (used as a

preposition, as it is here, “pending” primarily means “1.

Throughout the continuance of; during <in escrow pending

arbitration>”; used as an adjective, it primarily means “1.

Remaining undecided; awaiting decision <a pending case>”). 

While the program statement is ambiguous when read in

isolation, a reading of the statement as allowing credit for

time spent in civil immigration custody once criminal charges

are filed is confirmed by other parts of the same statement,

which emphasize that “‘official detention’ [means]subject to

the discretion of the Attorney General and the U.S. Marshals

Service with respect to the place of detention.” BOP Program

Statement 5880.28, at 1-14F. An alien in ICE custody is

subject to the Attorney General’s control when criminal

charges have been filed and remain pending.

5 At this point,

the Attorney General has “discretion to ‘direct the transfer of

a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another.’” 

Koray, 515 U.S. at 58 (quoting § 3621(b)).

The majority errs by failing to defer to this interpretation

of “official detention” set forth in the Program Statement, as

5 The program statement does not say “pending criminal charging” or

“awaiting the filing of charges” as the majority would prefer to read it. 

See Maj. Op. 17 n.11. As explained above, other parts of the program

statement make this clear. The BOP’s inclusion of the word

“determination” in the phrase “pending a civil deportation determination”

but omission of such a verbal noun from the subsequent phrase “pending

criminal charges,” also undermines the majority’s view that the latter

phrase anticipates some action, as in “awaiting the filing of charges.”

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it is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory

term that was provided by the agency Congress charged with

administering that term. Indeed, it is an interpretation that the

Supreme Court has accorded deference. Koray, 515 U.S. at

61; see also Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 806–07 (9th

Cir. 2008).

IV.

The majority’s interpretation of “official detention” has

the additional flaw of being difficult for district courts to

administer. The majority remands “for the district court to

determine in the first instance whether and when, during the

pre-indictment period, Zavala’s detention status changed

from detention pending deportation to detention pending

potential prosecution.” Maj. Op. 24. The majority directs

“the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing,” but

provides little guidance for determining when detention by

ICE shifts from “pending deportation to . . . pending potential

prosecution.” Id. at 25, 26. Presumably the government

would be required to put on evidence showing when an ICE

official of sufficient rank or involvement in a petitioner’s

detention developed a sufficiently concrete intention to

recommend criminal prosecution.

As the district court observed, this “interpretation of

section 3585(b) would be extremely difficult . . . to

administer.” Zavala v. Ives, No. CV 13-3603-JFW E, 2013

WL 4763839, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013). The majority

dismisses this concern on the basis of four unpublished

district court decisions granting credit for time spent in

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immigration detention.

6 These four decisions, which until

today were contrary to the overwhelming weight of

authority,

7

are hardly representative of the stream of habeas

petitions we can expect under the majority’s rule. These

decisions do not demonstrate that administering the rule will

not burden district courts and the government by requiring

fact-intensive inquiries into the purpose of an alien’s

detention. The fact that the BOP sometimes grants

sentencing credit for time spent in state or foreign criminal

custody does not negate the district court’s practical concern

6

See Maj Op. 20 n.14 (citing Paz-Salvador v. Holt, No. 3:10-CV-2668,

2011 WL3876268 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011); Reyes-Ortiz v. Schultz, CIV.

08-6386 (JEI), 2009 WL 4510131 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009); Galan-Paredes

v. Hogsten, No. 1:CV-06-1730, 2007 WL 30329 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2007);

Guante v. Pugh, No. CV 305-92, 2005 WL 3867597 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 2,

2005)).

7

See Maj. Op. at 15–16 n.10 (collecting some such cases); see also, e.g., 

Madrigal v. United States, No. CV 14-2033-CJC-E, 2014 WL 3101444

(C.D. Cal. July 2, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL 3055908 (C.D. Cal. July 2,

2014); Abpikar v. Lompoc Fed. BOP, No. CV 12–00827 MMM (RZ),

2012 WL3777156 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL3776499

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012); United States v. Taymes, No. CR 07-108-S,

2010 WL 93695 (D.R.I. Jan. 8, 2010); see also United States v. Lopez,

650 F.3d 952, 966 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding as “not clearly erroneous”

the district court’s denial of sentencing credit for ICE custody from

February 24 through June 16, 2009, even though on February 24 the ICE

agent who then interviewed the detainee described the matter as “a

criminal illegal reentry prosecution”); Baselet v. Lappin, No. CV 311-097,

2012 WL 1167142, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2012), adopted sub nom.

Baselet v. Wells, 2012 WL 1166960 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2012) (limiting one

of the four district court decisions that the majority cites). Cf. Al-Marri v.

Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom.

Al-Marri v. Berkebile, 134 S. Ct. 295 (2013) (lengthy pre-indictment

detention was not “as a result of the offense for which the sentence was

imposed” because it was based on independent authority to detain

defendant as a witness or enemy combatant).

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either. The BOP practice does not require an inquiry into the

elusive intent of individual officers, and it does not allow

civil detention to be deemed criminal in nature based on the

intent of an official who lacks authority to criminally

prosecute.

The disproportionate cost to benefit of the majority’s rule

is apparent in this case. Here, the difference between my

perspective and the majority’s concerns some fraction of the

sixteen days that Zavala was held by ICE before the

indictment was filed. Under the majority’s approach, the

district court will have to hold an evidentiary hearing probing

the thought processes of ICE officials to determine when

during these sixteen days Zavala’s custody became due to

“potential criminal prosecution.”8I do not mean to discount

the value of Zavala’s time, but only to highlight the practical

problems inherent to administering the majority’s

interpretation.9

8

In applying its rule, the majority appears to limit its reach such that

“official detention” may not occur until, at the earliest, “a final removal

order” has issued. Maj. Op. 26. This hedge may have the effect of

reducing the prospective burden on the district courts and the government

of administering the rule. Butsee id. 26 n.18 (retreating from this hedge). 

Regardless, a fact-intensive inquiry into when, after a final deportability

determination, ICE developed a sufficiently concrete intention to

recommend criminal prosecution would still be required, at least when the

government does not capitulate. I note that the majority’s limitation of its

rule further unravels whatever logic underlies its rule. The limitation

looks to whether deportation proceedings are actively ongoing rather than

to whether the government has decided potentially to pursue criminal

prosecution.

9

I acknowledge that, in some cases, aliens may spend inequitably

lengthy periods of time in ICE custody before unlawful reentry charges

are initiated. This case does not present an occasion to determine if a

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The bright-line rule adopted by most courts, that ICE

custody becomes “official detention” within the meaning of

§ 3585(b) when an alien is indicted or criminally charged,

makes much more sense as a matter of efficient

administration. Given competing, equally reasonable

interpretations, it is safe to say that Congress intended the

interpretation that would be less problematic prospectively. 

Koray, 515 U.S. at 64 (rejecting an interpretation of

§ 3585(b) that “would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the

circumstances of confinement”). Moreover, a bright-line rule

furthers Congress’s stated interest in providing prisoners and

the public with prompt, precise information about how much

time a prisoner must spend in prison. S. Rep. No. 98–225, at

46 (1983) (recognizing the value of a “system of sentencing

whereby the offender, the victim, and society all know the

prison release date at the time of the initial sentencing by the

court, subject to minor adjustments based on prison behavior

called ‘good time’”); see also Koray, 515 U.S. at 64

(preferring an interpretation of § 3585(b) that “provides both

[the government] and the defendant with clear notice”).10

defendant would be entitled to credit for “civil detentions which are mere

ruses to detain a defendant for later criminal prosecution.” United States

v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 357 (9thCir. 1993) (recognizing a possible

exception to the general rule that the Speedy Trial Act does not apply to

immigration detention).

10 My consideration of prospective effects is not my principal reason for

construing § 3585(b) to require custody to be subject to the Attorney

General’s control in order to qualify as “official detention.” It is clear,

though, that the majority’s principal argument is one of policy, that

similarly situated defendants should not be treated disparately. While this

is a compelling policy concern, it is one that the Supreme Court has

expressly dismissed in interpreting § 3585(b). Koray, 515 U.S. at 64. 

Indeed, the same kind of disparity in treatment for similarly situated

defendants would arise under the majority’s rule. Some defendants held

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V.

Despite my dissent from the majority’s broad rule, I agree

with the majority’s narrower rule: “Where ICE retains an

alien in custody subsequent to an indictment or the filing of

criminal charges and the alien is then convicted of those

charges, . . . the alien is entitled to sentencing credit” for the

intervening period of detention. Maj. Op. 22. Applying this

rule to this case, I would affirm the district court’s denial of

sentencing credit for Zavala’s first stint in ICE custody—the

sixteen days from his detainment by ICE until his indictment

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada for illegal

reentry.

11

When Zavala was indicted, however, he became subject

to the Attorney General’s control and, in fact, was promptly

transferred to USMS custody. I would vacate and remand the

in ICE custody will receive sentencing credit because their custody is

“pending potential criminal prosecution,” while others—even some in the

same facility, in the same cell—will not because they have not yet crossed

that inscrutable line.

11 I disagree with the majority’s argument that, under Koray, all ICE

custody is “official detention” under § 3585(b) because the now-abolished

Immigration and Naturalization Service used to fall under the Attorney

General’s purview. Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.

No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002), Congress removed

immigration custody from the Attorney General’s control. Congress

legislated against the clear backdrop of the interpretation of § 3585(b) set

forth in Koray, the government’s construction § 3585(b) in the BOP

Program Statement, and the government’s longstanding practice of

denying sentencing credit for time spent in immigration custody. We must

presume that Congress was aware of these “settled judicial and

administrative interpretation[s]” when it enacted the Homeland Security

Act. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc.,

506 U.S. 152, 159 (1993).

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district court’s denial of sentencing credit for Zavala’s second

stint in ICE custody—the twelve days from his transfer back

into ICE custody following dismissal of the criminal case

against him due to improper venue until he was again charged

for illegal reentry in the U.S. District Court for the Central

District of California. This time period occurred after Zavala

was indicted and initially became subject to the Attorney

General’s control. While no criminal case was actually

pending against Zavala during this period, Zavala has made

a prima facie showing that he remained subject to the

Attorney General’s control. See Boniface v. Carlson,

856 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (prisoner

bears the burden to establish his entitlement to credit against

his federal sentence for time served on his state sentence). As

the majority notes, the language of the government’s

proposed order of dismissal indicated its intention to refile

criminal charges in the proper venue and expressly identified

that venue. The dismissal may be fairly characterized as the

equivalent of a transfer of a filed criminal case from one

district to another for purposes of applying § 3585(b). 

Accordingly, on the record presented, it appears that Zavala

remained subject to the Attorney General’s control and thus

in “official detention” within the meaning of § 3585(b) during

this time. On remand, unless the government rebuts this

showing, Zavala would be due twelve days of credit toward

his sentence for illegal reentry.

VI.

“Official detention” in § 3585(b) does not take on

different meanings in different contexts, as the majority

would have it. Instead, in all contexts, a defendant is in

“official detention” within the meaning of § 3585(b) when he

or she is (1) detained in a correctional facility or similar

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setting and (2) subject to the Attorney General’s control. 

This interpretation of § 3585(b) is compelled by Koray,

correct as a matter of statutory construction and

administrative deference, and prudent in terms of prospective

effects. Applying this rule, I would affirm in part, vacate in

part, and remand to the district court.

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