Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02595/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02595-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East
Appellee
Hamilton Park Health Care Center LTD
Appellant

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 15-2595

_____________

HAMILTON PARK HEALTH CARE CENTER LTD,

Appellant

v.

1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-00621)

District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper

________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 29, 2016

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 1, 2016)

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David Jasinski, Esquire

Jennifer C. Van Syckle, Esquire

Rebecca D. Winkelstein, Esquire

Jasinksi, P.C.

60 Park Place, 8th Floor

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Appellant

Katherine H. Hansen, Esquire

William S. Massey, Esquire

Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP

817 Broadway, 6th Floor

New York, NY 10003

Counsel for Appellee

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Hamilton Park Health Care Center filed a petition to 

vacate an arbitration award in a dispute with the 1199 SEIU 

United Healthcare Workers East union. The District Court 

denied the petition and confirmed the award. On appeal, 

Hamilton Park asserts that the Court erred by approving a 

multi-year arbitration award when the parties’ collective 

bargaining agreement (“CBA”) only contemplated a singleyear award. Because the parties consented at arbitration to a 

multi-year award, we affirm this portion of the Court’s order. 

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Hamilton Park also argues that, even if a multi-year 

award is permissible, the Court should have severed a 

provision authorizing a new round of arbitration at a later 

date. We agree; thus we reverse and remand as to this portion 

of the order. 

I. Background

Hamilton Park is a long-term care facility that was 

previously a member of a multi-employer bargaining group. 

Morris Tuchman, Esq. represented the group (referred to as 

“Tuchman Homes”) in negotiations with 1199 SEIU, which 

was the exclusive bargaining agent for the group’s employees 

(subject to exceptions not at issue here).1In 2008, Tuchman 

Homes and the union agreed to a CBA beginning on March 

13 of that year and extending through February 28, 2013. The 

CBA gave the union the option to reopen negotiations in 

November 2011 to bargain for new wages, hours, and general 

terms and conditions of employment for the CBA’s last year 

(February 28, 2012–February 28, 2013). If the union 

exercised its right to reopen and the parties did not agree to 

terms by February 28, 2012, they could submit any 

unresolved items to binding interest arbitration.2

 

1 We use “Tuchman Homes” to refer to the bargaining group, 

and we use “Tuchman” to refer to Mr. Tuchman. 

2

In interest arbitration, the parties ask the arbitrator “to set 

new terms and conditions of employment.” Lodge 802, Int’l 

Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, 

Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 835 

F.2d 1045, 1046 (3d Cir. 1987). By contrast, in rights 

arbitration, which is not at issue here, the arbitrator’s role “is 

to resolve disputes involving the interpretation or application 

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The CBA provides that it cannot be changed “unless in 

writing, and signed by the authorized representatives of the 

parties.” It also says that the arbitrator cannot “add to, 

subtract from, or otherwise amend or modify the terms of this 

Agreement.” Although the CBA only authorizes interest 

arbitration for the contract’s last year, it does not expressly 

bar any other types of arbitration. Finally, the CBA empowers 

the arbitrator to “determine his jurisdiction” and grant “all 

appropriate remedies.” 

In November 2011, the union invoked its right to 

reopen negotiations. The parties reached an impasse, and they 

submitted the unresolved issues to arbitration. One of the 

main sticking points was the 4.5 percentage point increase in 

contributions that was necessary to maintain the level of 

health benefits that employees received. The union wanted 

Tuchman Homes to cover the entire increase, but the latter 

opposed paying any of it. During a hearing on March 26, 

2012, the arbitrator, Martin Scheinman, Esq., suggested that 

the parties consider allowing him to fashion a multi-year 

award that went beyond the scope of the February 28, 2012–

February 28, 2013 jurisdiction provided by the CBA. The 

purpose of this would be to spread out increased employer 

contributions over a longer period of time. As Scheinman 

recounted in the award he ultimately issued, the parties 

“tentatively” agreed to the request for expanded jurisdiction. 

He said that, in subsequent ex parte meetings, they firmly 

committed to this plan. Specifically, he said that “[b]oth sides 

agreed my jurisdiction permitted a multi-year Award, at my 

discretion.” However, these agreements were never in 

writing. 

 

of terms and conditions of employment that the parties have 

themselves agreed to in their contract.” Id. at 1047. 

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In November 2012, Scheinman issued a multi-year 

award that extended through June 2016. It dealt with, among 

other topics, wages and health benefits contributions. With 

respect to the dispute over health benefits, the award called 

for a 2 percentage point increase in employer contributions at 

the outset followed by a further 2.5 percentage point increase 

in March 2014. 

Scheinman also included a provision allowing the 

union to reopen negotiations for the contract’s last year (June 

30, 2015–June 30, 2016) and to submit any resulting disputes 

to binding interest arbitration. The effect of Scheinman’s 

award was to create what courts frequently call a “second 

generation” interest arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Globe 

Newspaper Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 648 F. Supp. 2d 

193, 198 (D. Mass. 2009). As the name implies, this refers to 

a scenario where an arbitrator uses his authority to decide a 

particular dispute to impose a requirement, not previously 

agreed upon by the parties, to arbitrate future disputes. 

Scheinman did not address why he included the second 

generation interest arbitration provision. Nor did he ever 

conclude that the parties consented to it. He did, however, 

explain his reasoning for including a reopener provision. He 

said he “followed the parties’ format,” derived from the 

2008–2013 CBA, of permitting the union to reopen 

negotiations for the contract’s last year. In both the 2008–

2013 CBA and Scheinman’s award, the reopener and 

arbitration provisions work in tandem (reopening followed, if 

need be, by arbitration). It appears that Scheinman presumed 

that the parties, having once (in the 2008–2013 CBA) elected 

to resolve disputes through interest arbitration, would 

continue to choose that model for future disputes. 

Hamilton Park responded to the award by filing a 

petition in the District Court to vacate it. The crux of its 

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argument was that Scheinman exceeded his authority under 

the CBA by issuing a multi-year award instead of confining 

himself to the year ending February 28, 2013 and by inserting 

a second generation interest arbitration provision. Hamilton 

Park’s position was that it did not provide oral consent for 

Scheinman’s actions and that, even if it had, it would be 

insufficient because the CBA requires written authorization.

In support of the contention that it never provided 

consent, Hamilton Park submitted to the Court a letter its 

counsel had written to Tuchman along with an unsigned 

declaration from Tuchman that was attached to the letter. The 

letter stated that Hamilton Park’s counsel had spoken with 

Tuchman and prepared the declaration on his behalf based on 

that discussion. It closed by asking Tuchman to execute the 

declaration, which asserted that he “never consented to any 

modification of the CBA authorizing Scheinman to issue an 

award beyond one year.” However, Hamilton Park later 

informed the Court that Tuchman refused to sign the 

declaration. 

Hamilton Park also submitted declarations from its 

chief financial officer, Donald Wuertz, and from Jacqueline 

Cousins, an administrator at Cranford Health and Extended 

Care, another member of the Tuchman Homes multiemployer bargaining group. The declarations said that neither 

the group as a whole nor Hamilton Park individually gave 

Scheinman or Tuchman authorization for a multi-year award. 

But they are silent on whether Tuchman, as the group’s 

representative, authorized Scheinman to issue such an award.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 10 

and 9 U.S.C. § 11, and we have jurisdiction per 9 U.S.C. 

§ 16(a)(1)(D) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “When reviewing a 

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district court’s denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration 

award, we review its legal conclusions de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error.” Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 

811 F.3d 116, 119 n.23 (3d Cir. 2016). 

III. Discussion

“There is a strong presumption under the Federal 

Arbitration Act [“FAA”] in favor of enforcing arbitration 

awards.” Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of 

Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citation 

omitted). We review them under an “extremely deferential 

standard,” the application of which “is generally to affirm 

easily the arbitration award.” Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 

365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003). This deference, of course, is subject 

to certain limitations. Indeed, “[e]ffusively deferential 

language notwithstanding, the courts are neither entitled nor 

encouraged simply to ‘rubber stamp’ the interpretations and 

decisions of arbitrators.” Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 

108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996).

For instance, the FAA gives district courts the 

authority to vacate awards where arbitrators “exceeded their 

powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 

and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 

made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Also subject to vacatur are 

awards that “do[] not draw [their] essence from the terms of 

the collective bargaining agreement,” Jersey Nurses Econ. 

Sec. Org. v. Roxbury Med. Grp., 868 F.2d 88, 88 (3d Cir. 

1989), that result from an arbitrator’s “own brand of 

industrial justice,” Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Paper, AlliedIndus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union Local No. 2-

991, 385 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), or that are contrary to “a well-defined and 

dominant public policy,” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon 

Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). With respect to the last category, 

because we are dealing with a CBA between a union and an 

employer, the public policy considerations embodied in the 

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) are particularly 

relevant. Moreover, district courts can modify awards in cases 

where “arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted 

to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the 

decision upon the matter submitted.” 9 U.S.C. § 11(b).

There are two aspects of the arbitration award that 

Hamilton Park asks us to review. The first is the issuance of a 

multi-year award. Because the CBA only authorizes a singleyear award, Hamilton Park would be on solid footing if it had 

not separately agreed to expand Scheinman’s jurisdiction. But 

it did reach such an agreement, and it is bound by it. 

The other issue is the inclusion of a second generation 

interest arbitration provision. Here, by contrast, there is no 

evidence that Hamilton Park consented to what Scheinman 

included. Because this portion of the award violates the 

principles of both the FAA and the NLRA, it cannot stand. 

A. Multi-year award

Hamilton Park’s main contention is that there is no 

authority in the CBA for Scheinman to issue an award that 

goes through June 2016. This is true but ultimately not 

dispositive. That is because parties are permitted to “agree to 

allow an arbitrator to go beyond the express terms of the 

collective bargaining agreement.” High Concrete Structures, 

Inc. of N.J. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 

Local 166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1218 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, 

Scheinman found that the parties made such an agreement. 

Specifically, his award states that “[b]oth sides agreed” to a 

“multi-year Award, at my discretion.” 

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Meanwhile, Hamilton Park has presented no evidence 

sufficient to demonstrate that the agreement did not exist. The 

only evidence it produced shows that neither it nor other 

members of the bargaining group authorized Tuchman or 

Scheinman to issue a multi-year award. But there is no 

competent evidence that Tuchman did not agree to the longer 

award on behalf of the bargaining group. 

That evidence might have come in the form of a signed 

declaration from Tuchman. But, as discussed, Tuchman 

declined to sign it. We do not assume that Tuchman’s refusal 

to sign the declaration is necessarily the same as a repudiation 

of its contents. Indeed, we note that counsel for Hamilton 

Park represented to the District Court that Tuchman, though 

he refused to sign the document, “did not deny that he did not 

authorize Arbitrator Scheinman to issue an award beyond one 

year.” On appeal, Hamilton Park vigorously challenges the 

arbitration award but fails to mention—even once—that 

Tuchman refused to sign a declaration that counsel had 

submitted to the District Court. The Magistrate Judge found 

the circumstances surrounding the declaration to be 

“troubling[].” No doubt. And even more troubling is 

Hamilton Park’s failure to acknowledge the incident in its 

briefing. 

Hamilton Park places great emphasis on the lack of 

any writing memorializing the agreement to authorize a 

multi-year award. It argues that an oral agreement would 

violate the CBA, which requires any changes to be in writing 

and signed by authorized representatives. But we have held 

that, once parties are in front of an arbitrator, their decision to 

submit additional subjects to arbitration—even those beyond 

the scope of the CBA—need not be “express” and instead 

“may be based on other relevant . . . actions.” High Concrete 

Structures, 879 F.2d at 1219. Indeed, an agreement to allow 

an arbitrator to address particular issues “may be implied 

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from the conduct of the parties.” Teamsters Local Union No. 

764 v. J.H. Merritt & Co., 770 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1985). In 

our case, the parties’ relevant conduct was to authorize 

Scheinman to enter a multi-year award. And the evidence of 

this is Scheinman’s acknowledgement of the agreement in his 

award.

The CBA’s writing requirement thus does not get 

Hamilton Park relief from its agreement. For instance, in 

High Concrete Structures the employer argued that the 

arbitration award, which went beyond the terms of the CBA, 

violated both the clause declaring the agreement to be 

complete and final (i.e., an integration clause) and the 

provision preventing the arbitrator from changing the 

agreement’s terms. We disagreed, observing that nothing in 

the CBA expressly “prohibit[ed] the parties from agreeing to 

a submission which is broader.” 879 F.2d at 1219 (“[I]n 

determining the arbitrator’s authority, the court must look not 

only at the text of the collective bargaining agreement but 

also at the agreed submission.”). Similarly, nothing in the 

CBA prohibited Hamilton Park and the union from agreeing 

to arbitrate additional issues. 

There are important policy considerations behind the 

rule from J.H. Merritt and High Concrete Structures. 

Specifically, there is a “strong federal policy favoring the 

speedy resolution of labor disputes through arbitration.” J.H. 

Merritt, 770 F.2d at 43. If a party, through its actions, were 

able to induce an arbitrator to issue an award outside the CBA 

and then challenge that award if it is unhappy with it, this 

policy would be frustrated. Id. Hamilton Park, having agreed 

to go beyond the CBA, is bound by that determination. 

As a result, we cannot say that Scheinman “exceeded 

[his] powers” within the meaning of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. 

§ 10(a)(4). Nor does the award fail to “draw its essence from 

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the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,” Jersey 

Nurses, 868 F.2d at 88, because that requirement poses no 

obstacle where the parties agree to go beyond the scope of the 

CBA, High Concrete Structures, 879 F.2d at 1219. 

Meanwhile, there is no tension with a “well-defined and 

dominant public policy,” Exxon Shipping, 993 F.2d at 360 

(internal quotation marks omitted), as holding parties to their 

representations to an arbitrator by no means contravenes 

public policy. Finally, there are no concerns about an 

arbitrator meting out his “own brand of industrial justice,” 

Citgo Asphalt, 385 F.3d at 816 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), or giving an award based on “a matter not 

submitted” for arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 11(b), because here the 

evidence demonstrates that Scheinman had the parties’ 

authorization. 

In one respect, however, the District Court erred in its 

analysis. Specifically, it determined that “the Court cannot 

challenge Arbitrator Scheinman’s finding that the parties 

consented to expanding his jurisdiction.” For this, the Court 

relied on the proposition that, as a general matter, we will not 

“reconsider the merits of an [arbitration] award even though 

the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or 

on misinterpretation of the contract.” United Paperworkers 

Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). 

However, this analysis overlooks two considerations. The 

first is that courts are authorized to review challenges that go 

“to the making of the agreement to arbitrate.” Buckeye Check 

Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The second is that we can inquire 

into whether an award is obtained “through the arbitrator’s 

dishonesty.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. All of this goes to say that 

our deferential review of arbitration awards does not deprive 

Hamilton Park of the ability to establish that, contrary to 

Scheinman’s representations, it did not agree to a multi-year 

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award. The fatal flaw for Hamilton Park, however, is that it 

has not done so. 

B. Second generation interest arbitration provision

The next issue is Scheinman’s inclusion of a second 

generation interest arbitration provision, which allows the 

union to force arbitration on any disputes that arise during 

negotiations over the award’s last year (June 30, 2015–June 

30, 2016). This is not a question of Scheinman’s authority to 

issue an award covering the year ending June 30, 2016. 

Rather, it is purely a question of the remedy that he imposed.3

And unlike with the extension of jurisdiction to encompass a 

multi-year award, Scheinman did not find that the parties 

agreed to a new arbitration provision. Because Hamilton Park 

did not consent to the provision, its inclusion is contrary to 

both the FAA and the NLRA. Although this is a matter of 

first impression for us, we join the company of several of our 

sister courts that have found second generation interest 

arbitration provisions to be impermissible without mutual 

consent. 

As a starting point, under the FAA arbitration “is 

strictly a matter of contract.” Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) 

Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999). As a result, a basic 

premise is that we “initially must find that there is a valid 

agreement to arbitrate.” Century Indem. Co. v. Certain 

Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 

2009). And “[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts 

have no authority to mandate that [it] do so.” Bel-Ray, 181 

 

3 The parties gave Scheinman the authority to impose all 

“appropriate remedies.” The key word, of course, is 

“appropriate.” We must therefore determine whether the 

arbitration provision is permissible. 

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F.3d at 444. Where a party has not executed an express 

agreement to arbitrate, we must therefore discern whether any 

“traditional principles of contract and agency law” can make 

it nonetheless bound by an arbitration provision. E.I. DuPont 

de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 

Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the initial contract was the CBA. The parties 

subsequently enlarged Scheinman’s authority under the oral 

agreement to permit a multi-year award. However, neither the 

CBA nor the oral agreement contemplated the arbitration of 

disputes for the year starting June 30, 2015. Nor did Hamilton 

Park, through its conduct, imply that it agreed to such a 

provision. It certainly was permitted—similar to what it did 

when it consented to the longer award—to agree to a new 

arbitration provision. But there is no evidence that it did. 

To the extent Scheinman attempted to infer Hamilton 

Park’s consent by reference to the arbitration provision in the 

2008–2013 agreement, that inference was flawed. Under this 

reasoning, Hamilton Park’s agreement to arbitrate disputes 

for that contract’s last year (February 28, 2012–February 28, 

2013) means that it would consent to having the same 

arrangement in place for the new award’s last year (June 30, 

2015–June 30, 2016). But neither Scheinman in his award nor 

the union on appeal has identified any principle of contract or 

agency law that would require a party to arbitrate in the future 

merely because it has agreed to do so in the past. 

The District Court notes that Hamilton Park, in 

agreeing to a multi-year award, never expressly “defin[ed] the 

boundaries” of Scheinman’s discretion and never objected 

during the arbitration process to the inclusion of the second 

generation interest arbitration provision. But this gets things 

backwards. Our starting principle is not that parties can be 

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forced to arbitrate unless they agree otherwise, but rather that 

“[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts have no 

authority to mandate that [it] do so.” Bel-Ray, 181 F.3d at 

444. And even assuming there might be circumstances where 

a lack of objection can signal consent, this is not one of them. 

There is no evidence that Hamilton Park had any reason to 

suspect prior to the issuance of the award that it would 

contain a second generation interest arbitration provision. A 

party cannot object to what it cannot reasonably foresee. 

Apart from being untethered from the principles 

embodied in the FAA, the second generation interest 

arbitration provision also conflicts with the NLRA’s public 

policy considerations. Under the NLRA, employers and 

unions are required to bargain over “wages, hours, and other 

terms and conditions of employment.” Brockway Motor 

Trucks, Div. of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 725 

(3d Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). On these 

subjects, the parties have an obligation to negotiate in good 

faith. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 

342, 349 (1958). By limiting mandatory bargaining to these 

topics, the NLRA embodies the public policy that, for all 

other subjects, parties are “free to bargain or not to bargain, 

and to agree or not to agree.” Id.

The question of whether to require arbitration does not 

relate to any of the mandatory bargaining subjects. As a 

result, the NLRA allows parties to accept or reject an 

arbitration provision as they see fit. However, if arbitrators 

were free to do as Scheinman did here, parties would have no 

control over the continued inclusion of an arbitration 

provision. This would allow for an end-run around the 

NLRA’s public policy considerations. 

To see how this problem plays out in practice, we start 

with the undisputed premise that, because an arbitration 

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provision is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, Hamilton 

Park was under no obligation to agree to arbitration in the 

2008–2013 CBA. It is only because Hamilton Park reached a 

limited agreement—the inclusion of an arbitration provision 

in a single CBA—that Scheinman was involved in the case in 

the first instance. He then used this agreement to expand 

Hamilton Park’s arbitration requirements. If an arbitrator, 

once empowered to decide a particular dispute, could then 

require all future disputes to be arbitrated, a party that has 

once agreed to a limited arbitration provision could forever be 

held hostage to it. As the Fifth Circuit explained, 

a party . . . may find itself locked into that 

procedure for as long as the bargaining 

relationship endures. Exertion of economic 

force to rid oneself of the clause is foreclosed, 

for the continued inclusion of the term is for 

resolution by [the arbitrator, who is] an 

outsider. Parties may justly fear that the 

tendency of arbitrators would be to continue 

including the clause, for that is exactly what 

happened in this case.

NLRB v. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants’ Union 

No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161, 1169 (5th Cir. 1976).

Because second generation interest arbitration 

provisions imposed without consent violate the contract law 

principles of the FAA and the public policy goals of the 

NLRA, we hold that they are unenforceable. As discussed, 

there is no evidence that Hamilton Park agreed to have such a 

provision. Hence it must be removed from Scheinman’s 

award. 

Our holding tracks the overwhelming consensus of 

federal courts. See, e.g., Local Union No. 666, Int’l Bhd. of 

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Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Stokes Elec. Serv., Inc., 225 F.3d 

415, 425 (4th Cir. 2000); Local 58, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 

Workers, AFL-CIO v. Se. Mich. Chapter, Nat’l Elec. 

Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 43 F.3d 1026, 1032 (6th Cir. 1995); 

Am. Metal Products, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n 

Local Union No. 104, 794 F.2d 1452, 1456–57 (9th Cir. 

1986); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 14 v. Aldrich 

Air Conditioning, Inc., 717 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1983); 

Columbus Printing, 543 F.2d at 1169–7. See also Globe 

Newspaper, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (“It appears that every 

court to have considered this question has concluded that this 

type of second generation interest arbitration provision is 

unenforceable . . . .”).4

* * * * *

Our deference to an arbitrator’s award does not include 

the rubber stamping of a self-perpetuating arbitration 

provision that the parties did not agree to include. We 

therefore reverse the portion of the District Court’s order 

approving the inclusion of a new arbitration provision for 

disputes arising for the year starting June 30, 2015. We 

remand the case with instructions for the Court to void only 

the portion of the award providing for that arbitration. See, 

 

4 The District Court notes that the typical case where a court 

voids a second generation interest arbitration provision occurs 

when the union insists on its inclusion. The Court correctly 

observes that there is no evidence that the union did so here, 

meaning that Scheinman may have included it on his own 

initiative. However, this has no bearing on our analysis. Even 

if the impetus for the provision comes from an arbitrator 

rather than a party, the result is the same: the imposition of a 

requirement to arbitrate. Unless both parties consent to that 

arrangement, it is unenforceable. 

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e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445 (“[A]n 

arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the 

contract.”). We affirm the Court’s order in all other respects.5

 

5

In the event that the parties have already engaged in 

arbitration for the June 30, 2015–June 30, 2016 contract year, 

nothing in this opinion prevents them from raising to the 

District Court any arguments that may exist as to why any or 

all of the resulting award should be enforced notwithstanding 

the invalidity of the arbitration provision. 

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