Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01409/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01409-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
COMAU, INC.
Respondent
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 2012 Decided March 2, 2012

No. 10-1406

COMAU, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with No. 10-1409

On Petition for Review and 

Cross-Application for Enforcement 

of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board

Thomas G. Kienbaum argued the cause for the petitioner. 

Theodore R. Opperwall and Noel D. Massie were on brief.

David Seid, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for the respondent. John H. Ferguson, 

Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate 

General Counsel, and Ruth E. Burdick, Supervisory Attorney, 

were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

USCA Case #10-1409 Document #1361515 Filed: 03/02/2012 Page 1 of 15
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Petitioner 

Comau, Inc. (Comau) seeks review of a decision of the 

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, Board) affirming the 

finding of an administrative law judge (ALJ) that Comau 

committed an unfair labor practice (ULP) in violation of

section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act 

(Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5). See Comau, Inc., 356 

N.L.R.B. No. 21, 2010 WL 4622509 (Nov. 5, 2010). The 

Board filed a cross-application for enforcement. For the 

reasons set forth below, we grant Comau’s petition and vacate 

the Board’s finding that Comau committed a ULP by

unilaterally changing its employees’ healthcare benefits. 

I.

Headquartered outside Detroit, Michigan, Comau designs 

and builds automated assembly lines and specialty tools for 

the automobile industry.1

 Over 200 of Comau’s employees 

are represented by the Automated Systems Workers Local 

1123 (Union, ASW).2

Between January 2008 and December 2008, Comau and 

 The most recent collective bargaining 

agreement between Comau and the Union ran from March 7, 

2005 through March 2, 2008. On the expiration date, the 

parties had not reached a new agreement but they agreed to 

extend the former contract’s terms indefinitely until a 

successor contract was agreed to. The extension was 

terminable on 14 days’ written notice by either party.

 1 Unless otherwise noted, all facts are taken from the ALJ’s 

decision. 

2 At the time the Union filed the underlying charge in this case, 

it was affiliated with the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, 

a unit of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 

America. 

USCA Case #10-1409 Document #1361515 Filed: 03/02/2012 Page 2 of 15
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the Union held more than twenty negotiating sessions over a 

new collective bargaining agreement. Comau General 

Counsel Edward Plawecki and Director of Labor Relations 

Fred Begle were Comau’s chief negotiators; Peter Reuter was 

the Union’s chief negotiator. Early in the negotiations, 

Comau stated that it intended to seek economic concessions 

from the Union and that any new agreement must either be

cost-neutral or reduce Comau’s costs. In particular, Comau 

hoped to reduce its healthcare costs3

The healthcare issue became a sticking point between 

Comau and the ASW. In August 2008, the Union offered to 

insure Union members through a Union sponsored plan 

(Union Plan).

by switching Union

members from a fully paid healthcare plan under which Union

members paid no healthcare costs (Old Plan) to the healthcare 

plan Comau used for non-unionized workers under which 

workers paid monthly premiums (Company Plan). Comau 

wanted a uniform healthcare plan for all of its employees and 

it reached agreements with two other unions representing 

Comau employees to use the Company Plan. Tr. of Hearing 

at 318-19, Comau, Inc., Case No. 7-CA-52106 (NLRB Nov. 

17, 2009) (ALJ) (Hearing Transcript). 

4

 3 Comau’s healthcare costs included providing benefits for 

hospitalization, medical treatment, dental care and vision care.

 Under the Union Plan, Union members would 

pay no premiums and Comau would pay a monthly 

per-employee contribution for each ASW member enrolled in 

the Union Plan. The ASW hoped that the Union Plan would 

allow Comau to reduce its healthcare costs without requiring 

ASW members to pay premiums. Comau was receptive to the 

Union Plan proposal but insisted on a reduction in Comau’s 

healthcare costs as compared to its costs under the Old Plan. 

4 Blue Cross/Blue Shield was the insurance carrier for all three 

plans—the Old Plan, the Company Plan and the Union Plan. 

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One of the cost issues of the Union Plan proposal 

involved who would pay so-called “trailing” or “trailer” costs 

associated with changing from the Old Plan to the Union 

Plan. The Old Plan was a self-insured healthcare plan under 

which Comau paid for each claim as it arose. That is, instead 

of paying its insurance carrier a fixed monthly premium, it 

paid the insurance carrier the cost of healthcare services it in 

fact incurred. Under the Union Plan, Comau would instead

make fixed monthly contributions. If Comau transferred 

Union members to the Union Plan, Comau would continue to 

pay claims for healthcare services provided to Union

members under the Old Plan for approximately three to six 

months after the transfer due to the lag time between when the

claim arose and when the insurance carrier sought payment. 

Thus, during this period, Comau would continue to pay the 

monthly per-employee contribution to the Union Plan and pay 

claims under the Old Plan. The latter payments are the 

trailing or trailer costs. 

After failing to reach an agreement on healthcare benefits 

and other issues, Comau declared impasse on December 3, 

2008, and gave notice that same day to the Union and

separately to Union members that it intended to terminate the 

extension of the former collective bargaining agreement and 

implement its last best offer on December 22, 2008. Comau’s 

last best offer expressly stated that its implementation date 

was December 22, 2008, and the Company Plan was part of

its terms.5

 5 In a two-page letter circulated to Union members on December 

8, 2008, Comau detailed the changes it was implementing as part of 

its last best offer and noted that the transfer to the Company Plan 

would be “effective March 1 of 2009.” Letter from Management to 

ASW Employees at 1 (Dec. 8, 2008). 

 Between December 22, 2008 and March 1, 2009, 

Comau, in consultation with and with assistance from the 

Union, took various steps necessary to roll out the Company 

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Plan, including educating Union members about the 

enrollment options under the Company Plan, enrolling Union

members and arranging for the appropriate payroll 

deductions. 

On the same day it declared impasse, Comau “notifie[d] 

the Union that it [was] prepared to continue negotiations in 

order to agree upon and reach a successor [collective 

bargaining agreement].” Notice of Imposition of Last Best 

Offer (Dec. 3, 2008). Comau and the Union resumed 

negotiations on December 8, 2008. Between December 8 and 

March 1, 2009, the parties met approximately ten times, 

generally with subcommittees focused on the healthcare 

benefits issue. The meetings involved primarily the amount 

Comau would contribute per employee to the proposed Union 

Plan. Over the course of these meetings, the parties grew

closer on Comau’s per-employee contribution and, on 

February 20, 2009, the Union presented a proposal that 

matched Comau’s proposed contribution amount of $835. 

The agreement on Comau’s per-employee contribution did 

not resolve all differences between the parties regarding 

healthcare benefits, however, and the parties remained 

divided over whether to break down the contribution amount 

into different categories depending on an employee’s family 

size, how to adjust Comau’s contribution amount if healthcare 

costs increased and the duration of the agreement. 

As set forth in Comau’s last best offer, the Company Plan 

went into effect on March 1. Nevertheless, on March 20, the 

full bargaining committees of both parties met as they had yet 

to agree on a new collective bargaining agreement. At the 

meeting, Comau proposed that the Union pay all trailing costs 

associated with transitioning to the proposed Union Plan. 

Shortly after Comau made its proposal, the parties adjourned 

the meeting and held no further negotiating sessions. 

Earlier, on March 5, the Union filed its first ULP charge 

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resulting from Comau’s unilateral implementation of its last 

best offer. In a subsequent amendment, the Union amplified 

its charge,

6

Regarding the Employer’s December 22, 2008 

implementation of terms and conditions of 

employment for unit employees represented by the 

Union, the evidence established that the parties were 

at a lawful impasse when the implementation 

occurred.

alleging that on “[a]bout December 22, 2008, 

[Comau] unilaterally changed employees’ terms and 

conditions of employment by implementing its ‘last best 

offer,’ without having reached good-faith impasse.” 

Amended Charge Against Employer, Case No. 7-CA-51886 

(NLRB Mar. 24, 2009). After an investigation, the Board’s 

Regional Director dismissed the charges. The Union

appealed the dismissal. On August 31, 2009, the Board 

General Counsel (General Counsel) denied the appeal, stating 

that:

Letter from Ronald Meisburg, General Counsel, NLRB, to 

Edward J. Pasternak (Aug. 31, 2009) (General Counsel 

Letter).

On May 19, 2009, the Union filed the ULP charge 

against Comau that underlies this case. The second charge 

originally alleged only that Comau had bargained in bad faith 

by having proposed on March 20 that the Union pay trailing 

costs, failed to provide requested financial information and 

refused the Union’s request to continue negotiations. It made 

no mention of Comau’s implementation of the Company Plan. 

 6 In its original charge, the Union alleged that Comau “violated 

[section] 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally implementing changes in 

termination procedures, health benefits and other terms and 

conditions of employment prior to impasse.” Charge Against 

Employer, Case No. 7-CA-51886 (NLRB Mar. 5, 2009). 

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On July 28, 2009, however, the Union amended the second 

charge to include the allegation that Comau “bargained in bad 

faith by . . . [u]nilaterally implementing a new health 

insurance plan about March 1, 2009, in the absence of bona 

fide bargaining impasse.” Amended Charge Against 

Employer, Case No. 7-CA-52016 (NLRB July 28, 2009). The 

Regional Director filed a complaint against Comau based on 

the ASW’s second ULP charge, including its allegation 

regarding the implementation of the Company Plan.

After conducting a hearing, an ALJ concluded that 

Comau’s unilateral implementation of the Company Plan 

constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of section 

8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA.7

II.

 See Comau, Inc., 2010 WL 

3285364 (NLRB May 20, 2010) (ALJ). In reaching his 

conclusion, the ALJ determined that Comau implemented the 

Company Plan on March 1, 2009 and that no impasse existed 

on that date. The Board affirmed, adopting the ALJ’s rulings, 

findings and order with minor exceptions not relevant here. 

See Comau, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 1 & n.5. Comau timely 

filed a petition for review and the Board filed a crossapplication for enforcement. 

“[Our] review of NLRB decisions is deferential” and we 

will vacate a Board decision “only if the Board’s factual 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or the 

Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying 

established law to the facts of the case.” Pirlott v. NLRB, 522 

F.3d 423, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 

 7 The ALJ dismissed the charges that Comau had engaged in 

unfair bargaining by proposing that the Union pay trailing costs and 

by failing to grant its healthcare subcommittee the authority to enter 

into a binding agreement. The Board left the dismissal intact and 

those charges are not before us. 

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citation omitted). “The Board cannot ‘ignore its own relevant 

precedent but must explain why it is not controlling.’ ” 

Manhattan Ctr. Studios, Inc. v. NLRB, 452 F.3d 813, 816

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting B B & L, Inc. v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 366, 

369 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). “Where an agency departs from 

established precedent without a reasoned explanation, its 

decision will be vacated as arbitrary and capricious.” Pirlott, 

522 F.3d at 432 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

The Board concluded that Comau violated section 8(a)(5) 

and (1) of the Act by unilaterally implementing the Company 

Plan on March 1, 2009, at which time Comau and the Union 

were not at impasse. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an 

unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain 

collectively with the representatives of his employees.”8

 29 

U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). An employer violates its duty under 

section 8(a)(5) to bargain collectively with the representative 

of its employees “if, absent a final agreement or a bargaining 

impasse, he unilaterally imposes changes in the terms and 

conditions of employment.”9

If parties reach a bargaining impasse, however, “an 

 TruServ Corp. v. NLRB, 254 

F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

 8 Mandatory areas of collective bargaining include “wages, 

hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 158(d). Comau acknowledges that the healthcare benefits at issue 

are a mandatory area of collective bargaining under the Act. See

Comau, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 8 n.18. 

9 Section 8(a)(1) prohibits an employer from “ ‘interfer[ing] 

with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise’ of their 

statutory right to bargain collectively.” S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. 

NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting 29 

U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)) (brackets added). “A violation of [s]ection 

8(a)(5) is also a violation of [s]ection 8(a)(1).” Id. 

USCA Case #10-1409 Document #1361515 Filed: 03/02/2012 Page 8 of 15
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employer does not violate the [Act] by making unilateral 

changes that are reasonably comprehended within his preimpasse proposals.”10 Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 

86 F.3d 227, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Am. Fed’n of 

Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C.

Cir. 1968)). “The rationale for this rule is that the employer’s

unilateral imposition of the final offer breaks the impasse and 

therefore encourages future collective bargaining. It moves 

the process forward by giving one party, the employer, 

economic leverage.”11

The issue here is not whether an impasse existed: the 

Board does not dispute that an impasse existed on December 

Mail Contractors of Am. v. NLRB, 514 

F.3d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). An impasse must exist at the time an 

employer implements a unilateral change. See Richmond 

Elec. Servs., 348 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1004 (2006) (“if the Union 

broke the bargaining impasse after [the employer declared 

impasse],” employer’s subsequent “unilateral implementation 

of its bargaining proposals would have been unlawful”); Jano 

Graphics Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 251, 251 (2003) (unilateral 

change violates section 8(a)(5) and (1) unless “there was . . .

impasse on . . . the date of . . . unilateral implementation”). 

 10 “A bargaining impasse . . . occurs when good faith 

negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an 

agreement” and “the parties . . . have reached that point of time in 

negotiations when [they] are warranted in assuming that further 

bargaining would be futile.” TruServ Corp., 254 F.3d at 1114

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

11 Once an employer unilaterally implements changes after 

reaching impasse, the changes “become terms and conditions of 

employment that the employer may not unilaterally change without 

first bargaining with the union to impasse.” Cox Ohio Publishing, 

354 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 3 (June 5, 2009). 

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22, 2008,12 and Comau does not contest the Board’s finding 

that no impasse existed on March 1, 2009. Instead, the issue 

is the date on which Comau unilaterally implemented the 

Company Plan: on December 22—when an impasse existed—

or on March 1—when no impasse existed. We think it is 

clear that Comau implemented its last best offer on December 

22. In notices dated December 3, 2008, Comau announced to 

the Union and to the Union members its decision to 

implement its last best offer on December 22. It informed the 

Union that “[Comau] shall impose its last best offer effective 

at 12:02 a.m. on December 22, 2008,” Notice of Imposition of 

Last Best Offer (Dec. 3, 2008), and it also informed ASW 

members that “[e]ffective at 12:02 a.m. on December 22, 

2008, the terms and conditions [of the last best offer] will be 

imposed and will be part of the terms and conditions under 

which you work,” Notice to ASW-Represented Employees 

(Dec. 3, 2008). Moreover, the copy of the last best offer that 

Comau provided the Union and its members expressly recited

that the offer’s “Implementation Date” was “December 22, 

2008.”13

The Company Plan was also unquestionably one of the 

terms and conditions implemented pursuant to Comau’s last 

best offer. Article 10 of the offer specifically addressed 

“Hospitalization, Medical, Dental, and Vision Care” and it 

 Imposed Last Best Offer, Automated Systems 

Workers (ASW) (Dec. 3, 2008) (Imposed Last Best Offer). 

 12 In explaining his rejection of the Union’s first ULP charge 

against Comau, the General Counsel stated that “the evidence 

established that the parties were at a lawful impasse when the 

implementation occurred [on December 22, 2008].” General 

Counsel Letter.

13 Regarding the Union’s first ULP charge filed on March 5, the 

General Counsel had likewise noted Comau’s “December 22, 2008 

implementation of terms and conditions of employment for [ASW 

members].” General Counsel Letter.

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provided details about the Company Plan such as premium 

amounts and available coverage for dependents. Imposed 

Last Best Offer at 21-28. Article 10.09 was entitled “Blue 

Cross Medical Coverage Plans (Effective March 1, 2009)”

and it provided that “[a]ll regular full time ASW employees 

who have been with [Comau] ninety (90) days or more will be 

eligible to elect medical coverage under the plans [available 

pursuant to Company Plan].” Id. at 23-24. 

In its notice to ASW members dated December 8, Comau 

informed them that, while some changes in its last best offer 

were “effective December 22, 2008,” “the effective date of 

[the] change [to the Company Plan] will be March 1 of 2009.” 

Letter from Management to ASW Employees at 1 (Dec. 8, 

2008). Despite the different “effective” dates, Comau was 

clear that the changes were “being implemented” as part of its 

last best offer, which, as noted above, expressly provided for 

implementation on December 22, 2008. Id. The different

“effective” dates merely reflected the fact that the mechanics 

of transferring ASW members from the Old Plan to the 

Company Plan required extensive preparation. As the ALJ 

found, between December 2008 and March 1, 2009, Comau 

was required to take “a number of steps to make it possible to 

switch the unit employees from [the Old Plan] to the 

[Company Plan].” See Comau, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 4. 

Despite the required additional steps and the parties’

continued negotiations after December 22, Comau was 

explicit that it was implementing the Company Plan—along 

with the other terms contained in its last best offer—on 

December 22. Even Peter Reuter, the Union’s chief 

negotiator, recognized that the required delay in the Company 

Plan’s effective date did not alter the implementation date of 

the change. At the hearing before the ALJ, he testified that 

because “the health insurance changes contained in Comau’s 

12/22/08 implemented offer had an effective date of 3/1/09,” 

Comau and the Union continued bargaining on healthcare 

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changes “between implementation and 3/1/09.” Hearing 

Transcript at 193-94.

Based on these facts, we conclude that the change to the 

Company Plan was “reasonably comprehended” in Comau’s

last best offer and that Comau unilaterally implemented the

offer—including the change to the Company Plan—on 

December 22, 2008. See Brooks Bros., 261 N.L.R.B. 876, 

881-83 (1982) (employer “implement[ed] . . . a program of 

dental insurance immediately before [a] November 21 [union] 

election” even though program was not “effective [until] 

January 1”); cf. NLRB v. Plainville Ready Mix Concrete Co., 

44 F.3d 1320, 1333-34 & n.11 (6th Cir. 1995) (if employer 

presents negotiating proposal “as a comprehensive, integrated 

whole,” it is “reasonably comprehended” proposal “[will] be 

implemented in its entirety”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, the Board’s finding that Comau 

committed a ULP when it unilaterally implemented the 

Company Plan was “arbitrary and capricious” because all 

parties agree that Comau and the Union were at impasse on 

December 22. Mail Contractors of Am., 514 F.3d at 34-36 

(Board’s finding that employer committed ULP by 

unilaterally implementing change after impasse “was arbitrary 

and capricious”). “[A]n employer does not violate the [Act] 

by making unilateral changes that are reasonably 

comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals” once the 

parties reach impasse. Serramonte Oldsmobile, 86 F.3d at 

232; see also Cox Ohio Publishing, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 3 

(“It is well settled that after bargaining to an impasse . . . an 

employer does not violate the Act by making unilateral 

changes that are reasonably comprehended within his preimpasse proposals.” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted; ellipsis in original)). 

The Board’s contrary conclusion results from its finding 

that Comau did not “implement” the Company Plan until it

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“became effective” on March 1, 2009. The Board adopted the 

ALJ’s reasoning, including his “point of no return” 

phraseology that “[a] change in terms of employment cannot 

reasonably be viewed as ‘implemented’ for unit employees at 

a time when that change is not being applied to a single one of 

those employees and the employer has not passed a ‘point of 

no return’ committing it to making the change at all.” 

Comau, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 10. According to the ALJ, 

“what [Comau] did in December 2008 regarding healthcare 

amounted to an announcement of intent to implement the 

[Company] [P]lan on March 1—not the implementation of 

such a plan.” Id. The Board takes the same position before 

us. See Respondent’s Br. 29. Earlier Board decisions, 

however, recognize that an employer can implement a change

in employment terms and conditions before the change is 

effective or otherwise “being applied to a single one of [its] 

employees.” See ABC Auto. Prods., Corp., 307 N.L.R.B. 248, 

249-50 (1992) (“the unilateral change was effectively 

implemented when it was announced” even though 

announcement occurred four days before change became 

effective); Brooks Bros., 261 N.L.R.B. at 881-83; cf. Daily 

News of L.A., 315 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1237-38 (1994) 

(“[W]henever the employer by promises or by a course of 

conduct has made a particular benefit part of the established 

wage or compensation system, then he is not at liberty

unilaterally to change this benefit either for better or worse 

during . . . the period of collective bargaining.” (emphasis 

added)). 

The ALJ, whose reasoning and supporting authority the 

Board adopted without amplification, relied on two cases—

Bryant & Stratton Business Institute, 327 N.L.R.B. 1135 

(1999), and PRC Recording Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 615 (1986)—

to support his “point of no return” theory but neither does so. 

In PRC Recording Co., the Board found that assuming 

arguendo an impasse existed, it was “instantaneously broken 

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by the continuation of further bargaining” and therefore did 

not justify the employer’s “initiation” of a change that it kept 

secret both from the union and from its employees. 280 

N.L.R.B. at 640 (emphasis added). In Bryant & Stratton, the 

ALJ concluded that an employer “stat[ing] that it ‘intends’ to 

implement [a change]” at a future date is different from the 

employer “say[ing] that the [change] was implemented 

immediately.” 327 N.L.R.B. at 1149 (emphasis added). 

Neither case suggests that a unilateral change can be 

“implemented” only when it becomes “effective.” And, 

importantly, neither suggests that a change not entirely

effective on implementation must pass through stages of 

implementation until it reaches a stage of irreversibility before 

the Board will sanction it. And as the Board’s counsel

conceded at oral argument, “no . . . specific case” supports the 

ALJ’s “point of no return” articulation. See Oral Argument

Tr. at 24-25.14

Moreover, the Board’s application of the “point of no 

return” test would lead to an arbitrary outcome at odds with 

the purpose of the Act. For example, as Comau points out, if 

an employer implemented a last best offer providing for wage 

increases at set future intervals, the “point of no return” 

analysis, carried to its logical conclusion, would suggest that 

the employer could later rescind the promised wage increases 

if bargaining resumed in the interim. After all, wage 

increases due to take place in the future are no more “past the 

point of no return” than a new health insurance plan set to 

take effect at some future date. 

 14 Indeed, once implementation is announced, imposing a “point 

of no return” condition could undermine the purpose of impasse by 

negating the employer’s “economic leverage” during the time 

needed to effect the change and thus inhibit its ability to “break[] 

the impasse and . . . encourage[] future collective bargaining.” Mail 

Contractors of Am., 514 F.3d at 31-32. 

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The ALJ, however, attempted to distinguish the two 

situations but we find his reasoning wholly unpersuasive. He 

cited Daily News to support his proposition that “if [an] 

employer has implemented [a] new wage plan” under which 

“raises . . . will not be triggered until later dates,” “it has 

passed the point of no return and cannot simply choose to 

ignore its obligation to provide the raises when the triggering 

dates arrive.” Comau, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 10 n.21 

(emphasis added). The ALJ is of course correct that if an 

employer implements such a plan, it cannot withhold future 

pay raises. But he assumes the answer to the underlying 

question at the heart of this case: namely, when does an 

employer implement a change? If a change is considered 

implemented only when it becomes effective, then promised 

wage increases would never be safe from future rescission—a 

result the ALJ refused to countenance. If, on the other hand, 

the new wage plan can be considered “implemented” even if 

specific pay raises “will not be triggered” until some future 

date, id., then there is no reason for treating the Company 

Plan at issue in this case any differently. In other words, the 

ALJ’s own reasoning with respect to the wage-plan 

hypothetical compels the conclusion that Comau’s healthcare 

plan was fully “implemented” on December 22, 2008, 

nothwithstanding the later “triggering date[]” for its specific 

healthcare changes. Id. 

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Comau’s petition for 

review and deny the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement.15

So ordered.

 

 15 Given our decision, we do not reach Comau’s other claims 

regarding the binding effect of the General Counsel’s findings and 

the scope of the Board’s remedy. 

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