Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01145/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Shockey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 6, 2016

Decided August 16, 2016

Before

No. 16‐1145

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY SHOCKEY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division.

No. 3:15CR16‐001

Robert L. Miller, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

Anthony Shockey appeals his within‐Guidelines, 40‐month sentence for

possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He had sought a sentence below the

Guidelines because in his view alcoholism was the root cause of his lengthy criminal

history and with treatment he would be unlikely to commit more crimes. The district

court rejected this argument and instead sentenced him at the high end of the Guidelines

range because there was no evidence that he would remain sober and his alcoholism

made him more likely to reoffend. Shockey now contends, contrary to the evidence in

the record, that the district court failed to address his argument regarding his

alcoholism. We affirm.

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Shockey sold a stolen rifle to a confidential informant while police officers

watched and listened nearby. He pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as a

felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).   

A probation officer calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’

imprisonment based on an offense level of 13 and a criminal‐history category of VI.

Shockey’s criminal history dated back to 1978 and included 28 separate convictions, 8 of

which received criminal‐history points. The convictions receiving points were for

marijuana possession, attempted escape from prison, two instances of battery resulting

in injury, and four alcohol‐related driving offenses. Shockey did not object to these

calculations.

The presentence report also recounted Shockey’s history of alcohol abuse.

Shockey, now 54, started drinking at age 14 to cope with depression and anxiety and by

age 16 was using alcohol daily. He described himself as a “binge drinker,” consuming

20 to 30 beers per night, multiple times each week. He reported becoming violent when

he drank. He sought treatment for his substance abuse twice, first in 1987 and again in

2006, but he continued drinking until his arrest in this case in February 2015. He

reported receiving mental‐health treatment throughout his life, most recently in 2012

and 2013.

Shockey argued before the district court that his struggle with alcohol abuse

warranted a lower sentence. He contended, first, that his criminal history was overstated

because many of his crimes stemmed from his alcoholism (in the words of his lawyer, he

“gets drunk and . . . does stupid things”) rather than malice or a violent propensity.

Second, he asserted that he was less likely to reoffend than in the past because he had

started taking medication for the mental‐health conditions underlying his alcohol abuse.

Finally, he insisted that addiction is involuntary and that imprisonment would not deter

alcohol abuse or “alcoholic crimes.”

The district court acknowledged Shockey’s alcoholism but rejected the argument

that it should be treated as a mitigating factor. The court believed that “anger issues”

also contributed to Shockey’s criminal past. The court thought that Shockey’s criminal

history might even be understated given the number of convictions that received no

points. Though the court agreed that Shockey would be less likely to reoffend if he could

manage his addiction, the court doubted that his 29th criminal conviction was any more

likely than the previous 28 to curb his alcoholism, given that he had received

mental‐health treatment only two years before committing this crime. The current crime,

the court added, had nothing to do with alcohol. The court further noted that Shockey

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committed this crime while he was serving home detention from a prior crime. Based on

Shockey’s “lengthy criminal record and lengthy history of substance abuse,” the court

found him “far more likely than the average offender to commit future crimes.” A

below‐Guidelines sentence, the court concluded, was “too short to reflect [his] history

and the risk that [he] pose[d] to others.” Near the close of the hearing, the judge asked

Shockey’s counsel whether he had “touched on each of the points that [counsel] raised,”

and counsel replied, “yes.”

On appeal Shockey first argues that the district court procedurally erred by not

addressing his mitigating argument regarding alcoholism. He asserts that the court

“engaged in no analysis” and “brushed off” the argument with one sentence about his

criminal history. But a defendant waives any challenge to the court’s consideration of

mitigating arguments if defense counsel confirms when asked that he is satisfied with

the court’s explanation—as was the case here. See United States v. Cruz, 787 F.3d 849, 850

(7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2013).

Shockey replies that there is no waiver because the court’s question was “a far cry from

asking whether the defense is satisfied that the court has actually addressed the main

defense arguments.” Although generic questions (e.g., “Anything else?”) will not suffice

for waiver, see United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2016), challenges to a

failure to address arguments in mitigation are waived as long as it is clear, as here, that

defense counsel understood the court to be asking whether he was satisfied with its

explanation, see United States v. Rosales, 813 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v.

Modjewski, 783 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2015) (argument waived where court stated: “[I]f

you feel that there was something that I needed to address specifically, . . . I would be

happy to do so.”).   

Even if the argument had not been waived, it is frivolous and misrepresents the

record. The district court acknowledged and rejected Shockey’s mitigating argument

with a lengthy explanation that alcohol addiction increased the likelihood of reoffending

and did not excuse his extensive criminal history. This explanation was more than

enough to reflect that the court meaningfully considered his argument. See United States

v. Jones, 798 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Boatman, 786 F.3d 590, 595–96

(7th Cir. 2015).

Shockey also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

court neither addressed his mitigating argument nor properly weighed the factors under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But Shockey’s within‐Guidelines sentence is presumptively

reasonable, and “[t]o sustain the presumption, a district court need provide only a

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justification for its sentence adequate to allow for meaningful appellate review and to

promote the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 585

(7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pilon, 734 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2013)). Shockey

has not rebutted this presumption. The district court addressed the § 3553(a) factors

when it noted that a “circumstance” of the crime was that Shockey committed it while

serving home detention for another crime and explained that Shockey’s long history of

crime and alcohol addiction made him more likely to reoffend and thus warranted a

longer sentence to protect the public. See United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 988–89

(7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “criminals addicted to drugs are at risk for recidivism

induced by their need to feed their habit” and “anything that increases the risk of

recidivism argues for a longer sentence”); United States v. Ramirez‐Gutierrez, 503 F.3d 643,

646–47 (7th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

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