Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cr-00228/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cr-00228-16/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benjamin John Martin
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BENJAMIN JOHN MARTIN,

Defendant.

No. 1:21-cr-00228 NODJ BAM

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO 

DISMISS

(Docs. 75, 76)

Benjamin Martin was identified by FBI agents as being present at and in the United States 

Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, during the riots occurring in and around that building.

Consequently, the Court issued a warrant to search Martin’s home and to seize items related to his 

travel to and conduct at the Capitol. Because of the search, Martin was charged with a violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). (Doc. 11)

He now moves the Court to suppress the firearms that the government seized from his 

home. (Doc. 75) In addition, Mr. Martin contends that the action should be dismissed because 18 

USC § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional. Because the Court determines the officers had probable

cause to seize the firearms and because the Court finds § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, the motions

are DENIED. 

I. Factual Background

Before the officers searched Martin’s home, they were aware that he was precluded from 

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possessing firearms and planned to obtain a rollover warrant if they found any such weapons. 

(Doc. 80-2 at 1-2) During the search, the agents found items in Martin’s closet consistent with 

gun ownership, including “a Benelli gun case, a pistol case, paperwork confirming Martin’s 

purchase of a Benelli shotgun and two firearm stocks/lower receivers.” Id. at 2. The agents also 

found a locked gun safe in Martin’s garage. Id. The agents decided to search the safe because due 

to its size, items covered by the search warrant could be found inside. Id. In the safe, the agents 

found firearms, including four rifles, two shotguns, including a Benelli 12-gauge shotgun, an 

assault rifle, a Kimber 1911 pistol, Martin’s passport, a birth certificate for Martin’s son, and a 

vehicle title in Martin’s name, among other documents. (Doc. 76-1 at 8-9) Because the agents 

understood that Martin was prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms, they removed 

the firearms from the safe and began processing the firearms as evidence. (Doc. 80-2 at 2) The 

agents examined the Benelli shotgun and the Kimber pistol to gather relevant information to 

assist in verifying that they were manufactured outside of California. (Doc. 75 at 4-5)

In the meanwhile, in consultation with the United States Attorney’s Offices in the District 

of Columbia and the Eastern District of California, the FBI agent sought an opinion from an agent 

from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as to the location of manufacture for the 

Benelli shotgun and the Kimber pistol, using the information gained from examining them. (Doc. 

80-2 at 2) The ATF agent opined that the weapons were manufactured outside of California. Id. 

In the affidavit supporting the issuance of a rollover warrant, the agent reported this 

information and that Martin had suffered “a 2018 domestic violence-related misdemeanor battery 

conviction in the Superior Court of Fresno County with Case Number Fl8901304. As a result of 

that conviction, MARTIN was placed on probation through January 10, 2022, with a condition 

that he not possess firearms. A further review of MARTIN’s criminal history showed that he is 

also subject to a temporary restraining order that prohibits him from possessing firearms.” (Doc. 

76-1 at 9) The Court issued a search warrant allowing the seizure of firearms, magazines, 

ammunition, firearms stocks and evidence of ownership and possession of firearms and 

ammunition. Id. at 2-15. Consequently, the agents seized the pistol, the rifles, the AR-15, 

ammunition, magazines, including five, high-capacity magazines, in addition to sites, scopes and 

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other firearm equipment and the receipt indicating that the defendant purchased the Benelli 

shotgun. (Search Warrant Return in case number 1:21-sw-00292 EPG) 

Following the seizure, Martin was arrested on a warrant issued with a criminal complaint 

charging him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). (Doc. 1) The grand jury indicted Martin 

on this charge soon thereafter and the indictment alleged that he was in possession of the Benelli 

shotgun, the Kimber pistol and “one round of Santa Barbara 7.62 X 51 mm ammunition.” (Doc. 

11)

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The Fourth Amendment states, “(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “search” occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment if the police 

seek information by intruding on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy or by means of 

trespassing upon one’s person, house, papers, or effects. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5

(2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5; El-Nahal v. Yassky, 835 F.3d 248, 253–54 

(2d Cir. 2016). 

The law is established that when officers encounter evidence of a new crime during the 

execution of a search warrant, they may seize the evidence under the plain view doctrine if the 

items are “immediately incriminating.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 142 (1990). 

The question raised in this motion is whether the officers could seize the firearms despite that

they could not be certain whether the firearms had traveled in interstate commerce without 

picking them up and examining them.

There is no dispute that the firearms at issue were within plain view once the officers 

opened the gun safe nor that they were entitled to open the safe under the terms of the original 

search warrant. At the time the agents removed the firearms from the gun safe, they “understood” 

that the firearms represented evidence of a federal crime (Doc. 80-2 at 2) and the opinion of the 

ATF agent, confirmed their understanding. This is sufficient. “By requiring that the incriminatory 

nature of the evidence be “immediately apparent,” the doctrine does not require that the officer 

“be possessed of near certainty as to the seizable nature of the items.” United States v. Hudson, 

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100 F.3d 1409, 1420 (9th Cir. 1996) quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741, (1983). “Instead, 

probable cause “is a flexible, common-sense standard,” requiring only that “the facts available to 

the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that certain items may be 

contraband ... or useful evidence of a crime.” Id. at 741–42, 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Carroll v. 

United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).” Hudson at 1420 (9th

Cir. 1996).

1 Thus, the fact that the officers were not certain that the firearms had traveled in 

interstate commerce when they opened the safe, does not mean that they could not seize the 

firearms. 

In addition, the subsequent search warrant was supported by probable cause to seize the 

firearms. The Fourth Amendment requires that the search warrant be based on “probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Thus, there must be probable cause 

to believe the evidence sought would assist in finding or convicting a particular defendant for a 

particular offense. Bill v. Brewer, 799 F.3d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Dalia v. United 

States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)). The issuing judge need only find under “‘the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit before him...a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.’” United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 240 (1983), 462 U.S. at 238); Warden, Md. 

Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). As noted above, the affidavit reported the key 

facts upon which the court could determine that Martin had committed a crime and that the items 

to be seized would assist in the prosecution of that crime. This is sufficient.

An accused person may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. 

Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 341 (1974); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h). When deciding a motion to 

suppress, courts first determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, and then 

1 On the other hand, a “seizure” of personal property occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment if the 

police meaningfully interfere with an individual’s possessory interests in that property. See United States 

v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, (1984); United States v. Iverson, 897 F.3d 450, 458 (2d Cir. 2018). Merely 

picking up the firearms to gather information needed to rule out that they had been manufactured in the 

state, did not meaningfully interfere with Martin’s possessory interests.

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whether suppression is appropriate. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–39 (2011). The 

burden is on the accused to show that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 

challenged search or seizure to have standing to challenge the admission of evidence. Simmons v. 

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1968). Because the Court does not find that Martin’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were violated, the motion to suppress is DENIED.

A. No Franks hearing is warranted

Mr. Martin seeks a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 

He argues that the affiant for the rollover warrant recklessly failed to indicate in the affidavit that 

the “other firearms may have been made in California” such that “it encouraged the U.S. 

Magistrate Judge to permit the seizure of evidence without probable cause for a federal crime.” 

(Doc. 75 at 7) However, the affidavit expressly noted the firearms and ammunition found in the 

gun safe and asserted only that the Benelli shotgun and the Kimber pistol were manufactured 

outside of California. (Doc. 76-1 at 8-9) The affiant made no representations about the origin of 

the four rifles or the assault rifle. Id. at 8. The Court finds that the failure of the affiant to state 

that he did not know the origin of the rifles or the assault rifle was neither false nor misleading. 

Likewise, there is no showing that this omission was necessary to the finding of probable cause. 

Consequently, no Franks hearing is warranted, and the request is DENIED.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Second Amendment protects 

the “individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. 

v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). Martin contends that the indictment should be dismissed because 

it funs afoul of the Second Amendment. Martin argues that, under Bruen, “When the Second 

Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects 

that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is 

consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. at 24. There is no 

dispute that the firearms at issue were in Martin’s home and no dispute that except for § 

922(g)(9), he would be entitled to possess a firearm for any lawful purpose. Thus, Martin argues 

that because the government has failed to demonstrate a sufficiently analogous historical 

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analogue for disarming those who engage in acts of spousal battery, which were prosecuted as 

misdemeanors, § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional. The Court disagrees. 

The parties agree that “[o]n the one hand, courts should not “uphold every modern law 

that remotely resembles a historical analogue,” because doing so “risk[s] endorsing outliers that 

our ancestors would never have accepted.” Drummond v. Robinson, 9 F.4th 217, 226 (CA3 2021). 

On the other hand, analogical reasoning requires only that the government identify a wellestablished and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day 

regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass 

constitutional muster.” Bruen, at 30. Where they don’t agree is the similarity between § 

922(g)(9)’s provisions and the circumstances under which our history disarmed people.2

As the government points out, courts across the nation have considered the 

constitutionality of § 922(g) and it cites to many of those cases. (Doc. 79 at 8) For example, in

United States v. Jackson, 622 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1066–67 (W.D. Okla. 2022), the court observed,

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence” as defined § 921(a)(33), from possessing a firearm, even for a lawful purpose

such as self-defense. Because the Second Amendment presumptively protects the 

proscribed conduct, the government must establish that the statute is consistent with a 

historical tradition of firearm regulation. The government attempts to do so with broad 

arguments that do not address a history of firearm possession by domestic violence 

offenders. The government instead relies on restrictions historically imposed on felons 

and adopts the analogy to surety laws discussed in Bruen. See Suppl. Resp. Br. at 5-6.

This approach is understandable. Legal scholars have commented on the paucity of 

evidence that American traditions reached within the home to interfere with domestic 

relationships, particularly the marital relationship. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Domestic

Violence and the Home-Centric Second Amendment, 27 Duke J. of Gender Law & Policy 

45, 55-56 (2020) (“In the context of domestic violence prohibitions, the historical record 

is problematic to say the least.”); Carolyn B. Ramsey, Firearms in the Family, 78 Ohio St. 

L.J. 1257, 1301 (2017) (“Historical support for the exclusion of domestic violence 

offenders from Second Amendment protection appears rather thin.”). Indeed, in the 

United States, the common law recognized until the mid-1800's a “right of chastisement” 

that allowed husbands to inflict corporal punishment on their wives. See Blocher, supra, at 

56 (citing Mary Anne Franks, The Cult of the Constitution, 77 (2018); Reva B. Siegel, 

2 The Court refers to “people” though, of course, historically any property a woman had at the time of her 

marriage became that of her husband. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative 

and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2122 (1996)). Thus, disarming women could not have been within the 

contemplation of the ordinary citizen at the making of our Constitution. Notably, as noted in Jackson, this

law review article talks about the “right of chastisement” of a wife by her husband, which allowed the 

husband to beat his wife even if only to “gratify his own bad passions.” Thus, clearly, history had a 

different view of what constitutes domestic violence than we have today.

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“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2121-

41 (1996)).

Despite a desire for greater specificity, the Court finds that the government's reliance on 

general historical tradition is sufficient to satisfy its burden to justify the firearm 

regulation of § 922(g)(9). Bruen teaches that the “historical inquiry that courts must 

conduct will often involve reasoning by analogy” and “determining whether a historical 

regulation is proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a 

determination of whether the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 

2132. The Court identified “two metrics” that would render regulations relevantly similar 

under the Second Amendment: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding 

citizen's right to armed self-defense.” Id. at 2132-33. If one accepts the dictum in Heller

on which courts have repeatedly relied, a “longstanding prohibition” supported by 

historical tradition is one “on the possession of firearms by felons.” See Heller, 554 U.S. 

at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Domestic violence misdemeanants can logically be viewed as 

“relevantly similar to felons” who should be “denied weapons for the same reasons.” See

Blocher, supra, at 56. To be sure, if numerous nonviolent felony offenses carry the 

resultant prohibition on gun possession, it would be incongruous to give different 

treatment to misdemeanants convicted of a violent offense, including domestic violence.

Notably, the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the reach of § 922(g)(9) without 

questioning its constitutionality. Most recently, in Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 

692, 136 S.Ct. 2272, 195 L.Ed.2d 736 (2016), the Court held that the statute applies to a 

misdemeanant who was convicted under an assault statute that encompasses “reckless” 

conduct. In that case, Justice Thomas opined in dissent that the majority's construction of 

the statute rendered it unconstitutional, but no other justice joined this part of his opinion 

or endorsed this view. See id. at 715, 136 S.Ct. 2272 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Under the 

circumstances currently presented, where the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Bruen on longstanding criminal prohibitions such as § 922(g) remains unclear, this Court 

declines to hold that § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment. 

Likewise, in United States v. Donahue, 2023 WL 4372706, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2023), the

court held,

Here, an analogy can be drawn between Section 922(g)(9) and founding-era legislation 

that disarmed people who were deemed dangerous. The prohibition of possession of 

firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants, and other groups identified as dangerous, 

is supported by history. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment

Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1187, 

1239 (2015) (“[H]istory suggests that when the legislature restricts the possession of 

firearms by discrete classes of individuals reasonably regarded as posing an elevated risk 

for firearms violence, prophylactic regulations of this character should be sustained.”); 

Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. 

Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1377 (2009) (citing historical 

examples for the proposition that “any person viewed as potentially dangerous could be 

disarmed by the government without running afoul of the ‘right to bear arms.’ ”).

The historical record reflects significant regulation of firearms designed to ensure public 

safety and responsible gun ownership. In the founding era, firearms “could be required to 

be registered,” gun owners could be required to undergo training, and the law could 

mandate storage requirements for “firearms and gun powder.” United States v. Nutter, 624 

F.Supp.3d 636, 641 (S.D. W. Va. 2022) (citing Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 

UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1562–63 (2009)). Finally, founding era laws prohibited bearing arms 

in a way that spread “fear” or “terror” among the people. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ––––, 142 

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S.Ct. at 2145. “In sum, founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed groups whom 

they judged to be a threat to the public safety.” Nutter, 624 F.Supp.3d at 643 (citing 

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 458 (7th Cir. 2019), abrogated by Bruen, 597 U.S. ––––, 

142 S.Ct. 2111 (Barrett, J., dissenting)). When Section 922(g)(9) was enacted, Congress 

deemed those convicted of domestic violence as dangerous, and “that conclusion is well 

supported by empirical evidence and statistics regarding domestic violence, recidivism by 

those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, and increased risks of 

serious harm and death posed when firearms are present in connection with domestic 

violence.” Id. (citing United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 161–67 (4th Cir. 2011)). 

Therefore, through analogy, Section 922(g)(9) is consistent with the Nation's historical 

tradition of firearm regulation.

Because the Court agrees with the rationale of these cases and it can add little to the 

analysis offered by the courts analyzing the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), the Court finds that § 

922(g)(9) is not unconstitutional and the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Notably, in issuing this ruling, the Court will not consider the declaration offered by Mr. 

Cramer and submitted with Martin’s reply3. The defense has made no effort to meet the 

requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 592, 593-94

(1993), in proffering this declaration. Because Mr. Cramer “does not show his work,” there is no 

way for the Court to determine whether his methods have been or can be tested, and it amounts to 

“Trust me, I am an expert.”

For example, Mr. Cramer omits reference, without explanation, to numerous criminal 

cases related to domestic violence cited in the law review articles cited here and, in the authorities 

quoted above. There is no demonstration that Mr. Cramer’s work has been peer-reviewed. The

fact that his publications have been cited by judges is not the same thing as having them reviewed 

by his peers who are trained in the appropriate methodological study of history. Absent this type 

of review, the Court is left with no basis to understand the significance of Mr. Cramer’s assertions

or the quality or completeness of his research. 

Indeed, Mr. Cramer does not provide a curriculum vitae and, instead, notes only that he 

has a “M.A. in History” and that he “teach[es] history at the College of Western Idaho.” (Doc. 85-

1 at 2) Though interesting, this fails to demonstrate that Mr. Cramer has sufficient qualification to 

3 Even if it considered Mr. Cramer’s declaration, the outcome here would not change, because he does not 

address the findings of his peers set forth in the law review articles cited here, which demonstrate that 

domestic violence was largely ignored, considered to be best handled within the family or was addressed 

by the church.

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meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 701 as to the relevant topic. The Court 

attempted to locate Mr. Cramer’s qualifications by accessing the link he included in his 

declaration. The link directed the Court to a list of articles he has written and a link to his 

webpage, which provides information on a score of topics including homeschooling, personal 

finance, astrophotography and more. (Doc. 85-1 at 2) Thus, the Court received no further clarity

as to Mr. Cramer’s qualifications. For the reasons set forth, the declaration is disregarded.4

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS:

1. Defendant’s motion to suppress (Doc. 75) is DENIED. 

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 76) is DENIED.

3. The Court sets a status conference before Judge McAuliffe on February 14, 2024 at 1:00 

p.m.5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2024 

4 Though counsel indicated at the hearing that the Sacramento location of the Federal Defender’s Office 

files its Bruen motions in this manner—waiting until its reply to file its historical evidence—the Court has 

not found been able to locate even a single case in which this has occurred.

5The parties may stipulate to a different date with a time exclusion.

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