Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05019/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sepedra Harrison
Appellant
Robert E. Rubin
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 29, 1999 Decided May 7, 1999

No. 98-5019

Sepedra Harrison,

Appellant

v.

Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury,

United States Department of the Treasury,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv02256)

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Eric M. Jaffe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, Mark E. Nagle and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Appealing the dismissal of her employment discrimination case, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to

amend her complaint to correct an erroneous statutory citation. She also argues that the district court erred in finding

her claims of race discrimination and retaliation barred by a

settlement agreement. We agree with appellant regarding

the motion to amend: Absent evidence of prejudice, delay--

the only reason given by the district court--cannot justify

denying a motion to amend to clarify the legal basis for a

complaint. Unable to assess on appeal the extrinsic evidence

necessary to determine precisely which administrative complaint and which incidents were in fact covered by the settlement agreement, we reverse the dismissal of appellant's Title

VII claims and remand to the district court for further

proceedings.

I

Appellant Sepedra Harrison, an African-American female

employee of the Internal Revenue Service, began working in

1991 as a secretary for Michael Sincavage, the Chief of the

Office of Disclosure. In 1992, she filed a complaint with the

agency's EEO office, alleging that she had been passed over

for a promotion in favor of a less experienced white woman.

Several months later, while Harrison's complaint was pending, Sincavage detailed her to the Tax Check Unit where,

according to Harrison, the work was more stressful and her

mental and physical health began to deteriorate. She claims

that although she made her health problems known to Sincavage and others and repeatedly a requested a transfer out of

the Tax Check Unit, the agency refused until she was "forced

to the point of a breakdown." Complaint p 19. Yet nonminority employees suffering similar health problems, she says,

were transferred immediately.

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In informal and formal EEO complaints, Harrison alleged

that during her detail to the Tax Check Unit, as well as after

her September 1993 transfer back to the Office of Disclosure,

Sincavage and others harassed her, threatened to discipline

her, and subjected her to discriminatory working conditions.

Under IRS EEO procedures, before the agency will accept a

formal complaint for investigation, an employee must file an

informal complaint; informal complaints require "informal

pre-complaint EEO counseling." Dep't of the Treasury, Individual Complaint of Employment Discrimination (notice on

form).

Exactly how many formal and informal complaints Harrison filed during this period and precisely what they alleged is

not at all clear. Her affidavit and interrogatory answers

refer to a September 20 informal complaint, which became

formal on November 22, and a December 1 informal complaint, which apparently concerned retaliation for making the

first complaint formal. Yet Harrison's reply brief accuses the

government of "erroneously" stating that she filed EEO

complaints on November 22 and December 1 (the same dates

mentioned in her own affidavit and interrogatory answers).

And Harrison's reply brief mentions for the first time a

November 15 informal complaint.

Because of the confusion about Harrison's administrative

complaints, and because only the November 15 complaint was

included in the record, we asked the parties at oral argument

to give us copies of all relevant complaints. In response, they

submitted the September 20 informal complaint, the November 22 formal complaint, and another copy of the November

15 informal complaint. However, they did not submit a

December 1 complaint, even though they had repeatedly

referred to one, or a pre-November 15 formal complaint, even

though the November 15 complaint alleges retaliation for

having filed an earlier formal complaint.

While Harrison's various complaints were being investigated, the IRS and Harrison signed a settlement agreement

dated January 6, 1994. Titled "Precomplaint Agreement in

the Discrimination Complaint of Sepedra E. Harrison," the

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agreement does not indicate which complaints or incidents it

resolves. It provides simply: "It is hereby agreed by the

undersigned representative for the Internal Revenue Service

and Sepedra E. Harrison that the following constitutes a full

and complete settlement of the alleged issue of discriminated

[sic] based on Race, Sex and Retaliation." Precomplaint

Agreement in the Discrimination Complaint of Sepedra E.

Harrison 1 (Jan. 6, 1994). In return for Harrison's promise

"[n]ot to pursue the matter, which is stated above, in the

EEO informal or formal process" and "[n]ot to institute any

further legal, equitable and/or administrative appeals on the

matter(s) raised," id., the agency agreed to transfer Harrison

to another position in the IRS's EEO and Diversity Office.

Following that transfer, the agency's EEO office processed

Harrison's November 22 formal complaint, eventually dismissing it because it "concerns the same matters that were

the subject of another complaint that was settled." Letter

from Michael Morgan-Gaide, Director, Regional Complaint

Center, Department of the Treasury, to Gregory L. Lattimer,

Attorney for Sepedra Harrison (Sept. 11, 1995).

Harrison then filed suit in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia. Count one of her complaint

alleged that the agency's delay in transferring her violated

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. s 12101 et seq.

(1994). Count two alleged that the delay in granting her a

transfer amounted to disparate treatment in violation of Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e et seq. Count three alleged that the

agency retaliated against her for filing the EEO complaints,

also in violation of Title VII. The retaliation count alleged,

among other things, a physical assault that Harrison claims

occurred the day after the settlement agreement was signed.

See 12/16/97 Tr. at 3-4 (quoting Harrison's statement that

Sincavage reached across his desk and grabbed her wrist as

she was moving files from the office).

The IRS moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that the ADA does not apply to noncongressional federal

workers, that the settlement agreement covered all of Harrison's Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims, and that

Harrison failed to state a cause of action based on the alleged

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assault or to exhaust her administrative remedies for that

claim. Harrison responded that she had mistakenly cited the

ADA and sought leave to amend the complaint to allege that

her disability discrimination claim actually arose under the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. s 791 (1994). Opposing

dismissal of her Title VII claims, Harrison submitted an

affidavit stating that the settlement agreement settled not all

of her EEO complaints, but only one informal "precomplaint"

that "addressed specific retaliatory actions that had occurred

from the time of [the] filing of the November 22 formal

complaint and November 30, 1993." Harrison Aff. p 2. She

also argued that the settlement agreement could not bar her

claims regarding the alleged assault because the assault had

not occurred until after she signed the agreement.

The district court, finding it "too late in the process for

Plaintiff to amend her complaint," granted the government's

motion to dismiss her ADA claim. See Harrison v. Rubin,

No. 95-2256 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1997) ("District Court Order").

Finding Harrison's retaliation and discrimination claims

barred by the settlement agreement, the court dismissed the

remaining counts. See id. Harrison appeals both orders.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires that leave to

file an amended complaint "shall be freely given when justice

so requires." Explaining its denial of Harrison's motion to

amend, the district court stated: "Two years have passed

since the filing of her complaint. The case is nearing trial,

and the parties have almost concluded their pre-trial discovery. The Court finds that it is too late in the process for

Plaintiff to amend her complaint." District Court Order at 1.

We review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of

discretion. See Material Supply Int'l, Inc. v. Sunmatch

Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Harrison argues that where as here a plaintiff seeks to

amend a complaint to add a new legal theory, the district

court may deny the motion only if the amendment would

prejudice the defendant. According to the government, unUSCA Case #98-5019 Document #434238 Filed: 05/07/1999 Page 5 of 9
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due delay is a permissible basis for denying any motion to

amend. The government relies on Foman v. Davis, but that

case simply reversed a district court's unexplained denial of a

motion to amend where "the amendment would have done no

more than state an alternative theory for recovery." 371 U.S.

178, 182 (1962). Although this Circuit has recognized undue

delay as a basis for denying a motion to amend, we have done

so only where plaintiffs sought to add new factual allegations.

See, e.g., Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Where an

amendment would do no more than clarify legal theories or

make technical corrections, we have consistently held that

delay, without a showing of prejudice, is not a sufficient

ground for denying the motion. See, e.g., Material Supply

Int'l, Inc., 146 F.3d at 991. As we said in Hanson v.

Hoffmann, the crux of "the liberal concepts of notice pleading

embodied in the Federal Rules" is to make the defendant

aware of the facts. 628 F.2d 42, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1980). "Unless

a defendant is prejudiced on the merits by a change in legal

theory," we explained, "a plaintiff is not bound by the legal

theory on which he or she originally relied." Id. at 53 n.11

(citations omitted).

Applying these standards, we conclude that the district

court should have granted Harrison's motion to amend to

substitute the Rehabilitation Act for the ADA. Harrison

sought to add no new factual allegations. In opposing the

motion, the government claimed no prejudice. In denying

the motion, the district court found no prejudice, and for good

reason: Claims and defenses under the two statutes are

virtually identical. See, e.g., Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of

Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) ("There is no

significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations

created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.").

The government nevertheless urges us to affirm the district

court because in 1996 Harrison's lawyer, after obtaining a

delay to amend the complaint, told the court: "I'm not

amending. I'm not filing any other lawsuits. We are going

forward on this case, and that's it." 4/2/97 Tr. at 4. But as

we read the record, counsel's statement had nothing to do

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with his later effort to amend Harrison's complaint to correct

the erroneous reference to the ADA. When counsel assured

the court in 1996 that he was prepared to go forward without

further amendments, he was referring only to his decision to

add no other counts or allegations based on Harrison's other

EEO administrative complaints. See id. at 2-4.

We reverse the district court's dismissal of Harrison's

disability discrimination claim and remand for further proceedings.

III

Challenging the district court's dismissal of her Title VII

claims, Harrison argues that the Precomplaint Agreement

settled only an informal complaint concerning certain retaliatory acts by Sincavage from November 22 to November 30,

1993. According to Harrison, the agreement resolved none of

the discrimination and retaliation claims included in her November 22 formal complaint, the basis for this lawsuit. She

relies on the following passage from her affidavit: "[The

settlement] agreement was only to address the informal

complaint of December 1, and in no way did it affect the

formal complaint of November 22." Harrison Aff. p 4. Harrison also points out that the settlement agreement is titled

"Precomplaint Agreement," and that "precomplaint" is the

term used to describe an informal complaint, not a formal

complaint.

The government originally disagreed with Harrison's position. It argued that the Precomplaint Agreement settled all

of Harrison's then-pending EEO administrative complaints,

including the November 22 formal complaint. It was on the

basis of this argument that the district court dismissed Harrison's Title VII claims. See District Court Order at 2.

The government has now abandoned this position. In a

motion to remand filed just two days before oral argument,

the government advised us that it now agrees with Harrison

that "the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement in

order to settle the claims raised by Appellant in an informal

complaint pending before the agency" and thus "technically

settled only one of Appellant's two administrative complaints." Appellee's Mot. to Remand at 2. Although the

government does not tell us which informal complaint it

believes was settled, it apparently disagrees with Harrison's

claim that the parties settled only the complaint alleging

retaliation for having filed the November 22 formal complaint.

Echoing the reasoning of the agency's EEO office, see supra

at 4, the government argues that the complaint the parties

actually settled concerned the same matters that Harrison

complained about in her November 22 formal complaint and

that formed the basis of her complaint in district court.

According to the government, Harrison conceded during administrative discovery that the matters she raised in her

formal complaint and those that she settled in the informal

complaint were "the same." Complainant's Interrogatory

Answers p 24. Disputing the government's interpretation of

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her "concession," Harrison insists that she meant only that

the two complaints concerned the same general "matters"--

i.e., discrimination and retaliation--but not the same incidents

and dates.

We do agree with the government about one thing: This

issue requires remand. In view of the government's change

in position, no one any longer defends the district court's

rationale for dismissing the Title VII counts. Both parties

agree that the plain language of the settlement agreement is

ambiguous, and both now resort to extrinsic evidence.

Under these circumstances, we reverse the dismissal of

Harrison's Title VII claims and remand to the district court

to determine whether, based on all the evidence, the Precomplaint Agreement bars Harrison from pursuing claims based

on the incidents alleged in her November 22 administrative

complaint. If the court concludes that the agreement does

not bar those claims, then Harrison's allegation of a postsettlement assault can proceed without regard to her failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. See Loe v. Heckler, 768

F.2d 409, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (where the ends of administrative exhaustion have been served by pursuing administrative

remedies for the underlying complaint, separate exhaustion of

administrative remedies for related post-complaint conduct is

not required); Webb v. District of Columbia, 864 F. Supp.

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175, 184 (D.D.C. 1994) ("[T]o force an employee to return to

the state agency and the EEOC every time he claims a new

instance of discrimination in order to have the courts consider

the subsequent incidents along with the original ones would

erect a needless procedural barrier." (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)).

So ordered.

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