Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01914/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01914-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Isaac
Defendant
Noel Rodriguez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOEL RODRIGUEZ,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

ISAAC,

 Defendant.

1:11-cv-01914-AWI-EPG-PC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

(Doc. 54)

 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND 

MOTION FOR 

DISQUALIFICATION OF 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

(Doc. 53)

I. BACKGROUND

Noel Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed an “extraordinary 

motion” which the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order dated 

February 5, 2016 granting Defendant’s motion for extension of time, and a motion for 

disqualification of Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean. (Doc. 53.) On March 3, 2016, 

Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s “extraordinary motion” as unauthorized. (Doc.

54.) On March 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike. (Doc. 55.)

Defendant’s motion to strike, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and Plaintiff’s 

motion to disqualify the Magistrate Judge are now before the Court.

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II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “extraordinary motion” should be stricken as an 

unauthorized motion, because the Court’s findings and recommendations, issued on December 

30, 2015, authorized objections by the parties, but did not authorize any further motions 

regarding the findings and recommendations. 

Defendant’s motion to strike shall be denied. Defendant has not cited any authority, 

and the Court finds none, supporting the argument that the Court’s findings and 

recommendations precludes the parties from filing a motion such as Plaintiff’s, seeking

reconsideration of a prior order and disqualification of the Magistrate Judge. 

III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

A. Legal Standards

Rule 60(b) allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for “(1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with 

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under

Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 

misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; or (6) any other reason that justifies 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) “is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to 

prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances . . .” 

exist. Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks and 

citation omitted). The moving party “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond 

his control . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In seeking reconsideration 

of an order, Local Rule 230(k) requires Plaintiff to show “what new or different facts or 

circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior 

motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.” 

“A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law,” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 

Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations 

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marks and citations omitted, and “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a 

disagreement with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation . . . ” of that which was already 

considered by the Court in rendering its decision,” U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 

F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a 

strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern-Tulare 

Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), affirmed in part and 

reversed in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s order of February 5, 2016 which granted 

Defendant an extension of time to file a reply to Plaintiff’s objections to the findings and 

recommendations. (Doc. 50.) Plaintiff’s argues that Defendant’s motion for extension of time 

to file a reply was filed too late, because it was filed after the date the reply was due, and 

therefore the Court should not have considered it. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s reply to the 

objections was due “around January 25, 2016,” [but] Defendant waited till Feb 1, 2016 to 

request an extension.” (Id. at 3 ¶4.) Plaintiff requests the Court to strike Defendant’s motion 

for extension of time and Defendant’s reply to Plaintiff’s objections. 

Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive, because Defendant’s motion was not filed late. 

Plaintiff has miscalculated the deadline the reply was due.

1

 Moreover, the Court has discretion 

to grant an untimely motion for extension of time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(b).

Plaintiff also argues that the Court granted Defendant’s motion for extension of time 

without considering Plaintiff’s opposition. Indeed, Plaintiff filed a timely opposition on 

February 11, 2016, but the Court had already granted Defendant’s motion on February 5, 2016. 

At this juncture, the Court has reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s opposition and is not 

 

1 The findings and recommendations required the parties to file and serve any reply to the 

objections “within ten days after service of the objections.” (Doc. 47 at 12:12-13.) Here, pursuant to Local Rule 

135(a), the Court electronically served Plaintiff’s objections on January 21, 2016. Ten days after January 21, 2016 

is February 1, 2016. Therefore, Defendant’s deadline to file a reply was February 1, 2016, not January 25, 2016 

under Plaintiff’s calculation. 

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persuaded to change its decision. Plaintiff’s opposition is based on the argument that 

Defendant’s motion was untimely, and as discussed above, this argument is without merit.

Plaintiff has not set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the 

Court to reverse its prior decision. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration shall be 

denied.

IV. DISQUALIFICATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

A. Legal Standards – U.S.C. § 455

Under 28 U.S.C. ' 455(a), A[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify himself in any 

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.@ Pesnell v. Arsenault, 

543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) provides in relevant part, “[h]e shall 

also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: [w]here he has a personal bias or 

prejudice concerning a party . . .” 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(1). A motion under § 455 is addressed to, 

and must be decided by, the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned.” Bernard v. 

Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 843(9th Cir. 1994). “Section 455 clearly contemplates that decisions with 

respect to disqualification should be made by the judge sitting in the case, and not by another 

judge.” Id. (quoting United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985)). 

“[S]ection 455 includes no provision for referral of the question of recusal to another judge; if 

the judge sitting on the case is aware of grounds for recusal under section 455, that judge has a 

duty to recuse himself or herself.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(citing Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 157 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1979)). On the other 

hand, “in the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse himself, a judge should participate in 

cases assigned.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The substantive standard is “‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the 

facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Pesnell, 

543 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

However, the bias must arise from an extra-judicial source and cannot be based solely on 

information gained in the course of the proceedings. Id. (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 554-56 (1994). A>Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias 

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or partiality motion.=@ In re Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). A>In and of themselves . . , they cannot possibly show reliance upon an 

extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism 

or antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial source is involved.’” Id. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff seeks disqualification of the Magistrate Judge from participating in this action, 

and requests a Court order striking the findings and recommendations dated December 30, 

2015 and the order dated February 5, 2016 granting Defendant’s motion for extension of time. 

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge “maliciously abus[ed] her position to get plaintiff’s 

case dismissed, by filing a false findings and recommendations, providing false info in a court 

order dated 2-4-16, and granting extension of time to an untimely Request.” (Doc. 53 at 1.) 

Plaintiff argues that the findings and recommendations presented false information “that a final 

Judgement was entered in a previous case and Defendant was a party in that action and Res 

Judicata Applies in this case.” (Id. at 3 ¶2.) Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s 

decisions, in the findings and recommendations and the order granting Defendant’s motion for 

extension of time, support Defendant’s arguments, and thus the Magistrate Judge abused her 

power and showed favoritism to Defendant. 

C. Discussion

Plaintiff’s arguments are not sufficient to show personal bias or prejudice by the 

Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s allegation that the Magistrate Judge’s orders show favoritism to 

Defendant is “devoid of specific fact allegations tending to show personal bias stemming from 

an extrajudicial source.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts 

demonstrating that the Magistrate Judge demonstrated prejudice towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff 

does not offer any facts supporting his assertion that any of the Magistrate Judge’s decisions in 

this case were made because of extrajudicial prejudice or bias.

Section 455 requires that a judge be subjectively confident of his or her ability to be 

evenhanded. Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). After

careful examination of the circumstances of this case, the Court does not find any bias for or 

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against any of the parties to this case by the Magistrate Judge. Thus, there are no grounds for 

recusal on the basis of actual bias. Section 455 also requires that a judge be confident “that an 

informed, rational, objective observer would not doubt his [or her] impartiality.” Id. After 

careful consideration of all the circumstances of this case, the Court finds no reason that the 

Magistrate Judge’s impartiality in this case might reasonably be questioned by an informed, 

rational, objective observer. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations would not lead a reasonable 

person to conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s impartiality in this case might reasonably be 

questioned. Accordingly, there is no appearance of bias or prejudice warranting 

disqualification of the Magistrate Judge in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Magistrate Judge Erica P. 

Grosjean from participating in this action shall be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to strike, filed on September 29, 2015, is DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and motion to disqualify Magistrate Judge 

Erica P. Grosjean are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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