Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-11315/USCOURTS-ca11-24-11315-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donna Ausborn
Appellant
Illinois Union Insurance Company
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11315

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DONNA AUSBORN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY,

d.b.a. Chubb, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-02925-JPB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11315

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Donna Ausborn appeals the district court’s order 

granting Appellee Illinois Union Insurance Company’s motion to 

dismiss her complaint and denying Ausborn’s motion for joinder of 

additional parties. Having reviewed the record and read the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s order.

I.

Ausborn brought a wrongful death claim against officers at 

the East Point jail in Fulton County, Georgia, following the death 

of her father that occurred while he was in a holding cell at the jail. 

Neither the City of East Point nor the officers defended the action, 

and the state court judge issued a default judgment against the officers in the amount of $7,000,000, plus court costs. At the time of 

the incident, Illinois Union insured the City for up to $7,000,000 in 

general liability coverage, among other coverage products. The 

policy contains policy conditions, including defense and settlement 

conditions. The pertinent conditions here state that Illinois Union 

has no duty to defend a claim against an insured (the City) seeking 

damages. It further provides that the insured has the duty to defend any claim up to a retained limit ($150,000), and when the damages and claim expenses exceed the retained limit, the insured will 

be entitled to indemnification by Illinois Union.

Ausborn filed a direct action against Illinois Union in state 

court seeking to collect the default judgment. Ausborn argued that 

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24-11315 Opinion of the Court 3

the policy covers the underlying claim (her wrongful death action) 

such that Illinois Union is required to satisfy the $7,000,000 default 

judgment, along with costs and accrued interest. Ausborn also 

sought attorneys’ fees and costs. Illinois Union removed the action 

to federal court, and then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Ausborn failed 

to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Illinois Union asserted that it was not required to satisfy the default judgment because the City breached a condition of the policy: the duty to defend in the wrongful death lawsuit. In addition, Illinois Union 

claimed that the policy provides no coverage in this case because 

there was no occurrence as defined under the policy and the policy’s Medical Service and Law Enforcement Health Care Services 

Exclusions apply.

Ausborn filed a motion for joinder of additional parties, requesting to join the officers as defendants under Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 19(a)(1)(B) and 20(a)(2). Illinois Union responded 

by stating that the only issue in the case is whether the policy obligates it to pay the default judgment; therefore, the officers are neither necessary nor permitted parties. Illinois Union also asserted 

that joinder of the officers would be fraudulent. The district court 

granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for joinder of 

additional parties. Ausborn appeals from that district court order.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s order of dismissal under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11315

814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s order on a motion for joinder of parties. 

Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002).

III.

In construing the insurance policy, we look first to its text, 

giving the terms their “usual and common meaning.” See Ga. Farm 

Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 298 Ga. 716, 719, 784 S.E.2d 422, 424 

(Ga. 2016). If we find the terms “explicit and unambiguous,” we 

simply apply the terms as written, “regardless of whether doing so 

benefits the carrier or the insured.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Under Georgia law, “exclusions from coverage sought to be invoked must be strictly construed,” and “all ambiguities as to policy 

exclusions are interpreted in favor of coverage because the insurer, 

having affirmatively expressed coverage through broad promises, 

assumes a duty to define any limitations on that coverage in clear 

and explicit terms.” Great Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 847 F.3d 

1327, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). “If the facts as alleged in the complaint even arguably 

bring the occurrence within the policy’s coverage, the insurer has 

a duty to defend the action.” City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 

231 Ga. App. 206, 207, 498 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).

There are three steps a court undertakes in the construction 

of a contract: (1) the court decides whether the language is clear 

and unambiguous, looking to the four corners of the agreement 

and giving words their usual and common significance; (2) if the 

court decides that the contract is ambiguous in some respect, the 

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24-11315 Opinion of the Court 5

court must apply the rules of contract construction to ascertain the 

intention of the parties, construing any ambiguity against the insurer as the drafter of the document; and (3) if the court determines 

that the ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, 

the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be resolved by a jury. Envision Printing LLC v. 

Evans, 336 Ga. App. 635, 638, 786 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2016) (quoting Gen. Steel v. Delta Bldg. Sys., 297 Ga. App. 136, 138, 

676 S.E.2d 451, 453 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)); Brogdon v. Pro Futures 

Bridge Cap. Fund, L.P., 260 Ga. App. 521, 523, 580 S.E.2d 303, 306 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2003); St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken 

Co., 198 F.3d 815, 820 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Enforcement of the parties’ 

intent is superior to the other rules of construction.”). 

On appeal, Ausborn contends that, contrary to the district 

court’s conclusion, the more reasonable interpretation of the duty 

to defend condition imposes a duty on the insured to defend and 

pay defense costs only up to the retained limit of $150,000. Under 

Ausborn’s interpretation, Illinois Union has exposure for all 

amounts over the retained limit regardless of whether the City provides a defense. In addition, Ausborn argues that under the policy, 

Illinois Union has an implied duty to defend when there is a foreseeable risk that the underlying claim will result in damages that 

exceed the retained limit. However, Ausborn’s interpretation is 

strained and unavailing. A review of the entire policy shows that 

Ausborn’s interpretation is not a reasonable one and attempts to 

create an ambiguity where none exists. See Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Wattles Co., 930 F.3d 1240, 1253 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[A]mbiguity is not to 

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11315

be created by lifting a clause or a portion of the contract out of context” and the “natural, obvious meaning is to be preferred over any 

curious, hidden meaning which nothing but the exigency of a hard 

case and the ingenuity of a trained and acute mind would discover.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Based on the record, we conclude that the district court did 

not err in finding the policy unambiguous. Under the policy conditions, the policy provides that Illinois Union has “no duty to defend a Claim against an Insured seeking Damages.” (Pl.’s App. p. 

30.). The policy further states that the insured has a “duty to defend 

any Claim to which this insurance applies and shall be responsible 

for the Damages and Claim Expenses up to the Retained Limit.” 

(Id.). The City breached this policy condition by failing to defend 

the officers in the wrongful death suit and subjecting them to a default judgment. 

In the context of an insurance policy, a condition precedent, 

like the one in this policy, must be performed before policy coverage is considered. Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Sorrough, 122 Ga. App. 556, 

560, 177 S.E.2d 819, 822 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970). The policy here 

clearly expresses an intention that the insured’s failure to comply 

with the condition will result in forfeiture of the insured’s rights 

under the policy. See Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 

335 Ga. App. 302, 310, 780 S.E.2d 501, 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015); 

Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12, 14, 703 

S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (notice provision expressly 

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24-11315 Opinion of the Court 7

made a condition precedent to coverage is valid and must be complied with for the insurer to provide coverage).

We conclude that the policy is not ambiguous and clearly 

states that Illinois Union has no duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify in this situation. The only duty to defend is on the insured, 

the City of East Point. The City did not provide a defense to the 

officers in the underlying wrongful death claim, and because it did 

not fulfill its duty, Illinois Union has no duty to indemnify damages 

and claim expenses within or equal to the retained limit. These 

duties are clearly stated in the policy as “Policy Conditions.” Thus, 

based on the record, we conclude that the district court did not err 

in granting the City’s motion to dismiss.

IV.

Ausborn also argues on appeal that the district court erred 

by denying her motion for joinder of parties. Ausborn has the burden of demonstrating that the absent party is indispensable, and she 

fails to meet her burden. See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. 

Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2011). Under Rule 19(a)(1), 

joinder is required if it will not deprive the court of subject matter 

jurisdiction and, in that party’s absence, the court cannot “accord 

complete relief among existing parties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1). 

Rule 20(a)(2) states that parties may be joined if “any right to relief 

is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2)(A).

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-11315

It is clear from the record that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion by denying Ausborn’s motion for joinder of parties. 

The rules indicate that here joinder was not warranted because the 

officers were not indispensable parties to the action because Ausborn’s action was one against Illinois Union only. Thus, we affirm 

the district court’s order denying Ausborn’s motion for joinder of 

parties.

Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order granting Illinois Union’s motion to 

dismiss and denying Ausborn’s motion for joinder of parties.

AFFIRMED. 

 

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