Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-40436/USCOURTS-ca5-09-40436-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Salwillel Thomas Fields
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40436

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

SALWILLEL THOMAS FIELDS, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CR-27-1

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and ELROD, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Executing a search warrant, police officers raided Salwillel Fields’s home,

finding drugs, cash, and guns. After securing written consent, the police

searched Fields’s two off-site storage lockers, discovering drugs in one. Fields

pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and to possession with 1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 3, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 09-40436

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 2

2

intent to distribute crack cocaine – but reserved his right to appeal the district 2

court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He urges that the search warrant so

lacked indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable and

that police officers doctored the consent form allowing them to search the storage

lockers. Unpersuaded, we conclude that the district court committed no

reversible error.

I.

Texas Ranger Jay Womack informed Bowie County Sheriff’s Officer

Captain Lance Hall that a drug-selling fugitive – Salwillel Fields – was living

in Wake Village, Texas. Hall learned that the State of Tennessee had issued six

warrants for Fields’s arrest, that he had been indicted for: conspiracy to sell

cocaine; possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana;

manufacturing cocaine; possession of prohibited weapons (including an AK-47);

being a convicted felon in possession of firearms (a Ruger 9mm, a Llama .45, and

a Ruger .357); and money laundering. Hall began surveilling Fields’s home,

where he saw Fields, confirming his identity by photograph and verifying the

address by motor vehicle records.

Hall sought a search warrant for the premises, signing a seven-page

affidavit averring that Fields is a drug-selling Tennessee fugitive, that based on

his two decades of experience, he is of the opinion that drug offenders typically

keep controlled substances and other evidence of crime in their residences. Hall

mentioned Fields’s recent drug- and gun-related indictments and attached to the

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During the 1990s, Fields was convicted in Tennessee of selling a controlled substance 3

and of attempt to sell cocaine.

18 U.S.C. §§ 921(g)(1) & 924 (e)(1). 4

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 5

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 6

3

affidavit Fields’s criminal history. The affidavit noted that Fields lived with his 3

wife. Tennessee also had recently indicted her for gun and drug offenses. Hall

intended with the search warrant to seize evidence of drug sales – including

papers and currency – as well as the guns and ammunition Fields possessed.

 The search warrant issued, which Ranger Womack and Captain Hall

executed at 6:43 am on February 28, 2005. They kicked down the door and

secured Fields, who had been asleep in the bedroom. They Mirandized him and

told him they had a search warrant. The officers then asked if he wanted to tell

them anything before they began searching the house. Fields responded that he

would cooperate and told the officers he had a shotgun in the bathroom and

drugs in the bedroom and car. The officers searched those locations, finding the

contraband.

Down at the station, Ranger Womack drew up a consent form to search

Fields’s off-site storage lockers. Fields signed the release (witnessed by a

Tennessee police officer), and the police searched Fields’s two lockers. In the

second locker they found drugs.

The Texas police sent Fields back to Tennessee, but, a year later, a federal

grand jury in Texas returned an indictment against him charging: (1) felon in

possession of a firearm; (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine and 4

crack-cocaine; and (3) possession of a firearm while trafficking drugs. 5 6

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4

Fields twice moved to suppress the fruits of the searches. He claimed that

the warrant was insufficient, that it was “bare bones” and full of conclusory

allegations. Fields testified at the second hearing that the police never

Mirandized him. He admits to signing the consent form, but he said it only had

one of his storage lockers listed. He accuses the police of subsequently adding

the second locker’s number, the locker in which the officers found drugs.

Captain Hall testified that Ranger Womack immediately Mirandized

Fields, and Fields cooperated, disclosing the locations of drugs and a gun.

Ranger Womack testified that he Mirandized Fields with Hall present, obviating

the need for a Miranda waiver. Womack advised Fields that they had a search

warrant, and asked if Fields wanted to tell them where the contraband was

located. Fields then told the officers where to find the shotgun and drugs in the

home and car. Womack personally prepared the consent form to search the

storage units, specifying two lockers numbered “I-7, K-2.” He read the consent

form to Fields, and Fields read it himself. Fields signed the form with both

lockers listed as locations to be searched. Womack testified that he did not

subsequently alter the consent form.

The district court, through a magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied

the suppression motions, addressing three issues – whether the officers could

rely in good faith on the warrant, whether Fields consented to the search of his

home and car, and whether Fields consented to the search of his second storage

locker. The court held that the affidavit in support of the warrant was not

conclusory and the police were entitled to rely on the warrant in good faith. On

the consent issues, the court found Fields had “effectively and voluntarily

cooperated with the police and consented to the searches.” The court expounded:

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18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government dropped the rest. 7

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). 8

See id. at 549 (“A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified 9

on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid.”).

5

Not only is Defendant asking the Court to believe, contrary to the

consistent testimony of Hall and Womack, that he never consented

to the search of his home and vehicle, but Defendant also asks the

Court to believe Womack . . . filled out the storage unit consent form

with only the I-7 storage unit and then doctored the form by adding

the K-2 unit. The Court is unwilling to accept Defendant’s

testimony and instead accepts Hall and Womack’s versions of the

facts as true.

Fields agreed to plead guilty to two of the charges, but reserved his right to

7

appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

II.

A.

We begin with the search of Fields’s home and car. The government

suggests that we can affirm because Fields consented to a search by pointing out

the location of his shotgun and drugs. But consent will not do. The district court

found that Fields consented to the search only after the police officers told him

they had a search warrant. The Supreme Court has long held that a search

cannot “be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that ‘consent’ has

been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he

possesses a warrant.” Admissibility here rises and falls with the warrant. 8 9

The pull of the exclusionary rule is not so strong as to suppress evidence

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See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 10

Id. at 923 (quotation marks omitted). 11

United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). 12

See United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The only instances 13

in which th[e] maxim [that the court should rely strictly on the good-faith exception] should

not be followed are those in which the resolution of a ‘novel question of law . . . is necessary

to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates.’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213, 264 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)) (omission in original)).

United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992). 14

6

obtained when officers act in good-faith reliance on a warrant. But this good- 10

faith exception to the exclusionary rule will not apply in cases where an officer

relies “on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause

as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Fields urges 11

that the warrant here lacks the necessary indicia, that it is bare bones.

“This court reviews conclusions of law regarding the sufficiency of a

warrant de novo. Our review involves a two-step process, whereby we must first

determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

Only if a novel legal question is presented or the good-faith exception does not

apply must we then ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that probable cause existed.” Whether (1) knowledge of where a 12

drug-dealer resides plus (2) an officer’s experience that such people hide drugs

in their homes can support reliance on a warrant is not a novel question in this

Circuit, so we engage only in the good-faith analysis.13

“‘Bare bones’ affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack

the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently

determine probable cause.” “Generally, examples of ‘bare bones’ affidavits 14

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United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted). 15

Craig, 861 F.2d at 823. 16

See, e.g., United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1477 (5th Cir. 1993); United States

17

v. Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1307

(5th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that some of these sales took place at locations other than Webster’s

residence is not determinative. The affidavit alleged that, based on the officer’s experience,

drug dealers and traffickers commonly keep caches of drugs, as well as paraphernalia and

records of drug transactions, in their residences. In other words, the basis for searching

Webster’s residence was his overall drug trafficking and sales activity, not just those sales that

actually took place at his residence.”).

Fields does not question the validity of these indictments, and “[a]n indictment is a 18

conclusive finding that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the indictment

took place.” United States v. Byrd, 898 F.2d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975).

Hall also referred to Fields’s drug-selling convictions. 19

7

include those that merely state that the affiant ‘has cause to suspect and does

believe’ or ‘has received reliable information from a credible person and does

believe’ that contraband is located on the premises.” “Although certainly not 15

a thing of beauty,” the affidavit here passes the threshold. 16

This court has often found good-faith reliance on a warrant to search a

defendant’s home where the affiant alleged (1) the defendant’s involvement in

drug trafficking and (2) that – based on the affiant’s law enforcement experience

– such criminals keep drug paraphernalia at their homes. The affidavit here 17

recited that Tennessee had recently indicted Fields on various drugs and

weapons charges – reasonably leading Hall to believe probable cause existed 18

that Fields continues to be a drug dealer – and that, in Hall’s extensive 19

experience, jurisdiction-fleeing, gun-toting drug dealers keep evidence of crime

in their homes. Hall did not offer first-hand observation of drug crime, but that

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Fields contends that he was not a fugitive, but it is undisputed that he was in Texas 20

and wanted on crimes committed in Tennessee.

“In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s 21

probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically

sufficient. Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in

seeking to comply with the law.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (quotation

marks and alterations omitted).

United States v. Singer, 970 F.2d 1414, 1418 (5th Cir. 1992) (“This court has 22

consistently held that a warrant authorizing a search of ‘the premises’ includes vehicles

parked on the premises.”).

United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 23

8

Fields was a fugitive wanted on drug and gun charges created an inference of 20

ongoing criminal activity sufficient to withstand the bare bones allegation.

The officers in good faith relied on a warrant to search Fields’s home.21

Because the warrant allowed the police to search the “premises,” the police could

comb-through Fields’s car parked on the property. The district court did not 22

err in allowing fruits of the home and car searches to come in evidence based on

the good-faith exception, emphasizing again that we do not pass on whether

probable cause existed.

B.

Moving to the search of Fields’s storage lockers, “[a] consensual search is

a[] well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Only free and voluntary consent justifies a warrantless search. In reviewing a

finding that consent was voluntarily given, this court employs a clearly

erroneous standard. This standard is particularly strong when the district judge

based his findings on oral testimony at the suppression hearing, as is this case

here.”23

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“A finding of consent to search may be overturned on appeal only if found to be clearly 24

erroneous. We will reject the trial court’s finding only if, after giving due regard to the

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we are left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . We will not second guess

the district court’s credibility judgment.” United States v. Botello, 991 F.2d 189, 194 (5th Cir.

1993) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

9

The police did not have a search warrant for Fields’s off-site storage

lockers, so they asked for consent. He obliged, signing a consent waiver after the

police Mirandized him. Fields admits to allowing the police into locker “I-7,” but

not into locker “K-2” – the locker with the drugs. To get around his signed

waiver for both lockers, Fields speculated that a police officer doctored his

written consent by later adding-in locker “K-2.” The police officers deny doing

so. The district court credited the officers’ testimony and not the defendant’s.

The clear error standard does not allow reversal in this credibility battle, and

there is no other evidence to suggest that the police acted nefariously.

24

AFFIRMED.

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