Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-03068/USCOURTS-ca10-19-03068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Wesley Wagner
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

WESLEY WAGNER, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-3068 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 5:17-CR-40097-DDC-1)

_________________________________ 

Trevor D. Riddle, (Sarah Ellen Johnson with him on the briefs), Monnat & Spurrier, 

CHTD, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellant. 

Bryan C. Clark, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen R. McAllister, United States 

Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Kansas City, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff - Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

MATHESON, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 3, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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In 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) deployed a Network 

Investigative Technique (“NIT”)1

 to identify the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses2

of computers accessing “Playpen,” a child pornography website. One of those IP 

addresses belonged to Defendant-Appellant Wesley Wagner. Agents executed a 

warrant for his Kansas residence, where they interviewed him and found evidence of 

child pornography on a laptop computer. 

Mr. Wagner was indicted for receipt and possession of child pornography in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B). He moved to suppress the NIT’s 

identification of his IP address, the child pornography evidence in his home, and his 

statements to the agents. He also moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was 

obtained through outrageous government conduct in violation of due process. The 

district court denied his motions. Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted him of 

both counts. 

 1

 For an explanation of how the NIT obtained identifying information from 

users’ computers, see United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 

2017). 

2

 As this court has previously explained, 

An IP address is a unique number identifying the location 

of an end[-]user’s computer. When an end-user logs onto 

an internet service provider, they are assigned a unique IP 

number that will be used for that entire session. Only one 

computer can use a particular IP address at any specific 

date and time. 

United States v. Henderson, 595 F.3d 1198, 1199 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010) (alterations 

and quotations omitted). 

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On appeal, Mr. Wagner argues the district court erred in denying his motions 

to suppress and motion to dismiss the indictment. He also contends an erroneous 

evidentiary ruling requires a new trial and that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his convictions. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Below we summarize the investigative and procedural background. We 

provide additional background in our discussion of Mr. Wagner’s issues on appeal. 

A. Investigative Background 

Investigation of Playpen

The FBI seized Playpen’s servers in January 2015 and moved them to a 

government facility in Virginia. The FBI then hosted the website from this facility, 

hoping to identify its users. 

The FBI obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court 

for the Eastern District of Virginia (“NIT Warrant”), which authorized agents to 

install an NIT on Playpen’s servers to collect identifying information from the 

“activating computers . . . of any user or administrator who log[ged] into [Playpen] 

by entering a username and password.” Supp. App. at 89. The activating computer, 

“wherever located,” transmitted the information, including its IP address and host 

name, to the government facility in Virginia. Id. at 83, 90. 

The FBI deployed the NIT on Playpen’s servers from February 20, 2015 to 

March 4, 2015, during which 100,000 users accessed the website. 

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Investigation of Mr. Wagner 

Playpen user “soldiermike” logged into the website on February 28, 2015.3

 

The NIT identified soldiermike’s computer’s host name as “SFC-Gunner.” App. at 

440. It also identified its IP address. Using subpoenaed records from the Tri-County 

Telephone Association, the FBI traced the IP address to Mr. Wagner and his 

residence in White City, Kansas. 

On September 15, 2015, the FBI obtained a warrant to search Mr. Wagner’s 

residence from a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas 

(“Residence Warrant”). The warrant authorized agents to seize, among other items, 

computers used to “display or access information pertaining to a sexual interest in 

child pornography” or to “distribute, possess, or receive child pornography.” Supp. 

App. at 280. 

Six law enforcement agents executed the Residence Warrant. Upon arrival at 

the residence, Kansas Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Angie Jones informed 

Mr. Wagner and his wife that they were not under arrest and were free to leave. The 

Wagners agreed to speak with the agents. 

Agent Jones and FBI Special Agent Mike Daniels interviewed Mr. Wagner 

while his wife waited on the porch. The recorded, 43-minute interview began on a 

bench outside the home and moved to a police vehicle when it started to rain. Mr. 

 3

 Playpen records later revealed that between January 31, 2015 and March 4, 

2015, soldiermike logged into Playpen for eight hours and fifty-nine minutes. 

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Wagner told the agents he served in the military and retired as a sergeant first class in 

2010 due to disability. He denied accessing child pornography on his computer but 

admitted to a past pornography addiction. He said that he and his wife were the only 

users of the family laptop, that no one had lived with them in the last year, and that 

no one else could access their wireless network. 

Agents in the home found child pornography on the laptop in a folder labeled 

“TOR.”4

 Agents Jones and Daniels then conducted a second recorded interview of 

Mr. Wagner about the folder’s contents. He denied knowledge of the folder and 

asked the agents to leave. The agents finished executing the warrant and left without 

arresting him. 

B. Procedural Background 

Indictment 

A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Wagner on two counts: (1) receipt of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); and (2) possession of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). 

Pretrial Motions 

Mr. Wagner moved to suppress (1) the NIT’s identification of his IP address, 

(2) evidence seized during the search of his home, and (3) his statements to Agents 

Jones and Daniels. He argued the NIT Warrant and Residence Warrant were invalid 

 4

 “TOR” is the acronym for “The Onion Router,” the encrypted network on 

which Playpen operated. To access Playpen, a user had to download the TOR 

browser. 

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and that the agents’ interviews violated his Miranda and due process rights. He also 

moved (4) to dismiss the indictment, asserting the FBI’s 13-day operation of the 

Playpen website was outrageous in violation of due process. 

Following a hearing, the court denied all four motions. It concluded (1) any 

evidence seized under the NIT Warrant was admissible under the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule, (2) the Residence Warrant was supported by 

probable cause and was sufficiently particular,5

 (3) Mr. Wagner’s statements were 

voluntary and elicited in a non-custodial setting, and (4) the Government did not 

engage in outrageous conduct. 

Jury Trial 

Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted Mr. Wagner of both counts. 

Agent Jones and Amy Corrigan, an FBI forensic examiner, testified for the 

prosecution. During Agent Jones’s direct examination, the Government played the 

recording of Mr. Wagner’s first interview. On cross-examination, defense counsel 

asked Agent Jones about Mr. Wagner’s responses. See App. at 520 (Q: “Told you he 

retired in 2010?” A: “Yes.” Q: “Told you that he had served 20 years?” A: “Yes.”). 

The Government objected on hearsay grounds, which the court sustained.6

 Forensic 

 5

 The court also determined that “the good faith exception, if needed, would 

apply” to the Residence Warrant. Supp. App. at 360. 

6

 The Government did not present the recording of Mr. Wagner’s second 

interview at trial. The only trial evidence of Mr. Wagner’s statements during the 

second interview came from Agent Jones’s testimony. See App. at 496 (Q: “What 

was the defendant’s response to what was being viewed on the laptop?” A: “He 

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examiner Corrigan testified about the child pornography evidence found on the 

laptop in Mr. Wagner’s home. 

Post-Trial Motions 

Mr. Wagner moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

33, asserting the court’s hearsay ruling during Agent Jones’s cross-examination 

prevented his counsel from highlighting certain statements for the jury. He also 

moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), 

arguing the Government’s evidence was insufficient to prove he knowingly received 

and possessed child pornography.7

 

The district court denied both motions. It concluded the hearsay ruling was 

proper, and even if it was not, Mr. Wagner had failed to show it affected his 

substantial rights. The court also found “sufficient circumstantial evidence to 

support the jury’s guilty verdict.” Supp. App. at 474. 

Sentence 

The district court sentenced Mr. Wagner to eight years of imprisonment and 

five years of supervised release. Mr. Wagner timely appealed. 

 

claimed he had no knowledge of it. His demeanor toward us changed. He got angry 

and told us that we need to leave his residence.”). 

7

 Mr. Wagner moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the 

Government’s case and renewed his motion after the jury’s verdict. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Mr. Wagner contends the district court erred when it (A) applied 

the good faith exception to the NIT Warrant evidence, (B) upheld the Residence 

Warrant, (C) admitted his interview statements, (D) denied the outrageous 

government conduct motion, (E) sustained the hearsay objection, and (F) denied the 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence motion. We affirm the district court on each issue. 

A. NIT Warrant Evidence 

The district court denied Mr. Wagner’s motion to suppress the NIT Warrant 

evidence because this circuit, like many others, has held the good faith exception to 

the exclusionary rule applies to evidence gathered under the warrant issued by the 

Eastern District of Virginia magistrate judge. See United States v. Workman, 863 

F.3d 1313, 1318-21 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1546 (2018); United 

States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1090 (10th Cir. 2019). Mr. Wagner fails to 

distinguish our precedent. 

Standard of Review 

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government [and] accept the district court’s findings 

of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. McNeal, 862 F.3d 1057, 

1061 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). We review de novo the “application of 

the [good faith] exception.” Workman, 863 F.3d at 1317. 

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Legal Background 

The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “When an individual seeks to preserve something 

as private, and his expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize 

as reasonable, . . . official intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as a 

search and requires a warrant.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 

(2018) (quotations omitted); see United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th 

Cir. 2013) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in a personal 

computer). A warrant must (1) “be supported by probable cause” and (2) “describe 

with particularity ‘the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” 

United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S. Const. 

amend. IV). 

Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment” is generally inadmissible. United States v. Knox, 883 F.3d 1262, 1273 

(10th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). But 

“exclusion [is] our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring v. United States, 555 

U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quotations omitted). Unlawfully obtained evidence is still 

admissible where its suppression would not “deter[] . . . future Fourth Amendment 

violations.” Knox, 883 F.3d at 1273; see Herring, 555 U.S. at 141-42. 

In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court held that when law enforcement 

agents rely in “objective good faith” on a later invalidated warrant, “there is no 

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police illegality and thus nothing to deter.” 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984). Evidence 

obtained under this good faith exception is admissible because its suppression 

“w[ould] not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way.” Id. at 

920 (quotations omitted). 

Leon identified five instances in which the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule cannot apply:

1. the magistrate judge “was misled by information in an 

affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have 

known was false except for his reckless disregard of the 

truth;” 

2. the “magistrate [judge] wholly abandoned his judicial 

role;” 

3. the “warrant [was] based on an affidavit so lacking in 

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable;” 

4. the “warrant [was] so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 

particularize the place to be searched or the things to be 

seized—that the executing officers c[ould not] reasonably 

presume it to be valid;” or 

5. the officer obtained the warrant based on a “bare bones 

affidavit and then rel[ied] on colleagues . . . ignorant of the 

circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to 

conduct the search.” 

Id. at 923 & n.24 (quotations omitted). We have held the Leon good faith exception 

also cannot apply when the officer’s search “exceed[ed] the scope of the warrant.” 

United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2006); see United States v. 

Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1208 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Leon good-faith 

exception will not save an improperly executed warrant.”). 

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In United States v. Workman, we concluded the good faith exception applied to 

the NIT Warrant evidence. 863 F.3d at 1318-21. We assumed without deciding that 

the warrant exceeded the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction by authorizing the search of 

computers located outside the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 1321.8 But we 

determined the executing agents relied on the warrant in good faith. Id. at 1320-21. 

They knew the NIT would be installed on servers in the Eastern District of Virginia, 

where both the magistrate judge was located and any identifying information would 

be retrieved. Id. at 1320. Because we did “not expect [the agents] to understand 

[the] legal nuances” of a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, we determined they 

reasonably relied on the warrant’s authorization to install the NIT. Id. at 1321; see 

Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1090 (applying good faith exception to NIT Warrant evidence 

under Workman). We also concluded the NIT Warrant “d[id] not fit any of the[] five 

situations” identified in Leon. Workman, 863 F.3d at 1318.9

 8

 Subject to limited exceptions, magistrate judges may issue warrants to seize 

evidence located only in their districts. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (granting 

magistrate judges authority “within the district in which sessions are held by the 

court that appointed the magistrate judge”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) (authorizing 

magistrate judges “to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property 

located within [their] district” and outlining exceptions). 

9

 Ten other circuits also have applied the good faith exception to NIT Warrant 

evidence. See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 323-24 (1st Cir. 2017); United 

States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118-21 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Werdene, 883 

F.3d 204, 216-18 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 691 (4th 

Cir. 2018); United States v. Ganzer, 922 F.3d 579, 584, 590 (5th Cir. 2019); United 

States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 971 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Kienast, 907 

F.3d 522, 528-29 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1049-52 

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Analysis 

The district court properly denied Mr. Wagner’s motion to suppress the NIT 

Warrant evidence. Even if the warrant was invalid because of its scope, the good 

faith exception applies under our “binding precedent” in Workman. Cookson, 922 

F.3d at 1090. 

Mr. Wagner contends Workman does not control because it did not address 

arguments he raises here to preclude application of the good faith exception. He 

argues the good faith exception cannot apply because (1) the NIT Warrant affidavit 

misled the magistrate judge by misrepresenting “critical” information about 

Playpen’s home page, Aplt. Br. at 9-10; (2) the affidavit, without the 

misrepresentation, did not establish probable cause, id. at 8-10; (3) the NIT Warrant 

was facially deficient for lack of particularity, id. at 11-13; and (4) the agents’ search 

exceeded the warrant’s scope, which was limited to evidence located in the Eastern 

District of Virginia, id. at 10-11. His arguments lack merit. 

First, Mr. Wagner has not shown the NIT Warrant affidavit misled the 

magistrate judge. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. The affidavit stated Playpen’s home page 

featured two prepubescent females with their legs spread apart, but when the FBI 

submitted the warrant application, the home page had changed to depict only one 

female with legs closed. Mr. Wagner does not explain how this change was material 

 

(8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018); 

United States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1291-93 (11th Cir. 2019). 

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in light of the other facts in the affidavit, see United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 

529 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluding the change in Playpen’s home page was 

“immaterial”), or how the agents’ failure to update the affidavit showed “reckless 

disregard of the truth,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 

Second, Mr. Wagner has not established that the NIT Warrant affidavit, 

without the description of Playpen’s home page, lacked probable cause. To establish 

the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” to preclude application of 

the good faith exception, Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quotations omitted), Mr. Wagner 

must show the affidavit was wholly “devoid of factual support,” Knox, 883 F.3d at 

1274 (quotations omitted). The affidavit here described Playpen’s content at length, 

how users anonymously viewed and uploaded child pornography on the website, and 

how the NIT would collect users’ identifying information. Supp. App. at 64-81. The 

executing agents’ belief that the affidavit contained sufficient information to 

establish probable cause was not “so wholly unwarranted that good faith [was] 

absent.” Knox, 883 F.3d at 1274 (quotations omitted). 

Third, Mr. Wagner has not shown the NIT Warrant was so lacking in 

particularity that the agents “c[ould not] reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 

468 U.S. at 923. The warrant “clearly specifie[d] that only activating computers [of 

Playpen’s users] are to be searched,” United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 323 (1st 

Cir. 2017), and detailed the information for seizure, see Supp. App. at 90. We find 

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no facial deficiency in the NIT Warrant that would render the agents’ belief in its 

validity unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.10

Fourth, Mr. Wagner has not shown the agents exceeded the NIT Warrant’s 

scope. Angelos, 433 F.3d at 746. The warrant’s first page referred to “Attachment 

A” for a description of “the property to be searched and . . . its location.” Supp. App. 

at 88. Attachment A authorized the NIT to “obtain[] information . . . from the 

activating computers . . . of any user or administrator who logs into [Playpen].” Id. 

at 89. It did not limit activating computers to those located in the Eastern District of 

Virginia.11 

Mr. Wagner’s unsubstantiated arguments do not distinguish Workman. 

Because the district court properly concluded the good faith exception applied, it did 

 10 Other circuits also have rejected the argument that the NIT Warrant was 

facially deficient. See Horton, 863 F.3d at 1052 (reasoning the court would “not find 

an obvious deficiency in a warrant that a number of district courts have ruled to be 

facially valid”); Eldred, 933 F.3d at 119 (same); McLamb, 880 F.3d at 691 

(concluding warrant was not “so facially deficient” when the “boundaries of a 

magistrate judge’s jurisdiction in the context of remote access warrants were unclear 

at the time of the warrant application” (quotations omitted)). 

11 Mr. Wagner’s remaining arguments would not preclude application of the 

good faith exception. First, he contends the good faith exception does not apply 

when the warrant exceeds the magistrate judge’s issuing authority. But Workman

held “the Leon [good faith] exception applies even if the magistrate judge had 

exceeded geographic constraints in issuing the warrant.” 863 F.3d at 1318. Second, 

he claims the warrant failed to include a “sufficient[] [computer search] 

methodology.” Aplt. Br. at 13. He offers no authority that a warrant’s lack of search 

methodology prevents application of the good faith exception. Further, our circuit 

has declined to require warrants to include computer search methodology. See 

United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005). 

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not err in denying Mr. Wagner’s motion to suppress the NIT’s identification of his IP 

address. 

B. Residence Warrant Evidence 

Mr. Wagner argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

the evidence seized from his home because the Residence Warrant was invalid. He 

contends the warrant was based on stale information that was insufficient to support 

probable cause. He also asserts it lacked sufficient particularity because it authorized 

a search for “any computers” and did not provide a computer search strategy. Aplt. 

Br. at 23-27. We disagree. 

Standard of Review 

We review the district court’s “[d]eterminations relating to the sufficiency of a 

search warrant” de novo. United States v. Haymond, 672 F.3d 948, 958 (10th Cir. 

2012). But we afford “great deference to the issuing judge’s finding of probable 

cause.” United States v. Edwards, 813 F.3d 953, 960 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations 

omitted). “We ask only whether, under the totality of the circumstances presented in 

the affidavit, the . . . judge had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 

existed.” United States v. Renigar, 613 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations 

omitted). 

Additional Legal Background 

a. Probable cause 

A search warrant must be based on probable cause. United States v. Dalton, 

918 F.3d 1117, 1127 (10th Cir. 2019). “An affidavit establishes probable cause for a 

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search warrant if the totality of the information it contains establishes the fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 

place.” Knox, 883 F.3d at 1275 (quotations omitted). When determining whether 

probable cause exists, we apply a “flexible, common-sense standard,” under which 

“no single factor . . . is dispositive.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 

(1983)). 

“[P]robable cause cannot be based on stale information that no longer suggests 

that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched.” Id. at 1276 

(quotations omitted). “[W]hether information is too stale to establish probable cause 

depends on the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and the 

nature of the property to be seized.” United States v. Villanueva, 821 F.3d 1226, 

1237 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted). 

Courts are less receptive to staleness challenges when the warrant concerns 

child pornography because “persons interested in those materials [are likely to hoard 

them] in the privacy of their homes . . . for significant periods of time.” United 

States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). We 

have rejected staleness challenges when information about child pornography was 

107 days old, Haymond, 672 F.3d at 959; 111 days old, Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1205-06; 

and even five years old, United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 860-61 (10th Cir. 

2005) (reasoning that the “the passage of time [was] not of critical importance” when 

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the child pornography “offense . . . [was] ongoing and continuing in nature” 

(quotations omitted)).12

b. Particularity 

The Fourth Amendment “specifies only two matters that must be ‘particularly 

describ[ed]’ in the warrant: ‘the place to be searched’ and ‘the persons or things to 

be seized.’” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006). A warrant is 

sufficiently particular when it “enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and 

identify the things authorized to be seized.” United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 

1154 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 

1263, 1269 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting our circuit takes “a somewhat forgiving stance 

when faced with a ‘particularity’ challenge to a warrant authorizing the seizure of 

computers”). 

We have held that when a warrant for child pornography evidence “as a 

whole” limits the agents’ search to evidence related to child pornography, the warrant 

is not overbroad for failure to expressly require that each individual category of items 

for seizure pertain to child pornography. United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 

1252 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting technical reading of seemingly broad categories of 

items for seizure where warrant, “as a whole, . . . more naturally instruct[ed] officers 

 12 Other circuits have taken a similar approach to staleness in the child 

pornography context. See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 

2006) (characterizing “staleness determination” in this context as “unique” and 

concluding two-year-old information was not stale); United States v. Newsom, 402 

F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Information a year old is not necessarily stale as a 

matter of law, especially where child pornography is concerned.”). 

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to search . . . only for evidence related to child pornography” (emphasis omitted)); 

see Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1270-71 (concluding warrant authorizing seizure of “any 

and all computer equipment” was not overbroad because it contained other 

“sufficiently particularized language requiring a nexus with child pornography”).

Although a warrant must describe with particularity the items sought on a 

computer, United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985-86 (10th Cir. 2001), it need not 

include “a particularized computer search strategy,” Brooks, 427 F.3d at 1251; see 

Russian, 848 F.3d at 1245 n.1 (“declin[ing] to require a search protocol for computer 

searches” because “courts are better able to assess the reasonableness of search 

protocols ex post”). 

Analysis 

The Residence Warrant met the probable cause and particularity standards. 

a. Probable cause 

The six-month-old information of soldiermike’s Playpen use13 did not 

“suggest[] that the items sought [would no longer] be found” in Mr. Wagner’s 

residence. Knox, 883 F.3d at 1276 (quotations omitted). Soldiermike’s Playpen use 

was “ongoing.” Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 861; see Supp. App. at 210 (noting soldiermike 

was “actively logged into” Playpen for nearly nine hours from January 31 to March 

4, 2015). County records linked soldiermike’s IP address to Mr. Wagner’s residence 

 13 Soldiermike last accessed Playpen on March 3, 2015. The FBI obtained the 

warrant for Mr. Wagner’s residence on September 15, 2015. 

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in White City, Kansas. See United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2018) 

(“[A] nexus exists when law enforcement connects the IP address used to access a 

website to the physical location identified by the warrant.”). Given the propensity of 

child pornography consumers to “hoard” their materials “in secure places, like a 

private residence,” Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1206, the magistrate judge had a “substantial 

basis” to believe evidence of child pornography would be at the residence associated 

with soldiermike’s IP address six months after Playpen was accessed, Renigar, 613 

F.3d at 994 (quotations omitted). 

b. Particularity 

The Residence Warrant also “ensure[d] that the search [was] confined in scope 

to particularly described evidence.” Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 636 (10th 

Cir. 2009) (alterations and quotations omitted). Although a few of the 16 categories 

of items listed for seizure did not reference a specific subject matter, see, e.g., Supp. 

App. at 280, 282 (identifying “[a]ny and all computer software” and “[a]ny and all 

cameras”), most of the categories specified child pornography, see, e.g., id. at 280 

(limiting agents to seizure of items “depict[ing] child pornography,” “pertaining to a 

sexual interest in child pornography,” and “pertaining to the possession . . . of child 

pornography”). Mr. Wagner may not rely on selective portions of a warrant that, 

read in context, “contained sufficiently particularized language requiring a nexus 

with child pornography.” Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1271.14

 14 Relying on United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 

Mr. Wagner argues the Residence Warrant was overbroad because it authorized the 

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Mr. Wagner’s argument that the Residence Warrant required a detailed 

computer search strategy lacks merit. He relies exclusively on unpublished out-ofcircuit decisions that conflict with our precedent. See Brooks, 427 F.3d at 1251; 

Russian, 848 F.3d at 1245 n.1. 

*     *     *     *

In sum, the district court properly concluded the Residence Warrant was valid. 

The warrant was supported by probable cause and particularly described the place to 

be searched and the items to be seized. 

C. Interview Statements 

Mr. Wagner argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to 

suppress his interview statements. He contends Agents Jones and Daniels were 

required to provide Miranda warnings because they subjected him to a custodial 

interrogation. He also asserts his statements were involuntary. The record belies 

both arguments. 

 

seizure of any computer located at the residence regardless of ownership. Griffith is 

inapposite. In that case, the officers suspected the defendant was the getaway driver 

in a homicide. The court held a warrant authorizing seizure of “all cell phones and 

electronic devices” in the defendant’s home was overbroad because the supporting 

affidavit established probable cause to search only those “devices owned by [the 

defendant]” or “linked to the [homicide].” Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1276. Here, by 

contrast, the agents had probable cause to search Mr. Wagner’s residence for any 

device that soldiermike could have used to access Playpen or child pornography. 

Because soldiermike’s identity was unknown, the Residence Warrant was not 

overbroad for failure to limit seizure to devices Mr. Wagner owned. 

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Standard of Review 

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress 

his statements, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the 

government” and “accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous.” United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1031 (10th Cir. 2017). We 

review de novo the applicability of Miranda, see id., and the voluntariness of a 

defendant’s statements, McNeal, 862 F.3d at 1061. But we review “subsidiary 

factual questions,” such as whether the police threaten or coerce the defendant, for 

clear error. Id. (quotations omitted); Sharp v. Rohling, 793 F.3d 1216, 1226 (10th 

Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). 

Additional Investigative Background 

Agents Jones and Daniels audio-recorded their initial encounter with the 

Wagners and their first interview of Mr. Wagner. We have listened carefully to the 

recording and summarize it below.15 

a. Initial encounter 

Upon arrival at the Wagner residence, Agent Jones informed Mr. and Mrs. 

Wagner that “neither one of [them] [was] under arrest and [they we]re free to leave at 

 15 At the suppression hearing, the district court reviewed a recording that 

included both the agents’ initial encounter with the Wagners and their first interview 

of Mr. Wagner. At trial, the Government presented an excerpted version of this 

recording that contained only the interview, with minor redactions. As noted, the 

Government did not present the recording of Mr. Wagner’s second interview. We 

rely only on the recording introduced at trial when summarizing Mr. Wagner’s 

interview statements and discussing the sufficiency of the evidence. 

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any time.” Hrg. Audio Ex. 9 at 00:10-15. She said the Wagners would not be “going 

with [the agents] today” and the agents would “get out of [their] hair as soon as [they 

could].” Id. at 01:00-06. She told Mrs. Wagner to “hang out here on the porch” 

while she and Agent Daniels interviewed Mr. Wagner. Id. at 02:22-28. 

b. Interview 

Mr. Wagner’s first interview began on a bench outside his home and moved to 

a police vehicle when it started to rain. Agent Jones explained the interview’s 

purpose was to get “identifying information,” “find out about [Mr. Wagner’s] 

Internet activities,” and learn about the “electronics [the agents were] going to find in 

the house.” Tr. Audio Ex. 3 at 00:05-20. Mr. Wagner agreed to continue speaking 

with Agents Jones and Daniels. Id. at 00:20-25. 

Mr. Wagner said no one other than he and his wife had lived in their house in 

the last year. Id. at 05:50-07:25. He denied viewing child pornography but admitted 

to having a pornography addiction “quite a few years ago,” id. at 13:20-14:30, and to 

accessing pornography the previous day, id. at 14:50-15:15. He also stated he 

suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) but did not currently require 

medication. Id. at 15:58-16:25. 

Agent Jones said the FBI believed someone in his house had accessed a child 

pornography website. Id. at 19:22-32. She stated the agents “just want to get to the 

bottom of what’s going on” so they can “wrap this up and move on” to finding 

individuals “who are actually touching and harming kids.” Id. at 20:10-50. 

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Mr. Wagner again denied viewing child pornography and stated that no visitor 

had stayed at his house in the last year. Id. at 21:35-22:16. He also explained that 

his wireless Internet connection was password-protected and did not extend beyond 

his driveway. Id. at 22:17-23:35. 

Agent Jones said the FBI knew a computer in his home had accessed child 

pornography. Id. at 24:13-27. The more Mr. Wagner could disclose about the 

computer’s contents, she said, the “better it [would be] for [him].” Id. at 27:20-42. 

When Mr. Wagner continued to deny knowledge of child pornography on any 

device in the house, Agent Jones asked, 

Is there anything that you’re reluctant to tell us? I mean, 

this is really your only opportunity because once we leave 

here, we go to the lab, the computer speaks for itself. So, 

just—spit it out—tell us what we need to know. [Laughs.] 

Id. at 34:00-14. Mr. Wagner did not admit to accessing child pornography. Id. at 

34:15-35. At the end of the interview, the agents said he could “go over” by the 

house while they “chat with [his wife].” Id. at 35:50-36:02. The agents finished the 

search without making an arrest. 

Additional Legal Background 

Statements to police are subject to procedural safeguards rooted in the Fifth 

Amendment’s Self-Incrimination and Due Process Clauses. 

a. Self-Incrimination Clause 

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held the Fifth 

Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause “prohibits admitting statements given by a 

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suspect during ‘custodial interrogation’ without a prior warning.” United States v. 

Cook, 599 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 933 (2010). 

Miranda warnings are required only “at the moment [the] suspect is in custody 

and the questioning meets the legal definition of interrogation.” United States v. 

Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Courts typically 

conduct this analysis in two steps, addressing (1) whether the questioning constituted 

an interrogation, and (2) whether the suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes. 

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011). Because the Government 

concedes the agents’ questioning of Mr. Wagner constituted an “interrogation,”16 we 

focus on the “in custody” requirement. 

An interrogation is custodial when, “in light of the objective circumstances of 

the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012) 

(alterations, citations, and quotations omitted). “[C]ase law is well established that a 

[suspect] is not in custody” when he voluntarily cooperates with the police. Jones, 

523 F.3d at 1239 (quotations omitted). Only when “a suspect’s freedom of action is 

curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest’” is he “in custody” for Miranda

purposes. Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). 

 16 See Aplee. Br. at 34 (referring to Mr. Wagner’s “interrogation”); see also

App. at 93 (noting “the government does not dispute that [the agents] ‘interrogated’ 

Mr. Wagner”). 

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Several non-exclusive factors inform the custody analysis: (1) “the extent . . . 

the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or 

to end the interview at will,” (2) “the nature of the questioning,” (3) the extent police 

officers “dominate the encounter,” id. at 1240 (quotations omitted), and (4) “the 

release of the [suspect] at the end of the questioning,” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. 

Officers may “dominate” an encounter by displaying a weapon, making physical 

contact, isolating the suspect in a police-controlled environment, or appearing in 

overwhelming numbers. See United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 

2008). 

b. Due Process Clause 

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause “erects its own barrier to the 

admission of a defendant’s inculpatory statements.” J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 280. 

“[W]hen the government obtains incriminating statements through acts, threats, or 

promises which cause the defendant’s will to be overborne, it violates the defendant’s 

[due process] rights and the statements are inadmissible . . . .” United States v. 

Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see Colorado v. 

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). A defendant’s statements must be the product 

of “an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Lopez, 437 F.3d at 1063 

(quotations omitted). 

We analyze the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements based on “the totality 

of all the surrounding circumstances, [including] both the characteristics of the 

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[defendant] and the details of the interrogation.” Sharp, 793 F.3d at 1233 (quotations 

omitted). Several factors are relevant to this analysis: 

the [defendant’s] age, education level, whether the 

[defendant] was advised of his or her constitutional rights, 

the length of his or her detention, the nature of the 

questioning, and any physical punishment such as 

deprivation of food or sleep. 

Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). Also relevant is 

whether an officer’s actions or statements amount to a “promise of leniency” in 

exchange for the defendant’s cooperation or confession. Id. at 1229. “The 

Government bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a 

[defendant’s statements were] voluntary.” Lopez, 437 F.3d at 1063 (citing Missouri 

v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 n.1 (2004)). 

Analysis 

Having carefully listened to the audio evidence, we agree with the district 

court that Mr. Wagner was not in custody for Miranda purposes and that his 

statements were voluntary. The admission of his statements from his first interview 

did not violate Miranda or his due process rights. 

a. Non-custodial 

The agents’ interview of Mr. Wagner was not custodial. Considering “the 

objective circumstances,” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, his “freedom of action [was not] 

curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest,” Jones, 523 F.3d at 1239 

(quotations omitted). Four factors support this conclusion. 

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First, Agent Jones repeatedly informed Mr. Wagner he was free to leave. See 

id. at 1240. Agent Jones said he was not under arrest, that he was “free to leave at 

any time,” and that he would not be “going with [them] today.” Hrg. Audio Ex. 9 at 

00:10-15, 01:00-06. “That a person is told repeatedly that he is free to terminate an 

interview is powerful evidence that a reasonable person would have understood that 

he was free to terminate the interview.” Jones, 523 F.3d at 1240 (quotations 

omitted). 

Second, the agents’ questioning was not coercive. See id. at 1240. The district 

court’s finding “that the officers questioned Mr. Wagner in a cordial manner during 

both interviews,” App. at 96, is not clearly erroneous. Our own listening to the 

interview supports this conclusion. The agents’ questioning, even when directed at 

soliciting a confession, see Tr. Audio Ex. 3 at 34:00-14 (asking Mr. Wagner to 

“just—spit it out”), remained “calm and conversational,” Chee, 514 F.3d at 1114. 

Third, the encounter was not police-dominated. Jones, 523 F.3d at 1240. Six 

law enforcement agents executed the Residence Warrant, but only two interviewed 

Mr. Wagner. See id. at 1242 (finding lack of police domination where, despite the 

presence of multiple agents, the defendant “was not confronted by them 

simultaneously or aggressively”).17 The record does not indicate the agents displayed 

 17 As noted, the first interview moved to a police car because it started to rain. 

Mr. Wagner does not argue the change in location supports custody. In any event, 

location is not controlling. See United States v. Lamy, 521 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th 

Cir. 2008) (“Although the vehicle belonged to the agents, location alone does not 

compel the conclusion that a defendant is in custody, so long as his freedom was not 

curtailed to a degree similar to arrest.”); Jones, 523 F.3d at 1243 (noting “[t]he 

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their weapons or made physical contact. See id. at 1240. Although they separated 

Mr. Wagner and his wife, she remained nearby on the porch.18 

Fourth, the agents left Mr. Wagner’s residence without making an arrest. See 

Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (noting a suspect’s “release . . . at the end of the questioning” 

is relevant to the custodial analysis). Mr. Wagner’s asking the agents to leave further 

indicates he “was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 

any significant way.” Chee, 514 F.3d at 1113 (quotations omitted). 

“[E]xamin[ing] all of the circumstances,” a reasonable person in Mr. Wagner’s 

position would have felt at liberty to terminate the interview and leave. Howes, 565 

U.S. at 509 (quotations omitted). Miranda warnings were not required. Jones, 523 

F.3d at 1239. 

b. Voluntary 

“[C]onsidering both the characteristics of [Mr. Wagner] and the details of the 

interrogation,” we agree with the district court that the Government has shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Wagner’s statements were voluntary. Lopez, 

437 F.3d at 1063. Agent Jones’s clear statements that Mr. Wagner was free to leave 

and the conversational nature of the agents’ questioning show his statements were the 

product of “an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Id. 

 

reason for detaining [the suspect] in the patrol car—specifically, the inclement 

weather—derogates from whatever coercive elements are otherwise normally 

attendant thereto” (quotations omitted)). 

18 Mr. Wagner does not argue the first interview’s duration made it coercive. 

See Aplt. Br. at 30-32. 

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Mr. Wagner argues his statements were involuntary because (1) Agent Jones 

“coerced [him] by promises of leniency,” (2) Agents Jones and Daniels threatened 

him to confess by characterizing the evidence against him as “irrebuttable” and 

stating the interview was his “only opportunity” to talk, and (3) his PTSD and 

military background made him “susceptible to the [agents’] coercive tactics.” Aplt. 

Br. at 33-35 (quotations omitted). Each argument fails. 

First, Agent Jones did not promise Mr. Wagner leniency. He contends she 

“implied” the FBI would “dismiss[] . . . the investigation if he talked to them.” Id. at 

34. Agent Jones said his cooperation would allow them to “wrap this up and move 

on” to identifying more serious offenders. See Tr. Audio Ex. 3 at 20:10-50. But her 

expressed interest in finishing the investigation was not “a promise that [Mr. 

Wagner] would be treated leniently.” Sharp, 793 F.3d at 1231 (determining officer 

promised leniency when he stated defendant “would not go to jail”); see Lopez, 437 

F.3d at 1064-65 (concluding officer promised leniency after telling defendant he 

would receive 54 fewer years in prison if he said the killing was a mistake). 

Although Agent Jones may have suggested Mr. Wagner’s conduct was not an FBI 

priority, she did not “impl[y]”—let alone “promise”—the FBI would “dismiss” its 

investigation. Aplt. Br. at 34. 

Second, the agents’ questioning was not threatening. Agents Jones and 

Daniels said that someone in his home had accessed child pornography, that only he 

and his wife lived there, and that in their experience, the husband is usually 

responsible. They did not describe or characterize the evidence against Mr. Wagner 

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as irrebuttable. At 35 minutes into the 43-minute interview, Agent Jones told Mr. 

Wagner that the interview was “really [his] only opportunity” to speak with them. 

See Hrg. Audio Ex. 9 at 40:18-36; Tr. Audio Ex. 3 at 34:00-14. We do not construe 

her statement as threatening. Moreover, Mr. Wagner had already admitted his past 

pornography addiction, the limited access to the laptop and wireless Internet 

connection, and the lack of visitors to the home in the last year. 

Third, the record does not reflect the agents tried to exploit Mr. Wagner’s 

PTSD or military career such that his “will [was] overborne.” Lopez, 437 F.3d at 

1063. He did not disclose his PTSD until 20 minutes into the interview and stated he 

did not then require medication. The recording reveals no attempt to influence Mr. 

Wagner based on his military background. See United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 

1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he police must somehow overreach by exploiting a 

weakness or condition known to exist.”). 

*     *     *     *

The admission of Mr. Wagner’s statements did not violate Miranda or his due 

process rights. The district court properly denied his motion to suppress them. 

D. Outrageous Conduct Motion 

The district court denied Mr. Wagner’s motion to dismiss the indictment, 

concluding the Government’s conduct was not outrageous in violation of due process. 

Mr. Wagner contends the FBI’s operation of Playpen, a child pornography website, 

established the “extraordinary” outrageous conduct defense. United States v. 

Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994). We disagree. 

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Standard of Review 

We review the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for outrageous 

government conduct de novo. Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1207. 

Additional Legal Background 

“When the government’s conduct during an investigation is sufficiently 

outrageous, the courts will not allow the government to prosecute offenses developed 

through that conduct because [doing so] would offend the Due Process Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment.” Pedraza, 27 F.3d at 1521 (quotations omitted). To prove 

outrageous government conduct, the defendant must show “either (1) excessive 

government involvement in the creation of the crime, or (2) significant governmental 

coercion to induce the crime.” United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1288 (10th Cir. 

2013) (quotations omitted). Under “the totality of the circumstances[,] . . . the 

government’s conduct [must be] so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it 

offends the universal sense of justice.” Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1207 (quotations 

omitted). 

“Excessive government involvement occurs if the government engineers and 

directs the criminal enterprise from start to finish.” Pedraza, 27 F.3d at 1521 

(quotations omitted). It is not excessive for the government “to infiltrate an ongoing 

criminal enterprise” or “to induce a defendant to repeat or continue a crime or even to 

induce him to expand or extend previous criminal activity.” Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1288 

(quotations omitted). The government can, for instance, “suggest the illegal 

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activity,” “provide supplies and expertise for the illegal activity,” and “act as both 

supplier and buyer in sales of illegal goods.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Governmental coercion must be “particularly egregious [to] rise[] to the level 

of outrageous conduct.” Pedraza, 27 F.3d at 1521. “[I]f the defendant is already 

involved in criminal activity similar to the type of crime the government is 

attempting to induce him to commit, then the government’s conduct is a less 

important consideration.” Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1289 (quotations omitted); see also 

United States v. Pawlak, 935 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that “[a] 

defendant who actively participates in the crime may not avail himself of [this] 

defense” (quotations omitted)). 

Every circuit to consider the issue has held the FBI’s operation of Playpen was 

not outrageous government conduct. See United States v. Anzalone, 923 F.3d 1, 6 

(1st Cir. 2019); Pawlak, 935 F.3d at 345-46; United States v. Harney, 934 F.3d 502, 

506-07 (6th Cir. 2019); Kienast, 907 F.3d at 530-31; United States v. Tippens, 773 F. 

App’x 383, 385 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished).19

Analysis 

Mr. Wagner has not shown the Government’s conduct was “so shocking . . . 

and intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice.” Perrine, 518 F.3d at 

1207 (quotations omitted). The Government was not excessively involved in 

Playpen’s operation and did not coerce Mr. Wagner’s participation. 

 19 See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may 

be cited for their persuasive value.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 

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The FBI did not “engineer[] and direct[] [Playpen’s operation] from start to 

finish.” Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1288 (quotations omitted). It did not create Playpen, alter 

the site’s functionality, add child pornography, or solicit new users. It seized 

Playpen’s servers and, pursuant to a warrant, hosted the website from a different 

location. Providing a suspect an opportunity “to expand or extend previous criminal 

activity” is not “excessive” government conduct. Id. (quotations omitted). 

Nor did the FBI coerce Mr. Wagner to access Playpen or download child 

pornography. He was an “active consumer” of child pornography before the FBI 

hosted the website. Pawlak, 935 F.3d at 345. Indeed, the 4,311 images and 74 

videos of child pornography found on the laptop in his home, App. at 578, strongly 

indicate he would have accessed Playpen without the FBI’s intervention. See 

Pedraza, 27 F.3d at 1522-23 (finding no outrageous conduct where the defendants 

did not show “they lacked the capacity to commit the crime without the government’s 

assistance” (alterations and quotations omitted)).20

Mr. Wagner has not shown the “egregious circumstances” necessary to warrant 

application of the “extraordinary” outrageous conduct defense. Id. at 1521. The 

district court properly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. 

 20 Mr. Wagner contends the FBI’s operation of Playpen was outrageous 

because it facilitated a “heinous crime” and “re-victimize[d]” the children depicted 

on the website. Aplt. Br. at 37-38. The FBI determined that “operating Playpen for a 

brief period of time to catch the individuals who create the demand for more [child 

pornography]” outweighed the consequences of continuing access for 13 days. 

Harney, 934 F.3d at 507. Even if the FBI’s “complex and carefully considered” 

approach to identifying Playpen’s users may have been debatable, it did not violate 

due process. Id. 

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E. Hearsay Ruling 

The district court denied Mr. Wagner’s motion under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 33 for a new trial, which was based on the hearsay ruling during defense 

counsel’s cross-examination of Agent Jones. Mr. Wagner contends the hearsay 

ruling was erroneous and prevented his counsel from highlighting portions of his 

statements for the jury. 

Standard of Review 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of 

discretion. Harte v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cty. of Johnson, 940 F.3d 498, 519 (10th Cir. 

2019). A new trial on the basis of “an erroneous evidentiary ruling . . . will be 

ordered only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial right of a party.” United 

States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 789, 795 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted); see Fed. R. 

Evid. 103(a) (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only 

if the error affects a substantial right of the party . . . .”). An evidentiary error is 

prejudicial “only . . . if it can be reasonably concluded that [absent the evidentiary 

ruling], there would have been a contrary result.” Weaver v. Blake, 454 F.3d 1087, 

1091 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). 

Additional Procedural Background 

The Government played the recording of Mr. Wagner’s first interview during 

Agent Jones’s direct examination. On cross-examination, Mr. Wagner’s counsel 

began asking her about his statements. The Government asked to approach the bench 

and the following colloquy ensued: 

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[GOVERNMENT]: Your Honor, this is hearsay. I 

understand that those questions were covered in the 

interview, but Rule 801(d)(2) does not allow an opponent 

to introduce his own hearsay statements into evidence. . . . 

THE COURT: Well, [if] you [are] offering these 

statements that Mr. Wagner, according to the witness, 

made to her, your offer of them is an offer of an out-ofcourt statement unless some exception qualifies? 

[DEFENSE]: The – the recordings have been entered into 

evidence. I’m simply asking clarifying questions about 

what was said at this point. I’m not asking for the truth, 

just if they were said. 

THE COURT: So what’s the non[-]truth portion? Why is 

that relevant? 

[DEFENSE]: It’s relevant because Mrs. – the agent has 

already testified about what Mr. Wagner told her. So it’s 

relevant to the fact just to make sure that is, in fact, what 

he told her. 

THE COURT: Well, she testified to that statement. It[’]s 

different when the government offers than when you offer 

because of the hearsay exception that permits her to do so. 

So I’m going to sustain the objection. To the extent you 

are seeking to elicit from this witness statements that 

someone made out of court, even Mr. Wagner, because it’s 

hearsay, it’s an out-of-court statement. 

App. at 522-23. After the jury’s verdict, Mr. Wagner moved for a new trial, asserting 

the court’s hearsay ruling prevented his counsel from highlighting his potentially 

exculpatory interview statements. 

Analysis 

The district court’s hearsay ruling, even if erroneous, was not prejudicial and 

does not warrant a new trial. The recording of Mr. Wagner’s interview statements 

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“was played in court, with minimal redactions, for the jury to hear.” Aplt. Br. at 42.21 

Mr. Wagner’s counsel had ample opportunity to highlight his statements without 

asking Agent Jones to repeat them on cross-examination. Counsel could, and indeed 

did, emphasize Mr. Wagner’s statements during closing argument. See, e.g., App. at 

727 (stating “Mr. Wagner over and over again [told Agents Jones and Daniels] that 

he never viewed child pornography”). Because Mr. Wagner has not shown the 

court’s hearsay ruling “prejudicially affect[ed] a substantial right,” Keck, 643 F.3d at 

795; see Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

his motion for a new trial. 

F. Sufficiency of Evidence 

Mr. Wagner argues the district court erred when it denied his motion under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) for judgment of acquittal based on 

insufficient evidence. We have reviewed the trial evidence and conclude it was 

sufficient to support Mr. Wagner’s convictions. 

Standard of Review 

“We review de novo whether there was sufficient evidence to support a 

defendant’s convictions, viewing all the evidence and any reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. 

Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 830 (10th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); see United States v. 

 21 The jury also requested and received a laptop to listen to the interview 

recording again during deliberations. Dist. Ct. Docs. 72, 72-1. 

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Wells, 739 F.3d 511, 525 (10th Cir. 2014). We consider both circumstantial and 

direct evidence, “but we do not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of 

witnesses.” Isabella, 918 F.3d at 830. Acquittal for insufficient evidence is proper 

“only when no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. 

Additional Procedural Background 

At trial, Agent Jones provided an overview of the execution of the NIT 

Warrant and Residence Warrant. As noted, the Government played the recording of 

Mr. Wagner’s first interview during her testimony. Forensic examiner Amy Corrigan 

testified as an expert in digital forensics about the child pornography evidence found 

on devices seized from Mr. Wagner’s home. We summarize her testimony below. 

On the laptop, forensic examiner Corrigan identified 4,311 images and 74 

videos of child pornography. App. at 577-78. She found a text file containing a 16-

character web address for an index of TOR websites that included a link to Playpen. 

Id. at 580-83. She discovered references to TOR, Playpen, and other child 

exploitation materials on the laptop’s Internet browsing history. Id. at 560-61, 572-

73. She also found the laptop user had accessed the website chaturbate.com with the 

username soldiermike and the same email address soldiermike used to register for 

Playpen. See id. at 576-77. Finally, she noted the laptop’s name was “SFC-Gunner,” 

consistent with the NIT’s identification. Id. at 553.22 

 22 During the first interview, Mr. Wagner told the agents he retired from the 

military as a sergeant first class, Tr. Audio Ex. 3 at 03:09-12, which is abbreviated 

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On Mr. Wagner’s cell phone, Ms. Corrigan found YouTube searches for 

“preteen,” “Lolita sex,” and “child panties,” among others. Id. at 612-14. She noted 

the cell phone used email addresses associated with the laptop, including 

“sfc_wagner@yahoo.com.” Id. at 619-20. She also found it contained images of 

nude females, some of whom appeared to be minors. Id. at 621-23. 

Additional Legal Background 

Mr. Wagner was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B). To prove the offenses, the 

Government had to show Mr. Wagner “knowingly receive[d]” and “knowingly 

possesse[d]” a “visual depiction” involving “the use of a minor engaging in sexually 

explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B); see Supp. App. at 467 [Jury 

Instruction No. 10], 468 [Jury Instruction No. 11]. 

Mr. Wagner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on whether he 

“knowingly received” and “knowingly possessed” child pornography. See Aplt. Br. 

at 46-47. Because the statute does not define these terms, “we are guided by [their] 

ordinary, everyday meaning.” United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th 

Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). The district court defined “knowingly,” “receive,” 

and “possess” for the jury. The court’s definitions, provided below, are uncontested 

on appeal and accord with our case law. 

 

“SFC,” U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Employment Toolkit, 

https://perma.cc/QT66-ET6T. 

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a. Knowingly 

The court instructed the jury that “knowingly” means “the act was done 

voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 

70 at 17 [Jury Instruction No. 15]; see Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1204 (concluding the 

“ordinary and everyday meaning” of “knowingly” under § 2252(a)(2) is “that an act 

was done . . . voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident” 

(quotations omitted)). 

b. Receive 

The court instructed the jury that “[t]o ‘receive’ a visual depiction means to 

take possession or accept delivery of it” and includes “download[ing] an image from 

the [I]nternet.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 70 at 14 [Jury Instruction No. 12] (emphasis omitted); 

see Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1203 (adopting district court’s definition of “receive” under 

§ 2252(a)(2) as “to accept an object and to have the ability to control it” (quotations 

omitted)). 

c. Possess 

The court instructed the jury that possession may be “actual” or “constructive” 

and generally “means to own or to exert control over [an] object.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 70 

at 14 [Jury Instruction No. 12] (emphasis omitted);23 see Haymond, 672 F.3d at 955 

 23 The court explained that a person has “actual possession” when he 

“knowingly has direct physical control over [it]” and “constructive possession” when 

he “knowingly has both the power and the intention . . . to exercise dominion or 

control . . . either directly or through another person or persons.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 70 at 

14 [Jury Instruction No. 12]. 

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(noting “possession of child pornography [under § 2252(a)(4)(B)] may be actual or 

constructive”); United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(defining “possession” under § 2252(a)(4)(B) as “holding or having something . . . as 

one’s own, or in one’s control” (quoting Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989))). 

Analysis 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we 

conclude that Mr. Wagner has not shown that “no reasonable jury could find [him] 

guilty” of knowingly receiving and possessing child pornography. Isabella, 918 F.3d 

at 830. 

NIT-transmitted data and subpoenaed records tied soldiermike to Mr. 

Wagner’s residence. Playpen records showed that from January 31 to March 4, 2015, 

soldiermike logged into Playpen for eight hours and fifty-nine minutes. When 

soldiermike logged into Playpen on February 28, 2015, the NIT identified the 

activating computer’s IP address. Supp. App. at 348. Subpoenaed records 

established that this IP address was registered to Mr. Wagner and his residence. Id. 

at 276. 

Agents found substantial evidence of child pornography in Mr. Wagner’s 

home. The laptop alone had thousands of images and videos of child pornography. 

It also contained evidence of Internet searches for terms relating to child 

pornography, App. at 572-73, 578, and a text file with a link to Playpen, id. at 

582-83. Mr. Wagner’s cellphone’s browsing history included search terms indicating 

an interest in child exploitation materials. Id. at 612-14. 

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Evidence adduced at trial linked Mr. Wagner to the laptop. In his first 

recorded interview, he confirmed that he and his wife were the only people who used 

the laptop, Tr. Audio Ex. 3 at 24:26-35, that the wireless Internet connection was 

password-protected and did not extend beyond the driveway, id. at 22:17-23:35, and 

that no visitor had lived with them in the last year, id. at 05:50-07:25, 21:35-22:16. 

Mr. Wagner also admitted to having a past pornography addiction, id. at 13:20-14:30, 

and to accessing pornography the previous day, id. at 14:50-15:15. 

Mr. Wagner argues the Government “left too many holes in its case” by not 

ruling out the possibility that a visitor to the Wagner residence downloaded the 

thousands of images of child pornography on the laptop that Mr. Wagner said only he 

and his wife used. Aplt. Br. at 46-47. Even if this were plausible, “the evidence 

necessary to support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable 

hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v. 

Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). Given Mr. 

Wagner’s past pornography addiction, the browsing history on his personal 

cellphone, the limited access to the laptop and Internet connection, and the multitude 

of child pornography images and videos found on the laptop, a reasonable jury could 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wagner knowingly received and possessed 

child pornography. See Dobbs, 629 F.3d at 1204 (finding “little doubt that [the 

defendant]—or at least his computer—‘received’ child pornography” where he “d[id] 

not contest that the government found images of child pornography on his 

computer”). 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 We uphold Mr. Wagner’s convictions and the district court’s denials of his 

motions to suppress, to dismiss the indictment, and for a new trial. We affirm the 

district court’s judgment. 

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