Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04240/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04240-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Phillip Ellisor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED 

Ualted State~ Cnrt ol Appeals T tnell Clralt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 2 7 1995 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PHILLIP ELLISOR JONES, also 

known as Phillip Jones, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TALFRED BROWN I 

Defendant-Appellant. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-4240 

No. 94-4030 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

For the District of Utah 

D.C. No. 93-CR-114 

Randy S. Ludlow, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant 

Phillip Ellisor Jones. 

Bruce C. Lubeck, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., 

United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America in case No. 

93-4240. 

Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the briefs for 

Defendant-Appellant Talfred Brown. 

Appellate Case: 93-4240 Document: 01019283500 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 1 
Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States 

Lubeck, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Salt Lake 

briefs for Plaintiff-Appellee United States 

94-4030. 

Attorney, and Bruce C. 

City, Utah, on the 

of America in case No. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Circuit Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge: and 

SAFFELS, District Judge.* 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior Judge for the United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by 

designation. 

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These appeals arise from the same trial in which both 

appellants were jointly accused. We combine them here for ease of 

disposition. After reviewing the record, we conclude the 

government failed in its burden of proof and thus vacate the 

judgments of conviction. 

Talfred Brown and Phillip Ellisor Jones were convicted of 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and of carrying and using a firearm during a 

drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Both raise several 

issues on appeal, but we deal only with the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

On October 6, 1991, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John Kelley 

stopped a vehicle for speeding. The vehicle was driven by Lori 

Grove, with Tracy Duhart in the passenger seat, and Phillip 

Ellisor Jones and Talfred Brown in the back seat. While Trooper 

Kelley talked to the driver, he "observed the odor of burnt 

marijuana." After running a vehicle check, he returned to the car 

and saw "rolling papers" on the rear armrest next to Mr. Jones. 

Trooper Kelley ordered all four occupants to exit the car and 

discovered a marijuana "roach" in Mr. Jones' possession. Trooper 

Kelley proceeded to search both the interior of the vehicle and 

the trunk.1 

While searching, he noticed a plastic screw loose in the 

trunk and observed the plastic trunk lining was pulled away from 

the trunk latch. Looking between the body of the car and the 

1 The validity of these searches has not been raised in this 

appeal. 

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trunk lining, Trooper Kelley found a loaded pistol. After calling 

for backup, he resumed his search and discovered approximately 113 

grams of crack cocaine eighteen inches from the place where he 

found the pistol. 

Having negotiated the dismissal of charges against her in 

exchange for her "truthful" testimony, Ms. Duhart became the 

government's principal witness at trial. Even viewing her tale in 

a light most favorable to the government, as we must, it is 

blatant Ms. Duhart strained the limits of credulity. 

According to her version of the facts, Ms. Duhart was at Ms. 

Grove's apartment in Denver on October 4, 1991. During that time, 

Ms. Grove had many telephone conversations, including several with 

a friend in Los Angeles called "Coco." Ms. Grove told Ms. Duhart 

"Coco" had just broken up with his girlfriend and wanted to come 

to Denver but was afraid to fly alone. Ms. Grove suggested that 

she and Ms. Duhart fly to Los Angeles and accompany "Coco" back to 

Denver. Although Ms. Duhart testified she understood the two 

women were going to return immediately to Denver, she inexplicably 

borrowed clothing and toilet articles from Ms. Grove and packed a 

bag to take with her. 

The duo arrived at the airport, and Ms. Grove attempted to 

purchase tickets with a check. When the ticket agent refused to 

accept that means of payment, Ms. Grove paid $402 cash for two 

one-way tickets. The two women arrived in Los Angeles after 

midnight on October 5th. Mr. Brown, who was identified by Ms. 

Grove as "Coco," met them at the airport. He introduced both Ms. 

Grove and Ms. Duhart to his companion, Mr. Jones. 

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Although Ms. Duhart apparently expected to make an immediate 

return to Denver, she testified the four nonetheless agreed to go 

to a motel in Los Angeles where Mr. Brown obtained two rooms for 

the night. The next morning, they discussed renting a car to 

drive to Denver. To facilitate their local transportation, Mr. 

Brown left and returned with a brown car in which all drove to a 

rental car agency. After what Ms. Duhart testified was "probably 

three hours, maybe even four," because of difficulty in 

establishing the necessary qualifications, Ms. Duhart rented the 

car in her name, paid for by Ms. Grove's mother's credit card.2 

Having transferred the women's bags to the trunk of the 

rental car, the four drove the two vehicles to another 

neighborhood unfamiliar to Ms. Duhart to return the brown car. 

Mr. Brown gave the car keys to a man standing outside a house, 

went in, and returned shortly. Mr. Brown asked Ms. Grove to "pop 

the trunk," and he and Mr. Jones stood at the rear of the car "for 

a little while." Ms. Duhart could not see what they were doing 

nor hear what, if anything, they were saying. Ms. Duhart's only 

observation was that Mr. Brown walked out of the house "with his 

shirt untucked . . . but before he went in his shirt was tucked 

in." 

2 The rental agreement indicates the car was delivered at 18:55 

(6:55 p.m.). Assuming the transaction took four hours, it is 

unexplained, and therefore unclear, what transpired in the six 

hours between the time the parties arose and the time they arrived 

at the rental agency. 

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The group then returned to the motel where the women showered 

and changed clothes.3 The four next drove the rental car to Mr. 

Brown's girlfriend's house to obtain his belongings. Mr. Brown 

went inside and returned with some clothes, which he and Mr. Jones 

put into the trunk with other items they had already stored there 

while the car was parked at the motel. 

Again, Ms. Duhart did not see what the men were doing at the 

car trunk. She nonetheless stated she saw Mr. Brown with his 

clothes as he walked by the car, and "when he came back to the 

front of the car he did not have the clothes." She assumed, 

therefore, "he put those in the trunk of the car." At the same 

time, she heard no conversation between the two men. 

Mr. Brown then returned to the front of the car, and while 

talking to Ms. Grove, "he was under the dashboard and he was 

feeling around under there." He then "got out and went to the 

front of the car where the hood was and was feeling around under 

there." Mr. Brown said nothing while conducting his explorations. 

The two men then got into the car, and the group began its journey 

to Denver. 

At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the government's 

principal witness, the only witness who could have connected 

either defendant to the gun and the crack cocaine, saw neither a 

gun nor a package of any kind remotely resembling the package of 

crack cocaine. Thus, there is no direct evidence in the record 

tying either defendant to the items which formed the basis of the 

3 Ms. Duhart stated Mr. Jones obtained a "new room" for this 

purpose. 

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charges against them. Moreover, the government was unable to 

identify any fingerprints on the gun or the package of crack 

cocaine, and no one attempted to obtain prints from the interior 

of the trunk where those items were found. Consequently, the 

government's entire case stands or falls upon Ms. Duhart's 

testimony, which we have set forth in its entirety. 

Nonetheless, the government argues there is sufficient 

evidence to support both convictions. The prosecution claims a 

reasonable jury could have found defendants guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt upon the direct and circumstantial evidence 

contained in the record and the reasonable inferences drawn from 

such evidence. United States v. Leonard, 936 F.2d 1138, 1140 

(lOth Cir. 1991); United States v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 1493, 1495 

(lOth Cir. 1993). 

First, the government relies extensively on inferences drawn 

from Ms. Duhart's testimony, depending heavily upon the facts Mr. 

Brown looked under the dashboard and hood of the car, and spent a 

few minutes by the trunk. The government argues these facts 

indicate Mr. Brown was looking for a place to hide the drugs and 

the gun. The government also contends the jury could have drawn 

an inference the women did not travel from Denver with the gun 

because of the jury's assumed knowledge that airport metal 

detectors would not have allowed them to carry the gun on an 

airplane. The government also contends there are guilty 

inferences in the bizarre circumstances of Ms. Grove and Ms. 

Duhart's flying to Los Angeles to pick up Mr. Brown and Mr. Jones 

and their driving back to Denver. Moreover, the government 

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suggests, Mr. Jones' failure to offer a "valid reason" for 

traveling to Denver also supports this inference.4 The government 

also points to Ms. Duhart's testimony that while the group was 

waiting at the side of the road following the stop by Trooper 

Kelley, Mr. Brown said he "should have smoked him."5 This 

evidence, the government argues, was sufficient for a jury to 

conclude the defendants "knew about the drugs, had some right to 

control over them, helped or aided in their transportation, and 

that the drugs were for delivery to someone else." 

Second, the government argues that sufficient evidence also 

exists to support conviction on the firearms charge. Under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c), the government may prove defendants either used 

or carried the firearm. The use requirement is satisfied if 

defendants had "ready access" to the firearm and it was an 

"integral part" of their drug trafficking. United States v. Ross, 

920 F.2d 1530, 1536 (lOth Cir. 1990). This court has held that 

the requirement was met when a gun was kept at home where drugs 

were distributed. United States v. Williams, 923 F.2d 1397, 1402-

03 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 925 (1991). 

Similarly, in a case where a defendant was arrested in his car 

with drugs and other indications of drug selling nearby and a gun 

was found underneath the driver's seat where he sat, we held the 

4 Of course, Mr. Jones was not obliged to provide any 

explanation for his actions. In any event, no one apparently 

asked him why he was making the trip, or if he was asked, no one 

testified about his reply. Thus, to suggest his failure to offer 

a reason for accompanying Mr. Brown permits an incriminatory 

inference is without logic. 

5 There was no effort made to explain this statement. 

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government established use. United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 

1519, 1525-26 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 270 (1991). 

Williams and McDonald indicate the type of evidence necessary to 

support a conviction. The government maintains the evidence in 

this case is similar. 

Alternatively, the government argues it may prove the 

defendants were "carrying" the gun. Carrying may be established 

by transporting the gun in a vehicle. United States v. cardenas, 

864 F.2d 1528, 1533 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 

(1989) . The government must also link the use or carrying of the 

firearm to the drug trafficking. This requirement is met with 

proof that the defendant intended the weapon to be available for 

use during the drug transaction. United States v. Nicholson, 983 

F.2d 983, 990 (lOth Cir. 1993). In this case, the prosecution 

argues the handgun was within easy reach upon entry into the trunk 

and was found within one foot of the drugs. This could allow the 

jury to find that it was intended for use in protecting the drugs. 

We review sufficiency of evidence claims by viewing all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The court 

must "determine whether any reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Coslet, 987 F.2d at 

1495. A conviction for possession with the intent to distribute a 

controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1), may be supported by a 

finding of constructive possession by the jury. "Constructive 

possession may be found if a person knowingly has ownership, 

dominion or control over the narcotics and the premises where the 

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narcotics are found. 11 Id.; United States v. Hager, 969 F. 2d 883, 

888 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992). 

Even with this standard limiting our view of the evidence, we 

find a critical flaw in the government's case. Recognizing its 

entire prosecution is built upon circumstantial evidence, the 

government depends upon inferences to carry its burden. A 

principle the government has overlooked, however, is probative 

inferences "must be more than speculation and conjecture." 

Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (lOth 

Cir. 1987) (citing Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 

(1943)). "A jury will not be allowed to engage in a degree of 

speculation and conjecture that renders its finding a guess or 

mere possibility. Such a finding is infirm because it is not 

based on the evidence. 11 Sunward, 811 F. 2d at 521 (quoting Daniels 

v. TWin oaks NUrsing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1982)}. 

Although we noted in Sunward a reasonable inference and mere 

speculation may be difficult to distinguish, we adopted the 

approach of the Third Circuit: 

The line between a reasonable inference that may 

permissibly be drawn by a jury from basic facts in 

evidence and an impermissible speculation is not drawn 

by judicial idiosyncrasies. The line is drawn by the 

laws of logic. If there is an experience of logical 

probability that an ultimate fact will follow from a 

stated narrative or historical fact, then the jury is 

given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there 

is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows 

from the proven facts. 

Tose v. First Penn~lvania Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 895 (3d Cir.) 

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981). Additionally, "the essential 

requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for 

probative facts after making due allowance for all reasonably 

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Appellate Case: 93-4240 Document: 01019283500 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 10 
possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked." 

Galloway, 319 u.s. at 395. 

We cannot permit speculation to substitute for proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Even though rational jurors may believe in the 

likelihood of the defendants' guilt, as they probably did in this 

case, they may not convict on that belief alone. It cannot be 

equivocated that a conviction without supporting evidence must 

fall. 

What the government contends constitutes reasonable 

inferences simply does not sustain a logical probability. For 

example, the prosecution's suggestion that Mr. Brown's 

explorations under the dash and hood are inferential of his 

attempt to hide the drugs and gun is illogical because it piles 

one inference upon another. To justify the inference Mr. Brown 

was trying to hide these items, there must have been some proof he 

possessed items to hide. Without such proof, the suggestion he 

was trying to hide something is conjecture. The only reasonable 

inference which is logically probable on the state of the evidence 

is that Mr. Brown was looking for something under the dash and 

hood. What he was seeking, again, is pure speculation. Thus, the 

inference he was attempting to hide something, let alone that he 

was trying to hide a gun and drugs, simply does not logically flow 

from the established facts. 

Of the same ilk is the government's suggestion the jury could 

have inferred the defendants must have possessed the gun because 

it is impossible to carry a firearm on a plane. Assuming for the 

moment that in the absence of testimony the jury could have drawn 

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on common experience to conclude guns cannot be transported on 

commercial aircraft, that knowledge does not inexorably lead to 

the inference either defendant possessed the gun. That inference 

might have been logical if the facts showed only the two women or 

the defendants and no one else could have placed the gun in the 

car. Upon the evidence produced by the government, however, it is 

an equally logical inference that the gun was in the car when it 

was rented. Indeed, no fact proved by the government logically 

implies how the gun or the drugs got into the trunk in the first 

place. Ms. Duhart, the only witness in a position to see 

defendants with the illicit items, denied having done so. Thus, 

the government's "proof" is nothing more than speculation. 

The government seeks to overcome this problem by arguing Mr. 

Jones had a blue bag of sufficient size to hold the gun. Yet, 

despite its size, there is absolutely nothing in the record to 

otherwise connect the gun to the blue bag. There is no testimony 

that the blue bag seemed heavy, that it appeared to contain a 

bulky item, that it had an oily residue, nor any other evidence 

suggesting the presence of a firearm. Indeed, from the state of 

the record, it is an equally plausible inference that the blue bag 

was always in the condition in which it was found: empty. 

The government also argues the bizarre conduct of these four 

people is inferential of drug trafficking. While there is no 

doubt Ms. Duhart's version of the events is patently inconsistent 

and of dubious credibility, taking the next step to infer bizarre 

actions imply illicit conduct is of questionable logic. To then 

take the further step and infer the illicit conduct was drug 

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trafficking is pure conjecture. There is nothing in the evidence 

which would have led the jury in logical steps from Ms. Duhart's 

testimony of bizarre activity to a verdict of guilty. 

Finally, Mr. Brown's statement he should have "smoked him" is 

at best equivocal. From the record, we have no idea what that 

statement meant because there was no effort made to explain it. 

We assume the jury was left to speculate what "smoke" means and 

that the object of the smoking was Trooper Kelley. The government 

made no attempt to aid the jury so it could have drawn a logical, 

if not weighty, inference from that statement. Ascribing a 

criminal motive to that statement now is simply surmise. 

While trial courts are generally reluctant to direct verdicts 

of acquittal, the motions to dismiss should have been granted 

here. Notwithstanding the critical evidence spewed by Ms. Duhart 

defies logic, and regardless of the inherently suspicious nature 

of the conduct of the four people in this case, the jury should 

not have been allowed to substitute its belief about what probably 

occurred for what the government actually proved. We cannot 

permit the verdict to stand. 

In suggesting we have substituted our judgment for that of 

the jury, the dissent has missed the point. We have looked at the 

testimony of the government's key witness in a light most favorable to the prosecution and have discovered it wanting. For the 

reasons we have explained, nothing within that testimony beyond 

surmise and conjecture provides the jury with any evidence, direct 

or circumstantial, tying the defendants to the gun and drugs 

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discovered hidden in the trunk of the car ostensibly rented by Ms. 

Duhart. 

For example, the dissent states defendants had access to the 

trunk and stood near its open door on "at least two occasions" 

suggesting these facts provide proof upon which the jury could 

have relied. We heartily disagree. Without more, and there is no 

more, that is proof only that defendants stood by the open trunk. 

It would be by the rankest speculation that any juror could infer 

from the fact defendants stood by an open trunk defendants had 

possessed cocaine and a gun and had hidden them in that location. 

Moreover, the irrationality of such an inference is increased in 

magnitude by the fact that the only items Ms. Duhart ever saw in 

defendants' possession were clothes defendants put in the trunk 

where they were later found by Trooper Kelly. 

Although the dissent correctly states an appellate court 

cannot rule upon the credibility of a witness, that is not what we 

have done in Ms. Duhart's case. It is not a determination of 

credibility to point out the testimony of a witness is blatantly 

inconsistent or defiant of common logic. Our statement of Ms. 

Duhart's credulity is based upon internally contradictory 

utterances she made in her testimony, and not upon our reaction to 

that testimony. Indeed, even the government in its argument 

referred to Ms. Duhart's story about the trip as "bizarre." We 

thus believe, although taken in the light most favorable to the 

government, the facts upon which our observation of the nature of 

Ms. Duhart's testimony is based are so patent, reporting them does 

not constitute a weighing of her credibility. 

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For example, assuming she testified truthfully when she said 

she believed she was returning immediately to 

subsequent testimony that she borrowed a change of 

other personal items to take with her is a 

Moreover, those statements are patently inconsistent 

Denver, her 

clothes and 

non sequitur. 

and stretch 

credulity, even in the eyes of the most impartial observer. When 

the entirety of the testimony of the government's key witness is 

peppered with that kind of inconsistency, we cannot turn our back 

upon it under the premise of not invading the province of the 

jury. Our duty as appellate judges transcends such a benign 

review of the evidence. 

Finally, the dissent further errs in assuming we question the 

judgment of the jury. As we have already noted, we simply believe 

the district court erred by permitting the jury to consider the 

case in the first instance. The court should have granted the 

defense motion to dismiss at the close of the prosecution's case. 

That is a judicial judgment quite removed from the province of the 

jury and one we are uniquely qualified to render. 

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS VACATED. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

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SAFFELS, Senior District Judge, Dissenting. 

Because I cannot support the decision by the majority to 

substitute its determination of witness credibility for that of the 

jury, I dissent. 

From the outset, it is clear that the majority questioned the 

credibility of Tracy Duhart and consequently determined that the 

jury could not have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 1 I fear the court has invaded the province of the jury and 

erroneously taken on the role of trier of fact. 

"An appellate court may not decide the credibility of 

witnesses as that is the exclusive task of the fact trier. [I]t is 

for the jury to decide which witnesses to believe and which not. 

Once the jury has spoken, this court may not reweigh the 

credibility of witnesses." u.s. v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349, 352-

53 (lOth cir. 1993). Credibility determinations are for the jury, 

not the appellate court. u.s. v. Uresti-Hernandez, 968 F.2d 1042, 

1045 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

"In determining whether evidence is sufficient • • • • [w]e 

will not weigh evidence or determine credibility. Appellate 

reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence should be confined to 

cases where the failure of the prosecution is clear. The evidence 

The majority states: 0 • • it is blatant Ms. Duhart 

strained the limits of credulity." Again, the majority attacks Ms. 

Duhart's testimony and states: " • there is no doubt Ms. 

Duhart's version of the events is patently inconsistent and of 

dubious credibility •••• " Once more the majority questions the 

testimony of the witness when it comments "Notwithstanding the 

critical evidence spewed by Ms. Duhart defies logic •••• 11 

Appellate Case: 93-4240 Document: 01019283500 Date Filed: 02/27/1995 Page: 16 
need not be unconnected to every condition save that of guilt. " 

u.s. v. Cardono-Usguiano, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994). 

"An appellate court can reverse only if no reasonable jury 

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

This standard is a strict one and a jury verdict will not be 

overturned lightly." u.s. v. Frayer, 9 F.3d 1367, 1371 (8th Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, Haney v. u.s., __ u.s. __ , 115 s. ct. 77 

(1994). A defendant must meet a heavy burden to gain reversal on 

a claim of sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant must show 

that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt (emphasis added). u.s. v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 

456, 460 {lOth cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ u.s. __ , 115 s. ct. 77 

(1994). 

The defendant argues that "if evidence is consistent with both 

innocence and guilt, it cannot support a conviction." United 

States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772, 775 {lOth Cir. 1984). The majority 

seems to implicitly concur by offering its discussion of "equally 

plausible inference[s]." However, this court in United States v. 

Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1530 {lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 

{1986) clearly stated that its past use of "consistent with both 

innocence and guilt" language in numerous opinions, including 

Varoz, was unfortunate and antithetical to the decisions of the 

United states Supreme Court in Holland v. United States, 348 u.s. 

121, 140 {1954) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 u.s 307, 326 (1979). 

It is erroneous to suggest that a criminal conviction cannot be 

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sustained if a reasonable hypothesis could be designed which is 

consistent with innocence. Id. 

Ms. Duhart testified that the defendants: had access to the 

trunk; were at the rear of the car with the trunk open on at least 

two occasions; carried certain items when they were at the rear of 

the car with the trunk up and which were not brought into the 

passenger compartment; conducted a search under the dashboard and 

under the hood; and pretended to be asleep when Officer Barney 

pulled the car to the side of the road. 

The jury, as all juries are, was free to believe this 

testimony. It is inconsistent with the role of appellate courts 

for us to now decide the jury was not free to believe that 

testimony on the basis of our reading of a cold record. "Only when 

the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, 

from which the jury could find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

may an appellate court overturn the verdict." U.S. v. DePriest, 6 

F.3d 1201, 1206 (7th Cir. 1993). Only when, without weighing the 

credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable 

conclusion as to the proper judgment may a trial judge or an 

appellate court reverse a jury verdict. 

Practice! 50.07(2] (2d ed. 1984). 

5 A J. Moore's Federal 

I do not believe this is one of those rare cases that contains 

no evidence to support the jury verdict or for which there is only 

one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. I do believe 

the jury properly exercised its judgment and that we are not now 

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free to question that judgment even though we might, had we been 

members of the jury, have reached a different conclusion. 

I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 

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