Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02257/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02257-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alfredo Frias-Trujillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

Robert L. Hoecker 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Office of the Clerk 

C404 United States Courthouse 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

November 15, 1993 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 92-2257, USA v. Frias-Trujillo 

Filed November 9, 1993 by Judge McKay 

Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

Mr. Svet's title, as attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

should read United States Attorney, not Untied States 

Attorney. 

Please make this correction to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 92-2257 Document: 01019284645 Date Filed: 11/09/1993 Page: 1 
PUBLISH F'ILED 

United Smw3 Cot:rt of Appeals 'i.:::-.th Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 0 9 1993 

----------------------~-OBERTL.HOSCKER 

Clo,.k · ~ .... 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

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Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 92-2257 

ALFREDO FRIAS-TRUJILLO 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-91-672-SC) 

Submitted on the briefs. 

Jana M. Miner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Don J. Svet, Untied States Attorney; Judith A. Patton and Charles 

L. Barth, Assistant u.s. Attorneys, District of New Mexico, Las 

Cruces, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 92-2257 Document: 01019284645 Date Filed: 11/09/1993 Page: 2 
The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted for 

decision on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 

34.1.2. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral 

argument. 

Defendant Alfredo Frias-Trujillo appeals his sentence for reentry into the United States after deportation in violation of 8 

U.S.C. § 1326(b), claiming that the district court erred in calculating his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b). Mr. Frias was convicted of burglary in Texas in May 1989. He was sentenced to 

twenty-five years imprisonment, and was deported in June 1991. 

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Frias re-entered the United States, and 

was arrested in New Mexico in November 1991 for burglary. Approximately one week later, Immigration and Naturalization Service 

agents interviewed Mr. Frias regarding his immigration status, and 

Mr. Frias admitted he was in the country illegally. Mr. Frias was 

subsequently charged with re-entry after deportation "[i]n violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 and 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) ." (R. Vol. I Doc. 1.) 

Mr. Frias eventually pled guilty. 

The presentence report calculated Mr. Frias' base offense 

level at eight, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The PSR then recommended a sixteen-level increase pursuant to§ 2L1.2(b) (2), based 

on the determination that the May 1989 burglary in Texas constituted a "crime of violence" so as to be an "aggravated felony" 

within the meaning of that section. Mr. Frias objected to this 

characterization, and the trial court accepted Mr. Frias' proffer 

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that the crime was committed during the day and no person or property was injured. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that 

the burglary was a crime of violence because it involved "a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property 

of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." 

(R. Vol. II at 4.) The trial court then applied the sixteen 

offense level increase to Mr. Frias' base offense level of eight, 

granted a two-level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed the statutory maximum sentence of sixty 

months, with three years supervised release. 

Mr. Frias appeals, arguing that under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) (1), 

the increase to the base offense level should have been only four 

rather than eight, for a total offense level of ten after the 

departure for acceptance of responsibility. With Mr. Frias' criminal history level of VI, his maximum sentence would then have 

been twenty-four to thirty months. We affirm the district court's 

sentence. 

The district court's legal interpretation of the Sentencing 

Guidelines is a question of law, subject to de novo review. 

United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1008 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. (Oct. 12, 1993). 

Mr. Frias raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues 

that, under Texas law, the May 1989 burglary does not constitute a 

"crime of violence" as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), so as to 

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Appellate Case: 92-2257 Document: 01019284645 Date Filed: 11/09/1993 Page: 4 
permit a court to impose a sixteen-level offense increase under § 

2L1.2 (b) (2) for an "aggravated felony." Section 2L1.2 defines an 

"aggravated felony" as "any crime of violence (as defined in 18 

U.S.C. § 16 ... ) for which the term of imprisonment imposed 

.. is at least five years." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n. 7). 

A "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 is defined as follows: 

(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person or property of another, or 

(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its 

nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 

against the person or property of another may be used in 

the course of committing the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 16. The legislative history to § 16 notes that 

"offenses such as burglary in violation of a State law . would 

be included in [§ 16(b)] inasmuch as such an offense would involve 

the substantial risk of physical force against another person or 

against the property." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, 

reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3182, 3487. 1 Mr. Frias urges this 

court to hold that, because in this particular case nobody was at 

home, no property was damaged, and nobody was injured, the burglary was not a "crime of violence." There is no indication that 

Congress intended "that a particular crime might sometimes count 

1 Mr. Frias appears to argue that whether a burglary 

constitutes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 depends 

upon how the crime is characterized under state law. Appellee's 

Br. at 8-9. We reject this view, because it would mean that a 

person convicted of exactly the same activity would, or would not, 

receive a sentence enhancement, depending on how the particular 

state characterized the crime. See Taylor v. United States, 495 

U.S. 575, 590-91 (1990); see also Dickerson v. New Banner 

Institute. Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1983) (absent plain 

indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed 

so that their application is dependent on state law) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-2257 Document: 01019284645 Date Filed: 11/09/1993 Page: 5 
towards enhancement and sometimes not, depending on the facts of 

the case." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990). We 

therefore affirm the district court's finding that the Texas burglary constituted a "crime of violence" for purposes of § 

2L1.2 (b) (2). 

Mr. Frias next argues that, since the indictment was treated 

as a violation of § 1326(b) (1) (re-entry after deportation subsequent to a felony "other than an aggravated felony"), rather than 

of § 1326(b) (2) (re-entry after deportation subsequent to an 

"aggravated felony"), the district court erred in applying § 

2L1.2(b) (2) 's enhancement provision. Essentially, Mr. Frias 

argues that there is a direct correlation between§ 1326(b) (1) and 

§ 2L1.2(b) (1) of the Guidelines (increase for prior deportation 

after conviction for a "felony"), and between§ 1326(b) (2) and§ 

2L1.2(b) (2) (increase for prior deportation after conviction for 

an "aggravated felony"). Since Mr. Frias pled guilty to a violation of § 1326(b) (1), he argues, the district court erred in 

enhancing his sentence under§ 2L1.2(b) (2) .

2 While Mr. Frias' 

argument enjoys a certain symmetry, we believe that a review of 

2 Mr. Frias argues that because the indictment failed to 

specify whether he was charged with violating§ 1326(b) (1) or 

(b) (2), his plea of guilty to a violation of § 1326(b) must be 

construed as a plea only to§ 1326(b) (1). The district court 

appears to have adopted this view as well, since it noted that 

"the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is sixty (60) months 

for this offense." (R. Vol. I Doc. 13 at 2); (R. Vol. II at 6.) 

Had the court construed the plea to be to§ 1326(b) (2), the 

statutorily authorized maximum sentence would have been 180 

months, or 15 years. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2). For purposes of our 

analysis, we construe the indictment as having charged a violation 

of § 1326 (b) (1) . 

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the history and structure of § 2L1.2 indicates that the symmetry 

is but an illusion. 

Under the Guidelines, the sentencing court is directed to 

select the appropriate guideline in light of the crime of conviction. The Guidelines provide that § 2L1.2 is the appropriate 

guideline for violations of § 1326. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. 

(statutory provisions); id., App. A at 396. Neither the commentary nor the statutory appendix breaks down the applicability of § 

2L1.2(b) into subsections. Furthermore, the Guidelines direct the 

district court to consider the "specific offense characteristics" 

in determining the appropriate sentencing range within the applicable guideline. U.S.S.G. §1B1.2, comment. (n.2). Section 

2Ll.2(b) is explicitly captioned "Specific Offense Characteristics," and states "[i]f more than one applies, use the greater." 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b). This language clearly indicates that the 

sentencing court's consideration is not limited by the particular 

subsection of § 1326 at issue. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a 

similar view. See United States v. Arias-Granados, 941 F.2d 996 

(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that sentences of defendants who pled 

guilty to a violation of § 1326(a) could be enhanced under 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (b) (1)). 

A brief review of the history of § 2L1.2 further supports 

this conclusion. Subsection (b) (1) first appeared in amendment 

193 to the Guidelines, effective November 1, 1989. See U.S.S.G. 

App. Cat 87. At that time, the section provided for a four-level 

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increase for deportation following a conviction for any felony 

other than one involving violation of the immigration laws. Id. 

At the same time, the Commentary was amended to include the following application note: 

3. A 4-level increase is provided under subsection 

(b) (1) in the case of a defendant who was previously 

deported after sustaining a conviction for a felony, 

other than a felony involving a violation of the immigration laws. In the case of a defendant previously 

deported after sustaining a conviction for an aggravated 

felony . . . an upward departure may be warranted. 

Id. In 1991, section 2L1.2(b) was again amended, taking its 

present form with two subsections, one indicating a four-level 

increase for a prior felony, and the other specifying a sixteenlevel increase for a prior aggravated felony. Id. at 199, amend. 

375. The commentary to amendment 375 indicates that the purpose 

of this amendment was to eliminate the need to request an upward 

departure for a prior aggrav~ted felony, because the Commission 

had determined that a sixteen-level increase was appropriate in 

such cases. Id. at 200. Thus, there is no indication that the 

Commission intended to establish a direct correlation between the 

respective subsections of § 1326 and§ 2L1.2(b). To the contrary, 

Mr. Frias' logic would indicate the Commission's desire to make 

the guideline more lenient by forbidding a sixteen-level increase 

unless the defendant was specifically convicted of a violation of 

§ 1326(b) (2), while the history of§ 2L1.2 indicates that the 

Commission intended to strengthen penalties for violations of § 

1326 as a whole by eliminating the need for a discretionary upward 

departure. We therefore hold that the district court did not err 

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in applying§ 2Ll.2(b) (2) to enhance the defendant's penalty. 

Mr. Frias finally argues that if this court holds that there 

is some ambiguity as to whether there is a direct correlation 

between the respective subsections of§ 1326(b) and§ 2L1.2(b), 

the rule of lenity requires us to give the more lenient interpretation of the penalty. In light of our holding above that the 

structure and history of§ 2L1.2(b) conclusively show that there 

is no such correlation, we reject this argument. 

In summary, we hold that the district court correctly applied 

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) (2) to Mr. Frias' conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 

1326. The sentence is AFFIRMED. 

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