Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02229/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02229-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Alameida
Respondent
Tri Vi Au
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 To avoid confusion, Tri Vi Au will be referred to as “Tri Au,” “Tri,” or “petitioner,” and

Dung Au will be referred to as “Dung Au” or “Dung.”

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRI VI AU,

Petitioner,

 v.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2229 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has filed a traverse. The case is ready

for decision. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Tri Vi Au1

 was convicted at a bench trial in Santa Clara County of selling

or offering to sell cocaine base, see Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11352(a), possessing

cocaine base for sale, see id. § 11351.5, and being under the influence of a controlled

substance, see id. § 11550(a). Ex. 6 (opinion of the California Court of Appeal) at 1. The

court found true that Tri had three prior serious felony convictions and had served a prior

prison term and failed to remain free of custody for five years. Id. He was sentenced to

twenty-five years to life for sale of or offering to sell cocaine base and was given a stayed

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sentence of twenty-five years to life for possessing cocaine base for sale. CT at 260. In

the interest of justice, the court imposed a concurrent one year sentence for being under

the influence and dismissed the prior prison allegation. Id. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentence. The

California Supreme Court denied his application for review. His state habeas petitions

presenting the issues raised here were denied.

As grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his convictions of

possessing cocaine base for sale and selling or offering cocaine base for sale violated due

process because there was insufficient evidence to support them; (2) his counsel was

ineffective in not making a motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case; and

(3) his counsel was ineffective in calling Truong Do as a witness.

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are taken from the opinion of

the California Court of Appeal:

Officer Luu Pham was a surveillance and undercover buy officer in the

San Jose Police Department, narcotics division. A reliable confidential informant

informed Pham that two Vietnamese individuals named Tri and Truong were

selling crack cocaine. The informant gave Officer Pham their cellular telephone

number: 829-4009. According to the informant, Officer Pham could use the

telephone number to contact the men and arrange a buy.

On April 13, 1999, Officer Pham called the cellular telephone number

provided by the informant. A man answered in Vietnamese and identified

himself as Tri. After Officer Pham identified himself as the friend of another

acquaintance, the man asked Officer Pham how many rocks he wanted. Officer

Pham replied “two” and the two arranged to meet at the Palm Tree Motel, room

26, on Monterey Road in 20 minutes.

Officer Pham, Officer Luan Nguyen and Officer Khanh Nguyen set up

surveillance at the motel. After about 20 minutes, they saw a black Integra

sedan park in front of room 26. An Asian male stepped out. The man, later

identified as Dung Au, was arrested for being under the influence. A search of

Dung revealed 14 rocks of cocaine. Dung did not have a cellular telephone in

his possession.

Dung was taken to the police station and interviewed. Dung consented

to the search of his bedroom at 2695 Ransdell, San Jose. Dung, along with the

three officers, went to the house. From the outside of the house, Dung pointed

out his room to the officers. Officer Pham remained in the patrol car with Dung.

The other two officers approached his residence.

From the front porch, Officer Luan Nguyen observed a man, woman and

young boy inside the residence. The man was looking at a stack of papers and

using a calculator. Officer Luan Nguyen knocked on the door and identified

himself. The woman saw the officers through the door, and yelled “cops are

here,” in Vietnamese. The man grabbed his papers and ran into a bedroom on

the right side of the house. A young man entered the living room, saw the

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officers, who were still outside, and ran back into a bedroom on the left side of

the house. The older man came back. The man, along with the woman, opened

the door.

Officer Luan Nguyen told them that they had Dung Au and were

investigating narcotics sales. After being invited inside, Officer Luan Nguyen

asked the woman if there was anyone else in the house. She said that there

was not. Officer Luan Nguyen received the woman’s permission to do a limited

sweep of the residence for other occupants.

Officer Luan Nguyen entered the bedroom on the left where he had seen

the other man retreat. He found Truong Do standing in a smoke-filled room.

Based upon his training and experience, Officer Luan Nguyen recognized that

the smoke was from crack cocaine. A homemade crack pipe, glass beaker and

baking soda were in plain view.

Officer Luan Nguyen escorted Do out into the living room with the others.

The older man, who was still in the living room, asked to get a jacket. Officer

Luan Nguyen accompanied the man to the master bedroom. As they

approached the closet, Officer Luan Nguyen heard a cellular telephone ring from

inside. Officer Luan Nguyen opened the closet door and saw a man, defendant,

squatting in the closet holding something in his hands.

Officer Luan Nguyen drew his gun, and ordered defendant out of the

closet and onto the ground. Officer Khanh Nguyen handcuffed defendant and

Officer Luan Nguyen seized the object in defendant’s hand, which was a cellular

telephone. The older man got his jacket and Officer Luan Nguyen escorted the

older man back into the living room.

Officer Khanh Nguyen remained in the bedroom with defendant.

Defendant became irate, began yelling, and charged Officer Khanh Nguyen. A

struggle ensued. Officer Khanh Nguyen, with the help of Officer Luan Nguyen,

subdued defendant.

Officer Pham, who was standing outside the search, observed Nhan Au

arrive at the residence. Officer Pham spoke with Au outside, detected an odor

of marijuana, and arrested and searched Au, finding marijuana. Officer Pham

requested and received permission to search Au’s bedroom. Au identified the

same room as Dung.

Defendant was taken outside to a patrol car. Officer Pham opined that

defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance. Officer Pham

spoke with defendant and recognized that his voice was the voice of the person

that had accepted Officer Pham’s order for cocaine. Officer Pham confirmed

that defendant’s name was Tri Au.

Officer Pham entered the residence. Officer Luan Nguyen handed Officer

Pham the cellular telephone defendant had in his possession. Using his own

cellular telephone, Officer Pham placed a call to the number he had received

from the informant. Defendant’s cellular telephone rang, displaying Officer

Pham’s number on the caller identification.

Defendant’s cellular telephone subsequently rang several times. Officer

Pham answered the calls, spoke with the callers in Vietnamese, pretending to

be a drug dealer. Officer Pham told the callers that defendant was unavailable

and took their drug orders.

Ex. 6 at 2-4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

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adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a

state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present

clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion, in this case that of the

Santa Clara County Superior Court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner Tri Au first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his

convictions for possession for sale of cocaine base and sale or offer for sale of cocaine

base. As to the first charge, he argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient

evidence that he had control or dominion over the drugs found in Dung Au’s sock or in the

handle of the portable stereo in Dung’s room. Tri Au further argues that the prosecution did

not present sufficient evidence that a sale or offer for sale of cocaine base actually

occurred.

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner is entitled to habeas

relief when the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as

sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).

A federal court sitting in habeas review of a state court conviction does not

determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence presented at trial established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, the

federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

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elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

may the writ be granted. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. The operative

question is whether the state court decision upholding the conviction as based on sufficient

evidence reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the

case. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005).

A. Possession for Sale

The Santa Clara Superior Court, in denying Tri’s habeas petition, determined that

substantial evidence establishing Tri’s guilt of possession of cocaine base for sale was

provided at trial. Ex. 10. As the superior court was the highest state court to rule on the

merits of this issue, this court reviews the decision to determine whether it was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established United States Supreme Court

precedent.

The evidence on this charge included: (1) the person who answered the phone

number provided to police by the informant identified himself as “Tri,” RT 106-107; (2)

Officer Pham asked to buy two rocks of crack cocaine and agreed to meet the person on

the phone at the Palm Tree Hotel in twenty minutes, RT 108; (3) fourteen individually

wrapped 0.2 gram packages of crack cocaine were found in Dung’s sock when he arrived

at the Palm Tree Motel approximately twenty minutes after Pham’s phone call, RT 110-111,

200; (4) in Dung’s pocket, the arresting officers found a pay-owe ledger containing the

name “Long,” which was the same fictitious name provided by Pham to the person on the

phone, RT 112; (5) the pay-owe sheet listed a quantity of two and a price of forty, RT 112-

113; (6) Tri was found by police hiding in a closet holding a cellular telephone in Dung’s

house, RT 164-165; (7) Pham called the telephone number that he was given by the

informant, and the phone confiscated from Tri rang, displaying Pham’s phone number, RT

119; and (8) upon speaking with Tri, Pham was positive that Tri was the person who he

spoke to earlier on the phone, RT 118.

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2 This is true even excluding any evidence that came out in the testimony of Truong

Do. In his traverse, Tri argues that relying on Do’s testimony for either of the sufficiency of

evidence claims proves prejudice in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This court

need not reach that assertion, because sufficient evidence for both of Tri’s convictions exists

absent Do’s testimony.

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This evidence was ample for a reasonable trier of fact to determine beyond a

reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed cocaine base for sale. A reasonable trier of

fact could determine that in making arrangements over the phone for drugs to be delivered

to Officer Pham at the Palm Tree Motel, Tri possessed dominion or control over the crack

cocaine found in Dung’s sock, which was clearly being offered for sale when Dung arrived

at the agreed upon location.2

 Petitioner’s due process rights therefore were not violated, so

the rejection of this claim by the California courts was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority.

B. Sale or Offer for Sale

Relying on contract law, petitioner argues that because during his telephone

conversation with Officer Pham, neither price, weight, nor quality of the crack rocks to be

delivered were discussed, no valid offer existed. However, in its denial of Tri’s habeas

petition, the Santa Clara Superior Court found the elements of the crime of offering

narcotics for sale had been met by the evidence presented at trial, thereby impliedly

rejecting the theory that the criminal charge requires an offer as defined in California

contract law. Ex. 10 at 2. Sitting in habeas corpus, this court is bound by the state court’s

interpretation of state law. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S 74 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485

U.S. 624, 629 (1988). Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence

may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.

1995). 

The circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convince a

reasonable fact-finder Tri was guilty of offering cocaine base for sale. Circumstantial

evidence of the offer for sale include the fact that the person who answered Officer Pham’s

phone call identified himself as Tri, that Officer Pham asked for two rocks of crack cocaine

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and the person on the phone said he would come to the Palm Tree Motel in twenty

minutes, and that Tri was found by police officers in possession of the phone used to

answer Officer Pham’s call. The phone interaction between Officer Pham and Tri was such

that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an offer to

sell cocaine base. Because sufficient evidence existed to convict Tri of offering to sell

narcotics, his due process rights were not violated. The state courts’ rejection of this

argument therefore was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Supreme Court authority.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner argues that his attorney’s performance was deficient because the attorney

did not move for his acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief and because

the attorney called Truong Do as a defense witness.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied

upon as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. To prevail on a Sixth

Amendment ineffectiveness claim, petitioner must establish: (1) that counsel’s

performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms, Id. at 687-688; and (2) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

In addition he must establish that the state court “applied Strickland to the facts of his case

in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). 

A. Failure to File Motion for Acquittal

Petitioner claims there was no conceivable advantage in his attorney’s failure at the

end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief to move for his acquittal based on insufficiency of the

evidence. However, it is not enough the establish a Sixth Amendment violation that there

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be “no conceivable advantage” in omitting the action; the omission must instead be an error

so serious that the attorney was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 at 689;

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001).

As discussed in section one above, there was more than sufficient evidence for a

rational trier of fact to convict Tri of both narcotics charges. Given the evidence against Tri

presented in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, a motion for acquittal would have been

meritless. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a motion that he knows is

without merit on the facts and the law. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273. For this reason

counsel’s conduct was both not deficient and not prejudicial. 

B. Calling Truong Do as a Witness

Petitioner argues that a significant amount of inculpatory evidence was introduced

because of his attorney’s decision to call Do as a witness. He claims that Do’s testimony:

(1) allowed the content of the drug ledgers into evidence; (2) brought out that Tri drove him

around to conduct drug deals, RT 235; (3) linked Tri to Dung’s bedroom where the cocaine

base and paraphernalia were found, RT 246; and (4) contradicted Dung’s testimony

regarding whether Dung had obtained the crack cocaine he was arrested with from Do

directly or from the bushes where Do hid his stash, RT 227. 

The court found Tri guilty of the drug offenses, relying on evidence that the person

who took Officer Pham’s drug order identified himself as “Tri,” that Officer Pham recognized

petitioner’s voice as the person who took the call, and that petitioner was found hiding in a

closet in Dung’s house under the influence of cocaine and holding the phone used to

receive Officer Pham’s order. Given this evidence, none of which is from Do, petitioner has

failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. That is, the error, if any, was not prejudicial. 

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C. Conclusion

Petitioner has failed to establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. The

rejection of the ineffective assistance claims by the state courts was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 10, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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