Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01017/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Lee Keffeler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' • PIL -.1 D 

Uoited Scares Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 3 0 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH LEE KEFFELER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 90-1017 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-183-3) 

(D. Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, 

District Judge.** 

Defendant Joseph Lee Keffeler entered a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

conditional plea of guilty to an information charging conspiracy 

to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute between 500 

and 1,000 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l). 

In exchange, the government recommended dismissal of other related 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior Judge for the United 

States District Court, District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1017 Document: 010110064929 Date Filed: 10/30/1990 Page: 1 
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drug possession and distribution charges, as well as a charge of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The defendant now 

raises three issues on appeal: (1) the denial of his motion to 

suppress certain evidence found in a search of his house, (2) the 

imposition of a three-year term of supervised release, and (3) the 

refusal to grant a two point reduction in his sentence for being a 

"minor" participant in the conspiracy under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. We conclude that the district court properly denied 

the motion to suppress and did not err in imposing a three-year 

term of supervised release and in refusing to reduce the sentence 

by two points. Accordingly, we affirm. 

The defendant's conviction arose out of an investigation into 

a suspected cocaine distribution ring. Through wiretaps and 

surveillance, the defendant was identified as having frequent 

contact with Paul Joseph Davidson, one of the main targets of the 

investigation. The FBI agents analyzing this information believed 

that Mr. Davidson was supplying cocaine to the defendant, who sold 

the cocaine to others. Based on this information, plus 

allegations by the affiant that the defendant "has been arrested 

numerous times for violations of narcotics laws and on at least 

one occasion, a large quantity of cocaine was obtained through a 

search warrant of Keffeler's residence (later suppressed due to 

insufficiency of affidavit)" (Affidavit at 80), the magistrate 

issued a search warrant for the defendant's house. The next day, 

FBI agents and police knocked on the defendant's door, and upon 

receiving no answer, broke down the door, and saw the defendant 

run upstairs. The officers followed but stopped and retreated 

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when they caught a glimpse of a shotgun in the room where the 

defendant entered. The defendant then surrendered at the request 

of the officers, was handcuffed and searched, detained for a brief 

time, and allowed to leave while the officers conducted the 

search. The search disclosed two partially empty bags of cocaine 

found in the toilet in the basement, one small bag of cocaine in 

the defendant's pocket, various drug paraphernalia with traces of 

cocaine, and at least eleven firearms. When the search began, the 

officers placed the firearms together in a separate room while the 

defendant and the three others who were in the house were 

detained. 

I. The Motion to Suppress 

The defendant advances 

legality of the search. 

several arguments challenging the 

First, he argues that various 

misrepresentations and improprieties in the affidavit invalidated 

the search warrant. Specifically, he argues that the affiant 

misled the magistrate by not noting the disposition of his prior 

arrests, even though the affiant had this information in his 

possession. Second, he argues that the affiant's reference to the 

earlier invalid search of the defendant's house invalidated the 

warrant. The defendant concludes that without this tainted 

information, probable cause did not exist to believe that cocaine, 

drug paraphernalia, or related drug trafficking documents would be 

found at his house. 

We do not reach these specific issues concerning the 

defendant's prior history because we believe there was ample 

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information accumulated through the wiretaps and surveillance of 

the defendant to justify a finding of probable cause without 

considering the disputed statements. A review of the affidavit 

reveals a substantial number of contacts demonstrating behavior 

consistent with drug trafficking as well as numerous conversations 

which, while couched in a rudimentary "code," clearly center 

around the distribution of drugs. (See Affidavit, ,r,r 19(d), 5l(do, m), 61 (d-e), 62(a), 64(e-g), 65(b), 68(a-b)). If considered 

in isolation, many of these facts would not suffice; however, the 

movements and conversations considered together in the context of 

Paul Davidson's interaction with other players in the ring, 

clearly satisfy the test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983), that the magistrate is to "make a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . there 

is a fair probability that the contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found at a particular place." The Gates Court also noted 

that a reviewing court should simply "ensure that the magistrate 

had a 'substantial basis for concluding' that probable cause 

existed." Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 

(1960). While defendant has offered exculpating explanations for 

some of these incidents, the conversations and movements contained 

in the affidavit placed in context as required by Gates provide a 

substantial basis for concluding that drugs, related 

paraphernalia, and drug records would be found in his residence at 

that time. The district judge made a similar finding upon 

reviewing the affidavit. (R. v, 255-56). 

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We held in United States v. Barrera, 843 F.2d 1576, 1580 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 153 (1988), that if a 

statement in an affidavit is found to be inaccurate or even 

knowingly or recklessly false, that statement should be excised 

and the reviewing court should look at the remaining information 

to determine whether probable cause still exists. See also United 

States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 641 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978)) (inaccurate 

statement in affidavit does not invalidate warrant when there are 

sufficient accurate statements remaining to support the issuance 

of the warrant). There is no reason to believe that the district 

court erred in finding that, even excluding the contested 

information, sufficient facts existed in the affidavit to support 

a finding of probable cause. 

Second, defendant points to defects in the search itself, 

arguing that it became a "general" search, exceeding the limits of 

the warrant. In support of this claim, he states that despite not 

being specifically listed in the warrant, the officers searched 

for and collected various firearms located throughout his house. 

He argues that neither the officers' safety nor the plain view 

doctrine justifies the roundup of these weapons. 

We conclude the legitimacy of the weapons roundup is not at 

issue in this appeal, as defendant pled guilty only to a 

controlled substance possession and distribution charge and not 

any weapons related charges and therefore suffered no prejudice. 

United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Besides the collection of the firearms, the defendant offers no 

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other evidence that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant 

other than implying that a search of more than four hours is per 

se "general," an inference that fails without further support. 

Even if we were to reach the issue of the legality of the 

weapons search, we would reject the defendant's arguments. First, 

the officers were entering a situation where they had good reason 

to fear for their safety. Upon entering the house, they saw the 

defendant sprint upstairs and then saw a shotgun leaning against 

the wall in the room he had just entered. The officers also found 

three other occupants in the house and at least one other firearm 

in the open. 

The district court found that the officers' cursory search of 

the premises and relocation of the weapons to assure that they 

were not accessible to the defendant or to any of the other 

occupants were legitimate actions to secure their safety. We 

agree. Also, the detention of the other occupants was proper 

under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (a legal 

search warrant implicitly carries with it the limited authority to 

detain the occupants at the premises while a proper search is 

conducted) . 

Second, the weapons that were not in plain view initially 

were found pursuant to a legal search. Horton v. California, 

U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990), held that officers conducting a 

search pursuant to a valid warrant may seize incriminating 

evidence they found during their search, the discovery of which 

need not even be inadvertent, if there is probable cause to 

believe that the evidence seized was being used in an illegal 

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of his position, he cites Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 

(1980), in which the Supreme Court held this same statute, prior 

to the 1988 amendment, did not allow the imposition of a special 

term of parole on a defendant convicted of conspiracy to 

distribute a controlled substance. Id. at 401. 

However, Bifulco was written prior to the enactment of the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. In light of this new sentencing 

authority, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Van Nymegen, 910 

F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1990), in circumstances similar to the present 

case, held that the Bifulco argument fails for two reasons. 

First, Bifulco dealt with "special parole" and not "supervised 

release," and treatment of the former doesn't necessarily subsume 

the latter. Second, and more important,§ 3583 of the Sentencing 

Reform Act of 1984, and not 21 U.S.C. § 846, provided the source 

of authority for sentencing, and imposition of a term of 

supervised release was therefore proper regardless of the language 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In Van Nymegen, the Fifth Circuit cited 

United States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1989), in 

which it held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583 provided for a term of 

supervised release in addition to the sentence imposed under the 

applicable statute. The Butler court held that, "[t]he addition 

of a period of supervised release to a maximum jail sentence does 

not extend a party's imprisonment; therefore, it cannot create a 

violation of the maximum prison sentence allowed by statute." Id. 

In the present case, the district court prefaced its 

imposition of supervised release by stating that its order was 

"[p]ursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984." (R. VI, 15). 

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Consequently, we find the logic of Van Nymegen to be persuasive in 

this case as well and hold that imposition of a three-year term of 

supervised release under§ 3583 was not an abuse of discretion by 

the district court. 

III. The Failure to Reduce the Offense Level for Being a Minor 

Participant 

The defendant argues that under§ 3Bl.2(b) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines he should have received a two level reduction for being 

a minor participant in the cocaine distribution conspiracy. He 

compares his involvement with other members of the distribution 

ring and concludes that his role was substantially less than that 

of the average participant. 

The district court found that the defendant was "involved in 

the distribution of at least 500 but not more than 1,000 grams of 

cocaine, " and that he "was not substantially less culpable than 

the other participants, and, in fact, provided other defendants 

with cocaine for distribution." (R. VI, 15). A finding that a 

defendant is or is not a minor participant is a finding of fact. 

United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424, 425 (10th Cir. 

Aug. 21, 1990) (citing United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 

541, 557 (9th Cir. 1989)). The district court's factual findings 

are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1563 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Beaulieu, 

denied, 

893 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (10th 

U.S._, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990). 

Cir.), cert. 

While there is 

evidence in the record that there were other participants in the 

conspiracy more central than the defendant, we believe that the 

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district court did not err in finding that the defendant was not 

substantially less culpable than the other participants. The 

defendant was in close and frequent contact with perhaps the most 

important member of the ring, Paul Davidson. The wiretapped 

conversations between the defendant and Mr. Davidson indicate that 

they were involved in a substantial distribution operation and 

that the defendant was a dealer himself and not merely the enduser of the cocaine. In fact, the defendant admitted in the 

stipulated facts contained in his plea agreement, as well as by 

pleading guilty to count number one of the information, that he 

distributed the cocaine he received from Paul Davidson. As such, 

there is sufficient evidence in the record for us to find the 

district court did not err in failing to reduce the defendant's 

offense level by two points for being a minor participant in the 

conspiracy. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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