Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50164/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50164-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eduardo Castro
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-50164

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  3:08-CR-00881-W-1

EDUARDO CASTRO, AMENDED

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 13, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed March 26, 2010

Amended June 4, 2010

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, William C. Canby, Jr. and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Goodwin

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COUNSEL

Anthony E. Colombo, Jr., San Diego, California, for the

defendant-appellant.

Steve Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego,

California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

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OPINION

GOODWIN, Senior Circuit Judge:

The opinion filed March 26, 2010, and appearing at 599

F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2010), is ordered amended and filed herewith.

Eduardo Castro, convicted of attempted reentry into the

United States after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326,

appeals his forty-six month sentence. Castro’s sentence

includes a sixteen-level increase in offense level for a prior

conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1),

which criminalizes lewd or lascivious acts on a child of 14 or

15 years by a person at least ten years older than the child.

Cal. Penal Code § 288(c)(1). Castro argues that a conviction

under section 288(c)(1) does not constitute a “crime of violence” warranting a sixteen-level increase under United States

Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual “U.S.S.G.” § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2009). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that a conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) categorically does not constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” and

therefore does not qualify as a crime of violence warranting

a sixteen-level increase. We therefore vacate Castro’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 

Castro also argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence and that it erred by increasing the statutory

maximum under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) because Castro’s prior

conviction was neither alleged in the indictment nor admitted

by him. Because we vacate Castro’s sentence, we do not

address whether the sentence was reasonable. Nor do we

reach his argument that the district court erred by increasing

the statutory maximum because, as Castro concedes, that

argument is foreclosed by precedent. See, e.g., United States

v. Garcia-Cardenas, 555 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009).

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2008, immigration and border patrol agents

arrested Castro while executing a search warrant at the home

of his ex-wife, who had been arrested two or three weeks earlier for smuggling illegal aliens into the United States. Castro,

a citizen of Mexico, had been deported in 2003 after pleading

guilty to committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child of 14

or 15 years, a felony, under California Penal Code section

288(c)(1). 

On March 23, 2009, Castro pleaded guilty to being a

deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326. At sentencing, the district court concluded that

Castro’s prior conviction under section 288(c)(1) constituted

“sexual abuse of a minor” and was therefore a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing enhancement. The court

found a base offense level of eight, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a); a

sixteen-level increase based on a prior conviction for a crime

of violence, id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); and a three-level

decrease for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, and

sentenced Castro to forty-six months in prison and three years

of supervised release. Castro timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

[1] Castro contends that his prior conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) does not qualify as a crime

of violence warranting a sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). For a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a base offense level of eight

and instruct that the offense level be increased by sixteen

levels “[i]f the defendant previously was deported . . . after

. . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). For

purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, “crime of violence”

includes, inter alia, “sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. at cmt.

n.1(B)(iii). We hold that section 288(c)(1) is broader than the

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generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor and that it therefore is not categorically a crime of violence. 

[2] To determine whether a conviction under section

288(c)(1) constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor,” we apply the

categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495

U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). “Under the categorical approach, we

‘compare the elements of the statute of conviction with a federal definition of the crime to determine whether conduct proscribed by the statute is broader than the generic federal

definition.’ ” Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d

688, 692 (9th Cir. 2007)). “We do not examine the facts

underlying the offense, but ‘look only to the fact of conviction

and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’ ” EstradaEspinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). 

[3] The statute of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), criminalizes the conduct of “[a]ny person who

commits an act described in subdivision (a) with the intent

described in that subdivision, and the victim is a child of 14

or 15 years, and that person is at least 10 years older than the

child.” Cal. Penal Code § 288(c)(1). Section 288(a), in turn,

applies to “[a]ny person who willfully and lewdly commits

any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any

part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14

years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying

the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the

child.” Id. § 288(a). Section 288(c)(1) therefore contains the

following five elements: (1) willfully and lewdly; (2) committing any lewd or lascivious act; (3) on a child ages 14 or 15;

(4) with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the

lust, passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or the child;

and (5) the defendant must be at least ten years older than the

child. 

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[4] Our case law recognizes two different generic federal

definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor.” Pelayo-Garcia v.

Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009).1 The first

generic definition contains three elements: (1) sexual conduct;

(2) with a minor; (3) that constitutes abuse. United States v.

Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2009). We define

the first two elements—(1) sexual conduct; (2) with a minor

—by “ ‘employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common

meaning of the words that Congress used.’ ” United States v.

Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1174

(9th Cir. 1999)). A statute of conviction contains the third element, “abuse,” if it expressly prohibits conduct that causes

“ ‘physical or psychological harm’ in light of the age of the

victim in question.” Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 513. Sexual

conduct with younger children is per se abusive. Id. at 514-15.

Because “[t]he conduct reached by Section 288(a) indisputably falls with the common, everyday meanings of the words

‘sexual’ and ‘minor,’ ” Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d at 1147, and

because it applies only to sexual conduct with younger children, we have previously held that a conviction under section

288(a) categorically constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor” for

purposes of sentencing enhancement. See id.; Medina-Villa,

567 F.3d at 516. 

[5] Section 288(c)(1), however, is categorically broader

than this first generic definition. Although it contains two elements of the generic crime—(1) sexual conduct; (2) with a

minor—it is broader than the generic crime because it criminalizes conduct that does not necessarily constitute abuse.

Section 288(c)(1) does not expressly include physical or psy1Although Pelayo-Garcia addressed whether a statute of conviction

constituted an “aggravated felony” in the immigration context, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43), and the present case concerns whether the statute of conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” in the sentencing context, U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2, the analysis is the same. See Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1013

n.1; Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 511-12. 

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chological abuse as an element of the crime. Moreover, unlike

section 288(a), which applies only where the minor is younger

than 14, section 288(c)(1) does not address conduct that is per

se abusive. See Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1015-16 (concluding that sexual conduct with a 15-year-old child is not per se

abusive). Section 288(c)(1) is therefore broader than the first

generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor. 

[6] We next compare section 288(c)(1) to the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor set forth by an en banc panel

in Estrada-Espinoza. This definition contains four elements:

“(1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with

a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the defendant and the

minor.” 546 F.3d at 1152. Although Estrada-Espinoza

referred to those elements, derived from 18 U.S.C. § 2243, as

defining “sexual abuse of a minor” generally, we subsequently clarified that the Estrada-Espinoza definition “encompassed statutory rape crimes only.” Medina-Villa, 567

F.3d at 514-15; accord Pelayo-Garcia, 598 F.3d at 1013-14.

As Medina-Villa noted, reading the Estrada-Espinoza definition to define the universe of crimes constituting “sexual

abuse of a minor” would lead to absurd results, because the

Estrada-Espinoza definition excludes crimes against children

under 12; moreover, it would “eliminate the need for the separate and independent example of ‘statutory rape’ as a ‘crime

of violence’ ” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 515-16. Rather than defining the

universe of crimes constituting “sexual abuse of a minor,”

therefore, Estrada-Espinoza set forth a second generic federal

definition. 

Section 288(c)(1) is also broader than this second generic

definition of sexual abuse of a minor. It contains three of the

required four elements: it applies to minors within the generic

crime’s designated age range; it requires an age difference

greater than the generic crime’s required four years; and it

contains the mens rea requirement because, in this context, a

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defendant cannot act “willfully” without also acting “knowingly.” This is so because the mens rea requirement of “knowingly” applies only to the defendant’s act of engaging in a

sexual act, Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1013, and California

Penal Code section 7(1) defines “willfully” as implying “a

purpose or willingness to commit the act.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 7(1). A defendant cannot logically have a purpose or willingness to commit an act without knowing that he or she is

engaging in the act. Section 288(c)(1) therefore contains three

elements of the second generic definition. 

[7] Section 288(c)(1), however, is categorically broader

than the generic offense because it is missing one element of

the generic crime, a “sexual act.” For purposes of the generic

offense of sexual abuse of a minor set out in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2243, “sexual act” is defined as follows:

(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the

penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight;

(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the

mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus;

(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or

genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by

any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,

degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any

person; or

(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not

attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse,

humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the

sexual desire of any person. 

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18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). Thus, for present purposes, “sexual act”

requires, at a minimum, an intentional touching, not through

the clothing, of a minor’s genitalia. 

[8] Section 288(c)(1), however, contains no such requirement; it requires only a “lewd or lascivious” act. Lewd touching, for purposes of section 288, can occur through a victim’s

clothing and can involve any part of the victim’s body. People

v. Martinez, 903 P.2d 1037, 1042-43 (Cal. 1995). Moreover,

a lewd or lascivious act need not involve touching at all; a

defendant can violate section 288 by instructing a minor to

disrobe. People v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 290, 308-09 (Cal. 1991).

Because a defendant could be convicted under section

288(c)(1) even if the government failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted a “sexual act,”

section 288(c)(1) is broader than the second generic definition

of sexual abuse of a minor. Therefore, because it falls outside

both generic definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor,” a conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) does

not categorically constitute a crime of violence for purposes

of the sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).2

Where, as here, the government has not asked us to apply

the modified categorical approach, we do not do so. See Latu

v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008). Because we

remand for resentencing on an open record, see United States

v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), the

district court has discretion to consider the modified categorical issue on remand. We retain jurisdiction to hear an appeal

after resentencing. 

VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing.

2We do not address whether section 288(c)(1) constitutes the generic

offense of “statutory rape” and therefore constitutes a “crime of violence,”

see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii), because the parties have not raised

that issue. 

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