Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01396/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01396-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Garmin International, Inc.
Appellee
Garmin USA, Inc.
Appellee
Pacing Technologies, LLC
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

GARMIN USA, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1396

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California in No. 3:12-cv-01067-BENJLB, Judge Roger T. Benitez.

______________________ 

Decided: February 18, 2015 

______________________ 

VICTOR MORRIS WIGMAN, Blank Rome LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented 

by PAUL MARK HONIGBERG, BRIAN WM. HIGGINS, CHARLES 

R. WOLFE, JR., NICHOLAS M. NYEMAH. 

NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 

Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, NY, argued for 

defendant-appellees. Also represented by JENNIFER H.

WU, JENNY CHIA CHENG WU. 

______________________ 

Case: 14-1396 Document: 44-2 Page: 1 Filed: 02/18/2015
2 PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Pacing Technologies, LLC (Pacing) appeals from the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment that Garmin

International, Inc.’s and Garmin USA, Inc.’s (collectively, 

Garmin) accused products do not infringe the asserted 

claims of Pacing’s U.S. Patent No. 8,101,843. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The ’843 patent is directed to methods and systems 

for pacing users during activities that involve repeated 

motions, such as running, cycling, and swimming. ’843 

patent col. 1 ll. 16–22. The preferred embodiment of the 

’843 patent describes a method for aiding a user’s pacing 

by providing the user with a tempo (for example, the beat 

of a song or flashes of light) corresponding to the user’s 

desired pace. Id. col. 9 ll. 4–9, col. 11 ll. 7–13.

Pacing alleges that Garmin GPS fitness watches and 

microcomputers used by runners and bikers infringe the 

’843 patent. The Garmin Connect website allows users to 

design and transfer workouts to the Garmin devices. 

Workouts consist of a series of intervals to which the user 

can assign a duration and target pace value. The devices 

display the intervals of a particular workout during 

operation, for example, by counting down the time for

which the user intends to maintain a particular pace. The 

devices may also display the user’s actual pace, e.g., 50 to 

70 spm, or steps per minute. The devices do not play 

music or output a beat corresponding to the user’s desired 

or actual pace. 

Claim 25 of the ’843 patent, the only asserted independent claim, reads as follows (emphases added):

A repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user 

comprising: 

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PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 3

a web site adapted to allowing the user to preselect from a set of user-selectable activity types 

an activity they wish to perform and entering one 

or more target tempo or target pace values corresponding to the activity;

a data storage and playback device; and

a communications device adapted to transferring 

data related to the pre-selected activity or the target tempo or the target pace values between the 

web site and the data storage and playback device. 

The district court construed the term “playback device” as “a device capable of playing audio, video, or a 

visible signal.” Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 

977 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021 (S.D. Cal. 2013). The district 

court also held that the preamble to claim 25 is a limitation and construed it to mean “a system for providing a 

sensible output for setting the pace or rate of movement of 

a user in performing a repetitive motion activity.” Id. at 

1021–24. This construction did not address whether the 

repetitive motion pacing system was required to play back 

the pace information using a tempo.

Garmin moved for summary judgment of noninfringement, contending that the accused devices are not 

“playback devices” under the district court’s construction. 

Pacing argued that the accused devices are “playback 

devices” because they “play” workout information to the 

user, which can include the user’s target and actual pace. 

To resolve this dispute, the district court supplemented 

its construction of “playback device” in the summary 

judgment order, holding that “[t]o be a playback device as 

envisioned in the patent, the device must play back the 

pace information.” Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, 

Inc., C.A. No. 12-CV-01067-BEN-JLB, at *9 (S.D. Cal.

Mar. 3, 2014), ECF No. 178. The court relied on the use 

of the term in the context of the specification and on its 

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4 PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

earlier decision that the preamble to claim 25 is limiting. 

Id. at 8–9. The court granted summary judgment of 

noninfringement to Garmin, reasoning that while “[t]he 

[accused] devices repeat back or display the pace input or 

selections,” they “do not ‘play’ the target tempo or pace 

information . . . as audio, video, or visible signals.” Id. at 

9–10. Both parties characterize the court’s construction of

the term “playback device” as implicitly requiring the 

devices to play the pace information as a metronomic 

tempo, as described in the preferred embodiment of the

’843 patent. Pacing appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

“[W]hen the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specification[], 

along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s 

determination will amount solely to a determination of 

law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.” Teva Pharm. USA Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 

S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (italics omitted). Because the only 

evidence at issue on appeal and presented to the district 

court in this claim construction was intrinsic, our review 

of the constructions is de novo. We review a grant of 

summary judgment from a court in the Ninth Circuit de 

novo. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 767 

(Fed. Cir. 2002).

I. Claim Construction

On appeal, the parties dispute whether the asserted 

claims require the claimed devices to play back the pace 

information using a tempo, such as the beat of a song or 

flashes of light. This dispute turns on whether the preamble to claim 25 is limiting and on the construction of a 

“repetitive motion pacing system” as recited in the preamble. 

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PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 5

We hold that the preamble to claim 25, which reads 

“[a] repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user . . . ,” is limiting. “Preamble language that merely 

states the purpose or intended use of an invention is 

generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.” 

Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 

2006). However, “[w]hen limitations in the body of the 

claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the 

preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary 

component of the claimed invention.” Eaton Corp. v. 

Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

That is the case here. The term “user” in the preamble of claim 25 provides antecedent basis for the term 

“user” in the body of that claim. The body of claim 25 

recites “a web site adapted to allowing the user to preselect from a set of user-selectable activity types an 

activity they wish to perform and entering one or more 

target tempo or target pace values corresponding to the 

activity.” Id. col. 19 ll. 29–32 (emphasis added). The term

“repetitive motion pacing system” in the preamble of 

claim 25 similarly provides antecedent basis for the term 

“repetitive motion pacing system” recited as a positive 

limitation in the body of claim 28, which depends from 

claim 25. Claim 28 of the ’843 patent reads: “[t]he repetitive motion pacing system of claim 25, wherein the repetitive motion pacing system can determine a geographic 

location of the data storage and playback device.” ’843 

patent col. 19 ll. 46–48. Because the preamble terms 

“user” and “repetitive motion pacing system” provide 

antecedent basis for and are necessary to understand 

positive limitations in the body of claims in the ’843 

patent, we hold that the preamble to claim 25 is limiting. 

The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user” does not 

require the claimed system to pace the user by playing

back the pace information using a tempo. However, claim 

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6 PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

terms are construed in light of the specification and 

prosecution history, not in isolation. See Phillips v. AWH 

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The 

specification and prosecution history compel departure 

from the plain meaning in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t 

Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The 

standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are 

“exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 

750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To act as a lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of 

the disputed claim term” and “clearly express an intent to 

define the term.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Similarly, 

disavowal requires that “the specification [or prosecution 

history] make[] clear that the invention does not include a 

particular feature.” SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced 

Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 

2001).

We have found disavowal or disclaimer based on clear 

and unmistakable statements by the patentee that limit 

the claims, such as “the present invention includes . . .” or 

“the present invention is . . . ” or “all embodiments of the 

present invention are . . . .” See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of 

Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed. Cir. 

2013); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 

1312, 1316–19 (Fed. Cir. 2006); SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 

F.3d at 1343–44. We have found disclaimer when the

specification indicated that, for “successful manufacture,” 

a particular step was “require[d].” Andersen Corp. v. 

Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). We have found disclaimer when the specification 

indicated that the invention operated by “pushing (as 

opposed to pulling) forces,” and then characterized the 

“pushing forces” as “an important feature of the present 

invention.” SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc., 497 

F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We also have found 

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PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 7

disclaimer when the patent repeatedly disparaged an 

embodiment as “antiquated,” having “inherent inadequacies,” and then detailed the “deficiencies [that] make it 

difficult” to use. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. 

Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Likewise, we have used disclaimer to limit a claim element to 

a feature of the preferred embodiment when the specification described that feature as a “very important feature 

. . . in an aspect of the present invention,” and disparaged 

alternatives to that feature. Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. 

v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). When a patentee “describes the features of the 

‘present invention’ as a whole,” he alerts the reader that 

“this description limits the scope of the invention.” AGA 

Med. Corp., 717 F.3d at 936. 

Here, the specification similarly contains a clear and 

unmistakable statement of disavowal or disclaimer. In a 

section entitled “Summary and Objects of the Invention,” 

the ’843 patent states that “it is a principal object of the 

present invention to provide a computer-implemented, 

network-based system having a networked server, database, client computer, and input/output device for use by 

individuals engaged in repetitive motion activities . . . .” 

’843 patent col. 3 ll. 9–13. It then lists 18 additional 

features, each time preceding the feature with the phrase 

“[i]t is another object of the present invention” or “[i]t is 

still another object of the present invention.” Id. col. 3 ll. 

9 – col. 4 ll. 52. This is a common practice in patent 

drafting. Many times, the patent drafter will cast certain 

features as “an object of the present invention,” and often 

those “objects of the present invention” correspond to

features recited in the claims. That is the case here, as 

many of the different “objects of the present invention” 

disclosed in the ’843 patent are recited as features in one 

or more independent or dependent claims. The characterization of a feature as “an object” or “another object,” or 

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8 PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

even as a “principal object,” will not always rise to the 

level of disclaimer. In this case, where the patent includes a long list of different “objects of the present invention” that correspond to features positively recited in one 

or more claims, it seems unlikely that the inventor intended for each claim to be limited to all of the many 

objects of the invention. However, the ’843 patent goes 

further, and includes additional language that constitutes 

unmistakable disclaimer when considered in the context 

of the patent as a whole. Immediately following the 

enumeration of the different objects of the present invention, the ’843 patent states that “[t]hose [listed 19 objects] 

and other objects and features of the present invention 

are accomplished, as embodied and fully described herein, 

by a repetitive motion pacing system that includes . . . a 

data storage and playback device adapted to producing 

the sensible tempo.” Id. col. 4 ll. 53–67. With these 

words, the patentee does not describe yet another object of 

the invention—he alerts the reader that the invention 

accomplishes all of its objects and features (the enumerated 19 and all others) with a repetitive motion pacing 

system that includes a data storage and playback device 

adapted to produce a sensible tempo. In the context of 

this patent, this clearly and unmistakably limits “the 

present invention” to a repetitive motion pacing system

having a data storage and playback device that is adapted 

to producing a sensible tempo. 

Pacing argues that a “repetitive motion pacing system

for pacing a user” cannot be limited to devices that produce a sensible tempo because the ’843 patent discloses an 

embodiment of a repetitive motion pacing system where 

the playback device does not need to produce a sensible 

tempo. Pacing points to the specification’s description of a 

repetitive motion pacing system having a playback device 

that plays video landscapes to a user who is, for example, 

running on a treadmill, with the video “automatically 

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calibrated to match the speed of the user’s . . . pace,” to 

simulate the user running through the actual landscape. 

’843 patent col. 16 ll. 51–61. Pacing argues that if the 

claim is construed to limit the invention to a repetitive 

motion pacing device adapted to producing a sensible 

tempo, this particular embodiment will not be covered. 

Pacing argues that for this reason, we should reject the 

construction. 

We disagree for two reasons. First, it is not clear that 

our construction excludes this embodiment. Our construction requires the repetitive motion pacing system to 

produce a sensible tempo, but it does not exclude additional features, such as outputting video matching a 

user’s pace. Moreover, the description of the embodiment 

that Pacing points to does not, as Pacing argues, exclude 

the production of a sensible tempo as required by the 

construction. Just because an embodiment does not 

expressly disclose a feature does not mean that embodiment excludes that feature. Second, even if Pacing is 

correct that this embodiment does not play a sensible 

tempo and therefore would be excluded under our construction, this is not a reason to ignore the specification’s 

clear and unmistakable disavowal. It is true that constructions that exclude the preferred embodiment are 

disfavored. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 

1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, in a case such as 

this, where the patent describes multiple embodiments, 

every claim does not need to cover every embodiment. See

Aug. Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1285 

(Fed. Cir. 2011). This is particularly true where the plain 

language of a limitation of the claim does not appear to 

cover that embodiment. The preamble of claim 25 differs 

from the preambles of the other seven independent 

claims. Claim 25 requires a “repetitive motion pacing 

system for pacing a user.” The plain language requires 

the system to pace the user. We conclude that the system 

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10 PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

of claim 25 must be capable of producing a sensible tempo 

for pacing the user. 

II. Infringement

We hold that there is no genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether the Garmin devices produce a sensible 

tempo. Merely displaying the rate of a user’s pace—for 

example, displaying “100 steps per minute”—does not 

produce a sensible tempo. Garmin’s accused devices are

therefore not repetitive motion pacing devices. We affirm 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the ’843 patent. 

AFFIRMED

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