Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01816/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01816-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Corrales-Portillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1769

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ismael Corrales-Portillo

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 14-1816

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jose Corrales-Portillo, also known as Abraham Diaz-Rodriguez

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

Appellate Case: 14-1816 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/09/2015 Entry ID: 4251777 
Submitted: November 14, 2014

 Filed: March 9, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

A grand jury indicted brothers Jose Corrales-Portillo (Jose) and Ismael

Corrales-Portillo (Ismael) for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (count one); possessing

with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count two); and possessing heroin with intent to

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count

three). Jose pled guilty to count one, and the district court1

 sentenced him to 175

months imprisonment. Ismael proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of all three

counts. The district court sentenced Ismael to concurrent sentences of 188 months

imprisonment on each count. Jose appeals his sentence, and Ismael appeals his

conviction and sentence. With appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

affirm in each appeal. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On July 3, 2013, a confidential informant—seeking to avoid drug charges of his

own—agreed to cooperate with an ongoing narcotics investigation by Officer Anthony

Ballantini and Sergeant Kirk Bagby of the Des Moines, Iowa, Police Department

(department). The informant, who had not previously cooperated with the department,

provided detailed information about his supplier, an older Hispanic man he knew as

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

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Compa (later identified as Jose). To assist with the investigation, the informant, in the

presence of the police, made a recorded call and texted Jose to arrange to purchase

three pounds of methamphetamine. The informant told officers Jose obtained the

drugs from Arizona and would transport them from Grand Island, Nebraska, to Des

Moines the following week. This information corroborated what the officers had

learned about the informant’s drug business earlier in their investigation.

On July 13, 2013, the informant advised the police that Jose was in Grand

Island and would deliver the drugs to Des Moines later that day. Contacting the

officers throughout the day, the informant forwarded Jose’s texts and advised the

officers of the time and place he was to meet Jose and where Jose had hidden the

drugs on his vehicle. The informant told the officers he expected Jose to be driving

a vehicle with Arizona or Nebraska license plates because the informant previously

had seen Jose deliver drugs in Grand Island with a blue Ford truck with Nebraska

plates.

Before the meeting, Officer Ballantini instructed the informant to depart from

the gas station where he was to meet Jose by driving south if he learned the drugs

were in Jose’s vehicle and to depart by driving north to a local garage if he was unsure

where the drugs were. Officer Ballantini devised this signal because he suspected

Jose might transport the drugs in a “ghost vehicle” to avoid police detection.2

As Jose neared Des Moines, officers began surveilling the informant’s

residence and the gas station where he was to meet Jose. When the informant left for

the meeting with Jose, Officer Ballantini followed him. Sergeant Cynthia Donahue

was already at the station. Having parked her unmarked car near the gas station,

Sergeant Donahue positioned herself inside the station. Sergeant Ronald Kouski

waited nearby in a marked vehicle with a drug dog to make a traffic stop if necessary. 

2

The investigating officers and informant testified drug traffickers frequently

use more than one car when transporting drugs either as a decoy or as a way to

conduct counter-surveillance on the police.

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The informant arrived at the gas station and parked his car. Minutes later, Jose,

an older Hispanic man, arrived in a blue Ford Ranger truck with Nebraska plates and

met with the informant. As they met, Sergeant Donahue observed Ismael pumping

gas into a Lexus with Nebraska plates. Ismael was watching the meeting and making

eye contact with Jose and the informant. Sergeant Donahue deduced Ismael was

providing counter-surveillance for Jose. When Ismael finished pumping gas, he

parked his car and headed toward the building. Sergeant Donahue then lost track of

Ismael as she left the building and returned to her car to keep an eye on the Lexus. 

At the meeting, Jose told the informant the drugs were inside the gas tank of the

Ford truck. The informant testified Ismael joined the meeting, and Jose introduced

him as his “partner,” explaining he was “showing [Ismael] the ropes,” “the spots

where people can meet up,” and “the people” so Ismael could see “what the person

looks like” and know “what to do,” enabling Ismael to “take over” Jose’s drug

deliveries. Neither Officer Ballantini nor Sergeant Donahue witnessed Ismael make

contact with the informant—both testified they were repositioning at the relevant time. 

The informant told Jose to follow him to a nearby garage to unload the drugs. Jose

returned to his truck and Ismael joined him as a passenger, leaving the Lexus in the

parking lot. 

With Jose and Ismael following in the Ford truck, the informant drove south out

of the gas station. As he drove, the informant called Officer Ballantini to tell him the

drugs were in the gas tank of Jose’s truck. When Jose abruptly turned into a

restaurant parking lot—abandoning the informant—Officer Ballantini directed

Sergeant Kouski to stop the truck. Once stopped, Jose and Ismael tried to exit the

vehicle before Sergeant Kouski instructed them to stay put. Sergeant Kouski

suspected Jose and Ismael were trying to distance themselves from contraband. 

Jose and Ismael each presented Arizona identification—Jose’s was false and

Ismael’s was valid. They told Sergeant Kouski they were traveling from Kearney,

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Nebraska, to Peoria, Illinois, to find roofing work. Drawing on his own roofing

experience, Sergeant Kouski was skeptical of their story based in part on their lack of

roofing tools. With Jose’s consent, Sergeant Kouski searched the truck and deployed

his drug dog. The dog alerted to the presence of contraband, and Sergeant Kouski

notified the narcotics officers, who arrived to assist with the search. 

After removing the bed of the truck, the officers found hidden in the truck’s gas

tank three one-pound bags of methamphetamine and eleven one-pound bags of heroin

with an estimated street value of more than $2 million.3

 The officers also seized other

evidence, including the cell phone Jose used to arrange the deal with the informant,

and placed Jose and Ismael under arrest. 

The police impounded the Lexus and searched it as well. When his drug dog

alerted to the back seat, Sergeant Kouski removed the seat and located a secret

compartment in the gas tank. Although the compartment was empty, Sergeant Kouski

testified his dog alerted to the odor of narcotics. 

B. Procedural History

On August 27, 2013, the government secured a three-count indictment charging

Jose and Ismael with conspiring to distribute controlled substances and possessing

with intent to distribute both methamphetamine and heroin. Before trial, Jose and

Ismael moved to suppress the evidence seized from the truck, arguing the police

lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because they had not independently

verified the information from their first-time informant. After a November 8, 2013,

suppression hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding reasonable

suspicion supported the stop. 

3

The police reassembled Jose’s truck and sold it at auction. The buyer’s

mechanic found another six one-pound packages of heroin in the gas tank. 

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On November 20, 2013, Jose pled guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange

for the government’s dismissal of the other two counts and its agreement to withhold

filing a notice of sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851. The district court

sentenced Jose to 175 months imprisonment, which Jose appeals. 

On November 22, 2013, Ismael went to trial. At the close of the government’s

case, Ismael moved for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. Over

Ismael’s objection, the district court instructed the jury it could convict Ismael if he

had been deliberately ignorant of the drug crimes. In closing, Ismael argued “he had

no idea what Jose was doing.” The jury convicted Ismael on all three counts.

On March 26, 2014, the district court held a sentencing hearing, at which Ismael

requested a four-level role reduction under United States Sentencing Guidelines

(U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) § 3B1.2(a), asserting he had a minimal role in the drug

conspiracy. Denying the request, the district court sentenced Ismael to 188 months

in prison—the bottom of his advisory Guidelines range. Ismael appeals his conviction

and sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ismael’s Motion to Suppress4

Ismael contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of Jose’s truck. In Ismael’s

view, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop because the informant had

no prior track record at the department and the officers failed to corroborate

independently the information he provided.

4

Although Ismael and Jose both raised this issue in the district court, only

Ismael challenges the district court’s denial of his motion.

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“We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but the underlying

factual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn by law

enforcement officials.” United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 982 (8th Cir. 2012). 

“‘We affirm . . . unless the district court’s decision is unsupported by substantial

evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the

entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.’” United States v. Wallace, 713 F.3d

422, 426 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Bay, 662 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir.

2011)). 

“A traffic stop constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), and therefore must

be reasonable to survive constitutional scrutiny.” United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d

1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004). “[T]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the [stop] is

supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify such a stop ‘is

dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of

reliability.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)

(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). In evaluating reasonable

suspicion, we “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see

whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting

legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 

“A confidential informant’s tip may support a reasonable suspicion if it has

sufficient indicia of reliability, such as the informant’s track record as a reliable source

or independent corroboration of the tip.” United States v. Manes, 603 F.3d 451, 456

(8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted); accord United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d

1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f an informant is otherwise unknown to police and has

no proven track record of reliability, police may deem an informant credible and make

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a finding of probable cause when an informant’s information is at least partly

corroborated.”). “An informant may also prove himself to be a reliable source for law

enforcement by providing predictive information about a meeting time or place.” 

Winarske, 715 F.3d at 1067. The reliability of an informant’s information “is

bolstered if the tip is corroborated not only by matching an identity or description, but

also by accurately describing a suspect’s future behavior.” Manes, 603 F.3d at 456. 

In this case, the totality of the circumstances sufficiently established the

informant’s reliability and provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. As part of his

ongoing investigation, which included electronic monitoring, Officer Ballantini

suspected the informant was obtaining drugs from Grand Island for sale in Des

Moines. When a search of the informant’s home revealed drugs, the

informant—trying to provide useful information to save his own skin—quickly agreed

to cooperate with the police and help them catch his supplier. Confirming what the

police already suspected about his drug activity based on their prior investigation, the

informant described his supplier and the blue truck he drove to their first meeting in

Grand Island. With officers present, the informant contacted his supplier and arranged

for delivery of three pounds of methamphetamine to Des Moines. On the day the

drugs arrived, the informant frequently updated the police with details about the

meeting, including the time, location, and method of the exchange. The informant

even forwarded Jose’s texts and instructions directly to the police. 

Visually monitoring the informant’s meeting at the time and location the

informant had said it would take place, the police quickly confirmed the informant’s

description of both his supplier and the blue truck with Nebraska plates the informant

predicted his supplier would drive. As the meeting ended and the exchange was about

to take place at a different location, the informant signaled the police according to

Officer Ballantini’s plan—driving south from the gas station to let Officer Ballantini

know the drugs were in the truck. As the informant drove south with Jose behind him,

the informant called Officer Ballantini to tell him Jose had hidden the drugs in the gas

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tank. When Sergeant Kouski began following the blue truck, Jose and Ismael reacted

suspiciously, see, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-76, abandoning the informant, turning

abruptly into a restaurant parking lot, and trying to distance themselves from the truck. 

 

By the time Sergeant Kouski made the stop, the officers were well aware of the

basis for the informant’s knowledge and had corroborated the vast majority of what

he had told them. The officers had more than enough reliable information to establish

a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing,” Arvizu, 534

U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417), before stopping Jose’s truck. See, e.g.,

United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming probable cause

for arrest based on a first-time informant’s “accurate and detailed information about”

a drug delivery arranged in the officers’ presence where the informant’s predictions

about the time and place of the delivery and his description of his supplier and his

vehicle “were corroborated by the independent observations of police officers”). The

district court did not err by denying Ismael’s motion to suppress. 

B. Deliberate Ignorance

Ismael next argues the evidence did not support giving a deliberate ignorance

instruction. “We review a district court’s decision to include a jury instruction for

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Galimah, 758 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2014). 

“We look to whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the instruction, reviewing

‘the evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the light most

favorable to the government.’” United States v. Whitehill, 532 F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir.

2008) (quoting United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1131 (8th Cir. 1990)).

“A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the evidence is

sufficient to support a jury’s conclusion that ‘the defendants had either actual

knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately failed to inquire about it before taking

action to support the activity.’” United States v. Hernandez-Mendoza, 600 F.3d 971,

979 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Whitehill, 532 F.3d at 751). “Ignorance is deliberate if

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[a defendant was] presented with facts putting [him] on notice criminal activity was

particularly likely and yet intentionally failed to investigate.” Whitehill, 532 F.3d at

751. “While a district court should not give the deliberate-ignorance instruction when

the evidence points solely to the defendant’s actual knowledge of the facts in question,

the ‘instruction is particularly appropriate when the defendant denies any knowledge

of a criminal scheme despite strong evidence to the contrary.’” United States v.

Woodard, 315 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Regan, 940

F.2d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir. 1991)). 

The evidence in this case justified the instruction. Over the course of the trial,

the government presented strong evidence Ismael was aware of the illegal drugs in

Jose’s truck and was actively working with Jose, his “partner,” to deliver them from

Arizona to Des Moines by way of Grand Island. In its closing argument, the

government emphasized that the testimony of the investigating officers and the

informant established Ismael drove a ghost vehicle registered under his brother’s false

name, conducted counter-surveillance at the gas station, joined the meeting between

Jose and the informant, was trying to “learn the ropes” of Jose’s drug trade,

unquestioningly got into Jose’s truck to travel to a different location to help remove

the drugs from the gas tank, and gave a common fabricated cover story when stopped

by the police. 

In his own closing argument, Ismael maintained there was “no evidence” Ismael

knew the drugs were hidden in the gas tank and asked the jury to “believe he had no

idea what Jose was doing.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the

deliberate ignorance instruction. See id.

C. Ismael’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Ismael argues the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of

acquittal on all three counts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). According to Ismael, the

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evidence was strong that Jose was guilty of the crimes charged, but the evidence “was

utterly and totally lacking that [Ismael] too participated in the criminal activity.” 

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing

all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. Vore, 743 F.3d 1175, 1180

(8th Cir. 2014). “We will not lightly overturn the jury’s verdict and will reverse only

if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. No Neck, 472 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2007).

1. Conspiracy

To convict Ismael of conspiracy as charged in count one, “the Government had

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that there was a conspiracy (an agreement to

possess with intent to distribute the drugs); (2) that [Ismael] knew of the conspiracy;

and (3) that [Ismael] intentionally joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Shaw, 751

F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2014). The government maintains it met its burden with direct

and circumstantial evidence of Ismael’s active involvement in the conspiracy to

distribute drugs with Jose. See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th

Cir. 1994) (“Because a jury rarely has direct evidence of a defendant’s knowledge, it

is generally established through circumstantial evidence.”). The government

highlights the informant’s testimony that Jose introduced Ismael as his “partner,” and

explained he was “just showing [Ismael] the ropes” so Ismael could take over

delivering drugs to Des Moines. 

In response, Ismael asserts the informant “was the only testifying witness that

had anything other than a hunch to offer that [Ismael] was involved in anything and

his testimony was sketchy at best.” In Ismael’s view, the informant’s testimony “was

not supported by any of the testifying officers.”

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But Ismael raised that argument at trial, and the jury reasonably rejected it. See

United States v. Listman, 636 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding “it was the

jury’s prerogative to believe” a co-conspirator who testified the defendant knew he

was transporting drugs because “‘[t]he jury is the final arbiter of the witnesses’

credibility, and we will not disturb that assessment’” (quoting United States v. Hayes,

391 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2004))). To the extent there were any “conflicts or

contradictions in [the] testimony,” the jury is responsible for resolving them, “and we

resolve any credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Ali, 616 F.3d

745, 755 (8th Cir. 2010). The government adduced sufficient evidence to permit a

reasonable jury to find Ismael intentionally conspired to distribute illegal drugs.

 

2. Possession with Intent to Distribute

To prove possession of methamphetamine and heroin with intent to distribute

as charged in counts two and three, respectively, “the Government had to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ismael] knowingly possessed the methamphetamine

[and heroin] in the truck with the intent to distribute it.” Vore, 743 F.3d at 1180; see

also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). “‘Possession can be actual or constructive.

Actual possession is the knowing, direct, and physical control over a thing.’” United

States v. Brown, 634 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. SerranoLopez, 366 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2004)). “Constructive possession is defined as

knowledge of [the] presence of the contraband plus control over the contraband.” 

United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1168 (8th Cir. 2014).

Ismael contends “evidence that [he] possessed either the methamphetamine or

the heroin is equally lacking” given the absence of direct incriminating evidence like

finger prints or “statements of ownership.” Relying on United States v. Pace, 922

F.2d 451 (8th Cir.1990), Ismael argues his “proximity to contraband” and his “mere

presence at the scene of concealed illegal activity is not enough” to convict. 

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Ismael’s arguments simply run out of gas. In Pace, we concluded the

government failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the defendant driver of a vehicle

knowingly possessed the illegal drugs concealed in his passenger’s bags in the back

of the car. See id. at 452-53. At trial, the driver and passenger both testified the

driver was unaware of the hidden drugs. See id. Noting there was no evidence the

driver opened the passenger’s bags or knew of the “criminal nature of the trip,” we

determined “it [was] merely conjecture to conclude [the driver] knew what those

packages contained.” Id. at 453.

Unlike Pace, “this is not a case in which the government could not prove, even

by inference, that the defendant was anything more than present in the vehicle or

physically proximate to the contraband.” United States v. Johnson, 18 F.3d 641, 648

(8th Cir. 1994). Ismael again ignores the informant’s testimony and the other strong

evidence that Ismael knowingly and actively worked with his “partner” Jose to

conceal, transport, and deliver the drugs hidden in the truck’s gas tank. See United

States v. Patterson, 886 F.2d 217, 219 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“Constructive

possession need not be proved by direct evidence, but rather may be premised upon

circumstantial evidence, which we recognize as being ‘intrinsically as probative as

direct evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Holm, 836 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir.

1988))). 

Ismael unsurprisingly points his finger at his brother Jose, claiming Ismael was

just innocently and ignorantly along for the ride. But “[p]ossession may be joint; it

need not be exclusive.” United States v. Smart, 501 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2007). 

And the evidence supporting Ismael’s convictions “need not exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence, but simply be sufficient to convince the jury beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.” United States v. McGuire, 45 F.3d

1177, 1186 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Burks, 934 F.2d 148, 151 (8th

Cir. 1991) (“If the evidence rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses, the

reviewing court will not disturb the conviction.”). Based on the record evidence, a

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reasonable jury could find Ismael and Jose jointly possessed the drugs with intent to

distribute. The district court did not err in denying Ismael’s motion for judgment of

acquittal. 

D. Ismael’s Sentence

Ismael finally contends the district court erred in denying his request for a fourlevel sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a), which provides a four-level

reduction in the offense level “[i]f the defendant was a minimal participant in any

criminal activity.” According to Ismael, he was entitled to a reduction because “his

conduct was less culpable than” Jose’s and the balance of the evidence, in his view,

suggested Ismael “was only along to assist Jose in his operation.” 

In denying Ismael a sentence reduction, the district court found the “degree of

sophistication involved in this offense,” the large quantity of drugs recovered, and

“the elaborate nature in which the drugs were hidden and protected” indicated “both

defendants [Jose and Ismael] were deeply involved” in criminal activity. We detect

no clear error in the district court’s findings regarding Ismael’s substantial role in his

crimes and conclude the district court properly denied Ismael’s request for a sentence

reduction. See United States v. Martinez, 168 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999)

(standard of review).

E. Jose’s Sentence

After Jose pled guilty to count one, the district court held a sentencing hearing. 

Adopting the factual findings in Jose’s presentence investigation report without

objection from either party, the district court calculated Jose’s advisory Guidelines

range to be 151 to 188 months imprisonment (level 33, category II).5

 The district

court rejected Jose’s request for a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months and

5

Jose’s range reflects a two-level reduction based on the parties’ stipulation

regarding a proposed amendment to the Guidelines.

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sentenced Jose to 175 months—near the middle of the range. On the government’s

motion, the district court dismissed the remaining charges. 

On appeal, Jose contends the district court committed multiple procedural errors

and imposed an unreasonable sentence driven in part by prejudice. In particular, Jose

complains the district court (1) failed to correct the government’s alleged

misstatement that he “had been involved in a sophisticated drug operation for twenty

years”; (2) referred to his “uncounted ancient criminal history”; (3) decided Jose’s

financial hardships did not justify the harm Jose’s activities caused the United States;

(4) considered the 240-month mandatory sentence Jose would have faced if the

government had filed notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851; and (5) said the court would “look

forward to reducing” Jose’s sentence if he cooperated with the government and gave

a truthful proffer. In Jose’s view, it was unreasonable for the district court to consider

and discuss these factors. 

Jose did not raise any of the alleged procedural errors at sentencing, so we

review for plain error. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005)

(en banc) (“Errors not properly preserved are reviewed only for plain error under Rule

52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). Absent significant procedural

error, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en

banc).

Our review of the sentencing record reveals Jose’s arguments are without merit

and his confused accusation of prejudice utterly unfounded. Most of Jose’s misguided

complaints relate to the district court’s thorough consideration of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors. In essence, Jose argues it was unreasonable for the district court to

consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and explain his sentence as required by law. 

The argument obviously fails. 

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Jose’s cursory reliance on United States v. Stokes, 750 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir.

2014), also fails. In Stokes, we concluded the sentencing judge plainly erred by

(1) assuming the defendant had sold drugs for ten years despite a lack of record

support, and (2) using that fact as “a principal basis for denying” a downward

variance. Id. Unlike Stokes, there is nothing in the record here to indicate the district

court concluded Jose sold drugs for twenty years, much less that any such fact was a

principal basis for imposing Jose’s within-Guidelines sentence. 

Contrary to Jose’s unsupported assertion, the district court need not “disavow”

purportedly “erroneous statements” made by the government or otherwise separately

address every argument made at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 670

F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2012). The district court did not plainly err in calculating

Jose’s sentence, and Jose abjectly “fails to overcome” the presumption of

reasonableness we afford his within-Guidelines sentence. United States v. Wanna,

744 F.3d 584, 589 (8th Cir. 2014).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm both Jose’s sentence and Ismael’s conviction and sentence. 

______________________________

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Appellate Case: 14-1816 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/09/2015 Entry ID: 4251777