Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05072/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger Blackwell
Appellant
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appellee
United States Department of Justice
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 15, 2011 Decided July 1, 2011

No. 10-5072

ROGER BLACKWELL,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00661)

James H. Lesar argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

David C. Rybicki, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 1 of 12
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge 

KAVANAUGH, with whom Circuit Judge ROGERS and Senior 

Circuit Judge WILLIAMS join.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Roger Blackwell was 

convicted of federal insider trading crimes. In this Freedom 

of Information Act suit, he seeks information from the FBI 

that he believes would show misconduct by the federal 

investigators and prosecutors handling his case. In response 

to Blackwell’s FOIA request, the FBI produced many

documents. But it redacted or withheld many other 

documents pursuant to various FOIA exemptions, including 

Exemption 7(C)’s protection for “personal privacy” and 

Exemption 7(E)’s protection for certain law enforcement 

techniques and procedures. Blackwell has challenged the 

legitimacy of the redactions and withholdings, the adequacy 

of the FBI’s search for responsive documents, and the 

sufficiency of the FBI’s Vaughn index describing the redacted 

and withheld documents. The District Court rejected 

Blackwell’s arguments. We affirm.

I

In 2005, Roger Blackwell was convicted of 19 counts of 

insider trading and related offenses. He was sentenced to 6 

years’ imprisonment and fined $1 million. His convictions

and sentence were upheld on direct appeal and in habeas 

proceedings. See United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739 

(6th Cir. 2006) (affirming convictions and sentence); 

Blackwell v. United States, Crim. No. 2:04-cr-00134 (S.D. 

Ohio Mar. 30, 2010) (denying habeas motion).

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 2 of 12
3

Blackwell has consistently maintained that he is innocent. 

He claims that he was unjustly targeted and prosecuted by the 

Federal Government because of his wealth and public 

visibility. In 2007, he sent several FOIA requests to the FBI 

for, among other things, all documents related to key 

witnesses in his trial, as well as documents related to the costs 

of the investigation and prosecution. 

When the FBI received Blackwell’s FOIA request, it 

searched its databases for documents related to Blackwell, 

identifying 3319 pages of potentially responsive documents. 

Of those, it determined that 1869 pages were responsive. 

After applying the various FOIA exemptions, the FBI gave 

Blackwell 1103 pages in full and 557 pages in part. It 

withheld 209 pages in their entirety. In its response to 

Blackwell, the FBI stated that it had identified responsive 

documents by searching based on Blackwell’s name alone and 

that it had withheld information related to third parties. 

In this lawsuit, Blackwell alleged that the FBI failed to 

justify its redactions and withholdings under the claimed 

FOIA exemptions, that the FBI’s search was inadequate, and 

that its Vaughn index was insufficient. The District Court 

granted summary judgment to the FBI on all issues. 

Blackwell v. FBI, 680 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 (D.D.C. 2010). We 

review that decision de novo. See Elliott v. Dep’t of 

Agriculture, 596 F.3d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

II

The Freedom of Information Act allows the public to 

obtain certain Executive Branch agency documents. See 5 

U.S.C. § 552. The Act contains a number of exemptions. See 

id. § 552(b); see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166-67

(1985). Here, the FBI invoked Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E) to 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 3 of 12
4

withhold records requested by Blackwell.

1

 Exemption 7(C) 

authorizes agencies to withhold “records or information 

compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent 

that the production of such law enforcement records or 

information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(C). Exemption 7(E) permits withholding of 

“records or information compiled for law enforcement 

purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such 

law enforcement records or information . . . would disclose 

techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations 

or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 

could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the 

law.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(E).

Blackwell initially argues that the requested documents 

qualify for neither of those exemptions because they are not 

“records or information compiled for law enforcement 

purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Even if they qualify as law 

enforcement files, Blackwell contends that the FBI’s claimed 

exemptions do not apply. We are not persuaded.

A

At the outset, Blackwell contends that the documents at 

issue in this case are not protected under either Exemption 

7(C) or Exemption 7(E) because those exemptions apply only 

to “records or information compiled for law enforcement 

purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). To show that the disputed 

 1 The FBI invoked Exemptions 2 and 6 in addition to

Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E). We need not consider Exemptions 2 

and 6 because we conclude that the documents at issue fall within 

Exemption 7(C) or Exemption 7(E).

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 4 of 12
5

documents were “compiled for law enforcement purposes,”

the FBI need only “establish a rational nexus between the 

investigation and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties 

and a connection between an individual or incident and a 

possible security risk or violation of federal law.” Campbell 

v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Keys v. Dep’t 

of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

The FBI here says that the files requested by Blackwell 

were compiled for law enforcement purposes under that 

standard. The FBI’s assertion is entitled to deference, 

Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32, and it is especially convincing in 

this case because Blackwell explicitly sought records related 

to his own criminal prosecution. The documents generated in 

the course of investigating and prosecuting Blackwell on 

insider trading charges were quite obviously related to the 

FBI’s law enforcement duties. Thus, the documents sought in 

this case easily qualify as “records or information compiled 

for law enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).

B

Blackwell challenges the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 

7(C). Exemption 7(C) authorizes the Government to withhold 

law enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected 

to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 

Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). 

As a result of Exemption 7(C), FOIA ordinarily does not 

require disclosure of law enforcement documents (or portions 

thereof) that contain private information. See, e.g., Martin v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Boyd v. 

Criminal Division of the Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387-

88 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Oguaju v. United States, 378 F.3d 1115, 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 5 of 12
6

1117 (D.C. Cir. 2004); SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 

1197, 1205-06 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As this Court has said, 

“privacy interests are particularly difficult to overcome when 

law enforcement information regarding third parties is 

implicated.” Martin, 488 F.3d at 457. Moreover, “the 

Supreme Court has made clear that requests for such third 

party information are strongly disfavored.” Id. That is 

particularly true when the requester asserts a public interest –

however it might be styled – in obtaining information that 

relates to a criminal prosecution. 

The relevant question here is whether Blackwell has 

shown government misconduct sufficient to overcome 

Exemption 7(C)’s protection for personal privacy under the 

test outlined in National Archives & Records Admin. v. 

Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). To obtain private information 

under the Favish test, the requester must at a minimum 

“produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable 

person that the alleged Government impropriety might have 

occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. We conclude that 

Blackwell has failed to meet the demanding Favish standard. 

The only support Blackwell offers for his allegation of 

government misconduct is his own affidavit, which recounts a 

litany of allegedly suspicious circumstances but lacks any 

substantiation. His most inflammatory allegation – that “the 

prosecutor claimed he was not aware of any immunity 

agreement” with Blackwell’s ex-wife’s parents but that the 

agreement was later discovered “to be signed by the very 

same prosecuting attorney that denied its existence,” 

Blackwell Decl. ¶ 9 – is utterly unsupported by references to 

the trial record. Blackwell’s claim that the Government

deliberately allowed his former in-laws to flee the country and 

avoid subpoenas that would have required their testimony at 

trial, id. ¶ 11, is similarly unsupported. He provides no 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 6 of 12
7

evidence that the Government even knew that the witnesses 

would be traveling, much less that it had allowed them to 

leave for the purpose of evading subpoenas. And he supplies 

no evidence to support his claim that his computers were 

“destroyed, and returned to [his] office in unusable 

condition,” rendering them useless for his defense. Id. ¶ 23. 

He gives no pictures of the “destroyed” computers, no 

documentation by a computer expert verifying that they were 

“unusable.” The affidavit alludes to the existence of such 

evidence, but Blackwell did not provide it to the District 

Court. Id. ¶ 25. In short, Blackwell has not come close to 

meeting the demanding Favish standard for challenging the 

FBI’s invocation of FOIA Exemption 7(C).

C

Blackwell also contests the FBI’s assertion of Exemption 

7(E). That exemption permits withholding of law 

enforcement records “to the extent that the production of such 

law enforcement records or information . . . would disclose 

techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations 

or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 

could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the 

law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). 

This Court has stated that “the exemption looks not just 

for circumvention of the law, but for a risk of circumvention; 

not just for an actual or certain risk of circumvention, but for 

an expected risk; not just for an undeniably or universally 

expected risk, but for a reasonably expected risk; and not just 

for certitude of a reasonably expected risk, but for the chance 

of a reasonably expected risk.” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 

F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under our precedents,

Exemption 7(E) sets a relatively low bar for the agency to 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 7 of 12
8

justify withholding: “Rather than requiring a highly specific 

burden of showing how the law will be circumvented, 

exemption 7(E) only requires that the [agency] demonstrate 

logically how the release of the requested information might 

create a risk of circumvention of the law.” Id. at 1194 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The FBI invoked Exemption 7(E) here with respect to 

two kinds of information. The first was “details about 

procedures used during the forensic examination of a 

computer” by an FBI forensic examiner. Hardy Decl. ¶ 70.

Forensic examination procedures are undoubtedly 

“techniques” or “procedures” used for “law enforcement 

investigations.” Thus, the FBI needed only to “demonstrate 

logically how the release of the requested information might 

create a risk of circumvention of the law.” Mayer Brown 

LLP, 562 F.3d at 1194 (alterations omitted). To that end, 

David Hardy, Chief of the FBI’s Record/Information 

Dissemination Section, explained that, “[t]he release of 

specifics of these investigative techniques would risk 

circumvention of the law by individuals who seek to utilize 

computers in violation of laws. By releasing that information, 

the FBI would be exposing computer forensic vulnerabilities 

to potential criminals.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 45. That explanation 

satisfies the Exemption 7(E) standard. 

The FBI also invoked Exemption 7(E) to protect 

“methods of data collection, organization and presentation 

contained in ChoicePoint reports.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 71. Hardy 

explained that “the manner in which the data is searched, 

organized and reported to the FBI is an internal technique, not 

known to the public,” and the “method was developed by 

ChoicePoint to meet the specific investigative needs of the 

FBI.” Id. ¶ 46. Hardy also said that disclosure of the reports 

“could enable criminals to employ countermeasures to avoid 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 8 of 12
9

detection, thus jeopardizing the FBI’s investigatory missions.” 

Id. These statements logically explain how the data could 

help criminals circumvent the law, and that suffices here to 

justify invocation of Exemption 7(E). See Mayer Brown LLP,

562 F.3d at 1194.

III

We briefly address two additional matters: 

Blackwell contends that the FBI’s search for responsive 

documents was inadequate because the Bureau did not search 

its databases using the names of the individuals he had 

specifically mentioned in his request. The FBI counters that it 

“will not conduct searches on third parties in the absence of 

proofs of death or privacy waivers from these individuals, or 

an articulation by a requester of a strong public interest that 

outweighs any privacy interest.” Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 7. 

Because a search for records “pertaining to” specific 

individuals, see FOIA Request of Dr. Roger Blackwell (Aug. 

27, 2007), would have added only information that we have 

concluded is protected by Exemption 7(C), it follows that the 

FBI was correct in declining to search for such documents.

Blackwell also says that the FBI’s Vaughn index of 

withheld documents was inadequate primarily because it 

failed to provide context for certain documents that had been 

entirely withheld. But the second Hardy declaration provided 

a concise explanation for each of these withheld documents. 

See Second Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. Blackwell’s Vaughn index 

argument is therefore unavailing.

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 9 of 12
10

* * *

We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 10 of 12
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I write separately to

make clear that the court rejects the government’s broadly stated

position that under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), “a

FOIA requester’s desire to obtain Brady[

1

] material is not a

public interest for purposes of Exemption 7(C).” Appellee’s Br.

22. To the extent the government’s position suggests that when

a requester seeks exculpatory evidence for purposes of a direct

appeal or a collateral attack on his conviction disclosure of such

information is categorically not in the public interest for

purposes of FOIA Exemption 7(C), this misreads precedent. To

the contrary, an individual’s “personal stake in the release of the

requested information is ‘irrelevant’ to the balancing of public

and third-party privacy interests required by Exemption 7(C),”

Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09-5428, slip op. at 23 (D.C. Cir.

June 28, 2011) (quoting Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1327

(D.C. Cir. 2000)), and “the public might well have a significant

interest in knowing whether the federal government engaged in

blatant Brady violations,” id. This court has not applied a per se

rule and does not do so today. See, e.g., Boyd v. Crim. Div. of

the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387–88 (D.C. Cir. 2007);

see also Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 453, 456–58

(D.C. Cir. 2007). 

The court applies the standard in National Archives &

Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004), whereby

a FOIA requester, to overcome the government’s authority not

to disclose pursuant to Exemption 7(C), must “produce evidence

that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the

alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” id. at

174. With no additional thumb on the scale, the court concludes

that Blackwell does not meet this standard. Op. at 6. Because

Blackwell has not as an evidentiary matter demonstrated that the

government failed to comply with its duty of disclosure of

exculpatory material at the time of his trial or appeal or that it is

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 11 of 12
2

currently withholding evidence that demonstrates his innocence

of the crimes of which he was convicted, his request fails under

the Favish standard; no per se rule is applied. 

USCA Case #10-5072 Document #1316156 Filed: 07/01/2011 Page 12 of 12