Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01718/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01718-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aaron Lynn Selby
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1718

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Aaron Lynn Selby, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 16, 2006

Filed: June 19, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Aaron Lynn Selby (Selby) challenges the sentence imposed by the district

court1

 after he pled guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), and conspiring to distribute marijuana, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(D). Selby was subject to a mandatory

minimum sentence of life imprisonment. Prior to sentencing, however, the

government filed a substantial-assistance downward-departure motion under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and recommended a 20% sentence reduction

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of 405 months. Selby, on the other hand, requested that the court consider 360 months

as the starting point for his substantial-assistance reduction. The court ultimately

sentenced Selby to 263 months’ imprisonment, which represented a 35% reduction

from 405 months.

On appeal, Selby contends that the district court erred in “arbitrarily” choosing

405 months as the starting point from which to apply the substantial-assistance

departure and that “life” is more appropriately defined in this context as 360 months.

For support, Selby relies upon 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii), and United States v.

Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1995). Selby maintains that, if the court had properly

defined life as 360 months, a 35% reduction would have resulted in a 234-month

sentence.

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the

Guidelines. See United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005).

“When construing the Guidelines, we look first to the plain language, and where that

is unambiguous we need look no further.” United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 427

(8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Where the plain language of the Sentencing

Guidelines is ambiguous, we will interpret the Guidelines in the manner that most

clearly adheres to the Sentencing Commission’s intent. See, e.g., United States v.

Gomez-Hernandez, 300 F.3d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 2002). The best source of the

Sentencing Commission’s intent is the Sentencing Guidelines Manual itself. See

United States v. Laughrin, 438 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006). The Sentencing

Guidelines Manual does not specifically set forth, for a life sentence, a fixed

equivalent in terms of months. It is clear, however, that the Sentencing Commission’s

intent was not to define a life sentence as 360 months, because under the Sentencing

Table, there are two separate sentencing levels where the range goes up to 405 months

before reaching life. See generally U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table). In other

words, Selby supports an interpretation that would render a sentence of 360 months

(Selby’s presumptive life sentence under the Guidelines) appropriate for crimes more

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serious than those warranting a sentence of 405 months. This clearly was not the

Sentencing Commission’s intent. Additionally, it appears Selby actually received a

favorable starting point of 405 months. See 2004 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing

Statistics, United States Sentencing Commission, Appendix A (“Prior to fiscal year

1993, the Commission defined life sentences as 360 months. However, to reflect life

expectancy of federal criminal defendants more precisely and to provide more

accurate length of imprisonment information, life sentences are now defined as 470

months.”); see also United States v. Keller, 413 F.3d 706, 711 (8th Cir.) (rejecting

argument that district court erroneously calculated substantial-assistance reduction on

life sentence; holding that court used correct starting point of 470 months), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 786 (2005). Accordingly, we hold Selby has failed to demonstrate

the district court erred in using 405 months as the starting point for applying the

substantial-assistance departure.

We further hold that Selby’s reliance on section 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) is misplaced

because that provision does not set the definitive standard as to what is meant by a life

sentence under the statutory sentencing framework. Rather, it applies to the

discretionary modification of a sentence for a defendant who is at least 70 years old,

has served at least 30 years in prison, and is no longer considered dangerous. Selby’s

reliance on Prevatte likewise is misplaced because Prevatte does not involve the

application of a mandatory minimum sentence of life. See Prevatte, 66 F.3d at 843

(holding 636-month sentence was abuse of discretion in light of Seventh Circuit’s

prior holding that where legislatively enacted sentencing scheme has expressly

deprived court of possibility of imposing life sentence, sentence for term of years

exceeding defendant’s approximate life expectancy would ordinarily constitute abuse

of discretion (quotation omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

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