Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00461/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00461-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James D. Hartley
Respondent
Balwinder Singh Tung
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BALWINDER SINGH TUNG, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

WARDEN JAMES D. HARTLEY, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:10-cv-00461-AWI-JLT HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE: 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE PETITION (Doc. 13) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

March 9, 2010. In it, Petitioner challenges a decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) 1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The

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Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on

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other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for the instant federal petition, the Court will consider the

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date of signing of the proof of service as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox

rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the proof of service for the instant petition on

March 9, 2010. (Doc. 1, p. 59). For all state petitions, the Court will use the actual filing date since Petitioner was

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following a hearing on August 14, 2006, that Petitioner was not suitable for parole. In the first and

third grounds for relief, Petitioner argues that the BPH’s 2006 decision was an unconstitutional and

unreasonable determination of the facts and a violation of due process. (Doc. 1, p. 24; 51). In the

second ground for relief, Petitioner appears to challenge four prior parole denials as well,

contending, inter alia, that the BPH’s prior decisions were a violation of due process and equal

protection. (Doc. 1, p. 37). 

On March 24, 2010, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response. (Doc. 7). On May 25,

2010, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, contending that the petition is untimely and

unexhausted and therefore should be dismissed. (Doc. 13). On June 9, 2010, Petitioner filed his

opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 14), and on June 23, 2010, Respondent filed a reply. (Doc.

15). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from

the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondent’s to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. §

represented by counsel in those proceedings. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 3(d).

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2244(d)(1)'s one year limitation period and Respondent’s contention that the claims are unexhausted

in state court. Because Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a Motion

to Dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has

not yet filed a formal Answer, the Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on March 24, 2010, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of

the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In this case, as discussed, Petitioner is challenging the results of a BPH hearing on August 14,

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2006. At that hearing, the BPH found that Petitioner was not suitable for parole and that he would

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison . 

(Doc. 1, p. 149). 

The AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations, as embodied in § 2244(d)(1), applies to habeas

petitions challenging an administrative decision in the context of a parole board determination. 

Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9 Cir. 2004); see Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1080 th

n. 4 (9 Cir. 2003). Under subsection (d), the limitation period begins to run on “the date on which th

the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” In the context of a parole board decision, the factual basis is the parole

board’s denial of a petitioner’s administrative appeal. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at

1082-1083. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run the day following a petitioner’s notification

of the parole board’s decision. Id. Where the date Petitioner received notice of the parole board’s

hearing is not part of the record, Shelby rejected the notion that remand for an evidentiary hearing

was required to determine the date on which a petitioner found out about the hearing, apparently

establishing instead a presumption that an inmate will in fact receive notice on the day the denial is

issued, and that date will be used to calculate the statute of limitations unless the petitioner rebuts

that presumption:

“Here, as in Redd, Shelby does not dispute that he received timely notice of the denial of his

administrative appeal on July 12, 2001, and he offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore,

the limitation period began running the next day.”

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066.

Applying the foregoing principles, Petitioner would have known the factual basis for his

claims on August 14, 2006, the day the BPH announced its decision in Petitioner’s presence. 

Accordingly, the one-year period would have commenced the following day, i.e., on August 15,

2006, and would have expired 365 days later, i.e., on August 14, 2007. As mentioned, the instant

petition was filed on March 9, 2010, approximately thirty months after the one-year period would

have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling, the instant

petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

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C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the documents submitted by Respondent with the motion to dismiss establish that

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Petitioner filed the following state habeas petitions related to the 2006 BPH hearing: (1) petition

filed in the Superior Court of Merced County on June 27, 2007, and denied on September 13, 2007; 

(2) petition filed in the 5 DCA on January 10, 2008 and denied on May 14, 2009; and (3) petition th

filed in the California Supreme Court on June 25, 2009 and denied on December 2, 2009. 

As discussed previously, the one-year period commenced on August 15, 2006 and continued

to run until Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the Merced County Superior Court on

June 27, 2007, a period of 316 days. At that point, Petitioner would have had only 49 days

remaining on his one-year period. Assuming, without deciding, that all three state petitions were

“properly filed” within the meaning of the AEDPA and therefore entitled Petitioner to statutory

tolling for both the pendency of the petitions and the intervals between them, Petitioner would have

been entitled to statutory tolling from June 27, 2007, until the California Supreme Court denied his

last state petition on December 2, 2009. The one-year period would have resumed the following day,

i.e., December 3, 2009, and would have continued to run unabated until it expired 49 days later, i.e.,

January 21, 2010. As mentioned, Petitioner did not file the instant petition until March 9, 2010,

some 47 days after the one-year period had expired. 

Additionally, the Court has accessed the state courts’ electronic database and has established

that Petitioner filed two additional state habeas petitions, although the nature of those petitions

cannot be determined from a cursory review of the State’s electronic database. The first petition, in

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case no. F059368, was filed in the 5 DCA on January 28, 2010 and denied on April 16, 2010. The th

second, in case no. S183759, was filed in the California Supreme Court on June 21, 2010, and is still

pending. The latter is obviously irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of the timeliness problem since

that state petition was filed after the instant petition and thus could have no tolling effect. 

The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

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accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir.

1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice

may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise

Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v.

Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980). As

such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.

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The same is true for case no. F059368, albeit for a different reason. A petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. 

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9 Cir. 2001); th th

see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d th

820 (9 Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of the limitations period that th

has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8 Cir. th

1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the

one-year limitations period). Here, as mentioned, the limitations period expired on January 21,

2010, seven days before Petitioner filed his second state habeas petition in the 5 DCA. th

Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of the AEDPA for that

petition. 

This same legal principles forecloses the Court’s consideration of any habeas challenge to the

BPH’s decision at prior hearings, as alleged in Ground Two. Petitioner alleges in Ground Two that

he was subjected to illegal and unconstitutional BPH hearings on three occasions prior to the 2006

hearing: May 3, 2001, November 25, 2002, and April 21, 2004. (Doc. 1, p. 23). Petitioner was

present at each of these hearings, and at the conclusion of each the BPH denied parole suitability. 

(Id., pp. 80; 88; 93). Accordingly, the one-year periods for challenging those BPH decisions would

have commenced, respectively, on May 4, 2001, November 26, 2002, and April 22, 2004, and would

have expired, respectively, on May 3, 2002, November 25, 2003, and April 21, 2005. Shelby, 391

F.3d at 1066. Petitioner has not submitted any evidence to establish that he is entitled to statutory

tolling for those three periods that are of sufficient length to make timely any petition raising claims

pertaining to those hearings. The “round” of state habeas petitions filed by Petitioner regarding his

2006 hearing was commenced after all three of the earlier one-year periods had expired. Thus, the

state petitions provide no statutory tolling for the three earlier petition. In the absence of any tolling,

those claims are barred by the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period as well.

In his opposition to this motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that the one-year period did not

commence until after the California Supreme Court denied his state petition on December 3, 2009. 

(Doc. 14, p. 2). Petitioner apparently assumes, incorrectly, that the statute of limitation is tolled until

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he files his first state petition. However, as discussed above, the statute starts to run on the day

following the BPH hearing, i.e., the date when Petitioner learned of the factual basis for his habeas

claim, and continued to run until tolled by a “properly filed” habeas corpus petition. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-1007 (The limitations period is not tolled for the period between finality of the appeal

and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court since no

state court application is “pending.”) 

In sum, after considering all possible statutory tolling available to Petitioner, the petition is

still untimely. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition should be dismissed

for violating 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

D. Equitable Tolling

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, __S.Ct.__, 2010 WL 2346549 *9

(U.S.S.C. June 14, 2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9 Cir. 1997). th

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d

1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim,

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing

two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 2010 WL 2346549 at *12; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under

AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” 

Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on

the record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. Accordingly, the Court

finds that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Thus, the petition is untimely and should be

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dismissed.

E. The Petition Should Be Dismissed For Lack Of Exhaustion.

As an alternative ground for dismissal, Respondent argues that the petition is unexhausted

and should be dismissed. The Court agrees.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state’s alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the “‘opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners’ federal rights” (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court. 

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Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition, Ground Two challenges the three prior BPH hearings on the grounds

that the hearings were unlawfully delayed. (Doc. 1, p. 37). In Ground One, Petitioner also argues,

inter alia, that the 2006 BPH decision was “untimely.” (Doc. 1, p. 24). 

As Respondent correctly notes, however, in Petitioner’s state habeas petition filed by his

attorney in the California Supreme Court, no claim of untimeliness is raised. (Doc. 13, Ex. 5). 

Rather, Petitioner’s counsel contended only that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding

that Petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger and that the Board’s decision was not supported

by “some evidence.” (Id.). By failing to present his untimeliness argument to the State’s highest

court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust that issue as required. 

In his opposition, Petitioner vehemently contends that the issue is exhausted, noting excerpts

from the state petitions filed in the 5 DCA and the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 14, p. 3). The th

former is irrelevant to an exhaustion analysis, since the issue is whether Petitioner presented his

claim not to an intermediate state court but to the State’s highest court, i.e., the California Supreme

Court. In that regard, Petitioner points to a fleeting reference in the Statement of the Facts in that the

petition filed in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 13, Ex. 5, p. 7). His attorney writes, “At

petitioner’s fourth parole hearing, that was untimely against his constitutional interests, on August

14, 2006, the Board of Prison Hearings gave petitioner a 2 year parole denial.” (Id.). (Emphasis

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supplied). 

In the Court’s view, such a “drive-by” reference to a constitutional claim falls far below the

“fair presentation” requirement for exhaustion of state remedies. First, the Court notes that this brief

reference does not refer to Petitioner’s three prior parole hearings and therefore provides no basis for

concluding that those claims have been exhausted. Second, the “fair presentation” requirement for

exhaustion has simply not been met.

To exhaust a claim, the petitioner must have presented his federal constitutional issue before

the appropriate state court “within the four corners of his appellate briefing.” Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9 Cir. 2005). “[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to th

a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not

alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in

the case, that does so.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347 (2004). Exhaustion

demands more than drive-by citation detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal

theory. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1003. General appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion. Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-163, 116 S.Ct. 2074 (1996). 

Here, Petitioner’s counsel presented the California Supreme Court with a petition partitioned

into sections, including, inter alia, Statement of the Facts, Request for Relief, Memorandum of

Points & Authorities, and Discussion. (Doc. 13, Ex. 5). Under “Discussion,” Petitioner’s counsel

lists three legal arguments as to why the BPH’s 2006 decision should be set aside. Nowhere in that

“Discussion” is the issue of untimeliness raised. Indeed, even in the Statement of Facts, counsel

makes only the briefest reference to the fact that the hearing was “untimely against [Petitioner’s]

constitutional interests.” Counsel does not specify whether those “constitutional interests” derive

from the California State Constitution or from the United States Constitution. Counsel does not set

forth facts upon which the California Supreme Court could consider whether the alleged

untimeliness of the 2006 hearing violated Petitioner’s “constitutional interests.” Nor does counsel

premise such a constitutional denial as a legal basis for reversing the BPH’s decision.

“[T]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some

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makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record. The ground relied upon must be

presented face-up and squarely; the federal question must be plainly defined. Oblique references

which hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not turn the trick.” Martens v.

Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 717 (1 Cir. 1988); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7 Cir. st th

1991)(“Judges are not like pigs hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). 

In sum, Petitioner did not put the California Supreme Court on notice as to his claim that the

untimeliness of any of his four prior parole hearings violated his federal constitutional rights, and

thus those claims were not “fairly presented” to the State’s high court. Accordingly, those claims are

not exhausted. 

3

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 13), be GRANTED, and that the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure

to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and for lack of exhaustion.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within fourteen (14) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). 

///

///

Normally, the Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust

3

the claim in state court if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. In some instances, the Court has, alternatively,

permitted a petitioner to withdraw the unexhausted claims and proceed on the exhausted claims. Here, however, in light of

the Court’s recommendation to dismiss the petition as untimely, dismissal of only the unexhausted claims would serve no

practical purpose.

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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