Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02451/USCOURTS-ca8-08-02451-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tyrone Shadale Oaks
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Michael J. Davis, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2451

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

Tyrone Shadale Oaks, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 12, 2010

Filed: May 26, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Tyrone Oaks was convicted by a jury of one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Pursuant to the Armed

Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the district court1

 sentenced Oaks

to 293 months' imprisonment. Oaks raises numerous issues on appeal involving the

conduct of his trial and his sentencing. We affirm.

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I

On July 18, 2007, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Officer David Palmer of the

Minneapolis Park Police was conducting a routine patrol of Lake Calhoun in

Minneapolis. Palmer spotted Oaks and three other persons–Oaks's girlfriend Lisa

Broadway, Anthony Young, and S.J. (Broadway's teenage daughter)–in the park after

hours. Upon approaching the group approximately twenty-five feet away, Palmer

observed Oaks and Broadway pass items between themselves and Broadway placing

an item in her front pocket. Palmer believed a drug transaction was occurring and

noted the group was beginning to disburse. As Oaks began to walk away, Palmer

observed him reach into the waistband of his pants to retrieve an object and make a

throwing motion toward the lake. Immediately thereafter Palmer heard a loud splash.

Palmer got out of his patrol vehicle, ordered the four to stop, and detained them.

A search of Broadway uncovered marijuana and one tablet of what Palmer believed

to be Ecstacy. When questioned about what he had thrown into the lake, Oaks

claimed he was disposing of marijuana. Shortly thereafter, Oaks, and then Young,

fled the scene on foot but were recaptured with the assistance of a canine unit.

Palmer and a second officer searched the area where Palmer observed Oaks

dispose of the unknown item. Within minutes they recovered a loaded 9 mm handgun

from the water. After Oaks was recaptured, he was returned to the scene where

Palmer positively identified him as the person who threw the item into the water.

Oaks was indicted with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). In advance of trial, defense

counsel became aware of threats Oaks made to the trial judge. Counsel moved for the

judge to disqualify himself, arguing the threats would prevent the court from

administering the case fairly and objectively. The court denied the request and the

case proceeded to trial.

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At trial, Palmer testified to the above events. During cross-examination, Palmer

stated he was unable to see what Oaks threw in the lake because shadows from nearby

shrubbery prevented him from seeing clearly. Defense counsel attempted to impeach

Palmer by pointing out he had not mentioned shrubbery in his earlier description of

the events. On redirect, Palmer reviewed a written statement made near the time of

the incident that indicated Oaks threw the item in the direction of "weeds" and

"vegetation," and the government argued his earlier statement and trial testimony were

consistent. Palmer also testified on redirect the nearest street light was approximately

150 feet from where the four persons were gathered. Defense counsel sought to crossexamine Palmer further on these two points but the district court denied the request.

The government also offered the testimony of S.J., who stated she overheard

Oaks ask Broadway, "Should I throw it?" and observed Oaks throw a large black

pistol into the lake. Conversely, Oaks, Young, and Broadway testified and denied

Oaks had a gun or that he disposed of it in the lake.

As an element of the charged offense, the government had to prove Oaks was

a convicted felon. The government offered four prior convictions it argued qualified

as felony convictions. In advance of trial, Oaks stipulated he was a convicted felon

and the government was precluded from offering the convictions to prove his status

as a felon. However, the district court allowed the government to introduce evidence

of Oaks's prior conviction for aggravated robbery. The robbery conviction involved

the possession of a firearm and the government successfully argued it was admissible

under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to prove Oaks was not mistaken

about his status as a convicted felon and his intent to possess the gun.

At the close of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury the

government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Oaks knowingly possessed the

handgun. The instruction stated knowingly "means that he was conscious and aware

of his action, realized what he was doing or what was happening around him, and did

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not act because of ignorance, mistake, or accident." Defense counsel did not object

to the instruction.

The jury convicted Oaks and a presentence investigation was ordered. After

reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSR), Oaks submitted various

objections but did not object to any information in the PSR detailing his four prior

felony convictions. Additionally, Oaks did not object at sentencing when the district

court, relying on the unobjected-to information in the PSR, determined Oaks's prior

felony convictions qualified him for enhanced penalties under ACCA.

After Oaks was convicted, but before sentencing was held, his relationship with

defense counsel deteriorated and counsel moved to withdraw. Counsel noted he had

met with Oaks to review the PSR and was told Oaks no longer wanted him to continue

his representation. A hearing was held and Oaks asked to dismiss his attorney and

have substitute counsel appointed. Oaks told the district court he would proceed pro

se if substitute counsel was not appointed. The district court granted the motion to

withdraw but refused to appoint substitute counsel and advised Oaks he would have

to represent himself. Days later, the district court reconsidered and appointed

substitute counsel. At sentencing, the district court, in addition to other sentencing

enhancements, applied ACCA and sentenced Oaks to 293 months' imprisonment.

II

Oaks raises numerous issues on appeal. We will address each argument in turn.

A. The Trial Judge's Refusal to Recuse Himself

Oaks first argues the trial judge erred by refusing to recuse himself after he was

made aware Oaks had threatened him. Oaks either sent threatening correspondence

to the district court or made statements while in jail threatening the judge which were

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communicated to marshals and ultimately the judge. As a result, the marshals and

court security personnel were more visible when Oaks was in the courtroom. When

defense counsel noticed the heightened security measures at a pretrial hearing, he

objected, fearing the presence of additional officers during trial would prejudice the

jury. The judge held a sidebar and stated he "deem[ed] [Oaks] a threat." He further

admonished defense counsel not to tell Oaks about the conversation. Defense counsel

moved for the judge's recusal, arguing the threats would cause the court to favor the

government and be antagonistic to Oaks. The court refused the request. Oaks now

argues the court's legal rulings during the course of the trial and the lengthy sentence

it imposed reflect the court's bias.

We review a judge's refusal to recuse for an abuse of discretion. Moran v.

Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 2002). Under section 455(a), a judge is required

to "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Congress amended section 455 in 1974 "to

clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualification and to conform with the

recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (1974)." Liljeberg v.

Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988). This court applies an

objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether recusal is required. "The

question is 'whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned by the

average person on the street who knows all the relevant facts of a case.'" United States

v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moran, 296 F.3d at 648).

"A party introducing a motion to recuse carries a heavy burden of proof; a judge

is presumed to be impartial and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial

burden of proving otherwise." Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 985 (8th

Cir. 1992).

We note that where a judge's opinions are based on facts introduced or

events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, those opinions

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do not warrant recusal unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. While a

defendant's threat against a judge may in some cases raise a sufficient

question concerning bias on the part of that judge, recusal is not

automatic on the mere basis of the judge's knowledge of the threat.

United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 817 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

Oaks argues the trial judge's bias is reflected in the comments made from the

bench indicating he deemed Oaks a threat, various adverse legal rulings during the

proceedings, and the 293-month prison term which was imposed. The brief comments

made by the district court do not, of themselves, indicate any "deep-seated favoritism

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id. The court's lack of

bias is also reflected in the contested rulings, which, as shown below, were legally

sound. There is no evidence suggesting any adverse rulings were motivated by bias

on the part of the court. See United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir.

1976) ("Adverse rulings, standing alone, do not establish judicial bias or prejudice,

nor create a reasonable question of judicial impartiality.") (citation omitted). Further,

the sentence was imposed after the court correctly applied ACCA and calculated the

proper Guidelines sentencing range. As a result, we conclude the court did not abuse

its discretion by denying the recusal motion.

B. The "Knowingly" Jury Instruction

Oaks next argues the district court gave an erroneous jury instruction defining

the term "knowingly." The district court instructed the jury "knowingly" meant Oaks

was "conscious and aware of his action, realized what he was doing or what was

happening around him, and did not act because of ignorance, mistake or accident."

Oaks, citing United States v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006), argues the court should

have instructed the jury that he "had knowledge of the fact he possessed the firearm."

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According to Oaks, the district court should have adopted the Supreme Court's

definition of "knowingly" and the district court's definition was misleading.

 Defense counsel failed to object to the instruction. Where trial counsel fails

to raise an error at trial, this court can correct the error where there is "(1) error, (2)

that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights." United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d

543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Oaks "bears the burden of persuasion"

with respect to proving his rights were prejudiced, and he normally can meet the

requirement only by showing the alleged error affected the outcome of the case.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). If Oaks meets his burden on the

first three prongs, the court "may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,

but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the judicial proceedings." Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted). Here, the

instruction does not constitute error and Oaks's arguments fail.

Jury instructions are adequate if, "taken as a whole, [they] adequately advise the

jury of the essential elements of the offenses charged and the burden of proof required

of the government." United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1981). It is

settled law in this circuit that a district court's failure to define "knowledge" or

"knowingly" does not constitute "error, much less plain error." United States v.

Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding there is no need to define

"knowledge" because the word has the meaning assigned it in common usage and a

juror would already understand the word); see also United States v. Williams, 923

F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("In the Manual of Model Criminal

Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit . . . , it is stated that 'the

Committee believes that in most cases the word "knowingly" does not need to be

defined.' Clearly, it was not plain error to omit such a definition.").

In this case, the district court did not omit a definition of "knowingly." This

court's precedent suggests a definition which comports with the common meaning of

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its usage will pass appellate review. The district court instructed the jury the

government needed to prove Oaks was conscious of what he was doing, aware of what

was going on around him, and did not act because of ignorance, mistake or accident.

Nothing about this definition suggests anything other than the term's common

meaning. Moreover, the district court's definition, while different in form from the

Supreme Court's definition in Dixon, did not alter the common substantive meaning

of the term. Accordingly, the district court did not commit any instructional error,

much less any error that affected Oaks's substantial rights.

C. Rule 404(b) Evidence of Prior Aggravated Robbery Conviction

Oaks next assigns error to the district court's order allowing the government to

offer evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated robbery under Rule 404(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.

Rule 404(b) states: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith."

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The rule prohibits evidence of prior bad acts used to

circumstantially prove a person has a propensity to commit acts of that sort. United

States v. Trogdon, 575 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2009).

Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very

prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of

what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the

trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because

of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows

actually happened.

Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee notes (1972).

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Rule 404(b) provides, however, evidence of prior bad acts "may . . . be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Rule

404(b) is thus "a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion and admits evidence of other

crimes or acts relevant to any issue in the trial, unless it tends to prove only criminal

disposition." United States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, evidence of prior bad acts "probative of the

crime charged" is not excluded under Rule 404(b), United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d

897, 913 (8th Cir. 1985), and the court will only find error in a 404(b) question if the

district court abused its discretion, Simon, 767 F.2d at 526.

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be 1) relevant to a

material issue raised at trial, 2) similar in kind and close in time to the crime charged,

3) supported by sufficient evidence to support a jury finding the defendant committed

the other act, and 4) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial value. United States v. Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2009).

Here, the government offered the aggravated robbery conviction because Oaks

committed the crime while carrying a handgun. According to the government, it was

relevant in this instance to prove Oaks's knowledge and intent. Oaks contends he did

not place his knowledge and intent at issue because his defense was that he did not

possess or throw the handgun into the lake.

Oaks's argument, however, is foreclosed by this court's earlier precedent.

Knowing possession of a firearm is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and Oaks

placed his knowledge of the firearm's presence at the scene on his person at issue by

pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir.

2006); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir. 1996). "Evidence that a

defendant possessed a firearm on a previous occasion is relevant to show knowledge

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2

Oaks's alternative arguments on this point are similarly without merit. Namely,

the district court acted within its broad discretion in concluding the probative value

of Oaks's prior conviction was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice under Rule 403. See United States v. Banks, 553 F.3d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir.

2009) (acknowledging the great deference given to the district court's Rule 403

balancing test). Oaks's prior conviction was not introduced to prove his status as a

felon, thus diminishing the limited rule he analogizes to in Old Chief v. United States,

519 U.S. 172 (1997). United States v. Dorsey, 523 F.3d 878, 880-81 (8th Cir. 2008)

(noting Old Chief distinguishes cases involving prior convictions under Rule 404(b)).

In addition, the district court provided a limiting instruction directing the jury to only

consider the evidence with respect to Oaks's knowledge and intent. See United States

v. Kent, 531 F.3d 642, 651 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Moreover, this Court has been reluctant

to find that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial when the district court gave an

appropriate limiting instruction, instructing the jury not to use the evidence as proof

of the acts charged in the indictment.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).

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and intent." Walker, 470 F.3d at 1274. Oaks's prior conviction for armed robbery

addresses the material issue of his knowledge of the presence of the firearm and his

intent to possess it. See Walker, 470 F.3d at 1274 (holding the defendant's prior

conviction for armed robbery addressed his knowledge and intent to possess the

firearm). We therefore reject Oaks's argument and conclude the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Oaks's prior aggravated robbery

conviction.2

D. Additional Cross-Examination of Officer Palmer

Oaks next argues the district court erred when it refused defense counsel's

request for additional cross-examination of Officer Palmer following his re-direct.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an opportunity for effective

cross-examination of witnesses. United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1024 (8th

Cir. 1996). However, courts "retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause

is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns

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about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness'[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also United States v.

Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 524 (8th Cir. 2000) (same). A Confrontation Clause

violation is shown when a defendant demonstrates a reasonable jury might have

received a significantly different impression of a witness's credibility had counsel

been allowed to pursue the proposed line of cross-examination. Harrington v. Iowa,

109 F.3d 1275, 1277 (8th Cir. 1997). A trial court's decision to limit

cross-examination will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of

discretion and a showing of prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Brown, 110

F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 1997).

During direct examination, Officer Palmer stated he was unable to see what

Oaks threw in the lake because shadows from tall shrubs or trees nearby prevented

him from seeing clearly. On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to impeach

Palmer by pointing out he had not mentioned shrubbery in his earlier description of

the events. On redirect, Palmer reviewed a written statement made near the time of

the incident that indicated Oaks threw the item in the direction of "weeds" and

"vegetation," and the government argued his earlier statement and trial testimony were

consistent. Palmer also testified on redirect the nearest street light was approximately

150 feet from where the four persons were gathered. When defense counsel asked to

re-cross examine Palmer more extensively on these points, the district court refused

the request.

On appeal, Oaks fails to explain what additional questions counsel wished to

ask and how the additional cross-examination would have significantly impacted

Palmer's credibility. Oaks suggests his counsel wished to revisit the purported

discrepancy between "shrubbery" versus "weeds" and "vegetation," but the issue had

been addressed and further cross-examination would have been cumulative. See

United States v. Beck, 557 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding the proposed

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testimony was duplicative and had little impact on the case). Similarly, the alleged

scarcity of lighting in the area, which would negatively impact Palmer's ability to

accurately see what occurred, was also before the jury in Palmer's prior testimony, and

counsel was free to argue the point at closing. See United States v. Wipf, 397 F.3d

677, 683 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding the restriction on defendant's cross-examination was

permissible, in part, where the defendant was already granted considerable leeway to

cross-examine the witness and impeach his credibility). Counsel's additional

questions would not have added to the testimony or detracted from Palmer's

credibility. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing

Oaks's counsel additional cross-examination of Palmer.

E. Oaks's Right to Self-Representation

Oaks next claims the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation when it appointed substitute counsel. The appointment of substitute

counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Mentzos, 462

F.3d 830, 839 (8th Cir. 2006).

While the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly guarantee the right of

self-representation, such a right is "necessarily implied by the structure of the

Amendment." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). In order to represent

himself, a defendant must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo the "traditional benefits

associated with the right to counsel." Id. at 835. While the defendant is not required

to have the skill and expertise of a lawyer to represent himself, he should know the

dangers of self-representation, so the record must establish he made an informed

choice. Id.

The right to self-representation is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of

Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000). "A defendant who wishes to waive his right to

counsel, and thereby proceed pro se, must do so clearly and unequivocally." United

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States v. Washington, 596 F.3d 926, 939 (8th Cir. 2010). The defendant must first

make his request to proceed pro se in a timely manner, after which the district court

retains the ability to "terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately

engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." United States v. Edelmann, 458

F.3d 791, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834). The district court also

has the authority to refuse to allow a defendant to represent himself when "the

defendant is unable to 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo the 'traditional benefits

associated with right to counsel.'" Id. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).

Oaks's claimed Sixth Amendment violation is without basis in fact. The record

demonstrates Oaks expressed displeasure with his appointed attorney, forcing the

attorney to move to withdraw. At the motion hearing, Oaks unequivocally stated, "I

ask that I have better counsel, that I have a lawyer who will represent me." Motions

Tr. at 3. Oaks indicated he would not proceed with his current appointed counsel.

The court advised him it would not appoint substitute counsel and Oaks would be

forced to represent himself if the motion was granted. Oaks then agreed to represent

himself, but expressed concern over his ability to properly prepare. See id. at 9 ("Can

I – I mean, if I'm not allowed to go to the law library, I find it impossible to try to even

start to fight for myself.").

Within days after refusing the request for substitute counsel, the district court

reversed itself and appointed a new attorney. The court recognized the obstacles Oaks

faced in accessing legal materials due to his heightened custody status, as voiced by

Oaks during the motions hearing. The district court believed these obstacles

ultimately impacted Oaks's ability to competently represent himself, and accordingly

it appointed substitute counsel in line with his original request. Under these

circumstances, the factual predicate for Oaks's current claim is based on a

misrepresentation of the record and his allegation of error is rejected. The district

court acted within its discretion in appointing Oaks substitute counsel.

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F. Due Process Violation at Sentencing 

Oaks next argues the district court violated his right to due process under the

Fifth Amendment by relying on misinformation contained in the PSR to find him

eligible for an enhanced sentence under ACCA. Specifically, Oaks argues the

information in the PSR about his prior felonies, which made him ACCA-eligible, was

not accurate and the district court should not have used it to enhance his sentence.

Once again, the factual predicate for his claim is based on Oaks's mischaracterization

of the record.

This court has repeatedly held "that unless a defendant objects to a specific

factual allegation contained in the PSR, the court may accept that fact as true for

sentencing purposes." United States v. Moser, 168 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 1999)

(collecting cases). Thus, a defendant's "failure to object to the PSR's factual

characterization of his conduct . . . is dispositive." United States v. Menteer, 350 F.3d

767, 771 (8th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Arrieta-Buendia, 372 F.3d 953, 955

(8th Cir. 2004). Oaks failed to object to the information contained in the PSR

detailing his prior felony convictions. Thus, the district court could accept the

information as true. Oaks's attempt to save his claim of error by characterizing it as

a due process violation is unavailing because his failure to object obviates any

argument he could make that the information was inaccurate.

We also reject Oaks's attempt to analogize this case to Townsend v. Burke, 334

U.S. 736 (1948). In Burke, the defendant was uncounseled and sentenced based upon

inaccurate information in his criminal record. 334 U.S. at 740-41. Neither of these

circumstances exist in this case because Oaks was represented by counsel and failed

to object to information contained in the PSR, which, as noted above, permitted the

district court to accept the information as true. Accordingly, we reject Oaks's claim

of error based on his failure to object to the accuracy of the information in the PSR.

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G. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Oaks next argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his status as a

convicted felon as required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

As an initial matter, Oaks incorrectly asserts the jury convicted him under

§ 924(e) instead of § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) is the statute defining the

substantive offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). One of the elements of the offense requires the government to prove, and

the jury to find, that the defendant was a convicted felon. United States v. Butler, 594

F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir. 2010). Ordinarily, a defendant convicted under section

922(g)(1) faces a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).

Section 924(e), or the Armed Career Criminal Act, is a sentencing provision, and the

determination of whether a defendant qualifies for the enhanced penalties contained

therein is a determination made by the sentencing court – not the jury. See United

States v. Van, 543 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing the district court's

imposition of ACCA in calculating the defendant's sentence). If ACCA applies and

the defendant has three previous convictions for a violent felony, he is subject to a

more stringent minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years. United States v.

King, 598 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2010).

As a result of the distinction above, we assume for purposes of this appeal that

Oaks is arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable

doubt he was a convicted felon for purposes of § 924(g)(1). This argument is without

merit. The record shows Oaks stipulated in advance of trial to his status as a

convicted felon in order to prevent the government from presenting evidence of all his

felonies to the jury. Because he stipulated to being a convicted felon, he cannot now

argue the evidence was insufficient to prove that element. See United States v.

Poulack, 236 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Because [the defendant] stipulated to the

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reduced drug quantity figure when he had knowledge that quantity was a key factor,

he waived his right to a jury determination on that issue.").

Oaks's challenge to the district court's application of ACCA at sentencing is

similarly without merit. First, Oaks correctly notes the government must prove each

of the facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2008).

However, as noted above, the district court may accept any undisputed portions of the

PSR in determining whether the government has met its burden. Id. Contrary to

Oaks's argument, his not guilty plea to the charge in the indictment does not suffice

to establish an objection to the PSR at sentencing regarding his prior convictions. Id.

(noting the defendant has to object to specific factual allegations in the PSR, or the

court may accept those facts as true in calculating its sentence). The PSR concluded

Oaks was convicted of three prior felony crimes of violence, and he did not object to

this determination. Therefore, the district court properly adopted the findings in the

PSR as facts for its consideration in determining Oaks's sentence. We therefore reject

Oaks's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and his ACCA status.

H. Oaks's Conviction for Attempted Breaking and Entering

Oaks next contends the district court erred when it considered his juvenile

conviction for attempted breaking and entering for purposes of ACCA. We review

de novo whether an offense is a violent felony under ACCA. United States v. Walker,

555 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Once again, Oaks's argument is based on a mischaracterization of the record.

The PSR – to which Oaks did not object – lists the conviction as an adult conviction,

not a juvenile conviction as Oaks claims. Because he failed to object, he cannot now

argue the information was inaccurate. As a result, the district court properly

concluded Oaks's attempted breaking and entering conviction qualified as a violent

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felony under ACCA. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203-05 (2007)

(concluding attempted burglary qualifies under ACCA because it poses the same kind

of risk as a completed burglary); United States v. Fish, 928 F.2d 185, 187-88 (6th Cir.

1991) (concluding the defendant's Michigan conviction for attempted breaking and

entering qualified as a violent felony for section 924(e) purposes).

I. Oaks's Conviction for Unlawfully Driving Away an Automobile

Finally, Oaks argues the district court erred when it used his Michigan

conviction for unlawfully driving away an automobile as one of the predicate felonies

necessary to enhance his sentence under ACCA.

The government concedes under United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969 (8th

Cir. 2008), the conviction for unlawfully driving away an automobile is not a violent

felony for purposes of ACCA. See Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008).

(holding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a violent felony under

ACCA). However, ACCA only requires three prior felony convictions for its

provisions to apply. Walker, 555 F.3d at 721. Aside from his unlawfully driving

away an automobile conviction, Oaks had felony convictions for attempted breaking

and entering, assault in the third degree, and aggravated robbery in the first degree.

Oaks only challenges the first of these convictions, which, as discussed above,

qualified under ACCA. Accordingly, any error committed by the district court in

considering Oaks's unlawfully driving away an automobile conviction was harmless

because he maintained at least three other qualifying ACCA predicate offenses. See

United States v. Comstock, 531 F.3d 667, 679 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding any error by

the district court in considering a conviction that did not qualify as a violent felony

was harmless where the defendant had at least three other qualifying convictions).

Because any error by the district court did not affect Oaks's substantial rights, we

reject his argument.

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Oaks's remaining arguments are without merit. First, the district court was not

required to apply a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, rather than a preponderance

of the evidence standard, in determining his sentencing enhancements. See Pirani,

406 F.3d at 551 n.4 ("Nothing in Booker suggests that sentencing judges are required

to find sentence-enhancing facts beyond a reasonable doubt under the advisory

Guidelines regime."). See also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, cmt. background ("The Commission

believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet

due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding

application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.").

Second, Oaks's rights were not violated by any lack of reasonable notice

regarding the allegation of three prior convictions and the increased sentence under

section 924(e). Notice by the government of its intention to seek an enhanced

sentence is not required under ACCA. United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1336

(10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mauldin, 109 F.3d 1159, 1162 (6th Cir. 1997).

Moreover, Oaks did have notice of the enhanced sentence by way of the indictment

and the PSR, which specifically cited section 924(e) and listed his prior convictions

which the government considered violent felonies.

Finally, Oaks asserts the district court violated his due process rights by failing

to provide him a hearing to determine the existence of the three prior convictions. We

reject this argument because the district court discussed the application of ACCA

during the sentencing hearing, during which Oaks was provided an opportunity to

object to the factual findings contained in the PSR. The district court properly

adopted those findings in the PSR as facts for its consideration after Oaks failed to

object. Accordingly, Oaks was not denied his due process rights and was not entitled

to a separate hearing.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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Appellate Case: 08-2451 Page: 18 Date Filed: 05/26/2010 Entry ID: 3668264