Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01971/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01971-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Frauenheim
Respondent
Martin Puledo Sanchez
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN PULIDO SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-01971-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Martin Pulido Sanchez, a pro se state prisoner, has brought a habeas petition pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and 

lodged exhibits with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

Sanchez was found guilty after a jury trial of eleven counts of lewd and lascivious conduct 

with two children. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 296-303. He was sentenced to eleven 

consecutive terms of fifteen years to life in prison. Id. at 506, 510-12. The California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the conviction. People v. Sanchez, No. A136104, 2013 WL 6843580, at *1 (Cal. 

Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2013). The California Supreme Court denied Sanchez’s petition for review. 

Answer, Ex. E.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

H. began dating appellant in 1989. In 1990, appellant, H., and two 

of H’s children, daughter S. and son M., moved into a house on a 

dairy ranch where appellant worked in the Two Rock area of 

Sonoma County. S., the younger of the two children, was five years 

old at the time of the move. After moving to the ranch, appellant 

and H. had two daughters together: An., who was born in 1990, and 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 1 of 20
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Ar., who was born in 1992. Appellant was violent toward H. and 

M., and H. sometimes left the house to sleep in her car.

Appellant repeatedly molested S., An. and Ar. while they lived at 

the dairy ranch. In 1999, he fled to Mexico after drugs were 

discovered at the house and S. reported appellant had raped her 

once. Appellant returned to the Bay Area and was arrested; and, in 

2000, he pled no contest to a single count of forcible lewd conduct 

with S., a child under 14 years of age. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).) He was 

sentenced to prison and sent to a facility in Mississippi to serve his 

term.

In 2008, while he was still in prison, appellant telephoned Ar. Ar. 

was very upset by the call, and her therapist contacted the Sonoma 

County Sheriff’s Office to report that Ar. had been molested by her 

father. Both Ar. and An. were interviewed as part of the resulting 

investigation.

The Sonoma County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint on 

March 8, 2010, and an arrest warrant issued. A preliminary hearing 

took place in March 2011, and an amended information was 

thereafter filed charging appellant with 11 counts of lewd conduct 

with a child under 14 under section 288, subd. (a), with five counts 

naming Ar. as a victim and six counts naming An. as a victim. The 

pleading included a “multiple victim” allegation as to each count 

under the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (b) & former subds. (c)(7) 

& (e)(5) [now (c)(8) & (e)(4) ]; see Stats. 1993–1994, 1st Ex.Sess., 

ch. 14, § 1, p. 8570; Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 6, p. 5575; Stats. 1998, 

ch. 936, §§ 9, 40, eff. Sept. 28, 1998, pp. 6874, 6923.) As to three 

of the Ar. counts and all of the An. counts, it was alleged appellant 

had committed acts of substantial sexual conduct under section 

1203.066, subdivision (a)(8). Two counts alleging continuous 

sexual abuse under section 288.5, subdivision (a) were dismissed 

before trial.

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on 

preaccusation delay in filing the complaint, which was denied by the 

trial court. The case proceeded to trial before a jury.

S. testified appellant had molested her repeatedly from the time she 

was about four years old, at least once a week for about 10 years. 

The acts included touching her vagina with his hands and penis, 

kissing, and intercourse. The property at Two Rock was like a 

“really old ghost town,” with barns, sheds, houses, and a chicken 

coop near the house where the family lived. Appellant would abuse 

S. in the barn and in his bedroom, and occasionally in their living 

room when H. was not home. S. confided in her best friend about 

the abuse, but did not tell anyone else because appellant had 

threatened to hurt her mother and had told S. he would keep abusing 

her regardless. When she decided to come forward and report one 

act of rape, she was 13 years old. She did not disclose the many 

other acts of abuse, because she thought it would be difficult to talk 

about so many incidents. The parties stipulated appellant had been 

convicted of a single count of forcible lewd conduct against S. on 

October 2, 2000.

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 2 of 20
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

An. testified appellant began sexually molesting her when she was 

four or five years old, and continued to do so about once a week 

until he left the house in 1999. The acts included intercourse, digital 

penetration and oral sex, and were committed in the living room of 

the house, her parents’ bedroom, the bedroom she shared with her 

sisters, the chicken shed near the house, a barn near their house and 

another barn on the dairy ranch. Appellant often abused Ar. at the 

same time as An., or had one of them act as a lookout while he 

molested the other. An. once saw appellant grab S. and orally 

copulate her while S. screamed. An. did not did not disclose the 

abuse because she loved her father very much and considered the 

acts their secret.

Ar. described a similar pattern. She testified she was abused by her 

father in the chicken coop in 1997, when she was about five years 

old. She recalled a day in which he touched her vagina over her 

clothing while he was driving her home from school, as well as an 

incident in the barn where he laid her on the hay and put his penis in 

her vagina. He would also put his penis in her vagina on other 

occasions in the barn, the chicken coop and in her parents’ bedroom. 

He once had her stand naked in front of the mirror in his bedroom 

and look at herself; other times he would put her in bed with him 

and make her touch his penis with her hand under the covers. She 

considered the abuse to be “like daddy’s secret” and did not report it 

because he was her father and she trusted him. She did not really 

understand what was going on at the time, and was also afraid 

because appellant had mood swings. Sometimes he behaved like a 

normal father “[a]nd then sometimes he was ... like[ ] a really 

terrifying monster that you didn't want to hurt anybody by saying 

anything.”

Appellant took the stand and denied he had ever touched S., An. or 

Ar. inappropriately, describing Ar. and An. as his “princess[es].” 

He worked many hours during the day and the girls were not 

allowed to accompany him to the barn. He argued frequently with 

H., who would accuse him of things, and he had hit H. in his 

daughters’ presence. Appellant believed he had a good relationship 

with S. in general, but he struck her and grabbed her hair when she 

was 12 years old because she became “jumpy” after he confronted 

her about speaking to a boy on the telephone. S. was very angry at 

him after that incident.

Asked about his departure from the house in 1999, appellant 

explained he “got into a little trouble with the law.” He returned to 

the Bay Area to reunite with his family and was arrested on charges 

that included the rape of S. He pled no contest to that count, though 

he did not understand what he was pleading to, because his attorney 

told him the judge in his case would be very lenient. He 

acknowledged telling a police officer his penis had touched S.’s leg, 

but claimed that many things he said during the interview were 

“lies.” Appellant had used methamphetamine, alcohol and 

marijuana in the 1990’s, so much so that he sometimes suffered 

from memory loss. Though he had considered the possibility he 

committed sexual assaults against his children while in a blackout 

stage, he did not believe he did so.

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 3 of 20
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

When appellant was interviewed by detectives about the allegations 

by An. and Ar., appellant told them “Whatever my daughter would 

say, I would say yes.” He acknowledged during the interview he 

might have molested An. once or twice.

Sanchez, 2013 WL 6843580, at *1-3 (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 4 of 20
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Sanchez asserts that: (1) his due process rights were 

violated based on preaccusation delay; (2) there was a statute of limitations violation; and (3) his 

sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

I. PREACCUSATION DELAY

Sanchez argues that his due process rights were violated due to the delay between the time 

Ar.’s therapist reported the crimes to law enforcement in May 2008 and the time law enforcement 

interviewed Ar. in December 2008. He also argues that he was prejudiced because the criminal 

complaint was not filed until March 2010.

Background

The California Court of Appeal described the relevant background for this claim and the 

trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss based on preaccusation delay:

In the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the following timeline was 

established: Ar. told her therapist about the molestations on April 

30, 2008, who in turn notified the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office 

on May 5. Detective Lomanto was advised of the report on May 8, 

and contacted the therapist within a few days of receiving that 

information. On May 27, Lomanto spoke to Ar.’s foster mother, 

Cynthia M., who told him Ar. had been extremely traumatized by 

the events and was not yet able to speak to him. Cynthia told 

Lomanto they would contact him when Ar. was ready. Lomanto 

checked back with the family when he did not hear from them, and 

in August or September, he was told Ar. was ready to be 

interviewed. An interview scheduled in September or October had 

to be cancelled.

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 5 of 20
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Lomanto interviewed Ar. at the Redwood Children’s Center on 

December 8, 2008, accompanied by an interview specialist and 

deputy district attorney. This was the first time the district 

attorney’s office was notified of the allegations. That same day, 

Ar.’s foster family told Lomanto that Ar.’s sister An. had been 

molested as well. Lomanto contacted An., who was then living in 

New York, and she flew to California for an interview on January 

15, 2009. In Lomanto’s view, he did not have enough information 

to follow through with his investigation until he had spoken to both 

Ar. and An. Lomanto submitted the case to the district attorney’s 

office on April 30, 2009, and the criminal complaint and arrest 

warrant issued on March 8, 2010.

During his investigation, Lomanto learned appellant was 

incarcerated in a facility in Mississippi on his California prison 

sentence. Lomanto interviewed him in California on July 26, 2010, 

the day of his release. Lomanto had requested permission to travel 

to Mississippi to interview appellant at an earlier date, but was told 

by his supervisors they did not have the funds necessary for him to 

do so. Lomanto did not seek to have appellant transferred back to 

California before the expiration of his prison term.

Appellant’s defense investigator, James Baker, was also called as a 

witness at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Baker was 

appointed to the case on June 9, 2011. He testified he had trouble 

locating witnesses, because “the information that we had on 

witnesses that were stated to me by the defendant were not listed in 

the original police reports. And then the defendant was only able to 

recall the first name of witnesses that he believed needed to be 

interviewed.” Baker later explained he had expected the police 

reports to contain the names of witnesses who worked at the dairy 

ranch at the time of the alleged molestations.

Baker visited a total of seven ranch and dairy properties, including 

the ranch at Two Rock, and made contact with people at two of the 

properties. He spoke to Maria Alonzo, who lived with her family in 

the house where appellant and his family had lived, and whose 

husband David had worked with appellant between 1995 and 1999. 

Baker also spoke to Dennis Hansen, the manager of the dairy and 

the nephew of its owner, but Hansen was reluctant to provide 

information and did not appear to remember some facts. Hansen 

would not or could not provide Baker with employment records for 

the dairy, and he did not want Baker to speak with dairy employees. 

A person named Lorenzo was identified as a potential witness, but 

Baker could not find him and believed he did not want to speak to 

him. David Alonzo did not make himself available for an interview.

Defense counsel stipulated the delay between the commission of the 

offenses and the therapist’s report to law enforcement in May 2008 

was not caused by the prosecution. Counsel argued appellant had 

been prejudiced by the district attorney’s delay in filing the charges 

after the molestations were reported, due to the victims’ inability to 

recall specific dates and the defense investigator’s difficulty in 

locating witnesses.

The court denied the motion to dismiss, stating: “[Appellant] has 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 6 of 20
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

made a due process claim under the state and [the] federal 

Constitutions based on preaccusation delay. Under the California 

Constitution the test is to balance actual prejudice against 

justification for the delay.... [¶] Under the federal standard, in 

addition to showing actual prejudice, [appellant] must also show that 

the delay was undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over [him].... 

[¶] In the present case there are two separate periods of delay. First, 

there is the delay between the date the offenses occurred and the 

date the offenses were first reported to law enforcement. Then 

there’s a second delay between the time the offenses were reported 

and the date charges were filed. [¶] As for the first delay, the court 

finds that the delay is justified based on the fact that law 

enforcement had no knowledge of any of the victims’ accusations 

until 2008; therefore, any prejudice arising out of that delay would 

be outweighed by the justification for the delay. [¶] As for the 

second period of delay, [appellant] has failed to demonstrate any 

actual prejudice arising out of that specific period of delay. There’s 

been no evidence presented that any physical evidence went missing 

during that period, that any witness became unavailable during that 

period, or that any witnesses’ memory faded during that period. 

Since no prejudice has been shown during that period of delay the 

court will not-the court need not make any findings ... whether that 

period of delay was justified or unjustified. [¶] Additionally, to the 

extent [appellant] is claiming a federal due process violation, [he] 

also fails to demonstrate the delay was undertaken to gain a tactical 

advantage over [him].”

Sanchez, 2013 WL 6843580, at *3-4.

Legal Standard

The United States Supreme Court has addressed due process claims based on 

preindictment delay in two main decisions: United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) and 

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). In Marion, the Supreme Court stated that the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment may, under some circumstances, require dismissal of a 

prosecution based on pre indictment delay even when the prosecution was brought within the 

applicable limitations period. 404 U.S. at 324. Nevertheless, because the defendants in Marion

did not show actual prejudice or that the government intentionally delayed the prosecution to gain 

some tactical advantage or to harass them, the Supreme Court found no due process violation. Id. 

at 325. The Supreme Court declined to specify “when and in what circumstances actual prejudice 

resulting from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution,” reasoning that 

such a determination “will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of 

each case.” Id. at 324-25.

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 7 of 20
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

In Lovasco, the Supreme Court stated that for claims of pre indictment delay, “proof of 

prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim,” and “the due 

process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.” 

431 U.S. at 790. The Supreme Court explained that prosecutors do not “deviate from fundamental 

conceptions of justice” when they postpone indictment in order to ensure that prosecution is 

warranted or to allow full development of all charges prior to indictment. Id. at 790-94. The 

Supreme Court held that “to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive 

him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of 

time.” Id. at 796. As in Marion, however, the Supreme Court again declined to articulate a clear 

rule setting forth the circumstances in which pre indictment delay requires dismissal of a 

prosecution. Id. at 796-97.

Since the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Lovasco, the federal courts of appeals have 

split on the proper standard to apply in cases alleging pre indictment delay. See Jones v. 

Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing circuit split). Under the two-prong Ninth 

Circuit standard, the defendant first must prove “actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay.” 

United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Establishing prejudice is a heavy burden that is “rarely met.” Id. If the defendant 

shows actual prejudice, the court balances the length of the delay against the reasons for the delay, 

and the defendant must show that the delay offends the “fundamental conceptions of justice which 

lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Fourth Circuit has adopted a similar standard, see Jones, 94 F.3d at 905, but most other circuits 

have held that to prevail on a claim of pre indictment delay, a defendant must show, in addition to 

actual prejudice, intentional delay by the government to gain an unfair tactical advantage. See id. 

(collecting cases). So far the Supreme Court has not clarified the standard for determining when 

preindictment delay violates due process. See New v. Uribe, 532 Fed. Appx. 743, 744 (9th Cir. 

2013) (“The relevant Supreme Court precedents explicitly decline to set out a clear test for 

balancing justification against prejudice, asserting that such balancing requires case-by-case 

consideration.”)

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 8 of 20
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal described the different standards under state and federal 

law and then denied this claim:

Appellant divides the preaccusation delay in this case into two 

blocks of time-the seven-month period between the therapist’s 

report of the crimes against Ar. to law enforcement in May 2008 and 

Lomanto’s initial interview of her in December 2008, and the 11-

month period between Lomanto’s submission of the case to the 

district attorney in April 2009 and the filing of the criminal 

complaint in April 2010. Because the trial court’s ruling was based 

on the lack of prejudice rather than the reasonableness of the delay, 

we view the claim as one involving a single block of time from May 

2008 until March 2010.

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion appellant 

was not prejudiced by the delay. Though it is undoubtedly true that 

memories faded and witnesses became unavailable during the years 

between the commission of the crimes and the trial on the charges, 

the defense did not establish any particular evidence was lost 

between May 2008 and March 2010, the period at issue. Baker’s 

testimony supported an inference the potential witnesses he spoke to 

were either reluctant to talk or had difficulty remembering certain 

facts, but appellant did not establish those witnesses would have 

been more cooperative or helpful if the trial had gone forward in 

May 2008, when the accusations were first reported to law 

enforcement. The prosecution of child molestation charges based on 

generic testimony, i.e., testimony about conduct occurring over 

several years when the facts of one offense are indistinguishable 

from those of other offenses, does not itself deprive a defendant of 

due process. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 318; Brown v. 

Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1527.)

Appellant argues he was entitled to dismissal under People v. Cave

(1978) 81 Cal. App. 3d 957, because the authorities were required to 

notify him of the pending charges once the complaint was filed. We 

are not persuaded. The court in Cave considered a prisoner’s 

statutory right to be brought to trial on new charges within 90 days 

of demanding a trial under section 1381. (Cave, at p. 964.) It 

concluded that because the authorities had not notified the defendant 

in that case of the new charges against him, he was excused from the 

statutory requirement of filing a demand for a trial, and his speedy 

trial claim involved the same basic test as when no specific statute is 

involved; i.e., the court must weigh the prejudicial effect of the 

delay against the justification for the delay. (Ibid.) The record in 

this case does not reveal when appellant first learned of the charges 

against him, and no postaccusation speedy trial claim has been 

raised under section 1381. In any event, Cave requires a showing of 

prejudice and prejudice has not been demonstrated.

Appellant claims he was “ambushed” by the detectives who 

interviewed him upon his return to California after he finished 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 9 of 20
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

serving his prison sentence in Mississippi. But no evidence was 

presented to show he was surprised by the interview or the charges 

against him, and he did not seek to suppress his statements as 

involuntary. And, even if we assume appellant was notified of the 

charges for the first time during the interview, he has failed to 

establish any connection between the preaccusation delay of which 

he now complains and his statements during the interview.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

concluded prejudice had not been established. It was unnecessary 

for the court to consider the reasons for the delay and did not err in 

failing to do so. (See In re Johns (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581 

[when considering delay in filing petition to extend commitment 

under § 1026.5, lack of prejudice made it unnecessary to consider 

reasons for delay].)

Sanchez, 2013 WL 6843580, at *5-6.

While the Supreme Court’s opinions in Marion and Lovasco clearly established that due 

process may be violated under certain circumstances by preaccusation delay resulting in actual 

prejudice, the Court declined to set forth a specific standard to determine when a delay violates 

due process. Due to the lack of a clear standard, this Court cannot say that the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision, that there was no prejudice and no due process violation, was objectively 

unreasonable.

1

 The decision was on point with Supreme Court precedent, that there is no due 

process violation without actual prejudice from the delay. See Lovasco at 789; Marion at 324-25. 

Nor does a review of the record indicate that the state court decision relied on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Sanchez has failed to demonstrate that the government intentionally delayed the 

prosecution to gain some tactical advantage or more importantly that he suffered actual prejudice. 

There are no allegations that any physical evidence was lost, any witness became unavailable, or 

that a specific witness’s memory faded during that period. Sanchez argues generally that

memories faded, but this argument is insufficient to establish prejudice. The defense investigator 

testified that potential witnesses he spoke to were either reluctant to talk or had difficulty 

 

1

The California Court of Appeal applied state law, noting “[b]ecause the protection afforded 

under the California Constitution is ‘at least as favorable for [appellant] in this regard as the law 

under the United States Constitution,’ we apply California law to appellant’s claim. Sanchez, 

2013 WL 6843580, at *5 (second alteration in original). It was not unreasonable for the state 

court to apply state law due to the lack of a definitive test from the Supreme Court.

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 10 of 20
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

remembering certain facts. But, Sanchez has not shown that these witnesses would have been 

more cooperative or helpful had the trial gone forward sooner. Nor has he described the specific 

facts that witnesses could not remember in 2010 that they could have remembered in 2008 

concerning incidents in the 1990s. For all these reasons this claim is denied.

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Sanchez argues that his convictions for the six counts naming An. as a victim were barred 

by the statute of limitations; therefore, his sentence under the One Strike Law for multiple victims 

must be reversed.

Background

The counts related to An. were alleged to have been committed between June 6, 1995, and 

December 1, 1999. Sanchez, 2013 WL 6843580, at *6. The prosecution commenced on March 8, 

2010, when the complaint was filed and an arrest warrant was issued. Id. The prosecution 

proceeded on the theory that the action was timely pursuant to California Penal Code section 

801.1, which at that time stated, “prosecution for a felony offense described in Section . . . that is 

alleged to have been committed when the victim was under the age of 18 years, may be 

commenced any time prior to the victim’s 28th birthday.” Id.

Sanchez argues that section 801.1 did not become effective until January 1, 2006, and that 

the previous statute of limitations had expired by then. Respondent argues and the California 

Court of Appeal noted that California Penal Code section 799 also applied. It states that the

“[p]rosecution for an offense punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state prison for life or 

for life without the possibility of parole . . . may be commenced at any time.” Sanchez, 2013 WL 

6843580, at *6 (omission in original).

Legal Standard

Laws extending the limitations period for prosecution of a crime, which are enacted after 

the previously applicable limitations period has expired, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Stogner 

v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 609 (2003). If such laws are enacted before the preexisting 

limitations period has expired, however, the enactment does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

Renderos v. Ryan, 469 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bischel, 61 F.3d 1429, 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 11 of 20
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (change in law extending statute of limitations after defendant committed 

offense but before original limitations period had run did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause). The 

fact that the extension of the limitations period is conditional on certain events, such as 

corroboration and reporting of the crime to authorities, does not matter; the focus is whether the 

limitations period has expired before the statute that extended the limitations period was enacted. 

See Renderos, 469 F.3d at 795. 

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal described the relevant state law and denied this claim:

Notwithstanding the theory on which the district attorney proceeded 

in the trial court, we agree with the People that section 799 applies. 

(See People v. Martinson (1986) 188 Cal. App. 3d 894, 899-900, fn. 

6 [judgment affirmed when suit was timely under different statute of 

limitations than applied by the trial court].) In People v. Perez

(2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 231, 239-240 (Perez), the court interpreted 

section 799 to extend to a defendant who, like appellant, was 

charged with and convicted of section 288, subdivision (a) 

violations with true findings under the multiple victim provision of 

the One Strike law. Such a defendant, the court reasoned, has 

committed a felony “punishable by ... imprisonment in the state 

prison for life” within the meaning of section 799. “Section 667.61 

is an alternative penalty scheme that, when charged, defines the 

length of imprisonment for the substantive offense of violating 

section 288[ ]. Thus, the unlimited timeframe for prosecution set 

out in section 799 for an offense ‘punishable by death or by 

imprisonment in the state prison for life ...’ applies, given that [the] 

defendant was found guilty of violating section 288[ ] and ‘in the 

present case or cases’ (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)) was found guilty of 

another such violation involving another victim (ibid.), and therefore 

was subject to the life-term sentencing provision contained in 

section 667.61, subdivision (b).” (Perez, at pp. 239–240.)

The court in Perez distinguished People v. Turner (2005) 134 Cal. 

App. 4th 1591 (Turner), which concluded section 799 does not 

govern when a defendant receives a life sentence as a consequence 

of having qualifying prior convictions under the “Three Strikes” law 

(§ 1170.12). Turner explained a Three Strikes law sentence, “is not 

a punishment specified by statute for an ‘offense,’ i.e., the current 

act for which the defendant is to be prosecuted.” (Id. at p. 1597.) 

Rather, “[i]t is an alternative sentence for those who commit a

current felony offense, and who are recidivist offenders” and “is 

imposed upon conviction of ‘a felony’ without regard to the 

seriousness of the current felony offense, if the defendant has two or 

more ‘serious’ or violent felony convictions.” (Ibid.)

Because the result in Turner was predicated on the distinction 

between recidivist allegations and conduct constituting the current 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 12 of 20
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

offense, we agree with Perez it is not controlling. As explained in 

Perez, the holding in Turner was based in part on the “‘... primary 

recommendation of the Law Revision Commission that the length of 

a “limitations statute should generally be based on the seriousness of 

the crime.” [Citation.] The use of seriousness of the crime as the 

primary factor in determining the length of the applicable statute of 

limitations was designed to strike the right balance between the 

societal interest in pursuing and punishing those who commit 

serious crimes, and the importance of barring stale claims. 

[Citation.] It also served the procedural need to “provid[e] 

predictability” and promote “uniformity of treatment for perpetrators 

and victims of all serious crimes.”’ ([Turner, supra, 134 Cal. App.

4th] at p. 1594.) Defendant’s crimes were serious enough to earn 

him a life sentence; therefore they were serious enough to warrant 

prosecution at any time during his natural life.” (Perez, supra, 182 

Cal. App. 4th at pp. 241–242.)

The People alternatively claim the convictions on the An. counts 

may be upheld because the evidence showed appellant committed 

many more lewd acts against An. than were charged, and at least six 

of them were committed within the limitations period of section 

801.1, subdivision (a). It appears the People are correct on this point 

as well.

On the dates appellant was alleged to have committed his offenses 

against An., the statute of limitations for a violation of section 288, 

subdivision (a) was six years. (Former § 800; Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, 

§ 2, p. 4335.) A section 288, subdivision (a) violation committed on 

June 6, 1995, the earliest date in the range alleged in the amended 

information for the An. counts, would have been time-barred as of 

June 6, 2001 had the six-year limitations period remained intact. 

However, on January 1, 2001, before the expiration of the six-year 

period, the Legislature enacted former section 803, subdivision 

(h)(1) and extended the limitations period for felonies requiring sex 

offender registration (including § 288, subd. (a) violations) to 10 

years. (Stats. 2000, ch. 235, § 1, p. 2338; Simmons, supra, 210 Cal.

App. 4th at p. 788; see § 801.1, subd. (b) [continuing 10-year 

limitations period].)

Under this 10-year limitations period, any section 288, subdivision 

(a) violation committed on or after January 1, 1996, was not timebarred on January 1, 2006, when section 801.1, subdivision (a) went 

into effect and extended the limitations period until the victim’s 28th 

birthday-a provision that would render the prosecution in this case 

timely because An. has not yet turned 28. (Stats. 2005, ch. 479, § 2, 

p. 3790; see Stats. 2007, ch. 579, §§ 40, 53, eff. Oct. 13, 2007, pp. 

4845, 4853.) Thus, the prosecution of each section 288 violation 

against An. would be untimely if committed between June 6, 1995 

(the earliest date alleged in the information) and December 31, 

1995, but timely if committed between January 1, 1996 and 

December 31, 1999 (the latest date alleged in the amended 

information). Appellant agrees December 31, 1995 is the date that 

demarcates timely and untimely charges.

Although the earliest date in a range of dates controls when a statute 

of limitations challenge is based on the pleading itself (People v. 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 13 of 20
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Angel (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 1145–1147 (Angel); Gasaway

v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal. App. 3d 545, 551), the proper 

question on review of a criminal conviction after a trial is “whether 

the record demonstrates that the crime charged actually fell within 

the applicable statute of limitations.” (Smith, supra, 98 Cal. App.

4th at p. 1193; accord, People v. Ortega (2013) 218 Cal. App. 4th 

1418, 1433 (Ortega).) In this case, each count did.

An. testified appellant molested her about once a week from 1995 

until 1999, at locations that included the chicken shed, the barn near 

the family home, the dairy barn, her parents’ bedroom and the 

bedroom she shared with her sisters. Her timeline as to some of 

these acts was vague, but she specifically described acts of 

intercourse and digital penetration in the chicken shed in 1995, 

1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. An. also testified the molestations 

occurred most frequently in her parents’ bedroom, where she saw 

appellant molest Ar. as well. The crimes against Ar. did not begin 

until 1997, a period appellant concedes was within the statute of 

limitations.

The evidence presented the jury with an all-or-nothing choice-that 

appellant had committed lewd acts against An. on a weekly basis 

from 1995 until 1999, or that he did not molest her at all. In 

convicting appellant of the charged offenses, the jury necessarily 

accepted An.’s version of events over appellant’s. Given An.'s 

testimony about weekly molestations in the chicken shed in 1996, 

1997, 1998 and 1999, and frequent molestations in her parents’ 

bedroom, with her sister’s presence dating these acts as occurring in 

1997 or later, at least six violations of section 288 were committed 

after December 31, 1995. The prosecution was timely. (Ortega, 

supra, 218 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1431 [when range of dates alleged, 

some within and some outside statute of limitations, victim’s 

testimony about weekly molestations sufficient to show defendant 

committed at least six acts within limitations period]; Smith, supra, 

98 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1188–1190 [evidence showed the defendant 

had committed at least one other violation of section 288 or 288.5 

within the six-year limitation period where victim testified to 

hundreds of acts, a multitude of which occurred within the necessary 

range]; contra, Angel, supra, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1146–1147 [section 

288 convictions reversed where range of dates alleged and victim’s 

testimony did not support a finding that any act occurred within 

limitations period].)

Sanchez, 2013 WL 6843580, at *7-8.

To the extent that Sanchez argues the California Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation 

of state law, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations 

on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether 

a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The state court’s 

ruling that penal code section 799 was applicable in this case is a matter of state law and does not 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 14 of 20
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

implicate the federal constitution. Moreover, a habeas petitioner may not “transform a state-law 

issue into a federal one” merely by asserting a violation of the federal constitution. Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, Sanchez’s argument that the six convictions 

against An. were not timely under section 801.1 due to an Ex Post Facto violation under Stogner is 

meritless in light of the convictions being timely under section 799.

Even assuming the state courts were incorrect regarding section 799, they also found that 

the offenses were committed within the limitations period of section 801.1 and that there was no 

Ex Post Facto violation. Sanchez has not shown that the California Court of Appeal decision 

regarding section 801.1 was objectively unreasonable. The state court looked to the various 

changes regarding the statute of limitations and when the changes took effect with respect to when 

the crimes occurred. The court found that there was no violation of Stogner and that there were at 

least six acts committed within the appropriate time period to sustain the convictions pursuant to 

state law. Sanchez has failed to demonstrate that this decision was an unreasonable application of 

Stogner. For all these reasons this claim is denied and his sentence under the One Strike Law was 

correct.

III. SENTENCE

Sanchez contends that his consecutive sentences, which constitute 165 years to life, are 

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes “cruel and unusual 

punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The United States Supreme Court has held that the 

Eighth Amendment includes a “narrow proportionality principle” that applies to terms of 

imprisonment. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 

U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 

(9th Cir. 2006). However, the precise contours of this principle are unclear, and successful 

challenges in federal court to the proportionality of particular sentences are “exceedingly rare.” 

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983); see also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th 

Cir. 2004). “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 15 of 20
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the 

crime.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem).

In assessing the compliance of a noncapital sentence with the proportionality principle, a 

reviewing court must consider “objective factors” to the extent possible. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. 

Foremost among these factors are the severity of the penalty imposed and the gravity of the 

offense. Id. at 290-91. “Comparisons among offenses can be made in light of, among other 

things, the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, the culpability of the offender, and 

the absolute magnitude of the crime.” Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1098.

The following decisions of the United States Supreme Court illustrate these principles. In 

Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a firsttime offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961. In 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) the Supreme Court held that it was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for the California Court of Appeal to 

affirm a “Three Strikes” sentence of two consecutive 25-years to life imprisonment terms for a 

petty theft with a prior conviction involving theft of $150 worth of videotapes. Id. at 66, 75-77. 

In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the Supreme Court held that a “Three Strikes” 

sentence of 25-years to life in prison imposed on a grand theft conviction involving the theft of 

three golf clubs from a pro shop was not grossly disproportionate and did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Id. at 18, 29. In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), the Supreme Court upheld the 

defendant’s sentence of 40 years in prison after his conviction for possession of nine ounces of 

marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 371-72. Finally, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 

(1980), the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a defendant’s 

third nonviolent felony: obtaining money by false pretenses. Id. at 265, 285.

Federal circuit courts have upheld similarly lengthy sentences. See e.g., Crosby v. 

Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784, 791-95 (9th Cir. 2012) (sentence of 26-years to life under California’s 

Three Strikes Law for the defendant’s failure to annually update his registration as a sex offender 

and failure to register within five days of a change of address did not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1285-96

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 16 of 20
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(9th Cir. 2010) (upholding a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole under 

Washington’s ‘Two Strikes Law’ following the defendant’s conviction for child molestation, 

which involved “touching a five-year-old girl on her ‘privates’ or ‘genitalia’ and over her clothing 

for at most ‘a couple of seconds.”); Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1098 (upholding a “Three Strikes” 

sentence of 25-years years to life in prison for possession of 36 milligrams of cocaine). Cf. 

Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a sentence of 254 

years and four months in prison violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment where the petitioner was a juvenile when he committed various sex and nonsex offenses).

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal discussed the relevant state and federal law and denied this 

claim:

Appellant argues that as “horrible” as his crimes were, “he has 

almost no likelihood of repeating them if ever released.” He notes 

that his offenses did not involve threats of violence, that his 

daughters have done very well in their lives despite the abuse, and 

that he lacked any other significant criminal record (though he 

acknowledges his conviction of forcible lewd conduct against S. and 

that he engaged in methamphetamine abuse and manufacturing). 

We are not persuaded.

At the time of his arrest in this case, appellant had been in prison for 

many years. Crediting his claim that he refrained from both child 

molestation and drug abuse during his incarceration, and noting that 

his score on the STATIC–99R actuarial instrument places him at a 

“low” risk of committing future sex offenses, he has nonetheless 

continued to deny molesting his daughters and there is no suggestion 

he had engaged in any sex offender treatment. That appellant’s 

daughters have gone on to become strong young women does not 

render his conduct at the time less serious or suggest he does not 

remain a danger to others. Nor is it particularly mitigating that his 

crimes did not involve threats of physical violence; his daughters 

were very young when he molested them and he possessed a 

tremendous psychological advantage due to the parental 

relationship. None of the circumstances mentioned by appellant 

renders a lifetime in prison a grossly disproportionate punishment or 

one that is “out of sync” with the nature of the crime or the offender.

Appellant complains he is being punished more harshly than he 

would have been if he had murdered one of his daughters. The 

purpose of the One Strike law is “to ensure serious and dangerous 

sex offenders would receive lengthy prison sentences upon their first 

conviction.” (People v. Palmore (2000) 79 Cal .App. 4th 1290, 

1296.) Appellant has been convicted of committing serious sexual 

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 17 of 20
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

offenses in two separate cases and against three separate victims, all 

of whom were very young at the time. Although the “final 

consequence” of a murder is categorically different than a sexual 

violation, the repeated commission of lewd acts against multiple 

victims is extremely serious (Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 930-

931) and punishing such conduct as harshly as murder is neither 

shocking nor outrageous (People v. Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal. App.

4th 178, 200 [no cruel and unusual punishment where rape during 

burglary punished as harshly as second degree murder]; People v. 

Estrada (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1278–1282 [same] ).

Appellant also notes he is being punished more harshly than he 

would have been if convicted of two counts of continuous sexual 

abuse under section 288.5, which at the time of the offenses carried 

a sentence of up to 16 years in prison, and was not then subject to 

the One Strike law sentencing provisions. (People v. Palmer (2001) 

86 Cal. App. 4th 440, 443.) There was no prosecutorial obligation 

to proceed under a statute affording more lenient punishment. (See 

Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 64, 87 [so long as 

sufficient facts demonstrate probable cause defendant committed a 

crime, prosecutor has discretion to determine what charges to 

bring].) Moreover, section 288.5 was added to the list of offenses 

subject to One Strike law sentencing in 2006 (former § 667.61; 

Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 33, p. 2639), a further indication that a life 

term for multiple lewd acts against two or more victims is neither 

cruel nor unusual.

Sanchez, 2013 WL 6843580, at *11-12 (footnote omitted).

The state court opinion denying this claim was not an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court authority. Sanchez’s sentence, while severe, was not so grossly disproportionate to his 

crimes to render it unconstitutional. Sanchez was convicted of multiple counts of lewd and 

lascivious conduct on his two daughters and had a previous conviction for a single count of 

forcible lewd conduct on another child who was residing with him. The Ninth Circuit has 

observed that “[t]he impact of [child molestation] on the lives of [its] victims is extraordinarily 

severe.” Norris, 622 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir.

1994) (alterations in original)). 

Sanchez’s crimes were more serious than the petty theft conviction in Andrade, the

shoplifting crime in Ewing, the conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses at issue in 

Rummel, and the conviction for possession of 36 grams of cocaine in Taylor, all of which involved 

sentences that were upheld against an Eighth Amendment challenge. California law provides for 

long terms of imprisonment for crimes of molestation of children, and Sanchez has identified no 

Supreme Court authority that would override that legislative decision. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 18 of 20
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

n.2; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 372 (the United States Supreme Court “‘has never found a sentence for a 

term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual 

punishment.’”). Sanchez’s conduct was more egregious than what was upheld by the Ninth 

Circuit in Norris, where the defendant improperly touched a child for just a few seconds over 

clothing and received a life sentence because it was his second strike. Sanchez has not 

demonstrated an unreasonable application of federal law to warrant habeas relief and thus this 

claim is denied.2

CONCLUSION

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. A certificate of 

appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which “reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

2. Petitioner’s motion for a hearing date (Docket No. 15) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

 

2 Because Sanchez has failed to raise an inference of gross disproportionality, this Court need not 

compare his sentence to the sentences of other defendants in other jurisdictions. Harmelin, 501 

U.S. at 1005; United States v. Meiners, 485 F.3d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“in the 

rare case in which a threshold comparison [of the crime committed and the sentence imposed] 

leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, we then compare the sentence at issue with 

sentences imposed for analogous crimes in the same and other jurisdictions.”).

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 19 of 20
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN PULEDO SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-01971-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 13, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Martin Puledo Sanchez ID: P-96562

Pleasent Valley State Prison A-3#237

P. O. Box 8500

Coalinga, CA 93210 

Dated: October 13, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

Case 3:14-cv-01971-JD Document 17 Filed 10/13/15 Page 20 of 20