Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00258/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00258-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donnie Bell
Defendant
Dwight Hart
Defendant
Antonio Johnson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONNIE BELL, et al, 

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cr-00258-WHO 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 37, 38, 44

INTRODUCTION 

 Count Four of the indictment in this case charges defendants Donnie Bell, Dwight Hart, 

and Antonio Johnson with using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c). The indictment alleges two crime of violence predicates for the section 924(c) charge: 

assault on a person assisting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (Count Two), and 

robbery of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2112 (Count Three). 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v), 

arguing that the section 924(c) charge fails to state an offense because neither of the alleged crime 

of violence predicates qualifies as a crime of violence under the definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c)(3), are DENIED. For the reasons discussed below, I find that section 2112 is not a crime 

of violence under section 924(c)(3), but that section 111 is. 

BACKGROUND 

 On May 7, 2015, Bell, Hart, and Johnson were charged in a common indictment with 

(1) one count of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) one count of assault on a person assisting a 

federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111; (3) one count of robbery of government property, 18 U.S.C. § 

2112; (4) one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) 

and (ii), 924(c)(1)(B); (5) one count of felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); and 

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(6) one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Dkt. No. 14 ¶¶ 1-9. 

The alleged crime of violence predicates for the section 924(c) charge are the assault in violation 

of section 111 (Count 2) and the robbery in violation of section 2112 (Count 3). 

 Bell and Hart filed separate motions to dismiss on November 18 and 19, 2015. Dkt. Nos. 

37-38. On December 2, 2015, Johnson filed a motion for joinder in the motions to dismiss. Dkt. 

No. 44.1 I heard argument from the parties on January 7, 2016. Dkt. No. 52. 

DISCUSSION 

Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides for certain penalties for a person “who, during and in 

relation to any crime of violence . . . , uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such 

crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Under section 924(c)(3), a “crime of 

violence” in this context means 

an offense that is a felony and (A) has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 

or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a 

substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 

another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Courts generally refer to the “(A)” clause of section 924(c)(3) as the “force 

clause” and to the “(B)” clause of section 924(c)(3) as the “residual clause.” 

Defendants contend that neither of the offenses underlying their section 924(c) charge 

qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3), and that as a result the section 924(c) 

charge must be dismissed. Specifically, defendants contend that neither section 111 nor section 

2112 is a crime of violence under the force clause, and that under the Supreme Court’s recent 

ruling in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson II”), the residual clause is 

unconstitutionally vague and thus cannot be used to support the section 924(c) charge against 

them.

I. FORCE CLAUSE 

I begin with the force clause, which, as stated above, defines “crime of violence” to include 

a felony offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

 

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Johnson’s motion for joinder, Dkt. No. 44, is GRANTED. 

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against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). 

 To determine whether an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under section 

924(c)(3), the Ninth Circuit applies the “categorical approach” set forth in Taylor v. United States,

495 U.S. 575 (1990). See United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In 

the context of crime of violence determinations under section 924(c), our categorical approach 

applies regardless of whether we review a current or prior crime.”); United States v. Amparo, 68 

F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488, 1490-92 (9th Cir. 

1993); United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 A court applying the categorical approach must “determine whether the [offense] is 

categorically a ‘crime of violence’ by comparing the elements of the [offense] with the generic 

federal definition” – here, the definition of “crime of violence” set forth in the section 924(c)(3) 

force clause. United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, 782 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2015). This 

process requires the court to “look to the elements of the offense rather than the particular facts 

underlying the defendant’s own [case].” United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918, 

920 (9th Cir. 2014). Because the categorical approach is concerned only with what conduct the 

offense necessarily involves, the court “must presume that the [offense] rest[s] upon nothing more 

than the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are 

encompassed by the generic federal offense.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). If the elements of the offense “criminalize a 

broader swath of conduct” than the conduct covered by the generic federal definition, the offense 

cannot qualify as a crime of violence, even if the particular facts underlying the defendant’s own 

case might satisfy that definition. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d at 920 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 In ascertaining the scope of conduct criminalized by the elements of an offense, the court

considers not only the statutory language, “but also the interpretation of that language in judicial 

opinions.” Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To find an offense overbroad, there must be a “realistic probability, not 

a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to conduct not encompassed by the 

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generic federal definition. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007); accord United 

States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the “realistic probability” 

standard to a crime of violence determination under section 924(c)(3)). 

In a case involving a “divisible” statute, the court may also go beyond the categorical 

approach and apply the “modified categorical approach,” which allows the court “to examine a 

limited class of documents to determine which of a statute’s alternative elements formed the basis 

of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A statute is “divisible” when it contains “multiple, alternative 

elements of functionally separate crimes,” Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 

2014) (emphasis in original), as opposed to just “alternative means of committing the same 

crime,” Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 2015 WL 9462976, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 2015). “[T]he key 

question [the court] must ask when determining a statute’s divisibility is whether a jury would 

have to be unanimous in finding those separate elements.” Ramirez v. Lynch, 2016 WL 239661, at 

*5 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2016).

 Defendants focus their arguments regarding the section 924(c)(3) force clause on the 

specialized meanings that have been given to the terms “physical force” and “use.” In Johnson v. 

United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson I”), the Supreme Court considered whether a 

conviction for simple battery under Florida law qualifies as a “violent felony” under the force 

clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA force clause, like the section 

924(c)(3) force clause, defines “violent felony” to include a felony offense that “has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 

U.S.C. § 924(2)(B)(i).2

 The Court held that to satisfy this definition, the physical force required 

by the offense must be “violent force – that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to 

another person.” 559 U.S. at 140 (emphasis in original). The Court observed that “even by itself, 

the word ‘violent’ in section 924(e)(2)(B) connotes a substantial degree of force . . . When the 

adjective ‘violent’ is attached to the noun ‘felony,’ its connotation of strong physical force is even 

 

2

This is the exact same language as the section 924(c)(3) force clause, except that it refers only to 

the “person of another,” as opposed to the “person or property of another.” 

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clearer.” Id.

 The Ninth Circuit has since extended this definition of “physical force” to other generic 

offense provisions, including 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, both of which define “crime 

of violence” using language that is identical or essentially identical to that used in the ACCA force 

clause and the section 924(c)(3) force clause.3 See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 

748 F.3d 918, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2014) (U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); United States v. Flores-Cordero, 723 

F.3d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013) (U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 

854 (9th Cir. 2013) (18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). A number of other courts have extended the Johnson I

definition of “physical force” to the section 924(c)(3) force clause. See, e.g., United States v. 

Davis, No. 15-cv-20564, 2015 WL 8311538, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2015); United States v. 

Merinord, No. 15-cr-00136, 2015 WL 6457166, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2015); United States v. 

Cruz-Rivera, No. 15-cr-00486, 2015 WL 6394416, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2015); United States v. 

Evans, No. 15-cr-00057, 2015 WL 6673182, at *4-5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2015). The government 

does not dispute that “physical force” under the section 924(c)(3) force clause carries the same 

meaning as under the ACCA force clause, and I apply that meaning here. 

 Finally, for a defendant to “use” violent force for the purposes of a crime of violence 

determination, the defendant must do so intentionally, not just recklessly or negligently. See 

United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 

F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (“The key 

 

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18 U.S.C. § 16(a) defines “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 

U.S.C. § 16(a). Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, “crime of violence” means 

[m]urder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex 

offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is 

not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is 

involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse 

of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of 

credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal, 

state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.

U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 (emphasis added). 

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phrase in [18 U.S.C. § 16(a)] – the ‘use . . . of physical force against the person or property of 

another’ – most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental 

conduct.”). 

With this framework in mind, I turn to the alleged crime of violence predicates at issue 

here, assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2112. 

A. 18 U.S.C. § 111 

Count Two charges defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § 111. The statute contains an 

“(a)” subsection and a “(b)” subsection and provides in whole: 

(a) In general. Whoever 

(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or 

interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title 

while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; 

or 

(2) forcibly assaults or intimidates any person who formerly served 

as a person designated in section 1114 on account of the 

performance of official duties during such person’s term of service, 

shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only 

simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 

one year, or both, and where such acts involve physical contact with 

the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another felony, be 

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. 

(b) Enhanced penalty. Whoever, in the commission of any acts 

described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon 

(including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that fails 

to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily 

injury, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 

years, or both. 

18 U.S.C. § 111. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that section 111 creates three separate offenses. DominguezMaroyoqui, 748 F.3d at 919-20 (identifying the three section 111 offenses under a prior but 

substantially similar version of the statute); United States v. Chapman, 528 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (same). Under the current (and applicable) version of section 111, those three offenses 

are (1) a misdemeanor under section 111(a) if the defendant’s acts constitute “only simple 

assault;” (2) a felony with a maximum sentence of 8 years under section 111(a) if the defendant’s 

acts “involve physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another 

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felony;” and (3) a felony with a maximum sentence of 20 years under section 111(b) if the 

defendant “uses a deadly or dangerous weapon . . . or inflicts bodily injury.” See 18 U.S.C. § 111; 

see also United States v. Stoddard, 407 F. Appx. 231, 232 (9th Cir. 2011).4

The section 111(a) misdemeanor is obviously not a crime of violence under the section 

924(c)(3) force clause, because to qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3), the 

offense must be a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). 

Under recent Ninth Circuit precedent, the section 111(a) felony is not a crime of violence 

either. In United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a prior 

version of the section 111(a) felony qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 

2L1.2.5 748 F.3d at 919. Applying the categorical approach and the Johnson I definition of 

physical force, the court of appeals held that the section 111(a) felony does not “ha[ve] as an 

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 

because while the section 111(a) felony requires “at least some form of assault,” it does not 

 

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 In his reply brief, Hart states in a footnote that Count Two is duplicitous because it charges all 

three section 111 offenses. Hart Reply at 2 n.1 (Dkt. No. 48). “An indictment is duplicitous 

where a single count joins two or more distinct and separate offenses. One vice of duplicity is that 

a jury may find a defendant guilty on a count without having reached a unanimous verdict on the 

commission of a particular offense.” United States v. Ramirez-Martinez, 273 F.3d 903, 913 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because Hart only raised this issue in his reply 

brief and has not requested dismissal of the indictment or any other remedy based on the alleged 

duplicity, I do not address the issue here. 

5

The relevant version of section 111(a) provided in relevant part: 

(a) In General. Whoever: 

(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or 

interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title 

while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; 

or 

(2) forcibly assaults or intimidates any person who formerly served 

as a person designated in section 1114 on account of the 

performance of official duties during such person’s term of service, 

shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only 

simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 

one year, or both, and in all other cases, be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 

Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d at 920 n.2. 

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require that “any particular level of force be used.” Id. at 921 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“To obtain a section 111(a) felony conviction, then, the government need not prove, and an 

adjudicator need not find, that the offense involved violent force capable of causing physical pain 

or injury.” Id. The court of appeals concluded that the section 111(a) felony is not categorically a 

crime of violence, and that section 111(a) is not divisible. Id. at 921-22. While DominguezMaroyoqui concerned a prior version of section 111(a), the government does not dispute that the 

decision’s reasoning also precludes characterization of the current version of the section 111(a) 

felony as a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) force clause. 

 This leaves section 111(b) as a possible crime of violence predicate. In United States v. 

Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit held that section 111(b) is 

categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).6 Id. at 946-48. It began by identifying 

two variants of the section 111(b) offense: “(1) assault involving a deadly or dangerous weapon, 

and (2) assault resulting in bodily injury.” Id. at 947. It defined “deadly or dangerous weapon” as 

“any object which, as used or attempted to be used, may endanger the life of or inflict great bodily 

harm on a person,” and “assault” as either (1) “a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person of 

another,” or (2) “a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another” combined with “an apparent 

present ability” and a resulting “reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). It then reasoned: 

A defendant charged with the first variant, assault with a deadly or a 

dangerous weapon, must have always “threatened the use of 

physical force,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because he or she will have 

either made a “wilful attempt to inflict injury” or a “threat to inflict 

injury” . . . with an object that “may endanger the life of or inflict 

great bodily harm on a person.” . . . Similarly, a defendant charged 

under the second variant, assault resulting in bodily injury, 

necessarily must have committed an act of force in causing the 

injury. Thus, both variants are “crimes of violence” pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 16(a). 

Id. at 948 (internal alterations omitted). 

 

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Juvenile Female also held that section 111(b) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 

which defines “crime of violence” using language identical to the section 924(c)(3) residual 

clause. See Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d at 947-48. I address the section 924(c)(3) residual clause 

in more detail below. 

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 Defendants acknowledge that Juvenile Female squarely contradicts their position but 

contend that the case is no longer good law under Johnson I. In the Ninth Circuit, where 

intervening Supreme Court authority “undercut[s] the theory or reasoning underlying [a] prior 

circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable,” a district court “should 

consider [itself] bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior [circuit precedent] 

as having been effectively overruled.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants argue that the reasoning in Juvenile Female is defective under Johnson I because it 

does not address the particular level of force – i.e., violent or nonviolent – that a person must have 

used to be convicted under section 111(b). See Bell Mot. at 10 (Dkt. No. 38). 

 Defendants are correct that Juvenile Female did not explicitly identify the particular level 

of force required for a section 111(b) conviction. See 566 F.3d at 946-48. However, while 

Juvenile Female did not explicitly state that section 111(b) requires the use of “violent force,” the 

Ninth Circuit by that time had already established a “violent force” requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 

16 and similar generic offense provisions. See, e.g., Sareang Ye v. I.N.S., 214 F.3d 1128, 1133 

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence [under 18 

U.S.C. § 16] must actually be violent in nature”) (internal quotation marks omitted); OrtegaMendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 

1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); 

see also United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 472 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (same, with respect 

to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); United States v. Cortez-Arias, 403 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005) (same). 

Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit has 

occasionally linked this “violent force” requirement to the statement in Leocal that the language of 

18 U.S.C. § 16 “suggests a category of violent, active crimes.”7 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11; see, e.g.,

Ortega-Mendez, 450 F.3d at 1016 (“Consistent with Leocal, we have squarely held that the force 

necessary to constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) must actually be violent in 

 

7

 Likewise, the Supreme Court in Johnson I relied in part on this statement from Leocal in 

determining that physical force under the ACCA force clause means violent physical force. See 

Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140. 

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nature.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The “crime of violence” analysis in 

Juvenile Female begins by quoting this same statement. See Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d at 947. 

This seriously undermines the claim that Johnson I amounts to intervening Supreme Court 

authority undercutting the reasoning of Juvenile Female. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 900; see also

United States v. Flores-Mejia, 687 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the argument that an 

intervening state high court decision was “clearly irreconcilable” with a prior circuit case, where 

the state high court decision “appears to have done nothing more than confirm [the state’s] 

definition of robbery – a definition that existed when we decided [the prior circuit case]”). It is 

not within my purview to reconsider Ninth Circuit precedent merely because it is written in a 

manner that is not to a party’s liking. 

 Further, while I share some of defendants’ concerns over the breadth of conduct 

criminalized under section 111(b),8 I find that the analysis in Juvenile Female is at least roughly in 

line with a number of Ninth Circuit decisions (from both before Johnson I and after) rejecting 

crime of violence and violent felony challenges to battery and assault statutes that require either 

the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or some level of resulting bodily injury. See United 

States v. Lawrence, 627 F.3d 1281, 1284-87 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a state statute 

criminalizing the “reckless infliction of substantial bodily harm in the course of an intentional 

assault” is a violent felony under the ACCA force clause; citing Juvenile Female for the 

proposition that “assault statutes penalizing intentional conduct that results or is likely to result in 

such bodily injury necessarily require force that goes beyond the least touching and represents 

actual force that is violent in nature”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); United 

 

8

For example, to be convicted under the section 111(b) “bodily injury” variant, the defendant 

must have intended to commit the assault, Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d at 947, but he need not have 

intended to inflict the bodily injury, United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 122 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th 

Cir. 1997). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, whether the bodily injury was inflicted by the 

defendant is determined by whether the bodily injury was part of the “natural and probable 

consequences” of the assault. Id. at 1268-69. The upshot is that, at least in theory, a person could 

be convicted under section 111(b) for committing an intentional assault that uses less than violent 

force but that results in an unintentional bodily injury. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 310 F.3d 554, 

555-57 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming a section 111(b) conviction based on evidence that the defendant 

resisted arrest by “squirm[ing] and twist[ing] as hard as he could” and one deputy marshal “who 

tried to handcuff [the defendant’s] hands behind his back . . . tore a ligament in his right thumb 

during the struggle”). 

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States v. Jennen, 596 F.3d 594, 601 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Our conclusion that unconsented touching 

with a firearm requires ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force’ compels the 

conclusion that unlawful touching using a deadly weapon does too.”); United States v. LauricoYeno, 590 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[California Penal Code § 273.5] does not penalize 

minimal, nonviolent touchings. It penalizes the intentional use of force that results in a traumatic 

condition. This . . . covers a category of ‘violent, active crimes.’”); United States v. Grajeda, 581 

F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[E]ven the ‘least touching’ with a deadly weapon or 

instrument . . . is violent in nature and demonstrates at a minimum the threatened use of actual 

force.”).

 Defendants make no attempt to distinguish these or other similar decisions, or to identify 

real-world examples of section 111(b) being applied in a manner that is beyond the scope of 

“crime of violence” as defined in the section 924(c)(3) force clause. See Lawrence, 627 F.3d at 

1287 (acknowledging that “[i]t may be possible to dream up unusual scenarios in which a 

nonviolent act, such as spitting, could thereby result in substantial bodily injury,” but nonetheless 

holding that the defendant’s conviction was for a crime of violence, where the defendant did not 

claim that his own conduct involved nonviolent conduct and did not point to any case applying the 

statute of conviction to nonviolent conduct) (internal quotation marks omitted); Laurico-Yeno, 590 

F.3d at 822 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that “a nonviolent least touching” could result in a 

conviction under a state statute “penaliz[ing] the intentional use of force that results in a traumatic 

condition,” where the defendant was “unable to identify a single . . . case resulting from a 

nonviolent use of force”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 For all these reasons, I am not convinced that Juvenile Female has been effectively 

overruled by Johnson I merely because it did not explicitly identify the particular level of force 

required under section 111(b). See Miller, 335 F.3d at 900. 

 I am also unpersuaded by defendants’ claim that Juvenile Female has been effectively 

overruled because it fails to take into account the distinction between “causing injury” and “using 

force.” See Bell Mot. at 11-13; Bell Reply at 2-3 (Dkt. No. 50). As an initial matter, defendants 

fail to articulate what this argument has to do with Johnson I. Again, I may only reject Juvenile 

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Female as effectively overruled if the case is clearly irreconcilable with intervening Supreme 

Court authority. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 900. To the extent that the reasoning in Juvenile Female 

has not been undercut by such authority, I remain bound by the decision. 

 In any event, defendants’ causing-injury versus using-force argument lacks merit. It is 

based principally on United States v. Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2012), in which the 

Fourth Circuit held that a criminal threats conviction under California Penal Code § 422(a) is not 

categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 701 F.3d at 167-171. A person violates 

section 422(a) when he, in relevant part, “willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result 

in death or great bodily injury to another person.” Cal. Penal Code § 422(a). The Fourth Circuit 

held that this language does not define a crime of violence because an offense may result in death 

or great bodily injury without involving the use of physical force. 701 F.3d at 168. “For example, 

a defendant can violate [section 422(a)] by threatening to poison another, which involves no use or 

threatened use of force.” Id. at 168-69. 

 Critically, in reaching this conclusion, Torres-Miguel distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in United States v. Villavicencio-Burruel, 608 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that 

section 422(a) is categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Villavicencio-Burruel

remains binding law in this Circuit. See United States v. Calderon-Jimenez, 2016 WL 146419, at 

*2 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016) (rejecting, as foreclosed by Villavicenio–Burruel, the defendant’s 

contention that section 422(a) is not a crime of violence); United States v. Zetina-Sandoval, 568 F. 

Appx. 498 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Hernandez-Perez, 473 F. Appx. 584, 585 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (same). Moreover, the reasoning in Torres-Miguel – which relies on the notion that an 

indirect application of force between defendant and victim does not qualify as “using” physical 

force for the purposes of a crime of violence determination – was rejected by the Supreme Court 

in United States v. Castleman: 

[T]he knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily 

involves the use of physical force . . . The District Court thought 

otherwise, reasoning that one can cause bodily injury “without the 

‘use of physical force’” – for example, by “deceiving the victim into 

drinking a poisoned beverage, without making contact of any kind.” 

[ . . . ] 

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[But] the knowing or intentional application of force is a “use” of 

force. [Defendant] is correct that under Leocal, the word “use” 

“conveys the idea that the thing used (here, ‘physical force’) has 

been made the user’s instrument.” But he errs in arguing that 

although “poison may have ‘forceful physical properties’ as a matter 

of organic chemistry, no one would say that a poisoner ‘employs’ 

force or ‘carries out a purpose by means of force’ when he or she 

sprinkles poison in a victim’s drink.” The “use of force” in 

[defendant’s] example is not the act of “sprinkling” the poison; it is 

the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical 

harm. That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a 

kick or punch), does not matter. Under [defendant’s] logic, after all, 

one could say that pulling the trigger on a gun is not a “use of force” 

because it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually strikes the 

victim. 

134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414-15 (2014) (internal citations and alterations omitted). 

Castleman addressed a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which, under Castleman,

requires a lower level of physical force than section 924(c)(3). See 134 S. Ct. at 1413. 

Nevertheless, a number of courts have applied this particular aspect of Castleman in the section 

924(c)(3) context. See, e.g., United States vs. Checora, No. 14-cr-00457, 2015 WL 9305672, at 

*4 (D. Utah Dec. 21, 2015); United States v. Morgan, No. 14-cr-20610, 2015 WL 9463975, at *2 

n.3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2015); United States v. McDaniels, No. 15-cr-00171, 2015 WL 7455539, 

at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 2015); Cruz-Rivera, 2015 WL 6394416, at *4. They have done so for 

good reason. While Castleman held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) requires a lower level of physical 

force than section 924(c)(3), this particular aspect of Castleman concerns not the level of physical 

force required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), but rather what it means to “use” physical force for 

the purposes of the statute. I see no material differences between 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and 

section 924(c)(3) in this regard. 

In sum, Juvenile Female remains binding on this Court and forecloses the argument that 

section 111(b) is not a crime of violence. 

 Because section 111(a) is not a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) force clause, 

but section 111(b) is, Count Two may serve as a predicate crime of violence for the section 924(c) 

charge so long as section 111 is a divisible statute subject to the modified categorical approach, 

and defendants are charged under section 111(b). Given that the Ninth Circuit has squarely held 

that section 111 “creates three separate offenses” with three different punishments, DominguezCase 3:15-cr-00258-WHO Document 53 Filed 01/28/16 Page 13 of 23
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Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d at 919, I have no trouble concluding that the statute is divisible. Count Two 

clearly charges defendants under section 111(b). See Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 5. Accordingly, Count Two 

may serve as a predicate crime of violence for the section 924(c) charge. 

B. 18 U.S.C. § 2112

Count Three charges defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2112, “the general robbery-ofgovernment-property statute.” United States v. Rivera, 521 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1975). Section 

2112 provides that “[w]hoever robs or attempts to rob another of any kind or description of 

personal property belonging to the United States, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years.” 

18 U.S.C. § 2112. The statute does not define “to rob,” and courts have given the term its 

common law meaning, i.e., “the felonious taking of property from the person of another by 

violence or by putting him in fear.” Norris v. United States, 152 F.2d 808, 809 (5th Cir. 1946); 

accord United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1987); Rivera, 521 F.2d at 128 n.5; 

Rutkowski v. United States, 149 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 1945). Neither party cites any authority 

directly addressing whether section 2112 qualifies as a crime of violence or violent felony under 

any of the generic offense provisions, and I have not found any.9

 Defendants argue that section 2112 is not a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) 

force clause because even when physical force is used to commit a section 2112 robbery, the 

amount of physical force required under the statute falls short of violent force within the meaning 

of Johnson I. Defendants cite to United States v. Rodriguez, 925 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir. 1991), which 

affirmed a conviction for aggravated robbery of a United States Postal Service Carrier in violation 

 

9

In United States v. Mendez, the Ninth Circuit held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) residual clause. 

992 F.2d at 1491-92. The case does not address whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 

is a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) force clause. See id. In United States v. Melton, 

344 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that a robbery conviction under Virginia 

law, which applies the “common law definition of robbery,” is a violent felony under the ACCA 

force clause. Id. at 1025-26. Because the analysis in Melton is based on the “common law 

definition of robbery as it has been articulated by the Virginia courts,” id. at 1026, I do not find the 

case especially instructive here. 

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of 18 U.S.C. § 2114.10 That statute, like section 2112, uses “the word ‘rob’. . . in its common law 

sense.” Rodriguez, 925 F.2d at 1052; see also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267 n.5 

(2000) (noting that in statutes such as section 2112 and section 2114, Congress “simply punished 

‘robbery’. . . , thereby leaving the definition of the[] term[] to the common law”). The evidence at 

trial showed that the victim “carried his keys inside his pocket, attached to a chain that in turn was 

attached to his belt by a leather loop,” and that, in taking the keys, the defendant “grabbed the key 

chain, pulled it once or twice, and ‘popped the loop on the holder.’”11 Rodriguez, 925 F.2d at 

1051. The Seventh Circuit found that this amounted to a sufficient showing of force to support the 

“robbery element” of the defendant’s conviction: 

Although the amount of force or violence used to take the keys from 

[the victim] was rather minimal, there was sufficient evidence for a 

rational trier of fact to conclude that a robbery did occur. [The 

victim’s] key chain was attached to his clothing, and [the defendant] 

had to pull the chain once or perhaps twice to snatch the keys. 

Courts have upheld robbery convictions when the item taken is so 

attached to the person or his clothes as to require some force to 

effect its removal. 

Id. at 1052 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Depass, 510 

F. Appx. 119, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 

 

10 The version of 18 U.S.C. § 2114 in effect at the time stated in relevant part: 

Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or 

custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the 

United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such . . . property 

of the United States, or robs any such person of . . . property of the 

United States, shall, for the first offense, be imprisoned not more 

than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such 

robbery he wounds the person having custody of such . . . property 

of the United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the use of a 

dangerous weapon, . . . shall be imprisoned not more than twenty 

five years. 

Rodriguez, 925 F.2d at 1051 n.2. 

11 The evidence at trial also showed that the defendant’s co-conspirator subsequently “threatened 

[the victim] with [a] gun.” Rodriguez, 925 F.2d at 1051. However, the Seventh Circuit did not 

consider this conduct in determining whether there was sufficient evidence of robbery, apparently 

because it concluded that the co-conspirator did not threaten the victim with the gun until after the 

robbery had been completed. See id. at 1052-53. 

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robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2114 where the defendant “pushed [the victim] from behind, entered 

the back of the vehicle, and grabbed the package”). 

The government does not address Rodriguez in its opposition brief. The government cites 

to Mendez and Melton, discussed above, as well as to a series of recent out-of-circuit district court 

cases holding that Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a crime of violence under the 

section 924(c)(3) force clause. See Opp. at 3-4 (Dkt. No. 47). But the government offers no 

explanation of why the amount of physical force required for a section 2112 conviction is 

sufficient to satisfy Johnson I. See id.

 Faced with no on-point authority and an extremely limited body of case law regarding 

section 2112, I agree with defendants that Rodriguez establishes a realistic probability that section 

2112 could be applied to nonviolent conduct. The case reflects the common law rule that there is 

“sufficient force to constitute robbery [where] the property is so attached to the victim’s person or 

clothing as to create resistance to the taking.” People v. Patton, 76 Ill. 2d 45, 49 (1979); see also 3 

Substantive Criminal Law § 20.3 (2d ed. 2015) (removing an article of value attached to the 

owner’s person or clothes “is not robbery unless the article in question . . . is so attached to the 

person or his clothes as to require some force to effect its removal”); 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 

465 (15th ed. 2015) (force is sufficient to constitute robbery “if the property is so attached to the 

person or clothing of the victim that resistance to the snatching is thereby created”); People v. 

Campbell, 234 Ill. 391, 392-93 (1908) (“if the article is so attached to the person or clothes as to 

create resistance, however slight, . . . the taking is robbery”). 

 The amount of force necessary to commit a section 2112 robbery under this rule is less 

than violent force. In United States v. Flores-Cordero, 723 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit considered whether an Arizona resisting arrest statute qualified as a crime of violence 

under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Id. at 1085-86. The Arizona statute defined resisting arrest in relevant 

part as “[u]sing or threatening to use physical force against the peace officer or another.” Id. at 

1087. The Arizona Court of Appeals had found that the statute applied to a defendant who 

“kicked the officers trying to control her,” thereby creating a “minor scuffle,” but not injuring 

anyone. Id. at 1087-88. The Ninth Circuit found that this conduct “did not necessarily involve 

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force capable of inflicting pain or causing injury as contemplated by the Supreme Court’s 

definition of violence in [Johnson I].” Id. at 1088. Accordingly, it held that the statute “cannot be 

considered categorically a crime of violence under [U.S.S.G § 2L1.2].” Id. 

The amount of force used by the defendant in Rodriguez was no more than the amount of 

force involved in kicking one’s arresting officers and causing a “minor scuffle.” See FloresCordero, 723 F.3d at 1087-88. The defendant in Rodriguez “popped” a leather loop attaching a 

key chain to a belt by grabbing the key chain and pulling it once or twice. 925 F.2d at 1051. The 

Seventh Circuit found it sufficient that the victim’s keys were “attached to his clothing,” and that 

the defendant “had to pull the chain once or perhaps twice to snatch the keys.” Id. at 1052. 

Nobody was injured as a result of the defendant’s use of force, and there is no indication that 

anyone was threatened with physical pain or injury as a result of his act of snatching the keys. See 

id. at 1050-51. In particular in light of Flores-Cordero, the defendant in Rodriguez cannot be said 

to have used violent force within the meaning of Johnson I. See 559 U.S. at 140; see also 

Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d at 921 (characterizing as nonviolent force one case in which the 

defendant was convicted for walking up to a prosecutor and “jolting her arm and shoulder,” and 

another in which the defendant was convicted for “grabbing” a federal agent’s jacket); United 

States v. Hollins, 514 F. Appx. 264, 266-69 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a Pennsylvania robbery 

statute making it a crime to “physically take[] or remove[] property from the person of another by 

force however slight” does not have a violent force element; stating that, under Johnson I,

“robbery by force, however slight, no longer satisfies [the force clause] definition of a crime of 

violence”). Accordingly, robbery of government property under section 2112 is not categorically 

a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) force clause.

This raises the question of whether section 2112 is divisible. It is not. In United States v. 

Dixon, the Ninth Circuit addressed the divisibility of California Penal Code § 211, which defines 

robbery in essentially the same terms as the common law, i.e., “the felonious taking of personal 

property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 

accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code § 211. The Ninth Circuit observed that 

the statute has two disjunctively worded phrases (“person or immediate presence” and “force or 

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fear”) but concluded that the phrases “are alternative means, not alternative elements” and do not 

render the statute divisible. Dixon, 805 F.3d at 1198. “To return a guilty verdict on a [California 

Penal Code § 211] charge, a jury must find that the elements are satisfied, but jurors need not 

agree on the disjunctively worded alternatives.” Id. The government identifies no reason that a 

robbery charge under section 2112 would operate differently, and I see none. Section 2112 is not 

subject to the modified categorical approach. 

II. RESIDUAL CLAUSE 

 Because I find that section 2112 is not a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3) 

force clause, I proceed to whether the statute qualifies as a crime of violence under the 924(c)(3) 

residual clause. Defendants do not dispute that section 2112 robbery, “by its nature, involves a 

substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the 

course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). Defendants argue instead that the 

924(c)(3) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson II and thus cannot be used to 

support the section 924(c) charge against them. 

In Johnson II, the Supreme Court held that imposing an increased sentence under the 

ACCA residual clause violates due process. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. That clause defines “violent 

felony” to include “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [that] 

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court began by explaining that its precedents require application of the 

“categorical approach” to decide whether a given offense fits within the scope of the ACCA 

residual clause. 135 S. Ct. at 2557. “Under the categorical approach, a court assesses whether a 

crime qualifies as a violent felony in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of 

how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Deciding whether the [ACCA] residual clause covers a crime thus 

requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to 

judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.” Id. 

The Court then identified two features of the ACCA residual clause that “conspire to make 

it unconstitutionally vague.” Id. First, it “leaves grave uncertainty” about how to assess the risk 

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of physical injury presented by a given crime. Id. It does so by requiring judges to base their 

assessment of risk on a judge-imagined “ordinary case” of a crime without instructing on 

“[h]ow [to] go about deciding what kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves.” Id. 

The clause thus “offers no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts” of what kind 

of conduct is involved in an “ordinary case.” Id. at 2558. Second, the clause “leaves uncertainty 

about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. The Court concluded 

that the clause, “[b]y combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime 

with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, . . . 

produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id. 

Defendants argue that the section 924(c)(3) residual clause is unconstitutional under the 

reasoning of Johnson II. They point out that the section 924(c)(3) residual clause requires 

application of the same “ordinary case” analysis undergirding the analysis in Johnson II, and that 

the section 924(c)(3) residual clause contains “essentially the same” language as the ACCA 

residual clause. See Bell Mot. at 6-9; Hart Mot. at 3-4 (Dkt. No. 37). They also note that the 

Ninth Circuit in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), and the Seventh Circuit in 

United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015), have already relied on Johnson II to 

find that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague. See 

Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 721-23. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) defines “crime of 

violence” as a felony offense “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 

against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 

18 U.S.C § 16(b). In other words, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) defines “crime of violence” using exactly the 

same language as the section 924(c)(3) residual clause. 

The government responds that the ACCA residual clause and the section 924(c)(3) residual 

clause “have different legal definitions,” in particular in that the ACCA residual clause is preceded 

by four enumerated examples of violent felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“violent 

felony” means “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [that] is 

burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”) (emphasis added). In Johnson II, 

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the Court noted that these four enumerated crimes contribute to the indeterminacy of the ACCA 

residual clause because they “confirm[] that the court’s task [in applying the categorical approach] 

goes beyond evaluating the chances that the physical acts that make up the crime will injure 

someone,” and because they “force[] courts to interpret ‘serious potential risk’ in light of the four 

enumerated crimes,” each of which is “far from clear” with respect to the degree of risk it 

ordinarily poses. Id. at 2557-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Court rejected 

concerns that holding the ACCA residual clause unconstitutional would cast doubt on other 

federal and state laws using terms like “substantial risk,” observing that “[a]lmost none of the cited 

laws links a phrase such as ‘substantial risk’ to a confusing list of examples.” Id. at 2561. The 

Court then stated: “More importantly, almost all of the cited laws require gauging the riskiness of 

conduct in which an individual engages on a particular occasion. As a general matter, we do not 

doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard such as 

‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

With respect to Dimaya, the government emphasizes that the Ninth Circuit explicitly 

cabined its holding to the particular application of the particular statute before it, stating in a 

footnote that its “decision does not reach the constitutionality of applications of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 

outside of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) or cast any doubt on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 

16(a)’s definition of a crime of violence.” Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120 n.17. 

I agree with defendants that the section 924(c)(3) residual clause cannot stand under 

Johnson II. The core of the Johnson II analysis is focused on the indeterminacy created by 

application of the categorical approach to the broad language of the ACCA residual clause. Under 

binding authority in this Circuit, the section 924(c)(3) residual clause, like the ACCA residual 

clause, requires application of the categorical approach. See Amparo, 68 F.3d at 1225-26; see also 

Piccolo, 441 F.3d at 1086-87; Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1490-92; Springfield, 829 F.2d at 862-63. Just 

like the categorical approach applied in the ACCA context – which requires a court to “assess[]

whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in 

terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion,” Johnson 

II, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 – the categorical approach applied in the section 924(c)(3) context is “in 

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contrast to the circumstantial or case-by-case method that requires the district court to inquire into 

the facts of the particular case.” Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1490. And, as Dimaya and Vivas-Ceja make 

clear, the differences in the language used in the ACCA residual clause versus the section 

924(c)(3) residual clause are not material insofar as the reasoning in Johnson II is concerned. See 

Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1117 (“Section 16(b) gives judges no more guidance than does the ACCA 

[residual clause] as to what constitutes a substantial enough risk of force to satisfy the statute.”); 

Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722 (“Just like the [ACCA] residual clause, § 16(b) offers courts no 

guidance to determine when the risk involved in the ordinary case of a crime qualifies as 

‘substantial.’”); see also United States v. Edmundson, 2015 WL 9582736, at *3-5 (D. Md. Dec. 

30, 2015) (holding that the section 924(c)(3) residual clause “suffers from exactly the same double 

indeterminacy” as the ACCA residual clause and is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson II). 

The government’s emphasis on the four enumerated crimes preceding the ACCA residual 

clause was addressed in both Dimaya and Vivas-Ceja and is no more persuasive here than it was in 

those cases. The Ninth Circuit in Dimaya explained 

It is true that, after the Court set forth its holding in [Johnson II], it 

cited [18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s] four enumerated offenses in 

responding to the government’s argument that the Court’s holding 

would cast doubt on the many criminal statutes that include 

language similar to the indeterminate term “serious potential risk.” 

In doing so, however, it stated that while the listed offenses added to 

the uncertainty, the fundamental reason for the Court’s holding was 

the residual clause’s “application of the ‘serious potential risk’ 

standard to an idealized ordinary case of the crime.” In short, this 

response clearly reiterated that what distinguishes ACCA’s residual 

clause from many other provisions in criminal statutes was, 

consistent with its fundamental holding, the use of the “ordinary 

case” analysis. [Johnson II] therefore made plain that the residual 

clause was void for vagueness in and of itself for the reasons stated 

in reaching its decision, and not because of the clause’s relation to 

the four listed offenses. 

803 F.3d at 1117-18 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). The Seventh Circuit in Vivas-Ceja

reached the same conclusion: 

The government insists that [Johnson II] doesn’t compel this 

conclusion because the Court placed special emphasis on the 

confusion created by the list of enumerated crimes preceding the 

residual clause, a feature not present in § 16(b). The government 

overreads this part of the Court’s analysis. As we’ve explained, the 

heart of the Court’s opinion demonstrates why the two aspects of the 

residual clause’s categorical approach – the ordinary-case 

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determination and the risk assessment – “conspire” to make the 

clause unconstitutionally vague. Only later did the Court observe 

that the residual clause also “forces courts to interpret serious 

potential risk in light of the four enumerated crimes,” which are “far 

from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses.” In other 

words, the enumeration of specific crimes did nothing to clarify the 

quality or quantity of risk necessary to classify offenses under the 

statute. The list itself wasn’t one of the “two features” that combined 

to make the clause unconstitutionally vague. 

808 F.3d at 723. Given that the section 924(c)(3) residual clause requires the same categorical 

approach as 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and consists of the same language as 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), I see no 

reason for this analysis to not apply with equal force here. Simply put, “[t]he fact that the 

language in the [ACCA residual clause] was made even worse by the additional presence of the 

four listed crimes does not save the [section 924(c)(3)] residual clause from impermissible 

vagueness.” Edmundson, 2015 WL 9582736, at *4. 

 The government’s reliance on the cabining footnote in Dimaya is also unpersuasive. 

Dimaya held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because, like the ACCA residual 

clause, it “requires courts to (1) measure the risk by an indeterminate standard of a judicially 

imagined ordinary case, not by real-world facts or statutory elements and (2) determine by vague 

and uncertain standards when a risk is sufficiently substantial.” 803 F.3d at 1120 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). While the Ninth Circuit made clear that this holding does not extend 

beyond the scope of the facts before it, that does not mean that the reasoning from the decision 

cannot be applied elsewhere. Here, as in Dimaya, the “minor distinctions between the text of the 

[ACCA residual clause] and that of the [section 924(c)(3) residual clause]” fail to “undermine[] 

the applicability of [Johnson II’s] fundamental holding to this case.” Id. 

 I recognize that a number of district courts have declined to extend Johnson II to the 

section 924(c)(3) residual clause. See, e.g., United States v. Green, No. 15-cr-00526, 2016 WL 

277982, at *3-5 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2016); United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-cr-10200, 2016 WL 

184389, at *11-14 (D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2016); Checora, 2015 WL 9305672, at *9; Morgan, 2015 

WL 9463975, at *7-9; United States v. Prickett, No. 14-cr-30018, 2015 WL 5884904, at *2-3 

(W.D. Ark. Oct. 8, 2015); United States v. Lusenhop, No. 14-cr-00122, 2015 WL 5016514, at *3 

(S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2015). Significantly, however, none of these courts (or any of the other 

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courts that have declined to extend Johnson II to the section 924(c)(3) residual clause) are in the 

Ninth Circuit. Several have relied on the conclusion that the section 924(c)(3) residual clause, in 

contrast with the ACCA residual clause, does not require application of the categorical approach. 

See Checora, 2015 WL 9305672, at *9; Morgan, 2015 WL 9463975, at *7-9; Prickett, 2015 WL 

5884904, at *2. That is not the law in this Circuit. And some have dismissed Dimaya as 

inapplicable in the section 924(c)(3) context. I find Dimaya highly persuasive here. The section 

924(c)(3) residual clause may not be used to establish that section 2112 robbery is a crime of 

violence. 

CONCLUSION 

Count Two (assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111) charges a crime of violence under 

section 924(c)(3). Count Three (robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2112) does not. Because the 

section 924(c) charge against defendants remains supported by a crime of violence predicate, 

defendants’ motions to dismiss Count Four are DENIED. A status conference is set for February 

4, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 2, 17th Floor. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

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