Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03717/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03717-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Administrator
Appellee
Greater Missouri Medical Pro-Care Providers
Appellant
Thomas E. Perez
Appellee
United States Department of Labor
Appellee
Wage and Hour Division
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3717

___________________________

Greater Missouri Medical Pro-Care Providers, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Thomas E. Perez; United States Department of Labor; Administrator; Wage and

Hour Division

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

____________

 Submitted: September 22, 2015

 Filed: December 14, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BYE and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Greater Missouri Medical Pro-Care Providers, Inc. (GMM) provides physical

and occupational therapiststo serve in hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities. 

GMM appeals the district court’s decision to uphold a final decision and order of the

United States Department of Labor (DOL) Administrative Review Board (ARB) that

found GMM violated several provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act

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(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., relating to the H-1B visa program, and awarded 1

damages and interest to some GMM workers. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND

GMM hired physical and occupational therapistsfrom the Philippines through

the H-1B program for temporary foreign workers. As part of the H-1B process,

GMM filed numerous labor condition applications (LCAs) with the Secretary of

Labor (Secretary) for the workers GMM wanted to hire. In the LCAs, GMM agreed

to provide prescribed wages and working conditions for its H-1B employees. See

8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(D); 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.730-.733.

The INA and the implementing regulationsrequire H-1B employers like GMM

to pay certain wages when an H-1B employee becomes “available for work or

otherwise comes under the control of the employer, such as by waiting for an

assignment, reporting for orientation or training, going to an interview or meeting

with a customer, or studying for a licensing examination.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 655.731(c)(6)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i)(II). Employers must pay

prescribed wages to employees in a “nonproductive status due to a decision by the

employer (e.g., because of lack of assigned work), lack of a permit or license, or any

other [unexcepted] reason,” 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(i)—a decision referred to as

“benching”—and cannot require employees to pay for the employer’s attorney fees,

costs, or other business expenses incurred filing LCAs and H-1B petitions, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(n)(2)(C)(vi)(II); 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(9)(ii), (iii)(C). And an employer may

not impose a penalty for early termination but, under certain conditions, may receive

The H-1B visa takes its name from 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), which 1

defines a class of non-immigrant alien workers eligible to work in the United States

temporarily to perform services in “specialty occupations.”

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“bona fide liquidated damages” from an H-1B employee who leaves employment

before an agreed upon date. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(A), (B). 

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1), the Secretary reviews the LCAs an H-1B

employer has filed “only for completeness and obvious inaccuracies” and, in the

absence of any such deficiencies, must certify the LCA within seven days of filing.2

Thus, the INA generally does not permit the Secretary to challenge the employer’s

attestationsin anLCA, nor doesthe INA otherwise contemplate a comprehensive precertification review. See id. § 1182(n). Instead, the INA generally provides four

situations for initiating an investigation of potential violations: (1) investigations

based on a complaint from an “aggrieved person or organization,” id.

§ 1182(n)(2)(A); (2) “case-by-case . . . random investigations” of an employer within

five years of a prior willful violation, id. § 1182(n)(2)(F); (3) investigations where the

Secretary “personally certif[ies]” he “has reasonable cause to believe that the

employer is not in compliance with [subsection (n)],” id. § 1182(n)(2)(G)(i); and

(4) investigations based on “specific credible information” of a willful violation of

certain requirements from a reliable source, id. § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii). 

On June 22, 2006, Alena Gay Arat, one of GMM’s H-1B therapists from the 

Philippines, filed a complaint with Missouri state regulators alleging GMM had

violated several H-1B requirements. Specifically, Arat alleged she paid all ofthe fees

to file and extend her H-1B visa, including attorney fees. Arat complained, “My

Employer . . . made me and the rest of us (therapist) [sic] stay[] in a company-paid

apartment to review for [a licensing exam] and during that non-productive period, my

employer just gave US$50.00 per week for food allowance.” Noting she arrived in

the United States on February 21, 2005, but did not work until May 6, 2005, Arat

Although the Secretary has delegated the authority to investigate and enforce 2

the H-1B programrequirementsto the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division,

see 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.715, 655.800(a), we refer to the Secretary as used in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(n). 

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alleged GMM did not pay her promised salary until Arat passed the exam and

obtained her license. Arat also questioned whether the fee GMM proposed to recover

for “breach of contract” upon Arat’s early termination of her employment contract

was legal.

The state regulators forwarded Arat’s complaint to the DOL, which treated it

as an “aggrieved party” complaint. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A). After reviewing

the complaint, DOL investigator Erica Simon concluded the Secretary had

“reasonable cause” to investigate the charge that GMM “[r]equired or attempted to

require [Arat to pay] a penalty for ceasing” her employment early. Simon initiated

an investigation on July 18, 2006, later explaining that date was “when we knew we

had a potentially valid complaint, something that we would have a reasonable cause

to move forward with.” In accordance with the DOL’s standard practice for all H-1B

investigations, Simon initiated a “full investigation under the H-1B provisions of the

IMA [sic]” “to see if there [we]re violations to any employee during [the relevant]

time period.”

On August 4, 2006, Simon sent GMM a “standard” DOL form letter notifying

GMM it had “been scheduled for investigation under [the H-1B LCA] provisions”

and, per the Secretary’s standard practice, requesting all of GMM’s H-1B documents

and records, including LCAs for all of GMM’s H-1B employees. Based on the sole

allegation that GMM improperly attempted to collect an early termination penalty

fromArat, the Secretary demanded sixteen different subcategories of evidence related

to GMM’s H-1B program and its H-1B employees. The Secretary’s request for

information did not mention Arat’s allegations or otherwise indicate the Secretary’s

comprehensive investigation was based on an aggrieved-party complaint. In addition

to obtaining GMM’s payroll and other records, Simon interviewed Arat and other

H-1B workers as well as representatives of GMM.

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Based on Simon’s investigation, the Secretary decided GMM violated the INA. 

Among other things, the Secretary concluded GMM (1) improperly failed to pay

required wages to employees GMM had placed in nonproductive status, including

employees studying to obtain occupational licenses; (2) made improper deductions

from employee wages for attorney and H-1B petition fees; and (3) “required or

attempted to require” improper penalty payments for early termination from some

employees. The Secretary ordered GMM to pay $372,897.93 in back wages to fortyfour employees—later amended to $382,889.87 to forty-five employees. 

GMM timely requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ),

and GMM and the Secretary filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Among

other things, GMM argued “[t]he applicable statute and regulation limit an aggrievedparty complaint to the specific issues of the Complaint and to the aggrieved party’s

LCA.” On October 23, 2009, the ALJ granted partial judgment to the Secretary,

opining “[n]othing in the [INA] or its implementing regulations supports GMM’s

theory that the [Secretary] is limited in investigatory power to a specific complainant

and his or her complaints.” The ALJ decided the Secretary’s broad investigation of

GMM was within his statutory and regulatory authority. 

The ALJ also rejected GMM’s argument that “[t]he applicable statute and

regulation impose a 12-month time limitfor investigating violations outside oftwelve

months prior to the filing of a complaint.” The ALJ reasoned, “While it is true that

an aggrieved party must file a complaint within one year of the last violation or

misrepresentation, the regulations make clear that this is a jurisdictional bar only to

the filing of a complaint, and it does not limit the scope of remedies.” Deciding there

were “no genuine issues of material fact” as to whether GMM failed to pay required

wages to some employees during nonproductive employment and made improper

deductionsfromemployee wages, the ALJ granted judgment to the Secretary on those

issues and set a hearing to consider “[a]dditional proof regarding which H-1B

employees were affected by” GMM’s violations and the proper remedies for those

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violations. The ALJ also determined GMM illegally withheld some employees’

paychecks. 

After the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision ordering GMM to pay

(1) $338,042.19 of back wages to forty employees for benching violations;

(2) $8,160.00 to seventeen employees for illegal fee deductions; and (3) $8,284.23

to four employees for illegally withholding paychecks. The ALJ also awarded preand post-judgment interest on the awards. The ALJ ultimately did not find GMM had

attempted to collect an improper penalty fromArat—the sole allegation that prompted

the Secretary’s comprehensive review of GMM’s H-1B practices. 

GMM petitioned the ARB for review, which affirmed in part and reversed in

part over a partial dissent by one board member. Like the ALJ, the ARB decided the

Secretary’s aggrieved-party complaint investigation was not limited to timely

allegations in the complaint. “Based on the plain language of the statute and

regulations, [ARB] precedent, and a broad reading of the relevant legislative and

regulatory history,” the ARB held “that the [Secretary] had the authority to

investigate alleged INA violations involving H-1B workers who did not file

complaints.” The ARB also affirmed the ALJ’s interest award. However, the ARB

reversed “the ALJ’s finding that discrete violations occurring outside a twelve-month

period prior to the filing of a complaint are actionable.” Upholding the award of back

pay as a remedy for violations that continued into the relevant twelve-month period,

the ARB reduced the award for benching violations to $106,785.85. 

The dissent agreed with the ARB’s decision to uphold Arat’s award and

acknowledged the Secretary’s discretionary authority to expand an aggrieved-party

investigation under other statutory and regulatory provisions. But the dissent would

have reversed the rest of the award because the dissent agreed with GMM that the

Secretary’s investigation into matters outside the complaint exceeded the Secretary’s

authority under § 1182(n)(2)(A). The dissent first disputed the suggestions in the

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ARB decision that(1) Arat’s complaint alleged INA violationsinvolving other GMM

employees, and (2) the Secretary’s investigation into other possible violations was

based on information Arat provided. The dissent found Arat’s allegations, when

taken in context, were clearly exclusive to her. In light of what the dissent saw as

Arat’s focus on herself, the dissent concluded the Secretary had no authority under

§ 1182(n)(2)(A) to expand the aggrieved-party investigation to include all of GMM’s

H-1B employees because the Secretary “independently obtained” the information

about other potential violations “during the course of its investigation into Arat’s

complaint.” 

In contrast to the broad investigatory powers the ARB authorized under the

aggrieved-party provisions, the dissent determined the INA required that if the

Secretary received credible information of other potential violations in the course of

an existing investigation, the Secretary should expand the inquiry by initiating a

credible-information/reliable-source investigation under § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii) and

20 C.F.R. § 655.807. Because the Secretary did not comply with the requirements in

those provisions when investigating GMM for violations toward employees other

than Arat, the dissent reasoned any award based on the results of this expanded

investigation exceeded the Secretary’s authority. 

GMM appealed the ARB’s decision to the district court pursuant to its right of

review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. § 702. On

cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court upheld the award based on

what it viewed as the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of § 1182(n)(2)(A). 

Noting GMM did not dispute the violations, the district court agreed with the ARB

that Arat’s complaint sufficiently alleged INA violations as to other GMM H-1B

employees during the relevant time period and the Secretary’s investigation was

within the authority granted by § 1182(n)(2)(A). The district court also affirmed the

award of interest. GMM appeals.

II. DISCUSSION 

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A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s determination that the ARB’s order did

not violate the APA. See McClung v. Paul, 788 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 2015). We

also “review de novo a district court’s findings and conclusions regarding the

correctness of an agency’s statutory interpretations.” Harmon Indus., Inc. v.

Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1999). We must “decide all relevant questions

of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning

or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

Section 706 further provides, in part, that we shall

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions

found to be–

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or

immunity;

(C) in excess ofstatutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or

short of statutory right; 

(D) without observance of procedure required by law; [or] 

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence.

B. Limited Scope of an Initial Aggrieved-Party Complaint

Investigation

This appeal requires us to consider the proper scope of the Secretary’s initial

investigation in response to an aggrieved-party complaint under § 1182(n)(2)(A). 

“We begin with the statute’s language.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125,

127 (1998). “And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, [we] end[]

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there as well.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999); accord

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“If

the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as

the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 

“[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words ‘“in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”’” King v.

Burwell, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). 

By its terms, § 1182(n)(2)(A) requires the Secretary to 

establish a process for the receipt, investigation, and disposition of

complaints respecting [an employer’s] failure to meet a condition

specified in an [LCA] or [an employer’s] misrepresentation of material

facts in such an application. . . . No investigation or hearing shall be

conducted on a complaint concerning such a failure ormisrepresentation

unless the complaint was filed not later than 12 months after the date of

the failure or misrepresentation, respectively. The Secretary shall

conduct an investigation under this paragraph if there is reasonable

cause to believe that such a failure or misrepresentation has occurred.

The Secretary has taken an extremely broad view of his authority under

§ 1182(n)(2)(A).

Taking the twelve-month time limitation first, we note that in urging the ARB

to affirm the damage award for discrete violations that occurred before the twelvemonth period specified in § 1182(n)(2)(A), the Secretary argued the statutory and

regulatory requirements were met as long as just one claim fell within the twelvemonth period. The ARB rejected the Secretary’s expansive interpretation, deciding

“[t]he plain meaning ofthe[] statutory and regulatory provisions dictate [sic] a finding

that any LCA violations which occurred more than a year before Arat filed her

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complaint are not actionable” under § 1182(n)(2)(A). The Secretary does not

challenge that sensible conclusion on appeal.

The Secretary’s view of his substantive authority to investigate an aggrievedparty complaint under § 1182(n)(2)(A) is just as broad. As the Secretary sees it, a

finding of reasonable cause to investigate just one allegation by an aggrieved party

automatically justifies a comprehensive investigation of the employer as a whole and

“authorize[s] DOL to inquire into other LCAs and the employer’s statutory [and

regulatory] compliance with the [H-1B] program in general.” That is, reasonable

cause to investigate any single violation alleged by an aggrieved party “establishes

a reasonable cause to investigate the employer” and every action the employer has

taken with respect to the H-1B program and its H-1B employees. The breadth of the

3

Secretary’s interpretation is evidenced by Simon’s testimony that the Secretary’s

standard practice isto conduct a “full investigation” “[e]very time” the DOL does “an

investigation of any sort under H1-B,” “to determine if any violations exist under 

H1-B” and “to see if there are violations to any employee during” the relevant time

period.

The Secretary’s expansive understanding of his investigatory authority is

inconsistent with the plain language and structure of § 1182(n). The Secretary speaks 

of “reasonable cause to investigate the employer” and the employer’s overall

compliance with the H-1B program, but § 1182(n)(2)(A) does not grant the Secretary

authority to investigate in those terms. Rather than authorize an open-ended

investigation of the employer and its general compliance without regard to the actual

allegations in the aggrieved-party complaint, § 1182(n)(2)(A) expressly ties the

Secretary’s initial investigatory authority to the complaint and those specific

The Secretary asserts in his brief, “The statute makes an aggrieved party 3

complaint a sufficient condition for initiating an investigation, . . . [and] nothing

limits DOL’s ability to inquire into the employer’s statutory compliance in general.” 

We disagree. 

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allegations “respecting [an employer’s alleged] failure to meet a condition specified

in an [LCA] or [an employer’s] misrepresentation of material facts in such an [LCA]”

for which the Secretary finds “reasonable cause to believe” the employer committed

the alleged violation. See also 20 C.F.R. § 655.806(a)(2) (“The [aggrieved-party]

complaintshall set forth sufficient facts for the [Secretary]to determine whether there

is reasonable cause to believe that a violation as described in § 655.805 has been

committed, and therefore that an investigation is warranted.”). Read naturally, the

Secretary’s authority to conduct an initial investigation under § 1182(n)(2)(A) is

based upon the Secretary finding reasonable cause to believe the employer’s specific

misconduct as alleged in the complaint violates the INA. That reasonable-cause 4

finding limits the scope of the initial investigation. 

To illustrate the discord between the statutory text and the Secretary’s broad

interpretation, we must look no further than the alternative avenues of investigation

in § 1182(n)(2). First consider § 1182(n)(2)(F). In contrast to § 1182(n)(2)(A)’s

limited focus on the particular misconduct alleged in the complaint, § 1182(n)(2)(F)

authorizes the Secretary, “on a case-by-case basis, [to] subject an employer [who has

willfully violated the statute] to random investigations for a period of up to 5 years”

and clarifies “[t]he authority of the Secretary under this subparagraph shall not be

construed to be subject to, or limited by, the requirements of subparagraph (A).” 

(Emphasis added). Similarly, § 1182(n)(2)(G)(i) authorizes the Secretary to

investigate “any [H-1B] employer . . . if the Secretary . . . has reasonable cause to

believe that the employer is not in compliance with this subsection,” provided the

We do not question the Secretary’s determination that an aggrieved party can 4

raise allegations on behalf of others, either individually or by class, but that

conclusion does not alter the proper scope of the Secretary’s initial aggrieved-party

complaint investigation, which still depends on the allegations in the complaint and

the Secretary’s reasonable-cause determination whether “such a failure or

misrepresentation has occurred.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A). 

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Secretary “personally certif[ies] that reasonable cause exists and . . . approve[s]

commencement of the investigation.” (Emphasis added). 

Had Congress intended to authorize (1) a comprehensive investigation of the

employer in § 1182(n)(2)(A) based on a single allegation in an aggrieved-party

complaint like it did in § 1182(n)(2)(F) based on past violations, or (2) a general

compliance review of the employer like it did in § 1182(n)(2)(G)(i), “Congress could

easily have said so.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 248 (2010). It did not. 

Indeed, the Secretary’s current standard practice has the practical effect of converting

every aggrieved-party complaint into a comprehensive compliance reviewwithoutthe

proceduralsafeguards of § 1182(n)(2)(G)(i). Neither the plain language ofthe statute

nor reason permits that practice.

Ignoring what Congress has actually said, the Secretary proposes “[t]he statute

is silent on the scope of [the Secretary]’s authority to investigate aggrieved party

complaints,” leaving “a gap for the agency to fill.” See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843

(“[I]f the statute issilent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question

for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction

of the statute.”). But § 1182(n)(2)(A) is not silent on the scope of the Secretary’s

investigation. While the statute does empower the Secretary to “establish a process

for the receipt, investigation, and disposition of [aggrieved-party] complaints,” the

statute does not grant the Secretary unlimited discretion to investigate such

complaints and authorize the comprehensive initial investigation of the employer and

its general compliance that the Secretary currently conducts in every case regardless

of the allegations in the complaint. Id. Put simply, § 1182(n)(2)(A) authorizes the

Secretary to investigate aggrieved-party complaints, yettheSecretary claims authority

to investigate far more. The Secretary’s initial authority to investigate an aggrievedparty complaint is unambiguously limited by the plain meaning of § 1182(n)(2)(A)

to those timely allegations in the complaint for which the Secretary has found

reasonable cause to investigate. 

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We recognize additional violations may come to light during a lawfully

initiated and properly limited aggrieved-party complaint investigation, and the

Secretary may be right that it could become necessary to modify or expand such an

investigation as it develops—presumably based on reasonable cause. See id.

§ 1182(n)(2) (requiring reasonable cause to investigate in the absence of prior willful

violations). But we need not address those issues here because that is not what

happened in this case. The Secretary’s comprehensive initial investigation of GMM

pursuant to the Secretary’s standard practice exceeded his statutory authority fromthe

outset. Simon testified the only allegation in Arat’s aggrieved-party complaint for

which she found reasonable cause to investigate was the charge that GMM may have

required Arat to pay an improper penalty for early termination. Based on that single

allegation and despite her very narrow reasonable cause determination,

Simon—asserting the expansive investigatory authority under § 1182(n)(2)(A) that

the Secretary has claimed throughout this case—launched a comprehensive review

of GMM, its general H-1B compliance, and all of its H-1B employees. Section

1182(n)(2)(A) did not authorize such a sweeping investigation. 

We also are not persuaded by the Secretary’s plea that enforcing the plain

textual limitation on the Secretary’s initial aggrieved-party complaint investigation

will somehow force the Secretary to “ignore” “violations in addition to those alleged

by the aggrieved party” that the Secretary discovers “through an inspection of the

employer’s documents.” Although we offer no opinion on the Secretary’s authority

to investigate potential violations discovered in the course of a properly limited

aggrieved-party complaint investigation and, to borrow the ARB’s language, do not

pretend to “dictate the exact contours of” an aggrieved-party investigation, we are

satisfied our decision does not require the Secretary to ignore other potential

violations it discovers in the course of a lawful investigation.

Indeed, § 1182(n) and the supporting regulations authorize several alternative

avenues of investigation. First, information from additional aggrieved parties could

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provide the basis for additional complaints and investigations. Section 1182(n)(2)(B)

contemplates “similar [aggrieved-party] complaints respecting the same” employer

and permits the Secretary to consolidate the hearings for those claims. Next, as noted

above, § 1182(n)(2)(G)(i) permits the Secretary to initiate a compliance review of the

type the Secretary conducted here, provided the Secretary “personally certif[ies] that

reasonable cause exists” and approvesthe investigation. Finally, as examined by the

ARB dissent, § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.807 authorize the Secretary to

investigate certain types of alleged violations when the Secretary receives credible

information about such violations from a reliable source, which could include

information discovered in the course of a lawful DOL investigation. 

Under § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii), the Secretary has authority to investigate if he

receives specific credible information from a source who is likely to

have knowledge of an employer’s practices or employment conditions,

or an employer’s compliance with the employer’s [LCA], and whose

identity is known to the Secretary of Labor, and such information

provides reasonable cause to believe that the employer has committed

a willful failure to meet a condition of paragraph (1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C),

(1)(E), (1)(F), or (1)(G)(i)(I), has engaged in a pattern or practice of

failures to meet such a condition, or has committed a substantial failure

to meet such a condition that affects multiple employees. 

Clause (iv) provides

Any investigation initiated or approved by the Secretary of Labor under

clause (ii) shall be based on information that satisfies the requirements

of such clause and that

(I) originates from a source other than an officer or employee of

the Department of Labor; or

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(II) waslawfully obtained by the Secretary of Labor in the course

of lawfully conducting another Department of Labor investigation

under this chapter o[r] any other Act.

Id. § 1182(n)(2)(G)(iv) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

The Secretary asserts § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii) does not apply to an aggrieved-party

complaint investigation, maintaining there is “no reason to read the statute to

bifurcate th[e] investigation process simply because [the Secretary] come[s] across

additional information during the course of a lawfully conducted [and] lawfully

initiated investigation.” But the Secretary fails to explain why information obtained

during an aggrieved-party complaint investigation is necessarily excluded from

§ 1182(n)(2)(G)(iv)(II) despite the statutory language there expressly stating

information obtained during another DOL investigation can constitute credible

information from a reliable source. That § 1182(n)(2)(G)(iv)(II) also might apply in

other circumstances does not preclude its application when credible information

about additional violations is obtained during an aggrieved-party complaint

investigation. 

GMM, on the other hand, asserts “§ 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii)-(iv) and the regulations

applicable to [a] credible information-reliable source investigation” stand at the ready

to provide “the very authority needed” to expand an ongoing aggrieved-party

complaint investigation and permit the Secretary to consider any additional

“information as to other possible violations or other employees” the Secretary might

uncover in the course of such an investigation. According to GMM, by enacting

§ 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii)-(iv), “Congress set forth a clear process applicable when an

investigation reveals information beyond the original investigation’s scope.” 

GMM may be right to a point, but closer examination of the statute reveals

§ 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii) would not necessarily cover all of the potential H-1B violations

the Secretary might discover during an aggrieved-party complaint investigation. 

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Section 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii) applies to an employer’s (1) willful failuresto meet certain

conditions; (2) “pattern or practice of failures to meet such a condition”; and

(3) “substantial failure to meet such a condition that affects multiple employees.” 

This subsection—which may apply to certain violations, but not others—is not the

clear and all-inclusive path of expansion GMM proposes. 

At any rate, we need not determine the applicability of § 1182(n)(2)(G)(ii), if

any, to this case, nor examine the contours of the Secretary’s extensive investigation

into GMM’s general H-1B compliance and all its H-1B employees. We need only

compare the sweeping scope of the Secretary’s initial aggrieved-party complaint

investigation with the narrow finding of reasonable cause to investigate just one

personal allegation in Arat’s complaint to see the Secretary exceeded his statutory

authority in this case from the beginning. See id. § 1182(n)(2)(A); cf. United States

v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“Of course a governmental

investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so

unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry asto exceed the investigatory power.”). 

Because the ARB’s findings of violations and the resulting awards were based

entirely on the Secretary’s unauthorized investigation of matters other than the

allegation GMM penalized Arat for quitting before her contract ran out, the awards

cannot stand. 

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

______________________________

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Appellate Case: 14-3717 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Entry ID: 4345939