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Parties Involved:
Carolyn Barnes
Appellant
Et Al
Appellee
Travis County
Appellee
Travis County Jail
Appellee
Travis County Pretrial Services
Appellee
Travis County Sheriff's Department
Appellee
Dennis Tumlinson
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50350

Summary Calendar

CAROLYN BARNES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

DENNIS TUMLINSON; TRAVIS COUNTY; TRAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S 

DEPARTMENT; TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL; TRAVIS COUNTY PRETRIAL 

SERVICES; ET AL,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:12-CV-28

Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carolyn Barnes appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failing to 

comply with a court order. Barnes filed hundreds of pages of pleadings, which 

the magistrate judge and district court found to be difficult to parse, and so she 

was ordered to file a single amended complaint not to exceed 30 pages that 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 17, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-50350

named all defendants, identified all claims, and complied with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8. Barnes, though given multiple opportunities to comply with 

the orders, extensions of time, and warnings that if she did not comply her case 

would be dismissed, did not file an amended complaint, and so the district court 

dismissed the case with prejudice.

A district court may dismiss an action where the plaintiff fails to comply 

with a court order. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 

1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988). Where, as here, a district court’s dismissal is with 

prejudice, we will uphold it only “when there is clear record of delay or 

contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not 

serve the best interests of justice.” Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 404 

(5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 

Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 766 (5th Cir. 2014). 

First, Barnes takes issue with the order that she limit her complaint to 

30 pages, contending the page limit was arbitrary and not required by Rule 8,

it would have been impossible to include all claims and defendants in a 

pleading of that length, and, if her pleadings were too voluminous, the court 

should have rejected them immediately when it received them. Rule 8(a) 

requires that a complaint contain, among other things, a “short and plain 

statement of the claim,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and the district court has “great 

leeway in determining whether a party has complied with” this rule, Gordon 

v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 745 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing cases where courts found 

that voluminous pleadings ran afoul of the requirement that the plaintiff 

provide a short and plain statement of the claim). In light of Barnes’s conduct 

in continually adding claims and defendants and the resulting volume of 

pleadings and related submissions received by the district court, the orders 

requesting that Barnes replead her case, comply with Rule 8, and limit her 

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pleadings to 30 pages were within the court’s discretion. See Cesarani v. 

Graham, Nos. 92-8588 & 93-8149, 1994 WL 261232, 1-2 (5th Cir. June 9, 1994) 

(explaining that the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint was 

not an abuse of discretion where the plaintiff failed to comply with the district 

court’s order that his amended complaint not exceed 20 pages in length and 

comply with Rule 8(a)); see also Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “[t]he federal courts are vested with the 

inherent power to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 

expeditious disposition of cases” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 

To the extent that Barnes argues that she was entitled to discovery 

before being required to enumerate all of her claims, she is mistaken. 

Discovery is not a license for the plaintiff to “go fishing,” Marshall v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), and is limited to information that “is relevant to any party’s 

claim or defense,” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Thus, it was incumbent on Barnes 

to lay out her claims before seeking discovery germane to them. 

Barnes also contends that though she did not comply with the court’s 

orders, her conduct was excusable because the magistrate judge would not 

provide her a sample pleading, the magistrate judge did not clarify the order 

that she file an amended complaint, and the district court refused her request 

for copies of her pleadings. She has not sufficiently explained, however, and it 

is not apparent, how any of these issues prevented her from submitting an 

amended complaint. She further alleges that, while in prison, she lacked 

access to supplies and materials necessary to file an amended complaint. This 

assertion rings hollow, though, because, during the same time period, she was 

nonetheless able to file motions for a new trial and extensions of time, and it 

is not evident why she could not also have filed an amended complaint as well.

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Barnes’s decision not to comply with the district’s court’s orders shows a 

clear record of purposeful, contumacious conduct and amounts to the “the 

stubborn resistance to authority” justifying a dismissal with prejudice. Millan

v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see Coleman, 745 F.3d at 766 & n.9. Moreover, 

the lesser sanctions imposed by the district court—in the form of warnings that 

Barnes’s failure to comply with its orders would lead to dismissal—did nothing 

to change her behavior, and so the continued imposition of additional lesser 

sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice. See Bryson, 553 F.3d at 

404; see also Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1982) 

(explaining that explicit warnings are among the lesser sanctions that courts 

should consider before dismissing a case with prejudice under Rule 41(b)).

Finally, Barnes complains that the district court denied her motion to 

appoint counsel. Her case, however, does not present the exceptional 

circumstances required for the court to appoint counsel, and the court did not 

abuse its discretion in declining to do so. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 

209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Especially in light of the fact that at one time, Barnes 

was a licensed attorney, she has not shown why she was unable to compose a 

short and plain statement of her case without the assistance of appointed 

counsel. Barnes’s remaining arguments on appeal take issue with various 

actions on the part of the magistrate judge that have no bearing on the orders 

requiring her to submit an amended complaint, and so we do not address them. 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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