Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00888/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00888-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Yolanda Yvette Cobb
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA YVETTE COBB,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-0888-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 

COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Yolanda Cobb (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant to Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

1

 The matter is currently before the Court 

on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara 

A. McAuliffe. The Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based upon proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court affirms the agency’s determination to deny benefits. 

 

1 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to 

Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted for Michael J. Astrue as 

the defendant in this suit.

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff filed her current application for SSI, alleging disability 

beginning July 1, 2009. AR 165.2 Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration. AR 96-100. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”). ALJ John Cusker held a hearing on September 20, 2011, and issued an order 

denying benefits on January 19, 2012. AR 16-33. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, 

which the Appeals Council denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

AR 1-3. This appeal followed.

Hearing Testimony

The ALJ held a hearing on September 20, 2011 in Fresno, California. AR 40-74. Plaintiff 

appeared and testified with her attorney Melissa Proudian. AR 40. Impartial Vocational Expert 

(“VE”) Judith Najarian also testified. AR 40. 

Plaintiff was 45-years old at the time of the hearing; she is not married and she lives with 

her sister and her sister’s three children. AR 44, 50. Plaintiff does not have a driver’s license and 

frequently takes the city bus for transportation. AR 45. Plaintiff testified that she can read and 

write, but she dropped out of high school in the 11th grade. AR 45. Plaintiff’s last job was as a 

group home counselor in 2008. AR 45. She also worked as a drug counselor at Valley State Prison 

around 2001 or 2002. AR 46.

With respect to her daily activities, Plaintiff goes to church once every three months. AR 

52. On a good day, Plaintiff will do activities with her sister, but will not leave the house on a bad 

day. AR 52. Plaintiff testified that she can occasionally take care of her own personal needs, but 

sometimes has trouble maintaining her balance in the shower. AR 51. Plaintiff does not cook 

unless people are around to avoid falling. AR 51. Plaintiff however vacuums and sweeps and 

occasionally goes to the grocery store. AR 51. Plaintiff’s hobbies include fishing and watching 

television for two to three hours a day. AR 52. 

When asked about her history of drug and alcohol abuse, Plaintiff testified that she 

previously abused drugs “really bad” in 2009. AR 52. Plaintiff claims that she used to drink 

 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 

number.

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

alcohol, smoke marijuana, and use cocaine. AR 53. Plaintiff has not attended drug rehabilitation, 

but she testified that she last used these drugs in 2009. AR 52. Plaintiff still occasionally drinks 

alcohol “every once in a while.” AR 53.

In regards to her alleged disability, Plaintiff alleged that she cannot work due to severe 

back pain, irritable bowel syndrome, major depression, and anxiety. Plaintiff was seeing a pain 

specialist for her undiagnosed back pain, but due to complications she is in the process of finding 

another pain doctor. AR 53. Plaintiff testified that she has taken medication for mental problems, 

but that the medication does not work. AR 54. Plaintiff testified that her past drug use was because 

narcotics helped her calm her nerves because she was “scared all the time.” AR 55-56. She was 

afraid of the voices would tell her to hurt herself and hurt other people. AR 56. The substances 

made it easier for Plaintiff to deal with the voices. AR 57. Plaintiff further stated that her mental 

problems were triggered through a series of family deaths in 2007. AR 57. Plaintiff’s mental 

problems cause difficulty concentrating and she spends most of her day lying down. AR 60. She 

has suicidal thoughts once or twice a month and reported a recent hospitalization for a suicide

attempt. AR 62-63. Plaintiff takes medications to help with her symptoms, but Plaintiff stated that 

her medication makes her sleepy, forgetful, dizzy, and causes headaches. AR 48. 

With respect to plaintiff’s physical impairments, she testified that she has trouble sitting 

for longer than thirty-minutes at a time. AR 64. Plaintiff also has trouble sleeping because the 

pain in her nerves sometimes jerk her awake at nights. AR 65. Plaintiff testified she can stand for 

fifteen to twenty minutes and she can lift a half-gallon of milk. AR 66. 

Thereafter, the ALJ elicited testimony of vocational expert Judith Najarian. AR 68. The 

vocational expert testified that Plaintiff had past relevant work in the medium, semi-skilled jobs of 

a houseparent, psychiatric attendant, and as a social service aide. AR 69-70. The ALJ asked the 

vocational expert what jobs a hypothetical individual could perform with Plaintiff’s RFC and the 

VE concluded that person could perform work as a cafeteria attendant, mail clerk, and office 

helper. AR 71.

Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 256-561. The medical evidence 

will be referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision.

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 16-32. More particularly, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since September 

24, 2009. AR 19. Further, the ALJ identified degenerative disc disease, chronic low back pain, 

asthma, major depressive disorder, and polysubstance dependence as severe impairments. AR 19. 

Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the severity of the Plaintiff’s impairment did not meet or 

exceed any of the listed impairments. AR 19.

Based on his review of the entire record, the ALJ determined based on all of Plaintiff’s 

impairments, including the substance use disorder, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

(RFC) to lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit, stand, and/or walk 

for 6 hours in an 8-hour day; and push and/or pull on an unlimited basis, other than as shown for 

lift and/or carry. Plaintiff can occasionally stoop and crouch; frequently climb ramps, stairs, 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds and frequently balance, kneel and crawl. AR 20. Plaintiff has no 

manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. She has the mental residual 

functional capacity to understand, remember and follow 1-2 step tasks; however she cannot 

maintain attention; and her persistence is poor unless supervised. She can interact with 

supervisors, co-workers and the public over brief periods, but she cannot withstand routine 

workday stress nor adapt to change without support. AR 20. 

 The ALJ found that with the above RFC, Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant 

work as a houseparent, psychiatric aide, nor drug counselor. AR 26. Having found that that 

Plaintiff did not have the RFC to return to her previous work, whether or not she stopped her 

substance abuse, the ALJ next considered whether Plaintiff could perform other jobs in the 

national economy. With regard to all of Plaintiff’s impairments, “including the substance abuse 

disorder,” the ALJ concluded that “there are no jobs that exist in significant number in the national 

economy that Plaintiff can perform.” If Plaintiff stopped the substance abuse, Plaintiff would still 

be unable to return to her past work, but the ALJ determined that other jobs existed in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. AR 32. The ALJ therefore found 

that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Id.

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, 

this Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. 

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. 

The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the Commission’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 

(9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commission must apply the 

proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court 

must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Secretary 

applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage 

in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental 

impairment of such severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but 

cannot, considering his or her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 

F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ erred in finding that she would not be 

disabled absent her drug and alcohol abuse. (Doc. 16 at 12). 

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

DISCUSSION

3

1. THE ALJ PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT SUBSTANCE ABUSE WAS A 

CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MATERIAL TO THE DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination that her substance use disorder is a 

contributing factor material to the determination of disability. (Doc. 16 at 14). Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ failed to credit the consultative examiner’s opinion that the “likelihood of Plaintiff’s 

durability problems was good.” According to Plaintiff, in essence, Dr. Gaab opined that 

Plaintiff’s disability would continue despite her drug and alcohol abuse. AR 552. Based on this 

interpretation of Dr. Gaab’s opinion, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff would 

not be disabled if she stopped the substance use is not based on substantial evidence and 

constitutes legal error.

In determining whether a claimant’s drug addiction is a contributing factor material to the 

determination of a disability, the “key factor” an ALJ must examine is whether the claimant would 

still be disabled if she stopped using illegal drugs. 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(1). In making this 

determination, an ALJ must evaluate which of the claimant’s limitations would remain if she 

stopped using illegal drugs, and whether any or all of those remaining limitations would be 

disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(2). If the ALJ determines that the claimant’s remaining 

limitations would not be disabling, the ALJ “will find that [the claimant’s] drug addiction ... is a 

contributing factor material to the determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(2)(i). The 

burden of proving that drug addiction was not a contributing factor material to the disability 

determination falls on the claimant, Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2007), but “the 

ALJ retains the responsibility of developing a full and fair record in the non-adversarial 

administrative proceeding.” Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 2003) 

(citation omitted).

In certain cases, a claimant’s substance use and impairment may be closely related. See, 

e.g., Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 623 (10th Cir. 2006) (claimant’s mental illness may 

account for that claimant’s substance abuse); Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 

 

3 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific argument 

or brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

2006) (claimant’s mental illness can precipitate substance abuse as a means by which the claimant 

tries to self-medicate). Notably, the mere fact that substance abuse aggravates rather than 

medicates mental illness does not establish that the mental illness itself is not disabling. See 

Kangail, 454 F.3d at 629. Due to the difficulty inherent in separating the effect of mental illness 

on a claimant’s functioning from the effect of substance use on that same claimant’s functioning, 

courts have held that if the effect of a claimant’s mental illness cannot be separated from the 

effects of substance abuse, the substance abuse is not a contributing factor material to the 

disability determination. See, e.g., Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In other 

words, on the materiality of his marijuana use, a tie would go to [claimant].”); Salazar, 468 F.3d at 

622-24. If, however, the claimant’s physician concludes that the claimant’s mental illness is 

secondary to the primary problem of substance abuse, the record supports a finding that the 

claimant is not disabled. See, e.g., Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2005) (“After 

considering all of the evidence under the substantial evidence standard, we are satisfied that the 

ALJ [ ] untangled [claimant’s] history of alcoholism and mental illness with sufficient clarity and 

detail to support the finding that she is not disabled apart from her alcoholism.”). The Ninth 

Circuit has stressed that courts must not “fail[] to distinguish between substance abuse 

contributing to the disability and the disability remaining after the claimant stopped using drugs or 

alcohol.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). That is, “[j]ust because 

substance abuse contributes to a disability does not mean that when the substance abuse ends, the 

disability will too.” Id.

Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s disability would not 

continue if she stopped her substance abuse making Plaintiff’s substance abuse a contributing 

factor material to the determination of disability. The ALJ found as follows:

If the claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would have the residual 

functional capacity to lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently; sit, stand, and/or walk with normal breaks for about 6 hours in an 8-

hour workday; and push and pull without limitations. The claimant could 

frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She could frequent 

balance, kneel, and crawl, and occasionally stoop and crouch. She would have no 

manipulative, visual, or environmental limitations. The claimant would have 

sufficient ability to understand and remember simple instructions; complete simple 

instructions; follow directions without additional assistance; and maintain 

concentration, persistence, and pace for such tasks as needed to complete a full 

workday or workweek. She would have an adequate ability to maintain appropriate 

behaviors with others; would be capable of accepting simple instructions and 

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

responding appropriately to feedback from supervisors; and would have sufficient 

ability to be aware of ordinary hazards, make simple decisions, utilize 

transportation, and cope with the demands of a routine work like environment. 

In making this finding the ALJ relied on the opinion of consultative examiner Maria Gaab, 

M.D. Dr. Gaab examined Plaintiff on November 4, 2011. Dr. Gaab reported that Plaintiff was 

independent for all activities of daily living, but noted that Plaintiff did not drive. Dr. Gaab 

observed that Plaintiff last worked in 2005, and had been fired from her earlier jobs because she 

feel asleep on the job, and because of medication abuse. Plaintiff reported several suicide attempts 

from combined drug and alcohol abuse. Plaintiff also had a recent history of alcohol and 

psychoactive drug use. AR 19. On examination, Dr. Gaab observed that Plaintiff was lethargic at 

times, and fell asleep performing one task. Her attention and concentration were generally poor 

on examination. She admitted regular use of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol. Test results showed 

problems with attention and memory. Dr. Gaab opined that medication might have caused 

cognitive slowing and contributed to problems with attention and memory. 

The ALJ summarized Dr. Gaab’s opinion as follows: 

Dr. Gaab noted the claimant provided an extensive list of psychotropic 

medications, but was unable to give dosage amounts or the names of any 

prescribing physicians, stating she took the medications not as prescribed, but 

rather as she needed them. She admitted using cocaine the prior month, and 

admitted she had lost jobs because of substance abuse issues. She reported 

attempting suicide four times with alcohol and drugs and having two drug related 

seizures. She admitted her desired was drugs and alcohol. She reported smoking 

marijuana once a month, drinking alcohol five times a week, and using prescription 

medications daily. She reported that she heard” spirits” telling her to harm herself. 

AR 24 

The ALJ gave Dr. Gaab’s opinion great weight, because her findings and opinions are 

consistent with other evidence of ongoing drug abuse and her objective findings. AR 24. After 

reviewing the entirety of the medical opinions, the ALJ “rel[ied] more heavily on the findings and 

opinions of Dr. Gaab as she was in a better position (due to recency and first-hand ability to observe 

and test) to comment on the claimant’s drug abuse than the State agency doctors and consultants. AR 

25. 

While Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Gaab’s statement that the 

“likelihood of durability problems is good,” the ALJ did not simply pick and choose the 

statements in Dr. Gaab’s opinion that supported a finding of non-disability. First, the ALJ relied 

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

on Dr. Gaab’s numerous findings that indicated that Plaintiff’s drug use affected her cognitive 

ability. The opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a 

nonexamining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir.1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 

753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.1984). The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Gaab’s opinion because she 

thoroughly examined Plaintiff. The ALJ noted “that Dr. Gaab’s report implies that the claimant’s 

concentration and attention would improve but for the claimants improper use of medication 

(including illegal drugs).” AR 28. Based on Dr. Gaab’s opinion and the other evidence in the 

record, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s limitations were in large part a result of her drug/alcohol 

abuse and the ALJ factored that finding into his RFC finding. It is the responsibility of the ALJ, 

not a claimant’s physician, to determine the RFC. Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

Further the ALJ’s opinion that Plaintiff would not be disabled absent her drug abuse is 

supported by the record. The ALJ noted that the medical evidence contains ample evidence of 

illegal drug abuse as follows. AR 25. 

There are positive drug screens showing that the claimant was taking nonprescription medication; and that there were drugs in her system inconsistent with 

any of her corresponding prescriptions. She admitted that cocaine was her drug of 

choice, that she used it on a weekly basis, and she did not want to quit using drugs. 

The claimant tried to sneak medications while involuntarily hospitalized, and 

hospital security had to confiscate her purse and medications. The claimant’s 

specific requests for Fentanyl patches and Norco from her doctors at Mountain 

Family Health Care suggest prescription drug seeking, particularly since they came 

at a time after Dr. Grandhe refused such medications to the claimant. The claimant 

admitted to consultative examiner Dr. Gaab that she used cocaine, smoking 

marijuana once a month, drank alcohol five times a week, and used prescription 

medications daily. Dr. Gaab further opined the claimant used her prescription 

medications for non-prescriptions reasons. The claimant’s sister accused the 

claimant of taking her phone and letting a drug dealer use it. While the latter event

occurred pre alleged onset date of disability, it is consistent with the subsequent 

records and supports a pattern of drug use.

AR 25. 

Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff lacked credibility. The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s history of 

drug seeking behavior and the multiple notations of malingering throughout the record. AR 32. 

The ALJ specifically mentioned that “claimant’s allegations lack credibility because of 

inconsistent statements, and evidence suggesting malingering and dishonest acts. For example, she 

testified she last used drugs in 2009, but in November 2011, the claimant reported to Dr. Gaab that 

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

she last used street drugs in October 2011(“one $10 rock and one $20 rock of cocaine”). Notably, 

Plaintiff makes no challenge to the credibility determination here.

When considering the record as a whole, and given the extensive evidence in the record 

regarding Plaintiff’s history of drug and alcohol abuse, the Court finds that there was substantial 

evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that 

substance abuse is not a contributing factor material to her disability, in that she would remain 

disabled if the substance abuse ceased. Parra, 481 F.3d at 748. In fact, Plaintiff concedes in her 

brief that “most of her jobs ended due to substance abuse.” (Doc. 16 at 13). The ALJ reviewed all 

of the medical evidence in detail and correctly found that substance abuse was a contributing 

factor material to the determination of disability, and therefore Plaintiff is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn 

W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff Yolanda Cobb.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00888-BAM Document 20 Filed 02/03/15 Page 10 of 10