Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00833/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00833-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cardinal Health Inc
Defendant
Jasminda Lowe
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JASMINDA LOWE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) Civil Action Number

CARDINAL HEALTH INC., ) 2:13-CV-00833-AKK

 )

 Defendant. )

)

 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jasminda Lowe pursues this claim against Cardinal Health Inc. for 

sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and under Alabama law for

invasion of privacy and negligent and/or wanton training, supervision, 

and/or retention. Doc. 1 at 1. Lowe contends that Cardinal Health discharged 

her because she rebuffed the alleged sexual advances of her supervisor, 

Ralph Ruggs, and that Ruggs had direct input into the majority of the 

disciplinary actions that led to her discharge. Id. at 7. Cardinal Health moves 

for summary judgment on all of Lowe’s claims, doc. 28, and the motion is

fully briefed and ripe for review, docs. 28, 34, and 36. Based on a review of 

the evidence and the law, the court finds that genuine material factual 

FILED

 2014 Oct-14 PM 03:22

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-00833-AKK Document 49 Filed 10/14/14 Page 1 of 30
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disputes exist regarding whether the alleged sexual harassment resulted in a 

tangible job detriment and whether a causal link exists between Lowe’s

protected activity and her discharge that precludes summary judgment on 

her sexual harassment and retaliation claims. However, summary judgment

is due on Lowe’s invasion of privacy and negligent and/or wanton 

supervision, training, and/or retention claims because Ruggs’s alleged 

behavior does not entitle Lowe to recovery and because Lowe has not

established that Cardinal Health failed to exercise due and proper diligence 

in response to Lowe’s reports of sexual harassment. For these reasons, 

Cardinal Health’s motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

1

I. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

 1 Cardinal Health also argues that the court should dismiss Lowe’s complaint, 

because Lowe failed to amend the defendant’s name from “Cardinal Health, Inc.” to 

“Cardinal Health 200, LLC” after notification that she improperly named the defendant. 

Doc. 28 at 27. This issue is moot in light of Lowe’s unopposed motion to correct 

misnomer of defendant, doc. 48.

Separately, Lowe also moves for sanctions against Cardinal Health for its alleged 

spoliation of evidence. Doc. 37 at 5–6. Spoliation is the “destruction of evidence or the 

significant and meaningful alteration of a document or instrument.” Green Leaf Nursery 

v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation 

marks omitted). Lowe argues that Cardinal Health meaningfully altered and then 

destroyed surveillance video and destroyed quality and productivity records. Doc. 37 at 

2–4. The court will carry this issue with the case to give the parties an opportunity to 

argue their respective positions.

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to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” “Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate 

time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (alteration in original). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish 

that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). 

The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes 

v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 255 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s 

favor). Any factual disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor 

when sufficient competent evidence supports that party’s version of the 

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disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (a court is not required to resolve disputes in the non-moving 

party’s favor when that party’s version of events is supported by insufficient 

evidence). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations 

are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. 

England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald 

Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s 

position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury 

could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 

(11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252)).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following facts reflect an assessment of the record in the light 

most favorable to Lowe. On May 23, 2011, Lowe began work at Cardinal 

Health as a warehouse associate. Doc. 1 at 3. In 2012, Ralph Ruggs became 

Lowe’s direct supervisor. Id; doc. 28-1 at 9. As a warehouse associate, 

Lowe’s responsibilities included taking and collecting, or “pulling,” 

products from the shelves to organize customer orders. Id. at 8, 18. 

The disciplinary steps that ultimately culminated in Lowe’s discharge 

began on March 6, 2012, when Ruggs disciplined Lowe by placing her on 

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Coach and Counsel for “continued high error volume” and “continuous 

consumer complaints.” Id. at 53. The form Ruggs prepared informed Lowe 

that “[f]ailure to improve upon these errors will result in discipline through 

the proper step progression, and may result in further corrective action 

including termination.” Id. Coach and Counsel is the first step of Cardinal 

Health’s disciplinary policy. The other three steps are: Step Two— Written 

Warning; Step Three— Final Warning; and Step Four— Termination. Id. at 

52. Although it is intended as a progressive discipline policy, Cardinal 

Health may “bypass steps within the corrective action process depending on 

the seriousness of the nature of the offense.” Id. at 53.

On May 15, 2012, Ruggs called Lowe and another employee into his 

office to discuss productivity rates. Id. at 14. During this meeting, Ruggs 

informed Lowe that she was not meeting the newly implemented 

productivity standards for the month of May,

2 and that she needed to 

improve her productivity rates or Cardinal Health would discharge her. Id. 

 2 Lowe signed the Quality and Productivity Requirements for Inbound/Outbound 

Hourly Associates on March 15, 2012. Doc. 28-1 at 50. The requirements stated that 

employees “must not exceed two errors for items flagged hard to pick/pack,” “errors 

resulting in a high inventory loss will be evaluated on a case by case basis and may be 

subject to corrective action,” and employees should achieve an eighty-five percent 

monthly productivity rate. Id. at 51. Cardinal Health enacted this policy in 2012, and only 

expected associates to achieve a seventy-five percent productivity rate for the months of 

April and May. Doc. 28-3 at 23. 

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This discussion did not result in a write-up and, as a result, Lowe remained 

at step one of the four-step process.

The following day, Lowe contacted Cardinal Health’s Advice and 

Counsel Center (“ACC”)3 and relayed to Martha Cotton that Ruggs 

threatened to discharge her because she had a “slow” rate of productivity. Id. 

at 14. Lowe also informed Cotton that Ruggs had asked her to stay in his 

hotel room during a company meeting, made frequent comments to her such 

as “you look so sexy,” “you look so good,” and “you smell sex,” and that on 

one occasion Ruggs placed his hands on her shoulders when he commented, 

“you look so sexy.” Id. at 10, 15. In addition, Lowe reported that Ruggs was

involved in a romantic relationship with a subordinate, Afiya Burwell, who 

held the same position as Lowe. Id. at 15, 19.

Cardinal Health launched an investigation that consisted of Lori 

LeDuc, a Human Resources employee, Raul Valdez, Manager of Warehouse 

Operations, and Everett Posey, Director of Operations, interviewing Lowe, 

Ruggs, Burwell, and several other employees on May 17, 2012. Doc. 28-1 at 

17–18. In their respective interviews Ruggs and Burwell denied being 

involved in a romantic relationship, and Ruggs denied any inappropriate 

conduct towards Lowe or Burwell. Doc. 28-2 at 14, 27. The focus of Lowe’s

 3 The ACC is an ethics hotline that employees can use to report concerns about a 

violation of the ethics policy. Doc. 28-1 at 14, 48.

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interview turned inevitably to her allegations concerning the alleged 

relationship between Ruggs and Burwell, with Posey and LeDuc asking her 

to disclose any information that she had regarding the alleged relationship. 

Id. at 31. Lowe also submitted a written statement after the interview. Doc. 

28-1 at 57. A week later, Lowe contacted Posey and relayed that Burwell 

had told her that Burwell and Ruggs engaged in sex at work and that Ruggs 

had shown Burwell his penis during a one-on-one performance conversation. 

Id. at 20–21. 

On May 29, 2012, Cardinal Health informed Lowe that it could not 

substantiate her allegations. Id. at 44. Additionally, to make matters worse 

for Lowe, the management team found that Lowe initially had withheld 

information about the alleged relationship between Burwell and Ruggs, by

waiting until a week after her interview to disclose that Ruggs and Burwell 

had sex at work and that Ruggs showed Burwell his penis at work. Id. at 31. 

As a result, on June 6, 2012, Lowe received a Written Warning for “failing 

to be forthcoming and not providing pertinent information in a timely 

manner in an investigation.” Id. at 54. This written warning advanced Lowe 

to Step Two of the disciplinary process. Id.

Apparently, Lowe was not the first employee to report the alleged 

relationship between Ruggs and Burwell. Prior to Lowe, Doug Brown had 

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informed Posey that Ruggs was engaged in a romantic relationship with 

Burwell. Doc. 28-2 at 11. Posey’s investigation failed to substantiate the 

allegations.

4 Id. During the subsequent investigation of Lowe’s allegations, 

Brown came forward with new information about the nature of the romantic 

relationship between Ruggs and Burwell. Doc. 47-10 *SEALED* at 1–3. In

his statement, Brown explained that “[a]t one time, in a conversation with 

Everett Posey, I expressed concerns that something along the Burwell/Ruggs 

situation might be happening without directly stating that it was going on.”

Id. at 3. Brown’s statement also contains information that could substantiate 

his allegations about Burwell and Ruggs’s purported affair, which he 

appears not to have previously disclosed to Posey.5 Id. at 1– 3. However, 

unlike Lowe, Brown received no discipline for providing this additional 

information. See generally doc. 47-13 *SEALED* (Brown’s personnel file).

A week after the written warning, Ruggs informed Lowe that she had 

failed to meet the required productivity rate for the month of May, and 

 4 This investigation was in response to Brown and other employees’ concern that 

Ruggs was showing favoritism toward Burwell regarding workplace benefits. Docs. 28-2 

at 15; 47-14 *SEALED* at 3. 5 Brown alleged that Burwell and Ruggs shared lunch in Ruggs’s office, that 

Ruggs drove Burwell home from work, and that he overheard Burwell making explicit 

remarks in a telephone conversation, and that she may have been talking to Ruggs. Doc. 

47-10 *SEALED* at 2.

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issued her a Final Warning (Step Three) for having a low productivity rate.

6

Doc. 28-1 at 12. Lowe’s productivity rate was 72.7 percent for the month of 

May. Id. at 55. The final warning meant Lowe’s next discipline would result 

in discharge.

The final infraction occurred a few weeks later, when, on July 3, 

2012, Lowe approached Ruggs to inquire about an approved vacation 

request that was omitted from the display board listing approved requests for 

paid time off (“PTO”). Id. at 22. Lowe reminded Ruggs that Cardinal Health 

approved her PTO on May 15, 2012, either told or screamed at Ruggs to “do 

his job,” and began to cry. Id. Ruggs responded “yeah, all the crap you 

brought up . . . I’ll do it for you, go away.” Id. Although Lowe denies that 

she yelled at Ruggs, id., James Stubblefield and Danny Marshall, coworkers

who witnessed the incident, provided written statements at Ruggs’s request 

that stated, respectively, that Lowe “repeatedly raised her voice and 

interrupted [Ruggs],” id. at 59, and that Marshall told Lowe to calm down, 

id. at 58. Ruggs sent an email detailing the incident to Posey on July 5, in 

which he included the Marshall and Stubblefield statements. Doc. 28-2 at

35–36.

 6 Lowe remained under Ruggs’s supervision throughout the process. After she 

reported Ruggs, Lowe testified that LeDuc asked her if she was “scared . . . [to] work 

with [Ruggs].” Doc. 28-1 at 20. According to Lowe, LeDuc offered to place Lowe on a 

different shift, but never followed through on the offer. Id.

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After a review of Ruggs’s reports and the statements Ruggs obtained, 

Posey and Valdez determined that Lowe’s behavior violated Cardinal 

Health’s standards of conduct. Doc. 28-1 at 56. Because Lowe previously

had received three corrective actions, Posey and Valdez determined the next 

disciplinary step to take was discharge. Cardinal Health discharged Lowe 

upon her return from PTO on July 16, 2012. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS

Lowe raises Title VII claims for sexual harassment and retaliation and 

state law tort claims. The court will begin with the sexual harassment claim, 

followed by the retaliation claim, and finally the state law claims.

A. Sexual Harassment

Lowe contends that Ruggs sexually harassed her and took an adverse 

employment action against her after she rebuffed his sexual advances. Doc. 

34 at 24–30. To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title 

VII a plaintiff must show that:

(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she has been subjected to 

unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her 

sex; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily 

abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the 

employer liable exists. 

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Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2004); 

Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad Serv., 234 F.3d 501, 508 n. 7 (11th 

Cir. 2000)). The Eleventh Circuit has referred to these elements as the 

“Mendoza factors.” See, e.g., Johnson, 234 F.3d at 508 n. 7. Cardinal Health 

contends that Lowe fails to meet her burden with regards to the fourth and 

fifth Mendoza factors. Doc. 28 at 11–19. Cardinal Health’s argument is ill–

founded, because it is premised on an overly narrow characterization of 

Lowe’s sexual harassment claim, i.e. that Lowe is only pursuing a hostile 

work environment theory of liability.

There are two instances in which sexual harassment amounts to a Title 

VII violation. The first is if the “employee’s refusal to submit to a 

supervisor’s sexual demands results in a tangible employment action being 

taken against her.” Hulsey, 367 F.3d at 1245. A tangible employment action 

is “‘a significant hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 

change in benefits.’” Id. at 1245 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 

524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). “An employer is liable under Title VII if it (even 

unknowingly) permits a supervisor to take a tangible employment action 

against an employee because she refused to give in to his sexual overtures.” 

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Id. Secondly, sexual harassment can constitute a Title VII violation “if it is 

sufficiently severe and pervasive to effectively result in a change . . . in the 

terms and conditions of employment, even though the employee is not 

discharged, demoted, or reassigned.” Id. (citing Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 

at 754). Lowe’s complaint and response to Cardinal Health’s motion for 

summary judgment clearly indicate that she is alleging both a hostile work 

environment and a tangible employment action theory of recovery.

7 Doc. 34 

at 25–28. Therefore, as shown below, focusing only on the severe and 

pervasive standard, as Cardinal Health suggests, would miss the mark on the 

tangible employment action claim.

As to Lowe’s hostile work environment theory, in order to determine 

whether a working environment is “hostile” or “abusive,” and consequently 

whether a plaintiff has established the fourth Mendoza factor––at least in the 

context of a hostile work environment theory––courts consider various 

factors including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work 

performance.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 

 7 This circuit’s case law explicitly establishes that a plaintiff may pursue a sexual 

harassment claim based on both a hostile work environment and a tangible employment 

action theory of recovery, even if both theories are premised on the same underlying 

harassment. See Hulsey, 367 F.3d at 1246. 

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Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lowe, the court 

agrees with Cardinal Health that Ruggs’s alleged conduct is insufficiently 

severe or pervasive to support recovery on a hostile work environment 

theory. Lowe alleged that Ruggs stated on multiple occasions, “you look so 

sexy” and “you smell sex,” invited her to spend the night with him in a hotel 

room, and touched her shoulders on one occasion and said, “you look so 

sexy.” Doc. 28-1 at 10, 15. With the exception of one time that Ruggs placed 

his hands on Lowe’s shoulders, Lowe does not contend that Ruggs touched

her inappropriately and she presented no evidence showing that Ruggs’s 

conduct was “physically threatening or humiliating” or that the cumulative 

effect of this conduct “unreasonably interfered” with her job duties. See

Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 23. While the alleged conduct was inappropriate and 

unwelcomed, it simply fails to reach the high threshold necessary in this 

circuit to meet the severe and pervasive standard. By point of comparison, in

Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., the court found that the following 

conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive: a supervisor propositioning 

an employee at a company banquet and on the drive home, asking her to 

spend the night in his hotel room, cornering her in his office and 

propositioning her by saying “hey, babe, blow me,” approaching her on 

more than one occasion and saying “hey, babe” while playing with his 

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zipper, and approaching her from behind two or three times and saying “hey, 

babe” while breathing down her neck. 480 F.3d 1287, 1302 (11th Cir. 2007).

Lowe’s allegations of a few remarks, one physical touch, and a single 

invitation to share a hotel room are even less severe and pervasive than the 

allegations in Baldwin.

8 Simply put, Ruggs’s alleged misconduct fails to 

meet the severe or pervasive standard in light of this circuit’s case law, and 

consequently cannot sustain a hostile work environment claim.

The court’s analysis of Lowe’s sexual harassment claim does not end 

here however, because, as explained above, Lowe also contends that 

Ruggs’s sexual harassment led to her discharge. The Eleventh Circuit has 

clearly stated that district courts must evaluate Title VII liability according 

to the Mendoza factors regardless of whether a plaintiff premises employer 

liability on a tangible employment action theory or a hostile work 

environment theory. See Johnson, 234 F.3d at 508 n. 7 (stating that because 

the court “[s]ee[s] no important distinction between a prima facie case under 

quid pro quo as opposed to hostile environment claims, we will apply the 

Mendoza factors to [the plaintiff’s] claims, irrespective of the terms ‘quid 

 8 For an additional point of comparison, see Mendoza, in which the court held the 

following conduct insufficiently severe and pervasive to sustain a Title VII claim: “(1) 

one instance in which [a supervisor] said to plaintiff, ‘I’m getting fired up’; (2) one 

occasion in which [supervisor] rubbed his hip against [plaintiff’s] hip while touching her 

shoulder and smiling; (3) two instances in which [supervisor] made a sniffing sound 

while looking at [the plaintiff’s] groin area. . .” 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). 

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pro quo’ and ‘hostile environment’”); see also Pipkins v. City of Temple 

Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197, 2000 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[a]lthough 

the elements for a prima facie case for these two kinds of claims formerly 

were analyzed under slightly varying tests, this court has indicated a 

willingness to abandon the distinction”) (citing Johnson, 234 F.3d at 508 n. 

7). However, there is a crucial difference regarding the application of the 

fourth Mendoza factor, i.e. whether “the harassment was sufficiently severe 

or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a 

discriminatorily abusive working environment,” Hulsey, 367 F.3d at 1244 

(citing Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1245), depending on whether a plaintiff is 

proceeding under a hostile work environment theory or a tangible 

employment action theory.

9 Under the tangible employment action theory, 

“if a supervisor retaliates against a worker for failing to give in to sexual 

advances, those advances will rise to the level of ‘severe or pervasive.’” 

 9 Hulsey, 367 F.3d at 1245–49, in which the plaintiff contended that the defendant 

was liable to her based on both theories, provides a good illustration of the difference 

between the application of the fourth Mendoza factor to a tangible employment action 

theory and its application to a hostile work environment theory. Only when analyzing 

liability on the hostile work environment theory did the court consider whether the 

wrongdoer’s actions were of a frequency, degree, and nature that would qualify as 

‘severe and pervasive.’ Id. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has described the difference 

between the two theories of liability as follows: “To prove sexual harassment in violation 

of Title VII, a plaintiff may rely on one of two theories. Under the first theory, the 

plaintiff must prove that the harassment culminated in a ‘tangible employment action’ 

against her. Under the second or ‘hostile work environment’ theory, the plaintiff must 

prove that she suffered ‘severe or pervasive conduct.’” Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old 

Country Store, 434 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006).

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Johnson, 234 F.3d at 508 n. 7. Consequently, when, as here, a plaintiff 

alleges liability for sexual harassment based on a tangible employment 

action theory, whether she satisfies the fourth and fifth Mendoza factor 

collapses into one inquiry: whether there is a basis for holding the employer 

liable because a supervisor took tangible employment action against the 

plaintiff for failing to comply with the supervisor’s sexual demands. 

Whether the supervisor’s alleged harassment was of a frequency, degree, 

and nature that would qualify as ‘severe and pervasive’—as Cardinal Health 

contends Ruggs’s does not—is irrelevant to the court’s analysis of a tangible 

employment action claim.

Turning now to the specific contentions before the court, Cardinal 

Health argues that Lowe’s alleged harassment did not result in a tangible 

employment action because Ruggs was not Lowe’s supervisor since he did 

not have the authority to discharge her or participate in the decision to

discharge her. Doc. 28 at 17. At a minimum, an issue of fact exists on the 

supervisory issue because Lowe contends, and the evidence (including 

Ruggs’s warnings to Lowe about her production) supports Lowe’s 

contention, that Ruggs had supervisory authority over her. Moreover, 

whether Ruggs lacked the authority to discharge or participate in the 

decision to discharge is not dispositive because, in this circuit, “a ‘cat’s paw’ 

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theory of recovery may apply when a biased actor recommends that an 

adverse employment action be taken against an employee, [even though] the 

biased actor is not the ultimate decision-maker.” Williamson v. Adventist 

Health Sys./Sunbelt. Inc., 372 F. App’x 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1999)). 

Furthermore, even if an:

employer does attempt to confine decision[-]making power to a small 

number of individuals, those individuals will have a limited ability to 

exercise independent discretion when making decisions and will likely 

rely on other workers who actually interact with the affected 

employee. . . . Under those circumstances, the employer may be held 

to have effectively delegated the power to take tangible employment 

actions to the employees on whose recommendations it relies.

Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013). When viewed under 

this framework, although Cardinal Health insists that Valdez and Posey 

alone decided to discharge Lowe, a jury question exists because the record 

indicates that they sought out Ruggs’s opinion and assistance. See docs. 28-2

at 10–11 (describing the formal process used to investigate an employee who

curses at a supervisor, which includes gathering statements); 28-3 at 39, 41–

42 (explaining that Ruggs notified Posey of the incident via email and 

gathered all of the witness statements in the formal investigation). 

In addition to Ruggs’s involvement in the incident that triggered the 

discharge, Ruggs also played a role in the earlier disciplinary steps that 

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culminated ultimately in the discharge. These earlier disciplinary incidents 

that advanced Lowe to the next level show that the so-called decisionmakers in the discharge had “a limited ability to exercise independent 

discretion . . . [that they] likely rel[ied] on other workers who interact[ed] 

with the affected employee . . . [and may] have effectively delegated the 

power to take tangible employement action . . . .” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452. 

Ruggs’s involvement in Lowe’s discipline began on March 6, when Ruggs 

issued a Coach and Counsel notice to Lowe for “high error volume” and 

“continuous customer complaints.” Doc. 28-1 at 53. Lowe made her 

complaint against Ruggs on May 16. Doc. 28-1 at 14. On June 5, Lowe 

received a Written Warning from Posey for initially withholding information 

about the alleged inappropriate relationship between Burwell and Ruggs

when Lowe reported Ruggs on May 16.

10 Id. at 54. Six days after this 

discipline, Ruggs issued Lowe’s Final Warning for alleged low productivity 

rates. Id. at 55. Following Lowe’s alleged outburst, on July 3, Ruggs sent 

Posey an email detailing the event, and gathered statements from other 

employees about the incident, knowing that any discipline would result in

Lowe’s discharge. Docs. 28-3 at 41, 45; 28-2 at 35. After Posey read 

 10 Interestingly, although another employee also reported that Ruggs had a sexual 

relationship with Burwell, there is no indication from the record that Cardinal Health 

disciplined Ruggs. Rather, the only person disciplined was Lowe for purportedly 

withholding information about the alleged Ruggs/Burwell relationship.

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Ruggs’s email, Posey stated, “the termination was relatively cut and dry in 

my opinion,” doc. 28-2 at 35, even though there is no indication he or 

anyone else in management ever directly spoke to the employees from 

whom Ruggs collected the statements. As the record plainly shows, without 

the earlier disciplinary write-ups issued by Ruggs, Lowe never would have 

advanced to the later steps, and without Ruggs’s input and investigation into 

the July 3rd incident, Posey and Valdez would have had no cause to 

discharge Lowe. Id. In sum, there is evidence that Ruggs, at a minimum, 

played a role in three of the four disciplinary actions that culminated in 

Lowe’s discharge. Therefore, whether Ruggs influenced Posey’s and 

Valdez’s decision based on discriminatory animus is a question for a jury.

In the final analysis, the record contains sufficient evidence to indicate 

that an issue of material fact exists as to whether Ruggs took an adverse 

employment action against Lowe or influenced the decision in a manner that 

could render Cardinal Health liable to Lowe. Consequently, Cardinal 

Health’s motion on Lowe’s sexual harassment claim is due to be denied.11

 11 Although Cardinal Health proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

Lowe’s termination, namely that she violated Cardinal’s Standards of Conduct, and the 

record contains evidence supporting Cardinal Health’s contention, in this circuit, the 

McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework is not applicable to sexual 

harassment claims: “We are unwilling to read the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine

framework into non-retaliation sexual harassment cases at this point. These types of cases 

have evolved quite separately from other Title VII cases, and applying a burden-shifting 

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B. Retaliation

Lowe alleges that Cardinal Health discharged her in retaliation for

reporting Ruggs’s sexual harassment. Doc. 34 at 14–18. When evaluating a 

claim of retaliation under Title VII, in the absence of direct evidence, courts 

apply the burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this standard, the first step is for the 

plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, which in the retaliation context 

requires that “a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in statutorily 

protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; 

and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the 

subsequently materially adverse employment action.” Brush v. Sears 

Holding Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 786 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Butler v. Ala. 

Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2008)). Cardinal Health

challenges only the third prong, and contends that Lowe has failed to show 

that a causal link exists between her report of sexual harassment and her 

discharge. Doc. 28 at 22–23.

To satisfy the causation requirement, a plaintiff must produce 

evidence that the employer’s “desire to retaliate” against the protected 

 

analysis to them would be a departure from precedent.” Johnson, 234 F.3d at 511 (citing 

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n. 11 (11th Cir.1982)).

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activity was the “but-for cause” of the adverse employment action. Univ. of 

Tex. Sw. Med. Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2521 (2013). Additionally, 

the Supreme Court has held “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by 

discriminatory animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse 

employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate 

employment action, then the employer is liable . . . .” Staub v. Proctor 

Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011). Also,“[t]he burden of causation can be 

met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected 

activity and the adverse action.” Adams v. City of Montgomery, 569 F. 

App’x 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 

506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007)). “But mere temporal proximity, 

without more, must be ‘very close.’” Id. (quoting Thomas, 506 F.3d at 

1364). The Eleventh Circuit has provided little guidance regarding how 

much time must elapse between protected activity and an adverse action 

before temporal proximity, alone, is insufficient to establish causation, aside 

from remarking, several times, that “a three month interval between the 

protected expression and the employment action . . . is too long.” Brown v. 

Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1182 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Thomas, 

506 F.3d at 1364); see also Jiles v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F. App’x 

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61, 65–66 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364; Higdon v. 

Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2004)). 

Here, the interval between the protected activity and the beginning of 

adverse action is much shorter than the three-month lapse rejected as 

insufficient by the Eleventh Circuit. Lowe engaged in protected activity 

when she reported Ruggs’s harassment to Cardinal Health’s ACC hotline on 

May 16, 2012. Doc. 28-1 at 14. Just three weeks later, on June 6, 2012, she 

received a written warning for failing to fully disclose her knowledge about 

Ruggs’s relationship with Burwell during her initial interview with LeDuc 

and Posey. Id. at 54. Five days after that, Ruggs issued an additional warning

to her for failing to meet production goals. Id. at 55. A month later, on July 

16, 2012, after her confrontation with Ruggs, Cardinal Health discharged 

her. Id. at 56. In sum, beginning just three weeks after she engaged in 

protected activity, Lowe was subjected to three adverse employment actions

over the course of two months: two warnings and, ultimately, discharge. The 

court finds that this temporal proximity is sufficient evidence of causation to 

satisfy Lowe’s burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. 

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the successful assertion 

of a prima facie case then creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer 

unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 

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F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence 

that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. 

Id. Cardinal Health contends that Lowe’s consistently low productivity 

rates, failure to be forthcoming in an investigation, and confrontation with 

Ruggs were the causes of its progressive disciplinary actions against Lowe, 

as well as the causes for its ultimate decision to discharge her. Doc. 28 at 

21–22. These reasons are sufficient to satisfy Cardinal Health’s burden.

Consequently, the burden shifts back to Lowe to “show that the proffered 

reason really is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Rioux, 520 F.3d at 

1275 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate 

pretext Lowe must show “that the employer’s proffered reason [for her

discharge] was false and that the true motive for the action was 

discriminatory.” Thomas v. CVS/Pharmacy, 336 F. App’x 913, 914 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 151 (1993)).

“To survive summary judgment, [Lowe] need only show that a genuine issue 

of material fact in dispute could lead a rational trier of fact to make a finding 

of pretext.” Id. (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024–25. 

Based on a review of the record, there are at least two grounds for 

finding that the reasons articulated by Cardinal Health were pretextual. First,

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as explained more thoroughly above, Ruggs, the alleged tortfeasor, played a 

crucial role in three of the four disciplinary actions that culminated in 

Lowe’s discharge. Moreover, for the last two, he did so with the knowledge 

that Lowe had accused him of sexual harassment and after expressing

resentment toward her and a desire for her to face consequences for her 

complaint against him. See Doc. 28-2 at 26–27 (Posey’s testimony that when 

he interviewed Ruggs regarding Lowe’s allegations, Ruggs became upset 

and said “What are you going to do with Jasminda. She is lying”; see also

doc. 28-1 at 22 (Lowe’s testimony that Ruggs referenced “all that crap you 

brought up” during their July 3, 2012 confrontation). Critically, Ruggs 

testified that, prior to reporting the July 3 confrontation between himself and 

Lowe, he knew that Lowe was on Final Warning and any additional 

disciplinary incident would result in her discharge. Doc. 28-3 at 45. 

Second, the record contains evidence that Cardinal Health failed to 

discipline other employees who engaged in similar conduct as Lowe. “A 

typical means of establishing pretext is through comparator evidence.” 

Walker v. St. Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., 506 Fed. App’x. 886 (11th Cir. 

2013) (citing Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th 

Cir. 2001); Sparks v. Pilot Freigh Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1563 n. 20 

(11th Cir. 1987)). Specifically, Cardinal Health issued a written warning to 

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Lowe on June 6, 2012 (advancing her to Step Two), when Posey and LeDuc 

determined Lowe initially withheld information during their investigation of 

the allegations she made in her May 16 telephone call to Cardinal Health

hotline because she subsequently provided additional information about the 

alleged Ruggs/Burwell relationship. Docs. 28-1 at 54; 28-2 at 17. However, 

when Brown, another warehouse associate, also provided additional 

information about the same relationship, he was not disciplined. 12 See 

generally doc. 47-13 *SEALED* (Brown’s personnel file). Finally, although

Cardinal Health contends it ultimately discharged Lowe in response to her 

July 3, 2012 altercation with Ruggs, Lowe testified that she witnessed

Burwell yelling and cursing at Ruggs on multiple occasions, and that

Cardinal Health never disciplined Burwell. Doc. 28-1 at 16–17. In addition, 

Posey also stated that he had heard other employees cursing but did not 

discipline them, and would not do so unless someone complained about the 

language. Doc. 28-2 at 10. These discrepancies are sufficient for Lowe to 

raise a jury issue.

 12 Brown also provided information regarding the alleged relationship between 

Ruggs and Burwell to Posey in 2012. Doc. 47-12 *SEALED* at 3. Brown followed up 

after his additional interview and provided additional information about the relationship. 

Id. In his May 17, 2012 statement, Brown states “[a]t one time, in a conversation with 

Everett Posey, I expressed concerns that something along the Burwell/Ruggs situation 

might be happening without directly stating that it was going on.” Id. Cardinal Health did 

not discipline Brown for providing additional information. Doc. 47-13 *SEALED*.

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In sum, Lowe has presented evidence that could lead a reasonable jury

to conclude, if it is so inclined, that Cardinal Health’s proffered reasons for 

her discharge were pretext for retaliation. As is often the case in the Title VII 

context, the resolution of Lowe’s retaliation claim—and, indeed, her sexual 

harassment claim, hinges on whether the jury believes Lowe’s version of 

events or that of the alleged tortfeasor, Ruggs. Because credibility 

determinations are the proper province of a jury, see Allen v. Bd. of Pub. 

Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007), Cardinal 

Health’s motion on Lowe’s retaliation claim is also due to be denied.

C. Invasion of Privacy

Lowe seems to contend that by asking her to spend the night with him 

at a hotel and touching her shoulders while saying “you look sexy,” Ruggs 

committed the tort of invasion of privacy, for which Cardinal Health can be 

held vicariously liable. Doc. 1 at 10–11. Invasion of privacy is “the wrongful 

intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause 

mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” 

McIssac v. WZEW-FM Corp., 495 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1986). However, 

Alabama courts have consistently required allegations of egregious conduct 

to sustain a claim. See id. at 152 (noting that “[e]ven the dire affront of 

inviting an unwilling woman to illicit intercourse has been held by most 

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courts to be no such outrage as to lead to liability” for the tort of invasion of 

privacy) (citing Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 124 (Ala. 

1985); W. Prosser, Law of Torts, 54–55 (4th ed. 1971)). Specifically, 

Alabama courts have generally required invasion of privacy claims to allege 

both ongoing, persistent verbal harassment and unwanted physical contact.13

In light of these stringent requirements, and in the absence of any 

legal support for Lowe’s contention, the court concludes that no reasonable 

jury could find Ruggs liable for the tort of invasion of privacy based solely 

on one inquiry to share a hotel room, a single incident of physical contact

and comments such as “you look sexy” and “you smell sex.” Doc. 28-1 at 9–

10. Consequently, Cardinal Health’s motion on the invasion of privacy claim 

 13 See, e.g., Ex parte Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998) 

(substantial evidence supported lower court’s finding that defendant committed invasion 

of privacy when the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant repeatedly touched 

her in a manner that was unwelcome and with sexual overtones, “made several lewd 

comments[,] asked [the plaintiff] to meet him outside of work for other than business 

purposes[,] . . . [and] looked up [the plaintiff’s] skirt on more than one occasion”)); 

Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (finding that the 

facts of the case supported an invasion of privacy claim when the plaintiff testified that 

the defendant called her into his office, locked the door, and interrogated her about her 

sexual relationship with her husband, repeatedly demanded sexual favors from her, 

reacted violently when she refused, “[o]n one occasion struck her across the buttocks 

with his hand[, and o]n still another occasion, . . . began papering his office window, thus 

obscuring the view of those in the surrounding area, in pursuit of what he hoped would be 

the consummation of lurid propositions to [the p]laintiff”); Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 

So. 2d 979, 980–81, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (finding that a reasonable jury could 

conclude the defendant intruded on the plaintiff’s privacy when the uncontested evidence 

showed that the defendant “frequently rubbed [the plaintiff’s] shoulders and repeatedly 

made lewd and suggestive comments to her, including suggestions that they have sex” 

and on one occasion “leaned over her as if he were going to whisper something to her and 

stuck his tongue in her ear”).

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is due to be granted. See Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. Jackson, 906 So. 2d 143, 155 

(Ala. 2005) (stating that “the dismissal of the tort claims against the agent . . 

. exonerated the principal . . . from liability for those alleged torts”).

D. Negligent/Wanton Training, Supervision, and/or Retention

Finally, Lowe asserts that because Ruggs sexually harassed her and 

she experienced an adverse employment action after she reported the 

harassment, Cardinal Health was negligent and/or wanton in its training, 

supervision, and/or retention of Ruggs. Doc. 34 at 30. To establish this 

claim, a plaintiff must show that the employer:

“(1) had actual knowledge14 of the tortious conduct of the 

offending employee and that the tortious conduct was directed at and 

visited upon the complaining employee; (2) that based upon this 

knowledge, the employer knew, or should have known, that such 

conduct constituted sexual harassment and/or a continuing tort; and 

(3) that the employer failed to take ‘adequate’ steps to remedy the 

situation.”

Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So. 2d 820, 824 (Ala. 1999) 

(quoting Potts v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1992)). 

 14 Courts have been inconsistent with their scienter requirements for these causes 

of action. See e.g., Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1309 (citing Stevenson v. Precision Standard, 

Inc., 762 So. 2d 820, 824 (Ala. 1999); Thompson v. Havard, 235 So. 2d 853, 858 (Ala. 

1970)) (“As to [the plaintiff’s] negligence claims, she must show that Blue Cross had 

actual knowledge of Head's harassment and did nothing about it (for negligent retention) 

or would have known about the harassment had it exercised due and proper diligence (for 

negligent training and supervision.”). A thorough discussion of the matter is unnecessary 

here because the disposition of Lowe’s negligent/wanton training, supervision and/or 

retention claims hinges on whether Cardinal Health took adequate steps to remedy the 

situation. 

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Lowe has not presented any evidence that Cardinal Health could have 

known about the alleged sexual harassment prior to her report on May 16, 

2012. Nonetheless, Lowe seems to argue that Cardinal Health is liable 

because it did not take adequate steps to investigate her report and failed to 

discipline Ruggs. The court disagrees because although Lowe received a 

copy of Cardinal Health’s anti-harassment policy, she failed to report the 

sexual harassment at the time it occurred. Doc. 28-1 at 30. Moreover, when 

Lowe reported Ruggs on May 16, 2012, Cardinal Health promptly 

investigated the allegations––including obtaining written statements and

conducting interviews. Docs. 28-1 at 31, 60–61; 28-2 at 31, 57. Ultimately, 

Cardinal Health was unable to substantiate Lowe’s allegations, doc. 28-2 at 

44, and, perhaps as a result, chose not to discipline Ruggs. The failure to 

discipline Ruggs, however, does not mean that Cardinal Health “did nothing 

about [the alleged harassment].” Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1309; see also Walton 

v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(citing EEOC Notice No. 915.002) (stating that, in the Title VII context 

“remedial measures should be designed to stop the harassment, correct its 

effects on the employee, and ensure that the harassment does not recur”);

Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. Of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 654 (10th Cir. 

2013) (“[C]orrective action does not always require discipline” of the 

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harasser.); c.f. Mills v. Wex-Tex Indus., 991 F. Supp. 1370, 1390–91 (M.D. 

Ala. 1997) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the 

plaintiff’s Alabama negligent/wanton retention claim because “[t]he facts 

establish[ed] that even after [the defendant] took some remedial measures, 

the harassing conduct continued”). The key inquiry, under these 

circumstances, is whether the alleged sexual harassment continued after 

Lowe’s complaint and, from the record here, it did not. Consequently,

Cardinal Health’s motion for summary judgment on Lowe’s negligent and/or 

wanton supervision, training and/or retention claim is due to be granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons fully explained above, Cardinal Health’s motion for 

summary judgment is due to be denied on the Title VII sexual harassment 

and retaliation claims and granted on the state law claims. The court will 

enter a separate order consistent with this opinion. 

DONE the 14th day of October, 2014.

 

______________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE

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