Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01834/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01834-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R. Gonzalez
Defendant
Chauncey Hollis
Plaintiff
Sweeney
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAUNCEY HOLLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. GONZALEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-1834 OWW DLB PC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

(Doc. 14)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

Findings and Recommendation Following Notice By Plaintiff

I. Background

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Chauncey Hollis (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action by filing his

complaint on December 2, 2008. On March 23, 2009, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave

to file an amended complaint within thirty days. On May 26, 2009, after receiving an extension of

time, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. On October 14, 2009, the Court screened the first

amended complaint and found that it stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Sweeney for

violation of the Fourth Amendment, and against Defendant Gonzales for retaliation in violation of

the First Amendment, but failed to state any other cognizable claims. The Court ordered Plaintiff

either to file a second amended complaint, curing the deficiencies identified, or notify the court of

his willingness to proceed only against Defendant Sweeney or Defendant Gonzales. On November

16, 2009, Plaintiff notified the Court he did not wish to amend and is willing to proceed only against

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Defendant Sweeney. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Findings and Recommendation.

B. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported bymere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949.

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is currently confined at Central Valley Modified Community Correctional Facility

in McFarland, California. The events giving rise to this action occurred at California Correctional

Facility (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, at Desert View Modified Community Correctional Facility (“Desert

View MCCF”) in Adelanto, and at the California Institute for Men (“CIM”) in Chino. Plaintiff

seeks money damages and equitable relief. 

A. Visual Body Cavity Search

Plaintiff alleges that on October 23, 2008, a search was conducted in Building One, which

included strip searches of all inmates. Plaintiff alleges that for inmates in his tier, the procedure

involved strip searches of the inmates at their cell. Plaintiff states that he complied with the order

to submit to a visual body cavity search. Plaintiff was then told to go to the recreation yard. As he

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was walking to the basketball court, defendant Sweeney, who is female, ordered Plaintiff to stop and

strip. Plaintiff contends that she ordered Plaintiff to submit to a second visual body cavity search

despite being informed by Plaintiff that one had just been conducted. Plaintiff contends that he

complied with the order but that defendant Sweeney then threatened to have officers shoot Plaintiff

if he did not comply more fully. Plaintiff alleges that he was ordered to submit to a second search

bydefendant Sweeney.Once the search was completed to defendant Sweeney’s satisfaction, Plaintiff

was ordered to sit on the rocks near the basketball court. Plaintiff alleges that he was not permitted

to use the toilet and that he subsequently urinated on himself. Plaintiff further alleges that the cuffs

were too tight and that his legs, buttocks and arms became numb after sitting for two hours on rocks. 

Plaintiff seeks relief from defendant Sweeney for violation of the Fourth Amendment, Eighth

Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1

Plaintiff contends that search of the Building was in response to a fist fight between two

inmates occurring six days earlier. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Director of Corrections

(“Director”) and Warden Gonzalez are liable for having authorized a plan to conduct strip searches

of the inmates using both female and male officers.

i. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable

searches, and its protections extend to incarcerated prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545

(1979). In determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, “[c]ourts must

consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification

for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Id. at 559. The reasonableness of a prisoner

search is determined by reference to the prison context and strip searches that are excessive,

vindictive, harassing or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest may not be reasonable. 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 at 332 (9th Cir. 1988). “When a prison regulation impinges

on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate

Plaintiff further contends that defendants violated various sections of Title 15. There is no independent

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cause of action for violation of Title 15 regulations. Davis v. Kissinger, No. CIV S-04-0878 GEB DAD P, 2009 WL

256574, *12 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009).

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penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).

The Ninth Circuit has not yet held that a cross-gender search in a prison setting violates a

prisoner’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir.

1985) (high potential for female guards to view male inmates disrobing, showering, and using toilet

facilities did not render prison policies unconstitutional); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524

(9th Cir. 1993); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 1997). Rather, a prisoner’s

legitimate expectations of bodily privacy from persons of the opposite sex are extremely limited. 

Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524; see also Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 328 (visual body-cavity searches of

male inmates conducted within view of female guards held constitutional). 

Plaintiff contends that the search conducted by defendant Sweeney was repetitive and

harassing. Underthe minimal federal notice pleading standard, Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant

Sweeney ordered Plaintiff to submit to a second visual body cavity search despite having knowledge

that a search had just been conducted, and that she threatened to have Plaintiff shot during the search,

are sufficient to state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim against her. However, Plaintiff’s claims

are insufficient to state a viable claim against defendants Director and Gonzalez. Their approval of

a plan that allows for visual body searches by female officers does not state a cognizable claim for

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Grummett, 779 F.2d at 496; Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524; Somers,

109 F.3d at 620.

ii. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficientlygrave to form

the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995

(1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth

Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew

of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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Plaintiff alleges excessive force and deliberate indifference by defendant Sweeney arising

from the visual body cavity search. However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her for violation 2

of the Eighth Amendment. Even assuming that Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the subjective

component of the Hudson analysis, Plaintiff fails to meet the objective component. The Court does

not find that an order to comply with a strip search, even in a situation where a similar search had

recently been completed by other prison staff, is objectively harmful enough to establish a violation

of the Eighth Amendment. Further, “[c]ross-gendered searches cannot be called inhumane and

therefore do not fall below the floor set by the objective component of the Eighth Amendment.” 

Somers, 109 F.3d at 623. 

Finally, the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical indetermining

whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth

Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s allegations that

he was forced to sit outside on rocks for two hours, that his hand cuffs were too tight, and that he was

not permitted to use the restroom fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. There is

nothing to suggest that the officer “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s]

health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

With respect to defendants Director and Gonzalez, Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable

Eighth Amendment claim against them. An allegation that they approved of a plan to search

inmates, and that a female officer was included as a member of the strip search team, does not meet

either the subjective or objective components of an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff has not

alleged that defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or

When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the cruel and

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unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson,

503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was

wanton and unnecessary, it is proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.

The Court does not find Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim based on an a theory of excessive force viable

because there are no allegations of physical force alleged. Further, verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient

to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir.

1987), and threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir.

1987).

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safety.” Id. Plaintiff has also failed to allege any wrongdoing that is objectively harmful enough to

establish a constitutional violation. Somers, 109 F.3d at 623. 

iii. Equal Protection Clause 

Next, Plaintiff alleges that the search violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. “Section 1983 claims based on Equal Protection violations must plead intentional

unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory

intent.” Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff

has not sufficiently alleged that defendants Sweeney, Director or Gonzalez acted with an intent or

purpose to discriminate against Plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class, Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), and a bare allegation that Plaintiff, who is male,

was searched by a female correctional officer is not sufficient to show that defendants acted with a

discriminatory amicus towards male prisoners. Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim for violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

iv. Due Process Clause

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that defendant Gonzalez and Director violated due process.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that he was deprived of

a protected interest without procedural due process. 

“To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required to

prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort

of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due

process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874

(9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845

(1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

that would support a claim that his rights under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause

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were violated.

B. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff additionallyallegesthat defendantsGonzalez andDirectorretaliated against Plaintiff

for filing prison grievances by transferring him from CCI to Desert View MCCF on January 26,

2009. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Under the minimal federal notice pleading standard, Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant

Gonzalez responded to Plaintiff’s grievance activity by transferring him to another facility is

sufficient to state a claim for retaliation against him. However, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient

to state a claim against defendant Director. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is

a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense[.]...Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is

entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950; see Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). The Court does not find plausible an

allegation that the Director of CDCR would personally intervene to have Plaintiff transferred from

one CDCR facility to another, in retaliation for Plaintiff pursuing prison grievance activity. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff states a claim only against defendant Warden Gonzalez for retaliation,

in violation of the First Amendment.

///

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C. Plaintiff’s Other Claims Arising at CCI

In addition to the claims discussed above, Plaintiff further alleges retaliatory activity by

various other prison staff members at CCI. A summary of these claims is provided by the following

paragraphs.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant librarian R. Hackett denied Plaintiff access to the law library,

thereby raising claims for denial of access to the courts, retaliation, violation of due process and

violation equal protection.

Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Correctional Officer Hawkins deliberately rerouted

Plaintiff’s mail and searched his cell in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievance activity. Plaintiff alleges

claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of due process and equal

protection. Plaintiff alleges similar claims against defendant Correctional Officer Reed, whom

Plaintiff states retaliated against him by moving him to another cell.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Appeals Coordinator Sampson violated Plaintiff’s rights

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments byfailing to answer or acknowledgePlaintiff’s inmate

grievances. 

i. Rule 18(a)

Plaintiff may not proceed in one action on a myriad of unrelated claims against different staff

members. “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to

relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as

independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has

against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against

Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims

against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a

multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners paythe required

filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals

that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d at 607. 

At this juncture, Plaintiff states only a claim against defendant Sweeney for violation of the

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Fourth Amendment, and against defendant Gonzalez for retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment. Upon review, the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims arising at CCI are unrelated to either

of the cognizable claims identified. Plaintiff maynot proceed with unrelated claims against different

defendants in a single suit. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff may not pursue his claims against defendants

Hackitt, Hawkins, Reed or Sampson in this action.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims Concerning his Conditions of Confinement at Desert View

MCCF and at CIM

For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiff may not pursue his claims arising from his

conditions of confinement at Desert View MCCF or at CIM in this action. The claims alleged

against correctional staff at those facilities are unrelated to the cognizable claims alleged against

defendants Sweeney and Gonzalez arising at CCI. To allow Plaintiff to pursue those unrelated

claims here would result in a violation of Rule 18(a). Plaintiff is not prevented from pursuing those

claims if he wishes; however, he may not litigate them in this action. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a claim against Defendant Sweeney for violation

of the Fourth Amendment arising from the strip search incident on October 23, 2008. Plaintiff also

states a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against defendant Warden

Gonzalez, for purportedlytransferringPlaintiff to a different CDCR facility in response to Plaintiff’s

grievance activities. Although both claims arise at CCI and the Court identifies both claims as

cognizable, the claims are unrelated. Plaintiff may not proceed with a “mishmash of a complaint”

and therefore cannot proceed with both claims in this one action. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff

has indicated that he is willing to proceed only against Defendant Sweeney in this action.

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS the following:

1) This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed May 26, 2009,

against Defendant Sweeney for violation of the Fourth Amendment;

2) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Gonzalez for retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment be DISMISSED without prejudice;

3) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hackitt, Hawkins, Reed and Sampson be

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DISMISSED without prejudice;

4) Plaintiff’s claims arising at Desert View Modified CommunityCorrectional Facility

and at the California Institute for Men be DISMISSED without prejudice;

5) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Director of CDCR be DISMISSED with

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and

6) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection claims be DISMISSED with

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 18, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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