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Parties Involved:
Ionel Muresanu
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-3690

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IONEL MURESANU,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 18-CR-129-JPS — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 3, 2020

____________________

Before FLAUM, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ionel Muresanu was arrested in 

Wisconsin for his role in a multistate ATM skimming operation. A grand jury charged him with four crimes: possession 

of counterfeit access devices and three counts of aggravated 

identity theft. The identity-theft charges were legally defective. The indictment alleged that Muresanu attempted to 

commit aggravated identity theft, but there is no such 

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federal crime; the statutory definition of aggravated identity 

theft doesn’t cover attempts.

Muresanu’s attorney did not object to the defective indictment in a pretrial motion under Rule 12(b)(3) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Instead, he strategically waited until trial and moved for acquittal on the identitytheft counts after the government rested its case. The district 

judge denied the motion, ruling that Muresanu waived the 

objection by failing to raise the matter in a Rule 12(b)(3) 

motion.

The judge then deleted the attempt language from the 

jury instructions and instructed the jury on the elements of 

the completed crime. The modified instruction conformed to 

the statutory offense but varied from the charges in the 

indictment. The evidence overwhelmingly supported conviction on the reformulated charges, and the jury found 

Muresanu guilty on all counts. The judge imposed a prison 

sentence of 34 months on count one and the mandatory 

24-month sentence on each of the three identity-theft counts, 

consecutive to count one but concurrent to the other 

identity-theft counts. 

Muresanu raises two challenges to the identity-theft convictions. First, he argues that the defect in the indictment—

its failure to charge an actual federal offense—deprived the 

court of jurisdiction over these counts. Second, he argues 

that the judge’s “cure” for the defect—instructing the jury on 

the completed crime rather than an attempt—violated his 

Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on charges contained 

in the grand jury’s indictment. He also challenges his sentence on count one for possession of counterfeit access 

devices.

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We affirm in part and reverse in part. The judge correctly 

applied the Sentencing Guidelines to count one, so that

challenge fails. Counts two through four are another matter. 

Defects in the indictment are not jurisdictional, United States 

v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002), and under Rule 12(b)(3)

they must be raised by pretrial motion, as the judge correctly

recognized. But the modification of the jury instructions led 

the jury to convict Muresanu of crimes not charged by the 

grand jury, violating his Fifth Amendment right to be tried 

only on charges brought by indictment. That category of 

error is per se reversible. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 

217 (1960). We have no choice but to vacate the judgment on 

counts two through four and remand for resentencing on 

count one alone. 

I. Background

In 2017 Muresanu began participating in an ATM skimming scheme run by a man known to him only as Vidu. 

Muresanu was then 17 years old and had recently arrived in 

this country from his native Romania. The skimming scheme 

generally operated in this way: Vidu provided Muresanu

and other participants with skimming devices and pinhole 

cameras to place in and on ATMs. The skimmers recorded 

the account information of the ATM cards inserted into the 

machines; the cameras recorded user PINs. For months

Muresanu and others—including his 16-year-old cousin 

Florin—placed and removed these devices on ATMs in 

Nashville, Atlanta, Kansas City, Louisville, and St. Louis,

collecting card-stripe information and PINs. Muresanu

passed this information to Vidu, who used it to create counterfeit debit cards and drain money from the original cardholders’ bank accounts. Vidu gave Muresanu 25% of the 

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proceeds from each batch of counterfeit ATM cards. 

Muresanu, in turn, paid his younger cousin Florin from his 

share of the proceeds. 

Muresanu’s participation came to a halt in May 2018 

when he was arrested in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. By then he 

had turned 18. On May 18 Oshkosh police were alerted to 

suspicious activity by people in a white van with Tennessee 

plates. Detective April Hinke located the van and followed it 

from a motel to a convenience store. There Hinke and other 

officers observed Muresanu and two minors—his cousin 

Florin and a teenager named Surdo—use one debit card after 

another at the store’s ATM. The officers arrested the three 

young thieves and recovered 100 counterfeit ATM cards in 

their possession. Muresanu was given Miranda warnings and

agreed to talk to the officers. He gave them detailed written 

and recorded statements confessing his involvement in the 

skimming scheme.

A grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging

Muresanu with possessing 15 or more counterfeit access 

devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) and three counts 

of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1). Although the statutory definition of aggravated identity theft does not cover attempts, counts two

through four of the indictment alleged that Muresanu “did 

knowingly attempt to transfer, possess, and use, without 

lawful authority, a means of identification ... , knowing that 

said means of identification belonged to another person.” 

(Emphasis added.)

The judge set a deadline for pretrial motions, but the date

came and went without a defense motion under 

Rule 12(b)(3) objecting to the defective indictment. As the 

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trial date approached, the judge distributed a copy of the 

jury instructions he planned to use at trial. As relevant here, 

the proposed instructions tracked the indictment: regarding 

counts two through four, the instructions described the 

charged offense as attempted aggravated identity theft and 

included an instruction on attempt.

Muresanu’s attorney contested little of the government’s 

case at trial. He made no opening statement and declined to 

cross-examine five of the government’s nine witnesses. His 

cross-examination of the remaining witnesses was light and 

brief. When the government rested its case, Muresanu’s 

attorney moved for judgment of acquittal on counts two 

through four; at that point the defense strategy became clear. 

Counsel explained that because attempted identity theft, as 

charged in the indictment, is not a federal crime, no rational 

jury could return a verdict of guilty on those counts. The 

judge denied the motion, ruling that the defect in the indictment should have been raised by pretrial motion as 

Rule 12(b)(3) requires. 

That left a dilemma about how to submit the case to the 

jury. The government argued that the “attempt” language in 

the indictment was surplusage and asked the judge to strike 

it. Muresanu objected, and the judge declined to adopt the 

government’s suggested fix. Instead, the judge modified the 

jury instructions to remove all references to “attempt.”

Muresanu objected to this remedy as well, but the judge 

overruled the objection. The final jury instructions thus 

reframed the offenses charged in counts two through four as 

completed acts of aggravated identity theft—not attempts, as 

charged in the indictment. The jury found Muresanu guilty 

on all four counts. 

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Muresanu filed posttrial motions seeking various forms 

of relief on counts two through four: judgment of acquittal 

under Rule 29, an arrest of judgment under Rule 34, or a 

new trial under Rule 33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29, 33, 34. He argued that the judge impermissibly amended the indictment 

by reformulating counts two through four as completed acts 

of aggravated identity theft and instructing the jury on the 

elements of that crime. The judge denied relief, again noting 

that Muresanu waived the defect in the indictment by failing 

to raise it by pretrial motion under Rule 12(b)(3). The judge

also reasoned that the modified jury instructions altered 

only the form of the indictment, not its substance, and 

Muresanu suffered no prejudice. 

At sentencing Muresanu challenged several aspects of 

the proposed offense-level calculation for count one, the 

conviction for possession of counterfeit access devices. The 

presentence report recommended a two-level enhancement 

for use of sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); a 

two-level enhancement for Muresanu’s supervisory role in 

the offense, id. § 3B1.1; and a two-level enhancement for 

using a minor to assist in the crime, id. § 3B1.4. Muresanu

objected to all three enhancements. He also argued that he 

was only a minor participant in the offense, justifying a twolevel downward adjustment under § 3B1.2. The judge overruled the objections, denied the minor-role reduction, and 

adopted the proposed Guidelines calculation.

That calculation yielded an advisory sentencing range of 

51–63 months on count one. The identity-theft counts carried 

an automatic 24-month sentence consecutive to count one as 

required by § 1028A(a)(1) and (b)(2). The judge settled on a

below-Guidelines sentence of 34 months on count one, 

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followed by the statutory consecutive sentence of 24 months 

on each of the identity-theft counts. Exercising the discretion 

conferred by § 1028A(b)(4), the judge ordered the three 

24-month terms on the identity-theft counts to run concurrently for a total sentence of 58 months.

II. Discussion

Muresanu raises three points on appeal. First, he argues

that the defect in the indictment—accusing him of attempted

aggravated identity theft, a “noncrime”—deprived the court

of subject-matter jurisdiction over counts two through four.

Alternatively, he contends that the judge’s alteration of the 

jury instructions led the jury to convict him of offenses not 

charged in the indictment, violating his Fifth Amendment 

right to be tried only on charges issued by a grand jury. 

Finally, he challenges his sentence on count one, reprising 

his objection to the three Guidelines enhancements mentioned above. 

A. Jurisdiction

We review jurisdictional questions de novo. See United 

States v. Rollins, 301 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). The federal 

criminal code does not contain a general attempt statute; 

attempts to commit a crime are punishable only if the statutory definition of the crime itself proscribes attempts. United 

States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1985). Many 

federal criminal statutes expressly cover attempts, but the 

one at issue here does not. Section 1028A(a)(1) mandates a

24-month consecutive prison sentence for anyone who 

“during and in relation to [a specified felony offense], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, 

a means of identification of another person.” 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 1028A(a)(1). Attempts to commit the crime are not included.

Nonetheless, counts two through four of the indictment 

inexplicably alleged that Muresanu attempted to commit acts 

constituting aggravated identity theft. He argued below and 

reiterates here that this type of defect in an indictment—the 

failure to allege an actual federal offense—is jurisdictional.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Cotton controls this 

question. The defect at issue in Cotton arose under Apprendi.

A grand jury indicted the defendants for conspiracy to 

distribute a “detectable amount” of cocaine and cocaine 

base, but the indictment did not contain specific drugquantity allegations. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627–28. A jury found 

the defendants guilty, and at sentencing the judge made 

drug-quantity findings and imposed enhanced penalties 

under the statutory scheme specifying longer prison terms 

for offenses involving larger drug quantities. Id. at 628. 

While the defendants’ appeal was pending, the Court ruled 

in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000), that any 

fact that increases the statutory penalty must be charged in 

the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Although the defendants had not preserved an Apprendilike argument in the district court, the court of appeals held

that the defect in the indictment—its failure to allege drug 

quantities as required by Apprendi—was jurisdictional and 

thus could not be waived. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629. The

Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a defective indictment” does not “deprive[] a court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 631

(overruling Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887)).

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The circuits are split on the proper interpretation of

Cotton. The Eleventh Circuit reads the Court’s holding as 

limited to defective indictments that omit necessary allegations but nonetheless charge some federal crime. United States 

v. McIntosh, 704 F.3d 894, 901–03 (11th Cir. 2013). On this 

view, the rule announced in Cotton does not apply if an 

indictment fails to allege any federal crime at all. Id. The 

Fifth and Tenth Circuits read Cotton more broadly, applying 

it even when an indictment fails to state an offense; on this 

view, defects in an indictment—of whatever kind—are not 

jurisdictional. United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1148–

49 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 283 

(5th Cir. 2002).

We think the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have the better 

reading. Cotton used general language, broadly holding that 

“defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power 

to adjudicate a case.” 535 U.S. at 630. The Eleventh Circuit’s

narrow interpretation is hard to reconcile with this expansive language. It also doesn’t fit well with the Court’s reasoning. Cotton relied in part on Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 

(1916). In that case the defendant was charged with impersonating an officer of the United States with intent to defraud; the indictment alleged that he falsely held himself out 

to be a congressman. Id. at 64. The defendant argued that 

because a congressman is not an officer of the United States, 

the indictment did not charge an actual federal offense, and 

this defect deprived the court of jurisdiction. Id. The Court

disagreed, ruling that subject-matter jurisdiction was unaffected by the defect in the indictment. Rather, “[an] objection 

that the indictment does not charge a crime against the 

United States goes only to the merits of the case.” Id. at 65.

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Cotton also relied on United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 

(1951), another case that similarly dealt with a contention 

that the conduct alleged in an indictment was not covered by 

the relevant criminal statute. The Williams defendants were 

police officers convicted of perjury for giving false testimony 

at their criminal trial on charges of conspiring to oppress

persons in their custody in the exercise of rights secured to 

them by the Fourteenth Amendment, violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 241. Id. at 58–59. On direct appeal from the judgment in the

underlying conspiracy prosecution, the court of appeals 

reversed the convictions and quashed the indictment, ruling 

that § 241 “d[oes] not apply to the general rights extended to 

all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 58. The 

defendants then challenged their perjury convictions, arguing that the defect in the § 241 indictment meant that the 

court in the earlier case lacked jurisdiction; and this, in turn, 

meant that they could not be convicted of perjuring themselves at the conspiracy trial. The Court rejected this argument, reaffirming that even when the indictment fails to 

state an offense, the court is not deprived of jurisdiction: 

“Though the trial court or an appellate court may conclude 

that ... the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a 

crime ... , it has proceeded with jurisdiction[,] and false 

testimony before it under oath is perjury.” Id. at 68–69.

Lamar and Williams support the Fifth and Tenth Circuits’

broader understanding of the rule announced in Cotton:

defects in an indictment do not deprive the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and this is so even when the defect is a 

failure to state a federal offense. See De Vaughn, 694 F.3d at 

1148–49. Because indictment defects go to the merits of the 

case—not the court’s power to hear it—an objection to a 

defective indictment may be waived.

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Under Rule 12(b)(3)(B) an objection to “a defect in the indictment” must be made “by pretrial motion.” The rule 

contains an illustrative list of defects that are subject to this 

requirement; the list expressly includes “failure to state an 

offense.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). So the district judge 

correctly held that Muresanu waived his objection to the 

defective indictment by failing to raise the matter in a 

Rule 12(b)(3) motion.

B. Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Right

The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused 

to be tried only on charges in an indictment returned by a 

grand jury. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215. Altering an indictment 

without the approval of the grand jury “is per se reversible 

error.” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1984) 

(emphasis omitted); see also Stirone, 361 U.S. at 217 (“Deprivation of such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as 

nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless error.”).

Muresanu argues that the judge’s “cure” for the defective 

indictment—removing the “attempt” language from the jury 

instructions on counts two through four—led the jury to 

convict him of crimes not charged by the grand jury and 

therefore violated his right to be tried only on charges 

contained in the indictment. The government responds that 

the judge’s modification of the jury instructions amounted to 

a permissible variance of the indictment. Permissible variances come in two varieties. The first are variations “that are 

merely a matter of form,” such as correcting a “typographical or clerical error or a misnomer.” United States v. 

Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1991). The second are 

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variations that narrow the indictment to either fewer offenses or to lesser-included offenses. Id.

The modification at issue here neither corrected an error 

of form nor narrowed the indictment. The judge altered the 

substance of the indictment by changing the offense charged 

in counts two through four from an attempt to a completed

crime of aggravated identity theft—hardly a narrowing of the 

indictment. It was instead an impermissible variance.

The government falls back on waiver, attacking 

Muresanu’s defense strategy of bypassing a Rule 12(b)(3)

motion and waiting to raise the defective indictment at trial

after jeopardy attached and the prosecution had rested its 

case. We’ve just explained why this litigation strategy

waived a challenge to the defective indictment. It did not, 

however, waive Muresanu’s right to object to the modified 

jury instructions that led the jury to convict him of crimes 

not charged in the indictment. He did in fact object, so the 

Fifth Amendment error is preserved. And under Stirone

prejudice is presumed. 361 U.S. at 215.

We recognize that rewarding Muresanu’s strategy of

omitting a pretrial motion is contrary to the important policy 

considerations underlying Rule 12. The requirement that a 

defendant litigate indictment defects by pretrial motion 

“permits the United States to appeal from an order that, 

because of the Double Jeopardy Clause, cannot be appealed 

after trial.” United States v. Nixon, 901 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 

2018). Moreover, it “permits the parties to brief the issue 

with care, rather than address [the] ... issue on the fly” when 

it is raised midtrial. Id. And “[i]t prevents game playing.” Id.

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Muresanu’s defense strategy thwarted these purposes, 

allowing him to “enjoy a trial that [he could] win but not 

lose.” Id. Still, under Stirone the constitutional error is categorically prejudicial, and the required remedy is to vacate 

the judgment on counts two through four.

C. Sentencing Enhancements on Count One

That leaves count one. Muresanu’s conviction for possession of counterfeit access devices is unaltered by the constitutional error infecting the convictions for aggravated 

identity theft. Muresanu reiterates his challenge to the 

application of three offense-level enhancements under the 

Sentencing Guidelines: one for using a sophisticated means

to commit the crime, another for his supervisory role in the 

offense, and a third for using a minor in the scheme. We 

review for clear error. United States v. Wayland, 549 F.3d 526, 

528 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A two-level enhancement applies if the offense involved 

“sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). Application of this enhancement has ample support in the trial 

evidence. The scheme involved sophisticated equipment—

ATM skimmers and pinhole cameras—and installing these

devices without being detected took some skill. Moreover, to

disguise his identity, Muresanu changed his clothes and 

hairstyle as he moved from location to location. And when 

Muresanu received counterfeit bank cards from Vidu, he 

waited a period of time before using those cards so the 

victims would have a harder time identifying the ATMs

Muresanu had compromised. The judge properly applied

this enhancement.

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Muresanu insists that the sophisticated-means enhancement cannot apply because he was not the architect of the 

scheme. This argument raises a legal question. The 

sophisticated-means enhancement is appropriate when “the 

defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct 

constituting sophisticated means.” Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).

Nothing in this language limits application of the enhancement to only the mastermind of the scheme. Rather, the 

enhancement applies when the defendant “engaged in” or 

“caused” the relevant conduct—here, ATM skimming—

using sophisticated means.

Muresanu also challenges the judge’s application of an

offense-level enhancement under § 3B1.1 to account for his

aggravated role in the offense and the related rejection of his 

request for a minor-role reduction under § 3B1.2. A two-level 

enhancement applies if the defendant was an “organizer, 

leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” Id. § 3B1.1 n.2. “Orchestrating or coordinating activities performed by others makes a particular defendant a 

manager or supervisor.” United States v. Martinez, 520 F.3d 

749, 752 (7th Cir. 2008). 

The uncontested evidence established that Muresanu supervised his minor cousin Florin in this months-long skimming scheme, paying him from the share of the proceeds he 

received from Vidu. The judge properly relied on this evidence to support the supervisory-role enhancement, and 

correspondingly, to reject Muresanu’s request for a minorrole reduction. 

Finally, Muresanu challenges the application of the enhancement for using a minor to commit a crime. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.4. Muresanu argues that the enhancement applies only 

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to adults who used a minor; he was himself a minor for part 

of the scheme. We do not need to decide if this interpretation 

of § 3B1.4 is correct. Muresanu was 18 when he was arrested

and at the time was continuing to supervise Florin in the 

commission of the offense. The judge correctly applied this

enhancement. 

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

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