Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-03055/USCOURTS-ca10-16-03055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond L. Rogers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

RAYMOND L. ROGERS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-3055 

(D.C. Nos. 6:13-CV-01448-JTM and 

6:10-CR-10186-JTM-1) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Raymond L. Rogers, appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability 

(COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration filed 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Rogers filed his Rule 60(b) motion after the district 

court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing 

that the district court erred by failing to address two issues raised in his habeas 

petition. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny the request for 

COA and dismiss this matter. 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 20, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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BACKGROUND 

Rogers has already sought review from this court two times. See United States 

v. Rogers, 520 F. App’x 727 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Rogers, 599 F. App’x 

850 (10th Cir. 2015). On December 2, 2013, after we affirmed Rogers’ conviction for 

robbing a bank, brandishing a firearm during the robbery, and being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, Rogers filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Rogers asked 

the district court to grant summary judgment on his §2255 Motion, and on December 

9, 2015, the district court denied his motion for summary judgment, denied his § 

2255 motion, and declined to issue a COA. We also declined to issue a COA and 

dismissed the appeal. See Rogers, 599 F. App’x 850. The Supreme Court later denied 

Rogers’ petition for writ of certiorari. 

 After the Supreme Court denied Rogers’ petition for writ of certiorari, Rogers 

filed a Rule 60(b) motion asking the district court to vacate its order denying his § 

2255 motion. In his Rule 60(b) motion, Rogers argued that the district court had 

failed to consider two of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The district 

court denied Rogers’ Rule 60(b) motion because it had previously considered and 

rejected the issues argued by Rogers. Rogers later filed a motion to reconsider under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The district court denied this motion to reconsider, and Rogers 

appealed. 

 On appeal, Rogers claims that the district court erred in denying his Rule 60(b) 

motion because the court failed to discuss “Grounds 8 & 9” in its Memorandum and 

Order. In Ground 8, Rogers claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his 

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appellate counsel failed to argue that the district court’s jury instructions 

constructively amended the indictment. In Ground 9, Rogers claimed ineffective 

assistance of counsel because his appellate counsel had failed to raise alleged 

violations under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), even though the 

Supreme Court decided Alleyne after his conviction was final. 

DISCUSSION

First, when analyzing a Rule 60(b) motion, we must “consider each of the 

issues raised in the motion in order to determine whether it represents a second or 

successive petition, a ‘true’ Rule 60(b) motion, or a mixed motion.” Spitznas v. 

Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006). Second, if the motion is a “true” Rule 

60(b) motion, we must determine whether Rogers is entitled to a COA. Id. at 1224–

25. 

1. Rogers’ Motions are “True” Motions 

Congress has restricted the filing of second or successive habeas petitions. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b). And Rule 60(b) motions constitute “second or successive 

[petitions] if [they] in substance or effect [assert] or [reassert] a federal basis for 

relief from the petitioner’s underlying conviction.” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215. By 

contrast a “true” Rule 60(b) motion “(1) challenges only a procedural ruling of the 

habeas court which precluded a merits determination of the habeas application; or (2) 

challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, provided that 

such a challenge does not itself lead inextricably to a merits-based attack on the 

disposition of a prior habeas motion.” Id. at 1216 (citation omitted). 

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 Here, Rogers’ motions are “true” motions rather than second or successive 

petitions. In his Rule 60(b) motion, Rogers claims the district court erred by failing to 

address issues he raised in his habeas petition. A claim that the district court failed to 

consider a ground raised in the habeas petition represents a “true” 60(b) claim. Id. at 

1225 (the defendants “contention that the district court failed to consider one of his 

habeas claims represents a ‘true’ 60(b) claim.”). Therefore, Rogers’ motion is a 

“true” motion, so we proceed to consider whether to issue a COA. 

2. No COA is warranted 

“If the district court correctly treated the motion . . . as a ‘true’ Rule 60(b) 

motion and denied it, we will require the movant to obtain a [COA] before 

proceeding with his or her appeal.” Id. at 1217–18. “A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review.” Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). We will issue a COA “only 

if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies petitioner’s claim on 

the merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the district court denies the petitioner’s 

claims on procedural grounds, the petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.; accord Omar-Muhammad v. 

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Williams, 484 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying this standard when 

deciding whether a § 2254 petitioner was entitled to a COA that would enable him to 

appeal the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion). 

 “Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment and request 

reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances . . . .” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 

545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). Rogers filed his motion under Rule 60(b)(4). We review 

de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. United States v. Buck, 281 

F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 2002). Rule 60(b)(4) allows a court to relieve a party from 

a final judgment if the underlying judgment is void. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). “A 

judgment is void only if the court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject 

matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” 

Buck, 281 F.3d at 1344 (quotation marks omitted). 

 Rogers contends that his habeas judgment is void because the district court 

denied him due process of law by failing to address two of his claims. But, under 

Rule 60(b)(4), a litigant has received due process if “fundamental procedural 

prerequisites—particularly, adequate notice and opportunity to be heard—were fully 

satisfied.” Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994). “[A] judgment is 

not void merely because it is erroneous.” Buck, 281 F.3d at 1344 (quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Rogers’ argument fails because the district court considered Rogers’ claims, 

discussed the claims, and adequately addressed Rogers’ arguments. For example, the 

district court explained that “counsel’s alleged failure to challenge defendant’s 84-

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month sentence [the Alleyne argument] was not a failure at all and would have been 

irrelevant based on the law at the time of defendant’s sentencing and before his 

judgment became final. Defendant’s assignment of error is therefore dismissed.” R. 

Vol. 1 at 773. We previously endorsed the district court’s analysis and described it as 

a “careful 25–page opinion.” Rogers, 599 F. App’x at 851. We continue to see no 

error in the Court’s analysis. Furthermore, Rogers doesn’t dispute that he received 

adequate notice or the opportunity to present his arguments. Thus, reasonable jurists 

could not debate the district court’s conclusion that the district court afforded Rogers 

due process and therefore, the judgment is not void. 

3. Rogers’ Motion to Supplement his Rule 60(b) Motion is Denied 

On July 1, 2016, Rogers filed a motion to supplement his Rule 60(b) motion 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Rogers filed this motion to supplement more than six 

months after the district court denied his Rule 60(b) motion and after he had already 

filed his briefing with this court. Thus, Rogers’ motion to supplement is untimely. 

Additionally, Rogers’ motion to supplement does not qualify as a pleading under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 15.1

 Finally, Rogers’ motion to supplement doesn’t seek any relief under 

Rule 60(b) and is, instead, an attempt to reargue issues we have already considered 

and rejected. So, Rogers’ motion to supplement his Rule 60(b) motion is denied. 

 1

 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), the only pleadings allowed are (1) a complaint; 

(2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to counterclaim designated as a counter 

claim; (4) an answer to a cross claim; (5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a 

third-party complaint; and (7) a reply to an answer. 

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CONCLUSION 

The application for COA, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and the 

motion to supplement the Rule 60(b) motion are denied and the appeal is dismissed. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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