Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05294/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05294-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Milan Paul Pakes
Petitioner
James A. Yates
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MILAN PAUL PAKES,

Petitioner,

v

JAMES A YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C-04-5294 VRW

ORDER

After carefully considering the merits of the petition,

the response and the traverse, the court referred this habeas

corpus matter to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing

pursuant to 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of

California Civil Local Rule 72-1. Order dated September 27, 2006,

Doc #21. The magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation

(R & R) recommending that the writ of habeas corpus be granted. 

Doc #55. Respondent James A Yates, the warden of Pleasant Valley

state prison in Coalinga, California, has filed objections to the

R & R. Doc #56. 

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For the reasons stated herein, the court hereby ADOPTS the

R & R in its entirety and GRANTS the petition for habeas corpus. 

 

I

The facts pertinent to the adjudication of the petition

were recited in the order of September 27, 2006 (Doc #21) and were

summarized in the R & R (Doc #55). The court referred this matter

for an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge in order to

resolve whether petitioner received constitutionally deficient

advice from his counsel and whether petitioner was prejudiced by

that advice. Doc #21 at 24, 30. 

The factual inquiry addressed four questions:

(1) Whether trial counsel misinformed petitioner

of the likelihood that he would be convicted under

California Vehicle Code § 2800.2. 

(2) Whether trial counsel failed to inform

petitioner that California Penal Code § 654 might

bar conviction and punishment under two separate

statutes for the same conduct. 

(3) Whether the trial court would have likely

instructed the jury on a possible affirmative

defense available to petitioner, the lesser

included offense of misdemeanor child

endangerment, and whether petitioner’s counsel

failed to inform him of this defense. 

(4) Whether trial counsel misled petitioner

regarding his likelihood of prevailing on his

Romero motion to strike a prior conviction. 

Id at 11-24. All four questions test petitioner’s contention that

his trial counsel, Miguel Chacon, gave him materially inaccurate

advice regarding the likely sentence petitioner would have received

if he had been convicted at trial versus that he could expect from

the plea bargain to which he ultimately agreed. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The magistrate judge conducted a three-day hearing in

which he heard testimony from Chacon, Santa Clara County prosecutor

James Gibbons-Shapiro, criminal defense attorney Allen Schwartz (who

testified as an expert witness for petitioner), petitioner, his

parents and his brother. The ensuing thirty-four-page R & R

contained detailed evidentiary findings in favor of petitioner on

all four of the questions presented and recommended granting the

petition. 

Respondent filed objections to the R & R, broadly

asserting that the magistrate judge was biased against respondent’s

witnesses, skeptical toward testimony supporting respondent’s

position, confused over California criminal law standards and

lacking in understanding of applicable federal constitutional

standards. Doc #56 at 3.

II

A court “shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C);

FRCP 72(b). A court “may accept, reject, or modify” the magistrate

judge’s recommendation. Id. Congress, by providing for a de novo

“determination” rather than a de novo hearing, “intended to permit

whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound

judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed

findings and recommendations.” United States v Raddatz, 447 US 667,

676 (1980). When dealing with issues of credibility, the district

court should rarely reject the magistrate judge’s determination

because “to do so without seeing and hearing the witness or

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witnesses whose credibility is in question could well give rise to

serious questions * * * .” Id at 681. 

Respondent cites Fisher v Roe, 263 F3d 906, 912 (9th Cir

2001) for the proposition that the magistrate judge’s factual

findings are reviewed for clear error. Doc #56 at 4. Fisher, which

concerns an appellate court’s review of a district court’s factual

findings, sets forth a helpful explication of the “clear error”

standard. Noting that many attorneys do not fully comprehend the

“arduousness” of the clear error standard, the Fisher court

encapsulates that standard colorfully as follows:

To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike

us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it

must, as one member of this court recently

stated * * *, strike us as wrong with the force

of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.

263 F3d at 912 (quoting Parts and Electric Motors, Inc v Sterling

Electric, Inc, 866 F2d 228, 233 (7th Cir 1988)). This, then, is

the standard under which the court reviews respondent’s objections

to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact. 

III

To recap the applicable law regarding the standards

applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims in

federal court arising from a petitioner’s entry of a guilty plea,

due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and

voluntary because it constitutes the waiver of three constitutional

rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s

accusers and the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin

v Alabama, 395 US 238, 242-43 (1969). 

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A criminal defendant who enters a guilty plea on the

advice of counsel may generally only attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice

he received from counsel was not within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Hill v Lockhart, 474

US 52, 56 (1985); Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258, 268 (1973);

United States v Signori, 844 F2d 635, 638 (9th Cir 1988). 

Petitioner must satisfy the two-part standard of Strickland v

Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984), by demonstrating that (1)

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. Hill, 474 US at 57-59.

In demonstrating that his counsel’s performance was

deficient, petitioner must overcome “a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 US at 689. Where the

issue is whether counsel accurately predicted the sentence a

defendant would receive if convicted at trial, “a mere inaccurate

prediction, standing alone, would not constitute ineffective

assistance.” Iaea v Sunn, 800 F2d 861, 865 (9th Cir 1986). 

Instead, petitioner must show “the gross mischaracterization of the

likely outcome * * * [and] erroneous advice on the possible effects

of going to trial.” Id. To satisfy the prejudice requirement,

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 US at 57-59; Iaea, 800

F2d at 865. 

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A

First, the R & R concluded that petitioner’s counsel’s

failure to inform petitioner of the availability of a viable

defense to California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 constituted a gross

mischaracterization of the likely sentence combined with erroneous

advice on the probable outcome of trial per Iaea v Sunn, 800 F3d

861, 865 (9th Cir 1986). Doc #55 at 13. The R & R set forth eight

specific evidentiary findings in support of this conclusion. Doc

#55 at 11-12. The R & R further found that petitioner was

prejudiced by the advice because, but for counsel’s errors in

advising him, petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. Id

at 27-28. The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s

conclusions. 

Respondent, in this and other objections to the R & R,

protests the magistrate judge’s weighing of testimony given at the

hearing. The availability of a defense on this specific issue

hinged in part on whether one or more police cars were behind, and

therefore “pursuing,” petitioner’s vehicle. The prosecution’s only

evidence in support of this element consisted of the testimony of

Adriene, the young girl at issue in the child endangerment charge,

at the preliminary hearing. The R & R painstakingly considered the

available evidence on this issue and concluded that “there were no

marked police cars pursuing [petitioner] until Sgt St Amour started

giving chase.” Doc # 55 at 10. Particularly persuasive on this

point was the evidence at the hearing establishing that the

prosecution had no other evidence of pursuing police cars at its

disposal. The prosecutor admitted this under oath and the other

police reports placed into evidence made no mention of other police

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cars giving chase. Id. Yet respondent’s objection challenges as

“clearly erroneous” the magistrate judge’s decision to give this

evidence greater weight than Adriene’s preliminary hearing

testimony, arguing that Adriene did not testify before the

magistrate judge and that a jury might have believed her. Doc #56

at 9-12. But the R & R systematically details the evidence from

the record and the evidentiary hearing that establishes, at the

very least, that the prosecution faced significant challenges in

trying to establish “pursuit.” See Doc #55 at 9-13. There is no

basis for disturbing the magistrate judge’s factual findings. 

Respondent also argues that both the undersigned and the

magistrate judge erred in construing “pursuit” under Vehicle Code §

2800.2(a). See order dated September 27, 2006 (Doc #21) at 14; Doc

# 55 at 8-9. Respondent, citing Estelle v McGuire, 502 US 62

(1991) for support, asserts that this court’s determination that

“pursuit” means that a police car must actually be behind the car

being pursued runs afoul of the prohibition on federal habeas

courts determining state law. Doc #56 at 9. Estelle held that “it

is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas

review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 

502 US at 67-68 (citations omitted). But Estelle is inapposite

because this federal court has not reviewed or reexamined a state

court’s determination of state law in this case. On the contrary,

the court specifically called attention to the absence of case law

interpreting the meaning of “pursuit” under § 2800.2(a) and,

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because petitioner pled guilty, there was no adjudication of legal

issues by the state trial court. Doc #21 at 14. 

At issue here is the competence of petitioner’s trial

counsel in advising petitioner prior to the guilty plea and,

specifically, how he handled the absence of case law interpreting

Vehicle Code § 2800.2. As the court explained in the order of

September 27, 2006, 

[w]ithout a controlling interpretation from a

California court, the court cannot conclusively

state that petitioner could not have been

convicted of violating § 2800.2. But given the

obvious uncertainty about the applicability of

the statutes under which petitioner was charged,

counsel had the obligation “to inform the

defendant of the dearth of legal authority, and

to inform defendant that the legal evaluation of

the case was based thereon,”

citing People v Maguire, 67 Cal App 4th 1022, 1031 (1998). After

taking evidence on the matter, the magistrate judge found that

petitioner’s counsel failed to inform him of the “dearth of legal

authority” interpreting “pursuit” under § 2800.2(a), Doc #55 at 9-

13, and that petitioner would not have pled guilty had be known of

the problems with the prosecution’s case on the Vehicle Code §

2800.2 charge. Doc # 55 at 23. In reaching this conclusion, the

magistrate judge did not merely rely on petitioner’s testimony to

this effect but also on his conclusion that the plea bargain was

“essentially worthless” and would have had little appeal had

petitioner been adequately informed. Id. The court agrees with

the R & R’s analysis of these points.

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B

Regarding the second question, the R & R concluded that

(1) petitioner’s counsel failed to inform him that California Penal

Code § 654 barred multiple punishments for the evasion and

endangerment charges and (2) that this failure prejudiced him by

inducing him to enter into a plea bargain that did not benefit him. 

Doc #55 at 13-15, 28-29. “All of the witnesses [at the evidentiary

hearing] agreed that Mr Pakes would not likely have been punished

for both crimes had he been convicted of both.” Id at 28-29. On

this point, the R & R cross-references evidence adduced at the

hearing that petitioner believed, in entering the plea bargain,

that his exposure at trial was to a sentence of fifty years to

life, a belief inconsistent with having been inadequately informed

of the impossibility of being convicted separately for the two

crimes. Doc # 55 at 15:14-16. Respondent has offered nothing more

specific than a general complaint about the magistrate judge’s

weighing of testimony from various witnesses. Accordingly, the

court discerns no reason to disturb the magistrate judge’s findings

regarding the § 654 question. 

C

On the third question, the R & R concluded that there was

a “strong likelihood” that the trial judge would have instructed

the jury of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor child

endangerment under California Penal Code § 273a(b) and that

petitioner’s counsel failed to inform petitioner of the

availability of this defense. Doc #55 at 21. The magistrate judge

determined that Chacon’s recommendation that petitioner plead

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guilty to a third strike felony when § 273a(b) provided a defense

was based on a gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome by

petitioner’s counsel. Id. Furthermore, the magistrate judge

determined that petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s

deficient performance. Id at 29. The court agrees with the

magistrate judge’s conclusions.

Respondent does not make specific objections to this

finding, but rather asserts generally that the magistrate judge

should have given Chacon and Gibbons-Shapiro more deference than

petitioner’s witnesses. The magistrate judge weighed their

testimony against that of petitioner and his mother, Marilyn Pakes. 

See Doc #55 at 18-21. While the magistrate judge found that whether

Chacon informed petitioner of the possibility of a misdemeanor

rather than a felony conviction if he chose to go to trial was “a

closer question” than others presented in the case, he determined

that Chacon did not inform petitioner of the possibility that he

might have been convicted of a misdemeanor instead of a felony and

thus drawn a lighter sentence because he found petitioner’s

witnesses more credible on this point. Doc #55 at 18. The

magistrate judge noted that the fact that “[petitioner] appeared

convinced that he would get 50 years to life if convicted at trial”

corroborated his determination. Id. The magistrate judge also

carefully considered the testimony of witnesses and the contents of

Chacon’s research files in determining that Chacon’s advice to

petitioner had been deficient. Id at 19. The court discerns no

basis for interfering with the magistrate judge’s determination of

the factual issues presented by the third question. 

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D

The fourth and final question the R & R addressed was

whether trial counsel misled petitioner as to the likelihood of the

trial judge granting his Romero motion. The magistrate judge found

that Chacon clouded petitioner’s understanding of the trial judge’s

on-the-record statements by failing to impress upon petitioner how

remote the possibility of the trial judge granting the Romero motion

actually was. Doc #55 at 22. The magistrate judge cited a letter

from petitioner to his father as well as the testimony of criminal

practitioner Schwartz that on the facts of petitioner’s case, the

chances that the trial judge would have granted the Romero motion

were “slim to none.” Id at 22. Moreover, Gibbons-Shapiro testified

at the evidentiary hearing that he knew of no instance in which

Judge Lee had granted a Romero motion. Id at 26. The magistrate

judge concluded that “there was no material advantage for

[petitioner] to enter the plea” and that “[t]he Romero motion would

likely have suffered the same fate whether made after plea or after

trial.” Id. 

Respondent argues that the magistrate judge ignored “the

strong and compelling testimony” of Chacon and Gibbons-Shapiro that,

in general, more Romero motions are granted before trial than after

trial and that “50 percent of all Romero motions are granted in

Santa Clara County.” Doc #56 at 14, 17-18. Respondent also draws

special attention to Schwartz’s testimony that in his own

experience, Romero motions were more often granted before than after

trial. Id at 14. But because respondent’s evidence can readily be

reconciled with the magistrate judge’s findings, the latter were not

“clearly erroneous.” The testimony about Romero motions generally

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does not effectively undercut the evidence that it was very unlikely

that the trial judge in this particular case would grant the motion. 

Moreover, the “tactical” decision to recommend a guilty plea because

of a supposed advantage of bringing a Romero motion before rather

than after trial makes little sense if the Romero motion was a long

shot under either scenario. Even doubling or tripling a remote

chance of success does not appreciably increase the odds of victory. 

On a separate point pertinent to the Romero motion, the

magistrate judge found that (1) petitioner’s prior convictions were

unlikely to have been disclosed to the jury if he had gone to trial

because child endangerment is a general intent crime not requiring

evidence of motive and (2) petitioner’s counsel failed to inform

petitioner that a jury was not likely to hear about his prior

convictions if he chose to go to trial, while the trial judge would

decide the Romero motion based on the entire record, including

petitioner’s prior convictions. Id at 29-31. As evidence of the

latter point, the magistrate judge found that Chacon never responded

to a letter from the prosecutor announcing his intention to

introduce the prior convictions, filed no response to the

prosecutor’s motion in limine and never moved to strike the priors. 

Id at 31. The R & R concluded “[t]hese facts indicate that, at the

very least, the issue was not a high priority for Mr Chacon and

therefore lessens the likelihood that he would have brought up the

issue with [petitioner].” Id. 

Although the magistrate judge found that “there is not a

reasonable probability that Mr Pakes would have refused the plea and

opted for trial on this issue alone,” he concluded that the failure

to inform petitioner about the likely inadmissibility of the prior

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convictions, while in itself not prejudicial, “strengthens the above

findings of prejudice flowing from the failure of Mr Chacon to fully

inform [petitioner] of his affirmative defenses.” Id at 32. The

R & R concluded: “The fact that Mr Pakes could have proceeded to

trial with a likelihood that the priors would have been excluded

enhanced the chance of a favorable outcome with the jury and thus

increased the chances that Mr Pakes, if adequately informed, would

have opted for trial.” Id. The court agrees with the magistrate

judge’s conclusions. 

Respondent objects to this part of the magistrate judge’s

analysis by arguing that evidence of petitioner’s parole violation

and prior convictions would in fact have been admissible before the

jury as motive evidence. Doc #56 at 18, 20. In support of this

position respondent first argues that the magistrate judge should

have placed greater weight on the testimony of Chacon and GibbonsShapiro than on the testimony of Schwartz. Id. Second, respondent

argues that the magistrate judge applied the law incorrectly when

concluding that evidence of petitioner’s parole status and his prior

convictions would have been excluded under California Evidence Code

§ 352 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by

the undue prejudice they would cause. Doc #56 at 18-20. The cases

respondent cites in support of his proposition —— i e, that evidence

of petitioner’s prior convictions and parole status would have been

admissible at trial —— all deal with specific intent crimes, see id

at 20, and, therefore, fail to refute the magistrate judge’s

rationale so far as it is based on child endangerment being a

general intent crime. Additionally, this court agrees that the

probative value of introducing petitioner’s prior convictions and

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parole status would have been substantially outweighed by the danger

of undue prejudice it may have created to the jury. 

We return again to the compass of this court’s inquiry: 

the court’s role is not to guess or to determine what would have

happened had petitioner elected to go to trial, but rather whether

petitioner received constitutionally adequate advice in making the

life-altering decision whether to plead guilty or to go to trial. 

The court finds persuasive the magistrate judge’s findings

indicating that Chacon took no steps to suppress the evidence of the

priors and the inference from this fact and from other evidence that

Chacon failed to advise petitioner about the likely inadmissibility

of his prior convictions. Schwartz’s testimony that the priors

should not have been admitted does not necessarily end debate on the

inadmissibility of the priors, but makes clear that this issue

should have had a higher profile than the evidence shows it did in

petitioner’s deliberations. 

Accordingly, the court adopts the magistrate judge’s

recommendation. 

IV 

The court, after reviewing the R & R and respondent’s

objections thereto, ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s recommendations.

 The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Pakes’

conviction is VACATED and respondent is ordered to release Pakes

from custody within sixty (60) days of the date this order is filed

unless the State of California initiates criminal proceedings

against him. The parties shall file a joint status report with the

court within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order. 

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The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the Santa

Clara County Public Defender’s Office at 120 West Mission Street,

San Jose, CA 95110. The court requests that the Santa Clara County

Public Defender provide or obtain representation for petitioner if

he meets the eligibility requirements. 

The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate all

pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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