Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01796/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01796-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M. Kramer
Respondent
Leroy Storie
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEROY STORIE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

M. KRAMER, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________ )

1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on December 7, 2006. A

preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the petition may be untimely. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

///

Case 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG Document 12 Filed 01/07/08 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 2

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood,

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed on December 7, 2006, and thus, it th

is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on February 9, 2001 and sentencved on

Case 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG Document 12 Filed 01/07/08 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner does not indicate the date on which the 5 DCA denied his appeal. However, the Court has access to 1 th

the California Courts’ electronic database and has determined the appropriate dates for Petitioner’s appeal. If Petitioner has

information that contradicts the dates contained in the state courts’ database, he should present that information in his

response to this Order to Show Cause.

In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 2

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

 3

March 13, 2001. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner indicated that he filed a direct appeal of his conviction;

however, the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District (“5 DCA”) denied the th

appeal on February 26, 2002. Petitioner does not allege in the petition that he then filed a Petition 1

for Review in the California Supreme Court, instead indicating “NA” at the appropriate place in the

form petition. The Court understands Petitioner to have indicated “not applicable” as to this point,

and indeed the Court has been unable to find any reference to such a Notice of Appeal in the

California Supreme Court in the state court’s database. Thus, direct review would have concluded

and Petitioner’s conviction would have become final forty days after the California Court of Appeal

filed its opinion on February 26, 2002. See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 24(a), 28(b), 45(a); Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 12a; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir. 2002). That date would be April 7, 2002. th

Petitioner would then have one year from that date, or until April 7, 2003, absent applicable

tolling, within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition in this case

was filed on December 7, 2006, over three and one-half years after the limitations period expired. 

Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling, his petition is untimely and

must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 2 th

Case 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG Document 12 Filed 01/07/08 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 4

(2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at

1005. However, the limitations period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001). 

Moreover, a petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run

prior to filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); see th

Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, th

920 (petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the oneyear limitations period). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that he filed a habeas petition in the Kern County Superior Court on

December 7, 2001, before Petitioner’s direct appeal became final. (Doc. 1, p. 3; p. 58). Petitioner

does not indicate when the Kern County Superior Court denied that petition. Petitioner also alleges

that he exhausted his claims by filing a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. (Doc.

1). Petitioner does not indicate when he filed that petition, or when it was denied, or whether he had

previously filed other habeas petitions in the lower state courts; rather, Petitioner appends his own

copy of the habeas petition, which is not file-stamped by the state supreme court. However, the

Court’s review of the state court electronic database indicates that Petitioner filed the habeas petition

in the California Supreme Court on November 10, 2005, that he filed an amended petition on or

about May 17, 2006, and that the supreme court denied the petition on August 23, 2006. 

As mentioned, however, the limitations period expired on April 7, 2003, some two and onehalf years before Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. Because

the limitations period appeared to expire before he filed his state habeas petitions, he would not be

entitled to statutory tolling. Green, 223 F.3d at 1003. Based on the information currently before the

Court, it appears that, unless the petition filed in the Kern County Superior Court remained pending

Case 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG Document 12 Filed 01/07/08 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 5

from its filing on December 7, 2001, until November 10, 2004 (one year prior to Petitioner filing his

state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court), the one-year statute of limitations would have

expired and the instant petition would be untimely.

Of course, it may be the case that Petitioner filed additional state habeas petitions that would

entitle him to statutory tolling but that Petitioner has simply neglected to inform the Court of that

fact. Accordingly, Petitioner will be permitted the opportunity in his response to the Court’s Order

to Show Cause to provide further information regarding the dates during which any state habeas

petitions were pending, including the dates of filing, the courts in which the petitions were filed, the

issues raised, and the dates of decision. Petitioner should include in his response copies of any state

petitions he has filed as well as the state court’s decisions on those petitions.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998)(citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1997)); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be th

available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances'

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time"). "When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9 Cir. 1999). th

Petitioner does not contend that equitable tolling applies here. 

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

///

///

Case 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG Document 12 Filed 01/07/08 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 6

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in Findings and

Recommendations recommending that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:06-cv-01796-AWI-TAG Document 12 Filed 01/07/08 Page 6 of 6