Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02634/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02634-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie Brown-Bey
Appellant
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Not Party

Document Text:

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

DLD-086 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 15-2634

____________

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIE BROWN-BEY,

Appellant

__________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Crim. No. 2-15-cr-00026-001)

District Judge: Lawrence F. Stengel

__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and

I.O.P. 10.6 and for a Certificate of Appealability Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253

December 17, 2015

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 19, 2016)

____________

OPINION*

____________

Case: 15-2634 Document: 003112182748 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/19/2016
2

PER CURIAM

Willie Brown-Bey appeals from an order of the District Court summarily 

remanding his state criminal case to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. 

For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

Brown-Bey was arrested by the Philadelphia police on or about May 2, 2012, and 

charged with various firearms offenses and receiving stolen property, see Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania v. Brown-Bey, No. CP-51-CR-0007330-2012. After his pretrial motion 

to suppress the evidence was denied, Brown-Bey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, see BrownBey v. CCP of Philadelphia County, D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-06321. He claimed that his 

continued detention violated his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and to be free from 

an unreasonable search and seizure, in pertinent part. The Magistrate Judge 

recommended dismissing the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, see Moore v. 

DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975), concluding that Brown-Bey did not establish the 

required extraordinary circumstances for relief because any delay associated with his trial 

was due to his own actions. The District Court agreed and dismissed Brown-Bey’s 

habeas corpus petition. On August 26, 2015, we denied him a certificate of appealability, 

stating that his case presented “no extraordinary circumstances warranting pretrial 

Case: 15-2634 Document: 003112182748 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/19/2016
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interference by a federal court in the normal functioning of state criminal processes,” see

C.A. No. 15-2179.1

Meanwhile, on January 6, 2015, Brown-Bey removed his criminal case to federal 

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1455 and § 1443, again challenging his state prosecution on 

federal constitutional grounds, particularly his right to be free from an unreasonable 

search and seizure. In an order entered on June 4, 2015, the District Court summarily 

remanded the case to state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4) (“If it clearly appears on the 

face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be permitted, 

the court shall make an order for summary remand.”).2 

Brown-Bey appeals. “An order remanding a case to the State court from which it 

was removed is not reviewable on appeal” unless the case was removed pursuant to either 

§ 1442 or § 1443. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Thus, to the extent that Brown-Bey challenges 

the District Court’s remand order with respect to any bases for removal other than § 1442 

or § 1443, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 

1044, 1047 (3d Cir.1997). We have jurisdiction to review the remand order to the extent 

that Brown-Bey asserted that removal was proper under § 1443, which authorizes 

removal in circumstances where a person is being denied his civil rights and cannot 

enforce those rights in the state courts. Id. (citing Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 

 

1 The publicly available docket for Brown-Bey’s criminal case, No. CP-51-CR-0007330-

2012, now shows that his trial is for February 22, 2016, and that he was granted bail on 

October 22, 2015, and is subject to house arrest and electronic monitoring.

2 The current version of § 1455, which went into effect on December 7, 2011, governs the 

procedures for removal of criminal prosecutions.

Case: 15-2634 Document: 003112182748 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/19/2016
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(1966)). We exercise plenary review here. See Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 237 

F.3d 242, 247 (2000).

Our Clerk advised Brown-Bey that the appeal was subject to summary action 

under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, and that the Court also would consider 

whether a certificate of appealability was required to proceed.3 The parties were invited 

to submit argument in writing and neither has done so. 

We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 

question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The 

District Court properly remanded Brown-Bey’s criminal prosecution to state court. As 

explained by the District Court, the removal permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1443 is narrow. 

Under subparagraph (1), removal is permitted only by a defendant “who is denied or 

cannot enforce” in the state courts “a right under any law providing for the equal civil 

rights” of such persons. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). Where the party seeking removal asserts 

the violation of his constitutional rights phrased in terms of general rights applicable to 

all citizens, rather than provisions couched in the specific language of racial equality, 

there is no basis for removal of an action to federal court. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792; 

Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047. Thus, a defendant seeking to remove a case under § 1443(1) 

must demonstrate that the rights claimed arise under a provision of the Constitution or 

federal law specifically designed to promote racial equality, and must also specifically 

allege that he has been denied or cannot enforce in the state court the right that was 

created by the civil rights law under which he seeks protection. The allegation of illegal 

 

3 A certificate of appealability is not required here, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(1)(A).

Case: 15-2634 Document: 003112182748 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/19/2016
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or corrupt acts of individual state officials that might be corrected by the state judiciary, 

or the mere possibility of an unfair trial in state court, will not justify removal to the 

federal court under § 1443(1). City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 

(1966). 

Here, removal under § 1443(1) would not be proper because Brown-Bey did not 

identify any provision of Pennsylvania statutory or constitutional law that would preclude 

the protection of his equal rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and he did 

not demonstrate that the Pennsylvania courts would not afford him the full protections of 

the law. The case also is not removable under § 1443(2). Subparagraph (2) applies only 

to “federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively 

executing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil rights,” Peacock, 384 

U.S. at 824; and state officers who refuse to do an act on the ground that it would be 

inconsistent with civil rights laws, see Greenberg v. Veteran, 889 F.2d 418, 421 (2d Cir. 

1989) (“The purpose of the ‘refusal clause’ is to provide a federal forum for suits against 

state officers who uphold equal protection in the face of strong public disapproval.”). 

Brown-Bey is neither a federal nor state officer. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 

summarily remanding Brown-Bey’s criminal case to state court. 

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