Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02303/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02303-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lucille Lorraine Montoya
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

LUCILLE LORRAINE MONTOYA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 93-2303 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR 93-208 HB) 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

Submitted on the Briefs:* 

Kurt J. Mayer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico for Defendant-Appellant. 

Tara c. Neda, Assistant United states Attorney, and John J. Kelly, 

United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Ms. Montoya plead guilty to possession with intent to 

distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, 21 u.s.c. 

§ 841(a) (1), (b) (1) (D), and appeals the district court's decision 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 93-2303 Document: 01019284568 Date Filed: 05/19/1994 Page: 1 
not to grant her a two-level downward adjustment of her offense 

level, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), for being a minor participant, 

specifically a courier, see id. comment, (n.2). The district 

court's finding that she was not a minor participant is not 

clearly erroneous. See United States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 

1114-15 (lOth Cir. 1994). Ms. Montoya had been involved in this 

venture at least four months prior to her transporting these 

seventeen pounds, by acquiring the vehicle and admitting to 

previous transportation in December 1992. We cannot agree that 

the district court misapplied the Guidelines by failing to 

recognize that a courier might be eligible for the adjustment, 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2), or by reasoning that a single 

defendant would be ineligible for the adjustment, or by failing to 

make adequate factual findings concerning challenged information, 

or by failing to explain its decision on the issue. Nor can we 

agree that Ms. Montoya was deprived of due process because the 

probation officer responded to Ms. Montoya's objections to the 

presentence report, or because the probation officer's ambiguous 

critique of our cases was somewhat broad, or because defendants in 

other cases have received the downward adjustment based upon 

stipulation or additional investigation. 

We reject out-of-hand the assertion that the probation 

officer is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by citing 

our cases to explain a recommended Guideline sentence, or by 

responding to the objections to the presentence report made by 

either party. Contrary to the assertion of defense counsel, the 

probation officer is doing no more than discharging her 

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Appellate Case: 93-2303 Document: 01019284568 Date Filed: 05/19/1994 Page: 2 
responsibility under 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(c) (2) (B), and assisting the court in resolving objections under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (3) (D). The district court remains the 

arbiter of such disputes, and upon proper objection, either the 

defendant or the government is free to appeal a finding/conclusion 

urged by the probation officer and ultimately adopted by the 

district court. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(a) & (b). 

We have reviewed the presentence report, the objections and 

supplemental objections to it, I R. docs. 23 and 24, and the 

sentencing transcript. The district court correctly recognized 

that there were no disputed facts requiring findings and then 

exercised its discretion based on the facts. III R. 14-15. It 

was not compelled to accept Ms. Montoya's view of the outcome 

suggested by selected facts. Ballard, 16 F.3d at 1115. The 

district court's apparent decision that Ms. Montoya's conduct, and 

involvement in more than "a single smuggling transaction" placed 

her beyond the conduct envisioned by U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.2, comment. 

(n.2), is amply supported by the facts. Given the important 

function of couriers in drug distribution networks, we have 

recognized that couriers often are not minor participants. 

Ballard, 16 F.3d at 1115; United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 

F.2d 1519, 1524 (lOth Cir. 1993); United States v. Martinez, 983 

F.2d 968, 977-78 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 s. Ct. 1959, 

2372 (1993); United States v. Carter, 971 F.2d 597, 600 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 628 (1992). And so it is with 

this case. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Appellate Case: 93-2303 Document: 01019284568 Date Filed: 05/19/1994 Page: 3