Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01518/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01518-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Versiah M. Taylor
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VERSIAH M. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1518

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Florida in No. 5:14-cv-00252-RSEMT, Judge Richard Smoak.

______________________ 

Decided: September 16, 2015

______________________ 

 VERSIAH M. TAYLOR, Talladega, AL, pro se. 

GEOFFREY MARTIN LONG, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 

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2 TAYLOR v. US

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Versiah M. Taylor pro se appeals the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Florida’s denial 

of his motion to transfer his claims to the United States 

Court of Federal Claims. Because the Court of Federal 

Claims lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor’s claims, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In August 2014, Mr. Taylor filed a complaint in the 

United States District Court for the Middle District of 

Florida, which was transferred sua sponte to the Northern 

District. The complaint alleges violations of 26 U.S.C. § 

7431, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(g), 18 U.S.C. § 2707(g) and 5 

U.S.C. § 552a by the Internal Revenue Service. In general, Mr. Taylor seeks damages for alleged improper 

disclosure of his personal information during an investigation into fraudulent income tax filings. Despite this, 

Magistrate Judge Timothy entered an order stating that 

“Plaintiff ... initiated this civil rights action by filing a 

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and requiring Mr. 

Taylor to use the corresponding local complaint form.1

Mr. Taylor filed a motion to transfer his case to the

Court of Federal Claims that was denied without explanation.2 An appeal to the District Judge was likewise de1 Mr. Taylor had previously filed allegations similar 

to those alleged in this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 using 

the local complaint form. See Taylor v. Pekerol, No. 14-

12446, 2015 WL 4774813, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2015). 

Those claims were initially dismissed, but that decision 

was vacated and remanded on appeal. Id. at *4.

2 “An appellate court can affirm a decision of the 

trial court upon any ground supported by the record.” 

 

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TAYLOR v. US 3

nied. Mr. Taylor appealed those decisions to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which 

transferred the appeal sua sponte to this court. 

DISCUSSION

Transfer is permissible only if the destination court 

has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Souders v. 

S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a 

motion to transfer. Id. Our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1292(d)(4)(A) is limited to the motion to transfer. Id. 

Although we afford pro se plaintiffs leniency for mere 

formalities, we cannot waive or overlook jurisdictional 

requirements. Kelley v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 

F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Below and on appeal Mr. Taylor argued that the 

Tucker Act, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), allows 

transfer of his complaint to the Court of Federal Claims. 

The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims over “any claim against the United States 

founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This limited subject matter jurisdiction does not cover Mr. Taylor’s claims. Rather, the jurisdictional statutes for each of

the claims alleged by Mr. Taylor, to the extent they provide jurisdiction, grant jurisdiction only to the district 

courts.

Mr. Taylor’s causes of action that arise under the 

criminal code, Title 18, must be brought in the district 

courts, if they can be brought at all. The Court of Federal 

Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1350 

(Fed. Cir. 2013). 

 

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4 TAYLOR v. US

Claims has previously held it “has no jurisdiction to 

adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal 

criminal code” in particular where there is no “money 

mandating provision of law ....” Joshua v. United States, 

17 F.3d 378, 379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting and summarily affirming the Court of Federal Claims’ order). Mr. 

Taylor’s initial complaint referenced Sections 2520(g) and 

2707(g) as permitting recovery. Both of these Sections, 

however, specifically exempt the United States from 

liability. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(a), 2707(a) (both “other than 

the United States”). On appeal, appellant’s informal brief 

instead referenced Section 2712. This Section specifically 

requires actions be filed “in United States District Court

....” 18 U.S.C. § 2712(a). Hence, none of the sections of 

Title 18 relied on create jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor’s other claims is explicitly granted to the district courts. The Internal Revenue 

Code, under 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a)(1), provides that the 

remedy for violations of the relevant statute is “a civil 

action for damages against the United States in a district 

court of the United States.” (emphasis added); see also 

Calhoun v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 400, 407 (1994) 

aff'd, 61 F.3d 918 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Likewise, the Privacy 

Act, under 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1), provides “the district 

courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction” over 

civil actions concerning the relevant statute. 

Having reviewed the matter carefully, we hold that, 

because the United States Court of Federal Claims would 

lack jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor’s claims, we must affirm

the order denying transfer.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida’s denial of 

Mr. Taylor’s motion to transfer. 

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TAYLOR v. US 5

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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