Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03133/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03133-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randell D. Murphy
Appellant
United States Parole Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RANDELL D. MURPHY, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

NOV 19 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 90-3133 

(D.C. No. 89-3188-R) 

(District of Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

The appellant, a prisoner in the United States Penitentiary, 

Leavenworth, Kansas, seeks to appeal the denial of his habeas corpus petition. He claims that the Parole Commission arbitrarily 

and capriciously denied him a release date within the parole 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3133 Document: 010110051317 Date Filed: 11/19/1990 Page: 1 
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guideline range. See 18 u.s.c. §§ 4203(a)(l), 4206; 28 C.F.R. 

§2.20. Appellant also claims that he was denied due process 

because the Parole Commission did not immediately set a date for 

his release. We grant appellant's application for a certificate 

of probable cause and motion for leave to proceed on appeal 

without prepayment of costs or fees. We proceed to the merits of 

the case. 

I. 

The appellant is currently serving a ten-year sentence for 

his conviction on August 12, 1985, of check forgery and aiding and 

abetting in violation of 18 u.s.c. §§ 2, 495 (1982). The Parole 

Commission conducted an initial parole hearing on December 19, 

1988. At his parole eligibility date, appellant had served forty 

months of his sentence. His aggregate guideline range for suggested time to be served before release, after calculating three 

administrative infractions, was 12-22 months. See 28 C.F.R. § 

2.20 (1989). The Parole Commission nevertheless ordered the 

appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence. It cited as a 

factor appellant's involvement in numerous criminal acts after his 

federal offense behavior. 

On appeal, the National Appeals Board affirmed the 

Commission's decision. The Board modified the Commission's reasons for denying parole, however, to state that it was appellant's 

criminal record prior to his arrest that warranted a departure 

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Appellate Case: 90-3133 Document: 010110051317 Date Filed: 11/19/1990 Page: 2 
from the guidelines. 

Appellant then brought this habeas action pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2241 (1988). Appellant initially argued that the Parole 

Commission's consideration of the nature of prior crimes committed 

by him was arbitrary and capricious. Appellant contended that 

previous convictions cannot be considered as an aggravating factor 

because the salient factor score used to calculate the guideline 

range already is based, in part, on the number of previous convictions. The previous convictions, appellant claimed, cannot be 

"double counted" to both place him within a certain guideline 

range and to justify a departure from it. The district court, 

however, reasoned that although the guideline considers the number 

of previous convictions, it does not take into account the nature 

of the crimes. The district court concluded that the Commission 

did not therefore engage in "double counting." 

Appellant also argued that he was denied due process when the 

Commission failed to set a date for his release pursuant to section 235(b)(3) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The district 

court, however, determined that appellant did not fall within the 

scope of that provision. 

II. 

The Parole Commission is authorized by statute to deny 

release notwithstanding the guidelines "if it determines there is 

good cause for so doing." 18 u.s.c. § 4206(c). We review Parole 

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Appellate Case: 90-3133 Document: 010110051317 Date Filed: 11/19/1990 Page: 3 
Commission decisions to determine whether "the decision is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion." Dye v. United 

States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977). 

We do not believe that the Commission abused its discretion 

here by finding good cause to exceed the guidelines and continue 

appellant's incarceration. We have previously held that the 

nature of prior convictions already used to calculate a prisoner's 

salient factor score may also provide good cause for continued 

incarceration. Castaldo v. United States Parole Comm'n, 725 F.2d 

94, 96 (10th Cir. 1984). The court in Castaldo, for example, 

approved the Commission's denial of a prisoner's parole not 

because he had a number of prior convictions but because the convictions were cocaine-related offenses. Here, the Board found 

that appellant was a more serious risk than indicated by his salient factor score. The Board justified its decision by noting the 

seriousness of appellant's prior record, which included convictions for rape, rape reduced to assault and battery, robbery, and 

robbery and escape (sentence deferred). Notice of Action on 

Appeal, No. 15008-001 (March 23, 1989). 

III. 

Appellant next argues that he was denied due process because 

the Commission has failed to set a date for his release pursuant 

to section 235(b)(3) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. That 

provision, as originally adopted, provided: 

The United States Parole Commission shall set a release 

date, for an individual who will be in its jurisdiction 

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Appellate Case: 90-3133 Document: 010110051317 Date Filed: 11/19/1990 Page: 4 
the day before the expiration of five years after the 

effective date of this Act, that is within the range 

that applies to the prisoner under the applicable parole 

guideline. A release date set pursuant to this paragraph shall be set early enough to permit consideration 

of an appeal of the release date, in accordance with 

Parole Commission procedures, before the expiration of 

five years following the effective date of this Act. 

Pub. L. 98-473, § 235(b)(3), 98 Stat. 1837, 2032 (1984). The 

five-year period began to run on November 1, 1987. Appellant 

claims that because the provision's language requires a parole 

date "within the range," the Commission was not authorized to 

exceed the guidelines. 

Section 235(b)(3) was later amended on December 7, 1987, however, to provide: 

The United States Parole Commission shall set a release 

date, for an individual, before the expiration of five 

years after the effective date of this Act, pursuant to 

Section 4206 of Title 18, United States Code. A release 

date set pursuant to this paragraph shall be set early 

enough to permit consideration of an appeal of the 

release date in accordance with Parole Commission procedures, before the expiration of five years following the 

effective date of this Act. · 

Pub. L. 100-182, § 2(b)(2), 101 Stat. 1266 (1987). "The amended 

section 235(b)(3) requires the Commission to set release dates 

'pursuant to section 4206 of Title 18 United States Code,' which 

permits release dates outside the guideline range." Lewis v. 

Martin, 880 F.2d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Appellant also complains that section 235(b)(3) requires that 

the Commission immediately set a time for his release. The district court, however, found that, because appellant's mandatory 

parole date is October 22, 1991, appellant will not be within the 

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jurisdiction of the Commission five years after the effective date 

of the provision. The Commission is therefore not required to set 

appellant's parole date pursuant to section 235(b)(3). 

We find the district court's decision consistent with our 

holding in Lewis, 880 F.2d at 291 (10th Cir. 1989). There, this 

court held that "'the task of setting a parole release date has no 

application to those already on parole, though still under the 

Commission's supervisory jurisdiction. Subsection 235(b)(3) concerns those within the jurisdiction of the Commission in the sense 

of remaining in prison.'" Id. (quoting Romanov. Luther, 816 F.2d 

832, 841 (2d Cir. 1987). 

IV. 

We therefore affirm the district's court's determination that 

the Commission's decision to deny appellant's parole was not arbitrary or capricious. We also affirm its finding that appellant's 

continued incarceration was not in violation of section 235(b)(3) 

of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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