Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cr-00218/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cr-00218-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Ray Fortune
Defendant
George Hoey Morris
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION NO.

) 2:06cr218-MHT

GEORGE HOEY MORRIS ) (WO)

a/k/a JOHNNY RAY FORTUNE )

ORDER AND OPINION

Defendant George Hoey Morris was tried and found

guilty on one count of making a false statement in a

passport application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542.

At the beginning of sentencing on April 16, 2009, the

court was confronted with a scenario in which Morris

refused, without justification, to accept his courtappointed attorney and refused to represent himself

either. This order memorializes, with explanation, the

rulings of the court in response to Morris's actions.

I.

For trial, the court appointed Attorney Jon Carlton

Taylor to represent Morris. After trial, Morris hired

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Attorney Susan James to replace Taylor and represent him

at sentencing. James, however, withdrew as Morris’s

attorney before sentencing could be conducted, and the

court reappointed Taylor. Taylor then moved to withdraw

as Morris’s attorney, citing the fact that Morris had

filed a bar complaint and a federal lawsuit against him.

The court granted this motion and appointed Attorney

Richard Keith in his place. Keith, however, also moved

to withdraw, citing a conflict of interest with Morris.

The court then appointed Attorney Daniel Hamm to

represent Morris. 

Morris subsequently filed a pro se motion to dismiss

Hamm, arguing that to allow Hamm to act as his counsel

would undermine his claims in the lawsuits he filed

against Attorney James and Attorney Susan Redmond, the

Assistant United States Attorney in this case. At

sentencing, the court took up Morris's dismissal motion.

Morris continued to refuse to be represented by Hamm,

insisting that James was his attorney. The court

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informed Morris that James had withdrawn as his attorney

and was not present in the court to represent him. The

court gave Morris several opportunities to provide

reasons why Hamm’s representation was itself inadequate,

but Morris simply continued to insist that James was his

attorney. The court therefore denied Morris’s motion to

dismiss Hamm.

Despite the court's ruling, Morris continued to

refuse to cooperate with Hamm in any way. He also

refused to represent himself. The court was therefore

confronted with a scenario in which a defendant was

refusing, without justification, to accept his courtappointed attorney and was refusing to represent himself

either. The court attempted to engage Morris in a

colloquy concerning his right to representation and the

dangers of self-representation. The court explained to

Morris in detail the penalties he faced, and the court

provided him with a general sense of the challenges he

was likely to confront as a pro se litigant. Morris,

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however, refused to answer the court’s questions as to

whether he understood the dangers of proceeding pro se.

The court then informed Morris that he had two options:

either he accept Hamm’s representation or he represent

himself. Morris refused these options, insisting that he

did not wish to represent himself but that he also did

not wish to be represented by Hamm. 

The court then found that Morris had knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel and must

represent himself because he had, without justification,

rejected his court-appointed counsel and because he

understood that his only alternative was

self-representation with its many attendant dangers. The

court discharged Hamm as Morris's attorney but appointed

him as standby counsel to assist Morris if Morris should

have any questions. 

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II.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained

that:

"We continue to stress that when a right

as fundamental as the right to counsel

is at stake, it is important for trial

courts to do all in their power to

ensure every defendant, from the most

cooperative to the most obstreperous, is

informed of the risks of proceeding pro

se and is prevented from waiving counsel

without sufficient knowledge of the

protections he is surrendering. Before

a court concludes a defendant has

knowingly waived his right to counsel,

the defendant 'should be made aware of

the dangers and disadvantages of

self-representation, so that the record

will establish that he knows what he is

doing and his choice is made with eyes

open.' Faretta [v. California], 422

U.S. [806,] 835, 95 S.Ct. [2525,] 2541

[(1975)] (quotations omitted). To that

end, the best practice is for district

courts to begin by attempting to engage

the defendant in a full discussion of

the dangers of self-representation

whenever a defendant expresses a desire

to waive his right to counsel, whether

affirmatively or by his conduct.

"Nevertheless, an unwilling defendant

can foil a district court's best efforts

to engage in dialogue, thereby

preventing the court from eliciting

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clear information regarding the

defendant's understanding of the dangers

of proceeding pro se. A dialogue cannot

be forced; therefore, when confronted

with a defendant who has voluntarily

waived counsel by his conduct and who

refuses to provide clear answers to

questions regarding his Sixth Amendment

rights, it is enough for the court to

inform the defendant unambiguously of

the penalties he faces if convicted and

to provide him with a general sense of

the challenges he is likely to confront

as a pro se litigant. So long as the

trial court is assured the defendant (1)

understands the choices before him, (2)

knows the potential dangers of

proceeding pro se, and (3) has rejected

the lawyer to whom he is

constitutionally entitled, the court

may, in the exercise of its discretion,

discharge counsel or (preferably, as

occurred here) provide for counsel to

remain in a standby capacity.

United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1267 (11th Cir.

2008) (en banc). 

Here, because the requirements of Garey were fully

met, this court's actions at Morris's sentencing were

proper. The court informed Morris of the dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation, of the choices he

now had, and of the consequences of his actions. Because

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Morris continued to refuse to accept Hamm as his attorney

and because he refused to represent himself either, the

court found that Morris had knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel; discharged Hamm as Morris's

attorney; and appointed Hamm as standby counsel to

assist Morris if Morris should have any questions. 

*** 

Accordingly, pursuant to the rulings in open court on

April 16, 2009, and for the reasons given above, it is

ORDERED and DECLARED that: 

(1) Defendant George Hoey Morris has knowingly and

voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

and is permitted to proceed pro se. 

(2) Attorney Daniel Hamm is discharged as defendant

Morris’s counsel but shall remain as standby counsel.

(3) Attorney Hamm is appointed as standby counsel for

proceedings in this court only. He is not appointed as

standby counsel for any appellant proceedings. 

DONE, this the 23rd day of April, 2009.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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