Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06725/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Defendant
Frank Rosenblum
Plaintiff
U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSFB Mortgage Backed Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-7
Defendant
U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Wachovia Bank, N.A., for MALT 2004-1
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK ROSENBLUM,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

AS TRUSTEE FOR CSFB MORTGAGE 

BACKED PASS-THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-7, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06725-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 12

Plaintiff Frank Rosenblum seeks to quiet title and cancel a deed of trust and a trustee’s 

deed related to a residential property in Woodside, California, to which he attained an interest 

through his wife, Jennifer Mae Rosenblum. Defendants move to dismiss because both state and 

federal courts have denied Ms. Rosenblum the relief Mr. Rosenblum now requests. Defendants 

argue, correctly, that Mr. Rosenblum is in privity with Ms. Rosenblum and that his claims are

foreclosed under res judicata.1 Mr. Rosenblum’s amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND2

This action relates to the ownership the property located at 35 Echo Lane in Woodside, CA 

(“the Subject Property”). Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at ¶ 7 [Dkt. No. 8]. It is necessary to 

understand the chain of title to the Subject Property and the history of the litigation surrounding it 

to understand whether res judicata applies.

 

1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), I find this matter suitable for disposition without oral 

argument and vacate the hearing and case management conference both currently scheduled for 

March 6, 2019.

2

I accept Mr. Rosenblum’s allegations in the Amended Complaint as true for purposes of this 

motion.

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The Separation Litigation, the Lis Pendens, and Richard Hatfield’s Deed of Trust

Ms. Rosenblum, formerly known as Jennifer M. Moore, acquired her interest in the Subject 

Property from Richard Hatfield, with whom she was previously in a domestic relationship. Id. at ¶ 

¶s 3, 8. They separated in 2001; Mr. Hatfield had record title to the Subject Property at the time of 

separation. Ms. Rosenblum then commenced litigation (the “Separation Litigation”) to determine, 

among other matters, their respective ownership rights in the Subject Property, and recorded a lis 

pendens on the Subject Property in June 20, 2002. Id., ¶ 9. In 2003, an order expunging the lis 

pendens was issued but never recorded.3 Rosenblum v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, No. A143027, 2016 

WL 1293999, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2016), as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 26, 2016)

(“Rosenblum II”); Rosenblum v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. A146526, 2016 WL 

5404370, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2016) (“Rosenblum III”). 

On February 2, 20044, Hatfield obtained a residential loan in the principal sum of 

$1,210,000 (the Subject Loan) that was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the Subject 

Property. Deed of Trust attached as Exhibit 3 to Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion 

to Dismiss First Amended Complaint by Defendants U.S. Bank, as Trustee and JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, N.A. (“RJN”) [Dkt. No. 12-1]. The encumbrance of the Subject Loan is the heart of this 

matter.

Ms. Rosenblum initiated a Marvin action5against Hatfield, resulting in a bifurcated trial. 

The first phase, dealing with all issues other than the accounting and division of the jointly owned 

property, concluded in December 2005. Id. at ¶ 11. On January 22, 2007, the San Mateo County 

Superior Court issued a statement of decision determining that Ms. Rosenblum and Hatfield 

jointly owned all property acquired during the relationship, including the Subject Property. Id. 

Because the trial was bifurcated, the statement of decision did not include an accounting or 

 

3 Mr. Rosenblum failed to point this out, despite it being recognized by two state appellate courts 

whose opinions I take judicial notice of as described infra.

4 Mr. Rosenblum states that Hatfield executed the deed of trust on February 27, 2004. Compl. at ¶ 

10. The difference in date is immaterial and the deed of trust itself is dated February 2, 2004.

5 A Marvin action is a suit between unmarried cohabitants to establish contractual rights to income 

and assets. See Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660.

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allocation of their joint property. Id. at ¶ 12.

Hatfield Declares Bankruptcy and the Lis Pendens Litigation

On January 31, 2008, before the accounting and allocation of the joint property could be 

tried in the second phase of the Marvin action, Hatfield filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. Id.

at ¶ 13. The bankruptcy proceeding automatically stayed the state court proceeding and Hatfield’s 

interest in all of his non-exempt property (including the Subject Property) was transferred to his 

trustee. Id. at ¶ 14, 17. 

On July 11, 2008, Hatfield’s bankruptcy trustee filed an amended complaint in an 

adversary proceeding challenging, among other things, the validity of Ms. Rosenblum’s lis 

pendens (the “Lis Pendens Litigation”). Id. at ¶ 16. Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”)

6

, listed 

as a party defendant, also contested the validity of the lis pendens. Id. Because of the stay in the 

Marvin case, the bankruptcy court treated both Hatfield’s trustee and Ms. Rosenblum as each 

holding a contingent or inchoate one-half ownership of each item of their joint property and did 

not address how ownership of the Subject Property would be allocated. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. On 

September 3, 2009, the bankruptcy court issued a memorandum decision and order determining 

that (i) the lis pendens was valid, (ii) Ms. Rosenblum’s ownership interest to the Subject Property 

related back to June 20, 2002 when the lis pendens was recorded, and (iii) the deed of trust did not 

attach to her interest in the Subject Property, but did attach to the interest of Hatfield’s bankruptcy

trustee. Id. at ¶ 21.

Ms. Rosenblum and Hatfield’s Trustee Enter into a Settlement Agreement

On March 1, 2010, Ms. Rosenblum and the bankruptcy trustee entered into a settlement 

agreement that provided for a final judgment in the adversarial proceeding, a sale to Ms. 

Rosenblum of the bankruptcy estate’s interest in real and personal property, and entry of final 

judgment in the Marvin action that granted the estate’s half interest in the Subject Property to her 

in partial satisfaction of her interest in the joint property. Id. at ¶ 23. Following notice to all 

creditors, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the bankruptcy trustee’s motion for approval of 

 

6 On February 26, 2018, WaMu filed Claim No. 5 in Hatfield’s bankruptcy with itself as the 

creditor, alleging a balance due on the note secured by the Deed of Trust. Id. at ¶ 15.

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the settlement and filed an order approving the settlement and authorizing the trustee to perform 

its terms was filed on March 31, 2010. Id. at ¶ 24. On May 3, 2010, the bankruptcy court entered 

the judgment in the adversarial proceeding. Id. at ¶ 25; Judgement Determining Validity, Priority, 

and Extent and Liens and Interests, Janina M. Elder, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of 

Richard L Hatfield v. Sand Hill Road Venture Group, et al, 08-cv-3072-TEC (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 

May 3, 2010) (the “Bankruptcy Judgment”) attached as Exhibit 6 to RJN. Pursuant to the 

settlement agreement, the bankruptcy trustee recorded a deed conveying any interest of Hatfield’s 

bankruptcy estate in the Subject Property to Ms. Rosenblum on July 28, 2010. Id. at ¶ 26.

Assignment and Notice of Default and Sale

On March 29, 2010, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) recorded

an assignment of the beneficial ownership of the deed of trust to defendant U.S. Bank National 

Association, as Trustee, Successor in Interest to Wachovia Bank, N.A., for MALT 2004-1 

(“MALT”). Id. at ¶ 27. MERS, as the apparent agent, did not identify the assignor of the deed of 

trust. Id. On May 7, 2011, WaMu’s successor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), filed a 

notice of change of address in Hatfield’s bankruptcy, indicating that the former name of the 

creditor was “Chase Home Finance/Washington Mutual” and the new name of the creditor was 

“JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.” Id. at ¶ 28. On August 1, 2011, MERS recorded an assignment of 

the beneficial ownership of the deed of trust to CSFB Mortgage Backed Pass-through Certificates, 

Series 2004-7 (herein “CSFB”) and did not name the assignor. Id. at ¶ 29. 

On December 18, 2017, a notice of default on the Subject Loan was recorded, reflecting 

the total balance due at $1,147,660.02. Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 

Trust attached as Exhibit 19 to RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1]. On October 9, 2018, CSFB recorded a notice 

of sale purporting to sell the Subject Property pursuant to the deed of trust. Compl. at ¶ 38. The 

sale occurred on November 6, 2018. Id. On November 28, 2018, the trustee’s deed naming U.S. 

Bank National Association as Trustee for CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, 

Series 2004-7 was recorded, listing that the amount the grantee paid at $2,103,585.97 to acquire a 

50% co-tenancy interest in the Subject Property. Id.; Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale attached as 

Exhibit 20 to RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1]. 

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Mr. Rosenblum Takes an Interest in the Subject Property

On October 2, 2010, Frank and Jennifer Rosenblum were married. Id. at ¶ 31. Ms. 

Rosenblum conveyed her interest in the Subject Property by grant deed to herself and Mr. 

Rosenblum on August 29, 2012. Id. at ¶ 32. 

Mr. Rosenblum argues that the title granted by the judgment entered in February 2014 to 

Ms. Rosenblum, and therefore his title as well, relates back to the recording of her lis pendens on 

June 20, 2002, and that the chain of title begins on that date. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. He also contends 

that the deed of trust, the trustee’s deed, and all other conveyances of any interest by Hatfield, 

Hatfield’s bankruptcy trustee, or any person claiming to convey title predicated on the deed of 

trust or the trustee’s deed are void against the February 2014 judgment. Id. at ¶ 36. He states that 

the July 28, 2010 deed from Hatfield’s bankruptcy trustee conveying the estate’s interest in the 

Subject Property to Ms. Rosenblum is also void because it conveyed Hatfield’s interest after the 

recording of the lis pendens when Hatfield had no interest to convey. Id.

By way of his complaint, Mr. Rosenblum seeks two things: (1) cancellation of the deed of 

trust and the trustee’s deed and (2) quieting title on the Subject Property. Id. at ¶¶ 39-47.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request that I take judicial notice of a number of recorded grant deeds, deeds of 

trust, notices of default, judicial statements of decision, orders, opinions, and judgments from state 

and federal courts. RJN. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a judicially noticed fact must be 

one not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either (1) “generally known within the trial 

court's territorial jurisdiction;” or (2) “can be adequately and readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). A court may “take 

judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or 

state courts.” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation 

omitted). 

I grant the request for judicial notice. I take judicial notice of Exhibits 1, 3-5, 9 and 19-20, 

as they are public records. See e.g., W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Heflin Corp., 797 F. Supp. 790, 

792 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (taking judicial notice of documents in a county public record, including a 

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state court file and deeds of trust); Valasquez v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08-cv3818-PJH, 2008 WL 4938162, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (taking judicial notice of a deed 

of trust and notice of default). I take judicial notice of the existence of Exhibits 2, 6-8, 10-18, and 

21 as they are court records. See, e.g., Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys. Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 

1160-61 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Judicial notice may be taken of 'adjudicative facts' such as court 

records, pleadings.”). The requests for judicial notice of the state court's rulings are granted as to 

the existence of the opinions but not as to the truth of their contents. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when 

the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citation omitted). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff 

must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555, 570.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The court is not 

required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, 

or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Rosenblum’s amended complaint on the grounds that it is 

barred by res judicata from prior judgments against Ms. Rosenblum in one federal judgment, two 

state trial court judgments, and two state appellate court opinions affirming the trial courts’ 

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judgments. Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 6 [Dkt. No. 12].7 As there are both federal and state 

court judgments involved here, I must analyze defendants’ res judicata arguments under both 

federal and California law.

I. THE RELEVANT PRIOR RULINGS

The oldest ruling involves the Statement of Decision Re Marvin and Related Issues Prior 

to Accounting in which the state trial court judge held that Ms. Rosenblum and Hatfield must 

divide their assets, including the Subject Property, equally. Moore v. Hatfield, Nos. CIV 433 625, 

CIV 443 746, CIV 444 497, F 068 286 Consolidated at 5 (Cal Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2007) (the 

“Marvin Decision”) attached as Exhibit 2 to RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1]. The next is the judgment from 

the federal bankruptcy court issued in the adversary proceeding. The court incorporated the 

Marvin Decision, found that Hatfield’s bankruptcy trustee held an undivided fifty percent share of

the Subject Property, and determined that the deed of trust stemming from the Subject Loan did 

not encumber Ms. Rosenblum’s interest in her fifty percent share of the Subject Property. 

Bankruptcy Judgment at 2-4.

The third ruling involved a lawsuit Ms. Rosenblum filed against MERS and U.S. Bank 

National Association, as Trustee for CSFB Mortgage Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 

2004-7 (“U.S. Bank”) filed in California Superior Court. Order Sustaining U.S. Bank’s Demurrer 

to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Without Leave to Amend, Rosenblum v. Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., CIV 463382 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 23, 2014) (“Rosenblum 

I”) attached as Exhibit 12 to RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1]. The trial court judge found that: Ms. 

Rosenblum failed to allege that the deed of trust was invalid when it was recorded or that it had 

been paid in full or was subject to reconveyance; the lis pendens recorded by Ms. Rosenblum was 

extinguished prior to recordation of U.S. Bank’s encumbrance; and the Bankruptcy Judgment had 

already decided these issues of ownership and lien priority. Id. at 2. The trial court separately

dismissed Ms. Rosenblum’s complaint with prejudice as to U.S. Bank and MERS, leading to two 

 

7 Defendants also argue that even if res judicata did not bar Mr. Rosenblum’s complaint, the 

complaint fails as a matter of law because all claims rely on Ms. Rosenblum’s claim that she owns 

the Subject Property free and clear of defendant U.S. Bank, as Trustee’s lien. MTD at 6.

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separate judgments, one to U.S. Bank and the other to MERS.

8

 Exhibits 13 and 14 attached to 

RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1].

The fourth ruling comes from Rosenblum II, where the state appellate court affirmed the 

judgment concerning U.S. Bank in Rosenblum I and found that the trial court did not err in 

concluding that the deed of trust encumbered the 50 percent of the property Ms. Rosenblum 

purchased from Hatfield’s bankruptcy trustee. Rosenblum II at 6-7. It also rejected Ms. 

Rosenblum’s challenge to U.S. Bank’s ownership of the deed of trust. Id. at 7-8.

The fifth ruling is from Rosenblum III, in which Ms. Rosenblum argued that MERS should 

not have been dismissed in Rosenblum I because (1) MERS’s failure to produce admissible 

evidence of its authority to assign the deed of trust and underlying note made the assignment 

subject to dispute and (2) that the separate judgment against MERS in an in rem quiet title action 

violated the one final judgment rule. Rosenblum III at 5-6. The appellate court reasoned that its 

holding in Rosenblum II necessarily foreclosed Ms. Rosenblum’s first argument. Id. at 9. With 

regards to Ms. Rosenblum’s second argument that the trial court’s opinion violated the one final 

judgment rule, the appellate court held that she was wrong on the merits and that the trial court 

correctly sustained the demurrer because Ms. Rosenblum failed to establish through her pleadings 

a necessary element of her claim. Id. at 9-10.

Ms. Rosenblum’s motions for rehearing of Rosenblum II and III were both denied. 

Exhibits 16 and 18 attached to RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1]. Her petition for review to the California 

Supreme Court was also denied; in issuing the remittitur, the clerk of court wrote that the opinion 

in Rosenblum II had become final. Exhibit 17 attached to RJN [Dkt. No. 12-1].

II. RES JUDICATA

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, “provides that a final judgment on the 

merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Res judicata is applicable whenever there is (1) 

 

8 This led to two separate appellate court rulings, one for each judgment, in Rosenblum II and 

Rosenblum III.

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an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.” Id.

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine extends to “any claims that were 

raised or could have been raised in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 

(9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted).

When determining whether a judgment by a California court has res judicata effect, the 

federal Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires a California federal court to apply the 

res judicata law of California to that judgment. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005) (finding that the Full Faith and Credit Act “has long been 

understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or 'claim preclusion,' and collateral 

estoppel, or 'issue preclusion”'); Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(holding that the Full Faith and Credit Act “requires federal courts to apply the res judicata rules 

of a particular state to judgments issued by courts of that state”). The application of res judicata 

under California law focuses on the same three factors as the federal res judicata doctrine: “(1) A 

claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior 

proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party 

against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 

proceeding.” Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal. 4th 788, 797 (2010) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Each factor is considered below.

A. Identity of the Claims

To determine whether two proceedings involve identical causes of action, California courts 

have “consistently applied the primary rights theory.” Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795 

(1975). Under this theory, “the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause 

of action.” San Diego Police Officers' Ass'n v. San Diego City Emp.'s Retirement Sys., 568 F.3d 

725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In other words, “if two 

actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant[,] then the 

same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of 

recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” Eichman v. 

Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (1983). “What is critical to the [primary rights] 

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analysis is the harm suffered; that the same facts are involved in both suits is not conclusive.” San 

Diego Police Officers' Ass'n, 568 F.3d at 734 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Federal courts apply a slightly different analysis and must determine (1) whether rights or 

interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the 

second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) 

whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise 

out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 

1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982). “The last of these criteria is the most important.” Id. at 1202. The Ninth 

Circuit has found that satisfaction of the fourth factor alone is sufficient to establish an identity of 

claims. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs-Employers Constr. Indus. Pension, Welfare and 

Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing cases finding res 

judicata bars successive claims based only on analysis of the fourth factor). 

This requirement is satisfied here, under both the California and federal tests; Mr. 

Rosenblum brings the same argument that Ms. Rosenblum did in Rosenblum II. 9 As the appellate 

court there articulated:

Plaintiff’s argument is as follows. The bankruptcy court held the lis 

pendens was effective in the Marvin action. Section 405.24 provides, 

in relevant part, “[t]he rights and interest of the claimant in the 

property, as ultimately determined in the pending noticed action, shall 

relate back to the date of the recording of the notice [of lis pendens].” 

Plaintiff was awarded 100 percent of the Property in the Marvin

action final judgment. Therefore, she concludes, her 100 percent 

interest in the Property relates back to 2002 before the Deed of Trust 

was executed.

Rosenblum II at 6. Mr. Rosenblum’s FAC states: “The Deed of Trust and Trustee’s Deed are out 

of the chain of the title held by Frank Rosenblum because neither he nor Jennifer Rosenblum was 

a grantor of the Deed of Trust, and it and the Trustee’s Deed were each recoded after 20 June 

 

9 Mr. Rosenblum also argues that since MERS’s assignment of the deed of trust to CSFB stated 

that was being recorded to “correct” the assignee from the March 29, 2010 assignment, it is void 

on its face because an assignment of an interest in real property cannot be corrected by recording a 

new assignment. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. Instead, Mr. Rosenblum argues that the assignee must assign the 

assigned interest back to its assignor, who must then execute and, in the case of an assignment of 

an interest in real property, record the new assignment. Id. This precise argument was rejected by 

the appellate court in both Rosenblum II and Rosenblum III. Rosenblum II at 7-8; Rosenblum III at 

8-9.

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2002, the date to which plaintiff’s title ‘relate[s] back,’ as provided by Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 

405.24.” FAC at ¶ 42. There is a clear identity of claims.

B. Final Judgment on the Merits

“In California, a judgment entered after the sustaining of a general demurrer is a judgment 

on the merits, and, to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not establish a cause of 

action, it will bar a second cause of action on the same facts.” Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. 

City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1993). In federal as well as California courts, 

“dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the merits, barring the entire 

cause of action.” Boeken, 48 Cal.4th at 793; see also Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. 

United States Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Final judgment on the merits is 

synonymous with dismissal with prejudice”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Ms. Rosenblum’s claims were dismissed with prejudice in Rosenblum I, the dismissal was 

upheld in Rosenblum II and III, and the California Supreme Court denied Ms. Rosenblum’s 

petition for review and stated that the opinion in Rosenblum II was now final. There is no 

question that there is a final judgment on the merits.

Mr. Rosenblum argues that these decisions were interlocutory because the quiet title 

statute requires that there to be only one judgment and that Rosenblum I ended with separate 

judgments as to U.S. Bank and MERS. Opposition at 3-5 [Dkt. No. 20]. As such, he contends 

that the separate judgments do not constitute a final judgment on the merits and that the state 

appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals (which Ms. Rosenblum herself filed). Id. 

This argument is wholly without merit and the state appellate court rejected it in Rosenblum III. 

To the extent that this argument represents a collateral attack on the judgments in Rosenblum I and 

the opinions of the state court of appeals in Rosenblum II and III, I am prohibited from hearing 

these de facto appeals of state court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. 

Hall, 241, F.3d 1148, 1163-1164 (9th Cir. 2003). The only place Rosenblum II and III may be 

challenged is at the California Supreme Court, and that court has already rejected Ms. 

Rosenblum’s petition for review. 

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C. Privity Between the Parties

To determine privity, California “courts examine the practicalities of the situation and 

attempt to determine whether plaintiffs are sufficiently close to the original case to afford 

application of the principle of preclusion.” Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 951 (1976) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In federal and California courts, privity exists 

when the party involved is “so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal 

right.” Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 318 (1949) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted); see also Tahoe-Sierra, 322 F.3d at 1081 (stating that privity between parties exists when 

parties in both actions are identical or substantially identical, “that is, when there is sufficient 

commonality of interest”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Rosenblum stated that Ms. Rosenblum conveyed her interest in the Subject Property 

by grant deed to both of them on August 29, 2012. FAC at ¶ 32. Under both federal and state 

law, this is sufficient to find that there is privity between Mr. and Ms. Rosenblum in this action for 

the purposes of res judicata. In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (a “non-party 

who has succeeded to a party's interest in property is bound by any prior judgment against the 

party”) (internal citation omitted); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 

894 (1942) (“A privy is one who, after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in the 

subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, 

succession, or purchase.”).

Because all three elements necessary for res judicata are satisfied, the doctrine applies.

Mr. Rosenblum is precluded from asserting these claims against defendants. There is no need to

consider defendants' other arguments for dismissal. Their motion to dismiss is granted.

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CONCLUSION

Including appeals and requests for rehearing, this is the sixth or seventh time plaintiff or 

his wife have tried to escape the effects of Hatfield’s encumbrance on the Subject Property. No 

amendment could avoid the res judicata effect of the prior proceedings. Plaintiff’s claims are 

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2019 

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

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