Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01331/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01331-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricky Edward King
Petitioner
David B. Long
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY EDWARD KING,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID B. LONG, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-1331 TLN KJN P

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Petitioner filed an 

application for petition of writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the 

court is respondent’s motion to dismiss the habeas petition as barred by the statute of limitations, 

and because it contains unexhausted claims. For the reasons set forth below, respondent’s motion 

should be granted.

II. Legal Standards

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. . . .” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss as a request for the court to dismiss under 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420

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(1991). Accordingly, the court will review respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its 

authority under Rule 4.

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) was 

enacted. Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 8 of the United States Code provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise 

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). 

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Generally, 

this means that the statute of limitations is tolled during the time after a state habeas petition has 

been filed, but before a decision has been rendered. Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th 

Cir. 2012). However, “a California habeas petitioner who unreasonably delays in filing a state 

habeas petition is not entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling during the gap or interval 

preceding the filing.” Id. at 781 (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-27 (2002)). 

Furthermore, the AEDPA “statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is 

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issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there 

is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), 

overruled on other grounds by Carey, 536 U.S. at 214. In Carey, the United States Supreme 

Court held that the limitation period is statutorily tolled during one complete round of state postconviction review, as long as such review is sought within the state’s time frame for seeking such 

review. Id., 536 U.S. at 220, 222-23. State habeas petitions filed after the one-year statute of 

limitations has expired do not revive the statute of limitations and have no tolling effect. 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the 

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed”); Jiminez v. 

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. Chronology 

For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this case is 

as follows:

1. Petitioner was convicted of first degree burglary. (Respondent’s Lodged Document 

(“LD”) 1.) A number of sentencing allegations were found true. (LD 1.) 

2. On January 12, 2013, petitioner was sentenced to a determinate state prison term of 

five years. (LD 1.) 

3. Petitioner filed an appeal. On April 30, 2014, the California Court of Appeal for the 

Third Appellate District affirmed the conviction. (LD 1.)

4. On June 3, 2014, the Clerk of the California Supreme Court informed petitioner that 

the court does not extend the time for filing a petition for review. (ECF No. 6 at 66.) The Clerk 

noted that the last day to file a timely petition for review was May 30, 2014. (Id.) Petitioner 

attempted to file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, but on August 13, 2014, it 

was returned to him as untimely-filed, noting that the court lost jurisdiction to act on any petition 

for review on June 30, 2014. (ECF No. 6 at 73.) 

5. Petitioner filed no post-conviction collateral challenges in state court.

6. On June 25, 2015, petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition. (ECF No. 

6.) See Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

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7. Respondent filed the motion to dismiss on December 10, 2015. (ECF No. 11.) On 

March 17, 2016, petitioner filed an opposition. (ECF No. 17.) No reply was filed. 

IV. Statutory Tolling

On April 30, 2014, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District 

affirmed the conviction. Petitioner did not seek timely review in the California Supreme Court, 

and his late filing was not excused. Thus, the state appeal process became final within the 

meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing a petition for review expired on June 9, 

2014, forty days after the California Court of Appeal filed its decision. See Cal. Ct. R. 

8.264(b)(1), 8.500(e); Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 2008). The one-year 

limitations period commenced running the following day. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 

1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, petitioner had until June 10, 2015, to file his federal habeas 

petition. However, he did not file the instant petition until June 25, 2015. Absent tolling, the 

federal petition is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed no post-conviction challenges in state court, so he is not entitled to 

additional tolling of the limitations period. 

In his opposition to the motion, petitioner argues that his actual filing deadline was June 

29, 2014, “by extension on the order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in letter dated 3 

June 2014.” (ECF No. 20 at 1.) Petitioner’s argument is unavailing because the California 

Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to extend AEDPA’s statute of limitations deadline. In 

any event, the deputy clerk’s June 3, 2014 letter does not address the federal statute of limitations 

deadline. Rather, the letter informed petitioner that the state court does not extend the time for 

filing a petition for review, and explained how petitioner could request permission to submit a 

late filing, and provided him with the deadlines pertinent to seeking review of his criminal appeal 

by the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 20 at 11.) Although petitioner claims he applied for 

relief from the untimely filing of the petition for review, it does not appear that his request was 

granted. Petitioner appears to argue that his submission to the California Supreme Court was 

timely, and because the court received his petition for review, the limitations period did not start 

until June 29, 2014. (ECF No. 20 at 2.) Petitioner is mistaken. The record does not reflect that 

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the California Supreme Court accepted the petition for review for filing, filed the petition for 

review, or ruled on the petition for review. Thus, the fact that petitioner mailed the petition for 

review to the California Supreme Court is of no consequence in calculating the limitations period. 

Based on the documents submitted in support of his opposition, it appears that the petition for 

review was not filed properly and timely, and did not act to toll the statute of limitations. 

Because the limitations period expired on June 10, 2015, and petitioner constructively filed 

the instant petition fifteen days later, on June 25, 2015, the instant petition is time-barred unless he 

can demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

V. Equitable Tolling

In his opposition, petitioner alleges no facts demonstrating his diligence and that 

circumstances beyond his control prevented him from timely filing the instant petition. (ECF No. 

20, passim.) In his June 26, 2015 request for extension of time, petitioner noted that the prison 

law library would be closed for two weeks, and complained that the law library refused to 

photocopy many documents without a court order. (ECF No. 4 at 3.) Respondent did not file a 

reply or address the issue of equitable tolling in the motion to dismiss.

“Equitable tolling may be available ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack 

of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim.’” McMonagle v. Meyer, 802 F.3d 

1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). “A 

petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline must show that (1) 

some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and (2) he has diligently 

pursued his rights.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). 

“The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation 

omitted). 

To apply the doctrine in “extraordinary circumstances” necessarily 

suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that 

extraordinary circumstances “stood in his way” suggests that an 

external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have 

said, merely “oversight, miscalculation or negligence on [the 

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petitioner’s] part, all of which would preclude the application of 

equitable tolling.

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 

2003) (petitioner must show that the external force caused the untimeliness). It is petitioner’s 

burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Espinoza-Matthews v. People of the 

State of California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions regarding lack of law library access or 

photocopies are insufficient to satisfy petitioner’s burden of showing that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond his control made it impossible for him to file his federal habeas petition on 

time. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended) (“the prisoner must 

show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his untimeliness” (citation 

omitted)); see also Bryant v. Ariz. Att’y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). “Equitable 

tolling is applicable only ‘if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file a petition on time.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (as 

amended) (citation omitted). Petitioner has not shown with any specificity that the photocopied 

material was required to complete a proper filing.

Moreover, equitable tolling is not warranted based on an assertion that the prisoner lacks 

legal knowledge and was unable to obtain legal assistance. In general, a pro se prisoner’s lack of 

legal training or ignorance of the law is not an “extraordinary circumstance” that would trigger 

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n.4 (“a pro se petitioner’s 

confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”); 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating 

the existence of grounds for equitable tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 

(2005) (petitioner bears burden of demonstrating grounds for equitable tolling).

////

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VI. Alternative Date of Filing Federal Petition

In his opposition, petitioner also argues that the limitations period was extended by the 

June 30, 2015 order, and that the docket reflects he complied with filing procedures. (ECF No. 

20 at 5.) Respondent did not file a reply. In an abundance of caution, the court reviews whether 

an alternative date for filing the federal petition may be appropriate based on petitioner’s initial 

filing or the June 30, 2015 order. 

Petitioner’s initial filing was a letter directed to the Clerk of the Court, stating the 

following:

I received the documents you returned to me stamped 6/15/2015. 

In your letter you requested a case number. I do not have a case 

number other than the Court of Appeals and Superior Court case 

number already supplied to you. I am submitting a request to 

proceed in the entitled matter. The letters from the Supreme Court 

have the case numbers of all filings . . . . I do not have a case 

number in the U.S. District Court thus my request for permission to 

proceed to obtain a case #. Do you require I send the 2254 Writ of 

Habeas Corpus[?] I was told to send that after permission was 

granted. Please clarify what is required.

(ECF No. 1 at 1.) Petitioner’s letter was accompanied by a declaration in support of petitioner’s 

application to proceed in forma pauperis, and copies of letters to him from the California 

Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1 at 2-6.) 

However, there was no timely petition pending on June 22, 2015, the date that this action 

was opened. Petitioner only filed a request for clarification, which cannot be considered a 

petition. Specifically, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must: “1) specify all the grounds for 

relief available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; (3) state the relief 

requested; (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and (5) be signed under penalty of 

perjury by the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2242.” Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 2. Petitioner’s request for clarification did 

not meet the above requirements. Petitioner could have remedied his situation by filing a 

“protective” petition, along with his request for clarification, but he did not do so. See Pace, 544 

U.S. at 416 (prisoners may avoid the risk of having the federal statute of limitations expire while 

they are exhausting their state remedies by filing a “protective” petition in federal court and 

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asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are 

exhausted.). As such, no petition was pending at the time the present action was opened on June 

22, 2015. Therefore, at that time it was not a “pending” case for habeas corpus relief and it did 

not toll the limitations period because his initial filing did not constitute a challenge to his 

conviction. Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (request for counsel in capital 

case is not equivalent to an actual habeas petition for purpose of determining whether AEDPA 

applies -- “a case does not become ‘pending’ until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is 

filed in federal court.”); see also Braggs v. Walker, 2011 WL 2709847, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 

(although the filing of a letter and request for an extension of time commenced the federal action, 

the filing did not constitute a “pending” habeas petition, and thus the limitations period was not 

tolled); Miles v. Grounds, 2013 WL 2337912, **4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2013) (petitioner’s 

correspondence with court and motions for extensions of time “cannot be considered petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus” for purposes of tolling limitations period); Alexander v. Uribe, 2012 WL 

2872809, **2 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (petitioner’s motion for extension of time commenced 

action, but it did not challenge the merits of his conviction, thus district court considered whether 

action is timely based on date petitioner filed his petition rather than the motion); Scott v. 

Swarthout, 2012 WL 2839804, *22 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2012) (“motion to toll time” did not toll 

limitations period). 

Petitioner’s reliance on the June 30, 2015 order is also unavailing. In addition to 

reviewing petitioner’s initial filing, the court addressed his request for extension of time to file a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus by denying his request for extension of time and warning him 

about the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) The court evaluated the initial filing and 

determined that it did not constitute a habeas petition as required by Rule 2(c) of the Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases. (Id.) Thus, the June 30, 2015 order cannot be construed as extending 

the statute of limitations period. 

As explained above, only the filing of a habeas petition tolls the statute of limitations 

under AEDPA. Because petitioner’s initial filing was not a habeas petition, it does not toll the 

limitations period or provide an earlier start to the limitations period. 

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Accordingly, the court considers whether this action is timely based on the date petitioner 

signed his petition on June 25, 2015, rather than on the date he signed his request for clarification. 

As set forth above, petitioner had until June 10, 2015, to file a timely petition. Petitioner filed the 

instant petition on June 25, 2015, fifteen days after expiration of the limitations period. Because 

the petition was untimely-filed, respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted, and this action 

be dismissed. This is a harsh result, but one that is required under AEDPA. 

VII. Alternative Argument

Respondent also contends that petitioner failed to exhaust all of the claims in the instant 

petition. Because the instant action is time-barred, the court need not address respondent’s 

alternative argument.

VIII. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after 

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 1, 2016

/king1331.mtd.hc.sol

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