Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01224/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01224-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Troy Gandy
Plaintiff
Sally Robbins
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sally Robbins, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV-03-1224-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint (doc.

107), the Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Party (doc. 107), and the Defendant's Motion to

Disqualify Counsel (doc. 119). The Court now rules on the motions.

I. Background

On June 27, 2003, Plaintiff Sally Robbins filed a Complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona. The Plaintiff brought the Complaint under the

Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., alleging medical

negligence on the part of the Defendant, United States of America, that resulted in personal

injuries to the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Defendant's

negligence the Plaintiff suffered permanent injury to her pancreas and resulting pain and

suffering, loss of wages, medical expenses, and permanent physical disability. 

On May 22, 2005, approximately three weeks before trial, the Plaintiff passed away.

The Plaintiff is survived by her children, Renee and Paul Montz as well as her parents,

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Darrell and Helen Robbins. The Plaintiff is also survived by her significant other, a man by

the name of Troy Gandy. Although the Plaintiff and Mr. Gandy were apparently partners for

more than ten years, they were never married. Troy Gandy was subsequently appointed as

the personal representative of Sally Robbins' estate with the consent of the decedent's

surviving children.

On May 24, 2005, the Defendant filed a Notice of Suggestion of Death of the Plaintiff.

On June 1, 2005, the Court held a status conference. The Court vacated the final pre-trial

conference to allow the parties to obtain the report of the medical examiner concerning the

cause of death. At a subsequent status conference on June 29, 2005, counsel for the Plaintiff

advised the Court that the parties were still awaiting the medical examiner's report and

notified the Court that the Plaintiff intends to file a motion asking leave to amend the

Complaint. 

Ultimately, the medical examiner concluded that the Plaintiff's death was a result of

a toxic level of combined prescription medications, some of which the Plaintiff was

undisputedly taking because of her pancreatic problems. 

On July 1, 2005, counsel for the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint and

Substitute Parties. The motion asks leave of Court to file an Amended Complaint alleging

a survival action pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3110, and an action for wrongful death pursuant

to A.R.S. § 12-611, et seq. Counsel seeks to substitute, in place of the decedent, Troy Gandy

as personal representative of the estate of Sally Robbins, on his own behalf, on behalf of the

estate, and on behalf of Renee Montz, Paul Montz, Darrel Robbins, and Helen Robbins

(beneficiaries of the estate). 

The Defendant opposes the motion to amend on the grounds that: (1) there is no

subject matter jurisdiction over the First Amended Complaint because the statutory

beneficiaries did not exhaust their administrative remedies for the alleged wrongful death

claim; (2) the amendment is prejudicial to the Defendant; and (3) the proposed amendment

names improper parties. 

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On September 12, 2005, the Defendant filed a Motion to Disqualify Counsel. The

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's counsel has a conflict of interest and cannot represent the

personal representative of the estate and estate beneficiaries. The Defendant is concerned

that the personal representative of the estate has a personal stake in the outcome of the

lawsuit, and that counsel has already incurred fees as a result of his prior representation of

the decedent. 

On November 18, 2005, the Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Filing Forms 95," which states

that the Plaintiff has served, or will serve within a few days, administrative claims with the

appropriate agency to satisfy any potential exhaustment requirement with respect to the

wrongful death claim alleged in the First Amended Complaint. The Court has not received

an update as to whether the claims have been denied. 

On February 6, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on all the pending motions. 

II. Legal Standard and Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court will address the pending motion to disqualify Plaintiff's

counsel. The Defendant contends that if the Motion to Amend Complaint is granted, this

Court will be divested of subject matter jurisdiction. Ordinarily, the Court would decide the

jurisdictional issue first, however, if counsel is disqualified, his motion will be stricken and

the jurisdictional issue will be moot.

A. Motion to Disqualify Counsel

Attorneys are bound by the local rules of the court in which they appear. The District

Court of Arizona has adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct approved by the Supreme

Court of the State of Arizona. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 936

F.Supp. 697, 700 (D. Ariz. 1996). In applying these ethical rules in the context of motions

to disqualify opposing counsel, the Arizona Supreme Court has counseled that "only in

extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the

attorney-client relationship of his opponent." Alexander v. Superior Court In and For

Maricopa County, 141 Ariz. 157, 161, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1984). The Court has also

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advised reviewing courts to "view with suspicion" motions by opposing counsel disqualify

an attorney based upon a purported conflict of interest with that attorney's own client or an

"appearance of impropriety." Villalpando v. Reagan, 211 Ariz. 305, __, 121 P.3d 172, 175

(Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Gomez v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 223, 226, 717 P.2d 902, 905

(1986)). 

Not only is the burden on the moving party to show sufficient reason why an attorney

should be disqualified from representing his client, but whenever possible the courts should

attempt to reach a solution that is less burdensome to the client or clients than

disqualification. Alexander, 141 Ariz. at 161, 685 P.2d at 1313. Additionally, it should be

noted that the use of a motion to disqualify as a tactical tool is frowned upon. Alexander, 141

Ariz. at 165, 685 P.2d at 1317.

Here, the Defendant argues that John Pepper Leader, counsel for Plaintiff Sally

Robbins, must be disqualified because subsequent to the death of Ms. Robbins, he has been

retained to represent Troy Gandy, individually and as the personal representative of the estate

of Sally Robbins, as well as the beneficiaries of the estate of Sally Robbins (Renee Montz,

Paul Montz, Darrell Robbins, and Helen Robbins). The Defendant suggests that such

representation violates ER 1.7 which governs conflicts of interest when a lawyer undertakes

representation of multiple clients at the same time. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 936 F.Supp. 697, 701 (D. Ariz 1996) (stating that ER 1.7 is the

standard for evaluating conflicts of interest).

Assuming for a moment that there is a conflict of interest, disqualification is still not

a result favored by the Court. Generally, a violation of ER 1.7 would create an issue for the

State Bar of Arizona, but would not be a basis for disqualification. It is not this Court's role

to impose sanctions for the ethical obligations imposed by, and policed by, the State Bar of

Arizona. In any event, because a Motion for Disqualification has been raised by the

Defendant, the Court will consider the particulars of the alleged violation and the

circumstances of the case, before determining that the harsh sanction of disqualification is

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1

 As discussed infra sections II.B.1. and II.B.2, Troy Gandy cannot bring a wrongful

death claim on his own behalf and does not have a financial stake in the outcome of this

litigation.

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warranted. Research Corp. Techs, Inc., 936 F.Supp. at 703. 

Concurrent representation of clients does not become a problem unless the interests

of the clients are adverse or become adverse during the trial. Alexander v. Superior Court

In and For Maricopa County, 141 Ariz. 157, 163, 685 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1984). The same

can be said of consecutive representation (representation alleged to be adverse to a former

client). There has not been any evidence presented by the Defendant that Troy Gandy's

interests are adverse to Renee Montz, Paul Montz, Darrell Robbins, Helen Robbins, or the

deceased. In fact, it appears to this Court that Mr. Leader's clients have a mutual interest in

this lawsuit. 

The beneficiaries will benefit in several ways from continued representation by Mr.

Leader. The Defendant agrees that Mr. Leader litigated this case on behalf of Sally Robbins

for more than two years. Both sides of this litigation have undertaken substantial discovery

and expended a considerable amount of time and money preparing for the trial. Mr. Leader

is already familiar with the facts and evidence that underlie this case. Allowing the attorney

or attorneys who are most knowledgeable about the facts and the evidence to continue to

represent the beneficiaries of the estate, and the representative of the estate, will help avoid

unnecessary cost and delay to the parties. These facts weigh in favor of continued

representation. Alexander, 141 Ariz. at 166, 685 P.2d at 1318.

The Defendant concedes that the beneficiaries selected Troy Gandy to be the personal

representative of Sally Robbins' estate. The fact that an action for wrongful death is brought

by the personal representative on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries, does not alter the

rights of the beneficiaries. Sentry Ins. v. Pinal County Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 557, 558,

753 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Ct. App. 1988). At this point in time, Troy Gandy does not appear to

have any interest in this lawsuit that is adverse to the interest of the statutory beneficiaries.1

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 Similarly, Mr. Leader's representation of Mr. Gandy does not appear to be adverse to the

interests of the beneficiaries of the estate. In fact, as the Defendant points out, counsel and

the representative of the estate both have fiduciary duties to the statutory beneficiaries.

Wilmot v. Wilmot, 203 Ariz. 565, 58 P.3d 507 (2002). 

 Because it does not appear that there is a substantial risk that Mr. Leader's

representation of the beneficiaries and the representative of the estate would be materially

and adversely affected by his own interest or his duties to another current client, a former

client, or a third person, the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify is denied. The Court will now

move to the merits of the Plaintiff's pending motion.

B. Motion to Amend/Correct/Substitute Party

The Plaintiff has moved to amend the Complaint to allege causes of action under both

A.R.S. § 14-3110, Arizona's survival statute, and A.R.S. § 12-611, Arizona's wrongful death

statute. The survival action seeks economic damages for the lost earnings of the decedent.

The survival claim is asserted by Troy Gandy, in his capacity as the personal representative

of Sally Robbins' estate, on behalf of the estate. The wrongful death claim seeks an

unspecified amount of damages for loss of future income, economic loss, loss of

companionship, and pain and suffering. The wrongful death claim is asserted by Troy

Gandy, in his capacity as personal representative of Sally Robbins' estate, on behalf of

himself and the statutory beneficiaries. 

1. Proposed Plaintiff(s) 

The Defendant argues that the First Amended Complaint, as proposed, improperly

names the personal representative of Sally Robbins' estate as a party in the wrongful death

claim. Wrongful death is a purely statutory cause of action and must be brought in the names

of the persons to whom such right is given by statute. Lingel v. Olbin, 198 Ariz. 249, 253,

8 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Ct. App. 2000); Knauss v. DND Neffson Co., 192 Ariz. 192, 199, 963

P.2d 271, 278 (Ct. App. 1997). Arizona's wrongful death statute provides that a personal

representative of the decedent's estate has the authority to bring a wrongful death claim, as

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would a surviving spouse. A.R.S. § 12-612(A); Sentry Ins. v. Encinas, 156 Ariz. 557, 558,

753 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Ct. App. 1988). Monies received by the personal representative are

for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries, who are the real parties in interest. Sentry Ins.,

156 Ariz. at 558, 753 P.2d at 1214. 

The only proper statutory plaintiffs in a wrongful death action are the: (1) surviving

spouse; (2) parent or guardian; (3) personal representative of the deceased person on

behalf of the surviving husband, wife, parents or children; or (4) if none of these survive,

the decedent's estate. A.R.S. § 12-612(A) (emphasis added); Knauss, 192 Ariz. at 200, 963

P.2d at 279. The estate itself cannot be the beneficiary of a wrongful death action if there is

a surviving spouse, parent, or child. Knauss; 192 Ariz. at 200, 963 P.2d at 278-79; Sentry

Ins., 156 Ariz. at 558, 753 P.2d at 1214. However, the statute does allow the personal

representative of the estate to bring a claim on behalf of the surviving parents, children, and

spouses. A.R.S. § 12-612(A).

The Court disagrees with the Plaintiff's argument that the personal representative of

the estate can bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of himself, as the decedent's significant

other. This Court must adhere to the plain language of the A.R.S. § 12-612. Knauss; 192

Ariz. at 200, 963 P.2d at 279. The statute only allows the personal representative of the

estate to recover monies in a wrongful death action on behalf of the surviving husband,

wife, parents or children. A.R.S. § 12-612(A). Because Troy Gandy is not a parent, child,

or spouse of the decedent, he is not a statutory beneficiary and cannot bring a wrongful death

claim on behalf of himself.

 Additionally, because there are surviving parents and children in this action, the estate

itself cannot be a beneficiary. In other words, Mr. Gandy cannot claim any damages on

behalf of the estate in the wrongful death action because there are surviving parents and

children. A.R.S. § 12-612. The fact that the Plaintiff died during the pendency of the

litigation does not revive any claim her estate would have had if there had been no survivors

upon the Plaintiff's death. Katz v. Filandro, 153 Ariz. 601, 604, 739 P.2d 822, 825 (Ct. App.

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1987). 

As personal representative of the estate of Sally Robbins, Troy Gandy does have the

authority to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of the decedent's surviving parents and

children. Thus, he is a proper party to the proposed First Amended Complaint to the extent

that it alleges a claim for wrongful death on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries. Any monies

collected as a result of the wrongful death claim would be solely for the benefit of Renee

Montz, Paul Montz, Darrell Robbins, and Helen Robbins. Mr. Gandy cannot, however,

assert a claim for wrongful death on behalf of himself or the estate.

Regardless of what the beneficiaries had hoped to accomplish by appointing Troy

Gandy as personal representative, A.R.S. § 12-612 simply does not give Mr. Gandy the

authority to seek damages for his own non-economic losses, or the losses of the estate. The

Plaintiff has not cited, nor can this Court find, any Arizona authority that would allow an

unmarried "significant other," by statute or common law, to recover non-economic losses

resulting from the wrongful death of a loved one. Additionally, causes of action for wrongful

death are not "freely assignable." Lingel v. Olbin, 198 Ariz. 249, 254, 8 P.3d 1163, 1168 (Ct.

App. 2000). Therefore, the statutory beneficiaries cannot contract away a portion of their

potential recovery under the wrongful death statute to Mr. Gandy by appointing him personal

representative of the estate. 

The Court finds that Troy Gandy, as personal representative of the estate of Sally

Robbins, is a proper party to the wrongful death claim alleged in the First Amended

Complaint. However, he can only bring the claim: (1) in his capacity as the personal

representative of the estate of Sally Robbins; (2) on behalf of statutory beneficiaries, Renee

Montz, Paul Montz, Darrell Robbins, and Helen Robbins; and (3) only for damages resulting

from the aforementioned statutory beneficiaries' alleged injuries.

 2. Survival of Plaintiff's Claims

The Defendant argues that there is no need to add a wrongful death claim to this

because Arizona's survival statute, A.R.S. § 14-3110, allows the decedent's claims to survive

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her death. Thus, the Defendant argues that the proper course of action would be to substitute

the personal representative of Sally Robbins' estate for the decedent, and to allow the

personal representative to continue to litigate the Complaint as it was originally brought. The

Plaintiff, however, argues that the addition of a wrongful death claim is necessary to

encompass the injuries allegedly resulting from Sally Robbins' death. The Court agrees.

The Plaintiff's original Complaint alleges medical negligence and seeks damages in

the amount of five million dollars for Sally Robbins' medical and hospital expenses, pain and

suffering, and lost wages and income. According to the Plaintiff, the vast proportion of the

damages sought are for non-economic injuries (pain and suffering). The Arizona legislature

decided that once an injured person dies, they cannot receive the benefit from an award of

pain and suffering. Harrington v. Flanders, 2 Ariz.App. 265, 267, 407 P.2d 946, 948 (1966);

see also A.R.S. § 14-3110 (excluding damages for pain and suffering of the deceased).

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's survival action does not include damages for the decedent's pain

and suffering. The Plaintiff does not dispute this.

The Plaintiff does, however, dispute the Defendant's argument that the personal

representative of the estate cannot bring any claims on behalf of the estate. According to

A.R.S. § 14-3110, the decedent's personal injury action may be asserted by the personal

representative of her estate, on behalf of the estate, providing that "damages for pain and

suffering of such injured person shall not be allowed." Mr. Gandy, in his capacity as

personal representative of Sally Robbins' estate, can maintain an action under the survivor

statute to recover damages for the estate. However, those damages are limited to certain

economic damages and cannot include any pain and suffering of the decedent, Mr. Gandy,

or the decedent's beneficiaries. See id. 

The only way that the Plaintiff can recover non-economic damages is to assert a claim

for wrongful death and seek compensation for the pain and suffering of the decedent's

surviving parents and children. 

3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the Wrongful Death Claim

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 If the Court grants the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, the case will go to trial on the

same operative facts, and the personal representative of the estate can attempt to recover

economic damages on behalf of the estate under the survival statute, and non-economic

damages resulting from the same alleged negligent acts on behalf of the surviving

beneficiaries. The question now is whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over a claim for

wrongful death. The Defendant contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

a claim for wrongful death because the proposed parties (the statutory beneficiaries) have not

filed an administrative claim related to a claim for wrongful death.

Under the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"), the United States may only be held

liable for money damages if a claimant first exhausts his administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2875(a). A claimant's remedies are exhausted after his claim is presented to, and denied

by, the appropriate agency. Id. The Defendant does not dispute that Sally Robbins

exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to the medical negligence claim and that

this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a survival action. However, the Defendant

contends that the statutory beneficiaries are required to meet the exhaustion requirement

before they can add a claim for wrongful death. 

The Defendant argues that wrongful death is a separate and distinct claim from the

Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim that involves new parties and new damages, therefore,

the new parties must also fulfill the statutory requirement of exhausting their administrative

remedies. The Court disagrees. 

It is true that wrongful death is a separate and distinct claim and is not derivative of

a survival action. Barrigan v. Superior Court of Pima County, 12 Ariz. App. 402, 405, 470

P.2d 722, 725 (1970). However, requiring beneficiaries to re-exhaust administrative

remedies every time a plaintiff dies from his injuries during the course of a medical

negligence lawsuit would be putting form over substance. The recognized purpose of the

FTCA is to provide compensation to those injured by the government's torts. Blair v. U.S.,

304 F.3d 861, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). The claim presentation requirement is designed to ensure

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that compensation is provided in a fair and equitable manner, not to provide a "regulatory

checklist" that which, if not strictly observed, creates a basis to terminate claims regardless

of their merits. Id. The notice requirement does not require a claimant to enumerate each

theory of liability. Brown v. U.S., 838 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1988). And compelling a

claimant to advance all possible causes of action is overly technical and may frustrate the

very purpose of the notice requirement. Id. at 1161.

In enacting the notice requirement, Congress sought to ensure that plaintiffs would

promptly inform the relevant agency of the circumstances surrounding the claim, so that the

agency can investigate the claim and respond accordingly. Broudy v. U.S., 722 F.2d 566, 568

(9th Cir. 1983). The notice requirement of the FTCA was modeled after statutes governing

notice of tort claims against municipalities which require minimal notice. Shipek v. U.S., 752

F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985). Minimal notice is notice that is sufficient to inform the

relevant agency of the existence of a claim. Id. Similarly, the FTCA's notice requirement

is construed liberally. Id. A "skeletal claim form," containing only the basic elements of

notice of the incident and injury and a sum certain representing damages, suffices to

overcome an argument that jurisdiction is lacking. Broudy, 722 F.2d at 568. 

The Plaintiff's proposed amendments do not divest this Court of subject matter

jurisdiction providing that the Plaintiff does not intend to seek damages in excess of five

million dollars. See Blair, 304 F.3d at 864 (FTCA notice requirement provides that an action

cannot be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal

agency). The wrongful death claim asserted in the First Amended Complaint is based on the

same core operative facts as the medical negligence claim asserted in the original Complaint

and the Plaintiff's prior administrative claim. Therefore, the claim filed by the Plaintiff

provided the Defendant with the facts necessary to conduct a full investigation of the

circumstances underlying the claim. See, e.g., Brown, 838 F.2d at 1161. 

The Defendant is correct that the parties will change from the decedent to her

beneficiaries, and the damages sought will now exclude the non-economic damages of the

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decedent and include the non-economic damages of her surviving parents and children.

However, the Defendant should have reasonably foreseen that it was possible that the

Plaintiff, who alleged medical negligence and severe injuries, might die from her injuries

before trial. The Defendant should also have foreseen that should this occur, the claim

would have to be amended to include damages arising from the Plaintiff's death. Considering

the circumstances of this case, requiring the Plaintiff to exhaust the administrative claim

procedure again would serve no purpose other than to delay litigation. See, e.g., Brown, 838

F.2d at 1161.

Taking into account the "generous notice interpretation," the Court finds that the

Plaintiff's prior administrative claim was broad enough to put the Defendant on notice of the

claims and injuries asserted in the First Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Goodman v. U.S.,

298 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, for purposes of the FTCA notice

requirement, a medical malpractice claim presented to the appropriate agency was broad

enough to put government on notice of related claim for failure to obtain informed consent).

Additionally, it should be noted that the Defendant conceded at oral argument before this

Court that the Plaintiff did file a form with the appropriate agency in November of 2005, and

that the administrative agency is likely to issue a denial before this case proceeds to trial. In

the event the pending administrative claim is denied, or the six month statutory period passes

without any decision and the claim is deemed denied, any lingering concern regarding this

Court's jurisdiction over the wrongful death claim will become moot.

 4. Prejudice to the Defendant

The Defendant argues that it will be prejudiced if this action is converted into a

wrongful death claim. This Court's discretion to grant leave to amend is "particularly broad."

Chodos v. West Pub. Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). However, when considering

a motion for leave to amend, a district court must consider whether the proposed amendment

will cause prejudice to the opposing party. Id.

Here, the Defendant argues that the claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint

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expand the scope of the Defendant's alleged negligence and seek different damages. The

Defendant also argues that if a wrongful death claim is added at this late date, the Defendant

will have to undertake further discovery and obtain expert witnesses on all aspects of the

wrongful death claim before the case can proceed to trial.

While it is true that the Plaintiff did not seek leave to amend until three weeks prior

to trial, this is simply not a case of "undue delay" that would cause prejudice to the opposing

party. There is absolutely no dilatory conduct on behalf of the Plaintiff in seeking leave to

amend. The late amendment in this case is solely the result of the Plaintiff's death during the

course of litigation. The Plaintiff did not simply fail to assert a claim or add parties that

could and should have been asserted earlier. No right to assert a cause of action for wrongful

death existed until the Plaintiff passed away. Thus, counsel cold not have sought leave to

amend the Complaint to add the wrongful death claim and substitute the real parties in

interest at an earlier point in this litigation. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves provide that they are to be construed

"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962). It is true that addition of a wrongful death

claim may require some additional discovery and trial preparation. However, this additional

trial preparation will have to be undertaken by both sides of the litigation. More importantly,

the need to undertake any additional trial preparation should not come as a surprise to the

Defendant. The possibility that Sally Robbins could die from her injuries prior to trial was

a foreseeable consequence of the injuries alleged in the Plaintiff's original Complaint.

The Defendant does not provide any persuasive arguments that it will be prejudiced

as a result by the addition of a wrongful death claim and the substitution of the real parties

in interest. Requiring the statutory beneficiaries to litigate an entirely separate action for

wrongful death based on the same operative facts that are present in this litigation would, on

the other hand, be unnecessarily duplicitave and a waste of time, money, and judicial

resources. 

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While it may not be the Defendant's preference to litigate a wrongful death claim, the

Court cannot say that allowing the amendment would in any way be "prejudicial" to the

Defendant. Granting leave to amend a complaint in order to cure deficiencies caused by the

death of the Plaintiff during the course of litigation is consistent with the spirit and purpose

of the applicable rules of procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (leave to amend shall be given

freely when justice so requires). Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is granted.

The Defendant also argues if this case is converted into a wrongful death action, the

Plaintiff must comply with requirements of A.R.S. § 12-2604, which governs expert witness

testimony in state law medical malpractice cases. Due to Sally Robbins' death, some limited

amount of discovery will inevitably have to be conducted before this case can proceed to

trial. This may or may not include retaining and disclosing additional expert witnesses.

However, at this point in time the Defendant's concerns about trial testimony and evidence

are premature. The Defendant can re-raise this issue, if needed, at the final pretrial

scheduling conference.

Lastly, the Defendant correctly points out that the Plaintiff improperly incorporates

by reference allegations made in the original Complaint. While this is insufficient reason to

deny the Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint, the Court will require the Plaintiff to correct

this deficiency prior filing the First Amended Complaint. 

The Court grants the Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint that conforms

with all of the holdings in this Order. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint

and Substitute Party (doc. 107).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify

Counsel (doc. 119). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Plaintiff shall draft a First Amended Complaint that

is consistent with the holdings in this Order. The Plaintiff shall file the First Amended

Complaint within ten days of the date of this Order. The Defendant shall respond according

to the applicable rules of procedure. 

DATED this 14th day of February, 2006.

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