Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03088/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Wichita
Appellee
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus Curiae
Harold Peterson
Appellant

Document Text:

HAROLD PETERSON, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

NOV .. G 1989 

ROBERT L. l'10ECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 89-3088 

CITY 

) 

OF WICHITA, KANSAS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 86-1013-C) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS 

Jim Lawing, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Gary E. Rebenstorf, Assistant City Attorney; Thomas R. Powell; and 

Ed L. Randels of the Office of the City Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Charles A. Shanor, General Counsel; Gwendolyn Young Reams, 

Associate General Counsel; L~mont N. White; and Vincent Blackwood 

of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C. 

as Amicus Curiae. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-3088 Document: 010110064960 Date Filed: 11/06/1989 Page: 1 
Harold Peterson brought this action under 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e 

et~ (1982) (Title VII), alleging that the City of Wichita, 

Kansas, had illegally discharged him on the basis of race. The 

district court dismissed the suit, concluding that Peterson had 

failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC as required by 

section 2000e-5 because the only filing within the applicable time 

period was unverified. See Peterson v. City of Wichita, 706 F. 

Supp. 766 (D. Kan. 1989). Peterson appeals and we reverse. 

The tangled history of Peterson's attempts to file a 

discrimination charge with the appropriate authority is fully set 

out in the district court opinion, ida, and we need not repeat it 

here. We base our decision on the following dispositive facts. 

The City informed Peterson on June 8, 1983, that his employment as 

Director of the City's Department of Human Resources was terminated effective immediately. The EEOC received Peterson's 

unverified complaint alleging discriminatory discharge on 

March 28, 1984, and assigned it a charge number. On June 3, at 

the EEOC 0 s request, Peterson sent in a completed questionnaire 

executed under penalty of perjury, from which the EEOC prepared a 

formal charge. Peterson executed this formal perfected charge on 

July 30, 1984. 

In a deferral state such as Kansas, a Title VII claimant must 

file his discrimination charge with the appropriate state or local 

agency, or with the EEOC, within 300 days of the alleged unlawful 

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Appellate Case: 89-3088 Document: 010110064960 Date Filed: 11/06/1989 Page: 2 
act. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(e); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. 

Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988). Here the only document the EEOC 

received less than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act 

was Peterson's unverified charge of March 28, 1984. Title VII 

provides that "[c]harges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as 

the Commission requires." 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis 

added). While it is undisputed that the March 28 filing otherwise 

satisfied these requirements, it was not made under oath or affirmation. 

The EEOC has issued regulations implementing Title VII, one 

of which provides: 

A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or 

omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to 

clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such 

amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which 

constitute unlawful employment practices related to or 

growing out of the subject matter of the original charge 

will relate back to the date the charge was first 

received. 

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Under this 

regulation, Peterson's later verified charge would relate back to 

amend the deficiency in his timely filing. The district court 

refused to apply the regulation, however, concluding that it was 

contrary to the statute and thus beyond the EEOC's power to 

promulgate. We disagree. 

Every circuit which has considered the issue has decided in 

favor of the validity of the regulation, concluding that an 

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Appellate Case: 89-3088 Document: 010110064960 Date Filed: 11/06/1989 Page: 3 
unve-ri~ied charge is a timely filing if it is subsequently amended 

by a char_ge executed under oath or affirmation. See Casavantes v. 

California State Univ., 732 F.2d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1981); Blue Bell 

Boots, Inc., 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern 

Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate 

v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1968); 

see also Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74, 77-78 & 

n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (approving regulation and noting it supports 

nonjurisdictional nature of verification element). Underlying 

these decisions is the principle that Title VII is remedial legislation to be construed liberally rather than technically. See 

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397 (1982); 

Casavantes, 732 Fo2d at 1442-43; Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 357; 

Choa.te, 402 F.2d at 360. Equally pertinent is the Supreme Court's 

recent admonition that the EEOC' s. interpretation of Title VII is 

entitled to deference if it is reasonable. See Commercial Office 

Prod., 108 S. Ct. at 1671. Finally, and most importantly, the 

district court's conclusion that a claimant's failure to file a 

timely verified charge bars his suit appears to directly conflict 

with the Supreme Court's ruling in Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393-95, that 

the timeliness of the filing is not jurisdictional. 

The district court based its r~jection of the regulation on 

the need to protect employers from frivolous claims; and on the 

language in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 65 (1982), which 

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Appellate Case: 89-3088 Document: 010110064960 Date Filed: 11/06/1989 Page: 4 
. states that the section 2000e-5(b) elements are a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to judicial enforcement of an EEOC summons. In its 

amicus brief to this court, the EEOC responds that the ruling in 

Shell Oil does not conflict with the regulation at issue because 

under that regulation the elements of section 2000e-5(b) are 

satisfied through the relating-back of the amending verified 

charge. In addition, although satisfying section 2000e-5(b) is a 

jurisdictional prerequisite to enforcing an EEOC summons, filing a 

timely EEOC charge is indisputably not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under Zipes. The EEOC also points out that requiring 

such amendment prior to enforcing an EEOC summons eliminates any 

prejudice to the employer from the claimant's previous failure to 

verify the charge. Contrary to the district court's belief, the 

regulation does not frustrate the purpose of the verification 

requirement, which is to protect an employer from frivolous 

claims, because the EEOC does not proceed to investigate a charge 

until it is verified. 1 

Accordingly, we uphold application of the relating-back 

provision of the regulation at issue when, as here, the defendant 

1 In reaching its decision, the district cou~t relied on 

Proffit v. Keycom Electronic Pub., .625 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 

1985). We do not find that case persuasive. It appears to be 

contrary to the Seventh Circuit's holding in Choate v. Caterpillar 

Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968), and its attempts to 

distinguish Choate lack force in view of the Supreme Court's 

discussion of the timeliness issue in Zipes v. Trans World 

Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393-95 (1982). We are likewise not persuaded by the district court's reliance on EEOC v. Appalachian 

Power Co., 568 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1978). In that case, contrary 

to the situation before us, the claimant never corrected his 

unverified charge by a subsequent verification. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3088 Document: 010110064960 Date Filed: 11/06/1989 Page: 5 
has alleged no prejudice arising from its operation. See Price, 

687 F.2d at 79; Sears Roebuck, 650 F.2d at 18; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 

231; Choate, 402 F.2d at 360. We reverse and r~mand for further 

proceedings. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3088 Document: 010110064960 Date Filed: 11/06/1989 Page: 6