Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_15-cv-01459/USCOURTS-alnd-7_15-cv-01459-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kcloefphraex Bosheauj Frierson
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

KCLOEFPHRAEX BOSHEAUJ 

FRIERSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, 

COMMISSIONER,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number

 7:15-cv-01459-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kcloefphraex Frierson brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the 

Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §405(g), seeking review of the final 

adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the 

Commissioner”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

applied the correct legal standard and that his decision – which has become the 

decision of the Commissioner – is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, 

the court AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits. 

I. Procedural History

Frierson filed her applications for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income 

and Title II Disability Insurance Benefits on January 11, 2010, and January 28, 

FILED

 2016 Jun-21 AM 08:47

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:15-cv-01459-AKK Document 11 Filed 06/21/16 Page 1 of 9
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2010, respectively, alleging a disability onset date of December 20, 2009, due to

severe anxiety and back pain. (R. 20, 94, 216, 218, 246). After the SSA denied 

her applications, Frierson requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 108, 122). The 

ALJ subsequently denied Frierson’s claim, (R. 91), and Frierson sought review, (R. 

104). The Appeals Council issued a decision vacating the ALJ’s denial of benefits. 

Id. On remand, the ALJ once again denied Frierson’s claim, (R. 17), which 

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused 

to grant review, (R. 1-4). Frierson then filed this action pursuant to §205(g) of the 

Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Doc. 1. 

II. Standard of Review

The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial 

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Walden v. 

Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the 

correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); 

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §405(g) 

mandates that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported by 

‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the 

final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable and 

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supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 

F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a 

preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529 

(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (other citations omitted)). If supported by 

substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings 

even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings. 

See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review 

of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield 

automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §416(i). A physical or mental 

impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3).

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Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20 

C.F.R. §404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in 

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4) whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national 

economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). An affirmative answer 

to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps three 

and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than 

step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to prior 

work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can do.” 

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

In performing the five step analysis on remand, the ALJ found that Frierson

had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 20, 2009, the

alleged onset date,” and therefore met Step One. (R. 23). Next, the ALJ found that 

Frierson did not satisfy Step Two because she did “not have an impairment or 

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combination of impairments that . . . significantly limited [her] . . . ability to 

perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive months; therefore, 

[Frierson did] not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Id. 

Since the ALJ answered step two in the negative, the ALJ ultimately found that 

Frierson had “not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

from December 20, 2009, through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision.” (R. 31).

V. Analysis

Frierson raises two contentions of alleged error. Specifically, Frierson 

contends that the ALJ failed to properly follow the “slight abnormality” standard in 

determining her severe impairments, and to properly evaluate and state the weight 

given to the medical evidence from Indian Rivers Mental Health Center (“Indian 

Rivers”). Doc. 8 at 7, 10. As shown below, neither contention establishes that the 

ALJ committed reversible error. Therefore, the court will affirm the ALJ’s 

decision. 

1. The ALJ properly followed the “slight abnormality” standard 

First, Frierson contends that the ALJ failed to follow the slight abnormality 

standard when he concluded that she “does not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments.” Doc. 8 at 8 (citing (R. 23)). Relying on case law 

that “[a]n impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect 

so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual’s 

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ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience,” McDaniel, 800 

F.2d at 1031, Frierson asserts that her paranoid schizophrenia is more than a “slight 

abnormality” and qualified as a severe impairment, doc. 8 at 10. As an initial 

matter, Frierson is correct that the records from Indian Rivers indicate that Frierson 

was receiving treatment for schizophrenia and had a “major” or “serious 

impairment or inability to function.” (R. 482, 734). However, as the ALJ noted, 

the medical records from Frierson’s treating physician, Dr. Larry Skelton, and 

another treating source, DCH Regional Medical Center (“DCH”), show that

Frierson rarely complained of any mental impairments and that her psychiatric 

exams consistently revealed that she had normal mood, affect, and decision making 

skills. (R. 29); see also, e.g., (R. 398, 401, 690, 816, 944, 983-4). Furthermore, 

the records from Dr. Skelton and DCH are consistent with the testimony of Dr. 

Alfred Jonas, a medical expert appointed by the ALJ. (R. 68-70). Dr. Jonas 

testified that “[t]here are no objective findings in this case and no other symptoms 

[besides those found at Indian Rivers] that [support Frierson’s] diagnosis of 

schizophrenia.” (R. 73). In light of this record, and because a diagnosis alone does 

not establish that an impairment is severe, see Wind v. Barnhart, 133 Fed. App’x. 

684, 690 (11th Cir. 2005), Frierson’s reliance on the Indian Rivers records to show 

error is unavailing. 

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In addition to relying on the Indian Rivers records, Frierson also takes issue 

with the ALJ’s decision to afford great weight to the opinion of Dr. Jonas. Doc. 8 

at 9-10. Frierson is correct that generally the opinion of a non-examining 

physician is entitled to little weight. However, an ALJ can rely on a nonexamining physician’s opinion if it is consistent with the medical evidence. See 

Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991); Jarrett v. Commissioner 

of Social Sec., 422 Fed. App’x. 869, 873 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The weight due to a 

non-examining physician’s opinion depends, among other things, on the extent to 

which it is supported by clinical findings and is consistent with other evidence.”). 

This was precisely the case here where the ALJ found: “[Dr. Jonas’] testimony 

opinion that [Frierson] has no medically determinable ‘severe’ impairments is 

consistent with and supported by the weight of the evidence in this case, including 

records and reports obtained from DCH, Dr. Skelton and Indian Rivers Mental 

Health.” (R. 29-30). Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Jonas’ opinion

and did not err in failing to find that Frierson’s paranoid schizophrenia is a severe 

impairment. See Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming 

an ALJ’s finding that an impairment was not severe where substantial medical 

evidence showed that the claimant “manifested few symptoms of the disease”); 

Jarrett, 422 Fed. App’x. at 873 (“[T]he more consistent a physician’s opinion is 

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with the record as a whole, the more weight an ALJ should place on that 

opinion.”). 

2. The ALJ properly evaluated the evidence from Indian Rivers 

As her second basis for error, Frierson contends that the ALJ failed to

properly evaluate and state the weight he gave to the medical records from Indian 

Rivers. Doc. 8 at 11. This contention is also unavailing because the ALJ, in fact,

discusses Frierson’s diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia from Indian Rivers and

noted that Frierson “reported symptoms to include seeing snakes, seeing shadows, 

hearing voices, and hearing footsteps.” (R. 25). Based on his review of the 

records from Indian Rivers, the ALJ found that the records “reflect not much more 

than routine follow up [appointments] about every four months.” Id. Because 

“there is no rigid requirement that the [ALJ] specifically refer to every piece of 

evidence in his decision, so long as [the court can] conclude [that] the [ALJ] 

considered [the claimant’s] medical condition as a whole,” Parks ex rel. D.P. v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec., 783 F.3d 847, 852 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), the court 

finds that the ALJ’s opinion sufficiently established that the ALJ adequately 

evaluated the records from Indian Rivers. 

Likewise, while Frierson is correct that the ALJ “must state specifically the 

weight accorded to each item of evidence and why he reached that decision,” 

Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit has 

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recognized that an ALJ may implicitly make such a determination, see Kemp v. 

Astrue, 308 Fed. App’x. 423, 426 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 

F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986)). In that respect, although the ALJ does not 

specifically state what weight he afforded the evidence from Indian Rivers, it is 

clear that the ALJ discounted the evidence by ultimately concluding that “there is 

nothing [in the record] that suggests the level of mental compromise or severity of 

anxiety reflected in [the Indian Rivers] records . . . .” (R. 29). Therefore, the ALJ 

did not commit reversible error. 

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination 

that Frierson is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ 

applied the proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the 

Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance 

with this memorandum opinion will be entered. 

DONE the 21st day of June, 2016.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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