Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02299/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02299-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David C. Gannon
Plaintiff
John E. Potter
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID C. GANNON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER

GENERAL, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-2299 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 19]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant John E. Potter's ("Defendant") Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim [Docket No. 19]. Having read and considered the arguments

presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, and having considered the arguments

presented by the parties at the December 13, 2005 hearing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim. Plaintiff's retaliation claim is hereby DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

Plaintiff David C. Gannon ("Plaintiff"), a white male, is an employee of the United States Postal

Service, employed by Defendant John E. Potter ("Defendant"), the Postmaster General of the United

States Postal Service. First Amended Complaint ("AC") at ¶ 1. Plaintiff is currently a Clerk at the Elk

Grove Post Office. Id. at ¶ 3. 

Plaintiff has worked for the Post Office since June of 1984. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8. Up until 1996,

Plaintiff consistently received performance ratings of satisfactory or better, and received various merit

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and performance awards throughout his career. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8. 

Beginning on or about 1991, while Plaintiff was working at the West Sacramento Postal Office,

Plaintiff and at least four other postal employees – including Ray Bastian ("Bastian"), Keith Komuri

("Komuri"), Wayne Silba ("Silba"), and Wesley Poe ("Poe") – formed an informal "carpool"

arrangement with a mentally disabled postal employee, Joe Enos ("Enos"). Id. at ¶ 10. Pursuant to the

arrangement, Enos' mother paid Plaintiff, Bastian, Komuri, Silba, and Poe between $5.00 and $7.50 per

week to drive Enos to work on a rotating basis. Id. 

In 1995, Plaintiff was an "EAS Level 16 Supervisor" and was compensated at an annual salary

of $65,000. Id. at ¶ 8. On or around October 1995, Plaintiff engaged in a conversation with Bastian,

who was his subordinate, concerning Bastian's restricted sick leave. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff told Bastian that

he would be taking Bastian off of sick leave. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12. Bastian agreed. Id. Gannon then asked

Bastian whether Bastian would be willing to transport Enos to and from work. Id. at ¶ 12. Bastian

agreed. Id. 

The following day, Gannon was told to report to James Taylor ("Taylor"), the boss of his

supervisor, Frank Jackson ("Jackson"). Id. Taylor accused Plaintiff of violating postal service rules

relating to restricted sick leave. Id. Specifically, Taylor accused Plaintiff of taking Bastian off of sick

leave in exchange for Bastian's agreement to take on Plaintiff's responsibilities relating to Enos. Id. at

¶ 13. 

On November 10, 1995, Plaintiff attended an investigatory meeting with Taylor. Id. at ¶ 14.

When Plaintiff requested that John Garrard ("Garrard"), the National Association of Postal Supervisors

representative, attend the meeting, Taylor pounded on his desk and yelled at Plaintiff. Id. Taylor again

accused Plaintiff of coercing Bastian into giving Enos a ride to and from work. Id. Plaintiff recalls that

Taylor did not take any notes during the meeting. Id. Immediately following the meeting, Jackson, who

was Plaintiff's acting supervisor at the time, placed Plaintiff on Administrative Leave. Id. 

Plaintiff remained on Administrative Leave for the next thirty days. Id. at ¶ 15. During this

time, he stayed at home and had no work or assignments. Id. Additionally, on November 13, 1995,

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Plaintiff received a Notice of Proposed Removal. Id. at ¶ 16. The Notice stated that Plaintiff had

"coerced" Bastian into giving Enos a ride to work. Id. Plaintiff later observed that the Notice, which

was dated November 13, 1995, actually appeared to have been drafted on November 9, 1995. Id. at ¶

17. 

On November 22, 1995, Garrad, the National Association of Postal Supervisors representative,

drafted a Reply to the Notice of Proposed Removal and sent it to Robert Williamson, the Senior Plant

Manager. Id. at ¶ 18. In the Reply, Garrad noted that there was no evidence that Plaintiff had coerced

Bastian, and that Plaintiff had merely acted out of his own altruistic desire to "provid[e] transportation

for an employee who . . suffers from such a severe degree of retardation that he cannot operate a motor

vehicle." Id. Garrad proposed that the removal action be reduced to a "discussion" and requested that

Plaintiff be restored to his former position. Id. Garrad also requested a meeting so that he and Plaintiff

could "present the full context of th[e] situation." Id.

On November 30, 1995, a meeting was held in the West Sacramento office regarding Plaintiff's

alleged violation of the sick leave policy. Id. at ¶ 19. The meeting was attended by Taylor, Williamson,

Plaintiff, and Marilyn Walton. Id. Garrad was not invited and did not attend. Id. At the meeting,

Plaintiff was repeatedly asked why he coerced Bastian into giving Enos a ride to work. Id. Plaintiff was

also accused of taking up to $45 per day for providing Enos transportation. Id. Also at the meeting,

Williamson produced a Routing Slip that was purportedly drafted by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 20. The Routing

Slip stated that Plaintiff would "voluntarily return to craft [window clerking instead of supervising]" and

that he desired "an assignment in the South Area with a guarantee of 40 hours per week." Id. Plaintiff

did not actually draft the Routing Slip and believes that it was fabricated by Williamson's secretary. Id.

Taylor then told Gannon that he had to take the "deal." Id. Plaintiff recalls that Taylor also told him:

"I will take your home, your car, and your family if you fight this in any way." Id.

Either during or after the meeting, Williamson produced another letter, purportedly addressed

to Plaintiff from Williamson. Id. at ¶ 21. The letter stated that: "Your request for voluntary return to

craft has been approved. Mr. James Taylor, Manager, Human Resources, will coordinate your return

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1

Plaintiff's formal EEOC Complaint (Case No. 4F-956-1058-96) was filed on April 15, 1996

(this EEOC Complaint is hereinafter referred to as the "April 1996 EEOC Complaint"). See Decl. of

Owen Martikan at Ex. A.

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date and reporting office." Id. Plaintiff believes that Williamson's secretary drafted the letter. Id.

Plaintiff was subsequently removed from the West Sacramento office, given an inferior window clerk

level position (EAS 5) in Elk Grove, and told that he would receive a $20,000 per annum decrease in

salary. Id. 

On December 8, 1995, Plaintiff received a letter from Williamson that stated: 

You are hereby notified that your request to return to craft is hereby rescinded.

There was been some more allegations made with respect to an [sic] in

connection with the Notice of Proposed Removal that you were issued, dated

November 13, 1995. You will remain in [administrative leave] status until the

investigation is completed.

Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff was not provided with any information regarding the new allegations. Id.

On December 13, 1995, Plaintiff was subjected to another investigation. Id. at ¶ 24. The

investigation was conducted by Darrel Clark ("Clark"), who had returned to work and had replaced

Jackson as the permanent Manager of Distributions. Id. Clark asked Plaintiff whether he had ever sent

a postal employee to pick up Enos in a postal vehicle. Id. Plaintiff stated that he had not. Id.

On December 19, 1995, Plaintiff received a letter from Clark. Id. at ¶ 26. The letter stated that

Clark had discussed Plaintiff's situation with Williamson and that Williamson had agreed to allow

Plaintiff to return to craft at the Elk Grove Post Office. Id. Plaintiff was told to report to Elk Grove on

December 21, 1995. Id. Plaintiff, however, told Taylor that he did not wish to return to the Elk Grove

Post Office. Id. at ¶ 27. Taylor then told Plaintiff that he would put Plaintiff on "AWOL" status for

every day that Plaintiff did not return to work and that he would reinstate all of the initial charges of

coercion. Id. Plaintiff recalls telling Taylor, "I'll see you in court." Id. However, Plaintiff returned to

work on December 21, 1995 as instructed. Id. 

In January 1996, Plaintiff filed an informal EEOC Complaint.1

 Id. at ¶ 28. In the complaint,

Plaintiff alleged that Jackson, a black male, had discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race and

gender. Id. Plaintiff also alleged that Jackson was known to use racial slurs such as "honkey." Id.

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2

The informal EEOC Complaint relating to Case No. 4F-957-1122-96 was filed on June 13,

1996. See Plaintiff's Response to December 8, 2005 Order at ¶ 9. 

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Later that month, the EEOC held that the Post Office should have provided Plaintiff with his MSPB

rights at the time of his December 19, 1995 demotion. Id. at ¶ 32. 

In February 1996, Plaintiff's supervisor, Beverly O'Neil ("O'Neil"), told Plaintiff that someone

was waiting to meet with him. Id. at ¶ 29. When Plaintiff arrived in O'Neil's office, he was confronted

by Clark, who asked Plaintiff to sign a performance evaluation. Id. at ¶ 30. The evaluation stated that

Plaintiff was being given an "unsatisfactory merit" rating. Id. The unsatisfactory rating meant that

Plaintiff would be denied $1,000 in merit pay. Id. Plaintiff refused to sign the paperwork. Id. 

In August 1996, Plaintiff filed a second formal EEOC complaint (Case No. 4F-957-1122-96)

alleging race and gender discrimination and retaliation/reprisal (this EEOC Complaint is hereinafter

referred to as the "August 1996 EEOC Complaint"). Id. at ¶ 31.2

 The August 1996 EEOC Complaint

was premised on Plaintiff's unsatisfactory merit rating. Id. 

 On or about August 28, 1998, Plaintiff settled Case No. 4F-957-1122-96. See December 12,

2005 Decl. of Counsel at Ex. 15. 

In 1998, Plaintiff was promoted from mail clerk to the Supervisor of Distribution and

Operations. AC at ¶ 8. 

On April 25, 2001, Plaintiff filed a United States Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB" or

"Board") appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 33. On December 13, 2001, the MSPB rendered its initial decision

dismissing Plaintiff's claims. Id. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the full Board in

Washington, D.C. Id. 

On January 29, 2003, the Board issued its Final Order dismissing Plaintiff's appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 5,

35. Plaintiff appealed the Final Order to the Federal Circuit. Id. On November 3, 2003, the Federal

Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the MSPB for a hearing on the merits. Id. At the MSPB

hearing, however, Plaintiff claims that he was denied the opportunity to have Bastian and Enos testify

on his behalf. Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff also claims that he was denied the opportunity to enter into evidence

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an affidavit signed by Enos which stated that he and Bastian were friends and that Bastian had been

providing Enos with rides from 1992 through 1995. Id. The MSPB rendered its decision on March 23,

2004. Id. 

After receiving the MSPB's decision, Plaintiff filed a second appeal with the full Board in

Washington, D.C. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 38. On April 29, 2005, the MSPB issued its Final Order dismissing

Plaintiff's MSPB complaint. Id. Plaintiff received the Final Order on or about May 9, 2005. 

On June 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant John E. Potter in this Court. The

initial complaint was brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Although

inarticulately pled, the initial complaint appeared to state a claim for discrimination based on gender and

retaliation. The initial complaint was premised solely on the April 1996 EEOC Complaint and did not

mention the August 1996 EEOC Complaint. 

On August 8, 2005 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim for Lack

of Jurisdiction ("First Motion to Dismiss"). In the First Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argued that

Plaintiff's retaliation claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. 

On September 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint alleges two causes of action: (1) unlawful discrimination based on race; and (2) unlawful

discrimination based on retaliation. The First Amended Complaint is premised on both the April 1996

EEOC Complaint and the August 1996 EEOC Complaint. 

On September 22, 2005, due to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, the Court dismissed

Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss as moot.

On October 4, 2005, Defendant filed its Second Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim

for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State Claim ("Second Motion to Dismiss"). 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted if it

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appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes of such

a motion, the complaint is construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded

factual allegations are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Everest &

Jennings, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). All reasonable

inferences are to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296

(9th Cir. 1997).

The court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory allegations cast in the

form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); See

Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."); Sprewell

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem Co., 845 F.2d 802,

810 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[C]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim.").

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted

unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court should consider factors such as "the presence or absence of

undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments,

undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment." Moore v. Kayport

Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party

is the most important. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971)). Leave to amend is

properly denied "where the amendment would be futile." DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d

655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to seek dismissal of an action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule

of Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the

motion." Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001). "'A

plaintiff suing in a federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence

of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having the defect

called to its attention or on discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the defect be corrected

by amendment.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926)). In adjudicating such

a motion, the court is not limited to the pleadings, and may properly consider extrinsic evidence. See

Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000). 

C. Title VII Discrimination

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions

or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin[.]"

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The statute also prohibits employers from retaliating against an individual

because of his or her involvement in an investigation or proceeding concerning employment

discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir.

1994). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in

statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the adverse action. EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 586

(9th Cir.2000). Title VII is the "exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal

employment." Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976).

ANALYSIS

A. Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss

Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss is aimed solely at Plaintiff's retaliation claim.

Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's retaliation claim must be dismissed because the cause of

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3 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation

because "the Postal Service demoted Gannon and lowered his salary rate in November,

1995, before Gannon filed his EEOC complaint because he thought that his demotion

was discriminatory." Mot. at 5 (emphasis in original). Based on the allegations in the

First Amended Complaint, this only appears to be partially true. Namely, Plaintiff 

admits, in his First Amended Complaint, that he was demoted in 1995, before he ever

filed a complaint with the EEOC. However, Plaintiff also alleges that he received a

poor performance review in 1996 – several months after he filed his initial EEOC

complaint – and that he was deprived of a $1,000 merit bonus due to this poor

performance review. Thus, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint on this basis.

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action is moot, since Plaintiff settled his retaliation claim in 1998. Defendant alternatively argues that,

if Plaintiff is asserting a retaliation claim that was not the subject of his August 1996 EEOC Complaint,

Plaintiff's retaliation claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies.3

 

1. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim is Moot.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's retaliation claim is moot because Plaintiff settled his claim

in 1998. An EEOC claim that has settled is moot. EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539,

1542 (9th Cir. 1987). Since mootness is a jurisdictional issue, see Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 167 F.3d

514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999), the Court is not limited to the facts contained in the pleading, and may

properly consider pertinent extrinsic evidence. See Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges, 217 F.3d at 778.

In the December 13, 2005 hearing, Plaintiff admitted that he settled his August 1996 EEOC

Complaint with the United States Postal Service on or about August 28, 1998. Plaintiff also provided

the Court with a copy of the EEOC Settlement Agreement. See December 13, 2005 Decl. of Counsel

at Ex. 15. The EEOC Settlement Agreement states, in pertinent part:

1. In exchange for the promises made by the Agency, the United States

Postal Service, in paragraph two (2) of this agreement, the Complainant

agrees not to institute a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the United States Constitution, or under

any other federal or state law or regulation; and the Complainant

hereby withdraws his formal complaint, dated August 2, 1996, and filed

in this the case [sic].

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2. In exchange for the promises of the Complainant, contained in

paragraph one (1) of the agreement, the Agency agrees to the following:

a. No reprisal action will be taken against the Complainant. 

b. To compensate the Complainant with a lump sum in the amount

of $1,000.00 with no deductions.

c. The 1995 merit will be changed to reflect a rating of Met

Objectives/Expectations. This is a rating change only, no pay

adjustment required.

Id. (emphasis added). 

Upon review of the August 1996 EEOC Complaint, it is clear to the Court that the underlying

facts alleged in support of the August 1996 EEOC Complaint are identical to those alleged in support

of the retaliation claim set forth in the First Amended Complaint. Compare August 1996 EEOC

Investigative Affidavit with AC at ¶¶ 29-31, 54-55. It is also clear that Plaintiff settled his retaliation

claim and, as part of the settlement, agreed that he would not file a lawsuit premised on the same legal

theory and factual events. As such, the Court finds that the retaliation claim alleged in Plaintiff's First

Amended Complaint is moot and hereby GRANTS Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss. 

2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

The Court also finds that Defendant has conclusively established that, to the extent Plaintiff is

attempting to assert a retaliation claim that is premised on facts that were not included in his August

1996 EEOC Complaint, Plaintiff's claim necessarily fails due to his failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Before filing suit in federal court, a federal employee who alleges discrimination or

retaliation under Title VII must first exhaust his administrative remedies "by filing a timely charge with

the EEOC, . . . thereby affording the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge." B.K.B. v. Maui

Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). This is a jurisdictional requirement. Id. 

When an employee seeks judicial relief for an incident not listed in his EEOC charge, the

unreported claim must be "like or reasonably related" to the allegations in the EEOC charge in order to

be considered exhausted. Oubichon v. Northern American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th

Cir.1973); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 642 F.2d 268, 271-272 (9th Cir.1981). Administrative exhaustion

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extends to all claims of discrimination that fall within the scope of an actual investigation of

employment discrimination charge or an investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out

of the charge. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634 (2003).

In his Opposition brief, Plaintiff contends that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with

respect to his retaliation claim because, even if the Court determines that he settled the August 1996

EEOC Complaint, his retaliation claim is reasonably related to the factual allegations contained in his

April 1996 EEOC Complaint. In order to support this argument, however, Plaintiff relies on a

completely new set of "facts" that are not alleged in the First Amended Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff

now alleges that he was retaliated against because he tried to provide "reasonable accommodations"

to Enos and Bastian for their alleged "mental disabilities." As a threshold matter, the Court is not

persuaded that Plaintiff's new retaliation theory is a cognizable legal theory. More importantly,

however, Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim on this basis in this case. Nowhere in the First

Amended Complaint does Plaintiff even discuss "reasonable accommodations" for Enos or Bastian.

Instead, the First Amended Complaint quite plainly states that Plaintiff's retaliation claim is premised

solely on his belief that his supervisors retaliated against him because he filed an informal EEOC

Complaint in January 1996. See AC at ¶ 55. Indeed, the exact language used in the First Amended

Complaint could not be clearer. It states:

Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's participation in the EEO process and

opposition to illegal practices, specifically Plaintiff's filing of an EEO

complaint for race and sex discrimination in response to Defendant's illegal

demotion of Plaintiff. Plaintiff received an "unsatisfactory merit" evaluation

from Darrel Clark and Beverly O'Neil less than two months after Plaintiff filed

a formal EEO complaint. Defendant is aware of the retaliation complaint. 

Id. 

Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that Rule 8 "notice pleading" does not require him

to allege all of the facts and theories supporting his retaliation claim. Although Plaintiff is correct that

the Rule 8 pleading standard applies to his First Amended Complaint, Rule 8 still requires him to

provide notice to the Defendant as to the legal theory he is pursuing. Additionally, because this Court's

jurisdiction is premised on Plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that he has exhausted his administrative

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remedies, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint must also set forth the facts necessary to make this

showing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff has utterly failed to comply with this requirement. Instead,

he has flagrantly thwarted the very purpose of Rule 8 by twice filing an insufficient complaint and then

changing his legal theory in order to oppose Defendant's motion to dismiss. Such conduct is not

condoned by this Court. 

Additionally, Plaintiff's attempt to evade dismissal by augmenting the record with his own selfserving declaration is highly improper. This matter is before the Court on both a 12(b)(6) and a 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss, and therefore the Court is confined to considering the allegations set forth in

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with the limited exception that it may consider certain documents

that are necessary to determine whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Schneider v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges,

217 F.3d at 778. The documents that are relevant to establishing subject matter jurisdiction are: (1) the

EEOC Complaints and supporting affidavits;(2) the EEOC dispositions, if any; and (3) Plaintiff's 1998

settlement agreement with Defendant. The only documents Plaintiff has submitted that meet this limited

exception are: (1) Exhibit 8 to the Declaration of Counsel (the April 1996 EEOC Complaint); (2) Exhibit

9 to the Declaration of Counsel (the August 8, 1996 Affidavit signed by Gannon); (3) Exhibit 11 to the

Declaration of Counsel (Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations

Statute);(4) Exhibit 12 to the Declaration of Counsel (April 7, 1997 Affidavit of David Gannon); Exhibit

14 to the December 13, 2005 Declaration of Counsel (October 10, 1996 EEOC Investigative Report);

and Exhibit 15 to the December 13, 2005 Declaration of Counsel (August 1998 EEOC Settlement

Agreement). The Declaration of David Gannon, and the remaining exhibits attached to the Declaration

of Plaintiff's Counsel, are wholly inappropriate and have therefore been disregarded by the Court.

Finally, while the Court may consider these new "facts" in order to determine whether leave to

amend should be granted, see Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1, the Court finds that such leave would

not be warranted here. Upon review of the April 1996 EEOC Complaint and the affidavits that Plaintiff

submitted in that case, it is quite apparent that Plaintiff did not pursue any "retaliation due to Plaintiff's

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efforts to provide reasonable accommodations" theory during the underlying administrative proceedings.

To the contrary, Plaintiff repeatedly stated that he was alleging discrimination based on his race and

gender only. See Decl. of Counsel at Ex. 12 (April 7, 1997 Affidavit of David Gannon) ("The charge

in [the Notice of Removal] is easily proved false and the only reason Mr. Jackson initiated this action

against me is because I am a White male.") (emphasis added). The Court also finds that Plaintiff's new

retaliation theory is not "like or reasonably related to" the discrimination theories at issue in his April

1996 EEOC Complaint. 

Thus, since Plaintiff concedes that the April 1996 EEOC Complaint and the August 1996 EEOC

Complaint were the only complaints that he filed with the EEOC, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

clearly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his new retaliation claim.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that granting Plaintiff further leave to amend would be futile. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim

[Docket No. 19] is GRANTED. Plaintiff's retaliation claim is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff may NOT file another amended complaint without first seeking leave of Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the parties shall appear for a telephonic Case Management

Conference on Wednesday, January 18, 2006 at 3:45 p.m. The parties shall meet and confer prior

to the conference and shall prepare a joint Case Management Conference Statement which shall be filed

no later than ten (10) days prior to the Case Management Conference. Plaintiff shall be responsible for

filing the statement as well as for arranging the conference call. All parties shall be on the line and shall

call (510) 637-3559 at the above indicated date and time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: 12/14/05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-02299-SBA Document 36 Filed 12/21/05 Page 13 of 13