Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03048/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael B. Mukasey
Respondent
Wen Ying Zheng
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3048

___________

Wen Ying Zheng, *

*

Petitioner, *

*

v. * Petition for Review of an Order

* of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney *

General of the United States, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: June 11, 2007

Filed: December 4, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Wen Ying Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,

entered the United States in 1994. Facing deportation in September 1997, Zheng

applied for asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture, claiming a fear of persecution if she returned to China on account of

her past political activities. After the birth of a child in 1998, Zheng claimed that she

also feared persecution and forced sterilization under China’s One Child policy. See

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). In June 2003, an immigration judge denied Zheng’s claims

for relief, granted her voluntary departure, and ordered her removed. Zheng appealed,

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the BIA summarily affirmed, and Zheng dismissed a petition for review to this court

in November 2004. 

In September 2005, Zheng filed a motion with the BIA for leave to file a

successive asylum application. Relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.4(a)(4), she claimed that the application was not barred because the birth of her

fourth child created an increased risk of persecution under China’s One Child policy.

The BIA denied the motion, holding that an alien who is under a final order of

removal must successfully move to reopen the case in order to file a successive

asylum application. The BIA then treated Zheng’s motion as a motion to reopen and

denied it as untimely because Zheng submitted no evidence of changed country

conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i-ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Zheng

petitions for judicial review, arguing that the BIA committed an error of law in ruling

that her successive asylum application must meet the more stringent requirements of

a motion to reopen. After the case was submitted, two of our sister circuits issued

decisions upholding the BIA’s construction of these statutes and regulations in

factually similar cases. See Chen v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2007); Huang

v. Attorney General, No. 06-3013, slip op., 2007 WL 2815598 (3d Cir. Sept. 28,

2007); accord Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2006). We agree with

these decisions and therefore deny the petition for review.

In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.

104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (“IIRIRA”), Congress enacted a number

of provisions intended to reduce delays and curb perceived abuses in removal

proceedings. Section 304 of IIRIRA provided that motions to reopen must be filed

within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal, subject to an exception that

is critical to this appeal -- there is no time limit if the motion to reopen claims a right

to asylum based on material new evidence of “changed country conditions arising in

the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.” 8

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i-ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Zhao v. Gonzales, 440

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A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of “entry of a final

administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA affirmed Zheng’s removal order in April 2004, more than

a year before she filed the motion for leave to file a successive asylum application. 

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F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2005). Section 604 of IIRIRA amended the asylum statute,

barring successive applications and those filed more than one year after entry unless

the applicant demonstrates “the existence of changed circumstances which materially

affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B)-(D). 

The Attorney General’s regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D)

construe the reference to “changed circumstances” as including “activities the

applicant becomes involved in outside the country of feared persecution that place the

applicant at risk.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i)(B). Zheng’s successive application is

based upon this type of personal circumstance -- the birth of her fourth child in the

United States. Because she presented no new evidence of a material change of

conditions in China, and because her motion was untimely under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i),1

 we must deny her petition for review if the BIA correctly ruled

that an alien subject to a final order of removal must successfully move to reopen the

proceedings in order to file a successive asylum application. We review the BIA’s

legal determinations de novo, “according substantial deference to the [BIA’s]

interpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers.” Negele v. Ashcroft, 368

F.3d 981, 982 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1035 (2004). 

Congress has not defined how 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(D) and 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)

interact. As removal proceedings can be protracted, an alien may confront changed

circumstances warranting an untimely or successive asylum application before the

proceedings have culminated in a final order of removal. Thus, the BIA’s ruling

under review -- that a successive application, if filed after entry of a final order of

removal, must also meet the more restrictive changed conditions requirement of

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Indeed, the cross reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1158 in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), though

not conclusive, is some support for this interpretation.

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§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) -- does no violence to the plain language of either statute.2

Moreover, practical realities support this interpretation. As the Second Circuit

observed, “it would be ironic, indeed, if petitioners . . . who have remained in the

United States illegally following an order of deportation, were permitted to have a

second and third bite at the apple simply because they managed to marry and have

children while evading authorities.” Wang, 437 F.3d at 274, quoted in Huang, 2007

WL 2815598 at *4. The Seventh Circuit made the same point in Chen, commenting

that the distinction between changed country conditions and changed personal

conditions is “sensible” after a final order of removal has been entered, “since the

alien can manipulate the latter but not the former.” 498 F.3d at 760. 

In arguing to the contrary, Zheng relies heavily on the legislative history of the

Attorney General’s implementing regulations, now 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4. The proposed

regulation governing successive asylum applications initially provided that “[c]hanged

circumstances arising after the denial of the application but before the alien’s

departure or removal from the United States shall only be considered as part of a

motion to reopen.” 62 Fed. Reg. 444, 463 (proposed Jan. 3, 1997). The final

regulation deleted this language because, the Attorney General explained, “of

inconsistency between the formulation of changed circumstances” in §§ 1158(a)(2)(D)

and 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 62 Fed. Reg.10312, 10316, 10321 (Mar. 6, 1997). Zheng

argues that this “unambiguously establishes that [she] is not required to reopen her

prior claim in order to pursue the new [asylum] claim” (emphasis in original). Like

the Seventh and Third Circuits, we disagree. See Chen, 498 F.3d at 760; Huang, 2007

WL 2815598 at *3-4. As we have explained, an untimely or successive asylum

application may be filed before entry of a final order of removal. Requiring the

applicant to satisfy the more stringent changed conditions requirements of a motion

to reopen at that time would be inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). But

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changing the regulations because of this possible inconsistency does not reflect a clear

intent to weaken the requirements of a motion to reopen when an alien under a final

order of removal seeks to file an untimely or successive asylum application. The final

regulation confirms this interpretation by providing that, when an asylum application

is filed after completion of removal proceedings or when the BIA has obtained

jurisdiction over the proceedings, the application must be filed “in conjunction with

a motion to reopen.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(b)(3)(ii) and (4). 

Zheng further argues that the Second Circuit “acknowledged” the procedure she

seeks to invoke in Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Haddad v.

Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2006). However, in denying relief to aliens

who filed untimely motions to reopen, those decisions simply suggested in dicta that

the relief Zheng seeks from the BIA in this case might be available under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)(2)(D). The Seventh Circuit concluded that this dicta was speculative and

declined to follow it. Chen, 498 F.3d at 760-61. We agree.

Like our sister circuits that have considered the question, we conclude that the

BIA reasonably harmonized the relevant statutes and regulations in concluding that

an alien under a final order of removal must successfully reopen under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) in order to pursue an untimely or successive asylum application

under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

______________________________

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