Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01490/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01490-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Jose De Jesus Diaz-Villalpando
Petitioner

Document Text:

CLD-133 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-1490

___________

JOSE DE JESUS DIAZ-VILLALPANDO,

a/k/a JOSE DIAZ,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A041-948-608)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter Durling

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant 

to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 9, 2015

Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 29, 2015 )

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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2

Petitioner Jose De Jesus Diaz-Villalpando (hereafter referred to as Diaz) seeks 

review of a final decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying a 

motion to reopen his removal proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 

petition for review and motion to stay removal.

Diaz is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the United States as a 

lawful permanent resident in 1988. After pleading guilty, Diaz was convicted in the 

United States District Court for the District of Hawaii on October 6, 2008, of conspiracy 

to possess with intent to distribute and distributing in excess of 50 grams of 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. He was 

sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. Diaz was thereafter served with a Notice to 

Appear on December 2, 2013, charging him as removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, and pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of a controlled substance violation. 

Diaz sought to have the removal proceeding terminated, arguing that he planned to 

collaterally attack his criminal conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner further argued that he had derived citizenship through his father, and thus could 

not be removed.

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) noted that petitioner had conceded the removal 

charges, and those charges were sustained. With respect to any collateral challenge Diaz

may have planned to file against his criminal conviction, the IJ concluded that the 

conviction was nonetheless final for immigration purposes. Finally, the IJ noted Diaz’s 

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concession that he was under 18 years of age when he was admitted. Because his mother 

married his father before Diaz reached the age of 18, she needed to have also been a

citizen in order for him to derive citizenship under the former INA § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 

1432(a) (repealed 2000). Diaz’s mother, however, is still a permanent resident of the 

U.S. The IJ therefore refused to terminate the proceeding and ordered Diaz removed to 

Mexico. See Certified Admin. R. (“A.R.”) at 111-114.

In an order issued on April 24, 2014, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s holding that Diaz

could not claim derivative U.S. citizenship through his parents. The BIA further affirmed 

the IJ’s holding that Diaz’s conviction is final and establishes removability in the absence 

of any evidence that the conviction had been overturned. Diaz’s contention that he had 

an argument to make under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), fared no better 

given the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), 

that Padilla does not apply retroactively to a defendant, like Diaz, whose conviction 

became final before the case was decided. The BIA also noted that Diaz’s drug 

trafficking conviction renders him ineligible for most forms of relief from removal, and 

that he had not articulated a prima facie claim for deferral of removal under the 

Convention Against Torture. The BIA thus dismissed the appeal. See A.R. at 27-28. 

Nothing in the administrative record indicates that Diaz sought review of the BIA’s 

decision.

Instead, Diaz returned to the BIA on November 17, 2014, and filed a motion to 

reopen. See A.R. at 9-11. Noting that Diaz did not explain the late date of his filing, and 

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finding no applicable exception to the filing deadline, the BIA denied the motion in an 

order issued on December 12, 2014. Id. at 2-3. The BIA noted Diaz’s argument that he 

had been convicted of the crime underlying his removability without having been advised 

of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. However, the BIA once again 

concluded that Diaz’s conviction remains final for immigration purposes unless and until 

it is overturned. The BIA further concluded that Diaz’s character evidence did not 

persuade it to find an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening or 

reconsideration.

A timely petition for review to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

followed, along with a motion for stay of removal. As Diaz’s removal proceedings were 

conducted in York, Pennsylvania, the Ninth Circuit transferred Diaz’s petition and 

request for stay of removal to this Court. It also vacated the temporary stay order it had 

previously issued. The Government opposes Diaz’s request for a stay of removal and has 

filed a motion to summarily deny his petition for review.

We initially note that our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) is limited in the 

instant case to the BIA’s ruling of December 12, 2014, denying Diaz’s motion to reopen.

1

Diaz did not timely petition for review of the BIA’s ruling of April 24, 2014, dismissing 

 

1

 In his Informal Brief, Diaz references “federal court” jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241. Section 2241 details, inter alia, a court’s jurisdiction to hear applications for a 

writ of habeas corpus. There is no indication in this case that Diaz ever sought relief

pursuant to § 2241. We will thus assume its mention as a basis of our jurisdiction was in 

error and exercise jurisdiction under § 1252(a).

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his administrative appeal. We thus lack jurisdiction to review that ruling. See Stone v. 

INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995); see also Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir.

1986). Additionally, because Diaz was convicted of an aggravated felony, our

jurisdiction is limited to review of constitutional claims and questions of law. 

Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005); § 1252(a)(2)(D).

We further lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision denying 

sua sponte reopening, see Calle–Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003), 

although we may consider whether the BIA’s decision “is based on a false legal 

premise.” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011). Diaz has not raised 

any obvious questions of law with respect to the BIA’s sua sponte determination. To the 

extent we have jurisdiction, we review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse 

of discretion. Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). The BIA’s decision 

will be upheld unless it was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id.

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which 

the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). In this 

case, the BIA dismissed Diaz’s administrative appeal on April 24, 2014. Diaz’s motion 

to reopen – which was dated November 3, 2014 – was filed on November 17, 2014, well 

beyond the ninety-day period. Moreover, Diaz fails to even argue that the BIA erred in 

determining that his motion to reopen was not timely filed, and no exceptions are evident. 

See, e.g., § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

To the extent that Diaz tries to argue for the first time in his Informal Brief that he 

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is eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under former INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), 

the Government is correct that we are without jurisdiction to review such an argument

that has not been administratively exhausted. See § 1252(d). Additionally, Diaz’s 

arguments with respect to the legality of his conviction in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Hawaii afford him no bases to challenge the BIA’s decision. The BIA 

correctly concluded that any purported collateral challenge Diaz has filed or intends to 

file does not affect the finality of his criminal conviction for immigration purposes unless 

and until that conviction is overturned. See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 

(3d Cir. 2008).

Turning to the last remaining issue in his Informal Brief, Diaz states that he 

“should be treated [like] a derived U.S. citizen.” See Pet’r’s Br. at 9. The issue of 

derivative citizenship is a purely legal question of statutory interpretation. See Morgan v. 

Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2005). Because there is no genuine issue of 

material fact, we have jurisdiction to consider Diaz’s citizenship claim. See §

1252(b)(5)(A). As relevant here, if a child’s parents are both living and are not “legal[ly] 

separat[ed],” then derivative citizenship is available only upon “[t]he naturalization of 

both parents” and only if the “child is under the age of eighteen years.” See § 1432(a)(1), 

(4).

2

 Diaz concedes that his mother is still married to his father and that she is a lawful 

 

2 Section 1432(a) was repealed and replaced by current INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431, 

when it was enacted in 2000 as part of the Child Citizenship Act. See Morgan v. Att’y 

Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 230 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). The current statute “does not apply 

retroactively to persons . . . who turned eighteen before” its enactment. Id. Diaz turned 

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permanent resident. See A.R. at 119. Diaz thus did not derive citizenship from his 

parents.

Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion and will deny the petition for 

review. We deny Diaz’s motion for a stay of removal as moot.

 

eighteen in 1989.

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