Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02234/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cr-02234-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Alfonso Galindo-Adarga
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jesus Alfonso Galindo-Adarga,

Petitioner, 

vs.

United States of America,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO. 05-CV-0533-TUC-FRZ

 04-CR-2234-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

Petitioner has filed a “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person

in Federal Custody (28 U.S.C. § 2255).”

Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States

District Courts provides, in relevant part, that

[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits,

and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not

entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and direct

the clerk to notify the moving party.

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255.

Background

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count Two of the

Indictment, which charged him with knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent

to distribute approximately 11.06 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).

Case 4:04-cr-02234-FRZ-JC Document 26 Filed 09/27/05 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner waived “any and all motions, defenses,

probable cause determinations, and objections which [he] could assert to the indictment or

to the Court’s entry of judgment against [him] and imposition of sentence upon [him]

consistent with [the plea] agreement.” In addition, Petitioner waived “any right to

collaterally attack [his] conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section

2255.”

The plea agreement provided for a sentencing range of 57-71 months. The United

States reserved the right to withdraw from the plea agreement if Petitioner received a

sentence of less than fifty-seven months. The Court imposed a sentence of fifty-seven

months, the lowest possible sentence under the plea agreement.

Discussion

A. Downward Departure

In his motion, Petitioner seeks a reduction of his sentence based on his minor role in

the offense, claiming that the Court “incorrectly determined” his role in the offense. This

claim is waived pursuant to the plea agreement. Moreover, this claim is not the proper

subject of a § 2255 motion. See Lizarraga-Lopez v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1168

(S.D. Cal. 2000) (section 2255 motion facially deficient when petitioner “seeks a downward

departure, which is within the sentencing court’s discretion but which does not implicate

constitutional or jurisdictional issues with regard to his conviction or sentence.”). Finally,

the Court did not “incorrectly” determine Petitioner’s role in the offense. The Court did not

need to determine Petitioner’s role in the offense before sentencing him to the lowest

sentence available under the plea agreement.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Ineffective Assistance in Plea Agreement

It appears Petitioner is asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related

to his decision to plead guilty. Petitioner alleges that “defense counsel misrepresented and

misadvised the plea to defendant about the condition of his plea bargain when specifically

enquired by defendant, in as much as counsel knew that defendant’s whole behavior and

Case 4:04-cr-02234-FRZ-JC Document 26 Filed 09/27/05 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Moreover, had Petitioner proceeded to trial, he would have also faced trial on Count

One of the Indictment – importation of approximately 11.06 kilograms of cocaine.

- 3 -

guilty plea was structured to avoid a plea agreement that would not result in a long sentence

or prison time” and that Petitioner “detrimentally rel[ied] on counsel’s advice, [and] pled

guilty to the charge.”

When a defendant pleads guilty based upon the advice of counsel, the defendant can

“‘only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the

advice he received from counsel’” was outside “‘the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases’” and was prejudicial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59, 106

S. Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,

267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.

759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970)). “[T]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’

requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Id. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370. 

Petitioner does not specify what advice counsel gave that fell outside the range of

competence for criminal attorneys. Moreover, Petitioner faced a significantly more serious

sentence had he been found guilty after a trial. He does not dispute that his Base Offense

Level was 32, that he was eligible for a two-level reduction under the Safety Valve, and that

he had a Criminal History I. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing range for an

Offense Level 30 and Criminal History I is 97-121 months. Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate any reasonable probability that, when his “whole behavior” was structured to

avoid a long prison sentence, he would have proceeded to trial facing a sentencing of 97-121

months, rather than accept a plea agreement which capped his sentence at 71 months.1

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim fails. See Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir.

1997) (Court “do[es] not have to evaluate both prongs of the [Strickland] test if the defendant

fails to establish one.”). 

Case 4:04-cr-02234-FRZ-JC Document 26 Filed 09/27/05 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Petitioner’s plea agreement was designated as a “Fast Track 5K3.1” plea agreement.

- 4 -

2. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing

Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing

because his attorney failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing and

seek a downward departure based on the fact that he was the sole caretaker and sole source

of economic support for his family. He also alleges that his attorney was ineffective for

failing to seek a downward departure based on his compliance with a “Fast Track” program,

his compliance with an “Early Disposition” program, and the fact that his conduct was

aberrant behavior.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show both

that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 

First, Petitioner’s attorney argued in his sentencing memorandum that the Court

should consider the issues identified by the Probation Officer regarding Petitioner’s aberrant

conduct and significant family ties and responsibilities. Second, the Court actually did depart

pursuant to the plea agreement “based on § (5K3.1) Early Disposition Program and savings

to the government by early plea and waiver of appeal.”2

 Finally, Petitioner’s attorney

repeatedly urged the Court to adopt the Probation Officer’s recommendation and sentence

Petitioner to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment, the lowest sentence under the plea

agreement. The Court did.

Had Petitioner’s attorney sought, and the Court imposed, a sentence below fifty-seven

months, the United States would have had the right under the plea agreement to withdraw

from the plea agreement. Had the United States done so, the Sentencing Guideline range

would have been significantly higher. Additionally, there was no guarantee that the Court

would have opted to depart based on the claims Petitioner raises and no guarantee that the

Court would have imposed a sentence of less than fifty-seven months. Therefore, seeking

Case 4:04-cr-02234-FRZ-JC Document 26 Filed 09/27/05 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

a sentence below fifty-seven months ultimately could have resulted in a sentence that was

significantly longer than the sentence actually imposed.

Petitioner’s counsel’s conduct was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim fails. See Pollard.

Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion (U.S.D.C. document #23 in

CR-04-2234-TUC-FRZ) is DENIED and this case (CV-05-533-TUC-FRZ) is DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court SHALL SERVE a copy

of the Motion and this Order on Respondent and SHALL SERVE a copy of this Order on

Petitioner.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2005.

Case 4:04-cr-02234-FRZ-JC Document 26 Filed 09/27/05 Page 5 of 5