Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03199/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03199-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William J. Moore
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 2 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

No. 89-3199 

WILLIAM J. MOORE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United states District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-20018-01) 

J. Steven Schweiker, overland Park, Kansas, for DefendantAppellant. 

Julie A. Robinson, Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin L. 

Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, with her on the brief), 

Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and COOK,* District 

Judge. 

COOK, District Judge. 

William J. Moore was convicted by a jury of one count of 

possession of 51.4 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute in 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a) (1), one count of the use of a 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3199 Document: 01019956479 Date Filed: 11/29/1990 Page: 1 
firearm in relation to possession with intent · to distribute in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c), and one count of the use of a 

machine gun in relation to drug trafficking in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 924(c). 

Moore raises several issues on appeal. Moore challenges the 

imposition of consecutive sentences on the two counts charging 

violations of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) as violative of the double 

jeopardy clause of the Constitution, in that the count charging the 

use of a firearm and the count charging the use of a machine gun 

are duplicative. Moore next questions the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury's verdict that the Sten machine gun 

and the other three firearms found in his apartment facilitated the 

predicate offense of possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute. Moore also questions whether the affidavit submitted 

to obtain the search warrant alleged sufficient facts to establish 

probable cause for the issuance of that warrant. Finally, Moore 

challenges as improper the district court's upward adjustment of 

his sentence two levels as a leader or organizer, pursuant to 

Sentencing Guideline§ 3Bl.l. For the reasons set forth below, we 

vacate in part and remand for resentencing on the firearms counts, 

and affirm as to all other issues. 

I. 

An undercover surveillance operation was conducted in 

September and October, 1988, by a Special Investigative Division of 

the Johnson County, Kansas Sheriff's Office, targeting narcotics 

trafficking. The investigation initially centered on Dale 

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Willeford for possible drug trafficking. (R. Supp. I, p. 13). An 

investigator with the Division, Richard Stutzman, made two 

controlled buys from Willeford on October 11 and 13, 1988. (Id. at 

16-17). In conversations with Stutzman, Willeford indicated that 

his "source" for the cocaine he sold to Stutzman was "a short 

distance away" and that his "source" could "always take care of 

me." (Id. at 18). Willeford was followed by other police officers 

to an apartment at the Georgetown Apartment complex in Merriam, 

Kansas. (Id. at 15) . Willeford was observed entering Apartment 107 

at 7100 Eby Drive, which was leased to defendant Moore. Continued 

surveillance of apartment 107 noted codefendant Larry Rogers 

frequently entering and leaving the apartment. At one point, 

Stutzman attempted to stop· Rogers near the apartment to buy 

cocaine. Rogers told Stutzman that he had no drugs to sell, but 

accepted a phone number from Stutzman to call later. (Id. at 20-

21). Rogers never contacted Stutzman, but Willeford later warned 

Stutzman to stay away from his "source". (Id. at 22). 

Stutzman executed an affidavit, detailing his contacts with 

Willeford and his belief that Willeford's "source" was to be found 

at apartment 107, 7100 Eby Drive, Merriam, Kansas. Based upon that 

affidavit, a search warrant was obtained for the above address. 

Rogers answered the door and allowed police officers serving 

the search warrant to enter the apartment. (R. Supp. II, p. 233). 

The apartment was small, with one bedroom. (Id. at 264). Moore was 

in the hallway leading into the bedroom when the officers entered. 

(Id. at 234). 

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In their search of the apartment, the officers seized 51.4 

grams of cocaine, packaged in fifteen small Ziploc plastic bags. 

The officers also seized a weighing scale, small and large Ziploc 

plastic bags, snow seals for gram-size packages, dealing records 

and calculator receipts with initials next to amounts owed, all of 

which were alleged at trial to be indicative of distributing 

cocaine. (R. Supp. I, p. 35-36, 50-51}. All these items, as well 

as $3,400 in currency, were recovered from the bedroom. From the 

living room, the officers seized a bong pipe and a mirror with 

cocaine residue and a razor blade on it. (Id. at 53-54). 

The officers also seized several firearms during the execution 

of the search warrant. A loaded Ruger semi-automatic rifle was 

propped up on the floor of an open linen closet in the hallway 

leading to the bedroom. (Id. at 65). A loaded Jennings .22 handgun 

was found under the sofa cushions in the living room, where Rogers 

apparently had been lying. (Id. at 63). A loaded Smith & Wesson 

handgun was found in the bedroom, on the nightstand next to the 

bed. (Id. at 66). A loaded, British Sten machine gun was in an 

open closet in the bedroom. (Id. at 67). Ammunition for the 

machine gun and the other firearms was found in that same bedroom 

closet. (Id. at 59, 77). 

At trial, several witnesses testified that they had purchased 

cocaine from Moore. (R. Supp. II, p. 119, 217; R. Supp. III, p. 

312}. These witnesses testified that they had seen various 

firearms in the apartment while purchasing cocaine there. (R. Supp. 

II, p. 121, 218; R. Supp. III, p. 313}. Their testimony also 

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indicated that generally Rogers would answer the door for cocaine 

purchasers. (R. Supp. II, p. 123, 199; R. Supp. III, p. 311). The 

actual purchases were usually made in the bedroom of the apartment. 

(R. Supp. II, p. 123; R. Supp. III, p. 312). Three witnesses 

testified that they purchased cocaine from Rogers, at the 

apartment, when Moore was unavailable.(R. Supp. II, p. 200, 217; R. 

Supp. III, p. 338). 

Moore was tried by jury on a four-count superceding 

indictment, charging him with the following offenses: 

Count 1 

Count 2 

Count 3 

Count 4 

Possession with intent to distribute 51.3 

grams of cocaine on October 14, 1988. 

Using a Jennings .22 handgun, a Ruger 10/22 

.22 caliber rifle, and a Smith & Wesson 9mm 

handgun during and in relation to the 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

count charged in Count 1. 

Distributing 27 grams of cocaine on March 11, 

1988. 

Using a Sten machine gun during and in 

relation to the drug trafficking crime 

alleged in Count 1. 

The jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts 1, 2 and 4, and a not 

guilty verdict on Count 3. The trial court denied Moore's motion 

for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 33 months on Count 

1, five years on Count 2, consecutive to his sentence on Count 1, 

and ten years on Count 4, consecutive to his sentence on Counts 1 

and 2. Moore then filed a timely appeal with this 

court. 

II. 

This court recently has addressed the question of whether a 

conviction for a single drug trafficking offense will support the 

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imposition of consecutive sentences under 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) for 

multiple firearms carried or used in connection with that single 

offense. In United States v. Henning, No. 89-2126, slip. op. (10th 

Cir. June 25, 1990), the defendant was convicted of one count of 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and 

of two counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug 

trafficking offense. At the time of his arrest, Henning had a 

semi-automatic pistol under his jacket; a machine gun, a rifle, a 

pistol (all of which were loaded), ammunition and over twenty grams 

of methamphetamine were found in Henning's vehicle. Id. at 4. 

Henning was sentenced to two counts involving the machine gun and 

the other firearms. 1 Id. at 6. This court vacated the sentences 

on the two firearm counts against Henning and remanded for 

resentencing. The court stated that "where a defendant has been 

convicted of a single drug trafficking offense and more than one 

firearm was involved, a single violation of§ 924(c) (1) occurs and 

multiple consecutive sentences may not be stacked to account for 

each firearm seized." Id. at 17. 

1 Henning was convicted under the same version of 18 u.s.c. § 

924(c) as was Moore. That statute provides, in pertinent part: 

Whoever, during and in relation to any . . • drug 

trafficking crime, [] including a drug trafficking crime, 

which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by 

the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for 

which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United 

States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to 

the punishment provided for such crime .•. , be sentenced 

to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a 

machinegun, ... to imprisonment for ten years. 

18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1) (1987). As noted in Henning. the penalties 

under that subsection have increased significantly since 1987. If 

the firearm is a machinegun, the mandatory consecutive sentence for 

a first-time conviction is twenty years. 

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case. 

Henning controls our disposition of the same issue in this 

Because Moore was convicted of only one underlying drug 

trafficking offense, we vacate the sentences imposed on the second 

and fourth counts and remand for resentencing. 

III. 

Moore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the jury's verdict on Count 4 that he used the Sten machine gun 

during and in relation to his offense of possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute. Moore contends that he merely possessed the 

machine gun, which, while visible in the bedroom closet, was not 

quickly and easily accessible to him. Moore also points to 

evidence that the machine gun malfunctioned, and to testimony from 

Willeford that the gun never caused him concern while at Moore's 

apartment. 2 

our standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence in 

criminal convictions is whether the evidence "both direct and 

circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom - is sufficient if, when taken in the light most 

2 Moore also argues that the evidence did not indicate the 

presence of large quantities of drugs or cash in his apartment, 

thereby rendering a "fortress" analogy inapplicable here. The 

"fortress" analogy apparently derives its name from the Second 

Circuit's description of a building filled with drugs, firearms and 

elaborate security precautions as a "veritable fortress, 11 in United 

States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir. 1976). See United 

states v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1989) ("fortress 

theory" applies when large numbers of firearms are readily 

available in strategic locations near large quantities of drugs and 

money); United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1988) 

(comparing similarities of the "fortress" there with that in 

Grant). 

However, a "fortress" analogy is not needed here to find that 

Moore "used" the machine gun, pursuant to section 924(c). 

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( 

favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. " United States v. 

McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Mere possession of the machine gun cannot support a conviction 

under section 924 (c). The government must demonstrate some 

relation between the "use" of the firearm and the underlying crime. 

United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 1988). 

However, the government need not prove that Moore fired, 

brandished, or even displayed the machine gun during the drug 

trafficking offense. United states v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372, 375 

(5th Cir. 1989). In United states v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th 

Cir. 1985), the court noted: 

If the firearm is within the possession or 

control of a person who commits an underlying 

crime as defined by the statute, and the 

circumstances of the case show that the 

firearm facilitated or had a role in the 

crime, such as emboldening an actor who had 

the opportunity or ability to display or 

discharge the weapon to protect himself or 

intimidate others, whether or not such a 

display or discharge in fact occurred, then 

there is a violation of the statute. 

Id. at 540. 

Other courts have found firearms to have been "used" under 

section 924(c) when the firearms were "a means of safeguarding and 

facilitating illegal transactions and as an integral means of 

protecting [defendant's] possession of the cocaine." United States 

v. Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1988). See also United 

States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1989) (five loaded 

firearms were "used" to protect supply of narcotics) ; United 

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States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1988) (machine gun's 

availability increased likelihood of success of criminal 

undertaking) . 

In this case, the jury reasonably could have concluded that 

Moore "used" the machine gun as a means of safeguarding and 

facilitating his possession of cocaine. The machine gun was 

visible within the bedroom, where, as the testimony indicated, most 

of the cocaine purchases were made. Several witnesses testified 

that they saw the machine gun in Moore's bedroom while purchasing 

cocaine there. The evidence established that the machine gun was 

within relatively close proximity to Moore's supply of cocaine and 

cash. The jury thus could have inferred that the machine gun 

"emboldened" Moore, providing him with protection for himself, the 

cocaine and the cash if the need arose. 3 Although Moore claims 

that the machine gun was not quickly and readily accessible to him 

from the bedroom closet, the jury apparently believed otherwise. 

The evidence also could have persuaded the jury that the 

machine gun had value in intimidating Moore's customers. Although 

Willeford testified that the machine gun in the bedroom did not 

cause him concern, two of Moore's other customers testified that 

they had noticed the machine gun while purchasing cocaine, and were 

able to specifically identify the machine gun as the one they had 

seen in the bedroom. From that testimony, the jury could have 

3 Moore testified at trial that he purchased the Smith & 

Wesson handgun for protection, after he was "mugged" at a 

convenience store, in May 1987. Moore also testified that he kept 

the guns for protection of the cash settlement he received from an 

auto accident, and admitted that he kept a lot of cash "on hand." 

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inferred that the machine gun drew the customers' attention, and 

thus had some worth in deterring inimical conduct by Moore's 

customers. 

Moore's argument is unpersuasive that the machine gun's 

malfunction should nullify any finding of his "use" of that firearm 

in connection with the underlying crime of possession of cocaine. 

At trial, a firearms expert testified that the machine gun would 

fire two or three rounds with one pull of the trigger, and then 

cease to fire at all. In United states v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372 

(5th Cir. 1989), however, the court noted that "[t]he fact that a 

firearm is •unloaded' or 'inoperable' does not insulate the 

defendant from the reach of section 924 (c). 11 Id. at 375. In 

Coburn, the defendant was convicted under section 924 (c), even 

though the rifle displayed in the truck window was unloaded. Id. 

at 373. See also United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 891-92 (8th 

Cir. 1987) (Section 924 (c) held applicable where firearm was 

inoperable for lack of a firing pin); United States v. Gonzalez, 

800 F.2d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (No requirement in section 924(c) 

that firearm be loaded or operable). 

Moore also questions the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the verdict on Count 2 for use of the other firearms in connection 

with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Moore 

concedes. that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty 

verdict on the loaded Smith & Wesson handgun, found on the bedroom 

nightstand, near the cash, cocaine and drug paraphernalia. 

However, Moore contends that the evidence must show the "use" of 

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all of the firearms seized to support a conviction under section 

924(c), relying upon United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 

(3rd cir. 1989). We disagree with Moore I s reading of that 

decision. 

In Theodoropoulos, a loaded shotgun was found inside the 

defendants' apartment, and three handguns and ammunition were found 

on the apartment's porch in a trash can. Id. at 596. One of the 

handguns was disassembled. Although it found that the shotgun was 

used in connection with the underlying offense, the Third Circuit 

was troubled by the indictment and a jury instruction that 

predicated a conviction under section 924(c) upon any of the guns 

seized, including the three found outside in the trash can. Id. at 

598. The Third circuit vacated a defendant's conviction under 

section 924(c) because of the possibility that the jury might have 

convicted that defendant solely on the basis of one or more of the 

handguns found in the trash can, and remanded for a new trial based 

only on the presence of the shotgun. Id. 

The indictment and jury instructions here also permitted the 

jury to base a conviction on any of the three firearms found in 

Moore's apartment. However, the evidence showed that the Ruger 

rifle and the Jennings handgun were loaded and operational, and 

given the compactness of the apartment, were readily accessible to 

Moore. Thus, even if the jury considered the other two firearms, 

and not the Smith & Wesson handgun, in finding Moore guilty on. 

Count 2, the evidence supported Moore's use of those two firearms 

in connection with his possession of cocaine with intent to 

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distribute. 

IV. 

Moore contends that the affidavit given to obtain the search 

warrant for his apartment contained conclusions without factual 

support. Specifically, Moore complains of a lack of facts in the 

affidavit to connect his apartment to Willeford' s source for 

cocaine and to show that cocaine transactions were actually 

consummated. Moore argues that the conclusionary statements should 

be stricken from the affidavit; the redacted ~ffidavit then does 

not provide probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 

Moore raised essentially the same argument of the affidavit's 

lack of fact to the trial court in a motion to suppress the 

physical evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The trial 

court denied that motion. In reviewing that denial, we accept the 

trial court's findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous, but 

review de novo the "ultimate determination of reasonableness under 

the fourth amendment." United states v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 

672 (10th Cir. 1990). 

We find no error in the trial court's denial of Moore's motion 

to suppress. Sufficient details are presented in the affidavit of 

the underlying circumstances upon which the affiant based his 

belief that Willeford's "source" was to be found at the apartment 

leased by Moore, and that cocaine transactions were taking place 

there. Bearing in mind that affidavits such as this, "are ·normally 

drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 

investigation," we will not examine this affidavit in a 

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"hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. 11 United States 

v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). 

v. 

Finally, Moore contends that the trial court improperly 

applied Sentencing Guideline § 3Bl.1 (c) to the facts to adjust 

Moore's sentence two levels upward for his role in the offense as 

a leader or organizer. 4 In making that upward adjustment, the 

trial court relied upon its notes made during the trial and the 

presentence report, which concluded that (1) Moore distributed 

cocaine out of his apartment, ( 2) that Moore led co-defendant 

Rogers, and (3) that Moore led his customers, who in turn sold 

smaller quantities of cocaine to others. We examine that factual 

determination under the clearly erroneous standard. United States 

v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1563 (10th Cir. 1990). 

This court's decision in United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 

1529 (10th Cir. 1990) is particularly relevant here. In Backas, 

the district court adjusted the defendant's sentence two levels 

upward under Sentencing Guideline§ 3Bl.l(c) for his role in the 

offense as a leader or "supervisor", based upon evidence that the 

defendant regularly sold drugs from a particular house, and that 

another person was in effect the defendant's "doorman" who let the 

customers in and screened them, for which he was paid by the 

defendant. Id. at 1529. This court affirmed the trial court's 

4 Sentencing Guideline § 3Bl.l(c) provides that if the 

defendant was an "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any 

criminal activity" that involved less than five participants, his 

sentence shall be increased by two levels. 

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application of§ 3Bl.l(c), concluding that that subsection and the 

term "supervisor" are "satisfied upon a showing that the defendant 

exercised any degree of direction or control over someone 

subordinate to him in the distribution scheme." Id. at 1530. 

Describing the 11 doorman111 s role as "trivial", this court found it 

nevertheless satisfied the requirements for defining the defendant 

as the "doorman"'s supervisor. Id. 

From our review, we find support in the record for the trial 

court's characterization of Moore as a "leader" or "organizer" for 

purposes of Sentencing Guideline §3Bl.1. Although, unlike Backas, 

the record reflected no payment to Rogers for his services, the 

evidence demonstrated that Rogers did provide "doorman" services 

for Moore and acted at Moore's direction. All witnesses testified 

that Rogers would answer the door for them when they sought to 

purchase cocaine from Moore. Three of the witnesses testified that 

they bought cocaine from Rogers at the apartment when Moore could 

not be reached there. Rogers' subordinate role to Moore may thus 

be inferred, in. that Rogers was able to sell Moore's cocaine for 

him in his absence, but that Moore alone handled the cocaine sales 

when he was at the apartment. Other evidence showed that Moore 

rented the apartment and set up his base of operations in the 

bedroom. 

The evidence indicated that two of Moore's customers resold 

cocaine they had purchased from Moore. The trial court included 

these two customers as among those led by Moore, in adjusting his 

sentence pursuant to,§ 3Bl.l(c). 

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( 

\ 

Recently, we have held that the mere sale of drugs to a 

customer does not prove the defendant's status as a supervisor or 

leader under §3B1.1. See United States v. Reid, No. 89-5158, slip 

op. at 18 (10th Cir. August 20, 1990); United States v. Mays, 902 

F.2d 1501, 1503 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Weidner, 

703 F.Supp. 1350, 1354 (N.D. Ind. 1985). Our review of the record 

here found no evidence that Moore exercised any authority, 

direction or control over his two customers' resale of the cocaine 

purchased from him. Instead, the evidence indicated that Moore was 

only a source for cocaine for his customers, who chose to 

personally use the drug or to resell it, without interference from 

Moore. The trial court thus erred in including these two customers 

as among those led by Moore. However, we deem that error to be 

harmless, having found that Moore supervised Rogers to support the 

trial court's upward adjustment of Moore's sentence under §3B.1 of 

the Sentencing Guidelines. 

In conclusion, we VACATE the sentences imposed on the second 

and fourth counts and REMAND for resentencing under 18 U.S. C. 

§924(c) (1) in accordance with this opinion. We AFFIRM as to all 

other issues. 

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