Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-23-04237/USCOURTS-ca4-23-04237-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jarvis Antonio Coleman-Fuller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4237

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JARVIS ANTONIO COLEMAN-FULLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cr-00038-DKC-7)

Submitted: January 10, 2025 Decided: January 15, 2025

Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Mirriam Z. Seddiq, SEDDIQ LAW FIRM, Rockville, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Adeyemi O. Adenrele, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Jarvis Antonio Coleman-Fuller appeals the criminal judgment sentencing him to 

156 months’ imprisonment following his convictions by a jury of conspiracy to distribute 

and to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, including heroin and fentanyl, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i), (vi), 846; possession with intent to distribute

40 grams or more of fentanyl and a quantity of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B)(vi), (C); two counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession of body armor 

by a violent felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(35), 924(a)(7), 931(a)(1). For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

Coleman-Fuller argues first that the district court erred in allowing the admission at 

trial of testimony about his prior incarceration, claiming that this testimony was unfairly 

prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

“Rule 403 states that a district ‘court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence.’” United States v. Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628, 643 (4th Cir. 

2019) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). “[W]hen considering whether evidence is unfairly 

prejudicial, damage to a defendant’s case is not a basis for excluding probative evidence 

because evidence that is highly probative invariably will be prejudicial to the defense.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Instead, unfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of 

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some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground 

different from proof specific to the offense charged.” Id. (cleaned up).

We review the district court’s evidentiary ruling under the deferential abuse of 

discretion standard. Burgess v. Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 59 (4th Cir. 2021) (“We will 

overturn an evidentiary ruling only if it is arbitrary and irrational.”) We have reviewed the 

record on appeal, and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 

testimony of Coleman-Fuller’s prior incarceration. The testimony was brief and limited, 

and especially in light of Coleman-Fuller’s stipulation to his felon status, its admission was 

not otherwise unfairly prejudicial. We accordingly affirm Coleman-Fuller’s conviction. 

Coleman-Fuller also challenges his sentence, asserting that the district court 

committed two procedural errors in the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range. “In 

assessing whether a district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, including its

application of any sentencing enhancements, we review the district court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Fluker, 891 

F.3d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). 

Coleman-Fuller first contends that the court should not have included drug amounts 

seized from a coconspirator’s home in determining his base offense level because these 

amounts were not reasonably foreseeable to him. “[I]n order to attribute to a defendant 

for sentencing purposes the acts of others in jointly-undertaken criminal activity, those acts 

must have been within the scope of the defendant’s agreement and must have been 

reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250, 

255 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court carefully 

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considered Coleman-Fuller’s argument and determined that the drug amounts seized from 

the home of his coconspirator were reasonably foreseeable to him. We discern no clear 

error in that finding. Accordingly, those drug amounts were properly used to calculate 

Coleman-Fuller’s advisory Guidelines range. 

Second, Coleman-Fuller argues that the court erroneously designated his prior 

Maryland first-degree assault conviction as a crime of violence in the determination of his 

base offense level. As the Government correctly notes, we did not determine that Maryland 

first-degree assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence until several months after 

Coleman-Fuller’s sentencing. See United States v. Redd, 85 F.4th 153, 173 (4th Cir. 2023). 

However, contrary to the Government’s assertion on appeal, such intervening case law 

applies here on direct review. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). 

Accordingly, the court’s designation of Coleman-Fuller’s Maryland first-degree assault 

conviction as a crime of violence amounts to procedural error. 

However, we conclude that this error is harmless. “It is well established that we

will not vacate a sentence if we determine that the district court’s improper calculation of 

the Guidelines advisory sentencing range [is] harmless.” United States v. Mills, 917 F.3d 

324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019). 

[A] Guidelines error is harmless and does not warrant vacating the 

defendant’s sentence if the record shows that (1) the district court would have 

reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue the other 

way, and (2) the sentence would be [substantively] reasonable even if the 

Guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor. 

Id. (cleaned up). Here, the improper crime-of-violence designation did not affect ColemanFuller’s combined offense level, which means the district court would have considered the 

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same Guidelines sentencing range regardless of the error. And the district court’s 

comments during the sentencing hearing make clear that it would have imposed the same 

sentence even absent the application of the base offense level that relied on the Maryland 

first-degree assault conviction as a crime of violence. Therefore, the first requirement of 

the harmless error analysis has been met. 

Furthermore, we are satisfied that Coleman-Fuller’s sentence is substantively 

reasonable. Without the challenged crime of violence designation, Coleman-Fuller’s 

Guidelines range would have remained the same. Moreover, the district court thoroughly 

explained why the chosen sentence (which represented a significant downward variance 

from the advisory Guidelines range) was appropriate based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors and the parties’ arguments, fashioning a sentence based on Coleman-Fuller’s role 

in the offense, criminal history, support system, rehabilitation efforts, and limited 

acceptance of responsibility. Any error in calculating the Guidelines range is thus 

harmless. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED 

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