Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01615/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01615-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Manuel Leon-Sanchez
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

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 Unless otherwise indicated, the cited docket numbers are from the civil case that was

opened upon the filing of the motion to vacate.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

Victor Manuel Leon-Sanchez, 

Defendant-Movant. 

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CV 10-1615-PHX-SRB (ECV)

CR 07-0932-PHX-SRB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Victor Manuel Leon-Sanchez (“Movant”), has filed an Amended Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 22.1

 On May 1, 2008,

Movant pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment, Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to

Distribute Methamphetamine and Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)(viii) and (A)(ii). Doc. 146 of CR 07-0932-001-PHX-SRB. On July 21, 2008,

Movant was sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for 228 months followed by

supervised release for five years. Id. 

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 Arguably, Movant is prohibited from re-urging in this matter the issue of the

voluntariness of his plea. A criminal defendant may not use a motion to vacate under section

2255 to re-litigate issues previously decided on direct appeal. United States v. Redd, 759

F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1985). Because, as this court concludes, the motion to vacate should

be denied on other grounds, the court need not address whether Movant’s claims are

precluded by the direct appeal decision. 

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Through counsel, Movant filed a Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2008. Doc. 156 of CR

07-0932-001-PHX-SRB. As set forth in the screening order for the initial motion to vacate,

Movant argued in his direct appeal that his guilty plea was not voluntary, thus rendering the

waiver of the right to appeal invalid. Doc. 13. Specifically, Movant argued among other

things that he was not adequately informed by his attorney or the trial court of the

consequences of pleading guilty and that the plea was the result of coercion. Id. The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals denied the appeal on April 29, 2009, finding “no indication in the

record that appellant’s entry into the plea agreement was not knowing and voluntary.” Doc.

237 of CR 07-0932-001-PHX-SRB.2

Through counsel, Movant filed the original motion to vacate on July 27, 2010. Doc.

1. The District Court Judge screened the motion in an order filed on September 7, 2010, and

ordered the motion to be served upon Respondent. Doc. 13. Movant subsequently filed an

Amended Motion to Vacate. Doc. 22. Movant identifies two grounds for relief in his

amended motion: (1) that his counsel during the plea proceedings provided ineffective

assistance by urging him to accept a plea offer that he did not understand; and (2) that his

counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance by failing to present mitigating

evidence. On January 13, 2011, Respondent filed a Response to Amended Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 20. Despite being

informed in the screening order of the opportunity to file a reply, Movant has not filed one.

DISCUSSION

Respondent argues in its response that Movant's claims are foreclosed by a waiver of

collateral review in the plea agreement. Movant has not challenged the validity of the

waiver, other than to allege in the first ground for relief that the guilty plea itself was

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rendered involuntary by his attorney’s actions. Alternatively, Respondent contends that

Movant’s claims fail on the merits. 

A. Waiver

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 198 (2005). A waiver of

appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to appeal

on the grounds raised and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. In addition to

a waiver of direct appeal rights, a defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255

action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub

nom. Abarca-Espinoza v. United States, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). A waiver of the right to bring

a § 2255 action likely would not include a claim that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the plea involuntary. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433

(expressing “doubt” that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously

induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular part of the plea bargain).

Here, Movant's express waiver in his plea agreement stated in relevant part:

The defendant further waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court's

entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any right to appeal the

imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United

States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right

to collaterally attack defendant's conviction and sentence under

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other

collateral attack. The defendant acknowledges that this waiver

shall result in the dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack the

defendant might file challenging his conviction or sentence in

this case.

Doc. 99, Attachment 1, of CR 07-0932-001-PHX-SRB. Movant signed the plea agreement

indicating that he understood and voluntarily agreed to all of its terms and conditions. Id. In

addition, Movant's responses to questions during the change of plea hearing indicated that

he understood he was waiving the right to an appeal or a collateral attack. Doc. 20, Exh. A

at 7. Based on Movant’s responses during the hearing, the District Court Judge found that

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the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 27. Additionally, during the

sentencing hearing, the District Court Judge found that Movant waived his rights to appeal.

Doc. 20, Exh. B at 20.

Movant does not address the waiver of appeal rights in his motion. Moreover, he did

not file a reply to address Respondent's assertion of the waiver defense. The evidence in the

record supports a finding that Movant understood the waiver and entered the plea knowing

that he would not be permitted to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence.

The court will therefore recommend that the waiver be enforced with respect to Movant’s

claim of ineffective assistance in ground two, and that the claim be denied. Because the

claim in ground one alleges that counsel’s actions rendered the guilty plea involuntary, an

issue that cannot be waived by a provision in the plea agreement, the court will address the

merits of that claim. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth by

the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. The Strickland test also applies to challenges to guilty pleas

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A

defendant who pleads guilty based on the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel

fell below the level of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 56. To

satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, "the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.

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Movant contends that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to

adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea agreement. Movant contends that his

lawyer told him he would be sentenced to no more than 10 years in prison and likely far less.

He claims he would not have pled guilty if he knew he could be sentenced to the 19-year

term that was ultimately imposed. Movant further contends that his lawyer improperly

pressured him to enter the plea agreement. 

Even if the court accepted Movant’s assertions about what his client told him before

entering the plea agreement, the District Court Judge during the change of plea hearing

clearly explained the sentencing range Movant was facing and Movant repeatedly stated he

understood. The Court first explained that based on the applicable law, “under no

circumstances” could he be sentenced to less than 10 years in prison. Doc. 20, Exh. A at 13.

Movant stated he understood that. Id. The Court further explained that the maximum

sentence he could receive under the plea agreement was 22 years. Id. Movant stated he

understood that. Id. The Court summarized by explaining:

The result of this agreement is as follows: If I accept your agreement at the

time of sentencing, I will give you a sentence of someplace between 10 years

and 22 years in prison, and I will not order that it be served consecutively to

any other sentence you might receive at a later time.

Id. at 14. 

The Court then explained that another agreement with the government provided that

the government would recommend that Movant be sentenced to between 15 and 22 years in

prison. Id. at 15. Movant said he understood that. Id. at 15, 16-17. The Court went on to

explain that neither Movant’s lawyer, the government, nor the Court could tell him at that

time precisely what his sentence would be and that if it turned out to be different from what

he was told, he would still be bound by the plea agreement. Id. at 18. Movant said he

understood. Id. at 18. The Court then directly asked Movant’s counsel what Movant’s likely

sentencing range would be. Doc. 20, Exh. A at 18. His attorney expected the guidelines

range to be more than 15-22 years and agreed that under no circumstances could Movant

receive less than 10 years. Id. at 18-19.

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 A court is not required to determine if counsel’s performance was deficient before

considering the prejudice issue. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will

often be so, that course should be followed.” Id.

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The Court also asked questions to ensure Movant entered the plea voluntarily,

including whether he understood everything in the plea agreement, whether anyone made

promises outside the agreement to induce him to plead guilty, and whether any threats or

force was used to get him to sign the agreement. Doc. 20, Exh. A at 8-9. Movant said he

understood everything and that he was not induced or threatened. Id. The Court further

asked if he understood he did not have to plead guilty, and if wanted to do so voluntarily,

both to which he answered yes. Id. at 9-10.

Thus, Movant’s contentions that his lawyer improperly pressured him to plead guilty

and told him he would serve no more than 10 years are clearly belied by the record. The

transcript of the change of plea clearly demonstrates that by the time he entered his guilty

plea, Movant knew he was facing more than 10 years in prison and up to 22 years in prison.

Even with this knowledge, Movant voluntarily agreed to plead guilty under the terms of the

plea agreement. Thus, even if at some point prior to the change of plea hearing, his lawyer

provided inaccurate information about his potential sentence, the court finds that Movant

cannot show prejudice because he voluntarily proceeded with the plea agreement when

properly informed of the sentencing range by the District Court Judge.3

 For these reasons,

the court finds that Movant has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland

standard.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Movant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in ground two is waived by the express waiver of a § 2255 motion in the plea

agreement. Additionally, the court finds that the ineffective assistance claim in ground one

is without merit. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the motion to vacate be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

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That the Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 22) be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be denied because the dismissal of the motion to vacate is justified by a plain procedural bar

and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and because Movant has

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 30th day of June, 2011.

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