Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00006/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Lee Morrison
Petitioner
Gary Swarthout
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS LEE MORRISON,

Petitioner,

 v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-14-00006 TEH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Curtis Lee Morrison, a state prisoner incarcerated at

California State Prison - Solano, has filed this pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging

the January 17, 2013 denial of parole by the Board of Parole

Hearings (“Board”). Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss

Petitioner’s amended habeas petition as untimely and/or unexhausted. 

Docket No. 7. Petitioner has filed an opposition and Respondent has

filed a reply. For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s motion is

GRANTED.

I

In 1974, a Contra Costa County jury found Petitioner

guilty of first degree murder, assault on a peace officer, and two

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counts of gun possession by a convicted felon. Docket No. 1 at 2. 

Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminte sentence of seven years

to life, with a minimum eligible parole date (“MEPD”) in 1981. Id.

On January 17, 2013, the Board denied parole for a period of seven

years. Docket No. 1 at 3.

Petitioner filed two habeas petitions challenging his 2013

parole denial in the state trial courts. The first state habeas

petition was filed in Contra Costa County Superior Court and denied

on August 23, 2013 in a reasoned opinion. Docket No. 1-1 at 15-18. 

Petitioner appealed the denial to the California Court of Appeal,

which denied his habeas petition on October 7, 2013. The California

Supreme Court denied the related petition for review on November 26,

2013.

The second state habeas petition challenging the 2013

parole denial was filed in Solano County Superior Court on October

18, 2013. Docket No. 1-1 at 24 and Docket No. 8 at 45. On December

11, 2013, the Solano County Superior Court transferred the petition

to the Contra Costa County Superior Court because “[h]abeas claims

concerning the denial of parole should be heard in the superior

court in the county in which the conviction and sentence arose.” 

Docket No. 8 at 45. It appears that Petitioner did not appeal this

denial to the California Court of Appeal or seek review of the

denial in the California Supreme Court.

 On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition containing the following cognizable claims: (1) the January

17, 2013 denial of parole renders his sentence disproportionate to

his crime, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

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against cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) in denying parole, the

Board retroactively applied amended parole statutes and regulations,

in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Docket Nos. 1 and 4. 

II

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) has imposed a one-year statute of limitations on petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions

filed by prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or

sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on

which: (A) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct

review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an

impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional

state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from

filing; (C) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the

factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Before filing a habeas petition in federal court,

petitioners are required to both (1) meet the statute of limitations

requirements set forth in § 2244(d)(1) and (2) exhaust state

judicial remedies by presenting the highest state court with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek

to raise in federal court, either on direct appeal or through

collateral proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S.

1, 3 (1981). The state’s highest court must be given an opportunity

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to rule on the claims even if review is discretionary. See

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (petitioner must

invoke “one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process”). The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine

“reflects a policy of federal-state comity . . . designed to give

the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). The court generally may not grant relief on an

unexhausted claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Both the legal basis and the factual basis of the claim

must be “fairly presented” to the state courts in order to exhaust. 

Picard, 404 U.S. at 275; Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155-56

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). It is not sufficient to raise only the

facts supporting the claim; rather, “the constitutional claim . . .

inherent in those facts” must be brought to the attention of the

state court. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277. The state’s highest court

must “be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims

under the United States Constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 368 (1995). With regard to the factual basis for the claim,

“the petitioner must only provide the state court with the operative

facts, that is, ‘all of the facts necessary to give application to

the constitutional principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.’” 

Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in

original). 

If state remedies have not been exhausted as to all

claims, the district court must dismiss the petition. Rose, 455

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U.S. at 510; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The court may stay mixed petitions to allow the petitioner to

exhaust in state court. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). 

However, the district court’s discretion to stay a mixed petition is

circumscribed by AEDPA’s stated purposes of reducing delay in the

execution of criminal sentences and encouraging petitioners to seek

relief in the state courts before filing their claims in federal

court. Id. at 275-76. Because a stay has the potential to

undermine these dual purposes of AEDPA, its use is only appropriate

where the district court has first determined that there was good

cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claims in state

court and that the claims are potentially meritorious. Id. at 277. 

An assertion of good cause turns on whether the petitioner can set

forth a reasonable excuse supported by sufficient evidence to

justify the failure to exhaust. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982

(9th Cir. 2014) (reversing denial of stay when petitioner supported

his good cause argument with evidence including neuropsychological

and psychological evaluations and many declarations); Wooten v.

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding denial of

stay because petitioner’s incorrect “impression” that counsel had

raised claims to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal did

not establish good cause under Rhines for failure to exhaust claims

earlier). 

III

Petitioner argues that the January 2013 denial of parole

was unconstitutional in two ways. First, Petitioner argues that in

considering his parole eligibility, the Board applied the current

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Petitioner claims that he has served the equivalent of 62 years

once his good-time credits are accounted for.

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versions of section 3041.5 of the California Penal Code and of

section 2281(c) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations,

rather than the versions that were in effect at the time of his

conviction, thereby violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Petitioner

argues that the versions of the statute and regulation in effect at

the time of his conviction required the Board to set a parole date

for prisoners after 40 years of incarceration and would have

resulted in a grant of parole. He argues that he is entitled to the

annual parole hearings available under the prior version of section

3041.5. He also argues that the circumstances tending to show

unsuitability for parole as set forth in the current section

3041.5(b)(3) have altered the legal consequences of his crime by

effectively significantly increasing the punishment for his crime.

Petitioner’s second argument as to why the 2013 denial of

parole is unconstitutional is that the denial rendered his

punishment grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability,

in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. Petitioner has been incarcerated for 47 years.1

Docket No. 1 at 3. This term, argues Petitioner, is far beyond the

suggested base punishment term for his crime – “16-18-20 years”,

id., and therefore disproportionate to his culpability. Petitioner

also argues that his high blood-alcohol level at the time of the

crime should be taken into account when determining his culpability

because it prevented him from forming the requisite intent to harm.

Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed because the

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claims are both unexhausted and untimely. 

A

Respondent argues that the petition is unexhausted because

Petitioner failed to present his Ex Post Facto claim in the

California Supreme Court and did not fairly present his Eighth

Amendment claim to the state courts. To exhaust state remedies

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), a petitioner must give the state’s

highest court an opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is

discretionary. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Both the legal

basis and the factual basis of the claim must be “fairly presented”

to the state courts in order to exhaust. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. 

To fairly present the legal basis of the claim, “the constitutional

claim . . . inherent in those facts” must be brought to the

attention of the state court. Id. at 277. To fairly present the

factual basis of the claim, “the petitioner must only provide the

state court . . .‘all of the facts necessary to give application to

the constitutional principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.’” 

Davis, 511 F.3d at 1009 (alteration in original).

In the petition for review presented to the California

Supreme Court, Petitioner makes the following arguments: (1)

Petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time of his arrest prevented

him from forming the requisite intent to commit assault; (2)

Petitioner’s length of incarceration — 62 years when good-time and

work-time credits are included — constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment when measured against the statutory maximum for his

crimes; and (3) the Board’s January 17, 2013 denial of parole was

improperly based on Petitioner’s commitment offense. Docket No. 8

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at 60. 

It is clear from the face of the instant habeas petition

that Petitioner has exhausted his Eighth Amendment claim of cruel

and unusual punishment. Respondent alleges that Petitioner’s claim

before the California Supreme Court was that his term was cruel and

unusual because it was beyond the statutory maximum while in the

instant petition Petitioner’s claim is that the retroactive changes

to parole statutes caused his term to become cruel and unusual. 

Respondent is incorrect. Petitioner makes both claims in the

instant petition. On page 3 of the instant petition, Petitioner

argues:

On 8/23/2013, the Superior Court of Contra Costa County

denied a writ of habeas Corpus, upholding the 1/17/2013

denial of release by the California parole board,

causing Morrison’s term to have become a violation of

the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,

exceeding the statutory maximum allowed by the

Legislature under § 2282, as by the end of the 1/17/2013

denial Morrison will have served 62 years on a 7 to life

term where the suggested base term is 16-18-20 years and

with the 4 months per year served, the 47 years will

become 62.

Docket No. 1 at 3. On page 11 of the memorandum of points and

authorities attached to the instant petition, Petitioner argues: 

The boards retroactive application of multiple

amendments of penal code section 3041.5, and the amended

version of california administrative code, Title 15,

section 2281, subdivision (c), enacted after the

commission of the crime, violates the prohibition of the

ex post facto clause under article I, section 10 of the

U.S. Constitution, and Article I, section 9, of the

California state constitution. 

Docket No. 1-1 at 11 (emphasis in original omitted). The Court

finds that Petitioner properly exhausted his claim that his sentence

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is beyond the

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statutory maximum. 

However, Petitioner did not exhaust his claim that the

Board’s retroactive application of amended California parole

statutes and regulations renders his sentence cruel and unusual. In

the instant petition, Petitioner claims that the Board’s application

of the current versions of section 3041.5 of the California Penal

Code (parole hearings) and section 2281(c) of title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations(criteria for reviewing proposed

parole decisions) rather than the versions that were in effect at

the time of his conviction resulted in rendering his sentence cruel

and unusual. In his petition for review, he references other

statutes and regulations. He argues that the parole denial

improperly relied on his commitment offense, in violation of section

3041 of the California Penal Code (parole release date), section

2402(c)-(d) of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

(suitability determination), and In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181

(Cal. 2008), which holds in relevant part that the petitioner’s due

process and statutory rights were violated when the governor relied

upon the “immutable and unchangeable circumstances of her commitment

offense in reversing the Board’s decision to grant parole.” In re

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1227. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim regarding the retroactive application of amended

California parole statutes and regulations is unexhausted. See,

e.g., Picard, 404 U.S. at 277 (the constitutional claim inherent in

the facts presented must be brought to the attention of the state

court).

Nor has Petitioner exhausted his Ex Post Facto claim. He

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Of the two state habeas petitions filed in state superior court

challenging his January 2013 parole denial, only the second petition,

filed in Solano County Superior Court on the same day he filed his

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, appears to raise

an Ex Post Facto claim. Docket No. 8 at 45. It appears that

Petitioner believes that he has exhausted his Ex Post Facto claim

because he believes that the California Supreme Court considered both

habeas petitions in denying review on November 26, 2013. Docket No.

3. This assumption is incorrect both factually and legally. As a

factual matter, the California Supreme Court considered only the

petition for review which Petitioner filed in its court and which is

attached to Petitioner’s opposition. The California Supreme Court did

not consider any other habeas petitions. 

10

points to the following as proof that he exhausted his Ex Post Facto

claim: (1) on page 6 of MC-275 (the form for federal habeas

petitions), he describes his petition for review to the California

Supreme Court as raising an Ex Post Facto claim, Docket No. 8 at 3

and Docket No. 1 at 6; (2) the Ex Post Facto claim was raised in the

habeas petition filed with the Solano County Superior Court, Docket

No. 8 at 5; and (3) he has raised this issue in previous habeas

petitions, including “as far back as 1989, in the case numbered CIV

83-1320 RAR,” Docket No. 8 at 5. Petitioner misunderstands the

exhaustion requirement. AEDPA requires that Petitioner present the

state’s highest court – in this case, the California Supreme Court –

an opportunity to rule on the claims.2

 See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at

845. Neither of Petitioner’s latter two claims – that he presented

his Ex Post Facto claim to the state superior courts or in prior

federal habeas petitions – satisfies the exhaustion requirement. 

The question is whether Petitioner presented to the California

Supreme Court the particular Ex Post Facto claim that the Board

should have applied the versions of section 3041.5 of the California

Penal Code (parole hearings) and section 2281(c) of Title 15 of the

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California Code of Regulations (criteria for reviewing proposed

parole decisions) that were in effect at the time of his conviction. 

Petitioner’s only petition for review in the California Supreme

Court regarding the denial of his January 2013 parole denial was

filed on October 18, 2013. It does not present the above Ex Post

Facto claim. The only claim in the October 18, 2013 petition for

review that could possibly be read as an Ex Post Facto claim was

Petitioner’s third claim. But, as discussed above, this claim

referenced different California statutes and regulations than those

identified in the instant habeas petition. Accordingly, Petitioner

failed to fairly present either the legal or factual basis of his Ex

Post Facto claim to the California Supreme Court, and this claim is

unexhausted. See, e.g., Gulbrandson, 711 F.3d at 1042.

Petitioner argues that if he failed to exhaust any claim,

it is because exhaustion was futile because “the issue has recently

been addressed adversely to [P]etitioner as in the case of In re

Vicks (2013) 56 Cal. 4th 274 (3/4/13).” Docket No. 8 at 2. “[A]

petitioner may be excused from exhausting state remedies if the

highest state court has recently addressed the issue raised in the

petition and resolved it adversely to the petitioner, in the absence

of intervening United States Supreme Court decisions on point or any

other indication that the state court intends to depart from its

prior decisions.” Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In re Vicks, 56 Cal. 4th 274 (Cal. 2013), addresses whether applying

the amended section 3041.5 of the California Penal Code violates the

Ex Post Facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 

However, it does not address whether applying the amended section

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2281(c) of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations violates

the Ex Post Facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. 

Accordingly, the Court excuses Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his

claim that application of the amended section 3041.5 of the

California Penal Code violates the Ex Post Facto clauses of the

state and federal Constitutions. Petitioner’s failure to exhaust

his claim regarding the amended section 2281(c) of title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations is unexcused. 

B

Respondent also argues that Petitioner’s claims are

untimely. Specifically, Respondent notes that Petitioner’s claims

are based on the underlying argument that his maximum punishment

term should be based upon the maximum term allegedly in effect at

the time of his conviction, which he suggests is sixteen, eighteen

or twenty years. Following from that premise, Petitioner reasons

that the failure to grant him parole after he has served the alleged

maximum term renders his punishment cruel and unusual in violation

of the Eighth Amendment, and is due to the improper application of

current and amended California statutes and regulations in violation

of the Ex Post Facto clause. Under Petitioner’s reasoning, he

should have been released in 1994 (twenty years after he was

incarcerated). Respondent argues that Petitioner was therefore

aware of the factual predicate of his claim the first time the Board

denied him parole after 1994. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), AEDPA’s one-year

limitation period starts on the date on which “the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through

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the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The

time begins “when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could

discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes

their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.

2000) (remanding case to district court for further factual findings

concerning determination of when, with exercise of due diligence,

petitioner could have discovered facts to support prejudice prong of

ineffective assistance of counsel claim). Petitioner claims that

under the California statutes and regulations in effect at the time

of his conviction he should have been released on parole in 1994. 

Petitioner was therefore aware of the factual predicate of his claim

(improper denial of parole) at the time of his first Board hearing

after 1994, namely his October 17, 1996 parole hearing. At a

minimum, his claims are 18 years overdue and therefore untimely. 

IV

Petitioner appears to seek additional forms of relief in

his opposition to the motion to dismiss. He seeks summary judgment,

to stay and abey the case, and appointment of counsel. Docket No.

8. Since the Court has found that Petitioner’s claims are

unexhausted and/or untimely, the Court dismisses these motions as

moot.

V

For the foregoing reasons, RESPONDENT’S motion to dismiss

is GRANTED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

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has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the U.S. Court of Appeals under Rule

22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 02/19/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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