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Parties Involved:
Ronald Chin
Appellee
Herman Hoffman
Appellant
Kathleen Hoffman
Appellant
Houston Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Appellee
Stuart Hughes
Appellee
J. D. Lambright
Appellee
Brett Ligon
Appellee
Wayne Mack
Appellee
Deborah Michielson
Appellee
Montgomery County, Texas
Appellee
Michael Seiler
Appellee
Gordon Welch
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20513 c/w

No. 19-20515

Summary Calendar

In the Matter of: Herman E. Hoffman

 Debtor

HERMAN E. HOFFMAN, JR., 

 Appellant

v.

HOUSTON SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO 

ANIMALS, 

 Appellee

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consolidated with: 19-20515

HERMAN HOFFMAN; KATHLEEN HOFFMAN,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

GORDON WELCH, In his individual capacity; DEBORAH MICHIELSON, In 

her individual capacity; J. D. LAMBRIGHT; STUART HUGHES; RONALD 

CHIN; WAYNE MACK; MICHAEL SEILER; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 

TEXAS; HOUSTON SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO 

ANIMALS; BRETT LIGON, 

 Defendants – Appellees

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 3, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-20513 c/w 

No. 19-20515

2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The earlier opinion issued April 1, 2020 is withdrawn by the panel, and 

the following is issued in its place.

In this consolidated action, Plaintiffs-Appellants Herman and Kathleen 

Hoffman challenge the district court’s dismissal of their suit against the 

Houston Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (HSPCA) and Texas 

county and state officials for unlawful search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Herman Hoffman also appeals the dismissal of his adversary 

proceeding against the HSPCA alleging fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. 

§§ 542, 548, and 550. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s dismissals.

The Hoffmans owned 211 horses, many of which had been starved and 

mistreated. Leslie Maybin worked for the Hoffmans from 2010 to 2014 and was 

owed years of wages. When Maybin returned to work for the Hoffmans on June 

22, 2015, the Hoffmans presented him with a bill of sale for ten horses, which 

Maybin explained was payment for wages owed. The county seized the 

remaining horses two days later, under an ordinance allowing for the seizure 

of mistreated horses.

The justice court, after finding that the horses had been starved and 

mistreated, then transferred title in the horses to the HSPCA pursuant to 

Chapter 821 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. The county court at law 

affirmed this judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hoffman v. 

Texas, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016) (mem.).

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On May 19, 2016, Herman Hoffman filed a voluntary petition under 

Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. He also filed an adversary proceeding 

against Maybin and the HSPCA. The bankruptcy court, following a hearing, 

dismissed Hoffman’s adversary proceeding. In re Hoffman, No. 16-32617, 2017 

WL 727543, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2017). It held that because 

Hoffman was divested of ownership of his horses, he had no standing to protest 

the subsequent transfer to the HSPCA under §§ 542, 548, and 550. Id. The 

court also held that issue preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

prevented Hoffman from relitigating his claims. Id. at *2 n.1, *5.

Hoffman next appealed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. In addition, 

both Herman and Kathleen Hoffman sued the HSPCA and Texas county and 

state officials who defended Montgomery County’s actions in seizing the horses 

in their individual and official capacities under § 1983. After conducting a 

hearing, the district court dismissed Hoffman’s case against Maybin on

grounds that Hoffman had no right to the horses or their value. In re Hoffman, 

No. AP 16-3222, 2019 WL 2501556, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2019). The court 

also dismissed Hoffman’s adversary proceeding against the HSPCA, affirming 

the bankruptcy court’s holding. Id. Lastly, it dismissed the Hoffmans’ § 1983 

suit against the HSPCA and Texas county and state officials. The court held, 

inter alia, that the Hoffmans’ § 1983 claims were time-barred. Id. at *4.

Now, the Hoffmans appeal the dismissal of their § 1983 claim, and 

Hoffman appeals the dismissal of his adversary proceeding against the 

HSPCA.1 We address each claim in turn. We review a district court’s grant of 

1 Hoffman also appealed his adversary claim against Maybin in a separate proceeding. 

This court has already affirmed the district court’s judgment in that case. See Matter of 

Hoffman, 795 F. App’x 291 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

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a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Budhathoki v. Nielsen, 898 

F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2018).

Because § 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations, courts “must 

borrow the relevant state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”

Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 2018). Texas has a twoyear statute of limitations for conversion of property claims. King-White v. 

Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2015); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003. Federal law determines when a cause of action 

under § 1983 accrues. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 

2001). We have held the limitations period begins to run once the plaintiff 

“becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to 

know that he has been injured.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 

(5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the clock here began to run at 

the moment Texas officials first seized the Hoffmans’ horses.

In their complaint, the Hoffmans allege that the seizure occurred on 

June 24, 2015. The Hoffmans thus had to bring their claim no later than June 

26, 2017.2 They first filed suit on July 31, 2017—over a month after the twoyear deadline had expired. The Hoffmans attempt to skirt around this by 

arguing the seizure of their horses was only finalized when the justice court 

divested them of ownership. Yet, even accepting this logic, the record makes 

clear the court issued its order on July 8, 2015, and thus the Hoffmans’ claims 

would still be time-barred.3 As such, the district court correctly held that the 

2 Texas law requires a claim be brought “no later than the same calendar day two 

years following the accrual of the cause of action,” which would make June 24, 2017, the final 

day the Hoffmans could file their claim. Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 893 

(5th Cir. 2005). Because that date fell on a Saturday, however, the Hoffmans had until the 

following Monday (June 26) to file. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(3)(A).

3 The Hoffmans argue that the continuing tort doctrine applies here because the 

horses were never returned. The Supreme Court of Texas has “neither endorsed nor 

addressed” this doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 592 (Tex. 2017)

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statute of limitations barred the Hoffmans’ § 1983 claims against both the 

HSPCA and Texas county and state officials.

Hoffman’s adversary claims against the HSPCA alleging fraudulent 

transfer under §§ 542, 548, and 550 also fail. All U.S. courts must give the same 

full faith and credit to prior state court judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. “Under 

collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a 

court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent 

suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior 

litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). When giving 

preclusive effect to a state court judgement, we apply the preclusion rules of 

that state; accordingly, Texas rules apply. In re Keaty, 397 F.3d 264, 270 (5th 

Cir. 2005). Texas law dictates that issue preclusion requires (1) “the facts 

sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the 

first action,” (2) “those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action,” 

and (3) “the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in 

privity with a party in the first action.” Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 

S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. 1994). Under the first factor, Texas courts consider 

whether the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with 

a reasoned opinion, and that the decision was subject to appeal. Mower v. 

Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1991). Under the second factor, facts are 

essential when they are “necessary to form the basis of a judgment” in the first 

action. Tarter v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 744 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1988).

(quoting Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 924 (Tex. 2013)). 

In any event, the search and seizure here—a single incident—does not amount to a 

continuing tort, one which would forever suspend the statute of limitations absent the horses’ 

return. See, e.g. Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 F. App’x 867, 874 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding the refusal 

to return seized animals was not a continuous tort); Huerta v. United States, 384 F. App’x 

326, 328 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“the continued poverty . . . allege[d] does not convert 

the one-time seizure into an ongoing tort”).

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Issue preclusion bars Hoffman from relitigating the seizure and transfer 

of his horses. First, the finding of animal cruelty, which resulted in the horses’ 

transfer to the HSPCA, was fully and fairly litigated. The justice court held a 

hearing before divesting Hoffman of the horses. Hoffman appealed this 

decision to the county court, which affirmed. He again sought review of the 

seizure when he filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Second, the court’s finding that Hoffman should be divested of ownership after 

cruelly treating his horses was essential to the HSPCA’s possession. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 821.023(d)(2) (“If the court finds that the animal’s 

owner has cruelly treated the animal, the owner shall be divested of ownership 

of the animal, and the court shall order the animal given to a . . . nonprofit 

animal welfare organization[.]”). Third, Hoffman was a party to the first action.

Hoffman contends issue preclusion cannot bar his claims because the 

justice court lacked jurisdiction under § 821.023 to issue a valid, final 

judgment. He argues that the “court of competent jurisdiction” in § 821.023 

that made previous criminal findings must be the same court that conducts a 

subsequent hearing on divestment of ownership. While Hoffman is correct that 

§ 821.023 does not explicitly specify that a justice court may conduct a 

disposition hearing, we agree with the bankruptcy court that the statute as a 

whole makes clear a justice court may do so. First, § 821.022(b) allows a justice 

court to conduct a hearing to determine whether an animal has been cruelly 

treated following seizure. Then, concerning appeals, § 821.025(a) states that 

an “owner divested of ownership of an animal under Section 821.023 may 

appeal the order to a county court or county court at law in the county in which 

the justice or municipal court is located.” (emphasis added). Lastly, if 

divestment results in an auction per § 821.023(d)(1), § 821.024(b) instructs 

that the “officer conducting the auction shall pay any excess proceeds to the 

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justice or municipal court ordering the auction.” (emphasis added). Because 

there was a valid, final judgment from the state court proceedings, the district 

court properly dismissed Hoffman’s adversary claims under collateral estoppel.

AFFIRMED.

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