Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03138/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03138-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tijani Ahmed Saani
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 18, 2010 Decided July 8, 2011 

No. 09-3138 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

TIJANI AHMED SAANI, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:08-cr-00147) 

Lisa H. Schertler argued the cause for appellant. With 

her on the briefs was Danny C. Onorato. 

Kevin R. Gingras, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was 

Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General. 

Before: GINSBURG, GRIFFITH, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 1 of 20
2 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Tijani Ahmed Saani appeals 

the sentence he received after pleading guilty to five counts of 

filing a false tax return, a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). 

Saani argues the district court erred in applying the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines by increasing his base offense 

level on the ground he significantly disrupted a governmental 

function and by denying him credit for acceptance of 

responsibility. He also argues the district court erred by 

varying upward from the Guidelines range pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

We hold the district court did not err by increasing 

Saani’s base offense level because he did significantly disrupt 

a governmental function, but we are unable to determine 

whether in denying Saani credit for acceptance of 

responsibility and varying upward from the Guidelines range, 

the court relied solely upon constitutionally permissible 

factors. We therefore vacate Saani’s sentence and remand his 

case for resentencing. 

I. Background 

Saani was a contract specialist for the U.S. Air Force at 

Camp Arifjan in Kuwait. His responsibilities in that position 

included the award of contracts for the supplies, services, and 

housing U.S. military personnel need while stationed in 

Kuwait. In the aggregate, Saani oversaw the expenditure of at 

least one million dollars annually.*

 

*

 The Government alleges Saani oversaw procurement actions 

totaling $750 million annually, while Saani maintains he had no 

authority to make purchases over $1 million. Insofar as Saani 

claims the district court erred in refusing to resolve this dispute, he 

does so only summarily in a footnote in his opening brief. His 

argument is therefore forfeit. See Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 2 of 20
3 

In 2006 the Government began to investigate allegations 

of corruption in its contracting offices in Kuwait. That 

investigation led to the successful prosecution of eighteen 

individuals, including four Army Majors stationed at Camp 

Arifjan. The Government also learned that while Saani was 

in Kuwait he wired $3.6 million to bank accounts around the 

world, at least $2.6 million of which went to non-U.S. 

accounts Saani owned or controlled. Indeed, the Government 

determined that in 2003 through 2006 Saani spent $2,412,731 

more than he received from known sources of income, which 

prompted a review of every contract Saani administered and 

caused some of them to be “reissued.”

The Government subsequently charged Saani with five 

counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7206(1), one count for each return filed in the five tax years 

2003 through 2007. The indictment alleged Saani’s returns 

were fraudulent in three respects: (1) on each return for tax 

years 2003 through 2007 Saani falsely stated he did not have 

any interest in or authority over a foreign financial account 

and, on each return for tax years 2003 through 2006, he (2) 

failed to report the interest income he earned from the monies 

in those accounts, and (3) underreported his income. The 

indictment did not contain any allegation pertaining to the 

source of the unreported monies in Saani’s various accounts.

One day before his pretrial conference was to take place, 

Saani pleaded guilty to all five counts without having entered 

 

898 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing N.Y. Rehab. Care Mgmt., LLC v. 

NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“It is not enough 

merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, 

leaving the court to do counsel’s work” (internal quotation marks 

omitted))). 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 3 of 20
4 

into a plea agreement. During the plea colloquy with the 

district court, Saani’s counsel stated: 

[Saani] is willing to plead guilty ... . He is 

prepared to allocute that for the years 2003, 

through 2007 ... he filed Federal tax returns 

[that] were signed under penalties of perjury, 

and that on those tax returns he stated that he 

did not have any interest in or signature 

authority over any foreign bank accounts, and 

that at the time that he made those statements 

he knew that those statements were false. 

Saani did not then admit (as he did later) he had understated 

his income, but the Government did not object and the district 

court accepted Saani’s plea.

In its Presentence Report (PSR) the Probation Office 

calculated Saani had an offense level of 20, reflecting a base 

offense level of 20 geared to the Government’s loss of 

$816,485 in taxes, a two-point upward adjustment pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2) for use of sophisticated means to 

commit a crime, and a two-point downward adjustment 

pursuant to § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. His total 

offense level and lack of a criminal history indicated a 

sentence of 33 to 41 months in prison. Saani’s refusal, upon 

the advice of counsel, to discuss with the Probation Office 

matters relating to his net worth and monthly cash flow 

prevented that office from specifying the size of the fine the 

court should impose, though it noted Saani did appear to be 

able to pay a fine.

The Government urged the district court to sentence 

Saani to at least 121 months in prison. In particular, the 

Government argued the court should refuse Saani credit for 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 4 of 20
5 

acceptance of responsibility (leaving his offense level at 20, 

the base, + 2 for his use of sophisticated means) and should 

increase Saani’s total offense level by ten (to 32) — 

comprising four levels pursuant to § 5K2.7 for significantly 

disrupting a governmental function, four levels pursuant to 

§ 5K2.21 for two uncharged offenses (filing a false return for 

tax year 2002 and making a false statement on an application 

for a security clearance), and two levels pursuant to 

§ 2T1.1(b)(1) for failing to report income derived from an 

illegal source. The Government also sought the maximum 

statutory fine, full restitution, and a special assessment, 

arguing Saani should not, by refusing to discuss his finances, 

be able to avoid a monetary sentence. 

For his part, Saani urged the district court to accept 

Probation’s conclusion he should receive credit for accepting 

responsibility: He had pleaded guilty before his pretrial 

conference — what the district court had called “the point of 

no return [for] getting acceptance of responsibility credit” — 

and, at the plea hearing, the Government had expressly stated 

his allocution was sufficient. Saani also later admitted he had 

failed to report $2.4 million of income and made a false 

statement in an application for a security clearance, and 

conceded he could be required to pay the maximum statutory 

fine in view of his refusal to cooperate fully with Probation. 

At the sentencing hearing the district court adopted most 

of the Government’s proposed increases. The court denied 

Saani credit for acceptance of responsibility in view of his 

“unwillingness to be forthcoming with Probation over and 

above his unwillingness to be more forthcoming about his 

conduct.” The court also increased Saani’s base offense level 

by eight — two levels for use of sophisticated means, four 

levels for significantly disrupting a governmental function, 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 5 of 20
6 

and two levels for uncharged conduct, viz., making a false 

statement in an application for a security clearance.

In Saani’s favor, the district court concluded the evidence 

was insufficient to support a finding he had filed a false tax 

return for 2002, and it therefore denied the Government’s 

motion for a two-level increase for that uncharged conduct. 

The court likewise refused to make an upward adjustment for 

Saani’s uncharged failure to report income derived from an 

illegal source. As a result, the district court assigned Saani a 

total offense level of 28, for which the Guidelines recommend 

a sentence in the range of 78 to 97 months in prison. 

After hearing argument about the sentencing factors 

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court varied upward from 

the Guidelines range and sentenced Saani to 110 months in 

prison. The court also sentenced Saani to pay the maximum 

statutory fine of $1,632,970,*

 plus a special assessment, and 

to make full restitution.

II. Analysis 

In reviewing a sentencing decision, we address purely 

legal questions de novo, accept the district court’s factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and give “due 

deference” to that court’s application of the Guidelines to the 

facts. United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 

States v. Bisong, No. 08-3014, 2011 WL 1900736, at *12 

(D.C. Cir. May 20, 2011) (the due deference standard “falls 

somewhere between de novo and clearly erroneous” review 

 

*

 By statute the maximum fine is the greater of $250,000 per count 

of conviction or, as here, twice the gross pecuniary loss to the 

victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b), (d). 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 6 of 20
7 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Saani 

argues the district court erred, first, by increasing his sentence 

for significantly disrupting a governmental function and, 

second, by denying him credit for acceptance of 

responsibility. He also argues the district court erred as a 

matter of law in denying him credit for accepting 

responsibility and giving him a sentence above the Guidelines 

range because, in so doing, the court impermissibly burdened 

his right against self-incrimination. The Government 

contends the district court did not clearly err in any respect 

and did not penalize Saani for his silence. 

A. Significant Disruption of a Governmental Function 

In ruling from the bench the district court said it would be 

an “understatement” to describe Saani’s actions as having a 

disruptive effect upon a governmental function. Referring to 

the “elaborate affidavit” submitted by a government 

investigator, the district court found Saani’s failure to report 

his income caused the Government to investigate contracts 

“involving millions and millions” of dollars. In view of the 

“huge disruptive effect,” the district court concluded 

increasing Saani’s offense level by four “was more than 

warranted.” Saani argues the district court clearly erred in 

applying that provision because (i) it was not his false tax 

returns that caused the disruption of the contracting offices in 

Kuwait and, even if it was, (ii) the district court failed 

adequately to justify the size of the increase. 

1. Causation 

Saani argues that under § 5K2.7 of the Sentencing 

Guidelines the Government must establish a direct link 

between the defendant’s misconduct and the alleged 

disruption by showing, for example, the defendant used 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 7 of 20
8 

government property or personnel to further his crime. See, 

e.g., United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 

1990), rev’d on other grounds, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) 

(affirming increase pursuant to § 5K2.7 where supervisor 

used “administrative resources” such as “time and personnel” 

to divert government funds). Here, because there was no 

misuse of government resources, Saani argues the 

Government cannot identify any effect his failure to report 

income had upon the contracting offices in Kuwait. Indeed, 

as his crime was discovered only after the Government’s 

investigation into allegations of corruption in Kuwait had 

begun, Saani argues his conduct could not have caused the 

investigation. Nor, Saani adds, may he be punished under 

§ 5K2.7 for prolonging an investigation that was already 

under way because the “portion of the investigation that 

occurred after Saani’s tax crimes were discovered was 

fruitless.”

These arguments are not convincing. Although the 

Government was initially conducting a broader investigation 

into allegations of corruption in the Kuwaiti contracting office 

for reasons unrelated to Saani’s crimes, it was, according to 

the affidavit of the government investigator, “Saani’s failure 

to report the existence of his foreign bank accounts [and his 

actual] income, his pattern of concealment [that] led to further 

inquiry and scrutiny of his contract actions.” It is irrelevant 

that the ensuing investigation was fruitless. Section 5K2.7 

permits a district court to increase the defendant’s offense 

level where “the defendant's conduct resulted in a significant 

disruption of a governmental function”; it does not require 

that the disruption be of any particular type or consequence. 

Unlawful conduct necessitating an unusually burdensome or 

prolonged investigation of a government office may suffice as 

a “significant disruption” under § 5K2.7 regardless whether 

the investigation proves fruitful. Cf. United States v. Howard, 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 8 of 20
9 

No. 95-1443, 1996 WL 30781, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 1996) 

(affirming increase in a defendant’s sentence per § 5K2.7 

where defendant’s theft of evidence caused several federal 

agencies to undertake a sprawling investigation). As a result 

of Saani’s conduct the Government was forced to review 

contracts involving millions of dollars. This task was so 

complex that the investigative team required the assistance of 

two senior officials at the Kuwaiti contracting office, who had 

to be diverted from their ordinary duties. The district court 

did not err clearly in finding that Saani’s conduct significantly 

disrupted a governmental function. 

2. Magnitude of the Increase 

Saani argues the district court also erred by failing to 

explain why his conduct warranted an increase of four levels 

instead of some lesser number. The district court found the 

disruptive effect of Saani’s conduct was “huge” and 

particularly harmful because it disrupted the Government’s 

functioning during a time of war. Saani did not ask at his 

hearing for a more elaborate explanation and the district 

court’s failure to provide one sua sponte was not so plain an 

error  if it was an error at all  that “the trial judge and 

[the] prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it.” United 

States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting 

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)); see also 

United States v. Tann, 532 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(“[o]rdinarily an objection not made in the district court is 

reviewable on appeal only for plain error”). 

B. Acceptance of Responsibility 

 Saani next argues the district court should have reduced 

by two his base offense level because he “clearly 

demonstrate[d] acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 9 of 20
10 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). As noted in the Sentencing Guidelines, 

the district court is in a “unique position to evaluate a 

defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” § 3E1.1, cmt n.5. 

Its decision to grant or deny credit pursuant to § 3E1.1 is 

therefore “entitled to great deference on review.” United 

States v. Berkeley, 567 F.3d 703, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing

§ 3E1.1 cmt n.5). As detailed below, none of Saani’s 

objections pertaining to his plea colloquy or his interaction 

with the Probation Office undercuts the deference we owe the 

district court. Because the court may have erred as a matter 

of law, however, by penalizing Saani for invoking his right to 

remain silent about certain matters beyond the offense of 

conviction, we remand his case to the district court for further 

consideration as we explain below. 

1. Timeliness of the Plea 

Saani first argues the decision to deny him credit under 

§ 3E1.1 should not stand because the district court failed to 

acknowledge the timeliness of his plea. He points out that at 

a status hearing the judge said if he pleaded guilty prior to the 

date of the pretrial conference, then he should have “no 

problem” getting credit under § 3E1.1. Thus, Saani argues, 

the court “essentially promised [him] that a plea by the 

deadline would result in a § 3E1.1 adjustment.”

Saani’s contention fails because a “defendant who enters 

a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under [§ 3E1.1] 

as a matter of right,” § 3E1.1 cmt n.3; indeed, the timeliness 

of a defendant’s plea is only one of eight factors the 

Guidelines suggest a court may consider, id. cmt n.1. Here, 

the district judge did not mention the timing of Saani’s plea, 

but did point to reasons for believing Saani had not in fact 

accepted responsibility  his failure at the plea hearing to 

admit he had underreported income and his refusal later to 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 10 of 20
11 

cooperate fully with Probation. Those are adequate reasons 

for denying him credit. A dozen years ago we rejected 

explicitly Saani’s implicit suggestion to the contrary. See 

United States v. Bridges, 175 F.3d 1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (“We see no reason, and have no warrant, to overturn 

the district court simply because it did not go through the 

exercise of explaining the rejection of choices implicit in the 

choice it did make”). 

2. Scope of the Allocution 

Saani next argues the district court should not have 

considered his failure at the plea colloquy to admit all of the 

allegations against him because doing so penalized him 

unfairly for a decision made by his counsel. More 

particularly, defense counsel told the court Saani admitted he 

had failed to report his interest in foreign bank accounts, but 

Saani’s allocution did not address the allegations he had 

underreported his income. According to Saani, it was not 

recalcitrance on his part that led him to allocute so narrowly. 

Rather, he claims, “The record demonstrates that defense 

counsel had incomplete data from the government at the time 

of [his] plea” and counsel “advised [him] to permit her to 

evaluate the government’s data before agreeing to [the 

amount of the tax loss in the Government’s proffer].”

When determining eligibility for an adjustment under 

§ 3E1.1, a district court may require the defendant “to provide 

a candid and full unraveling of the circumstances surrounding 

the offense of conviction,” In re Sealed Case, 350 F.3d 113, 

123 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), and 

may consider whether the defendant truthfully admitted, or 

instead falsely denied or frivolously contested, any 

“additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is 

accountable,” § 3E1.1 cmt n.1. Where, as here, a defendant is 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 11 of 20
12 

accused of making multiple false statements in his tax return, 

those alleged false statements are obviously “relevant conduct 

for which the defendant is accountable.” The district court 

did not, therefore, err by taking into account Saani’s failure to 

admit he underreported his income regardless whether he was 

acting upon the advice of counsel; a defendant is responsible 

for the strategic decisions of his attorney. See Comm’r v. 

Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 436 (2005) (“the attorney can make 

tactical decisions without consulting the client” because 

“[e]ven where the attorney exercises independent judgment 

without supervision by, or consultation with, the client, the 

attorney, as an agent, is obligated to act solely on behalf of 

... the client-principal”); Pittman ex rel. Sykes v. Franklin, 282 

F. App’x 418, 427 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008) (an attorney may act 

without consulting her client in tactical matters “if [the] 

decision is in the best interest of the client and the lawyer is 

impliedly authorized to so act”); cf. United States v. Morrison, 

98 F.3d 619, 626 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (lawyer’s failure to 

seek the client’s opinion before making a strategic decision 

does not render that decision “incompetent or inappropriate”). 

And there can be no question defense counsel’s decision to 

limit the scope of Saani’s allocution was in fact strategic.*

 

*

 At his sentencing hearing, Saani’s counsel stated: 

We [] delayed our acceptance on the unreported 

income and tax computations because the 

discovery in this case has really been an ongoing 

process. ... We continue[d] to receive financial 

records and the Government’s computations [of the 

claimed tax loss] well past the plea, and I wanted 

the opportunity to look at the Government’s 

computations ... before I felt comfortable that the 

Government’s particular figures were supported. 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 12 of 20
13 

3. Cooperation with Probation 

Saani also argues the district court ought not to have 

considered his refusal to speak candidly with Probation about 

his finances when deciding whether to give him credit under 

§ 3E1.1 because he had conceded at the sentencing hearing 

that he was able to pay a fine. Ability to pay is not, however, 

the only legitimate reason for expecting a defendant to 

disclose the location and amount of the income he failed to 

report on his tax returns. To the contrary, such details are a 

part of the “candid and full unraveling” a court may expect a 

defendant convicted of tax evasion to supply in assessing 

whether the defendant has accepted responsibility for his 

crime, In re Sealed Case, 350 F.3d at 123; see § 3E1.1 cmt 

n.1(A), and, as a practical matter, may be the essential detail 

if the Government is to recover the lost taxes.**

 

Defense counsel thereby made clear that instead of increasing the 

likelihood Saani would receive credit under § 3E1.1 by providing 

the Government with information about the extent of his crime — a 

task undoubtedly easier for Saani than it was for the prosecution, 

which had to rely upon the cooperation of foreign governments 

pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties — she believed Saani 

would be better off by putting the Government to its proof. 

** Saani argues he had a constitutional privilege to remain silent 

about the source of his unreported income because disclosing that 

source could subject him to punishment for a crime other than tax 

evasion. In arguing the district court erred by considering his 

failure to cooperate with Probation, however, Saani does not here 

argue the locational information requested by Probation might 

subject him to any greater punishment. Cf. United States v. Bolden, 

479 F.3d 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2007) (“it is not ... clear whether there 

are Fifth Amendment implications of requiring [a defendant] to 

disclose the location of ... stolen money [when] such disclosure 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 13 of 20
14 

4. Fifth Amendment Concerns 

Finally, with respect to the denial of credit under § 3E1.1, 

Saani argues the district court erred as a matter of law insofar 

as it relied upon his unwillingness to discuss matters about 

which he had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to speak, see 

U.S. CONST. amend. V (no person “shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself”). Specifically,

Saani argues the district court refused to give him credit for 

acceptance of responsibility because he did not cooperate with 

the Government’s bribery investigation by identifying the 

source of his unreported funds. The Government contests 

Saani’s reading of the record but, like the Supreme Court, 

“express[es] no view” on the constitutional issue, see Mitchell 

v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (holding Fifth 

Amendment extends to sentencing phase of criminal 

proceeding but reserving question whether silence bears upon 

credit for accepting responsibility).

Recall that in deciding whether a defendant should 

receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, it is 

appropriate for the district court to consider whether the 

defendant “truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the 

offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or [did] not 

falsely deny[] any additional relevant conduct for which the 

defendant is accountable.” § 3E1.1 cmt n.1(A). In order to 

avoid a potential violation of the defendant’s constitutional 

right against self-incrimination, however, the Commentary 

further provides: 

 

would not increase the penalty to which [the defendant] was already 

subject by pleading guilty to the underlying robbery”). 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 14 of 20
15 

[A] defendant is not required to volunteer, or 

affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond 

the offense of conviction in order to obtain a 

reduction under [§ 3E1.1] ... [and] may remain 

silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the 

offense of conviction without affecting his 

ability to obtain a reduction. 

Id.; see also United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992) (revision to § 3E1.1 and accompanying application 

note was intended to prevent tension between the Guideline 

and the Fifth Amendment). 

We considered this Commentary in a slightly different 

context In re Sealed Case. There the defendant had been 

convicted of, among other things, conspiracy to distribute 

cocaine. 350 F.3d at 115. The district court denied the 

defendant credit under § 3E1.1 in part because he refused to 

disclose the identity of his supplier and co-conspirator. Id. at 

122. Because the Guidelines “vest a sentencing court with the 

latitude to consider all reliable, probative indicia tending to 

demonstrate, or countervail, the genuineness” of the 

defendant’s remorse, id., we held a sentencing court may 

require a defendant seeking credit pursuant to § 3E1.1 “to 

provide a candid and full unraveling of the circumstances” of 

his offense, including the names of his co-conspirators, id. at 

123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If a defendant convicted of distributing drugs can be 

denied credit for failing to reveal the source of his drugs, then 

does it follow that Saani may be denied credit for failing to 

reveal the source of his unreported income? We are not 

certain the analogy holds. The defendant In re Sealed Case

stood convicted of conspiracy and naming his supplier would 

not have subjected him to the possibility of prosecution for an 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 15 of 20
16 

additional crime; one who has conspired necessarily has coconspirators. Saani, however, asserts that if he were forced to 

disclose the source of his funds, then he might face 

prosecution for a crime distinct from tax evasion, viz., bribery. 

Courts disagree whether the “compulsion” a defendant faces 

if he may be denied a reduction of his sentence unless he 

provides potentially incriminating information is sufficiently 

forceful to trigger the protection of the Fifth Amendment. 

Compare United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1084, 1086 

(4th Cir. 1992) (conditioning a reduction under § 3E1.1 “on 

the waiver of [a defendant’s] Fifth Amendment right is [] 

analogous to (and constitutionally indistinguishable from) the 

choice confronting the defendants in [a] plea bargain case[] 

... [it] may encourage defendants to provide information that 

could prove incriminatory, but it does not compel them to do 

so”); with United States v. Olivares, 905 F.2d 623, 628 (2d 

Cir. 1990) (requiring defendant “to accept responsibility for 

crimes other than those to which he has pled guilty ... in effect 

forces [him] to choose between incriminating [himself] ... or 

forfeiting [a] substantial reduction[]” in his sentence); United 

States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 779 (2d Cir. 2007) (same in 

dictum); see also United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 805 

(3d Cir. 1999) (a majority of circuits “construe denied 3E1.1 

reductions as ‘denied benefits’ rather than ‘penalties’”). 

We do not now resolve the constitutional issue because 

we cannot determine from the present record whether the 

district court did indeed take into account Saani’s refusal to 

disclose specifically the source of his funds when it denied 

him credit under § 3E1.1. See Tr. of Sentencing Hearing at 4, 

United States v. Saani, No. 08-147 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2009) 

(denying Saani credit because of his “unwillingness to be 

forthcoming with Probation over and above his unwillingness 

to be more forthcoming about his conduct here”). Instead, we 

vacate Saani’s sentence so the district court may clarify the 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 16 of 20
17 

basis or bases for, and if necessary reconsider, its conclusion 

Saani did not accept responsibility for his crimes. See Saro, 

24 F.3d at 287 (“For most constitutional errors, an appellate 

court is to reverse if it entertains a ‘reasonable doubt’ about 

whether the error affected the outcome below”). If the district 

court does not consider Saani’s refusal to disclose the source 

of the funds in deciding whether to grant or deny him credit 

under § 3E1.1, then there will be no Fifth Amendment issue 

with respect to that provision.*

C. Upward Variance 

After assigning Saani a total offense level of 28, for 

which the Guidelines range is 78 to 97 months in prison, the 

district court varied upward and sentenced Saani to 110 

months. Saani argues the variance violated his right against 

self-incrimination because it was, like the denial of credit 

pursuant to § 3E1.1, based upon his refusal to disclose the 

source of his unreported income.

We agree with Saani that portions of the record can be 

read to suggest the district court varied upward, in part, 

because Saani refused to disclose the source of his funds. It is 

 

*

 At the sentencing hearing the district judge stated the Guidelines 

calculations in Saani’s case “wouldn’t matter” because he believed 

a sentence of 110 months was appropriate. Based upon that 

statement, the Government argues any error the district court may 

have committed in calculating Saani’s Guidelines range was 

harmless; the district court “would have imposed the same sentence 

in any event” and that sentence, irrespective of the Guidelines, “was 

“independently justified by the § 3553(a) factors.” The 

Government’s argument fails because, as we explain below, there is 

an open question whether the sentence imposed under § 3553(a) 

was tainted by constitutional error. 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 17 of 20
18 

clear the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant not only from 

being compelled to provide information about guilt or 

innocence but also from being compelled to provide details 

about conduct beyond the offense of conviction that could 

increase the severity of his punishment. See Mitchell, 526 

U.S. at 325–30 (privilege against self-incrimination extends 

through sentencing phase of criminal trial; “defendant [is 

often] less concerned with the proof of her guilt or innocence 

than with the severity of her punishment”); cf. id. at 340 

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Court does not address whether 

judge may draw negative inference from defendant’s silence 

at sentencing hearing when considering “repentance, 

character, and future dangerousness”); United States v. 

Kennedy, 499 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2007) (Fifth 

Amendment does not forbid district court from considering 

“defendant’s refusal to [undergo psychological examination] 

in assessing what sentence is necessary to protect the public 

from further crimes” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

It is not evident a constitutional violation occurred here, 

however, because the record makes clear that, in addition to 

concern about the source of Saani’s income, the decision to 

vary upward was based upon the need to deter tax evasion by 

persons entrusted with the expenditure of federal funds. If the 

decision of the district court to vary upward rested solely 

upon the latter ground, then it would be not only 

constitutional but also a reasonable exercise of the district 

court’s considerable discretion. Still, out of an abundance of 

caution — and having decided on another ground to vacate 

Saani’s sentence and remand his case to the district court for 

reconsideration — we think it prudent to have the district 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 18 of 20
19 

court also clarify on remand its reason or reasons for varying 

upward from the Guidelines, should it again do so.*

D. Remand to a Different Judge 

Saani maintains that because the district judge made 

certain statements at his sentencing hearing expressing 

impatience or disagreement with the Guidelines, the judge 

will be unable to take a “fresh look” at his sentence on 

remand and we should therefore direct that his case be 

reassigned to a different judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 

(appellate court may “require such further proceedings to be 

had as may be just under the circumstances”); see also United 

States v. Wolff, 127 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (whether a 

case should be reassigned depends upon “whether the original 

judge would ... have substantial difficulty in putting out of his 

or her mind the previously-expressed views ... [and] whether 

reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of 

justice” (quoting United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d 

Cir. 1977))). In view of the considerable time and effort the 

district judge in this case spent soliciting and considering both 

the parties’ arguments, it is evident that irrespective of his 

personal views regarding the wisdom of the Guidelines, the 

 

*

 We also point out that in view of the district court’s refusal to 

increase Saani’s base offense level pursuant to § 2T1.1(b)(1) for 

failing to report funds obtained from an illegal source, it would 

seem anomalous for the district court later to find the evidence was 

sufficient to sustain an upward variance under § 3553(a) for the 

same ostensibly unlawful conduct. Cf. United States v. Lawson, 

494 F.3d 1046, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“it is permissible for a 

sentencing court to build a sentence, at least in part, on conduct 

[outside the offense of conviction] provided, as here, the court 

determined by a preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] 

engaged in the conduct”). 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 19 of 20
20 

district judge knew he was bound by law to consider them. 

There is nothing in the record to suggest the district judge on 

remand will be unable or unwilling to do so again. 

III. Conclusion 

The district court did not err in concluding Saani’s 

offense level should be increased pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 5K2.7 because Saani’s criminal conduct significantly 

disrupted a governmental function. We vacate Saani’s 

sentence and remand his case to the district court for 

resentencing solely because the record is unclear as to 

whether an arguably improper consideration infected the 

district court’s decisions to deny Saani credit for accepting 

responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and to vary 

upward from the Guidelines sentencing range pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

 So ordered. 

USCA Case #09-3138 Document #1317419 Filed: 07/08/2011 Page 20 of 20