Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-02762/USCOURTS-ca2-13-02762-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Annie George
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

1

13‐2762‐cr

United States v. George

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

________________

August Term, 2014

(Argued: November 17, 2014             Decided: February 25, 2015)

Docket No. 13‐2762‐cr

________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

—v.—

ANNIE GEORGE, AKA Annie Kolath, AKA Sajimol George,

Defendant‐Appellant.

________________

Before:

KEARSE, STRAUB, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

________________  

On appeal from a conviction for harboring an illegal alien, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), and related order of forfeiture, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II), defendant challenges (1) the district court’s jury instruction

on the meaning of “harboring” in light of United States v. Vargas‐Cordon, 733

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F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove harboring; and

(3) the forfeiture of her residence in light of the Eighth Amendment prohibition

on excessive fines.   

AFFIRMED.

________________

MARK M. BAKER (Joshua Kirshner, on the brief), Brafman &

Associates, P.C., New York, New York, for Defendant‐

Appellant.

WILLIAM A. GLASER, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (David A.

O’Neil, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David M.

Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Brenda K.

Sannes, Chief, Appellate Division, United States Attorney’s

Office for the Northern District of New York, on the brief), for

Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern

District of New York, Syracuse, New York, for Appellee.

________________

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:  

Defendant Annie George appeals from a judgment of conviction and order

of forfeiture entered on July 10, 2013, in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York (Gary L. Sharpe, Chief Judge), after a jury trial at

which she was found guilty of one count of harboring an illegal alien.    See 8

U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).  George contends that the district court plainly erred in

instructing the jury as to the meaning of the word “harbors” in light of United

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States v. Vargas‐Cordon, 733 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013), a case decided after

George’s conviction.    She further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

prove harboring.  Finally, she argues that forfeiture of her residence pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II) violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on

excessive fines.    We conclude that none of these arguments has merit and,

therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction and order of forfeiture.

I. Background

A. The Crime of Conviction

The crime of conviction originated in defendant Annie George’s

employment of undocumented Indian national Valsamma Mathai as a domestic

worker beginning in October 2005.    Mathai had come to the United States

approximately seven years earlier on a G5 visa that allowed her to reside in New

York City and work for a designated employee of the United Nations.  Mathai’s

visa did not allow her to work or live elsewhere in the United States.  

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Nevertheless, in 2005, Mathai left her authorized employment at the behest of a

man who introduced her to Annie George and her husband.1

At trial, the prosecution and defense offered contradictory accounts of the

ensuing relationship between the Georges and Mathai.  Viewing the evidence, as

we must, in the light most favorable to the government, see Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), it appears that the Georges—who communicated with

Mathai in her native language, Malayalam—offered her live‐in domestic

employment at a salary of $1,000 per month.    Annie George knew that aliens

needed United States authorization to work or live in this country.  Nevertheless,

she hired Mathai without ever asking to see such authorization or having Mathai

fill out any employment authorization forms.    By accepting the Georges’

employment offer and relocating to their home, Mathai lost her lawful status in

this country and became an illegal alien.

Mathai worked for George from 2005 to 2011, caring for five minor

children and performing various domestic tasks throughout workdays that

generally began at 5:30 a.m. and ended around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m.  She worked

 

1 George’s husband (as well as the couple’s eldest son) died in a plane crash in

2009, well before federal authorities learned of the activities giving rise to this

case.

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seven days a week, with no time off, vacation, or sick days.  During her 66‐month

employment, Mathai was never paid the promised $1,000‐per‐month wage;

rather, she received a total of approximately $25,000 to $26,000, some of which

was sent directly to India to help support her sons.

Neither George nor her husband ever filed the required W‐2, W‐3, W‐4, or

1099 forms with the Internal Revenue Service to document Mathai’s

employment.  On one occasion when Mathai expressed concern about her lack of

immigration papers, George took Mathai to see a man who might assist her in

securing such papers for a fee of $4,000, which Mathai asked George to deduct

from her salary.  No such papers were ever obtained, and when Mathai raised

the matter again, George said that she had more pressing concerns as a result of

her husband’s death.

Meanwhile, George instructed Mathai not to discuss her immigration

status with others and to tell anyone who inquired about her presence in the

George home that she was a visiting family friend.    George also discouraged

Mathai from traveling to India to attend her son’s wedding, telling her that such

travel could lead to her arrest and deportation by United States authorities.

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Over time, Mathai’s son became increasingly concerned about his mother’s

situation in the George household and, in April 2011, contacted a human

trafficking hotline, an action that led to federal agents removing Mathai from the

George home in May 2011.  When the agents arrived at George’s home for this

purpose, George delayed Mathai’s departure for almost two hours, refusing to

speak to the agents and at one point taking Mathai into the basement before later

pushing her out a side door and refusing to allow her re‐entry to retrieve her

possessions.

Thereafter, George had several telephone conversations with Mathai’s son,

which the latter recorded on his own initiative, subsequently providing the

recordings to federal authorities.    In one such call, George effectively

acknowledged her awareness of both Mathai’s illegal status in the United States

and her own violation of law in employing such a person.    She expressed

particular concern that if Mathai told federal authorities “anything about

working,” George could be charged with “a big crime,” because “[t]hey’ll start

adding up all the taxes and everything for all this time”; meanwhile, Mathai

herself would be put “in jail for ten years.  Poor thing.  Life will be over in jail.”  

J.A. 438.    George admitted counseling Mathai to lie to authorities about her

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presence in the George household, representing herself as a family friend rather

than an employee:  

If Valsamma says she has made any money here, then they will

come to me for it.  That’s what they are after.  I have specifically told

her what to say to them.  I have told her to say that she was staying

here because she was like family and the only reason she was

staying here with us is because she knew us and not to say anything

else because it will end up being a problem for all of us later . . . .

Id. at 431.  George lamented that Mathai had failed to follow earlier instructions

to the same effect, having “talk[ed] about not having paperwork to everyone[,]

even to people that she doesn’t know well.”  Id. at 428.   

B. Procedural History

On July 25, 2012, a grand jury in the Northern District of New York

returned a one‐count indictment charging George with harboring an illegal alien

with the aggravating purpose of private financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(1)(B)(i).    After a five‐day trial, a jury found George

guilty of harboring but acquitted her of the private‐gain penalty enhancement.  

Thereafter, George moved for a judgment of acquittal on the harboring charge

notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, inter alia, that the government had failed

to present legally sufficient evidence to sustain conviction.  See Fed. R. Crim. P.

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29(c).    The district court denied the motion in a memorandum decision dated

June 27, 2013, and in a judgment filed on July 10, 2013, sentenced George to five

years’ probation with eight months’ home confinement, and further ordered

forfeiture of her Rexford, New York residence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II).

This timely appeal followed.   

II. Discussion

A. The Challenged Jury Instruction

George argues that the district court erred in failing clearly to instruct the

jury that the charged harboring crime requires evidence of concealment, i.e.,

conduct intended “to prevent detection by the authorities of the alien’s unlawful

presence” in the United States.  United States v. Vargas‐Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382.  

Because George did not object to the jury charge in the district court, we review

the challenged instruction only for plain error, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b);

United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2013), a standard that requires

George to demonstrate (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) affecting

substantial rights, and (4) calling into question the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings, see United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262

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(2010).2    George fails to carry this burden because the jury instruction, when

viewed as a whole, adequately conveys the requisite concealment aspect of

harboring.

A jury instruction is erroneous if it either fails adequately to inform the

jury of the law or misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard.    See, e.g.,

United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 237 (2d Cir. 2010).  In making such an

assessment, we do not review a challenged instruction in isolation.  Rather, we

consider it in context “to determine whether considered as a whole, the

instructions adequately communicated the essential ideas to the jury.”    Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146–47

(1973) (applying “well established proposition that a single instruction to a jury

may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the

 

2 In her opening brief on appeal, George urged “modified” plain error review

under United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other

grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).    In her reply brief,

however, George explicitly abandons this argument.  See Appellant’s Reply Br.

14 n.2.    We, therefore, need not address whether the modified plain error

standard remains viable in light of Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).  

See United States v. Botti, 711 F.3d 299, 308–10 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing

uncertain validity of modified plain error review).

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overall charge”); accord United States v. Tran, 519 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2008);

United States v. Mitchell, 328 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2003).

The statute here at issue criminally punishes any person who,  

knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come

to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law,

conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal,

harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including

any building or any means of transportation.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).   Prior to United States v. Vargas‐Cordon, 733 F.3d

366, our precedent had lacked consistency in construing the “harbor[ing]”

proscribed by this section.    Some cases had interpreted harboring to imply an

element of evasion or concealment to prevent authorities from detecting the

alien’s unlawful presence; other cases had construed harboring to encompass

conduct that, with or without evasion, tended substantially to facilitate an alien’s

remaining in the United States illegally.    See id. at 380 (collecting cases).    In

Vargas‐Cordon, we recognized that common usage and dictionary definitions

supported both constructions, but upon careful review of the text and structure

of the statute, we determined that all three of the proscribed actions—“conceals,

harbors, or shields from detection”—“shar[e] a common core of meaning

centered around evading detection.”    Id. at 381 (internal quotation marks

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omitted).   Thus, as Vargas‐Cordon now makes clear, to constitute harboring, a

defendant’s action must be intended (1) substantially to facilitate an illegal alien’s

remaining in the United States, and (2) to prevent the alien’s detection by

immigration authorities:    

To ‘harbor’ under § 1324, a defendant must engage in conduct that is

intended both to substantially help an unlawfully present alien

remain in the United States—such as by providing him with shelter,

money, or other material comfort—and also is intended to help

prevent the detection of the alien by the authorities.  The mere act of

providing shelter to an alien, when done without intention to help

prevent the alien’s detection by immigration authorities or police, is

thus not an offense under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).

Id. at 382.   

Although the district court did not have the benefit of Vargas‐Cordon

when it charged the jury in this case, George is entitled to rely on that decision in

urging plain error on appeal.  See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121,

1130–31 (2013) (stating that whether “legal question was settled or unsettled at

the time of trial, it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate

consideration” (internal quotation marks omitted)).    Citing Vargas‐Cordon’s

statement that, “if the district court had [there] instructed the jury that

‘harboring’. . . ‘simply means to shelter,’ it would have erred,” 733 F.3d at 382,

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George argues that the district court did just that in her case when it told the jury

that “[h]arboring means simply to afford shelter to,” and that there was no need

for it to find “that Ms. George acted secretly or that the harboring of the alien

was clandestine,” J.A. 805.

These challenged statements must, of course, be read in context.    See

United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d at 237.  In doing so here, we conclude that the

district court adequately conveyed both the concealment and substantial

facilitation aspects of harboring identified in Vargas‐Cordon, as demonstrated by

the highlighted language below:   

The third element is harboring, concealing or shielding from

detection.  This element which the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt is that Ms. George harbored or concealed or

shielded from detection or attempted to harbor, conceal or shield

from detection an alien who had come to, entered or remained in the

United States in violation of the law.    Harboring means simply to

afford shelter to, shield from detection, to act in a way that prevents

the authorities from learning of the fact that an alien is in the United

States illegally.  You need not find that Ms. George acted secretly or

that the harboring of the alien was clandestine.

The fo[u]rth element is substantial facilitation.  The fourth element

the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Ms.

George’s actions of harboring or concealing or shielding from

detection substantially facilitated the alien’s ability to remain in the

United States illegally . . . to make that alien’s remaining in the

United States illegally substantially easier or less difficult.   

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J.A. 805 (emphasis added).   

With particular reference to the concealment aspect of harboring, the

highlighted language in the first paragraph shows that when the district court

defined harboring as “afford[ing] shelter,” it made clear that what it meant by

sheltering was action that shielded the alien from detection or discovery by the

authorities.  In short, while the statute uses “conceals, harbors, or shields from

detection” in the disjunctive, the district court here instructed the jury to view

these actions as synonymous, at least to the extent that preventing an illegal

alien’s detection by authorities was their common underlying purpose.    Thus,

there is no merit to George’s claim that the district court here failed to instruct

the jury as to the concealment aspect of harboring.

Nor is a different conclusion compelled by the district court’s statement

that harboring did not require proof “that Ms. George acted secretly or that the

harboring of the alien was clandestine.”  Id.  In fact, this accurately states the law.  

In United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1999), cited approvingly in

Vargas‐Cordon for its recognition of the dual facilitation and concealment

aspects of harboring, see 733 F.3d at 382, this court held that a defendant who

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openly employed an illegal alien under a false name and submitted falsified

work authorization documents to immigration authorities was nevertheless

guilty of harboring.  In short, even if a defendant intent on concealing an illegal

alien from detection by authorities might also generally seek to conceal his own

actions in doing so, it is only the former effort at concealment, not the latter, that

is necessary to establish harboring.

George’s plain error claim is further undermined by the fact that in

Vargas‐Cordon, we upheld a harboring conviction even though the district court

there too instructed the jury that “‘“[h]arboring” simply means to shelter, to

afford shelter to.’”    733 F.3d at 382 (quoting jury charge).    In so ruling, we

observed that in “the very next sentence,” the district court stated that the

government was obliged to prove that the defendant afforded shelter “‘in a way

intended to substantially facilit[ate] her remaining here illegally.’”  Id. (quoting

jury charge) (emphasis omitted).  We concluded that by thus requiring proof of

intended facilitation, the harboring instruction as a whole sufficiently informed

the jury as to the requisite concealment.  See id.  At the same time, however, we

acknowledged that it would have been preferable to make that point by

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“explain[ing] that harboring requires acting with an intent to prevent an alien’s

detection.”  Id. at 382 n.10.

Here, the district court’s instruction was substantially similar to that in

Vargas‐Cordon in explaining both the concealment and facilitation aspects of

harboring.  See J.A. 805.  In urging otherwise, George contends—for the first time

in her reply brief—that the district court nevertheless plainly erred in focusing

the jury’s attention on whether a defendant “act[ed] in a way that prevent[ed] the

authorities from learning” of an illegal alien’s presence in the United States, id.,

rather than on whether the defendant acted in a way intended to prevent such

detection.  We generally treat arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief

as waived.  See, e.g., Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 568 n.4 (2d Cir.

2014).  While that, by itself, is reason enough to reject George’s belated mens rea

challenge, she fails in any event to demonstrate plain error.   

The law focuses on a defendant’s intent to conceal and to facilitate to

ensure that the prohibition against “harboring” is not cabined more narrowly

than warranted.    Thus, as we observed in Vargas‐Cordon, a defendant who

intends to conceal an illegal alien from authorities may be guilty of harboring

even though his conduct “lack[s] the hallmarks of active, classic concealment.”  

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733 F.3d at 382 (observing that “even if Vargas‐Cordon’s conduct lacked the

hallmarks of active, classic concealment, it nevertheless was intended to make

[the illegal alien’s] detection by the authorities substantially more difficult”).  But

where active concealment is proved, it will be the rare case in which a defendant

will not have intended the achieved result.  That is not this case.

As we explain in the next section of this opinion, addressing George’s

sufficiency challenge, the evidence of George’s intent to prevent Mathai’s

detection by authorities was overwhelming.    Any misdescription of the

‘harboring’ element here was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    See

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999) (ruling that omission of element is

subject to harmless error review); see, e.g., United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d

235, 257 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding omission of element harmless where proved by

overwhelming evidence).    Accordingly, while we expect that, after Vargas‐

Cordon, district courts will charge the concealment and facilitation aspects of

harboring by reference to the defendant’s intent, George cannot show that any

failure to do so here affected her substantial rights.  See United States v. Marcus,

560 U.S. at 262 (stating that to satisfy third prong of plain error, defendant must

normally demonstrate that alleged error was not harmless).  Much less can she

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claim that any such error calls into question the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings.  See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

469–70 (1997) (holding fourth prong of plain error not satisfied where “no

‘miscarriage of justice’” occurred because evidence of omitted element was

“overwhelming” (alteration omitted)).  

Thus, we identify no plain error in the district court’s jury instruction on

the harboring element of the crime of conviction.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

George asserts that she was entitled to a judgment of acquittal under Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29 because the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to

prove that her actions were intended to prevent law enforcement authorities

from detecting Mathai’s illegal presence in the United States.  She bears a heavy

burden in making this argument because not only must we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing all reasonable inferences in

its favor, but also we must affirm the conviction if “any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original); accord, e.g., United

States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d at 254; United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 34–35

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(2d Cir. 2012).  Here, the trial record, when viewed in its entirety and in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, overwhelmingly demonstrates that George’s

actions were intended to conceal Mathai’s illegal presence in this country from

authorities.

First, George admitted knowing both that it was illegal for an alien to work

in the United States without proper authorization and that Mathai lacked such

authorization.  Nevertheless, George hired Mathai as a domestic worker and had

her reside in the George home for more than five years.  This evidence plainly

demonstrated George’s knowledge that she had something to hide from

authorities: the presence in her home of an undocumented alien worker.    The

remaining evidence we reference demonstrated her intent to effect such

concealment.

Second, in the more than five years that she employed Mathai as a live‐in

worker, George never filed any of the forms required by the Internal Revenue

Service for employers to document their paid workers.  She maintains that this

omission is insufficient to demonstrate active concealment, citing United States v.

Litwok, 678 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2012), a case in which we stated that the failure

to file a tax return is insufficient, by itself, to constitute the affirmative act of tax

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evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201.    The analogy is inapt.    The issue here is not

whether George’s filing omission constitutes an affirmative act of tax evasion, or

even active concealment under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), an issue we need not

here decide.    Rather, the pertinent question is whether that omission is a

circumstance from which a reasonable jury could infer that the action here at

issue—George’s sheltering of Mathai in her home for more than five years—was

intended to prevent authorities from discovering the alien’s illegal presence,

thereby constituting proscribed harboring.    We here conclude that George’s

persistent failure to file employment records required by law was circumstantial

evidence providing some support for an inference of intent as to George’s

sheltering.  See generally United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189–90 (2d

Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can

often be proved through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom”); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 143 (2d Cir. 1998)

(recognizing that “most evidence of intent is circumstantial”).

Nor is a different conclusion warranted because George may have had a

financial interest in not filing the required tax forms for Mathai.  To the contrary,

such a self‐interest was evidence of George’s motive to prevent authorities from

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detecting Mathai’s unlawful presence in the George home.  See United States v.

MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 185 n.2 (“[E]vidence of motive, or the lack thereof, is a

factor that a jury may weigh in considering whether the totality of the

circumstances permits it to infer guilty knowledge and intent beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 808 (2d Cir. 1969)

(Friendly, J.))).

Third, George’s intent to conceal finds still stronger support in evidence

that she specifically instructed Mathai, during more than five years of

employment, not to discuss her immigration status with anyone and, if asked, to

represent herself falsely as a visiting family friend, not a domestic worker.

In urging otherwise, George emphasizes that she never hid Mathai from

visitors nor restricted her movements or mistreated her in any way.  This misses

the point.    George was not charged with human trafficking, imprisonment, or

abuse.    See 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (prohibiting peonage); id. § 1589 (prohibiting

procurement of labor by force or threat).    She was charged with harboring,

proscribed conduct requiring proof only that George sheltered Mathai in her

home intending to make the alien’s “detection by the authorities substantially

more difficult.”    United States v. Vargas‐Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382 (emphasis

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added).    In Vargas‐Cordon, we held that where a defendant’s conduct

“undoubtedly diminished the government’s ability to locate” an illegal alien, he

was guilty of harboring even if he “did not actively hide [the alien] from the

outside world.”  Id.  The same conclusion applies here.  George may not have hid

Mathai from the outside world, but by counseling Mathai to lie about her status

to anyone who asked, George plainly diminished the likelihood of government

authorities’ discovering that she had an alien illegally working in her home.

Fourth, the inference of George’s culpable mens rea before Mathai was

discovered by authorities is reinforced by George’s post‐discovery actions.  Her

stalling efforts when authorities finally came to remove Mathai from the George

home, while plainly futile, nevertheless allowed a reasonable jury to infer that

her sheltering actions had long been intended to hamper the very discovery that

prompted Mathai’s removal.  A factfinder could similarly infer consciousness of

guilt from George’s efforts at obstruction, both in urging Mathai to lie to law

enforcement officials about her status in the George home, and in her own lying

at trial, which the district court found justified a sentencing enhancement for

obstruction of justice under section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  See, e.g.,

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United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing flight,

obstruction, and false statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt).

In sum, the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to

the government, overwhelmingly demonstrated that George acted with the

requisite intent to conceal Mathai’s illegal presence in the United States from

federal authorities and, thus, was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find

harboring proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, George’s sufficiency

challenge fails on the merits.

C. Forfeiture

George’s harboring conviction subjected her to the mandatory forfeiture of

“any property real or personal” that was “used to facilitate . . . the commission”

of that crime.  18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6)(A) (stating that “court, in imposing sentence

. . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States . . . ”).  Pursuant to this

section, the district court ordered the forfeiture of George’s Rexford, New York

home, an action that she now challenges as violative of the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on excessive fines.    See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; United States v.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (holding forfeiture imposed at culmination of

criminal proceeding, which requires conviction of underlying felony, to be

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punishment subject to Excessive Fines Clause).  We review a district court’s legal

determinations regarding forfeiture de novo and its underlying factual findings

for clear error.  See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d at 261.

A criminal forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive if “it is grossly

disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”    United States v.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.  In that case, a defendant convicted of willfully failing

to report the transportation of more than $10,000 out of the United States was

ordered to forfeit the full amount being transported, almost $360,000.  See id. at

324–25.    In holding the forfeiture grossly disproportional, the Supreme Court

observed that the crime of conviction “was solely a reporting offense”; that the

defendant was not transporting the money for any illegal purpose, such as

money laundering, drug trafficking, or tax evasion; that the maximum

punishment under the (then‐mandatory) Sentencing Guidelines was six months’

imprisonment and a $5,000 fine; and that the harm resulting from the crime was

“minimal,” affecting only the government and only in a minor way.  Id. at 337–

39.  Consistent with Bajakajian, this court has identified the following factors as

relevant to the proportionality assessment of a challenged criminal forfeiture:

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(1) the essence of the crime of the defendant and its relation to

other criminal activity, (2) whether the defendant fits into the

class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed,

(3) the maximum sentence and fine that could have been

imposed, and (4) the nature of the harm caused by the

defendant’s conduct.

United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted).    Here, these factors support the challenged

forfeiture.

First, the essence of George’s crime was no one‐time failure to report

otherwise legal activity as in Bajakajian.  Rather, she harbored an illegal alien in

her home for more than five years in order to secure the alien’s unauthorized

labor.    In doing so, she not only thwarted federal immigration law, but also

evaded federal minimum wage and tax laws.    In these circumstances, the

forfeiture of the home that facilitated George’s criminal harboring is not

constitutionally disproportional.3    See generally von Hofe v. United States, 492

F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding civil forfeiture of husband’s interest in

family home, where his drug activity therein was “neither a spur of the moment

 

3 George harbored Mathai in each of the homes occupied by her family from 2005

to 2011.  The Rexford, New York property that is the subject of the challenged

forfeiture became the George family home sometime in August 2008 and, thus,

was the site of harboring for almost three years.

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decision nor a momentary lapse of judgment,” such “that his own actions

eviscerated any sanctity he might claim in his home”).4

Second, George falls squarely within the class of persons targeted by 8

U.S.C. § 1324, namely, persons who knowingly and actively seek to prevent

government detection of an illegal alien for their own benefit.  In short, she is not

akin to the Bajakajian defendant, whose currency reporting failure did not take

place in the context of money laundering, drug trafficking, or tax evasion, the

targeted concerns of that crime of conviction.  See United States v. Bajakajian, 524

U.S. at 338.

Third, while the equity loss5 to George from the challenged forfeiture of

her home exceeds the $20,000 top of George’s applicable Guidelines fine range,

 

4 George’s reliance on those parts of our von Hofe opinion holding complete

forfeiture of the wife’s interest in the family home grossly disproportional is

misplaced because not only were we there considering civil forfeiture, see von

Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d at 184–86 (discussing differences between civil in

rem and criminal in personam forfeiture), but also George was no comparably

passive participant in the crime of conviction.  Rather, she was its principal and

persistent perpetrator.  Thus, her role is more analogous to that of the husband in

von Hofe—the forfeiture of whose interest in the family home we upheld, see id.

at 188—than it is to that of the wife, see id. at 188–91.

5 George appears to have held an equity interest in the home of less than

$100,000.    See generally von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d at 188 (relying on

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see U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3), it is well below the maximum statutory fine of $250,000

specified by Congress, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3); see,

e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338–39 & n.14 (citing low maximum

penalties under then‐mandatory Guidelines as indicative of defendant’s

“minimal level of culpability,” while also noting that statutory maximum

penalties are “relevant” to assessing “offense’s gravity”).6  This factor points to

no disproportionality in the challenged forfeiture order.

 

equity interest in home held by each co‐defendant to assess constitutionality of

civil forfeiture of residence); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Dr., 954 F.2d 29,

32, 39 (2d Cir. 1992) (relying on equity interest in mortgaged home, rather than

full market value, in assessing value of civil forfeiture).    The market value of

George’s home, when purchased in 2009, was $1,878,500.   [Blue 56]   Although

there is little evidence in the record as to the value of George’s home when the

district court entered judgment in July 2013, the balance owed on the mortgage

was $1,781,562 in June 2013.    Therefore, assuming the market value of the

property remained constant, George’s equity interest in her home was

approximately $96,938 at the time the forfeiture order was entered.  Moreover,

the listed owner of the residence was “Power Angels, LLC,” an entity owned by

George, her five minor children, and her brother.  Even assuming, however, that

the full weight of the forfeiture of the equity interest were to fall solely on

George, we identify no unconstitutional disproportionality for reasons explained

in text.

6 Where, as here, a defendant’s harboring of an illegal alien persists over more

than five years, frustrating federal immigration, minimum wage, and tax laws, it

would be difficult to conclude that a $20,000 fine marks the outer limits of

substantive reasonableness after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.

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Fourth, as for the harm caused by George, we have already observed that

her crime was no mere failure to report otherwise legal activity as in Bajakajian,

but a deliberate and sustained thwarting of federal immigration law, which

allowed her to exploit alien labor while ignoring federal wage and tax laws.  

Such criminal conduct harmed not only the government, but also the exploited

alien, as well as those citizens and lawful residents whose ability to secure work

consistent with the protections of federal law was necessarily hampered by the

sort of harboring evident here.  In sum, this is not a case in which the harshness

of the forfeiture so exceeds the gravity of the offense of conviction as to indicate

gross disproportionality violative of the Constitution.

 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir.

2008) (recognizing that, after Booker, broad range of sentences reaching beyond

Guidelines’ recommendation may be substantively reasonable).    For much the

same reason, while the Guidelines helpfully inform an assessment of the gravity

of a crime of conviction, they do not compel a conclusion that any forfeiture

above a Guidelines maximum is unconstitutionally excessive.    That

determination can be made only by reference to the totality of factors identified

in Bajakajian and Castello.    See generally United States v. Carpenter, 317 F.3d

618, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (observing that authorized Guidelines penalties “are but

one of several factors to consider in assessing the overall gravity of the offense”

of conviction), adopted in relevant part on reh’g en banc, 360 F.3d 591, 597 (6th

Cir. 2004) (en banc).

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Accordingly, we reject George’s Eighth Amendment challenge to the

forfeiture order as meritless.   

III. Conclusion

To summarize:

1. The district court’s jury instruction on “harboring” adequately

communicated the required concealment aspect of that proscribed activity and,

thus, manifests no plain error.

2. George’s sufficiency challenge to her harboring conviction fails

because the trial evidence, viewed in its totality and in the light most favorable to

the government, permitted a reasonable jury to find that George afforded shelter

to an illegal alien for more than five years intending to help prevent detection of

the alien by federal authorities.

3. The forfeiture of George’s equity interest in her home, when

considered in light of the gravity of her crime of conviction, does not

demonstrate gross disproportionality violative of the Eighth Amendment.   

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of conviction and order of

forfeiture are AFFIRMED.

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