Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City Of Fresno
Defendant
Douglas Edward Cox
Defendant
Jerry Dyer
Defendant
Doris Ray Knox
Plaintiff
Jerry Wayne Knox
Plaintiff
Edward Christopher Louchren
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY WAYNE KNOX; DORIS RAY 

KNOX,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipal 

corporation; JERRY DYER, individually 

and in his capacity as a Chief of Police for 

the CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendants.

1:14-cv-00799-GSA

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE 

COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 17)

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 30, 2015, Plaintiffs Jerry and Doris Knox (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Motion for 

Leave to Amend Complaint (the “Motion”). ECF No. 17. Defendants City of Fresno and Jerry 

Dyer (“Defendants”) oppose the Motion, in part. The Court has reviewed the papers and 

determined that this matter is suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 

230 (g). Upon a review of the pleadings, Plaintiff‟s motion is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Veronica Lynn Canter, the daughter and stepdaughter 

of Doris Knox and Jerry Knox, respectively. Plaintiffs allege, in a Complaint filed on May 27, 

2014, that two Fresno police officers shot and killed Canter when responding to a 911 call on 

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March 7, 2014. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the requirements of California Government Code §§ 910 

et seq., Plaintiffs filed a claim for damages arising out of the shooting with the City of Fresno on 

March 27, 2014. The claim was filed by Doris Knox “on her own behalf and on behalf of Ms. 

Canter‟s estate.” Declaration of Xiang Li in Support of Plaintiffs‟ Motion for Leave to Amend 

Complaint (“Li Decl.”), Exhibit B, ECF No. 18-2. The claim was rejected on May 2, 2014. 

Defendants‟ Opposition to Plaintiffs‟ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (“Opposition 

Brief”), Exhibit 1, ECF No. 20-1. Twenty days later, on May 27, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a 

Complaint. The Complaint included a single cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged a 

violation of Ms. Canter‟s Fourth Amendment right “to be free from the use of excessive force” 

and the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest of Plaintiffs “in the familial companionship and 

society of their daughter.” Complaint 5:3-5. 

Plaintiffs now seek to amend the Complaint to:

1) Voluntarily dismiss Jerry Dyer as a defendant;

2) Add Edward Christopher Louchren and Douglas Edward Cox, the two Fresno 

police officers involved in the shooting, as defendants, both individually and in 

their capacities as police officers for the City of Fresno;

3) Add Jeremy Edward Moore, Canter‟s son, as a plaintiff, individually and as the 

successor-in-interest to Canter; and

4) Add one additional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and three additional state claims 

for wrongful death, negligence, and battery.

Defendants do not object to 1), 2), the addition of the § 1983 claim under 4), nor the 

addition of Moore as a plaintiff for any federal claims under 3). Opposition 1:21-26. Rather, they 

object to the addition of any state claims and the addition of Moore as a plaintiff for any state 

claims. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Under Rule 15(a), a plaintiff may amend his complaint once “as a matter of course” 21 

days after serving the complaint or within 21 days after a response pleading has been served 

without the court‟s leave. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 

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1995). Once 21 days have passed from the service of a responsive pleading, however, a party can 

only amend the pleading with the opposing party‟s written consent or the court‟s leave. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Defendants filed an answer to the Complaint on June 10, 2014 and 

currently oppose Plaintiffs‟ Motion. ECF No. 6.

The grant or denial of leave to amend a complaint is within the discretion of the Court, 

although leave should be “freely give[n] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); 

Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). The intent of the rule is to 

“facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Chudacoff v. 

Univ. Med. Center of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). Consequently, the “policy of 

favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with „extreme liberality.‟” United States v. 

Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). 

To evaluate a motion to amend under Rule 15, the Court should consider: (1) whether 

there has been undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the moving party; (2) 

whether there have been repeated failures to cure deficiencies by previous amendments; (3) 

whether there has been undue prejudice to the opposing party “by virtue of the allowance of the 

amendment”; and (4) whether amendment would be futile. Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 774 

(9th Cir. 2015), quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Without a demonstration of 

prejudice “or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption

under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id (emphasis in original).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants do not contest the first three of the Foman factors. They oppose the Motion 

solely on the grounds that the proposed amendments would be futile—in other words, the 

addition of the state claims would be immediately subject to a motion to dismiss. Moore v. 

Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave to amend need not be 

given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal”). Defendants‟ argument that the 

addition of the state claims is futile revolves around the requirement under the California Tort 

Claims Act (the “Act”) that plaintiffs file a claim for damages before suing a public entity. 

Under the Act, a potential plaintiff must submit a claim describing the “indebtedness, 

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obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation 

of the claim” to the public entity that is the target of the claim. Cal. Gov‟t Code § 910. Once the 

public entity provides written notice that the claim has been acted on (e.g., rejected, approved, 

etc.), the potential plaintiff has six months to file suit based on any claims subject to the Act.1 Cal. 

Gov‟t Code § 945.6. The intent of the statute is to give the public entity notice of the claim so that 

it can be given “a timely opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the facts; and to avoid 

unnecessary lawsuits by giving the [entity] the opportunity to settle meritorious claims without 

going through an avoidable trial.” Lacy v. City of Monrovia, 44 Cal.App.3d 152, 155 (1974).

Defendants argue that: (1) the proposed amendment to add state claims is futile because 

the amendment (filed on January 30, 2015) comes more than six months after Plaintiffs‟ claim for 

damages was rejected by the City of Fresno (on May 2, 2014) and is thus time barred; and (2) the 

proposed amendment to add Moore is futile because Moore was never included as a claimant in 

Plaintiffs‟ claim for damages. 

Plaintiffs respond that: (1) the new state claims “relate back” to the initial federal claim, 

defeating any asserted statute of limitations; and (2) the claim for damages was brought on behalf 

of Canter‟s estate, which is enough to establish that they “substantially complied” with the 

requirements of the Act with respect to Moore.

A. Addition of the State Claims

“Relation back” refers to a doctrine that allows an amendment of a pleading to “relate 

back” to the date of the original pleading, thus evading any statute of limitations that might affect 

the amendment. Baldwin Cty. Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n. 3 (1984). An

amendment to a complaint “relates back” to the date the complaint was originally filed if the “law 

that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back” or “the amendment asserts 

a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted 

to be set out—in the original pleading.”2Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). California courts have 

 

1 The statute of limitations does not apply to federal claims. Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (“state 

notice of claim statutes have no applicability to § 1983 actions”).

2 Regardless whether state or federal law is applied, the “more forgiving principle of relation back . . . should be 

available to save the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1) 1991 amendment advisory committee‟s note.

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construed the Act to allow relation back when amending a complaint against a public entity if the 

newly asserted claims address the “same conduct” as the original claims.

3

See, e.g., Carlino v. 

L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1536 (1992) (allowing amendment 

substituting a party where plaintiff had “substantially complied with the claims presentation 

requirements” against public entity); Bendix Corp. v. City of L.A., 150 Cal.App.3d 921, 926 

(1984) (allowing additional claims against a public entity where the new claims “addressed the 

same conduct” as the original pleading). A new claim arises out of the “conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading” if it “will likely be proved by the „same kind of 

evidence‟ offered in support of the original pleading.” ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 

765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).

At least one federal court construing the Act has come to the same conclusion. In Roe v. 

County of Lake, 107 F.Supp.2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2000), a plaintiff sued Lake County under § 

1983, alleging that she had been raped by a deputy sheriff. She timely filed a claim with the 

County under the Act and sued after her claim was rejected. Nine months after the claim was 

rejected, she amended her original complaint to add a state law cause of action. Defendants 

moved to dismiss the amended complaint because the state law claims had been added more than 

six months after plaintiff‟s claim was rejected. The court rejected defendants‟ argument, saying 

that the failure to explicitly identify the state law theory was “not fatal in light of liberal notice 

pleading requirements in federal court, and because the amended complaint alleges this new 

cause of action based on the facts found in the original complaint.” Id. at 1154 (“the original 

complaint details almost verbatim the same factual allegations that are found in the amended 

complaint”). 

As in Roe, the conduct described in the original Complaint and the proposed First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) are the same: they both describe a sequence of events on March 7, 

2014 in which two Fresno police officers respond to a 911 call identifying Canter as a trespasser. 

 

3 Defendants argue that the statute of limitations that the Act makes “applicable to state causes of action is mandatory 

and cannot be circumvented by Rule 15(b) [sic].” Opposition Brief 4:9-10. Neither of the cases cited establish such a 

rule, however, nor do they hold that the Act precludes the application of the “relation back” doctrine to a state claim 

against a public entity. 

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The two officers respond to the call, break down the door of an apartment, and shoot Canter.

Compare Complaint at ¶ 12 (“. . . one of the officers pointed his gun at Ms. Canter, and without

cause or justification, shot and fired several bullets into Ms. Canter‟s body”) with FAC at ¶ 13 (“. 

. . Defendant Officer Louchren pointed his gun at Ms. Canter, and without cause or justification, 

shot and fired several bullets into Ms. Canter‟s body”). Canter dies shortly thereafter. 

Both the Complaint and the FAC also allege that the City of Fresno acted with “deliberate 

indifference” in training and supervising its officers, resulting in the alleged injuries. Compare

Complaint at ¶ 15 (“The actions of the officer who killed Ms. Canter were taken pursuant to the 

policies and practices of the Fresno Police Department, including, but not limited to, deliberate 

indifference to the use of excessive and often deadly force in encounters with civilians. . . “) with 

FAC at ¶ 16 (“The actions of the officers who killed Ms. Canter were taken pursuant to the 

policies and practices of the Fresno Police Department, including, but not limited to, deliberate 

indifference to the use of excessive and often deadly force in encounters with civilians. . . “). The

Complaint even contains express references to state claims.4See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 21 (“. . . 

defendants were acting . . . within the scope of their employment with the City of Fresno”); 22 (“. 

. . defendants . . . intentionally violated state and federal law”). Virtually none of the substantive 

factual allegations between the Complaint and the FAC are different.

The state causes of action thus arise out of the “same conduct” as the cause of action in 

the Complaint. They likewise arise out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . 

. in the original pleading.” Plaintiffs should thus be granted leave to amend their complaint to add 

appropriate state claims.

B. Addition of Moore as a Plaintiff

Defendants do not object to the addition of Moore as a plaintiff “with respect to any 

federal claims.” Opposition Brief 1:26. Thus, the only issue before the Court is whether or not the 

 

4 Among others, the Complaint alleges facts that could constitute a vicarious liability theory for recovery. This theory 

is made explicit in the FAC, but the inclusion of such facts suggests that the addition of the state claims in the 

amendment is merely a re-labeling of existing legal theories from the Complaint. Roe, 107 F.Supp.2d at 1154 

(amendment relates back where “the original complaint alleges violations of plaintiff‟s federal and state civil and 

constitutional rights, and lists state tort theories of liability, including a claim for respondeat superior against the 

County which is only available under state law”).

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claim for damages filed with the City of Fresno included the state claims now asserted by Moore. 

The argument, in Defendants‟ words, is that no “timely claim was ever filed by [Moore].” Id.

4:17-18. Because Moore never filed a claim with the City of Fresno, he should be precluded from 

asserting a claim now.5

As explained above, the claim submission requirements of the Act exist to “provide the 

public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle 

them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” Gen. Sec. Servs. Corp. v. Cty. of Fresno, 

815 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2011), quoting City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 

Cal.4th 730, 738 (2007). Thus, where “the face of the filed claim discloses sufficient information 

to enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the claim‟s merits and settle it 

without the expense of litigation, then there will be „substantial compliance‟ with sections 910 

and 910.2.” Id. at 1133 (“Where a submitted claim is deficient in some way, but the claim 

substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements, the doctrine of „substantial 

compliance‟ in some cases may validate the deficient claim”). Complaints based on deficient 

claims are generally barred “[o]nly where there has been a „complete shift of allegations, usually 

involving an effort to premise civil liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or 

by different persons than those described in the claim‟ . . . [w]here the complaint merely 

elaborates or adds further detail to a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or 

failures to act by the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly reflects the facts 

pled in the complaint.” Gen. Sec. Servs. Corp., 815 F.Supp.2d at 1133-34, quoting Stockett v. 

Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal.4th 441, 447 (2004).

The statutory requirements of the Act demand that a claim be submitted “by the claimant 

or by a person acting on his or her behalf.” Cal. Gov‟t Code § 910; Lacy v. City of Monrovia, 44 

Cal.App.3d 152, 155 (1974) (finding substantial compliance where the “wording of the claim” 

provided “all the notice and knowledge [defendant] needs concerning [plaintiff‟s] claim”).

6

 

5 Even if, as explained above, any such claims would not necessarily be time-barred because of the relation back 

doctrine, had they actually been filed.

6 The court in Lacy also noted that the damages sought included damages suffered by the party on whose behalf the 

claim was sought. The court explained that: “The claim statute was not intended to be used as a trap for the unwary. 

To require that the Lacy claim be divided into two separate claims in this situation would not serve the intended 

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The initial claim that Plaintiffs submitted to the City of Fresno in this case was filed by 

Doris Knox “on her own behalf and on behalf of Ms. Canter‟s estate.” Li Decl., Exh. B at 3. It 

alleges claims based on “42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations; loss of companionship, training and advice; 

battery; negligence; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and related causes of action.” Id. at 

4. It does, however, state that “Claimants have suffered significant emotional and mental distress 

as a result of the loss of their daughter,” suggesting that the claim for damages was brought only 

of behalf of Canter‟s parents, rather than Moore. Id. (emphasis added). Despite this, however, the 

claim includes enough detail to allow Defendants to investigate the merits of Plaintiffs‟ claims 

and attempt to settle them, if appropriate. It includes several causes of action governed by state 

law, including battery and negligence, both of which are now proposed additions in the FAC. It 

also expressly references Canter‟s estate, which could reasonably be read to mean that her interest 

in the claims could pass to any personal representative or successor-in-interest. Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 377.30 (“A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an 

action or proceeding . . . may be commenced by the decedent‟s personal representative or, if 

none, by the decedent‟s successor in interest”). 

As Plaintiffs point out, Defendants do not argue that they have been unable to investigate 

the allegations based on the asserted deficiency in the claim for damages or that they would be 

prejudiced if Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend the Complaint.7Instead, Defendants rely on 

Petersen v. Vallejo, 259 Cal.App.2d 757 (1968) for the proposition that “heirs will not be 

permitted to substitute in place of a previous claimant.” Opposition Brief 4:21. This reads 

Petersen too expansively, however. The court there concluded that a new party that was unnamed 

in a claim for damages could not rely on the fact that she was an heir to the decedent because

“[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the [claimant] filed a claim on behalf of [the new 

 

purposes of the claim statute and would result in unfairly precluding a determination of appellant‟s claim on its 

merits.” Lacy, 44 Cal.App.3d at 156.

7

In fact, the litigation appears to be in only the beginning stages of discovery. Moreover, the proposed amendments 

do not add a substantially greater amount of factual complexity to the case. This is particularly so because 

Defendants do not object to the addition of Moore as a plaintiff with respect to any federal claims—the factual basis 

for the federal claims is substantially similar to that of the state claims.

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party].” Id. at 766 (“It is not alleged or claimed that the daughter was named as a claimant, or that 

any sum was claimed on her behalf”). In Petersen, the best that the plaintiff could argue was that 

the claim for damages was filed “implicitly on behalf of all heirs.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have some 

facts in the record supporting their position—although some of the wording in the claim implies 

that it is brought merely on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Knox, the facts that it: (1) asserts state law 

causes of action on behalf of Canter‟s estate and (2) provided specific details about the allegedly 

tortious actions disclosed information sufficient for Defendants to conduct an adequate 

investigation. Nor would the purposes of the Act be saved by dividing Moore‟s state claims from 

his federal claim and into a separate action.

There was thus substantial compliance with the Act and amendment of the Complaint 

would not be futile. Because Defendants do not contest the other Foman factors, leave to amend 

must be granted.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff‟s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is GRANTED; and

2) Plaintiffs shall file their First Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of the service 

date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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