Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30297/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30297-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Douglas Vance Crooked Arm
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DOUGLAS VANCE CROOKED ARM,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30297

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00018-

DWM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KENNETH G. SHANE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30316

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00018-

DWM-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 29, 2014—Seattle Washington

Filed June 8, 2015

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2 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

Before: John T. Noonan, Michael Daly Hawkins,

and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss for failure to

state a felony claim an indictment charging two defendants

with violating the MigratoryBird TreatyAct of 1918, vacated

the sentences, and remanded.

The defendants argued that the counts to which they

conditionally pled guilty were improperly charged as felonies

because it is only a misdemeanor under the MBTA to sell

migratory bird feathers. 

The panel held that even under the defendants’

interpretation of the MBTA, Count I, which charges a

conspiracy to kill, transport, and offer for sale and sell

migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, charges a

felony.

The panel held that in regard to Count II, which charges

unlawful trafficking in migratory bird parts, the allegations

state a misdemeanor only.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 3

COUNSEL

Brian M. Murphy (argued) and Mark D. Parker, Parker, Heitz

& Cosgrove, PLLC, Billings, Montana, for DefendantAppellant Douglas Vance Crooked Arm.

Sherry S. Matteucci, Matteucci Law Firm, PLLC, Billings,

Montana, for Defendant-Appellant Kenneth G. Shane.

Leif Johnson (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Billings, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Following conviction and sentencing upon DefendantsAppellants Douglas “Vance” Crooked Arm’s and Kenneth

Shane’s (collectively Defendants) conditional guilty pleas in

this case, Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of their

pretrial Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a

Felony Claim. We consider the MigratoryBird Treaty Act of

1918 (MBTA). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate Defendants’

sentences, and remand.

I

A grand jury indicted Defendants on multiple counts of,

among other things, knowingly and willfully conspiring to

kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds,

including bald and golden eagles, in violation of the MBTA,

16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a) and 707(b) (Count I) and unlawfully

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4 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

trafficking in migratory bird parts, in violation of 16 U.S.C.

§§ 703(a), 707(b) (Counts II–IV). Defendants admitted

selling a fan made of eagle feathers to undercover agents of

the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) and, after

the district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

indictment, entered a conditional guilty plea on Counts I and

II.

On appeal, as at the district court, Defendants argued that

the counts to which they pled guilty were improperly charged

as felonies because it is only amisdemeanor under the MBTA

to sell migratory bird feathers. We conclude first, that even

under Defendants’ interpretation of the MBTA, Count I,

which charges a conspiracy to kill, transport, and offer for

sale and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden

eagles, charges a felony; and, second, that in regard to Count

II, the allegations state a misdemeanor only, not a felony.

II

We consider in this section, first, the underlying facts

revealed by the government’s criminal investigation, and

then, second, the procedural history leading to this appeal.

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 5

A

1

On August 17, 2008, undercover agents from FWS met

Defendants in Crow Agency, Montana, as part of “Operation

Hanging Rock,” an investigation into the unlawful sale of

migratory bird feathers. Shane gave the agents his contact

information and invited them to his house.

Seeing two golden eagles flying overhead during a

November 2008 meeting with Shane near Garryowen,

Montana, one of the undercover agents said to his partner:

“There’s your tail, Liz.” Shane asked whether the agents

were “looking for tails,” and the female agent said she needed

an eagle feather fan for her dress. Shane told her that

Crooked Arm “has got some made, beaded and everything. 

He likes to hunt.” Shane said that Crooked Arm caught

hawks and eagles by baiting them with deer and elk

carcasses.

Shane called Crooked Arm to tell him the agents were

interested in eagle feather fans and to ask whether he had any

for sale. Crooked Arm came to the meeting, where he

showed the agents some deer carcasses in the back of his

truck. Upon seeing a golden eagle flying nearby, Shane told

Crooked Arm to drop a carcass in the area. Crooked Arm

showed the agents two fans—one made from immature

1 This portion of the statement of facts, which describes the

government’s criminal investigation, is based on the government’s Offer

of Proof and the sources cited. Because the case was not tried after

Defendants’ conditional guilty pleas were accepted, there are no findings

of fact, only the district court’s independent determination that a factual

basis for the conditional guilty pleas existed. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(b)(3).

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6 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

golden eagle feathers and one made from magpie

feathers—before leaving to drop the deer carcass.

After Crooked Arm left, Shane told the agents that he and

Crooked Arm wanted $1,500 for the golden eagle fan and

$800 for the magpie fan. The agents bought the eagle fan,

paying Shane $1,500 in cash, and placed an order for a

magpie fan. The agents later saw Shane give Crooked Arm

a part of the $1,500 the agents paid for the eagle fan.

On February 11, 2009, one of the agents drove with Shane

to Crooked Arm’s residence in Hardin, Montana. The agent

told Crooked Arm that he needed another eagle fan and a

winter hawk fan. Crooked Arm said he had sold four golden

eagle fans and several hawk fans the previous week, but that

he still had plenty of tails available. He asked the agent to

email him the specifics for the fans and gave the agent his

phone number. The agent paid Crooked Arm a $500 deposit

for the two fans.

On March 8, 2009, Crooked Arm emailed photographs of

a bald eagle fan and a winter hawk tail to one of the agents,

and asked if the hawk tail—which he planned to use for the

agent’s fan—was acceptable. Crooked Arm sent a second

email later that day, explaining that production of the bald

eagle fan had been delayed because the eagle was bloody and

required special cleaning. On March 9, 2009, Crooked Arm

asked the agents what colors they wanted on the fan. He then

called to explain that the $500 deposit would be payment for

the winter hawk fan, but that the bald eagle fan from the

photo would cost $1,000.

On March 11, 2009, FWS agents served a search warrant

on Crooked Arm’s residence, where they found, among other

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 7

things, a handwritten note documenting the agents’ order for

a bald eagle fan and a winter hawk fan. Crooked Arm signed

an Advice of Rights Form, agreed to cooperate, and admitted

that he knew the undercover agents.

On the same day, FWS agents served a search warrant on

Shane’s father’s residence, where Shane lived. Like Crooked

Arm, Shane agreed to cooperate, and he conceded that he

knew it was illegal to sell hawk and eagle parts. Shane

acknowledged that Crooked Arm sold a golden eagle fan to

the undercover agents in November 2008, but he said he

never counted the money, all of which he gave to Crooked

Arm. Shane also admitted having heard the agents discuss

future purchases with Crooked Arm, and he said Crooked

Arm called him the previous day to ask for the agents’ phone

number in connection with the sale of the bald eagle tail fan

and the hawk fan.

B

On February 21, 2013, a grand jury indicted Defendants

on four criminal counts. Count I charged Defendants with

knowingly and willfully conspiring and agreeing together “to

kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds,

including bald and golden eagles, in violation of 16 U.S.C.

§§ 703(a) and 707(b).” Among the overt acts alleged was

that Crooked Arm had placed deer carcasses on the land to

attract and capture birds of prey including eagles and hawks. 

The specific conspiracy that Count I charged was the

conspiracy defined under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count II charged

that Defendants knowingly sold parts of a golden eagle for

$1,500. Count III charged that Defendants offered to sell

parts of a Magpie for $800. Count IV alleged that Defendants

offered to sell parts of a bald eagle for $1,000.

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8 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

On April 16, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

the indictment for failure to state a felony claim. Defendants

argued, in essence, that the indictment alleged facts sufficient

to support a misdemeanor charge of trafficking in migratory

bird parts in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), but that were 

insufficient to support a felony charge of trafficking in

migratory birds in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 707(b).

The district court denied Defendants’ motion on July 8,

2013, and said that Defendants were “misconstru[ing] the

statute under which [they] are charged.” The district court

ruled that the “indictment properly states a felony crime,”

because 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) “is designed to punish the

commercial sale of migratory birds, not to distinguish

between birds and bird parts.” The district court held that

although Defendants “sold parts of birds and not whole birds,

it is the commercial sale of the parts that elevates the

Defendants[’] offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.”

On July 22, 2013, Crooked Arm and Shane entered

identical conditional guilty pleas to Counts I and II, reserving

their right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motion

to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a felony claim.

On October 23, 2013, the district court entered judgment

sentencing Crooked Arm to four years of probation and

Shane to one year of probation. Crooked Arm appealed his

conviction and the district court’s denial of his motion to

dismiss the indictment for failure to state a felony claim, the

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 9

same day. Shane likewise appealed on the same grounds on

November 1, 2013.2

III

We review de novo a district court’s decision “whether to

dismiss a charge in an indictment based on its interpretation

of a federal statute.” United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764,

766 (9th Cir. 2009). Similarly, we review de novo questions

of statutory interpretation. See United States v. Thompson,

728 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013). We normally give

deference “to an executive department’s construction of a

statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer” when the

statute is ambiguous. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

IV

We begin with an overview of the MBTA. Congress

passed the MBTA in 1918 to protect migratory birds, “or any

part, nest, or egg of any such bird,” included in the terms of

a 1916 treaty between the United States and Great Britain,

which was acting on behalf of Canada. See MBTA, ch. 128,

§ 2, 40 Stat. 755, 755 (1918), now codified as amended at

16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712.3 The treaty stated that migratory birds

2 Defendants did not admit to all facts alleged in the Offer of Proof but

conceded that they “conspired to sell and actually sold” a golden eagle fan

“made with migratory bird parts.” Their argument on appeal is the legal

contention that what they did was misdemeanor and not felony conduct.

3 The MBTA later incorporated elements of similar bilateral treaties

between the United States and Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union. See

16 U.S.C. § 703(a). Pertinent here, eagles, which were not originally

covered under the MBTA, became protected by the statute in 1972. See

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10 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

in North America were “in danger of extermination through

lack of adequate protection,” and called for “insuring the

preservation of such migratory birds” by saving them from

“indiscriminate slaughter.” Convention for the Protection of

MigratoryBirds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702,

1702. And it banned the sale, or attempted sale, of

“migratory nongame birds” or their eggs without exception. 

Id. arts. II, VII.

The conduct proscribed by the MBTA has not changed

much since 1918. Today, the statute states that, with certain

exceptions not applicable here, “it shall be unlawful at any

time, by any means or in any manner, to”:

pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to

take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale,

sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase,

purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export,

import, cause to be shipped, exported, or

imported, deliver for transportation, transport

or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be

carried, or receive for shipment,

transportation, carriage, or export, any

migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any

such bird, or any product, whether or not

manufactured, which consists, or is composed

in whole or part, of any such bird or any part,

nest, or egg thereof.

16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (emphasis added). FWS, which

administers the MBTA, defines “migratorybird[s]” to include

United States v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9thCir. 1982) (“Obviously,

eagles are protected by the MBTA.”).

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 11

bald eagles, golden eagles, magpies, and many species of

hawk. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13. FWS regulations also state that

a “[m]igratory bird” for MBTA purposes means any species

listed in § 10.13, “including any part, nest, or egg of any such

bird, or any product” consisting “in whole or part, of any such

bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.” Id. § 10.12.

The punishment scheme for violations of the MBTA has

changed over time. Originally, all violations were

misdemeanors. See MBTA, ch. 128, § 6, 40 Stat. 755, 756

(1918). In 1960, however, Congress amended the MBTA to

make it a felony (1) to “take by any manner whatsoever any

migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to sell, barter or offer

to barter such bird,” or (2) to “sell, offer for sale, barter or

offer to barter, any migratory bird.” Act of Sept. 8, 1960,

Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866, 866. Congress again

amended the MBTA in 1986, this time to add a scienter

requirement to the felony provision of § 707. See Emergency

Wetlands Resources Act of 1986 § 501, Pub. L. No. 99-645,

100 Stat. 3582, 3590.

Today, then, the MBTA treats some violations as

misdemeanors and others as felonies:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this

section, any person, association, partnership,

or corporation who shall violate any

provisions of said conventions or of this

subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to

comply with any regulation made pursuant to

this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a

misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof

shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be

imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

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12 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter,

shall knowingly—

(1) take by any manner whatsoever any

migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to sell,

barter or offer to barter such bird, or

(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to

barter, any migratory bird shall be guilty of a

felony and shall be fined not more than

$2,000 or imprisoned not more than two

years, or both.

16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b).

V

We start with Count I. We conclude that this count

plainly charged a felony. The felony provisions of § 707(b)

are clearly invoked when someone takes a migratory bird

with intent to sell it. Here, Count I alleged that Defendants

“knowingly and willfully conspired . . . to kill, transport, offer

for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden

eagles, in violation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a) and 707(b).” The

overt acts that were alleged included that Crooked Arm had

“placed deer carcases on the land in order to attract and

capture birds of prey, including eagles and hawks.”

Count I formally charges Defendants with a conspiracy

under 18 U.S.C. § 371,4 which makes it a crime for “two or

4 The MBTA does not define a separate conspiracy offense. Here,

Count I charges a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which the Supreme

Court and our court have called the “general conspiracy statute.” United

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 13

more persons” to, among other things, conspire to “commit

any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of

such persons do any act to effect the object of the

conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 371 generally

felonizes conspiratorial conduct committed under that

provision. However, § 371 further states that if the offense,

“the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is

a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy

shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such

misdemeanor.” Id.

Under any reading of the statute, even if Defendants were

right that sale of eagle feathers is only a misdemeanor, Count

I clearly charges in part a statutory felony under 18 U.S.C.

§ 371. This is because Count I charges a conspiracy to “kill,

transport offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including

bald and golden eagles,” conduct that falls within the

MBTA’s felony provisions. And the overt acts alleged

included placing deer carcasses to attract birds of prey. The

substantive MBTA offense, “the commission of which is the

object of the conspiracy,” makes Count I a felony charge

under 18 U.S.C. § 371. 18 U.S.C. § 371. We hold that Count

I, to which Defendants pled guilty, charged a felony offense.5

States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 14 (1994); United States v.

Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 2014).

5

In their supplemental briefing to this court after oral argument,

Defendants raised for the first time a challenge to the adequacy of their

guilty pleas with regard to Count I. Defendants never moved in the

district court to withdraw their guilty pleas. Normally, we will not

consider an issue first raised on appeal and not presented to the district

court. Bennett Evan Cooper, Federal Appellate Practice: Ninth Circuit

§ 19:2 (2014–2015 ed.); see, e.g., Vision Air Flight Serv. v. M/V Nat’l

Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 1998) (issue not presented to or

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14 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

VI

Before considering challenges to whether Count II alleged

facts sufficient to charge a felony, we first ask whether the

conclusion that Count I charged a felony renders moot the

challenge to whether Count II charged a felony. The

challenge to the felony status of Count II is not moot for two

reasons.

First, if Defendants prevail on this appeal, we could give

relief by vacating their sentences and remanding for

resentencing. The District Court sentenced on the basis that

Defendants pled guilty to Counts I and II, and thus committed

two felony offenses. The district court gave a light sentence

of probation—four years for Crooked Arm and one year for

Shane. The district court was aiming at giving a light

sentence, even for conviction of two felony counts, but it

decided by district court, and as to which no factual record had been

developed, would not be considered on appeal); Slaven v. Am. Trading

Transp. Co., 146 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (appellate court will not

consider issues not properly raised before district court). Also,

Defendants did not contend in their opening brief before us that their pleas

were inadequate in factual basis or in understanding. The sole issue raised

in their opening brief questioned whether the sale of a “family heirloom

fan (containing a few feathers)” was a felony. Because no challenge to the

guilty pleas was raised in the opening brief, we consider any such

challenge to be waived. Cooper, Federal Appellate Practice, supra, at

§ 19:8; see, e.g., Stanford Ranch, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 618, 628

n.5 (9th Cir. 1996); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1995)

(issues not raised in the opening brief usually are deemed waived). 

Moreover, the record before us does not permit a conclusion that

Defendants’ pleas were not knowing and voluntary and without adequate

factual basis. We express no opinion about whether on a different factual

showing, presented with a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Defendants

might have any basis to withdraw their pleas, avoid the plea agreements,

and gain vacatur of their convictions and sentences.

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 15

could have given an even lighter sentence, such as less time

for probation, if it had concluded that Defendants pled guilty

to only one felony and to one misdemeanor, rather than to

two felonies.

Second, the fact of conviction for two felonies, rather than

one felonyand one misdemeanor, has collateral consequences

for Defendants. If either is convicted of any other federal

offense in the future, his advisory sentencing guidelines range

would be affected by criminal history, and that is affected by

whether he pled guilty to one felony or two. In general, the

greater the criminal history category in which one fits, the

greater will be the applicable advisory guidelines sentencing

range. We have said: “In this day of federal sentencing

guidelines based on prior criminal histories [and] federal

career criminal statutes” the presumption that “collateral

consequences” flow from a criminal conviction is

irrebuttable. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir.

1994) overruled on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c).

Having determined that Count I charged a felony, we still

must address whether Count II charged a felony. That

question is not moot and will affect both whether Defendants

are entitled to a resentencing as a result of our appellate

decision and whether their criminal histories thereafter will

reflect one or two felonies arising from the offenses to which

they pled guilty in this case.

VII

Turning to the remainder of the indictment, it is

undisputed that Counts II through IV charge criminal

conduct. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 60 (1979)

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16 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

(“[16 U.S.C. § 703] is naturally read as forbidding

transactions in all bird parts, including those that compose

pre-existing artifacts.”). As with Count I, the question is

whether the charged conduct amounts to a misdemeanor

under § 707(a) or a felony under § 707(b). This turns on

whether the sale of a fan made of migratory bird feathers

constitutes the sale of a “migratory bird.” We conclude that

it does not.

A

As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we begin

with the text of the MBTA. Nw. Forest Res. Council v.

Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1996). We examine

not only § 707(b), but also the MBTA as a whole, which

consists of ten sections codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 through

712, and its purpose. Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct.

2259, 2267 (2014); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,

341 (1997) (court considers “the language itself, the specific

context in which that language is used, and the broader

context of the statute as a whole”). We may consider

legislative history if the statute is ambiguous or if “the

legislative history clearly indicates that Congress meant

something other than what it said.” Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd.

v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

(quoting Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 753

(9th Cir. 1999)).

As outlined in Section IV of this opinion, it is a felony: 

(1) to take any “migratory bird” with the intent to sell, offer

for sale, barter, or offer to barter such bird; or (2) to sell, offer

for sale, barter, or offer to barter any “migratory bird.” 

16 U.S.C. § 707(b). Defendants contend that the term

“migratory bird” as used in § 707(b) refers to the bird as a

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 17

whole and does not also mean feathers or a product

containing migratory bird feathers. The Government

contends that the term “migratory bird” also includes

migratory bird parts and products containing migratory bird

parts.

“Migratory birds,” as the phrase is used in the MBTA,

“are those defined as such by the treaty between the United

States and Great Britain” and other relevant treaties. Id.

§ 715j (defining “migratory bird” for purposes of the

Migratory Bird Conservation Act and MBTA). The relevant

treaties generally define “migratory birds” with reference to

particular species of birds, e.g., ducks, cranes, herons. See

Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr.

Brit., art. I, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702. Consistent with the

definition contained in § 715j and the relevant treaties, the

common definition of the term “bird” is “any of a class

(Aves) of warm-blooded vertebrates distinguished by having

the body more or less completely covered with feathers and

the forelimbs modified as wings.” MERRIAM–WEBSTER:

DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/bird. Except in the limited context of

cookery, in which the term “bird” may refer more specifically

to a piece of meat, the term “bird” refers to a member of the

species rather than a part of the individual animal. Id.

Because the MBTA uses the phrase “migratory birds” in

numerous provisions, we endeavor to interpret the phrase in

a manner that gives it a consistent meaning throughout the

statute. Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir.

2012). Throughout the broader context of the MBTA,

Congress consistently differentiated between “migratory

birds” and “parts thereof”:

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18 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [to] take, capture,

kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess,

offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer

to purchase, purchase . . . any migratory bird,

any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or

any product . . . which consists, or is

composed in whole or part, of any such bird

or any part, nest, or egg thereof. 16 U.S.C.

§ 703(a) (emphasis added).

[T]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized

and directed . . . to determine when, to what

extent, if at all, and by what means, it is

compatible with the terms of the conventions

to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing,

possession, sale, purchase, shipment,

transportation, carriage, or export of any such

bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . . Id.

§ 704(a) (emphasis added).

It shall be unlawful to ship, transport, or carry

. . . from one State, Territory, or district to or

through [another] . . . any bird, or any part,

nest, or egg thereof . . . . It shall be unlawful

to import any bird, or any part, nest, or egg

thereof, captured, killed, taken, shipped,

transported, or carried at any time contrary to

the laws . . . of Canada . . . . Id. § 705

(emphasis added).

All birds, or parts, nests, or eggs thereof,

captured, killed, taken, sold or offered for

sale, bartered or offered for barter, purchased,

shipped, transported, carried, imported,

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exported, or possessed contrary to the

provisions of this subchapter . . . shall, when

found, be seized . . . . Id. § 706 (emphasis

added).

Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall

knowingly—(1) take by any manner

whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to

sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such

bird, or (2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer

to barter, any migratory bird shall be guilty of

a felony . . . . Id. § 707(b) (emphasis added).

All guns, traps, nets and other equipment . . .

used by any person when engaged in

pursuing, hunting, taking, trapping, ensnaring,

capturing, killing or attempting to take,

capture, or kill any migratory bird in

violation of this subchapter with the intent to

offer for sale, or sell or offer for barter, or

barter such bird . . . may be seized . . . . Id.

§ 707(c) (emphasis added).

The grammatical composition of these provisions is

instructive. See U.S. ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d

914, 918 (9th Cir. 2006). Importantly, Congress never joined

the phrases “migratory birds” and “parts, nests, or eggs

thereof” with the word “including,” the use of which may

have indicated that the phrase “migratory birds” also

encompasses its parts and products. Instead, the MBTA

repeatedly separates the phrases “migratory birds” and “parts,

nests, or eggs thereof” with the disjunctive “or,” which tells

us that the phrases have separate meanings. See Loughrin v.

United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) (use of “or” “is

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20 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to

be given separate meanings” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,

739–40 (1978) (interpreting series of words written in

disjunctive and reasoning that statute’s use of “or” implied

that each word in series had separate meaning).6

Interpreting the phrases “migratory birds” and “parts,

nests, or eggs thereof” as having distinct meanings comports

with other fundamental canons of statutory construction. 

Indeed, Congress demonstrated time and again that it knew

how to specify when a provision of the MBTA applies to

“migratory birds”; to “parts, nests, or eggs” of migratory

birds; to products consisting of migratory bird parts; or to all

three categories. Yet, Congress omitted all language relating

to “parts, nests, or eggs” of migratory birds and products from

Section § 707(b), making it a felony only to “take . . . any

migratory bird with intent to sell . . . or sell, offer for sale,

barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird . . . .” 16 U.S.C.

§ 707(b) (emphasis added). Under the longstanding canon

expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we presume that the

exclusion of the phrases “parts, nests, or eggs thereof” and

“products . . . consisting . . . of parts, nests, or eggs thereof”

from § 707(b) was intentional. Loughrin, 134 S. Ct. at 2390;

Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 163–64 (1990)

(where Congress included unambiguous language to cover

preemployment payments in two sections of statute, absence

6 The Government effectively asks us to give the term “migratory birds”

two different meanings within the same section of the MBTA. Although

the Government contends that the use of “migratory birds” in § 707(b)

must also mean “any part, nest, egg thereof” or any product consisting of

any part thereof, it is illogical to apply that same meaning to the term

“migratory bird” as it is used in § 707(c), which permits seizure of any

equipment used to “take, capture, or kill any migratory bird.”

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 21

of comparable language in third section indicated that

Congress did not intend for that section to apply to

preemployment payments).

Adhering to the expressio unius canon and interpreting

the phrases to have separate meanings further ensures that all

words and phrases in the statute have effect. See Corley v.

United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[A] statute should

be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so

that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or

insignificant.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

The Government’s interpretation, on the other hand,

renders the language “parts, nests, or eggs thereof”

superfluous, not only in one instance but in four different

provisions of the MBTA—a result that our rules of statutory

interpretation strongly disfavor. See United States v. Thum,

749 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting broad

interpretation of statutory term where interpretation would

effectively “leave no work to be done” by preceding phrase);

United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 974–75 (9th Cir.

2003) (declining to interpret “crime of violence” as including

all burglaries because doing so would render separate

enhancement for “burglary of a dwelling” mere surplusage).

When read in context and evaluated under traditional

canons of construction, the plain meaning of § 707(b)

indicates that the sale of a fan containing migratory bird

feathers is not a felony.

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22 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

B

We recognize, however, that our inquiry does not end at

the plain meaning of the statute if giving effect to the plain

meaning would lead to an absurd result or would be contrary

to the clearly expressed intent of Congress. AvendanoRamirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 339

(9th Cir. 1996)). The Government argues that the purpose of

the MBTA is to make all commercialization of migratory

birds a felony, such that the term “migratory bird” in § 707(b)

must be interpreted to include all migratory bird parts and

products made from the same.

Most of the cases upon which the Government relies

merely state an undisputed principle: It is a crime under the

MBTA to traffic in migratory birds, their parts, or products

derived from migratory birds or their parts. To the extent

those cases suggest that the sale of migratory bird parts or

products is a felony, they do so in unexplained dicta. For

example, in United States v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.

1982), we considered whether the government must prosecute

crimes involving the sale of eagles and eagle parts under the

Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”) rather

than the MBTA. Id. at 1122. We stated, “The MBTA,

16 U.S.C. ss 703, 707(b), and the BGEPA, 16 U.S.C.

s 668(a), prohibit offering to sell or selling eagles or parts of

eagles.” Id. Although we cited to § 707(b), we did not

consider or discuss whether the sale of eagle parts alone

constituted a misdemeanor or a felony.

In United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985),

the Sixth Circuit considered whether the absence of a scienter

requirement under § 707(b) violated due process. The felony

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 23

conviction in Wulff involved the sale of a necklace made in

part of red-tailed hawk and great-horned owl talons. Id. at

1122. Although the case involved the sale of migratory bird

parts, the Sixth Circuit specifically stated that the

Government’s argument that the charged conduct was

“exactly the type of commercialization of protected birds

Congress sought to punish as a felony” was not the issue

before the court. Id. at 1124–25.

The Third Circuit considered the same due process issue

in United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3rd Cir. 1986). 

There, the court explained that the MBTA “presents two

factual scenarios for imposing strict liability on those who

hunt migratory birds—if the actor hunts for pleasure, it is a

misdemeanor; if for commercial purposes it is a felony.” Id.

at 431. The court noted in its recitation of facts that the

defendant was found guilty of trafficking in migratory birds

and migratory bird parts in violation of § 703(a) and § 707(b),

but it did not discuss whether the sale of migratory bird parts

was properly charged as a felony. Id. at 427.

The only reported case to directly address the issue before

us is an out-of-circuit district court decision, United States v.

St. Pierre, 578 F. Supp. 1424 (D.S.D. 1983). St. Pierre held

that the sale of an invitation stick containing migratory bird

feathers constituted a felony. Id. at 1426. Relying on

legislative history, the court reasoned that “[i]t is the

commercialization in migratory game birds, of whatever

nature, that Congress addressed with the 1960 amendment.” 

Id. at 1427. Accordingly, the court determined that the “term

‘migratory bird’ in § 707(b) includes a whole bird as well as

any part thereof.” Id. The court explained that any other

interpretation would lead to the absurd result of allowing an

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individual who kills 100 migratory birds to escape felony

punishment by simply dismembering the birds. Id.

We disagree. Treating the sale of a fan containing

migratory bird feathers as a misdemeanor does not lead to an

absurd result under the MBTA. Individuals who kill or take

migratory birds with the intent to sell the birds have

committed a felony regardless of whether or how they

subsequently sell the migratory birds. Individuals who sell

migratory birds also commit a felony under the MBTA. 

Individuals who sell exclusively feathers of a migratory bird

or a product containing migratory bird feathers have also

committed a crime under the MBTA, albeit punishable as a

misdemeanor that is subject to a $15,000 fine and six-month

prison term. And, individuals who purchase a migratory bird

or migratory bird parts have also committed a crime under the

MBTA, again punishable as a misdemeanor. 16 U.S.C.

§§ 703(a), 707. Thus, the MBTA still protects against the

commercialization and destruction of migratory birds in all

regards.

Nor is the legislative history of § 707 as clear as the

Government or St. Pierre would suggest. The original bill

proposing the 1960 amendment to § 707 did not split the

available penalties into misdemeanor and felony categories. 

S. REP. NO. 86-1779, at 2–3 (1960) (reprinting letter

discussing original bill). Rather, the bill proposed an increase

to the available penalty from a maximum $500 fine and six

months in prison to a maximum $1000 fine and two years in

prison while still punishing all violations of the MBTA as

misdemeanors. Id. The bill also proposed adding a

subsection that would allow courts to order the seizure of

equipment used by violators to hunt or trap migratory birds. 

Id.

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UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM 25

The purpose of the1960 amendment, as indicated by the

statutory text and House and Senate Committee Reports, was

to increase available penalties for those who engage in the

killing of migratory birds for sale, not necessarily those

engaged in the sale of migratory bird parts or products. H.R.

REP. NO. 86-1787, at 1 (1960) (“The purpose of this bill is to

authorize more severe penalties for persons who engage in

the killing of migratory birds for sale.”); S. REP.NO. 86-1779,

at 1 (“The basic need for this legislation is the necessity to

better protect our migratory birds . . . This bill would

authorize more severe penalties for these market hunters

. . . .”).

In a May 1960 hearing on the original bill, subcommittee

members and proponents of the bill discussed the killing and

sale of whole birds. Increased Penalties for Violations of

Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Hearing on H.R. 11430 and H.R.

11674 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife

Conservation of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries, 86th Cong. 2 (1960). For example, while

discussing instances in which harsher penalties were needed,

Representative George P. Miller and Charles Lawrence, the

Assistant Chief of the Branch of Management Enforcement

for the Bureau of Sports Fisheries of the Department of the

Interior, had the following exchange:

Representative Miller:

What does the market hunter get for the

birds? For what does he sell the birds?

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Mr. Lawrence:

Generally for from $1.25 to $2 a bird or a

duck and up to $5 for a goose.

Representative Miller:

So that, if he is fined $500, and he takes

100 birds a day, that is about 2 days’ work

or 21⁄2 days’ work to pay the fine?

Mr. Lawrence:

Yes, sir. In some areas the conditions are

such that 500 to 700 birds can be killed in

6 seconds and the sale of those birds at

$1.25 or $2 brings him quite a return, sir.

Id. at 5–6. Mr. Lawrence also mentioned that some market

hunters in Illinois had informed an undercover agent that they

could provide the agent with 10,000 birds per year. Id. at 8.

Hearing attendees expressed doubt, however, about the

effectiveness of the amendment to actually deter market

hunters for two reasons. First, courts often were not imposing

the maximum available penalties under the existing statute. 

Id. at 5, 7 (statement of Alton Lennon, Subcomm. on

Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation). Second, the

amendment applied equally to market hunters and sport

hunters that might mistakenly exceed the scope of their

hunting permits. Id. at 19–20 (statements of Rep. Lennon and

Daniel H. Janzen, Dir. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and

Wildlife). In response to these concerns, a new bill was

drafted, which included the felony punishment provision that

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eventually became § 707(b). H.R. REP. NO. 86-1787, at 2

(explaining progression of proposed legislation to increase

penalties under MBTA).

The revised bill made the taking of migratory birds with

the intent to sell, the sale of migratory birds, and the purchase

of migratory birds felonies. Id. Reports indicate that the

revised bill was intended to authorize penalties for market

hunters that are more severe than those applicable to sport

hunters. Id. Prior to enactment, Congress modified the bill

so that the purchase of migratory birds remained a

misdemeanor, indicating that the bill did not target all

commerce in migratory birds. S. REP. NO. 86-1779, at 2. 

Indeed, when proposing the final amendment, the Senate

Committee Report explained, “[W]e are not convinced that

every purchaser of migratory birds should be exposed to such

a heavy penalty.” Id.

Congress again amended § 707 in 1986 to add a scienter

requirement to the felony provision of § 707(b). The Senate

Committee Report explained that the “amendment will

require proof that the defendant knew (1) that his actions

constituted a taking, sale, barter, or offer to sell or barter, as

the case may be and (2) that the item so taken, sold, or

bartered was a bird or portion thereof.” S. REP. NO. 99-445,

at 16 (1986) (emphasis added). The report does not further

discuss the scope or purpose of § 707(b).

The most recent revision to § 707 occurred in 1998. In

part, that amendment increased the available fine for

misdemeanor violations from $500 to $15,000. 16 U.S.C.

§ 707(a); H.R. REP. NO. 105-542, at 2 (1998). When

outlining the background and need for the 1998 amendments,

the House of Representatives Committee Report discussed

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the meaning of “migratory bird”: “What is a migratory bird?

Under the Convention, the term ‘migratory bird’ means all

wild species of ducks, geese, brants, coots, gallinules, rails,

snipes, woodcocks, crows, and mourning and white-winged

doves.” Id. at 2. Like the 1986 report, the 1998 report does

not elaborate on the scope of § 707(b).

At best, the legislative history is inconclusive. It is clear

that the sponsors of the 1960 amendment were concerned

with deterring market hunters, and proponents of the

amendment discussed the sale of birds as a whole rather than

migratory bird parts or related products. And, by removing

the purchase of migratory birds from the scope of § 707(b),

Congress indicated that it did not intend to punish all

commercial acts involving migratory birds as felonies.7

Consequently, the 1960 legislative history, which is entitled

to the greatest weight, does not provide “convincing”

evidence that the term “migratory birds” also means “parts,

nests, or eggs thereof” and related products. Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 612 F.2d 417,

422 (9th Cir. 1979). The 1986 Senate Committee Report

interpreted § 707(b) as applying to the sale of bird parts,

7 The Government relies heavily on the portion of the 1960

amendment’s legislative history providing that the increase in penalties

was “a more effective means of dealing with market hunters and with

others who commercialize in migratory game birds.” The Government

suggests that the reference to “others who commercialize in migratory

game birds” is a clear indication that Congress intended the 1960

amendment to apply to the sale of migratory bird parts. Yet, the quoted

statement was not made by a member of Congress. Instead, it was made

by the Department of the Interior in a report to the House Committee

expressing the Department’s support for the 1960 amendment. See, e.g.,

S.REP. NO. 86-1849, at 2 (providing copy of agency report). As such, we

do not find it particularly probative on the issue of Congress’ intent.

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which supports the Government’s position here. Yet, the

1998 House Committee Report interpreted “migratory birds”

to mean specific species of birds, which supports our

interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning. As postenactment legislative history, however, the 1986 and 1998

reports are not entitled to great weight. Nw. Forest Res.

Council, 82 F.3d at 836.

Certainly our goal in interpreting any statute is to give

effect to the intent of Congress. United States v. Neal,

776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2015). But neither the text of the

statute nor the legislative history indicate that Congress

intended for the sale of a fan containing migratory bird

feathers to constitute a felony rather than a misdemeanor. 

Given the clarity of the statutory text and the absence of

documentation indicating Congress’ intent to act otherwise,

we cannot read into § 707(b) what Congress did not draft.

C

Finally, to the extent that ambiguity did exist, the rule of

lenity would support our conclusion. See Burrage v. United

States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 891 (2014) (“Especially in the

interpretation of a criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity,

we cannot give the text a meaning that is different from its

ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the

defendant.” (internal citation omitted)); United States v.

Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1978)

(adopting opinion of district court applying rule of lenity to

determine that single act resulting in death of multiple

migratory birds constituted single violation of MBTA).

While we interpret the plain meaning of § 707 to indicate

that Congress intended for the sale of a product containing

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30 UNITED STATES V. CROOKED ARM

migratory bird feathers to be a misdemeanor, we also

recognize the logic of maximizing penalties to chill market

demand for any product that drives illegal commercial

hunting. The overall statutory purpose and logic of tying the

severity of penalties to the marketplace in general may

narrowly allow a second permissible reading of the statute. 

The rule of lenity directs us to resolve ambiguity in favor of

Defendants by punishing their acts as misdemeanors rather

than felonies. United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th

Cir. 1991) (applying rule of lenity to determine whether

defendant’s conduct amounted to a misdemeanor or felony).8

Our holding reaches only the facts and issue before us,

whether the sale of a fan containing migratory bird feathers

constitutes the sale of a “migratory bird” within the meaning

of § 707(b). Considering the plain language of the MBTA

and being mindful of the criminal application of the statute,

we conclude that Counts II through IV of the indictment

charge misdemeanors rather than felonies. The district court

8 The Government asks us to defer to the FWS interpretation of

“[m]igratory bird,” which defines the term as “any [listed] bird . . .

including any part, nest, or egg of such bird, or any product, whether or

not manufactured, which consists or is composed in whole or part, of any

such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.” 50 C.F.R. § 10.12. Because

application of the “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” yields a

clear meaning, deference to FWS’s definition under the rule of Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1997), is not

warranted in this case. Id. at 843 n.9; I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320

n.45 (2001) (findingChevron inapplicable because no ambiguityremained

after applying traditional rule that statute which is ambiguous with respect

to retroactive application is construed to be unambiguously prospective). 

In other circumstances, however, where ambiguity persists, further

evaluation of Chevron deference rather than application of the rule of

lenity may be appropriate. Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266,

1271–72 (9th Cir. 2001).

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should have granted Defendants’ motion with regard to those

counts.

VIII

Count I charged a felony. Count II charged a

misdemeanor. The district court should have denied the

motion to dismiss, as it did, with regard to Count I. But the

district court should have granted the motion to dismiss with

regard to Count II. Accordingly, on this appeal pursuant to

the conditional guilty plea, we affirm in part, as to Count I,

but reverse in part as to Count II. We also vacate the

sentence on both Counts, vacate the felony conviction on

Count II, and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion. On remand, the Defendants are given the option to

withdraw their guilty pleas with regard to Count II, Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(a)(2), or the district court may consider whether

to resentence their convictions on that count as

misdemeanors.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED

in part, and REMANDED.

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