Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03060/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03060-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Bowie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 25, 2000 Decided December 1, 2000

No. 99-3060

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Juan Bowie,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97cr00247-01)

Jonathan Zucker, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr.,

and Alan M. Boyd, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Williams, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Juan Bowie appeals his conviction for possession of counterfeit currency, claiming the district court improperly admitted evidence of his possession of

counterfeit currency on an earlier occasion. We find the

evidence admissible, though not on all the grounds cited by

the district court, and therefore affirm the conviction.

I.

On May 16, 1997, a joint Federal Bureau of Investigation/Metropolitan Police Department narcotics task force executed a search warrant at a southeast Washington, D.C.

apartment. During the search, an officer outside noticed

Paul Little sitting in the passenger side of a parked green

Pontiac with Tennessee plates, drinking a beer and listening

to loud music. Little told the officer the car belonged to

"Boo" and consented to a search. He also indicated that the

driver was upstairs in the apartment building and motioned

toward the apartment being searched. Officers found Bowie

in the apartment. He identified himself as "Boo" but denied

owning the Pontiac.

The search of the Pontiac turned up a large amount of

counterfeit currency and several items linking Bowie to the

car. More than $3,000 of counterfeit twenty and fifty dollar

bills were inside a console between the driver's and passenger's seats, laying underneath a pager activation form signed

by Juan Bowie and dated May 16, 1997. In the glove

compartment was a Maryland traffic ticket issued ten days

earlier. The ticket named Juan Bowie and indicated he was

driving a car with the same Tennessee plates. The glove

compartment also contained a court document bearing Bowie's printed name and what appeared to be his signature. An

additional $90 in counterfeit fifty and twenty dollar bills were

inside the pocket of a black leather jacket in the trunk. The

serial numbers on the counterfeit bills from the Pontiac's

console and from the trunk were identical.

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Secret Service agents summoned to the scene recognized

the serial numbers on the bills as the subject of an ongoing

investigation. They took Bowie to the Secret Service's Washington Office for questioning. Agents testified at trial that

Bowie confessed to owning the money and the other items in

the Pontiac and admitted that, using his brother Gary as an

intermediary, he had paid somebody named Kevin $2,000 in

genuine currency for $10,000 in counterfeit bills, $1,000 of

which he had already spent. Despite his admission, the

Secret Service found none of Bowie's fingerprints on the bills.

This was not Bowie's first arrest for possession of counterfeit money. One month earlier, police in Maryland caught

Bowie with counterfeit bills identical to those seized on May

16. At 11:30 a.m. on April 17, 1997, Prince George's County

police responded to an automobile accident involving Bowie.

He was driving a Chevrolet Celebrity owned by a third party;

with him was James Toler. The police arrested Bowie on an

outstanding warrant and impounded the car because Toler,

the passenger, did not have a valid driver's license. An

inventory of the car turned up approximately $1,300 in counterfeit currency inside the pocket of a jacket. An officer

found an additional $80 in counterfeit bills on Toler, but found

none on Bowie. The serial numbers on all of these bills

matched those on the counterfeit bills later seized on May 16.

Inside the car was a bag containing a pair of Reebok shoes

and Reebok socks as well as a receipt issued at 10:52 a.m.

that day from a nearby Lady Footlocker store.

Later in the day of April 17, police recovered from the

Laurel City Mall Lady Footlocker a $50 counterfeit bill

bearing the same serial number as the other $50 bills seized

from the Chevrolet Celebrity. According to the manager of

the Lady Footlocker, just before 11:00 that morning, a medium-built man wearing a black leather jacket purchased a pair

of Reebok running shoes and Reebok socks with a $50 bill

and a couple of twenties. The manager could not positively

identify Bowie from a photo array as the man who had passed

the counterfeit $50 bill. However, when Bowie and Toler

were arrested with identical counterfeit bills a short distance

away from the Laurel City Mall and only forty minutes after

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the Lady Footlocker transaction, Bowie was wearing a black

leather jacket and Toler a green coat.

The indictment in this case charged Bowie with possessing

counterfeit currency only on May 16, not on April 17. The

prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the uncharged

April 17 incident as prior acts evidence under Fed. R. Evid.

404(b). The district court admitted the evidence over Bowie's

objection. As a result, a significant portion of the trial was

devoted to Bowie's arrest on April 17, 1997, the discovery of

counterfeit notes in the car and on the passenger that day,

and the passing of a counterfeit bill at the Lady Footlocker.

The jury convicted Bowie of possessing counterfeit obligations and he was sentenced to 41 months incarceration.

Bowie's only argument on appeal is that admission of evidence of the April 17 incident violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

II.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits "evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts * * * to prove the character of

a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." It

permits such evidence for purposes unrelated to the defendant's character or propensity to commit crime, such as

"proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Fed.

R. Evid. 404(b). When the government plans to introduce

"bad acts" evidence, it must, upon request by the accused,

give notice of the "general nature of any such evidence." Id.

We review the district court's Rule 404(b) rulings for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 25-26

(D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498,

1532 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The district court admitted evidence of the April 17 incident on alternative grounds. The court first found the evidence not barred by Rule 404(b) on the basis that it was

"inextricably intertwined" with Bowie's possession of counterfeit bills on May 16. Because the serial numbers on the bills

seized in April tallied with those seized in May, the April

evidence was, the court thought, "in some sense really eviUSCA Case #99-3060 Document #559887 Filed: 12/01/2000 Page 4 of 17
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dence of the same crime." The court also found that the

April evidence had permissible non-propensity purposes under Rule 404(b), chiefly to establish Bowie's intent to defraud

and his knowledge of the bills' inauthenticity but also to

corroborate his confession to the Secret Service.

A.

We begin with the district court's ruling that Rule 404(b)

did not apply to the April evidence. The court relied on a

line of decisions in this and the other circuits holding that

Rule 404(b) does not apply to evidence that is "inextricably

intertwined" with the crime charged. See, e.g., United States

v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The theory is

that because Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence of a defendant's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," it creates a dichotomy

between crimes or acts that constitute the charged crime and

crimes or acts that do not. Professors Wright and Graham

explain: "One of the key words in determining the scope of

Rule 404(b) is 'other'; only crimes, wrongs, or acts 'other'

than those at issue under the pleadings are made inadmissible

under the general rule." See 22 Charles Alan Wright &

Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure

s 5239, at 445 (1978). Courts have denominated evidence of

the same crime "intrinsic" and evidence of "other" crimes

"extrinsic."

As a practical matter, it is hard to see what function this

interpretation of Rule 404(b) performs. If the so-called "intrinsic" act is indeed part of the crime charged, evidence of it

will, by definition, always satisfy Rule 404(b). The rule bars

bad acts evidence only when the evidence is offered solely to

"prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence that

constitutes the very crime being prosecuted is not of that

sort. So far as we can tell, the only consequences of labeling

evidence "intrinsic" are to relieve the prosecution of Rule

404(b)'s notice requirement and the court of its obligation to

give an appropriate limiting instruction upon defense counsel's request. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee's

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note on the 1991 amendment (indicating that the notice

requirement does not apply to "intrinsic" evidence); Fed. R.

Evid. 105 (mandating, upon request, limiting instruction for

multi-purpose evidence); United States v. Lewis, 693 F.2d

189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring a court to issue a limiting

instruction without prior request only if the evidence "has the

potential for substantially prejudicing the defendant."); United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Bifurcating the universe into intrinsic and extrinsic evidence has proven difficult in practice. Which of a defendant's

acts should be considered the charged crime and which

should not is often uncertain. In order to brighten the line

separating intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, many courts have

focused on the connection between a given crime or act and

the charged crime. When evidence is "inextricably intertwined" with the charged crime, courts typically treat it as

the same crime.1 Every circuit now applies some formulation

of the inextricably intertwined "test." See United States v.

Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989); United

States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000); United

States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1999); United

States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 861 (5th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995); United

States v. Hughes, 213 F.3d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 2000); United

States v. O'Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Matthews, 226 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. O'Brien, 131 F.3d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir.

1997); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.

1997). This court has characterized evidence as inextricably

intertwined with the charged crime in four cases. See United

States v. Allen, 960 F.2d at 1058; United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v.

__________

1 "Inextricably intertwined," "intricately related," "intimately related," and other variations on this theme are used by different

courts to express the same concept, namely the interconnectedness

between a given crime or act and the charged crime. We will use

"inextricably intertwined" in this opinion because the district court

relied on it and it is recited more often in the case law.

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Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1473-75 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States

v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

As we have written, treating evidence as inextricably intertwined not only bypasses Rule 404(b) and its attendant notice

requirement, but also carries the implicit finding that the

evidence is admissible for all purposes notwithstanding its

bearing on character, thus eliminating the defense's entitlement, upon request, to a jury instruction. See Fed. R. Evid.

105. There is, as well, a danger that finding evidence "inextricably intertwined" may too easily slip from analysis to

mere conclusion. What does the "inextricably intertwined"

concept entail? When is a defendant's crime or act so

indistinguishable from the charged crime that an item of

evidence is entirely removed from Rule 404(b)?

We have not defined "inextricably intertwined" in the few

Rule 404(b) cases in which we used those terms. See United

States v. Allen, 960 F.2d at 1058; United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d at 1134-35; United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d at

1473-75; United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1020. Our

sister circuits have attempted various formulations. The

Seventh Circuit, for instance, examines "whether the evidence

is properly admitted to provide the jury with a complete story

of the crime on trial, whether its absence would create a

chronological or conceptual void in the story of the crime or

whether it is 'so blended or connected' that it incidentally

involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends to

prove any element of, the charged crime." United States v.

Hughes, 213 F.3d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 2000). According to the

Second Circuit, "evidence of uncharged criminal activity is not

considered other crimes evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) if

it arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions

as the charged offense, if it is inextricably intertwined with

the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial." United

States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000).

We do not find these formulations particularly helpful.

Some are circular: inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic, and evidence is intrinsic if it is inextricably intertwined.

Others are over-broad. The "complete the story" definition

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of "inextricably intertwined" threatens to override Rule

404(b). A defendant's bad act may be only tangentially

related to the charged crime, but it nevetheless could "complete the story" or "incidentally involve" the charged offense

or "explain the circumstances." If the prosecution's evidence

did not "explain" or "incidentally involve" the charged crime,

it is difficult to see how it could pass the minimal requirement

for admissibility that evidence be relevant. See Fed. R. Evid.

401 and 402.

The district court invoked the "res gestae" doctrine in

finding the April 17 evidence inextricably intertwined with the

charged crime. See 10/2/98 Tr. 98. To the extent this

Latinism2 was meant to suggest that the April 17 evidence

was outside Rule 404(b) because it "explained the events" or

"completed the story," we do not agree. As we have said, all

relevant prosecution evidence explains the crime or completes

the story. The fact that omitting some evidence would

render a story slightly less complete cannot justify circumventing Rule 404(b) altogether. Moreover, evidence necessary to complete a story--for instance by furnishing a motive

or establishing identity--typically has a non-propensity purpose and is admissible under Rule 404(b). We see no reason

to relieve the government and the district court from the

obligation of selecting from the myriad of non-propensity

purposes available to complete most any story.

We recognize that, at least in a narrow range of circumstances not implicated here, evidence can be "intrinsic to" the

charged crime. Rule 404(b), for instance, would not have

barred testimony from a witness who saw Bowie put the

counterfeit currency in the Pontiac's console. Although such

testimony relates to one of defendant's acts, the act is the

charged crime of possessing counterfeit currency.3 See, e.g.,

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2 See United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir.

1981) (stating that the inextricably intertwined doctrine is sometimes labeled res gestae, "an appellation that tends merely to

obscure the analysis underlying the admissibility of the evidence.").

3 As noted earlier, the "intrinsic" label is unnecessary, as such

evidence by nature does not "prove the character of a person in

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Badru, 97 F.3d at 1474-75 (evidence "offered as direct evidence of the fact in issue" is not an "other" crime). In other

words, if the evidence is of an act that is part of the charged

offense, it is properly considered intrinsic. In addition, some

uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with the

charged crime may be termed intrinsic if they facilitate the

commission of the charged crime. See 22 Wright & Graham,

supra, s 5239, at 446-47 (noting that the "inseparable

crimes" interpretation of Rule 404(b)'s "other" crimes language "seems justifiable when used to cover situations where

the seller of contraband must necessarily be shown to have

possessed it....").

On the other hand, we are confident that there is no

general "complete the story" or "explain the circumstances"

exception to Rule 404(b) in this Circuit. Such broad exclusions have no discernible grounding in the "other crimes,

wrongs, or acts" language of the rule. Rule 404(b), and

particularly its notice requirement, should not be disregarded

on such a flimsy basis.

As to Bowie's case, we do not see how his acts on April 17

constituted the same crime as that charged in the indictment.

The authorities seized the counterfeit bills he had in possession on April 17, so the bills he possessed on May 16 could not

have been the same ones. Contrast United States v. Towne,

870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The continuous possession

of the same gun does not amount to a series of crimes, but

rather constitutes a single offense."). All of the bills--those

recovered in April and those seized in May--were doubtless

from the same supplier and possibly the same batch, and the

evidence indicated that Bowie purchased them at one time.

But the indictment charged him only with possession of the

counterfeit bills found on May 16. Given the charge, the

April evidence was relevant, for reasons we give later. But it

cannot be that all evidence tending to prove the crime is part

of the crime. If that were so, Rule 404(b) would be a nullity.

__________

order to show action in conformity therewith." It is thus admissible

whether viewed as "intrinsic" or as containing no propensity inference.

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While we therefore disagree with the district court that the

April evidence was outside Rule 404(b), we agree with the

court's alternative ruling that the government satisfied Rule

404(b).

B.

Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion.

"[A]lthough the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is 'framed

restrictively,' the rule itself 'is quite permissive,' prohibiting

the admission of other crimes evidence 'in but one circumstance'--for the purpose of proving that a person's actions

conformed to his character." United States v. Crowder, 141

F.3d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Crowder II),

quoting United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1180 (D.C.

Cir. 1991). Compliance with Rule 404(b) does not itself

assure admission of the other crimes evidence. If the defendant moves under Rule 403, the court may exclude the

evidence on the basis that it is "unfairly prejudicial, cumulative or the like, its relevance notwithstanding." See Old Chief

v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997). The Supreme

Court made much the same point in Huddleston v. United

States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988): if evidence is offered for a

proper purpose under Rule 404(b), "the evidence is subject

only to general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules

402 and 403."

Rule 404(b) thus is not so much a character rule as a

special aspect of relevance, constituting but one of many

exceptions to the general rule that "all relevant evidence is

admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402. The rule does not prohibit

character evidence generally, only that which lacks any purpose but proving character. See Crowder II, 141 F.3d at

1206. A proper analysis under Rule 404(b) begins with the

question of relevance: is the other crime or act relevant and,

if so, relevant to something other than the defendant's character or propensity? If yes, the evidence is admissible unless

excluded under other rules of evidence such as Rule 403.

Stated more formally, a Rule 404(b) objection will not be

sustained if: 1) the evidence of other crimes or acts is

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relevant in that it has "any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence," Fed. R. Evid. 401; 2) the fact of

consequence to which the evidence is directed relates to a

matter in issue other than the defendant's character or

propensity to commit crime; and 3) the evidence is sufficient

to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the

other crime or act, see Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.

681, 689-90 (1988). See also United States v. Mathis, 216

F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Gaviria, 116

F.3d 1498, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

In light of this standard, the district court properly admitted evidence of the April 17 incident to show Bowie's intent

and knowledge. To convict Bowie under 18 U.S.C. s 472,4

the government had to prove three elements: possession of

counterfeit notes, intent to defraud, and knowledge the notes

were counterfeit. See, e.g., Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d

1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bolin, 35 F.3d

306, 309 (7th Cir. 1994). Intent and knowledge were therefore facts of consequence to the case. Evidence that Bowie

possessed and passed counterfeit notes on a prior occasion

was relevant because it decreased the likelihood that Bowie

accidentally or innocently possessed the counterfeit notes on

May 16. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; United States v. Burch, 156

F.3d 1315, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Intent and knowledge are

also well-established non-propensity purposes for admitting

evidence of prior crimes or acts. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

The government presented sufficient evidence for a jury to

conclude that Bowie possessed counterfeit currency on April

17 and passed a counterfeit note that day at the Laurel City

__________

4 Title 18, U.S.C. s 472 states: "Whoever, with intent to defraud,

passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States or

keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United States,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than fifteen

years, or both."

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Mall Lady Footlocker. The government established that a

person matching Bowie's description passed a counterfeit bill

with the same serial number as on the bills found in the car

Bowie was driving and on his passenger. Although the police

found no counterfeit bills on Bowie's person, the jury heard

testimony that the man passing the bill wore a black leather

jacket, and that when Bowie and Toler were arrested barely

forty minutes later with matching counterfeit bills and a

receipt from the Lady Footlocker, Bowie was wearing a black

leather jacket and Toler a green coat.

This much Bowie does not contest. Rather, he claims that

the district court inadequately weighed the probative value of

the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. Evidence of other crimes or acts having a legitimate nonpropensity purpose undoubtedly may contain the seeds of a

forbidden propensity inference. Recognizing this possibility,

we have consistently stated that Rule 403 may bar evidence

otherwise admissible under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United

States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We do not,

however, prescribe any specific form this balancing must

take, and will not reverse for failure to make a formal Rule

403 finding if the applicable considerations are apparent from

the record. See United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015,

1022 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d

1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Bowie's claim that the district

court performed no Rule 403 analysis at all regarding intent

and knowledge is belied by the record. The court may not

have recited Rule 403 verbatim, but it expressly considered

the probative value versus the risk of unfair prejudice before

admitting evidence of the April 17 events. See 11/10/98 Tr.

23-24; United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.

Cir. 1998).

On the probative value side of the balance, Bowie claims

that his offer to stipulate deprived evidence of intent and

knowledge of its probative force because "those issues were

not even contested." Brief of Appellant at 24. Before trial,

Bowie orally offered to stipulate that whoever possessed the

currency seized on May 16 had the requisite intent to defraud

and guilty knowledge, but Bowie never presented a proposed

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written stipulation or a jury instruction.5 Two months before

trial, Bowie told the court that "we'll stipulate to whoever had

the intent knew it was--we're not going to put at issue that

whoever had it didn't know it was counterfeit." 10/2/98 Tr.

96. Five weeks later, he stated that "if you want intent, we'll

stipulate to intent. If you want knowledge, we'll stipulate to

knowledge. We'll stipulate to absence of mistake....

Knowledge can be just about anything [the prosecutor] wants

as far as the intent to defraud or the intent or the absence of

mistake or knowledge." 11/10/98 Tr. 20-21. Bowie's offers

encompassed only intent and knowledge, not corroboration:

he never offered to stipulate that he confessed to owning the

money and other items found in the Pontiac on May 16 and to

having paid $2,000 in genuine currency for $10,000 in counterfeit.

Whatever merit Bowie's stipulation argument had before,

see United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(en banc) (Crowder I), vacated, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), recent

cases in this court and the Supreme Court have eviscerated

its conceptual underpinnings. We briefly adopted Bowie's

reasoning in Crowder I but later discarded it in light of Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). In Crowder II,

we held that "a defendant's offer to stipulate to an element of

an offense does not render the government's other crimes

evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(b) to prove that element, even if the defendant's proposed stipulation is unequivocal, and even if the defendant agrees to a jury instruction of

the sort mentioned in [Crowder I]." Crowder II, 141 F.3d at

1209. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Old Chief, we

reiterated that evidence may be relevant under the Federal

Rules of Evidence whether or not the issue it relates to is

disputed. See 141 F.3d at 1206; see also Old Chief, 519 U.S.

at 179 (evidence going to an undisputed fact may be relevant,

and "its exclusion must rest not on the ground that the other

__________

5 Bowie suggested at one point that a "must-charge" jury instruction like that discussed in United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), would do.

He did not offer his own jury instruction or one from a case that

has not been overruled.

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evidence has rendered it 'irrelevant,' but on its character as

unfairly prejudicial, cumulative or the like, its relevance notwithstanding"). We concluded that offers to stipulate may

figure into the Rule 403 balancing, but cautioned that such

offers are not determinative. See 141 F.3d at 1210.

Bowie's stipulation argument is identical to the one we

rejected in Crowder II. In the district court, Bowie tried to

deflect the impact of that case by arguing that "based on

Crowder I, we could offer to stipulate and give a must-charge

instruction and in so doing estop the government from introducing that. All Crowder II has done is said no, we're not

going to let the defendant make the choice. We're going to

let the Court make the choice." 11/10/98 Tr. 20-21. Bowie's

supposition misses the fundamental point of Old Chief and

Crowder II, which is that evidence of undisputed issues may

be relevant and highly probative regardless of the defendant's willingness to concede certain points. Crowder II does

not, as Bowie insists, transfer the power to "estop" the

government from the defendant to the district court; rather,

it denies that offers to stipulate confer any such power at all.

To exclude relevant evidence based on an offer to stipulate,

the district court must do so under Rule 403, mindful of the

Supreme Court's admonition in Old Chief of the central role

of narrative integrity and our instruction in Crowder II that

an offer to stipulate does not automatically tilt the Rule 403

balance. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187-89; Crowder II, 141

F.3d at 1210.

Aside from the conceptual deficiencies in Bowie's argument,

the stipulations he offered are indistinguishable from the

offers to stipulate that we rejected in Crowder II as wholly

insufficient. In Crowder II, the defendants offered to concede "only that 'anybody who possessed those drugs possessed them with the intent to distribute'." See 141 F.3d at

1208. Similarly, Bowie offered to stipulate that some hypothetical person in possession of counterfeit currency had the

requisite intent and knowledge. Crowder II is so closely on

point to Bowie's proposed stipulation that we can transplant

wholesale the reasoning from that case, changing only the

defendant's name and the label of the crime. As in Crowder

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II, some hypothetical individual was not on trial, Bowie was.

And it was Bowie's intent and knowledge, not "anybody's,"

that the prosecution had to establish to the jury's satisfaction.

Yet the prosecution's evidence of Bowie's prior counterfeit

currency possession--a possession so close in time and circumstance to that charged in the indictment--was not meant

to show that someone had intent and knowledge. The evidence was introduced to prove that Bowie had the intent to

defraud and that Bowie knew what he was possessing. Bowie's proposed stipulation could not possibly have substituted

for such proof. It did not even mention him by name. Far

from a choice between "propositions of slightly varying abstraction," the choice in this case was between concrete

evidence of the defendant's actions giving rise to natural and

sensible inferences, and abstract stipulations about hypothetical persons not on trial. See Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1208.

Bowie's offer to stipulate contains yet another fatal defect.

The district court admitted the prior crimes evidence in part

to corroborate Bowie's confession.6 Yet Bowie never offered

to stipulate that he told the Secret Service that he owned the

counterfeit currency and other items found in the Pontiac on

May 16 and that he had paid $2,000 in genuine currency for

$10,000 in counterfeit. The April evidence corroborates the

last element of Bowie's confession because it increases the

probability that Bowie did buy $10,000 in counterfeit currency

for $2,000 in genuine currency. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Adding the money seized in April (approximately $1,400) to

that seized in May (approximately $3,100) gets us closer to

the $10,000 Bowie said he bought, less the $1,000 he said he

spent. Although Rule 404(b) does not explicitly list corroboration among its examples of non-propensity purposes, evidence

of other crimes or acts is admissible to corroborate evidence

that itself has a legitimate non-propensity purpose. See

United States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir. 1987);

United States v. Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1018-19 (6th Cir.

__________

6 Bowie has not argued against the admission of his confession.

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1991); United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th

Cir. 2000); United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1405

(11th Cir. 1998).7 Bowie's stipulation argument fails to recognize the legitimacy of corroboration as a non-propensity purpose. To merit consideration, an offer to stipulate must, at a

minimum, address all legitimate uses of a piece of evidence.

See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 441 n.3 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

As in Crowder II, the April evidence had "multiple utility."

141 F.3d at 1208. It not only tended to establish Bowie's

intent and knowledge, but also corroborated Bowie's confession to the Secret Service. A "piece of evidence," the Court

wrote in Old Chief, "may address any number of separate

elements, striking hard just because it shows so much at

once." Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187.

Bowie's arguments on the prejudice side of the Rule 403

balance warrant only a few words. Contrary to his claim that

the prior crimes evidence threatened to mislead the jury

because Bowie had not been convicted, the chain of inferences

connecting Bowie to the money on April 17 was easily within

the jury's reach. See supra pp. 11-12; see also Weinstein's

Federal Evidence s 404.21[2][b] (1997) ("extrinsic evidence

need not establish that other criminal activity resulted in a

conviction"). As for Bowie's argument that the prior crimes

evidence created a substantial risk of convicting him based on

character evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the risk of unfair prejudice did not

substantially outweigh its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid.

403.

__________

7 Some courts have imposed additional requirements for bad acts

evidence introduced for the purpose of corroboration, requiring that

the corroboration be direct and the corroborated matter be significant. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir.

1987); United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1993).

We see no reason to create such special rules. The underlying

concerns are properly addressed through Rule 403.

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In sum, neither Rule 404(b) nor Rule 403 barred admission

of the April 17 evidence to prove Bowie's intent and knowledge and to corroborate his confession to the Secret Service.

Affirmed.

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