Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05169/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05169-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roseanne Campbell
Respondent
Larry M. Johnson
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04-5169 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Larry Johnson, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a

pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This

Court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated seven cognizable claims

under § 2254 and ordered Respondent to show cause. Respondent filed an

answer to the petition and a memorandum of points and authorities and exhibits

in support thereof. Petitioner has not filed a traverse. This order denies the

petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2000, the Alameda County District Attorney filed an

information charging Petitioner with the murder of Lavonda Emery, Cal. Penal

Code § 187. On June 21, 2001, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree

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1

 Dates mentioned are to the calendar year 1998 unless otherwise noted.

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murder and, on October 21, 2001, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 15 years

to life in state prison.

On May 27, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. The California Supreme Court denied review on

August 27, 2003. Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on

November 24, 2004, in the Eastern District of California. The petition was

transferred to this Court on December 7, 2004. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual background of the

case as follows:

Lavonda Emery was last known to be alive on November 4,

19981

 in her Oakland apartment. Her badly decomposed body was

discovered a year and a half later on May 27, 2000, in a shallow

grave in an isolated and remote vacant field in Sacramento.

Defendant was arrested three days later at work in Sacramento. 

Oakland police had suspected defendant virtually from the

moment Ms. Emery's mother reported her missing on November 9.

Two days after that report officers interviewed defendant at the

police station. He told them that he had been dating Ms. Emery for

about two years, and at one point they had lived together. He last

saw her on the afternoon of November 4. They had an argument,

followed by consensual sex. Defendant left in Ms. Emery's car (a

red Dodge Neon) to go to work. He returned the car (which he had

washed) to appellant's apartment on the morning of November 5.

He left a note for her on the windshield. Discrepancies between

defendant's statement and other information were deemed

suspicious. The following day, November 12, officers went to

defendant's apartment and observed that most of the carpeting had

been removed.

Defendant's Hayward apartment was searched (pursuant to a

warrant) on November 13. Police found traces of numerous large

patches of human blood throughout the five-room apartment; the

blood appeared diluted, as if an attempt had been made to wipe it

away. In the closet of defendant's bedroom police found a large

knife with dried blood on the blade. The knife also had defendant's

fingerprint preserved in the blood. Also found was a bloody t-shirt.

The blood on the knife and the t-shirt did not come from defendant

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and most probably did come from the victim. Of the blood

samples collected off the walls, one was from defendant, one was

from an unidentified woman, and the rest were most probably from

the victim. 

During this 1998 investigation police learned more of the

relationship between defendant and the victim. Shortly before she

disappeared, defendant had “physically got her over his shoulders”

and carried her out of her place of work, in front of coworkers; the

victim described the incident as done by her “boyfriend,” who

“brought her problems everywhere she worked.” Joy Harris, an

“exotic dancer” and friend of the victim, testified that in late

September Ms. Emery stated that she wanted to leave defendant

“because he was controlling and abusive and possessive over her,”

particularly about her earnings. About this time Ms. Emery broke

up with defendant and moved out of the apartment they had shared

(this was the same apartment in Hayward searched by the police)

and moved into an Oakland apartment with Joy Harris. 

Thomas Riedl became friends with the victim shortly before

she disappeared. Emery told Riedl that defendant was “very

controlling.” She was scared of defendant who was constantly

calling her on a telephone number she had thought he did not

know. Defendant was “around all the time.” Riedl urged her to get

a restraining order but she decided against it, thinking that

defendant “will get over it.” At some point in mid-October Emery

called Riedl in hysterics, telling him that she and defendant had

just had a “fist fight.” On Halloween, Ms. Emery thought she had

an appointment to have dinner with a man for $300. The

appointment turned out to be a “set up”-“the date was not there,”

but defendant was. In early November the victim was talking to

Riedl about changing her “lifestyle” and her “profession.” Riedl

planned to meet Emery for dinner on November 4. On the morning

of the fourth Emery told Riedl that she was going to the Hayward

apartment to retrieve a resume. Emery was not worried about

meeting defendant, because she thought he would be away at work.

The victim's mother, Karen Emery, corroborated much of

Riedl's testimony. She too recounted how her daughter was talking

about changing her life and getting a different job. She told of how

her daughter regarded defendant as controlling and possessive,

especially about her earnings. The victim described defendant as

“stalking” her. Both Riedl and Ms. Emery testified that defendant

wanted to have sex with the victim “for the last time.” 

The victim's roommate, Joy Harris, also testified that the

victim thought defendant controlling of her company and her

money. Defendant’s presence around the apartment was constant

and unsettling-“he would come by, ... unexpected, like early in the

morning, late at night and Lavonda didn't want nothing to do with

him. She didn't want him coming over there. He was always

hanging around our apartment....” She corroborated the Halloween

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“set up” described by Riedl. She corroborated the victim's mother

that Lavonda thought defendant was “stalking” her. 

People v. Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. May

 27, 2003) (footnotes omitted).

Further evidence was presented at trial indicating that the victim died as a

result of criminal agency:

Pertinent testimony was provided by three experts:

Sacramento County Deputy Coroner Laura Santos, forensic

anthropologist Dr. Alison Galloway, and pathologist Dr. Stephany

Fiore.

Ms. Santos detailed why she concluded that this was a

homicide: “Based on the totality of the circumstances, I felt that ... the

fact that the body was concealed, buried in a grave in a site that was

somewhat remote, not visible to the public, the fact that the body was

not laid out in the grave but kind of limbs askew like she had been

hastily placed in the grave, the fact that the grave was kind of uneven

and shallow in some spots and deeper in other spots. Another factor

was the fact that there was no clothing on the bottom half of her body.

She was clothed on the top half, but there [were] no shoes, ... pants or

socks, no underwear on the bottom portion of the body. Also based

on the anthropology [sic ] findings and the findings of the

pathologist.”

Dr. Galloway testified that her examination of the remains

disclosed multiple signs of trauma to the bones. They included cut

marks and “a sharp force trauma, which means that it was some sharp

instrument that caused it” in the area of the eyes, a broken jaw, four

broken ribs, and fractures of both hips, the sacrum, and left femur.

Some of these could have occurred while the victim was alive or after

her body had been placed in the grave. Damage to the right knee

could have been caused by a shovel or a rototiller being operated on

the grave. Dr. Galloway also noticed some “carnivorous activity” on

the part of the left femur found outside the grave. She thought it

unlikely that the hip fracture occurred in the grave. 

Dr. Fiore performed the autopsy. She listed the cause of death

as undetermined because “I did not feel that I had sufficient evidence

to determine why she had died. She did have some injuries, I wasn't

sure whether those injuries had occurred in the grave or before she

had died, or she could have died from other means that didn't leave

any signs on the remains. So I ... wasn't comfortable with calling a

cause of death. [P] ... She could have been strangled, she could have

been buried alive and left unconscious, she could have ... been

stabbed to death. But I couldn't tell.” She too thought it unlikely that

all of the damage to the bones could have been caused while the body

was in the grave. Asked if the position of the remains was “consistent

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with ... having been in the trunk of a compact car” (i.e., such as the

victim's Neon), Dr. Fiore replied, “It would be consistent with being

folded up into a small space.” The cut marks on the skull could have

been caused by the knife found in defendant's closet. Dr. Fiore

agreed with Ms. Santos classifying the death as a homicide, giving as

her reasons: “A young woman is buried in a clandestine grave

approximately 120 miles from where she lives. So I would not have

classified that death as a natural, unlikely that it was a suicide. People

can't bury themselves after they're dead and accidental deaths usually

don't get buried in clandestine graves.”

Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

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529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other

grounds; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks

to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the Petitioner’s

claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision

on a Petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on

the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an independent review of the

record. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

the purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

This Court found that the habeas petition presented seven claims for

relief: (1) he was deprived of due process because there was insufficient

evidence showing that he proximately caused the victim’s death or that he

harbored malice; (2) he was deprived of due process and the right to a fair trial

because the trial court did not respond properly to the jury’s request for

clarification on the legal concepts of malice aforethought and voluntary

manslaughter; (3) he was deprived of due process and the right to a jury trial

because the jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter created an impermissible

presumption in favor of a murder verdict and were erroneous; (4) he was

deprived of due process and the right to a jury trial because the trial court

admitted hearsay statements attributed to the victim; (5) he was deprived of due

process because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of

involuntary manslaughter; (6) he was deprived of due process, equal protection,

and the right to a fair trial when the trial court improperly admitted evidence of

prior domestic violence and (7) he was deprived of due process because the jury

instructions that were given at trial misstated the burden of proof necessary for

conviction.

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DISCUSSION

I. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to

show that he proximately caused the victim’s death or that he harbored malice, 

in violation of his right to due process. 

The trial court instructed the jury on second degree murder, Cal. Penal

Code § 187, and voluntary manslaughter, Cal. Penal Code § 192(a). The court

told the jury that, in order to prove second degree murder, it needed to find,

beyond a reasonable doubt, “[one], a human being was killed; two, the killing

was unlawful and; three, the killing was done with malice aforethought.” RT 

2722. The court elaborated on the concept of malice aforethought:

Malice may be either express or implied. Malice is express

where there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human

being. Malice is implied when; one, the killing resulted from an

intentional act; two, the natural consequences of the act are

dangerous to human life and; three, the act was deliberately

performed with knowledge of the danger to and with conscious

disregard for human life.

When it is shown that a killing resulted in the intentional

doing of an act with express or implied malice, no other mental

state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice

aforethought.

The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not

necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed.

The word “aforethought: does not imply deliberation or

lapse of considerable time. It only means that the required mental

state must precede rather than follow the act.

Id. at 2722-23. Following the court’s instructions, the jury found Petitioner

guilty of second degree murder.

When Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of evidence supporting his

conviction as part of his appeal at the state level, the California Court of Appeal 

reviewed “the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to

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determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is

reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson, 2003 WL

21224035, at 5 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-20 (1979)).

Applying this standard (the “Jackson” standard), the California Court of Appeal

rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

The prosecution introduced considerable evidence that the

relationship between Ms. Emery and defendant was stormy, had

recently broken up, and that defendant was unreconciled to the

breakup. By his own admission to the police, he was the last

person to see the victim alive, when she came to his apartment in

Hayward. When that apartment was searched shortly thereafter,

police discovered substantial quantities of blood which-the jury

could conclude-belonged to the victim and were of recent origin

and which defendant had attempted to conceal. From the victim's

blood in the apartment, the blood on defendant's t-shirt, the victim's

blood on the knife found in the apartment, the jury could conclude

that a violent altercation occurred between defendant and the

victim which resulted in the victim's death at defendant's hands.

The jury could also conclude from the medical evidence recounted

in part I, ante, that wounds found on the victim's remains were not

product of accident, but of conscious and systematic intent,

indicative of malice, and were inflicted by defendant, who enjoyed

a pronounced physical advantage over the victim.

Defendant went to high school in the Sacramento area, and

at one point lived within several blocks of where the victim was

buried. There was evidence that defendant attempted to doctor his

employment records to show that he was at work on November 4,

1998, when in fact he was away from his job, thus providing him

the opportunity to commit the crime. The jury could also believe

that defendant was the last person to see Lavonda Emery alive. 

The jury could accept as evidence of guilt his admission that he

drove the victim's car on November 4. They could conclude that

he used it to transport her body, and attempted to remove

incriminating proof by removing the trunk carpet and washing out

the trunk. They could also conclude that he removed the carpet in

his apartment because it was soaked with the victim's blood. With

evidence connecting defendant to her last living moment and her

place of burial, together with the blood in the apartment, the bloody

t-shirt, and the bloody knife with his fingerprint preserved in the

victim’s blood, there is ample if not abundant substantial evidence

from which the jury could conclude that defendant was the killer of

Lavonda Emery. 

Id. (footnotes omitted).

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A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except

upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A

state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction

cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, see

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 321, which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief,

see Id. at 324. 

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not

determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993). The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” See id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338;

Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986);

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838

(1984).

On habeas review, a federal court evaluating the evidence under In re

Winship and Jackson should take into consideration all of the evidence presented

at trial. LaMere v. Slaughter, 458 F.3d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (in a case where

both sides have presented evidence, a habeas court need not confine its analysis

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2

 Prior to Juan H., the Ninth Circuit had expressly left open the question of

whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) requires an additional degree of deference to a state

court’s resolution of sufficiency of the evidence claims. See Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc); Bruce, 376 F.3d at 956-57. But

in Juan H., the court concluded that “the Supreme Court's analysis in Williams

compels the conclusion that the state court's application of the Jackson standard

must be “‘objectively unreasonable.’” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 n.13 (quoting

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409. 

11

to evidence presented by the state in its case-in-chief). If confronted by a record

that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must presume – even

if it does not affirmatively appear on the record – that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.

1995). Mere suspicion and speculation cannot support logical inferences,

however. Id.; see, e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 2005)

(granting writ where, after resolving all conflicting factual inferences in favor of

prosecution, only speculation supported petitioner’s conviction for first degree

murder under a theory of aiding and abetting). 

After AEDPA, a federal habeas court applies the standards of Jackson

with an additional layer of deference. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. Generally, a

federal habeas court must ask whether the operative state court decision reflected

an unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id.

at 1275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).2

 Section 2254(d)(1) plainly applies to

Jackson cases; that is, if the state court affirms a conviction under Jackson, the

federal court must decide whether the state court’s application of Jackson was

objectively unreasonable. Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677-78 (9th Cir.

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3

 The Ninth Circuit has adopted guidelines for applying the “objective

unreasonableness” test under § 2254(d)(1) to a state court decision applying

Jackson: (1) the focus of the inquiry is on the state court decision; (2) even with

the deference due by statute to the state court’s determinations, the federal habeas

court must look to the “totality of the evidence” in evaluating the state court’s

decision; (3) the failure of the state court to consider at all a key argument of the

defendant may indicate that its conclusion is objectively unreasonable; however,

the paucity of reasoning employed by the state court does not itself establish that

its result is objectively unreasonable; (4) the failure of a state court to give

appropriate weight to all of the evidence may mean that its conclusion is

objectively unreasonable; and (5) the absence of cases of conviction precisely

parallel on their facts does not, by itself, establish objective unreasonableness. 

Sarausad, 479 F.3d at 678.

12

2007). By contrast, § 2254(d)(2) is not readily applicable to Jackson cases,

because a court under Jackson makes no “determination of the facts” in the

ordinary sense of resolving factual disputes. Id. at 678. Rather, the court views

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution without resolving any

disputed factual questions. Id. The federal court’s task is not to decide whether

the state court unreasonably determined disputed facts; it is, rather, to decide

whether the state court unreasonably applied the Jackson test. Id.; see id. at 683

(finding that while state court’s characterization of certain testimony was

objectively unreasonable, its conclusion that the Jackson standard was satisfied

was not objectively unreasonable). Thus, a federal court evaluates a state court’s

resolution of a Jackson sufficiency of the evidence claim in all cases under §

2254(d)(1) rather than § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 2561-62.3

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that there

was insufficient evidence adduced at trial showing that Petitioner proximately

caused the victim’s death and that he harbored malice, in violation of Petitioner’s

right to due process, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

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clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The California Court of Appeal’s application of Jackson was not

objectively unreasonable. The appellate court looked at the totality of evidence

presented at trial and concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of second degree murder. 

The appellate court identified an ample amount of evidence of causation

presented at trial implicating Petitioner in the murder of the victim, from his

history of domestic abuse, to his fingerprint in the victim’s blood on a knife

discovered in his own home. The appellate court also highlighted evidence of

malice in the expert testimony presented at trial which supported the theory that

the wounds over the victim’s body were the product of a systematic intent. 

Although much of the evidence surrounding causation and malice was

circumstantial, the evidence was abundant and went far beyond “mere suspicion

and speculation” in supporting the logical inference that Petitioner murdered the

victim. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358; see, e.g., Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1278-79. 

 Petitioner has not identified, nor does the record reveal, any defects in the

appellate court’s application of Jackson that might be considered objectively

unreasonable under Sarausad. Petitioner makes an analogous argument when he

asserts that the California Court of Appeal failed to consider or give appropriate

weight to his self-proclaimed efforts to find the victim after she was reported

missing, to the “deficient” quality of the police investigation, and to the evidence

of Petitioner’s “good character.” Pet. at 3-4; See Sarausad factors (2), (3), and (4)

(Sarausad, 479 F.3d at 678). But given the state court’s task to determine

whether a rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt given the evidence supporting the verdict, the failure of the

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appellate court to discuss or give much weight to the evidence that Petitioner

identifies does not undermine its decision, particularly in light of the strong

circumstantial evidence implicating Petitioner in the victim’s murder.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his insufficient

evidence claim because the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim

was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

II. Failure to Respond to the Jury’s Request for Clarification

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

failed to adequately respond to the jury’s request for clarification on the legal

concepts of malice aforethought and voluntary manslaughter. The California

Court of Appeal provided the following background for Petitioner’s claim:

Several hours after it began deliberating, the jury sent the

court a note requesting “further clarification of the definition of

malice of forethought [sic] and voluntary manslaughter.” In the

presence of counsel for both sides, the court told the jury: “All I can

tell you is that you have received the legal definitions that you have

to work through. Without being more specific about what needs

clarification, I don't frankly understand the question. I think what

you're going to do-I don't know how long you've been discussing or

going-how long you've been going over these particular

instructions, and I don't want to know, and I don't know how long

you've been working on the facts and how the instructions and the

facts are going through your deliberations, but I think what you're

going to have to do is exchange ideas on what these instructions

mean and how they apply to the facts of the case. 

If you can be more specific about something that you're not

able to come to agreement about, if you can be more specific, I will

try to help you. But the question itself is vague enough to where I'm

not sure I know what it is that you're hung up on. I don't want to

hear any discussion out here about it, I want you to go back in the

jury [room], talk about it among yourselves, perhaps more talk is

necessary and more work needs to be done with the definition

you've already been given before we get to the point of other

questions. 

I'll leave that up to you, okay? So I don't have an answer for

you because I don't understand where your struggling with the

definition. So I'm going to send you back to work on it.... 

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If I can help you, if you can [be] a little bit more precise

about what you need, I will try.” After the jury left the room, the

court asked counsel “Any problems with what was said?” Both

counsel replied “No.”

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 18. 

The next day, the jury requested that the court reread the testimony of Eva

Jean, which referenced prior incidents of domestic abuse involving herself and

Petitioner, as well as her interactions with Petitioner following the victim’s death. 

RT 2746. The jury also requested that the court replay two audiotapes, one of the

victim’s December 31, 1997, “hang up call” to the police, in connection with a

domestic disturbance involving the victim and Petitioner, and another of

Petitioner’s interview with police following the victim’s disappearance. Id. 

Notably, the jury did not request any further clarification on the concepts of

malice aforethought and voluntary manslaughter. The following day, the jury

found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder. Id. at 2749.

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s response to the jury’s inquiry was

inadequate, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner contends that the

court, at a minimum, “should have made further inquiries” into the jury’s

confusion in order to better help the jury understand the relevant concepts. Pet. at

30.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim. The court

found that the instructions given were “full and complete.” Johnson, 2003 WL

21224035, at 18. The court noted that the jury’s desire for “further clarification”

was too general and that, given the opportunity to clarify its desire for more

specific assistance regarding malice aforethought and voluntary manslaughter, the

jury declined to do so, indicating that it resolved any difficulties in interpreting

the relevant concepts and that it arrived at a verdict based on the instructions as

they were given. Id.

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A. Legal Standard

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the instructional error

“‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). In other words, state prisoners seeking

federal habeas relief may obtain plenary review of constitutional claims of trial

error, but are not entitled to habeas relief unless the error resulted in “actual

prejudice.” Id.

“When a jury makes explicit its difficulties, a trial judge should clear them

away with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-

13 (1946). The trial judge has a duty to respond to the jury’s request for

clarification with sufficient specificity to eliminate the jury’s confusion. See

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (harmless due

process violation occurred when, in responding to request for clarification, court

refused to give clarification and informed jury that no clarifying instructions

would be given); United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 808-11. (9th Cir. 1999)

(trial judge’s confusing response to jury’s questions raised possibility that verdict

was based on conduct legally inadequate to support conviction); McDowell v.

Calderon, 130 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (same in state capital case).

However, the trial judge has wide discretion in charging the jury, a

discretion which carries over to the judge’s response to a question from the jury. 

Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). Also, just as a jury is

presumed to follow its instructions, it is presumed to understand a judge’s answer

to a question. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the

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trial court violated his due process rights when it failed to adequately respond to 

the jury’s request for clarification on the legal concepts of malice aforethought

and voluntary manslaughter was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The trial court originally instructed the jury with versions of CALJIC No.

8.11, which defines malice aforethought, and CALJIC No. 8.40, which defines

voluntary manslaughter. It is presumed that the jury followed these instructions. 

See Angelone, 528 U.S. at 234. It is further presumed that the jury understood the

court’s response to its request for clarification on the concepts of malice

aforethought and voluntary manslaughter, specifically, that the jury understood

that it needed to be “a little bit more precise” about its needs if it desired the

court’s assistance. Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 18. There was nothing

constitutionally infirm in the trial court’s request of the jury that they make more

explicit the nature of the difficulties they had with the given instructions. See,

e.g., Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 612-13. That the jury returned the next day and

made specific requests of the court regarding the rereading of testimony and

replaying of tapes, but did not make any additional requests related to the

clarification of these concepts, suggests that the jury resolved any outstanding

difficulties in interpreting CALJIC Nos. 8.11 and 8.40. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial

court responded improperly to the jury’s inquiry regarding the legal concepts of

malice aforethought and voluntary manslaughter because the California Court of

Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

determination of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or involved an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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III. Erroneous Jury Instructions on Voluntary Manslaughter

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process rights because

the jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter were erroneous and created an

impermissible presumption in favor of a murder verdict. The California Court of

Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim.

A. Legal Standard

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not

state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). Nor does the fact that a jury instruction was

inadequate by Ninth Circuit direct appeal standards mean that a petitioner who

relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to habeas corpus relief from a state

court conviction. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 744 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1158 (1996). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416

U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“‘[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is

undesirable, erroneous or even “universally condemned,” but that it violated some

[constitutional right].’”). 

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions

in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th

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Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988); see e.g., Middleton, 541 U.S. at 434-35

(no reasonable likelihood that jury misled by single contrary instruction on

imperfect self-defense defining “imminent peril” where three other instructions

correctly stated the law); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 922-24 (9th Cir.

2001) (no error where court allowed the jury to consider “such guilt phase

instructions as it found applicable” for the penalty phase (raising concerns that

they would rely on instructions precluding consideration of mitigating factors)

because when viewed as a whole the instructions required the jurors to consider

all relevant mitigating evidence for the penalty phase); cf. Lankford v. Arave, 468

F.3d 578, 585-87 (9th Cir. 2006) (additional, proper instructions did not cure

incorrect accomplice testimony instructions where conscientious jury might read

instructions in a way that permitted conviction on alternative legal theories, one of

which was legally incorrect, and verdict hinged on accomplice's testimony). The

defined category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness is very narrow: 

“Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process

Clause has limited operation.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 73.

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is not how reasonable

jurors could or would have understood the instruction as a whole; rather, the court

must inquire whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied

the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See id. at 72 &

n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see, e.g., Ficklin v. Hatcher,

177 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (harmless error when certain that jury did

not rely on constitutionally infirm instruction). A determination that there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way

that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred, however. 

See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the

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court also must determine that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict, see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (1993),

before granting relief in habeas proceedings. See Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47;

see, e.g., Sarausad, 479 F.3d at 679 (finding reasonable likelihood that jury

applied ambiguous instruction on accomplice liability to find defendant guilty of

murder in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proof, and that this error

was not harmless).

If the disputed instruction is erroneous on its face, the “reasonable

likelihood” standard employed for ambiguous jury instructions is not required. 

Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2003). If a jury instruction omits a

necessary element of the crime, for example, constitutional error has occurred. 

Id.; see also id. at 593 (finding jury instructions “erroneous” rather than

ambiguous, where they included an uncorrected erroneous instruction that

second-degree murder could be based on a finding of general intent, but also

included an accurate description of the elements of second-degree murder,

including specific intent). Actual prejudice is still required before relief may be

granted, however. See id. at 595 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the

trial court violated his due process rights because the jury instructions on

voluntary manslaughter created an impermissible presumption in favor of a

murder verdict and were erroneous was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Creation of an Impermissible Presumption in Favor of a

Murder Verdict

The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.42 and 8.43 as

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follows:

To reduce an unlawful killing from the offense of murder to

manslaughter, upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion,

the provocation must be of the character and degree as naturally

would excite and arouse the passion and the assailant must act under

the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to

manslaughter must be such passion as naturally would be aroused in

the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the same

circumstances.

A defendant is not permitted to set up his own standard of

conduct and to justify or excuse himself because his passions were

aroused, unless the circumstances in which the defendant was

placed and the facts that confronted him, were such as also would

have aroused the passions of the ordinarily reasonable person faced

with the same situation.

Legally adequate provocation may occur in a short or over a

considerable period of time. The question to be answered is

whether or not, at the time of the killing, the reason of the accused

was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would

cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act

rationally [sic] and without deliberation and reflection and from

passion rather than from judgment.

If there was provocation, whether of short or long duration

but of a nature not normally sufficient to arouse passion, or if

sufficient time elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow

for passion to subside and return, and if an unlawful killing of a

human being followed the provocation and had all the elements of

murder as I have defined it, the mere fact of slight or remote

provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter.

To reduce a killing, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion,

from murder to voluntary manslaughter, the killing must have

occurred while the slayer was acting under the direct and immediate

influence of the quarrel or heat of passion. Where the influence of

the sudden quarrel or heat of passion has ceased to obscure the mind

of the accused and sufficient time has elapsed for angry passion to

end and for reason to control his conduct, it will no longer excuse

express or implied malice and reduce the killing to voluntary

manslaughter. The question, as to whether the cooling period has

elapsed and reason has returned, is not measured by the standard of

the accused but the duration of the cooling period is the time it

would take the average or ordinarily reasonable person to have

cooled the passion and for that person’s reason to have returned.

RT 2723-2725. Petitioner argues that these instructions, as given, contained

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“frequent references to the idea that a manslaughter verdict requires a reduction of

the homicide from murder,” which, in turn, “intrude[d] into the deliberative

process and create[d] an improper presumption that homicide is murder rather

than manslaughter.” Pet. at 35. Petitioner further argues that CALJIC Nos. 8.42

and 8.43 “lightened” the prosecution’s burden of proof, in violation of his due

process rights. Id. at 37.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim, holding that

“[t]he language of which defendant now complains has been approved by our

Supreme Court virtually since California became a state” and that “[i]f the

language is found to be defective, it is not for this court to do the finding.” 

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 12.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the

accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This constitutional principle prohibits the

State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of

relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every

essential element of a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 400-03 (1991);

Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1989); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.

307, 313 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-24 (1979).

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to federal

law. Petitioner is correct that CALJIC Nos. 8.42 and 8.43 reference the legal

principle that a manslaughter verdict requires a reduction of homicide from

murder. It does not follow, however, that these instructions created any

“improper presumptions” or that they “lightened” the prosecution’s burden of

proof in such a way as to give rise to a due process violation. Rather, CALJIC

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Nos. 8.42 and 8.43 accurately state the law, which includes the principle that the

reduction of a homicide from murder to manslaughter hinges on the absence or

presence of malice aforethought. Petitioner has not established that the use of

these instructions lessened the burden of proof. 

Reading CALJIC Nos. 8.42 and 8.43 “in the context of the instructions as a

whole” reinforces the appellate court’s finding that these instructions created no

improper presumption of guilt. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Aside from CALJIC

Nos. 8.42 and 8.43, the court instructed the jury with additional CALJIC

instructions which made explicit the burden on the prosecution. CALJIC No.

8.50, for instance, was read to include the following: “To establish that a killing is

murder and not manslaughter, the burden is on the People to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt each of the elements of murder and that the act which caused the

death was not done in the heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel.” RT 2725-26. 

The jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 8.72, which provides: “If you are

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the killing was

unlawful, but you unanimously agree that you have a reasonable doubt whether

the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of

that doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.” Id. at 2726-28. If

the burden on the prosecution was in any way vague upon the issuance of

CALJIC Nos. 8.42 and 8.43, these additional instructions clarified the

prosecution’s burden. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial

court created an impermissible presumption in favor of a murder verdict because

the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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2. Issuance of Erroneous Instructions

 Prior to 2001, intent to kill was required for a conviction of voluntary

manslaughter. Following People v. Blakely, 23 Cal.4th 82, 96 (2000) and People

v. Lasko, 23 Cal.4th 101, 96 (2000), CALJIC No. 8.40 was revised to expand the

definition of voluntary manslaughter such that one could commit the offense

“either with an intent to kill, or with conscious disregard for human life.” 

CALJIC No. 8.40.

When discussing jury instructions, the trial court indicated that it would

issue the 2001 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.40. RT 2529. When the court

orally instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, however, it erred by

omitting reference to “conscious disregard for human life” in the opening

paragraph of the instruction. The court orally instructed the jury on CALJIC No.

8.40 as follows:

The crime of manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human

being without malice aforethought. Voluntary manslaughter, a

violation of section 192(a) of the Penal Code, is a lesser crime ... of

second degree murder. Every person who unlawfully kills another

human being without malice aforethought, but with an intent to kill,

is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of Penal Code

section 192(a). There is no malice aforethought if the killing

occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

RT 2723. The court proceeded to immediately thereafter complete the instruction

of CALJIC No. 8.40 with the appropriate post-2001 revision language:

Conscious disregard for life, as used in this instruction, means

that a killing results from the doing of an intentional act, the natural

consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was

deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct

endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard

for life.

In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements

must be proved: One, a human being was killed; two, the killing was

unlawful and; three, the perpetrator of the killing either intended to kill

the alleged victim or acted in conscious disregard for life and; four,

the perpetrator's conduct resulted in the unlawful killing.

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Id. (emphasis added.) The written instructions that were given to the jury contained

the same error in the first paragraph of the instruction. CT 1181.

Although the court properly incorporated the “conscious disregard for human

life” language from the 2001 revision in the latter portion of the instruction,

Petitioner argues that he was nonetheless deprived of due process because “the jury

could have thought that they could find [Petitioner] guilty of voluntary manslaughter

only if they found that he harbored an intent to kill” based on the initial omission. 

Pet. at 15.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim. The court held

that, while it was error “in the wake of Blakely and Lasko, to instruct a jury that a

conviction for voluntary manslaughter invariably requires proof of an intent to kill

. . . the situation was largely dissipated when the jury was then told that one of the

elements required for conviction was that ‘the perpetrator of the killing either

intended to kill the alleged victim or acted in conscious disregard for life.’” 

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 13. The court noted that the initial error of

omission was further mitigated by the trial court’s defining of “conscious disregard

for life” as part of the instruction, which “accurately informed the jury that

conviction for voluntary manslaughter did not depend on finding that defendant had

an ‘intent to kill.’” Id. Additionally, the court found that the prosecution did not

“exploit the potential confusion in CALJIC No. 8.40 ” that Petitioner identifies. Id.

at 14. In light of “all the evidence,” the court concluded that “the error was

harmless.” Id. at 15.

Petitioner now argues that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of his

erroneous instruction claim was incorrect because “it is not reasonable for a jury to

be expected to ferret out accurate and inaccurate parts of an instruction, particularly

an instruction that describes the elements of an offense.” Pet. at 15.

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Petitioner argues that CALJIC No. 8.40, as was given to the jury, was an

erroneous instruction. However, the instruction, as it was given, contained all of the

elements of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to the 2001 revisions. The fact that the

“conscious disregard for life” language was omitted from the first part of the

instruction did not render the instruction erroneous insofar as it was included in the

discussion of the elements of the crime and there were no false statements of the law

in the instruction. See Ho, 332 F.3d at 592.

The trial court’s error in failing to issue the revised jury instruction in its

entirety may at most have rendered the jury instruction ambiguous, in which case the

relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 7; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380 (1990). Despite the trial court’s error of initially

omitting the ‘conscious disregard’ language, it ultimately instructed the jury that in

order to prove voluntary manslaughter, the prosecution had to prove that “the

perpetrator of the killing either intended to kill the alleged victim or acted in

conscious disregard for life.” RT 2723. As the state court noted, the jury had all

elements of the crime before it with the given instruction and prosecution did not try

to exploit any ambiguity in the trial court’s error. It cannot be said that there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied this instruction in a way that violated

Petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

Even if Petitioner were able to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that

the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution, his

claim would still fail because Petitioner would not be able to establish prejudice.

See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (1993). Under Brecht, Petitioner must show that any

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict. Id. See also Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(finding Brecht prejudice where “at the very least” the court could not “‘say with fair

assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the [instructional]

error.’”). Given the ample evidence that Petitioner acted with malice aforethought

presented at trial, including the evidence regarding the relationship between the

victim and Petitioner, the testimony of forensic experts who indicated that criminal

agency played a role in the victim’s murder, it is clear that the judgment was not

“substantially swayed” by instructional error. See Coleman, 210 F.3d 1051.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the jury

instructions on voluntary manslaughter were erroneous because the California Court

of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

determination of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

IV. Admission of Hearsay Statements

Petitioner claims that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation, the right to due process, and the right to a fair trial because the trial

court improperly admitted 15 hearsay statements attributed to the victim. Petitioner

identifies the statements as follows:

1) From Isabel Perry, that Emery said that her boyfriend suddenly

walked into the Casbah Club, got her over his shoulders, and carried

her out of the club. She also said that her boyfriend caused her

problems at other clubs.

2) From Joy Harris, that Emery said that she wanted to leave Petitioner

because he was controlling and possessive.

3) From Joy Harris, that Emery said that Petitioner did not want her to

go out.

4) From Joy Harris, that Emery said that Petitioner took some of her

money.

5) From Joy Harris, that Emery said that Petitioner told her he had a

date set up for her to go to dinner with some guy for $300 on

Halloween night. However, when she went to his house to meet this

guy, only Petitioner was there. He had been trying to get back with

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her.

6) From Joy Harris, that Emery said that Petitioner was stalking her.

7) From Thomas Riedl, that Emery said that she broke up with

Petitioner because he was very controlling.

8) From Thomas Riedl, that Emery said that Petitioner told her that he

wanted to have sex with her one more time.

9) From Thomas Riedl, that Emery said, “It’s Larry’s car out there,”

referring to appellant’s car in the street outside the Jackson Street

apartment.

10) From Thomas Riedl, that Emery said that, “Larry will get over it

and he will be fine,” in response to Riedl’s suggestions that she get a

restraining order.

11) From Thomas Riedl, that Emery said that Petitioner called her and

said that he had set up a date for her to get paid $300 to go to dinner

with someone on Halloween. However, it had been a setup by

Petitioner to be with her.

12) From Thomas Riedl, that Emery said that Petitioner would not be

at his home in Hayward when she went there to get her resume.

13) From Karen Emery, that Emery said that Petitioner wanted to

control the money and kept it in the trunk of his car.

14) From Karen Emery, that Emery said that she moved into the

apartment in Oakland because Petitioner had become possessive and

controlling and she just wanted to be away from him.

15) From Karen Emery, that Emery said that there were occasions

when she came home to the Oakland apartment that Petitioner would

be across the street watching her. Once she went over to his car, and

he asked her for sex for the last time.

Pet. at 16-17.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial court

improperly admitted these statements. The court explained:

The relevant law was explained in People v. Noguera (1992) 4

Cal.4th 599, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160: “In People v. Ruiz

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854, ... we held that

the trial court's admission of the hearsay testimony of three murder

victims expressing their fear of the defendant was error because

‘neither the states of mind of these victims prior to their deaths ... nor

their acts or conduct ... were an issue in the case which might have

been resolved or assisted by the challenged evidence.’” [Citation.] ‘As

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our cases have made clear,’ we said, ‘”a victim's out-of-court

statements of fear of an accused are admissible under [Evidence Code]

section 1250 only when the victim's conduct in conformity with that

fear is in dispute. Absent such dispute, the statements are irrelevant.”

[Citations omitted.] 

We went on to observe ... that 'a victim's prior statements of fear are

not admissible to prove the defendant's conduct or motive (state of

mind). If the rule were otherwise, such statements of prior fear or

friction could be routinely admitted to show that the defendant had a

motive to injure or kill.' [Citation omitted.] 

Thus, hearsay statements of victims concerning fears or threats against

them by the accused, when offered to prove the conduct of the

accused, are not within the exception to the hearsay rule embodied in

Evidence Code section 1250. Here, neither Jovita's state of mind nor

her conduct was relevant to any part of the People's case; nor did the

defense raise any issue concerning her state of mind or behavior at or

before the night she was murdered. The entire thrust of the defense

case went to the identity of the killer and defendant's alibi that he was

attending a party miles away from the crime scene.... 

Jovita's state of mind or conduct not being an issue in either the

prosecution or defense case, her hearsay statements reflecting dislike

and fear of defendant failed to satisfy the requirement that the

declarant's 'state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation ... [be] itself

an issue in the action.' (Evid.Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).) It was thus

error for the trial court to admit them into evidence.” (People v.

Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th 599, 621-622, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d

1160.). 

Noguera is inapposite here, however, because defendant's

statement to police put into issue the victim's state of mind. The

evidence was particularly relevant to rebutting the substance of

defendant's November 11, 1998, statement, specifically that (1) the

victim willingly came to his apartment, expecting defendant to be

there, in order that she could pick up some money that defendant owed

her and her uncle and be picked up at defendant's apartment by an

“escort” and, (2) he visited the victim at her new apartment in Oakland

because she had given him a blanket invitation. The statements

concerning Ms. Emery's state of mind were relevant to whether she

would act in conformity with her oft-expressed fears, i.e., whether it

was at all likely that she would go to defendant's apartment if there

was any chance of meeting defendant. The statements were not offered

for the truth of their hearsay content, nor were they offered to prove

conduct by defendant.

Moreover, defendant's counsel put the victim's state of mind at

issue with these remarks in his opening statement at the start of the

trial: “You're going to hear evidence in this case that Lavonda Emery

and Larry Johnson lived together. You're going to hear evidence in this

case that Larry Johnson and Lavonda Emery had a romantic

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relationship ... that that relationship ended two to three weeks [ ]

before Miss Emery's disappearance. That Miss Emery moved in with

Joy Harris. [P] You're going to hear evidence that Larry Johnson

continued to have a relationship with Miss Emery; that relationship

was both friendly, financial and business-like.” 

The decision whether to admit state-of-mind evidence was

committed to the trial court's discretion. (People v. Escobar (2000) 82

Cal.App.4th 1085, 1103, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 696.) That discretion clearly

was not abused here. 

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).

Petitioner argues that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of his claim

was based on “overbroad reasoning.” Pet. at 17. He posits that the prosecution

introduced many of the statements in question to prove his conduct, not the victim’s

state of mind, “which is an impermissible purpose under the Evidence Code section

1250 hearsay exception.” Id. 

A. Legal Standard

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a

specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is ofsuch magnitude that the

result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See

Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d

984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). Failure to comply with state

rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal

habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. Van

de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 

While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was

conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial

even when state standards are violated; conversely,state procedural and evidentiary

rules may countenance processesthat do not comport with fundamentalfairness. See

id. (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 838 (1984)). The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the

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4

Crawford, decided after Petitioner’s case became final, does not apply

retroactively to his case on collateral attack. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct.

1173, 1184 (2007). 

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admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 F.2d

at 990. But only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from

the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal

cases the accused has the right to “be confronted with witnesses against him.” U.S.

Const. amend. VI. The federal confrontation right applies to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). It

commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a

particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16

(1974) (a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of crossexamination).

The Confrontation Clause applies to all "testimonial" statements. See

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. "Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or

affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id. at 51

(citations and quotation marks omitted); see id. ("An accuser who makes a formal

statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes

a casual remark to an acquaintance does not."). The Confrontation Clause applies

not only to in-court testimony but also to out-of-court statements introduced at trial,

regardless of the admissibility of the statements under state laws of evidence.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.4

In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980), the Supreme Court established a

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two-pronged test to determine whether admission of an out-of-court declarant’s

statement violates the Confrontation Clause. First, a showing must be made that the

declarant is “unavailable.” Roberts, 448 U.S. 65; Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d

424, 427 (9th Cir. 1988) (admission of dead witness’ statement not violation of

Confrontation Clause where testimony of girlfriend of dead witness placed petitioner

at scene of crime and met indicia of reliability); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396 (9th

Cir. 1985) (admission of sworn videotaped testimony by dead eyewitness not

violation of Confrontation Clause due to necessity for testimony and particular

guarantees of trustworthiness). 

Second, the statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of

reliability.” Roberts, 488 U.S. at 57. . Otherwise, the evidence may not be admitted

absent a showing of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 66.

Reliability may be established solely by a showing that the evidence falls within a

firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. 

Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay when offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974).

While the Confrontation Clause does not necessarily bar the admission of hearsay

statements, it may prohibit introducing evidence that otherwise would be admissible

under a hearsay exception. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813, 814 (1990); see,

e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139-40 (1999) (plurality) (admission of

accomplice’s hearsay confession to police inculpating defendant violated

Confrontation Clause); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring) (same). 

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the trial

court violated his due process rights when it admitted hearsay statements attributed

to the victim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Violation of Rights to Due Process and a Fair Trial

The trial court’s admission of the hearsay statements in question was not

arbitrary or prejudicial such that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See

Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. All of the

admitted statements were highly relevant, and not arbitrary, as they pertained to the

relationship between Petitioner and the victim and helped to provide insights into the

victim’s state of mind prior to her disappearance. Further, the trial court instructed

the jury that it could only consider the hearsay statements as to state of mind, “as

tending to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant,” and for no other

purpose. RT 794-95. Ultimately, it cannot be said that the admission of the 15

hearsay statements “rendered the trial ultimately unfair” because the statements

themselves constituted a negligible portion of the abundant circumstantial evidence

implicating Petitioner in the murder of the victim, based upon which the jury found

Petitioner guilty. Moreover, it cannot be said that there were no permissible

inferencesthat the jury could draw fromthe evidence such that its admission violated

due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim he was deprived

of the right to due process and the right to a fair trial because the trial court

improperly admitted these hearsay statements of the victim because the California

Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable determination of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or

involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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2. Confrontation Clause

Petitioner does not explain how he contends the admission of these hearsay

statements violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Although the victim’s disclosures to her friends constitute “out of court statements,”

they were not offered or admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead

as evidence of her state of mind. See Anderson, 417 U.S. at 211. Moreover, as

mentioned above, the trial court expressly instructed the jury that it could only

consider the hearsay statements as to state of mind, “as tending to prove or explain

acts or conduct of the declarant,” and for no other purpose. RT 794-95.

Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated by their admission.

 Even if the hearsay statements in question gave rise to a potential violation of

the Confrontation Clause, Petitioner’s claim would still fail because such claims are

subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th

Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231,1235 (9th Cir. 2005). For

purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the

Confrontation Clause is whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and

prejudicial effect upon the jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637); Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1393

(same). In light of the abundant evidence implicating Petitioner in the victim’s

murder, as discussed above, the admission of these statements cannot be considered

prejudicial.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim he was deprived

of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the trial court improperly

admitted the hearsay statements attributed to the victim because the California Court

of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

determination of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or involved an

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unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

V. Failure to Give Instruction on Involuntary Manslaughter

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. At trial,

Petitioner’s counsel expressly declined to argue for an instruction on involuntary

manslaughter because he didn’t “see any facts or inference from proven facts that

would support the giving of the involuntary manslaughter [instruction].” RT 2528.

The court agreed that “it seemed that involuntary manslaughter would not fit the

facts as they’ve come out in this case.” Id. at 2542. Nonetheless, Petitioner brought

a claim to the state appellate court that the trial court should have given an

instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The California Court of Appeal rejected

Petitioner’s claim as follows:

[T]here was no evidence that defendant merely brandished the

knife, as opposed to consciously employing it as a weapon. The

prosecution did present evidence of the latter (i.e., testimony that

around the victim's left eye were marks that could have been caused by

the knife found in defendant's closet), but defendant presented no

evidence of the former. The only evidence explaining his version of

the victim's last day was the statement he gave to police on November

11. At best it shows that that he and Ms. Emery had an argument that

involved yelling only, with no physical violence, and no mention of a

knife, and that it ended with sufficient lack of ill-feeling that the two

had sex. As for the “physical fight” defendant mentions, he is

referring to Riedl's hearsay testimony regarding the hysterical

telephone call he received from the victim weeks before her

disappearance, and it did not involve a knife. Based upon strong

evidence of the brutality and thoroughness of Ms. Emery's killing (cut

marks in the area of the eyes, a broken jaw, four broken ribs, fractures

of both hips, the sacrum, and left femur), the jury found defendant

guilty of murder. Under these circumstances, and considering that the

jury rejected voluntary manslaughter, there was no error in failing to

instruct on involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24

Cal.4th 130, 174, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v.

Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d

1094.) 

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 16.

Petitioner here argues that the appellate court was wrong to reject his claim,

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because the evidence of the “brutality and thoroughness” of the victim’s killing does

not “inform . . . with respect to the state of mind of the perpetrator.” Pet. at 18.

Petitioner asserts that the cut marks found on the victim could be the product of

criminal negligence, or could have been inflicted during the commission of an

ordinarily lawful act involving a high degree of risk of death or great bodily harm,

which would support a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

A. Legal Standard

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859

F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant

was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.

Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the

case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 745. After

all, due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence

supports it. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982); Menendez v. Terhune,

422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir.),

amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).

An examination of the record is required to see precisely what was given and

what was refused and whether the given instructions adequately embodied the

defendant's theory. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.

1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980). In other words, it allows a determination

of whether what was given was so prejudicial as to infect the entire trial and so deny

due process. See id.

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a

misstatement ofthe law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d at 475-76 (citing Henderson

v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure

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to give a particular instruction bears an “‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v.

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 155 (1977)). The significance of the omission of such an instruction may be

evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given. Murtishaw v.

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156);

see id. at 972 (due process violation found in capital case where petitioner

demonstrated that application of the wrong statute at his sentencing infected the

proceeding with the jury's potential confusion regarding its discretion to impose a life

or death sentence). 

It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate

instructions on the defense theory of the case. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734,

739 (9th Cir. 2000) (error to deny defendant's request for instruction on simple

kidnaping where such instruction was supported by the evidence). Failure to instruct

on the theory of defense violates due process if “‘the theory is legally sound and

evidence in the case makes it applicable.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904-05

(9th Cir.2006) (quoting Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 577). However, the defendant is not

entitled to have jury instructions raised in his or her precise terms where the given

instructions adequately embody the defense theory, United States v. Del Muro, 87

F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996); Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d at 1040, nor to an instruction

embodying the defense theory if the evidence does not support it, Menendez, 422

F.3d at 1029.

The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense in a capital case is

constitutional error if there was evidence to support the instruction. See Beck v.

Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980); Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir.

1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.

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It appears that Beck may not even apply to capital cases in California

because California, unlike the State of Alabama in Beck, has not

 “‘erected an artificial barrier that restrict[s] its juries to a choice between

conviction for a capital offense and acquittal.’” Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d

1053, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 96 (1998)).

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1999) (en banc).5

 But the failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser-included

offenses in a non-capital case does not present a federal constitutional claim. See

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d

1092, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1998); Turner, 63 F.3d at 819 (citing Bashor v. Riley, 730

F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)); cf. Vickers v. Ricketts,

798 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1986) (where evidence supports lesser-included-offense

instruction in capital case, due process requires that court give instruction sua

sponte), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). However, “the defendant's right to

adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the case might, in some cases,

constitute an exception to the general rule.” Solis, 219 F.3d at 929 (citing Bashor v.

Risley, 730 F.2d at 1240). Solis suggests that there must be substantial evidence to

warrant the instruction on the lesser included offense. See Solis, 219 F.3d 929-30 (no

duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense to murder

because evidence presented at trial precluded a heat of passion or imperfect selfdefense instruction; no duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter because

evidence presented at trial implied malice); see also Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d

1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (no duty in death penalty case to instruct on second

degree murder as a lesser included offense because the evidence established that the

killer had acted with premeditation, so if the jury found that the defendant was the

killer, it necessarily would have found that he committed first degree murder).

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the trial

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court violated his due process rights when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser

offense of involuntary manslaughter was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). The failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser-included offenses in

a non-capital case, such as the case here, does not present a federal constitutional

claim, except when there is substantial evidence to warrant the instruction on the

lesser included offense. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 929. In the instant case, the “lesser

included offense” is involuntary manslaughter, which is the unlawful killing of a

human being “without malice aforethought . . . without an intent to kill, and without

conscious disregard for human life.” CALJIC No. 8.45. 

Petitioner does not identify nor does the court find substantial evidence which

would support the court’s issuance of an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. 

To the contrary, the appellate court noted there was significant evidence presented

at trial indicating that Petitioner acted with malice aforethought, and that he harbored

an intent to kill and no evidence of a version of events consistent with involuntary

manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to instruct on involuntary

manslaughter cannot be said to violate Petitioner’s due process rights. See Clark,

450 F.3d at 904-05 (quoting Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 577).

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial court

violated his due process rights when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense

of involuntary manslaughter because the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of

the claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

VI. Evidence of Prior Domestic Violence

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence regarding past incidents of domestic

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6

See Section IV above for a complete description of the testimony of these

trial witnesses.

40

violence under Cal. Evid. Code § 1109. Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 provides, in relevant

part that, “except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal action in which

the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the

defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by

Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” Cal. Evid.

Code § 1109. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101 stands generally for the principle that

“[e]vidence of a person’s character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his or

her conduct on a specified occasion.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1101. Cal. Evid. Code §

352 permits courts, in their discretion, to “exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate

undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352. 

Petitioner filed several motions in limine to exclude or limit the testimony of

several witnesses whom might have been anticipated to testify on incidents of prior

domestic violence committed by Petitioner. These witnesses included Eva Jean,

Isabel Perry, Karen Emery, and Thomas Riedl.6

 The Court denied Petitioner’s

motions to exclude the testimony of these witnesses. On appeal, the California Court

of Appeal rejected this claim, explaining:

 This court rejected an identical due process claim in People v.

Escobar,supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, and we see

no reason to revisit that conclusion. 

The equal protection argument was rejected in People v.

Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, wherein

Division Three of this District stated: “domestic violence is

quintessentially a secretive offense, shrouded in private shame,

embarrassment and ambivalence on the part of the victim, as well as

intimacy with and intimidation by the perpetrator. The special

relationship between victim and perpetrator in both domestic violence

and sexual abuse cases, with their unusually private and intimate

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context, easily distinguishes these offenses from the broad variety of

criminal conduct in general. Although all criminal trials are credibility

contests to some extent, this is unusually-even inevitably-so in

domestic and sexual abuse cases, specifically with respect to the issue

of victim credibility. The Legislature could rationally distinguish

between these two kinds of cases and all other criminal offenses in

permitting the admissibility of previous like offenses in order to assist

in more realistically adjudging the unavoidable credibility contest

between accuser and accused. The fact that other crimes such as

murder and mayhem may be more serious and that credibility contests

are not confined to domestic violence cases do not demonstrate the

absence of the required rational basis for the Legislature's distinction

between these crimes.” (Id. at p. 1313, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727.) We agree

with this analysis.

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 16. Petitioner now argues that Cal. Evid. Code §

1109 is unconstitutional, and that it “violates equal protection of the laws.” Pet. at

24.

A. Legal Standard

Permitting a jury to hear evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may violate due

process. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6 (1983); Fritchie v.

McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

561 (1967)). A state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal

habeas review, however, unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing

upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the

defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th

Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot disturb on due process grounds a

state court's decision to admit evidence of prior crimes or bad acts unless the

admission of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357; Colley 784 F.2d 990. 

The admission of other crimes evidence violates due process where there are

no permissible inferences the jury can draw from the evidence (in other words, no

inference other than conduct in conformity therewith). See McKinney v. Rees, 993

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F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. But it is generally upheld

where: (1) there issufficient proof that the defendant committed the prior act; (2) the

prior act is not too remote in time; (3) the prior act is similar (if admitted to show

intent); (4) the prior act is used to prove a material element; and (5) the probative

value of admitting evidence of the prior act is not substantially outweighed by any

prejudice the defendant may suffer as a result of its admission. See McDowell v.

Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1366 (9th Cir.) (sentencer may rely on prior criminal

conduct not resulting in a conviction if the evidence has “some minimal indicium of

reliability beyond mere allegation”), amended, 116 F.3d 364 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated

in part by 130 F.3d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357-58

(upholding state admission of prior on federal habeas review); Sanders v.

Housewright, 603 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (D. Nev. 1985) (same), aff'd, 796 F.2d 479

(9th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Sneezer, 983 F.2d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1992)

(upholding admission of prior on direct review on similar grounds), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 836 (1993). But cf. Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2001)

(instruction permitting jury to consider priors for purposes of establishing propensity

violates due process when balance of prosecution’s case is not strong, other crime

is same crime for which defendant is on trial, and evidence of prior is emotionally

charged), overruled on other grounds by 538 U.S. 202 (2003).

A statute or rule of evidence allowing admission of evidence of prior crimes

to show a propensity to commit the charged offense does not facially violate due

process if the evidence to be admitted is subject to a balancing test by the trial court.

See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (new federal rules

of evidence allowing evidence of prior sexual offenses to show a propensity to

commit the charged offense do not violate due process because evidence is still

subject to trial court balancing test which provides for meaningful appellate review).

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B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the trial

court violated his due process rights when it allowed the prosecution to introduce

evidence regarding past incidents of domestic violence under Cal. Evid. Code §

1109, was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior crimes of domestic

violence was not arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357; Colley 784 F.2d at 990. To the contrary, the

prosecution argued that the incident of domestic violence to which Ms. Jean was to

testify was not remote in time (it occurred within the same year as the murder of the

victim), and it was probative of defendant’s propensity for violence. RT 45. In the

case of Ms. Perry, the prosecution argued, again, that the incident to which she was

going to testify spoke, in part, to Petitioner’s intent. RT 49. The prosecution also

stressed the probative value surrounding the testimony of Ms. Emery, the victim’s

mother, and Mr. Riedl, particularly as it pertained to Petitioner’s harassing behavior

towards the victim, and her fear of him. RT 58-59. In each case, the trial court judge

denied Petitioner’s motion to exclude limited evidence in limine. In each case there

was sufficient proof that Petitioner committed the prior act, which was not too

remote in time, involved domestic violence against the victim (as admitted to show

intent), was used to prove a material element (intent), and of marked probative value

as compared to any potential for prejudice. See McDowell, 107 F.3d at 1366.

Petitioner here fails to show how the trial court’s decision amounts to an error that

might give rise to a constitutional violation.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial court

violated his due process rights when it allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence

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regarding past incidents of domestic violence under Cal. Evid. Code § 1109 because

the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, or involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

VII. Jury Instructions Misstated Burden of Proof Necessary for Conviction

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s instruction to the jury on CALJIC Nos.

2.50.02, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 deprived him of due process by misstating the burden of

proof necessary for conviction. The California Court of Appeal provided the

following background for Petitioner’s claim:

The trial court instructed the jury with the version of CALJIC

No. 2.50.02 amended in 1999. As relevant here the jury was

instructed: “Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing

that the defendant engaged in an offense involving domestic violence

on one or more cases other than that charged in this case.... 

If you find that the defendant committed a prior offense

involving domestic violence, you may, but are not required to, infer

that the defendant had a disposition to commit offenses involving

domestic violence. 

If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but

are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit

the crime of which he is accused. 

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant committed a prior crime, or crimes involving domestic

violence, that is not sufficient by itself ... to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt, that he committed the charged offense. The weight and

significance, if any, are for you to decide. You must not consider this

evidence for any other purpose.” 

The jury was then instructed with CALJIC Nos. 2.50.1 and

2.50.2 as follows: “Within the meaning of the preceding instruction,

the prosecution has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that a defendant committed crimes other than that for which

he is on trial. You must not consider this evidence for any purpose

unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant

committed the other crimes. 

Preponderance of the evidence means evidence that has more

convincing force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is so evenly

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balanced that you are unable to find that the evidence on either side of

an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue must be against the

party who had the burden of proving it.” 

Defendant contends that these instructions “deprived him of due

process by misstating the burden of proof necessary for conviction.”

Defendant perceives the likelihood that the jury could find by a

preponderance of the evidence that he committed prior acts of

domestic violence, and from that draw “the improper inference of guilt

from propensity,” thereby impermissibly diluting the requirement of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this argument defendant

lays particular stress on the “and did commit” language in CALJIC

No. 2.50.02.

Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 16-17.

The court rejected Petitioner’s claim, noting that the “essence” of his

reasoning “was rejected by Division Two of this Court in People v. Brown (2000) 77

Cal.App.4th 1324, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 433, which relied in large part on the Supreme

Court's decision in People v.Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986

P.2d 182. We find the logic of Brown persuasive.” Id. at 17.

In Brown, the court found that CALJIC No. 2.50.02 expressly prohibited the

jury from inferring that the defendant committed the charged offense based solely on

proof of prior acts of domestic violence. Id. citing Brown, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 92.

The court further found that the review of the record revealed “a consistent message

from the instructions as a whole and from the closing arguments . . . that the jury

must find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it could convict him of any

of the charged offenses,” and concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that

the jury believed it could convict on a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id.

In Falsetta, and its progeny, including People v. Reliford 29 Cal.4th 1007

(2003), the Supreme Court of California addressed CALJIC No. 2.50.01, “which is

similar to CALJIC No. 2.50.02, except that it deals with evidence of prior sexual

offenses admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108.” Id. at 17. Where the

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defendant in those cases essentially put forth the same argument as the defendant in

Brown, and the court again found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the

jury believed it could convict on a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Based on the “logic of Brown and Reliford,” the California Court of Appeal

concluded that Petitioner’s claim “must be rejected.” Id. at 18. The court found that

the factual circumstances of the instant case were the same as in Brown, and that

Petitioner was unable “to point to proof in the record that other instructions or

argument from counsel which suggested a lowering of the prosecution's burden of

proof.” Id.

Petitioner here challenges the appellate court’s conclusion that there was no

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied a standard below reasonable doubt. He

reiterates his position that CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 misstate the way

in which a jury may treat propensity evidence, “in a manner that undermines the

presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard” and which is

“constitutionally infirm.” Pet. at 27.

A. Legal Standard

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp, 414

U.S. at 147; see also Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643 (1974) (“‘[I]t must be established

not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even “universally

condemned,” but that it violated some [constitutional right].’”). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact

necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397

U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This constitutional principle prohibits the State from using

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evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State

of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of

a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 400-03 (1991); Carella v. California, 491

U.S. 263, 265-66 (1989); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985); Sandstrom

v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-24 (1979). Failure to properly instruct the jury on the

necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt “can never be harmless error.” Gibson

v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 825 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 320 n.14 (1979)). “When a court gives the jury instructions that allow it to

convict on an impermissible legal theory, as well as a theory that meets constitutional

requirements, ‘the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the

conviction be set aside.’” Id. (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 379-80

(1990)).

When confronted with an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is whether there

is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied it in an unconstitutional manner.

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). Such

an unconstitutional application must also have a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict, see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, to warrant

relief in habeas proceedings. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146-47

(1998).

The Ninth Circuit found the 1996 version of CALJIC 2.50.01 to be facially

erroneous as to the burden of proof in Gibson, 387 F.3d at 821-22. That version

read,

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but

are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit the

same or similar type sexual offenses. If you find that the defendant had this

disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely to

commit and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. 

Id. at 822. The trial court immediately followed with CALJIC 2.50.1:

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Whereas CALJIC No. 2.50.1 governs the treatment prior sex offenses,

CALJIC 2.50.2 deals with evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence.

48

Within the meaning of the preceding instructions the prosecution has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant

committed sexual offenses and/or domestic violence other than those for

which he is on trial. 

Id. The Gibson court found that the trial court’s use of this version of CALJIC

2.50.01, combined with CALJIC 2.50.1, violated due process by allowing the “jury

to find the [petitioner] committed the uncharged sexual offenses by a preponderance

of the evidence and thus infer that he had committed the charged acts based upon

facts found not beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Id. at 821-23. The Gibson court specified that it found no errors in the remainder

CALJIC 2.50.01. See id.

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the trial

court violated his due process rights by misstating the burden of proof necessary for

conviction was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The versions of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 at issue in this case

are neither facially erroneous nor ambiguous with regard to the standard of proof. 

Gibson serves as an analogous case, as the language of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and

2.50.02 parallel each other.7

 The Gibson court found that the 1996 version of

CALJIC 2.50.01 coupled with 2.50.1 violated due process by allowing jurors to infer

guilt based on evidence of prior sex offenses proved not beyond a reasonable doubt,

but by the lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Id. at 821-23. Here,

however, the versions of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.1 and 2.50.2 that were given explicitly

prohibit a lesser, or preponderance of evidence, standard. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at

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72. As noted above, the version of CALJIC No. 2.50.2 used by the trial court

expressly proscribed the jury from inferring Petitioner’s guilt based solely on prior

incidents, as doing so would have been an insufficient basis for proving the instant

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson, 2003 WL 21224035, at 17.

Even if the instructions here were ambiguous, there is no “reasonable

likelihood” that the jury applied it in an unconstitutional manner. See Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72 & n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see, e.g., Ficklin v.

Hatcher, 177 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (“harmless error” when certain that

jury did not rely on constitutionally infirm instruction). 

Assuming the jury did improperly apply the version of the instruction here due

to ambiguity, it would not be a structural error as in Gibson, in which the court

refused to extend harmless error analysis to facially invalid jury instructions. 387

F.3d at 825. Instead, the inquiry would be whether the error had a substantial and

injurious effect on the guilty verdict and whether the verdict would stand absent the

erroneously admitted evidence. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 (citing Kotteakos, 328

U.S. at 764-65). However, the errant application of an ambiguous instruction

regarding the evidence of prior domestic offenses would not have had such an effect.

Petitioner faced overwhelmingly inculpatory evidence at trial that established his

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury could have reasonably determined

Petitioner’s guilt on this basis alone. Accordingly, this Court finds no due process

violation and rejects this claim on the merits.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial court

violated his due process rights by misstating the burden of proof necessary for

conviction because the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of

Respondent and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2007

_______________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CAMPBELL et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-05169 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 24, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Joan Killeen

Office of the Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Larry M. Johnson C-77494

CTF - Correctional Training Facility

P. O Box 689

Soldad, Ca 93960-0689

Dated: October 24, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:04-cv-05169-JSW Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 51 of 51