Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03626/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03626-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Lee Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3626

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

v. * District of Missouri.

*

Gary Lee Smith, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 13, 2004

Filed: May 5, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Gary Lee Smith, a commercial photographer, took sexually explicit

photographs of a nude twelve-year-old girl. He later distributed the photographs over

the Internet and by mail. The Government charged Smith with production of child

pornography, interstate transportation of child pornography, and reproduction of child

pornography for interstate distribution. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a)(1),

2252(a)(2). Smith retained counsel in May 2002. On the first day of Smith’s bench

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*

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

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trial eleven months later, Smith asked the district court*

 for the first time to remove

his attorney for ineffective assistance. Smith also requested a continuance. The court

denied Smith’s requests. At the conclusion of Smith’s bench trial, Smith was

convicted. Before sentencing, the Government filed a motion for an upward

departure alleging Smith’s criminal history was understated and his guideline

calculation underestimated his risk of recidivism. After hearing the testimony of

several witnesses at the sentencing hearing, the district court agreed. In a written

statement of reasons for departing upward, the district court specified it added two

criminal history levels because Smith’s otherwise applicable criminal history category

understates his past criminal conduct and his likelihood of re-offending. Thus, the

district court increased Smith’s criminal history category from II to IV. With a total

offense level of 33, Smith’s sentencing range was 188-235 months. The district court

sentenced Smith to 235 months in prison. 

Smith first contends the district court committed error in departing upward at

sentencing. We review de novo whether the district court based its departure on a

permissible factor, review the factual findings supporting the departure for clear error,

and review the reasonableness of the departure for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Long Turkey, 342 F.3d 856, 859-60 (8th Cir. 2003). In this case, the district court

based its departure on a permissible factor. Section 4A1.3(a)(1) of the sentencing

guidelines provides for upward departures when “reliable information indicates that

the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the

seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant

will commit other crimes.” Section 4A1.3(a)(2) specifies the types of information

forming the basis for an upward departure, including earlier sentences not used in

computing the criminal history category and earlier similar adult criminal conduct not

resulting in a criminal conviction. At the sentencing hearing, Government witnesses

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testified about Smith’s production and attempted production of child pornography

involving victims other than the trial victim, both before and after the trial victim’s

ordeal. One of the other victims testified Smith took sexually explicit photographs

of her when she was fifteen and tried to engage her in sexual activity. The victim was

corroborated by the photographs Smith had taken of her. None of this conduct was

taken into account in Smith’s initial criminal history category. The district court did

not commit clear error in crediting the victim’s testimony and finding Smith engaged

in the uncharged criminal conduct. Further, Smith had a conviction that was too old

to be counted for criminal history purposes. Contrary to Smith’s assertion, the district

court adequately specified the reasons for the departure in its written statement of

reasons attached to the judgment. See United States v. Aguilar-Lopez, 329 F.3d 960,

963 (8th Cir. 2003) (similar statement of reasons sufficient to allow review of

departure decision). The district court did not abuse its discretion in departing

upward two criminal history levels to account for the uncharged conduct. 

Next, Smith contends his 1998 Arkansas conviction for first-degree sexual

abuse, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-108 (Michie 1997), was not one relating to child

exploitation, and thus did not trigger an enhanced statutory minimum sentence of

fifteen years. Under the statute in effect at the time of Smith’s conviction, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2251(d) (2000), the basic statutory minimum sentence was ten years, but if the

defendant had one earlier conviction under certain federal laws or “under the laws of

any State relating to the sexual exploitation of children,” the statutory minimum

sentence was fifteen years. Smith does not contest that his victim in the Arkansas

case was fifteen years old. Likewise, Smith does not argue or cite authority for the

proposition that the district court could not look behind the elements of his state

offense to consider the age of his victim. Compare United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d

572, 582 (3d Cir. 2001) (district court may focus only on statutory definitions of

earlier convictions in determining whether defendant is subject to § 2251(d)

enhancement), with United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 447-49 (7th Cir. 2003)

(rejecting Galo and holding that when indictment and judgment, read in light of the

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statute of conviction, do not deny some fact that is relevant to enhancement and the

fact is uncontested or uncontestable, district court may use the fact–age of the

victim–in deciding whether the defendant has an earlier conviction relating to abusive

sexual conduct involving a minor warranting enhancement under § 2252(b)(2)). 

Instead, Smith argues only that the term “sexual exploitation of children” is

limited to pornography or criminal sexual conduct captured in visual depictions. We

reject this argument. Although the term “sexual exploitation of children” is not

defined in the statute, the term unambiguously refers to any criminal sexual conduct

with a child. By its very nature, any criminal sexual conduct with a child takes

advantage of, or exploits, a child sexually. The conduct need not be photographed

to qualify. In addition, the federal crimes specified in § 2251(d) as triggering the

enhancement are not limited to offenses involving pornography or visual depictions.

Accordingly, we conclude the district court properly applied the § 2251(d)

enhancement to Smith. 

Last, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s lastminute request for a new attorney and a continuance from trial. See United States v.

Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Yockel, 320 F.3d 818,

827 (8th Cir. 2003). Any claims of ineffective assistance are better addressed in

collateral proceedings, rather than on direct appeal. United States v. Pherigo, 327

F.3d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 2003). 

We thus affirm Smith’s conviction and sentence.

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