Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00067/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cr-00067-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Jacob Ockenfels
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

TIMOTHY JACOB OCKENFELS,

Defendant.

 /

No. CR 05-00067 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

AND REQUEST FOR FRANKS HEARING

On November 22, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence

and request for a Franks hearing. Having carefully considered the papers submitted by the parties and the

arguments of counsel, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion for suppression of evidence and DENIES

defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56

(1978).

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures without

probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure

cannot be admitted as proof against the victim of the search and, therefore, must be suppressed. See Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). In this case, the searches conducted by U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents on three computers owned by defendant and one from Fry’s

Electronics were valid for the reasons discussed below.

Case 3:05-cr-00067-SI Document 65 Filed 12/02/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1. Fry’s Electronics Loaner Computer (Computer #1) 

Defendant provides no basis for suppression of evidence with respect to the Fry’s loaner computer.

Because the search of the loaner computer was conducted after receiving valid consent fromthe owner ofthe

computer, the search did not require a search warrant. Consent to search is a well-established exception to

the Fourth Amendment prohibitionon warrantlesssearches. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

222 (1973). After defendant returned the computer to the store, Fry’s had the exclusive right to its possession

and was free to give its consent. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); see also United

States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, evidence from this computer was validly

obtained. 

2. Computer Seized on November 12, 2004 (Computer #2) 

Defendant argues that 42 U.S.C § 13032, which requires internet service providers to report any

informationin its possession concerning child pornography, effectively made AOL a state agent and, therefore,

any evidence obtained as a result of this “tip” should be suppressed. However, defendant’s challenge lacks

merit because he has not presented any facts supporting his contention thatAOL performed a “private search”

of his account. 

In the absence of any facts showing AOL engaged in a “search” and that government agents knew of

and acquiesced in this intrusive conduct, defendant’s argument essentially amounts to a facial challenge to 42

U.S.C. § 13032. Considering the plain language of the statute, it does nothing more than place a duty on

internet service providers to report if they obtain knowledge of facts or circumstances involving child

pornography. See 42 U.S.C. § 13032(e) (2005). The statute does not, on its face, authorize searches. See

id. Indeed, section (e) specifically states “nothing in this section may be construed to require a provider of

electronic communications services. . .to engage in the monitoring of any user, subscriber, or customer of that

provider, or the content of any communication of any such person.” Id. Thus, providers are not required to

take affirmative steps to monitor their customers.

Defendant further contends that the search of Computer #2 exceeded the consent form he signed

because he authorized agents to search “only for child pornography.” Applying the standard of “objective”

reasonablenesssetforth in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), this Court concludes that the agents

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did not exceed the scope of defendant’s consent. The consent form provided a detailed explanation of how

the search was to be conducted. Moreover, Special Agent Sean Sherrouse explained to defendant that the

objective ofthe search was to find child pornography. Therefore, a reasonable person could not misunderstand

the scope of the intended search.

3. Computer Seized on November 19, 2004 (Computer #3)

Defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained from Computer #3, a computer that defendant

purchased after Computer #2 was taken fromhis residence. Defendant asserts that agents exceeded the scope

of the search warrant when they searched his entire hard drive instead of limiting the scope of their search to

only child pornography. At the hearing, defendant argued the government illegally obtained evidence unrelated

to child pornography, such as information contained in emails and defendant’s internet activity on adult

pornography websites. This assertion lacks merit because the government may search for items that provide

evidence of a crime as well as the contraband related to that crime, so long as there is probable cause. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (c)(1-2); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983). 

Defendant also contends that the descriptions ofitems to be seized, specifically in Sections 2 and 3 of

Attachment B to the warrant, were not sufficiently particularized because they were “extraordinarily vague.”

These sections provided for the search and seizure of:

2. Information or correspondence pertaining to the digital posession, receipt, or distribution

ofvisual depcitions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §

2256. . .3. Records specifically relating to the use of a computer and/or an Internet or e-mail

account on the premises described in Attachment A in connection with digital possession,

receipt, or distribution of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256. . .

11/18/04 Search Warrant, attached as Exhibit D to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, at 19-20. It appears

that defendant is presenting a challenge to the requirements of prongs two and three of the test outlined in

United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986). However, defendant offers no explanation

to this Court why he believes the language used in the warrant offends the Fourth Amendment. From an

objective standpoint, the language employed in the warrant is clear and specifically states what federal agents

executing the warrant are to search for and seize from defendant’s residence. Without more ofa showing, the

Court cannot conclude that the language of the warrant was too vague to satisfy Fourth Amendment

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requirements. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the

11/18/04 search warrant.

4. Computer Seized on January 19, 2005 (Computer #4)

Likewise, defendant’s last ground forsuppressionofevidence also fails. Although there is some dispute

over whether Computer #4 was in plain view during the course of defendant’s arrest on January 19, 2005,

defendant does not dispute that agents had the authority to enter the computer room in the course of arresting

defendant in the next room. Officers executing an arrest warrant may, as a precautionary matter and without

probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look inside closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place

of arrest. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). Considering the record before this Court, it

appears that federal agents legally viewed Computer #4 and were not made aware of its existence by means

of an illegal search. Thus, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.

5. Request for Franks Hearing

Defendant argues that a Franks hearing is required because federal agents affirmatively misled the

magistrate judge by knowingly providing or omitting material information that was necessary to a finding of

probable cause in issuing search warrants on November 18, 2004 and January 19, 2005. Under Franks v.

Delaware, a party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he makes a substantialpreliminary showing that a false

statement was:(1) included in the affidavit forthe federalwarrant;(2) made knowingly and intentionally, or with

reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) necessary to the federal magistrate’s finding of probable cause. See

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. A non-conclusory “substantial preliminary showing” of such facts entitles the

defendant to an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 71-72. However, no hearing is required if “material that is the

subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the

warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause.” Id. at 172. 

Here, defendant fails to make the requisite “substantial preliminary showing.” See id. at 155.

Defendant maintains that the warrants indicate child pornography was found on Computer #1 yet the defense

has notfound any ofthis evidence on the mirrorimage hard drive produced during discovery. However, at the

hearing, defendant acknowledged he has not yet run a computer program that would detect the images

contained on the hard drive. In addition, this Court finds that defendant’s other claims of “misrepresentations

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and/or omissions” fail to cast doubt on the existence of probable cause rising to the levelof a Franks violation.

See United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 1992). As a result, there is no basis for this Court

to hold an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and request for a Franks hearing

is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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