Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01404/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01404-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Council on Education
Petitioner
Cellco Partnership
Intervenor
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent
Verizon Telephone Companies
Intervenor

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 2006 Decided June 9, 2006

No. 05-1404

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

VERIZON TELEPHONE COMPANIES AND

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS,

 D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

05-1408, 05-1438, 05-1451, 05-1453

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Matthew A. Brill argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs were Maureen E. Mahoney, Richard P. Bress,

Barry J. Blonien, James Xavier Dempsey, John B. Morris, Jr.,

Albert Gidari, Gerard J. Waldron, Andrew J. Schwartzman,

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2

Harold J. Feld, Jason Oxman, and Marc Rotenberg. John M.

Devaney entered an appearance.

Jacob M. Lewis, Attorney, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the

brief were Samuel L. Feder, General Counsel, John E. Ingle,

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Joseph R. Palmore,

Counsel.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.

Department of Justice, Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel,

and Scott R. McIntosh, Attorney, were on the brief for

respondent United States.

Michael E. Glover, Karen Zacharia, Joshua E. Swift,

John Scott, Samir C. Jain, and Meredith B. Halama were on the

brief for intervenors Verizon and Verizon Wireless in support of

respondents. 

Before: SENTELLE and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Dissenting opinion by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: In 2004, several lawenforcement agencies petitioned the Federal Communications

Commission (“FCC” or “the Commission”) to clarify the scope

of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47

U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (“CALEA” or “the Act”), with respect to

certain broadband Internet services. In response, the

Commission ruled that providers of broadband Internet access

and voice over Internet protocol (“VoIP”) services are regulable

as “telecommunications carriers” under the Act. As

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1

 Throughout this opinion we refer collectively to DSL and

cable modems as “broadband Internet access services,” or simply

“broadband.” We refer to interconnected VoIP services—which allow

users to make phone calls over broadband connections—simply as

“VoIP.” See generally In re IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863

(2004) (providing background information on both broadband and

VoIP). 

“telecommunications carriers,” broadband and VoIP providers

must ensure that law-enforcement officers are able to intercept

communications transmitted over the providers’ networks. The

American Council on Education and various other interested

parties (collectively “ACE”) petition for review, arguing that the

Commission’s interpretation of CALEA was unlawful. Because

we disagree, we deny the petition. 

I

Before the dawn of the digital era, there were few

technological obstacles to the government’s wiretapping

capabilities: Eavesdropping on a phone call was as easy as

finding the copper wires that ran into every caller’s home. With

the advent of the digital age, however, the architecture of the

world’s communications networks changed drastically. In the

place of physical copper wires that connected individual endusers, new communications technologies (such as digital

subscriber line (“DSL”), cable modems, and VoIP)1

 substituted

ethereal and encrypted digital signals that were much harder to

intercept and decode using old-fashioned call-interception

techniques. 

Responding to these changing technologies, in 1994

Congress passed CALEA, which requires “telecommunications

carriers” to “ensure” that their networks are technologically

“capable” of being accessed by authorized law enforcement

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2

 CALEA does not affect the scope of the government’s

wiretapping powers. Those powers instead come from the Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197

(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 42

U.S.C.), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No.

95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871.

officials.2 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a). While CALEA’s substantive

provisions apply to “telecommunications carrier[s],” they do not

apply to “information services.” See id. § 1002(a), (b).

Determining which communications services fall where is the

crux of this case. 

A

CALEA applies only to “telecommunications carriers.”

See id. § 1002(a). The Act defines a “telecommunications

carrier” as an “entity engaged in the transmission or switching

of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier for

hire.” Id. § 1001(8)(A). However, in addition to providers of

“transmission or switching,” CALEA’s definition of a

“telecommunications carrier” also includes:

[1] a person or entity engaged in providing wire or

electronic communication switching or transmission

service to the extent that [2] the Commission finds that

such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of

the local telephone exchange service and that [3] it is in

the public interest to deem such a person or entity to be

a telecommunications carrier for purposes of this

subchapter . . . .

Id. § 1001(8)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Section

1001(8)(B)(ii)—which is commonly referenced as CALEA’s

“Substantial Replacement Provision” or “SRP”—allows the

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Commission to expand the definition of a “telecommunications

carrier” to include new technologies that substantially replace

the functions of an old-fashioned telephone network.

CALEA does not apply to “persons or entities insofar as

they are engaged in providing information services.” Id. §

1001(8)(C)(i) (the “information-services exclusion”). The Act

defines an “information service” as “the offering of a capability

for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,

retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via

telecommunications.” Id. § 1001(6)(A). Because informationservice providers are not subject to CALEA, they need not make

their networks accessible to law-enforcement agencies. See id.

§ 1002(b)(2)(A).

B

In 2004, the United States Department of Justice, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Drug

Enforcement Administration (collectively, “the DOJ”) filed a

joint petition for expedited rulemaking before the FCC. The

DOJ explained that “[t]he ability of federal, state, and local law

enforcement to carry out critical electronic surveillance is being

compromised today by providers who have failed to implement

CALEA-compliant intercept capabilities.” In response, the

Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and invited

comments on whether certain communications

providers—including broadband and VoIP providers—must

comply with CALEA. See Communications Assistance for Law

Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, 19 F.C.C.R.

15676, 15677 (2004). 

After receiving thousands of pages of comments from

more than 40 interested parties, the Commission ruled that

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3

 Our dissenting colleague asserts that “[b]roadband Internet

is an ‘information service’—indeed, the Commission does not dispute

this.” Dissent at 2. However, in the Order the Commission

determines that broadband Internet is not an “information service” for

purposes of CALEA. See Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989, ¶¶ 37-38.

broadband and VoIP providers are covered (at least in part) by

CALEA’s definition of “telecommunications carriers.” See

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement and

Broadband Access and Services, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989, ¶ 8 (2005)

(“Order”). To avoid an “irreconcilable tension” between

CALEA’s SRP and the information-services exclusion, the

Commission concluded that the Act creates three categories of

communications services: pure telecommunications (which

plainly fall within CALEA), pure information (which plainly fall

outside CALEA), and hybrid telecommunications-information

services (which are only partially governed by CALEA). Id. ¶

18. 

The FCC then concluded that broadband and VoIP are

hybrid services that contain both “telecommunications” and

“information” components.3

 Id. at ¶¶ 24-45. The Commission

explained that CALEA applies to providers of those hybrid

services only to the extent they qualify as “telecommunications

carriers” under the three prongs of the SRP. First, providers of

both technologies must perform switching and transport

functions. See id. ¶ 26; id. ¶ 41. Second, providers of both

technologies serve as replacements for a substantial

functionality of local telephone exchange service: Broadband

replaces the transmission function previously used to reach dialup Internet service providers (“ISPs”), and VoIP replaces

traditional telephone service’s voice capabilities. See id. ¶¶ 27-

31; id. ¶ 42. Third, the public interest requires application of

CALEA to the “telecommunications” component of both

technologies: The even-handed application of CALEA across

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technologies will not impede competition or innovation (id. ¶¶

33-34; id. ¶ 43), and “[t]he overwhelming importance of

CALEA’s assistance capability requirements to law enforcement

efforts to safeguard homeland security and combat crime weighs

heavily in favor” of applying CALEA broadly. Id. ¶ 35; see also

id. ¶ 44.

Notwithstanding CALEA’s breadth, the Commission

clarified that the Act does not apply to “private networks.” See

id. ¶ 36 n.100 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(B)). The FCC

noted that some broadband companies “provide access to private

education, library and research networks.” Id. The Commission

explained that these companies may or may not qualify for

CALEA’s private-networks exclusion: 

To the extent [the petitioners] are engaged in the

provision of facilities-based private broadband networks

or intranets that enable members to communicate with

one another and/or retrieve information from shared data

libraries not available to the general public, these

networks appear to be private networks for purposes of

CALEA. . . . We therefore make clear that providers of

these networks are not included as “telecommunications

carriers” under the SRP with respect to these networks.

To the extent, however, that these private networks are

interconnected with a public network, either the [public

voice network] or the Internet, providers of the facilities

that support the connection of the private network to a

public network are subject to CALEA under the SRP. 

Id. Thus, private networks—like broadband and VoIP—are

excluded from CALEA insofar as they meet one of the statute’s

exclusions. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A) (excluding

“information services”), (B) (excluding “private networks”).

However, to the extent a service provider qualifies as a

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“telecommunications carrier,” it is subject to CALEA’s

substantive requirements. See id. § 1001(8). 

The Commission recognized that it had separately

adopted a different interpretation of a similar term

(“telecommunications service”) under a different statute.

Interpreting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-276 (“the Telecom

Act” or “the 1996 Act”), the FCC previously concluded that

broadband Internet service is not a “telecommunications

service,” and it therefore falls outside the ambit of the 1996 Act.

See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet

over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4823 (2002)

(“Broadband Declaratory Ruling”). To reconcile the Order

(promulgated under CALEA) with the Broadband Declaratory

Ruling (promulgated under the 1996 Act), the Commission

emphasized that both CALEA and the Telecom Act are silent

regarding how (or whether) the FCC should regulate mixed

services that have both “telecommunications” and “information”

components. Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989 ¶ 17. Thus, the FCC

concluded that both statutes vest it with discretion to interpret

Congress’s ambiguous treatment of hybrid telecommunicationsinformation services.

In the context of the 1996 Act, the Commission

concluded that hybrid services fall entirely outside the statute’s

scope. Because the 1996 Act defines both “telecommunications

service” and “information service” in terms of an “offering” to

consumers, see Broadband Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at

4820, ¶ 34, and because consumers perceive broadband Internet

access to be a single “offer” for an integrated “information

service,” id. at 4821-24, ¶¶ 35-41, the FCC concluded that cablemodem service is exclusively an “information service,” which

is unregulable under the 1996 Act, id. at 4832, ¶ 59. The

Commission further emphasized that its interpretation of the

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Telecom Act is consistent with Congress’s deregulatory goals.

See id. at 4802, ¶ 5; id. at 4823-24, ¶¶ 40-41; see also Verizon

Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 502 n.20 (2002)

(emphasizing “the deregulatory and competitive purposes of the

[1996] Act”); Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 96-103 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the 1996 Act’s “deregulatory

purpose”). The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s Broadband

Declaratory Ruling as a “reasonable” interpretation of the 1996

Act. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet

Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2708 (2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984));

see also id. at 2711 (upholding the Commission’s conclusion

that the purpose of the 1996 Act is to foster “a minimal

regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation

in a competitive market” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)). 

However, the Telecom Act differs significantly from

CALEA. Unlike CALEA, the 1996 Act does not contain an

analogue to CALEA’s SRP: While an entity is covered by

CALEA if it provides transmission, switching, or the functional

equivalent thereof, an entity is covered by the Telecom Act only

if it provides “transmission.” See 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). Also

unlike CALEA, the Telecom Act does not contain an analogue

to CALEA’s “insofar as” clause: While an entity is excluded

from CALEA only “insofar as” it provides “information

services,” the 1996 Act categorically excludes “information

services” en toto. See id. § 153(44). Finally, unlike CALEA,

the Telecom Act refers to two “service offerings”: While

CALEA refers only to an “offering” of “information services,”

the Telecom Act refers to “offerings” of both

“telecommunications services” and “information services.” Id.

§ 153(20), (46); see also Broadband Declaratory Ruling, 17

F.C.C.R. at 4823, ¶ 40 (emphasizing the fact that the 1996

Act—unlike CALEA—contains separate definitions for

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“telecommunications” and “telecommunications service”). 

Drawing on the statutes’ different texts, structures,

legislative histories, and purposes, the FCC decided to resolve

the ambiguities in CALEA and the 1996 Act differently. In light

of “Congress’s deliberate extension of CALEA’s [substantive]

requirements to providers satisfying the SRP,” the FCC

concluded that a telecommunications carrier should not escape

the Act’s reach altogether simply because the carrier’s service

offering has an “informational” component. Order, 20 F.C.C.R.

14989, ¶ 18. Thus, the FCC concluded that CALEA’s

definitional sections are not mutually exclusive: “[W]hen a

single service comprises an information service component and

a telecommunications component, Congress intended CALEA

to apply to the telecommunications component.” Id. at ¶ 21.

The Commission further emphasized that its interpretation of

CALEA is consistent with the Act’s law-enforcement goals. Id.;

cf. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 502 n.20.

II

ACE raises three arguments in its petition for review.

First, ACE argues that broadband Internet access is an integrated

“information service” under CALEA, and as such, it is

uniformly excluded from the Act’s substantive requirements.

Second, ACE argues that VoIP similarly qualifies for CALEA’s

information-services exclusion. Third, ACE argues that the

Commission unlawfully applied the Act to “private networks.”

Our review is governed by the classic two-step approach

set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See U. S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227

F.3d 450, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Under Chevron, “[i]f the intent

of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,

as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

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expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

However, if the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to

the specific question at issue,” we ask whether the agency’s

interpretation is “permissible,” that is, “reasonable.” Id. at 843-

44; see also Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145, 151

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“A ‘reasonable’ explanation of how an

agency’s interpretation serves the statute’s objectives is the stuff

of which a ‘permissible’ construction is made; an explanation

that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

statute,’ however, is not.” (citations omitted)). 

A

ACE first argues that broadband Internet access is an

“information service,” which falls completely beyond CALEA’s

reach. The Supreme Court has upheld the FCC’s classification

of broadband as an integrated “information service” under the

Telecom Act. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2696. CALEA’s

definition of “information service” is virtually identical to the

one included in the 1996 Act. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6)

(CALEA), with id. § 153(20) (Telecom Act). Therefore, ACE

concludes broadband providers must fall within the ambit of

CALEA’s identical “information services” exclusion.

Notwithstanding the superficial attractiveness of ACE’s

argument, we disagree.

ACE’s syllogism falls apart because CALEA and the

Telecom Act are different statutes, and Brand X was a different

case. Although ACE would have us read Brand X as controlling

this controversy, that case did not hold that broadband Internet

access is exclusively an “information service,” devoid of any

“telecommunications” component. Rather, it upheld the FCC’s

reasonable interpretation to that effect under a different statute.

See 125 S. Ct. at 2708 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (step

two)). Emphasizing that the Telecom Act “is ambiguous about

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whether cable companies ‘offer’ telecommunications with cable

modem service,” id. at 2706, the Court concluded “that the

Commission’s construction was a reasonable policy choice for

the Commission to make at Chevron’s second step,” id. at 2708

(internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). 

So here. CALEA expressly provides that the

Commission may extend the definition of a

“telecommunications carrier . . . to the extent that the

Commission finds that [a] service is a replacement for a

substantial portion of the local telephone service and that it is in

the public interest to deem such a person or entity to be a

telecommunications carrier . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii)

(emphasis added). Where, as here, “Congress has explicitly left

a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of

authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the

statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given

controlling weight,” so long as they reflect “reasonable policy

choice[s].” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45; see also United States

v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 

 The Commission’s interpretation of CALEA represents

a “reasonable policy choice.” CALEA—unlike the 1996

Act—is a law-enforcement statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)

(requiring telecommunications carriers to enable “the

government” to conduct electronic surveillance); id. § 1001(5)

(defining “government” as any public entity “authorized by law

to conduct electronic surveillance”). The Communications Act

(of which the Telecom Act is part), by contrast, was enacted

“[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce

in communication by wire and radio . . . .” Id. § 151; see also

Verizon, 535 U.S. at 502 n.20 (emphasizing “the deregulatory

and competitive purposes of the [1996] Act”). The statutes’

respective texts reflect their disparate objectives: While the

1996 Act is framed in terms of “offerings” made by “service”-

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4

 ACE attempts to obscure the differences between CALEA

and the 1996 Act by arguing that “when Congress uses the same

language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when

one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that

Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both

statutes.” Pet. Br. at 26 (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct.

1536, 1541 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course,

ACE is correct—but only when Congress “uses the same language in

two statutes having similar purposes.” As illustrated herein,

CALEA’s language and purpose differ markedly from the 1996 Act.

providers to consumers, CALEA’s SRP empowers the FCC to

expand its definition of a “telecommunication carrier” to meet

the evolving needs of law enforcement officials. The

Commission’s interpretation of CALEA reasonably differs from

its interpretation of the 1996 Act, given the differences between

the two statutes.4

Specifically, CALEA differs from the 1996 Act in two

important ways. First, CALEA’s definition of

“telecommunications carrier” is broader than the definition used

in the 1996 Act. To highlight the difference, we present the

statutory texts synoptically. 

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CALEA TELECOM ACT OF 1996

The term “telecommunications

carrier” (A) means a person or

entity engaged in the

transmission or switching of

wire or electronic

communications as a common

carrier for hire; and (B)

includes . . . (ii) a person or

entity engaged in providing

wire or electronic

communication switching or

transmission service to the

extent that the Commission

finds that such service is a

replacement for a substantial

portion of the local telephone

exchange service and that it is

in the public interest to deem

such a person or entity to be a

telecommunications carrier for

purposes of this subchapter;

but (C) does not include (i)

persons or entities insofar as

they are engaged in providing

information services . . . .

The term

“telecommunications carrier”

means any provider of

telecommunications services

[i.e., the offering of

transmission for a fee directly

to the public, or to such

classes of users as to be

effectively available directly

to the public, regardless of

the facilities used] . . . .

47 U.S.C. § 1001(8) 47 U.S.C. § 153(43), (44), (46)

While the Telecom Act limits its definition of

“telecommunications services” to “transmission,” CALEA’s text

is more inclusive: CALEA defines a “telecommunications

carrier” as a provider of “transmission or switching” plus any

provider that substantially replaces traditional transmission or

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5

 ACE attempts to cabin the expansive effect of the SRP by

arguing that it applies only “to commercial providers of

‘telecommunications’ that are not common carriers for hire.” Pet. Br.

at 38 (emphasis added and removed). However, ACE’s interpretation

of the SRP would eviscerate the clause that immediately precedes it,

which defines a telecommunications carrier as “a common carrier for

hire.” 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(A). Whatever the SRP’s meaning, ACE’s

internally contradictory interpretation is not it. 

switching. See id. § 1001(8)(B)(ii) (SRP).5

The second major difference between the two statutes is

that CALEA’s text and structure suggest that its definitions for

“telecommunications carrier” and “information services” are not

mutually exclusive terms. Unlike the 1996 Act, CALEA does

not refer to a “telecommunications service,” nor does its

definition of “telecommunications carrier” include a reference

to a service “offering.” Moreover, CALEA’s definition of a

“telecommunications carrier”—unlike the 1996 Act’s definition

of that term—excludes entities only “insofar as they are

engaged in providing information services.” Id. § 1001(8)(C)(i)

(emphasis added). These distinctions suggest that CALEA does

not define two mutually exclusive “services” that are

independently “offered” to consumers. That is, under CALEA,

a carrier might “offer” one “service” that contains both

“telecommunications” and “information” components. 

ACE’s argument to the contrary relies on the fact that

“information services,” by statutory definition, are delivered

“via telecommunications” under both CALEA and the Telecom

Act. See CALEA § 1001(6)(A) (defining “information services”

as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,

transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making

available information via telecommunications”); Telecom Act

§ 153(20) (same). In ACE’s view, the “via

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telecommunications” clause makes the telecommunications and

information components of an informational service offering

inseparable under both statutes. That is, once the

“telecommunications” dimension of an “information service” is

removed, the definition of the latter term becomes a nullity. As

a result, ACE argues, we should interpret CALEA to create two

mutually exclusive categories of “telecommunications” and

“information” services, which can never overlap.

ACE’s analysis is inconsistent with our standard of

review. We cannot set aside the Commission’s reasonable

interpretation of the Act in favor of an alternatively plausible (or

an even better) one. See, e.g., Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2699 (“If

a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s

construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to

accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the

agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best

statutory interpretation.”); Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 330

F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Even assuming the correctness

of [an alternative interpretation], the ambiguity of the statute in

combination with the Chevron doctrine eclipses the ability of the

courts to substitute their preferred interpretation for an agency’s

reasonable interpretation when that agency is the entity

authorized to administer the statute in question.”); Nat’l Mining

Ass’n v. Babbitt, 172 F.3d 906, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“If we

were interpreting the statute de novo, we might well agree that

appellant has the better argument. But we are not. And

although the government’s reading is a bit of a stretch, we think

it passes the Chevron test.”). The FCC offered a reasonable

interpretation of CALEA, and Chevron’s second step requires

nothing more.

We hasten to emphasize the continued vitality of

CALEA’s information-services exclusion. As the Commission

explained:

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A facilities-based broadband Internet access service

provider continues to have no CALEA obligations with

respect to, for example, the storage functions of its

e-mail service, its web-hosting and [“Domain Name

System,” or “DNS”] lookup functions or any other

[“Internet Service Provider,” or “ISP”] functionality of

its Internet access service. It is only the “switching and

transmission” component of its service that is subject to

CALEA under our finding today.

Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989, ¶ 38 (emphasis in original and

footnote omitted). Because CALEA’s definitions for

“telecommunications” and “information service” are not

mutually exclusive, the Commission reasonably concluded that

mixed services—such as broadband Internet access—are

partially covered by (and partially excluded from) the statute:

The “switching and transmission” portion of a broadband

service offering—which replaces the “switching or

transmission” portion of a dial-up Internet connection—is

covered, while any “capability for generating, acquiring, storing,

transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making

available information via telecommunications,” 47 U.S.C. §

1001(6)(A), is not. 

The Commission has long distinguished between

“information services” and the underlying

“telecommunications” that transport them. See, e.g.,

Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules &

Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 475,

¶ 231 (1980); Universal Service Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012,

24030, ¶ 36 (1998); CALEA Second Report & Order, 15

F.C.C.R. 7105, 7120, ¶ 27 (1999); CPE/Enhanced Services

Bundling Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7444, ¶ 43 (2001); Section

271 Remand Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9751, 9770, ¶ 36 (2001);

Wireline Broadband Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14864, ¶ 16

USCA Case #05-1404 Document #972478 Filed: 06/09/2006 Page 17 of 29
18

6

 Our dissenting colleague argues that “[p]rior to the issuance

of the instant Order, the Commission has consistently held that

broadband Internet service is an ‘information service.’ It has never

previously said otherwise. Indeed, it has never hinted otherwise.”

Dissent at 6. However, the Commission has consistently recognized

that the telecommunications and information components of

broadband are distinguishable. The fact that the Commission treated

those components as an integrated service-offering under one statute

does not preclude the Commission from reasonably treating those

differentiable components differently under a different statute. Cf.

Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2699-2700 (“[I]f the agency adequately

explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, change is not

invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the

discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the

implementing agency.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

(2005).6 The FCC reasonably applied that well-settled

distinction to give meaning to both the SRP and the informationservices exclusion in the context of broadband providers.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. 

B

ACE next argues that the Commission arbitrarily and

capriciously “refused to classify VoIP as either a

telecommunications service or an information service.” Pet. Br.

at 33. At oral argument, ACE’s counsel clarified that it is not

challenging the merits of VoIP’s classification in one category

or the other; ACE argues only that the Commission must

classify it. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 13:14-19:03. We need not

tarry long over this claim. 

 As we explained above, CALEA says nothing about

“telecommunications service[s].” To the extent ACE and its

fellow petitioners confusedly petitioned the Commission to

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19

(mis)classify VoIP in relation to a nonexistent statutory term,

the FCC did not err by declining the invitation. Moreover, ACE

ignores the fact that the Commission did classify VoIP providers

as “telecommunications carriers,” see Order, 20 F.C.C.R.

14989, ¶¶ 39-44, while specifically excluding the voicetransmission portions of VoIP from the definition of

“information services,” see id. ¶ 45. Regardless of the merits of

that classification—which ACE does not challenge—no one can

deny that the Commission made it. 

C

ACE’s third and final argument focuses on a single word

in a single sentence in a single footnote from the Order. The

Commission noted: “To the extent [that] private networks are

interconnected with a public network, either the [public voice

network] or the Internet, providers of the facilities that support

the connection of the private network to a public network are

subject to CALEA under the SRP.” Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989,

¶ 36 n.100 (emphasis added). Relying on language from the

proposed rule, ACE insists that the inclusion of the word

“support” in the FCC’s final rule “provides no real comfort” for

its fears that the Commission will extend its regulatory authority

“throughout [an] entire private network.” Pet. Br. at 46. 

Although ACE’s argument suggests the point is not

necessarily self-evident, it should go without saying that a

proposed rule is not a final rule. It should be equally obvious

that a challenge to the Commission’s possible future

applications or extensions of CALEA does not ripen by virtue

of a petitioner’s unfounded fears. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp.

v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding “if and

when [the petitioner’s fear] does come to pass, judicial review

of the issue ‘is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the

context of a specific application of this regulation than could be

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20

the case in the framework of the generalized challenge made

here.’” (quoting Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

158, 164 (1967)); Atl. States Legal Found. v. EPA, 325 F.3d

281, 284-85 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding a speculative fear about

possible future agency action does not present a case or

controversy ripe for review). The Order on review—like

CALEA—expressly excludes “private networks” from its reach.

See Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989, ¶ 36; 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(B).

If and when the Commission expands its interpretation, an

aggrieved party can bring a petition for review at that time. 

III

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for review is

Denied.

USCA Case #05-1404 Document #972478 Filed: 06/09/2006 Page 20 of 29
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Regardless of how serious the problem an

administrative agency seeks to address . . . it may

not exercise its authority in a manner that is

inconsistent with the administrative structure

that Congress enacted into law. 

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529

U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 

The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act

(“CALEA”) sets forth “assistance capability requirements,”

compelling “telecommunications carriers” to build and sustain

their equipment in a manner that allows law enforcement agents

to execute surveillance orders. Importantly, for purposes of this

case, the statute

• explicitly states that “telecommunications carrier[s]”

do not include “persons or entities insofar as they are

engaged in providing information services,” 47 U.S.C.

§ 1001(8)(C)(i) (2000), 

• defines “information services” as “the offering of a

capability for generating, acquiring, storing,

transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or

making available information via

telecommunications,” id. § 1001(6)(A), and

• expressly states that the assistance capability

requirements “do not apply to [ ] information services,”

id. § 1002(b)(2)(A).

In determining that broadband Internet providers are subject

to CALEA as “telecommunications carriers,” and not excluded

pursuant to the “information services” exemption, the

Commission apparently forgot to read the words of the statute.

CALEA does not give the FCC unlimited authority to regulate

every telecommunications service that might conceivably be

used to assist law enforcement. Quite the contrary. Section

1002 is precise and limited in its scope. It expressly states that

USCA Case #05-1404 Document #972478 Filed: 06/09/2006 Page 21 of 29
2

the statute’s assistance capability requirements “do not apply to

[ ] information services.” Id. Broadband Internet is an

“information service” – indeed, the Commission does not

dispute this. Therefore, broadband Internet providers are

exempt from the substantive provisions of CALEA.

__________

The FCC apparently believes that law enforcement will be

better served if broadband Internet providers are subject to

CALEA’s assistance capability requirements. Although the

agency may be correct, it is not congressionally authorized to

implement this view. In fact, the “information services”

exemption prohibits the FCC from subjecting broadband service

providers to CALEA’s assistance capability requirements. If the

FCC wants the additional authority that Congress withheld, it

must lobby for a new statute. Until Congress decides that the

“information services” exemption is ill-advised, the agency is

bound to respect the legislature’s will and we are bound to

enforce it. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation

Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“Were the

courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express

withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually

limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron

and quite likely with the Constitution as well.”). 

What we see in this case is an agency attempting to squeeze

authority from a statute that does not give it. The FCC’s

interpretation completely nullifies the information services

exception and manufactures broad new powers out of thin air. 

__________

 The most troubling aspect of the FCC’s interpretation of

CALEA is that it is directly at odds with the statutory language.

The statute defines “information services” as the offering of

various information capabilities via telecommunications. 47

U.S.C. § 1001(6)(A). See Appendix. The offering of one of the

USCA Case #05-1404 Document #972478 Filed: 06/09/2006 Page 22 of 29
3

specified information capabilities “via telecommunications” is

integral to the definition of exempt services. Despite this clear

language, the Commission’s Order states that “when a single

service comprises an information service component and a

telecommunications component, Congress intended CALEA to

apply to the telecommunications component.” Communications

Assistance for Law Enforcement and Broadband Services, First

Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20

F.C.C.R. 14,989 ¶ 21 (2005) (“Order”). This is utter

gobbledygook, and it certainly cannot be what Congress

intended. Under the plain words of the statute, exempt

information services are those specified services that include a

telecommunications component. If, as the FCC would have it,

the telecommunications component is excised, the statutorily

defined exemption no longer exists. This makes no sense.

The net effect of the FCC’s interpretation is to vitiate the

statutory exception altogether. If all information services that

are carried out “via telecommunications” are subject to CALEA,

then the “information services” exemption is an empty set.

Under the plain terms of the statute, this cannot be. 

In the face of this reality, the Commission offers an

example of a service that, under its interpretation, allegedly falls

within the information services exception – the “storage

functions of [a broadband Internet access provider’s] e-mail

service.” Order at ¶ 38. The example highlights the absurdity

of the agency’s position. Once email storage functions are

viewed apart from the telecommunications mechanism used to

transmit email messages, there is no sense in which email

services are offered “via telecommunications.” Thus defined,

email storage services fall outside of the statutory exception and

are thus potentially subject to CALEA’s requirements. 

__________

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4

If the FCC had construed CALEA’s information services

exception consistent with the parallel provision in the

Communications Act – which is identical in all relevant

respects, compare 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6) (2000) (CALEA) with id.

§ 153(20) (Communications Act) – the agency would have given

full effect to every provision of CALEA. And the FCC could

have relied on the statute’s “substantial replacement” provision

to apply CALEA to services that are not information services

and that do not otherwise fit within the definition of

telecommunications carrier.

VoIP is an example of such a service. There is no doubt

that VoIP replaces a substantial portion of local telephone

exchange service – it offers exactly the same functionality as

phone service. And, in contrast to broadband service, the

Commission has explicitly refrained from designating VoIP as

an information service under the Communications Act, see

Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to

Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11,541 ¶ 83 (1998). 

__________

It seems that the Commission had little interest in reading

CALEA in a manner that is consistent with the statute’s

language and structure. The Commission’s argument is quite

revealing. By emphasizing the need to construe CALEA to

“ensur[e] that technological change [does] not erode lawful

surveillance authority,” FCC’s Br. at 30, the Commission

betrays its true objective: administrative amendment of the

statute. Our standard for reviewing an agency’s interpretation

of congressional commands does not permit us to ratify the

FCC’s unauthorized attempt to legislate new and better tools for

law enforcement. 

As Chevron and its progeny teach, an “agency’s

interpretation of the statute is not entitled to deference absent a

delegation of authority from Congress to regulate in the areas at

USCA Case #05-1404 Document #972478 Filed: 06/09/2006 Page 24 of 29
5

issue.” Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796,

801 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), the

Court held that the FCC’s congressionally authorized ability to

modify the § 203 requirements of the Communications Act did

not permit the agency to make basic and fundamental changes

in the statute’s regulatory scheme. In refusing to ratify the

Commission’s interpretation of the statute, the Court found it

“highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of

whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially,

rate-regulated to agency discretion – and even more unlikely

that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as

permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.” Id. at 231. 

The Supreme Court reiterated this view in Brown &

Williamson. There the Court rejected an attempt by the Food

and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products, noting

that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of

such economic and political significance to an agency in so

cryptic a fashion.” 529 U.S. at 160. See also Am. Library Ass’n

v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (an agency does not

possess plenary authority to act within a given area simply

because Congress has endowed it with some authority to act in

that area); Am. Bar Ass’n v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 430 F.3d

457 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same).

Similar considerations militate against the proposition that,

in enacting CALEA, Congress quietly granted the FCC the

authority to subject a new industry – providers of broadband

service – to the intrusive requirements of the statute. In gauging

the plausibility of the FCC’s purported authority, one surely

must look to the FCC’s treatment of the “information services”

exception under the Communications Act. A term in one statute

does not necessarily control the Commission’s actions under

another statute. But here the Commission’s earlier rulings show

that “information services” has become a term of art. The

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6

agency cannot simply ignore its prior consistent constructions of

“information services,” especially when it offers no coherent

alternative interpretation. Under the Commission’s current

order, “information services” is meaningless. 

Prior to the issuance of the instant Order, the Commission

has consistently held that broadband Internet service is an

“information service.” It has never previously said otherwise.

Indeed, it has never hinted otherwise. For example, in its

Declaratory Ruling on the status of cable modem service under

the Communications Act, the Commission held:

As currently provisioned, cable modem service is a

single, integrated service that enables the subscriber to

utilize Internet access service through a cable

provider’s facilities and to realize the benefits of a

comprehensive service offering. 

. . . Consistent with the statutory definition of

information service, cable modem service provides the

capabilities described above “via telecommunications.”

That telecommunications component is not, however,

separable from the data-processing capabilities of the

service. As provided to the end user the

telecommunications is part and parcel of the cable

modem service and is integral to its other capabilities.

Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over

Cable and Other Facilitites, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking,17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4823 ¶¶ 38-39 (2002)

(internal citations omitted). See also Appropriate Framework

for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,

Report & Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket

No. 02-33, FCC 05-150, ¶ 15 (rel. Sept. 23, 2005) (“Because

wireline broadband Internet access service inextricably

combines the offering of powerful computer capabilities with

telecommunications, we conclude that it falls within the class of

USCA Case #05-1404 Document #972478 Filed: 06/09/2006 Page 26 of 29
7

services identified in the Act as ‘information services.’”);

Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. at

11,539 ¶ 80 (“The provision of Internet access service involves

data transport elements . . . . But the provision of Internet access

service crucially involves information-processing elements as

well; it offers end users information-service capabilities

inextricably intertwined with data transport. As such, we

conclude that it is appropriately classed as an ‘information

service.’”) (internal citations omitted).

There is no doubt that an “initial agency interpretation is not

instantly carved in stone”; nor is there any doubt that, if acting

pursuant to delegated authority, an agency may adopt different

interpretive positions to address different problems. See Nat’l

Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.

2688, 2700 (2005) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984)).

But these points are of no moment in this case. 

The question here is whether the FCC has identified a

statutory predicate for enlarging CALEA’s scope to encompass

providers of broadband access. It has not. Merely saying that

broadband is not an information service does not make it so,

certainly not in light of all that the FCC has said in the past.

And merely invoking law enforcement, “as though it were a

talisman under which any agency decision is by definition

unimpeachable,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States,

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983),

offends good sense. 

The FCC can no more contend that “information service”

providers are really “telecommunications carriers” because their

regulation can facilitate the law enforcement purposes of

CALEA, than the agency could assert that those who operate

“movie theaters” are really “radio broadcasters” because their

regulation would facilitate control of indecent material pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). There is absolutely no permissible

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8

basis for this court to sustain the FCC’s convoluted attempt to

infer broad new powers under CALEA. The agency has simply

abandoned the well-understood meaning of “information

services” without offering any coherent alternative interpretation

in its place. The net result is that the FCC has altogether gutted

the “information services” exemption from CALEA. Only

Congress can modify the statute in this way. 

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9

APPENDIX

The Applicable Provisions of the Communications Assistance for Law 

Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

47 U.S.C. § 1001. Definitions. 

* * * *

(6) The term “information services” – 

(A) means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,

transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available

information via telecommunications; and

(B) includes – 

(i) a service that permits a customer to retrieve stored information

from, or file information for storage in, information storage

facilities;

(ii) electronic publishing; and

(iii) electronic messaging services; but

(C) does not include any capability for a telecommunications carrier’s internal

management, control, or operation of its telecommunications network.

* * * *

(8) The term “telecommunications carrier” – 

* * *

(C) does not include – 

(i) persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in providing

information services; 

* * * *

47 U.S.C. § 1002. Assistance capability requirements.

(a) Capability requirements

. . . a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or

services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate,

or direct communications are capable of [serving government needs in intercepting

digital and other communications] . . . .

(b) Limitations

* * * *

(2) Information services; private networks and interconnection services and

facilities

The requirements of subsection (a) of this section do not apply to – 

(A) information services; 

* * * * 

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