Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01436/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01436-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeanne Kitchen
Plaintiff
Lodi Unified School District
Defendant
Catherine Nichols-Washer
Defendant
Neil Young
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JEANNE KITCHEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LODI UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; 

CATHERINE NICHOLS-WASHER, in 

her official capacity as 

Superintendent of the Lodi 

Unified School District; NEIL 

YOUNG, in his official 

capacity as Director of 

Personnel of the Lodi Unified 

School District,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:14-01436 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

This matter is again before the court after plaintiff 

Jeanne Kitchen filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

(Docket No. 19.) Defendants Lodi Unified School District

(“LUSD”), Catherine Nichols-Washer, and Neil Young have moved to 

dismiss plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 41, as well as to strike 

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portions of it pursuant to Rule 12(f). (Docket No. 28). The 

factual and procedural history is set forth in this court’s 

November 5, 2014 Memorandum and Order, (Docket No. 17), 

dismissing plaintiff’s original Complaint with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s FAC adds Nichols-Washer and Young as 

defendants acting in their official capacity. (FAC ¶¶ 9-10.) 

The FAC asserts five claims against all defendants: (1) 

disability-based discrimination in violation of Title I of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, et 

seq.; (2) disability-based discrimination in violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, et seq.; (3) retaliation in 

violation of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; (4) 

interference in violation of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203; and (5) retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation 

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 704, et seq. (FAC ¶¶ 29-48.) 

II. Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s first, third, 

and fourth claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity and all of 

plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim on which relief can be granted. Defendants also move to 

strike Nichchols-Washer and Young from plaintiff’s second and 

fifth claims pursuant to Rule 12(f). 

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the 

plaintiff normally bears the burden of establishing a 

jurisdictional basis for her action. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). However, the Ninth 

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Circuit has held that “Eleventh Amendment immunity does not 

implicate a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction in an 

ordinary sense,” and thus, should be treated as an affirmative 

defense for which “the public entity . . . bear[s] the burden of 

proving the facts that establish its immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment.” ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass’ns, 3 F.3d 

1289, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity, 

whatever its jurisdictional attributes, should be treated as an 

affirmative defense.”); see also Hill v. Blind Indus. and Serv. 

of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that 

Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a true jurisdictional bar

because it can be waived or forfeited by the state).

1. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims against LUSD

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff’s FAC reasserts 

claims against LUSD under Title I and Title V of the ADA. (FAC 

¶¶ 29-32, 37-44.) Defendants move to dismiss these claims 

pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with the court’s 

previous Order, which concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars 

these claims as against LUSD. (Nov. 5, 2014 Order at 4-5); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to . . . comply with 

these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the 

action or any claim against it.”). Plaintiff does not dispute 

this decision and states that she agrees to dismiss LUSD from her 

first, third, and fourth claims for relief. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 

n.1 (Docket No. 31).) Accordingly, the court will grant 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first, third, and 

fourth claims as against LUSD. 

2. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims against Nichols-Washer and 

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Young

“State governments can invoke the Eleventh Amendment’s 

guarantee of sovereign immunity against Title I suits seeking 

money damages,” but this immunity “does not bar Title I suits 

against state officials for prospective injunctive and 

declaratory relief.” Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 

1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Bd. Of Trustees of the Univ. 

of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 360, 374 n.9 (2001), and Ex parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). “In what has become known as part 

of the Ex parte Young doctrine, . . . a suit for prospective 

injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well-established, 

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Doe v. Lawrence 

Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Although the Eleventh Amendment precludes an award of 

monetary damages based on prior misconduct, the court may “enjoin 

state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of 

federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on 

the state treasury.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 

(1977). Thus, “[i]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte 

Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only 

conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint 

alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief 

properly characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Maryland, Inc. 

v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). 

Plaintiff does not dispute that an award of retroactive 

benefits or reimbursement of past premium payments is outside the 

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exception of Ex parte Young.

1 Plaintiff argues that her ADA 

claims allege a current and ongoing violation of federal law 

based on defendants “excluding Plaintiff from participation in 

the Early Retirement Health Benefits program.” (See FAC ¶¶ 3, 

31, 47.) Her prayer for relief seeks “all injunctive relief 

necessary to bring Defendants into compliance with the ADA . . . 

including an order requiring the Defendants to pay future 

premiums.” (Id. at 8.) 

Defendants characterize plaintiff’s claim for relief as 

solely retrospective because the bureaucratic decision to exclude 

her from the Early Retirement Health Benefits program was made in 

the past. (Defs.’ Reply at 4-5 (Docket No. 32).) An order 

requiring defendants to pay future premiums is equivalent, they 

argue, to an award of future damages.

In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Supreme 

Court recognized that “[t]he difference between the type of 

relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under 

Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between night 

and day.” Id. at 667. In subsequent cases, the Court has drawn 

a distinction between claims seeking “the award of an accrued 

monetary liability . . .’ which represented ‘retroactive 

payments,’” and those sseeking “‘payment of state funds . . . as 

a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a 

substantive federal-question determination.’” Milliken, 433 U.S. 

 

1 Plaintiff states that her prayer for reimbursement of 

past premium payments plus accrued interest are made solely under 

the Rehabilitation Act. (See FAC at 8; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) 

California has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of 

the Rehabilitation Act. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth 

Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 820, amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001).

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at 289 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-664, 668) (describing 

Edelman’s holding).2 

Mindful of this distinction, the court is unable to 

conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all relief plaintiff 

seeks here. To the extent plaintiff seeks an order allowing her 

to prospectively “participat[e] in the Early Retirement Health 

Benefits program,” (see FAC ¶¶ 24, 31, 47), her claims seek the 

kind of relief authorized by Ex parte Young. Such relief would 

arguably not involve a monetary award and would not attempt to 

compensate plaintiff for past misconduct. As a consequence of 

plaintiff’s participation in the Early Retirement Health Benefits 

program, defendants may be required to, among other things, pay 

plaintiff’s future premiums in accordance with the administration

of that program. However, the payment of future premiums “as a 

necessary consequence of compliance in the future” with the ADA

does not necessarily place plaintiff’s claims outside Ex parte 

Young. See Milliken, 433 U.S. at 289. Accordingly, because 

plaintiff’s requested relief is distinguishable from retroactive 

monetary damages and may only serve to prospectively place her in 

defendants’ Early Retirement Health Benefits program, the 

Eleventh Amendment does not bar plaintiff’s first, third, and 

 

2 In Milliken, for example, the Court upheld a district 

court’s order requiring that state officials eliminate a de jure 

segregated school system, noting the “continuing effects of past 

misconduct.” See Milliken, 433 U.S. at 289. In describing the 

nature of that relief, the Court reasoned that, “[u]nlike the 

award in Edelman, the injunction entered here could not 

instantaneously restore the victims of unlawful conduct to their 

rightful condition. Thus, the injunction here looks to the 

future, not simply to presently compensating victims for conduct 

and consequences completed in the past.” Id. at 290 n.21. 

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fourth claims against Nichols-Washer and Young. 

B. Sufficiency of the FAC under Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the 

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

The plausibility standard “does not require detailed 

factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Nor does it “impose a probability requirement at the 

pleading stage.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 

2011). This standard “‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ to 

support the allegations.” Id. at 1217 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 556). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task 

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

1. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims against Nichols-Washer and 

Young

Defendants first argue that plaintiff’s first, third, 

and fourth claims under the ADA are time barred. (Defs.’ Mem. at 

9-11.) Defendants base their argument on the fact that plaintiff

filed her FAC--but not her original Complaint--more than ninety 

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days after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notified 

her of her right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 

12117(a); Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445 

(9th Cir. 1990). Defendants assert that the court must consider 

the FAC’s filing date because plaintiff’s FAC cannot “relate 

back” to her original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1). (Defs.’

Mem. at 9-11.) 

Rule 15(c)(1) allows an amended pleading that adds a 

new party to relate back to the date of the original pleading 

when (1) “the amendment asserts a claim . . . that arose out of 

the conduct . . in the original pleading,” (2) within the period 

allowed by Rule 4(m), the new party “received such notice of the 

action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the 

merits,” and (3) the new party “knew or should have known that 

the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake 

concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(c)(1). 

All three of Rule 15(c)(1)’s requirements are met here. 

First, the parties do not contest that the new claims arise out 

of the same conduct asserted in plaintiff’s original Complaint. 

(See Defs.’ Mem. at 9.) Second, a sufficient “community of 

interest” exists between LUSD and the new defendants to impute 

knowledge of the action from the former to the later. See G.F. 

Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994)

(citing Korn v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 724 F.2d 1397, 

1401 (9th Cir. 1984)). Nichols-Washer and Young are agents of 

the original defendant, LUSD. As Superintendent and Director of 

Personnel for LUSD, Nichols-Washer and Young can reasonably be 

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expected to know of a pending lawsuit against their employer 

arising from conduct they took on LUSD’s behalf. Moreover, all 

defendants are represented by the same counsel, and plaintiff 

notified defendants’ counsel as early as September 22, 2014, that 

she intended to amend her Complaint to add Nichols-Washer and 

Young as defendants. (See Mot. to Amend at 2 (Docket No. 11)); 

Edwards, 892 F.2d at 1447 (considering the fact that the same 

counsel represented both new and original parties). The court is 

thus satisfied that the new defendants received sufficient notice 

of the action and will not suffer prejudice in defending on the 

merits. Third, defendants knew or should have known that the 

action would have been brought against them but for an error in 

pleading. As stated previously, plaintiff acknowledged her error 

in naming only LUSD as a defendant in September 2014 and informed 

defendants’ counsel that Nichols-Washer and Young would be added 

as defendants. (See Mot. to Amend at 2.) Accordingly, because 

all of the Rule 15(c)(1) elements are met, these claims relate 

back to the date of plaintiff’s original Complaint and are not 

time barred. 

Next, defendants argue that plaintiff’s third claim 

fails to allege a required element of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(a), specifically a causal link between plaintiff’s

alleged request for time off as a reasonable accommodation and 

defendants’ denial of early retirement health benefits. (Defs.’

Mem. at 12); see Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 389 F.3d 840, 

849 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation under the ADA, an employee must show that: (1) he or 

she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse 

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employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the 

two.”). Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n the basis of the time that 

Plaintiff requested and took off from work as a reasonable 

accommodation . . . Defendants denied Plaintiff’s access to 

LUSD’s Early Retirement Health Benefits program,” (FAC ¶ 3), and 

“Plaintiff has evidence which shows that Defendants took 

affirmative and intentional steps because of Plaintiff’s known 

disabilities and requests for reasonable accommodation to ensure 

that Plaintiff Kitchen would be excluded from the program,” (id.

¶ 21 (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the court finds that 

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a causal link and stated a 

claim for retaliation. 

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s fourth claim 

does not state a claim for interference under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(b). (Defs.’ Mem. at 13-14.) Section 12203(b) provides: 

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, 

or interfere with any individual in the exercise or 

enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having 

exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her 

having aided or encouraged any other individual in the 

exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or 

protected by this chapter.

42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n excluding 

Plaintiff from participation in the Early Retirement Health 

Benefits program due to the time off she requested and required 

as a reasonable accommodation for her disabilities, Defendant 

interfered with her on account of her having enjoyed rights 

protected under the ADA, in violation of Title V of the ADA.” 

(FAC ¶ 43.) From this, the court understands the time plaintiff 

took off as a reasonable accommodation to be the alleged “right 

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granted or protected” and the denial of retirement benefits for 

having “exercised or enjoyed” that right to be the alleged 

interference. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has 

stated a claim for interference. The court will thus deny 

defendants’ motion to dismiss claims one, three, and four as 

against Nichols-Washer and Young. 

2. Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act Claims

Regarding plaintiff’s second and fifth claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act, defendants first raise the statute of 

limitations. (Defs.’ Mem. at 11.) Rehabilitation Act claims 

under 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, et seq., have no independent statute of 

limitations, so courts apply the forum state’s personal injury 

statute of limitations. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth 

Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 (9th Cir. 2001); J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. 

Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (E.D. Cal. 

2008) (O’Neill, J.). California’s personal injury statute of 

limitations is two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. 

Plaintiff alleges that Nichols-Washer informed her that 

she did not qualify for early retirement health benefits on 

November 1, 2012. (FAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiff filed her original 

Complaint on June 16, 2014. (Docket No. 1.) Her claims against 

LUSD were thus timely filed. With regard to new defendants 

Nichols-Washer and Young, the court has already concluded that 

plaintiff’s claims relate back to the date she filed her original 

Complaint. See Part II.B.1. Accordingly, the statute of 

limitations does not bar plaintiff’s second and fifth claims

against any of the defendants. 

Next, defendants argue that plaintiff’s fifth claim for 

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retaliation fails to allege the element of a causal link. 

(Defs.’ Mem. at 14); see Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 

Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A prima facie case 

of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show: “(1) involvement in 

a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a 

causal link between the two.”). Just as above, plaintiff 

adequately addresses causation by alleging that “[o]n the basis 

of the time that Plaintiff requested and took off from work as a 

reasonable accommodation . . . Defendants denied Plaintiff’s 

access to LUSD’s Early Retirement Health Benefits program,” (FAC 

¶ 3), and “Defendants took affirmative and intentional steps 

because of Plaintiff’s known disabilities and requests for 

reasonable accommodation to ensure that Plaintiff Kitchen would 

be excluded from the program,” (id. ¶ 21 (emphasis added)). The 

court thus finds that plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim 

of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, the 

court will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss claims two and 

five. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) authorizes a court to “strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The 

function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure 

of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues 

by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Fantasy, 

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation 

marks, citation, and first alteration omitted), rev’d on other 

grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

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Because motions to strike are “often used as delaying 

tactics,” they are “generally disfavored” and are rarely granted 

in the absence of prejudice to the moving party. Rosales v. 

Citibank, FSB, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see 

also N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 667 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1128 

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Where the moving party cannot adequately 

demonstrate . . . prejudice, courts frequently deny motions to 

strike even though the offending matter was literally within one 

or more of the categories set forth in Rule 12(f).” (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 

has held that Rule 12(f) should not be used as “an attempt to 

have certain portions of [a] complaint dismissed or to obtain 

summary judgment against [a plaintiff] as to those portions of 

the suit--actions better suited for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a 

Rule 56 motion, not a Rule 12(f) motion.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. 

Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Defendants move to strike Nichchols-Washer and Young 

from plaintiff’s second and fifth claims because their inclusion 

in those claims is “redundant and immaterial.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 

4.) Defendants argue that any judgment against Nichchols-Washer 

and Young in their official capacity is in essence a judgment 

against LUSD. (Id. at 3-4); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 169 (1985) (“[A] judgment against a public servant ‘in his 

official capacity’ imposes liability on the entity that he 

represents.’” (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 

(1985))). There is thus no need to include both LUSD and its 

officers in claims two and five. 

Several decisions from this district have granted 

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similar motions to strike claims against individuals in their 

official capacity when a claim also named that individual’s 

employer. See, e.g., Contreras, ex rel. Contreras v. Cnty. of 

Glenn, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Mendez, J.); 

Haddox v. City of Fresno, 2008 WL 53244, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 

2008) (Wanger, J.). However, unlike the present case, those 

actions named government officials in both their individual and 

official capacities. See Contreras, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 

Striking them in their official capacities thus did not operate 

to fully dismiss the claims against them. See id. (“[T]his 

ruling in no way affects the suit against these officers in their 

individual capacity.”). The court is wary of the fact that 

granting such a motion to strike here will fully dismiss claims 

as against Nichchols-Washer and Young, contrary to the Ninth 

Circuit’s guidance on the role of Rule 12(f). See Whittlestone, 

618 F.3d at 974. 

Defendants have also failed to show any prejudice from 

the inclusion of claims against both LUSD and Nichchols-Washer 

and Young in their official capacity. If these claims are truly 

duplicative and immaterial, their inclusion should have little

impact on defendants. Accordingly, because such motions are 

disfavored in the absence of prejudice, see Rosales, 133 F. Supp.

2d at 1180, the court will deny defendants’ motion to strike. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) defendants’ motion to dismiss be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED with respect to claims one, 

three, and four as against defendant Lodi Unified 

School District only, and DENIED in all other 

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respects;

(2) defendants’ motion to strike be, and the same 

hereby is, DENIED. 

Dated: February 27, 2015

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