Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04405/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04405-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent
Balquees Quomsieh
Petitioner
Danial Quomsieh
Petitioner
Hanin Quomsieh
Petitioner
Jeries Quomsieh
Petitioner
Muna Quomsieh
Petitioner
Nadeen Quomsieh
Petitioner
Yacoub Quomsieh
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4405

___________

Yacoub Quomsieh; Muna Quomsieh; *

Hanin Quomsieh; Nadeen Quomsieh; *

Balquees Quomsieh; Jeries Quomsieh; *

Danial Quomsieh, *

*

Petitioners, *

* Petition for Review from the

v. * Board of Immigration Appeals.

*

*

Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General *

of the United States of America, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2006

Filed: March 15, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Yacoub and Muna Quomsieh and their children, Hanin, Nadeen, Balquees,

Jeries, and Danial Quomsieh, who are Palestinian Christians, petition for review of a

final per curiam order of removal of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny their applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). For the reasons discussed below, we deny the Quomsiehs’ petition. 

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Mr. Quomsieh entered the United States on January 31, 2001, with

authorization to remain until July 30, 2001; Mrs. Quomsieh and the children entered

the United States on June 19, 2001, with authorization to remain until December 19,

2001. All remained beyond their authorization dates without permission. Mr.

Quomsieh and his family filed an application for asylum on January 22, 2002. 

At a merits hearing conducted before the IJ on April 27, 2004, the Quomsiehs

contended that, while living in the West Bank, they were persecuted by Muslims

because of their Christian faith and were persecuted by Israeli soldiers because of their

Palestinian nationality. The Quomsiehs testified to several incidents they claim

constituted persecution, including harassment and threats Mrs. Quomsieh received

from Muslim parents of students she taught, Israeli soldiers forcing Mr. Quomsieh to

remove rocks and burned tires from the streets following Palestinian demonstrations,

Mrs. Quomsieh being overcome by tear gas fumes when a stray canister fired by

Israeli soldiers landed on the balcony of the Quomsiehs’ home, Israeli soldiers

entering and ransacking the Quomsieh’s home, Palestinian Authority officials unfairly

taxing Mr. Quomsieh’s business, threats received from Muslims who disapproved of

Mr. Quomsieh’s employment at a casino, and harassment and intimidation that the

Quomsiehs’ daughters received from Muslim men. The Quomsiehs also testified to

other incidents of persecution suffered by extended family. Mrs. Quomsieh’s parents’

home burned after it was hit by mortar shells from crossfire between Palestinian

Muslims and Israeli forces, Muslims attacked Mr. Quomsieh’s brother’s family at the

brother’s home during a barbeque where alcohol was served, and Muslims confiscated

land belonging to Mr. Quomsieh’s father. 

Further, Mr. Quomsieh testified about an incident that occurred in 1988 after

Israeli forces imposed a curfew in the West Bank. Mr. Quomsieh testified that he

violated the curfew in an effort to obtain medication for an ill child. When he was

discovered, Israeli soldiers took him to a checkpoint and detained him there. The

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soldiers forced Mr. Quomsieh to stand on one leg while holding his hands out. When

he lowered the raised leg or moved, the soldiers would beat him. One of the soldiers

then tied Mr. Quomsieh’s hands behind his back, and the soldiers beat him with their

rifles. Mr. Quomsieh was detained for four hours, until a higher-ranking Israeli

soldier arrived at the checkpoint and ordered his release. The following day, Mr.

Quomsieh sought medical care and learned he had suffered a cracked joint in his right

knee. 

In 1996, Mr. Quomsieh testified that his first cousin, Fayez Quomsieh

(“Fayez”) was arrested by the Palestinian Authority and accused of being an Israeli

collaborator. Fayez was never convicted of a crime, and he eventually died in

Palestinian Authority custody. While the Palestinian Authority claimed Fayez’s death

was a suicide, there was evidence he had been tortured, as well as evidence his death

was due to a heart attack caused by the torture. Mr. Quomsieh testified Fayez was

killed because he was a Christian. 

The IJ found that, although the petitioners were credible witnesses, the evidence

presented did not establish that the Quomsiehs had been persecuted because of their

religion or nationality, rather the IJ found that the Quomsiehs left the region for

general security reasons. The IJ noted that most of the incidents described by the

Quomsiehs–including the alleged beating by Israeli soldiers and the cousin’s death

while in Palestinian Authority custody–occurred prior to Mr. Quomsieh’s 1999 trip

to the United States to attend a nephew’s wedding, from which Mr. Quomsieh

returned to the West Bank because he was “making good money at the casino.”

Because Mr. Quomsieh testified he would not return to the West Bank, the IJ could

not find by clear and convincing evidence that the Quomsiehs would voluntarily

depart, and thus the IJ denied voluntary departure. In a per curiam order, the BIA

affirmed the IJ’s credibility finding and held that the incidents described by the

Quomsiehs were insufficient–singularly or cumulatively–to rise to the level of

persecution. The BIA further held that the Quomsiehs demonstrated a subjective fear

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of returning to the West Bank but had failed to show their fear was objectively

reasonable. 

The Quomsiehs contend on appeal that (1) the IJ and BIA erred in denying their

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT because

they established past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution, (2) the

record evidence supports a finding that they would more likely than not suffer torture

if removed, and thus they are entitled to relief under CAT, and (3) the BIA failed to

review the IJ’s denial of voluntary departure, therefore the matter should be remanded

to the BIA for proper consideration. 

We review a BIA’s factual decision under the substantial evidence standard,

reversing where petitioners demonstrate “that the evidence was so compelling that no

reasonable fact finder could fail to find in favor of the petitioner[s].” Turay v.

Ashcroft, 405 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)

(“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). Where, as here, the

BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and adds its own reasoning, we review both decisions

together. See Setiadi v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2006). 

Asylum may be granted to a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee”

is defined as a person who is outside his native country and is unable or unwilling to

return to his native country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “A well-founded fear is one

that is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d

594, 598 (8th Cir. 1997). Subjectively, the petitioner must demonstrate that he

genuinely fears persecution; objectively, the petitioner must show “credible, direct,

and specific evidence that a reasonable person in the [petitioner’s] position would fear

persecution” if returned. See id. Where the petitioner establishes that he was

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subjected to past persecution, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future

persecution on the same grounds. Francois v. INS, 283 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2002).

Where past persecution has been established, the burden shifts to the government to

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner no longer has a wellfounded fear of persecution due to a change in the conditions of the petitioner’s native

country. See id. at 930-31. 

The BIA determined that petitioners had not suffered past persecution, and that

while they had subjectively genuine fears of returning to the West Bank, those fears

were not objectively reasonable. While the petitioners described circumstances which

are troubling, we cannot say that the evidence is so compelling as to require us to

reach the contrary conclusion that petitioners were subjected to persecution. Absent

physical harm, the incidents of harassment, unfulfilled threats of injury, and economic

deprivation are not persecution. See Woldemichael v. Ashcroft, 448 F.3d 1000, 1003

(8th Cir. 2006) (“Absent physical harm, subjecting members of an unpopular faith to

hostility, harassment, discrimination, and even economic deprivation is not

persecution unless those persons are prevented from practicing their religion or

deprived of their freedom.”); Setiadi, 437 F.3d at 713 (“Past persecution does not

normally include unfulfilled threats of physical injury . . . .”). Also, incidents arising

solely from political unrest are insufficient to show particularized persecution. See

Feleke, 118 F.3d at 598 (political unrest and ethnic conflict is not enough to show

particularized persecution). 

While Mr. Quomsieh’s four hour detention and beating by Israeli soldiers is

more bothersome, we note, as did the IJ, that this one incident occurred in 1988, and

the Quomsiehs continued to live in the West Bank for thirteen more years without

suffering another similar incident from the Israeli government. See Alyas v.

Gonzales, 419 F.3d 756, 761, 761 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (“While any instance of

unjustified detention and physical abuse is regrettable, two isolated occurrences of

detention and abuse [that were followed by four years without additional problems]

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do not establish that [petitioner] is eligible for asylum because we have also

recognized that ‘brief periods of detention . . . or isolated violence do not necessarily

constitute persecution.’”) (quoting Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 832, 839 (8th

Cir. 2004); citing Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir. 2004) and Tawm v.

Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2004)). 

Also, nothing in the record, other than Mr. Quomsieh’s assertions at the

hearing, supports a finding that Fayez was tortured and killed by the Palestinian

Authority because of his religion or that the Palestinian Authority has been targeting

Christians for detention and torture. While acts of violence against a family member

may demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, those acts must be tied to the

petitioner through a pattern of persecution such that the petitioner would also

reasonably fear persecution. See Nyonzele v. INS, 83 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 1996)

(holding that there was no evidence to tie father’s murder for his political beliefs to

the petitioner). The petitioners have failed to show that Fayez’s torture and

subsequent death occurred because of his religion or that the petitioners have an

objectively reasonable fear of persecution by the Palestinian Authority because of

their religious beliefs. 

When a petitioner files an asylum application, a request for withholding of

removal is automatically included in the application. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b) (“An

asylum application shall be deemed to constitute at the same time an application for

withholding of removal . . . .”). In considering a withholding of removal request, the

petitioner must show a clear probability of persecution if returned to his native

country. Turay, 405 F.3d at 667. This is a more rigorous standard than the wellfounded fear standard needed for asylum relief, thus where the petitioner has failed

to prove eligibility for asylum, the petitioner cannot meet the standard for establishing

withholding of removal. Id. Accordingly, petitioners’ withholding of removal claim

fails. 

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Under CAT, the petitioners must show that “‘it is more likely than not that

[they] [ ] would be tortured if returned to the proposed country of removal.’” Id.

(quoting Ngure, 367 F.3d at 992); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). In considering such a

claim, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture should be considered,

including but not limited to: past torture; the petitioners’ ability to relocate to another

part of the country where torture is unlikely; and gross, flagrant, or mass violations

of human rights. Turay, 405 F.3d at 668. Where a petitioner fails to establish

eligibility for asylum, “it is likely that he will not succeed under CAT,” and a separate

CAT analysis is needed only if petitioner “presented evidence that he is likely to be

tortured for reasons unrelated to his asylum claim.” Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d

593, 595 (8th Cir. 2006). Because there is no evidence in the record, apart from that

presented in support of the asylum claim, showing petitioners would more likely than

not be subjected to torture if returned, the BIA and IJ did not err in denying

petitioners’ CAT claim. 

Upon independent review of the record, it is clear that the petitioners did not

raise the IJ’s denial of voluntary departure before the BIA. This failure to raise the

issue before the BIA precludes our review of that voluntary departure determination

or whether the BIA erred in failing to analyze the basis for denial. See Frango v.

Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006) (declining to review claims that IJ was

biased and denied petitioner fair hearing where petitioner failed to present those issues

to BIA and presented no reason to exempt him from general exhaustion requirement).

Even if the issue had been raised before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review a

denial of voluntary departure. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (no court shall have jurisdiction

to review the denial of voluntary departure); Fofanah v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1037,

1040-41 (8th Cir. 2006). 

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for relief. 

______________________________

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