Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01267/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alden Leeds, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1245
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2015 Decided February 5, 2016

No. 11-1267

ALDEN LEEDS, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 1245,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 11-1296

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

Joseph B. Fiorenzo argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for petitioner. 

Jeffrey W. Burritt, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, 

Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and 

Robert J. Englehart, Supervisory Attorney. 

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Patricia McConnell and Jessica D. Ochs were on the 

brief for intervenor United Food and Commercial Workers 

Local 1245 in support of respondent.

Before: TATEL, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Petitioner Alden Leeds, 

Inc. (“Alden Leeds” or “the Company”), seeks review of a 

Decision and Order issued by the National Labor Relations 

Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) on July 19, 2011. The Board 

has filed a cross-application for enforcement. The United 

Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1245 (“the 

Union”), the charging party before the Board, has intervened 

in support of the Board. 

The Board found that Alden Leeds had violated Sections 

8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” 

or “the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), by locking out its 

employees on November 3, 2009, without providing the 

employees with a timely, clear, and complete offer setting 

forth the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. Alden 

Leeds, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (July 19, 2011). Alden 

Leeds claims that substantial evidence in the record does not 

support the Board’s finding that the Company committed the 

cited unfair labor practices. Alden Leeds also argues that, 

even if the lockout was unlawful, the Board erred in declining 

to allow the Company to attempt to establish in a separate 

compliance proceeding that its backpay liability ended on 

November 9, 2009.

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We hold that, on the record before us, there is substantial 

evidence to support the Board’s finding that Alden Leeds 

violated the Act by locking out its employees on November 3, 

2009. Therefore, we deny the Company’s petition for review 

on this issue and grant the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement. 

We have no jurisdiction to consider the Company’s claim 

that the Board erred in precluding it from litigating its 

backpay liability in a compliance proceeding. Alden Leeds 

failed to raise this issue before the Board in the first instance, 

as required by Section 10(e) of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 

160(e) (“No objection that has not been urged before the 

Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by 

the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection 

shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). 

There are no “extraordinary circumstances” here which give

the court jurisdiction to address this matter.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Alden Leeds manufactures and packages 

swimming pool cleaning supplies and chemicals at two 

locations in New Jersey. The Company employs 

approximately fifty production and delivery employees, who 

have been represented by the Union since 2001. In September 

2009, Alden Leeds and the Union commenced negotiations on 

a new contract to succeed their 2005 collective bargaining 

agreement, which was set to expire on October 3, 2009. The 

Union sought increases in wages, sick days, and vacation 

days; changes in seniority; and a three-year agreement. The

main sticking point between the parties was health care. 

Premiums were set to increase under the existing health care 

plan, and the Company and Union disagreed over how to 

apportion the increases.

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The parties’ first bargaining session was on September 

30, 2009. At that meeting, Tom Cunningham, the Union’s 

business agent, went through the Union’s proposals and 

explained that the Union was seeking to keep its existing 

health care plan, which would necessitate increased 

contributions from the Company. Mark Epstein, the 

Company’s president and chief executive officer, informed 

Cunningham that the Company was not going to agree to the 

health care contribution increases the Union was seeking. 

Nonetheless, Epstein told Cunningham that he was going to 

explore alternative health care plans with the Company’s 

insurance broker. 

The next meeting between the parties took place on 

October 5. Epstein provided Cunningham with descriptions of 

several alternative health care plans that had been prepared by 

the Company’s broker. Cunningham stated that the plans 

would not work for the Union employees, as the deductibles 

and out-of-pocket costs were very high. Epstein responded 

that the Company’s broker would look into other health care 

plans that might be more affordable for the employees. 

Cunningham then attempted to discuss the Union’s other 

contract proposals, but Epstein interjected that he “couldn’t 

do anything” with the other proposals, and that all the 

Company wanted was “a freeze for one year.” Alden Leeds, 

Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 3. Cunningham responded that 

the Union would not agree to such a deal because the 

Company’s current health care contributions would not 

sustain medical coverage for the year. Epstein repeated that he 

would furnish Union officials with additional health care 

plans for their consideration. 

On October 8, the Company and the Union met again. At 

this meeting, Epstein stated that he was still trying to obtain 

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some additional health care plan proposals to provide the 

Union. Epstein also repeated that the Company wanted to 

extend the current contract for one year with a one-year 

“freeze.” Id. at 4. However, Epstein informed the Union that 

he expected to have information on some additional health 

care plans by the next week. The parties signed an agreement

at their October 8 meeting extending the 2005 collective 

bargaining agreement until November 2.

On October 21, Epstein emailed Cunningham an 

additional health care plan for the Union to review. Epstein

also indicated that he “hoped to have something even better” 

and that he would advise the Union if anything came through. 

Id. at 5. The next day, on October 22, Epstein emailed 

Cunningham an analysis of the health care plan that the 

Company had provided to the Union the day before. Epstein 

explained that the cost of the plan would be more expensive 

than the existing plan, but less expensive than the Union’s 

proposed renewal. Alternatively, Epstein suggested that if the 

Company provided employee-only coverage and eliminated 

family coverage, the cost would drop below the existing plan 

and the company could pay $400 towards each employee’s 

deductible. Epstein ended his email by reiterating that he 

hoped to have something better later that day and, if so, he 

would forward it to the Union. 

Later on October 22, Epstein emailed Cunningham yet 

another health care plan. He explained that, although the cost 

was similar to the plan that he had provided the day before

and the deductible was higher, employees would not be 

required to provide their medical histories in order to secure 

coverage. Cunningham showed these plans to the Union’s 

secretary treasurer, John Troccoli. Cunningham told Troccoli

that he was not really sure what the Company was proposing 

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on health care and that the Company had made no proposal 

dealing with the Union’s other issues. 

On October 30, Troccoli telephoned Epstein and 

informed him that the Union did not think any of the 

Company’s proposed health care plans would work because 

the deductibles were too high, medical reviews were required, 

and the cost to employees would be too high. As a 

concession, the Union offered the Company a continuation of 

the existing health care plan for one year at the same 

contribution levels. Troccoli requested that the parties go 

forward and discuss the other outstanding issues. Epstein 

replied, “You don’t understand. I just want to keep everything 

the same. I don’t want to pay anything more. . . . I want to 

keep everything the same for one year.” Id. at 6 (ellipsis in 

original). Troccoli responded that the Union was willing to do 

that with health care, but wanted to discuss the other 

outstanding issues. Epstein repeated that he wanted to keep 

everything the same for one year, and that the Union 

employees were supposed to vote on the Company’s offer. 

Troccoli responded, “Vote on what? I have no idea what 

we’re voting on.” Id. Epstein stated that if the employees did 

not vote and agree to the Company’s offer, the employees 

would be locked out. Troccoli repeated that he did not know 

what the Union employees were supposed to be voting on. 

Epstein replied that the Union would have something by the 

end of the day. 

Later that day, Epstein sent an email to the Union, which

stated:

During the 30 days since the Agreement between the 

parties expired we at the Company have tried our best to 

come up with an alternative medical plan that would cost 

the same or less than the proposed increase for the Union 

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plan. Our best efforts resulted in a plan that 1) requires 

medical interview for coverage 2) does not include dental 

3) does not include optical 4) did not cost less than the 

expiring plan. However if we were to eliminate the 

family coverage and go to single coverage for all Union 

members then this plan would cost less than the expiring 

Union plan. There would be enough of a savings that the 

Company would provide $400 to each member to go 

toward their deductibles. . . . If we have no Agreement 

between the parties by the close of business on Monday 

then the Company will lock out the Union members on 

Tuesday morning Nov 3, 2009.

Id. Union officials made no effort to contact Epstein regarding 

his email. At 4 p.m. on November 2, Epstein informed the 

Union that, effective immediately, the employees were locked 

out. On November 3, the Union employees attempted to 

punch in at work but were prevented from doing so by the 

Company. 

The parties met on November 3, 4, and 9. At the meeting 

on November 9, the Company presented the Union with a 

document entitled “Final Offer.” Id. at 8. In its “Final Offer,” 

the Company specified the health care plan that would be 

provided to employees and the contribution rates for both 

employees and the Company. The “Final Offer” further stated 

that all other terms of the 2005 collective bargaining 

agreement would remain in full force and effect. On 

November 12, the Union rejected the Company’s “Final 

Offer.” 

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II. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BOARD

The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the 

Company. Thereafter, the Board’s Regional Director issued a 

complaint and notice of hearing, alleging, inter alia, that 

Alden Leeds violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act 

by unlawfully locking out its employees. On August 30, 2010, 

following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

concluded that Alden Leeds had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 

(3) of the Act by locking out its employees on November 3, 

2009, without providing its employees with a timely, clear, 

and complete offer setting forth the conditions necessary to 

avoid the lockout. Alden Leeds, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 

10-13. The ALJ noted that the Company’s October 30 email 

purporting to detail the terms of its offer was confusing, 

incomplete, and internally inconsistent, and that both 

Cunningham and Troccoli were confused about which health 

care plan, if any, the Company was proposing. Id. at 11. The 

ALJ found that the Company first submitted a complete 

proposal to the Union on November 9, 2009. Id. at 12. The 

ALJ found, however, that this proposal did not cure the 

Company’s failure to provide a complete proposal prior to the 

lockout, and that the lockout, unlawful at its inception, 

retained its initial taint of illegality until it was terminated and 

the affected employees were made whole. Id. The ALJ 

recommended that the Company should cease and desist from 

illegally locking out its employees, reinstate the unlawfully 

locked out employees, and provide the unlawfully locked out 

employees full backpay. Id. at 13.

On July 19, 2011, the Board substantially adopted the 

ALJ’s findings and his recommended order. Id. at 1. The 

Board added the following explanation to its judgment:

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We agree with the [ALJ], for the reasons he states, 

that the lockout’s initial illegality was not cured when the 

Respondent provided the Union with a complete contract 

proposal on November 9, 2009, almost 1 week after the 

lockout began. The [ALJ] specifically so found and the 

[Company] has not argued in its exceptions or brief in 

support that the judge erred in so finding. Moreover, it is 

well established that “a lockout unlawful at its inception 

retains its initial taint of illegality until it is terminated 

and the affected employees are made whole.” Movers and 

Warehousemen’s Assn. of Washington DC, 224 NLRB 

356, 357 (1976), enfd. 550 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. 

denied 434 U.S. 826 (1977). The Board further held in its 

decision on the merits in Movers, “the burden must be on 

Respondent to show that its failure to restore the status 

quo ante had no adverse impact on the subsequent 

collective bargaining,” and that “no such showing has 

been made.” Id. at 358. Here, the [ALJ] did not find that 

the [Company] has carried its burden in this regard and 

the [Company] did not except to the absence of such a 

finding. In these circumstances, further litigation of this 

matter at compliance is unwarranted. 

Id. at 1 n.3. One member of the Board indicated that he would 

have allowed the Company to litigate its backpay liability at a 

compliance proceeding even though Alden Leeds had failed 

to raise a specific exception to the ALJ’s decision on this 

point. Id.

Alden Leeds now petitions for review of the Board’s 

Decision and Order. Specifically, Alden Leeds raises two 

challenges. First, Alden Leeds argues that the Board erred in 

adopting the ALJ’s finding that the Company violated the Act 

by failing to provide the Union with a timely, clear, and 

complete offer setting forth the conditions necessary to avoid 

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the lockout. Second, Alden Leeds contends that the Board 

erred in concluding that further litigation of the Company’s 

backpay liability in a compliance proceeding was 

unwarranted.

III. DEFERENCE DUE TO THE BOARD’S FINDINGS

It is well established that this court “accords a very high 

degree of deference to administrative adjudications by the 

NLRB.” Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.3d 929, 935 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We review the Board’s 

findings of fact for substantial evidence, which “gives the 

agency the benefit of the doubt, since it requires not the 

degree of evidence which satisfies the court that the requisite 

fact exists, but merely the degree which could satisfy a 

reasonable factfinder.” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. 

NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 377 (1998). Credibility determinations 

made by the ALJ, as adopted by the Board, are accepted 

unless they are patently insupportable. NLRB v. Creative 

Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Furthermore, “[w]hen the Board concludes that a violation of 

the NLRA has occurred, we must uphold that finding unless it 

has no rational basis or is unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” Bally’s, 646 F.3d at 935 (citation omitted). 

“Indeed, the Board is to be reversed only when the record is 

so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find 

to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor 

practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire 

or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 

employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 

labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Such conduct also 

violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, id. § 158(a)(1), which 

makes it an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain, or 

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coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed” in the 

Act. Laro Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 227 n.3 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995). An employer may, however, lawfully lock out its 

employees for “the sole purpose of bringing economic 

pressure to bear in support of [its] legitimate bargaining 

position.” Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 

(1965). In order for such a lockout to be lawful, the employer 

must inform the union in a clear and timely manner of its

demands so that the union has a fair opportunity to evaluate 

whether to accept the employer’s proposal and avoid a 

lockout. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 650, 656 

(2003), enforced in relevant part 402 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 

2005); see also Dietrich Indus., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 57, 60 

(2008).

Alden Leeds argues that its October 30, 2009, email was 

clear, and that the record is replete with evidence that the 

Company’s negotiating position remained unchanged 

throughout the entire period leading up to, and including, the 

lockout. According to Alden Leeds, the record demonstrates 

that the Union knew and understood that the Company was 

offering a one-year freeze on all terms of the existing 

agreement, including the cost of employee health care. On 

this view of the record, the Company argues that the Board 

had no grounds to support its determination that Alden Leeds 

violated the Act. We disagree.

Reviewing the record as a whole, it is clear that the 

Board’s judgment in this case is supported by substantial 

evidence. In considering the Company’s October 30, 2009, 

email to the Union – the last communication sent from the 

Company to the Union before the lockout – a reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that the Company’s proposal to the 

Union regarding health care was unclear. See Allentown Mack 

Sales, 522 U.S. at 377. The email fails to illuminate whether 

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the Company was proposing any or all of its various 

alternative health care plans, which differed from the existing 

health care plan under the 2005 collective bargaining 

agreement. Furthermore, the ALJ credited the testimony of 

both Cunningham and Troccoli that the Union was confused 

about which health care plan, if any, the Company was 

proposing in its October 30 email. We must accept these 

credibility determinations, as nothing in the record suggests 

that they are “patently insupportable.” See Creative Food 

Design, 852 F.2d at 1297.

Although Alden Leeds argues that the record contains 

evidence that is contrary to the Board’s findings and supports 

its position, “[t]he question before us is not whether 

substantial evidence supports the [Company’s] view, but 

whether it supports the Board’s.” Wayneview Care Ctr. v. 

NLRB, 664 F.3d 341, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Board’s 

judgment in this case easily commands the deference of this 

court under the controlling standards of review.

IV. THE SECTION 10(E) ISSUE

“[A] lockout unlawful at its inception retains its initial 

taint of illegality until it is terminated and the affected 

employees are made whole.” Movers & Warehousemen’s 

Ass’n of Metro. Wash., D.C., Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 356, 357 

(1976), enforced 550 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1977). In other 

words, to cure a lockout, the employer must restore the status 

quo ante as well as end the lockout. See Greensburg CocaCola Bottling Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1993), 

enforcement denied on other grounds, 40 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 

1994). Nevertheless, “an employer can avoid further liability 

if it is able to show affirmatively that a failure to restore the 

status quo ante did not adversely affect subsequent 

bargaining.” Id.

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Alden Leeds contends that the Board erred in refusing to 

permit the Company to litigate the scope of its backpay 

liability in a compliance proceeding. In particular, the 

Company argues that it should be afforded an opportunity to 

establish in a compliance proceeding that its backpay liability 

ended on November 9. We lack jurisdiction to consider this 

challenge, however, because Alden Leeds failed to raise this 

claim with the Board, as required by the Act.

Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides that “[n]o objection 

that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, 

or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure 

or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 

extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The 

Board’s regulation interpreting this provision requires parties 

to “set forth specifically the questions of procedure, fact, law, 

or policy to which exception is taken” and “concisely state the 

grounds for the exception.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b)(1); see also

id. § 102.46(b)(2) (“Any exception to a ruling, finding, 

conclusion, or recommendation which is not specifically 

urged shall be deemed to have been waived.”). “And it is long 

established that where a petitioner objects to a finding on an 

issue first raised in the Board’s decision, a petitioner must file 

for reconsideration to afford the Board an opportunity to 

correct the error, if any.” Nova Se. Univ. v. NLRB, 807 F.3d 

308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Woelke & Romero Framing, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982)).

It is undisputed that Alden Leeds failed to raise its claim 

with the Board as required by Section 10(e) of the Act. Once 

the ALJ found that the Company’s November 9, 2009, offer 

did not cure the lockout, and instead found that the lockout 

retained its initial taint of illegality until the Company 

terminated the lockout and made its employees whole, Alden 

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Leeds was obligated to challenge that finding in its exceptions 

to the Board in order to preserve the issue for judicial review. 

See Nova Se. Univ., 807 F.3d at 313 (dismissing challenge 

under Section 10(e) where petitioner failed to file proper 

exception); Spectrum Health-Kent Cmty. Campus v. NLRB, 

647 F.3d 341, 348-50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same). But as the 

Board found and the Company concedes, Alden Leeds failed 

to raise and preserve its objection. See Alden Leeds, Inc., 357 

N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 1 n.3; Br. of Petitioner at 50 (“The 

question of the scope of the Company’s backpay liability . . . 

was not the subject of a specific exception made to the NLRB 

below.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction under Section 

10(e) to consider the Company’s challenge. 

In an attempt to escape this conclusion, Alden Leeds 

presses several arguments, none of which is persuasive. First, 

the Company contends that under Greensburg Coca-Cola 

Bottling Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1993), cited by the 

dissenting Board member, the scope of the Company’s 

backpay liability should be reserved for the compliance stage 

of the Board’s proceedings, despite the fact that Alden Leeds 

did not raise this issue before the Board during the unfair 

labor practice proceedings. See Br. of Petitioner at 47-52. But 

as the majority of the Board correctly pointed out, 

Greensburg Coca-Cola does not support the Company’s 

position. In Greensburg Coca-Cola, the ALJ explicitly 

deferred the backpay issue of whether the lockout was cured 

or retained its initial taint of illegality to a future compliance 

proceeding, 311 N.L.R.B. at 1028-29, and neither party filed 

an exception to that portion of the ALJ’s decision. Thus, the 

jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) was not at issue. In the 

present case, in contrast, the ALJ explicitly ruled that the 

lockout was not cured and retained its initial taint of illegality

until the Union’s employees were made whole, but Alden 

Leeds never objected to this finding. Greensburg Coca-Cola

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thus presents no justification to disturb the application of 

Section 10(e)’s jurisdictional bar in the present case. 

Second, relying on Trump Plaza Associates v. NLRB, 679 

F.3d 822 (D.C. Cir. 2012), Alden Leeds argues that the 

jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) does not apply in this case 

because the Board was “sufficiently appraised” of the issue

that Alden Leeds now seeks to raise. Therefore, according to 

the Company, it would have been an “empty formality” to 

raise the matter with the Board in the first instance. Reply Br. 

of Petitioner at 22-24. We reject this argument.

In Trump Plaza, the court found that the substance of the 

petitioner’s challenge was encompassed in its other 

exceptions filed with the Board. Therefore, the court 

determined that Section 10(e) was not a bar to the petitioner’s

challenge, despite the petitioner’s failure to specifically object 

before the Board. Trump Plaza, 679 F.3d at 830. Unlike in 

Trump Plaza, Alden Leeds never put before the Board, in any 

manner, the argument that it now advances – that Alden 

Leeds should be able to contest the scope of its backpay 

liability at a compliance proceeding. Not only did Alden 

Leeds fail to make this argument in a specific exception filed 

before the Board, but none of the other exceptions filed by 

Alden Leeds encompassed the substance of this challenge. 

Indeed, Alden Leeds has never even argued that its other 

exceptions encompassed its backpay challenge. Trump Plaza

therefore provides the Company with no relief. See id.; see 

also Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 417-

18 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding vague exception insufficient to 

provide Board with required notice of ground for petitioner’s 

challenge).

Finally, Alden Leeds argues that Section 10(e) should not 

apply in this case because the Board discussed the backpay 

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issue on its own initiative, the issue has been briefed by the 

parties, and the issue involves an undecided question of law. 

See Br. of Petitioner at 51-52. These points cannot carry the 

day. The Company attempts to frame these circumstances as

“extraordinary,” sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court 

to address the issue. See Reply Br. at 24-28. The Company’s 

position, however, finds no support in the law. “[S]ection 

10(e) bars review of any issue not presented to the Board, 

even where the Board has discussed and decided the issue.” 

HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 798 F.3d 1059, 1069 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 

133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, Section 10(e) 

applies “regardless of whether the questions raised be 

considered questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed 

questions of fact and law.” P.R. Drydock & Marine 

Terminals, Inc. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 212, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 

1960).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we hereby deny the 

petition for review and grant the cross-petition for 

enforcement. 

So ordered.

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