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Parties Involved:
Lawrence Behr
Appellant
Federal Communications Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-1003 September Term, 2015

 FILED ON: DECEMBER 29, 2015

LAWRENCE BEHR,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

On Appeal from an Order of the 

Federal Communications Commission

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal from the order of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) was 

considered on the record and the briefs of the parties. See FED R. APP. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R.

34(j). The court has accorded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not 

warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Commission’s order be affirmed. 

Appellant Lawrence Behr challenges an FCC order denying his request for a hearing under 

47 C.F.R. § 1.110. Behr’s claim arises out of a lengthy history with the FCC. In 1993, Behr 

applied for and was awarded via lottery a 220-222 MHz-band broadcasting license. Due to the 

FCC’s administrative error, the license was improperly granted to another licensee in 1995. The 

FCC corrected its error in 1996 after Behr inquired about the status of his application in 1996, 

awarding him a reinstated license. This license required him to construct a base station within 12 

months — the same timetable as all other Phase I licenses assigned in the original 1993 lottery. 

See 47 C.F.R. § 90.725(f). 

In June 2003, Behr filed an application to modify his license; specifically, to update the 

contact information for the license, provide answers regarding foreign ownership, and change the 

station class from for-profit private carrier to for-profit interconnected service. Behr also 

attached a request for a waiver of the construction requirement for Phase I licenses, asking for an 

extension from 12 months to 5-10 years to construct his base station. The Wireless 

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Telecommunications Bureau denied his waiver request on November 12, 2003, and granted his 

license modification application on November 17, 2003. 

Under FCC regulations, “[w]here the Commission without a hearing grants any application 

in part . . . the action of the Commission shall be considered a grant of such application unless 

the applicant” sends the Commission a written rejection of the grant as made within 30 days. 47 

C.F.R. § 1.110 (emphasis added). Once that rejection is received, the Commission must “vacate 

its original action . . . and send the application for hearing.” Behr rejected the FCC’s grant of his 

application for modification, claiming that his application had been granted only in part because 

the Commission rejected his appended waiver request. He contends that his rejection of the 

grant entitles him to a hearing before the Commission under Section 1.110. 

The Commission rejected this claim in several proceedings below. This court “must uphold 

the Commission’s decision unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law.’” Archernar Broad. Co. v. FCC, 62 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 

1995) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Here, the FCC thoroughly explained its rationale for 

denying Behr’s hearing request. The agency views Behr’s matter as involving (i) a fully granted 

modification application and (ii) a separately attached request for a waiver of the construction 

timetable — which was denied. Behr argues, to the contrary, that the waiver request was the 

core of his application and, moreover, that its physical attachment to the modification application 

required the FCC to view them as a singular application. But the Commission explained that its 

consideration of Behr’s request to modify various factual elements of his license was entirely 

independent from its consideration and eventual denial of Behr’s waiver request. See In the 

Matter of Lawrence Behr, 29 FCC Rcd. 15,924, 15,933-34 (2014). Indeed, the Bureau decided 

the two portions of Behr’s application in two separate proceedings. See Letter from Ronald B. 

Fuhrman, Deputy Chief, Technical Analysis Branch, Commercial Wireless Div., to Donald J. 

Evans, Esq., Counsel to Lawrence Behr (Nov. 12, 2003); FCC File No. 0001332167 (Nov. 17, 

2003). 

The Commission further noted it “would have no logical reason to assume that action on the 

waiver request would have any bearing on Behr’s interest in keeping his license up-to-date.” 

Behr, 29 FCC at 15933. Behr’s interpretation of Section 1.110 would mean the denial of any

request for relief that happened to be attached to an application (even a wholly unrelated 

application) would entitle the requestor to an evidentiary hearing — which could require the 

Commission to expend limited resources conducting innumerable Section 1.110 hearings. The 

Commission’s interpretation of Section 1.110 is therefore reasonable and entitled to deference. 

See, e.g., Decker v. Nw Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337–38 (2013) (“[A]n agency’s 

interpretation need not be the only possible reading of the regulation — or even the best one —

to prevail.”). And, though its reading survives under either standard, the Commission is entitled 

to even greater deference here because it is interpreting its own regulation. See Auer v. Robbins, 

519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because the [relevant] test is a creature of the Secretary’s own 

regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless plainly 

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”). 

This Circuit also has relevant precedent which bolsters the Commission’s reading. In 

Buckley-Jaeger v. FCC, the court considered a case in which the FCC granted an application to 

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renew the petitioner’s license while denying the petitioner’s attached waiver request. 397 F.2d 

651 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The licensee there, like Behr, claimed this amounted to a partial denial 

entitling him to a hearing under Section 1.110. The court held that Section 1.110 “concerns 

situations where the applicant receives less than a full authorization. But here Appellant 

received the full authorization to which it was entitled under the statute and rules. In these 

circumstances we do not believe the rule can reasonably interpreted as making a hearing 

mandatory.” Id. at 656. That same logic applies with equal force in Behr’s case. 

Behr, moreover, had other avenues available for appealing the denial of his waiver request: 

by filing either a petition for reconsideration or an application for review. He did neither. Behr 

has also waived any substantive challenge by failing to raise this argument in his briefs. See 

Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2012). For these reasons, Behr cannot 

prevail on appeal and the Commission’s order is affirmed.

Pursuant to D.C. CIRCUIT RULE 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any 

timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R.

41(a)(1). 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

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