Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02290/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02290-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Varnador Sutton
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2015*

Decided March 20, 2015

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2290

VARNADOR SUTTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 13‐cv‐406

Sarah Evans Barker,

Judge.

O R D E R

In 2008 Varnador Sutton was convicted of defrauding Indiana Medicaid, and his

sentence included forfeiture of certain assets related to his scheme. In this civil suit

Sutton challenges various aspects of that forfeiture. The district court concluded that it

lacked jurisdiction over Sutton’s claim. We affirm.   

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐2290    Page 2

Our opinion from Sutton’s direct criminal appeal details the facts and procedural

history of his prosecution, United States v. Sutton, 582 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2009), but we

highlight those facts that are most relevant to this appeal. Sutton was charged in 2007

with defrauding Indiana Medicaid in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3147. Sutton, the

indictment alleged, ran a counseling business that had no patients but nevertheless

charged the state for providing psychological services. The indictment also gave notice

of the government’s intent to seek forfeiture of assets it determined were proceeds of

Sutton’s fraud. A jury found Sutton guilty, and the district court determined that the

government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Sutton received about

$3.3 million in profit from his scheme. A money judgment in that amount was entered,

and the government promptly notified the parties and court of its intention to forfeit

Sutton’s assets to satisfy the judgment.   

The government ultimately forfeited three bank accounts, three vehicles, and five

parcels of land. Sutton did not challenge the forfeiture in either his direct criminal

appeal or in a later appeal after we had remanded for resentencing. See United States v.

Sutton, 431 F. App’x 486 (7th Cir. 2011). Meanwhile, however, he filed a motion seeking

return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). He then learned,

to his apparent surprise, that his property already had been liquidated.   

His response to this unsuccessful bid to get his property back has been a flurry of

litigation, including this lawsuit, his fourth on the subject. The district court gleaned

two claims from Sutton’s narrative complaint: a challenge to the government’s power to

forfeit his assets and a challenge to the amount forfeited. The court, explaining that

these claims belonged in a direct appeal of his criminal sentence rather than an action

for return of the property, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Sutton’s complaint.

See Young v. United States, 489 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 2007).   

On appeal Sutton argues that the district court misapprehended the essential

nature of his claim. He maintains that he sought to challenge the sufficiency of the

government’s notice that it would forfeit his assets, grounding his challenge in due

process. But even if we accept that characterization, the Indiana district court would be

without jurisdiction to entertain his claim. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1),

jurisdiction over constitutional claims against the government for monetary relief in

excess of $10,000 lies only in the Court of Federal Claims. See United States v. Bormes, 133

S. Ct. 12, 16–17 & n.2 (2012); Global Relief Found., Inc., v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th

Cir. 2002). Sutton argues that the Tucker Act is inapplicable because he seeks “equitable

relief,” see E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998), but this argument is belied by his

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No. 14‐2290    Page 3

prayer for “equitable relief in the amount of $2,436,961.10.” Requests for such monetary

damages must be brought in the United States Court of Federal Claims.

AFFIRMED.

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