Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06104/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06104-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Curtis Keys
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

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1 1LEb 

U!lited Stctt% C'!Un qf Appeals 

'Tenth. Cir~.!!t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAR 3 0 19§0 

ROBERT L. 1-iOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL CURTIS KEYS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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} 

No. 89-6104 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-88-248-R) 

Rand C. Eddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for the Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert E. Mydans, United States Attorney, (Teresa Black, Assistant 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and KANE,* District Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, 

United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 1 
Michael Curtis Keys appeals his conviction and sentence f o r 

know ing l y possessing a weapon whil e an inmate of a federal 

correctional institution in violation of 18 u.s.c. secti on 

1 79 l (a)(2) . Keys c o nte nds t hat the dis trict c o ur t erred by: (1) 

f ail ing to exclude evide nce of his p ris on gang membersh ip; (2) 

permitting the testimony of two government witne sse s t o be re r e ad 

dur i ng j ury del i be r a tio ns; (3) a dding two level s t o his base 

off e nse lev e l for o bstr uctio n o f justice; and (4} departing upward 

froin the Sentencing Guidelines due to his priso n disciplinar y 

record. We affirm. 

I . 

Keys i s a f e deral inmat e c urr e nt l y serving twenty years f or 

bank robbery . On July 8, 1988, Keys wa s notified that he would b e 

transferred to another range of the cell b l ock and that he s hould 

gather his belo ng i n gs . Keys pa cked h i s belongi ngs in a 

pillowcase. Fi fteen o r twenty mi nu tes later, after all o f the 

other inmates in the range had been locked down, a n off ice r 

hand cu f f ed Keys , let him out of his cell, a nd then handed h im t he 

pil l owc a se conta ining his persona l belongings. Keys a nd t wo 

officers went downstairs to the lower rang e. Pursuant t o 

i nstitut ional p o licy, t he o f ficer s c ond ucted a sea r ch of Ke ys ' 

c l othing and belongi ngs. In the p i llowcas e the o f fice r s 

discovered a bund l e of e nve l opes , includi ng one which was s eal e d . 

When questio ned about t h e e nve l ope , Keys s ai d it conta i ned h is 

toothpowde r . Th e o f fi c er opene d the e nvel ope a nd f ound a "sha nk''-

-a razor blade melt ed into a toothbrush handle to form a knife. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 2 
Following this incident, Keys was involved in several. 

altercations with prison officials. In December 1988, in ari 

incident with officer Jim Eisenhour, Keys stated that he was a 

Crips member with sixty soldiers in the prison system who would do 

favors for him; that Eisenhour was a dead man; and that Keys would 

spread the word to his Crips brothers to kill Eisenhour. Officer 

Bob Logsdon was present and heard Keys make these statements to 

Eisenhour. On January 6, 1989, Keys attempted to assault the 

warden and assistant warden, requiring eight officers to subdue 

him. Prison authorities also intercepted a letter from Keys to 

another inmate, Johnny Molina. The letter implicitly invited 

Molina to perjure himself by describing, in precise detail, 

Eisenhour's alleged threats and abuse of Keys and asking Molina 

and two other inmates to testify to these alleged events. 

At trial, the jury found Keys guilty of possessing the knife, 

rejecting Keys' defense that the knife had been placed in his 

possession without his knowledge. The district court, after 

reviewing the presentence report and hearing the arguments of both 

sides, enhanced Keys' base offense level by two levels for 

obstruction of justice, finding that Keys had testified 

untruthfully at trial. The district court also departed upwards 

from the Guidelines, finding that Keys' criminal history category 

underrepresented the seriousness of his past conduct because the 

Guidelines calculation did not include Keys' assaultive conduct 

while in prison. The district court sentenced Keys to fifty 

months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 3 
II. 

The first issue on appeal is the propriety of the district 

court's decision to admit Keys' statements about gang membership 

into evidence. We review the district court's decision for abuse 

of discretion. See United States v . Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 

1301 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

The manner in which the case against Keys developed at trial 

is crucial to understanding why the district court admi tted Keys' 

statements concerning gang membership. The government sought to 

show that Keys was in knowing possession of the knife because he 

packed the envelope containing the knife into the pillowcase 

containing his personal belongings. Keys' defense was that his 

possession was not "knowing" because someone . else had p l aced the 

knife in the toothpowder envelope and left the envelope on Keys' 

side of the cell. Keys. argued that when the range orderly, an 

inmate named Steve Kinnison, went back to the cell to retrieve 

some items that Keys had left behind, Keys' cellmate, Kelly Ward, 

gathered up everything on Keys' side of the cell and gave the 

envelope, among other items, to Kinnison. Kinnison then gave the 

i tems to Keys, who placed them in his pillowcase. 

On cross examination, the government asked Keys about his 

statements dur ing the altercation with officer Eisenhour that he 

was a member of a prison gang and had sixty soldiers who would do 

him favors, including breaking the law. 1 Keys denied making the 

1 Before cross-examination, the government had agreed at a 

bench conference to refrain from mentioning the Crips by name or 

referring to Keys' threats to have Eisenhour murdered. Keys' 

counsel objected to introduction of Keys' claim of control over 

other i nmates, but the distri ct c ourt overruled the objection. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 4 
statements. The government also asked Kinnison and Ward if they 

were gang membe rs. Both Kinnison and Ward denied t hat they were 

gang members. 

In rebuttal, the government called officers Eisenhour and 

Logsdon to testify that Keys had made the statement about gang 

membership and having sixty soldiers who would do him favors, 

including breaking the law. The district judge permitted this 

testimony over objection, but instructed the jury that: 

Ladies and Gentlemen, in regard to [officer Eisenhour's] 

testimony, it is only being admitted -- [Keys is] not on 

trial for being a member of a gang. As you know, he's 

on trial in regard to possession of a weapon . But, this 

t estimony is admitted only so far as you may consider it 

relevant as to the credibility of other witnesses that 

have testified in the case. 

On appeal, the government contends that admission of Keys' 

statement about gang membership was probative of bias by the 

inmate witnesses in Keys' favor. Keys objected on the grounds 

that the information was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial . 

A. Bias Due to Common Membership in ~ Group 

United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), discusses the 

admissibility of gang membership to show the bias of a witness. 

In Abel, the government sought to prove the bias of a defense 

witness through cross-examination and extrinsic ev i dence showing 

that the defendant and the defense witness were members of the 

same prison gang, and that the tenets of the gang required members 

to "lie, cheat, steal, [and) kill" to protect each other. Id. at 

48. The Court held that "[a] witness' and a party's common 

membership in an organiza tion , even without proof that the witness 

or party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly probative 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 5 
of bias." Id. at 52. The Court also rejected the argument that 

the district court should cut off the description of the type of 

gang because evidence of the gang's tenets was unfairly 

prejudicial. The Court observed: 

This argument ignores the fact that the ~ of 

organization in which a witness and a party share 

membership may be relevant to show bias. The 

a t tributes of the Aryan Brotherhood--a secret prison 

sect sworn to perjury and sel f-protection--bore directly 

not only on the fact of bias but also on the source and 

strength of Mill's bias. 

Id. at 54 (emphasis in original). The Court not ed tha t the 

defendant had not been unfairly prejudiced where the district 

court had prevented the use of the term ''Aryan Brotherhood" and 

had given a cautionary instruction. See id. at 54-55. The Court 

t h us hel d that the district court had not abused its discretion in 

permitting the testimony about gang membership. 

Al t hough Abel permits the introduction of evidence of gang 

membership to show bias, the government must first lay a 

foundation showing t hat the defendant and the witness to be 

impeached belong to t he same gang. 2 In this case, however, the 

government's extrinsic evidence only showed that Keys was a member 

of a gang. Defense witnesses Kinnison and Ward on cross2 I n making this showing, the governmen t may rel y upon 

extrinsic evidence: 

Bias is never classified as a collateral matter which 

l i es beyond t he scope of inquiry, nor as a mat t er on 

which an examiner is required to take a witness's 

answer. Bias may be proved by extrinsic evidence even 

after a witness's disavowal of partiality. 

United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

{quoting Unitea-states v. Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 

1976)}. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 6 
examination denied being gang members, and, unlike the situation 

in Abel, the government did not have extrinsic evidence to 

contradict their denials. The re is thus no evidence in the record 

showing that Kinnison and Ward were members of the same gang as 

Keys. Absent such a foundation, Keys' statements concerning gang 

membership are not probative of bias on the part of Kinnison and 

Ward due to common membersh ip in a gang. 

B. Bias Due to Fear 

Although Keys' statement is not admissible to show that 

Kinnison and Ward were biased in Keys' favor because they belonged 

to the same gang, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by admitting the evidence to show bias. Keys' statement that he 

controll ed sixty soldiers in the prison system who would do him 

favors, including breaking the law, is relevant to show that 

Kinnison's and Ward's testimony might have been influenced by 

their fear of Keys' and his gang. In United States ~ Bratton, 

875 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit upheld the 

trial court's admission of evidence of the defendant-husband's 

physical abuse of his wife in an effort to establish her 

motiva tion to "falsify or fabr icat e testimony due to her fear of 

fu rther physical abuse at the hands of her husband." Id. at 443; 

see also Abe l , 469 u.s. at 52 ("Bias may be induced by a witness' 

like, dislike, or fear of~ party ..•. "). Although it 

considered the government's judgment in introducing the evidence 

''questionable," the Fifth Circuit found that the district court 

had not abused its discretion where it had carefully limited the 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 7 
evidence a dmit ted and had given a limiting i nstruction. See 

Bratton, 875 F.2d at 443 . 

We find the Fifth Circuit' s rationale persuasive. We have 

pe rmi tted testimony and questions about an inmate' s prison 

experience in the past , noting that an inmate's testimony may be 

temp ered by an understanding tha t "those who cooperate with the 

Government might be killed. " See United tate s~ Greschner, 802 

F.2d 373, 382-83 {lOth Cir. 1986), cert . deni ed, 480 U. S . 908 

(1987). Keys• statement that he controlled sixty soldiers in the 

prison system who would do him favors, including breaking the law, 

suggests t hat Ki nnison and Ward mi gh t fab ricate or slant their 

testimony due to fear of Keys and his ''soldiers." As the Supreme 

Court has observed: 

Proof of bias is a lmost always relevant beca use the 

jury , as fi nder of fact and weigher of credibility, has 

historically bee n entitled to assess all evidence which 

might bear on the acc uracy and truth of a witness' 

testi mony. 

Abel , 469 u.s. at 52. We find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in pe rmi tting these fa cts to reach the jury , 

especially where Keys • h imself claimed a leadership or controlling 

role over the " s oldiers." 

c. Rule 403 Balancing 

Keys contends that the district court should have exclude d 

his stat ements conce rning gang membe rship as unfairl y prejudi cial 

evidence. We disagree . The decision whether to exclude evidence 

as unfairly prejudic ial under Ru le 40 3 "is one fo r whi ch the trial 

judge, because of his famil i arity with the full array of evidence 

in t he c ase , is particularl y suited." Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hu tton 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 8 
Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 839 (lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting Rigby v. 

Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 293 (lOth Cir. 1977)), cert. 

denied, ---U.S. ---, 109 s. Ct. 1745 (19 89) . We will not dist urb 

the trial judge's ruling absent a "clear abuse of discretion." 

Id. 

Credibility was crucial to resolution of this case . If t he 

jury believed the Government's witnesses, Keys affirmat i vely 

packed the knife in his pillowcase, which suggests that he 

knowingly possessed the knife. If the jury bel ieved the defense 

witnesses, the knife could have been inside the envelope without 

Keys' knowledge, possibly raising a reasonable doubt as to whether 

Keys' possession of the knife was "knowing." In this context, 

evidence that the defense witnesses might have slanted their 

testimony because o f their fear of Keys and his fellow gang 

members had a high probative value. Moreover, the d istrict court 

took several precautionary measures which substantially reduced 

the danger of unfair prejudice. The court excluded mention of the 

gang's name and Keys' threat to have officer Eisenhour murdered 

and gave a limiting instruction that the jury should only consider 

Keys' statement for t he purpose of evaluating the credibility of 

the other witnesses. We therefore hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude Keys' 

statements concerning gang membership unde r Rule 403. 

III. 

The second issue on appeal is whether the district court 

erred in permitting the testimony of two government wi tnesses to 

be read to the jury after deliberations commenced. Keys contends 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 9 
that the district court's action " unduly emphasized" the 

test imony. We disagree. 

We revi ew for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Brunetti , 615 F . 2d 899, 903 {lOth Cir. 1980); United States v . 

Tager, 481 F.2d 97, 101 ( lOth Cir. 1973), cert . deni ed, 415 u.s. 

914 (1974). Al though rereading of testimony after deliberations 

have commenced is "disfavored ," see United States Y...!. Nolan, 700 

F .2d 479 , 486 {9th Cir.}, cert. denied, 46 2 U.S. 11 23 {1 983), we 

have found no abuse of discretion where the testimony was r ead in 

its entirety, ~Brunetti, 615 F.2d at 903; Tager , 481 F .2d at 

101. In this case the district court first ins tructed the jury to 

use their collective memo ries and told the jury that rereading 

would be allowed only if the testimony could not be recalled and 

was '' absolut ely essential" to their verdict. The jury indicated 

tha t they consider ed the testimony esse ntial. The district cou r t 

then permitted the entire testimony of the two witnesses to be 

read to the jury. We find no abuse of discretion under these 

circumstances . 

IV. 

The third issue presented on appeal concerns the p ropriety of 

enhancing Keys ' se n tence under the Sentencing Gu idelines for 

obstruction of justice, U.S .S.G. § 3Cl . l. Keys contends that the 

district court impermissibly penalized him for exercising his 

right to defend himself. We disagree. 

The government bears the burden of proof for increases in 

sentence . See Uni ted States ~ Kirk, No. 89-30 20, s lip op. at 5 

(lOth Cir. Ja n. 22, 1990) ; accord United States v. McDowell, 888 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 10 
F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1989}. "Evidence which does not. 

preponderate or is in equipoise simply fails to meet the required 

burden of proof. 11 Kirk, slip op. at 6. The distri ct court's 

application of the Guidelines to the facts is entitled to due 

deference, and a finding of fact will be upheld unl ess clearly 

e rroneous. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e). 

Guidelines section 3Cl.l provides: 

If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or 

attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of 

justice during the investigation or prosecution of the 

i nstant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 

U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l. Keys contends that presenting his theory of 

defense and denying guilt should not subject him to the 

possibility of an increase in punishment for perjurious testimony. 

We agree that a denial of guilt or exercise of the constitutional 

right to testify in one's own defense is not a proper basis for 

application of Guidelines section 3Cl.l. See id. § 3Cl.l, 

comment. (n.3}. The giving or subornation of perjurious 

testimony, however, is not the exercise of a constitutional right. 

As the Supreme Court observed in United States ~ Grayson, 438 

U.S. 41, 54 (1978), "[t]here is no protected right to commit 

perjury.n 

The government at Keys' sentencing hearing presented to the 

district court detailed allegati ons of perjury by Keys. The court 

also cons i dered Keys' objections to enhancing his sentence under 

Guidelines section 3Cl.l. The court specifically stated his own 

observation that the defendant had not testified truthfully. In 

addition, the court had before it the letter from Keys to Mol i na, 

detailing the all eged events that Keys wished Molina to testify to 

ll 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 11 
in order to discredit officer Eisenhour. Based on this re9ord, we 

-

cannot say that the district court's finding that Keys willfully 

obstructed the administration of justice was clearly erroneous. 

v. 

The fourth issue on appeal is whether the district court 

erred in departing upward from the guidelines. The district court 

departed upward because it determined that· the Guidelines did not 

address adequately the seriousness of Keys' past criminal conduct, 

particularly his prison disciplinary record. 

Our review of departures is controlled by United States v. 

White, No . 89- 3003, slip op. (lOth Cir . Jan. 8, 1990), which 

established a three step procedure for review of the district 

court's decision to depart: 

In the first step, we determine whether the 

circumstances cited by the district court justify a 

departure from the Guidelines. The sentencing court may 

depart from the Guidelines only if it "finds that there 

exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 

kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the Guidelines that should result in a 

sentence different from that described ...• " Our 

standard of review in the first step is plenary. 

Id . at 2. 

The district court relied on Keys' prison disciplinary 

record, which showed several instances of assaultive behavior, as 

the circumstance justifying departure . We examine Guidelines 

sections 4Al . l through 4Al.3 to determine whether the Sentencing 

Commission adequately considered a defendant's prison disciplinary 

record in its provisions for calculating a defendant's criminal 

history. See id. Guidelines sections 4Al.l through 4Al.3 

explicitly provide for various types of prior sentences, see, 

12 

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e.g., u.s.s.G. §§ 4Al .l, 4Al.2 (prior judicial sentences);_ id . 

§ 4Al .2( d) (juvenile sentences); id. § 4Al.2(f) (diversiona-ry 

dispositions); id. § 4Al.2(g) (military sentences); id. § 4Al .2(h) 

(foreign sentences); id . § 4Al.2(i) (tribal court sentences); id . 

§ 4Al.2(k) (revocations of probation, parole, mandatory release, 

or supervised release); see also id. § 4Al.2, comment. (nn.l, 7, 

9, 11}, but do not mention prison disciplinary tribunal sanctions. 

Guidelines section 4Al .3, however, does state that: 

If reliable information indicates that the c riminal 

history category does not adequately reflect the 

seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct 

• • . the court may consider imposing a sentence 

departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range. 

Such information may include, but is not limited to, 

information concerning: 

(c) prior similar 

adjudication or by 

administrative order; 

misconduct 

a failure 

established 

to comply 

by a civil 

with an 

(e) prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting 

in a criminal conviction . 

Id. § 4Al. 3, p.s. We hold that a prison disc iplinary record may, 

in appropriate situations, be a proper basis for an upward 

departure "when the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history o r 

the likelihood that the defendant wi l l commit fu rther crimes," i d . 

{emphasis added). 

Keys also objects to the district court' s consideration of 

his prison disciplinary record on the grounds that the district 

court may not use "unrelated" conduct as a basis for departing 

from the Guidelines. This contention ·is meritless. Guidelines 

section 1Bl.4 spec ifically states: 

13 

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In determining the sentence to impose within the 

guideline range, or whether a departure from the 

guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without 

limitation, any information concerning the background, 

character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise 

prohibited by law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 

Id. § 1Bl.4 (emphasis added). In our view, the Guidelines clearly 

permit the district court to consider information concerning Keys' 

prison disciplinary record that is unrelated to the actual offense 

of conviction. 

Keys further contends that Guidelines section 2Pl.2, which 

determines the sentence for providing or possessing contraband in 

prison, implicitly considered the possibility that the defendant 

might have a prison disciplinary record, therefore the district 

court should be barred from departing on that basis. We disagree. 

Guidelines section 2Pl.2 applies generally to visitors and 

prison officials, not just to prison inmates. This general 

applicability of Guidelines section 2Pl.2 forecloses Keys• 

argument because either visitors or prison officials would rarely, 

if ever, have prison disciplinary records. 

Furthermore, Keys' argument misunderstands the structure of 

the Guidelines. The mere fact that a factor is mentioned for one 

offense does not mean that it cannot be applied to other offenses. 

[A] factor may be listed as a specific offense 

characteristic under one guideline but not all 

guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not 

mean that there may not be circumstances when the factor 

would be relevant to sentencing. For example, the use 

of a weapon has been listed as a specific offense 

characteristic under many guidelines, but not under 

immigration violations. Therefore, if a weapon is a 

relevant factor to sentencing for an immigration 

violation, the court may depart for this reason. 

14 

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Id. § 5K2 .0, p.s. Thus, the absence of explicit mention of a 

factor does not mean that it was implicitly considered and 

included in the Guidelines provision . Instead, the presence of 

that factor may be grounds for departur e. Section 2Pl .2's general 

applicab ility and the structure of the Guidelines preclude Keys' 

contention that the Sentencing Commission implicitly considered 

prison disciplinary records in establishing Guidelines section 

2Pl.2. 

We hold that the Sentencing Commission did not adequately 

consider a defendant's possible prison disciplinary record when it 

formuluated Guidelines sections 4Al.l through 4Al.3 and 2Pl.2. 

The district court thus did not err under the first step of the 

White analysis when it decided to depart upward from the 

Guidelines because of Keys' prison disciplinary record . See 

White, slip op . at 2-3 . 

In the second step of the White analysis, we determine 

whether the circumstances cited by the district court to justify 

departure actually exist in the instant case. The findings of the 

district court will be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Id. 

at 2. Keys did not dispute the accuracy of his prison 

disciplinary record. There being no d ispute as to the existence 

of the circumstances forming the basis for the district court's 

departure, we turn to step three. 

The third step in our inquiry is a review of the 

reasonableness of the district court's degree of departur e from 

the Guidelines . Even if the district court's decision to d epa rt 

from the Guidelines is valid, we will still vacate the sentence if 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-6104 Document: 01019748636 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 15 
the degree of departure is unreasonable . See White, slip op . at 

4; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e}(3). In determining whether the degree of 

departure is reasonable, we consider the district court's 

proffered justifications as well as such factors as: the 

seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, 

deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment, the 

policy statements and sentencing pattern of the Guidel ines, and 

the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparaties. See Whi te , 

slip op. at 4; 18 U. S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3742(e)(3) . 

Guidelines section 4Al.3 gives spec ific direction to the 

district court concerning the appropriate degree of departure 

where the defendant's criminal history score underrepresents past 

criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit 

other crimes: 

In considering a departure under this provision, the 

Commission intends that the court use, as a reference, 

the guideline range for a defendant with a higher or 

lower criminal history category, as appl icable. 

U.S.S.G . § 4Al.3 p.s. We thus turn to the district court's 

calculation of the deg ree of departure. 

The district court determined that Keys' base offense level 

was 13, id . § 2Pl .2, and added 2 levels for obstruction of 

justice, id . § 3Cl.l, for a total offense level of 15. The court 

then determined that Keys' criminal history score was seven 

points, plus three points because he committed the offense whi le 

incarcerated. Id. §§ 4Al.l(d), 4Al. l (e) . Ten criminal history 

points places Keys in criminal history category V, id. § 5A, for a 

presumptive sentence of 37-46 months. The Guidelines state that 

where the criminal history category does not adequately reflect 

16 

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the seriousness of the defendant's criminal past, then dep~rture 

- is appropriate, id. § 4Al.3 p.s., and the district court should 

depart to the next highest criminal history category, in this case 

category VI, id. The presumptive sentence for an offense level 15 

with criminal history category VI is 41-51 months. Id. § SA. The 

district court sentenced Keys to fifty months, which is within the 

suggested departure range. Because we agree with the district 

court that Keys' prison disciplinary record shows a criminal 

history greater than that indicated by his criminal history 

category and because the court departed in the manner suggested by 

the Guidelines, we hold that the district court did not depart 

unreasonably from the Guidelines. 

VI. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

17 

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