Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01296/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01296-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adidas AG
Appellee
Christian Faith Fellowship Church
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP CHURCH,

Appellant

v.

ADIDAS AG,

Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1296

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

92053314.

______________________ 

Decided: November 14, 2016

______________________ 

RICHARD W. YOUNG, Quarles & Brady, LLP, Chicago, 

IL, argued for appellant.

JOHN ZACCARIA, Notaro, Michalos & Zaccaria P.C., 

Orangeburg, NY, argued for appellee. Also represented by 

BRADLEY S. CORSELLO, ANGELO NOTARO. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 1 Filed: 11/14/2016
2 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

Christian Faith Fellowship Church appeals a final 

judgment of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that, 

in response to a petition filed by adidas AG, cancelled its 

trademarks for failing to use the marks in commerce 

before registering them. The Board held that the 

Church’s documented sale of two marked hats to an outof-state resident were de minimis and therefore did not 

constitute use of the marks in commerce under the Lanham Act. Because the Lanham Act defines commerce as 

all activity regulable by Congress, and because the 

Church’s sale to an out-of-state resident fell within Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, we 

reverse the Board’s cancellation of the Church’s marks on 

this basis and remand for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

I.

Christian Faith Fellowship Church is located in Zion, 

Illinois, within five miles of the Illinois–Wisconsin border. 

Being located so close to the border, the Church’s parishioners include both Illinois and Wisconsin residents. In 

January 2005, the Church began selling apparel, both 

caps and shirts, emblazoned with the phrase “ADD A 

ZERO.” The Church sold the “ADD A ZERO”-marked 

apparel as part of a fundraising campaign to pay off the 

debt on its church facility and the associated 40-acre tract 

of land. Illinois-based Icon Industries supplied the 

Church with the “ADD A ZERO”-marked apparel, which 

the Church sold in its bookstore.1

 

1 The Church also presented evidence to the Board 

that it began offering the “ADD A ZERO”-marked apparel 

for sale on its website in 2010. Like the Board, we do not 

consider this evidence because it concerns activity after 

the critical trademark registration date of March 2005. 

See Couture v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379, 1381 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 2 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 3

The Church sought a federal trademark for the “ADD 

A ZERO” mark at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

in March 2005. The Church filed two clothing-based 

trademark applications, one for use of “ADD A ZERO” in 

standard characters and another for a stylized design of 

the phrase. The Church’s applications relied on actual 

use of the marks in commerce, not intent to use the marks 

in commerce. The Office granted the Church’s applications and registered the marks as U.S. Registration Nos. 

3,173,207 and 3,173,208.

II.

In 2009, adidas AG (“Adidas”) sought a clothing

trademark for the phrase “ADIZERO,” but the Office 

refused the application for likelihood of confusion with the 

Church’s “ADD A ZERO” marks. Adidas brought an 

action before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to 

cancel the Church’s marks, arguing several grounds for 

cancellation: (1) the Church’s failure to use the marks in 

commerce before registration; (2) the marks’ failure to 

function as trademarks; and (3) the Church’s abandonment of the marks for nonuse. The Board agreed with 

Adidas’s failure-to-use argument and cancelled the 

Church’s marks, without addressing Adidas’s alternate 

cancellation grounds. The Board considered the Church’s 

proffered evidence—over Adidas’s hearsay and authentication objections—of a cancelled check for the sale of two 

“ADD A ZERO”-marked hats for $38.34 in February 2005, 

before the Church applied for its marks. The Church had 

kept the check in its records and cross-referenced it with a 

sales register it maintained for its bookstore. The check’s 

drawer was Charlotte Howard, who had a Wisconsin

home address pre-printed on her check. 

 

(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 88 (2015) (“Use in 

commerce must be ‘as of the application filing date.’” 

(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 2.34(a)(1)(i))).

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 3 Filed: 11/14/2016
4 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

The Board disagreed with the Church that the sale to 

Ms. Howard evidenced the requisite “use in commerce” 

under the Lanham Act. The Board concluded: 

[T]he sale of two ADD A ZERO caps at a minimal 

cost within the state of Illinois to Ms. Howard, 

who resides outside the state, does not affect 

commerce that Congress can regulate such that 

the transaction would constitute use in commerce 

for purposes of registration. 

. . . This sale is de minimis and, under the circumstances shown here, is insufficient to show

use that affects interstate commerce.

adidas AG v. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, Cancellation No. 92053314, 2015 WL 5882313, at *7 (T.T.A.B. 

Sept. 14, 2015) (Board Op.) (footnote omitted).

The Church appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

DISCUSSION

The Lanham Act provides that “[t]he owner of a 

trademark used in commerce may request registration of 

its trademark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

Section 1051(a)’s “use in commerce” requirement distinguishes it from § 1051(b), which offers protection for “[a]

person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce.” Id. § 1051(b). The Lanham Act 

explains the “use in commerce” requirement as it relates 

to goods: 

The term “use in commerce” means the bona 

fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, 

and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. 

For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be 

deemed to be in use in commerce— 

(1) on goods when— 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 4 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 5

(A) it is placed in any manner on the 

goods or their containers or the displays 

associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the 

goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with 

the goods or their sale, and

(B) the goods are sold or transported 

in commerce . . . . 

Id. § 1127 (emphases added). Further, the Lanham Act 

defines “commerce” as “all commerce which may lawfully 

be regulated by Congress.” Id. Thus, to register a mark 

under § 1051(a), one must sell or transport goods bearing 

the mark such that the sale or transport would be subject 

to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, which 

includes its power to regulate interstate commerce. Larry 

Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 

662, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 8); 

see also In re Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d 806, 808–12 

(CCPA 1977). 

The dispute between the parties in this case is limited 

to whether the Church, which filed its applications under 

§ 1051(a)’s “use in commerce” subsection, made a sale of 

marked goods in commerce regulable by Congress before 

applying for its marks. 

I.

As a threshold matter, we address whether the Board 

erred in admitting Ms. Howard’s check into evidence and 

in finding that Ms. Howard resided in Wisconsin. Adidas 

argues that the Board should not have admitted the check 

because Ms. Howard’s pre-printed address on the check 

constitutes inadmissible hearsay and because the check 

was not authenticated. We review the Board’s admission 

of the check for abuse of discretion. Coach Servs., Inc. v. 

Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 5 Filed: 11/14/2016
6 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

2012) (citing Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 

601 F.3d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “We will reverse 

only if the Board’s evidentiary ruling was: (1) ‘clearly 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful’; (2) ‘based on an 

erroneous conclusion[] of law’; (3) premised on ‘clearly 

erroneous findings of fact’; or (4) the record ‘contains no 

evidence on which the Board could rationally base its 

decision.’” Id. (quoting Crash Dummy Movie, 601 F.3d at 

1390–91). 

No party disputes that Ms. Howard’s pre-printed address on the check is a hearsay statement, which is typically not admissible into evidence. The Federal Rules of 

Evidence provide, however, an exception to the bar on 

hearsay evidence for business records of regularly conducted conduct kept in the ordinary course. Fed. R. 

Evid. 803(6). The Board relied on this exception in admitting Ms. Howard’s check. A Church pastor, whose duties 

included Church recordkeeping, testified that the check 

was maintained in the Church’s records in the normal 

course of Church bookstore sales, along with the corroborating entry in the bookstore ledger of sales. Adidas 

argues that the pre-printed address on the check had 

nothing to do with Church business, and therefore, the 

check should not have been admissible under the business 

records exception. We disagree.

The business records exception “does not require that 

the document actually be prepared by the business entity 

proffering the document.” Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. 

United States, 172 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

When a business relies on a document it has not itself 

prepared, two factors bear on the admissibility of the 

evidence as a business record: “[1] that the incorporating 

business rely upon the accuracy of the document incorporated[;] and [2] that there are other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document.” Id. We hold 

that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining 

that the Church relied on the check, a bank-issued negoCase: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 6 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 7

tiable instrument, as accurate and trustworthy. We also 

hold that the check is self-authenticating as commercial 

paper under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(9). See United 

States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]

check is a species of commercial paper, and therefore selfauthenticating” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 902(9))).

Based on the admitted check and a Church pastor’s 

testimony that many Church parishioners reside in 

Wisconsin, the Board found that Ms. Howard resided in 

Wisconsin. Adidas argues this factual conclusion was 

unsupported. We review the Board’s factual determinations under a substantial evidence standard. In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 

(citing In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 

2003); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)). We conclude that the admitted check and the Church pastor’s testimony constitute 

substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination 

regarding Ms. Howard’s residence. 

II.

Having resolved that the Board properly admitted the 

Church’s evidence of an intrastate sale to an out-of-state 

resident, we now consider whether such a sale is regulable by Congress, satisfying the Lanham Act § 1051(a) “use 

in commerce” requirement. We review de novo the 

Board’s legal conclusions, including “its interpretations of 

the Lanham Act and the legal tests it applies in measuring registrability.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 

F.3d 1346, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); cf. Taylor v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2016) (holding the meaning 

of “commerce” element in a different federal statute, the 

Hobbs Act, to be a question of law).

A.

Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is 

broad. Larry Harmon, 929 F.2d at 664 (citing Silenus 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 7 Filed: 11/14/2016
8 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

Wines, 557 F.2d at 809–10). The Supreme Court’s contemporary Commerce Clause decisions illustrate Congress’s legislative abilities under this enumerated power. 

Beginning in the modern era with Wickard v. Filburn, the 

Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause as 

vesting in Congress the power to regulate activities that 

have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, explaining:

[E]ven if . . . activity be local and though it may 

not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts 

a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect 

is what might at some earlier time have been defined as “direct” or “indirect.”

317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). In Wickard, a farmer grew 

wheat for commercial sale, but also for personal and farm 

use. Id. at 114. Congress passed a statute imposing 

quotas on the amount of wheat that farmers could harvest, with penalties assessed for harvesting wheat in

excess of the quota level, even if the wheat was for personal use and not for sale. Id. at 114–15, 119. The 

farmer challenged the statute’s application to him as

exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, claiming 

his wheat harvesting was local in nature and had, at 

most, only an indirect effect on interstate commerce. Id. 

at 119. The Court disagreed with the farmer’s arguments, holding that the activity must be viewed not in 

isolation, but in the aggregate: “That [the farmer’s] own 

contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by 

itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of 

federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken 

together with that of many others similarly situated, is 

far from trivial.” Id. at 127–28. 

The Supreme Court reaffirmed Wickard’s “substantial 

effects” doctrine in Gonzales v. Raich, in which one of the 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 8 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 9

parties grew marijuana on her property for personal, 

medicinal use and did not sell or transport the drug. 545 

U.S. 1, 6–8 (2005). She argued that her local and de 

minimis cultivation and possession of marijuana should

not be subject to federal drug laws passed under the 

Commerce Clause. Id. at 15. The Supreme Court framed 

her argument as a request to “excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.” Id. at 23. 

But the Supreme Court held the statute’s application to 

individuals was a valid exercise of Congress’s powers 

under the Commerce Clause, indicating that its “case law 

firmly establishes Congress’s power to regulate purely 

local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of 

activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 

commerce.” Id. at 17 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 

U.S. 146, 151 (1971); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29). The 

Court did not believe that the case turned on the intrastate nature of the marijuana cultivation and possession 

at issue, explaining “[t]hat the regulation ensnares some 

purely intrastate activity is of no moment.” Id. at 22. The 

Court “refuse[d] to excise individual components of th[e]

larger scheme,” id., because, “where the class of activities 

is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 

power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, 

individual instances’ of the class,” id. at 23 (quoting Perez, 

402 U.S. at 154 (alteration omitted)). Thus, the Court 

held that when “a general regulatory statute bears a 

substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of 

no consequence” and Congress has the power to regulate 

it under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 17 (quoting United 

States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).

The Supreme Court most recently addressed the 

Commerce Clause’s “substantial effects” doctrine in 

Taylor, which involved a man federally convicted of 

robbery under a provision of the Hobbs Act for his participation in two home invasions involving marijuana dealCase: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 9 Filed: 11/14/2016
10 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

ers. 136 S. Ct. at 2077–78 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). 

The Hobbs Act criminalizes robberies and attempted 

robberies that affect any commerce “over which the United States has jurisdiction.” Id. at 2077 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(b)(3)). Citing Raich, the Court held that Congress 

legislated within its Commerce Clause powers when 

enacting the provision at issue. Id. at 2077–78, 2080. As 

applied, the Court reiterated that, under the aggregation 

approach to the substantial effects test, “proof that the 

defendant’s conduct in and of itself affected or threatened 

commerce is not needed.” Id. at 2081. Rather, the Court 

instructed that “[a]ll that is needed is proof that the 

defendant’s conduct fell within a category of conduct that, 

in the aggregate, had the requisite effect” on commerce. 

Id. The Court emphasized that, in the case before it, “the 

Government need not show that the drugs that a defendant stole or attempted to steal either traveled or were 

destined for transport across state lines. . . . And it makes 

no difference under our cases that any actual or threatened effect on commerce in a particular case is minimal.” 

Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154).

B.

Our past Lanham Act “use in commerce” cases equally

reflect the broad scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 

powers. For example, in Larry Harmon, the appellant 

argued that the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement could not “be satisfied by a single-location 

restaurant . . . that serves only a minimal number of 

interstate travelers.” 929 F.2d at 663. The appellant did 

not dispute “that there ha[d] been some use in commerce 

of [registrant]’s mark,” and indeed, the record established 

that the “mark ha[d] been used in connection with services rendered to customers traveling across state boundaries.” Id. at 666. Yet, the appellant petitioned this court

to adopt a standard relating to the percentage of services 

furnished to interstate travelers to determine whether a 

mark had been used in commerce under the Lanham Act. 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 10 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 11

Id. We refused to do so. Recognizing that “[t]he Lanham 

Act by its terms extends to all commerce which Congress 

may regulate,” id., and that “Congress has broad powers 

under the commerce clause,” id. at 664, we “reject[ed]

[appellant]’s argument that a certain increased threshold 

level of interstate activity is required before registration 

of the mark used by a single-location restaurant may be 

granted,” id. at 666. Likewise, our predecessor court 

explained in Silenus Wines that because Congress passed 

the Lanham Act in the wake of Wickard and because the 

Act expansively defines commerce as “all commerce which 

may lawfully be regulated by Congress,” it “clearly involves a broadening of jurisdiction” from earlier federal 

trademark statutes. 557 F.2d at 809–10. The court held 

that, under this broad jurisdiction, the intrastate sale of 

imported French wine constitutes “use in commerce” 

under the Act. Id. at 809.

C.

Moving to the facts of this case, it is clear in light of 

the foregoing precedent that the Church’s sale of two 

“ADD A ZERO”-marked hats to an out-of-state resident is 

regulable by Congress under the Commerce Clause and, 

therefore, constitutes “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act. We reach this conclusion without defining the 

outer contours of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers

because the transaction at issue falls comfortably within 

the bounds of those powers already sketched for us by the 

Supreme Court. The Lanham Act is a comprehensive 

scheme for regulating economic activity—namely the 

marking of commercial goods—and the “use in commerce” 

pre-registration requirement is an “essential part” of the 

Act. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Further, it cannot be doubted that the transaction at issue—the private sale of goods, 

particularly apparel, to an out-of-state resident—is “quintessentially economic.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25; see United 

States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (“[I]n those 

cases where we have sustained federal regulation of 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 11 Filed: 11/14/2016
12 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial 

effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question 

has been some sort of economic endeavor.”). This transaction, taken in the aggregate, would cause a substantial 

effect on interstate commerce and thus it falls under 

Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. Taylor, 136 S. Ct. 

at 2080–81; Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 

125. The Church did not need to present evidence of an 

actual and specific effect that its sale of hats to an out-ofstate resident had on interstate commerce. Nor did it 

need to make a particularized showing that the hats 

themselves were destined to travel out of state. See

Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081.

The Board’s rationale that the sale to Ms. Howard 

was “de minimis” and thus “insufficient to show use that 

affects interstate commerce” is squarely at odds with the 

Wickard progeny of Commerce Clause cases. Board Op. 

at *7. In particular, the Board’s reasoning contravenes 

Raich, which expressed that “the de minimis character of 

individual instances” arising under a valid statute enacted under the Commerce Clause “is of no consequence.” 

545 U.S. at 17. “[I]t makes no difference under our cases 

that any actual or threatened effect on commerce in a 

particular case is minimal.” Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081

(citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154); see also Larry Harmon, 929 

F.2d at 666. Adidas’s argument that the Church must 

present actual proof that its sale to Ms. Howard directly 

affected commerce also contradicts precedent. “[P]roof 

that the defendant’s conduct in and of itself affected or 

threatened commerce is not needed. All that is needed is 

proof that the defendant’s conduct fell within a category of 

conduct that, in the aggregate, had the requisite effect.” 

Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081.

Adidas would like us to cabin Raich and Taylor to 

their particular facts, namely to cases involving the 

market for illegal drugs. But the Supreme Court’s elucidation of the Constitutional reach of the Commerce 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 12 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 13

Clause in those cases applies to more than just federal 

drug regulation. Raich and Taylor apply, and indeed rest 

on, principles derived from Wickard, which involved the 

national market for wheat, not illegal drugs. And Taylor

is particularly applicable because, similar to the present 

case, it involves the construction of a statutory provision 

that defines “commerce” as including “all . . . commerce 

over which the United States has jurisdiction,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(b)(3). Moreover, there is nothing in these cases 

themselves to limit the Constitutional precepts and legal 

tests discussed therein to their facts. The Supreme Court 

has advised that, as a court of appeals, we must not 

“confus[e] the factual contours of [a Supreme Court decision] for its unmistakable holding” in an effort to reach a 

“novel interpretation” of that decision. Thurston Motor 

Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 534–35

(1983) (per curiam); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, 

Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“[O]nce the Court has 

spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”); Ariad Pharm., 

Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir.

2010) (en banc) (“As a subordinate federal court, we may 

not so easily dismiss [the Supreme Court’s] statements as 

dicta but are bound to follow them.”). We find that the 

principles discussed in Raich and Taylor apply here 

regardless of the factual differences at play. 

D.

Finally, we note that the Board erred by not properly

applying our holdings in Larry Harmon and Silenus 

Wines, which bear on the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” 

requirement specifically rather than on the Commerce 

Clause in the abstract. Had it done so, it would not have 

concluded that a sale it characterized as de minimis was 

therefore insufficient to satisfy the “use in commerce” 

requirement. 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 13 Filed: 11/14/2016
14 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

In Larry Harmon, we refused to adopt a de minimis

test for the “use in commerce” requirement. 929 F.2d at 

666. We further held that the Lanham Act by its terms 

extends to all commerce which Congress may regulate. 

Id. Although Larry Harmon involved a service mark and 

the marks here are for goods, the “in commerce” requirement is the same regardless of the type of mark and thus 

Larry Harmon applies to this case. True enough, § 1127 

provides distinct tests for the type of use that must occur

for goods versus services to satisfy the “use in commerce” 

requirement. For example, the statute requires that 

marked goods be “sold or transported” in commerce, while 

service marks must be “used or displayed in the sale or 

advertising of services and the services [must be] rendered” in commerce. But this distinction goes to the 

meaning of “use” in the “use in commerce” requirement, 

not to whether a use is “in commerce,” which we analyze 

under the same rubric regardless of the delineation between goods and services. 

Our predecessor court made this very point in Silenus 

Wines, 557 F.2d 806. In that case, the court rejected the

argument that an earlier decision, In re Gastown, Inc., 

326 F.2d 780 (CCPA 1964), was limited to service marks. 

Silenus Wines, 557 F.2d at 808. Gastown held that an 

applicant’s operation of marked auto service stations on 

an interstate highway satisfied the “use in commerce” 

requirement. Gastown, 326 F.2d at 784. Silenus Wines

explained that “Gastown’s rationale is not limited to 

services” because its “result depended on the Trademark 

Act definition of ‘commerce’” rather than on the Act’s 

prescribed uses for service marks. Silenus Wines, 557

F.2d at 808. 

The Board also erred to the extent it relied on In re 

Cook, United, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 284 (T.T.A.B. 1975), and 

In re The Bagel Factory, Inc., 183 U.S.P.Q. 553 (T.T.A.B. 

1974), for the proposition that an intrastate sale of goods 

can never be a sale “in commerce” without the trademark 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 14 Filed: 11/14/2016
CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG 15

applicant doing something more, such as knowingly

directing the movement of goods across state lines. Cook, 

188 U.S.P.Q. at 287–88; Bagel Factory, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 

554–55. These Board cases have been the source of 

confusion in our “use in commerce” doctrine. Doubt has 

been cast on the vitality of the Bagel Factory holding, 

with commentators noting that “under the modern interpretations of the Commerce Clause . . . it would appear 

that a sale or delivery does not have to cross a state line

in order to affect ‘commerce.’” 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, 

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

§ 19:123 (4th ed.) (footnote omitted). Others have similarly explained that, in Cook, “the PTO was operating under 

a different standard” than the one provided in the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause precedent and have

concluded that, especially after Larry Harmon, “not only 

is the PTO’s perspective [as stated in Cook] no longer 

appropriate nor correct, it is no longer the law.” Peter C. 

Christensen & Teresa C. Tucker, The “Use in Commerce”

Requirement for Trademark Registration After Larry 

Harmon Pictures, 32 IDEA 327, 332, 341 (1992). 

To the extent Cook and Bagel Factory assert that the 

Lanham Act requires commercial activity, whether for 

goods or services, beyond that which is sufficient for 

Congress to regulate commercial activity under the Commerce Clause, they are incorrect. It is beyond dispute 

that “the definition of commerce in the Lanham Act 

means exactly what the statute says, i.e. ‘all commerce 

which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’” Larry 

Harmon, 929 F.2d at 666 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127); see 

also Gastown, 326 F.2d at 784 (quoting Bulova Watch Co. 

v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir.), aff’d, 344 U.S. 280 

(1952)); cf. Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2079 (construing provision of Hobbs Act—which defines “commerce” as including

“all . . . commerce over which the United States has 

jurisdiction,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3)—as extending to full 

reach of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers). Because 

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 15 Filed: 11/14/2016
16 CHRISTIAN FAITH FELLOWSHIP v. ADIDAS AG

one need not direct goods across state lines for Congress 

to regulate the activity under the Commerce Clause, there 

is likewise no such per se condition for satisfying the 

Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement. See Raich, 

545 U.S. at 22 (“That the regulation [passed under the 

Commerce Clause] ensnares some purely intrastate 

activity is of no moment.”); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125

(“[E]ven if . . . activity be local . . . it may still, whatever 

its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . .”). In so 

holding, we comport with our own precedent, which 

disavows the bright line approach taken in Cook and 

Bagel Factory. See Larry Harmon, 929 F.2d at 666 (“It is 

not required that such services be rendered in more than 

one state to satisfy the use in commerce requirement.”

(citing Gastown, 326 F.2d at 782–84)); Silenus Wines, 557 

F.2d at 810–811 (“[The PTO] stated that ‘commerce’ did 

not cover intrastate transactions regardless of affect on 

interstate and foreign commerce. . . . We reject the PTO 

position.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s 

cancellation of the Church’s “ADD A ZERO” marks for not 

using them in commerce before federally registering them 

and remand for the Board to address Adidas’s other 

cancellation grounds. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Appellant.

Case: 16-1296 Document: 35-2 Page: 16 Filed: 11/14/2016