Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01557/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01557-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
3G Licensing, S.A.
Appellant
Honeywell International Inc.
Appellee
Sierra Wireless, Inc.
Appellee
Sierra Wireless, ULC
Appellee
TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited
Appellee
TCT Mobile (US) Holdings, Inc.
Appellee
TCT Mobile (US) Inc.
Appellee
TCT Mobile International Limited
Appellee
TCT Mobile, Inc.
Appellee
Telit Cinterion Deutschland GmbH
Appellee
Thales DIS AIS Deutschland GmbH
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

3G LICENSING, S.A.,

Appellant

v.

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC., SIERRA 

WIRELESS, ULC, FKA SIERRA WIRELESS, INC., 

TELIT CINTERION DEUTSCHLAND GMBH, FDBA 

THALES DIS AIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH,

Appellees

______________________

2023-1557

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2021-

01141.

______________________

Decided: December 10, 2024

______________________

ANDREW PETER DEMARCO, Devlin Law Firm LLC, 

Wilmington, DE, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

TIMOTHY DEVLIN, ROBERT J. GAJARSA.

 DANIEL TYLER KEESE, Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, OR, 

argued for all appellees. Appellee Sierra Wireless, ULC 

also represented by AMANDA TESSAR, Denver, CO.

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2 3G LICENSING, S.A. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC.

 JEFFREY R. GARGANO, K&L Gates LLP, Chicago, IL, for 

appellee Honeywell International Inc. Also represented by 

BRIAN PAUL BOZZO, Pittsburgh, PA; ERIK HALVERSON, San 

Francisco, CA.

 GUY YONAY, Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP, 

New York, NY, for appellee Telit Cinterion Deutschland 

GmbH. Also represented by KYLE AUTERI, I.

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

3G Licensing, S.A., (“3G”) appeals from a final written 

decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 

Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) holding claims 

34–40 of U.S. Patent 7,215,653 (“the ’653 patent”) 

unpatentable as obvious. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., v. 3G 

Licensing S.A., No. IPR2021-01141, 2023 WL 157065

(P.T.A.B. Jan. 11, 2023) (“Decision”). For the reasons 

provided below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The now-expired ’653 patent is directed to a mobile 

communications system for controlling data transmission 

between a base station and a mobile station (e.g., a 

cellphone). ’653 patent, Abstract, col. 1 ll. 16–33. A base 

station is the anchor-point of a network that allows a 

cellphone to access a cellular network, typically a cell 

tower. Id. col. 1 ll. 31–33. Representative claim 34 of the 

’653 patent recites, in relevant part:

34. A mobile station apparatus for use in a mobile 

communications system for controlling a data 

transmission rate on a reverse link, the apparatus 

comprising:

. . . 

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3G LICENSING, S.A. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. 3

control means connected with the receiving 

means adapted to control the data 

transmission rate based on the data rate 

control command, wherein a bit is sent on a 

reverse packet data control channel to 

indicate whether the mobile station has 

enough power and data to increase its data 

transmission rate on a reverse packet data 

channel.

Id. col. 20 ll. 5–8, 16–22 (emphasis added). The only claim 

limitation of the ’653 patent disputed in this appeal is the 

“increase availability bit” (“IAB”) limitation of independent 

claims 34 and 37, which signals if the mobile station has 

enough power and data to enable an increase in its data 

transmission rate. Id. col. 20 ll. 16–22. 

The ’643 patent claims priority from three Korean 

Applications, two of which are relevant to this appeal: 

2001-0006839 (“the ’6839 application,” dated February 12, 

2001), and 2001-0057600 (“the ’57600 application,” dated 

September 18, 2001). See J.A. 73. The ’6839 application 

teaches how a mobile station’s data transmission rate can 

be improved through a “reverse activity bit” (“RAB”) sent 

on the reverse link. J.A. 2494. The ’6839 application also 

discloses a reverse rate indicator (“RRI”) used to inform a

base station that a mobile station’s data transmission rate 

has changed. E.g., J.A. 2501. The ’57600 application 

teaches a bit used to signal if a mobile station has a 

sufficient power margin and data to increase its data 

transmission rate—i.e., an IAB. J.A. 2533. 

Honeywell International Inc., Sierra Wireless, Inc., 

TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited, TCT 

Mobile International Limited, TCT Mobile, Inc., TCT 

Mobile (US) Inc., TCT Mobile (US) Holdings, Inc., and Telit 

Cinterion Deutschland GmbH (collectively “Honeywell”) 

petitioned for inter partes review (“IPR”), arguing, among 

other things, that claims 34–40 of the ’653 patent would 

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3G LICENSING, S.A. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. 5

Samsung, together with other references, would have 

rendered obvious the challenged claims of the ’653 patent. 

J.A. 236–37, 249. 

In its pre-institution briefing, 3G argued the contrary, 

contending that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

have understood the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 application

to indicate whether the mobile station has sufficient power 

and data to enable an increase in its data rate—i.e., that 

the RRI would have been understood to function as an IAB.

J.A. 384–87. Therefore, in 3G’s view, the ’653 patent is 

entitled to the ’6839 application’s priority date, rendering 

Samsung unavailable as prior art. 3G supported its 

argument with slide 8 of Samsung, which it contended 

demonstrates that an RRI can function as an IAB. Slide 8 

provides two examples of “IAB setting,” including: (1)

“[r]edefining RRI[s],” and, (2) “add[ing]” an IAB to an RRI. 

J.A. 387; J.A. 1084 (Slide 8 of Samsung).

In its decision instituting the IPR, the Board disagreed

that the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 application provided 

sufficient written description for the IAB limitation and 

also disagreed that slide 8 supported 3G’s contention.

J.A. 435–40. Accompanying its Institution Decision, the 

Board provided a scheduling order stating that “[3G] is 

cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised 

in the [post-institution] response may be deemed waived.” 

J.A. 466. 

In the post-institution proceedings, Honeywell 

maintained that the ’6839 application did not provide

written description support for the IAB limitation. 

J.A. 582–91. Likewise, 3G maintained its argument to the 

contrary, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

have understood that the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 

application indicates whether a mobile station has 

sufficient power and data to increase its data transmission 

rate, thus providing written description support for the 

IAB limitation. J.A. 535–37. And again, 3G made 

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supporting arguments that slide 8 of Samsung confirms 

that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 

understood that the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 application 

could function as an IAB. J.A. 529–30. Post-institution, 

however, 3G’s slide 8 argument was slightly different: 3G 

contended that slide 8 confirms that an RRI can be adapted

to function as an IAB. J.A. 530. 

The Board concluded that the RRI disclosed in the 

’6839 application did not provide sufficient written 

description support for the ’653 patent’s IAB limitation. 

Decision at *11–16. Furthermore, the Board determined

that 3G had waived its argument relying on slide 8. Id. at 

16. The Board explained that because 3G’s pre-institution 

slide 8 argument was materially different from its postinstitution slide 8 argument, the argument was waived. Id. 

Nevertheless, the Board addressed the merits of 3G’s slide 

8 argument, concluding that slide 8 did not support 3G’s

contention that the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 application 

provided written description support for the ’653 patent’s 

IAB limitation. Id. at 16 n.6.

3G timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

3G raises two main arguments on appeal. First, 3G 

argues that the Board erred by holding its argument

relying on slide 8 of Samsung waived. Second, 3G argues

that when slide 8 is properly considered, substantial

evidence does not support the Board’s finding that the

’6839 application lacks sufficient written description 

support for the IAB limitation.

I

We begin with waiver. The Board found 3G’s slide 8 

argument waived pursuant to the rule set out in the 

Board’s Trial Practice Guide: that “[o]nce a trial is 

instituted, the Board may decline to consider arguments 

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3G LICENSING, S.A. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. 7

set forth in a preliminary response unless they are raised 

in the patent owner response.” Decision at *16. The Board 

also cited this court’s decision, In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 

F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in support. Decision at 

*16. 3G argues that this was error for two reasons. First, 

3G asserts that the Board’s waiver rule conflicts with the 

IPR statutes. And second, 3G contends that the Board 

incorrectly applied Nuvasive. We address each argument 

in turn.

Looking at the IPR statutes, 3G first points to 

35 U.S.C. § 313, which states that “[i]f an inter partes 

review petition is filed . . . the patent owner shall have the 

right to file a preliminary response to the petition”

(emphasis added). 3G then points to 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(8), 

which instructs the Director of the USPTO to prescribe 

regulations “providing for the filing by the patent owner of 

a response to the petition under section 313 after an inter 

partes review has been instituted, and requiring that the 

patent owner file with such response . . . any additional 

factual evidence and expert opinions on which the patent 

owner relies in support of the response” (emphases added).

In 3G’s view, because a patent owner is required to file 

“additional factual evidence and expert opinions” postinstitution, the statutes must be read to mean that a patent 

owner’s pre- and post-institution response should be read 

together as a single, unitary whole. 3G’s Br. 27–28. That 

is, according to 3G, arguments raised in a patent owner’s

pre-institution response are necessarily incorporated into 

the post-institution response. Therefore, 3G argues that 

the Board’s waiver rule conflicts with controlling statute by 

requiring patent owners to re-raise arguments from their 

pre-institution briefing post-institution.

We disagree. It is a non-sequitur that because a patent 

owner must proffer new evidence and expert opinions postinstitution, arguments raised in the pre-institution 

response are necessarily incorporated into the postinstitution response. No text in the statutes requires such 

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a reading. On the contrary, the statutes upon which 3G 

relies explicitly state that a patent owner’s pre- and postinstitution responses are distinct papers. Compare 35 

U.S.C. § 313 (discussing a patent owner’s “preliminary 

response”); with 35 U.S.C. 316(a)(8) (discussing a patent 

owner’s response . . . after an inter parties review has been 

instituted). The Board’s waiver rule therefore comports 

with the IPR statutes.

As for Nuvasive, 3G argues that that case holds only 

that a patent owner waives an argument made in its preinstitution response when the patent owner: (1) fails to 

raise the argument again in its post-institution response, 

and (2) expressly abandons that argument post-institution. 

3G’s Br. 25–26. Because it never expressly abandoned its 

slide 8 argument, 3G argues that the Board erroneously 

applied Nuvasive here. Again, we disagree.

In Nuvasive, the patent owner’s pre-institution 

response challenged the public accessibility of the prior art 

references put forth by the petitioner. 842 F.3d 1376, 1380. 

The Board was not persuaded by those arguments and 

instituted IPR. See id. As here, the Board’s scheduling 

order accompanying the institution decision provided that 

“[t]he patent owner is cautioned that any arguments for 

patentability not raised and fully briefed in the response 

will be deemed waived.” Id. at 1381. In its post-institution 

briefing, the patent owner did not make any arguments 

concerning the public accessibility of the asserted prior art 

and confirmed that it was abandoning the argument at an 

oral hearing. Id. at 1380–81. On appeal, we held that 

because the patent owner “no longer contested the public 

accessibility of the prior art references” post-institution, 

those arguments were waived. Id. at 1381. Although we 

noted that the patent owner’s counsel confirmed at the oral 

hearing that the patent owner was no longer pursuing its 

public accessibility arguments post-institution, our holding 

did not require the patent owner to expressly abandon the 

argument for it to be waived. See id. 

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Here, 3G made an argument relying on slide 8 in its 

pre-institution response. 3G specifically contended that 

“slide 8 . . . recognizes that an indicator bit such as the RRI 

can indicate whether the mobile station has enough power 

and data to increase the data transmission rate.” J.A. 349. 

Put differently, 3G argued that slide 8 established that an 

RRI—on its own—can function as an IAB. Likewise, in 

3G’s pre-institution sur-reply, 3G contended that 

“Samsung’s eighth slide” supported its assertion that the 

’6839 application’s “disclosure of an RRI would be sufficient 

for a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to understand [the 

IAB limitation] described in the claims of the ’653 patent.” 

J.A. 386–87. And just as in Nuvasive, the Board’s 

Institution Decision was accompanied by a scheduling 

order warning that any arguments 3G does not re-raise in 

its post-institution briefing may be waived. J.A. 466. 

But 3G’s argument relying on slide 8 changed postinstitution. In its post-institution response, 3G did not 

contend that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

have understood that an RRI itself can function as an IAB. 

Rather, 3G argued in its post-institution response that a 

person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood 

the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 application to function as an 

IAB because slide 8 states that an RRI can be “redefined” 

or “add[ed] [to]” in order to function as an IAB—i.e., that

an RRI must be modified to function as an IAB. J.A. 530. 

The same is true of 3G’s post-institution sur-reply, in which 

it stated “[a]s can be plainly seen in Samsung, slide 8, RRI 

is referenced for both examples of so-called ‘IAB setting’

[referring to RRI redefinition] [and] . . . even ‘adding a 

dedicated bit’ relies on using RRI.” J.A. 631. 

Accordingly, because 3G did not maintain the 

argument it brought pre-institution, i.e., that slide 8 

confirms that an RRI can itself function as an IAB, in its

post-institution briefing, the Board did not err in finding

3G’s slide argument to be waived pursuant to its Trial 

Practice Guide and Nuvasive. 

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10 3G LICENSING, S.A. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC.

Because we conclude that the Board did not err in 

holding that 3G waived its slide 8 argument, we need not 

address whether the Board erred in finding the ’6839 

application lacks written description support in light of 

slide 8. Nevertheless, for the sake of thoroughness, we 

proceed to address 3G’s arguments as to that issue as if 

there were no waiver and conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding for lack of written 

description.

II

For a claim to be entitled to the “the filing date of an 

earlier application under 35 U.S.C. § 120, each application 

in the chain leading back to the earlier application must 

comply with the written description requirement of 

35 U.S.C. § 112.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 

1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Each application in the chain 

must therefore “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the 

art that the inventor had possession of the [later-claimed] 

subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. 

Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 

banc). “Sufficiency of written description is a question of 

fact, reviewed for substantial evidence.” Gen. Hosp. Corp. 

v. Sienna Biopharms., Inc., 888 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2018).

As noted, the ’6839 application teaches how a 

cellphone’s data transmission rate can be improved 

through an RAB sent on the reverse link and discloses an 

RRI which is used to inform a base station that a

cellphone’s transmission data rate has changed. J.A. 2494, 

2501. The Board found that a person of ordinary skill in 

the art would not have understood the RRI disclosed in the 

’6839 application to function as an IAB and therefore that 

the ’653 patent is not entitled to the ’6839 application’s 

priority date. Decision at *11–16. That finding was

supported by substantial evidence. 

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3G LICENSING, S.A. v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. 11

As the Board recognized, there is nothing “in the ’6839 

application that actually discloses, either expressly or 

inherently, that the mobile station uses information about 

its power and data to make a decision about whether it can 

increase its data transmission rate,” as the claims require. 

Id. at *12. The Board relied not only on the ’6839 

application itself, but also on the testimony of Honeywell’s 

expert, who stated that a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would have not understood the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 

application to function as an IAB. See id. at *11–12.

3G contends that the Board’s conclusion was erroneous

because slide 8 “confirms” that a person of ordinary skill in 

the art would have understood that the RRI disclosed in 

the ’6839 application can function as an IAB. 3G Brief at 

29–30. But slide 8 teaches that an RRI can function as an 

IAB only when an RRI is “redefined” or “added” to an IAB. 

That the RRI disclosed in the ’6839 application must be 

modified to function as an IAB is not sufficient to satisfy 

the written description requirement. As we have 

explained, “[e]ntitlement to a filing date does not extend to 

subject matter which is not disclosed. . . . Rather, a prior 

application itself must describe an invention.” Lockwood, 

107 F.3d at 1572–73 (emphasis added).

The Board’s finding that the ’653 patent lacks written 

description support for the IAB limitation was therefore 

supported by substantial evidence. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered 3G’s remaining arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth above, 

we affirm the Board’s final written decision.

AFFIRMED

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