Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-06347/USCOURTS-ca4-08-06347-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack Lavelton Nicholson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-6347

JACK LAVELTON NICHOLSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(2:01-cr-00041-HCM-1)

Argued: September 24, 2009

Decided: July 12, 2010

Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges,

and Irene M. KEELEY, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King

wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Duncan joined.

Judge Keeley wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Marvin David Miller, LAW OFFICE OF MARVIN D. MILLER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. James

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Ashford Metcalfe, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Heather Golias, LAW OFFICE OF MARVIN D. MILLER,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Jack Lavelton Nicholson has twice been denied 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of Virginia

— and has twice appealed — on his claim that he was

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance

of counsel because his lawyer had an actual conflict of interest. More specifically, Nicholson maintains that, during his

sentencing proceedings on a federal firearm offense, his lawyer declined to move for a downward departure on the basis

of self-defense necessity (a "self-defense departure") in order

to avoid accusing another of the lawyer’s clients of threatening Nicholson’s life. In Nicholson’s first appeal of the district

court’s denial of § 2255 relief, we reversed the court’s ruling

that there was no conflict of interest, and we remanded for a

determination of whether the conflict adversely impacted the

lawyer’s performance during the sentencing proceedings. See

United States v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2007)

("Nicholson I"). On remand, the court ruled that the conflict

had not adversely affected the lawyer’s performance and,

thus, yet again deemed Nicholson’s claim to be without merit.

See United States v. Nicholson, No. 2:01-cr-00041 (E.D. Va.

Feb. 7, 2008) (the "Remand Opinion").1 In this second appeal,

as explained below, we reverse the court’s denial of § 2255

relief and remand for resentencing.

1The unpublished Remand Opinion is found at J.A. 757-97. (Citations

herein to "J.A. __" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the

parties in this appeal.) 

2 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON

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I.

A.

On June 6, 2001, Nicholson pleaded guilty in the Eastern

District of Virginia to the offense of possession of a firearm

and ammunition by a felon, in contravention of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). At Nicholson’s August 29, 2001 sentencing hearing, the district court determined that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range was 168 to 210 months of imprisonment,

but recognized that the statutory minimum sentence under the

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), was 180

months.

Significantly, Nicholson’s presentence investigation report

(the "Nicholson PSR") reflected that, when the authorities

found him in possession of the firearm and ammunition,

"Nicholson advised that he possessed the firearm for his own

personal protection." J.A. 858. Importantly, that Nicholson

needed protection at the time of his arrest was acknowledged

by the Government during both the sentencing hearing, see id.

at 50 ("Quite frankly, when he was arrested, there were people out to kill him."), and the earlier plea colloquy, see id. at

30 ("He stated that he had the firearm for his personal protection [and] [i]t’s certainly reasonable to believe that someone

might try to injure him or shoot him."). During his allocution

to the court at sentencing, Nicholson explained that "someone

[had been] out to kill [him]" because his brother was a police

informant, and that the person intending to kill him was

responsible for the attempted murder of his brother and the

murder of his step-father. Id. at 58. Nicholson then stated, "I

was in fear for my life, so, yes, I possessed a gun, but it was

only for my protection." Id.

Although it was broadly understood and accepted that

Nicholson had legitimate reason to fear for his life when the

authorities found him in possession of the firearm, his lawyer,

Jon Babineau, failed to move for a self-defense departure.

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Rather, Babineau sought only a downward departure on the

ground that Nicholson suffered from a serious health condition, namely sickle cell anemia. The district court rejected this

departure request and sentenced Nicholson to 189 months of

imprisonment — nine months more than the statutory minimum. On direct appeal, Nicholson challenged the court’s

denial of his request for a health-related departure, but we

affirmed. See United States v. Nicholson, 36 F. App’x 151

(4th Cir. 2002).

Thereafter, on June 6, 2003, Nicholson filed his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion, raising several ineffective assistance claims,

including the claim that Babineau had an actual conflict of

interest that adversely affected his performance during the

sentencing proceedings. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,

348 (1980) ("In order to establish a violation of the Sixth

Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must

demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely

affected his lawyer’s performance.").2 Nicholson’s actual conflict of interest claim was based on his postsentencing discovery that, at the same time Babineau was representing

Nicholson in connection with his federal firearm offense,

Babineau was also representing Lorenzo Butts, a major drug

2

In Nicholson I, we described Sullivan as requiring the petitioner to

show "(1) that his lawyer was under ‘an actual conflict of interest’ and (2)

that this conflict ‘adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’" Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 249 (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348). In so doing,

we followed a longstanding practice of our Court. See, e.g., Mickens v.

Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (delineating same

two-part test), aff’d, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). In the Supreme Court’s Mickens

decision, however, the Court clarified that "the Sullivan standard is not

properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. An ‘actual conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s

performance." 535 U.S. at 172 n.5. Thus, we now describe and apply Sullivan as requiring the petitioner to show, in order to prevail on an actual

conflict of interest claim, that (1) petitioner’s lawyer operated under a

"conflict of interest" and (2) such conflict "adversely affected his lawyer’s

performance." Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348. 

4 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON

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dealer and the very person who had threatened Nicholson’s

life and was intent on killing him. On October 15, 2003, the

district court denied § 2255 relief without conducting a hearing. See United States v. Nicholson, No. 2:01-cr-00041 (E.D.

Va. Oct. 15, 2003) (the "First Opinion").3 In assessing the

actual conflict claim, the court concluded that Babineau did

not have a conflict of interest. Thus, the court did not address

whether any conflict had adversely affected Babineau’s performance during Nicholson’s sentencing proceedings.

B.

Nicholson appealed from the First Opinion’s denial of

§ 2255 relief and, on November 10, 2004, we granted Nicholson a certificate of appealability ("COA") on a single issue:

"Did an actual conflict of interest cause his counsel to render

constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to move

for a downward departure?" See Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 244

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).4 In our subsequent Nicholson I decision of February 2, 2007, we summarized the conflict claim as follows:

Nicholson asserts that his lawyer was operating

under an actual conflict of interest at his August 29,

2001 sentencing hearing because, at that time, Nicholson’s lawyer, Jon Babineau, was representing

Nicholson as well as another client, Lorenzo Butts.

Butts had previously threatened to kill Nicholson

and his family, had attempted to kill Nicholson’s

brother, and had already killed Nicholson’s step3The unpublished First Opinion of the district court is found at pages

256-71 of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in the Nicholson I appeal

(No. 04-6092). 

4A § 2255 petitioner is not entitled to pursue an appeal from the denial

of relief unless he has been granted a COA. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1)(B). In order to obtain a COA, the petitioner must make "a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id.

§ 2253(c)(2). 

UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON 5

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father. Nicholson, who was convicted of a federal

offense for his possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, asserts that he carried the handgun

to protect himself from Butts. Nicholson maintains

that Babineau, during the sentencing proceedings,

failed to request a downward departure based on

Nicholson’s need to carry the handgun because, in so

doing, Babineau would have accused his other client

(Butts) of uncharged criminal conduct. Nicholson

asserts that an actual conflict of interest thus existed,

and that it adversely affected the performance of his

lawyer during the sentencing proceedings, in contravention of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Id. Because the district court had considered affidavits and

other materials submitted by the parties — but had not conducted an evidentiary hearing — we characterized the court’s

ruling in the First Opinion as akin to a summary judgment

award to the Government and, thus, viewed the facts in the

light most favorable to Nicholson. See id. at 248.

In assessing Nicholson’s actual conflict of interest claim,

we first concluded that, "[c]ontrary to the district court’s ruling," lawyer Babineau’s simultaneous representation of Nicholson and Butts created a conflict of interest. Nicholson I, 475

F.3d at 249. We explained, in short, that "Nicholson’s interests, on the one hand, and Butts’s interests, on the other, were

in total opposition to each other during Babineau’s simultaneous representation of them." Id. at 249-50. This simultaneous representation placed Babineau "in the position of

having to make claims against Butts in order to pursue a

downward departure motion, on the basis of self-defense

necessity, in Nicholson’s sentencing hearing." Id. at 251.

Because Babineau was "in the untenable position of having to

place the interests of one client (either Butts or Nicholson)

above another (either Nicholson or Butts)," Babineau was

impaired by a conflict of interest during Nicholson’s sentenc6 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON

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ing proceedings. Id. Accordingly, we reversed the district

court’s ruling that a conflict of interest did not exist. Id. at

252.

On the issue of whether Babineau’s conflict adversely

affected his performance in Nicholson’s sentencing proceedings, we observed that a § 2255 petitioner must satisfy, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the three-part standard established in Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2001)

(en banc), aff’d without consideration of this point, 535 U.S.

162 (2002). See Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 251-52. More specifically, we explained:

He must, first of all, "identify a plausible alternative

defense strategy or tactic that his defense counsel

might have pursued." [Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361].

Second, he must establish that "the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively reasonable under the

facts of the case known to the attorney at the time of

the attorney’s tactical decision." Id. In order to satisfy this second prong, "the petitioner must show that

the alternative strategy or tactic was ‘clearly suggested by the circumstances.’" Id. (quoting [United

States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 1991))].

Lastly, he must show that "the defense counsel’s

failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked to

the . . . conflict." Id. In establishing these three

aspects of this test, the petitioner is not required to

show that the strategy or tactic not taken would have

been successful, but only that it would have been

objectively reasonable. See id.

Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 252. We also observed that "‘much

of the adverse effect inquiry is heavily fact dependent,’" and

that we generally must "defer to a habeas court’s findings of

fact." Id. (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 360). We further recognized, however, that the district court here "did not conduct

a hearing and resolve the disputed factual contentions," nor

UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON 7

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did it "reach and address whether Babineau’s conflict

adversely affected his performance in Nicholson’s sentencing

proceedings." Id. As such, we deemed ourselves "obliged to

remand for a determination and assessment of the relevant

facts" on the adverse effect issue. Id.5

C.

1.

At the time of the First Opinion, the evidence before the

district court included affidavits executed by Nicholson, several of his family members, and lawyer Babineau, as well as

police and court documents related to Nicholson, Butts, and

Babineau’s simultaneous representation of these two clients.6

The evidence reflected that, on January 7, 2001, Nicholson

was arrested in Portsmouth, Virginia, on a state charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, immediately after city police

officers found a handgun on Nicholson’s person. At the time

5Notably, in Nicholson I, we rejected the Government’s contention "that

there was no adverse impact on Nicholson because it was not objectively

reasonable for Babineau to move for a downward departure, as Nicholson’s minimum Guidelines sentence was already lower than the statutory

minimum." Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 251 n.12. We explained that Nicholson 

was required to move for a downward departure prior to the

court’s final sentencing decision and, at that time, the Nicholson

PSR’s recommendation was merely that — a recommendation.

Furthermore, Babineau actually moved for a downward departure

based on another theory (Nicholson’s health situation). Although

a motion for a downward departure on self-defense necessity may

have proven futile, the advancement of that theory, along with the

presentation of supporting evidence, may have convinced the

court to sentence Nicholson to the statutory minimum instead of,

as imposed, nine months above the minimum. 

Id.

6Our account herein of the evidence before the district court at the time

of the First Opinion is largely drawn from the more detailed account in

Nicholson I. See 475 F.3d at 244-47. 

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of his arrest, Nicholson stated to the authorities that, because

he feared Butts and his associates, he had obtained the handgun for his personal protection.

Nicholson’s statements indicated that this fear arose after

his brother, Rudolph Nicholson, agreed in early 2000 to assist

federal officers in their criminal investigation of Butts and his

associates — prompting Butts to issue a series of threats

against Rudolph and other Nicholson family members.7 On

March 3, 2000, brother Rudolph was shot seven times by

Butts’s son in Portsmouth, but survived the attack. Rudolph

was treated for two months in a Norfolk, Virginia hospital,

where a would-be assassin disguised as a priest — actually

Butts himself — unsuccessfully attempted to enter Rudolph’s

room and kill him. Around May 2000, federal officers

informed Nicholson and his mother, Sandra Nicholson (whom

Butts also threatened), that Butts had placed a contract on

Nicholson’s life. On September 18, 2000, Nicholson’s stepfather, Charles Nicholson, was fatally shot multiple times on

a Portsmouth street by Butts and his accomplices.

Following the murder of his step-father, Nicholson

obtained a handgun from a friend and left Portsmouth to stay

with his cousin in the Washington, D.C. area. When Nicholson first came into possession of the handgun, it did not work,

and he left it at a gun shop in Chesapeake, Virginia (near

Portsmouth), to be repaired. On January 6, 2001, during a

visit to Portsmouth, Nicholson retrieved the handgun from the

gun shop. The following day, he was arrested with the handgun and charged by the Commonwealth with a state firearm

offense.

Lawyer Babineau was retained to represent Nicholson on

7We refer herein to the appellant as "Nicholson"; to his brother (actually

his half-brother) as "Rudolph Nicholson" or "Rudolph"; to their mother as

"Sandra Nicholson" or "Sandra"; and to Nicholson’s step-father

(Rudolph’s father) as "Charles Nicholson" or "Charles." 

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the state firearm charge, which was eventually dropped and

replaced by the federal charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Babineau’s representation of Nicholson continued over to the

federal charge. Nicholson was indicted by the federal grand

jury on March 23, 2001, two months after his state arrest, and

he was taken into federal custody on April 3, 2001. Shortly

thereafter, on May 29, 2001, Babineau publicly debuted as

Butts’s counsel, appearing for Butts at a preliminary hearing

conducted in a Virginia state court in Portsmouth on conspiracy, murder, and firearms charges. Both prior to and during

the time Babineau was representing Butts in these state proceedings, Babineau was also representing and advising Nicholson on whether he should accept a proposed plea agreement

from the United States Attorney on Nicholson’s federal

charge. Babineau never informed Nicholson that he was

simultaneously representing Butts on state criminal charges,

nor did Babineau seek Nicholson’s consent to represent Butts

during the same time frame.

According to their affidavits, Nicholson and his mother

both had repeatedly advised Babineau — during his representation of Nicholson — that Nicholson possessed the handgun

for protection from Butts. They had also explained to

Babineau the source of Nicholson’s fear: that Butts had

placed a contract on Nicholson’s life and had already killed

Charles Nicholson, threatened Sandra Nicholson, and

attempted to kill Rudolph Nicholson. Babineau averred in his

affidavit, however, that Nicholson had advised that "his possession of a firearm was not one out of fear of anyone in particular, including Butts, but that he carried a firearm because

of the activity that he was involved in, which created dangerous situations." J.A. 164. Babineau further averred that Sandra never mentioned Butts or his threats, and spoke with

Babineau only about an effort to obtain a downward sentencing departure for Nicholson premised on his substantial assistance to law enforcement. In any event, during discovery in

the federal prosecution of Nicholson, Babineau received written police reports reflecting statements made by Nicholson

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regarding his possession of the handgun. In these statements

to state and federal officers, Nicholson specified that he had

carried the handgun for protection against Butts and his associates, but that he did not have any information regarding

Butts and was not even sure what Butts looked like.

On June 6, 2001, Nicholson — represented by lawyer

Babineau — pleaded guilty to the federal firearm offense.

During the plea colloquy, the Government acknowledged to

the district court that it was reasonable to believe that someone might try to injure or shoot Nicholson. Two weeks later,

on June 22, 2001, in ongoing federal criminal proceedings

against Butts in the Eastern District of Virginia (separate from

his state proceedings), Butts notified the court that he would

be represented at sentencing by Babineau.8 As such, Babineau

then received a presentence investigation report on Butts (the

"Butts PSR"), which contained information implicating Butts

in both Rudolph Nicholson’s shooting and Charles Nicholson’s murder. The Butts PSR also stated that Butts’s "hit list"

included Nicholson.9 On July 23, 2001, the Nicholson PSR

was issued, and it pointed out that Nicholson had advised the

authorities that he carried the handgun for protection because

he feared an individual who was trying to harm him. The next

8On April 30, 2001, a federal jury had found Butts guilty of multiple

federal crimes, including conspiracy, drug distribution, and firearm

offenses. 

9The Butts PSR, provided to Babineau in June or July 2001, reflected

the following: in March 2000, Butts’s son shot "Unindicted Coconspirator #7" (Rudolph Nicholson) and was subsequently scolded by

Butts "for not shooting [Rudolph] in the head as he had been instructed";

after Butts’s son was shot and killed in September 2000, "Butts made an

oral ‘hit list’ of people he intended to have killed," including Charles

Nicholson, Rudolph Nicholson, and appellant Jack Nicholson (misidentified in the Butts PSR as "Jake Nicholson"); and, shortly after Charles

Nicholson’s murder later in September 2000, Butts admitted that "he and

several other individuals" driving together from Norfolk to Portsmouth

had spotted Charles standing alone on a Portsmouth street corner, "circled

the block, then exited the vehicle and fired on [Charles], who died as a

result of the gunshot wounds." J.A. 912. 

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day, July 24, 2001, Babineau served as Butts’s lawyer at sentencing in his federal proceedings, during which the court

adopted the Butts PSR. Babineau also represented Butts on

his appeal to this Court, which was filed on July 31, 2001. As

part of that appeal, Babineau maintained, inter alia, that the

trial court had erred by admitting evidence of Butts’s prior

bad acts, including the attempted murder of Nicholson’s

brother Rudolph and the murder of his step-father Charles. On

August 20, 2001, the Government responded to the Nicholson

PSR, stating that it had no objection to the facts set forth

therein (including Nicholson’s claim that he carried the handgun for self-protection). A week later, during Nicholson’s

August 29, 2001 sentencing hearing, the Government again

confirmed to the court that certain individuals were trying to

kill Nicholson at the time of his arrest. Babineau, however, in

his representation of Nicholson, failed to address any of the

circumstances surrounding Nicholson’s firearm possession or

to request a self-defense departure.

2.

On remand from our Nicholson I decision, the parties

engaged in discovery and the district court conducted a January 30, 2008 evidentiary hearing. The evidence adduced on

remand included testimony taken at depositions and during

the hearing.

a.

During his videotaped deposition of September 4, 2007,

Nicholson testified about his brother Rudolph Nicholson’s

cooperation with the authorities in their investigation of Butts

and his associates; the threats made by Butts against Rudolph

and other Nicholson family members; the shooting of

Rudolph in March 2000; the federal agents’ disclosure to

Nicholson in May 2000 that he was on Butts’s "hit list" and

that his "life was in danger," J.A. 351-52; and the murder of

his step-father Charles Nicholson in September 2000. Accord12 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON

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ing to Nicholson, a friend offered him a handgun after learning of Charles’s murder, which had occurred earlier that same

day. Nicholson accepted the handgun, which was not in working condition. On the day of Charles’s funeral, Nicholson

took the handgun to a Chesapeake gun shop called Chesapeake Gun Works to be repaired, and then left to stay with his

cousin in the Washington, D.C. area. While there, Nicholson

learned that Butts had been arrested by federal authorities, but

Nicholson remained fearful of Butts because "he had people

do his work for him." J.A. 358.

Nicholson further testified that, while living in the Washington, D.C. area, he periodically visited Portsmouth to meet

with his probation officer and returned home for Christmas.

Beginning on December 26, 2000, he was hospitalized for

several days because of his sickle cell anemia. Upon his

release in early January 2001, Nicholson stayed with his

mother at her house in Portsmouth. Around that time, Nicholson heard "street rumors" that Butts’s associates were "still

looking for [him]" and that there "was a cash reward for [his]

whereabouts." J.A. 362. On January 6, 2001, Nicholson went

to Chesapeake Gun Works to pick up the now-repaired handgun and purchase a box of ammunition. The next day, January

7, 2001, Portsmouth police officers found Nicholson with the

handgun and arrested him.

Babineau was retained to represent Nicholson on both the

initial state charge and the replacement federal charge. Prior

to his plea, Nicholson pushed for Babineau to move to suppress the firearm, as well as to assert justification as a complete defense to the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) offense, but

Babineau pursued neither of those tactics. Nicholson testified

that he subsequently learned from the probation officer who

prepared the Nicholson PSR that he might be eligible for a

self-defense departure at sentencing. Nicholson then urged

Babineau to seek such a reduction, but Babineau advised that,

in the words of Nicholson, "he couldn’t find [any] Fourth CirUNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON 13

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cuit case that dealt with that so it wouldn’t apply." J.A. 436.10

Nicholson reiterated that lawyer Babineau never disclosed his

simultaneous representation of Butts, even though Babineau

knew of Butts’s threats against Nicholson and Nicholson’s

claim that he possessed the firearm for protection from Butts.

Additionally, Nicholson averred that he had never discussed his criminal history with Babineau. Nicholson

10Nicholson’s testimony that he urged Babineau to move for a selfdefense departure is corroborated by two letters that were made part of the

record on remand. In the first of these letters, dated July 9, 2001 (during

the period between Nicholson’s guilty plea and sentencing), Nicholson

requested Babineau to "check on if [it’s] possible to get a downward

departure for instance when the defendant is a victim. The P.O. [probation

officer] was telling me something to that effect and he would check into

it." J.A. 470. In the second letter, which is undated, Nicholson wrote to

Babineau: 

I have a copy of a newspaper article that I would like you to

check out. I’m hoping this can help me out. I really think we need

to let the courts know that it was more of a self defense case than

anything . . . . For real[,] Mr. Babineau, I wasn’t out there running wild in the streets with a gun just for the hell of it. I mean

I just got the gun the day before which the ATF knows this

because they went to the gun shop where I got it fixed. It been

there like 3 months during the time I left the area to get away. I

came back Dec. 23rd[,] went in the hospital Dec. 26th[,] [and]

got discharged Jan. 2nd[.] I decided I was gonna stay home to be

close to my girlfriend while she was pregnant so I went and got

[the gun] because of the things that was going on with my

brother. 

I know we been through this before but I really think this needs

to be brought up especially with what is being said in the article

[that’s] included. 

Id. at 471. Nicholson enclosed a newspaper article reporting a recent decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals authorizing juries to "consider

whether a felon was justified in using a weapon in self-defense." Id. at

472. Nicholson wrote on the copy of the article: "I had an actual contract

out on me! Please help me[.] [T]here [has] got to be some kind of justice

for me. I’m not saying I should go free but I’m saying I [don’t] deserve

16 years for protecting myself and my family!!!" Id.

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acknowledged that he had prior convictions on various felony

offenses, each of which involved either firearms or controlled

substances, but not both. This testimony is consistent with the

Nicholson PSR, which reflected that, in April 1991 (at age

seventeen), Nicholson fired a .38 caliber revolver at a group

of people standing outside a Portsmouth fast food restaurant;

in November 1991 (at age eighteen), he was found by police

officers with 1.44 grams of cocaine base ("crack") in a Portsmouth housing project; and, in December 1991 (also at age

eighteen), he shot into an occupied vehicle in Portsmouth.

Nicholson was separately convicted and sentenced on state

charges arising from each of these three incidents, and he was

incarcerated in a state prison until March 1999. While incarcerated, Nicholson was found with marijuana in May 1997

and heroin in October 1997; he was convicted in January

1998 on two state drug possession charges and given two suspended sentences. These were his most recent offenses (other

than an October 2000 driving offense) at the time he was

arrested with the handgun on January 7, 2001. Nicholson disclaimed carrying or possessing any other firearm between his

March 1999 release from state prison and his September 2000

receipt of the handgun from a friend on the day of his stepfather Charles Nicholson’s murder.

b.

Two agents of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives (the "ATF"), John Underwood and

Marvin Logwood, testified at the January 30, 2008 evidentiary hearing at the Government’s behest. ATF Agent Underwood had interviewed Nicholson on the day of his January 7,

2001 arrest, after Nicholson gave statements to the two Portsmouth police officers who had arrested him. In his statements

to Agent Underwood and the Portsmouth officers, Nicholson

consistently maintained that he possessed the handgun, a

nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol, for protection from

Butts. Nicholson explained that Butts had placed a "hit" on

him because of brother Rudolph Nicholson’s cooperation with

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the authorities, and also because Butts apparently believed —

incorrectly — that Nicholson himself was involved in the

recent murder of Butts’s son, Vito Butts (who had previously

shot Rudolph).

In an effort to provide Nicholson an opportunity to render

substantial assistance to the Government and thereby obtain

relief under the Sentencing Guidelines, Babineau arranged

(but did not attend) another interview of Nicholson by ATF

Agent Underwood. See USSG § 5K1.1 (2000) (authorizing

court to grant downward departure, upon Government’s

motion, where defendant provides substantial assistance in

investigation or prosecution of another person). This interview was conducted on April 12, 2001, prior to Nicholson’s

sentencing, in a Chesapeake hospital where Nicholson was

being treated for sickle cell anemia. Agent Underwood

described the interview as an "off the record" proffer during

which Nicholson was to provide information to the Government about Butts. According to Underwood’s written notes of

the interview, Nicholson stated that Butts had paid Rudolph

Nicholson three separate times "not to come to court," giving

the money to Charles Nicholson "as a go between." J.A. 507.

Nicholson spoke with Charles the morning of Charles’s murder and asked him to tell Butts that Nicholson "didn’t have

anything to do with Vito’s murder." Id. Charles responded

that Butts "was crazy and wouldn’t listen." Id. The day after

Charles’s murder, Nicholson "rented a minivan and drove

around for a couple days thinking about revenge," but he did

not act because he "didn’t have anything" with which to exact

revenge on Butts. Id. at 508.11 Nicholson then left Portsmouth

to "hide out" in the Washington, D.C. area. Id. Sometime

before Christmas of 2000, after Butts had been arrested, Nicholson’s grandmother urged him to return to Portsmouth

11Testifying during the evidentiary hearing, Agent Underwood clarified

that when Nicholson stated he "didn’t have anything," he was referring to

the fact that the firearm he had obtained immediately following Charles

Nicholson’s murder "did not work." J.A. 633. 

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because he ran the risk of parole violations and "had a baby

on the way." Id. Nicholson did not provide any other information concerning Butts during the April 12, 2001 interview.

Thereafter, according to Agent Underwood’s evidentiary

hearing testimony, Underwood concluded that Nicholson "had

no use in the trial against Mr. Butts." Id. at 632.

During the April 12, 2001 interview by ATF Agent Underwood, Nicholson revealed information about his own drug

dealing and other persons involved therein. Agent Underwood

testified that Nicholson admitted during the interview that he

dealt drugs from "the early ‘90s, 1990 through I guess the

point where he was arrested" on January 7, 2001. J.A. 631.

Underwood acknowledged on cross-examination, however,

that neither Nicholson nor his companion at the time of the

January 7, 2001 arrest possessed any drugs, drug paraphernalia, or other indicia of drug dealing, such as large sums of

cash. See id. at 635. Underwood also acknowledged that, by

the time of Nicholson’s 2001 arrest on the firearm charge,

"law enforcement knew about Mr. Butts and his [welldeserved] reputation . . . for being violent and dangerous,"

and also knew that Butts "had plenty of associates out there"

and that not "everybody that he knew or had ever done any

criminal work for him" was (like Butts and many of his

known associates) then incarcerated. Id. at 636.12 Additionally, Underwood testified that, other than the handgun with

which Nicholson was arrested, he knew "of no other guns" in

Nicholson’s possession during the same general time period

(approximately spanning from Charles Nicholson’s murder in

September 2000 to Nicholson’s arrest on the replacement federal charge in April 2001). Id. at 639.

12Notably, Agent Underwood’s testimony about Butts’s known dangerousness prompted the Government to assert during the hearing that it was

"not saying that [Nicholson] had no reason to believe that other henchmen

out there on the street would be a danger to him. We have never taken that

position." J.A. 636-37. 

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Following his August 29, 2001 sentencing hearing, Nicholson submitted to another interview with a federal agent, this

time in an effort to obtain sentencing relief under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). See Fed. R. Crim. P.

35(b)(1), (4) (authorizing court, upon Government’s motion

made within one year of sentencing, to reduce sentence below

statutory minimum if defendant, "after sentencing, provided

substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another

person"). This interview was conducted on September 4,

2001, by ATF Agent Logwood. During his interview with

Agent Logwood, Nicholson again provided information about

Butts, as well as information about his own drug dealing,

which Nicholson admitted began when he was a teenager and

continued through the time of his arrest in April 2001 on the

replacement federal charge. Logwood testified at the evidentiary hearing about his conclusion that, although Nicholson was

"truthful," there was nothing "new" in his information "that

led to furtherance of [the Butts] investigation." J.A. 650. Logwood also acknowledged on cross-examination Butts’s reputation "in law enforcement and in the community" for being

"a violent, dangerous, murderous character," id. at 648, and

the absence of evidence that Nicholson possessed any firearm

— other than the handgun with which he was arrested on January 7, 2001 — between his release from state prison in 1999

and his federal arrest in April 2001.

c.

Lawyer Babineau testified in an August 9, 2007 deposition

and at the January 30, 2008 evidentiary hearing. During the

deposition, Babineau averred that he had discussed with Nicholson — prior to Nicholson’s guilty plea — the possibility of

raising justification as a complete defense to Nicholson’s federal charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In this regard,

Babineau testified that he "told [Nicholson] a number of

things, and one of them was . . . that the [complete justification defense,] in order to be deemed to be credible, or

believed by a jury, was going to [require Nicholson] to take

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the stand and testify" — exposing Nicholson to crossexamination about his criminal record and "other statements

that would be attributed to him." J.A. 246. Babineau further

testified that,

[s]econdly, and very importantly, is that I was not

going to suborn perjury for Jack Nicholson. Jack

Nicholson had told me that he was not afraid of

Butts. That’s contradictory to other statements that

he made to law enforcement and otherwise, but he

wasn’t afraid of Butts. . . . [H]e carried a gun

because he was a drug dealer and he used the gun for

protection. Was it protection from Butts and his

folks? I’m sure it was. But it was also protection

from the many other people that he dealt drugs to

and dealt drugs with on the streets of Portsmouth.

Id. at 246-47. Babineau added that, in looking at Nicholson’s

criminal record "with all of the violence that he had in there,

including gun violence and drugs, it was clear to me that that

all made sense. He was telling me that he carried a gun

because of the trade, the practice that he was in." Id. at 247.

Nevertheless, Babineau acknowledged that he did not have

any evidence, "[e]xcept what my client told me," contradicting Nicholson’s claim to the authorities that he possessed the

firearm on January 7, 2001, for protection from Butts. Id. at

305.

At the evidentiary hearing, Babineau expounded on his

views of Nicholson’s criminal history, testifying that it

revealed to him that Nicholson "was a very violent person

who had always carried a firearm." J.A. 660. Babineau also

testified that, "[i]n our conversations, [Nicholson] told me

repeatedly, more than once or twice or three times, that he

carried a gun always. He always had." Id. at 661. According

to Babineau, he specifically asked Nicholson whether he

feared Butts, and Nicholson responded "that he was not afraid

of Butts." Id. Nicholson ultimately agreed with Babineau that

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a complete justification defense to the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

charge would be unsuccessful. See id. at 662.13 Thereafter,

however, despite Nicholson’s exhortations that he do so,

Babineau refused to request a self-defense departure at sentencing. Babineau explained that he did not make such a

departure motion because he was not "in a position . . . to

argue ethically to the Court that [Nicholson] possessed a gun

because he was fearful of Mr. Butts," as Nicholson had told

Babineau "that that’s not the reason why he carried a gun." Id.

at 672. Babineau acknowledged, however, that he knew from

the Butts PSR that the Government had evidence tending to

show that Butts had placed Nicholson on a "hit list" and was

involved in the murder of Charles Nicholson and the

attempted murder of Rudolph Nicholson — evidence that

included witnesses other than Nicholson himself. See id. at

689-90. Babineau also conceded that he knew it was not necessary for Nicholson to testify at sentencing in support of a

self-defense departure motion, and that he "knew that there

were facts and witnesses in the Government’s arsenal of

things about Butts [being] a violent man and [making] threats

against Nicholson." Id. at 690-91.

Babineau repeatedly stated during the evidentiary hearing

that he did not perceive a conflict of interest at the time he

was representing both Nicholson and Butts, nor did he presently believe a conflict had ever existed. See, e.g., J.A. 670-71

("I do not believe there existed a conflict between my representation of Mr. Nicholson, with all due respect to the Fourth

Circuit’s opinion, and my representation of Mr. Butts.").

Babineau recalled that, following Nicholson’s April 12, 2001

interview by ATF Agent Underwood, Nicholson "told

[Babineau] what he told the agents" — specifically, that Nicholson "was not involved with Butts" and "that it was his

13In his letter to Babineau of July 9, 2001, Nicholson wrote that he

knew he did not "have a chance with trial" absent suppression of the firearm, but he did not expound on why he believed that to be the case. See

J.A. 470. 

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brother, Rudolph[,] [who] was a big time drug dealer . . .

involved with Butts," though when Nicholson "returned back

to the Tidewater area, . . . he started selling heroin again in

Portsmouth." Id. at 659-60. Babineau further recalled that he

had been informed by the prosecution, following Nicholson’s

interview by Underwood, that Nicholson had not provided

any useful information about Butts. Babineau did not receive

or review Underwood’s notes of the interview until years

later, a couple of days before Babineau’s August 9, 2007

deposition.

During both his deposition and the evidentiary hearing,

Babineau testified that he had lost most of his client files on

Nicholson and Butts, but had turned over to the Government

those files he could find (without Nicholson’s or Butts’s

authorization and despite Nicholson’s request for his own

files). The existing files did not include any contemporaneous

notes of Babineau’s discussions with Nicholson.

3.

In assessing the adverse effect issue in the Remand Opinion, the district court ruled that Nicholson satisfied the first

prong of the three-part Mickens standard, because "[t]here

existed ‘a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that

[lawyer Babineau] might have pursued.’" Remand Opinion 38

(quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361). The court further determined, however, that Nicholson failed to satisfy the second

and third Mickens prongs, in that he failed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that such "‘alternative strategy

or tactic was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case

known to [Babineau] at the time of [his] tactical decision,’"

and that Babineau’s "‘failure to pursue that strategy or tactic

was linked to the . . . conflict.’" Id. (quoting Mickens, 240

F.3d at 361). Thus, the court once again denied Nicholson

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See id. at 41.

Nicholson timely noted this appeal and, on June 25, 2008,

we granted a COA "as to the issue of whether counsel’s actual

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conflict had an adverse effect on [Nicholson’s] sentencing

proceeding." We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1291 and 2253.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions in

denying a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See United States v. Stitt,

552 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2008). We also review de novo

any mixed questions of law and fact addressed by the court

on whether the petitioner has established a valid Sixth

Amendment ineffective assistance claim. See Nicholson I, 475

F.3d at 248 (citing Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1131

(4th Cir. 1997) ("Whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate is a mixed question of law and fact which

we review de novo." (internal quotation marks omitted))).

When the court conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling, we review its findings of fact for clear error. See Stitt,

552 F.3d at 350.

III.

The usual standard for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claims is spelled out in the Supreme Court’s seminal

decision in Strickland v. Washington, which requires proof

"that counsel’s performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). Where (as here) the ineffective assistance claim is

premised on the existence of an actual conflict of interest,

however, such claim is assessed under the standard outlined

in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). The Sullivan standard requires a showing that (1) petitioner’s lawyer operated

under a "conflict of interest" and (2) such conflict "adversely

affected his lawyer’s performance." 446 U.S. at 348. If the

petitioner makes this showing, prejudice is presumed and

nothing more is required for relief. See id. at 349-50; see also

Rubin v. Gee, 292 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining

that prejudice is presumed because, "[w]hen lawyers’ con22 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON

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flicts of interest adversely affect their performance, it calls

into question the reliability of the proceeding and represents

a breakdown in the adversarial process fundamental to our

system of justice").

We ruled in Nicholson I that Nicholson had satisfied his

burden of establishing that lawyer Babineau had a conflict of

interest when he represented Nicholson in his sentencing proceedings. See 475 F.3d at 251. As we recognized therein,

however, "an adverse effect is not presumed from the existence of [a] conflict of interest." Id. at 249. Thus, we

remanded for the district court’s consideration of the adverse

effect issue under the applicable three-part standard established by our Court in Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361

(4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), aff’d without consideration of this

point, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). The specific issue before the district court on remand, and before us now, is whether

Babineau’s conflict of interest in simultaneously representing

Nicholson and Butts adversely affected Babineau’s performance in Nicholson’s sentencing proceedings.

A.

The district court concluded that Nicholson satisfied the

first prong of the three-part Mickens standard in that "[t]here

existed ‘a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that

[lawyer Babineau] might have pursued.’" Remand Opinion 38

(quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361). And indeed, a defendant

is eligible for a downward departure below the applicable

Sentencing Guidelines range if he "committed the offense

because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense." See USSG

§ 5K2.12 (2000).14 To be "sufficiently serious to warrant

14A complete justification defense requires a more stringent showing

than a Guidelines self-defense departure, including proof of an "imminent

and specific" threat of death or serious bodily injury. United States v.

Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2007). Prior to our decision in Nicholson I, Nicholson had sought a COA on his claim that Babineau was ineffective in failing to raise the complete justification defense at the time of

Nicholson’s conviction. We granted the COA, however, on the

sentencing-related claim only. 

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departure," the coercion must at least involve, inter alia, "a

threat of physical injury." Id. On this record, a motion for a

self-defense departure was a plausible defense strategy that

Babineau might have pursued. Simply put, there is overwhelming evidence — believed and even endorsed by the

Government — that Nicholson faced not only a threat of

physical injury, but also a genuine threat of death, at the time

he was found with the firearm and claimed he possessed it for

self-protection. Thus, we agree with the district court that

Nicholson made the required showing on the first Mickens

prong.

B.

Next, the district court ruled, on three separate grounds,

that Nicholson failed to satisfy the second prong of the Mickens standard in that he failed to establish that a motion for a

self-defense departure "‘was objectively reasonable under the

facts of the case known to [lawyer Babineau] at the time of

[his] tactical decision.’" Remand Opinion 38 (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361). We address and reject each of the three

grounds underlying the court’s ruling on the second Mickens

prong. In so doing, we emphasize that, although the second

Mickens prong requires findings on the facts known to the

lawyer at the time of his tactical decision, the ultimate question involves a conclusion of law reached under an objective

standard: whether, considering the facts known to the lawyer,

the alternative defense strategy was "objectively reasonable."

See Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361; cf. Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555

F.3d 324, 333 (4th Cir. 2009) (recognizing, in 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action, that "whether [officers’] conduct was objectively reasonable . . . is a question of law, not fact").

To be sure, a court’s inquiry on the second Mickens prong

does not induce the court to contemplate whether the alternative strategy was subjectively reasonable to the lawyer, nor

does it require or permit the court to view the lawyer’s performance under the "highly deferential" standard spelled out in

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Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (instructing that

"[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential," and that "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"); see also Beets v. Scott, 65

F.3d 1258, 1269 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (recognizing that

Strickland contains a "more deferential standard of attorney

competence" than does Sullivan). Indeed, to apply a subjective test or accord deference to the lawyer would pay no heed

to the principle that "[j]oint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney

from doing," Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90

(1978) — the very principle animating the rule that "unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error," Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349. See also Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176

("The purpose of our Holloway and Sullivan exceptions from

the ordinary requirements of Strickland [is] to apply needed

prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently

inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel."). With this understanding of

the applicable objective standard, we turn to our assessment

and rejection of the district court’s three grounds for ruling

that Nicholson failed to satisfy the second Mickens prong.15

15Additionally, with regard to the second Mickens prong, the district

court considered and rejected the parties’ contentions on the significance

of the court’s contemporaneous "Statement of Reasons" for the sentence

imposed on Nicholson on August 29, 2001, which included a finding that

Nicholson "possessed [the] weapon as his life was threatened." See

Remand Opinion 33. On the one hand, the Government contended that,

because this finding "demonstrate[d] that the Court accepted and acted

upon the self defense theory," Nicholson suffered no prejudice and the

adverse impact issue was moot. Id. The court rejected the Government’s

contention, however, explaining that it could not "speculate on what action

it would have taken if additional evidence or argument had been presented

on [Nicholson’s] self defense theory," and that, in any event, there was no

authority for the proposition "that the presumption of prejudice may be

rebutted." Id. On the other hand, Nicholson contended that, because the

court’s "Statement of Reasons" reflected an understanding that Nicholson

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1.

"First," according to the district court, "Babineau could not

ethically present or argue facts to the Court which he knew

were false." Remand Opinion 39 (the "Ethics Ground"). The

court observed that, although "certain facts were already in

the record in support of [a] self defense sentencing theory,"

Babineau knew from Nicholson’s "comments to him and the

federal agent" that self-defense was not Nicholson’s true reason for carrying the firearm at the time of his January 7, 2001

arrest. Id. Thus, "Babineau could not ethically file and pursue

a motion for downward departure based on self defense." Id.

In relying on the Ethics Ground, the district court explicitly

credited Babineau’s testimony that Nicholson had previously

told Babineau "that he was not afraid of Butts and he carried

a firearm because he dealt drugs." Remand Opinion 28.

Because of our highly deferential standard of review, we are

not in a position to disturb the court’s credibility finding. See

United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1317 (4th Cir.

1987) ("Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, this

Court declines to overturn a factual determination founded on

witness demeanor and credibility."). Notably, however, the

possessed the firearm as the result of a threat on his life, it would have

been objectively reasonable for Babineau to move for a self-defense

departure. See id. at 34-35. In rejecting Nicholson’s contention, the court

observed that the "objectively reasonable" test "concerns whether the tactic was objectively reasonable to the attorney, Babineau, not whether it

was later found persuasive by the Court. Clearly, Babineau was aware of

facts weakening the self defense theory of which the Court was not aware

at the time of the sentencing hearing." Id. at 35. 

We similarly reject any reliance by either party on the district court’s

"Statement of Reasons." We take issue, however, with the court’s description of the "objectively reasonable" test as being concerned with "whether

the tactic was objectively reasonable to the attorney." Remand Opinion 35.

This description suggests that the test is actually a subjective one or that

the lawyer is owed deference — which would be at odds with the objective standard prescribed in Mickens and discussed above. 

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court’s discussion of the Ethics Ground also suggests a finding that Nicholson, in his comments to the "federal agent"

(i.e., ATF Agent Underwood), renounced his self-defense

necessity claim. Any such finding would be clearly erroneous.

See United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2008).

As the court itself recognized earlier in the Remand Opinion,

"on the offense date, Nicholson told Agent Underwood that

he possessed the firearm for protection," and thereafter, "[o]n

April 12, 2001, Nicholson told Underwood of his extensive

history as a drug dealer which began in 1990 and extended

until his arrest on January 7, 2001." Remand Opinion 27.

There is no evidence or indication in the record that Nicholson told Underwood that self-defense necessity was not his

true reason for possessing the firearm, or that Underwood

ever drew such a conclusion on his own. At most, Nicholson’s

comments to Underwood, as thereafter relayed by Nicholson

to Babineau, corroborated Nicholson’s previous statements to

Babineau that he had been dealing drugs around the time of

his arrest. See id. (recounting Babineau’s testimony that,

"[a]fter Nicholson’s April 12, 2001 interview with Agent

Underwood, Nicholson told Babineau what he told the agent

at that interview" — specifically "that when he returned to

Tidewater he resumed selling heroin in Portsmouth"). Only

Babineau connected Nicholson’s drug dealing to his firearm

possession.16

Accepting (as we must) the district court’s finding that

Babineau was credible, however, the court yet erred on the

Ethics Ground in assessing and deciding a question of law —

a conclusion that we review de novo. See Stitt, 552 F.3d at

350. The question resolved by the court was whether

16At the time of Nicholson’s sentencing, Babineau’s knowledge of the

contents of the April 12, 2001 Agent Underwood interview was limited to

the information relayed by Nicholson to Babineau. Babineau did not

review Underwood’s notes of the interview until years later, and those

notes reflect only that Nicholson admitted dealing drugs around the time

of his January 7, 2001 arrest, without connecting the firearm possession

to the drug dealing. 

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Babineau, having been told by Nicholson that he did not fear

Butts, was ethically prohibited from requesting a self-defense

departure for Nicholson at sentencing. The court turned to the

Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and, more specifically, Rule 3.3 thereof. In relevant part, Rule 3.3, entitled

"Candor Toward The Tribunal," prohibits a lawyer from

knowingly "mak[ing] a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal"; "fail[ing] to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent

act by the client"; or "offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer

knows to be false." Rule 3.3 also authorizes a lawyer to "refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is

false."17

Notwithstanding these provisions of the Virginia Rules of

Professional Conduct, it is manifest that Babineau could have

requested a self-defense departure without compromising his

ethical duties. This is so because a motion for a self-defense

departure would not have required Babineau to make a false

statement of fact or law to the sentencing court, to offer evidence that he knew or reasonably believed to be false, or to

otherwise contravene the applicable ethics rules. Rather,

Babineau could have made a self-defense departure motion on

the strength of the truthful and undisputed evidence that Butts

had posed a genuine threat to Nicholson’s life, that Nicholson

had claimed to the authorities that he possessed a firearm on

January 7, 2001, for protection from Butts, and that the

authorities believed him.

As Babineau conceded, he knew that Nicholson "need not

testify at sentencing," J.A. 690, and that there was other evi17In addition to Rule 3.3, the court also invoked Rule 4.1, which pertains to transactions with persons other than clients. Rule 4.1, entitled

"Truthfulness In Statements To Others," prohibits a lawyer, "[i]n the

course of representing a client," from knowingly "[m]ak[ing] a false statement of fact or law," or "[f]ail[ing] to disclose a fact when disclosure is

necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client." 

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dence — indeed, undisputed Government evidence — establishing Butts’s murder of Nicholson’s step-father, attempted

murder of Nicholson’s brother, and inclusion of Nicholson on

a "hit list." As early as Nicholson’s June 6, 2001 plea colloquy, the prosecution itself had informed the district court that

Nicholson "stated that he had the firearm for his personal protection" and that it was "certainly reasonable to believe that

someone might try to injure him or shoot him." J.A. 30.

Thereafter, the prosecution interposed no objection to the

Nicholson PSR’s statement that Nicholson had advised the

authorities "that he possessed the firearm for his own personal

protection." Id. at 858. During Nicholson’s August 29, 2001

sentencing hearing, the United States Attorney again informed

the court that "when [Nicholson] was arrested, there were

people out to kill him." Id. at 50. Quite tellingly, the Government has never abandoned its position that Nicholson was in

real danger when he possessed the handgun — even acknowledging at oral argument in this appeal that, regardless of what

Nicholson may have told Babineau, it would have been "absurd" for Nicholson not to fear Butts.

In these circumstances, the Rules of Professional Conduct

did not bar Babineau from moving for a downward departure

— or, more precisely, from arguing for the statutory minimum — on the basis of self-defense necessity. To the contrary, by making such a motion, Babineau simply would have

been fulfilling his professional obligations to Nicholson. As

Justice Powell once cogently observed, "lawyers, by training

and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty

to present all available evidence and arguments in support of

their clients’ positions and to contest with vigor all adverse

evidence and views." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787

(1973); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465

U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (recognizing that "the private attorney’s

role" is to serve "as the client’s confidential adviser and advocate, a loyal representative whose duty it is to present the client’s case in the most favorable possible light"). Accordingly,

we reject the premise of the Ethics Ground: that a self-defense

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departure motion was not objectively reasonable under the

facts known to Babineau at the time of sentencing because the

applicable ethics rules barred him from making such a

motion.

2.

Next, on the second Mickens prong, the district court ruled

that a self-defense departure motion was not objectively reasonable because, based on the facts known to Babineau,

asserting the self-defense theory could have damaged Nicholson’s credibility and thereby jeopardized his chances for

future Rule 35(b) relief. See Remand Opinion 39 (the "Rule

35(b) Ground"). The court explained that "assisting the Government in the hope of receiving a reduction in sentence under

Rule 35(b) was [Nicholson’s] primary objective throughout

the litigation," and that Nicholson’s credibility would have

been damaged if he had "asserted through a motion for downward departure . . . that he only possessed the firearm in self

defense, while also telling federal agents that he was selling

drugs during the time he possessed the gun." Id. "This damage

to [Nicholson’s] credibility," according to the court, "could

have reduced his prospect of having his sentence reduced

under Rule 35(b)." Id.

The district court’s Rule 35(b) Ground — involving a

mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo, see

Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 248 (citing Smith v. Angelone, 111

F.3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1997)) — cannot be squared with

the record. As an initial matter, the record reflects that neither

ATF Agent Underwood (who twice interviewed Nicholson

prior to his guilty plea) nor ATF Agent Logwood (who interviewed him postsentencing) perceived any inconsistency

between Nicholson’s self-defense claim and his admission

that he had been dealing drugs around the time of his January

7, 2001 arrest. Rather, Agents Underwood and Logwood indicated that Nicholson provided truthful, albeit not useful, information. Moreover, even assuming that the prosecution could

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have used Nicholson’s admission of drug dealing to counter

his self-defense claim, nothing in the record suggests that the

prosecution would have taken that tack. Indeed, as Babineau

himself has acknowledged, there is no evidence in this record

— other than Babineau’s testimony about what Nicholson

told him during privileged attorney-client communications —

to support the proposition that Nicholson possessed the firearm because he was a drug dealer rather than for protection

from Butts. See J.A. 305 (Babineau’s deposition testimony

that his only evidence contradicting Nicholson’s self-defense

claim was "what my client told me").

The balance of the evidence reflects that, at the time of

Nicholson’s January 7, 2001 arrest, he was endangered by

Butts. Nicholson was found in possession of a handgun that

he had accepted from a friend in September 2000, on the day

of his step-father’s murder. Because the handgun was then

inoperable, Nicholson took it to a local gun shop for repairs

and then left for the Washington, D.C. area. On January 6,

2001, after returning to Portsmouth for Christmas and being

treated at a hospital for his sickle cell anemia, Nicholson

retrieved the now-repaired handgun and purchased ammunition. The next day, the authorities found Nicholson in possession of the handgun, but not in possession of any drugs, drug

paraphernalia, unusual amounts of cash, or other indicia of

present drug dealing. Furthermore, the authorities discovered

no evidence that Nicholson had possessed any other firearm

during the period between his release from state prison in

1999 and his federal arrest in April 2001, although he admittedly sold drugs during that time frame. And, Nicholson’s

extensive criminal record, which included convictions for

both firearm and drug offenses, contained no history of Nicholson having simultaneously possessed firearms and drugs.

In summary, the evidence — other than Babineau’s testimony about statements made to him by Nicholson — is

entirely consistent with Nicholson’s self-defense claim and

inconsistent with Babineau’s belief that Nicholson "carried a

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gun because of the [drug] trade," J.A. 247, and "was a very

violent person who had always carried a firearm," id. at 660.

If, for example, Nicholson always carried a firearm in connection with his drug dealing, he would have possessed a firearm

on the day of his step-father’s murder and would have had no

reason to accept an inoperable handgun from a friend.

Once again, we must credit Babineau’s testimony and thus

accept that Nicholson told Babineau his true reason for possessing the firearm was drug dealing, not self-defense. Nevertheless, as Babineau was well aware at sentencing, the

balance of the evidence supported the self-defense (but not

the drug dealing) theory. As such, it was not objectively reasonable for Babineau to refrain from moving for a selfdefense downward departure for fear that Nicholson’s credibility would somehow suffer and he would thereby be denied

Rule 35(b) relief. Though we certainly do not condone Nicholson’s ugly criminal record or his ongoing drug activities,

there is a larger principle at stake here: Nicholson’s Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Hence, we are constrained to conclude that the Rule 35(b)

Ground lacks merit.

3.

Lastly, on the second Mickens prong, the district court also

ruled that a motion for a self-defense departure was not objectively reasonable because Nicholson’s self-defense claim

"could have been rebutted by [his] admissions of drug dealing

to [ATF Agent Underwood and, thus,] could have proven to

be a serious tactical error in arguing the period of imprisonment [Nicholson] should receive." Remand Opinion 40 (the

"Invitation for Rebuttal Ground"). Put simply, the Invitation

for Rebuttal Ground fails for the same reasons that the Rule

35(b) Ground is without merit. Thus, we reject each of the

district court’s three grounds for ruling that Nicholson failed

to satisfy the second Mickens prong. Furthermore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Nicholson has met his

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burden of showing that a motion for a self-defense departure

was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case known

to Babineau at sentencing.

C.

Turning to the third prong of the Mickens standard —

whether Nicholson established that Babineau’s failure to

move for a self-defense departure "‘was linked to the . . . conflict,’" Remand Opinion 38 (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at

361) — the district court accepted Babineau’s testimony that

"his reason for not filing a [self-defense] departure motion . . .

was based upon the abovementioned tactical and ethical considerations, and not based upon his representation of Butts."

Id. at 40-41. The court observed that,

[w]hile Babineau’s decision to represent Butts and

Nicholson indicates a lapse in judgment, it does not

diminish Babineau’s credibility before the Court.

Babineau testified in person before the Court, and

the Court had the opportunity to observe his manner

and consider his testimony in light of the other evidence and testimony in the case. The Court found

Babineau believable as a witness, despite the

attempted attacks on his credibility by [Nicholson].

Id. at 41. The court thus ruled that Nicholson "failed to meet

his burden of proof on the linkage issue by a preponderance

of the evidence." Id.

As previously noted, we are bound to accept the district

court’s credibility finding.18 Nevertheless, the court erred by

18There are ample reasons, however, to infer that Babineau was less

than forthcoming in these proceedings, including the following: other than

Babineau’s testimony, the record fully supports Nicholson’s self-defense

claim; a plethora of evidence — especially Nicholson’s letters to

Babineau, see supra note 10 — contradicts Babineau’s testimony that he

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rejecting Nicholson’s proof on the link issue and instead relying on Babineau’s testimony about his subjective motives to

withhold relief from Nicholson on his actual conflict of interest claim.

Significantly, in writing for the en banc majority in Mickens, Judge Widener adopted for our Court the three-part

adverse effect standard utilized by the Eleventh Circuit in

Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 860 (11th Cir. 1999)

(en banc). With respect to the third prong — that counsel’s

failure to pursue the objectively reasonable defense strategy

was linked to the conflict — the Freund court explained that

the petitioner is entitled to prove such a link in either of two

ways: (1) by "establish[ing] that the alternative defense was

inherently in conflict with . . . the attorney’s other loyalties or

interests" (the "first aspect of the Freund test"), or (2) by otherwise showing that the alternative defense was "not

undertaken due to" those other loyalties or interests (the "second aspect of the Freund test"). See 165 F.3d at 860 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Freund court’s test on the link

issue is a longstanding and widely utilized standard for determining whether a conflict of interest adversely affected a lawyer’s performance. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d

146, 157 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying same test); United States v.

Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); United

States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir. 1985) (same); see

also United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir.

1990) ("[D]efense counsel’s performance was adversely

was told by Nicholson that drug dealing was his true and only reason for

carrying the firearm; Babineau produced no contemporaneous notes of his

conversations with Nicholson, having lost the majority of his files on both

Nicholson and Butts; Babineau turned over what records he did possess

on Nicholson and Butts to the Government without Nicholson’s (or,

worse, Butts’s) authorization and despite Nicholson’s request for his own

records; and Babineau yet will not acknowledge — and, in fact, continues

to deny — that his simultaneous representation of Nicholson and Butts

created a conflict of interest. 

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affected by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and

seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was

available to defense counsel, but it was inherently in conflict

with his duties to others or to his own personal interests.").19

Under the first aspect of the Freund test, if the petitioner

shows — as Nicholson clearly has here — "that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with . . . the attorney’s

other loyalties or interests," see 165 F.3d at 860 (internal quotation marks omitted), he thereby satisfies his burden of proving the requisite link and there is no need to consider the

second aspect of the Freund test. Cf. United States v. Williams, 372 F.3d 96, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that,

because it was "clear that Williams’ defense was ‘inherently

in conflict with [his lawyer’s] other loyalties or interests,’"

Williams had sufficiently "demonstrated the requisite lapse in

his representation"); Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38, 42-43 (2d

Cir. 1995) (ruling that the "inherently in conflict" standard

was satisfied where "the judge had the discretion to impose a

lower sentence and arguable grounds for leniency existed,"

but the lawyer "had the incentive to undermine [his client’s]

credibility . . . in order to reduce the risk of recriminations for

any [of the lawyer’s own] improper conduct"). In simple

terms, an alternative defense and the lawyer’s other loyalties

or interests are "inherently in conflict" if they are "inconsis19Notably, the First, Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits utilize a two-part

adverse effect test, in contrast to the three-part standard employed by the

Eleventh Circuit in Freund and adopted by our Court in Mickens. The

two-part test omits the second Mickens prong, which requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the alternative defense was "objectively reasonable" under the facts known to the lawyer at the relevant time. See

Eisemann v. Herbert, 401 F.3d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming the

Fourth and Eleventh Circuits’ standard, because of its additional objective

reasonableness requirement, to be "slightly more demanding" than the

Second Circuit’s approach). Nevertheless, the two-part test encompasses

the first Mickens prong (the "plausible alternative defense" requirement)

and, significantly, the third Mickens prong (the "link" requirement). As

such, it is helpful to look to decisions of the First, Second, Third, and

Tenth Circuits for guidance on the link issue. 

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tent" with each other. See United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d

465, 470 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "the applicable standard requires only the demonstration of a conflict inconsistent

with a plausible trial strategy or tactic"). In such a situation,

it is unnecessary — and even inappropriate — to accept and

consider evidence of any benign motives for the lawyer’s tactics, including the lawyer’s testimony about his subjective

state of mind. See id. (observing that "after-the-fact testimony

by [the conflicted] lawyer . . . is not helpful," as "[e]ven the

most candid persons may be able to convince themselves that

they actually would not have used that strategy or tactic anyway").20

20We do not suggest that courts may never consider a conflicted lawyer’s explanation for his actions in order to determine whether the lawyer’s failure to pursue an alternative defense strategy was linked to the

conflict of interest. Rather, we conclude only that in cases such as this one

— where the strategy at issue was plausible, objectively reasonable, and

inherently in conflict with the lawyer’s other loyalties or interests — consideration of the lawyer’s explanation is not helpful. In different circumstances, however, it may be appropriate, in assessing the link issue, to

consider the lawyer’s testimony on his subjective motives. For example,

in Stephens v. Branker, we credited the testimony of a (presumably) conflicted lawyer "that his trial strategy . . . was based solely on a tactical

decision" and was not linked to any conflict of interest. See 570 F.3d 198,

212 (4th Cir. 2009). Unlike lawyer Babineau, the lawyer in Stephens had

not failed to pursue an objectively reasonable defense strategy that was

inherently in conflict with the lawyer’s loyalties to another client. Rather,

the Stephens lawyer had pursued a theory arguably in conflict with his

other loyalties — "as far as the evidence would take it" — even though

such strategy was not objectively reasonable. See id. at 211-13; see also

Freund, 165 F.3d at 868-69 (crediting lawyer’s testimony on link issue in

circumstances similar to those in Stephens). Stephens exemplifies one type

of case where the lawyer’s testimony may properly be considered.

Another such type of case may be one in which the petitioner cannot

establish, under the first aspect of the Freund test, "that the alternative

defense was inherently in conflict with . . . the attorney’s other loyalties

or interests," but otherwise seeks to show, under the second aspect of the

Freund test, that the alternative defense was "not undertaken due to" those

other loyalties or interests. See 165 F.3d at 860 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

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Although, prior to today, we had not explicitly adopted the

Freund court’s test on the link issue under the third Mickens

prong, its application is entirely consistent with relevant

Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. The Supreme

Court, for example, has determined that a conflicted lawyer’s

omissions — "fail[ure] to cross-examine a prosecution witness" and "fail[ure] to resist the presentation of arguably inadmissible evidence" — "resulted from counsel’s desire to

diminish the jury’s perception of a codefendant’s guilt." Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349 (discussing Court’s prior decision in

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75 (1942)). The

Court so ruled because "the evidence of counsel’s ‘struggle to

serve two masters [could not] seriously be doubted.’" Id.

(quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75) (alteration in original).

As for this Court’s own precedent, our decision in Rubin v.

Gee

involved two attorneys who in the aftermath of a

crime schooled their client [Rubin] in the tactics of

evasion in order to guarantee their own fee. Then to

avoid criminal indictment and keep their conduct

from coming to light, the attorneys took cover as part

of the defense team. While the prosecution harped at

trial on Rubin’s actions immediately following the

crime, the attorneys could not be called as fact witnesses and their role in directing Rubin’s actions was

never explained.

292 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2002). After concluding that having the conflicted attorneys testify "was a plausible alternative

defense strategy which was reasonable under the facts of the

case," the panel majority in Rubin had no trouble deciding

that "the failure to pursue this strategy was linked to [the

attorneys’] conflict of interest." Id. at 405. Writing for the

majority, Judge Wilkinson characterized the conflict’s

adverse effect as "self-evident," id. at 398, and explained that

the attorneys "had a powerful conflicting interest in shielding

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themselves from testifying to conceal their role in the events

following the homicide," id. at 403. Significantly, the majority so concluded notwithstanding the dissenting view that —

based on the testimony of non-conflicted members of the

defense team (which the state habeas court had deemed credible) — there was no link between the other attorneys’ conflict

and their failure to testify. See id. at 411 (Motz, J., dissenting)

("Given this state-court finding, Rubin has not established and

cannot establish the necessary ‘link[ ]’ between [the attorneys’ conflict] and the decision she challenges." (first alteration in original)).

In Mickens, the petitioner asserted that his lawyer labored

under an actual conflict of interest in representing Mickens on

a murder charge, because the lawyer had previously represented Mickens’s murder victim. See 240 F.3d at 351. We

affirmed the district court’s ruling that "any viable defense

strategies" — including investigation into leads as to possible

alternative perpetrators and fuller cross-examination of a key

prosecution witness — "were not linked to [the] attorney’s

conflict of interest." Id. at 362. In other words, there was no

discernible inconsistency between those particular strategies

and the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to Mickens’s victim. As such,

Mickens could not prove "that the alternative defense was

inherently in conflict with . . . the attorney’s other loyalties or

interests." See Freund, 165 F.3d at 860 (internal quotation

marks omitted).21 The same would be true of a hypothetical

21Additionally, Mickens could not otherwise show, under the second

aspect of the Freund test, that any viable defense strategies were "not

undertaken due to the lawyer’s other loyalties or interests." See Freund,

165 F.3d at 860 (internal quotation marks omitted). We did not rule in

Mickens, however, that there was no link between other strategies not pursued and the conflict of interest where such strategies were, on their face,

inherently in conflict with the lawyer’s loyalty to the victim. Rather, we

concluded that those strategies were not objectively reasonable, without

reaching the link issue. See Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361-62. Furthermore, in

several decisions prior to Mickens, we determined that actual conflicts of

interest were proven where the defense strategies in question were inher38 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLSON

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claim by Nicholson that Babineau’s conflict caused him to

refrain from seeking a downward departure on the ground of

Nicholson’s serious health condition. Although arguably a

plausible and objectively reasonable strategy (being one that

Babineau actually did pursue), such a downward departure

motion was not inherently in conflict with Babineau’s representation of Butts.

A self-defense departure motion, by contrast, was inherently in conflict with Babineau’s loyalties to Butts — a point

we emphasized in Nicholson I in the context of ruling that

Babineau was laboring under a conflict of interest. See United

States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that Sullivan’s "two requirements" — a "conflict of interest" and an "adverse effect on counsel’s performance" — "are

often intertwined, making the factual analyses of them overlap" (emphasis omitted)). Of course, our conflict-of-interest

inquiry in Nicholson I focused on whether Nicholson’s and

Butts’s particularized "‘interests diverged with respect to a

material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.’" See

Nicholson I, 475 F.3d at 249 (quoting Gilbert v. Moore, 134

F.3d 642, 652 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)). The course of action

at issue was moving for a self-defense departure during Nicholson’s sentencing proceedings. If he made the motion,

ently in conflict with the lawyers’ other loyalties or interests. See United

States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1046 (4th Cir. 1992) (observing that,

while representing codefendants, the lawyer pursued a strategy on behalf

of one client that was "inherently damaging" to the second client’s position); United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the "known facts [led] inevitably to the conclusion that [the

lawyer] had unacceptable conflicts of interest," where, inter alia, "obvious

avenues for a full defense were not pursued, avenues which might have

assisted [the defendant] but would have clearly had adverse effects on [the

lawyer] and his law firm"); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 286 (4th Cir.

1990) (concluding, notwithstanding the lawyer’s testimony to the contrary,

that "a conflict was patent" and its adverse effects clear where the lawyer

advised one client to testify against another client as part of a plea agreement). 

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Babineau would act contrary to (and disloyal to) the interests

of client Butts by portraying him as a murderer, thus potentially jeopardizing Butts’s position on appeal and in any

future prosecutions. By failing to make the motion, Babineau

would act contrary to (and disloyal to) the interests of client

Nicholson. Accordingly, as we explained in Nicholson I,

"Nicholson’s interests, on the one hand, and Butts’s interests,

on the other, were in total opposition to each other during

Babineau’s simultaneous representation of them." Id. at 249-

50. This simultaneous representation placed Babineau "in the

untenable position of having to place the interests of one client (either Butts or Nicholson) above another (either Nicholson or Butts)." Id. at 251. In these circumstances, a conflict

of interest existed regardless of whether Babineau ultimately

chose to pursue a self-defense departure motion on behalf of

Nicholson.

The question now before us is whether Babineau’s conflict

of interest had an adverse effect on Nicholson. If Babineau

had zealously advocated for a self-defense departure, it is

unlikely that Nicholson could demonstrate that he was harmed

by the conflict (though Butts might have a viable Sixth

Amendment claim). The fact is, however, that Babineau did

not move for a self-defense departure on Nicholson’s behalf.

Viewed in this context, it is "self-evident" that Babineau was

possessed of a conflict of interest that was inescapably —

and, indeed, inherently — linked to the alternative defense

strategy not pursued: moving for a self-defense departure. Cf.

Rubin, 292 F.3d at 398. In other words, the competing interests of Nicholson and Butts were plainly stuck to Babineau’s

tactical considerations with respect to the self-defense departure motion — that is, Babineau’s conflict of interest was

inextricably woven into the alternative defense strategy.

Indeed, it was an essential characteristic and attribute thereof.22

22As The New Oxford American Dictionary (2d ed. 2005) explains, "inherent" is derived from the Latin "inhaerent– ‘sticking to,’ from the verb

inhaerere, from in– ‘in, toward’ + haerere ‘to stick.’" It is further defined

therein as "existing in something as a permanent, essential, or characteristic attribute." 

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Thus, Babineau’s conflict of interest was inherently linked to

the tactic of moving for a self-defense departure motion on

Nicholson’s behalf — unlike other alternative defense strategies that could be conjured up, such as (from the example discussed above) a health-related departure motion, which would

not have required Babineau to act contrary or disloyal to the

"inconsistent" interests of his other client Butts. See Malpiedi,

62 F.3d at 470.

In summary, because a self-defense departure motion was

inherently in conflict with Butts’s interests, Nicholson has

proven — by much more than a preponderance of the evidence — the necessary link between Babineau’s conflict of

interest and his failure to move for a self-defense departure,

thus satisfying the third and final Mickens prong.23 Having

also met his burden of proof on the first and second Mickens

prongs, Nicholson is entitled to § 2255 relief — specifically,

remand for resentencing.

IV.

Having concluded that Nicholson is entitled to § 2255

relief, we turn to the Government’s suggestion on appeal that

Nicholson’s habeas corpus petition has essentially been rendered moot because he has no chance of successfully pursuing

a self-defense departure on resentencing. The Government

23Importantly, proof of an inherent conflict between the alternative

defense strategy in question and the lawyer’s other loyalties or interests

satisfies only the third Mickens prong. It does not relieve the petitioner of

his burden of proof on the first and second Mickens prongs. See Hunter

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 395 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Freund’s "inherently in conflict" test does not eliminate

adverse effect requirement). The district court’s analysis on the third

Mickens prong, however, would undermine Mickens’s three-part standard.

In finding no link between Babineau’s conflict of interest and his failure

to move for a self-defense departure, the district court relied on

Babineau’s credible testimony that such a motion was not a subjectively

reasonable tactic. As such, the court rendered pointless any assessment of

the objective reasonableness issue under the second Mickens prong. 

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maintains that, because lawyer Babineau has revealed to the

sentencing court confidential attorney-client communications

made to him by Nicholson (and the court has credited

Babineau’s testimony), "a new sentencing could not have any

effect, except possibly to eliminate the benefit of having the

district court believe based on an incomplete record that there

was more to a self-defense argument than there really is." Br.

of Appellee 47. We are surprised by and disagree with the

Government’s position and its underlying premise: that resentencing will be a worthless exercise because Nicholson’s confidential communications to Babineau can be used against

Nicholson on remand.

First of all, on remand for resentencing, Nicholson should

be entitled to a protective order prohibiting the Government

from using privileged information revealed by Babineau in litigating Nicholson’s actual conflict of interest claim. See Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (rejecting contention that state prisoner "completely

waived" his attorney-client privilege by asserting ineffective

assistance claims in federal habeas proceedings, and affirming

district court’s protective order precluding use of privileged

materials for any purpose other than litigating federal habeas

petition). As Judge Kozinski cogently explained for the en

banc Bittaker court,

[a] narrow waiver rule is . . . consistent with the

interests of the habeas petitioner in obtaining a fair

adjudication of his petition and securing a retrial

untainted by constitutional errors. . . . If a prisoner

is successful in persuading a federal court to grant

the writ, the court should aim to restore him to the

position he would have occupied, had the first trial

been constitutionally error-free. Giving the prosecution the advantage of obtaining the defense casefile

— and possibly even forcing the first lawyer to testify against the client during the second trial —

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would assuredly not put the parties back at the same

starting gate.

Id. at 722-23. "What’s more," the Bittaker court recognized,

"requiring the petitioner to enter . . . a broad waiver would

force him to [a] painful choice" — a choice between "asserting his ineffective assistance claim and risking a trial where

the prosecution can use against him every statement he made

to his first lawyer," or "retaining the privilege but giving up

his ineffective assistance claim." Id. at 723. With these principles in mind, the Bittaker court not only characterized the district court’s entry of a protective order as being "entirely

justified," but also observed that the court "would have

abused its discretion" had it not entered such an order. Id. at

728. We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Bittaker,

which would entitle Nicholson to a protective order on

remand.

Additionally, we find ourselves constrained to direct the

assignment of a new judge for Nicholson’s resentencing proceedings. Although "this is not a case requiring remand to a

different judge because of bias," it is one of those "unusual

circumstances where both for the judge’s sake and the appearance of justice an assignment to a different judge is salutary

and in the public interest, especially as it minimizes even a

suspicion of partiality." United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d

1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On this issue, there are three points for consideration: "(1)

whether the original judge would reasonably be expected

upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of

his or her mind previously expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be

rejected"; "(2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve

the appearance of justice"; and "(3) whether reassignment

would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any

gain in preserving the appearance of fairness." Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lentz, 383

F.3d 191, 222 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying same standard).

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Here, as the Government has underscored, the original

judge has expressed the view that lawyer Babineau credibly

testified about being advised by Nicholson that he possessed

the firearm because of his drug dealing, and not for selfprotection. Under Bittaker, however, Nicholson’s privileged

communications with Babineau could not be admitted in the

remand proceedings. Because the original judge "cannot reasonably be expected to erase the earlier impressions from his

mind" — or, indeed, "may tend to lean over backwards or

overreact in an effort to be fair and impartial" — we are constrained to remand for resentencing by a different judge. See

Guglielmi, 929 F.2d at 1008 (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). In so ruling, we imply no personal criticism of the original judge or his handling of Nicholson’s

§ 2255 proceedings. Rather, we reserve our criticism for

Babineau and his failure to recognize and disclose the conflict

of interest that prevented Nicholson from enjoying his Sixth

Amendment right to effective representation. As such, we

equate this matter with those in which the Government has

breached a plea agreement and a remand for resentencing by

a new judge is essential to preserving the appearance of justice. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263

(1971) (observing that such remedy "is in no sense to question

the fairness of the sentencing judge; the fault here rests on the

prosecutor, not on the sentencing judge"). Furthermore, "[w]e

do not believe that any waste or duplication would be out of

proportion to the appearance of fairness a reassignment will

preserve." See Lentz, 383 F.3d at 222.

V.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the

district court and remand for resentencing.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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KEELEY, District Judge, concurring-in-part and dissentingin-part:

I concur in Parts I, II and III of the majority’s opinion holding that Nicholson has met his burden of establishing that his

attorney’s actual conflict of interest adversely affected his

representation of Nicholson. I also concur in the decision to

grant Nicholson relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. I respectfully

dissent, however, from the direction to assign a new judge to

resentence Nicholson.

At Nicholson’s initial sentencing, the district court adopted

the pre-sentence report ("PSR"), which recommended a base

offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of VI.

These factors placed Nicholson in a guideline range of 168-

210 months, with a mandatory minimum sentence of 180

months.1 Ultimately, the district court sentenced Nicholson to

189 months. Therefore, today’s decision leaves the sentencing

judge with a narrow, nine month window of discretion in

which to resentence Nicholson.2 For the following reasons, I

believe that this Court may entrust the responsibility of resentencing Nicholson to the trial judge.

First, the district court has proven willing to implement this

Court’s decisions regarding Babineau’s conflict of interest

and its impact upon Nicholson’s eligibility for relief under

§ 2255. The district court ably reheard Nicholson I on remand,

finding, despite its prior ruling and as directed by this Court,

that Babineau suffered an actual conflict of interest. After

1

"Based on his criminal history, Nicholson was sentenced as an armed

career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)." U.S. v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d

241, n. 6 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Nicholson I"). He therefore faced a mandatory

minimum sentence of 180 months and a maximum sentence of life. Id.

2Nicholson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by

a felon, in violation of §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 924(e). Nicholson, 475

F.3d at 246. Because Nicholson possessed a firearm in connection with the

offense, he is ineligible for the "safety valve" limitation of applicability of

statutory minimum sentences. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (Nov. 2009). 

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finding that Babineau suffered an actual conflict, it then

applied the relevant authority, Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d

348 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), as commonly understood at that

time. In doing so, the district court found that Nicholson had

satisfied the first part of the Mickens test by concluding that

"[t]here existed ‘a plausible alternative defense strategy or

tactic that [Babineau] might have pursued.’" Remand Opinion

at 38 (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361). Although the district court erroneously found that Nicholson could not establish either the second or third parts of the Mickens test, it did

so without the benefit of today’s clarifications of that test.

Based on the district court’s willingness to accept and apply

prior decisions in this case, it should be given the chance to

apply today’s decision on remand, just as it did in Nicholson

I.

Second, notwithstanding the district court’s prior decisions

in this case, it is nonetheless capable of resentencing Nicholson on the evidence of the threats of Butts to Nicholson’s life,

and reaching a reasonable sentence based not only on a

motion for departure for self-defense, but also the factors

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). To be sure, as the majority recognizes, there is no dispute that the district judge is willing to

treat Nicholson fairly. Ante at 43. Therefore, this case is

vastly different from the case relied on by the majority in support of its decision to remove the district judge on remand.

There the district judge "repeatedly adhered to an erroneous

view after the error [was] called to his attention," thus necessitating reassignment to another judge. United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001, 1004, 1007 (4th Cir. 1991). In addition,

the district judge had expressed on the record his inability to

forget the egregious nature of the evidence presented at trial.

Id. at 1006. Here, in contrast, the district court has shown

itself not only capable of applying this Court’s rulings but

also willing to revise its own assessment of the facts relevant

to sentencing.

For the foregoing reasons, I would remand this case to the

trial judge.

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