Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05084/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Germain Harris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

GERMAIN HARRIS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 15-5084 

(D.C. Nos. 4:14-CV-00745-GKF-PJC and 

4:12-CR-00037-GKF-1) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Germain Harris seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.1

 We deny a COA and dismiss 

the appeal. 

I 

 As part of a murder investigation, police witnessed a suspect enter and exit an 

auto shop owned by Harris. Police obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Harris filed a notice of appeal from the district court judgment. Because he 

may not appeal from a final order in a § 2255 proceeding without a COA, 

§ 2253(c)(2), and because the district court did not grant a COA, we construe Harris’ 

notice of appeal as a request for a COA. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 23, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-5084 Document: 01019591073 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 1 
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stating that a firearm used in the murder or keys to the getaway vehicle may be 

located inside the shop. The ensuing search did not uncover evidence related to the 

murder. But the police did find cocaine, cocaine base, items used to manufacture and 

distribute cocaine base, a pistol, and ammunition. Harris was indicted on several 

charges. He moved to suppress evidence found during the search, arguing the 

officer’s probable cause affidavit did not provide a sufficient nexus between the 

alleged criminal activity and the shop. The court denied his motion. A jury 

convicted Harris of drug manufacture, possession, and distribution charges, and of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 180 months’ 

imprisonment. Harris appealed and this court affirmed. United States v. Harris, 735 

F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013). Harris then filed a motion for relief under § 2255, 

which the district court denied. This request for a COA followed.

II 

We may issue a COA to appeal a final order denying § 2255 relief “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

§ 2253(c)(2). A “substantial showing” exists if “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). 

Harris advances claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

To prevail, he must make a substantial showing that his counsel “made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 

Appellate Case: 15-5084 Document: 01019591073 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 2 
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the Sixth Amendment” and that “ the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). An attorney’s performance is 

prejudicial if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

 Harris complains the district court should have granted an evidentiary hearing 

so that he could demonstrate trial counsel failed to pursue testimony from an 

exculpatory witness. He claims the witness would have testified that Harris was not 

aware of the contraband or drug activities occurring in the auto shop, and identified 

another individual responsible for that contraband. Harris fails to directly identify 

the witness who would provide this testimony, but construing his pro se pleadings 

liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), it appears likely 

Harris is referring to Alonzo Johnson—the suspect that entered the auto shop leading 

police to seek the search warrant. However, the district court determined that trial 

counsel’s decision not to interview Johnson was reasonable given the circumstances 

as they existed at the time of the challenged conduct. In his request for a COA, 

Harris offers no argument challenging this determination as erroneous, nor does he 

explain how an evidentiary hearing would change the outcome.2

 Thus, he has not 

 2

 In a seemingly related argument, Harris suggests trial counsel failed to 

conduct relevant discovery and failed to interview a witness whose post-trial affidavit 

demonstrates a reasonable probability that his testimony would have changed the 

outcome of the trial. However, Harris does not identify what evidence counsel 

should have pursued. Nor does he indicate what the witness’s affidavit states, what 

the testimony would have been, or why it likely would have changed the outcome of 

trial. Without more information, we are unable to conclude that counsel’s failure to 

investigate was deficient or prejudicial. Similarly, Harris argues that appellate 

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made a substantial showing that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview 

Johnson. 

Harris also contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

the trial court’s application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The court 

concluded ACCA applied based on three drug convictions for drug sales Harris made 

to undercover officers on three separate occasions over a ten day period.3

 Harris 

argues that these convictions all resulted from the same “scheme and plan,” and thus 

should have been treated as one offense for sentencing purposes. For support, Harris 

invokes United States v. Mohammed, 150 F. App’x 887 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(unpublished), in which the court addressed whether prior convictions are “related” 

under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. Mohammed, 150 F. App’x at 890. However, in United 

States v. Delossantos, 680 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2012), we observed that § 4A1.2 is 

irrelevant in the ACCA context. Delossantos, 680 F.3d at 1220-21 n.3. We further 

held that multiple drug sales to undercover agents may be counted as separate 

convictions so long as the defendant “had a meaningful opportunity to cease his 

illegal conduct.” Id. at 1220. The district court held that Harris had the requisite 

meaningful opportunity between his offenses, and he does not argue to the contrary 

 

counsel filed the direct appeal before receiving a full trial transcript. But he does not 

explain how obtaining the full trial transcript before filing would have changed the 

outcome. 

3

 Harris also argued below that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to ACCA application. But, as the district court noted, Harris’ trial counsel did 

object to Harris’ classification as an armed career criminal, and the trial court 

rejected the very argument Harris made in his § 2255 motion. 

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in his request for a COA. Thus, he has not made a substantial showing that appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sentencing calculation on direct 

appeal. 

 Finally, Harris argues the district court improperly failed to order his trial or 

appellate counsel to respond to allegations raised in Harris’ sworn affidavit. He 

contends that absent a response, his allegations must be deemed admitted under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 36. Even if we were to apply Rule 36 to this § 2255 proceeding, see 

§ 2255 Rule 12, and construe Harris’ affidavit as a request for admission, Harris’ 

argument fails because the district court did consider a responsive affidavit from 

Harris’ trial counsel. Moreover, Harris does not identify what sworn statements the 

district court allegedly discredited. Thus, Harris has not made a substantial showing 

that he was denied a constitutional right. 

III 

 We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. Harris’ motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

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