Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02835/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02835-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Glenda E. Armoster
Appellant
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the

Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District

of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2835

___________

Glenda E. Armoster, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: July 5, 2006

Filed: July 14, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Glenda E. Armoster appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of

supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. In her November

2001 applications Armoster alleged disability since September 2001 from, inter alia,

anemia, thyroid problems, arthritis, and swelling. After a November 2003 hearing,

where Armoster (age 36) was counseled, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found

Appellate Case: 05-2835 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/14/2006 Entry ID: 2067549
-2-

that Armoster’s impairments of morbid obesity, hypothyroidism, hypertension,

anemia, gastrointestinal disorders, and anxiety were medically determinable, but were

not severe alone or combined. In so finding, the ALJ discounted Armoster’s

subjective complaints. 

Armoster argues that the ALJ erred in denying her claim at step two of the

sequential evaluation process. Although she does not directly challenge the ALJ’s

credibility findings, the ALJ based his step-two determination in part on his finding

that Armoster’s subjective complaints were not credible. We find that the ALJ’s

decision to discount Armoster’s subjective complaints was based on multiple valid

reasons. See Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) (if ALJ explicitly

discredits claimant and gives good reasons for doing so, this court normally defers

to his credibility determination). We reject Armoster’s suggestion that her diagnoses,

considered together, required the ALJ to go beyond step two. Cf. Johnston v. Apfel,

210 F.3d 870, 871-75 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming step-two denial despite diagnoses of

hyperthyroidism and related vision problems, probable panic and anxiety disorder,

and occasional slow heart rate); Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1996)

(affirming step-two denial despite diagnosis of osteoarthritis). We also disagree with

her contention that the ALJ was required to explain why Armoster’s diagnoses had

no more than a minimal impact on her ability to perform each of the basic work

activities. See Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2001) (at step two,

burden is on claimant to establish severe impairment).

Armoster’s remaining arguments provide no basis for reversal. Accordingly,

we affirm. See Nguyen, 75 F.3d at 431 (standard of review). 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-2835 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/14/2006 Entry ID: 2067549