Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03210/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03210-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Stacy Winters
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3210

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

Stacy Winters, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 17, 2005

Filed: August 9, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Stacy Winters pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and use of a firearm

in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1153, 924(c).

Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Winters was subject to a maximum

sentence of 191 months' imprisonment. The district court1

 ruled that the United States

Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory and sentenced Winters to 240 months'

imprisonment. We affirm. 

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I. Background

On January 1, 2003, Winters and his brothers were drinking alcohol and

driving through Pine Ridge Village, a neighborhood on the Pine Ridge Indian

Reservation. Around dusk, Winters encountered Lucien Janis. Winters, known to be

affiliated with the TB gang, and Janis, a member of the Ter. Ter. gang, exchanged

unpleasantries. Winters left and went to Louis "Boy" Winters's home to get a gun.

Boy gave Winters a Colt .45 semi-automatic pistol and a loaded magazine.

Winters and his brothers continued to drive around Pine Ridge Village consuming

alcohol and eventually drove back to the place where Winters and Janis exchanged

words. Winters and one of his brothers confronted Janis. Janis said, "Give me the gun,

I'll shoot myself," and then Winters shot Janis in the head at close range, killing him

instantly. Winters and his brothers then fled the scene back to Boy's residence.

Winters gave Boy the Colt .45 and told him that Winters was in trouble and needed

to get out of town. Winters was arrested the following day.

A first indictment charged Winters with second-degree murder and use of a

firearm in the commission of a crime. In a superseding information, the seconddegree murder charge was replaced with a charge of voluntary manslaughter. Winters

pleaded guilty to both charges and the court ordered a presentence investigation

report ("PSI") to be prepared. The PSI noted that while the judges in the District of

South Dakota agreed that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), rendered the

Guidelines unconstitutional, the Guideline computation was being provided for use

on an advisory basis. 

Under the non-guideline statutory sentence, manslaughter carried a possible

ten-year maximum sentence and the firearm charge carried a mandatory ten-year

sentence to be served consecutively with the manslaughter. Winters faced a nonguideline statutory maximum of twenty years' imprisonment (240 months). The PSI

indicated that Winters was subject to a range of 41 to 51 months' imprisonment for

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The PSI gave Winters a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility, otherwise, he would have been subject to a range of between 57 and

71 months' imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter. 

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the manslaughter2

 and a mandatory 120 months for the firearm charge. Accordingly,

the PSI recommended a Guideline range for Winters between 161 and 171 months.

The district court, however, rejected the recommendation to make a downward

adjustment resulting in a Guideline range between 177 and 191 months.

The district court, treating the Guidelines as discretionary, sentenced Winters

to 240 months' imprisonment—the statutory maximum. In a statement of reasons, the

court stated:

In light of Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004),

the District Court ruled the Guidelines unconstitutional in this case.

Therefore, the Guidelines are not binding on the Court, but they were

taken into consideration. The Court also considered the factors set forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing the sentence in this case.

Winters objected to the district court holding the United States Sentencing Guidelines

unconstitutional and argued that he should be sentenced under the Guidelines. The

district court refused. Winters then filed the instant appeal.

Prior to the submission of this case, the United States Supreme Court issued its

opinion in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), extending Blakely to the

federal guidelines, and, thus, foreclosing Winters's argument on appeal. Nonetheless,

because Booker also mandated that appellate courts review sentences for

reasonableness in light of the factors enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Booker, 125

S. Ct. 764–66 (Breyer, J.), we requested that Winters submit a supplemental brief

addressing the reasonableness of his sentence. 

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II. Reasonableness 

We start by noting that because the district court did not use the Guidelines in

a mandatory fashion, Winters did not suffer a Booker-styled Sixth Amendment

violation. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 (Stevens, J.) (explaining that there would be

no Sixth Amendment violation "if the guidelines as currently written could be read

as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection

of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts."). Thus, this case comes

to the court in a fashion similar to that of Respondent Fanfan in Booker's companion

case. With respect to Fanfan, the Court stated:

In respondent Fanfan's case, the District Court held Blakely applicable

to the Guidelines. It then imposed a sentence that was authorized by the

jury's verdict--a sentence lower than the sentence authorized by the

Guidelines as written. Thus, Fanfan's sentence does not violate the Sixth

Amendment. Nonetheless, the Government (and the defendant should

he so choose) may seek resentencing under the system set forth in

today's opinions. Hence we vacate the judgment of the District Court

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 769 (2005).

The Court, however, directed appellate courts:

to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example,

whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the "plain-error"

test [for violations of the Sixth Amendment] . . . [and] in cases not

involving a Sixth Amendment violation, [to determine] whether

resentencing is warranted [after] application of the harmless-error

doctrine.

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The Court, however, did not apply either the plain-error test or harmless-error

test to Booker or Fanfan. Presumably, the Court vacated Fanfan's sentence and

remanded the case so that the district court would have the guidance of Booker in

calculating Fanfan's sentence.

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Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.3

 In this case, the district court went through the analytical

sentencing-framework prescribed by Booker. Specifically, the district court consulted

the Guidelines in an advisory fashion and looked to the factors in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a). Thus, there was no Booker error.

As such, we review Winters's sentence for reasonableness in light of § 3553(a).

See United States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628, 630–31 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining

that part of Booker's remedial command requires appellate courts to review the

sentence for reasonableness). Accordingly, we must review Winters's sentence with

respect to the following factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed--

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect

for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment

in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for–

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the

applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines–

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United

States Code, subject to any amendments made to

such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of

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While we are to judge the sentence for reasonableness, district courts are to

impose a reasonable sentence. In crafting the reasonableness standard of review for

appellate courts, the Supreme Court noted that appellate courts are familiar with the

standard as the Federal Sentencing Act has "long required [its] use in important

sentencing circumstances – both on review of departures . . . and on review of

sentences imposed where there was no applicable Guideline." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

-6-

whether such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into

amendments issued under section 994(p) of title

28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g),

are in effect on the date the defendant is

sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release,

the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28,

United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to

such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress

(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments

issued under section 994(p) of title 28);

(5) any pertinent policy statement--

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section

994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any

amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress

(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments

issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the

date the defendant is sentenced.

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants

with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).4

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766. Previously, our reasonableness standard for departures was judged in three parts:

First, as a question of law, the court determines whether the

circumstances on which the district court relied for departure are

sufficiently unusual in kind or degree to warrant departure. Second, as

a question of fact, the court determines whether the circumstances

justifying departure actually exist. Third, with deference to the district

court, the court reviews the reasonableness of the degree of departure

under an abuse of discretion standard. 

United States v. Joshua, 40 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.

Sweet, 985 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir.1993)). With respect to the third factor, we have

explained that it is the district court, not us, that makes this judgment call of

reasonableness. United States v. Sweet, 985 F.2d 443, 445 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, we must give "due regard to the district court's superior feel for the

case." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

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In his original appeal, Winters argued that the district court erred in refusing

to grant him an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Because §

3353(a)(4), and the mandates of Booker, require courts to consult the Guidelines, an

erroneous application of the Guidelines will be but one factor in applying the

reasonableness standard. We review a district court's denial of an acceptance of

responsibility adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for clear error. United States v.

Patten, 397 F.3d 1100, 1104–05 (8th Cir. 2005). A district court's factual

determination on whether a defendant has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility

is entitled to great deference and should be reversed only if it is so clearly erroneous

as to be without foundation. United States v. Arellano, 291 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.

2002).

In the plea agreement, the United States agreed to recommend that Winters

demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. In addition, the PSI indicated that Winters

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Winters returned the gun to Boy, who, in turn, gave it to his wife with

instructions to pass it on to a third person, Leon Janis, and get rid of it. Leon gave the

gun to a fourth person who subsequently notified the authorities and allowed them to

recover the weapon. 

-8-

satisfied the § 3E1.1 requirements. At the sentencing hearing, the district court

explained that "a plea of guilty is not sufficient to trigger the acceptance of

responsibility under the guidelines," and that after examining the file, Winters would

not be entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Indeed "[a] defendant

who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under [U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1] as

a matter of right." United States v. Morris, 139 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1998)

(brackets in original) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3). The district court, which had

the opportunity to observe Winters's demeanor at sentencing, was within its discretion

to conclude that he had not accepted responsibility for his offense. See id. 

Next we turn to the underlying facts to address the remaining portions of §

3553(a). In this case, Winters, while intoxicated, got into an argument with the

victim. He then left the scene and retrieved a gun that he used to shoot the victim at

close range in the head. Winters then fled the scene, and tried to dispose of the gun.5

The district court characterized Winters as the "trigger man" and the "hit man." In

addition, the court noted that the crime "was a malicious act which was entirely

senseless." 

Although the district court sentenced Winters outside the Guidelines range, we

cannot say that the sentence, when viewed in light of the relevant § 3553(a) factors,

is unreasonable. The facts offer nothing, other than Winters's voluntarily diminished

capacity, to ameliorate the abject brutality of an execution-style slaying of an

unarmed person. The district court aptly described it as malicious and senseless.

Furthermore, Winters has admitted to being prone to violence. A twenty-year

sentence in this case comports with the considerations in § 3553(a)(2) that the

sentence reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide

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just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and

protects the public from further crimes of the defendant. 

Winters relies heavily on the Congressional statement that a Guidelines

sentence is necessary to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. §

3353(a)(6). Winters explains that because he received the maximum statutory

sentence, his sentence will be quite different from other persons with no criminal

history who commit voluntary manslaughter. However, each case must be judged on

its own facts and few cases will present facts like this one. Applying Winters's

argument, that the range of reasonableness is essentially co-extensive with the

Guidelines range, would effectively render the Guidelines mandatory. We have been

directed to review a sentence for reasonableness based on all the factors listed in §

3353(a)(6). The Guidelines range is merely one factor. We cannot isolate possible

sentencing disparity to the exclusion of the all the other § 3553(a) factors.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Winters's sentence is reasonable

and affirm.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority’s holding that the district

court did not commit a Booker error, I disagree strongly with the majority’s

affirmance of Winters’s sentence. My reasons are twofold: First, the district court

clearly erred in denying Winters a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of

responsibility. Second, in imposing the maximum sentence for voluntary

manslaughter, the district court failed to fashion a sentence reflective of the § 3553(a)

factors. Instead, at sentencing, the court substituted its own subjective assessment of

what sentence should be imposed for the statutory factors. For these two reasons, I

would remand for resentencing.

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6

In determining whether a defendant qualifies for this provision, appropriate

considerations include, but are not limited to, the following: 

voluntary withdrawal from criminal conduct, or association with those

involved in such conduct; voluntary restitution payment made prior to

a guilty plea; admissions to authorities regarding the offense and related

conduct; prompt surrender to authorities after committing the offense;

assisting authorities in the recovery of relevant fruits and

instrumentalities; and the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in

manifesting the acceptance of responsibility. 

USSG. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1).

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I. The Guidelines Issue

In my view, the district court clearly erred in failing to apply United States

Sentencing Guidelines section 3E1.1(a), which states that a defendant is entitled to

a reduction in his offense level if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of

responsibility for his offense.”6

 Our court has held that a defendant’s eligibility for

this adjustment can be exhibited by outward manifestations of acceptance of

responsibility. United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 158 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Here, Winters met the relevant criteria to establish his acceptance of

responsibility. This fact was recognized by both the government and the pretrial

services officer, who recommended that Winters receive a three-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility and outlined their reasoning for this recommendation to

the court. The district court ignored these recommendations and the fact that Winters

had given a full account of his actions. Instead, it simply stated, “[t]he Court in

examining this file concludes that in the Court’s discretion, the defendant would not

be entitled to acceptance of responsibility. A plea of guilty is not sufficient to trigger

the acceptance of responsibility under the guidelines.” Sent. Tr. at 3. As a result,

Winters’s guidelines range increased from 41 to 51 months to 57 to 71 months.

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I certainly agree with the district court that a simple plea of guilty does not

entitle a defendant to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but as

this record makes clear, Winters did much more than that. He cooperated fully with

the government’s investigation. He assisted in the prosecution of another offense.

He notified the government of his intent to plead guilty in a timely fashion. Most

importantly, Winters’s statement at sentencing demonstrates his sincere

acknowledgment of and contrition for his criminal conduct: 

I wanted to make this part of the record of the total regret and remorse

I have for what has brought me to this courtroom today. If I could turn

back the hands of time, I would take the knowledge and feelings and

understanding I have today and believe I would have made better

choices concerning this matter. Key words here are “would have, should

have, and could have.” And this causes me to lie awake at night

constantly contemplating on my actions; has caused me many sleepless

nights. I am sorry for my past criminal history; I should say the lack of

criminal history, that I did not react and respond like I did on a normal

basis. And what has happened, believe it or not, is punishment in itself.

I am here today to let the Court know I am accepting full responsibility

for my actions. I would like to take this time to pray that the Court take

mercy on me and show forgiveness that God has shown me. I hope the

Court recognizes what happened is a horrible, horrible, horrible mistake

and unfortunately leave these loved ones as well as for mine. My

mistake is irreversible. I have no restitution or punishment can make up

for life here. It is life, although there are people who can give me

mercy, I want to let them know that I am very sincere about the

remorsefulness and in fact, my remorsefulness made me a spiritual

person that will insure I will never commit a crime like this ever again.

Showing forgiveness will give me a chance to prosper again, therefore

give me a chance to make up all I can to the victim’s loved ones as well

as be a productive citizen of the United States.

Sorry for what I did. . . . Hope you find it in your hearts to

forgive me, man. I know you guys hate me, man, but . . . I not only hurt

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7

The factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed; the

kinds of sentences available; the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

established for the offense; any pertinent policy statement relevant to the offense. 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628,

630 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that following Booker, we review the imposition of

sentences for unreasonableness, “judging it with regard to the factors in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)”); United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 824 (8th Cir. 2005) (same).

8

In the district court’s written Statement of Reasons, it stated that it “also

considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing the sentence in

this case,” but provided no further elucidation of those factors. 

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you and your family, I hurt my family, too. Forgive me for what I have

done.

Sent. Tr. 18-19.

Given Winters’s total cooperation and his “outward manifestations of

acceptance of responsibility,” Wivell, 893 F.2d at 158, he was entitled to a reduction

for acceptance of responsibility. The district court’s failure to adjust his guidelines

range accordingly was clear error.

II. Review of the Sentence in Light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

I would also remand for a second reason: the district court imposed an

unreasonable sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors.7

 United States v. Booker, S.

Ct. 738, 767 (2005), mandated that a district court in sentencing must consider not

only the guidelines, but the other § 3553(a) factors. Id. Our task is to review the

district court’s sentence for reasonableness.

The sentencing transcript reveals that the district court did not mention the §

3553(a) factors during the sentencing hearing.8

 The court rather gave the following

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Winters faced a ten-year consecutive sentence for this firearms conviction in

addition to his voluntary manslaughter sentence.

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two reasons for imposing the ten-year sentence for the manslaughter conviction, in

addition to the mandatory consecutive ten years for using a gun in committing the

offense: First, the court hypothesized that the defendant would be faced with the

possibility of a lifetime sentence under South Dakota law, and in this case the

defendant should not receive a lesser sentence simply because he was being

prosecuted in federal court rather than state court. This is not a valid § 3553(a)

concern; a state sentence is not available for this federal crime. Federal sentencing

judges may not attempt to equalize federal sentences to their state criminal analogs.

This approach would result in significant national disparity in sentences. Moreover,

there is no evidence in this record, nor are there any publicly available studies or

statistics, indicating that a first offender convicted of manslaughter with a firearm in

South Dakota would serve more than the thirteen to fifteen-year sentence the

defendant would have faced with a guidelines sentence.9

 Second, as is clear from the

sentencing transcript, the district judge was upset that the prosecutor accepted a plea

for manslaughter, rather than trying Winters for first- or second-degree murder. At

sentencing, the prosecutor strongly disagreed with the district court’s assessment of

its charging decision:

Though I have not practiced as long as Your Honor, we fully

investigated this matter. We conducted dozens of interviews. As far as

we are concerned, no one knows this case as well as we do. We are

second guessed, as you often know, following charging decisions

sometimes for years. 

The prosecutor repeatedly reiterated the conviction was for the charge that the

evidence supported. Sent. Tr. 12-14.

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10Though the deplorable conditions of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation cannot

serve as an excuse for Winters’s actions, it is important to note that the Pine Ridge

Indian Reservation is often considered one of the poorest places in America. Infants

are twice as likely to die from sickness or injury than other infants living across the

United States. The life expectancy for men at Pine Ridge is only 56.5 years, a figure

that rivals that of Central African nations, and is the lowest in the northern

hemisphere, with the exception of Haiti. More than one-third of the homes on Pine

Ridge have no indoor plumbing or electricity, and they often hold several families

living among two to three rooms. Edward B. Gehres III, Note, Visions of the Ghost

Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse, 17 J.L. &

POL. 135, 140-41(2001); Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, South Dakota: Community

Mini-Plan, South Dakota State University, Rural Community Planning, Sociology

640 (December 16, 2003, available at

http://sdrurallife.sdstate.edu/Rural%20Planning%20&%20Development/

Pine%20Ridge.pdf.

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In short, there is nothing about Winters or the circumstances of this case to

justify the district court’s dramatic variance from the guidelines. Until this offense,

Winters persevered in spite of the obstacles Pine Ridge presents to its residents.10 He

found himself at the age of twenty-two with no criminal record, a high school

diploma, and a member of his tribe’s spiritual community. His crime was

inexcusable, and resulted in the needless death of a fellow community member. But

Winters himself recognized the gravity of his actions as his allocution ably

demonstrated. It is not the duty nor the province of our sentencing courts to attempt

an ad hoc equalization between perceived state and federal sentencing disparities,

leaving an individual like Winters to suffer the burden of such an exercise. With an

affirmance of his sentence, Winters will serve a sentence double that of fellow

inmates who have committed similar crimes. This sentence is unjustified and

unreasonable. 

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CONCLUSION

If Winters were to be sentenced pursuant to this dissent, he would serve more

than thirteen years in federal prison. That sentence is adequate to fulfill the §3553(a)

sentencing goals. This district court ignored Winters’s sincere acceptance of

responsibility, and went on to impose a sentence far beyond what the guidelines

called for, providing our court with no justification for its decision. In my view, this

was an error. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand to the district court for

resentencing consistent with this dissent.

______________________________

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