Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01545/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01545-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Angel Sanchez-Castaneda
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

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All documents filed in CV-11-1545 will be designated as “CVDoc” and all

documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-04-0011 will be designated as “CRDoc.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jose Angel Sanchez-Castaneda, 

Movant/Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-1545-PHX-JAT (MHB)

CR-04-011-PHX-JAT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a Motion to Vacate

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (hereinafter, “§2255 motion”), filed on August 5,

2011, by Movant Jose Angel Sanchez-Castaneda, (CVDoc. 1.)1

 Respondent, the United

States of America, filed a Response on December 12, 2011. (CVDoc. 6.) The Response was

limited to affirmative defenses, as permitted by the Court (CVDoc. 3, at 3). Movant did not

file a Reply.

BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2004, Movant was indicted by a federal grand jury on two felony

counts: Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 5 kilograms or more of Cocaine, in

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violation of 21 U.S.C. §846, §841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (Count I); and Possession with

Intent to Distribute 5 kilograms or more of Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), and

(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (Count II). (CRDoc. 1.) Movant was arrested on the charges and eventually

entered into a plea agreement. (CRDoc. 44.) Movant plead guilty to Count I, and, pursuant

to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)©), the parties agreed that he would be sentenced to no more than

168 months in prison. (Id.) 

Movant entered his plea before the Court on March 31, 2008. (Transcript of Plea

Proceedings, hereinafter CVDoc. 1-2, at 2-25.) Movant was sentenced on July 23, 2008, to

168 months in prison. (CRDoc 45.)

On October 29, 2010, nearly 2-years after Movant was sentenced, he filed a notice of

appeal. (CRDoc. 54.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely

on January 12, 2011, pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A) (an appeal must be filed within

14 days of judgment). (CRDoc. 59-1.) Nearly 7-months later, on August 5, 2011, Movant

filed his §2255 motion. (CVDoc 1.) Therein, he raises the following issues:

Ground One: Movant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

his attorney failed to properly advise him during the plea process and failed to ensure that he

understood the nature and consequences of his guilty plea.

Ground Two: Movant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney failed to file objections to the presentence report and failed to challenge

the report’s computations.

Ground Three: Movant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney failed to perfect an appeal and Movant plead guilty without

understanding the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.

Ground Four: Movant alleges that the cumulative effect of his counsel’s errors

resulted in Movant receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.

Ground Five: Movant contends that his attorney was “ineffective by misrepresent[ing]

the factual basis of [the] government’s prof[f]er[]ed plea agreement, which was a fraud in

violation to the Rule 11.”

Ground Six: Movant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

his attorney did not advise him that he “was almost certain to be deported if he ple[]d guilty,”

and also contends that the Court did not inform him of the likelihood that he would be

deported if he plead guilty.

(CVDoc. 1, at 32-65.)

In response, Respondent argues that Movant’s §2255 motion is time-barred, as it was

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Although one of Movant’s claims is that his counsel did not advise him that he may

be deported, he does not set forth the date he learned of the basis for this claim, or any other

facts, other than this general complaint.

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filed after the 1-year statute of limitations had expired, and that Movant waived his right to

assert a §2255 motion in his plea agreement. (CVDoc. 6, at 4-9.)

LAW

A. Statute of Limitations.

The Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) establishes a

one-year limitations period for federal prisoners to file a motion collaterally attacking their

convictions. The limitations period runs from the latest of, as is pertinent here:

 (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final, or ... (4) the

date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §2255.

Movant’s judgment became final on August 7, 2008, fourteen days after judgment was

entered, as he did not file a notice of appeal. Movant does not allege any facts in support of

his claims that were discovered after his sentencing2

. Thus, Movant was required to file his

§2255 motion on or before August 8, 2009. Movant did not file his §2255 motion until

August 4, 2011, over three years after his judgment and sentence. 

Movant’s untimely appeal does not affect the statute of limitations analysis. The

filing of an untimely appeal does not restart the limitations clock. See, United States v.

Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 888-889 (9th Cir. 2011) (the Supreme Court’s denial of an untimely

petition for certiorari did not create a new date on which the judgment of conviction became

final for purposes of determining the timeliness of a §2255 motion). In the instant case,

Movant did not file his notice of appeal until the 1-year limitations period had already

expired. Thus, his motion is untimely under the AEDPA. 

B. Equitable Tolling.

In order for a petitioner to be entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1-year

limitations period, he must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

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that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland

v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (citation omitted). Equitable tolling

is appropriate only “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citations omitted) (tolling of statute of limitations due to extraordinary circumstances

requires that a defendant diligently pursue his claim). A petitioner bears the burden of

establishing that he pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances

stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Grounds for equitable

tolling are “highly fact-dependent.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003),

citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Movant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, but does not explain how his

counsel’s ineffectiveness interfered with his ability to file his §2255 motion within the 1-year

statute of limitations. See, Buckles, 647 F.3d at 890 (holding that the movant was not

entitled to equitable tolling notwithstanding his counsel’s alleged misconduct because it had

“no effect” on the timeliness of his motion); Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th

Cir. 2010) (defendant failed to show how his counsel’s failure to file an appeal prevented him

from filing of a habeas action). In fact, Movant’s §2255 motion indicates that he was aware

of the basis for most of his claims of ineffectiveness on the date of his sentencing: ground

one - attorney’s improper inducement to enter unknowing and unintelligent plea (CVDoc 1,

at 34): ground two - attorney’s failure to meet with Movant and his family prior to

presentence interview (Id., at 39): ground four - cumulative errors (Id., at 52): ground five -

counsel’s misrepresentation of the factual basis of the plea agreement (Id., at 53). As to the

basis for ground five - counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal - Movant does not indicate

why his counsel’s failure prevented him from filing his §2255 motion within the 1-year

statute of limitation, or even within the 2-years that had past before his filed his pro se notice

of appeal. As to the basis for ground six - counsel’s failure to advise Movant that he was

almost certain to be deported if he plead guilty - Movant does not set forth any facts in

support of this claim to aid the court in determining how this claim could support equitable

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tolling in this case.

Thus, Movant has not provided a basis for the equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations, and therefore, his §2255 motion should be dismissed as untimely.

C. Plea Waiver Provision.

Movant’s plea agreement contained the following paragraph under the header

“WAIVER OF DEFENSES AND APPEAL RIGHTS:”

 The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the

indictment or information or to the Court’s entry of judgment against the

defendant, providing the sentencing is consistent with this agreement. The

defendant further waives: (2) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of judgment

against the defendant, (2) any right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon

defendant under Title 18, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right

to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28,

United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. The

defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

appeal or collateral attack the defendant might file challenging his conviction

or sentencing in this case.”

(CRDoc. 44, at 4.)

It is well settled that a defendant who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a

charge with the advise of competent counsel waives the right to collaterally attack the

judgment of guilt. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984), abrogated in part on

other grounds, Puckett v. United States, – U.S. –, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009); United States v.

Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (a knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory

right, such as the right to file a petition for relief under §2255 is enforceable). The Ninth

Circuit has raised doubts that, despite an express waiver, a defendant would be precluded

from raising an ineffective assistance claim in a §2255 proceeding if the alleged ineffective

assistance affected the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea agreement or the

voluntariness of the waiver itself. United States v. Jeronimo 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir.

2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir.

2007) (en banc). 

In Jeronimo, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did

not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal of a movant who had waived his right to

collaterally attack his conviction in a plea agreement because the agreement was knowing

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and voluntary on its face, stating: “ A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is

enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds

raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id.; accord, U.S. v. Rahman,

642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011).

During Movant’s change of plea proceeding, the Court discussed with Movant the

essential terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver:

THE COURT: and in this plea agreement ... by signing it you are agreeing to

waive certain defenses and appeal rights found on page 4 of the plea agreement

where you are agreeing to waive any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, or objections which you might assert to the indictment or the

entry of judgment against you or the sentence imposed upon you as long as

that sentence is consistent with the plea agreement. You’re also waiving your

right to appeal the judgment and sentence imposed upon you and waiving and

giving up the right to collaterally attack your conviction and sentence under 28

2255 or any other collateral attack. So by signing this plea agreement you’re

waiving and giving up these defenses and appeal rights that are all set forth in

this paragraph in the plea agreement. Do you understand what you are doing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Transcript of Sentencing, attached as an exhibit to Movant’s §2255 motion, CVDoc. 1-2.,

at 11-12.)

Movant confirmed that he had reviewed the entire plea agreement with his counsel, that it

contained all of the agreements between him and the government, and that no one threatened

him or used force to get him to enter into the plea agreement. (Id., at 12-15.) Movant also

confirmed that he was entering into the plea agreement voluntarily, and that he was satisfied

with his lawyer’s representation. (Id., at 15-16, 10.)

Movant advised the Court that he was aware of the maximum penalties provided by

law for his offense, that his offense carried a minimum term of 10-years in prison, and that

a minimum term of 5-years of supervised release would follow his release from

imprisonment. (CVDoc. 1-2, at 16-17.) He also acknowledged that the plea agreement

contained an agreement to a stipulated cap of 168 months imprisonment, and that neither

Movant’s lawyer or the Court could tell him at the time of his change of plea precisely what

his sentence would be. (Id., at 19-21.) The Court then discussed the elements of the offense

that the government would have to prove at a trial with Movant, and then read, from the plea

agreement, the factual basis for the guilty plea. (Id., at 22-24.) Movant acknowledged his

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understanding the elements of the offense, and agreed that the government could prove the

factual basis beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id., at 24.) Movant then entered his guilty plea to

one count of Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or More of

Cocaine, and confirmed that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty of the charge.

(Id.)

The Court found that Movant’s plea of guilty had been “knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily made.” (CVDoc 1-2, at 24.) At sentencing, nearly 4-months later, Movant was

asked again if he was satisfied with his counsel and Movant replied, “yes.” (Id., at 44.)

Although the Court determined that Movant’s total guideline offense level was 37, and

criminal history category III, resulting in a guideline sentencing range of 262-327 months,

the Court varied from this range, considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553, and

imposed a sentence of 168 months. (Id., at 48.) The Court then confirmed with Movant that

he had agreed in his plea agreement to waive his right to appeal. (Id., at 50.)

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea

agreement carry substantial weight in determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing

and voluntary. Cf., United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991). Movant has

not produced any evidence that suggests that his plea agreement was invalid or his waiver

involuntary. Based upon this record, the Court finds that Movant was sentenced consistent

with the terms of his plea agreement, and that Movant’s waiver of his right to appeal and

collaterally attack his sentence was knowing and voluntary. Even if Movant’s counsel

ignored his instruction to file a notice of appeal, this fact would have no bearing on the

validity of, or the enforceability of his waiver of his right to collaterally attack his conviction

and sentence.

CONCLUSION

Movant has not alleged specific facts, if true, that would entitle him to relief, and thus

he has not earned the right to an evidentiary hearing. United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d

1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996). The motion and the files and records of Movant’s case

“conclusively show that [Movant] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. §2255. Movant’s

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request for a hearing, and request to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence should therefore

be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (CVDoc.

1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because jurists of reason would not find

it debatable whether the motion states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 14th day of May, 2012.

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