Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01959/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01959-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bank of America, N.A.
Appellee
Casa Stuckey
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 10, 2020*

Decided February 11, 2020 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1959 

CASA STUCKEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 18-cv-4004 

John Z. Lee, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

After Casa Stuckey defaulted on his mortgage loan in 2010, Bank of America 

brought a foreclosure action against him in Illinois state court. The state court entered a 

judgment of foreclosure and sale against Stuckey in 2017 and approved a sheriff’s sale 

in 2018 through which Bank of America bought the property. Stuckey responded by 

suing the bank in federal district court weeks later. In his complaint he alleged that the 

bank “cannot own property,” so the district court had to “annul” the state court’s order 

granting it ownership and give Stuckey “full possession.” The district judge concluded 

*

 We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the issues have 

been authoritatively decided. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 19-1959 Document: 15 Filed: 02/11/2020 Pages: 2
No. 19-1959 Page 2 

that Stuckey was impermissibly seeking federal-court review of a state-court decision. 

The judge therefore dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

On appeal Stuckey does not address the judge’s reasoning, nor does he develop 

any other arguments that would enable an appellee to respond. Bank of America 

therefore asks us to dismiss this appeal for failure to comply with our briefing rules. See 

FED. R. APP. P. 28. It also argues alternatively that the district court correctly dismissed 

the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

We affirm the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Although we 

agree with Bank of America that Stuckey’s brief is deficient, what is also clear is that 

Stuckey, a “state-court loser[],” has asked the federal district court to “review and 

reject[]” the state court’s final judgment—precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (citing Rooker v. 

Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C. Cour of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 

482–86 (1983)). Stuckey’s complaint challenges the Illinois court’s judgment of 

foreclosure and asks the federal district court to “annul” that ruling. “Claims that 

directly seek to set aside a state court judgment are de facto appeals that are barred 

without further analysis.” Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017). 

AFFIRMED 

Case: 19-1959 Document: 15 Filed: 02/11/2020 Pages: 2