Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50506/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50506-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Estefani Zaragoza-Moreira
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ESTEFANI ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50506

D.C. No.

3:12-CR-00618-

WQH-1

OPINION

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 5, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 18, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit

Judges, and Robert W. Gettleman, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Gettleman

* The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, Senior United States District

Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion

to dismiss an indictment charging importation of

methamphetamine, in a case in which the defendant asserted

that the government destroyed potentially useful evidence –

video footage of a Port of Entry pedestrian line – that might

have supported her claim of duress.

The panel held that the defendant’s due process rights

were violated because a Homeland Security agent, whose

probable cause statement omitted any reference to the

defendant’s claims of coercion or to her alleged conduct

while waiting in the pedestrian line, knew of the potential

usefulness of the video and acted in bad faith by failing to

preserve it. The panel concluded that the defendant is unable

to find comparable evidence to support her duress defense,

and remanded with directions to dismiss the indictment.

COUNSEL

Harini P. Raghupathi (argued), Federal Defenders of San

Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter

and Randy K. Jones (argued), Assistant United States

Attorneys, San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 3

OPINION

GETTLEMAN, Senior District Judge:

Defendant Estefani Zaragoza-Moreira (“Zaragoza”)

conditionally pled guilty to importing methamphetamine into

the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. 

She now appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to

dismiss the indictment on the basis that the government

destroyed potentially useful evidence that might have

supported her claim of duress. Zaragoza argues that the

district court erred by finding that the government did not act

in bad faith and, consequently, did not violate her due process

rights in failing to preserve the evidence. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and

remand.

BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of December 22, 2011,

Zaragoza entered the pedestrian line for admission into the

United States from Mexico at the San Ysidro, California, Port

of Entry. At the primary inspection booth, Zaragoza handed

Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) Officer Grant

Patterson her United States passport. Officer Patterson

observed that Zaragoza was traveling with another woman,

and that the two women were standing “shoulder to

shoulder.” Based on a computer-generated referral, Officer

Patterson sent Zaragoza to a secondary inspection.

CBP Officer Nancy Cervantes, who was conducting

secondary inspections, immediately put on gloves to pat

Zaragoza down. Prior to beginning the pat down, Officer

Cervantes asked Zaragoza whether she had any weapons or

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4 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

sharp objects on her body. In response, Zaragoza “blurted []

out” that she had packages on her. Officer Cervantes

subsequently removed a package from Zaragoza’s lower back

containing .34 kilograms of heroin and a package from her

abdomen containing .42 kilograms of methamphetamine.

Following her arrest, Zaragoza was interviewed by

Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) Agent Ashley

Alvarado over the course of an hour. The interview was

video recorded and later transcribed. During initial

background questioning, Zaragoza informed Alvarado that

when she was 13 she had been shot multiple times, including

in the head, in a gang-related incident, resulting in memory

and cognitive problems.1 Zaragoza also told Alvarado that

she had taken drugs in the past 24 hours, and that while she

was unsure what kind of drugs she had used, “theymade [her]

sniff it” and “it made [her] feel weird.”

Following preliminary questioning, Alvarado explained

that the purpose of the interview was “to get [Zaragoza’s]

side of the story,” and that “the hard part is over” because she

had “already been caught.” Zaragoza responded: “Yeah, I

made it obvious. I was making — I wanted to be known. I

didn’t want to do it.” Zaragoza proceeded to explain that she

was not paid to cross the drugs into the United States, but

instead that she had “want[ed] to go home.” Zaragoza told

1

In May 1999, Zaragoza was shot in the left arm, back, and head by

rival gang members and run over by a vehicle. As a result of the shooting,

Zaragoza suffers from seizures, depression, and memory loss. 

Psychological evaluations indicate that Zaragoza’s overall cognitive and

adaptive skills fall in the “mild range of mental retardation,” and that she

suffers from a loss of intellectual functioning capacity. Zaragoza’s

adaptive skills resemble those of an average 8 year old.

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 5

Alvarado that she had been in Tijuana for three days, after

traveling there to party with her friend Karen.

Zaragoza explained to Alvarado that after spending three

days in Mexico she had run out of money and wanted to

return home to the United States. At this time, two of the

men she was with, Hernan and Chino, who were allegedly

connected to the “Antrax of El Mayo” drug cartel, began

pressuring her to tape drugs to her body when she crossed the

border. The plan was that Hernan would accompany

Zaragoza to the border and then meet her at a restaurant to

retrieve the drugs after she had entered the United States. 

Zaragoza claimed that she originally resisted carrying the

drugs, telling the men that she “didn’t want to do it,” but that

the two men and her friend Karen continued to pressure her. 

Zaragoza eventually relented, allowing Karen to help strap

the packages of drugs to her body. According to Zaragoza,

Karen did not carry any drugs across the border.

Zaragoza insisted that while in the pedestrian line she

“wanted [the authorities] to notice [her],so she tried to attract

attention by “making a lot of noises so I could be noticed,”

and by making herself “obvious.” Zaragoza demonstrated to

Alvarado the motions she allegedly made so that border

inspectors would notice her, stating that she “was making so

many things like so they could notice there was something

wrong with me.” Zaragoza also claimed that she had been in

the pedestrian line earlier that morning, around 4:00 a.m., but

that Chino and Karen had taken her out of the line because

she had purposely tried to loosen the packages of drugs that

were attached to her body. She stated that she had “wiggled

around,” “patted her stomach,” and “threw her passport on

the ground” to draw attention to herself while in line. Karen

allegedly told Zaragoza to “calm down” because she was

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6 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

“making it obvious.” Zaragoza explained to Alvarado that

she did not directly alert border inspectors because she “was

scared because Karen was with [her]” in the line.

According to Zaragoza, Chino and Hernan did not offer

her any money to cross the drugs, but stated only that if she

did it, “nothing’s going to happen to [her] daughter or [her]

mother.” Zaragoza told Alvarado that she was in the

pedestrian line for about 40 minutes prior to reaching the

primary inspection booth. Zaragoza denied knowing what

type of drugs she was transporting, stating that she did not ask

Hernan or Chino because “[t]hey’re going to get paranoid and

they’re going to kill me.” Before the end of the interview

with Alvarado, Zaragoza again insisted that “I made myself

obvious. I made myself obvious a lot. I made myself

obvious.” In response to Alvarado’s questions regarding why

she was carrying Santa Muerte paraphernalia, a saint

commonly believed to protect and guide drug traffickers,

Zaragoza explained that the saint held a different meaning to

her, and that “if I want[ed] to not get caught, why was I

making myself obvious?”

During the interview, Zaragoza also told Alvarado that

she had previously been in Mexico for four months, staying

with Karen and Karen’s cousins, Juan and Junior. Zaragoza

stated that during that time, she “couldn’t leave,” because

“they took [her] money,” and that every time she sought to

return to the United States, Karen’s cousins convinced her to

stay. She also stated that she did not return to the United

States because she had fallen in love with one of the cousins’

friends. She claimed that during this four month stay, Juan

and Junior tried to convince her to cross people and drugs

into the United States, but she had refused. When Alvarado

probed for more information about Karen and her cousins,

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 7

Zaragoza was hesitant, explaining that she was scared

because “these people are really dangerous,” and had

connections “to the cartel.”

A criminal complaint charging Zaragoza with importing

heroin and methamphetamine into the United States was

issued on December 23, 2011. The complaint was based in

part on Alvarado’s probable cause statement, which stated

that Zaragoza admitted to attempting to smuggle narcotics

into the United States, but omitted any reference to

Zaragoza’s claims of coercion or to her alleged conduct while

waiting in the pedestrian line. Five days later, on December

28, 2011, Zaragoza’s attorney sent a letter to the Assistant

United States Attorney (“AUSA”) assigned to the case

requesting the preservation of evidence. The letter stated that

“defendant specifically requests that any and all videotapes

. . . that may be destroyed, lost, or otherwise put out of the

possession, custody, or care of the government and which

relate to the arrest or the events leading to the arrest [of

Zaragoza] in this case be preserved.”

Zaragoza was subsequently indicted by a grand jury of

one count of importing heroin and one count of importing

methamphetamine. On February 23, 2012, Zaragoza’s

counsel filed a motion to compel discovery and preserve

evidence, specifically referencing the video recordings at the

Port of Entry. Following a hearing on February 27, 2012, the

district court ordered the government to preserve the video

evidence. In line with the court’s order, on February 28, 2012,

the United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) requested the

Port of Entry video footage from the day of Zaragoza’s arrest. 

However, U.S. Customs and Border Protection informed the

USAO that the video footage from December 22, 2011, had

been destroyed around January 21, 2012, after it had been

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8 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

automatically recorded over within 30 to 45 days of

Zaragoza’s arrest.

Zaragoza moved to dismiss the indictment due to the

government’s destruction of the video footage. Zaragoza’s

motion was denied following a hearing in which Zaragoza,

CBP officers Patterson and Cervantes, and Agent Alvarado

testified. Zaragoza subsequently entered a conditional plea

of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s

denial. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s holding that Zaragoza’s due process

rights were not violated by the government’s failure to

preserve potentially exculpatory evidence is reviewed de

novo. United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir.

2013). Factual findings, such as the district court’s finding

that the government’s actions did not amount to bad faith, are

reviewed for clear error. Id. “‘[R]eview under the clearly

erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.”’ McMilan v. United States, 112 F.3d 1040, 1044

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal.,

Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S.

602, 623 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

Zaragoza argues that the government’s failure to preserve

the Port of Entry video footage from the morning of her arrest

violated her due process right to present a complete defense. 

In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984), the

Supreme Court held that “the government violates the

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 9

defendant’s right to due process if the unavailable evidence

possessed ‘exculpatory value that was apparent before the

evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the

defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by

other reasonably available means.”’ United States v. Cooper,

983 F.2d 928, 931 (1993) (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at

489). The Court subsequently added a third requirement for

establishing a due process violation in Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988), holding that the

defendant must demonstrate that the government acted in bad

faith in failing to preserve the potentially useful evidence. 

See also Cooper, 983 F.2d at 931.

As this court explained in Cooper, “Youngblood’s bad

faith requirement dovetails with the first part of the

Trombetta test: that the exculpatory value of the evidence be

apparent before its destruction.” Id. The presence or absence

of bad faith turns on the government’s knowledge of the

apparent exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was

lost or destroyed, because without knowledge of the potential

usefulness of the evidence, the evidence could not have been

destroyed in bad faith. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*;

Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1172; United States v. Leal-Del Carmen,

697 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When the government

doesn’t know what a witness will say, it doesn’t act in bad

faith in deporting him . . . . The question of bad faith thus

turns on what the government knew at the time it deported the

witness.”).

Applying the requisite test above, the district court found

that while the video footage was potentially useful evidence,

its exculpatory value was not readily apparent to Agent

Alvarado. Without addressing the AUSA’s actions, or lack

thereof, in light of the December 28, 2011, letter from

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10 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

defense counsel requesting the preservation of video

evidence, the district court held that “[t]he facts and

circumstances of this case do not support a finding that Agent

Alvarado or counsel for the government destroyed potentially

exculpatory evidence in bad faith.”

Zaragoza concedes on appeal that the destroyed video

footage was not materially exculpatory, but was, as found by

the district court, potentially useful evidence. While the

government does not admit that the evidence was potentially

useful, it does not present any argument to the contrary. 

Potentially useful evidence, as defined in Youngblood, is

“evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that

it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which

might have exonerated the defendant.” Youngblood, 488U.S.

at 57.

Here, the issue is whether the video footage of the Port of

Entry pedestrian line on December 22, 2011, was potentially

useful to Zaragoza’s duress defense. Duress is “a commonlaw defense that allows a jury to find that the defendant’s

conduct is excused, even though the government has carried

its burden of proof.” United States v. Kuok, 671 F.3d 931,

947 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S.

1, 12–14 & n.9 (2006)). “To establish duress, the burden of

proof is on the defendant to show that: (1) he was under an

immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) he had

a well grounded fear that the threat would be carried out, and

(3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape.” Id. (citing

United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

To satisfy the third element, it is relevant whether the

defendant had an “opportunity to surrender to the authorities

on reaching a point of safety.” United States v. Ibarra-Pino,

657 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2011). A defendant “must

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 11

present some evidence indicating that he ‘took the

opportunity to escape the threatened harm by submitting to

authorities at the first reasonable opportunity.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th

Cir. 1984)).

As the district court found, the destroyed video was

potentially useful evidence to support defendant’s claim of

duress. The video footage may have shown Zaragoza

throwing her passport on the ground, trying to loosen the

packages of drugs from her body, Karen and Chino removing

her from the pedestrian line, and other behavior that Zaragoza

allegedly engaged in to make herself “obvious” to law

enforcement. Such evidence, especially Zaragoza trying to

attract the attention of the border inspectors, would be

particularlyhelpful to Zaragoza establishing the third element

of her duress claim. The video may have also shed light on

the extent to which Karen was overseeing and controlling

Zaragoza, and whether it would have been feasible for

Zaragoza to have alerted border inspectors to the contraband

at an earlier time. As such, the district court correctly found

that the video footage was “potentially useful evidence.”

The district court, however, clearly erred in finding that

the exculpatory value of the video footage of the Port of

Entry pedestrian line was not readily apparent to Agent

Alvarado. As discussed above, when potentially useful

evidence has been destroyed by the government, the bad faith

inquiry initially “turns on the government’s knowledge of the

apparent exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was

lost or destroyed.” Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotes

omitted); Leal-Del Carmen, 697 F.3d at 970; Cooper,

983 F.2d at 931. A review of the interview transcript

establishes Agent Alvarado’s knowledge of the potentially

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12 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

exculpatory value of the pedestrian line video before it was

destroyed.

From the beginning to the end of Agent Alvarado’s hourlong interview with Zaragoza, Zaragoza repeatedly alerted

Alvarado to her duress claim and the potential usefulness of

the pedestrian line video footage. See Cooper, 983 F.2d at

931 (finding bad faith where the destroyed evidence’s “value

as potentially exculpatory evidence was repeatedly suggested

to government agents”). Shortly after questioning began,

when asked to tell her side of the story, Zaragoza stated

“[y]eah, I made it obvious. I was making — I wanted to be

known. I didn’t want to do it.” Thereafter, Zaragoza

repeatedly stated throughout the interview that she had tried

to attract the attention of the authorities while in the

pedestrian line by “making a lot of noises so I could be

noticed,” and by making herself “obvious.”

Zaragoza explained to Agent Alvarado that she had

initially been in the pedestrian line around 4:00 a.m. on

December 22, 2011, but had been removed from the line by

Chino and Karen after intentionally loosening the packages

of drugs taped to her body and engaging in other attentionseeking behavior. Zaragoza demonstrated to Agent Alvarado

the motions she allegedly made to indicate to border agents

that “there was something wrong with me” and explained that

she had “wiggled around,” “patted her stomach,” and

“thrown” her passport on the ground” to draw attention to

herself while in line. As the interview wound down,

Zaragoza continued insisting that “I made myself obvious. I

made myself obvious a lot. I made myself obvious,” and

stated that “if I want[ed] to not get caught, why was I making

myself obvious?”

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 13

Despite Agent Alvarado’s testimony that she

“overlooked” retrieving the video footage because it was “just

something I didn’t think about doing,” Alvarado undoubtedly

appreciated the significance of Zaragoza’s claims during the

interview. While discussing Zaragoza and Karen’s

interactions in the pedestrian line, Alvarado asked Zaragoza

how long she had waited in line, to which Zaragoza indicated

that she had been in the pedestrian line for about 40 minutes. 

Agent Alvarado also asked Zaragoza why she did not alert

border inspectors to the drugs earlier, and Zaragoza explained

that she was “scared because Karen was with me.” Alvarado

then followed up, asking Zaragoza if Karen was “right next

to [her],” if the two had been in the “same lines,” and if

Karen was “right there.” Later on, Alvarado confirmed that

“Karen was right behind you in the same line?”

Agent Alvarado obviously recognized the importance of

Zaragoza’s statement that Karen was with her in the

pedestrian line. Indeed, Alvarado asked the question in the

first place. She also repeated the question numerous times,

confirming Zaragoza’s answer, which she would not have

done if she thought the answer was inconsequential. See

Leal-Del Carmen, 697 F.3d at 970. Although the district

court recounted a number of other statements Zaragoza made

during the interview that may have weakened Zaragoza’s

duress claim, the strength of her defense and whether

Alvarado believed the claim do not diminish the potential

usefulness of the video. Cooper, 983 F.2d at 933

(“[Defendants] should not be made to suffer because

government agents discounted their version and, in bad faith,

allowed its proof, or its disproof, to be buried in a toxic waste

dump.”).

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The government argues that even if the video footage was

potentially useful evidence and Agent Alvarado was aware of

its exculpatory value, the government did not act in bad faith

in failing to preserve the evidence because it did not

“purposefully destroy the evidence to gain an unfair

advantage at trial.” The government asserts that failure to

preserve the video evidence was a mere “oversight,” and that

negligence or recklessness is not sufficient to support a

finding of bad faith. In the context of the instant case, we

disagree.

Contrary to the government’s contentions, Agent

Alvarado’s actions were not merely negligent or reckless, nor

was the video destroyed in the normal course of the

government’s usual procedures. Agent Alvarado testified that

she has a professional obligation to collect and preserve both

exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. She admitted that she

understood that a defendant who is threatened or forced to

commit a crime has a possible defense to that crime. Agent

Alvarado also testified that she knew the pedestrian line at the

Port of Entry was under constant video surveillance and that

she had the ability to review and preserve the video

recordings. However, despite this knowledge, including her

knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of the evidence,

Alvarado made no attempt to view or preserve the Port of

Entry video before it was destroyed.

Agent Alvarado authored four reports in connection with

this case. Of the four reports, only one, which was prepared

shortly before the district court’s hearing on Zaragoza’s

motion to dismiss, included Zaragoza’s statements about

being coerced into transporting the drugs and trying to attract

law enforcement attention while in the pedestrian line. Even

more disturbing, Alvarado’s probable cause statement

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 15

supporting the criminal complaint that was presented to the

magistrate judge did not include any reference to Zaragoza’s

claims of duress. Although Alvarado testified that such

reports and affidavits should be complete and accurate, these

official documents contained glaring omissions in light of the

statements Zaragoza repeatedly made to Alvarado.

The follow-up investigation conducted by Agent

Alvarado further indicates that she acted in bad faith in

failing to preserve the video footage from the Port of Entry. 

After questioning Zaragoza, Alvarado confirmed that Karen

had indeed crossed the border through the pedestrian line at

the San Ysidro, California, Port of Entry with Zaragoza on

December 22, 2011. This information, at least in part,

corroborated Zaragoza’s statements to Alvarado, providing

Alvarado with yet another reason to at least view the video

evidence to determine if Zaragoza’s statements could be

corroborated or disproved. In light of the apparent value of

the video evidence, which was known to Agent Alvarado, her

actions following Zaragoza’s interview are sufficient to

establish that she made “a conscious effort to suppress

exculpatory evidence,” thereby acting in bad faith. 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.

As noted above, in concluding that the government did

not act in bad faith, the district court did not address the

AUSA’s actions, or lack thereof, in light of the December 28,

2011, letter from defense counsel requesting the preservation

of video evidence. The parties agree, as do we, that Agent

Alvarado should not have been the only relevant actor in the

court’s bad faith analysis. The government, however, argues

that the AUSA’s “failure to notify [Homeland Security

Investigations] of Zaragoza’s request to preserve the video

evidence was nothing more than an oversight based on the

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16 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

fact that the parties were in plea negotiations that led to the

negotiated settlement of the case.”

We reject this argument that plea negotiations somehow

excused the AUSA’s lack of action following receipt of the

letter. When discovery is requested by the defendant, as was

the case here, plea negotiations should be based on full

disclosure of the requested evidence. In addition, had the

initial plea negotiations been successful, evidence of

Zaragoza’s duress claim, even if an imperfect defense, would

have been relevant as a mitigating factor at sentencing. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (“The court, in determining the

particular sentence to be imposed shall consider — the nature

and circumstances of the offense . . . .”); see also U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.12 (sentencing court may depart from Guideline range

“[i]f the defendant committed the offense because of serious

coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not

amounting to a complete defense”).

Moreover, when the government fails to comply with

preservation requests and allows evidence to be destroyed, it

likely runs afoul of its discovery disclosure requirements

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. See, e.g., United States v.

Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013) (Fed. R.

Crim P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i), requiring the government to “disclose

any documents or other objects within its possession, custody

or control that are ‘material to preparing the defense’ . . . . is

unconditional.”). While non-compliance with Rule 16 does

not amount to a due process violation absent bad faith, the

government’s failure to take action in response to defense

counsel’s letter in the instant case is particularly disturbing. 

Nevertheless, because AgentAlvarado’s actions are sufficient

to establish bad faith we need not decide whether that failure

would also constitute bad faith or contribute to such a finding.

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UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA 17

Because the district court did not find that the government

acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the video evidence, it

did not address whether “the missing evidence is ‘of such a

nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain

comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’” 

Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at

489). The government argues that Zaragoza has not met her

burden to show a lack of reasonably available comparable

evidence. According to the government, comparable

evidence is available in the form of defendant’s own

testimonyconcerning her duress claim and cross-examination

of “the Customs and Border Patrol officers about her

demeanor, whether she attempted to withdraw from the

crime, and whether they were aware of her attempts to call

their attention to the people who allegedly threatened her.” 

We again disagree.

The government has not suggested any reasonably

available evidence that would be comparable to the destroyed

video footage of the Port of Entry pedestrian line. The

government’s argument that in lieu of the destroyed video

footage Zaragoza could testify at trial concerning her conduct

in the Port of Entry line, runs afoul of Zaragoza’s Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination, by essentially

forcing her to testify in her own defense. Notwithstanding

the obvious Fifth Amendment implications triggered by the

government’s argument, Zaragoza’s self-serving testimony,

especially in light of her substantial cognitive disabilities,

would not be comparable to video footage that recorded her

actions while in the pedestrian line. Cross examination of the

border inspectors regarding Zaragoza’s behavior in the

pedestrian line would also be incomparable, because neither

the primary nor secondary inspectors observed Zaragoza

while she waited in line. Consequently, we conclude that

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18 UNITED STATES V. ZARAGOZA-MOREIRA

Zaragoza is unable to find comparable evidence to support

her duress defense.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court committed clear error by finding that the apparent

exculpatory value of the Port of Entry pedestrian line video

was not known to Agent Alvarado and that the government,

therefore, did not act in bad faith in failing to preserve the

evidence. Because we have determined that Agent Alvarado

knew of the potential usefulness of the video footage and

acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it, Zaragoza’s due

process rights were violated. We therefore reverse and

remand to the district court with directions to dismiss the

indictment.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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