Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-24-12592/USCOURTS-ca11-24-12592-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christian Bindslev
Appellee
Melissa Carolina Silva
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11896

____________________

CHRISTIAN BINDSLEV, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MELISSA CAROLINA SILVA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-21088-JEM

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11896

____________________

No. 24-12592

____________________

CHRISTIAN BINDSLEV, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MELISSA CAROLINA SILVA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-21088-JEM

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Melissa Silva appeals two orders, both issued by the district 

court pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 

International Child Abduction. In what we will call the “Return 

Order,” the district court found that Silva had wrongfully removed 

her child, I.S.B., to the United States and required her to return 

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24-11896 Opinion of the Court 3

I.S.B. to Denmark. And in what we will call the “Enforcement Order,” which was issued after the Return Order was pending before 

us on appeal, the district court required Silva to turn I.S.B. over to 

her father, Christian Bindslev, in Florida. The facts of the case are 

known to the parties, and we repeat them here only as necessary 

to decide the case. After carefully considering the record, and with 

the benefit of oral argument, we AFFIRM the Return Order and 

VACATE the Enforcement Order. 

I

When considering a district court’s order under the Hague 

Convention, “[w]e review a district court’s findings of fact for clear 

error and its legal conclusions and applications of the law to the 

facts de novo.” Gomez v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 

2016). 

We hold that the district court did not err in ordering I.S.B.’s 

return to Denmark. The Hague Convention, as implemented in 

the United States through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, “establishes legal rights and procedures for the prompt 

return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained.” 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4). When one parent removes a child 

from another country to the United States, a U.S. court can order 

the child’s return to his or her “country of habitual residence” if

the non-removing parent proves “by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the] child was ‘wrongfully removed or retained within 

the meaning of the Convention.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 742 F.3d 934, 

935, 938 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A)). 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11896

But that prima facie case for return can be rebutted through 

any of several affirmative defenses enumerated in the Convention. 

These defenses are “narrowly construed” and “do not automatically preclude an order of return.” Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 

1345 (11th Cir. 2008). One such defense applies when the party 

“which opposes [the child’s] return establishes that . . . there is a 

grave risk that . . . return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 

Child Abduction, art. 13, Oct. 25, 1980. If a court finds a grave risk 

of harm, it has three options: It can order the child’s return anyway, refuse to order the child’s return, or impose “ameliorative 

measures that could ensure the child’s safe return.” Golan v. Saada, 

596 U.S. 666, 678 (2022).

In the Return Order, the district court found that Bindslev 

had made out a prima facie case for return. Silva does not challenge 

this finding. Rather, she asserts that the court further found that 

return would expose I.S.B. to a “grave risk of harm” and that the 

“ameliorative measures” that the court imposed were ineffective. 

In the alternative, she argues that the district court was required, 

but failed, to make a finding on the grave-risk-of-harm issue.

We disagree. As we read the Return Order, the district court 

found that Silva had not established a grave risk of harm. In relevant part, the Order states as follows: “Although [Silva] argued that 

returning the child would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 

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24-11896 Opinion of the Court 5

situation, this Court finds that the court in Denmark is fully capable 

of protecting the child if necessary.” To be sure, the district court 

could have expressed itself more clearly, but by beginning its statement with the word “[a]lthough,” it sufficiently indicated its consideration, and rejection, of Silva’s grave-risk argument. The 

court’s reference to the Denmark court’s capacity to protect I.S.B. 

does not suggest otherwise. Although Silva contends that the remark refers to an ameliorative measure, and therefore suggests that 

the court found that she had established the requisite grave risk, the 

capacity of Denmark’s tribunals to protect I.S.B. is not a court-imposed ameliorative measure, but rather an independently existing 

fact. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s Return Order.1

II

“We review de novo questions on the jurisdiction of the district court.” Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 

2007). We hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue 

the Enforcement Order while the Return Order was pending before us on appeal.

“Absent entry of a stay on appeal . . . the District Court retain[s] jurisdiction to enforce its orders.” Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int’l 

1 The Return Order does not violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), 

as Silva contends. The Order incorporated “the reasons stated on the record,” 

and those reasons are sufficiently detailed to clear Rule 52’s low bar. See Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2020). 

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11896

Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2016). But “[t]he filing of a 

notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers 

jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of 

its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 

Gris v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Accordingly, the “‘district court does not have the power to alter the status 

of the case as it rests before the Court of Appeals.’” Green Leaf 

Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (quoting Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Min. Products Co., 

906 F.2d 1059, 1063 (5th Cir. 1990)).

The Enforcement Order purported to alter the status of an 

issue involved in a pending appeal. The Return Order stated that 

“[I.S.B.] shall not be turned over to [Bindslev].” In stark contrast, 

the Enforcement Order stated that Silva will “surrender [I.S.B.] to 

the custody and possession” of Bindslev. That was not a valid “enforcement” of the Return Order. Rather, it was an attempted 

amendment of a portion of the Return Order that was inseparably 

involved in a pending appeal before this Court. The district court 

has no jurisdiction to do so.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s Enforcement Order.

* * *

For these reasons, the Return Order is AFFIRMED, and the 

Enforcement Order is VACATED. 

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24-11896 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 1

ABUDU, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join in the Majority’s opinion vacating the district court’s 

Enforcement Order. The Majority opinion also should have vacated the district court’s Return Order for failing to make specific 

factual findings regarding the mother’s (Melissa Silva) allegations 

regarding domestic violence and other abusive behaviors against 

the father (Christian Bindslev), and because of the lower court’s 

failure to “state its conclusions of law separately” as to whether 

Silva satisfied her burden for presenting a “grave risk” defense to 

Bindslev’s ICARA petition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).

Neither the transcript from the hearing nor the district 

court’s written order contains factual findings or legal conclusions 

regarding Silva’s “grave risk” argument even though that was the 

central theory of her defense. Instead, the district court merely 

acknowledged the defense was raised and then included very specific instructions in the Return Order that required: (1) Silva, a U.S. 

citizen, to accompany the child (I.S.B.) to Denmark and stay with 

I.S.B. for an unspecified period of time; (2) prohibited Bindslev

from assuming physical custody of I.S.B. upon Silva’s arrival in 

Denmark; and (3) ordered Bindslev to secure separate housing for 

I.S.B. and Silva as well as pay all their living expenses. Although 

these requirements look like “ameliorative measures” that would 

safeguard I.S.B. from any harm Bindslev poses, we simply do not 

know what the district court intended these measures to address. 

Consequently, the order does not allow this Court to meaningfully 

review whether the district court made clearly erroneous factual 

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2 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 24-11896

findings, reached an erroneous legal conclusion on the issue of 

grave harm, or imposed these measures for other reasons. Gomez 

v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 2016) (applicable standards of review); Danley v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1090, 1091 (11th Cir. 2007)

(“[T]his Court has admonished district courts that their orders 

should contain sufficient explanations of their rulings so as to provide this Court with an opportunity to engage in meaningful appellate review.”). This lack of clarity does not even meet the “low 

bar” that Rule 52 sets. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In March 2024, Bindslev petitioned for I.S.B.’s return, alleging that Silva wrongfully removed I.S.B. from Denmark and 

brought her to the United States in violation of ICARA. Silva challenged the petition on the ground that returning I.S.B. to Denmark 

would expose I.S.B. to a grave risk of harm or place I.S.B. in an 

intolerable situation. Specifically, Silva claimed that I.S.B. would 

face a grave risk of harm because Bindslev has a history of violent 

behavior and physically assaulted her several times, including in 

I.S.B.’s presence. Silva further claimed that I.S.B. would be personally exposed to danger because the father sold and abused illicit 

drugs and abused alcohol. Finally, Silva claimed that separating her 

and I.S.B. would cause I.S.B psychological harm because she was 

the only caregiver I.S.B. had known.

During a three-day bench hearing, Silva proffered evidence 

to support her claims, including her own testimony and an “abuse 

log.” The father proffered evidence to refute Silva’s claims, 

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24-11896 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 3

including his own testimony, text messages, and expert testimony 

from a licensed psychologist.

From the bench, the district court granted Bindslev’s petition and ordered that Silva return I.S.B. to Denmark. The next day, 

the district court memorialized its decision in a two-page order. 

Other than acknowledging that Silva raised a “grave risk” defense, 

the court did not make any factual findings as to whether she satisfied her burden of proof, did not provide any legal analysis as to the 

grave risk defense, and imposed onerous demands on both parties 

without a clear explanation as to why such conditions were necessary. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Silva argues the district court violated Rule 

52(a)(1) by failing to include any specific findings regarding 

whether Bindslev’s alleged history of abuse was credible, whether 

I.S.B. would be unsafe in Denmark living alone with Bindslev, or 

whether Silva traveling with and staying with I.S.B. in Denmark 

was necessary for I.S.B.’s safety. Silva is correct on all fronts.

A. Rule 52(a)(1)

After a bench trial, “the court must find the facts specially 

and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or 

may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by 

the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The court must find these facts 

“with enough specificity for a reviewing court to identify the factual findings upon which the court’s legal conclusions are based.”

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4 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 24-11896

Stock Equip. Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 906 F.2d 583, 592 (11th Cir. 

1990). Further, the court should “state the reason for its decision 

and the underlying predicate.” Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 

957–58 (11th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases from our predecessor 

Court, the former Fifth Circuit). 

That said, “[t]he judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters.” Stock 

Equip. Co., 906 F.2d at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment). Further, “[a]lthough there must be sufficient record evidence to support the findings, [the court] need not state the evidence or any of the reasoning upon the evidence, nor assert the 

negative of rejected propositions.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). Notwithstanding the low bar for the sufficiency of a court’s explanation of its decision, it must state what 

that decision is. Id. 

B. ICARA and the “grave risk” exception

If a petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a child has been wrongfully retained in violation of 

ICARA, the child must “be promptly returned unless one of the 

narrow exceptions set forth in the [Hague] Convention applies.” 22 

U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4); see also Gomez, 812 F.3d at 1011–12. Article 13(b) 

of the Hague Convention prohibits the removed child’s return to 

the country of habitual residence where return would expose her 

to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. Baran v. Betty, 526 

F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Hague Convention on the 

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24-11896 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 5

Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 13(b), Oct. 25, 

1980). “While the proper inquiry focuses on the risk faced by the 

child, not the parent, . . . sufficiently serious threats and violence 

directed against a parent can nonetheless pose a grave risk of harm 

to a child as well.” Gomez, 812 F.3d at 1010. That said, sister circuits 

have recognized that the harm a child might experience from being 

taken away from one parent and removed to another parent does 

not always rise to a grave risk under ICARA. See, e.g., Whallon v. 

Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 459 (1st Cir. 2000); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 

58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 

1068-69 (6th Cir. 1996). 

Even still, the parent opposing the return must show that the 

child faces a grave risk of harm by clear and convincing evidence. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A). Accordingly, “[t]he Convention 

assigns the duty of the grave risk determination to the country to 

which the child has been removed.” Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d

1, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). “It is not a derogation of the authority of the 

habitual residence country for the receiving U.S. courts to adjudicate the grave risk question. Rather, it is their obligation to do so 

under the Convention and its enabling legislation.” Id. Thus, 

“where a party makes a substantial allegation that, if true, would 

justify application of the Article 13(b) exception, the court should 

make the necessary predicate findings.” Id. 

Here, although the district court acknowledged that Silva 

raised the grave risk exception, it did not make any findings of fact 

and did not provide a conclusion of law about whether Silva 

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6 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 24-11896

established, by clear and convincing evidence, that I.S.B. faced a 

grave risk of harm recognized under ICARA. To begin, Silva raised 

three distinct risks of harm to I.S.B. upon her return to Denmark:

(1) the father’s abuse of Silva; (2) the direct danger the father posed 

to I.S.B. because of his involvement with drugs and alcohol; and (3) 

the harm of turning I.S.B. over from the only caregiver I.S.B. knew 

– Silva. 

Both parties proffered evidence to support their positions as 

to the first and second alleged risks of harm. Although the court 

was not required to state what specific evidence it considered in 

deciding the issue, Stock Equip. Co., 906 F.2d at 592, it was required 

to state its decision on the record or in an opinion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

52(a)(1). However, the court made no definite findings as to 

whether Silva showed by clear and convincing evidence that I.S.B. 

faced a grave risk of harm because of the alleged abuse Silva experienced, or the father’s involvement with drugs and alcohol. Further, although the court acknowledged that, given I.S.B.’s age, 

I.S.B. may suffer harm if “turned over” from the mother to the father, that harm may not rise to the level of a “grave risk” for purposes of explaining the basis for the otherwise ameliorative 

measures the court imposed. See, e.g., Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459; 

Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068-69. Because 

the challenged order does not comply with the basic mandates of 

Rule 52(a)(1), this Court cannot meaningfully review whether the 

district court erred in assessing whether the purported harms 

amount to a grave risk under ICARA. 

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24-11896 Abudu, J., Dissenting in Part 7

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because the district court did not make definite 

findings on a pertinent, contested issue – whether, under ICARA, 

I.S.B. faced a grave risk of harm upon return to Denmark – the 

Return Order should be vacated, and this case should be remanded 

for the district court to make the appropriate factual findings and 

clearly state its legal conclusions. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 

U.S. 273, 291–92, 292 n.22 (1982). 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part. 

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