Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01124/USCOURTS-caDC-05-01124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Respondent
Secretary of Labor
Petitioner
Twentymile Coal Company
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 2006 Decided July 7, 2006

No. 05-1124

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

PETITIONER

v.

TWENTYMILE COAL COMPANY AND

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Jack Powasnik, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor,

argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was W.

Christian Schumann.

Ralph Henry Moore II argued the cause for respondent

Twentymile Coal Company. With him on the brief was Karen

L. Johnston.

Before: RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 1 of 21
2

1

See Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 27

F.M.S.H.R.C. 260, 278 (2005) (Jordan, Comm’r, concurring and

dissenting).

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This case represents the first

time in more than twenty years1 that the Federal Mine Safety

and Health Review Commission has overturned a decision by

the Secretary of Labor to cite the owner-operator of a mine, as

well as its independent contractor, for safety violations

committed by the contractor. This court has long recognized the

Secretary’s discretionary authority to cite the owner-operator,

the independent contractor, or both for contractor violations.

Because the Mine Act provides no meaningful standards against

which to judge the Secretary’s decisions regarding which party

to cite, the Commission is generally without authority to review

such decisions. We therefore grant the Secretary’s petition for

review and vacate the Commission’s ruling.

I

The Mine Act requires the Secretary of Labor, acting

through the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), to

promulgate mandatory safety and health standards for the

mining industry and to conduct regular mine inspections. 30

U.S.C. §§ 811, 813(a). If a MSHA inspector discovers

conditions that violate safety or health standards, § 104 of the

Act directs the Secretary to issue a citation or an order to the

mine’s “operator.” 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(a). The Act defines an

“operator” as “any owner, lessee, or other person who operates,

controls, or supervises a . . . mine or any independent contractor

performing services or construction at such mine.” 30 U.S.C. §

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 2 of 21
3

2

See Independent Contractors, 45 Fed. Reg. 44494, 44494 (July

1, 1980).

802(d) (emphasis added). (The entities listed before the

italicized “or” are also known as “production-operators.”2)

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

(FMSRHC) is an independent agency charged with adjudicating

disputes under the Mine Act, including disputes over whether

safety standards have been violated. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 815, 823.

The Commission appoints administrative law judges (ALJs) to

conduct trial-type proceedings to hear such disputes. See 30

U.S.C. § 823(d)(1). Any person aggrieved by a decision of an

ALJ may request discretionary review by the Commission, see

30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(i), and any person aggrieved by an

order of the Commission may obtain review in this court, see 30

U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). 

Twentymile owns and operates the Foidel Creek Mine, an

underground coal mine in Routt County, Colorado. In its

capacity as owner-operator, Twentymile often uses independent

contractors to undertake various projects at the mine. On

August 14, 2001, Twentymile hired Precision Excavating, Inc.,

an independent contractor, to perform work on a refuse pile. 

On August 30, 2001, MSHA Inspector Michael Havrilla

conducted an inspection of the surface areas of the Foidel Creek

Mine. During the course of his inspection, Havrilla observed

that the equipment used by Precision’s employees violated six

safety standards. Among the violations were a leaking diesel

fuel tank on a pan scraper, and a ten-by-ten-inch opening on a

service truck’s air compressor that permitted contact with the

drive belts and pulley. When Havrilla discussed the violations

with a Precision employee, he learned that Twentymile had not

examined the contractor’s equipment prior to its use at the mine.

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 3 of 21
4

See Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Co., 25 F.M.S.H.R.C. 352,

356 (2003) (hereinafter ALJ Decision). Fearing that Precision’s

violations might augur an increase in contractor violations,

Havrilla decided that issuing citations to both Precision and

Twentymile was the best way to guarantee mine safety. See id.

at 356-57. 

Precision, the independent contractor, did not contest the

citations and paid the $352 penalty assessed against it by

MSHA. Twentymile, however, contested the citations and the

attendant $900 penalty. In a hearing before an ALJ, Twentymile

stipulated that the conditions described in the citations

constituted violations of the Mine Act, but argued that it was

improper for the Secretary to cite it for violations committed by

Precision. See id. at 353. 

On July 7, 2003, the ALJ ruled in the Secretary’s favor.

Citing Commission precedent, the ALJ held that, “in instances

of multiple operators, the Secretary has wide enforcement

discretion and ‘may, in general, proceed against an owneroperator, his contractor, or both.’” ALJ Decision, 25

F.M.S.H.R.C. at 358 (quoting Secretary of Labor v. Mingo

Logan Coal Co., 19 F.M.S.H.R.C. 246, 249 (1997)). The ALJ

found no abuse of discretion with respect to the Secretary’s

decision to cite Twentymile as well as Precision. See id. at 359.

Although he recognized the nonbinding nature of enforcement

guidelines issued by the Secretary to identify when to charge an

owner-operator, the ALJ found that “the citations easily fit

within” the guidelines. Id. at 359; see id. at 359 n.1 (referring to

Enforcement Policy and Guidelines for Independent

Contractors, App. A to Independent Contractors, 45 Fed. Reg.

44494, 44497 (July 1, 1980) (hereinafter Enforcement

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 4 of 21
5

3

The Enforcement Guidelines state:

[A]s a general rule, a production-operator may be properly

cited for a violation involving an independent contractor: (1)

when the production-operator has contributed by either an act

or an omission to the occurrence of a violation in the course

of an independent contractor’s work, or (2) when the

production-operator has contributed by either an act or

omission to the continued existence of a violation committed

by an independent contractor, or (3) when the productionoperator’s miners are exposed to the hazard, or (4) when the

production-operator has control over the condition that needs

abatement.

45 Fed. Reg. at 44497.

Guidelines)).3 In particular, the ALJ found that “Twentymile’s

failure to inspect the equipment or ensure that the contractor

inspected the equipment was an omission that contributed to the

violations,” and that “Twentymile exercised sufficient control

over the scraper and service truck” to warrant a citation. ALJ

Decision, 25 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 360. The ALJ also credited the

MSHA inspector’s statement that “he was concerned that safety

hazards on contractors’ equipment were not being adequately

addressed” because the “cited conditions were rather obvious,”

and that “by issuing citations to Twentymile, the safety

violations would get more immediate attention than if he only

cited the contractor.” Id. at 359.

Twentymile appealed the ALJ’s decision to the

Commission. See Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co.,

27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 260 (2005) (hereinafter Commission Decision).

The company asserted that, under the Mine Act, an owneroperator is liable only for its own violations, and that the

Secretary was therefore without authority to cite it for the

violations of its independent contractor. See id. at 263. The

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 5 of 21
6

Secretary responded that court and Commission precedents were

directly to the contrary. See id. She further argued that her

decision to cite Twentymile for Precision’s violations was not

reviewable by the Commission because there was no meaningful

standard against which to review her exercise of charging

discretion. See id. at 265. In the event that the Commission

deemed her enforcement decision reviewable, the Secretary

argued in the alternative that the citation was not an abuse of

discretion. See id. at 266. 

The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision and vacated

the citations issued to Twentymile. See Commission Decision,

27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 277. Its opinion began by agreeing with the

Secretary’s (and the ALJ’s) view that “the Secretary generally

may proceed against an owner-operator, an independent

contractor, or both, for violations by the independent

contractor.” Id. at 263-64. Nonetheless, the Commission

rejected the Secretary’s contention that her exercise of

enforcement discretion was unreviewable. See id. at 265. And

a majority of the Commission concluded that the Secretary had

abused her discretion by citing Twentymile. See id. at 268.

According to the majority, the Secretary’s decision to cite the

owner-operator was an abuse of discretion because it was not

made for reasons “consistent with the purpose and policies of

the Mine Act.” Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This was so, the Commission said, because: (1) “[t]he record

show[ed] that the independent contractor was in the ‘best’

position to prevent the violations in question,” id. at 268; (2)

“Twentymile did not have a significant, continuing involvement

in the work specifically being performed at the refuse pile,” id.

at 270; (3) Twentymile did not contribute to the violations

“directly” or through a “significant” omission, id. at 270-71; and

(4) none of the criteria listed in the Secretary’s Enforcement

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 6 of 21
7

4

The Commission relied on the final point notwithstanding its

acknowledgment that “the Enforcement Guidelines are not binding on

the Secretary.” Commission Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 273 n.19.

Guidelines was satisfied at “a significant threshold” level, id. at

273.4

The Secretary of Labor now petitions this court for review

of the Commission’s decision to vacate the citations filed

against Twentymile. She contends that the Commission erred

in holding that her decision to cite Twentymile for violations

committed by Precision was reviewable; should we hold

otherwise, the Secretary contends that her decision was not an

abuse of discretion. Twentymile disputes both contentions, and

it further challenges what it describes as the premise of the

Secretary’s nonreviewability argument: that she has authority

to cite an owner-operator for safety violations committed by its

independent contractor. Because the Secretary’s authority is

indeed the premise of her argument, we consider that issue first

and then proceed to examine the issue of reviewability.

II

We can make relatively short work of the question of the

Secretary’s authority to cite owner-operators for violations

committed by their contractors because it is a question that this

circuit has already answered. Indeed, Twentymile concedes that

“decisions from this Court grant the Secretary the discretion to

cite both the production-operator and the independent contractor

for the violation of the independent contractor.” Respondents’

Br. 26. Although Twentymile urges us to rule to the contrary,

such a disposition is plainly beyond the power of a panel of this

court. See, e.g., Ranger Cellular v. FCC, 348 F.3d 1044, 1049-

50 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 7 of 21
8

This circuit’s seminal opinion regarding the authority of the

Secretary is Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d

533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.). There, the court observed:

“The Mine Act declares that ‘the operators’ of the nation’s

mines have primary responsibility for preventing the existence

of unsafe and unhealthful conditions, 30 U.S.C. § 801(e), and

throughout the Act the entity charged with compliance is

referred to simply as the ‘operator.’” Id. at 535 (citing 30

U.S.C. §§ 814(a), 815(a), 820(a) & (i)). To determine the

meaning of the term “operator,” the court reviewed the

legislative history of the Mine Act, first noting that the Federal

Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 -- the Mine Act’s

precursor -- defined “‘operator’” as “‘any owner, lessee or other

person who operates, controls, or supervises a coal mine.’” Id.

(quoting 30 U.S.C. § 802(d) (1976)). The court next pointed out

that, in Bituminous Coal Operators Ass’n v. Secretary of

Interior (“BCOA”), 547 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth

Circuit “interpreted that definition of ‘operator’ to include

independent contractors performing services at the

production-operator’s mine, and held that the Secretary had the

power to cite the independent contractor, the operator, or both

for independent contractor violations.” 796 F.2d at 535. The

court then noted that, when Congress enacted the Mine Act, it

amended the definition of “operator” by adding (inter alia) the

italicized phrase:

“[O]perator” means any owner, lessee, or other person

who operates, controls, or supervises a coal or other

mine or any independent contractor performing

services or construction at such mine[.]

30 U.S.C. § 802(d) (emphasis added); see Cathedral Bluffs, 796

F.2d at 535. Finally, Cathedral Bluffs explained: “The Senate

Report accompanying the bill that became the Mine Act stated

that the purpose of this amendment was to give statutory

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 8 of 21
9

5

Section 110 of the Mine Act, which under the Coal Act was 30

U.S.C. § 819 (1976), states:

The operator of a coal or other mine in which a violation occurs

of a mandatory health or safety standard . . . shall be assessed a

civil penalty by the Secretary. . . .

30 U.S.C. § 820(a) (emphasis added). 

expression to the doctrine of BCOA.” 796 F.2d at 535 (citing S.

REP. NO. 181, at 14 (1977)).

Two years after Cathedral Bluffs, in International Union,

United Mine Workers of America v. FMSHRC (“UMWA”), we

observed that “all of the courts that have had occasion to address

the question have held that multiple operators are jointly liable

under the Act[,] [o]r, put differently, the owner of a mine is

liable without regard to its own fault for violations committed or

dangers created by its independent contractor.” 840 F.2d 77, 83

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Cyprus Indus. Minerals Co. v.

FMSHRC, 664 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1981); Harman Mining

Corp. v. FMSHRC, 671 F.2d 794, 797 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981);

BCOA, 547 F.2d at 246). We found this holding to be in accord

with both the legislative history (as reviewed in Cathedral

Bluffs) and the statutory language as explained in BCOA:

“Without exemption or exclusion, § 819 makes the

operator of a coal mine in which a violation occurs

subject to a civil penalty . . . . Th[is] section[], when

read with the definition of operator, impose[s] liability

on the owner or lessee of a mine regardless of who

violated the Act . . . .”

Id. at 83 (quoting BCOA, 547 F.2d at 246).5

 We therefore

“agree[d]” with those other courts, holding that the Mine Act

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 9 of 21
10

“assesses liability without regard to the individual operator’s

fault.” Id. at 83-84. Moreover, “[s]ince liability under the Mine

Act is without regard to fault,” we declared that “the argument

that only an operator directly responsible for the violation . . .

can be liable . . . must be rejected.” Id. at 84. And for the same

reason, we must reject Twentymile’s contention that it cannot be

liable for the safety violations committed by Precision.

III

Having concluded that the Secretary of Labor has authority

to cite an owner-operator for safety violations committed by its

contractor, we next consider whether Twentymile may contest

the Secretary’s discretionary decision to do so. Because the

reviewability of the Secretary’s charging decision is a legal

question, we decide the issue de novo. See Secretary of Labor

v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir.

1998). 

A

Although there is a strong presumption that agency action

is reviewable, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 140 (1967), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

codifies the traditional exception that agency action is not

reviewable when it is “committed to agency discretion by law.”

5 U.S.C. § 701(a); see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828

(1985). In Overton Park, the Supreme Court declared that this

exception to the presumption of reviewability applies “in those

rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that

in a given case there is no law to apply.” 401 U.S. at 410

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Court

subsequently explained in Heckler v. Chaney, “review is not to

be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 10 of 21
11

6

See, e.g., Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192 (holding that an agency’s

“allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another

administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to agency

discretion”); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(holding that the FAA’s decision not to renew an aircraft examiner’s

authority is nonreviewable); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 252

F.3d 456, 459-60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that an agency’s decision

to reach a settlement is nonreviewable); In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d

208, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a federal prosecutor’s

certification that there is a substantial federal interest in a case,

required to proceed against a juvenile in federal court, “implicates core

prosecutorial judgment and discretion” and thus is normally “not

subject to judicial review”). 

meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s

exercise of discretion.” 470 U.S. at 830. “In such

circumstances, the courts have no legal norms pursuant to which

to evaluate the challenged action, and thus no concrete

limitations to impose on the agency’s exercise of discretion.”

Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

In determining “whether a matter has been committed

solely to agency discretion, we consider both the nature of the

administrative action at issue and the language and structure of

the statute that supplies the applicable legal standards for

reviewing that action.” Drake, 291 F.3d at 70. Both the

Supreme Court and this court have held that certain categories

of administrative decisions are unreviewable. See, e.g., Lincoln

v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993); Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831;

Drake, 291 F.3d at 70. In Chaney, for example, the Court held

that agency decisions not to institute enforcement proceedings

are presumptively unreviewable. See 470 U.S. at 831. Contrary

to Twentymile’s view, however, refusals to act are not the only

kinds of administrative determinations that evade review.6

 

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 11 of 21
12

Indeed, with respect to criminal charging decisions, the

Supreme Court has made clear that the government’s decision

“as to whom to prosecute” is generally unreviewable. Wayte v.

United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). “‘[S]o long as the

prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused

committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether

or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a

grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.’” Id.

(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (same); In

re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“In the

ordinary case, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, at the

very core of the executive function, has long been held

presumptively unreviewable.”). The Court explained the

considerations behind this view in Wayte:

This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition

that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited

to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the

case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the

Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s

relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement

plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis

the courts are competent to undertake.

470 U.S. at 607. These considerations apply as well to the

administrative charging decisions of the Secretary of Labor.

And we have previously found the traditional nonreviewability

of prosecutorial charging decisions applicable to administrative

cases. See Drake, 291 F.3d at 71 (holding that the “FAA’s

action in this case was . . . analogous to an exercise of

‘prosecutorial discretion,’” and noting that “when prosecutorial

discretion is at issue, the matter is presumptively committed to

agency discretion by law”); Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs.,

Inc. v. Feinstein, 103 F.3d 151, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 12 of 21
13

that the NLRB General Counsel’s decision to issue an unfair

labor practice complaint is unreviewable because, inter alia,

review would “invade the realm of prosecutorial discretion”).

Of course, if the Mine Act provided a “meaningful standard

against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” the

situation would be different. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).

If the Act provided such a standard, “whether this case involves

a presumption of nonreviewability under Chaney or, instead, a

presumption of reviewability under Overton Park,” would not

be dispositive. Drake, 291 F.3d at 72. That is because

“Chaney’s presumption against judicial review may be rebutted

where the relevant statute supplies meaningful standards to

cabin the agency’s otherwise plenary discretion,” while Overton

Park’s “presumption of reviewability is lost” where it does not.

Id. at 71; see Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 190; Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.

But the Mine Act does not provide a meaningful standard.

Under the Act, the Secretary’s charging discretion is as

uncabined as that of a United States Attorney under the Criminal

Code. Section 104(a) simply provides that “[i]f, upon inspection

or investigation, the Secretary or his authorized representative

believes that an operator of a coal or other mine subject to this

chapter has violated this chapter, . . . he shall, with reasonable

promptness, issue a citation to the operator.” 30 U.S.C. §

814(a). As we have noted, the Act defines “operator” as “any

owner, lessee, or other person who operates, controls, or

supervises a . . . mine or any independent contractor performing

services . . . at such mine.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(d) (emphasis

added). Nothing in this language instructs the Secretary of

Labor which of several jointly-liable operators to charge, any

more than the Criminal Code tells a U.S. Attorney which of

several co-conspirators to prosecute. Rather, the statute is

“utterly silent on the manner in which the [agency] is to proceed

against a particular transgressor.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 13 of 21
14

7

See Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 193-94 (holding unreviewable an

agency’s decision to discontinue funding a program where the statute

did “not so much as mention” the program); Swift v. United States,

318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding nonreviewability where

the statute did nothing to “circumscribe[] the government’s power to

discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

FERC, 252 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001). And, because of

that silence, the Secretary’s charging decisions are

unreviewable.7 

The Commission, however, hears sounds in the silence. In

support of its conclusion that the Secretary’s charging decisions

are reviewable, the Commission purported to discern the

following standard: The Secretary’s decision to cite an owneroperator, the Commission said, must be “made for reasons

consistent with the purpose and policies of the Mine Act.”

Commission Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 266 (internal

quotation marks omitted). That phrase is nowhere to be found

in the Act itself, nor does it offer a particularly meaningful

standard. Indeed, were we to regard it as one, we would have to

hold all agency decisions under all statutes reviewable, as all

legislation has “purpose[s] and policies.” Cf. Baltimore Gas,

252 F.3d at 461 (holding that a requirement that an agency

should protect “consumer interests” is merely a “boilerplate

truism” and not a “discretion-restricting guideline”); Steenholdt

v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting an

argument that the Federal Aviation Act’s “substantial evidence”

provision provides a standard for reviewing the FAA’s refusal

to renew an examiner’s authority because, if it did, “there would

be ‘law to apply’ in every agency action” since the APA’s

substantial evidence standard “applies generally to all agency

action”).

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 14 of 21
15

But the most pernicious aspect of employing this purported

standard as a check on charging decisions is that it invites the

reviewing body to substitute its views of enforcement policy for

those of the Secretary, a power that -- as we discuss in Part III.B

-- the Commission does not possess. In fact, that is precisely

what the Commission did in this case. It found that the

Secretary’s decision to cite the owner-operator was not

“consistent with the purpose and policies of the Mine Act”

because: (1) “the independent contractor was in the ‘best’

position to prevent the violations in question,” Commission

Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 268; (2) “Twentymile did not have

a significant, continuing involvement in the work specifically

being performed at the refuse pile,” id. at 270; (3) Twentymile

did not contribute to the violations “directly” or through a

“significant” omission, id. at 270-71; and (4) none of the criteria

listed in the Secretary’s enforcement guidelines was satisfied at

“a significant threshold” level, id. at 273. Yet, because the Mine

Act subjects an owner-operator to strict liability for its

contractor’s violations, see supra Part II, nothing in the statute

bars the Secretary from charging an owner-operator even if it

was not in the “best” position to prevent a violation, did not

have a “significant, continuing involvement” in the contractor’s

work, and did not contribute “directly” or “significant[ly]” to the

violation. And there is certainly nothing in the Mine Act that

requires the Secretary to impose a “significant threshold” test on

her own enforcement guidelines.

To be sure, “[t]his Court has noted that judicially

manageable standards may be found in formal and informal

policy statements and regulations as well as in statutes.”

Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 638 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The Commission regarded the Secretary’s

Enforcement Guidelines as such a policy statement. See

Commission Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 272-75 & n.19. But

“[i]n determining whether agency statements create such a

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 15 of 21
16

8

As discussed above, see supra note 4, the Commission applied

the Enforcement Guidelines to the Secretary’s decision to charge

Twentymile notwithstanding its acknowledgment that “the

Enforcement Guidelines are not binding on the Secretary.”

Commission Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 273 n.19.

standard,” the operative question is “whether the statements

create binding norms.” Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 638. And in

Cathedral Bluffs, this court expressly held that the Enforcement

Guidelines do “not establish a binding norm, but merely

announce[] [the Secretary’s] tentative intentions for the future,

leaving himself free to exercise his informed discretion.” 796

F.2d at 538 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).8

In Cathedral Bluffs, the court -- as we do here -- reversed

the Commission’s dismissal of a citation issued by the Secretary

to an owner-operator for a safety violation committed by its

independent contractor. See id. at 534. As is the case in part

here, the Commission’s dismissal was based on its view that the

Secretary’s decision to cite was inconsistent with the

Enforcement Guidelines. See id. In finding the Guidelines

nonbinding, then-Judge Scalia’s opinion for the court stressed

that the “question pertains to an agency’s exercise of its

enforcement discretion -- an area in which the courts have

traditionally been most reluctant to interfere.” Id. at 538 (citing

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821). “[T]he policies underlying that

restraint,” he declared, “extend as well to interference by a

quasi-judicial agency that has no enforcement responsibilities,

such as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review

Commission.” Id. Those policies are as pertinent here as they

were in Cathedral Bluffs.

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 16 of 21
17

B

The Commission held, and Twentymile asserts, that the

case law regarding nonreviewability does not apply to this

matter because of two specific provisions of the Mine Act. See

Commission Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 265-66. 

First, the Commission noted that cases such as Chaney and

its progeny “involve preclusion of review under section

701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act,” and that

“section 507 of the Mine Act expressly provides that section 701

of the APA does not apply to Commission proceedings.” Id. at

265 (internal citation omitted). Section 507 does indeed state

that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, the

provisions of . . . sections 701-706 of Title 5 shall not apply to

the making of any order, notice, or decision made pursuant to

this chapter, or to any proceeding for the review thereof.” 30

U.S.C. § 956. 

Contrary to the view of the Commission, however, the fact

that § 701(a)(2) itself is inapplicable does not mean that the

principles underlying it are also inapplicable. Rather, as the

Supreme Court has explained, “the Administrative Procedure

Act . . . codifies the nature and attributes of judicial review,

including the traditional principle of its unavailability ‘to the

extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion

by law.’” ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S.

270, 282 (1987) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)) (emphasis

added). “In Chaney,” the Court said, “we found that the type of

agency decision in question has traditionally been committed to

agency discretion, and . . . that the Congress enacting the APA

did not intend to alter that tradition.” Id. (internal quotation

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 17 of 21
18

9

See Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 191 (“[W]e have read § 701(a)(2) to

preclude judicial review of certain categories of administrative

decisions that courts traditionally have regarded as committed to

agency discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

10See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that the “presumption of agency discretion recognized in

Chaney has a long history and, contrary to the [plaintiff’s] assertion,

is not limited to cases brought under the APA”). 

marks omitted).9 Indeed, this court has rejected the claim that

the “conclusive language of section 701 applies only to bar

review under the APA.” Steenholdt, 314 F.3d at 639.10

Accordingly, the traditional principles of nonreviewability

discussed in Part III.A are applicable here, notwithstanding §

507 of the Mine Act.

Second, the Commission contended that the Mine Act gives

it express authority to review the Secretary’s discretionary

enforcement decisions and to formulate mine safety policy. See

Commission Decision, 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 266. The

Commission based this holding on Mine Act § 113, which

provides that any person aggrieved by a decision of an ALJ may

file a petition for Commission review on the ground that “a

substantial question of law, policy or discretion is involved.” 30

U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 

This circuit, however, has already rejected the contention

that § 113 gives the Commission authority to determine policy

issues. See Energy West Mining Co. v. FMSHRC, 40 F.3d 457,

463 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Energy West, we found that § 113

“merely states” the grounds upon which a “petitioner may call

upon the Commission’s power of discretionary review over a

decision of an administrative law judge.” Id. at 464. And we

found nothing in the section to “offer[] a convincing argument

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 18 of 21
19

11See Cathedral Bluffs, 796 F.2d at 537 n.2; Secretary of Labor

v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 1432, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989); RAG

Cumberland Res. LP v. FMSHRC, 272 F.3d 590, 595-96 (D.C. Cir.

2001); Secretary of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C.

Cir. 2003); see also Mutual Mining, 80 F.3d at 114-15 & n.3.

that Congress intended to deprive the Secretary of the deference

which we [have] previously afforded its interpretations of the

Act.” Id. In Secretary of Labor v. Mutual Mining, Inc., the

Fourth Circuit agreed: “[T]o say that the Commission reviews

cases involving questions of policy is not to say that it is the

final arbiter of such policies. Nor is it to say that the

Commission’s interpretation of the statute trumps a reasonable

interpretation put forth by the Secretary.” 80 F.3d 110, 114 n.3

(4th Cir. 1996) (citing Energy West, 40 F.3d at 463-64). 

Both Energy West and Mutual Mining are part of a line of

cases that anticipated, and then followed, the Supreme Court’s

decision in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review

Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991).11 Martin involved review

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”), in

which, like the Mine Act, “Congress separated enforcement and

rulemaking powers from adjudicative powers, assigning these

respective functions to two different administrative authorities.”

Id. at 151. Under the OSH Act, the former functions are

assigned to the Secretary of Labor and the latter to the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC);

under the Mine Act, the former are again assigned to the

Secretary of Labor and the latter to the Federal Mine Safety and

Health Review Commission (FMSHRC). Under this “split

enforcement” structure, the Court held, “enforcement of the Act

is the sole responsibility of the Secretary.” Id. at 151-52

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, since “Congress

did not invest the Commission with the power to make law or

policy by other means, we cannot infer that Congress expected

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 19 of 21
20

12See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 411 F.3d

256, 261-62 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Excel Mining, 334 F.3d at 167-

68; RAG Cumberland, 272 F.3d at 595-96; Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v.

FMSHRC, 212 F.3d 1301, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

the Commission to use its adjudicatory power to play a

policymaking role.” Id. at 154.

We have previously, and repeatedly, applied Martin’s

analysis to the Mine Act.12 We do so here as well. As is true

under the OSH Act, “enforcement of the [Mine] Act is the sole

responsibility of the Secretary,” 499 U.S. at 152 (internal

quotation marks omitted), and the Commission has no

“policymaking role,” id. at 154. Instead, “Congress intended to

delegate to the Commission the type of nonpolicymaking

adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the

agency-review context.” Id. “Under this conception of

adjudication, the Commission is authorized to review the

Secretary’s interpretations only for consistency with the

regulatory language and for reasonableness.” Id. at 154-55.

And, like a court, the Commission is not as a general matter

authorized to review the Secretary’s exercise of prosecutorial

discretion.

IV

We conclude that the Commission is generally without

authority to review the Secretary’s discretionary decisions

regarding whether to cite owner-operators, their independent

contractors, or both for safety violations committed by the

independent contractors. Such decisions are not, of course,

wholly immune from review. The Secretary’s discretion, like

that of a prosecutor, remains “subject to constitutional

constraints,” including those “imposed by the equal protection

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 20 of 21
21

13As we have explained: “Under the statutory scheme, the

Commission is required to accord deference to the Secretary’s

interpretations of the law and regulations. And while it may reverse

a decision by an ALJ for legal error, the Commission must uphold an

ALJ’s factual determinations if they are supported by substantial

evidence.” RAG Cumberland, 272 F.3d at 595 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”

Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. 

Moreover, the Commission retains authority to adjudicate --

subject to the appropriate standard of review13 -- whether safety

violations have in fact occurred. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(d),

823(d). In this case, however, Twentymile has stipulated that

the conditions cited by the Secretary constitute violations of

safety standards. See ALJ Decision, 25 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 353.

We therefore grant the Secretary’s petition for review. The

decision of the Commission, which reversed the decision of the

ALJ and vacated the citations issued to Twentymile, is itself

vacated and the citations are reinstated.

So ordered.

USCA Case #05-1124 Document #978971 Filed: 07/07/2006 Page 21 of 21