Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00251/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cr-00251-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eugene Dajohn Marshall
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND PROPOSED

ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE 1

McGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JESSICA A. MASSEY

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff, 

United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CASE NO. 1:19-cr-00251-DAD-BAM

)

Plaintiff, )

) STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE

) TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

vs. ) AND ORDER 

)

EUGENE DAJOHN MARSHALL, ) Date: April 13, 2020

 ) Time: 1:00 PM

) Judge: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

This case is set for status conference on April 13, 2020. On March 17, 2020, this Court 

issued General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California 

scheduled to commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was entered to address public 

health concerns related to COVID-19. On March 18, 2020, General Order 612 ordered all of the 

courthouses in the Eastern District of California were closed to the public. On March 30, 2020, 

General Order 614 issued, authorizing video/teleconferencing for Criminal Proceedings for all 

events listed in Section 15002(b) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security 

(CARES) Act. Additionally, because the defense is continuing to review the discovery in this 

matter, and plea negotiations are expected to continue, the parties, through their respective 

attorneys, stipulate that the status conference be continued to Monday June 8, 2020. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court 

Case 1:19-cr-00251-DAD-BAM Document 23 Filed 04/08/20 Page 1 of 4
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND PROPOSED

ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE 2

has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular 

case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there 

can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be 

harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2000) (explaining that a judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both 

mandatory and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period 

is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its 

reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the 

best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local 

Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from 

pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a 

continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-ofjustice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 

(9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing 

Furlow to exclude time following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the resultant 

public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the 

prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the 

following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under 

the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should 

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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND PROPOSED

ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE 3

designate a new date for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by 

and through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 13, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until June 

8, 2020, and to exclude time between April 13, 2020, and June 8, 2020, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case

includes investigative reports, documents, and dozens of audio/video files. The 

government is in the process of determining whether and how it can redact portions of 

outstanding audio/video files not yet provided discovery due to safety concerns involving 

a potential witness.

b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to confer with her client about a 

possible resolution, to review yet provided discovery, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, 

taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government concurs a continuance is necessary.

e. In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly 

apt in this case because counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to 

telework and minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult 

to avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed.

f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing 

the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within 

the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME

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ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE 4

g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 

3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 13, 2020 to June 

8, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) 

[Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties’

request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of 

the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within 

which a trial must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 8, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ JESSICA A. MASSEY 

JESSICA A. MASSEY 

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: April 8, 2020 /s/ CAROL ANN MOSES

CAROL ANN MOSES 

Counsel for Defendant 

EUGENE DAJOHN MARSHALL 

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the Status Conference is continued from April 13, 2020 to June 

8, 2020 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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