Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01097/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01097-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
C. Baker
Defendant
Ricky Tyrone Foster
Plaintiff
J. Navarro
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY TYRONE FOSTER,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

CHRISTOPHER BAKER, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01097-JLT-EPG (PC)

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 

WHY CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

AS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

(ECF NO. 1)

Plaintiff Ricky Tyrone Foster is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 

case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in Kings County Superior Court on April 28, 2023 claiming 

that Defendants Baker and Navarro failed to protect Plaintiff against a retaliatory inmate assault

and that an earlier federal court decision that dismissed such claims for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies was incorrect. (ECF No. 1 at 5). After being served with the complaint, 

Defendants Christopher Baker and J. Navarro removed the case to federal court. (Id. at 1). 

Defendants requested that this Court screen the complaint. (Id. at 2).

Upon review of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff improperly seeks to relitigate a

final order from an earlier case. Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit in this District asserting the 

same underlying failure to protect claims as this one. The previous court ultimately granted 

summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative 

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remedies before filing the lawsuit. In this action, Plaintiff directly challenges that earlier order.

However, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars parties from relitigating issues already 

decided by a court in a separate case, instead of challenging such orders by filing a motion for 

reconsideration in the earlier case or appealing that order.

Accordingly, the Court will order Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be 

dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiff must file a response within thirty days.

If Plaintiff fails to file a response, this Court will recommend to an assigned district judge that 

this case be dismissed.

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 

Under federal law, collateral estoppel “bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an 

earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: ‘(1) the issue necessarily decided at the 

previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first 

proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral

estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.’” Reyn’s Pasta

Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kourtis v. Cameron,

419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). Further, collateral estoppel can apply to a dismissal without 

prejudice if the determination being according preclusive effect was essential to the judgment 

of dismissal. Gallegos v. Reinstein, No. 12–16736, 560 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014)

(“Dismissal of Gallegos's claims related to a prior § 1983 action that the Arizona district court 

dismissed without prejudice was proper under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the 

issues raised in these claims had been previously litigated, and were necessary to the prior 

judgment of dismissal.”) (citing McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2004) and Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“The litigation of an 

issue presented and necessarily decided in a prior action between the same parties is foreclosed

by the doctrine of issue preclusion. It matters not that the prior action resulted in a dismissal 

without prejudice, so long as the determination being accorded preclusive effect was essential 

to the dismissal.”) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he principle is simply that later courts 

should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been actually litigated.” 18 C. Wright,

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A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416 (3d ed. 1998). Collateral 

estoppel serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve 

judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 

adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to relitigate an order from a previous federal case, Foster v. 

Baker, No. 1:18-cv-01511-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022), which granted summary 

judgment against Plaintiff on the ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies 

regarding for his claim that correctional officers failed to protect him from an inmate assault.

Plaintiff’s complaint specifically describes and challenges this order on the basis that it 

contradicted a different state court order:

On September 25, 2019, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate 

Dist, reversed the Kings County Superior Court ruling on defendant’s

demurrer, (Foster v. Baker, et al., Kings County Super. Ct. #18C-0240)) 

and on July 9, 2020, counsel for the defendant’s and plaintiff entered 

into a written stipulation agreement that Plaintiff [had] EXHAUSTED 

the administrative remedies with respect to Log # COR-17-04927 and 

Log # CAL-17-01322. . . .

The defendant’s counsel moved the state civil case to the Easter Dist 

Federal Court’s and filed for SUMMARY JUDGMENT while claiming 

that, plaintiff failed to EXHAUST his administrative remedies with 

respect to Log # COR-17-04927; and Log #CAL-17-01322 and 

deliberately negated to dis the July 9, 2020 “STIPULATION 

AGREEMENT” as well as the Court of Appeals September 15, 2019,

REVERSAL which resulted in the District Court granting counsel 

motion for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff’s complaint also attaches a narrative alleging that prison officials C. 

Baker, J. Navarro, and John Does 1 and 2 failed to protect Plaintiff from an assault by inmate 

Abella out of retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id. 9–16). Plaintiff then alleges that Defense counsel 

in the 2018 Foster case withheld their stipulation when bringing a motion for summary 

judgment without alerting the court to the state-court stipulation. Plaintiff alleges this omission 

violated the Model Rules of Professional conduct. (Id. at 17).

Plaintiff attaches the motion for summary judgment in the 2018 Foster case, the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations to grant Defendants’ motion for summary 

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judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the District Judge’s 

order adopting the Findings and Recommendations and dismissing the case without prejudice 

due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust all his available administrative remedies. (Id. 18–40). 

Thus, it appears that Plaintiff’s complaint improperly seeks to relitigate a decision in a 

separate case by filing this complaint, rather than by seeking reconsideration or appeal of that 

prior order. Such an attempt to relitigate the issue in a separate case is barred by the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel. The issue decided at the previous proceeding—i.e., whether Plaintiff 

exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing the 2018 Foster case—is identical to what 

Plaintiff seeks to litigate now. Indeed, Plaintiff is specifically identifying and challenging the 

court’s previous order. Moreover, the District Judge’s order explicitly addressed Plaintiff’s 

argument regarding the state court decision on exhaustion and why it did not change the 

outcome of the motion. (Id. at 39) (“[N]either that state court order nor plaintiff’s objections 

rebut the Ninth Circuit authority which appears to control the resolution of the issue presented 

here.”). Thus, the determination by the 2018 Foster court that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies notwithstanding the state court litigation was essential to the judgment 

of dismissal in previous case, and should be accorded a preclusive effect in this one. Gallegos, 

560 F. App’x at 669. Finally, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted, i.e, 

Plaintiff, was the same party in the first proceeding.

As Plaintiff appears to be attempting to relitigate an order in an earlier case, it appears 

that this case is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Wright v. Carter, No. C07-

5351FDB, 2007 WL 4562883, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash., Dec. 21, 2007) (adopting 

recommendation and dismissing case on estoppel grounds where “[t]here has been no material 

change in the facts regarding exhaustion since entry of judgment in Wright I”); Clark v. Mason,

No. C04-1647C, 2005 WL 1189577, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash., May 19, 2005) (“[T]he doctrine of 

collateral estoppel should preclude plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether he had 

exhausted administrative remedies for the claims asserted in Leeburg before he filed his 

complaint in that action. While plaintiff asserts that defendants obtained dismissal in Leeburg

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through false testimony and arguments, plaintiff had the opportunity in that case and on appeal 

to address those issues.”).

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

It appears from the face of the complaint that the claims in this case are barred by 

collateral estoppel. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of 

this order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel.

If Plaintiff fails to file a response, this Court will recommend to an assigned district 

judge that this case be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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