Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00292/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00292-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lion Bros
Plaintiff
United States Department of Agriculture
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LION BROS., a California ) 

partnership, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

AGRICULTURE, )

 )

Defendant. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-05-0292 REC SMS

ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION.

On August 22, 2005, the court heard Defendant’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Upon due consideration of the written and oral

arguments of the parties, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion on

the grounds that the Complaint was not ripe when filed.

I. Background

On February 28, 2005, Plaintiff Lion Brothers Farms (“Lion”)

filed a complaint against the United States Department of

Agriculture (“USDA”) alleging that the USDA failed to provide

Lion with agricultural inspections of raisins as requested by

Lion. The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. 

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A. Raisin Inspections Generally

Pursuant to its authority under the Agricultural Marketing

Act of 1946, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq., (the “1946

Act”), the USDA has issued regulations governing the inspection

and certification of certain fresh fruits, vegetables, and

processed products and established standards for grades of those

commodities. Title 7, Part 52 of the Code of Federal Regulations

provides for the inspection and certification of processed fruits

and vegetables, including processed raisins, and the standards

for those commodities. 7 C.F.R. § 52. 

Part 52 also contains the regulations regarding the

application for inspection and grading services under the 1946

Act. It provides that “any interested party” may make and

application for inspections. 7 C.F.R. § 52.5. It further

specifies the procedure for making an application; “[a]n

application for inspection service may be made to the office of

inspection or to any inspector, at or nearest the place where the

service is desired.” 7 C.F.R. § 52.6. An application may be

made orally or in writing and must provide certain necessary

information 

including but not limited to, the name of the product,

name and address of the packer or plant where such

product was packed, the location of the product, its

lot or car number, codes or other identification marks,

the number of containers, the type and size of the

containers, the interest of the applicant in the

product, whether the lot has been inspected previous to

the application by any Federal agency and the purpose

for which inspection is desired.

7 C.F.R. § 52.7. An application must be made in accordance with

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the regulations in part 52 to be considered filed, 7 C.F.R. §

52.8, and failure to comply with the filing procedures may be a

basis for rejecting an inspection request. 7 C.F.R. § 52.10.

Pursuant to its authority under the Agricultural Marketing

Agreement Act of 1937, as amended 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., (the

“1937 Act”), the USDA has also established a marketing order

regulating the handling of raisins produced from grapes grown in

California and establishing minimum grade and condition standards

for both natural condition and packed California raisins (the

“Raisin Marketing Order” or “Order”). The Raisin Marketing Order

is set forth in Title 7, part 989 of the Code of Federal

Regulations. The Raisin Administrative Committee (“RAC”) is

appointed by the USDA to oversee the Raisin Marketing Order.

Part 989 contains the regulations regarding inspections

under the Raisin Marketing order. The Order requires each

“handler” of California raisins to cause “an inspection and

certification to be made of all natural condition raisins

acquired or received” with exceptions not applicable here, 7

C.F.R. § 989.58(d), and sets forth minimum grade and condition

standards for natural condition raisins at 7 C.F.R. § 989.701.

The Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”) is charged with

the administration of the inspection regulations and provides

inspection and grading services to applicants in accordance with

the regulations established pursuant to the 1937 Act and the 1946

Act. Inspections of natural condition and processed raisins are

designed to assess the essential characteristics, class, quality,

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and condition of the product and to determine whether the product

does or does not meet the applicable grade or grade and condition

standards.

B. Lion’s Allegations

Lion is a producer of grapes and raisins in Fresno and

Madera counties. It is not a “handler” of raisins. In October

2004, Lion Raisins, which is a handler of raisins, contacted Ron

Worthley, the Senior Vice President of the RAC, regarding

providing inspections for raisins belonging to Lion that Lion had

agreed to store with Lion Raisins. Compl. Ex. A. 

On October 13, 2004, Mr. Worthley informed Lion Raisins that

there “are no provisions in the Marketing Order” for such an

inspection, i.e. “no provisions that allow a grower to have his

fruit certified as being inspected and meeting the minimum grade

standards for incoming raisins and then hold them for future

delivery to a packer.” Compl. Ex. B (emphasis added). 

On October 20, 2004, Lion wrote to the RAC that it “would

like to have the USDA perform an incoming inspection on about 500

tons of raisins at the Lion Raisins facility.” Compl. Ex. C. To

this Mr. Worthley replied that it was the handler, Lion Raisons,

rather than the producer, Lion, that “would be required to

acquire, place on memorandum storage or return the raisins to the

producer according to the Raisin Marketing Order.” Compl. Ex. D.

Lion responded to this by explaining by fax dated November

2, 2004, that Lion did not want to commit to selling its raisins

to the handler but wanted to obtain an inspection from the USDA

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and then determine how to market its raisins. The fax requested

that Mr. Worthley “confirm USDA will inspect said raisins on

behalf of Lion Brothers ASAP.” Compl. Ex. E. Mr. Worthley

responded that he asked for a review of Lion’s request and that

the USDA was looking into the issue. Compl. Ex. F. 

On November 18, 2004, Bruce Lion, on behalf of Lion, replied

that “I have read through the Marketing Order and I see no reason

not to approve what we have asked to be done.” Compl. Ex. G. 

Mr. Worthley’s response was that the Raisin Marketing Order had

no provision allowing a grower to have raisins certified as being

inspected and that the procedure under the Raisin Marketing Order

requires that a handler have inspections done in its name. 

Compl. Ex. H. Since Lion is not a handler, it would have to

deliver its raisins to a handler for inspection under the

marketing order. 

Lion alleges based on this correspondence that the USDA

impermissibly refused to provide it with inspections. Lion’s

first cause of action alleges that it was entitled to receive

inspections under section 989.58 and 989.158(a)(3) (the Raisin

Marketing Order), as well as under Title 7, Part 52 of the Code

of Federal Regulations. Lion seeks declaratory relief because,

as it is not a handler, it cannot challenge the Raisin Marketing

Order through the USDA’s administrative proceedings.

Lion’s second cause of action seeks an injunction

prohibiting the USDA from precluding Plaintiff from applying for

and receiving incoming USDA inspections.

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 The summary judgment standard should be used if the 1

jurisdictional question is “so intertwined” with the merits of a

case that it depends on resolution of the merits. Steen v. John

Hancock Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 1997). There is

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II. The Current Motion

USDA has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative for summary

judgment on the basis that Lion’s claims are not ripe. The USDA

argues that inspections were never requested of or denied by the

USDA, making Lion’s claims premature. 

Lion asserts that the USDA’s motion should be denied

“because the RAC - the arm of USDA and which body oversees the

Order’s regulations - claimed that it discussed this matter with

USDA and the requested inspections cannot take place.” Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2. Lion argues that it has therefore been denied

inspections and its claim appropriate for judicial review. In

the alternative, Lion asserts that subsequent to USDA’s motion

being filed, Lion specifically requested an inspection from the

USDA and the request was wrongly denied.

III. Legal Standard

“Whether a claim is ripe for adjudication goes to a court’s

subject matter jurisdiction under the case or controversy clause

of article III of the federal Constitution.” St. Clair v. City

of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993 (9th Cir.

1989) (citations omitted). Challenges to a court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, including claims of ripeness, are addressed

under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. “[W]hen considering a motion to 1

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no such intertwining in this case and, even viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to Lion, the outcome would be the same. 

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dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is not

restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any

evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual

disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v.

United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The ripeness doctrine is concerned with whether a “dispute

has yet matured to a point that warrants decision.” 13A C.

Wright, A Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure §

3532 (1984). It is meant to “prevent the courts, through

avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves

in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.

Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580, 87 L. Ed. 2d 409, 105 S. Ct. 3325

(1985) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,

148-49, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967)). If a claim

involves “contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” it is not ripe. 

Id. (quoting 13A C. Wright, A Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal

Practice & Procedure § 3532 (1984)). Ripeness also concerns the

“fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and the “hardship

to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. (quoting

Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 149). 

Ripeness is determined as of the commencement of the

litigation; it “is not a moving target affected by a defendant’s

action.” Makua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D. Haw.

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2001) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189-91, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610, 120 S. Ct.

693 (2000)). “[S]ubsequent ripening of the issue while the

matter is under the court’s consideration on a jurisdictional

motion to dismiss is not sufficient to confer the court with

jurisdiction that did not originally exist when the action was

initiated.” 15 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 101.74 (Matthew

Bender 3d ed. 2005).

IV. Discussion

In support of its motion, USDA offers the declaration of

Mickey Martinez, who is the officer in charge of the Processed

Products Branch Inspection Service for AMS in Fresno, California. 

One of Mr. Martinez’s duties is to supervise the provision of

inspection and grading services for various commodities,

including raisins. Mr. Martinez avers that, as of June 13, 2005,

Lion “has not applied for USDA inspection and certification

services for processed raisins. Nor has Lion Bros.[] applied for

USDA inspection and grading services for natural condition

raisins as a handler, or at all.” Martinez Decl. ¶ 9. 

Lion argues that the sole issue before the court is a legal

one: can “Lion Bros, a producer of raisins [ ] governed by the

Raisin Marketing Order receive and pay for the same inspection

that a handler, also regulated by the same Marketing Order, can

receive and pay for under the grade and condition requirements of

the Marketing Order.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. In other words, Lion

argues that because it is entitled to inspections under the

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Raisin Marketing Order it was wrongful for the RAC to refuse to

perform the requested inspection.

A. Lion Is Not Entitled to Inspections Under the Order 

The Raisin Marketing Order is specific; it states that “Each

handler, shall cause an inspection to be made . . ..” 7 C.F.R. §

989.58(d) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Lion is a

producer and not a handler of raisins. Lion has cited no

language in the Raisin Marketing Order under which it could be

arguable that a producer such as Lion is required to procure

inspections under the Order in the same manner and at the same

rate as handlers. Nor is there any language in the Raisin

Marketing Order that could be said to entitle a producer to

receive inspections pursuant to the Order. This is precisely

what Mr. Worthley communicated to Lion in October of 2004. 

Compl. Ex. B. Because Lion was not required or entitled to

receive inspections under the Order, there can be no argument

that such an inspection was wrongfully denied.

B. Did the Correspondence Between Lion & the RAC Constitute

an Application Pursuant to Part 52?

The only means by which a non-handler such as Lion can

obtain USDA inspections is pursuant to the 1946 Act and the

regulations promulgated thereunder, namely Part 52 of Title 7 of

the Code of Federal Regulations. Part 52 provides that any

“interested party” may request an inspection pursuant to the 1946

Act. Lion, as a producer, would plainly qualify as an

“interested party.” The question of ripeness turns on whether

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Lion applied for inspections pursuant to Part 52.

The USDA argues that Lion’s request to the RAC was

insufficient because the RAC is not an arm of the USDA such that

making a request to the RAC is tantamount to a request of the

USDA. USDA cites Lion Raisins v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 435,

437 (2003), in which the Court of Federal Claims held that the

RAC is a non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (“NAFI”) and

that it was not part of the government such that jurisdiction was

proper in the court of claims. 

Lion argues in response that the RAC is “one and the same”

as the USDA, however Lion has cited, and the court’s own research

has revealed, no authority for this proposition. To the extent

Lion argues that because the RAC consulted with the USDA in

determining that Lion was not entitled to inspections under the

Raisin Marketing Order, the request was properly made to the

USDA, Lion is mistaken. Lion’s correspondence with the RAC

indicates that it is seeking inspections under the Raisin

Marketing Order, see, inter alia, Compl. Ex. G., not as an

“interested party” under Part 52. The issue on which the RAC

consulted with the USDA was unrelated to the application process

under Part 52.

Even if the RAC is part of the USDA, Part 52 provides that

applications for inspection be made to “the office of inspection

or to any inspector, at or nearest the place where service is

desired.” 7 C.F.R. § 52.6. The RAC is not an inspector or an 

inspection office; the regulations relating to the duties of the

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 According to the letter of Mr. Martinez dated June 21, 2005 2

(Leighton Decl. Ex. I), Lion’s request was dated June 15, 2005.

Neither Lion nor USDA submitted a copy of this request. 

 To the extent Lion asserts that Mr. Martinez’s letter 3

claimed inspections are not available to Lion under 7 C.F.R. § 52,

the assertion is unsupported. At no point does the letter imply

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RAC do not indicate that the administration of inspections for

producers is amongst the RAC’s duties. See 7 C.F.R. § 989.36. 

Mr. Martinez, as the Officer in Charge of the AMS inspection

office in Fresno, is the proper party to whom requests for

inspections pursuant to Part 52 should be made.

The correspondence between the RAC and Lion does not amount

to an application for inspection services pursuant to Part 52. 

As no request for an inspection was made by Lion, no application 

was wrongly denied. The Complaint was not ripe for judicial

review when filed.

C. Subsequent Correspondence With USDA is Insufficient

Lion asserts that the USDA’s motion is “disingenuous,” Pl.’s

Opp’n at 3, because after Lion received USDA’s motion to dismiss,

which was filed on June 14, 2005,

Lion Bros. did specifically ask USDA directly what the

government claimed that Plaintiff did not do, and the 2

unequivocal response from the USDA inspection service

of June 21, 2005 claimed that said inspection service

for a producer was not available under the Order or

Part 52 of 7 C.F.R.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 2-3 (citing Leighton Decl. Ex. I). Assuming,

arguendo, that Lion’s letter to Mr. Martinez constituted a proper

application for inspection services and that the response cited

by Lion was an improper refusal, this is insufficient to confer 3

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that Lion cannot receive inspections under part 52. To the

contrary, the letter informs Lion that if it “would like to request

an inspection of natural condition raisins, please submit an

application for inspection services pursuant to section 52.6 of the

regulations governing inspection and certification. 7 C.F.R. §

52.6.” Leighton Decl. Ex. I. 

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subject matter jurisdiction that was lacking when the Complaint

was filed. See Moore’s, supra. 

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the USDA’s motion is hereby

GRANTED.

FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. The clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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