Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-03374/USCOURTS-ca7-16-03374-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terrence Barrett
Appellee
Mark C. Curran
Appellee
Joseph Fusz
Appellee
Christine Hecker
Appellee
Amir Jakupovic
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐3374

AMIR JAKUPOVIC,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MARK C. CURRAN, JR., et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:16‐cv‐03636 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2017

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, FLAUM, Circuit Judge, and

CONLEY, Chief District Judge.*  

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Amir Jakupovic was charged in Lake

County, Illinois with telephone harassment. Before trial, the

state court ordered that Jakupovic first be detained and

then released on electronic surveillance. Jakupovic alleges

                                                  * Of the Western District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 16‐3374

that various state officials acted unlawfully in refusing to re‐

lease him on electronic surveillance because he lacked a Lake

County residence. The district court dismissed Jakupovic’s

claims with prejudice. We conclude the claims are jurisdic‐

tionally barred and vacate and remand with instructions to

dismiss without prejudice.

I. Background

Jakupovic resided in Cook County, Illinois. In September

2015, Jakupovic’s then‐girlfriend filed a domestic battery re‐

port against him in Cook County. Around the same time, the

girlfriend’s mother filed a telephone harassment report

against Jakupovic in Lake County. On September 25, the State

charged Jakupovic with telephone harassment in Lake

County. The trial court released Jakupovic after his brother

posted bond, and, on October 22, Jakupovic pled not guilty.

The trial court ordered that Jakupovic undergo an Ontario

Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (“ODARA”), pursuant to

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110‐5(f). On November 17, the trial court

reviewed the ODARA report and ordered that Jakupovic first

be taken into custody and then placed under pre‐trial elec‐

tronic surveillance.

The Lake County Sheriff’s Department did not release

Jakupovic under electronic surveillance. As alleged, the de‐

partment required pre‐trial detainees to have a Lake County

residence in order to be monitored electronically. Lacking

such a residence, Jakupovic failed to meet this condition. The

next day, on November 18, Jakupovic filed an emergency mo‐

tion, arguing that the electronic monitoring condition on his

bond could not be satisfied because he was not a resident of

Lake County, and that, as a result, he could be subject to in‐

definite custody. The trial court denied Jakupovic’s motion. It

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No. 16‐3374 3

then refused to reconsider the order, concluding that having

a Lake County residence for the purposes of electronic moni‐

toring was one of the conditions of Jakupovic’s bond and his

inability to meet that condition was insufficient grounds for

reconsideration. So the Lake County Sheriff’s Department

continued to detain Jakupovic. Shortly thereafter, Jakupovic

filed a motion to modify his bond conditions. The trial court

scheduled a hearing for November 25, but Jakupovic pled

guilty on November 23. Jakupovic did not file any appeals in

the state courts.

In March 2016, Jakupovic sued Mark Curran (Lake County

Sheriff and Director of the Lake County Jail), Terrence Barrett

(the jail’s Pretrial Unit Manager), Christine Hecker (Lake

County’s Principal Probation Officer), and Joseph Fusz (a

Lake County Assistant State’s Attorney) under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Jakupovic alleged that his six‐day detainment violated

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and constituted false

imprisonment under Illinois law. The district court granted

defendants‐appellees’ motion to dismiss Jakupovic’s com‐

plaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce‐

dure 12(b)(6). This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de

novo. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 382

(7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Proce‐

dure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a complaint for fail‐

ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To properly state a claim, a plaintiff’s com‐

plaint must contain allegations that plausibly suggest that the

plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a

speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chi., 810 F.3d 476, 480

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(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kubiak v. City of Chi., Ill., 137

S. Ct. 491 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omit‐

ted). “We accept as true all of the well‐pleaded facts in the

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [ap‐

pellants].” Id. at 480–81 (citation omitted).

“[W]e are required to consider subject‐matter jurisdiction

as the first question in every case, and we must dismiss this

suit if such jurisdiction is lacking.” Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d

816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Ill. v. City of Chi., 137 F.3d 474,

478 (7th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). We conclude that,

under the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine, we have no jurisdiction

here. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C.

Cir. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). Simply put:

Lower federal courts are not vested with appel‐

late authority over state courts. The Rooker‐Feld‐

man doctrine prevents lower federal courts from

exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by

state court losers challenging state court judg‐

ments rendered before the district court pro‐

ceedings commenced. The rationale for the doc‐

trine is that no matter how wrong a state court

judgment may be under federal law, only the

Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdic‐

tion to review it.

Sykes v. Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741–42

(7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Kelley v. Med‐1 Sols.,

LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A state litigant seeking

review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate

process through the state court system and then directly to the

United States Supreme Court.”) (citation omitted). The initial

inquiry, then, “is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set

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No. 16‐3374 5

aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, present‐

ing an independent claim.” Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,

374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quota‐

tion marks omitted). To make this determination, we ask

whether the federal claims either “directly” challenge a state

court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with one. Id.  

Claims that directly seek to set aside a state court judg‐

ment are de facto appeals that are barred without further anal‐

ysis. Id. But even federal claims that were not raised in state

court, or that do not on their face require review of a state

court’s decision, may still be subject to Rooker‐Feldman if those

claims are inextricably intertwined with a state court judg‐

ment. Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (citation omitted); see also Feldman,

460 U.S. at 482 n.16. While the latter concept is a “somewhat

metaphysical” one, the crucial point is whether the district

court is essentially being called upon to review the state court

decision. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (citation and internal quota‐

tion marks omitted). Ultimately, the “determination hinges on

whether the federal claim alleges that the injury was caused

by the state court judgment, or alternatively, whether the fed‐

eral claim alleges an independent prior injury that the state

court failed to remedy.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742; see also Long v.

Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999). If we

determine that a claim is inextricably intertwined with a state

court judgment—that is, that the former indirectly seeks to set

aside the latter—then we must determine whether the plain‐

tiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state

court proceedings. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (quoting Brokaw v.

Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2002)). If so, the claim is

barred.

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Notably, the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine is a narrow one.

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

“[F]ederal jurisdiction does not terminate automatically on

the entry of judgment in a state court,” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742

(citation omitted), as independent claims are jurisdictionally

firm, Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603 (citation omitted). For a federal

claim to be barred, “there must be no way for the injury com‐

plained of by [the] plaintiff to be separated from [the] state

court judgment.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (citations omitted).

Jakupovic’s claims do not directly seek to set aside the

state trial court’s judgments regarding his electronic‐surveil‐

lance bond condition. Thus, we must determine whether his

claims are inextricably intertwined with those judgments, and

if so, whether he had a reasonable opportunity to raise these

issues in state court proceedings.  

A. Inextricably Intertwined

Jakupovic argues that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine does

not bar his claims, because he does not challenge the state

court’s judgments keeping him detained for lack of a Lake

County residence. Instead, he stresses, he challenges defend‐

ants‐appellees’ “procedure which forced the Plaintiff to unnec‐

essarily be detained in jail for [six] days.” However, when

“the injury is executed through a court order, there is no con‐

ceivable way to redress the wrong without overturning the

order of a state court. Rooker‐Feldman does not permit such an

outcome.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 743.

Kelley and Sykes are instructive. In Kelley, the plaintiff ar‐

gued that it was not the state court’s award of attorney’s fees

that caused his injury, but rather the attorneys’ preceding

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No. 16‐3374 7

fraudulent misrepresentations. 548 F.3d at 605. We concluded,

however, that the plaintiff’s claims were inextricably inter‐

twined with the state court’s judgment, despite the fact that

the allegedly unlawful actions occurred prior to that judg‐

ment, because “[w]e could not determine that defendants’

representations ... related to attorney fees violated the law

without determining that the state court erred by issuing

judgments granting the attorney fees.” Id. Similarly, in Sykes,

the plaintiff asserted that her Americans with Disabilities Act

claims were independent from the state judge’s order denying

the plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodations, be‐

cause they focused on the state judge’s wrongful conduct—in‐

terrogating the plaintiff about her service dog and banning

the dog from the courtroom. 837 F.3d at 742. Nevertheless, alt‐

hough the judge’s conduct preceded the order, we found that

we lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims, because “[i]f the

judge violated the ADA by engaging in impermissible ques‐

tioning or wrongly banning [the dog] from her courtroom,

those alleged violations were also the basis of her order.” Id.

at 743.

Jakupovic’s claims meet the same fate. As alleged, defend‐

ants‐appellees executed the state court’s bond condition and

order, and detained Jakupovic for six days. To find defend‐

ants‐appellees’ conduct unlawful, we would have to deter‐

mine that the state court erred in keeping Jakupovic detained

for lacking a Lake County residence. As such, Jakupovic’s

claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judg‐

ments.

Jakupovic’s reliance on Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665 (7th

Cir. 2006), is misplaced. There, the state court denied the

plaintiff jail credit that he believed he was owed; but he did

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not challenge this decision, as he ultimately got the credit he

sought by raising the issue with the state’s department of cor‐

rections. Id. at 668. The plaintiff instead filed a federal lawsuit

against Department‐of‐Corrections officials for allegedly tak‐

ing too long to administratively grant the plaintiff his credit.

Id. That issue was neither presented to nor decided by the

state court, so the plaintiff’s claim was not inextricably inter‐

twined with any state court judgment. Id. Thus, we con‐

cluded, Rooker‐Feldman presented no jurisdictional bar. Id.

Here, unlike in Burke, the argument Jakupovic now presents

is in essence what he argued below: The residence require‐

ment may lead to indefinite detention. And the state court re‐

jected this argument; so defendants‐appellees executed the

state court’s bond condition and order and kept Jakupovic de‐

tained. Although Jakupovic alleges that defendants‐appellees

detained him under their own residence “policy,” we cannot

find that policy unconstitutional without also concluding that

the state court’s judgments, ordering the same residence re‐

quirement and detainment, were unlawful. See Kelley, 548 F.3d

at 605. So Jakupovic’s claims and the state court’s judgments

are inextricably intertwined.

B. Reasonable Opportunity to Raise in State Court

Although Jakupovic’s claims are inextricably intertwined

with the state court’s judgments, the claims are barred under

Rooker‐Feldman only if he had a reasonable opportunity to

raise the issues in state court proceedings. See Taylor, 374 F.3d

at 534–35; see also Kelley, 548 F.3d 605–06. “The ‘reasonable op‐

portunity’ inquiry focuses not on ripeness, but on difficulties

caused by ‘factor[s] independent of the actions of the oppos‐

ing part[ies] that precluded’ a plaintiff from bringing federal

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No. 16‐3374 9

claims in state court, such as state court rules or procedures.”

Taylor, 374 F.3d at 534–35 (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 558).  

Jakupovic had at least three opportunities to raise in state

court the issues he now raises on appeal. First, he filed an

emergency motion challenging the state court’s bond condi‐

tion, alleging that it could lead to indefinite custody. The court

denied that motion. Second, Jakupovic asked the state court

to reconsider its ruling on the bond condition, but the court

denied that motion, too, and explicitly ordered that Jakupovic

continue to be detained because he did not have a Lake

County residence. Finally, Jakupovic filed a motion to modify

his bond conditions, and the state court scheduled a hearing

for one week later, on November 25; before the hearing, how‐

ever, Jakupovic pled guilty. That Jakupovic had a reasonable

opportunity to present to the state court claims that are inex‐

tricably intertwined with that court’s judgments deprives us

of subject‐matter jurisdiction.

C. Dismissal Without Prejudice

The district court dismissed Jakupovic’s claims with prej‐

udice. Because we conclude that Jakupovic’s claims are juris‐

dictionally barred under Rooker‐Feldman, the complaint

should be dismissed without prejudice. See Frederiksen v. City

of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When the

Rooker‐Feldman doctrine applies, there is only one proper dis‐

position: dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction. A jurisdic‐

tional disposition is conclusive on the jurisdictional question:

the plaintiff cannot re‐file in federal court. But it is without

prejudice on the merits, which are open to review in state

court to the extent the state’s law of preclusion permits.” (cit‐

ing T.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997))).

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the

district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss

Jakupovic’s claims without prejudice for lack of subject‐mat‐

ter jurisdiction.

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