Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00307/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00307-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Norris
Defendant
Glenn Edward Whitham
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

GLENN EDWARD WHITHAM PETITIONER

vs. Civil Case No. 5:04CV00307 HLJ

LARRY NORRIS, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United

States District Court Judge William R. Wilson, Jr. Any party may

serve and file written objections to this recommendation.

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or

legal basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual

finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that

supports your objection. An original and one copy of your

objections must be received in the office of the United States

District Court Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date

of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to

the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result

in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to

submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a

hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 1 of 19
2

the same time that you file your written objections, include the

following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is

inadequate.

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before

the District Judge (if such a hearing is granted)

was not offered at the hearing before the

Magistrate Judge. 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be

introduced at the hearing before the District Judge

in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or

the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the

necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the

Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 402

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

Now before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Glenn Edward Whitham, an inmate of

the Arkansas Department of Correction. Petitioner was charged on

February 17, 1998, with manufacturing methamphetamine. He filed a

motion to quash his arrest warrant and a motion to suppress

evidence discovered pursuant to the search warrant. The trial

court held a hearing on November 5, 1998, and denied both motions

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 2 of 19
3

(Respondent’s Exhibit 2). On November 10, 1998, Petitioner entered

a conditional guilty plea (Respondent’s Exhibit 3), and he received

a sentence of thirty years imprisonment. He appealed the denial of

his motion to suppress to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which

affirmed his conviction. Whitham v. State, 69 Ark.App. 62 (2000)

(Respondent’s Exhibit 4). Petitioner states he filed a petition

for rehearing that was denied on March 1, 2000, and that the

Arkansas Supreme Court denied a petition for review (DE # 1,

Petition, pp. 2 & 7). He filed a motion for post-conviction relief

under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which

the trial court denied, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed in

an unpublished per curiam opinion, Whitham v. State, 2003 WL

22100472 (Ark. Sept. 11, 2003)(Respondent’s Exhibit 5). 

In the present proceeding, Petitioner raises the following

grounds for relief:

1. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to establish his standing to contest the

violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and

state law;

2. Appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to

establish his standing to assert his Fourth Amendment

rights; and

3. The decisions of the Arkansas courts in denying

relief to Petitioner, although he was situated

identically to his co-defendant, violate his right to

due process and equal protection.

Respondent admits Petitioner is in his custody and that he has

exhausted all available state remedies, but he contends the

petition should be dismissed.

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 3 of 19
4

I.

In its opinion rejecting Petitioner’s Rule 37 appeal, the

Arkansas Supreme Court gave the following statement of facts from

the record:

On February 9, 1998, Bobby Pierce arrived at his

girlfriend's apartment, # 49, to find appellant sleeping

in one of the bedrooms. After being awakened, appellant

began smoking methamphetamine, and explaining how to cook

it. He asked Mr. Pierce to obtain pseudoephedrine to

prepare methamphetamine. It was decided that the cooking

of the methamphetamine would take place in the next door

apartment, # 50.

Mr. Pierce left the apartment, and contacted his brother,

a member of the Drug Task Force. Officers provided Mr.

Pierce with pseudoephedrine, which he took to appellant

in apartment # 50. Appellant immediately began to break

apart the pseudoephedrine pellets. The police obtained

a search warrant for apartment # 50 and executed it in

the early morning hours of February 10, 1998. Appellant

was present, along with what was described as a “meth

lab.”

Whitham v. State 2003 WL 22100472 at 1. 

Petitioner’s co-defendant, Stephen Scott Whitaker, was also

present in the apartment. The police arrested both men and charged

both with manufacturing methamphetamine. Both defendants filed

motions to suppress the evidence taken during the search,

challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit underlying the

nighttime search warrant for the apartment. The trial court

denied Petitioner’s motion, and he entered a conditional guilty

plea pursuant to Rule 24.3(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal

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5

Procedure, which allowed him to appeal the denial of his motion to

suppress. 

The trial court denied Whitaker’s motion to suppress also.

He went to trial before a jury, was convicted and received a fortyyear sentence of imprisonment. He also appealed to the Arkansas

Court of Appeals, which decided his appeal before it decided

Petitioner’s. The court found Whitaker’s motion to suppress should

have been granted on the ground that the affidavit in support of

the search warrant failed to state sufficient facts to justify a

nighttime search, and it reversed Whitaker’s conviction on that

basis. Whitaker v. State, 1999 WL 1212494 (Ark. App. Dec. 15,

1999)(unpublished). 

A different panel of the court rejected Petitioner’s appeal

of the denial of his motion to suppress, finding he had not

established “standing” to challenge the search, although standing

had not been an issue before the trial court, and the trial court

had not denied his motion on that basis. Whitham v. State, 69

Ark.App. at 63-64. The Court of Appeals stated:

Although an overnight guest in a home may claim the

protection of the Fourth Amendment, one who is merely

present with the home owner's consent may not. Minnesota

v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373

(1998). The only information pertinent to this issue is

the fact that appellant had been sleeping in apartment

# 49, and, specifically, not apartment # 50 that was the

object of the search. There is simply no evidence to

suggest that appellant was an overnight guest in the

Wallings' apartment. Furthermore, there was no evidence

presented regarding appellant's relationship to the

Wallings or that appellant had any other purpose in the

Wallings' apartment aside from his illegal activity. We

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6

cannot reach the constitutionality of the search where

appellant has failed to show that he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the apartment that was

ultimately searched. Rankin v. State, 57 Ark.App. 125,

942 S.W.2d 867 (1997).

Id. 

II.

The court will first address Petitioner’s ground three, his

claim that the state court’s decision denying him relief, although

he was situated identically to Whitaker, violated his right to due

process and equal protection. Respondent contends this claim is

procedurally barred because it was not raised properly in state

court, and that, even if it is properly before this court,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief because Fourth Amendment

claims are personal in nature and he had the burden of establishing

his own rights were violated by the challenged search. Petitioner

states he presented this argument in his Rule 37 proceedings, and

he contends the Arkansas Supreme Court’s finding in his postconviction appeal that “Rule 37 is not meant to function as a

second opportunity to petition for rehearing or review” was an

unreasonable application of Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001),

and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 

The phrase “unreasonable application” is language from 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which provides as follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

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7

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Petitioner does

not cite the statute or Williams, and he does not explain this

reference. In any event, I find neither Williams nor the statute

are applicable to ground three, because no state court addressed

the merits of the claim. Taylor v. Bowersox 329 F.3d 963, 968 (8th

Cir. 2003). In addition, the only two cases cited by Petitioner,

Fiore v. White and Griffin v. Illinois, do not specifically address

Petitioner’s due process and equal protection issues, and therefore

are not “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent supporting

his claims. Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005)(holding that a

petitioner may not obtain habeas corpus relief on claim he was

denied access to a law library while he was representing himself in

state court, because there is no clearly established precedent

addressing the issue). 

As for Respondent’s procedural default argument, if a

petitioner has not properly presented his claim to the state

courts, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977), requires him

to demonstrate adequate cause for this default and actual prejudice

resulting from the constitutional violation he asserts. Coleman v.

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8

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991). If he is unable to satisfy the

cause and prejudice requirement, the court may still consider the

claim if he establishes a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is "actually innocent" and

the failure to hear the claim would result in a "fundamental

miscarriage of justice." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495

(1986). 

Petitioner contends in a conclusory manner that, to the extent

the Arkansas Supreme Court’s refusal to address the claim is

considered a procedural bar, its finding is not based on an

adequate state ground. He also makes the conclusory assertion that

the due process and equal protection claims were fully and fairly

presented to the state court. He asserted in his petition that he

filed a petition for rehearing, which the Arkansas Court of Appeals

denied, and that he unsuccessfully petitioned the Arkansas Supreme

Court for review, but he has not submitted copies of such petitions

or the orders denying relief. Because Petitioner’s assertions are

unsupported by facts or legal authority, the court will not

consider them. I find Petitioner procedurally defaulted ground

three when he did not raise it in his direct appeal proceedings

before the Arkansas Court of Appeals or the Arkansas Supreme Court,

and he has not established sufficient cause for the default. I

further find he has not asserted the existence of any “new reliable

evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 8 of 19
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that was not presented at trial,” which shows a "constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327-328

(1995); Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998).

Further, I find Petitioner has not established he would be

prejudiced by this court’s failure to consider the ground. The

Supreme Court has held that, “[i]nconsistency in a verdict is not

a sufficient reason for setting it aside,” even where the

inconsistent verdicts occurred in a joint bench trial. Harris v.

Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345 (1981). In Petitioner’s and Whitaker’s

cases, two different panels of an appeals court considered

different issues in separately appealed cases. As far as the court

can discern, the question of standing did not arise in Whitaker’s

case, and even if it had and that panel mistakenly granted Whitaker

relief, Petitioner would not be entitled to the benefit of that

mistake. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554-555

(1962)(holding the “Fourteenth Amendment does not ‘assure

uniformity of judicial decisions ....’”). Petitioner has not

attempted to distinguish his case from the general rule in Rivera

and Beck. The question simply comes back to whether Petitioner can

show he had standing to challenge the search, a question barred

from habeas review by Stone. I find he has not established he

would be entitled to relief on ground three.

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 9 of 19
1 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976), prohibits a

federal habeas court from reviewing Petitioner’s claims under the

Fourth Amendment, since the State of Arkansas provided him with the

opportunity to litigate them, and Petitioner does not contend the

procedures themselves were not “full and fair.” However, a Sixth

Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on

counsel’s alleged failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim, or to

pursue the claim adequately, may be addressed in habeas

proceedings. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1986);

Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1150 n6 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1010 (1998). 

10

III.

In ground one, Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to establish he had standing to challenge the search of

apartment #50.1 He contends his attorney should have elicited

testimony at his suppression hearing from Bobby Pierce that

Pierce’s girlfriend had evicted Petitioner and Whitaker from

Apartment #49 the night of the search, and that he should have

presented Corey Walling’s testimony that Whitaker and Petitioner

had spent several nights in Apartment #50 with the Wallings prior

to the evening of the search. He argues this testimony would have

established he and Whitaker were overnight guests in apartment #50,

which would have established he had standing to challenge the

search. Thus, he concludes, he would have obtained the same result

in the appeal of his motion to suppress as Whitaker. He also

asserts counsel failed to present Petitioner’s own testimony, but

he does not state what that testimony would have been. The court

presumes it would have been the same testimony he alleges Pierce

and Walling would have given.

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 10 of 19
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The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the merits of this claim

in Petitioner’s Rule 37 appeal. The court recognized the longestablished general standard for reviewing claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. 

To determine the competency of counsel, we apply the

standard adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in which the

petitioner must prove that ‘counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that,

but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different.’”

Whitham v. State, 2003 WL 22100472, at 1. The court also noted

there is a presumption counsel is competent and it is a defendant’s

burden to overcome that presumption. Id. In addition, the court

cited to the standard for prejudice articulated by the Supreme

Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), when the Court

first applied Strickland to a defendant who had entered a guilty

plea, that such a defendant must establish “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Whitham

v. State, 2003 WL 22100472, at 1. 

The court concluded Petitioner had not satisfied the first

prong of the Strickland test in that he had not established

counsel’s conduct was unreasonable. The court found counsel had 

elicited testimony at the suppression hearing that

appellant had moved from apartment # 49 to apartment #

50, and that the search warrant was executed at 2:55 a.m.

Also, Mr. Pierce testified at the suppression hearing

that appellant and Mr. Whitaker planned on spending the

night in apartment # 50, where they were going to

manufacture methamphetamine.” 

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 11 of 19
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Id. at 2. The court further found Petitioner had not presented

Pierce’s testimony at the Rule 37 hearing and he had not alleged

that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at 2-3. 

Instead, appellant alleges that, but for his counsel's

alleged error, the court of appeals would have reached

a different decision in his direct appeal. In effect,

appellant's alleged prejudice would require this court

to review the court of appeal's resolution of the

standing issue.” 

Id. The court concluded this was insufficient to allege prejudice,

and denied relief on this issue. 

As the court touched upon above, under the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal habeas court

may “undertake only a ‘limited and deferential review of [the]

underlying state court decisions.’” Morales v. Ault, 476 F.3d 545,

549 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 177 (2007); Lomholt v. Iowa,

327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1059 (2003).

This court may only determine whether the conviction or sentence

violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 389. The question under AEDPA

is whether the Petitioner seeks to apply a rule of law that was

clearly established by the United States Supreme Court at the time

his state court conviction became final. Id. at 379 (Stevens, J.

concurring). If he is, he is entitled to relief if the state

court’s decision was either “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,” that established law. Id. at 391.

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 12 of 19
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‘[A]n unreasonable application of [the Supreme Court's]

precedent’ occurs ‘if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court's]

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts.’ Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d

389 (2000) (O'Connor, J.). To be unreasonable, the state

court's application of Supreme Court precedent ‘must have

been more than incorrect or erroneous.’ Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471

(2003). Rather, the application ‘must have been

objectively unreasonable.’ Id. (internal quotation

omitted).

Garcia v. Mathes, 474 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Petitioner argues the state court employed the wrong standard

and it wrongfully failed to consider his prejudice argument. He

contends the correct standard under Strickland and Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 477 U.S. at 375, is “whether the failure to establish

standing is outside the range of professionally competent

assistance,” and whether there is a reasonable probability that the

result of the suppression proceeding would have been different.

Petition, p. 10. 

Neither party cited to any Supreme Court cases involving the

same legal and factual circumstances involved here. However, I

find Strickland, Kimmelman and Hill are clearly established Supreme

Court precedent from which to determine the standard for reviewing

a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on

a Fourth Amendment issue arising from the denial of a motion to

suppress. Kimmelman involved the failure of an attorney to file a

motion to suppress prior to trial. The Court held that, in

addition to the performance prong of the Strickland standard, a

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2 A state court is not required to cite specific cases, or

even be aware of them “so long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts” Supreme Court

precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). Thus, it is

immaterial whether the state court cited the correct standard.

14

petitioner must also show the Fourth Amendment claim had merit and

there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been

different, absent the excludable evidence. Id. at 374-375. Even

if a Fourth Amendment claim had merit and certain evidence should

have been excluded, there may have been sufficient evidence,

properly admitted, to support a guilty verdict. Since Kimmelman

involved a trial, its Strickland prejudice prong necessarily speaks

in terms of verdicts, but it follows that, in cases involving

guilty pleas, the correct standard for the prejudice prong must be

a combination of the Hill standard and the Fourth Amendment prong

of Kimmelman. Therefore the ineffective assistance of counsel

standard in Petitioner’s case is whether counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, whether the Fourth

Amendment claim has merit and, if so, whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the excludable evidence, Petitioner would

not have entered a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to

trial.2 Further, in this case, the question of whether the Fourth

Amendment claim has merit must first focus on what is at issue

here, which is whether Petitioner had standing to challenge the

search, before it reaches the ultimate question decided in Whitaker

of whether the search was improper.

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 14 of 19
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The Supreme Court has held that “capacity to claim the

protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ··· upon whether the

person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Minnesota v. Carter

525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998), quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,

143 (1978). Status as an overnight guest is alone sufficient to

show that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

residence, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), but one who is

merely present with the consent of the householder does not have

such an expectation. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. 

In Minnesota v. Olson, Olson and Joseph Ecker were suspected

of bank robbery. Ecker was apprehended when he and Olson tried to

return to Ecker’s home following the robbery, but Olson escaped.

Police learned that Olson, who had his own residence, had stayed

with Ecker several days before the robbery, and had fled to a

duplex rented by a woman and her daughter. Olson spent the night

of the robbery at the duplex, where he had a change of clothes with

him. The day after the robbery, Police stormed the unit without a

warrant and arrested Olson. 495 U.S. 93-94. The Court found Olson

was an overnight guest at the duplex and “he had an expectation of

privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as

reasonable.” Id. at 96-97.

In Minnesota v. Carter, the defendants were merely present in

a home to package cocaine, and the Court found 

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 15 of 19
3 Mr. Pierce testified Petitioner and Whitaker were “looking

for a place real hard, trying to find a place to” manufacture the

drugs. Respondent’s Exhibit 2, p. 377. Ms. Walling, the person

who rented apartment #50, told police Petitioner was not even in

the apartment when she went to bed that evening. Respondent’s

Exhibit 6, p. 9.

16

If we regard the overnight guest in Minnesota v. Olson

as typifying those who may claim the protection of the

Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely

“legitimately on the premises” as typifying those who may

not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in

between. But the purely commercial nature of the

transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period

of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous

connection between respondents and the householder, all

lead us to conclude that respondents' situation is closer

to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We

therefore hold that any search which may have occurred

did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.

There is ample evidence in the record that Petitioner and Mr.

Whitaker were merely in apartment #50 to “cook” the drugs before

they left town the next day,3 and it is a close question as to what

impact the additional testimony would have had on the question of

Petitioner’s standing. Thus, I find it was not objectively

unreasonable for the Arkansas Supreme Court to determine, under the

performance prong of the Strickland standard, that Petitioner did

not establish counsel’s conduct in not presenting the evidence was

unreasonable. I further find that, even if the testimony had been

presented, it would not have been objectively unreasonable for the

state court to determine Petitioner did not have standing to

challenge the search, and therefore he could not establish that,

absent counsel’s conduct, he would not have entered a guilty plea

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 16 of 19
4 If there is no procedure through which to present the

claim, there can be no procedural default.

17

and he would have insisted on going to trial. Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on ground one.

IV.

Ground two is Petitioner’s assertion that appellate counsel

were ineffective because they failed to argue on direct appeal that

Petitioner had standing to challenge the search and they failed to

emphasize certain points regarding the standing issue. Petitioner

also argues counsel did not object when the State raised the

standing issue for the first time on appeal, although such was

prohibited by State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188 (1990), at the time.

Petitioner raised these issues in his Rule 37 proceeding, but the

Arkansas Supreme Court found they were not cognizable because,

under that Rule, “the sole issue is whether the plea was

intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent

counsel.” Respondent’s Exhibit 5, p. 6. Respondent contends these

claims are procedurally barred, but he does not assert what avenue

Petitioner had in which to raise them in state court, and this

court will not consider the argument.4

Respondent also argues Petitioner’s reliance on State v. Houpt

is misplaced. The Arkansas Court of Appeals has distinguished

Houpt. 

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 17 of 19
18

The dissent contends that, because the State argues

appellant's lack of standing for the first time on

appeal, the issue cannot be considered by this court. The

three cases cited for that proposition are Arkansas Game

& Fish Commission v. Murders, 327 Ark. 426, 938 S.W.2d

854 (1997); Pulaski County v. Carriage Creek Improvement

District No. 639, 319 Ark. 12, 888 S.W.2d 652 (1994); and

State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188, 788 S.W.2d 239 (1990). In

each of those cases, however, the appellant raised the

appellee's lack of standing for the first time on appeal

in an effort to obtain a reversal. The supreme court

held only that lack of standing is not a jurisdictional

defect of the sort that will allow an appellant to make

an argument for reversal for the first time on appeal.

In none of those cases did the court do any violence to

the longstanding rule that we may affirm the result

reached by the trial court, if correct, even though the

reason given by the trial court may have been wrong. See

Summers v. State, 292 Ark. 237, 729 S.W.2d 147 (1987)

(trial court's decision affirmed although the decision

should have been based on a different reason, which was

not argued by the appellee in the trial court); Garcia

v. State, 18 Ark.App. 110, 711 S.W.2d 176 (1986) (trial

court's decision affirmed, albeit for a reason neither

relied upon by the trial court nor argued below by the

appellee). The dissent also incorrectly states that the

issue of standing was argued to and clearly addressed by

the trial court in each of the cases cited in the text

of this majority opinion. In fact, the opinions in Dixon

v. State, supra; McCoy v. State, supra; Littlepage v.

State, supra; and Davasher v. State, supra, do not state

that the State argued the issue in the trial court, much

less that the trial court ruled on the question.

Nevertheless, in each case, the supreme court affirmed

the denial of the motion to suppress because the

appellant had failed to establish his standing to raise

a Fourth Amendment challenge in the first place. In

fact, the opinions in McCoy and Littlepage state

specifically that the trial court denied the appellants'

motions on the merits of their Fourth Amendment

arguments, and indicate only that the State argued on

appeal the appellants' failure to establish standing.

See also Fernandez v. State, 303 Ark. 230, 795 S.W.2d 52

(1990) (trial court denied motion to suppress because it

found challenged search consensual, but supreme court

affirmed because appellant failed to establish standing;

no indication of what State argued either below or on

appeal); Duckett v. State, 268 Ark. 687, 600 S.W.2d 18

(1980) (trial court's denial of motion to suppress, which

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 18 of 19
5 These allegations include the ones made in ground one and

the assertions that investigators’ notes indicate that the

informant told investigators that the defendants were staying in

apartment #50 and that the Wallings’ daughter brought defendants’

their clothes. 

19

was based on merits of the challenge, was affirmed by

court of appeals on account of appellants' lack of

standing, “a matter not discussed in the parties'

briefs”).

Ramage v. State, 61 Ark.App. 174, 178 (1998). Thus, there was no

basis to challenge the State’s assertion of standing under Houpt.

In addition, given the court’s resolution of ground one, I find

Petitioner has not shown he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

include in their brief the allegations in ground one in support of

his argument that he was an overnight guest in apartment #50.5

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on ground two.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this petition be, and it is

hereby, dismissed with prejudice. The relief prayed for is denied.

SO ORDERED this 9th day of September, 2008.

 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:04-cv-00307-BRW Document 11 Filed 09/09/08 Page 19 of 19