Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04247/USCOURTS-ca4-09-04247-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry Glen Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 09-4247

BARRY GLEN THOMPSON, a/k/a

Barry G. Thompson,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg.

Joseph R. Goodwin, Chief District Judge.

(6:95-cr-00115-1)

Argued: December 4, 2009

Decided: February 23, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY,

Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory

wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Michael joined.

Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for AppelAppeal: 09-4247 Doc: 30 Filed: 02/23/2010 Pg: 1 of 9
lant. Monica Kaminski Schwartz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public

Defender, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.

Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Charleston, West

Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

The defendant, Barry Glen Thompson ("Thompson"), challenges the district court’s revoking his supervised release and

sentencing him to eighteen-months imprisonment. Thompson

claims the district court’s failure to explain its chosen sentence was plainly unreasonable. We agree, vacate Thompson’s sentence, and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

I.

On January 20, 2009, the United States Probation Office

petitioned to revoke Thompson’s supervised release. The petition alleged that Thompson had been arrested on two counts

of battery on, and obstruction of, a police officer and that he

had possessed methamphetamine. The petition also alleged

that Thompson had twice previously violated his supervisedrelease terms by testing positive for narcotics.

At his revocation hearing, Thompson conceded that the

government could prove the charged violations. The district

court then determined that under the applicable, non-binding

policy tables, Thompson faced between twelve- and eighteenmonths imprisonment. Neither party objected to the calculation.

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The court next gave each party an opportunity to argue for

the appropriate sentence. The government emphasized that

Thompson had committed battery on two police officers and

had done so at 2:00 a.m., which it believed was relevant.

Counsel for Thompson argued that it was his first violation,

he had minor children, and that he had been gainfully

employed since his initial release. Thompson also argued that

he had notified the police of loose ammunition in the squad

car following his arrest. Given this, Thompson sought a sixmonth prison term, followed by supervised release.

The court then sentenced Thompson to eighteen-months

imprisonment followed by supervised release. Only when

defense counsel requested that Thompson be allowed to selfreport to prison did the court note that Thompson was probably not a flight risk, but that based on Thompson’s history,

conduct, and characteristics, the court could not say that he

was not a danger to the community. Thompson timely

appealed.

II.

This Court reviews whether or not sentences imposed upon

revocation of supervised release are within the prescribed statutory range and are not "plainly unreasonable." United States

v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006). The government argues that plain-error review applies here because

Thompson never objected below to the adequacy of the district court’s sentencing explanation. As we explained in our

recent decision United States v. Lynn, ___ F.3d ___, 2010

U.S. App. LEXIS 1927 (4th Cir. Jan 28, 2010), though, a

defendant need only ask for a sentence outside the range calculated by the court prior to sentencing in order to preserve

his claim for appellate review. Id. at *13. Because Thompson

did so here by requesting a six-month sentence, rather than a

sentence within the advisory range calculated by the district

court, we decline to apply plain-error review and proceed to

review whether his sentence is plainly unreasonable.

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III.

When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly

unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th

Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. Thompson claims that

his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district

court failed to provide an adequate explanation for its chosen

sentence. We agree.

a.

Revocation sentences are governed by non-binding, policy

statements in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7(A)(1). Though a district court

must consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and other

statutory provisions applicable to revocation sentences, the

court has broad discretion to impose a particular sentence.

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438; see Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656.

That discretion has some limits. A district court commits

significant procedural error where it "fail[s] to adequately

explain the chosen sentence." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007). This requirement applies "[r]egardless of

whether the district court imposes an above, below, or withinGuidelines sentence." United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325,

330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a postconviction sentence, but it still "must provide a statement of

reasons for the sentence imposed." Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657.

The district court provided no such statement here. Instead,

it simply stated: "It’s the judgment of the Court the defendant

be committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons

for a term of 18 months." J.A. 42.* We may be hard-pressed

*Citations to J.A. __ refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties

upon appeal. 

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to find any explanation for within-range, revocation sentences

insufficient given the amount of deference we afford district

courts when imposing these sentences; but a district court

may not simply impose sentence without giving any indication of its reasons for doing so. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657.

Were we to hold otherwise, district courts could effectively

thwart appellate review of any within-range revocation sentences they impose. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

The government argues that the district court’s statement

after sentencing Thompson made clear its reasons for imposing that sentence. When Thompson requested voluntary surrender, the district court stated, "[b]ased on the character and

the conduct and history of the defendant, I can’t find that

there’s not a danger to the community, although I doubt

there’s a risk of flight." J.A. 43. This statement, the government claims, shows that the court adequately considered the

relevant sentencing factors when imposing sentence. We

decline to reach such a speculative conclusion.

It is true that in some cases, a district court’s reasons for

imposing a within-range sentence may be clear from context,

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007), including the

court’s statements to the defendant throughout the sentencing

hearing. Lynn, 2010 U.S. App. 1927 at *31. But those other

statements must actually relate to the imposed sentence, not

some distinct, penological or administrative question. The district court’s statement here did not explain the sentence it

imposed; rather, it explained the court’s reasons for not allowing voluntary surrender. Under the circumstances, we cannot

impute the district court’s reasoning for the latter to the former. The sentence was therefore procedurally unreasonable.

b.

Having determined that the district court’s failure to

explain its chosen sentence was unreasonable, we must now

consider whether it was plainly so. To determine whether a

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sentence is plainly unreasonable, this Court looks to the definition of "plain" used in plain-error analysis. Crudup, 461

F.3d at 439. For a sentence to be plainly unreasonable, therefore, it must run afoul of clearly settled law. See United States

v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005).

It is indeed true that the law as it relates to federal sentencing is in a state of flux, and that this Court, like our sister circuits, is still in the process of implementing many of the

Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements. See, e.g., Lynn,

2010 U.S. App. 1927 at *3; Carter, 564 F.3d at 330. We are

certain, though, that the district court’s obligation to provide

some basis for appellate review when imposing a revocation

sentence, however minimal that basis may be, has been settled

in this Circuit since at least Moulden. 478 F.3d at 657. Given

how clearly settled this requirement is, even as it applies to

revocation sentences, the district court’s failure to provide any

reasons for its sentence contravened clear circuit precedent

and was, therefore, plainly unreasonable.

c.

Finally, we cannot be sure that the district court’s failure to

justify the sentence imposed was harmless. For a procedural

sentencing error to be harmless, the government must prove

that the error did not have a "‘substantial and injurious effect

or influence’ on the result." Lynn, 2010 U.S. App. 1927 at *33

(quoting United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir.

2003)). Here, the government does not argue that the error

was harmless, and we cannot presume that it was under these

circumstances. Had the court explicitly considered Thompson’s non-frivolous argument that he deserved leniency

because he had completed nearly all of his supervised release

without incident, it could conceivably have given him a lower

sentence. See id.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Thompson’s sentence

and remand to the district court for a new hearing.

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VACATED AND REMANDED

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Barry Thompson violated the terms of his supervised

release in being arrested on two counts for assaulting police

officers; by possessing methamphetamine; and by twice testing positive for cocaine. The district court revoked his supervised release and imposed an 18-month sentence of

imprisonment, which was within the range recommended by

the Sentencing Guidelines.

Ordinarily, we review a sentence under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard, reversing only for unreasonableness.

See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). But in

reviewing a sentence for violation of supervised release, our

standard is yet more deferential, as we may reverse only if we

find the sentence was "plainly unreasonable." See United

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006).

I respectfully submit that the majority opinion in this case

affords the district court an inadequate measure of deference,

demanding that the district court state reasons that are obvious

from the record, from the arguments counsel made to the

court, and from what the court said and did.

The court found multiple violations of the terms of Thompson’s supervised release. It explained that the violations were

of the "most serious grade," resulting in a Guidelines range of

12 to 18 months’ imprisonment. It imposed a sentence within

the recommended Guidelines range. It explained, in denying

Thompson the opportunity to surrender voluntarily that it

could not find that Thompson was "not a danger to the community." And finally, it explained:

You did such a long stretch. I thought you were

going to make it. You’ve got 18 months of supervised release when you get out the next time. If you

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can just do that without getting in trouble, you can

be free of this stuff. I hope you can do that. Good

luck to you.

This record adequately satisfies the Supreme Court’s standard in sentencing a defendant within the Guidelines range.

As the Court explained in Rita v. United States:

The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.

Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply to apply

the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not

necessarily require lengthy explanation. Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his

decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that

the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in

terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge found

that the case before him is typical.

551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In Rita, the sentencing judge listened to the arguments

of counsel, which requested a downward departure, and then

simply observed that a sentence at the bottom end of the

Guidelines range was "appropriate." Id. at 358-59. Approving

the explanation, the Court said what is particularly appropriate here:

We acknowledge that the judge might have said

more. He might have added explicitly that he had

heard and considered the evidence and argument;

that (as no one before him denied) he thought the

Commission in the Guidelines had determined a sentence that was proper in the mine run of roughly similar perjury cases; and he found that Rita’s personal

circumstances here were simply not different enough

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to warrant a different sentence. But context and the

record made clear that this, or similar, reasoning

underlies the judge’s conclusion. Where a matter is

conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the

record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe

the law requires the judge to write more extensively.

Id. at 359.

The record in this case is strikingly similar to that presented

in Rita, except in this case we owe the district court even

more deference because the defendant was back, after having

been originally sentenced, for a revocation of his supervised

release. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438.

While the majority opinion properly articulates the standards for reviewing a district court’s sentence, its holding in

this specific case falls elsewhere.

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