Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03107/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Sylvia Young
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 1997 Decided March 11, 1997

No. 96-3107

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SYLVIA YOUNG,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96ms00021)

Evelina J. Norwinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were

on the brief. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Kristina L. Ament, Attorney, United States Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellee, with

whom William D. Braun, Trial Attorney, was on the brief.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: This criminal contempt conviction arose out of a civil class-action suit

in which District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("DOC") employees alleged that they had

been victims ofsexual harassment and retaliation. Appellant Sylvia Young was convicted of criminal

contempt for violating a court order issued in conjunction with the sexual harassment lawsuit that

enjoined DOC, together with all its agents and employees, from taking or threatening any retaliatory

action against witnesses testifying in the lawsuit. Young was sentenced to 180 days in prison. On

appeal, she claims that her conviction should be reversed for two reasons: (1) there was insufficient

evidence to convict her because the court order from which the contempt charge arose was not

sufficiently clear and specific; and (2) the district court violated her rights under the Due Process

Clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) by failing to provide her with adequate notice

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1The district court's judgment against the Department of Corrections in that case was reversed

by this court. See Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

2The memorandum, which was dated March 16, 1995, and which accompanied the distribution

of the March 15 order to Department of Corrections employees, stated:

Anyone who violates this March 15, 1995 Order ... may be found in criminal

contempt of court and be fined and/or imprisoned. The court has made it

extremely clear that no violations of the spirit or letter of [court orders protecting

plaintiffs and witnesses] will be acceptable.

The seriousness of this matter cannot be overstated. Sexual harassment and

retaliation will not [be] tolerated. Each employee will be held accountable for

ensuring that the D.C. Department of Corrections is a workplace that is free from

all forms of discrimination, including sexual harassment and retaliation.

App. A10. 

of the charges against her in its show cause order. We find that neither of these two claims has merit

and affirm the conviction. Young did not challenge her sentence, and therefore its appropriateness

is not at issue in this appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time of the events that gave rise to this criminal contempt conviction, appellant Sylvia

Young had been employed as a DOC corrections officer for approximately seven years. During her

tenure, a number of other DOC employees brought a class action alleging sexual harassment and

retaliation. See Bessye Neal v. Margaret Moore, Acting Director, D.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.

93cv2420 (RCL).1 On March 15, 1995, the district court judge presiding over the Bessye Neal case

issued a preliminary injunction stating that

2. Defendants, together with all of their agents and employees, are enjoined from

taking any retaliatory action, or making any threats of retaliatory action, against any

person who has been or may be called to testify as a witness in this case, and who is

listed on Exhibit A, attached hereto.

Appendix ("App.") A1 (emphasis added). The district court directed DOC to distribute copies of the

order to all Department employees, to post the order at Department facilities, and to ensure that the

order was read at roll calls. Accordingly, DOC circulated the court order to all its employees, along

with a supplementarymemorandumexplaining the order's meaning and import.2 On March 17, 1995,

Young (along with all other DOC employees) individually signed a document certifying that she had

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3Copies of the Post article had been left at the Transportation Unit dispatch office on Monday,

March 6, 1995, which was Brown's first day back at work after testifying. 

received and read the March 15 order and that she understood she was bound by it.

Like appellant, Yvonne Brown was employed as a corrections officer at DOC. In early 1995,

both Brown and appellant were assigned to DOC's Transportation Unit in Lorton, Virginia. Brown

was a dispatcher, and was chiefly responsible for assigning other officersto transport inmatesto court

or to other appointments. Correctional officers assigned to the Transportation Unit receive and

return their equipment at the dispatch office at the beginning and end of each shift. Brown was one

of the witnesses in the Bessye Neal case and was therefore listed on Exhibit A to the court's March

15 order. On March 3, 1995, Brown testified that Lieutenant Laviska Gerald, a friend of Young's

and a supervisor in the unit in which Brown worked, had sexually harassed Brown.

Brown and Young worked differentshifts, but their timesin the office often overlapped. Prior

to March 6, 1995, Brown and Young had a "cordial" working relationship. However, on March 6,

followingBrown'stestimonyagainst Gerald and a subsequent article in the Washington Post detailing

that testimony,3the relationship between Young and Brown changed dramatically for the worse.

Young began to threaten and verbally harass Brown. On March 6, appellant came to the dispatch

office door where Brown was working and said, "I have to be careful about what I say because

motherfuckers will have you in court telling shit like they did [about] Gerald." App. B26. On March

9, appellant approached the dispatch door where Brown was working and said, "I'mnot going to talk

in here because this telling bitch that got Gerald in trouble is in here." App. B27. On March 14,

appellant walked up to the dispatch office door and told Brown, "Don't let me catch you smoking in

here because I'm telling because I want to get paid." App. B73-74. When Brown responded by

commenting about Young'sregular paycheck, appellant retorted, "That's not what I'm talking about.

I'm talking about getting paid like you and Wyatt [another witness in the Bessye Neal litigation]."

On March 15, the district court issued its injunction forbidding any and all DOC employees

or agents from engaging in retaliatory conduct based on the pending sexual harassment suit. Even

subsequent to that date, however, Young's harassing comments and actions continued. On March

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22, appellant approached the dispatch office door to turn in her equipment to Brown and said, "Get

off your ass and take this equipment before I slap you." App. B31. On April 21, appellant walked

up to the dispatch office door and told Brown, "You better get the hell out of here with that

cigarette." Brown countered that appellant was "off duty and you have been off and you don't have

anything to do with what I am doing." Appellant then used profane language to Brown and, after

making a telephone call at the office door, told Brown, "If you have something to say, say it now so

I can slap you." App. B29-30.

On May 8, appellant wasshowing photosto another correctional employee, CorporalJoseph

Hill, at the door to the dispatch office. When Hill suggested that Brown view the pictures, Brown

declined and appellant said, "No, that bitch is not looking at my pictures." In an ensuing argument

between Brown and Young, appellant said she would "kick [Brown's] ass" and "blow [her] away."

App. B32. The shift supervisor, Lieutenant Rita Goodall, broke up the argument. As Young was

being led outside by Sergeant Curtis, Young stated to Goodall, "Brown actslike she can't be touched

but I don't care about that suit." App. C56-57.

On May 16, appellant again harassed Brown by dropping rounds of live ammunition on the

floor in front of Brown when returning her equipment, laughing, and stating to Brown "that is your

problem." App. B33, C4-5. Such conduct with weapons or ammunition violated Department of

Correctionssafety policy. Finally, on July 21, appellant attempted to trip Brown as she was entering

one of the trailers that made up the Transportation Unit. App. C16.

In addition to these actions directed against Brown, Young also publicly expressed her

unhappiness with Brown's trial testimony. About two weeks after Brown's testimony, Young told

her friend and co-worker Larry Wellington that "they didn't have to do what they did to Gerald."

App. C23. And in April 1995, Young told Theresa Manigault, a training officer, that "somebody

needs to talk to Brown because that's messed up what she's doing to Gerald." App. C33.

Moreover, during the course of the events leading to the contempt conviction, Young was

twice taken aside by other correctional employees who suggested that her conduct was improper in

light of the district court's order. First, in April 1995, when Young expressed her displeasure at

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4The district court announced that it would not impose a sentence of more than 180 days

imprisonment if it found Young guilty of criminal contempt, so that a jury trial was not required. 

5The statute provides that, "[a] court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or

imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as... (3)

Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command." 18

U.S.C. § 401(3).

Furthermore, Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that

Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the

Brown'stestimony in the case, Manigault told her "you need to leave that alone. You have no control

over that. That's none of your business." App. C33. And again later, after the May 8 altercation,

Corporal Hill reminded Brown about the district court's order, stating "you know that the judge's

order said, any type of retaliation against those people on the list." He warned her that "you need to

stop messing with Brown before you get in trouble." App. B75. Despite these warnings from

co-workers, Young's harassment of Brown continued.

Following these events, Brown moved the court to hold Young in contempt of the order,

alleging that Young had violated the judge's order by retaliating against Brown because of Brown's

testimony in the Bessye Neal case. The Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") investigated

Brown's allegations and concluded that appellant had retaliated against Brown for her testimony. A

SpecialMaster appointed by the district court reviewed the report of OPM'sinvestigation and agreed

with the report, finding that there was "ample evidence that Young did subject Brown to a series of

abusive and threatening statements and associated behavior beginning after Brown's testimony in

March 1995," and that there was "probable cause to believe that [appellant's] remarks and behavior

were the result ofretaliatoryanimusstemming fromBrown'strialtestimony." App. A16. The district

court adopted the Special Master's recommendation and issued an order directing Young to show

cause why she should not be held in contempt for violating its March 15 order. After a two-day

bench trial,4the district court entered a guilty verdict and sentenced Young to 180 days in prison.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

To convict an individual of criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3),5the government

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reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in

reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act

or acts sought to be restrained;....

FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d); see, e.g., United States v. Holtzman, 762 F.2d 720, 726 (9th Cir. 1985)

("Rule 65(d) requires the language of injunctions to be reasonably clear so that ordinary persons

will know precisely what action is proscribed."). 

6The record shows that appellant had completed high school and one semester of college. 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a court order that is "clear and reasonably

specific." United States v. NYNEX Corp., 8 F.3d 52, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The government must also

prove that the defendant violated the order, and that the violation was willful. Id. Appellant argues

that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge's order was "clear and

unequivocal at the time it [was] issued." In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993). She

argues that the March 15 order was too vague to give a correctional officer with little more than a

high school education6fair notice of what conduct was prohibited. She claims that the order was

ambiguous in two particulars: (1) the order appeared to apply only to supervisory employees; and

(2) because the words "retaliatory action" were not specifically defined or explained, it was not clear

on its face that the order prohibited the kind of conduct in which appellant engaged.

This court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the factsin the light most

favorable to the government. United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 1407, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We

apply "the familiar standard for any criminal conviction," that is, "asking whether a fair-minded and

reasonable trier of fact [could] accept the evidence as probative of a defendant's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt." In re Ellenbogen, 72 F.3d 153, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Holloway,

995 F.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employing this standard

of review here, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the criminal contempt

conviction of Young. Contrary to appellant's contentions, all three requirements of a criminal

contempt conviction were satisfied: (1) the court order was clear and reasonably specific; (2)

appellant violated the order; and (3) her violation of the order was willful.

1. The March 15 Order Was Clear and Reasonably Specific

First, despite appellant's claimsto the contrary, the record showsthatshe had sufficient notice

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7App. A10 (emphasis added). Appellant also argues that the court's August 9, 1995 order

(which was a final order permanently enjoining employees of DOC from engaging in sexual

harassment and retaliation) modified or clarified the March 15 order, proving that the first order

had not clearly defined the meaning of "retaliatory" action. On August 9, 1995, the district court

did issue a final judgment and order in the Bessye Neal litigation, permanently enjoining DOC

of the illegality of her conduct in retaliating against Brown for her testimony in the Bessye Neal case.

In determining whether an order issufficiently clear and specific to justify a contempt conviction, we

apply an objective standard that takes into account both the language of the order and the objective

circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order: " "Whether an order is clear enough depends

on the context in which it isissued and the audience to which it is addressed.' " In re Levine, 27 F.3d

594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

The record shows that this order wassufficiently clear. For one thing, appellant's contention

that she believed the order applied only to supervisors and not to a nonsupervisory employee like

herself is implausible. The March 15 order was directed to all employees of the Department of

Corrections. The order enjoined the Department of Corrections, "together with all of [its] agents and

employees, ... from taking any retaliatory action, or making any threats of retaliatory action" against

any protected witness. App. A1. Appellant, like all other employees, was required to sign a form

(and did so on March 17, 1995) indicating that she had "personally received and read" the March 15

order "which prohibit[s] retaliation against all witnesses who may be called to testify in the sexual

harassment lawsuit," and that she "underst[ood] that [she was] bound by the Court's March 15, 1995

Order and previous orders of the Court ..., and that any violation of these orders may subject [her]

to sanctions for criminal contempt including fines and/or imprisonment." App. A11. Additionally,

the context in which the order was issued to DOC employees further demonstrates its intended

coverage of nonsupervisors; indeed, the record shows that other employees understood that the

order so applied to nonsupervisory employees. Aside from the fact that each employee had to sign

a form expressing his or her understanding of the order, DOC distributed a supplementary

memorandum (addressed to "ALL EMPLOYEES") explaining that "[a]nyone who violate[d] the

order" was subject to discipline, and two different co-workers specifically told appellant she should

leave Brown alone because of the court's order.7

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employees from engaging in sexual harassment and retaliation, but that order specified that the

March 15 order was to remain in effect pending resolution of absent class members in the Bessye

Neal case.

The August 9 order defined "retaliation" as follows:

[T]aking or threatening to take adverse employment actions against a person

because he or she has engaged in legally protected activity.

(1) Adverse employment actions include any negative change in the

terms[,] conditions[,] or privileges o[f] employment. It includes, for

example, changes in assignments, shifts, or evaluation. It also includes

creation of a hostile work environment because an employee has engaged

in legally protected activity.

App. 141. Although the March 15 preliminary injunction had not included an explicit definition of

the meaning of "retaliatory action," appellant's argument is without merit. The August 1995 order

did not clarify ambiguous language in the March 15 order. Rather, it merely finalized the March

15 order, specifically directing that the March 15 order should remain in effect. App. 149. 

8Appellant also testified on her own behalf at trial, claiming that she did not understand the

meaning of "retaliatory" action as used in the order, and that she did not understand that the order

applied to nonsupervisory employees. The trial court found this testimony to be incredible. 

9Cf. United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1567 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Even an egregiously

vague order may be thought adequate to cover conduct so gross as to fall within its core."),

quoted in In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

Similarlyimplausible is appellant's claimthatshe did not understand that her hostile words and

behavior toward Brown constituted "retaliatory action" within the meaning of the order. Officer

LarryWellington, a friend ofYoung's, testified at the bench trial that he, Young, and other employees

"didn't have an understanding of what retaliation was," and that "the order was never explained to

us in detail on what it meant." The district court rejected these assertions, "find[ing] that any

common sense understanding would lead any person to know that you cannot treat a person

differently because of their testimony here in court."8 Wherever the outside parameters of contempt

for treating a person "differently" might be, we agree with the district court that on the facts of this

case, a high school educated individual should have had a "common sense understanding" that acts

of the sort committed by Young against Brown were "retaliatory" in nature and therefore forbidden

by the March 15 order.9Indeed, as the government persuasively argued, the key terms in the order

("all ... agents and employees" and "any retaliatory action") "are not complex legal terms but rather

are readily understandable to a high school graduate, such as appellant, who has also taken college

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10The district court found that "the timing of the defendant's change in attitude toward Officer

Brown is strong evidence that the defendant's behavior was caused by Brown's testimony in this

courtroom on March 3rd." App. E5. Moreover, a number of Young's hostile comments actually

mentioned or alluded to the testimony. App. E5, E6, E7. 

11Although the court's order forbidding such conduct was not issued until March 15, the timing

of the commencement of appellant's harassment shows quite starkly that her motive was

retaliation for Brown's testimony. 

level courses." Brief for the United States, at 17. In sum, the aggregate acts at issue hereovert

threats and insults, use of profanity, and hostile actions such as throwing live ammunition near

Brown, conduct all of which commenced after, and inferentially as "pay back" for,10 Brown's

testimonyagainst Geraldclearlyconstituted "retaliatoryaction" within any common-sense definition

of that term.

2. Appellant Violated the March 15 Order

Second, the record overwhelminglysupportsthe district court'sfinding that appellant violated

the order. Appellant and Brown had a normal working relationship prior to March 1995.

Immediately after learning of Brown's March 3 testimony against Gerald, appellant initiated a

sequence of hostile actionstoward Brown. The first verbal assault took place on March 6, 1995, two

days after the Washington Post article detailingBrown'stestimony, and continued with further hostile

comments directed at Brown on March 6, March 9, and March 14.11 Furthermore, following the

issuance of the March 15 order (and in defiance of it), Young maintained the pace of her harassing

comments and actions. On March 22, appellant came to the dispatch office door to turn in her

equipment to Brown and said, "Get off your ass and take this equipment before I slap you." App.

B31. On April 21, appellant made other comments and used profane language in speaking to Brown.

App. B29-30. On May 8, appellant declined to show her photos to Brown and stated (in the presence

of another correctional employee), "No, that bitch is not looking at my pictures." During the same

incident, appellant said she would "kick [Brown's] ass" and "blow [her] away." App. B32. After the

shift supervisor broke up the argument, Young stated, "Brown acts like she can't be touched but I

don't care about that suit." App. C56-57. And in the May 16 incident, appellant dropped live

ammunition on the floor in front of Brown when returning her equipment and stated "that is your

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problem," App. B33, C4-5, conduct clearly violative of DOC safety policy. These acts in toto

indisputably constituted "retaliatory action" against a protected witness within the meaning of the

district court's order.

3. Appellant's Violation of the March 15 Order Was Willful

Third, appellant's violation of the order was proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be willful.

To establish willfulness, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted

with deliberate or reckless disregard of her obligation under the March 15 order. In re Holloway, 995

F.2d at 1082. There was abundant evidence of such willfulness in this case. Brown repeatedly

showed her defiance to the order, both by her numerous comments and actions directed against

Brown (detailed above) and by her comments to co-workers about the order. On May 8, appellant

stated that she did not care about the lawsuit and threatened to "blow [Brown] away." Moreover,

Young ignored two separate warnings from co-workers that indicated she might be violating the

court order. First, in April 1995, when Young expressed her displeasure at Brown's testimony in the

case, co-worker Manigault told her "you need to leave that alone. You have no control over that.

That's none of your business." App. C33. Second, after the May 8 altercation, Corporal Hill

reminded Brown about the district court's order, stating "you know that the judge's order said, any

type of retaliation against those people on the list." He warned her that "you need to stop messing

with Brown before you get in trouble." App. B75. Despite these warnings, Young's harassment of

Brown continued. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the facts on this

recorddemonstratingYoung's egregious and continuing retaliatory actions against Brown, Young's

own statement about her disregard for the court order and lawsuit, and Young's refusal to listen to

co-workers who warned her about violating the orderaremore thansufficient to support the district

court's conclusion that appellant's violation of the order was willful.

B. Alleged Due Process and Rule 42(b) Violations

Appellant next argues that the government failed prior to trial to provide her with notice that

one ofthe essentialfacts constituting the criminal contempt charged was a July 1995 incident in which

she allegedly attempted to trip Brown. She claims that the case must be remanded to the district

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12Rule 42(b) provides in part:

A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be

prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing,

allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the

essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such....

FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). 

13Appellant was notified approximately one week prior to her trial that the tripping incident

was at issue when she received discovery materials in the case. Those materials included a report

of a Federal Bureau of Investigations interview with the witness who recounted the tripping

incident. 

court to consider whether the remaining factual allegations, absent the "tripping" incident, would

justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of criminal contempt. We review

de novo to determine whether procedures comported with the Due Process Clause and with Rule

42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.12

At trial, appellant objected to admission of evidence concerning the July 21 tripping incident.

She pointed out that the show cause order and attached report had not referred to the incident, but

the district court nonetheless overruled her objection and allowed the government witness to testify

about the tripping incident. At oral argument in this court, the government conceded that, in light

of the inadequate notice given to the defendant,13 evidence of the tripping incident should not have

been considered in the adjudication of the contempt charge.

Even if we assume that the district court's decision to admit evidence of the tripping incident

was error, this error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not merit reversal of the

conviction on due process or Rule 42(b) grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Saro, 34 F.3d 283, 287

(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("For most constitutional errors, an appellate court is to reverse if it entertains a

"reasonable doubt' about whether the error affected the outcome below, while nonconstitutional

errors are reviewed under some laxer standard ....") (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967)); United States v. Merlos, 984 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Even an error of

constitutional dimension does not require reversal if the court finds the error harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt."). Other evidence presented at trial (including the testimony of numerous

witnesses) overwhelmingly supported the allegationslaid out in the specialmaster'sreport. The May

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8 and May 16 incidents alone (both of which were duly included in the notice given appellant) were

flagrant instances of retaliatory action taken by Young against Brown, and evidence of the tripping

incident was therefore entirely unnecessary for the conviction. Moreover, the district court found

appellant's trial testimony denying her involvement in the pivotal May 8 and May 16 incidents to be

incredible. Thus, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the single oversight of failing to

notify Young that the tripping incident would be addressed at trial was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reject appellant's dual claims of insufficient evidence and

inadequate process and therefore affirm her conviction for criminal contempt.

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