Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01005/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick Baker
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PATRICK BAKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1005

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00343-TCW, Judge Thomas C. 

Wheeler. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 15, 2016

______________________ 

PATRICK BAKER, Texarkana, AR, pro se.

DANIEL S. HERZFELD, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

CLAUDIA BURKE. 

______________________ 

Before TARANTO, LINN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 BAKER v. US

PER CURIAM. 

After Patrick Baker quit his employment with the 

United States Army under threat of discharge for drinking before work, Mr. Baker charged the Army with racial 

discrimination in threatening to fire him when it allowed 

his coworker to continue working despite engaging in the 

same conduct. The parties settled the dispute, with the 

Army agreeing to employ Mr. Baker, subject to his meeting certain physical and suitability requirements, and to 

pay Mr. Baker and his lawyer. When the Army later 

refused to employ him, Mr. Baker filed administrative 

charges against the Army, alleging racial discrimination. 

And when he was unable to secure administrative relief, 

Mr. Baker filed the present action in the Court of Federal 

Claims, alleging that the Army racially discriminated 

against him, committed various torts, wrongfully garnished his tax refund, and breached the settlement 

agreement. 

The court dismissed the case. Baker v. United States, 

123 Fed. Cl. 203 (2015). It concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Baker’s racial-discrimination claim, tort 

claims, or wrongful-garnishment claim. And it concluded 

that it lacked jurisdiction over the breach-of-contract 

claim and, in the alternative, that Mr. Baker had not 

adequately pleaded an actual contract breach. 

We affirm the court’s dismissal of all claims except 

the contract claim, as to which we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Baker worked at the Army’s Red River Army 

Depot in Texarkana, Texas. The morning of November 

12, 2008, he and a coworker drank alcohol before coming 

to work, and they admitted to doing so when questioned 

by a supervisor. According to Mr. Baker, the army depot 

gave him a choice: voluntarily resign and return to a job 

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BAKER v. US 3

he had held with a private company or be fired. He chose 

to resign. 

Mr. Baker’s resignation set off two series of events 

that led him to file the current lawsuit in the Court of 

Federal Claims. First, although Mr. Baker resigned in 

the middle of a pay period, the Army erroneously paid 

him for the entire period. Realizing the mistake, the 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service attempted to 

secure the overpaid amount from Mr. Baker. When he did 

not pay, the Internal Revenue Service subtracted the 

amount due from the tax refund he was to receive. Mr. 

Baker now challenges that setoff as a wrongful garnishment of his tax refund.

Second, shortly after he resigned, Mr. Baker learned 

that the Army let his drink-sharing coworker stay in his 

job, and in early 2009, Mr. Baker filed an administrative 

claim that the Army had engaged in racial discrimination 

in treating him and his coworker differently. In August 

2009, the Army and Mr. Baker executed a Negotiated 

Settlement Agreement of claims described as arising 

under, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended. The Army agreed to appoint Mr. Baker as a 

“Heavy Mobile Equipment Repairer WG-5803-08 in the 

Directorate for Maintenance Production, Travel Division 

effective not later than September 14, 2009,” subject to

“his meeting physical requirements for the . . . position 

and meeting all suitability requirements for placement.” 

S.A. 38. The Army also promised to pay $5,000 to Mr. 

Baker and the same amount to his attorney. The agreement includes two paragraphs about procedures for 

handling a breach: 

6. If the complainant believes that the Army has 

failed to comply with the terms of this settlement 

agreement, the complainant shall notify the Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review (EEOCCR), . . . in 

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4 BAKER v. US

writing, of the alleged noncompliance within 30 

calendar days of when the complainant knew or 

should have known of the alleged noncompliance. 

. . . 

7. The complainant may request that the terms of 

the settlement agreement be specifically implemented or, alternatively, the complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point 

processing ceased. If the Director, EEOCCR has 

not responded to the complainant in writing, or if 

the complainant is not satisfied with the attempts 

to resolve the matter, the complainant may appeal 

to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for a determination as to whether or 

not the Army has complied with the terms of this 

settlement agreement. The Complainant may file 

such an appeal to the EEOC 35 calendar days after service of the allegation of noncompliance upon EEOCCR, but not later than 30 calendar days

after receipt of the Army determination.

S.A. 39 (emphases in original). 

Soon after executing the settlement agreement, Mr. 

Baker was charged by Arkansas with the offense of domestic battery in the third degree. He pleaded guilty and 

was sentenced to probation for twelve months. After his 

conviction, his complaint in this case suggests, he unsuccessfully asked for the job promised in the settlement 

agreement. Separately, it appears, sometime later he 

applied for a job with URS Corporation, a government 

contractor, to do work for URS at the Red River Army 

Depot. But an Army official determined that Mr. Baker’s 

criminal conviction rendered him unfit to work at the 

depot, a determination that disqualified him from the 

URS job. 

In October 2013, Mr. Baker filed a new administrative 

claim of racial discrimination. Both the Army and the 

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BAKER v. US 5

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dismissed 

his complaint as untimely. Thereafter, Mr. Baker filed a 

suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Texas. The district court retained a retaliation 

claim against URS, but it dismissed all claims against the 

Army for lack of jurisdiction. It explained that it lacked

jurisdiction over Mr. Baker’s discrimination claims because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies and 

that it lacked jurisdiction over his breach-of-contract 

claim because he sought damages exceeding the $10,000 

limit in the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), so 

the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction.

Mr. Baker then filed the present action in the Court of 

Federal Claims. He asserts four types of claims: (1) a 

discrimination claim under Title VII; (2) tort claims for 

defamation of character, infliction of emotional distress, 

and retaliation; (3) a claim of wrongful garnishment of his 

tax refund; and (4) a breach-of-contract claim. The government filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the 

court granted. The court concluded that the Title VII and 

tort claims fell outside its jurisdiction. Baker, 123 Fed. 

Cl. at 205. It drew the same conclusion as to the wrongful-garnishment and breach-of-contract claims, finding no

money-mandating statute or contract provision. Id. at 

205–06. Finally, the court determined that the breach-ofcontract claim independently failed because Mr. Baker 

did not plead a breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at 

206. 

Mr. Baker appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the dismissal of Mr. Baker’s complaint de 

novo, there being no factual or discretionary determinations by the Court of Federal Claims to which we owe 

deference. Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 

1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction); 

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6 BAKER v. US

Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1284, 

1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (dismissal for failure to state a 

claim).

The only jurisdictional grant at issue here is the 

Tucker Act, which gives the Court of Federal Claims 

“jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against 

the United States founded either upon the Constitution, 

or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 

department, or upon any express or implied contract with 

the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1). While we agree with the Court of Federal 

Claims that Mr. Baker’s Title VII, tort, and wrongfulgarnishment claims do not fall within that limited grant 

of jurisdiction, we conclude that his breach-of-contract 

claim does. 

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over 

Mr. Baker’s Title VII discrimination claim. Congress has 

provided that federal district courts have jurisdiction over 

an aggrieved employee’s employment-discrimination 

action under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 

2000e-16(c). And the Supreme Court has described Title 

VII as “an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and 

judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment 

discrimination.” Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 

820, 829 (1976). Such a specific, comprehensive scheme of 

administrative and judicial review is inconsistent with

the Court of Federal Claims asserting jurisdiction under 

the Tucker Act. United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12, 18 

(2012); Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002, 1009 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005); see Gardner v. United States, 439 F. App’x 879, 

881 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The Court of Federal Claims . . . 

does not have jurisdiction over Title VII claims.”).

Mr. Baker’s tort claims also are outside the Tucker 

Act. Nothing in that Act identifies tort claims as covered; 

to the contrary, its listing of covered topics excludes 

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BAKER v. US 7

claims “sounding in tort.” Mr. Baker pleads defamation of 

character, infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation, 

all of which have long been recognized as tort claims. See

Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 

Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302–03 (1977) (defamation and 

infliction of emotional distress); Qualls v. United States, 

678 F.2d 190, 193 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (retaliation). Therefore, 

the Court of Federal Claims correctly held that it lacks

jurisdiction over Mr. Baker’s tort claims.

Mr. Baker’s claim of wrongful garnishment of his tax 

refund under the Debt Collection Improvement Act, 31 

U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3702, 3711, 3716, fares no better. Although the Tucker Act covers a claim “founded . . . upon 

. . . any Act of Congress,” the particular statute must be

one that mandates monetary relief against the United 

States when violated. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290–91 (2009); United States v. Testan, 

424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 

1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part). 

The statutory provisions relied on by Mr. Baker authorize 

an agency to withhold funds payable by the United States 

to a person to satisfy a claim, but they do not authorize 

monetary relief for a violation. See McNeil v. United 

States, 78 Fed. Cl. 211, 228 (2007), aff’d, 293 F. App’x 758 

(Fed. Cir. 2008). If there is a remedy for a violation, it is 

not through the Act of Congress portion of the Tucker Act. 

Cf. Miller v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 449 F.3d 1374, 

1385 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (noting that 

some courts have assumed the availability of Administrative Procedure Act review of agency determinations to 

make offsets under the Debt Collection Improvement Act).

With respect to Mr. Baker’s breach-of-contract claim, 

the Court of Federal Claims erred in dismissing for lack of 

jurisdiction. In Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303 

(Fed. Cir. 2011), this court noted that “when a breach of 

contract claim is brought in the Court of Federal Claims 

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8 BAKER v. US

under the Tucker Act, the plaintiff comes armed with the 

presumption that money damages are available.” Id. at 

1314. The court then squarely held that the Tucker Act is 

available for a claim seeking monetary relief for a breach 

of provisions of a settlement agreement, specifically of a 

Title VII claim, relating to future employment. Id. at 

1315–16; see also Cunningham v. United States, 748 F.3d 

1172, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Holmes, the court also 

expressly concluded that the Tucker Act monetary remedy 

is available notwithstanding the provision of nonmonetary remedial options like those set forth in the 

Settlement Agreement paragraphs 6 and 7 quoted above. 

657 F.3d at 1316. Those options were available in Holmes 

by EEOC regulation, but we do not see why the result is 

any different when they are written into the contract in 

non-exclusive form.

Contrary to the Court of Federal Claims’ conclusion, 

Baker, 123 Fed. Cl. at 206, this court did not alter the 

foregoing law as to certain settlement agreements in 

Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

The court in Higbie itself recognized that “[t]ypically, in a 

contract case, the presumption that money damages are 

available satisfies the Tucker Act’s money-mandating 

requirement.” Id. at 993 (citing Holmes, 657 F.3d at 

1314). But the court found no damages available for the 

particular contract breach at issue, which did not involve 

future-employment-related provisions of a Title VII 

settlement agreement. Rather, it involved a confidentiality provision of a mediation agreement in “boilerplate 

common to agreements associated with similar mediation 

proceedings,” for which the agreement specified exclusion 

of evidence as the remedy for breach. Id. at 995 n.1, 994. 

In rejecting application of the Tucker Act for that contract, the court pointedly distinguished “a settlement 

agreement that created specific duties owed by the Government to th[e] particular plaintiff,” as in Cunningham. 

Id. at 995 n.1.

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BAKER v. US 9

This case is covered by Holmes and Cunningham, not 

Higbie. Mr. Baker alleges that the Army breached the 

Title VII settlement agreement, specifically a provision 

crafted particularly for him and concerning his future 

employment, and that he is entitled to $350,000 in damages. And the agreement contains no language that 

limits monetary relief for breach of the job provision, but 

only language of the very type held not to bar monetary 

relief in Holmes. The Court of Federal Claims therefore 

erred in holding that it lacked Tucker Act jurisdiction 

over Mr. Baker’s contract claim.

The Court of Federal Claims held, in the alternative, 

that the claim must be dismissed for failure of the complaint to plead a breach. Baker, 123 Fed. Cl. at 206. That 

characterization fails to give the handwritten, informal, 

pro se complaint the reading it warrants. Taken as a 

whole, and read generously, Mr. Baker’s complaint alleges

that the Army breached the settlement agreement by not 

giving him the promised job, seemingly because it viewed 

his conviction as rendering him unsuitable. The dismissal 

of the complaint is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of 

Federal Claims’ dismissal of all claims except the breachof-contract claim, as to which we reverse and remand. 

No costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED

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