Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01032/USCOURTS-caDC-12-01032-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dodge of Naperville, Inc. and Burke Automotive Group, Inc.
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2015 Decided August 4, 2015

No. 12-1032

DODGE OF NAPERVILLE, INC. AND BURKE AUTOMOTIVE 

GROUP, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS NAPERVILLE JEEP/DODGE,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 12-1122

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of

the National Labor Relations Board

James F. Hendricks Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs was Gary L. Lieber. 

Douglas Callahan, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General at the time the brief was filed, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Scott R. McIntosh, Sarang V. Damle, and Melissa 

Patterson, Attorneys, John H. Ferguson, Associate General

USCA Case #12-1032 Document #1566001 Filed: 08/04/2015 Page 1 of 18
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Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Linda Dreeben, 

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Usha Dheenan, 

Supervisory Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and MILLETT and 

WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: The owner of a small car 

dealership closed the dealership down and informed the six 

mechanics there – all of whom were union members – that 

they were expected to continue working at the owner’s larger, 

non-unionized dealership for reduced wages and inferior 

benefits. After delivering this news, the owner refused to 

bargain with the mechanics’ union over the effects of the 

move or to otherwise recognize the union in any way. The 

union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board, 

which ultimately found that the company had committed 

various unfair labor practices during the relocation. Most 

critically here, the Board concluded that the company acted 

unlawfully when it withdrew recognition of the union. 

On appeal, the company contends that it had no choice 

but to withdraw recognition of the union, on the ground that 

the relocated employees had been absorbed into a larger unit 

of non-union employees at the new dealership. The company

also levies an attack on the Board’s composition at the time 

the decision was issued. Because we conclude that these

challenges are meritless, we deny the petition for review and 

grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

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I.

A.

This labor dispute unfolded outside of Chicago at two car 

dealerships owned by Ed Burke: Burke Automotive Group, 

Inc., doing business as Naperville Jeep Dodge, in Lisle, 

Illinois; and its subsidiary, Dodge of Naperville, in nearby 

Naperville, Illinois. (We refer to these dealerships 

respectively as the Lisle dealership and the Naperville 

dealership, and collectively as Burke Automotive, or simply 

Burke.) In early June 2009, the Lisle dealership employed 

fourteen mechanics, none of whom were unionized, while the 

Naperville dealership employed six mechanics, all of whom 

belonged to Automobile Mechanics Local No. 701, 

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 

Workers, AFL-CIO (“the Union”). See Dodge of Naperville, 

Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 183, 2012 WL 30418, at *1 (Jan. 3, 

2012). The Union had represented employees at the 

Naperville dealership for 20 years. Id. at *28.

The Chrysler bankruptcy of 2009 triggered a chain of 

events that forced Burke Automotive to close one of its

dealerships. On June 19, after significant back-and-forth,

Chrysler approved a proposal by Ed Burke to continue selling 

vehicles in Lisle so long as he closed, at least temporarily, the

Naperville facility. Id. at *13.

On June 20, Burke Automotive shut down the Naperville 

dealership and notified the six mechanics that they no longer 

had jobs there. Id. at *14, 17. It permitted the Naperville 

mechanics to work at the Lisle dealership immediately and 

told them that if they refused employment, they would be 

viewed as having quit and would be denied unemployment 

compensation. Id. at *1, 17-20. Burke also ceased to honor 

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the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that it had 

entered into with the Union. Id. at *19. At the Lisle facility, 

the transferred employees worked alongside the other Lisle 

employees and under the same supervision. They also were 

compensated with wages and benefits at the standard Lisle 

rates, which were considerably less favorable than those set 

forth in the Naperville employees’ CBA. Id. at *2, *19-20. 

Two former Naperville employees resigned in light of the 

inferior terms and conditions imposed. Id. at *35-36.

1

The Union contacted Burke Automotive and requested 

the opportunity to bargain over the effects of the move. But 

Burke refused to recognize the Union, explaining that it no 

longer represented a majority of mechanics in the bargaining 

unit. Id. at *18-19. 

B.

The Union filed charges with the National Labor 

Relations Board’s General Counsel, who subsequently issued 

a complaint against Burke Automotive. A hearing was held 

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in Chicago on 

March 15 and March 16, 2010. The ALJ found that Burke 

Automotive had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the 

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by failing to bargain 

with the Union about the effects of the relocation on the 

Naperville mechanics, unreasonably delaying the provision of 

 1 Although the hourly rate was the same at the two dealerships, at 

Naperville the mechanics were guaranteed 34 hours of pay a week, 

provided that they were present at the dealership for 40 hours that 

week. At Lisle, the mechanics were paid solely for the hours of 

work that they were assigned and completed, even if they were 

present in the garage for 40 hours or more. This often resulted in 

considerably less take-home pay at the Lisle dealership. Dodge of 

Naperville, 2012 WL 30418, at *16, *19.

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information to the Union, and unlawfully threatening the 

mechanics against unionizing. Dodge of Naperville, Inc., 13-

CA-45399, 2010 WL 3285387 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Aug. 

2, 2010). He further found that Burke Automotive had 

unlawfully withdrawn recognition of the Union as the 

exclusive representative of the mechanics in the Naperville 

bargaining unit, unlawfully repudiated the collective 

bargaining agreement in effect at the time, unilaterally 

changed the terms and conditions of employment, and 

constructively discharged the two Naperville mechanics who 

resigned. Id.

The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, subject to some 

technical modifications and clarification of the underlying 

reasoning. The Board also affirmed the ALJ’s order directing 

Burke Automotive to take various affirmative steps, including 

bargaining with the Union. One of the panel’s members 

dissented with respect to the Board’s finding that Burke

unlawfully withdrew recognition of the Union.2

 It is 

primarily this question of withdrawal that Burke presses in its 

petition for review. 

 2

 Because the dissenting member believed that withdrawal of 

recognition was proper, he also dissented from the Board’s findings 

that the employer unlawfully informed the Naperville employees 

that they no longer enjoyed union representation at the Lisle 

dealership, unlawfully repudiated the CBA, unlawfully imposed 

unilateral changes without bargaining, and constructively 

discharged two members. See Dodge of Naperville, 2012 WL 

30418, at *7 n.3. 

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II.

A.

Because the Board has “the primary responsibility of 

marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the 

statutory duty to bargain” under the NLRA, this Court “defers 

to the Board’s ‘reasonably defensible’ construction of that 

duty.” Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. NLRB, 938 

F.2d 284, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. 

NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496-97 (1979)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Any findings of fact made by the Board are 

conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, “even if a 

reviewing court on de novo review would reach a different 

result.” Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.3d 1195, 

1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Synergy Gas Corp. v. NLRB, 

19 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (the Court will uphold an 

order of the Board unless “it appears that the Board’s factual 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence or that the 

Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying 

established law to the facts at issue”).

B.

1.

As noted, the Board concluded that Burke Automotive 

violated its duty to bargain with the Union over the effects of

the relocation to Lisle. Although Burke does not challenge 

this ruling – at least not directly – the ruling bears on other 

issues raised in the appeal. We therefore pause to discuss the 

scope of an employer’s duty to bargain over the effects of a 

relocation.

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An employer generally is free to make decisions about 

the scope and direction of its enterprise, including whether to 

shut down or relocate part of the business. First Nat’l Maint. 

Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686-88 (1981). The employer 

must, however, bargain with the union over the effects of that 

decision on the employees represented by the union. Id. at 

681-82; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Local 

540 v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 490, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

“[B]argaining over the effects of a decision must be 

conducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time,” 

First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 681-82, which did not 

occur here. Burke Automotive did not inform the Union of 

the move until after it happened, and even then refused to 

engage in any discussions with the Union about the move’s 

effects on the employees. 

The range of topics discussed during effects bargaining 

depends on the nature of the change imposed. When an 

employer transfers employees from one facility to another, 

mandatory subjects of bargaining generally include “initial 

wages, benefits, seniority rights, and working conditions at 

the new location.” Dodge of Naperville, 2012 WL 30418, at 

*3; see also Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 48 F.3d 1360, 1368 

(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that employer had a duty to bargain 

with union over the effects of a merger on “wages, hours, 

work rules, work schedules, and work locations”); Comar,

Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 342, 354 (2007) (“Comar II”) (noting that 

bargaining subjects during transfer included “the relocated 

workers’ wages, work locations, schedules, carryover of 

seniority, and other terms and conditions of employment at 

the new plant, as well as over the conditions of the transfer”).

3

 

 3 Burke mischaracterizes its duty to bargain to include, at most, the 

effects of the mechanics’ discontinuation of employment. See

Petitioner’s Br. 24. The cases cited by Burke, however, refer to 

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Burke Automotive therefore was required to bargain with 

the Union about the former Naperville employees’ initial 

wages, benefits, schedules, and other terms and conditions at 

the Lisle facility. During such bargaining, the employer was 

required to consider “any proposals” put forth by the Union 

on these topics. First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 678-79

n.17. 

The duty to engage in effects bargaining persists even if 

the employer’s management decision renders the historic unit 

inappropriate for other purposes. Thus, an employer cannot 

avoid effects bargaining simply by waiting until after the 

change has taken place and then claiming that the bargaining 

unit is no longer viable. See Comar II, 349 N.L.R.B. at 354. 

We affirmed this commonsense principle in United Food & 

Commercial Workers Local 540, where an employer claimed 

that its duty to engage in effects bargaining was rendered 

moot by the closure of a facility. We rejected the employer’s 

argument, holding that an “employer’s duty to bargain over 

the effects of a plant closing continues even after the closing: 

. . . [W]hen a plant closes, an employer cannot escape its 

effects bargaining duty simply by saying ‘No one works here 

anymore; the bargaining unit has disappeared.’” 519 F.3d at 

 

mandatory topics of bargaining when an employer shuts down a 

facility and lays off the employees. See, e.g., Friedman’s Exp., Inc., 

315 N.L.R.B. 971, 971-72 (1994) (in the context of a plant closure, 

“it is well settled that effects bargaining encompasses ‘issues such 

as severance pay, seniority, pensions, health insurance, [and] job 

security’ that are of concern to all bargaining unit employees 

‘whose employment status will be altered by the managerial 

decision.’”) (footnotes omitted). The Board found that Burke’s 

actions constituted a relocation or transfer. Dodge of Naperville, 

2012 WL 30418, at *3, *20, *24-25. Burke does not expressly 

challenge this factual finding, which is supported by substantial 

evidence in any event. 

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496. Likewise, even if the Naperville bargaining unit merged 

with the Lisle employees moving forward, the employer 

retained an obligation to bargain about the relocation’s effects 

on the Naperville employees.

2.

The more difficult question – and the one that Petitioner 

more clearly presses on appeal – is whether the historic 

Naperville unit became an inappropriate unit for other

collective bargaining purposes once those employees were

moved to Lisle. This question is critical to the Board’s 

finding that Burke Automotive unlawfully withdrew 

recognition of the unit. As the Board observed, an employer 

may lawfully withdraw recognition (for purposes other than 

effects bargaining) if the union no longer enjoys support from 

a majority of employees in the relevant unit. Dodge of 

Naperville, 2012 WL 30418, at *2 (citing Serramonte 

Oldsmobile, 318 N.L.R.B. 80, 104 (1995), enforced in 

relevant part, 86 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 

Burke Automotive argued to the Board that the only 

appropriate unit was the aggregated group of historic Lisle 

and former Naperville employees. Burke contended that the 

old Naperville unit lost its distinct identity when its 

mechanics began working side-by-side with Lisle employees, 

and that the merged group formed one (and only one) 

“community of interest.” 

The Board rejected this view. It began its analysis, 

however, by explaining that under other circumstances, the 

changes made during the relocation would justify recognizing 

a combined Naperville-Lisle unit, rather than a unit of only 

former Naperville employees. Specifically, many of the 

similarities between the two units – the fact that the 

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mechanics did the same work side-by-side, under the same 

supervision, for the same wages and benefits – indicated that 

the units were no longer distinct. Dodge of Naperville, 2012 

WL 30418, at *2. The Board further explained that these 

changes usually would constitute the sort of “compelling 

circumstance” that would justify disregarding a unit with a 

twenty-year bargaining history. Id.

But not so here, where many of the employer’s unilateral 

changes to the former Naperville employees’ working 

conditions – such as reductions in take-home pay and inferior 

benefits, to conform to the Lisle employees’ conditions –

were put into place without the required effects bargaining. 

Because these changes were unlawful, they could be 

disregarded in the analysis. Id. at *3. Moreover, the Board 

reasoned, the employer’s failure to engage in any sort of 

effects bargaining “ma[de] it impossible to assess what the 

terms and conditions of the Naperville employees would have 

been after the relocation, had the Respondent not acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Deaconess Medical Center, 314 

N.L.R.B. 677, 677 n.1 (1994), and Holly Farms Corp., 311

N.L.R.B. 273, 279 n.25 (1993)). The Board therefore 

concluded that the changed circumstances did not compel

modification of the historic Naperville unit at that time.

We review the Board’s determination of the appropriate 

bargaining unit deferentially, as “the NLRA vests in the 

Board authority to determine ‘the unit appropriate for the 

purposes of collective bargaining.’” Serramonte, 86 F.3d at

236 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994)). We recognize that 

“the Board’s discretion in this area is broad, reflecting 

Congress’ recognition of the need for flexibility in shaping 

the bargaining unit to the particular case.” Id. (quoting NLRB 

v. Action Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985))

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

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United Food & Commercial Workers Local 540, 519 F.3d at 

494 (Because a determination of an appropriate bargaining 

unit “requires a fact-intensive inquiry and a balancing of 

various factors, the Board has broad discretion in making the 

determination; we have said its decision is entitled to wide 

deference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also 

have long observed that “the Board need only select an

appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit.” Serramonte, 

86 F.3d at 236 (emphasis in original) (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

When determining whether a smaller bargaining unit is 

appropriate, as opposed to a larger unit, the Board looks to 

whether there is a “community of interest” among the 

employees. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 540,

519 F.3d at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing 

so, the Board considers factors such as “‘the employees’

wages, hours and other working conditions; commonality of 

supervision; degree of skill and common functions; frequency 

of contact and interchange with other employees; and 

functional integration.’” Id. (quoting Sundor Brands, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 168 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Home 

Depot USA, 331 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290 (2000) (mentioning 

these factors, as well as “employment benefits,” “amount of 

working time spent away from the employment or plant 

situs,” and “history of bargaining”). 

The traditional community of interest analysis may be 

modified under particular circumstances, and two such 

modifications are relevant here. First, the Board is reluctant 

to alter a historical relationship between a unit and its union, 

and it therefore gives significant weight to a unit’s bargaining 

history. Specifically, the Board demands that a party 

challenging a historical unit show that “compelling 

circumstances” warrant modification of the unit. Trident 

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Seafoods, Inc. v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 111, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 

ADT Security Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1396 (2010). 

Second, when evaluating the community of interest factors, 

the Board ignores any impermissible changes made 

unilaterally by the employer (for example, changes made 

without effects bargaining, if that was required). In re 

Comar, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 903, 911 (2003) (“Comar I”) (“To 

hold otherwise would allow [the employer] to benefit from its 

own unlawful conduct.”), enforced, 111 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 

2004); Holly Farms Corp., 311 N.L.R.B. at 279.

The Board applied these legal principles when it 

concluded that Burke Automotive had failed to establish 

compelling circumstances that would justify disregarding the 

historic Naperville unit. Burke argues that this conclusion 

was erroneous for various reasons. For the following reasons, 

all of Burke’s arguments must be rejected.

Burke Automotive first argues that the NRLB applied a 

“new standard” when it applied the “compelling 

circumstances” test discussed above. Petitioner’s Br. 3, 26. 

Burke is incorrect about the novelty of the “compelling 

circumstances” test. As noted, the Board has repeatedly held

that a historical bargaining unit remains appropriate absent a 

showing of “compelling circumstances,” as this Court has 

recognized. Southern Power Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 946, 951 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing “compelling circumstances” 

standard); Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. California v. NLRB, 335 

F.3d 1079, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Trident Seafoods,

101 F.3d at 118 (same).

Burke next argues that the Board should have applied an 

“accretion” doctrine. “Accretion is the addition of a group of 

employees to an existing union-represented bargaining unit

without a Board election.” Dean Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 551 

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F.3d 1055, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).

4

 The 

Board has not applied the doctrine where, as here, the larger 

unit was not organized and had no bargaining representative. 

See N.Y. Rehab. Care Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070,

1077 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Rather than relying on the accretion 

doctrine, the Board framed its decision in accordance with its 

presumption against disturbing a historical bargaining unit. 

This was consistent with Board precedent. 

Burke also contends that the Board’s decision in Brown 

Truck & Trailer Manufacturing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 

(1953), establishes that a historical union cannot bargain over 

the terms and conditions of unit employees at a new facility 

where non-unit employees work. See Petitioner’s Br. 25. 

Burke’s assertion misconstrues the case. Brown Truck merely 

stands for the proposition that a bargaining unit that is 

transferred to another facility cannot bargain over the terms 

and conditions of employment for all of the employees at the 

new facility. 106 N.L.R.B. at 1002. This principle – that a 

union cannot bargain over the terms and conditions of 

employment for employees it does not represent – is a core 

tenet of labor law. See Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union 

v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1961) (holding that a union 

cannot represent a group of employees for which it does not 

enjoy majority support). But it is inapposite here, where the 

Board was simply considering whether the Union could 

continue representing the six former Naperville employees.

 4

 When considering whether a smaller unit has been accreted into a 

larger unit, the Board evaluates whether the two merged units form 

an “overwhelming community of interest.” Safeway Stores, Inc., 

256 N.L.R.B. 918, 918 (1981). Even if accretion were relevant 

here, it is not clear whether this standard is meaningfully different 

from the “compelling circumstances” test.

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It is only Burke Automotive’s last argument that gives us 

pause. Burke questions whether, even if it had engaged in 

effects bargaining with the Union, any changes made with 

respect to mandatory bargaining topics would have been 

sufficient to maintain the distinctness of the historic 

Naperville and Lisle units. Burke points out that in other 

cases where the Board has refused to disturb a historical 

bargaining unit after a relocation or merger, additional factors 

beyond wages and benefits indicated that the historical unit 

remained distinct. For example, in Comar II, the Board found 

that changed circumstances did not compel disregarding a 

historical bargaining unit where an employer relocated a 

group of employees from one facility to another but kept the 

two sets of employees at the new facility separate from each 

other and under different supervision. 349 N.L.R.B. at 360;

see also ADT, 355 N.L.R.B. at 1388-89 (finding no 

compelling circumstances, despite merger of two units of 

service employees, where each set of employees retained 

different terms of employment, including – unlike here –

different primary work locations).

Although this is a tougher call, we conclude that the 

Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and 

that it was not arbitrary. It is clear that the Naperville

employees could have bargained for “wages, hours and other 

working conditions” that were different from those of the 

Lisle employees and were more consistent with the terms

outlined in the CBA; this weighs against finding a community 

of interest. Moreover, the bargaining process is a flexible 

one, where an employer is obligated to consider in good faith 

“any proposals” submitted by the union. First Nat’l Maint. 

Corp., 452 U.S. at 678-79 n.17. Although Congress has 

limited mandatory subjects of bargaining “to matters of 

‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 

employment,’” an employer and a union sitting down at the 

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bargaining table “are free to bargain about any legal subject.” 

Id. at 674 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 158(a)(5)). 

Burke and the Union could have agreed to other changes that 

would have led the Naperville employees to have, for 

example, distinct supervisors or spheres of work from the 

Lisle employees. There is uncertainty about what the 

relocation would have looked like had effects bargaining 

taken place, and the Board found that it would be unfair to 

permit Burke to benefit from the uncertainty created by its 

unlawful refusal to bargain. In view of the “wide deference” 

accorded to the Board, United Food & Commercial Workers

Local 540, 519 F.3d at 494, we cannot say that this was error.

We note, however, that our decision is limited to these 

particular facts. We might have reached a different 

conclusion had effects bargaining taken place and resulted 

only in modest differences between the two groups in wages

and benefits. The Board itself has noted that it can be 

unworkable to continue recognizing a union representing only 

a historic bargaining unit if unit employees are working sideby-side with non-unit employees. See Abbott-Northwestern 

Hosp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1067 (1985) (recognizing the 

potential difficulty in having unit and non-unit employees 

working alongside each other, performing the same jobs). It 

may turn out that Burke’s withdrawal of recognition was 

simply premature – but premature is still improper. We

therefore uphold as reasonable the Board’s conclusion that 

Burke Automotive unlawfully withdrew recognition of the 

Union when it did so immediately upon the relocation, prior 

to any effects bargaining. 

C.

Burke Automotive also challenges the Board’s decision 

by attacking the composition of the Board itself. Burke

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argues that the Board was operating with only two valid 

members at the time that the decision was issued, and that the 

Board consequently lacked the requisite quorum. According 

to the employer, the Board’s opinion is therefore invalid. See

New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2640-42 (2010) 

(holding that the Board cannot render decisions when its 

membership falls below three). 

The Board’s opinion was issued on January 3, 2012. It is 

undisputed that on that date, the three members that issued the 

opinion – Chairman Mark G. Pearce, Member Brian Hayes, 

and Member Craig Becker – were the only individuals acting 

as Board members at that time. It also is undisputed that the 

appointment of Craig Becker (who was recess appointed in 

the second session of the 111th Congress) expired at the end 

of the first session of the 112th Congress. See U.S. Const., 

art. II § 2, cl. 3 (“[The President] shall have power to fill up 

all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, 

by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their 

next session.”). 

Burke Automotive argues that Becker’s appointment 

ended on December 17, 2011, when the Senate agreed to 

adjourn and convene for pro forma sessions only every 

Tuesday and Friday between that date and January 23, 2012. 

According to Burke, this action triggered the end of the 

session and the beginning of an inter-session recess.

This argument has no merit. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the 

same argument regarding Member Becker’s service). The 

Supreme Court recently observed that the end of an annual 

session is triggered by a recess only if the Senate adjourns 

sine die – that is, without specifying a date to return. NLRB v. 

Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560-61 (2014) (“The Senate 

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or the House of Representatives announces an inter-session 

recess by approving a resolution stating that it will ‘adjourn 

sine die,’ i.e., without specifying a date to return (in which 

case Congress will reconvene when the next formal session is 

scheduled to begin).”). Because the Senate convened every 

few days after December 17, the short recesses that took place 

were intra-session recesses – in other words, the prior session

did not end. The first session of the 112th Congress instead 

ended at noon on January 3, 2012, when the second session 

began. See U.S. Const., amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress shall 

assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall 

begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by

law appoint a different day.”); D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 352

(“Because there was no sine die adjournment on an earlier 

date, one Senate session ended on January 3, 2012, 

immediately before the next session began at noon.”).

In its reply, Burke suggests (without any evidence or 

argument) that perhaps the Board’s order issued after noon on 

January 3, 2012, after Becker’s appointment expired. 

Because we do not consider arguments raised for the first time 

on reply, we do not address this argument. Petrochem 

Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB, 240 F.3d 26, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

5

 5

 Burke Automotive also contends that the Board abused its 

discretion in issuing an affirmative bargaining order. See

Petitioner’s Br. 38. Although the affirmative bargaining order 

originated with the ALJ, Burke did not object to the nature of that 

order before the Board and has not explained its failure to do so. 

We therefore lack authority to consider its objection here. See 29 

U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that has not been urged before the 

Board . . . shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or 

neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 

extraordinary circumstances.”); Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 

133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A court of appeals altogether ‘lacks 

jurisdiction to review objections that were not urged before the 

USCA Case #12-1032 Document #1566001 Filed: 08/04/2015 Page 17 of 18
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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the Board’s 

conclusions with respect to Burke Automotive’s unlawful 

withdrawal of recognition. We also reject Burke’s other 

challenges to the Board’s decision. We therefore deny 

Burke’s petition for review and grant the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement. 

So ordered.

 

Board.’”) (quoting Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 

U.S. 645, 665-66 (1982)).

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