Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04017/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jessie J. Sprouse
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-4017

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Jessie J. Sprouse, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: January 5, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, LAY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Jessie J. Sprouse (Sprouse) appeals the judgment and sentence of the district

court1

 following his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Sprouse to 260 months

imprisonment. Sprouse contends the district court erred by ruling his two prior felony

convictions for thefts of motor vehicles constituted (1) crimes of violence under the

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United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), and (2) violent felonies for

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2002, Springfield, Missouri, police officers stopped a vehicle

for failing to display a front license plate. Sprouse was a front-seat passenger in the

vehicle. A search of the vehicle uncovered a Jennings Firearms Bryco, Model 59

MM, 9 millimeter pistol on the rear passenger-side floorboard. After the vehicle’s

occupants denied owning the gun, a fingerprint was removed from the magazine of

the pistol and later identified as Sprouse’s fingerprint. Because Sprouse was a felon,

he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

The government charged Sprouse with being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The indictment also cited four

previous felony offenses committed by Sprouse, two of which involved the theft of

motor vehicles.

The U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR),

which reported Sprouse was sentenced to four years in prison in 1991 for stealing a

car and a pickup truck from an auto dealership in New Madrid, Missouri, and driving

the vehicles to Memphis, Tennessee, where Sprouse was apprehended. In 1995,

Sprouse received five years in prison for stealing a pickup truck and a .30-.30 rifle

and then damaging the truck by shooting into it. In 1997, Sprouse received three

years in prison for exhibiting a sawed-off shotgun in an angry or threatening manner.

The PSR recommended a base offense level of 24, because Sprouse violated 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The PSR also recommended the district court

sentence Sprouse as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.4, which would result in an increase in Sprouse’s base offense level to 33. The

PSR calculated, based on fifteen criminal history points, a criminal history category

of VI.

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At sentencing, Sprouse conceded the 1997 conviction for exhibiting a shotgun

in an angry or threatening manner was a crime of violence. Citing United States v.

Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2002), the district court overruled Sprouse’s

objections to the PSR’s crimes of violence assessment and determined Sprouse’s two

felony convictions for motor vehicle thefts were crimes that carried a serious risk of

violent confrontation. As a result, the district court relied on the PSR offense level

calculation, assessed Sprouse’s base offense level at 33, and sentenced Sprouse to

260 months in prison.

On appeal, Sprouse challenges his enhanced sentence, arguing his two prior

felony motor vehicle theft convictions (1) were not crimes of violence for purposes

of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, and (2) were not violent felonies under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B). Sprouse argues the district court should have looked at the facts and

conduct underlying the prior felony convictions for motor vehicle theft before

concluding the convictions were crimes of violence and violent felonies. In

Sprouse’s opinion, a person in Missouri can commit the offense of vehicle theft

without violence.

II. DISCUSSION

We review for clear error the district court’s findings of fact and review de

novo its application of the sentencing guidelines. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d at 750.

Sprouse’s arguments on appeal are based on the definitions of crimes of

violence and violent felonies. Section 2K2.1(a)(2) of the Guidelines provides for an

enhanced sentence if the defendant convicted of possessing a firearm had at least two

prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. Crimes of violence include any

offense that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a)(2). The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) directs that a person who

violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three prior convictions for a violent felony shall

be “imprisoned not less than fifteen years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Violent felonies

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under the ACCA include any offense that “presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). It is no coincidence section 4B1.2’s

definition of a crime of violence mirrors the ACCA’s definition of a violent felony.

In 1989, section 4B1.2’s definition of a crime of violence was amended, and the

current definition “is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) [i.e., the ACCA].” U.S.S.G.

app. C, amend. 268 (1989). Because the definitions of crime of violence and violent

felony are identical, the same analysis applies in determining whether Sprouse’s

convictions fall within the conduct defined.

In Sun Bear, we considered whether the attempted theft of an operable vehicle

was a crime of violence. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d at 751-53. We first recognized our

court has determined walkaway escapes and also burglaries of commercial buildings

constituted crimes of violence. Id. at 752. With that precedent in mind, we reasoned

that “[t]heft of a vehicle presents a likelihood of confrontation as great, if not greater,

than burglary of commercial property, and it adds many of the dangerous elements

of escape.” Id. at 752. The crime involves a thief entering a vehicle at a time when

the thief is likely to encounter a returning driver or passenger, a police officer, or a

passerby, who may attempt to stop the theft. Id. at 752-53. These encounters carry

a serious risk of violent confrontation. Id. at 753. We also applied common sense to

recognize a thief fleeing in a vehicle operates a potentially deadly or dangerous

weapon, the vehicle itself, with which he is likely unfamiliar, and the thief may be

pursued, or perceive a threat of pursuit, and drive recklessly, turning any pursuit into

a high-speed chase with potential harm to innocent people, to the police, and to the

thief himself. Id. We concluded categorically that the “serious potential risks”

associated with automobile theft “compel a holding that the theft or attempted theft

of an operable vehicle is a crime of violence.” Id. 

Based on Sun Bear, we must conclude Sprouse’s two felony motor vehicle theft

convictions are crimes of violence and violent felonies, because the crimes present

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Although the court need not consider the facts underlying an individual

defendant’s prior convictions in order to determine whether they constitute “crimes

of violence,” see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-602 (1990), we note, in

passing, that Sprouse’s 1995 pickup theft included theft of a .30-.30 rifle and a

shooting into the pickup, and his 1991 theft entailed driving vehicles to another state

where Sprouse was confronted by police and apprehended.

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a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”2

 Because this court already

has addressed the arguments Sprouse raises here, we are bound by precedent. United

States v. Wright, 22 F.3d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[A] panel of this Court is bound

by a prior Eighth Circuit decision unless that case is overruled by the Court sitting en

banc”).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Sprouse was subject to enhanced punishment as an armed career

criminal under the ACCA. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

LAY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Because I believe we are bound by our holding in United States v. Sun Bear,

307 F.3d 747, 752-53 (8th Cir. 2002), I concur in the judgment of this case. I write

separately to voice my agreement with Judge Melloy in his dissent in Sun Bear, as

well as the five judges who voted to rehear Sun Bear en banc.

The defendant in this case was charged and convicted of felony stealing. MO.

REV. STAT. § 570.030. Like the prior offense at issue in Sun Bear, stealing of an

operable motor vehicle under Missouri law is not a separate offense, but included as

one of several offenses in a statute prohibiting the appropriation of the property or

services of another. See id. In holding that attempted theft of an automobile is a

crime of violence, the Sun Bear court found that:

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The crime begins when a thief enters and appropriates a vehicle, a time

when he is likely to encounter a returning driver or passenger, a

passerby, or a police officer, any of whom may be intent on stopping the

crime in progress. As we observed in Solomon, an encounter between

the thief and such a person carries a serious risk of violent confrontation.

Once the thief drives away with the vehicle, he is unlawfully in

possession of a potentially deadly or dangerous weapon. While he is

absconding in the vehicle, with which he will probably be unfamiliar,

the thief may be pursued or perceive a threat of pursuit. Under the stress

and urgency which will naturally attend his situation, the thief will likely

drive recklessly and turn any pursuit into a high-speed chase with the

potential for serious harm to police or innocent bystanders. 

Sun Bear, 307 F.3d at 752-53 (citations omitted). With this description, the Sun Bear

court at most described the potential risks attendant to extreme instances of car theft,

but by no means did it describe a generic case of simple car theft. 

Most simple car thefts do not result in encounters between the felon and the

owner of the vehicle, a police officer, or a passerby. Nor do most simple car thefts

result in a pursuit, reckless driving, and high-speed chases. While it is true that the

potential harm to persons from these scenarios may be described as the potential risks

of a car theft, I do not think they may properly be described as serious potential risks.

In my view, there must be some aggravating circumstance beyond simple car theft in

order to categorically classify car theft as a crime that, by its nature, is a crime of

violence. 

For these reasons, I would not place simple car theft on the same level as

burglary of a commercial dwelling, theft from a person, or escape. See United States

v. Griffith, 301 F.3d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that theft from a person is a

“violent felony”); United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001) (ruling

that all escapes constitute crimes of violence); United States v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902,

904 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that second degree burglary of a commercial building is

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a crime of violence). In each of these cases, the probability that another person will

be encountered during the commission of the crime is far greater than the potential

of a harmful encounter during a simple automobile theft. See Sun Bear, 307 F.3d at

754 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (noting that the proximity of victim and felon in theft

from a person, the enhanced law enforcement response to an escape, and the risk that

a felon is not aware that a commercial building is occupied create greater potential

risks of harm to a person than simple automobile theft). As the Fifth Circuit

recognized in United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2002), simple

automobile theft does not present a serious potential risk of physical injury, it

presents “a risk of injury to property, that is, the automobile.” Id. (emphasis in

original). Judge Melloy correctly noted in Sun Bear that simple car theft, by its

nature, does not involve the same potential risks of injury to a person. Sun Bear, 307

F.3d at 755-56.

______________________________

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