Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03026/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonione Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2000 Decided November 24, 2000

No. 00-3026

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Antonione Smith, a/k/a Abdul Mines,

a/k/a York,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00399-01)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee and

Tony W. Miles, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered

appearances.

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Mary B. McCord, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and

Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: On November 3, 1999, following a

three-day trial, a federal jury found appellant Antonione

Smith guilty on one count of unlawful possession of a firearm

and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(1) (1994). Smith was thereafter sentenced to 51

months in federal prison, where he now resides. On appeal,

Smith identifies three alleged evidentiary errors, each of

which he argues merit reversal of the judgment below and

remand for a new trial. Only one of the alleged errors,

however, requires extended treatment here.

Smith challenges the admission of government witness

Frank Haera's testimony that government informant Kevin

Perry, himself a witness at trial, had provided truthful information to the police in the past. Here, Smith renews his

timely objection that the testimony was irrelevant under

Federal Rule of Evidence 402. He also offers a new argument that was not raised at trial, i.e., that the so-called

"bolstering" evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of

Evidence 608(b). Rule 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic

evidence "for the purpose of attacking or supporting [a]

witness' credibility." Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). The Government

responds that the prosecution offered the "bolstering" testimony to rebut defense counsel's insinuation on crossexamination that informant Kevin Perry had been biased by

his plea agreement. As a result, the Government argues that

Rule 608(b) does not apply.

We need not reach the substance of this disagreement.

The fact that Perry had testified truthfully in the past was

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plainly relevant. Because Smith did not raise the more

specific Rule 608(b) objection at trial, we must review admission on that front for plain error. This circuit has not yet

addressed whether, and to what extent, Rule 608(b) prohibits

admission of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of past

"truthful" cooperation offered by the government to rebut

allegations of an informant's bias; and there is no consensus

among the circuits that have addressed the issue. Thus, even

were we to find error, it would not be plain.

Smith's two remaining challenges fare no better. Smith

argues that the trial court, despite defense counsel's failure to

lodge timely objections, should have barred sua sponte the

prosecution's references to Smith's aliases as well as statements implying that Smith was a violent and dangerous

criminal. Allusions to Smith's aliases were not so gratuitous,

and implications that Smith was a violent criminal not so

transparent, as to merit a finding of plain error on either

count. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District

Court.

I. Background

A. The Investigation

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF")

utilizes a special High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

("HIDTA") task force to investigate narcotics dealing, violent

crime, and drug-related homicides in the District of Columbia.

In 1996, HIDTA agents began a targeted investigation of the

Park Morton housing complex and surrounding area--a

known locus of drug-trafficking, violence, and a number of

unsolved murders. Trial Transcript at 21-22 (Nov. 2, 1999)

[hereinafter Tr.]. The investigation employed observation

posts, undercover narcotics purchases, and the arrest and

recruitment of confidential informants to aid in locating and

arresting other perpetrators. Tr. at 22-25.

In the midst of the ongoing investigation, officers observed

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bution charges, Perry, who is confined to a wheelchair, entered into a cooperation agreement on February 14, 1997.

Pursuant to his agreement, Perry entered a guilty plea to one

count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine. Tr. at 59. In

exchange for assistance, information, and truthful testimony,

HIDTA agents agreed to dismiss two charges then pending

against Perry in Superior Court. Tr. at 63-64. The Government also agreed to file a substantial assistance motion

pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 5K1.1

(1997), urging the District Court to waive the mandatory 10-

year minimum sentence on the federal distribution charge.

Tr. at 63. Though not explicitly part of the agreement,

agents also provided Perry with various amounts of money

for rent, bills, childcare, transportation, and moving expenses.

Tr. at 46-47, 104-07.

B. The Transaction

According to Perry, Smith--whom he had known for 10

years--repeatedly approached him in the summer of 1997

about purchasing an "AK-47." Tr. at 66-67. Though Smith

was not himself a target of the investigation, HIDTA agents

instructed Perry to go ahead with the transaction. Tr. at 67.

Perry testified that he and Smith agreed on a price of $900

for the rifle, and because Perry claimed to be buying the

weapon on behalf of a friend, Smith agreed to give Perry a

small finder's fee. Tr. at 67. The actual "deal" took place in

Perry's apartment on July 9, 1997. Agent Frank Haera of

the HIDTA task force oversaw the sting operation. Tr. at

27-29.

On the evening of July 9, and before Smith was to arrive at

Perry's apartment, undercover officer Clarence Brooks exchanged Perry's wheelchair for one equipped with a video

camera to record the transaction. Tr. at 114. He also fitted

Perry with a radio transmitter and provided him a cell phone

and money to purchase the rifle. Tr. 30-31. On his way out,

Officer Brooks passed a man entering the apartment whom

he recognized as Smith, also known to him as "York." Tr. at

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114. Though no officer was present during the transaction,

Agent Haera surveyed the events via radio transmitter from

a block away. Tr. at 30.

Smith did not have the gun with him when arriving at

Perry's apartment. At trial, Perry testified that he and

Smith initially discussed how Smith might inconspicuously

transport the weapon from down the street to the apartment.

Tr. at 70-71. Smith left once and returned without the gun,

at which time they again caucused over means of moving the

merchandise without attracting attention. Tr. at 71-72.

Smith left a second time and eventually returned with Daniel

Hamilton, or "Cat Face," who carried a large, torn cardboard

box into the apartment. Tr. at 72. Hamilton put down the

box, which contained a loaded Norinco SKS rifle, loose ammunition, and a black skull cap. Tr. at 34-36, 116-18. Perry

and Smith moved the box under the couch, and Perry gave

Smith the money. Smith returned a few dollars to Perry for

arranging the deal, before leaving the apartment with Hamilton. Tr. at 74. Officer Brooks then returned to the apartment, retrieved the box and its contents, and exchanged

wheelchairs. Tr. 116-17.

C. Proceedings Below

On November 17, 1998, a federal grand jury indicted both

Smith and Hamilton on one count of unlawful transfer and

possession of a semi-automatic assault weapon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. s 922(v)(1) (1994). Because Smith already had a

previous felony conviction, he was also indicted on one count

of unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1). See Indictment,

United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 98-399-01-JR (D.D.C.

Nov. 17, 1998), reprinted in Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at

10. The District Court dismissed the indictment on the first

count as to each defendant, leaving only the second count as

to Smith.

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The trial involving Smith's prosecution commenced on November 1, 1999. After one day of testimony and argument,

the jury returned a guilty verdict. At trial, the Government

called four witnesses--Agent Haera, Officer Brooks, Kevin

Perry, and Jeffrey Descheemaeker, an ATF firearms specialist to testify about the rifle's capabilities. During direct

examination of Perry, the prosecutor played the videotape of

the transaction, though the sound was inaudible. Tr. at 85.

Thus, Perry's testimony was the only evidence presented

regarding the content of his discussions with Smith and

Hamilton. The defense rested without calling witnesses.

On February 28, 2000, the trial judge sentenced Smith to

51 months in federal prison, followed by three years' supervised release. See Judgment, Smith, Crim. No. 98-299-01-

JR (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2000), reprinted in App. at 13. Smith

now appeals, challenging three alleged evidentiary errors.

He seeks reversal of the District Court's judgment and

remand for a new trial.

II. Analysis

A. The So-called "Bolstering" Evidence

Smith argues that the District Court improperly admitted

"bolstering" testimony that Perry, himself a witness at trial,

had provided truthful information to the task force in the

past. Smith points to the following exchange on re-direct

examination between the prosecutor and government witness

Agent Haera:

Q: Mr. Miles asked you some questions about Mr.

Perry's cooperation and the information he's given you.

Do you remember those questions?

A: Yes.

Q: Is it true that Perry had given you information that

has led to the capture of other criminals?

Mr. Miles: Objection, Your Honor.

The Court: Sustained.

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By Ms. Covell:

Q: As a result of Mr. Perry's cooperation, have you

been able to arrest other criminals?

Mr. Miles: Objection.

The Court: Sustained. It's leading.

By Ms. Covell:

Q: What happened--well, let me rephrase this. With

the information that Mr. Perry gave you, what did you

do?

Mr. Miles: Objection to relevance.

The Court: I'll overrule that objection.

The Witness: Repeat your question.

Ms. Covell: Sure.

By Ms. Covell:

Q: Mr. Perry gave you certain information about individuals in the Park Morton complex; is that right?

A: That's true.

Q: And what did you do with that information?

A: The information that Mr. Perry gave me personally,

I did a lot of different things with it. Some of the

information was used to obtain search warrants. Some

of the information was used to begin investigations on

other people in that area that were committing crimes

such as drug dealing and firearms possession. And some

of the information was used to inform the attorneys of

how he could help us in these investigations by way of

testimony in the grand jury and at trials.

Q: In any of those search warrants that were based on

information given you by Perry, did you uncover contraband?

A: Yes.

Q: And any of those investigations of other individuals

that you started as a result of Mr. Perry's information,

did any of those investigations lead to arrest?

A: Yes

Q: And were the arrests of those individuals corroborated by any tangible evidence?

Mr. Miles: Objection, Your Honor.

The Court: Sustained.

By Ms. Covell:

Q: Agent Haera, based on what you know about the

information Mr. Perry gave you, and the search warrants

you've gotten and the arrests, do you believe that the

information Mr. Perry gave you is truthful?

Mr. Miles: Objection, Your Honor.

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The Court: Sustained.

Ms. Covell: That's all I have, Your Honor.

Tr. at 52-55 (emphasis added). This exchange came on the

heels of a cross-examination, during which defense counsel

elicited from Agent Haera information regarding Perry's

possible bias, including his plea agreement and money paid

Perry by the ATF. Tr. at 42-48. Smith here renews his

relevance objection and also raises for the first time the

inadmissibility of the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).

Because defense counsel lodged an objection on the basis of

relevance in a timely fashion, we review admission of the cited

testimony for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 983 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 120

S. Ct. 223 (1999). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.

That Perry has informed and testified truthfully in the past

under his plea agreement certainly bears on his response to

similar pressures and temptations in the present. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which prohibits the

admission of evidence regarding past acts "to prove the

character of a person to show action in conformity therewith,"

would be largely superfluous if the rules on "relevance" were

construed to proscribe "propensity" testimony. Similarly,

were we to agree with Smith, Rule 608(b)'s prohibition on the

use of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness'

truthful or untruthful conduct "for the purposes of attacking

or supporting the witness' credibility" would itself be redundant. The concerns giving rise to Rules 404(b) and 608(b) are

not relevance concerns. To the contrary, both "propensity"

rules and the rule restricting the admission of extrinsic

credibility evidence embody specific concerns that, although

relevant, evidence of prior acts will either unduly prejudice

and overpersuade the jury, see Old Chief v. United States,

519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681

F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)), or waste time by sanctioning

countless distinct credibility mini-trials within the trial proper, see Fed. R. Evid. 405 advisory committee's note; Fed. R.

Evid. 608(b) advisory committee's note. In short, we reject

Smith's claim that the disputed testimony was irrelevant and

turn to his 608(b) challenge.

It should first be noted that certain of the alleged "bolstering" testimony--concerning whether the information that

Perry had given to law enforcement officers in the past had

been corroborated and whether Perry had been truthful in

past dealings--was objected to on unspecified grounds and

the objections were sustained. Nonetheless, Agent Haera

was allowed to testify that he had received and used information from Perry to facilitate investigations, uncover contraband, and secure arrests. It is this latter testimony that

Smith claims was "bolstering" and erroneously admitted under Rule 608(b). In light of our ruling in this case, we need

not address the accuracy of appellant's characterization of the

disputed testimony as "bolstering."

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Because Smith failed to raise a timely Rule 608(b) objection, we review admission of the testimony for plain error.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Spriggs,

102 F.3d 1245, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The term "plain" as

used in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) "is synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious.' " United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). "At a minimum, a court of

appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless

the error is clear under current law." Id.

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As noted above, this circuit has not yet addressed whether,

and to what extent, Rule 608(b) prohibits admission of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of past "truthful" cooperation offered by the government to rebut allegations of an

informant's bias. Although this fact, alone, is not dispositive

of the plain error issue, it is important when we consider that

Rule 608(b) itself admits of no simple answer to the question

at hand and, in addition, our sister circuits have been unable

to agree on the point at which impermissible "bolstering"

ends and permissible use of past cooperation to rebut bias

begins. Compare United States v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 781

(4th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t was error for the district court to admit

extrinsic evidence that the informer, Phillips, had provided

reliable information and testimony that resulted in several

convictions, in order to bolster Philips' credibility."), and

United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 321-22 (3d Cir. 1997)

(discussing Taylor), with United States v. Lochmondy, 890

F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Several circuits have held that

evidence of cooperation on other matters is admissible to

justify a cooperation agreement and to rebut allegations of

bias." (citing United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 1561 (11th

Cir. 1986); United States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996 (5th Cir.

1984); United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.

1985))), and United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1264 (7th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Lochmondy).

Rule 608(b) states that,

[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the

purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609,

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,

however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of

truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness'

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness

of another witness as to which character the witness

being cross-examined has testified.

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Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (emphasis added). As both the plain

language of the rule and the cases cited above suggest, the

threshold question under Rule 608(b) is: For what purpose

has the prosecution offered the extrinsic evidence? If offered

solely "in order to bolster [the informant's] credibility," Taylor, 900 F.2d at 781, then Rule 608(b) bars admission lest one

of the exceptions applies. But, if offered for a different and

legitimate reason, such as "to justify a cooperation agreement

[or] rebut allegations of bias," Lochmondy, 890 F.2d at 821,

the evidence falls outside Rule 608(b)'s narrow confines.

Government informants present a uniquely difficult case for

courts determining whether the prosecution has offered the

so-called "bolstering" evidence for a permissible or an impermissible purpose. Routinely, defense counsel cross-examines

government witnesses about an informant's bias--whether it

be a plea agreement, a financial arrangement, or both. On

re-direct, the prosecution may want to introduce specific

instances of fruitful cooperation under the plea agreement to

show that the informant has already cooperated substantially

with the police, thereby reducing the marginal temptation to

lie in the present circumstance. The line between this permissible use and impermissible "bolstering" is indeed a hazy

one. In Fusco, the Fifth Circuit held extrinsic evidence of

past cooperation admissible to rebut implications that the

informant had received $45,000 from the DEA solely for his

help in that case: "Because the government was trying to

convince the jury that [the informant] was not biased, it was

not 'bolstering' [the informant] in a prohibited way, and [the

informant's] prior cooperation was not 'extrinsic,' as those

terms are used in Federal Rule of Evidence 608. Bias, as

opposed to general veracity, is not a collateral issue." 748

F.2d at 998. Likewise, in United States v. Lindemann, 85

F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit found admissible similar evidence offered in response to suggestions that

the informant "would not have gotten a plea deal if he hadn't

come up with the name of a 'big fish' like Lindemann." Id. at

1242. The court held that

[t]he evidence specifically rebutted the allegation that

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mann's case: Burns' successful participation in numerous

other cases meant that at the time he was negotiating

over his plea deal, he had lots of information to use as

bargaining chips. That fact was relevant under the

standards of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 402 because it

made less probable the assertion that Burns was lying in

Lindemann's case out of self-interest.

Id. at 1243.

Because defense counsel in the instant case failed to raise

the 608(b) objection below, the prosecution never had an

opportunity to explain why it offered the alleged "bolstering"

evidence. Defense counsel had used its cross-examination of

Agent Haera to expose the terms of Perry's plea agreement,

Tr. at 45-46, to suggest that Perry need only "accuse"

suspects to benefit under that agreement, Tr. 44-45, and to

show the tremendous financial incentives on Perry to provide

even false information, Tr. at 46-48. Perhaps, as in Lindemann, the prosecution offered the testimony to demonstrate

the diminished marginal value to Perry of his participation in

the instant case; perhaps as in Fusco, it was offered to

undermine any insinuation that Perry had received funds for

his participation in this case alone; or finally, perhaps the

prosecution wanted to counter defense counsel's specific insinuation that Perry would benefit merely by accusing people.

We simply do not know. Given these possibilities, the ambiguity in the case law, and the context of the present testimony, we cannot say that admission of the evidence constituted

plain error.

We conclude by emphasizing that, to satisfy the plain error

standard, Smith must show that the alleged error "affect[ed]

substantial rights," that is, "affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (holding

that the "substantial rights" inquiry of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) mirrors Rule 52(a)'s "harmless error"

inquiry, except that the burden in the former falls on the

defendant to show prejudice). Moreover, " '[t]he plain error

exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement

should be used sparingly, only for "particularly egregious

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errors" that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings." ' " Spriggs, 102 F.3d at

1257 (quoting United States v. Copelin, 996 F.2d 379, 383

(D.C. Cir. 1993)). Here, the minimal damage arguably

wrought by the contested testimony stands in stark contrast

to the overwhelming weight of evidence against Smith. Furthermore, as noted above, it appears that the most damaging

of the alleged "bolstering" testimony was excluded pursuant

to objections that were raised by Smith's attorney. There

was no plain error.

B. The Remaining Challenges

We pause only briefly over Smith's two remaining evidentiary challenges. As with the Rule 608(b) issue, defense

counsel failed to raise timely objections at trial. We thus

review admission for plain error.

Smith argues first that the District Court improperly allowed the prosecution to refer to and to elicit answers regarding Smith's aliases. The transcript does not reveal, however,

whether the prosecution offered the aliases for arguably

irrelevant and prejudicial purposes or primarily as a means of

identifying Smith--Perry had apparently known Smith as

"York." Tr. at 66. Furthermore, Smith has not shown how

the limited allusions prejudiced his defense.

Smith's second remaining argument--that the District

Court erred by admitting evidence implying that Smith had

been a target of the Park Morton investigation and implying

that Smith had threatened Perry with violence--fares no

better. Perry himself testified that "[Smith] wasn't the target of the investigation, but, however, he approached me and

asked me was I interested in buying an AK-47." Tr. at 67.

As to possible implications that Perry had been moved on

various occasions to protect him from Smith, the District

Court addressed any potential problem on its own initiative

by requiring the prosecutor to ask for clarification from its

witness:

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(Bench conference on the record)

The Court: This is--in NFL language, this is my time

out. There's been a lot of sort of hinting around the

edges of the danger this guy was in, and my concern, of

course, is that the implication of all of it is that this

defendant is the one responsible for the danger. Now

both sides have--both sides have toyed with this. I can't

unscramble this egg. But there haven't been any objections until now, but I don't want this danger thing to be

played up.

Ms. Covell: I understand, Your Honor. My view is that

Mr. Miles opened the door by asking him about the

payments for the move. I was going to ask why and

make it clear--I can ask a follow-up question was it

because of the defendant. He knows it wasn't because of

the defendant.

The Court: That would be very helpful.

Ms. Covell: I can do that.

Mr. Miles: Okay.

(End of bench conference)

By Ms. Covell:

Q. What were the reasons that you moved Kevin Perry?

A. I felt that his life was in danger on several occasions.

That's why I moved Mr. Perry.

Q. Were any of those occasions that you moved him a

result of any sort of threat or danger that came from the

defendant?

Let me rephrase that: You never learned that the defendant had ever threatened Mr. Perry in any way?

A. No.

Tr. at 48-49. Any residual problems lingering after the

clarification certainly do not constitute plain error.

III. Conclusion

Because the District Court's alleged evidentiary failings do

not rise to the level of plain error, Smith's conviction is

Affirmed.

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