Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01343/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01343-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Laina Jeanne Young
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

Ualtecl States Court '?r App~ls FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circu1t 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LAINA JEANNE YOUNG, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant.) 

JAN 1 9 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-1343 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-273) 

David C. Japha, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney (Henry L. 

Solano, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District 

Judge. 

BROWN, District Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1343 Document: 01019290240 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 1 
This case was the indirect result of a traffic stop in 

Arizona. On September 6, 1989, Arizona Highway Patrolman Sandra 

Prichett stopped a car that had crossed the center line of the 

highway. The driver of vehicle could not produce a driver's license 

when asked to but said that her name was Laina Young. The driver 

and a passenger, Sam Evans, produced papers showing that the car 

had been rented by Laina Young at the Los Angeles Airport. The 

officer became suspicious when she obtained a description of Laina 

Young from the California Division of Motor Vehicles that did not 

match the driver of the car. In fact, the driver's name was Natasha 

Renfro. When asked to produce some form of identification, the 

driver began looking through the trunk of the vehicle. This turn of 

events ultimately led to the officer's discovery of a suitcase in 

the trunk containing approximately seven kilograms of cocaine. 

A subsequent investigation led authorities to charge eleven 

individuals in a second superseding indictment with various counts 

of drug trafficking and money laundering. Defendant-appellant Laina 

Young was one of the individuals charged. Ms. Young and a codefendant, Jose Gutierrez, were the only two defendants to proceed 

to trial. Mr. Gutierrez' appeal is decided in a companion case, 

United States v. Gutierrez, No. 93-1296 (lOth Cir. Dec. , 1994). 

The evidence at trial showed a large scale conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine headed by a man named Ernest Evans. In short, 

the evidence showed that Evans distributed large amounts of cocaine 

to individuals in several cities. Evans obtained payment for drugs 

on several occasions by means of wire transfers at Western Union 

2 

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offices in Los Angeles. Evans had numerous individuals, including 

appellant Laina Young, receive these payments for him, usually in 

$9,000 increments. 

A jury found Ms. Young guilty on two counts of money 

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The jury was unable to 

reach a verdict on one additional count of money laundering and on 

a charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

cocaine. Appellant was sentenced to 70 months imprisonment. She now 

asserts five separate grounds for error. For the reasons set forth 

herein, we affirm. 

Admission of Tape Recorded Conversation 

Appellant's first argument concerns the district court's 

denial of her motion to suppress a tape recorded telephone 

conversation between Keith Rutherford and Ernest Evans, two codefendants named in the indictment. The conversation, which took 

place on May 5, 1993, was recorded by Rutherford upon the advice of 

his attorney. During the conversation Evans asked Rutherford if he 

intended to plead guilty and, among other things, indicated that he 

was willing to testify on behalf of Rutherford. Rutherford turned 

the tape over to the government when he pled guilty on May 10, 

1993. Ernest Evans entered a guilty plea on May 14, 1993. 

Ms. Young's trial began on June 7, 1993. The government called 

Rutherford as a witness in its case-in-chief; he gave testimony 

incriminating Ms. Young. Ms. Young called Ernest Evans as a witness 

in her case. Evans admitted being extensively involved in drug 

trafficking but testified that he told Young nothing about his 

3 

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criminal activities. During cross-examination, counsel for the 

government asked Evans whether he had called Rutherford within the 

last six weeks to see if Rutherford was going to plead guilty and 

to tell Rutherford that he (Evans) was willing to testify as a 

favorable witness. Evans denied having done so, although he 

acknowledged having called Rutherford at some point. Vol. 22 at 

980. After the defense rested, the government indicated that it 

would call Rutherford as a rebuttal witness and, for the first 

time, disclosed the existence of the taped conversation between 

Rutherford and Evans. Over the defendant's objection, the trial 

court determined that the tape was admissible to impeach Evans and 

permitted the government to introduce it during Rutherford's 

rebuttal testimony. Counsel for Ms. Young then cross-examined 

Rutherford about the tape. 

Appellant's first argument is that the government's failure to 

disclose the taped conversation prior to rebuttal was a violation 

of her right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 

83 s.ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Brady established that "the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 

either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or 

bad faith of the prosecution." Id., 373 U.S. at 87. 1 Impeachment 

evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the Brady 

1 Appellant does not allege that the government acted in bad 

faith in this case. Aplt. Br. at 22. 

4 

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rule. Giglio v. United States, 405 u.s. 150, 154, 92 s.ct. 763, 31 

L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). 

Appellant argues that the tape contained impeaching evidence 

against Rutherford. Specifically, she cites a portion of the tape 

where Rutherford stated that he was "a pawn, 11 that "they're pushing 

me around," and that "You know, because like I, like I try to tell 

them, I don't really know much about anything, anyway. And they 

[throw a bunch of names at me and] I don't know these people. 11 

Govt. Exh. 54D, E. Appellant concedes that, unlike Brady, the 

evidence at issue in this case was actually disclosed during the 

trial and that she had the opportunity to cross-examine Rutherford 

about it. She maintains, however, that the government's failure to 

produce the tape before the end of the case was damaging "because 

there is a big tactical difference between whether the government 

puts on damaging evidence first, or whether the defendant can 

cross-examine with it first." Aplt. Br. at 19. Counsel for Ms. 

Young also suggests that he would have prepared differently for Mr. 

Evans' testimony had he known about the tape. Id. 

Notwithstanding the delayed disclosure of the tape, we 

conclude that appellant received a fair trial. Evidence is 

"material" within the meaning of Brady "only if there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 

L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). "A •reasonable probability' is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 11 Id. To the 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-1343 Document: 01019290240 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 5 
extent Brady applies where an allegation is made that the 

government's belated disclosure of material during the trial 

resulted in prejudice to the defense, 2 the materiality inquiry 

focuses on whether earlier disclosure would have created a 

reasonable doubt of guilt. See United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 

1501, 1511 (lOth Cir. 1992). Cf. United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 

1412 (11th Cir. 1991) (A Brady violation can occur if the 

prosecution delays in transmitting evidence during a trial, but 

only if the defendant can show prejudice,~., the material came 

so late that it could not be effectively used.) 

Our examination of the record convinces us that there is no 

reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been 

different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense earlier. 

To begin with, Rutherford's statements on the tape are so vague 

that their impeachment value must be considered marginal. Nothing 

on the tape indicates that he was referring to Ms. Young when he 

said "I really don't know much about anything" and "I don't know 

these people." Additionally, it is clear that there was ample other 

evidence besides Rutherford's testimony that supported Ms. Young's 

2 We have stated on several occasions that Brady is not 

violated when the material requested is made available during the 

trial. See~, Rogers, 960 F.2d at 1510. Cf. Beale, infra (Brady 

may be violated by disclosure occurring at trial.) Despite our 

seemingly unequivocal statements on this question, we have 

generally proceeded to examine whether the circumstances of 

disclosure during a trial were such as to prejudice the defense. 

See ~, Rogers, 960 F. 2d at 1511. In this case, we need not 

decide whether there are some circumstances where the disclosure of 

impeaching evidence during trial would constitute a violation of 

Brady because we find that the evidence disclosed here was not 

material and the delay resulted in no prejudice to the defendant. 

6 

Appellate Case: 93-1343 Document: 01019290240 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 6 
money laundering convictions. Without recounting the evidence in 

full, it is sufficient to say that the evidence showed that on 

several occasions appellant went to Western Union at the behest of 

Ernest Evans and accepted wire transfers from various individuals 

in the amount of $9,000. See Vol. 17. A jury could easily conclude 

that the wire transfers were made under circumstances that would 

likely arouse suspicion in the average person and which suggested 

that Ms. Young had knowledge of their illicit nature. There was 

also abundant circumstantial evidence from which a jury could 

properly conclude that appellant was aware of Ernest Evans' drug 

activities at the time she engaged in these monetary transactions. 

For example, there was evidence that Ernest Evans lived a lavish 

lifestyle during the time of the alleged drug conspiracy, having 

purchased a $700,000 house in California and automobiles that 

included a BMW, a Porche, and a Rolls Royce. Ms. Young was closely 

associated with Evans during this time period and also associated 

with several of the other admitted coconspirators. Clayton Bullard 

testified that when he came to Los Angeles to purchase cocaine from 

Ernest Evans, he was introduced to Laina Young by Evans at an 

apartment that contained weighing scales and other materials used 

in the packaging of cocaine. Vol. 18 at 140-41. Bullard also 

testified that on one occasion when he called on the phone and 

Evans was unavailable, Young provided him with the names that he 

should send wire transfers to. Id. at 143. These transfers 

represented payment for cocaine. Id. at 144. Additionally, there 

was testimony from Clayton Bullard and Phil Evans that Ernest Evans 

7 

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told them that Young was involved in distributing drugs for him. 

Vol. 18 at 142; Vol. 21 at 751-52. 

When the abundance of evidence is combined with the fact that 

counsel was able to cross-examine Rutherford in rebuttal and the 

jury was able to hear and weigh the statements on the tape, we see 

no basis for concluding that the outcome of the trial could have 

been different if the tape had been disclosed earlier. Cf. United 

States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1511 {lOth Cir. 1992) (No 

violation of Brady found where documents were disclosed to the 

defense on the last day of trial) . See also United States v. 

Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1340 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 

u.s. 928 (No prejudice to appellant where he was allowed to recall 

a witness for additional cross-examination after disclosure of 

impeaching material.) Similarly, appellant's vague assertion that 

the late disclosure affected preparation of the defense is not 

sufficient. 3 "[T]he relevant standard of materiality does not focus 

on the trial preparation, but instead on whether earlier disclosure 

would have created a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not 

otherwise exist." United States v. George, 778 F.2d 556, 562 (lOth 

Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97, 112 n.20, 

96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). 

Appellant also asserts that the introduction of the tape 

violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 

3 The trial judge granted Ms. Young permission to recall 

Ernest Evans in surrebuttal to give his explanation of the tape, 

Vol. Supp. 2 at 1130, but counsel apparently decided not to recall 

him. Id. at 1174. 

8 

Appellate Case: 93-1343 Document: 01019290240 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 8 
against her. She contends that "the information held back by the 

government prevented counsel from exploring every aspect of Mr. 

Rutherford's relationship with Mr. Evans, thus denying Ms. Young a 

full opportunity to confront that witness." Apl t. Br. at 21. We 

cannot agree that Ms. Young was denied her right to confront the 

witness. Prior to the disclosure of the tape, counsel had the 

opportunity to fully cross-examine Mr. Rutherford about the events 

alleged in the indictment and Rutherford's relationship with Ernest 

Evans. In rebuttal, counsel was able to fully explore the 

circumstances surrounding Rutherford's taping of his conversation 

with Evans. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that 

appellant was provided an opportunity for effective crossexamination of the witness. 

Appellant's final argument concerning the tape is that the 

government violated the Jenck's Act, 18 u.s.c. § 3500, by failing 

to turn the tape over immediately after Rutherford's testimony on 

direct examination. In light of appellant's subsequent opportunity 

to cross-examine Rutherford about the statements, however, we must 

find that any error in this regard was harmless. See United States 

v. Pope, 574 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 u.s. 929, 

949 ( 1978) (Any harm from failure of government to turn over 

statement after direct examination was cured by allowing defendant 

further cross-examination concerning the statement.) 

Speedy Trial Act 

Appellant next contends that her rights under the Speedy Trial 

Act were violated and that the indictment should have been 

9 

Appellate Case: 93-1343 Document: 01019290240 Date Filed: 01/19/1995 Page: 9 
dismissed. In sum, appellant contends that several periods of delay 

resulting from continuances granted by the district court are not 

excludable under the Act because the court did not make the "ends 

of justice" findings required by statute when it granted those 

continuances. See 18 u.s.c. § 316l(h) (8} (A); United States v. 

Pasquale, 25 F.3d 948, (lOth Cir. 1994) (Failure to make "ends of 

justice" findings at each continuance precludes an examining court 

from justifying the continuances retroactively under § 

316l(h) (8) (A).) Although we have examined the record relating to 

this question in detail, we find it unnecessary to lengthen this 

opinion by setting forth the complex procedural history of the 

case. Specific dates and events will be referred to herein as 

necessary to explain our ruling. For the reasons set forth herein, 

we find no violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 

The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that a criminal trial 

must commence within 70 days of the latest of a defendant's 

indictment, information, or appearance. 18 u.s.c. § 3161(c) (1). 

Certain periods of delay are excluded, however, in computing the 

time within which a trial must commence. § 3161 (h). Among the 

delays excluded are those resulting from certain continuances 

described in§ 316l(h) (8) (A). Additionally, delays resulting from 

pretrial motions are generally excluded, as are reasonable periods 

of delay pertaining to co-defendants joined for trial. See id. at 

subsections (1) (F), (7). 

The speedy trial issue was raised in the district court by 

means of a motion filed June 3, 1993, Vol. 2, Doc. 67, and was 

10 

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argued to the district judge on June 7, 1993. See Vol. 16. Although 

computation of the 70 day period generally begins with a 

defendant's first appearance, our review of the record makes clear 

that the specific issue raised by Ms. Young in the district court 

was whether more than 70 days of non-excludable delay elapsed 

during the period from November 2, 1992, to the date of trial, June 

7, 1993. For purposes of her motion to dismiss, the defendant 

conceded below that the period prior to November 2, 1992, was 

excludable under the Act. 4 On appeal, appellant's argument does not 

appear to be similarly limited in scope. For example, appellant 

complains of the trial court's failure to make any "ends of 

4 The defendant noted in her motion that at the April 9, 1992, 

status conference the court set the trial for November 2, 1992, 

without making any contemporaneous findings on the record as to why 

the ends of justice served by this continuance outweighed the best 

interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Vol. 

2, Doc. 67 at 6. For purposes of computing the seventy day time 

limit, however, the defendant assumed that the time prior to 

November 10, 1992, was excludable under the Act. Id. at 6-7. Ms. 

Young's motion did not attempt to calculate the time excludable due 

to pretrial motions but simply asserted that "assuming that the 

November 2, 1992 trial date was set within the allowable time, and 

that all motions were disposed of by the November 10, 1992 order 

setting the James hearing, the seventy day period begins to run 

from November 10, 1992. 11 Id. This was reiterated in arguments to 

the court, in which counsel for Ms. Young made clear that the 

defendant's speedy trial argument was premised solely on the time 

period from November 1992 until June 7, 1993. See~, Vol. 16 at 

2 ("[T]he construction of our motion is that based upon November 

10, which my understanding is that's the last motion as to Ms. 

Young were [sic] determined, that would be the beginning of a new 

counting for speedy trial.") See also id. at 7, 22-23; id. at 37 

("And we are conceding that the period of excludability would end 

on November 2, so that the arraignment of the defendants in July 

'92 and the filing of the second superseding indictment July '92 

has no bearing whatsoever on any excludable time.") See also id. at 

41 ("So if the government is suggesting that the time is excluded 

from August to May 14, 1993, if the Court accepts that proposition, 

then our motion must fail.") 

11 

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justice" findings at an April 9, 1992 conference and argues that 

"the speedy trial time should be counted from April 9, 1992 until 

the first motions were filed." Aplt. Repl. Br. at 17. 5 

We will not broaden the scope of the speedy trial inquiry at 

this point for two reasons. First, appellant conceded a point in 

the district court that she now attempts to argue on appeal 

namely, whether the time prior to November 2, 1992 counted against 

the speedy trial clock. As a result, the district court had no 

opportunity to rule on any of the numerous questions raised by 

addressing that time period. Second, the record before us does not 

provide a basis from which we can determine how much of the period 

from January 1992 to November 1992 was excludable delay 

attributable to motions or other proceedings relating to 

appellant's co-defendants. The record does contain a docket sheet 

setting forth the motions Young filed prior to November 2, 1992 

(and those of defendant Gutierrez). But the record contains no 

documentation of the motions filed by the nine other co-defendants. 

In these circumstances we will not speculate as to what time is or 

is not excludable prior to November 2, 1992, because even the 

5 Appellant also states that 32 days should subtracted from 

the seventy day time limit based on the period from Ms. Young's 

arraignment on January 6, 1992, to February 10, 1992, the date a 

written order was entered declaring the case complex. Aplt. Rep. 

Br. at 16. Aside from the fact that appellant did not make this 

argument below, it overlooks the fact that in a case such as this 

the speedy trial clock would generally begin to run from the date 

the last co-defendant was arraigned. Although the record before us 

is incomplete in this regard, it shows that defendant Gutierrez was 

arraigned on February 7, 1992. See Henderson v. United States, 476 

U.S. 321, 323, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986) (The Act began 

to run on the date of arraignment of the last co-defendant.) 

12 

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partial record before us indicates that a large number of motions 

were filed by appellant's co-defendants in that period. 6 In this 

regard, we note that appellant bears the burden of proof of 

supporting the motion to dismiss. See§ 3162(a) (2). We conclude 

that appellant has failed to meet her burden of showing that the 

speedy trial clock was running prior to November 2, 1992. 

We thus turn to the same issue argued by appellant in the 

district court: whether more than seventy days of non-excludable 

delay elapsed between November 2, 1992 and June 7, 1993. In arguing 

this issue the parties have focused almost exclusively upon whether 

periods of delay resulting from the continuances granted by the 

district court would be excludable under§ 3161(h) (8) (A). Even if 

a period of delay is not excludable under that subsection, however, 

it may be excludable under a different provision of the Speedy 

Trial Act. In this case, the record shows that the entire period 

6 Prior to the severance of October 6, 1992, the delay caused 

by motions filed of any of appellant's ten co-defendants would 

probably be attributable to appellant as well. See§ 3161(h) (7). 

Appellant asserts in her reply brief: "While the defendant 

acknowledges that there may have been outstanding motions filed 

either by this defendant or others, the failure to decide any of 

those motions in no way affected the beginning of any trial." Aplt. 

Repl. Br. at 16. Although the meaning of this statement is not 

clear, it is apparently intended to suggest that the period during 

which motions were pending did not result in "delay" because the 

motions were not the actual cause of the continuances granted by 

the trial court. 

Assuming we have interpreted appellant's assertion correctly, 

we must reject it as inconsistent with§ 3161(h). As we pointed out 

in Unites States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1426 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

the exclusions in § 3161(h) are automatic, so no inquiry into the 

"true cause" of a delay is proper. We further noted that Henderson 

v. United States, 476 u.s. 321 (1986) makes clear that the entire 

time from the filing of a motion through the hearing on the motion 

is excludable under subsection (h) ( 1) (F) . See Tranakos, 911 F. 2d at 

1426. 

13 

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from November 2, 1992 to the date of trial would be excludable as 

to defendant Young pursuant to§ 3161(h) (1) (F) and§ 3161(h) (7). 

Under subsection (h) (1) (F), periods of delay resulting from 

any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the 

conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such 

motion are excluded from the seventy day period. Under subsection 

(h) (7), a reasonable period of delay is excluded when the defendant 

is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for 

trial has not yet run and no motion for severance has been granted. 

Prior to November 2, 1992, Lisa Carol Means, a co-defendant of 

Ms. Young's, filed a motion to suppress evidence. Although a 

hearing on the motion was initially set for November 4, 1992, Means 

requested and was granted a continuance of the hearing, evidently 

for the purpose of obtaining additional witnesses. See Vol. 8 at 

48. The motion was then set for December 4, 1992, but that hearing 

was canceled and the motion remained pending until it came on for 

hearing on May 14, 1993. When the judge inquired at this latter 

hearing if Means was ready to proceed with the motion to suppress, 

counsel announced that Means intended to enter into a plea 

agreement. Vol. 13 at 1-2. As a result, Means agreed to withdraw 

the motion to suppress. Id. at 13. Under§ 3161(h)(1)(F), the 

entire period from the filing of the motion to suppress until 

resolution of the motion at the hearing on May 14, 1993 is 

excludable as to defendant Means. See Henderson v. United States, 

476 u.s. 321, 106 s.ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). And because we 

find that this delay was "reasonable" within the meaning of § 

14 

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316l(h) (7), the delay is excludable as to defendant Young as well. 7 

See United states v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1426 (lOth Cir. 

1990) 0 

The period from May 14, 1993 until the date of trial is also 

excludable delay. The trial court interpreted comments by counsel 

for Ms. Young at the May 14, 1993 hearing as a request for a "James 

hearing" (to determine the admissibility of statements by alleged 

co-conspirators) on behalf of Ms. Young. Such an interpretation was 

clearly reasonable under the circumstances. See Vol. 13 at 28-30 

and Vol. 16 at 40-41. Consequently, the court scheduled and held a 

James hearing on May 28, 1993. This period from the time of the 

request through the time of the James hearing itself is 

excludable under§ 316l(a) (1) (F). See United States v. Bermea, 30 

F.3d 1539, 1568 (5th Cir. 1994) (Defendants' James motions tolled 

the speedy trial clock.) And finally, the remaining period is 

7 Ms. Young argued in the district court that the delay caused 

by defendant Means' motion was not excludable as to her because of 

United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (lOth Cir. 1986). See Vol. 

16 at 42. In Theron we indicated that the reasonableness of a delay 

depends upon all the circumstances. We have weighed all of the 

relevant factors here and conclude that the delay was reasonable. 

The delay furthered the interest in efficient use of prosecutorial 

and judicial resources in trying multiple defendants in a single 

trial. Cf. Theron, 782 F.2d at 1514. Secondly, although Ms. Young 

was detained in this case pursuant to a writ, she was also under a 

sentence entered in the Eastern District of Oklahoma and would 

otherwise have been in custody on that sentence. Young did seek a 

severance from the other defendants in September of 1992. She also 

asserted her right to a speedy trial at least as of March 17, 1993. 

But Young also sought extensions of time to file motions on more 

than one occasion and also moved to join in the motions asserted by 

her co-defendants, including defendant Means, on more than one 

occasion. See~, Vol. 1, Docs. 18, 22, 24. Cf. United states v. 

Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1426 (lOth Cir. 1990) (delay of fifteen 

months caused by co-defendant's motion was "reasonable" under § 

3161 (h) (7)) 0 

15 

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excludable because of defendant Gutierrez' motion to dismiss filed 

on May 27, 1993 and decided the day of trial, June 7, 1993. 

Although in October of 1992 Ms. Young's trial had been severed from 

that of Mr. Gutierrez (and thus delays caused by Mr. Gutierrez 

would not otherwise be excludable as to Ms. Young under (h) (7)), on 

May 14, 1993 appellant agreed to a re-joinder of her trial with the 

remaining defendants, including Mr. Gutierrez. See Vol. 13 at 7. As 

a result of this joinder, the delay arising from Mr. Gutierrez' 

motion of May 27, 1993 is excludable as to Ms. Young under § 

3161 (h) (7). 

Thus, the entire period from November 2, 1992 to June 7, 1993 

consists of excludable delay. Based upon the record before us we 

find that the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the 

indictment against the defendant. 

Court's Refusal to Accept Guilty Plea 

Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by refusing to accept her guilty plea. Ms. Young 

appeared at a hearing on March 15, 1993, to plead guilty to one 

count of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1). 

The charge in question was based on a March 21, 1989 transaction in 

which she allegedly received a wire transfer of $9,000 at a bank 

and gave the money to Ernest Evans. After questioning the defendant 

about her role in this transaction the judge refused to accept the 

plea, indicating that he did not think Ms. Young's statement 

constituted an admission of the offense. In particular, the judge 

expressed concern over whether Ms. Young was willing to admit that 

16 

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she had the knowledge and intent required for a violation of § 

1956(a) (1). Vol. 11 at 12-14. 

Section 1956(a) (1) provides in part: 

Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a 

financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 

form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 

conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 

involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity 

(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 

specified unlawful activity; or 

. (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in 

whole or in part --

( i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the 

location, the source, the ownership, or the control of 

the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting 

requirement under State or Federal law, 

shall be guilty of an offense. The indictment in this case alleged 

that the defendant's conduct violated each of the three subsections 

listed above, (A) (i), (B) (i), and (B) (ii), and also charged her as 

an aider and abettor. 

Under the first paragraph of § 1956(a) (1), it must be shown 

that the defendant engaged in the transaction "knowing" that the 

property represented proceeds "from some form, though not 

necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under 

State, Federal, or foreign law .... " See§ 1956(c)(1). Appellant 

argues that the district court erroneously concluded that Ms. Young 

had to admit that she knew the money in question came specifically 

from drug trafficking before she could be guilty of the offense. 

After reviewing the transcript of the plea hearing, we find 

that the district court could properly conclude that the defendant 

failed to admit the knowledge required by the first paragraph of 

the statute. Although the defendant stated at one point that she 

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"knew it was unlawful activity" and at another that "I suspected it 

was illegal activity, 11 when the court inquired further she was 

unable or unwilling to explain the factual basis for her knowledge. 

Vol. 11 at 16-19. Among the responses the defendant gave to the 

judge's questions were statements to the effect that she was just 

doing Evans a favor by picking up the money (id. at 10), that she 

had no idea that the money was from drugs (id.), that she did not 

know she was doing anything illegal (id. at 13), and that she knew 

that the defendant had several businesses and thought that the 

money was "maybe for -- I don't -- I can't even say cause drugs was 

[farthest] from my mind. A business deal. 11 ( Id. at 19.) 

Additionally, a written statement filed by the defendant admitted 

only that "she probably knew that [the money] was from some kind of 

illegal activity. 11 (emphasis added) Vol. 2, Doc. 57. The 

defendant did indicate at one point that she thought that the money 

was from "maybe gambling, something like that ... 11 and that the 

amount of the transaction made her think it "wasn't legit." [sic] 

Taken as a whole, however, her alleged admission of knowledge was 

equivocal. To "know" a fact implies more than having a mere 

suspicion that it is true; it suggests that one has the fact within 

the mind's grasp with certitude. See Webster's Third New Int'l. 

Dictionary at 1252 ( 1961) . Although knowledge may be shown by 

circumstantial evidence (and the circumstances here may have been 

sufficient for a jury to find knowledge), when the defendant carne 

before the court to adrni t guilt she made numerous statements 

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intimating that she did not engage in the transaction knowing that 

the money represented proceeds of some form of illegal activity. 

In addition to the foregoing, the record shows that the 

defendant did not admit having the intent or knowledge required for 

a violation of any of the three subparagraphs of§ 1956(a) (1) under 

which she was charged. Ms. Young specifically denied knowing 

anything about any transaction reporting requirements, which 

eliminates any contention that she admitted a violation of § 

1956(a) (1) (B) (ii). Neither could anything she said be construed as 

an admission that she engaged in the transaction "with the intent 

to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity."8 See 

subs. (A) (i). We note that although the plea agreement contained a 

stipulation that the transaction was designed to promote Ernest 

Evans' unlawful activity, it contained no stipulation that Ms. 

Young knew this fact when she engaged in the transaction. See Vol. 

2, Doc. 56. Similarly, we see no indication in any of Ms. Young's 

statements that she admitted having knowledge that the transaction 

was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 

activity. See sub. (B) (i). A statement filed by the defendant on 

the date of the plea hearing asserted that "Ms. Young only 

collected money in this fashion for Mr. Evans and never asked him, 

and he did not tell her, why." Vol. 2, Doc. 57. Finally, nothing in 

the record indicates that the defendant admitted aiding or abetting 

others in the commission of the offense. Aiding or abetting 

8 "Specified unlawful activity" is defined at§ 1956(c) (7). 

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generally requires a showing that a defendant willfully assisted or 

participated in a criminal venture. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 

911 F.2d 1394, 1399 (lOth Cir. 1990). Ms. Young maintained that she 

did not know she was doing anything illegal and did not know why 

she was asked to collect money in the fashion described in the 

indictment. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 gives a trial judge 

discretion to refuse to accept a plea of guilty. North Carolina v. 

Alford, 400 u.s. 25, 39 n.12, 91 s.ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). 

Along with that discretion comes a duty to ensure that a plea is 

voluntary before it can be accepted. Fed.R.Crim.P. ll(d). Although 

a defendant may in some circumstances plead guilty without 

admitting all the elements of the offense, .§_gg Alford, those 

circumstances are not presented here. It is clear to us that the 

district judge did not abuse his discretion by rejecting the plea. 

Denial of the Motion to Disqualify. 

Appellant next contends that the district judge erred by 

denying her motion to disqualify him. Appellant sought 

disqualification based upon the judge's remarks during a scheduling 

conference on March 17, 1993. The conference was attended by 

attorneys for five of the defendants. None of the defendants were 

present. The discussion centered upon selection of trial dates. See 

Vol 12. When Mr. Japha (counsel for Ms. Young) insisted upon a 

trial by May 25, 1993 in order to comply with speedy trial 

requirements, the court set the trial for May 24th and 25th. The 

discussion then turned to whether two days for trial was sufficient 

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and whether any of the defendants intended to or were likely to 

plead guilty. Id. at 8. Mr. Japha commented that "We tried [to 

plead guilty]" and the prosecutor noted "We thought Ms. Young was 

going to plead, but we're reluctant to make any speculation." Id. 

When the judge indicated he thought three days for the Young and 

Means trial was sufficient, the following discussion took place: 

MR. JAPHA: Well, Your Honor -- and I'm sorry to be the 

stick-in-the-mud. I'm wondering then if we could start 

that trial, then, on Monday, May 17, because I have a 

conflict in the middle of the week May 26th and 27th. 

THE COURT: No, because I've got the Sarmiento crowd. No. 

That's the week I'm in Washington for the federal judges• 

association. We've got a union meeting. 

MR. JAPHA: What about the week before? 

COURTROOM DEPUTY: He's in trial. 

THE COURT: That's when we're going to be in trial on 

this Sarmiento case for two weeks. That's the six weeks' 

case that we're going to do in two. So we're going to 

have to do your lady on the 24th unless she sees the 

light. 

MR. JAPHA: I hear you. I'll just say, the difficulty I 

have is, on Wednesday the 26th and 27th --

THE COURT: And bear in mind this: that the obvious thing 

that's going to happen to Ms. Young is that she's go1ng 

to get convicted, and then they're going to sprinkle her 

and bless her with immunity, and then she's going to get 

to testify. And then she's going to pull the same act on 

me again, and then she's going to the county jail for at 

least 30 if not 60 or 90 days for contempt. And we'll do 

that as often as necessary until she starts talking. 

MR. JAPHA: Well, in all due respect, Your Honor, she has 

been in the county jail since January of 1992 which is 

THE COURT: Well, this is going to be in addition to 

anything else. 

MR. JAPHA: Well, I'm not quite sure how to respond to 

that, Your Honor. 

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MR. STUCKEY: [counsel for defendant Evans] Bring the 

light of day to her. 

THE COURT: You don't need to respond, David. All I'm 

telling you is that that's the preview of the coming 

attractions. 

MR. JAPHA: I understand. 

THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll start Means and Young 

on May 24th, and we'll finish it some way that week. 

Vol. 12 at 9-10. The defendant filed a motion to disqualify the 

district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) based upon the judge's 

comments concerning the defendant's "obvious" fate. Although the 

district court denied the motion, appellant contends that the 

judge's comments show a bias against her and are such that "his 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned" within the meaning of 

§ 455(a). 

The Supreme Court recently addressed the disqualification 

statute in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. ___ , 114 S.Ct. 1147, 

127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). The Court noted that although§ 455(a) is 

a "catch-all" provision that is broader than the specific grounds 

for disqualification set forth in§ 455(b), there is some overlap 

between the two sections. The Court indicated that when a ground 

for disqualification is addressed specifically in subsection (b), 

the limitations applicable to that subsection are generally 

contained within subsection (a)'s general standard as well. Id., 

127 L.Ed.2d at 489. This interplay is relevant in a case such as 

this where it is alleged that the judge demonstrated a bias or 

prejudice against the defendant. Section 455 (b) ( 1) specifically 

requires disqualification where the judge "has a personal bias or 

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prejudice concerning a party, ... " Liteky makes clear that this 

standard is not violated by every judicial predisposition; the 

pejorative nature of the terms "bias" and "prejudice" connotes a 

favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow 

wrongful or inappropriate. Id. at 488. Liteky teaches that an 

opinion or disposition may be considered wrongful or inappropriate 

where it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the 

subject ought not to possess, or because it is excessive in degree. 

Id. 

As Liteky indicated, the so-called "extrajudicial source" 

doctrine is the most common basis for establishing disqualifying 

bias or prejudice. Id. at 488. That doctrine recognizes that, while 

judges naturally form opinions of the parties before them based 

upon information properly acquired in the course of judicial 

proceedings, it may be inappropriate to form dispositions or 

opinions relying upon knowledge acquired outside of such 

proceedings. But an "extrajudicial source" is not the only basis 

for showing bias or prejudice. "A favorable or unfavorable 

predisposition can also deserve to be characterized as 'bias' or 

'prejudice' because, even though it springs from the facts adduced 

or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display 

clear inability to render fair judgment." Id. Liteky makes clear, 

however, that these latter opinions do not constitute a basis for 

disqualification "unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id. at 491. 

"Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial 'hhat are 

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critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the 

parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or 

partiality challenge. 11 Id. Likewise insufficient are 11 expressions 

of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are 

within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after 

having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. 11 Id. 

With these standards in mind we turn to appellant's claim that 

the trial judge's remarks show an inappropriate prejudice against 

her. As an initial matter, we see no indication that the judge 

expressed an opinion based upon knowledge gathered outside of the 

course of judicial proceedings. Fundamentally, the remarks were 

related to Ms. Young's change of plea hearing, which is not the 

type of improperly acquired knowledge addressed by § 455 (b) (1). See 

Liteky, 127 L.Ed.2d at 488 ( 11Also not subject to characterization 

as 'bias' or 'prejudice' are opinions held by judges as a result of 

what they learned in earlier proceedings. 11 ) We also conclude that 

the judge's comments, considered in context, do not 11 display a 

deep-seated antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible ... The comments reflected the judge's belief that Ms. 

Young was likely to be convicted if she went to trial. Such an 

opinion of what the jury was likely to find does not show that the 

judge could not possibly render fair judgment. Nothing in the 

remark indicates that the judge was unable or unwilling to carry 

out his responsibilities impartially. Similarly, the judge's 

intimation that Ms. Young had not been candid with him during the 

change of plea hearing provides no basis for disqualification. This 

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opinion, acquired in the course of previous proceedings, contains 

no indication that the judge had such a deep-seated antagonism 

toward the defendant that he would abandon his judicial role. 

Finally, the judge predicted that if Ms. Young went to trial she 

would be given immunity to testify and, in an obvious reference to 

Ms. Young's equivocal answers at the plea hearing, indicated that 

if she "pull[ed] the same act on me again" he would find her in 

contempt and put her in jail. As appellant points out, this 

prediction was off-base inasmuch as immunity was apparently never 

contemplated for Ms. Young. But we fail to see how it shows, as 

appellant contends, that the district judge "sided with the 

government." In context, this prediction of future events must be 

regarded as a comment by the judge upon the strategic choices faced 

by Ms. Young. It does reflect some impatience or exasperation on 

the part of the judge concerning what he believed was Ms. Young's 

unwillingness to make a full admission of guilt. The setting in 

which it was made indicates that the judge intended to convey a 

message to Ms. Young that if she wanted to enter a guilty plea she 

would have to admit knowledge sufficient to constitute an offense 

under the statute. Taken in context, however, it does not show "a 

personal bias or prejudice" within the meaning of the statute. In 

sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the 

motion to disqualify. 

Sentencing 

Appellant's final arguments relate to sentencing. First, 

appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant 

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a two level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 

3El.l. We review a district court's ruling on such a matter under 

a ''clearly erroneous" standard. United States v. Lloyd, 13 F.3d 

145, 1453 {lOth Cir. 1994}. Fundamentally, appellant's argument is 

based on the premise that Ms. Young demonstrated acceptance of 

responsibility at the change of plea hearing but that the judge 

mistakenly rejected her plea. As we have already noted, however, 

Ms. Young's statements at the plea hearing were equivocal and did 

not constitute an admission of all the elements of the offense. We 

conclude that the judge did not err in refusing to grant a decrease 

for acceptance of responsibility. 

Appellant also argues that the judge erred by refusing to 

grant a decrease based on Ms. Young's role in the offense. 

Appellant has failed to identify any specific facts, however, that 

would lead us to conclude that the district court was clearly 

erroneous in finding that she did not play a minor role in the 

offense. The record supports the judge's finding. 

Finally, appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the 

district court contains a mathematical error that requires a remand 

for resentencing. Appellant was sentenced to 70 months imprisonment 

(the lowest end of the guideline range) on two counts of money 

laundering. The sentence on these two counts was to run 

concurrently. At the time of sentencing, Ms. Young also had an 

undischarged term of 49 months remaining on a sentence arising out 

of the District of Oklahoma. In such a situation the guidelines 

direct that "the sentence for the instant case shall be imposed to 

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run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to 

the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment 

for the instant offense." USSG § 5G1.3(c). The judge stated at the 

sentencing hearing that the sentence in the instant case "shall run 

consecutively for a term of 12 months and concurrently thereafter 

for the balance of the defendant's imprisonment pursuant to the 

judgment" in the Oklahoma case. The judgment itself states that 

"twelve months of this sentence is to run consecutive to the 

sentence imposed in the Western District of Oklahoma Case. II 

Vol. 2, Doc. 88. 

Appellant suggests that the sentence imposed reflected the 

judge's intention that Ms. Young serve the remainder of the 

Oklahoma sentence (49 months) plus only twelve months additional 

time on the instant sentence. Recognizing that this would only 

result in a total of 61 months imprisonment (which is below the 70 

month sentence in this case) appellant suggests that we should send 

the case back and direct the district court to grant a two point 

reduction either for acceptance of responsibility or for a minor 

role in the offense, which would result in a guideline range 

encompassing 61 months. 

We must reject appellant's tortured construction of the 

sentence imposed by the district judge. The notion that the judge 

intended for the defendant to serve less than the 70 months he 

imposed is untenable. The judge's intention to impose incremental 

punishment is unmistakable from the transcript of the sentencing 

hearing. See Supp. Vol. 1 at 17. As appellant recognizes, the oral 

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pronouncement. of sentence controls over any ambiguity created by 

the slightly different language of the written judgment. See United 

states v. Blackner, 901 F.2d 853, 855 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Simply put, the 70 month sentence of imprisonment in this case 

began to run twelve months after the date of sentencing, leaving 

appellant to serve a total combined sentence of 82 months from July 

27, 1993. Thus, beginning July 27, 1994, the sentence in this case 

began to run concurrently with the remainder of the Oklahoma 

sentence. In other words, aside from the question of any credits to 

which the Bureau of Prisons determines she is entitled, as of July 

27, 1994, appellant had 70 months imprisonment to serve on the 

instant sentence. 

Conclusion 

The judgment of the distr_ct court is AFFIRMED. 

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