Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02912/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02912-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jody Eugene Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2912

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jody Eugene Smith

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: May 11, 2015

 Filed: August 3, 2015

[Published]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837 
Jody Eugene Smith appeals the 720-month sentence that the district court1

imposed for child pornography offenses. Smith argues that the district court

procedurally erred and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm. 

I. Background

On August 25, 2013, Smith created an online photo-sharing account under the

username "Friendofset." His user profile stated that he was "[a]lways looking for

trades. You first of [course]. Also have he. Pics and vids. You first."

Several law enforcement agencies independently observed Smith's illicit online

activities. On August 29, 2013, Smith traded naked pictures via the internet of his tenyear-old stepdaughter, M.S., with an undercover officer in Australia. On September

12, 2013, Smith offered to trade pornographic pictures of his step-daughter via the

internet for purported pornographic pictures of an undercover Homeland Security

agent's daughter. Also on September 12, Smith communicated with an undercover

officer from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who represented that he had

a 13-year-old daughter. Smith told the undercover Florida officer that he wanted to

come to Florida during a planned vacation in November 2013 to engage in sexual

relations with the officer's 13-year-old daughter and record the encounter on video.

On September 17, 2013, Smith sent a sexually explicit picture of M.S. to the

undercover Florida officer; later that same day, Smith sent another picture of M.S.'s

genitals to the undercover Florida officer. 

On September 19, 2013, law enforcement executed a valid search warrant for

Smith's residence. During the subsequent search, Smith agreed to exit his residence

and wait in a law enforcement vehicle. When informed of the reason for the search,

Smith stated that the officers must be there because of "friendofset." He admitted that

1

The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837 
he had an ongoing history of viewing child pornography that started when he was a

child and that the police were likely to find several hundred photos of child

pornography on his computer. Officers indeed found over 800 photos and 144 video

files on Smith's laptop depicting child pornography. Smith also stated that he used the

internet to receive and trade child pornography files. Smith further admitted that he

had several sexual encounters with his minor stepdaughter, R.S., since she was five

years old, as well as touched the genitals of M.S. Finally, Smith admitted that he used

pen cameras to take pictures and videos of both of his stepdaughters in the shower.

Officers found the pen cameras, which had 11 video files and over 600 photos of R.S.,

M.S., and one of their friends as they were naked in the bathroom. 

The government indicted Smith on four counts: Count I charged Smith with

production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e); Count

II charged Smith with attempted production of child pornography, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e); Count III charged Smith with receipt of child pornography,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1); and Count IV charged Smith with

the transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) and

(b)(1). Smith eventually pleaded guilty to all four counts of the indictment pursuant

to a plea agreement. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court indicated that it had read and

reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSR) in preparation of the hearing. It

next calculated the Guidelines offense level at 43 and Smith's criminal history

category at II. The court calculated Smith's Guideline sentence to be life

imprisonment. Smith later reminded the court that the parties' plea agreement

stipulated "a [downward] variance of the total offense level by four levels to

adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense." The court acknowledged the

stipulation, stating that Smith was "correct in that. And with that, the range would be

I think 292 to 365 months." Next, the parties offered brief oral argument regarding the

appropriate sentence for Smith within that Guidelines range. Among other things,

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837 
Smith argued that the court should consider abuses that he suffered as a child and

sentence him at the low end of the Guidelines range. 

After argument, the court offered its reasoning before for imposing its sentence.

It stated that "there are some things, Mr. Smith, that are just so vile and horrendous

that the dismay, the disdain, the distastefulness of them is so bad that it's the same as

witnessing it yourself firsthand. This is one of those circumstances." Addressing

Smith's difficult childhood, the court stated that "[i]t's very difficult, very, very

difficult, Mr. Smith, to find anything that excuses such conduct like this." The court

next imposed a sentence on Smith "pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

as well as the provisions of 18 U.S.C. [s]ection 3553(a)" of 360 months for Count I

and 360 months for Count II to be served consecutively; the court also imposed

sentences of 240 months for both Counts III and IV to be served concurrently. Thus,

the court imposed a total sentence of 720 months' imprisonment. Smith did not object

to this sentence before the district court. 

II. Discussion

On appeal, Smith argues that the district court committed procedural error and

that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.2

 Smith first argues that the district

2

As a preliminary matter, the parties both address whether this appeal should

be dismissed based on the enforceability of an appeal waiver in the parties' plea

bargain agreement. "[T]he burden of proof is on the Government to demonstrate that

a plea agreement clearly and unambiguously waives a defendant's right to appeal."

United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted).

"To meet this burden, the government must establish: (1) that the appeal is within the

scope of the waiver, (2) that the defendant entered into the waiver knowingly and

voluntarily, and (3) that dismissing the appeal based on the defendant's waiver would

not result in a miscarriage of justice." United States v. Mink, 476 F.3d 558, 562 (8th

Cir. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted). The government has conceded that they

cannot meet their first burden because the appeal is not within the scope of the appeal

waiver. While the parties argue over other elements of the government's burden, the

government's concession makes this a nonissue.

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837 
court procedurally erred by "failing to consider the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in

reaching an appropriate sentence." See, e.g., United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455,

461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) ("Procedural error includes . . . failing to consider the

§ 3553(a) factors . . . ." (quotations and citations omitted)). Smith also argues that the

district court did not reference the issues presented in the PSR (likely referring to

Smith's childhood) and failed to provide its reasoning for the sentence.3

 "If a

defendant fails to timely object to a procedural sentencing error, the error is forfeited

and may only be reviewed for plain error. Under plain-error review, the defendant

must show: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial rights."

United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

"A court adequately addresses the factors if it references at least some of the

considerations in § 3553(a)." United States v. Wood, 587 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.

2009) (citations omitted). Here, the court read the PSR, which is one indication of

considering § 3553(a) factors. See Wood, 587 F.3d at 884 (the district court's review

of the PSR was a factor in finding that the court considered § 3553(a) factors). Also,

the court's description of Smith's actions as being "so vile and horrendous that the

dismay, the disdain, the distastefulness of them is so bad that it's the same as

witnessing it yourself firsthand" evinces consideration by the court of the seriousness

of Smith's offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court's follow-up statement that

"[i]t's very difficult, very, very difficult, Mr. Smith, to find anything that excuses such

conduct like this" is an indication that the court considered but gave little weight to

Smith's history and characteristics. See id. § 3553(a)(1). Finally, the court explicitly

3

While Smith originally submitted these arguments to show that the sentence

is substantively unreasonable, these arguments are better categorized as asserting

procedural error. See United States v. Moore, 565 F.3d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 2009)

(applying a plain-error review standard for the defendant's procedural error arguments

that "the district court failed to adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

and failed to sufficiently explain its sentencing decision." (citation omitted)); see also

Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461.

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837 
stated that its sentence was based on "the provisions of 18 U.S.C. [s]ection 3553(a)."

Therefore, we find no error, plain or otherwise, because the district court adequately

addressed the § 3553(a) factors, addressed the issues presented in the PSR, and

adequately explained its reasoning for the sentence. 

Second, Smith argues that the total punishment of 720 months' imprisonment

is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to meet the federal

sentencing goals under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard regardless of the

defendant's failure to raise this objection before the district court. United States v.

Bolivar-Diaz, 594 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2010). Smith argues that given the

Guidelines range of "292 to 365 months, a sentence of 720 months without any

explanation must be deemed unreasonable." We disagree. "If the defendant's sentence

is within the Guidelines range, then we may . . . apply a presumption of

reasonableness." Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the

sentences imposed for Counts I and II of 360 months were both within the Guidelines

range of 292 to 365 months. Also, the imposition of consecutive, as opposed to

concurrent, sentences for these two counts does not amount to an abuse of discretion

given the nature of the offenses. In United States v. Beasley, we affirmed a defendant's

sentence of 3,480 months' imprisonment. 688 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2012). This

sentence was the result of "within-Guidelines consecutive sentences of 360 months

on counts I through VIII and count X, and 240 months on count IX, to be served

concurrently with 120-month sentences on counts XI and XII." Id. at 534. We found

that "[t]he district court was entitled, based on the seriousness of Beasley's crimes, to

impose a within-Guidelines sentence ensuring Beasley remains incarcerated for life."

Id. at 536 (citing United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 827–28 (8th Cir. 2008)

(affirming a convicted child pornographer's 750-year sentence, reasoning "[t]he

absurdity of a 750 year sentence, or even a 10,000 year sentence, should not detract

from the gravity of [the defendant's] crimes")). Given the similarity to Beasley and

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837 
Betcher, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's imposition of a 720-month

sentence. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Smith's sentence.

______________________________

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-2912 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301837