Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03308/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frieda W. Fuller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR O 3 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FRIEDA W. FULLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 91-3308 

(D.C. No. 91-20048-01) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Frieda W. Fuller appeals her conviction for larceny in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1641, arising from a charge of shoplifting at 

the Main Post Exchange operated by the Army/Air Force Exchange 

Service at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She contends that the 

magistrate judge erred in bringing her to trial before the minimum 

30-day waiting period prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 

u.s.c. § 3161(c}(2). Section 3161(c)(2) provides as follows: 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-3308 Document: 010110239127 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 1 
Unless the defendant consents in writing to the 

contrary, the trial shall not commence less than 30 days 

from the date on which the defendant first appears 

through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects 

to proceed prose. 

Ms. Fuller was tried the same day she made her initial 

appearance before the magistrate judge, and was found guilty as 

charged. The district court subsequently denied an appeal from 

that conviction and final judgment was entered on September 19, 

1991. 

It is not disputed that Ms. Fuller, who was represented by 

appointed counsel, did not execute a written waiver of her right 

to have 30 days to prepare for trial as required by§ 316l(c)(2). 

It is also undisputed that neither Ms. Fuller nor her counsel 

objected, moved for a continuance, or moved for a dismissal on the 

ground that trial was commenced less than 30 days from the date of 

Ms. Fuller's initial appearance. No specific prejudice is 

articulated by Ms. Fuller as a result of having been deprived of 

the time period in question. Furthermore, she does not contest 

the government's assertion that the facts of the case are 

uncomplicated, involving only the testimony of the store 

detective, corroborated by a video tape of Ms. Fuller, against Ms. 

Fuller's own testimony that she simply forgot to pay for the item 

alleged to have been stolen. Ms. Fuller does not suggest what 

other guidance would have been offered if she had had more time. 

The district court found that any violation of the statute 

was waived by Ms. Fuller's failure to object, move for a 

continuance, or move for a dismissal prior to trial. R. Vol. I, 

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Appellate Case: 91-3308 Document: 010110239127 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 2 
Tab 6 at 2. Fuller argues on appeal that we should apply the 

plain error doctrine. "Plain error is 'fundamental error, 

something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements 

that justice cannot have been done.'" United States v. Lonedog, 

929 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. 

Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1397 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting other 

authorities) (emphasis in original) . Upon a careful review of the 

record, and consideration of Ms. Fuller's arguments, we do not 

find that plain error occurred in the proceedings below. Even if 

we reached the merits, we would not be inclined to hold that a 

violation of§ 3161(c)(2), under the circumstances presented here, 

would automatically require a reversal of the conviction, or a new 

trial. See United States v. Daly, 716 F.2d 1499, 1506 (9th Cir. 

1983); United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675-76 (10th Cir. 

1989). 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-3308 Document: 010110239127 Date Filed: 04/03/1992 Page: 3