Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00849/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00849-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Fuller
Plaintiff
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MICHAEL FULLER,

NO. CIV. S-05-0849 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc.’s, (“Wal-Mart”) motion for summary judgment or, in

the alternative, summary adjudication. Defendant also moves to

strike plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. Plaintiff

Michael Fuller (“Fuller”) opposes the motion. For the reasons

set forth below,1 defendant’s motion for summary judgment or 

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2 The court notes defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s

untimely filing of his opposition and supporting materials. In

this instance, the court will consider plaintiff’s filings. 

However, plaintiff is reminded that he must comply with the

requirements for filing set forth in the applicable Local Rules.

3 For the purposes of this motion, the court recounts

plaintiff’s version of the facts. (Pl.’s Separate Stmt. of

Material Undisp. Facts in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

(“SSUF”), filed June 23, 2006). While plaintiff titled this

document as a separate statement of undisputed facts, the court

interprets this document as a separate statement of disputed

facts filed pursuant to Eastern District Local Rule 56-260(b).

Where the facts are undisputed, the court refers to the

parties’ statement of undisputed facts. (See Pl.’s Response to

Def.’s Separate Stmt. of Material Undisp. Facts (“RUF”), filed

June 23, 2006. 

2

summary adjudication is DENIED and defendant’s motion to strike

is GRANTED.2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Fuller commenced his employment with defendant

Wal-Mart on April 30, 2003. (SSUF ¶ 1). Plaintiff was hired as

a courtesy clerk and was responsible for caring for customers,

greeting customers, and assisting his co-workers. (SSUF ¶ 2). 

He primarily worked outside rounding up carts. (SSUF ¶ 2). 

Plaintiff worked on nearly a daily basis with another courtesy

clerk, Randy Brazil (“Brazil”). (SSUF ¶ 3).

Plaintiff asserts that Brazil’s offensive behavior toward

him began from the first time they worked together. (SSUF ¶ 4). 

On that day, while rounding up carts, Brazil asked plaintiff why

“Blacks and Hispanics bump up their music in their cars.” (SSUF

¶ 4, RUF ¶ 2). Plaintiff contends that Brazil made the comment

with a nasty look on his face. (SSUF ¶ 4). Plaintiff also

contends that almost immediately after the incident, he attempted

to report the offensive conduct to his manager, Mehri Azad

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3

(“Azad”) and to an assistant manager, Kevin Lancaster

(“Lancaster”) who was also in the office. (SSUF ¶ 5). He

reported that Brazil was making derogatory comments about his

race and another race. (Dep. of Michael Fuller (“Fuller Dep.”),

attachment 1 to Decl. of Jesse S. Ortiz III in Opp’n to Mot. for

Summ. J (“Ortiz Decl.”), filed June 26, 2006, 61:5-7). Plaintiff

asserts that Azad told him she would be with him in a minute and

then left the office. At that time, Lancaster, plaintiff’s

direct supervisor, remained in the office and advised him to be

cool and think nothing of the situation. (SSUF ¶ 5).

Plaintiff contends that about two days after this first

incident, Brazil repeated the offensive comments. (SSUF ¶ 5). 

Plaintiff asserts that he again told Azad about the comments and

that she responded that she was too busy and that plaintiff

should speak to assistant manager, Mitch Hayter (“Hayter”). 

(SSUF ¶ 6). Hayter responded that he couldn’t do anything if he

didn’t hear Brazil make the comments and if he didn’t have an

“dirt” on him. (SSUF ¶ 6). Plaintiff then asked Hayter what he

should do, and was advised that nothing could be done. (SSUF ¶

6). 

Plaintiff asserts that Brazil continued with his racially

derogatory comments every time they worked together. (SSUF ¶ 7). 

Plaintiff contends that because Brazil’s conduct was continuous,

he is unable to recall the specific racially offensive comments. 

(SSUF ¶ 7). However, plaintiff does recall that Brazil asked him

questions such as “why for Black women wear weaves in their

hair?”, “why do Black women have their bootys out?” and that

Brazil made a comment that black people are not able to control

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or supervise their children. (RUF ¶¶ 1-2; SSUF ¶ 7). No one

else heard Brazil ask the questions or make the comments that

plaintiff found offensive. (RUF ¶ 4). Plaintiff also asserts

that Brazil was lying to managers about plaintiff’s conduct. 

(Fuller Dep. 77:1-4). In or around June 2003, plaintiff

requested to have his schedule switched to avoid working with

Brazil, but his request was denied. (SSUF ¶ 8). Plaintiff

attempted to ignore Brazil’s comments and did not further advise

management because his previous complaints were ignored or

brushed off as unimportant. (SSUF ¶ 9).

In or around August 2003, Brazil called plaintiff and

another employee “niggers.” (SSUF ¶ 11). Immediately

thereafter, plaintiff advised Azad of Brazil’s conduct. (SSUF ¶

11). Plaintiff also told Azad that Brazil was accusing him of

stealing Wal-Mart’s time by not working when plaintiff was

actually doing “customer carryout.” (Fuller Dep. 78:23-79:6). 

Plaintiff asserts that Azad knew that plaintiff was doing

“customer carryout,” and wondered why Brazil was engaging in such

conduct. (Fuller Dep. 78:5-7). Azad advised plaintiff to fill

out a grievance form and detail what had transpired. (SSUF ¶

11). Plaintiff filled out a grievance form and also wrote a

letter, which he attached to the grievance form and gave to Azad. 

(Fuller Dep. 79:24-80:12; 87:17-22). Azad then told plaintiff to

return to work. (Fuller Dep. 88:11-12). Plaintiff asserts that,

notwithstanding the filing of the written grievance, Brazil’s

racially offensive conduct continued up through his termination

from Wal-Mart. (SSUF ¶ 11).

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5

In or around the last week plaintiff’s employment with WalMart, plaintiff again complained to Azad about Brazil’s conduct. 

Plaintiff asserts that he was warned by Azad that if he continued

to complain to her about the problems with Brazil, he would be

terminated. (SSUF ¶ 15). 

During the course of his employment with Wal-Mart, plaintiff

was absent 26 times and tardy 20 times. (RUF ¶ 24). At all

times during plaintiff’s employment, Wal-Mart had in place an

attendance policy, which, by plaintiff’s understanding, provided

that an employee faced termination if he was either absent or

tardy for three days without justification. (SSUF ¶ 14). 

Plaintiff was absent from work more than three times. (RUF ¶

17). He was warned by his supervisors and Azad to stop being

late and absent from work. (RUF ¶ 18). On July 19, 2003,

plaintiff received a final warning for attendance problems,

called a Decision Making Day Coaching, from Hayter for failure to

call or appear for work on July 18, 2003 and for appearing six

hours late for his shift on July 19, 2003. (RUF ¶ 20). 

Plaintiff knew that he could be terminated after he received a

Decision Making Day Coaching for excessive absenteeism. (RUF ¶

21). Plaintiff was absent at least five times after he received

a final written warning in July, until he was terminated. (RUF ¶

23). Plaintiff contends that he missed work and was tardy

because of the stress he experienced as a result of Brazil’s

conduct. (SSUF ¶ 14). Plaintiff also contends that he told Azad

on two different occasions that he was late and absent because of

the stress caused by Brazil and that Azad did nothing to correct

the situation. (SSUF ¶ 14; Fuller Dep. 138:20-144:11). 

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Plaintiff also contends that he told Lancaster the same thing. 

(Fuller Dep. 150:23-25). 

On October 9, 2003, plaintiff was scheduled to work. (SSUF

¶ 16). However, because of his fear of having to work again with

Brazil, plaintiff was approximately two hours late for work. 

(SSUF ¶ 16). After plaintiff clocked in and began working,

Brazil began harassing plaintiff. (SSUF ¶ 16). Plaintiff

immediately complained to Azad about Brazil. (SSUF ¶ 16). Azad

ignored plaintiff’s complaint and instead asked why he was late. 

(SSUF ¶ 16). Plaintiff responded that it was because of Brazil’s

harassment. (SSUF ¶ 16). Plaintiff was directed to remain in

the break room, and after approximately two or three hours, was

terminated from his position by Lancaster. (SSUF ¶ 16; Fuller

Dep. 158:5-9). Lancaster informed plaintiff that he was

terminated because of his absences and tardiness. (Fuller Dep.

158:12-15). However, plaintiff asserts that he was terminated

because of his complaints of racial discrimination and because of

Wal-Mart’s failure to remedy the racial harassment to which

plaintiff was subjected. (SSUF ¶ 17). 

Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of the constant

harassment by Brazil, Wal-Mart’s failure and refusal to remedy

the harassment, and his termination, plaintiff suffered physical

and emotional distress. (SSUF ¶ 22). Such distress manifested

itself in the form of stress, anxiety, humiliation, anger,

insomnia, headaches, and depression. (SSUF ¶ 22). 

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of

Sacramento, alleging violations of the California Fair Employment

and Housing Act (“FEHA”) based upon racial harassment and

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retaliation. Plaintiff also asserted a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Defendant removed the action

to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. On June 6,

2006, defendant filed the current motion for summary judgment, or

in the alternative, summary adjudication of the claims. 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

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standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56©,

is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

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4 In his complaint, plaintiff asserts a claim for

“Discrimination/Retaliation Violation of FEHA.” However, the

(continued...)

9

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56©; SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

A. Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims

Plaintiff brings claims under the Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”) for harassment on the basis of race and for

retaliation because he complained of race harassment.4

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4(...continued)

basis of his claim is a harassment claim and a retaliation claim. 

Further, plaintiff raises only a hostile work environment

argument in his opposition. Therefore, the court will only

address these two alleged violations of FEHA. To the extent that

plaintiff sought to bring a claim for discrimination, such a

claim is not supported by any evidence submitted by plaintiff,

and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

10

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff

has not produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of

fact for violations of FEHA. Because the antidiscrimination

objective and relevant wording of Title VII and § 1981 are

similar to those of FEHA, “California courts often look to

federal decisions interpreting these statutes for assistance in

interpreting the FEHA.” Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th

798, 812 (2001). California courts apply the McDonnell Douglass

burden shifting approach to claims brought pursuant to FEHA and

apply the same guiding legal principles. See Brooks v. City of

San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Beyda v.

City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 4th 511, 517 (Cal. Ct. App.

1998); Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th

1607, 1614 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). 

1. Hostile Work Environment Claims

Plaintiff contends that he was subject to a hostile work

environment in violation of FEHA based upon racially-offensive

comments made to him by co-worker Brazil. FEHA makes it unlawful

for an employer to discriminate against a person in the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment because of that person’s

race. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a) (West 2006). To survive

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summary judgment on a claim of hostile work environment under

FEHA, plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether

(1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct

because of her race, (2) the conduct was unwelcome, and

(3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of plaintiffs employment and

create an abusive working environment.

Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir.

2002). Like Title VII, FEHA is not a general civility code. Id.

(citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788

(1998)). “Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated

incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to

discriminatory changes in the terms or conditions of employment.” 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Rather, “[a] hostile work environment

claim involves a workplace atmosphere so discriminatory and

abusive that it unreasonably interferes with the job performance

of those harassed.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 923. Therefore, in

order to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must

present evidence that his “workplace [was] permeated with

discriminatory intimidation . . . that [was] sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create

an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214

Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Further, “[t]he

working environment must both subjectively and objectively be

perceived as abusive.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522,

1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22)). 

The Supreme Court has warned that evidence of a hostile work

environment should not be viewed too narrowly; “[T]he objective

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severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all

the circumstances.’” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,

523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “The

real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a

constellation of surrounding circumstances . . . which are not

fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used . . . .” 

Id. at 81-82. Such circumstances “may include the frequency of

the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether is unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65

Cal. App. 4th 511, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Harris, 510

U.S. at 23). “The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s

conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work

performance and would have seriously affected the psychological

well-being of a reasonable employee and that [he] was actually

offended.” Id. (quoting Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 609-10). 

“[T]he required showing of severity or seriousness of the

harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or

frequency of the conduct.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878

(9th Cir. 1991) (citing King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of

Wisconsin Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s hostile work environment

claim is based solely on Brazil’s one-time use of a racial slur,

combined with questions to plaintiff about African Americans, and

that these assertions are insufficient to set forth a claim of

harassment as a matter of law. However, plaintiff has produced

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evidence that Brazil verbally harassed him on a consistent basis

throughout the entirety of his employment with Wal-Mart. 

Plaintiff asserts that he worked with Brazil on a nearly daily

basis and that Brazil made derogatory and offensive racial

remarks on a nearly daily basis. Because of the pervasive manner

of the harassment, plaintiff contends that he cannot recall all

of the specific remarks made to him by Brazil. However,

plaintiff has pointed to numerous incidents where derogatory

questions were asked, offensive comments were made, and where an

offensive racial epithet was directed at him. Further, plaintiff

has pointed to several occasions where he reported this conduct

to Wal-Mart management and no action was taken to remedy the

situation. He also presents evidence that he informed Wal-Mart

management that the conduct was so distressing that he did not

want to come into work. As such, plaintiff has presented

evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding his claim of

harassment in violation of FEHA. See Walker v. Ford Motor Co.,

684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court’s

finding of a Title VII violation where defendant’s personnel’s

use of racially abusive language was “repeated,” “continuous,”

and “prolonged,” despite the plaintiff’s objections and where the

language made plaintiff feel unwanted and uncomfortable in his

surroundings); Dee v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th

30, 36-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there was a triable

issue of fact where plaintiff was subjected to an ethnic slur on

one occasion, was called derogatory names, was ordered to lie,

and blamed for tasks). Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary 

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judgment regarding plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim

under FEHA is DENIED. 

2. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff asserts that defendant retaliated against him for

complaining about Brazil’s harassment by terminating his

employment with Wal-Mart. Defendant asserts that plaintiff was

not terminated for his complaints, but rather due to his

tardiness and absences.

FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against any of its employees because he has filed a complaint for

violations arising under FEHA. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h) (West

2006). To establish a case of retaliation, plaintiff must prove

(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection

between the two. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th

Cir. 1987) (citing Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State Univ.,

797 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Fairchild Indus.,

Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under McDonnell

Douglass, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of

retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. 

Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th

Cir. 2003). However, “[o]nly the burden of production shifts;

the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.” 

Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376 (citing Texas Dep’t of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). If defendant can

make this showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 

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show that the alleged explanation is a pretext for impermissible

retaliation. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1377.

Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff can establish a

prima facie claim of retaliation. (Def.’s Reply, filed June 29,

2006, at 8). However, defendant contends that it had a

legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff. At this stage in

the burden-shifting analysis, defendant “need only produce

admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact

rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been

motivated by discriminatory animus.” Miller v. Fairchild Indus.,

Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Burdine, 450

U.S. at 257)). Defendant presents undisputed evidence that

plaintiff was absent 26 times and tardy 20 times during his

employment with Wal-Mart. Defendant also presents undisputed

evidence that plaintiff received a final warning called a

Decision Making Day Coaching and that plaintiff was absent at

least five times after he received a final written warning

regarding his attendance. This showing substantiates defendant’s

explanation that plaintiff’s employment was terminated due to

attendance problems, and raises a genuine issue of fact as to

whether defendant retaliated against plaintiff. See Yartzoff,

809 F.2d at 1376-77. 

Once a defendant carries the burden of sufficiently

articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse

employment action, “the legally mandatory inference of

retaliatory discrimination arising from the plaintiff’s prima

facie case drops away.” Id. at 1377 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at

255 & n.10). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff “to

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raise a genuine factual question whether [the defendant’s] stated

reason is in reality a mere pretext.” Miller, 797 F.2d at 732

(citing Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir.

1985)). “To show pretext, the plaintiff is not necessarily

required to introduce evidence beyond that already offered to

establish [his] prima facie case.” Id. Further, “[c]ourts have

recognized that in discrimination cases an employer’s true

motivations are particularly difficult to ascertain,” and

therefore, summary judgment is usually unsuitable. Id. (citing

United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.

711, 716 (1983)); Yartzoff, 809 F.2d 1377; Lowe, 775 F.2d at

1009, as amended, 784 F.2d at 1407.

Plaintiff presents evidence that throughout his employment

with Wal-Mart, he complained to management about Brazil’s

offensive conduct. However, these complaints were not acted upon

and the conduct continued on a nearly daily basis. Plaintiff

also presents evidence that shortly before he was terminated,

Azad warned him that if he continued to complain about the

problems he was having with Brazil, plaintiff would be

terminated. On October 9, 2003, plaintiff presents evidence that

Brazil once again harassed him and that plaintiff almost

immediately reported the conduct to Azad. Plaintiff was

terminated from his position that afternoon. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolving

all inferences in his favor, there is a genuine issue of material

fact regarding defendant’s motive in terminating plaintiff’s

employment with Wal-Mart. As such, defendant’s motion for

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summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s retaliation claim under

FEHA is DENIED. 

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant requests the court to grant summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress. 

“The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant;

(2) emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4)

actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” 

Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 617 (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit

Assn., 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1120 (1986)). Where plaintiff

establishes a viable claim for discrimination, retaliation, or

harassment under FEHA, a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress will usually also lie because, by definition,

a “harassment in the workplace is outrageous conduct as it

exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent

society.” See id. 

Plaintiff did not address this claim in his opposition. As

such, defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed. 

However, in its moving papers, defendant “concedes that if the

Court finds that an issue of fact exist as to plaintiff’s

discrimination and wrongful termination claims, then plaintiff’s

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress

will also remain a viable claim.” (Def.’s Mem. of P.&A. in Supp.

of Mot. for Summ. J., filed June 6, 2006, at 22). Because, the

court has found that plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact

as to his harassment and retaliation claims, plaintiff has also

raised triable issues of fact as to defendant’s outrageous

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conduct for the purposes of his intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim. See Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2

Cal. 4th 744, 754-55 (1992); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 2

Cal.3d 493 (1970) (finding triable issue of fact for claim of

intentional infliction of emotion distress where racial insult

was an aggravating factor). Further, plaintiff presents evidence

that defendant’s conduct caused him to suffer physical and

emotional distress, which manifested itself in the form of

stress, anxiety, humiliation, anger, insomnia, headaches, and

depression. Therefore, plaintiff has presented sufficient

evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding his claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment regarding this claim is DENIED.

C. Punitive Damages

Finally, defendant moves to strike plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages. Pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294, an

employer is only liable for punitive damages where 

the employer had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of

the employee and employed him or her with a conscious

disregard of the rights or safety of others or

authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which

the damaged are awarded or was personally guilty of

oppression, fraud, or malice. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b) (West 2006). Section 3294 further

specifies that in regards to a corporate employer, “the advance

knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification,

or act of oppression, fraud or malice must be on the part of an

officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” Id. A

managing agent for purposes of this section is an employee who

“exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over decisions

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that ultimately determine corporate policy.” White v. Ultramar,

Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563, 577 (1999) (holding that “supervisors who

have no discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately

determine corporate policy would not be considered managing

agents even though they may have the ability to hire or fire”). 

Defendant presents evidence that Azad is not an officer or

director of Wal-Mart. (Decl. Of Mehri Azad (“Azad Decl.”), filed

June 6, 2006, ¶ 14). Defendant also presents evidence that,

although Azad had the authority to hire and fire other employees,

she had no input in establishing, revising, or determining

corporate policies or procedures. (Id. ¶ 15). Finally,

defendant presents evidence that Azad, as a store manager, does

not have discretion to alter or deviate from corporate policies

and procedures in any form or manner. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff

offered no response, by way of evidence or argument, to

defendant’s evidence that Azad was not an officer, director, or

managing agent of defendant corporate employer. Therefore,

defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s prayer for punitive

damages is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is DENIED

and defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 17, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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