Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02664/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02664-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Angela Marie Gray
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2664

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri. 

Angela Marie Gray, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: March 8, 2010

Filed: May 28, 2010

___________

Before BYE, ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Angela Gray pled guilty to one count of executing a scheme to defraud U.S.

Bank by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and

promises, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The district court1

 imposed a sentence of

87 months’ imprisonment. Gray appeals, and we affirm.

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After Gray entered her plea of guilty, the United States Probation Office

calculated Gray’s advisory guideline sentencing range as 33 to 41 months. Gray

urged the district court to sentence below the advisory range, arguing that her

placement in criminal history category VI overstated the seriousness of her criminal

history, that she did not present a high risk of recidivism, and that her ready

cooperation with law enforcement merited leniency. Calling Gray “a persistent and

unrelenting thief” and “recidivism personified,” the district court not only rejected

Gray’s request for leniency, but decided to vary upward from the advisory range to

impose a sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment. 

Gray appeals her sentence, arguing that the district court committed procedural

error by failing to consider the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and by

failing to explain its chosen sentence. She also contends that the sentence of 87

months’ imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.

In reviewing a sentence after Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), we

“must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,”

including a failure to consider the § 3553(a) factors or to provide an adequate

explanation of the chosen sentence. Id. at 50-51. If the district court’s sentencing

decision is procedurally sound, we may then consider whether the sentence imposed

is substantively reasonable. Id. at 51. This analysis “take[s] into account the totality

of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance” from the advisory

guideline range, and “a major departure should be supported by a more significant

justification than a minor one.” Id. at 50-51. When reviewing substantive

reasonableness, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, recognizing the

district court’s “access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the

individual defendant.” Id. at 51 (internal quotation omitted).

Gray contends that the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was

faulty because it focused almost exclusively on her criminal history, without giving

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adequate consideration to information that she provided to law enforcement or to

factors suggesting she may present a low risk of recidivism. She also asserts that the

district court erred by failing to discuss specific factors that she raised in her

sentencing memorandum and in oral argument at sentencing. Because Gray did not

raise these objections in the district court, we review for plain error. United States v.

Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2008). 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained its reasoning at length.

The court recognized positive aspects of Gray’s life, including her pursuit of

education and attempts at learning a trade. But the court concluded that Gray’s

persistent acts of theft and fraud outweighed any mitigating factors and that the

advisory guideline range was not adequate to achieve the sentencing goals of

deterrence, protection of the public, and punishment. We are satisfied that the court

considered the relevant factors, both positive and negative, before pronouncing

sentence and did not commit a plain procedural error.

Under our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the sentence

imposed was not substantively unreasonable. Gray’s extensive history of theft and

fraud, and her apparent inability to break from this history and discontinue criminal

activity, provided a reasonable basis for the district court’s decision to vary upward

from the advisory guideline range. See United States v. Hill, 513 F.3d 894, 899 (8th

Cir. 2008); United States v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2008).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 ______________________________

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