Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01961/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01961-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose DeJesus Gonzalez
Petitioner
Joe A. Lizarraga
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE DeJESUS GONZALEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:15-cv-1961 WBS GGH P 

ORDER 

 In this case petitioner’s primary claim is insufficiency of evidence. However, the issue 

arrives at this court in an unusual procedural context. The parties are aware of the underlying 

background facts and the undersigned will not set them forth herein. 

 Three theories were presented to petitioner’s jury concerning his involvement in the crime 

for which he was convicted: 1- he was the actual shooter; 2-he aided and abetted the shooting of 

the victim by another; 3-the murder was a natural and foreseeable result of a fight in which 

petitioner was a participant. Petitioner was convicted of murder, but the jury did not give a 

finding of what theory(s) prompted their verdict. 

 Without setting forth here the entire procedural history of petitioner’s appeal, the 

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important underlying fact for this order is the fact that petitioner’s appellate counsel did not 

contest the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to petitioner being the actual shooter, but only 

contested the latter two theories. The Court of Appeal never actually reviewed the merits of the 

alleged insufficiency grounds raised by petitioner because it simply relied on the fact that 

petitioner had not challenged sufficiency of the evidence on theory one—petitioner was the actual 

shooter. Since sufficiency of the evidence was a given on theory one, the Court of Appeal found 

that whether the evidence was actually sufficient on theories 2 and 3 was inconsequential as to 

petitioner. It further ruled that the jury was not required to have specified the theory of conviction 

in its verdict.1 

 Although the Court of Appeal did not use the term, for all intents and purposes, it found 

that petitioner had waived his right to contest sufficiency of the evidence. No analysis of 

petitioner’s sufficiency arguments on their merits had to be made because petitioner had not 

challenged the sufficiency on theory one. Seemingly, by any reasonable interpretation of the 

Court of Appeal decision, petitioner had waived the issue.2

 Petitioner recognizes the AEDPA context of the petition, i.e., the Court of Appeal ruling 

must be upheld unless it was AEDPA unreasonable, but he argues the facts concerning 

insufficiency—something the Court of Appeal never adjudicated. In essence, petitioner seeks this 

court to perform a de novo review. Respondent, on the other hand, simply relies on petitioner’s 

waiver of the ability to contest sufficiency of the evidence, and essentially argues the waiver 

finding by the Court of Appeal to be a ruling on the merits, a procedural ruling which should be 

given AEDPA deference. 

 The undersigned desires further briefing on the following points: 

1. Do the parties agree that the Court of Appeal never analyzed the underlying facts of 

sufficiency of the evidence as to petitioner, and if so, does this constitute a waiver of the 

 

1

 This latter ruling was correct as a matter of state law and federal law as well, at least where the 

issue on appeal is sufficiency of the evidence. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S.46 (1991). 

2

 Without a finding of waiver, the Court of Appeal decision makes no sense. It would be 

tantamount to finding: Petitioner challenges sufficiency of the evidence, but because he does not 

challenge sufficiency of the evidence, he loses. This is the stuff of Alice in Wonderland. 

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sufficiency issue; 

2. Assuming question one is answered in the affirmative, what is the AEDPA standard of 

review for a waiver finding; that is, should it be analyzed as a type of procedural default 

or some type of merits ruling; 

3. Within the course of a 28 page petition, in an introductory “notwithstanding” phrase in 

one sentence on page 20, petitioner alludes to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

Does this constitute a fair raising of the ineffective assistance issue in this habeas action, 

was this issue ever exhausted, and if so, does respondent waive any exhaustion 

requirement. The latter question in the preceding sentence requires a “yes,” or “no” 

answer; “maybe,” or “respondent reserves the right to argue exhaustion at a later time,” or 

the like, is an unacceptable answer. 

 The further briefing shall be contemporaneously briefed, and filed no later than 14 days from 

the filed date of this order. 

Dated: May 16, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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