Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00083/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00083-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Curtis Howard
Petitioner
Scott Kernan
Respondent

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS HOWARD,

Petitioner, No. CIV-04-0083 DFL KJM P 

vs.

SCOTT KERNAN, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with an application for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of fifty-seven-years-tolife in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Answer, Ex. B at 2. A jury

convicted petitioner of first degree murder and found true the allegation that petitioner

discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. Id. The same jury also convicted petitioner of

assault with a firearm and found true the allegation that petitioner used a handgun in committing

that offense. Petitioner challenges his convictions and sentences. 

I. Background

Following his trial and sentencing, petitioner appealed to the California Court of

Appeal. Answer, Ex. A. The Court of Appeal summarized the facts related to petitioner’s

convictions as follows:

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Defendant Cherie Lee Forstein and her 13-year-old son Chad

moved to the Franklin Villa apartment complex in the summer of

1999. Conflicts arose with the neighbors, particularly between

Chad and people she described as “the local gangsters.” Forstein

reported numerous threats and assaults to the police. She did not

move out of the complex because she was unable to find a place

that would accept Chad’s Rottweiler. Forstein told her mechanic,

Dean Madeiros, and her employer, Frank Munoz, that she would

bring in some muscle to deal with the neighborhood problems.1 

She explained that her “ex” was a bail bondsman who lived in San

Francisco. 

Chad made friends with another teenager in the complex, the

assault victim LaMarr. The friendship soured when Chad lost his

pager and accused LaMarr of taking it. On another occasion, Chad

sprayed - - or threatened to spray - - LaMarr with mace his mother

had given him.

During the same period, Forstein had several confrontations with

Wanda Frazier, LaMarr’s mother. After one incident, a friend

informed Frazier that Forstein said she was going to “get one-eyed

Jimmy and come back and kill” Frazier’s children. Another time,

Forstein yelled at Frazier, mentioned a gun, and said she would not

take “this bullshit.” She continued, “I’ll kill all these mother

fuckers.”

On September 7, 8, and 9, 1999, Forstein left telephone messages

for Chad’s father, the 78-year-old defendant Curtis Howard. She

explained that Chad was in danger, and threatened to kill Howard

if he failed to pay the money he owed so she could move.

On Monday, September 20, 1999, Forstein stopped LaMarr outside

her apartment on his way from school. She grabbed him by the

collar, pushed him against a tree, and told him Chad’s father was a

bail bondsman with a lot of power. Forstein said Chad’s father

knew someone named “one-eyed Jimmy,” and other “crazy

people,” who would come to Sacramento and kill for him. LaMarr

testified the threats were directed toward his brother and father.

At that point, Frazier came out of her apartment across the alley,

and the two women began yelling at each other. During the

argument Forstein said, “I’m tired of you black nigger

disrespecting my house.” She told Chad to leave “the mother

fuckers” alone because she was going to kill them.

Forstein, Chad, and Chad’s friend Keith Hodges went to Edna Jean

Finch’s house after the September 20 confrontation with Frazier. 

Morris, LaMarr’s older brother, ran up to the door. Frazier,

Morris’s mother, stopped him from trying to get inside saying “it’s

not worth it.” Forstein asked Chad to get the phone and call

someone. The line was busy the first time he tried to reach his

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father, but he tried again. Chad dialed the number and handed the

phone to Forstein. Hodges overheard part of the conversation in

which Forstein stated: “I got a job for you, come here as soon as

possible, I need you to get rid of these two black niggers . . . .”

Frazier saw Forstein leave the complex 45 minutes or an hour after

the confrontation. Forstein returned 20 minutes later, and pulled

into her driveway. At that point, Howard Morris, Sr., young

Morris’s father, pulled up and got out of his car. He spoke with

Forstein for a few minutes, and drove away with LaMarr. Forstein

followed them out of the complex. Robert Price, the security

guard, overheard Forstein tell Howard Morris, Sr., “[T]hat’s okay,

I get my fellows to come down here and teach you niggers

something.” She also said, “I’m going to have one-eyed Willie

come over and kill a bunch of you mothers.”

Forstein and Chad went to San Francisco that night, and stayed

with Howard for two days. They returned to Sacramento on

Wednesday, September 22. Accompanying them in a separate car

were Howard, and his driver, defendant James Stringer, who was a

skip tracer in the bail bond business. Both Howard and Stringer

were armed. 

Upon arriving at Franklin Villa, Forstein went to check her mail

near where LaMarr was sitting. She walked up to LaMarr, grabbed

him by the head, and said, “[L]ook what [you got yourself] into.” 

Around the same time, Forstein warned Finch and her son Donny

that she had her people with her and things were going to “come

down.”

Shortly thereafter, Howard and Stringer got out of their car and

approached LaMarr. One of the men showed the boy a badge, and

patted him down. Both Howard and Stringer pointed their guns at

LaMarr, and one stuck a gun in the 13-year-old’s side. Howard

told LaMarr he was going to kick in his teeth. LaMarr started to

walk away. Stringer grabbed him and smashed his hand against

the mailbox, breaking two bones.

Forstein, Howard, Stringer, and Chad ended up at Forstein’s

apartment. Forstein cleaned up the mess the dog left in their

absence. Chad and Stringer began playing Play Station. Howard

brought the guns from the car, put one under the mattress, kept the

other gun with him, and went back outside.

Meanwhile, LaMarr ran to Shirley Hamilton’s apartment and

called 911. He told the dispatcher that two men had threatened to

arrest him and said they were coming to get his father and brother. 

LaMarr went back outside to wait for an officer to arrive. One

police car drove up, but immediately left to take another call. At

that moment Morris walked up with two friends. Morris was 5 feet

11 inches tall, and weighed 207 pounds. After hearing what had

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 The court understands that “nunchaks” in this context refers to the martial arts weapon

consisting of two wooden dowels approximately a foot or so in length connected by a chain or

rope. 

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happened, Morris went inside Hamilton’s apartment and called his

mother. He then went to his own house, grabbed a metal baseball

bat, and headed for the door. LaMarr and the two other young men

tried to block his way, but Morris left through an open window. 

One witness heard Morris yell for Chad to come out with his dog

and nunchaks.1

There was conflicting testimony about the baseball bat. However,

the witnesses generally agreed Morris had nothing in his hands

when he walked toward Howard. The older man pulled out his

gun and pointed it at Morris. Morris held up his hands with his

palms and began backing up. Howard fired from a short distance

away, and Morris fell to the ground. Howard fired a second and

fatal shot at Morris’s head.

Howard reloaded his gun, and warned members of the gathering

crowd not to approach the victim. Shortly thereafter, he

surrendered peacefully to police officers. Officer Michael

Galipeau recounted that Howard stated as he approached,

“[P]eople need to be getting killed on this corner trying to hurt my

son, all these people need to get a life.” Later at the police station,

Galipeau asked Howard whether he had any sharp objects in his

pockets. Howard said he did not, and continued, “I would not

want to hurt you, you have done nothing to me, I did what I came

here to do and I’m done.”

At trial, Howard testified in his own defense. He admitted taking

the gun with him when he left Forstein’s house, and intentionally

firing the shot that killed Morris. However, he also stated, “I was

afraid because he wanted to catch me to take my gun, and if he

take my gun he going to kill me and Chad.” The defense

introduced expert testimony that defendant suffered a stroke in

1996 which resulted in dementia.

______________________________________

1 The court admitted the testimony of Munoz only as to Forstein.

Answer, Ex. B at 4-8. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentences on October

1, 2002. Id. at 1, 50. The Court of Appeal modified its original opinion on October 30, 2002

with the same result. Answer, Ex. C at 6. Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeal’s

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of appeal

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, the Fourth Circuit has erred. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

70-71; Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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decision in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. D at 2. His request for review was

denied. Id. at 1. The claims presented in this action were raised by petitioner before the Court of 

Appeal and the California Supreme Court on direct review. Pet. at I; Answer, Ex. A at 3-4;

Answer, Ex. D at 3. 

II. Standard For Habeas Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-775 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief). See also Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and

therefore did not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).2 Courts are not

required to address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on

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the ground that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2003), in which the Ninth Circuit

required district courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief

is precluded by § 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that he is not precluded

from obtaining relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform and “independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

/////

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 A transcript of the recordings can be found between pages 470 and 484 of the Clerk’s

Transcript prepared for direct appeal or in exhibit A to petitioner’s habeas application between

pages 490 and 504. 

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words, the court assumes the state-court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law

has been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Arguments And Analysis

A. Hearsay

Petitioner’s first argument is that his Constitutional right to confront witnesses

against him was violated by the admission into evidence of out of court statements made by

Cherie Forstein. Pet. at 20-29. The statements challenged are recordings of telephone messages

left by Ms. Forstein on petitioner’s answering machine.3

 As noted above, the messages were left

on petitioner’s answering machine on September 7, 8 and 9, 1999. The California Court of

Appeal, the highest and last court to issue a reasoned opinion with respect to petitioner’s

Constitutional claim, addressed the claims as follows:

“‘The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the

reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by

subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary

proceeding before the trier of fact.’ [Citation.]” (Lilly v. Virginia

(1999) 527 U.S. 116, 123-124 [144 L.Ed.2d 117, 126] (Lilly).) 

“[T]he veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to

allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused 

when (1) ‘the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay

exception’ or (2) it contains ‘particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be expected to

add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability.” (Lilly, supra,

at pp. 124-125 [144 L.Ed.2d at p. 127, emphasis added, quoting

Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608]

(Roberts).)

A hearsay exception is firmly rooted ‘if, in light of ‘longstanding

judicial and legislative experience,’ [citation], it ‘rest[s] [on] such

[a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence

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within [it] comports with the “substance of the constitutional

protection.”’ [Citations.] This standard is designed to allow the

introduction of statements falling within a category of hearsay

whose conditions have proven over time ‘to remove all temptation

to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as

would the obligation of an oath’ and cross-examination at trial.

[Citation.]” (Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 126 [144 L.Ed.2d at pp.

127-128].) “[W]hether the statements fall within a firmly rooted

hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes is a question

of federal law.” (Id. at p. 125 [144 L.Ed.2d at p. 127].) If, as in

Lilly, the proferred statement is inherently unreliable and falls

outside a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the prosecution must

satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test in order to introduce

the statements. (Lilly, supra, at pp. 131, 134 [144 L.Ed.2d at pp.

131, 132-133].)

The Evidence Code section 1250 state-of-mind exception to the

hearsay rule is firmly rooted in California’s decisional and

statutory law. (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., 29B West’s

Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll § 1250, pp. 280-281; People v.

Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177; see also People v. Morales (1989)

48 Cal.3d 527, 552 (Morales).) Included within this hearsay

exception are statements offered to show the declarant’s intent to

do a future act, such as draw others into a plot to rob a restaurant

or to commit murder. (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475,

518 (Sanders); Morales, supra, at p. 552.) Statements within this

exception are admissible against confederates as well as

declarants. (Sanders, supra, at pp. 515, 518; Morales, supra, at

pp. 551-552; People v. Han (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 797, 806.) 

We independently review the trial court’s ruling on this “factintensive, mixed question [] of constitutional law” (Lilly, supra,

527 U.S. at p. 136 [144 L.Ed.2d at p. 134]), and conclude it

properly found that Forstein’s statements fell within the Evidence

Code section 1250 state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. 

The taped telephone messages showed Forstein’s fear of her

neighbors, concern for Chad’s safety, and anger at Howard for not

paying her the money she said he owed. The remaining statements

reveal Forstein’s intent to bring Howard and his confederates from

San Francisco to kill LaMarr and his family. Her warnings to the

Finches show knowledge of what was about to happen.

Answer, Ex. B at 25-27.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), the Supreme Court held that this

provision bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial

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unless [s]he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” In Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), the Court noted with respect to

the Crawford decision:

A critical portion of this holding . . . is the phrase ‘testimonial

statements.’ Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be

a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”

[Citation omitted.] It is the testimonial character of the statement

that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to

traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the

Confrontation Clause.

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273. 

In Crawford, the Court discussed what constitute “testimonial statements:”

Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation

made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.

[Internal quotations and citation omitted.] An accuser who makes a

formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense

that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does

not. 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. In Davis, the court added that one testifies out of court when he or she

acts like a witness. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. In other words, the determinative question to ask

is whether the out of court statement is “a weaker substitute for live testimony at trial.” [Internal

quotations omitted.] Id. 

While the contours of what constitutes “testimonial statements” under Supreme

Court precedent at this point have not been precisely demarcated, the messages left by Cherie

Forstein are not testimonial statements. Ms. Forstein was not acting “like a witness” in relaying

information regarding this case to a governmental official. She was simply communicating with

petitioner. Cf. United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, ___

U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1487 (2006) (out of court statements from one co-conspirator to another not

“testimonial”). In light of Crawford and Davis, the court must reject petitioner’s Confrontation

Clause claim. 

/////

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 Neither party has submitted People’s Exhibit 3 to this court.

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B. Picture of Victim

Petitioner’s second argument is that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the

presentation of a picture of Howard Morris, the victim. Pet. at 29-30. Petitioner asserts that in

the picture, People’s Exhibit Number 3, Mr. Morris appears shorter than his little brother

LaMarr. Id. at 29. Petitioner asserts this damaged his case because he had tried to convince

jurors that he was afraid of Mr. Morris due to his size. Id. at 29-30. Petitioner also asserts that

Mr. Morris appears effeminate in the picture because he is wearing shorts and a long sweater

resembling a smock. Id. at 29.4

The California Court of Appeal found that admission of the picture was not

improper. Answer, Ex. B at 32-33. 

The admission of photographs can violate the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment if the images are “of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” 

Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9thCir. 2006). Even if there are no permissible inferences

to be drawn from a picture, a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial has not necessarily been

violated by the picture’s admission. Id.

Petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not violated even if Mr. Morris’s appearance

in People’s Exhibit 3 made him appear sympathetic. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

found that admission into evidence of more inflammatory material did not violate due process. 

See, e.g., Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1982) (prejudice associated with

pictures of victim’s dead body did not violate the defendants’ due process right to a fair trial). 

Furthermore, the picture did not violate due process on the theory that the picture did not

adequately convey the size of Howard Morris. During trial, a pathologist testified that, at the

time of his death, Mr. Morris weighed 207 pounds and was 5'11". RT 993:5-23. This testimony

provided a basis for the jury’s resolving any ambiguity created by the picture as to Mr. Morris’s

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size. The admission of the picture did not violate federal law. Petitioner’s second claim also

must be rejected. 

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons the court will recommend that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

In accordance with the above IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 14, 2007.

1

howa0083.157

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