Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05403/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05403-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mitchell Delk
Appellee
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Appellee
Tony Morgan
Appellant

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2002 Decided May 9, 2003

No. 01-5403

TONY MORGAN,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION AND

MITCHELL DELK,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv01397)

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Nancy R. Kuhn argued the cause for appellees. With her

on the brief were Diane Marshall Ennist and Kathy B.

Houlihan.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-5403 Document #748590 Filed: 05/09/2003 Page 1 of 12
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Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The plaintiff in this case brought

suit against the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

and one of its officers, alleging that the corporation failed to

hire him for any of several positions because of his race and

in retaliation for his having filed a discrimination complaint

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The

district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,

and we affirm.

I

Plaintiff Tony Morgan, an African–American male, was

employed as Director, Executive Corporate Relations at the

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (‘‘Freddie Mac’’)

from January 17, 1995 to March 31, 1996. His employment

ended as a result of a reduction in force. In exchange for six

months of severance pay and other benefits, Morgan signed a

release of all ‘‘claims arising out of or relating in any way to

[his] employment relationship’’ prior to April 7, 1996, the

effective date of the release. J.A. at 203–04. Before and

after executing the release, the plaintiff applied for a number

of other positions at Freddie Mac, but was unsuccessful in

obtaining reemployment.

On December 11, 1996, Morgan filed a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging, inter alia, that Freddie Mac’s failure to rehire him was

due to racial discrimination. After filing the complaint, Morgan submitted several additional, also unsuccessful, applications for employment with the corporation.

On June 3, 1998, Morgan filed suit against Freddie Mac

and three of its officers in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff alleged that

Freddie Mac had refused to rehire him because of his race, in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He also alleged, inter

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alia, that the refusal was in retaliation for his having pressed

employment discrimination claims with the EEOC, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).1

On November 9, 2000, the district court granted a motion

to dismiss Morgan’s claims against two of the three individual

defendants. After extensive discovery, the remaining defendants, Freddie Mac and its Vice President, Mitchell Delk,

moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56. By that point, the plaintiff had narrowed

his claims to discrimination and retaliation in Freddie Mac’s

failure to offer him eight positions. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding four

of those jobs because Morgan had been rejected for them

prior to the effective date of the 1996 release of claims.

Morgan v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 172

F. Supp. 2d 98, 108 (D.D.C. 2001). As to the claims relating

to the four remaining positions, the court granted summary

judgment on the ground that Morgan had failed to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Id. Only

the latter four positions are at issue on this appeal.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989,

991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Such a grant is appropriate if ‘‘ ‘there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and TTT the moving

1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it ‘‘an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire TTT

any individual TTT because of such individual’s race [or] color.’’ 42

U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in

‘‘the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Title

VII also makes it ‘‘an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any TTT applicant[ ] for employment TTT

because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’’ concerning

employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).

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party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ’’

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A dispute is ‘‘genuine’’ only

‘‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party,’’ id. at 248, and a moving

party is ‘‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’’ if the

nonmoving party ‘‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial,’’ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Because Morgan has no direct evidence that Freddie Mac

refused to hire him for any of the positions on account of his

race, we analyze those claims under the familiar framework

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 802–05 (1973). See also Carter v. Duncan–Huggins,

Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying the

McDonnell Douglas framework to § 1981 claims). Under

that framework, ‘‘the plaintiff must [first] establish a prima

facie case of discrimination.’’ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The plaintiff can

satisfy that initial burden by showing ‘‘(i) that he belongs to a

racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job

for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,

despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after

his rejection, the position remained open and the employer

continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s

qualifications.’’ McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. As the

Supreme Court has explained, this framework ‘‘demand[s]

that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his

rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate

reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job

applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the

absence of a vacancy in the job sought.’’ International Bhd.

of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).

If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the defendant then bears the burden of ‘‘ ‘produc[ing] evidence that the

plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’ ’’ Reeves, 530 U.S. at

142 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450

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U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If the defendant produces such evidence, ‘‘the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non.’’ Id. at 142–43 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). At that point, to

‘‘survive summary judgment the plaintiff must show that a

reasonable jury could conclude that [he] was [rejected] for a

discriminatory reason.’’ Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 992 (citing

Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir.

1998)). Although the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts

‘‘intermediate evidentiary burdens’’ between the parties,

‘‘ ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff

remains at all times with the plaintiff.’ ’’ Reeves, 530 U.S. at

143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

This framework also governs our analysis of Morgan’s

claims of unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–3(a). See Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C.

Cir. 1985); Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 116 (D.C. Cir.

1980). The only difference is the phrasing of the prima facie

case: ‘‘In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a

plaintiff must show: 1) that [he] engaged in a statutorily

protected activity; 2) that the employer took an adverse

personnel action; and 3) that a causal connection existed

between the two.’’ Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff claims that

the retaliation took the form of a failure to hire, the plaintiff

must also show: 4) that he applied for an available job; and

5) that he was qualified for that position. Id. at 86 n.5;

Williams, 663 F.2d at 116 & n.43.

III

On appeal, Morgan has confined his claims to Freddie

Mac’s allegedly unlawful failure to offer him four positions for

which Morgan applied after the period covered by his 1996

release. We consider the first three of those positions in this

Part, and conclude that Morgan failed to make out a prima

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facie case of discrimination or retaliation as to any of them.

We consider the fourth position in Part IV below.

In letters dated July 3, 1997, Morgan applied for three jobs

previously posted by Freddie Mac: 1) Director, Business

Support; 2) Director, Business Strategies; and 3) Director,

Issues Management. With respect to his application for the

first of these — Director, Business Support — Freddie Mac

responded with a letter advising Morgan that the position was

currently on hold and that the corporation had stopped all

recruitment. Clarke Letter (July 18, 1997) (J.A. at 289). In

support of its motion for summary judgment, Freddie Mac

proffered evidence that it had suspended recruitment for the

position a month before Morgan applied, and that it was

never filled. Gertz E-mail Messages (June 6, 1997) (J.A. at

553–56); Clarke Decl. at ¶ 5 (J.A. at 550).

Morgan offered no evidence to rebut the corporation’s

assertion that it had suspended recruitment for the Business

Support directorship before he applied. He did dispute the

contention that Freddie Mac never filled the position, noting

that in the fall of 1997, a woman named Ann Herrington was

interviewed for and in 1998 accepted a job, entitled ‘‘Director,

Strategic Planning,’’ in the same department. But the plaintiff offered no evidence to contradict the corporation’s proof

that this was a completely different position, other than to

point to the fact that the job description for Director, Business Support included the term ‘‘strategic planning’’ in the

list of critical skills and experience needed for the position —

albeit not in the list of the position’s responsibilities. J.A. at

284–85. Having thus failed to raise a genuine issue that the

Business Support position for which he applied was one ‘‘for

which the employer was seeking applicants,’’ McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, Morgan failed to establish a prima

facie case of either discrimination or retaliation, and summary

judgment on this claim was therefore appropriate. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44; Williams,

663 F.2d at 116 n.43.

The second position for which Morgan applied on July 3,

1997, was entitled ‘‘Director, Business Strategies.’’ In its

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letter responding to Morgan’s application, Freddie Mac advised that the job was open only to internal candidates.

Morrow Letter (July 18, 1997) (J.A. at 290). Morgan does

not argue, and there is no evidence to suggest, that this

qualification was other than bona fide or that the corporation

imposed it as a means of excluding Morgan or other minority

applicants from consideration. Indeed, the requirement that

candidates come from within the company was contained in

the corporation’s original notice of availability, which was

posted two months before Morgan applied. J.A. at 395.

Morgan does contend that, despite the stated qualification,

Freddie Mac did not limit its consideration to internal candidates. There is no evidence, however, to support this claim.

Morgan points to a ‘‘resume distribution’’ cover sheet, which

shows that on May 1, 1997, the corporation’s human resources

department forwarded an external candidate’s r ́esum ́e to Vice

President Delk, the hiring manager for the Business Strategies position (as well as for other jobs not at issue here). See

J.A. at 315. But that r ́esum ́e was received and forwarded

before the Business Strategies position was posted, compare

id. at 315, with id. at 395; the external applicant did not

apply for any specific position, see id. at 315, 317; and the

r ́esum ́e was not forwarded to Delk with reference to any

particular job opening, see id. at 315. Moreover, Delk responded that he was not interested, see id., and the only other

person Morgan contends Freddie Mac considered for the

position, a lawyer in its legal division, plainly was an internal

candidate. See id. at 352, 428–29.2

 Because Morgan thus

provided no evidence that he met a bona fide qualification for

the Business Strategies position, he failed to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, and summary

judgment was again appropriate. See International Bhd. of

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44; Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86 n.5;

Williams, 663 F.2d at 116 & n.41.

The final position for which Morgan applied on July 3, 1997,

was that of Director, Issues Management. In response,

2 The position of Director, Business Strategies was never filled

and was ultimately cancelled. Delk Dep. at 33 (J.A. at 351).

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Freddie Mac told Morgan that the hiring decision had already

been made. See Morrow Letter (J.A. at 290). In support of

its motion for summary judgment, the corporation offered the

testimony of the hiring manager for that job, Ann Schnare,

who averred that she had filled the post by making two hires

(one part-time, one full-time) in June, before Morgan applied.

J.A. at 195. (The vacancy announcement had been published

two months earlier, in April 1997. Id. at 397.) Morgan’s

principal response is to cite a letter from Schnare to one of

those individuals, Susan Gates, that was dated July 14, 1997.

Id. at 325. Contrary to Morgan’s contention, however, the

letter does not offer Gates the position, but rather confirms

the corporation’s earlier ‘‘offer and your [Gates’] acceptance.’’

Id. The letter is thus consistent with Schnare’s testimony

that the offer and acceptance took place in June, and Morgan

offers nothing to call that testimony into question.3

 Accordingly, the plaintiff has for a third time failed to establish a

critical element of a prima facie case of discrimination or

retaliation: the existence of a vacancy in the position for

which he applied. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431

U.S. at 358 n.44; Williams, 663 F.2d at 116 n.43.

IV

In November 1997, the position of Director, Issues Management once again became open.4

 In December, without

advertising the job, Freddie Mac offered it to Ann Herrington, a white female who was working at the General Electric

3 Morgan also contends that Freddie Mac continued to seek

applicants for the Issues Management position after Morgan submitted his application, citing an application that Ann Herrington

submitted on July 14, 1997. J.A. at 320. But that document

establishes nothing more than that Morgan was not the only person

who applied for the opening after it was filled.

4 Freddie Mac explained that the job became available because

Gates, the part-time incumbent, had become responsible for writing

speeches for Freddie Mac’s corporate communications group and

was no longer able to fulfill her Issues Management responsibilities.

Schnare Decl. ¶¶ 5–7 (J.A. at 569–70).

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Company at the time. Herrington turned the offer down

(accepting a different position instead), and Freddie Mac

ultimately eliminated the office altogether as part of a reorganization the following March.5

 Morgan points out that both

he and Herrington originally applied for the Issues Management job at the same time, in July 1997,6

 and contends that

Freddie Mac’s failure to offer him the position that December

constituted unlawful discrimination and retaliation.7

Because there was a vacancy at the time Freddie Mac

made the offer to Herrington, and because Herrington was

herself an external candidate, Morgan’s prima facie case

regarding this claim does not suffer from the defects that we

have identified with respect to the July 1997 positions. Although Freddie Mac contends that there are other problems

with Morgan’s prima facie case concerning the November

1997 opening, we need not resolve that dispute because the

corporation also proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for not

considering Morgan at that time: namely, that it was unaware that he was still interested. As the Supreme Court

has made clear, once a defendant has proffered such a

nondiscriminatory explanation, it has ‘‘done everything that

would be required of [it] if the plaintiff had properly made out

a prima facie case.’’ United States Postal Serv. Bd. of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). At that point,

‘‘whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant,’’ and

the only question is ‘‘whether ‘the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff.’ ’’ Id. at 715 (quoting

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); see Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 993

n.6. On that question, Morgan bears the ‘‘ ‘burden of showing that a reasonable jury could conclude’ ’’ that Freddie Mac

failed to offer him the position out of discriminatory or

5 The plaintiff does not assert that the cancellation of the position

was due to discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

6 See supra note 3.

7 Morgan describes the Issues Management directorship as a

single position, for which he was twice rejected. Freddie Mac

contends that there were two separate positions. In our view,

nothing turns on this distinction.

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retaliatory animus. Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 993 (quoting

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290).

Morgan has failed to satisfy that burden. Freddie Mac

explained that, although both Morgan and Herrington initially

applied for the Issues Management directorship in July 1997,

the corporation was not aware that Morgan remained interested after he was informed in mid–July that the position had

been filled. Herrington, by contrast, repeatedly expressed

her interest later that fall. Thus, when the position again

became available in November, the corporation knew that

Herrington was interested but did not know that Morgan

was. Schnare Dep. at 60–62 (J.A. at 196, 533–34). A plaintiff

may, of course, ‘‘attempt to establish that he was the victim of

intentional discrimination ‘by showing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’ ’’ Reeves, 530

U.S. at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). But in the

district court the plaintiff offered no evidence to rebut Freddie Mac’s contention that it was unaware of his interest in

late 1997, and his appellate briefs do not even allege that this

contention was false.8

In addition to showing that an employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of belief, a plaintiff may submit other

evidence of the employer’s unlawful animus in a bid to avoid

summary judgment. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148–49; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289.9

 Although

8 At oral argument, Morgan did contend that he had in fact made

his interest known in the fall of 1997. But he offered no evidentiary

support for that assertion, and appellate argument is in any event

too late in the proceedings to controvert the issue. See Frito–Lay,

Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding

that in reviewing summary judgment, the court of appeals’ ‘‘sole

and limited task is to assess with care the record before the District

Court at the time it granted [the motion],’’ and may not consider

evidence proffered for the first time on appeal (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

9 A plaintiff may also rely on the evidence used to establish his

prima facie case. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Waterhouse, 298

F.3d at 992–93; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. Here, however, Morgan

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Morgan does not frame the argument in this way, we have

considered the only two pieces of evidence that might be

relevant in this regard. First, Morgan’s brief alludes to a

racially degrading e-mail sent out by a single Freddie Mac

employee. But Morgan does not allege that the offending

employee had any role whatsoever in deciding whether to hire

him. See Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077, 1079–

80 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that evidence of a discriminatory

statement by an individual uninvolved in the challenged employment decision is insufficient to defeat summary judgment). Second, Morgan notes that, in response to his EEOC

complaint, the Commission issued a determination of reasonable cause to believe that Freddie Mac had discriminated

against him. J.A. at 280–82; see 42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(b) (requiring the Commission to determine whether ‘‘there is reasonable cause to believe that [an unlawful employment practice] charge is true’’). But the EEOC determination does not

indicate whether it covers Morgan’s claim regarding the

November 1997 Issues Management position, and it is doubtful that it does since Morgan last filed EEOC charges in April

1997, see Appellant’s Br. at 25, well before he applied for any

of the openings at issue on this appeal. Moreover, the

determination’s conclusory sentences are insufficient, standing alone against Freddie Mac’s unrebutted nondiscriminatory explanation, to satisfy Morgan’s ‘‘burden of showing that a

reasonable jury could conclude’’ that he was not offered the

Issues Management position on account of his race or discrimination complaint, Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290. See Coleman

v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 2000);

Goldberg v. B. Greene & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.

1988).10

presented (at best) a bare bones prima facie case that alone could

not constitute ‘‘sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to

reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision’’

or ‘‘to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.’’

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 140, 148.

10 Moreover, the Statement of Genuine Issues filed by Morgan in

the district court cited the EEOC letter only in support of his

separate claim that Freddie Mac had created a hostile work enviUSCA Case #01-5403 Document #748590 Filed: 05/09/2003 Page 11 of 12
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V

Morgan’s claims that Freddie Mac unlawfully rejected him

for three positions in July 1997 fail because he cannot ‘‘demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two

most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might

rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of

qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought.’’

International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. His

contention that Freddie Mac unlawfully failed to offer him a

position in late 1997 founders upon his failure to provide any

evidence that the corporation’s lawful explanation for not

offering him the post was false, or any other evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that he was not hired

because of racial discrimination or retaliation. Accordingly,

the district court properly granted defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, and the decision of that court is therefore

Affirmed.

ronment, a claim that plaintiff has not raised on this appeal. J.A. at

380–81.

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