Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10501/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10501-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Alvarez-Ulloa
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESUS ALVAREZ-ULLOA, AKA Jesse

Ulloa, AKA Jesse Alvarez Ulloa,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10500

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-2268-

NVW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESUS ALVAREZ-ULLOA, AKA Jesse

A. Ulloa,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10501

D.C .No.

4:07-cr-1972-

NVW-1

OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 11, 2014—San Francisco California

Filed April 21, 2015

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2 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Richard A. Paez, Circuit

Judges, and Frederic Block, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Tashima

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for illegal reentry under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and the district court’s order revoking

supervised release based on that conviction, in a case in

which the defendant contended that the district court erred in

rejecting his Batson challenges and that a supplemental jury

instruction impermissibly coerced the jury and constructively

expanded the indictment.

The panel held that the district court erred in failing to

reach the third step of the Batson framework, where it

dispensed with each challenge by determining that the

government had asserted facially neutral grounds for its

peremptorystrikes of three Hispanic individuals in the venire,

without evaluating the persuasiveness of the government’s

facially neutral reason. The panel held, however, that the

defendant failed to show purposeful discrimination and that

the record does not support such a finding on de novo review.

* The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge,

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 3

The panel held that the district court’s supplemental

instruction – which clarified that the insanity defense would

not apply if, while the defendant was illegally present in the

United States, he was sane for a long enough period to have

left the country – was substantively correct and not coercive.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the

supplemental jury instruction constituted a constructive

amendment of the indictment. The panel wrote that because

it is well-established in this circuit that an indictment under

§ 1326(a) need not specifically denote the duration of a

defendant’s illegal presence, the indictment provided the

defendant with adequate notice that he was being charged

with a course of criminal conduct that began when he

reentered the United States; and that the supplemental jury

instruction was not “distinctly different” from the indictment.

COUNSEL

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Keith J. Hilzendeger

(argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, Mark S.

Kokanovich, Deputy Appellate Chief, and Kiyoko Patterson

(argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix Arizona,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Jesus Alvarez-Ulloa (“Ulloa”)1appeals his conviction for

illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and the district

court’s order revoking his supervised release based on the

jury’s guilty verdict in the illegal reentry case. During jury

selection, Ulloa unsuccessfully challenged three of the

government’s peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986). At trial, Ulloa asserted the insanity

defense, arguing that as a former boxer he suffered from brain

damage that prevented him from understanding the nature of

his presence in the United States. After the jury deadlocked,

the district court clarified that the insanity defense would not

apply if while Ulloa was illegally present in the United States

he was sane for a long enough period to have left the country. 

The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict.

On appeal, Ulloa contends, first, that the district court

erred in rejecting his Batson challenges, and, second, that the

supplemental instruction impermissibly coerced the jury and

constructivelyexpanded the indictment. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

I.

Over a period of about twelve years, between

approximately 1984 and 1996, Ulloa was first an amateur and

1 Our ordinary convention is to refer to litigants with hyphenated

Hispanic surnames by the name appearing first in the hyphenated series. 

However, because Alvarez-Ulloa uses the second of his two surnames, we

adopt that nomenclature here.

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 5

later a professional boxer. Although Ulloa was raised and

appears to have lived primarily in Arizona, he is a citizen of

Mexico, a designation responsible for many of his recent

legal problems.

In 2010, Ulloa was removed to Mexico following a

conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Ulloa subsequently

reentered the United States. Local police found and detained

Ulloa in October 2011 at a resort in Phoenix after he

reportedly attempted to steal a copy of the roster of the

Arizona Cardinals.

After concluding that Ulloa was a citizen of Mexico

subject to a previous deportation order, the government

charged Ulloa with illegal reentry. The indictment charged,

in full:

On or about October 23, 2011, at or near

Phoenix, in the District of Arizona, JESUS

ALVAREZ-ULLOA, an alien, was found in

the United States of America after having

been previously denied admission, excluded,

deported, and removed from the United States

at or near San Ysidro, California, on or about

December 17, 2010, and not having obtained

the express consent of the AttorneyGeneral or

the Secretaryof Homeland Security to reapply

for readmission.

In violation of Title 8, United States Code,

Sections 1326(a) and (b)(1).

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6 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

During jury selection, Ulloa raised three Batson

challenges to the government’s peremptory strikes. Ulloa

alleged that the government’s strikes of Panelists 25, 29, and

30 were motivated by impermissible racial discrimination. 

According to Ulloa’s counsel, there were five Hispanic

individuals in the venire of thirty-six potential jurors, and the

government used three of its seven peremptory strikes on

Hispanic individuals.

The district court discussed each of the prospective strikes

with the government and Ulloa’s counsel.

At the court’s prompting, the government first addressed

the strike of Panelist 25. The government asserted it struck

Panelist 25 because he “was a pre-med major in sports

medicine and [had] experience in that area and [was]

involved in football, karate, and boxing.” Additionally,

Panelist 25 had previouslyattended a pro-immigration reform

rally with his mother, which, the government suggested,

might indicate potential bias in an immigration-related

prosecution.

Panelist 29 was struck, according to the government,

because she was a third-year law student and had previously

worked for a criminal defense firm. The government

contended that this background was “indicative of somebody

who would be less trusting of the government in immigration

prosecution.”

Finally, the government asserted that it struck Panelist 30

because she had a son who had been convicted of armed

robbery, and reported other negative experiences with law

enforcement officers, including having had her house

searched by law enforcement officers while she was not

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 7

home. Although Panelist 30 had also noted positive

experiences with police during questioning, the government

stated she was struck because of a potential bias against law

enforcement.

The court sustained each of the strikes. Working

backwards, the court explained that with respect to Panelist

30:

[T]he government has articulated a facially

neutral ground that is actually well supported

by the witness’s answers that reflected a

negative experience with law enforcement. 

Now, she also had positive experiences, but it

was apparent that she had some continuing

sensitivity and feeling. And so I don’t have

any difficulty concluding that is a facially

neutral ground for exercising the strike.

The court next addressed Panelist 29:

Ifind that both articulated grounds are facially

neutral. She’s two years out of law school. 

She’s worked in law offices. . . . I’ve never

been able to get on a jury my whole life. 

Nobody would let me on because I was a

lawyer. And I didn’t take it personally. But

that’s accepted wisdom of not having

someone on the jury who may be in a position

to, A, second guess you and, B, carry perhaps

special influence into the deliberations of the

jury because of the legal training. And her

involvement in immigration criminal defense

certainly suggests a special interest and

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8 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

sensitivity that, for purposes of a peremptory

challenge, is facially neutral.

The court spent the most time considering the strike of

Panelist 25. At one point, it noted that “it’s the perception of

the prosecutor, not my perception that matters.” The court

eventually concluded:

I’m satisfied that whether or not the [rally]

was specifically focused on Sheriff Arpaio or

just generally focused on pro-immigration,

that is a facially neutral ground to exercise the

strike because it reflects a very substantial

interest in this area of policy that most of us

have strong views about this, but the fact that

he went to a rally reflects a much higher level

of interest. And so all of the objections are

overruled.

No further discussion of Ulloa’s Batson challenges occurred.

At trial Ulloa stipulated that he had been found on or

about October 23, 2011, in Phoenix, noting that it would be

“surprising” if the government failed to prove the elements of

illegal reentry. Ulloa intended to build his case on the

insanity defense, alleging that, due to injuries he sustained

during his career as a professional boxer, he was unable to

understand the wrongfulness of his actions. The government

presented evidence that Ulloa had been previously deported

and was found in the United States in October 2011, and

evidence suggesting that Ulloa did not have a mental disease

or defect. Ulloa presented evidence suggesting that he in fact

suffered from chronic traumatic encephalopathy, a disease

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 9

which – according to his expert witness – could have

rendered him legally insane.

Under the jury instructions, for Ulloa to be found guilty

under § 1326(a), the government was required to prove that: 

(1) Ulloa “was deported from the United States on or about

December 17, 2010,” (2) Ulloa “voluntarily entered the

United States,” (3) “after entering the United States, [Ulloa]

knew that he was in the United States and knowingly

remained,” (4) “on or about October 23, 2011, [Ulloa] was

found in the United States,” and (5) “[Ulloa] was an alien at

the time of [his] entry into the United States.” The court

further instructed that “[a] defendant is insane only if at the

time of the crime charged, one, the defendant had a severe

mental disease or defect; and two, as a result, the defendant

was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the

wrongfulness of his acts.”

Several hours after the jury began deliberations, the court

received a note from the foreperson, which stated:

The juryneeds clarification on the defendant’s

mental state needed to consistently meet the,

quote, ‘insane,’ close quote, criteria for the

entire time he was here illegally, (from

2010–2011). Specifically, if the defendant

had any moments of mental clarity during that

time or he was able to appreciate the nature

and quality or wrongfulness of his acts, does

that negate the defense of insanity?

After consulting with the parties, the court answered the

question by referring the jury to the original jury instructions. 

Thereafter, the jury sent out another note stating:

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10 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

We currently seem to be unable to reach a

unanimous decision on a verdict and would

like some direction from the court on what to

do at this point.

The court responded:

If the Court gives a more specific answer to

your previous question, would you wish to

continue to deliberate to try to reach a

unanimous verdict?

After the jury replied affirmatively, the court provided the

jury with the following supplemental instruction in response

to its question:

The insanity defense would be negated if,

after entering the United States, the Defendant

ceased to be insane for a long enough time

that he reasonably could have left the United

States, and he then knowingly remained in the

United States for that time.

Thirty-seven minutes later, the jury returned a guilty verdict. 

The district court subsequentlysentenced Ulloa to 48 months’

imprisonment.

II.

A.

We first address Ulloa’s contention that the district court

improperly rejected his Batson challenges. We normally will

not set aside a district court’s findings under Batson unless

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 11

clearly erroneous. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433,

1442 (9th Cir. 1992). However, we review de novo whether

the district court properly applied Batson. See United States

v. Collins, 551 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2009).

Under Batson, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in

selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal

protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by

jury is intended to secure.” 476 U.S. at 86. In ruling on a

Batson challenge, a district court must apply a three-part

framework:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie

showing that a peremptory challenge has been

exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that

showing has been made, the prosecution must

offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror

in question. Third, in light of the parties’

submissions, the trial court must determine

whether the defendant has shown purposeful

discrimination.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003) (citations

omitted).

At Batson’s third step, “the trial court must decide not

only whether the reasons stated are race-neutral, but whether

they are relevant to the case, and whether those stated reasons

were the prosecutor’s genuine reasons for exercising a

peremptory strike, rather than pretexts invented to hide

purposeful discrimination.” Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d

1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). The trial court “must undertake

a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct

evidence of intent as may be available.” Id. (quoting Batson,

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12 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

476 U.S. at 93). Such evidence may include “the

prosecutor’s demeanor; . . . how reasonable, or how

improbable, the explanations are; and . . . whether the

proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339. The court cannot simply accept

the prosecutor’s reasons as facially neutral and stop there; it

must make an explicit determination at the third step. See

Green, 532 F.3d at 1030–31; United States v. Alanis,

335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the district court did not reach the third step of the

Batson framework. Although it questioned both the

government and Ulloa’s counsel about the strikes, the court

dispensed with each challenge by determining that the

government had asserted facially neutral grounds. The court

conducted no further analysis after determining that facially

neutral grounds existed. At one point, the court noted that

“it’s the perception of the prosecutor, not my perception that

matters.” This comment suggests the court believed its

responsibility under the Batson framework was merely to

establish the presence of a facially neutral ground. Yet our

precedents specifically require that the court evaluate the

persuasiveness of the government’s facially neutral reason. 

See Green, 532 F.3d at 1030–31; Alanis, 335 F.3d at 969. 

The district court thus erred in failing to reach Batson’s third

step.

B.

Faced with an improper application of the Batson

framework, we may decide de novo whether the

government’s strikes were motivated by purposeful

discrimination. See Green, 532 F.3d at 1033; Alanis,

335 F.3d at 969 n.5; see also United States v. Stephens,

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 13

514 F.3d 703, 713 (7th Cir. 2008). Alternatively, we may

remand to the district court, either for a factual hearing or for

a new trial. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254,

1261–62 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Kimbrel,

532 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. TorresRamos, 536 F.3d 542, 561 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the

record here is well-developed and there are not outstanding

issues that would benefit from an additional hearing long

after the original trial, we assess now whether Ulloa proved

purposeful discrimination in violation of Batson.

Ulloa contends that impermissible racial discrimination

inhered in the government’s strikes of three prospective

jurors: (1) Panelist 25 – a sports enthusiast and former premed major who had attended a pro-immigration rally;

(2) Panelist 29 – a student at a local law school who had

worked in criminal defense; and (3) Panelist 30 – a woman

who described negative experiences with law enforcement,

including a police raid on her property. Each of these

prospective jurors was Hispanic.

Ulloa has made out a prima facie case under step one of

Batson that each of these strikes was based on purposeful

racial discrimination. To make out a prima facie case, a

defendant must show only “that the totality of the relevant

facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94; see Johnson v. California,

545 U.S. 162, 173 (2005) (concluding that Batson’s first step

is not a “more likely than not” standard). The challenges here

meet that modest bar. Out of a venire of thirty-six potential

jurors containing five Hispanic individuals, the government

used three of its seven peremptory strikes on Hispanics. 

Given the racially charged context of this case, the

government’s striking sixty percent of Hispanic individuals

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14 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

and approximately eight percent of non-Hispanic individuals

is sufficient to ground a prima facie case. Cf. id. at 164–65

(concluding that the defendant made out a prima facie case

because the prosecution used three of its twelve challenges to

strike the only African-American prospective jurors from the

venire).

Likewise, the government articulated race neutral

justifications for each of the challenged strikes. The

government stated that Panelist 25 was struck because his

background in sports medicine and apparent interest in

immigration policy might have rendered him reluctant to

convict a former boxer of an immigration violation. Panelist

29, according to the government, was struck out of concern

that her experience in criminal defense might bias her against

the government. And Panelist 30 was struck because of the

government’s concern that an individual who had negative

experiences with law enforcement might be biased in favor of

a criminal defendant. Each of these purported reasons is

race-neutral and has support in the record.

Ulloa’s challenges thus turn on step three of the Batson

framework. In addressing step three, we emphasize that, as

the partyalleging unconstitutional discrimination, Ulloa bears

the ultimate burden. Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 895 (9th

Cir. 2006). We examine Ulloa’s challenges at step three

seriatim.

First, Panelist 29 – the law student with criminal defense

experience. In general, the concern that jurors with legal

experience will bias or commandeer a jury is widespread

among lawyers, and other courts have accepted it as a

persuasive justification at step three of Batson. See United

States v. Bolden, 545 F.3d 609, 613–14 (8th Cir. 2008). More

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 15

importantly, there is simply no evidence in the record that the

government’s concern related to anything other than the

panelist’s legal background, i.e., that it was pretextual. Ulloa

suggests that the government’s failure to strike several

similarly situated prospective jurors indicates a

discriminatorymotive. Comparative juror analysis is a useful

tool at Batson step three, Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,

241 (2005), and failure to strike similarly situated venire

members can ground a conclusion that purposeful

discrimination occurred, see Green, 532 F.3d at 1030. 

However, Ulloa does not point to any panelists not struck

who actually were lawyers or law students, and who would

have raised the same concern the government articulated as

justification for its strike of Panelist 29. Thus, Ulloa cannot

satisfy his burden of showing purposeful racial

discrimination.

Second, Panelist 30 – the woman who disclosed negative

encounters with law enforcement. This challenge similarly

fails. Other courts have indicated that a prospective juror’s

potential distrust of law enforcement may ground a

peremptory strike. See Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 455

(8th Cir. 2012). That justification is particularly convincing

in a case such as this one, where the prospective juror

described deeply traumatic experiences involving law

enforcement, including having firearms pointed at her

children during a police raid. As with Panelist 29, there is no

evidence in the record that the government was concerned

about race and Ulloa cannot point to panelists not struck who

were situated similarly to Panelist 30. Although several nonHispanic jurors who were not struck disclosed family

members convicted of crimes, none revealed the same kind of

traumatic encounter with police as did Panelist 30.

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16 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

Finally, Panelist 25 – the former sports medicine student

who had attended a pro-immigration rally. As with the other

challenged strikes, there is no evidence in the record that the

government was concerned about this panelist’s race. 

Comparative analysis reveals no similarly situated nonHispanic jurors who were not struck. Ulloa identifies Panelist

45, who had a close friend involved in boxing, as a similarly

situated juror. However, Panelist 45 differed from Panelist

25 in at least two meaningful ways. First, Panelist 45’s

experience with sports was apparently casual and secondhand, rather than first-hand as part of a course of academic

training. Second, Panelist 25 had both a sports background

and a potential interest in immigration policy, making him a

more attractive target for a strike than Panelist 45. Although

the government’s decision to strike a Hispanic venire member

for a purported interest in immigration policy perhaps raises

questions about motive, the burden of showing purposeful

discrimination rests with Ulloa. In a case, such as this one,

where the statistical evidence is not overwhelming and

comparative analysis is unhelpful, Ulloa cannot meet that

burden.

We hold that, although the district court erred in applying

the Batson framework, Ulloa failed to show purposeful

discrimination, and the record does not support such a finding

on de novo review. We therefore reject Ulloa’s Batson

challenges.

III.

A.

Ulloa next contends that the district court’s supplemental

instruction impermissibly coerced the jury’s verdict in

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 17

violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although we review the

decision to give a supplemental jury instruction for abuse of

discretion, see United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1295

(9th Cir. 1987), we review de novo whether a trial court’s

actions impermissibly coerced a jury’s verdict, United States

v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1202 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008).

In resolving Ulloa’s challenge, we first examine whether

the supplemental instruction was substantively correct. Ulloa

was charged with the crime of being “found in” the United

States after having been removed, one of “three distinct

substantive offenses” under § 1326(a). United States v.

Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006). It is

an affirmative defense to any federal crime, including those

under § 1326, that “at the time of the commission of the acts

constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe

mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature

and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 17(a).

Although we have not had occasion to apply the insanity

defense to the “found in” offense under § 1326(a), our

precedents offer guidance on how the defense operates. 

Illegal reentry is a continuing offense, meaning that the

offense “commences with the illegal entry, but is not

completed until discovery.” United States v. HernandezGuerrero, 633 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2011). When a

defendant asserts an affirmative defense to a continuing

offense, he generallymust show that the requirements for the

defense were satisfied for the entire period in question. See

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412 (1980) (noting that

an individual using a duress defense to defend a charge of

escape, another continuing offense, “must . . . offer evidence

justifying his continued absence from custody as well as his

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18 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

initial departure”); see also United States v. Williams,

791 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1986). Continuing offenses, by

their nature, contemplate extended periods of proscribed

criminal conduct. It would be anomalous for a defense that

negates culpability for only one portion of a continuing

offense’s criminal period to completely bar conviction.

The Tenth Circuit dealt with a case which involved a

situation similar to the case at bench, in which the defendant

asserted duress as a defense to an illegal reentry charge under

§ 1326(a). See United States v. Portillo-Vega, 478 F.3d 1194

(10th Cir. 2007). There, the defendant claimed that he

illegally reentered the United States because he feared

persecution at the hands of Mexican police. Id. at 1198–99. 

The court reasoned that for the defendant to be entitled to a

duress instruction, he needed to adduce evidence to show not

only that he reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury

when he reentered, but also throughout the duration of his

illegal stay. Id. at 1201.2 The logic of Portillo-Vega applies

with equal force to the insanity defense, which is historically

and conceptually analogous to duress. See Powell v. Texas,

392 U.S. 514, 535–36 (1968) (plurality opinion). To succeed

in his defense, Ulloa thus needed to prove that he was legally

insane for virtually the entire duration of his illegal stay, such

that he could not reasonably have left the United States. We

therefore conclude that the district court’s supplemental

instruction was substantively correct.

2 Specifically, the court noted that for the duress defense to abrogate

culpability under § 1326(a), the defendant must “proffer evidence of a

bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed

duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.” Portillo-Vega, 478 F.3d

at 1201 (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415).

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 19

B.

We next consider whether the supplemental instruction

was impermissibly coercive. We evaluate whether a trial

court’s supplemental charge to a jury was coercive “in its

context and under all the circumstances.” Smith v. Curry,

580 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lowenfeld v.

Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988)). When a trial court

responds to jury questions “every effort must be undertaken

to avoid influencing or coercing a jury to reach one verdict

over another.” United States v. Evanston, 651 F.3d 1080,

1084 (9th Cir. 2011). “Extraordinary caution must be

exercised when acting to break jury deadlock.” Id. at 1085. 

However, the trial court has a responsibility to assist the jury

in applying the proper legal standards. When the jury “makes

explicit its difficulties by, for example, asking a question, the

trial court should clear [the jury’s difficulties] away with

concrete accuracy.” Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bollenbach v. United States,

326 U.S. 607, 612–13 (1946) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original)).

In Smith, the trial court faced a jury deadlocked as a result

of a single holdout. 580 F.3d at 1079. The trial court

instructed the jurors to focus on “specific evidence the court

thought supported the guilty verdict favored by the majority

of jurors.” Id. at 1082. We held the instruction to be

coercive, in part, because “the [trial court’s] summary of the

evidence was not neutral by any reasonable standard.” Id. at

1083. By contrast, in Parker, a state trial court judge

provided additional instructions to a deadlocked jury,

encouraging the jurors to “not hesitate to re-examine [their]

views” and to experiment with various deliberation strategies. 

Parker v. Small, 665 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2011). We

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20 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

accepted the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the

trial judge’s behavior was not coercive, and distinguished

Smith, because the trial court did not “attempt to recast the

evidence in a light more favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at

1149; cf. Johnson, 351 F.3d at 993 (upholding, under the

abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s supplemental

instruction defining “consent” in a sexual assault prosecution

through “a non-exclusive list of examples of what ‘without

consent’ includes”).3

Conducting the holistic, contextual inquiry required by

our precedents, we conclude that the supplemental instruction

in this case was not coercive. Ulloa’s central argument is that

the supplemental instruction indicated Ulloa’s mental defect

was of a kind that could have relented for long enough to

make him aware of the wrongfulness of his presence in the

United States, thereby putting a pro-government gloss on the

evidence. Contrary to Ulloa’s assertion, the supplemental

jury instruction did not suggest that Ulloa’s mental defect

could have relented. Rather, it merely informed the jury that

if the defect had relented that would be legally dispositive,

without betraying a stance on whether the defect had relented. 

Cf. Parker, 665 F.3d at 1149; Smith, 580 F.3d at 1083. 

Moreover, the district court gave the jury the supplemental

instruction only after the jury made clear that it did not

understand the legal standard and failed to reach a verdict on

the original instructions. The supplemental instruction was

brief, direct, and does not appear to have been directed at any

3 Parker, like Smith, arose in the habeas context, requiring that we apply

the deferential standard of review prescribed by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Parker, 665 F.3d at 1147. However, our explanation in that

case of how the facts at hand differed from those in Smith remains

persuasive authority.

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 21

particular juror. The district court did not err in giving the

supplemental instruction.

C.

Ulloa also contends that the supplemental jury instruction

constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment in

violation of the Fifth Amendment. We review de novo

whether a constructive amendment took place. United States

v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006). A constructive

amendment occurs “when the charging terms of the

indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by the

prosecutor or a court after the grand jury has last passed upon

them.” United States v. Ward, 747 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir.

2014) (quoting United States v. Van Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586

(9th Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d

1090, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2001); Howard v. Dagget, 526 F.2d

1388, 1389–90 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). For a

constructive amendment to inhere, jury instructions must

“diverge materially” from the indictment and evidence must

have been “introduced at trial that would enable the jury to

convict the defendant for conduct with which he was not

charged.” Ward, 747 F.3d at 1191. If the possibility exists

that “the defendant’s conviction could be based on conduct

not charged in the indictment,” then a constitutional violation

results because an amendment “destroy[s] the defendant’s

substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an

indictment.” Id. (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S.

212, 217 (1960) (alteration in original)).

For example, in Howard we found a constructive

amendment where a defendant was indicted for having

business relationships with two particular prostitutes, but the

trial court’s instructions did not “specifically reference the

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22 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

two women named in the indictment.” Ward, 747 F.3d at

1190–91 (citing Howard, 526 F.2d at 1389). We found a

constructive amendment in this circumstance because the

government had introduced evidence at trial that the

defendant had relationships with various prostitutes aside

from the individuals mentioned in the indictment. Howard,

526 F.2d at 1389–90.

We have not previously addressed whether a constructive

amendment occurs when an indictment for a continuing

offense does not specifically mention the duration of that

offense. Seizing on this ambiguity, Ulloa argues that because

the indictment on which he was tried mentioned only his

removal and found-in dates and did not discuss the time

between when Ulloa reentered the country and when he was

found, the supplemental jury instruction “expand[ed] the

temporal scope of the acts that the jurors had to conclude

were negated by Mr. Ulloa’s insanity defense” and, thus,

constituted a constructive amendment.

To resolve Ulloa’s challenge, we must determine whether

the indictment adequately “presented” the period of time

between when Ulloa reentered and when he was found in

Phoenix such that his rights were not abridged. Stirone,

361 U.S. at 217. We note first that an indictment generally

must articulate only “the crime charged,” “the essential

elements of the indicated crime,” and “the acts alleged to

constitute the offense in detail sufficient to bring them within

the scope of the offense and sufficient to inform the accused

generally of the acts attributed to him and the time of their

commission.” Elder v. United States, 142 F.2d 199, 200 (9th

Cir. 1944). In the case of the “found in” crime with which

Ulloa was charged, those elements are that the defendant: 

(1) is an alien; (2) had previously been removed; (3) was

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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA 23

subsequently found in the United States; and (4) did not have

the permission of the Attorney General to reapply for

admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); United States v. PargaRosas, 238 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 2001). An indictment

for the found in crime need not mention the actual reentry

because that concept is “embedded in the ‘found in’ offense,”

as must be, by extension, the time spent in the United States

between when one reenters and is found. See United States

v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).

Reentry and time spent inside the United States after

reentry are embedded within § 1326(a)’s elements because

illegal reentry is a continuing offense. United States v.

Hernandez-Guerrero, 633 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Because continuing offenses contemplate conduct which is

open-ended in time, we generally do not require the

government to mention each day in the charging document. 

See United States v. Forrester, 616 F.3d 929, 941 (9th Cir.

2010) (noting that an indictment for conspiracy identifying

the conspiracy’s end date need not specify when the

conspiracy began); see also United States v. Spaeni, 60 F.3d

313, 315 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[O]nly in rare cases is time a

material element of a charged offense, even where continuing

offenses . . . are alleged.”).

Given that the concepts of reentry and illegal presence are

embedded in § 1326(a), we conclude that, in this case, no

constructive amendment occurred.4 Because it is wellestablished in this circuit that an indictment under § 1326(a)

need not specifically denote the duration of a defendant’s

4 We do not address whether, in the context of a non-continuing offense,

an indictment’s failure to mention a particular period of time later

referenced in jury instructions may give rise to a constructive amendment.

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24 UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-ULLOA

illegal presence, the indictment provided Ulloa with adequate

notice that he was being charged with a course of criminal

conduct that began when he reentered the United States. The

supplemental jury instruction thus was not “distinctly

different” from the indictment. United States v. Bhagat, 436

F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006); cf. United States v. Patino,

962 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the touchstone

of the constructive amendment inquiry is whether “the

defendant was given notice of the ‘core of criminality’ to be

proven at trial”) (quoting United States v. Heimann, 705 F.2d

662, 666 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)). The indictment

and supplemental instruction thus did not deprive Ulloa of

any substantive right.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Ulloa’s contentions,

first, that the government violated Batson in exercising its

peremptory challenges and, second, that the district court’s

supplemental jury instruction impermissibly coerced the

verdict and constructively expanded the indictment.

The judgment of the district court (No. 13-10500) and the

district court’s order revoking supervised release (No. 13-

10501) are AFFIRMED.

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