Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-10669/USCOURTS-ca9-11-10669-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry Lamar Bonds
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BARRY LAMAR BONDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-10669

D.C. No.

3:07-cr-00732-SI-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 13, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed September 13, 2013

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Michael Daly Hawkins,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 1 of 19
2 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed Barry Bonds’s conviction of one

count of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503, arising from Bonds’s testimony before a grand jury

investigating whether the proceeds of the sales of

performance enhancing drugs were being laundered.

The panel held that § 1503 applies to factually true

statements that are evasive or misleading.

The panel held that there was sufficient evidence to

convict Bonds because his statement describing his life as a

celebrity child – in response to a question asking whether his

trainer ever gave him any self-injectable substances – was

evasive, misleading, and capable of influencing the grand jury

to minimize the trainer’s role in the distribution of

performance enhancing drugs.

The panel rejected as foreclosed by precedent Bonds’s

contention that § 1503 does not apply to a witness’s

statements before a grand jury.

The panel rejected Bonds’s contentions that the use of the

word “corruptly” in § 1503 is unconstitutionally vague.

The panel held that the indictment – which covered any

false, misleading, or evasive statement Bonds made during

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 2 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 3

his grand jury testimony – was sufficient, and that narrowing

the indictment via jury instructions listing the specific

statements for which Bonds could be convicted – was

permissible.

The panel concluded that the district court properly

rejected Bonds’s request to add the words “when considered

in its totality” to the jury instructions.

COUNSEL

Dennis P. Riordan (argued) and Donald M. Horgan, Riordan

& Horgan, San Francisco, California; Ted Sampsell Jones,

William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Melinda Haag, United States Attorney, Barbara J. Valliere,

Assistant United States Attorney, Merry Jean Chan (argued),

Assistant United States Attorney, San Francisco, California,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Barry Bonds was a celebrity child who grew up in

baseball locker rooms as he watched his father Bobby Bonds

and his godfather, the legendary Willie Mays, compete in the

Major Leagues. Barry Bonds was a phenomenal baseball

player in his own right. Early in his career he won MVP

awards and played in multiple All-Star games. Toward the

end of his career, playing for the San Francisco Giants, his

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 3 of 19
4 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

appearance showed strong indications of the use of steroids,

some of which could have been administered by his trainer,

GregAnderson. Bonds’s weight and hat size increased, along

with the batting power that transformed him into one of the

most feared hitters ever to play the game. From the late1990s through the early-2000s, steroid use in baseball fueled

an unprecedented explosion in offense, leading some

commentators to refer to the period as the “Steroid Era.”1In

2002, the federal government, through the Criminal

Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service, began

investigating the distribution of steroids and other

performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”). The government’s

purported objective was to investigate whether the

distributors of PEDs laundered the proceeds gained by selling

those drugs.

The government’s investigation focused on the

distribution of steroids by the Bay Area Laboratory

Co-operative (“BALCO”), which was located in the San

Francisco Bay Area. The government raided BALCO and

obtained evidence suggesting that Anderson distributed

BALCO manufactured steroids to Bonds and other

professional athletes. The government convened a grand jury

in the fall of 2003 to further investigate the sale of these

drugs in order to determine whether the proceeds of the sales

were being laundered. Bonds and other professional athletes

were called to testify. Bonds testified under a grant of

immunity and denied knowingly using steroids or any other

PEDs provided by BALCO or Anderson. The government

1

See Buster Olney, Steroid Allegations Overshadow Achievements,

http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=olney_buster&

id=2011727 (last visited July 22, 2013) (“[H]istory is destined to recall

th[e] period [from 1988 to 2004] as baseball’s Steroid Era.”).

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 4 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 5

later charged Bonds with obstructing the grand jury’s

investigation. After a jury trial, Bonds was convicted of one

count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503. He now appeals. We affirm the conviction.

BACKGROUND

Our earlier opinion provides the background of the

government’s investigation into BALCO and Bonds. See

United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Because Bonds’s grand jury testimony is central to this

appeal and was not at issue in the earlier opinion, we below

briefly describe his grand jury testimony and the resulting

criminal trial.

On December 4, 2003, Bonds testified before the grand

jury under a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002. 

The immunity order stated that “the testimony and other

information compelled from BARRY BONDS pursuant to

this order . . . may not be used against him in any criminal

case, except a case for perjury, false declaration, or otherwise

failing to complywith this order.” Before Bonds testified, the

government informed him that the purpose of the grand jury

was to investigate any illegal activities, including the

distribution of illegal substances, that Anderson and Victor

Conte (the founder of BALCO) engaged in. The government

also explained the scope of the immunity grant under which

Bonds would testify.

Bonds testified before the grand jury that Anderson never

offered him, supplied him with, or administered to him any

human growth hormone, steroids, or any substance that

required injection. A portion of Bonds’s testimony, referred

to as “Statement C,” formed the basis for the later criminal

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 5 of 19
6 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

charge of obstruction of justice. It is the underlined portion

of the following grand jury excerpt:

Question: Did Greg ever give you anything

that required a syringe to inject yourself with?

Answer: I’ve only had one doctor touch me. 

And that’s my only personal doctor. Greg,

like I said, we don’t get into each others’

personal lives. We’re friends, but I don’t –

we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because

he knows I don’t want – don’t come to my

house talking baseball. If you want to come

to my house and talk about fishing, some

other stuff, we’ll be good friends, you come

around talking about baseball, you go on. I

don’t talk about his business. You know what

I mean?

Question: Right.

Answer: That’s what keeps our friendship. 

You know, I am sorry, but that - you know,

that – I was a celebrity child, not just in

baseball by my own instincts. I became a

celebrity child with a famous father. I just

don’t get into other people’s business because

of my father’s situation, you see.

Shortly after that exchange, the government returned to the

subject of drugs and asked whether Anderson provided Bonds

any drugs that required self-injection. Bonds answered with

a somewhat indirect denial:

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 6 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 7

Question: And, again, I guess we’ve covered

this, but – did [Anderson] ever give you

anything that he told you had to be taken with

a needle or syringe?

Answer: Greg wouldn’t do that. He knows

I’m against that stuff. So, he would never

come up to me – he would never jeopardize

our friendship like that.

Question: Okay. So, just so I’m clear, the

answer is no to that, he never gave you

anything like that?

Answer: Right.

Bonds was later indicted on the basis of his grand jury

testimony. The third superseding indictment charged him

with four counts of making false statements before a grand

jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), and one count of

obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. With

respect to the obstruction of justice charge, the indictment

read as follows:

On or about December 4, 2003, in the

Northern District of California, the defendant,

Barry Lamar Bonds, did corruptly influence,

obstruct, and impede, and endeavor to

corruptly influence, obstruct and impede, the

due administration of justice, by knowingly

giving material Grand Jury testimony that was

intentionally evasive, false, and misleading,

including but not limited to the false

statements made by the defendant as charged

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 7 of 19
8 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

in Counts One through Four of this

Indictment. All in violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 1503.

Bonds’s criminal trial began on March 22, 2011, but was

interrupted when the government appealed an adverse

evidentiaryruling. The district court had excluded on hearsay

grounds evidence the government contended linked Bonds to

steroid use. We affirmed the district court’s decision to

exclude the evidence. Bonds, 608 F.3d at 508. The trial then

continued.

At the close of its case-in-chief, the government

dismissed one of the false statement charges. On April 13,

2011, the trial jury returned its verdict. The jury convicted

Bonds of the obstruction of justice charge, finding on the

verdict form that Statement C was misleading or evasive. It

was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining three false

statement counts. The district court sentenced Bonds to 30

days home confinement and two years probation.

Bonds now appeals the judgment of conviction. He

asserts five principal challenges. First, he asserts that the

obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, does not

apply to statements that are misleading or evasive, but

nevertheless factually true, and even if § 1503 does apply,

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

Second, he claims that § 1503 does not cover a witness’s

testimony to a grand jury. Third, he contends that the use of

the word “corruptly” in § 1503 is unconstitutionally vague. 

Fourth, he maintains that the indictment did not provide him

with sufficient notice of the obstruction of justice charge. 

Fifth and finally, he argues that the trial court should have

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 8 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 9

granted his request to modify the jury instructions. We affirm

the conviction.

DISCUSSION

I.

Bonds claims that he could not have been convicted of

obstructing the grand jury’s investigation with an answer that

was misleading or evasive, no matter how far removed that

answer was from the question asked, unless the answer was

false. According to Bonds, because his response in Statement

C that he was a “celebrity child” was factually true, his

conviction should be reversed. The problem is that while

Bonds was a celebrity child, that fact was unrelated to the

question, which asked whether Anderson provided Bonds

with any self-injectable substances. When factually true

statements are misleading or evasive, they can prevent the

grand jury from obtaining truthful and responsive answers. 

They may therefore obstruct and impede the administration

of justice within the meaning of the federal criminal statute,

18 U.S.C. § 1503, a statute that sweeps broadly.

The obstruction of justice statute provides in relevant

part:

Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force,

or by anythreatening letter or communication,

influences, obstructs, or impedes, or

endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede,

the due administration of justice, shall be

punished as provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 9 of 19
10 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

That portion of the statute, known as the omnibus clause,

is comprehensive. We have described it as being “designed

to proscribe all manner of corrupt methods of obstructing

justice.” United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 851–52

(9th Cir. 1981). The essence of the statute is that it

criminalizes conduct intended to deprive the factfinder of

relevant information. See United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d

819, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Brady,

168 F.3d 574, 577–78 (1st Cir. 1999) (“It is settled . . . that

‘the due administration of justice’ includes the operation of

the grand jury, and that depriving the grand jury of

information may constitute obstruction under [18 U.S.C.

§ 1503]”). The language of the statute does not differentiate

between obstructive statements that are false, and obstructive

statements that are not false. It requires only that the

defendant make his statement with the intent to obstruct

justice.

We can easily think of examples of responses that are true

but nevertheless obstructive. Consider a situation where a

prosecutor asks a grand jury witness if the witness drove the

getaway car in a robbery. The witness truthfully responds, “I

do not have a driver’s license.” This response would be

factually true, but it could also imply that he did not drive the

getaway car. If the witness did in fact drive the getaway car,

his answer, although not in itself false, would nevertheless be

misleading, because it would imply that he did not drive the

getaway car. It could also be deemed evasive since it did not

answer the question.

The cases interpreting § 1503 support our conclusion that

misleading or evasive testimony that is factually true can

obstruct justice. Several courts have noted the material

similarity between evasive or misleading testimony and false

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 10 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 11

testimony. In United States v. Griffin, the Fifth Circuit

observed that there was no material difference between an

evasive answer that deliberately conceals information and a

false answer, because both block the flow of truthful

information. 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1979). The

Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Perkins grouped evasive

and false statements together when it stated that “a reasonable

jury could have found that [the defendant’s] answers were

evasive or false in an effort to obstruct the grand jury’s

investigation.” 748 F.2d 1519, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1984). 

The Second Circuit quoted with approval the district court in

United States v. Gambino (Thomas), No. 89-CR-431

(E.D.N.Y.), in which Judge Jack Weinstein said that “literally

true but evasive and misleading testimony would support

prosecution of [the defendant] for obstruction of justice.” 

United States v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir. 1992). 

Accordingly, we hold that § 1503 applies to factually true

statements that are evasive or misleading. Bonds cannot

escape criminal liability under § 1503 by contending that his

response that he was a “celebrity child” was true.

Bonds next asserts that even if the obstruction of justice

statute can apply to factually true statements, the evidence at

trial did not establish that Statement C was evasive,

misleading, or material. We must view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), and we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence to convict Bonds of obstructing justice.

The jury instructions provided that the government had to

prove that Bonds, “(1) for the purpose of obstructing justice,

(2) obstructed, influenced, or impeded, or endeavored to

obstruct, influence, or impede the grand jury proceeding in

which [he] testified, (3) by knowingly giving material

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 11 of 19
12 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

testimony that was intentionally evasive, false, or

misleading.” Bonds does not challenge the instructions as to

these elements.

Bonds made Statement C in response to a question that

asked whether Greg Anderson ever gave Bonds any selfinjectable substances. Bonds responded that he and Anderson

did not discuss each other’s “business.” Bonds stated:

That’s what keeps our friendship. You know,

I am sorry, but that – you know, that – I was

a celebrity child, not just in baseball by my

own instincts. I became a celebrity child with

a famous father. I just don’t get into other

people’s business because of my father’s

situation, you see.

Bonds’s description of his life as a celebrity child had

nothing to do with the question, which asked whether

Anderson provided him with self-injectable substances. The

statement served to divert the grand jury’s attention away

from the relevant inquiry of the investigation, which was

Anderson and BALCO’s distribution of steroids and PEDs. 

The statement was therefore evasive.

The statement was also at the very least misleading,

because it implied that Bonds did not know whether

Anderson distributed steroids and PEDs. Yet, the jury at trial

heard testimony from the Giants former team athletic trainer

who testified about a conversation he had with Bonds before

Bonds’s grand jury testimony. According to the trainer,

Bonds stated in this conversation that he knew that Anderson

distributed steroids. Bonds also told the trainer about

techniques Anderson used to conceal the identities of players

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 12 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 13

taking steroids. This evidence at trial showed that Bonds’s

statement to the grand jury was misleading. It is irrelevant

that Bonds eventually provided a direct response to the

question about self-injectable substances. Section 1503

punishes any “endeavor” to obstruct. Obstruction occurred

when Bonds made Statement C.

With respect to materiality, we have said that a statement

is material so long as it had “a natural tendency to influence,

or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.” United States v.

McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The question asking whether

Anderson provided Bonds with injectable substances was

well within the scope of the grand jury’s investigation, since

many steroids and PEDs are injectable. Bonds’s evasive and

misleading “celebrity child” response was capable of

influencing the grand jury to minimize Anderson’s role in the

distribution of illegal steroids and PEDs. The statement was

material.

II.

Bonds next asks us to hold that even if § 1503 applies to

evasive or misleading statements that are factually true, the

statute does not apply to statements a witness makes to the

grand jury. Established Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court

precedent, however, holds that § 1503 does apply to a

witness’s testimony before the grand jury. The omnibus

clause of the statute is just that. It “proscribe[s] all manner of

corrupt methods of obstructing justice.” Rasheed, 663 F.2d

at 852; see also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598

(1995) (noting that the “‘[o]mnibus [c]lause’ serves as a

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 13 of 19
14 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence,

obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice”).

Consistent with the broad scope of the omnibus clause,

we have held that a witness can be convicted under § 1503 on

the basis of statements made under oath before a judge. 

United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1491–92

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Griffin, 589 F.2d at 205–06

(rejecting the argument that the legislative history of § 1503

militates against applying the statute to a witness’s in-court

statements).

Bonds cites an early case in which we described the

statute as applying to threatening conduct occurring outside

of the courtroom. We once said that § 1503 “seem[ed] to be

limited to intimidating actions” against witnesses and jurors. 

United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1970). 

This court and the Supreme Court, however, have

subsequently recognized that § 1503 applies to a witness’s

in-court testimony. In Rasheed, we clarified Metcalf and

ruled that § 1503’s scope was not limited to “intimidating

actions.” 663 F.2d at 852 (“The use of the word ‘corruptly’

in the statute is a clear indication that not every violation of

[§] 1503 involves threats or intimidation.”). Later in

Gonzalez-Mares we made it clear that § 1503 applies to false

statements a defendant makes under oath to a judge. 

752 F.2d at 1491. The Supreme Court confirmed our

interpretation of § 1503 when it concluded that one who

delivers false testimony or documents directly to the grand

jury violates § 1503, because such conduct “all but assures

that the grand jury will consider the material in its

deliberations.” Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601.

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 14 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 15

Bonds’s contention that his conviction should be reversed

on the ground that § 1503 does not apply to a witness’s

statements before the grand jury is therefore foreclosed by

established precedent.

III.

Bonds next argues that the use of the word “corruptly” in

§ 1503 is unconstitutionally vague and failed to put him on

notice that his conduct was criminal. The word “corruptly”

in the omnibus clause of § 1503 provides the mens rea of the

statute and means that the obstructive conduct “must be done

with the purpose of obstructing justice.” Rasheed, 663 F.2d

at 852.

Bonds relies on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United

States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), to

support his claim that the term “corruptly” is

unconstitutionally vague. Poindexter, however, involved an

as-applied challenge to a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1505,

that proscribes corruptly obstructing or impeding a

congressional or agency proceeding. The court ruled that

§ 1505’s use of the term “corruptly” was “too vague to

provide constitutionally adequate notice that [§ 1505]

prohibits lying to Congress.” Id. at 379. Even though the use

of “corruptly” in § 1505 was borrowed from § 1503, the

Poindexter court itself cautioned other courts against finding

that the term as used in § 1503 was unconstitutionally vague. 

Id. at 385. The court noted that § 1503 and § 1505 are so

“materially different” that the interpretation of § 1505 should

not guide the interpretation of § 1503. Id.

The courts examining this issue, including the D.C.

Circuit that decided Poindexter, have thus refused to extend

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 15 of 19
16 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

Poindexter’s holding to § 1503. See, e.g., United States v.

Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 435–36 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States

v. Watt, 911 F. Supp. 538, 545–47 (D.D.C. 1995); see also

Griffin, 589 F.2d at 206–07 (rejecting the argument that the

term “corruptly” in § 1503 is unconstitutionally vague). 

Bonds cannot cite any case reversing a § 1503 conviction on

the theory that the term “corruptly” in § 1503 is

unconstitutionally vague. The most he can cite is a footnote

in which an en banc panel of this court noted that Poindexter

raised an issue of whether the term “corruptly” in § 1503 was

unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d

1475, 1486 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), aff’d in part, rev’d

in part, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995). The Supreme Court

reviewed Aguilar, but the majority resolved the case without

addressing the vagueness argument. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at

600 & n.1.

Although the majority in Aguilar did not reach the

vagueness issue, the dissenters did. Justice Scalia, joined by

Justices Kennedy and Thomas, dissented and expressly

rejected the contention that the term “corruptly” in § 1503 is

unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 616–17 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). The dissent noted that it is “well-accepted” that

the term “corruptly” means “[a]n act done with an intent to

give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the

rights of others . . . . It includes bribery but is more

comprehensive; because an act may be corruptly done though

the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by

another.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in

original).

Therefore, the only opinions discussing vagueness

challenges to the use of the term “corruptly” in § 1503 have

rejected such challenges. Their analysis is sound, and there

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 16 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 17

is no basis for holding that Bonds lacked notice that he could

be punished under § 1503 for providing the grand jury with

misleading or evasive testimony. Grand jury testimony

“intended to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due

administration of justice [is] obviouslywrongful, just as [it is]

necessarily‘corrupt.’” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).

IV.

Bonds also contends that the indictment was insufficient

because Statement C was not explicitly referenced or quoted

in the indictment. An indictment is sufficient if it contains all

of the elements of the offense charged so that it informs the

defendant of the charge, and enables the defendant to use the

indictment to prevent “future prosecutions for the same

offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). 

The obstruction of justice count read in relevant part as

follows:

On or about December 4, 2003, in the

Northern District of California, the defendant,

Barry Lamar Bonds, did corruptly influence,

obstruct, and impede, and endeavor to

corruptly influence, obstruct and impede, the

due administration of justice, by knowingly

giving material Grand Jury testimony that was

intentionally evasive, false, and misleading,

including but not limited to the false

statements made by the defendant as charged

in Counts One through Four of this

Indictment. All in violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 1503.

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 17 of 19
18 UNITED STATES V. BONDS

The indictment put Bonds on notice that he could be

convicted of violating § 1503 for any material false,

misleading, or evasive statement he made during his grand

jury testimony. During the pre-trial stage of the case, the

district court limited the statements the jury could actually

consider, and the government proposed jury instructions

identifying eleven separate statements that could constitute an

obstruction of justice. Then, before the jury was instructed,

the number of obstructive statements was further reduced by

the court. The jury was instructed correctly that to convict,

it had to agree unanimously on which statement or statements

qualified as intentionally evasive, false, or misleading.

Bonds argues that the listing of specific statements

somehow, and improperly, expanded the indictment. A

listing of statements might be problematic if the original

indictment charged a few specific obstructive statements, and

the jury instructions later added other statements. See United

States v. Shipsey, 190 F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 1999)

(jury instructions are improper if they permit the jury to

convict under a theory not included in the indictment).

That scenario, however, did not occur in Bonds’s case. 

The indictment here covered any false, misleading, or evasive

statement he made during his grand jury testimony. The

listing of specific statements in the jury instructions,

therefore, narrowed the statements for which Bonds could be

convicted. Narrowing an indictment via jury instructions is

permissible. United States v. Wilbur, 674 F.3d 1160, 1178

(9th Cir. 2012). The indictment was sufficient.

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 18 of 19
UNITED STATES V. BONDS 19

V.

Bonds last challenges the district court’s rejection of his

request to modify the jury instructions. Bonds requested that

the instructions for the obstruction count contain the words

“when considered in its totality,” such that the instructions

would have read “by knowingly giving material testimony

that, when considered in its totality, was intentionally

evasive, false, and misleading.”

The district court correctly rejected Bonds’s proposed

addition because it added little or nothing to the instructions

given, and was covered adequately by those instructions. See

United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1120 (9th Cir.

2010). The jury knew it had to consider statements in context

because it was instructed to “consider[] all the evidence,” and

was instructed that a statement was material “if it had a

natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing,

the decision of the grand jury.” To the extent Bonds’s

proposed language deviated from the given instructions by

implying that the jury had to find that Bonds’s entire

testimony was evasive or misleading in order to convict him,

Bonds’s proposed language was incorrect. The indictment

and the jury instructions made clear that Bonds could be

convicted on the basis of individual statements that were

evasive or misleading.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 11-10669, 09/13/2013, ID: 8780787, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 19 of 19