Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01507/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01507-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal National Mortgage Association
Plaintiff
Harriet Nickels
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

HARRIET NICKELS,

Defendant.

No. 1:16-cv-01507-DAD-BAM

ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

MATTER TO THE MADERA COUNTY 

SUPERIOR COURT AND DENYING AS 

MOOT MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS

(Doc. Nos. 1–2)

This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by plaintiff Federal 

National Mortgage Association against defendant Harriet Nickels. On October 6, 2016, 

defendant removed this case to this court from the Madera County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Defendant asserts that proper removal is based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1441, and alternatively, civil rights removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443. 

(See id. at 8–15.) On the same day as the notice of removal, defendant filed a motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis in this court. (Doc. No. 2.) 

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 

& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 

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strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 

the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106–07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 

F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, “the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely 

on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO Envtl.

Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that “the court resolves all 

ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case “must be rejected 

if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 

F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If 

at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 

case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. 

NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see also California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 

375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c).

“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 

215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. 

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s 

statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation of 

avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at 

1014. Accordingly, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the 

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defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense 

is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); 

Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. 

Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks 

somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under 

federal law.”).

Here, defendant Harriet Nickels has not established that removal of this action to this 

federal court is appropriate on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. The complaint filed by 

plaintiff is a straight-forward unlawful detainer action that is based entirely on state law. (See 

Doc. No. 1 at 22–26.) In her notice of removal, defendant appears to rely on what appear to be 

potential defenses rooted in federal law. For example, defendant alleges that (1) the underlying 

trust deed loan is controlled by federal law; and (2) she was discriminated against in the process 

of eviction, in violation of the federal laws. (See id. at 2–3, 5–6.) Removal on these bases is 

improper, as the defensive invocation of federal law cannot form the basis of this court’s 

jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 70; Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183; 

California, 215 F.3d at 1014. 

Because there is no federal question appearing in plaintiff’s complaint, defendant has 

failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Remand to the Madera County Superior Court 

is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Bruns, 122 F.3d 

at 1257.

CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL JURISDICTION

In addition, defendant relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1443 as providing the removal jurisdiction of 

this court. A party removing an action under § 1443 must satisfy the following two-part test: (1) 

the court must determine that the right allegedly being denied the removal petitioner arises under 

a federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of equality; and (2) the court must 

determine that the petitioner cannot enforce the specified federal right in state court. Johnson v. 

Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 220 (1975); Georgia v. Rachel, 383 U.S. 780, 792, 794–99 (1966).

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Even if defendant could satisfy the first prong of this test, she cannot meet the second. In 

this regard, a defendant has no inherent right to a federal forum to adjudicate a federal right 

absent exclusive federal jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 

U.S. 1, 10–12 (1983).

[T]he vindication of the defendant’s federal rights is left to the state 

courts except in the rare situations where it can clearly be predicted 

by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state law or 

federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very 

act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.

City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966). This showing normally requires that 

“the denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 803; see also

Johnson, 421 U.S. at 220.

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s bringing of an unlawful detainer action against her in 

state court was discriminatory, and that state court officials have violated or will violate her 

federal rights in the state unlawful detainer action. Specifically, defendant states that she believes 

that the state court procedures deprive her of her rights under the United States Constitution and 

that removal to a federal forum is the only adequate means of protecting her interests. (Doc. No. 

1 at 4.) She further broadly argues that “there is a pervasive state statutory program which both 

on its face and as applied discriminates unfairly against pro se litigants and in so doing directly 

violates Federal U.S. laws guaranteeing equality of access to the court, ability to present 

evidence, and to make and enforce contracts . . . .” (Id. at 11.) This is not sufficient to support 

removal under § 1443, as defendant has failed to allege specific facts substantiating her claims 

that her federal rights have been violated. For example, she has not identified the manner in 

which state law has effectively denied her right to enforce a federal right. Nor has defendant 

demonstrated that she will be denied her rights under federal law if this matter remains in state 

court. State courts are bound to uphold the federal constitution and there is no reason to doubt 

that the state court will do so in this action.

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Accordingly,

1. This action is remanded forthwith to the Madera County Superior Court for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction;

2. Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is denied as moot; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 6, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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