Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03487/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03487-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terrick Terrell Nooner
Appellant
Larry Norris
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3487

___________

Terrick Terrell Nooner, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas *

Department of Correction, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: June 13, 2007

Filed: August 24, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Terrick Terrell Nooner (Nooner) appeals the district court’s denial of his

application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We reverse the

dismissal of Nooner’s habeas application as a second or successive application and

remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 16, 1993, Nooner shot and killed Scot Stobaugh. A jury convicted

Nooner of capital-felony murder with aggravated robbery and theft of property as the

underlying felonies, and the jury returned a verdict of death by lethal injection.

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Nooner appealed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Arkansas

affirmed. Nooner v. State (Nooner I), 907 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Ark. 1995). Nooner

filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure

37. The trial court denied relief and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on

November 18, 1999. Nooner v. State (Nooner II), 4 S.W.3d 497, 498 (Ark. 1999)

(Smith, J.). 

Nooner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus on July 30, 1996, and

amended applications on August 14, 1996, and May 17, 2000. The district court

dismissed Nooner’s application, finding Nooner competent to withdraw his habeas

application and granting Nooner’s motion to withdraw his habeas application, and

alternatively, finding Nooner’s habeas claims to be without merit. On appeal, a panel

of this court, in a split decision, affirmed the denial of Nooner’s application. Nooner

v. Norris (Nooner III), 402 F.3d 801, 820 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2037

(2006). After the issuance of the panel opinion, Nooner filed a Motion for Order to

Allow Access to Appellant for Mental Health Evalulation with this court. The court

issued an order providing “[t]he court being without jurisdiction in the absence of a

pending proceeding, the motion . . . is denied without prejudice to [Nooner’s] right to

file a petition for habeas corpus in the district court.” 

On April 7, 2006, Nooner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus with

the district court using the original case number seeking an order permitting Nooner

to undergo a complete mental health evaluation. Larry Norris (Norris), Director of the

Arkansas Department of Correction, had not allowed Nooner access to mental health

experts to obtain a mental health evaluation. On July 27, 2006, the district court

dismissed, without prejudice, Nooner’s application on grounds that Nooner’s

application was a second or successive application for purposes of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b), which Nooner had filed without the authorization of the circuit court. This

appeal followed. We granted a certificate of appealability on two questions:

(1) whether Norris’s refusal to allow Nooner access to mental health experts for

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1

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) creates a gatekeeping mechanism, which

provides:

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior

application shall be dismissed unless— 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

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purposes of a mental health evaluation violated the Constitution, and (2) whether the

district court was correct in ruling that Nooner’s application was a second or

successive application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 

At the time of oral argument, the State of Arkansas had not yet set Nooner’s

execution date. After oral argument, the State of Arkansas set Nooner’s execution

date on September 18, 2007. Nooner filed a Motion for Stay of Execution, seeking

time to allow this court to decide Nooner’s appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

Because the second certified question concerns our jurisdiction, we consider it

first. E.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2852 (2007); see also

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 n.3 (1970) (noting “a court always has

jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction”). We review de novo the district court’s

conclusion Nooner’s instant application was a second or successive habeas

application. See Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2006), petition for

cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. May 10, 2007) (No. 06-11260).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.

No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, limits the availability of habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b);1

 Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2007). Before filing a

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(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not

have been discovered previously through the exercise of

due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and

viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense. 

See also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 793, 796 (2007) (concluding a

habeas application filed after a previously adjudicated application was a second or

successive application, which had not been authorized by the appropriate court of

appeals, and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it). 

2

Because the parties have assumed an Atkins-based mental retardation claim

should be treated the same as a Ford-based incompetency claim, for purposes of this

case, we assume, without deciding, the two claims should be treated similarly. 

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second or successive application, the applicant must “move in the appropriate court

of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

Nooner does not rely on the exceptions set forth in § 2244(b)(2). Nooner

instead relies on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523

U.S. 637, 643 (1998), and Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2853. Nooner argues the instant

application is not a second or successive application because it does not challenge his

conviction and sentence, but rather the application challenges Norris’s denial of access

to mental health experts in Nooner’s effort to develop a claim under Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding the Eighth Amendment “places a

substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded

offender,” (internal quotation marks omitted)) and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,

409-10 (1986) (holding “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out

a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane”).2

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In Martinez-Villareal, an applicant filed a habeas application alleging, among

other things, a Ford-based incompetency claim. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 640.

The district court dismissed the Ford-based incompetency claim without prejudice,

because the state had not yet obtained a warrant for the applicant’s execution and the

application was premature. Id. at 640, 643. After the state obtained an execution

warrant, the applicant sought permission from the court of appeals to file a second or

successive application alleging the Ford claim. Id. at 640-41. The Supreme Court

held the applicant “was not required to get authorization to file a ‘second or

successive’ application before his Ford claim could be heard” because “[t]here was

only one application for habeas relief.” Id. at 643-44. The Court concluded the

applicant was entitled to a hearing on the merits of his Ford-based incompetency

claim, because the state issued a warrant for the applicant’s execution and the

applicant’s claim was “then unquestionably ripe.” Id. at 643, 646. 

In Panetti, the Supreme Court extended the holding of Martinez-Villareal.

Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2853. The applicant filed an initial habeas application, however,

the application did not include a Ford-based incompetency claim. Id. at 2849. After

the state trial court set an execution date, the applicant filed another habeas application

containing a Ford claim. Id. The Supreme Court noted it “has declined to interpret

‘second or successive’ as referring to all § 2254 applications filed second or

successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment

already challenged in a prior § 2254 application.” Id. at 2853. The Court observed

“Congress did not intend the provisions of AEDPA addressing ‘second or successive’

[applications] to govern a filing in the unusual posture presented here: a § 2254

application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is

ripe.” Id. In conclusion, the Court stated “[t]he statutory bar on ‘second or

successive’ applications does not apply to a Ford claim brought in an application filed

when the claim is first ripe.” Id. at 2855. After discussing the merits, the Court

reversed the denial of habeas relief. Id. at 2863. 

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In both Martinez-Villareal and Panetti, the Supreme Court held the statutory bar

on second or successive applications does not apply to Ford-based incompetency

claims filed after the state has obtained an execution warrant. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at

2849, 2853; Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 640, 643-44. For the limited purpose of

the statutory bar on second or successive applications found in § 2244(b)(2), we

cannot think of any statutory reason why this holding cannot be extended to Fordbased incompetency and Atkins-based mental retardation claims filed before the state

has obtained an execution warrant. 

Moreover, in both Martinez-Villareal and Panetti, the Supreme Court indicated

the setting of an execution date caused the applicants’ Ford-based incompetency

claims to become ripe. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2852; Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at

643. Here, Nooner filed the habeas application before the State of Arkansas had

obtained an execution warrant. That Nooner filed the habeas application before the

setting of an execution date is irrelevant to the ripeness of Nooner’s habeas application

because “it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the [d]istrict

[c]ourt’s decision that must govern.” Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.

102, 140 (1974); see also Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 8 of Clay County, Mo. v. City

of Kearney, Mo., 401 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 2005). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of

Nooner’s habeas application as a second or successive application and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because the district court did not

reach the merits of the first certified question, we remand for further proceedings so

the district court can consider the matter in the first instance. Nooner’s Motion for

Stay of Execution is dismissed as moot, without prejudice to filing a motion for stay

of execution in the district court.

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BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result.

I agree the habeas petition Terrick Nooner filed in the district court was not a

second or successive petition, and Nooner did not require the authorization of the

circuit court before filing the petition in the district court. I therefore concur in the

result reached by the Court, but write separately because I do not agree the claim

brought in the petition ripened only after Arkansas set an execution date.

The Court characterizes Nooner's claim as an Eighth Amendment claim brought

pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536

U.S. 304 (2002). A fair reading of Nooner's petition, however, indicates the thrust of

his claim is based on the constitutional right-of-access to the courts, a claim which is

merely prefatory to his bringing a Ford or Atkins claim. Nooner claimed, as a

condition of his confinement, the Arkansas Department of Corrections was denying

him access to mental health professionals and such a denial violated his constitutional

right of access to the courts by impeding his ability to prepare a future Ford-based

incompetency claim or Atkins-based mental retardation claim when his execution date

was actually set. I believe a right-of-access claim ripens when the state places a

substantial impediment in the way of the future litigation a prisoner seeks to pursue,

so long as the prisoner shows the underlying claim itself is colorable. See Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-15 (2002) (discussing the distinction between a rightof-access claim brought to remove a roadblock to future litigation, and the underlying

(future) claim itself, and indicating such a claim is viable when the prisoner shows the

underlying claim is "nonfrivolous" or "arguable.").

I concur in the result.

______________________________

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