Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01165/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01165-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lester Jay Baker
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

SEP 12 1990 

PUBLISH &.OBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (Jerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-1165 

LESTER JAY BAKER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-59) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and Mark J. Rosenblum, 

Asst. Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colo., for defendantappellant. 

Michael J. Norton, u.s. Attorney, and James P. Moran, Asst. U.S. 

Attorney, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee. 

Before TACHA, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Lester Jay Baker appeals his sentence for bank robbery, 18 

u.s.c. § 2113{a) & (d), and receiving an explosive in interstate 

commerce with knowledge that the explosive would be used to kill, 

injure, or intimidate other individuals, 18 u.s.c. § 844(d). 

Baker contends that the district court erred in departing upwards 

from the Sentencing Guidelines due to his use of dynamite. Baker 

argues that dynamite falls within the definition of "dangerous 

weapons" for which a sentence enhancement is otherwise prescribed. 

Baker also objects a sentence enhancement based on a finding of 

abduction and his use of a firearm with respect to the receipt of 

explosives charge. We affirm. 

I. 

On February 8, 1988, Baker approached the owner of a supply 

store in Cripple Creek, Colorado, while wearing a mask and 

carrying two pistols. He demanded twenty sticks of dynamite, 

which the owner surrendered. The dynamite had previously been 

shipped in interstate commerce. 

On February 9, 1988, Baker entered a federal credit union in 

Colorado Springs, Colorado and approached the manager. Baker and 

the manager went into the manager's office, where Baker had the 

manager open his briefcase. The briefcase contained eight to ten 

sticks of dynamite. Baker then produced two handguns and demanded 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 2 
money and threatened to blow up the bank if the money was not 

provided. The manager put $4700 into the briefcase. 

Baker was arrested on February 11, 1988, and he later 

admitted to stealing the dynamite and robbing the credit union. 

Baker agreed to plead guilty to the robbery charge, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a) & (d), and the explosives receipt charge, 18 u.s.c. 

§ 844(d). The base offense level for the robbery charge was 18. 

u.s.s.G. § 2B3.1(a). Because the loss was between $2501 and 

$10,000, the offense level was increased by one. Id. 

§ 2B3.1(b)(1)(B). Finally, because Baker had "brandished" a 

firearm, the offense level was increased by 3. Id. 

§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). Baker's total offense level was thus 22. The 

base offense level for the explosives charge was also 18. Id. 

§ 2K1.6(a)(1). Together, the two charges gave a combined offense 

level of 24, id. § 3D1.4, and the parties stipulated Baker should 

receive a 2 point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, for 

a final offense level of 22. Baker's criminal history category 

was III. The Guidelines provide for a sentencing range of fiftyone to sixty-three months for a criminal history category of III 

and an offense level of 22. Id. § SA. 

The district court found two aggravating factors, however, 

and departed from the Guidelines, imposing a seventy month 

sentence. The district court found that Baker's possession of 

dynamite was an aggravating factor because the dynamite "could 

have been even potentially more dangerous than the brandishing of 

the firearms since it could have been set off." The court also 

found that the Guidelines provisions on the explosives charge did 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 3 
not contain an "adjustment for the aggravating factors of 

abdpcting and robbing at gunpoint." Accordingly, the district 

court departed upwards three levels and imposed a sentence at the 

bottom of the new range of seventy to eighty-seven months. 

II. 

We review the district court's decision to depart from the 

Guidelines in a three step process. In the first step we 

determine whether the circumstances justify a departure, which we 

determine de novo. In the second step, we ascertain whether the 

circumstances given by the district court as grounds for departure 

actually exist, which we review under the clearly erroneous 

standard. In the third step, we determine whether the degree of 

departure is "reasonable." See United States Y..!.. White, 893 F.2d 

276, 277-79 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

1. 

In the first step, we determine whether the circumstances 

justify a departure. A departure is justified if it falls outside 

the "heartland" or "set of typical cases embodying the conduct 

that each guideline describes. " U.S. S. G. § 1A4. (a), p. s.; ~ 

also 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b). Baker contends that the possession and 

display of dynamite cannot be grounds for departure because such 

conduct is comprehended within the "specific offense 

characteristics" of Guidelines section 2B3.1, and hence is not a 

proper ground for departure. We disagree. 

Guidelines section 2B3.1(b)(2) provides: 

(A) If a firearm was discharged increase by 5 

levels; (B) if a firearm or a dangerous weapon was 

otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (C) if a firearm 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 4 
or other dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed or 

possessed, increase by 3 levels. 

The commentary to Guidelines section lBl.l defines a "dangerous 

weapon" as follows: 

"Dangerous weapon" means an instrument capable of 

inflicting death or serious bodily injury. 

u.s.s.G. § lBl.l, comment. (n.l(d)). The Guidelines also state, 

however, that where "a weapon or dangerous instrumentality was 

used or possessed in the commission of the offense," the court may 

depart from the Guidelines, and that "[t]he extent of the increase 

ordinarily should depend on the dangerousness of the weapon, the 

manner in which it was used, and the extent to which its use 

endangered others." Id. § SK2.6, p.s. 

In our view the district court was justified in departing 

from the Guidelines' sentencing range due to Baker's use of 

dynamite in the robbery and his abduction at gunpoint of the 

supply store owner. We find that the Sentencing Commission's 

definition of "dangerous weapon" was not intended to comprehend 

explosives. We reach our conclusion for three reasons. First, 

the definition of "dangerous weapon" speaks only of injury to a 

person, not persons or property. See id. § lBl.l, comment. 

(n.l(d)). This suggests that the weapon contemplated by the 

definition is one capable of direction at a specific individual or 

object, such as a firearm, knife, club, fist, etc. Dynamite or 

other explosives are of a different order because by their nature 

they will tend to injury both persons and property, rather than 

just a specific person. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 5 
Second, the language of Guidelines section 2B3.1, which 

assesses a five point increase if a firearm is discharged, a four 

point increase is a firearm or dangerous weapon is otherwise used, 

and a three point increase if a firearm or dangerous weapon is 

displayed or possessed, indicates that the Commission believed the 

discharge of a firearm to be the most serious aggravating factor. 

Dangerous weapons, however used, can be assessed at most a four 

point increase in offense level. Given the greater destructive 

nature of dynamite and explosives relative to a firearm, the 

language and structure of section 2B3.1 shows that the Sentencing 

Commission did not contemplate the use of such explosive devices 

when it devised the "dangerous weapon" aggravation provisions. 

Third, we find that the uncontrollable nature of many 

explosives, which can result in indiscriminate destruction and 

slaughter, is sufficient in itself to justify departure. As the 

policy statement in Guidelines section SK2.6 states, "the court 

may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range 

. depend[ing] on the dangerousness of the weapon, . . . and 

the extent to which its use endangered others." It is 

undisputable that dynamite and other explosive devices are 

extremely dangerous when used as a weapon and that their use can 

lead to a substantial endangerment of others, including bystanders 

and people in adjacent, and possibly even remote, areas of the 

structure. The district court did not err in finding Baker's 

possession and use of dynamite to be an aggravating factor that 

was not considered by the Sentencing Commission. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 6 
The district court also cited, as grounds for departure, the 

fact that Baker abducted the supply store owner at gunpoint in 

order to compel him to surrender the dynamite. We agree with the 

district court that this conduct justifies departure. The 

explosives provision, id. § 2Kl.6, does not include any 

aggravating factors for use of a firearm or abduction. Analogy to 

the robbery provision, which provides for a three point increase 

for display of a firearm and a possible four point increase for 

kidnapping, suggests the propriety of departure for such conduct. 

See id. 2B3.1(b). The fact that the Sentencing Commission did not 

expressly provide for such aggravating factor does not require a 

contrary result. See id. 5K2.0, p.s. ("[A] factor may be listed 

as a specific offense characteristic under one guideline but not 

under all guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not 

mean that there may not be circumstances when that factor would be 

relevant to sentencing. For example, the use of a weapon has been 

listed as a specific offense characteristic under many guidelines, 

but not under immigration violations. Therefore, if a weapon is a 

relevant factor to sentencing of ran immigration violation, the 

court may depart for this reason."). 

2. 

Turning to the second step of the White analysis, there is no 

dispute that Baker did abduct the supply store owner at gunpoint 

in order to obtain dynamite, and that he did use both firearms and 

dynamite in robbing the credit union. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 7 
• 

3. 

The third step of the White analysis requires us to review 

the reasonableness of the district court's departure. The 

district court departed upwards seven months over the Guidelines' 

sentencing range of fifty-one to sixty-three months. We note that 

even though the district court stated it was departing upward 

three levels on the offense table, the sentence imposed, seventy 

months, falls within the upper limits of the sentencing range for 

the next most severe offense level. Accordingly, we find that the 

district court's degree of departure was reasonable. 

III. 

We hold that the use of explosives for intimidation during a 

bank robbery is an aggravating factor not considered by the 

Sentencing Commission in Guidelines section 2B3.1. We also hold 

that abduction at gunpoint is an aggravating factor not considered 

by the Commission in Guidelines section 2K1.6. The district court 

therefore did not err in departing on the basis of those factors. 

AFFIRMED. 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1165 Document: 01019708228 Date Filed: 09/12/1990 Page: 8