Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15125/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15125-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
G. W. Lewis
Appellee
Julius M. Robinson
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIUS M. ROBINSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

G. W. LEWIS,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14-15125

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-00604-WBS-AC

ORDER CERTIFYING

QUESTION TO THE

CALIFORNIA

SUPREME COURT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

William B. Shubb, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 11, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed July 28, 2015

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit

Judges and J. Michael Seabright,* District Judge.

* The Honorable J. Michael Seabright, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

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2 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel certified to the California Supreme Court the

following question:

When a state habeas petitioner has no good

cause for delay, at what point in time is that

state prisoner’s petition, filed in a California

court of review to challenge a lower state

court’s disposition of the prisoner’s claims,

untimely under California law; specifically, is

a habeas petition untimely filed after an

unexplained 66-day delay between the time a

California trial court denies the petition and

the time the petition is filed in the California

Court of Appeal?

ORDER

We ask the California Supreme Court to resolve an

important question of state law that the Ninth Circuit has long

struggled to answer, a struggle that absorbs appellate and

district court resources and frustrates state prisoners. The

question is: when is a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of

state habeas corpus in a non-capital case timely filed in a

California court? Without the California Supreme Court’s

guidance on this issue, federal courts lack the means to make

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 3

a correct determination of whether a state habeas petition was

properly filed, and thus whether its filing tolls the federal

statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. 

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules

of Court, we certify the following question to the California

Supreme Court:

When a state habeas petitioner has no good

cause for delay, at what point in time is that

state prisoner’s petition, filed in a California

court of review to challenge a lower state

court’s disposition of the prisoner’s claims,

untimely under California law; specifically, is

a habeas petition untimely filed after an

unexplained 66-day delay between the time a

California trial court denies the petition and

the time the petition is filed in the California

Court of Appeal?

Our phrasing of this question should not restrict the

Court’s consideration of the issues involved. The Court may

rephrase the question as it sees fit in order to address the

contentions of the parties. If the Court agrees to decide this

question, we agree to accept its decision. We recognize that

our certification request adds to the substantial caseload of

the Court, and we submit this question for the Court’s

consideration because of its importance and its prevalence, as

discussed below. “Comity and federalism counsel that the

California Supreme Court, rather than this court, should

answer” the certified question. Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 522

F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 2008).

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4 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

We provide a brief background of the issue and its

importance before discussing the particular case that requires

us to consider it.

I

A

Under federal habeas law, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a state

prisoner must file a petition for federal habeas review within

a one year limitations period.1 Section 2244(d)(2) further

 

1

 Section 2244(d)(1) provides:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 5

specifies that this federal limitations period is tolled for “[t]he

time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” The federal statute

has been interpreted to define “[t]he time that an application

for state postconviction review is ‘pending’” as including “the

period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and

(2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that

the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” 

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006).

Chavis explained that in most states other than California,

the number of days a petitioner has for filing an appeal is

established by statute. Id. at 191–92. This makes it simple to

determine whether a filing is “timely under state law,” see id.,

and thus whether a petition for review is “properly filed” and

the federal statute of limitations tolled, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). California, however, has a unique system by

which state habeas petitioners challenge adverse state court

decisions. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 192. Rather than requiring a

petitioner whose habeas petition has been dismissed to appeal

that decision to a higher court, California law provides that an

original petition may be filed at each level of the California

court system. Id. at 192–93. Such a petition is timely if filed

“within a ‘reasonable time.’” Id. at 192 (quoting In re Harris,

5 Cal. 4th 813, 828 n.7 (1993)). California courts allow a

longer delay if the petitioner demonstrates good cause. In re

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998).

If a California court states it has dismissed a state habeas

petition because the petition was untimely, “that would be the

end of the matter.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226

(2002). When a California state court determines that a state

prisoner’s state habeas petition is untimely under state law,

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6 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

there is “no ‘properly filed’ state petition, and [the state

prisoner is] not entitled to statutory tolling” under AEDPA. 

White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam).

But if a California court dismisses a habeas petition

without comment, or even if it reviews a petition on the

merits without discussing timeliness, a federal court “must

itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the

state courts would have held in respect to timeliness,” Chavis,

546 U.S. at 197–98, in order to determine whether the

petition was “properly filed” for purposes of tolling the

federal statute of limitations, id. at 191 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2)). Observing that California courts had not

provided authoritative guidance on this issue,Chavismade its

own conjecture regarding state law, namely “that California’s

‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays

substantially longer than” between 30 and 60 days, the range

of time allowed for filing a notice of appeal by other states’

statutes. Id. at 199, 201. Based on this conjecture, Chavis

held that California courts would hold the unexplained sixmonth delay by the state prisoner in that case to be

unreasonable, and therefore concluded the state prisoner had

not filed his state habeas petition on time. Id. at 201.

Given the conjectural nature of its 30 to 60 day

benchmark, Chavis suggested we certify a question to the

California Supreme Court to address the problem of the

“uncertain scope of California’s ‘reasonable time’ standard.” 

Id. at 199. We did so in 2008. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 542

F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2008).

Chaffer involved a state prisoner who delayed 101 and

115 days in filing state habeas petitions, id. at 663–64, but

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 7

argued that he had good cause for some of the delays, id. at

666–67. We sought the California Supreme Court’s guidance

regarding whether these delays, or any delay exceeding 60

days, were unreasonable, and if so, whether the petitioner

demonstrated good cause for the delays. Id. at 663–64, 666.

The California Supreme Court denied certification. 

Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam).

B

We have now had seven more years’ experience applying

California’s “reasonable time” standard and we remain

uncertain about the scope of California’s rule. Although

Chavis explained that, on its reading of California law,

permissible delays would not be “substantially longer than”

30 to 60 days, 546 U.S. at 199–200, neither California nor

Ninth Circuit courts have created a clear rule for cases

involving an unexplained delay of more than 60 days.

In the nine years that have passed since Chavis attempted

to deduce how California courts would assess timeliness,

California courts have not provided any authoritative

guidance regarding when a state habeas petition is timely

filed if good cause is absent. Indeed, few state courts have

addressed this issue. For the most part, California cases have

addressed timeliness issues in the context of determining

whether a state prisoner has good cause for a delay, and have

not addressed timeliness where good cause is absent. See In

re Lucero, 200 Cal. App. 4th 38, 44–45 (2011) (holding a

10-month delay was not unreasonable when a prison law

library did not receive a newly-decided case for several

months, and the issue was exceptionally important); In re

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8 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

Crockett, 159 Cal. App. 4th 751, 636–37 (2008) (holding a

five-month delay was not unreasonable when an attorney

“had no prior experience with appellate writs and could not

obtain the assistance of experienced appellate counsel”). But

cf. In re Nunez, 173 Cal. App. 4th 709, 723 (2009) (holding

a six-month delay prior to filing an initial habeas petition was

not unreasonable, especially as the delay did not prejudice the

state).

We are aware of only one California case that considered

the timeliness of a state habeas petition when good cause was

lacking, but that case addressed a petition in the context of

parole. See In re Burdan, 169 Cal. App. 4th 18, 31 (2008)

(holding that a petitioner’s 10-month delay in challenging a

parole determination was not unreasonable). Because Burdan

“specifically explained that the timeliness rules apply with

less force where the petitioner is challenging a parole board

determination,” we concluded that it provides little or no

guidance in the non-parole context. Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d

929, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2014).

A handful of unpublished California cases also discuss

timeliness. See, e.g., In re Little, No. D047468, 2008 WL

142832, at *4 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2008) (holding a 14-

month delay was not unreasonable “[i]n the circumstances of

this case”). But because they are unpublished, Rule 8.1115

of the California Rules of Court directs that we not rely on

them as precedent.

In the absence of guidance from California courts, courts

in the Ninth Circuit have struggled to discern how California

courts would rule on the timeliness issue, particularly when

there is no justification for the delay. We have held that

delays of 115, 101, and 81 days make a petition untimely

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 9

unless the petitioner can show good cause. Velasquez v.

Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011); Chaffer, 592

F.3d at 1048 (holding the state habeas petitions were untimely

because the peititoner’s “filing delays were substantially

longer than the ‘30 to 60 days’ that ‘most States’ allow for

filing petitions”). We have also interpreted Saffold as holding

“that California’s reasonableness standard is commensurate

with the limitations of other states, which are 30 or 45 days.” 

Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012). More

recently, we have indicated that the Supreme Court’s 60-day

limit is the “benchmark” from which we will not depart

without a showing of good cause. See Stewart, 757 F.3d at

935 & n.8 (explaining that a delay beyond 60 days is not “per

se unreasonable under California law,” because, as our case

law holds, the 30 to 60 day “benchmark may be exceeded

under appropriate circumstances”). But we have not yet

expressly adopted a bright line rule that an unexplained delay

of more than 60 days is unreasonable.2

District courts in the Ninth Circuit have also wrestled

with this issue. “[N]o consensus has emerged among district

courts in California as to the length of unexplained delay

which is unreasonable in the wake of the decision in Chavis.” 

2 Unpublished Ninth Circuit cases also fail to clarify whether any

unexplained delay over 60 days is unreasonable or whether the delay must

be “substantially longer than” 60 daysto be unreasonable. Compare, e.g.,

Livermore v. Sandor, 487 F. App’x 342, 343–44 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding

a 76-day delay was unreasonable), and Hurth v. Campbell, 537 F. App’x

696, 697 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding a 70-day delay was unreasonable

because “in the absence of an adequate explanation we cannot see why

there was any delay beyond the thirty-to-sixty-day range” (footnote and

internal quotation marks omitted)), with Pena v. Martel, 450 F. App’x

670, 671 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding a delay of unspecified length was

unreasonable because it was “substantially longer than” 30 to 60 days).

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10 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

Wynn v. Martel, No. CIV S-09-2728 JAM DAD P, 2011 WL

864500, at *5 nn.4 & 5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2011), report and

recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-09-2728 JAM DAD P,

2011 WL 1811109 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). Some

California district courts have held that “unexplained delays

of 61 to 70 days in pursuing relief between courts are not

unreasonable.” Id. at *6.3 Other district courts have held that

delays within this window were unreasonable,4or that longer

delays were reasonable.5 Because of the uncertainty

3

See also Gonzales v. Hubbard, No. CV 11-3395-GAF AGR, 2011 WL

6951958, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 11-3395-GAF AGR, 2012 WL 28649 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4,

2012).

4

See Bayaird v. Cate, No. 1:09-CV-01898-LJO-GSA HC, 2010 WL

1339617, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) (holding an unjustified 67-day

delay was unreasonable); Hunt v. Felker, No. 1:07-CV-01281-OWWTAG HC, 2008 WL 364995, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:07-CV-1281-OWW-TAG HC, 2008 WL

752592 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2008) (holding a 70-day delay, not justified

by good cause, was unreasonable); see also Culver v. Dir. of Corr., 450

F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding a 71-day delay was

unreasonable).

 

5 Young v. Sisto, No. CIV S-11-0166 JAM CKD P, 2012 WL 125520,

at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012) (holding an unjustified 77-day delay was

reasonable but other, longer delays were not, and denying the petition as

untimely); Brown v. Campbell, No. CIVS-06-2360 LKK DAD P, 2007

WL 2265588, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CIVS-06-2360 LKK DAD P, 2007 WL 2793284 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 25, 2007) (holding an unjustified 81-day delay was reasonable);

Ramirez v. Campbell, No. CIVS-06-1257 FCD GGH P, 2006 WL

3114287, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2006) (holding an unjustified 75-day

delay was reasonable but other delays were not, and denying the petition

as untimely), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIVS-06-1257

FCD GGH P, 2007 WL 569996 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007), aff’d, 384 F.

App’x 654 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming without discussing the 75-day gap).

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 11

surrounding timeliness, district courts spend substantial

judicial resources addressing this issue. The question of what

constitutes filing within a reasonable time under California

law has arisen in over 500 district court cases in this circuit

since Chavis was decided, and in over 250 since the

California Supreme Court last denied our request for

certification of this question in Chaffer.

C

This question of when a state prisoner’s habeas petition

is timely filed in a California court is an issue of exceptional

importance to both federal and California courts.

As noted above, federal courts expend substantial

resources in an effort to discharge our duty to discern the

state rule for timeliness of filing state habeas petitions. If we

underestimate the permissible delay between a California

lower court’s denial of a petition and the filing of a petition

challenging that decision in a higher court, we will deprive a

state prisoner of the federal review to which the prisoner is

entitled. But if we overestimate the permissible delay, we

will fail to implement “the statutory purpose of encouraging

prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal

system from being forced to hear stale claims.” Saffold, 536

U.S. at 226.

The proper application of the federal statute of limitations

also serves important state interests. If federal courts

overestimate the length of time a prisoner may delay and still

timely file a petition, we fail to afford the California court

decisions that tacitly rest on untimeliness the respect due

under the federal system. The federal statute of limitations

also protects the finality of state decisions and promotes the

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12 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

exhaustion of state remedies. As the Supreme Court

explained in Duncan v. Walker, “[t]he 1-year limitation

period of § 2244(d)(1) quite plainly serves the

well-recognized interest in the finality of state court

judgments” because it “reduces the potential for delay on the

road to finality by restricting the time that a prospective

federal habeas petitioner has in which to seek federal habeas

review.” 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001). Furthermore, the tolling

provision of § 2244(d)(2) “promotes the exhaustion of state

remedies by protecting a state prisoner’s ability later to apply

for federal habeas relief while state remedies are being

pursued.” Id. The federal courts’ lack of clarity regarding

California’s “reasonable time” standard threatens these state

interests.

California courts have explained that time limits for filing

a petition for collateral review of a state conviction are

important for several reasons. The California Supreme Court

has explained that petitioners must timely file:

[to] vindicate society’s interest in the finality

of its criminal judgments, as well as the

public’s interest in the orderly and reasonably

prompt implementation of its laws. Such

timeliness rules serve other salutary interests

as well. Requiring a prisoner to file his or her

challenge promptly helps ensure that possibly

vital evidence will not be lost through the

passage of time or the fading of memories. In

addition, we cannot overestimate the value of

the psychological repose that may come for

the victim, or the surviving family and friends

of the victim, generated by the knowledge the

ordeal is finally over.

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 13

In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 703 (1999) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). These important state

interests are undermined if federal courts misinterpret

California’s timeliness rules and lengthen the time before a

state conviction becomes final.

Finally, the uncertainty regarding timeliness under state

law “vex[es] prisoners as well, for they cannot know whether

the federal statute of limitations is running while they prepare

their state petitions.” Saffold, 536 U.S. at 235–36 (Kennedy,

J., dissenting). We have held that this uncertainty does not

provide a basis for equitable tolling of the federal statute of

limitations if a prisoner’s state habeas petitions were filed

after Saffold. See Velasquez, 639 F.3d at 969 (holding that

prisoners who filed claims after Saffold had adequate notice

“that federal courts would address the timeliness of [their]

petition[s] in the event that the California courts neglected to

do so”); accord Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 781–83

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding a state prisoner whose federal

petition was filed pre-Saffold could receive equitable tolling). 

State prisoners, including the petitioner in this case,

nevertheless argue that the uncertainty leaves them without

notice of how long a delay a court will find reasonable. State

prisoners face an especially difficult challenge in cases like

this one, where, as summarized above, no Ninth Circuit case

addresses a delay of this length and district courts are split. 

Raising this concern, one commentator argued that “it is

profoundly unfair to expect accuracy in calculation from a

pro se inmate on a topic that neither the Supreme Court nor

the Ninth Circuit has succeeded at clarifying.” Emily Garcia

Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators:

The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a

Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus,

14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1219, 1241 (2012).

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14 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

II

This is an especially appropriate case in which to seek the

California Supreme Court’s guidance because it raises the

timeliness issue without requiring consideration of good

cause for the delay.

A

The facts of this case are as follows. Julius Robinson was

convicted by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder,

two counts of malicious discharge of a firearm, and gun and

gang enhancements. He was sentenced to a determinate term

of 17 years, and an indeterminate term of 205 years to life. 

On February 8, 2011, the California Court of Appeal

modified the sentence and affirmed the judgment. The

California Supreme Court denied review, and the deadline for

Robinson to seek certiorari review with the United States

Supreme Court expired on August 9, 2011.

On November 12, 2011, 94 days after the certiorari

deadline passed, Robinson constructively filed a state habeas

petition in California Superior Court.6 On January 19, 2012,

the Superior Court denied Robinson’s petition. On March 26,

2012, 66 days after the Superior Court denied his petition,

Robinson filed a petition with the California Court of Appeal. 

6 Because Robinson was a pro se, incarcerated petitioner, the “mailbox

rule” applies, meaning that his petition is deemed filed on the date of its

submission to the prison authorities for mailing. See Noble v. Adams, 676

F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012). The application of this mailbox rule is

not disputed. There are, however, several discrepancies in the record

regarding the dates the petitions were constructively filed. Because the

dates found by the magistrate judge are not disputed, we rely on the filing

dates found by the magistrate judge as the operative ones.

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 15

On April 5, 2012, the California Court of Appeal denied

Robinson’s petition, citing In re Steele, 32 Cal. 4th 682, 692

(2004), and In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (1962). 

Neither case involves a timeliness determination. Accord

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 310 (2011) (“California

courts signal that a habeas petition is denied as untimely by

citing the controlling decisions, i.e., [In re] Clark[, 5 Cal. 4th

750 (1993)] and Robbins.”). On July 6, 2012, 91 days after

the California Court of Appeal decision, Robinson filed a

petition with the California Supreme Court. The California

Supreme Court denied his petition on October 24, 2012.

Robinson filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

in federal district court on March 13, 2013, which was 139

days after the California Supreme Court issued its denial. 

Adding up the delays that were attributable to Robinson

(delays of 94, 66, 91, and 139 days), and excluding the time

when his filed petitions were being considered by the

California courts, his petition was filed 390 days after his

conviction became final and the time for seeking certiorari

review by the Supreme Court expired.

The government moved to dismiss the petition, on the

ground that the one-year statute of limitations under 28

U.S.C. § 2244 had expired before Robinson filed his petition. 

A magistrate judge considered whether Robinson was entitled

to tolling of the statute of limitations for the gaps between

each lower court denial of Robinson’s habeas petition and his

subsequent filing of a new petition in the next-level state

court. She concluded that the 66-day period between the

denial of his California Superior Court petition and the filing

date of his Court of Appeal petition was unreasonable, and

therefore Robinson was not entitled to tolling for that period. 

The magistrate judge also concluded that Robinson was not

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16 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

entitled to tolling for the 91-day period between the denial of

his California Court of Appeal petition and the filing date of

his California Supreme Court petition.7 Absent tolling for

either of these two periods, Robinson’s petition was untimely. 

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations and granted the government’s motion to

dismiss Robinson’s federal habeas petition with prejudice as

barred by the statute of limitations.

On appeal, we are considering only the question whether

Robinson is entitled to tolling for the 66-day interval between

the California Superior Court denial of habeas relief and his

filing a new petition in the California Court of Appeal.8 The

issue of good cause is absent in this case. Although Robinson

claimed in district court that the delay was “attributed to

further research and litigation of potential issues,” the district

court rejected this justification because “[t]he petition filed in

the California Court of Appeal was simply a photocopy of the

prior petition.” Robinson did not dispute this conclusion in

7

In the district court, the state made clear that it “does not argue that the

[California Supreme Court petition] was improperly filed; therefore

[Robinson] is entitled to tolling for the pendency of his third state action

. . . for the period of August 1, 2012 through October 24, 2012.” On

appeal, the state nonetheless argued that no tolling should be permitted for

the period between when Robinson filed his petition with the California

Supreme Court and when that court decided it, because the untimely

petition was not “properly filed.” Because the state intentionally

relinquished the argument in the district court, we will not consider it on

appeal. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1834–35 (2012).

8 Robinson did not appeal the district court’s determination that he was

not entitled to tolling for the 91-day period.

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 17

his briefing before our court. He has therefore waived it.9

See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir.

2005).

B

Because there is no issue of good cause in this case, the

question of the permissible length of an unjustified delay is

squarely presented for the California Supreme Court’s

review. For the reasons stated above, we need guidance from

the California Supreme Court in order to determine accurately

whether Robinson’s appeal was timely filed in the California

Court of Appeal.

An answer to this question will determine the outcome of

this case.10If 66 days is a substantial delay, Robinson’s

9 Even had Robinson not waived this argument, our precedent dictates

that we reject it. See Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 736–37 (9th Cir.

2008) (rejecting a petitioner’s justifications for delay when he had access

to a library and his revised petition was nearly identical to his first);

Stewart, 757 F.3d at 933 n.3, 937 (rejecting a pro se petitioner’s argument

that his delay was justified by his inability to research claims when he

eventually presented the same claims); see also Velasquez, 639 F.3d at

968.

10 Robinson argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because he did not

know that he was required to file an appeal in the California Court of

Appeal within 60 days or risk having a federal court conclude that the

petition was not “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Robinson waived this claim by not raising it to the district court. See

Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992). In

any event, we would lack jurisdiction to consider this claim. Robinson

filed his state habeas petitions after Saffold and Chavis were decided, and

we have held that prisoners who filed claims after Saffold had adequate

notice “that federal courts would address the timeliness of [their]

petition[s] in the event that the California courts neglected to do so.”

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18 ROBINSON V. LEWIS

federal habeas petition is untimely and the district court

properly dismissed it. If it is not a substantial delay, his

federal habeas petition was timely, and we will reverse and

remand for the petition to be considered on the merits. Under

our precedent, absent guidance from the California Supreme

Court, we could hold either that the 66-day period is tolled

because it is not substantially longer than the 30 to 60 days

other states permit, cf. Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048, or we could

hold it is not tolled because it is beyond Chavis’s 30 to 60-

day benchmark and no good cause exists, see Stewart, 757

F.3d at 935–36. We would prefer to have California’s

guidance on this important issue, and defer to California’s

determination of what constitutes a timely filing in state

court. We therefore respectfully ask that the California

Supreme Court decide the certified question.

III

The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit

forthwith to the California Supreme Court, under official seal

of the Ninth Circuit, a copy of this order and request for

certification and all relevant briefs and excerpts of record

pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.548. Submission of

this case is withdrawn, and the case will be resubmitted

following receipt of the California Supreme Court’s opinion

on the certified question or notification that it declines to

answer the certified question. The panel shall retain

jurisdiction over further proceedings in this court. The

parties shall notify the Clerk of this court within one week

after the California Supreme Court accepts or rejects

Velasquez, 639 F.3d at 969. Therefore, Robinson has not “made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” which is a

prerequisite to taking an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

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ROBINSON V. LEWIS 19

certification. In the event the California Supreme Court

grants certification, the parties shall notify the Clerk within

one week after the court renders its opinion.

The caption of this case is:

No. 14-15125

JULIUS M. ROBINSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

G. W. LEWIS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Counsel for the parties are as follows:

For Petitioner-Appellant: Heather E. Williams, Federal

Defender; David Hare Harshaw, III, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, 801 I Street, 3rd Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814.

For Respondent-Appellee: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney

General of California; Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Brian G. Smiley, Supervising Deputy

Attorney General; David Andrew Eldridge, Deputy Attorney

General, 1300 I Street, Suite 125, P.O. Box 944255,

Sacramento, CA 94244

CERTIFICATION REQUESTED; SUBMISSION

VACATED.

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