Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00165/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00165-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Asia Abid
Plaintiff
Chaudry Abid
Plaintiff
Mudasar Abid
Plaintiff
Shamim Abid
Plaintiff
Tubasim Abid
Plaintiff
Allstate Insurance Company
Defendant
Kiran Chaudry
Plaintiff

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CHAUDRY ABID, previously known

as ASIA ABID; SHAMIM ABID,

previously known as MUDASAR

ABID; and KIRAN CHAUDRY,

previously known TUBASIM ABID,

NO. CIV. S 08-165 FCD GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a

California corporation; and

DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by

defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).1 Plaintiffs

Chaudray Abid, Shamim Abid, and Mudasar Abid (collectively

“plaintiffs”) oppose the motion. For the reasons set for below,

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2 The facts contained herein are drawn from plaintiff’s

amended complaint. (See Pl.’s Amended Compl. (“Compl.”), Ex. A-1

to Def.’s Notice of Removal (Docket #1-2), filed Jan. 23, 2008.)

2

defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to amend is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND2

On September 11, 2001, a fire broke out at plaintiffs’ home

in Sacramento, California. (Compl. ¶ 7.) The residence was

covered by a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by Allstate. 

(Id.) On September 12, 2001, plaintiffs filed a claim for

benefits under the insurance policy, alleging damage to the home

and personal property within the home, and other injuries. (Id.

¶ 21.) Allstate denied the claim and refused to pay any benefits

under the policy. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)

On March 23, 2002, plaintiffs, acting through legal counsel,

made a formal demand on Allstate for policy benefits. (Id. ¶

10.) Allstate ignored the demand and continued to refuse

payment. (Id.) Between March 23, 2002, and July 29, 2005,

Allstate failed to communicate with plaintiffs regarding any

additional documents needed to obtain benefits under the policy. 

(Id. ¶ 21.) 

During the summer of 2006, plaintiffs retained an attorney. 

(Id. ¶ 10.) On December 12, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint

against Allstate in Sacramento Superior Court to recover benefits

under the homeowner’s insurance policy. An amended complaint was

filed on December 19, 2007. Thereafter, Allstate removed the

action to this court. Allstate now moves to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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3

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

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4

73 (1984)). 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

Under California law, the statute of limitations on

insurance policies containing fire coverage is one year. Cal.

Ins. Code § 2071. The limitations period begins to run at the

“inception of loss,” defined as the time at which “appreciable

damage occurs and is or should be know to the insured.” Id.;

Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 3d 674,

686-87 (1990). The statute of limitation may be equitably tolled

for numerous reasons, including when an insurer “leads its

insured to believe that an amicable adjustment of the claim will

be made.” Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 690.

Here, plaintiffs allege their homeowner’s insurance policy

covered the damage caused by the fire that destroyed their home

on September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs further allege Allstate

repeatedly denied their claims for benefits under the policy. 

However, the complaint fails to allege facts setting forth

plaintiffs’ entitlement to equitable tolling of the applicable

statute of limitation. According to the complaint, Allstate

first denied plaintiffs’ claim sometime in 2001. The complaint

alleges plaintiffs filed a formal demand on Allstate in 2002,

which apparently was also denied. Plaintiffs then assert that

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3 For the same reason, the court will not consider the

exhibits filed by defendant in support of its motion to dismiss. 

5

there was no communication between plaintiffs and Allstate

between March 23, 2002, and June 29, 2005. Plaintiffs allege

that, subsequently, in the summer of 2006, plaintiffs and

Allstate began communicating about the claim again. The

complaint was not filed until December 2007, more than a year

after these alleged communications. As currently pled,

plaintiffs’ allegations fail to support a claim that defendant,

the insurer, led plaintiffs, the insureds, to believe that an

amicable adjustment of the claim would be made or that the

statute of limitation should be tolled for other reasons. 

In their opposition, plaintiffs ask the court to take notice

of additional facts contained in their brief and in the

supplemental declaration of plaintiff Chaudry Abid attached

thereto. However, on a motion to dismiss the court is confined

to the complaint and any exhibits attached to the complaint. See

Mir, 844 F.2d at 649; Isuzu Motors Ltd., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1042. 

Thus, the court cannot consider the additional facts and evidence

proffered by plaintiffs.3

Therefore, because plaintiffs have failed to plead facts in

their complaint to sufficiently support a theory of equitable

tolling, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. In their

opposition, plaintiffs request the opportunity to amend their

pleadings. Based upon the submissions and arguments of the

plaintiffs in opposition to defendant’s motion, the court does

not find that leave to amend is futile, sought in bad faith, or

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4 Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be

freely given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should

be granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997).

5 Nothing in this order prevents defendants from raising

this argument later in the litigation.

6

would cause unnecessary delay.4

 Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion to

amend the complaint is GRANTED.

In its reply, Allstate for the first time asserts that under

the doctrine of judicial estoppel, plaintiffs cannot make a claim

against Allstate because such a claim was not listed as an asset

of their estate in plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceedings filed in

2004. Plaintiffs have not been given an opportunity to respond

to this argument, and thus the court will not consider it on the

merits.5 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their

complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a Second Amended

Complaint within twenty (20) days from the issuance of this

order. Defendant is granted thirty (30) days from the date of

service of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint to file a

response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: April 10, 2008. 

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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