Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cr-00391/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cr-00391-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Walker Trent Grant
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

WALKER TRENT GRANT,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cr-00391-EMC-1 

FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 

ORDER

Defendant Walker Trent Grant has been charged with two violations of 18 U.S.C. §

1001(a)(2). Section § 1001(a)(2) provides in relevant part as follows:

[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 

legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United 

States, knowingly and willfully –

. . .

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 

representation; . . .

. . . .

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . , 

or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 

According to the government, Mr. Grant violated § 1001(a)(2) when, in applying for a 

pilot’s license, he included false information in forms that he submitted to the Federal Aviation 

Administration (“FAA”). More specifically, the government claims that Mr. Grant made false 

statements related to his medical condition. Per the indictment, on January 19, 2017, and then 

(approximately a year later) on January 25, 2018, Mr. Grant allegedly made false statements on a 

FAA Form 8500-8 

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that (i) he did not suffer from and had never been diagnosed with 

“frequent or severe headaches” (Question 18a), despite having 

represented to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that he 

suffered from tension headaches, and (ii) . . . he did not receive 

medical disability benefits (Question 18y), despite having received 

service-related medical disability benefits from the VA, including 

benefits related to his tension headaches, since 2011.

Docket No. 1 (Indictment at 1-2).

I. TRIAL DATE & LENGTH OF TRIAL

Jury selection shall take place on February 21, 2020. Counsel shall be present in the 

Courtroom at 8:00 a.m. 

The jury trial shall begin on February 24, 2020. Trial shall last from 8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 

on each day, except for Thursdays, which are dark. On all trial days counsel shall be present in the 

Courtroom at 8:15 a.m. to discuss any matters requiring resolution prior to commencement of trial 

at 8:30 a.m.

The parties estimate that the trial shall last for approximately one week. The parties will 

endeavor to abide by this estimate, as the Court will not be available March 4 and 5, 2020 should 

the case and deliberation extend into the following week.

II. WITNESSES

A. Government

The government has identified the following individuals as witnesses it may call in its 

case-in-chief. See Docket No. 63 (witness list).

1. Dr. Susan Northrup. 

2. Dr. Robert Gabbay. 

3. James England. 

4. Dr. Roger Tauran. 

5. Laurie Freeman. 

6. Reggie Lee. 

7. Nicholas J. Sanzone. 

8. Custodian of records (bank records). 

9. Custodian of records (VA medical records). 

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10. Custodian of records (VA disability applications and decisions). 

11. Custodian of records (FAA Forms 8500-8). 

At the hearing, the government indicated that custodians of records would not need to be 

called because the parties had reached agreement on authenticity of records. Mr. Grant agreed.

B. Defendant

Mr. Grant has identified the following individuals as witnesses he may call in his case-inchief.

1. Rob Will. 

2. Tracy Damico. 

3. Elizabeth Brokaw. 

4. Stephanie Grant. 

5. Dr. Gregory Pinnell. 

III. EXHIBITS

The government has filed objections to certain exhibits recently submitted by Mr. Grant. 

The Court shall discuss the objections with the parties at 8:00 a.m. on February 21, 2020, prior to

starting the jury selection process.

Regarding other exhibits, Mr. Grant’s motions to dismiss or suppress, as well as the both 

parties’ motions in limine, are addressed below. 

Exhibits, even if not objected to, are not automatically admitted. The proponent must 

move for admission of each exhibit at trial.

IV. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR DISCOVERY

(DOCKET NOS. 32-33)

Mr. Grant has also moved to dismiss the charges against him on the basis of selective 

enforcement. According to Mr. Grant, there has been selective enforcement because the VA 

Office of the Inspector General (“VA OIG”) and the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) 

“targeted veterans” in particular “by comparing VA records to FAA records.” Mot. at 2. In the 

alternative, Mr. Grant asks for leave to conduct discovery to support his selective enforcement 

claim.

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Both the motion to dismiss and the motion for discovery are DENIED. A claim of 

selective enforcement falls under the rubric of equal protection. 

Where [government] action does not implicate a fundamental right 

or a suspect classification, [an individual] can establish a “class of 

one” equal protection claim by demonstrating that [he] “has been 

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 

that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”

Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (addressing selective 

enforcement as an affirmative claim in a civil case). In the instant case, veterans are not a suspect 

class and no fundamental right is implicated; therefore, rational review applies. 

Under this standard, the government’s actions withstand scrutiny. There is a rational basis 

for the government’s targeting of those who receive disability benefits. As the government 

argues:

First, the receipt of benefits for a disabling condition presupposes 

that the pilot received a diagnosis from a medical professional and a 

determination from the agency dispensing the funds that the pilot 

was, in fact, disabled by that condition. The fact that there is a paper 

[trail] that establishes an undisclosed disabling condition is a 

rational basis to pursue an investigation of possible fraud.

Second, pilots receiving disability benefits for diagnosed medical 

conditions have a greater incentive to withhold this information and 

deceive the FAA than pilots who may have the same diagnosed 

condition but do not receive benefits – the former pilots may fear 

that disclosure could jeopardize the benefits as well as the receipt of 

an Airman Medical Certificate.

Opp’n at 10.

To the extent Mr. Grant argues an equal protection violation because the government could 

be targeting pilots who receive veteran’s benefits as opposed to those who received other kinds of 

disability benefits – e.g., Social Security – Mr. Grant’s own evidence indicates that the 

government has in fact pursued such others. See Mot., Ex. 2 (DOT document titled “Falsification 

of FAA Airman Medical Certificate Applications by Disability Recipients”) (discussing 

“Operation Safe Pilot,” a program conducted by DOT along with, inter alia, SSA). 

V. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUPPRESS (DOCKET NO. 31)

The government obtained Mr. Grant’s medical records from the VA after obtaining an 

order from Judge James of this District. The order was not issued pursuant to a search warrant 

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predicated on probable cause. Mr. Grant moves to dismiss the charges against him on the ground 

that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights when it obtained his medical records 

from the VA without a warrant.1 In the alternative, Mr. Grant moves to suppress the medical 

evidence. 

Mr. Grant’s motion is DENIED. “To invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment, a 

person must show he had a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy.’” United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 

597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000).

This inquiry . . . normally embraces two discrete questions. The 

first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an 

actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” – whether . . . the 

individual has shown that “he seeks to preserve [something] as 

private.” The second question is whether the individual's subjective 

expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize 

as ‘reasonable,’” – whether . . . the individual’s expectation, viewed 

objectively, is “justifiable” under the circumstances.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)

Here, it is highly doubtful that Mr. Grant had a subjective expectation that his VA medical 

records would be kept private from another government agency. The VA’s Notice of Privacy 

Practices in effect at the time explicitly stated that “[w]e may disclose your health information to 

law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes when applicable legal requirements are 

met” – with one law enforcement purpose being identified as “[r]esponding to a specific request 

when in pursuit of a focused civil or criminal law enforcement investigation.” Highsmith Decl., 

Ex. 1 (Notice at 3, 5) (emphasis omitted). Cf. United States v. Cooper, No. CR 05-0549 VRW, 

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39116, at *15-18 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2005) (in a case where the 

government charged defendant with making false statements on a FAA form based on medical 

records it obtained from the Social Security Administration, holding that defendant “could not 

have expected that his medical information would be held in a level of confidence that would 

implicate the protection of the Fourth Amendment”; noting that form completed by defendant as 

1

In the caption of his motion, Mr. Grant also refers to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. However, the body of the motion reflects that Mr. Grant seeks relief based on the 

protections provided by the Fourth Amendment only. 

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part of his SSA application for disability benefits indicated that disclosure could be made to other 

agencies for purposes other than making a determination on the disability claim). 

Mr. Grant protests there is no evidence in the record that he actually received the VA’s 

Notice (or that “veterans in general[] actually review” it), Reply at 5; however, Mr. Grant also 

does not deny that he received the Notice. Mr. Grant further argues that, per the Notice, disclosure 

is permitted to law enforcement only “when applicable legal requirements are met” and that such 

legal requirement means the Fourth Amendment. But that phrase does not expressly or clearly 

implicate the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Grant’s argument is problematic because it presupposes 

that the Fourth Amendment is applicable – and here, the government’s point is that the protections 

afforded by the Fourth Amendment are triggered only where there is a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the first place. Mr. Grant’s argument begs the central question.

No such reasonable expectation obtains here. Even if Mr. Grant did “harbor[] an 

expectation of privacy, the [C]ourt finds that [his] expectation of privacy is not one that society is 

prepared to accept as reasonable.” Cooper, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39116, at *20. In this regard, 

the Court takes note that the U.S. Code contain provisions expressly allowing for disclosure of VA 

medical records in certain circumstances – e.g., “[w]hen required by any department or other 

agency of the United States” and “[i]n any suit or other judicial proceeding when in the judgment 

of the Secretary such disclosure is deemed necessary and proper.” 28 U.S.C. § 5701(b)(3), (5). 

Implementing regulations likewise permit disclosure of VA medical records. See also 38 C.F.R. § 

1.506(a) (providing that “[a]ll records or documents required for official purposes by any 

department or other agency of the U.S. Government . . . shall be furnished in response to an 

official request, written, or oral, from such department or agency”); 38 C.F.R. § 1.513(b)(2) 

(providing that, inter alia, the Department of Justice “may, on request, be given pertinent 

information from medical records for use in connection with investigations conducted by these 

departments[;] [e]ach such request shall be considered on its merits, and the information released 

should be the minimum necessary in connection with the investigation conducted by [the] 

department[]”). Cf. Cooper, No. CR 05-0549 VRW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39116, at *20 (noting 

that the Privacy Act “reflects a societal determination that records containing information 

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knowingly and voluntarily submitted to one agency are not protected from disclosure to another 

agency without a warrant or consent when such disclosure is made for purposes of law 

enforcement”).2 

Moreover, Mr. Grant’s expectation of privacy, viewed objectively in a larger context, is 

not justifiable given the specific circumstances at hand: i.e., if an individual asks the federal 

government to award VA benefits and relies on VA medical records in support of the claim for 

benefits and obtains those benefits, he or she cannot reasonably expect that the federal government 

will not consider those records where those documents have obvious and direct significance to 

federal agency action – such as in an application with the FAA for a pilot’s license – especially 

when public safety is at issue.

VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM

The Court has reviewed the parties’ filing on jury instructions and will separately file 

proposed jury instructions that it intends to give. The parties shall file any objections to the jury 

instructions within 24 hours of the Court filing of those instructions. 

The Court takes the opportunity herein to address the main dispute regarding the jury 

instructions. The basic dispute relates to the fact that, in each count in the Indictment, the 

government charges Mr. Grant with making two false statements – one related to headaches and

the other related to medical disability benefits. Mr. Grant asserts that, to be guilty of a count, the 

government must prove that both statements were false, as reflected by the use of the word “and” 

in the Indictment. See Docket No. 1 (Indictment at 1) (alleging that Mr. Grant falsely indicated 

that “(i) he did not suffer from and had never been diagnosed with ‘frequent or severe headaches’ 

(Question 18a), despite having represented to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that 

2 At the hearing, Mr. Grant suggested that § 5701 cannot represent a societal determination 

regarding an expectation of privacy in VA medical records because the statute does not cover VA 

medical records in the first place. The Court does not agree. Section 5701(a) provides for 

confidentiality of all documents “pertaining” to a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 5701(a) 

(providing that “[a]ll files, records, reports, and other papers and documents pertaining to any 

claim under any of the laws administered by the Secretary . . . in the possession of the Department 

shall be confidential and privileged”). VA medical records (including treatment records) are used 

by a veteran to support a claim for benefits which must be periodically reviewed and renewed and 

thus are covered by § 5701. Mr. Grant last renewed his application to VA benefits in 2019

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he suffered from tension headaches, and (ii) that he did not receive medical disability benefits

(Question 18y), despite having received service-related medical disability benefits from the VA, 

including benefits related to his tension headaches, since 2011”) (emphasis added); see also

Docket No. 67 (arguing that “the instructions should mirror the government’s decision to charge in 

the conjunctive and prosecute the case based on that Indictment”). Mr. Grant argues that “‘false 

statement’ or ‘statement’ in the above instruction should be in the plural,” Joint Prop. Instr. at 6, 

and that at trial the government must prove both misstatements.

The Court rejects Mr. Grant’s position. “When a statute specifies two or more ways in 

which an offense may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one count and proof 

of any one of those conjunctively charged acts may establish guilt.” United States v. Booth, 309 

F.3d 566, 572 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 419-20 (1970) 

(noting that “26 U. S. C. § 4704 (a) makes it unlawful to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute a 

narcotic drug not in or from the original package bearing tax stamps”; “[t]he general rule is that 

when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as 

Turner’s indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of 

the acts charged”) (emphasis added). Mr. Grant argues that “[t]he authority to charge multiple 

means does not equate with the power to allege the same means twice in the same count with 

reference to two different statements.” Docket No. 67 (Memo. at 2) (emphasis in original). While 

the Court understands the distinction Mr. Grant is making, he has not shown how that distinction 

is material. Moreover, Mr. Grant does not cite any specific authority to support his position. 

Finally, the Court notes that, even if Mr. Grant were correct, the government could file a 

superseding indictment changing “and” to “or,” and such an indictment would not prejudice Mr. 

Grant – he admitted at the Final Pretrial Conference herein that, even if the government had used 

“or” instead of “and,” the preparation of his defense would have been the same; only his argument 

would be different. Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 694 F. App’x 548, 549 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting 

original indictment charged defendant with importing methamphetamine only and that the 

government filed a superseding indictment, adding a charge of importing heroin, on the first day 

of trial; stating that “the superseding indictment did not prejudice” defendant because “[h]is 

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defense – that he did not know the drugs were in the car – remained the same”).

Because the Court rejects Mr. Grant’s position, it agrees with the government that a 

unanimity instruction should be given as well as a special verdict form. The Court has reviewed 

the government’s proposed unanimity instruction and special verdict form. The Court agrees with 

the government’s proposals.

VII. DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. First Motion to Exclude Evidence Under Rule 16 (Docket No. 54) 

Mr. Grant has moved for exclusion of all documents and objects disclosed after the 

December 30, 2019, the deadline ordered by the Court for Rule 16 disclosures. Mot. at 1. The 

motion is DENIED.

• Computer screenshots of the online MedXPress Form 8500-8 application. The 

government’s delay in producing the computer screenshots was relatively brief 

(just under two weeks). Mr. Grant has failed to identify any prejudice he suffered 

as a result of this relatively short delay. This is not surprising given that the 

evidence is publicly available and it is obvious the government would rely on the 

evidence given the charges filed against him. In this regard, the Court also notes 

that Mr. Grant may well have kept tabs on similar cases being prosecuted by the 

government, and the government relied on this evidence at the trial of one of these 

cases. See United States v. Beyer, No. CR-18-0392 CRB (N.D. Cal.), Docket No. 

92 (Exhibit No. 1 on government’s exhibit list, filed on 1/8/2020).

• 2019 Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners. The government’s delay in 

producing the Guide was also relatively brief (about two-and-a-half weeks). As

above, Mr. Grant has failed to identify any prejudice he suffered as a result of this 

relatively short delay, which is not surprising given that the evidence is publicly 

available and that it is obvious the government would rely on the evidence given 

the charges filed against him. In this regard, the Court notes that the evidence was 

filed as part of the government’s prosecution of a similar case United States v. 

Chrisman, No. CR-18-0390 VC (N.D. Cal.), Docket No. 34-2 (Exhibit No. 1 

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attached to Tse declaration, filed on 9/26/2019). 

The Court acknowledges that this motion in limine also addresses additional evidence – in 

particular, evidence related to Dr. Northrup and evidence related to Dr. Gabbay. Evidence related 

to Dr. Northrup is discussed in Part VI.B, infra. Evidence related to Dr. Gabbay is discussed in 

Part VI.C, infra. 

B. Second Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony (Docket No. 55) and Sixth Motion to 

Exclude Expert Testimony (Docket No. 61)

In two different motions, Mr. Grant has asked the Court to exclude the testimony of Dr. 

Northrup as untimely pursuant to Rule 16. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) (governing 

disclosures related to expert witnesses – e.g., a summary must be provided that “describe the 

witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications”). 

The motions are DENIED.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the government initially argued Dr. 

Northrup’s testimony is lay testimony only, and not expert testimony. However, in a recent filing, 

the government stated that, “[w]hile it is a close question as to whether Dr. Northrup is a lay or 

expert witness, the United States intends to offer Dr. Northrup as an expert witness at Defendant 

Grant’s trial.” Docket No. 85 (Memo. at 1). The Court thus proceeds on that basis.

The government first disclosed Dr. Northrup to Mr. Grant on December 31, 2019 (which 

was essentially consistent with the Court’s order directing that Rule 16 disclosures be made by 

December 30, 2019). However, Mr. Grant fairly argues that the original disclosure did not 

provide sufficient specificity on at least some of Dr. Northrup’s opinions – on Questions 18(a) and 

(y) in particular – until approximately two weeks later (on January 16, 2020). Moreover, the 

government provided more disclosures with respect to Dr. Northrup on January 23 and 25, 2020 –

most notably, regarding Questions 18(c) and 18(x).

Although the Court does not condone the late disclosures and notes that, by making tardy 

disclosure, the government risks the sanction of exclusion, the critical issue is whether Mr. Grant 

has been prejudiced by the delay, particularly as trial in this case is not to begin until February 24, 

2020. Pressed by the Court at the hearing, Mr. Grant was not able to identify any specific 

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prejudice resulting from the delayed disclosure. For example, although Dr. Northrup’s opinions 

on Questions 18(a) and 18(y) were provided late, there is no claim that her opinions were a 

surprise,3and Mr. Grant had already been preparing a defense on Questions 18(a) and 18(y) as 

evidenced by the hiring of his own expert, Dr. Pinnell. Also, while Mr. Grant may have been 

delayed in his investigation of Dr. Northrup, there is not, at this point, any indication that he 

cannot conduct an adequate investigation of Dr. Northrup in advance of trial. Nor is there any 

indication that, because of the delay, he has not been able to obtain, in advance of trial, documents 

necessary for the cross-examination of Dr. Northrup. The Court therefore denies the motion to 

exclude Dr. Northrup from testifying at the trial. 

However, in so ruling, the Court does not preclude Mr. Grant from moving for a 

continuance of the trial if he is able to articulate and demonstrate a specific basis as to how the 

delay in the disclosures related to Dr. Northrup has prejudiced him (e.g., critical documents could 

not be obtained in time for trial notwithstanding due diligence).

4

 In addition, although the Court 

shall permit Dr. Northrup to testify, it shall not allow her to provide opinions on Questions 18(c) 

and 18(x) (respectively, concerning unconsciousness and other illness) on Rule 402 and 403 

grounds. In contrast, Dr. Northrup may testify about Question 19 (visits to health professionals 

within the last three years) as Mr. Grant has access to that information. Dr. Northrup’s testimony 

is otherwise limited to the disclosures that the government has already provided or provided in 

Docket No. 85. Finally, as an additional safeguard for Mr. Grant, the Court shall allow Mr. Grant 

to voir dire Dr. Northrup at trial but in advance of her testimony (and outside the presence of the 

jury).

3 For instance, it is hardly surprising that Dr. Northrup intends to testify that “an applicant’s 

response to Question 18A is significant because migraine headaches can be completely 

incapacitating, can come on suddenly, and can affect an applicant’s vision and ability to see 

clearly while piloting an aircraft.” Mot., Ex. 9 (letter).

4 At the hearing, Mr. Grant suggested that the late disclosures related to Dr. Northrup have 

prejudiced him because he has not yet been able to obtain copies of his safety records for trial. 

The issue may be moot because Mr. Grant expects to obtain the safety records shortly. However, 

if Mr. Grant does not obtain the records and thereafter moves for a continuance, he will have to 

show that it is the late disclosures of Dr. Northrup that actually gave rise to the need to obtain his 

safety records. At the hearing, the government argued that the need to obtain the safety records 

was clear long ago.

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C. Fourth Motion to Exclude Evidence Under Rule 16 (Docket No. 59)

Mr. Grant has moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. Gabbay, as well as a letter he wrote 

to Mr. Grant, as untimely pursuant to Rule 16. The motion is DENIED.

The Court addresses first the testimony of Dr. Gabbay. For purposes of this opinion, the 

Court assumes that Rule 16 is applicable.5 With this assumption, the critical question is – similar 

to above – whether the delay in disclosure of the witness interviews of Dr. Gabbay, the disclosure 

of which took place on or about January 17 and 21, 2020, has prejudiced Mr. Grant. As above, 

Mr. Grant has failed to identify any specific prejudice from the delayed disclosure, which is not 

surprising given that Mr. Grant has known of Dr. Gabbay long ago (as he was the AME who 

issued Mr. Grant’s 2017 and 2018 airman medical certificates). 

The Court therefore denies the motion to exclude Dr. Gabbay from testifying at the trial. 

However, in so ruling, the Court does not preclude Mr. Grant from moving for a continuance of 

the trial if he is able to articulate a specific bases as to how the delay in the disclosures related to 

Dr. Gabbay has prejudiced him. Furthermore, the Court shall allow Mr. Grant to voir dire Dr. 

Gabbay at trial but in advance of his testimony (and outside the presence of the jury).

As for the letter written by Dr. Gabbay (in which he terminated the physician-patient 

relationship), the Court also does not exclude the evidence because there is no showing of 

prejudice from the delayed disclosure. Indeed, the Court is hard pressed to see any prejudice 

because Mr. Grant has long known about the letter since the letter was written to him specifically. 

D. Fifth Motion to Exclude Evidence Under Rule 16 (Docket No. 60)

Mr. Grant has moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. Tauran as untimely pursuant to Rule 

16. The motion is DENIED.

The analysis above related to Dr. Gabbay is largely applicable here. That is, assuming 

Rule 16 is applicable, the critical issue is whether the delay in disclosure of the witness interview 

5 The government argues it does not, because the witness interviews of Dr. Gabbay constitute 

Jencks Act statements. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2) (providing that Rule 16 does not “authorize 

the discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective government witnesses except as 

provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500 [the Jencks Act]”); see also Opp’n at 4 (suggesting that the 

documents should not even be considered Jencks Act statements). 

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of Dr. Tauran, the disclosure of which took place on or about January 23, 2020, has prejudiced 

Mr. Grant. As above, Mr. Grant has failed to identify any specific prejudice, which is not 

surprising given that Mr. Grant has known of Dr. Tauran long ago (as he was a physician who 

examined Mr. Grant in conjunction with his VA disability claim for his headaches).

In so ruling, the Court does not preclude Mr. Grant from moving for a continuance of the 

trial if he is able to articulate a specific bases as to how the delay in the disclosure related to Dr. 

Tauran has prejudiced him. Furthermore, the Court shall allow Mr. Grant to voir dire Dr. Tauran 

at trial but in advance of his testimony (and outside the presence of the jury).

E. Third Motion to Exclude Evidence of Benefits Fraud (Docket No. 56)

Mr. Grant has moved to exclude evidence that he committed benefits fraud because such 

evidence is irrelevant and would be highly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-03. The Court 

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Mr. Grant’s motion. The government shall not make any 

argument that Mr. Grant engaged in benefits fraud (against the VA). Indeed, such an argument 

would be inconsistent with the government’s position that Mr. Grant lied to the FAA. However, 

the government is not barred from relying on evidence related to Mr. Grant’s VA disability claim 

(including his VA medical records) in support of its claim that Mr. Grant made inconsistent 

statements and lied to the FAA. If the jury makes an inference that Mr. Grant either lied to the 

FAA or to the VA, that is a matter that cannot be avoided. That being said, the only charges at 

issue in the instant case are false statements to the FAA, and the government may not argue to the 

jury that Mr. Grant committed benefits fraud by lying to the VA.

VIII. GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Motion re Rule 404(b) (Docket No. 57)

The government has moved to admit certain evidence that could “be viewed as other 

potential crimes, wrongs, or acts” that fall within the rubric of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 

Mot. at 6. The evidence consists of (1) FAA Forms 8500-8 that Mr. Grant filled out for prior 

years (2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015), as well as omissions from those forms, and (2) Mr. Grant’s 

visits to health professionals for the three years prior to the dates that he filled out his 2017 and 

2018 FAA Forms 8500-8, as well as his failure to disclose such visits on his 2017 and 2018 forms. 

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See Mot. at 8-9. According to the government, the evidence should not be considered “other 

wrongs” evidence within the meaning of Rule 404(b) because it is inextricably intertwined with 

evidence concerning the crime charged – i.e., the evidence is “part of the transaction that serves as 

the basis of the criminal charge evidence and necessary to allow the government a coherent and 

comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime.” Mot. at 11; see also United States 

v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that there are “[t]wo general categories of 

other act evidence [that] may be ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a charged crime and thus 

exempted from the requirements of Rule 404(b)”). The government also argues that, even if the 

evidence were covered by Rule 404(b), it should still be admitted because the government would 

not be offering the evidence as character evidence (Rule 404(b)(1)) but rather for another purpose 

(Rule 404(b)(2)) – i.e., as proof of motive and intent. Finally, the government asserts that Rule 

403 is not a bar to the evidence because the probative value of the evidence is not “substantially 

outweighed by a danger of [e.g.] unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

In response, Mr. Grant states that he “has no objection to the government’s motion.” 

Opp’n at 1. Records of Mr. Grant’s visits to health professionals is inextricably intertwined with 

the evidence concerning the crime charged; the prior Form 8500-8 are also relevant to his motive 

and intent under Rule 404(b). Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the government’s motion 

and deems the evidence at issue admissible.

B. Motion to Permit Authentication Under Rule 902 Without Witnesses (Docket No. 57)

The government has moved for a Court ruling that certain documents are selfauthenticating public records – in particular, “(1) Defendant’s medical disability applications and 

rating decision[s] as well as his medical records from the Veterans Administration (VA); (2) the 

FAA Forms 8500-8; and (3) Defendant’s bank records.” Mot. at 15. The government notes that it 

has asked Mr. Grant to stipulate to the authenticity of such records.

In response, Mr. Grant states that he “has no objection to proceeding consistent with the 

rules as set forth by the government in its motion.” Opp’n at 1. As this amounts to an agreement 

to stipulate to the authenticity of the above documents (as confirmed by Mr. Grant at trial), the 

Court GRANTS the government’s motion. Given this ruling, the government need not offer 

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custodian of records to authenticate the above documents.

C. Motion to Preclude Evidence that Defendant Would Have Received Airman Medical 

Certificates (Docket No. 57)

The government has moved to preclude evidence that, if Mr. Grant “had revealed his 

medical history and the fact that he was receiving medical disability benefits, he would have 

obtained an airman medical certificate.” Mot. at 19. According to the government, it “is only 

required to show that Defendant’s false statements had the capability of influencing the FAA, not 

that Defendant would [actually] have been denied an airman medical certificate in 2017 and 2018 

based on them.” Mot. at 19 (emphasis added); see also 9th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instruction No. 

8.73 (listing essential elements for crime of false statement to a government agency under 18 

U.S.C. § 1001; identifying one element as follows: “the [statement] [writing] was material to the 

activities or decisions of the [specify government agency or department]; that is, it had a natural 

tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing the agency’s decisions or activities”); United 

States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1545 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that “[t]he materiality requirement of 

a [§ 1001] violation is satisfied if the statement is capable of influencing or affecting a federal 

agency[;] the false statement need not have actually influenced the government agency”). The 

motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

The Court agrees with the government that what the FAA would have done is not the issue, 

and therefore evidence and argument on what the FAA would have done had the answers on 

Questions 18(a) and 18(y) been truthful is not the issue and are thus excluded. That being, the 

Court does not agree with the government that Mr. Grant thereby cannot provide any evidence as 

to his medical condition or any evidence related to his safety record. That evidence is, at the very 

least, relevant to Mr. Grant’s subjective state of mind in responding to Question 18(a) (i.e., 

whether he had ever been diagnosed with or had frequent or severe headaches). To the extent the 

government has concerns about jury confusion, the jury will be instructed on the issue of 

materiality; in addition, the government is not barred from arguing to the jury that it is irrelevant 

what the FAA actually would have done and that the relevance of the evidence is with respect to 

state of mind.

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D. Motion to Preclude Defendant from Introducing Own Hearsay Statements (Docket No. 57)

The government has moved to preclude Mr. Grant from introducing his own hearsay 

statements “in his case-in-chief [as they are not opposing party statements under Rule 801(d)(2)], 

or ‘back door’ these statements by eliciting them from the government’s witnesses on cross 

examination.” Mot. at 57. Mr. Grant does not oppose the motion. It is therefore GRANTED.

E. Motion to Preclude Reference to Punishment (Docket No. 57)

The government has moved to preclude “any reference by the defense to the Defendant’s 

potential sentence during all phases of the trial” – including, e.g., “more subtle [references such 

as] ‘this case has serious consequences for my client’” and ‘the defendant’s liberty is at stake in 

this trial.’” Mot. at 21. In response, Mr. Grant states that he does not intend to “refer to specific 

penalties” but does intend to inform the jury (including in voir dire and in closing argument) that 

“this case involves the potential loss of liberty and serious consequences for Mr. Grant.” Opp’n at 

4. 

The government’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Mr. Grant shall not 

make reference to any specific punishment. In addition, he may not refer to any potential loss of 

liberty given that it is not clear what Mr. Grant’s sentence would actually be (e.g., if convicted, he 

might be eligible for probation which, although a kind of loss of liberty, is not incarceration and 

the “loss of liberty” as that term is likely to be perceived by the jury). Mr. Grant, however, may 

refer to serious consequences of conviction.

F. Motion to Exclude Character Witness Testimony (Docket No. 57)

In his witness list, Mr. Grant has identified four individuals who will provide testimony 

about his character and reputation for honesty.

1. Rob Will. 

2. Tracy Damico. 

3. Elizabeth Brokaw. 

4. Stephanie Grant. 

In its motion, the government suggests that, at most, Mr. Grant should be allowed to have 

only three of the above witnesses testify, as having more would be cumulative evidence with 

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“weak probative value and great potential to confuse the issues and prejudice the jury.” Mot. at 

22. The government also argues that, given the Federal Rules of Evidence, the testimony of the 

witnesses should be limited in certain respects. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (providing that, 

“[e]xcept for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove 

specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for 

truthfulness[;] [b]ut the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are 

probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . (2) another witness whose 

character the witness being cross-examined has testified about”) (emphasis added).

In his opposition, Mr. Grant states that he will comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence 

and that character evidence will take the form of opinion and reputation. 

The Court RESERVES ruling on the government’s motion. At this point, it is not clear 

whether having all four witnesses testify (as opposed to, e.g., three) would be cumulative, confuse 

issues, or prejudice the jury.

G. Objection to Defense Expert Dr. Gregory Pinnell (Docket No. 73)

Mr. Grant has designated Dr. Gregory Pinnell as an expert witness who will testify in his 

case-in-chief. The government has objected to the entirety of his testimony. Below are the subject 

matters on which Dr. Pinnell intends to testify, see Docket No. 68 (Def.’s Witness List at 2), and 

the Court’s rulings thereon. As detailed below, the objection is SUSTAINED in part and 

DENIED in part.

• “None of Mr. Grant’s diagnoses would have resulted in denial of his FAA medical 

certificate.” Dr. Pinnell cannot testify on this subject matter. What the FAA would 

have done is irrelevant; the issue is whether Mr. Grant’s statements were capable of 

influencing the agency.

• “The term ‘frequent and severe’ headaches [as used in FAA Form 8500-8] is not 

synonymous with the term ‘tension’ headaches [with which Mr. Grant was 

diagnosed].” Dr. Pinnell is allowed to testify on this subject matter. 

• “There is no quantitative measurement for ‘prostrating’ headaches [a term used by 

the VA in assessing Mr. Grant’s claim for disability benefits].” Dr. Pinnell is 

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allowed to testify on this subject matter. 

• “‘Prostrating’ headaches might or might not be ‘frequent’ or ‘severe.’” Dr. Pinnell 

is allowed to testify on this subject matter. 

• “There is no evidence of any mental disorder with respect to Mr. Grant.” Mr. Grant 

has withdrawn this subject matter testimony as the government is not claiming any 

mental disorder.

• “The VA strongly encourages veterans, during out-processing, to service connect 

all conditions in order to establish a basis for future benefits including disability 

and healthcare (that is, to avoid being denied coverage for a worsening condition). 

Advice is given through the Transition Assistance Program and through Veteran 

Service Officers (advisers).” On the current record, Dr. Pinnell has not 

demonstrated a sufficient basis on which to provide the opinion, nor does he 

specify any methodology on how he derived that opinion. Further, it does not 

appear to be relevant (i.e., even if the VA encourages veterans to connect 

conditions to service, it does not follow that veterans were encouraged to fabricate 

or exaggerate medical conditions in applying for VA benefits). If Mr. Grant 

believes that Dr. Pinnell may opine on narrow subject matters relevant and 

adequately supported, then he must disclose that opinion by February 19, 2020.

• “Discrepancies between VA benefits and information reported on FAA Form 8500-

8 are not uncommon. The FAA has often allowed veteran pilots to correct such 

discrepancies.” Again, there is a Daubert problem with the subject matter 

testimony; no bases or methodology for his opinion is disclosed. If Mr. Grant 

seeks to submit a revised disclosure, he must do so by February 19, 2020.

• “Regarding FAA 8500-8, Question 18(y) [asking about medical disability benefits] 

was not on the original form and was added later. The corresponding guide (issued 

by MedXpress) gives no guidance re Question 18(y).” Because Question 18(y) has 

been on the form since 2011 (i.e., before Mr. Grant ever submitted any application 

to the FAA), the first part of the testimony is irrelevant; accordingly, Dr. Pinnell 

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cannot testify on that specific subject matter. As for whether there is guidance for 

18(y), Dr. Pinnell may provide testimony on that specific fact. 

Any objection by the government to revised disclosures must be filed by 12:00 p.m., 

February 20, 2020.

IX. JURY VOIR DIRE

The Court shall conduct its own voir dire guided by the voir dire proposed jointly and 

separately by the parties, and thereafter shall allow each party twenty (20) minutes to voir dire the 

jury.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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