Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15257/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15257-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Doe
Appellee
Interstate Equipment Leasing Incorporated
Appellant
Chad Killibrew
Appellant
Jerry Moyes
Appellant
Joseph Sheer
Appellee
Swift Transportation Company Incorporated
Appellant
Virginia Van Dusen
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VIRGINIA VAN DUSEN; JOSEPH

SHEER; JOHN DOE 1, individually

and on behalf of all other

similarly situated persons,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION

COMPANY INCORPORATED;

INTERSTATE EQUIPMENT

LEASING INCORPORATED; CHAD

KILLIBREW; JERRY MOYES,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 15-15257

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-00899-JWS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 16, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed July 26, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and Sandra S.

Ikuta and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

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2 VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION

Opinion by Chief Judge Thomas;

Concurrence by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY*

Arbitration / Appellate Jurisdiction

Dismissing an interlocutory appeal from a district court’s

case management order in a labor law case, the panel held

that the Federal Arbitration Act did not grant it jurisdiction to

hear the appeal.

In a prior appeal, the court of appeals held that the district

court, rather than an arbitrator, must decide whether the

dispute was exempt from arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 1,

which provides that the Federal Arbitration Act does not

apply to contracts of workers engaged in foreign or interstate

commerce. On remand, the district court issued a scheduling

order for discovery and a trial on the § 1 issue.

The panel held that the district court’s order was not final

and was not subject to review under the collateral order

doctrine. In addition, the order was not reviewable under

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) on the basis that it had the practical

effect of denying a motion to compel arbitration.

Concurring, Judge Ikuta agreed with the majority’s

holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an

interlocutory appeal from the district court’s case

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 3

management order. She wrote that for the reasons explained

in her dissent to the panel’s other opinion in this matter, Van

Dusen v. Swift, No. 15-70592, — F.3d — (9th Cir. 2016), the

defendant nonetheless was entitled to a writ of mandamus.

COUNSEL

Ronald J. Holland (argued), Ellen M. Bronchetti, and Paul S.

Cowie; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, San

Francisco, California; for Petitioners-Appellants.

Edward Tuddenham (argued), New York, New York; Dan

Getman and Lesley Tse, Getman & Sweeney PLLC, New

Paltz, New York; Jennifer Kroll and Susan Martin, Martin &

Bonnett PLLC, Phoenix, Arizona; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

OPINION

THOMAS, Chief Judge:

We must determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act

(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., grants us jurisdiction to hear an

interlocutory appeal from a district court’s case management

order. We conclude it does not, and we dismiss the appeal for

lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I

Virginia Van Dusen and Joseph Sheer are interstate truck

drivers who entered into contracts with Swift Transportation

Company, Inc. (“Swift”) and Interstate Equipment Leasing,

Inc. (“Interstate”). Van Dusen and Sheer each agreed to drive

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4 VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION

trucks, Interstate agreed to finance the trucks, and Swift

agreed to pay Van Dusen and Sheer for their services. The

contracts designated Van Dusen and Sheer as independent

contractors, not employees. Each contract also contained a

clause to arbitrate “[a]ll disputes and claims arising under,

arising out of or relating to [the] [a]greement[s].”

Van Dusen eventually terminated her contract with Swift. 

Swift separately terminated its contract with Sheer. Van

Dusen and Sheer (collectively “Van Dusen”) later filed a

collective and class action complaint against Swift, Interstate,

and senior executives at both companies (collectively

“Swift”). The complaint alleged that Swift misclassified Van

Dusen and others as independent contractors. The complaint

also alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., the California Labor Code, New

York labor laws, state and federal minimum wage laws, and

laws prohibiting forced labor, among other claims.

The lawsuit was filed in the Southern District of New

York and later transferred to the District of Arizona. In

Arizona, Swift moved to compel arbitration and dismiss or

stay the district court action. Van Dusen objected that § 1 of

the FAA prevented the district court from compelling

arbitration. That section provides that the FAA does not

apply to “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad

employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign

or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. The district court

granted Swift’s motion to compel arbitration. The court also

determined that an arbitrator should decide whether the § 1

exemption applies to the parties’ agreement. The court

subsequently denied Van Dusen’s motion to reconsider or

certify an appeal.

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VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 5

Van Dusen petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. 

In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Van

Dusen I”). Van Dusen argued that the district court

committed clear error when it referred the § 1 issue to the

arbitrator—that the issue should properly be decided by a

court. Id. We agreed with Van Dusen that the “the best

reading of the law requires the district court to assess whether

a [§] 1 exemption applies before ordering arbitration.” Id. at

846. This determination resolved the underlying legal

question. However, we concluded that the district court did

not clearly err because of “the lack of controlling precedent,”

which “render[ed] the question relatively close.” Id. The

petition was denied. Id.

Following Van Dusen I, Van Dusen moved for

reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration, or, in the

alternative, to certify an interlocutory appeal. The district

court denied the portion of the motion requesting

reconsideration, noting that it “continue[d] to believe its

original opinion” referring the § 1 inquiry to an arbitrator was

“correct, particularly in light of the fact that the parties agreed

to arbitrate questions of arbitrability.” The district court then

certified an interlocutory appeal.

On appeal, we clarified that the district court—not an

arbitrator—must decide the § 1 issue. Van Dusen v. Swift

Transp. Co., 544 F. App’x 724 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Van Dusen

II”). We concluded that the position in Van Dusen I was law

of the case and binding on the district court. Id. at 724. We

remanded with instructions to “determine whether the

Contractor Agreements between each appellant and Swift are

exempt under § 1 of the FAA before . . . consider[ing] Swift’s

motion to compel.” Id. Swift petitioned the Supreme Court

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6 VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION

for a writ of certiorari and was denied. Swift Transp. Co. v.

Van Dusen, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (2014).

The district court then set out to determine the § 1

exemption issue. It issued a scheduling order for discovery

and a trial to “determin[e] issues relating to plaintiffs’ status

as employees or independent contractors.” Swift moved for

an order to stay proceedings, including discovery, and for an

order setting a briefing schedule to determine the § 1 issue

without resort to discovery and trial.1 The court denied

Swift’s motion. It also concluded that the order was not

immediately appealable. This interlocutory appeal followed.

II

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we only have appellate

jurisdiction over “final decisions” of district courts. Id.

Thus, with certain exceptions, we lack appellate jurisdiction

over interlocutory appeals from orders of the district court

issued before final judgment. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.

304, 309 (1995). Congress, of course, may by statute invest

us with jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders. District

courts may certify a decision for interlocutory appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or certify a summary

judgment order as final under Fed. R. Civ P. 54(b).

The Supreme Court has also confirmed our appellate

jurisdiction over “a small category of decisions that, although

they do not end the litigation, must nonetheless be considered

1 Swift fashioned its motion as a “Motion to Determine Appropriate

Standard for Resolution of the Section 1 Exemption Issue.” The motion

requested that the district court “set a briefing schedule to determine the

section 1 exemption without resort to merits discovery and two trials.”

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VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 7

‘final.’” Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42

(1995). This “collateral order doctrine” is a “practical

construction” of the concept of finality in 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.

863, 867 (1994) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). “That small category

includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve

important questions separate from the merits, and that are

effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment

in the underlying action.” Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citing

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546). In turn, we have given the concept

of “finality” the following practical construction: “A ruling is

final for purposes of § 1291 if it (1) is a full adjudication of

the issues, and (2) clearly evidences the judge’s intention that

it be the court’s final act in the matter.” Nat’l Distrib. Agency

v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 433 (9th Cir.

1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, we are presented with an interlocutory appeal from

a scheduling and case management order. The order was not

“a full adjudication of the issues,” nor did it “clearly

evidence[] the judge’s intention that it be the court’s final act

in the matter.” Id. The order was not “conclusive”; it did not

“resolve important questions separate from the merits”; nor

did it involve a decision “that [is] effectivelyunreviewable on

appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” 

Swint, 514 U.S. at 42. Much to the contrary, it was a routine

order following remand from this Court establishing a

procedure for pre-discovery disclosure, and a schedule for

discovery, the filing of dispositive and nondispositive

motions, and a trial, if necessary. Thus, it does not fall within

that “small category” of orders subject to interlocutoryreview

under the collateral order doctrine.

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The district court did not certify the order for appeal. 

Consequently, we are confronted with the remaining question

of whether Congress has by statute created an exception to

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and vested us with appellate jurisdiction

over this type of order.

Congress has, to be sure, granted us appellate jurisdiction

over an order denying a petition to compel arbitration. 

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). However, the district court order did

not deny the petition to compel arbitration; it simply

established a case management plan for resolution of the § 1

exemption issue at a later date. We therefore lack appellate

jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).

Swift argues that the district court’s scheduling order “has

the practical effect of denying a motion to compel,” giving

rise to jurisdiction. Swift’s argument is that discovery and

trial will cause the district court to make determinations on

merits issues in the underlying dispute. These

determinations, Swift claims, will have a preclusive effect on

an arbitrator if the case is ultimately sent to arbitration. As a

result, Swift argues, resolution on briefing alone is less

hostile to arbitration. And because the FAA favors

arbitration, the district court must use briefing to decide the

§ 1 issue. So when the district court denied Swift’s motion

proposing briefing, Swift says, it effectively denied a motion

to compel arbitration—giving rise to jurisdiction under

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).

This argument is unpersuasive. First, the district court

has expressly deferred making a decision on the motion to

compel arbitration. One cannot construe a case management

order designed to lead to a decision on a motion to compel

arbitration as a decision to deny the motion. The district

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VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 9

court was simply establishing a decision-makingmechanism,

not deciding the question on the merits.

Second, the text of the provision that Swift relies on is

plain: “[a]n appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . .

denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order

arbitration to proceed.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). In this case,

there was no order denying a petition to compel arbitration. 

Jurisdiction does not obtain under the statute.

Third, we have never recognized an “effective denial”

theory that supplements appellate jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C.

§ 16. We interpret the text of FAA, including § 16, according

to its ordinary meaning. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.

Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (interpreting term in § 16

of the FAA according to its “ordinary meaning” where not

otherwise defined (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S.

255, 259–60 (1992)). In so doing, we do not add to the

jurisdictional provisions set forth by Congress. It is well

established that “statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly

construed.” Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S.

511, 515 (2007) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local

Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983)); Stoneridge Inv.

Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008) (it is

an “established principle that the jurisdiction of the federal

courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial

interpretation” (quoting Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,

341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951)) (internal quotations omitted)). We

cannot expand the scope of § 16(a)(1)(B) to embrace an

“effective denial” theory based on an unrelated order.

Fourth, Swift identifies no case in which a federal court

of appeal assumes § 16(a)(1)(B) jurisdiction without an order

denying a petition to compel arbitration. In four of the five

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cases Swift cites, the district court denied a motion to

compel.2Jurisdiction under § 16(a)(1)(B) makes sense in

those cases. In the fifth case, the district court ordered

arbitration and the court of appeals assumed jurisdiction

based on a separate provision of § 16.3 None of Swift’s

authorities support the proposition it advances today: that

§ 16(a)(1)(B) permits an appeal from a denial of a motion to

compel, where no denial actually exists.

Fifth, an “effective denial” theory is inconsistent with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79. Green

Tree establishes that an order compelling arbitration and

dismissing all of the claims before a district court may be

 

2 Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360 F.3d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.

2004) (“The district court . . . order . . . specif[ied] that [party’s] petition

to compel arbitration before the NASD was denied”); Microchip Tech.

Inc. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 367 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The

district court denied Philips’ motion to compel arbitration”); Sandvik AB

v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Advent Funds

then moved to compel arbitration under the FAA. The District Court

refused . . . ”); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 363

(7th Cir. 1999) (“the district court refused to compel arbitration” and

“there is no doubt from the record that the district court denied the

defendant’s motion and clearly meant to foreclose arbitration”).

3

Stedor Enterprises, Ltd. v. Armtex, Inc., 947 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir.

1991) (“the district court dismissed Stedor’s complaint and ordered the

parties to proceed with arbitration”). The Fourth Circuit determined that

jurisdiction obtained under a separate provision, § 16(a)(3), which permits

appeals following a final order. And though Stedor contains the language

that “an order that favors litigation over arbitration . . . is immediately

appealable,” id. at 730, the Supreme Court later rejected this argument in

Green Tree, 531 at 86 (Noting, for example, that “[s]ection 16(a)(3) . . .

preserves immediate appeal of any ‘final decision with respect to an

arbitration,’ regardless of whether the decision is favorable or hostile to

arbitration.”).

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VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 11

appealed under § 16(a)(3). Id. at 89. Crucially, the Court

clarified that appeals under the FAA are limited to the

specific set of orders and decisions specified in § 16. Id. at

84 (“Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . governs

appellate review of arbitration orders.”). The Court declined

to adopt the view that, based on the FAA’s policy, the Act

permits the appeal of any interlocutory order hostile to

arbitration, but prevents the appeal of interlocutory any order

that favors it. Id. at 86. To the contrary, appeals under the

Act are limited to those specified in § 16.

Swift makes essentially the same argument here that the

Court rejected in Green Tree: that it may invoke the policy of

the FAA to expand the scope of appellate jurisdiction in § 16. 

Not so, says Green Tree. Review under § 16 is limited to

those types of orders specified in plain text of that section. A

contrary result would be inconsistent with Green Tree’s

statement that “[s]ection 16 . . . governs appellate review of

arbitration orders,” id. at 84, and with the prohibition against

judicial expansion of statutorygrants of appellate jurisdiction.

Following Green Tree, other circuits have affirmed that

the scope of 9 U.S.C. § 16 is confined to the specific, limited

set of orders set forth in the statute. The Tenth Circuit has

concluded that “9 U.S.C. § 16 directs us to exercise

jurisdiction only over a specific set of orders.” Grosvenor v.

Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 999 (10th Cir. 2013). In that

case, the court concluded that a district court’s decision to go

to trial on a formation issue under § 4 of the FAA “cannot

mean that everysubsequent order is immediatelyappealable.” 

Id. The Tenth Circuit has also rejected the view that § 16

jurisdiction arises from “all motions founded at least in part

on arbitration agreements.” Conrad v. Phone Directories Co.,

585 F.3d 1376, 1382 (10th Cir. 2009). Instead, appellate

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12 VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION

jurisdiction under § 16 only “encompass[es] motions brought

explicitly pursuant to the FAA or those in which it is plainly

apparent that the applicant seeks only arbitration.” Id. The

First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Campbell v. Gen.

Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir.

2005), where it held that because “[§] 16(a) clearly

enumerates the types of orders covered by the FAA’s various

jurisdictional shelters,” it is impermissible “to treat that

provision as a general mechanism permitting the immediate

appeal of any order hostile to arbitration.” The D.C. Circuit

has likewise rejected the argument that “any order hostile to

arbitration may be immediately appealed” because such an

interpretation “would significantly and improperly expand”

the scope of 9 U.S.C. § 16. Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., 333 F.3d 250, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

We agree that appellate jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C.

§ 16(a) is confined to the types of orders that are specified in

the statute. There is no “effective denial” principle through

which a litigant can bootstrap its way into appellate

jurisdiction. An actual order denying a petition to compel

arbitration is required when a party invokes 9 U.S.C.

§ 16(a)(1)(B).

In sum, this is not an appeal from a “motion[] explicitly

brought under the FAA or unmistakably invoking its

remedies.” Conrad, 585 F.3d at 1382. Swift instead seeks

review of the district court’s case management order. 

Because the district court did not “den[y] a petition . . . to

order arbitration to proceed,” there is no jurisdiction under

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).

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VAN DUSEN V. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 13

Absent statutoryauthorization, district court certification,

or application of the collateral doctrine, we lack appellate

jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it.4

DISMISSED.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, concurring:

The majority has issued two separate opinions in this

case. This opinion holds that we lack jurisdiction to hear an

interlocutory appeal from the district court’s case

management order. I agree with this conclusion.

But the majority has issued a second opinion denying

Swift’s petition for a writ of mandamus, see Van Dusen v.

Swift, No. 15-70592, — F.3d — (9th Cir. 2016), even though

the district court has made repeated errors and is forcing

Swift to litigate a matter that it may be entitled to arbitrate. 

For the reasons explained in my dissent to that opinion, I

would hold that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is

warranted in this case.

4 The motions for judicial notice of the existence of various district court

documents are GRANTED. See Docket Nos. 26, 37, 40.

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