Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-mc-80117/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-mc-80117-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shirley V. Remmert
Defendant
Julia C. Venoya
Defendant
Delfin M. Venoya
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELFIN M. VENOYA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHIRLEY V. REMMERT and JULIA C.

VENOYA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 07-80117M CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT'S

REQUEST TO PROCEED

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND REMANDING CASE

Defendant Shirley V. Remmert requests leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (IFP) so that she can remove a state court action,

Superior Court Case No. Civ. 438208, to this Court. In a previous

case, number C 06-6709 CW, Defendant also requested leave to

proceed IFP in order to remove this same state case to this Court. 

In case number C 06-6709 CW, Defendant's request to proceed IFP was

denied and the case was remanded to state court on the grounds that

there was no basis for federal jurisdiction and that her IFP

application was inadequate.

Case 4:07-mc-80117-CW Document 5 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states:

. . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that--

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

2

In this notice of removal, Defendant asserts that there is now

a basis for federal jurisdiction because an order of the state

court issued within the last thirty days denied "indispensable

parties of their constitutional and civil rights" and refers to her

attached Exhibit A which is an order by the state court denying

Defendant's request for a temporary restraining order

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that leave to proceed IFP

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is properly granted only when the

plaintiff has demonstrated poverty and has presented a claim that

is not factually or legally frivolous within the definition of

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).1 O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.

1990); Tripati v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370

(9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court "may deny leave to proceed in

forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the

proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit." 

Id. (quoting Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir.

1962); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 896 (1965)). An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous

if it has "no arguable basis in fact or law." O'Loughlin, 920 F.2d

at 617; Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1379; Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d

Case 4:07-mc-80117-CW Document 5 Filed 06/07/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).

The Supreme Court holds that dismissal prior to service under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is appropriate where no legal interest is

implicated, i.e., the claim is premised on a meritless legal

theory, or clearly lacking any factual basis. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) accords judges the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual

allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are

clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). 

Because a dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) is not a dismissal

on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court's discretion

under the in forma pauperis statute, the dismissal does not

prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same

allegations. Id.

Although requests to proceed IFP are usually brought by

plaintiffs, it is reasonable to apply § 1915(e)(2)(B) to Defendant

in this case who is requesting to proceed IFP in order to remove a

state action to this Court. In this case, the notice of removal is

similar to the pleadings in a case brought by a plaintiff. 

Therefore, the Court will review the notice of removal to determine

if it provides sufficient grounds for federal jurisdiction.

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to

federal district court so long as the district court could have

exercised original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447 provides that if at any time

before judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over a case previously removed from state

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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court, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). On a

motion to remand, the scope of the removal statute must be strictly

construed. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

"The 'strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction means that

the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is

proper." Id. Courts should resolve doubts as to removability in

favor of remanding the case to State court. Id.

Ordinarily, federal question jurisdiction is determined by

examining the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). When a

plaintiff has suffered an injury that could give rise to both

federal and State causes of action, the plaintiff "is free to

ignore the federal cause of action and rest the claim solely on a

state cause of action." Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726

F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1984). A case may not be removed to

federal court on the basis of a federal defense, even if the

defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if

both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question

truly at issue. Franchise Tax Board of State of Cal. v.

Construction Laborer Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1,

12 (1983). Nor may a complaint be removed on the basis of the

defendant's federal-question counter-claim. The Rath Packing Co.,

v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1976).

In her notice of removal, Defendant claims federal question

jurisdiction based on the fact that the state court denied her

motion for a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff which

she contends denied "indispensable parties their constitutional

Case 4:07-mc-80117-CW Document 5 Filed 06/07/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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rights." However, federal question jurisdiction is determined from

the face of the complaint at the time the complaint is filed

unaided by answer, not upon a possible or conjectural controversy

that appears in the future after the complaint is filed. Gully v.

First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936); Santa Margarita Mut.

Water Co. v. State Water Rights Bd., 165 F. Supp. 870, 876 (S.D.

Cal. 1958) ("Original jurisdiction of the Federal court, sufficient

in the first instance to have maintained the action sought to be

removed is a pre-requisite to removal. . . . The mere fact that

during the course of the proceedings, a Federal question may arise

is not ground for removal."). Therefore, the fact that the state

court denied Defendant's motion for a temporary restraining order,

which she interprets as a denial of her constitutional rights, is

insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state complaint. 

Furthermore, in her notice of removal, Defendant alludes to

the fact that Plaintiff's complaint contains a claim against her

for violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 

Notice of Removal at 4. Defendant does not attach the entire

complaint to her notice of removal, as is required under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446. However, she attaches the caption of Plaintiff's second

amended complaint to a document titled, "Defendant Emmert's Third

Party Complaint Against G. & A. Ramirez/Exhibit A." The caption

sheet lists twenty-nine state law causes of action; there is no

mention of a cause of action for violation of the ADA. Defendant's

allusion to a claim against her under the ADA without providing the

support for this allusion is insufficient to establish federal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Defendant's application to proceed IFP is still

insufficient. She indicates that she is self-employed and earns

$1,500 per month. She indicates that her expenses are $500 per

month. Therefore, it appears that Defendant has $1,000 per month

in disposable income. This does not establish that Plaintiff is

impoverished to the extent that she is unable to pay the costs of

this action.

Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant's application to proceed IFP

and finds that the notice of removal does not state a valid basis

for federal jurisdiction. The case is remanded to the superior

court of San Mateo County. Defendant shall not attempt to remove

this case in the future.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/7/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VENOYA et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

REMMERT et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-80117 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on June 7, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Shirley V. Remmert

Women's Correctional Center

#1112552

1590 Maple Street - Dorm C-34

Redwood City, CA 94063

Dated: June 7, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:07-mc-80117-CW Document 5 Filed 06/07/07 Page 7 of 7