Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-30304/USCOURTS-ca9-06-30304-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elmer J. Clark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

DOCKETED NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 1 6 2007 

CATHY A. CATTERSOVCLERK 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

V. 

ELMER JAY CLARK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 06-30304 

D.C. No. CR-05-0289-TSZ 

MEMORANDUM* 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Washington 

Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2007 

Seattle, Washington 

Before: O'SCANNLAIN and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and HADDON**, District 

Judge. 

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 

** The Honorable Sam E. Haddon, District Judge for the District of 

Montana, sitting by designation. 

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Elmer J. Clark (Clark) appeals the district court's denial of his motion to 

suppress. The district court's finding of abandonment was clear error as there was 

insufficient evidence to objectively establish a denial of ownership or voluntary 

physical relinquishment by Clark of the property containing evidence sought to be 

suppressed. However, the search was conducted incident to a lawful arrest. Clark 

suffered no prejudice from the district court's reaching a proper result using 

erroneous rationale. Reversal is neither necessary nor appropriate. See United 

States v. Doe, 136 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. CastilloFelix, 539 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Todhunter, 297 F.3d 886, 

889 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the court may affirm the district court's denial of a 

motion to suppress "on any basis fairly supported by the record') (quoting 

United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Clark also challenges the district court's consideration of evidence of 

predicate prior convictions in classifying him as a career criminal. Prior 

convictions are appropriate for consideration as sentencing factors. AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998). The Judge, when applying the 

Armed Criminal Career Act based upon prior guilty pleas, is "generally limited to 

examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, 

transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to 

which the defendant assented." Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). 

Here, the district court properly reviewed charging documents, transcripts of plea 

colloquies, written plea agreements, and findings of fact of record for six of 

2 

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Clark's prior convictions as explicitly authorized by Shepard. 

AFFIRMED. 

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United States v. Clark, No. 06-30304 

BERZON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

FILED 

APR 1 6 2007 

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 

I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the district court's ruling on the 

suppression motion on the abandonment ground and remand. The search-incidentto-arrest theory upon which the majority affirms was not reached by the district 

court, although it was raised, first, in the government's opposition to the motion to 

suppress. 

The theory on which the majority affirms rests on factual premises that have 

not been resolved, necessary to determine whether there was probable cause to 

arrest for resisting arrest and related offenses (none of which were ever 

prosecuted). See United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (noting the search-incident-to-arrest theory involves a mixed 

question of fact and law). The unresolved factual issues include, for example, 

whether Officer Kaffer instructed Clark to stop prior to grabbing him and whether 

Officer Clark pushed Clark off of the landing of the trailer and thereby created a 

danger of serious injury. See State v. Bradley, 10 P.3d 358, 361 (Wash. 2000) 

(holding that the actual risk of serious injury is a defense to the charge of 

assaulting a police officer); State v. Little, 806 P.2d 749, 753 (Wash. 1991) 

(holding that probable cause to arrest for obstruction exists when a defendant 

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"refus[es] to stop when instructed to do so" pursuant to a valid Terry stop): Also, 

there has been no finding concerning whether the pouch in which the gun was 

found was within the area that would satisfy the search incident to arrest criteria. 

See United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A legitimate 

'search incident to arrest' is limited to the arrestee's person and to the area 'within 

his immediate control,' meaning 'the area from within which he might gain 

possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." (quoting Chimel v. California, 

395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969))). 

The defendant's brief asked for a remand if the abandonment ground was 

found improper. I believe that is exactly the relief that is appropriate. The plea 

agreement in this case allows the defendant to withdraw his plea if the ruling on 

the motion to suppress was reversed, and the government to reprosecute. Should 

the defendant not withdraw the guilty plea on remand, the conviction would stand. 

Should the guilty plea be withdrawn, the government could reprosecute, and could 

then seek a determination on the search-incident-to-arrest theory that was not 

decided by the district court on the first go round. 

1The probable cause for the firearms offense that was prosecuted was 

developed only as a result of the search. 

2 

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Proceeding via the shortcut sanctioned by the majority assumes factual 

determinations that have never been made. Because we may only affirm the denial 

of a motion to suppress "on any basis fairly supported by the record," United 

States v. Todhunter, 297 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting 

United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002)), I would not 

affirm on the present record. I therefore respectfully dissent. 

3 

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