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Parties Involved:
Ryan D. Krueger
Appellant
Peggy Miller
Appellee
State of Wisconsin
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 21, 2020*

Decided January 22, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2609

RYAN D. KRUEGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WISCONSIN and PEGGY 

MILLER, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin.

No. 19-C-1148

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ryan Krueger sued the state of Wisconsin and a family-court commissioner, 

alleging violations of his right—which he says arises under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act—to have an “advocate” accompany him during state-court proceedings. 

The district court dismissed his complaint at screening, concluding that Krueger failed 

 

* The district court dismissed the complaint in this case at screening, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), before any defendant appeared. The appellees are not participating in 

the appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 19-2609 Page 2

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

Because intervening events have rendered the appeal moot, we vacate the district 

court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.

In his complaint, Krueger alleges that the state-court commissioner, at a hearing

in a paternity case, denied his request for “an advocate; a military disability and PTSD 

specialist” to help him “level the court playing field.” This denial, he alleges, violated

Title II of the Act, which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability 

shall...be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities” of a public entity, such as a court. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II 

includes a duty to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities. 

See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531–33 (2004) (describing duty regarding accessibility 

of judicial services).

Krueger filed his federal complaint only 16 days after the commissioner denied 

his request. He asked the district court to “allow [him] to proceed in the [Wisconsin 

state court] with an advocate” and asserted that the matter was urgent because he was 

being prevented from seeing his children. The district court dismissed Krueger’s 

complaint at screening for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 

court stated that he does not have an absolute right to “counsel or an advocate” under 

the Act, noting that there is no such right in civil cases generally. Construing his 

complaint as also requesting visitation with his children, the court reasoned that the 

domestic-relations exception to subject-matter jurisdiction precluded its intervention. 

On appeal, Krueger argues that the district court misconstrued his complaint as 

requesting a “court-appointed” advocate when he instead requested permission to 

proceed with an advocate if he could obtain one, and, relatedly, that the Act requires 

that he be allowed an advocate in his state-court proceedings. 

Recent developments render Krueger’s appeal moot, however. As Exhibit A to 

his brief, Krueger attached a letter from the commissioner (dated 11 days after the 

district court dismissed his case) stating that Krueger is “certainly entitled to have an 

Advocate present” in court. The commissioner explained that during the earlier 

hearing, she had assumed that Krueger’s request for an “advocate” (without any further 

explanation from him) was for a court-appointed attorney. 

Krueger asserts that his “Case must [still] be fully redressed,” but he has already 

received the relief he sought. A controversy must remain live throughout all stages of 

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No. 19-2609 Page 3

litigation in order for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction. See Already, LLC v. Nike, 

Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013). Here, the state court will allow him to have an advocate 

of his choosing to assist him in navigating the proceeding. Although a defendant’s 

voluntary cessation of the offending conduct does not always moot a controversy, in 

this case, the state court explained that it simply misunderstood Krueger’s request, so 

we have no reason to expect that it would resume the alleged violation of Krueger’s 

rights. See id.

We note that Krueger has two other appeals pending that relate to the same 

underlying state-court case, and we therefore emphasize that our ruling here pertains 

only to the question of his entitlement to have an advocate with him in court. 

Insofar as Krueger challenges the district court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction 

over his claim requesting visitation with his children, the court properly invoked the 

domestic-relations exception to federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Struck v. Cook 

Cty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859–860 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Jones v. Brennan, 

465 F.3d 304, 306–07 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with 

instructions to dismiss as moot. 

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