Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03092/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
MDOW Insurance Company
Appellee
Kirk Manuel
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3092

___________________________

Kirk Manuel

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MDOW Insurance Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Helena

____________

 Submitted: April 16, 2015

 Filed: June 29, 2015

____________

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Kirk Manuel sued his insurance provider, MDOW Insurance Company, after

MDOW refused to cover the loss of Manuel’s house to a fire. A jury found in favor

of MDOW, and Manuel moved for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. 1

The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas.

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Manuel appeals the denial of his motion and contests the court’s admission of certain

evidence at trial. We reject his claims and affirm the judgment.2

I. Background

On September 14, 2011, Manuel’s home burned down while he and his family

were vacationing in Las Vegas. Manuel had insured his home through MDOW with

a policy providing $150,000 for the house, $75,000 for personal property, and

$45,000 for added costs. Manuel filed a claim for the fire, but MDOW denied it. 

MDOW told Manuel that it believed he or someone acting on his behalf had

intentionally set the fire and that Manuel’s claim form contained fraudulent

information.

Manuel sued MDOW in Arkansas state court for breach of contract, and

MDOW removed the case to federal court. During the trial, Richard Eley testified as

an expert witness for MDOW. Manuel did not object to Eley’s testimony or

certification as an expert witness. Eley testified that he had nearly 40 years of

experience investigating fires. He opined that someone had intentionally set the fire

that destroyed Manuel’s home. He reached this conclusion after eliminating other

potential causes of the fire and after speaking with Manuel. Counsel for Manuel

questioned Eley extensively about his methods, comparing them to those detailed in

the National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion

Investigations (NFPA 921). Counsel noted that NFPA 921 recommends against

3

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2

“The NFPA is a nonprofit organization dedicated to fire prevention, and

3

NFPA 921 is a document intended to ‘establish guidelines and recommendations for

the safe and systematic investigation or analysis of fire and explosion incidents.’” 

Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing NFPA 921

§1.2.1).

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using a “negative corpus” method, which involves “eliminating all ignition sources

found, known, or believed to have been present in the area of origin” to prove the fire

was set intentionally. NFPA 921 § 18.6.5 (2011). Eley insisted that everything he

did “was scientific, and it followed NFPA 921.” But Eley also disagreed with some

parts of NFPA 921, including its description of negative corpus:

And what I believe negative corpus would be is if I came into this room

and all I had was the light fixtures and the switches and things like that,

I did not have a chance to talk to the owner or the last person in, and just

from just looking around and saying, well, I don’t see anything that

could have caused it, well, boom, you know, that in my mind might be

negative corpus.

On the other hand, if you do a physical examination of everything in the

area where the fire started and you can’t find anything in that area that

shows evidence that it caused a fire, and then I’m able to talk to the

owner, like Mr. Manuel, or whoever the last person was in the house at

the time of the fire, and they gave me all the information that I’ve talked

about already from him, that nothing was on, there was no problems,

nothing stored in the house of a flammable nature, I believe that goes

beyond the negative corpus . . . . 

That additional human element, Eley posited, led himto the only possible conclusion:

The fire had been intentionally set. 

After a three-day trial, a jury returned a special verdict in MDOW’s favor after

deliberating for only 45 minutes. The jury found that MDOW proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that Manuel “either burned his home or caused it to

be burned.” The jury did not decide whether Manuel had intentionally

misrepresented information during the fire investigation.

Manuel then moved for a new trial. He swore in an affidavit that two

jurors—Juror W and Juror C—had failed to disclose relationships with five of his

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witnesses. Manuel asserted that these two jurors had either actual or implied bias

based on these undisclosed relationships. Manuel also attached affidavits from his

witnesses. One witness, Corey Watson, said that Juror W is his cousin. Watson, 4

however, did not know Juror W was on the jury until Watson made eye contact with

the juror during the trial. According to Watson, the two had attended a family funeral

together several weeks before trial. Nicholas Skinner, a named witness who was in

the court during the trial but did not testify, said that Juror W had once halted a fight

between Skinner and another student when Skinner was in junior high school. 

Skinner had a knife during the fight. Manuel’s son Deangelo Manuel, who did testify

at trial, said in his affidavit that Juror W was a coach and teacher at the junior high

school and the high school he had attended. Deangelo Manuel also said that his

mother, Tawanna Manuel, had once introduced him to Juror W in 2004 or 2005.

Manuel also attached affidavits from two witnesses who said they knew

Juror C. Testifying witness Jacqueline Strother said that Juror C was a childhood

friend, and the two had attended the same “middle, junior high, and high school.” 

Strother said that Juror C married a man to whom Strother was once engaged. 

Melissa Cartwright said that Juror C was an art teacher and had taught Cartwright’s

autistic son. Cartwright said she also had once met Juror C during a meeting with all

of Cartwright’s son’s teachers. She stated in her affidavit that she had testified at the

trial; but in fact, neither party called her as a witness, and she never testified.

The district court rejected Manuel’s arguments and denied the motion. The

court noted that the Eighth Circuit has not adopted an “implied bias” test of juror

impartiality. The court concluded that, even under that test, there was insufficient

potential bias alleged to warrant a new trial. Although Juror W is a cousin of one

witness, the court noted, the evidence showed that they are not “close relatives” as is

required to presume bias. Nor had Manuel submitted evidence to establish that any

We note that Juror W’s last name is not Watson.

4

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witness was actually biased against him because of a preexisting relationship. 

Manuel now appeals.

II. Discussion

a. Motion for New Trial

Manuel first argues that the district court wrongly denied his motion for a new

trial. He says that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether Jurors W and C had actual bias. He asserts that the jurors’ undisclosed

relationships with some of his witnesses “gives rise to a natural inference” that they

were being dishonest about their ties to the case, rather than merely inaccurate about

whom in the trial they knew. Alternatively, Manuel implores this court to adopt an

implied bias test at least with respect to Juror W, who is a cousin of a witness.

This court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. 

Hiser v. XTO Energy, Inc., 768 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2014). The question before

this court is whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision, not

whether one would have. Id. To receive a new trial based on concealed juror bias,

Manuel had to prove “(1) that the juror answered dishonestly, not just inaccurately;

(2) that the juror was motivated by partiality; and (3) that the true facts, if known,

would have supported striking the juror for cause.” United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d

762, 770 (8thCir. 2006); see McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.

548, 556 (1984) (holding that to obtain a new trial based on concealed juror bias,

“a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material

question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have

provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause”).

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1. Juror W

For proof of Juror W’s bias, Manuel points to more than just his witnesses’

affidavits. During jury selection the district court read a list of anticipated witnesses

to the potential jurors. The court admonished the jurorsto answer counsels’ questions

honestly and to disclose whether they knew either party or any witness. Juror W

explained that he was a retired teacher from Central High School, which at least one

potential witness had attended. Specifically, Juror W admitted that he knew Brett

5

Ford, one of Manuel’s witnesses, whom he had taught several years earlier. Juror W

said he did not believe that relationship would affect his impartiality as a juror. 

Neither party moved to strike Juror W for cause. Juror W did not disclose a

relationship with any other witness. After Tawanna Manuel testified, however,

Juror W told the district court that he knew Tawanna from her time in school. He told

the court he did not believe that relationship would affect his impartiality. Neither

party moved to exclude Juror W.

Manuel asserts that Juror W revealed “his more innocuous relationships” that

would not prevent his serving on a jury but did not disclose his relationships with the

other witnesses. Manuel cites the affidavits of Skinner and Deangelo Manuel as

evidence thatJuror W intentionally withheld evidence of his relationships with those

witnesses. Manuel says that Juror W’s failure during jury selection to identify these 

other two witnesses as individuals he had known or taught in school establishes a

pattern of dishonesty that, if exposed, would have led to a challenge for cause. 

Both Skinner and Deangelo Manuel swore in their affidavitsthatJuror W also 5

had taught at the junior high school they attended. Deangelo Manuel also swore that

Juror W taught at a different high school that Tawanna Manuel had attended. 

Juror W did not confirm during jury selection whether he had taught at numerous

schools; he said only that he had retired from Central High School in 2010.

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We disagree with Manuel’s assessment of the evidence. First, neither

Deangelo Manuel nor Skinner says that Juror W was his teacher: Deangelo Manuel

says only thatJuror W was a teacher at his junior high school whom he had once met,

and Skinner says Juror W once broke up a fight involving Skinner. Moreover,

Skinner did not testify. And there is no evidence that Juror W even saw Skinner or,

if he did, recognized him from the fight at the school.

Second, the “pattern” Manuel points to is illusory. As a teacher who had

recently retired, Juror W likely taught numerousstudents over the years. Yet, in their

affidavits, neither Deangelo Manuel nor Skinner identified himself as one of

Juror W’s former students. And, significantly, Juror W told the court about the two

former students he did recognize, Brett Ford and Tawanna Manuel. Though we are

not entirely sure what Manuel means by an “innocuous relationship,” we note that

Tawanna Manuel is Manuel’s ex-wife; and Juror Winformed the court and the parties

that he had been one of her teachers. Whatever Manuel’s definition, it is unclear how

the relationship between Juror W and Tawanna Manuel falls into the category of

“innocuous,” while the purported relationships to Deangelo Manuel and

Skinner—whom Juror W apparently did not teach and may not know at all—do not. 

Rather, the relationship between Juror W and the Plaintiff’s ex-wife would seem

particularly noteworthy and even more likely to create cause to excuse Juror W. Yet

after Juror W informed the court and the parties that he knew Tawanna Manuel,

neither party asked that he be excused. Counsel for Manuel expressly stated, “I don’t

have any problem with him.” 

Moreover, Juror W’s honesty about those relationshipssuggests he simply did

not remember the other witnesses. See Ruiz, 446 F.3d at 770 (noting that a juror’s

self-disclosure reflects the juror’s honesty). We presume that a prospective juror is

impartial. See Moran v. Clarke, 443 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2006). And Manuel

submitted no evidence to counter that presumption or to support his assertions that

Juror W dishonestly, rather than inaccurately or mistakenly, answered the questions

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during jury selection or was motivated to be partial. See McDonough Power Equip.,

464 U.S. at 556. 

Manuel also says Juror W’s “close familial relationship[]” to one witness,

Corey Watson, could have created “negative emotions.” Manuel asserts that the

district court should have granted a hearing to determine whether that relationship

“was close enough to give rise to implied bias.”

Though we have never adopted an implied-biastestfor juror partiality, we have

noted that “prejudice may be implied in certain egregious situations.” Sanders v.

Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d

748, 756 (8th Cir. 1992)). Implying bias, however, is limited to “extreme situations”

in which “the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the

litigation . . . [makes it] highly unlikely that the average person could remain

impartial in his deliberations.” Id. (quoting Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th

Cir. 1988)). Examples of an “extreme situation” include when a “juror is a close

relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction.” Id. at

792–93 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1981) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring)). We have relied on the examples from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence

when rejecting a claim of implied juror bias. See id. at 793; United States v. Tucker,

243 F.3d 499, 509 (8th Cir. 2001).

Corey Watson said he and Juror W are cousins and had attended a funeral

together weeks earlier. Manuel cites United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 145 (3d

Cir. 2012), for the proposition that “consanguinity is the classic example of implied

bias.” That may be so, but we think the familial relationship must resemble

something closer than what we have in this case to imply bias. Indeed, the court in

Mitchell likewise rejected “the most expansive formulations that categorically

presume bias whenever a juror shares any degree of kinship with a party in a case.” 

Id. at 146. That court noted that a distant relative generally “is unlikely to harbor the

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sort of prejudice that interferes with the impartial discharge of juror service.” Id. We

agree with that assessment. 

In this case, Watson says simply that he is a cousin of Juror W without

specifying whether he and Juror Ware first cousins or related more distantly. Watson

does not say that he traveled with Juror W to the funeral together, interacted with him

while there, or communicated with him since. And Watson said it was not until he

was on the stand and made eye contact with Juror W that he realized he knew

Juror W. As for Juror W himself, there is nothing in the record to suggest he

recognized Watson by name or appearance. These facts do not suggest that Watson

is a “close relative” ofJuror Wor that their relationship made it “highly unlikely” that

Juror W could not remain impartial. Manuel offers nothing to show that the familial

relationship between Juror W and Watson was sufficiently close to “engender

negative emotions,” as Manuel suggests. As the district court properly concluded,

this is not an “extreme case” in which bias should be implied.

2. Juror C

As he did regarding Juror W, Manuel asserts that Juror C’s actions during trial

provide additional evidence of bias. During Jacqueline Strother’s testimony, Juror C

mouthed to the district judge that she knew Strother. After Strother’s testimony, and

outside the presence of the jury, Juror C explained that the two went to school

together but had not remained friends. Juror C said she saw Strother where Strother

worked about one year before the trial. She said she did not believe that relationship

would affect her jury service. When given the opportunity, neither party questioned

Juror C about this relationship or moved for her removal. Juror C also taught the son

of another named witness, Melissa Cartwright, who ultimately did not testify at the

trial. Manuel says Juror C’s failure to disclose these relationships suggests that she

harbored actual bias against those witnesses and, thus, against Manuel.

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Again, we disagree with Manuel’s interpretation of the evidence. Strother said

that Juror C married a man to whom Strother was engaged when Strother was

18 years old. But Strother does not say that she ended her engagement because of

Juror C’s involvement or that Juror C is now her “rival,” as Manuel words it. Her

affidavit provides no added description of her relationship with Juror C other than

that the two were “childhood friends” and attended the same schools. And even if

there is unspoken ill-will between these two, Manuel points to nothing in the record

to suggest Juror C has an actual bias against Manuel or that her adverse relationship

with Strother led her to vote in favor of MDOW. See United States v. Gianakos, 415

F.3d 912, 923 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to replace

juror because defendant provided no evidence that the juror was biased against him).

And, like Juror W had, Juror C informed the court and the parties that she

recognized Strother after Strother entered the courtroom to testify. Juror C

acknowledged the childhood relationship they had but said she did not believe it

would affect her partiality. Juror C’s self-disclosure suggests her honesty, not an

intent to deceive. See Ruiz, 446 F.3d at 770. Moreover, Manuel did not move to

strike Juror C or note any concern about her remaining on the jury after she revealed

her past with Strother. See Crimm v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 750 F.2d 703, 708 (8th Cir.

1984) (rejecting claim of juror bias because during voir dire appellant expressly

agreed to keep juror on panel). As for Melissa Cartwright, she did not testify at trial,

though she swore in her affidavit that she did. Again, Manuel has failed to present

any evidence to support the conclusion that Juror C’s relationship with these two

witnesses showed improper bias.

Because there is no evidence that either juror had an actual bias against

Manuel, or that the circumstances presented an “extreme situation” from which we

could imply bias, we conclude that the district court properly denied the motion for

a new trial. Also, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion to

deny an evidentiary hearing on this issue. See United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d

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1082, 1095 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that district court should grant evidentiary hearing

only if allegations of misconduct are substantiated and serious). Manuel’s only

evidence of bias, other than the information the jurorsthemselves offered at trial, was

the affidavits provided by his witnesses. These affidavits are bereft of detail to

suggest a hearing would have provided the court more evidence of a serious issue of

misconduct. Such skeletal assertions are not enough to warrant an evidentiary

hearing. Cf. United States v. Schoppert, 362 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting

that party seeking evidentiary hearing on claimofjury taint “needs to make a showing

that his allegation is credible and that the prejudice alleged is serious enough to

warrant whatever action is requested”).

b. Fire Science Expert Testimony

Manuel next argues that the district court erred by allowing the testimony of

MDOW’s expert witness, Richard Eley. Manuel says the court should have rejected

Eley’s testimony because, Manuel insists, Eley relied on the “negative corpus”

method that NFPA 921 has rejected to determine the cause of the fire. Manuel asserts

that the jury’s verdict rested on this improper testimony, without which there is no

evidence that the fire was set intentionally.

Manuel did not move in limine to exclude Eley’s expert testimony, nor did he

object to the admission of Eley’s testimony during the trial. Thus, our review is for

plain error. See Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 626–27 (8th Cir. 2007). 

This court has qualified NFPA 921 as “‘a reliable method endorsed by a professional

organization’” for determining the cause of a fire. Russell, 702 F.3d at 455 (quoting

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (8th Cir.

2005)). Following NFPA 921 is not the only method of fire investigation that we

have approved. Id. But if an expert purports to have followed NFPA 921, he must

have followed it reliably, or his testimony may be excluded. Id. (citing cases).

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During direct examination, Eley did not acknowledge NFPA 921 nor did he say

he followed it. Counsel for Manuel first mentioned NFPA 921 on cross examination

and asked Eley whether he followed NFPA 921. Eley responded that his method

“was scientific, and it followed NFPA 921.” But Eley also testified that he

considered NFPA 921 “a guide” and “not accurate in every case.” He explained that

his method of investigating this fire was not “negative corpus” as NFPA 921 defines

it. Instead, he conducted “a physical examination of everything in the area where the

fire started” and then talked to Manuel. Manuel told Eley “that nothing was on, there

was no problems, nothing stored in the house of a flammable nature.” It was only

with Manuel’s added information, Eley testified, that he was able to conclude that the

fire was incendiary.

We have some concern about Eley’s testimony. On direct examination, he did

not say that he followed NFPA 921 when conducting his investigation; but later, on

cross examination he said that his investigation did follow that guide. Eley also

testified at trial that he disagreed with the NFPA 921 definition of negative corpus

and said he did not apply negative corpus methodology as he understood it. He then

proceeded to supply his own definition of negative corpus, as well as a description

of why he believed the methodology he used in the investigation of the Manuel fire

was not negative corpus. But the only difference Eley gave between NFPA 921’s

description of negative corpus and his own applied method wasthe “human element”

of speaking to Manuel about the condition of his home before he had left for

Las Vegas. And Manuel told Eley only that no appliances were left on and nothing

flammable wasleft in the house, allowing Eley to eliminate those additional potential

sources of the fire’s origin. Viewed in this way, the additional information Eley

relied on does not “go[] beyond the negative corpus” as Eley purported.

But even with these concerns, the admission of Eley’s testimony did not

amount to plain error for two reasons. First, Eley determined the origin of the fire

based on his observations at the scene and nearly 40 years of experience investigating

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fires. We have held that an expert may base his final determination of a fire’s cause

on those two factors. See Russell, 702 F.3d at 457; Shuck v. CNH America, 498 F.3d

868, 875 (8th Cir. 2007); Hickerson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Corp., 470 F.3d 1252,

1257 (8th Cir. 2006). Eley testified that after speaking with Manuel, he examined the

house while taking photographs of the damage. He determined that the area of origin

was in the southeast corner of the house near the kitchen where the damage was

heaviest because, as he explained, “it burns hotter there. It burned longer there, the

combustible materials would.” The wall studs also were missing, a sign of intense

heat; there was oxidation on one side of the stove and refrigerator, suggesting the

direction of the flames; and the wiring had melted and shorted. Because Manuel

assured Eley that nothing had been left on, there were no problems in the house, and

no new appliances were in the home, Eley concluded that the fire had been set

intentionally. 

Second, despite framing his argument on appeal as one against Eley’s expert

opinion, Manuel’s actual argument is that the jury should not have credited Eley’s

testimony. Manuel did not object to any part of Eley’s testimony describing his

methodology, his qualifications as an expert witness, or his observations and ultimate

conclusions. Instead, Manuel chose to cross examine Eley by pointing out possible

inconsistencies between the methods Eley used and what NFPA 921 prescribes. 

In particular, the jury heard how Eley defined “negative corpus” and that his

definition differed from that in NFPA 921. It is possible the jury could have found

that Eley’s definition was no different than the NFPA 921 definition, that he

improperly applied negative corpus methodology, and that MDOW had failed to offer

any evidence that the fire was intentional. That is likely the result Manuel had in

mind when adopting his strategy of challenging Eley’s testimony through

cross examination rather than a motion to exclude his expert testimony. Yet despite

the vigorous cross examination, the jury apparently credited Eley’s testimony

sufficiently to find in favor of MDOW. Thus, even if Eley’s conclusion regarding the

source of the fire was improper under NFPA 921’s definition of negative corpus, we

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cannot conclude that allowing his testimony, without any objection from Manuel,

prejudiced Manuel and thus constituted plain error. See Rush v. Smith, 56 F.3d 918,

922 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that under plain-error review, an error without objection

“is grounds for reversal only if the error prejudices the substantial rights of a party

and would result in a miscarriage of justice”).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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