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Parties Involved:
Clarence Armour
Appellant
Annie Pearl Bailey
Appellant
Quincy P. Barclay
Appellant
Betty Barker
Appellant
Dorothy Baums
Appellant
Monsanto Company
Appellee
Pharmacia Corporation
Appellee
Solutia, Inc
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-15621

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:01-cv-01407-KOB

ANTONIA TOLBERT, 

JOHNNY JONES, SR., 

Executor Administrator for Johnny Jones III (deceased), 

ALL PLAINTIFFS, 

SARAH E. CLOPTON, 

JUDY JONES, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

MONSANTO COMPANY, 

PHARMACIA CORPORATION, 

SOLUTIA, INC., 

 Defendants - Appellants.

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_______________________

No. 14-10967

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-01408-KOB

CLARENCE ARMOUR, 

ANNIE PEARL BAILEY, 

QUINCY P. BARCLAY, 

on behalf of themselves individually and all others similarly situated, 

BETTY BARKER,

DOROTHY BAUMS, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

MONSANTO COMPANY, 

PHARMACIA CORPORATION, 

SOLUTIA, INC., 

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(September 4, 2015)

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Before JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges, and WALKER,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The corporate appellants in the Tolbert litigation, Monsanto Company, 

Pharmacia LLC (formerly Pharmacia Corporation), and Solutia, Inc., appeal the 

district judge’s November 5, 2013, Order, denying their expedited motion for an 

injunction to protect the Final Judgment and Order, entered on September 9, 2003, 

pursuant to the settlement agreement in an extensive pollution action. The 

individual appellants in the Armour litigation appeal the district judge’s February 

3, 2014, Order, dismissing with prejudice their complaint to set aside the 2003 

Final Judgment and Order and to relitigate the claims in the Tolbert litigation under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) as a class action. We consolidated these 

related appeals; we affirm dismissal in the Armour case and dismiss as moot the 

appeal in the Tolbert case.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The 2003 Final Judgment and Order, which incorporated the Global 

Settlement Agreement and the Settlement Agreement, resolved the claims of 

18,000 individual plaintiffs for personal injuries and damage to real property 

 * The Honorable Mark E. Walker, United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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resulting from exposure to carcinogenic polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”),

1

produced and discharged by Monsanto at its plant in Anniston, Alabama. The 

PCBs polluted portions of Anniston and nearby areas, affecting humans and 

wildlife.2

Under the terms of the Final Judgment and Order, defendants settled 

plaintiffs’ claims for $300,000,000, which included healthcare services, 

pharmaceutical benefits for up to twenty years, a community health clinic in 

Anniston, health screening for plaintiffs, and educational benefits for minor 

plaintiffs. A Settlement Administrator oversaw the various settlement payments 

for the individual Tolbert plaintiffs. Significantly, the Final Judgment and Order, 

dated September 9, 2003, and signed by the district judge handling the case at that 

time, unequivocally states: “This Final Judgment and Order shall be binding on all 

parties to this action and on the entities that have accepted performance or 

payment obligations under the written settlement documents.” Final J. & Order ¶ 

 1 These PCBs, resulting from industrial use, were banned by Congress in 1979.

2 In their Consolidated, Amended, and Restated Complaint, filed October 9, 2003, plaintiffs 

represent “PCBs cause cancer, neurological deficits, liver disease, adverse skin conditions and 

other maladies in humans, as well as disease and death of several species of wildlife (some to the 

point of extinction).” Consolidated, Amended, & Restated Compl. ¶11. They further allege 

Monsanto disposed of PCBs and acid, containing PCBs, into the sewer system of its Anniston 

plant, which discharged into ditches that frequently flooded and carried PCBs onto surrounding 

property. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs allege Monsanto also dumped PCBs and PCB-contaminated 

substances into crude landfills they failed to maintain. Id. ¶ 17. Consequently, PCBs from the 

Monsanto Anniston plant were discharged into the atmosphere, soil, and waterways of Anniston. 

Id. ¶ 18. 

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11 (emphasis added). It further provides: “The Court shall retain complete 

jurisdiction of this action, all parties, and all related matters.” Id. ¶ 13. 

Regarding the binding effect on named plaintiffs, the Final Judgment and 

Order instructed plaintiffs to identify and add all persons to the complaint to which 

the Tolbert litigation applied. The judge ordered that these individuals be 

identified by filing “an amended complaint specifically naming each person 

subject to the tolling agreement as an additionally named plaintiff within thirty 

(30) days after entry of this Final Judgment and Order.” Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). 

The individuals added through the Consolidated, Amended, and Restated 

Complaint, filed October 9, 2003, were 7,159 people, who were not included in the

September 9, 2003, Final Judgment and Order. The cumulative total of individuals 

included in the Final Judgment and Order and the Consolidated, Amended, and 

Restated Complaint was 18,000.3 

The impetus for this case in district court and on appeal was the filing by 

271 of the 7,159 added plaintiffs through the 2003 Consolidated, Amended, and 

Restated Complaint of a new complaint against the same corporate defendants on 

July 30, 2013, which attempted to set aside the 2003 Final Judgment and Order 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) and to relitigate those claims under 

 3 The 18,000 individuals included plaintiffs in both the Tolbert litigation and Oliver v. 

Monsanto, No. 02-C-0836-S (N.D. Ala.), which the district judge consolidated. We do not 

address the Oliver litigation in this consolidated appeal. 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 as a class action.

4

 Armour v. Monsanto Co., 

No. 2:13-cv-01408-KOB ( N.D. Ala. filed July 30, 2013). The corporate 

defendants in the Tolbert litigation responded to the Armour complaint by filing an 

expedited motion for an injunction to protect and preserve the Final Judgment and 

Order in that case. A different district judge issued an order for the Tolbert

plaintiffs to show cause why defendants’ requested injunction should not be 

entered.

In their response, plaintiffs contend: “The Armour Plaintiffs along with more 

than 7,000 other people were nothing but names listed on an exhibit prepared by 

lawyers and filed 30 days after the final judgment was entered.” Plaintiffs’ 

Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause at 1-2. Because they were not part 

of the Tolbert litigation, the Armour plaintiffs maintain the Final Judgment and 

Order does not apply to them; consequently, they filed an independent action under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Significantly, the Tolbert plaintiffs 

admit “all of the Armour Plaintiffs were told by their lawyers and treated by the 

Tolbert Administrator as though they were bound by the Tolbert settlement 

 4 The Armour complaint states: “The Plaintiffs are 271 of the 7,159 people who were not 

before the Court on September 9, 2003 when the Court approved the settlement agreement, 

including attorney’s fees, in a final judgment and order but are persons whom the Court 

attempted to bind by the judgment and order the 7,159 people who were added to the case by 

Exhibits A and B to a ‘Consolidated, Amended and Restated Complaint’ in the Oliver and 

Tolbert cases filed by the counsel for the Plaintiffs on October 9, 2003, thirty days after the socalled ‘Final Judgment and Order’ was entered by the Court said persons had not previously 

been listed as Plaintiffs in the Oliver and Tolbert cases.” Armour Compl. ¶ 2. 

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agreement, including requiring that they pay the lawyers who claimed to be 

representing them in the Tolbert case.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 

On November 5, 2013, the district judge entered the order the Tolbert

defendants appeal. She denied defendants’ motion for an injunction to protect the 

Final Judgment and Order under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,

5 and 

permitted the Armour plaintiffs to proceed with their independent action under 

Rule 60(d). On February 3, 2014, the district judge entered the order the Armour

plaintiffs appeal. She determined they had not countered defendants’ motion to 

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) by failing to 

satisfy the standard for an independent action in equity, to state a plausible claim 

the Tolbert Final Judgment and Order was void, to show their claims were not

 5 The district judge denied the Tolbert defendants’ expedited motion for an injunction to 

protect the Final Judgment and Order under the All Writs Act, which states: “The Supreme Court 

and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 

of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1651(a); see Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A court 

may grant a writ under this act whenever it is calculated in the court’s sound judgment to achieve 

the ends of justice entrusted to it, and not only when it is necessary in the sense that the court 

could not otherwise physically discharge its duties.” (citation, internal quotation marks, ellipsis, 

and alteration omitted)). The judge invited the Armour plaintiffs to file an independent action 

under Rule 60, because she had found the Armour complaint facially to be a valid Rule 60, 

independent action. See Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 883 (11th Cir. 1989) 

(“Most significantly, the court explicitly invited the state plaintiffs to make their due process 

challenge in federal court pursuant to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion or through an independent 

action.” (emphasis added)). “[A] court may not issue an injunction under the All Writs Act if 

adequate remedies at law are available. Generally, if a party will have opportunity to raise its 

claims in the concurrent federal proceeding sought to be enjoined, that concurrent proceeding is 

deemed to provide an adequate remedy at law.” Ala. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 

1117, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). It remained for the Armour plaintiffs to 

establish their claims, which they attempted to do with multiple amended complaints. 

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barred by estoppel principles, to delineate how their allegations satisfied the 

requirements of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and to 

explain why the original district judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The 

Tolbert defendants and the Armour plaintiffs timely appealed the district judge’s 

respectively applicable November 5, 2013, and February 3, 2014, orders, which we 

have consolidated on appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

On the facts and record in these consolidated appeals, the resolution is 

governed by equitable estoppel, a question of law we review de novo. Bailey v. 

ERG Enters., LP, 705 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). It is settled law in this 

circuit that “‘[w]here one in whose favor a judgment is rendered accepts the 

benefits, he is estopped from questioning the validity, of the judgment in any 

subsequent litigation.’” Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 906 F.2d 645, 650 

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Livesay Indus., Inc. v. Livesay Window Co., 202 F.2d 

378, 382 (5th Cir. 1953)) (emphasis added). “Thus, a plaintiff should not be 

permitted to assert formally the existence of one state of facts in a claim against 

one party and accept benefits in satisfaction of that claim, and then maintain an 

action against another party on the ground that the facts first asserted did not 

exist.” DeShong v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 737 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 

1984).

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Although the Armour appellants had accepted funds and valuable benefits 

pursuant to the 2003 Final Judgment and Order, they sought to reopen the Tolbert

litigation to increase those benefits in 2013. Their proposed remedy does not

require them to return the money they have received for a decade; they conceded at 

oral argument that would be a practical impossibility. Consequently, the object of 

the Armour litigation is an inequitable remedy that conflicts with our circuit law 

under Zaklama. The Armour appellants have received the funds and benefits in the 

Final Judgment and Order that settled the Tolbert litigation, in which they were 

added plaintiffs, money and valuable benefits they are unable to return. 

In addition, the Armour appellants have failed to respond to the equity and 

estoppel arguments raised by the corporate appellees in their motion to dismiss, 

which was noted by the district judge in dismissing their case. Since they have not 

addressed these arguments on appeal, they have abandoned them. See Sapuppo v. 

Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When an 

appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the 

district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of 

that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”); Hamilton v. 

Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (recognizing 

a party abandons an issue “by failing to list or otherwise state it as an issue on 

appeal”). Accordingly, we affirm dismissal of the Armour litigation and dismiss as 

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moot the appeal of the corporate appellants from denial of their motion for an 

injunction to preserve the 2003 Final Judgment and Order in the Tolbert litigation.6

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

 6 At oral argument, the individual Tolbert appellees and the individual Armour appellants

argued there was a fraud exception to the Zaklama estoppel principle. Zaklama, 906 F.2d at 650. 

We directed counsel to address the applicability of a fraud exception in supplemental letter 

briefing. In their letter briefs, the claimants provide no precedent showing they were not 

estopped or any alternative reason excusing their failure to raise the issue on appeal. Instead, 

they present a convoluted argument that there is a fraud exception to estoppel in Tolbert, because 

the original district judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Because the original district judge 

did not know about the additional individual claims presented by the Armour appellants when he 

approved the 2003 Final Judgment and Order, they contend there was fraud. But the individual 

Tolbert claimants were represented by counsel and made parties to the final Tolbert complaint,

settlement agreement, and Final Judgment and Order by their counsel with their consent. Under 

the Final Judgment and Order, the district judge gave the Tolbert plaintiffs a 30-day opportunity 

to add plaintiffs. This resulted in the 2003 Consolidated, Amended, and Restated Complaint, 

which added 7,159 plaintiffs, who shared in the funds and valuable benefits accorded to the 

individual Tolbert claimants under the Final Judgment and Order. Their acceptance of those 

funds and benefits estops their challenge to the 2003 Final Judgment and Order ten years later as 

well the addition of claimants to accept those funds and benefits through the Armour litigation.

If the Tolbert and Armour claimants have problems with their former counsel, that is a separate 

matter and not the fault of these corporate defendants. 

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