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Parties Involved:
John William Daniels
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Fl LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unit d Ststes Coutt of Ap~Is 

Tenth Cir::uit 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 1 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

JOHN WILLIAM DANIELS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Nos. 89-5136 and 89-5142 

(N.D. Oklahoma} 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-04-01-B} 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

John W. Daniels was convicted by a jury of supervising a 

continuing criminal enterprise (CCE} in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 848; conspiring to manufacture and distribute amphetamine; 

conspiring to defraud the Internal Revenue Service; and filing 

false tax returns. The district court dismissed Mr. Daniels' drug 

conspiracy conviction as a lesser offense included in his CCE 

conviction, but entered judgment on the remaining counts. We 

affirmed that conviction on direct appeal. 

Daniels, No. 86-1972 (10th Cir. Dec. 4, 1987). 

Subsequently, Mr. Daniels collaterally 

United States v. 

attacked his 

conviction by filing a motion pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5136 Document: 01019967239 Date Filed: 05/01/1990 Page: 1 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process 

by the actions and inactions of the prosecutor, and denial of due 

process and a fair trial due to the actions and inactions of the 

trial judge. Mr. Daniels also sought an evidentiary hearing on 

those matters. The district court refused an evidentiary hearing 

and denied the petition for relief under§ 2255. Mr. Daniels 

appeals (No. 89-5142 in this court), reasserting his contentions 

below, and contending that it was error to deny him an evidentiary 

hearing. We affirm. 

In a separate action (No. 89-5136 in this court), Mr. Daniels 

filed a motion to recall all copies of his presentence report. 

The district court denied that motion, and we affirm that judgment 

as well. 

I. 

Mr. Daniels alleges he was denied effective assistance of 

counsel because: 

(1) His counsel was not versed in the statute under 

which Daniels was tried; 

(2) His counsel failed to challenge the indictment as 

to the substantive offenses relied upon to support 

the "series of violations" required to support a 

section 848 charge; 

(3) His counsel permitted the government to amend the 

commencement date of the conspiracy as to count l; 

(4) His counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's 

prejudicial statements; and 

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(5) His counsel failed to request the court to give a 

lesser-included offense charge to the jury. 

Mr. Daniels' first argument is that his counsel could not 

possibly have mounted an effective defense because the lawyer was 

unfamiliar with the criminal statute under which Daniels was 

charged, and had not previously tried a case to a jury in federal 

court. However, except for the allegations of error listed above, 

and a general complaint that, in effect, his counsel pleaded him 

guilty to the conspiracy count of the indictment, Mr. Daniels does 

not specify what prejudice resulted from those perceived 

deficiencies of his counsel. That is, Mr. Daniels provides no 

specifics such as a defense which was omitted, witnesses who were 

not called, testimony which was not elicited, evidence which was 

not introduced, and so forth. In short, Mr. Daniels' arguments 

with respect to his counsel's lack of knowledge and experience are 

too general and conclusory to cast doubt upon the outcome of the 

trial, or to warrant an investigation. 

Mr. Daniels' contentions with respect to the sufficiency of 

the indictment on the CCE charge focus on the "series of 

violations" element of 21 u.s.c. § 848, and are simply incorrect. 

He apparently argues that separate substantive violations must be 

charged in the indictment to satisfy the "series" requirement, and 

that violations of the narcotics laws listed as overt acts in the 

conspiracy count could not satisfy the "series" requirment. This 

is so, he reasons, because "contrary to the statute, [the 

conspiracy count] alleged acts both in violation of the narcotics 

laws and acts without a relationship to violation of the narcotics 

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laws, and competent counsel would have to move for a clarification 

of which acts were to be relied upon to prove the 'series of 

violations.'" Reply Brief of Appellant at 7. 

This circuit has not held that a CCE count in an indictment 

must specify the acts constituting the series of violations. See 

United States v. Rivera, 874 F.2d 754, 755 (10th Cir. 1989) (en 

bane). Thus, counsel would not have been ineffective by 

permitting an indictment to stand, without objection, even if no 

violations at all had been specified. However, a multitude of 

narcotics violations were specified in the indictment. As many as 

nine separate violations of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) were specified 

in the conspiracy count of the indictment, in the form of overt 

acts. In United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 719 (1990), we expressly held that 

"a CCE indictment is sufficient where, as here, the CCE counts 

charge appellants in the language of the statute, and the 

indictment additionally alleges at least three violations in 

another count or counts." The indictment in Staggs included two 

violations as overt acts listed under a separate count of the 

indictment. Id. at 1530 n.4. Moreover, contrary to Mr. Daniels' 

contention, the government is not required to elect which of the 

narcotics violations listed in the indictment upon which it 

intends to rely. 

We also reject Daniels' argument that the inclusion of nonnarcotics violations such as violations of the Travel Act raised 

the possibility of a conviction by the jury on the CCE count by 

reliance upon the wrong type of violations for the ''series" 

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requirement. And, we reject the further contention that a 

conviction on the conspiracy count either automatically resulted 

in a conviction on the CCE count, or could have been included, 

improperly, as one of the "series" violations under the CCE count. 

The jury was instructed at length on the essential elements of the 

crime of continuing criminal enterprise, including specific 

instructions on the "continuing series of violations'' element. 

Those instructions required the jury to find "that Mr. Daniels 

committed at least three offenses which are felony violations of 

the federal controlled substance drug laws," which were then 

listed, for the purposes of Daniels' trial, as "unlawful 

manufacture 

amphetamine 

distribution 

of 

with 

of 

amphetamine; 

intent to 

amphetamine." 

and/or unlawful possession of 

distribute; and/or unlawful 

R. Supp. Vol. at Tab 2. The jury 

was then separately instructed as to what constitutes the 

manufacture, distribution, and possession of amphetamine. 

In short, the indictment and the "series of violations" 

requirement of the CCE count as well as the instructions relating 

to those matters, were proper in all respects. Therefore, counsel 

could not have been ineffective on that subject. 

Mr. Daniels next contends that his counsel should not have 

permitted the government to change the commencement date of the 

conspiracy from 1981, as alleged in the indictment initially, to 

1982. Daniels' theory is that the change was done to avoid 

testimony showing that Eddie Davis loaned Daniels money in 1981 in 

order to get started in the drug business, and that Davis, not 

Daniels, was the true leader of the criminal enterprise. Initial 

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Brief of Appellant at 20. Daniels contends that he was not a 

manager and, therefore, could not have been liable under the CCE 

statute. He also argues that by changing the date to 1982, the 

government split one large conspiracy, beginning in 1981, into a 

smaller and incorrectly denominated conspiracy beginning in 1982. 

These arguments are not persuasive. The government has attached 

to its brief a copy of an affidavit by the Assistant United States 

Attorney, and an excerpt from certain testimony before the grand 

jury. Those documents establish that a witness who testified 

before the grand jury as to a certain meeting with Daniels in 1981 

later advised the government that he was in error as to that date, 

and that the meeting had taken place in 1982. No impropriety 

appears, and the change on that basis was proper. An objection 

from Daniels' counsel would have been unavailing. Furthermore, it 

was not necessary for the jury to find that Daniels was the ''boss" 

of the entire enterprise, for him to be convicted under the CCE 

statute. The district court Correctly instructed the jury that: 

"an 'organizer' can be defined as a person who puts 

together a number of people engaged in separate 

activities and arranges them in their activities in one 

essentially order operation or enterprise. A 

'supervisory position' can be defined as one who manages 

or directs or oversees the activities of others. For 

purposes of this element, a person may occupy a position 

of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other 

position of management without having direct personal 

contact with each of the person she is organizing, 

supervising, or managing." 

R. Supp. Vol. at Tab 2. 

On direct appeal, Mr. Daniels argued that he was not anyone's 

"boss." We outlined the evidence against him at trial on that 

point, including -- the names of more than five people in addition to 

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Davis whom Daniels managed. We specifically determined that the 

evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Daniels' conviction under 

the CCE count. We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 

such conclusion would not have been changed by any testimony from 

Eddie Davis with regard to a conspiracy beginning in 1981. 

Furthermore, any complaint about the conspiracy count itself is 

irrelevant because Daniels' conviction on that count was vacated. 

Mr. Daniels next contends that his counsel improperly failed 

to object to "the unchallenged introduction of allowing the 

government to introduce 'uncharged crimes' as 'substantive 

violations of the Controlled Substance Act' and informing the jury 

that they could consider these uncharged crimes as substantive 

violations necessary to prove the 'series of violations' element 

of the 848 charge." Initial Brief of Appellant at 23. If that 

alleged error refers to evidence of the narcotics violations 

referred to in count I of the indictment, Daniels is simply wrong. 

If Daniels is referring to evidence regarding cocaine 

distribution, admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and is arguing 

that the jury was allowed to use that evidence in the "series" 

element of the CCE charge, he is wrong again. As explained above, 

the court's instructions confined the jury's consideration of the 

"series" violations to the manufacture, possession, and 

distribution of amphetamine. Also, in our consideration of the 

direct appeal in this case, we ruled that the district court 

properly admonished the jury as to Rule 404(b} evidence, and that 

"given the other evidence presented against him, Mr. Daniels 

cannot- claim that the Rule 404(b} evidence against him was 

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'crucial to the prosecution' and had a 'severe impact' on his 

defense.'' United States v. Daniels, No. 86-1972, slip. op. at 9 

(10th Cir. Dec. 4, 1987). 

Finally, Mr. Daniels argues that his counsel erred in failing 

to request the court to give a lesser-included offense charge to 

the jury with respect to the conspiracy count. No prejudice could 

attach to the conspiracy count, because Mr. Daniel's conviction on 

that count was vacated. See United States v. Rivera, Nos. 

85- 1768, 85-1771, slip. op. at 23 (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 1990) (en 

bane). At page 25 of his initial brief on appeal, Daniels lists 

four reasons why a failure of an explicit lesser- included 

instruction on this point prejudiced him, culminating with the 

allegation that by his counsel's lack of defense on the conspiracy 

count, Daniels was essentially exposed to an automatic finding of 

guilty on the CCE charge. The jury instructions would not have 

permitted any such "automatic'' finding. Rather, the jury was 

specifically instructed with respect to each element of the CCE 

count, and, as indicated in the direct appeal, we determined that 

the evidence was sufficient to uphold Daniels' conviction on that 

count. Other reasons listed by Daniels relate to the commencement 

date of the conspiracy, and the "series" element of the CCE 

charge, contentions which we have already addressed and rejected. 

In summary, Daniels has failed to make even the slightest 

showing that his counsel was ineffective under the standards set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). And, 

he has most certainly failed to overcome the "strong presumption 

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

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professional assistance." Id. at 689. Furthermore, there is no 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 

unprofessional errors, the result of this proceeding would have 

been different. See Kirnrnelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 

(1986} (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

We also reject Mr. Daniels' contention that he was denied due 

process of law and a fair trial because of actions and inactions 

of the government, and that he is entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on the subject. Items under the subject heading include 

knowledge by the government of Eddie Davis' testimony that he 

helped Daniels get started in the drug business in 1981 and was 

using Daniels in his organization in order to expand his supply, 

and that Davis had made statements that "the cocaine alleged in 

the 404(b} material was furnished by someone other than the 

appellant." Initial Brief of Appellant at 28. Daniels contends 

that "the knowing suppression of evidence favorable to a defendant 

at any stage of the prosecution is highly prejudicial." Id. at 

29. We have already addressed the situation involving Eddie 

Davis. The subject of the cocaine was fully explored at trial, 

and Daniels makes no contention that he was prevented from 

presenting any evidence, or conducting any cross examination, that 

would have any reasonable possibility of changing the result of 

the trial. In his petition, Daniels includes eight quotes from 

the trial transcript, offered to show "the intentional misconduct 

of the prosecutor." The district court reviewed those quotes and 

concluded that none showed any misconduct. We have also reviewed 

the quotes and agree with the district court. 

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Finally, Mr. Daniels contends that he was denied due process 

and a fair trial by the actions and inactions of the trial judge, 

and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that 

subject. Under this heading, Mr. Daniels once again complains 

about the amendment which changed the beginning date of the 

conspiracy from 1981 to 1982, the alleged introduction of evidence 

of uncharged crimes which the jury could consider as substantive 

violations for the "series" element of the CCE charge, and that 

the court exhibited a lack of understanding of the statutes under 

which Daniels was being tried. We have already addressed these 

subjects, including Daniels' allegation that "Eddie Davis [could 

not be] the 'boss' and an employee at the same time," thus 

apparently making it impossible for Daniels to have been a 

supervisor for purposes of the CCE statute. No error was 

committed at the trial in this regard. Mr. Davis was not denied 

due process by any action or inaction of the trial judge, and he 

is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the subject. 

By using the labels of ineffective assistance of counsel and 

due process, Mr. Daniels has succeeded in testing the legality of 

matters which should have been raised on direct appeal and which, 

normally, would not be cognizable by way of a motion to vacate, 

set aside, or correct a sentence. See United States v. Cox, 567 

F.2d 930, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1977); 

Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971). It is 

noteworthy that Mr. Daniels does not contend that his counsel on 

the direct appeal, the federal public defender, was ineffective. 

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In any event, we have considered all of Mr. Daniels' 

arguments and are satisfied that the files and records of the case 

conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. There is no basis for an evidentiary hearing. See id.; 

Harris v. United States, 436 F.2d 591, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1971). 

II. 

In his "Motion to Recall all Copies of Defendants Presentence 

Investigation Report" Mr. Daniels alleges that his presentence 

report was furnished to the Federal Bureau of Prisons in violation 

of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). He contends that the illegally transmitted 

report has been used by the Bureau of Prisons to "keep his 

security level high, keep [him] in a higher level institution, and 

keep [him] from being transferred to a lower level institution." 

The relief requested in defendant's motion is limited to a recall 

of the presentence report. 

On appeal Mr. Daniels expands his complaints regarding the 

presentence report, and its use at his sentencing, and requests 

that this court issue an order for resentencing. Reply Brief on 

Behalf of Appellant at 18. We will address only those matters 

raised in the motion originally filed in the district court, 

described above, and upon which the district court ruled. It is 

that judgment of the district court, along with the district 

court's order denying reconsideration, which is the subject of 

this appeal. 

Mr. Daniels cites to us no case which holds that the district 

court may not forward a presentence report to the Bureau of 

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• 

Prisons without complying with 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Rather, he 

extrapolates that conclusion from reasoning based upon language 

from various cases which do not deal directly with the issue. We 

reject any such rule. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), applicable to 

offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, provided that "a 

wr itten record of such findings and determinations shall be 

appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence 

investigation report thereafter made available to the Bureau of 

Prisons of the Parole Commission." We read that portion of the 

rule as recognition of the authority of the courts to furnish 

presentence reports to both the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole 

Commission. Furthermore, we have previously held that the Freedom 

of Information Act does not apply to the courts of the United 

States. Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885, 885 (10th Cir. 1968). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err when it refused to 

recall Mr. Daniels' presentence report from the Bureau of Prisons. 

III. 

We have considered all of Mr. Daniels' many arguments, 

addressing those we deemed appropriate. The judgments of the 

district court in Nos. 89-5136 and 89-5142 are AFFIRMED. The 

mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for t he Court 

Stephen H. Anders on 

Circuit Judge 

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