Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50038/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50038-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Luis Osvaldo Torres Pimental
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LUIS OSVALDO TORRES PIMENTAL,

AKA Luis Torres,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50038

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-00794-

MMA-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 8, 2013

Pasadena, California

Filed June 24, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit

Judges, and Wiley Y. Daniel, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

* The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for Colorado, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel reversed the denial of a motion to suppress a

defendant’s incriminating statements, vacated his conviction

for importation of marijuana, and remanded the case for

further proceedings.

The panel held that under the McNabb-Mallory rule, the

statements the defendant made to a federal agent forty-eight

hours after his arrest, but before he was presented to a

magistrate judge, must be suppressed because the four-day

delay in presenting him to a magistrate was unreasonable and

unnecessary.

COUNSEL

Devin Burstein (argued) and Zandra L. Lopez, Federal

Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Steve Miller and Mark R. Rehe (argued), Assistant United

States Attorneys, San Diego, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 3

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Luis Osvaldo Torres Pimental appeals his conviction

following a conditional guilty plea to one count of

importation of over fifty kilograms of marijuana, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Torres

Pimental entered his guilty plea on the condition that he

retain his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to a

federal agent forty-eight hours after his arrest, but before he

was presented to a magistrate judge. Torres Pimental now

seeks reversal of the denial of his motion to suppress.

Because the delay in presenting Torres Pimental to a

magistrate was unreasonable and unnecessary, Torres

Pimental’s statements must be suppressed under Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 5(a), McNabb v. United States,

318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.

449 (1957). See United States v. Valenzuela-Espinoza, 697

F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2012). We REVERSE the district

court’s denial of Torres Pimental’s suppression motion,

VACATE the conviction, and REMAND for further

proceedings. Because we vacate his conviction based on the

McNabb-Mallory rule, we do not address Torres Pimental’s

challenge to his conviction based on Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966).

I. BACKGROUND

On Friday, January 14, 2011, Torres Pimental, a United

States citizen with no prior criminal record, entered the

United States from Mexico through the San Ysidro Port of

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4 UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL

Entry. He was the sole passenger in a white Dodge Durango

driven by Blanca Canales.

At the Port of Entry’s “pre-primary inspection area,” a

narcotics inspection dog alerted on the vehicle. At

approximately 9:25 a.m., United States Customs and Border

Protection (“CBP”) Officer Gruda was notified of the alert. 

Officer Gruda approached the vehicle and asked Canales

where she was going. Canales replied that she was on her

way to Paramount, California. She said the Dodge Durango

was her uncle’s and that she had driven to Mexico to drop off

her grandmother.

Officer Gruda conducted a cursory inspection of the

vehicle and noticed that the rear passenger seat felt hard. He

removed the car seat from the top of the rear passenger seat

and noticed a large lump in the rear seat. He folded up the

rear passenger seat and discovered cellophane packages

hidden underneath. At 9:30 a.m., CBP officers arrested

Canales and Torres Pimental and escorted them to the

security office in handcuffs.

Officer Gruda drove the vehicle to the “secondary

inspection area” for further inspection. At 10:00 a.m., CBP

Officer Alves inspected the vehicle. Officer Alves

discovered and seized 37 packages containing approximately

71.25 kilograms (156.75 pounds) of marijuana hidden in the

rear doors, quarter panels, passenger seat, middle seat, and

third row seat of the vehicle. Three of the packages were

discovered in the front passenger seat, where Torres Pimental

had been sitting. The packages were in vacuum-sealed bags

wrapped in dryer sheets and cellophane.

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 5

Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Shelly

Aradanas, who worked at the San Ysidro Port of Entry, was

notified about the drugs found in Canales’s vehicle. At 11:52

a.m., Torres Pimental was brought to an interview room

where Agent Aradanas read him his Miranda rights. Agent

Aradanas asked Torres Pimental if he understood his rights

and asked him to initial each of the rights on a pre-printed

Advisement of Rights form. Torres Pimental wrote his

initials next to each of the rights and signed the form,

agreeing to answer questions without an attorney present. 

Agent Aradanas then asked Torres Pimental where he was

driving. Torres Pimental shook his head, indicating “no.” 

She asked him what he was doing in Mexico. Torres

Pimental again shook his head, indicating “no.” At 11:54

a.m., two minutes after the interview began, Torres Pimental

stated: “I think it would be better if I wait for an attorney.” 

Agent Aradanas stopped questioning Torres Pimental and

terminated the interview at that time.

At about 12:42 p.m., Agent Aradanas began to interview

Canales, and advised her of her Miranda rights. Canales

acknowledged her rights and agreed to answer questions

without an attorney present. Canales initially denied

knowledge of the marijuana found in the vehicle. After

Agent Aradanas said she did not believe Canales’s story,

Canales stated that she knew the car contained marijuana and

that she and Torres Pimental together had planned the

marijuana smuggling venture. Canales stated that she did not

know where they were delivering the marijuana, but she

thought they were going to the Los Angeles area. She stated

that she knew she would be compensated with money, but she

had not negotiated a payment amount. Canales also said that

two other men went down to Tijuana with Canales and Torres

Pimental. Those men, she said, drove back in a separate car,

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6 UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL

which had also been pulled into the secondary inspection area

at the San Ysidro Port of Entry at the same time she and

Torres Pimental had been pulled into the secondary lot.

At 5:00 p.m., Agent Aradanas signed a complaint against

Torres Pimental and Canales, stating that Torres Pimental and

Canales “knowingly and intentionally import[ed]” marijuana

into the United States. Agent Aradanas faxed the complaint

and a one-and-a-half page affidavit to United States

Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis in San Diego. Judge Lewis

signed the complaint at 8:14 p.m.

Earlier that day, there was a magistrate court calendar for

Rule 5 presentment at the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California in San Diego, located just

seventeen miles, or about twenty-two minutes, from the San

Ysidro Port of Entry where Torres Pimental was being held.1

The calendar began at 2:00 p.m. — four-and-a-half hours

after Torres Pimental was arrested and over two hours after

his interrogation at the Port of Entry ended. Agent Aradanas

knew that if Torres Pimental was not brought to the court for

presentment that day, he would not go to court or be

appointed an attorney until the following Tuesday because of

a three-day holiday weekend. Nevertheless, neither Agent

Aradanas, nor any other agent, drove Torres Pimental the

short distance to the San Diego courthouse for his initial

appearance that day.

1 Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1)(A), “[a] person

making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without

unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, or before a state or local

judicial officer[,] unless a statute provides otherwise.”

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 7

Instead, after Torres Pimental’s interrogation ended at

11:54 a.m., Agent Aradanas kept him in custody in a San

Ysidro Port of Entry holding cell because no beds were

available at the Metropolitan Corrections Center (“MCC”) in

downtown San Diego. Torres Pimental remained in custody

at the Port of Entry from Friday morning until the MCC had

space available on Sunday morning.

During his detention at the Port of Entry that Friday and

Saturday night, Torres Pimental slept on the floor of the

holding cell with nine to twelve other arrestees. He was

given a blanket for only part of the time he was detained

there, even though the air conditioning was turned on and the

holding cell was cold.

Nearly forty-eight hours after his arrest, Torres Pimental

was driven to the MCC on Sunday, January 16, 2011, by

DHS Agent Sabas Torres. Agent Aradanas transported

Canales to the MCC in a separate vehicle at the same time. 

The drive from the Port of Entry to the MCC took fifteen to

twenty minutes.

During the drive, Torres Pimental asked Agent Sabas

Torres how long his sentence would be. Agent Sabas Torres

told Torres Pimental that he did not know the facts of Torres

Pimental’s case and did not know how longTorres Pimental’s

sentence would be. The agent told Torres Pimental about the

factors that impact a sentence generally, including the point

system, criminal history, declarations given at the time of

arrest, case agent reports, and government recommendations.

Agent Sabas Torres informed Torres Pimental that

“defendants are given their time to explain their side of the

story during questioning,” but that “sometimes people don’t

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take that seriously.” He said it was “difficult for an agent to

. . . talk to the defendant after he gets appointed counsel . . .

because they now have an attorney. It’s difficult to set up a

meeting.” He told Torres Pimental that “if you don’t speak

to the agents right away then you don’t get another

opportunity to speak to them for a while.” Agent Sabas

Torres explained that defendants “get less time” if they

“make a statement.” Agent Sabas Torres told Torres

Pimental that “it happens a lot that people don’t cooperate

and they get more time.”

Because of Agent Sabas Torres’s statements, Pimental

“felt [he] had to make a statement admitting guilt or else [he]

was going to have to stay in jail for a long time.” When they

were less than a minute from the MCC, Torres Pimental

asked if he could speak with Agent Aradanas. Agent Sabas

Torres informed Torres Pimental that “everything you say has

to be voluntary, okay. We cannot ask you questions.” Torres

Pimental responded, “Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, it’s volunt[ary].”

When both vehicles arrived at the MCC, Agent Sabas

Torres told Agent Aradanas that Torres Pimental wanted to

speak to her. Agent Aradanas approached Torres Pimental

and asked, “What’s up?” Torres Pimental told Agent

Aradanas to ask him what she wanted to know. Without

reminding him of his Miranda rights, Agent Aradanas asked

Torres Pimental how much he was going to get paid for the

marijuana, where he was taking the drugs, who hired him,

and if he knew what was in the car. Torres Pimental

confessed that he was going to be paid $1,500; he was going

to Lynwood, California; a person named Ruben hired him;

and he knew marijuana was in the car. Agent Aradanas

advised Torres Pimental to tell his attorney that he asked to

talk to her, then she took him inside the MCC for processing.

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 9

On Tuesday, January 18, 2011, four days after he was

arrested, Torres Pimental was brought to a magistrate judge

for the first time. Counsel was appointed and bail was set. 

He was released on bond several days later.

Torres Pimental was indicted by a grand jury on one

count of conspiracy to import marijuana and one count of

importation of marijuana. He moved the district court to

suppress the statements he made to Agent Aradanas on

Sunday, January 16, because: (1) the delay in presenting

Torres Pimental to a magistrate was unreasonable, and his

statements made nearly forty-eight hours after his arrest must

be suppressed under the rule announced in McNabb v. United

States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States,

354 U.S. 449 (1957);2and (2) the statements were taken in

violation of Miranda and were not made voluntarily.

The district court denied the motion to suppress after

conducting an evidentiary hearing.

After the district court denied the motion to suppress,

Torres Pimental pleaded guilty — pursuant to a conditional

plea agreement — to one count of importation of marijuana

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

He was sentenced to twelve months and one day in custody

and three years’ supervised release. He timely appeals the

denial of his motion to suppress.

2 Under the McNabb-Mallory rule, a confession is inadmissible if it is

“given after an unreasonable delay in bringing [an arrested person] before

a judge.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306 (2009).

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II. DISCUSSION

Torres Pimental argues that his incriminating statements

must be suppressed because of an unnecessary or

unreasonable delayunder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

5(a) and the McNabb-Mallory rule. We agree.

We review de novo a denial of a motion to suppress, but

the underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 

United States v. Amano, 229 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 2000). 

We review for clear error a district court’s finding that a

delay in bringing a defendant before a magistrate judge was

reasonable. United States v. Liera, 585 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th

Cir. 2009).

A. The McNabb-Mallory Rule

Under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, “[a] person making an arrest within the United

States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay

before a magistrate judge . . . .” The McNabb-Mallory rule

“generally renders inadmissible confessions made during

periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment

requirement of Rule 5(a).” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.

303, 309 (2009) (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,

511 U.S. 350, 354 (1994)) (alterations omitted). Under the

McNabb-Mallory rule, an arrested person must be brought

“before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may

be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause

may be promptly determined.” Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454. 

Although the arrestee may be “‘booked’ by the police[,] he is

not to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a

process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to

eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest and

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 11

ultimately his guilt.” Id. The rule thus requires an arrested

person be brought before a magistrate judge without

unreasonable delay.

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) in response to the

McNabb-Mallory rule. See Valenzuela-Espinoza, 697 F.3d

742, 748 (9th Cir. 2012). Section 3501(c) “provides a sixhour ‘safe harbor’ period during which a confession will not

be deemed inadmissible solely because of a delay in

presentment to a magistrate.” Id. (citing Liera, 585 F.3d at

1242). The six-hour limitation under § 3501(c) does not

apply, however, where “the delay in bringing [the defendant]

before [a] magistrate judge . . . beyond such six-hour period

is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the

means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the

nearest available such magistrate judge.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3501(c).

Following the enactment of § 3501, the Supreme Court

“reaffirmed the applicability of the McNabb-Mallory Rule”

in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009). Liera,

585 F.3d at 1242. The Court held that § 3501(c) “modified

McNabb-Mallory without supplanting it.” Corley, 556 U.S.

at 322. The Court established a two-part test for applying the

McNabb-Mallory rule in light of the § 3501(c) six-hour safe

harbor period. First, “a district court . . . must find whether

the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless a

longer delay was reasonable considering the means of

transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest

available magistrate judge).” Id. (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted). “If the confession came within that

period, it is admissible . . . so long as it was made

voluntarily.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If,

however, “the confession occurred before presentment and

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beyond six hours, . . . the court must decide whether delaying

that long was unreasonable or unnecessary under the

McNabb-Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to be

suppressed.” Id. This is true even if the confession was made

voluntarily. Id. at 308.

B. Unreasonable or Unnecessary Delay

We must first “find whether [Torres Pimental] confessed

within six hours of arrest (unless a longer delay was

reasonable considering the means of transportation and the

distance to be traveled to the nearest available magistrate

judge).” Corley, 556 U.S. at 322 (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 3501(c)). It is undisputed that Torres Pimental’s

incriminating statements, made on a Sunday,were made more

than six hours after his 9:30 a.m. Friday morning arrest and

before his Tuesday morning initial appearance. Moreover,

the delay was not a result of the distance to be traveled to the

nearest available magistrate holding a presentment calendar

that Friday. The nearest available magistrate was located

only seventeen miles — or about twenty-two minutes —

away. See Liera, 585 F.3d at 1242 (holding that the delay

was not a result of the distance to be traveled to the nearest

available magistrate when the nearest available magistrate

was located fifteen miles away).

Because the § 3501(c) safe harbor does not apply, our

analysis turns on whether the delay was “unreasonable or

unnecessary under the McNabb-Mallory cases.” Corley,

556 U.S. at 322. If the delay was unreasonable or

unnecessary under the McNabb-Mallory cases, “the

confession is to be suppressed.” Id. We have “identified

three categories of reasonable delays apart from

transportation, distance, and the availability of a magistrate”: 

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 13

(1) delays for “humanitarian reasons;” (2) “delays due to the

unavailability of government personnel [and judges]

necessary to completing the arraignment process;” and

(3) “delays necessary to determine whether a suspect should

be criminally charged.” Valenzuela-Espinoza, 697 F.3d at

752 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The delay in presenting Torres Pimental does not fall

within any of the three categories, and therefore was

unreasonable.

First, the government does not contend that the delay was

reasonable for humanitarian reasons.

Second, the delay was not “due to the unavailability of

government personnel and judges necessaryto completing the

arraignment process.” United States v. Garcia-Hernandez,

569 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court,

citing Garcia-Hernandez and similar cases, held that the

delay here was reasonable because the complaint was

presented to the magistrate judge at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday

before a long holiday weekend. Between 5:00 p.m. on Friday

until the Tuesday after Torres Pimental was arrested, the

magistrate judge was presumably unavailable; thus, the

district court determined, that Tuesday was the earliest

possible time Torres Pimental could have been presented to

a magistrate. We agree that, in certain circumstances, if a

defendant is arrested after the magistrate court is closed on a

Friday night before a holiday weekend, and a judge is not

available over the weekend for Rule 5 presentment, then a

weekend delaymight be reasonable. See United States v. Van

Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 289–90 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a

weekend delay due to the unavailability of a magistrate judge

was not unreasonable when the defendant was arrested on a

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Friday afternoon and no magistrate judge was available over

the weekend).

That the complaint was not faxed to the magistrate judge

until 5:00 p.m. was not “due to the unavailability of

government personnel and judges necessaryto completing the

arraignment process,” Garcia-Hernandez, 569 F.3d at 1106,

as found reasonable in Van Poyck. Rather, here a magistrate

judge was available starting at 2:00 p.m. on Friday at the

federal courthouse in San Diego only seventeen miles away. 

And there is no suggestion that there were not enough federal

agents to transport Torres Pimental that short distance to the

court. See Valenzuela-Espinoza, 697 F.3d at 752 (concluding

that, just because “one officer out of nine was fulfilling his

responsibility to obtain a search warrant did not make the

delay reasonable under McNabb-Mallory”). The reason

Torres Pimental was not transported to the magistrate was not

due to the unavailability of any necessary personnel or

available judge; rather, Torres Pimental could have been

taken to the nearby available magistrate by any number of

law enforcement officers at the Port of Entry. Thus, the delay

does not fall under the second category.

Third, the delay was not reasonable to determine

“whether [Torres Pimental] could be criminally charged.” Id. 

The agents had enough information to charge Torres Pimental

at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, when 37 packages containing over

150 pounds of marijuana were found in the Dodge Durango

(including 3 packages found in the passenger seat where

Torres Pimental had been sitting). The government urges us

to find the delay reasonable because of the need to interview

Torres Pimental and Canales and the need to prepare a

complaint before Torres Pimental could be taken to a

magistrate for his initial hearing. We disagree.

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 15

The government argues that it would have been

“unfeasible” for Torres Pimental to be taken to the court

seventeen miles away at any time after his arrest at 9:30 a.m.

on Friday, because “the case did not begin and end with him.” 

Not only did Agent Aradanas have to interview Torres

Pimental before presenting him to a magistrate judge, the

government contends, but, she also had to interview Canales

before presenting Torres Pimental to a magistrate judge.

Agent Aradanas’s desire to fully investigate the crime by

interrogating Torres Pimental and Canales was not a valid

reason to delay presenting Torres Pimental to a magistrate

judge. There is no evidence in the record that such

interrogation was necessary to determine whether Torres

Pimental should be criminally charged (or any suggestion that

he was not going to be charged). See Mallory, 354 U.S. at

454 (an arrested person is “not to be taken to police

headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that

lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging

statements to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt”);

Corley, 556 U.S. at 308 (reaffirming that “delay for the

purpose of interrogation is the epitome of ‘unnecessary

delay’” (quoting Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455–56)); United States

v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing

“[t]he desire of the officers to complete the interrogation” as

“the most unreasonable excuse possible” for a delay in

presentment); ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Pretrial

Release 10-4.1(b) (3d ed. 2007), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_

section_archive/crimjust_standards_pretrialrelease_blk.htm

l#10-4.1 (“[A] defendant’s first appearance should not

ordinarily be delayed in order to conduct in-custody

interrogation or other in-custody investigation.”).

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In Valenzuela-Espinoza, we specifically rejected the idea

that a delay is reasonable to fully investigate a crime when it

is unnecessary to conduct further investigation to determine

whether a suspect should be charged. See ValenzuelaEspinoza, 697 F.3d at 752–53. In that case, federal agents

had enough information to charge Valenzuela-Espinoza with

possession of marijuana at 11:15 a.m. when he “exited a

carport in a ‘cloud of marijuana smoke’ and told officers that

there was ten pounds of marijuana inside the house.” Id. 

Rather than presenting Valenzuela-Espinoza to a magistrate

judge, however, the officers detained him to interrogate him

and conduct a search of the property. Id. at 746–47, 752–53.

A search warrant was issued at 3:25 p.m., and a large amount

of marijuana was discovered. Id. at 746. ValenzuelaEspinoza, who had been detained since his arrest at 11:15

a.m., was taken to an Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement

station for questioning later that evening. Id. He was held in

custody overnight and presented to the magistrate judge the

next day. Id. at 747. We held that the delay was

unreasonable because “it was not necessary to conduct any

further investigation to determine whether ValenzuelaEspinoza could be criminally charged.” Id. at 752. There

was “simply nothing in the record to support the claim that

the officers needed to execute the search warrant to determine

whether they could charge Valenzuela-Espinoza with

possession of marijuana.” Id. at 753.

Here, as in Valenzuela-Espinoza, there is nothing in the

record to support the claim that the agents needed more

evidence than what they had at 10:00 a.m. on Friday — the

fact that over 150 pounds of marijuana were in 37 packages

inside the Dodge Durango, including 3 packages in the

passenger seat where Torres Pimental was sitting — to

determine whether they could charge Torres Pimental with

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UNITED STATES V. TORRES PIMENTAL 17

importing marijuana. Although we understand why law

enforcement sought to strengthen its case against Torres

Pimental further, the delay in presenting Torres Pimental to

a magistrate judge in order to interrogate him and Canales

was unreasonable. See id.

Even if it was valid to delay presentment to interrogate

Torres Pimental and Blanca Canales, the failure to present

Torres Pimental to the magistrate judge on Friday afternoon

was still unreasonable because there was ample time between

10:00 a.m. and the conclusion of the magistrate judge’s

calendar to conduct the interviews, prepare a complaint, and

transport Torres Pimental to the courthouse seventeen miles

away. Agent Aradanas knew there was a three-day weekend

looming, and knew that if Torres Pimental was not presented

to a magistrate judge on Friday, he would be imprisoned

without the benefit of a court appointed attorney from Friday

morning till Tuesday. Agent Aradanas was required to

promptly take all necessary steps to ensure that Torres

Pimental was presented on Friday afternoon, absent a valid

reason for delay.

In sum, the four-day delay in presenting Torres Pimental

to the magistrate judge was unreasonable under the McNabbMallory rule. “The purpose of the McNabb-Mallory Rule is

not merely to avoid all the evil implications of secret

interrogation of persons accused of crime,” it was “also

designed to insure that a defendant is brought before a

judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may be

advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause

may be promptly determined.” Liera, 585 F.3d at 1243

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under the

facts presented here, the four-day delay between Torres

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Pimental’s arrest and his initial appearance before a

magistrate judge was unreasonable and unnecessary.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court clearly erred

when it determined that the delay in presentment was

reasonable and necessary and erred when it declined to

suppress the incriminating statements that Torres Pimental

made to Agent Aradanas on Sunday morning, about fortyeight hours after his Friday morning arrest, and before he was

presented to a magistrate judge on Tuesday.

III. CONCLUSION

The delay in presenting Torres Pimental to the magistrate

judge was unreasonable and unnecessary in violation of Rule

5(a) and the McNabb-Mallory rule. We reverse the denial of

Torres Pimental’s suppression motion, vacate his conviction,

and remand for further proceedings.

VACATED and REMANDED.

 Case: 12-50038, 06/24/2014, ID: 9143005, DktEntry: 47-1, Page 18 of 18