Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08043/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey K. Stumpf
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED. 

United Stares Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS J'JL ~ 3 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JEFFREY K. STUMPF, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 90-8043 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 89-022-0lJ) 

Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant. 

David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney (Richard A. 

Stacy, United States Attorney, and John R. Green, Assistant United 

States Attorney, on the brief), District of Wyoming, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, SETH, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

The appellant, Jeffrey K. Stumpf, pled guilty to two criminal 

charges and was duly sentenced. The district court imposed a sentence which represents an upward departure from the Sentencing 

Appellate Case: 90-8043 Document: 01019293856 Date Filed: 07/03/1991 Page: 1 
Guidelines. Mr. Stumpf now appeals that sentence. 

On April 14, 1989, Mr. Stumpf and an associate, Johnny Wayne 

Colacino, were indicted on one count of possession of firearms 

after having previously been convicted of a felony in violation of 

18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(1) (1988), and ten counts of possession of a 

destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1988), as 

well as aiding and abetting in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2 (1988). 

The destructive devices at issue were ten trip-wire pipe bombs 

manufactured by Mr. Stumpf. On June 26, 1989, Mr. Colacino pled 

guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; the government, in return, dismissed the remaining counts. Mr. Colacino is 

not a party to this appeal. On January 5, 1990, Mr. Stumpf pled 

guilty to the count of possession of a firearm by a felon and to a 

single count of possession of a destructive device. Pursuant to a 

plea agreement, the remaining counts were dismissed. 

The presentence report established an offense level of twelve 

and a criminal history level of III which, under the Sentencing 

Guidelines applicable at the time, yielded a sentencing range of 

fifteen to twenty-one months. After a hearing, the district court 

imposed a sentence of thirty-eight months' imprisonment and three 

years of supervised release, plus a special assessment of $100.00. 

Mr. Stumpf asserts that this upward departure is (1) unreasonable, 

and (2) an unconstitutional ex post facto application of the law 

because it relies upon sentencing guidelines not in effect at the 

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time of the offense. 

Our review of an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines involves three steps: (1) de nQYQ review of whether the 

circumstances cited by the district court justify the departure, 

(2) review of the underlying factual determinations under a 

clearly erroneous standard, and (3) review to determine whether 

the degree of departure is reasonable. United States v. White, 

893 F.2d 276, 278 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

After announcing its intention to depart upward, the district 

court began a lengthy explanation of its reasons for doing so. 

The court articulated several justifications: (1) Mr. Stumpf was 

very involved in and sophisticated about the acquisition and 

building of weapons of the "anti-personnel variety," record, vol. 

4, at 114; (2) Mr. Stumpf had previously received lenient treatment for serious offenses because of his youth, id. at 115; (3) 

Mr. Stumpf apparently lacked recognition of the gravity of his 

previous offenses, and seemed unable to learn from experience, id. 

at 116, 123; (4) Mr. Stumpf professed to accept responsibility for 

his actions and received the appropriate reduction in his offense 

level, but the court felt that his testimony indicated that he 

continued to blame others for his criminal behavior and was therefore likely to continue such behavior, id. at 118-19; (5) Mr. 

Stumpf's activities posed a threat to public safety, id. at 119-

20, 122; (6) Mr. Stumpf believed that he was selling weapons for 

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use by an illegal paramilitary organization, id. at 122, and Mr. 

Stumpf had exercised a leadership role in the scheme. Id. at 116. 

The court may depart upward for reasons not specifically 

listed in the Sentencing Guidelines. United States Sentencing 

Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0, policy statement (Nov. 

1990). However, in this case the question of whether the departure was justified is easily answered because at least two of the 

justifications articulated by the district court are specifically 

mentioned by the Sentencing Commission. First, a court may depart 

upward "when the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or 

the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes." 

Id. at § 4A1.3, p.s. An example of a defendant in this category 

is one who "for appropriate reasons ... had previously received 

an extremely lenient sentence for a serious offense." Id. 

Second, a court may depart if public safety is significantly 

endangered. Id. at § 5K2.14, p.s. 

The district court pointed out that Mr. Stumpf, age twentythree, was already on probation for two previous felony convictions. He had previously been convicted of arson in the bombing 

of an empty building in order to facilitate the theft of copper 

cable, and of burglary in which more than sixty weapons were 

stolen from a gun store. Mr. Stumpf had received lenient sentences on both of those convictions.* Also, the court felt that 

* Mr. Stumpf received a sentence of five years' probation on 

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Mr. Stumpf was a threat to public safety because he had collected 

and sold anti-personnel weapons and was building highly volatile 

bombs in a residential area without regard to the safety of 

others. Thus, we hold that an upward departure was justified in 

this case. 

Mr. Stumpf argues that the evidence did not support the district court's conclusions regarding (1) his potential to reoffend 

and (2) his belief that he was selling weapons to an illegal paramilitary group. 

As to the first finding, the court pointed out evidence that 

Mr. Stumpf was given lenient treatment by previous courts and was 

offered help and support by several people anxious to help him 

rehabilitate himself, yet he persisted in criminal activity. Mr. 

Stumpf's testimony showed that he blamed others for his present 

problems. Furthermore, the evidence showed that Mr. Stumpf had 

unreasonable expectations of quick financial success and he unhesitatingly involved himself in criminal activity to achieve it. 

As to the finding regarding Mr. Stumpf's belief that he was 

selling weapons to an illegal paramilitary group, the government 

presented transcripts of conversations between Mr. Stumpf and an 

undercover agent to whom Mr. Stumpf sold the pipe bombs and two 

the arson charge. On the burglary charge Mr. Stumpf was sentenced 

to six to eight years' imprisonment. However, sentence was suspended, and he received three years' probation on condition of one 

year in a Community Residential Treatment Center. 

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guns. The undercover agent told Mr. Stumpf that he wanted the 

trip-wire bombs for "perimeter protection around . . . our compound." Record, vol. 2, at 88. Mr. Stumpf argues that this reference alone was insufficient to put Mr. Stumpf on notice that he 

was supposedly dealing with a paramilitary group. However, the 

government also presented evidence that Mr. Stumpf had an interest 

in, and some level of sophistication about, paramilitary activities. In a search of Mr. Stumpf's home in connection with an earlier arrest, the authorities found a cache of weapons including an 

AK-47 assault rifle, a Thompson submachine gun, a sniper scope 

with a homemade lighting device, a homemade rocket launcher, several cans of gunpowder, a pipe bomb, various copies of Soldier of 

Fortune magazine, and an outline describing a thirty-man army that 

was drawn up by Mr. Stumpf. Also, Mr. Stumpf attempted to convince the undercover agent that he could procure quantities of 

large and sophisticated weapons. In light of the above evidence, 

we cannot say that the trial court's findings of fact are clearly 

erroneous. 

Having determined that an upward departure was justified in 

this case and that the trial court's findings of fact are adequately supported by the record, we must now turn to the question 

of whether the degree of upward departure was reasonable. Unfortunately, the present record will not allow us to make that determination. 

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In United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

this court set out in detail what the record must contain in order 

to allow us to conduct meaningful review of the reasonableness of 

upward departures. "We will not rationalize a district court's 

departure from the Guidelines--either the decision to depart or 

the degree of departure." Id. at 990. "Just as the district 

court must premise its departure on the Guidelines' deficiency in 

assigning a defendant a particular offense level, criminal history 

category, or both, the court also must explain a departure sentence in these terms." Id. Because the record in this case does 

not meet the requirements of Jackson, we remand to the district 

court for reconsideration of the degree of departure in light of 

Jackson. 

In pronouncing sentence, the district court made reference to 

Guidelines which were not in effect at the time of Mr. Stumpf's 

offenses. Mr. Stumpf argues that the court actually applied the 

newer Guidelines in violation of the ex post facto clause of the 

Constitution. See United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 

1990) (use of amended Guidelines not in effect at time of offense 

violates ex post facto clause). While one remark at the end of a 

lengthy discussion by the court suggests that the court was applying the newer Guidelines, we believe that the court's remarks, 

read as a whole, show the court understood that the former 

Guidelines governed, and that it was merely looking to the amended 

Guidelines for guidance in exercising its discretion to depart 

upward. See United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 800 (7th Cir. 

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1988) (sentencing discretion may be guided in part by new 

Guidelines if court does not feel bound by them). 

Because the record does not present sufficient explanations 

of the degree of departure, we REMAND with directions to 

reconsider the degree of departure in light of Jackson. If the 

record does not provide adequate grounds for the sentence imposed, 

we instruct the district court to vacate the sentence and 

resentence in light of Jackson. 

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