Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06085/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Samuel D. Byrd
Appellee
James Goad
Appellant
Town of Meeker
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAMES GOAD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

TOWN OF MEEKER; SAMUEL D. 

BYRD, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-6085 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-00282-HE) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

James Goad sued the Town of Meeker and Meeker Police Chief Samuel D. 

Byrd (the Defendants), asserting federal-civil-rights and state-law claims after Chief 

Byrd obtained an arrest warrant based on Goad’s allegedly making a false statement 

to Meeker police. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants, 

and Goad appeals. We first conclude that Goad has waived review of some of his 

claims. For Goad’s other claims, we conclude that the district court did not err in 

considering information outside Chief Byrd’s arrest-warrant application in its 

probable-cause determination. We hold that, with that information, probable cause 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 1, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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supported the charge against Goad and the resulting seizure. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Goad and the Meeker Police Department

Even before a dispute with police in which Goad claimed ownership of a 

pawnshop—which was the false statement underlying his charged crime—Goad had a 

history of conflict with the Meeker Police Department. On June 4, 2012, Goad had a 

dispute with Meeker Police Officer Sean Sugrue. While on traffic patrol, Officer 

Sugrue had parked his police car in front of Meeker Supply and Pawn—a pawnshop 

that Goad operated with his brother, Gerald Goad. Officer Sugrue’s car was blocking 

the pawnshop’s entrance when Goad arrived. Although the pawnshop was then 

closed, Goad told Officer Sugrue that he owned the pawnshop and that the officer 

needed to move the police car because Goad was expecting a delivery. Officer Sugrue 

refused to move, and Goad told Officer Sugrue that he was going to raise the issue 

with the city manager. Soon after this, Goad drove to Meeker City Hall to voice his 

grievances. When Officer Sugrue saw Goad heading toward City Hall, Officer Sugrue 

decided to follow so that he could meet with the town manager to explain his side of 

the story. Two days later, on June 6, 2012, Goad filed a citizen’s complaint against 

Officer Sugrue. Chief Byrd, who was then Meeker’s Assistant Chief of Police, 

investigated the complaint and issued verbal and written warnings to Officer Sugrue. 

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On February 16, 2013, eight months later, Officer Sugrue stopped Goad for 

driving 45 mph in a 35-mph zone.1

 Goad hired an attorney to defend him, and, on 

March 6, 2013, Goad’s attorney requested Officer Sugrue’s personnel files. 

B. The Arrest-Warrant Application and Criminal Charge

On March 7, 2013, a local prosecutor working for Lincoln County (where 

Meeker is located) filed a criminal complaint against Goad for making a false 

statement, which was accompanied by Chief Byrd’s arrest-warrant application. In the 

application, Chief Byrd declared that Goad had falsely sworn in an earlier citizen’s 

complaint against Officer Sugrue that Goad owned the pawnshop. Chief Byrd found 

Goad’s claim inconsistent with Goad’s status as a convicted felon. Based on the 

arrest-warrant application, a Lincoln County District Court judge found probable 

cause to issue the arrest warrant. When Goad learned about the arrest warrant, he 

turned himself in at the Lincoln County Jail and was booked and released. On August 

7, 2013, the local prosecutor moved to dismiss the charge, simply deeming dismissal 

to be “in the best interest of justice.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 570. That same day, 

the state court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. 

 1

 In reviewing this matter, the federal district court concluded that “Officer 

Sugrue did not know the identity of the person he was pulling over when he initiated 

the traffic stop,” because it was dark at the time of the incident and Goad was driving 

a different car from the one he had been driving during his June 4, 2012 encounter 

with Officer Sugrue. Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 805. 

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C. Goad’s Lawsuit

On January 6, 2015, Goad filed a federal lawsuit against the Defendants,2

alleging five claims for relief: (1) various civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, (2) First Amendment retaliation, (3) malicious prosecution and abuse of 

process, (4) false arrest and unreasonable seizure, and (5) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.3

 

The Defendants moved for summary judgment. Addressing Goad’s first four 

claims, the Defendants argued that Goad had failed to present any evidence to 

support those claims. The Defendants also contended that Chief Byrd had probable 

cause to obtain the arrest warrant. In doing so, the Defendants relied on information 

beyond that which Chief Byrd had included in the arrest-warrant application. 

In response, Goad disputed that probable cause supported the arrest warrant 

and contended that, in arguing for probable cause, the Defendants were limited to the 

information contained within the four corners of the arrest-warrant application. Goad 

then recited the allegations Chief Byrd made in the arrest-warrant application, argued 

that some of Chief Byrd’s statements were false,4

 argued that those statements should 

 2

 Goad asserted municipal liability against the Town of Meeker. 

3

 Goad pleaded the fifth claim for relief against only Chief Byrd. 

4

 Specifically, Goad asserted that Chief Byrd falsely claimed that Goad was 

not allowed under Oklahoma law to conduct business or have any dealings with 

pawnshops, and that Goad was operating a pawnshop without a license. The first fact 

is not a fact at all, but a legal conclusion. The second fact would support Goad’s 

making a false statement in his complaint. But Chief Byrd started investigating 

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be removed from consideration, and argued that the remaining facts failed to support 

a probable-cause finding that he had committed a crime. This being so, Goad argued 

that his seizure resulting from the arrest warrant was unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants on all of 

Goad’s claims. In its order, the district court noted that “the question is not whether 

Byrd’s written [arrest-warrant] application was sufficient to support a finding of 

probable cause, but is rather whether Byrd had probable cause for the charge at all.” 

Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 807 n.9 (emphasis in original). Considering all of the 

information that Chief Byrd knew when he applied for the arrest warrant, the district 

court concluded that there was probable cause to believe that Goad had violated 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 453 (2015), by making a false statement to law enforcement. 

Goad now appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Goad argues that the district court erred in its probable-cause 

analysis by considering information beyond what Chief Byrd included within the four 

corners of the arrest-warrant application. In addition, Goad argues that the district 

court erred by concluding that he had confessed three of the First Amendment civil-

 

because Goad had mentioned that he had spent time in prison, causing Chief Byrd to 

wonder whether Goad was a felon who could not operate a pawnshop. The second 

fact has little relevance here. 

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rights violations in his first claim for relief (including his rights to free speech and to 

petition the government for redress of grievances).5

For the following reasons, we conclude that Goad has waived some of his 

claims. For Goad’s other claims, we conclude that, in evaluating whether Goad’s 

voluntary surrender was an unreasonable seizure, the district court was free to 

consider in its probable-cause analysis all of the information that Chief Byrd knew, 

and not just the information in Chief Byrd’s arrest-warrant application. We also 

conclude that probable cause supported the false-statement charge against Goad. 

A. Standard of Review 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Baca v. Sklar, 

398 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate where the 

moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “To avoid 

summary judgment, the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish an 

inference of the existence of each element essential to the case.” Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc., 43 

F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 

 5

 Because he appealed from the district court’s summary-judgment order, we 

consider almost all of Goad’s claims reviewable on appeal. See Pierce v. Shorty 

Small’s of Branson Inc., 137 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 1998) (limiting review to 

claims made regarding “final judgments or parts thereof that are designated in the 

notice of appeal”) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1) (requiring notice of appeal to 

“designate the judgment . . . being appealed”)). But since on appeal Goad has not 

raised his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for the right to 

assistance of counsel, or for a substantive-due-process violation, he has waived them. 

See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an 

appellant waived claims she did not address in her opening brief). 

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(1986)). The nonmovant “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, 

but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 

B. Waiver 

Before considering the merits, we address whether Goad has preserved all of his 

claims by raising them in the district court and to us.6

 In response to the Defendants’ 

summary-judgment motion, Goad argued that Chief Byrd’s arrest-warrant application 

failed to establish probable cause that he had committed the charged crime. And after 

limiting the available facts to those within the four corners of the arrest-warrant 

application, Goad argued that two of Chief Byrd’s statements were false, warranting their 

removal from the probable-cause determination. See Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 

1562 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that probable cause must support an arrest warrant and 

determining probable cause by setting aside false information from an affidavit and 

including material, omitted information in the affidavit). Similarly, Goad argued that the 

Defendants had not met the Rule 56 standard for summary judgment for Goad’s First 

Amendment-retaliation claim. 

An appellant waives a claim if he fails to raise it in the district court and then fails 

“to argue for plain error and its application on appeal.” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 777 

F.3d 1073, 1080 (10th Cir. 2014). And even for claims raised in the district court, a party 

waives a claim if he does not raise it in his opening brief—even if he later raises it in his 

 6

 Indeed, Goad’s discussion of what claims he actually wishes to raise on 

appeal is murky at best. 

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reply brief. Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).7

 Under this rule, 

Goad has not waived his unreasonable-seizure, malicious-prosecution, abuse-of-process, 

false-arrest, and First Amendment-retaliation claims. By arguing against the district 

court’s probable-cause determination, Goad has preserved review of those claims on 

appeal. 

But Goad has waived his claims unrelated to probable cause. First, Goad has not 

addressed on appeal his intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress or substantive-dueprocess claims. Because he has failed to mention those two claims in his opening brief, 

we will not consider them. See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(concluding that an appellant waived claims that she did not address in her opening 

brief). Goad has also failed to argue against the district court’s dismissal of his 

municipal-liability claims against the Town of Meeker. Thus, we decline to consider 

those claims. Id.

We also conclude that Goad has waived consideration of his First Amendment 

claims based on his rights to free speech and to petition for redress. True, Goad mentions 

 7

 Conversely, the appellants in Reedy waived a procedural-due-process claim 

because they “argue[d] only that they have a property interest in their prison wages” 

and did “not challenge the court’s reasoning” that the process the prison provided 

was adequate. Reedy, 660 F.3d at 1275. Goad does far more than the plaintiffsappellants in Reedy; he uses our precedent to challenge the district court’s probablecause determination and the adequacy of Chief Byrd’s arrest-warrant application. 

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in his brief that the district court concluded that he had confessed8

 these First Amendment 

claims and disputes this as “simply not the case.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21. But 

Goad’s First Amendment argument solely concerns his retaliation claim, ignoring any 

violation of his rights to free speech and to petition for redress. Nowhere does Goad say 

that he even argued those claims in his summary-judgment response. We affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of these claims, noting that Goad has cited no legal authority in 

support of them. See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1092 

(10th Cir. 2006) (citing Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To 

make a sufficient argument on appeal, a party must advance a reasoned argument 

concerning each ground of the appeal, and it must support its argument with legal 

authority.” (citation omitted))). 

 8

 We disagree with the district court’s use of Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) to deem 

Goad’s First Amendment claims (except retaliation) confessed. The rule provides: 

Each party opposing a motion shall file a response within 21 days after the 

date the motion was filed. Any motion that is not opposed within 21 days 

may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed confessed. The court may 

shorten or lengthen the time in which to respond. 

 

United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Local Court Rules

10 (2015), http://www.okwd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/local_rules_11-26-

2015.pdf. 

 Although a district court may prescribe local procedural rules, those rules must 

be “consistent with the Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Procedure.” Reed 

v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002). Many district courts have 

erroneously considered all “uncontested motion[s] confessed, making no exception 

for summary judgment motions.” Id. at 1193. To the extent that this rule permits 

district courts to deem claims confessed, district courts relying on this local rule must 

still consider Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 before granting summary judgment. The district court 

did not do that here. Nevertheless, we need not reverse, because Goad has waived the 

claims the district court deemed confessed. 

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C. Voluntary Surrenders and Fourth Amendment Seizures 

At oral argument, Goad conceded that he was not arrested. But that does not mean 

that Goad was not seized. When Goad learned of the arrest warrant, he turned himself in 

to the Lincoln County Jail and was released after booking. Goad’s “surrender to the 

State’s show of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality opinion); see Cummisky v. Mines, 

248 F. App’x 962, 965 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (noting that “a person’s 

‘surrender to the State’s show of authority’ by reporting to police after learning of an 

outstanding warrant ‘constitute[s] a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment’” 

(alteration in original) (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 271)). 

D. Considering Information Outside of the Arrest-Warrant Application 

Goad first argues that the district court erred in its probable-cause analysis by 

considering information from outside of Chief Byrd’s arrest-warrant application. Put 

another way, Goad contends that the district court should have determined whether there 

was probable cause for issuing the arrest warrant, not whether there was probable cause 

for the criminal charge against him in the complaint. 

We disagree with Goad. To succeed on each of the remaining claims he raises, 

Goad must show the absence of probable cause for the criminal charge, not, as Goad 

argues, for issuance of the arrest warrant. 

1. Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Seizure 

To prevail on his Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure claim, Goad would 

have to show that the Defendants lacked probable cause to support the charged crime 

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against him. Specifically, Goad must show a violation not of the Fourth Amendment’s 

Warrant Clause but of the Reasonableness Clause. “[F]or § 1983 liability” in Fourth 

Amendment claims, “the seizure must be unreasonable.” Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 

593, 599 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). Put another way, even if Goad had been 

arrested rather than self-surrendering after learning of the arrest warrant, he could not 

“prevail merely by showing that [he was] arrested with a defective warrant; [he] must 

show that [he was] unreasonably seized.” Graves v. Mahoning Cty., -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 

2753907, at *2 (6th Cir. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original); see Molina v. Spanos, No. 

98-1499, 1999 WL 626126, at *5–6 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999) (unpublished) (noting that 

the Warrant Clause “has no application” to the constitutionality of the arrest, which 

considers whether there was probable cause “that a crime has been committed and that a 

specific individual committed the crime”). 

In Graves, the plaintiffs in a § 1983 action claimed that officers had seized and 

arrested them with illegal arrest warrants. Graves, 2016 WL 2753907, at *1. The Sixth 

Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the arrest warrants had been “issued without any 

independent probable cause determination.” Id. But the Sixth Circuit still affirmed 

because the plaintiffs did not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 

Reasonableness Clause. Id. at *2. The court was concerned not with whether the warrant 

was invalid, but whether the seizure (there, an arrest) was reasonable. Id. For support, the 

Sixth Circuit stated as “the general rule: ‘[E]ven [when] the arrest warrant is invalid,’ 

probable cause is ‘sufficient to justify arrest.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United 

States v. Fachini, 466 F.2d 53, 57 (6th Cir. 1972)). 

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Just as the Sixth Circuit noted in Graves, seizures resulting from actual arrests do 

not require a warrant. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (noting that 

“warrantless arrests . . . were . . . taken for granted at the founding”) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). And in cases involving arrests, courts ask not whether the 

warrant was valid, but whether the seizure was reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. 

Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414–24 (1976) (listing cases and considering whether there was 

probable cause for an arrest). Similarly, a “seizure having the essential attributes of a 

formal arrest” is reasonable only if probable cause supports it. United States v. Ritchie, 35 

F.3d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 

(1981)); see Fuerschbach v. Sw. Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A 

. . . seizure generally requires either a warrant or probable cause.” (emphasis added)). 

Goad contends that Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 

560 (1971), confines our evaluation of probable cause to the facts in the arrest-warrant 

application. There, the Supreme Court held that a conclusory complaint rendered an 

arrest warrant defective under the Fourth Amendment. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 564–65. But 

in that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the officer lacked “probable cause for 

arrest without a warrant,” id. at 566, and did not possess “any factual data tending to 

corroborate” that Whiteley and his codefendant had committed a crime, id. at 568. Only 

the latter deficiency established a violation of Whiteley’s rights under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 568–69; see also Graves, 2016 WL 2753907, at *2 

(holding that plaintiffs can prevail only by showing that they were unreasonably seized). 

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In short, the district court was free to look beyond the arrest-warrant application to 

determine if probable cause supported the criminal charge against him (which in turn led 

to the seizure). 

2. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process 

We next consider Goad’s malicious-prosecution and abuse-of-process claims.9

Although the common-law elements of malicious prosecution are the “starting point” for 

analyzing Goad’s § 1983 claim, “‘the ultimate question’ in such a case ‘is whether 

plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 

F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1257–

58 (10th Cir. 2007)). In Wilkins, the plaintiffs “premised their § 1983 malicious 

prosecution claim on a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

 9

 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on 

Goad’s abuse-of-process claim, concluding that “it is in essence one for malicious 

prosecution.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 816. We agree with how the district court 

characterized Goad’s claim. In his complaint, Goad alleged that “[a]t the time Mr. 

Byrd sought the arrest warrant for Mr. Goad, he was aware that no probable cause 

existed for the charges and that his Application for Warrant of Arrest was not 

truthful, but he nonetheless sought and obtained the arrest warrant to harass, 

intimidate and/or injure Mr. Goad.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 20. A maliciousprosecution claim, however, is not to be confused with an abuse-of-process claim. 

Malicious prosecution must be “distinguished from abuse of process—the former lies 

for the malicious initiation of process and the latter for a perversion of the process 

after it is issued.” Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 906 (Okla. 1994) (emphasis 

in original). Here, Goad’s allegations relate only to the initiation of the proceedings 

against him. He does not allege anywhere that, once the process was initiated, the 

Defendants perverted the legal process. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 

explained, “there is no abuse if the court’s process is used legitimately to its 

authorized conclusion.” Id. at 905 (emphasis omitted). Thus, because the presence of 

probable cause defeats Goad’s malicious-prosecution claim, it also defeats his abuseof-process claim. 

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unreasonable seizures, [so] we analyze[d] the elements of their claim in light of Fourth 

Amendment guarantees.” Id. Similarly (although not expressly invoking it), Goad roots 

his malicious-prosecution claim in the Fourth Amendment. In asserting this claim in his 

complaint, Goad repeatedly alleges that Chief Byrd lacked probable cause to seek an 

arrest warrant. 

Because Goad’s malicious-prosecution claim is based on the Fourth Amendment’s 

right to be free from unreasonable seizure, we conclude that we can look beyond the 

arrest-warrant application to determine probable cause (which is one of the elements of a 

malicious-prosecution claim). See Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 502 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002) (“The issue in a malicious prosecution case is not whether there was probable 

cause for the initial arrest, but whether there was probable cause for the underlying suit.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). 

3. False Arrest 

To prevail on a false-arrest claim, Goad must establish a lack of probable cause 

supporting the charged crime. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(noting that the plaintiff must establish that his arrest was without probable cause); 

Gouskos v. Griffith, 122 F. App’x 965, 970 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (“The 

common-law tort of false arrest has a single element in Oklahoma: that the defendantofficer arrested the plaintiff without probable cause.”). In Kerns, we reversed the denial 

of qualified immunity for the defendant officers because, notwithstanding “whatever 

mistakes, omissions, or misstatements they may have made in connection with the arrest 

warrant affidavit or in grand jury proceedings, there was still probable cause to arrest and 

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detain [Kerns] during the period of his prosecution.” Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1187. At least 

two other circuits have considered “the facts and circumstances within the defendant’s 

knowledge” to answer the probable-cause question. Lawson v. Veruchi, 637 F.3d 699, 

703 (7th Cir. 2011); see Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2015) (“An 

officer possesses probable cause when, at the moment the officer seeks the arrest, ‘the 

facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [she] had 

reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 

that the [plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense.’” (alterations in original) 

(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))).10 We do the same here. 

4. First Amendment Retaliation 

Similarly, we need not constrain our probable-cause analysis to the arrest warrant 

for Goad’s First Amendment-retaliation claim. Among other elements, Goad must “plead 

and prove the absence of probable cause for the prosecution” in order to succeed on this 

claim. Becker, 494 F.3d at 925 (emphasis added). Because we consider whether probable 

cause supported the prosecution—and not just the arrest— we can look beyond the arrestwarrant application to resolve Goad’s First Amendment-retaliation claim. 

E. Probable Cause for the Charge Against Goad 

We now consider whether probable cause supported the charge filed against Goad. 

 10 See also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009) (“It is well 

settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent 

intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks 

the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” (quoting Taylor 

v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Castellano 

v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc))). 

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Probable cause is a “common-sensical standard” that is “not reducible to precise 

definition or quantification.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (quotation 

marks omitted). Rather, to establish probable cause, an officer must show “a substantial 

probability that a crime has been committed and that a specific individual committed the 

crime.” Wolford, 78 F.3d at 489. A “bare suspicion” is not enough. Kerns, 663 F.3d at 

1188. 

In the arrest-warrant application, Chief Byrd swore as follows: (1) Goad filed a 

notarized citizen’s complaint “based upon the conversation he had . . . with Meeker 

Police Officer Sean Sugrue”; (2) in the written complaint, Goad identified himself as 

the owner of Meeker Supply and Pawn; (3) “Goad is a convicted felon in the State of 

Oklahoma with a lengthy criminal record”; and (4) “[u]nder Oklahoma [s]tate [l]aw, 

Goad is not allowed to . . . conduct business or otherwise have any dealings with a 

pawn shop.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 575. Based on this, Chief Byrd declared that 

“a false sworn declaration was given to [him] by Goad that was to be used in a 

personnel proceeding authorized . . . by law, [in violation of] Title 21 section 453.” 

Id. Under section 453, it is a felony offense to “falsely prepar[e] any book, paper, 

record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or 

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allow it to be produced as genuine upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, 

authorized by law . . . .”11 Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 453. 

If we constricted our review to Chief Byrd’s application, we would struggle to 

find probable cause for a violation of section 453. But two additional facts outside 

the arrest-warrant application support our conclusion that probable cause supported 

the charge against Goad. First, the prosecutor filed a Supplemental Information (on 

the same day she filed with the county court both the criminal complaint against 

Goad and the arrest-warrant application), stating that one of Goad’s felony 

convictions was for knowingly concealing stolen property—a felony that we believe 

“substantially relates to the occupation of a pawnbroker or poses a reasonable threat 

to public safety.” Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 1503A(B). 

Second, Chief Byrd knew from consumer-affairs officials that Goad was not 

listed as the owner of Meeker Supply and Pawn and that Goad’s name was not listed 

on any of the pawnshop’s information. The district court found that: 

Defendant Byrd knew plaintiff stated in a sworn statement that he was the 

owner of Meeker Supply and Pawn. It is undisputed that he also had been 

told by the Oklahoma Department of Consumer Credit, the agency that 

licensed and regulated pawnshops in Oklahoma, that plaintiff’s name did 

not appear on any of the documents associated with Meeker Supply and 

Pawn and that Gerald Goad, not plaintiff, was the owner of the pawnshop. 

The court concludes defendant Byrd could presume the information 

provided by the Department of Consumer Credit was reliable and he 

therefore had reasonable grounds for believing plaintiff had violated [Okla. 

 11 In the arrest-warrant application, Chief Byrd also listed two administrative 

statutes, later referred to the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office for review: 

(1) operating a pawnshop after a felony conviction, Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 1503A(B); and 

(2) operating a pawnshop without a license, id. § 1512(C). 

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Stat. tit. 21, § 453], by making a false sworn declaration in his citizen’s 

complaint that he owned Meeker Supply and Pawn. He also had a 

reasonable basis for believing plaintiff had violated [Okla. Stat. tit. 59, 

§§ 1503A and 1512(C)] by operating a pawnshop after a felony conviction 

and without a [license]. 

Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 813–14 (footnotes omitted). Based on this knowledge, the 

court explained that “the undisputed facts show probable cause to have existed for the 

arrest warrant and plaintiff’s prosecution.” Id. at 814. 

Based on these facts and the information that Chief Byrd included in the arrestwarrant application, we agree that probable cause supported the charge of falsely 

preparing a writing for any legally authorized inquiry, a violation of section 453. And 

because probable cause supported the charge, Goad cannot succeed on his unreasonableseizure, malicious-prosecution, abuse-of-process, false-arrest, and First Amendmentretaliation claims. 

Before concluding, we note that Goad attempts to raise an issue that he failed 

to brief adequately in the district court.12 Goad attempts to argue that his alleged 

conduct does not fit within any prohibition in section 453. Specifically, Goad 

 12 We also note that Chief Byrd argues that qualified immunity shields him 

from liability. But the district court concluded that Chief Byrd failed to adequately 

argue for qualified immunity in his summary-judgment motion. See Appellant’s App. 

vol. 3 at 810 n.15 (noting that Chief Byrd’s argument was “almost an afterthought” 

and did not apply the typical qualified-immunity analysis to Goad’s claims). Because 

we conclude that probable cause supported the charge against Goad, we need not 

address whether Chief Byrd can now assert qualified immunity. Cf. MacArthur v. San 

Juan Cty., 495 F.3d 1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007) (“We have consistently held . . . that 

‘qualified immunity can be raised at any time and a district court may enter . . . 

judgment on that ground at any point before trial at which it is appropriate.’” (second 

alteration in original) (quoting Langley v. Adams Cty., 987 F.2d 1473, 1481 n.3 (10th 

Cir. 1993))). 

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contends that what Chief Byrd alleged in the arrest-warrant application was not a 

violation of section 453, because Goad did not file a non-genuine citizen’s complaint. 

Rather, Goad asserts that Defendants are relying on an allegedly untrue, nonmaterial 

fact in a genuine citizen’s complaint to support an alleged violation of section 453 

(Goad contends that he did in fact own the pawnshop with his brother). 

For good reason, the district court did not decide Goad’s argument about the 

scope of section 453 in its summary-judgment order: 

Plaintiff did not raise any other defense to the applicability of [Okla. 

Stat. tit. 21, § 453] other than that he did not make a false statement. He 

states in his response to defendants’ factual statement that “the charge 

does not fit the actual criminal statute,” but does not develop the 

argument in his brief. Doc. #63, p. 20, ¶43. While there may be some 

basis for questioning the applicability of the statute, the court will not 

attempt to resolve an argument that was not adequately briefed. See 

Rieck v. Jensen, 651 F.3d 1188, 1191 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (“But an 

argument is not preserved by merely alluding to it in a statement of 

facts.”). 

Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 814 n.19. Goad has waived any argument about the scope 

of section 453 because he failed to raise it sufficiently in the district court and then 

failed to argue for plain error and its application on appeal. Campbell, 777 F.3d at 

1080. 

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CONCLUSION 

We conclude that, for some of his claims, Goad has waived appellate review. 

For Goad’s remaining claims, we conclude that probable cause supported the charge 

against Goad. We affirm the district court. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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15-6085, James Goad v. Town of Meeker, et al. 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I join the panel opinion except insofar as it could be read to imply that the arrest of 

a person is lawful when (1) an arrest warrant for the person is not supported by probable 

cause; (2) the officer who executed the affidavit supporting the warrant had further 

information that, when considered in addition to the information set forth in the affidavit, 

would establish probable cause for the arrest; but (3) that officer did not communicate the 

additional information, directly or indirectly, to those who executed the arrest. Here, 

Goad’s detention at the jail was lawful because (1) as conceded on appeal, he was not 

arrested and his booking was the same as it would have been based on the complaint 

alone, and (2) there was probable cause supporting the complaint. 

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