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Parties Involved:
Carolyn W. Colvin
Appellee
Scott Michael Putnam
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 31, 2016*

Decided June 1, 2016

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2321

SCOTT MICHAEL PUTNAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 1587

Mary M. Rowland,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

In pursuing disability insurance benefits from the Social Security Administration, 

Scott Putnam, age 40, asserts that he cannot work. He says that he was disabled during

the 76 days between October 17, 2006 (the day after his first Social Security claim was 

denied, a decision that Putnam is precluded from relitigating, see Meredith v. Bowen, 833 

F.2d 650, 652–53 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1987)), and December 31, 2006 (his date last insured). A 

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-2321 Page 2

year earlier, the Department of Veterans Affairs had determined that, under its 

disability-benefits program, Putnam was entitled to benefits for his service-related 

disability (rated at 100%). In seeking additional benefits from the Social Security 

Administration, he alleges two main sets of impairments: physical (knee pain) and 

mental (depression and anxiety). He has abandoned an appellate argument about other 

impairments, so we need not discuss them. An ALJ denied Putnam’s application (and 

the district court agreed), concluding that Putnam’s anxiety and depression were not 

severe impairments and that his knee pain did not render him disabled. The ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence, so we affirm. 

Putnam’s knee pain, which stems from an injury in the military in 1995, has 

varied over time. Initially, by taking anti-inflammatory medications and muscle 

relaxers, and avoiding high-impact activities and prolonged standing or walking, he 

functioned well. He swam, used public transit, and walked to his medical clinic from 

the train until he injured his knee again in 2005. After he re-injured his knee, he was 

warned not to bear weight on it temporarily, but he told his doctor that he was able to, 

and he declined orthopedic appointments in 2006. During the 76 days at issue in his 

claim, Putnam reported that his medication controlled his knee pain and that he was 

walking daily, although he limped and used a cane. Shortly after the 76 days ended,

Putnam again reported that his medications still helped his knee pain, which he rated at

3 or 4 on a scale of 10. About three years later, after he was no longer insured, the 

situation changed. In 2009 Putnam’s severe knee pain had returned, and his 

primary-care physician opined that Putnam could not sit more than an hour or walk or 

stand more than 15 minutes. 

The evidence about depression and anxiety also varies. In 2005 Putnam told 

doctors that he was moody, tearful, depressed, and anxious because of his physical 

disability. Doctors from the Veterans Health Administration opined that he had 

memory and concentration difficulties. His scores of Global Assessment of Functioning, 

a controversial measure of mental health, reflected serious to moderate symptoms and 

possible impairments in functioning. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(explaining that the GAF scale is used to rate a person’s adjustment to psychological 

and daily living challenges, but the scale has been criticized for its subjectivity); Voigt v. 

Colvin, 781 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the American Psychiatric 

Association has eliminated the GAF scale as unreliable). But Putnam decided not to 

pursue the mental-health treatment that the veterans’ program offered him. During the 

76 days, he declined an appointment for counseling, and he ignored several attempts to 

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contact him for treatment. As a result, his doctors discharged him from the treatment 

program. 

No further evidence of mental impairments appears until two years after the

76 days ended. Putnam complained to a doctor in 2008 that for several years he had 

been experiencing mild depression and anxiety. But he also reported to his doctors that 

he was able to do housework and run errands. A physician prescribed antipsychotic

and antianxiety medications, and Putnam’s mood stabilized with no apparent side 

effects. His social worker reported that he declined to attend several sessions in 2009. 

Over a year later Dr. Lisa Polsby opined that Putnam’s mental health impairments had 

disabled him from working, functioning socially, and concentrating since 2005, though 

she did not begin to treat him until 2010 and her progress notes said that medication 

stabilized his moods. A year later, Dr. Donald Koziol opined that Putnam’s depression 

and anxiety prevented him from working, but he saw Putnam only four times, 

beginning in 2010. 

A hearing before an ALJ supplemented this evidence. First Putnam testified. He 

acknowledged that he had participated in a work-study program in early 2006. But, he 

asserted, his knee pain forced him to use a cane or walker, his feet swelled, and he

frequently fell asleep from the side effects of his knee medications. (The last two 

assertions are not reflected in treatment notes.) Regarding his mental health, Putnam 

recalled that before 2006 he experienced anxiety, some crying spells, panic attacks, and 

difficulty sleeping and concentrating. The ALJ asked Putnam to explain why, during 

the 76-day period, Putnam had ignored his doctor’s offers to treat his mental health. 

Putnam replied that he did not want to go through the mental-health assessment, and 

the inclement weather and his assistive device made it hard to get to the clinic (though 

treatment notes from this period reflect that he was walking daily). He acknowledged

that medication has helped decrease his panic attacks in social interactions.

A medical expert and vocational expert also testified. Dr. Laura Rosch reviewed 

Putnam’s medical records and testified that his knee causes chronic pain, so he should 

be limited to sedentary work with no exposure to hazards or heights, no climbing, and 

no loud noises. She also noted that Putnam had been diagnosed with and treated for 

anxiety and depression, but the record was not sufficient to establish their severity. The 

vocational expert testified that Putnam could not return to his previous work as a 

forklift driver or cook, but, under the limitations suggested by Dr. Rosch, he could work 

as a sorter, assembler, or bench packager. 

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The ALJ denied Putnam’s claim using the five-step framework for determining 

benefit eligibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Putnam had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity (step 1); his left knee injury was a severe impairment, but his depression

or anxiety were not (step 2); his impairment did not equal a listed impairment (step 3); 

he was unable to perform his past relevant work, but he could perform sedentary work. 

That work, the ALJ specified, must allow him to use his assistive device and may not 

involve frequent stooping, bending, kneeling, crouching, or crawling; any climbing or 

heights; any loud noises and concentrated exposure to hazards, dust, and fumes

(step 4). With these restrictions, the ALJ concluded at step 5 that Putnam could work as 

a sorter, assembler, or bench packager.

The ALJ explained why he discredited Putnam’s assertion that his knee pain 

disabled him from working. During the 76 days Putnam had told his doctors that his 

pain was controlled by his medications and that he walked daily. The ALJ also observed

that, in the times surrounding that period, Putnam told his doctors that his pain was 

only a 3 or 4 on a scale of 10. Putnam had also returned to work, used public 

transportation, walked to the medical clinic from the train, ran errands, and completed 

housework. And, the ALJ explained, Putnam had considered himself fit enough both to 

disregard his doctor’s advice not to bear weight on his knee and to decline orthopedic 

appointments. These activities and decisions belied his claim that his knee pain was 

disabling. 

The ALJ further explained why he gave no weight to the mental-health opinions 

from Putnam’s two doctors. First, treatment notes did not support Dr. Polsby’s opinion. 

According to those notes, medications had stabilized Putnam’s moods, Putnam 

experienced no adverse side effects, and he was feeling less anxious. Second, both 

opinions were too remote in time. Dr. Polsby saw Putnam over three years after the 

76 days had ended, and Dr. Koziol saw Putnam only four times, starting more than four 

years after the 76 days. 

On appeal Putnam first argues that the ALJ wrongly discredited his two doctors’ 

opinions. And by discrediting them, Putnam continues, the ALJ erred at step 2 in 

finding that his anxiety and depression were not severe and again at step 4 in not 

incorporating their opinions in assessing his remaining capacity to work. But the ALJ 

permissibly reasoned that, because these opinions were not supported by treatment 

records and were too remote in time, he need not accept them. Dr. Polsby’s notes show 

that drugs had corrected Putnam’s mood swings without adverse side effects. And the 

opinions, rendered several years after the 76 days, contained no reason to believe that 

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they were based on Putnam’s condition at that time. See Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 

507 (7th Cir. 2016); Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868–69 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Putnam next contends that the ALJ should have looked at the records outside the 

76 days to evaluate his depression and anxiety. But the ALJ did examine all of Putnam’s 

medical history, including treatment outside the relevant period, to infer his 

mental-health condition within that period. See Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 810–11 

(7th Cir. 1998) (evidence from previous benefits denial used to fill gaps in later benefits 

claim). Yet, as the ALJ correctly observed, from 2005 through 2010 Putnam sought

“sporadic treatment at best,” and when he sought it, it stabilized any mood swings. This 

history implied that Putnam was not disabled. 

Putnam next argues that the ALJ did not follow 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. This

regulation requires the ALJ to determine how any mental impairments affect daily 

activities, social functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace, and ability to cope

with stressors. See Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2008). Putnam contends 

that the ALJ omitted this regulation from his analysis, but any omission was harmless: 

The ALJ reasonably explained that Putnam’s mental-health impairments could not be 

chronically severe because he had declined treatment during the relevant period and for 

years later, despite its ready availability. See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 365–67 

(7th Cir. 2013). The ALJ also permissibly discounted Putnam’s proffered excuse for 

declining treatment—that it was difficult for him to get to the appointments—because 

Putnam had reported that he walked daily during this same time and that his knee pain 

was under control. 

Finally Putnam argues that the ALJ erred at step 3 in finding that none of his 

impairments equal a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. But 

Putnam fails to specify which impairment the ALJ ignored, and undeveloped 

arguments are waived. See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013). In any 

case, elsewhere in the decision the ALJ reasonably credited the opinion of Dr. Rosch, 

who, after reviewing the record and regulations, said Putnam’s impairments did not 

equal the listings. See Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2015); Johansen v. 

Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 287–88 (7th Cir. 2002). And the ALJ further explained that, under 

listings 1.02, 1.03, and 1.04, Putnam’s knee injury did not qualify as a listed impairment 

because he was able to walk with a cane during the relevant period. 

AFFIRMED.

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