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Parties Involved:
John Beaulieu
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

Uaired Si:;itfi Court of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

APR l 7 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN BEAULIEU, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

88-2580 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The Western District 

Of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-88-129-P) 

Edward Y. Crandall, ~idwest City, Oklahoma, for DefendantApP,ellant. 

Robert G. Mccampbell, Assistant United States Attorney (William s. 

Price, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge*. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from the trial court's upward adjustment of 

defendant's sentence imposed under the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines ("Guidelines''). John Beaulieu, defendant-appellant, 

contends that the trial court's upward adjustment based on the 

court's finding that he obstructed justice by testifying 

untruthfully is unconstitutional and based on insufficient 

evidence. Finding no constitutional error in the trial court's 

upward adjustment and that the court was not clearly erroneous in 

its finding that defendant testified untruthfully, we affirm the 

trial court's sentence. 

The defendant was charged, along with his brothers Darrell 

and Ronald Beaulieu, with conspiracy to manufacture amphetamines 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. ·§ 846. See United States v. Ronald 

Beaulieu, F.2d , No. 88-2568, slip op. (10th Cir.); 

United States v. Darrell Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.). In 

·a joint trial with his brother Ronald, defendant denied all 

involvement with the manufacturing of amphetamines. Defendant's 

version of the facts was contradicted by several government 

witnesses. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, in a hearing 

prior to sentencing, the defendant objected to a pre-sentence 

report recommendation that his base offense level of 26 be 

adjusted by two levels on the ground that he obstructed justice by 

testifying untruthfully. See Guidelines§ 3Cl.l, n.l(c). The 

trial court accepted the pre-sentence report recommendation and 

concluded that defendant testified untruthfully. At sentencing, 

the court applied the Guidelines and adjusted the defendant's base 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 2 
offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice to result 

in a total· offense level of 28. Defendant was sentenced to 80 

months' imprisonment, within the Guidelines range for his total 

offense level. 

Defendant does not contest his underlying conviction, but 

objects to the sentencing court's two level upward adjustment for 

obstruction of justice based on its finding that he testified 

untruthfully. Defendant first asserts that sentencing in this 

manner is unconstitutional in violation of due process and his 

right to testify. We review defendant's constitutional challenges 

de novo since they involve contested issues of law. See 

United States .v. Fredericks, No. 89-6009, slip op. at 3-4 (10th 

Cir. Feb. 28, 1990). The standard of review on appeal for issues 

of law is the same as that applied by the trial court in making 

its initial ruling. Id. For the reas9ns.stated below, we hold 

that defendant's constitutional challenges have no merit. 

Section 3Cl.l of the Guidelines allows the sentencing judge 

to adj~st a defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice. 

Application Note l(c) to § 3Cl.l states, in relevant part, that 

"testifying untruthfully ••• concerning a material fact" is 

conduct that may justify a finding of obstruction of justice. 

Application Note 3 further states that "(t]his provision is not 

intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a 

constitutional right. A defendant's denial of guilt is not a 

basis for application of this provision." 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 3 
Defendant contends that the sentencing court's consideration 

of his untruthful testimony inhibits exercise of his right to 

testify. As support he urges that "he has a right to put on a 

defense and not be placed on the horns of a dilemma by having to 

decide whether the trial Judge will punish him harsher at the 

sentencing stage if the jury returns a verdict of guilty and he 

testifies at trial." Defendant's Brief at 13. 

It is clear that prior to the Guidelines, it was not 

unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to consider a defendant's 

false testimony as observed by the judge at trial. See 

United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41; Humes v. United States, 186 

.F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir.). The Supreme Court in Grayson expressly 

rejected an indistinguishable argument from the one presented by 

defendant that consideration of a defendant's untruthful testimony 

at sentencing would violate his right to testify. In rejecting 

this argument, the Court held that there is no protected right to 

commit perjury. See Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54. The Court further 

stated: 

"That argument misappreh~nds the nature and 

scope of the practice we find permissible • 

• • • [W)e are reaffirming the authority of a 

sentencing judge to evaluate carefully a 

defendant's testimony on the stand, 

determine--with a consciousness of the frailty 

of human judgment--whether that testimony 

contained willful and material falsehoods, 

and, if so, assess in light of all the other 

knowledge gained about the defendant the 

meaning of that conduct with respect to his 

prospects for rehabilitation and restoration 

to a useful place in society. Awareness of 

such a process realistically cannot be deemed 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 4 
·to aff·ect -the decision of an accused but 

unconvicted defendant to testify truthfully in 

his own behalf." 

Id. at 55. 

Although Grayson is a pre-Guidelines case, there is nothing 

to indicate that the same result would not apply under the facts 

of this case. Our holding is consistent with other circuits which 

have similarly found this argument to be unpersuasive under the 

Guidelines. See United States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1090, 1098 (8th 

Cir.) (rejecting argument that an adjustment for testifying 

untruthfully violated defendant's constitutional right to 

testify); United States v. Acosta-Ca~ares, 878 F.2d 945, 953 (6th 

Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 255 (defendant's 

right to testify is not violated where the sentencing judge 

believes that the defendant.attempted to obstruct justice under. 

§ 3Cl.l by lying during his testimony). 

Defendant's next contention that the trial court's 

consideration of his untruthful trial testimony deprived him of 

due process is likewise without merit. Defe~dant asserts that 

sentencing in this manner violates due process because it is 

arbitrary in that it allows the court to "draw the line'' between 

what is true or false. Defendant's Brief at 13. Moreover, 

defendant urges that he is being punished for perjury, a crime for 

which he was not convicted. 

Initially, we note that these arguments were flatly rejected 

in Grayson. The Supreme Court held that it did not violate due 

process and was within proper judicial discretion for a sentencing 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 5 
'I 

judge, who obse~ved the defendant at trial, to consider the 

defendant's alleged perjury at trial, a crime for which the 

defendant was not tried or convicted. See Grayson, 438 U.S. 52-

54. The Court explained: 

Id. at 53. 

"[T]he evolutionary history of sentencing 

•.• demonstrates that .it is proper--indeed, 

even necessary for the rational exercise of 

discretion--to consider the defendant's whole 

person and personality, as manifested by his 

conduct at trial and his testimony under oath, 

for whatever light those may shed on the 

sentencing decision." 

The fact that Grayson is a pre-Guidelines case does not, as a 

matter of due process, change the result. ''As a matter of due 

process ••. ·the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 

requires no different rules with respect to what evidence may be 

used in determining a sentence than were already in place." 

Beaulieu, 893 F~2d at· 1180 (10th Cir.) (citing United States v. 

Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir.)). Since a sentencing judge's 

consideration of the defendant's untruthfulness at trial did not 

violate due process prior to the Guidelines and we find nothing in 

the Guidelines which supports a contrary result, we must reject 

defendant's argument. 

Furthermore, defendant's argument essentially restates a 

challenge which we have already rejected. We recently held that 

the quantum of proof required by due process for the trial court 

to make factual determinations during sentencing under the 

Guidelines is a preponderance-of-the-evidence and not beyond-a-

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 6 
reasonable-doubt. Fredericks, No. 89-6009, s·l-ip op. at 4-9 (10th 

Cir. Feb. 28, 1990}. Accordingly, we found no due process 

violation by the sentencing court's consideration, based on a 

preponderance of the evidence, of criminal activity for which the 

defendant had never been charged or convicted. Id. See also 

United States v. Barnerd, 887 F.2d 841, 842 (8th Cir.} (the 

-Sentencing Guidelines do not violate due process because defendant 

does not have a right to trial by jury on facts which result in 

increase in sentence}. In this case, similarly, there is no due 

process requirement that a sentencing judge under the Guidelines 

can consider the non-charged conduct of defendant (perjury} only 

if the quantum 6f proof would support a conviction. 

"Due process requires that a defendant not be sentenced on 

the basis of 'misinformation of a constitutional magnitude.'" 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1181 (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 

U.S. 443, 447). Section 6Al.3(a} of the Guidelines states, in 

relevant part, that: 

"When any factor important to the sentencing 

determination is reasonably in dispute, the 

parties shall be given an adequate opportunity 

to present information to the court regarding 

that factor. In resolving [this dispute] 

• • • the court may consider relevant 

information without regard to its 

admissibility under the rules of evidence 

applicable at trial, provided that the 

information has sufficient indicia of 

reliability to support its probable accuracy." 

(Emphasis added.} 

After reviewing the record in this case, we fail to find any 

due process violation by the sentencing court's consideration of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 7 
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~efendant's untruthful testimony. The court held a· hearing, prior 

to sentencing, where the defendant was provided an opportunity to 

rebut the pre-sentence report recommendation that he testified 

untruthfully. Further, the s~ntencing judge's determination that 

the defendant committed perjury while on the stand was based on 

his personal observation of defendant's demeanor at trial which 

satisfies the indicia of reliability required under the Federal 

Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 

43 (2d. Cir.) (no due process violation by sentencing judge's 

failure to conduct a hearing prior to enhancing defendant's 

sentence based on alleged perjury at trial, where judge who 

imposed sentence was the same judge at trial). 

Defendant next contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

support the trial court's finding that he obstructed justice by 

testifying untruthfully. Whether the defendant testified 

untruthfully is a factual determination. See United States v. 

O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir.). We shall give due regard to 

the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses and accept the district court's findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous. See 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e). 

Under the clearly erroneous standard, we will not reverse the 

trial court unless the court's finding was without fa~tual support 

in the record, or if after reviewing all the evidence we are left 

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 

Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 8 
'. 

,I I 

·In ·this case, the trial court· clearly disbelieved defendant's 

testimony, stating: 

"I recall in great detail the explanations he 

gave at trial concerning the items found in 

his house, his association and participation 

with some of these members of the conspiracy. 

And not only did it simply not ring true, it 

was just flatly contradicted by the evidence 

of numerous accomplice witnesses and the 

corroborating evidence presented by the 

government." 

Record, Vol. 5, at 76-77. 

A review of the record fully supports the trial court's 

conclusion that defendant testified untruthfully. At trial, 

defendant denied all involvement in the manufacturing of 

amphetamines, in flat contradiction to the testimony of government 

witnesses, Regina Chester, Clint Bowen, Terry Bowen and Russell 

Allen. Record, Vol. 2, at 10~15; Vol. 3, at 280-84. Further, the 

government witnesses' testimony was corroborated with respect to 

the extent of defendant's involvement in the conspiracy. The 

defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was unaware that a 

box seized from his bedroom contained items used to manufacture 

amphetamine because the box belonged to his brother. Record, 

Vol. 3, at 273-74, 280. In addition, the defendant admitted 

owning a triple beam scale seized at his house; however, he 

testified he didn't use it, could not recall where it came from 

and denied testimony that he was present when the scale was used 

to weigh amphetamines. Record, Vol. 3, at 274, 280-81. 

Based on this testimony and our deference to the trial 

court's credibility assessments, we cannot find that the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2580 Document: 01019583512 Date Filed: 04/17/1990 Page: 9 
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sentencing judge's conclusiorr·tha~ defendant testified 

untruthfully was clearly erroneous. Our conclusion is not altered 

by Application Note 2 to § 3Cl.l which states that "[i]n applying 

this provision, suspect testimony and statements should be 

evaluated in a light most favorable to the defendant.'' This 

provision has be interpreted as instructing the sentencing judge 

to resolve in favor of the defendant those conflicts about which 

the judge, after weighing the evidence, has no firm conviction. 

See United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir.). 

Here, it is clear that the sentencing judge firmly disbelieved 

defendant's testimony. 

AFFIRMED. 

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