Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01651/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01651-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federated Retail Holdings
Appellee
Jack Randall
Appellant
Pearl Randall
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

2

Now Federated Retail Holdings, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1651

___________

Jack Randall; Pearl Randall, *

*

Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri

Federated Retail Holdings, Inc., *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2005

Filed: November 23, 2005 

___________

Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

 

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge

In this diversity action, Jack and Pearl Randall appeal from a final order

entered in the United States District Court1 for the Eastern District of Missouri

granting a Directed Verdict in favor of May Department Stores Co. (“May”), 2

 in

their nuisance case. On appeal, the Randalls challenge the district court’s Directed

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Verdict on their nuisance claim and the district court’s granting of May’s Motion In

Limine No. 1, restricting the Randalls’ proof of damages to those damages accrued

as of the date of filing of the initial complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we

affirm the judgment of the district court.

Background

In 1961, May purchased the property to the east and south of the four-story

building located at 224 North Seventh Street in St. Louis, Missouri (the “Randall

Building”). In 1962, May built a multi-story parking garage with basement level

parking on its property immediately adjacent to the Randall Building. Only six to

eight inches separate the east wall of the Randall Building and the west wall of May’s

parking garage.

In March 1962, May and the then-owners of the Randall Building entered into

a license agreement under which May built an emergency exit on its property

allowing exiting from the basement restaurant in the Randall Building into the

stairwell of May’s parking garage for emergency purposes. The license agreement

provided it would expire if certain events occurred affecting May’s parking garage

or on March 31, 2000.

In 1976, the Randalls purchased the Randall Building, knowing that the

second, third and fourth floors of the building did not have any emergency exits. The

Randalls wished to convert the top three floors to residential use. In order to do so,

the City of St. Louis required the Randalls to install an emergency exit on the fourth

floor of the building.

On January 5, 1978, the Randalls and May entered into a license agreement

granting the Randalls a license for emergency exiting purposes from the second, third

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or fourth floors of the Randall Building into the stairwell of May’s parking garage.

Like the 1962 license agreement, the 1978 license agreement provided that it would

expire no later than March 31, 2000. May broke through its parking garage wall to

accommodate the emergency exit on the fourth floor of the Randall Building, and,

like the basement exit, the fourth floor exit entered into May’s property.

In 1978, the Randalls installed a new sprinkler system in the basement of the

Randall Building. Pursuant to an oral license, May permitted the Randalls to use

May’s private waterline as a source of water for the Randall Building’s sprinkler

system.

In 2000, May sent the Randalls notice that the licenses for the emergency exits

from the Randall Building into May’s parking garage were expiring on March 31,

2000. In early 2000, May offered to lease the first floor of the Randall building for

$20 per square foot, and the Randalls rejected it. In February 2000, May offered to

purchase the Randall Building for $350,000, and again the Randalls rejected the offer.

On March 31, 2000, the license agreements for the emergency exits expired.

On April 25, 2000, May revoked the oral license permitting the Randalls to use the

waterline. May capped the water supply to the fire sprinkler system in the Randall

Building, and on April 25, 2002, May sealed the emergency exits from the Randall

Building into the stairwell of May’s parking garage.

The Randalls installed a new water connection for the sprinkler system in the

basement of their building at a cost of $33,142.00.

The Randalls filed suit against May on February 25, 2003, in the Circuit Court

of St. Clair County, Illinois. The Randalls sought monetary damages based upon

state common law claims, including interference with the right of quiet enjoyment,

tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and nuisance. May

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removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois based

on diversity jurisdiction. The case was then transferred to the U.S. District Court for

the Eastern District of Missouri.

On May 23, 2003, May filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, a

Motion for More Definite Statement, asserting that the Randalls failed to plead the

necessary elements of their stated causes of action. The district court allowed the

Randalls to file an amended complaint. The Randalls’ Second Amended Complaint

alleged that May: (1) interfered with their right of quiet enjoyment (Count I); (2)

tortiously interfered with their prospective economic advantage (Count II); and (3)

created a nuisance (Count III). The Randalls also claimed a right to an “easement by

necessity” (Count IV). 

On February 26, 2003, the district court dismissed the Randalls’ claims for

interference with the right of quiet enjoyment (Count I), tortious interference with

prospective economic advantage (Count II), and imposition of an easement by

necessity (Count IV). The nuisance claim (Count III) remained the issue for trial.

Prior to trial, the district court granted May’s Motion In Limine No. 1,

restricting the Randalls’ proof of damages to those damages that had accrued as of the

date of filing of the initial Complaint because the Randalls failed to specifically

request an injunction in the prayer for relief of Count III.

A jury trial began on November 15, 2004. On November 17, 2004, at the

conclusion of the Randalls’ evidence, the district court granted May’s Motion for a

Directed Verdict, entering judgment in favor of May. On December 2, 2004, the

Randalls filed their Motion to Vacate the Directed Verdict Finding. The district court

denied the Randalls’ contention that the reasonableness of the defendant’s land use

is the primary question in a nuisance suit. Instead, the district court held that “before

issues of reasonableness can be addressed by the jury, Plaintiffs must demonstrate

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that they have a right susceptible to legal protection under Missouri nuisance law.”

Relying on 44 Plaza, Inc. v. Gray-Pac Land Co., 845 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. Ct. App.

1992) (44 Plaza, Inc.), the district court further held that the Randalls did not

demonstrate a right susceptible to legal protection and denied the Randalls’ Motion

to Vacate. The Randalls appealed.

Discussion

We review the grant of a motion for directed verdict de novo, applying the

same standard used by the district court, which is Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. Arabian

Agriculture Services Co. v. Chief Industries, Inc., 309 F.3d 479, 482 (8th Cir. 2002).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate “if during a

trial by jury a party has been heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient

evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 

The Randalls first challenge the district court’s reliance on the nuisance

standard stated in 44 Plaza, Inc. In that case, the court held that “[o]ne of the

prerequisites to a cause of action for nuisance is that the right of enjoyment which is

impaired must be a right that is susceptible to legal protection.” 845 S.W.2d at 578.

First, the Randalls contend that they did have rights susceptible to legal protection:

(1) to be able to escape their residence safely in the event of fire, (2) to be able to

occupy their home, (3) to be able to maintain the use of their building for residential

use, (4) to be able to rent the commercial portion of their building, and (5) to be able

to use or sell their building for a fair market price. The Randalls contend these rights

are distinguishable from the right to a view, which was the focus of 44 Plaza, Inc. and

which was held to be an unprotected right. See id.

Each one of the rights the Randalls assert existed only because of the license

agreements. Once the license agreements expired, the Randalls were no longer able

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to rely on May to provide them these rights. In Missouri, “[a] license is a privilege

to enter certain premises for a stated purpose and does not vest any title, interest or

estate in the licensee.” Hill v. Eads, 970 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing

Hermann v. Lynnbrook Land Co., 806 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Mo. Ct. App.1991)).

Because May no longer had any obligation to provide the Randall Building with fire

escapes and water to the sprinkling system, it was proper for May to seal its exits and

sever its waterline to prevent others from using May’s property without May’s

consent. By allowing the licenses to expire pursuant to the license agreements, May

and the Randalls simply put the Randall Building in the same place it was before

those agreements came into being. 

The Randalls next contend that the district court was wrong to rely on 44

Plaza, Inc. First, the Randalls claim that the standard set forth in dicta in Howe v.

Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 150 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941), is the appropriate

standard for nuisance. In Howe, the court stated that “[t]here must be something more

[than merely the inconvenience of neighbors to enjoin a property owner from doing

lawful acts], such as an injurious invasion of a fixed and determined property right,

or a use creating a discomfort in the enjoyment of the property which threatens the

health or welfare of the occupant, with resultant injury to property.” Id. at 497. The

Randalls claim that the district court applied only the first part of the test to rule that

no “fixed and determined property right” had been invaded. The Randalls contend

the district court erred in failing to apply the second part of the test to determine

whether the Randalls’ use created a “discomfort in the enjoyment of the property

which threaten[ed] the health or welfare of the occupant, with resultant injury to

property.” Id. The Randalls assert that May’s cutting off the water and blocking the

emergency exits threatened the health and welfare of the Randall Building’s

occupants and resulted in the severe diminution of the Randall Building’s value.

Howe helps May more than the Randalls. The court in Howe decided that no

nuisance had occurred because “Plaintiff’s real contention is Defendant should permit

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the use of its land as part of the right of way to Plaintiff’s land” and no “right of way

in defendant’s premises [existed], either by prescription or by grant, which might be

protected by an injunction.” Id. The Randalls, like the plaintiffs in Howe, seek to

physically use May’s property without a right to do so by prescription or grant. 

Finally, the Randalls claim that “nuisance is the unreasonable, unusual, or

unnatural use of one’s property so that it substantially impairs the right of another to

peacefully enjoy his [or her] property.” Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Mgmt.,

687 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). The Randalls claim that the focus should

be on the reasonableness of May’s actions and that reasonableness is a question for

the jury, not the judge. The Randalls argue that May’s sealing the emergency exits

and capping the water line constitute unreasonable uses of May’s property because

these acts were done only to force the Randalls to sell the Randall Building for a price

far below market value.

Reasonableness is a question for the jury; however, the issue of reasonableness

and the balancing of the above-mentioned factors can only occur after the plaintiff

has presented a submissible case. Under Missouri law, a submissible nuisance claim

requires a right of enjoyment susceptible to legal protection. 44 Plaza, Inc., 845

S.W.2d at 578. Here, each of the rights that the Randalls claim stem from the expired

license agreements. 

The Randalls also challenge the district court’s ruling on May’s Motion In

Limine No. 1, restricting the Randalls’ proof of damages to those damages accrued

as of the date of filing the initial Complaint. However, because the Randalls failed

to make a submissible case of nuisance, we need not address the issue of the scope

of damages.

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Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

_____________________________

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