Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03147/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03147-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Reva Young
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

REVA YOUNG 1 a/k/ a REVA L. MABARY 1 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FIL.~D United State!:! Court of Ap:;>es.b 

Tcr\1}! C!rcuit 

DEC 3 L 1991 

No. 91-3147 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-20083-01) 

Tanya J. Treadway (Lee Thompson, United States Attorney, with her 

on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Michael L. Harris (Charles D. Anderson, Federal Public Defender, 

with him on the brief), Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kansas 

City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Reva Young appeals her conviction for bank fraud for opening 

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 1 
an unauthorized checking account in her employer's name and 

drawing checks thereon which she used for personal expenses. 

In November 1988, Ms. Young began working part-time for Dr. 

Henry Habib in his medical office. Her duties included making 

appointments, billing, opening the mail, answering the telephone 

and assisting with female patients. When the doctor began solo 

practice, Ms. Young became a full-time employee receiving an 

annual salary of approximately $18,000 a year. Since 1970, Dr. 

Habib maintained a corporate checking account at Citizens-Jackson 

County Bank for which he was the only authorized signer. The 

doctor was paid primarily by insurance checks made payable to the 

corporation, which arrived in the mail. As part of her office 

duties, Ms. Young was responsible for depositing those checks in 

the corporate account. Ms. Young, without authorization, 

attempted to gain signatory authority for this account but was 

refused by bank personnel. 

In January 1989, Ms. Young opened an account in the name of 

Dr. Habib at the Douglass Bank in Kansas City, Kansas. She made 

the initial deposit with insurance checks made payable to him. 

Ms. Young's neighbor, a bank officer, introduced her to the new 

accounts representative. The representative gave Ms. Young 

paperwork for Dr. Habib to sign authorizing the account but the 

papers were never returned to the bank. Because the bank did not 

have a signature card for Dr. Habib it initially refused payment 

on checks drawn on the account. Subsequently, Ms. Young sent a 

-2-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 2 
handwritten letter authorizing payment and represented she was an 

authorized signer on the account. During the life of the account, 

Ms. Young deposited approximately $25,000 of Dr. Habib's money in 

the account and wrote checks for personal expenses totalling over 

$24,000. Ms. Young, and only Ms. Young, signed all the checks 

written on the account. 

In early August 1989, Ms. Young failed to show up for work 

for several days because she was in jail for a probation violation 

stemming from an attempted felony theft conviction which she did 

not disclose to Dr. Habib. Because of her unexplained absence, 

Dr. Habib fired Ms. Young. 

Soon thereafter, Dr. Habib received an insufficient funds 

notice in the mail. Perplexed, he sent his wife to CitizensJackson County Bank to check it out. A bank officer discovered 

the Douglass Bank checking account and reported this to Dr. Habib. 

This was the first Dr. Habib knew of the bank or the checking 

account in his name. The bank released the balance of the account 

to the doctor. Dr. Habib instituted suit against the bank and 

this was settled out of court by the bank paying Dr. Habib 

$19,000. 

Ms. Young was charged with executing a scheme to defraud a 

financial institution in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1344 and 

interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 2314. At trial, a jury found Ms. Young guilty of both 

-3-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 3 
crimes. 

At trial Ms. Young 

Habib's bias against her. 

fired, not because of 

attempted to present evidence of Dr. 

Specifically, Ms. Young alleged she was 

unexcused absence, but because she 

confronted the doctor about possible medical malpractice exposure. 

The government had filed a motion in limine to exclude any 

reference to medical malpractice which the trial court granted. 

Ms. Young also sought to introduce evidence concerning the civil 

litigation between the doctor and Douglass Bank regarding the 

alleged unauthorized account. Ms. Young claims the doctor had 

incentive to claim he knew nothing about the account because the 

bank reimbursed him for the loss. Ms. Young claimed Dr. Habib 

authorized the account in return for sexual favors. Although the 

government moved in limine to exclude evidence about the 

settlement as it related to the bank's negligence, it did not 

contest this evidence could be used to show bias or prejudice. 

The trial court reserved judgment on the matter. During the 

course of the trial Ms. Young did not attempt to elicit 

information regarding the settlement. 

Finally, in response to Dr. Habib's response on crossexamination that he had never previously accused an employee of 

embezzlement, Ms. Young attempted to introduce testimony of a 

former employee to rebut Dr. Habib's claim. Ms. Young sought to 

use this evidence to show honesty or dishonesty under Fed. R. 

Evid. 608(b) and as a prior civil wrong to show plan or intent 

-4-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 4 
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The court found this to be a 

collateral matter and ruled it inadmissible. 

Ms. Young appeals and asserts as error: (1) the facts do not 

support bank fraud because use of the bank was only incidental to 

the fraud; (2) the court erred by denying cross-examination of Dr. 

Habib on matters regarding bias or prejudice; and (3) the court 

erred by precluding introduction of testimony of a prior employee 

that Dr. Habib accused her of embezzlement. 

I. BANK FRAUD 

A jury found Ms. Young guilty of bank fraud in violation of 

18 u.s.c. § 1344(a)(l) (1989) which provides that "[w]hoever 

knowingly executes ... a scheme or artifice to defraud a federally 

chartered or insured financial institution" shall be guilty of a 

crime. 1 Ms. Young stole insurance checks payable to her employer 

and deposited them in the unauthorized account she opened in her 

employer's name at Douglass Bank. She subsequently sent the bank 

a letter claiming to be a signatory on the account and the bank, 

relying upon this letter, cashed over $24,000 worth of checks 

drawn by Ms. Young and used by her for her personal expenses. 

Ms. Young claims that "18 u.s.c. § 1344(1) does not cover 

1 The 1989 version of § 1344 applies as Ms. Young committed the 

acts charged in 1989. The substantive elements of the crime have 

remain unchanged. Only the penalty and the subsection numbering 

have been revised. Section 1344(a)(l) is now§ 1344(1) and we 

will refer to the statute's current numbering for the purposes of 

this discussion. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 5 
these situations in which a financial institution is incidentally, 

or peripherally involved" and challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to establish a bank fraud violation. Ms. Young asserts 

the bank in this case was not the target, the object or an 

indispensable part of the scheme and therefore she did not defraud 

the bank so as to violate§ 1344(1). Thus, the issue Ms. Young 

presents is whether her conduct of depositing stolen checks into 

an unauthorized account, representing to the bank she was a 

signatory on the account and then signing checks for her personal 

expenses is cognizable under the bank fraud statute. See United 

States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1512 (lOth Cir. 1990) (although 

appeal is "couched in terms of sufficiency of the evidence" 

Appellant's basic argument is that his conduct is not criminalized 

under the section of federal statute with which he is charged). 

The government argues Ms. Young's conduct victimized the bank 

through deceit therefore bringing it within the purview of the 

bank fraud statute. The government identifies two separate acts 

of deceit directed toward the bank: Ms. Young's implied 

misrepresentation that she had authority to open a checking 

account in Dr. Habib's name and Ms. Young's express 

misrepresentation to the bank through her handwritten letter that 

she had authority to sign checks on the account. The government 

claims her acts deceived not only her employer but the bank as 

well. The government contends the theft from her employer could 

not have occurred without these acts of deceit directed toward the 

bank as Ms. Young had no access to the corporate account. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 6 
Therefore, the government argues, the Douglass bank was an 

indispensable part of her scheme to defraud. Finally, the 

government contends §§ 1344(1) and 1344(2) 2 of the bank fraud 

statute overlap and evidence used to establish a subsection 2 

violation can establish a subsection 1 violation as well. 

We review the question of whether defendant's conduct is 

prohibited by a federal statute under a non-deferential de novo 

standard. United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1454 (lOth 

Cir. 1989). Our review of the record finds the government's 

arguments to be more persuasive and we uphold Ms. Young's 

conviction under§ 1344(1). 

Congress enacted the current bank fraud statute (18 u.s.c. 

§ 1344) in 1984 in response to various Supreme Court decisions 3 

which narrowed the application of the then existing bank fraud 

statute. Bonnett, 877 F.2d at 1454. The bank fraud statute was 

modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 

1344) which courts have construed very broadly. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 

at 1454. The bank fraud statute contains virtually the same 

language as the mail and wire fraud statutes. Likewise, courts 

have construed the bank fraud statute liberally. See id., 877 

F.2d at 1450. Accord United States v. Matousek, 894 F.2d 1012, 

1014 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 1832 (1990); United 

2 Section 1344(2) criminalizes knowing execution of a scheme or 

artifice to obtain money by false and fraudulent pretenses, 

representations, or promises. 

3 See,~' Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982). 

-7-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 7 
States v. Gunter, 876 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 

871 (1989); United States v. Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

The bank fraud statute sets forth two prohibited offenses. 

Bonnett, 877 F.2d at 1453. Each of the two offenses share common 

elements and thus their proof overlap. United States v. Medeles, 

916 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1990). For example, each offense 

requires the criminal act be directed against a federally 

chartered or insured financial institution, and each requires a 

knowing execution of a scheme or artifice. Id. "'[S]cheme' and 

'artifice' are defined to include fraudulent pretenses or 

misrepresentations intended to deceive others to obtain something 

of value, such as money, from the institution to be deceived." 

United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1991). 

To establish a violation of subsection 1, the government must 

prove the scheme defrauded a financial institution. Bonnett, 877 

F.2d at 1453. Subsection 2 requires a scheme intended to obtain 

money under custody or control of the institution by fraudulent 

means. Medeles, 916 F.2d at 198. 

The government charged Ms. Young under§ 1344(1); therefore 

it must prove a scheme which defrauded the financial institution. 

Bonnett, 877 F.2d at 1453 (emphasis in original). The scheme to 

defraud requirement of § 1344 has not been precisely defined. 

United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987). A 

-8-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 8 
scheme to defraud need not be executed by means of 

misrepresentation but it does not exclude misrepresentations. 

United States v. Rafsky, 803 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1986) 

(analysis of mail fraud statute), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 931 

(1987). 

We find United States v. Morgenstern, 933 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 

1991), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 7, 1991) (No. 91-6371), 

instructive in the instant case.

4 In Morgenstern the defendant 

challenged the applicability of § 1344 to his conduct where his 

scheme to defraud was directed at his employer and not the bank. 

The defendant developed a scheme whereby he misrepresented the 

amount of tax liability owed by his employer. The employer made 

out a check in the inflated amount which the defendant was to 

deposit in a depository account at the bank. Rather than deposit 

the inflated checks in the employer's depository account as 

required, the defendant deposited them in a corporate account 

under his control. He then withdrew the excess money for personal 

expenses. During this period the defendant also made legitimate 

deposits into both the accounts. When the defendant's 

responsibilities with his employer changed, he modified the 

scheme. No longer having access to the tax checks, the defendant 

took checks payable to other entities which he was supposed to 

mail and, using a pen eraser, erased the name of the payee and 

4 Although the defendant in that case was charged under 

§ 1344(2) the court analyzed his "scheme to defraud the bank" 

which is an element under § 1344(1). The court found the 

defendant's conduct victimized the bank a requirement of 

§ 1344(1) that is not necessary under§ 1344(2). 

-9-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 9 
substituted the name of the depository account. He also altered 

the dollar amount of the checks. Id. at 1110-11. 

The defendant argued he committed fraud against his employer 

and not the bank and therefore he could not be convicted under 

§ 1344. Id. at 1112. The government contended his fraud deceived 

the bank as well as his employer. The Morgenstern court found 

fraud against the bank where the defendant misrepresented his 

authority to deposit checks, neither signed nor payable to the 

defendant, into an account controlled by him. Id. at 1113. The 

court also found that although the case could have proceeded in 

state court, federal court retains jurisdiction where the elements 

of bank fraud are met. Id. at 1113. 

We find Ms. Young's conduct is cognizable under § 1344(1). 

We find she knowingly executed a scheme to defraud a bank. As 

noted above, a scheme can involve fraudulent misrepresentations to 

deceive a bank to obtain money. See Lemons, 941 F.2d at 314-15. 

The fraudulent misrepresentations which Ms. Young made to the bank 

constitute her scheme to defraud. In this case, Ms. Young made 

two misrepresentations intending to deceive the bank so she could 

access the bank's money through Dr. Habib's account. As in 

Morgenstern, Ms. Young misrepresented to the bank she had 

authority to deposit the checks. Where the defendant in 

Morgenstern deposited the checks in a separate account under his 

control, Ms. Young similarly deposited the checks into an account 

under her control. Although the account was opened in the 

-10-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 10 
doctor's name, the doctor knew nothing about the account, knew 

nothing about the bank and the bank had no paperwork with his 

authorization for the account. Fundamentally, the account was 

under Ms. Young's control. 

If this was the only evidence of Ms. Young's deceit directed 

at the bank, we might not have such an easy time disposing of the 

case. However, Ms. Young made additional misrepresentations to 

the bank. She sent the bank a letter representing she was a 

signatory on the account in Dr. Habib's name. This 

misrepresentation was a direct attempt to deceive the bank so Ms. 

Young could have access to the bank's money in Dr. Habib's 

account. She attempted to write checks on the account. The bank 

refused to honor the checks. To gain access to the money, Ms. 

Young was forced to represent to the bank she was authorized to 

sign on the account. Relying on this misrepresentation, the bank 

allowed Ms. Young access to Dr. Habib's account -- access she did 

not have absent this express misrepresentation of authority. Ms. 

Young's conduct clearly was designed to defraud the bank as well 

as Dr. Habib. See Morgenstern, 933 F.2d at 1113. Accordingly, 

the Douglass Bank was a victim of Ms. Young's scheme of fraud. 

See United States v. Hubbard, 889 F.2d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

(bank must be a victim of scheme to defraud). To support a§ 1344 

conviction the government does not have to prove the bank suffered 

any monetary loss, only that the bank was put at potential risk by 

the scheme to defraud. Lemons, 941 F.2d at 316 (by distributing 

customer funds to an unauthorized party, banks are put at risk). 

-11-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 11 
The Morgenstern court found the bank was an intended victim 

where the fraudulent conduct "resulted in the improper release to 

a third party of a depositor's money without [his] authorization." 

933 F.2d at 1114. That court found where the challenged conduct 

exposed the bank to civil litigation the conduct victimized the 

bank. Id. Ms. Young's misrepresentations to the bank put the 

bank at risk, and thus Douglass bank was a victim of Ms. Young's 

scheme to defraud. In fact, Ms. Young's conduct resulted in the 

bank's payment of $19,000 to Dr. Habib to avoid civil litigation. 

There can be no question Ms. Young's scheme of fraud created risk 

to and thus victimized the bank. 

II. CROSS-EXAMINATION REGARDING BIAS OR PREJUDICE 

Prior to trial, the government moved in limine to exclude 

evidence regarding any claims of medical malpractice against the 

doctor and also any evidence of the civil litigation between the 

doctor and Douglass Bank concerning the alleged unauthorized 

account. Ms. Young objected asserting she was terminated for 

confronting the doctor about medical malpractice claims and 

therefore the evidence would be probative of bias or hard feelings 

on the part of the doctor toward Ms. Young. Ms. Young also 

claimed the settlement between the doctor and the bank provided 

incentive for him to continue to deny authorizing the checking 

account when in fact he did approve it and was fully aware of its 

existence. Ms. Young alleges this evidence is also probative of 

bias or prejudice. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 12 
The court sustained the government's motion to exclude 

reference to malpractice claims because the prejudicial effects 

greatly outweighed any probative value. The court reserved ruling 

on the civil litigation evidence. Ms. Young never pursued that 

theory of bias during the trial. 

Ms. Young appeals and asserts that by precluding her from 

examining Dr. Habib's possible bias in those areas the district 

court violated her constitutional right to confrontation. Ms. 

Young's assertion warrants little discussion. 

A. Medical Malpractice 

Ms. Young argues her inability to examine Dr. Habib on his 

bias toward her for confronting him about potential medical 

malpractice liability violates her Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation. The government argues the trial court's decision 

to withhold the evidence was not a constitutional violation but 

merely a proper exercise of its discretion. 

The Supreme Court has stated that even faced with the Sixth 

Amendment confrontation clause, the trial court retains discretion 

to reasonably limit the scope of cross-examination. Delaware v. 

VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The confrontation clause 

guarantees the right 

attempting to show bias. 

to effective cross-examination when 

United States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 

497 (lOth Cir. 1985). However, these rights are not unlimited. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 13 
United States v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789, 792 (lOth Cir. 1991). The 

Supreme Court lists factors to weigh regarding the confrontation 

clause similar to the factors weighed in a Fed. R. Evid. 403 

analysis. An analysis under Fed. R. Evid. 403 will not in all 

cases subsume the constitutional issue. Id. Under Fed. R. Evid. 

403, 5 a trial judge can exclude evidence relevant to the witness's 

bias if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. Id.; C.A. Associates v. Dow Chemical 

Co., 918 F.2d 1485, 1489 (lOth Cir. 1990). Because of its 

familiarity with the evidence, the trial judge is in a better 

position to make such a conclusion, and we will overturn his 

decision only if it represents a manifest abuse of discretion. 

The trial court conducted the government's motion in limine 

outside the jury's hearing to determine what evidence would be 

presented concerning medical malpractice. Ms. Young sought to 

introduce evidence Dr. Habib fired her because she confronted him 

about possible medical malpractice liability and not because of 

her unexcused absence. Ms. Young contended her testimony and 

cross-examination of Dr. Habib would show bias against her. The 

government asserted that any mention of medical malpractice would 

5 Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 14 
be highly prejudicial. After both sides had an opportunity to 

present arguments, the court found that "from what counsel [has 

said], any possible evidence as to malpractice is so remote and 

the prejudicial effect greatly outweighs any possible probative 

value at this point." We do not find the trial court abused its 

discretion. Consequently, in this case we find no confrontation 

clause violation. 

B. Civil Litigation 

Ms. Young asserts the exclusion of evidence of the civil 

litigation and settlement between Dr. Habib and Douglass Bank also 

violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The 

government contends the trial court deferred ruling on the motion 

to exclude this evidence and Ms. Young nonetheless failed to 

pursue this theory of bias at trial. Our review of the record 

reveals the government is correct. The court did reserve ruling 

on the civil litigation question. As we only have jurisdiction to 

rule on final decisions of the district court, where the defendant 

failed to pursue a proposed theory and thus did not receive a 

final decision we have no jurisdiction to address her claim. 28 

U.S.C. § 1291; Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. 

Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1351 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

III. PRIOR ACCUSATIONS OF THEFT 

On cross-examination, Ms. Young asked Dr. Habib whether he 

had ever accused Cathy Staggs, a former employee, of embezzling 

money from his office account. Dr. Habib denied the accusation. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 15 
During her case in chief Ms. Young attempted to call Ms. Staggs to 

testify that the doctor accused her of embezzling. Ms. Young 

sought to use the testimony to show honesty or dishonesty under 

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) and to show Dr. Habib's plan and intent to 

wrongly accuse employees under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The 

government argued that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to prove 

the credibility of a witness under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). The 

trial court found it was a purely collateral matter and was 

inadmissible under either rule. 

Ms. Young appeals and asserts the testimony was admissible 

"under Rule 404(b) as evidence if [sic] intent to falsely accuse 

employees of theft." 

We review the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of 

discretion standard. 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

United States v. Harmon, 918 F.2d 115, 118 

We will only reverse a trial court's 

evidentiary ruling where we are left with a "definite and firm 

conviction that the [trial] court made a clear error of judgment 

or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the 

circumstances." Bonnett, 877 F.2d at 1458 (quoting United States 

v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1986)). We find the 

trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Ms. Young the 

ability to present Ms. Staggs' testimony. 

Ms. Young contends Ms. Staggs' proffered testimony is 

admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) which provides that 

-16-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 16 
"[e]vidence of other ... acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person ... to show [that he acted] in conformity 

therewith. It may ... be admissible ... as proof of intent 

[or] plan " Through Ms. Staggs' testimony, Ms. Young sought 

to show Mr. Habib's intent or plan to make false embezzlement 

charges against his employees. Ms. Young's argument contains no 

merit. 

Ms. Staggs would have testified she worked in a doctor's 

office which Dr. Habib took over and consolidated with his own. 

Ms. Staggs continued to work in the office 

She would also testify that in January 

doing 

of 

clerical work. 

1988, 

indirectly accused her of embezzling, which she denied. 

and left not on good terms with Dr. Habib. 

Dr. Habib 

She quit 

While Ms. Young sought to impeach the doctor under 404(b), 

the effort was unavailing because the alleged facts were 

collateral and not impeaching. The issue of whether Dr. Habib 

accused another employee of embezzlement is collateral to whether 

Ms. Young's conduct constitutes bank fraud. Dr. Habib denied he 

accused a former employee of embezzlement. Ms. Young wanted the 

employee to impeach Dr. Habib's earlier testimony. We have said, 

"If the witness denies making a statement on a matter classified 

as collateral, his examiner must take his answer -- that is, he 

may not prove the making of the statement by extrinsic evidence." 

Walker, 930 F.2d at 792 (citations omitted). Thus, the use of Ms. 

Staggs' testimony to refute Dr. Habib's earlier denial would be 

-17-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 17 
improper. 

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding this evidence. We find Ms. Young's conduct of opening 

an unauthorized checking account and misrepresenting to the bank 

her signatory authority is cognizable under 18 u.s.c. § 1344(1). 

We also find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

excluding evidence of potential medical malpractice claims or 

claims by a former employee of embezzlement accusations to prove 

plan or intent. Finally, we have no jurisdiction to decide an 

issue upon which the trial court reserved ruling but the proponent 

abandoned during the course of the trial. The trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

-18-

Appellate Case: 91-3147 Document: 01019338745 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 18