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Parties Involved:
Wyoming Attorney General
Appellee
Wyoming Department of Corrections Medium Correctional Institution Warden
Appellee
Kurt Young
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

KURT YOUNG, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS MEDIUM 

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 

WARDEN, Steve Donald Hargett; 

WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Peter K. Michael, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 16-8089 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00016-SWS) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, HARTZ, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Kurt Young, a Wyoming state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of 

appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his application for relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny the request for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

January 5, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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I. Background 

In 2013 Mr. Young was charged on one felony count of delivery of 

methamphetamine, and four misdemeanor counts of possession of marijuana, 

methamphetamine, heroin, and MDMA. Under a plea agreement he pleaded guilty to 

the felony count and the misdemeanor marijuana and methamphetamine counts; the 

other charges were dismissed. At his change-of-plea hearing he admitted that he had 

injected another person with methamphetamine while she was overdosing on heroin 

(purportedly attempting to counteract the heroin’s effect), and that he had possessed 

methamphetamine and marijuana at that time. The court sentenced him to a prison 

term of 12 to 18 years on the felony count, plus concurrent 12-month prison 

sentences on the other two counts. 

After Mr. Young filed a notice of appeal, his appellate counsel moved to 

withdraw and filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

The Wyoming Supreme Court initially denied the motion to withdraw because 

counsel had failed to provide a complete record with respect to possible irregularities 

with search warrants that concerned Mr. Young. After counsel supplemented the 

record on appeal with the missing documents and filed a renewed motion to withdraw 

and a revised Anders brief, in which he asserted that there were no meritorious, 

arguable issues for appeal, the court granted the motion to withdraw and allowed Mr. 

Young to file a pro se appeal brief. His brief raised four claims: 

1. His appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in filing an Anders

brief; 

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2. trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate 

possible defenses; 

3. trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inducing him to plead 

guilty with a promise that he would receive a sentence of probation; and 

4. the prosecutor had a conflict of interest because of his previous 

representation of Mr. Young in another matter. 

After reviewing the brief the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and 

sentence. 

 Mr. Young then filed a § 2254 application asserting the same four claims 

raised in his state court pro se appeal brief. The district court dismissed part of the 

application because Mr. Young had waived certain claims by pleading guilty and 

then granted Respondents summary judgment on the remaining claims. Applying the 

deferential review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2), the district court held that the Wyoming 

Supreme Court’s rulings on Mr. Young’s claims did not unreasonably apply clearly 

established federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. 

II. Discussion 

 A. Standards of Review 

To obtain a COA, Mr. Young must make “a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In deciding whether to issue a 

COA, we limit our examination to “a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of 

[the applicant’s] claims.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Our 

standard of review depends on whether the district court decided a claim on the 

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merits or dismissed it on procedural grounds. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000). The district court denied some of Mr. Young’s claims on the merits. To 

obtain a COA as to those claims he “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would 

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Id. The district court dismissed other claims on procedural grounds. As to those 

claims, he must show that jurists of reason would find it debatable (1) “whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and (2) “whether 

the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Because Mr. Young 

proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his application for a COA. See Hall v. Scott, 

292 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002). 

 B. Waived Claims 

The district court held that Mr. Young waived his right to assert some of his 

habeas claims by pleading guilty. The court relied on Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 

258 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held: 

When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is 

in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter 

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights 

that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the 

voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the 

advice he received from counsel was not within [the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases]. 

Id. at 267. The district court reasoned that under Tollett, Mr. Young waived his 

claims (1) that the prosecutor had a conflict of interest and (2) that his trial counsel 

was ineffective in failing to investigate possible defenses, except insofar as that 

failure made his plea unintelligent or involuntary. In his application in this court for 

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a COA, Mr. Young does not challenge the district court’s holding that he waived 

these claims by pleading guilty. He therefore fails to demonstrate that reasonable 

jurists would debate the correctness of the district court’s procedural ruling. We 

deny a COA on these issues. 

 C. Voluntary and Intelligent Guilty Plea

 “In the guilty plea context, to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s error, the defendant would 

have insisted upon going to trial.” United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096, 1099 

(10th Cir. 2005). The district court addressed on the merits Mr. Young’s claim that 

his trial counsel’s performance was so constitutionally defective as to render his 

guilty plea invalid.1

 Mr. Young contended his trial counsel refused to investigate 

possible defenses and then induced him to plead guilty by promising he would not be 

sentenced to prison. 

Regarding possible defenses, the district court concluded that Mr. Young 

failed to explain or offer any evidence how an investigation of the facts and sources 

of information recited in his habeas application had a genuine possibility of 

 1

 The district court concluded that the Wyoming Supreme Court had decided 

on the merits both this claim and Mr. Young’s claim that his appellate counsel 

provided ineffective assistance. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100 

(2011) (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court 

has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the 

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.”). Mr. Young does not dispute the district court’s conclusion. 

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exonerating him. The court held that he had not rebutted the strong presumption that 

his counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance 

and could be considered sound trial strategy. It also noted that the plea agreement 

negotiated by Mr. Young’s counsel required dismissal of two of the five counts and 

secured an agreement that he would not face federal prosecution for the same 

underlying conduct. Mr. Young’s arguments on this issue in his § 2254 application 

and in his application for a COA are nearly verbatim. For the reasons articulated by 

the district court, he still fails to demonstrate that his counsel’s failure to pursue 

certain defenses constituted deficient performance affecting the validity of his guilty 

plea. 

As to his counsel’s alleged promise of a probation sentence that Mr. Young 

says induced him to plead guilty, the district court reviewed the record of his 

change-of-plea hearing, noting he had expressly acknowledged that he could be 

sentenced to 22 years in prison. The court quoted the following colloquy during the 

hearing: 

THE COURT: Now, you understand, Mr. Young, that the 

agreement here does not include a sentencing recommendation. Even if it 

did, it wouldn’t be binding on this Court, right? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And I understand you’re going to apply to the Drug 

Court and that’s fine, but you need to understand that even if you’re 

accepted in the Drug Court Program, I may not go along with that, and I 

may, in fact, order you to serve 22 years of incarceration and pay fines of 

up to . . . $27,000? Do you understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 

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 THE COURT: And you need to understand as well, Mr. Young, that 

whatever happens at sentencing, I will not permit you to withdraw a guilty 

plea if you’re unhappy with the way things work out, right? 

 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I realize that, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: So two things. Number one, any recommendations 

here will certainly be given due consideration, but at the end of the day, 

there’s no guarantee as far as sentence is concerned. And number two, 

whatever does happen, you are stuck with it. Do you understand all that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Questions about any of that? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 

THE COURT: Having said all that, do you want to go ahead with 

this agreement? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 

R., Vol. 1 at 62-63; see also id. at 55 (advising Mr. Young of the maximum prison 

sentences for each offense); id. at 58 (noting he could face the penalties previously 

reviewed). 

 Mr. Young asserts (as he did in the district court) that neither the trial court’s 

admonitions regarding a possible prison sentence, nor his verbal acknowledgement of 

those warnings, cured the prejudice of his counsel’s promise regarding a probation 

sentence. This is so, he says, because his counsel advised him 

that during the change of plea hearing the judge would inform him in open 

court of all of the possible consequences of his plea and of the possibility of 

Petitioner being sentenced to prison. Petitioner was told by [his counsel] 

that in order for the plea agreement to be accepted by the court and in order 

for Petitioner to receive probation that he had to acknowledge to the judge 

that prison was a possibility. [Mr. Young’s counsel] stated that Petitioner’s 

acknowledgement to the judge was a simple formality, that the judge’s 

statements were not to be construed by Petitioner that he could go to prison, 

and that Petitioner should not consider that prison may be a possible 

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sentence – but only that the judge was required by law to recite all possible 

consequences of a crime. 

COA Appl. at 10. 

But the district court questioned Mr. Young’s assertions regarding his 

counsel’s sentencing advice, noting that they were contradictory. On the one hand, 

he claimed that “his trial counsel unqualifiedly told him there was ‘no way that any 

court would sentence him to prison.’” R., Vol. 1 at 331 n.2 (quoting R., Vol. 1 at 

14). In the next sentence, however, Mr. Young stated that his counsel advised that 

“‘based on his experience, it was extremely rare for a first-time, non-violent felon to 

be sentenced to prison.’” Id. And the district court found that during the 

change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Young “clearly stated he had not been induced to plead 

guilty.” R., Vol. 1 at 327. When the trial court asked him, “Have any promises been 

made concerning sentencing or anything else, other than what you’ve discussed in 

your plea agreement?,” Mr. Young responded, “No, sir.” Id. at 60-61. He does not 

contend that his counsel told him to lie in response to this (or any other) inquiry or 

that his response to it was simply a formality. Nor does he claim that his counsel told 

him that the judge had promised or otherwise agreed to a sentence of probation. 

Based on Mr. Young’s statements during the change-of-plea hearing, the trial 

court concluded that his plea was knowing, voluntary, made after consultation with 

his counsel, and “without any improper inducement or conditions.” R., Vol. 1 at 71. 

The Wyoming Supreme court rejected his challenge to the validity of his guilty plea, 

and the district court held that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly 

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established federal law or unreasonably determine the facts of his case. Because Mr. 

Young has not shown that reasonable jurists would consider the district court’s ruling 

debatable or wrong, we deny a COA on this issue. 

 D. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

The district court also addressed on the merits Mr. Young’s claim that his 

appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by filing an Anders brief. The court 

held that the Wyoming Supreme Court’s ruling on this claim did not unreasonably 

apply clearly established law, nor did it unreasonably determine the facts of Mr. 

Young’s case. Rather, the district court concluded that the state court and Mr. 

Young’s counsel both adhered to the requirements of Anders, and in doing so, 

provided Mr. Young with “all the procedural protection that the Constitution 

requires.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 287 (2000). Mr. Young was therefore 

obliged to overcome the presumption “that the result of the proceedings on appeal is 

reliable.” Id. The district court held that he failed to demonstrate any deficiency in 

his appellate counsel’s representation. 

 Mr. Young first argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by presenting only one issue—the validity of the search warrant—in the 

Anders brief. But the Anders brief was not so limited; it noted other claims that 

Mr. Young wished to assert, including challenges to the validity of his guilty plea, 

the length of his sentence, and the prosecutor’s alleged conflict of interest. Counsel 

then addressed the effect of Mr. Young’s guilty plea on his ability to assert his claims 

on appeal, the validity of his guilty plea based on the record, his trial counsel’s 

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performance, the validity of his sentence, and the validity of the search warrant. 

Although Mr. Young asserts that his appellate counsel did not fairly and adequately 

present his appeal issues, he fails to demonstrate that “counsel unreasonably failed to 

discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them.” Smith, 528 U.S. 

at 285. 

 Mr. Young also contends that the Wyoming Supreme Court erred by 

permitting his appellate counsel to file a second Anders brief, contrary to McCoy v. 

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429 (1988). In McCoy the Court stated that 

“if the court concludes that there are nonfrivolous issues to be raised, it must appoint 

counsel to pursue the appeal and direct that counsel to prepare an advocate’s brief 

before deciding the merits.” Id. at 444. But the Wyoming Supreme Court did not 

conclude from the first Anders brief that Mr. Young had nonfrivolous appeal issues. 

It decided only that counsel failed to provide a complete record and demonstrate that 

he had “discharged his duty to fully review the trial proceedings and show that the 

captioned appeal is frivolous.” R., Vol. 1 at 118. Mr. Young’s appellate counsel 

corrected these deficiencies by supplementing the record and filing a new Anders

brief that addressed the validity of the search warrant. 

The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected Mr. Young’s contention that his 

appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. Applying deferential review under 

AEDPA, the district court denied habeas relief. We deny a COA because Mr. Young 

has not shown that the district court’s disposition of this claim is debatable by 

reasonable jurists. 

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III. Conclusion 

We deny Mr. Young’s application for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

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