Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04168/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04168-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny L. Stanley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4168

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Johnny L. Stanley, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 18, 2008

Filed: March 21, 2008

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After Johnny Stanley pleaded guilty to possessing five firearms while subject

to a valid court order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2), the district

court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 24 months in prison and 3 years of

supervised release. On appeal we denied counsel’s request under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), to withdraw, and we directed the parties to file briefs

addressing whether the district court established an adequate factual basis for the

guilty plea. Specifically, the parties were to address whether Stanley received actual

notice of the state court hearing that resulted in an order of protection being issued,

the existence of which was the basis for the instant firearm charge. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(8) (stating in relevant part that court order must have been “issued after a

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hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an

opportunity to participate”). We now reverse the conviction and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

At the change-of-plea hearing, the government described the following

evidence that would have been presented had there been a trial. On September 28,

2005, Independence, Missouri police officers were called to help a woman retrieve an

automobile that was behind a gate. As they were helping her retrieve the car, they

heard three rounds of gunfire. After cordoning off the area, the officers were able to

get Stanley to exit a residence and discovered five firearms inside the house. At the

time of the incident, Stanley was subject to a full order of protection from Boone

County, Missouri, which stated in several places that he was prohibited from

possessing firearms. 

Stanley testified at the plea hearing that, on September 28, he was unaware of

the full order of protection. He testified that he did not receive a copy of the earlier

ex parte order, which had included the date of the hearing to determine whether a full

order of protection should issue. He explained that the ex parte order may have been

served at his mother’s house while he was in jail.

On this record, we cannot say that the district court had an adequate factual

basis to conclude that Stanley received “actual notice” of the order-of-protection

hearing and an opportunity to participate in it, as required by section 922(g)(8). See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) (before entering judgment on guilty plea, court must

determine there is factual basis for it); United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012

(8th Cir. 1994) (factual basis for plea of guilty is established when court determines

there is sufficient evidence at time of plea upon which court may reasonably

determine that defendant likely committed offense); see also Dusenbery v. United

States, 534 U.S. 161, 169 n.5 (2002) (equating “actual notice” with “receipt of

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notice”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1090 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “actual notice” as

notice “given directly to, or received personally by, a party”). 

Stanley, however, did not raise any objection below. Therefore, we will not

reverse unless it is warranted under our plain-error standard of review. See United

States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549-50 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (errors not properly

preserved are reviewed only for plain error; there must be (1) error, which is (2) plain,

(3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings). We conclude that the error was plain and affected

Stanley’s substantial rights, because the evidence presented at the change-of-plea

hearing was insufficient to convict him of violating section 922(g)(8). We also

conclude that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the judicial proceedings, because a miscarriage of justice would result if the error were

left uncorrected. See United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 644 (8th Cir. 2006), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 1504 (2007).

Accordingly, Stanley’s conviction is reversed and we remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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