Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00537/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00537-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Johnnie Sentez Smith
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHNNIE SENTEZ SMITH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0537 AC 

ORDER 

The case was referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(15). Before the court is 

defendant Colvin’s (“the Commissioner”) motion to reconsider the court’s order granting 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanding for the determination of benefits. ECF 

No. 24. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny the Commissioner’s motion. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) 

motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct 

manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if 

such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously 

unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent 

manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an 

intervening change in controlling law. 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 

197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1082 (2000)). 

However, “amending a judgment after its entry remains an extraordinary remedy which should be 

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used sparingly.” Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amendment of 

judgment is sparingly used to serve the dual “interests of finality and conservation of judicial 

resources.” See Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On February 25, 2014, plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny him benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1381-1383f. ECF No. 1. On March 25, 2015, the court granted plaintiff’s subsequent motion 

for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, 

reversed the Commissioner’s decision, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for an 

award of benefits. ECF No. 23. The court found that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

improperly rejected the opinions of the examining physicians and all the residual functional 

limitations cited by those doctors. The court concluded that rejecting the examining physicians’ 

opinions was legal error, as the rejection was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

The court further concluded that, crediting those opinions as true, plaintiff was disabled. 

 On April 22, 2015, the Commissioner moved to alter or amend the court’s judgment. ECF 

No. 25. The motion argues only the first Allstate ground, and is based upon the Commissioner’s 

view that it was legal error to remand for payment of benefits rather than for further proceedings. 

The parties have fully briefed the motion. ECF No. 29 (plaintiff’s Opposition), 30 

(Commissioner’s Reply). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 The court will deny the Commissioner’s motion because its order remanding for the 

payment of benefits is not based on a manifest error of law. As the Commissioner correctly 

argues, the Ninth Circuit law governing remand for payment of benefits has been further 

developed beyond the cases cited by the court in its decision. However, that further development 

does not mandate a different result in this case. The Ninth Circuit has devised a three-part creditas-true standard, each part of which must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to the 

Commissioner with instructions to calculate and award benefits: 

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(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and 

(3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, 

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on 

remand. 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). There is “flexibility” built into the rule, 

however. Specifically, even if all three above factors are satisfied, the court should still remand 

for further proceedings, rather than for an award of benefits “when, even though all conditions of 

the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt 

that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021. 

 Although it did not specifically list the Garrison factors, the court’s decision found all 

three factors to be met. See ECF No. 23 at 21 (“ALJ did not provide ‘clear and convincing’ 

reasons for rejecting the examining doctors’ opinions,” and he also “failed to provide ‘specific 

and legitimate reasons’” for doing so), 22 (“[t]he record is fully developed,” and crediting the 

doctors’ opinions as true, “the only outcome here . . . is that plaintiff is disabled . . .”). Further, 

contrary to the Commissioner’s argument, the court did consider the record as a whole, and 

concluded that “the only outcome here, based on this record, is that plaintiff is disabled . . ..” 

ECF No. 23 at 22. The court specifically considered the evidence the Commissioner now argues 

was not considered, namely, the “evidence” of malingering, the opinion of the reviewing doctor, 

Dr. Funkenstein (which is the same as Dr. Brooks’s opinion), the opinions of Drs. Lindgren, 

Scaramozzino and Torrez, and plaintiff’s other appointments at the Parole Outpatient Clinic 

(“POC”). 

 The record as a whole does not create “serious doubt” that plaintiff is, in fact, disabled. 

To the contrary, as the court initially determined, when the opinions of Drs. Torrez and 

Scaramozzino are credited as true, the testimony of the Vocational Expert (“VE”) makes clear 

that plaintiff could not maintain any employment in the general economy given the limitations 

outlined by those doctors. See ECF No. 23 at 18-19. As the court also noted, the ALJ stated that 

he was crediting the opinion of Dr. Torrez. See AR 15 (“I credit the opinion of the consultative 

psychologist, and note that it is consistent with the prior consultative examination”), 16 (“I further 

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find that Dr. Torrez’s opinion is not contradicted by the treatment records”). Moreover, the “prior 

consultative examination” was that of Dr. Scaramozzino. Yet, inexplicably, the ALJ rejected all 

the functional limitations that both doctors cited. 

 The Commissioner’s motion offers no reason for the court to change its determination that 

the opinions of Drs. Torrez and Scaramozzino should be credited as true, other than mere 

disagreement with that decision. The motion will be denied where, as here, the Commissioner 

offers mere disagreement with the court’s decision, and recapitulates the arguments it made 

before the court in its cross-motion for summary judgment. See Arteaga v. Asset Acceptance, 

LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1237 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (rejecting Rule 59(e) motion where plaintiff’s 

“arguments on reconsideration simply recapitulate her original argument”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s 

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (ECF No. 25), is DENIED. 

DATED: October 14, 2015 

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