Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02154/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Toby Joe Gutierrez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

TOBY JOE GUTIERREZ, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals . 'l'en_th Circuit . 

FEB 1 O 19·99 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

86-2154 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-22065) 

Jennifer A. Salisbury, Assistant U.S. Attorney (William L. Lutz, 

United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Ann Steinmetz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Toby Gutierrez (defendant) appeals the denial of his motion 

to vacate or set aside his sentence pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255. 

At the beginning of 1965, defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking 

Appellate Case: 86-2154 Document: 010110017270 Date Filed: 02/10/1988 Page: 1 
in heroin. 26 u.s.c § 4705(a} (1964} (repealed 1970). At that 

time he was 22 years old and had been addicted to he~oin for nine 

years. He served four years, including a drug rehabilitation program. For ten years defendant maintained a clean record. In 

1980, however, he was convicted of heroin trafficking under N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 30-31-20(A}(2} (1978). Two years later, New Mexico 

enhanced his sentence to life imprisonment because of the prior 

federal offense, pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-20(B}(2} 

(1978}. Defendant now argues that his 1965 guilty plea was not 

knowing and voluntary. 

Defendant, who initially appeared prose in district court 

but was subsequently represented by counsel, raised three grounds 

in support of relief. First, defendant alleged that he was suffering from the symptoms of withdrawal from heroin addiction at 

the time of his plea, and hence was incompetent to enter a knowing 

and voluntary plea. Second, defendant alleged that neither the 

court nor his trial counsel advised him of the sentencing range 

for his offense or that he would not be eligible for suspension, 

probation, or parole. He argued that his plea was therefore not 

knowing and voluntary, and that his counsel was ineffective. 

Third, defendant alleged that he was convicted under a statute 

which only applies to physicians. 

The United States moved to dismiss the motion on the ground 

that the transcript of the plea proceeding demonstrated that 

defendant understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty. 

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In the alternative, the government contended that defendant's 

motion should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 9(a) of t.ae Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings because the government hatl-·been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by defendant's 

twenty-year delay in bringing the motion. The United States 

attached letters and an affidavit to the motion to show that the 

attorneys present at the plea and at sentencing no longer had any 

specific recollection of defendant's condition. 

John F. Quinn, a former assistant United States attorney, 

wrote a letter indicating that he had no "remembrance of [defendant's] demeanor the morning of the change of plea.'' The assistant 

United States attorney at the time of sentencing, Scott McCarty, 

stated in an affidavit that he had "no specific recollection" of 

the sentencing. Mr. McCarty noted, however, that if defendant had 

appeared to be under the influence of heroin or any other illicit 

drug at the time of sentencing, he would have noticed defendant's 

condition. Mr. McCarty further stated that if he had believed 

defendant was under the influence of drugs, he would have brought 

it to the attention of the judge. 

After the defendant filed a response, the government supplemented its motion with a letter from defendant's former counsel, who indicated that a review of the transcript had not 

refreshed his recollection of events. Counsel also indicated that 

his files were "no longer retained." He volunteered that he would 

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be happy to cooperate if the government could think of another way 

to trigger his memory. 

In his response, defendant, through counsel, argued that Rule 

9(a) was inapplicable because 28 u.s.c. § 2255 states that "a 

motion for such relief may be made at any time." Defense counsel 

did not object to the procedural aspects of the case until it was 

on appeal. Nor was there any meaningful analysis of the substantive issues until the case reached the court of appeals. Only 

then were the relevant issues briefed and the substance of the 

government's position opposed on grounds sufficiently specific to 

admit of review. Notwithstanding the result in this case, we do 

not condone this type of practice. 

Pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(l)(B), the district court 

referred the motion to dismiss to the United States magistrate. 

The magistrate found that the government had been prejudiced by 

the delay and that defendant had knowledge of the alleged defects 

in his plea proceeding for the entire time prior to filing his 

motion pursuant to§ 2255. The magistrate therefore recommended 

dismissal under Rule 9(a). The magistrate also reviewed the transcript of the plea proceeding and concluded that the defendant's 

guilty plea was accepted in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 as 

it existed in 1965. The magistrate therefore recommended that in 

the alternative the district court deny the motion on the merits. 

The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation without 

specifying either alternative. 

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I• 

A. 

Rule 9(a) states, "A motion for relief made pu.rsuant to these 

rules may be dismissed if it appears that the government has been 

prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by delay in its 

filing unless the movant shows that it is based on grounds of 

which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred." The district court's dismissal under Rule 9(a) 

raises the issues of the substantive standards for considering a 

motion to dismiss under the rule and the proper procedure for 

reviewing the motion. See Hill v. Linahan, 697 F.2d 1032 (11th 

Cir. 1983). Because these issues are related, we will consider 

them together. 

A motion under 28 u.s.c. § 2255 may be filed "at any time." 

Therefore, the passage of time alone cannot logically be sufficient to bar defendant's motion under Rule 9(a). Cf. Bowen v. 

Murphy, 698 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1983) (§ 2254 case holding 

"[d]elay alone is not sufficient to dismiss a petition pursuant to 

Rule 9(a)) ." Prior to the adoption by the Supreme Court in 1976 

of the Rules Governing§ 2255 Proceedings, this court had indicated that any diligence requirement in filing a§ 2255 motion 

would in effect impose a statute of limitations on§ 2255, contrary to the language of the statute. Haier v. United States, 334 

F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1964). This court therefore rejected a diligence requirement per se, although the court indicated that there 

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might be circumstances in which a defendant's conduct would "disentitle him to the relief he seeks." Id. at 443. 

Rule 9(a) under§ 2255 is in accord with our holding in Haier 

that delay in filing alone cannot bar defendant from the relief he 

seeks. The original draft of Rule 9(a) provided that a rebuttable 

presumption of prejudice would arise after a delay of five years 

in seeking relief. H.R. Rep. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5, 

reprinted in (1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2478, 2481. 

Congress, however, rejected even a rebuttable presumption against 

defendant arising from delay, indicating that it was "unsound 

policy to require the defendant to overcome a presumption of prejudice and that the [change brought] Rule 9(a) into conformity with 

other provisions of law," specifically the same provision relied 

on in Haier that a§ 2255 motion may be made "at any time." Id. 

at 2481 and 2482 n.9. 

In Bowen, we interpreted Rule 9(a) under 28 u.s.c. § 2254, 

which contains nearly identical language to Rule 9(a) under 

§ 2255. We concluded that the government ''must first make a particularized showing of prejudice in its ability to respond." 698 

F.2d at 383. Only then does the burden shift to the defendant. 

Id. In accord with the legislative history of Rule 9(a) and the 

reasoning in Bowen, we conclude that the burden of proof remains 

on the government, regardless of the length of the delay. 

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Rule 9(a) is also consistent with the equitable standard 

announced in Haier that a defendant's conduct may "dis.entitle him 

to the relief he seeks." Haier, 334 F.2d at 443. ·~subdivision 

(a) provides a flexible, equitable time limitation based on laches 

to prevent movants from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in meeting the allegations of the motion 

and in any possible retrial. It includes a reasonable diligence 

requirement for ascertaining possible grounds for relief. If the 

delay is found to be excusable, or nonprejudicial to the government, the time bar is inoperative." Advisory Committee Note to 

Rule 9, 28 u.s.c. foll. § 2255. 

In McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1982), the 

Fifth Circuit addressed Rule 9(a)'s equitable standard under 

§ 2254. "The doctrine of !aches, as codified in Rule 9(a), is an 

equitable one. It is fact-oriented and its application varies 

from case to case. . While it is clear that the purpose of 

Rule 9(a) is to permit summary dismissals of stale claims, such 

dispositions are drastic and final. They should be entered only 

when the evidence before the court fully satisfies the standards 

required in the rule." Id. at 254-55; see Bowen, 698 F.2d at 382. 

Substantively, then, Rule 9(a) provides to the government what is 

in essence an equitable affirmative defense. 

Rule 9(a) is a substantive rule permitting dismissal of a 

motion under§ 2255 in some circumstances. The Rules Governing 

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§ 2255 Proceedings do not suggest the procedure to be used in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(a). The FederaI Rules 

of Civil Procedure therefore apply. Rule 12, 28 u.s~c. foll. 

§ 2255; see also McDonnell, 666 F.2d at 249. In view of the substantive requirements of summary disposition under Rule 9(a), a 

motion under the rule raising factual allegations of prejudice to 

the government must be characterized as a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 250. 

In recommending that defendant's motion be dismissed under 

Rule 9(a), the magistrate in the court below entered findings 

resolving disputed factual issues based solely on evidence submitted by the government, without notice to defendant or an opportunity for him to submit contrary evidence. These circumstances 

are similar to those considered in Hill, 697 F.2d 1032, and 

McDonnell, 666 F.2d 246. In each case, the appellate court 

reviewed a dismissal by the district court under Rule 9(a) of 

§ 2254. The magistrate had relied on the state's exhibits, 

attached to its motion to dismiss, in recommending that the petition be dismissed. 

In McDonnell, 666 F.2d at 253, the Fifth Circuit held that 

the district court could not decide a Rule 9(a) motion raising 

factual allegations of prejudice without giving notice to defendant that the court intended to consider more than the pleadings in 

ruling on the motion. Cf. Bowen, 698 F.2d at 383 (dismissal up8 

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held where state showed prejudice and petitioner "given the opportunity" to respond) • The court relied on Fed. R. Ci v-. P. · 56"( c), 

which provides that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment 

must be served with the motion at least ten days before the hearing. Id. at 252. Further, the court noted that "[t)he Advisory 

Committee Note to Rule 9(a) ... suggests imposing a notice 

requirement in Rule 9(a) cases" to permit the defendant to explain 

his delay, and even provides a form for that purpose. McDonnell, 

666 F.2d at 252-53. Accord Hill, 697 F.2d at 1034-35. 

This court also recognizes a notice requirement under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "The provisions of Rule 56(c) for notice 

to the opposing party and an opportunity for him to serve opposing 

affidavits are mandatory. Noncompliance therewith deprives the 

court of authority to grant _summary judgment." Torres v. First 

State Bank, 550 F.2d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, 

before a court may grant summary judgment, it must give the opposing party the opportunity to submit any material pertinent to the 

motion as construed. Id. The court cannot convert a motion to 

dismiss to a motion for summary judgment without notice, State of 

Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 585 F.2d 454 (10th 

Cir. 1978), unless the opposing party has responded to the 

movant's attempt to convert the motion by filing his own affidavits, see Nichols v. United States, 796 F.2d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 

1986). 

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In addition, the Advisory Committee's discussion of Rule 9(a) 

under § 2254, including the suggestion of giving notice p·rior to 

dismissal, applies equally to Rule 9(a) motions under§ 2255. 

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255. 

Moreover, Rule 9(a) following§ 2255 also provides a form to be 

sent to the defendant advising him of the possibility of dismissal 

under Rule 9 and asking him to provide an explanation. Therefore, 

·in accord with the reasoning of the Fifth and the Eleventh 

Circuits, we hold that the district court must provide notice to 

defendant prior to considering matters outside of the pleadings in 

dismissing a§ 2255 motion under Rule 9(a). The district court 

erred in dismissing defendant's motion without giving notice that 

it intended to treat the government's motion as a motion for summary judgment. 

We note for guidance of the parties that the government's 

presentation below was sufficient to raise a prima facie case of 

prejudice. Once the government has shown such prejudice, "the 

burden shifts to the petitioner to show either that the state 

actually is not prejudiced or that petitioner's delay is 'based on 

grounds which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of 

reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the 

state occurred.'" McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d at 251 (quoting 

Rule 9(a), 28 u.s.c. foll.§ 2254); see also Bowen v. Murphy, 698 

F.2d at 383. 

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B. 

The magistrate also concluded, and the district~ourt ~greed, 

that there was sufficient information in the record-to summarily 

deny the motion on the merits. In Sanders v. United States, 373 

U.S. 1 (1963), the Supreme Court held in circumstances very similar to those at oar that the district court should grant an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petitioner's allegations. 

In Sanders, petitioner alleged that he was mentally incompetent at 

the time of his guilty plea due to the administration of narcotic 

drugs during his incarceration. "However regular the proceedings 

at which [petitioner] ••. pleaded guilty might appear from the 

transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not 

make an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional 

rights. For the facts on which petitioner's claim is predicated 

are outside the record." Id. at 20 (citations omitted); 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1976) ("the barrier of the 

plea of sentencing proceeding record, although imposing, is not 

invariably insurmountable"). Under the circumstances of this 

case, the district court must provide defendant an evidentiary 

hearing if it proceeds past Rule 9(a) to the merits of defendant's 

allegations. Cf. id. at 75-76 (specific factual allegations showing broken promise require hearing despite valid plea record). 

II. 

Defendant's second ground is that neither the court nor his 

counsel informed him that his sentence, by statute, would carry no 

possibility of parole. See 26 u.s.c. § 7237(d)(l) (1964) 

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(repealed 1970). The transcript of the plea proceeding does not 

reflect whether defendant was made aware of his ineligibility for 

parole if he pleaded guilty. However, the Supreme Court has 

recently made clear that a trial court's failure to -inform the 

defendant of his parole eligibility is not a basis for withdrawal 

of a plea on voluntariness grounds. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52, 56 (1985). The Court also made clear that an issue of attorney ineffectiveness only arises if petitioner alleges that he 

would not have pled guilty had counsel informed him of his parole 

eligibility. Id. at 60. In this case, defendant did not make 

such an allegation. Under Hill, therefore, we must affirm the 

dismissal of his claim that his rights were violated when he was 

not advised that he would be ineligible for parole. 

Finally, defendant, who is represented by counsel on appeal, 

has not renewed his argument that he was convicted under a statute 

that did not apply to him. We accordingly deem the issue abandoned. 

Under 28 u.s.c. § 2255, "[u]nless the motion and the files 

and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is 

_ entitled to no relief, the court shall grant a prompt hearing 

thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." The record in this case 

does not conclusively show that defendant is entitled to no 

relief. We therefore vacate the district court's judgment and 

remand for further proceedings. 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED insofar as it denies relief for 

failure of the court or counsel to advise him of ineligibility for 

parole. On the issue of drug addiction affecting the voluntariness of his plea, the judgment is VACATED, and the cause is 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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