Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07134/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07134-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eli Lilly and Company
Appellee
Paula J. Galvin
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2006 Decided June 8, 2007

No. 05-7134

PAULA J. GALVIN,

APPELLANT

v.

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv01797)

Aaron M. Levine argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Brandon J. Levine.

James J. Dillon argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Paula J. Galvin appeals the

summary judgment entered by the district court in favor of

defendant Eli Lilly and Company. Galvin claims she suffered

injuries resulting from her exposure to Diethylstilbesterol (DES)

manufactured by Lilly. The district court concluded Galvin

failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate she was

exposed to DES made by Lilly rather than by another company.

We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

DES, also known as stilbesterol, is a synthetic estrogen that

was prescribed in the middle third of the twentieth century to

prevent miscarriage and premature birth. Gassmann v. Eli Lilly

& Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2005). Later research

revealed that the children of women who took DES while

pregnant are more likely to have certain health problems,

including infertility. Id.

In 1964 and 1965 Elizabeth Keller, while pregnant with

Galvin, was prescribed 25 mg DES pills, which she purchased

from the Crowell Ash Drug Store in Pittsburg, Kansas. Some 40

years later, Galvin filed this suit against Lilly, claiming Keller

had purchased DES manufactured by Lilly and she was infertile

as a result of her exposure to the drug in utero.

After discovery Lilly moved for summary judgment,

arguing that Galvin could not show the DES Keller had taken

was more likely than not made by Lilly. The Company provided

evidence from various directories of drug manufacturers (the

1964-65 Blue Book and the 1964 and 1965 editions of the Red

Book, respectively) listing 32, 104, or 97 firms that

manufactured DES in the relevant years. According to Lilly,

Galvin had presented only two items of evidence relevant to

product identification: Keller’s description of the pill she took

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and a statement by Bill Waltrip, a pharmacist who had worked

at the Crowell Ash Drug Store, discussing the store’s stocking

practices and suggesting the only DES it carried in the 1960s

was made by Lilly. Keller had described the pill she took as a

round “little white pill with a cross” and had answered “no”

when asked whether she could remember (1) any other markings

on the pill, (2) whether it had any coating, (3) what package the

pill came in, or (4) anything about the label on the package.

Lilly contended Keller’s description of the pill was insufficiently

specific; it identified not only Lilly’s pill but also two other

pills, one manufactured by Squibb (now Bristol-Myers Squibb)

and one manufactured by Marsh Parker. As for the Waltrip

statement, Lilly noted Waltrip did not start working for the

Crowell Ash Drug Store until 1967 — two years after Keller had

last purchased DES — and therefore lacked relevant personal

knowledge.

In response Galvin sought to introduce supplemental

affidavits by Keller and Waltrip. Keller’s supplemental affidavit

stated “[t]o the best of my recollection, the [DES] pills were

small, round, white, and cross-scored without any writing on

either side of the pill” and, referring to a photograph of a DES

pill manufactured by Lilly, added “[a]s I stated in my deposition,

the attached photograph shows the pills I ingested.” Waltrip’s

supplemental affidavit stated that in 1967 he talked to other

pharmacists at the drugstore and observed the practices and

procedures of the store, from which it was apparent to him that

the practices and procedures in 1967 did not differ from those

followed in 1964-65. Galvin also noted she had presented

expert testimony indicating no other DES pill matched Keller’s

description and evidence suggesting Lilly had the “lion’s share”

of the market. She also argued that her mother could not have

purchased either the Squibb pill or the Marsh Parker pill because

the Squibb pill had “Squibb” imprinted on the side and therefore

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did not match her description and the Marsh Parker pill was no

longer sold in 1965.

The district court refused to consider Keller’s supplemental

affidavit because “it was not included in the discovery ....

Plaintiff is not entitled to recharacterize and modify to her

advantage statements made in the course of depositions after

Defendant has relied on those depositions in drafting a

dispositive motion.” The court similarly refused to consider the

Waltrip supplement, calling it an inappropriate “post hoc

recalibration.” The court then concluded Kansas law governed

the claim, wherefore Galvin had to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the Lilly product was the actual cause of her

injury, and she had not done so. Although the Squibb pill could

be eliminated as a possible culprit because it was for a different

dosage, the Marsh Parker pill could not be discounted.

Therefore, even if Keller’s supplemental affidavit were

considered, the court reasoned, there was no evidence

suggesting the Marsh Parker pill differed in appearance from the

Lilly pill, and Galvin’s contention that Marsh Parker was not in

the market at the time was refuted by its listing in the Red Book.

Galvin had also submitted two documents indicating the market

shares of various DES manufacturers during 1964 and 1965 that

did not identify Marsh Parker as a producer, but the district court

rejected them because it appeared they did not encompass the

Kansas market. The court therefore concluded Galvin “cannot

demonstrate that she was injured by Lilly DES rather than DES

produced by a different company” and accordingly granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Galvin filed a motion to amend the judgment, arguing in

relevant part that the court had erred in refusing to consider the

supplemental affidavits. The district court denied the motion,

opining that Keller’s supplemental affidavit “fundamentally

change[d] the nature of [her] earlier deposition testimony” and

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*

 Although we have not formally addressed the standard applicable to

review of a district court decision to treat an affidavit as a sham,

Pyramid suggests the determination is part of our overall review of

summary judgment and accordingly subject to de novo review. See

924 F.2d at 1123-24. Similarly, the Second Circuit has implied this

that it was in any event irrelevant. As for Waltrip’s

supplemental affidavit, the court said, “Plaintiff cannot receive

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and then go in

search of new evidence with which to attack Defendant’s

arguments. This contradicts the very notion of a discovery

process.”

 II. Analysis

On appeal, Galvin challenges the district court’s refusal to

consider the two supplemental affidavits and its grant of

summary judgment for Lilly. 

A. Admissibility of Supplemental Affidavits

A party opposing summary judgment may submit affidavits

in support of its position provided such affidavits meet the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).

Virtually every circuit has adopted a form of the so-called “sham

affidavit rule,” which precludes a party from creating an issue of

material fact by contradicting prior sworn testimony unless the

“shifting party can offer persuasive reasons for believing the

supposed correction” is more accurate than the prior testimony.

Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123

(D.C. Cir. 1991); see Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526

U.S. 795, 806-07 (1999) (collecting cases). See generally 10A

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY

KANE,FEDERAL PRACTICE &PROCEDURE § 2726, at 448-52 (3d

ed. 1998).*

 If the supplemental affidavit does not contradict but

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determination is a matter of law, while the First, Sixth, Seventh,

Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have treated this issue as an evidentiary

one subject to review for abuse of discretion. Compare Langman

Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc., 160 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.

1998), with Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 21

(1st Cir. 2000); Briggs v. Potter, 463 F.3d 507, 512-13 (6th Cir.

2006); Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1055-56 (7th

Cir. 2000); Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1016 (10th Cir.

2002); Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1342-43

(11th Cir. 2000). 

instead clarifies the prior sworn statement, then it is usually

considered admissible. See, e.g., Selenke v. Med. Imaging of

Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001); Slowiak v. Land

O’Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Aka

v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1296 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(en banc); WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra. 

The district court refused to consider the supplemental

Keller and Waltrip affidavits on the ground it was improper for

the affiants to “recharacterize” their prior testimony after the

close of discovery. We agree that “parties’ opportunism should

not readily imperil summary judgment,” Pyramid, 924 F.2d at

1124; see also Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 141 F.3d

751, 756 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A] deposition is the time for the

plaintiff to make a record capable of surviving summary

judgment — not a later filed affidavit”), and also recognize that

a district court has broad discretion with respect to discovery,

see Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

A supplemental affidavit filed by an interested party should not

be deemed inadmissible solely because it was filed in response

to a motion for summary judgment, however; the important

considerations are whether the affidavit contradicts a prior

sworn statement without justification or the filing party breached

its obligations in discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.

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Galvin contends the supplemental affidavits do not

contradict but merely clarify the affiants’ prior statements.

Because we conclude there would not be a genuine dispute over

a material fact even if the supplemental affidavits were

admitted, we find it unnecessary to rule upon their actual

admissibility. Were it otherwise, we would have to determine

whether these affidavits contradict or clarify prior statements

and possibly also whether the sham affidavit rule should be

applied to a non-party witness. 

B. Summary Judgment

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. See Flynn v. R.C. Tile, 353 F.3d 953, 957 (D.C. Cir.

2004). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,” FED.R.CIV. P. 56(c);

see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986);

there is such a “genuine issue” if “a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Applying that standard, “[w]e view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in its favor.” Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

It is uncontested on appeal that Kansas law governs this

case and Galvin’s burden is therefore to prove Lilly’s product

was more likely than not the cause of her injury. See Lyons v.

Garlock, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228-29 (D. Kan. 1998);

Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Kan. 1980);

see also Yount v. Deibert, 147 P.3d 1065, 1072-74 (Kan. 2006);

Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 360 (Kan. 1983); cf.

Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980)

(holding DES manufacturers liable under California law in

proportion to their market shares). This she may do by means

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of circumstantial evidence, see Arterburn v. St. Joseph Hosp. &

Rehab. Ctr., 551 P.2d 886, 890 (Kan. 1976), but the

“circumstances shown must justify an inference of probability

as distinguished from mere possibility.” Mays, 661 P.2d at 360;

see also Arterburn, 551 P.2d at 892 (“There must be a rational

basis for concluding it is more probable than not that the

defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s damage. It is not

necessary for the plaintiff to eliminate all other possible causes

of his injury in order to present a jury question.”). Therefore, to

avoid summary judgment Galvin need provide only evidence

sufficient for a reasonable juror, drawing all reasonable

inferences in her favor, to conclude she was more probably than

not exposed to DES manufactured by Lilly. See Shields v. Eli

Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d 1463, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Yount, 147

P.3d at 1074. It follows that, because Lilly presented an

alternative theory, Galvin — though she need not disprove that

alternative — must give some credible reason for a juror to

accept her theory over the alternative. Cf. Siegel v. Mazda

Motor Corp., 878 F.2d 435, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“When the

record thus contains competing, unrebutted hypotheses

consistent with driver error, proof that a mechanical defect was

merely ‘capable of’ causing the accident does not satisfy the

standard ... that such an explanation be ‘more probable than

not’”). 

Galvin contends she met this standard by presenting (1)

Keller’s physical description of the pills she took, (2) Waltrip’s

testimony regarding practices at the drugstore where Keller

purchased her DES, (3) expert testimony suggesting the Lilly

pill is unique, (4) a hospital (“labor and delivery”) record

indicating Keller took “Stilb 25 mg,” (5) testimony suggesting

the wholesaler that supplied the Crowell Ash Drug Store would

have provided DES made by Lilly to fill Keller’s prescription,

and (6) evidence relating to Lilly’s share of the DES market.

Galvin acknowledges these “proofs might be peripheral,

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*

 Galvin claims she was blindsided by Lilly’s evidence of the Marsh

Parker pill, but her objection comes too late. Lilly introduced Marsh

Parker as an alibi pill in its motion for summary judgment, supported

by deposition testimony given in a different case by Robert Anderson,

a pharmacist in Massachusetts. Galvin suggests that Lilly’s failure to

disclose the deposition earlier was unfair because Galvin had asked

Lilly during discovery to disclose the identity of any individuals who

had information regarding possible alternative pills and Lilly had not

angulated and fragmented,” but contends they interlock to form

a “mosaic” showing she was exposed to Lilly’s product. Just as

a jigsaw puzzle cannot be solved if a piece is missing, however,

Galvin cannot survive summary judgment if there is a gap in the

causal chain between Lilly and Keller. 

Galvin’s evidence suggests two possible theories linking

Lilly to Keller. First, Keller’s description of the pills she took,

in combination with Galvin’s evidence negating alternatives,

might be sufficient. Second, the evidence regarding the sales

and stocking practices of the Crowell Ash Drug Store, together

with the evidence regarding the purported business practices of

the store’s purported supplier of DES, might do the job. There

are, however, problems with each theory.

1. The Description

Keller described the pill she took as small, round, white,

and cross-scored, and she picked the Lilly pill out of a photo

array. Of the approximately 20 pills she was shown, however,

no other pill was round, white, and cross-scored and Keller

admitted that seeing the photos probably reminded her of what

the pill she took looked like. In any event, as Lilly points out,

her description is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to

conclude Keller purchased Lilly’s brand of DES because it also

describes the Marsh Parker pill.*

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listed Anderson. She also notes that Anderson gave an affidavit after

summary judgment in this case disavowing his prior testimony

regarding the Marsh Parker pill. Galvin, however, did not object to

the Anderson testimony at summary judgment, and the district court’s

rejection of Anderson’s post-judgment affidavit was not an abuse of

discretion. See Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d

774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

Lilly reasons that, because the Marsh Parker pill shows

Keller’s description is not unique to Lilly’s product, it might

apply to any number of DES pills manufactured in 1964-65.

Lilly’s point is that Keller’s description could not prove she took

a Lilly pill even if Galvin could prove Keller did not purchase

the Marsh Parker pill. This approach implies a burden shifting

sequence for product identification through physical description:

First, Galvin must provide a physical description that matches

the Lilly pill. Then, to avoid judgment, Lilly must show that at

least one other DES pill matches Keller’s description, in which

event Galvin, finally, must show not only that Keller did not

take the matching pill(s) identified by Lilly but also that Keller

did not take any other pill identified by Lilly as having been in

the market but not otherwise described. Because we hold that

Galvin has not eliminated the Marsh Parker pill from

consideration, we reach no conclusion regarding Lilly’s

approach. 

Keller’s supplemental affidavit, assuming it was admissible,

does not help Galvin eliminate the Marsh Parker pill. Although

the supplemental affidavit includes a photograph of a Lilly DES

pill as a purported description of the pills Keller took, it does not

indicate that Keller selected the Lilly pill in a pairwise

comparison against the Marsh Parker pill. The photograph is

therefore only a visual representation of Keller’s earlier verbal

description, not her identification of the Lilly pill, and as such

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does not show that Keller took a pill manufactured by Lilly

rather than by Marsh Parker.

Galvin also presented the affidavits of Harold Sparr and

Philip Cafferty stating that no company other than Lilly

manufactured a round, white, cross-scored DES pill. Rule 56(e)

requires admissible affidavits to be made “on personal

knowledge, ... set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and ... show affirmatively that the affiant is competent

to testify to the matters stated therein.” Sparr and Cafferty do

not lay claim to the personal knowledge necessary to meet this

requirement. Sparr recounts that he is a former President of the

Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy, former

President of the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health

Sciences Alumni Association, and twice a delegate to the U.S.

Pharmacopoeia, which sets standards for all medicines and other

healthcare products manufactured and sold in the United States,

see The United States Pharmacopeial Convention, Inc., About

USP, http://www.usp.org/aboutUSP. Cafferty is a pharmacist

and former Eli Lilly district manager for Rhode Island and

Massachusetts. Although well-credentialed experts, their selfdescribed experiences are almost exclusively limited to New

England; the only experiences remotely suggesting that either

might have any knowledge of the DES market outside New

England are, in Sparr’s case, attendance at the U.S.

Pharmacopoeia, but he does not indicate when he was a delegate

nor what his role was, and in Cafferty’s, his position at Lilly,

though he provides no information about it to suggest as much.

Nothing in their affidavits do anything to establish their

competence to testify as to what brands of DES were available

in Kansas in 1964-65. No reasonable juror therefore could find

their assertions regarding the DES market credible with

reference to any place other than New England.

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Galvin suggests the Marsh Parker pill was unavailable in

Kansas in 1964-65 because, of the three drug directories in the

record, only the Red Book lists Marsh Parker as a manufacturer

then. Furthermore, market share analyses done for DES

litigation in New York and California do not include the Marsh

Parker pill.

This evidence would not permit a reasonable juror to infer

that Marsh Parker was not in the Kansas market during the

relevant time period. The market share analysis in the

California litigation concerned a different product — 5 mg pills,

not the 25 mg pills at issue in this case — and it is unclear

whether the market being evaluated even included Kansas.

California law requires market share liability to be calculated

using an analysis of the “relevant DES market,” Brown v.

Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 486 (Cal. 1988), and the record

does not indicate whether the relevant market for that litigation

is the California market, some smaller local or larger regional

market, or the national market. The market share analysis used

in the New York litigation was national in scope, see Hymowitz

v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989), but a

reasonable juror could not infer anything from the one page

Galvin put into the record. That page covers only about 30

percent of the market during the relevant time; Lilly represents

and Galvin does not deny that only 56 percent of the market was

allocated to specific companies even in the complete analysis.

Furthermore, the page we have appears to be an alphabetical

listing of manufacturers from “H” to “Re,” but many of the

listed manufacturers are said to have been “granted summary

judgment in the NY Market Share proceeding” (whatever that

may be) and have no market share indicated; certain other

manufacturers have no market share indicated without

explanation. A reasonable juror therefore could not infer

anything from Marsh Parker’s absence from the list, and would

have no basis for concluding Marsh Parker’s national market

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*

 Galvin nonetheless argues that Lilly’s exclusive listing in the PDR,

which she calls the “Bible of Drugs,” should allow a reasonable juror

to infer that Lilly was the market leader in DES, or at least had a

greater market share than did Marsh Parker. The dissent relatedly

suggests Marsh Parker’s absence from the PDR and the Blue Book

allows the inference that “Marsh Parker was not a major producer of

DES during the relevant period.” For this to be a reasonable inference

from the materials cited, however, there would have to be evidence

indicating how the Blue Book and the PDR were compiled. If there

were evidence that the winnowing criterion was market share, then the

inference would indeed be reasonable, but there is no such evidence

in the record. (In fact, Galvin’s Reply Brief implies a listing in the

PDR had to be purchased.) On the present record, the only thing that

reasonably can be inferred from the Blue Book, the Red Book, or the

PDR is that listed drugs were produced by the indicated

manufacturer(s) at the time of publication. 

share was not part of the unallocated 44 percent. Finally, Galvin

concedes the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR), which she put

into the record, is not an exhaustive list of manufacturers;* nor

does she challenge the accuracy of the 1964 and 1965 Red

Books in which Marsh Parker is listed. 

Galvin does argue that, because the 1964 and 1965 Red

Books do not distinguish between regional and national

manufacturers or contain any information about “availability,

popularity or accessibility,” no reasonable juror could infer from

them that Marsh Parker then sold 25 mg DES pills in the Kansas

market. Relatedly, Galvin suggests Lilly must provide evidence

showing Marsh Parker was stocked at the Crowell Ash Drug

Store. It is Galvin’s burden, however, to show Keller more

likely than not took DES manufactured by Lilly; noting that a

listing in the Red Book is consistent both with Marsh Parker

selling in Kansas and not selling in Kansas does not help meet

that burden. 

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*

 This argument is reminiscent of the familiar Blue Bus hypothetical,

a popular topic among commentators. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,

An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.

1477, 1508-10 (1999); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,

Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble

Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L.REV. 1001 (1988). One

formulation of the hypothetical is as follows: 

While driving late at night on a dark, two-lane road, a person

confronts an oncoming bus speeding down the center line of

the road in the opposite direction. In the glare of the

headlights, the person sees that the vehicle is a bus, but he

cannot otherwise identify it. He swerves to avoid a collision,

and his car hits a tree. The bus speeds past without stopping.

The injured person later sues the Blue Bus Company. He

proves, in addition to the facts stated above, that the Blue Bus

Company owns and operates 80% of the buses that run on the

road where the accident occurred. Can he win? 

Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and

the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV.L.REV.1357, 1378-79 (1985).

Even if Marsh Parker was in the relevant market, Galvin

suggests the evidence of Lilly’s dominant market share would

allow a reasonable juror to infer that Keller probably purchased

a Lilly pill.*

 The case law on this issue is mixed, compare, e.g.,

Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945), with

Kramer v. Weedhopper of Utah, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 104, 107-08

(Ill. App. Ct. 1986), though we understand courts usually reject

the argument Galvin is making. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER,

PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 81 (2003). But

see Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology

and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA.L.REV. 1491, 1524-25 (2001).

See generally Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base

Rate Statistics Are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 373 (2002).

Even if we were, however, to conclude that statistical evidence

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could by itself establish causation for the purpose of summary

judgment, Galvin would still need to adduce statistics indicating

it was more likely than not that Keller took pills manufactured

by Lilly. 

Galvin points to four pieces of evidence relating to Lilly’s

presence in the DES market. First, according to a market share

analysis constructed for an unidentified lawsuit in New York,

Lilly had 28.9 percent of the national market for 25 mg DES

pills in 1964 and 27.5 percent in 1965. Second, as mentioned

above, an analysis concerning 5 mg pills constructed for a

lawsuit in California showed Lilly had a 47.8 percent share in

1964 and a 48.9 percent share in 1965 in some unspecified

geographical market. Third, Galvin presented the 1960

testimony of a Lilly vice president that Lilly produced

approximately 75 percent of the stilbesterol consumed in the

United States. The probative value of this statement is

essentially nil, however, because most stilbesterol was

consumed by animals. Finally, Galvin cites the listing for

diethylstilbesterol in the 1965 PDR, which identifies only Lilly

as a manufacturer. Although Galvin concedes the PDR listing

does not prove Lilly was the only manufacturer of DES that

year, she does contend a reasonable juror could infer that Lilly

was the dominant producer in the national market. 

Based upon this evidence, a reasonable juror could not infer

the probability Keller took a pill manufactured by Lilly is

greater than 50 percent. Most of the evidence presented either

does not directly address a relevant product or geographic

market or, in the case of the PDR, is simply uninformative on

the question whether Lilly accounted for more than 50 percent

of the market. The most probative evidence is clearly the

national market share analysis used in the New York litigation,

and it suggests the probability that Keller purchased a Lilly pill

is less than 30 percent — well below the “more likely than not”

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standard. On this record, a reasonable juror could not conclude

Lilly was more likely than not the manufacturer of the pills

Keller took. 

Finally, Galvin argues in essence that the whole of her

evidence is greater than the sum of its parts. Put another way,

she argues a juror could reasonably infer the white cross-scored

pill Keller took was more likely manufactured by Lilly than by

Marsh Parker because Lilly’s share of the market for round

white cross-scored DES pills was greater than Marsh Parker’s at

the relevant time. This argument may be consistent with our

decision in Shields, see 895 F.2d at 1466, but Galvin simply has

not provided the evidence — market share data for the Marsh

Parker pill in a relevant market — necessary for a reasonable

juror to conclude that a Lilly pill was probably the cause of her

injury. She does submit a page from a market share analysis

performed for New York litigation that reports Lilly had

approximately 28-29 percent of the market during the relevant

time and does not include Marsh Parker at all but, for the

reasons noted above, no reasonable juror could infer anything

from Marsh Parker’s absence from that analysis. 

2. Business Practices

Galvin makes two related arguments based upon evidence

of business practices. She first notes that, according to the

Waltrip affidavits, the Crowell Ash Drug Store sold only Lilly’s

brand of DES in the 1960s; therefore, when Keller purchased her

DES, she must have received Lilly’s product. The second

argument is more complicated. Although her doctor’s written

prescription is not available, her labor and delivery record

suggests he prescribed her “Stilb 25 mg,” which Galvin

contends would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the

underlying prescription did not specify a particular brand. Other

evidence suggests Lilly wholesalers provided Lilly products to

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17

*

 Rule 406 states: 

Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of

an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless

of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the

conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion

was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.

pharmacies when they received orders for drugs not specified by

brand name. Finally, Waltrip in his affidavit states the Crowell

Ash Drug Store ordered its DES from Pennington Wholesale

Drug, which was a Lilly wholesaler. Galvin claims this

evidence would make it reasonable for a juror to infer that

Keller’s doctor prescribed DES without specifying a brand,

which led the Crowell Ash Drug Store to order DES from

Pennington without specifying a brand, which then caused

Pennington to provide DES manufactured by Lilly.

Both theories depend upon the Waltrip testimony, which the

district court correctly held was inadmissible pursuant to Rule

56(e). As previously mentioned, Waltrip did not become a

pharmacist until 1967 and he does not suggest he was personally

familiar with the Crowell Ash Drug Store’s stocking practices

in 1964-65. Although his supplemental affidavit notes that upon

arriving at the drugstore in 1967, he talked to and took

instructions “from other pharmacists and observed the practices

and procedures of the store, as they existed in the years prior,”

that demonstrates only that Waltrip’s knowledge of practices in

1965 is based upon inadmissible hearsay.

Galvin suggests Waltrip’s statement is reducible to

admissible form as evidence of a routine practice, presumably

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 406.*

 Even if it is, that

would not cure Waltrip’s lack of personal knowledge for the

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18

* Our dissenting colleague suggests Waltrip’s testimony is bolstered

by the testimony of Sparr and Cafferty regarding Lilly’s stocking

practices. We fail to see how. Sparr and Cafferty do not claim to

know anything about the Crowell Ash Drug Store’s supplier in 1965,

and what they may know about Lilly’s “nationwide wholesale

strategy” does not change that fact.

relevant time.* Galvin assumes Waltrip could reasonably infer

the Crowell Ash Drug Store’s stocking practices in 1967 were

the same as its practices in 1965, but she cites no authority

supporting this counter-intuitive proposition, nor has she

presented any evidence suggesting the practice did not change

in the interim. Merely to assume a practice in 1967 to have been

the same as it was in 1965 is not reasonable, and we accordingly

find the Waltrip testimony unhelpful to Galvin in opposing

summary judgment.

So to say is not, as Galvin claims, to “g[ive] Lilly the

benefit of the inference that the drugstore underwent a

revamping or overhaul of its regular practices of ordering and

stocking.” We adopt a neutral posture, inferring neither change

nor continuity at the drugstore. Still, a reasonable juror must

have some reason to believe the practice followed in 1967 was

the same as the practice followed in 1965. Galvin has provided

none, and thus has failed to carry her burden as the plaintiff.

III. Conclusion

A reasonable juror considering only the evidence that

satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(e) could not have found it

more probable than not that Galvin ingested DES manufactured

by Lilly. This remains so even if the supplemental affidavits of

Keller and Waltrip are admissible. Accordingly, the judgment

of the district court is 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #05-7134 Document #1045938 Filed: 06/08/2007 Page 18 of 30
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Assuming, as the court

does, that only two pills match the description given by Galvin’s

mother of the small, round, white, cross-scored pill that she

took, Galvin has proffered evidence from which a reasonable

jury could find that she was more probably exposed to

diethylstilbestrol (“DES”) manufactured by Lilly than the

alternative manufactured by Marsh Parker. The events

underlying Galvin’s complaint occurred more than four decades

ago. Hence, it is hardly surprising that evidence such as

pharmacy business records from 1964-65 is unavailable to

demonstrate with certainty which manufacturer produced the

DES giving rise to Galvin’s claims for relief. But Galvin need

not produce at trial evidence of substantial certainty, and the

court errs by holding her to a standard of proof greater than is

required under the relevant State law, to wit: “more probable

that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not.”

In a universe of two pills, any evidence tending to implicate

the Lilly pill suffices to make that pill the more probable cause

of Galvin’s injuries. Galvin has proffered multiple pieces of

evidence that, when viewed together as a mosaic, support the

reasonable inference that among the small, round, white, crossscored pills, her mother’s DES pill was more probably

manufactured by Lilly than by Marsh Parker. In response to

Lilly’s alternative theory that the Marsh Parker pill, which also

matches Galvin’s mother’s description, may have caused

Galvin’s injuries, the court initially acknowledges that, as the

non-moving party, Galvin “need not disprove that alternative.”

Op. at 8. This, however, is what the court requires her to do.

Thus, having rejected the probative value of each piece of her

evidence viewed in isolation, the court observes that “Galvin

simply has not provided the evidence — market share data for

the Marsh Parker pill in a relevant market — necessary for a

reasonable juror to conclude that a Lilly pill was probably the

cause of her injury.” Op. at 16. But Galvin is not relying solely

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2

on statistical evidence. See Op. at 14-16. Once that flaw in the

court’s analysis is removed the “mosaic” that emerges from

Galvin’s evidence, according her as we must the benefit of all

reasonable inferences, suffices to defeat Lilly’s claim that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, for at the summary

judgment stage Galvin is not required to “produce evidence in

a form that would be admissible at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

I.

“Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper ‘if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.

at 322 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). In other words, the

“mosaic” approach, in contrast with the court’s breaking up of

Galvin’s evidence under two theories of analysis, see Op. at 9,

is consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction on summary

judgment. Thus, 

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id. Galvin’s proffer of evidence is not so deficient. At the

summary judgment stage, “[t]he court’s function is not to try

disputed issues of fact, but only to ascertain whether such an

issue is present, and any doubt on that score is to be resolved

against the movant.” Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660

F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). Where any

USCA Case #05-7134 Document #1045938 Filed: 06/08/2007 Page 20 of 30
3

such dispute exists after giving the non-movant “the most

favorable view of the record,” Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d

120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2,

summary judgment must be denied because “[t]rial by affidavit

is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the

hallmark of ‘even handed justice.’” Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S.

464, 473 (1962). At the summary judgment stage, Galvin’s

evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to

be drawn in [her] favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Additionally, she is “not require[d] . . . to

discredit every conceivable alternative theory of causation.”

Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d 1463, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

To determine whether a reasonable juror could find in

Galvin’s favor based on her proffered evidence, the court must

apply the substantive law of Kansas. See Erie R.R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). To prevail under Kansas

law, a plaintiff must “‘introduce evidence from which

reasonable persons may conclude that it is more probable that

the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not.’”

Yount v. Deibert, 147 P.3d 1065, 1073 (Kan. 2006) (quoting

PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 269-70 (5th ed. 1984)).

Kansas law does not hold the plaintiff “to a highly detailed

burden of proof,” id. at 1072, but simply requires “evidence

which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is

more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a

cause in fact of the result,” id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON §

41, at 269-70). Thus, “triers of fact are allowed to draw upon

ordinary human experience with regard to the probabilities of

the case.” Id. at 1073. To create a material issue of disputed

fact, “circumstantial evidence in a civil case need not rise to that

degree of certainty which will exclude every reasonable

conclusion other than the conclusion sought to be established.”

Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Kan. 1980).

At trial, a jury is entitled to make a reasonable inference from

USCA Case #05-7134 Document #1045938 Filed: 06/08/2007 Page 21 of 30
4

the evidence even if “some other inference equally reasonable

might be drawn therefrom.” Arterburn v. St. Joseph Hosp. &

Rehabilitation Ctr., 551 P.2d 886, 890 (Kan. 1976). In a

products liability case, the evidence “must justify an inference

of probability as distinguished from mere possibility.” Mays v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 360 (Kan. 1983). 

II.

The court declines to consider Lilly’s contention that other

manufacturers of DES may have made a pill that matches

Galvin’s mother’s description because “Galvin has not

eliminated the Marsh Parker pill from consideration.” Op. at 10.

Galvin is not required to do so in order to defeat summary

judgment, see Part I, although the court repeatedly suggests that

she must, see Op. at 10, 12-13, 15-16. Assuming, as the court

does, that only two DES pills meet the description given by

Galvin’s mother, Op. at 10, Lilly has not offered any evidence

suggesting that Galvin was probably exposed to the Marsh

Parker pill, and the mosaic based on the evidence proffered by

Galvin suffices to show that it is more probable that she was

exposed to the Lilly pill. Even assuming no individual piece of

evidence proffered by Galvin would alone suffice to meet her

burden, she has offered evidence that begins with her mother’s

identification of the pill and her hospital records, continues with

affidavits from several pharmacists — including an expert —

concerning Lilly’s nationwide agreements and stocking

practices, and with Lilly’s Warehousing and Distribution

Service Agreement, and concludes with the druggists’ reference

books — the Physician’s Desk Reference (“PDR”) and the

American Druggist Blue Book (“Blue Book”) — and a national

market-share matrix. The conclusion that Galvin has met her

burden follows without deciding whether the district court

properly denied Galvin’s request to file supplemental affidavits,

see Op. at 6, or whether this court errs by allowing Lilly to avoid

USCA Case #05-7134 Document #1045938 Filed: 06/08/2007 Page 22 of 30
5

the result of a disavowing affidavit, see Op. at 9 n.*.

Galvin’s mother gave a four-point description of the pill she

took in 1964-1965 and hospital notes indicate that she was

prescribed “Stilb 25 mg,” which supports the reasonable

inference that her prescription also indicated a generic name

only. The initial affidavit of pharmacist Bill Waltrip provides

information about the business practices with regard to DES at

the drug store in Pittsburg, Kansas from which Galvin’s mother

obtained her DES pills; no records exist for the pharmacy from

1964-65. Waltrip states that, “[i]n the 1960's, Ash Drug Store

only stocked and dispensed the [Lilly] brand of

diethylstilbestrol.” Waltrip asserts, “[b]ased on [his] personal

observation of the habit and custom” of the drug store in the

1960's, that the Lilly brand of DES would have been dispensed

to a “woman who came into the pharmacy with a prescription

for ‘DES’, ‘stilbestrol’, or ‘diethylstilbestrol.’” He also states

that the prescribing obstetrician for Galvin’s mother practiced in

Ft. Scott, Kansas, and that the Ash Drug Store filled and

dispensed many of his patients’ prescriptions. Finally, Waltrip

notes that the drug store ordered DES from Pennington

Wholesale Drug located in Joplin, Missouri, which was a Lilly

wholesaler. 

Although Waltrip did not begin working at the Ash Drug

Store until 1967, his affidavit establishes that at that time (1)

Lilly DES was available in Kansas through a Lilly wholesaler,

(2) it was sold at the same drug store where Galvin’s mother’s

prescription was filled, and (3) no other DES was available at

that drug store. The court rejects the probative value of

Waltrip’s testimony about stocking practices on the ground that

it is adopting “a neutral posture, inferring neither change or

continuity at the drugstore” since 1964-65. Op. at 18; see id. at

17 n.* (quoting FED. R. EVID. 406). On summary judgment,

however, the court must give the non-moving party the benefit

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6

of all reasonable inferences. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A

reasonable jury could infer, when Galvin’s other evidence is

considered, that Waltrip’s affidavit makes it more probable that

Lilly DES was sold in the same drug store in 1964-65. The twoyear period affects the strength of the inference that may

reasonably be drawn; it does not eliminate its relevance. See

FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note. 

Bolstering the probative force of Waltrip’s affidavit is the

Lilly Warehousing and Distribution Service Agreement, which

states that the wholesaler shall promote Lilly products and not

give preference to any other brand when no brand is specified.

Galvin’s mother’s hospital records indicate that she was

prescribed “Stilb 25 mg” without specifying a brand. Op. at 16.

Additionally, the affidavits of Harold B. Sparr and Philip J.

Cafferty are relevant because of their personal familiarity with

Lilly’s literature, its nationwide wholesale strategy in the 1950s

and 1960s, and the nature of its agreements with wholesalers

throughout the United States. Both Sparr and Cafferty state that

no manufacturer other than Lilly had a round, white, crossscored DES pill without any other markings. Their evidence

further bolsters the probative force of Waltrip’s affidavit.

Sparr states that he was familiar with Lilly publications and

its marketing and stocking practices in the 1950s and 1960s. He

also states that he reviewed the sworn statements of over 105

pharmacists regarding the prevalence and availability of Lilly

DES products in their stores in the 1950s and 1960s. Sparr is a

registered pharmacist in Massachusetts, New York, and

California; he holds a Masters in Health Care Management from

Pacific Western University and has taught pharmacy at the

Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Northeastern; he has

over forty-seven years of experience as a practicing pharmacist,

beginning in the mid-1950s; he has served as President of the

Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy and was

USCA Case #05-7134 Document #1045938 Filed: 06/08/2007 Page 24 of 30
7

named Pharmacist of the Year in 1995 by the Massachusetts

Pharmacy Association; and he was twice a delegate to the

United States Pharmacopoeia.

According to Sparr, in the 1950s and 1960s “Lilly was the

leading pharmaceutical manufacturer in America [] with top

market popularity because of its reputation, quality, control,

efficiency of inventory and distribution through wholesalers.”

He notes, among other things, that at that time “Lilly was the

only major drug house that employed licensed pharmacists as

detailmen” to restock drug stores with Lilly products and also

employed unique stocking practices, enabling retail pharmacists

to save money. Even though Sparr’s pharmaceutical practice

and teaching experiences were in New England, his familiarity

with Lilly literature that was distributed nationwide and its

nationwide stocking practices and its unique detailing practices

lends support to the reasonable inference that the Ash Drug

Store in Pittsburg, Kansas — which, according to Waltrip,

obtained its DES from a Lilly wholesaler in 1967 — dispensed

the Lilly DES pill to Galvin’s mother. The affidavit of Philip

Cafferty, a pharmacist since 1961, is to the same effect, noting

also that for nineteen years, beginning in 1965, he was employed

by Lilly as a professional representative or detailman and district

manager in New England. 

While it is possible, in the sense that anything is possible,

that Lilly functioned in a different manner in Kansas in 1964-65,

Sparr and Cafferty are familiar with Lilly’s nationwide practices

and top popularity in the relevant years. The court rejects their

evidence because Sparr’s and Cafferty’s experiences were

“almost exclusively limited to New England.” Op. at 11. This

overlooks not only that Lilly also relies on the testimony of a

pharmacist who worked solely in Massachusetts, Op. at 9 n.*,

but also that Sparr and Cafferty have undisputed knowledge of

Lilly’s nationwide practices when Galvin’s mother was taking

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8

DES. By proffering this evidence, Galvin has offered further

support for the reasonable inference that a jury could draw that

it was more probable than not that her mother took Lilly’s DES

pill.

Other support for the probative force of the inference about

1964-65 from Waltrip’s affidavit is found in three survey-type

references. The first two references are national catalogues

listing brands of drugs. The Physician’s Desk Reference

(“PDR”), which Galvin asserts (and Lilly does not contest, a

point overlooked by the court, Op. at 13 & n.*), is the “Bible of

[d]rugs” that was “on the [d]esk of [e]very [d]octor in America,”

Appellant’s Br. at 17, lists Lilly as the only brand of DES in the

Twentieth Edition published in 1965. A second reference,

proffered by Lilly, is the 1964-65 edition of the American

Druggist Blue Book, which includes the catalogues of seventyfour manufacturers and describes itself as listing the latest

products and price changes. The Blue Book also does not list

Marsh Parker among the brands of DES.

The court dismisses the probative value of the PDR on the

ground that Galvin concedes that it is not an exhaustive list of

DES manufacturers and imposes on Galvin a unique burden to

show the compilation methodologies used in the PDR and the

Blue Book even though Lilly does not dispute Galvin’s

characterization of the PDR and Lilly proffered the Blue Book.

See Op. at 13 & n.*. The court does not address the fact that

Marsh Parker does not appear in the Blue Book other than to

impose a compilation burden, Op. at 13 n.*, instead finding that

the listing of Marsh Parker in the Red Book, also proffered by

Lilly, is conclusive. See Op. at 12-13. No doubt the nonexhaustive nature of the listing means that the PDR is not

complete proof. But Galvin, not Lilly, is entitled on summary

judgment to all reasonable inferences and a reasonable juror

could find that it is more probable that the more prominent and

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9

more widely available drug would have been listed than the less

prominent drug. From the absence of Marsh Parker from these

two listings a reasonable juror could infer that Marsh Parker was

not a major producer of DES during the relevant period.

Although the Red Book for 1964 and 1965 lists both Lilly and

Marsh Parker, a reasonable juror could accept that Marsh Parker

was on the market in 1964-65 and still conclude that it is more

probable than not that Galvin was exposed to Lilly DES. To the

degree that the Red Book supports the contrary inference — that

Galvin was exposed to Marsh Parker DES — under Kansas law,

Galvin’s burden at trial does not require her to exclude other

reasonable inferences, see Arterburn, 551 P.2d at 890, much less

offer mathematical proof of causation, see Yount, 147 P.3d at

1072-73.

The third reference is a national market share matrix

developed in connection with litigation in New York. See

Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y.

1989). The matrix indicates that Lilly had a significant

percentage — approximately 28% — of the national market in

1964-65. It does not list Marsh Parker at all. That summary

judgment was granted to some drug manufacturers and that

Galvin proffered only one page of the matrix, see Op. at 12, are

red herrings, for Lilly was not among the manufacturers granted

summary judgment and the single page is where Marsh Parker

would have been listed in alphabetical order. The court also

dismisses the probative value of this evidence because it shows

that Lilly had less than 30% of the market. Op. at 15-16.

Contrary to the court’s implication, Op. at 14-16, Galvin is not

relying on statistical evidence “by itself” to defeat summary

judgment and, consequently, the court’s expression of doubt

about the probativeness of statistical evidence, see Op. at 14-16,

misses the mark. But even accepting Lilly’s bald assertion that

the matrix leaves 44% of the market share unaccounted for, a

reasonable juror could doubt, in view of Galvin’s evidence, that

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10

Marsh Parker was a dominant market force accounting for more

than 28% of the remaining 44% but was somehow excluded

from the PDR and the Blue Book and the matrix. Contrary to

the court’s conclusion, a reasonable juror need not believe that

these reference materials have no probative value at all. Rather,

they lend support to the reasonable inference that in 1964-65

Lilly DES was more prevalent than Marsh Parker DES, thus

making it more probable that Galvin was exposed to Lilly’s pill

than Marsh Parker’s. 

In reaching a contrary conclusion about the probative force

of the mosaic of evidence that Galvin has proffered, the court

appears to suggest that Lilly is entitled to summary judgment

because Galvin may not have proven that it is certain that she

was exposed to Lilly’s product or that it is significantly more

probable that she was exposed to Lilly’s product than to Marsh

Parker’s. See Op. at 9, 10, 12-13, 15-16. This is not her burden

as the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see

also Yount, 147 P.3d at 1072-73. At this stage of the

proceedings, Galvin need only adduce evidence from which a

reasonable juror could conclude that it is more probable — even

if only slightly more probable — that she was exposed to Lilly’s

pill even if there is another reasonable inference. She has done

so. The court’s contrary conclusion stems from its failure to

adhere to the summary judgment standard, see, e.g., Op. at 13

n.*, 18 n.*, where the non-movant’s evidence is to be taken as

true and receive all reasonable inferences, see Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255, and Kansas law, which requires only moreprobable-than-not proof of causation.

To the extent some courts insist on “direct” evidence of

causation, see, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754

(Mass. 1945), while others permit circumstantial evidence to

establish liability based on probabilities, see, e.g., Kramer v.

Weedhooper of Utah, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (Ill. App. Ct.

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11

1986); cf. Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp., 288 N.W.2d 426 (Mich.

1979), we understand that “direct” evidence is not necessarily

more accurate than statistical evidence of probabilities, both of

which rely on a degree of generality. See FREDERICK SCHAUER,

PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 93-97 (2003);

Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information

Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW &

SOC’Y REV. 123, 151-56 (1980-81); cf. Ronald J. Allen, A

Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L.REV.401, 414-15

(1986); Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the

Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L.REV. 530, 538-39, 542-43

(1989). As one jurist has put it, “it is now generally recognized

. . . that since all evidence is probabilistic — there are no

metaphysical certainties — evidence should not be excluded

merely because its accuracy can be expressed in explicitly

probabilistic terms.” Richard A. Posner, An Economic

Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.REV. 1477, 1508

(1999), quoted in Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think

Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 373, 373

& n.1 (2002). 

Whatever may be the merits of the broader debate over

whether courts should allow verdicts on the basis of statistical

evidence, Galvin’s mosaic of evidence suffices to meet her

burden of proof and thus to defeat Lilly’s motion for summary

judgment. Although Lilly maintains that even if Galvin was not

exposed to the Marsh Parker pill, she has not demonstrated that

she was exposed to Lilly’s pill because other manufacturers of

DES in 1964-65 may have produced a pill that matches her

mother’s description, Lilly’s alternative argument cannot

prevail. The court suggests that mediating this contention would

require consideration of a complex burden-shifting scheme in

which the plaintiff is burdened with disproving all remaining

alternatives. See Op. at 10. However, Galvin does not bear the

burden of proving a certainty. See, e.g., Shields, 895 F.2d at

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12

1466. Galvin’s mother offered a fairly precise description of the

pill she took that provides four data points — it was small; it

was white; it was round; and it was cross-scored. The court

acknowledges that Galvin’s mother was shown a photo array in

which she identified the Lilly pill but deems significant the fact

that the Lilly pill was the only pill among the twenty shown that

matched her description. See Op. at 9. Galvin is, however,

entitled to all reasonable inferences. The court fails to recognize

that the photo array suggests that the four-point composite

description given by Galvin’s mother is uncommon. The only

question this court must ask is whether a reasonable juror could

infer that there are probably no additional DES pills that match

this description. That Lilly could find one other matching pill

— the Marsh Parker DES pill — would not make it

unreasonable for a juror to infer that Lilly had probably found

the only other matching pill. 

Accordingly, because the court has improperly raised the

standard for defeating summary judgment to require Galvin to

produce evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude

that it was significantly more probable that Galvin was exposed

to the Lilly DES, I respectfully dissent and would reverse in

view of Galvin’s Rule 56(e) evidence and reasonable inferences

in her favor as the non-moving party, and remand the case to the

district court. 

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