Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03799/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03799-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Redd
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3799

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY REDD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:03-CR-53-TS—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 30, 2010—DECIDED JANUARY 4, 2011

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and

WOOD, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Timothy Redd was convicted

in 2005 of distributing crack cocaine and was sentenced

to 405 months’ imprisonment. In 2007 the Sentencing

Commission reduced the Guideline ranges for crack

offenses (Amendment 706, effective November 1, 2007).

The next year it made that change retroactive (Amendment 712, effective March 3, 2008). This allowed prisoners

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whose ranges had been affected by the change to seek

lower sentences under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2). See Dillon v.

United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010). Redd swiftly took

advantage of this opportunity, and the district judge

reduced his sentence to 327 months. Redd did not appeal.

Ten months later, he filed in the district court a document styled “Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively

Renewed Motion for Modification of Sentence.” Redd

contended that the judge had not given him as great a

reduction as the law warranted. The judge denied this

motion, and Redd has appealed.

As a motion for reconsideration, the document that

Redd filed in the district court was ineffectual. Only a

motion filed within the time for appeal acts as a genuine

request for reconsideration. United States v. Healy, 376

U.S. 75, 77–78 (1964). See also United States v. Rollins, 607

F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2010). Redd had 10 days to

appeal; he took 30 times that long to file his motion.

(An amendment to Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) effective December 1, 2009, increases the time to 14 days; it does not

affect Redd’s situation.) The document therefore was

what the second half of its caption called it: a new

motion for a lower sentence under §3582(c)(2).

Until the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, district

judges could reduce any sentence within 120 days of the

final appellate decision. See United States v. Addonizio, 442

U.S. 178, 187–88 (1979) (describing the former approach).

The 1984 Act converted the federal system to one of

determinate sentences. District judges lost any continuing

authority over sentences, see 18 U.S.C. §3582(c) (“The

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No. 09-3799 3

court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it

has been imposed”); United States v. Smith, 438 F.3d 796

(7th Cir. 2006), subject to two general exceptions stated

in Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, which was amended as part of the

legislation. One exception is the power to fix an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error within 14 days. See

Rule 35(a) and §3582(c)(1)(B). The second is the power to

reduce a sentence on the prosecutor’s motion, if the

defendant provides substantial assistance after the sentence is imposed. See Rule 35(b) and §3582(c)(1)(A). The

only other exception is §3582(c)(2), which depends on a

decision by the Sentencing Commission to make retroactive a reduction in a Guideline range—and the district

judge’s authority is limited to implementing the Commission’s changes. A decision under an amended Guideline is not a full resentencing. Dillon explains how

this works.

Redd treats §3582(c)(2) as if it countermanded the

basic determinate-sentence system and bestowed on

district judges a continuing power to adjust sentences—a

power that would last indefinitely, unlike the older

system limiting that power to 120 days after the final

appellate decision. Neither the text of §3582(c)(2) nor

the language of Amendment 712 suggests that prisoners

are entitled to more than one opportunity to request a

lower sentence, for any given change in the Guideline

range. Once the district judge makes a decision, Rule 35

applies and curtails any further power of revision, unless

the Commission again changes the Guidelines and

makes that change, too, retroactive.

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Only one other circuit has addressed this subject in a

published opinion. It held that the doctrine of law of the

case usually forecloses successive requests for lower

sentences. See United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d

1556, 1560–61 (11th Cir. 1997), relying on Christianson v.

Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1988).

The eleventh circuit did not discuss either Rule 35 or the

norm from §3582(c) that “[t]he court may not modify a

term of imprisonment once it has been imposed”. We

think it best to stick with the statute rather than

apply a common-law doctrine such as law of the case.

Redd let the time for reconsideration or appeal of the

district judge’s resentencing expire without action. He

could not use a new §3582(c)(2) motion to obtain a

fresh decision—or to take what amounts to a belated

appeal of the original decision. The judgment of the

district court denying the successive §3582(c)(2) motion

therefore is

AFFIRMED.

1-4-11

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