Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03302/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03302-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Everette Vern Guder
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL 1 u 11 United States CA>μrt <?f Appee.\ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT DEC 2 2 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

EVERETTE VERN GUDER and 

GARY RONALD GUDER, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Nos . 92-3302, 92-3303 

(D .C. Nos. 92-3161-C and 

92-3150-C) 

(D. Kansas) 

ORDER AND J1JDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(e); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 .3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-3302 Document: 010110154879 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 1 
We join these appeals because they raise identical issues. 

Both defendants appeal from orders of the district court denying 

their 21 U.S.C. § 2255 motions to vacate sentences. We affirm the 

judgments of the district court for the reasons stated in the 

memorandum and order filed in each case. 

Defendants appeal those orders contending they "speak[] in 

c ircles. " They claim that the district court erroneously 

concluded 18 U.S.C. § 2 is not a separate offense, posing the 

question: If § 2 is not a separate offense, how could they have 

been found guilty of violating its terms? The answer, of course, 

is they were not found guilty of§ 2, they were found guilty of 

the underlying substantive offense. 

As noted by the district court, § 2 does not define a crime. 

It defines a status. The statute merely eliminates the common law 

distinction between principal perpetrators and accessories. Since 

its passage, § 2 has provided that persons who actually commit an 

offense have the status of principal, and persons who aid, 

encourage, advise, command, induce, or obtain the commission of a 

crime by another also have the status of principal. As a result, 

both the perpetrator and the accessory have equal guilt in the 

eyes of the law. 

Defendants have simply misunderstood the meaning of § 2 and 

the manner in which it is charged. Their misunderstanding, 

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Appellate Case: 92-3302 Document: 010110154879 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 2 
however, is not a reason for reversing the s ound judgment of the 

district court . 

AFFIRMED . 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

John P . Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-3302 Document: 010110154879 Date Filed: 12/22/1992 Page: 3