Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03054/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03054-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Intervenor
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Robert Michael Miller
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT MICHAEL MILLER,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2015-3054

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-1221-13-0574-W-2.

______________________ 

Decided: August 6, 2015

______________________ 

ROBERT MICHAEL MILLER, Fairfax, VA, pro se.

STEPHEN FUNG, Office of the General Counsel, United 

States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC,

for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

ERIN MURDOCK-PARK, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

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2 MILLER v. MSPB

Washington, DC, for intervenor. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON 

KIDD-MILLER. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and O’MALLEY,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Robert M. Miller appeals the decision of the Merit 

System Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his individual right of action (“IRA”) appeal because Miller failed 

to allege that he made a protected disclosure under 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012), amended by Whistleblower 

Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (“WPEA”), Pub. L. 

No. 112–199, 126 Stat. 1465. Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins.

Co., 2014 M.S.P.B. 83 (2014) (“Board Decision”). We 

affirm. 

I 

A 

Miller began his employment with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) as an Economic Analyst with the San Francisco Regional Division of 

Insurance and Research on March 10, 2008. In light of 

complaints regarding comments Miller allegedly made in 

potential violation of the FDIC’s anti-harassment policy, 

the FDIC issued a Letter of Warning to Miller on May 3, 

2011. In light of the Letter of Warning, Miller filed a Step 

1 grievance, titled “Grievance of Matters Relating to 

Terms of Employment, Breach of Agreement, and Violations of Law and Policy,” in accordance with the 

FDIC/NTEU Term Collective Bargaining Agreement. In 

the Step 1 grievance, filed on May 29, 2011, Miller alleged 

a variety of errors in the investigation of his allegedly 

harassing comments, including, inter alia, that: (1) the 

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MILLER v. MSPB 3

gator; (2) he was not sufficiently notified of his rights 

under FDIC regulations; (3) the allegations lacked sufficient detail; (4) the allegations did not constitute harassment; (5) the FDIC did not conduct adequate harassment 

training; and (6) the FDIC’s harassment policy was inadequate. Miller claimed that the investigation into his 

comments, and the Letter of Warning, caused adverse 

employment actions, including, inter alia: (1) failure to 

perform a desk audit for a promotion, (2) failure to promote Miller; (3) failure to publish papers by Miller; (4) 

exclusion of Miller from opportunities for experience and 

advancement; and (5) a low performance evaluation. 

Miller requested, as one form of relief, to be a member of a 

working group to revise the FDIC’s sexual harassment 

policy, procedures, and training, due to Miller’s prior 

experience developing sexual harassment procedures for 

the United States Army and Army ROTC.1 The FDIC

denied his Step 1 grievance on July 14, 2011. 

Miller filed a Step 2 grievance on July 22, 2011, again 

alleging that the FDIC erred on multiple grounds in 

issuing the Letter of Warning. Miller reiterated his 

arguments that the FDIC lacked a sufficient antiharassment policy, necessary training for avoiding harassment, and appropriate procedures for investigations 

into complaints of harassment. Miller again requested 

the opportunity to be part of a working group to improve 

the FDIC’s harassment policy and procedures. The FDIC 

denied his Step 2 grievance on August 26, 2011, in part 

because the FDIC claimed that the Letter of Warning was 

only an informal inquiry, not a disciplinary or adverse 

action, and did not lead to charges of misconduct. Miller 

subsequently filed a Step 3 grievance on September 8, 

1 Miller also requested an expunging of his record, a 

promotion with back pay, and restoration of sick leave 

used in light of the allegations. 

 

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2011, alleging the same errors in the FDIC’s investigatory 

process and the same lack of adequate harassment policy 

or training. Miller claimed that his supervisors had taken 

further retaliatory action against him, such as decreasing 

the number of opportunities for Miller to make presentations and cancelling various proposed work details. The 

FDIC denied his Step 3 grievance. 

Miller made two separate disclosures outside of the 

formal grievance process. On May 26, 2011, Miller contacted the FDIC Internal Ombudsman with his concerns 

about FDIC procedures and policies. Miller claimed that 

the “FDIC violated the law, several United States Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission [(“EEOC”)] Compliance Guidelines, and many of its own policies and 

procedures,” and that the final decision in his case was 

“based on a faulty understanding of the law and policies.” 

Resp’t’s App’x (“R.A.”) 122. The Ombudsman referred 

Miller to an EEOC Counselor to discuss any allegations of 

discrimination. On February 7, 2012, Miller contacted 

Acting Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg regarding “FDIC 

Values, Culture Change, Merit System Principles”. R.A. 

89–92. After detailing the allegations, the grievance 

process, and his injuries, Miller contended that the investigation process was inadequate, the FDIC policies for 

handling harassment complaints were unclear, and 

members of the FDIC management lied during the investigation. Gruenberg referred Miller to his Chief of Staff, 

Barbara Ryan, but Ryan took no further action. 

B 

After completing the grievance process with no resolution, Miller filed a complaint with the Office of Special 

Counsel (“OSC”) on February 17, 2012. Miller alleged 

that the FDIC retaliated against him due to whistleblowing disclosures he made during the grievance process, 

including his statements that the FDIC procedures and 

policies regarding harassment were inadequate. In 

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MILLER v. MSPB 5

particular, Miller claimed that he informed the FDIC that 

the agency: (1) violated Supreme Court precedent regarding the required manner of conducting sexual harassment 

investigations; and (2) failed to provide anti-harassment 

policies that met the minimally-sufficient standards of 

EEOC guidances. Miller did not mention his communications with Acting Chairman Gruenberg or the Internal 

Ombudsman. Miller further alleged that the FDIC retaliated by denying his request for a desk audit, withholding 

a promotion, and denying his request to publish two 

papers. OSC informed Miller on May 15, 2012, that it 

had made a preliminary determination not to take action 

on the complaint because it could not conclude that the 

FDIC violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). OSC closed its file on 

his complaint on May 31, 2012, after Miller did not respond to the preliminary determination. 

C 

Miller appealed OSC’s decision to the Board on June 

26, 2012, asserting an IRA based on allegations made to 

OSC. In light of Congress enacting the WPEA to amend 

portions of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989

(“WPA”), Pub. L. No. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16, the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) dismissed Miller’s appeal without 

prejudice pending the Board’s resolution of Hooker v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, 2014 M.S.P.B. 15 (2014). 

Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., No. SF-1221-13-0574-W-1, 

2013 MSPB LEXIS 4543 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 27, 2013). The 

AJ stated that Miller’s appeal would be refiled sua sponte. 

Id. at *2. 

The Board issued its decision in Hooker on March 11, 

2014, holding that WPEA § 101(b)(1)(A), which expanded 

the Board’s jurisdiction over IRA appeals to include 

allegations made under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B), did not 

apply retroactively. Hooker, 2014 M.S.P.B. 15, at ¶¶ 11–

15. The Board subsequently refiled Miller’s appeal on 

March 12, 2014, and issued an order to show cause why 

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6 MILLER v. MSPB

the Board had jurisdiction over his appeal. Miller responded on April 14, 2014, explaining that he made 

disclosures protected under § 2302(b)(8) during the course 

of the grievance hearings and in his communications with 

the Internal Ombudsman and Acting Chairman Gruenberg. Miller also asserted that he made nonfrivolous 

allegations of retaliation due to the FDIC’s failure to 

perform the desk audit or promote him, and the FDIC’s 

decision to issue a below-average performance review. 

The AJ issued an Initial Decision on June 6, 2014, 

dismissing Miller’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Miller 

v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., No. SF-1221-13-0574-W-2, 2014 

MSPB Lexis 3565 (M.S.P.B. June 6, 2014). The AJ first 

addressed the disclosures to the Internal Ombudsman 

and Acting Chairman Gruenberg. Id. at *7–8. The AJ 

found that Miller did not identify these disclosures in his 

OSC complaint and did not establish that he raised these

disclosures with OSC at any time during their review. Id.

at *7. The AJ thus concluded that Miller failed to exhaust 

his remedies with the OSC regarding these disclosures. 

Id. at *8. 

As for the disclosures made during the grievance 

process, the AJ first concluded that the alleged reprisal 

for Miller’s allegations made during the grievance process 

are prohibited under § 2302(b)(9), not § 2302(b)(8). Id. at 

*8–9. The AJ also found that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the FDIC is a government corporation excluded from coverage under § 2302, except for disclosures 

made under § 2302(b)(8). Id. at *9. The AJ then analyzed 

the effect of the WPEA on the Board’s jurisdiction over 

Miller’s claims. Id. at *10–13. The AJ explained that 

retaliation for disclosures made under § 2302(b)(9)(A), as 

amended by the WPEA, would justify the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at *10–12. But, the AJ also found that the 

Board’s retroactivity analysis in Hooker should apply

equally to § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), such that the WPEA is not 

retroactive, and pre-WPEA § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) did not 

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MILLER v. MSPB 7

justify the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at *10–12. Because 

his disclosures occurred before the effective date of the 

WPEA, the AJ concluded that the amended WPA did not 

apply to Miller’s disclosures. Id. at *12–13. And finally, 

the AJ found that, even if post-WPEA § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) 

applied, the Board would not have jurisdiction because 

Miller’s disclosures did not concern “remedying an alleged 

violation of subparagraph (b)(8),” as required in 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). Id. at *14. 

Miller filed a petition for review of the AJ’s decision, 

but the Board denied the petition in a November 6, 2014, 

decision. Board Decision, at ¶¶ 13, 15. First, the Board 

declined to address the AJ’s analysis regarding exclusion 

of the FDIC from the purview of § 2302. Id. at ¶ 4 n.2. 

The Board also did not address the AJ’s conclusion that, if 

the WPEA applied to Miller’s disclosures, they would still 

not justify jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 15 n.6. The Board, however, affirmed the AJ’s conclusion that Miller failed to 

exhaust his remedies with OSC regarding the disclosures 

to the Internal Ombudsman and Acting Chairman 

Gruenberg. Id. at ¶¶ 6–10. The Board found that, even 

though Miller addressed these disclosures in his response 

to the AJ’s show cause order, he presented no evidence 

that he informed OSC of these communications. Id. at 

¶¶ 7–8. Miller claimed that he made reasonable attempts 

to inform OSC, but OSC had already decided to terminate 

the investigation regardless of any other disclosures. The 

Board concluded, however, that Miller’s new allegations of 

protected activity must be presented to OSC before the 

disclosures could justify the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at 

¶¶ 9–10.

The Board then decided that Miller’s disclosures made 

during the grievance process should be treated as allegations of prohibited personnel practices under § 2302(b)(9), 

not § 2302(b)(8), because, according to our decision in 

Serrao v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 95 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 

1996), disclosures made in the context of a grievance 

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8 MILLER v. MSPB

proceeding are treated as disclosures under § 2302(b)(9). 

Board Decision, at ¶¶ 11–12. Further, the Board concluded that, in light of Hooker, the WPEA-enabled broadening 

of the Board’s jurisdiction to include IRA’s predicated on

disclosures protected by § 2302(b)(9) did not apply retroactively. Id. at ¶ 15. The Board thus affirmed the AJ’s 

dismissal of Miller’s appeal because his allegations, 

protected only under § 2302(b)(9), did not justify Board 

jurisdiction under the pre-WPEA statute. Id. at ¶ 13.

Miller filed a timely Notice of Appeal on January 5, 

2015, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

II

The scope of our review of a Board decision is limited. 

We can set aside a Board decision only if it was: (1) “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law”; (2) “obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed”; 

or (3) “unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c). The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but is 

limited by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1). The petitioner 

has the burden of establishing the Board’s jurisdiction by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Serrao, 95 F.3d at 1573 

(citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)). The Board’s jurisdiction 

is a question of law that we review de novo. Serrao, 95 

F.3d at 1573. 

A 

An aggrieved employee can invoke the Board’s jurisdiction through filing an IRA under 5 U.S.C. § 1214. 

Under the pre-WPEA § 1214, “[a]n employee . . . may seek 

corrective action from the Board under section 1221, if 

such employee . . . seeks corrective action for a prohibited 

personnel practice described in section 2302(b)(8) from the 

Special Counsel” and meets certain procedural requirements. Id. § 1214(a)(3) (2012) amended by Whistleblower 

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MILLER v. MSPB 9

Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–

199, 126 Stat. 1465. Section 1214 thus requires an employee to first seek review from OSC before filing an IRA 

with the Board, unless the employee has “the right to 

appeal directly to the Merit Systems Protection Board.” 

Id. Pre-WPEA § 1221 similarly states that an employee 

may seek corrective action from the Board for “any personnel action taken . . . as a result of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b)(8).” Id. § 1221(a). 

Thus, prior to amendment of the WPA by the WPEA, 

Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal required that the 

personnel practice at issue be barred by 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8). That subsection provides:

(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct 

others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority— 

(8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take 

or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of— 

(A) any disclosure of information 

by an employee or applicant which 

the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences— 

(i) a violation of any law,

rule, or regulation, or

(ii) gross mismanagement, a 

gross waste of funds, an 

abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger 

to public health or safety . . 

. ; or 

(B) any disclosure to the Special 

Counsel, or to the Inspector GenCase: 15-3054 Document: 29-2 Page: 9 Filed: 08/06/2015
10 MILLER v. MSPB

eral of an agency or another employee designated by the head of 

the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the 

employee or applicant reasonably 

believes evidences— 

(i) a violation of any law, 

rule, or regulation, or

(ii) gross mismanagement, 

a gross waste of funds, an 

abuse of authority, or a 

substantial and specific 

danger to public health or 

safety

Id. § 2302. Importantly, pre-WPEA, a disclosure under 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) could not provide the basis for Board 

jurisdiction over an IRA:

(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct 

others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority— 

(9) take or fail to take, or threaten to take 

or fail to take, any personnel action 

against any employee or applicant for employment because of— 

(A) the exercise of any appeal, 

complaint, or grievance right 

granted by any law, rule, or regulation— 

(i) with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8);

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MILLER v. MSPB 11

Id. Personnel practices taken against an employee because of their exercise of grievance rights thus did not 

give rise to any IRA rights.2 

The WPEA amended Title 5 with regards to the 

Board’s jurisdiction and IRA appeals. Section 1214(a)(3) 

now expands the Board’s jurisdiction to include “if such 

employee . . . seeks corrective action for a prohibited 

personnel practice described in section 2302(b)(8) or 

section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) from the Special 

Counsel . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) (emphasis added). 

Section 1221(a) has also been expanded to include “prohibited personnel practice[s] described in . . . section 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).” The WPEA did not, 

however, amend § 2302(b)(8) or § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) as 

relevant to Miller’s appeal. Under the WPEA, in contrast 

to the WPA, an employee may file an IRA, and the Board 

will have jurisdiction over the appeal, if the prohibited 

personnel action is due to a disclosure covered by either 

§ 2302(b)(8)—i.e. retaliation for whistleblowing—or 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)—i.e. retaliation for exercising a grievance right related to whistleblowing. 

The Board found that § 101(b)(1)(A) of the WPEA, 

which amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a), 1221(a)(3), did not 

apply retroactively in light of its analysis in Hooker. 

Board Decision, at ¶ 15. Importantly, Miller does not 

challenge the Board’s retroactivity analysis. He instead 

argues that the statements he made during the grievance 

process are disclosures protected under § 2302(b)(8), not 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), under the pre-WPEA statute. Because 

2 Under Pre-WPEA § 1221(e)(1), the Board “shall 

order such corrective action as the Board considers appropriate” if the employee demonstrates that “a disclosure 

described under section 2302(b)(8) was a contributing 

factor in the personnel action which was taken or is to be 

taken against such employee.” Id. § 1221(e)(1).

 

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Miller does not challenge the Board’s retroactivity analysis, and because neither party briefed the issue, we assume for the purposes of our analysis that WPEA 

§ 101(b)(1)(A) is not retroactive, and do not comment on

the Board’s analysis below or in Hooker.3

B 

After Miller received the Letter of Warning, he made 

two sets of disclosures: (1) the statements made to the 

Internal Ombudsman and to Acting Chairman Gruenberg 

by email outside of the grievance process; and (2) the 

statements made in his Step 1–3 complaints to FDIC 

officials, and in his OSC complaint. We analyze these 

disclosures in seriatim. 

1 

In a series of emails in 2011 and 2012, Miller expressed his concerns with the FDIC’s harassment policies 

to the Internal Ombudsman and Acting Chairman 

Gruenberg. Miller contended that the FDIC’s policies and 

training for harassment complaints were inadequate, and 

that certain members of FDIC management lied during 

his investigation. As the Board recognized, Miller did not 

mention these conversations in any of his Step 1–3 grievance filings or hearings, and did not discuss the disclosures in his OSC complaint. Board Decision ¶¶ 8–9. On 

appeal, Miller does not claim that he informed OSC of 

these disclosures, but instead argues that he would have 

told OSC of these disclosures had OSC reasonably explained the exhaustion requirement. Miller also argues 

that OSC would have closed his file even if he had includ3 We also do not comment on the Board’s analysis 

in Colbert v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2014 

M.S.P.B. 80, ¶ 7 (2015) (finding that the WPEA did not 

apply retroactively to § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) or 

§ 2302(b)(9)(C)).

 

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MILLER v. MSPB 13

ed a discussion of the disclosures to the Internal Ombudsman and Acting Chairman Gruenberg, because the

OSC appeared uninterested in his complaint. The government responds that exhaustion is mandated by statute, and his status as a pro se filer does not excuse his 

failure to meet statutory requirements. The government 

also argues that OSC met its obligation to “investigate the 

allegation to the extent necessary” by reviewing Miller’s 

filings, even if it did not interview Miller. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1214(a)(1)(A). We agree with the government’s arguments.

Section 1214(a)(3) requires that an employee first 

seek corrective action from OSC before filing an IRA 

appeal with the Board. In determining if the employee 

sufficiently exhausted his remedies, we look to “the complaint to OSC requesting corrective action under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1214(a)(3), not the employee’s subsequent characterization of that statement in his appeal to the Board.” Serrao, 

95 F.3d at 1577 (citing Ward v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 981 

F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). We require that the 

employee “articulate with reasonable clarity and precision 

[before OSC] the basis for his request for corrective action 

under the WPA” to allow OSC to effectively pursue an 

investigation. Id. (quoting Ellison v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

7 F.3d 1031, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Knollenberg v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 953 F.2d 623, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1992)

(requiring the petitioner to provide OSC with, at least, a 

“sufficient basis to pursue an investigation which might 

have led to corrective action”). An employee may include 

further detail regarding his allegations before the Board, 

but a reasonably clear claim must first be made to OSC. 

Briley v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 236 F.3d 1373, 

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Board’s jurisdiction over an 

IRA appeal, assuming the employee does not have an 

independent right to appeal directly to the Board, is thus 

limited to those issues that have been previously raised 

with OSC. Ellison, 7 F.3d at 1036–37. Miller “bears the 

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14 MILLER v. MSPB

burden of showing that [he] sought corrective action from 

the OSC and that [he] exhausted [his] remedies there.” 

Briley, 236 F.3d at 1377.

Miller did not raise his communication with the Internal Ombudsman or Acting Chairman Gruenberg in his 

complaint to OSC. The statute does not require that OSC 

affirmatively inform Miller that he must include any 

disclosures made, even those made outside the grievance 

process, in his OSC complaint in order to exhaust remedies. Cf. Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 

(Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that OSC is merely required 

to ‘investigate the allegation to the extent necessary to 

determine whether there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, 

exists, or is to be taken’” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)). 

Our precedent makes clear that § 1214(a)(3) requires, at a 

minimum, that the complaint before the OSC include 

some claim, “articulate[d] with reasonable clarity and 

precision,” that identifies the basis for the employee’s 

whistleblowing allegations. Ellison, 7 F.3d at 1037. 

Miller failed to raise these two disclosures before OSC in 

any capacity, and it is mere speculation for Miller to claim 

that raising the disclosures would have been irrelevant to 

OSC’s decision to close his file. We therefore affirm the 

Board’s conclusion that Miller failed to exhaust his remedies before OSC for his disclosures to the Internal Ombudsman and Acting Chairman Gruenberg. 

2 

Miller’s other disclosures occurred during the grievance process established under the FDIC/NTEU Term 

Collective Bargaining Agreement. Similar to the disclosures made to the Internal Ombudsman and Acting 

Chairman Gruenberg, Miller claimed that the FDIC’s 

harassment policies were inadequate, and that the FDIC 

did not provide appropriate training. Miller also argued 

that these inadequate policies and trainings were a reaCase: 15-3054 Document: 29-2 Page: 14 Filed: 08/06/2015
MILLER v. MSPB 15

son why he received the Letter of Warning, which led to 

multiple adverse employment actions. The Board concluded that Miller’s disclosures made during the grievance process were disclosures under § 2302(b)(9), not 

§ 2302(b)(8), and thus did not support the Board’s jurisdiction under the pre-WPEA statute.

Miller argues on appeal that he made two types of 

disclosures during the grievance process: (1) those disclosures for which he sought personal relief, such as a promotion; and (2) those disclosures for which he sought 

correction of agency policy and procedure. Miller claims 

that, although the first set of disclosures do not justify the 

Board’s jurisdiction and are covered by § 2302(b)(9), the 

second set of disclosures can give rise to an IRA through 

§ 2302(b)(8). Miller further alleges that the content of 

these disclosures—informing FDIC officials of inadequacies in their training and guidance documents that Miller 

believes could leave the FDIC open to liability—qualifies 

as evidence of either “a violation of any law, rule, or 

regulation”, “gross mismanagement”, or an “abuse of 

authority” under § 2302(b)(8). According to Miller, because his disclosure is the type of disclosure that Congress intended § 2302(b)(8) to remedy, the Board should 

have jurisdiction. The government responds that there is 

a clear dividing line between the sorts of disclosures 

discussed under § 2302(b)(8) and § 2302(b)(9). The government argues that, even if a disclosure made during a 

grievance is the type of disclosure typically covered by 

§ 2302(b)(8), it still must be considered a § 2302(b)(9) 

disclosure when it is made during a grievance proceeding. 

Under the applicable pre-WPEA § 1214(a)(3) and 

§ 1221(a), the Board could potentially have jurisdiction 

over Miller’s disclosures if they fall within § 2302(b)(8), 

but not § 2302(b)(9). We have drawn a strict line between 

disclosures under these two provisions. We recognized 

that Congress “differentiate[d] between reprisal based on 

disclosure of information and reprisal based upon exercisCase: 15-3054 Document: 29-2 Page: 15 Filed: 08/06/2015
16 MILLER v. MSPB

ing a right to complain.” Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

978 F.2d 679, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Ellison, 7 F.3d 

at 1035 (identifying the “deliberate and substantive 

distinction established by Congress between reprisals 

based on ‘whistleblowing’ disclosures of government 

illegality, waste, and corruption . . . and reprisals based 

on exercising one’s right to complain . . .”). Reading the 

disclosures covered by § 2302(b)(8) too broadly to include 

activities under § 2302(b)(9) “would have the effect of 

reversing this carefully considered Congressional decision 

. . . render[ing] § 2302(b)(9)(A) largely irrelevant, if not 

completely superfluous.” Spruill, 978 F.2d at 691. In 

Ellison, we explained that an employee can make separate disclosures based on the “same operative facts,” with 

some made under § 2302(b)(8), and others under 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A), such that filing a grievance itself does not 

disqualify an employee from pursuing corrective action 

through an IRA. 7 F.3d at 1035. 

We explained this statutory distinction in detail in 

Serrao. In Serrao, the employee claimed that “even 

assuming his OSC complaint was based upon alleged 

section 2302(b)(9)(A) reprisal, he nevertheless presented 

section 2302(b)(8) reprisal claims.” 95 F.3d at 1575. We 

clarified that the issue before the court was “whether the 

Board has jurisdiction . . . when disclosures allegedly 

protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) are made solely in 

the course of exercising agency grievance rights and are 

never presented outside that context.” Id. at 1576. We 

agreed with the Board’s conclusion that “only disclosures 

made outside grievance procedures or discrimination 

complaint procedures could serve as the basis for Board 

jurisdiction over an IRA appeal.” Id.; see also Smart v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 211 F. App’x 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 

2007) (“Our cases have squarely held that disclosures 

made solely during grievance proceedings, and not separately disclosed to the agency, cannot form the basis for a 

whistleblowing claim.”). We concluded that allowing an 

Case: 15-3054 Document: 29-2 Page: 16 Filed: 08/06/2015
MILLER v. MSPB 17

employee to meet the jurisdictional requirements for an 

IRA by placing § 2302(b)(8) allegations into a grievance 

proceeding would “undercut Spruill” and “blur” the distinction made by Congress between the types of disclosures covered in these subsections of § 2302. Serrao, 95 

F.3d at 1576.

Miller presents the same question as in Serrao: does 

the Board have jurisdiction over disclosures allegedly 

protected under § 2302(b)(8) when those disclosures are 

made solely during a grievance proceeding? In light of 

Serrao, we conclude that the disclosures Miller made 

during his grievance proceeding are protected under 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), not § 2302(b)(8). Miller admits that he 

made the allegations about inadequate FDIC policies and 

proceedings as part of his grievance process. Even though 

he initiated the grievance proceedings because of the 

Letter of Warning, Miller alleges that some of the personnel actions taken against him were because of his continued desire to seek relief through the grievance process, 

including, presumably, his disclosures about FDIC policies and practices. The Board therefore properly concluded that Miller’s disclosures were protected under 

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), and applying the pre-WPEA statute, 

did not err in dismissing Miller’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Because the Board did not err in dismissing Miller’s 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we affirm the Board’s 

decision.

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-3054 Document: 29-2 Page: 17 Filed: 08/06/2015