Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01179/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01179-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tonya Evans
Appellee
Marlia Mattke
Appellee
Vanessa Robertson
Appellant
Wisconsin Department of Health Services
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1179 

VANESSA ROBERTSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH SERVICES, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 2:18-cv-00116-JPS — J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 7, 2020 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Vanessa Robertson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the State of Wisconsin’s Department of Health Services (“DHS”). In her 

complaint, Ms. Robertson set forth claims under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation for complaining of discrimination in the 

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2 No. 19-1179 

workplace. She named as defendants DHS and two DHS 

employees, Marlia Mattke and Tonya Evans.1

 

The defendants moved for summary judgment. In her 

opposition to that motion, Ms. Robertson did not defend her 

equal protection claim, and the district court deemed that 

claim abandoned and dismissed it.2 The district court dismissed the Title VII claims against Ms. Evans and 

Ms. Mattke because Title VII authorizes suit only against an 

employer as an entity, not against individuals.3 

The district court then granted the summary judgment 

motion. It first held that Ms. Robertson’s retaliation claim 

against DHS for failing to promote her to the director position failed because she could not prove a “but-for” causal 

link between her protected activity—reporting discrimination—and DHS’s decision not to promote her. With respect 

to her second retaliation claim, alleging that DHS continued 

1 The district court’s jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). 

2 See Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding claim 

abandoned where party failed to defend it “in his district court brief in 

opposition to summary judgment” and failed to raise it in his appellate 

brief). In any event, an equal protection claim, if based on the same allegations underlying Ms. Robertson’s Title VII claim, would not be tenable 

here. “[T]he right to be free from retaliation may be vindicated under the 

First Amendment or Title VII, but not the equal protection clause.” Boyd 

v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2004). 

3 See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012), overruled on other 

grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Title 

VII ... authorizes suit only against the employer as an entity rather than 

against individual people who are agents of the employer.”). 

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No. 19-1179 3

the retaliation against her through Ms. Evans, the court held 

that Ms. Robertson had failed to establish that she suffered 

an adverse action. Accordingly, the district court granted the 

defendants’ motion and dismissed all claims. Ms. Robertson 

filed a timely notice of appeal.4

 She seeks reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

We now affirm the district court’s judgment. With respect to her failure-to-promote claim, DHS provided a nonretaliatory reason for choosing another candidate, and 

Ms. Robertson has failed to submit evidence that DHS’s reason is pretextual. With respect to her claim alleging that 

DHS continued the retaliation through Ms. Evans, 

Ms. Robertson has failed to show that she suffered a materially adverse action. 

I. 

BACKGROUND

In October 2009, Ms. Robertson became the deputy director of Milwaukee Enrollment Services (“MilES”), a bureau 

within DHS. Employees of MilES are responsible for determining eligibility for medical assistance, FoodShare, child 

care, and caretaker supplement entitlements for Milwaukee 

4 Our jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ms. Robertson appealed the entirety of the district court’s summary judgment decision. 

The caption of her brief includes Ms. Mattke and Ms. Evans as “Defendants-Appellees,” but DHS contends that her “Statement of the Issues” 

confirms that she has abandoned all claims against these individual employees. Ms. Robertson does not respond to this point in her reply brief, 

nor does she raise any arguments with respect to the individual employees. We therefore conclude that DHS is the only appellee in this appeal. 

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residents. As deputy director, Ms. Robertson directly supervised ten to twenty employees and indirectly supervised 

about 350 others. 

In January 2014, an employee approached a section chief, 

Juanita Brown-Small, and reported that the MilES bureau 

director, Ed Kamin, had told her that he was going to “pimp 

her out” to another agency.5

 Ms. Brown-Small reported this 

complaint to Ms. Robertson, and the two then informed the 

human resources department. An investigation took place 

and concluded that Kamin had engaged in discriminatory 

conduct. In April 2014, he resigned in lieu of termination. 

Deputy administrator of DHS, Marlia Mattke, and assistant 

deputy secretary of DHS, Kevin Moore, met with 

Ms. Robertson and the section chiefs to inform them about 

the resignation. At that time, Ms. Robertson and the section 

chiefs said that they feared retaliation from management in 

Madison (DHS headquarters) because Kamin had boasted 

about his connections there. 

After Kamin’s removal, DHS officials designated 

Ms. Robertson acting director of MilES and tasked her with 

running the day-to-day operations. She reported to 

Ms. Mattke, who worked in Madison. The operation ran 

smoothly under Ms. Robertson’s leadership. 

In September 2014, DHS conducted open recruitment for 

a new MilES director. It received fifty-seven applications, 

including Ms. Robertson’s. After screening the resumes and 

conducting some interviews, DHS narrowed the field to 

three applicants: Ms. Robertson, Danyel McNeil (another 

5 R.31 at 4. 

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No. 19-1179 5

MilES employee), and Ms. Evans (not a MilES employee). 

Ms. Mattke and Mr. Moore conducted the interviews. 

During the second round of interviews, both Ms. Robertson and Ms. McNeil, as current MilES employees, were 

asked how they would move the agency forward, given 

Kamin’s resignation. The interviewers did not pose the question to Ms. Evans. Neither Mr. Moore nor Ms. Mattke maintained notes during the second round of interviews. 

Mr. Moore recalled, however, that Ms. Robertson had discussed the importance of bridging the gap between Madison 

and Milwaukee, a very important issue for MilES. Additionally, Ms. Robertson, unlike Ms. Evans, had income-maintenance experience, which was important to the 

work at MilES. Mr. Moore had no concerns about 

Ms. Robertson’s candidacy after her interview. However, he 

was concerned about Ms. Evans’s lack of income-maintenance experience and lack of experience working with the State of Wisconsin. He did not consider either of 

these concerns to be barriers to Ms. Evans’s success.6

6 Q. Were there any negatives or concerns you had about 

Ms. Evans? 

A. I would say that there were two. That she had never 

done an income maintenance case and that she was not 

from within state government. The former was one that I 

figured, I was assuming that if that was—if we went 

down that path, that she would be able to learn the income maintenance process. And on the latter side, I assumed that she wanted to become—she applied for a 

state government position and that she wanted to for a 

number of reasons, personally, professionally, whatever 

it might be, that she viewed this as a move that would be 

a positive for her. 

(continued ... ) 

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Ms. Mattke testified, however, that she and Mr. Moore were 

impressed with Ms. Evans because of her strategic plan for 

MilES. Ms. Robertson and Ms. Evans had both led social services agencies, directed policy, managed supervisory-level 

employees, and headed organizations of over 150 employees. Ms. Robertson had five years of experience working for 

MilES. Ms. Evans had a master’s degree in administration. 

DHS hired Ms. Evans. 

For purposes of summary judgment, we must assume the 

correctness of Ms. Robertson’s allegation that Ms. Evans, 

once chosen as director, antagonized, insulted, and undermined Ms. Robertson. According to Ms. Robertson, in her 

first meeting with Ms. Evans and Ms. Brown-Small, Ms. Evans commented that she “knew all about the last director 

leaving” and made references to the “prior director being 

forced to resign from his position.”7

 Ms. Robertson understood these comments as a declaration by Ms. Evans that she 

would not be forced out as Kamin had been. At later meetings, Ms. Evans sat with her back to Ms. Robertson. Ms. Evans also made statements during meetings that implied 

Ms. Robertson had been doing things incorrectly while acting as interim director. When Ms. Robertson spoke at meet-

( ... continued) 

R.12 at 19 (Moore Dep. 73:14–74:1). 

7 R.31 at 18. 

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No. 19-1179 7

ings, Ms. Evans would roll her eyes8

 and tell Ms. Robertson 

to “be quiet.”9 

In Ms. Robertson’s reply brief, she recounts that MilES 

hosted public meetings which were “a part of a class action 

settlement.”10 At these meetings, MilES staff, including 

Ms. Robertson, presented information detailing the agency’s 

compliance with certain benchmarks established in the settlement of the lawsuit. Ms. Evans would talk over Ms. Robertson and show disrespect toward her at these meetings. 

Eventually, Ms. Robertson stopped attending. 

Ms. Evans also revoked one of Ms. Robertson’s job duties, resource allocation. According to Ms. Robertson, resource allocation was a key element of her job. To support 

this assertion, she points to Ms. McNeil’s testimony that 

“making timely changes to resource allocation was an area 

in which Ms. Robertson excelled ... due to her extensive 

knowledge of income maintenance and her extensive 

knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the staff.”11

As the direct manager of the section chiefs, 

Ms. Robertson had to meet regularly with them. However, 

Ms. Evans discouraged section chiefs from meeting with 

8 R.24 at 4 (Thomson Decl. ¶ 17). 

9 R.28 at 6 (Brown-Small Decl. ¶ 22); R.25 at 6 (McNeil Decl. ¶ 25). 

10 Appellant’s Reply Br. 3–4. 

11 Appellant’s Reply Br. 5 (alteration in original) (quoting R.25 at 5 

(McNeil Decl. ¶ 21)). 

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Ms. Robertson and eventually demanded to be present any 

time a section chief met with Ms. Robertson. 

Dana Thomson, a unit chief at MilES, testified that 

Ms. Evans treated Ms. Robertson worse than she treated two 

section chiefs, Mike Poma and Jerry Turner, who had not 

participated in the Kamin investigation. Ms. Thomson noted, 

for instance, that when Mr. Poma fell asleep during a meeting, Ms. Evans did not reprimand him. 

On February 20, 2015, Ms. Robertson emailed Ms. Mattke 

and Mr. Moore to request a meeting to discuss her “unhealthy” work environment.12 Specifically, Ms. Robertson 

explained that she believed her “authority as a Deputy Director has been diminished over the last few months.”13 

Ms. Mattke responded to the meeting request by offering 

a date and time but also stated that Ms. Evans would have to 

be present. Ms. Robertson responded that she did not want 

Ms. Evans included in the meeting. When Ms. Mattke asked 

why, Ms. Robertson responded that she was not comfortable 

discussing her concerns in Ms. Evans’s presence. One hour 

later, Ms. Evans emailed the entire MilES staff and directed 

them to speak with a direct supervisor before contacting 

human resources. Ms. Evans justified this step as necessary 

because of the “great demands” being placed on human resources.

14 This policy change would have required 

Ms. Robertson to address her concerns to Ms. Evans before 

12 R.29-2 at 2. 

13 Id. 

14 R.18-1 at 1. 

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No. 19-1179 9

speaking to human resources. Jennifer Potts, who worked in 

human resources at MilES, believed that the policy could 

have had a chilling effect on employees who wanted to 

speak with human resources—especially if the employee’s 

problem related to her manager.15 Mr. Moore and 

Ms. Mattke also testified that they were concerned that such 

a policy would silence people and create a hostile working 

environment.16

Ms. Brown-Small and Ms. Thomson both stated that 

Ms. Evans created an environment worse than the one that 

had existed under Kamin’s management. Ms. McNeil resigned from MilES in October 2016, and Ms. Thomson resigned from MilES in February 2017 due to Ms. Evans’s harassment. 

II. 

DISCUSSION 

A.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Robertson, the non-moving party. Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 694 (7th 

Cir. 2017). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the 

grant of summary judgment only when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party 

15 R.27 at 2 (Potts Decl. ¶ 10). 

16 R.12 at 13 (Moore Dep. 50:13–23); see R.13 at 9 (Mattke Dep. 33:11–23). 

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needs more than a scintilla of evidence, however, to defeat 

summary judgment. ... [T]he non-movant must show ‘that a 

discriminatory reason more likely motivated [the employer’s] 

decision or that [its] proffered explanations are unworthy of 

credence.’” Senner v. Northcentral Tech. Coll., 113 F.3d 750, 

757–58 (7th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir. 1994)). 

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating 

against employees on the basis of race and sex, among other 

protected classifications. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII’s 

anti-retaliation provision provides that it is unlawful for an 

employer to discriminate against its employee because the 

employee filed a complaint or participated in an investigation of an unlawful employment practice. See id. § 2000e-3(a). 

This provision “seeks to prevent employer interference with 

‘unfettered access’ to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms ... by 

prohibiting employer actions that are likely ‘to deter victims 

of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,’ the courts, 

and employers.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 

548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 

U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 

To succeed on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff 

“must produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the [employer] took a materially adverse action 

against her; and (3) there existed a but-for causal connection 

between the two.” Burton, 851 F.3d at 695; Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). 

When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, an employer may produce evidence which, if taken as 

true, would permit the conclusion that it had a legitimate 

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No. 19-1179 11

non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action. See Lord, 839 F.3d at 564. If the employer meets 

this burden, the plaintiff, to avoid summary judgment, then 

must produce evidence that would permit a trier of fact to 

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. Argyropoulos v. 

City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 736 (7th Cir. 2008). In determining 

whether the employer’s reason can be characterized as pretextual, we do not evaluate whether the employer’s proffered justification was accurate or even whether it was unfair. Our sole focus is on whether the employer’s stated reason can be characterized as a falsehood rather than an honestly held belief. Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 

311 (7th Cir. 2012); O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 

625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). 

B. 

1.

Ms. Robertson claims that DHS retaliated against her in 

violation of Title VII when it did not select her for the director position. Rejection of her candidacy was, she maintains, 

in retaliation for her having complained about Kamin’s discriminatory activities in the workplace. The district court did 

not accept this contention; in its view, Ms. Robertson failed 

to demonstrate that the rejection of her application was 

caused by her participation in the Kamin investigation. According to the district court, 

[w]ith respect to the failure-to-promote claim, 

the defendants agree that Robertson engaged 

in statutorily protected activity by reporting 

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12 No. 19-1179 

Kamin’s discriminatory conduct and that Robertson suffered an actionable adverse action by 

not being chosen for the director position. 

Therefore, the only element in dispute is 

whether Robertson’s complaint about Kamin 

was the but-for cause of DHS’s decision not to 

promote her to director.17

The district court then determined that Ms. Robertson 

had not submitted evidence to establish that her complaint 

about Kamin’s activity had caused the rejection of her application. After examination of the record, we must agree with 

the district court’s conclusion that Ms. Robertson does not 

have direct evidence establishing causation. She therefore 

“must rely on circumstantial evidence like suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, treatment of similarly-situated 

employees, and any other relevant information that could 

permit an inference of retaliation.” Burton, 851 F.3d at 697. 

The “dispositive question” is “whether a reasonable 

[fact-finder] could find a but-for causal link between the protected activities and adverse actions at issue.” Id. 

Ms. Robertson attempts to shoulder the burden of establishing causation by arguing that she was “objectively the 

most qualified candidate,”18 and that DHS’s failure to recognize this reality in its decisionmaking is therefore powerful 

circumstantial evidence that her participation in the Kamin 

investigation was the cause of her non-selection. She stresses 

that she alone had experience in the area of income mainte17 R.34 at 9 (internal citation omitted). 

18 Appellant’s Br. 31. 

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No. 19-1179 13

nance. The successful candidate, Ms. Evans, had no experience in this area and could only offer superior educational 

qualifications, which were not a necessary qualification for 

the job. Ms. Robertson, who had experience working for the 

State, also contends that Ms. Evans’s lack of experience 

working for the State caused concern for at least one of the 

decisionmakers.19 Ms. Robertson also noted that, unlike 

Ms. Evans, she had experience managing a large organization.20

Ms. Robertson admits that Mr. Moore and Ms. Mattke 

explained that they were “looking for a candidate with a vision and an ability to lead” and who could improve the office’s communication with the operation in Madison.21 She 

19 R.12 at 19 (Moore Dep. 73:14–74:1). 

20 Ms. Robertson had five years’ experience supervising the entire MilES 

staff of over 300 employees. Ms. Evans had only two years’ experience 

supervising a staff of 156 employees. Ms. Robertson contends that a jury 

could conclude that she had “superior qualifications in managing large 

organizations.” Appellant’s Br. 34. 

21 Appellant’s Br. 35. 

Q. What were you looking for in a bureau director? 

A. I was looking for a leader who could manage internally and externally a very highly visible portion of our 

business, of our programs. 

Q. And how were you intending to be able to assess this 

from the potential candidates? 

A. How the respondents, how they answered questions, 

what their vision was, how they are—just the discussion 

in my mind was important to know because of the exposure of this position that, you know, I was looking for 

(continued ... ) 

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submits that she had the right to argue to a jury that, because 

of her participation in the Kamin investigation, the selection 

committee considered her to be “less cooperative with management in Madison, ... less trustworthy, or as hav[ing] less 

of a vision going forward.”22 She suggests that, in making 

the determination, the decisionmakers might have relied on 

evidence that Kamin had friends in the Madison office—

friends who would be hostile to her. Finally, she suggests 

that Kamin had a close relationship with the decisionmakers 

that influenced the decision not to appoint her because of 

( ... continued) 

a—somebody who could really kind of take MilES and 

move it forward. 

Q. Any particular skill set or experience you were looking for? 

A. I was looking for interpersonal skills. I was looking 

for just general, you know, understanding of challenging 

situations. Leadership. 

R.12 at 16 (Moore Dep. 64:6–22). 

Q. Did you have any concern that she didn’t have any 

income maintenance experience? 

A. I didn’t. 

Q. And why not? 

A. Because we felt like with this position, the key is having a really good leader, and income maintenance is 

something the staff can support and you can learn from 

staff, but the leadership skills were most important. 

R.13 at 20 (Mattke Dep. 77:6–14). 

22 Id.

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her role in the investigation. She also notes that the decisionmakers asked only the candidates who had participated 

in the investigation whether they could function as director 

in the aftermath of the investigation.23 

Ms. Robertson believes that this evidence establishes a 

causal connection between her participation in the Kamin 

investigation and her non-selection for the director position. 

However, because DHS presented a non-retaliatory reason 

for the adverse action, the controlling question at the bottom 

of this case is “whether the proffered reasons were pretext 

for retaliation.” Burton, 851 F.3d at 697. DHS’s 

non-retaliatory reason for hiring Ms. Evans over 

Ms. Robertson is that Ms. Evans was the better overall candidate. Ms. Robertson must therefore show that the record 

would support a determination that this reason was pretextual. “In determining whether an employer’s stated reason is pretextual, ‘[t]he question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the 

employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the discharge.’” Harper, 687 F.3d at 311 (alteration in 

original) (quoting O’Leary, 657 F.3d at 635). To meet this 

burden, Ms. Robertson therefore “‘must identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions’” 

in DHS’s stated reason that would permit a reasonable person to conclude that the stated reason was “‘unworthy of 

credence.’” Id. (quoting Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 

489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

23 Id. at 38–39. 

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The record shows that both candidates presented attractive qualifications. Ms. Robertson had diverse experience 

and, importantly, had extensive experience working in income maintenance. Ms. Robertson also had supervised directly employees and large staffs for years. She did not have, 

however, a college education. Ms. Evans, on the other hand, 

had slightly more diverse experience. She, like Ms. Robertson, had leadership experience and had supervised directly 

employees. Head Start hired Ms. Evans when it was in noncompliant status. When she left, it was fully compliant. 

Ms. Evans had a master’s degree in administration. However, she did not have prior experience in income maintenance. 

Mr. Moore and Ms. Mattke explained that they were 

looking for a candidate with a vision and the ability to lead. 

Mr. Moore was also hoping to find an individual who could 

improve the communication between Madison and Milwaukee. He admitted that Ms. Robertson successfully addressed 

this concern in her interview. During the second interview, 

however, the interviewers asked Ms. Evans and 

Ms. Robertson to complete a writing sample that involved 

interpreting a policy. According to Ms. Mattke, 

Ms. Robertson did not offer big picture ideas or a strategic 

vision for MilES. Instead, Ms. Robertson discussed continuing the good work MilES was already doing. Ms. Mattke 

consequently believed that Ms. Robertson would be better at 

running day-to-day activities rather than developing leadership and strategic vision. Ms. Evans, by contrast, discussed 

her prior experience leading an organization under federal 

scrutiny and the decision that she made to bring her team 

together and move forward. 

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Ms. Robertson contends that to determine why DHS 

chose to hire Ms. Evans over Ms. Robertson requires an examination of DHS’s intent and credibility, factors “which 

must go to a jury unless ‘no rational factfinder could draw 

the contrary inference.’”24 She attempts to establish pretext 

by contending that: (1) she was objectively the most qualified candidate; (2) a jury could conclude that DHS’s subjective desire to select a candidate with “vision” was pretext for 

choosing someone other than Ms. Robertson; and (3) the interview process was biased because Mr. Moore “admits to 

having worked closely with Director Kamin” and 

Ms. Mattke “shared with Director Kamin pictures of her new 

baby while she was on leave.”25

Ms. Robertson’s contention that she was better qualified 

cannot carry the day for her. An employee’s “own opinions 

about [her] ... qualifications [do not] give rise to a material 

factual dispute.” Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 

1996). “‘[U]nless [the competing qualifications] are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was 

clearly better qualified for the position at issue,’” the plaintiff’s qualifications alone do not establish evidence of pretext. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir. 2002) 

(emphasis added) (quoting Deines v. Texas Dep’t of Protective 

and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999)). 

24 Appellant’s Br. 31 (quoting Darchak v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., 580 

F.3d 622, 633 (7th Cir. 2009)). 

25 Appellant’s Br. 36–37. 

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18 No. 19-1179 

Nor, on these facts, does timing establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Roughly seven months passed after 

Ms. Robertson reported Kamin’s conduct before DHS hired 

Ms. Evans as the new director. See Burton, 851 F.3d at 698 

(“While the six-month gap does not preclude Burton’s claim 

as a matter of law, it does substantially weaken it.”). Additionally, during the time between Ms. Robertson’s complaint 

and the alleged retaliation, DHS gave Ms. Robertson the role 

of interim director, and she was selected as a final-round interviewee for the permanent director position. As the district 

court noted, “[t]his evidence flies in the face of Robertson’s 

theory ... .”26

In short, Ms. Robertson has failed to “identify such 

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in DHS’s stated reason for hiring Ms. Evans over her 

“that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.” Harper, 687 F.3d at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 792). See Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 

736 (In “assessing a plaintiff’s claim that an employer’s explanation is pretextual, we do not ... ‘second-guess[] an employer’s facially legitimate business decision[].’”) (quoting 

Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

DHS was therefore entitled to summary judgment because there is no material issue of fact as to whether its reason for not hiring Ms. Robertson is pretext for retaliation.

Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640–41 (7th Cir. 

2008) (stating that “‘[a] genuine issue of material fact arises 

only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party ex26 R.34 at 14. 

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No. 19-1179 19

ists to permit a jury to return a verdict for that party’”) 

(quoting Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 

2008)). 

2. 

Ms. Robertson also submits that DHS violated Title VII 

by retaliating against her through the actions of its new director, Ms. Evans. She claims that Ms. Evans treated her 

poorly and created a hostile workplace. She submits that, 

shortly after hiring her, DHS higher management informed 

Ms. Evans about Ms. Robertson’s involvement in the Kamin 

investigation and that Ms. Evans thereafter continued management’s retaliation. 

The district court determined that Ms. Robertson failed to 

show that Ms. Evans’s actions amounted to a materially adverse action against her. To succeed on this claim, 

Ms. Robertson must show that Ms. Evans’s actions would 

have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee, such 

that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from 

making or supporting an investigation of discrimination. 

Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57. Although the challenged actions 

need not be employment-related, id. at 67, our previous cases 

indicate that challenged actions involving the reassignment 

of job responsibilities are typically not materially adverse 

unless there is a “significant alteration to the employee’s duties, which is often reflected by a corresponding change in 

work hours, compensation, or career prospects.” Stephens v. 

Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 791 (7th Cir. 2009). We judge each case 

“from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

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20 No. 19-1179 

(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 

81 (1998)). 

First, Ms. Robertson contends that a reasonable jury 

could find that Ms. Evans was made aware of the details of 

the Kamin investigation because Ms. Evans said to 

Ms. Brown-Small, “So you are the one who made the report 

about Mr. Kamin.”27 Ms. Robertson alleges that various retaliatory actions of Ms. Evans purportedly established a materially changed work environment. For example, she cites as 

evidence Ms. Evans’s body language, “cold shoulder,”28 and 

statements such as “be quiet” and, “[I] need[] to clean up the 

poor morale Ms. Robertson created by Mr. Kamin’s forced 

resignation.”29 

Under the rules governing summary judgment, we must 

assume that Ms. Evans did and said everything that 

Ms. Robertson attributes to her. Ms. Robertson nevertheless 

fails to show that she suffered a materially adverse action in 

the workplace. “‘[S]nubbing by supervisors and coworkers’” is not actionable. Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban 

Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Burlington 

N., 548 U.S. at 68). Similarly, “[u]nfair reprimands or negative performance reviews, unaccompanied by tangible job 

consequences, do not suffice ... .” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 

919 (7th Cir. 2016). In other words, “Title VII protects against 

discrimination, not ‘personal animosity or juvenile behav27 R.28 at 5 (Brown-Small Decl. ¶ 18). 

28 Appellant’s Br. 8. 

29 Id. at 20–21. 

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No. 19-1179 21

ior.’” Brown, 700 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, 

Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2005)).30 

The district court is correct that Brown is instructive. 

There, two employees sued their employer alleging racial 

discrimination. The employees were not formally disciplined, terminated, or denied pay or benefits, but they alleged that their employer did not listen to them, gave them a 

“cold shoulder,” and wrongly accused them of being “cry 

bab[ies]” and “trouble maker[s].” Id. at 1107 (alteration in 

original). We held that this behavior did not constitute “a 

30 In 2016, several employees complained to Ms. Mattke that 

Ms. Robertson had acted in an unprofessional manner. Following standard practice, DHS initiated a personnel investigation which was conducted by investigators from the Department of Administration’s Division of Personnel Management. These investigators had not previously 

been involved in any MilES investigations. They interviewed twenty current and former MilES employees, including Ms. Robertson and four 

individuals with whom she requested they speak. See R.17 at 6 (Mattke 

Decl. ¶¶ 21–22); R.15 at 29 (Robertson Dep. 113:10–19). 

The investigators determined that Ms. Robertson had violated two 

DHS work rules by engaging in acts of mismanagement and unprofessional and disrespectful behaviors. As a result of the investigation, 

Ms. Robertson was demoted and her salary decreased by $2.80 per hour. 

Id. at 6–7 (Mattke Decl. ¶ 24); R.15 at 35 (Robertson Dep. 138:6). Although 

Ms. Robertson “believe[s] the complaint was fabricated as part of retaliation and [she] was demoted [as a result],” she admits that she does not 

know whether Ms. Evans had any control over the demotion. R.15 at 35 

(Robertson Dep. 137:17–138:1). 

Ms. Robertson’s conclusory statement that the complaint filed 

against her was “fabricated” lacks sufficient elaboration and evidence. 

Moreover, Ms. Robertson herself concedes that her demotion is not relevant in this litigation. R.20 at 18–19 ¶ 81; R.23 at 13 ¶ 81. 

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22 No. 19-1179 

materially adverse employment action.” Id. The behavior 

easily fell into the “non-actionable category”—even assuming that the comments referred to the plaintiffs’ discrimination complaints. Id. See, e.g., Dunn v. Washington Cty. Hosp., 

429 F.3d 689, 690–93 (7th Cir. 2005) (nurse complained that a 

doctor sexually harassed her, and doctor responded by asking the nurse to withdraw her complaint in a “nasty and uncivil tone” and told her that “paybacks are hell” but took no 

other action and therefore did not cause any actionable injury); see also Stephens, 569 F.3d at 790 (“[B]eing stared and 

yelled at ... is not an actionable harm.”). 

Assessed against these precedents, Ms. Evans’s behavior 

cannot be characterized as materially adverse—causing “a 

significant or substantial change”—to her job responsibilities. Stephens, 569 F.3d at 790. Although Ms. Robertson alleges that Ms. Evans prevented Ms. Robertson from “doing a 

key element of her job, which was human resource allocation for the approximately 350 staff members,”31 she gives no 

more detail in her brief than this as to what “resource allocation” entails. Nor does she discuss “resource allocation” in 

her deposition. Ms. Robertson appears to have first contended that “resource allocation” was a “key element of her job” 

in her brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.32

The other changes to Ms. Robertson’s job, as developed 

in the record, do not rise to the level of “materially adverse” 

either. First, Ms. Robertson provides testimony of an attor31 Appellant’s Br. 21. 

32 R.21 at 15. 

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No. 19-1179 23

ney who attended the public meetings who observed that 

Ms. Robertson was not allowed to freely communicate with 

the public as she had always done in the past.33 Instead, 

Ms. Evans spoke over Ms. Robertson and advised her not to 

answer community member questions. As a result, 

Ms. Robertson stopped going to community meetings. Second, Ms. Robertson alleges that Ms. Evans interfered with 

Ms. Robertson’s ability to have meetings with the employees 

she supervised. Ms. Brown-Small testified that if she met 

with Ms. Robertson, Ms. Evans would say, “How can you be 

doing your job if you are meeting with Vanessa?”34 Because 

of these interruptions, Ms. McNeil testified, “the continuation of any meeting [with Ms. Robertson was made] pointless.”35 

Ms. Robertson, however, does not provide evidence that 

these meetings were a job responsibility of hers. With respect 

to Ms. Robertson’s meetings with the section chiefs she directly supervised, the record indicates that Ms. Evans “discouraged” the weekly meetings and that as a result the meetings occurred “more on a monthly basis.”36 The record fails 

to establish that these meetings were a job responsibility, or 

that they needed to occur on a weekly basis. With respect to 

the community meetings, Ms. Robertson established that 

MilES staff presented at these meetings and that she was “an 

33 R.26 at 2–4 (DeLessio Decl. ¶¶ 6–7, 12, 14). 

34 R.28 at 8 (Brown-Small Decl. ¶ 27). 

35 R.25 at 6–7 (McNeil Decl. ¶ 32). 

36 R.28 at 8 (Brown-Small Decl. ¶ 28). 

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24 No. 19-1179 

excellent resource at these meetings,” but she does not establish that speaking at these meetings was a job responsibility 

of hers.37 Ms. Brown-Small observed that, because 

“Ms. Robertson had always been an active participant in 

these meetings,” it was “very embarrassing for 

Ms. Robertson” when Ms. Evans told Ms. Robertson not to 

speak at the meetings.38 Being an “active participant” in and 

an “excellent resource” at an activity, however, is not synonymous with that activity being a job responsibility. The district court correctly held that “there [was] no evidence that 

the loss of this particular duty was a ‘significant or substantial change’ to her responsibilities such that it was materially 

adverse.”39

Even if these job functions do constitute job responsibilities, Ms. Robertson does not show that Ms. Evans’s interference with them was materially adverse. “Whether a change 

in job responsibilities is materially adverse ‘all depends on 

how much of a change, and how disadvantageous a change, 

took place.’” Stephens, 569 F.3d at 791 (quoting Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2003)). A reassignment of job duties is not “materially adverse” unless it is 

a “significant” change that is “often reflected by a corresponding change in work hours, compensation, or career 

prospects.” Id. Ms. Robertson does not provide any details 

about her former resource allocation duties, nor does she al37 R.26 at 2–3 (DeLessio Decl. ¶¶ 6–7). 

38 R.28 at 8 (Brown-Small Decl. ¶ 29). 

39 R.34 at 17 (quoting Stephens, 569 F.3d at 790). 

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No. 19-1179 25

lege that any of the ways in which Ms. Evans interfered with 

her ability to hold meetings resulted in a “corresponding 

change in work hours, compensation, or career prospects.” 

Stephens, 569 F.3d at 791. 

As the district court stated, “[w]ithout having produced 

sufficient evidence that she suffered an adverse action, Robertson’s retaliation claim [alleging that DHS continued its 

retaliation through the actions of Ms. Evans] cannot proceed 

to trial.”40 We cannot conclude from the record that a reasonable person in Ms. Robertson’s situation would have 

been dissuaded from participating in an investigation of discrimination. The district court was correct in granting DHS 

summary judgment on this issue. 

Conclusion 

The district court correctly granted summary judgment. 

With respect to her failure-to-promote claim, DHS provided 

a non-retaliatory reason for hiring Ms. Evans (she was the 

better candidate), and Ms. Robertson failed to show that 

there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether that 

proffered reason was pretext. With respect to her claim that 

DHS continued its retaliation through Ms. Evans, Ms. Robertson also failed to produce sufficient evidence that she suffered a materially adverse action. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED 

40 R.34 at 18. 

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