Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03267/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03267-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Emmanuel Rodriguez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3267

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Emmanuel Rodriguez, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 12, 2007

Filed: May 7, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Following Emmanuel Rodriguez’s (Rodriguez) conviction for conspiracy to

distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, the district court1

 sentenced Rodriguez to 360

months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Rodriguez appeals. We

affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Rodriguez and his brother, Yone Rodriguez (Yone), were the focus of a threeyear collaborative investigation among several law enforcement agencies based on

intelligence indicating the brothers led a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy in

southwest Missouri. Authorities arrested Rodriguez on December 16, 2003, upon his

arrival at the Tulsa, Oklahoma, airport to pick up Jacquelyn Witt (Witt), a courier who

transported methamphetamine for the conspiracy. Witt was cooperating with law

enforcement after having been arrested earlier that day at the same location in

possession of approximately one kilogram of methamphetamine.

Based on information provided by Witt, a reliable confidential informant (CI),

and other conspiracy members, as well as from intelligence reports concerning

Rodriguez and Yone, Jasper County (Missouri) Drug Task Force Detective Randee

Kaiser (Detective Kaiser) applied for a search warrant for a residence believed to be

owned and occupied by Rodriguez and Yone. The warrant, issued and executed on

December 16, 2003, authorized a search of property located at 5165 County Lane 50

in Reeds, Jasper County, Missouri (Reeds residence). Upon executing the search

warrant, officers found numerous documents bearing the names of Rodriguez and

Yone, three firearms, ammunition, digital scales, and other items associated with

distribution of controlled substances. 

On December 19, 2003, Detective Frank Lundien (Detective Lundien),

supervisor of the Jasper County Drug Task Force, applied for a second search warrant

for property located at 3411 South Pearl Street in Joplin, Newton County, Missouri

(Joplin residence), which officers believed to be owned by Rodriguez and Lisa

Bateman (Bateman), Rodriguez’s girlfriend. As the agent responsible for coordinating

the investigation of Rodriguez and Yone, Detective Kaiser knew the facts contained

in Detective Lundien’s affidavit and search warrant application and discussed those

facts with other members of the Jasper County Drug Task Force before execution of

the warrant. A search of the Joplin residence on December 19 revealed several

receipts for purchases and wire transfers by Rodriguez; a bond receipt dated

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The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable James

C. England, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

3

The district court admitted, over Rodriguez’s objection, receipts detailing a

$3,200 tire purchase and a $430 security system purchase for Rodriguez’s Lincoln

Navigator, five Western Union receipts for wire transfers by Rodriguez totaling

$4,676, and the bond receipt evidencing payment by Bateman in the amount of

$3,100.

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December 17, 2003, showing a cash payment in the amount of $3,100 from Bateman;

and over $5,000 in cash. 

Rodriguez was indicted for conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of

methamphetamine. Before trial, Rodriguez moved to suppress evidence seized during

the execution of the two search warrants. The district court2

 denied Rodriguez’s

motions to suppress. The case proceeded to trial. Over Rodriguez’s objections, the

district court allowed the government to introduce evidence of Rodriguez’s

unexplained wealth3

 and testimony from a law enforcement officer regarding

statements made by Witt during her telephone conversation with Rodriguez. The jury

convicted Rodriguez of the conspiracy charge. 

Rodriguez’s presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended (1) a base

offense level of 36 because the offense involved at least five kilograms but less than

fifteen kilograms of methamphetamine, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2); (2) a two-level

enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); and

(3) a four-level enhancement for Rodriguez’s role in the offense as an organizer or

leader, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Based on an adjusted offense level of 42 and a

criminal history category I, the PSR calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 360

months’ to life imprisonment. Rodriguez objected to the PSR’s drug quantity

determination and to both sentencing enhancements. The district court overruled

Rodriguez’s objections, sentencing Rodriguez to 360 months’ imprisonment and 5

years’ supervised release.

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Rodriguez appeals, challenging (1) the denial of his suppression motions,

(2) the admission of evidence regarding his unexplained wealth, (3) the admission of

Witt’s statements through the testimony of an officer, and (4) the district court’s drug

quantity determination and sentencing enhancements.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Motions to Suppress

Rodriguez contends the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence

seized during searches of the Reeds residence and the Joplin residence because neither

search warrant was supported by probable cause. Ordinarily, when reviewing a

district court’s denial of a suppression motion, we review for clear error the court’s

factual findings and review de novo whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.

United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2007). However, Rodriguez did not

file timely objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation denying

Rodriguez’s motions to suppress. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Rodriguez’s “failure

to file any objections waived his right to de novo review by the district court of any

portion of the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge as well as his right

to appeal from the findings of fact contained therein.” United States v. Newton, 259

F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir.

1994)). Thus, “we review the court’s factual determinations for plain error.” United

States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2002). 

In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, “we may consider the

applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule before reviewing the

existence of probable cause,” because engaging in a probable cause determination is

unnecessary if the officers acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant. United States v.

Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2006). “Where a search is conducted pursuant

to a warrant, the good faith exception . . . applies, and evidence should not be

suppressed due to an absence of probable cause unless the warrant was based on an

affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its

existence entirely unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,

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At the suppression hearing, Detective Kaiser testified he received several

pieces of information before Witt’s arrest on December 16 indicating Witt was

transporting methamphetamine from California for Rodriguez.

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923 (1984)). The officers’ reliance on the warrant must be objectively reasonable.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 919. When assessing the good faith of the officers, we look to the

totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the officers, but not

included in the affidavit. United States v. Chambers, 987 F.2d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir.

1993).

With regard to the Reeds residence search warrant, the affidavit was not based

on an anonymous tip. Rather, a CI advised Detective Kaiser that Witt was going to

California to pick up a large quantity of methamphetamine for Rodriguez and Yone.

Previous information indicated Witt typically stayed in California for one to two days

before returning home. Officers confirmed Witt paid cash for a one-way airline ticket

and flew to California on December 15, 2003. Detective Kaiser also learned Witt

would be flying back from California to Tulsa. Following Witt’s arrest on December

16 at the Tulsa airport, Witt corroborated the CI’s allegations that Witt flew to

California with Yone on December 15, where Yone carried $12,000 cash, purchased

methamphetamine, and gave Witt methamphetamine to transport.4

 Witt also stated

Rodriguez and Yone lived at 5165 County Lane 50 in Reeds, Missouri. According to

Witt, she had been at the Reeds residence on December 15, and observed Rodriguez

sell two ounces of methamphetamine to another individual. Witt further observed

numerous guns, a large quantity of methamphetamine, and thousands of dollars in

cash inside the Reeds residence. Detective Kaiser included all this information in the

application for the search warrant.

In addition to the information set forth in the affidavit, Detective Kaiser

testified at the suppression hearing that at the time he applied for the search warrant,

he was aware of the following: (1) three separate sources reported Rodriguez and

Yone had a trailer house in Reeds and used the residence in connection with their

drug-trafficking activities; (2) officers confirmed the address and location of the

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Reeds residence by following a map prepared by Witt and by conducting their own

independent investigation; (3) Juan Gonzalez, whose real name is Galdino Gallegos

(Gallegos), had been arrested at the Tulsa airport on December 16, 2003, and

implicated Rodriguez as having directed Gallegos to pick up Witt at the airport;

(4) Witt cooperated with law enforcement following her arrest and placed a controlled

telephone call to Rodriguez, resulting in Rodriguez coming to the Tulsa airport; and

(5) Rodriguez and Yone had been the focus of a three-year investigation by the Jasper

County Drug Task Force and other law enforcement agencies, resulting in numerous

reports regarding Rodriguez’s and Yone’s methamphetamine distribution activities.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude it was objectively

reasonable for the officers to rely on the validity of the search warrant for the Reeds

residence, and the Leon exception applies. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23.

With regard to the search warrant for the Joplin residence, Rodriguez asserts no

reasonable law enforcement officer would have relied on the search warrant based

upon the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant. We disagree. The

affidavit recounted the events occurring three days earlier, including Witt’s arrest at

the Tulsa airport, Witt’s observations of drug-trafficking activity at the Reeds

residence, and Rodriguez’s written statement to law enforcement following his arrest.

According to the affidavit, Witt informed officers Rodriguez’s girlfriend, Bateman,

lived near 34th Street in Joplin, Bateman’s brother advised officers that his sister

dated Rodriguez, surveillance conducted on the Joplin residence observed Rodriguez

coming and going from the location, and further investigation revealed Bateman paid

the waste water bill for the residence. Additionally, the affidavit discussed evidence

retrieved from a garbage collection search outside the residence during the early

morning hours of December 19–the same day the warrant was executed–indicating the

presence of methamphetamine, items consistent with methamphetamine distribution,

and discarded mail addressed to Bateman. 

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The officers’ good-faith reliance on the validity of the Joplin residence search

warrant was further bolstered, not diminished, by additional facts known to the

officers, but not included within the affidavit, including (1) Rodriguez’s written

statement to law enforcement following the December 16 Reeds residence search, and

(2) information Bateman and Rodriguez lived at the Joplin residence with their minor

child. As noted previously, the officers were intimately familiar with the affidavit’s

facts as well as other information stemming from the extensive, three-year

investigation of Rodriguez. Given the officers’ knowledge at the time the Joplin

residence’s search warrant was executed, the officers’ reliance on the search warrant’s

validity was objectively reasonable. 

The Leon good faith exception applies. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. We

therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motions to suppress. 

B. Admission of Evidence of Unexplained Wealth

Rodriguez contends the district court erred in admitting evidence of

Rodriguez’s unexplained wealth in the absence of evidence showing a lack of other

legitimate sources of income. Reviewing the district court’s evidentiary ruling for an

abuse of discretion, see United States v. Claybourne, 415 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir.

2005) (standard of review), we find none. Unexplained evidence of wealth

subsequent to the commission of a crime is relevant and generally admissible in the

district court’s discretion, even in the absence of direct proof of a defendant’s prior

impecuniousness. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1972);

see, e.g., United States v. Pensinger, 549 F.2d 1150, 1152 (8th Cir. 1977), cited with

approval in United States v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1991).

Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument evidence of impecuniousness

or poverty is a foundational prerequisite to admitting evidence of unexplained wealth,

the government satisfied this requirement by presenting testimony from one of its

witnesses that it was a “hassle” for Rodriguez to distribute drugs while at work, thus

Rodriguez quit his job in order to distribute drugs from his house or other locations.

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The testimony of Tulsa Police Department Officer Annette Williams, who was

present with Officer Claramunt during Witt’s conversation with Rodriguez,

corroborated Witt’s testimony on this topic.

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C. Admission of Officer Chris Claramunt’s Testimony

Rodriguez argues his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him

was violated by the admission of testimony from Officer Chris Claramunt (Officer

Claramunt), a narcotics detective with the Tulsa Police Department and a task force

officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration, regarding Witt’s telephonic

statements to Rodriguez. While cooperating with law enforcement, Witt placed a

recorded telephone call to Rodriguez in the presence of Officer Claramunt and another

officer. Witt testified at trial that during the call, she told Rodriguez “the dope was

smaller” and asked whether she would “still get paid the same amount.” According

to Witt, Rodriguez responded affirmatively and agreed to pick Witt up at the airport.5

At trial, Officer Claramunt summarized Witt’s statements to Rodriguez by testifying,

“Basically that [Witt] had arrived at the airport and her ride wasn’t there and [she

stated] I need a ride. I’m nervous. I’ve got 2 pounds of meth on me. You

[Rodriguez] need to come get me.” At the end of the government’s direct examination

of Officer Claramunt, counsel for Rodriguez objected, arguing the testimony

constituted inadmissible hearsay. The district court overruled the objection, holding

the testimony was admissible to show Rodriguez’s state of mind and to place into

context Rodriguez’s follow-up statement agreeing to come to the airport.

Because Rodriguez did not raise a Confrontation Clause objection to this

testimony at trial, we review his claim for plain error. See, e.g., United States v.

Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543,

550 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (2005) (setting forth plain error

standard of review). In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), the

Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause bars the “admission of testimonial

statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify,

and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Regardless whether

Witt’s statements to Officer Claramunt were “testimonial,” they do not implicate

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Rodriguez’s right to confrontation. Officer Claramunt’s testimony recounting Witt’s

telephonic statements was admitted to show Rodriguez’s state of mind and to place

Rodriguez’s statement into context, that is, what caused Rodriguez to arrive at the

airport, and the testimony was not offered or admitted to prove the truth of the matter

asserted. The testimony did not violate Rodriguez’s rights under the Confrontation

Clause. See id. at 60 n.9 (“The [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of

testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter

asserted.” (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) (holding “[t]he

nonhearsay aspect of [the testimony] . . . raises no Confrontation Clause concerns.”)));

see, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting

the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford makes clear “the [Confrontation] Clause

has no role unless the challenged out-of-court statement is offered for the truth of the

matter asserted in the statement”). 

Furthermore, Witt testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination by

Rodriguez, thereby satisfying Rodriguez’s right to confront witnesses against him.

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (“[W]hen the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use

of [the declarant’s] prior testimonial statements”). Although Witt’s testimony differed

slightly from Officer Claramunt’s, Rodriguez was entitled to argue those

inconsistencies to the jury, and such inconsistencies go to the weight of the evidence,

not its admissibility. Consequently, Rodriguez’s Confrontation Clause challenge

lacks merit.

D. Sentencing Issues

Finally, Rodriguez challenges the district court’s drug quantity determination

and sentencing enhancements. We review de novo the district court’s application of

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Rodriguez argues the district court erred in rendering its sentencing

determinations by using a preponderance of the evidence standard, asserting the

Supreme Court ultimately will determine a defendant’s culpability must be established

by clear and convincing evidence instead of by the preponderance standard. Under

the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

judicial fact-finding based on a preponderance of the evidence standard is permitted,

so long as the Guidelines are applied in an advisory manner. See United States v.

Thorpe, 447 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 2006). Because the district court so applied the

advisory Guidelines, we reject Rodriguez’s invitation to remand this case for

resentencing under a stricter burden of proof.

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the Sentencing Guidelines and review for clear error its factual findings.6

 United

States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005).

1. Drug Quantity Determination

“In order to attribute a quantity of drugs to a defendant, the sentencing court is

required to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the activity involving those

drugs was in furtherance of the conspiracy and either known to that defendant or

reasonably foreseeable to him.” United States v. Morin, 437 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir.

2006) (quoting United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 822 (8th Cir. 2004)). In a

drug conspiracy case, “the district court may consider amounts from drug transactions

in which the defendant was not directly involved if those dealings were part of the

same course of conduct or scheme.” Id. 

In this case, sufficient evidence supports the district court’s determination that

Rodriguez was involved in a conspiracy and Rodriguez knew, or it was reasonably

foreseeable to him, the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms, but less than

fifteen kilograms of methamphetamine. Witt testified she and another individual

routinely transported methamphetamine from California; Atlanta, Georgia; and Texas.

Flight records indicated Witt, Yone, and another individual made more than ten trips

to these locations in 2002 and 2003. Witt also testified she brought back

approximately one kilogram on each trip. Such testimony is borne out by Witt’s arrest

on December 16, 2003, while in possession of approximately one kilogram of

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methamphetamine after returning from California. The record also contains testimony

from several co-conspirators corroborating the amount of methamphetamine involved

in the conspiracy. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug

quantity attributable to Rodriguez and setting Rodriguez’s base offense level at 36. 

2. Aggravated Role Enhancement

Section 3B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a four-level

enhancement “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or a leader of a criminal activity.”

In determining whether to impose the enhancement, a sentencing court should

consider the defendant’s 

exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the

commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed

right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of

participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope

of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised

over others. 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. 

Considering these factors, we find sufficient evidence to support Rodriguez’s

role enhancement. At trial, Witt testified Rodriguez provided $20,000 to $60,000 cash

for the drug-buying trips, each time giving Witt money for her airline ticket and for

the actual drug purchase. Rodriguez also coordinated Witt’s transportation to and

from the airport, paid Witt for delivering drugs to him after each trip, and once paid

Witt’s $494 cab fare when no one picked Witt up from the airport. Rodriguez also

instructed Witt about what to do when Yone was detained at a California airport.

Additionally, cooperating witness Sharon Robbins (Robbins) described

Rodriguez as “the top dog,” and testified that in September 2003, Rodriguez arrived

with a gun to enforce a drug deal gone awry and to discern the location of his money

and drugs. Gallegos, another cooperating witness, testified Rodriguez received the

cash for drug sales, even when others conducted transactions for him. Gallegos

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described Yone’s and Rodriguez’s joint leadership positions, testifying Yone “was in

charge of getting the dope,” and Rodriguez “was in charge of selling it.” Cooperating

witness David Reyes corroborated this testimony by describing Rodriguez’s role as

picking up drug deliveries from the airport, weighing the drugs and distributing them

to others, and making sure Rodriguez received the money. Such testimony

demonstrates Rodriguez exercised considerable decision-making authority and

participated extensively in planning and organizing the drug conspiracy’s activity and

the actions of its members.

Rodriguez argues the conspiracy’s true leader was Yone, and that Rodriguez,

like everyone else, took orders from Yone. Rodriguez’s characterization of his and

Yone’s respective roles is unconvincing. Furthermore, for purposes of § 3B1.1(a), the

defendant need not be the sole organizer or leader of a criminal organization; rather,

there can be more than one organizer or leader. United States v. Zimmer, 299 F.3d

710, 719 (8th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., United States v. Placensia, 352 F.3d 1157, 1166

(8th Cir. 2003). Based on the record before us, even if Yone also was an organizer or

leader, the district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level enhancement for

Rodriguez’s role in the drug conspiracy. 

3. Weapon Enhancement

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a two-level

enhancement if the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon, including a firearm, in

connection with a drug offense “unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was

connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.3; see, e.g., Morin, 437 F.3d

at 781. At trial, the government presented evidence Rodriguez (1) arrived armed at

another individual’s residence to enforce a drug deal, (2) possessed firearms at various

drug distribution locations, (3) asked others to bring guns to trade for drugs, and (4)

told others he wanted guns to protect his drug operation. Officers also seized three

firearms and several rounds of ammunition from the Reeds residence during the

December 16, 2003, search. Given this evidence, the district court did not clearly err

in imposing the two-level weapon enhancement.

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III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm Rodriguez’s conviction and sentence.

______________________________

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